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Volume LXXIII 

No. 1880 

July 7, 1975 

Address by Secretary Kissinger 1 


Statement by Assistant Secretary Rogers 30 


For index see inside hack cover 


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VOL. LXXIII, No. 1880 
July 7, 1975 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
tlie field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and tlie functions 
of the Department. Information is 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a , 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of tlie Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 

The United States and Japan in a Changing World 

Adch-ess by Secreta)]/ Kissinger 

America's ties with Japan are strong, 
close, and full of promise. Tonight I want 
to describe the importance of this relation- 
ship — for America, for Asia, and for the 
world. This occasion comes as a welcome op- 
portunity. The tragic end of our involvement 
in Indochina has stimulated questions, among 
Asians as well as Americans, about the fu- 
ture of U.S. foreign policy. But paradoxi- 
cally, these events have also driven home the 
recognition, among Asians as well as Amer- 
icans, of how essential a strong and purpose- 
ful United States is to global peace and 

As we and Japan seek to shape the future 
together, we face a world profoundly differ- 
ent from that in which our relation.ship was 

The bipolar world of the 1950's and 1960's 
has disappeared. The reemergence of Europe 
and Japan, the rivalry among the Commu- 
nist powers, the growth of military technol- 
ogies, the rise and increasing diversity of 
the so-called Third World, have created a 
new intei'national environment — a world of 
multiple centers of power, of ideological dif- 
ferences both old and new, clouded by nu- 
clear peril and marked by the new impera- 
tives of interdependence. 

American policy has sought to shape out of 
this a new international structure based on 
equilibrium rather than domination, negotia- 
tion rather than confrontation, and a con- 
sciousness of global interdependence as the 
basis of the ultimate fulfillment of national 

' Made before the Japan Society at New York 
on June 18 (text from press release 338). 

As the members of this society have long 
recognized, the I'elationship between the 
United States and Japan is crucial to this 
design. It is central to the continued sta- 
bility, progress, and prosperity of the inter- 
national community, and it is fundamental 
to American policy in Asia. 

— Our Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Security reflects an enduring sense of com- 
mon interest in the peace of Asia. Through 
many changes in conditions and alignments, 
our ties have proven their continuing and 
indispensable validity for our two countries 
and for global stability. 

— As maritime trading nations with com- 
plementary economies, the United States and 
Japan account for 52 percent of the produc- 
tion and 26 percent of the trade of the en- 
tire non-Communist industrialized world. We 
possess the world's most dynamic economies. 
As economic superpowers, our respective 
policies profoundly affect each other and the 
world at large. 

— Our nations share an enduring commit- 
ment to the political values of free societies 
and an abiding concern for the well-being 
of our fellow men. 

Japan's evolution over the last 30 years 
into a major factor on the world scene in- 
evitably has brought changes in the style of 
our relations even as the community of our 
mutual interests has grown. Adjustments 
in U.S. economic policies and a new policy 
toward China in 1971 led to painful but 
transitory misunderstandings to which — let 
us be frank — our own tactics contributed. 
We have learned from experience; these 
strains are behind us; our policies are mov- 

July 7, 1975 


ing in harmony in these areas; our consulta- 
tions on all major issues are now close, fre- 
quent, and frank. 

U.S. -Japanese bilateral relations, I am 
pleased to say, have never been better in 30 

It is a fitting symbol, therefore, that in his 
first trip abroad as chief of state. President 
Ford visited Japan last November. We look 
forward to the visit of His Imperial Majesty 
the Emperor, whose presence will lend 
further dignity and strength to the ties be- 
tween us. And before the Emperor's arrival, 
Prime Minister Miki will come to Washing- 
ton for consultations on the foreign policy 
and economic issues facing our two coun- 

I cannot refer to this series of consulta- 
tions without paying tribute to Eisaku Sato, 
a great leader of Japan, a great champion 
of Japanese-American friendship, and one of 
the world's great statesmen. I sought his 
counsel on each of my five visits to Japan, 
even after he had left office. I was privileged 
to know him as a colleague and a personal 
friend. I shall miss him greatly. 

The Foundations of Our Partnership 

Japan and the United States have known 
each other for a century and a quarter. Our 
relationship has passed through an incred- 
ible range: from curiosity to competition, 
conflict, occupation, reconciliation, to alli- 
ance and mutual dependence. This long, com- 
plicated, and varied experience has taught 
us that our close association is more essen- 
tial than ever and that the dramatic differ- 
ences in national styles and situations are a 
strength to be husbanded rather than a 
weakness to be overcome. 

We Americans are a disparate people — 
heterogeneous in our origins, constantly 
striving to redefine what we have in com- 
mon. Japan, on the other hand, is a country 
of unusual cohesiveness and homogeneity. 
For Americans, contracts and laws are 
prime guarantors of social peace. The 
Japanese depend less on legal and formal 
rules to preserve social harmony than on the 
quality of human relationships and on un- 

stated patterns of consensus and obligation. 

Our language is designed for categoriza- 
tion. It invites logical distinctions and value 
judgments. The Japanese have lived to- 
gether for so long and shared so many 
experiences that they frequently communi- 
cate through intuition and indii'ection, occa- 
sionally without need of words. The 
Japanese prize form and mood as well as 
content. We honor content above all and 
frequently exhibit impatience with emphasis 
on style. 

The United States is blessed with vast 
land and ample resources ; abundance is 
taken for granted. Japan is a great indus- 
trial power, but its prosperity is more 
recent and — because of the dependence of 
its industry on imported food, energy, raw 
materials, and external markets — more 

In foreign policy, the United States has 
assumed global security responsibilities. 
Japan has devoted its energies to the growth 
of its economy and commerce, while — alone 
among the world's great powers — forswear- 
ing large military forces or assertive 

Communication between cultures is always 
difficult. But the United States and Japan 
have achieved an increasing sensitivity, 
sometimes fascination, with our national 
diff'erences. Our two nations supremely dem- 
onstrate the possibility of close and enduring 
association between two difi'erent cultures 
and two distant continents. It is an extraor- 
dinary achievement, and we too often take 
it for granted. 

We formed a political alliance and security 
relationship in a period of Japanese depend- 
ence. War had shattered her economy and 
political system. Japan accepted American 
leadership in that difficult period and only 
gradually began to reassert an autonomous 
diplomacy and active political involvement 
in the world around her. 

Japan's emergence as a major economic 
power and international force has substan- 
tially transformed our relations in recent 

The reversion of Okinawa eliminated the 
last major vestige of the war from our 

Department of State Bulletin 

bilateral agenda. We have made significant 
progress in removing the trade imbalance 
which was so often an irritant in our rela- 
tions. In response to Japanese concerns, the 
United States has reaffirmed its specific 
commitments as supplier and purchaser of 
important goods and materials. 

Our relationship, which was forged by the 
necessities of security, has flourished as well 
on the other contemporary challenges: im- 
proving relations with the Communist coun- 
tries, advancing the prosperity of the in- 
dustrial democracies, and building a new era 
of cooperation among all nations. 

Our most immediate shared interest, 
naturally, is in Asia. 

The United States and Asia 

The security interests of all the great 
world powers intersect in Asia, particularly 
in Northeast Asia. China comprises the 
heartland of the continent. The Soviet Far 
East spreads across the top of Asia. The 
Japanese islands span 2,000 miles of ocean 
off" the mainland. America's Pacific presence 
encompasses the entire region. Western 
Europe has important economic links with 
Asia and feels indirectly the effects of 
any disturbance of the equilibrium in the 

Asia's share of the world's population and 
resources is immense. In the last two dec- 
ades, the Asian-Pacific economy has experi- 
enced more rapid growth than any other 
region. It is here that the United States 
has its largest and fastest growing overseas 
commerce. We have as vital an interest in 
access to Asia's raw materials as Asia has 
to our markets and technology. 

The ties between Asia and America have a 
deeper philosophical and human dimension. 
The influence of America and the West 
stimulated the transformation of much of 
Asia during the past 100 years. From the 
days of the New England transcendentalists 
to the modern period, Asian culture and ideas 
have significantly touched American intellec- 
tual life, thereby reflecting the universality 
of human aspirations. 

The role of Asia, then, is potentially deci- 

sive for the solution of the contemporary 
agenda of peace and progress and the 
quality of life. 

This is why, in spite of recent events, the 
United States will not turn away from Asia 
or focus our attention on Europe to the 
detriment of Asia. Our relationships with 
Europe and Japan are equally vital; each 
is essential to global peace and security. In 
the modern world the problems and oppor- 
tunities of each area overlap and are in- 
separable from those of the other. Our 
fidelity to cur commitments will be as 
strong in one part of the globe as in the 

Nor can we confine our Asian policy to 
Japan without destroying the underpinnings 
of the U.S. -Japanese relationship. The inter- 
ests that bind Japan to Asia are no less vital 
than those binding it to America and the 
other nations of the West. The value of our 
political and security relationship depends 
on its contribution to a broad balance of 
security in Asia. This is decisive for Japan 
as well as for us. 

The basic principles of America's foreign 
policy find their reflection and necessity in 

— First, peace depends on a stable global 

While an effective foreign policy must 
reach beyond the problem of security, with- 
out security there can be no eff'ective foreign 
policy. A world where some nations survive 
only at the mercy of others is a world of 
dependence, insecurity, and despotism. This 
is why the United States will continue to 
oppose the eff"orts of any country or group of 
countries to impose their will on Asia by a 
preponderance of power or blackmail. 

We have learned important lessons from 
the tragedy of Indochina — most importantly 
that outside effort can only supplement, but 
not create, local efforts and local will to re- 
sist. But in applying these lessons we must 
take care not to undermine stability in Asia 
and, ultimately, world peace. 

We will permit no question to arise about 
the firmness of our treaty commitments. 
Allies who seek our support will find us con- 
stant. At the same time, if any partner 

July 7, 1975 

seeks to modify these ccmmitments, we will 
be prepared to accommodate that desire. 

In fulfilling our commitments we will look 
to our allies to assume the primary respon- 
sibility for maintaining their own defense, 
especially in manpower. And there is no 
question that popular will and social justice 
are, in the last analysis, the essential under- 
pinning of resistance to subversion and ex- 
ternal challenge. But our support and 
assistance will be available where it has been 

Specifically, we are resolved to maintain 
the peace and security of the Korean Penin- 
sula, for this is of crucial importance to Ja- 
pan and to all of A.sia. We will assist South 
Korea to strengthen her economy and de- 
fense. But we shall also seek all honorable 
ways to reduce tensions and confrontation. 

We place the highest value on our rela- 
tionship with our ANZUS partners, Aus- 
tralia and New Zealand, and on our historic 
relationship with the Philippines. We will 
maintain our treaty obligations throughout 
Asia and the Pacific. And we welcome the 
growing influence of the Association of South- 
east Asian Nations — Malaysia, Indonesia. 
Singapore, Philippines, and Thailand — as a 
force for self-reliance, .stability, and progress 
in the region. 

— A second basic principle of our foreign 
policy is that peace depends ultimately on 
reconciliation among nations. 

All of us, friends, neutrals, or adversaries, 
exist on a small planet threatened with ex- 
tinction. The ultimate aim of our alliances 
has always been to ease, not intensify, di- 
visions and tensions. We will continue 
our effort to normalize relations with the 
People's Republic of China in the spirit of 
the Shanghai communique. 

Similarly, we will continue our effort to 
regularize and improve our relations with 
the Soviet Union and to make further prog- 
ress in the control of arms, especially stra- 
tegic arms. 

We have no illusions. We recognize that 
our values and social systems are not com- 
patible with those of the Communist powers 
and may never be. But in the thermonuclear 
age, when the existence of mankind is at 

stake, there is no decent alternative to the 
easing of tensions. Should these efforts fail, 
at least our peoples will know that we had 
no choice but to resist pressure or black- 
mail. There can be no conciliation without 
strength and security, but we would be reck- 
less if we forget that strength without a 
spirit of conciliation can invite holocaust. 

New regimes have come to power in Asia 
in the last few months. They have flouted 
international agreements and flagrantly vio- 
lated accepted international standards, and 
that we cannot ignore. But we are prepared 
to look to the future. Our attitude toward 
them will be influenced by their conduct 
toward their neighbors and their attitude 
toward us. 

— Finally, peace depends upon a structure 
of economic cooperation which reflects the 
aspirations of all peoples. 

The problems of the world economy — in- 
suring adequate supplies of food, energy, 
and raw materials to consumers and mar- 
kets and stable income to producers — require 
global economic arrangements that accom- 
modate the interests of developed and devel- 
oping, consumers and producers. We have 
consistently taken the view that a necessary 
first step is close cooperation among the in- 
dustrialized countries. On the basis of unity 
and mutual support, we welcome a dialogue 
with the developing countries in a spirit of 
sympathy, realism, and cooperation. 

These are the principles which guide 
America's actions in the world and in Asia. 

Japan's role and the U.S. -Japanese rela- 
tionship can be decisive. 

The United States and Japan 

Tlie Challenge of Peace and Security 

Japan's contribution to a peaceful world 
is unique. Despite its industrial prowess 
Japan elected to forgo the military attributes 
of great-power status, limiting itself to mod- 
est conventional self-defense forces and re- 
lying for its security on the support of the 
United States and the good will of others. 

In this framework, Japan has thrived. Its 
security has been assured ; its democratic 
institutions have flourished. Its economy has 

Department of State Bulletin 

achieved unparalleled growth, partly because 
through much of this period Japan enjoyed 
assured access to imported raw materials 
and food at reasonable prices. Japan has 
been able to develop constructive economic 
and political relations with its neighbors, 
thei'eby contributing to regional stability and 

The events of recent years have ti'ans- 
formed this relatively simple universe. The 
interaction among the major powers has be- 
come much more complex than in the fifties 
or early sixties. The oil crisis of 1973 con- 
fronted Japan with its economic vulnerabil- 
ity. Today suppliers of raw materials are 
presenting a variety of new demands that 
are not easily accommodated in the context of 
existing world trade and monetary struc- 

These changing circumstances have re- 
quired both Japan and the United States to 
rethink old premises and new, crea- 
tive approaches. By their nature, these prob- 
lems require collaborative, not separate 
responses. Japan and the United States must 
relate national security to international rec- 
onciliation and national growth to interna- 
tional cooperation. 

The ChallcDfir of Reconciliation 

Both our countries seek to move the world 
beyond equilibrium toward I'econciliation. 
The United States has attempted to nor- 
malize and improve its relations with the 
Soviet Union and the People's Republic of 
China. Japan has made the same effort. For 
some time the Japanese Government has pur- 
sued what it has described as "peace diplo- 
macy," a diplomacy designed to ease Asian 

Japan normalized its relations with the 
Soviet Union in 1956; recently it has been 
intensifying its economic relations with that 
country. Japan has been a trading partner 
of the People's Republic of China for dec- 
ades. In 1972 Japan granted full recognition 
to Peking and since then has been broaden- 
ing her bilateral relations. We have wel- 
comed these developments. 

As each of us engages in this more com- 
plex interplay among the major powers, we 

have faced a common problem; How to pre- 
serve a sense of priority among our inter- 
national relationships? This government has 
stated on many occasions — and I will state 
again — that we make a clear distinction be- 
tween cur allies and our advei-saries. "Equi- 
distant diplomacy" is a myth. For us, Japan 
is not an occasional interlocutor, but a per- 
manent friend — a partner in building a 
woi'ld of progress. 

Of course, we do not expect to pursue 
identical policies — toward China, toward the 
Soviet Union, or toward all Asian issues. 
But we .should seek to maintain compatible 
approaches. In our bilateral relations we 
should recognize a higher standard of mutual 
concern than normally obtains between 
.states — accepting a greatei- obligation to con- 
sult, to Inform, and to harmonize domestic 
and external policies that impinge on the 
interests of the other. 

We believe that both our countries share 
this approach. To implement it, we have 
jointly developed channels for more inten- 
sive consultation and used them with grow- 
ing frequency and frankness. The United 
States intends to propose a semiannual re- 
view of policies at the foreign ministers level, 
alternately in Washington and Tokyo, to 
assess the pre.sent and to chart the future. 

The ChaUoige of Economic Cooperation 

The prosperity which Japan and America 
have achieved in the of the past three 
decades is one of the great successes of the 
postwar world. The economic power we pos- 
sess as a result imposes on us special re- 
sponsibility for the health of the global 
economy and for its ability to satisfy the 
thrust of human aspirations. Today that 
responsibility is under severe challenge. A 
major recession, an energy crisis, global food 
shortages, unprecedented inflation, and a 
trend toward politicizing economic issues 
have subjected the world economy to serious 

We have three major objectives: 

— We must spur the stable growth of our 

— We must sti-engthen cooperation among 
the industrialized countries. 

July 7, 1975 

— We must respond to the aspirations of 
the developing world. 

All our objectives — domestic well-being, 
security, unity, relations with the Commu- 
nist world and the developing rations — re- 
quire economic strength and growth. Few 
can be realized by stagnating economies. The 
stability of our institutions and the self- 
assurance of our societies will benefit from 
the earliest possible recoverj^ of sustained 
and noninflationary economic growth. 

In the global economy, no nation can hope 
to achieve su.stained growth by its own 
efforts alone. In a world of interdepend- 
ence, the experience of 30 years has shown 
that the indu-strialized nations prosper or 
suffer together. Coordination of effort is 
essential for any economic objective — 
whether it be growth, energy, food, or raw 
materials — and also to maintain the condi- 
tions of well-being that underpin our politi- 
cal and security cohesion. 

It is encouraging that over the last year 
the United States and its major partners are 
beginning to harmonize their national pol- 
icies to combat recession and promote ex- 
pansion. This was a central topic of the Presi- 
dent's discussions in Tokyo last November. 
The.-^e consultations should be continued sys- 
tematically and deal particularly with a com- 
mon analysis of the requirements of global 
economic growth. 

We have no reason to apologize for the 
economic system we have built since the war. 
It has spread progress far beyond the in- 
dustrialized world ; in fact, it has contributed 
to the political evolution and diffusion of 
economic power that have now brought that 
system under challenge. Nevertheless it is 
important to recognize that no set of eco- 
nomic relationships can flourish unless its 
benefits are widely shared; it must be per- 
ceived as just. 

It is in the self-interest of the advanced 
industrialized countries that global economic 
arrangements embrace the aspirations of the 
majority of mankind. Reality makes us a 
global community; if world order breaks 
down over economic conflicts, we face the 
specter of chronic global civil war. 

The Japanese Government, acutely sensi- 

tive to this problem, has made an imagi- 
native proposal to the OECD [Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development] 
• — that the industrialized democracies under- 
take a joint long-range examination of how 
the progress of the advanced societies can 
be pursued to foster the progress of the 
developing countries. We welcome this initia- 
tive and have supported it; it is a subject 
of profound importance. We will work close- 
ly with the Japanese Government as the 
study proceeds. 

Let me now turn briefly to a number of 
crucial economic issues, first in terms of 
Japanese-U.S. relations and then in terms of 
their impact on the global order. 

Our two nations have a special concern 
and responsibility in tiade. We have suc- 
ceeded in resolving most of the bilateral 
problems in our trading relationship ; we 
must now turn our attention to what we 
can jointly do to improve the global trading 
system which has nourished the world's pros- 
perity for a generation. 

The current round of the multilateral 
trade negotiations is called, appropriately, 
the Tokyo Round ; for Japan's extraordinary 
dependence on commerce gives it a unique 
stake in the outcome. Our purpose in those 
talks must be to reach agreement on a reduc- 
tion of tariffs, the removal of nontariflf 
barriers, assuring more reliable access to 
supplies as well as markets, the renunciation 
of the use of restrictive trade measures 
to cover deficits brought about by recent 
economic difficulties. We must pay special 
attention, as well, to the needs of the de- 
veloping countries for improved trade oppor- 
tunities. With respect to all of these issues, 
we will proceed on the basis of close consul- 
tation with Japan. 

Eiierc/ij is a key element in the structure 
of global interdependence. Each industrial- 
ized country has a choice : to permit increas- 
ing vulnerability to arbitrary price rises and 
political pressures or to impose conservation 
and spur the development of alternative sup- 
plies. But individual efforts are almost cer- 
tain to be inefl'ective. To reduce dependence, 
the major consumers must pool their efforts. 

This is why Japan and the United States 

Department of State Bulletin 

have joined other industrialized countries in 
common programs to transform the energy 
market through the International Energy 
Agency (lEA). Together we are working to 
protect against new embargoes, to maintain 
financial solidarity, to conserve energy, and 
to develop new sources. Japan's dependence 
on energy imports means that it cannot end 
its energy vulnerability by conservation 
alone. It has a major stake, therefore, in 
research and development of new sources. 

For the next 10 years nuclear energy will 
be increasingly important. The United States 
has pioneered the development of uranium 
enrichment processes for nuclear energy; 
Japan has been our largest market. As 
Japan's use of and dependence on nuclear 
energy expands, so too does our obligation 
to be a reliable supplier of fuel. The United 
States therefore pledges to continue to pro- 
vide nuclear fuel, appropriately safeguarded, 
under long-term contracts. We will shortly 
add enrichment capacity to insure adequate 
supplies to meet domestic and foreign needs. 

Over the long term, more exotic energy 
sources must be emphasized. Our two coun- 
tries are in a unique position to focus capital, 
skill, and the most advanced technology in 
their development. We are ready to begin a 
large-scale energy research and development 
effort with Japan. Japanese capital is wel- 
come to participate and will receive in turn 
a proportional share of our expanded pro- 
duction of conventional and synthetic fuels. 

But energy, of course, is not simply a 
technical issue. It goes to the heart of our 
political relationship with the developing 
world. Japan has been insistent that we 
must proceed by cooperation rather than 
confrontation, a view which we share. We 
and Japan together with the other members 
of the lEA are prepared to resume the dia- 
logue with the energy producers and search 
for cooperative solutions of mutual benefit. 

Japan and the United States both recog- 
nize the desire of raw material producers for 
a dialogue that goes beyond the issue of 
energy. Together with our other partners 
in the lEA, we have expressed our readiness 
to discuss these concerns. We and Japan and 
other importing nations have an interest in 

reliable supplies. The producers need long- 
term stability of incomes for their develop- 
ment programs. It is in the joint interesst 
of producers and consumers to discuss how 
drastic price fluctuations can be alleviated 
in order to encourage timely investment in 
the development of new supplies and to give 
reality to the development plans of pro- 
ducers. Both Japan and the United States 
have a political stake in promoting a healthy 
commodities trade which serves the interests 
of both producers and consumers. 

No issue on the economic agenda is more 
vital than food. It is a dramatic example of 
the links between bilateral and global issues 
and between relations with our allies and 
relations with the developing world. 

Japan is our largest market for agricul- 
tural exports, and we are Japan's principal 
external provider of food. The world's de- 
pendence on the United States for foodstuffs 
imposes upon us an obligation to be a re- 
liable supplier. The United States therefore 
pledges that in times of tight markets it will 
take account of the needs of our longtime 
customers, such as Japan. We will seek to 
prevent a repetition of the unfortunate ex- 
perience of 1973 when we were forced sud- 
denly to restrict the export of soybeans to 
Japan and other countries. 

In a broader context, the United States 
and Japan bear a special responsibility be- 
cause they are among the world's largest 
producers and consumers of agricultural 
goods. We both are in a position to apply 
technical innovation and skill to the expan- 
sion of food production in developing coun- 
tries. And as a hedge against the feast-and- 
famine cycle of global harvests, we should 
both help in creating an international system 
of nationally held grain reserves by the end 
of this year. 

These areas do not by any means exhaust 
our joint agenda. We attach great impor- 
tance to our scientific and technical ex- 
changes. This fall we expect to conclude a 
comprehensive joint review of all our ex- 
changes. We will then be able to plan our 
efforts more efliciently and identify new 
areas for cooperation. 

As two of the most advanced industrial 

July 7, 1975 

nations, we have a special awareness of what 
progress has done to the enviivriment. The 
bilateral accord we are about to conclude 
for environmental protection is therefore of 
great potential importance not only for us 
but for others in the process of industrial- 

The talents and joint efforts of our two 
gifted peoples will surely be a unique con- 
tribution to the wider world community. To 
strengthen this bond, the United States in- 
tends to augment our cultiiral relatiotis with 
Japan — an endeavor in which the work of 
this society, and through it, the U.S. -Japan 
Cultural Conference, has been crucial. The 
Administration will seek to integrate and 
obtain approval this year of proposals now 
before the Congress to establish a Japan-U.S. 
friendship fund which would make substan- 
tial new funds available for cross-cultural 
programs between our two countries. 

The great Japanese writer Saikaku, who 
lived in another era when the old order was 
breaking down and the shape of things to 
come was not yet clear, said that to ex- 
perience "this modern age, this mixture of 
good and ill, and yet to steer through life on 
an honest course to the splendors of success 
— this is a feat reserved for paragons." 

Our times demand as much of us. We 
may not be paragons, but our assets are 
great. No two nations are so different yet 
so close ; none have a more direct and wide 
experience of the best and the worst which 
the modern age offers; and none have con- 
structed a more intensive and effective rela- 
tionship of consultation and cooperation. Our 
mutual interest has brought us together, but 
our mutual understanding has enabled our 

friendship to thrive to a degree which would 
have been unimaginable two decades ago. 

Americans and Japanese can take pride in 
what we have achieved and use it as a point 
of departure for greater efforts still. We 
are seeking the crucial balance between di- 
versity and common purpose that is the best 
hope for building a creative, just, and pro- 
ductive international community. With the 
good will and good sense, the high hopes 
and hard work which have so far marked our 
journey, we will continue to strengthen our 
relations — for ourselves and for mankind. 

United States Mourns Death 
of Eisaku Sato 

Eisaku Sato, Prime Minister of Japan 
from 196^ to 1972, died at Tokyo on June 2. 
Folloiving is a statement by President Ford 
issued on June 3 at Rome. 

White House press release (Rome. Italy) dated June 3 

I was deeply saddened to learn of the death 
of Eisaku Sato. The passing of this great 
statesman, Nobel laureate, who did so much 
for his nation and for the cause of peace, is 
a loss to the world. His service as Prime 
Minister of Japan won the respect of all na- 
tions; his counsel was sought and valued. 
He was a close friend of the American people 
and devoted his life to strengthening the ties 
of understanding and friendship between the 
United States and Japan. I speak on behalf 
of all Americans in expressing our deepest 
sympathy to Mrs. Sato and the Japanese 

Department of State Bulletin 

Prime Minister Rabin of Israel Visits Washington 

Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of the 
State of Israel made an official visit to Wash- 
ington June 10-lS. Following are remarks 
made hy Prime Minister Rabin a)id Secre- 
tary Kissinger upon the Prime Mivister's 
arrival at Andrews Air Force Base on June 
10, an exchange of toasts between President 
Ford and Prime Minister Rabiii at a dinner 
at the White House on June 11, and the 
transcript of a news conference held by 
Secretary Kissinger at the White House on 
June 12. 


Pi-ess release 326 dated June 10 

Secretary Kissinger 

Mr. Prime Minister, Mrs. Rabin: On be- 
half of President Ford and his Administra- 
tion I would like to welcome you to the 
United States. You are among friends here. 
We have many problems to discuss, including 
the problem of progress toward peace in the 
Middle East and our bilateral relations. For 
two countries whose destiny has been closely 
intertwined for decades, these talks will be 
important, and they will be conducted in the 
spirit of friendship and cordiality and con- 
fidence that has marked our relationship. 

As I have said before, you are among 
friends. Welcome. 

Prime Minister Rabin 

Mr. Secretary, ladies and gentlemen: I 
am very pleased to come back to visit the 
United States. I am very glad that President 
Ford has invited me to take a part in the 
talks that I am looking forward to. 

I believe that Israel is interested in par- 

ticipating in every effort to move toward 
peace and will do whatever is possible to 
participate with the United States and the 
countries of the area in the movement 
toward peace. 

I come here, as the Secretary said, know- 
ing the deep ties and the special relations 
between our two countries. And I am really 
looking forward to the talks that will take 
place with the President and the Secretary. 
Thank you very much. 


Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 16 

President Ford 

Mr. Prime Minister : I am very delighted 
to have you here and to welcome you back 
to Washington. 

You have been here a number of times, 
plus your long service as a member of the 
diplomatic corps, and we are delighted to 
have you here on this occasion. I think it 
also gives to all of us an opportunity to thank 
you for your very generous hospitality on 
behalf of many Members of the Congress 
and others, as well as many Americans, who 
have visited Israel. I thank you on their 

I think your visit comes at a very impor- 
tant moment in the history of both of our 
countries. As Americans, we face our nation's 
200th anniversary and, in the process, of 
course, we are reviewing the past in search 
of some of the fundamental human values 
which characterize, as I see it, the very best 
in America. 

The most basic of this, of course, is the 
desire for freedom and the desire for inde- 
pendence and the right of each individual to 
live in peace. Fortunately, Israel shares this 

July 7, 1975 

view with us. It is this sharing which is the 
basis of our fundamental relationship — of 
the United States strong and continuing sup- 
port of the State of Israel and Israel's under- 
standing of the essential interests of the 
United States. 

Mr. Prime Minister, when we met in 
Washington nine months ago, at the very 
outset of my Administration, we jointly re- 
affirmed the need to continue our intensive 
efforts for peace. We then recognized the 
importance of maintaining the momentum of 
negotiations toward this end. 

Having admired you as an Ambassador, 
we found it easy, I think, to establish a good 
working relationship. We agreed that it was 
in our mutual interest that these efforts 
succeed and it would be a tragedy if they 
failed. I think we recognize that stagnation 
would be most unfortunate in our work for 

We met today to insure that this does not 
occur, to seek progress toward a truly just 
and durable peace, a settlement that is in the 
best interest of all of us, in the Middle East. 
I consider the meeting this morning very 
constructive and our conversations here to- 
night equally so. I think with perseverance 
we can be successful. 

Gentlemen, let me ask that you join me 
in a toast to the success in these efforts to 
obtain a just and durable peace in the Middle 
East, to the close relationship between our 
two countries, and to an individual of dedi- 
cation and courage in the service of his coun- 
try, the Prime Minister of Israel : Mr. Prime 

Prime Minister Rabin 

Mr. President, Members of the Congress, 
members of the Administration: Mr. Presi- 
dent. I would like to thank you very much 
for inviting me to Washington in the efforts 
to do whatever is possible to move toward 
peace in the Middle East. I believe that your 
interest, your determination to do whatever 
is possible and to explore all the possibilities 
that will lead these complex conflicts in the 
area toward peace are a sign of the great 

leadership of you and a few great countries 
in the free world. 

I would like to assure you in the name of 
my country and my people, that if there is 
something that we are really eager to achieve, 
it is a real peace in the area. We have tried 
for 27 years to do whatever is possible, cr 
was possible, to achieve peace. Unfortunately, 
peace has not been achieved. 

But we believe that peace must be reached 
in the area. It is in the interests of all the 
people who live there and will serve to their 
interests. And therefore whatever is done to 
move toward peace is more than appreciated 
by us, by the people of Israel. 

I am sure that in the course of the talks 
that we have had and we will have, we will 
try to find what are the best ways in which 
we can cooperate with you, Mr. President, 
with the U.S. Government, to move toward 

But allow me to say that peace, a real one, 
can achieve only by understanding — can be 
achieved by compromise, but must be 
achieved when the two sides that are in- 
volved in the conflict would decide to put an 
end to it and to establish the structure of 

The United States has served — and I am 
very pleased and grateful to you that you 
are determined to continue to play — a major 
role in the achievement of peace. Israel has 
learned to admire, to appreciate the United 
States and American people. In the last 27 
years, we have gained the support, the 
understanding of the American people, and 
we are more than thankful for what has been 
done by the United States in supporting 
Israel and helping the cause of peace. 

I would like to thank you, Mr. President, 
very much, for your understanding of the 
problems of Israel and the need — the 
urgency — to move toward peace. And I hope 
that through your efforts we would achieve 
what has not been achieved by now, a real 
move toward a real peace. 

Therefore allow me to raise my glass to 
you : To the President of the United States 
and to the friendship between our two 


Department of State Bulletin 


Press release 332 dated June 12 

Secretary Kissinger: I really don't have a 
very long statement to make. As we pointed 
out after the meeting between President 
Sadat [of Egypt] and the President, the 
purpose of these meetings is not to reach 
any definitive conclusions or to engage in 
any detailed negotiations but, rather, to 
enable the President to establish a personal 
contact with the principal leaders in the area, 
to review the alternatives, and to clarify the 

The meeting between the Prime Minister 
and the President was conducted in a very 
cordial and friendly atmosphere. We evaluate 
the results as very constructive. I think the 
alternatives have been brought into sharper 
focus, the implications of the various roads 
that can be pursued are seen more clearly. 

We will now continue consultations with 
other interested parties. As you know, the 
Foreign Minister of Syria is coming here 
next week. And we will of course be in 
touch with other parties in the area. We will 
stay in close touch with the Government of 
Israel. And we hope that within the next few 
weeks we can reach a final clarification of 
the best course that could be pursued, on the 
basis of consensus among all the parties 

Now I will take some questions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you saying that the 
President does not yet know enough to go 
fonvard with his policy statement as he said 
he ivoidd? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think the President 
is not likely to make a policy statement 
within the next week or two. But I do believe 
that the meetings that have just concluded 
mark a considerable step forward, and we 
evaluate them in a positive manner. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, hoiv would you evaluate 
the chances for a resumption of negotiations 
between Israel and Egypt on another partial 
settlement in the Sinai? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think there are 

chances, but we cannot yet make a final 

Q. The tendency seems to be becoming 
aware that an interim settlement is a pre- 
ferred solution, rathe)- than a return to 
Geneva. Is that correct? 

Secretary Kissinger: No. As I pointed out 
at Salzburg [on June 2], the United States 
is not pushing any one particular approach. 
The United States is committed to progress 
in the negotiations. The United States be- 
lieves that a stalemate in the diplomatic 
process in the Middle East would not be in 
the interest of any of the parties or in the 
interest of world peace. 

We have found in the talks that this con- 
viction is shared by all of the principals, and 
it is clearly and emphatically shared by the 
Prime Minister of Israel. 

So, we are not pushing any particular ap- 
proach, but we will support whichever ap- 
proach seems most promising. 

Q. Have you found in your talks with the 
Egyptian and Israeli leaders any signs that 
either or both are willing to adjust their 
positions that existed at the end of March ? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have told both 
sides that if an interim agreement is to be 
reached, both sides would have to modify 
their positions. 

I call your attention to the decision of the 
Israeli Cabinet last Sunday in which the 
Israeli Cabinet pointed out the Israeli will- 
ingness to modify their position if Egypt 
were prepared to modify its own position. 

We have the impression that therefore 
there is a certain parallel approach on both 
sides. What remains to be seen now is when 
one goes into the details, whether that per- 
mits a sufficient concreteness. 

Q. You really haven't gotten into the de- 
tails yet? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have gone into 
the parameters, but not into the details. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, when you speak of 
touching base ivith other representatives, 
other groups, do you include the Palestinians? 

July 7, 1975 


Secretanj Kissinger: No. 

Q. Mr. Secretcuij, were you able to assure 
Mr. Rabin that the United States ivill con- 
tiiiue its militarii and economic aid to Israel? 

Secretanj Kissinger: There has never been 
any question about the United States con- 
tinuing economic and military aid to Israel. 
The question has been within the framework 
of the very large request that we have be- 
fore us, how to relate it to all the other 

So, about the principle of economic and 
military aid, there is no debate at all. But 
there were some discussions on that issue, 
and I will continue them at lunch, if you let 
me get there. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been — 

Secretary Kissinge)-: This will keep the 

Israeli journalists from asking questions. 


Q. There has been a reported holdup of 
deliveries of certain military equipment, i)i- 
clnding the Lance missiles, and I think the 
F—l.j. Has the decision been made to go 

Secretary Kissinger: No. The F-15 was a 
question of a technical evaluation team com- 
ing over here. It had not been a question of 
holding up any equipment. But the point is, 
it has always been clear that these particular 
items were related to the whole process of a 
free assessment. And as this process is com- 
ing to a conclusion, these decisions will be 
made with respect to these items. 

Q. Will you make another trip to the area 
before the reassessment is completed, or how 
soon do you plan another trip to the area? 

Secretary Kissinger: Whether I make 
another trip to the area depends on which of 
the approaches that are open to us is going to 
be pursued. But a trip is not excluded. 

Q. Do you have any opinion. Dr. Kissinger, 
as to what they would prefer? Do yon get a 
feeling from either one or both that they 
would prefer you to start shuttle diplomacy 
again ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is too 
soon to say this precisely, but I would say 

that nothing that has happened in the dis- 
cussions between President Sadat and Presi- 
dent Ford, and between Prime Minister Ra- 
bin and President Ford, has made the pros- 
pect less likely, and much that has happened 
has made it perhaps more possible. 

Q. So you sort of expect to resume some- 

Secretary Kissiyiger: That would be prema- 
ture to say. But certainly neither side has 
precluded a reexamination of the interim 

Q. How will you get i)ito details — through 
diplomatic channels, or do you have to go 
out there yourself? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think through both, 
if we go beyond a certain — We will start 
through diplomatic channels, and at that 
point we will decide whether — 

Q. You just want to knoiv whether there 
is enough for agreement before you go out, 
so you have to know the details? 

Secretaiy Kissinger: That is correct. As 
I pointed out, we will now stay in close con- 
sultation with the Government of Israel, and 
we will also be in close touch with the other 
interested parties. And after we have all 
their views, we will then be in a position to 
make the decision whether they are close 
enough for me to take a trip to the area. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, lohat are the other 
parties that you have been talking about that 
you are going to consult ivith before you 
make a decision? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as I said before, 
the Foreign Minister of Syria is coming here 
next week. We are obviously going to be in 
touch with the Government of Egypt. And 
we will be talking to other Arab countries. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you k)iow very well 
what the particular issues were that held up 
the March agreement. Are you really — 

Secretary Kissinger: After I read a lot 
about it, I didn't know any more whether 
I knew. [Laughter.] 

Q. Are you really telling us you are no 
further along on understanding whether 


Deportment of State Bulletin 

either side liits changed its position to make 
an agreement possible? 

Secretary Kissinge).- No. I am saying that 
obviously there has been an evolution in the 
thinking of both sides. I am saying that we 
are not yet at a sufficient degree of detail 
for me to be able to say whether an agree- 
ment is possible and that we have not been 
engaged in an actual detailed process of 
negotiation. Neither side has been asked to 
put forward a specific position at this 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the President has 
stated that he was going to make a definitive 
statement or a statement about this when 
the reassessment is complete. Could you tell 
us hoiv definitive that is likely to be, how 
long? Does it include reexamination of the 
whole question? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think it depends in 
part on which of the options before him, of 
those that he has described, he is likely to 
pursue. And I think obviously when the 
President states the direction in which we 
are going, he will do it with sufficient con- 
creteness to explain what we hope to achieve 
and where it is likely to take us. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the President made 
reference to the desirability of Israel being 
)nore flexible. I liave asked several times at 
the White House and can get no definition 
of any specific of how Israel could be more 
flexible. I was ivondering if this request that 
it be more flexible means that Israel should 
give up Mitla and Giddi in exchange for 
nothing but Egyptian ivords, not even guar- 
antees of shipping in the canal or diplomatic 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, you are way 
ahead of me in the precision of the negotia- 
tion. I don't believe that the President has 
said that Israel should be more flexible. 
There was one reference to his evaluation of 
the March negotiations. 

I don't think that it would serve any pur- 
pose now to apply adjectives to the various 
positions of the parties. The issues that led 
to the breakdown, as Mr. Kalb [Marvin 
Kalb, CBS News] said, are clearly under- 

stood. I think the two sides know in which 
area the major concerns of the other are. 
We have done our best to explain the posi- 
tions of each side to the other as we under- 
stand it. We have found a general receptivity 
to looking at the prospects for making prog- 
ress. And I can assure you, as someone who 
has negotiated with Israeli negotiating 
teams, the danger of their giving away 
something for nothing is extremely remote. 
Mr. Koppel [Ted Koppel, ABC News]. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I can understand why 
it was necessary for President Ford to 
establish some kind of personal contact with 
Mr. Sadat, whom he had never met before. 
I'm a little harder pressed to understand why 
it is necessary with Mi. Rabin, who he k)iows 
quite well. Is it then a fact that this is the 
only need for that meeting, to establish per- 
sonal contact? 

Secretary Kissinger: No. The need for this 
meeting was the necessity of reviewing the 
positions and options of all sides in the Mid- 
dle East and of the American relationship 
to it. 

Since this involves rather fateful decisions 
for Israel and very crucial decisions for the 
United States, it was imperative for the 
Prime Minister and the President to meet, 
not just to exchange ideas on technical de- 
tails but to gain an understanding of their 
perception of the Middle East situation. I 
think the meeting was extremely important 
from that point of view as well as from 
others. And I don't believe either of these 
two leaders would have been prepared to 
make the decisions that need to be made with- 
out having a full opportunity to understand 
not only the technical but also the intangible 
aspects of the other side. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the President said the 
other night that if step-by-step does not 
work, he woidd have a comprehensive plan 
of his own to present possibly at Geneva. 
Did he reveal to Mr. Rabin what the outlines 
of that comprehensive plan ivould be? 

Secretary Kissinger: The two leaders had 
an extremely frank and detailed review. The 
President's habit is always to put forward 

July 7, 1975 


his thinking as fully as he can, and he did 
put before the Prime Minister his best 
judgment of the situation in some detail, yes. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, following the breakdown 
there ivas a widespread impression — and I 
can understand yoitr unwillingness to engage 
in use of adjectives — there was a widespread 
impression left as a result of official state- 
ments on the record and background record, 
that the Israelis were stubborn and arch and 
were responsible for the breakdown. As a 
residt of today's meeting, is that impression 
not justified any more? Has that been wiped 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, an Israeli 
friend of mine has once defined objectivity 
as a hundred percent approval of the Israeli 
point of view. And maybe some of these im- 
pressions that you describe arose from that 
particular definition of objectivity. Be that 
as it may, we are now looking to the future ; 
and we believe, as I pointed out before, that 
all the parties with whom we have talked 
are interested in making progress toward 

As the Prime Minister pointed out in his 
toast last evening, no country can have a 
greater interest in peace than Israel. There- 
fore we will work with the parties concerned 
with the attitude of seeing how we can help 
ease tensions and help them to achieve what 
is above all in their overwhelming interest. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have spoken to both 
sides now, and it has been made public by the 
Israelis that they would like an agreement 
of long duration, defined as three to five 
years. Now that you have spoken to both 
sides, is this a likely prospect? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to go 
into any of the details of the various aspects. 
But as I pointed out, from what I have seen 

of the positions of the parties, the possibility 
of progress is by no means precluded. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, one last question. When 
will the aid program be presented to the 
Congress on the Middle East? 

Secretary Kissinger: We don't have a pre- 
cise date yet, but I have stated our general 
view with respect to aid. 

Secretary Names Five to Board 
of Governors for East-West Center 

The Department of State announced on 
June 13 (press release 334) the appointment 
by the Secretary of five prominent Ameri- 
cans to the newly created Board of Gover- 
nors of the East-West Center in Hawaii. 

Named to the Board of the corporation to 
administer the Center were former Senator 
J. William Fulbright of Arkansas ; Edgar F. 
Kaiser, Chairman of the Board of Directors 
of the Kaiser Industries Corporation, Oak- 
land, Calif. ; John K. Maclver, attorney and 
civic leader of Milwaukee, Wis. ; Lucian W. 
Pye, Ford Professor of Political Science at 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 
Cambridge, Mass. ; and Eleanor H. B. Shel- 
don, President of the Social Science Research 
Council of New York City. (For additional 
biographic data and information about 
the East-West Center corporation, see press 
release 334.) 

The full Board of the new corporation will 
be comprised of 18 persons. The Assistant 
Secretary of State for Educational and Cul- 
tural Affairs, the Governor of Hawaii, and 
the President of the University of Hawaii 
are ex officio members. The Governor of 
Hawaii is to appoint five members, and the 
remaining five seats will be filled by election 
of the board. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for U.S. News and World Report 

Following is the transcript of an inter- 
vieiv with Secretary Kissinger which u'as 
published in the June 23 issue of U.S. News 
and World Report. 

Press release 335 dated June 16 

Q. Mr. Secretary, a year ago everyone 
ivas hailing American foreign policy as a 
great success story. Noiv everything seems 
to be coming apart at the seams. What's 
gone wrong? 

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, I don't 
think everything is "coming apart at the 
seams." Our foreign policy is, I believe, effec- 
tive and strong. 

Our relations with Western Europe and 
Japan have never been better. Our relations 
with the Soviet Union and the People's Re- 
public of China are essentially on course. 
With respect to the Third World, we have 
developed new initiatives at the recent meet- 
ings of the OECD [Organization for Eco- 
nomic Cooperation and Development] and 
the lEA [International Energy Agency] in 
Paris. We have had a temporary setback 
in the Middle East, but I expect that mo- 
mentum will soon be restored. Further in- 
terim discussions or some form of overall 
discussions are inevitable. What has been 
done previously has laid the basis for what 
is being done now. 

The collapse of Indochina was, of course, 
both a setback and a tragedy — and, we be- 
lieve, an unnecessary one. But it has nothing 
to do with the architecture of our foreign 

Q. How then do you explain the wide- 
spread criticism of American foreign pol- 

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that many 
of these criticisms reflect a turmoil in our 
domestic situation and not the reality of our 

foreign policy. I have consistently said that 
you cannot have foreign policy without au- 
thority and that to the extent that the central 
authority is undermined for whatever rea- 
son — even if it's the fault of the central au- 
thority — it will ultimately affect the conduct 
of foreign policy. 

Curiously enough, the price we paid dur- 
ing Watergate, while harmful, was not ex- 
treme. While Watergate was going on, debate 
on foreign policy was muted. But then, after 
Watergate was over, there suddenly was an 
orgy of criticism. Pent-up concerns about 
Chile, Turkey, and Viet-Nam all crystallized 
into extremely controversial issues. All of 
them, coming together, produced a serious 
multiplier effect. 

I have the sense that this phase was ter- 
minated with the collapse of Viet-Nam. 
While Congress is now not in an uncritically 
accepting mood, it is also not in an uncriti- 
cally contentious mood. The position of the 
Pre.sidency — which is, after all, the central 
element in foreign policy — has been con- 
siderably strengthened in recent weeks. The 
dialogue between the executive and the Con- 
gress is now on a healthier basis. Therefore 
the effectiveness of our foreign policy is on 
a healthier basis. 

Q. Why did the collapse in Viet-Nam bring 
that change in Congress? 

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, because 
no one can debate anymore that there was 
a "domino effect." This is .self-evident. Sec- 
ondly, no one can deny that it has had a 
shocking impact even where there was no 
domino effect. Thirdly, I believe that the 
American public is not in a mood to see 
the country's world position decline. What- 
ever the public's reaction was to the merits 
of our involvement in Viet-Nam, the public 
reaction to its aftermath is that the United 

July 7, 1975 


states should not be seen to be retreating in 
the world. 

The support for the handling of the 
Maungiiez incident and the general public 
attitude, which are reflected in the votes on 
the defense bill, seem to indicate that the 
American public now feels that the period of 
turmoil — of the Viet-Nam debate, of the 
Watergate debate — should be ended. 

Q. As you see it, are the American people 
still prepared to accept the defense burden 
and other saciifices necessarii to support a 
world role for this country? 

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. That is my im- 
pre.ssion. I think our biggest asset is wide- 
spread public support — which was never as 
weak as the noise level in Washington would 
have indicated. 

Q. Wlint effect has the Viet-Nam collapse 
had in the rest of the world? 

Secretary Kissincier: I think the sudden 
collapse of Viet-Nam brought home to a lot 
of countries the central role of America and 
its foreign policy. It led to a profound 
concern in many countries about the conclu- 
sions we might draw from that event. 

Basically, what happened in the NATO 
meeting [summit conference in Brussels 
May 29-30] was what we were hoping to 
achieve in the Year of Europe in 1973. Our 
basic argument then — in 1973 — was that se- 
curity, political, and economic factors are 
all related, and that the Atlantic nations, 
together with Japan, had to deal with them 
simultaneously and with a concept of what 
kind of future we wanted for ourselves and 
our children. 

Frankly, our allies were not ready for this 
approach in 1973. But in 1975 — at Brussels 
— Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada put 
forward as his own idea, and without any 
previous discussion with us, exactly this pro- 
posal. And all heads of government present 
accepted it, with France, which was not rep- 
resented by the head of government, being 
the only exception. 

So I think that in this sense the events 
in Indochina have brought things into per- 

Q. Do you expect that our allies, as a re- 

sult of this, ivill now do more to keep Amer- 
ica involved around the world? 

Secretary Kissinger: First, the allies have 
understood they cannot necessarily take 
America for granted and that there is a 
point beyond which disappointment could 
push us into a more isolationist position. 

Secondly, the central importance of the 
American role for both peace and progress 
has been brought home to them in no un- 
certain terms. 

And thirdly, I think that the President's 
calm and strong leadership has had a very 
positive effect. 

Q. As you look to the future, ivhat lies 
ahead for tlie United States? 

Secretary Kissinger: We are moving into 
a new world. The kind of world that emerged 
in the immediate post-World War II period 
had sub.stantially eroded by the late sixties 
and early seventies. We are in a period of 
adjusting the American role in the world 
to a new environment. Today's world is 
marked by multipolarity among countries, 
divisions in the Communist world, growth 
of Europe and Japan, and greater assertive- 
ness of the underdeveloped countries. All 
this fragmentation has occurred at the same 
time that economic interrelationships are 
demonstrating the interdependence of the 

So you have confrontation on a political 
level, and on an economic level the need for 
cooperation. You have on the political level 
continued ideological hostility, but you have 
on the nuclear level the realization that there 
is no alternative to peace. 

Q. What does that mean as far as Amer- 
ican foreign policy is concerned? 

Secreta)-y Kissinger: We had to design 
a much more complex strategy than the one 
that characterized the immediate postwar 
period. We are trying to design a policy that 
is not a response to crisis, but to the realities 
of the present and the hopes of the future, 
a policy that looks at the evolution of his- 
tory and the American contribution to it. 
While any policy has imperfections, I think 
we are clearly moving in the right direction. 


Department of State Bulletin 

On the other hand, the architecture is 
not completed; many issues remain unre- 
solved. There is still an unfinished agenda. 
But I would like to point out that if you 
interview a Secretary of State three years 
from now he, too, should have an unfinished 
agenda. It is an American illusion to believe 
that foreign policy ought to lead to a solu- 
tion to all problems. Foreign policy cannot 
do that; it is always a dynamic process. 

Relations With the Soviet Union 

Q. Tnrning to Soviet- American detente: 
Hoiv do yon answer the criticism that is so 
often heard that this is a one-way street that 
benefits only Russia? 

Secretary Kissinger: I am certain that in 
Moscow whatever opponents of detente there 
may be are making exactly the same argu- 
ment. What you get, as the result of three 
years of detente, is that people like all the 
benefits of detente, plus all the psychic satis- 
faction of a tough posture. There is no ques- 
tion that the American public prefers peace 
to war and anti-Communism to Communism. 
So the question is — and it's not an easy one — 
how do you bring these two into balance with 
each other. . 

Detente has not been a one-way street. 
The agreements we have made with the 
Soviet Union have been based on reciprocity ; 
both sides have benefited. Some of the events 
that have happened in the world that have 
been against our interests have been caused 
by the Soviets; others have not. Some have 
been caused by our failure to take adequate 
unilateral actions — for those we have no one 
but ourselves to blame. 

Detente is not a substitute for American 
action. Detente is a means of controlling the 
conflict with the Soviet Union. 

Detente is not a substitute for American 
strength. But it can enable us to reduce the 
risks that we will ever have to make use 
of that strength. 

Q. Do you mean that under the rules of 
detente, one side is free to exploit a local 
situation to gain an advantage? 

Secretary Kissinger: Of course not. I am 

saying that the minimum objective of detente 
must be to reduce the dangers of general nu- 
clear war. That we have certainly done with 
some success. 

The second objective is to reduce direct 
conflict in areas of vital importance to both 
countries, such as Central Europe. That we 
have done remarkably well. 

The third objective is to create links that 
will provide incentives for moderation. Prog- 
ress here has been uneven, and we have been 
weakened by the Trade Act. 

The fourth objective is to reduce conflict 
in peripheral areas. And here, to be frank, 
we have not made as much progress as we 

Q. You mentioned the Trade Act, which 
made ecorwmic concessioyis to Russia con- 
tingent on more liberal Soviet emigration 
policies. How has that weakened the policy 
of detente? 

Secretary Kissinger: Relations with the 
Soviet Union must have incentives for mod- 
eration and penalties for intransigence. 

The penalties for intransigence are sup- 
plied mo.stly by our defense budget and by 
our foreign policy. I think that is going 
reasonably well. 

As for incentives for moderation, the 
Trade Act was one of the elements we had 
hoped to have available. We have always 
held the view that to inject the emigration 
issue into it hurt our relations with the 
Soviet Union, hurt us economically and — 
most tragically of all — hurt the people it 
was supposed to help. 

Q. How can you reconcile ivhat the Rus- 
sians have done in Viet-Nam, the Mideast, 
and Portugal with detente? 

Secretary Kissinger: Let's discuss each of 
these. First, Viet-Nam was not caused by 
the Russians. Viet-Nam had its own dynam- 
ics. Secondly, the Soviet aid level in Viet- 
Nam remained relatively constant. But our 
aid level dropped — by 50 percent in each of 
two successive years — to the point where no 
equipment and very few spare parts were 
delivered in Viet-Nam after May 1974. The 
GVN [Government of Viet-Nam] even 
reached the point where ammunition had to 

July 7, 1975 


be rationed for the Vietnamese forces. 
Therefore, what happened had many causes, 
of which Soviet actions were only a part. 

The situation in Portugal was not caused 
by the Soviets. It was caused by the internal 
dynamics of Portugal itself. If we have 
not assisted the democratic forces adequate- 
ly, the reasons lie far more in our own 
domestic debates than with the Soviets. 

Q. And the Middle East? 

Seo'etarji Kissinger: In the Middle East, 
I would not be surprised if in Moscow they 
made the same argument and said that we 
have been using detente to improve our 
position. At any rate it is not evident to 
me — in contrast to our own position — that 
the Soviet Union has improved its position 
in the Middle East in the last two years. 
The opposite seems to me to be the case. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you satisfied that 
the Russians are not cheating on the strw- 
tegic arms limitation agreement that was 
signed in 1972? 

Secretary Kissinger: When you have stra- 
tegic forces on both sides in the present 
state of technical complexity and in the 
process of modernization, it is inevitable 
that questionable actions will emerge. 

The Soviets have worried us in several 
areas. We have taken those up in the Soviet- 
American Standing Commission which is de- 
signed to deal with such complaints. With 
respect to a number of these issues we have 
received answers which — while not fully 
satisfactory — are moving in the right direc- 
tion. One or two issues are still unsettled, 
but they do not go to the heart of the SALT 
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] agree- 
ment. But we will pursue them nevertheless. 
One or two issues that have been reported 
in the newspapers seem to me mischievous 
and special pleading. 

Q. What about SALT Two? Is there going 
to be an agreement tliis fall? 

Secretary Kissinger: The issues of prin- 
ciple with respect to SALT have been more 
or less settled. What now remains to be 
worked out is the technical implementation 
of issues that are very complicated. I should 

think that the chances are better than even 
that we will have a SALT Two in the fall. 
But we could fail, either because we just 
can't solve the technical issues or because 
political tensions rise. 

Q. Is a visit to Washington by Soviet 
leader Brezhnev in the fall firmly set, or ivill 
that depend on a SALT agreement? 

Secretary Kissinger: That will depend on 

Q. In other words — no SALT agreement, 

no Brezhnev visit? 

Secretary Kissinger: 1 would think that 
Brezhnev, too, would prefer to mark his visit 
with some significant result. 

The Middle East 

Q. President Ford recently spoke of the 
Middle East as the most dangerous problem 
in the world today. What are the prospects 
now of making progress toward a settlement 
of the conflict there? 

Secretary Kissinger: Logically, the condi- 
tions should be there, either on an interim 
or an overall basis. As the President has 
said, we are determined to make progress. 
If we cannot get it on an interim basis, we 
will promote an overall settlement. We will 
not permit the situation simply to fester. 

Q. How do you prevent it from festering? 

Secretary Kissinger: By engaging in ac- 
tive diplomacy and using our influence, 
which, after all, is not inconsiderable in that 
area, to encourage progress. 

Q. What has resulted from President 
Ford's meetings ivith President Sadat [of 
Egypt] and Priine Minister Rabin [of Is- 
rael] that ivill open the tvay to new negotia- 
tions for a Middle East settlement? 

Secretary Kissinger: The meetings with 
President Sadat and Prime Minister Rabin 
have been extremely important in helping to 
crystallize our thinking on how best to pro- 
ceed. They have helped us understand the 
views of both on how they think the nego- 
tiating process might be renewed. They were 
both constructive, though neither meeting 


Department of State Bulletin 

was an occasion for coming to detailed de- 

We, as well as the two governments con- 
cerned, are now reflecting on the best course 
to follow. We will be following up with both 
Israel and Egypt through diplomatic chan- 
nels, as well as talking with Syrian Foreign 
Minister Khaddam here in the coming days. 
We will also stay in close touch with other 
interested governments. 

From all of these consultations we hope a 
decision can be taken on how to move toward 
the negotiated settlement we all seek. 

Q. Is it feasible to go for an overall settle- 
ment if you can't get Egypt and Israel to 
agree even on a lifnited settlement in the 

Secretary Kissinger: That remains to be 
seen. It probably won't be an extremely 
rapid process. 

Q. Can you count on any help from tlie 
Russians in promoting a settlement — or are 
they mainly interested in perpetuating a con- 
flict that they can exploit? 

Secretary Kissinger: On the one hand, 
you can argue that they like the tension in 
the area because it creates a chance for en- 
hanced influence. On the other hand, it can 
be argued that tensions which force a coun- 
try to take positions which it then cannot 
implement do not, in the long run, enhance 
its influence. 

So I would think that as a result of the 
events of recent years, the Soviet Union 
could come to the view that it is running 
risks disproportionate to what it is getting 
out of it. And if that is true, perhaps condi- 
tions for a more constructive relationship 
will develop. Certainly in recent months the 
Soviet Union has not been as aggressive 
about the Middle East as they might have 

Q. How is your negotiating position in 
the Middle East affected by the fact that 
76 Senators have signed a letter in support 
of Israel? 

Secretary Kissinger: I did not recommend 
the letter be sent. But we will take it into 
account. We will study it. 

Q. Six Presidents have declared a commit- 
ment to the survival and security of Israel. 
In practical terms, what does that really 

Secretary Kissinger: We have a historic 
commitment to the survival and the well- 
being of Israel. This is a basic national policy 
reaffirmed by every Administration. But we 
are in no way committed to the status quo. 
Israel itself has said that it does not insist 
on the existing territorial arrangement for 
a final peace. 

The art of our foreign policy is to recon- 
cile as many of America's interests as we 
can, and not to emphasize one to the exclu- 
sion of all of the others. We have many in- 
terests that need to be accommodated: we 
have an interest in good relations with the 
Arab countries; we have an interest in the 
economic well-being and security of Western 
Europe and Japan; and we have an interest 
in not having unnecessary confrontations 
with the Soviet Union. We believe all these 
interests can be reconciled with our tradi- 
tional friendship for Israel. 

Q. What do you think of suggestions that 
an Israeli withdrawal to its pre-1967 borders 
ivould tend to lower oil prices? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think it would be 
extremely dangerous for the United States 
to let its foreign policy be determined by oil 
price manipulation. We have refused to dis- 
cuss our political objectives in relation to 
the price of oil and will continue to do so. 

The Energy Problem 

Q. More generally on the oil problem: Can 
we live with another $Jt-a-barrel increase 
that's being talked about for the fall? 

Secretary Kissinger: I do not know that 
there will be a $4 increase in the price of 
oil. That would be an increase of over 30 
percent. We are strongly opposed to an in- 
crease. We believe that the increases of '73 
and '74 have been so inflationary and so 
disruptive of the world economy that another 
rise is clearly not justified. To impose a $4 
increase on top of the present precarious 
world situation is not even in the interest 

July 7, 1975 


of the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries] countries. We would 
certainly strongly oppose it. 

Q. But irJiat can ive do to oppose any 
increase that OPEC chooses to make? 

Secretary Kissinger: Basically we cannot 
fight unilateral increases effectively until we 
create the objective conditions which will 
transform the market forces. It is another 
area where it is easy to strike a tough verbal 
stance. But a tough verbal stance unrelated 
to objective factors is not going to do us 
any good. 

We are attempting in the International 
Energy Agency to create the objective condi- 
tions which will transform power in the 
marketplace by reducing consumption and de- 
veloping alternative energy sources. At the 
same time, the capacity of OPEC to cut pro- 
duction in order to sustain prices will di- 
minish as development programs in other 
countries grow and the producers' need for 
real resources mounts. Therefore, some point 
inevitably will be reached where the market 
must shift. How quickly it is reached de- 
pends on the decisiveness with which the 
industrialized consumer countries cooperate. 
This is the effort in which we are now deep- 
ly — and reasonably successfully — engaged. 

Q. A year ago the Administration was 
talking about getting the price of oil doivn. 
Now you're talking about keeping the price 
from going up. Why has the objective 

Secretary Kissinger: The policy has not 
changed. But policy and rhetoric need to be 
kept separate. We would like prices to come 
down. But we cannot get them down until 
after we have succeeded in keeping them 
from going up. At a time when OPEC is 
threatening to increase prices, it's senseless 
to talk about getting them down. We are 
opposed to the current prices. We are even 
more opposed to higher prices. We will work 
with determination to bring about conditions 
in which this cannot continue. 

If OPEC insists on raising its prices, I 
have no doubt that it will lead to increased 
consumer solidarity and a speeded-up pro- 
gram to shift market conditions. This is 

our policy — to change market conditions — 
and I think it will succeed. 

We are pursuing the only sensible policy 
available to bring about a price cut. You 
can talk about embargoes and counterembar- 
goes. But when you analyze them you will 
find they usually hit the countries that politi- 
cally give us the strongest support and whose 
role may not be decisive. Furthermore, these 
measures generally would not be backed by 
the other consuming countries. So if we 
pursued them we would be putting our- 
selves at a political and probably economic 
disadvantage. But we are determined to 
bring about an improvement in the market 
conditions of oil. 

Q. Wluj is it so difficult to get the indus- 
trial consuming countries to cooperate on 
the kind of joint policy that you advocate? 

Secretary Kissinger: Because none of the 
consumer countries want to risk a confronta- 
tion. Therefore, to some extent the producer 
countries can blackmail at least some of the 
consumer nations. Another reason is that 
independence requires difficult domestic ef- 
forts. Consumption cuts are unpleasant and 
occasionally painful. So, many countries — 
including ours — are using the fact that there 
is a recession which imposes oil conservation 
as an excuse to avoid policy-induced conser- 

Q. How much will the success or failure of 
this ivhole program depend on action by 

Secretary Kissi)iger: The role of the Con- 
gress is absolutely pivotal. The United States 
consumes 50 percent of the world's energy; 
many of the resources for alternative pro- 
grams must come from American technol- 
ogy. Without a major American program, 
there can be no eff'ective policy among con- 
sumer nations. 

Q. Is the energy program that Congress 
appears likely to approve sufficient to do the 
job ? 

Secretary Kissinger: It is sufficient to 
make a start on the policy. It is not, how- 
ever, adequate to do the whole job. 

Q. Have you been surprised at the ability 


Department of State Bulletin 

of the OPEC coil )i tries to cut production as 
deeply as they have to maintain their price? 

Secretary Kissinger: No. I think they are 
beginning to approach a point where pro- 
duction cuts will become more and more 

Q. But isn't pressure on OPEC countries 
to cut production going to ease as we get 
economic recovery here as ivell as in Europe 
and Japan? 

Secretary Kissinger: It is going to be a 
very serious problem. The recovery will in- 
crease our need for oil, but it will not affect 
the ability of the OPEC countries to make 
further production cuts. 

Q. Do yon anticipate another oil embargo 
by tlie Arabs? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think it would be 
a very rash action, and — outside the context 
of a Middle East war — I would not antici- 
pate it. 

Asia Policy 

Q. Getting back for a moment to the after- 
math of Viet-Nam: We keep hearing that 
China wants the United States to stay in 
Asia. Is that based on any direct assurance 
you've had? 

Secretary Kissinger: It is based not on 
assurances, but on fairly hard evidence — 
that is, on what Chinese leaders have told 
Asian leaders and some of our leaders. 

Q. Wlnj do they now want us to stay after 
agitating for so many years to get us out 
of Asia? 

Secretary Kissinger: The Chinese are ex- 
tremely realistic. They realize that their se- 
curity depends on a world equilibrium. They 
understand that the United States must in- 
evitably be a major part of such an equi- 
librium. For this reason, they do not want 
to open up Asia to the aspirations of other 
countries whose intentions toward them 
might be less benevolent. 

Q. In that connection, is there any truth 
to reports that China has tried to dissuade 
North Korea from going to ivar against the 
South ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I cannot confirm 
those reports. But our general impression 
is that the People's Republic of China is not 
interested in an exacerbation of tensions in 

Q. What, in your judgment, are the 
chances of war in Korea? 

Secretary Kissinger: In the immediate 
aftermath of Viet-Nam, we were profoundly 
concerned that the leaders in North Korea 
should not misread the American position. 
We were also concerned that a collapse of 
South Korea would have a disastrous impact 
on Japan. 

The events of recent weeks are beginning 
to make clear that the United States is pre- 
pared to defend its interests in the world and 
that it would be a wildly rash adventure to 
use military force in Korea. Many of the 
problems that exi.sted with respect to Viet- 
Nam do not exist with respect to Korea. 

Q. Because the United States lias a mu- 
tual security treaty with South Korea? 

Secretary Kissinger: That's right. 

Q. In view of the Viet-Nam debacle, is 
President Ford still planning to go to China 
this fall? 

Secretary Kissinger: That is still the plan. 

Q. Is it possible for him to go without 
discussing the Taiwan situation? 

Secretary Kissinger: No, but it is possible 
for him to go without bringing that situation 
to a conclusion. 

Q. Will the United States be obliged to 
change its relations with Taiivan? 

Secretary Kissinger: Not in order for the 
President to go to China. 

Q. Looking a bit further ahead: Do you 
expect the triangular Soviet-American- 
Chinese relationship to survive after Mao 
Tse-tung and Leonid Brezhnev are gone? 

Secretary Kissinger: The problem in for- 
eign policy is to be able to discern the reali- 
ties of the situation and not to tie it to per- 
sonalities. The realities could shift to some 
extent — and all foreign policy is subject to 
change. The reality of Asia is the geopolitical 

July 7, 1975 


impact on each other of the Soviet Union and 
the People's Republic of China, plus the mem- 
ory of what has happened. 

We are not exploiting this. We are not 
encouraging it, and we didn't create it. 

To some extent the reality will continue. 
There may be shifting accents that will affect 
us, and we must be aware of these. It is also 
important not to be so obsessed with im- 
mediate threats that one forgets long-term 
threats. But the essential architecture of our 
foreign policy is sound and will be seen to be 
sound. The fact that it has survived some 
of the shocks of this past year proves that 
it is sound. 

Western Europe 

Q. A final point concerynnq Europe: Why 
is it left to this coimtry to deal ivith major 
problems in Europe while Europeans turn 
their backs — such problems as Spain, Portu- 
gal, Greece and Turkey? 

Secretary Kissinger: It is left to the 
United States because fate has put us in the 
position where we are the only non-Commu- 
nist country that is strong enough and 
domestically cohesive enough to play a world 
role. Therefore, if certain thiiigs are not 
done by us, they will not be done by anyone. 
And while it might be fairer if somebody 
else took some of the responsibility, the fact 
is that a catastrophe is no less real for hav- 
ing been brought about by attempts to shift 
responsibility to others. 

Portugal, of course, is primarily a Portu- 
guese problem. Many of the European coun- 
tries are extremely active with respect to 
Portugal. However, as the strongest country 
in the alliance, we have to state a position 
with respect to Portugal and particularly its 
relationship to NATO. This is all we have 
done, in addition to some economic aid which 
we have given. 

With respect to Spain, we are the only 
Western country that has a defense relation- 
ship with Spain. For some European coun- 
tries there is a domestic problem with 
respect to dealings with Spain. But it is 
also clear that if Spain is left totally isolated, 
the evolution there could take very traumatic 

forms, and this is what we are attempting 
to deal with. 

Greece, Turkey — again, we have a prob- 
lem of the eastern end of the Mediterranean, 
of the domestic evolution in both of these 
countries, and of the world equilibrium. We 
were perhaps projected into it somewhat 
more dramatically than we might have de- 
sired by certain domestic events in the 
United States, and we have been forced to 
stake more on this than might have been 
thought desirable from an ab.stract consider- 
ation of foreign policy. 

But we do have an interest in retaining 
both of these friendly countries in NATO, 
in maintaining our traditional friendships 
with both countries and not have the eastern 
end of the Mediterranean turn into uncon- 
trolled chaos — or, for that matter, controlled 

Q. Why does the United States seem so 
much more concerned about the Communist 
influence in Po)tugal than the Europeans? 

Secretary Kissinger: All we are saying is 
that at some point the evolution in Portugal 
will have reached a stage where we will have 
to make a decision whether this is still an 
allied government or a neutralist govern- 
ment. At that point, we will have to consider 
the implications of our actions for Italy, 
Spain, and the other European countries. 

We have told our European allies that this 
is not something to be determined in the ab- 
stract. We are continuing our economic aid 
program to Portugal for the time being. 
But we do not believe that we have to delude 
ourselves about \vhat is going on there. 

Q. Outside Portugal, do you get the feel- 
ing that neut)-alis7n is spreading in Western 

Secretary Kissinger: No, I have the sense 
that with the present governments, the 
awareness of the importance of the Atlantic 
alliance is increasing. However, in many of 
the European countries neutralist forces are 
growing — not in the governments, but in po- 
litical life. And that is a worrisome phenom- 
enon for the middle and longer term. It is 
one of the factors we are keeping in mind 
with relation to Portugal. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Q. All in all, Mr. Secretary, are you opti- 
mistic about the future? 

Secretary Kissinger: I'd like to repeat; 
We're moving into a new world, and I think 
that we are moving in the right direction. 
There will always be unfinished business, 
and the more effective you are the more 
unfinished business you will have. 

President Ford's News Conference 
of June 9 

Following are excerpts relating to foreign 
policy from the transcript of a news con- 
ference held by President Ford in the Rose 
Garden at the White House on June ,9.' 

Q. Mr. President, at a recent news con- 
ference you said that you had learned the 
lessons of Viet-Nam. Since then, I have re- 
ceived a letter from Mrs. Catherine Litchfield 
of Dedham, Mass. She lost a son in Viet- 
Nam; and on her behalf and on behalf of 
many, many parents with her plight, I wotdd 
like to ask you, tvhat are those lessons you 
learned from the Viet-Nam experience? 

President Ford: I think, Miss Thomas 
[Helen Thomas, United Press International], 
there are a number of lessons that we can 
learn from Viet-Nam. One, that we have to 
work with other governments that feel as we 
do — that freedom is vitally important. We 
cannot, however, fight their battles for them. 
Those countries who believe in freedom as 
we do must carry the burden. We can help 
them, not with U.S. military personnel but 
with arms and economic aid, so that they 
can protect their own national interest and 
protect the freedom of their citizens. 

I think we also may have learned some 
lessons concerning how we would conduct a 
military operation. There was, of course, 
from the period of 1961 or 1962 through the 
end of our military involvement in Viet-Nam, 
a great deal of controversy whether the mili- 

' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Com- 
pilation of Presidential Documents dated June 16. 

tary operations in Viet-Nam were carried 
out in the proper way. Some dispute between 
civilian and military leaders as to the proper 
prosecution of a military engagement — I 
think we can learn something from those dif- 
ferences and, if we ever become engaged in 
any military operation in the future — and I 
hope we don't — I trust we've learned some- 
thing about how we should handle such an 

Q. Does that me.a)i that you would not con- 
duct a limited war again with a certain 
amount of restraint on the part of our bomb- 
ers and so forth ? 

President Ford: I wouldn't want to pass 
judgment at this time on any hypothetical 
situation. I simply am indicating that from 
that unfortunate experience in Viet-Nam, we 
ought to be able to be in a better position to 
judge how we should conduct ourselves in the 

Q. I xvonder if I can change the subject to 
Europe and the future. There are reports in 
Europe, sir, that both the United States and 
the Soviet Union seem to be less and less in- 
terested in the Security Conference that is 
due up this year. Coidd you tell me something 
about the fut%ire timetable, when that might 
come up, how SALT [Strategic Arms Limi- 
tation Talks] is doing, when you might be 
seeing Mr. Brezhnev, and so forth? There 
seems to be some slippage in this. 

President Ford: While I was in Europe, I 
discussed with many European leaders the 
status of the European Security Conference, 
their views. It appears that there are some 
compromises being made on both sides be- 
tween the Warsaw Pact nations and Euro- 
pean nations, including ourselves, that will 
potentially bring the European Security Con- 
ference to a conclusion. Those final com- 
promises have not been made, but it's getting 
closer and closer. 

I hope that there will be sufficient under- 
standing on both sides to bring about an end- 
ing to this long, long negotiation. If it does, 
in the near future we probably would have 
a summit in Helsinki. 

July 7, 1975 


The negotiations on SALT Two are pro- 
gressing, I think constructively. The tech- 
nicians are now working on the problems of 
verification and other matters that are very 
important but can be better outlined and put 
together by the technicians. 

I'm optimistic that we can have a SALT 
Two agreement. But I can assure you, as I 
have others, that we are going to make sure, 
make certain, that our national security in- 
terest is very, very adequately protected. And 
I think it can be, as I look at the overall 

Q. To follow up. sir, when do you think Mr. 
Brezhnev might he coming here? Would you 
give a ballpark guess on that? 

President Ford: I would hope, if negotia- 
tions go the way they are, sometime in the 
fall of 1975. 

Prime Minister Rabin of Israel, which is to 
be held on Wednesday and Thursday of this 
week, will be a meeting where I will get his 
personal assessment of the overall situation 
in the Middle East. 

We will discuss the options that I see as 
possible : either a resumption of the sus- 
pended step-by-step negotiations, or a com- 
prehensive recommendation that I would 
make to probably reconvene the Geneva Con- 
ference, or a step-by-step process under the 
umbrella of the Geneva Conference. 

I'm going to go into these alternatives or 
these options in depth with Prime Minister 
Rabin; and when we have concluded our dis- 
cussions, I'll be in a better position to know 
how our government should proceed in trying 
to achieve a broader peace, a more perma- 
nent peace, with fairness and equity in the 
Middle East. 

Q. Mr. President, to follow on Helen's ques- 
tion, sir, do you believe that the language of 
our miitual defense treaty with South Korea 
requires the presence of American troops 
titer e, or can the United States fidfill its com- 
mitment short of that? 

President Ford: I believe it is highly de- 
sirable under our mutual defense treaty with 
South Korea to maintain a U.S. military con- 
tingent in South Korea. We have now roughly 
38,000 U.S. military personnel in South Ko- 
rea. I think it's keeping the peace in Korea, 
and I think it's important for the mainte- 
nance of peace in the Korean Peninsula that 
that force stay in South Korea. 

Q. Are you thinking of keeping them there 
indefinitely, or do you hope to review that 
question next year? 

President Ford: It's constantly under re- 

Q. The Prime Minister of Israel is coming 
on Wednesday, I believe, and you met ivith 
Egyptian President Sadat a iveek ago. As you 
go into this next phase of consultations, are 
you any more prepared to give Israel strong- 
er guarantees? 

President Ford: Well, my meeting with 

Q. Mr. President, when you ivere in Salz- 
burg, you appeared to be especially friendly 
icith Egyptian President Sadat. Was this 
public display of friendliness with him de- 
signed in any way to pressure Israel to make 
new concessions toivard a Middle East set- 

President Ford: I did enjoy my oppor- 
tunity to get acquainted with President 
Sadat. And I not only enjoyed his company, 
but I benefited from his analysis of the Mid- 
dle East and related matters. But I have the 
same relationship with Prime Minister Ra- 
bin. I have known him longer; and this will 
be the second or third opportunity that I've 
had a chance to meet with him, plus my op- 
portunities when he was the Israeli Am- 
bassador here. 

I think I can be benefited immeasurably 
by meeting face-to-face with people like 
Prime Minister Rabin and President Sadat. 
This judgment by our government in this 
area is a major decision, and we have to get 
the broadest possible information to make 
the best judgment. And in both instances, as 
well as others, I am glad to have the help and 
assistance of those who come from that area 
of the world. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Secretary Kissinger's Remarks at PBS Luncheon 

Following is an excerpt from Secretary 
Kissinger's remarks at a Pnblic Broadcast- 
itig Service (PBS) hmcheon honoring the 
British Broadcasting Corporation at Wash- 
ington on June 16. ' 

At this time, when the policies of all na- 
tions, and especially the experiences of our 
nation, are undergoing such a revolutionary 
change, it is difficult to present to the public 
the nature of the problem and the essence of 
the answers. The news reports, in the nature 
of things, emphasize the spectacular and the 
tactical. They emphasize the urgent very 
often rather than the important. What is 
badly needed is what PBS and other pro- 
grams around the world are attempting to do 
— to explain the context of events, to have 
some analysis of their significance not neces- 
sarily geared to the headlines of the moment. 

I had some discussion with Mr. Gunn about 
this many months ago concerning how to 
conduct foreign policy in an environment in 
which the real issues can very often not be 
discussed on some of the media because of 
pressures of time and the nature of the me- 

I would like to say that what PBS has done 
m many of your programs is a major con- 
tribution to the understanding of interna- 
tional affairs, and therefore I am glad to 
accept this opportunity to come and meet 
with you. Now I think we can proceed most 
usefully if I answer your questions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, my question is: Will the 
Umted States use troops to defend South 
Korea if it is invaded by the North Koreans? 

Secretary Kissinger: There are American 

' For remarks by Hartford N. Gunn, president of 
PBS, introducing Secretary Kissinger and the open- 
ing paragraphs of the Secretary's remarks, see press 
release 337 dated June 16. 

troops in South Korea, and an attack on 
South Korea would be barely possible that 
did not involve American forces. And we 
have a security treaty. Of course we would 
follow constitutional procedures and the pro- 
visions of the War Powers Act, but we are 
bound by international obligations that have 
been ratified by the Congress to come to the 
assistance of South Korea. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, ivould you tell us the dif- 
ferences, as yo}i see them, between serving 
as Secretary of State under President Ford 
as compared to serving as Secretary of State 
under former President Nixon? 

Secretary Kissi)iger: I think this is not a 
question that I should now answer, or per- 
haps should ever answer. Obviously each 
President has his own style and has his own 
intellectual cast. I think that both have made 
a major contribution to American foreign 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I have a question from 
President Ford's home town for you. Would 
you please comment on the role of Congress 
and the President in international affairs — 
how much should its members be informed; 
hoiv much is your personal diplomacy ; how 
much of it is the domain of Congress and 
the President? 

Secretary Kissinger: There are several 
parts to that question. First, should the Con- 
gress be informed? Secondly, of what should 
it be informed? And third, who shall be in- 

Now, I have always believed — and of 
course President Ford as a longtime member 
of the Congress feels this equally strongly 
— that it is essential to keep the Congress 
informed of the nature of our foreign policy. 
The issue is not only of keeping the Congress 
informed but what information it should be 

July 7, 1975 


given and who can handle that information. 

The Congress, in our view, should be con- 
sulted on all the main lines of American for- 
eign policy; that is, the major decisions and 
those that effect changes of course or funda- 
mental commitments. The Congress is in a 
poor position to handle the day-by-day de- 
tails of American foreign policy — although, 
of course, of those, too, they should be in- 
formed in a general way. But if you consider 
the mass of information that comes into the 
Department day after day, there is no staff 
in the Congress that could possibly absorb all 
this information. 

The third problem is, who in the Congress 
should be informed. When I started out as 
Secretary of State, I established a very close 
relationship with the leadership of the House 
and the Senate, and with the Foreign Rela- 
tions Committee of the Senate and what is 
now called the International Relations Com- 
mittee in the House. In the last two years, 
however, there has been a revolution in the 
Congress, esnecially in the House, so that the 
traditional leadership can no longer speak 
for the members as it did in the past. And 
the traditional committees that concerned 
themselves with international relations no 
longer represent the group that is primarily 
or that is exclusively concerned with foreign 
policy. So that the requirements of briefing 
now become enormous. I must say I spend at 
least 25 percent of my time on the Congress, 
and my associates spend more. One of the 
problems we face is to identify a leadership 
group in the Congress which we can keep 
informed and with which we would share all 
relevant information. 

So the problem of informing the Congress 
is soluble if the Congress can organize itself 
to receive it. 

The next question is the degree of congres- 
sional supervision in the conduct of policy. 
Again, I believe that the main lines of policy 
should be developed on the basis of the closest 
consultation between the Congress and the 
executive. But again, even though the line 
cannot be clearly drawn, for the Congress to 
get into the tactical issues is likely to be 
extremely counterproductive. We have seen 
it with the Trade Act, which hurt relations 

between the Soviet Union and the United 
States and hurt the very people it was sup- 
posed to help. We have seen it with respect 
to the cutoff of military aid to Turkey, which 
could have very serious repercussions. And 
we have seen it in a number of other in- 

On the other hand, we are prepared to 
take into account congressional concerns and 
to set up a system of consultation so that 
legislative actions don't become necessary. 

I recognize that some of this is a reaction 
to what is conceived in the Congress as ex- 
cesses of executive authority, and some of 
those congressional concerns are quite justi- 
fied. We will do our best to meet them. 

Indeed, I must say that in recent weeks, 
in fact in recent months, the problem which 
seemed so acute earlier this year has im- 
proved enormously, and the cooperation be- 
tween the executive and the legislative 
branches is now going along much more 
smoothly than earlier. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think the CIA 
is important to the conduct of our foreign 
policy, or do you think it has damaged our 
foreign policy? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think the CIA is im- 
portant to the conduct of our foreign policy, 
and I do not believe that it has damaged the 
conduct of our foreign policy. I believe, at 
least in my experience, the CIA has acted 
within Presidential authority. 

I think it is essential for the United States 
to have a first-rate intelligence organization 
under strict control by the political leader- 
ship and under such controls as the Congress 
can now establish. There obviously have been 
some abuses that have been described in the 
Rockefeller report and others that may come 
out in the reports of the various congression- 
al committees. But I consider the CIA es- 
sential for the conduct of our foreign policy, 
and I hope that it will not be damaged by 
these various investigations. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do yon think you can 
really get the Middle East situation calmed 
down permanently without further full-scale 
wars ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the Middle East 


Department of State Bulletin 

has been torn by tensions throughout most of 
its history and certainly through the last 
generation. Therefore it would be a rash man 
to say that it can be calmed down perma- 
nently. We will make a major effort to make 
progress toward a peace settlement, either 
in the form of an interim agreement or in the 
form of an overall agreement. 

I am hopeful that it can be done without 
war. I think another Middle East war would 
be a catastrophe for all of the parties. It 
would settle none of the issues that are now 
before them, and at the end of it they would 
be exactly at the point they have reached 
now, which is how to negotiate progress 
toward a lasting peace. 

I think we can make progress, and we are 
working very hard to promote some progress. 
I think it is imperative that it be done with- 
out war. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, California is a region 
of the country where many of the recent 
Vietnamese refugees, now immigrants to the 
United States, are being concentrated. Many 
of onr citizens ont there are asking what can 
the Federal Government do, what can the 
Ford Administration do, to ameliorate the 
economic impact on our region from this 
gro2ip of neiv immigrants. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, of course I am 
not an expert on the domestic economy, as 
my colleagues would be eager to tell you. I 
can't make that point emphatically enough. 
So quite frankly, I don't know what specific 
steps we can take to ameliorate the impact of 
refugees in various communities. 

My impression has been that the number 
was relatively small in terms of the overall 
labor market; that the number in any one 
location would not be decisive. I am sure that 
an effort will be made to ease it. But I can- 
not give you an answer, because I don't know 
what these efforts are. It is not in the prov- 
ince of my Department, and everyone knows 
how meticulous I am not to step over that 

Q. Mr. Secretary, it has recently been al- 
leged that the strength of the OPEC [Or- 
ganization of Petroleum Exporting Colin- 
tries'] oil cartel is due in some part to your 

Middle Eastern policy of conciliation of both 
the Arabs and Israelis. If there is any stib- 
stance to this allegation, is peace in the Mid- 
dle East ivorth the price that we must now 
pay for oil — that is, ivorld inflation? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't agree with the 
allegation. It is easy to take a verbally tough 

First of all, conciliation of the Israelis, 
which is not what I have been accused of in 
the last few months, has nothing to do with 
the oil price. 

Secondly, with respect to the oil price, it 
will not come down by a tough declaration. 
It will come down only when the objective 
conditions are created which .shift the forces 
of the market or which create political in- 
centives to reduce the price. 

This is what we are working on with great 
energy. We have created over the last year 
the International Energy Agency, which 
brings together all of the consuming coun- 
tries in joint programs of conservation, in 
developing alternative sources, and in joint 
research and development programs. It will 
take some time to take full effect. 

But even today the market forces have al- 
ready shifted somewhat in favor of the con- 
sumers, though not yet in a decisive manner. 
Until they have moved in a more clear-cut 
manner, no amount of verbal tough talk is 
going to change this; all the more so since 
the victims of this are usually the countries 
that will not join an oil embargo — which we 
have to keep in mind, in view of Middle East 
tensions — and that have otherwise cooper- 
ated with us. 

So I believe that the policies we are pur- 
suing are designed to bring the oil price 
down and that they cannot be described as 
conciliating those who want to bring the 
price up. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, your policies obviously 
are based on your perceptions of the ivorld 
we live in today and were formed, I think, as 
xve heard, nearly 20 years ago. I wanted to 
know if they are still valid or have they real- 
ly in fact changed? 

Secretary Kissinger: My views? 

Q. Yes, sir. 

July 7, 1975 


Secretary Kissinger: Since they were elab- 
orated 20 years ago? I'll tell you, I have not 
read anything that I have written since I 
came down here. And there is good reason 
for that, because there is a British reviewer 
who wrote about one of my books, "I don't 
know whether Mr. Kissinger is a great 
writer, but anyone who finishes this book is 
a great reader." 

I think it is possible — at least I leave open 
the theoretical possibility — that I might have 
changed my mind on something in my life, 
but don't press me too hard. 

Q. Mr. Secretarji, the United States has 
been recently accused of buying the friend- 
ship of other coii>itries ivith gifts, ivhich 
kind of resulted in a loss of credibility. I 
was icondcfiug how we are going to counter- 
act that. 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't believe it 
would be a valid criticism to say that we are 
trying to purchase the good will of other 
countries with gifts. 

Q. I don't believe so, either. But it seems 
like other people think that. 

Secretary Kissi)iger: I think basically rela- 
tions between countries have to be based on 
their perception of common objectives and 
their perception of parallel interests. 

Through the immediate postwar period, 
when the United States was economically and 
militarily the dominant country all over the 
world and when other countries were either 
just getting started or were in disarray, it 
is true that the United States material con- 
tribution was quite essential and that this 
might have created some of the atmosphere 
that you describe. I don't think this is the 
situation today. 

Today the big problem is to bring the 
nations of the world together in a recogni- 
tion of the fact of interdependence and to 
deal in a cooperative manner with the issues 
of energy, raw materials, food, that none of 
them can solve by themselves — that no na- 
tion can solve for any other — and that re- 
quire a cooperative effort. This, I would 
say, is our big problem. And to the extent 
that there are vestiges of the previous state 
of affairs, we are trying to overcome them. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, how have the recent 
accusations of CIA meddling in policies of 
foreign countries affected our foreign policy? 

Secretary Kissingc)-: There is no other 
country in the world in which an intelli- 
gence agency would be exposed to the public 
scrutiny that has been the case here in the 
last six months. In some parts of the world 
these accusations of meddling have been able 
to be used as propaganda against our foreign 

I think it is safe to say that in most parts 
of the world, leaders do not consider the sub- 
stance of the charge as unusual as some 
Americans do or are not as shocked by these 
accusations as we like to think — or some of 
us like to think. I think these reports have 
been on the whole not helpful to our foreign 
policy. They have above all not been helpful 
to the conduct of intelligence operations 
abroad. But they have not been a major 
impediment to the conduct of foreign policy. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, does the recent rash of 
press criticism against yoti bother you? 

Secretary Kissinger: Totally unjustified. 

Q. Do you feel they are unfair? 

Secretary Kissinger: Do I think they are 

Q. The recent o'iticism of i/ou in the 

Sec)-eta)-y Kissinger: Well, of course, un- 
less there was some hope for a terminal 
date to my efforts, the morale of my a.sso- 
ciates would disintegrate completely. Are 
those some of my associates applauding? 

I think there was a period where, for 
understandable reasons, when everything 
seemed to be disintegrating domestically, 
praise for me was excessive. This was then 
balanced by another period in which perhaps 
criticism was excessive. I tend to think 
any criticism of me is excessive. I don't think 
it was unfair. 

I have to say this about criticism. One 
way I keep the press here in control is that 
my father keeps a scrapbook of anything 
that is written about me. And he has, I 
think, 34 volumes. Every author is given 


Department of State Bulletin 

two chances. After he has written two un- 
favorable articles, he becomes a non-person 
and is eliminated from the scrapbook. There 
are few journalists willing to take that risk. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what would you con- 
sider positive steps that Castro would have 
to take before the United States started to 
change our policy toward Cuba? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have indicated 
that we would respond to the positive moves 
that Castro might take. And he has recently 
moderated the tone of Cuban propaganda 
and even taken some limited steps. I don't 
want to give a precise list of our require- 
ments, because I think we should discuss 
those first through private channels. 

But we are prepared to reciprocate Cuban 
moves, and we do not consider that an ani- 
mosity toward Cuba is an essential aspect of 
our foreign policy. 

World Environment Day Marked 
by President Ford 

Statement by President Ford ^ 

On this day, the third anniversary of the 
opening of the United Nations Conference on 
the Human Environment, it is appropriate 
that we join our neighbors throughout the 
world to reflect upon efforts being made to 
improve the quality of our global environ- 

Today there is growing recognition of 
mankind's interdependence, of our relation- 
ship with nature's other handiworks, and of 
the danger to our planet which environ- 
mental degradation poses. 

An active concern for the environment is 
the first essential step toward restoration 

'■ Issued on June 5 (text from White House press 

and preservation of environmental quality. 
We in the United States, and the citizens of 
many other countries, have taken that first 
giant step, but we have far to go. 

Through local, national, and international 
efforts, we have already begun to redeem the 
works of destruction which man has visited 
upon the earth for generations. 

We recognize that these efforts can suc- 
ceed on a global scale only if every nation 
becomes involved. Since participating in the 
United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment at Stockholm in 1972, the 
United States has joined in international 
efforts to implement the recommendations 
formulated by that conference and adopted 
by the United Nations. 

The United States has strongly supported 
the United Nations Environment Program. 
We have participated in the development of 
international conventions to protect the 
planet, its settlements, and its species. We 
have entered into bilateral environmental 
agreements with other countries. 

As the United States approaches the be- 
ginning of its third century, our desire to 
maintain and enhance the quality of life in 
this country and throughout the world re- 
mains undiminished. This nation is com- 
mitted to striving for an environment that 
not only sustains life but also enriches the 
lives of people eveiywhere — harmonizing 
the works of man and nature. This commit- 
ment has recently been reinforced by my 
proclamation, pursuant to a joint resolution 
of the Congress, designating March 21, 
1975, as Earth Day, and asking that special 
attention be given to educational efforts di- 
rected toward protecting and enhancing our 
lifegiving environment. 

In support of the action of the United 
Nations General Assembly, I am happy on 
this day. World Environment Day, to ex- 
press the dedication and deep concern of 
Americans for the goal of achieving a better 
world environment. 

July 7, 1975 



Department Discusses U.S. Policy Toward Cuba 

Statement by William D. Rogers 

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs ' 

Mr. Chairman [Representative Jonathan 
B. Bingham, chairman, Subcommittee on In- 
ternational Trade and Commerce] : I wel- 
come this opportunity to testify before the 
Subcommittee on International Trade and 
Commerce and the Subcommittee on Inter- 
national Organizations. 

You have asked for the views of the De- 
partment on H.R. 6382, introduced by your- 
self, a bill that would lift the embargo on 
U.S. trade with Cuba by removing the legis- 
lative authority for it. You also asked for a 
report on recent developments within the Or- 
ganization of American States with respect 
to the Cuban question and a statement on 
current U.S. policy. I shall cover these ques- 
tions first. I will then turn to certain others 
that directly affect U.S. -Cuban relations and 
which have been commented upon earlier dur- 
ing the joint hearings of your subcommittees, 
including Cuba's economy, the problem of 
compensation for expropriated properties, 
and human rights. 

First, I would like to say a word about 
Cuba in the context of our overall interests 
in Latin America. Cuba is the subject of in- 
tense media interest and in the U.S. Con- 
gress. Several members of this body have 
visited the island recently. 

I should not like to be understood as being 

' Made before the Subcommittees on International 
Organizations and on International Trade and Com- 
merce of the House Committee on International Af- 
fairs on June 11. The complete transcript of the 
hearings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C. 20402. 

uncomfortable with congressional study vis- 
its anywhere in Latin America. Nor am I 
concerned that the press should focus such 
lively attention on this part of the Caribbean. 
But, as Assistant Secretary in charge of our 
relations with the entire hemisphere, I can- 
not begin a discussion of Cuba without em- 
phasizing that there is a great deal more to 
Latin America — a great deal which likewise 
deserves the most serious attention of the 
American press, the Congress, and the public. 

Cuba should not distract us from the fact 
that there are some two dozen other nations 
in this Western Hemisphere, with over 200 
million people. The nations of this part of 
the world share with ours a common Western 
tradition and culture and a common origin in 
the struggle for liberty from European colo- 
nialism. All are developing. Many share a 
truly firm commitment to the open society — 
to the right of political dissent and political 
competition and to the free creative spirit. 
Such nations as Costa Rica, Venezuela, and 
Mexico, democracies all, are just a few ex- 
amples of other nations in the same region 
which deserve the sympathetic interest of 
this Congress and the American people. 

Economically, the Latin American nations 
are generally more advanced than other de- 
veloping countries. Policies to deal with hem- 
isphere issues are becoming more complex. 
Raw materials, investments, technology 
transfer, upgrading of articles in our bilater- 
al trade — these familiar issues must be 
thought through again as the environment in 
the hemisphere evolves. They are mammoth 
issues which will require the best thinking 


Department of State Bulletin 

of our people in the executive and in Con- 

I like to hope that as we move toward more 
normal relations with Cuba the attention of 
the American people, of the press, and of the 
Congress will be drawn more strongly to the 
struggling democracies of this hemisphere, 
with whom we share such strong traditions 
and interests. 

Let me now turn to the process of normal- 

Multilateral Character of Trade Constraints 

The problem is, in the first instance, a 
multilateral problem. 

You will recall that a resolution adopted by 
a two-thirds vote at the meeting of the Organ 
of Consultation of the Organization of Amer- 
ican States in 1964 mandated that the mem- 
ber states of the OAS should terminate 
diplomatic and commercial relations with 
Cuba. Our denial program antedated that res- 
olution. But the 1964 resolution, in effect, 
made it a matter of international law that we 
not reinstate trade or diplomatic relations 
with the island until the resolution is changed. 

The issue whether to reinstitute trade is 
therefore for the moment a multilateral 
issue. For us to resume bilateral commerce 
now, while the 1964 resolution is still on the 
books, would be to violate a resolution of the 
OAS. We take the resolution seriously. A 
number of other OAS countries have re- 
sumed relations, of course. But we consider 
that the United States has a particular re- 
sponsibility to honor international legal 
commitments and that a breach by us would 
have particularly grave consequences for the 
integrity and legitimacy of the general 
peace-keeping structure of the Rio Treaty. 

The difficulty with the multilateral char- 
acter of the present constraints on trade 
with Cuba is that the other nations of the 
hemisphere are not of one mind. Some 
strongly favor a repeal of the 1964 measures. 
Others oppose. The split within the hemi- 
sphere was reflected at the abortive meeting 
at Quito, Ecuador, last November, where an 
Organ of Consultation proposal to lift the 
multilateral measures got 12 votes — not the 

necessary two-thirds. The United States 
adopted a neutral attitude at Quito. 

Since then, however, as the Secretary has 
said, we have been searching with the mem- 
ber states for a solution to this divisive issue 
which could commend itself to an effective 

The Cuban measures must be dealt with 
under the procedures established in the Rio 
Treaty itself. Cuba was therefore not on 
the OAS General Assembly agenda last 
month. The Rio Treaty functions through 
the Organ of Consultation. However, the 
matter did move forward. 

As part of the eflfort to speed the process 
of OAS reform and modernization, the May 
General Assembly agreed to convene a Con- 
ference of Plenipotentiaries in San Jose, 
Costa Rica, from July 16 to 28 to refine the 
OAS Special Committee's recommendations 
on a protocol of amendment to the Rio 
Treaty, approve and open this protocol for 
signature. The work is far advanced. We 
expect the conference will reach agreement 
on a number of useful reforms, including 
the change in the voting requirement to lift 
sanctions from two-thirds to a majority. As 
you know, the United States has supported 
the change in the voting requirement. We are 
confident this change will be in the protocol 
of amendment. 

Once a protocol of amendment is ap- 
proved, it is likely there will be an effort 
to end the mandatory OAS sanctions. As 
the Secretary indicated at Houston, the 
United States stands ready to cooperate in 
reaching a generally acceptable solution.- 
We are continuing our consultations with 
ether members of the OAS on how to handle 
the issue. There is considerable sentiment 
among the member states that a way should 
be found to implement the principle of major- 
ity rule, which will be in the revised treaty, 
with respect to the existing measures against 
Cuba and without waiting for the lengthy 
process of ratification to run its course. If 
the members can translate that view into 
a resolution, we can anticipate action at the 
meeting at San Jose which will finally and 

- For Secretary Kissinger's address at Houston 
on Mar. 1, see Bulletin of Mar. 24, 1975, p. 361. 

July 7, 1975 


effectively take Cuba off the multilateral 
agenda and leave each nation free to decide 
for itself whether or not to conduct trade 
and diplomatic relations with Cuba. 

A related development at last month's 
OAS General Assembly has some bearing 
on the question of Cuba sanctions. Mexico 
sponsored a declaration — best described as 
something akin to a sense-of-Congress reso- 
lution — which stated that the members, once 
a protocol of amendment to the Rio Treaty 
had been approved, would proceed to leave 
the sanctions without effect. 

The resolution has no legal effect. It 
passed, but without the vote of enough par- 
ties to make a similar move effective under 
the Rio Treaty. We abstained, along with 
a number of other countries, on the sound 
juridical grounds that this particular reso- 
lution was improper for the General Assem- 
bly since it did not accord with the pro- 
cedures of the Rio Treaty. In abstaining, 
we made clear our desire to reach a general- 
ly acceptable solution. The indecisive result 
on the Mexican resolution illustrates the 
divided views among the OAS members and 
the importance of moving carefully within 
the OAS to construct a solid consensus at 
San Jose. 

In all this, a principal objective has been 
to find a way to clear the multilateral decks 
of this issue in a manner that helps restore 
the integrity of the Rio Treaty. The treaty, 
we think, is a useful mechanism for the 
peaceful settlement of disputes, particularly 
in respect of conflicts within the hemisphere. 
It serves as a deterrent to aggression from 
beyond the seas as well. We want to pre- 
serve and nurture it, as do the other coun- 
tries of the hemisphere. Hence, our efforts 
not to permit the transient Cuban question 
to threaten the Rio Treaty system. 

Resolving Issues Through Diplomatic Process 

As for future bilateral U.S. policy, Secre- 
tary Kissinger has made clear that we do 
not favor perpetual antagonism with Cuba. 
We have noted forthcoming and conciliatory 
statements by high Cuban Government offi- 
cials recently. There is a change of mood 

in Havana toward Washington. 

By the same token, the United States has 
made several gestures on its part toward 
Cuba recently. These include, for example, 
the permission for Cuban diplomats accred- 
ited to the United Nations to travel 250 miles 
from New York. Cuba has not reciprocated 
these gestures. Nevertheless, as the Secre- 
tary has said, "We have made clear to Cuba 
that we are prepared to improve our rela- 
tions." 3 

The several recent unoflicial visitors to 
Cuba have not attempted to, and could not, 
substitute for the process of conventional 
diplomatic negotiation. We do not consider 
them, or the public media of TV or news- 
papers, as a method of communication to 
and from Cuba. The process of improving 
and normalizing relations, in the case of 
Cuba as in other instances, is first and fore- 
most a process of negotiation. That negotia- 
tion can only be conducted by direct contacts 
between representatives of the two govern- 
ments concerned. It cannot be done indirect- 
ly through third-party intermediaries, or 
through public statements to the press. 

As to our policy, when and if the multi- 
lateral measures against Cuba are repealed 
by the OAS, there are a considerable num- 
ber of issues on both sides. Trade is one. 
We are also concerned with the question of 
family visits in both directions ; we are con- 
cerned with prisoners now in Cuban jails; 
we are concerned with the return of aircraft- 
hijack ransom money which found its way 
to Cuba and which Cuba has retained ; we 
are concerned with the question of compen- 
sation for expropriated U.S. property ; we 
are concerned with Cuba's attitude about 
Puerto Rico ; and we are concerned whether 
Cuba is prepared to follow a clear practice 
of nonintervention everywhere in the hemi- 

Cuba, on the other hand, is interested not 
only in resuming trade. It is also concerned 
with the reinstitution of diplomatic rela- 
tionships ; it is concerned with Guantanamo ; 
and it is concerned with expanding athletic 

' For an inter\'ie\v with Secretary Kissinger broad- 
cast on the NBC-TV "Today" show on May 7, see 
Bulletin of May 26, 1975, p. 671. 


Department of State Bulletin 

and cultural relations among other things. 

This agenda of interrelated and sensitive 
national interest issues can only be addressed 
through a diplomatic process which can deal 
with the total agenda coherently. That proc- 
ess, at best, will be long and intricate. For 
the Congress to concentrate on one issue 
only, to mandate the premature dismantle- 
ment of the present ban on Cuban trade 
and to open the U.S. market to Cuban im- 
ports and permit quite free export from the 
United States to Cuba without regard to the 
other circumstances of our complex relation- 
ship, would be a mistake. It would take 
away an important element of executive 
discretion in the conduct of our foreign re- 
lations. This should further complicate the 
task of putting relations with Cuba on a 
solid and mutually satisfactory basis. Con- 
gress should speak to the rules of the game. 
But it should not try to play each hand. For 
this reason we would not support H.R. 6382. 

Cuba's Economic Performance 

I now turn to Cuba's economic perform- 
ance and trade prospects. These subjects 
will be covered more thoroughly, I un- 
derstand, by Deputy Assistant Secretary 
[Arthur T.] Downey of the Commerce De- 
partment. I do wish to make some comments 
particularly as they bear on foreign policy 
and possibilities for normalizing relations 
with Cuba. 

Cuba's economic performance after 1959 
was largely shaped by two circumstances : 
the economic denial policy and ineffective 
and inconsistent economic planning. Our per- 
centage of Cuba's total foreign trade dropped 
from 66 percent in 1959 to 2 percent in 
1961 and zero in 1962, creating obvious ad- 
justment consequences. At the same time, 
indecision and false starts in market and 
production planning, perhaps illus- 
trated by the early decision to diversify out 
of sugar and the later impractical target 
of output of 10 million tons in 1970 — the 
con.sequence was limited growth in product. 

From a review of this experience stemmed 
reorganization and the beginning of better 
performance. Material incentives were sub- 
stituted for moral ones. Improved national 

planning was instituted, and accounting 
techniques were adopted. Even before the 
price of sugar soared in 1974, the Cuban 
economy had entered into a period of more 
rapid growth. Then the bonanza of soaring 
sugar prices in 1974 brought Cuba its first 
trade surplus under Castro. 

Although sugar prices already have come 
down, it is likely they will remain at levels 
higher than in the 1960's, owing to a steadily 
growing demand for sugar throughout the 
world, particularly on the part of developing 
countries. To some extent this will be offset 
by increased planting of cane and beets and 
the development of sub.stitutes. But some 
stabilization of sugar prices is a possibility. 

Cuba's other exports are minerals (mainly 
nickel), citrus fruits, rum, tobacco, and sea- 
food. Cuba is trying to increase these ex- 
ports to lessen its heavy dependence on sugar 
as a foreign exchange earner. 

Development of tourism is another poten- 
tial source of foreign exchange. Although 
there has been some ambiguity in the past 
in Cuba about welcoming large numbers of 
tourists from the rest of the hemisphere, 
recent indications point to a cautious move 
in the direction of refurbishing hotels to 
attract a share of the sunshine tourist trade. 

Our estimate is that the Cuban economy 
will continue its recent growth. Internally, 
diversification is proceeding. Externally, 
Cuba is in the process of shifting part of 
its trade from the Communist world to the 
industrialized countries of the West and 
Japan. If it proves possible to achieve nor- 
malization of U.S. -Cuban bilateral relations, 
some share of this trade would probably be 
diverted to the United States. 

Considerations Affecting Trade Prospects 

With the above in mind, I would like to 
devote a few words to prospects for U.S. 
trade with Cuba. More than 100 U.S. com- 
panies have asked us about the prospects for 
trade relations with Cuba. To our knowl- 
edge there have been few if any surveys 
by business of the potential. Most companies 
tell us they do not know the prospects but 
they do not wish to be the last to enter an 
opening market. 

July 7, 1975 


Our reading of the situation leads us to 
caution on the immediate prospects. The 
legacy of over a decade of antagonism and 
diversion of trade relations elsewhere, to- 
gether with the complex question of Cuba's 
attitude toward and respect for private en- 
terprise and private property, as reflected in 
the vexed issue of compensation for claims, 
will restrain any great expansion of business. 

I believe a number of witnesses here have 
also advised to avoid extravagant expecta- 
tions. In the long run, there may be greater 
opportunities, perhaps in yet-to-be-developed 
industries and mining processes. Indications 
now, however, are that the Cubans are 
uncertain how to face the prospect of 
American tourists and businessmen, not- 
withstanding a respect for American ad- 
vanced technology and familiarity with an 
industrial infrastructure largely of Ameri- 
can origin. 

An additional consideration of importance 
to us is that since our economic sanctions 
against Cuba were instituted we have de- 
veloped other trade relationships. As some 
Cuban leaders have said, geography dictates 
that there should be trade between the 
United States and Cuba. In principle we 
agree. But if relations are normalized, trade 
with Cuba would have to be phased so as 
not to disrupt our trade relationships with 
countries from which we have been buying 
sugar and cigars for the past decade. And 
we would imagine that Cuba would have sim- 
ilar concerns about its trading partners. 

Condition of Human Rights in Cuba 

I would now like to address briefly the 
other subject of these hearings: the question 
of human rights in Cuba. 

During the OAS General Assembly last 
month, I made a statement in the context 
of Chile. I said that no issue is more funda- 
mental to the business of the hemisphere 
than the humane tradition which is common 
to us all — the sustenance of human freedom 
and individual dignity. If we are concerned 
about human rights in Chile and elsewhere 
in the hemisphere, we should be no less so 
about human rights in nextdoor Cuba. As 
the Deputy Secretary of State wrote to 

Chairman Morgan on June 27, 1974: * 

No matter where in the world violations of human 
rights occur, they trouble and concern us and we 
make our best efforts to ascertain the facts and 
promote respect for human rights and fundamental 

We do not regard human rights as an 
exclusively domestic concern. The OAS 
member states have subscribed to interna- 
tional standards in the Universal Declara- 
tion of Human Rights and the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 
signed in Bogota in 1948. The present Cuban 
Government has never renounced the stand- 
ards established in the American Declara- 
tion although, as you know, Cuba has been 
excluded from participation in the Organi- 
zation of American States since 1962. 

Three reports by the Inter-American Hu- 
man Rights Commission issued in 1963, 1967, 
and 1970 detail the cases, and incidents 
brought before the Commission and addi- 
tional denunciations are contained in the 
Commission's annual reports. The Commis- 
sion has addressed the Government of Cuba 
on numerous occasions requesting informa- 
tion on the events denounced. In view of 
the silence of the Cuban Government, the 
Commission, in accordance with its proce- 
dures and on the basis of other factors, con- 
cluded in its 1970 report: 

1. That there are many persons in Cuba, including 
women and children, who have been jailed for po- 
litical reasons and executed without prior trial or 
after a trial in which the accused did not enjoy the 
guarantees of due process. 

2. That the situation of the political prisoners 
in Cuba sentenced to imprisonment after having 
been arbitrarily arrested and subjected to trials in 
which the guarantees of due process have not been 
observed, continues to have extremely serious char- 
acteristics incompatible with the principles set forth 
in the Charter of the OAS, the American Conven- 
tion of Human Rights, the American Declaration of 
the Rights and Duties of Man, and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. 

We condemn violations of human rights 
anywhere, including in Cuba. We regret the 
failure of the Cuban Government to cooperate 
with the Commission. 

* For text of the letter, see Bulletin of Aug. 
26, 1974, p. 310. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Mr. Chairman, two questions have arisen 
in these hearings: the current status of 
human rights in Cuba and the relationship 
between the human rights problem and U.S. 
policy toward Cuba. 

Previous witnesses before your subcom- 
mittees have estimated that there are be- 
tween 100,000 and 200,000 political prison- 
ers incarcerated in Cuba. The U.S. Govern- 
ment does not have a definite number, and 
we are not able to confirm these estimates. 
Cuban leaders have been reticent about this 
subject both publicly and in private discus- 
sions with visiting Americans. 

The only occasion we are aware of when a 
Cuban leader cited a number publicly came 
in 1965 when Prime Minister Castro told Lee 
Lockwood, a journalist, that there were 
20,000 political prisoners. In his October 
1974 interview with CBS television, Mr. 
Castro said that 80 percent of Cuban politi- 
cal prisoners had been released. These are 
the only public references by Cuban leaders 
that have come to our attention. 

If the numbers are unclear, what is cer- 
tain is that there continue to be political 
prisoners in Cuba. They include eight U.S. 
citizens serving 20-to-30-year sentences. 

Parenthetically, I might add that there 
are also 765 American citizens and 1,177 
Cuban-national relatives of our citizens pre- 
sumably still seeking to leave Cuba and 
registered with the Swiss Embassy in Ha- 
vana. Cuba claims that of these only 89 are 
American citizens. The Cuban Government 
states that the other 1,853 who registered to 
leave are Cuban-national and dual-national 
relatives. Only a handful of these persons 
has been permitted to leave Cuba annually 
since termination of repatriation flights. 

Let me turn now to the key question of 
our policy and human rights in Cuba. Since 
the break in diplomatic relations between 
our two countries 14 years ago, mutual an- 
tagonism characterized our official attitudes 
until recently. Nonetheless two understand- 
ings were reached by our governments. One 
established the airlift which enabled 265,000 
Cubans to come to our country. The other 
contributed to the near-elimination of hi- 
jackings of U.S. passenger aircraft — a 

measure which, incidentally, we regard as a 
major step forward and which represented, 
in our view, a significant gesture on the part 
of the Government of Cuba. 

The airlift is our major achievement in 
the general area of human rights during this 
entire period. In fact, it could be argued, as 
it has by some scholars, that the policy of 
international hostility increased the pro- 
pensity of the Cuban Government to internal 
repression. For example, thousands were 
arrested in the wake of the Bay of Pigs. 

It has been suggested in these hearings 
by some that reestablishment of diplomatic 
relations with Cuba could have the eff'ect 
of ameliorating human rights problems in 
Cuba or at least of providing a channel for 
the better expression of our concern. Others 
have suggested that resumption of diplo- 
matic and commercial relations would coun- 
tenance the human rights practices of the 
present Cuban administration and thus vio- 
late all moral principles. 

With regard to the first view, I would 
only say that the policy of hostility and of 
seeking Cuba's isolation had, so far as we 
can ascertain, no significant positive impact 
on Cuba's record in the human rights field. 

With regard to the second suggestion, I 
note that the United States has diplomatic 
and commercial relations with many coun- 
tries whose forms of government are con- 
trary to the democratic principles which 
guide our own nation. Senate Resolution 
205, passed in 1969, states that the recog- 
nition by the United States of a foreign 
government and exchange of diplomatic rep- 
resentations does not imply that the United 
States approves the form, ideology, or pol- 
icies of that government. We share this view 
and would emphasize that maintenance of 
relations does not imply either moral ap- 
proval or condemnation of its governmental 

In conclusion, we continue to be concerned 
with the condition of human rights in Cuba 
and to have a humanitarian interest in see- 
ing families reunited. You may be assured 
that in any future negotiations with Cuba 
this concern and interest on our part will be 

July 7, 1975 


Department Summarizes U.S. Policy 
Toward Namibia 

Statement by Xathaniel Davis 
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ' 

I am happy to have the opportunity to 
represent the Department of State before 
this subcommittee which is examining U.S. 
policy toward Namibia. The recently con- 
cluded U.N. Security Council meeting on 
Namibia has focused international attention 
on the Namibian question and on the policy 
of a number of countries, including the 
United States, toward the territory. 

I would begin by stating that the past year 
has seen no change in basic U.S. policy 
toward Namibia. We have reiterated publicly 
our support for U.N. General Assembly 
Resolution 2145 of October 1966, which 
terminated South Africa's mandate over 
Namibia, and for the conclusions of the 
International Court of Justice Advisory 
Opinion of 1971. 

We have made clear to the South African 
Government our deep concern over violations 
of human rights in the territory and have 
emphasized our position that although the 
mandate has been revoked, South Africa 
continues to have obligations to insure the 
observance of basic human rights. 

One example of our concrete concern in 
the human rights area was our persistent 
effort during the first half of 1974 to seek 
information from the South African Gov- 
ernment on the detention of some 15 SWAPO 
[South West Africa People's Organization] 
and SWAPO Youth League members ar- 
rested in late January and early February 

Efforts by our Embassy in South Africa 
to obtain particulars on these detentions, 
such as charges and planned charges, the 
legal basis of detention, access to counsel, 

> Made before the Subcommittee on International 
Resources, Food, and Energy of the House Com- 
mittee on International Relations on June 10. The 
complete transcript of the hearings will be pub- 
lished by the committee and will be available from 
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

places of detention, et cetera, began on 
February 22, 1974. After repeated oral and 
written inquiries on our part, the South 
African Department of Foreign Affairs re- 
plied on June 25 by supplying us with the 
answers to some but not all of our questions. 

Our efforts to obtain further information 
continued until all of the 15 detainees were 
either released without being charged or 
brought to trial. Officers from our Embassy 
in South Africa attended all three trials 
which were eventually held, involving five 
detainees. One detainee was found not 
guilty; two detainees, including SWAPO 
National Chairman David Meroro, were 
found guilty but received light suspended sen- 
tences. The remaining two detainees, David 
Taopopi and Joseph Kashea, were found 
guilty of attempting to incite people "to 
commit murder or to cause public violence 
or malicious damage to property in South 
West Africa" and sentenced to five years 
with thi-ee years suspended. 

Our Embassy in South Africa also made 
strong representations to the South African 
Government in November 1973 and again in 
April 1974 when we became aware of press 
reports that people in Ovamboland, northern 
Namibia, were being publicly flogged because 
of their political opposition to the South 
African administration of Namibia. On both 
occasions our Ambassador to South Africa 
made clear to high South African Depart- 
ment of Foreign Affairs officials our deep 
concern over these reported floggings and 
emphasized the ultimate responsibility which 
the South African Government bore for the 
actions of tribal authorities in Namibia. 
Since that time the appellate division of the 
South African Supreme Court, on February 
24, 1975, has enjoined such political floggings 
in Ovamboland. 

Regarding U.S. investment in and trade 
with Namibia, we continue to inform pro- 
spective U.S. investors in Namibia who come 
to our attention by letter, and in some cases 
orally, of our policy of discouraging invest- 
ment in the territory. They are also informed 
that the U.S. Government will not under- 
take to protect investments made on the 
basis of rights acquired from the South 


Department of State Bulletin 

African Government following the 1966 
termination of the mandate against the 
claims of a future lawful government in 
Namibia. In addition, Export-Import Bank 
facilities are not made available for trade 
with Namibia. U.S. firms having inve.stments 
in Namibia are informed by letter of U.S. 
support for U.N. Security Council Resolu- 
tion 310 (1972) and of our hope that they 
will seek to conform their employment 
practices to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. 

We have also sent to all U.S. companies 
having interests in Namibia a pamphlet pre- 
pared by the Department of State in Febru- 
ary 1973 entitled "Employment Practices of 
U.S. Firms in South Africa." This pamphlet 
describes the initiatives taken by various 
firms in South Africa to improve the employ- 
ment conditions of non-white workers and 
urges other countries to follow suit. In addi- 
tion these U.S. firms have received a Sep- 
tember 1974 statement in which we call upon 
U.S. firms to persist in their eff"orts to insure 
that their employees and their families have 
the means available to lead decent and pro- 
ductive lives. 

We are encouraged by Newmont Mining 
Corporation's public statement in its 1974 
annual report of its policy to adhere to fair 
employment principles and to seek applica- 
tion of these principles by its subsidiaries 
and affiliates. The annual report also states 
that the Tsumeb Corporation in Namibia, 
mostly owned by Newmont and another U.S. 
firm, American Metal Climax, Inc., has re- 
ceived permission from the de facto authori- 
ties to build an initial 100 houses for black 
workers and their families. 

We believe that our present policy on in- 
vestment reflects our concern over South 
Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia and 
our desire that the people be permitted to 
exercise their right of self-determination. 
We would hope that our investment policy, 
together with our efl'orts to encourage U.S. 
firms in Namibia to utilize enlightened em- 
ployment practices, w'ould result in a future 
lawful Namibian government being favor- 
ably disposed toward U.S. investment. How- 
ever, at this stage, it is difficult to predict 

what position such a government would take 
regarding U.S. investment. 

At this point I wish to reiterate the De- 
pai'tment's position on the granting of tax 
credits for U.S. firms doing business in 
Namibia. While the U.S. Government re- 
gards South Africa as illegally occupying 
Namibia and considers the oflScial actions of 
the South African Government to be invalid, 
the Treasury Department has determined 
that these factors are not governing in de- 
termining whether payments to the South 
African Government are creditable under 
section 901 of the Internal Revenue Code; 
thus tax credits are granted. In the Treasury 
view, the current law provides for a credit 
in the event of any payment of taxes upon 
income to a governing power without regard 
to its legality. We do not consider the grant- 
ing of the tax credit to imply any recogni- 
tion by the U.S. Government of the legality 
of the taxing power, in this case the South 
African Government. 

The U.N. Council for Namibia decree of 
September 27, 1974, for the protection of the 
natural resources of Namibia has generated 
considerable interest. This decree asserts 
that no person or corporate body may ex- 
plore, process, or export any Namibian nat- 
ural resources without the permission of the 
U.N. Council for Namibia and declares that 
concessions granted by the South African 
Government in Namibia are null and void. 
Furthermore, under the decree, natural re- 
sources taken from Namibia without the 
consent of the U.N. Council for Namibia, 
and the ships carrying them, are subject to 
seizure by or on behalf of the U.N. Council 
for Namibia, and persons and corporations 
contravening the decree may be liable for 
damages by a future independent Namibian 
government. U.N. General Assembly Resolu- 
tion 3295 of December 13, 1974, inter alia, 
requested all states to insure full compliance 
with the provisions of the decree. The United 
States abstained on the resolution, essen- 
tially because it contained a veiled call for 
chapter VII action by the Security Council. 
The Department of State takes the position 
that enforcement jurisdiction regarding this 
decree rests not with the executive branch 

July 7, 1975 


but rather with the courts and parties in- 

U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2248 
of May 19, 1967, which established the Coun- 
cil for Namibia, directed the Council to 
proceed immediately to Namibia and granted 
it broad administrative powers, all of which 
were "to be discharged in the territory." We 
have interpreted this provision to mean that 
the Council can exercise its administrative 
powers only after it gains admission to the 
territory. However, we cannot judge what 
position the courts would take should the 
Council seek legal recourse to enforce the 

The Department of State periodically re- 
views the question of U.S. membership on 
the U.N. Council for Namibia. The United 
States abstained on U.N. General Assembly 
Resolution 2248, which established the Coun- 
cil, because we believed the stated functions 
of the Council, such as traveling to Namibia 
to take over the administration of the terri- 
tory from the South African Government, 
were beyond the U.N.'s available means to 
achieve. We therefore declined to serve on 
the Council and have maintained this posi- 
tion ever since. 

Mr. Chairman, you have also requested the 
U.S. position on support for the U.N. Fund 
for Namibia and the Institute for Namibia. 
In 1974 the United States made a voluntary 
contribution of $50,000 to the U.N. Fund for 
Namibia. In making this contribution, we 
stated that further U.S. contributions to the 
Fund would be conditional upon the cessa- 
tion of allocations from the regular U.N. 
budget to the Fund. The 29th U.N. General 
Assembly in December 1974 authorized the 
appropriation of $200,000 from the U.N.'s 
general budget for the Fund for Namibia. 
Therefore we have not proposed to make a 
voluntary contribution to the Fund in 1975. 
However, on March 21, 1975, the United 
States pledged, subject to congressional ap- 
proval, $50,000 to the U.N. Education and 
Training Program for Southern Africa to 
be earmarked for the training of Namibians. 

With regard to the Institute for Namibia 
to be established in Lusaka, we agree in 
principle with the purpose of its creation. 

We are awaiting further details, particularly 
budgetary, regarding its establishment and 
functions. We will then be in a position to 
decide what concrete assistance, if any, we 
are prepared to offer. 

Regarding the future of Namibia, we hold 
the following views: 

a. All Namibians should, within a short 
time, be given the opportunity to express 
their views freely and under U.N. super- 
vision on the political future and constitu- 
tional structure of the territory; 

b. All Namibian political groups should 
be allowed to campaign for their views and 
to participate without hindrance in peaceful 
political activities in the course of the proc- 
ess of self-determination; 

c. The territory should not be split up in 
accordance with apartheid policy; and 

d. The future of Namibia should be de- 
termined by the freely expressed choice of 
its inhabitants. 

Over the past year the U.S. Government 
has made known its views on the future of 
Namibia both directly and indirectly to the 
South African Government. In late Novem- 
ber and early December 1974, we conveyed 
to the South African Government our belief 
that South Africa should make plans in con- 
sultation with the U.N. Secretary General 
for speedy self-determination within the 
whole territory and issue a specific statement 
of its intentions toward the territory. On 
December 17, 1974, we joined in the unani- 
mous adoption of U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 366, which demanded that South 
Africa take a number of actions including 
the necessary steps to transfer power to the 
people of Namibia with U.N. assistance. On 
April 22 we joined with the British and 
French in a tripartite approach to the South 
African Government to express our views on 
the future of Namibia. 

The South African Government issued 
virtually identical responses to the April 22 
tripartite approach and to Security Council 
Resolution 366 on May 27. In these responses 
the South African Government emphasized 
its standing policies on Namibia. It did state 
that unitary independence was one of the 


Department of State Bulletin 

options open to the inhabitants of the terri- 
tory who would determine freely their own 
political and constitutional future and that 
it would administer the territory "only as 
long as the inhabitants so wish." 

The South African Government asserted 
that while it ruled out U.N. supervision 
of Namibia, it expressed Prime Mini-ster 
Vorster's willingness to discuss the Nami- 
bian situation with a mutually acceptable 
representative of the U.N. Secretary Gen- 
eral, African leaders, the President of the 
U.N. Council for Namibia and the OAU 
[Organization of African Unity] Special 
Committee on Namibia (composed of the 
seven African members of the U.N. Council 
for Namibia). These responses did not indi- 
cate that South Africa was willing to with- 
draw from Namibia in accordance with U.N. 
resolutions, nor did they give significant 
details for proceeding to self-determination 
along lines stipulated by these U.N. reso- 

The U.S. Government approached last 
week's Security Council debate on Namibia 
believing that there had been some forward 
movement in the Namibian situation over 
the preceding six months, but clearly not 
enough. We were disappointed at the pace 
of movement toward genuine self-deter- 

However, in order to deal realistically 
with the present situation, we believe that 
South Africa's offer to resume a dialogue 
with a representative of the U.N. Secretary 
General and to hold discussions with various 
African leaders, the President of the U.N. 
Council for Namibia, and the OAU Special 
Committee on Namibia should be explored 
and South Africa should be induced to move 
from general statements of purpose to spe- 
cific implementing action. We reiterate our 
belief that U.N. supervision of the self- 
determination process is necessary to assure 
the international community that Namibians 
will be able to choose freely their political 

Efforts to negotiate an acceptable resolu- 
tion in the Security Council debate were un- 
successful. As I have said, we condemn 
South Africa's continued and illegal occu- 

pation of Namibia, and we made this clear 
during our participation in the Council's 
debates. However, we believe that the most 
effective way to bring about the genuine 
exercise of the right of self-determination 
for all Namibians is through continued 
efforts to induce South Africa to move more 
quickly to implement its agreement to such 
a right. There were serious and good-faith 
efforts to work out a meaningful compromise 
text during the negotiations at the United 
Nations last week, but in the end the Afri- 
can group decided to press for a vote on 
its text. We shall continue to work through 
the U.N. and with interested parties for the 
implementation of U.N. resolutions regard- 
ing Namibia. 

Corporate Payments Abroad 
Discussed by Department 

Statement by Mark B. Feldman 
Deputy Legal Adviser > 

In recent weeks, the media have carried 
a number of stories dealing with reported 
political contributions and other payments 
by U.S. firms to foreign government officials. 
Such payments and their disclosure can have 
important ramifications for our foreign rela- 
tions and economic interests. It would not 
be appropriate for the Department of State 
to comment on the details of individual cases 
which are currently under investigation by 
other U.S. Government agencies ; I would, 
however, like to discuss with you the effects 
some of these developments have had on 
our foreign relations, and what the State 
Department believes the U.S. Government 
should do about it. 

At the outset, I want to make clear that 
the Department of State cannot and does not 

' Made before the Subcommittee on International 
Economic Policy of the House Committee on Inter- 
national Relations on June 5. The complete tran- 
script of the hearings will be published by the com- 
mittee and will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 

July 7, 1975 


condone illegal activities by American firms 
operating in other countries. We condemn 
such actions in the strongest terms. Illicit 
contributions and their disclosure can ad- 
versely affect governments, unfairly tarnish 
the reputation of responsible American busi- 
nessmen, and make it more difficult for the 
U.S. Government to assist U.S. firms in the 
lawful pursuit of their legitimate business 
interests abroad. 

Let me give a few examples of events 
related to the disclosures of the last weeks 
which have impacted on our foreign rela- 

— The head of a friendly government has 
been removed from office and other friendly 
leaders have come under political attack. 

— Both multinational enterprises and U.S. 
Government agencies have been accused of 
attempting to subvert foreign governments. 

— A firm linked with payments in one 
country has had property in another coun- 
try expropriated, not because of any alleged 
improprieties in that country, but simply on 
the grounds that it was an "undesirable 

— Several governments have presented 
firms suspected of making payments with 
ultimatums of economic retaliation or crim- 
inal prosecution. 

These are certainly disturbing develop- 
ments. They underscore the reason that the 
U.S. Government urges our enterprises to 
respect the laws of all the nations in which 
they operate and to conduct themselves as 
good corporate citizens of those nations. Yet 
companies cannot operate in a vacuum, and 
it is the responsibility of host governments 
to set out the rules under which firms and 
public officials deal with each other. 

Regrettably, governments, as well as firms, 
have not always exercised their responsi- 
bilities in this area. Investors frequently 
find themselves in countries whei'e the laws 
dealing with political contributions, agents' 
fees, or other payments are unclear or un- 
enforced. In countries where small payments 
are a necessity for getting things done at 
the lowest echelons of the bureaucracy, 
larger payments may be solicited or de- 

manded by high-level officials. It should also 
be noted that these problems are not con- 
fined to American enterprises. Foreign 
competition frequently contributes to these 

By describing such conditions, I am not 
trying to excuse improper activities by U.S. 
firms. Far from it. Corruption weakens the 
fabric of government, erodes popular sup- 
port, and jeopardizes the important interests 
we share with our friends abroad. 

The free enterprise system is a vital factor 
in world economic growth upon which social 
progress, economic justice, and perhaps 
world peace depends. There are many op- 
ponents eager to restrict free enterprise, 
and every American businessman who in- 
vests or sells abroad holds an important 
trust for the integrity of the system. 

What, then, should be done? 

First, it is important that all U.S. in- 
vestors and foreign governments clearly 
understand that we condemn payments to 
foreign government officials and that any 
investor who makes them cannot look to the 
Department of State to protect him from 
legitimate law enforcement actions by the 
responsible authorities of either the host 
country or the United States. 

Second, the U.S. agencies investigating 
these cases should cooperate with responsible 
foreign authorities seeking information con- 
sistent with the requirements of our laws 
and procedural fairness. However, these 
agencies cannot act on the basis of rumor 
or speculation. 

Third, the U.S. Government will provide 
appropriate diplomatic protection to Amer- 
ican nationals abroad who are not treated 
fairly in accordance with international law. 
We are concerned at threats of extrajudicial 
sanctions which may be disproportionate to 
the offense and based on unproved allega- 
tions. We do not believe that economic 
retaliation is an appropriate response to 
payments which, although controversial, are 
either lawful under the foreign law con- 
cerned, or if unlawful, are subject to specific 
civil or criminal penalties prescribed by that 

Beyond these clear statements of policy, 


Department of State Bulletin 

however, I believe that we need to move 
carefully. Some have suggested that we 
should enact legislation making it a criminal 
act for U.S. companies to engage abroad in 
what we regard as improper activities here 
at home, such as corporate political contri- 
butions. Although investors operating in 
foreign lands would be wise to avoid even 
the appearance of impropriety in those coun- 
tries, we believe it would not be advisable 
for the United States to try to legislate the 
limits of permissible conduct by our firms 
abroad. It would be not only presumptuous 
but counterproductive to seek to impose our 
specific standards in countries with diff"ering 
histories and cultures. Moreover, enforce- 
ment of such legislation would involve sur- 
veillance of the activities of foreign ofl^icials 
as well as U.S. businessmen and would be 
widely resented abroad. 

Extraterritorial application of U.S. law, 
which is what such legislation would entail, 
has often been viewed by other governments 
as a sign of U.S. arrogance or even as inter- 
ference in their internal affairs. U.S. penal 
laws are normally based on territorial juris- 
dictions, and with rare exceptions, we be- 
lieve that is sound policy. 

There are other actions that can be taken, 
however. The Securities and Exchange Com- 
mission and other regulatory agencies have 
the authority to protect specific American 
intere-sts in foreign transactions, such as the 
disclosure of material information necessary 
to protect the investment of shareholders 
in public companies. The SEC has demon- 
strated that it is prepared to act forcefully 
in these cases, and that demonstration should 
have a positive eifect on U.S. businessmen 
and on those they deal with abroad. 

In addition, the executive agencies respon- 
sible for administering programs abroad 
which may provide temptations for such 
activities need to review their procedures 
to see whether additional measures might be 
effective. The Department of State and the 
Defense Department have begun such a re- 
view of the foreign military sales program, 
and we expect improved procedures to result 
that should be helpful. 

Another possible approach could be to 

reflect our position in a code of conduct con- 
cerning multinational corporations (MNC's). 
The U.S. Government has indicated in a 
number of international fora that it is will- 
ing to examine the possibility of development 
of guidelines relative to MNC's, provided 
that such guidelines take into account the 
responsibilities of host states as well as those 
of enterprises. If other governments are 
agreeable, such a code might include a spe- 
cific provision to the effect that foreign 
investors should neither make nor be so- 
licited to make payments to government offi- 
cials or contributions to political parties or 
candidates. This would be a modest step, 
but international acceptance of this principle 
might help to relieve pressures for question- 
able payments. 

I am sure, Mr. Chairman, that all of the 
members of this committee appreciate the 
complexities of this problem. Corruption of 
friendly foreign governments undermines 
the most important objectives of our foreign 
relations. But experience shows the United 
States cannot police foreign societies. In the 
final analysis the only solution to corruption 
lies in the societies concerned. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

94th Congress, Ist Session 

Granting an Alien Child Adopted by an Unmarried 
United States Citizen the Same Immigrant Status 
as an Alien Child Adopted by a United States 
Citizen and His Spouse. Report of the House 
Committee on the Judiciary to accompany H.R. 
568. H. Kept. 94-121. March 26, 1975. 7 pp. 

Foreign Service Buildings Act, 1926. Report of the 
House Committee on International Relations to 
accompany H.R. 5810. H. Rept. 94-140. April 10, 
1975. 6 pp. 

Congress and Foreign Policy: 1974. Prepared for the 
House Committee on International Relations by 
the Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional Re- 
search Service, Library of Congress. April 15, 
1975. 72 pp. 

Vietnam Contingency Act of 1975. Report of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, together 
with individual views, to accompany S. 1484. S. 
Rept. 94-88. April 18, 1975. 26 pp. 

Ending the Conflict in Vietnam. Report of the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany S. 
Res. 133. S. Rept. 94-89. April 18, 1975. 2 pp. 

July 7, 1975 



U.S. Vetoes Resolution on Namibia 
in U.N. Security Council 

Following are statements made in the U.N. 
Security Council by U.S. Representative 
John Scali on June 3 and June 6, together 
ivith the text of a draft res^lutdon which 
ivas vetoed by the United Stales and two 
other permanent members of the Council on 
June 6. 


Statement of June 3 

USUN press release 63 dated June 3 

Last December the United States sup- 
ported Security Council Resolution 366. We 
voted "yes" in the belief that the text, though 
imperfect in some ways, adequately reflected 
our view that South Africa should act quick- 
ly and decisively to end its illegal occupation 
of Namibia. We believe, moreover, that the 
Security Council rightly placed its views and 
recommendations before the South African 
Government and urged it to move promptly 
along the path indicated. 

During the last six months, there has 
been some forward movement in the Nami- 
bian situation, but not enough. It is clear, 
however, that regardless of how disappointed 
we are at the pace of steps toward genuine 
self-determination, we must move carefully 
lest we worsen rather than improve the out- 
look for justice and freedom. 

In this connection we hear calls for an 
arms embargo. The record of the U.S. 
Government in this respect is one of which 
the American people can be proud. For 12 
years the U.S. Government has voluntarily 
refused to allow shipments of American 
arms and military equipment to South 
Africa. Our government has done this as 
a matter of principle. We do so out of con- 

viction and not because we are required to 
do so by an international forum. If others 
wish, they can join us in such a voluntary 
policy, and we earnestly invite them to do so. 
As the Security Council considers what 
constructive steps it can take for the future 
of Namibia, there are four fundamental 
questions as we see them : 

— Whether there is a commitment by South 
Africa to a course of self-determination for 
all the people of Namibia and to respect for 
their rights ; 

— The timing of steps toward self-deter- 
mination once that principle is accepted by 
South Africa; 

— The question whether all Namibians, of 
whatever color, political affiliation, or social 
origin, would have their voices heard in 
determining the future of the territory; and 

— The U.N.'s role in the process of self- 
determination for all the people of Namibia. 

The South African Government made pub- 
lic its position on Namibia in a letter from 
Foreign Minister Muller to Secretary Gen- 
eral Waldheim on May 27. In this letter, 
the South African Foreign Minister restated 
many positions already put forward by his 

My delegation believes we should explore 
South Africa's offer to resume a dialogue 
with a representative of the U.N. Secretary 
General and to enter into discussions with 
African leaders, with the Chairman of the 
United Nations Council for Namibia, and 
with the Special Committee of the Organiza- 
tion of African Unity (OAU). We fully 
recognize the past difficulties in such dia- 
logues and note the restrictive terms of 
South Africa's present offer. Nonetheless, 
in our view, it is important that new efforts 
be made to determine whether, in fact, a 
genuine discussion can now be initiated in 
these channels. 

We also note that the letter of May 27, 


Department of State Bulletin 

in discussing the future of the territory, 
states that all options are open, including 
"independence as one state." We have also 
noted that this letter reiterates South Afri- 
ca's recognition of the international status 
of the territory and states that it is the 
South African Government's wish that a con- 
stitutional conference take place in as short 
a time as possible. 

Mr. Muller's v^'ords go somewhat beyond 
the assurances he gave the Secretary Gen- 
eral in April 1973. They may reflect a more 
realistic appraisal of the situation in south- 
ern Africa. Ambiguities remain, and South 
Africa should provide clarification of its 
intent. We wish to know more precisely 
when and in what manner the planned 
constitutional convention will be conducted 
and who exactly will participate. 

During the Council's debate on December 
17, 1974, I called unequivocally for precision 
and detail in South African planning for 
Namibia's future. Coupled with positive ac- 
tion. Such clarity is called for to insure a 
peaceful and realistic settlement of the ter- 
ritory's future. Mr. Muller's most recent 
statements may off'er hope that South Africa 
will allow a truly fair exercise of self- 
determination in Namibia. 

South Africa must now move from gen- 
eral statements of purpose to specific imple- 
menting action. Can South Africa be in any 
doubt that the international community 
wants these steps to define Namibia's separ- 
ate status and the timetable for carrying 
them out, and these to be stated in unam- 
biguous terms? 

At its meeting in Dar es Salaam in April, 
the OAU Council of Ministers reviewed the 
situation in Namibia and adopted a compre- 
hensive declaration on the territory aimed 
at overcoming South Africa's recalcitrance. 
Members of the Security Council, including 
the United States, have also been active in 
seeking to encourage South Africa to move 
forward decisively in Namibia to allow the 
Namibian people to express their views free- 
ly on the political future and the constitu- 
tional structure of the territory. 

The United Nations, and this Council espe- 
cially, have a unique and grave responsibility 

for Namibia and its future. South Africa 
has now given us some reason to expect 
that it acknowledges the interest of the 
international community in Namibia even 
though it still has not accepted U.N. partici- 
pation in the process of self-determination 
for Namibia. Once again we declare to South 
Africa that it is our considered view that 
without a role for the United Nations in 
the self-determination process, the interna- 
tional community cannot judge progress ob- 
jectively and therefore cannot be satisfied 
that the people of Namibia will be able to 
exercise a democratic choice as to their 

The United States, for its part, remains 
committed to the view (a) that all the people 
of Namibia should within a short time be 
given the opportunity to express their views 
freely and under U.N. supervision on the 
political future and constitutional structure 
of the territory; (b) that all Namibian po- 
litical groups should be allowed to cam- 
paign for their views and to participate with- 
out hindrance in peaceful political activities 
in the course of the process of self-deter- 
mination; (c) that the territory should not 
be split up in accordance with the policy of 
apartheid; and (d) that the future of 
Namibia should be determined by the freely 
expressed choice of its inhabitants. 

As we continue to press for these goals, 
the United States will sustain its present 
policies with regard to the territory. We 
will continue to discourage U.S. investment 
in Namibia and to deny Export-Import Bank 
guarantees and other facilities for trade with 
Namibia. We will continue to withhold U.S. 
Government protection of U.S. investments 
made on the basis of rights acquired through 
the South African Government after 196G 
against the claims of a future lawful govern- 
ment of Namibia. This policy reflects our 
.•^trongly held belief that South Africa should 
act in the immediate future to end its illegal 
occupation of Namibia. 

Mr. President, the obligation of this Coun- 
cil is to foster a peaceful and just settle- 
ment. Our agreed goal is the exercise by 
the people of Namibia of their right to self- 
determination. As a responsible delibera- 

Joly 7, 1975 


tive body, it is our duty to encourage all the 
parties concerned and to explore every pos- 
sible opportunity for launching the process 
of timely self-determination. 

In view of the facts of the Namibian 
situation, it is difficult to find that a threat 
to international peace and security exists 
within the meaning of the charter. The party 
seen by some as causing the threat has 
agreed on some of the objectives desired by 
the international community and has offered 
to exchange views on the means of achieving 
them. This clearly does not add up to a 
crisis, peace-and-war situation at this time. 

Thus, in our view, it would not be appro- 
priate to invoke mandatory sanctions which 
specifically are reserved for threats to the 
peace. We believe the Council, in collabora- 
tion with other African states, should insist 
that South Africa give concrete effect to its 
words, give firm assurances about the issues 
on which it has not yet declared its position, 
and move forward with dispatch toward a 
new environment of freedom in southern 

Statement of June 6 

USUN press release 64 dated June 6 

On behalf of my government, I have voted 
"no" on draft resolution S/11713 with grave 
reluctance and concern. 

The power of the permanent members of 
the Security Council to cast a veto is a 
right that must be exercised after the most 
careful and solemn consideration. Indeed, 
this occasion marks only the seventh time in 
the 29-year history of the United Nations 
that the United States has found it necessary 
to do so. But my government believes that 
the situation in Namibia, however illegal, 
however unacceptable to the international 
community, does not constitute a threat to 
international peace and security. 

We recognize that many of the states 
represented around the Security Council 
table have a different view. But we are 
obliged to make our own careful estimate 
of the conditions which we believe to exist 

and to act accordingly within the Charter 
of the United Nations, which all of us have 
pledged to uphold. 

As I said on behalf of the United States 
in my opening statement June 3, we cannot 
accept the view that there exists a threat 
to the peace in Namibia in a situation where 
the wrongdoer. South Africa, has offered, 
even if on terms not entirely to our liking, 
to enter into discussions with the organized 
international community on the objective of 
self-determination for Namibia. 

The United States wishes to draw atten- 
tion to the praiseworthy efforts of several 
members of the Council in seeking to draft 
a resolution which all members could have 
supported. These delegations sought over 
many hours to point the way for this Coun- 
cil to adopt practical measures to advance 
the struggle for freedom and justice in 
Namibia. The goal of a resolution which, 
unhappily, never was tabled could, in our 
view, have led to visible progress rather than 
a debate ending in dispute and deadlock. 
My delegation is gravely disappointed that 
these serious efforts to find an acceptable 
middle way have failed. 

In this situation we feel compelled to ask: 
Who will benefit from the inability of the 
Council to take the effective action which 
would have been possible today? Once again, 
in contrast to the usefulness of the Council's 
unanimity in the case of Resolution 366, we 
have today yielded to the lure of rhetoric, 
which should never be mistaken for effective 
action in the real world. 

Who will find comfort in the failure of 
this Council? Certainly not the United 
States, which has a long record of working 
for universal recognition that Namibia is a 
serious, solemn international responsibility. 

As I said in my speech on Tuesday, the 
United States for 12 long years has fol- 
lowed a policy of banning all arms and 
military supplies to South Africa. We have 
done so voluntarily as a matter of principle — 
deliberately — to avoid encouraging Pretoria 
to think the United States will sacrifice na- 
tional principle for military or financial 


Department of State Bulletin 

gain. We will continue to uphold principle. 
We pray we have not lost momentum in the 
struggle for freedom and justice in southern 


The Security Council, 

Recalling General Assembly resolution 2145 
(XXI) of 27 October 1966, which terminated South 
Africa's mandate over the Territory of Namibia, 
and resolution 2248 (S-V), of 19 May 1967, which 
established the United Nations Council for Namibia, 
as well as all other subsequent resolutions on 
Namibia, in particular resolution 3295 (XXIX) of 
13 December 1974, 

Recalling Security Council resolution 245 (1968) 
of 25 January and 246 (1968) of 15 March 1968, 264 
(1969) of 12 August 1969, 276 (1970) of 30 January, 
282 (1970) of 23 July, 283 (1970) and 284 (1970) of 
29 July 1970, 300 (1971) of 12 October and 301 
(1971) of 20 October 1971, 310 (1972) of 4 February 
1972 and 366 (1974) of 17 December 1974, which 
confirmed General Assembly decisions. 

Recalling the advisory opinion of the Interna- 
tional Court of Justice of 21 June 1971 that South 
Africa is under obligation to withdraw its presence 
from the Territory, 

Taking note of the letter dated 27 May 1975, 
addressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
South Africa to the Secretary-General (S/11701), 

Having heard the statement by the President of 
the United Nations Council for Namibia, 

Having considered the statement by Mr. Sam 
Nujoma, President of the South West Africa Peo- 
ple's Organization (SWAPO), 

Gravely concerned about South Africa's continued 
illegal occupation of Namibia and its persistent 
refusal to comply with resolutions and decisions of 
the General Assembly and the Security Council, as 
well as with the advisory opinion of the Interna- 
tional Court of Justice of 21 June 1971, 

Gravely concerned at South Africa's brutal re- 
pression of the Namibian people and its persistent 
violations of their human rights, as well as its 
efforts to destroy the national unity and territorial 
integrity of Namibia, 

Reaffirming the inalienable and imprescriptible 
rights of the people of Namibia to self-determina- 

' U.N. doc. S/11713; the draft resolution was not 
adopted owing to the negative vote of three perma- 
nent members of the Council, the vote being 10 in 
favor, 3 against (U.S., France, U.K.), with 2 
abstentions (Italy, Japan). 

tion, national independence and the preservation of 
their territorial integrity. 

Noting with concern that South Africa has not 
made the declaration demanded in paragraph 3 of 
resolution 366 (1974) of the Security Council, 

Further noting with the deepest concern that the 
demands in paragraphs 4 and 5 in the aforemen- 
tioned resolution have been totally ignored by South 

1. Condemns South Africa's failure to comply 
with terms of Security Council resolution 366 
(1974) of 17 December 1974; 

2. Condemns once again the continued illegal 
occupation of the Territory of Namibia by South 

3. Further condemns the illegal and arbitrary 
application by South Africa of racially discrimina- 
tory and repressive laws and practices in Namibia; 

4. Demands that South Africa put an end forth- 
with to its policy of bantustans and the so-called 
homelands aimed at violating the national unity and 
the territorial integrity of Namibia; 

5. Further demands that South Africa proceed 
urgently with the necessary steps to withdraw from 
Namibia and, to that end, to implement the measures 
stipulated in resolution 366 (1974); 

6. Reaffirms the legal responsibility of the United 
Nations over Namibia and demands that South 
Africa take appropriate measures to enable the 
United Nations Council for Namibia to establish its 
presence in the Territory with a view to facilitating 
the transfer of power to the people of Namibia; 

7. Declares that in order for the people of 
Namibia to freely determine their own future it is 
imperative that free elections be organized under 
the supervision and control of the United Nations 
as soon as possible and, in any case, not later than 
1 July 1976; 

8. Affirms its support for the struggle of the 
People of Namibia for self-determination and 

9. Acting under Chapter VII of the United 
Nations Charter, 

(a) Determines that the illegal occupation of the 
Territory of Namibia by South Africa constitutes a 
threat to international peace and security; 

(b) Decides that all States shall prevent: 

(i) Any supply of arms and ammunition to South 

(ii) Any supply of aircraft, vehicles and military 
equipment for use of the armed forces and para- 
military organizations of South Africa; 

(iii) Any supply of spare parts for arms, vehicles 
and military equipment used by the armed forces 
and paramilitary organization of South Africa; 

(iv) Any activities in their territories which pro- 
mote or are calculated to promote the supply of 

July 7, 1975 


arms, ammunition, military aircraft and military 
vehicles to South Africa and equipment and mate- 
rials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms 
and ammunition in South Africa and Namibia; 

10. Decides that all States shall give eflfect to the 
decision set out in paragraph 9 (b) of this resolu- 
tion notwithstanding any contract entered into or 
licence granted before the date of this resolution, 
and that they notify the Secretary-General of the 
measures they have taken to comply with the 
aforementioned provision; 

11. Decides that provisions of paragraph 9 (b) 
shall remain in effect until it has been established, 
to the satisfaction of the Security Council, that the 
illegal occupation of the Territory of Namibia by 
South Africa has been brought to an end; 

12. Requests the Secretary-General, for the pur- 
pose of the effective implementation of this resolu- 
tion, to arrange for the collection and systematic 
study of all available data concerning international 
trade in the items which should not be supplied to 
South Africa under paragraph 9 (b) above; 

13. Requests the Secretary-General to report to 
the Security Council concerning the implementation 
of paragraph 7 and other provisions of this resolu- 

14. Decides to remain seized of the matter and 
to meet on or before 30 September 1975 for the 
purpose of reviewing South Africa's compliance 
with the terms of the relevant paragraphs of this 
resolution, and in the event of non-compliance by 
South Africa to taking further appropriate measures 
under the Charter. 

U.N. Disengagement Observer Force 
in Israel-Syria Sector Extended 

Following is a statement made in the U.N. 
Security Council by U.S. Representative 
John Scali on May 28, together with the text 
of a resolution adopted by the Council that 


USUN press release 53 dated May 28 

I welcome the opportunity today to par- 
ticipate in the decision of the Security Coun- 
cil to renew for an additional six months the 
mandate of the U.N. Disengagement Ob- 
server Force. We believe this Force is im- 
portant to the maintenance of the disengage- 

ment agreements between Syria and Israel. 

On behalf of the United States, I express 
once again our appreciation for all the efforts 
of the Secretary General and his associates 
in maintaining UNDOF in accordance with 
the wishes of this Council. We particularly 
commend those governments which contrib- 
ute officers and troops to UNDOF, the men 
who -serve there, and the Officer in Charge, 
Col. Hannes Philipp. We are especially 
pleased that the Secretary General is able to 
report that both parties have generally com- 
plied with the agreement on disengagement 
and that the cease-fire has been maintained. 
This is a job well done. 

I congratulate you, Mr. President, for your 
efforts in working out this resolution for 
presentation to the Council and assuring its 
prompt adoption. All concerned are to be 
warmly congratulated on this constructive 


The Security Council, 

Hai'ing considered the report of the Secretary- 
General on the United Nations Disengagement 
Observer Force (S/11694), 

Having noted the efforts made to establish a dur- 
able and just peace in the Middle East area and the 
developments in the situation in the area, 

Expressing concern over the prevailing state of 
tension in the area. 

Reaffirming that the two Agreements on disen- 
gagement of forces are only a step towards the 
implementation of Security Council resolution 338 

Decides : 

(a) To call upon the parties concerned to imple- 
ment immediately Security Council resolution 338 

(b) To renew the mandate of the United Nations 
Disengagement Observer Force for another period 
of six months; 

(c) To request the Secretary-General to submit 
at the end of this period a report on the develop- 
ments in the situation and the measures taken to 
implement Security Council resolution 338 (1973). 

•U.N. doc. S/RES/369 (1975); adopted by the 
Council on May 28 by a vote of 13 (U.S.) to 0, with 
the People's Republic of China and Iraq not par- 
ticipating in the vote. 


Department of State Bulletin 


Current Actions 



International agreement for the creation at Paris 
of an International Office for Epizootics, with 
annex. Done at Paris January 25, 1924. Entered 
into force January 17, 1925.' 

histi-ument of accessioji signed by the President: 
June 9, 1975. 

Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the development, 
production, and stockpiling of bacteriological (bio- 
logical) and toxin weapons and on their destruc- 
tion. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow 
April 10, 1972. Entered into force March 26, 1975. 
Ratifications deposited: Lebanon, June 13, 1975; 
Malta, April 7, 1975; Qatar, April 17, 1975. 


Protocol for the continuation in force of the inter- 
national coffee agreement 1968, as amended and 
extended (TIAS 6584, 7809), with annex. Ap- 
proved by the International Coffee Council at 
London September 26, 1974.= 
Approval deposited: France, May 9, 1975. 

Cultural Property 

Convention on the means of prohibiting and pre- 
venting the illicit import, export, and transfer of 
ownership of cultural property. Adopted at Paris 
November 14, 1970. Entered into force April 24, 

Acceptance deposited: Iran, January 27, 1975. 
Ratification deposited: Tunisia, March 10, 1975. 


Agreement amending the agreement of November 
18, 1974, on an international energy program. 
Done at Paris February 5, 1975. Entered into force 
March 21, 1975. 


Amendment to articles 24 and 25 of the constitution 
of the World Health Organization of July 22, 
1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at 
Geneva May 23, 1967. Entered into force May 21, 
Acceptance deposited: Nepal, May 20, 1975. 


Strasbourg agreement concerning the international 
patent classification. Done at Strasbourg March 
24, 1971. Enters into force October 7, 1975. 

Notifications from World Intellectxial Property 
Organization that ratifications deposited : Fin- 
land, May 16, 1975; Monaco, June 13, 1975. 

Property — Industrial 

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial 
property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at 
Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 
entered into force May 19, 1970; for the United 
States August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 
entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United 
States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923. 
Notification from World Intellectual Property 

Organization that ratification deposited: France, 

May 12, 1975. 
Notification from World Intellectual Property 

Organization that accession deposited: Upper 

Volta, June 2, 1975. 
Nice agreement concerning the international classi- 
fication of goods and services for the purposes of 
the registration of marks of June 15, 1957, as 
revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967. Entered 
into force March 18, 1970; for the United States 
May 25, 1972. TIAS 7419. 
Notification from World Intellectual Property 

Organization that ratification deposited: 

France, May 12, 1975. 
Locarno agreement establishing an international 
classification for industrial designs, with annex. 
Done at Locarno October 8, 1968. Entered into 
force April 27, 1971; for the United States May 
25, 1972. TIAS 7420. 
Notifications from World Intellectual Property 

Organization that ratifications deposited: 

France, June 13, 1975; Italy, May 12, 1975. 

Property — Intellectual 

Convention establishing the World Intellectual 
Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July 
14, 1967. Entered into force April 26, 1970; for 
the United States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932. 
Accession deposited: Upper Volta, May 23, 1975. 


Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade 
convention (part of the international wheat agree- 
ment) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at Washing- 
ton April 2, 1974. Entered into force June 19, 
1974, with respect to certain provisions and July 
1, 1974, with respect to other provisions. 
Ratification deposited: Tunisia, June 18, 1975. 
Declaration of provisional application deposited: 

Iran, June 17, 1975. 
Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat 
trade convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at 
Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force 
June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions 
and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions. 
Ratifications deposited: Australia, June 13, 1975; 

Canada, June 18, 1975; Egypt, June 17, 1975; 

Korea, June 18, 1975; Pakistan, June 17, 1975; 

' Not in force for the United States. 
■ Not in force. 

July 7, 1975 


Sweden, June 16, 1975; Vatican City State, 
June 16, 1975. 
Approval deposited: Norway, June 18, 1975. 
Declarations of provisional appUcatiov deposited: 
Finland, June 16, 1975; Iran, Kenya, Syrian 
Arab Republic, June 17, 1975; Belgium," Brazil, 
European Economic Community,' France,' Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany," Guatemala, Ireland,' 
Israel, Italy,' Japan,' Libya, Luxembourg,' 
Morocco, Netherlands,' ' United States,' June 18, 
Accessions deposited: Lebanon, June 13, 1975; 
Panama, June 16, 1975; Denmark,' Greece, 
Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom," June 
18, 1975. 
Protocol modifying and further extending the food 
aid convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at 
Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force 
June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions 
and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions. 
Ratifications deposited: Australia, June 13, 1975; 
Canada, June 18, 1975; Sweden, June 16, 1975. 
Declarations of provisional application deposited: 
Finland, June 16, 1975; Belgium, European 
Economic Community, France, Federal Republic 
of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan,' Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, United States,' June 18, 1975. 
Accessions deposited: Denmark, United Kingdom, 
June 18, 1975. 



Agreement relating to the reciprocal acceptance of 
airworthiness certifications. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Washington December 24, 1974, and 
June 11, 1975. Entered into force June 11, 1975. 

Agreement for the reciprocal acceptance of cer- 
tificates of airworthiness for imported aircraft. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington 
November 20, 1959. Entered into force November 
20, 1959. TIAS 4.358. 
Terminated: June 11, 1975. 

RepubJJc of China 

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and 
man-made fiber textiles and apparel products, 
with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington May 21, 1975. Entered into force 
May 21, 1975; effective January 1, 1975. 

' With a statement. 

' With respect to the Kingdom in Europe and to 

' Applicable to Dominica, Saint Christopher, Nevis 
and Anguilla, Saint Vincent, Bailiwick of Guernsey, 
Isle of Man, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Is- 
lands, Gibraltar, Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony, 
Hong Kong, Montserrat, Saint Helena and Depend- 
encies, and Seychelles. 


Agreement relating to cooperation in the areas of 
technology, research and development. Signed at 
Washington June 6, 1975. Entered into force 
provisionally, June 6, 1975; definitively, on the 
date of receipt of the later of the two notes where- 
by the contracting parties inform each other that 
the constitutional procedures required to give 
effect to the agreement have been fulfilled. 


Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. 
Signed at Conakry May 8, 1975. Entered into 
force May 8, 1975. 


.Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, 
with agreed minutes. Signed at Jakarta May 30, 
1975. Entered into force May 30, 1975. 

New Zealand 

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports 
from New Zealand of fresh, chilled or frozen 
meat of cattle, goats, and sheep, except lambs, 
during calendar year 1975. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Washington May 14 and June 9, 1975. 
Entered into force June 9, 1975. 


.\greement relating to trade in cotton textiles, with 
annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash- 
ington May 6, 1975. Entered into force May 6, 
1975; effective July 1, 1974. 

Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles, with 
exchange of letters, as amended and extended. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 
6, 1970. Entered into force May 6, 1970; effective 
July 1, 1970. TIAS 6882, 7369, 7598, 7640, 7724. 
Terminated: July 1, 1974. 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of November 23, 1974 
(TIAS 7971). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Islamabad May 27, 1975. Entered into force May 
27, 1975. 


.\greement relating to the limitation of imports 
from Panama of fresh, chilled or frozen meat of 
cattle, goats, and sheep, except Iambs, during 
calendar year 1975. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Panama April 21 and June 6, 1975. Entered 
into force June 6, 1975. 


Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and 
man-made fiber textiles and apparel products, 
with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington May 21, 1975. Entered into force 
May 21, 1975; effective January 1, 1975. 


Agreement for the sale of agricultural commodities. 
Signed at Dar es Salaam May 23, 1975. Entered 
into force May 23, 1975. 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX July 7, 1975 Vol. LXIII, No. ISSO 


ecretary Kissinger Interviewed for U.S. 

i, News and World Report 

■fie United States and Japan in a Changing: 
{World (Kissinger) 


Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 


Corporate Payments Abroad Discussed by 

Department (Feldman) 

Department Discusses U.S. Policy Toward 

Cuba (Rogers) 

Department Summarizes U.S. Policy Toward 

Namibia (Davis) 

Secretary Kissinger's Remarks at PBS 

Luncheon (excerpt) 


Department Discusses U.S. Policy Toward 
Cuba (Rogers) 

Secretary Kissinger's Remarks at PBS 
Luncheon (excerpt) 

Economic Affairs 

Corporate Payments Abroad Discussed by 
Department (Feldman) 

The United States and Japan in a Changing 
World (Kissinger) 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Secretary 
Names Five to Board of Governors for East- 
West Center 

Egypt. President Ford's News Conference of 
June 9 (excerpts) 

Energy. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for 
U.S. News and World Report 

Environment. World Environment Day Marked 
by President Ford (statement) 


President Ford's News Conference of June 9 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for U.S. News 
and World Report 


President Ford's News Conference of June 9 

Prime Minister Rabin of Israel Visits Wash- 
ington (Ford, Rabin, Kissinger) 

U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in Israel- 
Syria Sector Extended (Scali, text of resolu- 


The United States and Japan in a Changing 
World (Kissinger) 

United States Mourns Death of Eisaku Sato 
(statement by President Ford) 


President Ford's News Conference of June 9 

Secretary Kissinger's Remarks at PBS 
Luncheon (excerpt) 

Middle East 

President Ford's News Conference of June 9 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for U.S. News 
and World Report 

Secretary Kissinger's Remarks at PBS 
Luncheon (excerpt) 


Department Summarizes U.S. Policy Toward 
Namibia (Davis) 














U.S. Vetoes Resolution on Namibia in U.N. 
Security Council (Scali, text of draft resolu- 
tion) 42 

Presidential Documents 

Prime Minister Rabin of Israel Visits Wash- 
ington 9 

United States Mourns Death of Eisaku Sato . 8 
World Environment Day Marked by President 
Ford '..... 29 

South Africa 

Department Summarizes U.S. Policy Toward 
Namibia (Davis) 36 

U.S. Vetoes Resolution on Namibia in U.N. 
Security Council (Scali, text of draft resolu- 
tion) 42 

Syria. U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in 
Israel-Syria Sector Extended (Scali, text of 
resolution) 45 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 47 

U.S.S.R. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for 
U.S. News and World Report 15 

United Nations 

U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in Israel- 
Syria Sector Extended (Scali, text of resolu- 
tion) 4g 

U.S. Vetoes Resolution on Namibia in U.N. 
Security Council (Scali, text of draft resolu- 
tion) 42 

Viet-Nam. President Ford's News Conference 
of June 9 (excerpts) 23 

Name Index 

Davis, Nathaniel 3g 

Feldman, Mark B . . 39 

Ford, President 8 9 23 29 

Kissinger, Secretary l' 9' 15* 25 

Rabin, Yitzhak ' .' '9 

Rogers, William D . . . . 30 

Scali, John . 42 46 

Xo. D.ate 

335 6/16 


Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: June 16-22 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 


Kissinger: U.S. News and World 
Report interview. 

Ingersoll: Japan-America So- 
ciety of Chicago. 

Kissinger: Public Broadcasting 
Service luncheon. 

Kissinger: Japan Society, New 

Accelerated program of Viet- 
namese refugee processing on 

Study Group 7 of the U.S. Na- 
tional Committee for the CCIR, 
July 17. 

U.S. -Spain joint communique. 




*340 6/19 

1341 6/19 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN. 

Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington. d.c. 2o402 


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LA' V 





Volume LXXIII 

No. 1881 

July 14, 1975 

Address by Secretary Kissinger i9 




Statement by Under Secretary Sisco 73 


For index see inside back cover 


Vol. LXXIII, No. 1881 
July 14, 1975 


For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 


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approved by the Director of the Office of 

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Note; Contents of this publication are not 

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STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN 
a weekly publication issued by f| 
Office of Media Services, Bureau 
Public Affairs, provides the public a| 
interested agencies of the governme 
with information on developments 
the field of U.S. foreign relations ana 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and oth 
officers of the Department, as well 
special articles on various phases 
international affairs and the functio^ 
of the Department. Information 
included concerning treaties and inte 
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United States is or may become ; 
party and on treaties of general inte 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department 
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international relations are also lUtt 

Constancy and Change in American Foreign Policy 

Address by Secretary Kissinger ' 

We meet at a time when America, as so 
■fteii before in its history, is turning a time 
'i' testing into a period of renewal. 

Less than three months ago, under the im- 
lact of our disappointments in Indochina, 
ome were questioning the very nature of our 
nvolvement in world affairs. The executive 
nd the Congress seemed to be heading for 

stalemate on foreign policy. But paradox- 
cally, our setbacks have brought home to us 
—as well as the rest of the world — how 
ssential America is to the peace and pros- 
lerity of mankind. And at home the dialogue 
)etween our two coequal branches of govern- 
nent is taking place in a more constructive 

We have every reason to face our future 
vith confidence. The United States still stands 
is the greatest democracy the world has ever 
:nown. Our institutions have withstood 
xtraordinary turmoil and dissension and 
lave emerged vital and strong. Whatever 
air disappointments, we have reason for 
)ride in our achievements. If there is peace 
n the world today, our sacrifice has been 
lecisive; if there is to be progress, our con- 
ribution will be essential. 

We have learned irrevocably the central 
act of the modern world: our security, our 
veil-being, our very existence, are intimate- 
y bound up with the kind of international 
mvironment we shall succeed in building. If 
he weakness of free peoples tempts aggres- 
;ion, the lives of Americans will be in dan- 
ger. If the disunity of free peoples invites 

^ Made before the Southern Council on Interna- 
tional and Public Affairs and the Atlanta Chamber 
pf Commerce at Atlanta, Ga., on June 23 (text from 
press release 342). 

economic chaos, the well-being of Americans 
will be in jeopardy. As the energy crisis 
surely has taught us, we live in an inter- 
dependent world — a world in which words 
such as "isolation" and "withdrawal" grow 
ever more anachronistic. 

Thus we are not about to reverse the 
course of the last 30 years, retreat from our 
commitments, and leave our friends and 
allies to fend for themselves in the vacuum 
our actions would inevitably create. We shall 
not invite chaos. On the contrary, before us 
is a new opportunity to achieve peace and 
progress greater than even in our recent 

Since the end of World War II, the United 
States has undertaken a role of world leader- 
ship which has had the support of both 
parties and all Administrations. That policy 
has preserved peace and freedom; it has 
sustained global stability and the global 
economy. Indeed, it is our very accomplish- 
ments that have created the new conditions, 
and problems, which we must now face. 

— America's assistance to the postwar re- 
covery of Western Europe and Japan, and 
our defensive shield, promoted the resur- 
gence of those allies as strong and inde- 
pendent pillars of the free world. 

— The international economic system, the 
trading and monetary relationships created 
by American leadership at Bretton Woods 
in 1944, has fostered economic progress not 
only in the industrial democracies but in 
every quarter of the globe. 

— The inexorable process of decoloniza- 
tion, which we encouraged, and our pioneer- 
ing eft'orts in technical and economic assist- 
ance for development have helped scores of 

IJuly 14, 1975 


new nations launch their own national prog- 

Foreign policy is a process. It knows no 
plateaus. What does not become a point of 
departure for a new advance soon turns first 
into stagnation and then into retreat. Thus 
the achievements of the past generation have 
created the agenda for the next decades: 

— The growing strength and self-con- 
fidence of our allies requires the adaptation 
of our alliances from Amei-ican tutelage to 
equal partnership. 

— The growing destructiveness of nuclear 
weapons requires an alternative to jjolicies 
of confrontation and an easing of interna- 
tional tensions. 

— The interdependence of the world econ- 
omy must lead to increased cooperation 
among the industrialized nations and a 
greater recognition of the concerns of the 
developing countries. 

This agenda is vast. But there are not 
many periods of history when man can see 
clearly the outline of his own future and 
shape it to his ends. We have it in our 
power to lay the foundation of a new inter- 
national structure in which nations no 
longer fear domination, in which negotia- 
tion replaces confrontation, and in which 
the fulfillment of basic human needs be- 
comes a central concern on the agenda of 
international diplomacy. 

A world of over 140 nations is a world 
of unimagined diversity and complexity. But 
it is also a world of enormous potential. A 
world of pluralism, of spreading ideas, of 
independent states free to choose their 
destiny, is a world of hope and an oppor- 
tunity for fresh creation. 

And the United States will always be 
mindful of its responsibilities. We have 
learned our limits, but we have not for- 
gotten our possibilities. We are the world's 
largest democratic nation; we are the 
greatest single concentration of economic 
and military power; we are the nation with 
the most experience in organizing interna- 
tional cooperation; we are the major in- 
fluence in global communication. If we do 

not lead, no other nation that stands for 
what we believe in can take our place. 

The Elements of America's Strength 1 

What, then, is required of us? What are' 
the elements of our strength? 

First of all, we must maintain the bed- 
rock of our security. While foreign policy 
must reach beyond military concerns, there 
can be no substitute for maintaining our own 
defenses and the objective conditions of our 
security. An equilibrium of power is essen- 
tial to any stable international order. A 
world in which the survival of nations is 
at the mercy of others is a world of insecu- 
rity, instability, and oppression. 

America's military strength has always 
been used to defend, never to oppress. At 
home, we have already adapted our defense 
budget to accord with our national priori- 
ties. In terms of its portion of the Federal 
budget and of the gross national product, 
our defense spending is at the lowest level 
in 25 years. Yet the trend of military pro- 
grams of our potential adversaries is in the 
direction of expansion. Therefore there is 
an irreducible minimum below which we 
cannot go without allowing important in- 
terests of the United States and its allies to 
be endangered. We will seek prudent meas- 
ures of arms control to enhance our security. 
But this Administration is determined never 
to allow the military defenses of the United 
States to be dismantled. 

We strive to create the conditions for ac- 
commodation and reconciliation of differ- 
ences with adversaries. But conciliation must 
not flow from weakness ; flexibility is a 
virtue only in those who are thought to 
have an alternative. 

Secondly, we have also learned that all 
our objectives — our security, our well-being, 
the cohesion of our alliances, and the health 
of the international environment — depend 
to a remarkable degree on the health of the 
American economy. This is, rightly, an 
immediate concern of every American ; it is 
also the engine of economic growth world- 
wide and therefore an international respon- 


Department of State Bulletin 

The recession and inflation of the last 
two years have had ominous international 
consequences — which now we are on the 
way to remedying. Recession and inflation 
eat away at the well-being and hopes of 
groups on the margin of prosperity. They 
breed disunity at home, drain the energies 
of nations away from international con- 
cerns, and complicate the harmony of inter- 
national relations. At home, they undermine 
social peace, confidence in government, and 
the vitality of democratic processes. Abroad, 
economic strains tempt the governments of 
the industrial nations into protectionism or 
measures of rivalry and threaten an era of 
bloc economic warfare between rich nations 
and poor. 

Yet no government acting alone has a 
possibility of correcting the fundamental 
economic conditions that beset it. In the 
nodern world, our economies are tied to- 
gether ; we prosper or decline together. The 
restoration of growth ofl'ers our best hope 
i)f accommodating the aspirations of all who 
'.ompete for betterment of their own future, 
t frees resources for meeting all national 
leeds. It restores faith in democratic insti- 
utions and democratic leaders. 

The position of the American economy is 
;entral. As the President said in his state of 
he Union address in January: 

A resurgent American economy would do more to 
estore the confidence of the world in its own future 
ban anything else we can do. 

We shall do what is required. 

Finally, our national strength depends on 
ur unity as a people. There is no limit to 
vhat free men can accomplish acting 

In the last quarter of this century, we are 
10 longer preponderant. We can no longer 
iverwhelm our problems with our resources ; 
he diversity and complexity of the world 
10 longer offer moral simplicity. We are 
herefore called upon, as never before, to 
how purpose, coherence, flexibility, and 
magination in the conduct of our foreign 

We must be one nation, one government. 

Our institutions must moderate special in- 
terests in the definition of a national interest. 
We must have the self-discipline to shape 
our domestic debates into a positive, not a 
destructive, process. We must attack our 
problems, and not each other. We can no 
longer afi'ord disunity, disarray, or disrup- 
tion in the conduct of our foreign aff'airs. 

The consensus which sustained an en- 
lightened involvement in foreign affairs for 
more than a generation is one of our most 
precious national resources. We are on the 
way to restoring our unity and therefore our 
capacity to act as a confident nation. We 
shall spare no effort to continue this process 
so that we will face our third century and 
its challenges as a united people. 

Let me now turn to our agenda and de- 
scribe the design of our policy. 


Our allies and friends remain our first 
international priority. 

What unites us and our allies are not 
simply the treaties signed a generation ago 
but the inescapable necessities of the present 
world. In recent weeks we have reaffirmed 
our commitment to our alliances. We have 
made clear that the United States will stand 
by its obligations in Asia as well as in 
Europe. But what gives life to our alliances 
is not verbal reaffirmation, but the reality of 
common action in response to common prob- 
lems. We must find common purpose in 
challenges beyond the necessities of military 

This is why last week I outlined, on behalf 
of the President, the agenda for our close 
relationship with Japan and Asia. This is 
why on his trip to Europe the President 
outlined the issues facing all the nations of 
the Western alliance. The tasks which the 
President set before the NATO summit 
could serve as the agenda for all our alli- 

— We must maintain a strong, modern, 
and credible defense; an alliance that does 
not have the vigor and dedication to defend 
itself fails in its primary purpose. 

uly 14, 1975 


— We must improve the quality and in- 
tegrity of our political relations; participa- 
tion and responsibility must be unqualified 
if they are to be credible. 

— We must improve our political consul- 
tation to develop common policies to deal 
with common problems. 

— We must work together in setting a 
productive and realistic agenda for the 
easing of tensions. 

— We must look to the health of our demo- 
cratic institutions. 

— We must understand that the industrial- 
ized societies hold the key to the world's 
new problems of population, food, energy 
development, raw materials. 

Urgent, cooperative action is needed on all 
these issues. Alliances must be adjusted to 
changing security requirements, or they will 
disintegrate. They must reflect common 
political objectives and a common strategy 
for attaining them, or their defensive 
capability will lack a sense of purpose. 
Therefore we attach great importance to 
improved political consultations. And we 
must never forget that strong domestic in- 
stitutions ultimately provide the best pro- 
tection against subversion as well as the 
sinews for defense against aggression. 

Progress has been made, but much work 
remains. On the central problem of econom.ic 
growth, allied leaders have begun to co- 
ordinate national economic policies to an 
unprecedented degree. 

On the vital subject of energy, the indus- 
trial nations created the International 
Energy Agency to pool the efforts of the 
major consumers. We have agreed on safe- 
guards against new oil emergencies ; we have 
established a $25 billion solidarity fund to 
insure against monetary dislocations due to 
the massive payments imbalances caused by 
energy costs; we have launched new pro- 
grams of conservation of existing supplies 
and the development of alternative sources. 
We are building the foundation for a con- 
structive dialogue with the energy producers 
looking toward a fair and equitable long- 
term economic relationship. 

This remains a priority concern. We are 
determined to end our vulnerability to ex- 


ternal decisions or external pressures. As the 
economies of the industrialized nations be- 
gin again to expand, the necessity for 
energy conservation and development of new; 
energy sources becomes more urgent. With- 
out determined efforts now, the expansion of 
demand will give free rein to the producers' 
ability to maintain or raise the price of oil 
or to use the supply of energy for political 

The national interest demands a compre- 
hensive and effective energy program. The 
President will work with the Congress to 
obtain it, but if that effort fails he will 
exercise the authority he has to reduce our 
dependence on foreign energy sources. 

In our political relations, we and our allies 
both have an obligation to a common inter- 
est. We do not assist others in their defense 
as an act of charity, but in our mutual in- 
terest. For us to terminate military assist- 
ance or even sales to an ally is basically 
self-defeating. We weaken the political ties, 
endanger our collective defense, and also 
fail to achieve whatever purpose the aid re- 
striction was meant to serve. For this rea- 
son, the President has strongly opposed the 
congressional cutoff of military aid to Tur- 
key and is now working hard with the 
Congress to bring about its immediate 

By the same token, no country should 
imagine that it is doing us a favor by re- 
maining in an alliance with us. Any ally 
whose perception of its national interest 
changes will find us prepared to adapt or 
end our treaty relationship. No ally can 
pressure us by a threat of termination; we 
will not accept that its security is more im- 
portant to us than it is to itself. 

We assume that our friends regard their 
ties to us as serving their own national pur- 
poses, not as privileges to be granted and 
withdrawn as means of pressure. Where 
this is not the mutual perception, then 
clearly it is time for change. Where it is the 
common view, the United States will remain 
a steady friend. We regard our alliances as 
the cornerstone of our foreign policy and the 
essential pillars of the structure of inter- 
national stability. 

Department of State Bulletin 

Easing of Tensions 

However fundamental our alliances, we 
recognize that a peace that rests solely on a 
balance of forces and offsetting blocs is 
fragile and sterile. We are committed, there- 
fore, to continue the effort to improve rela- 
tions with the Communist powers. In the 
thermonuclear age, there is no alternative 
to a serious effort to ease tensions on a 
reliable and reciprocal basis. 

Therefore in the past few years we have 
taken a number of practical steps to regu- 
larize our relations with the Soviet Union. 
The objective has been, in our own interest, 
to reduce the danger of war and to encourage 
new patterns of relations and international 

This process proceeds on several levels. 
We have negotiated balanced and effective 
agreements to limit strategic weapons on 
both sides and in other areas of arms control. 

In our bilateral relations, we have reached 
a number of agreements for economic and 
technical cooperation, agreements that pro- 
vide benefits to both sides and give both sides 
a stake in the continuation of a positive 

In resolving political conflicts in vital 
areas where we are both engaged directly, 
such as Europe, we have reached an agree- 
ment, in 1971, to make Berlin more secure. 
We are now engaged in comprehensive nego- 
tiations on mutual and balanced force 
reductions and on the broader questions of 
security and cooperation in Europe. 

In other areas of the world, such as the 
Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, the 
course of U.S.-Soviet relations has been 
uneven. There have been cases where ten- 
sions have, in our view, been exacerbated 
needlessly. Thus, while we have made 
significant progress in our relations with the 
Soviet Union over the past six years, we 
have done so without illusion. The U.S.S.R. 
remains our ideological and political rival. 
Should it seek to use detente as a device for 
selective exploitation of strategic opportuni- 
ties, the entire fabric of our evolving rela- 
tionship will be brought into question. 

At the same time, it is vital to maintain 
our perspective. We must never lose sight 

(I July 14, 1975 

of the fact that war between nuclear super- 
powers risks the extinction of mankind. We 
are ideological opponents ; technology drives 
our competition ; political conflict around the 
world pulls us into rivalry. If humanity is 
not to live constantly at the edge of an abyss 
and eventually to be consumed by its tech- 
nology, we must take care to nurture mutual 
restraint which has been .so painfully built 
up, guarding against the tendency to use 
our improving relationship with the U.S.S.R. 
as the whipping boy for our frustrations. 

Detente can never be a substitute for our 
own efforts; where our own efforts flag, we 
should not blame the resultant setbacks on 
our adversaries. International events in a 
turbulent world, and domestic conditions in 
many countries, are sufficient explanation 
for many problems. We should not exag- 
gerate Soviet influence by blaming all dif- 
ficulties on them. 

The experience of Indochina should have 
taught us that it is easier to start confronta- 
tions than to sustain them. Tough rhetoric 
is not the same as sustained strong action. 
We will defend our vital interests and those 
of our allies uncompromisingly. But we can 
do so effectively over an extended period of 
time only if our people know that we have 
first pursued untiringly all conceivable al- 
ternatives to confrontation. 

The principal item on the U.S.-Soviet 
agenda today is SALT, the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks. We are actively engaged 
in working out a new agreement based on 
the principles already agreed by the Presi- 
dent and General Secretary Brezhnev in 
Vladivostok last November. If we can re- 
solve the issues that still remain between us 
— and I believe we can — we will for the first 
time in history have placed a ceiling on the 
nuclear arms race. 

Our new relationship with the People's 
Republic of China is now a durable feature 
of the world scene. It serves our respective 
interests and the broader interests of peace 
and stability in Asia and around the world. 
No stable international order is conceivable 
without the participation of this one-quarter 
of the human race. As you know. President 
Ford plans to visit China, thereby confirm- 


ing the durability of our relationship and 
further advancing the ties between our two 
countries on the basis of the Shanghai 

The Middle East 

Our present agenda necessarily includes 
those areas of crisis which pose a danger 
of wider conflagration. To help moderate 
conflicts where our good oflSces are desired 
is an American tradition that goes back at 
least to the beginning of this century. His- 
tory has shown that the breakdown of peace 
around the globe can touch our lives directly, 
and there are some disputes for which we 
have a special responsibility, such as the 
Middle East crisis. 

That troubled area still poses grave dan- 
gers of war and of worldwide economic 
dislocation. The mistrust of decades is not 
easy to overcome. The international impli- 
cations of chronic crisis in the area and the 
moral and strategic commitments of outside 
powers compound the basic intractability. 
They also require continued movement 
toward a lasting settlement. An active 
American role is imperative: 

— Because of our historical and moral 
commitment to the survival and well-being 
of Israel; 

— Because of our important interests in 
the Arab world, an area of more than 150 
million people sitting astride the world's 
largest oil reserves; 

— Because the eruption of crisis in the 
Middle East would severely strain our rela- 
tions with our allies in Europe, and Japan; 

— Because continuing instability risks a 
new international crisis over oil and a new 
setback to the world's hopes for economic 
recovery, threatening the well-being not only 
of the industrial world but of most nations 
of the globe ; and 

— Because a crisis in the Middle East 
poses an inevitable risk of direct U.S.-Soviet 
confrontation and has done so with increas- 
ing danger in every crisis since the begin- 

We can never lose sight of the fact that 
U.S. foreign policy must do its utmost to 

protect all its interests in the Middle East. 
Given our inescapable involvement — eco- 
nomic, political, and military — there is no 
alternative to the full and active engage- 
ment of the United States in the diplomacy 
of peace in the Middle East. 

Since October 1973 we have made major 
efforts to help the warring parties to resolve 
their differences. Unprecedented progress 
has been made. Disengagement agreements 
have been negotiated between Israel and 
Egypt and Israel and Syria which have been 
carried out by all sides. While deep suspi- 
cions remain, these agreements may have 
demonstrated to the parties that there is an 
alternative to war. We welcome the opening 
of the Suez Canal; we believe the Syrian 
decision to extend the U.N. mandate for six 
months was helpful ; and the recent decision 
of the Israeli Government to thin out and 
withdraw some of its forces and equipment 
in the Sinai is a constructive move. 

But we must not be lulled into inaction by 
the relative quiet of recent weeks; the 
fundamental issues remain unresolved. It 
would be imprudent to view recent steps — 
valuable as they are — as an indication that 
further progress is no longer urgent. Events 
have been calmed in the last few months in 
considerable part by the expectation, and our 
pledge, that the American effort would re- 
sume. We are now at a point where there 
must be a turn either toward peace or toward 
new crises. 

We consider diplomatic stagnation an 
invitation to confrontation. We will not be 
deflected from our course by temporary dis- 
appointments or strong passions. The Presi- 
dent has stated repeatedly that the United 
States will not accept stalemate or stagna- 
tion. We urge all parties to take seriously 
these words which were carefully chosen. 

In recent weeks President Ford has held 
important consultations with King Hussein 
[of Jordan], President Sadat [of Egypt], 
Prime Minister Rabin [of Israel], and 
Deputy Prime Minister Khaddam of Syria. 
We expect to come to an early judgment on 
how best to proceed. 

The United States will pursue whichever 
course seems most promising. We are open- 


Department of State Bulletin 

minded whether interim agreements or an 
early convening of the Geneva Conference 
offers the best method. Each course has its 
recognized advantages and pitfalls and risks. 
We are not committed to a particular ap- 
proach ; we are committed to progress. 

Our ultimate goal is clear: to find solu- 
tions that will take into account the terri- 
torial integrity and right to live in security 
and peace of all states and peoples in the 
area. To reach that goal will require con- 
cessions by all parties. We are determined 
to persevere in pursuit of what we consider 
the fundamental national interest of the 
United States : the security and economic 
well-being of our country, of our allies, and 
above all, of the peoples in the area that 
demand it. 

The Developing Nations 

In recent years, the problems of the new 
nations of the developing world have grown 
more urgent. 

The strength of the dollar, the expansion 
of trade, the free flow of investment, the 
supply and price of energy, food, and other 
vital raw materials all depend on the vitality 
of the international economic system. But 
no economic system can be stable if scores 
of nations consider themselves outside of 
and hostile to it. The present global eco- 
nomic system is large enough to encom- 
pass the well-being of consumers and pro- 
ducers, rich and poor. But if it does not, 
we face a generation of economic warfare. 
The United States is prepared to work, with 
understanding and imagination, for change. 
But there must be a process of mutual 
accommodation that safeguards the interests 
of all nations. We will not submit to black- 
mail, bloc pressures, or ideological rhetoric. 
We will defend our interests. But we will 
listen to reasoned debate and consider care- 
fully productive suggestions for reform. 

The United States has already taken the 
lead with new proposals on a range of issues 
vital to the developing world: 

— To fight the scourge of hunger, this 
government, recognizing that America's food 
aid cannot provide a long-term solution to 

July 14, 1975 

the global food problem, called for the World 
Food Conference which met last November 
in Rome. At that conference we engaged 
other nations in a multilateral commitment 
to raise food production, to improve agri- 
cultural financing and distribution, and to 
establish an international system of national- 
ly held grain reserves. 

— Some 140 nations are now engaged in 
an unprecedented negotiation on a compre- 
hensive new law of the sea. At stake are 
the reach of territorial sovereignty, the safe- 
ty of the shipping lanes, and access to vast 
resources. Success in these negotiations 
would represent an unprecedented achieve- 
ment in international cooperation affecting 
three-quarters of the surface of our planet 
and enormous mineral and other wealth. The 
United States will make a major effort to 
bring it to a successful conclusion at the 
final session next March. 

— On the broader question of raw mate- 
rials, the developing countries seek a stable 
and fair income from commodities which are 
central to their development programs. We 
in turn seek reliability of supply for our 
industries. The United States has therefore 
proposed new international rules and pro- 
cedures on access to supplies and markets, 
discussions on new arrangements for com- 
modity trade on a case-by-case basis, and 
new ways of financing commodity develop- 
ment in producing countries. 

All these issues will be raised at a special 
session of the U.N. General Assembly this 
September. Working closely with Congress, 
we are now preparing concrete, detailed, 
and— we hope — creative proposals for that 
session. We intend, while fully protecting 
our nation's interests, to deal with contro- 
versial issues with realism, imagination, and 
understanding. We hope that others will 
meet us in the same spirit. 

Challenge at Home 

We have before us a vast agenda. 


peace and prosperity of future generations 
depend on decisions we make now. The 
choice is relatively straightforward: either 
we use our strength and opportunities for 


good, or others will surely use their own 
strength for ends incompatible with our 
values. The problems we face are of such 
magnitude, their answers so complex — and 
the opportunities so far-reaching — that the 
last quarter of the 20th century will either 
be remembered as another period of Amer- 
ican leadership and creativity or as a time 
of growing chaos and despair. Therefore 
it is time to put an end to the self-doubt 
and cynicism which have marked, and 
marred, American life for so much of the 
past decade. It is time to remind ourselves 
that America has accomplished great things 
in the past and that thei'e are still greater 
things to be accomplished. 

In our pluralistic society, national action 
depends on the support of citizens every- 
where — not only in government but in the 
professions, in business and labor, in the 
universities, in the cities and on the farms 
all over America. These people, in their 
millions, have supported an enlightened in- 
ternational involvement for more than a 
generation ; for they knew in their hearts that 
the greatest nation on earth could no longer 
remain isolated from the world around it. 
Again today, at another time of decision, it 
will be the American people who will decide, 
as they should, the direction their country 
will take. 

There can be no doubt about the outcome. 
The American people will decide to keep 
their country the pillar of stability and the 
vision of hope that it has been for two cen- 
turies. They will support our leadership in 
the search for a new, lasting, just and peace- 
ful international order. 

Throughout our histoi-y America has 
proved capable of renewal and greatness. 
The colonists who came to the shores of a 
wilderness, the Founding Fathers who cre- 
ated the world's only revolution that never 
declined into tyranny, the pioneers whose 
eyes never left the horizon, the men of enter- 
prise who made American productivity and 
efficiency the world's standard, the soldiers 
and statesmen of our century who built a 
world power both great and constructive, and 
the creative minds of a democratic society 

who have given the breath and inspiration 
of freedom of men and women everywhere — 
these are the foundations on which we build 
and the traditions we seek to emulate. 

"Equal and exact justice to all men" — this 
was how Thomas Jefferson defined the goal 
of our national destiny, at home and abroad. 
And he added, ". . . should we wander ... in 
moments of error or alarm, let us hasten to 
retrace our steps and to regain the road 
which alone leads to peace, liberty, and safe- 
ty." We are at one of those moments. We will 
not miss our road. 

Questions and Answers Following 
the Secretary's Address at Atlanta 

Press release 342B dated June 23 

The chairman [Ivan Allen III, president, 
Atlanta Chamber of Commerce']: Mr. Secre- 
tary, we have several questions from the 
andience, a)id if it meets your pleasure, I 
(tin prepared to give them to you if you would 
like to respond. 

The first question is this: If Israel is to 
concede occupied territory to Egypt, should 
not Egypt provide the meaus for common 
civilian access between the two countries 
so tliat a common understanding can be 

Secretary Kissinger: There are basically 
two ways for going at the peace settlement, 
or the prospects of peace in the Middle East. 
One is to attempt to make a final peace. The 
other is to take a series of individual steps. 

Under conditions of final peace, the totality 
of the issues must be settled, and the end 
process must be that the relations between 
Israel and its neighbors will be as normal 
as the relations between countries at peace 
generally are. In that case, there should of 
course be free movement of people between 
Israel and its neighbors. 

If, however, it proves too difficult to nego- 
tiate a final peace settlement all at once, 
then the best approach is to take a series of 
individual steps in which less than total 
peace is balanced against less than total 


Department of State Bulletin 

Israeli withdrawal. Under those conditions, 
at any one step total peace will not have been 

Each of these approaches, as I said in my 
speech, has its advantages and its risks. We 
had in the past favored the step-by-step 
approach because it enabled the problem to 
be divided into individual elements and be- 
cause these elements seemed more manage- 
able than an overall settlement. 

But the United States is prepared to sup- 
port any approach that leads to a solution, 
and we will not push one if it proves to be 

The chairman: With the transfer of sig- 
nificant amounts of tangible wealth to the 
Arab countries, does this economic disrup- 
tion pose a problem of social disruption that 
will tip the balance of power to the Com7nu- 
nist countries ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I am not sure 
whether that question refers to the balance 
in the Arab countries or the balance in the 
countries which are transferring the wealth. 
But in either case, I do not believe that the 
transfer of wealth by itself will tip the bal- 
ance toward the Communist countries. The 
transfer of wealth on the scale in which it 
occurs places sudden and very large re- 
sources into the hands of countries which 
heretofore did not have it and therefore 
gives them a capacity for disruption, even 
unintentionally, that requires the closer co- 
operation of the industrial world. 

Secondly, the monopoly on energy by the 
OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Export- 
ing Countries] countries gives them a capac- 
ity to manipulate prices and to bring politi- 
cal pressure that over an extended period of 
time should be our effort to end. The energy 
policy of the United States is designed to 
bring about conditions in'which this monop- 
oly can no longer be exercised. This is why 
we are so strongly supporting the energy 
program within the United States and the 
cooperation among energy-consuming coun- 

The chairman: In view of the recent de- 
velopments in Portugal and the Italian re- 

July 14, 1975 

gional elections, what do yon think that the 
future holds for the North Atlantic alliance 
and the democratic governments on the con- 
tinent of Europe? 

Secretary Kissinger: The domestic situa- 
tion in Portugal creates a serious problem if 
present trends continue. If Portugal slides 
in the direction of a neutralist or even Com- 
munist-dominated government, we will face 
the problem of how that can be compatible 
with an alliance designed to prevent Com- 
munist aggression or of how you can have 
the most confidential talks and the frankest 
consultations when one of the governments 
has such close association with the potential 

This is why we have called the attention 
of our allies to these events and why we shall 
be watching them carefully. We do not be- 
lieve that this point has yet been reached. 
But the tendencies are disquieting. 

With respect to Italy and other countries, 
the electoral results, of course, reflect the 
public judgments on essentially domestic is- 
sues. And again, we hope that the conditions 
which have produced the dissatisfaction can 
be overcome, because a democracy in which 
the opposition parties are all essentially non- 
democratic is one that is very vulnerable to 
shifts in the public mood. 

The chairman: I think this is a Chamber 
of Commerce question. Atlanta is the second 
busiest airport in the United States. Do you 
anticipate internatioyial connections between 
Atlanta and Europe, and if so, are bilateral 
treaties being negotiated noiv? [Laughter.l 

Secretary Kissinger: I was going to ask 
the Mayor after this meeting why he praised 
the airport for people wanting to go some- 
place else than Atlanta. [Laughter and 
applause.] But the negotiation of internation- 
al air routes is outside of my direct responsi- 
bility. [Laughter.] 

I think I'll blame Ambassador Reinhardt 
[John E. Reinhardt, Assistant Secretary for 
Public Affairs] for that, too. 

The chairman: For detente to work in the 
long run, must the Soviet Union become a 
more free society? 


Secretary Kissinger: There is a certain 
paradox in the situation that it is the ideo- 
logical rivalry that creates the tensions but 
it is paradoxically also the ideological rivalry 
that makes efforts at relaxing tensions so im- 

What creates the necessity for this effort 
is that war with modern weapons will have 
consequences for which there is no historical 
precedent. No leader has ever faced the 
prospect that tens of millions of people could 
be annihilated in a matter of days. And 
therefore the question of war and peace be- 
tween the two great nuclear powers, regard- 
less of ideology, must be a preoccupation and 
indeed has been a preoccupation of every 
President, of whatever party, however differ- 
ent their personalities and, I may say, what- 
ever their views before they entered the 

So if the domestic structures were more 
compatible, there would be less of an ur- 
gency. But also, since our domestic struc- 
tures are not compatible, there is still a great 
need to make these efforts. 

The chairman: There has recently been an 
increased expression of concern over North 
Korea emanating from various government 
officials. Can you comment on the basis for 
this increased concern, and how real is a 
threat from North Korea at the present 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, North Korea 
belongs to a small and select group of the 
most aggressive regimes in the world, and it 
is an extremely nationalistic and, at least 
vocally, a very bellicose government. 

The collapse of the American effort in 
Indochina undoubtedly contributed an ele- 
ment of insecurity among all our allies who 
have depended on our support. And we have 
been concerned lest it create the wrong im- 
pression on the part of potential aggressors, 
particularly of countries like North Korea, 
which constantly affirm that they are going 
to unify their country, if necessary by force. 

We do not believe that North Korea can 
now be under any misapprehension about 
the determination of the U.S. Government to 
honor the treaty commitments which were 

ratified by the Congress and have been re- 
affirmed in every Administration since 1954. 
And as long as we can maintain this convic- 
tion, we believe there is no immediate danger 
of attack. 

The chairman: Mr. Secretary, ive have 
two more questions. Is the United States 
likely to use its strength as a food-producing 
nation in negotiations ivith other nations 
relying on their natural resources as their 
basis of strength and poiver? 

Secretary Kissinger: We believe that the 
model we have put forward on how food 
should be organized and how surplus food 
should be shared should be a model for how 
other nations that have scarce resources 
should dispose of them within the interna- 
tional community. 

The chairman: And after your response to 
tliis question, we ivill call on Mr. [Dean] 
Rusk to close the evening. 

In light of Africa's increasing political and 
economic influence throughout the ivorld and 
the Third World community more specifical- 
ly, can ive anticipate a more open effort at 
cooperation with the neivly liberated and 
emerging countries? And is our policy taking 
into consideration that over one-third of the 
untapped mineral yuitural resources are 

Secretary Kissinger: We are attempting 
to give greater emphasis to our African 
policy. There is, however, a perplexity on 
how this can best be done, because most of 
the African governments, while they wel- 
come increased American interest, also are 
very concerned with maintaining their inde- 
pendence of decision and very concerned not 
to be involved too much in great-power rival- 
ry emanating from outside of Africa. 

Our new Assistant Secretary for African 
Affairs is at this moment traveling in east 
Africa and has just completed a trip in 
west Africa. And we are trying to define a 
basis for a creative relationship with Africa. 
We have a mission in Zaire at this very 

But I must be honest to say that we have 
not yet found all the approaches that we 
think will be needed in the years ahead. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Atlanta June 24 

Press release 344 dated June 24 

Mr. Richard Miles, president of the At- 
lanta chapter of Sigma Delta Chi: Thank 
you for coming here this morning for this 
news conference. Before ive begin the press 
conference, in recogriition of his fine-honed 
nervs ability- — that abilitii to travel around 
the world to find any story, to chase any 
story — ive of the Atlanta Society of Profes- 
sional Jo)ir)ialists would like to honor the 
Secretary of State xvith an honorary mem- 
bership in our organization ajid to present 
him a symbol of our profession: a green 
eyeshade. [Applause.] 

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Miles, the only 
thing that is lacking in this picture are 
some electric wipers for my glasses, which 
somebody gave me for my birthday. 

I am very flattered to receive this award 
and to join the only remaining profession in 
the United States that can still protect its 
sources of information. [Laughter.] And 
with this, why don't I take your questions? 

Q. Mr. Secretary, last night — 

Secretary Kissinger: Who is this ringer 
here? [Laughter.] 

Q. Last night in your speech you advised 
our allies that ive will not be subjected to 
pressure and, indeed, treaties are two-way 
streets ayid if they have other interests, so 
be it. This ivas taken by some people as a 
warning, particularly to Turkey. Is that 
accurate, or is it a more general warning — 
perhaps including Greece and a lot of Asian 
countries as ivell? 

Secretary Kissinger: It was intended as 
a general observation to all of our allies. 
It was not directed at any one particular 

We have reaffirmed in recent weeks — the 
President, the Secretary of Defense, and I — 

July 14, 1975 

our commitment to our allies. But I think 
it is important to understand that these alli- 
ances have to be two-way streets, that they 
must reflect a common interest, and that 
they cannot be used as pressure against the 
United States. It was not directed at any 
one particular country, but it was a general 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you spoke last flight 
about the treaty relationships, but you also 
spoke about the Middle East. Are you plan- 
ning a new trip through the area at any 
time in the near future? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have not made 
any precise decision as to which method 
would most serve progress toward peace in 
the Middle East. 

At the moment we are engaged in diplo- 
matic exchanges with all of the interested 
parties. After these diplomatic exchanges are 
somewhat further advanced, we can make a 
decision whether there is enough promise in 
any particular interim approach or whether 
we should attempt to promote an overall 
solution. That decision has not yet been 

Yes, sir. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, it is said by some local 
observers that you are doing this trip to 
Atlanta not only just because you like our 
city but because you are trying to help the 
President's image in "George Wallace coun- 
try." What is your feeling about this? What 
is the purpose of this mission? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, there's one 
thing to be said. No one will consider my 
accent a Yankee accent. [Laughter.] 

I am taking these trips for a number of 
reasons. One was that a few months ago I 
made a speech in Washington in which I 
pointed out that the heartland of America, 


in my jiidjrment, supported American for- 
eign policy. So when I got through, one of 
these cynical Washington newsmen — a type 
that does not exist here, I am sure [laughter] 
— came up to me and said, "When were you 
last in the heartland of America?" — which 
was not a bad question. So I decided to go 
around the country and find out for myself. 

But more seriously, the purpose of these 
trips is to bring to various parts of the 
United States a description of our foreign 
policy — a discussion of where we are going — 
and at the same time to meet with local 
groups to hear what concerns them. The 
foreign policy problems we now face are so 
complex and the challenges before us are so 
grave that only with a strong public support, 
on a bipartisan basis, can we hope to master 
what is ahead of us. 

I want to make absolutely clear that I 
do not consider, nor does the President con- 
sider, foreign policy a partisan issue and we 
have no intention of making it a partisan 
issue. The great periods of American for- 
eign policy have had nonpartisan support. 
That is what I am aiming for in these trips. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could I follow that up 
just a moment? The President has an- 
nounced that he will be a candidate for 
President next year, and I wonder if that is 
likely to change the ivorking relationship 
between you and him. Is he likely to be un- 
der pressures to make decisions in foreign 
policy for political reasons rather than 
reasons ivhich you think may not be in the 
best interests of foreign policy? 

Secretary Kissinger: My impression is 
that he has not quite announced it yet, and 
I have never seen an announcement shaved 
into so many little pieces. But my impres- 
sion is that he is very seriously considering 
running — to put it mildly. 

When he does announce his candidacy, I 
am certain it will not change our working 
relationship. I know that he considers the 
national security of the United States be- 
yond partisan politics, and I am convinced — 
in fact, I know — that he will conduct his 
office for the best interests of the country, 
and that in our relationship we will not dis- 


cuss what helps him as a candidate, but what 
helps the nation. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, ivhat is the U.S. posi- 
tion on Russia's proposal to make Indochina 
a neutral zone and remove all military bases? 

Secretary Kiss'niger: I must tell you the 
truth: I am not familiar with a formal 
Russian proposal to remove all military bases 
from Indochina, because there are no for- 
eign military bases. I am familiar with the 
Asian security .scheme of the Soviet Union. 

Well, our view is that Asia — Southeast 
Asia — should be kept as free as possible of 
great-power rivalry. As far as we are con- 
cerned, we have withdrawn from Indochina. 
We have no interest in achieving bases there 
or having any military influence in Indo- 
china. And therefore it is not an issue on 
which we need to take a position. We have 
no diplomatic relations with Cambodia and 
Viet-Nam, and our diplomatic presence in 
Laos is being harassed. So this is really not 
something addressed to us. 

Yes, sir. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in recent weeks there 
have been reports of clashes in Cambodia 
and along the Cambodian borders, and to- 
day there are reports again of fighting with- 
in Cambodia between the Khmer Rouge and 
the rightiving Cambodians led by an uncle 
of Prince Sihanouk. Do we knoiv what's 
happening in Cambodia since ive pulled out? 

Secretary Kissinger: We know much less 
what is happening in Cambodia than, ob- 
viously, we did before. No foreign country 
has any diplomatic missions in Cambodia 
today, so all of our information is second- 
hand or it comes from intelligence sources. 

We do know that there has been a rather 
terrible toll of civilians that was inflicted 
on the Cambodian people when the popula- 
tion of all the towns was evacuated into a 
countryside that will not have a harvest 
until November; and the death toll, accord- 
ing to all estimates that we have heard, is 
very great. 

We have also had rather firm reports of 
clashes between the South Vietnamese and 
the Cambodians along the border and on 
some of the off'shore islands — including the 

Department of State Bulletin 

island near which the Mayaguez was orig- 
inally captured. 

I have not seen any hard evidence of fight- 
ing within Cambodia, and therefore I cannot 
confirm that. 


Q. Mr. Secretary, there is increasing spec- 
ulation that we are near some kiiid of official 
change in onr relationship with Cuba. And 
Premier Castro's return of $2 million to 
Southern Airivays, of course, heightened 
that kind of speculation. Is there any defini- 
tive kind of change that We can expect in 
the near future — let's say, two or three 

Secretary Kissinger: Our policy toward 
Cuba is that we are prepared to improve 
our relationship, depending on what steps 
Cuba is prepared to take. And, of course, 
ultimately Cuba will have to negotiate this 
with the U.S. Government and not with in- 
dividual legislators that may be invited to 

There have been some gestures on the part 
of Cuba, such as the return of the $2 million, 
which we welcome. And we are prepared to 
conduct a dialogue with a positive attitude. 
We have no fixed timetable when improve- 
ment can take place, and of course, the 
Organization of American States is meeting 
next month on the general issue of the sanc- 
tions. So the conditions exist in which a 
discussion can take place. 


Q. Mr. Secretary, in this last year, with 
the fall of South Viet-Nam and the failure of 
the Mideast talks, and just recently a high- 
level staff member of yours resigned criti- 
cizing the State Department, do you have 
any intention of reorganizing the State De- 
partment in any way to make it more effi- 
cient? Do you plan to delegate some of the 
work that yon are currently doing to any 
other officials? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, there are sev- 
eral myths in Washington which I will not 
be able to eliminate, no matter what I do. 
One of them is that I do not delegate enough 

Now, it is true I am not the most retiring 

Secretary of State that has existed. But I 
am sure that most of the Assistant Secre- 
taries in the Department- — and especially 
their wives — would be astonished to find out 
that responsibility is not being delegated, 
because if it is not, they are working 15 
hours a day for nothing. 

I feel that the Department of State today 
is staffed in its top levels by the ablest, the dedicated group that has been there in 
many years. The decisions are being taken 
on the basis of very close consultation be- 
tween the Assistant Secretaries and myself. 
Of course, it is the responsibility of the 
Secretary of State to provide the leadership 
and the sense of direction, and that is a 
function I do intend and attempt to exercise. 
But it is not fair to the really dedicated and 
extraordinarily able group of top officials to 
imply that they are not given major re- 
sponsibilities — and I think more responsi- 
bility than has been the case in a very long 

Now, it always happens that there are 
some individuals who feel that their talents 
are not suflficiently recognized. And it may 
even be true, because in this vast spectrum 
of decisions that have to be taken, it is some- 
times not possible to give equal priority to 
all of the issues. 

I have very high regard for Dixy Lee Ray, 
and I wish her well. But I do not think one 
can make a generalization from one partic- 
ular case to what has, after all, been a very 
stable group of Assistant Secretaries who 
have worked with great dedication and in a 
very collegial atmosphere. 

But in addition, though, you asked a ques- 
tion — am I planning any changes? I am 
planning some changes in the organization 
of the overall management structure of the 
Department of State and also in the selec- 
tion and training programs of the Foreign 
Service in order to push the ablest people to 
the top more rapidly, to make sure the ablest 
people are being selected, and to make sure 
there is greater flexibility as between the 
various regional bureaus. 

We have already required that people have 
to be transferred between regional areas in 
order to develop a broader perspective. And 

July 14, 1975 


we will announce these changes within the 
next two weeks. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your address last 
night, you made the statement that our na- 
tional strength depends on our unity as a 
people. How can you expect Americans to be 
unified in support of the government when 
a substantial number of Americans still 
look on the government ivith suspicion and 
sometimes even fear? What plans does the 
Admin istratioyi have to clear up these suspi- 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, of course, I am 
not sure I completely agree with you that a 
substantial number of Americans look on 
their government with suspicion — and even 
less do I agree with you that a substantial 
number of Americans look at their govern- 
ment with fear. 

I do believe, however, that the government 
has a responsibility to the public to explain 
itself as fully and as honestly and with as 
much description of the underlying trends as 
it possibly can. We have an obligation to 
have a serious dialogue so that the public 
feels that when their lives and well-being 
are involved the decisions reflected a serious 
democratic process. 

That is what we are trying to do — partly, 
in a limited way, by these trips such as I 
am taking now, partly by inviting leaders 
from various parts of the country to Wash- 
ington, and by sending officials of the De- 
partment of State into the country. 

The President is making a major effort 
himself — not only in the foreign field but in 
the domestic field — to explain our position. 
And I believe, as I said in my speech yester- 
day — I believe that we have gone through a 
tragic decade. I have the sense that we are 
coming out of it and that we are going — 
that we are on the way to recovering our 
unity. I think that the problem which 
I mentioned yesterday is on the way to 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you. said recently that 
the United States may have to issue assur- 
ances to Israel in. order to achieve a Middle 
East settlement. Cayi you get a little more 

specific about that? Are you talking about 
assurances that would require congressional 
approval or would these kinds of assurances 
ivin the support of the public today? 

Secretary Kissinger: I was speaking in 
the context of a final settlement and in a 
final settlement which will have to address 
such issues as boundaries, refugees, the Pal- 
estinian issue, the future of Jerusalem, and 
the Arab peace obligations — that is, specific 
Arab commitments as to the content of these. 
This whole package will undoubtedly require 
for its reinforcement some international and 
— in my view, very probably — some Amer- 
ican guarantees. 

Now, these guarantees cannot be effective 
unless they have congressional support. It 
is very hard to say now whether the Con- 
gress would support them when the outline 
of a settlement is not clear yet and when 
one cannot say what it is that the Congress 
is being asked to support. But I believe that 
the importance of peace in the Middle East 
is so great that the Congress would look 
very seriously at the recommendations of an 
Administration that thought that its guar- 
antee might be the necessary element to 
bring about a final settlement. But we are 
not anywhere near that point yet. 

Yes, sir. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, witli all the attention 
that is being paid to Southeast Asia and the 
Middle East in recent weeks and years, it 
seems that our neighbors in the Western 
Hemisphere have sort of been ignored. Have 
our relations with our neighbors in the West- 
ern Hemisphere improved or deteriorated 
si)ice you became Secretary of State in 1973? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think that relations 
within the Western Hemisphere have im- 
proved in recent years. We have paid more 
attention to the Western Hemisphere. I think 
I have met with more Foreign Ministers of 
the Western Hemisphere than any of my 
predecessors. And we consider Western 
Hemisphere relations as absolutely crucial. 

If we cannot establish close relationships 
with countries that stand somewhere be- 
tween the developing and the developed part 
of the world — countries with a similar his- 


Department of State Bulletin 

tory and a comparable culture — then the 
whole relationship between the industrialized 
and the developing world will be problem- 

Of course, since Latin America is itself 
in a state of transition, this relationship is 
bound to be uneven, and this process of 
transition is bound to create occasional ten- 
sions and the inevitable problems of adjust- 
ment. But I think we are on a good course 
in the relationship with the Western Hemi- 

The recent meeting of the General Assem- 
bly of the OAS was conducted in the least 
polemical way, in the most constructive man- 
ner, that any observer can recall. I believe 
we are on the way to solving some of the 
outstanding problems in the Western Hemi- 
sphere, and we plan to go on to some con- 
structive achievements. 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed 
for CBS-TV Evening News 

Following is the transcript of an inter- 
vietv tvith Secretary Kissinger by Walter 
Cronkite broadcast on the CBS television 
Evening News on June 19. 

Mr. Cronkite: A current question, Mr. 
Secretary, on the day's neios regarding the 
Middle East. There is a story out of Israel 
that the majority party is sticking by a map 
or at least its plans, which make clear that 
it has no intention of giving up the Golan 
Heights or the Gaza Strip— an old position, 
but it has been restated today. Have they 
stated that that is a nonnegotiable position? 

Secretary Kissinger: Of course we are 
dealing with the Government of Israel and 
not with a party. The Government of Israel, 
when Prime Minster Rabin was here, indi- 
cated flexibility with respect to negotiations. 
We did not attempt to di'aw any final lines. 
But we did have the impression that they 
were ready to negotiate in a flexible manner. 

Mr. Cronkite: President Ford told the 
Minneapolis Tribtine that the drift is still 
toward ivar in the Middle East, a statement 

made after the meetings with Rabin, and, 
of course, with Sadat in Europe. Do yon 
agree ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think you are try- 
ing to get me into trouble, Walter. I think 
that the President was trying to emphasize 
that, as long as there is no progress either 
toward an interim settlement or an overall 
settlement, there will be a drift toward war 
and that this drift must be arrested. We 
believe that there are possibilities of negotia- 
tions, but until they have been achieved, the 
drift toward war will continue. 

Mr. Cronkite: Wliat are the prospects noiv 
for reversal of that drift? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think we have a 
chance to reverse that drift. 

Mr. Cronkite: Could you give us a time- 

Secretary Kissinger: I can't give a time- 
table, but I think we are trying to do it with- 
in the next months. 

Mr. Cronkite: The Secretary of State, in 
addressing the Japan Society in New York 
last night, seemed to further define U.S. 
foreign policy, particidarly in the sticky area 
of militari/ support for nondemocrutic re- 
gimes. He said the lesson of Viet-Nam ivas 
that outside military support ivas not enough 
— that there was not a popular will to resist. 
Nonetheless, he added, the United States, in 
the interest of peace and security, ivill meet 
treaty obligations to support governments 
that do not reflect the "popular will" and 
social justice. I asked him if that meant 
that American foreign policy put expediency 
above principle. 

Secretary Kissinger: That is a very ex- 
treme statement. There are situations in 
which the collapse of a country could have 
dra.stic consequences for world peace. For 
example, in World War II, the United States 
and Great Britain supported the Soviet 
Union even though we had fundamental dis- 
agreements with their internal system. On 
the other hand, wherever the United States 
can do so, and to the maximum extent pos- 
sible, we mu-st support democratic institu- 
tions, humane governments; and before 

July 14, 1975 


there are pressures, we should use and in- 
tend to use our influence in that direction. 

Mr. Cronkite: You mentioned specifically 
Korea last night, and obviously this is what 
you had in mind in much of this discussio)t. 
Are you saying that we rvill keep our treaty 
commitment even if we know from the Viet- 
namese experience that popular will is lack- 
ing and we therefore are likely to lose the 
ball game in the end anyway? 

Sccretarii Kissinger: I don't think that 
the judgment is correct that we will lose the 
ball game in the end in Korea or that a 
willingness to defend against attack from 
North Korea is lacking. There are some dis- 
putes regarding the internal situation in 
South Korea, and the United States basically 
supports a liberal evolution toward demo- 
cratic forms. But the will to resist certainly 
exists in Korea; and it does not have to be 
created, as was the case in Viet-Nam. 

Mr. Cronkite: On another point from last 
night's speech, sir, you said that our atti- 
tude toward the new regimes in Indochina 
— and I assume you mean South Viet-Nam, 
Cambodia, and I suppose Laos along with 
that — "will be influenced by their conduct 
toward their neighbors and their attitude 
totvard us." I ivonder what specific signs 
you are going to be looking for that would 
signal the possibility of detente with those 
Communist nations of Southeast Asia. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, of course, as 
far as Laos is concerned, we still have diplo- 
matic relations with it. With respect to 
Viet-Nam and Cambodia, we would look for 
particularly the implementation of the Paris 
agreement, especially with respect to the 

missing in action; and we would expect that 
they maintain peaceful relations without 
pressure or subversion with their neighbors. 
Under those conditions, we would be willing 
to consider our relationships to them. 

Mr. Cronkite: How long a time do they 
have to prove themselves — that they ivill not 
have aggressive intentions toward their 
neighbors? That could be a long time in 
proof, wouldn't it? 

Seo-etari) Kissi)iger: Well, but I think one 
can determine over the next months or year 
what the basic pattern of their behavior is 
going to be. And I think we'd be openminded 
looking for signals. 

M)-. Cronkite: A story that Jias just 
crossed our desk from Zaire — that the U.S. 
Ambassador lias been declared persona non 
grata, at least lias been asked to leave the 
country, presumably over the allegation that 
Americans were involved in a plot against 
President Mobutu's life. Have you any re- 
action to that? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, these allega- 
tions are totally unfounded, and we regret 
that this decision has been taken. We do 
consider Zaire one of the key countries of 
Africa with which we would like to main- 
tain cordial relations. And the action was 
based on totally wrong information that fell 
into the hands of the Government of Zaire, 
probably as a result of forgery. 

Mr. Cronkite: As a result of what, sir? 

Secretary Kissinger: It must have been 
forgery, because we had absolutely no con- 
nection with any plot, nor did we know there 
was a plot. 


Department of State Bulletin 

President Walter Scheel of the Federal Republic of Germany 
Makes State Visit to the United States 

President Walter Scheel of the Federal 
Republic of Germayiy made a state visit to 
the United States June 15-20. He 'met with 
President Ford and other government offi- 
cials at Washington June 16-17. Following 
are an exchange of greetings between Presi- 
dent Ford and President Scheel at a wel- 
coming ceremony on tlie South Laivn of the 
White House on June 16, their exchange of 
toasts at a dinner at the White House that 
evening, and an address made by President 
Scheel before a joint session of the Congress 
on June 17. 


Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 23 

President Ford 

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: It is 
a very great honor and a personal pleasure, 
Mr. President, to welcome you here on behalf 
of the American people. Although this is 
your first visit as a Federal President, you 
have been welcomed to our country on many 
previous occasions. I therefore greet you not 
only as Federal President but also as an 
old and very dear friend of America. 

Over 17 years have passed since your dis- 
tinguished predecessor, Theodor Heuss, paid 
us a state visit. In that year, 1958, the 
Federal Republic was in the early stages of 
a remarkable economic recovery and growth 
which can now be seen as an economic 

The Federal Republic was on its way to 
becoming one of our strongest allies, one of 
our most important trading partners and 
closest of friends. 

We have seen many, many changes since 
the late 1950's. Mr. President, today we face 

new challenges of unparalleled complexity, 
including those of energy and international 
economics. Yet the basic principles of our 
foreign policies and of our relationship re- 
main sound and constant. 

We are as strongly committed as we were 
17 years ago to safeguarding the freedom 
of the West. We have remained committed 
to the freedom and security of Berlin. We 
see the peace and security of Central Europe 
as a true test of the process known as 

Only a few days ago I made my first visit 
to Europe as President of the United States. 
In Brussels, the heads of government of the 
North Atlantic nations met and reaffirmed 
the continuing solidarity of our alliance and 
the continuing strength of our commitment 
to the goals that unite our peoples. 

In the era now before us, I can say with 
confidence that Americans are committed to 
this alliance with renewed dedication, vision, 
and purpose. 

It is my intention, Mr. President, to work 
in close concert with you to serve our 
peoples' common objectives. Together, our 
strong, free, and prosperous nations can 
achieve much for our own peoples and for 

Your visit, Mr. President, bears eloquent 
testimony to the friendship and partner- 
ship of the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the United States. In this spirit, I bid 
you a most cordial welcome on this occasion, 
and I look forward to our discussions of the 
problems of mutual interest and concern. 

President Scheel 

Mr. President, Mrs. Ford: My wife and 
I should like to express our sincere thanks 
for your friendly words of welcome. 

July 14, 1975 


Today, I come to the White House for the 
first time as President of the Federal Re- 
public of Germany. What is, after all, the 
purpose of such a state visit? 

Firstly, by its very character, it is in- 
tended to mirror the state of mutual rela- 
tions. These relations are — I know of no 
doubt about it — excellent. We are showing 
people both at home and abroad how close 
are the ties which unite us. 

This is a good thing, and important, too. 
It is something the world should, indeed 
must, know. 

Such a visit also enables us to take stock. 
We look back at the past. 

The bicentenary of the founding of the 
United States is near at hand. The 30th 
anniversary of the end of the war in Europe 
is just over. Both anniversaries play an im- 
portant part in our relations. 

The U.S. Constitution gave birth to mod- 
ern democracy based on freedom and thus 
to the democratic family of nations, to which 
the Federal Republic also belongs. 

For us Germans, the 30th anniversary of 
the end of the war calls forth ambivalent 
feelings, but it also reminds us of the debt 
of gratitude we owe to the people of the 
United States for the generous help they 
afforded their former enemy. I need not 
press the point that this help will never be 

But we must not only dwell on the past ; 
we must also face up to the present. No 
one, Mr. President, has a clearer picture than 
you and the government you lead of the 
problems of worldwide dimensions which 
confront us today. 

The free Western world has taken up this 
historic challenge. I am convinced it has 
enough courage, perception, imagination, 
and initiative to solve the pending problems. 

Of course, this cannot be done unless we 
join forces. Alone, everyone for himself, we 
shall not succeed. This means that we need 
European unification. We need the Atlantic 
partnership between a united Europe and 
the United States of America. 

This Atlantic partnership must comprise 
not only our common security policy, which 
will continue to be vital, but also all political 

spheres of importance for both sides. In 
particular, it must include a common ap- 
proach to the crucial economic and monetary 
problems facing the world today. 

Every step toward more solidarity, I be- 
lieve, is a step to strengthening our free 
democratic system. 

Your impressive visit to Europe under- 
lined once more these fundamental truths. 
The countries joined in the Atlantic partner- 
ship do not cut themselves off from the out- 
side world. Indeed, one of the reasons for 
uniting has been to contribute with our com- 
bined strengths toward a solution of the 
global social problem of our time — that of 

The chances for the survival of democracy 
are, as I see it, crucially dependent on the 
forces of freedom all over the world finding 
the right answer to this problem. 

Mr. President, I am pleased to feel that 
I am a welcome guest in your country. Let 
me say here and now that you, too, would 
be a highly welcome guest in our country. 
I do hope that I will be able in the not too 
distant future to welcome you in Bonn as 
the guest of the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many. But right now, Mr. President, I am 
looking forward to my talks with you. 

President Ford 

Thank you very much. I look forward to 
coming there. 


\^'eekIy Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 23 

President Ford 

Mr. President, Mrs. Scheel, ladies and 
gentlemen : On your first visit to Wa.shington 
as President of the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, we extend, Mrs. Ford and myself, our 
heartiest welcome. 

Your first year on the job has shown you 
have brought to the highest office of your 
land the same energy and the same dedica- 
tion that you displayed throughout your 
long career in the parliament of your coun- 

You are no stranger, Mr. President, to our 


Department of State Bulletin 

American officials. You served with great 
distinction as Foreign Minister. You have 
shown a remarkable breadth and expertise in 
economics, as well as in politics, and you have 
a very firm grasp — and we are most grateful 
— in the Third World as well as in our 
industrial communities. 

We have also noted, Mr. President, your 
rise to stardom in another important field — 
popular music — and I refer specifically to 
a piece that you recently recorded, which 
became a smash hit, as we call it, throughout 
your country. 

Your musical success contributes to your 
overall accomplishments as you seek har- 
mony at home and in concert with Germany's 
neighbors, both West as well as East. You 
have dedicated yourself, Mr. President, to 
the cause of European unity, as we discussed 
this morning, as well as Atlantic solidarity. 
I know these goals are vital to you, as well 
as to your country. 

At the same time, your contribution to 
better East-West relations has been most 
significant. Recent experience has demon- 
strated there can be no domestic tranquillity 
or stability and prosperity in any country 
without cooperation with other nations. 

My Administration has been extremely 
proud to work closely with the Federal Re- 
public on important international problems 
facing both of us in today's world. Your 
country has made an important contribution 
to international peace, Mr. President, not 
only through its cooperation with 
its friends as well as its allies but also in 
the example set by your government and 
your people in meeting the new challenges 
of the modern world. 

The Federal Republic today is in many, 
many ways a model of the development of 
the modern industrial state — thriving in 
freedom as well as in democracy, earning its 
role of eminence by hard work of its people, 
and finding its successes in common en- 
deavors within the European Community 
and with its allies. 

This is the real challenge for the leaders 
of the West. I am inspired, Mr. President, 
by the determination that I sense in the 
Federal Republic and its leaders not to let 

our democratic way of life be undermined. 

I continue to be impressed by your nation's 
ability to meet the tasks of today's world — 
whether in the fields of economics, trade, 
energy, national defense, or East-West rela- 
tions — through the effective democratic gov- 
ernment and creative diplomacy. 

This tradition, Mr. President, is the most 
encouraging aspect of our friendship today. 
We cooperate very closely on the practical 
problems facing us, sharing the conviction 
that these solutions will mean nothing if 
our political and social institutions are not 
simultaneously preserved. A confident role 
in the world depends upon confidence in 

Mr. President, earlier today it was a pleas- 
ure to participate with you in the ceremony 
creating the John J. McCloy Fund,' a fund 
established through a very generous contri- 
bution from the Federal Republic to our 
Bicentennial celebration, a fund which will 
be used to further German-American ex- 
changes, conferences, contacts across the 
broad spectrum of our relations. I think 
this fund symbolizes anew the very close 
relationship between our peoples. 

In this spirit, Mr. President, I raise my 
glass and welcome you to our country: Mr. 

President Scheel - 

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: I 
am glad to be visiting the United States just 
at a time when the whole country is pre- 
paring for the great jubilee of its history, 
the Bicentennial. 

One could reflect at length on whether the 
United States is an old or a young country. 
It is no secret that there is a rather uncriti- 
cal school of thought in Europe that arro- 
gantly thinks it can dismiss the United 
States, despite its 200 years, as a "country 
without a history." True, in my country, 
too, we have cities and towns that were a 
thousand years old when America gained 

' For remarks made at the ceremony by P)-esirlent 
Scheel, President Ford, and Mr. McCloy, see Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents dated .Tune 
23, 1974, p. 635. 

" President Scheel spoke in German. 

July 14, 1975 


its independence, but there is no merit in 
age alone. The tortoise reaches a ripe old 
age, but it is not the most noble of creatures. 
And how old is the Federal Republic of 
Germany? It is 26. 

And this brings me to the main point: The 
United States is not simply 200 years old. In 
an unbroken historical tradition, it has been 
a liberal republic from its very beginning. 
Two hundred years of uninterrupted repub- 
lican democratic tradition — where else in the 
world is there a republic which for two cen- 
turies has made liberty and equality for all 
citizens its law of life, which has not even 
shirked a civil war in order to remain true 
to the ideals upon which it entered world 
history? And those ideals are today still the 
most important, the most topical, and the 
most vital of all. Europe is, who would doubt 
it, the mother of the United States, but the 
United States is, and who could doubt that, 
the mother of European democracy. 

Over the centuries, many German immi- 
grants have come to this country. We Ger- 
mans were gratified at the result of a public 
opinion survey carried out by your Bureau 
of the Census. Of the 205 million questioned, 
30 million .said their heritage was Anglo- 
Saxon, but 25 million, the next largest group, 
said their heritage was German. They had 
left their native country because they wanted 
to escape religious oppression, because eco- 
nomic necessity left them no choice, because 
the accelerating process of industrialization 
had uprooted them, or because they were per- 
secuted on political grounds. 

Well, they all quickly became Americans, 
even though many of them still cherished 
their native country. But their loyalty they 
gave unshakably to the land whose citizens 
they were proud to be. 

Many of them returned to our country as 
American soldiers after the war and brought 
with them, together with their fellow citizens, 
the message of the free America. We hungrily 
threw ourselves upon everything that came 
from the other side of the Atlantic. Our 
writers were inspired by William Faulkner 
and Ernest Hemingway, our young architects 
stood in awe at the ti'emendous strides made 
in the meantime by architecture in America, 

our newspapers modeled themselves upon 
their American counterparts, and young Ger- 
mans fell for jazz. In short, one cannot 
imagine the cultural life of our country with- 
out the stimuli it received from this country. 

Today, Mr. President, our two countries 
are closely linked with each other, but those 
ties are based not only on the identity of our 
political, economic, and security interests 
but on the interplay of cultural and historical 
developments that have been of such great 
importance to both countries. History shows 
us the way to each other. 

And that is why the American President's 
appeal to us to join in the celebrations has 
met with a broad-based response in the Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany. It gives me great 
pleasure, Mr. President, to be able to an- 
nounce on this festive occasion some of the 
contributions the Federal Government will 
be making on the occasion of your jubilee 

Those contributions are intended to sym- 
bolize the close relationship between our two 
countries, to help make both peoples even 
more conscious of its many facets. 

We have therefore established a fund 
which will be known as the John J. McCloy 
Fund for German-American Exchanges. The 
fund will enable young politicians, journal- 
ists, and representatives of trade unions and 
employers organizations to undertake infor- 
mation trips and participate in German- 
American seminars. There was hardly any 
need to search for a name of the fund, be- 
cause John J. McCloy, whom I am delighted 
to see with us here tonight, has become a 
symbol of German-American friendship and 
cooperation over the past 30 years. 

In the purely academic sphere, the New 
School for Social Research in New York will 
be endowed by the Federal Government with 
a new chair. The New School is a university 
founded by German emigrants, and the years 
of close cooperation with the school have 
shown that by dint of mutual effort it has 
been possible to bridge a dark chapter of the 

At Georgetown University here in Wash- 
ington, D.C., a guest professorship will be 
created with a view to deepening the close 


Department of State Bulletin 

relations between the university and the Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany. 

The new Air and Space Museum in the 
Smithsonian Institution is to have a large- 
scale projection apparatus for the planetar- 
ium to be known as the Einstein Spac'earium. 
That great physicist, who was director of the 
most outstanding research establishment in 
his field, the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of 
Physics in Berlin, was expelled from Ger- 
many on racial grounds. The dedication of the 
Einstein Spacearium on 4 July 1976 will 
again link his name, which belongs to both 
countries, with Germany. One of the best 
known modern composers of my country, 
Karl Heinz Stockhausen, will be composing 
special electronic music for the occasion. 

I have mentioned some of the contribu- 
tions that will be made by the Federal Gov- 
ernment. But the Lander of the Federal Re- 
public of Germany and many cities and or- 
ganizations, too, are making preparation to 
mai'k the bicentenary of German-American 
ties. All this adds up to a token of gratitude 
to a nation which refuses to be excelled where 
generosity is concerned. We Germans have 
every reason to remember this, and I can as- 
sure you that we shall never forget it. 

As the President of a parliamentary de- 
mocracy who was himself for many years a 
member of the German Bundestag, I wish 
on this occasion to convey another kind of 
thanks to the American people — the thanks 
of the German parliamentarians for the gen- 
erous hospitality they have received in 
America when they came here to get to know 
the parliamentary work of this country and 
to see for themselves what life here was 
really like. I myself was in the first group of 
members of the state parliament of North- 
Rhine Westphalia which visited your country 
in 1951. The friendly and generous reception 
we were given then, so soon after the war, 
had a profound effect on my view of America, 
I will not deny it. And all my colleagues at 
that time had the same experience. 

When the independence of the United 
States of America was proclaimed, men 
whose daring matched their circumspection 
demonstrated to the world that internal and 
external freedom require each other. Free- 

dom can only be preserved if it is linked with 
the readiness to defend it both internally and 

Precisely that is the purpose of the al- 
liance in which we are united, the purpose of 
Atlantic partnership, to which we again com- 
mitted ourselves during your visit to Brussels 
a few weeks ago, Mr. President. 

But we should not content ourselves with 
defending our own freedom, our own pros- 
perity. We cannot tolerate a situation in 
which the dignity of man is the privilege 
of but a few nations whilst the majority sink 
in hunger and misery. 

In the year 2000, the world population will 
be 7,000 million. Even now agricultural pro- 
duction can hardly keep pace with popula- 
tion growth. And as the population grows, 
so too do the import requirements of the de- 
veloping countries, very many of whom are 
the poorest nations on earth. If social devel- 
opment in the Third World is not to get 
completely out of control, some 300 million 
new jobs will have to be created there by 
1980. But these countries have not the re- 
sources to be able to achieve this by them- 
selves. They have to be helped. But this ob- 
jective can only be attained through sacrifices 
and imagination. 

This is where the members of the Atlantic 
alliance are called upon to make a big joint 
effort. If anything can fill us with the courage 
to face this problem squarely and coolhead- 
edly, it is that belief in the inalienable dig- 
nity and freedom of man which inspired the 
founders of this mighty Republic 200 years 

For the American democracy is old, but its 
message is eternally young and great — like 
this country, the United States of America. 


Mr. President, Mr. Speaker: You have invited me 
to address you. I appreciate this special gesture. I 
respond by expressing the deep respect which every 
democrat owes to this outstanding assembly. I am 
glad of this opportunity to express some thoughts 

^ Reprinted from the Congressional Record, June 
17, p. H 5578. 

July 14, 1975 


on questions that are of concern to all people in the 
free world. 

The world is fraught with unrest and problems, 
and I am grateful to be able to discuss them with 

Today all governments with a sense of responsibil- 
ity unavoidably find themselves competing to save 
mankind from misery and anarchy. The leaders in 
that contest are not automatically the powerful ones, 
but rather those who can come up with convincing 
answers to the problems of modern society. 

We have had to learn that not only the individual 
is mortal but the whole of mankind. It can perish 
in a few days through arms of destruction. It can 
perish in a few generations through environmental 
pollution and the wasteful exploitation of its natural 

The words of St. Matthew still hold true for the 
whole of mankind: No town, no household that is 
divided against itself can stand. The community in 
this situation has nothing more to fear than the 
passions of egotism. It needs nothing more than the 
voice of reason which reconciles the different ele- 
ments and forges them into a whole. 

That voice has often been raised on this side of 
the Atlantic. When Europe began to break up the 
old feudal systems with new democratic ideas, the 
American Revolution turned the theory of democracy 
into practice. 

When the nations of Europe picked themselves up 
from the debris in 194.5, it was the United States 
who through its inspired leadership galvanized the 
forces of the old continent into a coordinated re- 
covery operation. 

That action was perhaps the most generous in 
the history of mankind. It will be associated forever 
with the name of Secretary of State George 

My country was included in it as early as 1947. 
Indeed in 1946 already a great American statesman. 
Secretary of State James Byrnes, in his historic 
speech in Stuttgart held out a hand to the former 
enemy. The tests and dangers we had withstood 
together let this understanding grow into a well- 
tried political partnership. That partnership has 
rendered us capable of great achievements. It has 
made our ostpolitik possible and has enabled us to 
defuse the complex and dangerous Berlin problem. 

But the freedom of Berlin is not based on inter- 
national agreements alone. Berlin remains free by 
virtue of deeds ever since American citizens risked, 
indeed, sacrificed, their lives during the airlift. It 
remained free by virtue of the words by which 
President Kennedy called himself a "Berliner." That 
city remains a decisive hinge of East- West relations 
in Europe. Here the strengths of any policy of 
detente and our alliance are put to the test day by 

It is true, I speak to you as the representative 
of a divided nation. We have not succeeded in over- 
coming the artificial and unnatural division of Ger- 

many by peaceful means. Other than peaceful means 
have never been thought up, nor will they be. No 
one will understand better than you, Senators and 
Congressmen, that a nation can never forgo its unity 
as a political goal. 

The first essential is this: If a rational and sincere 
policy of detente is to have any meaning for us, it 
must surely be to make it easier for the people in 
divided Germany to live together. 

After the darkest years in our history, the United 
States gave us generous support. But let me also 
say that nothing of what you have done for us since 
has been in vain. You have gained a good ally who 
makes its full contribution toward the defense 
capability of the alliance, a contribution that is 
second to none but that of the United States — an ally 
for democracy, a partner for the efforts which 
Europe and America will have to make together in 
order to enable all people to live in conditions 
worthy of man. 

But the partners of the Atlantic alliance, who 
include the oldest democracies on Earth, must not 
shirk the question, "Can our democratic way of life 
survive?" Has it not already been overtaken by 
the accelerating rate of change in the world ? Do we 
still have the moral strength to find for ourselves 
and others the way through the uncertain? 

These questions lead us back to the ideas of which 
our democracies were born. 

I am convinced that they will stand scrutiny. They 
make us alive to the reliable, the constant elements 
of our policy: the Atlantic alliance, on which our 
freedom and our freedom of action rests, and the 
common values in which our partnership is rooted. 

The meeting of the NATO Council in Brussels and 
the prominent role which President Ford played 
there have confirmed that these are joint beliefs 
and vital links. The political responsibility of the 
world power America extends beyond the Atlantic 
area. Wherever world peace is threatened, this coun- 
try places its enormous weight on the scales of 
peace. And at this present time as well the world 
hopes that the courage and perseverance of its 
political leaders will give them the strength to forge 
peace in the Middle East bit by bit. For what use 
are the dignity and freedom of man if they lack 
the ground of peace in which to grow? 

Belief in these very values, the dignity and free- 
dom of man, has inspired our best political minds 
for over two centuries. When my own generation 
entered upon the political scene, we considered the 
model offered by America as proof that the concept 
of Western democracy was a fitting basis from which 
to cope with the problems of this, the most difficult 
of all worlds. 

I realize that for 12 years those ideals were 
treated with shocking contempt in Germany, and 
yet freedom ultimately prevailed. Exactly 22 years 
ago today, on the 17th of June 195.3, it showed its 
elemental strength when East Berlin workers, heed- 
less of the risks to life and limb, hoisted the black. 


Department of State Bulletin 

red, and gold flag on the Brandenburg Gate. 

Totalitarianism may use arbitrary means; yet in 
the end freedom will triumph. Nevertheless, freedom 
can preserve its strength only if each generation 
anew makes it Its own. In the European Community 
democratic forces openly vie with one another and 
with the Communists, but we have learned that our 
idea of freedom will be cogent only as long as it is 
the motive force of social change. If this is not so, 
it remains a hollow word. 

The catchword of our time is "detente." It is a 
fundamental objective of our foreign policy. It is a 
great hope of our nation. But the peaceful existence 
side by side of East and West knows of no cease-fire 
on the ideological front. And the fronts in this 
ideological battle run right through the German 
nation, which has been divided for decades. We shall 
be the losers in that struggle unless we see why 
Communist ideologies are effective in Europe or in 
the Third World. We see communism succeed where 
injustice and misery predominate, and we have to 
sharpen our conscience. 

It is my belief that political freedom cannot pre- 
vail where the social conscience remains silent. In 
our two countries we have been able to humanize 
working conditions without revolution and bloodshed. 

Our political leaders have rated human dignity 
and freedom higher than the rights of the powerful 
in the free market. They know that political freedom 
becomes a farce unless the individual has the mate- 
rial means of self-realization. Freedom and social 
justice go together. Social peace is the prerequisite 
for a nation's inner strength. Without that inner 
strength it has no strength internationally. 

Our Constitution upholds the concept of ownership 
as the basis of a free economic order. But at the 
same time, it postulates the social obligation in- 
herent in ownership. That is what our Constitution, 
the basic law of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
prescribes, and this has been the approach of all 
governments of the Federal Republic of Germany. 

Ten million refugees from the lost regions of 
eastern Germany found a new homeland in the de- 
stroyed and overpopulated western part of our 
country. Generous legislation and the sacrifices made 
by the people gave those expellees equal opportuni- 
ties. My country is proud of that achievement. 

Today we are trying to achieve a balance of in- 
terests and opportunities on a much larger scale. 
The entire world economic order must be given the 
chance to develop further, but in the process, noth- 
ing should be given up that has proved its value. 

We are called upon to share responsibility for 
answering vital questions from five continents: 
Tomorrow's grain and rice deficit, the interplay of 
population pressure and economic development, the 
mounting cost of military security. The starving in 
many parts of the world still need our help. Young 
nations who hoped to achieve industrial prosperity 
overnight with the aid of our capital and tech- 
nology are disappointed and put the blame on us. 

The industrialized countries can only meet these 
challenges if their economic constitution is sound. 

This means for our countries we must continue 
along the paths we have taken in fighting unemploy- 
ment and worldwide recession. Our economic policies 
must give sufl^cient impulses to domestic demand. 

One thing is certain: Only through close coopera- 
tion between North America and Europe and by 
harmonizing interests have we any prospect of 
mastering such tasks. It is certain that our com- 
bined energies will not provide the solution without 
the contributions of other nations. And it is certain 
also that we would be betraying the old fundamental 
ideas of democracy if we were always to be found 
on the side of those who defend property and priv- 
ilege against social demands, demands born of 
hunger and distress. 

It is our task to find evolutionary solutions, but 
this is no easy matter. The welfare of our peoples 
which we have to guard did not come to us over- 
night. We owe it to the hard work and privations of 
whole generations. It would be politically meaning- 
less and economically impossible just to transfer our 
assets and our social achievements to others, as 
some developing countries would like it. 

Our aim is not to maintain the status quo, but to 
seek harmonization of interests. The readiness to 
accept change is the prerequisite for the pursuit of 
happiness, and in that context it is the spirit we 
adopt in our relations with the partners from other 
camps that will be decisive. 

Our diplomatic tools shall not include threats and 
intimidation. In a spirit of partnership without 
mental reservation, it is possible to reconcile even 
sharply conflicting interests. In everything we do 
we must start from the fact that in the decades 
ahead there is only one rational course open to us, 
that of cooperation. 

The nine European states have, with much good 
will, worked out an overall modus of economic 
cooperation with the nations of Africa, Asia, and 
the Caribbean. In protracted negotiations, sharply 
diff'ering points of view and interests of many 
sovereigrn partners have been harmonized. Here we 
have a promising example of multilateral coopera- 
tion with the Third World. It also shows that the 
European Community can have a stabilizing influ- 
ence on the world economy. 

At the same time, it becomes clear that the 
European Community is capable of helping to ease 
the burden of the United States, once it finds its 
way to joint action. The European union to which 
we have committed ourselves has not yet been com- 
pleted, and to be frank, in this respect we are still a 
long way behind our hopes and our promises. But 
Europe is needed, and we shall build it, and in so 
doing, we need the understanding of the United 

We need long-term European-American coopera- 
tion. It must be based on mutual trust. It must be 
candid. It must not again make the mistake of 

July 14, 1975 


emphasizing divergent secondary interests at the 
expense of primary common interests. 

We need not only the willpower and the technical 
capability of the United States which President 
Ford referred to in Brussels but also, to quote him 
again, "its spiritual drive and steadiness of purpose." 

Not as some may have feared and others may 
have hoped, recent developments have not loosened 
the ties of European-American solidarity. On the 
contrary, more energies have been set free for the 
alliance which will be concentrated on its tasks. The 
awareness of our interdependence is deeper than 
ever. It has above all become clear to us that it is 
the common fundamental democratic beliefs which 
distinguished the alliance from others and which 
nourished its strength in each member state. 

I believe in a Europe committed to the human 
rights that were embodied for the first time in the 
constitution of Massachusetts, a Europe which fills 
these principles with a sense of social justice of our 
generation. Only with a deeper understanding of 
our spiritual heritage will the democracies on either 
side of the North Atlantic be able to assert them- 
selves and thus effectively serve the cause of world 

Together with you, we shall recall the concepts 
and ideals of the American Revolution. May our age 
find us as resolved, as realistic, but also as idealistic 
as those men and women who made this great coun- 

U.S. Grants Egypt $40 Million 

for Suez Canal Area Reconstruction 

AID press release 75-47 dated May 30 

The Agency for International Develop- 
ment is providing two additional grants to 
Egypt totaling $40 million for reconstruc- 
tion projects in the Suez Canal area. One 
grant for $30 million will finance electrical 
equipment, materials, and related services 
to help the Egyptian Government recon- 
struct the electrical distribution systems in 
Port Said, Ismailia, and Suez City. The other 
grant of $10 million will finance heavy equip- 
ment, spare parts, and related materials for 
the reconstruction of roads, city streets, and 
structures in the Suez Canal area. 

The grant agreements were signed in 
Cairo May 28 by U.S. Ambassador Hermann 
F. Eilts and Egyptian Minister of Economy 
and Economic Cooperation Muhammad Zaki 

Last February, AID signed an $80 million 
loan to Egypt to finance imports of agricul- 
tural and industrial equipment, spare parts, 
and other essential commodities to aid the 
Egyptian economy. In addition, AID pro- 
vided a $14 million grant to help clear the 
103-mile-long Suez Canal of sunken ships, 
wreckage, and explosives and a $2 million 
grant for technical assistance. 

The AID loans and grants are part of the 
$250 million economic assistance program 
approved by the U.S. Congress for fiscal 
year 1975. The U.S. Government also do- 
nated about $5 million for Food for Peace 
commodities in fiscal vear 1975. 

U.S. Gives Views on Use of Funds 
by UNICEF for Indochina Program 

Folloicing is a statement by Michael N. 
Seelsi, U.S. Representative on the Executive 
Board of the U)iited Nations Children's Fund 
(VNICEF), made in the program committee 
of the board on May 27. 

USUN press release 7,1 (corr. 1) dated May 27 

The U.S. delegation does not believe addi- 
tional funds fi'om the general resources 
budget should be committed to the Indochina 
Program in view of the limited resources and 
needs in other parts of the world. There is 
ample opportunity for countries wishing to 
expand UNICEF assistance to Indochina to 
do so by contributing to the Secretary Gen- 
eral's special appeal. 

The U.S. delegation wants it explicitly 
noted in the records of this committee that 
it has reservations with regard to this 


Department of State Bulletin 


U.S. Policy in the Area of the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula 

Statement by Joseph J. Sisco 

Under Secretary for Political Affairs ^ 

Mr. Chairman [Representative Lee H. 
Hamilton] : My statement will address itself 
to U.S. policy in the area of the Persian 
Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula — an area 
of major importance to the United States 
in political, economic, and strategic terms. 

It is timely to take another comprehensive 
look at this region, and I want to commend 
the chairman and the members of the com- 
mittee for having launched this useful re- 
view and dialogue in 1972 — a dialogue which 
has been carried on with regularity since 
then. Our policies impact on both regional 
and global interests, and I hope to show that 
our military sales program, in which I 
know you have a special interest, is an in- 
tegral part of that overall policy, pursued 
carefully and with balance, with a view 
to promoting the interests of the United 

In the Persian Gulf-Arabian Peninsula 
area are 10 countries which are related geo- 
gi'aphically, religiously, and for the most 
part, ethnically, but which present sharp and 
distinctive economic and political contrasts. 
Some have long histories as independent 
nations with established interests and in- 
fluence in and beyond the area, while others 
have achieved independence as recently as 
1971. All have strong economic ties with 
the outside world. Several are among the 

' Submitted to the Special Subcommittee on In- 
vestigations of the House Committee on Interna- 
tional Relations on June 10. The complete transcript 
of the hearings will be published by the committee 
and will be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20402. 

world's wealthiest in terms of per capita 
GNP, while others are still among the poor- 
est. Their political systems range from abso- 
lute monarchy based on Koranic law through 
gradations of parliamentary democracy to 
a Marxist-Leninist-style People's Republic. 
Except for the People's Democratic Republic 
of Yemen, where we have had no diplomatic 
relations and no official presence since Octo- 
ber 1969, and Iraq, where despite the absence 
of diplomatic relations we maintain a small 
U.S. Interests Section in the Belgian Em- 
bassy, our relations with all the countries 
in this region are good. With many of these 
countries, the depth and variety of our re- 
lationship have grown significantly in recent 

It remains an area where a spectacular 
transition is underway: 

— Where new political institutions have 
been formed and tested and where tradi- 
tional values are subject to modern social 
change ; 

—Where there has been a dramatic evolu- 
tion in relationships between international 
oil companies and oil producer states ; 

— Where a technology transfer is being 
greatly accelerated as the oil-exporting coun- 
tries seek help from the developed countries 
to diversify and industrialize their econ- 
omies ; and 

— Where concerns for security and sta- 
bility have loomed large since Britain's ter- 
mination in 1971 of its protective treaty 
relationships with a number of gulf states 
and as the countries in the area have moved 
toward greater regional cooperation. 

July 14, 1975 


It also remains an area where develop- 
ments affect the relationships among and 
policies of major world powers. With the 
shift in world oil market power from con- 
sumer nations to the producer countries, 
the application in 1973 of the oil embargo, 
and the quadrupling of oil prices, the global 
strategic equation has been affected by what 
happens in the gulf. The increasing world 
focus on the gulf has been marked by a grow- 
ing Soviet presence in its periphery as the 
Soviets have sought to increase their posi- 
tion and military presence in the People's 
Democratic Republic of Yemen, Somalia, and 
Iraq. Since 1967 and particularly since the 
October 1973 war, the major Arab oil pro- 
ducers in the peninsula have become the prin- 
cipal financial support for the Arab states 
more directly involved in the Middle East 
conflict. While they are not directly pai't of 
the process of reaching a Middle East settle- 
ment, their views are very important, and 
they are regularly consulted by the Arab 
parties to the negotiations as well as by the 

Current Overview 

Before examining our policy, it is im- 
portant to look briefly at where we were in 
the area four years ago — when there was 
uncertainty about the region's future sta- 
bility with Britain relinquishing its security 
responsibilities in the gulf and small newly 
independent states in the region about to 

Just four years ago, we were concerned 
about whether any federation of small gulf 
states could hold together, about the numer- 
ous unresolved boundary disputes, about the 
impact of the growing Communist-supported 
insurgency in Oman's Dhofar Province, and 
finally about the dearth of technicians and 
nation-building institutions needed for the 
area's development. In short, only four years 
ago there were real concerns as to how and 
indeed whether the area would be able to 
benefit from rapid change without falling 
prey to the instability inherent in such 

While the rapid political and social transi- 
tion now underway still leaves a number of 

uncertainties, there has been a substantial 
degree of progress and stability. Recently, 
we have seen the smooth succession of power 
in Saudi Arabia. The seven-member United 
Arab Emirates has solidified and is building 
up its federal structure. The wealthy gulf 
riparians are attracting a growing number 
of foreign technicians and companies to help 
with their development. The significant rise 
in the price of oil has made several gulf 
states capital-surplus nations, enabling them 
to increase sharply their level of foreign 
assistance and to become attractive markets 
for our goods and services as they seek to 
accelerate their own development. 

At the same time, there has been a per- 
ceptible trend toward greater regional co- 
operation. For these countries, the gulf re- 
mains the key communications link to the 
outside world for most of their imports and 
exports, and this circumstance has required 
them to deal with each other in seeking to 
resolve issues contributing to area tensions. 
The Shah's recent visit to Saudi Arabia 
has highlighted the closer cooperation among 
the two principal gulf riparians. 

Progress has been made on a number of 
boundary issues. Iran has settled its bound- 
ary dispute with Iraq. Iraq in turn has 
reached a preliminary boundary settlement 
with Saudi Arabia. The United Arab Em- 
irates has settled its boundary problem with 
Saudi Arabia and negotiated a median line 
in the gulf with Iran. 

In the poorest but most populous state 
on the peninsula, North Yemen, we have 
seen strong Saudi financial support for a 
new government which is earnestly trying 
to put centuries of tribalism and factionalism 
behind it and to get on with the business of 
development and progress for its people. 
The insurgency in Dhofar supported by the 
radical South Yemen regime has failed to 
gain its objective, and one of the principal 
reasons has been the military and economic 
assistance Oman has received from friendly 
regional states. 

Finally, the reopening of the Suez Canal 
provides opportunities and incentives to the 
South Yemen regime to moderate its ideolog- 
ical bent if it plans to put Aden's unique 


Department of State Bulletin 

bunkering facilities to use once again for 
world shipping. Whether it will perceive its 
interests in this light, of course, remains to 
be seen. 

Objectives of U.S. Policy 

Our main policy objectives for the gulf 
and Arabian Peninsula region, which we have 
set forth before to the committee, have re- 
mained constant since we developed a com- 
prehensive policy framework in anticipation 
of the termination of the special British role 
there in 1971. They are: 

— Support for collective security and sta- 
bility in the region by encouraging indige- 
nous regional cooperative efforts and orderly 
economic progress. Being responsive to re- 
quests from the regional states for advice re- 
garding the types and quantities of military 
equipment and services they need to meet 
their defense and internal security needs as 
they perceive them, and responding on a case- 
by-case basis to their requests to purchase 
such equipment and services from us, have 
served this purpose; 

— Continued access to the region's oil sup- 
plies at reasonable prices and in sufficient 
quantities to meet our needs and those of our 

— Encouraging the states in the area to re- 
solve by peaceful means territorial and other 
disputes between them and widening the 
channels of communication between them ; 

— Expanding our diplomatic, cultural, 
technical, commercial, and financial presence 
and activities ; and 

— Assisting oil exporters to employ their 
rapidly growing incomes in a constructive 
way, supportive of the international financial 

Regional Security 

Mr. Chairman, we must remember that the 
nations in the gulf region have a primary in- 
terest in stability and orderly progress. The 
littoral states of the gulf are aware that they 
sit on what is probably the world's most val- 
uable energy asset, valued at something over 
$4.5 trillion at today's oil and gas prices. 

They know there is little in history to sug- 
gest that resources of this magnitude, of such 
critical importance to every nation of the 
world, will go unmolested very long unless 
there is a degree of collective security. They 
know that any implicit big-power guarantees 
that they feel might have existed in the past 
have now disappeared with the British re- 
linquishing their former protective role in 
the gulf and the gulf states themselves ac- 
quiring control and ownership of their own 
petroleum resources. 

It is our view that the major burden for 
assuring security in the region must be borne 
by the gulf states themselves and in particu- 
lar by the major nations of the region, Iran 
and Saudi Arabia. We have had a long tra- 
dition of military cooperation with those 
nations through the provision of training and 
furnishing of military equipment which dates 
back to World War II. When the British 
announced in 1968 they would end their pro- 
tective treaty relationships in the gulf, we 
carefully reviewed our policy. We decided on 
an approach which incorporated the follow- 
ing guidelines : 

— To continue to promote regional coopera- 
tion by encouraging the two strongest ripar- 
ian states, Iran and Saudi Arabia, to assume 
increasing responsibilities for the collective 
security of the region; 

— To establish direct U.S. relationships 
with the new political entities in the area 
where they had not existed before, including 
the establishment of diplomatic representa- 
tion in the lower gulf states; and 

— To develop plans for technical and educa- 
tional assistance and cultural exchange, 
through private as well as public programs, 
for the purpose of promoting orderly devel- 

This approach recognizes the role which 
the British will continue to play as adviser on 
security and economic development, but it is 
a course which has relied increasingly on a 
varied mix and growing nexus of relation- 
ships — in which military supply for regional 
security is one aspect. It is a policy approach 
which we have since periodically reexamined 
in our review of the most desirable basis for 

July 14, 1975 


maintaining stability in the area of the Per- 
sian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. 

The execution of a regional policy based 
on these general guidelines has required that 
our actions be tailored to the specific country 
concerned, taking into account its human re- 
sources, size and geography, degree of devel- 
opment, and the security threats which it be- 
lieves it faces. There are in the gulf at least 
four entities that need to be addressed sep- 

Iran's Security and Development Programs 

Iran shares a lengthy border with the So- 
viet Union. While seeking cooperation with 
the powerful northern neighbor, any prudent 
Iranian leader has to remain concerned about 
long-term Soviet intentions. Looking east and 
west, he can see substantial Soviet involve- 
ment in Afghanistan and Iraq; to the south 
he sees growing Soviet naval activity in the 
Indian Ocean. Possessing half of the shore- 
line of the Persian Gulf, a waterway of vital 
importance to its burgeoning economy and oil 
exports, Iran has a natural strategic interest 
in maintaining free passage through the 
gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, through which 
pass all of Iran's and two-thirds of the 
world's oil exports, and the Indian Ocean, 
through which the gulf is reached. 

Iran's size, harsh terrain, relatively limited 
transportation network, and great distance 
from foreign suppliers of military equipment 
have required it to develop comprehensive 
defense plans which correspond to these con- 
ditions. The result has been a concept that 
keeps the standing armed forces relatively 
small in number (about 350,000) while pro- 
viding advanced equipment for air, naval, 
and armored forces and the means to move 
ground forces by air rapidly from one loca- 
tion to another. 

While using a portion of its oil wealth to 
equip itself for its defense, Iran has sought 
to develop a cooperative approach to regional 
security among states. It has recently been 
able to settle a longstanding territorial dis- 
pute with Iraq. At the same time, it has of- 

fered support to its gulf neighbors in dealing 
with radical threats. Iranian units are pres- 
ently in Oman to help the Sultan end the in- 
surgency in Dhofar, which has its sanctuary 
and base in the Soviet-backed People's Dem- 
ocratic Republic of Yemen. 

The size of Iran's population, coupled with 
its rapid social and economic development, 
gives it a capability to exercise leadership in 
the gulf. The United States has welcomed 
Iran's taking on greater security responsi- 
bilities. We have agreed to sell it a substan- 
tial quantity of defense material, especially 
aircraft and naval craft. The progress which 
Iran has made in improving its military capa- 
bility has given Iran a credible deterrent, en- 
abled it to play a more active role in protect- 
ing the vital trade routes of the gulf, and was 
undoubtedly a factor in the recent decision 
of the Iraqi and Iranian leadership to resolve 
a major bilateral dispute by negotiation. I 
would note it is only recently that Iran's 
armed forces have drawn level with Iraq's 
militai-y capabilities and strength. 

Much has been said regarding the re- 
sources which the Iranian Government is 
putting into building its defense military ca- 
pacity. But too little has been said about the 
impressive strides which the government has 
made in economic development and in im- 
proving the welfare of its people. Iran's do- 
mestic investment program is more than 
twice what it spends on defense. The Iranian 
five-year plan (1973-78) calls for the ex- 
penditure of roughly $70 billion in the civil- 
ian sector. A substantial portion is for in- 
dustrial growth, but $19 billion is earmarked 
for housing, free education, urban and rural 
development, and a massive increase in med- 
ical facilities. 

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Lower Gulf States 

Saudi Arabia is also greatly concerned 
about its security. It, too, covers a vast land 
area, almost as big as the United States east 
of the Mississippi, with 2,000 miles of coast- 
line. On its southern perimeter, it sees a con- 
tinuing insurgency festering in western 


Department of State Bulletin 

Oman supported by the radical South Yemen 
regime and to the north an Iraq with signifi- 
cant ideological differences. We tend to forget 
that Saudi towns were bombed by Egyptian 
aircraft in 1963 and South Yemen forces 
struck Saudi outposts in 1969 and 1973. 
Lightly populated, with military and para- 
military forces of only about 80,000, Saudi 
Arabia has much to protect but relatively lit- 
tle to protect it with. 

In the security and defense field, we have 
conducted for the Saudis comprehensive sur- 
veys of their military requirements on two 
occasions in recent years, taking into account 
the threat they perceive to their national se- 
curity and their limited manpower resources. 
Our cooperative effort has been to assist the 
Saudis to achieve several objectives which 
they see as critical to their own defense and 
stability in the Arabian Peninsula : Develop- 
ment of a credible air defense system, mod- 
ernization and training of their ordnance 
corps, upgrading of their air force through 
acquisition of F-5E aircraft, building a small 
force of naval patrol craft, modernizing ele- 
ments of the National Guard to improve its 
capabilities to protect key installations, and 
construction of military infrastructure facil- 

Our programs have been clearly related to 
Saudi Arabia's capacity to absorb the equip- 
ment it purchases. Because training, main- 
tenance, and the construction of the physical 
plant to use the equipment are such a major 
portion of our defense-related activities in 
Saudi Arabia, and because these programs 
are stretched out over a period of many 
years, the cost figures involved are often 
many times higher than would be the case in 
a purchase of hardware. 

Kuwait's primary concern has been the ab- 
sence of any acceptance by Iraq of the pres- 
ent boundary between the two countries. Ku- 
wait has made a reasoned analysis of what it 
can do with its limited territory and its small 
army to take the steps necessary to equip it- 
self with a modest defense against air and 
armor attack. After a survey which they 
asked us to make in early 1972 and after sev- 

eral years of discussion, marked by several 
Iraqi border incursions and the continued 
Iraqi occupation of some Kuwaiti territory, 
Kuwait recently contracted for the purchase 
of a number of Hawk air defense missiles, 
A-4 aircraft, and TOW antitank missiles. 
These weapons systems have been purchased 
by Kuwait for the purpose of reinforcing its 
defense in order to have sufficient force to 
slow down an aggressor long enough for 
either friendly regional forces or diplomacy 
to come to its aid and bring an end to the 

Except for Oman, which is faced with an 
active insurgency, weapons requirements for 
the lower gulf states have been small. What 
little they have purchased from us has been 
mainly from commercial sources. Other than 
the recent sale of a small number of TOW's 
to Oman to defend against the possible use 
by South Yemen of Soviet-supplied tanks 
(Oman itself has no armor) and some anti- 
personnel mines, our foreign military sales to 
lower gulf states have been limited thus far 
to training courses. These states have con- 
tinued to meet their more limited require- 
ments from other friendly sources. 

While we are prepared to make available 
on a sales basis modest amounts of training 
or equipment as may be appropriate to their 
real internal security needs, we have no in- 
tention of encouraging an arms race among 
these smaller states. Instead, we have en- 
couraged them to cooperate closely among 
themselves and to look for their security in a 
regional context by cooperating with their 
larger neighbors. 

Military Programs and Overall Objectives 

Given our mutuality of interests, it is rea- 
sonable and sensible for us to support the 
policy goals of these friendly countries where 
such goals parallel our own. Their concerns 
are in the political, economic, cultural, as well 
as defense fields : political, in a desire for co- 
operative and friendly relations with us; eco- 
nomic, in a desire for us to play a role in 
helping them carry out their plans for eco- 

July 14, 1975 


nomic development and diversification which 
also brings benefits to us; cultural, in a desire 
for U.S. cooperation in rapidly building their 
educational resource bases in technological 
and other fields ; and defense, in a desire that 
we assist them to train and equip the forces 
necessary to insure their own security and 
that of the gulf area. 

These elements of policy are closely linked, 
and an eff'ective policy cannot be realistically 
pursued by divorcing the defense-related as- 
pect of our policy from other aspects. This is 
true because the leaders of the gulf states do 
perceive threats to their stability and well- 
being and see cooperation in defense matters 
as part of the totality of our relationship. 
They would consider any U.S. policy which 
purported to be helpful and cooperative but 
which ignored their security needs to be un- 
realistic and irrelevant to one of their prin- 
cipal preoccupations. 

Therefore we see no practical way to sep- 
arate the military and defense aspects of our 
policies from the diplomatic, political, eco- 
nomic, and other ties we maintain. We can- 
not claim friendship and interest in one 
breath and deny goods or services which have 
life-or-death importance with the next. 

Nonmilitary Aspects of Relations 

The impression that our military relation- 
ships with the gulf nations have dominated 
all other aspects of our relations is as erro- 
neous as it seems to be persistent. It persists, 
I suppose, because the sale of military hard- 
ware and services is highly visible and gen- 
erally carries a large price tag. It is errone- 
ous because we have carried out a vigorous 
and effective program of broadening our ties 
to the gulf states in a number of fields, in 
specific and conscious execution of the policies 
we have decided to pursue. Our growing dip- 
lomatic, trade, and financial ties, our growing 
technical assistance and educational and cul- 
tural exchange, bear witness to the impor- 
tance of the nonmilitary aspects of our re- 
lationships. In the case of Saudi Arabia and 
Iran, these have further been widened 

through the recent creation of Joint Com- 
missions which are establishing a more sys- 
tematic framework for our long-term rela- 
tionships in many fields of common interest. 

Under the auspices of the Iranian Joint 
Commission, we expect to stimulate a sub- 
stantial increase in trade — over $20 billion 
in non-oil, nonmilitary items from now until 
1981 — and are currently discussing a variety 
of projects in the fields of agriculture, fertil- 
izer uses and production, manpower training, 
and housing and urban development, all of 
which could result in the sending to Iran of 
scores of technical specialists on a totally re- 
imbursable basis. 

In Saudi Arabia, the Joint Commission of- 
fice has recently gone into operation. Within 
the next year, we expect the Joint Commis- 
sion will be responsible for more than 100 
U.S. experts in Saudi Arabia in the fields of 
agriculture, science and technology, statistics, 
education, and manpower utilization. These 
are the priority areas established in almost 
a year of planning and discussion of Joint 
Commission goals between ourselves and the 

All of this activity will be funded by the 
Saudi Government, primarily via an innova- 
tive technical cooperation agreement which 
we concluded with the Saudis earlier this 
year. That agreement provides, in effect, for 
a massive aid program for Saudi Arabia — 
but an aid program financed by the recipient. 
In short, the Saudi Joint Commission prom- 
ises to become a major element in our rela- 
tions, an important new channel for coopera- 
tion between the United States and Saudi 
Arabia, and a significant factor in the de- 
velopment and industrialization of that coun- 

Diplomatic Actions 

As I mentioned above, one specific deci- 
sion which flowed from our policy review in 
the late sixties was that as the lower gulf 
countries became responsible for the conduct 
of their foreign policy we should establish 
full diplomatic relations with them. Late in 


Department of State Bulletin 

1971, we began to open Embassies in these 
countries and in the past year have assigned 
resident Ambassadors who are Ai'abic-lan- 
guage qualified — an accomplishment, I might 
add, which was made easier by your strong 
support, Mr. Chairman. Let me emphasize 
that in the lower gulf, we have lean, hard- 
working, "shirtsleeve" Embassies, staffed 
with some of the best young talent we have, 
whose mission is to represent the United 
States to nations and peoples who know little 
of us firsthand. One of their primary goals is 
to promote trade with those nations, and as I 
will mention later, the commercial oppor- 
tunities are attractive and fast growing. 

Another responsibility of our Ambassa- 
dors is to maintain a direct dialogue with the 
leaders and people of the lower gulf on such 
matters of vital interest to us as peace in the 
Middle East, the continuing supply of oil, 
and producer-consumer cooperation. This 
they are doing. They are helping to expand 
the horizons both of our interests in these na- 
tions and of these nations' perceptions of the 
United States. And they are only just getting 
started. Contrast that to the situation only 
four years ago, when we had no resident 
representatives at all in the sheikhdoms, and 
you will readily see that we have come a long 
way in a short time. 

Trade and Finance 

There are exceptional market opportuni- 
ties for the United States in the area of the 
Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. 
Most of these countries have to import prac- 
tically everything they consume as well as 
the capital goods to carry out their ambitious 
development plans. In 1973, their imports 
totaled $8.7 billion. This total is based on the 
import figures of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab 
Emirates, Oman, and North and South Yem- 
en. Preliminary estimates are that their im- 
ports rose to over $13.5 billion in 1974 (about 
15 percent of which was security-related 
equipment), making the area the fastest 
growing market for our goods and services 

in the world. By 1980, imports by gulf coun- 
tries could well reach $50 billion. 

As I mentioned, one of the primary tasks 
of our Embassies is to facilitate access to this 
market for U.S. business. In a number of 
cases, we have to overcome longstanding 
traditions of reliance by these countries on 
European suppliers. The Department of 
State, on a daily basis, is directly involved in 
advising and assisting U.S. businessmen in- 
terested in the area. The Commerce Depart- 
ment, which has primary responsibility for 
trade promotion, has established a special 
action group which each day helps U.S. busi- 
nessmen seeking to do business in the Near 
East. Also, on any given day, hundreds of 
American businessmen are in the gulf states 
actively exploring the possibilities. 

The policies of the gulf states themselves, 
being by and large free market in nature, en- 
courage expanded trade relations with the 
most favorable suppliers. We believe we are 
on the threshold of a major expansion in this 
area. Our market share in the region has 
grown to 25 percent in the last two years, 
with $3.4 billion in exports in 1974. We be- 
lieve that with appropriate effort and sup- 
port American businesses will be able to 
further increase our market share. 

The financial reserves of the gulf states 
today total about $50 billion; by 1980, they 
may be several times this figure. Obviously, 
the sheer weight of these resources involves 
a potential for disruption of international 
monetary and financial systems. By the same 
token, these resources cannot be of value to 
the nations which hold them unless they have 
access to investment opportunities in the in- 
dustrialized world and unless that world also 

So there is a very definite common interest 
between the United States and the indus- 
trialized economies of Western Europe and 
Japan on the one hand, and the gulf states on 
the other, in promoting the productive and 
profitable placement of gulf moneys abroad. 
It is widely acknowledged that the gulf na- 
tions have by and large used their emerging 
enormous financial power with prudence and 

July 14, 1975 


responsibility, making it clear that they rec- 
ognize both its potential for good and its 
potential for damage. We have developed 
close and mutually advantageous relations in 
this critical area with most of the gulf na- 

Cultural Exchanges and Technical Assistance 

The scale of activities in educational and 
cultural exchange has grown rapidly in the 
last few years. A new aspect of life in many 
American universities is the growing number 
of students from the gulf countries. Iranian 
students alone are now estimated to number 
13,500, and the Iranian Government has in- 
stituted a new scholarship program which 
could double this figure. 

The number of students from Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait has doubled since 1970, now to- 
taling 1,400 and 900 respectively, and both 
governments have had to expand their official 
support staff here for these students. Al- 
though the number of students from the 
lower gulf states is still small (about 210), 
it was virtually zero only four years ago. 
These countries have sought and are receiv- 
ing educational counsel from American pri- 
vate organizations and consultant firms. They 
are entering into university-to-university re- 
lationships (there are 12 with Iran alone) 
and are embarking on a major upgrading of 
their own institutions of higher learning 
through faculty development programs. 

For our part, we have measurably ex- 
panded our cultural and informational activ- 
ities in these states. We have, for example, 
an English Language Center in Riyadh 
(which is financed by Saudi Arabia) and 
another in Jidda. We hope to have one soon 
in Abu Dhabi. In Iran, there are six bina- 
tional centers which we have established in 
collaboration with Iranian authorities. In 
Kuwait and the lower gulf, we have mounted 
an active USIA-sponsored speaker and cul- 
tural program. We have tripled the number 
of persons coming from the smaller gulf 
states under the educational exchange pro- 
gram administered by the State Department's 
Educational and Cultural Affairs Bureau. 
The number of independent travelers from 

the region is rising even faster. In short, we 
are seeing a rapidly growing human inter- 
change. We put a high value on this increas- 
ing exposure to American customs, education, 
and technology, and we believe it should 
facilitate U.S. cooperation with these coun- 
tries over the longer term. 

The gulf states are striving to convert 
their principal natural resource — oil — into 
a complex of financial, industrial, commer- 
cial, and other assets which will outlast their 
petroleum supplies and promise a secure and 
prosperous future. To do so, they will be 
indeed heavily dependent on the technical ex- 
pertise of the developed nations, and they 
are keenly aware of this. 

We have taken a number of steps to pro- 
vide the kind of assistance they need, because 
it is entirely consistent with our policy of 
promoting friendly and cooperative relations 
and because it helps to promote U.S. business 
opportunities. As I noted above, in Saudi 
Arabia and Iran, we have in recent months 
concluded agreements to promote the provi- 
sion of technical expertise in development- 
related fields on a fully reimbursable basis. 
In Bahrain, whose oil income is relatively 
modest and whose reserves are limited, we 
expect to have a jointly funded technical 
assistance program. Elsewhere in the gulf, 
we are also providing reimbursable experts 
in a variety of fields. 

As in the commercial field, the opportuni- 
ties for reimbursable technical assistance are 
tremendous, and we are pursuing them as 
actively as the situation permits. 

Mutuality of Interests 

Mr. Chairman, I know of the concerns in 
the Congress and of your personal concerns 
about our arms supply programs in the gulf 
region, and I believe it is important to get 
these concerns out on the table and discuss 
them. These are valid questions for Ameri- 
cans who are troubled at seeing their country 
in the arms supply business. The image of 
the "merchant of death" dies hard. 

I hope I have been able to put this issue 
into proper and realistic perspective and to 
demonstrate that we are dealing with it in 


Department of State Bulletin 

the context of an overall and carefully de- 
veloped policy concept. The fact is that for- 
eign relations are a whole piece. We cannot 
pick up elements with which we feel com- 
fortable and ignore others. For every coun- 
try in the world, its ability to defend itself is 
the most important thing to its national sur- 
vival. If we do not take this into account in 
our relations with that country, the totality 
of our relationship with that country will 
suffer, as will our political and economic ob- 

In the gulf, we have developed over the 
years meaningful relationships with most of 
the states of the region. The importance of 
the region's energy resources and its growing 
financial wealth dictate an American interest 
in the security as well as the political and 
economic progress of the states located there- 
in. They in turn recognize a community of 
interests with us and with other Western in- 
dustrialized states, and they want to build 
on that relationship without outside inter- 
vention in their affairs. Our relationship 
therefore has been one based on a mutuality 
of interests. We stand ready to provide ad- 
vice and technology where needed and 
wanted, to expand our trading relationship, 
and to support regional efforts at coopera- 

We believe that these states have the will, 
financial resources, and growing capability 
to assure their security, and we feel that this 
aspect of our relationship should remain one 
geared to encouraging regional security. To 
this end, we are convinced that we should 
continue to provide military equipment and 
training. The success of these countries in 
achieving a degree of cooperation and in 
maintaining the tranquillity that has pre- 
vailed in recent years is serving broader 
U.S. interests in world peace and a relaxation 
in world tensions. 

Our close relationships with most of these 
countries also facilitate our efforts to play an 
influential role in pursuing new paths toward 
a resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict. In 
the final analysis, a resolution of that conflict 
v/hich will be seen as just and equitable by 
all the states and peoples of the area is es- 

sential both to the well-being of the entire 
region and to the maintenance of cooperative, 
mutually beneficial relations between that 
strategic region and the United States. 

OECD Financial Support Fund 
Legislation Sent to Congress 

Folloiving is the text of identical letters 
sevt by President Ford on June 6 to Speaker 
of the House Carl Albert and President of 
the Senate Nelson A. Rockefeller. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 9 

June 6, 1975. 

DE.4R Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. Presi- 
dent: ) I am today transmitting legislation 
to authorize participation by the United 
States in a new, $25 billion Financial Sup- 
port Fund. This Fund would be available for 
a period of two years to provide short- to 
medium-term financing to participating 
members of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
which may be faced with extraordinary 
financing needs. 

The proposal for a Financial Support 
Fund originated in suggestions put forward 
independently by the United States and the 
Secretary General of the OECD as part of a 
comprehensive response to the economic and 
financial problems posed by severe increases 
in oil prices. Establishment of the Support 
Fund has been agreed upon, subject to nec- 
essary legislative approval, by all members 
of the OECD except Turkey, which has not 
yet signed the Agreement. The Support Fund 
represents, in my view, a practical, coopera- 
tive and efficient means of dealing with 
serious economic and financial problems 
faced by the major oil-importing nations. 

A Special Report on the Fund, prepared 
by the National Advisory Council on Inter- 
national Monetary and Financial Policies, 
accompanies this legislation.' I fully endorse 

1 The texts of the draft legislation and the special 
report of the Advisory Council are printed in H. Doc. 
94-178, 94th Cong., 1st sess. 

July 14, 1975 


the Council's strong recommendation for 
U.S. participation in the Fund, and I urge 
prompt Congressional action to authorize 
that participation. 

The financial problems arising from the 
oil price increases are expected to be transi- 
tional, although the real costs imposed by 
those price increases will remain. These 
financial problems do not reflect the inability 
of oil-importing nations as a group to obtain 
needed financing, because the investable sur- 
pluses of the oil-exporting nations are avail- 
able to them in the aggregate. Rather, the 
problems arise from the possibility that de- 
spite satisfactory operation of the system as 
a whole, an individual nation will not be able 
to obtain, on reasonable terms, the external 
financing it needs to maintain appropriate 
levels of domestic economic activity. This in- 
ability might also lead to imposition of in- 
appropriately restrictive policies on inter- 
national trade and capital movements. If 
permitted to begin, recourse to such policies 
could spread quickly, severely disrupting the 
world economy and threatening the coopera- 
tion of oil-importing nations on energy 
matters and broader economic issues. 

The private financial markets and other 
existing sources of financing are expected to 
continue to perform well, and it is our hope 
that these potential dangers will never ma- 
terialize. However, this risk remains. It is 
common to all countries, and it must be 
faced. The Support Fund is designed to en- 
courage cooperation among the major coun- 
tries in energy and general economic policies, 
and to protect against this common risk by 
assuring fund participants that needed 
financing will be available on reasonable 

In essence, the Financial Support Fund 
represents an arrangement under which all 
participants agree to join in assisting one of 
their members if an extreme need develops. 
As such, the Financial Support Fund will 
serve as an insurance mechanism or finan- 
cial "safety net," backstopping and thus 
strengthening other sources, of financing. Its 
objective is to provide assurance that financ- 
ing will be available in a situation of extraor- 

dinary need, rather than to supplant other 
financing channels or to provide financing on 
generous terms. 

Participants must make the fullest appro- 
priate use of other sources before turning to 
the Support Fund. Loans by the Support 
Fund will be made on market-related terms 
and will require specific policy conditions in 
the energy and general economic areas. Sup- 
port Fund loans will thus contribute directly 
to cooperative energy policy and to correc- 
tion of the borrower's external financial 
difficulties. A further provision, of major 
importance in such a mutual support ar- 
rangement, requires that all risk involved in 
loans by the Support Fund will be shared 
equitably by all participants on the basis of 
pre-determined quotas, as will all rights and 
obligations of members with respect to the 
Fund. The terms of the Financial Support 
Fund therefore assure it will not become a 
regular operating part of the world's finan- 
cial machinery or be used as a foreign aid 

The proposed United States quota in the 
Support Fund — which will determine U.S. 
borrowing rights, financial obligations, and 
voting power in the Fund — is 5,560 million 
Special Drawing Rights (SDR), or approxi- 
mately $6.9 billion. This quota represents 
27.8 percent of total quotas in the Fund. The 
legislation I am proposing today will permit 
the United States to participate in the Fund 
up to its SDR quota, by authorizing the is- 
suance of guarantees by the Secretary of the 
Treasury. It is intended that any United 
States contributions will be primarily, if not 
exclusively, in the form of guarantees to 
permit the Support Fund to borrow in world 
capital markets as necessary to meet its 
lending needs. Most other members also in- 
tend to use this guarantee technique. This 
approach removes the need for the $7 billion 
in 1976 appropriations for the Support Fund, 
as proposed in the budget, and will also re- 
duce outlays by $1 billion. 

Only if a borrower from the Support Fund 
failed to meet the payments on its obliga- 
tions would the United States be required 
to transfer funds as a result of its guaran- 


Department of State Bulletin 

tees. In that unlikely event, the resources of 
the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) 
would be used to fulfill the requirements of 
immediate payment on the guarantees. 
Should it appear desirable, in light of eco- 
nomic and other conditions, for the United 
States to make direct loans to the Support 
Fund, these could also be provided from the 
ESF in accordance with existing statutory 
authority. This new legislation provides for 
appropriations to be used to replenish ESF 
resources to the extent the Stabilization Fund 
is used for these purposes. In no event will 
U.S. financial obligations to the Support 
Fund exceed the dollar value of its quota. 

The Financial Support Fund Agreement 
was signed on April 9. OECD member coun- 
tries are now seeking legislative and other 
authority needed to enable them to partici- 
pate. While the problems the Support Fund 
is designed to deal with are temporary, the 
need for the Fund is nonetheless real and 
immediate. I urge the Congress to act 
promptly to enable the United States to join 
in this major instrument of international 
financial cooperation. 

Gerald R. Ford. 


Current Actions 


Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the development, 
production, and stockpiling of bacteriological (bio- 
logical) and toxin weapons and on their destruc- 
tion. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow 
April 10, 1972. Entered into force March 26, 1975. 
TIAS 8062. 
Ratification deposited: Ethiopia, June 26, 1975. 

Diplomatic Relations 

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at 
Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 

24, 1964; for the United States December 13, 1972. 

TIAS 7502. 

Notification of succession : Zambia, June 16, 1975. 


Memorandum of understanding concerning coopera- 
tive information exchange relating to the develop- 
ment of solar heating and cooling systems in 
buildings. Formulated at Odeillo, France, October 
1-4, 1974. Entered into force July 1, 1975, with 
respect to those signatories which have signed 
the memorandum of understanding on or before 
that date. 

Signatures: United States, May 13, 1975; Greece, 
May 30, 1975. 


Articles of agreement establishing the Asian De- 
velopment Bank, with annexes. Done at Manila 
December 4, 1965. Entered into force August 22, 
1966. TIAS 6103. 

Admission to membership: Gilbert and Ellice 
Islands, May 28, 1974. 


Amendment of articles 24 and 25 of the constitution 
of the World Health Organization of July 22, 
1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at 
Geneva May 23, 1967. Entered into force May 21, 
Acceptances deposited: Chile, Cuba, June 17, 1975. 

Load Lines 

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done 
at London April 5, 1966. Entered into force July 
21, 1968. TIAS 6331. 

Extended by United Kingdom to: Bermuda, April 
1, 1975. 

Oil Pollution 

International convention relating to intervention on 
the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, 
with annex. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. 
Entered into force May 6, 1975. 
Accession deposited: Lebanon, June 5, 1975. 

Privileges and Immunities 

Convention on the privileges and immunities of the 
United Nations. Done at New York February 13, 
1946. Entered into force September 17, 1946; for 
the United States April 29, 1970. TIAS 6900. 
Notification of succession: Zambia, June 16, 1975. 

Safety at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life at 
sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered 
into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780. 
Extended by United Kingdom to: Bermuda, April 
1, 1975. 

International regulations for preventing collisions at 
sea. Approved by the International Conference on 
Safety of Life at Sea at London May 17 to June 
17, 1960. Entered into force September 1, 1965. 
TIAS 5813. 

Acceptance deposited: Republic of China (with a 
reservation), June 2, 1975. 

July 14, 1975 


Seabed Disarmament 

Treaty on the prohibition of the emplarement of 
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass 
destruction on the seabed and ocean floor and in 
the subsoil thereof. Done at Washington, London, 
and Moscow February 11, 1971. Entered into force 
May 18, 1972. TIAS 7337. 
Accessioyi deposited: Portugal, June 24, 1975. 


Convention on registration of objects launched into 
outer space. Opened for signature at New York 
January 14, 1975.' 

Signature: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
June 17, 1975. 

Tonnage Measurement 

International convention on tonnage measurement of 
ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at London June 
23, 1969." 

Acceptance deposited: Belgium, June 2, 1975. 
Accession deposited: Hungary (with a statement). 
May 23, 1975. 

Women — Political Rights 

Convention on the political rights of women. Done 
at New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force 
July 7, 1954.= 
Accession deposited: Tanzania, June 19, 1975. 



Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of October 4, 1974 
(TIAS 7949). Effected by exchage of notes at Dac- 
ca June 5, 1975. Entered into force June 5, 1975. 


Agreement concerning settlement of U.S. claims in 
connection with the withdrawal of U.S. military 
personnel, supplies, and equipment from French 
territory following decisions of the French Gov- 
ernment in 1966, with related letter. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Paris June 12, 1975. Entered 
into force June 12, 1975. 


Agreement regarding the consolidation and resched- 
uling of certain debts owed to the U.S. Govern- 
ment and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at 
Washington May 2, 1975. 
Entered into force: June 13, 1975. 

Saudi Arabia 

Technical cooperation agreement. Signed at Riyadh 
February 13, 1975. 
Entered into force: May 12, 1975. 

' Not in force. 

■ Not in force for the United States. 

GPO Sales Publications 

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock 
number from the Superiyitendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Prititing Office, Washington, B.C. 20i02. 
A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or 
m.ore copies of any one publication mailed to the 
same address. Remittances, payable to the Superin- 
tendent of Documents, must accompany orders. 
Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, 
are subject to change. 

Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements — Texts 
and History of Negotiations. A compilation of texts 
of agreements and lists of signatories, including the 
most recent agreements and introductions providing 
background and context. Pub. 77. 159 pp. $1.80. 
(Stock No. 044-000-01565). 

Energy and International Cooperation. This pam- 
phlet is based on a speech delivered by Robert S. 
Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State, before the 
annual combined luncheon of the Yale-Harvard- 
Princeton Clubs at Washington, D.C., February 13, 
1975. Pub. 8804. 8 pp. 35C (Cat. No. 81.71:8804). 

Memorandum to: U.S. Business Community From: 
Department of State Subject: Assistance in Inter- 
national Trade. This booklet briefly describes serv- 
ices and sources of information which the Depart- 
ment offers the American businessman, and provides 
some information on Department activities which 
help U.S. citizens in general. Pub. 8807. 16 pp. 40c. 
(Cat. No. S1.2:T67/5). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Bangla- 
desh amending the agreement of October 4, 1974, as 
amended. TIAS 7973. 2 pp. 250. (Cat. No. S9.10: 

Mutual Defense Assistance. Agreement with Norway 
amending Annex C to the agreement of January 27, 
1950, as amended. TIAS 7975. 3 pp. 25(' (Cat. No. 

Military Assistance — Payments Under Foreign As- 
sistance Act of 1973. Agreement with El Salvador. 
TIAS 7979. 4 pp. 25(. (Cat. No. 89.10:7979). 

Fisheries — Shrimp. Agreement with Brazil modify- 
ing and extending the agreement of May 9, 1972, 
as extended. TIAS 7980. 3 pp. 25(. (Cat. No. S9.10: 

Fisheries. Agreement with the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics extending the agreement of 
February 21, 1973, and of June 21, 1973. TIAS 7981. 
4 pp. 25('. (Cat. No. 89.10:7981). 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX July U, 1975 Vol. LXXIII, No. 1881 

Africa. Questions and Answers Following the 

Secretary's Address at Atlanta 56 

China. Constancy and Change in American 

Foreign Policy (Kissinger) 49 


OECD Financial Support Fund Legislation 
Sent to Congress (letter from President 
Ford) 81 

U.S. Policy in the Area of the Persian Gulf 

and Arabian Peninsula (Sisco) 73 

Cuba. Secretary Kissinger's News Conference 

at Atlanta June 24 59 

Developing Countries. Constancy and Change 
• in American Foreign Policy (Kissinger) . . 49 

Economic Affairs 

Constancy and Change in American Foreign 

Policy (Kissinger) 49 

OECD Financial Support Fund Legislation 
Sent to Congress (letter from President 
Ford) 81 

Egypt. U.S. Grants Egypt $40 Million for 

Suez Canal Area Reconstruction .... 72 

Europe. Constancy and Change in American 

Foreign Policy (Kissinger) 49 

Foreign Aid. U.S. Grants Egypt $40 Million 
for Suez Canal Area Reconstruction ... 72 

Germany. President Walter Scheel of the 
Federal Republic of Germany Makes State 
Visit to the United States (Ford, Scheel) . 65 

Indochina. U.S. Gives Views on Use of Funds 

by UNICEF for Indochina Program (Scelsi) 72 

Iran. U.S. Policy in the Area of the Persian 

Gulf and Arabian Peninsula (Sisco) ... 73 

Israel. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for 

CBS-TV Evening News 63 

Italy. Questions and Answers Following the 

Secretary's Address at Atlanta 56 

Japan. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for 

CBS-TV Evening News 63 

Khmer Republic (Cambodia). Secretary Kis- 
singer's News Conference at Atlanta June 
24 59 


Questions and Answers Following the Secre- 
tary's Address at Atlanta 56 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for CBS-TV 
Evening News 63 

Latin America. Secretary Kissinger's News 
Conference at Atlanta June 24 59 

Middle East 

Constancy and Change in American Foreign 

Policy (Kissinger) 49 

Questions and Answers Following the Secre- 
tary's Address at Atlanta 56 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for CBS-TV 

Evening News 63 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at 

Atlanta June 24 59 

U.S. Policy in the Area of the Persian Gulf 
and Arabian Peninsula (Sisco) 73 

Portugal. Questions and Answers Following 

the Secretary's Address at Atlanta ... 56 

Presidential Documents 

OECD Financial Support Fund Legislation 
Sent to Congress 81 

President Walter Scheel of the Federal Re- 
public of Germany Makes State Visit to the 
United States 65 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications .... 84 

.Saudi Arabia. U.S. Policy in the Area of the 

Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula (Sisco) 73 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 83 


Constancy and Change in American Foreign 

Policy (Kissinger) 49 

Questions and .\nswers Following the Secre- 
tary's Address at .\tlanta 56 

United Nations. U.S. Gives Views on Use of 
Funds by UNICFJF for Indochina Program 
(Scelsi) 72 

Viet-Nam. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed 
for CBS-TV Evening News 63 

Zaire. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for 

CBS-TV Evening News 63 

Name Index 

Ford, President 65, 81 

Kissinger, Seci-etary 49, 56, 59, 63 

Scelsi, Michael N 72 

Scheel, Walter 65 

Sisco, Joseph J 73 

Check List 

of Department of State 


Releases: June 23-29 

Press releases may be obtained from the 

Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 


D.C. 20520. 






Kissinger: Southern Council on 
International and Public Af- 
fairs; Atlanta Chamber of 

*342A 6/23 

Kissinger: introductory remarks 

preceding- Atlanta address. 

342B 6/23 

Kissinger: questions and answers 

following Atlanta address. 



Steigman sworn in as Ambassa- 
dor to Gabon (biographic data). 



Kissinger: news conference, At- 



Possible oil exchanges between 
U.S. and Canada. 



Ocean Affairs Advisory Commit- 
tee, July 23-24. 



U.S. appoints members of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitra- 
tion (biographic information). 



Kissinger: remarks to Foreign 
Service officer class. 



"Foreign Relations," 1948, vol. I, 
General; United Nations, part 
1, released. 


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a later issue of the Bulletin. 

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washington. d.c. 204o2 



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Volume LXXIII 

No. 1882 

July 21, 1975 



Remarks at a Swearing-in Ceremony for Foreign Service Officers 85 



Statement by Thomas Stern 

Deputy Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs 98 


For index see inside back cover 

Si 1 1 '■ 




Vol. LXXIII, No. 1882 
July 21, 1975 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

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Note: Contents of this publication are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart' 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
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legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 

Secretary Kissinger Announces New Steps for Improvement 
I of Department's Resource Allocation and Personnel Systems 



Following are remarks by Secretary Kis- 
singer made on June 27 at the swearing-in 
ceremony for the 119th Foreign Service 
officer class. 

Press release 349 dated June 27 

I have come here today to congratulate you 
on your choice of career, and the Department 
of State for its wisdom in selecting you. It 
will be, I know, the beginning of a long and 
fruitful association. 

Six years of experience in Washington 
have convinced me that you are joining the 
most able, the most dedicated group of pro- 
fessionals with whom it has been my privi- 
lege to be associated. You are joining an 
institution with a great tradition — and tra- 
dition, even today, is not something lightly 
to be put aside. This Department and the 
people in it have, you will find, a unique 
sense of pride in their purpose and a deep 
sense of dedication to the national interest. 

But with all these qualities, one of the 
tests of any profession or institution is its 
ability to overcome the tendency to fight new 
problems with outmoded concepts and an ob- 
solete structure. 

Some of the functions of diplomacy have 
not changed over the centuries. The repre- 
sentation of our country's interests abroad 
remains at the heart of your profession. But 
in today's interdependent world the scope of 
diplomacy has broadened dramatically and 
continues to do so every year. In the con- 
temporary world as never before, events and 
policies in one country have unprecedented 
effect on the lives of millions elsewhere 
around the globe. 

It is not enough in today's world for the 
Foreign Service to report on foreign devel- 

July 21, 1975 

opments and their relationship to our na- 
tional interests. That, important as it is, 
is a passive function. Today what is needed 
is a Foreign Service that understands our 
goals as a nation, is capable of formulating 
a strategy for reaching those goals, and pos- 
sesses the tactical skill necessary to imple- 
ment that strategy. 

At home as well, the context of diplomacy 
has changed. No longer is it the esoteric art 
of an elite separated from the people and 
the political process it serves. Today the 
Congress has a decisive role to play in the 
formulation and execution of our foreign 
policy; today the American people must be 
convinced of the wisdom of the course we 
espouse. In a speech [before the Interna- 
tional Platform Association at Washington 
on August 2, 1973] I gave shortly before 
becoming Secretary of State, I said that no 
foreign policy could survive in a democracy 
if it were born in the minds of a few and 
carried in the hearts of none. I believe that 
today even more deeply than I did two years 

In short, while the objectives of diplo- 
macy may not have changed, its scope most 
certainly has. And so have the responsibili- 
ties of the Department of State. In a time 
of ma!3.sive and continuous change, this De- 
partment must, as a matter of course, con- 
stantly reexamine the assumptions it has 
made, the strategies it has espoused, and the 
objectives it seeks to serve. 

What is the purpose of the Department? 
In its broadest sense, it is to preserve the 
peace, the security, and the well-being of 
the United States and — since America can- 
not live in isolation — to contribute to just 
international arrangements for all mankind. 


It is to bring to the formulation and execu- 
tion of our foreign policy a vision of the 
future and a sense of direction. 

This concept of the Department's role 
defines the focus of our work. The crucial 
test of the Department's relevance will lie 
in our sense of history and historical per- 
spective. And it will lie in our ability to 
integrate and to synthesize the national in- 
terests of the United States, the global con- 
cerns that affect it, the tactical issues of 
the moment, and the isolated events of the 
day into a conceptual whole which gives 
meaning to events and purpose to our deci- 
sions. If the Department of State serves 
the President with these qualities, it will 
stand at the center of the foreign policy 
process, not because an organization chart 
says it should, but because its courage, its 
intellectual strength, and its strategic grasp 
have put it there. 

What you are entering today is not the 
Foreign Service of the State Department, 
but the Foreign Service of the United States. 
Foreign Service officers should not think that 
their natural base is overseas, with Wash- 
ington tours the painful interruption in an 
otherwise interesting career. They should 
look forward to Washington assignments 
and cultivate the skills necessary for such 
work. In the field, where our principal pur- 
pose is the execution of foreign policy, com- 
promise and negotiation are the natural tools 
of diplomacy. But in Washington, where it 
is the formulation of foreign policy that 
should most concern us, our purpose must 
often be an unrelenting drive to clarify pur- 
poses and discover alternatives so that the 
policymaker will know the depth and di- 
mension of the issues he has before him 
for decision. 

After nearly two years in this Depart- 
ment I am convinced that the dedication and 
native ability of the Foreign Service mark 
it as a unique and great institution. Indi- 
vidually we are professionally as good as 
the best the country has to offer. But the 
product of our collective effort is sometimes 
less than the sum of our individual abilities. 
I, like every Secretary of State before 
me, hope that when I take my leave this 


Department will be a more effective instru- 
ment than when I came. I want the Foreign 
Service and the Department to have a better 
appreciation of their own value and worth; 
I want them to be less concerned with status 
and more concerned with substance. I be- 
lieve we have already made great strides: 

— The principle of putting the ablest 
where their talents can best be used is well 
established, as demonstrated by the number 
of Ambassadors and Assistant Secretaries 
appointed solely on the basis of merit and 
without regard to age or rank. We have 
shown that even an FSO-4 can have an 
Ambassador's baton in his knapsack. 

— We have reformed the assignment proc- 
ess that allowed, or forced, an officer to 
return to the same geographic area repeated- 
ly. As a result. Foreign Service officers are 
gaining a broader perspective and a deeper 
sense of the range and complexity of the 
challenges we face as a nation. 

— We have moved to compensate for the 
rigidities of specialization by encouraging 
officers to take assignments outside their 
area of functional expertise. While I recog- 
nize that the establishment of the cone sys- 
tem was in response to the need for greater 
emphasis on specialization, we must not per- 
mit compartmentalization to deter us from 
providing the breadth of experience neces- 
sary for positions of high responsibility. 

— Our analytical and conceptual capabili- 
ties have been greatly enhanced by giving 
the Policy Planning Stafl?' a central position 
in the organization and by staffing it with 
the best available talent. The Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research, too, has been 
brought into a dynamic and intimate 
relationship with policymaking and policy- 

These steps were primarily designed to 
improve the Department's product by focus- 
ing greater attention on a precise definition 
of our mission and by encouraging a more 
analytical, more strategic approach to the 
issues of foreign policy. This is the essen- 
tial first phase of institutionalization. Now 
it is time to turn our attention to the develop- 
ment of a departmental structure that is 

Department of State Bulletin 

'. more responsive both to the needs of its 
^ members and the demands of an increasingly 
" interdependent world. 






Resource Allocation 

Our first and most critical task is to find 
a more effective means than we now possess 
to link resources and policy objectives. Over 
the years — and especially over the past dec- 
ade — our policy priorities have undergone 
substantial change. Yet our resources — 
people and money — have, because of institu- 
tional inflexibility, remained focused on the 
familiar problems of the past. 

The Department lacks an effective system 
for addressing or deciding priorities among 
areas or specialties. What is needed, there- 
fore, is a new approach — a mechanism for 
coordinating resources and goals and for re- 
programing existing resources from less im- 
portant functions to areas that deserve pri- 
ority attention. 

I have therefore recently established a 
Priorities Policy Group whose principal task 
will be to provide the mechanism for linking 
decisions on resource allocation to the 
broader considerations of foreign policy. The 
Group will have the following functions: 

a. It will play the central role in formulat- 
ing the Department's annual budget. 

b. It will review the present allocation of 
all positions on a regular basis. 

c. It will examine all significant requests 
for additional resources, both in Washington 
and overseas. 

d. It will employ whatever instruments it 
deems necessary, including expanded use of 
the Foreign Service Inspection Corps, to 
identify and correct the inefficient use of 
our resources. 

The Group will be headed by the Deputy 
Under Secretary for Management and will 
include as members the Director of the 
Policy Planning Staff, the Director General, 
the Inspector General, the Counselor, the 
Assistant Secretary for Administration, and 
the Director of Management Operations. 

I have directed the Deputy Under Secre- 
tary for Management to use this new mecha- 
nism to bring our budget process under 

July 21, 1975 

central management control. This will mean 
change in some of our current budgetary 
practices, and a reduction in the degree of 
autonomy the bureaus now enjoy in the 
management of their funds. But it will also 
mean that the Department as a whole will 
have an important new capacity to bring its 
resources into i-elationship with its problems. 


Our greatest resource in this Department 
is people. How well we serve the national 
interest will depend on the kinds of people 
we recruit, how well we train them, how de- 
manding we are of superior performance, 
and how well we reward those who perform 
with excellence. And so, in consultation 
with the American Foreign Service Associa- 
tion as appropriate, I am directing new de- 
partures to improve the recruitment, evalua- 
tion, assignment, and career development of 
our professional service. 


Our country has every right to expect a 
corps of foreign affairs professionals which 
is expert in politics, economics, science, the 
oceans, military strategy, and other disci- 
plines. These people must be capable of 
drawing together the widely divergent in- 
terests of our society and government, syn- 
thesizing this array of forces, tapping avail- 
able expertise in and outside of government, 
and advising our political leadership on how 
best to pursue our national objectives. 

In the area of recruitment our major prob- 
lem rests in the need for a clearer definition 
of our requirements and the need for sys- 
tematic standards for appointment. I have 
therefore instructed the Director General: 

— First, to adjust examination standards 
for FSO's to relate our selection more closely 
to our needs, without at the same time forc- 
ing the officer to choose a specialty even be- 
fore he has begun his career. I personally 
am doubtful that either the Department or 
the individual concerned is well served by a 
system that requires the selection of a func- 
tional cone at the time of examination. 


— Second, to define and develop exacting 
standards and procedures for recruiting pro- 
fessionals outside the Foreign Service Officer 
Corps. With the right training and experi- 
ence, Foreign Service officers will be able 
to perform many of the tasks requiring both 
expertise and specialization. But there will 
be a continuing need for highly expert, 
specialized professional talent which cannot 
necessarily be found in a closed career sys- 
tem. The Department must be free to hire 
the best talent our society can offer and to 
guarantee those it hires fair treatment and 
adequate reward. The career system, on the 
other hand, has a right to expect that the 
Department will not abuse its right to hire 
and promote outside the career service as a 
device for circumventing the system. 

— Third, to institute a program aimed at 
recruiting top-quality women and represent- 
atives of minority groups. Our record as an 
equal opportunity employer must be im- 
proved ; I intend to see that it is. 

for the institution of a senior threshold 
which would apply to officers about to enter 
the executive levels of the Foreign Service. 


Central to the quality of our service is the 
assignment process. The system today is too 
decentralized, too much characterized by 
bargaining between bureaus. It is neither 
rational nor servicewide in its approach. In 
order to correct this weakness, I have in- 
structed the Director General to establish a 
more open, centrally directed assignment 
process. While the new procedures will take 
into account the legitimate interests of the 
individual, the bureaus, and the posts abroad, 
they can only be fair and orderly if they 
drastically limit the right of an Assistant 
Secretary or Ambassador to veto assignments 
and if it is clear that every member of the 
Service must accept an assignment once 


Virtually everyone agrees that our system 
of performance evaluation is badly in need 
of improvement. Regular efliciency reports 
will continue to be essential in identifying 
those officers deserving of promotion. But 
there has been a growing tendency for rating 
officers to avoid the hard and critical judg- 
ments that an effective merit system re- 

We need to place more emphasis on eflTec- 
tive methods for evaluating oflicers at criti- 
cal points in their careers. We have, for 
some time now, experimented with the con- 
cept of a junior "threshold"— a system that 
would permit the Department stringently to 
examine a junior officer's performance, abili- 
ties, and potential for growth before any 
final decision to promote him to the inter- 
mediate ranks. It is now time to move from 
the experimental stage to implementation of 
this threshold concept as an integral part 
of the career process. I have instructed the 
Director General to take the steps necessary 
to accomplish this. I have also asked her 
to develop for my early consideration plans 


Professional Development 

As in all other professional fields today, 
the range and complexity of foreign affairs 
issues are heavily affected by the expanding 
horizons of knowledge and technology. If the 
professional service is to provide relevant 
leadership in a wide range of technical sub- 
jects, it must be intellectually equipped, as 
a part of the career process, to take these 
complexities into account in framing foreign 

policy. But our present training programs 

except in the field of languages, where we 
have an outstanding program — vary widely 
in quality and relevance. 

As a first step toward correcting this sit- 
uation, I have ordered the establishment of 
a Board of Professional Development. It will 
have the following functions: 

— To formulate a comprehensive training 

— To oversee its implementation. 

—To assure that changes in that policy 
are made as the needs of the Department 

— To correct current failings in the system. 

It will also have oversight responsibility 

Department of State Bulletin 


for details to other agencies and branches of 
government and assignments to universities. 

The members of this Board will be the 
Deputy Under Secretary for Management, 
the Director General of the Foreign Service, 
the Director of the Foreign Service Institute, 
and other senior officers of the Department 
on a rotating basis. The Board should, from 
its inception, seek advice from universities, 
business, and other appropriate institutions 
with experience in advanced training tech- 

The Department must also give greater at- 
tention to other forms of professional devel- 
opment. I have, for example, instructed that 
an expanded Junior Officer Rotational Train- 
DSi ing Program be established. This program 
"'1 will give more entering officers on-the-job 
experience during their first assignment in 
all of the principal areas of Foreign Service 
'"^work — administration and consular, eco- 
nomic, and political affairs. I would hope that 
we can have this program established in time 
for at least some of you to take part in it. 

We also need to redress our neglect of 
training in such areas as administration and 
for those most critically important people, 
our secretaries. I have directed that these 
areas be given priority attention. 

Finally, details to other agencies, assign- 
ments to state and local governments and 
to the Congress will be substantially ex- 
panded. In this regard, I welcome the recent 
efforts in Congress to make it possible for 
the Department to detail a greater number 
of its officers to the Congress and to state 
and local governments throughout the coun- 
try. Such assignments would offer enviable 
experience and should, in some cases, pro- 
vide excellent managerial training. And most 
important — now that foreign and domestic 
policies are virtually inseparable — these as- 
signments will make us more sensitive to the 
values, interests, and priorities of the coun- 
try we represent. 

In order to relate all these forms of pro- 
fessional development to the key steps in an 
officer's career, I have asked the Director 
General to make a year of training or a spe- 
cial detail outside the Department a part 
of the threshold process. Such assignments 

July 21, 1975 

should be looked upon as at least as impor- 
tant to an officer's career as an assignment 
to a bureau or a post abroad. 

Responsibilities and Obligations 

Ladies and gentlemen, I recognize that 
some of the institutional changes I have 
announced today may not, at least at first, 
meet with universal popularity. Reforms sel- 
dom do. But I am convinced that they will, 
over time, be seen as a creative strengthen- 
ing of the Department and the Foreign Serv- 
ice and that they will mean a more challeng- 
ing and exciting career for all of you. Yet, 
in the last analysis, it will be the mutual 
sense of respon.sibility and obligation that 
you feel for the Department of State and 
that the Department feels toward you that 
will be important. As you go on in your 
careers, it will be the Department's respon- 
sibility, as well as your own, to encourage 
the fresh approach, the new initiative; it 
will be the Department's obligation to per- 
mit you to argue what you believe deeply, 
however unorthodox, and to question old 

But the reverse side of that coin is that 
you have an obligation to support decisions 
once made. "Loyalty" has become an archaic 
term, but ultimately it means professional 
self-discipline and as such is the pride and 
strength of any professional service and a 
prerequisite to its self-respect. 

If, over the many years ahead, you and 
the Department can maintain a mutual sense 
of esteem and devotion because each has met 
its obligation to the other and both have ful- 
filled their duty to the nation, you will have 
achieved such a standard of excellence that 
the question of which agency is the Presi- 
dent's principal tool in the conduct of Amer- 
ican foreign policy will not need to be a.sked. 
You and your colleagues will already have 
given the answer. 

But having a central place in the policy 
process is only a means to an end. Your 
ultimate objective must be to serve your 
country with all your heart and mind, no 
matter how onerous the task, no matter 
how difficult your position. Your job, as 


junior officers no less than when you reach 
the senior levels, will often require undra- 
matic, persevering, laborious effort. But if 
you do your best, I believe you will always 
find it exhilarating. 

I know that I speak for the Director Gen- 
eral and all your other colleagues here in 
the Department and abroad when I extend 
to you best wishes for a long and produc- 
tive career. You stand at the threshold of 
an exciting time, in a world poised between 
great danger and unprecedented promise. 
Whether we succumb to the dangers or re- 
alize the promise will, in large measure, de- 
pend on you. 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed 
on ABC Saturday Nev/s 

Following is a transcript of an interview 
with Secretary Kissinger by Ted Koppel re- 
corded for broadcast on the ABC television 
Saturday News on Jidy 5. 

Press release 355 dated July 5 

Mr. Koppel: And in Washington, earlier 
today, an interview ivith Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger. 

Mr. Secretary, the Israelis are obviously 
nervous. Tomorroiv they have a Cabinet 
meeting, and these rumors of the past week 
while you have been away have got them 
terribly upset, privately and semipuhlicly. 
To what extent is the United States still com- 
mitted to Israel? To what extent is there a 
drifting apart? 

Secretary Kissinger: The United States is 
committed to the survival and security of 
Israel, and nothing in the current discussions 
changes that situation. We also believe, how- 
ever, that the security of Israel is best as- 
sured through a process of peace in the Mid- 
dle East. In fact, we believe that if there is 
no progress toward peace in the Middle East, 
another war sooner or later will be inevitable 
with disastrous consequences for all of the 
peoples in the Middle East as well as for 
Western Europe, Japan, and serious conse- 

quences for the United States in terms of a 
possible confrontation with the Soviet Union. 
For all these reasons, we feel that there 
should be progress toward peace in the Mid- 
dle East. In fact, we feel there must be 

Mr. Koppel: So in that serise, it is not 
really unfair to suggest that the United 
States is pushing very hard for a peace set- 

Secretary Kissinger: The United States 
has publicly stated that it urges progress 
toward peace in the Middle East. But the 
United States also remains committed to the 
survival and security of Israel. 

Mr. Koppel: Now, the question is, is the 
United States pushing President Sadat and 
the Egyptians with equal vigor? Are you 
looking for concessions from the Egyptians 
as much as you are from the Israelis? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is fair to 
say that all of the concessions, or many of 
the concessions, that President Sadat has of- 
fered have been the result of American urg- 
ing. So the United States is attempting to find 
a formula in which both sides, making con- 
cessions, take a step toward peace. 

Israel does have a problem in the sense 
that it is giving up territory while it is get- 
ting in return some assurances. But this fact 
has been known for a year. The United States 
has asked nothing of Israel in recent weeks 
that it did not make clear that it felt was 
necessary for the last 10 months. 

Mr. Koppel: Well, noiv, as the Israeli Cab- 
inet goes into session tomorroiv, if you xvere 
addressing yourself to the Israeli people di- 
rectly, what wotdd you tell them? 

Secretary Kissinger: I would say that 
whatever decision they make is going to 
have problems; that it is not going to be a 
question of one road being easy and the other 
road being difficult. All roads are difficult. 
We understand their dilemmas. We under- 
stand their fears. But we also feel that they 
must take a chance on making progress 
toward peace, because any other approach is 
going to lead to a war sooner or later which 


Department of State Bulletin 

is going to have serious consequences, above 
all for the people of Israel. But the United 
States will stand behind them in conditions 
in which we can reasonably say to our people 
that progress is being made. 

Mr. Koppel: Now, Mr. Secretary, over tlie 
past few months both you and the President 
have always finessed the question of ivhich 
route to take. And yet it seems behind the 
scenes that the United States is pushing for 
another interim agreement. Everythfng that 
is happening over the past feiv tveeks seems 
to indicate another interim, agreement. Is 
that inaccurate? 

Secretary Kissinger: The United States 
has always believed that an interim agree- 
ment is a step that can most easily be taken. 
If that does not prove possible, then the 
United States will have to pursue an overall 

It is certain, however, that on the road 
toward an overall agreement we will very 
soon find exactly the same dilemmas, and this 
time on all fronts and on all issues that have 
produced the difficulties now. 

Mr. Koppel: Next Saturday you and Prime 
Minister Rabin [of Israel] will be in Bonn 
at the same time. Isn't it inevitable that the 
tivo of you tvill meet and talk? 

Secretary Kissinger: No. As I understand 
it, Prime Minister Rabin's tentative plan is 
to leave Bonn on Friday. We have left open 
the possibility that we might meet, depending 
on the Cabinet decision tomorrow and wheth- 
er there are any further clarifications that 
may be needed. At this moment, there is no 
fixed plan to meet, but there is a geographic 
proximity that makes it possible for us to 
meet if it should be necessary. 

Mr. Koppel: On another subject — since you 
have been gone. Prime Minister Gandhi of 
India has revoked essentially all the demo- 
cratic processes in India, in ivhat ive have 
always rather proudly referred to as the 
world's largest democracy. We have received 
word that you came down rather hard on all 
your people here arid said, "Button up. I don't 
want to hear anything." Is it possible for 

you now to say anything, and is it possible for 
the United States not to say anything ivhen 
something like this is going on? 

Secretary Kissinger: The fixed policy of 
the Department of State is not to comment on 
the internal developments in other countries. 
The American preference for democratic 
forms is clear. But we do not think that it 
would help the situation at this moment for 
us to make daily comments on the situation 
in India. Our preference for democratic pro- 
cedures is clear. 

Mr. Koppel: Hoiv does this affect U.S. for- 
eign policy in that part of the world? Does 
this make it more difjicidt? Do you see Mrs. 
Gandhi yioiv moving even closer into the 
Soviet orbit? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have noticed 
that Mrs. Gandhi last week made some 
friendlier references to the United States 
than has been the case previously. The United 
States considers India an important country. 
We have said this during periods of diffi- 
culties with Indian foreign policy,, and we 
have to say this now. We were not asked 
about these domestic events that are taking 
place in India, and we do not think it is ap- 
propriate for us to make official comments on 

Mr. Koppel: Also tuhile you ivere gone — a 
great deal has happened ivhile you have been 
away — the Murphy Commission [Commis- 
sion on the Organization of the Government 
for the Conduct of Foreign Policy] issued its 
findings, and one of the points they made was 
that in the future they do not believe that any 
man should simultaneonsly hold the positions 
of Secretary of State and head of the Nation- 
al Security Council. If it is possible for you 
to take an objective view of that, how would 
you feel in the future? Do you think anyone 
should ever again hold these dual positions? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think that the 
President ought to have the flexibility. It 
depends entirely on his chemistry with the 
people concerned and on the qualities of the 
people concerned. And therefore I don't think 
there should be any legislative action that 

July 21, 1975 


constricts the President's freedom of choice. 
I think the Murphy Commission has a 
point that under normal circumstances it 
would be more usual to keep the two jobs 
split. But I think that the President, if he 
finds somebody with whom he can work in 
this manner, and depending on the circum- 
stances, should have the flexibility to make 
that decision. 

Mr. Koppel: Well, if you ivill permit my 
phrasing it this way, ivhat is the abnormality 
of the current situation? Are you the ab- 

Secretary Kissinger: No. The situation is 
that I was Assistant to the President when 
I was appointed Secretary of State, so I had 
in fact been carrying out — I had been in fact 
active in both jobs. 

Secondly, that the President obviously has 
believed that I can perform both jobs simul- 
taneously, and I have no question that this 
can happen again. When Acheson was Sec- 
retary of State, and when Dulles was Secre- 
tary of State, they in fact carried out both 
jobs, though they didn't have the title. The 
position of the Assistant to the President at 
that time was a purely technical administra- 
tive function. 

And therefore, when you have a strong 
Secretary of State who has a close relation- 
ship with the President, in fact the tendency 
is that he will carry out both of these jobs. 
It is not such an unusual event. 

Mr. Koppel: You don't, then, regard this 
as a personal slap at you. 

Secretary Kissinger: No. In fact, they 
specifically exempted me. 

Sixth Round of U.S.-Spain Talks 
Held in Washington 

Joint U.S.-Spain Communique ^ 

The sixth round of negotiations between 
the Spanish and the United States delega- 
tions took place in Washington from June 16 
to June 19. The Spanish delegation was 
chaired by the Under Secretary for Foreign 
Aff"airs, Mr. Juan Jose Rovira, and the 
American delegation was headed by Ambas- 
sador-at-Large Robert J. McCloskey. 

The two delegations continued the discus- 
sion on the key aspects of the defense rela- 
tionship between the two countries and noted 
the progress being made in defining areas 
of mutual agreement. 

The discussions included an examination 
of the subject of the Spanish facilities which 
are used by American forces, and Spanish 
military defense needs. 

The two delegations agreed to set up a 
steering committee which would establish 
guidelines and supervise working groups 
which would study specific technical prob- 

As a result of their decision to accelerate 
the pace of work, the two delegations agreed 
to hold the seventh round in Madrid during 
the week beginning June 30th. 

The Spanish Ambassador off'ered a dinner 
in honor of the two delegations, and Ambas- 
sador McCloskey reciprocated with a lunch- 
eon in the State Department in honor of 
Under Secretary Rovira. 

'Issued on June 19 (text from press release 341). 


Department of State Bulletin 

President Ford's News Conference of June 25 

Following are excerpts relating to foreign 
policy from the transcript of a neivs con- 
ference held by President Ford on the South 
Grounds at the White House on June 25.^ 

Q. Mr. President, the United States, as a 
matter of policy, has consistently disavowed 
the first use of nuclear weapons. Is that still 
our policy in vietv of recent developments? 

President Ford: Well, the United States 
has a policy that means that we have the 
maximum flexibility for the determination 
of what is in our own national interest. We 
had a change of some degree about a year 
and a half ago. 

When I took office, or since I have taken 
office, I have discussed this change to maxi- 
mize our flexibility and to give us the greatest 
opportunity for our own national security 
with Secretary Schlesinger [Secretary of De- 
fense James R. Schlesinger], and I can assure 
you that it is a good policy, and it is a policy 
that I think will help to deter war and pre- 
serve the peace. 

Q. Well, may I follow up, sir? 

President Ford: Sure. 

Q. You haven't said ivhether you will use 
the first strike, in terms of tactical or stra- 
tegic, and don't you think the American peo- 
ple should know ? 

President Ford: I don't think it is appro- 
priate for me to discuss at a press conference 
what our utilization will be of our tactical 
or strategic weapons. This is a matter that 
has to be determined if and when there are 
any requirements for our national interests. 
And I don't believe under these circumstances 

' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Com- 
pilation of Presidential Documents dated June 30. 

that I should discuss how, when, or what kind 
of weapons should be used. 

Mr. Cormier [Frank Cormier, Associated 
Press] . 

Q. Mr. President, like your formal declara- 
tion of candidacy, the completion of the Mid- 
dle East reassessment is getting closer every 
day. I wonder how close is it now, and does 
it look more like a return to step-by-step 
diplomacy or a move to Geneva? 

President Ford: The reassessment that we 
are undertaking in regard to the Middle East 
has not been concluded. We have met with a 
number of heads of government in the Middle 
East. We have discussed the alternatives and 
options with a number of other people who 
are knowledgeable in this area. But I cannot 
give you a date as to when that reassessment 
will be concluded. 

Obviously, it is getting closer and closer — 
because we must not permit, to the degree 
that we can affect it, a stalemate or stagna- 
tion, because the longer we have no move- 
ment toward peace in the Middle East, the 
more likely we are to have war and all of its 
ill ramifications. 

I can only say we are working on the prob- 
lem with countries in the Middle East and 
with others and that the reassessment will 
be concluded in an appropriate time and it 
will provide for movement, as far as we are 

Yes, Mr. Cormier. 

Q. Is it more likely to be in the direction of 
Geneva or more shuttle diplomacy? 

President Ford: The options are still open. 
Yes, Mr. Barnes [Fred Barnes, Washing- 
ton Star]. 

Q. Mr. President, your popularity in the 
public opinion polls has risen rather dra- 

July 21, 1975 


maticalhi recenthj, and I knoiv you have dis- 
cussed this matter with pollster Louis Harris. 
To what do you attribute your improvement 
in the public opinion polls recently? 

President Ford: Naturally, I am pleased 
that the polls have shown improvement. I 
think this is a reflection of the fact that we 
have had a consistently strong policy, do- 
mestically, aimed at doing something affirma- 
tively about inflation and showing our con- 
cern and compassion in the field of finding a 
remedy to the recession. 

I think it also reflects some of the hard de- 
cisions we had to make in the area of for- 
eign policy. Obviously, the Mayaguez incident 
and the way it was handled has had a good 
reaction, but we have done other things in 
foreign policy. The trip to Europe, I think, 
was effective in that it showed the alliance is 
strong and we are committed to the alliance. 
And, of course, the alliance has contained ag- 
gression and maintained peace in Western 

So there is a whole series of things that, 
in my judgment, have been good for the coun- 
try. And when something is good for the na- 
tion, people who have something to do with 
it do benefit to some extent. 

Q. Mr. President, on the subject of foreign 
policy. Secretary Kissinger spoke in Atla^ita 
the other night, and he had something to say 
about our alliances, that no country shoidd 
imagine that it is doing us a favor by re- 
maining in an alliance tvith us. Is this a sig- 
nal of a neiv attitude toivard our allies? 

President Ford: I don't think it is a signal 
of a new attitude. Any bilateral agreement 
is in the mutual interest of both parties, and 
any alliance, such as the North Atlantic al- 
liance, is also in the mutual interest of all 
of the participants. 

Now, occasionally, I suspect, some partner 
gets the impression that his country is 
getting less out of an alliance than another. 
We think it is important to keep them on a 
mutual basis, and we intend to do so. But 
there was nothing in Secretary Kissinger's 
comments in Atlanta the other night that was 
aimed at any one country or any one alliance. 

Q. Well, if he might have had Turkey in 

mind as one country, I am just wondering if 
this is a diplomatic thing to say at this time 
when our bases are at stake and the welfare 
of NATO? 

President Ford: Secretary Kissinger's 
comment, as I said a moment ago, was not 
aimed at any one country or any one alliance. 
We are concerned about the conflict in the 
Mediterranean, which has resulted from the 
Cyprus difficulty of about 18 months or more 
ago, which has resulted in differences be- 
tween Turkey and Greece. 

I can assure you that we are going to work 
as we have in the past to try and find an an- 
swer to that problem. But I don't think the 
Secretary's comment in Atlanta was aimed 
at either Greece or Turkey or any particular 

Q. Mr. President, the congressional budget 
office is concerned that if the Middle East oil 
producers raise the price of oil this fall as 
they have threatened to do, it ivill prolong the 
American recession and delay the recovery. 
If the Middle East oil producers do, in fact, 
increase the price of oil, ivould you expect the 
American people to just swallow that in- 
crease or would you have a definitive Ad- 
ministration response to an increase from the 
Middle East, and if you do, ivhat ivoidd it be? 

President Ford: First, any increase in for- 
eign oil would be, in my judgment, very dis- 
ruptive and totally unacceptable. 

As you know, I have been trying to get the 
Congress to pass an energy program that 
would make us less vulnerable to any price 
increase by foreign oil sources. Unfortunate- 
ly, the Congress has done nothing, but we are 
going to continue pressing the Congress to 

Now, our program, which I hope the Con- 
gress will pass eventually, would produce 
more domestic oil and make us less depend- 
ent on foreign oil. In the meantime, we have 
to work with our allies the oil-consuming na- 
tions to bring our policies closer together so 
we can act in negotiations with the oil- 
producing countries. And the International 
Energy Agency, which was formed by the oil- 
consuming nations, has made some progress 


Department of State Bulletin 

in this area. I hope that through this organi- 
zation and our domestic energy program, we 
can meet the challenge, or the prospective or 
possible challenge, of the OPEC [Organiza- 
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries] na- 

Q. Is that wliut you mean when you say 
that an increase from the Middle East woidd 
be unacceptable, or do you have something 
else in mind, and cotdd you spell that out? 
What does unacceptable mean? 

President Ford: It means that it is unac- 
ceptable in the sense that we as a nation 
individually and we as a nation in conjunc- 
tion with our allies are going to find some 
answers other than OPEC oil. 

Yes, Mr. Schieffer [Bob Schieffer, CBS 

Q. Mr. President, in response to your com- 
ments to Helen [Helen Thomas, United Press 
International} at the beginning of the neivs 
conference, let me just ask you this question 
pointblank: If North Korea attacked South 
Korea, would you rise nuclear weapons to 
stop that? 

President Ford: I don't think, Mr. Schief- 
fer, that I ought to, in a news conference like 
this, discuss what I might or would do under 
the circumstances you describe. We have a 
strong deterrent force, strategically and tac- 
tically, and of course those forces will be 
used in a flexible way in our own national 
interest, but I do not believe it is in our na- 
tional interest to discuss how or when they 
would be used under the circumstances — 

Q. You are flatly not ruling it out, though? 

President Ford: I am not either confirming 
it or denying it. I am saying we have the 
forces and they will be used in our national 
interest, as they should be. 

Mr. Lisagor [Peter Lisagor, Chicago 
Daily News] . 

Q. Mr. President, your old sidekick, the 
former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, 
has written in a magazine article that the 
Riissians have repeatedly violated the SALT 
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] agree- 
ment and have mocked detente, and he also 

July 21, 1975 

has so)ne thiiigs to say about ivhut they are 
doing in Portugal and the Middle East. Hoiv 
concerned are you about these charges? 

President Ford: I have investigated the 
allegations that the Soviet Union has vio- 
lated the SALT agreements, that they have 
used loopholes to do certain things that were 
intended not to be done under the agreement. 

I have found that they have not violated 
the SALT agreement, they have not used 
any loopholes. And in order to determine 
whether they have or they have not, there 
is a standing consultative group that is an or- 
ganization for the purpose of deciding after 
investigation whether there have been any 
violations. And that group, after looking into 
the allegations, came to the conclusion there 
had been no violations. 

Now, as I indicated in Brussels at a press 
conference, we are concerned about develop- 
ments in Portugal. We do not believe that a 
Communist-dominated government in Portu- 
gal is compatible with NATO. 

Now, it has not reached that stage yet, and 
we are hopeful that it will not, and some of 
the developments in the last several days 
are somewhat encouraging. We certainly 
have a concern and a care and a great friend- 
ship for the Portuguese people. And we will 
do what we can in a legitimate, proper way 
to make sure that the rights of the Portu- 
guese people are protected. 

Q. Call I also ask you in connection ivith 
this, do you then see that the European Se- 
curity Conference is likely to come off a^ the 
Russia7is would like to have it come off, in 
late July, in Helsinki? 

President Ford: There have been rather 
protracted negotiations involving the Euro- 
pean Security Conference. It didn't look a 
few months ago that there would be any 
conclusion this summer. But there have been 
some compromises made, and there may be 
some others achieved that would permit a 
summit this summer in Helsinki. But it has 
not yet reached the stage where I could say 
there will be a summit, because the compro- 
mises have not been finally achieved. 


Q. Mr. President, I would like to ask you, 
sir, you said that if the Arabs hike their oil 
prices or there were another embargo, it 
mould be very disruptive for the economy. 
You have also said recently that the reces- 
sion has bottomed out or is bottoming out. 
May I ask you what will happen to your 
predictions that the recession is bottoming 
out if the oil-producing nations hike the 
price of oil by $2 to $^ a barrel as they are 
threatening to do this October? 

President Ford: If such an oil price were 
put into effect, it would have an impact on 
our economy. It would undoubtedly have a 
much more significant impact on the econo- 
mies of Western Europe, Japan, and prob- 
ably an even more adverse impact on the 
economies of the developing nations. It 
would have an adverse impact worldwide. 

I think it would be very unwise for OPEC 
to raise their prices under these circum- 
stances, because an unhealthy economy in 
the United States and worldwide is not in 
their best interest. 

Q. Mr. President, are you making any 
current efforts to persuade the oil-producing 
nations not to increase their prices this 
autumn as they have threatened, and are you 
meeting with any success? 

President Ford: We are seeking to solidify 
our consumer-nation organization so that we 
act in concert when we have to meet with 
the producing nations. 

And equally importantly, I am trying to 
get the United States Congress to do some- 
thing affirmatively in the field of energy so 
we don't have to worry about OPEC price 

Q. Mr. President, the Rockefeller Com- 
mission was told about extensive electronic 
surveillance by Soviet intelligence agents and 
American ability to piggyback on to that 
monitoring. Can you tell us how long that 
has been going on and what is being done 
about it? 

President Ford: I don't think that I should 
comment on a matter of that kind. I can say 

very emphatically that we have an expert 
intelligence-gathering community in our 
Federal Government and we have a first- 
class counterintelligence organization in the 
United States Government. I have full faith 
in their responsibilities in any field, such as 
that that you mention. 

U.S. Contributes $10.9 Million 
for Cyprus Relief 

AID Announcement, June 3 ^ 

The United States is contributing $10.9 
million to two international agencies for the 
relief effort in Cyprus, bringing total dona- 
tions for the 1975 fiscal year to $25 million. 
The new contributions, made by the Agency 
for International Development (AID), con- 
sist of $9.9 million to the U.N. High Com- 
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and $1 
million to the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) to continue their as- 
sistance to Greek and Turkish Cypriots 
displaced from their homes in 1974. The 
present grants bring the total U.S. assistance 
to Cyprus to $20.8 million to the UNHCR 
and $4.2 million to the ICRC. The United 
States has provided about half of the total 
contributions from more than 40 govern- 
ments and private donors in 20 countries. 

Part of the AID contribution will be used 
by UNHCR to buy imported food and local 
fresh fruits and vegetables to support the 
relief feeding program. In addition, the AID 
funds will be used to purchase about $3.5 
million worth of blankets and sheets in the 
United States for distribution to victims of 
the civil strife. The immediate needs of 
shelter for displaced persons have been met, 
and the main requirements are now food and 
work. The remaining AID funds will finance 
small projects developed by local authorities 
to provide work relief to fill the direct needs 
of displaced persons. 


^ Text from AID press release 75-49 dated June 3. 


Department of State Bulletin 

The $1 million AID donation to the ICRC 
will be used to help that relief agency protect 
civilians, provide medical and relief assist- 
ance, and trace missing persons. Under its 
relief assistance program, the ICRC has 
made regular deliveries of meat, baby foods, 
and powdered milk to about 140,000 persons 
and has distributed food to some 5,000 
Turkish Cypriots in unsurrendered villages. 
An ICRC tracing agency collects information 
concerning missing persons on both sides 
and has carried more than a million mes- 
sages between families and friends separated 
by the civil strife. 

People's Republic of Mozambique 
Recognized by United States 

Folloiving is the text of a letter dated June 
25 from President Ford to Samora Moises 
Machel, President of the People's Republic 
of Mozambique. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 30 

Dear Mr. President : I am pleased to in- 
form you that the United States Government 
extends recognition to Mozambique. It is our 
hope, with your agreement, that diplomatic 
relations can soon be established between our 
two countries. 

We congratulate your leaders and their 
Portuguese colleagues on the wise statesman- 
ship that has led to Mozambique's independ- 

The American people share with the peo- 
ple of Mozambique the knowledge that hard- 
won individual liberty and national independ- 
ence can be preserved only by unremitting 
labor and sacrifice. 

As we strengthen and multiply our bonds 
of mutual friendship, I am confident of a 
future in which our two peoples will work 
together in the freedom, peace and security 
of all mankind. 

Gerald R. Ford. 

The White House, June 25, 1975. 

Secretary Designates U.S. Members 
of Permanent Court of Arbitration 

The Department of State announced on 
June 26 (press release 347) that the Secre- 
tary of State has designated four U.S. mem- 
bers of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. 
They are William W. Bishop of Ann Arbor, 
Mich., Herbert Brownell of New York, N.Y., 
Monroe Leigh of Washington, D.C., and John 
R. Stevenson of New York, N.Y. (For bio- 
graphic data, see press resealse 347.) Messrs. 
Brownell and Stevenson are being appointed 
to a second consecutive term. Members of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration serve in 
their personal capacities and not as officers 
of the United States. They are appointed for 
terms of six years. 

Under the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, the members of the Perma- 
nent Court of Arbitration nominate persons 
for election by the U.N. Security Council and 
General Assembly as judges of the Interna- 
tional Court of Justice. The Statute recom- 
mends that each national group of Perma- 
nent Court members "consult its highest 
court of justice, its legal faculties and schools 
of law, and its national academies and na- 
tional sections of international academies de- 
voted to the study of law" before making these 
nominations. Five vacancies will occur on the 
International Court of Justice this year. 

The Permanent Court of Arbitration was 
created by the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conven- 
tions for the Pacific Settlement of Interna- 
tional Disputes "with the object of facilitat- 
ing an immediate recourse to arbitration for 
international diff'erences, which it has not 
been possible to settle by diplomacy." In ac- 
cordance with the two Hague Conventions, 
each signatory power selects four persons as 
members of the Court. The Hague Conven- 
tions provide that when any contracting 
powers desire to seek recourse to the Per- 
manent Court of Arbitration for the settle- 
ment of a diff"erence that has arisen between 
them, the tribunal to decide the diff'erence 
shall be chosen from the general list of the 
members of the Court. 

July 21, 1975 



Department Discusses Policy on the Sale 
of U.S. Military Articles and Services 

Statement by Thomas Stern 

Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs ^ 

I would like to address myself today to 
U.S. foreign military sales policy considera- 
tions, in particular our purposes and goals 
in selling defense articles and services and 
general infrastructure to governments with 
which we maintain close security ties as well 
as those with which we share common 
political and economic interests. 

I hope that today's session represents the 
continuation of a dialogue between the Con- 
gress and the executive branch on this im- 
portant subject. Our policies support the 
regional and global interests of the United 
States, and I hope to show the manner in 
which our interests are supported. I also 
hope to demonstrate that our policies and 
program are carefully constructed and pur- 
sued with prudence and balance. You will 
note that I do not use the phrase "arms 
transfers"; for to do so would obscure the 
fact that many foreign military sales orders 
include funds for training, maintenance, and 
construction of facilities which have both 
military as well as civilian uses. 

The most fundamental reason for security 
assistance and military sales is to be found 
in American history and the growing 
realization in this country that, in the 20th 
century, we could not isolate ourselves from 
the mainstream of major forces and events 

' Made before the Subcommittee on Foreign As- 
sistance and Economic Policy of the Senate Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations on June 18. The 
complete transcript of the hearings will be published 
by the committee and will be available from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

abroad. The view that aggression should not 
be permitted to succeed had, after our ex- 
perience in World War II, assumed a certain 
moral force. The emergence of new threats 
in the late 1940's, toward Greece and Turkey, 
Europe, and then Korea, were clear chal- 
lenges to our own security. 

As the leading proponent of collective 
security and international organization, we 
looked to the newly formed United Nations 
to respond. Where it could not, we created 
regional collective security organizations. 
Where required and appropriate, we also 
entered into special bilateral arrangements. 
Throughout this immediate postwar period, 
the United States saw the danger to its in- 
terests as both military and ideological, i.e., 
as a threat to the beliefs, values, and institu- 
tions of the Western world. 

In a world that was divided along bipolar 
lines, the U.S. role as a major supplier was 
clear and straightforward: we sold or gave 
military materiel and services to countries 
that were closely associated with us in op- 
position to the Soviet Union and Communist 
China. While the legislative and executive 
branches sometimes debated the specifics of 
our security assistance program, there 
existed a consensus on the relationship of our 
program to our security, and it was generally 

More recently, however, changes in the 
international scene have made security rela- 
tionships a much more complex subject. 

The rigid bipolar world of the 19.50's and 
early 1960's no longer exists. Our painful 


Department of State Bulletin 

involvement in Viet-Nam is ended. And 
power no longer is measured today in purely 
military terms. The post-bipolar period is an 
era of increasing interdependence in the 
lields of international trade, international 
security, and in development, trade, and 
sliared environmental concerns. 

Despite this interdependence, this is a 
world of nations, whose number is constantly 
growing. The total now approaches 150. All 
have some kind of armed force, and few 
judge themselves capable of insuring in- 
ternal order or of maintaining the integrity 
of their territory without external sources of 
military supply. Furthermore, no govern- 
ment can be indifferent to its security, how- 
ever it defines it; and security requirements 
will compete with economic and social de- 
velopment for a share of whatever resources 
are available. 

Not surprisingly, then, this is also a world 
in which the level and quantity of military 
transactions between nations will be sub- 
stantial. Most of the world's almost 150 
nations have no arms industries. Their 
equipment and related services must be ac- 
quired from the more industrialized nations 
on a cash, credit, or grant basis. 

In the early 1950's the United States and 
the United Kingdom were the dominant sup- 
pliers of major weapons systems. The Soviet 
Union is now very active, and France has 
equaled and at times surpassed Britain as a 
major weapons supplier. Nine nations were 
the source of 97 percent of world military 
exports over the period 1964-73. The United 
States delivered 51 percent, the Soviet Union 
27 percent, the United Kingdom, France, 
and China 10 percent, and Czechoslovakia, 
Poland, Canada, and West Germany 8.5 
percent. These trends all point toward the 
growth in size and complexity of the inter- 
national military trade. 

Today, those who purchase from the 
United States vary widely in their security 
concerns and political orientations. There 
are, of course, the traditional U.S. allies, 
such as the NATO countries of Western 
Europe. In addition, we sell military items 
to Israel, Korea, Jordan, the Philippines, and 
Thailand — countries with which we maintain 

special ties and connections. Within the past 
three years, a substantial proportion of our 
military sales has shifted to the Persian 
Gulf area. This is an area where a spectacu- 
lar transition is in progress in tei-ms of the 
balance of economic power, the emergence 
of new political institutions, and the transfer 
of technology from industrialized nations to 
states in the region. It is also an area where 
concerns for security and stability have 
loomed large since Britain's termination in 
1971 of its protective presence. Because the 
forces at work in the Persian Gulf could 
have a profound influence on the world 
balance of power, the U.S. Government has 
developed a special relationship with a num- 
ber of states in the area. 

Organization of Review Process 

I wish to turn next to how the U.S. Gov- 
ernment functions in the military sales field. 

In developing and implementing its policy, 
the U.S. Government has developed in recent 
years a well-structured review process that 
passes on all requests for military materiel 
and services within the framework of the 
Foreign Assistance and Foreign Military 
Sales Acts. This process may be familiar to 
you, but I would like to recapitulate briefly 
its main features. 

The normal review channel for military 
equipment transfers which involve appro- 
priated funds is the Security Assistance Pro- 
gram Review Committee chaired by the 
Under Secretary of State for Security As- 
sistance and consisting of representatives 
from State, Defense, Treasury, 0MB, NSC, 
AID, and ACDA [Office of Management and 
Budget, National Security Council, Agency 
for International Development, Arms Con- 
trol and Disarmament Agency] . The commit- 
tee reviews both the level and the content of 
each country program. 

In cases of cash sales through government 
channels or commercial sales, the procedures 
vary somewhat depending on type of case. 
All cases are processed within policy guide- 
lines established by the Department. 
Furthermore, all major cases must be ap- 
proved by senior officials in the Department. 

July 21, 1975 


Within the State Department cases are re- 
viewed by the regional bureau involved and 
the Politico-Military Bureau. In very im- 
portant cases of whatever type, the Presi- 
dent or the Secretary of State may make the 

Although the views of Defense Depart- 
ment officials are fully taken into account in 
the decisionmaking process, it should be 
emphasized that the Defense Department 
does not make policy with respect to military 
sales or transfers. The prime responsibility 
of the Defense Department is to implement 
national policy. This is clearly understood 
within the executive branch but may not be 
so clearly understood elsewhere. 

Procedures in and of themselves, of 
course, cannot insui'e that sales, or any other 
activity, support the national interest. Deci- 
sions are made by men, not organizational 
and staffing arrangements. But procedures 
can help insure that the relevant informa- 
tion, analysis, and perspectives are brought 
to bear on the issue for decision. 

Factors Affecting Transfer Decisions 

There is a large range of considerations 
that we normally take into account when 
judging whether to enter into a military 
supply relationship and — when that deci- 
sion is positive- — determining what kinds 
and quantities of materiel and services we 
will provide. Each case is unique and handled 
as such. There are, however, some fairly con- 
sistent yardsticks that we do apply, and I 
would like to sketch these briefly for you. 

On the political side we assess : 

— The role the country plays in its sur- 
roundings and what interests it has in 
common with the United States and where 
our interests diverge. 

— Whether the transactions further U.S. 
objectives more on balance than other 
economic or political measures. 

— The position of influence that sales 
might help support, including the potential 
restraint that can be applied in conflict situa- 

— Whether a particular sale would set a 
precedent which could lead to further re- 

quests for arms or similar requests from 
other countries. 

— The current internal stability of the 
recipient country, its capacity to maintain 
that stability, and its attitude toward human 

— The disadvantages of not selling to a 
government with which we enjoy good rela- 

— The options available to the recipient 
country. Will a refusal result in the country's 
turning to other sources of supply? What 
sources? What will be the political, military, 
and economic implications of this? If a coun- 
try has options that it will unhesitatingly 
employ, by refusing to sell might we forfeit 
opportunities of maintaining a close rela- 
tionship that could better enable us to de- 
velop or maintain parallel interests and 

There are also important economic ques- 

— Whether the proposed sale is consistent 
with the country's development goals or our 
economic assistance program, if there is one. 

— Whether the sale might strain the coun- 
try's ability to manage its debt obligation or 
entail operations and maintenance costs that 
might make excessive claims on future 

— The economic benefits to the United 
States from the sale or coproduction of arms, 
especially to the oil-rich states. As significant 
as these benefits may be, however, they re- 
main secondary and certainly would never 
decide an issue. 

And finally, there are military aspects to 
be taken into account: 

— The threat the military capability is 
supposed to counter or deter, whether we 
agree on the nature of the threat, and how it 
relates to our own security. During a period 
when the United States and some other 
major powers are transferring some security 
responsibilities, we must attempt to under- 
stand the security concerns of smaller coun- 
tries. To us their concerns may seem exag- 
gerated, but to them their concerns are 
usually very real. 

— How the proposed transfer affects the 


Department of State Bulletin 

regional military balance, regional military 
tensions, or the military buildup plans of 
another country. 

— Whether the recipient country has the 
capability to absorb and utilize the arms 

— What other military interests — for ex- 
ample, overflight rights or access to facili- 
ties—would be supported by the transaction. 

— The impact on our readiness. At least 
since the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973, 
we have had to assess the impact of sales on 
the readiness posture of our own forces. 

— Whether a substantial physical de- 
pendence on U.S. sources of supply could 
enable us to better control conflict under 
some circumstances. 

— Finally, except in special circumstances 
we do not sell or otherwise transfer certain 
sensitive items such as hand-transportable 
surface-to-air missiles and weapons which 
are primarily designed for use against 

The basic issue is to make the best possible 
systematic judgment in light of the totality 
of U.S. interests just as we do in other in- 
ternational political judgments. And this is 
a critical point: security relationships are 
an element of foreign policy and thus 
neither more nor less subject to uncertainties 
than any other tool of policy. Like any other 
tool it could theoretically be dispensed with. 
But in an age when we need to exploit our 
capabilities to the maximum, it would be 
pointless to forgo the use of any tool that, 
when wisely used, promises substantial 
benefit at acceptable cost and risk. 

Various Rationales for Transfers 

I believe it would be important in this 
context to consider why the United States is, 
for many countries, the supplier of choice. 

At the simplest level, others prefer our 
products because they are of high quality. 
Like other American manufactured goods, 
our hardware is well designed, well made, 
and dependable. Our supporting systems — 
training and logistics — are second to none. 

Of equal importance, many nations want 
to buy from us because they want to be 

associated with the United States on other 
matters of mutual interest, and they may 
wish to avoid relations with other exporting 
countries whose intentions are open to ques- 
tion. Military assistance and, most recently, 
military sales have been supporting elements 
in relationships with friends and allies over 
the years. I would like to reiterate what 
Under Secretary Sisco recently stated during 
a discussion of our transfer policies : - 

These are valid questions for Americans who are 
troubled at seeing their country in the arms supply 
business. The image of the "merchant of death" 
dies hard. 

I hope I have been able to . . . demonstrate that 
we are dealing with it in the context of an overall 
and carefully developed policy concept. The fact is 
that foreign relations are a whole piece. We cannot 
pick up elements with which we feel comfortable and 
ignore others. For every country in the world, its 
ability to defend itself is the most important thing 
to its national survival. If we do not take this into 
account in our relations with that country, the 
totality of our relationships with that country will 
suffer, as will our political and economic objectives. 

Even nations not under immediate threat 
find it prudent to maintain a certain level of 
military capability to meet unforeseen 
foreign or domestic contingencies, much as 
we did through long periods of our own his- 
tory. Also, a military establishment is almost 
an inevitable symbol of national sovereignty, 
especially in new countries that are develop- 
ing a national identity and pride. One may 
have reservations about this, but it is a fact 
of life. 

Obviously it is not in our interest to cater 
to extreme expectations, and we practice 
maximum restraint in dealing with countries 
under these circumstances. But refusal to 
sell any military articles and services would 
be in some cases interpreted as a signal by 
the United States that we do not support the 
security concerns of the countries involved 
or do not consider them mature enough to be 
trusted with some types of military equip- 
ment. There may be cases in which we in 
fact make such judgments in light of our 
interests and as a result will refuse the sale 

" For a statement by Under Secretary Sisco made 
before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations 
of the House Committee on International Relations 
on June 10, see Bulletin of July 14, 1975. p. 73. 

July 21, 1975 


of sought-after equipment. However, we 
must recog-nize the sensitivity of these prob- 
lems and make careful judgments in a con- 
text of trying to foster maturity and 

It has been argued that relationships in- 
volving military exports harbor hidden dan- 
gers. Based primarily on our Viet-Nam 
experience, some think that these transac- 
tions, whatever our intentions, can draw us 
into Quarrels among nations, or within na- 

It is true that military transfers by their 
nature are not as politically neutral as non- 
military trade or economic assistance, 
especially M'hen the supplier is a nation, such 
as the United States or the U.S.S.R., that is 
recognized as having global interests and 
responsibilities. Moreover, as I indicated 
earlier, military assistance and sales are by 
design supportive of bilateral relationships 
and broader foreign policy interests. 

However, a distinction can be made be- 
tween these transfers, whether grant or 
sales, that support a recognized security 
commitment and others which support a 
more general relationship. In the latter case, 
commitments are not entailed; in the former, 
transfers only support a commitment al- 
ready made. Moreover, to the extent military 
transfers strengthen the ability of states to 
defend themselves, they can diminish the 
excessive dependence on the United States 
which has so often led to pressures for direct 
U.S. military involvement in the past. 

Finally, it is my own view that those who 
argue that our military assistance and sales 
policies are intrinsically destabilizing and 
eventually lead to conflict assume a narrow 
view of history. In contrast, I would suggest 
that an arms balance in areas of tension has, 
in most cases, inhibited the occurrence of 
conflict. Further, I suggest that a good case 
can and should be made that the risk of war 
is increased in situations when a power im- 
balance exists, where the stronger power is 
tempted to take advantage of the weaker or 
where one power or the other attempts to 
mai-kedly alter the power relationship. 

Repeal Urged of Byrd Amendment 
on Chrome From Southern Rhodesia 

Following is a statement by Charles A. 
James, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Afri- 
can Affairs, before the Subcommittee on In- 
ternational Organizations of the House Com- 
mittee on International Relations, on June 

Thank you for this opportunity to testify 
on the draft amendment to H.R. 1287. As the 
committee is aware, the Department of State 
has already expressed its strong support for 
H.R. 1287, which would restore the United 
States to full compliance with the U.N. eco- 
nomic sanctions against the Smith regime in 
Southern Rhodesia. Early passage of H.R. 
1287 has become even more urgent in the 
light of recent developments in Southern 

As was noted by Deputy Assistant Secre- 
tary [for African Affairs James J.] Blake 
when he appeared before you in February, 
it is now no longer a question of whether 
there will be majority rule in Rhodesia but, 
rather, a question of when. There are con- 
tinuing indications that the final chapters 
of the so-called Rhodesian problem are now 
being written. In Salisbury itself, there seems 
to be a growing perception that their present 
course can only lead to violent tragedy, and 
on-again-off-again talks between the Smith 
regime and Rhodesian nationalists are under- 
way; in Lusaka, Dar es Salaam, and Ga- 
borone there are continuing efforts to support 
and encourage a peaceful settlement in Rho- 
desia; in Pretoria, leaders of the Republic 
of South Africa are continuing to urge the 
Smith regime to reach an acceptable settle- 
ment with the majority of the Rhodesian 
people; in London, the British Government 
announced last week that it was sending an 
emissary to Salisbury to discuss with the 

'The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Smith regime and with African nationalist 
leaders the timing and modalities of a con- 
stitutional conference; in Kingston [Jamai- 
ca], the leaders of the Commonwealth coun- 
tries agreed to provide special financial as- 
sistance to Mozambique to help that country 
to apply U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia; 
and in Lourengo Marques, the imminent inde- 
pendence of Mozambique on June 25 and the 
prospect of the closing of its border to 
Rhodesian trade will add still greater phys- 
ical and psychological pressure on the Smith 
regime to come to accommodation. 

It would be a tragedy, Mr. Chairman, and 
an injustice to our own heritage if this coun- 
try, the United States of America, is depicted 
in these chapters not as protagonist for lib- 
erty, freedom, and justice, but as the last re- 
maining prop of an illegal and repressive 

Our primary objective has always been the 
repeal of the Byrd amendment. It is in this 
context that we support the objectives of the 
proposed amendment to H.R. 1287. The pro- 
posed amendment could make the sanctions 
program more effective by encouraging 
stricter compliance on the part of other 
countries. We do not believe that our trade 
or commerce with other nations would be 
unduly affected by this amendment, since the 
nations who will be required to provide cer- 
tificates of origin all support the U.N. sanc- 
tions program against the Smith regime in 

The requirement that a certificate of origin 
issued by the foreign government or its desig- 
nee with respect to shipments of steelmill 
products to the United States be filed with 
the Secretary of Treasury appears to us to 
be a reasonable method of assuring that 
chrome of Rhodesian origin is efliectively 
barred from the United States. It would fol- 
low of course that if the Secretary is called 
upon to make a determination as to the ade- 
quacy of such a certificate, he should have 
the discretionary authority to establish pro- 
cedures to ascertain that such certificates do 
indeed contain accurate information. 

In closing, I would like to emphasize again 

that repeal may be "now or never" — that in 
the near future we may find ourselves con- 
fronted with a successor government to the 
Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia which 
will base its political and trade relations with 
other nations on the degree of support pro- 
vided for self-determination and majority 
rule in Rhodesia. Indeed, during their visit 
to Washington in early May, the president 
of the Rhodesian African National Council, 
Bishop Abel Muzorewa, and other ANC of- 
ficials, specifically made this point. In this 
sense then, repeal of the Byrd Amendment 
now may be vital in assuring long-range ac- 
cess to Zimbabwe chrome and other minerals 
for American companies. 

Department Testifies on U.S. Policy 
Toward Mozambique 

Statement by Nathaniel Davis 
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ^ 

I welcome this opportunity to meet with 
the subcommittee for the first time since my 
appointment as Assistant Secretary of State 
for African Affairs. I would like to begin by 
saying that I look forward to frank and 
constructive exchanges with you on all as- 
pects of our relations with the nations of 
Africa. In dealing with the many complex is- 
sues involved in our relations with these na- 
tions, I shall hope for your advice and co- 

This is a particularly opportune time for 
us to discuss Mozambique, which will become 
independent in less than two weeks' time. 

I would first like to submit for the record 
the following brief summary of economic 
data. During the course of my remarks, I will 
touch briefly on the economic development 
of Mozambique and on the role that the 

' Made before the Subcommittee on Africa of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on June 
13. The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

July 21, 1975 


United States could play in assisting that de- 
velopment. Mr. Dennis Conroy, from the 
Agency for International Development, is 
with me here today. 

U.S. policy toward Mozambique has been 
predicated on the principles of self-determi- 
nation and majority rule. It has also been our 
policy to encourage the achievement of these 
goals by peaceful means. Therefore the 
United States established an embargo on 
arms shipments to both sides in the Portu- 
guese colonial wars after the outbreak of 
hostilities in Angola in 1961, two years be- 
fore the U.N. called for a similar embargo. 
We also began at that time asking for and 
receiving assurances from the Portuguese 
that any military equipment supplied them 
would not be used outside the NATO area, 
an area which has not included their African 
colonial territories. 

It was in accordance with our hope for 
peaceful resolution of southern African prob- 
lems that we, along with the rest of the 
world, heartily welcomed Portugal's decision 
after April 1974 to recognize the right of 
self-determination in Mozambique and in the 
other Portuguese territories in Africa. 

In Mozambique, the process of negotiation 
led the Front for the Liberation of Mozam- 
bique (FRELIMO) — the group representing 
the peoples of Mozambique — and Portugal on 
September 7, 1974, to sign an agreement 
setting June 25, 1975, as the date for Mozam- 
bican independence. The same agreement 
provided for a provisional government to 
lay the groundwork for that independence 
and to administer the country in the interim. 
We immediately sent a letter of congratula- 
tions to the provisional government, made 
up of both FRELIMO and Portuguese rep- 
resentatives, to mark this dramatic develop- 
ment in the decolonization effort. 

President Ford stated our government's 
policy toward Mozambican independence in 
his toast to Zambia's President Kaunda on 
April 19. Speaking of all the former Portu- 
guese colonies. President Ford said : 

... we have been following developments in 
southern Africa with great, great interest. For 
many years the United States has supported self- 

determination for the peoples of that area, and we 
continue to do so today. 

We view the coming independence of Mozambique, 
Angola, and the island territories with great satis- 
faction, just as we viewed the independence of 
Guinea-Bissau just last year. 

. . . America stands ready to help the emerging 
countries . . . and to provide what assistance we 
can .... 

In the spirit of the President's remarks, 
we are now looking forward to a cooperative 
relationship with the new Mozambique. It is 
a country of dynamism and potential. Its 
leaders are already participating in efforts 
to seek a solution to the problem of Rhodesia. 
The United States will recognize this new 
nation on its independence and seek a mu- 
tually beneficial relationship. 

We are aware of the major administrative 
and development challenges which face Mo- 
zambique. It is basically an agrarian nation — 
with 85 percent of its population living in 
rural areas — and its new leaders have indi- 
cated that they will concentrate their efforts 
on rural development and the agricultural 
sector. Mozambique's development plans will 
also emphasize other areas, in particular 
health care but also education and training. 

We are ready to give a prompt and sympa- 
thetic response to an expression of interest 
in U.S. assistance and cooperation in these 
areas. We are also ready to consider balance- 
of -payments support and P.L. 480 assistance, 
subject to congressional authorization and 
appropriation. The United States has dis- 
cussed these questions with FRELIMO's 
President, Samora Machel. My predecessor 
met with President Machel in October 1974 
and indicated our willingness, within our 
means, to assist the new nation. In January, 
we offered to send an economic survey team 
to study developmental problems and assist- 
ance potential. We are hopeful that a date 
will be set for consultations with Mozambique 
on this subject before or soon after inde- 

As a further indication of our attitude, 
I would like to mention that the United 
States has contributed $275,000 in disaster 
relief funds over the past year, to aid vic- 
tims of the September disturbances in Lou- 


Department of State Bulletin 

reiiQO Marques and to aid victims of flooding 
in the Limpopo Valley area; we indicated 
that we were prepared to consider a request 
for P.L. 480 assistance from Mozambique; 
the Export-Import Bank approved both a 
$4.5 million credit and equivalent guarantee 
for the purchase of locomotives by Mozam- 
bique; and we are now considering a con- 
tribution to a U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees' (UNHCR) appeal for a refugee 
resettlement program. 
J In more general terms, the Congress has 
demonstrated its interest in the former Por- 
tuguese territories by appropriating funds 
under the Foreign Assistance Act for the spe- 
cific purpose of aid to these areas. The fiscal 
year 1975 appropriation was for $25 million 
for Portugal and the territories, not less than 
$5 million of which would go to Cape Verde 
and not less than $5 million for Mozambique, 
Guinea-Bissau, and Angola. Under this ap- 
propriation $400,000 has been obligated for 
a development-oriented training program for 
nationals of Portuguese-speaking Africa, 
$1 million has been granted to the UNHCR 
for resettlement of refugees in Guinea- 
Bissau, and we hope to sign a $1 million grant 
and a $3 million loan with the Cape Verde 
islands this month. We also hope to add 
another $1 million grant to Cape Verde early 
in FY76, but this will require special authori- 
zation under the continuing resolution. 

I believe these actions illustrate U.S. 
interest and concern for all the Portuguese- 
speaking African nations in general and for 
the new nation of Mozambique in particular. 
The role that they will play and the effect 
they will have on stability and progress in 
southern Africa, with its many problem.s — 
some of which will be subject of later hear- 
ings by this committee — make their peaceful 
and successful transition to independence of 
great concern and importance to all nations 
which favor peace with justice in southern 

The United States numbers itself among 
nations that take this approach. We look for- 
ward to the evolution of stable and prosper- 
ous nations in southern Africa — under 
principles of human dignity and self-deter- 

July 21, 1975 

mination. We believe that Mozambique will 
play a major role in the achievement of these 
objectives. Therefore we offer our congratu- 
lations and extend the hand of friendship to 
the Government and people of Mozambique. 


U.S. To Launch Satellites 
for Japan 

The Department of State announced on 
May 27 (press release 300) that the United 
States and the Government of Japan have 
entered into an agreement under which 
NASA will launch satellites on a reimburs- 
able basis for the National Space Develop- 
ment Agency of Japan. 

These satellites — the geostationary mete- 
orological satellite, the medium-capacity geo- 
stationary communications satellite for 
experimental purpose, and the medium-scale 
bi-oadcasting satellite for experimental pur- 
pose — will be launched from the Kennedy 
Space Center, the first launch scheduled two 
years from now. 

Notes concluding the agreement were 
signed by Dr. Dixy Lee Ray, Assistant Secre- 
tary of State for Oceans and International 
Environmental and Scientific Affairs, and 
Takeshi Yasukawa, Ambassador of Japan, 
on May 23. (For text of the Japanese note, 
see press release 300.) The agreement was 
concluded pursuant to the launch policy an- 
nounced by the President October 9, 1972. 
That policy is designed to promote inter- 
national cooperation in the peaceful use of 
outer space and to make the capabilities of 
space available to all mankind. 

The satellites are being built in the United 
States and will be launched by Delta launch 
vehicles. A memorandum of understanding 
between NASA and the Science Technology 
Agency will be signed shortly which estab- 
lishes the general responsibilities for each 


side in connection with preparation for and 
conduct of these launchings. Further, an 
agreement will be signed between NASA and 
the National Space Development Agency of 
Japan with the detailed arrangements for 
each launch. 

Previous reimbursable launches have been 
conducted for Canada, the United Kingdom, 
the European Space Research Organization, 
France and Germany, and further launches 
are planned for Canada, Italy, Indonesia, 
and ESRO. 

U.S. and Poland Conclude 
Fisheries Agreements 


Press release 309 dated May 30 

Representatives of the United States and 
Poland signed on May 29 an agreement aimed 
at providing improved conservation for cer- 
tain species of fish, such as river herring, 
which are found off the U.S. Atlantic coast 
and increased protection for some shellfish 
and other creatures, such as lobsters, found 
upon the U.S. east coast continental shelf. 

The new agreement, the latest in a series 
which began in 1969, places additional and 
much-needed restrictions upon Poland's fish- 
ing efl'ort in waters of the western region of 
the Middle Atlantic. These waters, heavily 
fished by foreign fleets, contain once-rich 
stocks of fish such as flounders, hake, and 
black sea bass which are particularly desired 
by U.S. consumers and which are of great 
importance to U.S. fishermen. 

The new restrictions include both addition- 
al reductions in the geographic area in which 
the Poles may fish and reductions in the 
amount of the Polish catch. For example, 
Poland agreed not to direct any fishing effort 
toward river herring and to avoid fishing at 
times and in places where concentrations of 
such fish occur. 

As is the case with all such agreements 
concluded recently, the new arrangements 
provide for a number of practical measures 
that are to be taken to avoid catching or 
otherwise harming the fishery resources of 
the U.S. continental shelf, such as lobsters 
and some crabs. In order to help insure that 
these and other provisions in the agreement 
are strictly adhered to, additional arrange- 
ments permit the use of observers upon Pol- 
ish fishing vessels and allow for on-board in- 
spection of catches and gear. 

Practical measures to minimize the possi- 
bility of conflict between different types of 
fishing gear have been included within the 
agreement; and should such conflicts never- 
theless occur, the new agreement continues 
the existing U.S.-Polish Fisheries Board, a 
mechanism aimed at providing for settlement 
of claims for damage from gear conflicts and 
consideration of other fisheries problems 
arising from the agreement. 

In return for the many measures resulting 
in a reduction of the Polish fishery to protect 
resources of special interest to U.S. fisher- 
men, the agreement continues to allow Polish 
vessels to conduct loading operations in the 
contiguous fisheries zone between 3 and 12 
miles off the U.S. coast in three localities and 
to make limited port calls as before. A new 
provision permits Polish vessels a limited 
opportunity to exchange their crews in the 
Port of New York only. 

The agreement will enter into force July 
1, 1975, and extend to June 30, 1976, and if 
agreed at that time, may extend for another 
year. At the request of either government, 
it can be terminated upon two months' 
notice at any time during the period of force 
of the agreement. 

The U.S. delegation to the deliberations 
was headed by William L. Sullivan, Jr., Co- 
ordinator of Oceans and Fisheries in the 
Department of State, and included a number 
of representatives of the east coast fishing 
community. The Polish delegation was led 
by Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade and 
Maritime Affairs Romuald Pietraszek. 


Department of State Bulletin 


Press release 311 dated June 2 

The Governments of the United States and 
Poland on May 30 concluded a short-term 
fisheries agreement eflfective from June 15 
to December 31, 1975, relating to the fish- 
eries of the North Pacific area extending 
from California north to Alaska. This is the 
first such agreement concluded between the 
two countries on Pacific coast fisheries. 

Poland, which is a relative newcomer to 
the North Pacific fisheries, agreed to main- 
tain the level of her fishing effort in 1975 to 
not more than 15 vessels, of which not more 
than 11 vessels would fish at the same time. 
The 11 vessels will be dispersed in a manner 
designed to avoid a concentration of vessels 
in one locality. 

Poland agreed to refrain from fishing for 
salmon and halibut and will not conduct 
specialized fisheries for other species of 
special importance to the United States. 
These species include rockfish, black cod, 
flounders, soles, anchovy, Pacific mackerel, 
and shrimp. At the same time, Polish vessels 
will, during the period of the agreement, 
begin to switch from bottom trawling to 
pelagic trawling, thereby minimizing the 
chances of catching bottom species which 
U.S. fishermen primarily seek. In addition, 
Poland has agreed to abide by the conserva- 
tion provisions of the agreements concluded 
between the United States and other coun- 
tries fishing in the North Pacific. Further- 
more, Poland agreed to refrain from fishing 
in a new closed area off northern California 
where U.S. fishermen fish with fixed gear so 
as to prevent damaging the U.S. gear. 

Both governments agreed to expand their 
research on species of interest to both sides 
and to exchange biostatistical data on a 
timely basis. Both governments also agreed 
to initiate a program whereby fisheries ex- 
perts from one side could board vessels of 
the other side to observe their operations and 
collect data. In this regard, the Polish side 
also agreed to permit duly authorized U.S. 

Federal and state officials to board and con- 
duct inspections of their vessels. 

The new agreement also spells out mea- 
sures which the Polish fishermen will take 
to avoid taking U.S. continental shelf re- 
sources, such as king and tanner crabs. In 
return for the cooperation extended by the 
Polish side in agreeing to observe existing 
conservation arrangements in the North 
Pacific, the United States will permit Polish 
vessels to conduct loading operations in two 
localities in the U.S. contiguous fishery zone 
(3-12 miles). 

The negotiations between the two delega- 
tions were conducted in a cordial and 
friendly atmosphere. The U.S. delegation, 
which included representatives from the De- 
partments of State and Commerce, state 
agencies, and the fishing industry, was 
headed by William L. Sullivan, Jr., Coordi- 
nator of Oceans and Fisheries in the Depart- 
ment of State. The Polish delegation was led 
by Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade and 
Maritime Affairs Romuald Pietraszek. 

Current Actions 



Amendments to articles 24 and 25 of the Constitu- 
tion of the World Health Organization of July 22, 
1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at 
Geneva May 23, 1967. Entered into force May 21, 

Acceptances deposited: Bahrain, June 25, 1975; 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, June 10, 
Amendments to articles 35 and 55 of the Constitu- 
tion of the World Health Organization of July 22, 
1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at 
Geneva May 22, 1973.' 

Acceptances deposited: Bahrain, June 25, 1975; 
Cyprus, June 20, 1975; Syrian Arab Republic, 
June 18, 1975. 


Radio regulations, with appendices. Done at Geneva 
December 21, 1959. Entered into force May 1, 

' Not in force. 

July 21, 1975 


1961; for the United States October 23, 1961. 
TIAS 4893. 

Notificatio7i of approval: Mauritius, April 24, 

Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 
1959, as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590, 
7435), to establish a new frequency allotment 
plan for high-frequency radiotelephone coast sta- 
tions, with annexes and final protocol. Done at 
Geneva June 8, 1974.' 

Notification of approval: Mauritius, April 24, 

International telecommunication convention with 
annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torre- 
molinos October 25, 1973. Entered into force 
January 1, 1975.' 
Ratifications deposited: Jamaica,' Tunisia, April 

25, 1975. 
Accession deposited: Jordan, May 28, 1975. 


Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat 
trade convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at 
Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force 
June 19, 1975, with respect to certain pro\'isions 
and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions. 
Declaration of provisional application deposited: 
Iraq, June 27, 1975. 


Republic of China 

Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles, with 
annex, as amended. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Washington December 30, 1971. Entered into 
force December 30, 1971; effective January 1, 
1971. TIAS 7249, 7468, 7590. 
Terminated: January 1, 1975. 

Agreement concerning trade in wool and manmade 
fiber textile products, with annexes, as amended. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington 
December 30, 1971. Entered into force December 
30, 1971; effective October 1, 1971. TIAS 7498, 
Terminated: January 1, 1975. 


Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and 
manmade fiber textiles and textile products, with 
annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Bogota 
May 28, 1975. Entered into force May 28, 1975; 
effective July 1, 1975. 


Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of April 16, 1975. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Kingston June 9, 
1975. Entered into force June 9, 1975. 


Agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles with 
related exchange of notes, as amended. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Washington June 29, 
1971. Entered into force June 29, 1971; effective 
May 1, 1971. TIAS 7152, 7732. 
Terminated: May 1, 1975. 

' Not in force. 

^ Not in force for the United States. 

^ With reservations contained in final protocol. 

First 1949 "Foreign Relations" Volume 
on Far East and Australasia Released 

Press release 324 dated June 10 (for release June 17) 

The Department of State released on June 17 
volume VII, part 1, in the series "Foreign Relations 
of the United States" for the year 1949. This volume 
is entitled "The Far East and Australasia." 

One of the two volumes on China for the year 
1949 (volume IX) was released in January. The 
companion volume on China (volume VIII) and part 
2 of volume VII, containing documentation on Japan, 
Korea, and regional matters, will be released sub- 
sequently to complete the issuance in the series of 
material on the Far East for 1949. 

Volume VII, part 1, contains 600 pages of pre^^- 
ously unpublished documentation on many important 
topics, with principal emphasis on U.S. interest in 
nationalist opposition to the restoration of French 
rule in Indochina and Netherlands rule in the East 
Indies (Indonesia). 

This volume was prepared by the Historical Office, 
Bureau of Public Affairs. Copies of volume VII, part 
1 (Department of State publication 8797, GPO cat. 
no. Sl.l:949/v. VII, 1), may be obtained for $8.75 
(domestic postpaid). Checks or money orders should 
be made out to the Superintendent of Documents and 
sent to the U.S. Government Book Store, Depart- 
ment of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX July 21 , 1 975 Vol. LXXIII, No. 1 882 


Department Discusses Policy on the Sale of 

U.S. Military Articles and Services (Stern) 98 
Department Testifies on U.S. Policy Toward 
Repeal Urged of Byrd Amendment on Chrome 

Mozambique (Davis) 103 

From Southern Rhodesia (James) .... 102 

pyprus. U.S. Contributes $10.9 Million for 
Cyprus Relief 96 

)epartment and Foreign Service. Secretary 
Kissinger Announces New Steps for Im- 
provement of Department's Resource Allo- 
cation and Personnel Systems (remarks) . 85 

.•Economic Afifairs. U.S. and Poland Conclude 

Fisheries Agreements 106 

Snergy. President Ford's News Conference of 
June 25 (excerpts) 93 

Slurope. President Ford's News Conference of 
June 25 (excerpts) 93 

Foreign Aid. U.S. Contributes $10.-9 Million 
for Cyprus Relief 96 

India. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed on 
ABC Saturday News 90 

nternational Law. Secretary Designates U.S. 
Members of Permanent Court of Arbitration 97 

|apan. U.S. To Launch Satellites for Japan . 105 

liddle East 

President Ford's News Conference of June 
25 (excerpts) 93 

pccretary Kissinger Interviewed on ABC 
Saturday News 90 

.lilitary Affairs 

Department Discusses Policy on the Sale of 
, U.S. Military Articles and Services (Stern) 98 
Sixth Round of U.S.-Spain Talks Held in 
Washington (text of joint communique) . . 92 


department Testifies on U.S. Policy Toward 
Mozambique (Davis) 103 

People's Republic of Mozambique Recognized 
by United States (letter from President 
Ford) 97 

Mand. U.S. and Poland Conclude Fisheries 
Agreements 106 

Presidential Documents 

people's Republic of Mozambique Recognized 

by United States 97 

resident Ford's News Conference of June 25 
(excerpts) 93 

Publications. First 1949 "Foreign Relations" 
Volume on Far East and Australasia 


Southern Rhodesia. Repeal Urged of Byrd 
Amendment on Chrome From Southern 
Rhodesia (James) 102 

Space. U.S. To Launch Satellites for Japan . 105 

Spain. Sixth Round of U.S.-Spain Talks Held 
in Washington (text of joint communique) 92 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 107 

U.S. and Poland Conclude Fisheries Agree- 
ments 106 

U.S. To Launch Satellites for Japan .... 105 

Name Index 

Davis, Nathaniel 103 

Ford, President 93, 97 

James, Charles A 102 

Kissinger, Secretary 85, 90 

Stern, Thomas 98 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: June 30-July 6 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Oflice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 




351 6/30 Joint Committee on U.S.-Japan 
Cultural and Educational Co- 
operation, Hawaii, June 21-23; 
*352 7/1 U.S. and Republic of Korea sign 
textile agreement. 

1353 7/1 New U.S.-Finland extradition 


1354 7/2 U.S. and U.K. establish fellowships 

in creative and performing arts 
to mark Bicentennial. 
355 7/5 Kissinger: interview with Ted 
Koppel, ABC Saturday News. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

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U.S. government printing office 



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Washington, D.C. 20402. 






Volume LXXIII 

No. 1883 

July 28, 1975 


Letter From President Ford to the Speaker of the House 

and Statement by Under Secretary Secretary Sisco 109 


Statement by Assistant Secretary Hartman 118 


Statement by Assistant Secretary Habib 123 



For index see inside back cover 


Vol. LXXIII, No. 1883 
July 28, 1975 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 


52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 

domestic $42.50, foreign $53.15 

Single copy 85 cents 

Use of funds for printing this publication 

approved by the Director of the Office of 

Management and Budget (January 29, 1971). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well at 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 

Military Assistance and Sales to Turkey 

Folloiving are texts of a letter dated July 9 
from President Ford to Speaker of the House 
Carl Albert and a statement by Joseph J. 
Sisco, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, 
made before the House Committee on Inter- 
national Relations on July 10 } 


July 9, 1975. 

Dear Mr. Speaker: I wish to share with 
you my concern about a complex foreign 
]iolicy problem that relates to the deteriorat- 
ing situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, 
the threat to our North Atlantic Alliance 
1 elationships, the plight of the people of 
Cyprus and the role of the United States, 
r.oth the Congress and the Executive Branch 
share a responsibility to reexamine this crit- 
ical situation with care. This is not a parti- 
san matter or one where the rights and 
wrongs of a decades-old dispute can easily 
be judged — particularly by outsiders. Our 
overriding objective must be to help in the 
Ijeaceful settlement of a problem that in- 
volves two valued Allies and a people whose 
history as an independent nation has been 
riven by strife. 

The strategic situation must also be 
weighed. At a time of uncertainty in the 
Middle East, we should consider carefully 
any action which could add to the tensions 
that already exist. Our facilities in Turkey 
and our mutual defense arrangements have 

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
jiublished by the committee and will be available 
fi-om the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov- 
tinment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

■ Reprinted from the Congressional Record, July 
'.', p. H 6473. 

played and continue to play a vital role in the 
security of the area and, more directly, in 
the security of our own forces. Mutual de- 
fense links that have stood us well for thirty 
years should not be lightly cast aside. 

I have spent much time studying these 
issues and have talked in Brussels with the 
leaders of Turkey and Greece. I am con- 
vinced that U.S. and We.stern security inter- 
ests require the urgent passage by the House 
of legislation enabling the resumption of our 
long-standing security relationship with 
Turkey. The Senate has already acted favor- 
ably on a bill to accomplish this purpose. 

Existing legislation passed by Congress 
last December 18, with an effective date of 
February 5, 1975, has been in force for 
nearly five months. This action has: (1) 
called into question the ability of an Ally 
to continue to fulfill its essential NATO re- 
sponsibilities, thus undermining NATO's 
strength in the Eastern Mediterranean; (2) 
jeopardized vital common defense installa- 
tions which Turkey and the U.S. jointly 
maintain; (3) contributed to tensions which 
are not helpful to Greece; and (4) reduced 
American influence to move the Cyprus 
negotiations toward a peaceful conclusion 
acceptable to all parties. 

The legislation voted against Turkey last 
December is sweeping in its effect. It is more 
extensive than similar legislation enacted in 
October, 1974, with which the Administra- 
tion was in full compliance. The December 
legislation provides for not only a total em- 
bargo on grant military assistance, and cash 
and credit sales of defense items by the 
U.S. Government, but prohibits as well the 
issuance of licenses to permit the export of 
military equipment purchased from Ameri- 
can firms. Practically all nations of the world 
can purchase in this country at least some 

July 28, 1975 


items that are forbidden to Turkey. It is now 
impossible for Turltey to procure most items 
produced in third countries under U.S. 
license; nor can Turkey even take possession 
of merchandise in the U.S. which it paid for 
prior to February 5 and which is now ready 
for shipment. The result is that a relation- 
ship of trust and confidence with this im- 
portant NATO Ally, built up over many 
years, has been seriously eroded. Continua- 
tion of the embargo risks further deteriora- 
tion, jeopardizing our security interests 
throughout the Eastern Mediterranean area. 

For all these reasons, it is my strong view 
that the Administration and the Congress 
must join in legislative action that will 
remedy the present situation. The form that 
legislation should take to achieve this end is 
for Congress itself to decide, but it is clear 
that only legislation can produce the actions 
which are necessary in this case. 

I know that in the minds of many in the 
Congress there remains the issue of how 
American-supplied arms were used last sum- 
mer. The Cyprus problem is one where 
neither moral nor legal judgments, on the 
arms issue or any other, can be easily or 
lightly made. Yet, the effect of the embargo 
is to ascribe blame totally to one of the 
parties in a dispute that has its roots in cen- 
turies of animosity and for which both sides 
must share some responsibility. 

Where we can all agree, and where I be- 
lieve we must all act together, is in our sense 
of anxiety and concern over the Cyprus prob- 
lem and in a consensus that the only way to 
achieve what we all seek — a just and broadly 
acceptable settlement — is through negotia- 
tions in which we maintain maximum flex- 
ibility with all the parties. Unless some prog- 
ress is made in the negotiations, the humani- 
tarian plight facing the people of Cyprus, 
including particularly the refugee problem, 
cannot be solved. 

The United States will continue to work, 
as it has done continuously since last July, as 
hard and as determinedly as possible to move 
the parties of the Cyprus conflict toward a 
negotiated settlement. Recent U.S. diplo- 
matic activity in Ankara, Athens and Brus- 
sels has contributed to the start of a Greek- 

Turkish dialogue which has defused the tense 
situation and hopefully laid the groundwork 
for Greek-Turkish cooperation. 

As we pursue our eff'orts, we want the 
continued friendship of both Greece and Tur- 
key, and our sympathy and concern extend 
to all the people of Cyprus. We want an 
end to human suff'ering and misery, and the 
rebuilding of an island where all can live in 
freedom and security. 

At present, our ability to urge this view 
persuasively is compromised by the erosion 
of our influence. I ask the Congress' coopera- 
tion and assistance, therefore, in enacting 
legislation which will assure that America's 
influence is not further weakened and U.S. 
interests further threatened at this time of 
critical concern in Cyprus and throughout 
the Eastern Mediterranean. 

Gerald R. Ford. 


Press release 361 dated July 10 

Mr. Chairman [Representative Thomas E. 
Morgan] and members of the committee: I 
come before you today to enlist your support 
in preserving our vital security relationship 
with our NATO ally Turkey and in strength- 
ening our close ties with an equally im- 
portant NATO ally, Greece. You have al- 
ready seen the message from the President 
in which he explained his concern about the 
deteriorating situation in the eastern Medi- 
terranean, the threat to our military facili- 
ties in Turkey, and the plight of the peoples 
of Cyprus. 

As the President emphasized in his mes- 
sage, prohibiting military assistance and 
sales to Turkey has had damaging effects in 
four areas: (1) It has weakened the ability 
of our Turkish ally to continue to fulfill its 
essential NATO responsibilities, thereby 
further debilitating the southern flank of 
NATO; (2) it has jeopardized common de- 
fense installations which Turkey and the 
United States jointly maintain and which 
serve vital interests of the United States 
and NATO; (3) it has contributed to ten- 


Department of State Bulletin 

sions which are not helpful to any of the 
parties, including Greece; and (4) it has 
severely reduced American influence to move 
the Cyprus negotiations toward a peaceful 
settlement acceptable to all parties. 

Throughout the world, we face changing 
relationships with a number of our friends 
and allies. The reasons for these changes are 
complex, and in some cases where they ad- 
versely affect our interests, there is little we 
ourselves can do to reverse them. In the 
case of Turkey, however, something can be 
done. And in our judgment, it must be done 

We maintain alliances and provide mili- 
tary supplies — both sales and assistance — 
to a variety of friends around the world not 
as a favor to a particular country or as a 
unilateral gesture of good will but because 
we believe such relationships are in the 
mutual interests of both the United States 
and our partners. That has been the case 
for almost 30 years, through successive 
American Administrations, in our alliance 
relationship with Turkey. 

We are deeply interested — and I want to 
put particular stress on this — in improving 
our relations with Greece. Greece is a coun- 
try whose security and prosperity are of 
particular and longstanding importance to 
the United States. We can look back with 
pride and a sense of achievement at what 
the Greek people have accomplished with our 
help since World War 11. When we began 
our economic and military aid to the Greeks 
in 1947, Greece was in the grip of a cruel 
and ruinous civil war. We worked with the 
Greeks to restore that country's economy and 
to shore up its security. We are as devoted 
as ever to the well-being of the Greek people. 
We are gratified that the Greek people have 
a democratic government. 

As you know, we are already providing 
cash and credit military sales to Greece in 
response to specific requests from the Greek 
Government. We are also examining sym- 
pathetically requests for economic assistance 
as well. Moreover, we plan to continue to 
work closely with the Greek Government 
with a view to helping in every meaningful 
way we can in the reconciliation of outstand- 

July 28, 1975 

ing differences between Greece and Turkey 
not only regarding Cyprus but also with 
respect to issues in dispute between them in 
the Aegean. It is for all these reasons that we 
welcome the expressions of continued sup- 
port for Greece contained in H.R. 8454, 
which was introduced yesterday by Chair- 
man Morgan and other members of the 

Lifting of Ban on Arms Shipments to Turkey 

The Administration is committed to work- 
ing together with the Congress on this vital 
issue. Our relationship to our Greek and 
Turkish allies is not a partisan matter. It 
is one which requires common understanding 
and cooperation between us. 

As you know, the Administration has re- 
quested and the Senate has adopted the 
Scott-Mansfield bill which would restore 
grant assistance as well as cash and credit 
sales to Turkey. This remains the legislative 
action preferred by the Administration. 
However, as the President said yesterday, 
and reflecting the dialogue and cooperation 
we seek with the Congress on this issue, we 
are prepared to accept the compromise 
legislation (H.R. 8454) now before you. 

Let me now deal directly with the main 
arguments against a restoration of sales and 
assistance to Turkey we have heard from 
some members of Congress and from con- 
cerned Americans. 

First there is the assertion that Turkey, 
during the crisis of last year, violated the 
agreement required under our law by using 
U.S.-provided equipment in ways not en- 
visaged in the Foreign Assistance Act. We 
understand and respect this point of view. 
At the same time I have also heard the view 
expressed that the Congress should not now 
remove the ban it has enacted against arms 
shipments to Turkey because otherwise it 
will appear to approve, or at least condone, 
the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus. 

This is not the case. The prohibition 
against arms shipments to Turkey has now 
been in effect for more than five months. It 
has demonstrated to Turkey the strong feel- 
ings of many in this country over the mili- 


tary action taken by Turkey last year. This 
period of time has also afforded both the 
executive branch and the Congress an op- 
portunity to assess the probable conse- 
quences of continuation of the present prohi- 
bition on arms shipments. A lifting of the 
prohibition at this time based upon consid- 
erations of what is in the best interests of 
the United States cannot be construed as an 
endorsement of Turkey's military action last 
summer. Congress has made this point ab- 
solutely clear by adopting the embargo 

Action by Congress to rectify the situa- 
tion, rather than condone the Turkish action, 
would remove the impairment to our ability 
to promote an early negotiated settlement on 
Cyprus, to maintain good bilateral relations 
with both Greece and Turkey, to restore the 
solidarity of NATO, and to preserve im- 
portant U.S. security interests in the eastern 
Mediterranean. I can assure the Congress 
that the executive branch will not represent 
action rectifying the present situation as 
condoning Turkish military action. 

U.S. Efforts Toward Cyprus Settlement 

Moreover, with regard to Cyprus, the 
situation is not one where there is a monop- 
oly of right or wrong on either side. There is 
a long history of deep divisions between 
the ethnic communities on Cyprus and of 
resulting international tensions. Efforts have 
been made to devise ways to protect the in- 
terests of the two population groups under 
a system of government that would allow 
Cyprus to function as an independent nation. 
However, the 1960 Constitution and treaty 
of guarantee failed to resolve the mistrust 
and animosity existing between the Greek 
and Turkish Cypriot communities. 

Twice before the crisis of last summer, 
Turkey had been on the brink of military 
intervention because of repressive acts 
against the Turkish minority. When the 
Greek junta suddenly intervened last year 
and overthrew the government of Arch- 
bishop Makarios, replacing it with one led 
by Nicos Sampson, a foremost exponent of 
terror tactics and enosis with Greece, Tur- 



key became alarmed and fearful of the con. 
sequences for the Turkish Cypriots. This act' 
started the unfortunate chain of events wej 
have seen this past year in the easternl 

There are also some who say we have not 
worked hard enough or imaginatively 
enough since last summer in trying to brings 
about a Cyprus settlement. I think a brief 
look at the record will demonstrate that this- 
allegation is false. 

In the first instance, vigorous efforts were 
made by the United States to find a way to 
avoid military intervention in Cyprus. Once 
it became clear that the guarantor powers 
could not agree on restoring the status quo 
ante, there was unfortunately no way that 
armed intervention by Turkey could have 
been prevented short of active military in- 
tervention by the United States — a course 
which would not have been approved by the 
American people. 

Since those tragic events, the Administra- 
tion has been continuously and intensely in- 
volved in encouraging and assisting the 
parties to find a solution to the Cyprus prob- 
lem which would restore both peace on the 
island and harmony in relations between the 
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot com- 
munities. Our task has obviously not been 
easy. In the weeks and early months after 
the hostilities, the suspicions and passions 
were so deep that it was impossible at times 
even to bring the parties to the negotiating 
table — not to speak of producing progress 
toward a solution of the problem. 

There have been other factors, extraneous 
to Cyprus, particularly political uncertainty 
in Turkey, which have impeded progress. We 
had reason to expect last fall that the Egevit 
government would undertake important 
gestures relating to Turkish troop reduc- 
tions, troop pullbacks, and Greek Cypriot 
refugees which would have improved the 
negotiating atmosphere and the prospects 
for a Cyprus settlement. But the Turkish 
Government fell at that time, thereby ending 
our hopes for early progress. Turkey then 
entered a long period of political stalemate 
under a caretaker government, and it was 
only recently that a political government 

Department of State Bulletin 


under Prime Minister Demirei was estab- 
lished, with only a narrow majority in the 
Turkish National Assembly. 

Nevertheless, throughout this period we 
continued our efforts with Greek, Turkish, 
and Cypriot leaders to create the groundwork 
for the negotiation of a Cyprus settlement. 
As a consequence of Secretary Kissinger's 
meetings in Brussels in December with the 
Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers, inter- 
communal talks were resumed in January. 
The strategy throughout was, and is, to 
encourage and support the negotiating proc- 
ess. We have repeatedly made clear to all 
the parties that the ultimate solution should 
include agreement on constitutional arrange- 
ments along federal lines, territorial conces- 
sions, and an easing of the refugee situation. 
We have also expressed our view that Cyprus 
must remain a sovereign and independent 

This spring. Secretary Kissinger made two 
special trips to Ankara to reinforce our ef- 
forts to find a solution and also to express 
our concern over the deteriorating situation 
in the Aegean area. These talks were later 
followed by meetings in Brussels between 
President Ford and Prime Ministers Cara- 
manlis [of Greece] and Demirei. 

It was partly as a result of our diplomatic 
efforts that a direct Greek-Turkish dialogue 
has been established. This dialogue can help 
to defuse the tense situation in the Aegean 
and should help to maintain a positive cli- 
mate within which Turkey and Greece can 
continue efforts to help achieve a Cyprus 
settlement. Meanwhile, we have continued 
actively to support the intercommunal talks 
between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots 
which began under the auspices of U.N. Sec- 
retary General Waldheim in May and which 
will be reconvened in Vienna later this 

In our judgment, however, our role in pro- 
moting either these talks or the Greek- 
Turkish dialogue is seriously circumscribed 
as long as we maintain a policy of total denial 
of U.S. military equipment to Turkey. We 
can understand the reasons which led the 
Congress to impose this ban and the view 
that Turkey had violated agreements with 

the United States when it used U.S. military 
equipment without our permission to conduct 
its military operations in Cyprus last sum- 
mer. We believe, however, that it is clearly 
not in the U.S. national interest to maintain 
an embargo that weakens our influence, jeop- 
ardizes our NATO defenses by depriving our 
Turkish ally of the military equipment it 
needs to discharge its alliance responsibili- 
ties, and impedes progress in the Cyprus ne- 

Other Questions of Concern 

I have dealt at length with these matters 
because I believe they are central to your 
concerns. But there are other questions which 
have been raised which deserve direct an- 

There are those who argue that lifting the 
Turkish embargo could be construed as an 
anti-Greek move. It seems to me that this is 
an argument based on a false premise. The 
maintenance of an alliance relationship with 
Turkey, now more than a generation old, is 
certainly not directed against Greece. Greece 
has a vital stake in having Turkey a part of 
the Western alliance system, and in the 
analysis, stability in the ea.stern Mediter- 
ranean is largely dependent upon the coop- 
eration of our two close allies Greece and 

Some have also asked why the Turks could 
not do something — make concessions, pledge 
secretly to make concessions at some later 
date, or make some gesture in the humanitar- 
ian field before the Congress itself undertakes 
new legislative action. Simple answers to 
these questions do not exist. The Turkish 
Government has made clear that it cannot 
and will not make advance concessions, 
which would be considered by the Turkish 
people to be capitulation to outside pressure. 
It is our judgment that pressure for prior 
concessions relating to the embargo will only 
further harden the Turkish stance, both on 
Cyprus and with respect to facilities in 

The question has been asked whether once 
the House passes legislation the Turks will 
in fact then be ready to be more conciliatory 

July 28, 1975 


at the negotiating table. Frankly, I cannot 
give you categoric assurances. Flexibility, of 
course, will be required on both sides. 

Both the President and the Secretary of 
State are determined to use U.S. influence in 
bringing about constructive results, because 
our interests, those of the parties, and of 
NATO require no less than a maximum ef- 
fort. Failure on the part of Turkey to adopt 
a flexible and constructive position in the 
aftermath of the lifting of the embargo would 
go to the heart of the American-Turkish rela- 

Finally, let me also say a word about the 
opium issue, which is a matter of deep con- 
cern to all Americans. In July of last year the 
Turks did, indeed, lift their total ban on the 
cultivation of the opium poppy. But the gov- 
ernment also announced its intention of meet- 
ing its obligation to the world community to 
prevent the poppy harvest in Turkey from 
being diverted into illicit channels. 

Since then Turkey has outlawed completely 
the hard-to-control "bleeding" of the pop- 
pies by the farmers in the field. It has put 
into effect measures to enforce this ban. 
Farmers, under the law, have to sell their 
poppy straw to the government at a fixed 
price, which is backed by a U.N. standby 
compensation fund. The objective, through 
the combination of a government price high 
enough to make sales to the government at- 
tractive and a strengthened control mech- 
anism, is to try to keep the product of the 
opium poppy in government hands and out 
of the illegal market. 

The first harvest under this new procedure 
is now underway. Preliminary reports on the 
harvesting and control process are good. Both 
U.S. and U.N. personnel are watching this 
matter very closely. We believe the Turkish 
Government is heavily committed to making 
the system work. 

To sum up, Mr. Chairman, before taking 
the committee's questions, I would like to 
repeat that the Administration solicits the 
bipartisan understanding, support, and co- 
operation of the Congress in helping to ame- 
liorate a serious foreign policy problem of 
many dimensions and great complexity. 

We seek to preserve our friendship and 

vital alliance relationships with both Greece 
and Turkey. At the same time, we earnestly 
seek a negotiated and durable Cyprus solu- 
tion which would restore tranquillity to that 
troubled island and, by enabling Greece and 
Turkey to put the Cyprus problem behind 
them, resolve other outstanding issues and re- 
store stability to their region. 

We hope the Congress will act speedily on 
the compromise bill submitted yesterday. 

President Ford Outlines U.S. Goals 
in the United Nations 

Following is an excerpt from remarks 
made by President Ford on June 30 at the 
swearing-in ceremony for Daniel P. Moyni- 
han as U.S. Representative to the United 


The United States was the chief architect 
of the United Nations. We joined with others 
during the dreadful suffering of World War 
II to conceive an organization for peace and 
to serve all mankind. 

We have been determined supporters of 
the United Nations, and we will continue to 
be so in the future. There is no other course, 
as I see it, consistent with our advocacy of 
peace and justice for all humanity. 

As the need for worldwide cooperation de- 
veloped, so did the inherent diflficulty in find- 
ing practical solutions which must advance 
the enlightened self-interest of the United 
States as well as the interests of others. 

We face not only the fundamental task of 
maintaining international peace and security 
but also entirely new problems for world 
economic interdependence. 

We must deal with new political problems 
as developing nations press forward vigor- 
ously to correct what they see as injustices. 
In this developing situation, we will concen- 
trate on practical and mutually beneficial 

' For the complete text of President Ford's re- 
marks and Ambassador Moynihan's reply, see 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 
dated July 7, p. 693. 


Department of State Bulletin 

projects and we will strive for universal co- 

We will engage at the United Nations in 
1 dialogue of candor and directness and of 
inderstanding and respect for the concerns 
)f all member nations. We will seek concrete 
ichievement. We will work with firmness and 
ivith patience in a determined eff"ort to foster 
nutually beneficial relations with the develop- 
ng world. 

At the same time, we will firmly resist 
efforts by any group of countries to exploit 
;he machinery of the United Nations for nar- 
•ow political interests or for parliamentary 

Ambassador Moynihan takes on this very 
serious responsibility at a time when a vast 
md vital agenda is before the world — the 
realization of agreed goals in the area of food 
md population, the resolution of interna- 
:ional conflicts, the strengthening of peace- 
keeping forces, and a new law of the sea 
;reaty, and, of course, economic prosperity 
for all. 

President Suharto of Indonesia 
Meets With President Ford 

General Siiharto, President of the Republic 
of Indonesia, met with President Ford and 
otlier government officials at Camp David, 
Md., on July 5. Following is an exchange of 
toasts between President Ford and President 
Suharto at a luncheon at Camp David that 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 14 


Mr. President: I am greatly honored to 
have the opportunity of welcoming you on 
your visit to the United States as a part of 
your world tour. 

You visited the United States last, as I 
understand it, in 1970, and we all recognize, 
of course, that through the years you have 
been a very wise and valued friend of the 
United States. 

July 28, 1975 

I recognize, as all of us do here from the 
United States, that you have achieved a 
great deal for your country in the period 
during your Presidency. The Indonesian peo- 
ple, we recognize, have developed a solid 
foundation to deal with your nation's very 
complex challenges and the very difficult 
road, but in the process of development great 
progress has been made. 

Admiring you, President Suharto, and 
your country as I do, I have wanted to meet 
with you and discuss with you the many 
issues that concern both of our nations. And 
I have found today in our discussions that 
your observations concerning Southeast Asia 
and the Pacific have been extremely mean- 
ingful and very constructive. I hope that this 
exchange of views will be mutually beneficial 
to both countries as we face our problems in 
the years ahead. 

We do attach, in the United States, a great 
deal of importance to our relations with you. 
You have been a source of strength in South- 
east Asia and in Asia as a whole, and we 
respect you for this part that you have 
played in the area as well as the leadership 
that you have given to your own country in 
the process of development in the last five 
to ten years. 

We look forward to the opportunity of 
working with you in the future. The fact 
that we had a recent tragedy in Indochina 
actually should redouble, and does, our in- 
terest in the stability of Southeast Asia. 
Your assessment there, as I indicated, is 
most helpful to us as we plan and look to 
the future. 

Let me say that the American people have 
great respect for your people, as we do for 
you and those in your government. I was 
delighted this morning to reaffirm our na- 
tion's solid support for Indonesia's develop- 
ment efforts, and we look forward to work- 
ing with you in economic matters and the 
strengthening of your country in its major 
role in Southeast Asia. 

Mr. President, in the months and years 
ahead, it seems to me that your country can 
provide continuing leadership in that part 
of the world, working with other nations 
that have a like philosophical — ideological — 


view. Let me assure you that we will be most 
anxious to work with you and those other 

Today has been most enjoyable, most 
pleasant, and I think most constructive. I 
hope that you will return to the United 
States very soon and for a much longer and 
more extended visit to the United States. 

It is a pleasure for me to ask all of you to 
raise your glasses to the good health and 
sustained success of the leader of Indonesia 
— His Excellency President Suharto. 


Mr. President, Excellencies, distinguished 
guests: May I first of all convey our highest 
appreciation and heartfelt thanks on behalf 
of my wife as well as my delegation for the 
opportunity given me to accept the kind in- 
vitation of you, Mr. President, to be here in 
the United States, and may I also, on behalf 
of — the Indonesian people and Government 
convey their profound gratitude for this op- 
portunity provided us. 

As part of the nature of this very short 
visit — I'd say only for several hours — but I 
would like very much to take this valuable 
opportunity, an opportunity which is very 
valuable for us, to enable us to be able to 
conduct exchanges of views in our common 
efforts and in the discharge of my duty to 
further strengthen these relations and 
friendly cooperation between the United 
States and Indonesia and also to have the 
opportunity to discuss with you, Mr. Presi- 
dent, and conduct exchanges, open and frank 
exchanges of views, relating not only to 
bilateral relations and problems concerning 
our two countries but also on the interna- 
tional situations as well. 

I believe entirely — and I am also fully 
confident — of the sincerity of the U.S. Gov- 
ernment, Mr. President, for the pledge and 
the assistance that the U.S. Government will 

^ President Suharto spoke in Indonesian. 

provide not only to Indonesia but also to 
other Southeast Asian countries, but par- 
ticularly to Indonesia, an Indonesia which 
is presently busily engaged in carrying out 
economic development eff'orts to create or to 
establish a just and prosperous society, a 
just and prosperous society which calls for 
its development, of course, for a lending 
helping hand from other able countries who 
are really able to assist and help us in our 
development efforts. 

In view of the fast-changing developments 
which have happened recently in Southeast 
Asia, particularly in the Indochinese Penin- j 
sula, Mr. President, we are now striving' 
very hard to consolidate what we call the j 
national resilience and also to strengthen our 
national ideology, a national ideology which 
is based on our own principles, national 
ideology which should be strengthened in the 
effort of the development efforts — we would 
like very much to accelerate that effort — the 
national ideology which should be strength- 
ened in a way that the confidence of the 
people in this ideology will be such that this 
will not corrode and the confidence will 
bolster the unity of the nation, national 
ideology which becomes the most important 
aspect of our national resilience to enable usi 
to face any eventualities which could en- 
danger our independence and territorial 
integrity in the future. 

May I also, on this occasion, once again 
I'eiterate our heartfelt thanks and gratitude 
for the pledge and the assistance and support 
that the United States has so far provided' 
and will continue to support in this respect 
and gain our heartfelt appreciation. 

In our common efforts of furthering or 
enhancing the friendly cooperation between 
the two countries, I see the great importance 
of having this reciprocal visit, a mutual 
visit by the heads of government. 

And in this spirit, Mr. President, I would 
kindly invite Your Excellency to visit Indo- 
nesia and see for yourself, be the witness of 
what is going on in Indonesia and what are 
really the efforts of the Indonesian people 


Department of State Bulletin 

11 tl 

vnd Government at the present state of our 
jconomic development. 

May I, in conclusion, Mr. President, in- 
(,'ite kindly Your Excellencies and distin- 
guished guests to raise your glasses and join 
me in a toast to the health and happiness of 
His Excellency the President of the United 

AID Makes $114 Million Loans 
To Assist Egyptian Economy 

'fljjmAID press release 64 dated July 1 

i™ Two loans to Egypt totaling $114,275,000 
" ' are being made by the Agency for Interna- 
tional Development to assist that country to 
expand existing industrial enterprises and 
to increase agricultural production as well 
as to modernize port facilities for grain 

A loan of $70 million to finance imports 
from the United States of agricultural and 
industrial machinery, equipment, and spare 
parts and other essential commodities will 
assist Egypt to more fully utilize existing 
industrial capacity and to insure availability 
of agricultural inputs essential to increase 
agricultural production. 

A loan of $44,275,000 will finance the 
foreign exchange costs of goods and services 
required in the design and construction of 
two grain silo facilities at Alexandria and 
Cairo and ship-unloading equipment at Alex- 

These loans will bring the total of U.S. 
official assistance to Egypt during the fiscal 
year 1975 to $250 million. 

The $70 million commodity imports loan 
will be the second such loan Egypt received 
in FY75. In February 1975 the United States 
and Egypt executed a $80 million commodity 
imports loan agreement for the financing of 
goods from the United States. 

AID anticipates these loans will enable 
U.S. suppliers and exporters to reestablish 
jfj old trade relation.ships and to create new 
jj ones for industrial raw materials and ma- 



chinery and commodities essential for in- 
creased agricultural production. Egypt will 
repay these loans in dollars in 40 years after 
the first disbursement, including a 10-year 
grace period. Interest during the grace period 
will be 2 percent and thereafter 3 percent 

The grain silo loan of $44,275,000 will help 
finance a $84,075,000 modernization program 
the Egyptian Government is undertaking to 
speed handling of grain imports and provide 
greater and more efficient storage facilities 
to replace those now used. Egypt currently 
imports approximately 75 percent of its food 
grain needs, with grain imports expected 
to reach 4.5 million tons by 1980 compared 
to 3.5 million tons in 1974. 

The modernization project consists of the 
construction of a 100,000-ton silo at Alex- 
andria port together with new 1,000-ton-per- 
hour pneumatic ship-unloading equipment 
which transports bulk grain directly to the 
silo for short-term storage, also a 100,000- 
ton silo facility at Cairo for storage and re- 
distribution. The ultimate benefits are ex- 
pected to be reduced costs of bread and other 
grain products. 

This loan will be repaid in dollars over 40 
years, also including a grace period of 10 
years. The interest rate during the grace 
period will be 2 percent and 3 percent there- 

AID assistance programs to Egypt during 
FY75 were: 

Suez Canal clearance $ 14 million 

Technology transfer & 

manpower development 1 million 

Fea.sibility studies 1 million 

Electric distribution system (Suez).... .30 million 

Heavy equipment 10 million 

Grain storage 44 million 

Total 100 million 

Basic import & 

production loan (I) 80 million 

Basic import & 

production loan (II) 70 million 

Total 150 million 

Total FY75 Assi.stance $250 million 

July 28, 1975 


Department Urges Congressional Approval 
of Trade Agreement With Romania 

Statement by Arthur A. Hartman 
Assistant Secretary for European Affairs ^ 

I am very pleased to have the opportunity 
to testify on behalf of the trade agreement 
that we have negotiated with Romania.- 

This agreement is a major step forward in 
our relations with Romania. It places our 
bilateral trade on a basis beneficial to the 
economic interests of both countries. Further, 
it brings our commercial relations into accord 
with our very satisfactory political ties. 

Improvement of U.S. -Romanian relations 
serves the foreign policy intere.sts of both 
countries. The dominant theme of Romania's 
foreign policy is the desire to maintain a 
high degree of independence. More than any 
other Eastern European country, Romania 
has pursued friendly relations with countries 
of differing political and economic systems — 
with the United States, the People's Republic 
of China, the developing world, and with 
Israel as well as Arab countries. Romania 
participates actively in a number of interna- 
tional organizations. It is the only COM- 
ECON [Council of Mutual Economic Assist- 
ance] country which is a member of the IMF 
[International Monetary Fund] and the 
World Bank. Romania has acceded to the 
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade]. It leads the COMECON countries in 
the proportion of its trade with the West. 

' Made before the Senate Committee on Finance 
on July 8. The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will be avail- 
able from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

- For text of the agreement, see Bulletin of May 
19, 1975, p. 655. 

We wish to encourage Romania's inde- 
pendent policy orientation through the ex- 
pansion and improvement of bilateral rela- 
tions. We believe this approach also furthers 
our policy of detente as we seek to develop 
a pattern of interacting interests and po- 
litical restraint in our relations with the 
Communist world. Accordingly, in recent 
years there have been visits by the heads of 
state of the two countries, and various steps 
have been taken to develop cultural, scien- 
tific, and economic ties. 

Measures to improve economic relations 
include extension of credits and guarantees 
of the Export-Import Bank for our exports 
and making guarantees of the Overseas Pri- 
vate Investment Corporation available to 
American private investment there. These 
facilities were withdrawn as required under 
section 402 of the Trade Act of 1974; but 
they will be fully restored, as permitted un- 
der the President's Executive order of April 
24, when congressional approval of the trade 
agreement is assured. In December 1973, 
Presidents Nixon and Ceausescu issued a 
Joint Statement on Economic, Industrial, and 
Technological Cooperation, which set out a 
framework for bilateral economic relations. 
It established the American-Romanian Eco- 
nomic Commission, which provides a Cabinet- 
level forum for annual review of our econom- 
ic relations. At the same time the U.S.- 
Romanian Economic Council was established 
by the U.S. and Romanian Chambers of 
Commerce to facilitate increased contact be- 
tween American companies and Romanian 


Department of State Bulleti 


enterprises and economic organizations. A 
very recent development is the negotiation 
of a final settlement between the Foreign 
Bondholders Protective Council and Romania 
on defaulted bonds. This agreement was 
signed on June 24. 

Recent trade trends reflect the development 
of closer bilateral economic relations. Two- 
way commerce has grown from $22 million 
in 1968 to over $400 million last year. Our 
exports to Romania have been exceeding im- 
ports by over 2 to 1. This favorable ratio in- 
dicates the strong Romanian demand over 
the years for U.S. agricultural goods and 
capital equipment, despite the fact that Ro- 
mania has not enjoyed MFN [most-favored- 
nation] treatment. Our principal import is 
petroleum products, which Romania contin- 
ued to supply during the OPEC [Organiza- 
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries] 
embargo. If we now do not remove discrim- 
inatory treatment of Romanian goods we 
could not expect this favorable trade situa- 
tion to continue. But with nondiscriminatory 
tariff treatment we are confident that the 
target in the agreement of at least a threefold 
increase in trade during the period of the 
agreement in comparison with the period 
1972-74 will be met and that a favorable 
trade balance will continue. 

In negotiating this agreement we have 
attempted, I think successfully, to establish a 
framework that will encourage continued 
growth of trade along lines consistent with 
our economic interests. We considered it es- 
sential that this framework take account of 
Romania's centrally planned economy in two 
general respects : 

— First, we wished to obtain arrangements 
that would provide a measure of equivalence 
to the free access to our domestic market 
that we assure through extension of nondis- 
criminatory tariff treatment. 

— Second, we wished to obtain arrange- 
ments that would insure Romanian coopera- 
tion in dealing with any threat of injury to 
our industries cau.sed by disruptive imports, 
while m.aintaining the right to take unilat- 
erally what steps might be called for to deal 
with such a situation. 

Negotiation of the trade agreement was 
undertaken in the latter half of January in 
Bucharest by an interagency team under the 
leadership of Ambassador Harry Barnes 
[U.S. Ambassador to Romania]. Ambassador 
Dent [Frederick B. Dent, Special Representa- 
tive of the President for Trade Negotiations] 
and Under Secretary Tabor [John K. Tabor, 
Under Secretary of Commerce] have re- 
viewed for you many of the provisions of the 
agreement from the perspective of their re- 
sponsibilities. You have, in addition, a state- 
ment provided by Secretary Simon [William 
E. Simon, Secretary of the Treasury]. I 
would like myself to make the following 
general points : 

— Following the mandate of section 405 
of the Trade Act, concerning provision of 
rights and assurances for American business- 
men carrying out commercial activities in the 
other country, we have set out basic ground 
rules here that will facilitate the activities 
of American businessmen, supported as ap- 
propriate by our Emba.ssy. 

— Also without precedent is the inclusion 
of commitments by both countries to main- 
tain a balance of concessions over the lifetime 
of the agreement. Further, the two countries 
agree to reciprocate each other's concessions 
in the multilateral trade negotiations, taking 
into account their different levels of develop- 
ment. These are conditions set out in the 
Trade Act for renewal of bilateral agree- 
ments. A reference was included to the spe- 
cial commitment offered by Romania as a 
state-trading country when it joined the 
GATT, in order to make clear that we do not 
consider that mutual tariff reductions would 
suffice to assure a balance of benefits. 

— Safeguards against market disruption 
have been included which rigorously follow 
and in some respects exceed the requirements 
of the Trade Act. We doubt that disruption 
by imports from Romania is a serious poten- 
tial problem. The preponderance of our im- 
ports from Romania consists of petroleum 
products, which strengthen rather than com- 
pete with American industry. Also, in one 
sensitive area, textiles, we have recently 
negotiated a new bilateral agreement that 

July 28, 1975 


will protect our interests. Nonetheless, we be- 
lieve that with a state-trading country there 
are special reasons for concern regarding 
possible injury from imports, as well as spe- 
cial opportunities for dealing with such situa- 
tions on a basis of mutual cooperation. Ac- 
cordingly, we have included safeguard ai'- 
rangements calling for close consultation on 
the governmental level. They also require 
action by Romania to insure that its exports 
conform to restrictions deemed by us to be 
necessary, and they reserve our right to take 
appropriate steps unilaterally. These safe- 
guards give the fullest protection to Ameri- 
can firms against injury from imports. 

These and the other provisions designed 
to protect our interests, together with the 
responsiveness to many of our requirements 
that the Romanian Government demonstrated 
during the negotiations, give us every rea- 
son to believe that the agreement will give 
further impetus to our trade with Romania 
and that this trade will be conducted on terms 
favorable to our commercial interests. 

Turning to the emigration aspect of this 
agreement, we are very mindful of the in- 
terest of the Congress as a whole in this im- 
portant matter and of the concern of indi- 
vidual Members of Congress in specific emi- 
gration cases. Let me say that we welcome 
this interest and will continue to consult 
closely with you on how to deal with these 
cases and with the emigration problem in 
general. While the Administration has res- 
ervations about linking trade with emigra- 
tion by legislation, we recognize and accept 
the necessity to meet the requirements of 
the Trade Act. From the beginning of our 
discussions in Bucharest we emphasized that 
we needed more than just agreement on a 
commercial document alone, and we also 
made plain that our concerns went beyond 
the few hundred Romanians wishing to move 
permanently to the United States. Also, we 
drew upon the numerous strong expressions 
by Members of the Congress to underscore 
with the Romanians the importance of this 

These requirements obviously posed seri- 
ous problems for the Romanians, especially 
following refusal by the U.S.S.R. and other 

Eastern European countries to accept them 
as a basis for negotiations. We discussed the 
matter in considerable detail and on numer- 
ous occasions, and we believe we and the 
Romanians understood each other entirely on 
the practical meaning and implementation 
of the language appearing in the President's 
waiver report and in other documents re- 
quired by the act. As far as that language 
itself is concerned, it fully satisfies, in our 
judgment, both the letter and spirit of the 
act and will contribute to the achievement 
of the objectives of section 402. At the same 
time it takes account of legitimate Romanian 

We fully understand the wish of some 
Members for more details on our discussions 
of this subject with the Romanians. I would 
only emphasize their sensitivity and the con- 
sequences to both countries' interests if they 
should become subject to public debate. Mean- 
while I would urge the Congress to judge 
Romanian emigration practices by future 
deeds in addition to the words of the Presi- 
dent's report waiving section 402 of the 
Trade Act. It will be on this basis that the 
President himself will decide whether to seek 
further extension of the waiver next year. 

I would be less than candid if I were to try 
to gloss over the relatively poor performance 
of the Romanians during the early months 
of this year. I refer to emigration to both the 
United States and to Israel. We do not know 
what factors lay behind this disappointing 
situation, but I would urge the Congress to 
view it in context of several important con- 
siderations. One is the relatively small scale 
of the emigration problem in Romania ; there 
are onlj- a few hundred cases of divided- 
family members and dual nationals who have 
indicated a desire to come permanently to the 
United States. Secondly, the Romanian Gov- 
ernment has applied a liberal policy on Jew- 
ish emigration over recent years. Under this 
policy well over 300,000 Jews have been per- 
mitted to move to Israel and other countries. 

Since this trade agreement was sent to the 
Congress we have seen encouraging signs 
that the Romanians are seeking earnestly to 
solve the family reunification problems that 
concern us. They have approved the passport 


Department of State Bulletin 

applications of a substantial portion of the 
several hundred people I referred to earlier 
who want to join their families in the United 
States. There has been a similar improvement 
in approvals of divided-family members 
wishing to go to Israel. Although there are 
both personal and official arrangements to 
be made to translate these approvals into ac- 
tual departures, we believe this will occur 
and that the Romanian Government will do 
its part to speed up the process. We therefore 
recommend that the Congress approve this 
trade agreement, understanding that both 
the executive and the legislative branches 
will reexamine carefully the question of a 
further extension less than 12 months from 

Both we and the Romanians have an im- 
portant political as well as economic stake in 
the continued improvement of our bilateral 
relations. For Romania to continue its policy 
of independence in foreign affairs is clearly 
something we should encourage, and we see 
this trade agreement as fostering that objec- 
tive. Beyond that, if the Congress approves 
this agreement, we can confidently expect a 
sizable increase in U.S. exports to Romania. 
At the same time, we will make a significant 
stride toward the free movement of peoples 
which both the legislative and executive 
branches of this government greatly desire. 
Rejection of this agreement, on the other 
hand, could forfeit all these worthwhile ob- 
jectives, to the detriment of both the U.S. 
and Romanian peoples. 

U.S. and Finland Agree on Draft 
of New Extradition Treaty 

Press release 353 dated July 1 

Representatives of the United States and 
Finland reached agreement on July 1 on the 
text of a new draft treaty on extradition. 
The new treaty, expected to be signed in 
the near future, will significantly modernize 
extradition relations between the two coun- 
tries. It will include provisions to assist in 
obtaining extradition of narcotics offenders 
as well as airline hijackers. 

Department Discusses Issue 
of Syrian Jewish Community 

Following is a statement by Harold H. 
Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, made 
before the Special Subcommittee on Investi- 
gations of the House Committee on Interna- 
tional Relations on June 25 during a hearing 
on H. Con. Res. 312, a concurrent resolution 
disapproving the obligation of Middle East 
special requirements funds for certain 
projects in Syria.^ 

The executive branch of the government 
shares the concern of this committee over 
the well-being of the Syrian Jewish com- 
munity. We neither condone nor support 
repressive measures taken by other govern- 
ments against their citizens or against 
others. The U.S. Government is deeply con- 
cerned about human rights generally, re- 
flecting our own traditions as well as an 
appreciation that human rights and respect 
for such rights are valid foreign policy 
objectives in themselves. 

This situation must be seen in the con- 
text of the wider pattern of relationships in 
the Middle East, and that is the context in 
which we have considered how the U.S. 
Government can best address this question. 

There are two ways in which Americans 
can approach an issue of this kind: 

— One is to seek to alleviate the problem 
by the means we judge most effective, w^hich 
in this case involves the use of quiet diplo- 
macy to help create conditions within which 
the policies in question can change. 

— The other is to create a confrontation 
between our two governments on the issue. 

We have chosen the former course because 
we judge that a confrontation would produce 
results that are the opposite of those de- 
sired. Experience has shown this, and our 
discussions with those most intimately con- 
cerned with the situation seem to us to in- 

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

July 28, 1975 


dicate that they share the view that a public 
airing and confrontation can only harm 
those who have most at stake. 

The long-range approach to the future of 
Syrian Jews is thi'ough a settlement of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. As you know, we are 
bending every effort to bring this about 
through a process of negotiation. We all 
recognize that unless this process continues 
— unless progress is made toward a settle- 
ment — not only will we fail in our goal of 
achieving a settlement but we will probably 
at some point see the outbreak of further 
hostilities, with all the dangers and uncer- 
tainties this will bring to all the people 

Syria is one of the key states in this nego- 
tiation. Under the leadership of President 
Asad and, in part, in response to efforts of 
the United States, Syria has taken an in- 
creasingly positive stance toward the search 
for peace. The Syrian-Israeli disengagement 
of May 1974 was of course the key step in 
this direction. Most recently the Syrian 
Government has taken another such step in 
renewing for six months the mandate of the 
U.N. Force stationed along the disengage- 
ment lines. 

The Syrian Government naturally deter- 
mines its own policies and actions in this 
respect. The role that the United States is 
playing in the search for peace, however, 
gives a particular and continuing importance 
to the relationship between the United States 
and Syria. It is fair to say that trust and 
confidence in this relationship will materially 
enhance the capacity of the United States 
to play a positive part in the negotiating 

The Syrians are putting increasing em- 
phasis on their economic development and 
are interested in having U.S. technical co- 
operation and capital participation. The 

proposed aid to Syria will demonstrate to 
the Syrians that the United States is serious 
about sustaining and strengthening our 
cooperation in all areas of mutual concern. 

While a peace settlement is the most com- 
plete answer to the problem we are con- 
sidering today, there are things we can do 
and are doing short of that, which we believe 
can also be beneficial. These lie in the realm 
of quiet diplomacy, and hence they too de- 
pend heavily on the creation and mainte- 
nance of a broad relationship of confidence 
between ourselves and the Syrians. 

The situation of the Syrian Jewish com- 
munity has, we believe, improved in the 
recent past. This has been confirmed by in- 
formation from a variety of sources, but it 
would not be appropriate to discuss the 
details in public session. Much as we might 
like to see a definitive solution to the ques- 
tion, it would neither be reasonable in itself 
nor fair to the Syrian Jews to ignore the 
value of such relative improvements in the 
conditions under which the community lives. 

We thus have two trends, both of which 
offer some hope. To take the action being 
considered by this committee could only 
harm the relationship between the United 
States and Syria and jeopardize these hope- 
ful trends. It would be an exaggeration to 
say that cutting oflF aid to Syria would be 
fatal to our hopes, but to take this step when 
developments appear to be moving in the 
right direction, however slowly, would sure- 
ly be a step from which we could expect only 
negative results. 

Particularly so long as our present ap- 
proach appears to be bearing fruit in the 
more general setting as well as in the par- 
ticular issue, we should do all we can to 
develop it, not hampering it with actions 
that offer no hope in themselves for achiev- 
ing what we are trying to achieve. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Department Discusses Status of Human Rights In the Republic of Korea 
and the Republic of the Philippines 

Statement by Philip C. Habib 

Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs ^ 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear be- 
fore this subcommittee to testify on U.S. 
policy toward Korea and the Philippines in 
the context of developments affecting human 
rights in those countries. 

In his testimony before you on July 30, 
1974, the then Acting Assistant Secretary, 
Mr. Arthur Hummel, gave a clear statement 
on our general policy of human rights mat- 
ters as well as an accurate, forthright sum- 
mary of the situation in South Korea at that 
time.2 Therefore I need not take up the time 
of this committee by restating what is al- 
ready on the record. However, I do believe 
that before I get into the current situation 
a few introductory remarks are in order. 

The U.S. Government is genuinely and 
deeply concerned about human rights mat- 
ters. This concern reflects both our own 
traditions as well as a realization that human 
rights, and respect for them, are valid 
foreign policy objectives in their own right. 
Moreover, we recognize the importance of 
human rights in the conduct of our foreign 
policy as well as the clear intent of the Con- 
gress that human rights questions be ad- 
dressed in the formulation of our policies. 

We neither condone nor support repressive 

' Made before the Subcommittee on International 
Organizations of the House Committee on Interna- 
tional Relations on June 24. The complete transcript 
of the hearings will be published by the committee 
and will be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20402. 

" For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 26, 1974, p. 305. 

measures taken by other governments 
against their citizens or against others. In- 
deed, many of our basic policies are designed 
to create an international environment in 
which political and economic development 
can proceed in an atmosphere of security and 
personal freedom. Within the U.N. frame- 
work, we have taken the lead in supporting 
initiatives on such matters as elimination of 
religious intolerance, racial discrimination, 
and other infringements of human rights. 
We continue to press for broader in- 
ternational support on these fundamental 

We are, as you know, in continuing con- 
tact at every level of the Department of 
State with American groups interested in 
human rights matters. Even where there is 
serious disagreement with our policies, we 
have, and certainly plan to continue, this 
dialogue. Also, as further evidence of our 
concern for human rights we have, as you 
know, institutionalized this concern as part 
of the foreign policy process. We have 
designated Mr. James Wilson as Coordinator 
for Humanitarian Affairs in the office of the 
Deputy Secretary. We have also appointed 
Human Rights Officers in each of the re- 
gional bureaus and an Assistant Legal Ad- 
viser for Human Rights Affairs. 

Further, in those cases where we can be 
effective, we do quietly express to other gov- 
ernments our views on human rights matters 
and assure that they clearly undei'stand the 
strongly held views, not only in the Congress 

July 28, 1975 


but certainly among the American people, 
on human rights matters. We have done this 
both in Korea and the Philippines. 

At the same time, Mr. Chairman, we must 
recognize that we are dealing with sovereign 
countries with different political systems. 
We can neither determine the course of in- 
ternal change nor be certain as to what the 
outcome will be in situations where there 
are internal tensions. Further, our policies 
toward individual countries represent a mix 
of interests, objectives, and relationships 
differing in almost every case. We know that 
neglect of human rights may well adversely 
affect the achievement of other important ob- 
jectives. We also know that internal popular 
support is essential to long-term political 
stability. As the Secretary of State said in 
his address to the Japan Society on June 18 : 

. . . there is no question that popular will and 
social justice are, in the last analysis, the essential 
underpinnings of resistance to subversion and ex- 
ternal challenge. 

Situation in the Philippines 

With these introductory remarks, I will 
now turn to the Republic of the Philippines. 
Mr. Chairman, I am submitting separately 
to your committee more detailed replies to 
some of the questions you raised on human 
rights in the Philippines in your letter of 
June 10 to the Department. I would like to 
take a few moments here to comment on the 
human rights situation in the Philippines as 
we see it and to explain the rationale for our 
military assistance to the Philippines. 

The Department of State recognizes that 
the consequences of martial law in the 
Philippines have included the suspension of 
certain democratic processes and human 
rights. Specifically, as pointed out by Am- 
bassador Mutuc [Amelito R. Mutuc, former 
Philippine Ambassador to the United States] 
in testimony before this committee, there 
have been wide-ranging arrests since the 
commencement of martial law, and a number 
of these people have been held for over two 
years without trial. In addition, freedom of 
the press has been curtailed, and under 
martial law, freedom of assembly and the 
entire spectrum of democratic processes have 

been strictly regulated. Several referenda 
have taken place, but were held under condi- 
tions of martial law. 

In regard to the question of mistreatment 
or torture of prisoners, we have heard 
charges that this has occurred. We do not, 
however, have any evidence that mistreat- 
ment of prisoners or torture is either a policy 
of the Government of the Philippines or a 
general practice. The Philippine Government 
has acknowledged that some abuses have 
occurred, particularly in more remote areas, 
and has taken steps to punish the offenders 
and to better regulate the system as a whole. 
We have been advised in this regard that the 
Government of the Philippines has agreed 
to accept a mission of the International Com- 
mission of Jurists and to afford its fullest 
cooperation in every aspect of its investiga- 

While we support the Philippine Govern- 
ment's avowed intention to promote im- 
provement in the social, economic, and ad- 
ministrative areas and think that there has 
been measurable progress in some of these, 
we do not believe that the ends justify or re- 
quire the curtailment of human rights. 

Having said this, I believe it is important 
to mention the fact that the Philippines has 
had a long association with the United 
States: first as a colony, then as the Philip- 
pine Commonwealth, and since 1946 as a 
close and valued ally. 

The democratic form of government that 
was in effect in the Philippines until the 
introduction of martial law in September 
1972 was patterned after our own, and we, 
of course, would have preferred to see that 
form of government continue. However, we 
feel strongly that the future of the Philip- 
pines and that of its form of government are 
for the Philippine people to determine, not 
us. Regarding the question of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, we can only 
express our concerns, as we have, and hope 
that governments will realize that free peo- 
ple inevitably come down on the side of that 
which is good for the country as a whole. 

I might note that the United States had 
no advance notification nor did we expect 
the actual declaration of martial law in 


Department of State Bulletin 

September 1972, despite some earlier rumors 
that it was being considered. However, as 
some of your witnesses have pointed out, 
most of the Philippine people appeared to 
accept martial law at the time it was declared 
and, indeed, some aspects of martial law 
were clearly welcomed (for example, the 
marked improvement in law and order and 
in government administration). Since the 
establishment of martial law in September 
1972, we have continued to maintain friendly 
relations with the Philippine Government 
while avoiding any comment either in con- 
demnation or support of the declaration or 
continuation of martial law. 

Military Assistance to the Philippines 

In security matters the Philippines has 
traditionally been one of our closest and 
most important treaty allies in East Asia. 
The defense commitments and mutual se- 
curity interests of both countries are formal- 
ly embodied in longstanding agreements. We 
have military bases in the Philippines, the 
existence of which is important both for 
Philippine defense and for broader security 
interests of the United States. We have long 
considered it important that the Philippine 
Armed Forces be well prepared, and it is 
to these ends that our military assistance 
has been directed since 1946. 

Since the late 1940's, the United States 
has supplied a wide variety of military 
equipment to the Philippine Armed Forces. 
At least one of the purposes of this assistance 
has been to help the Philippine Army de- 
velop a capability for maintaining internal 
security. Our military assistance is a long- 
established component of our security rela- 
tionship with the Philippines; it long 
predates the Moslem and Communist insur- 
gencies. We are aware that U.S. military 
equipment is being used to counter Moslem 
insurgency in the southern Philippines as 
well as the smaller threat posed by Com- 
munist guerrillas in the north and central 
Philippines. We keep our military units 
strictly out of the Moslem areas, and we 
screen our assistance program in terms of 
equipment provided. It has been U.S. policy 

and practice to stay out of Philippine efforts 
to suppress both of these domestic insurgen- 

Our small U.S. Military Advisory Group 
is not involved in combat operations of any 
kind. JUSMAG [Joint U.S. Military Ad- 
visory Group] Philippines is assigned a mili- 
tary assistance role only at the national level. 
U.S. Army personnel do not perform direct 
advisory functions below the level of the 
Department of Defense, the Armed Forces 
of the Philippines General Headquarters, or 
service headquarters, all of which are located 
in the Manila area. These advisory efforts 
do not directly support operations of the 
Philippine Armed Forces but are limited 
to military procurement, distribution, uti- 
lization, maintenance, and the like. 

Human Rights in Korea 

When we turn to the Republic of Korea, 
the issue of human rights is a matter of con- 
tinuing concern. Since last year's hearing, 
there have been a series of further domestic 
events impacting on the human rights situa- 
tion. In this connection, I have prepared the 
attached statement on certain specific ques- 
tions you have raised in dealing with 
political prisoners, due process procedures, 
and other questions. 

Since the hearings last year, the original 
four emergency measures have been lifted. 
A total of 203 persons were tried under these 
emergency measures. Subsequently all but 
35 were released, although the prominent 
poet Kim Chi Ha has since been arrested on 
other charges. Further, of the 35 persons 
whose sentences were not suspended, eight 
reported members of the People's Revolu- 
tionary Party were executed on April 9 after 
the Supreme Court confirmed their original 

On May 13 a new Emergency Measure 
No. 9 was instituted by President Park and 
continues in force. The provisions of this 
measure are broad in their terms and sig- 
nificantly inhibit political expression, in- 
cluding advocating constitutional revision; 
they further prohibit political activities on 
the part of students and form the basis for 

July 28, 1975 


severely restricting press coverage of cer- 
tain major domestic political issues. The 
measure provides for minimum sentences of 
one year although, unlike the earlier 
measures, trial is in the civil court, not by 
court martial. In addition, any Korean 
criticizing the government or constitution to 
foreigners in Korea or abroad could be sub- 
ject to the antislander law passed in March 
of this year. 

The Korean Government has justified its 
latest emergency measure by the threat from 
the North, which it believes is accentuated 
in the post-Viet-Nam situation. Such North 
Korean activities as the tunnels under the 
DMZ [demilitarized zone] have had a sig- 
nificant effect on the Republic of Korea. The 
government acknowledges that the emer- 
gency measure inhibits political rights, al- 
though activities within the National 
Assembly itself are excluded from the 
emergency measure. The Korean Govern- 
ment believes that South Korea is still freer 
than North Korea. The initial reaction to the 
latest emergency measure in the Republic of 
Korea has been muted. Although the measure 
is recognized by the government's critics as 
infringing on political rights, the political 
opposition has continued to cooperate with 
the government parties in the National As- 
sembly, in part recognizing, in the post- 
Viet-Nam situation, the need for focusing 
national efforts on the country's external 
security threat. 

In describing the Korean situation, I wish 
to make it clear that the U.S. Government is 
neither involved nor associated with the 
Korean Government's internal actions. My 
remarks are a description, not a justification, 
of the Korean Government's domestic poli- 
cies. In the case of the execution of the eight 
reported members of the People's Revolu- 
tionary Party, we publicly expressed our 
regret at this action. We continue to assure 
that the Korean Government is aware of the 
public impact within the United States of 
certain of its actions. While I believe this 
may have some limited effect, the Korean 
Government views its domestic policies as 
internal matters not subject to consultation 
with other governments. 

U.S. -Korea Security Relationship 

At the same time, we do have close rela- 
tionships with the Republic of Korea extend- 
ing over the 27 years of its life. These close 
ties encompass a continuing concern in the 
development of functioning representative 
institutions within a framework of respect 
for human rights. Beyond that, we also have 
a direct and vital interest in the maintenance 
of peace and security on the Korean Penin- 
sula. We have a Mutual Defense Treaty 
obligation, and our military presence and 
military assistance have been essential ele- 
ments in maintaining the military balance 
on the peninsula. This is in our own interest 
as well as that of the Republic of Korea and 
of its people. Very obviously our security 
relationship contributes importantly to the 
peace and security of Northeast Asia and is 
so recognized by our allies, including Japan. 

I would further point out that, whatever 
their criticisms of the Korean Government, 
President Park's domestic opponents and 
critics view the security relationship with 
the United States as being essential. Within 
Korea our military presence and programs, 
particularly in this post-Viet-Nam period, 
are not the focus of criticism and debate. 
Rather, as you know, the Korean Govern- 
ment's political opponents have joined it in 
emphasizing the importance of our security 
commitments and wish them to continue. 

We should not misjudge the determination 
of the people of South Korea to resist North 
Korean aggression nor the internal cohesion 
of the nation on this issue. What is most 
important to the Koreans, whatever their 
view of their own government, is the pres- 
ervation of their military security and in- 
tegrity. The continuation of our bilateral 
relations is essential to that objective. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would 
stress again the importance with which we 
view human rights matters and assure you 
that we recognize the clear interest of 
Congress in this issue. We neither associate 
ourselves with, nor justify, internal repres- 
sive actions and will continue to make clear 
our concern and that of the American people 
over the protection and preservation of 
human rights. At the same time, we will 


Department of State Bulletin 

continue our security policies which serve 
the interest of Korea, the region as a whole, 
and the United States. The preservation of 
peace on the peninsula remains the essential 
prerequisite for political development and 
the exercise of human rights in Korea. 

I am sure you will agree that we must 
often strike a balance between our interests 
and objectives in a particular nation. At the 
present time in. East Asia, the area about 
which you are most concerned, there are 
very clear valid concerns about security and 
about the future direction of the United 
States policy in the aftermath of the Indo- 
china tragedy. In this part of the world, 
particularly the Republic of Korea, there is 
a broad public recognition that the issues of 
war and peace and the nation's security in 
the face of external threat are of overriding 
importance and must weigh heavily in the 

Jordan Receives $10 Million Loan 
for Highway Construction Project 

AID press release 67 dated July 3 

The Agency for International Develop- 
ment has made a $10 million loan to Jordan 
to help finance the construction of 44 miles 
of new road to remove a bottleneck in the 
highway from Amman, the capital, to Aqaba, 
the country's only port. 

Jordan is investing $4.2 rriillion. The proj- 
ect involves realignment of the highway be- 
tween the townships of Ma'an and Quweria. 
The Aqaba-Amman road is a vital communi- 
cations link for transporting goods and peo- 
ple from the population centers in the north 
to the port in the south. Jordan is landlocked 
except at its southern extremity, where 
about 16 miles of shoreline of the Gulf of 
Aqaba gives access to the Red Sea. Jordan 
has a population of about 2.6 million. 

The loan agreement was signed in Amman 
June 28. The loan is to be repaid in dollars 
in 40 years, with an initial grace period of 
10 years. Interest is payable at 2 percent 
annually during the grace period and 3 per- 
cent thereafter. 

Funds for the loan come from a special re- 
quirements fund of $100 million for assist- 
ance to the Middle East appropriated by 
Congress in December 1974. 

Syria Receives Development Loans 
of $58 Million From United States 

AID press release 64 dated June 30 

The Agency for International Develop- 
ment is providing two loans to Syria totaling 
$58 million to help that country improve its 
economic development. 

A loan of $48 million will assist Syria 
in its three-part $150 million program to 
expand and modernize the entire water sup- 
ply system in Damascus. The AID loan will 
finance the foreign exchange costs of con- 
struction and installation of about 222 miles 
of new pipes and related construction services 
in the newer areas of Damascus. Other inter- 
national resources will finance similar work 
in the old part of the city. The water distri- 
bution project is expected to benefit about 1 
million people. Aim of the expansion pro- 
gram is to avert a serious water shortage 
and reduce water-related illness. 

Another loan of $10 million will help Syria 
increase its agricultural production and ac- 
celerate general economic development. Syria 
is increasing the acreage of land being placed 
under irrigation so as to achieve greater pro- 
duction of such crops as rice and cereals. 

Syria also plans a livestock project to 
produce meat and dairy animals supported 
by the development of 250,000 acres of re- 
claimed Euphrates Valley land which will be 
planted to fodder crops, primarily oats and 

The funds will be used to buy materials 
needed for agricultural development, such as 
plows, harrows, harvesters, irrigation equip- 
ment, earthmoving machinery, and insecti- 
cides. Both loans will be used to buy Amer- 
ican machinery, equipment, and services. 

The loans are to be repaid in dollars in 40 
years, with an initial grace period of 10 
years. Interest is payable at 2 percent an- 
nually during the grace period and 3 percent 

July 28, 1975 


thereafter. The loan agreements were signed 
June 30 in Damascus by U.S. Ambassador 
Richard W. Murphy and Syria's Deputy Min- 
ister of State for Planning Affairs Moham- 
med Issam Hilou. 

Last February AID made a grant of $4 
million to Syria for technical services and 
feasibility studies in agricultural production, 
irrigation, processing of agricultural prod- 
ucts, mechanization of agriculture, and other 
fields. AID also made available a $1 million 
grant to train Syrian graduate students in 
the United States in such fields as agricul- 
ture, engineering, medicine, geology, and 
irrigation management. 

Funds for the loan and grants come from 
a special requirements fund of $100 million 
for assistance to the Middle East appropri- 
ated by Congress in December 1974. 

United States and Israel Plan 
Joint Desalting Project 

AID press release 59 dated June 27 

The Governments of the United States and 
Israel have signed a joint agreement to con- 
struct a desalting plant that will daily pro- 
duce 10 million gallons of potable water from 
sea water. For this project, the United States 
will provide a grant of $20 million and 
Israel will invest about $35 million. The 
plant will be constructed near the city of 
Ashdod located on the Mediterranean coast 
about 25 miles south of Tel Aviv. 

The proposed desalting plant is considered 
to be a prototype because of the nature of 
the evaporation process developed by the 
Israel Desalination Engineering, Ltd., which 
is known as the horizontal multiple-effect, 
aluminum tube, spray film evaporator. 

The project agreement calls for the design, 
construction, supporting research, testing, 

and operation and maintenance of a 10- 
million-gallon-a-day (MMGD) dual-purpose 
power-generating desalting plant. Construc- 
tion of the plant is expected to take four 
and a half years. 

The U.S. and Israeli funds will help fi- 
nance the cost of machinery, equipment, 
materials, services, operation, and mainte- 
nance. U.S. funds will be used for purchases 
in the United States and Israel. 

The U.S. and Israel will share in the tech- 
nology derived from the construction and 
operation of the 10 MMGD plant, which will 
also be made available to other interested 
nations, particularly to water-short arid and 
semiarid lands. Patents and know-how de- 
veloped from this project will be made avail- 
able to private U.S. companies on a non- 
exclusive, nondiscriminatory, reasonable roy- 
alty basis for use anywhere in the world. 

AID will enter into a participating agency 
services agreement with the Office of Water 
Research and Technology, Department of 
Interior, to provide two experts in desalting 
processes and engineering who will serve 
on the staff of the Israeli project manager. 

Israel's demand for water is growing 
steadily, and conventional water resources 
are nearing their limits. Exploitation of the 
natural water sources in Israel has now 
reached 85 percent of the potential and is 
forecast to approach full potential by the 
late 1970's. Israeli scientists say the estab- 
lishment of large-scale seawater desalting 
plants is the only practical means to meet 
the country's need for water. 

The grant agreement was signed at the 
U.S. Department of State by Daniel Parker, 
Administrator of the Agency for Interna- 
tional Development, for the United States, 
and Israeli Ambassador to the United States 
Simcha Dinitz, representing the State of 


Department of State Bulletin 

Department Outlines Comprehensive Approach to Commodity Policy 

Statement by Julius L. Katz 

Deputy Assistant Sea-etary for Economic and Business Affairs ^ 

I welcome this opportunity to appear be- 
fore your committee to discuss international 
commodity policy. This subject has attracted 
wide attention recently, and it will be high on 
the agenda of a number of international con- 
ferences in the coming months and through- 
out the next year. These hearings thus come 
at an opportune moment when we are in 
the process of developing the U.S. approach 
to commodity policy. 

Interest in the functioning of interna- 
tional commodity markets is not a new 
phenomenon. In each of the last several 
decades, interest and concern has been 
aroused by some aspect of commodity sup- 
ply, most often the question of price. It is 
in the nature of commodity trade that prices 
are often regarded as being too low or too 
high, and with some commodities, prices 
can reach both exaggerated low and high 
points in a relatively short space of time. 
In the past three years, we have seen ex- 
ceptionally great price volatility, with prices 
of many commodities increasing by 100 
percent or more and then falling sharply to 
levels at or near the original point of 

But concern over extreme price volatility 
is only one of the causes for the current 
interest in commodity policy. The recent 
example of action by a number of govern- 
ments to restrict exports, whether for eco- 

' Made before the Subcommittee on International 
Trade, Investment, and Monetary Policy of the 
House Committee on Banking, Currency, and Hous- 
ing on July 9. The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 

nomic or political reasons, and the specter 
of possible resource limitations has raised 
serious concern about the question of security 
of supply. Moreover, the example of OPEC 
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun- 
tries] and evidences of producer associations 
for several other commodities have suggested 
the possibility of a widespread tendency 
toward producer cartels. Finally, the de- 
mands of the so-called Third World for a 
redistribution of the world's wealth through 
commodity pricing has served to focus at- 
tention on the question of commodity policy, 
although not on the most useful or con- 
structive aspects of this question. 

Against this background, I would like to 
outline briefly our views on commodity policy, 
to indicate what concerns us and what doesn't 
concern us, to describe what we propose to 
do and what we propose not to do. 

First, we are not concerned in any practi- 
cal sense about the physical limitation of 
resources. Unquestionably, the search for 
mineral resources must increasingly rely 
upon lower grade ores or resources in more 
remote areas of the world. But the real 
limiting factor is capital investment rather 
than the depletion of physical resources. And 
here I have in mind not only the raising of 
capital but the process of organizing ex- 
ploration, development, and marketing of 
resources, including the provision of tech- 
nological and managerial skills. 

Second, given the increasingly unfavorable 
and unstable political environment facing 
private investment throughout the world, the 
question arises whether there are likely to 
take place the levels of investment necessary 
to meet growing demands for new produc- 

July 28, 1975 


tive capacity in the decades ahead. This, in 
our view, is a matter for genuine concern. 

Third, despite superficial evidences to the 
contrary, stirred to somewhat hysterical pro- 
portions by some popular writers, there is 
little reason to be concerned about the so- 
called threat of producer cartels. Simple 
analogies are misleading, and the projection 
of the OPEC model to other commodities is 
simplistic and wrongheaded. Nonetheless, 
when productive capacity is inadequate to 
meet peak demand and supplies are conse- 
quently tight, it is likely that governments 
will resort to various means of export re- 
striction or of supply allocation. Thus the 
question of security of supply is a matter of 
legitimate concern. 

Fourth, excessive price fluctuations are 
costly both to producers and consumers. The 
eff'ects are harmful to the development efforts 
of poor countries and, as we have seen, can 
be destabilizing in developed countries. The 
exaggerated price swings of the 1972-75 
period have been attributed largely to the 
synchronized boom of the major industrial- 
ized countries in 1972-73 followed by the 
recession of 1974-75. It is an unsettled ques- 
tion whether this phenomenon was unusual 
or whether the pattern is likely to be re- 
peated in the future. A continuation of 
synchronized business cycles in the major 
economies of the world implies greater stress 
in commodity markets and much greater 
price volatility, unless adequate productive 
capacity is developed to deal with peak de- 
mand. This, of course, implies idle capacity 
in slack times. Alternatively, larger reserve 
stocks accumulated in periods of low demand 
can substitute for excess productive capacity. 

Fifth, we do not support proposals to 
establish high fi.xed prices for commodities 
and to maintain their real value through 
indexation. Such a policy would seriously 
distort patterns of investment and result in 
a misallocation of resources. Even if a work- 
able system of indexation could be developed 
— an assumption open to serious question — it 
would redistribute income contrary to the 
manner intended. It would take from the 
poorest countries, which tend to be net im- 
porters of raw materials, in favor of the 

richer developed countries (Canada, Aus- 
tralia, the United States, South Africa, 
and the U.S.S.R.) which are major net ex- 
porters of raw materials. 

In sum then, we are not overly concerned 
about producer cartels or a physical limita- 
tion of resources. There is, however, an evi- 
dent problem arising from the poor prospects 
for investment in new productive capacity, 
and we believe that this problem increases 
the risk of supply limitations in times of 
shortage. We believe that excessive price 
volatility is inherently undesirable. At the 
same time we believe that attempts to fix and 
index prices at arbitrarily high levels are 
bad policy, which we reject. 

How, then, do we propose to deal with 
these problems and concerns? Clearly, there 
is no simple answer to the problems of com- 
modity trade. The circumstances of partic- 
ular commodities diff'er, and the solutions to 
the problems of individual commodities will 
vary. Secretary Kissinger in his May 28, 
1975, speech to the OECD [Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development] 
Ministers meeting at Paris laid out a series 
of proposals that we believe represent a 
comprehensive approach to the general prob- 
lem of commodity policy. 

First, he proposed that new rules and 
procedures for access to markets and sup- 
plies be negotiated in the multilateral trade 
negotiations now underway in Geneva. What 
we have in mind here basically is to ex- 
change bindings or assurances on supply 
access as we have previously exchanged bind- 
ings on market access. We would also expect 
to have elaborated more precise rules govern- 
ing the resort to export restraints, much 
along the lines of rules governing use of 
import restraints. A further issue for reso- 
lution in the trade negotiations concerns the 
objective of providing opportunities to de- 
veloping countries to market their raw ma- 
terials in a higher stage of processing. The 
obstacle to such exports frequently results 
from "tariff escalation," the practice of levy- 
ing progressively higher duties on processed 
goods than on the raw material itself. This 
situation can be a significant barrier to in- 
dustrialization, and progress toward tariff 


Departmenf of State Bulletin 

de-escalation can be of genuine benefit to 
developing countries while improving the 
efficiency of the world economy. 

Second, Secretary Kissinger indicated a 
readiness to discuss new arrangements for 
individual commodities on a case-by-case 
basis. Let me say directly and emphatically 
that this is not intended to introduce a policy 
of cai'telizing the world's commodity markets. 
While we are prepared to consider tradi- 
tional international commodity agreements 
where such agreements are feasible and ap- 
propriate, we believe that the number of 
such cases is in fact very limited. 

What we have in mind is to examine 
commodity problems in an analytical manner 
and to consider broadly based solutions not 
excluding but certainly not limited to price 
stabilization measures. For a number of com- 
modities the problem in fact is not excessive 
price volatility, but low returns to producers. 
Stabilization agreements are not suitable to 
cope with such problems. Rather the solu- 
tion might better be found in diversification 
providing lower cost production techniques, 
better marketing, or opportunities for mar- 
keting more processed forms of the material. 
The basic point here is that we are prepared 
to examine individual commodity problems 
in a serious way to find pragmatic solutions. 

Third, as I have indicated earlier, we 
regard capital investment as the most serious 
limiting factor in resource availability. If 
the growing needs of the world for raw 
materials are to be met, new forms of in- 
vestment will need to be found to overcome 
the disincentives to investment which exist 
at the present time. 

Secretary Kissinger proposed that the 
World Bank increase its financing of resource 
investments and explore new ways of com- 
bining its financing with private manage- 
ment, skills, technology, and capital. We 
believe that the World Bank, with its asso- 
ciated institutions, the International Finance 
Corporation and the International Develop- 
ment Association, is uniquely suited to un- 
dertake this role. It has the capacity to 
analyze investment requirements for partic- 
ular commodities; it can provide capital; it 
can mobilize private capital through joint 

financing; and it can draw on the unique 
skills of private enterprise while diminishing 
the major risks that private capital might 
face going it alone. 

Finally, Secretary Kissinger indicated our 
readiness to join in the examination of pro- 
posals to improve mechanisms for the sta- 
bilization of earnings, notably those of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to pro- 
tect the developing countries against exces- 
sive fluctuations in export income. 

The IMF facilities provide exporters of 
primary products with additional access to 
the Fund's resources to meet balance-of- 
payments difficulties arising from temporary 
export shortfalls resulting from circum- 
stances beyond the member's control. In mid- 
June of this year, the United States proposed 
a substantial liberalization of this facility. 
We are participating in a study by the IMF 
Executive Directors to determine exactly 
what form the liberalization should take. 

In addition to the IMF facility, the Euro- 
pean Community recently negotiated with its 
associated developing countries a somewhat 
different approach to earnings stabilization 
as part of the Lome Convention. This con- 
vention, signed in January of this year, 
covers all aspects of economic relations be- 
tween the Community and the 46 developing 
countries and establishes a stabilization fund 
known as STABEX. This fund takes a com- 
modity-by-commodity approach rather than 
concentrating on fluctuations in overall ex- 
port earnings as in the IMF scheme. 

The advantage earnings stabilization mech- 
anisms have, whatever the approach chosen, 
is that they meet certain critical financial 
problems of producing countries arising from 
commodity price instability without the need 
to interfere with the operation of commodity 

These, then, Mr. Chairman, are the basic 
directions we propose to move in with respect 
to commodity policy — supply and market 
access assurances, investment, case-by-case 
examination of individual commodity prob- 
lems, and earnings stabilization. It is a 
comprehensive approach. It is pragmatic and, 
we believe, it offers the promise of tangible 
and realistic results. 

July 28, 1975 


U.S.-Brazil Agreement on Shrimp 
Transmitted to the Senate 

Message From President Ford ^ 

To the Senate of the United States: 

With a view to receiving the advice and 
consent of the Senate to ratification, I trans- 
mit herewith the Agreement between the 
Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Federative Re- 
public of Brazil concerning Shrimp. Also 
enclosed are an Agreed Minute, a related ex- 
change of notes concerning compensation, 
an exchange of notes concerning interim 
undertakings, and translations of the 
Brazilian notes. These documents were 
signed at Brasilia on March 14, 1975. 

The Agreement establishes a basis for 
regulating the conduct of shrimp fishing in 
a defined area off the coast of Brazil. Such 
regulation will help to conserve shrimp re- 
sources and will provide an interim solution 
to problems which have arisen over jurisdic- 
tion over those resources. 

The measures prescribed in the Agreement 
will safeguard the economic interests of the 
shrimp industries of both countries and pro- 
tect from prejudice their respective legal 
positions on the extent of coastal state juris- 
diction over ocean fisheries under interna- 
tional law. The interim nature of the 
Agreement reflects the expectation that this 
underlying question may in the near future 
be settled by general international agree- 
ment on the law of the sea. 

A more detailed explanation of the Agree- 
ment is' contained in the report of the De- 
partment of State which also accompanies 
this message. 

This Agreement will contribute to main- 
taining and strengthening the friendship 
and cooperation which have long charac- 

' Transmitted on June 11 (text from White House 
press release); also printed as S. Ex. D, 94th Cong., 
1st sess., which includes the texts of the agreement 
and related documents and the report of the De- 
partment of State. 

terized relations between the United States 
and Brazil. I recommend that the Senate 
give it early and favorable consideration. 

Gerald R. Ford. 

The White House, June 11, 1975. 

Claims Against the German 
Democratic Republic 

Department Announcement, May 28 

Press release 303 dated May 28 

The Department of State and the Foreign 
Claims Settlement Commission wish to ad- 
vise American citizens who have claims 
against the Government of the German 
Democratic Republic for confiscation of 
property located in East Germany that less 
than six weeks remain in which to register 
their claims. The deadline for all such regis- 
trations is July 1. 

The Foreign Claims Settlement Commis- 
sion, the official agency of the U.S. Govern- 
ment which will ultimately adjudicate all 
such claims, mailed registration forms to 
over 7,000 individuals and organizations 
since February 1, 1975, and has received only 
about 700 claim registrations. 

Information obtained from such registi'a- 
tions will form the basis for the negotiation 
of an equitable settlement of American prop- 
erty losses between the United States and the 
German Democratic Republic. The Depart- 
ment of State plans to initiate talks aimed 
at negotiating a settlement of these property 
losses following their registration and tabu- 
lation by the Foreign Claims Settlement 

Potential claimants are urged to promptly 
file their claim registration forms. Claimants 
who do not have such forms are invited to 
contact the Office of the General Counsel, 
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, 
1111 20th Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 
20579, or call the Commission on 202-382- 


Department of State Bulletin 

Report of Interagency Task Force on Indochina Refugees 
Transmitted to the Congress 

On June 23 President Ford transmitted 
to the Congress a report of the Interagency 
Task Force on Indochina Refugees and a 
Department of Defense-AID report on re- 
trieval of assistance funds to Cambodia and 
South Viet-Nam. Following are texts of a 
letter dated June 2-J from President Ford 
to six congressional committee chairmen, a 
letter dated June 18 to President Ford from 
Jidia Vadala Taft, Director of the inter- 
agency task force, and the text of the task 
force reports 


White House press release dated June 23 

Dear Mr. Chairman : The Indochinia 
Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 
1975 requires that I transmit within thirty 
days after its enactment a report to six com- 
mittees of the Congress describing the status 
of refugees from Cambodia and South Viet- 

In response to that requirement, I am 
forwarding a report prepared by the acting 
director of the interagency task force for 
Indochina. It sets forth current progress 
in receiving and resettling the refugees. 

Progress to date has been good when con- 

' Identical letters were sent to James 0. Eastland, 
chairman, Senate Committee on the Judiciary; 
Peter W. Rodino, chairman, House Committee on 
the Judiciary; John J. Sparkman, chairman, Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations; Thomas E. Mor- 
gan, chairman. House Committee on International 
Relations; John L. McClellan, chairman. Senate 
Committee on Appropriations; and George H. 
Mahon, chairman. House Committee on Appropria- 
tions. The Department of Defense-AID report and 
the annexes to the task force report are not printed 

sidered in the context of the magnitude of 
the refugee situation — the large numbers 
and great distances — and the short period 
of time available to deal with it. The co- 
operation and sacrifices made by private in- 
dividuals and organizations, by Members of 
the Congress, by Federal, State and local 
officials, and by military personnel have been 
exemplary. I compliment all of them, and 
I ask that as many more people as possible 
contribute their efforts toward complete re- 

I am also transmitting a report regarding 
retrieval of assistance funds to Cambodia 
and South Vietnam by the Department of 
Defense and the Agency for International 
Development as required by section 4(b) (3) 
of the Act. 

I anticipate that the subsequent supple- 
mentary reports required by the Act will 
provide the committees additional informa- 
tion on these activities. 

Gerald R. Ford. 


June 18, 1975. 

Dear Mr. President: The Indochina Mi- 
gration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 
requires that you transmit to the Congress 
a report describing the status of the refugees 
from Cambodia and South Vietnam not more 
than thirty days after the enactment of the 
Act. Attached is a report on the activities 
of the Interagency Task Force during the 
past two months for inclusion in your report 
to the Congress. 

I have attempted to make an open and 

July 28, 1975 


forthright statement about our activities and 
have attached a lengthy set of annexes with 
additional statistical material, detailed de- 
scriptions of various aspects of our programs 
and policy guidelines. 

A report of this kind tends to omit the 
human dimension of the problems we have 
faced transporting more than 130,000 evac- 
uees halfway around the world, setting up 
small cities where the refugees can be housed 
temporarily and processed while they await 
the opportunity to move to their new homes, 
and establishing a broad spectrum of pro- 
grams which will enable these new residents 
of our country to integrate themselves quick- 
ly into our society. In addition, the report 
does not give full credit to the wide ranging 
support we have received from the voluntary 
agencies, state and local governments, citi- 
zen's groups and private individuals who 
have joined in the national resettlement 

The Task Force has had tremendous co- 
operation in this undertaking from all levels 
of the Executive Branch in setting up and 
administering this program and from the 
Congress in providing prompt and effective 
legislative support. I believe that the Gov- 
ernment and the American people have re- 
sponded to the plight of the Indochina refu- 
gees in the best tradition of our country 
and that we should all be proud of the 
progress during these past eight weeks. Yet 
the job is not over. There are still several 
problems ahead as outlined in the report 
which we believe can be overcome through 
the continuing cooperation among all levels 
of the United States Government and the 
support of the American people. 

Julia Vadala Taft 
Director, Interagency Task Force 


Interagency Task Force on Indochina Refugees 
Report to the Congress 
June 15, 1975 

On June 16, the Interagency Task Force on Indo- 
china refugees had been in operation for 60 days. 

Events have moved quickly during this brief time. 
In the first days after the Task Force was estab- 
lished on April 18, the world was witness to the 
collapse of the armed forces of Vietnam, a dramatic 
air and helicopter evacuation from Saigon, the flee- 
ing of tens of thousands of refugees from their 
homelands, and the installation of new regimes in 
Vietnam and Cambodia. The President assigned to 
the Interagency Task Force, with representatives 
from almost every cabinet level agency in the Execu- 
tive Branch of the U.S. Government, the respon- 
sibility for the coordination of the evacuation effort 
and the refugee and resettlement problems relating 
to the Vietnam and Cambodia conflicts. 

The activities of the Task Force during the two 
months of its existence have included: 

— the coordination of the evacuation of 86,000 
U.S. citizens and South Vietnamese by air and sea 
in U.S. military or chartered craft; 

— the establishment, supply, and staffing of stag- 
ing centers at Guam and Wake for the care and 
jireliminary processing of the refugees and other 
reception centers at Camp Pendleton, Fort Chaffee, 
Eglin Air Force Base, and Fort Indiantown Gap for 
the final processing of the refugees prior to their 
resettlement in the United States; 

— the reception into these camps of 131,399 
evacuees as of June 15; 

— the organization and coordination of health, 
social security, and security check procedures to 
facilitate the departure of refugees from the cen- 
ters. As of June 15, 32,321 of the evacuees had left 
the centers for new places of residence in the 
United States; 

— testimony which led to the passage of "The 
Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 
1975" to fund the refugee program which the Presi- 
dent signed into law on May 24, nineteen days after 
the first of nine appearances by Task Force mem- 
bers before Congressional Committees and Sub- 

— the promotion of international resettlement ef- 
forts through initiatives to the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the 
Intergovernmental Committee on European Migra- 
tion (ICEM) and through direct contact with third 
countries which has resulted in the departure to 
date from U.S. territory of 3,756 refugees for re- 
settlement elsewhere; in addition, several thousand 
refugees who fled elsewhere have been accepted for 
resettlement in third countries. In Western Europe 
and Canada, over ten thousand Vietnamese and Cam- 
bodians stranded by the sudden outcome of the wars 
have been allowed to stay indefinitely. 

— the negotiation of contracts with nine volun- 
tary agencies to support their resettlement pro- 
grams in the United States; 

— negotiations with interested state and local 
governments for special resettlement programs in 
their communities; 


Department of State Bulletin 

— organizing special programs with private 
American business organizations to provide jobs 
and housing, or commodity support for refugees; 

— the establishment of guidelines for the States 
which explained the nature of Federal Government 
financial support in the fields of health and medical 
services, education, and welfare services. 

Statistical Snm7nary 

As of June 15, a total of 131,399 evacuees had 
entered the U.S. system of control, of whom 36,188 
were in Western Pacific reception centers, 58,654 in 
continental U.S. reception centers, 480 en route to 
centers, 32,321 had been released from the centers 
for resettlement in the United States and 3,756 for 
resettlement in other countries. An analysis of 
refugee status for June 15 by reception center re- 
veals the following [Table 1]: 

Table 1 












to third 

Reception center 

Capacity ^ 

at center 

in V.S. 


Guam, Wake and 

other Western 

Pacific Sites 





Travis ' 

























^ Capacity figures in the continental U.S. reflect surge capacity 
for period of June 15 to July 15. 
^ Initial continental U.S. processing center no longer in use. 

A survey of 99,580 refugees who were vv'ithin the 
care of the United States Government on June 10 
showed 19,619 heads of household, 79,929 family 
members attached to the households and 32 orphans. 
A total of 15,134 of the 99,580 refugees have U.S. 
citizen or permanent resident relatives or sponsors. 
(As of that date, the Immigration and Naturaliza- 
tion Service listed 1,885 orphans who had entered 
under "Operation Babylift" and had been placed for 

Upon their release from the reception centers, the 
refugees have been located in all parts of the coun- 
try, although the principal destinations are clustered 
on the Pacific coast, the highly urbanized centers on 
the East Coast, Florida, and Texas. As of June 10, 
the States which led as destinations for refugees 

1. California 





2. Virginia 





3. New York 





4. Texas 





5. D.C. 





6. Hawaii 





July 28, 1975 

Reception Center Processing and Preparation for 
Initial Resettlement 

At the reception centers on Guam and Wake, the 
refugees receive basic health care and begin proc- 
essing for entry into the United States, which in- 
cludes the initiation of the security clearance. Repre- 
sentatives from the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Inter- 
governmental Committee on European Migration 
(ICEM), the International Red Cross (ICRC) and 
some third countries (Canada and Australia at 
times) have been present on Guam to assist refugees 
who wish to go to third countries or return home. 
The other Western Pacific refugee centers — in the 
Philippines and Thailand — serve as temporary hold- 
ing areas for refugees awaiting transportation to 
Guam and Wake. Of special concern at the Western 
Pacific sites has been the possibility after May 1 
of a typhoon on Guam which is the largest of the 
reception centers and has a capacity for 50,000 
refugees. Tropical typhoons would seriously threaten 
many of the temporary shelters. The number of 
refugees on Guam had been decreased from 43,939 
on June 1 to 26,447 on June 15. An order was issued 
on June 13 to reduce the refugee population on 
Guam to the level capable of being housed in other 
than tent quarters no later than June 24. By that 
date all tent quarters should be dismantled. 

The major activities at the four reception centers 
in the continental United States are: 

— the provision of food, shelter, clothing and 
other necessities; 

— processing by the Immigration and Naturaliza- 
tion Service (INS), including interviewing, finger- 
printing, photographing, creating of an alien file, 
security clearance verification, completion of parole 
document, authorization of employment, and grant- 
ing of parole; 

— processing by the Department of Health, Edu- 
cation and Welfare, including medical screening, 
assignment of a social security number, initiating 
action to reunite split families, explaining voluntary 
agency and sponsorship role to the refugees, and 
determining resources for travel; 

— providing employment counseling through the 
Department of Labor, including identification of 
skills, analysis of sponsor-related job offers, and 
information on skill demand and excesses by loca- 

— language training and cultural orientation 
which are presently being provided by volunteer 
agencies, individual volunteers, and State and 
Federal personnel; 

— recreational activities, generally under the aegis 
of the YMCA and other volunteer organizations; 

— arranging sponsorship through the voluntary 
resettlement organizations in most cases but also 
directly through State and local governments in 
some instances. 

During the middle part of May, the principal 


delay in resettlement resulted from the requirement 
to complete clearances for all refugees prior to their 
departure from reception centers. Normal INS se- 
curity procedures require clearance for entry into 
the United States by INS, the CIA, the FBI, and 
the Department of State. At the request of the 
House Judiciary Subcommittee, the Task Force also 
instituted clearance with the Drug Enforcement Ad- 
ministration and the Department of Defense. To 
expedite the new security clearance process, the 
records of the individual agencies were assembled 
in Washington and in several instances computer- 
ized, the collection point for the cleared statements 
was centralized at INS headquarters in Washington 
where it could be cabled to the respective camp, 
and the initiating request for the security clearance 
was begun on Guam rather than waiting for the 
refugees to arrive in the United States. At the 
present time, many security clearances are com- 
pleted in a matter of hours. 

Sponsorship — placing the refugee with an in- 
dividual or organization willing and able to assume 
responsibility for assisting in the refugee's integra- 
tion into the American economy and society on a 
self-sufficient basis — will continue to be the key 
element in the resettlement of the Indochinese 
refugees. Offers of sponsorship from the public are 
being solicited by the voluntary resettlement agen- 
cies, public and private organizations and by the 
Task Force itself. Each of the voluntary agencies 
works in its own way to develop sponsorships: 
religious groups generally through local churches 
and non-sectarian organizations through a network 
of community groups who have supported them in 
the past. Officials in the State of Washington, the 
cities of Cincinnati and Honolulu and other com- 
munities around the country have expressed interest 
in developing local programs for the resettlement of 
refugees. In response to an outpouring of public in- 
terest in providing assistance, the Task Force estab- 
lished a toll-free telephone number on May 5 to 
receive and record such offers. As of June 15, the 
Task Force had received more than 20,000 calls in 
addition to hundreds of letters containing other offers 
of assistance. 

The sponsorship offers received by the Task Force 
as well as the personal data collected about the 
refugee upon arrival in the United States have been 
placed in a central computer bank, Printouts of 
sponsorship offers are being made available to the 
voluntary agencies. Computer terminals have been 
installed at each voluntary agency headquarters and 
at each of the reception centers to provide instant 
access to the information which has been stored in 
the computer. This information is available to sup- 
plement the voluntary agencies' normal sources of 

Verifications of the sponsorship offer from other 
than those groups which the voluntary agency has 
had regular contacts with is one of the most im- 

portant and, at the same time, most difficult elements 
in the entire resettlement process. Since the Federal 
Government is not the proper agent to evaluate 
whether the offering party has the means, good-will 
and follow-up ability to provide continuing support 
for the refugee, the voluntary agencies have agreed 
to attempt verification of the sponsorship offers 
which have been generated by the toll-free number. 

After the assurance of sponsorship has been ob- 
tained and the security check has been completed, 
the refugee is ready for release from the reception 
center. Transportation to a point near the sponsor's 
community is arranged by the center. If it is de- 
termined that the refugee or sponsor cannot afford 
all or part of these transportation costs, transporta- 
tion is provided under the resettlement program. 

The resettlement of the refugee in American so- 
ciety is a cooperative effort involving the sponsor 
and his community, the voluntary agency, and the 
Federal Government. Sponsorship involves a moral 
commitment to provide food, shelter, clothing, pocket 
money, ordinary medical costs and assistance in find- 
ing employment to enable the refugee to become self- 
sufficient. While one family group is usually desig- 
nated as the sponsor of each refugee family, the 
voluntary agencies have usually contacted a com- 
munity group, church or civic organization to provide 
supplementary assistance in kind and advice to the 
sponsor and the refugee. Resettlement is a long-term 
proposition. Family problems may develop, the first 
job might prove unsatisfactory, or economic con- 
ditions may alter the sponsor's ability to be of 
assistance. Since the resettlement process often 
involves a difficult cultural adjustment for the 
refugee family, requiring more assistance than for 
an American newcomer to the community, the com- 
munity group designated to support the sponsor 
plays an essential role in the assimilation process. 

If the sponsor and his community fail to provide 
the adjustment assistance or personal difficulties 
develop, the responsibility for a second attempt rests 
with the voluntary agency. The Task Force has been 
encouraging each of the voluntary agencies to en- 
sure that every refugee under its aegis knows whom 
to contact if the sponsorship breaks down. The 
voluntary agency may attempt a second resettlement 
effort in the same or a nearby community or move 
the refugee family to a different part of the coun- 
try. Recently, occasional stories in the press have 
reported that refugees have gone on welfare shortly 
after arriving in a community. In most cases, these 
are refugees who arrived in the United States and 
left the reception centers before the voluntary 
agencies were actively involved in resettlement or 
refugees whose American-resident relatives were un- 
able to provide sufficient assistance. 

The responsibilities of the Federal Government 
are both residual — in cases of total breakdown of 
sponsorship — and direct — to provide initial support 


Department of State Bulletin 

for the refugees through the sponsorship program 
and to the communities in which the refugees have 

The Social and Rehabilitation Service (SRS) of 
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 
working through State welfare agencies, is re- 
sponsible for the provision of financial assistance, 
medical assistance, and social services to Viet- 
namese and Cambodian refugees, as the need arises, 
after their resettlement in communities throughout 
the nation. Federal funds under the SRS refugee 
assistance program will be utilized to reimburse the 
States 100% for such assistance and services so that 
a refugee will not become an extra burden on State 
or local resources if the resettlement plan breaks 
down. The following are the principal provisions of 
the program to provide financial assistance, medical 
assistance, and social services to needy refugees: 

— Needy individuals and families will be assisted 
regardless of family composition. 

— ^State welfare agencies are required to verify 
with the sponsors of refugees that the resettlement 
has broken down before assistance can be granted. 

— Financial assistance to refugees will be based 
on the same standards of need and the same pay- 
ment levels as apply in the Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children program. 

— Medical assistance will be provided to meet 
health needs of needy refugees and to help keep 
sponsorships from breaking down if major medical 
costs arise. 

— Social services will be provided in accordance 
with a State's approved plan for service programs 
so that refugees are eligible for the same range 
of services as other residents of the communities 
in which they settle. 

Other Federal programs are designed to assist 
the refugee become integrated into American 

— Negotiations are under way to develop lan- 
guage and orientation materials and provide tech- 
nical assistance to school districts. 

— Plans are being developed to implement a grant 
program to school districts. 

— Refugees have been declared eligible for HEW's 
direct student aid programs for post-secondary 

— The Department of Labor, in cooperation with 
State and local employment agency representatives, 
is presently identifying occupational skills of 
refugees and providing counseling about employ- 
ment and training possibilities in areas where they 
are resettling. 

The Interagency Task Force has promulgated two 
general guidelines in an effort to influence areas 
of resettlement: (1) to avoid resettlement in areas 
of high unemployment; and (2) to avoid high con- 
centrations of refugees in any specific community. 
The Department of Labor's counseling program at 

each of the camps provides assistance to the 
refugees and to the voluntary agencies in avoiding 
areas of high unemployment or areas where the 
refugee's skills are already in excess. As a matter 
of fact, the voluntary agencies generally have re- 
ceived fewer offers of assistance, especially job- 
related, from communities with high unemployment 
rates. The voluntary agencies have also shown gen- 
eral understanding of the importance of avoiding 
the concentration of large numbers of refugees in 
any single community. Refugees are presently re- 
settling in all parts of the country. Since any 
resident of the United States is free to move and 
to settle in any location, it is nevertheless possible 
that clusters of Vietnamese may assemble in selected 
parts of the country at a future date. 


On May 8 the Task Force sent the following 
message to all U.S. diplomatic posts and to U.S. 
refugee camps: 

1. The following provides official USG policy 
for those refugees who wish to return to Indo- 
china, whether they are in third countries or 
the United States. 

2. The United States will not repeat not in- 
terfere with their effort to return to their 
country of origin. All cases which come to the 
attention of the USG will be promptly referred 
to the United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees who will assume responsibility for 
screening, care and maintenance if necessary, 
and onward transportation under the auspices of 
the Intergovernmental Committee on European 
Migration or through other means if re- 
quired . . . 

Civil coordinators at the camps were then di- 
rected to post notices and circulate information in 
camp newspapers that persons desiring repatria- 
tion were free to do so and should indicate their 
wishes to specified members of camp staffs. 

At the same time, discussions were held with the 
UNHCR, who agreed that assistance to persons 
wishing repatriation was within his mandate. The 
UNHCR then spoke with the Vietnamese authorities 
who agreed to its proposed role in the organization 
of repatriation. UNHCR representatives at Guam, 
Chaffee, Camp Pendleton, Eglin Air Force Base, 
and Indiantown Gap, as well as UNHCR representa- 
tives in other countries, have been interviewing ap- 
plicants for repatriation, using a questionnaire de- 
veloped jointly between the UNHCR and the 
Vietnamese authorities. At the request of the 
UNHCR, the American Red Cross (ARC) is assist- 
ing the program in the United States. If refugees 
outside the camps indicate a desire to go home, the 
UNHCR and the Red Cross are informed and ar- 
rangements are made to interview the applicants. 

Completed questionnaires are forwarded by the 
UNHCR representative to his headquarters in 

July 28, 1975 


Geneva and from there to the Vietnamese authori- 
ties for their consideration. 

Repatriation to Cambodia is not yet as well 
planned as return to Vietnam. Arrangements similar 
to those for Vietnamese repatriation are being 
worked out by the UNHCR to accommodate those 
Cambodians who wish to be repatriated. (On May 
29 and June 1 about 340 Khmer armed forces 
personnel returned from Thailand to Cambodia 
under arrangements between the Thai Supreme 
Command and the Khmer local authorities at the 
border without reference to the UNHCR.) 

The United States Government will pay the costs 
of movements back to home countries from the 
money appropriated for resettlement outside the 
United States. 

As of June 15, a total of 1,917 Indochina refugees 
under U.S. administration had indicated a desire for 

The speed and form of the repatriation effort now 
are essentially in the hands of the present authori- 
ties in Saigon who will accept or reject the appli- 
cants for repatriation. 

Third-Convtry Rescfflcmevt 

From the beginning, we have made every effort 
to internationalize Indochina refugee resettlement. 
On April 10, Department of State officials met with 
John Thomas, Director of ICEM, who agreed to 
take up with his Executive Committee the need for 
the full machinery and expertise of his agency as a 
matter of urgency. On April 12, before the fall of 
the Khmer Republic, the State Department in- 
structed its Geneva Mission to request assistance 
from the UNHCR and ICEM in resettling Khmer 
refugees throughout the world. A similar instruc- 
tion pertaining to Vietnamese refugees went out on 
April 17. Because of our desire to take no action 
which would precipitate the collapse of the Khmer 
and Vietnam governments, these approaches were 
made privately but they focused the attention of the 
international agencies on the problem and stimu- 
lated preparations for worldwide resettlement. 

At the ICEM Executive Committee meeting, April 
28-29, John Thomas formally advised delegates of 
the 32 member governments that the United States 
had requested ICEM to assist in the resettlement of 
Indochina refugees. In the absence of objections, he 
proposed to undertake the task. 

On May 8 and 9, the UNHCR sent an appeal for 
resettlement opportunities to some 40 governments 
and a second appeal went out on May 29. Mean- 
while, both ICEM and the UNHCR placed repre- 
sentatives on Guam, strengthened their staffs 
elsewhere, and began registering refugees for third- 
country resettlement. 

Earlier, on April 27, acting through the State 
Department, the Task Force had instructed Ameri- 
can Ambassadors in most countries around the 
world to ask the governments to which they were 

accredited to share the burden of refugee resettle- 
ment. The instruction noted that this bilateral appeal 
paralleled those which ICEM and the UNHCR 
would soon be making. 

There have been many positive responses to the 
U.S. and international approaches. Canada has 
agreed to take 3,000, plus those who have relatives 
in Canada and those who had been issued visa 
letters prior to the fall of Saigon. More than 3,000 
refugees have already arrived in that country. 
Germany has indicated willingness to accept stu- 
dents who are already there and their families. The 
total could reach several thousand. France, which 
has for over a century had close ties with Indo- 
china, is accepting those with relatives already in 
the country, students who are in France and others. 
Other countries in Western Europe, Latin America 
and Africa have agreed to take smaller numbers. 
ICEM is presently selecting refugees with special 
skills for resettlement in Latin American countries. 

By June 15, the number of Indochina refugees 
released to third countries from U.S. reception cen- 
ters had reached 3,756. Approximately 4,000 other 
refugees in U.S. centers have also requested re- 
settlement elsewhere and are now awaiting approval. 
A number of initial asylum countries have permitted 
refugees to remain and many thousands more have 
traveled to resettlement countries from countries 
of initial asylum. ICEM reports that as of May 31, 
there were also 2,545 Indochina refugees in Hong 
Kong, Singapore, and Thailand who were being 
processed for resettlement in third countries. 

Estimated Expenses 

The Indochina Evacuation and Resettlement Pro- 
gram has a total budget of $508 million. As of June 
6, 1975, total obligations were $181 million. The 
largest portions have been obligated as follows: 
the Department of Defense for facilities and daily 
maintenance at the reception centers ($64.5 mil- 
lion), the Department of Defense for the airlift 
($63.1 million), and contracts with the voluntary 
agencies ($34.32 million). An analysis of the source 
of funds and their obligations follows [Table 2]. 

Issues for the Future 

The Interagency Task Force has been involved 
in a wide range of issues over the past eight weeks. 
There are also many problems which must be solved 
to carry out successfully the resettlement program. 
The principal issue is that of sponsorship. Given 
time, the traditional voluntary agency system of 
settlement should permit the absorption of the 
Indochinese refugees as it has permitted the re- 
settlement of over 1^2 million refugees from Europe 
and other parts of the world since World War II. 
Time is of great importance for this resettlement 
program. While there is little doubt that the legis- 
lative program goal of resettling refugees by June 


Departmenf of State Bulletin 


AID funded by 

AID funded by- 
Indochina Post- 
war Reconstruc- 
tion Program 

State portion of 
Refugee Act of 
1975 (includes 
portions) ^ 

HEW portion of 
Refugee Act of 
1975 1 

Table 2 


Total obligations Amount 

available as of 6/6/75 available 

$ 5,000.000 $ 2.678,892 S 2.321,108 

98.000.000 98,000,000 

305,000,000 79.733,000 225,267,000 

669,884 99,330,116 


$508,000,000 $181,081,776 $326,918,224 

1 Represents amount appropriated in P.L. 94-24. This appro- 
priation does not include the additional $50 million which was 
authorized by Congress in P.L. 94-23. 

30, 1976, can be met, the Task Force hopes to be 
able to move more rapidly to prevent unacceptably 
high human and financial costs. The traditional 
resettlement systems are not able to adapt easily 
to processing the desired numbers within the time 
frame we are imposing. 

A second and related issue is the breakdown of 
the sponsorships. Many of the first refugees to 
arrive in this country moved directly to the com- 
munities of their relatives and friends without the 
benefit of sponsorship verification through the vol- 
untary resettlement agencies. Inadequate housing 
and unemployment have forced some of these refu- 
gees on welfare. The voluntary agencies have in 
the past been effective in resettling refugees in a 
way that few become long-term charges on the wel- 
fare system or become impossible to assimilate into 
American life. The Task Force will be evaluating 
breakdown cases to determine what steps might be 
taken to assist those refugees who have already 
sought government support to become self-sufficient 
and to prevent future breakdowns. At the same 
time, when considering any broadened system of 
sponsorship, the valuable role which the resettlement 
agencies play in preventing breakdown must not be 

The Task Force is further concerned that all 
refugees who are cleared for entry into this country 
find homes in America. Obviously, some refugees 
and their families — possibly the less educated and 
unskilled — will take longer to be assimilated into 
American society than others. Early identification 
of such refugees is currently in progress and inten- 
sive language training and orientation will be pro- 
vided beginning in early July. The resettlement 
organizations are committed to the resettlement of 
all of these refugees. 

In addition, the United States Government will 
have to find homes outside this country for those 
refugees at Western Pacific locations who might be 
determined as ineligible for entry here. The num- 
ber is expected to be small. A plan for this group 
will be foi-mulated as the dimension of the problem 
becomes more apparent. 

The Task Force has undertaken to expand the 
traditional sponsorship system by seeking the in- 
volvement of a broader range of labor, business, 
civic and social service organizations. In addition, 
the Task Force is also expanding initiatives with 
State and local governments in identifying sponsors 
and assisting in resettlement. 

One of the key problems related to sponsorship 
has been the effective use of offers which have 
come for'.vard. The Task Force is developing an 
identification service which will be contacting 
individuals who called on the toll-free number to 
verify their continuing interest in sponsorship and 
to ensure appropriate consideration of each offer 
by a voluntary agency. In addition the identifica- 
tion service will be used to search the computer 
system for information about the location of Viet- 
namese who have entered the United States. While 
attempting to make available all information which 
will aid resettlement, the Task Force is mindful of 
the importance of maintaining the confidentiality 
of the personal history data which might be ac- 
quired about the refugees. The Red Cross agreed 
to establish an international family locator service 
for Indochina refugees, using the facilities of the 
Central Tracing Agency of the International Com- 
mittee of the Red Cross in Geneva. 

The Task Force has been looking ahead to the 
time when all of the staging areas in the Western 
Pacific area and the reception centers in the United 
States can be closed, but definite dates have not 
yet been established. Some original estimates indi- 
cated that all of the centers might be closed in 
three months. Eglin Air Force Base in Florida will 
have the shortest use, possibly being phased out 
by the end of July. With the continual refinement 
of the processing procedures at the centers, which 
should speed up the outflow, the Task Force hopes 
that all but one or two of the centers will be 
closed in September. 

Resettlement of the refugees from Indochina will 
take time, not only to move the refugees from the 
reception centers into communities around the coun- 
try, but also to assist them in the difficult process of 
adjustment to a new way of life. Many dramatic 
events have occurred during the past eight weeks. 
The future will be less dramatic, but much work 
lies ahead to achieve the successful assimilation of 
the Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees into 
American society. 

July 28, 1975 



U.N. Outer Space Committee Meets at New York 

The U.N. Outer Space Committee met at 
New York June 9-20. Folloioing are state- 
ments made in the committee by U.S. Repre- 
sentative W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., on June 11 
and by U.S. Alternate Representative Ronald 
F. Stoive on June 17. 


USUN press release 65 dated June 11 

The past year has been an active one both 
in space exploration and in the work of this 
committee and its subcommittees. The brev- 
ity of our agenda conceals a myriad of com- 
plex and significant questions which will re- 
quire a great deal of hard work to resolve. 
Happily, the reports of the Legal Subcom- 
mittee and of the Scientific and Technical 
Subcommittee ' reflect that efforts of those 
two bodies during the past year have been 
fruitful in a number of areas. 

Also on a positive note, we in the United 
States have had a most successful year in 
our national program for the continued ex- 
ploration and use of outer space. Two ex- 
amples in particular are worthy of note here : 
Pioneer 10, which last December swept past 
Jupiter and headed for a rendezvous with 
Saturn in 1979, and Landsat 2, an earth re- 
sources technology satellite, which was 
launched into orbit in January. The Ameri- 
can efforts have focused both on the scien- 
tific and technical challenges of the explora- 
tion of the farthest reaches of the solar sys- 
tem and on concerns that significantly affect 
the quality of everyday lives. 

One of the useful functions of the Outer 
Space Committee's annual review of space 

' U.N. docs. A/AC.105/147 and A/AC.105/150. 

activities is to identify and encourage in- 
ternational cooperation in the peaceful ex- 
ploration and use of outer space. 

With regard to the U.S. international co- 
operative programs, I would briefly note the 
following events which have taken place 
since this committee's last session. 

The National Aeronautics and Space Ad- 
ministration has launched four cooperative 
satellites, one each with the Federal Republic 
of Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom. In these projects, in which 
we have a strong program interest, we fur- 
nish the booster and launch services, while 
our cooperating partners take responsibility 
for the spacecraft. 

NASA has launched three satellites on a 
reimbursable basis : one for Canada, one for 
the Federal Republic of Germany, and one — 
the Symphonie communications satellite — for 
France and West Germany. Early last month 
NASA agreed to launch an Indonesian do- 
mestic communications satellite. 

Both NASA and the new European Space 
Agency are actively engaged in coordinated 
planning for the use of Spacelab, the manned 
orbital laboratory which Europe is building 
as an integral part of the NASA Space Shut- 
tle. The prime development contract was 
awarded just one year ago, and the project 
has proceeded on schedule in Europe. This 
integrated contribution to the future ex- 
ploration and use of space represents a new 
dimension in international cooperation. 
Spacelab will provide, for the first time, op- 
portunities for U.S. and foreign scientists 
and engineers to accompany their experi- 
ments into space. It will facilitate many 
joint-use programs. 

The members of this committee are already 


Department of State Bulletin 

well aware of the ATS-6 [Advanced Tech- 
nology Satellite] television broadcasting ex- 
periments we have undertaken. The impor- 
tance of the potential of such community 
broadcasting is emphasized by our own na- 
tional experiments in this area. 

Even though the United States has a highly 
developed domestic communications system, 
we have many areas remote from metropoli- 
tan centers that lack many of the services 
and facilities which these centers provide for 
their populations. We are experimenting with 
space applications to provide improved med- 
ical, education, and communication services 
to these areas ; and ATS-6 has been used here 
to conduct the Health/Education/Telecom- 
munications experiment in Alaska, the Rocky 
Mountains, and the Appalachian area since 
its launch in May 1974. This experiment is 
designed to determine whether satellite sys- 
tems offer an effective way of providing high- 
quality educational programs and health 
services to people in remote areas. 

These experiments could open new oppor- 
tunities for the benefit and advancement of 
students and doctors and their patients in 
the United States and, we hope, perhaps be 
even more valuable to countries without an 
already extensive ground communications 

The ATS-6 has recently been moved from 
its position over the Galapagos Islands east- 
ward to a station over Lake Victoria in 
central Africa. From this location it will be 
made available to the Government of India 
for four to six hours a day for about a year 
to conduct the Satellite Instructional Tele- 
vision Experiment. India will use the satellite 
to relay Indian instructional broadcasts to 
augmented receivers in more than 2,000 re- 
mote Indian villages and to some 3,000 ad- 
ditional villages via conventional ground re- 
lay systems. 

The Indian Space Research Organization 
is responsible for television programing and 
for designing, manufacturing, and maintain- 
ing services, associated ground equipment, 
and antennas. Its programing will be directed 
toward improved agricultural techniques and 
family planning, hygiene, and school instruc- 

tions. The results of this practical applica- 
tions experiment should give us all a better 
understanding of the potential of broadcast 
satellites as a tool for development. Brazil 
is already using ATS-6 in an educational 
television experiment. 

Landsat 2, like the first earth resources 
technology satellite, is serving as a focus for 
international cooperation. Investigators from 
45 countries and five international organiza- 
tions have been selected to conduct studies 
with data it obtains. More than one-third of 
the member states on this committee are 
working with us in expanding the practical 
uses of remote sensing by satellite. 

Somie countries have established their own 
data acquisition, processing, and dissemina- 
tion facilities. Stations in Canada and Brazil 
are now operating, and stations in Italy, Iran, 
and Zaire are expected to become operational 
during the coming year. These stations help 
assure the reception of global data in event 
of tape-recorder failures, and as the report 
of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee 
makes clear, they can facilitate the emergence 
of regional arrangements. 

Finally, I wish to mention the progress of 
the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project. This project 
marks the crossing of a major threshold in 
international space cooperation on both the 
political and technical levels. On May 22, 
senior officials of NASA and the Soviet Acad- 
emy conducted a joint flight-readiness review 
and concluded that the mission was ready 
for on-schedule launchings July 15. We look 
forward to the Apollo-Soyuz mission and to 
reporting on its operations at the next ses- 
sion of the committee. 

Although we may comment in more detail 
later during our session on the contents of 
the reports of our two subcommittees, I 
would like to make a few general remarks on 
the course of their work this year. 

The Legal Subcommittee, in our view, took 
positive and constructive steps in continuing 
to try to clarify the legal implications of both 
direct television broadcasting and remote 
sensing from satellites. We support the thor- 
ough and responsible approach which has 
thus far characterized the Legal Subcom- 

July 28, 1975 


mittee's examination of these two extremely 
complicated areas. 

The drafting exercise to develop pi'inciples 
i-elating to direct television broadcasting by 
satellite has been useful in identifying those 
areas of general agreement and in helping 
clarify the views of countries on the issues 
on which there are substantially different 
opinions. Although the latter are of consid- 
erable significance — and I must admit that 
my delegation does not immediately see how 
they are to be reconciled — we recognize that 
the Legal Subcommittee has faced difficult 
issues frequently in its work, and we have 
confidence that with determination, patience, 
and good will on all sides we will again in 
good time find appropriate and acceptable 
solutions to the problems we are addressing. 

The Legal Subcommittee also began a seri- 
ous thorough examination of the legal impli- 
cations of remote sensing of the earth from 
satellites for the first time since this item 
has been on its agenda. An increased num- 
ber of delegations have expressed their views 
on the legal implications of remote sensing, 
and we look forward to hearing from the re- 
maining members of the subcommittee when 
it meets again next year. 

The U.S. delegation introduced a working 
paper at the last session of the Legal Sub- 
committee with the intention of spelling out 
our views regarding the direction which any 
further development of legal principles in 
this area should take.- From the starting 
point of the freedom of exploration and use 
of outer space reflected in the 1967 Outer 
Space Treaty, we strongly believe that the 
international community should encourage 
the broadest possible cooperation and ex- 
change of information so that all countries, 
not just the space powers, can share in the 
benefits which we believe can be derived from 
programs such as the Landsat experiments. 

There obviously are different points of 
view regarding where the greatest interests 
of the members of the international com- 
munity lie. Those differences have been re- 
flected to some extent in the several drafts 

- For text of the working paper, see Bulletin of 
Mar. 31, 1975, p. 423. 

which have been put forward and in the 
comments which a number of delegations 
have made during our debates so far. 

More than anything else, the discussions 
about remote sensing in the Legal Subcom- 
mittee have begun to point out how extremely 
complex the legal implications of such ac- 
tivities are. The one week which the Legal 
Subcommittee devoted to remote sensing 
proved useful in beginning to identify the 
issues which must be addressed but also dem- 
onstrated that we have considerable work to 
do even to reach agreement on the very com- 
plex and difficult questions to be asked. 

For example, the U.S. delegation felt 
rather strongly that an early issue to be faced 
is the definition of the activities the legal im- 
plications of which we are trying to assess. 
Although it is only one of numerous issues 
which must be further examined, attempts to 
rush into drafting precise language even be- 
fore agreement on the scope of the remote 
sensing activities we are talking about seem 
ill advised. 

Another important example of an issue 
which needs considerably more attention is 
the likelihood that application of a restric- 
tive dissemination policy would result in the 
loss of remote sensing data for many coun- 
ti'ies which do not have their own programs, 
including the space segments. Although the 
United States is not concerned about its 
ability to conduct such programs for its own 
benefit, we would consider it most unfor- 
tunate if nations, except for the small 
handful of space powers, were to cut them- 
selves out, perhaps inadvertently, from 
sharing in these exciting programs and 
directly obtaining their own national bene- 
fits. This consequence cannot simply be dis- 
missed. For those countries who depend on 
others for data, it should be very, very care- 
fully studied before attempts are made to 
reach agreement on precise language for 
guidelines on this matter. 

I also wish to note that a considerable 
amount of time and effort was devoted by 
many delegations to attempting to reconcile 
the remaining issues in the draft moon 
treaty. Obviously the key remaining obstacle 


Department of State Bulletin 

to completion of this treaty centers on the 
question of natural resources of the moon 
and other celestial bodies. 

In spite of the extensive efforts made, it 
seems that we are prevented from complet- 
ing this treaty because of factors not di- 
rectly related to the exploration and use of 
outer space. There are a number of elements 
valuable to all countries in the already agreed 
provisions of this draft treaty, such as the 
proposed measures to protect the environ- 
ment of the moon and other celestial bodies, 
the publication of greater amounts of in- 
formation derived from exploration of 
celestial bodies, and the endorsement of en- 
hanced cooperation among the countries 
undertaking such exploration. , 

Because the unmanned exploration of the 
planets is in fact continuing even now, 
whereas the possibilities for commercial ex- 
ploitation of resources still seem in the 
distant future, my delegation would consider 
it unnecessary to delay completion of the 
moon treaty just because of provisions which 
would not realistically have significance for 
some time to come. We would hope that 
delegations may find it possible to reconcile 
their views in the near future. 

We look forward to continuing our con- 
structive discussions of the legal implica- 
tions of these and other issues related to 
remote sensing at the next session of the 
Legal Subcommittee. 

With regard to the report of the Scientific 
and Technical Subcommittee, we are pleased 
by the progress which was made, partic- 
ularly in the examination of organizational 
aspects of remote sensing. Our delegation has 
been among those which have attempted to 
insure that the political and legal assessments 
of remote sensing did not outrun the assess- 
ment of what was actually practicable and 
desirable. The parallel approach adopted in 
the past year has in our view been beneficial 
to both subcommittees and has kept the 
deliberations on the legal implications from 
becoming irrelevant to actual progress in 
the field. 

We note with much favor the focus of 

July 28, 1975 

attention on the desirability of using extant 
or planned ground stations as the nuclei of 
regional centers for receiving and processing 
remote sensing data of different areas of the 
world. The studies which have been re- 
quested can be most useful in the subcom- 
mittee's future deliberations on what par- 
ticular type of international facilities and 
functions in the remote sensing area we wish 
to develop. We look forward to their comple- 

The United States is also supportive of 
the growing number of seminars and 
symposia which are being held to acquaint 
scientists and potential users with the char- 
acteristics of current remote sensing experi- 
ments. In fact, at this very time, the week 
of June 8 through 13, NASA is sponsoring 
a major Earth Resources Symposium at the 
Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas. 
More than 1,500 persons from a wide variety 
of fields are focusing on the practical appli- 
cations of earth resources survey data 
gathered by satellites and aircraft. The re- 
sults of Landsat experiments and of Skylab 
earth resources programs and the need for 
new data systems are being discussed. 

This has been another important year in 
the exploration and use of outer space and 
in our deliberations on the wide variety of 
questions which those activities generate. 
The United Nations, through its specialized 
bodies such as this committee and through 
its Secretariat experts and staff, has again 
done much constructive and valuable work. 
The United States continues to view the 
Outer Space Committee and its subcommit- 
tees as examples of some of the best aspects 
and best hopes for multilateral diplomacy. 
We are looking at highly complex questions 
with practical applications both now and in 
the distant future. We are working in a field 
of exploration into hitherto unknowaa areas 
and are developing new and sophisticated 
disciplines. Most of all, we are working to 
apply the benefits of these activities to im- 
prove the lives of all peoples. It is therefore 
with considerable pleasure that my delega- 
tion looks forward to our continued work 
and future progress. 



Although it was not originally the inten- 
tion of my delegation to address the sub- 
stance of the remote sensing debates which 
have taken place in our subcommittees, we 
have heard recently, and in particular this 
morning, a number of assertions which we 
feel must be responded to. 

First, we believe that there has been an 
effective and constructive effort underway 
to deal with the extremely complex issues 
involved in remote sensing. We disagree with 
those who claim that no progress has been 
made. Substantial work is now in progress, 
and it should be recognized. 

A very important aspect of current remote 
sensing activities is that they involve and are 
being pursued under programs and projects 
of international cooperation. We have heard 
apparent distress from at least one delega- 
tion about what was called the unilateral 
nature of present activities. This is some- 
what remarkable. Under the Landsat pro- 
gram — and I refer to that program because 
it is the only one which is making data avail- 
able — data collected by satellite are received 
by earth stations in four separate countries, 
and others are now building substations. 
Scientific and research projects are in proc- 
ess or are completed using these data in 55 
countries, and we know of at least five major 
international organizations which are using 
the available data in scientific studies. This 
does not appear to be a classic definition of 
a unilateral program. Major progress is 
being made in the use and application of 
remotely sensed data, and much of it is of 
substantial benefit to many countries. 

If, on the other hand, this concern is that 
data are available from only one source, 
then I suggest that complaints such as we 
heard this morning about reliance on the good 
will of the data provider are quite ill consid- 
ered. If it had not been for the good will of 
this space power for the last 15 years, there 
would be remarkably little data at all public- 
ly available. The international community 
has not received data from anyone else. 

Furthermore, we are not the ones who 
wish to restrict data availability. On the one 
hand we hear concern about the reliability 
of data availability; on the other hand, we 
hear from the same parties proposals which 
in fact could go quite far toward reducing 
the benefits which all but space powers could 

We are mindful of the concerns expressed 
by many states about how data are to be 
controlled, distributed, or used. It is clear, 
of course, to the representatives here that 
raw sensed data coming from a satellite have 
relatively little intrinsic value. To be of use 
they must be processed, interpreted, and 
combined with other data of a corroborative 

Maximum use of the remotely sensed data 
requires an environment of cooperation. It 
assumes availability of trained scientists and 
specialists, and it produces information that 
can help finance and sustain the profes- 
sionals necessary to use the data. Restriction 
of the collection and dissemination of data 
would be strongly in favor of the countries 
with a satellite operational capability and 
strongly adverse to the interests of develop- 
ing countries. 

Several countries today possess the capa- 
bility to build and launch remote sensing 
satellites. We believe that by 1980 the num- 
ber could be doubled or trebled. Few coun- 
tries who may develop the capability to 
conduct such sensing could reasonably be 
expected to become party to a treaty which 
would deny this right, a right which is 
guaranteed by the Outer Space Treaty of 

Therefore, to insure that data collected 
are not to be held or unilaterally employed 
by a sensing state to its exclusive advantage, 
it is our view that this committee and the 
international community should endorse rec- 
ommendations that data collected must be 
made available on nondiscriminatory terms 
to anyone wishing to use them. Any alterna- 
tive structure that we have seen proposed 
would result in unilateral control of data by 
sensing states, putting all others potentially 


Department of State Bulletin 

at a disadvantage. We believe that any other 
approach invites exclusion, discrimination, 
and reduced timeliness of data, and in some 
cases, perhaps eventual denial of access 

If one or a selected number of earth sta- 
tions are built in a system wherein data are 
controlled, each earth station operator would 
be in a highly privileged role. On the other 
hand, if each country must establish its own 
station, costs multiply enormously. Admin- 
istrative problems arise, and restrictions 
generate hostility and friction, which in our 
view constitute greater dangers than those 
posed by access to the data. 

We strenuously urge those delegations 
which are promoting restrictive systems of 
dissemination based on prior consent to 
reexamine the long-range practical conse- 
quences of such an approach. As I said, it 
appears to us that no nation with the capa- 
bility is likely to voluntarily forgo its right 
to conduct peaceful uses and scientific re- 
search using remotely sensed data from 
satellites. We believe that such uses are 
clearly within the scope of the legal princi- 
ples of the 1967 treaty. 

Suggestions have been made here that 
thei'e is a juridical vacuum in place of any 
legal norms for the conduct of remote sens- 
ing. These suggestions overlook the provi- 
sions of several existing international agree- 
ments, most notably the Outer Space Treaty 
itself. The very first article of that treaty 
states that "There shall be freedom of scien- 
tific investigation in outer space," and pro- 
vides that ". . . States shall facilitate and 
encourage international cooperation in such 
investigations." Remote sensing is surely 
within the scope of such investigation, with 
the evidence accumulating day by day of its 
scientific contribution, and it is as surely a 
peaceful use of outer space. 

My delegation views the proposals to im- 
pose new, restrictive rules as retrogressive 
and counter to our aims of securing the bene- 
fits of the peaceful activities in which 55 
states are now participating. 

It is because of these significant differ- 

ences of view that my delegation has urged 
that the Legal Subcommittee concentrate on 
detailed, precise analysis of the implications 
of remote sensing before beginning a draft- 
ing exercise. We would consider it irrespon- 
sible to do otherwise. This does not preclude 
us from attempting to draft provisions on 
areas which have been clarified, and we 
would have no interest in opposing such 

Our position is not one of wishing to pre- 
clude drafting; it is one of attempting to 
avoid reversing a logical chain of events. 
First we should understand generally what 
we wish to do, and then we should attempt 
to codify those goals. I do believe, on the 
basis of informal consultations, that a com- 
promise can be worked out with regard to 
the mandate for next year's session of the 
Legal Subcommittee. 

U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 
Extended for Six Months 

Folloiving is a statement made in the U.N. 
Security Council by U.S. Representative W. 
Tapley Bennett, Jr., on June 13, together 
with the text of a resolution adopted by the 
Council that day. 


USUN press release 66 dated June 13 

We have today unmistakably affirmed the 
conviction of this Council that those con- 
cerned must commit themselves to rapid 
progress toward a negotiated settlement on 
Cyprus. Our responsibilities under the U.N. 
Charter, together with the prolonged suffer- 
ing of all the Cypriot people, make this an 
urgent requirement. 

The United States welcomes the recent 
agreement of the parties concerned to re- 
sume the Vienna discussions on July 24. We 
thank the Secretary General for the great 
skill and patience he has shown in helping 
to advance these talks and in preserving 

July 28, 1975 


their momentum. His objective, thoughtful 
report emphasizes not only the hopeful start 
which has been made but also the patient 
efforts, good faith, and mutual understand- 
ing which are still required to achieve a 
settlement. The continued skillful assistance 
of the Secretary General will be essential 
to the success of this process. 

The U.N. Force in Cyprus, whose man- 
date we have just extended, has continued 
to make an outstanding contribution to the 
safety and welfare of all the people of 
Cyprus. In so doing, it has also significantly 
assisted the negotiating process. The Secre- 
tary General's Representative on Cyprus, the 
Commander of the U.N. Force, and his staff 
and men have continued to demonstrate the 
professional ability and sensitive under- 
standing the world has come to expect of 
them. We earnestly hope that all parties 
will make every effort to assist, and to safe- 
guard, the men of the Force as they carry 
out their demanding tasks. 

My government fully supports the action 
which the Council has just taken. The 
President of the United States and the Secre- 
tary of State have in recent days directly 
urged the parties to recognize the paramount 
importance of reaching a settlement through 
free negotiations among themselves and to 
make effective use of the assistance to them 
which the Council has provided in the per- 
sonal auspices of the Secretary General. We 
join this Council and the world community 
in emphasizing that progress must be made 
toward permanent peace on Cyprus — and it 
must be made now. 


The Security Council, 

Noting from the report of the Secretary-General 
of 9 June 1975 (S/ 11717) that in existing circum- 
stances the presence of the United Nations Peace- 
keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed to perform 

'U.N. doc. S/RES/370 (1975); adopted by the 

Council on June 13 by a vote of 14 to 0, with the 

People's Republic of China not participating in the 

the tasks it is currently undertaking if the cease- 
fire is to be maintained in the island and the search 
for a peaceful settlement facilitated, 

Noting from the report the conditions prevailing 
in the island, 

Noting further that, in paragraphs 67 and 68 of 
his report, the Secretary-General has expressed the 
view, in connexion with the talks in Vienna between 
the representatives of the two communities held 
pursuant to resolution 367 (1975) of 12 March 1975, 
that the negotiating process should be maintained 
and, if possible, accelerated and that its success 
would require from all parties determination, under- 
standing and a willingness to make reciprocal 

Noting also the statement by the Secretary- 
General contained in paragraph 69 of his report that 
the parties concerned had signified their concurrence 
in his recommendation that the Security Council 
extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace- 
keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six 

Noting that the Government of Cyprus has agreed 
that in view of the prevailing conditions in the 
island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus 
beyond 15 June 1975, 

1. Reaffirms the provisions of resolution 186 
(1964) of 4 March 1964, as well as subsequent reso- 
lutions and decisions on the establishment and 
maintenance of UNFICYP and on other aspects of 
the situation in Cyprus; 

2. Reaffirms once again its resolution 365 (1974) 
of 13 December 1974, by which it endorsed General 
Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), adopted unani- 
mously on 1 November 1974, and calls for their 
urgent and efl'ective implementation and that of its 
resolution 367 (1975); 

3. Urges the parties concerned to act with the 
utmost restraint and to continue and accelerate de- 
termined co-operative efforts to achieve the objec- 
tives of the Security Council; 

4. Extends once more the stationing in Cyprus 
of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, estab- 
lished under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), 
for a further period ending 15 December 1975 in the 
expectation that by then sufficient progress towards 
a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or 
substantial reduction of the Force; 

5. Appeals again to all parties concerned to extend 
their full co-operation to the United Nations Peace- 
keeping Force in its continuing performance of its 

6. Requests the Secretary-General to continue the 
mission of good offices entrusted to him by para- 
graph 6 of resolution 367 (1975), to keep the Secu- 
rity Council informed of the progress made, and to 
submit an interim report by 15 September 1975 and 
a definitive report not later than 15 December 1975. 


Department of State Bulletin 


U.S. and Peru Reach Agreement 
on Airline Services 

The Department of State announced on 
July 8 (press release 359) that diplomatic 
notes had been exchanged on July 7 at Lima 
bringing into effect an understanding be- 
tween the United States and Peru which will 
govern airline services between the two 
countries for a three-year period. Ambas- 
sador Robert W. Dean signed the U.S. notes 
and Foreign Minister Miguel Angel de la 
Flor signed for Peru. (For texts of the 
understanding and the exchanges of notes, 
see press release 359). 

The understanding allows Braniff Air- 
ways, the designated U.S. airline serving 
Peru, to operate 15 roundtrip flights per 
week between U.S. points and Lima via in- 
termediate points. Ten of these flights may 
operate beyond Lima to Santiago, La Paz, 
Asuncion, Buenos Aires, Sao Paulo, and Rio 
de Janeiro. The Peruvian designated airline, 
AeroPeru, will be allowed to operate air 
services between Lima and Los Angeles, 
Miami, and New York via intermediate 
points at certain specified frequency levels. 

The two governments also agreed in a 
separate exchange of notes on steps each 
country would take to allow the airlines to 
implement the rights accorded in the under- 
standing. Services previously operated by 
the airlines may be restored immediately up 
to the levels specified in the understanding, 
and each government will use its best efforts 
to issue new or amended operating permits 
to the airlines by mid-September. 

This new agreement, which supplements 
the U.S. -Peru Air Transport Agreement of 
1946, resolves through negotiation the civil 
aviation issues which arose between the gov- 
ernments earlier this year. 

Current Actions 



Protocol for the continuation in force of the interna- 
tional coffee agreement 19G8, as amended and ex- 
tended, with annex. Approved by the International 
Coffee Council at London September 26, 1974.' 
Ratification deposited: Nicaragua, July 2, 1975. 


Convention on registration of objects launched into 
outer space. Opened for signature at New York 
January 14, 1975.' 

Signature: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, 
June 30, 1975. 

Terrorism — Protection of Diplomats 

Convention on the prevention and punishment of 
crimes against internationally protected persons, 
including diplomatic agents. Done at New York 
December 14, 1973.' 

Ratifications deposited: Czechoslovakia, June 30, 
1975; Denmark, Sweden, July 1, 1975. 


Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade 
convention (part of the international wheat agree- 
ment) 1971. Done at Washington April 2, 1974. 
Entered into force June 19, 1974, with respect to 
certain provisions and July 1, 1974, with respect 
to other provisions. TIAS 7988. 
Accession deposited: Guatemala, June 12, 1975. 

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat 
trade convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at 
Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force 
June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions 
and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions. 
Accession deposited: Peru, July 9, 1975. 

Women — Political Rights 

Convention on the political rights of women. Done 
at New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force 
July 7, 1954.= 
Accession deposited: Peru, July 1, 1975. 



Joint statement of the U.S.-Israel Joint Committee 
for Investment and Trade relating to expansion of 
economic cooperation. Signed at Washington May 
13, 1975. Entered into force May 13, 1975. 

' Not in force. 

' Not in force for the United States. 

July 28, 1975 


Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

Agreement extending the agreements of February 
21, 1973, as extended (TIAS 7573, 7572, 7571, 7981, 
8020), relating to certain fisheries problems in the 
northeastern part of the Pacific Ocean off the 
coast of the United States, fishing operations in 
the northeastern Pacific Ocean, and fishing for 
king and tanner crab. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington June 30, 1975. Entered into 
force June 30, 1975. 

tion 8791; GPO cat. no. Sl.l:949/v. IV) may be 
purchased for $11.15 (domestic postpaid). Checks or 
money orders should be made out to the Superinten- 
dent of Documents and sent to the U.S. Government 
Book Store, Department of State, Washing^ton, D.C. 

GPO Sales Publications 


1949 "Foreign Relations" Volume 
on Western Europe Released 

Press release 314 dateil June 4 (for release June 10) 

The Department of State released on June 10 
"Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949," 
volume IV, "Western Europe." This volume is the 
latest in a series which has been published con- 
tinuously since 1861 as the official record of Ameri- 
can foreign policy. The volume nov7 released is the 
third of a projected nine volumes documenting 
American foreign policy during the year 1949. 
Previously two volumes were published — one con- 
cerned with policy toward Austria and Germany 
and the other, with China. 

This volume of 854 pages presents documentation 
— hitherto unpublished and of the highest classifica- 
tion — on such major issues as the participation by 
the United States in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, the interest of the United States in 
the economic recovery of Western Europe, the future 
of the Free Territory of Trieste, and the disposition 
of the former Italian colonies in Africa. A selective 
but comprehensive outline of the relations of the 
United States with the countries of Western Europe 
(exclusive of Austria and Germany) is documented 
with particularly significant bodies of papers on 
relations with France, Spain, and the United King- 
dom. Prominent personages who figure importantly 
in the pages of this volume include President Tru- 
man, Secretary of State Acheson, Under Secretary 
of State Webb, British Foreign Secretary Bevin, 
French Foreign Minister Schuman, W. Averell 
Harriman, and Paul Hoffman. 

The "Foreign Relations" volumes are prepared by 
the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs. 
Volume IV (listed as Department of State publica- 

Publications may he ordered by catalog or ttock 
number froyn the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
20J,02. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 
100 or ynore copies of any one publication mailed to 
the same address. Remittances, payable to the 
Superintendent of Documents, must accompany 
orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic 
postage, are subject to change. 

1974 Report of the Visa Office. This report by the 
Department of State's Bureau of Security and Con- 
sular Affairs shows in graphs and charts the nature 
and volume of visa activity for fiscal year 1974. 
Pub. 8810. Department and Foreign Service Series 
150. 84 pp. $1.70. (Cat. No. S1.69:8810). 

Narcotic Drugs — Provision of Helicopters and Re- 
lated Assistance. Agreement with Mexico amending 
the agreement of June 24, 1974. TIAS 7983. 4 pp. 
25«'. (Cat. No. 89.10:7983). 

Fisheries — Certain Fisheries Off the United States 
Coast, Salmon Fisheries, King and Tanner Crab. 

Agreements with Japan. TIAS 7986. 86 pp. 85(* 
(Cat. No. 89.10:7986). 

International Labor Organization — Amendment of 
the Constitution. Instrument of amendment adopted 
by the General Conference of the International 
Labor Organization, at the fifty-seventh session, 
Geneva, June 22, 1972. 8 pp. 30(* (Cat. No. S9.10: 

Mutual Defense Assistance — Cash Contribution by 
Japan. Arrangement with Japan relating to the 
agreement of March 8, 1954. TIAS 7989. 6 pp. 25(*. 
(Cat. No. 89.10:7989). 


The editor of the Bulletin wishes to call 
attention to the following error which appears 
in the July 7 issue: 

p. 43, col. 1 : The second sentence of the 
second full paragraph should read: "Coupled 
with positive action, such clarity is called for 
to insure a peaceful and realistic settlement 
of the territory's future." 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX Juhj 28, 1975 Vol. LXXIII, No. 1883 

Brazil. U.S.-Brazil A^eement on Shrimp 
Transmitted to the Senate (message from 
President Ford) 132 

Commodities. Department Outlines Compre- 
hensive Approach to Commodity Policy 
(Katz) 129 


Military Assistance and Sales to Turkey 

(Ford, Sisco) 109 

U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus Extended 

for Six Months (Bennett, text of resolution) 145 

Egypt. AID Makes $114 Million Loans To 

Assist Egyptian Economy 117 

Finland. U.S. and Finland Agree on Draft of 

New Extradition Treaty 121 

Germany. Claims Against the German Demo- 
cratic Republic 132 

Greece. Military Assistance and Sales to Tur- 
key (Ford, Sisco) 109 

Indonesia. President Suharto of Indonesia 
Meets With President Ford (exchange of 
toasts) 115 

Israel. United States and Israel Plan Joint De- 
salting Project 128 

Jordan. Jordan Receives $10 Million Loan for 

Highway Construction Project 127 

Korea. Department Discusses Status of 
Human Rights in the Republic of Korea and 
the Republic of the Philippines (Habib) . . 123 

Peru. U.S. and Peru Reach Agreement on Air- 
line Services 147 

Philippines. Department Discusses Status of 
' Human Rights in the Republic of Korea and 

the Republic of the Philippines (Habib) . . 123 

Presidential Documents 

Military Assistance and Sales to Turkey . . 109 

President Ford Outlines U.S. Goals in the 
United Nations 114 

President Suharto of Indonesia Meets With 

President Ford 115 

Report of Interagency Task Force on Indo- 
china Refugees Transmitted to the Congress 133 

U.S.-Brazil Agreement on Shrimp Trans- 
mitted to the Senate . 132 


GPO Sales Publications 148 

1949 "Foreign Relations" Volume on Western 
Europe Released 148 

Refugees. Report of Interagency Task Force 
on Indochina Refugees Transmitted to the 
Congress (Ford, Taft, text of report . . ". 133 

Romania. Department Urges Congressional 
Approval of Trade Agreement With Ro- 
mania (Hartman) 118 

Space. U.N. Outer Space Committee Meets at 
New York (Bennett, Stowe) 140 


Department Discusses Issue of Syrian Jewish 

Community (Saunders) 121 

Syria Receives Development Loans of $58 
Million From United States 127 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 147 

Department Urges Congressional Approval of 
Trade Agreement With Romania (Hart- 
man) 118 

U.S. and Finland Agree on Draft of New Ex- 
tradition Treaty 121 

U.S. and Peru Reach Agreement on Airline 

Services 147 

U.S.-Brazil Agreement on Shrimp Trans- 
mitted to the Senate (message from Presi- 
dent Ford) 132 

United Nations 

President Ford Outlines U.S. Goals in the 

United Nations (remarks) 114 

U.N. Outer Space Committee Meets at New 

York (Bennett, Stowe) 140 

U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus Extended 

for Six Months (Bennett, text of resolution) 145 

Name Index 

Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr 140, 145 

Ford, President .... 109, 114, 115, 132, 133 

Habib, Philip C 123, Arthur A 118 

Katz, Julius L 129 

Saunders, Harold H 121 

Sisco, Joseph J 109 

Stowe, Ronald F 140 

Suharto, President 115 

Taft, Julia Vadala 133 


k List 

of Department of State 


Releases: July 7-13 

Press releases may be obtained from the 


of Press Relations, Department of State, | 



D.C. 20520. 






Kissinger Scholarship Fund 



U.S. Advisory Commission on 
International Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, July 23. 



Advisory Committee for U.S. 
Participation in the U.N. Con- 
ference on Human Settlements 



U.S. -Peru air transport under- 
standing (rewrite). 



Kissinger: departure, Andrews 



Sisco: House International Rela- 
tions Committee. 



Kissinger: arrival, Paris, July 9. 



Kissinger, Sauvagnargues: re- 
marks, Paris. 



Twenty-one foreign energy re- 
search leaders to visit major 
U.S. facilities. 



Heroism award presented post- 
humously to Ronald A. Webb. 



Kissinger, Sauvagnargues: re- 
marks, Paris, July 10. 



Kissinger: arrival, Geneva, July 

Kissinger, Gromyko: remarks. 



Geneva, July 10. 



U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint communique, 

* Not prir 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 


Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. government printing office 



postage and fees paid 
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Volume LXXm 

No. 1884 

August 4, 1975 

Address by Secretary Kissinger at Milwaukee 149 

Address by Secretary Kissinger at Minneapolis 161 




For index see inside hack cover 

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Vol. LXXIII, No. 1884 
August 4, 1975 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by 
Office of Media Services, Bureau 
Public Affairs, provides tlie public and 
interested agencies of t/ie government 
wit/i information on developments in 
tlie field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on t/ie work of tlie Department am 
tlie Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national Interest. 

Publications of the Department oi 
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legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 


The Global Challenge and International Cooperation 

Address by Secretary Kissinger '■ 

K Ten days ago our nation entered its 200th 
year. We begin our Bicentennial with jus- 
tifiable pride in our past, a recognition of 
the challenges of the present, and great hope 
for the future. 

The world in which we live is poised un- 
easily between an era of great enterprise and 
creativity or an age of chaos and despair. We 
have, on the one hand, developed weapons 
that could destroy us and our civilization ; 
we have, on the other, created a world 
economy that could — for the first time in 
history — eradicate poverty, hunger, and 
human sufi'ering. 

This complex of unprecedented oppor- 
tunity and unparalleled danger is at the heart 
of the great challenge that has faced the 
United States with increasing urgency since 
the close of World War II. And it is our 
generation that must make the choices which 
will determine success or failure. It is a 
burden that we can shoulder with fortitude 
or ignore with peril — but it is a burden we 
cannot shed. 

Our nation has come to symbolize man's 
capacity to master his destiny. It is a proud 
legacy that has given hope and inspiration 
to the millions who have looked to us over 
the past two centuries as a beacon of liberty 
and justice. 

Today's generation of Americans must be 
as true to its duty as earlier generations were 
to theirs. When weapons span continents in 

' Made before a dinner meeting sponsored by the 
University of Wisconsin Institute of World Affairs 
and other organizations at Milwaukee, Wis., on 
July 14 (text from press release 370). 

minutes, our security is bound up with world 
peace. When our factories, farms, and 
financial strength are deeply affected by 
decisions taken in foreign lands, our pros- 
perity is linked to world prosperity. The 
peace of the world and our own security, the 
world's progress and our own prosperity, are 

The Structure of Peace 

We have a proud foundation on which to 
build. We have maintained stability in the 
world, insured the security and independ- 
ence of scores of nations, and expended 
blood and treasure in the defense of freedom. 
Our economic support helped our major allies 
regain their strength ; we contributed to a 
global trading and monetary system which 
has sustained and spread prosperity through- 
out the world. With our encouragement, the 
new nations took their place in the inter- 
national community and set out on the path 
of economic development. At our initiative 
many longstanding disputes were settled by 
peaceful means. Conflicts were contained and 
global war was avoided. 

We have provided more economic assist- 
ance than any other nation in history. We 
have contributed more food, educated more 
people from other lands, and welcomed more 
immigrants and refugees. We have done so 
because we are a generous people — for which 
we need not apologize — and because we have 
understood that our self-interest is bound 
up with the fate of all mankind. 

These successes have brought great change. 
The rigidities of the cold war period have 

August 4, 1975 


fragmented. Power and wealth, ideology and 
purpose, have become diffused and have 
transformed the international scene. The 
reemergence of Europe and Japan, the 
rivalry among the Communist powers, the 
growth of military technologies, the rise 
and increasing diversity of the developing 
nations have produced a new global environ- 
ment — a world of many centers of power, of 
persistent ideological differences, clouded by 
nuclear peril and struggling for economic 
security and advance. The central focus of 
U.S. foreign policy is to help shape from this 
environment a new international structure 
based on equilibrium rather than confronta- 
tion, linking nations to each other by 
practices of cooperation that reflect the real- 
ity of global interdependence. 

Our task begins at home. To be strong and 
effective abroad, we must be strong and pur- 
poseful at home. To preserve peace, our 
military strength must be beyond challenge. 
To promote global prosperity, our domestic 
economy must prosper. To carry forward our 
international efforts, we must be a united 
people, sure in our purposes and determined 
to build on the great achievements of our 
national heritage. 

Our first responsibility abroad is to the 
great industrial democracies with whom we 
share our history, our prosperity, and our 
political ideals. Our alliances across the 
Atlantic and with Japan are the cornerstone 
of our foreign policy. Today they are more 
than responses to military threat; they are 
instrumentalities of social and economic 
cooperation as well. 

The ultimate objective of our alliances has 
always been to ease, not to freeze, the 
divisions of the world. In the past few years 
the United States has taken a number of 
steps to resolve concrete problems with the 
Soviet Union and lay the basis for more 
positive endeavors. We have also forged a 
new relationship with the People's Republic 
of China. There can be no lasting inter- 
national stability unless the major powers 
learn habits of restraint and feel a stake 
in international peace; all our hopes for a 
better world require that they use their 
power for the benefit of mankind. 

The scores of new nations that have be- juitw 
come independent since the Second World 
War are now major actors on the world scene. 
In their quest for their own progress, they 
present a challenge to the rest of the world 
— to demonstrate that the international 
structure can give them a role, a fair share, 
dignity, and responsibility. 

All of us — allies and adversaries, new 
nations and old, rich and poor — are part of 
a world community. Our interdependence on 
this planet is becoming the central fact of 
our diplomacy. Energy, resources, environ- 
ment, population, the uses of space and the 
seas — these are problems whose benefits and 
burdens transcend national boundaries. They 
carry the seeds of political conflict over the 
coming generation ; they challenge the capaci- 
ties of the international community with new 
requirements for vision and statesman- 

Much of our current agenda is therefore 
global in nature and must be dealt with on 
a global basis. Within a few weeks there 
will be two major meetings of the most 
prominent international organization, the 
United Nations. A special session of the 
General Assembly will be devoted to economic 
issues, and the 30th regular session of the 
General Assembly will address the broad 
range of international problems. 

Therefore I would like to use this occasion 
to place before you and our fellow members 
of the United Nations a candid assessment 
of how the U.S. Government views the 
contemporary United Nations — its capacities 
and its limitations, its promise and the trends 
which threaten future progress. 

The Record of the United Nations 

Thirty years after the founding of the 
United Nations, its achievements have been 
substantial, and its promise is great. Most 
of the world is at peace. Beyond the absence 
of armed conflict, there has been a transition 
from a preoccupation with security to a new 
concern for the economic and social progress 
of all mankind. Yet, at the very time when 
interdependence impels international co- 
operation and when the membership of the 


Department of State Bulletin 



Jnited Nations is most universal, the inter- 
ational organization is being tested by a new 
lash of ideologies and interests and by 
nsistent tactics of confrontation. Such 
endencies diminish the prospect for further 
ichievement and threaten the very institution 

Let me place these tendencies in historical 

The end of the Second World War brought 
)n a period of idealism and hope. Victory in 
ffav against tyrannical regimes — by nations 
jnited for that purpose — seemed as much a 
;riumph for liberty as for peace. The end 
3f the colonial era was shortly to begin and 
was clearly in prospect. The awesome power 
3f nuclear weapons, ironically, gave hope 
that the imperatives of collective security 
and peaceful settlement of disputes would at 
last impress themselves on mankind. The 
League of Nations had failed, but the cost of 
another failure now seemed so overwhelming 
that it was possible to hope that the nations 
of the world would be obliged to make the 
United Nations succeed. 

No nation embraced this hope more 
genuinely than the United States. No country 
more seriously looked for the United Nations 
to replace force and domination with co- 
operation. No government more earnestly 
sought to create a world organization with a 
capacity to act. It is worth recalling that 
a year after the San Francisco Conference, 
when the United States was the sole 
possessor of nuclear weapons, we offered to 
turn this entire technology over to the United 

Even then American spokesmen were care- 
ful to insist that there were realistic limits to 
the scope of the new organization. Of these 
limits the most important, even if perhaps 
the easiest to overlook, is that the United 
Nations is not a world government ; it is an 
organization of sovereign states. It is not 
an entity apart from its membership. It 
reflects the world context in which it operates 
— its diversity, its imperfections, its many 
centers of power and initiative, its competing 
values, its worldly compound of nobility and 

The founders' hope for peace rested not on 

a naive belief in the perfectibility of man 
but on the hope that the major powers, given 
a dominant role in the Security Council, 
would be able to concert together to keep the 
peace. This hope, of course, proved stillborn 
when the United Nations became an arena 
for the confrontations of the cold war. 

A generation later, its record in main- 
taining the peace shows both success and 
failure. There have been local wars; yet 
there has been no general war. More than 
once, small conflicts which could have led in 
the past to great ones have been contained 
through the efforts of the United Nations. 

Time and again — in the eastern Medi- 
terranean, in the Middle East, in the Congo, 
in Kashmir — the peacekeeping role of the 
United Nations has proved indispensable 
for settlement, guarantees, and prevention of 
major-power intervention. While a far cry 
from the concept of collective security orig- 
inally envisioned, these operations have 
proven valuable and increasingly indispen- 
sable. They represent the most advanced 
manifestations of international cooperation 
for security yet achieved. 

The United Nations has understood the 
principle that peace is not the same as the 
status quo, but must embrace procedures 
for peaceful change. Whether by special 
commissions or mediators or through the 
expanded role of the Secretary General 
within his broad responsibilities under article 
99 of the charter, the United Nations has 
off'ered a flexible instrument of pacific 
settlement on a score of occasions since its 

The United Nations has provided a forum 
for debate and negotiation on regional or 
global problems and for multilateral efforts 
for arms control and disarmament. The talks 
provide a safety valve and a sounding 
board; in the corridors, quiet progress is 
often being made. 

We found early on that there were limits 
to U.N. action on behalf of peace and secu- 
rity. Its writ can run no further than the 
agreement of its members. And on the sweep- 
ing issues of war and peace, it is the great 
powers, by virtue of their size, military 
strength, economic power, and political in- 

August 4, 1975 


fluence, who bear the principal responsibility 
for world stability and security. Of late, as 
the great powers are learning the practices 
of coexistence, there is hope that the United 
Nations can find renewed possibilities for 
effective action in accordance with the vision 
of its founders. 

The United Nations, originally concerned 
primarily with issues of peace and security, 
has been the focus of increasing attention 
to economic and social issues. The U.N. 
Charter contains a commitment "to employ 
international machinery for the promotion 
of the economic and social advancement of 
all peoples." Today, roughly nine-tenths of 
expenditures within the U.N. system relate 
to economic and social cooperation. We wel- 
come this evolution and have contributed 
generously to it. 

Indeed, it is in these fields that the work 
of the United Nations has been most suc- 
cessful and yet the most unheralded. Its 
specialized agencies have been efi^ectively 
involved with countless areas of human and 
international concern — speeding decoloniza- 
tion ; spreading education, science, and tech- 
nology; organizing global cooperation to 
combat hunger and disease, to protect the 
environment, and to limit population growth ; 
regulating international transport and com- 
munication and peaceful nuclear power; ad- 
vancing human rights and expanding inter- 
national law among nations and in outer 
space and on the seas; preserving the price- 
less cultural heritage of mankind. It is 
striking, and of great importance for the 
future, that the United Nations has been 
able to respond creatively to so many of 
the challenges of the modern age. 

Thus the United Nations is of considerable 
importance for the world's future. It has 
accommodated our traditional security and 
political concerns to the new conditions of 
international diplomacy; it has extended 
its reach — even before most nations did — 
toward the new agenda that now confronts 
the world community. The United Nations 
is both a symbol of our interdependence and 
our most universal instrument for common 

In this connection, I want to pay tribute 

to the outstanding leadership given to the 
United Nations by its Secretary General, 
Kurt Waldheim. He is tireless and totally 
dedicated to peace, fairness, and the future 
of the United Nations. The rapidity and 
efficiency with which he organized and dis- 
patched peacekeeping forces to the Middle 
East in late 1973 was but one example 
of the many services he has rendered the 
organization and the international com- 

The United States and the United Nations 

Yet with all these achievements, the future 
of the United Nations is clouded. Much that 
has transpired at the United Nations in re- 
cent years gives us pause. At the very mo- 
ment when great-power confrontations are 
waning, troubling trends have appeared in 
the General Assembly and some of its spe- 
cialized agencies. Ideological confrontation, 
bloc voting, and new attempts to manipulate 
the charter to achieve unilateral ends threat- 
en to turn the United Nations into a weapon 
of political warfare rather than a healer of 
political conflict and a promoter of human 

The United Nations naturally mirrors the 
evolution of its composition. In its first 
phase it reflected the ideological struggle 
between the West and and East ; during that 
period the United Nations generally followed 
the American lead. Time and again in those 
days there were some 50 votes in support 
of our position and only a handful of Com- 
munist-bloc members against. 

Ten years later, when membership had 
grown to more than 80, our dominance in 
the General Assembly no longer was a.ssured. 
Neither East nor West was able to prevail. 
In the Security Council the American posi- 
tion was still sustained, while the Soviet 
Union was required to cast veto after veto 
in order to protect what it considered to be 
its vital interests. 

But with the quantum leap to the present 
membership of 138, the past tendencies of 
bloc politics have become more pronounced 
and more serious. The new nations, for un- 
derstandable reasons, turned to the General 


Department of State Bulletin 

Assembly, in which they predominated, in 
a quest for power that simply does not re- 
side there. The Assembly cannot take com- 
pulsory legal decisions. Yet numerical ma- 
jorities have insisted on their will and 
objectives even when in population and 
financial contributions they were a small 
proportion of the membership. 

In the process, a forum for accommoda- 
tion has been transformed into a setting 
for confrontation. The moral influence which 
the General Assembly should exercise has 
been jeopardized and could be destroyed if 
governments — particularly those who are its 
main financial supporters — should lose con- 
fidence in the organization because of the 
imposition of a mechanical and increasingly 
arbitrary will. 

It is an irony that at the moment the 
United States has accepted nonalignment and 
the value of diversity, those nations which 
originally chose this stance to preserve their 
sovereign independence from powerful mili- 
tary alliances are forming a rigid grouping 
of their own. The most solid bloc in the 
world today is, paradoxically, the alignment 
of the nonaligned. This divides the world 
into categories of North and South, develop- 
ing and developed, imperial and colonial, at 
the very moment in history when such 
categories have become irrelevant and mis- 

Never before has the world been more in 
need of cooperative solutions. Never before 
have the industrial nations been more ready 
to deal with the problems of development 
in a constructive spirit. Yet lopsided, loaded 
voting, biased results, and arbitrary tactics 
threaten to destroy these possibilities. The 
utility of the General Assembly both as a 
safety valve and as an instrument of inter- 
national cooperation is being undermined. 
Tragically, the principal victims will be the 
countries who seek to extort what substan- 
tially could be theirs if they proceeded co- 

An equally deplorable development is the 
trend in the specialized agencies to focus 
on political issues and thereby deflect the 
significant work of these agencies. UNESCO 
[U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 

Organization], designed for cultural matters, 
and the International Labor Organization 
have been heavily politicized. An egregious 
recent case came in the World Food Council 
in Rome, where the very nations who des- 
perately need, and would most benefit from, 
food assistance threatened to abort its work 
by disruptive tactics unworthy of an inter- 
national organization. This Council grew 
out of the American initiatives at the 
World Food Conference last year. It re- 
flects our deepest humanitarian concerns; 
it represents a serious efi'ort on our part 
to eliminate hunger and malnutrition. Abuse 
by those whom we are trying to help, 
attacks on our motives by the beneficiaries 
of our eff"orts, threaten to undermine the 
very fabric of cooperation in a field of cru- 
cial long-range importance to mankind. 

We realize that those of us who wish to 
surmount the current crisis must show some 
understanding of its origins. The major 
powers have hardly always set a consistent 
example of altruistic or benevolent behavior. 
The nations which would seek to coerce the 
industrialized countries have themselves 
been coerced in the past. History haunts us 
all. But it is precisely to transcend that his- 
tory that the United Nations was founded. 
And it is precisely to arrest such trends that 
the United States is calling attention to them 

The process is surely self-defeating. Ac- 
cording to the rules of the Genera) Assem- 
bly, the coerced are under no compulsion to 
submit. To the contrary, they are given all 
too many incentives simply to depart the 
scene, to have done with the pretense. Such 
incentives are ominously enhanced when the 
General Assembly and specialized agencies 
expel member nations which for one reason 
or another do not meet with their ap- 

Our concern has nothing to do with our 
attitude toward the practices or policies of 
the particular governments against which 
action is being taken. Our position is con- 
stitutional. If the United Nations begins to 
depart from its charter, where suspension 
and expulsion are clearly specified preroga- 
tives of the Security Council, we fear for 

" August 4, 1975 


the integrity and the survival of the General 
Assembly itself, and no less for that of the 
specialized agencies. Those who seek to ma- 
nipulate U.N. membership by procedural 
abuse may well inherit an empty shell. 

We are determined to oppose tendencies 
which, in our view, will undermine irrep- 
arably the effectiveness of the United Na- 
tions. It is the smaller members of the 
organization who would lose the most. They 
are more in need of the United Nations than 
the larger powers such as the United States 
which can prosper within or outside the 

Ways must be found for power and re- 
sponsibility in the Assembly and in the spe- 
cialized agencies to be more accurately re- 
flective of the realities of the world. The 
United States has been by far the largest 
financial supporter of the United Nations; 
but the support of the American people, 
which has been the lifeblood of the organi- 
zation, will be profoundly alienated unless 
fair play predominates and the numerical 
majority respects the views of the minoi'ity. 
The American people are understandably 
tired of the inflammatory rhetoric against 
us, the all-or-nothing stance accompanied by 
demands for our sacrifice which too fre- 
quently dominate the meeting halls of the 
United Nations. 

The United States, despite these trends, 
intends to do everything in our power to 
support and strengthen the United Nations 
in its positive endeavors. With all its limi- 
tations and imperfections the world body 
remains an urgent necessity. We are eager 
to cooperate, but we are also determined to 
insist on orderly procedures and adherence 
to the charter. The United Nations was 
never intended as an organization of like- 
minded states but, rather, an arena to accom- 
modate and respect different policies and 
different interests. The world needs coopera- 
tive, not arbitrary, action; joint efforts, not 
imposed solutions. In this spirit the United 
States will do what it can to make the 
United Nations a vital hope for a better 

The Agenda Before Us 

This, then, is the promise and the prob- 
lem of the United Nations. We must insure 
that the promise prevails, because the agenda 
we face makes the institution more necessary 
than ever before. 

The United Nations, first, faces continu- 
ing and increasing responsibilities in its 
mission, in the famous words of the U.N. 
Charter, "to save succeeding generations 
from the scourge of war." 

One of the central issues of our time is 
the Middle East conflict, and the U.N. Secu- 
rity Council continues to play a vital role 
in the quest for a solution. Resolution 338 
of 1973 launched a negotiating process which 
has borne fruit and proved durable. Secre- 
tary General Waldheim convened and ad- 
dressed the first session of the Geneva Con- 
ference. Resolution 242 of 1967 stated gen- 
eral principles for a comprehensive peace. 
The stationing of U.N. Forces was an indis- 
pensable element of the recent disengage- 
ment agreements between Israel and Egypt 
and Israel and Syria in 1974. 

But despite these and other real achieve- 
ments, the global perils of local conflict 
continue to loom large. The world has dealt 
with them as if it were possible to contain 
conflict perpetually. But such tolerance 
tempts conflagration. That is how the first 
two World Wars began. We must not have 
a third ; with modern weapons there would 
not be a fourth. It is not enough to contain 
the crises that occur; we must eradicate 
their causes. President Ford is therefore 
determined to help bring about a negotiated 
solution in the Middle East, in Cyprus, and 
in other areas of dispute. And peacekeeping- 
and peacemaking must be a top priority on 
the U.N. agenda. 

Another problem of peace which the world 
community must urgently address is the 
spread of nuclear weapons. Their awesome- 
ness has chained these weapons for almost 
three decades; their sophistication and ex- 
pense have long helped limit the number of 
nations which could possess them. But now 
political inhibitions are crumbling. Nuclear 


Department of State Bulletin 

catastrophe — whether by plan or mistake, 
accident, theft, or blackmail — is no longer 

It is imperative to contain — and reverse — 
the nuclear arms race among the major 
powers. We are now engaged in translating 
the principles agreed to in Vladivostok be- 
tween President Ford and General Secretary 
Brezhnev into a new accord between the 
United States and the Soviet Union that 
will for the first time place a long-term 
ceiling on the strategic weapons of both 

As we strive to slow the spiral of nuclear 
arms, we must work as well to halt their 
spread. This requires both political and 
technical measures. In these areas the work 
of the United Nations has been important 
and could be crucial. 

The Nonproliferation Treaty of 1970 was 
an important beginning. The recent confer- 
ence held under U.N. auspices to review the 
treaty, and the adherence of additional coun- 
tries to its provisions, have been valuable 
further steps. 

The priority now is to strengthen the 
safeguards on the export of nuclear mate- 
rials for peaceful uses. The oil crisis adds 
fresh urgency to this task because it has 
made the development of nuclear energy 
essential for an increasing number of na- 
tions. This means wider availability of ma- 
terials, such as Plutonium, and of equipment 
which might be used to develop nuclear 

Future generations have a right to expect 
of us that commercial competition among the 
industrial exporting countries will not be so 
reckless and irresponsible that it accelerates 
the spread of nuclear weapons and thereby 
increases the risks of a nuclear holocaust. 

Therefore the United States has begun 
confidential discussions with other nuclear- 
exporting countries to develop stronger and 
generally accepted safeguards. In this task, 
the role and work of the U.N.'s International 
Atomic Energy Agency is vital. As peaceful 
nuclear programs grow in size and com- 
plexity it is crucial that supplier and user 

nations agree on firm and clear export 
standards and strengthened IAEA safe- 
guards. An efi"ective world safeguards sys- 
tem will minimize nuclear risks while foster- 
ing the development of peaceful nuclear 
energy. The control of nuclear weapons is 
one of the most critical tests of this genera- 
tion. The United Nations can crucially help 
decide whether we will meet this test. 

The Problem of Interdependence 

In the last few years the world economy 
has undergone a series of shocks and strains: 

— Nations have suffered both severe infla- 
tion and deep recession on a worldwide scale. 

— The price of the world's most essential 
commodity, petroleum, has been precipitous- 
ly and arbitrarily increased, burdening the 
economies of all consuming nations and im- 
posing the most serious hardships on the 
poorest countries. 

— The world's food reserves have dwindled 
alarmingly in only a few short years. Un- 
less massive efforts are mounted, the gap 
between population growth and food produc- 
tion could reach disastrous proportions. 

— The pursuit of economic growth is com- 
plicated by the fact of interdependence; it 
can no longer be pursued by national efforts, 
but requires coordinated global actions. 

This September's special session of the 
General Assembly will focus on the new 
global economic concerns. It will be an early 
and important test: Will the rich nations 
and poor nations identify common goals and 
solve problems together, or will they ex- 
acerbate their differences? Can we turn our 
energies from rhetorical battles to practical 
cooperation? Will nations strive for empty 
parliamentary victories or concrete prog- 
ress ? 

The United States has made its choice. We 
believe strongly in a cooperative approach. 
We believe that the time has come t(3 pjuj:; the 
technological and economic genius oSf' man- 
kind into the service of progress for all. We 
will approach the special session with deter- 
mination to make progress; we intend to 

August 4, 1975 


make concrete and constructive proposals for 
action across a broad spectrum of interna- 
tional economic activities such as trade and 
commodities, world food production, and in- 
ternational financial measures. 

The session will also consider structural 
changes to improve the U.N.'s capabilities in 
the field of economic development. A group 
of experts appointed by Secretary General 
Waldheim has just completed a study of this 
subject. We will offer specific comments 
on these recommendations during the Assem- 
bly debate. 

In this spirit, let me speak directly to the 
new nations who have pressed their claims 
with inci-easing fervor. We have heard and 
have begun to understand your concerns. 
We want to be responsive. We are prepared 
to undertake joint efforts to alleviate your 
economic problems. Clearly this requires a 
posture of cooperation. If nations deal with 
each other with respect and understanding, 
the two sessions this fall could mark the 
beginning of a new era in which the reali- 
ties of an interdependent world economy 
generate a global effort to bring about peace- 
ful and substantial change. 

At the same time we are obliged to speak 
plainly to the question of what works and 
what does not. We believe that economic 
development is in the first instance an in- 
ternal process. Either societies create the 
conditions for saving and investment, for in- 
novation and ingenuity, and for enterprise 
and industry which ultimately lead to self- 
sustaining economic growth, or they do not. 
There is no magical shortcut and no rhetori- 
cal substitute. And to claim otherwise sug- 
gests a need for permanent dependence on 

In this quest for development, experience 
must count for something and ideology is 
an unreliable guide. At a minimum, we 
know which economies have worked and 
which have failed ; we have a record of what 
societies have progressed economically and 
which have stagnated. We know from our 
own experience that investment from abroad 
can be an important spur to development. 
We know also that it is now in short supply. 
In the future, as in the past, there will be 

competition to attract capital; therefore 
those who do not wish investment from 
abroad can be confident that they will not 
receive it. By the same token those countries 
which are eager to industrialize must also 
be ready to create the conditions that will 
attract large-scale investment. 

The voting records of the blocs in the 
General Assembly simply do not reflect eco- 
nomic reality. The family of less developed 
countries includes both producers and con- 
sumers of energy, importers and exporters 
of raw materials, and nations which can 
feed their populations as well as those which 
face the specter of famine. These divergent 
interests must be accommodated and reflected 
in practical measures ; they cannot be re- 
solved from the unreality of bloc positions. 

At the same time, the industrial world 
must adapt its own attitudes to the new 
reality of scores of new nations. At bottom 
the challenge is political, not economic — 
whether the interests and weight of the 
less developed nations can be accommodated 
in the international order. Their political 
objectives often represent legitimate claims. 
Yet at the same time the new nations must 
not expect us to make onhj political decisions, 
with no thought for economic consequences. 
If they want truly to serve their peoples, 
there must be practical concern for effec- 
tive results. 

If the industrial world wants to overcome 
the attitude of confrontation between na- 
tions, it must offer equitable solutions for 
the problems of the less fortunate parts of 
the world. Just as we are rightly concerned 
about the economic impact of exorbitant oil 
prices, so we should show understanding for 
the concerns of producers of other raw 
materials whose incomes fluctuate radically. 

As for the operation of our companies 
abroad, we consider it in our interest, as well 
as in the common interest, to promote an 
environment of mutual benefit in which our 
international businesses can continue to be 
both profitable and beneficial to the countries 
in which they operate. We will address this 
issue more fully at the special session. 

Above all, the industrialized countries 
must recognize that many developing coun- 


Department of State Bulletin 

tries have had frustratingly slow rates of 
growth. Rather than a comfortable margin 
of progress, they face an abundance of ob- 
stacles and a surplus of despair. The future 
of international politics over the next gen- 
eration — the kind of world our children will 
inherit — will be determined by what actions 
governments take now on this spectrum of 
economic issues. 

The Central Role of the United Nations 

Dag Hammerskjold once predicted that 
the day would come when people would see 
the United Nations for what it really is — 
not the abstract painting of some artist, but 
a drawing done by the peoples of the world. 
And so it is — not the perfect institution of 
the dreamers who saw it as the only true 
road to world harmony and not the evil 
instrument of world domination that the 
isolationists once made it out to be. 

Rather it is, like so many human institu- 
tions before it, an imperfect instrument — 
but one of great hope nonetheless. The 
United States remains dedicated to the prin- 
ciples upon which the United Nations was 
founded. We continue to believe it can be a 
mighty and effective vehicle for pi-eserving 
the peace and bridging the gap between the 
world's rich and poor. We will do all we can 
to make it so. 

The past decade, and particularly the past 
several years, have been a difficult time for 
America. We have known the agony of in- 
ternal dissension and political turmoil and 
the bitter costs of a lengthy war. But our 
nation has come through all this and its most 
difficult constitutional crisis since the Civil 
War with our institutions intact and our 
people resilient. And we have seen that the 
world still looks to us for leadership in 
preserving the peace and promoting eco- 
nomic advance for all mankind. 

But the past decade has also surely shown 
that — strong and prosperous as we are — we 
cannot remake the world alone. Others must 
do their part and bear their responsibility 
for building the better world we all seek 
for the generations that will come after us. 

In this endeavor, the United Nations plays 
a central role. It is there that each nation. 

large or small, rich or poor, can — if it will — 
make its contribution to the betterment of 
all. It is there that nations must realize 
that restraint is the only principle that can 
save the world from chaos and that our 
destinies are truly intertwined on this small 
planet. It is there that we will see whether 
men and nations have the wisdom and cour- 
age to make a reality of the ideals of the 
charter and, in the end, to turn the Parlia- 
ment of Man into a true expression of the 
conscience of humanity. 

Questions and Answers Following 
the Secretary's Milwaukee Address 

Press release 370B dated July 14 

Q. Has the United States recently shifted 
its position toward developing a first-strike 
nuclear capability? 

Secretary Kissinger: Before I answer any 
questions, I wanted to make one remark about 
some of the people at the head table here. 

For those of us in the executive branch, 
close relations between the executive and the 
legislative have always been crucially im- 
portant, and I wanted to take the occasion to 
pay tribute to the senior ranking Democrat 
on the International Relations Committee 
after the chairman, your Congressman from 
Milwaukee, Clem Zablocki, who has been of 
enormous assistance in helping us put for- 
ward what we consider useful foreign policy 
initiatives, and who has not, I must point 
out, hesitated to harass us when he wrongly 
thought we were wrong. [Laughter and ap- 

And I would also like to say a word for 
one of that rare breed, the few Republicans 
that are left in the House of Representatives, 
Mr. Kasten, on my right, who — and when any 
member of the executive branch says any- 
thing friendly about a freshman these days, 
it is an accident. [Laughter.] But in his brief 
tenure in Washington, I have known him as 
a supporter of enlightened foreign policies 
who has not hesitated, I regret to say, to 
criticize us. But we will teach him. [Laughter 

August 4, 1975 


and applause.] You notice I did not say that 
about Zablocki. [Laughter.] 

Now, with respect to your question: I do 
not believe that the United States has 
changed its basic policy with respect to first 
strike. It has always been the United States 
policy that in certain extreme circumstances, 
if the national survival was at stake or if the 
survival of our close allies, especially Europe, 
were at stake, and if no other means were 
available, that the United States might have 
to be the first to resort to nuclear weapons. 

If you look at the statements of Presidents 
and Secretaries of Defense since the fifties, 
this has been a settled American doctrine. It 
has recently been stated more elegantly than 
in the past and therefore has attracted new 
attention. But it is not a new American pol- 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what importance, other 
than ceremonial, do you attach to the coming 
July 30 East-West summit conference in Hel- 

Secretary Kissinger: The European Secu- 
rity Conference has been in progress for sev- 
eral years. And in that period, it has at- 
tempted to establish a balance between the 
concerns of the East, which dealt primarily 
with the acceptance of frontiers, and the con- 
cerns of the West, which concerned primarily 
a recognition that peaceful change was not 
precluded by the existing circumstances and 
that an easing of human contacts with the 
East was in prospect. 

I believe that the final document that has 
been negotiated achieves a balance between 
these two objectives. The meeting at the sum- 
mit in Helsinki will symbolize this and will 
give an opportunity for the various heads of 
government to exchange ideas on many other 
problems going far beyond the Security Con- 

The Security Conference should not be 
overestimated as marking a decisive turn. It 
is one step in a progress toward the easing 
of tensions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, ivill you explain the dif- 
ferences between your plan to disengage the 
Arabs and Israelis atid the U.N. Resolution 
242 signed by the big powers the loar before 

last, a«c? do yon believe the two sides prefer 
your plan to the U.N. 2^2? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it is hard for 
me to imagine that anyone would not prefer 
my plan. [Laughter and applause.] 

But the two approaches are not inconsist- 
ent with each other. 

There are two general ways one can get at 
the solution of the Middle East problem. One 
is to attempt in one grand negotiation to set- 
tle all issues simultaneously — frontiers, Pal- 
estinians, guarantees, obligations of peace, 
and so forth. This would be the most desira- 
ble route, but it is also the most complicated, 
because the most extreme elements may dom- 
inate the debate and because outside powers 
may also bring pressure on the discussion. 

The other approach is to try to isolate in- 
dividual issues, deal with them one at a time 
until one has reached a point where this so- 
called step-by-step approach could no longer 
be feasible, and then attempt to have the 
overall negotiation. 

We have believed that the distrust among 
the countries was so great, the issues so com- 
plicated, that to deal with them all simulta- 
neously had an unacceptable risk to produce 
a stalemate and therefore an unacceptable 
risk of a Middle East war. And in a way, the 
complexity of even a single negotiation tends 
to support this. 

On the other hand, if we should succeed in 
the negotiations now going on, it is highly 
probable that the next phase will deal with 
an overall settlement. 

So what I have been doing up to now 
should be looked at as a preparatory phase 
to the overall settlement that was foreseen by 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. 

Q. Mr. Chairman, given the threat of the 
Soviet base i)i Somalia, do you believe this 
fact will give Congress added impetus to ap- 
prove fioids for a naval base at Diego Garcia 
in the Indian Ocean? 

Secretary Kissinger: The visits by two 
congressional committees to Somalia seem to 
support the proposition that there is a Soviet 
facility in Somalia. And therefore it would 
be my impression that it would tend to 
strengthen the case for the base at Diego 


Department of State Bulletin 

Garcia that the Administration has proposed. 
I would like to add, however, that the case 
for the base at Diego Garcia rests not only on 
the Soviet facility in Somalia, but it rests 
also on the general necessities of American 
strategy on a global basis and therefore has 
more justification than simply the base in 
Somalia, even though that is a contributing 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the evoit of another 
Middle East war, would you support direct 
American military involvement to support 

Secretary Kissinger: Israel has never 
asked for direct American military involve- 
ment and has always asked to be given suf- 
ficient arms to take care of itself. Therefore 
we do not believe that this issue will arise in 
another Middle East war. Nevertheless 
another Middle East war is .something that 
we have every incentive to avoid, because 
it would create unacceptable pressures on 
our relations with Western Europe and Japan 
and high risk of confrontation with the 
Soviet Union. 

The United States has taken the position 
that we would resist outside intervention in 
the area. But we have also taken the position 
that the best way to avoid these contingencies 
is to make steady progress toward peace. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what are the minimum 
demands of President Sadat iyi order to re- 
new the U.N. peacekeeping agreement? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the Egyptian 
position has been to tie a renewal of the U.N. 
mandate to progress in the Israeli-Egyptian 
negotiations. That decision will have to be 
made by July 24. And no one can survive 
who makes a prediction in the Middle East 
which can be proved right or wrong in such 
a short period. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, some of us in the United 
States feel that poiver and force is no longer 
the best means to solve world problems, even 
as the U.N.'s framers felt. What can the 
ordinary citizen do to assure that our gov- 
ernment will begin to use the best minds and 
best hopes to solve these very complex prob- 
lems? Could we not seek out a dozen of the 

best minds in each state to pool their wisdom 
to aid in the support of peaceful means with- 
in the realm of the United Nations? 

Secretary Kissinger: I agree with you that 
under contemporary conditions force is not 
an adequate means for settling international 
disputes. But I think it is also unfortunately 
true that as long as other countries maintain 
strong forces, the only way this can be 
achieved is by the United States maintaining 
its own strength. 

Now, is it possible to avoid this threat by 
some comprehensive approach to the prob- 
lem, either through government or by bring- 
ing in outside minds. As a former professor, 
I find it tempting to think that somewhere 
out there are 12 people in each country who, 
if they could only be consulted, would solve 
our problems. I frankly do not think that is 
the case. I do not doubt that there are out- 
standing people in the world who are not 
being sufficiently consulted. But I think the 
problem of war and peace and the elimina- 
tion of war and the reduction of the reliance 
on force require a slow, patient, persevering 
eflFort. And I do not believe that it can be 
achieved in one grand solution written by a 
group of outsiders, however brilliant they 
are. I won't have that view, though, after I 
have left this position. [Laughter and ap- 

Q. We just want to help you along a little 

Secretary Kissinger: Dr. Baumann [Carol 
Baumann, Director, Institute of World Af- 
fairs of the University of Wisconsin] says 
I will take one more question from the floor 
and then one from the head table. All right — 
please; whoever is next. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, how long will it he until 
we reestablish diplomatic ties with Cuba? 

Secretary Kissinger: How long will it be? 
We have publicly stated that hostility to 
Cuba is not an organic aspect of our foreign 
policy and that we are prepared to have 
serious exchanges with Cuba on the basis of 
reciprocity. We have made some gestures. 
Recently Cuba has made some gestures in 
our direction. But they have so far mostly 

August 4, 1975 


concerned atmospherics. We are prepared to 
begin a dialogue with Cuba; and once that is 
in progress, we can judge better what the 
possibilities are for improving our relation- 

Dr. Baumann: I'm sorry, but we are at 
the limit of our time. One of the prerogatives 
of the chair is to change the format. And 
there teas a very good question that I would 
like to ask Dr. Kissinger which came from 
the head table. 

Having responded to the many coyicerns 
over crisis areas this evening, could you per- 
haps close this informative session with an 
optimistic note reflecting the brighter areas 
and some of the accomplishments that in- 
fluence the present U.S. position and our 
future ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is impor- 
tant to understand that the world right now 
is in the process of transition from the post- 
war period, in which Western Europe and 
Japan were impotent as a result of the war, 
in which communism was monolithic, to a 
period in which Western Europe and Japan, 
largely as a result of our own efforts, of our 
own contribution — or to a considerable ex- 
tent as a result of our own contribution — 
have recovered their strength and self- 
confidence to a considerable extent and in 
which the Communist world has fragmented 
itself into competing centers. And also that 
we are living in a world, as I said in my 
speech, that is growing ever more inter- 
dependent. So the commotion we are wit- 
nessing is the birth of a new international 
system, in which, on the whole, considerable 
progress is being made. America's relations 

with Western Europe and Japan have never 
been better — and not just on issues of com- 
mon defense but also in relationship to the 
issues of energy, raw materials, and im- 
provement of the human condition. 

Our relationship with the Soviet Union is 
still an adversary relationship. Nevertheless 
we have for the first time begun to limit 
strategic arms; and we hope by the end of 
this year, or certainly in the near future, we 
will conclude a comprehensive agreement 
which for the first time will put a ceiling on 
strategic weapons and therefore substan- 
tially reduce the possibilities of nuclear con- 

We have established relationships with the 
People's Republic of China. 

With all the debates that are now going 
on, we think there is a great opportunity to 
work out together with the new nations a 
new approach to international development 
which will for the first time create a true 
world community. So I believe that our 
foreign policy is basically making progress 
and that we can look back to this period as 
one in which tensions were eased and a new 
international system was being created 
amidst much turmoil, with many frustra- 
tions, but on the whole one that will create a 
safer and better world for future genera- 
tions. [Applause.] 

Dr. Baumann: Mr. Secretary, that enthu- 
siastic applause is but a small indication of 
our appreciation for the candor with which 
you share your thoughts ivith us, the sparkle 
of your irit, and the time you so generously 
spent in answering our questions. On behalf 
of everyone here, our sincere thanks. 


Department of State Bulletin 

The Moral Foundations of Foreign Policy 

Address by Secretary Kissinger '■ 

I have long looked forward to coming to 
Minnesota because it is the home of a man 
I admire enormously, the one man who likes 
to talk almost as much as I do — Senator 
Humphrey. At the hearings on my nomina- 
tion as Secretary of State, Senator Humph- 
rey instructed me with much wisdom on 
the difficult job ahead. His advice was right 
on the mark and has been ever since. He is 
a good friend and a great statesman. Minne- 
sotans can be proud that he represents them 
in the U.S. Senate, for he is an example of 
the spirit of our country — its decency, its 
humanity, and its strength. 

America has now entered upon its 200th 
year as a free nation. In those two centuries 
our country has grown from a small agricul- 
tural nation with vei'y few responsibilities 
beyond its borders to a world power with 
global responsibilities. Yet, while the range 
of interests has changed massively, our com- 
mitment to the values that gave birth to our 
nation has remained unaltered. 

These are the aspects of our national ex- 
perience I would like to address today: the 
pursuit of America's values as a humane and 
just example to others, and the furthering 
of America's interests in a world where 
power remains the ultimate arbiter. How do 
we reconcile and advance both aspects of our 
national purpose? What, in our time, is the 
significance of the age-old quandary of the 
relationship between principle and power? 

Through the greater part of our history 

' Made at a luncheon meeting sponsored by the 
Upper Midwest Council and other organizations at 
Bloomington (Minneapolis), Minn., on July 15 (text 
fiom press release 372). 

we have been able to avoid the issue. A for- 
tunate margin of safety and an unexplored 
continent produced the impression that prin- 
ciple and power automatically coalesced, that 
no choice was necessary, or that only one 
choice was possible. 

But now for nearly a decade our nation 
has been weighed down by uncertainty and 
discord. We have found ourselves doubtful 
of our virtue and uncertain of our direction 
largely because we have suddenly realized 
that, like other nations before us, we must 
now reconcile our principles with our neces- 
sities. Amid frustration, many Americans 
questioned the validity of our involvement 
in the international arena; in the wake of 
our disappointments, some abroad now doubt 
our resolve. 

We are, I believe, emerging from this 
period with a renewed sense of confidence. 
Recent events have brought home to us — and 
to the rest of the world — that a purposeful, 
strong, and involved America is essential to 
peace and progress. These same events have 
also reminded us of the contribution this 
country made in the 30 years since World 
War n and what is at stake in the next 30 

The United States can look back on an 
extraordinary generation of achievement. 
We have maintained a stable balance of 
power in the world. We have preserved peace 
and fostered the growth of the industrial 
democracies of North America, Western 
Europe, and Japan. We helped shape the 
international trade and monetary system 
which has nourished global prosperity. We 
promoted decolonization and pioneered in 

August 4, 1975 


development assistance for the new nations. 
We have taken major initiatives to forge 
moi-e reUable and positive relationships with 
the major Communist powers. 

In a planet shrunk by communications and 
technology, in a world either devastated by 
war or struggling in the first steps of na- 
tionhood, in an international system not of 
empire but of scores of independent states, 
the global contribution of one nation — the 
United States — has been without precedent 
in human history. Only a nation of strong 
conviction and great idealism could have ac- 
complished these efforts. 

We shall not turn our backs on this legacy. 

The Modern Agenda 

Today we face a new agenda. Our accom- 
plishments over the past generation have 
changed the world and defined our tasks for 
the coming decades: 

—Our allies, the major industrial democ- 
racies, have recovered their vigor and in- 
fluence. We are transforming our alliances 
into more equal partnerships. We shall act 
in harmony with friends whose security and 
prosperity is indispensable to our own and 
whose cooperation is essential for progress 
and justice. 

— The incredible destructiveness of mod- 
ern weapons has transformed international 
politics. We must maintain our militai-y 
strength. But we have an obligation, in our 
own interest as well as the world's, to work 
with other nations to control both the growth 
and the spread of nuclear weapons. 

— In our relations with the Communist 
powei's we must never lose sight of the fact 
that in the thermonuclear age general war 
would be disastrous to mankind. We have 
an obligation to seek a more productive and 
stable relationship despite the basic antag- 
onism of our values. 

— Thirty years of economic and political 
evolution have brought about a new diffusion 
of power and initiative. At the same time, 
interdependence imposes upon all nations the 
reality that they must prosper together or 
suffer together. The destinies of the world's 

nations have become inevitably intertwined. 
Thus, the capacity of any one nation to shape 
events is more limited, and consequently our 
own choices are more difficult and complex. 

The Legacy of Our Past 

To deal with this agenda we require 
strength of purpose and conviction. A nation 
unsure of its values cannot shape its future. 
A people confused about its direction will 
miss the opportunity to build a better and 
more peaceful world. This is why perhaps 
our deepest challenge is our willingness to 
face the increasing ambiguity of the problem 
of ends and means. 

We start with strong assets. Throughout 
our history, we have sought to define and 
justify our foreign policy in terms of prin- 
ciple. We have never seen ourselves as just 
another nation-state pursuing selfish aims. 
We have always stood for something beyond 
ourselves — a beacon to the oppressed from 
other lands, from the first settlers to the 
recent refugees from Indochina. This con- 
viction of our uniqueness contributed to our 
unity, gave focus to our priorities, and sus- 
tained our confidence in ourselves. It has 
been, and is, a powerful force. 

But the emphasis on principle has also 
produced a characteristic American am- 
bivalence. Relations with a world of nations 
falling short of our ideal has always pre- 
sented us with dilemmas. As a people, we 
have oscillated between insistence on our 
uniqueness and the quest for broad accept- 
ance of our values, between tiying to influ- 
ence international developments and seeking 
to isolate ourselves from them, between ex- 
pecting too much of our power and being 
ashamed of it, between optimistic exuber- 
ance and frustration with the constraints 
practicality imposes. 

Through most of our history, we have 
sought to shield our country and hemisphere 
from outride intrusion, to shun involvement 
in balance-of-power politics. Soldiers and 
diplomats — the practitioners of power — have 
always been looked upon with suspicion. We 
considered generosity in relief efforts, the 
encouragement of free international trade, 


Department of State Bulletin I 

and the protection of our economic interests 
abroad as the only wholesome forms of in- 
ternational involvement. 

Our Founding Fathers were sophisticated 
men who understood the European balance 
of power and knew how to profit from it. 
For the succeeding century and a half, our 
security was assured by favorable circum- 
stances over which we had little influence. 
Shielded by two oceans and enriched by a 
bountiful nature, we proclaimed our special 
situation as universally valid to nations 
whose narrower margin of survival meant 
that their range of choices was far more 
limited than our own. 

Indeed, the concern of other nations for 
security reinforced our sense of uniqueness. 
We were a haven for millions, a place where 
the injustices, inequities, privations, and 
abridgements of human dignity which the 
immigrants had suff"ered were absent or 
amenable to rapid redress. 

As our strength and size expanded, we 
remained uncomfortable with the uses and 
responsibilities of power and involvement in 
day-to-day diplomacy. At the turn of the cen- 
tury, for example, there were soul-searching 
debates over the Spanish-American War and 
our first acquisition of noncontiguous terri- 
tories. While many saw' our policies as dic- 
tated by our interests, others considered 
them our entrance into a morally question- 
able world. 

Our tradition of law encouraged repeated 
attempts to legislate solutions to interna- 
tional conflicts. Arbitration, conciliation, in- 
ternational legal arrangements, neutrality 
legislation, collective security systems — all 
these were invoked to banish the reality of 
power. And when our involvement in con- 
flict became unavoidable in 1917, Woodrow 
Wilson translated our geopolitical interest in 
preventing any nation's hegemony in Europe 
into a universal moral objective; we fought 
to "make the world safe for democracy." 

The inevitable disillusionment with an im- 
perfect outcome led to a tide of isolationist 
sentiment. The Great Depression drew our 
energies further inward, as we sought to 
deal with the problems of our own society — 

even as that same depression simultaneously 
generated real dangers abroad. 

We were stirred from isolation only by 
external attack, and we sustained our effort 
because of the obvious totalitarian evil. We 
had opposed all-out war, and total victory 
further strengthened our sense of moral rec- 
titude — and ill prepared us for the after- 
math. Of all the nations involved, we alone 
emerged essentially unscathed from the 
ravages of conflict, our military power, 
economic strength, and political confidence 
intact. And in the postwar bipolar world of 
cold war confrontation, we believed we faced 
a reincarnation of the just-defeated foe — an 
apparently monolithic and hostile ideological 
empire whose ambitions and values were 
antithetical to our own. 

Our success and the preeminent position it 
brought convinced us that we could shape 
the globe according to American design. Our 
preponderant power gave us a broad margin 
for error, so we believed that we could over- 
whelm problems through the sheer weight of 
resources. No other nation possessed so 
much insurance against so many contingen- 
cies; we could aflFord to be imprecise in the 
definition of our interests. Indeed, we often 
imagined that we had nothing so selfish as 
interests, only obligations and responsibili- 
ties. In a period of seemingly clear-cut black- 
and-white divisions, we harbored few doubts 
about the validity of our cause. 

America's Role 

We no longer live in so simple a world. We 
remain the strongest nation and the largest 
single factor in international affairs. Our 
leadership is perhaps even more essential 
than before. But our strategic superiority 
has given way to nuclear balance. Our 
political and economic predominance has 
diminished as others have grown in strength, 
and our dependence on the world economy 
has increased. Our margin of safety has 

Today we find that — like most other na- 
tions in history — we can neither escape from 
the world nor dominate it. Today, we must 

August 4, 1975 


conduct diplomacy with subtlety, flexibility, 
maneuver, and imagination in the pursuit of 
our interests. We must be thoughtful in de- 
fining our interests. We must prepare 
against the worst contingency and not plan 
only for the best. We must pursue limited ob- 
jectives and many objectives simultaneously. 
In this effort, the last decade has taught us: 

— That our power will not always bring 
preferred solutions; but we are still strong 
enough to influence events, often decisively. 

— That we cannot remedy all the world's 
ills; but we can help build an international 
structure that will foster the initiative and 
cooperation of others. 

— That we can no longer expect that moral 
judgments expressed in absolute terms will 
command broad acceptance; but as the rich- 
est and most powerful nation, we still have 
a special responsibility to look beyond nar- 
row definitions of our national interests and 
to serve as a sponsor of world order. 

— That we cannot banish power politics 
from international affairs; but we can pro- 
mote new and wider communities of interest 
among nations; we can mute the use and 
threat of force ; we can help establish incen- 
tives for restraint and penalties for its ab- 
sence; we can encourage the resolution of 
disputes through negotiation; and we can 
help construct a more equitable pattern of 
relations between developed and developing 

This new complexity has produced in some 
a rebellion against contemporary foreign 
policy. We are told that our foreign policy is 
excessively pragmatic, that it sacrifices vir- 
tue in the mechanical pursuit of stability. 
• Once attacked as cold-war-oriented, we are 
now criticized by some as insensitive to 
moral values. Once regarded as naive in the 
use of power, we are now alleged to rely too 
much on the efficacy of force. Once viewed 
as the most generous of nations, we now 
stand accused by some of resisting a more 
equitable international economic system. 

It is time to face the reality of our situa- 
tion. Our choice is not between morality and 
pragmatism. We cannot escape either, nor 
are they incompatible. This nation must be 

true to its own beliefs, or it will lose its bear- 
ings in the world. But at the same time it 
must survive in a world of sovereign nations 
and competing wills. 

We need moral strength to select among 
often agonizing choices and a sense of pur- 
pose to navigate between the shoals of diffi- 
cult decisions. But we need as well a mature 
sense of means lest we substitute wishful 
thinking for the requirements of survival. 

Clearly we are in need of perspective. Let 
me state some basic principles : 

— Foreign policy must start ivith security. 
A nation's survival is its first and ultimate 
responsibility; it cannot be compromised or 
put to risk. There can be no security for us 
or for others unless the strength of the free 
countries is in balance with that of potential 
adversaries, and no stability in power rela- 
tionships is conceivable without America's 
active participation in world affairs. 

The choices in foreign policy are often 
difficult and the margins are frequently nar- 
row; imperfect solutions are sometimes un- 
avoidable. In the Second World War, for 
example, we joined forces with countries 
whose values we did not share, in order to 
accomplish the morally worthy objective of 
defeating nazism. Today we cooperate with 
many nations for the purpose of regional 
stability and global security, even though we 
disapprove of some of their internal prac- 
tices. These choices are made consciously and 
are based on our best assessment of what is 

— At the same time, security is a means, 
not an end. The purpose of security is to 
safeguard the values of our free society. And 
our survival is not always at stake in inter- 
national issues. Many of our decisions are 
not imposed on us by events. Where we have 
latitude, we must seize the moral opportunity 
for humanitarian purposes. 

Our assistance to developing nations, for 
example, serves both foreign policy and 
humanitarian ends. It strengthens political 
ties to other nations. It contributes to ex- 
panded trade; close to 90 percent of our 
foreign assistance is eventually spent in this 
country. And our assistance reflects our 


Department of State Bulletin 

values as a people, because we cannot close 
our eyes to the suffering of others. Because 
of history and moral tradition, we cannot 
live with ourselves as an island of plenty in 
a world of deprivation. 

In the whole field of foreign aid, and par- 
ticularly in food aid, America's record is un- 
surpassed. We and the world owe much to 
leaders with vision and compassion like 
Senator Humphrey who drafted the Food 
for Peace legislation some 20 years ago. 

— Finally, our values link the American 
people and their government. In a democ- 
racy, the conduct of foreign policy is possible 
only with public support. Therefore your 
government owes you an articulation of the 
purposas which its policies are designed to 
serve — to make clear our premises, to con- 
tribute to enlightened debate, and to explain 
how our policies serve the American people's 
objectives. And those principles — freedom, 
the dignity of the individual, the sanctity of 
law — are at the heart of our policy; they are 
also the foundation of our most basic and 
natural partnerships with the great indus- 
trial democracies, which are essential to our 
safety and well-being. 

Morality and Policy 

The relation of morality to policy is thus 
not an abstract philosophical issue. It applies 
to many topics of the current debate. It ap- 
plies to relations with the Communist 
powers, where we must manage a conflict of 
moral purposes and interests in the shadow 
of nuclear peril; and it applies in our polit- 
ical ties with nations whose domestic prac- 
tices are inconsistent with our own. 

Our relationship with the Communist 
powers has raised difficult questions for 
Americans since the Bolshevik Revolution. 
It was understood very early that the Com- 
munist system and ideology were in conflict 
with our own principles. Sixteen years 
passed before President Franklin Roosevelt 
extended diplomatic recognition to the Soviet 
Government. He did so in the belief, as he 
put it, that "through the resumption of 
normal relations the prospects of peace over 
all the world are greatly strengthened." 

Today again courageous voices remind us 
of the nature of the Soviet system and of our 
duty to defend freedom. About this there is 
no disagreement. 

There is, however, a clear conflict between 
two moral imperatives which is at the heart 
of the problem. Since the dawn of the nuclear 
age, the world's fears of holocaust and its 
hopes for a better future have both hinged 
on the relationship between the two super- 
powers. In an era of strategic nuclear 
balance — when both sides have the capacity 
to destroy civilized life — there is no alterna- 
tive to coexistence. 

In such conditions the necessity of peace 
is itself a moral imperative. As President 
Kennedy pointed out: - 

... in the final analysis our most basic common 
link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all 
breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's 
future. And we are all moral. 

It is said, correctly, that the Soviet per- 
ception of "peaceful coexistence" is not the 
same as ours, that Soviet policies aim at the 
furthering of Soviet objectives. In a world 
of nuclear weapons capable of destroying 
mankind, in a century which has seen resort 
to brutal force on an unprecedented scale 
and intensity, in an age of ideology which 
turns the domestic policies of nations into 
issues of international contention, the prob- 
lem of peace takes on a profound moral and 
practical difficulty. But the issue, surely, is 
not whether peace and stability serve Soviet 
purposes, but whether they also serve our 
own. Constructive actions in Soviet policy 
are desirable whatever the Soviet motives. 

This government has stated clearly and 
constantly the principles which we believe 
must guide U.S.-Soviet relations and inter- 
national conduct and which are consistent 
with both our values and our interests: 

— We will maintain a strong and flexible 
military posture to preserve our security. We 
will as a matter of principle and national 
interest oppose attempts by any country to 
achieve global or regional predominance. 

■ For President Kennedy's address at American 
University, Washington, D.C., on June 10, 1963, see 
PnbUc Papers of the Presidents : John F. Kennedy, 
19(J3, p. 459. 

August 4, 1975 


— We will judge the state of U.S.-Soviet 
relations not by atmospherics, but by 
whether concrete problems are successfully 

— All negotiations will be a two-way 
street, based on reciprocity of benefit and 
reliable observance of agreements. 

— We will insist, as we always have, that 
progress in U.S.-Soviet economic relations 
must reflect progress toward stable political 

— We will never abandon our ideals or our 
friends. We will not negotiate over the heads 
of, or against the interests of, other nations. 

— We will respond firmly to attempts to 
achieve unilateral advantage or to apply the 
relaxation of tensions selectively. 

Beyond the necessities of coexistence there 
is the hope of a more positive relationship. 
The American people will never be satisfied 
with simply reducing tension and easing the 
danger of nuclear holocaust. Over the longer 
term, we hope that firmness in the face of 
pressure and the creation of incentives for 
cooperative action may bring about a more 
durable pattern of stability and responsible 

Today's joint manned mission in space — 
an area in which 15 years ago we saw our- 
selves in almost mortal rivalry — is symbolic 
of the distance we have traveled. Practical 
progress has been made on a wide range of 
problems. Berlin has been removed as a 
source of conflict between East and West; 
crises have been dampened; the frequency of 
U.S.-Soviet consultation on bilateral and 
multilateral problems is unprecedented; the 
scope of bilateral exchanges and cooperation 
in many fields is in dramatic contrast to the 
state of affairs ten, even five, years ago. The 
agreements already achieved to limit stra- 
tegic armament programs — the central weap- 
ons of our respective military arsenals — 
are unparalleled in the history of diplomacy. 
Your Senator Mondale is a strong and con- 
structive advocate of such strategic arms 
control efforts. 

Our immediate focus is on the interna- 
tional actions of the Soviet Union not be- 
cause it is our only moral concern, but 

because it is the sphere of action that we can 
most directly and confidently affect. As a 
consequence of improved foreign policy rela- 
tionships, we have successfully used our in- 
fluence to promote human rights. But we 
have done so quietly, keeping in mind the 
delicacy of the problem and stressing results 
rather than public confrontation. 

Therefore critics of detente must answer: 
What is the alternative that they propose? 
What precise policies do they want us to 
change? Are they prepared for a prolonged 
situation of dramatically increased interna- 
tional danger? Do they wish to return to the 
constant crises and high arms budgets of the 
cold war? Does detente encourage repression 
— or is it detente that has generated the 
ferment and the demands for openness that 
we are now witnessing? Can we ask our 
people to support confrontation unless they 
know that every reasonable alternative has 
been explored? 

In our relations with the Soviet Union, the 
United States will maintain its strength, de- 
fend its interests, and support its friends 
with determination and without illusion. We 
will speak up for our beliefs with vigor and 
without self-deception. We consider detente 
a means to regulate a competitive relation- 
ship — not a substitute for our own efforts in 
building the strength of the free world. We 
will continue on the course on which we are 
embarked, because it offers hope to our chil- 
dren of a more secure and a more just world. 

These considerations raise a more general 
question: To what extent are we able to 
affect the internal policies of other govern- 
ments and to what extent is it desirable? 

There are some 150 nations in the world, 
and barely a score of them are democracies 
in any real sense. The rest are nations whose 
ideology or political practices are incon- 
sistent with our own. Yet we have political 
relations and often alliances with some of 
these countries in Asia, Latin America, 
Africa, and Europe. 

Congressman Eraser has raised this issue 
with great integrity and concern, and I have 
profited from many discussions with him. We 
do not and will not condone repressive prac- 
tices. This is not only dictated by our values 


Department of State Bulletin 

but is also a reflection of the reality that re- 
gimes which lack legitimacy or moral author- 
ity are inherently vulnerable. There will 
therefore be limits to the degree to which 
such regimes can be congenial partners. We 
have used, and we will use, our influence 
against repressive practices. Our traditions 
and our interests demand it. 

But truth compels also a recognition of our 
limits. The question is whether we promote 
human rights more effectively by counsel and 
friendly relations where this serves our in- 
terest or by confrontational propaganda and 
discriminatory legislation. And we must also 
assess the domestic performance of foreign 
governments in relation to their history and 
to the threats they face. We must have some 
understanding for the dilemmas of countries 
adjoining powerful, hostile, and irreconcil- 
able totalitarian regimes. 

Our alliances and political relationships 
serve mutual ends; they contribute to re- 
gional and world security and thus support 
the broader welfare. They are not favors to 
other governments, but reflect a recognition 
of mutual interests. They should be with- 
drawn only when our interests change and 
not as a punishment for some act with which 
we do not agree. 

In many countries, whatever the internal 
structure, the populations are unified in seek- 
ing our protection against outside aggres- 
sion. In many countries our foreign policy 
relationships have proved to be no obstacle 
to the forces of change. And in many coun- 
tries, especially in Asia, it is the process of 
American disengagement that has eroded the 
sense of security and created a perceived 
need for greater internal discipline — and at 
the same time diminished our ability to in- 
fluence domestic practices. 

The attempt to deal with those practices 
by restrictive American legislation raises a 
serious problem not because of the moral 
view it expresses — which we share — but be- 
cause of the mistaken impression it creates 
that our security ties are acts of charity. And 
beyond that, such acts — because they are too 
public, too inflexible, and too much a stim- 
ulus to nationalistic resentment — are almost 
inevitably doomed to fail. 

There are no simple answers. Painful ex- 
perience should have taught us that we ought 
not exaggerate our capacity to foresee, let 
alone to shape, social and political change in 
other societies. Therefore let me state the 
principles that will guide our action : 

— Human rights are a legitimate interna- 
tional concern and have been so defined in 
international agreements for more than a 

— The United States will speak up for hu- 
man rights in appropriate international 
forums and in exchanges with other govern- 

— We will be mindful of the limits of our 
reach ; we will be conscious of the difference 
between public postures that satisfy our self- 
esteem and policies that bring positive re- 

— We will not lose sight of either the re- 
quirements of global security or what we 
stand for as a nation. 

The Domestic Dimension 

For Americans, then, the question is not 
whether our values should affect our foreign 
policy, but how. The issue is whether we 
have the courage to face complexity and the 
inner conviction to deal with ambiguity, 
whether we will look behind easy slogans 
and recognize that our great goals can only 
be reached by patience and in imperfect 

The question is also whether we will use 
our moral convictions to escape reality or as 
a source of courage and self-confidence. We 
hear too often assertions that were a feature 
of our isolationist period : that a balance of 
power is a cynical game; that secret con- 
spiratorial intentions lurk behind open pub- 
lic policies ; that weapons are themselves the 
sources of conflict ; that intelligence activities 
are wicked ; that humanitarian assistance 
and participation in the economic order are 
an adequate substitute for political engage- 

These are the counsels of despair. I refuse 
to accept the premise that our moral values 
and policy objectives are irreconcilable. The 
ends we seek in our foreign policy must have 

August 4, 1975 


validity in the framework of our beliefs, or 
we have no meaningful foreign policy. The 
maintenance of peace is a moral as well as 
a practical objective ; measures to limit arma- 
ments serve a moral as well as practical end ; 
the cohesion of our alliances with the great 
industrial democracies makes our way of life 
and our principles more secure; cooperation 
to improve the world economic system en- 
hances the well-being of peoples ; policies to 
reconcile the rich nations and the poor, and 
to enhance the progress of both, serve a hu- 
mane as well as a political end. 

We live in a secular age which prides itself 
on its realism. Modern society is impersonal 
and bureaucratized. The young, who in every 
generation crave a sense of purpose, are too 
often offered cynicism and escapism instead 
of a faith that truly inspires. All modern 
democracies are beset by problems beyond 
the margin of government's ability to con- 
trol. Debunking of authority further drains 
democratic government of the ability to ad- 
dress the problems that beset it. A world of 
turmoil and danger cries out for structure 
and leadership. The opportunities that we 
face as a nation to help shape a more just in- 
ternational order depend more than ever on a 
steady, resolute, and self-assured America. 

This requires confidence — the leaders' con- 
fidence in their values, the public's confidence 
in its government, and the nation's collective 
confidence in the worth of its objectives. 

Thus, for this nation to contribute truly 
to peace in the world it must make peace with 
itself. It is time to put aside the cynicism and 
distrust that have marked — and marred — our 
political life for the better part of the past 
decade. It is time to remind ourselves that, 
while we may disagree about means, as 
Americans we all have the same ultimate ob- 
jective — the peace, prosperity, and tranquil- 
lity of our country and of the world. 

And most of all, it is time we recognized 
that as tha greatest democracy the world 
has ever known, we are a living reminder 
that there is an alternative to tyranny and 
oppression. The revolution that we began 
200 years ago goes on, for most of the world 
still lives without the freedom that has for 
so long been ours. To them we remain a 

beacon of hope and an example to be emu- 

So let us come together for the tasks that 
our time demands. We have before us an 
opportunity to bring peace to a world that 
awaits our leadership. 

Questions and Answers Following 
the Secretary's Minneapolis Address 

Press release 372B dated July 17 

Donald R. Grangaard, president, Upper 
Midicest Council: Mr. Secretary, for the 
great Upper Midwest, a portion of this na- 
tion which has long been concerned with 
principles and ideals and their execution, 
you have brought a great message, and we 
again are deeply grateful. Thanks, most 
sincerely. [Applause.] 

As was suggested earlier in the day, we 
will nou' spend a profitable period imposing 
on Secretary Kissinger to respond to ques- 
tions which have been submitted by the 
audience. I am going to follow on the order 
of questioning ichich has been selected by our 
World Affairs Panel. With your permission, 
Mr. Secretary, I would like to read the ques- 
tion, and the name of the person who has 
authored it, and invite you to come to the 
podium to respond to it, please. 

The first question is from Mr. Nathan 
Berman of Minneapolis. Do you feel that 
pressuring Israel to make concessions with- 
out equal pressure being applied to Egypt 
is morally defensible? 

Secretary Kissinger: Let me answer this 
question, and then there were a few ques- 
tions submitted orally earlier [laughter], 
which I would also like to deal with. 

First of all, it is not correct that we are 
pressuring Israel to make concessions or 
that the advice that we may give to one side 
is not matched by advice which we give to 
the other side. 

It is worthwhile to remember that all our 
eflforts in trying to promote peace in the 
Middle East have been carried out at the 
request of both parties. It is also worthwhile 
to remember that the consequences of 


Department of State Bulletin 

another war in the Middle East would be 
extremely grave for Israel, extremely grave 
for the industrial world, and raise a high 
risk of confrontation with the Soviet Union. 
Therefore we have an obligation to attempt 
to see whether it can be avoided. 

But any settlement that may be reached 
between Israel and Egypt will be the result 
of American efforts which have been exerted 
equally on both parties. The difference is 
that when we make a proposal to Israel, it 
has to be discussed in its Cabinet, which 
speaks almost as much to the press as our 
Cabinet does, and therefore there is a 
slightly greater consciousness in the public 
press of what we say to Israel than what we 
say to Egypt. 

If there should be an agreement, and when 
it is possible to compare the starting posi- 
tion of both sides with what is finally 
achieved, I am certain that everybody will 
agree that both sides will have made sig- 
nificant concessions, because without that, no 
meaningful agreement is possible. 

Now, if I could perhaps address one or 
two of the questions that I heard earlier. 
One was, "Why do we not recognize Cam- 
bodia, or why do we not have diplomatic 
relations with Cambodia and Viet-Nam?" 

With respect to Cambodia, we are dealing 
with a government that at this moment is 
engaged in one of the most barbaric prac- 
tices that we have seen, in which 3 million 
people that lived in cities were told in a 
matter of minutes to go out into the country- 
side — a countryside that will not have a crop 
until November, and in which thousands, 
probably tens of thousands, are going to die 
from starvation and disease. It is a govern- 
ment, moreover, that has refused to estab- 
lish diplomatic relations with all of the coun- 
tries that have offered to have diplomatic 
relations with it. And therefore the question 
of diplomatic relations with Cambodia has 
never come up in any concrete way. 

With respect to Viet-Nam, I have stated 
publicly, and I repeat here, that the United 
States is willing to look to the future and to 
gear its policies toward Viet-Nam to the 
policies which it pursues toward us and 
toward its neighbors. 

With respect to the economic and military 
aid and its relationship — and the relation- 
ship between them, the question of military 
aid depends on whether it is given to coun- 
tries whose security is in our interests and 
whether we share their conception of their 
security needs. It goes through detailed con- 
gressional scrutiny in each year and has 
substantially declined in each year and is 
substantially below the level of our foreign 
economic aid. 

The foreign economic aid is not all we 
would like it to be. But we owe a great debt 
of gratitude to Senator Humphrey for his 
enlightened management of our foreign aid 
legislation, which relates us to other coun- 
tries in the world and which contributes to 
establishing an economic and political struc- 
ture that reflects the interdependence of 
mankind, and therefore we consider that 
both economic aid and declining military aid 
are in the national interests. 

Mr. Grangaard: The next question sub- 
mitted in the usual n;ay is from Mr. Gelatis 
of Red Wing. Mr. Secretary, would you give 
us your thoughts on the problem of nuclear 
iveapons proliferation and on the prospects 
for limitation and control? 

Secretary Kissinger: The problem of 
weapons proliferation has two aspects — one, 
the development of nuclear weapons by coun- 
tries that have industrial capacity to do so 
today, such as, for example, a country with 
the industrial capacity of Japan; and second- 
ly, the danger of nuclear proliferation that 
derives from the spread of nuclear technol- 

With respect to the first problem, the 
United States and a number of other coun- 
tries in 1970 signed the Nonproliferation 
Treaty, which was designed to put a limit — 
actually the Nonproliferation Treaty was 
signed before 1970 and ratified then — which 
was designed to prevent the spread of nu- 
clear weapons by putting safeguards on cer- 
tain types of explosives and on the spread of 
nuclear technology. However, not all coun- 
tries in the world have signed the Non- 
proliferation Treaty. 

We face today, as a result of the energy 

August 4, 1975 


crisis, a much greater incentive for the 
spread of nuclear technology because nu- 
clear energy has now become commercially 
profitable and in fact, in many countries, 
economically necessary. We are deeply con- 
cerned about the impact of the spread of 
nuclear technology because it will give an 
increasing number of countries the technical 
capability to develop nuclear weapons of 
their own. 

There is the danger that in the pursuit of 
commercial interests, the countries exporting 
nuclear technology may begin to compete in 
easing safeguards. Therefore the United 
States is at this moment engaged in negotia- 
tions with exporters of nuclear technology 
to see whether we could all agree to strength- 
ening the existing safeguards under prefer- 
ably United Nations IAEA — International 
Atomic Energy Agency — safeguards in 
order to avoid the tragedy that commercial 
competition and the pressures of the energy 
crisis produce a situation where 10 to 15 
years from now people will ask themselves: 
"What did the leaders in the 1970's think of 
when they permitted this nuclear technology 
to spread unchained ?" 

These decisions will have to be made within 
the next year or the proliferation of nuclear 
technology may really raise grave difficulties 
in other decades. 

Mr. Grangaard: Mr. Secretary, this q^ies- 
tion is from Mr. Dietz of St. Paul. What is 
State Department policy with respect to 
n-hether American overseas busiiiess should 
conform to local custom or folloiv on U.S. 
standards of business morality in the host 
country? [Laughter.] 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know which 
of the two criteria are more painful. 

I think that the relationship of American 
corporations, or of multinational corpora- 
tions, to the host country is one of the prob- 
lems that requires a great deal of attention. 
On the one hand, private capital is more 
readily availlable right now for development 
than much of government capital. Therefore 

it is in our interests to encourage the in- 
vestment abroad of American capital. 

On the other hand, these American enter- 
prises must conform to local conditions, and 
we must see whether the local requirements 
can be put into some international frame- 
work so that there is some pattern that gives 
assurances to the host government against 
undue interference and to American busi- 
ness some guarantee of stability. 

We are inviting to the State Department in 
the next few weeks a number of executives 
from our leading corporations to see whether 
they could think up, or work with us in de- 
veloping some criteria that they could live 
with and at the same time could be inter- 
nationally acceptable that would deal with 
the problem that is raised by this question, 
which we could then take up with potential 
host countries to see whether one can get 
some international framework of acceptable 
conduct by both host governments and 
foreign corporations. 

Mr. Grangaard: Mr. Secretary, this ques- 
tion from Mr. Cameron of Pryor Lake. Hov 
strong do you feel the trend in the United 
States is toward returning to a policy of 
isolationism ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the curious 
thing that is happening in America right 
now is that the trend toward isolationism is 
strongest in those parts of the country which 
used to carry the international policies — in 
many parts of the East, among many intel- 
lectuals. The support for foreign policy is 
most active in those parts of the countiy that 
used to be isolationist, like the Middle West 
and many parts of the country away from 
the eastern seacoast — which is an interesting 
phenomenon of the contemporary period. 

I believe, however, that with the end of 
the war in Indochina, America is coming 
together again and that there is an increas- 
ing recognition of our importance to peace 
and progress in the world and also a greater 
understanding that we cannot do every- 
thing and that we must work more coopera- 
tively. So I think our most difficult period in 


Department of State Bulletin 

this sense is behind us and that we can work 
together on a nonpartisan basis in the pur- 
suit of our foreign policy. 

Mr. Grangaard: This from Mr. Stewart 
Hunter of North field. What are the prospects 
and the means for an effective international 
peacekeeping body such as a good, effective 
United Nations? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, yesterday in 
Milwaukee, I pointed out the concerns the 
United States has with the present proce- 
dures, the conduct of some countries in the 
United Nations. 

The United States continues to believe that 
many problems, including the problem of 
peacekeeping, can only be settled — solved — 
on a global basis. The nature of nuclear tech- 
nology, the nature of the energy and food 
and raw materials problems, all require 
global solutions. But also we must face the 
fact that many nations have organized them- 
selves into blocs and are pursuing bloc tactics 
of confrontation. 

What I intended yesterday with my speech 
in Milwaukee — if I may mention that city 
here [laughter] — is to point out that we 
have a great opportunity for international 
cooperation, in fact, an unprecedented op- 
portunity, but that requires a sense of re- 
sponsibility by all of the countries and that 
it requires an attitude of cooperation which 
has not always been reflected in the recent 
sessions of the General Assembly or its 
specialized agencies. 

Mr. Grangaard: And this question from 
Mr. Brown, Mr. Rich Broion, of St. Paul. 
What is your reaction to the concept that 
detente ivith the Russians helps the U.S.S.R. 
more than the United States? 

Secretary Kissinger: I reject this concept. 
Detente is in the mutual interests of both the 
Soviet Union and the United States. Both 
countries have a great interest in preserving 
the peace. Both countries sooner or later, if 
not in this decade then in the next decade, 
must solve the problem that the globe is now 
too small for the kind of confrontation that 
was natural in the relationship among na- 

tions even a generation ago. 

If we look at what has actually been nego- 
tiated between the two countries, every 
settlement has been in the mutual interest. 
A limitation of strategic arms is in our 
mutual interest. A settlement of the Berlin 
crisis is in the mutual interest. The easing 
of tensions is in our mutual interest. 

We, however, must not use detente as a 
cure-all for everything. Detente is not a sub- 
stitute for our own efforts. Detente must not 
be used as an alibi when things go wrong 
anywhere in the world of blaming it on some- 
body else, because very often it is to our 
own actions. And those who raise this ques- 
tion should ask themselves this: "What 
exactly is it they want us to do as an alterna- 
tive to this policy? Do they want us to create 
tension? Do they want us to raise the level 
of international conflict?" Can we really ask 
the American people to face the risks of war 
unless we can demonstrate to them that their 
government has explored every reasonable 

I believe that any Administration, of 
whatever party, whatever may be said in the 
abstract, will be driven to the realization 
that the problem of peace is the dominant 
problem of our time, and that it cannot be 
conceived as a unilateral benefit to anybody. 

Mr. Grangaard: Mr. Secretary, this ques- 
tion from Mr. Robert Provost of Minnea- 
polis. Hotv do you see the Korean problem 
being resolved? 

Secretary Kissinger: I frankly do not see 
that the Korean problem has a permanent 
solution in the foreseeable future. 

What we have on the Korean Peninsula is 
two governments, the South Korean Govern- 
ment and the North Korean Government, 
which have irreconcilable objectives. What 
we must attempt to do for this period is to 
prevent the outbreak of war, to create con- 
ditions in which these two governments can 
resume the process of negotiation which they 
started some years ago, and to look toward 
a general easing of world tensions within 
which the Korean problem can also in time 
be solved. But it has no short-term solution. 

August 4, 1975 


Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Minneapolis July 15 

Following is the transcript of a neivs con- 
ference held by Secretary Kissinger at the 
Radisson South Hotel in Bloomington (Min- 
neapolis), Minn., on July 15. 

Press release 374 dated July 17 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could 
tell lis what progress, if any, the State De- 
partment is making on negotiating with the 
Canadian Government on maintaining the 
flow of oil to this country. It gets kind of 
cold here in the wintertime. 

Secretary Kissinger: I was asked this 
question this morning in an off-the-record 
meeting, and I did not know the answer 
then. I really do not have the answer to that 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you know, where I live 
in Minnesota the farmers don't care very 
much for the idea of a lot of government- 
held grain reserves hanging over the market 
price. Are you going to he coming along 
one of these days and telling them that is a 
sacrifice they should accept in the national 
interest ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the farmers 
have no objection to the purchases that are 
involved in building up the grain reserves. 
They are concerned that the grain reserves 
will be used to depress prices in inflationary 
periods and that the government will use 
grain reserves to depress prices. And sec- 
ondly, they are not very much for govern- 
ment storage of grain reserves. 

Now, the grain reserve program that we 
have put forward first of all calls for pri- 
vately held grain reserves. Secondly, the 
basic reason for our position on grain re- 
serves is that, if there are catastrophes that 
could have been foreseen by governments 
that were not dealt with, it shakes confidence 
in governments all over the world. The 
margin by which food is now being produced 

in relation to needs is very narrow indeed. 
And at that point, if there is a major short- 
fall, the demand on the American supplies 
will be so enormous that things could get 
completely out of control. 

So we are looking for the grain reserves 
not in order to aflfect domestic prices, but 
so that we have a cushion in case of emer- 
gencies and so that we can get other govern- 
ments also to hold reserves, many of which 
would be purchased from the United States. 

But we believe that when the agricultural 
community understands the nature of our 
grain reserve proposal they will substantially 
support it. They are seeing it in terms of 
some of the older schemes that have existed. 
Basically our idea is that the American re- 
serves should be privately held, and secondly, 
that the international reserves would be up 
to each country to create, which would enable 
us to establish some priority among claim- 
ants on our own food. And it is not relevant 
to an attempt to reduce the prices in this 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you comment on 
the FBI's report that foreign embassies have 
been broken into over the course of the past 
several years? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have not seen this 
report yet. I have just seen some frag- 
mentary press accounts. And therefore I 
cannot really comment on it. 

Q. Mr. Secretaj-y, the Egyptians say that 
they are not going to renew the U.N. man- 
date in the Sinai next tveek. What does this 
do to your Middle East peace efforts? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it underlines 
the problem to which we have been calling 
attention. Has it been oflficially stated? 

Q. A letter from the Egyptian Govern- 
ment to Waldheim \_Kurt Waldheim, U.N. 
Secretary General] . 


Department of State Bulletin 

Secretary Kissinger: I think it calls atten- 
tion to the urgency of the problem and to 
the need of working out some new interim 
solutions. We will have to study the impli- 
cations — whether they will in fact ask for 
the removal of these forces, which I doubt. 
I think they may simply not renew the man- 
date. But I will have to study precisely what 
it means. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I realize that you are 
not looking for apple pie answers and ques- 
tions. And I'm from the Heartline KDHL 
Radio in upper Minnesota. And I have a reso- 
lution here from the American Legion, the 
whole State of California, that states that the 
Council on Foreign Relations, 68th Street, 
Neiv York City, is a subversive organization. 
And it has already been passed in a resolution. 
Now, these are a thousand of Legionnaires; 
and I am speaking as a Legionnaire myself, 
as well as a reporter. Now, I understand 
that you are a member of the Council on 
Foreign Relations. And if the American 
Legion considers this siibversive, then why 
are you a part of it, sir? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first of all, with 
all due respect for the American Legion, I 
think that its judgment of whether the Coun- 
cil on Foreign Relations is subversive may be 
based on insufficient information. After all, 
the Council on Foreign Relations has in its 
membership almost every — in fact, every 
Cabinet member who has dealt with foreign 
policy or defense policy, or every senior 
official — 

Q. Well, sir, don't you believe that the 
American Legion, tvho has fought for our 
country — a7id there are many laying out in 
foreign lands — are capable enough of investi- 
gating and their investigating should be just 
as positive as this jerky Congress we have 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I must say I — 

Q. I mean, you are talking abont the 
American Legion ncnv. And I want you to 
answer in that vein; if they are stupid 
enough not to knoiv ivhat the CFR is — 

Secretary Kissinger: You are talking 
about one American Legion post. 

August 4, 1975 

Q. This is thousands of — this is the whole 
chapter of California, sir. I don't believe 
they are stupid, and I don't believe they like 
to be called stupid. 

Secretary Kissinger: I am not saying they 
are stupid. But I must say, with all due 
respect to the American Legion in Califor- 
nia, if you look at the membership of the 
Council on Foreign Relations and consider 
it subversive, then the country is really in 
bad shape, because it contains every major — 

Q. You don't suppose it is in good shape, 
do you, Mr. Secretary, ivith the unemploy- 
ment and all this juyik, and the educational 
system? You don't believe that we are not 
having a little problem? 

Secretary Kissinger: I do not think that 
the subversion in this country will be led by 
the Council on Foreign Relations. 

Q. Well, I hope that the news media here 
this evening, if they have got any guts at 
all, can bring this out to the American 
Legion as to your answer to this. Thank you 
very much, Mr. Secretary. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could I ask you to be 
more specific about your speech last night 
about the United Nations and your reference 
again today. Specifically, if the General As- 
sembly should vote to exclude Israel in the 
coming General Assembly session, is this the 
sort of thing that might cause the United 
States to withdraiv from the General As- 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we have not 
said exactly what we will do if the Charter 
of the United Nations is violated, in our 
view. We believe that the expulsion of mem- 
ber states by the General Assembly, which 
is a responsibility under the charter of the 
Security Council, would be an act which 
would affect American participation in the 
activities of that body. To what degree and 
in what manner remains to be determined. 
But we believe that the charter should be 
strictly observed and should not be used for 
punitive purposes that are incompatible 
with it. 

Q. If I could just follow that up. You say 


it ivould affect American participation. Are 
you referring to the reaction that probably 
ivould occur in Congress or are you talking 
about action by the executive branch? 

Secretary Kissinger: The executive branch 
would undoubtedly take some actions. But 
what these actions would be I am not now 
prepared to say. But above all we are try- 
ing to prevent that situation from arising. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you mentioned in re- 
sponse to an earlier question today that what 
the United States says to Israel is in the 
press more than ivhat the United States says 
to Egypt. Is there anything that the United 
States has said to Egypt that hasn't made 
the news as of yet? 

Secretary Kissinger: The individual steps 
by which the negotiation proceeds are, in 
the nature of the governmental system in 
Israel, likely to be more public. The basic 
point that I made was that the United States 
attempts to advance the negotiating process 
and it makes its best judgment to each side 
as to what is needed to make progress. And 
we have done this with Egypt. As the nego- 
tiations come to a conclusion, if they come 
to a conclusion, then it will be apparent what 
each side has conceded. 

But the United States cannot, as an inter- 
mediary, announce on its part what each 
side is going to say or what it says to each 
side at each stage along the way. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, along those lines, the 
conduct of foreign policy in a democracy 
has been compared to playing stud poker 
with the hole card turned up. Leaving abuses 
in the past aside, should security leaks — 
breaches of jvhatever nature — occur again, 
would you participate in wiretapping or 
other surveillance methods similarly covert? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, you know, the 
subject of wiretapping has been discussed 
at inordinate length in recent years, however 
confined usually only to one administration. 

The problem of security in a democracy, 
the problem of what things should be made 
public and what things threaten national 
security, is a very serious one. There are 

certain secrets that anybody concerned with 
the conduct of foreign policy must want to 
safeguard because if they are jeopardized 
they will threaten the national security of 
the United States. 

Your question is very hard to answer in 
the abstract. But any government, any ad- 
ministration, has to protect some of its 
secrets. Now, whether that is carried too 
far, whether the effort to protect it is carried 
too far, that is a question of legitimate in- 

And I would also say that, of course, the 
legal position — the Supreme Court has taken 
a position on wiretapping that every admin- 
istration should — must — observe and will 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Agriculture Secretary 
Butz said yesterday that he thought that 
President Ford xvas unbeatable in 1976. Do 
you concur with that assessment? 

Secretary Kissinger: I am responsible for 
foreign policy. I think foreign policy is a 
nonpartisan effort. And I will not get into 
partisan activities or make any political pre- 

Q. How do you vieio today's space flight, 
Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is a posi- 
tive indication of the relationships between 
the Soviet Union and the United States. It 
is the sort of cooperative effort which brings 
home to both peoples, on both sides, that we 
are living on a small planet, that we can do 
constructive things together, and that we 
must try to coexist. I therefore view it as a 
very positive thing. 

Q. Coidd you please advise on foreign 
countries' current needs for American agri- 
cultural products and what importance they 
play in your negotiations ivith: one, the 
OPEC countries [Organization of Petroleum 
E.r porting Countries] and tivo, Russia? 

Secretary Kissinger: The agricultural pro- 
ductivity of the United States is one of the 
most important factors in the world economy 
today, and it is one of our great assets. The 
United States produces the largest surpluses. 


Department of State Bulletin 

It contributes more food aid than all of the 
rest of the world combined. Its technological 
skill can contribute enormously to closing 
the gap between production and need, in 
which the ultimate solution of the food prob- 
lem resides. 

Now, the way we can use this in concrete 
negotiations is affected by two things: first, 
by the negotiation itself; and secondly, by 
the kind of world that we want to create. 
Because after all, it is in our interests and 
in the interests of the world to show that a 
commodity in which we have a special advan- 
tage, used responsibly, can set a pattern for 
how commodities in which other countries 
have a special advantage can also be used 

So in negotiations with the Soviet Union, 
we have the problem that our sales are con- 
ducted by private companies, and of course 
our foreign policy is not yet conducted by 
private companies. So we have to gear some 
of the actions of these private companies, 
maybe, to our requirements in foreign pol- 
icy; and that does not mesh with great 

We are trying to keep in mind that we 
should not sell so much that it will later 
bring enormous pressures on our own econ- 
omy or deprive us of the food for our other 
international needs and yet sell enough so 
that the American farmer can get rid of his 

We have worked out an informal system 
which has worked rather well and which we 
will apply in this present situation on sales. 

Q. The other- half of that was the OPEC 

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. With respect to 
the OPEC countries, a great deal depends 
on what actions they will take and what 
general framework can be created for all 
kinds of commodities ; and this we will know 
a little better at the end of this year. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, in your speech you ap- 
parently said that no stability in power 
relationships is conceivable without Amer- 
ica's active participation in world affairs. 
And my question is how actively do you feel 

the United States must participate in world 
affairs in order to achieve stability in power 
relationships, for instance, in Korea or in 
the Middle East? 

Secretary Kissinger: That is a difficult 
question to answer in the abstract. In many 
parts of the world no stability is possible 
without an American effort. On the other 
hand, the situation of the United States has 
changed as compared to the immediate post- 
war period, in which all the efforts had to 
be carried out almost exclusively by the 
United States. Other parts of the world have 
now developed some strength and self-confi- 
dence and can assume larger responsibilities. 

As a general rule, the United States is 
reluctant to undertake new commitments for 
the long-term stationing of military forces 
abroad and looks rather for the local capacity 
to defend itself if necessary and, if we think 
it is in our own interests, with our support. 

In the Middle East we are in the position 
that we are the only country that both 
parties can talk to or have been willing to 
talk to. And also we are the country that 
has been the major source of support for 
Israel. Therefore we have an obligation to 
see what we can do to bring the parties 
closer together and to see whether some 
momentum can be created for peace. 

In Korea we have a mutual security treaty 
which obliges us to the common defense, 
which is also in our interest because of the 
importance Japan and other countries attach 
to it. 

So I would say our role is changing. It is 
less direct than it was in the past, and it is 
less military than it has been in the past. 
But it .still has to be significant. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in vieiv of your out- 
standing diplomatic contributions, I was 
luondering: first of all, why it seems to be 
that you pour so much into your ivork and 
work so rigorously; and secondly, ivhat you 
do to relax and get away from things of 
the Department of State? 

Secretary Kissinger: What I do to get 
away from the Department of State? Travel. 

August 4, 1975 


Q. First of all, why do you work so rigor- 
ously in diplomatic relations and what you 
do to relax and just unwind? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the first ques- 
tion requires, I suppose, a psychological 
analysis which I may not be in the best posi- 
tion to make. But I think for somebody who 
has seen in his life the consequences of what 
can happen if societies collapse and the con- 
sequences of war, there is an interest and 
an incentive to do what one can for domestic 
tranquillity and above all for international 
peace. And perhaps for somebody who has 
come to this country as an immigrant, one 
can understand better how important this 
country is to the rest of the world than 
people who have perhaps not exactly the 
standard of comparison. 

As far as relaxing is concerned, this job 
does not lend itself to too many free periods. 
But I have been given a dog for my birthday, 
and I have to walk him now. [Laughter.] 

Q. Mr. Secretary, three of the recommen- 
dations of the Murphy Commission were that 
the CIA be reorganized into a new agency, the 
Foreign Intelligence Agency; that the para- 
military operations of the CIA he shifted to 
the Departmeyit of Defense (DOD) ; and that 
the Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs should not ordinarily hold 
a Cabinet position, as you currently do. What 
plans are there to iinplement these recom- 
mendations, and if there are no such plans, 
why not? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the Murphy 
Commission recommendations are now being 
studied by the executive branch, and there- 
fore I cannot tell you which of them are 
going to be implemented and which of them 
are not going to be implemented. 

The proposition that the Assistant to the 
President should not ordinarily be a Cabinet 
member is one with which it is hard to dis- 
agree. I would agree with those who hold 
the view that the President should have the 
right to make that decision himself. All the 
more so as the influence of any person with 
the President does not depend on the hier- 
archical position that he may have. The fact 
that I hold two positions does not give me 

any additional influence with the President. 
And therefore I think it depends on the 
judgment that the President makes in each 
case. Some other recommendations of the 
Murphy Commission will no doubt be im- 
plemented. Maybe this one will be imple- 
mented, too. It is a little early to say. 

Q. Specifically, do you see any advantages 
to shifting the paramilitary operations of 
the CIA to Defense Intelligence Agency in 
the DOD? 

Secretary Kissinger: No, frankly, not par- 
ticularly, because you can make a case for 
the proposition that we should not engage 
in paramilitary operations. But there is no 
way that the Defense Department can con- 
duct paramilitary operations in the same 
way. The reason for having them in the 
Intelligence Agency was to permit a degree 
of dissociation from overt military opera- 
tions and to prevent there being a direct 
engagement of American military power. 

So I think one could have the argument 
one should not have paramilitary operations. 
But this is one that I have some question 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you confirm for- us 
absolutely rumors that there is going to be 
a major Soviet-U.S. grain deal this year; 
and if so, tell us hoiv large it is going to be. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, there is no 
U.S.-Soviet grain deal of the kind of 1972, 
in which there were some governmental 
credits involved. We have had reports that 
the Soviet Union is interested in substantial 
purchases of American grain. And there have 
been some informal discussions in which 
they have tried to determine the amount 
that could be purchased without disrupting 
our market so completely that it might lead 
to a reaction such as occurred last year 
when an informal limit had to be put on. 
These informal discussions have taken place. 
But what the exact limit is has not yet been 
finally established. But I have the impres- 
sion there will be Soviet grain purchases. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, ivhat area, in your esti- 
mation, poses the greatest threat to our U.S. 
security today? 


Department of State Bulletin 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, without an- 
swering the question of what is a threat to 
U.S. security, obviously the greatest immedi- 
ate threat of war is in the Middle East. 

The action to which my attention was 
called, which I have not officially heard yet, 
of the nonrenewal of the UNEF [U.N. Emer- 
gency Force] mandate in the Sinai is just 
one example of the precariousness of the 
situation in the Middle East if no progress 
is made toward a peace settlement. If there 
is a war in the Middle East, it is bound to 
have consequences outside of the Middle 
East. I think that is the area that is most 

Of course, the nature of modern weapons 
is such that there are always dangers of 
technological breakthroughs and of one side 
getting ahead of the other, which is one 
reason why we attach so much importance 
to the strategic arms negotiations. 

But the single most complicated area in 
the world and the single area most likely 
to produce a conflict, if no progress is made, 
is the Middle East. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, your talk today in a 
sense ivas a basic revieiv of American for- 
eign policy over 200 years. The question is, 
did the time and place of the talk have any- 
thing to do with the choice of the subject? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have felt for a 
long time that I should talk about the rela- 
tionship of principles to practice in foreign 
policy. And I generally do not try to invent 
talks for particular audiences. That is to 
say, I thought this was an important subject 
on which to talk. I do believe, however, that 
particularly in Minnesota, with its idealistic 
tradition, with its Senators and Congress- 
men who have paid such particular attention 
to the range of problems that I discussed 
today, that this was an appropriate subject 
for this area. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, if U.S. troops are com- 
mitted as a buffer in the Sinai, need we be 
afraid that that might be a military foot in 
the door that ivill be hard to extract, as the 
foot in Viet-Nam was hard to extract many 
years ago? 

Secretary Kissinger: There is no possi- 

bility of committing American forces as a 
buffer. And whatever may be done in the 
Sinai will not be to involve the United States 
in any possible military operation. 

Now, I have seen some of the newspaper 
speculation on what might or might not be 
done. But I want to make clear that nothing 
that is being considered or even generally 
talked about involves a possibility of an 
American military involvement in any mili- 
tary conflict in the Middle East. 

We are now conducting reconnaissance 
flights for both of the parties. 

The issue that has been informally raised 
is whether some of these functions that are 
performed occasionally by reconnaissance 
flights could be done on a more permanent 
basis; that is to say, warning and so forth. 
But that would be done for both sides. It 
would not be done for the United States, 
and it would not involve any possibility of 
military combat. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, please, sir, in light of 
the recent and ever-continuing terrorist acts 
in Israel, is it a vital step still that Israel 
must negotiate with the Palestinians en 
route to the Geneva Conference? 

Secretary Kissinger: The United States 
has never recommended that Israel negotiate 
with the Palestinians. The U.S. position is 
that the question of any negotiation between 
Palestinians and Israel presupposes the ac- 
ceptance by the Palestinians of the State of 
Israel and of the relevant Security Council 
resolutions, neither of which has yet been 
done by the Palestinians. So we have never 
taken the position which you have described. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, first, we are very happy 
that you are here. Second, why do yoxi insist 
on Israel to pull back; and if they do not, 
you say that you will not sell them any 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, both of these 
propositions are incorrect. 

We believe that progress toward peace in 
the Middle East is essential. It is essential 
in the interests of Israel ; it is in the interests 
of the other countries; it is in the interests 
of the United States. 

As long as the United States is in the 

August 4, 1975 


position in which it finds itself in the Middle 
East, we cannot escape the consequences of 
either a stalemate or of an explosion. And 
therefore we, having been first invited by 
both of the parties to participate in the nego- 
tiations, have given our own judgment as 
to what is required to make progress. 

There has never been any question of 
embargoing arms to Israel. The questions 
have been the normal discussion of the scale 
of the support and some items of a partic- 
ular kind of technology which are rather 
long-lead-time items. 

So the two basic assumptions in your 
question are not correct. 

But the United States believes — the Presi- 
dent has repeatedly said it, and I have re- 
peatedly said it — that a stalemate in the 
Middle East will in time have consequences 
that will be extremely unfortunate for all of 
the parties. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I ivould like you to com- 
ment on the negotiations for a Panama Canal 

Secretary Kissinger: The United States 
signed about 18 months ago a declaration of 
principles with the Government of Panama 
in which we committed ourselves to continue 
in good faith the negotiations that were 
started in 1964, looking toward a new ar- 
rangement for the Panama Canal. The im- 
portance of this negotiation resides in the 
fact that Panama could become, in certain 
circumstances, a focal point for the kind 
of nationalistic guerrilla type of operation 
that we have not yet seen in the Western 
Hemisphere directed against the United 
States and might unify all of Latin America 
against the United States. Therefore the 
United States has negotiated in good faith to 
see what can be achieved that would give the 
United States a guarantee with respect to the 
defense of the canal and a substantial period 
of operation of the canal, but which 
would remove some of the particularly grat- 
ing aspects of the pre.sent situation in 

The United States will continue these ne- 
gotiations. We do not yet know whether 
they can be concluded. We will stay in the 

closest contact with the Congress on this at 
each stage and consult intimately with the 
Congress about the negotiations. But we 
are continuing the negotiations. 

United States and Canada Discuss 
Possible Oil Exchanges 

Press release 345 dated June 25 

Following a meeting in Ottawa on June 
18, U.S. and Canadian ofllicials have con- 
cluded that oil exchanges between U.S. and 
Canadian refineries could contribute to re- 
ducing supply and transportation costs, help- 
ing consumers in both countries. 

Officials at the meeting discussed several 
alternatives for oil exchanges between U.S. 
and Canadian refiners, including possible 
longer term arrangements for the exchange 
of Alaskan oil. 

U.S. and Canadian oflficials agreed to con- 
sider adjusting or removing legal, fiscal, and 
administrative impediments to commercially 
workable and mutually beneficial oil ex- 
changes consistent with their respective na- 
tional policies. 

The Federal Energy Administration 
(FEA) will shortly contact U.S. refineries 
historically dependent on Canadian oil im- 
ports to advise them of the results of the 

An exchange involves the supply by one 
company of oil to another company's refinery 
offset by the second company's returning oil 
to the first company's refinery at another lo- 
cation. The exchange results in transpoi-ta- 
tion and other savings for both companies. 

The Ottawa meeting was held between 
officials of the Department of State and the 
Federal Energy Administration and the 
Canadian Ministries of External Affairs and 
Energy, Mines and Resources. 

In a related activity, the FEA is consider- 
ing establishing a system for allocation of 
Canadian crude oil imports. However, such 
action, if implemented, cannot be expected 
to provide more than short-term relief to 
U.S. refiners dependent on Canadian oil. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Milwaukee July 16 

Press release 375 dated July 17 

Q. Mr. Secretary, does the Egyptian 
threat to terminate the U.N. jjeacekeeping- 
force mandate signal a snag in the Middle 
East negotiations? 

Secretary Kissinger: We are not yet fully 
clear about what is intended with the 
Egyptian letter to the Security Council. 
There is some implication in that letter, 
which we are attempting to clarify, that the 
UNEF [U.N. Emergency Force] can be ex- 
tended by the Security Council and that they 
were primarily concerned with the surround- 
ing circumstances. We believe that the tim- 
ing of this letter, at this delicate moment, is 
extremely unfortunate and complicates 

Of course, the United States has an inter- 
est in progress in the negotiations in the 
Middle East, and the United States is mak- 
ing every effort it can to promote progress 
in the Middle East. But ultimately, progress 
depends on the willingness of all parties to 
be conciliatory and to make the moves that 
are necessary. The U.S. effort cannot substi- 
tute for the effort of the parties concerned. 

Q. When you say, Mr. Secretary, "the sur- 
rounding circumstances," what are you re- 
ferring to? 

Secretary Kissinger: I do not want to 
speculate on something that we are attempt- 
ing to clarify. But the possibility exists that 
the letter is intended to stimulate a general 
negotiating process and to call attention to — 
the objection was to the stalemate in the 
negotiations more than to the existence of 
the Force. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, also on the Mideast, 
there is a report that AO Arab-bloc Foreign 
Ministers are meeting in Jidda today and 
voted to exclude Israel from the U.N. Gen- 
eral Assembly this autumn. Is this the sort 

of thing that you have in mind that could 
trigger an American reaction? 

Secretary Kissinger: The U.S. position 
was stated by me in Milwaukee here two 
evenings ago. The United States strongly 
objects to the use of exclusion from the Gen- 
eral Assembly as a method of conducting the 
diplomacy of any area. Exclusions from the 
United Nations or any of its organs have 
been by the charter assigned to the Security 
Council. And the United States cannot be 
indifferent to the abuse of the charter if that 
should be attempted. 

I have not seen an official report of the 
action to which you have referred. But if 
this should be a proposition, the United 
States would resist it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in addition to the 
Egyptian letter, there have been demonstra- 
tions in Israel by people ivho oppose ivhat 
they suspect is an agreement, coming agree- 
ment, by the government there. What do you 
see in vieiv of these are the prospects now 
for an interim — another interim Israeli- 
Egyptian agreement? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I can only re- 
peat what I have said previously. The prog- 
ress toward peace in the Middle East is going 
to be difficult, and it is going to require 
sacrifices by all parties concerned. And in- 
evitably, therefore, it is going to have pain- 
ful elements for any of the parties. 

The United States cannot substitute its 
efforts for the good will, for the willingness 
to cooperate, for the readiness to relate the 
immediate to the long-term interests of the 
parties involved. Therefore what I have said 
earlier is addressed to all of the parties: that 
the United States can help the parties; it 
cannot substitute for them. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Israelis seem to feel 
that they are the ones — the only ones being 

August 4, 1975 


asked to make sacrifices for a peace- which 
iroiild benefit both sides. What sacrifices are 
the Egyptians and the Arab side being asked 
to make? 

Secretary Kissinger: I do not believe that 
it is helpful for the United States, which is 
trying to act as an intermediary at the re- 
quest of the parties, to list the concessions 
that either side is willing to make. None of 
the stories of what either side has been 
willing to do or has been asked to do has 
come from the United States. 

I am confident that if an agreement is 
reached, that when any fair-minded person 
compares the publicly stated starting posi- 
tion of the two sides with the final agree- 
ment, it will be self-evident that both sides 
have made concessions. 

With respect to the question earlier that 
I have not fully answered, I believe that 
there are possibilities for achieving agree- 
ment. I stated last weekend that progress 
had been made. I still maintain this. I be- 
lieve there is a possibility for making an 
agreement if everybody keeps in mind that 
the consequences of a breakdown of negotia- 
tions will transcend in significance any of 
the difficulties that will be produced by the 
negotiation itself. And under those condi- 
tions, I think the progress that has already 
been made can be consolidated and extended. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you see the role 
of the United States being vis-a-vis struggles 
for majority rule in southern Africa during 
the 1970' s, especially in light of the heavy 
U.S. business interests in that area? 

Secretary Kissinger: The United States 
has made clear its position that it favors 
respect for human rights and respect for the 
rights of all the populations in southern 
Africa. The United States has expressed also 
the strong hope, in the interests of all of the 
peoples concerned, that this process take 
place by peaceful means and through nego- 
tiation. And there have been some encourag- 
ing developments in this direction. So the 
United States will support an evolution in 
the direction of an extension of humane 
values, and it will support this evolution by 
peaceful means. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, ivhat do you think the 
consequences would be of the withdrawal of 
UNEF from the Sinai Desert? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the conse- 
quences of the withdrawal of UNEF from 
the Sinai Desert would be to complicate 
enormously the negotiating possibilities and 
to raise serious doubts about the possibilities 
of such negotiating efforts. It would un- 
doubtedly contribute to an increased state of 
tension. It would not necessarily mean an end 
of all the agreements that have been reached, 
but it would certainly compound an already 
difficult situation. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, former Governor Jimmy 
Carter of Georgia has criticized your policy 
position as being neglectful of the smaller 
developing countries. Do you plan at any 
time soon to make a visit to Africa to assure 
these countries that they are not being 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first, I under- 
stand the problems that Governor Carter 
has, and I do not want to be uncooperative. 
But if you read the public statements of the 
U.S. Government and the many speeches that 
I have given on the subject in recent months, 
the whole thrust of our approach is to insist 
that some arrangements must be negotiated. 

Keep in mind the concerns of these devel- 
oping countries. Our dispute with the devel- 
oping countries is not about their aspira- 
tions, but about their methods. What I 
attempted to say here the other evening, what 
I said at the OECD [Organization of Eco- 
nomic Cooperation and Development] meet- 
ing in Paris, what I have said in Kansas 
City, is that the United States is prepared to 
have a dialogue on development with the new 
countries and to discuss with them their 
concerns with respect to raw materials, with 
respect to development, with respect to 
transnational corporations and other issues. 
And I have stated that we will put before 
this special session of the General Assembly 
our program of how to deal with it. 

With all due respect to Governor Carter, 
I do not agree with him about the lack of 
concern. It is one of the big themes in our 
foreign policy. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Now, on the specific question, whether I 
plan to go to Africa. I have had the intention 
of going to Africa and have not been able to 
set a date because there were always some 
immediate crises that kept me here. But I 
would say my physical presence in Africa 
should not be confused with the basic direc- 
tion of our policy, because the basic direc- 
tion of our policy will be along the lines that 
I have described here. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you consider the 
recent statements in this country by Alexan- 
der Solzhenitsyn a threat to detente between 
the United States and the Soviet Union, and 
also, do you think that this Administration 
should minimize its contact with Mr. Sol- 

Secretary Kissinger: I consider Solzhenit- 
syn one of the greatest writers of this period. 
In my present position, I seem to read only 
classified papers. Solzhenitsyn is one of the 
few unclassified documents that I have been 
reading. So I have enormous respect and 
admiration for Solzhenitsyn as a writer. 

Secondly, I think this country can well af- 
ford to listen to a man of his distinction 
without worrying about what effect it will 
have on the foreign policy interests of the 
United States. 

As for seeing senior officials, this can be 
considered from the foreign policy aspect. 
From the point of view of foreign policy the 
symbolic eff'ect of that can be disadvanta- 
geous — which has nothing to do with a re- 
spect either for the man or for his message. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you advise Presi- 
dent Ford not to see Solzhenitsyn, and if you 
did, doesn't this kind of weakness convey to 
the world perhaps that the United States is 
not williyig to stand up for its ideals? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is a very 
bad idea for White House advisers to engage 
in this constant series of leaks on who ad- 
vised or who did not advise the President on 
what should be done. 

In issues of this kind, the President 
solicits the opinion of many advisers, includ- 
ing foreign policy advisers. I myself hap- 
pened to be out of the city when that 

particular decision came up, but my office 
was asked, and I gave my opinion, and my 
opinion is the one that I have stated here, 
which is to distinguish between the man and 
the foreign policy implications of such a 
symbolic gesture. 

I stand behind that view, which I do not 
consider a view of weakness, and which 
would have to be considered also in terms of 
other actions. But the President makes up 
his own mind, and I do not go into debates 
of who specifically recommends what at any 
moment, and I do not consider these — 

Q. If I could folloiv up for a moment. In 
what kind of light do you take his warnings 
that detente is a trap ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I take his warnings 
— if I understand the message of Solzhenit- 
syn, it is not only that detente is a threat but 
that the United States should pursue an ag- 
gressive policy to overthrow the Soviet 

I believe that Solzhenitsyn is a man whose 
suffering entitles him to be heard and who 
has stood with great anguish for his views. 
But I do believe that if his views became the 
national policy of the United States, we 
would be confronting a considerable threat 
of military conflict. Therefore, for those who 
are responsible for the foreign policy of the 
United States, his views can be listened to 
with respect, but they cannot guide our ac- 
tions, much as we admire his writings. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there are reports at the 
White House that the President may now 
see Solzhenitsyn. 

Secretary Kissinger: The schedule of the 
President is not made in the State Depart- 
ment. As I said, when I am asked for the 
foreign policy implications, I will give them. 
As to the composition of the President's 
schedule, I think that should be asked by 
White House correspondents. That is not 
my responsibility. 

Q. You said that Solzhenitsyn, as you 
understand it, would pursue an aggressive 
policy to overthroiv — 

Secretary Kissinger: My understanding of 
the message of Solzhenitsyn is that the 

August 4, 1975 


United States should seek to ovei'throw the 
Soviet system. And I believe that under 
modern conditions, with modern weapons, 
this has consequences that will not be accept- 
able to the American people or to the world. 
But this is no reflection on the literary 
greatness of Solzhenitsyn or on the impor- 
tance of some of his messages. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, on a related topic, what 
will the U.S. position be on the status of 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia? 

Secretary Kissinger: The U.S. position on 
these subjects is unchanged by recent events, 
and we have no need to take a new position. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, did the Egyptian move 
not to renew the U.N. mandate come as a 
surprise to the Ainerican Government, or 
H-as it predicted as part of the stalemate 

Secretary Kissinger: We have warned for 
months that a continuation of the stalemate 
would lead to serious consequences. We did 
not expect the move on the day on which it 
occurred. But we have predicted a move like 
that as the inevitable consequence of a con- 
tinued stalemate. Therefore, in a strategic 
sense, we are not surprised. As far as the 
particular timing is concerned and the day 
on which it occurred, I have expressed my 

Q. To clarify, Mr. Secretary — is it your 
vieiv that the withdrawal of the U.N. Force 
would lead to a breakdown of the negotia- 
tions ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I do not want to say 
that. I would say without any question the 
withdrawal of the U.N. Force would compli- 
cate the negotiations. 

Q. Is it possible, sir, for the U.N. Force to 
stay on without a mandate? 

Secretary Kissinger: This is the sort of 
question that will have to be explored over 
the next few days. And of course one has to 
consult the views of the Secretary General 
of the United Nations and of legal authori- 
ties on this subject. Whether this is a possi- 
bility or whether it is possible for the 
Security Council to extend the mandate in 

the absence of a direct request — these are 
questions that will have to be looked into. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is the solution to the 
Middle East a tn-o-way one, a separate one 
for Jerusalem and a separate one for the 
oilier areas? And secondly, do you think the 
Pope could have any role in the solution? 

Secretary Kissinger: There have been two 
general approaches to the Middle East nego- 
tiation, and these approaches are not in- 
compatible but would inevitably merge at 
some point. One is whether all issues should 
be negotiated simultaneously between all of 
the parties on all of the topics — whether all 
of the countries and parties that have an in- 
terest should be participating from the very 
beginning and whether frontiers, Arab peace 
obligations, guarantees, Palestinian rights or 
interests, Jerusalem, and all the surrounding 
circumstances — whether all of these should 
be negotiated simultaneously or whether one 
should go as far as possible by taking in- 
dividual steps between two of the pai'ties 
concerned and go on from there to the final 

Up to now, the United States has had the 
view that if the parties agree, it would be 
better to take the individual steps first, to 
create a climate of confidence and to make 
the general negotiation take place under 
conditions in which there is less of a danger 
of explosion because there would be less of 
an immediate urgency. If, however, that is 
not possible, the President has stated re- 
peatedly that we, under those circumstances, 
would have to pursue, with some energy, an 
overall approach and try to bring about an 
overall solution. 

In any event, it is our view that the in- 
terim process or the step-by-step process 
cannot be carried on for an indefinite period 
of time and that somewhere along the road, 
and in our judgment very soon along the 
road, a return to an overall approach would 
be inevitable. 

So I do not think that the problem is to 
be segmented into so many individual parts. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the last time you visited 
this particular region of the country, there 
u'as someivhat of a diversion, the Cambodian 


Department of State Bulletin 

crisis involving the U.S. merchant ship 
Mayaguez. How do you gauge the response 
to your particular ideas — 

Secretary Kissinger: I was trying to figure 
out what you meant by this region of the 
country. When I was in St. Louis, yes. 

Q. When you were in St. Louis and 
Kansas City. How do you gauge the response 
in this particular area, now that you have 
had a chance to travel about, to the Admin- 
istration's foreign policy views, and how do 
you see the politics of that situation affecting 
the Administration? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, let me take the 
second question first. I have believed strongly 
that the foreign policy of the United States 
is a nonpartisan effort. It has been carried 
out with the support of both parties. And I 
do not consider it my obligation — and I do 
not have the slightest intention of participat- 
ing in any pai'tisan effort. 

The major progress that has been made 
in American foreign policy has had the sup- 
port of both parties, and it has had the sup- 
port of Democrats and Republicans, includ- 
ing the elected representatives from this 
state. So I am not taking these trips in order 
to have any impact on the political situation. 

With respect to the first question, I think 
it is an interesting phenomenon that the 
formerly isolationist part of the United 
States is now the part of the country that 
most strongly supports an active and re- 
sponsible involvement of the United States 
in international affairs. I consider that one 
of the most heartening developments of the 
last generation and one of the sources of 
strength for our foreign policy. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you spoke a great deal 
about interdependence in your speech. 

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. 

Q. Is it your vierv and position that the 
U.N. Charter should be implemented in all 
of the nations who are member nations of 
the United Nations, superseding the consti- 
tutions of the individual nations? 

Secretary Kissinger: The U.N. Charter is 
based on the proposition that the United 
Nations is composed of a group of sovereign 

states, and therefore the United Nations has 
never been intended as a world government 
superseding the sovereign governments. 

When I speak of interdependence, I do not 
speak of world government. I speak of co- 
operation among sovereign nations based on 
their recognition that they are now living on 
a small planet under conditions in which 
they cannot maintain the peace or achieve 
economic progress except by cooperative ef- 
forts. The difficulty is that for sovereign na- 
tions it is inherently more difficult to 

This is the problem that our period must 
solve, and it cannot be solved by world 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give yoiir as- 
sessment of the situation in Portugal folloiv- 
ing the decisio7i of the Socialist Party to pull 
out of the government? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the evolution 
in Portugal has been increasingly in the 
direction of a state in which political parties 
play a less and less significant role; in which 
the final decisions are made by the Armed 
Forces Movement, as it is called, which has 
its own definitions of democracy, which are 
different from the definitions that have been 
historically accepted. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, during these trips you 
have been having private sessions with com- 
munity leaders. Do you find in talking to 
them that they have any urgent considera- 
tions or any insights? In other ivords, educa- 
tionally, what are you learning in talks with 
them out here? Do you find anything, any 
insights that you don't get back in Washing- 

Secretary Kissinger: For the benefit of the 
local press, the Washington contingent that 
is here is trying to get me to say something 
that will make great news in Washington — 
namely, an admission by me that I can learn 
something from anybody [laughter], which 
would be a historic event. [Laughter.] 

But to answer your question seriously, I 
find these meetings with the leadership 
groups in the various cities extremely help- 
ful. They give me an opportunity to respond 
to their concerns. They also give me an op- 

August 4, 1975 


portunity to find out what serious and in- 
terested people are thinking- about the 
direction of their country in foreign policy 
in various parts of the United States. And 
since these are the leaders that can and will 
influence opinion in their communities, it is 
important for me and for the President to 
know what issues are of greatest concern to 
them. So I have been very grateful for the 
opportunity to exchange ideas. 

I do not make any presentation at these 
meetings. It is a very free give-and-take. I 
have found them extremely helpful, and I am 
very grateful to the local sponsors who have 
arranged them. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the South Koreans ap- 
pear to be so7newhat paranoid about a 
possible invasion from the North. Do you 
share their fears, and if so, would you 
anticipate that the United States would get 
involved again in Korea? 

Secretary Kissinger: The concern about 
Korea developed most strongly in the after- 
math of Indochina. There was a justifiable 
concern that a government which has in a 
way excluded itself from contacts at least 
with the Western world might suffer the 
misapprehension that events in Indochina 
would be permitted to repeat themselves in 
Korea. Therefore it was judged important 
for the United States to make clear its posi- 
tion before any such impression developed. 

Secondly, the United States has a treaty 
of mutual assistance with South Korea, 
which has been ratified by the Congress and 
which spells out the legal obligations of the 
United States in case of aggression. And the 
President, the Secretary of Defense, and I 
have all pointed out that we would maintain 
our obligations. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with the 
previous question, do you see these trips as 
a means, perhaps, to get around Congress 
and to get your views across ^vithout being 
filtered through the Washington press? 

Secretary Kissinger: Absolutely not. I 
believe that foreign policy must be carried 
out in the closest consultation between the 

Congress and the executive. These trips are 
not designed to get around the Congress, 
because on every concrete issue the Congress 
will still have to support us. There has been 
no reduction in the intensity of briefings of 
Congressmen and Senators. In fact, it has 
been increased with the fragmentation of 
authority within the Congress and with the 
many new centers of power that have de- 
veloped within the Congress. 

But we think we have an obligation, in a 
democratic government, to put the issues to 
the Congress as well as to the people. And I 
think anybody who has attended any of my 
meetings in addition to, of course, the public 
record, will look in vain for any attempt to 
urge anybody to use any particular influence 
with the Congress. In fact, most of the issues 
that are being discussed are not controversial 
between the Congress and the executive. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the leaders yesterday 
whom you conferred with before your speech 
indicated that at a private meeting you 
sounded them out on the use of U.S. civilian 
technicians operating some sort of electronic 
buffer zone betiveen the Egyptians and the 
Israelis in the Si7iai. Why did you sound 
them out on that, and what reaction do yoic 
have to that sort of idea? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I did not 
initiate the discussion. The discussion arose 
out of questions that were asked me, which 
were generated in turn by press reports, and 
therefore I [asked] them that if these press 
reports ever became a reality — which they 
have not at this point — what their reaction 
would be to such propositions. And this is 
one of the functions that I believe these 
meetings serve in giving us an insight into 
what people think on these issues. 

In any event, if such an issue arose, that 
is to say if the parties ever asked us to do 
this, we would certainly submit it to the 
Congress for the Congress' view before we 
got American technicians, whether military 
or civilian, involved in the Middle East. 

The press: Mr. Secretary, thank you very 


Department of State Bulletin 

Secretary Kissinger Meets With Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko 
and With Israeli Prime Minister Rabin During European Trip 

Secretary Kissinger left Washington July 
9 for a visit to Paris (July 9-10), Geneva 
July (10-11), Bonn (July 11-12), and Lon- 
don (July 12). He met with French Presi- 
dent Valery Giscard d'Estaing and Foreign 
Minister Jean Sauvagnargues at Paris; tvith 
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko 
at Geneva; with Federal German President 
Walter Scheel, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, 
and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Gen- 
scher and with Israeli Prime Minister Yit- 
zhak Rabin at Bonn; and with British 
Foreign Secretary James A. Callaghan at 
Londoyi. Folloiving are remarks by Secre- 
tary Kissinger, Foreign Minister Jean Sau- 
vagnargues, and Prime Minister Rabin, to- 
gether tvith the text of a joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
statement issued at Geneva July 11. 


Press release 360 dated July 9 

Secretary Kissinger: I am leaving for con- 
sultations with our European allies and also 
to meet with the Soviet Foreign Minister 
to review Soviet-American relations, and 
particularly to discuss the situation in the 
Middle East. And of course we attach great 
importance to the meeting with Prime Min- 
ister Rabin, all of which is part of our effort 
to encourage the process of peace in the 
Middle East. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there's been some talk 
of additional U.S. assurances, commitments, 
guarantees for Israel. Are there any addi- 
tional assurances? 

Secretary Kissinger: Any progress toward 
peace in the Middle East has two elements 
— the negotiations between the parties in the 
Middle East and what the United States can 

contribute in the way of any assurances, or 
acting as a transmitter of assurances of 
the two sides to each other. And whatever 
it is humanly possible to do, the United 
States will do to promote progress. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there are reports that 
an agreement is already ivrapped up betiveen 
Israel and Egypt. 

Secretary Kissinger: Totally wrong. 

Q. But is it approaching the point? 

Secretary Kissinger: No. We are not any- 
where near that point. But all sides, Israel 
and Egypt, are working seriously. And of 
course the United States has repeatedly ex- 
pressed its interest in promoting peace on 
a basis just to all. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there's been a report that 
the President and some leaders in the House 
have worked out a tentative compromise on 
resuming aid to Turkey. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, they discussed 
this morning possible ways by which aid to 
Turkey can be resumed. Hearings will be 
held in the Foreign Affairs Committee — or 
the International Relations Committee — to- 
morrow, and we are hopeful that something 
can be done. 


Remarks to the Press Following Meeting 
With President Valery Giscard d'Estaing 

Press release 363 dated July 10 

Q. Who took the initiative for this meet- 

Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues: We are 
in constant contact with the Secretary of 

August 4, 1975 


state, and it had at first been agreed that I 
would meet with him in Washington. But 
the Secretary of State's schedule and the 
meetings he is to have in Bonn led him to 
modify his plans and to come to Paris. I 
thank him for this while nevertheless hoping 
to see him again, probably in Washington on 
the occasion of the U.N. meeting. The Sec- 
retary of State is going to tell you person- 
ally that we had a long private conversation 
this morning and that we decided to go 
together and report it to the President of 
the Republic. 

Q. On ivhat subjects, Mr. Foreigyi Min- 

Foreign Minister Sanvagnargues: We 
spoke of the resumption of the dialogue ; we 
spoke of Cyprus ; we spoke of the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe; and 
we discussed in a general way— The Secre- 
tary of State referred to the Middle East 
problem — This was a very thorough ex- 
change of views and, I believe, a vei-y con- 
structive one. 

Q. — the European cooperation conference? 

Secretary Kissinger: First, let me say that 
I agree completely with what my colleague 
has said. We've had very constructive talks, 
and we reviewed most of the outstanding is- 
sues in the spirit of friendship and coopera- 
tion which characterizes our relationship. We 
discussed the resumption of the dialogue be- 
tween consumers and producers, and I be- 
lieve we have made very good progress 
toward establishing a framework for the re- 
sumption of this dialogue. And we had fruit- 
ful exchanges on a range of other subjects. 

With respect to the European Security 
Conference, I believe that both our countries 
are of the view that it should be brought to 
a conclusion as rapidly as possible and that 
both our delegations are working in that 
sense at Geneva. 

Q. What did you tell the President about 
the prospects for another settlement in the 
Middle East, Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary Kissinger: We had a full dis- 
cussion of the situation in the Middle East, 

and I told him we cannot really judge until I 
have had a chance to talk with the Israeli 
Prime Minister and until the views of the 
Israeli Government will then have been 
formally communicated to the Egyptian Gov- 
ernment for their reaction. 

Q. About President Giscard d'Estaing's 
proposal for a monetary conference next 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we have not had 
a formal suggestion to that effect, but we take 
the views of the French Government on the 
monetary situation seriously, and we recog- 
nize that this is one of the big outstanding 
issues about which we will remain in very 
close contact. 

Q. Have you agreed on a tentative date for 
the resumption of the oil dialogue? 

Secretary Kissinger: We haven't agreed on 
a date, but I think we are making progress 
toward establishing a framework which 
should enable us to propose dates within a 
reasonable future. 

Q. .Aboiit the renewal of the dialogue be- 
fore the special session of the United Na- 
tions ? 

Secretary Kissinger. 
that direction. 

We are working in 

Remarks to the Press Following Meeting 
at the French Foreign Ministry 

Press release 366 dated July 11 

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you envisage any- 
thing to Old the deadlock between producers 
and consumers? 

Secretary Kissinger: We talked at some 
length about the producer-consumer dialogue 
and how to resume it. And I think that we 
have made good progress which gives us hope 
that the dialogue can be resumed in the rela- 
tively near future. 

Q. Have you discussed the situation in the 
Middle East? 

Secretary Kissinger: We had a discussion 
about the situation in the Middle East also, 


Department of State Bulletin 

Q. What are the main obstacles, according 
to you ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as you know, 
some rather delicate negotiations are now 
going on, and I will be meeting the Israeli 
Prime Minister in Bonn, and we are in close 
touch with the Egyptian Government as well 
as with other Arab governments. So I don't 
think it would be proper for me to character- 
ize the state of the negotiations while they 
are in progress. 

Q. About the reaction of the developing 
countries to the resmnption of the dialogue 
between oil producers and oil consumers? 

Secretary Kissinger: My impression is that 
the ideas that were discussed this morning by 
the Foreign Minister, the President, and my- 
self offer a basis on which the developing 
countries will also agree to resume the dia- 

Q. On the basis proposed by the Energy 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't want to 
go into the details. But the ideas that have 
been commonly discussed will undoubtedly 
be incorporated. 

Q. A comment about the liftuig of the arms 
embargo to Turkey ? 

Secretary Kissinger: As you know, the Ad- 
ministration strongly favors the lifting of 
the arms embargo and has made specific pro- 
posals to the Congress to that effect. The 
Senate has already approved it. The Presi- 
dent and I met with the leaders of the House 
of Representatives yesterday, who promised 
us they would take urgent action, and they 
are now considering our proposals. 

Q. And what about negotiating the bases 
in Turkey? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we are assum- 
ing that on the basis of the action that we 
have proposed to the House of Representa- 
tives that the climate for the discussion with 
respect to our bases in Turkey will be greatly 

Q. On which international question have 

you and Mr. Kissinger made the best prog- 
ress ? 

Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues : Well, we 
have found to have a fairly broad conver- 
gence of views on most of the major interna- 
tional problems. Since we have really cov- 
ered all the major problems that currently 
confront the world, I don't think I can point 
out any single problem. Lastly, I think that 
we have reached a solid base for progress in 
those areas which call for the joint action of 
the United States and of France. 

Q. Which problems? 

Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues: Espe- 
cially on the dialogue, especially on the in- 
ternational monetary problems that have to 
be approached. And thei-e is a whole series 
of things on which general opinions were ex- 

Q. And on the Conference of European Se- 

Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues: On the 
European Security Conference, the United 
States and France are of the opinion that this 
conference, which is now in its final stage, 
should be brought to its conclusion as fast as 
possible. And we hope that the final stage in 
Helsinki can take place either by the end of 
July or, at the latest, by the end of August. 

Q. Mr. Minister, did you discuss Mr. Gis- 
card d'Estaing's proposal for a monetary con- 
ference ? 

Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues: Mr. Gis- 
card d'Estaing did in fact speak of it. There 
is no proposal as yet. Only the ideas were ex- 

Coming out of the Elysee we have already 
told you the essentials about what we dis- 
cussed this morning. We do not have to re- 
peat it. I believe one may say that the ex- 
changes of views that we have had with the 
American Secretary of State and the con- 
versation we have had with the President of 
the Republic were entirely useful and have 
reflected, as one could expect, the excellent 
climate of relations between the United 
States and France. 

August 4, 1975 



Press release 367 dated July U 

I am glad to be back in Geneva for an op- 
portunity to continue an exchange of views 
with Foreign Minister Gromyko. As you 
know, we believe that the United States and 
the Soviet Union have a particular responsi- 
bility to do all they can to lessen international 
tension and contribute to the solution of out- 
standing problems. It is in this spirit that we 
will review a number of bilateral issues and 
a number of issues of world peace with For- 
eign Minister Gromyko, and I hope we will 
make some contribution toward the solution 
of these issues. 

I would like to express my appreciation to 
the Swiss Government for making this meet- 
ing possible and for the hospitality they have 

Thank you. 

Secretary Kissinger: I understand that the 
only country that has not yet joined the con- 
sensus is Malta and that they are waiting to 
hear from them either tonight or tomorrow 

Q. Did Mr. Gromyko give you anything re- 
semhli)ig a new proposal on verification that 
would help reach agreement? 

Secretary Kissinger: I cannot go into the 
details of a discussion that is still going on, 
but as I pointed out progress has been made. 

Q. The Middle East? 

Secretary Kissinger: The Middle East will 
be discussed tomorrow. We have not yet dis- 
cussed the Middle East. Tomorrow we will 
continue our discussions on SALT, and then 
we will turn to the Middle East. We will meet 
here at 10 :30. We have been meeting off and 
on with the Ambassadors to the European 
Security Conference. 


Secretary Kissinger: Well, we had very 
extensive talks, very constructive, and con- 
ducted in a cordial atmosphere. We concen- 
trated on the European Security Conference 
and mostly on SALT [Strategic Arms Limi- 
tation Talks]. With respect to the European 
Security Conference, the United States sup- 
ports the consensus that has developed that 
the last stage of the conference should take 
place on July 30 as proposed by Canada, and 
we are prepared to bring this to as rapid a 
conclusion as possible in order to permit the 
Finnish hosts to make their preparations. 
With respect to SALT we had extensive dis- 
cussions, which will be continued tomorrow, 
and progress was made. 

Thank you. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you heard anything 
from Malta? Since the meeting is still on, 
they are still waiting down there. 

' Made following a meeting with Foreign Minister 
Gromyko at the Soviet Mission (text from press 
release 368). 


Press release 369 dated July 11 

In accordance with an earlier agreement, 
a meeting was held on July 10-11 in Geneva 
between the Secretary of State of the United 
States and Assistant to the President for Na- 
tional Security Affairs, Henry A. Kissinger, 
and Member of the Political Bureau of the 
Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., Andrei A. 

In furtherance of the conversations held 
previously, they continued their exchange of 
views on matters of bilateral US-Soviet rela- 
tions. Particular attention was given to is- 
sues related to working out a new long-term 
agreement on the further limitation of stra- 
tegic offensive arms on the basis of the under- 
standing reached between President Gerald 
R. Ford and General Secretary of the CPSU, 
L. I. Brezhnev, at their meeting in Vladivo- 
stok in November, 1974. 

In reviewing the international issues of 
interest to both sides, they held a thorough 


Department of State Bulletin 

discussion, in particular, on questions con- 
cerning the holding of the final stage of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe at the summit level in Helsinki. They 
also continued their exchange of views on 
matters of achieving a just and lasting peace 
settlement in the Middle East, including the 
question of resuming the Geneva Peace Con- 

The talks were conducted in a friendly 
atmosphere and both sides believe that the ex- 
change of views was constructive and useful 
from the standpoint of further developing 
US-Soviet relations in conformity with the 
course they have embarked on together and 
the concrete agreements reached during the 
US-Soviet summit meetings. 


Prime Minister Rabin: Well, Mr. Secre- 
tary, ladies and gentlemen, I am very thank- 
ful to the Federal Republic of Germany for 
making it possible to use my visit for another 
purpose, not just visiting the Federal Repub- 
lic. I thank the Secretary, who found the time 
to have this meeting with me. In the meeting 
we have discussed in the way that normally 
we discuss between Israel and the United 
States — in a friendly atmosphere — the prob- 
lems we face today. 

We discussed various elements and aspects 
of the interim agreement with Egypt. We re- 
ceived — the Israeli part has received — certain 
clarifications. With these clarifications I am 
going tonight to Israel. We will have to dis- 
cuss it there, and the Ambassador of Israel 
to the United States will bring our reaction 
to what we have heard and we have discussed 
in this meeting. 

I am still hopeful that an interim agree- 
ment will be reached, but we have to over- 
come certain difficulties in the road to its 
achievement. Thank you very much. 

'■' Made to the press at the conclusion of talks at 
Schloss Gymnich (text from press release 373 dated 
July 15). 

Secretary Kissinger: I also would like to 
express the appreciation of the U.S. Govern- 
ment to the Federal Republic for making this 
meeting possible. The Prime Minister and I 
had a very friendly and very constructive 
talk. We reviewed all the elements of a pos- 
sible interim agreement, and we attempted to 
answer the questions that Israel had put to 
us earlier in the week and additional ques- 
tions that the Prime Minister raised this 

I believe that we have made progress in 
achieving understanding of the elements that 
are needed, and the Prime Minister will now 
return to Israel and communicate with us 
through his Ambassador later in the week. 
But from our point of view, I consider the 
talks constructive, and the atmosphere was 
friendly and warm as befits the relationship 
between our two countries. 

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, what are the major 
difficulties you referred to? 

Prime Minister Rahin: I am not going to 
elaborate about details. I believe for the time 
being the statements that have been made 
are enough. You are going on the plane; 
you'll get an opportunity to — [Laughter.] 

Secretary Kissinger: It may produce a 
senior official familiar with the Middle East. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think an interim 
agreement is closer now than it was prior to 
your meeting with the Prime Minister? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I always believe 
that some progress in clarifying issues was 
made, and this can only be helpful. But, of 
course, it depends on all of the parties, and 
we will have to see later on in the week. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, [inaudible] do you plan 
a trip to the Middle East notv? 

Secretary Kissinger: I said the next event 
will be the return of the Israeli Ambassador 
to Washington, and after that, we will make 
the decisions of how to carry the process for- 

August 4, 1975 


President Ford's News Conference 
at Chicago July 12 

Folloiving are excerpts relating to foreign 
policy from the transcript of a news con- 
ference held by President Ford at Chicago 
on Jidy 12.^ 

President Ford: Good morning. Won't you 
all please sit down. 

I have one short announcement, a very- 
important announcement. 

I am deeply relieved at the report of the 
safe release of Colonel [Ernest R.] Morgan. 
Since his abduction on the 29th of June, the 
U.S. Government, with the close cooperation 
of the Government of Lebanon, has been try- 
ing to secure Colonel Morgan's return, and 
we are extremely glad to report that that has 

At the same time, the United States is 
greatly appreciative of the extraordinary 
efforts of the Government of Lebanon in 
obtaining Colonel Morgan's release and for 
the assistance of others who have worked 
toward this end. 

Q. Mr. President, can you tell 7is ivhat ivas 
negotiated in order to obtain the release 
of Colonel Morgan? 

President Ford: Our representatives in 
Lebanon worked very closely with the Gov- 
ernment of Lebanon and with other elements 
in order to make sure that Colonel Morgan 
was returned. We have a policy — and I think 
it is the right policy — that we will not as 
a government pay ransom, and as far as I 
know it was not done in this case by our 
government. But by working closely and 
firmly with all parties, we were, thank good- 
ness, able to return Colonel Morgan safely. 

Q. Mr. President, the United States is ap- 
parently prepared to approve negotiations of 
a multiterm wheat and grain sale with the 
Soviet Union. Other countries are facing 
drought and may ask for sales, too. 

My questions are: How much can we sell 

' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Com- 
pilation of Presidential Documents dated July 21. 

without dipping in too much into our harvest 
this year; and won't this increase costs of 
bread and food later this year to oxir con- 

President Ford: First, we should thank 
the farmers of this country for their tre- 
mendous productivity. We are fortunate in 
America to be the breadbasket of the world. 
Our farmers do a tremendous job in the 
production of food for us and for the world 
as a whole. 

We are anticipating the largest corn crop, 
the largest wheat crop in the history of the 
United States, but there are some uncertain- 

We hope that there will be a sale to the 
Soviet Union. It will be helpful to the Amer- 
ican farmer and will be a reward for his 
productivity. We hope that there will be 
ample supplies of corn and wheat and feed 
grains so that we can help other nations 
around the world through our Food for 
Peace program. 

And if there is this sizable crop in the 
variety of areas, it will mean that we can 
expand our Food for Peace program and 
act in a humanitarian way to the less 

I have no idea at this point what the 
amount will be of the sale to the Soviet 
Union, if it does materialize. 

But I think the fact that we can make 
one is a blessing, and I hope we do make 
one. But I want to assure you, as I do the 
American consumer, that we are alert to the 
danger of too big a sale or too much ship- 
ment overseas because the American con- 
sumer has a stake in this problem as well. 

So we have to find a careful line to tread, 
of selling all we can, but protecting the 
rights of the American consumer and utiliz- 
ing the productivity of the American farmer 
to help our balance of payments, to improve 
our humanitarian eff'orts overseas, and to 
indirectly help us in our relations with other 

Q. But a sale of any substantial size would 
mean some increase in a loaf of bread here, 
ivouldn't it? 

President Ford: I don't think I am in a 


Department of State Bulletin 

position — or anyone else is in a position — to 
define what a substantial sale is. A big sale 
with big wheat and feed grain and corn pro- 
duction would have a minimal effect on 
consumer prices in the United States. 

I can only assure you and the American 
people that we are watching all aspects of 
this problem, and we will keep alert to any 
pitfalls or dangers that might result. 

Security Assistance Program 
Discussed by Department 

Statement by Carhjle E. Maw 

Under Secretary for Security Assistance ^ 

I welcome this opportunity to meet with 
the subcommittee today and to testify with 
respect to the status of our security assist- 
ance program. 

Security assistance has been an important 
instrument of our foreign policy for more 
than a quarter of a century. It began with 
special programs of military aid to the 
Philippines in 1946 and Greece and Turkey 
in 1947 and was expanded in the 1950's and 
1960's to include nations in Asia, the Middle 
East, and Latin America. 

Security assistance is provided for several 
basic reasons : to assist allies and other .^,tates 
with the means to defend themselves, to ob- 
tain bases and other military access rights, 
and to support political objectives that are 
deemed essential to the U.S. Government. In 
pursuit of these objectives, we have over the 
years provided military assistance to more 
than 75 countries, made military instruction 
available to almost 500,000 foreign military 
personnel, and recently provided on a non- 
reimbursable basis an annual average of $4 
billion in military equipment and related sup- 

' Made before the Subcommittee on Foreign Opera- 
tions of the Senate Committee on Appropriations on 
July 10. The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 

port to countries in Southeast Asia, the Mid- 
dle East, and elsewhere. 

Today the situation is different. As the sub- 
committee is aware, recent events in South- 
east Asia have necessitated an extensive re- 
view of our policies in Asia. At the same time, 
we are engaged in a major effort to bring 
peace to the Middle East through a nego- 
tiated settlement of Arab-Israeli differences. 
Concomitantly, we have underway a reassess- 
ment of our Middle Eastern policies as well as 
a study of the types of programs needed to 
achieve our objectives in this region. 

In early February 1975, the President 
transmitted to Congress his recommended 
foreign assistance legislation for fiscal year 
1976. He made it clear that the sums he had 
recommended for security assistance — $790 
million for grant military assistance, and 
$560 million for foreign military sales credits 
to finance a $1,021 billion program — were 
contingent in nature. He pointed out at the 
time that: 

Due to the largely fluid situations in Indochina 
and the current reassessments of our Middle East 
policy, the military assistance programs are now 
under review. 

I wish to stress at this juncture that what 
is at stake in this policy review is not the 
arithmetic of appropriations, but the nature 
of future American relations with nations in 
the Middle East and Asia. Until the Middle 
East review is completed, we will not be in 
a position to provide Congress with a com- 
plete presentation of our security assistance 
funding requirements for FY76. The coun- 
tries that will be omitted include Israel, 
Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. On the other hand, 
our Asian policy assessment is fully under- 
way, and we should be in a position to pro- 
vide to the subcommittee the Administra- 
tion's proposed security assistance program 
for countries in this region within the next 
few weeks. 

At the same time, we will be in a position 
to report to the Congress on security as- 
sistance and human rights as required under 
section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961 (amended) [Public Law 93-559, 
approved Dec. 30, 1974]. 

The U.S. Government is genuinely and 

August 4, 1975 


deeply concerned about human rights mat- 
ters. This concern reflects both our own tra- 
ditions as well as a realization that human 
rights, and respect for them, are valid for- 
eign policy objectives in their own right. 
Moreover, we recognize the importance of 
human rights in the conduct of our foreign 
policy as well as the clear intent of the Con- 
gress that human rights questions be ad- 
dressed in the formulation of our policies. 

At the same time, we must recognize that 
we are dealing with sovereign countries with 
differing political systems. There is also a 
very finite limit to the proper role of an out- 
side government in internal developments 
and aff'airs. We can neither determine the 
course of internal change nor be certain as 
to what the outcome will be in situations 
where there ai*e internal tensions. 

Further, our policies toward individual 
countries represent a mix of interests, ob- 
jectives, and relationships different in almost 
every case. We know that neglect of human 
rights may well adversely affect the achieve- 
ment of other important objectives. We also 
know that internal popular support is es- 
sential to long-term political stability. As the 
Secretary of State said in his address to the 
Japan Society on June 18 : 

. . . there is no question that popular will and 
social justice are, in the last analysis, the essential 
underpinnings of resistance to subversion and ex- 
ternal challenge. 

In the State Department, we have strength- 
ened our capacity to deal with human rights 
matters. We have within the last year di- 
rected each of our Embassies to report in 
detail on the status of human rights in its 
country. Over the past three months, we have 
directed a comprehensive review of the hu- 
man rights situation preparatory to trans- 
mittal of a report to the Congress as required 
under section 502B. 

The Administration has been active in com- 
plying with other congressional require- 
ments. For example, section 51 of the For- 
eign Assistance Act urges new initiatives in 
the area of international controls over the 
transfer of arms and calls for a report to the 
Congress by the President "setting forth the 
steps he has taken to carry out" the provi- 

sions of section 51. This report is in prepara- 
tion and should be received by the Congress 
within the next few days. 

Over the past several months, we have also 
embarked on a serious effort to meet the pro- 
visions of section 17(b) of the Foreign As- 
sistance Act, which directs the President to 
submit to the first session of the 94th Con- 
gress a "detailed plan for the reduction and 
eventual elimination of the present military 
assistance program." We expect that we will 
be in a position to submit a report on this 
subject by the third quarter of 1975. 

At the same time, we are attempting to 
deal with a number of other equally impor- 
tant questions as we develop a revised FY76 
security assistance program for presentation 
to the Congress. Our future relations with 
Turkey is one such question. The total U.S. 
embargo on grant assistance, credit, and com- 
mercial sales of military equipment to Tur- 
key, so sweeping that members of the War- 
saw Pact can purchase items now forbidden 
to Turkey, is subjecting our security relation- 
ship with this important NATO ally to an 
intolerable burden. A relationship of trust 
and confidence built up over many years has 
already been seriously and adversely affected. 
Continuation of the embargo risks further 
deterioration that could jeopardize our se- 
curity interests throughout the eastern 
Mediterranean area. 

While the Administration strongly believes 
that the embargo should be rescinded, it is 
for Congress itself to decide what form the 
legislation should take. The Senate has al- 
ready adopted the Scott-Mansfield bill, which 
would restore grant assistance as well as 
cash and credit sales. In any case, it is im- 
portant that the Congress act as expeditious- 
ly as possible. As a result of the February 
5 embargo, Turkey has recently informed us 
it wishes to begin negotiations in mid-July 
on the future of U.S. facilities. The Govern- 
ment of Turkey has not linked the facilities 
negotiations to progress toward lifting the 
embargo, but it is clear that the scope of the 
negotiations will be affected by congressional 

The downward spiral in U.S. -Turkish rela- 
tions that would result from a prolongation 


Department of State Bulletin 

of the embargo is contrary to U.S. and Turk- 
ish interests. It would also deal a heavy blow 
to the NATO alliance at a time when other 
major unresolved problems exist in the 
Mediterranean region. Diminution of the 
Western position in Turkey is also likely 
to have adverse implications for our stand- 
ing in the Middle East. 

As the subcommittee is aware, we are en- 
gaged in base rights negotiations with the 
Government of Spain, and we are also about 
to embark on discussions with the Govern- 
ment of the Philippines on our bases in that 
country. The outcome of these negotiations 
could have a significant impact on our se- 
curity assistance funding needs. 

Gentlemen, we continue to believe that 
political and economic development can only 
take place in a more secure world. Thus se- 
curity assistance is a necessary complement 
to our efforts to assist development. 

As you know, we have greatly modified 
our security assistance programs in the past 
five years to encourage nations to bear the 
primary burden for their own defense. In 
specific situations, grant assistance must 
continue to play a major role; where we de- 
crease grant assistance we should provide 
adequate credit to our friends and allies to 
enable them to purchase the arms they re- 
quire. The foreign military sales program 
promotes the self-sufficiency we seek and our 
partners are pursuing. 

Whatever the outcome of the Middle East 
and Asia reviews now in progress, the pro- 
gram that is presented to the Congress will 
substantially contribute to the following 
goals : 

— Creating a lasting peace in the Middle 

— Building the capacity of the nations of 
East Asia to determine their own destiny. 

— Establishing the foundations for coun- 
tries in Latin America and elsewhere to meet 
pressing internal security and self-defense 

— Lowering the burden on the United 
States to play a dominant security role with 
our own armed forces. 

We in the United States cannot alone un- 

derwrite the success of the quest to resolve 
old issues or alone persevere in the face of 
continuing obstacles to peace. Nor can we 
assure that the imperative to cooperation 
will overcome the temptation of nations to 
pursue short-term advantage. But it is equal- 
ly clear that hopes for a peaceful, coopera- 
tive, and just international order can only be 
realized with the strong participation of this 
nation. Our security assistance program is a 
crucial vehicle for that participation. 

I believe that this is a time of transition 
and of testing in our relations with other 
nations. It is also a time when we must move 
prudently and patiently in fashioning new 
policies and constructing programs to aid 
other nations. I hope that the subcommittee 
will appreciate what we are attempting to 
accomplish and will bear with us as we de- 
velop a coherent and eff'ective security as- 
sistance program for FY76. 

U.S. Interpretive Statement on 
NPT Review Conference Declaration 

The final declaration of the Review Con- 
ference of the Parties to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was 
adopted by consensus on May 30 at Geneva.^ 
Folloiving is the U.S. interpretive statement 
on the declaration, which was made before 
the conference that day by David Klein, U.S. 
Alternate Representative to the conference. 

My delegation is pleased to have joined 
in the adoption of the final declaration of 
this, the first NPT Review Conference. We 
believe that by reaching agreement on the 
conference declaration, which is the culmina- 
tion of our efforts over the last four weeks, 
we have taken an important step forward. 

The declaration is a realistic document, 
containing recommendations for improving 
the effectiveness of the treaty's operation 
and, most important, of the nonproliferation 

' For a statement by U.S. Representative Fred C. 
Ikle made before the conference on May 6 and the 
text of the final declaration, see BULLETIN of June 
30, 1975, p. 921. 

August 4, 1975 


regime generally. Some ideas — including 
those relating to international cooperation 
on physical security, to improvements of 
safeguards on exports, and to regional solu- 
tions to fuel-cycle needs — are innovative and 
are receiving broad international endorse- 
ment for the first time. In addition, the con- 
ference declaration strongly underlines the 
need for determined and timely efforts to 
achieve widely shared objectives. Taken as a 
whole, the final declaration establishes a 
practical and comprehensive course of action 
for strengthening the nonproliferation re- 
gime. It shows clearly that we all have a 
shared and overriding interest in the success 
of efforts to curb nuclear proliferation, 
which is a continuing and complicated 

We recognize that no delegation can give 
unqualified support to each of the conclusions 
and recommendations contained in the decla- 
ration. Some may have reservations about 
particular ideas expressed in the document; 
others may regret that some of their sugges- 
tions were not included or were given less 
emphasis than they would have preferred. 
This is as true of our delegation as it is of 

I would like to take this opportunity to 
briefly state for the record our views on 
some of the issues covered in the final decla- 

First, I would like to reiterate that we look 
forward, as soon as possible after the con- 
clusion of the agreement outlined at Vladi- 
vostok, to the commencement of follow-on 
negotiations on further limitations and re- 
ductions in the level of strategic arms. 

Second, with respect to the question of 
restraints on nuclear testing, my government 
joins in affirming the determination of par- 
ticipants of this conference to achieve the 
discontinuance of all explosions of nuclear 
weapons for all time. The final declaration 
notes that a number of delegations at the 
conference expressed the desire that the 
nuclear-weapon states parties enter as soon 
as possible into an agreement to halt all 
nuclear-weapon tests for a specified period of 
time. Our view is that any treaty or agree- 

ment on nuclear-weapons testing must con- 
tain provisions for adequate verification and 
must solve the problem of peaceful nuclear 
explosions. It would not be realistic to as- 
sume that an agreement banning all nuclear- 
weapons testing, whether by nuclear-weapon 
states party to the NPT or by all testing 
powers, could be concluded before solutions 
to these problems are found. 

With reference to nuclear-free zones, we 
believe that the creation of such zones could 
effectively complement the NPT as a means 
of preventing the spread of nucleai'-explosive 
capabilities. We have emphasized that, to 
be effective, regional arrangements should 
meet the following criteria: 

The initiative should be taken by the 
states in the region concerned. The zone 
should preferably include all states in the 
area whose participation is deemed impor- 
tant. The creation of the zone should not 
disturb necessary security arrangements, 
and provision must be made for adequate 
verification. Finally, we do not believe that 
the objective of nonproliferation would be 
served if a nuclear-free-zone arrangement 
permitted the indigenous development of nu- 
clear explosives for any purpose ; no effort 
to achieve nonproliferation could succeed if 
it permitted such indigenous development of 
nuclear explosives by non-nuclear-weapon 
states or failed to safeguard against diver- 
sion of nuclear materials to such use. 

A number of delegations at the conference 
urged that nuclear-weapon states provide, in 
an appropriate manner, binding security as- 
surances to those states which became fully 
bound by the provisions of a regional 
arrangement. My government adhered to 
protocol II of the Latin American Nuclear- 
Free-Zone Treaty, which contains such a 
binding security assurance, after deter- 
mining that that treaty met the criteria 
noted above. However, we believe that each 
nuclear-fj-ee-zone proposal must be judged 
on its own merits to determine whether the 
provision of specific security assurances 
would be likely to have a favorable eflfect. 
Moreover, we do not believe it would be 
realistic to expect nuclear-weapon states to 


Department of State Bulletin 

make implied commitments to provide such 
assurances before the scope and content 
of any nuclear-free-zone arrangement are 
worked out. 

I ask that this written statement be in- 
corporated in annex II of the final document. 


Current Actions 



Agreement amending and extending the interna- 
tional coffee agreement, 1968. Approved by the 
International Coffee Council at London April 14, 
197.3. Entered into force October 1, 1973. TIAS 
Accession deposited: Ireland, July 8, 1975. 


Amendments to articles 35 and 55 of the Constitu- 
tion of the World Health Organization of July 22, 
1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at 
Geneva May 22, 1973.' 

Acceptances deposited: Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, July 9, 1975; Malaysia, July 3, 1975. 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 
6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 

Acceptance deposited: Ethiopia, July 3, 1975. 
Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948 
on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative 
Organization, as amended (TIAS 4044, 6285, 
6490). Done at London October 17, 1974.' 
Acceptances deposited: Barbados, June 30, 1975; 
Bulgaria, April 16, 1975; People's Republic of 
China, April 28, 1975; France, March 24, 1975; 
Iran, July 8, 1975; Norway, April 28, 1975; 
Panama, May 23, 1975; Spain, March 24, 1975; 
Sweden, May 5, 1975; Trinidad and Tobago, 
May 16, 1975; Union of Soviet Socialist Re- 
publics, April 28, 1975; United Kingdom, June 
26, 1975. 
Inter-American convention on facilitation of inter- 
national waterborne transportation, with annex. 
Done at Mar del Plata June 7, 1963.' 

' Not in force. 

" Not in force for the United States. 

'Applicable to Berlin (West). 

Ratification deposited: Chile (with reservation 
and statement), June 16, 1975. 

Oil Pollution 

International convention on civil liability for oil 
pollution damage. Done at Brussels November 29, 
1969. Entered into force June 19, 1975.= 
Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, May 20, 1975.^ 


Strasbourg agreement concerning the international 
patent classification. Done at Strasbourg March 
24, 1971. Enters into force October 7, 1975. 
Notification from World Intellectual Property 
Organization that ratification deposited: Bel- 
gium (with a declaration), July 4, 1975. 

Property — Industrial 

Convention of Paris for the protection of indus- 
trial property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done 
at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 
entered into force May 19, 1970; for the United 
States August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 
entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United 
States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923. 
Notification from World Intellectual Property Or- 
ganization that ratification deposited: Monaco 
July 4, 1975. 

Nice agreement concerning the international classi- 
fication of goods and services for the purposes of 
the registration of marks of June 15, 1957, as 
revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967. Entered 
into force March 18, 1970; for the United States 
May 25, 1972. TIAS 7419. 

Notification from World Intellectual Property 
Organization that ratification deposited: Mon- 
aco, July 4, 1975. 

Trademark registration treaty, with regulations. 
Done at Vienna June 12, 1973.' 
Accession deposited: Upper Volta, May 23, 1975. 



Agreement extending the term of the task force 
assisting Egypt in the clearance of the Suez 
Canal. Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo 
June 16 and 29, 1975. Entered into force June 29 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of June 7, 1974 (TIAS 
7855). Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo 
June 30, 1975. Entered into force June 30, 1975. 


Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of April 12, 1973 (TIAS 
7610). Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul May 
27, 1975. Entered into force May 27, 1975. 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of April 12, 1973 (TIAS 
7610). Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul 
July 1, 1975. Entered into force July 1, 1975. 

August 4, 1975 



Agreement amending the agreement of December 
11, 1974, as amended, relating to cooperative ar- 
rangements to support Mexican efforts to curb 
the illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by ex- 
change of letters at Mexico March 20, 1975. 
Entered into force March 20, 1975. 

Agreement relating to the provision of equipment 
and training by the United States to support 
U.S. -Mexican efforts to curb illegal narcotics 
traffic. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico 
May 29, 1975. Entered into force May 29, 1975. 

Agreement relating to the provision of equipment 
and training by the United States to support 
U.S.-Mexican efforts to curb illegal narcotics 
traffic. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico 
June 25, 1975. Entered into force June 25, 1975. 


Understanding relating to the air transport agree- 
ment of December 27, 1946, as amended (TIAS 
1587, 4050, 6.080), with related notes. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Lima July 7, 1975. Entered 
into force July 7, 1975. 


Agreement relating to payment to the United 
States of the net proceeds from the sale of defense 
articles by Portugal. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Lisbon May 30, 1974 and June 30, 1975. 
Entered into force June 30, 1975; effective July 1, 

United Arab Emirates 

Agreement relating to the sale of defense articles 
and services to the United Arab Emirates. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Abu Dhabi June 
15 and 21, 1975. Entered into force June 21, 1975. 

United Kingdom 

Agreement extending the agreement of March 30, 
1973, as amended and extended, relating to im- 
plementation and enforcement of civil aviation 
advance charter rules, and the related letter of 
March 29, 1974 (TIAS 7594, 7832, 8047). Effected 
by exchange of notes at London June 4, 1975. 
Entered into force June 4, 1975. 

Agreement concerning an exchange program of 
Bicentennial fellowships in the creative and per- 
formed arts. Effected by exchange of notes at 
London July 2, 1975. Entered into force July 2, 

United Nations 

Agreement amending the grant agreement of No- 
vember 7, 1973, as amended, concerning assistance 

to economic and social development programs in 
Africa. Signed at New York June 3, 1975. Entered 
into force June 3, 1975. 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: July 14—20 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

370 7/14 Kissinger: Institute of World Af- 
fairs, Milwaukee, Wis. 
*370A 7/14 Governor Lucey of Wisconsin: 

introductory remarks. 
370B 7/14 Kissinger: questions and an- 
swers following address. 
*371 7/14 Holdridge sworn in as Ambassa- 
dor to Singapore (biographic 

372 7/15 Kissinger: Upper Midwest Coun- 

cil. Bloomington (Minneapolis), 
*372A 7/15 Donald Grangaard, Senator Hum- 
phrey, Governor Anderson of 
Minnesota: introductory re- 
372B7/15 Kissinger: question and answers 
following address. 

373 7/15 Kissinger, Rabin: remarks at 

Bonn, July 12. 

374 7/17 Kissinger: news conference, 

Bloomington (Minneapolis), 

Minn., July 15. 

375 7/17 Kissinger: news conference, 

Milwaukee, Wis., July 16. 

*376 7/17 Study Group 2 of the U.S. Na- 
tional Committee for the 
CCITT, Sept. 11. 

*377 7/17 Study Group 8 of the U.S. Na- 
tional Committee for the CCIR, 
Aug. 27. 

*378 7/18 Advisory Committee on the U.N. 
Conference on Human Settle- 
ments, July 31. 

*379 7/18 Study Group 5 of the U.S. Na- 
tional Committee for the 
CCITT. Aug. 8. 

*380 7/18 Andrew Wyeth to visit U.S.S.R. 

t381 7/18 U.S. and U.S.S.R. sign North 
Pacific fisheries agreement. 

1382 7/18 U.S. rejects ICNAF Northwest 
Atlantic fisheries regulations. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX August k, 1975 Vol. LXXIII, No. 188i 

Africa. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer- 
ence at Milwaukee July 16 179 

Agriculture. Secretary Kissinger's News Con- 
ference at Minneapolis July 15 172 

American Principles. The Moral Foundations 

of Foreign Policy (Kissinger) 161 

Arms Control. Questions and Answers Follow- 
ing the Secretary's Minneapolis Address . 168 

Canada. United States and Canada Discuss 

Possible Oil Exchanges 178 

Congress. Security Assistance Program Dis- 
cussed by Department (Maw) 191 

Cuba. Questions and Answers Following the 

Secretary's Milwaukee Address 157 

Developing Countries. The Global Challenge 

and International Cooperation (Kissinger) . 149 

Disarmament. U.S. Interpretive Statement on 
NPT Review Conference Declaration 
(Klein) 193 

Economic Affairs 

President Ford's News Conference at Chicago 
July 12 (excerpts) . 190 

Questions and Answers Following the Secre- 
tary's Minneapolis Address 168 


Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at 

Minneapolis July 15 172 

United States and Canada Discuss Possible 

Oil Exchanges 178 

Europe. Questions and Answers Following the 

Secretary's Milwaukee Address 157 

Foreign Aid. Security Assistance Program 

Discussed by Department (Maw) .... 191 

France. Secretary Kissinger Meets With 
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and With 
Israeli Prime Minister Rabin During Euro- 
pean Trip (remarks, joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
statement) 185 

Human Rights. The Moral Foundations of 

Foreign Policy (Kissinger) 161 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

U.S. Interpretive Statement on NPT Re- 
view Conference Declaration (Klein) . . . 193 

Israel. Secretary Kissinger Meets With Soviet 
Foreign Minister Gromyko and With Israeli 
Prime Minister Rabin During European 
Trip (remarks, joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. state- 
ment) 185 

Khmer Republic (Cambodia). Questions and 
Answers Following the Secretary's Minne- 
apolis Address . . , 168 


Questions and Answers Following the Secre- 
tary's Minneapolis Address 168 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at 

Milwaukee July 16 179 

] Lebanon. President Ford's News Conference 

at Chicago July 12 (excerpts) 190 

Middle East 

Questions and Answers Following the Secre- 
tary's Milwaukee Address 157 

Questions and Answers Following the Secre- 
tary's Minneapolis Address 168 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at 
Milwaukee July 16 . 179 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at 

Minneapolis July 15 172 

Panama. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer- 
ence at Minneapolis July 15 172 

Portugal. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer- 
ence at Milwaukee July 16 179 

Presidential Documents. President Ford's 
News Conference at Chicago July 12 (ex- 
cerpts) 190 

Somalia. Questions and Answers Following 
the Secretary's Milwaukee Address . . . 157 

Terrorism. President Ford's News Conference 

at Chicago July 12 (excerpts) 190 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 195 


The Moral Foundations of Foreign Policy 

(Kissinger) 161 

President Ford's News Conference at Chicago 
July 12 (excerpts) 190 

Questions and Answers Following the Secre- 
tary's Milwaukee Address 157 

Questions and Answers Following the Secre- 
tary's Minneapolis Address 168 

Secretary Kissinger Meets With Soviet 
Foreign Minister Gromyko and With Israeli 
Prime Minister Rabin During European 
Trip (remarks, joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. state- 
ment) 185 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at 
Milwaukee July 16 179 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at 
Minneapolis July 15 172 

United Nations 

The Global Challenge and International Co- 
operation (Kissinger) 149 

Questions and Answers Following the Secre- 
tary's Milwaukee Address 157 

Questions and Answers Following the Secre- 
tary's Minneapolis Address 168 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at 

Milwaukee July 16 179 

Viet-Nam. Questions and Answers Following 

the Secretary's Minneapolis Address . . . 168 

Name Index 

Ford, President 190 

Kissinger, Secretary 149, 157, 161, 

168, 172, 179, 185 

Klein, David 193 

Maw, Carlyle E 191 

Rabin, Yitzhak 185 

Sauvagnargues, Jean 185 

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Volume LXXIII 

No. 1885 

August 11, 1975 



Statement by Assistant Secretary Enders 217 


Statements by Assistant Secretary Davis 
and Assistant Secretary Biiffum 209 


For index see inside back cover 



Vol. LXXIII, No. 1885 
August 11, 1975 


For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 


52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 

domestic $42.50, foreign $53.15 

Single copy 85 cents 

Use of funds for printing this publication 

approved by the Director of the Office of 

Management and Budget (January 29, 1971). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETl 
a weekly publication issued by 
Office of Media Services, Bureau 
Public Affairs, provides the public 
interested agencies of the governing 
with information on developments 
the field of U.S. foreign relations ojj 
on the worlc of the Department 
tlie Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes select 
press releases on foreign policy, issi 
by tlie White House and the Depi 
ment, and statements, address* 
and news conferences of the Preside 
and tlie Secretary of State and otl 
officers of the Department, as well 
special articles on various phases 
international affairs and the functionS[ 
of tlie Department. Information 
included concerning treaties and inte 
national agreements to which tl 
United States is or may become 
party and on treaties of general intt 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department 
State, United Nations documents, ai 
legislative material in tlie field ot^ 
international relations are also listei 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of July 25 

Following is the transcript of a news con- 
ference held btj Secretary Kissinger at the 
White House on July 25. 

Press release 387 dated July 25 

Ronald H. Nessen, Press Secretary to 
President Ford: This is all on the record, for 
immediate release and quotation. Maybe the 
best way to go at this would be to have 20 
minutes or so of questions on the trip, which 
begins tomorrow, and 15 minutes or so, if 
there are other matters that interest you. 
The Secretary has a crowded schedule today, 
and we would like to try to hold this to some- 
where between 30 and 35 minutes. 

Secretary Kissinger: Barry [Barry 
Schweid, Associated Press], I understand 
you have the first question. 

Q. / was going to ask a Middle East ques- 
tion. There is a statement here that the 
White House has put out on the trip.^ In it, 
the President says the Helsinki declaratioyi 
will further the aspirations of the people of 
Eastern Europe, and he restates our commit- 
ment to the peaceful changes. In a specific 
way, can you tell us how somehow this ivill 
fjirtlier the aspirations of the people now 
locked into the Soviet sphere? 

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, one has 
to analyze what the phrase "locked into the 
Soviet sphere" means. 

Q. Lithuania, Latvia, and part of the 
Soviet Union. 

Secretary Kissinger: In those countries, 
the existing situation in Europe reflects, 
among other things, a balance of forces and 
a state of affairs that has continued for a 
generation. It was not created by a docu- 

' See p. 204. - 
August 11, 1975 

ment, and it will not, as such, be changed by 
a document. 

Therefore, the question that has had to 
be answered in the entire postwar period and 
has been answered in different ways at dif- 
ferent times is, what is more helpful for a 
humane evolution, a policy of confrontation 
or a policy of easing tensions ; whether peo- 
ples can realize their aspirations better under 
conditions in which there is political, and a 
threat of military, conflict or under condi- 
tions in which the two sides are attempting 
to settle their disputes and ease tensions. 

The judgment that has been made — and it 
is important to remember that it is not only 
that of the United States but of all West 
European countries — is that a policy in 
which an attempt is made to settle political 
conflicts will help the humane values that 
they espouse. 

This was the basis for Chancellor [of the 
Federal Republic of Germany Willy] 
Brandt's Ostpolitik in 1969, in which he 
faced within his country the question of 
whether the objectives that he sought were 
best achieved by a policy of political con- 
frontation or by a policy of easing tensions. 

He gave the answer; he made the decisions 
as far as the Federal Republic and the 
German question was concerned, which in 
turn was at the heart of the European 

The agreement by the United States to 
attend the European Security Conference 
was in fact made conditional on progress on 
the German question and particularly on the 
solution of the Berlin issue. 

So, therefore, it is, I believe, that the eas- 
ing of tensions in the world and easing of 
tensions in Europe will help ease the lives of 
people and may contribute to an evolution in 
which the problems that produced the cold 


war can be dealt with more effectively. 

No document is going to change the exist- 
ing balance of power on the Continent, and 
therefore there are limits to what any agree- 
ment can achieve, but this is the sense in 
which the President used that paragraph. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, tvhat do you foresee as 
being the consequences of yesterday's House 
vote on the Turkish arms embargo? Do you 
see any progress in — 

Secretary Kissinger: I would like to 
answer that in the second part of the press 

Q. Question please. 

Secretary Kissinger: The question was the 
consequences of the House vote on the Turk- 
ish aid embargo, and I would prefer to 
answer this — if we could keep the first 20 
minutes on the trip and the implications of 
the trip and the second 20 minutes on gen- 
eral foreign policy questions — 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the President will he 
meeting with Secretary Brezhnev \_Leonid I. 
Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union] ttvice. Can you describe ivhat 
will be disciissed in those talks and how far 
apart and how difficidt to narroiv is the gap 
on the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks] negotiations? 

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, every time 
the President and the General Secretary 
meet, there is a general review of the world 
situation. But I would think that the three 
subjects that will receive most attention will 
be primarily SALT, then the further evolu- 
tion of European negotiations such as MBFR 
[mutual and balanced force reductions], and 
finally, undoubtedly there will be a discus- 
sion about the Middle East. 

With respect to the SALT negotiations, 
Foreign Minister [of the U.S.S.R. Andrei 
A.] Gromyko gave us some replies to the 
American position on SALT while we met in 
Geneva. On several important categories, 
these represented distinct progress. 

In other categories, there is still a gap. 
The issues on which a gap remains are sub- 
stantially fewer in number than was the case 

a few weeks ago. So, what the President and 
the General Secretary will attempt to do is 
to see whether the issues on which progress 
has been made — how to turn them over to 
Geneva, and on the issues on which progress 
still remains to be made, whether they can 
narrow the differences. 

It is our view that a SALT agreement is 
possible and that the issues on which the 
compromises have to be made are now quite 
clearly defined, and therefore it depends on 
political decisions in both countries. 

Q. Mr. Kissinger, since the United States 
is going to go into the CSCE [Conference on 
Sernrity and Cooperation in Europe] sum- 
mit with absolutely no economic policy ivhat- 
soever except massive austerity and triage, 
which is backed up by the kind of interna- 
tional terrorisms that you are now personally 
implicated in, in the Colt arms deal and 
Black September and various other things, 
New Solidarity woidd like to know ivhat yon 
are going to tell us will be the American 
response to the Soviet alternative to all of 
this, irhicli is increasing trade arrangements 
with the Third World and Western Europe 
based on a transfer of rubles ivhich ivould 
undercut the existing dollar debt structure — 

Q. Question ? 

Q. What ivas the question. Dr. Kissinger? 

Secretary Kissinger: The question was 
almost as complicated as my answers tend 
to be and probably a little more comprehen- 
sible. But if I understand the question it was, 
has the L'nited States an economic policy — I 
am leaving out the various personal allu- 
sions — 

Q. No, what )could your response be to 
the Soviet policy ichich has now been made 
clea r ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think we have to 
make clear that at the European Security 
Conference the Soviet Union is not likely to 
put forward an integrated economic policy 
to which we have to i-espond, because the 
European Security Conference really is 
primarily concerned with ratifying the 
agreements that have been reached in stage 


Department of State Bulletin 

two and to permit each of the leaders to 
make a policy statement. 

However, at the side there will be many 
bilateral discussions. The United States — 
leaving aside the various comments about 
Soviet economic policy — the United States 
requires a foreign economic policy for an 
extremely rapidly changing world and one 
which it is quite possible the Soviet Union 
may attempt to enter over the next five to 
ten years, but I do not believe that that issue 
will come up at Helsinki. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, why do you think the 
Russians seem so interested in having such 
a conference? What do they fiet out of it? 

Secretary Kissinger: I would like to stress 
that our policy has to be made in terms of 
our purposes. We should not gear our policy 
to preventing something that the Soviets 
may have a motive for doing. We have to 
assess whether it also serves our own pur- 

Now, the European Security Conference 
has been a part of Soviet policy since 1953 
and 1954. At that time, it had a totally dif- 
ferent purpose. At that time, it was designed 
to keep the Federal Republic from entering 

It has been resurrected at periodic inter- 
vals by the Soviet Union. It was rejected for 
a long time by all the European nations as 
well as the United States. 

In the 1960's an increasing number of 
West European nations moved toward ac- 
ceptance of the idea of a European Security 
Conference. And then, in the late 1960's, 
with the beginning of the change in German 
policy, it gained a momentum in which the 
United States decided that it was wiser to 
participate in that process rather than to 
attempt to block it. 

However, the conditions have changed 
importantly since this process was initiated, 
and I would say that for the Soviet Union it 
was started at one time to prevent the 
Federal Republic from entering NATO. 

In the 1960's it may have been conceived 
as a kind of a substitute peace treaty, but 
then as the 1960's developed, many of the 
issues which originally could have been dis- 

cussed at the European Security Conference 
were settled in a series of bilateral agree- 
ments which the Soviet Union made with 
every West European country and the 
United States, so now the focus of the Euro- 
pean Secui'ity Conference has drifted more 
to a general statement of principles rather 
than the character it had then. 

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union has con- 
tinued to attach great importance to it, per- 
hajjs in part because, like other governments, 
when something has been such a cardinal 
aim, once it is achieved, even if some of the 
original assum])tions have somewhat altered, 
it still retains its importance as an achieve- 
ment, as a long-held goal. 

But as far as the United States is con- 
cerned, we see the significance of the Securi- 
ty Conference as a useful step in a general 
pattern of the improvement of relations be- 
tween the East and West. We do not consider 
it an additional ratification of any existing 
arrangement. We consider these principles 
of conduct that repeat what has already been 
stated in many bilateral arrangements and 
add to it certain principles of peaceful 
change and improved human contact, which 
we consider useful progress but which we 
will confine to the words "useful progress." 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the United States ini- 
tiallv came to the position of participating 
in the conference in the belief that also some 
parallel progress should be made in MBFR. 
Can you tell us now ivhat progress is being 
made in MBFR? 

Secretary Kissinger: No, that is not a cor- 
rect description of what the U.S. position has 
been. The United States linked the opening 
of the European Security Conference to the 
opening of the MBFR discussion. During the 
course of it, it was never the position of the 
United States, and certainly never the posi- 
tion of our West European allies, that prog- 
ress in both of these negotiations should be 
linked, and indeed on the one or two occa- 
sions that we explored the possibility of this 
link with our West European allies, they re- 
jected the concept that the force reduction 
negotiations should be conducted in step with 
the European Security Conference. 

August n, 1975 


So the fact that they are not linked to- 
gether is primarily due to discussions within 
the West, and it has never been a condition 
that the United States made. 

The question is, where do we stand on 
the force reduction negotiations ? The United 
States attaches importance to the force re- 
duction negotiations. Without question, the 
President will raise this in his discussion 
with the General Secretary. 

These negotiations are now in recess. They 
have followed the procedures and the gen- 
eral atmosphere that occur in the general 
course of these negotiations, which is that 
they go through a long discussion of tech- 
nical phases in which the positions of the 
two sides are not frequently compatible. 

They are now at a point where some deci- 
sions have to be made on both sides. Some 
decisions have to be made on both sides 
modifying the positions that exist. 

The positions that have been taken up to 
now, while they have been irreconcilable, 
have nevertheless enabled both sides to study 
the technical implications of a number of 
reduction proposals that have been put 
forward. We are now at a phase where this 
requires a decision — which has happened 
also in the SALT negotiations — to move 
things into a stage of more detailed negotia- 

Q. Mr. Secretary, one criticism of this 
conference is that its purposes are so modest 
that it does not seem to warrant engaging 
the presence of the President of the United 
States and 3i other heads of government, to 
sig7i these papers. Hoir do you respond to 

Secretary Kissinger: The position that the 
United States took throughout the confer- 
ence was that we would attend the confer- 
ence at the highest level if this was the 
judgment of the other participants and if 
sufficient progress were made to justify it. 

That "sufficient progress" was defined dur- 
ing the conference as progress in the so- 
called Basket 3 on human rights and prog- 
ress on the military provisions of the ad- 
vance notification of maneuvers and, finally, 
on tlie clause with respect to peaceful change 

in Basket 1 on the statement of prin- 
ciples. These objectives were substantially at- 

Nevertheless, the United States did not 
agree to the .summit level until all the major 
West Eui-opean countries had previously 
agreed to it, and it was our view that 
nuances that might separate one in one's as- 
sessment of this did not warrant breaking 
allied unity on the subject. 

Secondly, the conference will give a very 
useful opportunity, of course, for the meet- 
ing with General Secretary Brezhnev and 
also with other leaders for the President to 
exchange views and to make progress on 
outstanding issues. 

So on the whole we consider the content 
of the conference useful, and the visit will 
also make a significant contribution in a 
number of areas. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the meeting with 
Brezhnev, yon had talked about SALT a lit- 
tle bit, but can you be more specific? Has 
there been progress on the verification issue, 
and has the Soviet Union accepted American 
proposals on the counting of MIRV's [multi- 
ple independently targetable reentry ve- 
hicles] or hare they come up with a viable 

And tivo, are you seeking Soviet forbear- 
ance for an iyiterim agreement or for Ameri- 
can presence, as technicians, in the Middle 
East? Wliat do you ivant to talk about on the 
Middle East? 

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to 
SALT, I have no question that within the 
next weeks it will seep out of various ele- 
ments in the government, uncharacteristic- 
ally, but in summer our standards relax a 

But I have promised Foreign Minister 
Gromyko that until the negotiations were 
somewhat further advanced not to go into 
a detailed description of the proposal. 

I can only repeat what I have said before, 
that in some areas some significant progress 
has been made. In other areas, considerable 
differences remain. And, of course, the 
United States has attached importance to 
the verification issue, but I don't want to go 


Department of State Bulletin 

into where the differences remain and where 
the progress has been made. 

With respect to the Middle East, to say 
the United States asked for Soviet forbear- 
ance is to imply a state of affairs that may 
not correspond to facts. We naturally, as 
cochairmen of the Geneva Conference, 
periodically review the Middle East situation 
with the Soviet Union. We have also always 
held the view that no final settlement could 
be made in the Middle East that excluded 
Soviet participation. 

So what we have to discuss with the Soviet 
Union is where down the road and in what 
manner the approaches to a final settlement 
will be made. 

With respect to negotiations now in prog- 
ress, it is not correct to say we are seeking 
Soviet forbearance, so, of course, the re- 
straint of all of the parties as well as outside 
countries in that process, is of utility. 

Mr. Nessen : Let's open it up now for more 
general questions, for 15 minutes. 

Q. I icould like to ask this question to 
bridge the tivo subjects. Mr. Secretary, the 
Admiriistration is encountering extraordi- 
nary criticism here of the President's trip to 
Helsinki. Simultaneously, the Administra- 
tion suffered a major setback in Congress 
yesterday on the Turkish vote and also in 
committee on the Jordanian Hawk missiles. 
Can it be the Administratio7i is seriously 
misjudging the Congress ayid the public in 
terms of what their vieivs are of what the 
traffic will bear on foreign policy^ 

Secretary Kissinger: One of the benefits 
of detente is that you can criticize detente; 
and if we did not have it, we would be 
criticized for mis.sing opportunities for 

Is it true? Is the Administration misjudg- 
ing what the temper of the country is? We 
believe that in the basic direction of East- 
West relations, the Administration is in no 
way misjudging the temper of the coun- 

In any event, the Administration has an 
obligation to put before the country and to 
put before the Congress its best judgment of 
what is required for peace or progress 

toward peace in certain areas, even if it 
should get defeated on the issues. 

First, on the East- West relations, we do 
not believe we are misjudging the temper of 
the country, and we ought to keep in per- 
spective the nature of the criticism, the 
depth of the criticism, and we ought to be 
aware of the fact that what makes the 
criticism possible at all is that we are not 
living under conditions of crisis. 

So there is a temptation to have all the 
benefits of peace, as well as all the benefits of 
looking tough. 

With respect to the Turkish aid vote, I 
believe this is a result of a special congres- 
sional situation that existed before last year 
and of considerable pressures that were 

We offered a compromise between the total 
cutoff and the total restoration, which we 
favored. We believe that it is a very un- 
fortunate decision. We had no choice except 
to request a change in a congressional deci- 
sion which is unfortunate for Greece, un- 
fortunate for Turkey, unfortunate for the 
possibilities of a settlement in Cyprus, and 
unfortunate for the security of the eastern 

I think it is a tragic evolution, and I hope 
that when this subject continues to be dis- 
cussed, it will not be seen in terms of a con- 
flict between the executive and the legislative 
and not trying to prove who was right to 
begin with, but trying to see it in terms of 
the fundamental interests of the United 
States and the basic requirements of peace. 

It is in that spirit that we will try to live 
with the decision and we will try to do the 
best we can. We will have to come back to 
the Congress with our best judgment later 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Texas Senator Lloyd 
Bentsen says a CIA spokesman told him the 
Soviets are pumping about $10 million a 
month into Portugal to finance a Communist 
takeover of that country. 

Senator Bentsen says the State Depart- 
ment tells him there are unconfirmed reports 
of $2 million a month. Can you tell us what 
you knoiv about how the Soviets are inter- 

August 11, 1975 


vening in the internal affairs of Portugal? 
Is this intervention not a violation of the 
European security agreement, and if it is 
a violation, why are ice signing the agree- 

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, with re- 
spect to the CIA estimates, we may have 
reached a point where the CIA estimates to 
nongovernmental personnel have a greater 
degree of precision than the CIA estimates 
which we received. 

We have not been given that figure, but 
that is not the point. I have not seen any 
confirmed reports of any particular figure, 
$10 million, $2 million, or any other figure. 
What I have seen makes SIO million seem 
high, but that is not the issue which you are 

With respect to Portugal, it is important 
to remember a number of things. 

First, the original change in Portugal had 
nothing to do with the Communist Party of 
Portugal or with the Soviet Union. That 
resulted from the colonial war and the in- 
efficiency and lack of popular base of the 
previous authoritarian government. 

Secondly, when the change occurred, the 
evolution it took also was largely due to 
internal Portuguese trends, including the 
fact that the dominant Armed Forces Move- 
ment had been serving in African colonial 
wars for a long time and had not perhaps 
been in the mainstream of Western Euro- 
pean liberal democratic thought. 

Thirdly, in assessing what outside powers 
did, it is important to assess not only what 
one side did do but what the Western coun- 
tries, for a variety of reasons, did not do. 
In making a fair assessment of the evolu- 
tion in Portugal, both of these factors have 
to be taken into account. 

Fourthly, to the extent that the Soviet 
Union is active in Portugal, we consider it 
incompatible with the spirit of relaxation of 
tensions, and we will bring it to the atten- 
tion of the Soviet leaders when we meet with 
them, as we already have brought it to their 

Q. Mr. Secretary, to follow that question, 
ivhat do they say? 

Q. What do they say when you bring it to 
their attention? 

Secretary Kissinger: The question is, first 
of all, what is the degree of their interven- 

I will not go into the details of the diplo- 
matic discussions. We have brought it to 
their attention. If there is any result from 
our approaches, the result is more likely to 
be reflected in actions — if there is any result 
— than in a long exchange, because govern- 
ments are not in the habit of confirming this 
kind of activity. 

I would like to stress, however, again, it 
is an easy way out for us to blame every- 
thing that goes against our interests on So- 
viet machinations. We have also to consider 
the failures of the West to do what it can do. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you say note or give 
any indication hoiv close you believe Egypt 
and Israel are to reaching a neiv interim 
agreement and ivhether you believe another 
shuttle ivill be required? 

Secretary Kissinger: Egj-pt and Israel, in 
my view, are now both making serious ef- 
forts. These efforts still have left considerable 
gaps between the two positions. Neverthe- 
less, if the two sides can survive each other's 
public statements — which is not yet self- 
evident to me — I believe that they are be- 
ginning now to talk about the same range of 
issues in a negotiable manner. 

Whether there will in fact be an agreement 
is premature to say. If we should get close 
to an agreement and if the success is prob- 
able, then I would think that a shuttle will 
be necessary to work out the language and 
the final details. 

We are not yet at the point where we can 
make that decision; but basically there has 
been a serious effort by both sides which has 
led to a narrowing of the differences, which 
in several key areas, however, are still quite 

Q. Can I follow that up, Mr. Secretary? 


Department of State Bulletin 

Are you prepared at this point to offer any 
suggestion of your own in order to bridge the 
gap betiveen the two sides? 

Secretary Kissinger: In the mediating 
process in which we are engaged we ob- 
viously, when we receive ideas from either 
side, occasionally indicate what in our view 
the traffic will bear and occasionally make 
suggestions of the direction in which we be- 
lieve progress can be made. 

We have not thought, up to now, that the 
difference between the two sides was suf- 
ficiently narrow for us to put forward an 
integrated American plan, and we still do 
not think we have reached that point and, 
moreover, it is not necessary as long as there 
is not any total deadlock, and we don't be- 
lieve there is a deadlock now. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been reports 
that the CIA plotted to overthrow the 
■Allende regime in Chile. In one instance, the 
plot included the kidnapping of a ranking 
military officer of that country. Is this indeed 
the case, and ivere you aware of it, and did 
you do anything about it? 

Secretary Kissinger: I do not believe that 
any purpose is served by discussing frag- 
mentary reports that leak out of this or that 
office. All the documents on all the covert 
activities that have ever been planned or 
carried out in Chile have been submitted to 
the Church committee [Senate Select Com- 
mittee on Intelligence Activities]. 

The Church committee therefore will be 
able to make a report based on all the docu- 
ments in everybody's file, and it will be able 
to distinguish between things that may have 
been talked about and things that were ac- 
tually done in a way that the press does not 
always do in reporting about it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I am just interested in 
your answer to Murrey Murder a while ago 
on this criticisyn, where you said one of the 
things we have to do is keep in perspective 
the nature and depth of the criticism. What 
does that mean? Does that mean the criti- 
cism is invalid in some ivays? 

Secretary Kissinger: No, it does not mean 
that even remotely. The criticism is put for- 
ward by serious people with serious concerns, 
but I believe also that it does not necessarily 
reflect the majority of the American people. 

It is inevitable when you conduct a 
policy across as wide a range of issues as are 
involved in moving toward a less tense rela- 
tion with the East European countries and 
the Soviet Union, that there are many aspects 
of it that will be objected to by this or that 

Our point is that one has to look at the 
evolution ; and secondly, one has to look at the 
alternative, and one has to ask oneself what 
the alternative policy is that is being pro- 

We respect the views of the critics. We 
take them seriously; but we have to assess 
that criticism on its merits, and we have to 
assess also its threats. 

Q. Wo7dd you answer a question on CSCE 
vis-a-vis the matter of human rights, which 
there has been skepticism raised about? How 
far are the Soviet Union and Eastern Euro- 
pean countries willing to go on the matter of 
respecting the human rights embodied in the 
CSCE document, and how optimistic are you 
that the Soviet Government and the Eastern 
European bloc will liberalize to that extent? 

Secretary Kissinger: On the so-called Bas- 
ket 3, which contains the human rights provi- 
sions, the outcome of the conference was sub- 
stantially a Soviet acceptance of a joint 
Western proposal that was made as a final 
agreed position in early May. So if all of 
these provisions are carried out, we believe 
it would be a substantial step forward. 

At the same time, of course, we cannot 
assert that this document is without legal 
force with respect to us, but is of legal force 
with respect to the other side. Therefore a 
great deal depends on the general atmosphere 
that exists in the world on whether these 
guidelines and principles will in fact be im- 

What the so-called Basket 3 does is to en- 
able the West and the United States to ap- 

August n, 1975 


peal to agreed documents as a guide for con- 
duct, and this is what we will do. And we 
will also hope to bring about a further im- 
provement of East-West relations that would 
accelerate the process and improve the atmos- 
phere. It is not absolutely binding, but it is 
a step forward, to have Communist agree- 
ment with these principles; and we will do 
our utmost to hold them to it. 

Q. Mr. Secietary, what reaction do you 
anticipate the Turkish Government ivill take 
in response to ivhat Congress has done? Will 
they now caiise us to have to give up, leave, or 
otherwise terminate some of our bases there? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have learned one 
thing in recent months, which is that if what 
you predict happens, you are blamed for hav- 
ing caused the result which you foresee by 
your prediction ; and therefore I am not going 
to make a prediction which we will then be 
accused of having encouraged the Turkish 
Government to take. 

We believe that it was a very unfortunate 
and sad decision that was taken yesterday 
because it helped nobody, including those who 
passionately urged it. But we have made this 
case now. 

We have been told by the Turkish Govern- 
ment on innumerable occasions that there 
would be some reaction. We are now engaged 
in talking to the Turkish Government— I had 
a telephone conversation with Prime Minister 
Demirel this morning; the President sent 
him a message yesterday — in trying to urge 
restraint and moderation on the Turkish Gov- 
ernment, because the basic values that are 
involved in our joint defense and that affect 
issues far beyond Turkish-American rela- 
tions have not changed as a result of this 

So we are hoping that Turkey will not take 
any precipitous action and give everybody an 
opportunity to see whether progress can be 
made on the issues that have produced this 
in the first place, so I would not want to make 
a prediction. I do not know what the Turkish 
reaction to our appeals will be. 

European Security Conference 
Discussed by President Ford 

Statement by President Ford '■ 

I am glad to have this opportunity, before 
taking off for Europe tomorrow, to discuss 
with you frankly how I feel about the forth- 
coming European Security Conference in 

I know there are some doubts and 
disagreements among good Americans about 
this meeting with the leaders of Eastern 
and Western European countries and Canada 
— 35 nations altogether. 

There are those who fear the conference 
will put a seal of approval on the political 
division of Europe that has existed since the 
Soviet Union incorporated the Baltic nations 
and set new boundaries elsewhere in Europe 
by military action in World War II. These 
critics contend that participation by the 
United States in the Helsinki understandings 
amounts to tacit recognition of a status quo 
which favors the Soviet Union and perpetu- 
ates its control over countries allied with it. 
On the other e.xtreme there are critics who 
say the meeting is a meaningless exercise be- 
cause the Helsinki declarations are merely 
statements of principles and good intentions 
which are neither legally binding nor en- 
forceable and cannot be depended upon. They 
express concern, however, that the result 
will be to make the free governments of 
Western Europe and North America less 
wary and lead to a letting down of NATO's 
political guard and military defenses. 

If I seriously shared these reservations I 
would not be going, but I certainly under- 
stand the historical reasons for them and, 
especially, the anxiety of Americans whose 
ancestral homelands, families, and friends 
have been and still are profoundly aflfected 

' Made on July 25 at a meeting at the White House 
with seven Members of Congress and representatives 
of Eastern European ethnic groups (text from White 
House press release). 


Department of State Bulletin 

by East-West political developments in Eu- 

I would emphasize that the document I 
will sign is neither a treaty nor is it legally 
binding on any participating state. The Hel- 
sinki documents involve political and moral 
commitments aimed at lessening tensions 
and opening further the lines of communica- 
tion between the peoples of East and West. 

It is the policy of the United States, and 
it has been my policy ever since I entered 
public life, to support the aspirations for 
freedom and national independence of the 
peoples of Eastern Europe — with whom we 
have close ties of culture and blood — ^by every 
proper and peaceful means. I believe the out- 
come of this European Security Conference 
will be a step — how long a step remains to 
be tested — in that direction. I hope my visits 
to Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia will 
again demonstrate our continuing friendship 
and interest in the welfare and progress of 
the fine people of Eastern Europe. 

To keep the Helsinki Conference in per- 
spective, we must remember that it is not 
simply another summit between the super- 
powers. On the contrary, it is primarily a 
political dialogue among the Europeans, 
East, West, and neutral, with primary em- 
phasis on European relationships rather than 
global differences. The United States has 
taken part, along with Canada, to maintain 
the solidarity of the Atlantic alliance and 
because our absence would have caused a 
serious imbalance for the West. 

We have acted in concert with our free and 
democratic partners to preserve our interests 
in Berlin and Germany and have obtained 
the public commitment of the Warsaw Pact 
governments to the possibility of peaceful 
adjustment of frontiers — a major concession 
which runs quite contrary to the allegation 
that present borders are being permanently 

The Warsaw Pact nations met important 
Western preconditions — the Berlin Agree- 
ment of 1971, the force reduction talks now 

underway in Vienna — before our agreement 
to go to Helsinki. 

Specifically addressing the understandable 
concern about the effect of the Helsinki dec- 
larations on the Baltic nations, I can assure 
you as one who has long been interested in 
this question that the United States has never 
recognized the Soviet incorporation of Lith- 
uania, Latvia, and Estonia and is not doing 
so now. Our official policy of nonrecognition 
is not affected by the results of the Euro- 
pean Security Conference. 

There is included in the declaration of 
principles on territorial integrity the provi- 
sion that no occupation or acquisition of ter- 
ritory in violation of international law will 
be recognized as legal. This is not to raise 
the hope that there will be any immediate 
change in the map of Europe, but the United 
States has not abandoned and will not com- 
promise this longstanding principle. 

The question has been asked: WTiat have 
we given up in these negotiations and what 
have we obtained in return from the other 
side? I have studied the negotiations and dec- 
larations carefully and will discuss them even 
more intensely with other leaders in Helsinki. 
In my judgment, the United States and the 
open countries of the West already practice 
what the Helsinki accords preach and have 
no intention of doing what they prohibit — 
such as using force or restricting freedoms. 
We are not committing ourselves to anything 
beyond what we are already committed to 
by our own moral and legal standards and 
by more formal treaty agreements such as 
the United Nations Charter and Declaration 
of Human Rights. 

We are getting a public commitment by the 
leaders of the more closed and controlled 
countries to a greater measure of freedom 
and movement for individuals, information, 
and ideas than has existed there in the 
and establishing a yardstick by which the 
world can measure how well they live up to stated intentions. It is a step in the 
direction of a greater degree of European 
community, of expanding East-West con- 

August n, 1975 


tacts, of moi'e normal and healthier rela- 
tions in an area where we have the closest 
historic ties. Surely this is the best interest 
of the United States and of peace in the 

I think we are all agreed that our world 
cannot be changed for the better by war; 
that in the thermonuclear age our primary 
task is to reduce the danger of unprecedented 
destruction. This we are doing through con- 
tinuing Strategic Arms Limitations Talks 
with the Soviet Union and the talks on Mu- 
tual and Balanced Force Reductions in Eu- 
rope. This European Security Conference in 
Helsinki, while it contains some military un- 
derstandings such as advance notice of 
maneuvers, should not be confused with 
either the SALT or MBFR negotiations. The 
Helsinki summit is linked with our overall 
policy of working to reduce East-West ten- 
sions and pursuing peace, but it is a much 
more general and modest undertaking. 

Its success or failure depends not alone on 
the United States and the Soviet Union but 
primarily upon its 33 European signatories,, West, and neutral. The fact that each 
of them, large and small, can have their 
voices heard is itself a good sign. The fact 
that these very different governments can 
agree, even on paper, to such principles as 
greater human contacts and exchanges, im- 
proved conditions for journalists, reunifica- 
tion of families and international marriages, 
a freer flow of information and publications, 
and increased tourism and travel seems to me 
a development well worthy of positive and 
public encouragement by the United States. 
If it all fails, Europe will be no worse off 
than it is now. If even a part of it succeeds, 
the lot of the people in Eastern Europe will 
be that much better, and the cause of free- 
dom will advance at least that far. 

I saw an editorial the other day entitled 
"Jerry, Don't Go." 

But I would rather read that than head- 
lines all over Europe saying "United States 
Boycotts Peace Hopes." 

So I am going, and I hope your support 
goes with me. 

Department Stresses Importance | 

of Economic Assistance Programs 

Statement by Robot S. Ingersoll 
Deputy Secretary ' 

It is with pleasure that I appear before 
this committee this morning. The Adminis- 
tration greatly welcomes the consideration 
your committee is and will be giving toward 
one of the most essential elements in our 
framework of international cooperation; 
namely, our economic assistance program. 

Our country, about to enter the third cen- 
tury of its existence as a nation, faces prob- 
lems of enormous complexity M'hich go be- 
yond the political and economic techniques 
devised in response to needs of an earlier, 
simpler time. Today, when change is con- 
stant and accelerating, when the fates of so 
many societies ai-e closely interwoven, the 
essential conditions of our international co- 
operation need to be strong and well con- 
sidered, and they must enjoy the support of 
the American Congress and people. 

Since the beginning of this decade many 
new factors have transformed the interna- 
tional scene. Japan and Europe have emerged 
as major economic forces. There has been 
some muting of East-West tensions along 
with the concurrent growth in complexity 
and destructiveness of military power. In 
the postcolonial era, the number and diver- 
sity of developing nations have increased. 
These countries represent 70 percent of the 
world's population. Their underdevelopment, 
poverty, and scarce managerial skills are a 
detriment to themselves and to stable inter- 
national conditions. 

The people who comprise the southern part 
of the globe face problems of hunger and 
malnutrition, of inadequate health services, 
poor education, and unemployment. They 

' Made before the House Committee on Interna- 
tional Relations on July 14. The complete transcript 
of the hearings will be published by the committee 
and will be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20402. 


Department of State Bulletin 

need help from the United States and other 
industrialized countries in their efforts to 
improve the quality of their lives. One sig- 
nificant way to approach this goal is through 
an aid program designed to help meet the 
basic needs of the majority of these coun- 

This committee, two years ago, took the 
initiative to give new emphasis to our as- 
sistance programs by addressing the prob- 
lems of food and nutrition and of population 
and health. It also took the initiative to stress 
an AID [Agency for International Develop- 
ment] program design which, to the extent 
possible, directly aids the poor in less devel- 
oped countries (LDC's). Seventy-two per- 
cent of the development assistance program 
for fiscal year 1976, which you are consider- 
ing today, will go to countries with a per 
capita income of less than $275 per annum. 
The U.S. emphasis on this assi.stance to the 
poorest elements is echoed by the other in- 
ternational development institutions. Sim- 
ilarly, American innovations in the sectors 
of food production and education have served 
as models for such institutions — the World 
Bank, for instance. 

Our record in the past has been a good 
one. Indeed, one of the more important 
achievements over the past decade has been 
the success of our efforts in helping the poor 
countries achieve a commendable level of 
economic growth, although all poor countries 
have not shared in this. We have also en- 
gaged other donor countries in increasing 
the flow of assistance to the less developed. 
For every dollar of U.S. economic aid we now 
provide, other donors are providing two dol- 
lars of assistance. 

In effect, we have participated with others 
in creating an international system of 
assistance-giving that is unprecedented in 
the history of mankind. We must continue to 
contribute our fair share along with Euro- 
pean nations and Japan while at the same 
time encouraging the oil-rich countries to 
increase their portion of the assistance bur- 
den. Despite their current economic difficul- 
ties, other countries are maintaining and 

many are increasing their contributions. 

We do well to preserve and to maintain a 
role which represents an essential continuity 
in our foreign policy. We have been a gener- 
ous donor in the past. The United States has 
been in the forefront of those countries who 
have shared their bounty with others less 
developed, although, expressed in real terms, 
the volume of official development assistance 
over the past decade has remained relatively 
the same. Yet our bilateral aid programs are 
the vital means whereby we remain active 
partners in the difficult long-term process of 
working with other nations to foster a less 
chaotic world through economic growth and 
an enhancing of the human condition. 

To fail to deal with these problems can 
lead to economic-bloc confrontation and 
breakdown in the world economic system. To 
fail to respond effectively to the basic eco- 
nomic and social issues will have an effect 
on our own economic order and ultimately 
on our own security. To falter in our aid 
because of current domestic economic prob- 
lems would be a form of beggar-thy-neighbor 
policy that would be taken as a signal of 
U.S. indifference to the problems of the 
world's poor. 

The United States recognizes the respon- 
sibilities that accompany its political, eco- 
nomic, and military power. And we recognize 
our own self-interest in promoting coopera- 
tive approaches. 

Our relations with the less developed coun- 
tries embrace a network of important eco- 
nomic, political, and defense agreements. In 
the economic sphere alone we depend on 
some of them both to supply critical raw 
materials and to absorb many of our exports. 

Last year, the LDC's purchased approxi- 
mately one-third of our exports. Our balance- 
of-trade surplus with non-oil-producing 
LDC's was approximately $5.5 billion. This 
never would have occurred in the absence of 
current interlocking network of development 
assistance programs by all the industrialized 
nations. U.S. investment in LDC's has grown 
to over $28 billion as of last year. These 
statistics indicate that the U.S. relationship 

August 11, 1975 


with LDC's is not one-sided, with all the 
benefits flowing in one direction. 

Growing worldwide economic interdepend- 
ence and the increasing impact of events 
abroad on our domestic policies requires the 
United States to play an active economic role 
on the world stage. There is mutuality of 
interest in expanding trade and investment, 
in monetary stability, in equitable access to 
raw materials, and in the protection of the 

We are convinced that an international 
system whose paramount characteristic is 
rivalry between blocs will result in instabili- 
ty and confrontation. The outcome of such 
a situation would be disastrous, especially 
for the less developed countries. The inter- 
national order will be stable only so long as 
its economic benefits are widely shared and 
its arrangements are perceived as just. 

The United States cannot prosper as an 
island of plenty in a world of deprivation. A 
foreign aid program becomes an essential 
instrument of U.S. foreign policy aimed at: 

— Making it possible for cooperation 
rather than confrontation to become the way 
the North-South dialogue is conducted. 

— Engaging the ingenuity, creativity, and 
technical competence of our nation to cope 
with the problems of hunger, disease, illit- 
eracy, and poverty which characterize the 
lot of most of the rest of the world. 

— Assisting in the expansion of the 
world's trade and more productive employ- 
ment for all nations. 

If our foreign policy fulfills what is best 
in America, the world will not remain al- 
ways divided between the permanently poor 
and the permanently rich. 

Responsibility for Indochina Refugee 
Task Force Transferred to HEW 

Statement by President Ford ' 

I am today formally announcing the trans- 
fer of principal operational responsibility of 
the Interagency Task Force for the resettle- 
ment of refugees from Indochina from the 
Department of State to the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare. 

Since I formed the task force in April, 
the resettlement of refugees has become pri- 
marily a domestic rather than foreign affairs 
concern. A great deal has been accomplished 
in evacuating, caring for, and resettling refu- 
gees from Indochina. However, much remains 
to be done. I ask all Americans to open their 
hearts to these refugees as we have to others 
throughout our history. 

Mrs. Julia Taft, Deputy Assistant Secre- 
tary of Health, Education, and Welfare, who 
has been acting as Director of the Task Force 
since the departure of Ambassador Dean 
Brown, will continue as Director. All deci- 
sions and activities regarding the domestic 
and international resettlement of refugees 
from Indochina will be coordinated by her. 
She will act under my direction and in close 
coordination with the Secretary of Health, 
Education, and Welfare and the President's 
Advisory Committee on Refugees. Mrs. Taft's 
responsibilities will continue to involve nu- 
merous governmental departments, and I am 
directing each of them to offer her their full 
cooperation and support in this important 

^ Issued on July 21 (text from White House press 


Department of State Bulletin 

Department Discusses Situation in Southern Rhodesia 

Follotving are statements by Nathaniel 
Davis, Assistant Secretary for African Af- 
fairs, and William B. Buffmn, Assistant Sec- 
retary for International Organization Af- 
fairs, made before the Subcommittee on 
Africa of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations on July 10.^ 


I welcome this opportunity to meet with 
the subcommittee again — this time for an 
exchange of views on the situation in South- 
ern Rhodesia. Ambassador William B. Buf- 
fum, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- 
national Organization Affairs, is here with 
me today. 

As you know, Rhodesia is technically a 
self-governing British colony in revolt 
against the British Government. Its unilat- 
eral declaration of independence (UDI) of 
1965 has not been formally recognized by any 
country. The regime of Ian Smith, represent- 
ing less than 5 percent of the total Rhodesian 
population, has since 1965 taken steps to per- 
petuate white minority rule and to exclude 
the African majority from meaningful par- 
ticipation in the political and economic life 
of the country. 

For the better part of 10 years the Rho- 
desian problem has evaded every solution 
despite repeated efforts of the British Gov- 
ernment, supported by the United Nations, 
which imposed mandatory economic sanc- 

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

tions against Rhodesia in 1966 and 1968. 

Since the accession of Mozambique to inde- 
pendence, the situation in southern Africa, 
including Rhodesia, has changed. As you 
know, Mozambique, a nation with a 700-mile 
common border with Rhodesia, became Inde- 
pendent just two weeks ago. The independ- 
ence of Mozambique and the possibility of the 
closing of its borders to Rhodesian trade has 
placed additional pressure on the Smith re- 
gime. (It is estimated that some 80 percent 
of Rhodesian exports and imports go through 

There are some indications of an increased 
perception within the minority regime that 
its present course can only lead to further 
violence and tragedy and that it would be 
preferable to enter into serious negotiations 
with representatives of the African majority 
on the future of Rhodesia. Leaders of the 
neighboring states of Zambia, Tanzania, 
Mozambique, Botswana, and South Africa 
are seeking to exert influence toward the 
promotion of peaceful solution in Rhodesia. 
Preliminary talks between the Smith regime 
and the Rhodesian nationalists, who formally 
united in December under the African Na- 
tional Council, are continuing, despite dead- 
locks, interruptions, and procedural difficul- 
ties. The formal unification of Rhodesian 
nationalists is a significant development, en- 
couraged by Presidents Kaunda [of Zambia], 
Seretse Khama [of Botswana], Nyerere [of 
Tanzania], and Machel [of Mozambique]. 
The preliminary talks, which resulted from 
the December agreement in Lusaka, are de- 
signed to pave the way for a full-fledged con- 
stitutional conference. 

Thus, there are some encouraging signs — 

August 11, 1975 


including the fact that the United Kingdom 
sent an emissary to Salisbury late in June to 
discuss with the Smith regime and with Rho- 
desian nationalist leaders the timing and 
modalities of a possible constitutional con- 
ference. Nonetheless, Mr. Chairman, I think 
it would be a mistake to be overly optimistic. 
A Rhodesian settlement is still far from ac- 
complishment at this point, and there is every 
likelihood that there will be a period of hard 
negotiations ahead. 

The main lines of our policy toward Rho- 
desia have followed from the illegal Rhode- 
sian UDI based on minority rule. In brief, 
we do not recognize the Rhodesian regime's 
claim to independence; we continue to regard 
the British Crown as the lawful sovereign 
in Rhodesia ; we support the United Nations 
and the United Kingdom in their efforts to 
influence the Rhodesian regime to negotiate 
a peaceful settlement based on the principles 
of self-determination and eventual majority 
rule in Rhodesia. To this end we voted for 
and support the U.N. sanctions against Rho- 

I might add, Mr. Chairman, that while 
our record of sanctions enforcement has been 
good, there is a major gap in this enforce- 
ment created by the Byrd amendment allow- 
ing the importation of chrome and certain 
other materials from Rhodesia. In addition 
to providing the regime in Salisbury with 
much-needed foreign exchange, the Byrd 
amendment has also provided moral and psy- 
chological support to that regime. I would 
like to stress again the Administration's 
support for legislation repealing the Byrd 
amendment (H.R. 1287) currently being 
considered by the Congress. We are very en- 
couraged by the progress of the repeal bill, 
voted out of the House International Rela- 
tions Committee yesterday. Early repeal not 
only would enable the United States to com- 
ply fully with its international obligations 
but, we hope, would add an important incre- 
ment of influence on the Smith regime to 
move into serious negotiations regarding 
Rhodesia's future. 

Mr. Chairman, we strongly support self- 
determination for the people of Rhodesia 

and hope that current eff"orts to arrive at a 
settlement acceptable to the population of 
Rhodesia as a whole will be successful. 


I should like to review briefly for this 
committee the nature of the U.N.'s concerns 
with Rhodesia and the U.S. position with re- 
gard to those concerns. 

As you know, the Ian Smith regime in 
Rhodesia unilaterally declared independence 
from Great Britain on November 11, 1965. 
Great Britain, interested in granting inde- 
pendence to a multiracial state governed by 
majority rule, requested U.N. assistance in 
dealing with the Smith regime's persistent 
illegal claim to independence. The Security 
Council decided on November 12 and 20, 
1965. to set in motion a program of volun- 
tary economic sanctions directed at Southern 
Rhodesia at the request of the United King- 
dom, calling on all states to refrain from as- 
sisting the illegal Smith regime and to do 
their utmost to break all economic relations 
with it, including an embargo on oil and 
petroleum products. 

Early in April 1966 attempts were made 
to circumvent the voluntary oil embargo. 
On the grounds that such action, specifically 
the arrival of the oil tanker Joanna V at the 
port of Beira, Mozambique, could lead to a 
collapse of the entire sanctions program 
against Southern Rhodesia, the United 
Kingdom urgently requested a meeting of 
the Security Council on April 7, 1966. The 
British submitted a resolution before the 
Security Council describing the situation in 
Southern Rhodesia as "a threat to the 
peace," and it was adopted on April 9. The 
United States had participated in the volun- 
tary sanctions, and if you wish I can supply 
this committee with a brief chronology of 
U.S. actions taken during 1965 and 1966. 

The U.N. Security Council responded 
again to British requests for a meeting in 
December of 1966, and on December 16 
again decided that the Rhodesian situation 
constituted a threat to the peace. The United 


Department of State Bulletin 

states concurred in these Security Council 
findings because we believed that a U.N. 
policy of passivity in the face of the Rho- 
desian rebellion would sharpen existing 
tensions in the southern half of Africa, en- 
courage extremism on the part of both black 
and white communities in African states, 
and make possible exploitation of the situa- 
tion by extremists of the left and right. 

At the request of the United Kingdom, 
members of the U.N. Security Council con- 
cluded that selective mandatory sanctions 
should be applied against the Rhodesian 
regime. The prevailing hope was that the 
sanctions would induce the leaders in Rho- 
desia to agree to majority rule, a step which 
would clearly reduce the potential for vio- 
lence in a very sensitive area of the African 
Continent. It was the first time that the 
Security Council had decided in favor of 
mandatory sanctions. While it was uncei'- 
tain at the time what the actual effect of 
mandatory sanctions on the Smith regime 
might be, the U.S. support of this decision 
was based on the hope that the mandatory 
sanctions would assist the United Kingdom 
in its effort to create a more equitable polit- 
ical situation in the British territory. 

The issue of sanctions is not without 
limits. In March of 1970, the United States 
first exercised its veto on a proposal to in- 
clude further mandatory provisions to the 
effect that all states should sever all ties 
with the Smith regime, including means of 
transportation, postal service, and all forms 
of communication. The U.S. Representative, 
Ambassador Yost, pointed out that his gov- 
ernment shared the desire to achieve an 
equitable solution to this problem, but that: 

The question . . . arises whether these more 
extreme measures which have been suggested would 
be sufficiently supported by the international com- 
munity, especially those most directly concerned, to 
make them in fact effective .... 

He further pointed out that the United 
States has consistently attached great sig- 
nificance to the maintenance of communica- 
tions even where relations were strained, 
since we would view most seriously the 
prospect of leaving U.S. citizens anywhere 

in the world without the means to travel and 

As to the U.S. actions pursuant to the 
Security Council decisions, on Januaiy 5, 
1967, President Johnson issued Executive 
Order 11322, which implemented for the 
United States the Security Council's Resolu- 
tion 232 of December 16, 1966. 

The Security Council reconvened on the 
question of Southern Rhodesia, and on May 
29, 1968, unanimously adopted Resolution 
253, which reaffirmed the 1966 resolution, 
expanded the scope of the sanctions, and in 
addition, established a committee of the 
Security Council (commonly referred to as 
the Sanctions Committee) to monitor the 
implementation of the sanctions. The United 
States has been and is an active member of 
the Sanctions Committee, and we submit 
quarterly reports regarding trade (medical 
and educational materials are permitted) 
and investigations of possible violations. To 
date there are 237 cases of alleged sanctions 
violations by various states. Thirty-three of 
those cases involve U.S. importation of 
Rhodesian chrome. 

The status of the Byrd amendment and its 
repeal are inextricably a part of U.S. par- 
ticipation in the Sanctions Committee. In 
November 1971, President Nixon signed into 
law the Military Procurement Authorization 
Act, of which section 503 was the Byrd 
amendment. The Byrd amendment permits 
the importation into the United States of 
certain strategic and critical materials, in- 
cluding those from Rhodesia. A key item 
included in this category is chrome. 

This legislation had as a stated objective 
the lessening of U.S. dependence on the 
Soviet Union as a source of chromium im- 
ports. During the period before 1972, the 
United States had imported from the Soviet 
Union about one-half of its metallurgical- 
grade chromite. We imported virtually no 
chrome ore from Rhodesia from 1968 
through 1971 inclusive, and no ferrochrome 
before 1972. Since 1972, our metallurgical- 
grade chromite imports from Rhodesia have 
remained steady at approximately 10 percent 
of total U.S. imports of this material. 

August 11, 1975 


However, imports of Rhodesian chromite 
seem to have replaced declining' purchases 
from other countries rather than to have 
displaced imports from the Soviet Union. 
In general, importation of this material from 
areas other than Soviet Union has fallen, 
while the Soviet Union has maintained its 
relative percentage of total U.S. imports. 

A few days after assuming the Presidency, 
President Ford stated his full commitment 
to the repeal of the Byrd amendment. Sec- 
retary Kissinger has declared [in a letter to 
Representative John Buchanan dated Feb- 
ruary 8, 1974] that he is personally con- 
vinced that the Byrd amendment is "not 
essential to our national security, brings us 
no real economic advantages, and is costly 
to the national interest of the United States 
in our conduct of foreign relations." His 
statement is particularly pertinent to the 
U.S. posture in the United Nations and the 
Security Council's Sanctions Committee. I 
hope that the Senate will see its way clear to 
repeal the Byrd amendment. 

Department Discusses Situation 
In Angola 

Statement by Nathaniel Davis 
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ^ 

I welcome this opportunity to meet with 
the subcommittee for an exchange of views 
on the situation in Angola. 

Angola, as you know, will be the last of 
Portugal's African colonies to attain its in- 
dependence, which is scheduled for Novem- 
ber 11 of this year. Unlike the situation in 
the other territories, where a single libera- 
tion movement existed when Portugal em- 
barked on its policy of decolonization last 
year, three major liberation groups have 
existed in Angola for some years. In addition 

' Made before the Subcommittee on Africa of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 14. 
The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub- 
lished by the committee and will be available from 
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

to agreement with Portugal, the three groups 
had to agree among themselves on the 
modalities for independence. This was done 
last January, and a transitional government 
composed of representatives of the three 
movements and of Portugal was installed 
on January 31. 

The basic problem posed by the separate 
identities of the three groups and the strong 
competition between them for ultimate 
leadership of Angola was not resolved; and 
as you know, there have been recurring 
serious outbreaks of violence since January. 
The three movements, divided by ethnic, 
ideological, and personal differences, have 
made several efforts to reach political ac- 
commodation and to insure a peaceful transi- 
tion to independence; but fighting among 
them has continued. A second "summit" 
meeting between leaders of the three groups 
took place in Nakuru, Kenya, June 16-21, 
under the sponsorship of President Ken- 
yatta. We sincerely hope that the three 
leaders — Agostinho Neto of the Popular 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola 
(MPLA), Holden Roberto of the National 
Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), 
and Jonas Savimbi of the National Union for 
the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) 
— will continue to make serious efforts to 
resolve their differences through negotia- 
tions. The agreement reached on June 21 
pledged each of them to sharing in the 
preparations for independence without ad- 
ditional bloodshed. Fighting between MPLA 
and FNLA broke out again late last week, 

Our own position toward the future in- 
dependent Angola was started by President 
Ford at the White House dinner for Presi- 
dent Kaunda of Zambia on April 19, when 
he said: 

. . . we have been following developments in 
southern Africa with great, great interest. For many 
years the United States has supported self- 
determination for the peoples of that area, and we 
continue to do so today. 

We view the coming independence of Mozambique, 
Angola, and the island territories with great satis- 
faction, just as we viewed the independence of 
Guinea-Bissau just last year. 


Department of State Bulletin 

. . . America stands ready to help the emerging 
countries . . . and to provide what assistance we 
can .... 

I would add that we hope to enter into 
mutually beneficial relations with independ- 
ent Angola at the appropriate time. 

Although the problems now facing Angola 
and its leaders are profound, the country has 
a great potential which can only be realized 
if peace and order prevail. Angola's natural 
and human resources will, in the long term, 
make it a politically important and eco- 
nomically viable member of the family of 
nations. We look forward to welcoming 
Angola into the international community and 
wish the leaders success in reaching a peace- 
ful resolution of their differences. 

United States Extends Recognition 
to Republic of Cape Verde 

Following is the text of a letter^ dated July 
5 from President Ford to President Aristedes 
Pereira of the Republic of Cape Verde, which 
was released on July H. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 21 

Dear Mr. President: The American peo- 
ple join me in extending congratulations and 
best wishes to you and the people of the Re- 
public of Cape Verde on the occasion of your 
independence. In this regard, I am pleased 
to inform you that the United States Govern- 
ment extends recognition to Cape Verde. 

I am aware of the serious drought which 
has affected the islands for the past eight 
years. I know that this situation must be a 
matter of great concern as your government 
assumes the responsibilities for the well- 
being of your people. I am hopeful that the 
steps already taken by the United States to 
provide humanitarian aid and technical as- 
sistance to Cape Verde will help alleviate the 
current hardship and provide a base for 
economic development and future prosperity. 

As the historic ties of friendship and co- 
operation between the peoples of the United 
States and Cape Verde grow and strengthen, 

I look forward to the opportunity for our 
two nations to work together in the cause of 
peace, freedom and the welfare of mankind. 

Gerald R. Ford. 

The White House, July 5, 1975. 

Department Urges U.S. Participation 
in African Development Fund 

Statement by Nathaniel Davis 

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs * 

I am very pleased to have this opportunity 
to testify on behalf of the proposed U.S. 
membership in the African Development 
Fund. The statement of my colleague As- 
sistant Secretary Cooper [Charles A. Cooper, 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for 
International Afl'airs] has already provided 
you with a background analysis of the Fund 
and its financial operations. I would like to 
add to Assistant Secretary Cooper's state- 
ment and underline the importance of this 
legislation in our general relations with 

The African Development Fund is the 
African Development Bank's aflliliate insti- 
tution for providing concessional assistance 
to Bank members. The Fund's membership 
includes the Bank, representing its member 
states, and non-African donors. We are pro- 
posing that the U.S. Government join and 
contribute to the Fund, the appropriate 
vehicle for American financial participation 
in the joint regional development activities 
of the two institutions. We do not consider 
the provisions of the Bank's charter which 
exclude non-African members to be detri- 
mental to our interests nor an argument 
against our belonging to the Fund. 

^ Made before the Subcommittee on International 
Development Institutions and Finance of the House 
Committee on Banking-, Currency, and Housing on 
July 1.5. The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

August 11, 1975 


Our primary purpose in seeking to join 
the African Development Fund is to take 
our place with other donors in providing the 
financial resources required by an institu- 
tion already proven effective. in the African 
development effort. It is the clear sense of 
the Congress that our assistance should be 
directed to the needs of the poorest nations. 
Africa, despite progress made in recent 
years, remains one of the poorest regions 
of the world. Sixteen of the world's twenty- 
five least developed countries are in Africa. 
The resources of the African Development 
Fund have been largely directed to these 16 
states. Thus, American membership in the 
Fund is entirely consistent with our own 
policies in encouraging African economic 

Our growing economic stake in Africa 
also argues for U.S. participation in the 
African Development Fund. Assistant Sec- 
retary Cooper has noted the quintupling — 
from $1 billion to $5 billion — of American 
private investment in Africa over the last 
decade. U.S. trade with Africa doubled in 
value during 1974. The value of U.S. exports 
to Africa increased by 58 percent in 1974 
although the doubling of trade largely re- 
flects increased petroleum imports from 
Nigeria, now our first supplier of imported 
oil. The combined long-term trade and in- 
vestment figures show a clear trend toward 
greatly increased interest by American busi- 
ness in African countries, both as suppliers 
and as purchasers of goods and services in 
our international trade. 

This growth in our trade and investment 
relations with Africa has also involved a 
significant shift in geographic emphasis. 
Until the 1960's, when the majority of black 
African nations achieved independence, the 
American economic stake in the Republic of 
South Africa was almost as important as 
our economic involvement in the rest of 
Africa combined. However, when Angola 
becomes independent this year, 73 percent 
of direct American investment in Africa 
south of the Sahara and over three-fourths 
of our trade with that area will be with 
independent black African countries. Thus, 
our interest in those countries belonging to 

the African Development Bank has grown , 
substantially. ' 

Generally speaking, regional development 
finance institutions have two major advan- 

— Greater familiarity with and focus on 
regional development problems. 

— Ability to provide a training ground in 
sound principles of development finance for 
regional nationals. 

These merits are particularly valid in the 
case of the African Development Bank and 

Tlie application of local expertise by the 
Fund has been reflected in the institution's 
rightfully directing its major efforts toward 
rural infrastructure in the poorest African 
countries. Compared with other parts of the 
developing world, infrastructure deficiencies 
in Africa are relatively more important and 
intimately related to problems of rural de- 
velopment and self-sufficiency in food pro- 

Local confidence in the African Develop- 
ment Bank stems from the Bank's status as 
a unique example of self-help within the 
developing world. The African decision to 
restrict Bank membership to African states 
meant substantially reduced prospects for 
capital resources. Nevertheless, the Africans, 
on the basis of their colonial experience, 
were determined to establish an institution 
with full commitment to African interests. 
The African Development Fund was estab- 
lished as a separate affiliated institution to 
permit developed country participation in 
the African development effort without dilut- 
ing the African character of the Bank. The 
African oil producers (Algeria, Libya, Ni- 
geria, and Gabon) have recently increased 
their combined capital subscriptions to the 
Bank by $78 million. In addition, the Afri- 
cans have asked Arab donors to use the Bank 
and Fund as vehicles for transferring Arab 
oil-producer resources into Africa. Finally, 
Algeria has turned over its $20 million con- 
tribution to the Arab-African solidarity fund 
to the Bank for administration. 

Training in development finance for Afri- 
cans within the Bank's operations is partic- 


Department of State Bulletin 

ularly effective not only because the Bank 
enjoys the confidence of African govern- 
ments but also because the trainees are 
exposed to the expertise of the technical 
assistance staff provided separately by all 
major Fund donors. I would like strongly to 
endorse Assistant Secretary Cooper's sup- 
port "for continued AID-funded [Agency for 
International Development] American tech- 
nical assistance to the Bank following our 
membership in the Fund. This formula of 
a Treasury-sponsored contribution to the 
Fund coupled with separate AID-funded 
technical assistance to the Bank is the most 
appropriate way for the United States to 
participate in the two institutions. 

Assistant Secretary Cooper has described 
the growing financial importance of both the 
African Development Bank and Fund. These 
institutions are now recognized by the inter- 
national financial community as vigorous and 
effective participants in the African develop- 
ment process. Participant donors have al- 
ready begun the process of increasing their 
contributions to the Fund. Fund procure- 
ment is growing rapidly. Since procurement 
is limited to firms whose governments are 
members of the Bank and Fund, American 
companies will not have access to the 
business opportunities arising from that in- 
creased Fund procurement until we have 
made our contribution. 

American membership in the African De- 
velopment Fund is consistent with our con- 
tributions to the concessional loan facilities 
of other regional financial institutions in 
Asia and Latin America. Conversely, a re- 
fusal to participate might be construed as 
a discriminatory act and cast doubt on the 
U.S. commitment to African development. 
During my i-ecent consultations with officials 
of the African Development Bank, it was 
made clear to me that our participation in 
the Fund has become a matter of consider- 
able importance to them. African partici- 
pants expressed similar views during the 
symposium on "Changing Vistas in U.S.- 
African Economic Relations" which Chair- 
man Diggs [Representative Charles C. Diggs, 
Jr.], sponsored here last March. The Afri- 
can keynote speaker, the representative of 

the Organization for African Unity, and the 
representative of the African Development 
Bank urged the United States to join the 
African Development Fund. 

We seek a cooperative basis for our grow- 
ing economic interdependence with the de- 
veloping world. We seek to emphasize to 
African and other developing nations that 
we must have pragmatic dialogue on the spe- 
cific problems of the developing world and 
joint efforts to develop solutions in which 
we can actively participate. Most impor- 
tant to African nations will be a demonstra- 
tion on our part that we are committed to 
assisting them in their own objective of 
achieving a better life for their peoples. 
Membership in the African Development 
Fund is entirely consistent with this ap- 

President Ford, in his September 1974 
legislative goals message to the Congress, 
urged early authorization of American mem- 
bership in the Fund. I can only reiterate to 
this committee his appeal for favorable ac- 
tion on the pending authorization request. 

U.S. Provides Assistance 
to Cape Verde 

AID press release 65 dated July 2 

The new island Government of Cape 
Verde, a former Portuguese possession, will 
receive a $3 million agricultural-sector sup- 
port loan and grants totaling $2 million from 
the Agency for International Development 
to assist it in its early days of independence. 

Cape Verde, with a population estimated 
at 300,000, obtained its independence on July 
5. A Constituent Assembly, which was 
elected June 30, is empowered to draft a 
constitution and select a President. The Cape 
Verde Archipelago has been governed since 
December 1974 by the Transitional Govern- 
ment of Cape Verde. 

Cape Verde obtains its independence at a 
time when the 10 islands are suffering from 
an eight-year drought related to the Sahelian 
drought in continental Africa. The drought 
has reduced agricultural output, particularly 

August n, 1975 


maize and livestock, to about one-fourth of 
its normal level and has made the economy 
heavily dependent on imported food for sub- 
sistence. Portugal, which has been providing 
assistance up to $30 million annually, an- 
nounced it would no longer continue large- 
scale assistance after independence. 

The transitional government appealed to 
the U.N. agencies and to bilateral donors for 
assistance both in meeting its immediate 
need for food and in development programs 
to foster the newly independent country's 
economic development. 

Assistance is being given Cape Verde at 
a time when there is estimated to be only one 
month's supply of basic foods in the islands. 
A $1 million grant which was signed on June 
30 will be used for the procurement of food 
from the United States for distribution to 
the needy and to assist food-for-work proj- 
ects. An amendment adding an additional $1 
million is planned in July. The transitional 
government has estimated food requirements 
for 1975 at about 70,000 tons, including 
40,000 tons of maize, 8,000 tons of beans, 
8,000 tons of maize and cassava flour, and 
4,500 tons of milk powder. 

The $3 million agricultural loan, also 
signed June 30, will provide financing for 
foreign exchange and local costs to support 
labor-intensive rural works projects, in- 
cluding land clearing, construction of access 
roads, conservation works, and small-scale 
irrigation facilities. Project activities will be 
organized by the Ministry of Economic Co- 
ordination and Labor. The soil and water 
conservation works would be located pri- 
marily on Santo Antao island, which has the 
greatest agricultural potential, as well as on 
Sao Vicente, Fogo, Brava, and Santiago. 
These would include building dikes in valley 
areas to catch alluvial soils washed from the 
mountainsides, erection of retaining walls to 
prevent further erosion of soils into valley 
areas used for crop production, and con- 
struction of stone and concrete aqueducts to 
permit irrigation of valley areas through the 
diking system. 

The overall project goal is to increase pro- 
duction of agricultural products and increase 
small-farmer income as well as reducing Cape 

Verde's dependence on imported food com- 
modities. The loan will be repaid in dollars 
within 40 years from the first disbursement, 
including a grace period not to exceed 10 

U.S.-U.K. Creative Arts Fellowships 
Established To Mark Bicentennial 

Piess release 354 dated July 2 

As part of the celebration of the American 
Revolution Bicentennial the Government of 
the United States and the Government of 
the United Kingdom announced on July 1 a 
progi-am of fellowships in the creative and 
performing arts. The exchange of notes 
establishing the program, which will be 
jointly funded, took place in London between 
the U.S. Ambassador, Elliot Richardson, and 
the British Foreign Secretary, James Callag- 

Under the new program, up to five fellow- 
ships will be awarded each year for a period 
of five years in such fields as drama, opera, 
ballet, music, cinema, television, graphics, 
design, painting, sculpture, and architecture, 
or any other field of activity considered by 
the selection committees to be in the spirit of 
the fellowships. The fellowships will be open 
to men and women already established in 
their fields who show a clear potential to 
become prominent members of their pro- 

Fellowships for American participants, 
which will be funded by the Department of 
State and by the National Endowment for 
the Arts, will be administered by the Endow- 
ment. In the United Kingdom the program 
will be administered by the British Council. 

Thomas L. Hughes, President of the Car- 
negie Endowment for International Peace 
and former American Minister at London, 
has agreed to serve as chairman of the 
American selection committee. Others on the 
committee will be Nancy Hanks, Chairman 
of the National Endowment for the Arts; 
John Richardson, Jr., Assistant Secretary 
for Educational and Cultural Affairs; and 
George Sanderson, Educational Attache of 
the British Embassy in Washington. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Department Discusses Status of International Energy Program 

Statement by Thomas 0. Enders 

Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs ' 

The energy crisis is not only a crisis in our 
economy; it is a fundamental challenge to 
our security as a nation and to our role in 
the world. At present, the element in our 
economy most critical to employment and 
pi-osperity is subject to manipulation both as 
to price and as to supply by countries that do 
not necessarily have an interest in our well- 
being and success. 

Just as we are vulnerable, so are the other 
main industrial countries. Most of them are 
far more dependent on oil imports than we 
are; most have fewer energy resources to 

And the industrial countries have a strong 
interest in cooperation with each other to 
overcome their vulnerability. Alone, no 
single country can, through conservation and 
the creation of alternative sources, create a 
new balance in the world market for oil and 
thus bring the price down. In the next few 
years no country can successfully defend 
alone against a new embargo or massive 
shifts in petrodollars. Finally, no single 
country can alone carry out all the research 
and development (R. & D.) or provide all the 
capital required for replacing fossil fuels 
when they are exhausted. 

But it is equally true that the industrial 
countries would all suffer if they failed to 
restore competitive conditions to the oil 
market. A degree of national freedom would 

' Made before the Senate Committee on Finance 
on July 14. The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will be avail- 
able from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

permanently be lost. It would be far more 
difficult to restore sustained growth. The 
industrial world would begin to split as each 
country offered political and economic con- 
cessions in an effort to make a separate peace 
with the oil producers. The future balance 
of power in the Middle East might be ir- 
reparably compromised. 

It was this sense of shared interest that 
led to the U.S. initiative to convene the 
Washington Energy Conference in February 
1974. As a consequence, the International 
Energy Agency was founded in November 
1974. Eighteen countries now belong to it. 
The lEA's objectives are: 

— To provide security against a new oil 
embargo by a coordinated program to build 
oil stocks and to share available oil in an 

— To share equitably among industrial 
countries the burden of conservation; and 

— To coordinate our measures to stimulate 
the development of alternative sources. 

Current Situation 

That is what we are aiming at. What has 
so far been accomplished ? 

First, emergency planning. On the basis 
of the detailed agreement signed in Novem- 
ber, the lEA now has the necessary planning 
and machinery in a good state of readiness, 
should we be confronted with a new embargo 
situation. In order to back them up, each 
country must have authority to implement 
quick-acting conservation measui'es on a 
coordinated basis, and we need decisions to 

August 11, 1975 


raise emergency oil stocks in all countries 
from the present minimum of 60 days of 
imports to the agreed level of 90 days. 

In contrast to some other lEA members, 
the United States has lagged in developing 
the needed emergency authorities. On thg 
other hand, congressional action to create a 
90-day petroleum reserve will put us ahead 
of our partners in this critical area. How- 
ever, both emergency powers and more 
storage are necessary for an effective re- 
sponse to a new embargo. It is clear that in- 
stability in the Middle East creates a very 
real potential for a new interruption in oil 

Second, conservation. However necessary, 
it is painful and costly to restrain demand 
for oil. And as a matter of simple politics, 
few other industrialized countries will be 
willing to sustain a strong conservation pro- 
gram over time unless others join them, and 
there is thus the possibility of changing 
market conditions and eventually bringing 
oil prices down. For this reason we proposed 
and the lEA adopted the goal of saving 2 
million barrels per day (MMBD) of oil by 
the end of 1975 and distributed the target 
among countries according to their oil con- 
sumption. Since we have half the oil con- 
sumption of the group, our target was 
1 MMBD by the end of the year. 

Nearly all the other members of the lEA 
have taken action to decrease oil demand, 
by passing through increased crude costs to 
the end user, by new taxation, by such 
specific conservation measures as fuel 
switching and lighting and heating regula- 

In contrast, the United States has lagged. 
So far the only major conservation measure 
with immediate effect that this country has 
taken is the oil import fees. Decontrol of old 
oil over the phased schedule the President 
will recommend will add very substantially 
to our conservation effort, bringing us up to 
the level where other countries are already. 

The lagging performance of the United 
States can be seen in comparisons with other 
countries' results. Between the first quarter 
of 1973 and the first quarter of this year 
Germany's oil consumption fell by 14 per- 

cent, Italy's by 8 percent, Japan's by 8 
percent, Britain's by 18 percent, ours by 6 
percent. And yet of all these countries the 
recession, which of course has reduced de- 
mand for oil, was far more severe here than 
elsewhere. We have the world's highest per 
capita consumption of energy — twice Ger- 
many's — but we have not been doing our 

H.R. 6860 [A Bill To Provide a Compre- 
hensive Energy Conservation and Conversion 
Program] would save us an estimated 
314,000 barrels per day in 1977 — not much 
more than the program Britain has already 
undertaken with an economy one-tenth the 
size of ours. 

Third, alternative sources. The basic ac- 
tions to stimulate the development of new 
energy must of course be national: the pro- 
vision of subsidies to high-cost or untested 
energy developments; tax incentives; ade- 
quate domestic pricing policies; the removal 
of unnecessary or undesirable legal obstruc- 
tions. But there are important contributions 
to be made internationally: 

— By finding a way to cooperate in R. & D. 
without jeopardizing proprietary rights. No 
country has a monopoly on scientific imagina- 
tion and Innovation. Even the United States, 
with its major public and private industry 
commitment to energy R. & D., has much 
to gain through avoiding duplication and 
sharing costs and through scientific cross- 

— By encouraging the flow of foreign 
capital into areas of energy development 
where it is needed and wanted. All of us 
have capital-short economies; with perhaps 
a trillion dollars of new capital needed in the 
energy sector in lEA countries over the next 
10 years, we have an interest in finding ways 
to encourage foreign investment without 
jeopardizing the achievement of the national 
energy policy goal of independence. 

— By assuring that countries that contrib- 
ute to the welfare of the whole group by 
developing higher cost energy sources are 
protected against possible predatory pricing 
by OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Ex- 
porting Countries] and are not penalized 


Department of State Bulletin 

if for other reasons prices fall on the inter- 
national oil market. This is the purpose of 
the minimum safeguard price concept, in 
which each country in the lEA, by means of 
its own choosing, applies a comparable level 
of border protection to energy investment. 
Contrary to what is often suggested, this 
mechanism would not assure a minimum 
price to OPEC; it is a guarantee only to our 
own investors that they will not face com- 
petition from imported oil below a minimum 
preestablished level well below current world 

TEA countries agreed in principle on these 
three points in March. They are now being 
elaborated within the Agency with the ob- 
jective of having a complete package ready 
for adoption by year's end. 

Future Action 

Domestically and internationally, we have 
just begun on conservation and alternative 
sources. The question we must ask is how 
far we must go, how fast. 

The answer must come, in part, from 
analysis of the staying power of the oil 
cartel. In May OPEC produced 26 MMBD 
as against 32.8 MMBD in September 1973, 
just before the crisis. Despite the soft 
market, the OPEC price structure has come 
through largely intact, although quality 
differentials have been reduced or eliminated 
and credit terms lengthened. Now demand 
will firm, as we go into the winter and out 
of the recession. In the absence of additional 
conservation measures, the OPEC market 
may rise to preembargo levels by the end of 
1977. In the late 1970's it may begin to fall 
again as North Sea, Alaskan, Mexican, and 
Chinese oil comes on the market in large 

Even if there are no new conservation 
measures, and if OPEC succeeds in raising 
prices to offset any increased costs of its 
imports, some oil-exporting countries will 
already have gone into balance-of-payments 
deficit during the period 1975-77. Algeria is 
in deficit now; so is Libya; Venezuela and 
Iran may follow. These pressui-es will in- 
tensify in the late 1970's as the OPEC 

market shrinks, when most producers other 
than Saudi Arabia and Kuwait may go into 

A serious program of conservation — the 2 
MMBD the President proposed for the 
United States by the end of 1977, matched 
by other lEA members to make 4 MMBD — 
would greatly intensify the pressures on the 

Given the cohesion the cartel has shown 
this year during the recession, it is not cer- 
tain that such a conservation program would 
suffice. To be sure that the cartel loses its 
exclusive capacity to set oil prices and does 
not regain it, we probably would have to 
compress the OPEC market to somewhat 
over 20 MMBD. In the next decade, this can 
only be done by a large-scale program of 
developing fossil fuels. For the United States 
this would imply an import level of 3 to 
5 MMBD in the mid-1980's, as proposed by 
the President. 

To see the meaning of this, consider the 
possible price increase OPEC now threatens 
us with. Each additional dollar on the price 
of oil might reduce demand by one-half to 1 
MMBD, out of a market of a little more than 
25 MMBD. OPEC can now absorb cuts like 
that without excessive difficulty. But if we 
had the President's program in place, the 
scope for such price increases would be 
greatly reduced or eliminated in the next 
three years. Not only would they be unjusti- 
fied, as now; they would be infeasible. 

Consumer-Producer Dialogue 

In parallel with our effort to develop effec- 
tive programs of consumer cooperation, we 
are also seeking to establish a basis for pro- 
ductive dialogue between consuming and 
producing nations. The first formal attempt 
to launch a multilateral energy dialogue in 
Paris this past April did not succeed. 

In May Secretary Kissinger proposed a 
new approach to the launching of a dialogue, 
broadening it to include the whole range of 
relations between industrial and developing 
countries. This would involve the establish- 
ment of three separate commissions: one to 
cover energy, one for raw materials, and one 

August 11, 1975 


to consider problems of economic develop- 
ment. The reaction to Secretary Kissinger's 
proposals has been generally positive, and 
we are optimistic that sufficient consensus 
can be reached along those lines over the 
next several weeks to permit agreement to 
reconvene the Paris meeting in early fall 
to prepare for the creation of the commis- 

The purpose of this dialogue is broader 
than energy; it is to find a realistic and equi- 
table basis on which decisions affecting the 
main elements of the world economy can be 
shared between industrial and developing 
countries. The oil producers must understand 
that unilateral exercise of their power to 
raise prices at this time would not be con- 
sistent with this purpose. 

For two years we have all been trying, in 
the United States and among industrial 
countries, to build agreement around the 
tougher energy policies we must all adopt. 
We have so far achieved far less than we 
require. But it would be wrong to judge what 
now can be done by what has been done. It 
has always been true that the great democ- 
racies are extraordinarily difficult to get 
moving. But when they do, they go very far. 
I think both our friends and our adversaries 
should keep that in mind, Mr. Chairman. So 
should we, for it is high time that we get on 
with it. 

U.S. Rejects Fisheries Regulations 
Proposed by ICNAF 

Press release 382 dated July 18 

The United States on July 18 rejected a 
proposal from the International Commis- 
sion for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 
(ICNAF) which would regulate the over- 
all fishing off the U.S. coast from Maine to 
North Carolina in 1976. 

Under the proposal, the total catch would 
be reduced to 650,000 metric tons in 1976 
from the allowable catch of 850,000 metric 
tons in 1975, but squid would be excluded 
from the quota — which was not the case in 

previous years. Quotas on squid will allow a 
catch of 74,000 tons of that species in 1976, 
up from 71,000 tons in 1974. The United 
States and Canada voted against the pro- 
posal at the ICNAF annual meeting which 
was held in Edinburgh, Scotland, from June 
10 to 20, 1975. 

At the catch level of 650,000 tons plus the 
squid, scientists estimate that a full decade 
would be required for stock recovery. In 
addition, there is an associated probability 
of approximately 30 percent that recovery 
will not begin in 1976 at this catch level, 
and hence a longer period of recovery may 
be required. 

The United States had proposed a quota of 
550,000 tons, including squid, which would 
have meant a five-year recovery period with 
a 90 percent probability of recovery, starting 
in 1976. That proposal, along with others 
ranging up to 800,000 tons (13-year re- 
covery, 59 percent chance of success), was 
rejected by the Commission before the 650,- 
000 level was agreed upon unanimously. A 
later proposal to exclude .squid from the total 
was carried by a majority vote over U.S. 

In announcing the official objection, which 
will exclude the United States from applica- 
bility of the proposal if it becomes effective 
for others. Ambassador Thomas A. Clingan, 
Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans 
and Fisheries Affairs, called the situation 

"The United States has been watching 
massive overfishing off its coasts for some 
years now," the Ambassador said. "This 
kind of situation cannot be allowed to con- 
tinue. Nor can we any longer afford the 
luxury of a leisurely approach to fisheries 
problems. The resources have been too badly 
depleted, and the American fishermen have 
suffered too much, to avoid the hard deci- 
sions which are required now by all fishing 

The chief U.S. representative to ICNAF, 
David H. Wallace, Associate Administrator 
of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, Department of Commerce, 
said that the ICNAF decision to increase the 


Department of State Bulletin 

U.S. quota from 211,600 tons in 1975 to 
230,000 tons in 1976 iiad not persuaded the 
U.S. delegation to vote for the proposal or 
the U.S. Government to accept it after it 
was adopted by majority vote. 

"We attach as much importance to the 
conservation and protection of the valuable 
natural resources as we do to the protection 
of the Amei'ican fishermen," Wallace de- 
clared. "Starting to give the fishermen a real 
opportunity to produce an adequate supply 
of fish for the American market, as they 
were once able to do, is not enough. We 
must also restore the productivity of the 
stocks. Virtually every species off our At- 
lantic coast has been overfished, some very 
severely. The only way to correct the situa- 
tion is by a drastic cutback in catch and 
fishing effort, and this is what the United 
States is insisting upon." 

The question of the overall allowable catch 
and the exclusion of squid from it will be 
taken up again at a special meeting of 
ICNAF in Montreal. A decision had already 
been made to schedule the meeting to discuss 
various matters, mostly related to the Cana- 
dian coast, which had not been resolved at 
the annual meeting. The United States has 
put the quota and squid issue on the agenda 
for the special meeting, which will be held 
September 22-27. 

Each individual species or stock is the sub- 
ject of a separate quota and national allo- 
cation. These were adopted by ICNAF in 
June and do not appear to be in question. 
The overall quota is less than the sum of 
the individual quotas and is designed to 
focus fishing effort as precisely as possible 
on target species. 

One reason the stocks are so depleted off 
the U.S. coast is that there is an unusually 
high species mix, with the result that many 
fish are taken as a bycatch, or incidental to 
the target species. Such fish are often sim- 
ply discarded at sea or made into fishmeal. 

The basis for this "two-tier" quota system 
was laid at a special ICNAF meeting in 
Ottawa in October 1973 after the 1973 an- 
nual meeting had ended in complete failure. 
At that time the United States was seriously 

considering withdrawing from the Commis- 
sion but acceded to the pleas of other mem- 
bers to enter into the special negotiations. 
They produced an agreement that the catch 
would be reduced to 923,900 tons in 1974 
and 850,000 tons in 1975 from the over 1.1 
million tons it had reached in 1972 and 1973. 

The agreement also specified that the catch 
would be further reduced in 1976 to the 
"amount which will allow the biomass to 
recover to a level which will produce the 
maximum sustainable yield." However, the 
agreement did not specify how long the re- 
covery period was to be. That led to the 
present difficulty. 

Three other U.S. proposals will be taken 
up at the Montreal meeting: 

1. To close a large area on Georges Bank, 
off New England, to fishing with bottom gear 
all year round in order to protect the serious- 
ly depleted groundfish stocks in the area, 
such as haddock. 

2. To license fishing vessels from all 
ICNAF members in the Northwest Atlantic. 
At the present time some members do not 
know where their vessels are or what they 
are fishing for. 

3. To simplify and clarify the allowable 
exemptions in the ICNAF trawl regulations, 
which allow for a bycatch which is too high. 

The second and third proposals were 
added to the agenda of the Montreal meet- 
ing at the request of the United States. 
These subjects had been discussed at the 
June and earlier meetings, but agreement 
was not reached on them in ICNAF. The 
Georges Bank closure proposal had already 
been referred to the special meeting. Prog- 
ress had been made on it in Edinburgh, but 
time did not permit conclusion of the dis- 
cussions on some major details. 

Members of ICNAF are Bulgaria, Canada, 
Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, 
France, German Democratic Republic, Ice- 
land, Italy, Japan, Norway, Poland, Portu- 
gal, Romania, Spain, U.S.S.R., United King- 
dom, and the United States. In addition, 
Cuba has indicated it might join ICNAF 
after discussions at the Montreal meeting. 

August 11, 1975 


Vessels from most of these countries fish 
off the U.S. coast, but a few nations normally 
fish only in the ICNAF areas off Canada or 

Report on World Weather Program 
Transmitted to Congress 

Message From President Ford ' 

To the Congress of the United States: 

People everywhere recognize that weather 
influences day-to-day activities. People are 
also mindful that weather, sometimes violent, 
breeds storms that take lives and destroy 
property. Coupled with these traditional 
concerns, there is now a new awareness of 
the cumulative effects of weather. The im- 
pact of climate and climatic fluctuations 
upon global energy, food and water resources 
poses a potential threat to the quality of life 

The World Weather Program helps man 
cope with his atmosphere. We must con- 
tinue to rely upon and to strengthen this 
vital international program as these atmos- 
pheric challenges — both old and new — con- 
front us in the future. 

I am pleased to report significant progress 
in furthering the goals of the World Weather 
Program. This past year has recorded these 

— The United States began near-continu- 
ous viewing of weather and storms over most 
of North and South America and adjacent 
waters through the use of two geostationary 

— The U.S.S.R., Japan, and the European 
Space Research Organization have taken 
steps to join with the United States in ex- 
tending this weather watch to include five 
geostationary satellites around the globe. 

— Computer power devoted to operational 
weather services and to atmospheric re- 
search has been increased appreciably. This 

' Transmitted on June 10 (text from White House 
press release). 

leads to immediate gains in weather predic- 
tion and to long-term gains in extending 
the time, range and scope of weather predic- 
tions and in assessing the consequences of 
climatic fluctuations upon man and of man's 
activities upon climate. 

— During the summer of 1974, an un- 
precedented event in international science 
occurred with the successful conduct of an 
experiment in the tropical Atlantic. More 
than one-third of the earth's tropical belt 
was placed under intensive observation by 
69 nations using a network of hundreds of 
land stations, 39 research ships, 13 specially 
instrumented aircraft and 7 meteorological 
satellites. The results of this experiment are 
expected to permit a sound understanding 
of the role of the tropics as the heat source 
for the global atmosphere and to provide 
new insight into the origin of tropical storms 
and hurricanes. 

Senate Concurrent Resolution 67 of the 
90th Congress declared the intention of the 
United States to pai-ticipate fully in the 
World Weather Program. It is in accordance 
with this Resolution that I transmit this an- 
nual report describing current and planned 
Federal activities that contribute, in part, 
to this international program from which all 
nations benefit. 

Gerald R. Ford. 
The White House, June 10, 1975. 

U.S.-Japan Committee on Cultural 
and Educational Cooperation 

Following is the text of a communique 
issued at the conclusion of the meeting of 
the Joint Committee on U.S.-Japan Cultural 
and Educational Cooperation June 21-23. 

Press release 351 dated June 30 

The Joint Committee on United States-Japan 
Cultural and Educational Cooperation met in Hawaii, 
June 21-23, 1975. 

The Committee took special note of the growing 
importance of the cultural and educational factors 


Department of State Bulletin 

in achieving mutual understanding between Japan 
and the United States. It recognized the increased 
importance of improved communication between the 
two countries in a world drawn together by inter- 
dependence. Both countries were seen to share 
numerous societal problems brought on by rapid 
technological innovation, especially the information 

In this atmosphere, the Committee reviewed 
progress made in carrying forward the recommenda- 
tions of CULCON VII [Seventh United States- 
Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational 
Interchange] which met in Tokyo in June 1974. 
These included cooperative projects and activities 
in the fields of American studies, education, 
Japanese studies, journalist exchange, museum, and 

The Committee was gratified to note that there 
has been a marked increase in private participation 
on both sides, thus highlighting the unique feature 
of CULCON, which is the cooperation between 
government and private representatives to further 
mutual understanding. Greater activity by the sub- 
committees of CULCON suggests the possibility of 
increased cooperation among them. 

The organization of the Joint Committee was 
discussed, and it was agreed to ask the panel chair- 
men to consider what modifications might be rec- 
ommended to CULCON VIII. 

The Committee welcomed the June 18th announce- 
ment by Secretary of State Kissinger that the U.S. 
Administration would seek to integrate and obtain 
approval this year of proposals before the U.S. 
Congress to establish a Japan-U.S. Friendship Fund 
for the expansion of cultural and educational ac- 
tivities between both nations. 

In reviewing activities related to CULCON, the 
Committee particularly noted: 

1. The Conference of Asian and Pacific American 
Studies Specialists to be held in September 1975 in 
Japan and the Bicentennial World Conference on 
American Studies to be held in Washington, D.C. 
in September 1976, 

2. The work in the field of education for inter- 
national understanding to develop educational 
materials on each other's country for elementary 
and secondary schools, 

3. The increased efforts by Japanese government 
and private organizations to publish books and 
articles on Japan translated into English, 

4. The increased importance of exchanging jour- 
nalists as a means of narrowing the communication 

5. Plans for exchanging museum exhibitions and 
other related programs in the coming years, 

6. The prospect of new cooperation in cultural 
and educational television in both countries, 

7. The need for a library subcommittee and 
separate subcommittees for television and print 
media and recommended their establishment to 

A. American Studies 

The Committee received with satisfaction the 
Japanese Association of American Studies' report, 
"Current Status of the Study of America in 
Japanese Liniversities," an extensive accumulation 
of data sponsored by the FHilbright Commission in 
Japan, and noted the progress of American Studies 
in Japan. 

The Hawaii meeting influenced the subcommittee 
by directing attention outside the field of higher 
education and research toward public and adult edu- 
cation, professional internships, the teaching of 
English, arid public information. The opportunity 
to contribute to the discussion of the concerns of 
other subcommittees, including the proposed sub- 
committee on libraries, is viewed with anticipation. 

It was reported that the Asia and Pacific Regional 
Conference of American Studies Specialists will be 
held on 4-7 September at the Institute of Interna- 
tional Studies and Training Center in Fujinomiya 
City with the participation of fourteen nations. 
Approximately fifty people will attend the confer- 
ence from abroad and roughly the same number from 
Japan. The subjects to be discussed are: (1) Ameri- 
can Revolution, (2) Influence of American civiliza- 
tion on other countries, and (3) Problems relating 
to American Studies in the participating countries. 

Recommendations : 

1. Taking advantage of the Regional Conference, 
at which most of the subcommittee members will be 
in attendance, there should be a joint subcommittee 
meeting in Tokyo on September 8, 1975. 

2. The Committee recommends the following 
agenda for the joint meeting: (a) Report on Hawaii 
meeting; (b) Role and scope of American Studies 
Subcommittee; (c) Evaluation of Asian Bicen- 
tennial Conference; (d) Report on Washington 
Bicentennial Conference for 1976; (e) Response to 
"Current Status of the Study of America in Japanese 
Universities"; (f) Future of Kyoto American Stud- 
ies Seminar; (g) CULCON VIII; (h) Progress re- 
ports on translations, book orders, teacher orienta- 
tion, student exchange, counseling and accreditation, 
financing: public and private, joint and cooperative 
research and bibliographies, faculty and scholarly 
exchange, and cooperation with the United Nations 

B. Education 

The meeting concerned with education for inter- 
national understanding discussed the final arrange- 
ments for the opening of the joint seminar which is 

August n, 1975 


scheduled to begin three weeks hence at the East- 
West Center. 

The new Office of Education publication, Film 
Resources o» Japav, was presented at the meeting. 
It inventories more than 550 films and filmstrips 
about Japan available in the United States, which 
can be used for multiple educational purposes. 

Finally, the Committee noted with approval the 
U.S. Office of Education decision to assist four new 
East Asian Studies centers in American colleges 
and universities located in regions not currently well 
ser\-ed by the existing USOE centers. One center is 
in North Carolina and an important part of that 
Center's program is collaboration with the North 
Carolina State Department of Education and the 
CULCON project on education for mutual under- 
standing in elementary and secondary education. 

Recommeinlations : 

A variety of possible activities for future con- 
sideration by the joint subcommittee was considered. 
Some of these might be initiated during the coming 
year and some could be undertaken following the 
completion of the present project. Among the 
possibilities for building bridges for understanding 
between educators and educational systems in the 
two countries are: 

1. Expanding and improving links between ele- 
mentary and secondary schools and teacher educa- 
tion institutions in both countries. 

2. Establishing and/or strengthening facilities 
and service in both countries to assist visiting 
teachers from the other country with their study 
interests, including the development of curriculum 

3. Increasing access to reliable, up-to-date in- 
formation about the educational system, issues, and 
developments in the other country. To help expand 
the dialogue between Japanese and American edu- 
cators across language barriers, various possibilities 
for publishing articles in English by Japanese 
educators about education in Japan were considered. 
For example, occasional issues of specialized existing 
journals might be devoted to U.S. -Japan educa- 
tional subjects. The reverse need was also con- 
sidered — helping the Japanese side to select par- 
ticularly significant articles from the wide collection 
of writing on education in American professional 
journals for translation into Japanese. 

C. Japanese Studies 

The Committee expressed its appreciation for the 
efforts of the Japan Foundation and the Expo '70 
Foundation to strengthen Japanese language train- 
ing and improve library resources in the U.S. to 
disseminate the results of Japanese scholarship to 
an international audience. It noted, as well, progress 
in integrating the study of Japan into teaching and 
research by social scientists outside of Japan and in 
expanding Japanese studies at the undergraduate 

level in the United States. The Japan Foundation's 
Introductory Bibliography for Japanese Studies and 
Books on Japan were well received. The work of the 
newly established Japanese Language Division of 
the Natural Research Institute on the Japanese 
Language also was noted with appreciation. 

Recommendations : 

1. Precise, up-to-date data about institutions, 
scholars and activities in Japanese studies should 
be compiled through the efforts of both sides for 
presentation to CULCON VIII. 

2. More specialists from Japan should teach in 
American universities. 

3. Joint research projects in Japanese studies 
need more solid American financing. 

4. The quality and quantity of English abstracts 
and translations of Japanese scholarly works need 
improving (and the Committee will give special 
priority to this problem). 

5. A Japanese mission to survey Japanese studies 
in the U.S. should be sent to the U.S., possibly in 
the spring of 1976, and an American mission to 
survey facilities for Americans to study in Japan 
should be considered. 

D. Journalist Exchange 

Substantial time was devoted to a discussion of 
the exchange of journalists between the LLS. and 
Japan. Recognition was given to another of the In- 
ternational Press Institute's bilateral seminars for 
newspapermen which will be held in Racine, Wis- 
consin this coming November. The changing roles 
of the two nations in Asia will be explored during 
the seminar discussions. 

It was reemphasized that one of the important 
and effective ways to fill the communication gap 
between Japan and the U.S.A. and to deepen the 
understanding of the general public in both countries 
is the exchange of mass-media people, including 
publishers, editorial writers, columnists, journalists, 
and magazine writers. 

Recommendation : 

1. Details of the respective exchange or grant- 
type programs should be widely disseminated among 
the individual professional organizations concerned 
with management, editorial or reporting responsi- 
bilities. As an example, attention should be given to 
making the Fulbright program for working news- 
men more widely known throughout the profession. 

E. Library 

Re com m en da t ion s : 

1. It was recommended to establish a Library 
Subcommittee with the following suggested ob- 
jective and activities: 

a. The primary objective of the subcommittee 
would be to improve access of Japanese to American 
material and American access to Japanese materials. 


Department of State Bulletin 

b. A number of possible activities that the sub- 
committee may wish to explore would include the 
interchange and training of personnel, interchange 
of publications, inter-library cooperation, the 
establishment of documentation centers especially 
in the social sciences, and the need for specialized 

2. The committee expressed the view that the 
proposed Library Subcommittee, when officially 
established, should maintain close liaison with other 
subcommittees of CULCON, especially the Japanese 
Studies, American Studies and Education Subcom- 
mittees as it formulates and implements its pro- 

3. Establishment of this subcommittee should be 
at an early date and that a preparatory meeting be 
held in Tokyo or Kyoto before or after the Third 
Japan-U.S. Conference on Libraries and Informa- 
tion Science in Higher Education to be held in 
Kyoto in October 1975 to work out a plan of ac- 
tivities for the future. 

F. Museum Exchange 

In the field of museum exchange, details were 
discussed concerning the exhibition "Collected 
Masterworks from Art Museums of the United 
States" which will be held in Tokyo and Kyoto dur- 
ing 1976 to celebrate the U.S. Bicentennial. Other 
exhibitions including the Shinto Exhibition, Chinese 
Ceramics from Japanese collections and Kamakura 
Sculpture were also discussed. 

Recommendations : 

1. With regard to future exchanges, it was agreed 
that the following should be discussed further: 

a. The appropriate interval between major 
Japanese exhibitions to be sent to the United 

b. Use of the museum subcommittee as an in- 
formation center among American museums for 
the planning of art exhibitions to and from Japan. 

c. Better balance in the exchange of exhibitions 
between the United States and Japan. 

d. Financial guidelines for the sharing of ex- 
penses between the sender and recipient of exhibi- 

G. Television 

The Committee considered the next T.V. Program 
Festival with a view to promoting the program ex- 
change more effectively. It noted the important role 
of PBS [Public Broadcasting Service] in this area. 
Further, providing United States cultural and edu- 
cational television programs to Japan and showing 
Japanese produced magazine television programs 
over PBS stations in the United States was dis- 

The establishment of an American Subcommittee 
was noted with appreciation in view of the need for 
continuity on the U.S. side. 

The Committee discussed Sister Station affiliations 
and expressed satisfaction regarding progress in 
this area. 

Recommendations : 

1. Considering that the most promising oppor- 
tunity for Japanese educational and cultural pro- 
grams to be viewed by the most American people 
would be on PBS stations, it is recommended that 
consideration be given to holding the 3rd Television 
Program Festival at the National Association of 
Educational Broadcasting (NAEB) Meeting in mid- 
November 1975 or in 1976. In the case of the 1975 
NAEB Meeting, the Japanese program entries would 
come mainly from the group of programs in custody 
of the Japan Society in New York. Final decision on 
this issue will be made after consultation with the 
Broadcast Programming center of Japan (BPJC). 

2. Information should continue to be exchanged 
on type and subject of programs to be exchanged 
considering other country's program needs. 

3. To further the exchange of information re- 
garding Sister Station activities a newsletter could 
be developed by the BPJC and the Japan Society. 


The Committee recommended that CULCON VIII 
be held in Washington, D.C. in May 1976. In view 
of the celebration of the American Bicentennial in 
1976, it was also recommended that private organiza- 
tions be invited to sponsor and organize, in con- 
sultation with CULCON, a special symposium on a 
major theme of common interest to both countries 
to be held in conjunction with CULCON VIII. 

August 11, 1975 



U.S. Discusses Approach to the Seventh Special Session 
of the U.N. General Assembly 

Statement by Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr. 

U.S. Representative in the U.N. Economic and Social Council ' 

Just a few days ago we marked the 
30th anniversary of the founding of the 
United Nations. It is therefore appropriate 
that this, the 59th session of the Economic 
and Social Council, should be the first major 
U.N. session following our recent celebra- 
tion. This fortuitous appropriateness sym- 
bolizes the fundamental importance of global 
economic and social health to the well-being 
of mankind. 

The founders of the United Nations rec- 
ognized this when they assigned to the or- 
ganization as one of its purposes: "To 
achieve international cooperation in solving 
international problems of an economic, so- 
cial, cultural, or humanitarian charac- 
ter . . . ." But for many reasons, in the 
intervening years political and security 
problems have been the central focus of U.N. 
deliberations. These remain serious prob- 
lems. Problems of security and political 
coexistence, however, do not exist as iso- 
lated phenomena. They are not detachable 
coupons from the main bond of the human 
condition. As our Secretary of State, Dr. 
Kissinger, said in a recent speech: ^ 

The paramount necessity of our time is the preser- 
vation of peace. But history has shown that inter- 
national political stability requires international 
economic stability. Order cannot survive if economic 

' Made before the 59th session of the U.N. Eco- 
nomic and Social Council (ECOSOC) at Geneva on 
July 4 (text from USUN press release 75 dated 
July 7). 

' For Secretary Kissinger's address at Kansas 
City, Mo., on May 13, see Bulletin of June 2, 1975, 
p. 713. 

arrangements are constantly buffeted by crisis or if 
they fail to meet the aspirations of nations and 
peoples for progress. 

The 59th ECOSOC is also an important 
link in a series of past and future confer- 
ences dedicated to the resolution of urgent 
economic problems, particularly those of 
developing countries. We convene here at a 
particularly critical time. A scintilla of 
evidence suggests that the world's economy 
could be at a stage of turning from slowdown 
and contraction to new growth and expan- 

But for many national economies, time is 
relative. Some are yet to experience the 
throes others have survived. We meet at a 
time when many countries, having experi- 
enced the most severe economic strains, are 
reviewing long-held economic policies and 
seeking new openings for economic and so- 
cial cooperation. And our convocation occurs 
at a time when we perceive more clearly the 
shortfalls of the global economy and sense 
more keenly the need to render economic 
justice rather than to adjudge guilt for real 
or imagined past deeds. 

It has been a bit more than one year since 
the General Assembly devoted itself, in its 
sixth special session, to the overwhelming 
issue of the nature and shape of global eco- 
nomic interdependence. While in that session 
many issues divided us, and some of those 
issues still retain their divisive potential, 
nonetheless that session marked the begin- 
ning of our preoccupation with the global 
economic crisis. 


Department of State Bulletin 

The word "crisis" has become such com- 
mon currency in our commentaries and ex- 
changes as to risk a devaluation of the 
meaning thi'ough overuse. Nonetheless a 
survey of global economic problems, im- 
balances, and injustices fully warrants the 
denomination "crisis" as descriptive of the 
current state of the global economy. 

But crisis also connotes opportunity. 
Rarely in the more than a quarter century 
since the end of World War II have so many 
opportunities been presented to address the 
fundamentals of the global economic system. 
Indeed, it may very well be that this is the 
first opportunity to work out the implications 
of global interdependence in the full realiza- 
tion that it is indeed interdependence, con- 
sciously perceived, that is the organizing 
principle of our labors. 

A central concern over the last year has 
been the nomenclature of that which we seek 
to achieve. There has indeed been divisive- 
ness on this issue. Whether in our labors we 
have been about the design of a new inter- 
national economic order or whether we have 
been about the task of fundamental reform 
of the existing order has needlessly con- 
sumed all too much time and effort. 

Our Secretary of State has called for an 
end to this theoretical confrontation. Indeed, 
we hope that this essentially theological de- 
bate will come to an end. My government has 
sought and now seeks to make clear that this 
problem of nomenclature should be set aside 
in the interest of resolving some of those 
crucial issues which need the urgent atten- 
tion of not only this body but the entire U.N. 
system. These problems exist by virtue of 
their own imperatives. And their solutions 
will commend themselves to the global com- 
munity not on the basis of labels but, rather, 
because of their intrinsic justice. 

For our part, the United States recognizes 
the declaration and program of action as 
articulated policy goals of a substantial num- 
ber of states within the United Nations.' 

" For texts of the Declaration and Program of 
Action on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order adopted by the sixth special session 
of the U.N. General Assembly on May 1, 1974, see 
Bulletin of May 27, 1974, p. 569. 

Many of these articulated goals are radical in 
the truest sense of the word. On the other 
hand, we should hope that the mutuality of 
respect for differing opinions would extend 
to those views espoused by my government, 
derived from our principled beliefs as shaped 
by our national experience. 

The theoretical — and at times even theo- 
logical — differences need not require that we 
resolve questions of philosophy before ad- 
dressing what we all recognize as problems 
which simply must be urgently addressed lest 
the human condition sustain irremediable 
injury in a generation of economic warfare. 

It is, then, in the spirit of addressing those 
issues which appear to be ripe for resolu- 
tion that my government has sought coopera- 
tion rather than confrontation in this body 
and elsewhere. 

The first implication of global economic 
interdependence is that all on this globe are 
involved in, and affected by, that condition. 
It would seem to follow that all those in- 
volved and affected have the right — even the 
duty — to participate in the process of iden- 
tifying and resolving those problems which 
so urgently require solution. It is too late in 
the day to accept that any single state or any 
bloc of states can arrogate unto itself all 
wisdom and all power in the ordering of our 
economic system. It is indeed much too late 
in the day to forget that judgments and 
opinions can be wrong as well as being right. 
My government is most happy to join with 
all those other governments who hold to the 
belief that true consensus regarding solu- 
tions is the only viable outcome of our 
deliberations. We are prepared to join the 
quest for consensus Veritas. 

The General Assembly and Economic Reform 

Mr. Chairman, of overriding concern is the 
impending seventh special session and, more 
immediately, preparations for that Assembly 
in this session of ECOSOC. The seventh 
special session is included on our formal 
agenda. Perhaps of more importance is the 
fact that that session of the General Assem- 
bly will be a subject for informal consulta- 
tions in accordance with the recommendation 

August 11, 1975 


of the second preparatory conference re- 
cently concluded in New York. 

Although most important decisions re- 
garding the seventh special session remain 
to be taken, our efforts thus far have not 
been in vain. A general consensus seems to 
be emerging — that we will focus on a limited 
number of items of high priority and that 
we will seek meaningful positive action. 

It remains to build on this emerging con- 
sensus in agreeing to an agenda and perhaps 
a general outline of the form of action to 
be taken by the seventh special General 

I believe it will be helpful to review the 
relative roles which various forums in the 
international system — the General Assem- 
bly, the specialized agencies, and other bodies 
— can best play in making progress toward 
concrete achievement. The U.N. General 
Assembly has not been much experienced in 
the world of global economics. Expounding 
the reasons for this lack need not detain us 

It does seem necessary, however, to state 
explicitly what to us seems to be the obvious. 
The General Assembly as it is constituted — 
and given its history over the last 29 years — 
does not seem to be the institution best de- 
signed to actually fashion the necessary 
I'emedies, to negotiate the required commit- 
ments, and to administer those processes 
that might be brought into being. 

Of necessity, these tasks must be per- 
formed elsewhere and with a different type 
of representative from those of us who peo- 
ple the General Assembly. On the other hand, 
in this dawning era of global economic inter- 
dependence, only the General Assembly 
comes near to that ideal of a representative 
body of the entire globe. The General Assem- 
bly does have the capability for the true 
expression of that perfect consensus, or 
nearly perfect consensus, of all mankind. 

It is the view of my government that the 
true role and function of the General As- 
sembly is to give expression to the broad 
consensuses as to priorities, to give general 
guidance, and to keep itself apprised of de- 
velopments in the global economy. We, for 


ourselves, are certain that no one contem 
plates that it will be the General Assembly 
which itself negotiates commodity arrange- 
ments reflecting a general consensus, or that 
the General Assembly itself will undertake 
to negotiate trade reform or monetary re- 
form, or that the General Assembly will 
itself undertake to fashion arrangements to 
assure the feeding of the world. 

Its basic responsibilities are clear — to ob- 
serve and keep under review the state of in- 
ternational cooperation and to draw atten- 
tion of member states to conditions requiring 
international cooperation in the solution of 
problems. In this, it is neither a passive ob- 
server nor a technical negotiating body. We 
might therefore envisage the seventh special 
session of the General Assembly as identi- 
fying areas of priority interest, as establish- 
ing guidelines for international cooperation 
in those areas and continuing its normal 
process for monitoring the activities of the 
various bodies charged with actual negotia- 

U.S. Proposals for Seventh Special Session 

The general approach of my government 
to the seventh special session has been enun- 
ciated in the recent speeches of Secretary 
Kissinger. This positive approach is but- 
tressed by a serious and thorough review of 
our policies at the highest levels of the U.S. 

As our varied positions emerge, we will be 
prepared to engage in the dialogue and nego- 
tiations we all contemplate. I hope, however, 
that it is clear now that our effort is to 
identify: first, policies which are responsive 
in particular to the needs of developing coun- 
tries; second, policies which are susceptible 
to meaningful cooperative action; and third, 
policies to which the United States can make 
a real contribution. These are the parameters 
of our own review. 

Speaking of the seventh special session. 
Secretary Kissinger stated on June 23: 

Working closely with Congress, we are now pre- 
paring concrete, detailed, and — we hope — creative 
proposals for that session. We intend, while fully 
protecting our nation's interests, to deal with con- 

Department of State Bulletin 

troversial issues with realism, imagination, and 
understanding. We hope that others will meet us 
in the same spirit. 

Without going into details, I would like to 
note that my government has circulated its 
proposals regarding the agenda for the 
seventh special session. While differing in 
some respects, we believe that in general they 
are in keeping with the proposals advanced 
by the Group of 77. We have suggested 
two additional topics — "International Food 
Needs" and "The Problems of the Poorer 
Developing Countries." We believe that they 
fit into the criteria of being of priority in- 
terest and of a potential for effective inter- 
national action. 

In any event, we look forward to consulta- 
tions during this session to refine our collec- 
tive thinking. I would emphasize, however, 
that we approach the issue of the agenda not 
in terms of substantive agreement but in 
terms of identifying areas appropriate for 
intensive consideration by the seventh 
special session. 

Meeting International Food Needs 

Among the suggestions for the agenda of 
the seventh special session proposed by my 
government is the addition of an item on 
"International Food Needs." Formation of 
a sound global agricultural economy requires 
effective action in a number of critical areas. 
First, world food production must be in- 
creased significantly, with primary emphasis 
on raising average yields in developing coun- 
tries. Until this increase is attained, food 
needs of developing countries must be met, 
at least in part, by dependable food-aid pro- 
grams. In addition, we support an inter- 
national system of nationally held grain 
reserves as the best means to achieve world 
food security through enhancing the assur- 
ance of availability of adequate supplies. 

The long-range needs for food require 
further action on preliminary agreements 
reached at the World Food Conference. My 
government believes that meeting interna- 
tional food needs is of prime concern to the 
U.N. system. The U.N. General Assembly 

should take note of the World Food Con- 
ference resolutions and progress on their 
implementation, taking into account the re- 
port of the World Food Council, and should 
request the World Food Council to periodi- 
cally inform the General Assembly of its 
proceedings and recommendations. 

Global Economic and Social Issues 

If I have dealt at length with preparations 
for the seventh special session, it was not 
to denigrate other agenda items before us. 
Appropriate to the purpose of the Economic 
and Social Council, they cover a wide range 
of genuine economic and social concerns and 
could by themselves fully occupy us over the 
next four weeeks. My delegation will, as 
appropriate, be commenting in detail on 
these items as they arise, but a few general 
comments may be in order. 

Both national economies and the global 
economy have been through a trying period. 
We are particularly aware of the strains 
placed on most developing countries facing 
the multiple problems of international infla- 
tion and recession. 

Looking at the United States, most econ- 
omists both within and without the govern- 
ment believe that we are bottoming out and 
can now anticipate a period of general eco- 
nomic recovery with, hopefully, further de- 
clension in the rate of inflation. Perhaps we 
should draw two major conclusions from our 
recent national experience. First, of course, 
is the fact of the interdependence of our na- 
tional economies, and second is the realiza- 
tion of the importance and effectiveness of 
cooperative action among nations in dealing 
with global economic problems. 

President Ford spelled this out in trans- 
mitting his report on the international econ- 
omy to the U.S. Congress when he said: 

The United States firmly believes that our own 
problems, and those of the rest of the world, can 
be dealt with most effectively through international 
cooperation .... our motivating principles, our 
standards of conduct and the guidelines we set for 
the conduct of international economic development 
are ever more crucial to our national well-being, 
and that of the world. 

August n, 1975 


Mr. Chairman, the World Conference of 
the International Women's Year recently 
concluded its session in Mexico City, and we 
look forward to reviewing the results. As in 
other instances, my government's delegation 
to that conference had reservations concern- 
ing some of the resolutions discussed. We 
fully support, however, the underlying pur- 
pose of the conference — to seek to insure 
that a person who happens to be a woman 
will not be consigned to a life of deprivation 
or, in some instances, a life of misery solely 
because of the accident of sex. 

Issues of relief and assistance, of national 
resources and environment, of industrial 
development, of freedom from colonialism — 
in fact all of the items on the agenda deserve 
our serious attention. And we will be com- 
menting on them later. 

Mr. Chairman, I opened by referring to 
the 30th anniversary of the founding of the 
United Nations. I would like to refer to 
another anniversary, today: the 199th an- 
niversary of our Declaration of Independ- 
ence from a colonial yoke. And, Mr. Chair- 
man, I beg your indulgence for a personal 
note. As I am preparing to take leave of you 
and my colleagues on the Economic and So- 
cial Council, I eagerly seize this occasion to 
say to you all that I consider myself to have 
been privileged to have labored with you in 
our joint endeavor to better the human 

U.S. Contributes $17 Million 
to U.N. Forces in Middle East 

USUN press release 72 dated July 3 

The United States on July 3 transmitted 
to the Secretary General of the United Na- 
tions a check in the amount of $17,278,413. 
This payment covers the U.S. contribution 
toward the apportioned costs of the U.N. 
Emergency Force (including the U.N. Dis- 
engagement Observer Force) through the 
period ending April 24, 1975. It represents 
a total of $34,614,613 contributed toward 
the total UNEF costs of $119.8 million for 
the period October 24, 1973-April 24, 1975. 

U.S. Completes Contribution 
to UNFICYP for Fiscal 1975 

USUN press release 74 dated July 3 

The United States on July 3 presented to 
the Secretary General of the United Nations 
a check in the amount of $4.8 million. This 
payment, which completes the U.S. contribu- 
tion to the United Nations Peacekeeping 
Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for fiscal year 
1975, brings the cumulative total of U.S. 
support for UNFICYP to $76.1 million. 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Agreement 
on North Pacific Fisheries 

Press release 381 dated July IS 

The Governments of the United States and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics con- 
cluded on July 18 at Washington an agree- 
ment relating to the fisheries of the North 
Pacific area, extending from California north 
to Alaska. This is the fifth such agreement 
concluded between the two governments on 
Pacific coast fisheries. The new agreement 
covers the period August 1, 1975, through 
December 31, 1976. A 30-day-notice reopen- 
ing clause is provided, should the situation in 
the fisheries change greatly during that 

Under the new agreement, the Soviet 
Union is required to place additional and 
extensive restrictions on its Pacific fishery 
ofi" the U.S. coast. These restrictions include 
the closing-off of large areas to the Soviet 
fleets, either on a year-round basis or during 
periods when Soviet fishing could be harm- 
ful to stocks of fish such as halibut, rock- 
fish, and crabs that are of particular interest 
to U.S. fishermen. 

Limitations on Soviet catches are provided 
for such species as pollock, hake, and rock- 
fish. These catch quotas, in combination 


Department of State Bulletin 

with the extensive area-time closures, are 
expected to provide considerable protection 
for species of special interest to U.S. fisher- 

As has been the case in all such agree- 
ments recently concluded by the United 
States with foreign countries fishing off its 
shores, the new agreement contains meas- 
ures to prevent fishing-gear conflicts, protect 
the species which inhabit the U.S. conti- 
nental shelf, and provide for observation 
and enforcement of the agreement's provi- 
sions. Cooperative research and exchange 
Df information on species of joint interest 
are also provided for. 

The U.S. delegation, which included rep- 
resentatives from the Departments of State 
ind Commerce, state agencies, and the fish- 
ng industry, was headed by Ambassador 
Thomas A. Clingan, Jr., Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State for Oceans and Fisheries 
f\ffairs. The Soviet delegation was led by 
Deputy Minister of Fisheries Vladimir M. 


urrent Actions 



Convention on offenses and certain other acts com- 
mitted on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo Septem- 
ber 14, 1963. Entered into force December 4, 1969. 
TIAS 6768. 

Accession deposited: Tunisia, February 25, 1975. 
Notification of succession: Bahamas, effective July 
10, 1973. 

^Aaritime Matters 

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as 
amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 
6490). Done at London October 17, 1974.' 
Acceptance deposited: Canada, July 16, 1975. 

>larcotic Drugs 

'rotocol amending the single convention on narcotic 
drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972. 
Accession deposited: Singapore, July 9, 1975. 
Entered into force: August 8, 1975. 

)cean Dumping 

'onvention on the prevention of marine pollution by 
j dumping of wastes and other matter, with an- 

lugust 11, 1975 

nexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and 

Washington December 29, 1972.' 

Ratification deposited: Guatemala, July 14, 1975. 

Property — Industrial 

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial 

property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at 

Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 

entered into force May 19, 1970; for the United 

States August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 

entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United 

States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923, 7727. 

Notification from World Intellectual Property 

Organization that ratification of articles 1 

through 12 deposited: Japan, June 27, 1975 

(effective from October 1, 1975). 

Notification from World Intellectual Property 

Organization that accession to articles 1 

through 12 deposited: Australia, June 27, 1975. 

Safety at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life at 

sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered 

into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780, 6284. 

Acceptance deposited: Ecuador, June 30, 1975. 
International regulations for preventing collisions 

at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. 

Entered into force September 1, 1965. TIAS 5813. 

Acceptance deposited: Ecuador, June 30, 1975. 
International convention for the safety of life at 

sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London November 

1, 1974.' 

Signatures: People's Republic of China, June 20, 
1975;= Norway, June 24, 1975.= 


Convention on registration of objects launched into 
outer space. Opened for signature at New York 
January 14, 1975.' 

Signature: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, 
July 11, 1975. 


Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annex, and 
final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. 
Entered into force September 1, 1974.' 
Notification of approval: Pakistan, May 15, 1975. 

Telephone regulations, with appendices and final 
protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered 
into force September 1, 1974." 
Notification of approval: Pakistan, May 15, 1975. 

International telecommunication convention with an- 
nexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos 
October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1 
Ratification deposited: Israel, May 28, 1975. 

Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 
1959, as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590, 
7435), to establish a new frequency allotment plan 
for high-frequency radiotelephone coast stations, 
with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva 
June 8, 1974.' 

Notifications of approval: Australia, May 30, 
1975; Singapore, May 10, 1975. 

' Not in force. 

'' Subject to ratification. 

= Not in force for the United States. 


World Meteorological Organization 

Convention of the World Meteorological Organiza- 
tion. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. 
Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052. 
Accession deposited: Democratic Republic of Viet- 
Nani (with reservation), July 8, 1975. 


Costa Rica 

Agreement relating to the provision of assistance 
by the United States to support Costa Rican 
efforts to curb the production and traffic in illegal 
narcotics. Effected by exchange of notes at San 
Jose May 29 and June 2, 1975. Entered into force 
June 2, 1975. 


Agreement amending annex B of the mutual defense 
assistance agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS 
2014). Effected by exchange of notes at Luxem- 
bourg June 27 and July 4, 1975. 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

Agreement I'egarding fisheries in the northeastern 
Pacific Ocean off the coast of the United States, 
with related letters. Signed at Washington July 
18, 1975. Entered into force August 1, 1975. 

Agreement relating to fishing for king and tanner 
crab, with related letter and statement. Signed 
at Washington July 18, 1975. Entered into force 
August 1, 1975. 


1948 "Foreign Relations" Volume 
on the United Nations Released 

Press release 350 dated June 27 

The Department of State on June 27 released 
volume I, part 1, in the series "Foreign Relations 
of the United States" for the year 1948. This volume 
is entitled "General; The United Nations." 

Part 1 includes documentation on U.S. policies 
with regard to the United Nations as an institution, 
including matters related to implementation of the 
Headquarters Agreement of 1947; elections to cer- 
tain organs, commissions, and committees of the 
United Nations; elections of new members to the 
United Nations; voting procedures; and budget. 
Part 1 also includes material on non-self-governing 
territories outside the U.N. trusteeship system; the 
human rights question; the U.N. conference at 
Geneva on freedom of information; U.S. policy at 


the United Nations with respect to regulation ol 
armaments and collective security; Internationa 
control of atomic energy; and efforts toward agree- 
ments placing armed forces at the disposal of tht 
Security Council. 

Part 2, to be published subsequently, will contair 
documentation on national security policy, atomic 
energy, foreign economic policy, and Antarctica. 

This volume was prepared by the Historical Office 
Bureau of Public Affairs. Copies of volume I, par 
1 (Department of State publication 8805; GPO cat 
no. Sl.l:948/v. I, 1) may be obtained for $8.1( 
(domestic postpaid). Checks or money orders shouk 
be made out to the Superintendent of Document: 
and should be sent to the U.S. Government Bool 
Store, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520 

GPO Sales Publications 

Publicatioyis may be ordered by catalog or stoc, 
number from, the Superintendent of Dociimenti 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C 
201t02. A 25-percent discount is made on orders fo 
100 or more copies of any one publication mailed t 
the same address. Remittances, payable to th 
Superintendent of Documents, must accompan, 
orders. Prices shown below, which include domcsti 
postage, are subject to change. 

United States Foreign Policy. This pamphlet in th( 
General Foreign Policy series is an overview ol 
current U.S. foreign policy. Pub. 8814. 40 pp. 75(' 
(Cat. No. S1.71:8814). 

Assistance for Children and Mothers. Agreement 
with the United Nations Children's Fund. TIAS 
7970. 3 pp. 25('. (Cat. No. 89.10:7970). 

Military Assistance — Payments Under Foreign As 
sistance Act of 1973. Agreement with Panama. TIAS 
7977. 5 pp. 25('-. (Cat. No. S9.10:7977). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Israel 
TIAS 7978. 15 pp. 40('. (Cat. No. 89.10:7978). 

Protection of Birds and Their Environment. Conven- 
tion with Japan. TIAS 7990. 54 pp. lOt (Cat. No. 

Peace Corps. Agreement with the Gilbert and Ellice 
Islands. TIAS 7991. 4 pp. 25(' (Cat. No. 89.10:7991). 

Peace Corps. Agreement with Rwanda. TIAS 7992. 
7 pp. 30c. (Cat. No. 89.10:7992). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Chile. 
TIAS 7993. 36 pp. 50^. (Cat. No. 89.10:7993). 

Launching of French-German Symphonic Communi- 
cations Satellites. Agreement with France and the 
Federal Republic of Germany. TIAS 7994. 7 pp. SO^*. 
(Cat. No. 89.10:7994). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Jordan. 
TIAS 7995. 25 pp. 450. (Cat. No. 89.10:7995). 

Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX August 11, 1975 Vol. LXXIII, No. 1885 

Africa. Department Urges U.S. Participation 

in African Development Fund (Davis) . . 213 

Angola. Department Discusses Situation in 
Angola (Davis) 212 

Cape Verde 

United States Extends Recognition to Re- 
public of Cape Verde (letter from President 
Ford to President Pereira) 213 

U.S. Provides Assistance to Cape Verde . . . 215 


Department Discusses Situation in Angola 

(Davis) 212 

Department Discusses Situation in Southern 

Rhodesia (Buffum, Davis) 209 

Department Discusses Status of International 

Energy Program (Enders) 217 

Department Stresses Importance of Foreign 

Assistance Programs (Ingersoll) .... 206 

Department Urges U.S. Participation in 
African Development Fund (Davis) . . . 213 

Report on World Weather Program Trans- 
mitted to Congress (message from Presi- 
dent Ford) 222 

Cyprus. U.S. Completes Contribution to 

UNFICYP for Fiscal 1975 230 

Economic Affairs. U.S. Rejects Fisheries Reg- 
ulations Proposed by ICNAF 220 

Energy. Department Discusses Status of In- 
ternational Energy Program (Enders) . . 217 


European Security Conference Discussed by 

President Ford (statement) 204 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of 
July 25 197 

Foreign Aid 

Department Stresses Importance of Foreign 

Assistance Programs (Ingersoll) .... 206 

Department Urges U.S. Participation in 

African Development Fund (Davis) . . . 213 

U.S. Provides Assistance to Cape Verde . . 215 

Japan. U.S.-Japan Committee on Cultural and 

Educational Cooperation (communique) . . 222 

Middle East 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of 

July 25 197 

U.S. Contributes $17 Million to U.N. Forces 

in Middle East 230 

Portugal. Secretary Kissinger's News Con- 
ference of July 25 197 

Presidential Documents 

European Security Conference Discussed by 

President Ford 204 

Report on World Weather Program Trans- 
mitted to Congress 222 

Responsibility for Indochina Refugee Task 

Force Transferred to HEW 208 

United States Extends Recognition to Re- 
public of Cape Verde 213 


GPO Sales Publications 232 

1948 "Foreign Relations" Volume on the 

United Nations Released 232 

Refugees. Responsibility for Indochina Refu- 
gee Task Force Transferred to HEW 
(Ford) 208 

Science. Report on World Weather Program 

Transmitted to Congress (message from 
President Ford) 222 

Southern Rhodesia. Department Discusses 
Situation in Southern Rhodesia (Buffum, 
Davis) 209 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 231 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Agreement on North 

Pacific Fisheries 230 

Turkey. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer- 
ence of July 25 197 


Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of 
July 25 197 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Agreement on North 

Pacific Fisheries 230 

United Kingdom. U.S.-U.K. Creative Arts Fel- 
lowships Established To Mark Bicentennial 216 

United Nations 

Department Discusses Situation in Southern 

Rhodesia (Buffum, Davis) 209 

U.S. Completes Contribution to UNFICYP for 

Fiscal 1975 230 

U.S. Contributes $17 Million to U.N. Forces 

in Middle East 230 

U.S. Discusses Approach to the Seventh Spe- 
cial Session of the U.N. General Assembly 
(Ferguson) 226 

Name Index 

Buffum, William B 209 

Davis, Nathaniel 209, 212, 213 

Enders, Thomas 217 

Ferguson, Clarence Clyde, Jr 226 

Ford, President 204, 208, 213, 222 

Ingersoll. Robert S 206 

Kissinger, Secretary 197 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: July 21-27 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

*383 7/21 Shipping Coordinating Commit- 
tee working group on sub- 
division and stability, Aug. 14. 

*384 7/21 Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 
Advisory Committee, Aug. 7. 

t385 7/23 U.S.-Spain joint communique. 

*386 7/23 Robert V. Keeley appointed 
Deputy Director of Inter- 
Agency Task Force for Indo- 
chinese Refugees (biographic 
data ) . 
387 7/25 Kissinger: news conference, July 

*388 7/25 Theberge sworn in as Ambassa- 
dor to Nicaragua (biographic 

" Not printed. 

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Volume LXXm 

No. 1886 

August 18, 1975 



Statements by U.S. Representative Patricia Hutar, 

Texts of U.S. -Sponsored Resolutions, and 

Text of World Plan of Action 233 


For index see inside back cover 


Vol. LXXIII, No. 1886 
August 18, 1975 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

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Washington. D.C. 20402 


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A ot€ : Contents of this publication are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides tlie public and 
interested agencies of tfie government 
with information on developments in 
t/ie field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of tlie Department and 
tlie Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the iVIiite House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of tlie Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 

U.N. World Conference of the International Women's Year 
Held at Mexico City 

The United Nations World Conference of 
the International Women's Year iv,vs ,c.t-iu, ac 
Mexico City Jiine 19-July 2. Followmg are 
statements made in plenary sessions of the 
conference on June 20 and July 2 by U.S. 
Representative Patricia Hidar,^ together 
with the texts of resolutions sponsored or 
co-sponsored by the United States and the 
text of the World Plan of Action for the 
Implemeyitation of the Objectives of the 
Internatioyial Women's Year adopted by the 
conference on July 2. 


I wish to extend my congratulations to 
President Ojeda Paullada [Pedro Ojeda 
Paullada, Attorney General of Mexico] on 
his unanimous election to head the inter- 
national conference. 

Ladies and gentlemen: I would like to 
begin by bringing you the personal greetings 
from the First Lady of the United States, 
Betty Ford: 

As I am unable to be with you in Mexico City, I 
send my cordial greetings to President Echeverria 
and Mrs. Echeverria, to President of the Conference 
Ojeda Paullada, to Secretary General Waldheim, 
Secretary General of the Conference Mrs. Sipila 
[U.N. Assistant Secretary General Helvi Sipila], 
and to all who are attending this historic conference. 

I wish you to know that the people and Govern- 
ment of the United States are firmly committed to 
the goals of the conference and to the work that 
must follow it if these goals are to be reached. 

The high purpose of International Women's Year 

'Mrs. Hutar, who is U.S. Representative on the 
Commission on the Status of Women of the U.N. 
Economic and Social Council, was co-head of the 
U.S. delegation, with Daniel Parker, Administrator, 
Agency for International Development, from June 
19 to 21 and thereafter was head of the delegation. 
For names of other members of the U.S. delegation, 
see press release 281 dated May 22. 

— to promote the equality of women — truly enhances 
the equality of us all. As my husband said on the 
occasion of announcing our own National Commis- 
sion for the Observance of International Women's 
Year, the search to secure rights for women frees 
both sexes from restrictive stereotypes. Liberation 
of the spirit opens new possibilities for the future 
of all individuals and of all nations. I am awed by 
the task you face. I am inspired by the opportunity 
you have for progress. 

I know that the leaders of the U.S. delegation will 
work unceasingly with you in a spirit of cooperation 
to make the Conference on International Women's 
Year a landmark in the history of women's affarirs 
and of humanity's search for peace and under- 

We are deeply grateful to President Eche- 
verria for gracing our deliberation this 
afternoon and to the Government of Mexico 
for its generosity in volunteering to host this 
international conference. We thank the Gov- 
ernment of Mexico for all the work it has 
done in making arrangements for us. The 
vibrance and beauty of this capital city are 
a stimulus to achievement. The hospitality 
of the Mexican people enhances our en- 
joyment of our brief time among them. 
We also wish to praise the extraordinary 
competence of those members of the U.N. 
Secretariat at all levels who completed the 
enormous task of preparing for a world 
conference of this magnitude in an unprece- 
dentedly short period of time. 

The representatives of the United States 
of America come to this conference with a 
deep sense of empathy and solidarity with 
women in all parts of the world. We desire 
to work together on the many concerns that 
are common to us all. 

Discrimination based on sex is the most 
widely known kind of discrimination. It is 
found in all developed and developing socie- 
ties, either openly or covertly, and it is mani- 
fested in diverse forms. The time is long 

August 18, 1975 


overdue for women to eliminate discrimina- 
tion based on sex. No rhetoric, however 
attractive it may be, should postpone the 
achievement of equal rights and responsibili- 
ties for women. 

We in the United States had long felt the 
need for all countries of the world to come 
together to discuss the most important prob- 
lems that affect over half the world's popu- 
lation, the women of the world. Therefore, 
with the cosponsorship of nine developing 
nations, we introduced a U.N. resolution to 
establish a World Conference for Interna- 
tional Women's Year. We all are aware that 
declarations and statements of principle 
enunciated by the United Nations, though 
of great value, were not enough. There was 
a need to focus worldwide attention to dram- 
atize the problems faced by women. 

We will work with the other delegations 
to produce a plan of action that will impact 
on national governments for the implemen- 
tation of the principles of International 
Women's Year — equality, development, and 
peace. But plans are not enough. Mecha- 
nisms need to be established to insure that 
real progress is made. 

We in the United States expect to learn 
much from the accomplishments of our 
sisters around the world. In exchange, we 
offer to share with you the substantial prog- 
ress made in the United States to further 
women's rights and responsibilities. 

Much has been done, but there is much 
more that needs to be done to overcome the 
limitations and discriminatory practices of 
the past, reinforced by centuries of laws, 
traditions, and customs. We are proud in 
the United States of the legislation and 
government action that has been taken in 
the past several years to prohibit employ- 
ment discrimination based on sex. Such leg- 
islation provides for equal pay for work of 
equal value, nondiscrimination in hiring, in 
discharging, and in compensation. Another 
piece of important legislation prohibits dis- 
crimination on the basis of sex in educational 
programs or activities. 

These antidiscrimination laws and other 
social change have come about in our country 
through the joint efforts of voluntary organi- 

zations and the government. Traditionally 
the Government of the United States does' 
not plan social change in the sense that some 
other governments do — it responds to the 
demands for reform made by citizens and/or 
voluntary associations and works with them; 
in charting the mechanisms of social change. 
We are also proud of the fact that we 
have established various national machinery 
to continue to monitor and implement non- 
discrimination on the basis of sex. Some of 
these include a Special Assistant to the Pres- 
ident of the United States for Women and 
an Office of Women's Progi-ams in the White 
House; the Women's Bureau in our De- 
partment of Labor, established in 1920 ; a 
Women's Action Program in the Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare; and a 
Federal Women's Program Coordinator to 
monitor employment practices in every gov- 
ernmental body. We also have citizens ac- 
tively in^^olved in this machinery, including 
a President's Advisory Council on the Status 
of Women, Advisory Councils to the Secre- 
taries of Labor, Defense, and Health, Educa- 
tion, and Welfare. 

Equality and Integration in Development 

Though many general economic, political, 
and social changes are modifying the basic 
situation of women throughout the world — 
both in those countries now undergoing 
arduous processes of development and those 
which have already experienced the impact 
of industrialization — these changes will not 
automatically redress the balance. It requires 
positive efforts to identify and cope with 
the many factors which limit women and 
stand in the way of their full integration in 
development. I need mention only the lack 
of access to employment, education, and 
political integration to make the point that 
women are prevented from making their 
full and responsible contribution to the life 
of their societies and their full contribution 
to their families, their communities, and 
their nations. 

International Women's Year has chosen 
as two of its basic goals equality for women 
and their integration in development. These 


Department of State Bulletin 

goals are inextricably interrelated. Each is 

' indispensable to the other. 

Equality without development means 
shared misery and frustration. Development 
without equality may mean a worsened sit- 
uation for many women, both those who are 

t homemakers and those who are in the labor 

• force. Similarly, achieving one of the goals 
helps achieve the other. Development creates 
new situations and changes which make it 
possible for women to win a new and more 
equal status. And the full, equal participation 
of women in the development process can 

: make the difference between success and 
failure of development itself. 

The U.S. Government is prepared to in- 
troduce at this conference a draft declaration 
on equality and development that embraces 
these two basic goals of the Year, w^hich I 
have stated are intertwined. 

But women cannot wait, with arms folded, 
for men to achieve a new order before 
women can achieve equality. On the con- 
trary, women must continue their work, al- 
ready begun, to achieve a truly equal part- 
nership. Women must be in decisionmaking 
positions in the power structure along with 
men to build a more just w^orld order. 

Women have a strong sense of social re- 
sponsibility and are searching for opportuni- 
ties to share their vision of a new society 
free of hunger and poverty. We must have, 
though, the understanding and commitment 
of men to reach the goal of equality. We 
have heard pledges of such commitment al- 
ready in this conference in our opening 
session. We welcome this pledge of partner- 

Increasing Participation in Decisionmaking 

The third goal of International Women's 
Year is to strengthen the role of women in 
j establishing world peace. To achieve it, 
'' women must mobilize their potential politi- 
cal power to assure that governments active- 
ly pursue the goal of disarmament. 
J The United States believes that disarma- 
ment negotiations should be directed toward 
general and complete disarmament under 
strict international control. It is our pro- 

found hope that women will not only use 
their influence to keep governments working 
toward this end but we believe also that 
women must equip themselves for and assert 
their right to serve in agencies of govern- 
ment and on international delegations that 
are responsible for arms control and dis- 

Basically, the issue and challenge which 
we face is to develop and utilize the un- 
tapped potential of over half the world's 
population. There is a great scarcity of 
women in policymaking positions in the 
world. Women remain significantly absent 
from high-level posts in governments, in 
international affairs, in the professions, and 
in business. 

Women want to share with men the re- 
sponsibilities and the duties involved in deci- 
sions affecting peace and development as 
well as in decisions that affect their lives. 
But unless they are able to move into the 
top positions in their fields, their impact 
in national and world affairs will be negli- 
gible and the possibilities of helping other 
women to move ahead in their roles will be 

Women's presence must be felt