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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXIV • No. 1906 • January 5, 1976

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE
OF DECEMBER 9 1

THREE ASPECTS OF U.S. RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA
Address by Assistant Secretary Rogers 1^

U.S. VETOES UNBALANCED SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

CONCERNING ISRAELI AIR ATTACKS IN LEBANON
Statements by Ambassador Moynihan and Text of Draft Resolution 21

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIR

Vol. LXXIV, No. 1906
January 5, 1976

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U.S. Government Printing Office

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The Department of State BULLETI,
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witfi information on developments I
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Tfie BULLETIN includes select I
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United States is or may become i
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Publications of tfie Department '
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international relations are also listt.

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of December 9

Prt'ss release n96 dated December 9

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and gentle-
men, before I go to your questions I thought
it would be helpful to review some of the
SALT issues that have been raised. I will
not get into a debate with aspirants to po-
litical office, either statewide or national.
Therefore I will not deal with specific testi-
mony that may have been given except to
note that no opportunity was presented to
any member of the Administration to pre-
sent the truth. What I would like to do is to
deal with categories of assertions that have
been made and then to explain the real state
if affairs with respect to them.

The assertions have been made that there
lave been massive Soviet violations, that
:he Administration colluded with the Soviet
Union in masking these violations, that the
A.dministration has not pursued the issue of
violations diplomatically, and that senior
officials, especially the President, have not
jeen kept informed about the facts with re-
spect to these violations.

I would like to discuss with you the pro-
•edures that the government is following
vith respect to SALT compliance and illus-
rate them with one or two examples.

First of all it is important to keep in mind
hat with respect to SALT or with respect
.0 the strategic forces on both sides, we are
iealing with military establishments of
neat technical complexity that are con-
itantly engaged in military activities. These
nilitary establishments, moreover, on both
udes are in the process of constant change
io that there is great fluidity in what one
)bserves. We are not dealing with a static
situation; we are dealing with a fluid situa-
ion. Therefore, too, the information that is
>btained has to go through various stages of
malysis.

The first information about any event is
usually extraordinarily illusive and ambigu-
ous, and one part of the process of the gov-
ernment is to refine the information until
we reach a point at which senior officials
can make a reasonable decision. I believe it
is a good working hypothesis to assume that
government is not run by conspiracy but by
serious people trying to come to serious con-
clusions about difficult topics, especially
when the charge of a violation of a formal
agreement is not a minor matter to be intro-
duced into the diplomatic discourse.

Now, first of all, what is meant by a vio-
lation? There are several meanings that can
be attached to the notion of violation that
are being used interchangeably in the cur-
rent debate.

A violation can be a deliberate violation
of a SALT limitation, aimed at increasing
the Soviet strategic capability in ways which
the agreement was intended to preclude.

Second, a violation can be an action in-
consistent with the sense or the spirit of the
agreement and tending to undermine its
viability even though it is not prohibited by
the agreement. There can be borderline situ-
ations where a technical violation cannot be
established but where the activity strains
the interpretation of particular provisions.

Third, there can be unintended violations
occurring, for example, through negligence
of higher officials responsible for insuring
compliance by their subordinate organiza-
tions.

Fourth, there can be actions not banned
by an agreement but which complicate veri-
fication of the agreement.

Fifth, there can be ambiguous activities
resulting from differing interpretations of
the provisions of the agreements.

Sixth, there can be activities that are

anuary 5, 1976

assessed as ambiguous due to inadequate in-
formation or misinterpretation of informa-
tion which suggests a violation where in fact
none exists.

I want to repeat that many compliance
issues will arise initially as ambiguous ac-
tivities which could apply to any of these
categories. Our policy is to seek clarification
of ambiguous situations as soon as there is
a tangible basis for doing so and to resolve
ambiguities as quickly as possible in order
to preclude development of a more serious
situation.

Now to go to the procedures for handling
allegations of violations. Any one of these
categories would be initially reported in in-
telligence channels, either from the Central
Intelligence Agency or from the Department
of Defense. The Department of State and
the White House have no independent means
of acquiring any of this information.

There is no instance in which a reported
violation was not immediately — an alleged
violation — was not immediately reported to
the President. And we have searched all the
files of all the incidents.

I will in a minute discuss the handling of
intelligence, and I would like to talk now
about the procedures that are followed.

In order to deal with the problem of com-
pliance, there are four institutions. There is
a special intelligence committee, which was
established by the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency in the summer of 1973.
This committee makes a quarterly report on
the problem of SALT compliance. This com-
mittee— I'm looking now for how many
meetings it has held — well, it has met quar-
terly since July '73, so you can figure it out
for yourselves, and all of its reports have
gone directly to the President as well as to
every senior member of the Administration
that is dealing with the problem of strategic
arms.

In addition, there are three other bodies.
There is the Verification Panel of the NSC
[National Security Council]. There is the
Verification Panel's Working Group. And
there is, of course, the NSC itself.

The Verification Panel Working Group of
the NSC has met on SALT matters 11 times

since the middle of 1973. The Verification
Panel has met four times on SALT matters
— has met four times on compliance issues
exclusively since 1973. But in addition, it
has met 40 times on SALT matters since
1973. Each of these meetings, each of these
40 meetings, is preceded by a CIA briefing
that includes all compliance issues. So that,
in addition to the four formal meetings,
there were 40 meetings of the Verification
Panel where whatever compliance issues
existed at the time were brought to the
attention of the Verification Panel.

The President has been briefed on com-
pliance matters 10 times since the middle
of 1973, six times in the Administration of
President Ford. There has been one NS(
meeting solely devoted to compliance issues,
and parts of others.

The procedure is that the working group
will attempt to determine what is going on
and will devise either options or recom-
mendations for consideration by the Veri-
fication Panel. The Verification Panel then
reviews it and makes a recommendation or
defines options.

In all the meetings that I have described
of the Verification Panel there was never a
split decision. The allegation that individuals
or departments have held up consideration
of compliance issues, have obscured consid-
eration of compliance issues, have refused to
deal with compliance issues, is a total false-
hood. All the decisions of the Verification
Panel with respect to compliance have been
unanimous. That is to say, they were agreed
to by the Department of Defense, by the
Chiefs of Staff, by the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, by the Central In-
telligence Agency, and by the State Depart-
ment.

There is no doubt that there may have
been differences of opinion in the working
group as these papers were being considered.
I am not familiar with these disagreements,
because unless they are passed on to the
Verification Panel there would be no par- [
ticular reason for me to deal with them.

Let me now turn to the handling of in-
telligence. First of all, I think it is impor-
tant to understand how the flow of informa-

Department of State Bulletin

tion to the President is handled, because it
is a rather grave matter if it can be alleged
that information is being kept from the
President of the United States. The flow of
information to the President is handled in
the following way.

The President receives daily, unabbrevi-
ated and without a covering summary, the
President's daily brief and the daily intelli-
gence bulletin of the Central Intelligence
Agency. These are placed on his desk to-
gether with separate notes from various
departments every morning and waiting for
him when he comes to his office.

In the period of the Presidency of Presi-
dent Ford he has had, until recently, the
practice of reading those two intelligence
summaries in the presence not of a member
of the National Security Council staff, but in
the presence of a representative of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency. Therefore any in-
telligence item that would deal with compli-
ance would come to his immediate attention.
And in compiling a list of the various com-
pliance issues, it is apparent that the Presi-
dent's daily bulletin would reflect the in-
formation of the Central Intelligence Agency,
as you would expect, within no more than
two weeks of its first appearance on a tech-
nical level.

Secondly, any memorandum from a Cab-
inet member or from the head of an agency
is transmitted to the President, usually in
those cases with a summary by the NSC
staff on top of it. But never is the summary
alone sent to the President. Therefore, any
Cabinet member, any member of the Joint
Chiefs, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, all have the opportunity, and know
they have the opportunity, to address the
President directly. Never has the Assistant
to the President held up any memorandum
from any of these individuals or any other
memorandum addressed to the President by
the head of an agency.

However, there is no memorandum in the
files by any of these individuals, by any
Chief of Staff of any of the services, by
any head of any department, raising any of
the issues that have been alleged in recent

testimony. There is nobody who has claimed
that the issue of compliance was not being
adequately pursued. There is nobody who
has objected to the handling of the informa-
tion. There has been no reclama of any of
the decisions of the Verification Panel, ex-
cept in one case where one department that
had first recommended one course of action
— that course of action being not to protest
a seeming issue of noncompliance because it
wanted to protect its sources of intelligence
— later changed its mind and recommended
that the issue be raised in the Standing Con-
sultative Commission.

When that Department changed its mind,
the President agreed with that new position,
and the decision of the Verification Panel
was changed.

The reason there have been so few NSC
meetings on the subject is because the deci-
sions of the Verification Panel have always
been unanimous and because no member of
the Panel has ever appealed to the Presi-
dent with a contrary view.

With respect to the handling of intelli-
gence, all intelligence concerning alleged
noncompliance was immediately distributed
to all the members of the Verification Panel
and by them to those of their senior mem-
bers that were concerned with SALT.

For the period that a preliminary investi-
gation was going on, the intelligence was
not distributed in the technical publications
that were addressed to those whose primary
responsibility was not concerned with SALT
at a level below the Cabinet level. The long-
est time this ever took place was a period of
two months, and usually the so-called hold
has been for a period of about a week or
two to permit the refinement of intelligence.

There has been no case in which the in-
telligence was not distributed in the quar-
terly intelligence publication that was con-
cerned with the question of SALT monitor-
ing. And in no case was intelligence kept
from members of the Verification Panel.

Even during the period that this refine-
ment was going on, the United States did not
feel itself precluded from taking diplomatic
action. For example, in one instance, which
I will get into in a minute in greater detail,

January 5, 1976

in one instance there were reports of un-
identified construction in Soviet missile
fields. We received this report on June 20
[1973] at a time when Brezhnev [Leonid I.
Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union] was in the United States. It
seemed improbable that the Soviet Union
would violate the agreement by blatantly
building additional missile silos, and there-
fore a further study of the subject was
ordered.

Nevertheless, on June 26 the United
States sent a note to the Soviet Union in the
Presidential channel raising the issue of that
construction, even before we had begun our
detailed examination of the issue. In that
case the distribution of that information was
kept out of those journals that went to indi-
viduals not concerned with SALT matters
until August 8, when it was generally dis-
tributed. In that interval two American
notes had been sent to the Soviet Union in
the Presidential channel raising that issue.

Now, as I have pointed out, the issue of
compliance is an extremely complicated one,
and in rummaging through the files of vari-
ous departments it is not difficult to find
memoranda written by subordinates who
have no idea of what is going on in the
overall picture, who will write down their
own perceptions of what they think is hap-
pening— usually in the modern form of
memoranda of conversation to themselves
that nobody ever sees, on which no one can
ever comment, and which appear three years
later in a context that no one can ever dis-
cover.

But let us take the case of these missile
silos. There appeared in the summer of 1973
in a number of Soviet missile fields, the be-
ginning of some construction that clearly
looked like additional silos. If these had been
converted into missile silos, there was no
question that they would have represented
a clear violation of the agreement.

The construction of a silo generally takes
two years to complete. And it is important
for you to keep in mind in any event that
almost any of these noncompliance events
extend over a time span that, to be signifi-

cant, is months and usually years, so that
those of us who are engaged in policymak-
ing, and not rhetoric, must have an oppor-
tunity to study the problem before we draw
any final conclusions, and we do have this
opportunity.

Now, when we approached the Soviet
Union within six days of receiving that in-
formation in the White House, we were told
that these would be command and control
silos and that as the construction proceeded
it would become increasingly evident that
they would be command and control silos.

This, incidentally, was also the judgment
of our intelligence community. Our intelli-
gence community believed that almost cer-
tainly these were command and control silos.
The question being raised was whether, at
some later time, they could be converted into
missile silos.

It is also fair to point out that the Soviet
Union in reply raised certain questions about
certain ambiguities in American practices
which we were not excessively anxious to
have publicized and which accounted for the
fact that these exchanges were conducted in
a rather less dramatic manner than some
people might have thought appropriate.

There were six exchanges in this channel
of increasing specificity, in which we began
to advance criteria which could be met in
order to assure us that these silos were in
fact intended for command and control. This
extended over a period of a year. At that
point in 1974, we moved the discussion from
the Presidential channel to the Standing
Consultative Commission and made formal
representations building on the previous ex-
changes.

We have since received assurances, and I
believe it is the unanimous opinion of all
agencies, that we are dealing with command
and control silos. We have been given cri-
teria which seem to us for the time being
adequate; and there is no agency that today
disputes that this issue is for the time being
quiescent, though we will be vigilant in
making certain that any unusual construc-
tion activity at these silos would raise pro-
found questions.

For a variety of reasons, including the

Department of State Bulletin

fact that the information about alleged non-
compliance inevitably involves sensitive in-
telligence, I cannot go through all of the
allegations that have been made; though I
vould perhaps mention one other, which is
;he most serious one and which comes clos-
st to the borderline of a possible violation,
ivhich has to do with the testing of certain
mtiaircraft radars in what might be con-
idered an ABM [antiballistic missile] mode.
The issue is complicated by the fact that,
it American insistence, the ABM treaty in-
;ludes a provision that antiaircraft radar
;ould be used — could be tested — in a manner
n space for range-instrumentation purposes.
: might point out that this was our idea,
ind if we had not included that, that issue
)f the SA-5 radar could have been more
•apidly resolved.

We received information that some test-
ng was going on with respect to the SA-5
•adar in 1973. At that time it was routinely
listributed, and nobody paid any attention
0 it because it was not put into connection
vith a possible ABM testing program. Be-
ween Aprili and June 1974 some more tests
ook place which at least raised the problem
hat the radar might be tracking incoming
nissiles. That clearly is not permitted by
he treaty, though it raises an ambiguity
vith respect to whether this is done for
ange-instrumentation purposes.

In any event, several meetings of the

vorking group and the Verification Panel

ook place. The first decision in December

.974 was, on the recommendation of the

defense Department and the Central In-

-elligence Agency, that this issue not be

•aised because we did not wish to reveal the

'liource of our intelligence.

" In January 1975 the Defense Department

(l "eversed itself and recommended that the

■ ssue be raised. As a result, the issue was

S "aised in February 1975. Since then, within

>' i 17-day period after we had raised the issue,

? ;his activity has stopped — has not since

I' oeen resumed. It was at the borderline of

• v^iolation, but it has now stopped.

There are other issues, some having to do

with unilateral American statements which

' the Soviet Union specifically disavowed. I

think it is at least open to question whether
the United States can hold the Soviet Union
responsible for its own statements when the
Soviet Union has asserted that it does not
accept that interpretation. Therefore the
issue of SALT compliance has been handled
in a serious manner. It stands to reason
that no responsible U.S. official could wish
to make an agreement with the Soviet Union
and permit the Soviet Union to violate it
with impunity. It stands to reason that the
United States would not accept noncompli-
ance with an agreement that had any con-
ceivable impact on the strategic equation.

I would, in fact, suggest that this debate
of the allegation in which some violations
are invented, and in which the lack of vigi-
lance of the Administration is asserted, may
tempt the very noncompliance which it
claims to seek to avoid, because it may create
the impression that the U.S. Government
would make a serious agreement on a matter
affecting the survival of the United States
and that its senior oificials would then col-
lude in a violation of this agreement.

Let no foreign government believe that
this is conceivable. And I think the time has
come that we deal with each other more
seriously.

I want to make just one other point be-
fore I go to your questions. That point con-
cerns the endless allegations that a secret
agreement was made with the Soviet Union
respecting 70 missiles to be placed on sub-
marines that by now are 30 years old, or 25
years old, that have not been off the coast
of the United States since 1967.

On the face of it this charge should be
too absurd to require any commentary. I
dealt with it at great length in a press con-
ference on June 24, 1974, and June 26, 1974.
It concerned a highly technical issue: which
missiles were eligible for retirement as part
of those that had to be dismantled in order
to shift from land-based to submarine mis-
siles and whether and what kind of new
missiles could be placed on submarines with-
out being counted.

I refer you all to this press conference if
you want to go into the technical complexi-
ties of this issue, except to say there was no

' January 5, 1976

secret agreement, that whatever there was
in that interpretative statement was stated
publicly by me at the press conference that
I gave in Moscow the night the SALT agree-
ment was signed on May 26, 1972. It was
repeated in a discussion of the Verification
Panel on June 5, 1972. It was contained,
practically verbatim, in a note distributed
to all the agencies on June 19, 1972, and it
was testified to by Gerard Smith [then Di-
rector of the U.S. Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency and head of the U.S.
delegation to the Strategic Arms Limita-
tion Talks] before the Jackson committee in
July 1972. There was no secret agreement.

Some overawed technocrats found what
they thought was a loophole by which, if the
Soviets wanted to design a missile that they
didn't have anywhere for just that one cate-
gory of diesel submarines that was 25 years
old, they might conceivably place it on that
submarine. We, of course, would never have
accepted this.

When we raised this loophole with the
Soviet Union, even though they thought it
was — shall we put it kindly — a rather
strained interpretation, they nevertheless
closed the loophole, and despite some rather
excited testimony last week, let me say flatly
that no price was paid for closing a loophole
that did not exist and that we would never
have accepted and that ran counter to the
whole record of the discussion.

I think I can stop at this point and take
your questions on this or any other topic.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to what extent is politics
interfering today with your attempts to tvork
out a neiv SALT agreement? And do you see
a deadline beyond ivhich it would be, be-
cause of the political campaigns, impossible
to make any real progress on a treaty?

Secretary Kissinger: As Secretary of
State it is my obligation to recommend to
the President what I believe to be in the
national interest. My recommendations are
not affected by the political situation; and I
have, so far, seen no evidence that his deci-
sions are affected by the political situation.

I cannot say that the debate that is going
on greatly enhances the atmosphere of con-

fidence in the country, but our recommenda-
tions are not affected by the political situ-
ation. We are not operating against a dead
line.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can I just change tht
subject for a moment? Have you proposec
to the Israeli Government, as reported today,
that it should drop its boycott of the Securiti
Council debate? And also, do you see am
indications the PLO [Palestine Liberation
Organization] may be shifting its attitude
with regard to its recognition, or nonrecog
nition, of Israel's right to existence?

Secretary Kissinger: I will answer thi
question, but may I then recommend tha
we take all SALT questions and then go ti
all other questions? I will answer this one
though.

The United States has indicated to th'
Israeli Government that it would be bette
served if it participated in the Securit;
Council debate, though it is of course clea
that the Israeli Government may not wisl
to be in the room while the PLO delegate i
actually speaking.

This position of ours has been clear. Ou
attitude with respect to the PLO is ur
changed. I haven't reaffirmed it for about 4
hours, so it is about time that I do it again
We will not deal with the PLO, negotiat '
with the PLO, or urge Israel to deal wit
the PLO, as long as the PLO does not recog
nize the existence of Israel and as long a,b
the PLO does not accept Security Counc
Resolutions 242 and 338.

That will be our attitude during the Secu ^
rity Council debate, and I would like t
stress again that the only resolutions tha'
the United States considers relevant for th
Security Council debate are Resolutions 24
and 338 and we will not accept any resolu
tion that tries to introduce any element tha
goes beyond 242 and 338.

Now on SALT?

Q. Yes, notv on SALT — do you have an
evidence today that the Soviet Union is pre
pared to offer, in your own words, a reason ''
able and serious counterproposal to the las
American proposal that tvas made to th
Russians?

Department of State Bulletil '"i

a

Secretanj Kissinger: The exchanges which
re have had with the Soviet Union since
rovember indicate that the Soviet Union
ealizes that no settlement is possible on the
asis of its present proposal and that it is
'illing to negotiate on the basis of the prop-
sition that it must modify its position and
aat we are then also prepared to look at
ur position. And it is on this basis that a
rip by me to Moscow has been discussed.

Q. Are there plans for such a trip in the
nmediate future?

Secretary Kissinger: I would expect such
trip to take place within the next four
'eeks —

Q. Mr. Secretary —

Secretary Kissinger: — four to five weeks.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your discussion car-
ter, you made some reference to the fact that
t one point — as I recall, after the evidence
ad emerged that the Soviets ivere building

certain kind of silo — at one point the
evicts raised some questions about Ameri-
m practices that we, as I understood you,
>ere not anxious to publicize. Could you tell
s any more about what those practices
light have been?

Secretary Kissinger: No, the basic point
nat I wanted to make is this: It was in our
iterest — we were interested, as long as
aere was no conclusive evidence, to keep
ne debate on the confidential level and to
ermit both sides to raise with each other
echnical issues in which they could raise
uestions and clarify questions.

I would say that the issues that the Soviet
Inion raised did not in fact involve viola-
lons of the agreement by the United States,
ut from the point of view of Soviet pho-
agraphy, they might not have been self-
vident. And it is therefore one of those
6sues where ambiguous evidence is pro-
'uced in good faith that can be clarified by
urther exchanges.

There have been no American violations
f the agreement, except in the technical
lense that I have described.

Q. Are they satisfied ivith your response
0 that?

anuary 5, 1976

Secretary Kissinger: It is still being dis-
cussed, but I think we are making prog-
ress.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you touched most lightly
on the strongest issue, which is a continuing
07ie in Congress, ivhich is a claim that Soviet
performance on the agreement has failed to
live up to your own assurances of what you
told Congress the Soviet Union was expected
to do.

Secretary Kissinger: I said —

Q. You referred to the unilateral agree-
ments— one of the issues ivhich is a continu-
ing one up there, of course, is the question of
conversion of Soviet light missiles to heavy
missiles. Could you deal broadly with the
question which you only touched on earlier,
of the unilateral statements and the Soviet
nonagreement and nonperformance on those
unilateral statements?

Secretary Kissinger: All right, let me first
deal with another issue. One of the argu-
ments that is being made is that the SALT
agreement was sloppily negotiated — between
myself and Dobrynin [Anatoly F. Dobrynin,
Soviet Ambassador to the United States],
usually — and that we are now suffering from
the draftsmanship, from that draftsman-
ship.

Well, first of all, I do not believe that the
SALT agreement was sloppily negotiated.
But in any event, the text of the agreement
was negotiated in Helsinki. There is not one
paragraph in that document that was
drafted by any other group than the negoti-
ating teams in Helsinki, which included
representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the Defense Department, the State Depart-
ment— and indeed all interested agencies —
and which was backstopped by a technical
panel here.

So that the charge that documents were
drafted in the absence of technical advisers
is absolutely ludicrous.

Now, the exchanges that took place be-
tween Dobrynin and me, first of all, were
confined to very few matters and usually
concerned a question of principle, such as
whether offensive weapons should be dealt

with simultaneously with defensive weapons
or whether they should be dealt with sepa-
rately. That question, strange as it may
seem today, took three months of exchanges
to settle, and those of you who followed
SALT matters will remember that at the
end of May 1971, it was settled with an
agreement in principle that offensive and
defensive negotiations should proceed in
parallel. That did not require great technical
knowledge.

As soon as that decision was made, it was
shifted to the SALT delegation in Helsinki,
and all the implementing negotiation of that
was conducted in Helsinki.

Then on my visit to Moscow in April 1972,
the Soviet Union made a proposal and for
the first time — in which for the first time
they agreed to include submarine missiles in
the offensive count and proposed a proce-
dure by which this could be accomplished
by the retirement of land-based or other mis-
siles.

I might add that one of the most ardent
advocates of this particular solution is a
prospective candidate for the Senate — from
Virginia, in case any of you have any ques-
tion of whom I am talking about [laughter]
— because he did not wish to build any addi-
tional nuclear submarines at that time.

This general proposal was brought back
by me from Moscow, was put before the Na-
tional Security Council at a meeting in which
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director
of the Arms Control Agency and our chief
negotiator were represented. Specific in-
structions were given how to work out the
technicalities of it, and it then was worked
out in detail in Helsinki.

Those were the two areas in which I was
most active.

Now let us deal with the specific issue of
the conversion of light to heavy missiles.

In the agreement there is a provision
which was also put in, in part at our request
— but at any rate which we accepted without
any difficulty — to the effect that the exist-
ing silos could be increased by 15 percent in
the process of modernization. This is the
only legal requirement of the agreement;
that is, if either side increased any of its

silos by more than 15 percent it would b(
in violation of the agreement.

There is no charge that this has beer
done. In fact, it has not been done. The in-
telligence community agrees that the in
crease in silo dimensions in the moderniza-
tion program of the Soviet Union does no1
exceed 15 percent.

The United States added another uni-
lateral statement to the effect that if ir
these SS-11 holes a missile were placec
which was significantly larger than th(
SS-11 that we — I don't know what phras«
we used, at any rate, that we —

Q. "Significantly larger"?

Secretary Kissinger: "Significantly larger'
was the phrase. I don't know whether w(
used the phrase, "We consider this a viola
tion— "

Q. Substantially larger?

Secretary Kissinger: No, "significantb
larger" is the phrase. But I don't knov
whether we said it's a violation or what w(
said, what the specific — incidentally, tha
statement was drafted by the delegation.

Q. But wasn't it on your instruction,
from —

Secretary Kissinger: That unilateral state
ment?

Q. That was issued by the delegation, as .
recall, the last day of the negotiations, jus
to finish up the piece of paper.

Secretary Kissinger: Wait a minute, le'
me make clear — I don't want to play a game

I agreed with everything the delegatior
did. I think the delegation did a good job
Everything that the delegation did was fi-
nally approved in the White House.

The text of it, however, was not draftee
by me, but approved by me ; and I am there-
fore fully behind it. I am simply trying tc
get the sequence straight.

Now, for about a year, our intelligenct
indicated that the two new Soviet missiles
that were being developed, the SS-17 and
19, were about 15 to 20 percent larger than
the ones that had existed in 1972.

8

Department of State Bulletin

Q. Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Fifteen to twenty
percent — don't hold me to these precise fig-
ures, because I am doing it from memory.
But it is in that range, and it is always with
an inaccuracy factor.

Starting in the middle of 1974, it became
apparent that at least one of them, the
SS-19, could be as much as 40 percent
larger. So we had the dilemma that we have
a missile that is larger, by that percentage,
than the SS-11 put into a hole that is not,
however, in violation of the agreement, by a
better utilization of existing space and more
efficient use of fuel ; and that raises a serious
question.

We are attempting — the assurances I
gave in 1972, which were based on the pro-
vision of the agreement, obviously dealt with
the missiles we then knew. We obviously did
not know in '72 what missiles the Soviet
Union would be testing in '74 ; and the ques-
tions I was asked were always concerned
with whether the Soviet Union would be
able to put the SS-9 into the SS-11 hole, the
SS-11 hole being the smaller one. And all
of my answers, obviously, had to be directed
toward the missiles I knew and not toward
the missiles that came along two years later.

With respect to the SS-19, we are at-
tempting to put limitations on this in the
current round of SALT negotiations; and it
is in that category, which Secretary Schles-
inger [James R. Schlesinger, former Secre-
tary of Defense] has also described, of no
specific violation but of being sufficiently
ambiguous to raise some questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a three-part question.
What evidence do you have that the Soviet
Union realizes no settlement is possible on
the basis of its last known existing proposal?
Secondly, do you have reason to believe that
there is now, or soon will be, a new Soviet
proposal? And what are the prospects for a
new SALT agreement within the next three
or four months?

Secretary Kissinger: If I go to Moscow —
or the fact that I say that I will in all prob-
ability go to Moscow indicates that I have
evidence that the Soviet Union will not in-

sist on its last proposal, because otherwise
there would be no point in going.

Q. But is there a new one in the works?

Secretary Kissinger: When that proposal
will be surfaced — whether it will be surfaced
then, when I am there, or whether it will be
surfaced ahead of time — that remains for
discussion.

Your second question? What was it?

Q. The second part: Is there a new pro-
posal?

Secretary Kissinger: At any rate, since I
have stated that we will not accept their last
proposal, if there is no new proposal, there
will be no settlement. There is no possibility
of our accepting the last Soviet proposal.

Now, what do I think the chances are? I
believe that if both sides make a serious
effort that the diff'erences should be solved.
The Soviet Union must make a serious effort,
and we are prepared to make a serious ef-
fort. I am moderately optimistic.

Q. Well, even to be talking about going
to Moscow, you must know something that
we don't. You would not go there just for
the ivinter weather. Do you have a reason
to believe that if you —

Secretary Kissinger: I said I had reason
to believe that they will not insist on their
last proposal.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the neivs reports in con-
nection with Admiral Zumivalt's [Elmo R.
Zumwalt, Jr., former Chief of Naval Opera-
tions] testimony carry the phrase here that
the admiral suggested that "Mr. Kissinger's
lack of candor" — and I am quoting from a
news report, sir — "sprang from a personal
and political commitment to the success of
the detente policy" ivhich made him, quote,
"reluctant to report the actual facts." How
do you react to that, sir?

Secretary Kissinger: I have stated how we
have handled information, and I think my
statement makes it absolutely clear that
the admiral got carried away by his political
ambitions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned, among

January 5, 1976

the possible violations, Soviet interference
tcith national means of inspection. Have they
interfered ivith our —

Secretary Kissinger: No, I have listed that
as a —

Q. A possibility, yes. Have they interfered,
or are they noiv attempting to interfere, with
our national means of inspection? And while
I have the floor, how are you doing on the
threshold test ban, and what are the pros-
pects in that agreement?

Secretary Kissinger: The question of inter-
ference with national means of detection:
there has been a Soviet program from the
middle — it dates back from the middle of
the 1960's — to make photography and other
means of detection more complicated.

There have been some actions since the
SALT agreement in that category. Several
of those have been raised with the Soviet
Union. Some of those that have been raised
have been ended. None of those, up to now,
have fundamentally interfered with our na-
tional means of detection.

Q. Are they currently trying to interfere?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, you know there
are so many separate things going on, there
is always an effort. We have several things
befoi-e them at this moment. I have said
that, up to now, nothing has decisively
interfered with our national means of de-
tection.

And the second question is: How are we
doing on the test ban?

Q. And what are the prospects of getting
a settlement on that quickly? There is a
deadline on that, I believe, coming up.

Secretary Kissinger: We are negotiating
it. There are only one or two issues left, and
therefore it can be settled any time, but it
hasn't been settled yet.

Q. Aren't those the same issues, though,
that existed last July?

Secretary Kissinger: That's true. And so
either they will be settled, or they will not
be settled. And I know that is going to be
the headline tonight. [Laughter.]

10

Q. Mr. Secretary, I think you know that
this issue to which you have addressed your-
self here this afternoon is so complex that
many of us — and probably most of the mem-
bers of the public — are unable to understand
the details that you are referring to. I won-
der if —

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but they can
understand the procedures to which I am
referring, and those are perfectly plain.

Q. I am just wondering, Mr. Secretary, if ,
you tvould address yourself to the various
political charges, or the various charges that
you claim arise from political motives, and
in simple language, categorically deny them,
if that be the —

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I am not saying
all of them arise from political motives.
Some do, some don't.

But I don't want to go into the question of
motives. I think I have dealt with all the
essential charges. The charge that informa-
tion has been deliberately withheld is false.
The charge that the President was not
briefed is false. The charge that either I as
Secretary of State or as Assistant to the
President have refused to deal with compli-
ance issues is false. The charge that there
were secret agreements is essentially false.

And I think these are the major items; if
there is anyone else who wants to ask or if
I have left one out I will be glad to—

Q. // / may just follow up: Why do you
say " essentialhj" false?

Secretary Kissinger: Because there was an
interpretative statement that for some rea-
son was not distributed to the bureaucracy,
even though the essence of it was distrib-
uted to the bureaucracy, and even though
the bureaucracy was instructed to testify
as to its contents. Why it was not distrib-
uted, I cannot for the life of me remember
now. But the bureaucracy was told that such
an interpretative statement would be nego-
tiated, its content was distributed to it, so
technically speaking this was not seen, but
the content was known.

Q. Mr. Secretary, tivo questions. On SALT
Two — ju^t so that I am clear — you said you

Department of State Bulletin

would probably go to Moscow within four to
five weeks. Is it a fair assumption that you
are not going on this trip you leave on, to-
morroiv ?

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct.

Q. And if so, ivhat has happened? I think
you left the impression you would go to Mos-
cow before Christmas. Was there some slip-
page or some bureaucratic problem here or
in the Soviet Union?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think there is
no sense going to Moscow until we have our
positions prepared in great detail and until
we are confident also that on the Soviet side
there is sufficient understanding of what is
needed. And given the travel schedules of
all of the key members here, it seemed on
the whole best not to hurry the process and
to move at a pace that permitted a very de-
tailed examination of all of the issues.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the second part of that
question deals with another ambiguity, or
what-have-you; it's the charge that the
Soviets have perhaps built another ABM
test site at Kamchatka. Can you address this?

Secretary Kissinger: This is an issue that
is now under discussion with the Soviet
Union, and I simply want to explain the
issue. It is one of these technical issues.

There is no dispute that the radar in
Kamchatka faces the Soviet Union, and not
the United States. And therefore we are
dealing with a test radar. The ABM treaty
requires that ABM testing could take place
only at agreed test ranges, and we listed
ours. The Soviet Union didn't list theirs.

Q. You listed one for them.

Secretary Kissinger: We unilaterally listed
one for them, and the Soviet Union gave an
ambiguous reply to that, saying what their
test ranges were was generally known; but
they would not confirm or deny the one we
gave for them. And I think we claimed two
for ourselves.

If the Soviet Union had claimed the
Kamchatka range for itself at that time,
there would be no problem. If the Soviet
Union told us today that the Kamchatka

range is an ABM test range, then — suppos-
ing we were satisfied about the characteris-
tics of the radar — there would be no signifi-
cant problem.

So here we are dealing with a technical
issue of what an agreed test range is — since
there is no disagreement that the radar in
Kamchatka faces into the Soviet Union and
therefore must be used for some sort of
internal tracking.

Q. Mr. Secretary, isn't it true that you
wouldn't have made these very important
announcements here today and this report
on intelligence and evaluation and how it all
works if it hadn't been for the investigations
on Capitol Hill?

Secretary Kissinger: I didn't say anything
about the investigations on Capitol Hill.

Q. Yes, I know you didn't — but I mean
this obviously is a reply to them. Right?

Secretary Kissinger: I did not criticize
the investigations.

Q. No, I didn't say you did. But I say, isn't
it a good thing that we have had all this
come out today, and isn't it true that it
wouldn't have come out had it not been for
the investigations up there?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, then the ques-
tion is whether it could have come out with-
out some of the wild charges that were
made.

But be that as it may, I am not criticizing
the efi'ort of the Congress to get clarity
about how the intelligence process operates.
And to the extent that my briefing today
was elicited by the Congress, I have no ob-
jection if you give some credit to them.

Q. Do you think this will take care of the
subpoena now? You say you think this will
be—

Secretary Kissinger: No, no, on the sub-
poena— the subpoena has nothing to do with
this. The subpoena concerns covert opera-
tions and recommendations of Secretaries of
State when I was not in office — it has noth-
ing to do with any recommendations I made
— recommendations of a previous decade, to
previous Presidents.

January 5, 1976

11

The President has exercised executive
privilege with respect to that. I am under
instructions from the President with respect
to it. The resolution of this issue is between
the White House and the committee. It is
not an issue that concerns any actions while
I have been Secretary of State, and it has
nothing to do with the SALT issue. It has
to do with the subject of covert operations,
and the reason the President has exercised
executive privilege is because he believed
that recommendations of Cabinet members
to the President should be protected.

But I am not expressing a personal opin-
ion on that subject.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can we turn to another
subject?

Secretary Kissinger: Can we wind this up
fairly soon? I have some luncheon guests
upstairs who are getting restless.

Q. All right. Mr. Kissinger, on the subject
of Angola, you and the President have made
some accusations. A protest has been made
to the Soviet Union about alleged interven-
tion. There's comments about Cuban inter-
vention there. Isn't it about time that you
told Its roughly ivhat the United States has
done in the way of helping forces in Angola,
and since ivhen?

Secretary Kissinger: I have said that the
United States has tried to be helpful to some
neighboring countries. Whatever we have
done has started long after massive Soviet
involvement became evident. So this is not
a case that really lends itself to great dis-
pute on that subject, because the Soviet
Union has been active there in this manner
since March. But I would rather not go any
further until we see what can be done in
the present diplomatic effort.

Q. What can be done, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, that's what we
are trying —

Q. What are the available opportunities
open to the United States —

Secretary Kissinger: That's what we are
trying to find out. We have stated repeatedly

that outside powers should stay out of An-
gola and, especially, extracontinental powers
should stay out of Angola.

Q. What do you mean, Mr. Secretary, when
you say whatever we have done started long
after the massive — what has the United
States done?

Secretary Kissinger: I have said that we
try to give some assistance to neighboring
countries — not South Africa — but I don't
want to go any further.

Q. Mr. Secretary, before we say "thank
you" — sotne of my colleagues seem about to
bury Mr. Brezhnev. Can you give us your
latest estimate of the state of his health?

Secretary Kissinger: I have received no
communication from the Soviet Government
about the health of Mr. Brezhnev, as has
been alleged. My visit to the Soviet Union
has absolutely nothing to do with any com-
ments regarding his state of health. Our
impression is that he is in active charge and
that he will continue beyond the Party Con-
gress.

U.S. Replies to Soviet Proposal
on Middle East Peace Conference

Folloiving is the text of a note delivered
to the Embassy of the U.S.S.R. at Washing- i
ton on December 1.

The Government of the United States has
carefully examined the message received
from the Government of the Soviet Union '
on November 9, 1975, on the subject of re-
convening the Middle East Peace Conference
at Geneva and wishes to convey the follow-
ing reply.

The United States shares the concern for
further progress toward a comprehensive
settlement of the conflict in the Middle East.
The United States is also of the view that
all of the issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict,
including the Palestinian issue, must be re-
solved if a lasting peace in the Middle East
is to be achieved. The issue is how most

12

Department of State Bulletin

I

ffectively to move toward that goal.

The United States agrees that a resump-
ion of the Geneva Peace Conference after
areful preparation would serve the goal of
chieving progress in the settlement of the
onflict. The goal of a reconvened Confer-
nce should be the achievement of a com-
rehensive political settlement of the Middle
last conflict.

The Soviet Union has proposed that the
LS. and the USSR as Co-chairmen take a
)int initiative to reconvene the Geneva
eace Conference. The United States is con-
ilting with the parties to determine their
lews and will be prepared to consult with
le Soviet Government on how best to pre-
are the agenda and procedures for a re-
jnvened Conference and to deal with the
uestion of participation in the Conference.

With respect to the Soviet position on
alestinian participation at the Geneva Con-
?rence, the U.S. has always held the view
lat legitimate Palestinian interests must be
iken into account in an overall settlement,
he United States cannot agree, however,
lat the Co-chairmen of the Conference
m alter the definition of the participants
I the Conference initially agreed to by the
•iginal participants.

The Soviet Union will recall that the iden-
cal letters presented by the Permanent
epresentatives of the U.S. and the USSR
) the Secretary General of the United Na-
ons on December 18, 1973 stated: "The
arties have also agreed that the question
f other participants from the Middle East
rea will be discussed during the first stage
f the Conference." As no decision was
eached at the Conference in December 1973
jncerning possible additional participation,
lis remains a subject for discussion among
le original participants. It also remains the
iew of the United States that the appro-
riate UN resolutions to serve as the basis
or negotiations leading toward a peace
ettlement, and the ones which the parties
ave accepted for this purpose, are Security
'ouncil Resolutions 242 and 338. It would
herefore not be appropriate to introduce
ther resolutions not accepted by all parties
or this purpose.

As a practical way of proceeding, the
United States proposes a preparatory con-
ference of those who have participated so
far in negotiations looking toward a settle-
ment within the Geneva Conference frame-
work. In addition to the United States and
the Soviet Union, such a preparatory con-
ference could include Egypt, Jordan, Syria,
and Israel and could consider agenda, pro-
cedures, and the matter of participation in
a subsequent full conference, with a view
toward laying the foundation for negotia-
tion of an overall settlement. The United
States is also prepared to consider holding
bilateral consultations with the USSR in
advance of such a preparatory conference,
and solicits the views of the Soviet Union
on this possible approach.

United States and Poland Hold Talks
on Northeastern Pacific Fisheries

Joint U.S.-Polish Communique '

Delegations of the Polish People's Republic
and the United States met in Washington,
D.C., December 3-6 to discuss fisheries mat-
ters of mutual concern in the Northeastern
Pacific Ocean off the coast of the United
States. The Polish delegation was headed by
Vice Minister Edwin Wisniewski of the Min-
istry of Foreign Trade and Shipping. Head
of the American delegation was Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State Rozanne L.
Ridgway.

A new Agreement concerning 1976 Polish
fishing activities off the United States Pa-
cific coast was initialed on December 9 and
10, 1975. The new Agreement will be signed
in Washington at an early date.

Both delegations expressed satisfaction
with the new Agreement, which represents
continuing significant cooperation between
the two Governments and substantial prog-
ress in the conservation of fisheries stocks
off the Pacific Coast of the United States.

'Issued on Dec. 10 (text from press release 600).

anuary 5, 1976

13

f

Three Aspects of U.S. Relations With Latin America

Address by William D. Rogers

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs

Governor [Reubin] Askew, Congressman
[Dante B.] Fascell, Congressman [Claude
D.] Pepper, Mayor [Maurice] Ferre, distin-
guished guests: I was delighted that you
should ask me to come to Miami today to
say a word or two by way of despedida to
those of you who are setting off this after-
noon on your goodwill trip to Colombia and
Venezuela.

Your visit is important. You will carry
the message to Latin America of the central
significance of Florida and particularly of
this great city to our relations with the
hemisphere. You will see once again the
vibrance and subtlety of these two great
nations. And your being there, as leaders of
this country, most significantly will sym-
bolize once again for Latin America the
importance we attach to Latin America.

I intend to touch on three aspects of that
relationship. The first is Panama; the sec-
ond, our economic relations; and finally, the
future of the inter-American system.

First, Panama. President Lopez Michelsen
of Colombia, whom you will see I gather,
recently made a state visit to Washington.
It was a considerable success.

At the White House banquet, in his meet-
ings with House and Senate leadership, and
elsewhere, he said, with the tact and sensi-
tivity which is his trademark, that Panama
is the one continental problem we face. He
meant, by that, that the need to design a
new relationship between Panama and the
United States is the single issue of inter-

' Made before the Greater Miami Chamber of Com-
merce and the International Center of Greater Miami
at Miami, Fla., on Dec. 4.

14

;«

American relations on which all the natioq
of Latin America are most united.

As you know. Ambassador Ellswort'
Bunker is now engaged in an effort to wor
out a new canal treaty with Panama,
would replace the existing treaty of 190
which no longer corresponds to the realil
of today's world; it does not accommoda'
the enormous changes which have occurrt*
during the past 70 years.

We are negotiating because we are co>
vinced that a new and more equitable trea1
is essential to best protect our national i
terest in Panama. In essence our fund
mental interest is a canal that is ope
secure, neutral, and efficiently operated.

In today's world the extensive rights tl
United States acquired in 1903 to act as "
it were the sovereign" over a strip of Pan.
manian territory are not only unnecessai
to that fundamental national interest, bi
this also flies in the face of the need i
maintain an open canal. The 1903 arrang
ment is an increasing source of conflict n(
only in Panama but in the entire hemispher
as you will certainly hear in both Venezue
and Colombia. In recent years Panamania
consent to our presence in the original fori
prescribed in the 1903 treaty has decline
significantly. Failure to recognize this rea
ity and to adjust our relationship coul
threaten the very interests we are seekiii
to preserve — the availability of the canal I
the world's waterborne commerce.

The February 1974 statement of princ
pies signed by Secretary Kissinger ar
Panamanian Foreign Minister Tack provide
the framework for a new treaty relationshi

Department of State Bullet!

Ill

hi

•hich we believe will restore the important
] gradient of Panamanian consent to our
j'esence while giving us the treaty rights we
i-ed. In essence the principles provide that:

— Panama would grant the United States
te rights, facilities, and lands necessary to
cntinue operating and defending the canal
ir the treaty period;

— For its part the United States would
iturn to Panama jurisdiction over its terri-
try and arrange for Panamanian participa-
t)n over time in canal operation and de-
fnse;

— The new treaty would provide for any
epansion of canal capacity that may even-
tally be needed and give Panama a more
(uitable share of the benefits resulting
fjm use of its geographic location.

Substantive negotiations on the major
i;ues within the framework of these prin-
oles have been underway since June 1974.
^e have already reached general agreement

< some issues, such as jurisdiction, the
ijhts we shall require for operation and
(fense, and Panamanian participation in
lese functions. Some of the most difficult

< estions, such as duration, the lands and
nters we shall require for operation and

< fense, and economic benefits to Panama,
ie still unresolved.

But we are persuaded that a new treaty
nbodying the concept of constructive part-
1 rship contained in these principles should
lovide a practical means of reconciling our
htional interests and assuring that the
( nal remains open, efficient, and secure.

As the President said on October 7 in
'noxville: ^

For three Administrations — President Johnson,
•esident Nixon, and myself — negotiations have been
>ing on with the Government of Panama concerning
at problem. If you will refresh your memory, you
ill recall there were serious riots in Panama, I
ink in 1965. Around 30 people were killed, including
me Americans. Now, these negotiations are going
I have taken the position that we will not accept

'For the transcript of an interview with President
3rd recorded at Knoxville, Tenn., on Oct. 7 for tele-
sion broadcast that evening, see Weekly Compila-
on of Presidential Documents dated Oct. 13, 1975,
1129.

inuary 5, 1976

— and I would not recommend to the Senate — any
proposal that interfered with the national security
of the Canal, that would interfere with the opera-
tions of the Canal.

I would not, under any circumstances, do anything
in the negotiations or submit a proposal to the Senate
that undercut our national security.

The negotiations, he added, are going for-
ward within these principles. The Admin-
istration is dedicated to the success of this
effort. We think we can find, in those nego-
tiations, a new treaty relationship with
Panama which will indeed protect and en-
hance the fundamental national interests of
both parties.

I think you will see no better evidence
during your visit of the relevance of this
venture to our relations throughout the
hemisphere, and most particularly with
Venezuela and Colombia. We had better
succeed, for the consequences are not pleas-
ant to contemplate.

Latin American Development Needs

Now let me turn to a second area of im-
portance to our relations with the hemi-
sphere— economics. Here, we have some-
thing to show for our recent efforts.

The inter-American issues of the future
are largely economic issues. Political and
security problems have dominated our rela-
tionships within the hemisphere in the past.
Today the burning aspiration of Latin Amer-
ica is development. It is in terms of whether
they bode well or ill for Latin America's
economic growth that our own policies are
now being tested.

In general, the Latin American countries
are not among the "poorest of the poor" in
global terms. They are the middle-class
countries ; they have already achieved a con-
siderable degree of industrial development.
These are nations which are fully part of
the world economy. Their future economic
development depends on broad relationships
with the economies of industrialized coun-
tries, and they are better able to take ad-
vantage of such a relationship than those
lowest on the development ladder.

Thus the development needs of Latin
America are not less than those of the
poorer countries. But they are different.

15

They must have trade opportunities that
reflect their needs and possibilities. With-
out exporting they cannot import.

They also need capital. Investment is the
key to growth ; and in many, probably most,
of these countries, because they still have
only a modest standard of living, domestic
savings are not adequate to maintain satis-
factory levels of growth.

Thirdly, they need technology. They must
be able to draw on the technological ad-
vances made in the industrial countries to
increase their productivity and reach
higher levels of industrialization.

New U.S. Economic Policies

It is in this context that the initiatives
of the recent U.N. General Assembly sev-
enth special session take on special impor-
tance for the nations of Latin America. As
Secretary Kissinger stated, many of the
U.S. proposals delivered at the beginning of
that session were particularly designed with
the needs of Latin America in mind. The
proposals, many of which were included in
the final agreed resolution of the session,
are largely directed at improving the func-
tioning of the market to better serve the
needs of the LDC's [less developed coun-
tries] rather than at creating new mecha-
nisms to meet development needs. The suc-
cessful implementation of these proposals
will be a difficult, long-term task. I would
like to review with you the progress being
made on some of the major initiatives as
they relate to Latin America.

One of the major concerns of the develop-
ing countries of the area has been the wide
year-to-year fluctuations in export earnings,
particularly for primary products. These
swings in earnings have badly disrupted de-
velopment plans and are doing so now. For
many of the Latin American countries, the
vulnerability to cyclical changes in exports
was not only a matter of primary products ;
several have become significant exporters of
manufactured goods, the demand for which
is sharply afi'ected by economic conditions
in the industrialized countries. So as a
result of the current world economic crisis,
in part caused by the huge increase in the

cost of energy last year, many Latin Amer
ican countries are now experiencing seven
balance-of-payments problems.

As a partial answer to this problem, Sec-
retary Kissinger at the special session pro
posed the creation of a development securitj
facility within the International Monetarj
Fund. The facility would provide protectior
against disruption of overall export earnings
for both primary and manufactured prod
ucts. The Executive Directors of the IMF
have this proposal, as well as a proposal foi
creation of a trust fund to finance grants foi
the poorest countries, under active consider
ation. We hope they can reach agreemeni
within the next few months.

The development security facility, if es-
tablished, would be a step toward ameliorat-
ing the problem of unstable export earnings
from primai-y commodities. In addition, th(
Secretary also proposed that there be a pro
ducer-consumer forum for consideration ol
key commodities and that we move on a case
by-case basis in an effort to strengthen th(
market functions for both buyers anc
sellers. This represents a major advance ii
U.S. policy.

Because of the importance of the U.S
market for Latin America, the implementa
tion of our generalized system of prefer
ences on January 1 will also be of specia
significance. It will provide new export op-
portunities for the hemisphere.

There are other proposals made at the
seventh special session which, when devel-
oped, will be valuable to the Latin Americar
countries. A special working group of the ^
IMF-IBRD [International Monetary Fund-
International Bank for Reconstruction and '
Development] Development Committee is
considering means of facilitating access to
world capital markets by LDC's. As Latin
America moves beyond large-scale conces-
sional lending, capital market borrowings
will be a major source of development funds.
They could obtain special benefit from the
proposed expansion of the International
Finance Corporation to strengthen its sup-
port for private investment in LDC's, and
the creation of an International Investment'
Trust which would attract capital for invest-

16

Department of State Bulletin

ment in public, private, and mixed enter-
prises in LDC's.

These proposals represent some of the
important economic initiatives set forth, in
major part in the Kissinger address of Sep-
tember 1 at the U.N. seventh special session.
They meet some of the concern of the na-
tions of the hemisphere.

There is no more important issue, as I
have said, for our relations with the hemi-
sphere. It is vital that we support, and
cooperate with, the development aspirations
of the hemisphere, as you will see in the
course of your trip. So we tend to think we
scored something of an important break-
through with these new U.S. economic poli-
cies this fall.

Wide Range of OAS Activities

The same cannot be said for the third
matter I would like to touch on — the Or-
ganization of American States and its char-
ter.

For the better part of the last three years,
representatives of 24 American states have
been trying to draft a new charter for the
Organization of American States. Their
goal: to modernize the organization, which
is the centerpiece of the inter-American
system.

The OAS, oldest surviving international
organization, traces its roots back to 1890,
and its history has been one of high ac-
complishment. In its best known role, the
organization has traditionally provided a
place the governments of this hemisphere
can meet to consult on common problems,
including some thorny ones — human rights,
family planning — sometimes as an adjunct
to bilateral or other multilateral fora, but
. more often as the prime locus for discussion.
I The inter-American system began that
way — as a series of conferences. In the past,
these high-level meetings, now called Assem-
blies, have produced agreements in a number
of sensitive security, political, and economic
areas.

Almost 30 years ago in Rio de Janeiro,
one of these meetings yielded a hemispheric
mutual security pact, the Rio Treaty. Al-
though born in response to the Nazi threat.

the treaty during the 1950's drew renewed
vitality from the commonly held apprehen-
sions of the cold war. But even today, in a
world of reduced military tension, the Rio
Treaty has demonstrated its staying power,
perhaps attributable more now to recogni-
tion of growing power imbalances within
Latin America itself than to fear of extra-
territorial aggression. The member states
reaffirmed their support for an updated Rio
Treaty at San Jose this last summer.

A 1948 agreement on the peaceful settle-
ment of disputes symbolized the commit-
ment within the inter-American system to
reduce and control strife among the member
states, just as the Rio Treaty was conceived
primarily as a defense against extrahemi-
spheric aggression. The organization's suc-
cessful efforts to stop quickly the fighting
in 1969 between El Salvador and Honduras
show the continuing need for the OAS as a
peacekeeper and its ability to act with dis-
patch.

But more and more, especially during the
last decade, as I have said, economic prob-
lems have become the central issues of the
hemisphere. A 1967 revision of the OAS
Charter set down some general principles of
economic relations, and it provided for some
new machinery to relate to the development
process. But, as we shall see, formal agree-
ments do not guarantee success.

The OAS has also served as an umbrella
for the activities of a myriad of technical
organizations which bring together special-
ists from throughout the hemisphere. These
have produced concrete benefits in, for exam-
ple, telecommunications, tourism promotion,
ports and harbors, and trade facilitation.

I have used these examples because they
happen to be the subjects of OAS meetings
going on at various places in the hemisphere
at this very moment. A complete list of OAS
technical activities would reveal an astound-
ing range of subjects under consideration at
the expert level. This fact is a unique fea-
ture of the organization.

Finally, the OAS carries out numerous
additional projects. Specialized organizations
work in the fields of health ; agriculture ; the
problems of women, children, and Indians;

January 5, 1976

17

as well as social and economic development;
educational, scientific, and cultural coopera-
tion; and human rights.

The organization, in short, is big. And it
does a great deal. It spends almost $100
million a year, $65 million of which comes
from the United States. It employs 1,500
people stationed throughout the member
states.

As you can see from this, a gamut of
hemispheric concerns has found their way
into the inter-American system. This span
of involvement has created a unique heri-
tage. Can it be sustained in a world of
change ?

In 1973, a mere three years after the last
major modification of the charter entered
into force, uneasiness over the organization's
relevance to a changing world led members
to agree to yet another study of the organi-
zation. Why so soon? What are the factors
promoting this presumed need for frequent
self-examination? And what were the re-
sults?

The OAS groups a diverse polity. It brings
together 25 distinct nations. The differences
among us are marked, though we share the
same hemisphere and all won our independ-
ence from extracontinental overlords. Most
of the members are, economically speaking,
among the world's middle class, but some
are truly poor. In terms of size, consider
Brazil and Grenada. The four major lan-
guages mirror different cultural heritages.
Alaska and Argentina are almost poles apart,
in more than just geography. The diversity
has been growing.

These variations have introduced a new
and significant element to inter-American
relations for the future. In an earlier, less
complicated time, it was an unquestioned
principle that all member states should as-
pire to liberal representative democracy.
This consensus has given way to acceptance
of what in the OAS has been dubbed a
plurality of ideologies. At San Jose in July,
we agreed to incorporate the principle of
ideological pluralism in the Rio Treaty.

Moreover, fast-moving events in the rest
of the globe during this decade have also

begun to strain the inter- American system:
the emergence of a multipolar world, new
economic power centers such as the oil pro-
ducers, the spectacular growth of transna-
tional enterprises, the boom of the early
seventies, and the bust that we are now
suffering through. These have affected tra-
ditional perceptions of international relation-
ships in the hemisphere.

U.S. global policies during the last few
years have also been noted by the Latins.
Detente has changed the context of inter-
American security cooperation. Many saw
President Nixon's proposal for a "mature
partnership" as a form of neglect anything
but benign. Economically, bilateral assist-
ance to Latin America from the United
States stagnated; Colombia has just decided
to phase out direct U.S. aid entirely, for
example. Various congressional amendments
sought to protect U.S. private ventures
abroad by threatening reduction or elimina-
tion of assistance. The 10 percent surcharge
imposed on all imports in 1971 applied
equally to our OAS allies and struck at the
"special relationship" concept we had touted.
The slow-paced implementation of trade re-
form, at least until the Secretary's special
session address, was viewed by Latins as
belying our promises to give their economic
interests special weight.

Issues in Charter Reform

The study to revise the structure and
purpose of the OAS was begun in 1973 at
Latin initiative, in the context of those
world changes.

The Latins were motivated to the study in
large part as a reaction to policy in the eco-
nomic realm, which, as I have said, is the
key to our future relationship.

The United States looms large in the eco-
nomic life of Latin America — so large in
fact that it is not surprising that the special
committee created by the 1973 mandate con-
centrated on curbing specific U.S. actions
which they regard as interfering with their
own ability to cope with foreign economic
forces.

One of these efforts became known by the

18

Department of State Bulletin

code phrase "collective economic security."
Peru took the lead in urging that collective
economic security be written into the OAS
Charter. It advanced the theory that when
a state takes measures which have negative
effects on another's economy, it may commit
a form of aggression. A tribunal of other
states should sit in judgment. If a majority
agrees that an offense has occurred, the
tribunal should assess damages.

A draft treaty placed before the study
committee made clear this potential equa-
tion of economic policy with military aggres-
sion. The drafters had in mind such exam-
ples as our 10 percent surcharge and Con-
gress' requirement that we cut assistance
in cases of uncompensated confiscation of
U.S. property or fishing vessels. We of
course do not believe that these actions can
be labeled aggression. We could hardly
agree, therefore, to create a court and a
judge and jury to try us for actions which
we consider to be sovereign acts to defend
legitimate U.S. interests.

Another charter-reform sticking point re-
lates to the conduct of transnational enter-
prises. The issue here is Latin America's
venerable Calvo doctrine. This juridical no-
tion holds that foreign investors may have
no recourse to their own governments in
disputes over expropriation. The decisions of
host country courts are final. We of course
recognize that local law obtains; but we be-
lieve that international obligations, includ-
ing the responsibility of a state to protect
its citizens, must be taken into account.

But, more importantly, we do not believe
that these contentious issues of principle
and doctrine, as important as they are, can
be injected into the OAS Charter in the
absence of any agreement between ourselves
and the Latin Americans regarding their
validity.

On the other hand, we do believe that a
modernized inter-American system can con-
tinue to play a significant and creative role
in inter-American relations even in the ab-
sence of agreement on the concepts of inter-
national law relating to certain economic
issues. This is so in terms of peacekeeping

and conflict management. It is so in terms
of support for the development efforts of
Latin America.

And it is so in the area of human rights,
where, we are persuaded, the organization
can make a major contribution. The stand-
ards of human rights are international
standards, laid down in the Inter-American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man; and it is particularly appropriate,
therefore, that the determination whether
countries are abiding by those standards be
in the first instance through international
machinery.

In short, we find that the charter-reform
effort to date, which has cost several million
dollars, has raised more questions than it
has answered about the extent to which we
can agree on the nature and type of coop-
erative relationship we want within the
inter-American system. The final draft
which has emerged from the OAS labors of
the last three years does little to advance
the common vision of an OAS which is an
effective instrument of regional cooperation.
As the Mexican Representative has said in
recent days, the organization faces its "mo-
ment of truth."

The United States therefore proposed late
last week that we drop the new OAS Charter
draft and begin over again. This time, we
should embrace the objective of making the
OAS capable of responding to the hemi-
sphere's aspirations for the future, within
the limits of those goals and objectives upon
which we and Latin America can agree.

We are now approaching other govern-
ments of the hemisphere. Our Ambassador
to the OAS, William Mailliard, and Deputy
U.S. Representative Robert White are in
Latin America now. They will be visiting
capitals throughout the hemisphere during
your own trip, including both Caracas and
Bogota. I will be going to Mexico in a few
hours. Our purpose will be to explore with
other foreign ministries whether there
exists a consensual vision of a truly effec-
tive, relevant OAS for the future.

There is no more important common effort
on the inter-American agenda.

January 5, 1976

19

U.S.-Yugoslav Board on Scientific
and Technological Cooperation Meets

Joint Statement *

The U.S.-Yugoslav Joint Board on Scien-
tific and Teciinological Cooperation met at
the Department of State, Washington, D.C.,
December 4-5, for its regular semiannual
meeting.

The Board reviewed over 100 ongoing
projects in a wide range of fields, such as
agriculture, health, basic sciences, technol-
ogy, ecology, transportation, and others. The
Board also approved additional funding for
16 projects, worth approximately 8.5 mil-
lion dinars ($500,000), to be financed from
the U.S.-Yugoslav Joint Fund established
in accordance with the agreement on scien-
tific and technological cooperation which the
two countries signed on May 18, 1973.

The Board reiterated its belief that scien-
tific and technological cooperation between
the U.S. and Yugoslavia has been very suc-
cessful; and it expressed the hope that new
sources of funding can be found to extend
the program beyond 1977-78, when most of
the current projects will expire.

The United States was represented by Mr.
William A. Root, Acting Director, Office of
Soviet and Eastern European Scientific and
Technological Affairs, Department of State,
and Dr. Herman Chinn, Scientific Attache,
American Embassy, Belgrade.

Yugoslavia was represented by Dr. Edo
Pirkmajer, Secretary General, Research
Community of Slovenia, and Chairman of

' Issued on Dec. 5 (press release 593).

the Board, and Mr. Milos Rajacic, Scienlific
Counselor, Yugoslav Embassy, Washington.
The Board tentatively scheduled its next
meeting in Yugoslavia in late June 1976.

U.S. and Argentina Establish
Bilateral Working Groups

Press release 611 dated December 16

Argentine Ambassador Rafael M. Vazquez
and Assistant Secretary William D. Rogers
met on December 16 to implement a series
of bilateral working groups between Argen-
tina and the United States. The meeting re-
sulted from a decision made by the Argen-
tine Foreign Minister and the Secretary of
State when they met in New York last Sep-
tember, to place greater emphasis on areas
of potential collaboration between the two
countries.

Ambassador Vazquez and Assistant Sec-
retary Rogers moved to establish informal
working groups in the fields of trade, invest-
ment and finance, culture and tourism, agri-
culture, and science and technology. These
working groups will be constituted both in
Buenos Aires and Washington, to permit
representatives of the private sector, as well
as government officials, to participate in the
task of improving U.S.-Ai'gentine relations.

The Ambassador and the Assistant Sec-
retary pointed to the bilateral memorandum
of understanding on cooperation in the
health sciences, which is to be signed shortly
in Buenos Aires, as the kind of mutually
productive relationship which can be fos-
tered by the working groups.

20

Department of State Bulletin

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

U.S. Vetoes Unbalanced Security Council Resolution
Concerning Israeli Air Attacks in Lebanon

Following are statements made in the
U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representa-
tive Daniel P. Moynihan on December U, 5,
and 8, together with the text of a draft reso-
lution which loas vetoed by the United States
on December 8.

STATEMENTS BY AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN

First Statement of December 4

USUN prtss release 174 dated December 4

The U.S. delegation has insisted upon a
vote on the issue of inviting representatives
of the Palestine Liberation Organization to
appear before the Security Council.' As a
matter of principle, we shall vote against
their being invited to appear.

We have witnessed a concerted attempt
to disregard the rules of procedure and to
accord to the Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation a role greater even than that which
over the years the Council has granted to
observer governments and a role greater by
far than has in more recent times been
granted to the spokesmen of legitimate na-
tional libei'ation movements invited here
under rule 39.

' The Council had before it a letter from the Perma-
nent Representative of Egypt requesting "an urgent
meeting of the Security Council to discuss the Israeli
aggression against the Palestinian refugee camps in
Lebanon" and "the participation of the Palestine Lib-
eration Organization in the debate during the discus-
sion of this item" (U.N. doc. S/11893), as well as a
letter from the Permanent Representative of Leba-
non requesting an urgent meeting of the Council
(U.N. doc. S/11892).

The United States is not prepared to agree
to an ad hoc departure from the rules of
procedure tailored to meet the asserted
needs of the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion.

What is more important, my government
is not prepared to acquiesce in an action
which will undermine the negotiating proc-
ess, which is the only process that can lead
to peace. For the representatives of the
Palestine Liberation Organization have re-
peatedly, and as recently as the day before
yesterday, told the General Assembly of
their disdain for systematic negotiation.

They have openly declared their hostility,
indeed their contempt, for the work of this
Council. They categorically rejected Security
Council Resolution 242, which for years has
served as the only agreed basis for sarious
negotiation. And now we find the Palestine
Liberation Organization citing actions taken
in the General Assembly and the Security
Council as the basis for still further erosion
of the negotiating process.

For these fundamental reasons, we are
totally opposed to inviting the Palestine
Liberation Organization. To do so will dis-
serve the search for peace in the Middle East.

The noblest and most fundamental aim of
the Security Council is to achieve peace and
security. In the case of the Middle East, my
government is dedicated to active leadership
in the pursuit of that goal. My government
has long maintained that the legitimate
interests of the Palestinian people must be
reflected in the arrangements that will bring
peace and security to the Middle East.

The effort which has been made to flout

January 5, 1976

21

the procedures of this Council and to disre-
gard entirely the sensitivities of the people
of the State of Israel can only complicate
the search for peace. We urge all who share
the hope for a just peace in the Middle East
to withhold their support from this egre-
gious attempt to use this body to deal with
an amorphous terrorist organization as
though it were a concrete entity with the
attributes of a sovereign government.
The United States will vote "No." ^

Second Statement of December 4 ^

USUN prtss release 175 dated December 4

I intervene briefly in the interest of keep-
ing the record straight with respect to some
of the things which have been said here this
afternoon.

The distinguished Representative of Iraq
asserted that the decision of the Security
Council in September to hear the two Viet-
Nams is a precedent for the proposal to in-
vite what is called the full participation of
the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Mr. President, the Vietnamese case was
entirely different. First, what the Council
did in that case was to invite the Viet-Nams
to make a statement to the Council after the
vote, not to participate fully.

Second, that invitation was extended on a
nonobjection basis. The President very prop-
erly paused and, after a moment, said, "Since
there is no objection, it is so decided." There
are objections here.

Third, although the then President of the
Council made no reference to any rule of the
Council's rules of procedures when the
Council invited the Viet-Nams, there was no
reason for him to have done so. We knew
under what rule we acted. The fact is that

" The Council on Dec. 4 adopted by a vote of 9 to 3
(Costa Rica, U.K., U.S.), with 3 abstentions (France,
Italy, Japan), the procedural proposal for the par-
ticipation of the PLO in the debate. Under article 27
of the U.N. Charter, decisions of the Council on
procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative
vote of nine members.

^ For further statements made by Ambassador
Moynihan on Dec. 4, see USUN press release 175.

the legal basis of the invitation was rule 39.
As the distinguished Representative of Italy
has said today, there can be no other basis
under the rules as they so stand.

Finally, in this regard, Mr. President,
whether we believe there are one or two
Vietnamese states, there certainly is at least
one such state. But there does not now exist
any state of Palestine, nor does the Palestine
Liberation Organization claim that there
exists a state of Palestine. The PLO cannot
therefore be treated properly as the govern-
ment of a state.

Finally, Mr. President, I should like to
adumbrate certain concerns about refer-
ences which have been made here this after-
noon to what was agreed or not agreed in
the private consultations which the Council
has held prior to this formal meeting.

I regret to say, Mr. President, that the
recollections of the U.S. delegation are very
much at variance at a number of points with
the recollections of other members of this
Council. I regret this because it must surely
be a sign that we have a faulty memory.

I do not in any way mean to suggest that
there has been misrepresentation, much lees
that there has been deliberate misrepre-
sentation. But there is on our part some
distress that our recollections and under-
standings should be so at variance with those
of other members of the Council.

And it must be the fact, Mr. President,
that if the creative practice which the Coun-
cil has evolved of meeting in private and
without the maintenance of a record is to
become the source of subsequent confusion,
even disagreement and conceivably even the
quest for advantage in consequence of the
absence of a record, then clearly the dis-
position of some members of this Council to
continue that practice will have been dimin-
ished, and a creative innovation in our pro-
cedures will perhaps commence to decline.

I make that point only, Mr. President, in
the most open and nonaccusatory manner,
simply to say that it seems to me that it is
not useful in this debate to make reference
to earlier agreements which are now at this
point not a matter of record.

22

Department of State Bulletin

Statement of December 5

USUN pitss release 176 dated December 5

Once again we meet to consider the trag-
edy of violence and counterviolence in the
Middle East and the dilemma which it poses
for all of us. Surely no one can listen to the
accounts of actions which involve the maim-
ing and killing of innocent civilians without
feeling the utmost compassion for those
concerned. How satisfying it would be if we
felt that through what we say and do here
we could break this vicious circle which has
brought so much tragedy to so many people
over the last quarter century.

Surely, however, as responsible member.s
of the international community charged with
serious obligations under the U.N. Charter,
we must recognize we do not accomplish this
by condemning isolated acts. The attacks we
are considering today do not occur in isola-
tion. There is always cause and effect.

My delegation considers that all loss of
innocent human life is reprehensible, and we
are prepared to deplore it in strong terms
whether it occurs from the acts of organized
groups or of governments.

We would remind the Council that orga-
nizations which carried out recent acts of
violence against citizens of Israel have pub-
licly acknowledged their responsibility for
those acts, just as the Government of Israel
has acknowledged its responsibility for the
attacks which are now before us. I make
these points not to condone or excuse Israel's
recent massive air attacks, which by their
nature could not avoid taking irtnocent vic-
tims. We neither condone nor excuse them.
But we must deal with them in context and
not in isolation.

So let me be quite clear, Mr. President:
the United States deeply deplores these at-
tacks, just as we have consistently deplored
those despicable terrorist incidents which
have caused the loss of life in Israel.

We are prepared to support an appropri-
ate resolution which registers the strongest
disapproval of this Council of all acts of vio-
lence in the Middle East, particularly those
which result in the death of innocent civil-

ians, and which calls on all parties to refrain
from any action that might endanger peace
negotiations.

Certainly there is nothing all of us would
wish to see more than an end to this sense-
less slaughter. But on reflection I think most
of you would agree that there is only one
way to do this, and that is to bring peace
to the area.

That, Mr. President, is precisely what my
government has been devoting its most in-
tensive efforts to try to do over the past two
years. We remain committed to that goal.
We will persevere in our efforts to achieve
it. We believe we have made progress, but
we recognize that much remains to be
settled.

One of the unhappy features of the situa-
tion we are dealing with today is the disrup-
tive effect it has on the efforts to move fur-
ther toward a peace agreement. The tensions
and passions generated by the recurring
cycle of violence are hardly conducive to the
type of atmosphere that will permit the
parties concerned to arrive at that accommo-
dation of opposing views which is the pre-
requisite of a peace agreement.

Our task is to weigh deliberately how our
reactions can best advance that reconcilia-
tion of views. It will not be accomplished
through the adoption of one-sided resolu-
tions which leave one party believing it is
the victim of discrimination and bias on the
part of the United Nations. It will be facili-
tated if this body renders impartial, rea-
soned, and reasonable judgments on the
issues properly within its competence. It is
our duty to react in the most responsible
and constructive way that we can con-
ceive.

Statement Before the Vote, December 8

USUN puss release 182 dated December 8

At the outset of this present debate in the
Security Council concerning the complaints
of Lebanon and Egypt about Israeli raids in
Lebanon, the United States spoke briefly
but, we hope, consistently — consistent with a
position we have maintained throughout the

January 5, 1976

23

long and often heartbreaking duration of
this conflict which is nearly coeval with the
existence of the United Nations itself.

We stated that we considered that all loss
of innocent human life was reprehensible,
that we were prepared to deplore in strong
terms such loss of life, whether it occurs
from the acts of governments or from the
acts of organized groups. We made no dis-
tinction, as indeed no distinction could be
made, with respect to the value or the ex-
tent of the loss of the life of a Lebanese
child any more than the loss of the life of an
Israeli or Syrian or Egyptian child.

We asked on that occasion, Mr. President,
if it were not possible for the Council to
join in this perception which all of us shared.
None of us around this table in this Council
chamber think otherwise; none of the na-
tions or that organization seated at this
table would share a different view.

We said on that occasion that:

We are prepared to support an appropriate resolu-
tion which registers the strongest disapproval of this
Council of all acts of violence in the Middle East,
particularly those which result in the death of inno-
cent civilians, and which calls on all parties to refrain
from any action that might endanger peace negotia-
tions.

Now, Mr. President, we said this in our
capacity as a member of the Council, but I
think it will be granted that ours is a spe-
cial concern in this regard owing simply to
the fact that we are also the member of the
Council which is seeking, in the role of
mediator, to bring about peace in the Middle
East. We are trying to mediate this seem-
ingly unending conflict. And we cannot see
mediation as in any way advanced by a one-
sided resolution, a resolution which would
persuade one party or another party that
an imbalance had occurred, that an injustice
was being done. It is only the evenhanded-
ness of the United Nations, just as it is the
evenhandedness of the mediator, that bears
any promise of success.

In the past, Mr. President, this Council
has seen and understood and acted upon this
fundamental requirement of responsible be-
havior; to wit, the requirement of even-

handedness and balance. The most recent
occasion on which a Security Council resolu-
tion of this kind has been before us was in
April of 1974, when we adopted Resolution
347 in a context not dissimilar from the
present context: violence and countervio-
lence, and violence counter to the counter-
violence, then violence counter to that. It is
not new to human history, certainly not to
that of the Middle East.

On that occasion the Security Council
acted in a manner which was resolute but
fair, concrete but balanced. Resolution 347
was adopted by 13 votes to none in opposi-
tion, such that the whole of the Council may
be said to have approved this course of ac-
tion. And, Mr. President, nothing a year and
a half later should suggest to us that there
was anything imprudent about what we did.
To the contrary, it stands as an example of
responsible behavior, seeking effective re-
sults. We all know this; there is no govern-
ment at this table that does not know this.

It is not required of me to do anything
more than to say what we also all know,
which is that the resolution before us is not
balanced, will not be perceived as fair; it will
not advance the cause of peace, and to that
extent it cannot be seen as responsible.

We speak not just as a government but as
a government seeking to bring peace in the
role of mediator. That is our role in the
Middle East. It is never an easy one. We find
ourselves called upon to make pleas to you
for perspective and balance.

We fully understand that there are gov-
ernments at this table that do not feel bal-
anced at this moment. We can understand
why they would not. Yet we as mediators
say, even so, it is not the moment that
matters, it is the progress we are making
toward a just and lasting peace. The ques-
tion is: Will the action we take today add
to that progress, encourage it, facilitate it,
or will it do otherwise?

And so, Mr. President, the United States,
the mediator country, would like to suggest
two simple amendments to the resolution
before us. We have asked the Secretariat to
circulate the amendments without delay;

24

Department of State Bulletin

and I am sure it is doing its very best, as it
always does, and here indeed they are.

Mr. President, these are not unfamiliar
amendments. To the contrary, the language
will be familiar to you, sir, and to a number
of the members of the Council, to most of
the members of the Council, for the very
simple reason that most members of this
Council have already voted for these amend-
ments. These amendments have won the
approval of every permanent member of this
Council which voted on them. They won the
approval of all those members elected to the
Council who were here last year, and they
won the approval of all the other elected
members who were there at the time, all of
this with the exception of one permanent
and one elected member who chose not to
participate in the vote. But among the par-
ticipating nations, the vote was unanimous.

Mr. President, the U.S. amendments would
add to our present resolution, which has
three operative paragraphs, a fourth and a
fifth. Th^ fourth paragraph reads as follows :

Condemns all acts of violence, especially those
which result in tbe tragic loss of innocent civilian
life, and urges all concerned to refrain from any
further acts of vidlence;

Paragraph 5 reads:

Calls upon all parties to refrain from any action
which might endanger negotiations aimed at achiev-
ing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

I repeat, sir, these are operative para-
graphs which the Security Council has al-
ready voted upon and did so in a similar
situation — a not dissimilar situation — a year
and a half ago. There is no one present at
this table who opposed those paragraphs.

The purpose of the fourth paragraph, very
simply, would be to provide balance in those
acts which we condemn, reflecting nothing
more than our true feelings and our stated
position — that we condemn all acts of vio-
lence.

I cannot imagine that any government
would not be willing to condemn and deplore
violence which leads to the loss of innocent
lives, and I simply point out that there is not
a government at this table which did other-

wise when faced with the possibility — more
than the possibility, the necessity — of doing
so a year and a half ago.

Finally, the fifth operative paragraph
would call on all parties to refrain from any
action that would endanger the negotiations
aimed at achieving a just and lasting peace
in the Middle East. I remind you, sir, these
negotiations have not failed in the year and
a half since this resolution was adopted. To
the contrary, extraordinarily difficult, dense,
but in the end successful negotiation has
brought the condition of peace, the absence
of violence, stability, to the Sinai, and similar
efforts are soon to be undertaken, we cannot
doubt, with respect to the Syrian-Israeli
border and their relations.

In those circumstances, Mr. President, in
the name of sanity, in the name of peace,
the United States proposes these amend-
ments and asks for a vote.

Statement After the Vote, December 8

USUN press release 183 dated December 8

As has been clear in what I have said
here tonight and what my delegation has
done today, this is an outcome which is dis-
appointing to the United States. On Decem-
ber 4, when this matter first arose, we spoke
briefly, plainly, and we asked for balance.
All day long, as my distinguished friend the
Representative from the Cameroon has said,
we spoke in private meetings with members
of this Council, asking for some measure of
balance in this resolution. We were not suc-
cessful.

We introduced measures familiar to the
Council, part of the Council's record, which
we thought would provide balance. The dis-
tinguished Representative of Italy asked for
12 hours that we might recess, adjourn if
you will, to talk further about these pro-
posals, and we voted with five other mem-
bers of the Council for such an adjournment.
But it was not the wish of a majority.

Mr. President, the United States strongly
deplores the Israeli actions which were
brought to our attention by the Govern-
ments of Lebanon and Egypt through the

January 5, 1976

25

offices of their distinguished Ambassadors
who are with us tonight. But we also be-
heve that the problem of the loss of innocent
life from incursions from Lebanon and other
neighboring states of Israel should also be
condemned. This is part of the cycle of vio-
lence with which we are dealing and which
the United States, as a mediating power,
hopes to bring to an end.

We worked strenuously for a balanced
resolution, and we have reluctantly had to
veto the resolution as it now stands, which
as we have made clear from the beginning,
we did not consider to be balanced.

TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION *

The Security Council,

Having considered the question inscribed in its
agenda at the 1859th meeting,

Having noted the contents of the letter of the
Permanent Representative of Lebanon (S/11892) and
of the letter of the Permanent Representative of
Egypt (S/11893),

Having heard the statements of the Permanent
Representatives of Lebanon, Egypt, the Syrian Arab
Republic and the representative of the Palestine Lib-
eration Organization,

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions,

Deploring Israel's defiance of these resolutions,

Grieved at the tragic loss of human life caused
by indiscriminate and massive Israeli air attacks,

Gravely concerned about the deteriorating situa-
tion resulting from Israel's violation of Lebanon's
sovereignty and territorial integrity and of Security
Council resolutions.

Convinced that Israeli massive air attacks against
Lebanon were premeditative in nature,

1. Strongly condemns the Government of Israel
for its premeditated air attacks against Lebanon in
violation of its obligations under the United Nations
Charter and of Security Council resolutions;

2. Calls upon Israel to desist forthwith from all
military attacks against Lebanon;

3. Issues once again a solemn warning to Israel
that if such attacks were repeated, the Council
would have to consider taking appropriate steps and
measures to give effect to its decisions.

'U.N. doc. S/11898; the draft resolution was not
adopted owing to the negative vote of a permanent
member of the Council, the vote being 13 in favor,
1 against (U.S.), with 1 abstention (Costa Rica).

U.S. Votes Against General Assembly
Resolution on the Middle East

Following is a statemeyit made in plenary
session of the U.N. General Assembly by
U.S. Representative W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.,
on December 4, together with the text of a
resolution adopted by the Assembly on De-
cember 5.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR BENNETT

USUN press release 171 dated December 4 I

This General Assembly plenary continues
to focus our attention on one of the most
sensitive and difficult problems we face as a
global community: the situation in the Mid-
dle East. We have already discussed aspects
of this issue on various occasions during the
current session, and the Security Council
and committees of the Assembly are at this
moment working on Middle Eastern issues.
I therefore do not need to dwell on the seri-
ousness of the Middle East situation nor on
its importance to us all; the issue is heavy
upon us.

Nor do I really need to tell you what U.S.
policy is in the Middle East. Since the sign-
ing of the new Egyptian-Israeli agreement
of September 4, 1975, U.S. policy in the
Middle East has been elaborated several
times by Secretary of State Kissinger, most
notably in his address before this Assembly
on September 22. He has explained our view
of that agreement and what the United
States is prepared to do next. It may be
useful, nevertheless, to reiterate here some
of the main points of that position in order
to demonstrate once again the determination
of the United States to go forward in the
pursuit of a peaceful settlement.

Our conclusion after the October war of
1973 was that to have approached all the
issues pertaining to all the countries in-
volved was nearly futile until a minimum of
confidence had been established. The United
States believed that we should proceed step
by step with the parties that were ready to

26

Department of State Bulletin

negotiate, and on issues that allowed some
room for maneuver. We believed that, once
into the process, the parties would have a
stake in its success and that momentum
would be created which could produce bepe-
fits and agreements that would be kept. We
considered that in the end this step-by-step
approach would bring about conditions
which could then lead to a final overall
settlement. This has been our goal from the
beginning and remains our goal today.

Since October 1973, there has been more
progress toward peace than at any time since
the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The United Nations has played an important
role in making that progress possible and in
assuring that gains achieved were not lost.
Security Council Resolution 338 launched a
negotiating process and the first Geneva
Conference. Agreements to separate forces
and to create buffer zones in support of the
'cease-fires were negotiated between Egypt
and Israel in January 1974 and between
Syria and Israel in May 1974. A further
agreement, not the direct outcome of war
but as a step toward peace, was signed in
September 1975 between Egypt and Israel.

We have said and we will say again that
these are only steps in a continuing process.
We have made notable progress, but the task
is in no way finished. We are determined to
persevere.

The question before us all is: Where do
we go from here and how? The United
States is convinced answers to this question
can be found.

President Ford has made it clear that the
United States will assist the parties in any
way it can, as the parties desire, to achieve
a negotiated settlement within the frame-
work established by Security Council Reso-
lutions 242 and 338. We are fully aware that
all the basic issues must be met and that
there will be no permanent peace unless it
deals with the concern of the parties for
their territorial integrity, political independ-
ence, and right to exist in peace and takes
into account the legitimate interests of all
concerned, including the Palestinians. We

remain ready to help in further negotiations
between Syria and Israel. We are ready to
consult and discuss the possibilities of a re-
convened Geneva Conference. We are ready
and willing to explore any practical method
of advancing the cause of peace, including a
preparatory conference of the original par-
ticipants in the Geneva Conference to dis-
cuss agenda procedures, participation, and
other matters relevant to a resumption of
the Geneva Conference. This is the policy of
the United States. We shall execute it vigor-
ously.

The resolution before us for our consider-
ation does not, in the view of the United
States, help us in the process toward peace
we support. We shall vote against it. Its one-
sided condemnation of one of the parties to
the Arab-Israeli dispute and its departure
from the accepted negotiating framework
established by Security Council Resolutions
242 and 338 make further settlement be-
tween those parties more difficult. It calls
upon the Security Council to implement cer-
tain resolutions that deal with problems that
can only be solved by negotiation. That is
the task before us all: to get to the serious
work of negotiation among the i>arties in
which real progress can be made. Resolu-
tions such as the one before us today can
only exacerbate the situation.

Further, it adds to the series of one-sided
resolutions which are a disservice to our-
selves and to this institution. It would take
us one step further in destroying credibility
throughout the world that the General As-
sembly is truly going about its business.
These irresponsible resolutions do not take
into account the legitimate concerns of one
of the parties and lead us into a domain re-
moved from the reality where a settlement
can be achieved.

Let us turn away from empty rhetoric
and resolutions. Let us commit ourselves to
a practical process of negotiations, which
continues to hold out the best hope for
reaching that objective so essential to the
peoples of the Middle East and indeed of the
entire world.

January 5, 1976

27

TEXT OF RESOLUTION '

The General Assembly,

Having considered the item entitled "The situation
in the Middle East",

Guided by the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations and resolutions of the
United Nations as well as those principles of inter-
national law which prohibit the occupation or acqui-
sition of territory by the use of force, and which
consider any military occupation, however temporary,
or any forcible annexation of such territory, or part
thereof, as an act of aggression.

Gravely concerned at the continuation of the Is-
raeli occupation of Arab territories and Israel's per-
sistent denial of the inalienable national rights of the
Palestinian people,

Recalling relevant resolutions of the General As-
sembly and the Security Council, particularly those
concerning the inalienable national rights of the
Palestinian people and its right to participate in any
efforts for peace,

Convinced that the early reconvening of the Peace
Conference on the Middle East with the participation
of all the parties concerned, including the Palestine
Liberation Organization, is essential for the realiza-
tion of a just and lasting settlement in the region.

Convinced that the present situation prevailing in
the Middle East continues to constitute a serious
threat to international peace and security, and that
urgent measures should be taken in order to ensure
Israel's full compliance with relevant resolutions of
the General Assembly and the Security Council on
the questions of Palestine and the Middle East,

Recognizing that peace is indivisible and that a
just and lasting settlement of the question of the
Middle East must be based on a comprehensive solu-
tion under the auspices of the United Nations, which
takes into consideration all aspects of the Middle
East conflict, including, in particular, the enjoyment
by the Palestinian people of its inalienable national
rights, as well as the total withdrawal from all the
Arab territories occupied since June 1967,

1. Reaffirms that the acquisition of territory by
force is inadmissible and therefore all territories
thus occupied must be returned;

2. Condemns Israel's continued occupation of Arab
territories in violation of the Charter of the United
Nations, the principles of international law and re-
peated United Nations resolutions;

3. Requests all States to desist from supplying
Israel with any military or economic aid as long as
it continues to occupy Arab territories and deny the
inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people;

4. Requests the Security Council, in the exercise
of its responsibilities under the Charter, to take all

'U.N. doc. A/RES/3414 (XXX) adopted by the
Assembly on Dec. 5 by a rollcall vote of 84 to 17
(U.S.), with 27 abstentions.

necessary measures for the speedy implementation,
according to an appropriate time-table, of all relevant
resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security
Council aiming at the establishment of a just and
lasting peace in the region through a comprehensive
settlement, worked out with the participation of all
parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation
Organization, and within the framework of the
United Nations, which ensures complete Israeli with-
drawal from all the occupied Arab territories as well
as full recognition of the inalienable national rights
of the Palestinian people and the attainment of those
rights;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to inform all
concerned, including the Co-Chairmen of the Peace
Conference on the Middle East, and to follow up the
implementation of the present resolution and report
thereon to the Security Council and to the General
Assembly at its thirty-first session.

U.N. Disengagement Observer Force
in Israel-Syria Sector Extended

Following are statements made in the U.N.
Security Council on November 30 by U.S.
Representative Daniel P. Moynihan, together
with the text of a resolution adopted by the
Council that day.

STATEMENTS BY AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN

Statement Before the Vote

USUN press release 165 dated November 30

Mr. President [Yakov Malik, of the
U.S.S.R.] : I should like to express my grati-
tude to you for the opportunity I now have
to be the first of the many members — first,
I am sure, of what will prove to be all of the
other members of this Council — to express
appreciation to my brother from Guyana,
and his colleagues from Mauritania, from
Tanzania, and Cameroon, for the valiant
efforts which they have made to bring about |
this result. These required a great deal of
them and were an expression of their com-
mitment to the work of this Council, which
we all share and, in their performance this
past three days, certainly admire.

Mr. President, with respect to the reso-
lution before us, the United States wishes

28

Department of State Bulletin

to make clear that we are not agreeing to
this resolution, which includes a provision
calling for a Security Council debate on the
situation in the Middle East, out of any de-
sire for such a debate in this setting — much
less out of any intention, howsoever remote,
of seeing a transfer of the negotiations be-
tween the two parties to the UNDOF [U.N.
Disengagement Observer Force] arrange-
ments to the Security Council.

We have agreed, we are agreeing, solely
out of deference to the right of the Security
Council to take up any matter it desires to
take up. We consider that this resolution is
taken without prejudice whatsoever to the
Geneva formula or to the negotiations by
the parties through intermediaries.

With respect to the matter of relevant
U.N. resolutions, the United States considers
that only Security Council Resolutions 242
and 338 are in fact relevant to the situation
in the Middle East.

Statement After the Vote

USUN press release 166 dated November 30

I am sure you would agree, sir, that the
only words which would truly serve to ex-
press the admiration and the gratitude and
the respect which we all have for the Sec-
retary General at this moment would be
brief words. His labors have been herculean,
and I assume, if today is no different from
other days, they are not yet concluded. My
government, sir, would join wholly in the
tributes paid to you.

My delegation wishes also to make clear
that the United States, Mr. President, does
not support the statement of the Council
President- — of yourself, sir — indicating that
the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion] will be invited to participate in the
January session.' This statement in any

' The following statement was read by the Presi-
dent of the Council after the vote:

"It is the understanding of the majority of the
Security Council that when it reconvenes on 12 Janu-
ary 1976 in accordance with paragraph (a) of Secu-
rity Council resolution 381 (1975) the representatives
of the Palestine Liberation Organization will be in-
vited to participate in the debate."

event did not report a decision, but was
merely a summation of the views of some
members of the Council. We do not consider
that the extraneous matters which have
been introduced into the Council's action to-
day can have the effect of changing either
the negotiating framework, the basis for
these negotiations, or the participants in
them.

Mr. President, I should like also to note
that subparagraph (a) of the operative
paragraph, properly read, declares the inten-
tion of the Security Council to debate the
question of whether or not the Middle East
problem does in fact include the Palestinian
question. Such, Mr. President, is the role of
the comma in English composition.

Nonetheless, and finally, to the parties
concerned and to this Council, the United
States pledges its continued efforts to fur-
ther the process toward peace in the Middle
East. We do that with the indispensable
support of UNDOF, of its commander, its
officers, and its men, and of course, once
again, you, Mr. Secretary General, and those
not less valiant colleagues whom you have
brought as your associates on the 38th floor.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION "^

The Security Council,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-
General (S/11883 and Add.l) on the United Nations
Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF),

Having noted the discussions of the Secretary-
General with all parties concerned on the situation
in the Middle East,

Expressing concern over the continued state of
tension in the area.

Decides :

(a) To reconvene on 12 January 1976, to continue
the debate on the Middle East problem including the
Palestinian question, taking into account all relevant
United Nations resolutions;

(b) To renew the mandate of UNDOF for another
period of six months;

(c) To request the Secretary-General to keep the
Security Council informed on further developments.

"U.N. doc. S/RES/381 (1975); adopted by the
Council on Dec. 1 by a vote of 13 (U.S.) to 0, with
the People's Republic of China and Iraq not partici-
pating in the vote.

January 5, 1976

29

United States Urges Increase
in Contributions to UNRWA

Following i« a statement made in the Spe-
cial Political Committee of the U.N. General
Assembly by U.S. Representative Barbara
M. White on November 18, together with the
text of a resolution adopted by the commit-
tee on November 20 and by the Assembly on
December 8.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR WHITE

USUN prtss releast 152 (corr. 1) dated November 18

Sir John Rennie, the distinguished Com-
missioner General of the United Nations Re-
hef and Works Agency (UNRWA), has told
us that the Agency is facing a crisis un-
equaled in its 25 years of existence. My
delegation believes that this somber warning
is one which must be heeded by every na-
tion represented in this room today. We are
faced not solely or even predominantly with
the possibility that an organization of tested
merit is in deep trouble. No, Mr. Chairman,
the prospect we face is much more impor-
tant, much more pressing, and potentially
much more tragic ; for we are discussing the
lives of the million and a half refugees who
depend so directly on UNRWA. In very
practical terms, we must face the fact that
unless very strenuous efforts are made, the
lives of the refugees could be dramatically
changed for the worse, particularly by the
elimination of the major part of UNRWA's
educational services.

It is UNRWA's schools which will suffer
especially if expenditures must be reduced
to the level of contributions which UNRWA
estimates for this year and the years ahead.
There can be no other way in 1976, for
example, to reduce a budget of $140 million
to accommodate a deficit of $55 million. We
cannot allow this to happen.

UNRWA's schools mean more than a
quarter of a million schoolchildren and over
4,300 vocational students — of whom 92 per-

cent will be employed upon graduation.
UNRWA's schools also mean over 8,000
teachers, all of them refugees themselves.
UNRWA's schools mean, finally, the employ-
ment now and upon graduation of thousands
of refugees each year, providing better and
useful lives not only for themselves but for
the thousands more who are or will be de-
pendent upon them.

And there is yet a further consequence:
the education provided by UNRWA is a dy-
namic in what for 25 years has been an
otherwise static situation. While the search
for a political solution for the future of the
refugees continues, UNRWA has already
addressed that future by giving the refugees
and their children some of the resources to
meet it.

Mr. Chairman, education is among the
most vital services that UNRWA provides.
With the strong support of the refugees
themselves, UNRWA has decided to give the
maximum support to its schools, even at the
cost of greater austerity in its other serv-
ices. It is for this reason that for many years
UNRWA expenditures on education have
equaled 37 percent of the total budget, an
amount roughly equal to that spent on
relief.

The Commissioner General was quite cor-
rect, in noting UNRWA's anniversary this
year, that 25 years of refugee status can be
no occasion for celebration. However, to
UNRWA's great credit, it is also true that
although that status tragically continues, the
Agency has made it possible for thousands
of the refugees to acquire the modern skills
to support constructive lives. The members
of the United Nations must not allow this
possibility to be destroyed.

In 1975 half of those members, including
many countries well able to give, contributed
nothing to UNRWA. Many other members
have made only nominal contributions. The
Commissioner General has asked, with every
justification, that UNRWA's chronic finan-
cial weakness be ended. This requires — let
us acknowledge it here and now — that

30

Department of State Bulletin

UNRWA's income must rise annually to
meet the increases in costs from factors such
as inflation and currency devaluation over
which the Agency has no control.

Let me note here that the United States
has responded to the appeals by the Secre-
tary General and the Commissioner General
in 1975 with two special contributions in
addition to our regular pledge.' The total
amounted to nearly 40 percent of all govern-
ment contributions to UNRWA. However,
all members of the United Nations must now
respond if regular increases of this size are
to be met. Undercontributors and noncon-
tributors must take their part of the respon-
sibility which their votes in the General As-
sembly for UNRWA resolutions over the
years have created.

It is our challenge, our commitment, and
our responsibility to sustain the hope
UNRWA has brought to those it serves. Let
us, all of us, discharge that duty together.

The U.S. delegation introduces draft reso-
lution A/SPC/L.335 in full recognition of
the situation described by Commissioner
General Sir John Rennie. In doing so, we call
upon all member states of the United Na-
tions to make the most generous efforts pos-
sible to meet the anticipated needs of
UNRWA.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ^

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 3331 (XXIX) of 17 Decem-
ber 1974 and all previous resolutions referred to
therein, including resolution 194 (III) of 11 December
1948,

Taking note of the annual report of the Commis-
sioner-General of the United Nations Relief and
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near

' On Nov. 26 in a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee
of the General Assembly for the Announcement of
Voluntary Contributions to the U.N. Relief and
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near
East, Daniel P. Moynihan, U.S. Representative to the
United Nations, announced the U.S. pledge of $26.7
million to UNRWA for calendar year 1976. For his
statement in the ad hoc committee, see USUN press
release 160 dated Nov. 26.

East, covering the period from 1 July 1974 to 30
June 1975,

1. Notes with deep regret that repatriation or
compensation of the refugees as provided for in para-
graph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III)
has not been effected, that no substantial progress
has been made in the programme endorsed by the
Assembly in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) of
26 January 1952 for the reintegration of refugees
either by repatriation or resettlement and that, there-
fore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a
matter of serious concern;

2. Expresses its thanks to the Commissioner-Gen-
eral and to the staff of the United Nations Relief
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East for their continued dedicated and effective
efforts under difficult circumstances to provide essen-
tial services for the Palestine refugees, and to the
specialized agencies and private organizations for
their valuable work in assisting the refugees;

3. Notes with regret that the United Nations Con-
ciliation Commission for Palestine has been unable
to find a means of achieving progress in the imple-
mentation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly
resolution 194 (III) and requests the Commission to
exert continued efforts towards the implementation
of that paragraph and to report as appropriate, but
no later than 1 October 1976;

4. Directs attention to the continuing seriousness
of the financial position of the United Nations Relief
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East, as outlined in the Commissioner-General's
report ;

5. Notes with profound concern that, despite the
commendable and successful efforts of the Commis-
sioner-General to collect additional contributions, this
increased level of income to the United Nations Re-
lief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in
the Near East is still insufficient to cover essential
budget requirements in the present year, and that,
as presently foreseen levels of giving, deficits will
recur each year;

6. Calls upon all Governments as a matter of ur-
gency to make the most generous efforts possible to
meet the anticipated needs of the United Nations
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in
the Near East, particularly in the light of the budg-
etary deficits projected in the Commissioner-General's
report, and therefore urges non-contributing Govern-
ments to contribute regularly and contributing Gov-
ernments to consider increasing their regular con-
tributions.

= A/RES/3419 B (XXX) (text from U.N. doc. A/
SPC/L.335, draft resolution); adopted by the com-
mittee on Nov. 20 by a vote of 79 to 0, with 2 absten-
tions, and by the Assembly on Dec. 8 by a vote of
121 to 0, with 1 abstention.

January 5, 1976

31

THE CONGRESS

Department Discusses Grain Exports
and Reserves Negotiations

Following is a statement by Thomas 0.
Enders, Assistant Secretary for Economic
and Business Ajfairs, made before the Sub-
committee on International Resources, Food,
and Energy of the House Committee on
International Relations on December 3.^

Mr. Chairman [Representative Charles C.
Diggs, Jr.] : I appreciate the committee's
invitation to appear today to comment on
the Administration's policy on grain export
sales and management. In these comments,
I will seek to respond, within my compe-
tence, to the issues raised in your letter of
October 30 to Assistant Secretary [for Con-
gressional Relations Robert J.] McCloskey.
Those were:

— The basis for determining availabiUty
of grains for concessional exports under the
Food for Peace program.

— The importance of grain exports as a
source of foi'eign exchange.

— The policy process as applied to food
matters and grain exports.

— The status of grain reserves negotia-
tions.

I would like to begin with a few general
comments about U.S. export policy as it ap-
plies to grain. The same principles of multi-
lateralism and nondiscrimination apply to
grain as to the export of other U.S. prod-
ucts. Full production and improved competi-
tiveness over the past several years have
allowed American farmers to expand grain
exports in response to growing world de-
mand, and our policy is to maintain the

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be
published by the committee and will be available
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

gains that we have recently enjoyed on
world markets.

The large majority of foreign buyers of
American grain have generally free access
to our market. The one exception to this
policy is the agreement with the Soviet
Union. In this case, because of the Soviet
record of highly irregular and potentially
disruptive grain purchases, it was necessary
to obtain a long-term commitment from
them on annual demand and to establish an
arrangement to monitor purchases during
years of peak demand. The Soviet commit-
ment to purchase at least 6 million tons is
unconditional. On the other hand, the agree-
ment enables the United States to lower the
amount it will supply below 6 million tons,
should expected supply in this country fall
below the 225-million-ton level.

With respect to the food aid program,
Public Law 480 (the Agricultural Trade De-
velopment and Assistance Act of 1954, as
amended), provides that the Secretary of
Agriculture shall determine the type and
quantity of commodities available for con-
cessional sales. This determination only sets
the limits for what may be programed as
food aid. It is the budgetary decision of the
President that determines the size of our
food aid program. Since it is the prerogative
of the Secretary of Agriculture to make
food aid commodity determinations, I be-
lieve it would be more appropriate for fur-
ther comment on this aspect of the com-
mittee's interest to be made by the spokes-
man for that Department.

Export of agricultural commodities has
long been one of the mainstays of U.S.
foreign trade. The export of grains, always
a significant item in our balance of pay-
ments, has been an increasingly important
foreign exchange earner in recent years.
Grain export earnings grew from $2.6 bil-
lion to $10 billion between 1970 and 1974,
almost a fourfold increase — against a 130
percent gain in the value of our total ex-
ports, from $43 to $98 billion. Without the
$10.3 billion earned from grain sales abroad
last year, the $3.4 billion deficit we expe-
rienced on current account would have been

32

Department of State Bulletin

much greater. Our ability to sustain the im-
port of raw materials and fuels required by
industry and other foreign goods sought by
the American consumer would have been
diminished. In addition to an increase in unit
value, the volume of grain exports has
doubled in this decade, and the United
States, this year, will supply about 50 per-
cent of world wheat exports and 55 percent
of feed grains. The significant increase
^xpected in grain exports this year from
k-ecord crops in wheat and corn will further
strengthen our balance of payments and
allow us to meet a growing world demand
for food.

These facts underscore the important
position of agriculture, and grains in par-
ticular, in our foreign economic policy. I
oelieve that some of the discussion we have
fieard in recent weeks about who makes for-
eign agricultural policy simply reflects a
greater public awareness of the interna-
;ional importance of U.S. agriculture. The
formulation of policy and the decisionmak-
ng process within the Administration have
lot changed. Our delegation that negotiated
:he agreement with the Soviet Union on
irain supply was headed by Under Secre-
tary of State Robinson and included senior
Department of Agriculture officials. Our
Darticipation in international eff"orts under-
;aken over the past year to solve world food
aroblems has been fully coordinated, involv-
ng the participation of all interested agen-
cies. The Department of Agriculture retains
ts traditional role in both the domestic and
foreign aspects of agricultural policy.

In response to your expressed interest,
Mr. Chairman, and because it is a major U.S.
initiative in dealing with world food needs,
[ would like to summarize the status of work
jn establishing a grain reserves system.

Building on the principles outlined by Sec-
retary Kissinger in his September speech to
the seventh special session of the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly, the United States presented
k detailed proposal for a system of nation-
ally held food grain reserves to a working
group of the International Wheat Council
|(IWC) that has the negotiation of elements

January 5, 1976

of a new wheat agreement under considera-
tion. Our proposal is designed to establish
a system to increase assurance that ade-
quate food supplies will be available to all
countries despite global production fluctua-
tions. Twice in this decade unpredictable
shortfalls in world grain production have
sharply reduced available supplies, causing
widely fluctuating prices and altered con-
sumption and trading patterns. In those
situations, with food-importing countries
competing for scarce supplies, the most seri-
ously affected have been the more economi-
cally vulnerable developing countries. Our
proposal for a 30-million-ton world security
resei-ve stock of wheat and rice, held by
importers and exporters alike, would create
a reserve adequate to offset at least 90 per-
cent of production shortfalls in food grains.

As I have stated, our reserves proposal is
currently before the IWC working group,
and those discussions have not yet reached
a conclusive stage. We hope that the Wheat
Council, meeting this week in London, will
agree to accelerate the pace of those dis-
cussions so that we can move to actual nego-
tiations early next year.

There is an important procedural obstacle,
however, posed by the European Commu-
nity. The EC has taken the view that pro-
posals having to do with grain stocks should
be negotiated in the context of trade issues
in the multilateral trade negotiations (MTN)
and has not been willing to continue discus-
sions in London. We prefer the Wheat Coun-
cil forum for negotiation of a grain reserves
system because of its functional experience
and expertise in grain matters and because
of its membership, which includes the
U.S.S.R. We also believe that a reserves
system aimed at improving world food secu-
rity is urgently required and therefore
should be determined apart from other con-
tentious issues involving international grain
trade. To meet the EC's concerns, we have
stated our willingness to take the results
of a food security reserves negotiation into
full account in the MTN. But so far this
offer has not unblocked the reserves nego-
tiations. We wonder whether the EC is

33

really committed to acting to improve world
food security. Our bilateral contacts with
the EC have continued up to this time in
an effort to convince it that progress on a
reserves system is an essential part of the
common commitment to attacking the food
problem the EC and we made at the World
Food Conference one year ago.

Polar Bear Conservation Agreement
Transmitted to the Senate

Message From President Ford '

To the Senate of the United States:

I am pleased to transmit for the Senate's
advice and consent to ratification the Agree-
ment on the Conservation of Polar Bears,
done at Oslo, November 15, 1973.

I am also transmitting, for the informa-
tion of the Senate, the report of the Depart-
ment of State with respect to the agreement.

This agreement, negotiated by the five
circumpolar nations, the United States, Can-
ada, Denmark, Norway and the Soviet
Union, provides a plan of protection for
polar bears consisting of a prohibition of
hunting, killing or capturing the mammals
subject to specified exceptions. It also pro-
vides for the countries involved to cooperate
and consult with each other on research in-
volving management and conservation of
polar bears.

This agreement implements one of the
mandates of the Marine Mammal Protection
Act of 1972 which, in Section 108, calls for
development of bilateral or multilateral
agreements for the protection of marine
mammals, including polar bears. No legisla-
tion is necessary to implement the agree-
ment, since the protections of the Marine
Mammal Protection Act of 1972 exceed the
requirements of the agreement.

'Transmitted on Nov. 28 (text from White House
press release dated Nov. 29); also printed as S. Ex. I,
94th Cong., 1st sess., which includes the text of the
agreement and the report of the Department of State.

34

In addition to being the first international
agreement to focus on the conservation of
polar bears, this agreement is the first to be
negotiated by the circumpolar nations ex-
clusively. I recommend that the Senate give
early and favorable consideration to this
agreement.

Gerald R. Ford.

The White House, November 28, 1975.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention on international civil aviation. Done af

Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into forcf

April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.

Adherence deposited: Papua New Guinea, Decern
ber 15, 1975.
Protocol relating to an amendment to the conventioi

on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591). Done

at Rome September 15, 1962. Entered into forci

September 11, 1975.

Proclaimed by the President: December 16, 1975.
Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizun

of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 1970

Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 7192.

Notification of succession: Papua New Guinea
December 15, 1975 (with a reservation).
Convention for the suppression of unlawful act

against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon

treal September 23, 1971. Entered into force Janu

ary 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.

Notification of succession: Papua New Guinea '
December 15, 1975 (with a reservation).

Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done a
Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force Marc
19, 1967; for the United States December 24, 196i
TIAS 6820.

Notification of succession: Papua New Guinea
December 4, 1975.

Customs

Convention establishing a Customs Cooperation Coun
cil, with annex. Done at Brussels December IE

Department of State Bulleti

I

1950. Entered into force November 4, 1952; for the
United States November 5, 1970. TIAS 7063.
Accession deposited: Sierra Leone, November 6,

1975.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at
Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24,
1964; for the United States December 13, 1972.
TIAS 7502.

Notification of succession: Papua New Guinea,
Ij December 4, 1975.

Health

Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the Constitu-
tion of the World Health Organization of July 22,
1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086).
Adopted at Geneva May 22, 1973.'
Acceptances deposited: Iceland, December 5, 1975;
Qatar, December 8, 1975.

Maritime Matters

invention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6,
1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS
4044.
Accession deposited: Guinea, December 3, 1975.

tAeteorology

Convention of the World Meteorological Organiza-
tion. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. En-
tered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.
Accession deposited: Papua New Guinea, Decem-
ber 15, 1975.

^Jarcotic Drugs

'rotocol amending the single convention on narcotic
drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972.
Entered into force August 8, 1975. TIAS 8118.
Ratification deposited: Guatemala, December 9,
1975.

Scean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by
dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes.
Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Wash-
ington December 29, 1972. Entered into force
August 30, 1975.
Proclaimed by the President: December 15, 1975.

Privileges and Immunities

Convention on the privileges and immunities of the
United Nations. Done at New York February 13,
1946. Entered into force September 17, 1946; for
the United States April 29, 1970. TIAS 6900.
Notification of succession : Papua New Guinea,
December 4, 1975.

Safety at Sec

Convention on the international regulations for pre-
venting collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London
October 20, 1972.'

Instrument of acceptance signed by the President :
December 12, 1975.

Amendment to chapter VI of the international con-
vention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS
5780). Adopted at London November 20, 1973.'
Instrument of acceptance signed by the President:
December 15, 1975.
Amendments to chapters II, III, IV and V of the
international convention for the safety of life at
sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at London Novem-
ber 20, 1973.'

Instrument of acceptance signed by the President :
December 15, 1975.

Space

Convention on international liability for damage
caused by space objects. Done at Washington,
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into
force September 1, 1972; for the United States
October 9, 1973. TIAS 7762.

Accession deposited: Federal Republic of Ger-
many, December 18, 1975 (applicable to Berlin
(West)).

Convention on registration of objects launched into
outer space. Opened for signature at New York
January 14, 1975.'
Signature: Poland, December 4, 1975.

Trade

Protocol of provisional application of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Concluded at
Geneva October 30, 1947. Entered into force Janu-
ary 1, 1948. TIAS 1700.

De facto application: Surinam, November 25,
1975.

BILATERAL

Australia

Treaty on extradition. Signed at Washington May 14,
1974.'

Instrument of ratification signed by the President :
December 16, 1975.

Canada

Treaty on extradition, as amended by exchange of
notes of June 28 and July 9, 1974. Signed at Wash-
ington December 3, 1971.

Instrument of ratification signed by the President:
December 12, 1975.

Iceland

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and
the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to
taxes on income and capital. Signed at Reykjavik
May 7, 1975. Entered into force December 26, 1975.
Proclaimed by the President: December 12, 1975.

Poland

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and
the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to

Not in force.

{January 5, 1976

35

taxes on income, with related notes. Signed at
Washington October 8, 1974."

Instrumeixt of ratification signed by the President :
December 15, 1975.
Agreement regarding fisheries in the northeastern
Pacific Ocean ofl" the coast of the United States,
with annexes and agreed minutes. Signed at Wash-
ington December 16, 1975. Enters into force Janu-
ary 1, 1976.

Romania

Convention with respect to taxes on income. Signed
at Washington December 4, 1973.'
Instrument of ratification signed by the President :
December 15, 1975.

U.S.S.R.

Convention on matters of taxation, with related
letters. Signed at Washington June 20, 1973.'
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Decem-
ber 15, 1975.
Convention on matters of taxation, with related
letters. Signed at Washington June 20, 1973.'
Instrument of ratification signed by the President :
December 17, 1975.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock
number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20U02.
A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or
more copies of any one publication mailed to the
same address. Remittances, payable to the Superin-
tendent of Docutnents, must accompany orders.
Prices shown below, which include domestic postage,
are subject to change.

Trade — Meat Imports. Agreement with El Salvador,
TIAS 8104. 5 pp. 2bt (Cat. No. 89.10:8104).

Narcotic Drugs — Cooperative Arrangements to Curb
Illegal Traffic. Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 8108.
19 pp. 40c'. (Cat. No. S9.10:8108).

' Not in force.

No.

Date

t607

12/15

t608

12/15

*609

12/15

*610
611

12/15
12/16

t612 12/16

t613
*614
*615

12/16
12/16
12/17

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: December 15-21

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Snbject

Kissinger: remarks, Fiirth,
F.R.G.

NATO ministerial meeting com-
munique, Brussels, Dec. 12.

Learson sworn in as Ambassador
at Large and Special Repre-
sentative of the President for
the Law of the Sea Conference
(biographic data).

Kissinger: arrival, Paris.

U.S. and Argentina establish bi-
lateral working groups.

Kissinger: Conference on Inter-
national Economic Cooperation,
Paris.

U.S. and Poland sign new fish-
eries agreement.

Kissinger: interview by ABC,
CBS, NBC, Paris.

Shipping Coordinating Commit-
tee (SCC), Subcommittee on
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS),
working group on radiocommu-
nications, Jan. 15.

Study Groups 10 and 11 of the
U.S. National Committee for
the International Radio Con-
sultative Committee (CCIR),
Jan. 15.

Study Group 5 of the U.S. Na-
tional Committee for the CCIR,
Jan. 16.

Kissinger, MacEachen: remarks,
Paris.

Kissinger, MacEachen: joint
statement, Paris.

Davis sworn in as Ambassador to
Switzerland (biographic data).

U.S. statement in response to
announcement of U.K. import
measures.

U.S., Canada, U.K., Japan, and
the U.S.S.R. continue discus-
sions on the Interim Convention
on Conservation of North Pa-
cific Fur Seals of 1957.

SCC, SOLAS, working group on
subdivision and stability, Jan.
28.

Schaufele sworn in as Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs
(biographic data).

*616 12/17

*617 12/17

*618

12/17

t619

12/17

*620

12/18

t621

12/18

t622 12/18

*«23
*624

12/18
12/19

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

36

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX January 5, 1976 Vol. LXXIV, No. 1906

Angola. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer-
ence of December 9 1

Argentina. U.S. and Argentina Establish Bi-
lateral Working Groups 20

Congress

Department Discusses Grain Exports and Re-
ser\'es Negotiations (Enders) 32

Polar Bear Conservation Agreement Trans-
mitted to the Senate (message from Presi-
dent Ford) 34

Disarmament. Secretary Kissinger's News Con-
ference of December 9 1

Economic Affairs

Department Discusses Grain Exports and Re-
serves Negotiations (Enders) 32

Three Aspects of U.S. Relations With Latin
America (Rogers) 14

United States and Poland Hold Talks on North-
eastern Pacific Fisheries (joint communique) 13

Environment. Polar Bear Conservation Agree-
ment Transmitted to the Senate (message
from President Ford) 34

Food. Department Discusses Grain Exports and
Reserves Negotiations (Enders) 32

Intelligence. Secretary Kissinger's News Con-
ference of December 9 1

Israel

U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in Israel-
Syria Sector Extended (Moynihan, text of
resolution) 28

U.S. Vetoes Unbalanced Security Council Reso-
lution Concerning Israeli Air Attacks in
Lebanon (Moynihan, text of draft resolution) 21

Latin America. Three Aspects of U.S. Relations
With Latin America (Rogers) 14

Lebanon. U.S. Vetoes Unbalanced Security
Council Resolution Concerning Israeli Air
Attacks in Lebanon (Moynihan, text of draft
resolution) 21

Middle East

U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in Israel-
Syria Sector Extended (Moynihan, text of
resolution) 28

U.S. Replies to Soviet Proposal on Middle East
Peace Conference (text of U.S. note) ... 12

United States Urges Increase in Contributions
to UNRWA (White, text of resolution) . . 30

U.S. Vetoes Unbalanced Security Council Reso-
lution Concerning Israeli Air Attacks in
Lebanon (Moynihan, text of draft resolution) 21

U.S. Votes Against General Assembly Resolu-
tion on the Middle East (Bennett, text of
resolution) 26

Military Affairs. Secretary Kissinger's News
Conference of December 9 1

Organization of American States. Three As-
pects of U.S. Relations With Latin America
(Rogers) 14

Panama. Three Aspects of U.S. Relations With
Latin America (Rogers) 14

Poland. United States and Poland Hold Talks
on Northeastern Pacific Fisheries (joint com-
munique) 13

Presidential Documents. Polar Bear Conserva-
tion Agreement Transmitted to the Senate . 34

Publications. GPO Sales Publications .... 36

Refugees. United States Urges Increase in
Contributions to UNRWA (White, text of
resolution) 30

Science and Technology. U.S.- Yugoslav Board
on Scientific and Technological Cooperation
Meets (joint statement) 20

Syria. U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in
Israel-Syria Sector Extended (Moynihan,
text of resolution) 28

Treaty Information

Current Actions 34

Polar Bear Conservation Agreement Trans-
mitted to the Senate (message from Presi-
dent Ford) 34

U.S.S.R.

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of
December 9 1

U.S. Replies to Soviet Proposal on Middle East

Peace Conference (text of U.S. note) ... 12

United Nations

U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in Israel-
Syria Sector Extended (Moynihan, text of
resolution) 28

United States Urges Increase in Contributions
to UNRWA (White, text of resolution) . . 30

U.S. Vetoes Unbalanced Security Council Reso-
lution Conceming Israeli Air Attacks in
Lebanon (Moynihan, text of draft resolution) 21

U.S. Votes Against General Assembly Resolu-
tion on the Middle East (Bennett, text of
resolution) 26

Yugoslavia. U.S.-Yugoslav Board on Scientific
and Technological Cooperation Meets (joint
statement) 20

Name Index

Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr 26

Enders, Thomas O 32

Ford, President 34

Kissinger, Secretary 1

Moynihan, Daniel P 21, 28

Rogers, William D 14

White, Barbara M 30

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXIV

No. 1907 • January 12, 1976

ENERGY, RAW MATERIALS, AND DEVELOPMENT:
THE SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND

Statement by Secretary Kissinger and Text of Final Communique
of the Conference on International Economic Cooperation 37

SECRETARY KISSINGER ATTENDS NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING 51

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETI^

Vol. LXXIV, No. 1907
January 12, 1976

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Note: Contents of this publication are not
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The Department of State BVLLETU
a weekly publication issued by tf
Office of Media Services, Bureau <
Public Affairs, provides tfie public at
interested agencies of the governmei
with information on developments •
the field of U.S. foreign relations ai
on the work of the Department ai
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The BULLETIN includes select
press releases on foreign policy, issw
by the White House and the Depat
ment, and statements, addresst
and news conferences of the Preside
and the Secretary of State and oik
officers of the Department, as well
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lEnergy, Raw Materials, and Development: The Search for Common Ground

The Conference on International Eco-
lomic Cooperation met at Paris December
'6-19. Secretary Kissinger headed the U.S.
ielegation December 16-17. Following is
Secretary Kissinger's statement for the open-
ng session of the conference on December
'6, together ivith the text of the final coni-
nunique of the conference.

TATEMENT BY SECRETARY KISSINGER

ress release 612 dated December 16: as prepared for delivery

The challenge of our time is to build a
table and just international structure. This
ask has two principal dimensions. There is
he imperative of peace — the more traditional
iroblems of building security, resolving con-
licts, easing tensions. These issues dominate
he agenda of relations between East and
Vest. No less urgent is the imperative of
ustice — the compelling requirements of
lobal economic progress and social advance,
^hese are now the major issues in the rela-
ionship between North and South. They,
00, carry the potential for either conflict or
rder. Neither the goal of peace nor that of
ocial justice can be achieved in isolation.
Ve must succeed in both quests or we will
ucceed in neither.

Social justice and economic progress are
ur concerns at this conference. We meet
lere to launch the dialogue that has been so
iften urged and so long awaited. The con-
ening of this meeting should itself be a
eason for hope. For we believe it represents
[i commitment to the path of conciliation. It
jlemonstrates a recognition that consumer
ind producer, industrial and agricultural,
leveloped and developing, rich and poor,
nust together address the challenges of the
global economy.

anuary 12, 1976

The United States will work with dedica-
tion and energy for a positive outcome. We
will do so in our own self-interest and in the
interest of a more just and prosperous com-
munity of nations. We will do our utmost to
help mobilize the world's resources and the
talents of men and women everywhere in the
service of economic progress and common
well-being.

In the past two years we have all learned
that no nation or group of nations can solve
its economic problems in isolation. In a world
which is becoming increasingly interdepend-
ent, we have witnessed that inflation and
recession affect us all. We have seen that no
country can achieve redress by exporting its
economic difficulties or by exacting an exorbi-
tant economic price from others.

But our deepest challenge is political. Eco-
nomic distress magnifies the problems of gov-
ernment in all our countries, clouding the
prospects of social peace and democratic in-
stitutions. We have seen that national eco-
nomic problems thus become international;
they spawn clashes of interest and protec-
tionist pressures that strain the fabric of
collaboration even among traditional friends.
We have all come to understand that, if un-
resolved, the competing claims of developed
and developing, consumer and producer, will
thwart any effort to build a stable and pro-
gressive international structure.

Our future depends now not on blind eco-
nomic forces, but on choices that statesmen
make. The world's nations can struggle in
national or ideological contention — or they
can acknowledge their interdependence and
act out of a sense of community. The United
States has chosen the path of cooperation.

The United States, as the world's strongest
economy, has demonstrated its resilience;

37

we are on the road to recovery. We might
best survive any new round of economic war-
fare. But it is my country's conviction that
tests of strength benefit no nation. The ap-
proach that we took at the seventh special
session of the U.N. General Assembly in
September reflects our vision of a more posi-
tive future.

The special session reached consensus on
an impressive range of economic problems.
This commitment to cooperation can become
a benchmark in human affairs — if its spirit is
carried forward. We owe our people solu-
tions, not slogans. So let us set to work. Let
us implement the consensus of the special
session and take up its unfinished tasks. Let
us make this conference a decisive step to-
ward their achievement.

The Road to This Conference

We are here because two years ago the
international structure was gravely tested
by a crisis in energy. No problem on the
international agenda is more crucial to the
world economy. As this conference demon-
strates, it has led us to a much broader con-
sideration of the range of related issues.

The unprecedented expansion of the global
economy in the decades since World War II
relied upon the plentiful supply of energy at
reasonable prices. It produced economic
growth, fostered industrialization, and en-
couraged development in every quarter of
the globe.

Thus the energy crisis — caused by a com-
bination of the 1973 embargo and the fivefold
increase in the price of oil — has dealt a seri-
ous blow to global stability and prosperity.

Inflation, recession, and payments balances
significantly worsened in all the industrial-
ized world and in those developing nations
which had realized substantial progress
toward industrialization. The poorest of the
developing countries, struggling to make
modest steps toward progress, were dealt
the cruelest blow of all. Their hopes for
growth were, and continue to be, thwarted.
Their development planning has been dis-
rupted. Even their agricultural production
has been undermined by the increased cost

of petrochemical fertilizers. For the vasi
majority of the developing world, economi(
justice was poorly served.

In response to the energy crisis, the Unitec
States sought first to reach a consensu;
among the industrialized nations. We workec
together to assure basic security agains
future arbitrary disruptions in oil supply an(
against potential oil-induced financial difii
culties. We pledged ourselves to long-tern
cooperation in energy conservation and th'
development of alternative energy supplies
We agreed not to resort to protectionis
measures; and we began unprecedented co
operation in our economic policies, as drama
tized by the recent economic summit i
Rambouillet.

These actions were not taken in a spirit o
confrontation. Most are prudent steps of sell
protection which have effect only if cor
frontation is provoked by others. Other
involve an urgent program for the develoj
ment of alternative sources to the benefit c
all.

But the collaboration of the industrii
countries has always been conceived as onl
part of a larger program for economic proj
ress. From the beginning, we have foresee
an effort to develop a constructive dialogt
leading to close and mutually beneficial lonj
term economic ties with oil-producing natior
— so that our investment and technical su]
port would contribute to their developmei
and their prosperity would contribute to th
worldwide expansion of trade and develo]
ment. We recognize that the only durab'
basis for constructive relations is an ec('
nomic system which fosters the prosperit
of all. Each of us has a stake in the progrej
of others.

Last April, at the invitation of the Pres
dent of France, we agreed to begin this di:
cussion. The industrial nations wanted 1
focus on energy. The oil-producing and oth( i
developing nations wanted to give equ^
priority to a wider range of developmei
issues, including prices and markets f(
other raw materials, and to international 1
nancial questions. The industrial nations r
garded these issues as too varied and comple
to be addressed effectively in a single forur

38

Department of State Bulleti

Tie April preparatory conference failed to
r:oncile these positions.

To demonstrate its desire for a construc-
te and cooperative solution the United
Bites worked closely with other participants
;i developing a mutually satisfactory ar-
Mgement: energy, the concerns of the less
i /eloped countries about raw materials,
i/elopment, and related financial matters
vuld be addressed as part of a discussion
):global economic problems, while maintain-
i: enough distinction between them for a
jiful dialogue.

The United States is committed to a seri-
)■; and wide-ranging program of cooperation
\h the developing world. My country
ilerstands full well, and has shown in its
my proposals, that this dialogue must en-
mpass issues of concern to all sides — in-
;! ding the needs of the many nations not in
1 endance here. For us, this clearly requires
I iscussion of the effects of energy prices
)i the world economy. For cooperation de-
)• ds on mutual respect, mutual understand-
I, and mutual benefit.

"'o this end, at the seventh special session
)1 the U.N. General Assembly three months
H; the United States made a series of pro-
X als in several areas :

-To insure the economic security of de-
/oping countries against shortfalls in ex-
it t earnings, food shortages, and natural
ii isters ;

-To accelerate their economic growth by
r)roving their access to capital markets,
:€inology, and foreign investment;

-To better the conditions of trade and
nestment in key commodities on which
nny of their economies are dependent and
x;et an example in the vital area of food ;

-To improve the world trading system
ti make it better serve development goals,
u; realize through the multilateral trade
Kotiations a strengthening of developing-
■cntry participation; and

-To address the especially urgent needs
lithe poorest countries devastated by cur-
rtjt economic conditions.

I^he seventh special session ended on a
Q'ie of conciliation and cooperation. The

Wuary 12, 1976

spirit of the session was carried forward to
the October preparatory conference in Paris,
where the declaration laid the basis for our
meeting today.

This will be the attitude of the United
States here. Progress has been made in many
areas, and this conference must move us for-
ward.

The Work of the Commissions

The four commissions that this conference
is establishing have much work before them :

— The Commission on Energy should pro-
mote an effective world balance between
energy demand and supply. It should work
for practical cooperation among industrial-
ized and developing countries to develop new
energy supplies. And it should lay the foun-
dations of a mutually beneficial long-term
relationship between energy producers and
consumers.

— The Commission on Raw Materials
should work to establish the conditions for
stable longrun supplies of raw materials
vital to global progress at prices that are
remunerative to producers and fair to con-
sumers.

— The Commission on Development should
strive to accelerate economic development in
all nations, especially the poorest. In par-
ticular, it should bring together industrial
nations and oil-wealthy nations to provide
financial support for the development initia-
tives of the U.N. special session.

— The Commission on Finance should ad-
dress financial issues as they relate to the
work of the other three commissions. It
should seek to strengthen the sense of shared
financial responsibility for the health and
growth of the international economy.

With a cooperative approach, the commis-
sions can give direction and impetus to re-
lated activity in other forums and organiza-
tions, under whose jurisdiction a number of
these issues fall. They can serve as clearing-
houses for information and motivate other
organizations doing similar work. They can
identify areas where necessary work is not

39

being done and devise new initiatives where
needed.

The United States will support progress
on a broad range of topics in the context of
the four commissions. But we have a special
interest in the following areas:

— First, the price of oil and the security
of oil supply as they affect the international
economy ;

— Second, the serious balance-of-payments
problems of developing countries ;

— Third, the conditions of international in-
vestment ;

— Fourth, the issues of key commodities,
especially food ;

— Fifth, the problems of trade; and

— Sixth, the urgent needs of the poorest
countries.

Let me discuss each of these in turn.

Energy

First, energy. The application of science
and technology to tap the vast energy poten-
tial imprisoned beneath the earth, radiated
by the sun, generated by the movement of
wind and water across the earth's surface, or
locked in the core of matter is fundamental
to the hopes of millions to pull themselves
above a bare struggle for existence. For the
expansion of the global economy for both
developed and developing countries depends
heavily on our harnessing and efficiently
employing the world's energy resources.

Some nations are particularly well en-
dowed with these resources; some have the
scientific and technological expertise to ex-
plore and utilize that potential. The inter-
national flow of energy, investment capital
required to produce it, and goods produced
from fuels have become in effect a global
energy system which sustains all our econo-
mies. Only through international coopera-
tion can all nations benefit from these
processes and can the world economy harness
its energy resources most effectively.

The United States is committed to a co-
operative approach. We have much to offer.
We have produced more energy than any
other nation in the history of mankind, our

energy science and technology are the mc ;
advanced, and we have tremendous potent I
for future energy development in our coi'-
try and abroad. The United States also h;
much to gain from cooperation. Our ener-
needs are the world's largest; our ability i
raise living standards for all our citiz€;
depends on greater energy production a I
the more efficient use of energy resources
This dialogue and this conference hf ;
these tasks:

— First, it is time to reach a common ev ■
uation of the relationship between changes i
energy prices and the stability and perfor ■
ance of the world economy.

The abrupt and arbitrary increase in 1 s
price of oil has been a major factor in ra i
of inflation and unemployment unpreceden I
since the 1930's. It has led to serious balan •
of-payments deficits, indirectly throi i
global recession and directly through hig! •
priced imports.

By extraordinary eft'ort, the indust 1
countries, on the whole, put their payme 5
back in balance over the last year, althoi i
at a high cost to the well-being of tl r
peoples. Thus the immediate burden of ;
massive petrodollar deficit is now bo ;
largely by the developing countries wh i
have little or no oil resources.

Developing countries, by definition, tent )
have less of a margin to reduce consumpt ,
to restructure energy use, or to shift 5
alternative sources when the oil price ri; .
They are the most vulnerable — and the ir t
wounded.

A lower oil price would make possible m e
rapid economic recovery around the gk !.
It would assist the developing countries 1
easing their enormous balance-of -payme s
burden and their debt burden and increas %
foreign demand for their exports. A lo' r
price, along with stability of supply, wod
also benefit producer nations over the I'k
term by easing the urgency for consum g
countries to develop alternative supy
sources.

Conversely, any further increase in pri3
would seriously hamper economic recov('.
retard international trade, compound the i-

40

Department of State Bull

nal difficulties of many countries, weaken
ability of the advanced nations to assist
developing, and strain the fabric of inter-
ncional cooperation.

!t is time for a serious discussion of this
isue. We are prepared to make a sustained
elDrt to achieve understanding.

-Second, we must collaborate to find new

ices of energy and intensify our conser-
■ ion efforts. All consuming countries, de-
vtoped and developing, must use energy
■nre efficiently and develop more abundant
snplies. Producers need to prepare their
scnomies for the day when they will have
ajiausted their easily accessible oil reserves.

ndividually, the industrialized countries
ii accelerating the development of their
m energy sources. The United States is de-
I'oping its conventional fuels and also new
screes, including nuclear power, to replace
''c^il fuels. We have committed massive re-
screes to research and devoted our best
:a'nts to this effort; we expect it to result
m substantial increase in U.S. energy pro-
lition. In Europe, major efforts have been
a iched along the same lines, with the
N' "th Sea as the most dramatic example
)f he potential. The development of alterna-
;i'' energy sources is vital.

II the near future, the industrial countries
■V take the first steps toward welding these
liional programs into a coherent cooperative
3rgram. These programs are designed to
Jimote conservation and to accelerate the
Uelopment of alternative energy supplies
-hjugh large-scale joint projects and coop-
er tion in research and development. We will
leionstrate our commitment to the maxi-
nm development of new energy by agree-
i^ not to permit imported oil to be sold in
)i internal markets below a common mini-
um safeguard price.

'his effort will bring a better balance to
:h world energy market. But as it gathers
aiport, it will bring important benefits to
''eloping as well as industrial countries.

■ programs that the industrial countries
undertaking, and those that many de-
oping countries have within their poten-
1 to undertake, can lead to additional and
rojre secure supplies of energy, which can

be a spur to their prosperity and develop-
ment. All nations will have access to a larger
pool of energy resources, and there will be
less competition for oil. The efforts of de-
veloping countries to increase their own pro-
duction of energy, if supported, can be the
single most important step they take to
secure their development for future genera-
tions.

At the seventh special session of the Gen-
eral Assembly, the United States proposed
an International Energy Institute. Through
such an organization, the developed coun-
tries and OPEC countries [Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries] can assist
poorer developing nations to utilize energy
more efficiently, increase their own produc-
tion, and improve allocation and distribution
of existing resources. It could identify cur-
rent or new energy technologies most rele-
vant to their special needs. The institute can
help oil-producing countries to improve the
use of their own energy.

Using the most advanced techniques of
analysis, the institute could help assess all
countries' energy resources and require-
ments. Staffed by experts drawn from gov-
ernment, industry, and academic life in both
industrialized and developing countries, it
could provide training for local and regional
technicians or specialists in energy problems.
It could become a central point of contact
where policymakers and experts could ex-
change ideas on plans and programs.

We see the institute as a first bridge be-
tween the massive effort the industrialized
countries have now launched to develop al-
ternative sources of energy and the effort
which the developing countries must now
undertake.

In addition, the United States has sug-
gested a number of other means by which
the talents and experience of the developed
nations, collectively and individually, can as-
sist developing states to find and exploit new
energy sources and conserve their national
patrimony. We will advance these proposals
in the Energy Commission. We anticipate a
full exchange of views on their scope and
substance.

Oil producers and nations with the tech-

J«i|oary 12, 1976

41

nology to help develop oil resources share an
interest in cooperation on conservation and
exploration. But this cooperation will be
easier to forge in a stable energy market
with a more appropriate structure of energy
prices.

— Third, the United States seeks a greater
participation and contribution of the oil-
producing countries in the international
economy. With the extraordinary transfer
of wealth that has taken place, it is in the
common interest that the oil-producing na-
tions be constructive members, not challen-
gers, of the world economic system, that in-
vestment and the latest technology be made
available to them on a reimbursable basis
for their development programs, and that
the flow of goods and services be enhanced
between producing and consuming countries.

We believe that these three issues — a
better understanding of the effects of oil
price increases on the world economy; coop-
eration on conservation and new production ;
and the orderly integration of OPEC econo-
mies into the global economy — are priority
tasks for the energy forum.

Balance of Payments

The balance-of-payments problems of de-
veloping countries are an immediate and
urgent task for this conference to address,
closely related to the energy issue. Current
projections indicate that the developing
world in 1976 will be collectively in deficit
by about $35 billion. Bilateral and multilat-
eral aid, along with direct investment, will
finance roughly $25 billion of this. The ques-
tion is whether borrowing from international
capital markets can again this year make up
the remainder. If not, some countries will
be forced to reduce imports, cut back de-
velopment programs, and further mortgage
their future. The deficits of the developing
countries thus could endanger not only their
own well-being but also the stability of the
international trade and financial system.

A multitude of ideas and proposals are al-
ready before us. Let us address steps that
can be taken now.

— First, the members of the IMF [Inte
national Monetary Fund] should prompt
agree on the details of the Trust Fund whi(
the United States has proposed to furni;
concessional financing for the poorest cou
tries. It would provide these countries a
ditional resources of $l-$2 billion a ye£
using the profits from IMF gold sales as w
as national contributions. We are well on t
way to resolving outstanding issues on IIV
gold; let us take final action on the Tru
Fund in January.

- — Second, the members of the IMF shoi
complete negotiations next month on t
new development security facility. T
United States made this major proposal
provide more substantial financing to cot
tries facing temporary shortfalls in expc
earnings due to the world business cy
or commodity fluctuations. We proposed tl
on September 1 ; its realization in Janua
would be an impressive demonstration
international resolve and responsiveness.

— Third, the IMF should approve a oi
third increase in member quotas, thus (
panding its potential financing for all me
bers.

Final approval can and must be taken
each of these proposals at the meeting
the IMF Interim Committee in Jamaica
early January. Together with substani
unused regular drawings still available <
developing countries, these measures \ I
add significantly to the capacity of deveL"
ing countries to sustain their needed impo I
and their development programs.

But however substantial these faciliti ,
they may not be enough. Once the Tn ;
Fund and these other proposals have b(i
implemented in January, we must determ i
how best to respond to the remaining ):■
ance-of -payments problems of the develop) !
countries. The United States is committed )
finding a constructive solution.

Our specific response will depend in pt
on whether there is a general across-t-
board financing problem or one concentr-
ing on a few countries. One promising ■
proach would be to expand the credit tU
developing countries can draw from the II''
by liberalizing the rules governing access J

42

Department of State Bulled

regular IMF resources. The IMF Board could,
for example, increase the size of each credit
drawing, base them on expanded new quotas,
or add a new drawing beyond those now
available. Decisions on such proposals will
aeed to be based on close analysis of their
jffect on the financial integrity of the IMF.
Secretary [of the Treasury William E.]
5imon will present our analysis and pro-
posals for increased use of the IMF at the
nterim Committee meeting.

We cannot emphasize enough the need for
mmediate action in this area to supplement
he long-term proposals which have already
)een made. The responsibility does not lie
vith the industrialized countries alone. We
annot be expected to bear the major bur-
lens for remedying balance-of -payments
iroblems in which the actions of others play
uch a significant role. There is a collective
bligation to act; there must be a joint pro-
:ram involving the industrialized as well
s the oil-producing countries.

ivestment and Technology for Development

The balance-of-payments deficits of the
eveloping countries will perhaps moderate
s the global economy recovers from reces-
ion. But sustained economic growth re-
uires the continuous application of capital,
echnology, and management skills to de-
elopment needs.

Private investment has always been a
lajor factor in the growth of the global econ-
my. My own country has benefited from
oreign investment throughout its history,
"oday more than ever, the developing coun-
ries need this capital in addition to the
mited supply of official development assist-
nce.

To make this possible, governments of
eveloping countries need better access to
/orld capital markets. The United States
as urged that technical assistance and ex-
lertise be provided to developing countries
hat are ready to enter long-term private
apital markets for the first time. We have
(iroposed a major expansion of the resources
'if the World Bank's International Finance
'orporation (IFC) to strengthen the private

anuary 12, 1976

sector in developing countries and to enhance
their international competitiveness for pri-
vate capital. We have recommended crea-
tion of an international investment trust to
mobilize private portfolio capital for invest-
ment in local enterprises. And we are con-
tributing to the work of the IMF-World
Bank Development Committee to assist in
removing impediments to developing coun-
tries' access to capital markets.

But we also believe that one of the most
important vehicles for transferring capital,
technology, and management skills to where
they are most needed is private enterprise.
There simply is not enough governmental
capital available. Because of ideological con-
siderations, these private enterprises oper-
ate in an investment climate increasingly
clouded by unpredictable national legislation
and uncertain rules of the game.

In this environment everybody suffers.
Host countries are deprived of the capital
resources, technology, and management
which these enterprises uniquely provide,
as well as a source of tax revenue. Home
countries are deprived of the overseas
markets, investment income, and the new
ideas and techniques which come with
foreign contact. And the enterprises them-
selves are squeezed at both ends, making
overseas investment less worthwhile for
them and reducing their contribution to
home and host country alike and to the
global product.

The United States has taken an active part
in international eff'orts to facilitate inter-
national investment on a basis that serves
the interests of all parties. We are willing to
explore voluntary guidelines for the be-
havior of both transnational enterprises and
governments. At the United Nations I stated
four basic principles that should be included :

— Transnational enterprises must obey
local law and refrain from unlawful interven-
tion in the domestic affairs of host coun-
tries.

— Host governments must treat these en-
terprises equitably, without discrimination
among them, and in accordance with inter-
national law.

— Both governments and businesses must

43

respect the contractual obligations they free-
ly undertake.

— Principles for transnational enterprises
should apply to domestic enterprises where
relevant.

But efforts should not be limited to gen-
eral guidelines for investment. Other re-
medial measures are possible.

Taxation is one such area. Because they
operate in multiple jurisdictions, transna-
tional enterprises may sometimes be subject
to either double taxation or inappropriate
tax incentives. The result in either case is
that investment patterns are distorted. We
must find ways to enable both host and home
countries to coordinate their tax policies and
make them more equitable to each other and
to productive enterprises.

A second area for improvement is inter-
governmental consultation on investment
disputes. This is especially important to de-
veloping countries whose progress is depend-
ent on a climate conducive to an adequate
flow of investment. It is time to develop
generally accepted international rules for the
settlement of investment disputes and the
arbitration of differences and other guide-
lines for dealing with problems arising be-
tween governments and enterprises. The
United States recommends that the World
Bank's International Center for Settlement
of Investment Disputes be given a greater
role in solving important investment contro-
versies.

International assistance for development
must also focus on the advancement, selec-
tion, and application of modern technology.
Many countries in the developing world are
already on the path of industrialization.
They have proved their capacity to take
advantage of the vast storehouse of modern
technology. The United States encourages
this endeavor. We have long been in the fore-
front of the effort to train more managers,
technicians, and researchers in the develop-
ing countries to carry this forward.

Most technology transfer takes place
through international investment and the
operations of transnational entei-prises on a
licensing, equity, or contract basis. The
United States understands the concern of

44

many developing countries not to become the
repository of obsolescent technology. Tech-
nology must be suited to local needs, the
terms and conditions must be mutually ac-
ceptable, and it must be effectively managed
and utilized. Developing countries must be
enabled to make their own informed choices
of foreign or domestic technology, to adapt
it to their own needs and conditions, and to
manage its application skillfully. This tech-
nology transfer requires the development of
human capabilities — the management and
skills that constitute the infrastructure of
technological development.

People — their training and their place-
ment in a country's management systems-
are the key to making technology a produc-
ing resource. International cooperation car
make no greater contribution to develop-
ment than to foster the training of a corps
of specialists in each country competent tc
select, bargain for, and manage technologies
We see this requirement as an importani
topic for consideration by the Commission or
Development, and we will make concret(
proposals to this end.

Commodities

A healthy global economy requires tha
both producers and consumers find protec
tion against the cycle of raw materials sur
plus and shortage which chokes growth am
disrupts planning. We must insure mon
reliable supplies of vital commodities oi
terms fair to all. j

The problem is most urgent in food, man
kind's most critical need. The cycles of feas |
and famine, widely fluctuating prices of basi
foodstuffs, and breakdowns in the system o
storage and transportation continue to af
flict mankind. These show few signs of abat
ing. And in the long run, growth in demani |
for food threatens to outrun the expansioi
of supply.

As the world's largest producer and e»
porter of food, the United States recognize
its special responsibility. At home, we hav'
been committed to policies of maximum foo(
production and have removed all productioi
restraints ; internationally, we have propose<
a system of grain reserves to help moderat

Department of State Bulletiit

fluctuations in world prices and supplies.

We believe that our grain reserves pro-
posal can be a model for cooperation on other
commodity problems. It takes into account
the interests of producers and consumers. It
makes special provision for the concerns of
developing countries. Its reliance on buffer
stocks minimizes the distortion of trade and
improves the efficiency of the market. We
nowf await the cooperation and commitment
3f others to help implement this proposal.

Most importantly, we are increasing our
assistance to developing countries — not
nerely for short-term relief but to help them
300st their own agricultural production. Our
jilateral aid programs in this area have
)een expanded greatly. We also strongly
iupport the proposal first made by oil-export-
ng countries for an International Fund for
Agricultural Development. We have an-
lounced our willingness to make a contribu-
ion of $200 million, or one-fifth of the world-
vide goal of $1 billion.

Other commodities are of critical impor-
ance to many countries, either as producers
>r consumers. Many developing countries
lepend crucially on earnings from commod-
ty exports to lift their people above subsist-
■nce levels, to support basic social programs,
ind to finance the beginnings of industriali-
ation. The solution to commodity issues will
ffect not only the developing countries but
.Iso the industrial countries — who are in
act the largest producers, consumers, and
xporters of commodities. The economies of
11 countries are affected by the instabilities
f the market — the vulnerability of agricul-
ural commodities to the vagaries of weather
nd shifts in world demand, the sensitivity
if agricultural and mineral markets to fluc-
uations in the business cycle in industrial
ountries, and the higher prices of critical
nergy imports.
At the seventh special session a consensus
vas achieved that commodity issues should
)e approached cooperatively. The U.S. posi-
ion is that a realistic and constructive ap-
iroach will require that we:

— Establish producer-consumer forums
or discussions of key commodities;
— Reduce obstacles to producers' access to

markets and to consumers' access to sup-
plies ;

— -Rely more on buffer stocks, where fea-
sible and necessary, in preference to restric-
tions on trade and production ;

— Improve the productivity and market-
ability of agricultural raw materials; and

— Expand worldwide production capacity
in other key commodities.

We now stand ready to cooperate in estab-
lishing producer-consumer forums to discuss
copper, bauxite, and other commodities. We
plan to address the question of supply and
mai'ket access in the multilateral trade ne-
gotiations in the next several months. We
have proposed that the IFC and the IBRD
[International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (World Bank)] make available
increased financing for mineral development
and look forward to progress in the near fu-
ture. We plan to support the U.N. Revolving
Fund for Natural Resources Exploration.
Finally, we have proposed establishment of
an organization to finance and coordinate
research on nonfood tropical products to im-
prove their productivity and competitiveness.

We look forward to additional discussion
of these measures in the Raw Materials Com-
mission of this conference.

Trade

An expanding and more open international
trading system is a principal factor in the
growth and development of both developed
and developing nations. We are committed
to the strengthening of this system so it can
better serve the needs of the international
community and include importantly the de-
veloping nations.

Trade enables nations to earn their own
way. It is most consistent with national dig-
nity and with the efficiency of the economic
system.

Over the last five years, in a major step of
international cooperation, all the major in-
dustrial nations have committed themselves
to establish a generalized system of tariff
preferences, giving developing countries bet-
ter access to the markets of all industrial
nations.

January 12, 1976

45

The United States will implement its gen-
eralized system of preferences in two weeks'
time. Under this system we will eliminate
duties on 2,724 tariff items, representing
some 19 percent of dutiable non-oil imports
from eligible countries in 1974. This will open
up significant potential new markets for the
products of developing countries in the
United States.

Tropical products are a promising area of
export expansion for many developing coun-
tries. The international trading system
should encourage this expansion. In the mul-
tilateral trade negotiations in Geneva, work
is beginning on a package of tariff conces-
sions on tropical products for early imple-
mentation. We attach much importance to
this effort.

Tariff escalation — the process by which
tariffs are progressively increased on goods
as they move higher on the ladder of process-
ing— is an obstacle to the exports and in-
dustrialization of many developing countries.
At the U.N. special session, we proposed
that reduction, or in some cases elimination,
of tariff escalation be an important goal for
the multilateral trade negotiations. The ef-
fort to identify and negotiate specific
changes will begin next year.

This effort, however, is related in our view
to the issue of access to supply of raw mate-
rials. Consumers cannot be expected to im-
prove access to their markets for finished
products if they face restrictions on supplies
of related raw materials. Thus the Geneva
negotiations must also improve access to
supply as well as access to markets.

Reducing or eliminating nontariff barriers
to trade is another major task facing the
international trading community. We will
make a particular effort to negotiate special
and differential treatment for developing
countries in this area.

An improved and strengthened world trad-
ing system would not be complete, however,
if it did not insure greater sharing by de-
veloping countries of both benefits and re-
sponsibilities. Developing countries should
gradually take on the normal obligations of

reciprocity and trade rules as they progress.

The multilateral trade negotiations are
the most effective forum for pursuing all
these objectives.

The United States put forward proposals
in many of these areas at the recent meet-
ing of the Trade Negotiations Committee in
Geneva as goals for 1976. The developing
countries will also benefit from progress in
all other areas of the negotiations, which
we now hope will be completed in 1977.

The United States is committed to a role
of leadership in the multilateral trade nego-
tiations. We will seek rapid progress for the
benefit of both developing and developed
countries. I believe that this conference and
its relevant commissions should endorse the
work of the multilateral trade negotiations.
It should provide continued support for the
negotiations by monitoring and contributing
ideas to the work in Geneva.

Global Poverty

Our deliberations here must address the
plight of the one-quarter of mankind whose
lives are overwhelmed by poverty and hun-
ger and numbed by insecurity and despair
This group has suffered immeasurably froir
high prices of food and fuel. Their export
revenues have been seriously undermined
by global recession.

In these regions less than one person ir
five is literate; one baby in ten dies in child-
hood, and in some areas closer to one out oi
two; life expectancy is less than 50 years;
and birth rates continue to be intolerably
high. Public expenditures for education and
health care are low — and their per capita
income has been declining for the last four
years.

And so today, alongside the Third World
with its increasing power and assertiveness^
there has come into being a fourth world;
where human beings still struggle for bare
existence.

In one international conference after
another, we have all pointed to the fourth
world with sincere intentions of giving im-

46

Department of State Bulletin'

mediate help, providing long-term assistance,
and devising special arrangements. We have
agreed that this is a major test of a just
international structure. It is time for all of
us here to act on our words. Three areas
need immediate action:

— First, many of the poorest cannot fi-
nance balance-of-payments deficits because
they cannot gain access to capital markets
)r because of high interest rates on what
ittle finance they can obtain. The Trust
?'und which the United States proposed in
;he IMF to provide up to $2 billion for
;mergency relief is of special benefit to them.
!iet us reach a consensus to create this Trust
^und at next month's IMF meeting in
Famaica.

— The second area for immediate action
s food aid. No obligation is more basic than
lur insuring that the poorest are fed. This
iscal year the United States expects to pro-
•ide more than 6 million tons of food aid —
r more than 60 percent of the 10-million-ton
rlobal target set by the World Food Confer-
nce and a 20 percent increase over last
ear's contribution. Others must donate
heir fair share.

— Third, the poorest countries need pref-
rential and expanded access to oflicial con-
essionary financial aid. The United States
/ill do its part. More than 70 percent of our
ilateral development assistance now goes
0 low-income countries. The concessional
nancing of the international financial insti-
utions should also be expanded. At the
eventh special session, my government
ledged to support the fifth IDA [Inter-
ational Development Association] replen-
5hment and the regional development banks.
Ve are making every effort to secure con-
ressional appropriations for funds already
ommitted. We hope that the traditional and
ew donors will help the poorest through
nancial contributions to both bilateral and
multilateral programs.

Let us urgently rededicate ourselves to
ction on behalf of the poorest among us.
iuch action is the responsibility of the entire

world community — not just the industrial
countries but also the more affluent in the
developing world. While no one commission
will be dealing with the totality of problems
of the fourth world, each commission has a
responsibility to be conscious of the need for
special consideration for the poorest.

Conclusion

Ladies and gentlemen: The nations and
economies of the world are many; our dif-
ferences are great. But our reasons for pull-
ing together are far greater. Therefore our
dialogue here must be candid, but with a
positive spirit and cooperative attitude. The
prosperity, the progress, and indeed the
security of the world may depend upon
whether we succeed in finding realistic
answers to the kinds of problems before us
at this conference. For lasting peace around
the globe will depend not only on containing
conflict but mounting progress. It requires
not merely the preservation of stability but
the fulfillment of human aspirations.

The issues we face are often technical, but
their implications could not be more pro-
found. They go to the heart of our future.
Only rarely in history does mankind con-
sciously swing out from familiar, well-
marked paths to move in new directions.
Only rarely does humanity comprehend as
clearly as we do today that change is immi-
nent and that the direction to be taken is
subject to human decision. The nations of
the world face such an opportunity now.

We have the possibility of forging inter-
national relationships that will govern world
affairs for the next several decades. We can
bring together developed and developing,
producer and consumer, in common endeav-
ors— or we can go our separate ways, with
every one of us paying the price for a lack
of vision in lower standards of living and
increased international tensions. Mutual
interest should bring us together; only blind-
ness can keep us apart.

The American people have always believed
in a world of conciliation rather than a world

lanuary 12, 1976

47

ruled by intimidation, pressure, or force. My
country, in spite of its own strengths and
advantages, has chosen the path of cooper-
ation. We will remain committed to that
path. But we cannot travel it alone; others
will have to join us. All of us here must base
our policies on the reality that we have a
practical and moral stake in each other's
well-being.

I am confident of our cooperation and of
our success. The result will be a fair and
prosperous world economy of benefit to all
nations, and with it new hope, opportunity,
and justice for all peoples.

TEXT OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE '

1. The Conference on International Economic Co-
operation met in Paris at ministerial level, from
December 16 to December 19. Representatives of the
following 27 members of the Conference took part;
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Cameroon.
Canada, EEC [European Economic Community],
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Japan,
Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, United States, Venezuela,
Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia. The ministerial repre-
sentatives who attended the conference welcomed the
presence of the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.

2. The work of the Conference was opened by H. E.
the President of the French Republic, Mr. Valery
Giscard d'Estaing.

3. The Hon. Allan J. MacEachen, Secretary of
State for External Affairs of Canada, and Dr. Manuel
Perez-Guerrero, Minister of State for International
Economic Affairs of Venezuela, co-chairmen of the
Conference on International Economic Cooperation,
presided at the ministerial meeting.

4. The ministerial representatives at the Confer-
ence expressed their views with regard to the inter-
national economic situation. They made suggestions
as to how the problems which they had identified
might be resolved. Attention was drawn to the
plight of the most seriously affected countries. They
recognized that the Conference on International
Economic Cooperation provides a unique opportunity
to address these problems and to further interna-
tional economic cooperation for the benefit of all
countries and peoples.

5. The Conference decided to initiate an intensified

international dialogue. To this end, it establishes
four Commissions (on energy, raw materials, de
velopment and financial affairs) which will mee
periodically through the coming year. It was agree
that each of the four Commissions would consist o
fifteen members, ten of them representing develop
ing countries, five of them representing industrial
ized countries.

6. The Commissions shall start their work on Fel
ruary 11, 1976. Preparation for the work of the fou
commissions shall be reviewed at a meeting of th
co-chairmen of the Conference and of the four Con
missions after consultation with the other partic
pants in the Conference. This meeting will tak
place on January 26, 1976 within the framework (
the general guidelines contained in paragraphs 10-1
of the final declaration of the Second Preparator
Meeting which are approved by the Conference.'

7. The Conference agreed that the following pai
ticipants should serve on the Commissions:

— Energy: Algeria, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, EE(
India, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Japan, Saudi Arabi;
Switzerland, United States, Venezuela, Zaire.

— Raw materials: Argentina, Australia, Cameroo
EEC, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Spai
United States, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambi

— Development: Algeria, Argentina, Cameroo
Canada, EEC, India, Jamaica, Japan, Nigeria, Pak
stan, Peru, Sweden, United States, Yugoslavia, Zair

— Finance: Brazil, EEC, Egypt, India, Indonesi
Iran, Iraq, Japan, Mexico, Pakistan, Saudi Arabi
Sweden, Switzerland, United States, Zambia.

The co-chairmen of the Commissions will be:

— Energy: Saudi Arabia and United States.
— Raw materials: Japan and Peru. .

— Development: Algeria and EEC. |

— Finance: EEC and Iran.

Joint meetings of the co-chairmen of the Conferen
and of the Commissions may be held if the nei
arises.

8. It was agreed that members of the Conferen^
who wish to follow the work of a Commission
which they do not belong should be entitled to a
point a representative in the capacity of audit
without the right to speak.

9. The Conference decided that a number of inte
governmental functional organizations which a
directly concerned with the problems to be consider!
would be able to make a useful contribution to the
consideration. It therefore invited these organizatioi
(United Nations Secretariat, OPEC, lEA, UNCTAl
OECD, FAO, GATT, UNDP, UNIDO, IMF, IBR:

'Issued at Paris on Dec. 19 (unofficial text).

- For text of the final declaration of the secoi
preparatory meeting issued at Paris on Oct. 16, 197
see Bulletin of Nov. 10, 1975, p. 668.

48

Department of State Bulleti

SELA) ' to be represented on a permanent basis in
:he relevant commissions. Their observers will have
;he right to speak but not the right to vote and
lence will not participate in the formation of a con-
sensus. Each commission may, in addition, invite
ippropriate intergovernmental functional organiza-
ions to participate as observers ad hoc in the exami-
lation of specific questions.

10. The Conference decided to establish an inter-
national secretariat with an exclusively administra-
ive and technical function on the basis of proposals
i)ut forward by the two co-chairmen. It named Mr.
Jernard Guitton [of France] as head of the secre-
ariat and approved plans for its organization and
perational procedures. The financial costs arising
irom the establishment of the secretariat and from
uture meetings of the Conference will be borne by
lembers of the Conference on the basis of a formula
greed by the Conference.

11. It was agreed that the four Commissions
hould meet in Paris. Subsequent meetings of the
ommissions will be convened by their co-chairmen.

12. One or several meetings of the Conference at
le level of government officials may be held at
■ast six months after this ministerial meeting. The
[inisterial Conference agreed to meet again at min-
iterial level in about twelve months time.

13. The Conference adopted the rules of procedure
^commended by the Preparatory Meeting which
re based on the principle of consensus, according to
hich decisions and recommendations are adopted
hen the chair has established that no member dele-
ation has made any objection. English, Arabic,
panish and French are the official and working
nguages of the Conference. The rules of procedure
pply to all the bodies of the Conference.

14. The Conference took note of the resolution of
le General Assembly entitled "Conference on Inter-
itional Economic Cooperation" (Resolution 3515
ICXX)) and agreed to make reports available to
le 31st session of the U.N. General Assembly.

15. The members of the Conference paid special
ibute to President Giscard d'Estaing for the action
! had taken to bring about the dialogue which is
)w engaged and expressed their warm appreciation
' the Government of France for its hospitality and
ir the efforts and obligations it had undertaken in
•der to make the Ministerial Conference a success.

''Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries;
iternational Energy Agency; United Nations Con-
iirence on Trade and Development; Organization for
iconomic Cooperation and Development; Food and
griculture Organization; General Agreement on
ariffs and Trade; United Nations Development Pro-
ram; United Nations Industrial Development Or-
mization; International Monetary Fund; Interna-
onal Bank for Reconstruction and Development;
atin America Economic System.

anuary 12, 1976

The Common Challenge in the Search
for an Enduring Peace

Folloiving are remarks made by Secretary
Kissinger at Fuerth, Federal Republic of
Germany, on December 15 upon accepting
Fuerth's Gold Medal for Distinguished Na-
tive Citizens.

Press release 607 dated December 15

Mr. Foreign Minister, Mr. Minister-Presi-
dent, Mr. Lord Mayor, distinguished guests,
friends: This is not the first time in the last
35 years that I have paid a sentimental visit
to Fuerth. I enjoyed a brief but warm stay in
1959. I have often exchanged letters with
your distinguished Lord Mayor and his prede-
cessor and have been encouraged and
strengthened by their good wishes in many
periods of my public life. When the honor I
am now receiving was first offered to me, I
accepted with pleasure.

I am proud to be here as the Secretary of
State of perhaps the only country in the
world where it is possible for an adopted son
to have the opportunity for responsibility
and service that I have enjoyed. I am happy
to share this occasion with my family, my
parents, who have never lost their attach-
ment to this city in which they spent the
greater part of their lives. I believe that my
visit here exemplifies the extraordinary re-
birth of friendship between the American
people and the German people.

This is why the central role in this event
of my colleague and friend Hans-Dietrich
Genscher means so much to me. The partner-
ship that he and I carry out every day in
international affairs is given a deeper quality
by the personal affection and comradeship
that exists between us.

Our generation has witnessed — and has
no excuse ever to forget — the dark force of
brutality and raw power at large in the mod-
ern world. As I stand here today, suffering is
still dominant in many parts of the globe. Of
all the species on this planet, man alone has
inflicted on himself the great part of his own
anguish.

49

Yet our generation, more than any other,
also has the possibility and indeed the im-
perative of something better. We live in a
world of some 150 sovereign nations, in an
era of both instant communication and ideo-
logical competition and in the shadow of
nuclear cataclysm. No longer can we afford
to submit to an assumed inevitability of his-
tory's tragedy. The interdependence of states
links our societies, our economies, and our
destinies; we will either progress together
or we will decline together.

Much has happened from which we can
take hope and courage. Free societies have
come closer to the dream of well-being and
justice than any earlier period has witnessed.
Our two nations have moved from bitter
conflict to peace and from peace to reconcili-
ation and common endeavor. We have been
leaders in the quest for peace — in Europe
and in the world.

Our common challenge is to help build an
international structure of relationships
which keeps continents stable and nations
secure, which ties nations to each other by
bonds of mutual interest, which fosters the
habits of restraint and moderation in inter-
national conduct, which gives free rein to
man's striving for freedom and justice. Our
goal is a peace which all — the small as well
as the large — have a share of shaping; a
peace that will endure because all — the
strong as well as the weak — have a stake in
making it last.

We know that such a peace will not come —
nor can it be maintained — without effort and
courage. We must be conciliatory without
weakness and tolerant without moral con-
fusion; we must temper strength with wis-
dom and seek justice while respecting the
sense of justice of others. Posterity will not
forgive either truculence or the failure to

act firmly in defense of interest and princi-
ples. Posterity will not forgive either illusions
or the failure to grasp opportunities that
come fleetingly and may never return.

In our search for a peaceful world we must
never forget:

— That freedom must be vigilantly de-
fended ;

— That stability depends on restraint
among as well as within nations;

— That no nation or group of nations can
achieve satisfaction of its needs alone;

— That the best must not become the
enemy of the good; and

— Above all, that every great achievement
is an ideal before it becomes a reality.

Thus in its deepest sense this simple cere-
mony, which shows to what extent we have
overcome an unhappy past, symbolizes as
well the future for which we must strive—
a world of nations which find pride in then
reconciliations, not their power; an era ir
which convictions are the source of mora
strength rather than of intolerance or hatred

One of America's first and greatest leaders
Benjamin Franklin, expressed a universa
hope of human society:

. . . God grant that not only the love of liberty
but a thorough knowledge of the rights of men, ma:
pervade all nations of the earth, so that a philoso
pher may set his foot anywhere on its surface an(
say, "This is my country."

Human history has not yet reached thi;
ideal. But we must persevere until what i;
now unfamiliar becomes natural, what is nov
a vision of peace becomes a reality and ou
legacy to our children.

In this spirit— and on behalf of my famil:
as well — I accept your distinction and shal
treasure it. I am honored and moved anc
grateful.

50

Department of State Bulletii

Secretary Kissinger Attends NATO Ministerial Meeting

Secretary Kissinger headed the U.S. dele-
gation to the regular ministerial meeting of
the North Atlantic Council at Brussels
December 11-12. Folloiving are remarks to
the press by Secretary Kissinger and Greek
Foreign Minister Diniitrios Bitsios after a
bilateral meeting on December 11; remarks
to the press by Secretary Kissinger and
Turkish Foreign Minister Ihsan Sabri Cag-
layangil after a bilateral meeting on Decem-
ber 12; an interview with Secretary Kissin-
ger for German television conducted on
December 12; a neivs conference held by
Secretary Kissinger on December 12; and
the text of a communique issued at the con-
clusion of the North Atlantic Council meet-
ing on December 12.

REMARKS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER
AND THE GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER

Press release 603 dated December 11

Q. [Unintelligible] on the Cyprus situa-
tion ?

Secretary Kissinger: The Foreign Minis-
ter and I had a very friendly talk and re-
viewed the Cyprus situation and general
relationships between Greece and the United
States. With respect to the Cyprus situation,
the United States feels that the time for
negotiations is here and that there are really
no further obstacles to negotiations. We
strongly support resumption of the inter-
communal talks between the two communities
and a solution based on justice and equity
and respecting the sense of dignity of both
communities. And we will use all our efforts
in that direction.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, would you agree
that there are no obstacles to negotiations
with Turkey?

Foreign Minister Bitsios: I would say
there are no more obstacles of the kind that
the Turkish Government was putting for-
ward before. You remember — elections and
all of that. And I fully agree on the line
which the Secretary of State took. We think
that it is high time that the negotiations be
resumed, for a solution. The situation cannot
go on in Cyprus like that. I think the repre-
sentatives of the communities must sit down
for meaningful negotiations.

Q. Does that mean that you now expect
meaningful negotiations to get underway?

Foreign Minister Bitsios: You must be
two; that's inevitable. I explained to you our
position.

Q. The Turks have been interested in en-
larging the intercommunal talks. How do
you regard that proposal?

Foreign Minister Bitsios:
statement last Saturday.

I have made a

Q. And could you repeat that statement
for us today?

Foreign Minister Bitsios: I don't see any
reason why we should change the existing
forum.

Q. But that forms an obstacle then, be-
cause you have one position and the Turks
have another.

Secretary Kissinger: I will talk to the
Turkish Foreign Minister tomorrow. I be-
lieve that if the existing forum resumes,
modalities can be found by which the other
interested nations can be related to it. The
issues seem to me sufficiently clearly defined
now. A package deal is necessary, and it
should not be delayed on the issue of the
modalities of the negotiations, particularly

January 12, 1976

51

as it is my impression that one will be able
to relate the various parties to it in the
proper way.

REMARKS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER
AND THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER

Press relt-ase 604 dated December 12

Secretary Kissinger: The Foreign Minis-
ter and I had a very constructive talk in the
atmosphere of friendship that characterizes
the relationship between the United States
and Turkey. We discussed bilateral relation-
ships, and I am very hopeful that we will
solve the question of the American bases in
Turkey and the mutual defense relationship
in the very near future.

With respect to the Cyprus problem, we —
I am very hopeful that negotiations can be
started in the near future. I believe that the
differences between the parties are relatively
— the procedural differences between the
parties are relatively small and that a solu-
tion can be found this afternoon when the
Foreign Minister of Turkey and the Foreign
Minister of Greece meet to resume the com-
munal talks in an appropriate setting. So I
am very pleased with this talk.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: [In
French.] I share the opinion of my colleague.
I think that we have had a very constructive
negotiation, especially in bilateral relations.
I hope — after having had a negotiation with
my Greek colleague — that perhaps we can
advance a little in our relations.

Q. Mr. Minister, do you speak English?

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: My Eng-
lish is very poor. I am very sorry.

Secretary Kissinger: That's a trick to give
time to think while I talk. [Laughter.]

Q. Why are yoji confident, Mr. Secretary,
about the bases question?

Secretary Kissinger: Because we reviewed
the issues that divide us or that are still un-
solved, and I believe that they are manage-
able. I am going to meet with our Ambassa-
dor to Turkey tomorrow in London, and we

will be giving him new instructions. And I
have invited the Foreign Minister of Turkey
to come to the United States at the end of
January, and I am extremely hopeful that
whatever differences remain will be solved
on that occasion.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: [Statement
in Turkish.]

Secretary Kissinger: Valeriani [Richard
Valeriani, NBC News], ask a question on
that.

Q. In what language?

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: [Inter-
preter's ti'anslation from Turkish.] In rela-
tion to our bilateral relations with the United
States, I join the views expressed by Secre-
tary of State Kissinger, and I hope that in
the near future we can solve these problems
and find a compromise.

Q. [In French.'] When do you have the
meeting with the Greek Minister?

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: [In
French.] Today at 3 o'clock.

Q. [In French.] Here?

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: No, at
NATO.

Secretary Kissinger: Nice of you to have
come.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: Thank you.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: [Says fare-
well in Turkish.]

Q. [Repeats Turkish farewell.]

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: Bravo. No
need to translate.

Q. [Inaudible question on negotiations on
Cyprus.]

Secretary Kissinger: I am quite confident
that we can get the communal talks started
again in order that some real impetus will
now be given to them. It is more than just
resumed.

Q. Will you be able to report back to the
President, loho can report to Congress that
you have got real progress going now?

52

Department of State Bulletin

Secretary Kissinger: I think we have
something.

INTERVIEW FOR GERMAN TELEVISION '

'less release 605 dated December 12

Q. The NATO states ivill make the offer
n Vienna also to withdraw nuclear weapons
ironi Western Europe. Isn't this a dangerous
■oncession ?

Secretary Kissinger: Let me explain it in
English. I do not believe that it goes too far,
lecause we will be offering a category of
weapons of which, due to modernization,
ome have become dispensable, in return for
withdrawal of substantial Soviet ground
orces. But the United States remains firmly
ommitted to a strong local defense in Eu-
ope, and the United States will under no
ircumstances participate in anything that
'ill lead to the denuclearization either of
lurope or of any part of Europe.

Q. You are just leaving the Deutschland-
'ssen [Allied meeting on Berlin and Ger-
lany]. The responsibility of the Westeryi
'ates was underlined during that meeting.
*oes this hide the fear that the friendship
greement between the Soviet Union and
erlin ivoidd influence the representation of
ie four powers?

Secretary Kissinger: It is not directed at
ny particular event. It is a permanent fea-
ire of the four-ix)wer relationship that the
•eedom of Berlin is central to all of our
ohcies and of course the precondition for
ny relaxation of tensions.

Q. One of the most important conditions
) keep the alliayice capable of defense is to
nify weapons. What do you think of the
eclaration of the European states in this
latter?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we strongly
Ivor it, and we are pleased that the Euro-
eans will discuss the problem first among

' Secretary Kissinger answered in English questions
osed in German. The German Foreign Minister,
ans-Dietrich Genscher, was interviewed on the
ime program.

themselves and then will solve it in close
coordination with the United States. And I
think it is a significant step toward the
strengthening of NATO.

Q. How serious is the offer of the United
States to buy iveapons in Europe?

Secretary Kissinger: It is a serious offer.
It of course depends on the ability of the
Europeans to rationalize their production
and to produce them at comparable prices.
Both should be possible.

Q. Weren't you disappointed over what
came out of the Helsinki Conference?

Secretary Kissinger: Frankly, not particu-
larly. I didn't expect too much, and I was not
disappointed.

Q. What part ivill and has the European
Community to play in world politics?

Secretary Kissinger: For the United
States, the relationship between the United
States and Western Europe is absolutely
central. We support European integration,
and we think that the relationship which is
now developing between Europe and the
United States is creating a community of ob-
jectives and parallel policies to which we
attach great importance. We think that secu-
rity and progress in the world requires a
strong, unified, and economically developing
Europe.

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE
AFTER NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING

Press release 606 dated December 12

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and gentle-
men, the U.S. delegation considers this meet-
ing to have been very successful. It was
conducted in the spirit of friendship and close
consultation which characterizes the relation-
ship in the North Atlantic community. The
communique speaks for itself, and therefore
I will go straight to your questions.

Q. There are reports in both the Netv York
Times and Washington Post today of U.S.
contributions of $50 million to Angola in

January 12, 1976

53

recent months. Could you respond to those
reports ?

Secretary Kissinger: I have not had the
privilege of reading either of these distin-
guished newspapers today, and I will not go
into any details. I have stated — the other day
— that the United States cannot be indiffer-
ent to massive Soviet supplies of arms and
is in contact with other interested African
countries.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on that point, could you
amplify this aspect of it? Do you have any
concern that there ivill develop in Angola,
if there is not already, a war of proxy be-
tween the major powers? And in addition to
that, how would you distinguish betiveen the
degree of major-power involvement in An-
gola and the Viet-Nam situation, the Viet-
Nam history?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States
wishes that the situation in Angola be
handled as an African problem, and it would
support a solution in which no outside power
participates and in which the Organization
of African Unity will cooperate with the
parties inside Angola to find an African
solution.

The United States did not beconrie con-
cerned until there had already taken place
substantial Soviet involvement and the in-
troduction of massive outside equipment and
later the introduction of Cuban forces.

I think, as I have pointed out repeatedly,
there should not be a war by proxy of the
great powers. I do not think it is a situation
analogous to Viet-Nam, because in Viet-Nam
the conflict had a much longer and more
complicated history; but the United States
cannot be indifferent to what is going on in
Angola.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you frequently say that
the United States should not be indifferent.
But in what manner ivould the United States
respond? Can you tell us what sort of coun-
termeasures the United States might take
in this situation?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States
favors a solution in which all of the parties

54

in Angola can negotiate with each other free
of outside interference and in which th(
problem of Angola is handled as an Africai
issue. The United States will support anj
solution in this direction. Failing that, th(
United States will try to prevent one partj
by means of massive introduction of outside
equipment from achieving dominance.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on a previous occasioi
you mentioned the possibility that the An
golan involvement of the Soviet Unioi
couldn't help but affect other aspects of th
Soviet-American relationship. Do you see i
at any point as endangering the entire polic.
of detente?

Secretary Kissinger: Incidentally, I ough
to make one thing clear. The press report
yesterday gave the impression that all of th
afternoon session was devoted to Angola. Th
afternoon session yesterday was devoted t
East-West relations, in which Angola playe^
a relatively minor role. So, this is a NAT(
meeting. This is not a meeting of Africa |
problems, and I think this should be clearl
understood. !

It cannot but affect relations between th
United States and the Soviet Union, as
stated publicly before, if the Soviet Unio
engages in a military operation or massivel
supports a military operation thousands o
miles from Soviet territory in an area wher
there are no historic Russian interests an
where it is therefore a new projection o
Soviet power and Soviet intei-ests.

But again let me emphasize to you, ladie
and gentlemen, that this was a NATO meal
ing, in which Angola played a relatively ir
significant role and was used only as a
illustration of more general problems.

Q. Mr. Secretary General [sic], did yo
talk about Spain, or did you propose bring
ing Spairi closer to NATO?

Secretary Kissinger: We did not have at
opportunity to go into the problem of Spaiii
and the future relationship of Spain in anjl
formal sense. The United States favors '
closer relationship of Spain both to the Ati
lantic organization as well as to Wester*
Europe.

Department of State Bulletii

Q. Mr. Secretary, I tvonder if you could
expand a bit, amplify this extreme concent
the United States has over Angola. Why /.s-
fhis situation so different? You referred to
\distance, but after all the Soviet Union has
massively armed many countries in the ivorld
and I don't remember this type of strong
talk from the United States. What is it about
Angola —

Secretary Kissinger: Should I point out
again to you, ladies and gentlemen, that this
was a NATO meeting? You may have re-
ceived certain briefings yesterday. The sub-
ject was not Angola. The subject was the
Western alliance, and while I am glad to
inswer questions on Angola, I want to point
jut that it is being raised by you, ladies and
gentlemen, much more acutely than it was
-aised by us.

Q. This has continued as a process now of
ieveral weeks where the United States has
}een extremely concerned publicly.

Secretary Kissinger: It makes a difference
vhether the Soviet Union is arming a coun-
Ty or whether it is arming a faction in a
■ountry. It makes a difference whether the
Soviet Union is operating in an area of tradi-
ional relationships or whether it is attempt-
ng to establish a new pattern of dominance.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the last time you at-
ended a NATO meeting, just before it you
'xpressed your conviction that Portugal
vould not easily remain a member of the
dliance because it was going Communist.
Vhat is your assessment now? What has
leen Soviet behavior with respect to Portu-
lal, and what does that mean in terms of
ingola ?

Secretary Kissinger: I hope that the non-
\merican members here noted the single-
nindedness with which the American press
)ursues its obsessions. Now, first let me
nake clear I did not say the last time that
'ortugal could not easily remain a member
)f NATO because it was going Communist. I
iaid it the other way around. I said if Portu-
ral went Communist, it could not easily re-
nain a member of NATO.
j I believe that, on the whole, the situation in

Portugal has improved. The danger of Portu-
gal going Communist seems less. The possi-
bility of a pluralistic evolution seems better.
So, therefore, this particular danger which
I referred to last time is not as acute as it
was then.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you didn't answer about
the Soviet Union's role in Portugal.

Secretary Kissinger: I think that the So-
viet Union's role in Portugal is not as acute
as its role in Angola.

Q. Will the U.S. bases in Turkey reopen?
And when? And to ivhat extent do you con-
sider them inoperative ever since they were
closed ?

Secretary Kissinger: Closed bases are
generally inoperative. But I had a very good
talk with the Foreign Minister of Turkey
this morning. I expect that the negotiations
about the bases will soon be given a new
impetus, and I have invited the Foreign Min-
ister to come to Washington by the end of
January. I hope that we will be able to con-
clude the negotiations by then.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I assume that you men-
tioned the Middle East in your discussion.
If this is correct, are you happy about the
state of affairs in the Middle East now as a
result of your step-by-step diplomacy? Isn't
there any change of heart from the part of
the United States regarding the Palestinians
and the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation'] to accelerate the process of peace in
the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think the
Middle East was designed to inspire happi-
ness, and therefore I cannot say I have
reached that state of contentment with if.

With respect to the Palestinians, I have
not repeated the American position for 48
hours and never in Brussels. So let me say
that the United States cannot change its
position until the Palestinians recognize the
existence of Israel and until they accept the
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
At that point we will look at our position
again.

lanuary 12, 1976

55

Q. Do theij have to recognize Israel before
Israel recognizes them, or must this come
simidtaneouslij? For you cannot ask the
Palestinians. It's fair enough that both of
them recognize each other at the same time,
isn't it?

Secretarii Kissinger: It is in the context
that the United States can look at its posi-
tion, but not under present circumstances —
in the context that I have given.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think that the
■"ttands of Greece and Turkey are more co7i-
ciliatory noiv for the solution of the prob-
lems between the two countries and that of
Cyprus ?

Secretary Kissinger: Having talked to the
Foreign Ministers of both Greece and Tur-
key, I have the impression that the conditions
for a resumption of the communal talks are
good. Of course, they will meet each other
this afternoon, and it would be a rash man
who would predict what happens when an
actual interaction occurs between Greek and
Turkish representatives.

My impression is that the conditions for a
resumption of communal talks are good and
that both Foreign Ministers recognize the
importance of making rapid progress towai'd
a settlement. We believe that a package deal
is necessary and that it should take into
account the sense of dignity of both commu-
nities. We will use our influence in that di-
rection.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you got any netv
evidence from the Soviet Union which makes
you confident that you ivill be ready to go in
four or five iveeks, as you had said you woidd,
on SALT? Also, what assurance is there that
the conflicts within the U.S. Government on
SALT will be resolved tvithin four or five
weeks ?

Secretary Kissinger: I wouldn't describe
the discussions in the American Government
as "conflict." The issues are technically
complicated and require careful study. I am
confident that we will come up with a solu-
tion that will have support of all the agen-
cies.

As I have pointed out, going to Moscow is
based on the presupposition that both sides
will be prepared to modify their positions;
and therefore it is based on the assumption,
indeed on the knowledge, that the Soviet
Union, as well as we, will be prepared to
modify the last positions which each side
took. I'm quite confident that the date that
has been indicated, or the approximate date,
will be maintained.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that Angola
ivas a minor issue in the discussion and the
main topic was East-West relations. So,
after this discussion, what is your assess-
ment of the present status of East-West re-
lations ?

Secretary Kissinger: There are worrying
elements such as Angola. There remains,
nevertheless, the necessity to attempt to im-
prove relations between East and West on
the basis of reciprocity, and there is a recog-
nition on the part of all allies that the process
of improvement of relations requires an
undiminished concern for Western security.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said yesterday that
the United States supports the resumption
of the intercommunal talks, but you also
mentioned something about a way of relat-
ing other interested parties to it at a later
state. What would you envisage by that?

Secretary Kissinger: The most interested
parties, of course, are the Governments of
Greece and Turkey, and this is a question
that the Foreign Ministers of Greece and
Turkey will deal with this afternoon. It is
my impression, having talked to both of
them, that they are approaching a consensus
on this, and I expect that this problem will
be solved. But I'd leave it up to them to an-
nounce the details.

Q. Yesterday you expressed your concern
about the Communist pressure on the south-
ern countries of the alliance. What is your
opinion on the Italian situation and also, in
your opinion, what would be the conse-
quences for the alliance of having participa-
tion of the Italian Communists in the gov-
ernment, which, as you know very well, is
not terribly improbable for the futurel

56

Department of State Bulletin

Secretanj Kissinger: I did not yesterday
express any opinion on the questions which
you raised. Of course, we consider the Italian
domestic situation a matter for Itahans to
decide— all the more so as our advice is
likely to have the opposite effect from the
one we wish to bring about. But if I were
fonning a government in Italy, which is un-
likely, I would not move in the direction of a
"historic compromise."

The ptesa: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

TEXT OF NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
COMMUNIQUE '

1. The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial
session in Brussels on 11 and 12 December, 1975.

2. Ministers noted that there had been encouraging
features in the development of East-West relations
during recent months. They reaffirmed their determi-
nation to persevere in their efforts to place relations
mth the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries
3n a more stable basis.

At the same time they noted that the beneficial
effects of detente can develop only in so far as all
che countries concerned do their best to reduce the
risk of confrontation in both the political and mili-
tary fields.

In the political sphere, detente requires tolerance
»nd mutual understanding, and accordingly demands
;hat the natural contest of political and social ideas
should not be conducted in a manner incompatible
vith the letter and spirit of the Final Act of Hel-
sinki. Furthermore, Ministers considered that at-
;empts to take advantage of tension in any part of
;he world could have a negative impact on detente.

In the military sphere. Ministers viewed with con-
•em, as on previous occasions, the continued rapid
growth of the power of the land, air and naval
'orces of the Warsaw Pact, which exceeds its ap-
Jarent defensive needs. They emphasized that de-
ente and security are closely linked. In these cir-
cumstances they stressed the need to preserve the
lefensive strength of the Alliance which is importaTit
is a deterrent not only against military aggression
3Ut also against political pressure.

Ministers reaffirmed that the solidarity of the
Alliance and the security which it provides are es-
sential conditions for the improvement of East-West
"elations, and they restated the determination of
:heir Governments, expressed in the Ottawa Declara-
-ion, to maintain and improve the efl^ciency of their
forces.

"Issued at Brussels on Dec. 12 (text from press
-elease 608 dated Dec. 15).

3. Ministers welcomed the adoption of the Final
Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe [CSCE] which provides guidelines for an
evolution of relations between the participating
states and between their peoples towards greater
understanding and cooperation. They noted the fact
that the results of the Conference apply throughout
Europe, including, subject to Quadripartite rights
and responsibilities, Berlin. The Allies attach high
priority to the full implementation of the Final Act
by all signatories in improving relations between
states, in applying confidence building measures, in
encouraging closer economic cooperation, and in
lowering barriers between people. Noting that only a
short time had elapsed since Helsinki, Ministers
hoped that substantial progress would be seen during
the coming months.

In accordance with the provisions of the Final Act,
the Allies concerned have already notified all CSCE
participants of a number of military maneuvers and
have invited observers. The Allies look for the imple-
mentation of such measures also by the members of
the Warsaw Pact.

4. Ministers heard a report from the United States
Secretary of State on the continuing U.S. efforts to-
wards the further limitation of strategic offensive
arms. The Ministers expressed satisfaction with the
substantial progress made since the Vladivostok Sum-
mit towards a SALT II Agreement. They expressed
the hope that further efforts would lead to the con-
clusion of a satisfactory agreement. The Ministers
also expressed appreciation for continuing consulta-
tions within the Alliance with respect to strategic
arms limitation.

5. Ministers of the participating countries reviewed
the state of the negotiations in Vienna on Mutual
and Balanced Force Reductions. They recalled that
it is the aim of these negotiations to contribute to
a more stable relationship and to strengthening of
peace and security in Europe.

These Ministers stressed again that the existing dis-
parities in ground force manpower and tanks are the
most destabilizing factor in Central Europe and that
any agreement must deal adequately with these dis-
parities. They reconfirmed, therefore, the Allied pro-
posal to establish in the area of reductions approxi-
mate parity in ground forces in the form of a com-
mon collective ceiling for ground force manpower
on each side. A first phase reductions agreement
concerning United States and Soviet ground forces
as proposed by the participating Allies would be an
important and practical step towards this goal.

With a view to achieving these objectives, they
approved important additional proposals and author-
ized their presentation at the appropriate moment in
Vienna.

These Ministers reiterated their resolve to pursue
vigorously all the Allied objectives in order to as-
sure undiminished security for all parties. They pro-
ceed on the premise that the additional proposals will
lead to the achievement of these objectives.

{lanuary 12, 1976

57

These Ministers noted with satisfaction that Al-
lied solidarity has continued to prove itself in
these negotiations. They reaffirmed the principle
that NATO forces should not be reduced except in
the context of a Mutual and Balanced Force Reduc-
tions agreement with the East.

6. The Ministers took note of the Declaration made
by the Governments of France, the United Kingdom
and the United States on 14 October, 1975, that the
rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers for
Berlin and Germany as a whole remain unaffected by
the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual
Assistance concluded by the USSR and the GDR on
the 7 October, 1975. They shared the view of the
Government of the Federal Republic of Germany
that its policy to work for a state of peace in Europe
in which the German nation will regain its unity
through free self-determination, is fully consistent
with the Final Act of Helsinki.

Ministers underlined the essential connection be-
tween the situation relating to Berlin and detente,
security and cooperation throughout Europe.

They emphasized in particular, that traffic and ties
between Western sectors of Berlin and the Federal
Republic of Germany and the representation abroad
of the interests of those sectors by the Federal Re-
public of Germany continue to be important elements
of the viability of the city.

7. Ministers reviewed developments in the Mediter-
ranean area since their last meeting. They expressed
concern at the possible dangers of new tensions that
could affect the balance of forces in this region. They
reaffirmed the importance they attach to the con-
tinuation of efforts designed to achieve an overall
settlement resulting in a just and durable peace in
the Middle East.

Ministers took note of the report on the situation
in the Mediterranean prepared on their instructions.
They requested the Council to keep this question
under review and to report back to them again at the
next meeting.

8. The issue of the present fisheries dispute be-
tween Iceland and the United Kingdom was raised
and discussed.

9. Ministers discussed various aspects of problems
related to armaments and standardization with the
aim of improving the military capability of the Alli-
ance and of making more effective use of available
resources, especially in view of the increasing pres-
sures in national budgets. They agreed that the exam-
ination of these questions would be pursued by the
Council and the other competent bodies of the Alli-
ance in accordance with established procedures. They
agreed to form for a limited time an ad hoc com-
mittee under the Council to prepare a specific pro-
gram of action covering the interoperability of mili-
tary equipment.

10. Ministers took note of the progress achieved by
the Committee on the Challenges of Modem Society
(CCMS). They endorsed resolutions on coastal water
pollution and oil spills, noting the determination of
the member countries to continue to combat pollution
of the seas and to enhance the quality of the marine
environment. Ministers noted and endorsed the initi-
ation of a pilot study open to interested nations on
the relationship between food and health, and the
continuation of other studies relating to the environ-
ment and to energy. They noted the important con-
tribution of the CCMS to effective international co-
operation in areas of major concern to our societies.

11. Ministers reaffirmed the attachment of their
nations to the democratic principles on which their
free institutions are founded. They expressed their
confidence in the ability of their countries to sur-
mount the problems of our time. They considered the
cohesion and vitality of the Alliance to be a sure
source of mutual support and solidarity.

12. The next Ministerial session of the North At-
lantic Council will be held in Oslo on 20 and 21 May,
1976.

U.S.-Canada Joint Statement
Issued at Paris

Following is the text of a joint statemem
by Secretary Kissinger and Canadian Sec
retary of State for External Affairs Allai
MacEachen issued at the conclusion of t
bilateral meeting at Paris on December 17

Press release 619 dated December 17

The United States and Canada have a lonj
history of friendship and cooperation. Bot?
of our Governments have the intention t(
continue the process of consultation anc
negotiation which enables us to surmount
the inevitable economic strains that aris(
from time to time between these two majoi
economies. The recent meetings in Ottawj
between the two Foreign Ministers and th<
excellent relations between President Fore
and Prime Minister Trudeau give the high'
est confidence that our relations will continu*
to be managed in a way that will strengthei
even further our friendship and cooperation

58

Department of State Bulletii'

THE CONGRESS

irst Progress Report on Cyprus
ubmitted to the Congress

tessage From President Ford '

'o the Congress of the United States:

I am submitting, pursuant to Public Law
4-104, the first of a series of reports on
fforts this Administration is making to help
esolve the Cyprus problem. Subsequent
rogress reports, as required by this legis-
ition, will be forwarded to you at sixty-day
itervals.
In his speech before the U.N. General As-
smbly on September 25 [22], 1975, the
ecretary of State outlined the Administra-
on's policy on the complex Cyprus problem
s follows:

The details of a Cyprus settlement are for the two
immunities themselves to decide. However, in keep-
ig with U.N. resolutions which the United States
is fully supported, the following principles are
isential:

A settlement must preserve the independence, sov-
•eignty, and territorial integrity of Cyprus;

It must insure that both the Greek-Cypriot and the
urkish-Cypriot communities can live in freedom and
ave a large voice in their own affairs;

The present dividing lines cannot be permanent,
here must be agreed territorial arrangements which
iflect the economic requirements of the Greek-Cypriot
)mmunity and take account of its self-respect;

There must be provisions for the withdrawal of
)reign military forces other than those present
nder the authority of international agreements; and,

There must be security for all Cypriots; the needs
nd wishes of the refugees who have been the princi-
al victims and whose tragic plight touches us all
lust be dealt with speedily and with compassion.

These elements, which we consider essen-
ial to a settlement, are consistent with the
spirations of the overwhelming majority

'Transmitted on Dec. 8 (text from White House
ress release).

of the people of Cyprus. Beyond that, only
the Cypriot people can decide how to rebuild
and preserve their sovereign, independent
nation so it may again serve the interests of
all its citizens.

With this appreciation of both the oppor-
tunities and limitations of U.S. action, I
declared immediately following enactment
of P.L. 94-104 on October 6 that the United
States would make a major effort to en-
courage a resumption of the Cyprus negotia-
tions and to facilitate progress by all the
parties involved — Greece, Turkey and Cy-
prus— toward a peaceful and equitable solu-
tion. I also stated that the United States
would undertake whatever role the parties
themselves wanted us to play in achieving
a settlement.

Immediately thereafter, we took a number
of steps through diplomatic channels aimed
at helping the parties find a basis for re-
suming the intercommunal talks under the
aegis of U.N. Secretary General Waldheim.
As a first step, I wrote directly to the Prime
Ministers of Greece and Turkey to stress the
importance the United States attaches to
the resumption of the intercommunal Cyprus
talks and to emphasize our wish that the
Cyprus problem be removed as a source of
instability in the Eastern Mediterranean. My
letters were followed by a series of commu-
nications from Secretary Kissinger to the
Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey and
to President Makarios of Cyprus. In each of
these communications, an effort was made
to define the differences as we saw them be-
tween the negotiating positions of the other
parties and to urge that an effort be made
to narrow the gap.

The Secretary of State, during the past
sixty days, also has consulted extensively
with several of our major European allies
who have engaged in corresponding and
complementary initiatives with the Greek,

anuary 12, 1976

59

Turkish and Cypriot governments. Parallel
initiatives also were undertaken during this
period by the European Community.

These initiatives have not produced a
major breakthrough ; but taken together
they have advanced prospects for a nego-
tiated settlement. A new appreciation now
exists in Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia that
delay in resuming the intercommunal talks
will harden attitudes and make future prog-
ress more difficult. In each capital, there is a
desire to begin anew an earnest search for
a solution. Each party also has a realistic
understanding of what it must do to make
progress possible.

In Ankara, the Turkish Foreign Minister
announced on October 21, shortly after the
Turkish senatorial elections, that the time
was opportune to search for a solution and
that all aspects for a settlement could be
discussed at the intercommunal talks. Tur-
key has also indicated that it would encour-
age the Turkish Cypriots to engage in mean-
ingful negotiations within the intercom-
munal framework. There is also a recogni-
tion in Ankara that a discussion of their
position on territory is essential once the
intercommunal talks have been resumed and
that troop reductions as well as steps to re-
solve the refugee issue are essential in-
gredients to any Cyprus settlement.

Similar meaningful changes have occurred
in the Greek and Greek-Cypriot negotiating
positions with respect to such subjects as
the organization of the future central gov-
ernment and the division of responsibilities
and delegation of authority to the future re-
gional administrations.

In sum, we have seen, as have our princi-
pal Western allies, a narrowing of differences
on most of the key issues necessary to nego-
tiate a Cyprus solution. The range of dis-
agreement between the parties now seems to
us surmountable. Under such circumstances,
it should have been possible in November to
bring the parties back to the negotiating
table. Howevei-, once a date had been sched-
uled in New York for the Cyprus debate at
the U.N. General Assembly, the parties felt

60

compelled to await the outcome before sit
ting down with the U.N. Secretary Genera
to resume actual negotiations.

Now that the United Nations has com
pleted its consideration of the Cyprus ques
tion and passed a new resolution calling fc
intercommunal negotiations, efforts t(
schedule new talks are underway. We havi
consulted U.N. Secretary General Waldhein
and the Governments of Greece, Turkey, an(
Cyprus. Our common interest is to have re
newed negotiations of sufficient depth an(
duration to allow full discussion of all ke;
substantive issues. There is every reason t
believe this kind of negotiation will begii
in the very near future. To facilitate thi
effort, I have asked the Secretary of Stat
to give special emphasis to the subject o
Cyprus negotiations when he meets witl
the Turkish and Greek Foreign Minister
during the NATO Ministerial meeting i
Brussels in the second week of December.

We now find ourselves at an importar
juncture in the search for a Cyprus settk
ment. The negotiating framework which ha
emerged finally should allow early and oi
derly discussion of the most serious sul
stantive issues, including refugees whic
hold the key to a final settlement. We hav
succeeded in moving to this point in larg
part because, since early October, the Unite
States has been free to resume an activi
evenhanded role among all the parties. Th
outcome of the resumed Cyprus negotii
tions may depend upon our ability to mair
tain this role in the months ahead.

An important beginning has been mad
in the past sixty days toward the elusiv
goal of a peaceful, equitable, and endurin
Cyprus solution. In the days ahead, I believ
our efforts will bring results if we continu
to have the support and understanding c
the Congress. I intend to review with you i
subsequent reports the progress that ha
been made in the common quest to restor
peace and stability to the island of Cyprui

Gerald R. Ford.
The White House, December 8, 1975.

ii

Department of State Bulleti

li

'resident ReafRrms Recommendations

'or Assistance to Greece

Following is the text of identical letters
lated December 8 from President Ford to

• Speaker of the House Carl Albert, Chairman
1/ the Senate Committee on Appropriations
'ohn L. McClellan, and Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations John
Iparkman.

Weekly Compilation ol Presidential Documents dated December lo

Pursuant to Section 2(b)(2) of P.L. 94-
04, I am pleased to submit to the Congress
ay recommendations for economic and mili-
ary assistance to Greece for fiscal year
976.

The bonds between the United States and
Ireece have historically been close and deep,
toth countries were linked together as allies
1 World World II. They later cooperated in
efeating the communist guerrilla movement
1 Greece in the late 1940's. Subsequently,
ireece sent a military force to Korea to
ssist the United Nations' effort against the
ommunist aggression. In 1952, Greece

; 3ined NATO. The bonds between our two
ations are not only political, but ethical and

, ultural as well. The peoples of Greece and
Ke United States cherish a common heritage
nd a common belief in freedom and human

i: ignity.

' My Administration has worked with the
ew Greek Government in this spirit of

I i riendship and alliance to identify areas in
'hich we might be of assistance and, there-
y, advance our common interests. Following

ir onsultations with the Greek Government,
'e began consideration of a program aimed
t assisting Greece economically. We sup-
orted increased financial assistance for
Greece at the International Monetary Fund
nd World Bank. For fiscal year 1975, we
Iso raised the level of military credit as-
istance to Greece from $71 million to $86
lillion. In addition, to increase the amount
f Export-Import Bank lending to Greece,

* he Bank Chairman visited Athens last
; pring to discuss with Greek businessmen

'J

anuary 12, 1976

and officials ways in which Greece could take
better advantage of the Bank's programs.
This visit was followed by a further Export-
Import Bank mission in November.

The Greek Government itself has moved
vigorously to confront its most serious prob-
lems. It has dramatically reduced the level
of inflation. It has reversed the decline in
its Gross National Product. In addition, it
has moved to restore public confidence in the
military establishment as a non-political
force capable of defending Greece's security
interests.

At the same time, the government in
Athens has made clear to this Administra-
tion its need for increased levels of assist-
ance for the current fiscal year. Based on
that request and in keeping with the spirit
of Congressional debate preceding passage
of P.L. 94-104, I sent an expert team to
Athens from the Department of State and
the Agency for International Development
in October to consult with senior Greek offi-
cials on that Nation's most urgent needs for
economic and military assistance.

The team of experts concluded that
Greece, faced with continued domestic eco-
nomic difliiculties and a need to modernize
its military establishment, merited increased
U.S. support for fiscal year 1976. Based on
Greek requests and the findings of our own
experts, I submitted to the Congress on
October 30, 1975, a request for fiscal year
1976 for $50 million in grant military aid,
$90 million in FMS credit and $65 million as
a supporting assistance loan. This latter loan
is designed specifically to ease Greece's
temporary balance of payment diflSculties.

This package of assistance is justified on
three grounds. First, it will help strengthen
the foundation of representative democracy
in Greece. Second, it will demonstrate our
interest in modernizing and improving the
Greek armed forces, and will be consistent
with our stated desire that Greece return at
an early date to a full participation within
the NATO Alliance. Finally, it will assist the
Greek Government and the Greek people in
a moment of critical economic need.

61

Based on my review of Greece's need as
well as our overall budgetary situation, I
have concluded that my proposals of October
30 are appropriate for this fiscal year. I
strongly urge the Congress to give them
early and favorable consideration.
Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford.

President Ford Reports to Congress
on Turkish Opium Poppy Control

Following is the text of identical letters
dated December 8 from President Ford to
Speaker of the House Carl Albert, Chairman
of the Senate Committee on Appropriations
John L. McClellan, and Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations John
Sparkman.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated December IS

Pursuant to Public Law 94-104, discussions
have been held with the Government of Tur-
key on effective means of preventing diver-
sion of the Turkish opium poppy crop into
illicit channels. These discussions continue
long-standing consultations between the Gov-
ernments of the United States and the Re-
public of Turkey on suppression of the illegal
intei-national traffic in narcotics.

The Government of Turkey is aware of our
concern and that of other nations of the
world regarding the terrible plight of drug
abuse. This concern has been made known to
successive Governments of Turkey by this
and previous Administrations, by many other
governments, and by the United Nations.

I have been encouraged by reports from
our Embassy in Ankara, from the Drug En-
forcement Administration and from the
United Nations, indicating the Government
of Turkey's efforts to keep poppy cultivation
under effective control thus far have been
successful. I have received no evidence to
date that there has been any illicit diversion
of the current Turkish crop.

When Turkey permitted the resumption of
poppy cultivation in 1974, the production of
opium gum was forbidden and the poppy

straw harvesting process was adopted in
stead. At the same time, Turkey imple
mented stringent inspections and controls o
the poppy crop. The poppy straw procesi
makes control of the crop much easier. I
has been used successfully in several coun
tries to facilitate efforts to prevent illici
diversion from legal opium poppy growinj
areas. Turkey has reissued the same contrc
decree to cover next year's crop. We expec
the controls to be as effective as before, be
cause of the introduction of more moder
communications and surveillance equipmen
and more experience in administering th
controls.

The United Nations Fund for Drug Abus
Control has provided Turkey with technics
assistance in meeting the requirements c
the poppy straw process. I believe the Unite
States should continue to support the goo
work of the United Nations Fund for Dru
Abuse Control in its assistance to Turke
and other countries in combating the divei
sion of legally produced opiates from legit
mate pharmaceutical uses.

I also share the views of the majority i
the Congress that close bilateral cooperatic
with Turkey is essential to prevent illicit d
version of poppy crops. In July of this yej
at our meeting in Helsinki, I discussed wit
Prime Minister Demirel my continuing de«
concern about the ravages of drug abuse ar
the need to suppress diversion of opiates in1
illicit channels. Prime Minister Demir
strongly concurred in my views and aflfirme
his personal commitment to the preventic
of illicit diversion of opiates from his coui
try.

On October 29, following enactment (
Public Law 94-104, I sent a letter to t\
Prime Minister of Turkey urging that a
ready existing discussions between our tw
governments on opium poppy controls be ii
tensified in the period ahead. On Novembf
28, Prime Minister Demirel sent me a ver
positive response confirming his earlier a.
surance that he fully supports continuiii
effective poppy controls and maintaining
dialogue between the two governments c
this vital subject.

Since the passage of Public Law 94-10

62

Department of State Bullet

discussion and meetings on poppy controls
have been held with Turkish Government
officials at many levels. Ambassador Macom-
ber has reviewed the issue with the Turkish
Prime Minister. Additionally, the Deputy
Chief of Mission and the Embassy Narcotics
Control Coordinator have met with the Turk-
ish Foreign Ministry's Director of Narcotics
Control Affairs. The U.S. AID poppy special-
ist in Ankara has held consultations with
Turkish Soils Product Office and Agriculture
Ministry officials in Ankara, Izmir, and in the
poppy growing areas. In addition, the Re-
gional Director of the Drug Enforcement
Administration in Ankara has been in con-
tinuing contact with high Turkish law en-
forcement officials. Our Ambassador and his
staff will continue these meetings and dis-
cussions on poppy controls.

I believe the desire of the Congress that
meaningful discussions be conducted with
the Government of Turkey on insuring con-
tinued effective poppy controls have been
met by the actions described above.
Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

'4th Congress, 1st Session

[nternational Development and Food Assistance Act
of 1975. Report of the Senate Committee on For-
eign Relations, together with supplemental views,
to accompany H.R. 9005; S. Kept. 94-406; October
1, 1975; 80 pp. Report of the Senate Committee on
Agriculture and Forestry to accompany H.R. 9005;
S. Rept. 94-434; October 28, 1975; 90 pp.

Vlilitary Construction Appropriation Bill, 1976. Re-
port of the House Committee on Appropriations,
together with separate views, to accompany H.R.
10029. H. Rept. 94-530. October 3, 1975. 67 pp.

Protecting the Ability of the United States To Trade
Abroad. Hearing before the Subcommittee on
International Trade of the Senate Committee on
Finance. October 6, 1975. 71 pp.

Peace Corps Authorization for Fiscal Year 1976 and
the Transition Quarter. Report of the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations to accompany H.R.
6334. S. Rept. 94-412. October 7, 1975. 10 pp.

Magnuson Fisheries Management and Conservation

1 Act. Report of the Senate Committee on Commerce

I to accompany S. 961. S. Rept. 94-416. October 7,
1975. 66 pp.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND CONFERENCES

jJanuary 12, 1976

U.S. Gives Views on Cyprus
in General Assembly Debate

Follotving are statements made in plenary
session of the U.N. General Assembly by
U.S. Representative W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.,
on November lA and by U.S. Representative
Albert W. Sherer, Jr., on November 20, to-
gether with the text of a resolution adopted
by the Assembly on November 20.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR BENNETT,
NOVEMBER 14

USUN press release 147 dated November 14

The events of the year since the General
Assembly last debated the question of Cy-
prus have much to tell us of the stubborn
complexities of this issue as they have been
measured against the capabilities of our
organization. The parties to the Cyprus
question are deeply and sincerely committed.
They remain deeply and sincerely divided as
well, despite the persistent and dedicated
efforts of this organization. The past year
has witnessed acts of understanding, hope,
and statesmanship. It has also witnessed
acts of prejudice, of fear, and of recalcitrance.

The United States remains committed to
intercommunal negotiations under Resolu-
tion 3212 as by far the best method for
reaching a settlement which will be perma-
nently acceptable to both communities on
Cyprus. It is important, as we see it, that
both communities exercise the flexibility and
statesmanship necessary to resume these
negotiations at the earliest possible moment.
We recognize the difficulties which all parties
have encountered in the past in participat-
ing, and in making progress, in these talks.
Some of these difficulties have now been
overcome. As to the other difficulties, we
emphasize that the parties have an obliga-
tion to set them aside and proceed with seri-

63

ous negotiations. This is an obligation of the
parties both to each other and to the inter-
national community which has devoted the
time, resources, and manpower of this or-
ganization to assisting them.

The United States admires and appreci-
ates the patience, persistence, and skill
which the Secretary General and his per-
sonal representatives on Cyprus have exer-
cised in their work with all the parties in
furtherance of the intercommunal talks. We
also salute the gallantry, devotion, and imag-
inative use of resources shown by Com-
mander Prem Chand and the men of UNFI-
CYP [United Nations Peacekeeping Force in
Cyprus] in their dedicated service to the re-
duction of tension and the support of hu-
manitarian activities in this difficult year on
Cyprus.

Mr. President, the United States hopes
and will do its full share to insure that this
debate and its outcome bring home to all the
parties concerned their obligation — calmly,
constructively, but unmistakably. The re-
sponsibility which these U.N. members have
under the charter for the peaceful settle-
ment of disputes has in this case been made
more specific and more demanding by the
continuing efforts of the United Nations and
particularly of the Secretary General. The
United States looks foi-ward to supporting
what we hope will be a unanimous resolu-
tion of this Assembly asserting its convic-
tion that the intercommunal talks must re-
convene at once and must move promptly
toward the settlement for which all the
suffering people of Cyprus and we here have
waited long enough.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SHERER,
NOVEMBER 20

USUN press release 155 dated November 20

The United States greatly regrets that
the Assembly was unable to write a resolu-
tion on Cyprus acceptable to all the parties
concerned. We believe that such a resolution
would have provided an appropriate basis
for the negotiation of a Cyprus settlement.
Since no resolution was acceptable to all of

the parties, we abstained on draft resolution
A/L.775.

However, we note that the resolution
adopted today refers to General Assembly
Resolution 3212. Under that resolution, and
under Security Council Resolutions 370 and
367, the Secretary General retains a clear
mandate from both bodies to continue his
mission of good offices to the parties and
particularly to encourage them to proceed
with the intercommunal talks.

We sincerely hope, and urge, that the
representatives of the two communities will
cooperate fully and effectively with the Sec-
retary General in achieving progress toward
a just settlement of the Cyprus issue. Such
a settlement has been asked for by the
United Nations, is ardently desired by the
American people, and has been awaited all
too long by the people of Cyprus.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION '

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of Cyprus,

Having heard the statements in the debate and
taking note of the report of the Special Political
Committee,"

Noting with concern that four rounds of talks
between the representatives of the two communities
in pursuance of Security Council resolution 367
(1975) of 12 March 1975 have not yet led to a
mutually acceptable settlement,

Deeply concerned at the continuation of the crisis
in Cyprus,

Mindful of the need to solve the Cyprus crisis
without further delay by peaceful means in accord-
ance with the purposes and principles of the United
Nations,

1. Reaffirms the urgent need for continued efforts
for the effective implementation in all its parts of
General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) of 1 No-
vember 1974 endorsed by the Security Council in its
resolution 365 (1974) of 13 December 1974 and, to
that end;

2. Calls once again upon all States to respect the
sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and
non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and to
refrain from all acts and interventions directed
against it;

'U.N. doc. A/RES/3395 (XXX) (A/L.775);
adopted by the Assembly on Nov. 20 by a vote of 117
to 1 (Turkey), with 9 abstentions (U.S.).

"U.N. doc. A/10352. [Footnote in original.]

64

Department of State Bulletin

[2 3. Demands the withdrawal without further delay
of all foreign armed forces and foreign military pres-
ence and personnel from the Republic of Cyprus,
and the cessation of all foreign interference in its
affairs;

4. Calls upon the parties concerned to undertake
urgent measures to facilitate the voluntary return
of all refugees to their homes in safety and to settle
all other aspects of the refugee problem;

5. Calls for the immediate resumption in a mean-
ingful and constructive manner of the negotiations
between the representatives of the two communities,
under the auspices of the Secretary-General, to be
conducted freely on an equal footing with a view to
reaching a mutually acceptable agreement based on
their fundamental and legitimate rights;

6. Urges all parties to refrain from unilateral
actions in contravention of resolution 3212 (XXIX),
including changes in the demographic structure of
Cyprus;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his
role in the negotiations between the representatives
of the two communities;

8. Also requests the Secretary-General to bring
the present resolution to the attention of the Secu-
rity Council and to report on its implementation as
soon as appropriate and not later than 31 March
1976;

9. Calls tipon all parties to continue to co-operate
fully with the United Nations Peace-keeping Force
in Cyprus;

10. Decides to remain seized of this question.

I

U.S. Supports Continuation
of U.N. Force in Cyprus

f! Folloiving is a statement made in the U.N.
Security Council by U.S. Representative
Albert W. Sherer, Jr., on December 13, to-
gether tvith the text of a resolution adopted
by the Council that day.

:fl

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SHERER

USUN press release 186 dated December 13

In the consultations which have preceded
this meeting, the United States has stressed
two views.

First, we agree with the Secretary-Gen-
eral that the renewal of UNFICYP [U.N.
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus] is essential.
UNFICYP remains a vital factor in the
preservation of stability on the island. With-

January 12, 1976

out stability the direct negotiations between
the parties, which we consider indispensable,
cannot be expected to progress.

Secondly, we recognize that the agreement
of the concerned parties to the resolution by
which UNFICYP is renewed is important
both to those negotiations and to the con-
tinuance of UNFICYP's effectiveness.

We are accordingly particularly pleased
that in the course of the long and skillful
consultations conducted by the Security
Council President and the Secretary Gen-
eral, the parties most directly concerned,
whatever their difficulties, have accepted the
resolution which we have just adopted. We
urge that this spirit be continued and that
the parties will not only provide effective
cooperation with UNFICYP in Cyprus but
also will contribute to the speedy resumption
and progress of the intercommunal negotia-
tions.

We have had occasion to remark here be-
fore that the question of Cyprus is one
which has placed particularly great demands
upon the time and resources of the United
Nations. The arduous consultations which
have preceded this meeting have now given
the members of this Council a direct expe-
rience of the nature of the extended efforts
which the Secretary General has repeatedly
made to further understanding and negotia-
tions among the parties.

Speaking from our own experience, I
would like to say once again that the United
States deeply appreciates the skillful and
painstaking thought and action which the
Secretary General has given to this issue. Ho
has our full support for the further actions
which he has informed the Council that he
intends to take.

In this connection, I wish also to reaffirm
the respect and admiration which my gov-
ernment feels for the dedication and gal-
lantry of the commander and men of UNFI-
CYP. As the Secretary General's report
m.akes unmistakably clear, the operations of
the Force in all parts of Cyprus have again
done honor to the high tradition and stand-
ing of U.N. peacekeeping.

We leave this debate with a renewed sense
that the unstinted response which so many

65

in the United Nations have made to the re-
quirements of the Cyprus problem now
places a compelling obligation on members —
and most especially upon the immediate
parties — to progress rapidly toward its solu-
tion. On this matter, our organization has
done everything, and more, that could rea-
sonably be asked of it. Those who have so
benefited by its work can now fairly be
asked to repay its efforts with their own.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION '

The Security Cou7icil,

Noting from the report of the Secretary-General
of 8 December 1975 (S/11900 and Add.l) that in
existing circumstances the presence of the United
Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed
not only to maintain the cease-fire but also to facili-
tate the continued search for a peaceful settlement,

Noting from the report the conditions prevailing
in the island,

Noting further that, in paragraph 68 of his report,
the Secretary-General has expressed the view that
in the present circumstances the best available means
of making progress towards a settlement is through
continued talks between the representatives of the
two communities and that such talks can only be
fruitful if the interlocutors are ready and authorized
to engage in meaningful negotiations on all essential
aspects of a settlement of the Cyprus problem,

Noting also the concurrence of the parties con-
cerned in the recommendation by the Secretary-
General that the Security Council extend the station-
ing of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in
Cyprus for a further period of six months.

Noting that the Government of Cyprus has agreed
that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island
it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond
15 December 1975,

Noting that General Assembly resolution 3395
(XXX) of 20 November 1975 reaffirmed the urgent
need for continued efforts for the effective imple-
mentation in all its parts of General Assembly
resolution 3212 (XXIX) of 1 November 1974 which
was endorsed by the Security Council in its resolu-
tion 365 (1974) of 13 December 1974,

1. Reaffirins the provisions of resolution 186
(1964) of 4 March 1964, as well as subsequent reso-
lutions and decisions on the establishment and
maintenance of the United Nations Peace-keeping

Force in Cyprus and on other aspects of the situation |
in Cyprus;

2. Reaffirms its resolutions 365 (1974) of 13
December 1974 and 367 (1975) of 12 iVIarch 1975
and calls for their urgent and effective implementa-
tion;

3. Urges the parties concerned to act with the ut-
most restraint and to continue and accelerate deter-
mined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives
of the Security Council;

4. Extends once more the stationing in Cyprus of
the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, established
under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a
further period ending 15 June 1976 in the expectation
that by then sufficient progress towards a final solu-
tion will make possible a withdrawal or substantial |
reduction of the Force; i

5. Appeals again to all parties concerned to ex-
tend their full co-operation to the United Nation^
Peace-keeping Force in its continuing performance of
its duties;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to continue the
mission of good offices entrusted to him by paragrapli
6 of resolution 367 (1975), to keep the Security
Council informed of the progress made and to submit j
a report not later than 31 March 1976. I

TREATY INFORMATION

•U.N. doc. S/RES/383 (1975); adopted by the
Council on Dec. 13 by a vote of 14-0, with the Peo-
ple's Republic of China not participating in the vote.

United States and Poland Sign
New Fisheries Agreement

Pie^s release 613 (Corr.) dated December 16

The United States and Poland signed on
December 16 in Washington a new fisheries
agreement concerning Polish fishing off the
Pacific coast of the United States.

The new agreement is the first bilateral
transition agi'eement in implementation of
the new U.S. fisheries initiative. The U.S.
fisheries initiative was announced by Secre-
tary Kissinger in a speech to the American
Bar Association Convention in Montreal, '
Canada, last August. The Secretary described
proposals in Congress to establish a 200-mile
fishing zone by unilateral action as "ex- I
tremely dangerous" and incompatible with I
efforts to solve fisheries problems in the i
Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea.

66

Department of State Bulletin

To conserve the fish and protect our fishing indus-

<y while the treaty is being negotiated (Secretary
Kissinger said) the United States will negotiate
ii terim arrangements with other nations to conserve
'.te fish stocks, to insure effective enforcement, and

l| protect the livelihood of our coastal fishermen.

'lese agreements will be a transition to the eventual

:0-mile zone.

The first step in the new initiative was suc-
I'ssfully completed at the meeting of the
jiternational Commission for the Northwest
.tlantic Fisheries in October. Among other
lings, member countries (other than the
Inited States) that fish off the U.S. Atlantic
(ast agreed to reduce their catch in 1976
1' 34 percent over 1975. In succeeding nego-
litions, the United States will continue to
jirsue the objectives and principles of the
Iheries initiative.

The agreement with Poland includes, for
1e first time, principles that will govern
iture fishing off the Pacific coast of the
hited States by Pohsh fishermen. These
linciples are based on the consensus emerg-
i^ from the U.N. Conference on the Law of

"te Sea concerning legal and jurisdictional
canges in the regime of fisheries manage-
unt within 200 miles of coastal countries.
The new principles are designed to adjust
fture Polish fishing to the new regime.
I'land agrees that the United States will
ctermine the total allowable catch for
secies off the Pacific coast on the basis of
te best available scientific evidence. Within
tis total, which will be set to insure the
eective conservation of the stocks, Ameri-
cn fishermen will have a preference to that

' prt of the total they are able to harvest,
iiy surplus within the total will be allocated

■ aiong foreign fishermen.

In the elaboration of these principles, sub-

sintial new restrictions and controls affect-

i? Polish fishing operations in the North

licific, designed to protect resources off the

- IS. coast and the special interests of U.S.
Ihermen, were agreed to by Poland.
Under terms of the former agreement,
bland harvested 42,500 metric tons of hake
(' the U.S. Pacific coast in 1975. Under the
) w agreement, Poland's hake quota has been

Ijiduced in 1976 by 39 percent, to 26,000

nuary 12, 1976

metric tons. Poland also agreed to reduce its
fishing effort by a similar percentage in
terms of numbers of days that its fishing
and processing vessels will engage in the
hake fishery. Under this arrangement, Poland
will move its fleet seaward off the U.S. coast
when it has reached its hake quota or the
agreed number of vessel-days, whichever
occurs first. This measure will serve to pro-
tect certain important coastal species, such
as rockfish, which are taken incidentally by
foreign countries while fishing for hake.

Even with the new restrictions and con-
trols in the Polish fishery, the total harvest
of Pacific hake is, however, in excess of
maximum sustainable yield level since, in
addition to Poland, several other foreign
countries are engaged in the hake fishery.
Therefore the United States will seek to re-
duce the catches made by other nations in
future negotiations to protect the hake stock.

Poland also agreed to reduce the total
number of vessels it plans to license for oper-
ation off the U.S. Pacific coast in 1976 from
15 to 12 and to reduce the number of fishing
and processing vessels that will be permitted
in various areas and times off the U.S. coast
from 11 to 8.

A provision in the former agreement pro-
hibiting fisheries by Poland on Pacific salmon,
halibut, rockfish, blackcod, flounders and
soles. Pacific mackerel, shrimp, and conti-
nental shelf resources was expanded to in-
clude Pacific herring as well in 1976.

New area and time restrictions have also
been incorporated in the new agreement. For
example, Poland agreed to refrain from fish-
ing year-round from 38° 30' N. latitude off
the coast of northern California south to the
U.S.-Mexico border to help protect rockfish
and juvenile hake stocks. In the Gulf of
Alaska, Poland agreed to refrain from fish-
ing in certain areas and times, similar to
provisions in the U.S. agreements with Japan
and the Soviet Union, to protect halibut and
other groundfish stocks and to reduce fishing
gear conflicts.

In addition, Poland agreed to refrain from
fishing for a nine-month period in a large
area between 147° W. and 157° W. longitude

67

in the vicinity of Kodiak Island, Alaska.

Other restrictions and measures contained
in the former agreement, including a volun-
tary inspection scheme, conciliation of gear
loss and vessel damage claims, and the op-
portunity to place U.S. observers aboard
Polish vessels to collect scientific data, are
continued in tlie 1976 agreement.

The new agreement was signed on behalf
of the United States by Miss Rozanne Ridg-
way, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans
and Fisheries Affairs, Department of State,
who headed the U.S. delegation. The Polish
Charge d'Affaires a.i., Minister Jozef Wie-
jacz, signed for the Polish People's Republic.
The agreement will be effective for one year,
starting January 1, 1976.

cations and government documents between state
Adopted at Paris December 3, 1958. Entered in
force May 30, 1961; for the United States June
1968. TIAS 6439.
Ratification deposited: Belgium, October 22, 197

Trade

Arrangement regarding international trade in te
tiles, with annexes. Done at Geneva December 2
1973. Entered into force January 1, 1974, excf]
for article 2, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, which enten
into force April 1, 1974. TIAS 7840.
Acceptance deposited: Portugal for Macao, Decer
ber 1, 1975.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the whp;
trade convention (part of the international whe:
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done .
Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into fon
June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisioi
and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions.
Ratification deposited: Ecuador, December 2
1975.

Current Actions

BILATERAL

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon-
treal September 23, 1971. Entered into force Janu-
ary 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.
Ratification deposited: Turkey, December 23, 1975.

Energy

Agreement on an international energy program. Done
at Paris November 18, 1974."

Notification of consent to be bound deposited:
Switzerland, November 8, 1975.

Publications

Convention concerning the international exchange of
publications. Adopted at Paris December 3, 1958.
Entered into force November 23, 1961; for the
United States June 9, 1968. TIAS 6438.
Ratification deposited: Belgium, October 22, 1975.

Convention concerning the exchange of official publi-

Canada

Understanding concerning principles applying to ce
tain rocket launches and similar experiments ;
Cape Perry, Northwest Territories (Operatii
"Periquito"). Effected by exchange of notes :
Ottawa November 24 and 25, 1975. Entered in
force November 25, 1975.

Iran

Memorandum of understanding relating to the pr(
vision of advisory technical assistance to Iran i
organizing its civil emergency preparedness capj |
bility. Signed at Tehran November 22, 1975. Ei
tered into force November 22, 1975.

Peru

Memorandum of understanding on an interim agree
ment relating to compensation for the Marcon
Mining Company, with annex. Signed at Lim
December 11, 1975. Entered into force Decembe
11, 1975.

' Not in force.

68

Department of State Bullet

J(

i

INDEX January 12, 1976 Vol. LXXIV, No. 1907

Vmerican Principles. The Common Challenge in
the Search for an Enduring Peace (Kissinger) 49

ingola. Secretary Kissinger Attends NATO
Ministerial Meeting (Kissinger, Bitsios,
Caglayangil, communique) 51

.'anada. U.S.-Canada Joint Statement Issued
at Paris (text) 58

ommodities. Energy, Raw Materials, and De-
velopment: The Search for Common Ground
(Kissinger, text of final communique of Con-
ference on International Economic Cooper-
ation) 37

ongress

ongressional Documents Relating to Foreign

Policy 63

irst Prigress Report on Cyprus Submitted to
the Congress (message from President Ford) 59
resident Ford Reports to Congress on Turkish
Opium Poppy Control (text of letter) ... 62
resident Reaffirms Recommendations for As-
sistance to Greece (text of letter) .... 61

rprus

rst Progress Report on Cyprus Submitted to
the Congress (message from President Ford) 59
■cretary Kissinger Attends NATO Ministerial
Meeting (Kissinger, Bitsios, Caglayangil,

communique) 51

S. Gives Views on Cyprus in General Assem-
bly Debate (Bennett, Sherer, text of reso-
lution) 63

S. Supports Continuation of U.N. Force in
Cyprus (Sherer, text of resolution) ... 65

!veloping Countries

lergy. Raw Materials, and Development: The
Search for Common Ground (Kissinger, text
Df final communique of Conference on Inter-
lational Economic Cooperation) 37

'. onomic Affairs. Energy, Raw Materials, and
Development: The Search for Common Ground
(Kissinger, text of final communique of
Conference on International Economic Co-
)peration) 37

"^ lited States and Poland Sign New Fisheries
Agreement 66

] ergy. Energy, Raw Materials, and Develop-
nent: The Search for Common Ground (Kis-
singer, text of final communique of Confer-
mce on International Economic Cooperation) 37

I reign Aid. President Reaffirms Recommenda-
ions for Assistance to Greece (text of letter) 61

i rmany. The Common Challenge in the Search
'or an Enduring Peace (Kissinger) .... 49

Ceece

Ijsident Reaffirms Recommendations for As-
istance to Greece (text of letter) .... 61

S ;retary Kissinger Attends NATO Ministerial
Heetmg (Kissinger, Bitsios, Caglayangil,
ommunique) 51

Fernational Organizations and Conferences.

Energy, Raw Materials, and Development:
The Search for Common Ground (Kissinger,
ext of final communique of Conference on
nternational Economic Cooperation) ... 37

I w of the Sea. United States and Poland Sign
"few Fisheries Agreement 66

J Idle East. Secretary Kissinger Attends
MTO Ministerial Meeting (Kissinger,
Jitsios, Caglayangil, text of communique) . 51

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Secretary
Kissinger Attends NATO Ministerial Meet-
ing (Kissinger, Bitsios, Caglayangil, text of
communique) 51

Poland. United States and Poland Sign New
Fisheries Agreement 66

Presidential Documents

First Progress Report on Cyprus Submitted to
the Congress 59

President Ford Reports to Congress on Turkish

Opium Poppy Control (text of letter) ... 62

President Reaffirms Recommendations for As-
sistance to Greece (text of letter) .... 61

Treaty Information

Current Actions 68

United States and Poland Sign New Fisheries
Agreement 66

Turkey

President Ford Reports to Congress on Turkish

Opium Poppy Control (text of letter) ... 62

Secretary Kissinger Attends NATO Ministerial
Meeting (Kissinger, Bitsios, Caglayangil,
communique) 51

U.S.S.R. Secretary Kissinger Attends NATO
Ministerial Meeting (Kissinger, Bitsios,
Caglayangil, text of communique) .... 51

United Nations

U.S. Gives Views on Cyprus in General Assem-
bly Debate (Bennett, Sherer, text of reso-
lution) 63

U.S. Supports Continuation of U.N. Force in
Cyprus (Sherer, text of resolution) ... 65

Name Index

Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr 63

Bitsios, Dimitrios 51

Caglayangil, Ihsan Sabri 51

Ford, President 59, 61, 62

Kissinger, Secretary 37, 49, 51

Sherer, Albert W., Jr 63, 65

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: December 22-28

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

No. Date Sabject

*625 12/22 U.S. National Committee for the
International Radio Consulta-
tive Committee, Feb. 5.

*626 12/22 Secretary's Advisory Committee
on Private International Law
Study Group on Negotiable In-
struments, Jan. 23.

t627 12/23 Kissinger: news conference.

*628 12/24 Samuel W. Lewis sworn in as
Assistant Secretary for Inter-
national Organization Affairs
(biographic data).

*Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

I

Superintendent of Documents

u.s. government printing office

washington. dc. 20402

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G^

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXIV

No. 1908 • January 19, 1976

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE
OF DECEMBER 23 69

U.S. DISCUSSES ANGOLA IN U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Statement by Ambassador Moynihan 80

U.S. WELCOMES ADOPTION BY U.N. OF DECLARATION ON TORTURE

Statement by Carmen R. Maymi and Text of Resolution 86

DEPARTMENT DISCUSSES THE ROLE OF EAST-WEST TRADE

IN U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS

Statement by Deputy Secretary Ingersoll 90

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXXIV, No. 1908
January 19, 1976

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The Department of State BVLLETli
a weekly publication issued by ti
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interested agencies of tlie governme
witfi information on developments
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T/ie BULLETIN includes select
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ficretary Kissinger's News Conference of December 23

ii'^s release 627 dated December 23

\Q. Mr. Secretary, noiv that continued U.S.
(d to the anti-Soviet factions in Angola
H'ins doubtful, are there any other ways the
luited States can bring pressure to bear on
!(' Soviets to stop supporting the Popular
iovement [Popular Movement for the Liber-
,\ion of Angola (MPLA)]?

Secretary Kissinger: We should not have

I idea that we can substitute in our bilateral

, ilations with the Soviet Union for the situ-

sion on the ground. As far as the situation

the ground is concerned, the United

■iates will make every effort with what is

i the pipeline and what is still available. It

^ 11 also continue the diplomatic efforts that

, '3re started prior to the events of last week

. Jid that have become severely complicated

the congressional action. If these do not

ceeed by the time that the Congress re-

nis, we will go back to the Congress and

esent the situation as it then exists.

I I As far as our relations with the Soviet

' nion are concerned, we consider the actions

Angola incompatible with a relaxation of

nsions, and they are certain to affect our

lationship unless a diplomatic solution is

and.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you plan to go to
(i.^coiv sometime after the first of the year?

Secretary Kissinger: My present plans are
ji go to Moscow in the second half of Janu-
!'y to discuss primarily SALT and other
jsues, but we will have to see what the

tuation is in January.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect that visit
> be complicated by the events in Angola,
■)ecifically the congressional action on An-
ola? Will that make it harder?

anuary 19, 1976

Secretary Kissinger: The congressional
action on Angola makes the situation in
Angola much more difficult. As a result, it
will also hurt our negotiating position with
the Soviet Union. We will have to make a
judgment later on, when the diplomatic
moves that are now in progress will have
had an opportunity to play themselves out,
just how serious the effect will have been.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it true, as published
this morning, that the CIA has found that
Israel's request for American aid has been
greatly inflated and that, should it receive
the $2.3 billion requested in U.S. assistance,
it would have a budget surplus of $500 mil-
lion ?

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, I don't
know who is on the distribution list for
what reports. I don't know whether I am on
all the distribution lists that some of the
press people are.

The reports that I am familiar with and
the studies that I have seen indicate that,
even at the level of $2.3 billion that we have
requested, Israel will have to engage in an
austerity program in order to make ends
meet. And our figure was based on an inter-
departmental study which came to the con-
clusion that the figure that we requested
from the Congress enables Israel to meet
its needs on an austerity basis. We have
never heard of a figure that enables Israel
to achieve a surplus. And of course we would
not support that. But we have no evidence
whatever for that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you say you con-
sider the Soviet actions in Angola incompati-
ble with detente, what does that mean? What
is the "or else," and how incompatible?

69

Secretary Kissinger: Let us make a few
observations here about detente. And let us
separate two things: The relationship with
the Soviet Union that is inherent in the rela-
tion of two superpowers and, secondly, those
relations that are subject to decisions and
that we can regulate in terms of Soviet be-
havior.

The basic problem in our relations with
the Soviet Union is the emergence of the
Soviet Union into true superpower status.
That fact has become evident only in the
1970's. As late as the Cuban missile crisis,
the disparity in strategic power between the
United States and the Soviet Union was
overwhelming in our favor. In the seventies
and eighties the Soviet Union will have
achieved, and is on the road to achieving,
effective strategic equality, which means
that whoever may be ahead in the damage
they can inflict on the other, the damage to
the other in a general nuclear war will be
of a catastrophic nature.

This being the case — in the past the emer-
gence of a country into superpower status,
such as, for example, imperial Germany vis-
a-vis Great Britain, has generally led to war.
Under the conditions of the nuclear age, it
must not lead to war. That is a fact of the
period that any Administration, and any
opponent of the Administration, would have
to face if they had to assume responsibility.
How to manage the emergence of Soviet
power without sacrificing vital interests is
the preeminent problem of our period. That
part of the Soviet-American relationship
cannot be abolished. That is inherent in the
relationship.

The second problem we have is whether
we can accelerate this process of moderating
this potential conflict by conscious acts of
policy. This has been called detente. In this
respect, it requires conscious restraint by
both sides. If one side does not practice re-
straint, then the situation becomes inher-
ently tense. We do not confuse the relaxation
of tensions with permitting the Soviet Union
to expand its sphere by military means. And
that is the issue, for example, in Angola.
The danger to detente that we face now is
that our domestic disputes are depriving us

of both the ability to provide incentives fc
moderation, such as in the restrictions o
the Trade Act, as well as of the ability 1'
resist military moves by the Soviet Unioi:
as in Angola. |

If the Soviet Union continues action suci
as Angola we will, without any questio,
resist. And failure to resist can only let
other countries to conclude that their situ,
tion is becoming increasingly precarious-
because in Angola we are not talking aboi
American participation ; we are talkii
about giving military and financial assis
ance to people who are doing the fightin ■
to local people who are doing the fighting, i

To return to your question, unless tl
Soviet Union shows restraint in its foreij
policy actions, the situation in our relatio
ship is bound to become more tense, ai
there is no question that the United Stat '
will not accept Soviet military expansion 1
any kind. I

Q. Mr. Secretary, in a democracy, wh
there is this kind of conflict between t
executive branch and the legislative bran
and the legislative branch is not moving a
is not responding to your requests and
your entreaties, how is that eventually
solved? I mean, you can't act without d
gress.

Secretary Kissinger: It will become :
solved when the consequences of these ;
tions become apparent. The danger is t?
they usually become apparent too late.

We warned and warned about the imi
cations of the amendments with respect
Soviet trade. The end result was that t
Ti-ade Act could not be implemented, or t
trade agreement could not be implement
and the people who were supposed to •■
helped were hurt in the sense that Jewi.
emigration from the Soviet Union fell frd
38,000 to 10,000.

We warned and warned about the imj-
cations of the Turkish aid cutoff, and it i
now perfectly evident that our relatici
with Turkey have been damaged beyond a'
immediate hope of recovei-y, though we hn
made some progress.

And we are warning now that what ?

70

Department of State Bulled

appeiiing in Angola has nothing to do with
le local situation in Angola. We were pre-
,ared to accept any outcome in Angola before
lassive arms shipments by the Soviet Union
ad the introduction of Cuban forces oc-
♦irred. We are not opposed to the MPLA as
!ich. We make a distinction between the
;ictions in Angola and the outside inter-
■nition. We can live with any of the fac-
lons in Angola, and we would never have
jven assistance to any of the other factions
i other great powers had stayed out of it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if these congressional
straints on action in Angola by us, or for

.iigola, are not removed — and there isn't

iuj sign that they are going to be — hotv can
III make your statement stick that the
nited States will not accept Soviet military

rpansion of any kind? It ties your hands,

lies it not?

Secretary Kissin,ger: It ties our hands, but
1 is my conviction that if one does not dis-
( arge one's responsibilities in one place,
lie will be forced to do so elsewhere under
lore difficult circumstances. The problem
'ill not go away. The situation will become
lore difficult.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to follow that up, if I
luld ask a complicated question on that: I
i ought that one of the lessons of Viet-Nam

as that the United States is no longer going
i be the policeman for the world. There are
■I vital U.S. interests at all in Angola. You
■ id that publicly. The Russians have a long
.story of failures in Africa. Why is it neces-
. ry every time the Russians get involved
iiy where in the world, even in places where
.merican interests are not affected, that you
:el that you are compelled to go confront
• em?

And. in connection with that, if you con-
■der it .so important, ivhy do you do it in a
iandestine way? Why don't you take it to

e Congress and say, "This is important;

e need money for it," and have it debated
the beginning, instead of having it blow
a in your face?

Secretary Kissinger: May I separate out
)me of the strands of this exposition?

inuary 19, 1976

First, the phrase that the United States
cannot be the world's policeman is one of
those generalities that needs some refine-
ment. The fact of the matter is that security
and progress in most parts of the world de-
pend on some American commitment.

Now, with respect to Angola, the issue, I
repeat, is not whether a pro-Soviet faction
is becoming dominant in Angola. The U.S.
policy until well into the summer was to stay
out of Angola, to let the various factions
work out their own arrangements between
themselves. We accepted in Mozambique
without any difficulty a pro-Marxist faction
that came to power by indigenous means, or
perhaps with some minimum outside sup-
port, in the Frelimo [Front for the Libera-
tion of Mozambique]. What happened be-
tween March and the middle of the summer
was a massive introduction of Soviet mili-
tary equipment, which was then followed
by Soviet advisers and large numbers of
Cuban troops — large at least in relation to
what it takes in Angola to affect the situa-
tion.

Therefore the issue is not whether the
country of Angola represents a vital interest
to the United States. The issue is whether
the Soviet Union, backed by a Cuban expedi-
tionary force, can impose on two-thirds of
the population its own brand of government.
And the issue is not whether the United
States should resist it with its own military
forces. Nobody ever suggested the introduc-
tion of American military forces. The Presi-
dent has made it clear that under no circum-
stances will we introduce American military
forces. The issue is whether the United
States will disqualify itself from giving a
minimal amount of economic and military
assistance to the two-thirds of the popula-
tion that is resisting an expeditionary force
from outside the hemisphere and a massive
introduction of Soviet military equipment.

If the United States adopts as a national
policy that we cannot give even military and
economic assistance to people who are trying
to defend themselves without American
military forces, then we are practically in-
viting outside forces to participate in every
situation in which there is a possibility for

71

foreign intervention. And we are therefore
undermining any hope of political and inter-
national order.

Now, as far as the Congress is concerned,
let us keep in mind we are talking about
trivial sums. We are talking about tens of
millions of dollars. And there is something
wrong if one says that, if one approves tens
of millions of dollars, the next thing you
know is you will have spent $150 billion and
have 500,000 troops there. A country must
know how to make distinctions. We are
talking about tens of millions of dollars in a
situation in which our whole strategy was
to produce a negotiated solution, of which
the first step was going to be the speech I
made in Detroit at the end of November.

We did it in a clandestine way because we
did not want to have a public confrontation
if we could avoid it.

Nor is it correct to say that the Congress
did not know about it. Congressional com-
mittees were briefed on 25 separate occa-
sions about what we were doing in Angola.
Every stage of additional expenditures was
put before the six congressional committees
that have supervisory responsibilities. Some
of them have designated only two members
to receive these briefings ; others have desig-
nated as many as 13 members to receive
these briefings. But the designation is not
the Administration's decision ; it is the deci-
sion of the Congress. But six congressional
committees were briefed at least 25 times.
In addition, the two intelligence committees
were briefed, I believe, a total of four times,
two each. And I briefed the Church commit-
tee myself for two and a half hours.

So we followed the procedures that had
been established. We were expecting to
bring this matter to a negotiated solution,
without a huge controversy, in a reasonably
brief period of time.

And again, we should remember that this
whole controversy is breaking out about
American equipment asked for by African
countries to support other Africans, and
which amounts to some tens of millions of
dollars.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I just tvant to check.
You have left the impression that if the

72

Soviets continue in their current support i|!
Angola, your trip to Moscoiv would he n
jeonardy later this month, or it might rn\
take place.

Tne second point is, if indeed the Angola,
situation is really a test between the Sovi^
Union and the United States, why not go ij
the heart of the issue on a question like gra:,
shipments to the Soviet Union arid thini^
like that, in which the Soviet Union has \
direct interest and some pressure can ^^
brought to bear? j

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is I
rather curious method to say "You go aherj
and take over Angola with 5,000 foreij 1
troops, but in the meantime we will sta I
harassing you with some other things."

We are talking to the Soviet Union with
the context of our overall relationship, a)
there is no question that our overall rel |
tionship will suffer if we do not find an ac ' j
quate solution to the Angolan proble '
Where it will suffer and in what ways, I £ I
not prepared to say. I have not said that t ' I
trip to Moscow will be in jeopardy. I sf ' '
we will have to look at the situation clof
to the time of the trip before we can answ
the question whether it is in jeopardy or n '

The question of strategic arms limitatic
is a matter that is in our mutual inten
and that should not be lightly discarded.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have often said th
no policy can he effective without Americ
public support. Unless you can shoiv soi
clear and compelling national interest
volved in Angola, hoiv do you propose
loin American public support?

Secretary Kissinger: I think I have sho^
— in my view, what I have said here tl
morning shows — a clear and compelli
American national interest to do the thin >
that we had wanted to do, which were mir '
expenditures compared to what is involv I
internationally.

We are talking about, I repeat, tens
millions of dollars. We are not talking abc:
an American expeditionary force. We are i:
talking about a major American invol'-
ment.

The debate has been misrepresented, ' (

Department of State Bulle* I

J

Mich American assistance to indigenous
Irces becomes an American commitment to
irht a war. That is not the case.

And therefore, if we do not succeed in
cnvincing the public or the Congress, then
V3 will certainly lose. And then the question
i— then we will certainly lose on this issue,
iid then we will face the problem that is
£ivays faced in these cases. Those who are
tv'ing to resist are doing so because they
Vint to prevent a worse contingency. If they
culd prove that worse contingency without
; y question, everybody would agree with
tern. A danger avoided can never be demon-
£-ated.

Therefore, if those of us who hold the
\2w that I have described here are correct,
\! will face more serious dislocations and
cngers further down the road. And when
te dangers become serious enough, they
^\l unify the American people and the Con-
fess and the executive.

We are trying to avoid that contingency
iiva arising. If we turn out to be wrong
I d the Congress is right, I will be delight-

Q. M?-. Secretary, implicit in all of these
I estions, though, is the fact that Viet-Nam
Igayi as a very minor involvement, began
ith material assistance, not just military
tsistance. Implicit in all of this is the
I'der standing that if in fact you are not
i ccessftd tvith the tens of millions of dol-
Irs, that the next request then ivill be for
Indreds of millions of dollars. Hoiv do you
ispond to that?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, the situ-
;ions in Angola and in Viet-Nam are totally
(fferent.
In Viet-Nam, we were involved with a
fate of some size that had fought a civil
vir for decades and that had shown a sub-
fan tial ability to conduct its own war
■ rainst the French and against its own
)ponents in the country. In Viet-Nam, in
ct, the analogy, if there is any, is the So-
et support for Hanoi. And if the Soviet
inion had taken the position the Senate is
3w taking vis-a-vis Hanoi, namely, that they
ould not support them once we got involved,

then we would certainly have won the war.

Now, in Angola we are dealing with three
factions, none of them very large, none of
them very well organized. Without outside
support, the war would end on the basis that
the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
has proposed, through some sort of coalition
among the local forces. That is all that we
want. We have no permanent interests in
Angola and, I repeat again, we have no ob-
jection to the MPLA as long as it is an
African organization.

Now, the only way we would have to come
back for more and more funds is if the So-
viet Union decided, on its side, to put hun-
dreds of millions of dollars into Angola. If
the Soviet Union were prepared to do this
in an area 8,000 miles away from its borders
in which it has no historical interest, if it
were willing to fight a proxy war with the
United States that far away from its
borders, then we better know about it. Then
we can make all sorts of decisions.

It was our belief, and it remains our be-
lief, that this is a situation that can be
solved by negotiation. And if we have the
minimum degree of unity in this country
and the minimum degree of confidence in
ourselves, it will be resolved. But if a coun-
try is afraid to spend $10 million lest it
spend $10 billion, then it is getting itself
into great difficulties.

And let us not fool ourselves about what
happened in Viet-Nam. We did not start in
Viet-Nam with a few hundred men and wake
up one morning and have 500,000 troops
there. Every step in Viet-Nam was a con-
scious decision that was publicly known and
to which there was no significant objection
when there was time to do something about
it.

There is no possibility that the same
thing could happen in Angola, when even the
first step has produced such an intense de-
bate. And therefore I would warn against
our putting ourselves — against drawing
such facile analogies to Viet-Nam.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can we switch to the
Middle East for a minute and ask you if the
United States has asked the Rabin [Yitzhak
Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel] govern-

anuary 19, 1976

73

tnent not to allow further settlements in the
Golan Heights or, Indeed, if the United
States has suggested anything in this regard
to the Rabin government?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not want to
comment about Presidential messages. It
has been our general policy to point out that
the creation of new settlements on the Golan
Heights and elsewhere complicates the diplo-
matic process. And we have from time to
time brought this to the attention of the
Israeli Government.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you spoke earlier of the
emergence in this decade of the Soviet Union
as a superpower, and you also spoke about
detente as an effort to modify Soviet be-
havior by conscious acts of policy. Why are
you waiting to affect the overall relationship
of detente through those means by which we
reinforce the Soviet ability to grow as a
■superpower — in other ivords through eco-
nomic and food shipments, in which the So-
viets can then divert their resources into
becoming a military superpower?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, Ameri-
can credits to the Soviet Union have been
minimal and have always been tied to specific
projects which, in our judgment, did not
affect the basic Soviet strategic position.
The major amounts of credits to the Soviet
Union from the outside world have come
from the West Europeans and Japan, and
not from the United States.

With respect to grain shipments, the sale
of grain to the Soviet Union does not enable
them to divert resources. It affects their
standard of consumption and the happiness
of the population, but it would not basically
affect the Soviet strategic position.

The fact we have to face is that the Soviet
Union, as a major industrial power, will de-
velop, inevitably, associated military capa-
bilities. The Soviet Union has been prepared
to spend a greater percentage of its gross
national product for military forces than
the United States and has therefore been
able to translate it into stronger forces for
each new conflict than the United States.
That is not a result of detente; that is a re-
sult of domestic priorities in the two coun-

tries which we have it in our power t
change and which we should change.

We have to make a decision whether, witl
an emerging superpower, we should conduc
our foreign policy entirely on the basis o
unbridgeable hostility or whether, througl
a combination of moderation or creating ir
centives for moderation, and firmness whe
challenged, channel the inevitable competi
tion into a direction which prevents wha
has generally happened when a new supei
power emerged — namely, a war. And a wa
under present circumstances would hav
catastrophic consequences for all of humai
ity.

Now, this is the problem of detente. An
I must stress again we are being deprive
now of both the incentives for moderatio
and the capacity to resist, and this must lea
to an extremely dangerous situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is Cuba's militay-y intei
vention in Angola going to result, in yoit
view, in an indefinite postponement of ov
normalization of trade and diplomatic reU
tions ?

Secretary Kissinger: We will not continu
the process of normalization until Cuba
forces return to Cuba.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how can you say you ai
going to continue to press for more and fret
trade and to change the trade reform act i
get rid of some of the restrictions on trad
with the Soviets at the same time tve ar
trying to meet them tvith firmness in Ai
gola?

Secretary Kissinger: We are not likely t
press for that at this time.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is the confrontation bt
tween Congress and the Administration o
Angola crucial enough for you to resig
over?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not want to giv
them an incentive for more confrontatioi
[Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you say anythin
about those diplomatic moves you were met
tioning in order to achieve the solution i
Angola? Can you say what they are? Ar

J

74

Department of State Bulleti

hcij especially in the direction of the Or-
tanization of African Unity?

Secretary Kissinqer: We believe that the
ippropriate sohition in Angola should be
;ought by the Organization of African
Jnity. It should be done on the basis that
he three factions in Angola should agree
imong themselves on an appropriate coali-
ion or anything else that they agree among
hemselves — that foreign forces, as I said
he other day, from the Soviet Union, from
'uba, and from South Africa should be
vithdrawn from Angola. Under those condi-
ions, Angola will cease being a significant
nterest of the United States, and we will
ooperate with its economic development as
lart of our overall African policy.

We have no national objectives in estab-
shing a pro-American or pro-Western gov-
rnment in Angola. We want an African
overnment that is not imposed by anybody
rom the outside.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the Soviet re-
ponse when you talk about the need for
estraint in Angola and suggest that broader
'etente relations, bilateral relations, may be
ndangered by this?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we were only
t the beginning of the diplomatic process
.'hen we got diverted into congressional
learings. But so far, obviously, the response
las not been conclusive.

Q. Do yon see any sign of moderation, of
eduction of arms shipments?

Secretary Kissinger: My view was that a
olution was achievable in the relatively
lear future, especially if we could have pur-
ued it with quiet diplomacy.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on your basic problem
lere ivith the Congress and the public, isn't
t going to be necessary, in order to have a
yrayer of marshaling any support, for the
idminist ration to come cleaner ivith the
niblic than it has about what it is involved
jW in Angola — the time sequence, exactly
■vhat it has put in, whether there is any at-
empt to recruit mercenaries, the numbers
)/ advisers? You say the Soviet Union is

^ January 19, 1976

blocking an attempt at a coalition govern-
ment. The Soviet Union claims that it is the
United States that foreclosed an attempt to
have a coalition government in the earlier
period of this year.

Secretary Kissinger: That is untrue.

Q. Well, the public is really bereft of facts
on the record here to deal ivith this situation.
Is it not possible to have some more candor
about it? You said that the basic situation in
Viet-Nam tvas open and known. Certainly,
that cannot be said very clearly here about
Angola.

Secretary Kissinger: The situation in An-
gola, you have to remember, was not a major
enterprise. The situation in Angola was one
that was resoluble by diplomatic means.

It is absolutely untrue that a coalition
government was offered by the Soviet Union
earlier this year, or by anybody else earlier
this year, and rejected by the United States.
It has been the fixed American policy to
foster a coalition among the parties. It has
been the fixed American policy to support
the OAU in its efforts to bring about con-
ciliation among the parties. And at no time
has the United States attempted for any
particular group to prevail. It was only mas-
sive Soviet intervention that has prevented
this.

We had hoped that on the relatively small
scale that the operation was conducted —
and with the very extensive congressional
briefing that was going on — that to escalate
the problem too much would complicate its
solution.

It is perfectly clear now that, if we go
back to the Congress for additional support,
we will have to put the facts in all their
details before the Congress.

But I would also point out that there is an
area in which confidential diplomacy must
have an opportunity to operate or every
problem becomes that much more difficult.

Q. Mr. Secretary —
Q. Mr. Secretary —

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Binder [David
Binder, New York Times] first.

75

i

Q. Mr. Secretary, isn't it a fact that a year
ago the primary outside forces engaged in
Angola — that is, the supplies and advisers —
were China and the Soviet Union and that
the Chinese withdreiv sometime in the sum-
mer and that the United States more or less
filled the gap left by the Chinese?

Secretary Kissinger: That is, with all re-
spect, a rather superficial way of putting it.
Our involvement — and again, I must repeat
— our involvement is relatively small finan-
cial support to African countries that have
asked us to help other Africans. It is not a
commitment of American forces in Angola.
Ours occurred when a very substantial influx
of Soviet forces, extending over many
months, beyond any capacity of the Chinese
to match, seemed to create a situation where
an outside power imposed its solution on the
country. It was not coordinated with the
Chinese. It was not discussed with the Chi-
nese. It was done for our own reasons.

Q. Mr. Secretary, why do you consistently
minimize any reference to South Africa's in-
volvement in your statements on Angola?
Are you less concerned about South African
involvement than Soviet involvement? And
what diplomatic pressures, if any, are you
taking to get South Africa to ivithdraw?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that the re-
moval of South African forces is a relatively
simpler matter than the removal of Cuban
and Soviet forces. And the United States,
I have stated publicly, and I have repeated
it today, is in favor of the removal of both
Cuban and South African forces, and of all
outside intervention.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any realistic
hope or expectation of getting money from
Congress to continue your efforts in Angola;
and two, if you do not, these dangers that
you warn of, what practical consequences
anight there be?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we are going
to make a major effort, both diplomatically
and on the ground, to make do with what we
have, to generate as much support from

other countries as we can. And we have had
very positive responses from many African
countries over the last few days. And we will ,
also make our views known to those coun-
tries that will attend the OAU summit meet-
ing on January 10 and 12. So we are not
operating on the assumption that it must
necessarily fail.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you can have a diplo-
matic dialogue with the Soviet Union by
hinting that detente or SALT or other initi-'
atives are threatened. But what pressure
points do you have with the Cubans, who
have 5,000 or 6,000 expeditionary troops''
there ?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, let us
keep in mind one thing: that SALT anc
what I described as detente is in our com-
mon interest. It is not a favor we grant t(
the Soviet Union. It is an inherent necessitj
of the present period. Avoiding nuclear wai
is not a favor we do anybody. Avoiding nu
clear war without giving up any interests i;
the problem that we face now.

As far as Cuba is concerned, we have m ,
particular additional pressure points. And oi
the other hand, we do not believe that Cub;
would do what it is doing except under So
viet advice. \

President Deplores Senate Cutoff
of Additional Funds for Angola

Statement by President Ford^

The Senate decision to cut off additiona
funds for Angola is a deep tragedy for al
countries whose security depends upon th
United States. Ultimately, it will profoundl;
aff'ect the security of our country as well.

How can the United States, the greates
power in the world, take the position tha

' Made to correspondents in the press briefing roor
at the White House on Dec. 19 (text from Whit
House press release).

76

Department of State Bulletil

I

ts Soviet Union can operate with impunity
nmy thousands of miles away with Cuban
ti)ops and massive amounts of military
eaipment, while we refuse any assistance
t(the majority of the local people, who ask
oly for military equipment to defend them-
stves ?

The issue in Angola is not, never has been,
ai never will be a question of the use of
L3- forces. The sole issue is the provision
o: modest amounts of assistance to oppose
nflitary intervention by two extraconti-
aital powers ; namely, the Soviet Union and
^ba.

Phis abdication of responsibility by a
iTJority of the Senate will have the gravest
c< (sequences for the long-term position of
tl United States and for international
oier in general. A great nation cannot es-
ii<e its responsibilities. Responsibilities
alindoned today will return as more acute
cues tomorrow.

therefore call upon the Senate to reverse
it position before it adjourns. Failure to do
3(will, in my judgment, seriously damage
tl national interest of the United States.

Pisident Ford's News Conference
0 December 20

''olloiving is an excerpt relating to foreign
pdcy from the transcript of a neivs confer-
ee e held by President Ford in the press
b.efing room at the White House on Decem-
b, 20}

}. Mr. President, yesterday you isstied a
attement about your sentiments on what the
S'late has done on Angola.

^resident Ford: I said it fairly strongly.

). You sure did. After you did it. Dr. Kis-
^iger said something a little more — even

For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila-
ti[ of Presidential Documents dated Dec. 29, 1975,
p.j387.

stronger over at the State Department
around five o'clock. He said the responsibil-
ity for the conduct of foreign policy is not
altered or affected simply because Congress
has taken an action. I don't knoiv quite how
to read that, but I can read that once you
spend the money that is in the pipeline there
isn't any more. What is the U.S. policy
toward Angola going to be, given the fact
that you are going to run out of money in
about two months?

President Ford: Our fundamental purpose
in Angola was to make sure that the people
of Angola decide their own fate, establish
their own government, and proceed as an
independent nation. We think it is funda-
mentally very unwise, very harmful, for any
foreign power, such as the Soviet Union is
obviously doing and as Cuba is doing, to try
to dominate any government in that country.
All we want is for the majority of the people
in Angola to decide for themselves what
they want.

Now, unfortunately because the Soviet
Union has spent literally millions and mil-
lions of dollars and unfortunately because
Cuba has anywheres from 4,000 to 6,000
combat troops in Angola, we think this is a
setback for the people in Angola. Now, I
take this problem very seriously.

Q. Well, what is to be done with your
hands tied, so to speak?

President Ford: Well, the Congress un-
fortunately has tied our hands, and I think
it is a serious mistake. I feel very strongly
that a great country like the United States
should have flexibility to help those people
in any one country to decide their own fate.
And the action of the Congress is crucial in
that it has deprived us of helping a majority
of the people in Angola to make their own
decisions.

And the problem that I foresee on a
broader basis is a good many countries
throughout the world consider the United
States friendly and helpful, and we have
over a period of time helped to maintain free
governments around the world. Those coun-

Jliuary 19, 1976

77

tries that have depended on us — and there
are many — can't help but have some mis-
givings because the Congress has refused
any opportunity for us in Angola to help a
majority of the people. And they can't help
but feel that the same fate might occur as
far as they are concerned in the future.

I hope the House of Representatives will
have a different view, and we are certainly
going to try and get the House of Repre-
sentatives to reverse the Senate action.

Q. If not, are we through there?

President Ford: I never say we are
through; but the action of the Senate has
seriously handicapped any effort that we
could make to achieve a negotiated settle-
ment so that the people of Angola could have
a free and independent government.

Q. Mr. President, on that subject, ivhy did
we not start earlier in making public our op-
position to what the Soviet Uyiion was doing
there and telling this country how much
money and what effort ive were making
there, and can you tell us how much money
we spent there?

President Ford: I don't think it is wise for
me to discuss in any detail what we have
done or contemplated doing. It was a legiti-
mate covert operation where not one Ameri-
can military personnel was involved in the
operation, and we had no intention whatso-
ever of ever sending any U.S. military per-
sonnel there. But to discuss any further
details than that I think, in this case as in
any other covert action case, the President
just should not discuss it publicly.

Q. Mr. President, now that the Soviet
Union is persisting, despite what the Con-
gress did on our side, in pouring equipment
and material into Angola, do you see now the
possibility that this anight seriously harm
any chance for a completion of SALT Two?

President Ford: The persistence of the
Soviet Union in Angola with a hundred mil-
lion dollars' or more worth of military aid

certainly doesn't help the continuation c
detente.

Now I will add another comment. As
said earlier, there are between 4,000 an
6,000 Cuban combat military personnel i
Angola. The action of the Cuban Goveri
ment in sending combat forces to Ango
destroys any opportunity for improvemei
in relations with the United States. Th(
have made a choice. It, in effect, and I met
very literally, has precluded any improv
ment in relations with Cuba.

Q. Mr. President, do you see any possib.\
ity that this matter could be taken to tt\
United Nations or worked on from the dipl
matic standpoint now?

President Ford: We certainly intended
try to get diplomatic efforts underway ai
to help in the diplomatic area, but I thii
our influence in trying to get a diploma!
solution is severely undercut by the actL
of the U.S. Senate.

Now, there is a meeting in early Janua
of the Organization of African Uni
[Unity] — the foreign ministers of that (
ganization — they are meeting the first we
or so in Africa. We hope that they will ta
some action to let the Angolans themseh
decide this. In addition, there is a meeti
later in January of the heads of govei,
ments of the OAU. That body, of course, i i
the one that could do the most. And I knt |
that there are a number of African stai I
who have apprehension about a forei
power dominating a country as rich and i
tentially strong as Angola. And so I c
assure you to the extent that we can ha;
any impact in diplomatic areas we are a
tainly going to maximize our efforts.

But I repeat that what the Senate (
yesterday undercuts very, very seriou! '
any impact we can have in the diploma '
field.

Q. Mr. President, a couple of months a>
there were some efforts by the Administ-
tion to try and warm relations with Cuba-
Dr. Kissinger made some statements, I i-

78

Department of State Build

I

I

mve. It in apparent noiv that at that very
vne the Cubans had to be gearing up or
I'eir that theij were probably at least con-

II ring sending troops to Angola. Did our
iteUigence pick up this fact, and was there
(.11 cause and effect? Were we in effect try-

/ to persuade them not to participate in
^igola, and were we off'ering friendship to
tern in return for their not participating?

President Ford: The sending of military
[rsonnel by Cuba to Angola is a rather
i:ent development in any magnitude. The
sitements made by the Secretary indicat-
i r that if there was a softening, a change
c the part of Cuba, it would be reciprocated
V us, was made before there was any sig-

kant military involvement by Cuba in
i >gola.

[ wanted to be on the record and as force-
f as I can say. The action of the Cuban
(vernment in the effort that they made to
g; Puerto Rico free and clear from the
I ited States and the action of the Cuban
(vernment to involve itself in a massive
nlitary way in Angola with combat troops
els, as far as I am concerned, any efforts
a all to have friendlier relations with the
C vernment of Cuba.

3. Sir, I don't think you answered my
Qistion. Can you tell me if the efforts were
c mected in any ivay with the Cuban efforts?

^resident Ford: I thought I answered it.

3. / am sorry.

3. Mr. President —

President Ford: To be very specific and
S)rt, no.

Death of Generalissimo Franco,
Chief of State of Spain

Generalissimo Francisco Franco, Chief of
State of the Spanish State, died at Madrid
November 19. Following are statements by
President Ford and Secretary Kissinger is-
sued on November 20.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT FORD

White House press release dated November 20

It was with sorrow that I learned of the
death of Generalissimo Francisco Franco,
who led his country for almost four decades
through a significant era in Spanish history.
With his passing, I express deepest sym-
pathy to his wife and family on behalf of
the Government and people of the United
States.

We wish the Spanish people and the Gov-
ernment of Spain well in the period ahead.
The United States, for its part, will continue
to pursue the policy of friendship and co-
operation which has formed the touchstone
for the excellent relations existing between
our two countries.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY KISSINGER

Press release 575 dated November 20

The death of General Franco ends an era
in Spanish history. At this solemn moment,
I offer my sincere condolences to the widow
and family of the Chief of State, to Prince
Juan Carlos, and to the Spanish people.

[nuary 19, 1976

79

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

U.S. Discusses Angola in U.N. General Assembly

Following is a statement made in plenary
session of the U.N. General Assembly by
U.S. Representative Daniel P. Moynihan on
December 8 during the debate on proposed
amendments to a resolution recommended by
the Special Political Committee under agenda
item 53, Policies of apartheid of the Govern-
ment of South Africa.^

USUN press rebase 180 (corr. 1) dated December 8

Mr. President, fellow delegates: The Gen-
eral Assembly of the United Nations is ap-
proaching another moment of truth, a test
of our capacity to meet the obligations which
the Charter of the United Nations imposes
upon us, reposes in us. And we shall see,
perhaps before this day is out, whether,
faced with this moment of truth, the Gen-
eral Assembly of the United Nations settles
for a big lie — the big lie that intervention in
the country of Angola is that of one nation
only, in the face of the enormous fact that
this is not true.

' On Nov. 28 the Assembly had postponed the vote
on draft resolution F, Situation in South Africa,
recommended by the Special Political Committee in
its report on agenda item 53 (U.N. doc. A/10342).
On Dec. 8 the Representative of Madagascar intro-
duced amendments (U.N. doc. A/L.784) cosponsored
by seven African countries to add a preambular para-
graph referring to "direct intei-vention of South
African armed forces in Angola" and an operative
paragraph condemning that intervention. On Dec. 8
the Representative of Zaire introduced subamend-
ments (U.N. doc. A/L.786) rewording the preambu-
lar paragraph to refer to "direct intervention of
certain foreign Powers, including South Africa, in
Angola" and the operative paragraph to condemn
"all foreign intervention in Angola, including the
intervention of South African armed forces . . . ."
The amendments and subamendments were with-
drawn on Dec. 10 and the resolution was adopted by
a rollcall vote of 101 to 15 (U.S.), with 16 absten-
tions (A/RES/3411 G (XXX)).

This moment of truth comes at a partic
larly poignant time for each of us. We ha^
reached a moment long desired, long work(
for, when one of the great injustices of mo
ern history was being righted. Step by stf
and with their own proud cooperation, hono
able cooperation, the European natioi
which in the course of the late 18th and thi
19th, and some earlier, centuries had taki
over every inch of the African Contine
save only the ancient kingdom of Ethiopia-
the European colonizers who had come
conquer every square foot of Africa sa
only Ethiopia — have now left Africa. Mc
have left in good repute and with good a:
strong and friendly feelings and ties th
endure with the areas, now nations, whi
they had come to occupy. And with the c
parture of Spain from Sahara on the 28
of February next, there remains but o
tiny area of European-controlled territo
in all of the continent. In effect the era
colonization has ended. The General Assei
bly has played an honorable and disti
guished role in bringing about that tern
nation.

But at just the moment when the Eui
pean colonizers of the 17th and 18th a
19th centuries have departed — at just th
moment — a new European colonizing, co
nial, imperial nation appears on the con
nent of Africa, armed, aggressive, involv
in the direct assault upon the lands and t
people of Africa. The European colon
power is back, a new colonial power mo
mighty than any that ever preceded it. ■
has come with its arms, with its armies, wi
its technology, with its ideology; and )
colonization of Africa commences, or mo;
accurately, the effort now to recoloni;
Africa commences.

80

Department of State Bullet'

I

The question is whether it will succeed.
The enormous and critically important ques-
tion is whether African nations themselves
vvill allow themselves to be parties to a new
European conquest.

Now, Mr. President, we are very much
iware of the alleged role, as it is asserted
0 be, of the nation of South Africa in some of
he goings-on right now in Angola. We have
lot seen evidence presented to this Assem-
)ly, but no doubt it can and will be; other-
vise we could not imagine there would have
)een the amendment which we have before
IS and which we are discussing. We assume
he sponsors of that amendment will bring
vidence before us and we can consider it.
"Ay government will consider it with no
difficulty whatever, considering its view,
ifhich is shared by almost all of the mem-
bers of this Assembly, about the nature of
he regime in South Africa.

Our detestation for the abominable prac-
ice of apartheid does not need to be re-
tated. I would just call your attention to
he fact that it is a member of the U.S.
elegation to this General Assembly who
his year was denounced by name by the
'rime Minister of South Africa. Only an
imerican delegate was denounced by South
ifrica so far in this Assembly, so far as I
m aware. There may be others; but there
5 no question that my good friend, and a
reat American, Clarence Mitchell was de-
ounced by name. And there is equally no
uestion that, accused of having stated un-
I'uths by the Prime Minister of South Af-
ica, Mr. Mitchell, a free American in a free
assembly, came to this podium and in a
iwyer-like and detailed way spelled out,
amed names, cited dates and places and
iws, spelled out our profound disagreement
.'ith that system, and answered the charge
hat our disagreement was not based upon
acts. The facts were presented from this
orum by an American delegate.

We are proud of that delegate and proud
f his presentation, and we are not unaware
f the fact that it was one of the first occa-
ions in this General Assembly in which
uch facts have been brought to this oodium.

Now, as I say, we have not yet had the

<anuary 19, 1976

facts about South African intervention. We
will welcome such information as it appears
before the Assembly.

My purpose, however, is to introduce some
facts about the whole of the situation. Now,
it is well known to the members of this As-
sembly that the Organization of African
Unity has condemned all intervention in An-
gola— all intervention. The OAU has done
this and was right to have done it. The
United States of America for one has con-
demned all intervention in Angola, and we
are happy to join the OAU in that matter.

Which of the great powers, as they are
called, of the world has not condemned all
intervention in Angola? You know very well
which has not. It is the Soviet Union which
has not, the European power now engaged
in colonial expansion in the continent of
Africa.

In Pravda, on December 4, a commentary
by Mr. E. Kapskiy, and the Soviet Deputy
Permanent Representative Kharlamov's
statement here on November 26, the Soviet
Government, far from condemning interven-
tion, has acknowledged it, saying that it is
assisting its friends in Angola and saying
that it would continue to do so. Europeans
on the continent of Africa with European
arms, fighting Africans — this is what is
happening, gentlemen.

Two African Presidents have spoken of
illegal Soviet overflights bringing equipment
over their lands to the area. Angolan free-
dom fighters have captured some of the in-
vading force; photographs have appeared in
the press. No secret. But let me be more
specific, and let me share with you informa-
tion which is known to all the world. It
would be well for me to stand here and re-
port what American diplomatic or intelli-
gence services might have gathered as
information, and many of us here could do
more, or at least as well ; but that would be
in the nature of somewhat arcane informa-
tion.

Let me read to you from the front page
of the New York Times, certainly one of the
world's great newspapers and, I need hardly
remind the members of this Assembly,

81

hardly a spokesman for the U.S. Govern-
ment.

What is on the front page of today's New
York Times? The article is headed "Cubans"
— which are a Western Hemisphere nation,
of course — "with Soviet Arms" — that's a
European nation — "Said to Turn Angola
Tide." I will read to you the report from
Washington by Mr. David Binder, a distin-
guished American journalist who has cov-
ered European affairs as well as American
affairs. Mr. Binder writes:

A Cuban expeditionary force equipped with Soviet
armored vehicles and rocket launchers is turning the
tide of civil war in favor of the Popular Movement
for the Liberation of Angola, according to American
officials.

The officials, who are assigned to watching devel-
opments in Angola, made this estimate on the basis
of information reaching here through intelligence
channels as well as from friendly governments.

They said Cuban infantry and artillery units had
spearheaded columns of the Popular Movement in
their advance north of Luanda, the old Portuguese
colonial capital (you change masters but not capitals,
is that it?) against the National Front for the Lib-
eration of Angola.

The National Front has set up a coalition govern-
ment in Huambo — formerly Nova Lisboa — with the
National Union for the Total Independence of An-
gola. Both the National Union, known as Unita,
and the National Front have been fighting the
Soviet-armed and Cuban-aided troops of the Popular
Movement, which has proclaimed itself sovereign and
has its capital in Luanda.

Now, listen to this, fellow delegates:

The Popular Movement has pushed more than 50
miles up the coast during the last 10 days . . . cap-
turing the town of Caxito and moving toward the
Atlantic port of Ambriz.

Cuban infantry and artillery units, the American
officials said, have been responsible for advances in
the south-central battle area where they are con-
testing for control of the 896-mile Renguela railroad,
which links the countries of Zaire and Zambia to
the large Angolan harbor of Lobito.

Understand that the two nations, Zambia
and Zaire, will find if this movement is suc-
cessful that their port of exports for their
products and imports or other matters is
controlled by the new colonial power.

In that area, the Popular Movement's forces,
stiffened by the Cubans, have been fighting sizable
numbers of men of the National Union, who are said

here to be supplemented by soldiers from South
Africa.

Did you read that? There appear to be
soldiers from South Africa working with the
National Union.

The Cubans and the Popular Movement are said
to have taken the town of Cangumbe, which is on
the rail line.

Then it says:

[Correspondents in Angola, however, say they
have seen no evidence that South African soldiers
are actually fighting there, though the South African
Government has admitted giving training and logisti-
cal support.] [Brackets in original.]

So we have a dispute about how many
South Africans, if there are any. But we can
get evidence. We have an amendment which
assumedly is based on evidence.

"The Cubans are involved everywhere," an Ameri-
can official observed. A Latin-American official who
has just arrived here from Havana said today that
Cuban officials had told him that 3,100 soldiers are
now serving in Angola. He said Cuban soldiers had
also been seen south of Luanda in a third battle
region, centered around the rich agricultural belt
between Gabela and Quibala.

Well, this story goes on this way — bu1
remember, we are now getting stories froir
American officials, so you can discount their
a little bit perhaps :

Both officials said there was clear evidence thai
the Soviet Union was continuing large-scale ship-
ments of military supplies directly to Luanda by seJ
and by air.

Of course Pravda has confirmed this
European arms landing, supporting Euro
pean expeditionary forces in Africa, gentle
men. That is what is happening today.

The last big Soviet airlift to Luanda occurred las'
Monday, the officials here said, when several hugi
AN-22 transports came in.

Now, that is a summary of news fron
Washington. The New York Times also ha(
this morning a report from Angola itself
from Huambo, an area not under Populai
Movement control, by an American journal
ist, Michael T. Kaufman. I wonder if oui
anti-imperialists would listen to me while
talk about this, please, for another moment

82

Department of State Bulletir

I

those of us who are so enthusiastic to see
imperialism end, will they pay a little atten-
tion to this new imperialism?
From Huambo, December 4:

! As seen from here, the Popular Movement for the
I Liberation of Angola, aided by vast quantities of
Soviet arms and by Cuban fighting men, has made
sharp military advances on three fronts in recent
days.

Now note, fellow delegates, I am not try-
ing to persuade you to take the winning side
in this argument. It is not clear which is the
winning side. We are talking about what is
the right side, the claim which every act of
this General Assembly in 30 years surely
attests, which is that flie European coloniza-
tion of Africa must end. But it says here,
"aided by vast quantities of Soviet arms" —
European arms — "and by Cuban fighting
men, there have been great advances" —

[Ambassador Moynihan was interrupted on a point
Df order by the Representative of Madagascar.]

Thank you, Mr. President. As I under-
stand your ruling, sir, the distinguished
representative from Madagascar will speak
following me or shortly thereafter. Thank
you, Mr. President; thank you, sir.

I do not wish extensively to incur upon
the delegates' time or the Assembly's time,
but I simply do want to make the point
which Mr. Holden Roberto, the President of
the National Front for the Liberation of
Angola, made — a freedom fighter if ever
there was one, a distinguished member of
his people — and this is what he has to say:
"This is a war of men against weapons — we
have the men and they have the weapons."

Now, if ever there was a man who ap-
peared in the country of Angola, a leader of
his people, it is this very Holden Roberto.
And what has he said? He said, "This is a
war of men against weapons — we have the
men and they have the weapons." And who
are the men ? They are African men. And
what are the weapons being used against
them? They are European weapons — Euro-
pean weapons. And if this Assembly will not
face this fact, then what is the good of this
place?

Now, I think we will. I think there are

men and women of courage in this room who
will. But if we then do not, think of what
history will say about us. And they will not
face only the colonization of southwestern
Africa, they will perhaps one day even face
up to the colonization by the same nation on
the northeastern coast, Somalia, where the
Institute for the Study of Conflict has noted
that this same European nation has landed
150 T-35 tanks, up to 100 T-54 tanks, 300
armored personnel carriers, 200 coastal bat-
teries, 50 MIG's, a squadron of Ilyushin-28
bombers, six patrol boats, and two guided-
missile patrol boats, and a batch of SA-2
surface-to-air missiles.

Now, let me sum up. We are faced with a
situation properly the concern of this As-
sembly. An independent nation has been
invaded by foreigners, foreign troops, for-
eign arms. One group of African countries
has brought to our attention the prospect
that a nation, South Africa, has been in-
volved. We await their evidence. That evi-
dence will be carefully considered by my
delegation. And I remind the delegates that
my delegation has insistently and in detail
stated its abhorrence of the social system in
South Africa. And we have other informa-
tion of invasion by another country, two
other countries.

Now, are we going to pay attention to
those? I think we should pay attention to
the words of my distinguished colleague and
my predecessor at this podium. Ambassador
Mutuale of Zaire, who spoke with pride of
his nation's role in the liberation of the
African people from the colonial yoke. Those
were his words, and he clearly meant that
his nation did not mean to be party to the
reimposition of that colonial yoke by a great
European power with its armies and its
weapons already on the northeast coast and
southwest coast of that continent.

Ambassador Mutuale said, how can two
different standards, two different treat-
ments, discriminatory treatments, be ad-
mitted to so fundamental a norm of interna-
tional relations, he said, as the duty to avoid
interference in the internal affairs of an-
other country? He asked, how can it be
tolerated? Ambassador Mutuale said no

January 19, 1976

83

intervention can be justified in Angola. He
said there cannot be two yardsticks.

Fellow delegates, if the strong and true
words of the Ambassador of Zaire are ig-
nored today, do not be surprised if the pro-
nouncements of this General Assembly are
ignored by the rest of the world from today
on. We face a moment of truth. It is time
to tell the truth. If we settle for a big lie,
we will have earned the contempt which the
world will heap upon us and which history
will record as having been our due.

U.S. Gives Views on U.N. Resolution
on Human Rights in Chile

folloiving is a statement rnade in Commit-
tee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural)
of the U.N. General Assembly on November
11 by U.S. Representative Leonard Garment,
counselor to the U.S. delegation, together
ivith the text of a resolution adopted by the
committee on November 11 and by the As-
sembly on December 9.

STATEMENT BY MR. GARMENT

USUN press release 142 dated November 11

The United States will vote for the reso-
lution before us. The vote of the U.S. dele-
gation in favor of the draft resolution
dealing with the protection of human rights
in Chile is a vote for human rights, a vote in
support of the purpose assigned to this
organization under the charter "to achieve
international cooperation ... in promoting
and encouraging respect for human rights
and for fundamental freedoms for all . . . ."

Our vote reflects deep concern over re-
ports which continue to come to this organi-
zation from many credible sources about
violations of basic human rights taking place
in Chile. My government is of the opinion
that these reports deserve to be addressed
by appropriate U.N. action.

It was because of our desire to find the
best means for bringing the influence of
world opinion to bear in a positive way on

that situation that my government gave its
strong support to the establishment of an
ad hoc working group by the U.N. Commis-
sion on Human Rights. The promise of that
government to welcome the visit of the ad
hoc working group to Chile was, we thought,
a hopeful sign that more rapid progress in
bringing about an improvement of the situ-
ation there would occur. Consequently, my
government was deeply disappointed that
the visit of the working group to Chile did
not take place. The position we take today
has been greatly influenced by that develop-
ment.

I should point out that, unlike other drafts
on the situation in Chile which have beer
informally circulated and to which my dele-
gation has objected because of their objec-
tionable intervention in the internal affairs
of that government, the draft resolution
before us draws attention to specific provi-
sions of international instruments to which
Chile as well as other members of the United
Nations is party. These international instru-
ments are among the most important
achievements of this organization during its
existence. We regard this resolution as a
positive attempt to give meaning to these
human rights instruments through its call
on the Chilean authorities to give full re-
spect to them.

Mr. Chairman, having noted the reasons
why my government has voted for this reso-
lution, I wish to record some of the doubts
we have had about the resolution.

First of all, we have been hesitant about
the approach embodied in the resolution
which focuses specifically upon certain con-
ditions which are stated to exist in that
country. I reiterate our concern that resolu-
tions of this nature must not go too far in
their prescription of specific measures of
correction. We raise this point to draw at-
tention to the importance of avoiding actions
which can be seen as attempting to involve
the organization too directly in matters of
domestic concern, as against resolutions
which correctly apply agreed human rights
principles.

We also note that this Assembly by this
resolution singles out for particular atten-

84

Department of State Bulletin

tion the human rights situation in one coun-
try. This leaves the impression that the
United Nations is willing to overlook situa-
tions involving gross violations of human
rights in other countries, some of which are
among the loudest and most belligerent
critics of Chile.

We object to this approach because it is
not evenhanded. To put it bluntly, for some
it is an act of blatant hypocrisy. In our
view, the United Nations should address
problems of this nature in a more general
fashion which will emphasize the need to
protect human rights on a worldwide basis
rather than adopt a selective and necessarily
one-sided approach. However, while we re-
ject and abhor the flagrant application of a
double standard in the field of human rights,
we cannot say that the United Nations
should remain silent in the case of Chile.

My delegation reached its decision to vote
for this resolution after a careful weighing
of the resolution's positive and negative as-
pects. We cast our vote in the manner we
hope will have the best influence in promot-
ing the cause of human rights. We are hope-
ful that the Government of Chile will take
heed of the strong concern in the world
which the vote on this resolution reflects.
We hope that its adoption will strengthen
respect for human rights in Chile, a respect
which has characterized the long and proud
tradition of the Chilean people. We trust it
will strengthen the cause of human rights
everywhere.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION '

Protection of human rights in Chile

The General Assembly,

Conscious of its responsibility under the Charter
of the United Nations to promote and encourage re-
spect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all,

'A/RES/3448 (XXX) (text from U.N. doc. A/
10284/Add.l, report of the Third Committee (part II)
on agenda item 12, Report of the Economic and Social
Council); adopted by the committee on Nov. 11 by a
rollcall vote of 88 (U.S.) to 11, with 20 abstentions,
and by the Assembly on Dec. 9 by a recorded vote
of 95 (U.S.) to 11, with 23 abstentions.

Recalling that, in accordance with the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, everyone has the right
to life, liberty and security of person and the right
not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or
exile or to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.

Recalling that, in its resolution 3219 (XXIX) of
6 November 1974, the General Assembly expressed
its deepest concern about reported constant and
flagrant violations of basic human rights and funda-
mental freedoms in Chile and urged the authorities
in that country to take all necessary steps to restore
and safeguard those rights and freedoms,

Noting that the General Conference of the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organi-
zation, at its eighteenth session, the General Con-
ference of the International Labour Organisation, at
its sixtieth session, the World Conference of the
International Women's Year and the Sub-Commission
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, at its twenty-eighth session, called for the
cessation of violations of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms in Chile,

Noting that, in its resolution 8 (XXXI) of 27
February 1975, the Commission on Human Rights,
after expressing its serious concern about the con-
tinuing reports of violations of human rights in
Chile, decided to establish an ad hoc working group
to inquire into the present situation of human rights
in that country on the basis of all available evidence,
including a visit to Chile, and appealed to the author-
ities of Chile to extend its full co-operation to the
group,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-
General under resolution 3219 (XXIX) " and, in
particular, the progress report submitted by the
Ad Hoc Working Group on the Situation of Human
Rights in Chile,'

Convinced that the progress report contains evi-
dence on which to conclude that flagrant and con-
stant violations of basic human rights and funda-
mental freedoms have taken place and continue to
take place in Chile,

Expressing its appreciation to the Chairman and
members of the Ad Hoc Working Group for their
report which has been prepared in a commendable
manner, notwithstanding the refusal of the Chilean
authorities to permit the Group to visit the country,

Reaffirming its condemnation of all forms of tor-
ture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment,

1. Expresses its profound distress at the constant,
flagrant violations of human rights, including the
institutionalized practice of torture, cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary
arrest, detention and exile, to which the progress
report brings additional evidence, which have taken

•U.N. doc. A/10295. [Footnote in original.]
'U.N. doc. A/10285. [Footnote in original.]

January 19, 1976

85

place and, according to existing evidence, continue
to take place in Chile;

2. Calls on the Chilean authorities to take, without
delay, all necessary measures to restore and safe-
guard basic human rights and fundamental freedoms
and fully to respect the provisions of the interna-
tional instruments to which Chile is a party and, to
this end, to ensure that:

(a) The state of siege or emergency is not used
for the purpose of violating human rights and funda-
mental freedoms, contrary to article 4 of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

(b) Adequate measures are taken to end the in-
stitutionalized practice of torture and other forms of
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment in full respect of article 7 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

(c) The rights of all persons to liberty and secu-
rity of person, in particular the rights of those who
have been detained without charge or in prison solely
for political reasons, as provided for in article 9 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, are fully guaranteed and steps are taken to
clarify the status of those individuals who are not
accounted for;

(d) No one shall be held guilty of any criminal
offence on account of any act or omission which did
not constitute a criminal offence, under national or
international law, at the time when it was committed,
contrary to article 15 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights;

(e) No one, in accordance with article 15, para-
graph 2, of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, shall be arbitrarily deprived of Chilean na-
tionality;

(f) The right to freedom of association, including
the right to form and join trade unions, shall be
respected in accordance with article 22 of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

(g) The right to intellectual freedoms, as provided
for in article 19 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, shall be guaranteed;

3. Deplores the refusal of the Chilean authorities
to allow the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Situation
of Human Rights in Chile to visit the country, not-
withstanding previous solemn assurances given by
the authorities in this regard and urges them to
honour these assurances;

4. hivites the Commission on Human Rights to
extend the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group
established under resolution 8 (XXXI), as presently
constituted, to enable it to report to the General
Assembly at its thirty-first session and to the Com-
mission on Human Rights at its thirty-third session
on the situation of human rights in Chile and, in
particular, any developments which occur to re-
establish respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms;

5. Requests the President of the thirtieth session
of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General
of the United Nations to assist in any way they may
deem appropriate in the re-establishment of basic
human rights and fundamental freedoms in Chile.

U.S. Welcomes Adoption by U.N.
of Declaration on Torture

Following is a statement made in Commit-
tee III (Social, Huntanitarian and Cidtural)
of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Rep-
resentative Carmen R. Maymi on November
28, together with the text of a resolution
adopted by the committee on November 28
and by the Assembly on December 9.

STATEMENT BY MS. MAYMI

USUN pre?s release 164 dated November 28

In his address before the General Assem-
bly September 22, Secretary of State Kissin-
ger underscored the persistent and serious
problem of torture in the world. He urged
the Assembly to adopt the draft declaration
on protection of all persons from being sub-
jected to torture. He also encouraged this
Assembly to go further and tackle the prob-
lem of implementation. His proposal was
progressive. He suggested that a group of
experts be appointed by the Secretary Gen-
eral to study the nature and extent of tor-
ture in the world today and to report back
to the next Assembly.

My delegation welcomes the adoption of
the declaration. This is a step of major im-
portance. It is an accomplishment which
underlines the gravity of the problem of
torture in the world and demonstrates our
collective determination to do something
about it. This declaration reinforces the
complete and unconditional prohibition
against torture set forth in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and in the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Now
there can be no possible loophole through
which government officials responsible for ■

86

Department of State Bulletin

torture can escape condemnation by the
international community.

Drafting of texts, however, is but the first
step the United Nations must take to com-
bat the problem of torture. Now that the
principles have been set forth, we must con-
sider the most effective approach to insure
that they are observed. The challenge still
before us is to organize and concentrate the
concern of the world community.

My delegation had hoped that this com-
mittee might have decided upon measures
for implementation. The inexorable factor of
time, however, has forced us to conclude
that this committee would not be able to
give adequate attention to a major progres-
sive proposal in the area of implementation.
We intend to pursue this matter again in
this Assembly and perhaps in other human
rights forums. We will be consulting with
other interested delegations to develop our
ideas in a form which we hope will receive
widespread support.

The resolution contained in document
A/C.3/L.2187/Rev.l, introduced by the
Greek delegation, contains a number of re-
quests to various U.N. bodies to carry for-
ward the work to eliminate the practice of
torture. My delegation wholeheartedly sup-
ported it. We note in particular the request
addressed to the Commission on Human
Rights in operative paragraph 2.'

The resolution recognizes that our task
is not finished. Much remains to be done. We
hope that during this coming year our work
in this area will go ahead as called for by
this resolution and also that the Subcommis-
sion on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities will continue to
make its important contribution. With such

'Draft resolution A/C.3/L.2187/Rev.l, as orally
amended, was adopted by the committee on Nov. 28
and by the Assembly on Dec. 9 without a vote (A/
RES/3453 XXX)). Operative paragraph 2 requests the
Commission on Human Rights to study the question
of torture and any necessary steps for "Ensuring the
effective observance of the Declaration . . ." and
"The formulation of a body of principles for the
protection of all persons under any form of deten-
tion or imprisonment. . . ."

progress the 31st General Assembly will be
in a better position to decide upon further
measures to combat the practice of torture.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION 2

The General Assembly,

Considering that, in accordance with the principles
proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations,
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal
and inalienable rights of all members of the human
family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace
in the world,

Considering that these rights derive from the in-
herent dignity of the human person.

Considering also the obligation of States under
the Charter of the United Nations, in particular
Article 55, to promote universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental free-
doms,

Having regard to article 5 of the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights and article 7 of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, both
of which provide that no one may be subjected to
torture, or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment.

Adopts the Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from being subjected to Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, the text of which is annexed to the present
resolution, as a guideline for all States and other
entities exercising effective power.

ANNEX

Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
being subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, In-
human or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Article 1

1. For the purpose of this Declaration, torture
means any act by which severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted
by or at the instigation of a public official on a per-
son for such purposes as obtaining from him or a
third person information or confession, punishing
him for an act he has committed or is suspected of
having committed, or intimidating him or other per-
sons. It does not include pain or suffering arising
only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanc-

= A/RES/3452 (XXX) (text from U.N. doc. A/
10408, report of the Third Committee on agenda item
74, Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment in relation to detention and
imprisonment) ; adopted by the committee on Nov. 28
and by the Assembly on Dec. 9 by acclamation.

January 19, 1976

87

tions to the extent consistent with the Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.

2. Torture constitutes an aggravated and deliberate
form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.

Article 2

Any act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment is an offence to
human dignity and shall be condemned as a denial
of the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations
and as a violation of human rights and fundamental
freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.

Article 3

No State may permit or tolerate torture or other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment. Exceptional circumstances such as a state of
war or a threat of war, internal political instability
or any other public emergency may not be invoked
as a justification of torture or other cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article U

Each State shall, in accordance with the provisions
of this Declaration, take effective measures to pre-
vent torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment from being practised within
its jurisdiction.

Article 5

The training of law enforcement personnel and of
other public officials who may be responsible for
persons deprived of their liberty shall ensure that
full account is taken of the prohibition against tor-
ture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment. This prohibition shall also,
where appropriate, be included in such general rules
or instructions as are issued in regard to the duties
and functions of anyone who may be involved in the
custody or treatment of such persons.

Article 6

Each State shall keep under systematic review
interrogation methods and practices as well as ar-
rangements for the custody and treatment of persons
deprived of their liberty in its territory, with a view
to preventing any cases of torture or other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article 7

Each State shall ensure that all acts of torture
as defined in article 1 are offences under its criminal
law. The same shall apply in regard to acts which
constitute participation in, complicity in, incitement
to or an attempt to commit torture.

Article 8
Any person who alleges he has been subjected to

torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment by or at the instigation of a
public official shall have the right to complain to,
and to have his case impartially examined by, the
competent authorities of the State concerned.

Article 9

Wherever there is reasonable ground to believe
that an act of torture as defined in article 1 has been
committed, the competent authorities of the State
concerned shall promptly proceed to an impartial
investigation even if there has been no formal com-
plaint.

Article 10

If an investigation under article 8 or article 9
establishes that an act of torture as defined in article
1 appears to have been committed, criminal proceed-
ings shall be instituted against the alleged offender
or offenders in accordance with national law. If an
allegation of other forms of cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment is considered to be
well founded, the alleged offender or offenders shall
be subject to criminal, disciplinary or other appro-
priate proceedings.

Article 11

Where it is proved that an act of torture or other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment has been committed by or at the instigation of
a public official, the victim shall be afforded redress
and compensation, in accordance with national law.

Article 12

Any statement which is established to have been
made as a result of torture or other cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment may not be
invoked as evidence against the person concerned or
against any other person in any proceedings.

United States Supports Admission
of Surinam to the United Nations

Following is a statement made in plenary
session of the U.N. General Assembly on
December 4 by U.S. Representative Pearl
Bailey, Special Adviser to the U.S. delega-
tion.

USUN press release 173 dated December 4

Just as we warmly supported Surinam's
candidacy in the Secui'ity Council, the
United States has cosponsored wholeheart-
edly the resolution on the admission of
Surinam to membership in the United Na-

88

Department of State Bulletin

itions. We extend our enthusiastic greetings
to Surinam as the newest member of the
United Nations.'

Surinam's achievement of independence is
a tribute to the dedication and capacity of
her elected leaders and their commitment
to the well-being of their people. It is also
a tribute to the progressive policies of the
Government of the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands.

The United States and Surinam have his-
torical links which go back to the early-
colonial days of the Western Hemisphere,
(n fact, in 1667 the colonies of Surinam and
Nieuw Amsterdam, as New York was called
it the time, were exchanged by the then
metropolitan powers. The U.S. consulate in
Surinam, established in 1790, was elevated
0 an Embassy on November 25, 1975, when
Surinam became an independent nation.

Mr. President, as host country repre-
;entative, my delegation extends a warm
velcome to Surinam's representatives at this
leadquarters. My delegation offers a par-
icularly cordial welcome and greeting to
Mme Minister Arron, Mrs. Arron, and the
)ther members of the Surinam delegation
vho have come to the United Nations on this
listoric occasion.

It is the sincere hope of my delegation
hat this day marks the beginning of even
:loser and friendlier ties between the Gov-
ernment of the United States and the Gov-
■rnment of Surinam as we engage in a
ommon effort to realize the goals of the
Charter of the United Nations.

Surinam's diverse and capable population,
ich natural resources, and varied agricul-
ural production, along with a commitment
0 liberal trade policies, provide the basis
or continued economic development. The
hew republic's long history of democratic
traditions and self-government, including
he establishment of a legislative council
)ver a century ago, are grounds for antici-
mtion that Surinam will make important
ontributions to the United Nations.

it' j 'The Assembly on Dec. 4 adopted by acclamation
,1 ]i resolution (A/RES/3413 (XXX)) admitting Suri-
,_ (lam to membership in the United Nations.

Mr. President, my delegation wishes Suri-
nam all the benefits of independence and
membership in the United Nations. We look
forward to a strong Surinam contribution in
the deliberations and activities of our or-
ganization.

Once again: Welcome, Surinam.

And before this is over, I would like to
say something, gentlemen. I watched your
delegation, dear Surinam, walk in. I watched
you as you proceeded around there and down
the aisle. You walked very proudly, and I
felt very proud to watch you walk in, be-
cause you walked with something that men
should walk with. It is called dignity. No
one looked back; everyone looked forward.
That's the only way that men should walk.

United Nations Documents:
A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as
those listed below) may be consulted at depository
libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publica-
tions may be purchased from the Sales Section of
the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
10017.

General Assembly

Status of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights and the Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. Report of the Secretary General.
A/10196. September 9, 1975. 8 pp.

Succession of states in respect of treaties. Report of
the Secretary General containing comments and ob-
servations of member states. A/10198. September
11, 1975. 26 pp.

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the
region of the Middle East. Report of the Secretary
General containing replies received from govern-
ments. A/10221. September 12, 1975. 7 pp.

Letter dated September 4, 1975, from the Permanent
Representatives of Ghana and Italy, as representa-
tives of the countries exercising the chairmanship
of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group (ACP)
and the presidency of the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC), transmitting the text of the ACP-
EEC Convention of Lome, signed on February 28,
1975. A/AC.176/7. September 16, 1975. 84 pp.

United Nations Fund for Namibia. Report of the
Secretary General. A/10229. September 23, 1975.
10 pp.

{January 19, 1976

89

THE CONGRESS

Department Discusses the Role of East-West Trade
in U.S. Foreign Relations

Statement by Deputy Secretary Robert S. Ingersoll '

I am pleased to have this opportunity to
appear before the committee today to speak
about the role of East-West trade in our
foreign relations.

As you are aware, our relations with the
Communist countries entered a new phase
more than three years ago. Progress in
political relations was marked by the Berlin
settlement, advances in the arms control
negotiations, and the Moscow summit in the
spring of 1972. This opened the way for
progress in trade and economic relations,
which led to the conclusion of the commei'-
cial agreements with the Soviet Union later
that year. Not only in the U.S.S.R. but in
China and East Europe as well, we have re-
garded the development of trade and eco-
nomic relations as the natural outgrowth of
political progress.

The development of East-West trade
brings important economic benefits. Our
exports of industrial and agricultural goods
to this fast-growing market still represent
less than 3 percent of our total exports, but
they create earnings for American firms and
jobs for our farmers and workers. These
countries are sources of valuable raw mate-
rials, like metals and petroleum products.
The economic benefits of this trade have
been described by other participants in these
hearings in detail.

' Made before the Senate Committee on Commerce
on Dec. 12. The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will be avail-
able from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

90

East-West trade also improves the ei
vironment for future progress on politic;
issues. Trade relations, like cultural an
scientific relations, can bring expansion (
contact, continuing interchange, and a d(
gree of interdependence, which contribul
to the growth of shared interests, greate
stability, and mutual restraint.

We must be careful, however, to assess th
political implications of East-West trac
realistically. We should not overestimate tl
political leverage we can obtain from oi
economic relations with these countries. T?
U.S. share in East-West trade is relatival
small. For the vast majority of traded good
the Communist countries can find sources (
supply outside the United States.

In order to insure that any of the speci;
restrictions we may place on trade and 1
nancial relations with Communist countrit
are eff'ective, we should keep our policit
and practices reasonably consistent wit
those of other Western industrialized coui
tries.

We should also not try to tie individu;
trade transactions to specific political coi
cessions, for example, concessions on arn
control issues. The temptation to do this ca
be great if we have something to sell th;
the other side wants very badly. Even
political concessions could be extracted i
this way, they would be likely to evaporat
once the terms of the commercial tran;
action had been met. We would then be lei
with a business deal in which we had give I
away some real economic benefits in retur

Department of State Bulleti

01' vague political promises. Trade trans-
ctions, like political and arms agi'eements,
lUst be able to stand on their own merits.

We also have to remember that neither
he United States, nor its allies (who are
leavily engaged in trade with the Commu-
ist world), nor the Communist countries
lemselves are prepared to relinquish basic
iterests or fundamental principles for the
like of trade.

I We recognize that Communist govern -

iients, some more than others, engage in

ractices which are incompatible with our

ileals. We and the Communist states still

Ijgard ourselves as engaged in a struggle

ijtween antagonistic systems.

But the existence of differences between

> and the Communists, profound as they

ay be, should not deter us from cautiously

eking ways to discover and cultivate our

immon interests. This applies to restrain-

g the strategic arms race, to dealing with

e global problems of food, energy, and the

ivironment, and to the expansion of our

ade and economic relations. It also con-

ibutes to confining the struggle between

ir systems so that we avoid resorting to

rce and armed conflict.

If we approach East-West trade in this

alistic way, I believe that it can have an

direct, but broad and long-lasting, payoff.

has benefits above and beyond the sum

tal of the transactions involved. Over time,

creased trade can erode the autarkic

ndencies of the Communist countries and

i them more closely into the world eco-

imic system.

East-West trade can have a real impact

'1 the economies of the Communist coun-

ies and on their economic decisionmaking.

') increase their exports to the United

lates — as all of them, and especially the

!)viet Union, wish to do — they must devote

1 sources and skills to production and mar-

'ting of the kinds of goods and services

liich are salable on the American market.

creased acceptance by these countries of

e responsibilities inherent in more normal

ade relations would reduce their capacity

ir, and their interest in, disrupting the

lade and economic system created by the

Western countries over the past 30 years.

Thus, over time, U.S. trade with Commu-
nist countries can help to build a continuing
relationship — a relationship which the Com-
munist countries have an interest in main-
taining and which they would find costly to
repudiate. In this way, trade adds an element
of restraint and stability to our overall rela-
tions. The failure to permit trade to develop
normally not only reduces our potential eco-
nomic gains but also inhibits progress to-
ward these political goals.

Structure of Policy and Legislation

It is logical that if we seek to expand
trade with the Communist countries over the
coming years, we will need at the same time
to develop a structure of policy and legisla-
tion to support this expanded trade. Such a
structure must permit steady progress
toward more normal relations, on the basis
of mutual benefit. Since not all problems can
be foreseen, the structure must also permit
the resolution of disputes and take into ac-
count the very basic differences between
market and nonmarket systems.

The Trade Act of 1974 offers such a
structure. It provides that most-favored-
nation (MFN) tariff treatment can be ex-
tended to non-market-economy countries
only on the basis of a trade agreement. Such
a trade agreement must provide safeguards
against the possible disruption of our mar-
kets; it must protect industrial property
rights and copyrights; it must insure ar-
rangements for the settlement of commer-
cial disputes ; it must facilitate trade
promotion; and it must be subject to sus-
pension or termination for reasons of na-
tional security.

To protect our security interests, the
present structure of unilateral and multi-
lateral strategic export controls must also
be maintained.

Some changes in existing legislation are
required, however, if we are to create a legal
structure which will permit improvement in
our trade relations with the non-market-
economy countries. For example, we favor
legislation to allow for nondiscriminatory.

inuary 19, 1976

91

nonconcessional financing of trade, which is
essential to the maintenance of our com-
petitive position. We also favor modification
of section 408 of the Trade Act to give us
greater flexibility in our relations with
Czechoslovakia. Since the Johnson Debt De-
fault Act of 1934 no longer serves its origi-
nal purpose of protecting American investors
against defaulting governments, considera-
tion might be given to its repeal. The repeal
of section 511 of the Trade Agreements
Extension Act of 1951, which embargoes the
importation of certain furs from the
U.S.S.R. and China, would remove an obso-
lete impediment to trade.

Varied Effects of Existing Legislation

In East Europe, the effect of existing
legislation has varied from country to coun-
try. Poland and Yugoslavia, with which the
United States has had GATT [General
Agreement on Tariff's and Trade] relations
for a number of years, were exempt from
the provisions of section 402 of the Trade
Act, and our trade and political relations
with those countries have continued to
progress.

Romania, continuing to pursue its inde-
pendent foreign policy, negotiated a trade
agreement with us under the provisions of
the Trade Act; and so the general improve-
ment in U.S.-Romanian relations noted over
several years continues.

Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and
the German Democratic Republic, following
the Soviet lead, have stated that they are
not prepared to negotiate trade agreements
under the emigration provisions of the Trade
Act. Although U.S. trade with most of these
countries has increased in recent years in
the absence of MEN, the full potential of
their markets cannot be enjoyed by Ameri-
can exporters so long as we are not in a
position to extend MEN to their products
coming into our country.

It is not easy to quantify these losses, but
we do know the extension of MEN is clearly
encouraging trade expansion with Poland
and Romania, where total trade turnover in
each case is expected to triple between 1974

and 1977. Our inability to proceed towarc \
normalization of trade relations with thes(
other four countries reduces our flexibilitj
and our capacity for developing appropriatt
and effective policies. It thus involves not
only economic loss for both sides but also {
political irritant.

The Trade Act has not directly affectec
our trade or political relations with th(
People's Republic of China. The Shangha.
communique of 1972 continues to serve a;
the framework for the development of oui
trade. At this stage of our relationship witl
the P.R.C., a broad understanding of hov
trade relations should develop is not ye
attainable.

The Administration fully supports the ob
jectives of section 402 of the Trade Act .
and we share the views of those who believi
that the United States must work to brinj
about increased emigration from the U.S.S.R

Lost Opportunities in U.S. -Soviet Trade

Since the passage of the Trade Act, bot!
the United States and the U.S.S.R. hav ,
tried to sustain trade. We have, howevei :
paid an economic and political price in op
portunities lost. The rise in overall trade i
1975 points not to a continuing dynamism i
our commercial relationship, but to greatl;
increased grain sales and deliveries of in
dustrial goods ordered before 1975. Severa
major orders have been diverted from Amer
ican companies this year, and in some case
we have been told plainly that the switcl
was politically motivated.

While we have cut off the flow of govern
ment-sponsored credits to the U.S.S.R. \
Western Europe and Japan have been com
peting with each other to offer more, an(
the total available to be drawn on is nov
some $10 billion. Not surprisingly, tradi
flows along the same lines as these credits
Since the last Eximbank loans were ex
tended in May of 1974, the U.S. share o:i
new Soviet orders of machinery and equip
ment from Western countries has fallei
from its 1973 level of about 22 percent t(
about 14 percent in the first 10 months Oi
1975.

92

Department of State Bulletii

Our inability to use the facilities of the
Export-Import Bank to finance our trade
vith the Soviet Union also has broader im-
)lications. Providing access to Eximbank
acilities is not a one-way concession. Exim-
)ank loans are tied to U.S. exports and to
pacific projects, whereas the credits that
he Soviet Union can obtain commerciallj'
,t only slightly higher interest rates are
lot. Through the Export-Import Bank, we
an also control the flow of credit in ways
hat we cannot in private financial markets.

Our inability to grant most-favored-nation
reatment to the Soviet Union also involves
)st opportunities. The Soviets would prefer
3 pay for their imports with increased ex-
orts, instead of financing them with costly
redits. By discriminating against Soviet
xports, we limit the expansion of our mu-
lal trade. In doing so, we inhibit the growth
f our own exports, and we forgo some of
le indirect political benefits that come from
II expanding trade relationship. The absence
f MFN also makes long-term projects, in
hich repayment takes the form of products
roduced, less attractive with the United
tates than they are with countries which
oply a nondiscriminatory tariff.

An additional economic price has been the
?ssation of Soviet payments of their lend-
ase obligations. The lend-lease agreement
cached in 1972 provided for the payment
' three installments totaling $48 million by
ily 1, 1975. These have been paid in full,
he repayment of the balance of $674 mil-
Dn was made conditional on our granting
lost-favored-nation tariff treatment to the
oviet Union. This will not be paid until
[FN is extended.

Finally, the trade agreement would have
rotected American industry more fully
?ainst market disruption resulting fi-om
aviet imports. It would also have encour-
?ed the use of procedures for the arbitra-
on of commercial disputes. These benefits
re not available to us as long as the agree-
lent remains in abeyance.

We regret these lost opportunities. We

so recognize, however, that Soviet emigra-
on policies are a matter of continuing
i)ncern to the public, the Congress, and the

Administration. The future evolution of
these policies will be watched closely. We
share the urgent desire of the Congress to
find a way out of the dilemma which will
achieve our primary humanitarian purpose.
Our concern for basic human rights is last-
ing, not transient.

We hope to work closely with the Con-
gress not only on overcoming the legislative
impasse but on all aspects of our economic
relations with non-market-economy coun-
tries. Congress should play a key role in
East-West trade, as it does in other areas of
trade policy. We would welcome any sugges-
tions for improvements in the consultative
arrangements between the Administration
and the Congress so that we can work more
closely together.

U.S. -Soviet Grain and Oil Arrangements

In addition to our efforts to develop an
overall structure of policy and legislation to
support the expansion of East-West trade,
there are times when we need to develop
special arrangements to deal with special
problems. One such special case was the
grain agreement which Under Secretary
Robinson signed in Moscow on October 20.
It is designed to deal with the recurrent
problem of the sudden large grain purchases
which the Soviets make when their harvests
fall short of their needs. These purchases
have periodically disrupted world markets,
pushed up prices, and forced the President
to impose various ad hoc restrictions on
grain exports.

The Soviets have agreed to purchase at
least 6 million tons of grain per year, and
they can purchase an additional 2 million
tons without government-to-government
consultations. More, of course, can be pur-
chased on the basis of such consultations.
We are not obliged to sell if our grain supply
falls below a specific level. Sales will be at
market prices prevailing at the time of the
purchase. The agreement involves no U.S.
Government credits.

Under this agreement, our farmers will
be able to take advantage of the large Soviet
market on a regular basis without price ef-

anoary 19, 1976

93

fects harmful to the American consumer.
At the same time, the U.S.-Soviet maritime
agreement, which is still under renegotia-
tion but which we hope will be renewed
before the end of the year, enables U.S.
shipping to carry a fair share of the grain
cargoes at profitable rates.

The grain agreement is a positive step in
our relations with the Soviet Union. It en-
courages a long-term interrelationship be-
tween our two economies, involving implicit
political constraints.

The Department of State played a role in
the negotiation of the grain agreement that
was consistent with the role we play in
other areas of international economic policy.
Under Secretary Robinson led our negotiat-
ing team, pursuant to instructions developed
in the White House by an interagency team.
He worked closely at every stage with the
Department of Agriculture, relying heavily
on the expertise and sound judgment of the
Assistant Secretary of Agriculture [for
International Affairs and Commodity Pro-
grams], Richard Bell, who was with him in
Moscow.

We decided that it was appropriate to
conclude this as an executive agreement in-
stead of a treaty. It does not affect U.S. law,
and no new legislation is required to imple-
ment the commitments that we made. We
also had a strong interest in obtaining a firm
Soviet commitment upon signature.

At the time we signed the grain agree-
ment, we exchanged letters of intent with
the Soviets on an agreement for the supply
of oil. We expect these negotiations to begin
in the near future.

The oil agreement we envisage would give
us an option — not a commitment — to pur-
chase up to 10 million metric tons of Soviet
crude or petroleum products each year. This
would represent about 200,000 barrels per
day — only 3 percent of our annual imports.
We should not, however, underrate the sig-
nificance of such an agreement. It would
mean a net increase in the amount of oil
available to the free world and would repre-
sent a further diversification of our sources
of supply.

Although the U.S.S.R. is now the world's

largest oil producer, with production averaj
ing about 9.5 million barrels per day, we d
not expect it to become a major oil exporte
Its exports are now 2.3 million barrels pe
day. Most of this goes to Eastern Europi
Unless the Soviet Union can exploit majc
new sources, we expect its exports to dimii
ish in coming years as its own economy d(
velops and its consumption increases a(
cordingly.

It is not realistic to expect the Soviets t
give us a sizable discount on the oil that the
sell us. They do, after all, have other potei
tial hard-currency buyers, and we are m
giving them a discount on our grain. Hov
ever, the price will have to be set at a lev^
that we find satisfactory in order for th
purchases to be made.

In conclusion, the Department of Stat
continues to believe that the Peterson ri
port of August 1972 is the proper guide i
our economic relations with the Soviet Unic
and Eastern Europe.- The report states tha

Closer economic ties bear both cause and efFe
relationships to relaxation of political tension. Ir
provement in political relationships is a prerequisi
for improved economic relationships, but, once
place, economic ties create a community of intere
which in turn improves the environment for furth
progress on the political side.

If political accords with the Communi
countries are to endure, they must be bu
tressed by concrete progress, by tangib
benefits, and by economic self-interest.

If we are to preserve the gains of tl
recent past we must improve the basis (
our trade and economic relations with t\
Soviet Union and other Communist coui
tries. As Secretary Kissinger said in h
testimony before the Senate Foreign Rel;
tions Committee last year:^

We face an opportunity that was not possible '.
years, or even a decade, ago. If that opportunity
lost, its moment will not quickly come again. Indee
it may not come at all.

In sum, I believe that we must take add

■ U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relationships in a Nc
Era, by Peter G. Peterson, then Secretary of Con
merce (U.S. Government Printing Office).

^ For Secretary Kissinger's statement of Sept. 1
1974, see Bulletin of Oct. 14, 1974, p. 505.

94

Department of State Bulieti

J

;ional steps to promote both liberalized emi-
gration and improved economic and political
•elations with the East. If you in the Con-
gress share this view I hope that you will
iTiake suggestions as to how and when we
should proceed in order to move toward both
hese goals. They need not be contradictory
)bjectives, as long as we concentrate on the
esults we seek and are pragmatic in the
ipproach we adopt.

>enate Asked To Approve Convention
or Conservation of Antarctic Seals

Message From President Ford '

> the Senate of the Uyiited States:

I am pleased to transmit for the Senate's
dvice and consent to ratification the Con-
ention for the Conservation of Antarctic
Seals, with Annex, done at London June 1,
972. I transmit also, for the information of
he Senate, the report of the Department of
itate with respect to the Convention.

Though commercial sealing has not yet
tarted in the water and on the sea ice in
Uitarctica, this Convention provides some
aluable protection for seals of that region.
t prohibits entirely the commercial taking
f three species of Antarctic seals and sets
onservation limits on the taking of three
ther species. It prohibits sealing in the
/ater, except in limited quantities for scien-
ific research. It sets aside reserves where
10 sealing can take place and forbids sealing
ntirely during six months of the year. More
mportantly, it sets up the machinery to give
he necessary warning when catch limits are
)eing approached. It obligates the Parties
it that point to prevent further sealing by
heir nationals and vessels. Provision is also
nade for adoption of additional controls, in-
luding an effective system of inspection, if

'Transmitted on Dec. 17 (text from Weekly Com-
lilation of Presidential Documents dated Dec. 22);
iilso printed as S. Ex. K, 94th Cong., 1st sess., which
includes the texts of the convention and the report
j)f the Department of State.

commercial sealing starts in the area. There
is nothing in the Convention to prevent a
Party from adopting for its nationals and
vessels more stringent controls than pro-
vided in the Convention. The United States
has done this in the Marine Mammal Pro-
tection Act of 1972. While that legislation
is in effect, and until the Parties decide to
adopt controls and inspection procedures, in
accordance with Article VI, no new legisla-
tion is needed to implement the Agreement.
Unfortunately in recent years, it has often
been only after a species or class of wildlife
has become severely depleted or even endan-
gered that international conservation meas-
ures have been initiated. This Convention
represents a unique opportunity for the
world community to put into practice the
hard learned lessons of the past and to act
prospectively to protect the seals of Ant-
arctica. I urge the Senate to give the Con-
vention its prompt and favorable considera-
tion.

Gerald R. Ford.

The White House, December 17, 1975.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

94th Congress, 1st Session

Early-Warning System in Sinai; hearings before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; October
6-7, 1975; 264 pp. Report of the committee, to-
gether with individual views, to accompany S.J.
Res. 138; S. Rept. 94-415; October 7, 1975; 20 pp.

Potential Impact of the Proposed 200-Mile Fishing
Zone on U.S. Foreign Relations. Special oversight
report of the House Committee on International
Relations, together with additional and minority
views, on H.R. 200, the Marine Fisheries Conserva-
tion Act of 1975. H. Rept. 94-542. October 8, 1975.
18 pp.

Amending Sections 2734a(a) and 2734b(a) of Title
10, United States Code, To Provide for Settlement,
Under International Agreements, of Certain Claims
Incident to the Noncombat Activities of the Armed
Forces, and For Other Purposes. Report of the
House Committee on the Judiciary to accompany
H.R. 7896. H. Rept. 94-543. October 8, 1975. 9 pp.

The Amendments to the Convention for the Safety
of Life at Sea, 1960. Report of the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations to accompany S. Ex.
K, 93-2. S. Ex. Rept. 94-9. October 22, 1975. 3 pp.

Uanuary 19, 1976

95

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Astronauts

Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the return of
astronauts, and the return of objects launched into
outer space. Opened for signature at Washington,
London, and Moscow April 22, 1968. Entered into
force December 3, 1968. TIAS 6599.
Aecessioyt deposited: France, December 31, 1975.

Coffee

Protocol for the continuation in force of the inter-
national coffee agreement 1968, as amended and
extended, with annex. Approved by the Interna-
tional Coffee Council at London September 26,
1974. Entered into force October 1, 1975.
Accessions deposited: Ireland, November 3, 1975;
Liberia, December 12, 1975.

Conservation

Convention on international trade in endangered

species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices.

Done at Washington March 3, 1973. Entered into

force July 1, 1975.

Ratifications deposited: Ghana, November 14,
1975; Madagascar, August 20, 1975; Morocco,
October 16, 1975; Niger, September 8, 1975.

Accession deposited: German Democratic Repub-
lic, October 9, 1975.

Customs

Customs convention on containers, 1972, with annexes
and protocol. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972.
Entered into force December 6, 1975.^
Ratification deposited: Canada, December 10, 1975.

Expositions

Protocol revising the convention of November 22,
1928, relating to international expositions, with
appendix and annex. Done at Paris November 30,
1972.=

Ratification deposited: Austria, October 21, 1975.
Accession deposited: Morocco, October 30, 1975.

Narcotic Drugs

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic
drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972.
Entered into force August 8, 1975.
Ratification, deposited: South Africa, December
16, 1975.

Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by
dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes.
Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Wash-
ington December 29, 1972. Entered into forct-
August 30, 1975.

Ratification deposited: Union of Soviet Sociali-t
Republics, December 30, 1975.

Space

Convention on international liability for damagf
caused by space objects. Done at Washington, Lon-
don, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into
force September 1, 1972; for the United Stat..-
October 9, 1973. TIAS 7762.
Accession deposited: France, December 31, 1975.

Convention on registration of objects launched int.-
outer space. Opened for signature at New York
January 14, 1975.=

Signature : Denmark, December 12, 1975.
Ratification deposited: France, December 17, 1975

BILATERAL

Brazil

Agreement concerning shrimp, with annexes, agreei
minutes, and exchange of notes. Signed at Brasili;
March 14, 1975.

Instrument of ratification signed by the President .
December 22, 1975.

Japan

Agreement modifying the arrangement of Septembew
27, 1974 (TIAS 7934), concerning trade in cotton*
wool, and man-made fiber textiles, with record oil
discussions. Effected by exchange of notes a"
Washington December 19, 1975. Entered into forc<
December 19, 1975.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Agreement extending the agreement of February 26
1975 (TIAS 8021), on certain fishery problems or
the high seas in the western areas of the middlf
Atlantic Ocean. Effected by exchange of notes a1
Washington December 18 and 30, 1975. Enterec
into force December 30, 1975.

Agreement regarding certain maritime matters, wit!
related letters and memorandums. Signed at Wash-
ington and Moscow December 29, 1975. Enterec
into force January 1, 1976.

Convention on matters of taxation, with relatec
letters. Signed at Washington June 20, 1973.
Ratifications exchanged: December 30, 1975.
Enters info force: January 29, 1976, effective Jan-
uary 1, 1976.

' Not in force for the United States.
' Not in force.

96

Department of State Bulletin

JdEX Januai-y 19, 1976 Vol. LXXIV, No. 1908

.ngola

1-esident Deplores Senate Cutoff of Additional
Funds for Angola (statement) 76

1-esident Ford's News Conference of December
20 (excerpts) '^'^

.'■cretary Kissinger's News Conference of
December 23 69

i.S. Discusses Angola in U.N. General As-
sembly (Moynihan) 80

'jitarctica. Senate Asked To Approve Conven-
tion for Conservation of Antarctic Seals
(message from President Ford) 95

tiile. U.S. Gives Views on U.N. Resolution
on Human Rights in Chile (Garment, text
of resolution) 84

ingress

(ngressional Documents Relating to Foreign

Policy 95

1 partment Discusses the Role of East-West

Trade in U.S. Foreign Relations (Ingersoll) 90

<ba

lesident Ford's News Conference of December

'I (excerpts) "77

etary Kissinger's News Conference of
December 23 69

lonomic Affairs. Department Discusses the
Role of East-West Trade in U.S. Foreign
Relations (Ingersoll) 90

1 vironment. Senate Asked To Approve Con-
.ention for Conservation of Antarctic Seals
message from President Ford) 95

1 rope. Department Discusses the Role of
East-West Trade in U.S. Foreign Relations
Ingersoll) 90

liman Rights

13. Gives Views on U.N. Resolution on Human
Rights in Chile (Garment, text of resolution) 84

IS. Welcomes Adoption by U.N. of Declaration
)n Torture (Maymi, text of resolution) . . 86

] ael. Secretary Kissinger's News Conference
)f December 23 69

lesidential Documents

1 ath of Generalissimo Franco, Chief of State
)f Spain

lesident Deplores Senate Cutoff of Additional
Funds for Angola

lesident Ford's News Conference of December
10 (excerpts)

fnate Asked To Approve Convention for Con-
servation of Antarctic Seals

5uth Africa

f cretary Kissinger's News Conference of
December 23 69

IS. Discusses Angola in U.N. General As-
sembly (Moynihan) 80

1'ain. Death of Generalissimo Franco, Chief
3f State of Spain (statements by President
Ford and Secretary Kissinger) 79
rinam. United States Supports Admission of
.Surinam to the United Nations (Bailey) . . 88

79
76
77
95

Trade. Department Discusses the Role of
East-West Trade in U.S. Foreign Relations
(Ingersoll) 90

Treaty Information

Current Actions 9"

Senate Asked to Approve Convention for Con-
sei-vation of Antarctic Seals (message from
President Ford) 95

|T c o o

Department Discusses the Role of East-West
Trade in U.S. Foreign Relations (Ingersoll) 90

President Ford's News Conference of December
20 (excerpts) • '^'^

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of
December 23 69

U.S. Discusses Angola in U.N. General As-
sembly (Moynihan) 80

United Nations

United Nations Documents 89

U.S. Discusses Angola in U.N. General As-
sembly (Moynihan) 80

U.S. Gives Views on U.N. Resolution on Human

Rights in Chile (Garment, text of resolution) 84

United States Supports Admission of Surinam

to the United Nations (Bailey) 88

U.S. Welcomes Adoption by U.N. of Declara-
tion on Torture (Maymi, text of resolution) 86

Name Index

Bailey, Pearl „ 88

Ford, President 76, 77, 79, 95

Garment, Leonard 84

Ingersoll, Robert S 90

Kissinger, Secretary 69, 79

Maymi, Carmen R 86

Moynihan, Daniel P 80

Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: Dec. 29-Jan. 4

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Subject

Kissinger: Washington Star in-
terview.

Foreign investment and national-
ization.

Pine Arts Committee, Jan. 17.

Shipping Coordinating Commit-
tee, Subcommittee on Maritime
Law, Feb. 3.

U.S. -Japan textile agreement.

Joan Braden appointed as Con-
sumer Affairs Coordinator (bio-
graphic data).

No. Date

*629 12/29

*630 12/30

*631 12/31

*632 12/31

*'633 12/31
*634 12/31

■ Not printed.

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U.S. government printing office

WASHINGTON, DC, 20402

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of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402.

<3o'^

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXIV

No. 1909 • January 26, 1976

PRESIDENT FORD ADDRESSES AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION

Excerpt From Address 97

PRESIDENT FORD INTERVIEWED FOR NBC TELEVISION 100

DEPARTMENT OUTLINES DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. RELATIONSHIP

WITH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Statement by Assistant Secretary Habib 106

UNITED STATES DISCUSSES FULFILLMENT OF GOALS

OF INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S YEAR IN THE U.N.
Statements by Carmen R. Maymi and Text of Resolution 110

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXXIV, No. 1909
January 26, 1976

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

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Note: Contents of this publication are not
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STATE BULLETIN as the source will be
appreciated. The BULLETIN Is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of U.S. foreign relations and
on the wortc of the Department and
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selectei
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses,
and news conferences of the President
and the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
international affairs and the functions
of the Department. Information is
included concerning treaties and inter-
national agreements to which the
United States is or may become a
party and on treaties of general inter-
national interest.

Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.

{resident Ford Addresses American Farm Bureau Federation

Following is an excerpt from an address
I President Ford made before the conven-
on of the AmeyHcan Farm Bureau Federa-
on at St. Louis, Mo., on January 5.'

Today, I want to remind those who would
inimize our national strength that over
le-half of the grain moving across interna-
onal boundaries throughout the world is
•own by you, the American farmer. And we
•e proud of your efforts and your results.

But if we want dependable export markets
>r our food, the United States must be a
iliable supplier. On two occasions since I
icame President, the government was
•reed to temporarily restrain farm exports.

recognize that these actions resulted in
)nfusion and concern among some of our
irmers.

The first government interruption came in
ctober of 1974 when the Soviet Union
iddenly, and without any notice whatso-
;er, entered our markets to buy at a time
hen we had a short crop in some areas,
he government was forced to intervene to
arn Soviet intentions. This was in the in-
•rest of our livestock producers and our
igular grain-buying customers overseas
[id the American public. Accordingly, con-
tacts with the Soviet Union were renego-
ated to change the proportion of corn and
heat for export.

These actions headed oiT the danger of
Jen more severe legislative restrictions by
le Congress.

Last summer, the Soviets suffered another
xtremely short crop. They again turned to
le U.S. farmers for supplementary grain

i ' For the complete text, see Weekly Compilation of
jresidential Documents dated Jan. 12, 1975.

supplies. A temporary hold on new sales to
the Soviets was made only after they had
become our largest foreign customer by pur-
chasing 9.8 million metric tons of grain —
375 million bushels.

There was, as you know, deep concern at
that time about our own corn crop. Although
the wheat harvest was nearly completed by
July, our feed grain crop was still somewhat
uncertain. Dry weather had already dam-
aged corn in the western corn belt. Thei'e
was no way of knowing if we would have a
repeat of the drought or an early freeze
which hit the corn crop the previous year.

Again, a temporary hold on new grain
sales to the Soviets and, later, to Poland
was taken, I can assure you, with extreme
reluctance. Pressures in the Congress were
increasing to halt all private grain sales and
put agricultural exports in the hands of a
government management and control board.
I did not, and do not, want the government
running your business 365 days a year, year
in and year out.

It was a unique situation that required
corrective action and long-term solution.
The temporary hold on the new sales per-
mitted us to work out a five-year agreement
with the Russians. Since then — since then,
in the open market we have made substan-
tial new sales to the Soviet Union and to
Poland. Right now, ships filled with U.S.
grain are now backed up at foreign ports
waiting to be unloaded. There is every like-
lihood that we may sell even more this year
to the Soviet Union.

This new agreement now assures that the
Russians will purchase at least 6 million
metric tons of U.S. corn and wheat each
year for the next five years. This is more
than a bushel a person in terms of the en-

ionuary 26, 1976

97

tire U.S. population. Poland has also indi-
cated it will buy about 100 million bushels
of U.S. grain annually for the next five
years.

In addition to the annual Russian pur-
chase commitment of 228 million bushels of
wheat and corn, this agreement provides an
option to purchase an additional 76 million
bushels annually. All purchases will be at
market prices through the private sector.
If the Russians wish to purchase more than
304 million bushels in any year, it is possible
under the agreement. There is no arbitrary
and inflexible ceiling. For example, we have
already sold them more than 500 million
bushels out of the current 1975 crop.

This agreement is in the interest of both
the American farmer and the American
consumer. It prevents the Soviets from dis-
rupting our markets. As we have seen over
the years, disruptive and unpredictable pur-
chases led to such problems as congressional
demands for export control and the refusal
of unions to handle grain shipments.

We have now assured American grain
producers that at planting time they will
have a much more reliable indication of how
large an export market there will be at
harvest time, and that is good for all of us.
The American livestock producer will have
a better idea of his feed supply. The Amer-
ican consumer will know that grain will be
moving overseas in a regular flow and be
assured there will be adequate food at home.

We have transformed occasional and er-
ratic customers into regular customers. We
have averted an outcry every year that the
Russians are coming to make secret pur-
chases in our markets. The private market-
ing system has been preserved. Record
exports are moving right now.

The alternatives were and are intolerable.
The prospects of massive pileups at docks
with crops backed up all the way to local
elevators is totally unacceptable.

I ask you: Should we run an obstacle
course through Congress and other road-
blocks each year on whether to sell any
grain to the Soviet Union? I say no, and I

hope you do, too. Should we turn our crop
over to a government control board to man- j
age and sell overseas? I emphatically say no,
and I hope you do, too.

Some in Congress and elsewhere are now
questioning the wisdom of grain sales to the
Soviet Union because the Soviets are inter-
vening militarily in the newly independent
African country of Angola. Our commitment
to work with all nations, including the So-
viet Union, to lessen the risk of war and to
achieve greater stability is a sincere and
constructive undertaking, but it is a com-
mitment which must be honored by both
sides. There cannot be a lessening of world
tension if the Soviet Union, by military sup-
port and other means, attempts to expand
its sphere of influence thousands and thou-
sands of miles from its borders.

The United States will not cease its ef-
forts, diplomatic and otherwise, to stabilize
the military situation in Angola and promote
a quick and peaceful settlement. We favor an
immediate cease-fire and an end to all, all,
all outside intervention and a government of
national unity, permitting the solution of
the Angolan problem by the Angolans them-
selves. We are working closely with many
other African countries to bring this about
— countries that realize, perhaps better
than the U.S. Congress, that our continued
effort to counter Soviet and Cuban action is
crucial to any hope of a fair solution.

The Soviet Union must realize that the
Soviet attempt to take unilateral advantage
of the Angolan problem is inconsistent with
the basic principles of U.S.-Soviet relations.
If it continues, damage to our broader rela-
tions will be unavoidable.

You, the farmers of America, understand
the importance of America's relations with
the rest of the world. You know we cannot
abdicate our responsibilities for maintaining
peace and progress.

I emphasize, however, that it is a serious
mistake to assume that linking our export of
grain to the situation in Angola would serve
any useful purpose whatsoever. In fact,
withholding grain already under contract,

98

Department of State Bulletin

already sold, would produce no immediate
gain in diplomatic leverage. American grain,
while important to the U.S.S.R., is not vital
to them. The Soviet Union has survived for
nearly 60 years, including years of total
Western economic embargo, without Ameri-
can grain. The impact of a grain cutoff
would be felt only after a long, long period.
It would not produce the needed short-term
results.

There is not the slightest doubt that if we
tried to use grain for leverage, the Soviets
could get along without American grain and
ignore our views. This was emphatically and
quite dramatically demonstrated by theij-
attitude toward the U.S. Trade Act provi-
sions of 1972 on emigration from the Soviet
Union.

The linkage of grain [with] diplomacy
would mean disruption and hardship for
you, the farmer, a serious increase in ten-
sions between the world's two superpowers,
and no effect whatsoever in Angola.

U.S.-Soviet rivalry in some areas around
the world has unfortunately not ceased. The
answer is to take other appropriate limited
measures necessary to block and stop Soviet
actions that we find unacceptable. And we
will.

Now, in these complicated and controver-
sial times, it is imperative that you maintain
the freedom to market crops and to find
customers wherever you can. Strong agri-
cultural exports are basic to America's farm
policy and the freedom of every farmer to
manage his own farm. You should be re-
warded, not punished, for producing each
year much more than we consume at home.

You must — and I emphasize must — export
two-thirds of each year's wheat crop or cut
back production. You must export 50 per-
cent of your soybeans or cut back produc-
tion. You must be able to export more than
55 percent of your rice crop or cut back
production. You must be able to export 40
percent of your cotton or cut back produc-
tion. You must export at least one-fourth
of your feed grain or cut back production.

In short, you must export to keep farming

profitable in America. You must export if we
are to keep a favorable balance of U.S. inter-
national trade. You must export if you are
to prosper and the world is to eat. This is
the farm policy that is bringing new life to
our rural countryside.

Food, as all of you know, is now our num-
ber-one source of foreign exchange. Farm
exports last year totaled nearly $22 billion.
Our favorable $12 billion balance in inter-
national agricultural trade offsets deficits in
nonagricultural trade. It strengthens the
American dollar abroad. This helps to pay
for the petroleum and other imports that
are vitally essential to maintain America's
high standard of living.

We have heard much in the 1970's of
"petropower," the power of those nations
with vast exportable petroleum resources.
Today, let us consider a different kind of
power — agripower, the power to grow. Agri-
power is the power to maintain and to im-
prove the quality of life in a new world
where our fate is interdependent with the
fate of others in this globe.

People throughout the world can reduce
the consumption of petroleum with some
sacrifice, but they cannot reduce the con-
sumption of food without widespread starva-
tion. Indeed, the world's population will
nearly double by the year 2000. By coping
with hunger, we can assure a better future
for all the peoples of the world.

Gen. George C. Marshall, in outlining his
European recovery plan at Harvard Univer-
sity in 1947, said that "Our policy is di-
rected not against any country or doctrine
but against hunger, poverty, desperation,
and chaos." General Marshall's words are
today reflected in our foreign policy.

The credibility of the United States — our
credibility around the world — rests upon our
vast resources as much as our defenses. As
we assess our strength for peace, America's
farming families stand shoulder to shoulder
with our men and women in uniform as they
do the job for all of us. And we thank you
for your contribution.

January 26, 1976

99

President Ford Interviewed for NBC Television

Following is the transcript of an interview
with President Ford by John Chancellor and
Tom Brokaw of NBC Netvs tvhich ivas re-
corded at the White House on January 3 for
the NBC Neivs special program on foreign
policy broadcast on January 5.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated January 12

Mr. Brokaiv: Mr. President, do you think
that it is possible for you to make decisions
in the name of national security if those
decisions do not reflect the popular will of
the people?

President Ford: It does make it somewhat
difficult, Tom, but I think it is the responsi-
bility of a President to fully inform the
American people and convince them that
what we are seeking to do in foreign policy
is in our best interests, and if a President
carries out that responsibility, then he can
and will have the support of the American
people.

Mr. Brokaw: Is that the situation now in
Angola? Do you have to convince the Ameri-
can people of what you consider to be the
national security of the United States there?

President Ford: I believe there is a need
and necessity for that. I don't believe that
enough Americans understand the great re-
sponsibilities we have as a nation on a
worldwide basis, and that includes, of course,
Africa as a whole. What we really want and
what we are seeking to do in Angola is to
get an African solution to an African prob-
lem. And through bilateral negotiations,
through working with the Organization of
African Unity, through relations with the
Soviet Union and others, we are trying to
achieve that African solution to an African
problem.

Mr. Brokaw: Mr. President, the Soviet

Union quite clearly has signaled in a Tass
article that it wants all major powers to
withdraw militarily from Angola. Has Mos-
cow privately communicated that to you as
well?

President Ford: We are working with all
powers, including the Soviet Union, to try
and permit the Angolan people, the three
different groups there at the present time,
to get a decision or solution that will reflect
a majority view of the Angolan people. And
we are doing it, as I indicated, with a num-
ber of major powers, including the Soviet
Union, as well as the many, many African
countries that are a part of the Organiza-
tion of African Unity.

Mr. Brokaw: But as a result of this Tass
article, is it your understanding now that
Russia is prepared to break off its military
.support and to have Cuba quit sending
troops as well to Angola?

President Ford: I don't believe we can say
categorically that that is their intention.
We are simply working with them because
a continuation of that confrontation is de-
stabilizing; it is, I think, inconsistent with
the aims and objectives of detente. And we
are making some headway, but I can't say
categorically that the end result is what we
want it to be at the present time.

Mr. Brokaw: Mr. President, in a recent
speech. Secretary Kissinger said there is a
gray area between foreign policy and na-
tional security which, he said, ive deny our-
selves at great risk to our national security.
I suppose that training foreign mercenaries
for use in Angola might be called part of
that gray area. Are we training foreign
mercenaries for v^e in Angola?

President Ford: The United States is not

100

Department of State Bulletin

training foreign mercenaries in Angola. We
do expend some Federal funds — or U.S.
funds — in trying to be helpful, but we are
not training foreign mercenaries.

Mr. Brokaw: Are we financing the train-
ing of foreign mercenaries?

President Ford: We are working with
other countries that feel they have an inter-
est in giving the Angolans an opportunity
to make the decision for themselves, and I
think this is a proper responsibility of the
Federal Government.

Mr. Brokaw: Mr. President, while you
may disagree with the results of the Senate
vote on Angola, do you agree that it 'prob-
ably represents the ivill of the American
people?

President Ford: It may at this time. But I
will repeat, as I said a few moments ago, the
American people, I think, if told and fully
informed as to the role and responsibility
and the aims and objectives of the American
Government in trying to let the Angolans
and the Africans come to a solution, I think
in time the American people will support
what we have been trying to do in Angola.

Mr. Brokaw: Mr. President, in the past
the congressional role in foreign policy has
been largely confined to a few chairmen and
senior Tnennbers. Now the process has been
broadened considerably. You are formerly a
man of Congress. Do you think that is a
healthy sign?

President Ford: I think Congress, under
the Constitution, does have a proper role in
foreign policy, but I don't think our fore-
fathers who drafted that Constitution ever
envisioned that 535 Members of the House
and Senate could execute foreign policy on
a day-to-day basis. I think the drafters of
the Constitution felt that a President had
to have the opportunity for decisiveness, for
flexibility, for continuity in the execution of
foreign policy and somehow we have to mesh
the role and responsibility of the Congress,
which is proper, with the opportunity for
the President to carry out that foreign pol-
icy in the best interests of the United States.

Now, there have been some instances in
recent months where I think the actions of
the Congress have hampered, interfered
with, the execution of foreign policy, and let
me cite one or two examples.

The action of the Congress about a year
ago has harmed the opportunity of many to
emigrate from the Soviet Union. I noticed
just the other day that the emigration from
the Soviet Union is down this year, includ-
ing many reductions in the emigration of
Soviet Jews from Russia. I think the action
of the Congress was harmful in that regard.

It is my judgment that in the case of con-
gressional action on Turkish aid, they have
slowed down the potential solution to the
Cyprus problem.

In some respects, and I emphasize "some,"
the action of the Congress has hurt our
efforts in the intelligence field, although the
Congress in some respects in this area has
illuminated what were — and I think we all
recognize — some abuses in the intelligence
field.

But overall, there has to be a better under-
standing of the role of the Congress and the
role of the President, and they have to be
meshed if we are going to be successful.

Mr. Chancellor: Mr. President, is it be-
cause of Viet-Nam and the fact that Presi-
dent Johnson and, to some degree. President
Nixon had a lot of control over Viet-Nam,
and the Congress had very little control of it
that you are in this fix?

President Ford: I believe some of the in-
stances that I have cited, John, are an after-
math of the trauma of Viet-Nam. Congress
really asserted itself in the latter days of
the Viet-Nam war. We all understand why;
and Congress, having whetted its appetite,
so to speak, I think in the last few months
has continued to do some things that have
been harmful in the execution on a day-to-
day basis of our foreign policy.

Mr. Brokaxv: Mr. President, as a result of
the Soviet role in Angola, the fact that the
SALT talks [Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks] now have bogged down somewhat, the
fact that the spirit and the letter of the

January 26, 1976

101

Helsinki agreement have not been fully car-
ried out by Russia, are you now less enthusi-
astic about the prospects for detente?

President Ford: I am not at all, and I
think it would be very unwise for a Presi-
dent— me or anyone else — to abandon de-
tente. I think detente is in the best interest
of this country. It is in the best interest of
world stability, world peace.

We have to recognize there are deep ideo-
logical differences between the United States
and the Soviet Union. We have to recognize
they are a superpower militarily and indus-
trially just as we are. And when you have
two superpowers that have such great influ-
ence, it is in the best interests of those two
countries to work together to ease tensions,
to avoid confrontation where possible, to
improve relations on a worldwide basis.

And for us to abandon this working rela-
tionship and to go back to a cold war, in my
opinion, would be very unwise for we in the
United States and the world as a whole.

Mr. Brokatv: But ivon't you be under a lot
of domestic political pressure in this election
year to change your attitude about detente?

President Ford: I think it would be just
the reverse; because when we look at de-
tente— with the Berlin agreement of 1971,
with SALT One, which put to some extent
a limitation on nuclear development, et
cetera — and when I look at the benefits that
can come from the Vladivostok agreement
of 1974, it is my opinion that we must con-
tinue rather than stop.

And if the American people take a good
calculated look at the benefits from de-
tente, I think they will support it rather
than oppose it; and politically, I think any
candidate who says "abandon detente" will
be the loser in the long run.

Mr. Brokaw: Mr. President, the historian
Will Durant has said that a statesman can't
afford to be a moralist as ivell. Briefly, do
you agree with that statement?

President Ford: I don't believe there is
any necessary conflict between the two. We
have to be pragmatic at the same time. We
have to be practical as we meet these specific

problems. But if you lose your moral value,
then I think you have destroyed your capa-
bility to carry out things in a practical way.

Mr. Chancellor: Mr. President, I ivonder
if I could ask you a question about the
United Nations, ivhich seems to have less
utility in the world these days than it did'
when it began, and also about some of the
pressure groups that we find both within the
United Nations and as you see these pressure
groups in foreign affairs — / am thinking,
for example, of the influence of American
Jeivs, of the growing influence of Arabs, of
various groups. Aren't those groups kind of
closing in on you, or do you feel that some-
times, sir?

President Ford: I believe that substantial
progress, John, was made in the United Na-
tions in the seventh special session late in
1975. That was a very constructive session
of the United Nations which sought to bring
together the developing, as well as the de-
veloped, nations.

This was constructive. Now, it is true that
subsequent to that there were some very
vitriolic debates, there were some very seri-
ous diff'erences that developed in the United
Nations from various pressure groups.

I would hope that in the future some of
this conflict would subside and there would
be a more constructive effort made to solve
the problems, and since I am always an opti-
mist— and I think it is important and neces-
sary for a President to be that — I think that
as we move in the United Nations in the
future that we can calm some of the voices
and get to some of the answers.

And so this country's foreign policy in the
United Nations will be aimed in that direc-
tion, and if we follow what we did in the
seventh special session and what we are
trying to do now, I think these pressure
groups will recognize that words are not the
answer but solutions will be to the benefit of
all parties concerned.

Mr. Chancellor: In your history of public
life, as a Member of Congress, Mr. President,
and now as the President, do you find that
organized groups play a greater role now in
terms of our foreign affairs, or trying to

102

Department of State Bulletin

influence them, than they did when you
began?

President Ford: To some degree, yes. I
think highly organized, very articulate pi'es-
sure groups can, on occasion, tend to distort
the circumstances and can hamper rather
than help in the solution.

I don't believe those pressure groups nec-
essarily represent the American people as a
whole. So a President, myself included, has
to look at the broad perspective and not
necessarily in every instance respond to the
pressure groups that are well intentioned
but who have a limited perspective, or scope.

And as we move ahead, we are going to
try and predicate our foreign policy on the
best interests of all the people in this coun-
try, as well as our allies and our adversaries,
rather than to respond to a highly articu-
late, a very tightly organized pressure group
of any kind.

We cannot let America's policies be predi-
cated on a limited part of our population or
our society.

President Ford's Year-End Meeting
With Reporters

Follotving are excerpts relating to foreign
policy from the transcript of President
Ford's question-and-answer session with 23
reporters in the Oval Office at the White
House on December 31.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated January 5

In foreign policy, we had, of course, a set-
back in Southeast Asia. But if you take a
look at what has been accomplished else-
where, whether it is in NATO, where we have
convinced our allies that the American
people are going to stand strong in that area
— they absolutely believe that the United
States is going to be a firm partner. And I
think the personal relationship with leaders
in Western Europe is as good, if not better,
than any time in the last 20 or 30 years.

If you look to the Pacific, despite the
problems in Viet-Nam, our relationship with
Japan is the best in the history of this coun-
try. We have kept faith with other countries
in the whole Pacific area, and they believe
that the United States will stand in the
future firmly for the freedom that they have
and the opportunities for a better life for
all of their people.

Q. Mr. President, in 1972, we and the Rus-
sians signed a pledge in Moscow —

President Ford: What year was that?

Q. In 1972, ive signed a pledge with the
Russians, both sides agreeing not to raise
tensions anywhere in the world — detente.
The Russians say that detente does not mean
that the status quo around the ivorld stays
the same. We know it isn't the same in An-
gola. Aren't they breaking the rules on
detente there, and how do we stand?

President Ford: Both Secretary Kissinger
and I have spoken out very strongly against
the Soviet activity in Angola, and I reaffirm
it today. I think what is being done in An-
gola by the Soviet Union in conjunction
with the Cubans is not constructive from
the point of view of detente.

We couldn't be any firmer publicly than
we have been in that regard. But I think we
have an obligation to continue to work with-
in the framework of detente because there
are some other benefits that have accrued.
I think SALT One was a step forward, and
if SALT Two can be negotiated on a mutual
basis, it will be constructive within the
framework of detente. But, I reaffirm, An-
gola is an example of where I think detente
has not worked the way it should work, and
we strongly object to it.

Q. Is it possible, sir, that detente may
simply end up being agreements on nuclear
iveapons and nothing else?

President Ford: I hope not. I think it
ought to have a far broader implication. I
think detente can be helpful, just as an
example, in the longrun solution in the
Middle East. And there are some good signs

January 26, 1976

103

that it is helping to moderate certain influ-
ences in the Middle East.

Q. Mr. President, your predecessor sat in
this office and, in May of 1970, warned
against the United States of America be-
coming a pitiful, helpless giant. In a sense,
our speaking out on Angola is about all we
can do. The United States, seemingly oper-
ating tvithin the frametvork of detente,
seems to be powerless to do anything else
other than speak out in offering statements
by the President and by the Secretary of
State. Have we, therefore, in effect, reached
a kind of status in the world where we are a
pitiful, helpless giant in the continent of
Africa?

President Ford: I don't think we are a
pitiful, helpless giant in Africa. We have a
great many countries that look to us and
work with us and, I think, are sympathetic
to what we are trying to do in conjunction
with them. There are some African states
that obviously don't look toward us, but look
toward the Soviet Union.

I think we would have been in a stronger
position to find a compromise in Angola if
the Senate had not taken the action that it
took. Nevertheless, despite that setback, we
are maximizing the utilization of funds that
are available, small as they are. And we are
moving as strongly as possible in the area
of diplomatic initiatives with the OAU [Or-
ganization of African Unity], on a bilateral
basis with African states, with other coun-
tries throughout the world that have an
interest in Africa.

I certainly think, despite the handicap of
the Senate action, we are going to do every-
thing we possibly can. And we certainly are
not a pitiful giant in this process.

Q. Mr. President, can I follow that one up?

President Ford: Surely.

Q. You said you would do everything we
possibly can. Would this include the use of —
rethinking of the sales of grain as a political
weapon or as a diplomatic tool?

President Ford: I think the grain sale with
the Soviet Union, the five-year agreement,
is a very constructive part of the policy of

detente. It certainly is constructive from the
point of view of American agriculture. We
have a guarantee of 6 million tons a year
with a top limit of some 8 million tons. It, I
think, over the long haul will be looked upon
as a very successful negotiation. I see no
reason at this time, certainly under the cir-
cumstances existing today, for any revision
of that negotiated agreement.

Q. Mr. President, why is it necessary for
you to rule out any improvement in our rela-
tions with Cuba, when what they are doing
in Angola is essentially no different than
what the Soviet Union is doing or South
Africa is doing. But especially what evil have
the Cubans done?

President Ford: It is pretty hard for me
to see what legitimate interest Cuba has in
sending some 6,000 well-equipped, well-
trained military personnel to Angola. I just ,i
don't see what their interest is. And it cer- '
tainly doesn't help our relations with Cuba
when they know that we think it is in the
best interests of the three parties in that
country to settle their differences them-
selves.

Q. You say it is not standing in the way
of detente with the Soviet Union; it has not
broken off our relations with South Africa
and what they are doing there. Why is Cuba
singled out for apparently a more strict
treatment? I

President Ford: I think that is very simple.
We have had a period of what, 13 years of
very few, if any, contacts with the Govern-
ment of Cuba and many, many differences,
and there were some prospects — I say were
some prospects — for gradual improvement.
But when we are trying to resolve differ-
ences in Angola, they are seeking to expand
the conflict there with active military per-
sonnel. It just is such a different view from
our own. I don't see how, under those cir-
cumstances, we can feel that we can work
with them in the future in this hemisphere
or elsewhere.

Q. Mr. President, have you hinted at some
progress with the Russians on Angola. Is

104

Department of State Bulletin

that true? I mean, do you have some under-
currents?

President Ford: I can only say that we
have presented very forcefully our view that
what is being done there is contrary to de-
tente. I think there is a better solution. As
I said yesterday — and I will repeat today —
we are maximizing our effort diplomatically,
broadly as well as bilaterally.

United States Official Killed
in Athens

Following are texts of a statement read to
neivs correspondents on December 23 by
Robert L. Funseth, Director, Office of Press
Relations, and a statement by President
Ford issued at Vail, Colo., that day.

Q. Mr. President, you mentioned Viet-Nam
at the beginning. I wonder tvhether we could
have one more look back at that tvar. I am
sure history is going to be asking this ques-
tion. I think it will. Whatever happened to
the domino theory, which I think you once
espoused? Looking back, did it really ever
have any validity, or does it continue to have
a validity?

President Ford: I think it can have valid-
ity, and the situation that developed in Laos,
as you well know, the coalition government
there has dissolved, been overcome. I know
that there are countries in Southeast Asia
that were fearful that it might be a reality.
We were able to reaffirm our presence at the
present time as well as in the future in the
Pacific, or Southeast Asia. And thus far we
have been able to preclude what I honestly
felt might have taken place.

Outside of some weakening in some coun-
tries, the domino theory has not taken place,
and we are fortunate. I am glad that that
theory has been disproven, but it took some
strong action and I think some leadership
by this country to handle the matter.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT

Richard S. Welch, a Special Assistant to
the Ambassador and First Secretary at the
U.S. Embassy in Athens, was shot to death
by three unidentified assailants this after-
noon, December 23, 1975.

Secretary Kissinger has sent a message
of condolence to Mr. Welch's widow, who
resided with him in Athens.

The Greek Government has conveyed to
us its outrage at this barbaric act and has
given us its assurances that all possible
means are being taken to apprehend the
criminals responsible.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT FORD

White House press release (Vail, Colo.) dated December 23

I was shocked and horrified by the terror-
ist murder of Mr. Richard Welch outside his
home in Athens, Greece. Mr. Welch has long
been a dedicated official of the U.S. Govern-
ment, and the hearts of all Americans go out
to his family in sympathy and in gratitude
for a life given in devoted service to his
country.

January 26, 1976

105

THE CONGRESS

Department Outlines Development of U.S. Relationship
With the People's Republic of China

Statement by Philip C. Habib

Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs *

Before discussing the President's recent
trip to Peking, I believe it will be useful to
outline in general terms our relationship
with the People's Republic of China.

A fundamental goal of U.S. foreign policy
is to promote an international order of peace,
justice, and prosperity for all. In pursuing
this objective, our approach proceeds from
the premise that peace depends on a stable
global equilibrium. Nowhere is this more
important than in the Pacific, where the
security concerns of four great powers — the
United States, the Soviet Union, China, and
Japan — intersect, and where the United
States has important interests and responsi-
bilities.

The normalization of U.S. relations witli
the People's Republic of China is a crucial
element in preserving this equilibrium. For
over two decades our relations with this
country, which represents nearly one-quar-
ter of mankind, were based on hostility and
mutual suspicion. Gradually leaders on both
sides came to realize that this posture
served the interests of neither country and
was incompatible with the changes that had
taken place in the world over the last 25
years.

' Made before the Special Subcommittee on Investi-
gations of the House Committee on International
Relations on Dec. 17. The complete transcript of the
hearings will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
20402.

Since 1971, we have managed through our
joint efforts to overcome the legacy of the
past and to work out a relationship of mu-
tual respect between the United States and
China. As Secretary Kissinger stated in his
speech to the U.N. General Assembly on
September 22, 1975 :

There is no relationship to which the United
States assigns greater significance than its new ties
with the People's Republic of China. We believe that
the well-being and progress of a quarter of humanity
is an important element in global stability.

Although this is not the occasion for a
review of the entire history of U.S.-P.R.C.
relations, it is important to remember that
the Communist victory in China, the emer-
gence of a seemingly monolithic Sino-Soviet
bloc, and the outbreak of the Korean war
in 1950 served to freeze our relationship
with the People's Republic of China into the
basic form it was to retain for over 20 years.

Throughout this period the Taiwan issue
remained the overriding problem between
Peking and Washington. While there was a
gradual evolution in official Washington
thinking in favor of seeking an accommoda-
tion with the People's Republic of China,
hopes for progress were frustrated by the
sharply divergent views between the two
sides, by our involvement in the Viet-Nam
conflict, and by the outbreak of the cultural
revolution in China, which for a time com-
plicated Peking's relations with the outside
world in general. Throughout this period
we maintained contact with the People's

106

Department of State Bulletin

Republic of China through the ambassa-
dorial-level talks that began in Geneva in
1955 and were later moved to Warsaw, but
the exchanges in this forum failed to narrow
the differences between the two sides.

In the late 1960's, however, the U.S. Gov-
ernment undertook a number of steps de-
signed to relax tension between the United
. States and the People's Republic of China
ill areas such as trade and travel. In the
spring of 1971 these moves were recipro-
cated by Peking's invitation to an American
table tennis team to visit the People's Re-
public of China, a step that was followed
I shortly by Dr. Kissinger's first visit to
Peking in July 1971 and President Nixon's
announcement that he would visit China in
1972.

To understand why, after two decades of
confrontation and isolation, the United
I States and the People's Republic of China
were finally able to agree to move toward
normalization, we should recall the global
context in which the move took place.

There had been basic changes in the inter-
national environment — and our understand-
ing of that environment — since 1950. The
U.S.S.R. had risen to a position of global
power. There had been a shift in the nuclear
balance between the United States and the
Soviet Union in the direction of parity, and
China itself had developed a nuclear capa-
bility.

Of no less importance was the fact that
the close Sino-Soviet relationship of the
1950's had dissolved, and the schism between
Peking and Moscow had reached the point
of open military clashes on the Sino-Soviet
border by the spring of 1969. These clashes
came shortly after the Soviet intervention
in Czechoslovakia in 1968, which Moscow
justified in terms of a universalist formula
that made such intervention a duty to pre-
vent backsliding from Soviet-approved So-
cialist norms. These developments clearly
contributed to Peking's preoccupation with
its own security.

The United States, for its part, was end-
ing its involvement in the Viet-Nam war.
Our troop presence in Indochina was begin-
ning to decline, and as we looked to the post-

war future in Asia, it was increasingly clear
that we should try to involve the People's
Republic of China in a new structure of
peace in Asia characterized by mutual re-
straint of the great powers. Not only was
the freedom of action of U.S. diplomacy
severely constrained by the absence of rela-
tions with the People's Republic of China,
but growing urgency was attached to the
task of preventing dangerous miscalcula-
tions by the new and emerging nuclear
power in China.

These changes in the international en-
vironment enabled the United States and
the People's Republic of China to arrive at
a new appreciation of their relationship in
which common elements were seen to pre-
dominate over the differences flowing from
our varying societies, philosophies, and posi-
tions in the world.

In essence there are three aspects of our
relations with the People's Republic of
China. The first is the geopolitical aspect,
reflected in our common recognition that the
overall security of the international order
would be better maintained if the United
States and China had a relationship of dia-
logue with each other than if they were in a
position of permanent hostility. The second
aspect concerns those factors affecting the
full normalization of our relations, the most
important of which is the question of Tai-
wan. The third concerns the mutually bene-
ficial bilateral ties we have established in
areas such as trade and scientific and cul-
tural exchanges.

President Nixon's visit to the People's
Republic of China in February 1972 dealt
with all three of these aspects. The results
of his visit were set forth in the Shanghai
communique, a document which continues
to form the basis for the new and durable
relationship that has emerged between our
two countries. The communique was an
unusual document, since it outlined the
differences between the two countries. More
importantly, however, the communique re-
corded certain broad principles of interna-
tional relations to which both subscribed.

Both sides agreed that despite differences
in social systems and foreign policies, coun-

January 26, 1976

107

tries should conduct their relations on the
basis of respect for the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of all states, nonaggres-
sion against other states, equality and mu-
tual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. They
agreed that international disputes should be
settled on this basis without resorting to the
use or threat of force.

With these principles in mind, the United
States and the People's Republic of China
jointly stated that:

— Progress toward the normalization of
relations between China and the United
States is in the interest of all countries.

— Both wish to reduce the danger of inter-
national military conflict.

— Neither should seek hegemony in the
Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to
efforts by any other country or group of
countries to establish such hegemony. (Dur-
ing Secretary Kissinger's visit to the Peo-
ple's Republic of China in November 1973,
the two sides reiterated this point and ex-
panded it to include opposition to efforts to
establish hegemony in any part of the
world.)

— Neither is prepared to negotiate on be-
half of any third party or to enter into
agreements or understandings with the
other directed at other states.

On the crucial question of Taiwan, both
sides stated their positions clearly. The
United States acknowledged that all Chinese
on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain
there is but one China of which Taiwan is a
part. The U.S. Government did not challenge
this position. It reaffirmed its interest in a
peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue by
the Chinese themselves, and with this pros-
pect in mind, it affirmed the ultimate objec-
tive of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and
military installations from Taiwan. In the
meantime, the United States stated that it
would progressively reduce its military pres-
ence on Taiwan as tension in the area dimin-
ished.

Finally, the Shanghai communique laid
the foundation for tangible improvement in
U.S.-P.R.C. relations. It was agreed that the
two sides would facilitate bilateral ex-

changes in such fields as science, technology,
culture, sports, and journalism. They under-
took to facilitate the progressive develop-
ment of trade and agreed that the two gov-
ernments would maintain contact through
various channels, including sending a senior
U.S. representative to Peking periodically
to exchange views on issues of common con-
cern.

Developments since the Shanghai commu-
nique was signed have confirmed that our
relationship with the People's Republic of
China is on a sound basis. There have been
extensive exchanges of scientific and tech-
nological delegations, of sports teams and
performing arts groups. In February of
1973, we agreed with the Chinese on the
reciprocal exchange of Liaison Offices, which
provides us with a means for conducting our
day-to-day bilateral relations. Trade rose
from a base of zero in 1970 to nearly a bil-
lion dollars in 1974. Members of Congress,
State Governors, and other representative
Americans have visited the People's Repub-
lic of China. And Secretary Kissinger has
had important conversations with Chinese
leaders in New York as well as China, on
many occasions.

There are, of course, a number of unre-
solved bilateral issues, including the prob-
lem of Taiwan. It will take time to resolve
these, although the direction of our policy
is clear. We have approached normalization
of our bilateral relations with the People's
Republic of China in accordance with the
position we stated in the Shanghai commu-
nique that the ultimate resolution of the
Taiwan question is for the Chinese them-
selves to decide and that the resolution
should be by peaceful means. For our part,
we have progressively reduced our forces in
the Taiwan area as tensions in Asia have
diminished.

We have continuing disagreements with
the People's Republic of China in ideology
and varying national interests which lead to
differences in our respective foreign policies.
We make no attempt to hide these. This is
only natural, and each side will inevitably
determine its own policies according to its
own situation and perception of its national

108

Department of State Bulletin

interest. At the same time, the fundamental
geopolitical considerations that caused us to
work out the present relationship remain
valid and lend it a degree of stability it
might otherwise lack.

President Ford's recent visit to the Peo-
ple's Republic of China should be viewed in
this context. Extensive changes had oc-
curred in both countries and the world since
President Nixon's visit in 1972. Both sides
recognized the importance of sustaining the
dialogue between the top leaders of the two
countries and reviewing our respective per-
ceptions of the international situation which
contributed so much to bringing our two
countries closer together.

The President's visit confirmed that while
U.S.-P.R.C. relations are not yet normalized,
they are good and will be gradually im-
proved. The discussions naturally centered
on the international aspects of the relation-
ship, to which both sides attach primary
significance. The talks demonstrated the
existence of important points in common,
although there were of course some differ-
ences in view.

President Ford reaffirmed the determina-
tion of the United States to complete the
normalization of relations with the People's
Republic of China on the basis of the Shang-
hai communique, which P.R.C. Vice Premier
Teng Hsaio-p'ing described as remaining
"full of vitality today." Overall, the discus-
sions significantly promoted the objectives
which the United States and the People's
Republic of China share with regard to both
our bilateral relations and the international
scene.

The United States is confident that we can
continue to build a relationship with the
People's Republic of China which advances
the national interests of both countries. This
relationship must be founded on mutuality
as well as realism, which is a firmer basis
than sentiment for sound and durable ties.
As President Ford said in his speech in

Hawaii on December 7 this year, our rela-
tionship with the People's Republic of China
"is becoming a permanent feature of the
international political landscape. It benefits
not only our two peoples but all peoples of
the region and the entire world."

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

93d Congress, 2d Session

Multinational Corporations and United States For-
eign Policy. Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Multinational Corporations of the Senate Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations on investments by multi-
national companies in the Communist bloc countries.
Part 10. June 17^uly 22, 1974. 405 pp.

94th Congress, 1st Session

Increased U.S. Participation in the Inter-American
Development Bank. Report of the House Commit-
tee on Banking, Currency and Housing, together
with supplemental views, to accompany H.R. 9721.
H. Rept. 94-541. October 8, 1975. 49 pp.

Report by Congressional Advisers to the Seventh
Special Session of the United Nations. Submitted
to the House Committee on International Relations
and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
October 13, 1975. 67 pp.

International Labor Organization Convention and
Recommendation Concerning the Prevention and
Control of Occupational Hazards Caused by Car-
cinogenic Substances and Agents. Communication
from the Assistant Secretary of State for Con-
gressional Relations transmitting the texts of In-
ternational Labor Organization convention no. 139
and recommendation no. 147. H. Doc. 94-280. Octo-
ber 9, 1975. 16 pp.

International Labor Organization Convention and
Recommendation Concerning Paid Educational
Leave. Communication from the Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Congressional Relations trans-
mitting the texts of International Labor Organiza-
tion convention no. 140 and recommendation no.
148. H. Doc. 94-281. October 9, 1975. 18 pp.

The Convention on the International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972. Report of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accom-
pany Ex. W, 93-1. S. Ex. Rept. 94-8. October 22,
1975. 10 pp.

January 26, 1976

109

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

United States Discusses Fulfillment of Goals
of International Women's Year in the U.N.

Following are statements made in Com-
mittee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cul-
tural) of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S.
Representative Carmen R. Maymi on Decem-
ber 3 and December 5, together with the text
of a resolution adopted by the committee on
December 5 and by the Assembly on Decem-
ber 15.

STATEMENTS BY MS. MAYMI, COMMITTEE III

Statement of December 3

USUN press release 170 dated December 3

My delegation has looked forward to the
day when the General Assembly would be-
gin work on the item for the World Confer-
ence of the International Women's Year.'
For too long the world community has failed
to perceive sexual discrimination as one of
the most widespread deprivations of human
rights.

From its inception, the United Nations
under article 1 of the charter has held a
mandate to encourage respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all,
without distinction as to sex. Yet during
this period the United Nations has not

' For U.S. statements at the World Conference of
the International Women's Year at Mexico City on
June 20 and July 2, texts of resolutions sponsored or
cosponsored by the United States, and text of the
World Plan of Action for the Implementation of the
Objectives of the International Women's Year, see
Bulletin of Aug. 18, 1975, p. 233.

exerted the leadership nor have its members
availed themselves of the opportunities to
move as rapidly as possible to end discrimi-
nation against women at all levels, social
and economic levels, in law and in practice,
even in the U.N. system itself, which has
continued discriminatory practices in the
international civil service despite pleas for
equal opportunities.

As a result of this discrimination women
have been repeatedly denied the opportunity
to make their full contribution to our soci-
eties. The result has been that all people
have suffered. Adequate solutions to prob-
lems have not been reached, nor has the
genius of women been channeled into society.

It is not an overstatement to say that
women of countries at every stage of de-
velopment and at every social and economic
level looked forward to the World Women's
Conference as an instrument that would
help to change and improve their lives.
Women have awaited the day when this ses-
sion of the General Assembly will put its
weight behind a call for action.

At the Mexico City Conference there was
full agreement that discrimination against
women is incompatible with human dignity
and with the welfare of the family, that it
prevents women's participation on equal
terms with men in all aspects of the life of
their countries, and that it is an obstacle to
the full development of women's potentiali-
ties in service to humanity as well as to
their self -fulfillment as human persons.

The world conference reminded us of the

110

Department of State Bulletin

great contribution made by women in social,
political, economic, and cultural life and of
the part they play, along with men, in the
rearing of children. But it also reminded us
of the U.N.'s commitment to the attain-
ment of human rights for women as well as
men. It reminded us of the necessity to in-
sure the universal recognition, in law and in
fact, of the principle of the equality of men
and women. It noted further that it is the
primary responsibility of governments and
peoples of individual countries to insure the
advancement of women within the process
of national development.

The conference stressed that only through
a sustained international commitment to
improving standards of living of the poorest
in each community can women, who consti-
tute a disproportionately high number of
this group, live in dignity and justice free
from hunger and poverty. Significantly, it
noted that changes in the social and eco-
nomic structures of societies cannot, of
themselves, insure the elimination of dis-
crimination against women or their full
integration into their society.

Nevertheless, despite very full delibera-
tions and recommendations of the World
Conference of the International Women's
Year, we still hear in these halls the ques-
tion: "What is it that women want?"

Madam Chairperson, what women want
has been highlighted in every member coun-
try during this significant year; and we, as
women, have found a new understanding
among ourselves in expressing these needs.
We hope that it has helped men to under-
stand as well.

Women want to be treated as full, equal,
and responsible members of society. They
want the underutilization of half of the
world's human resources to cease.

Women want the right to make their con-
tribution to economic and social development
on an equal basis with men with human dig-
nity. They want to share equally in its re-
wards. Their full participation in the vari-
ous economic, political, social, and cultural
sectors is an important indication of the

dynamic progress of peoples and their de-
velopment.

Women want equal access to education
and to vocational guidance and training in
order to widen their choice of employment
opportunities.

Women want removal of the age-old
stereotyped concepts of their role ; they want
freedom of choice to enter the occupations
from which they have been excluded in the
past.

Women want the same opportunities as
men for promotion to decisionmaking and
policymaking positions within all spheres of
economic, social, and political activity.

Women want a narrowing of the wide gap
in earnings between women and men, and
they want equal pay for work of equal value.

Women want all elements of the U.N. sys-
tem to support projects that will reduce the
heavy burden placed on women in the de-
veloping countries. This will enable them to
enter more productive activities at levels
commensurate with their skills, and it will
increase their earning power.

Women want assurances that their child-
bearing capacity will not be used as an ex-
cuse to limit their role in society and force
on them alone child-rearing responsibilities.
They want men to share actively in the re-
sponsibilities of child rearing and in family
life.

Women want the right to develop their
potentialities and to exercise options in life
without discrimination as equal partners
with men in fulfilling national economic and
social needs. They ask member governments
and the United Nations to take those rights
fully into account and to make adequate
provision for the improvement of their sit-
uation.

Madam Chairperson, we see no mystery in
what women want. Nor was this a mystery
to the men and women who gathered at the
World Conference. Although they spoke
different languages, embraced various faiths,
represented different degrees of develop-
ment and different economic levels, they
were united by a broad mutuality of inter-

January 26, 1976

111

ests in their common determination to as-
sert their rights, to assist each other,
and to exercise solidarity by urging appro-
priate action from governments, the U.N.
system, nongovernmental organizations, and
other groups working toward the achieve-
ment of these goals.

These are the goals toward which the plan
of action and most of the resolutions are
directed.

The role of women in development was
one of the principal concerns of the confer-
ence, not only because justice and equal
rights demand their full participation, but
also because the development process re-
quires it. Indeed, this process cannot succeed
if any nation ignores one-half of its human
potential. The goals of equality for women
and their integration into the development
process are inextricably interrelated. Each
is indispensable to the other.

In our own bilateral AID [Agency for
International Development] programs we
have sought to give tangible form to this
conviction. By statute and by administrative
regulations, our AID programs are now re-
quired to give priority to programs which
integrate women into the national econo-
mies of their countries. Our AID missions
are required to submit impact statements
indicating the effects of proposed programs
on women.

Another important initiative of the con-
ference concerned the practices of the
United Nations itself as an employer. The
United States was pleased to cosponsor
Resolution 8, "The Situation of Women in
the Employ of the United Nations and Spe-
cialized Agencies."

Everyone in this committee knows that the
United Nations still falls short of the ideals
it proclaims on equality for women; surely
this is the year for launching the needed
steps so that the United Nations as an em-
ployer will set standards of which all can be
proud. A resolution adopted this week in the
Fifth Committee should provide an impor-
tant impetus to needed action.^

We also wish to note the valuable work of

the Standing Committee on the Employment
of Women in the Secretariat, a group re-
porting to the Joint Advisory Committee on
Personnel. The standing committee, created
in response to a recommendation of the
Fifth Committee during the 29th General
Assembly, began work last spring and has
since produced two reports. We urge both
the Secretariat and member states to give
priority attention to its recommendations.

Resolutions and plans of action do not of
themselves change the world. Implementa-
tion and the call for implementation are not
the same thing. Ultimately, the significance
of what we are doing here today will depend
upon our ability to retain the consensus
evident at Mexico City that the U.N. system
should become an effective instrument for
sustained action to improve the condition
of women worldwide. It will depend even
more on what governments and organiza-
tions and individuals, both men and women,
around the world do to carry out commit-
ments that have been made.

Madam Chairperson, I have spoken up to
now about the excellent work of the confer-
ence. Unfortunately, it is necessary also to
refer to other than constructive aspects.

The United States objected strongly to
the efforts of some to politicize the confer-
ence, and we have no wish to politicize the
question here. I will only remark how deeply
the people of the United States objected to
the references to Zionism in the Declaration
of Mexico and to the wording of a few of
the resolutions of the conference.^ The in-
jection of divisive issues was disruptive,
was not germane to the substance of the
conference itelf, and weakened the very posi-
tive achievements and impact of the con-
ference.

" A resolution on employment of women in the
Secretariat of the United Nations was adopted by
Committee V (Administrative and Budgetary) on
Dec. 1 and by the Assembly on Dec. 8 (A/RES/3416
(XXX)).

' For text of the declaration, plans of action, reso-
lutions, decisions, and recommendation adopted by
the conference, see U.N. doe. E/5725, Report of the
World Conference of the International Women's Year.

112

Department of State Bulletin

It does no credit to our work that some
delegations persistently raise divisive issues
that only divert us from the job at hand.
Confrontation, not positive action, seems
their objective. We deeply want to concen-
trate on our common goals and objectives
and work together to achieve them. How-
ever, as necessary, we will not shrink from
our responsibility to oppose those resolutions
or provisions of resolutions which we cannot
accept — some of which even violate the very
principles on which the United Nations was
founded.

The World Plan of Action was recognized
from the start as the single most important
document of the conference. And we wish to
commend Mrs. Helvi Sipila, Secretary Gen-
eral of the conference and Mrs. Margaret
Bruce, Deputy Secretary General, as well as
the U.N. Commission on the Status of
Women for the excellent preparatory work
done on the World Plan of Action. The plan
of action was amended by minor modifica-
tions and adopted by consensus in Commit-
tee I and in plenary. We see this consensus
as extremely significant. Effectiveness will
of course depend upon the extent to which
it is translated into action.

Fortunately, we are now on the verge of
declaring a "Decade for Women: Equality,
Development and Peace." We intend to de-
vote this Decade to the implementation of
the programs and projects which will bring
about the fulfillment of the goals of Inter-
national Women's Year and the World Plan
of Action. This will not occur on its own;
the Decade will need strong and enduring
supporters. Like the plan itself, the Decade's
success will depend upon cooperation and
determination by all.

Finally, let me say a few words about what
is being done in the United States. Individ-
uals and organizations representing labor
unions, women's groups, the educational
community, and private industry have
worked intensively and jointly to plan for
the national observance of the Year.

Women throughout our country joined
women throughout the world in the plan-

ning for a nongovernmental conference in
sessions running concurrently with the
world conference. Six thousand persons came
to Mexico from all over the world to express
their views on the need to eliminate dis-
crimination against women.

President Ford appointed a National
Commission for the Observance of Interna-
tional Women's Year and has given the
Commission a mandate to plan "An Agenda
for the Future." The Commission has or-
ganized a series of working groups to re-
view the status of women in these relevant
areas: international interdependence, women
in power, enforcement of the laws, child de-
velopment, reproductive freedom, the mass
media, the arts and humanities, the concerns
of homemakers, and women in employment.
The Commission is already submitting rec-
ommendations and will submit its report to
him early in 1976 to indicate the need for
necessary action or appropriate legislation.

In the case of the Women's Bureau, of
which I am the Director, our concern will be
for a forceful enforcement of the antidis-
crimination laws and Executive orders that
now exist in order to eliminate sex discrimi-
nation in employment, to promote employ-
ment opportunities for women especially in
the areas from which they have been ex-
cluded in the past, and to take action to
recognize the contribution of all women
workers to the economy of our country.

Other Federal agencies have established
machinery to monitor and implement non-
discrimination on the basis of sex. Some of
these include a Special Assistant to the
President of the United States for Women
and an Office of Women's Programs in the
White House; the Women's Bureau in our
Department of Labor, established in 1920; a
Women's Action Program in the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare; and a
Federal Women's Program Coordinator to
monitor employment practices in every gov-
ernmental body. We also have citizens ac-
tively involved in this machinery, including
a President's Advisory Council on the Status
of Women, Advisory Councils to the Secre-

January 26, 1976

113

taries of Labor, Defense, and Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare.

On the nongovernmental level, women's
groups and other organizations have been
tremendously motivated by the World Plan
of Action. These organizations are develop-
ing their own agendas for action. In i-ecent
months they have independently produced
and distributed thousands of copies to
women thi'oughout the country. Special ship-
ments have gone to opinionmakers and deci-
sionmakers in American organizational life
and will soon reach a wider distribution
throughout the country.

Ultimately, it is actions such as these,
taken by individuals and groups determined
to improve the condition of women, that
represent the greatest strength of the inter-
national women's movement. It is our hope
that the activities of the U.N. system to
implement the World Plan of Action will
spur these efforts in each country through-
out the world.

Statements of December 5

USUN press release 177 dated December 5

Explanation of Vote on Draft Resolution
A/C.3/L.2195

My delegation will abstain on resolution
A/C.3/L.2195.'' The United States strongly
supports steps to implement the World Plan
of Action through a Decade of sustained na-
tional, regional, and international action.
Some of the wording in what is an otherwise
workmanlike resolution is. however, unac-
ceptable to us.

Counterproductive and divisive issues, de-
tracting from the needed consensus to ad-
vance equality for women, have once again
been introduced.

In operative paragraph 1, we had re-
quested the deletion of the final clause. The
positions taken by my government in Mexico
City remain firm. We object to any sugges-
tion of giving blanket endorsement to all

* The resolution was adopted by the committee on
Dec. 5 by a rollcall vote of 97 to 2, with 22 absten-
tions (U.S.) after separate votes on operative para-
graphs 1 and 2, which the U.S. voted against.

resolutions which resulted from the confer-
ence or to the Declaration of Mexico.

We will vote against operative paragraph j
2 because of an undesirable ambiguity in its
call for action to implement not only the
World Plan of Action but also, and I quote,
"related resolutions." Indeed, this phrase,
"related resolutions," appears in a number
of places in the text.

The United States interprets the phrase
"related resolutions" to refer to those reso-
lutions adopted at the Mexico City Confer-
ence which have a direct and relevant bear-
ing on the World Plan of Action. We do not
consider as related to the plan, or to the
work to be accomplished during the Decade,
the political resolutions that were adopted
at Mexico City, including those with provi-
sions on Palestinian women, elimination of
Zionism, alleged human rights violations by
Israel, the Panama Canal, natural resources
and right of nationalization (without quali-
fication), general and complete disarmament
(without adequate controls), the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States, and
the new international economic order.

Since certain other delegations may not
make the same interpretation, it is our in-
tention to make clear the strength of our
views by voting against the ambiguity of
the last phrase in the second operative para-
graph.

I must record one comment on the World
Plan of Action, which the United States
strongly supports. At the time the plan was
adopted at Mexico City, the United States
wholeheartedly favored the Decade To Com-
bat Racial Discrimination, which is endorsed
in paragraph 186 of the plan. Since that
time, as is well known in this committee, the
U.N. General Assembly has tragically and
falsely equated Zionism wth racism. Ac-
cordingly, the United States no longer sup-
ports that Decade. Of this there should not
be the slightest doubt. Needless to say, we
remain committed to the elimination of
racial discrimination as that term was
understood prior to this General Assembly.

In conclusion, I would like to say that my
delegation recognizes and applauds the ef-
forts of all who have worked long and hard

114

Department of State Bulletin

to produce reasonable and concrete programs
which will have a significant impact on
achieving the goals of the Decade for
Women.

Explanation of Vote on Draft Resolution
A/C.3/L.2196

My delegation voted "no" on resolutions
A/C.3/L.2194 and 2196.^ There is language
in both resolutions which we are unable to
accept.

The United States deplores the growing
tendency to introduce a corrupted language
of political morality which has become to-
tally devoid of meaning. This trend is evi-
dent in both resolutions, but we most em-
phatically object to the repeated calls for
the "elimination of racism." The elimination
of racism, and the original moral imperative
it once implied, have been turned into a
mockery.

We are not deceived by what has hap-
pened in these resolutions. It has happened
before, not only in the United Nations but
in every international forum where totali-
tarian regimes have banded together to
press their vision upon the world. They do
so by preying on the self-critical nature of
liberal society and its continuous quest for
improvement. They do so by insuring that
every time we set out to condemn some fail-
ing in our societies we end by having to
condemn what is good about them as well.
They do so by confusing and corrupting the
language of political morality; and by doing
so, they erode our capacity to defend those
things that bear defending.

= Draft resolution A/C.3/L.2194/Rev.l, entitled
"Women's participation in the strengthening of inter-
national peace and security and in the struggle
against colonialism, racism, racial discrimination,
foreign aggression, occupation and all forms of for-
eign domination," was adopted by the committee on
Dec. 5 by a vote of 73 to 27 (U.S.), with 22 absten-
tions, and by the Assembly on Dec. 15 by a recorded
vote of 90 to 21 (U.S.), with 22 abstentions (A/RES/
3519 (XXX)). Draft resolution A/C.3/L.2196, en-
titled "Equality between men and women and the
elimination of discrimination against women," was
adopted by the committee on Dec. 5 by a vote of 88
to 2 (U.S.), with 26 abstentions, and by the Assem-
bly on Dec. 15 by a vote of 102 to 3 (U.S.), with 26
abstentions (A/RES/3521 (XXX)).

But we are aware of this. We know it
when we see it, we know of its long past,
and we will speak out when it appears. We
are not going to permit our best impulses
to be turned into tools of our detraction.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION «

World Conference of the International Women's Year

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 3010 (XXVII) of 18 De-
cember 1972 in which it proclaimed the year 1975
International Women's Year,

Recalling also Economic and Social Council reso-
lutions 1849 (LVI) and 1851 (LVI) of 16 May 1974
convening an international conference during the
International Women's Year as a focal point of the
international observance of the Year,

Recalling further its resolutions 3276 (XXIX) and
3277 (XXIX) of 10 December 1974 as well as Eco-
nomic and Social Council resolution 1959 (LIX) of
28 July 1975 concerning the World Conference of the
International Women's Year,

Recalling the importance of the participation of
women in the implementation of the decisions of the
General Assembly at its sixth and seventh special
sessions as well as in the implementation of the
Programme of Action on the Establishment of the
New International Economic Order,

Having considered the report of the Conference,

Having considered also the note by the Secretary-
General on the establishment of an international re-
search and training institute for the advancement
of women,'

Convinced that the Conference, through the adop-
tion of the Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of
Women and their Contribution to Development and
Peace, 1975, the World Plan of Action for the Imple-
mentation of the Objectives of the International
Women's Year and other resolutions, has made a
valuable and constructive contribution towards the
achievement of the threefold objectives of the Year,

•A/RES/3520 (XXX) (A/C.3/L.2195) (text from
U.N. doc. A/10474, report of the Third Committee on
agenda items 75, International Women's Year, and
76, Status and role of women in society) ; adopted
by the Assembly on Dec. 15 by a rollcall vote of 107
to 1, with 26 abstentions (U.S.), after separate votes
on operative paragraphs 1 and 2, which the U.S.
voted against. The U.S. supported resolutions en-
titled "Improvement of the economic status of women
for their effective and speedy participation in the
development of their countries" (A/RES/3522
(XXX)); "Women in rural areas" (A/RES/3623
(XXX)); and "Measures for the integration of
women in development" (A/RES/3524 (XXX)).

'U.N. doc. A/10340.

January 26, 1976

115

namely the promotion of equality between men and
women, ensuring the full integration of women in
the total development effort, the promotion of
women's contribution to the development of friendly
relations and co-operation among States and the
promotion of their contribution to the strengthening
of world peace,

Considering the valuable and constructive contri-
butions towards the implementation of the threefold
objectives of the International Women's Year made
by conferences and seminars held during the Year,

Convinced also that the promotion of development
objectives and the solution of crucial world economic
and social problems should contribute significantly
to the improvement in the situation of women, in
particular that of women in rural areas and in low-
income groups.

Convinced further that women must play an im-
portant role in the promotion, achievement and
maintenance of international peace.

Considering that the decisions and recommenda-
tions of the Conference should be translated into
concrete action without delay by States, organiza-
tions of the United Nations system and intergovern-
mental and non-governmental organizations.

Recalling that the Conference stressed the impor-
tant role of regional commissions in the implementa-
tion of the World Plan of Action and related resolu-
tions.

Convinced that periodic and comprehensive re-
views and appraisals of progress made in meeting
the goals of the World Plan of Action and related
resolutions endorsed by the Conference are of crucial
importance for their effective implementation and
should be undertaken at regular intervals by Gov-
ernments and by the organizations of the United
Nations system within an agreed time frame.

Noting that the Conference recommended the con-
tinuing operation of the Commission on the Status
of Women or some other representative body, within
the structure of the United Nations, designed specif-
ically to deal with matters relating to the status of
women, so as to ensure the implementation of con-
tinuing projects designed to carry out the pro-
g^rammes set forth in the World Plan of Action,

1. Takes note of the report of the World Confer-
ence of the International Women's Year, including
the Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women
and their Contribution to Development and Peace,
1975, the World Plan of Action for the Implementa-
tion of the Objectives of the International Women's
Year, the regional plans of action, and the resolu-
tions and other recommendations adopted by the
Conference, and endorses the action proposals con-
tained in these documents;

2. Proclaims the period 1976-1985 United Nations
Decade for Women: Equality, Development and

Peace, to be devoted to effective and sustained na-
tional, regional and international action to implement
the World Plan of Action and related resolutions;

3. Calls upon Governments, as a matter of ur-
gency, to examine the recommendations contained in
the World Plan of Action and related resolutions,
including action to be taken at the national level,
such as:

(a) The establishment of short-term, medium- term
and long-term targets, and priorities to this end,
taking into account the guidelines set forth in chap-
ters I and II of the World Plan of Action, including
the minimum objectives recommended for achieve-
ment by 1980;

(b) The adoption of national strategies, plans and
programmes for the implementation of the recom-
mendations within the framework of over-all develop-
ment plans, policies and programmes;

(c) The undertaking of regular reviews and ap-
praisals of progress made at the national and local
levels in achieving the goals and objectives of the
World Plan of Action within the framework of over-
all development plans, policies and programmes;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to
the relevant organs of the United Nations and to the
organizations of the United Nations system the deci-
sions and recommendations of the Conference;

5. Invites all relevant organizations of the United
Nations system concerned:

(a) To submit, within the framework of the Ad-
ministrative Committee on Co-ordination their pro-
posals and suggestions to the Economic and Social
Council at its sixth-second session for implementing
the World Plan of Action and related resolutions
during the United Nations Decade for Women: Equal-
ity, Development and Peace;

(b) To develop and implement, during the first
half of the decade 1976-1985, under the auspices of
the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination, a
joint interagency medium-term programme for the
integration of women in development, which should
co-ordinate and integrate activities undertaken in
accordance with subparagraph (a) above, with spe-
cial emphasis on technical co-operation in pro-
grammes relating to women and development;

(c) To render, in accordance with requests of
Governments, sustained assistance in the formulation,
design, implementation and evaluation of projects
and programmes which would enable women to be
integrated in national and international development;

6. Calls upon the regional commissions to develop
and implement, as a matter of priority, effective
strategies to further the objectives of the World
Plan of Action at the regional and subregional levels.

116

Department of State Bulletin

bearing in mind their respective regional plans of
action;

7. Urges all financial institutions and all inter-
national, regional and subregional development banks
and bilateral funding agencies to accord high priority
in their development assistance, in accordance with
requests of Governments, to projects that would pro-
mote the integration of women in the development
process, in particular women in the rural areas, as
well as the achievement of equality of women and
men, priority being given to countries with limited
financial means;

8. Urges non-governmental organizations, at the
national and international levels, to take all possible
measures to assist in the implementation of the
World Plan of Action and related resolutions within
their particular areas of interest and competence;

9. Decides in principle, in accordance with reso-
lution 26 adopted by the Conference, to establish,
under the auspices of the United Nations, an Inter-
national Institute on Research and Training for the
Advancement of Women, which would be financed
through voluntary contributions and would collabo-
rate with appropriate national, regional and inter-
national economic and social research institutes;

10. Invites the Secretary-General therefore to
appoint, with due consideration to the principle of
equitable geographical distribution, a group of five
to ten experts to draw up, in consultation with the
representatives of existing regional centres and/or
institutes for research and training which have simi-
lar objectives and goals, the terms of reference and
structural organization of the Institute, giving spe-
cial consideration to the needs of women of develop-
ing countries, and requests the Secretary-General to
report to the Economic and Social Council at its
sixtieth session on the basis of the recommendations
of the group of experts;

11. Affirms that a system-wide review and ap-
praisal of the World Plan of Action should be under-
taken biennially, and that such reviews and appraisals
should constitute an input to the process of review
and appraisal of progress made under the Interna-
tional Development Strategy for the Second United
Nations Development Decade, taking into account the
Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order and the decisions re-
sulting from the sixth and seventh special sessions
of the General Assembly;

12. Affirms that the General Assembly and other
relevant bodies should also consider biennially the
progress achieved in the promotion of the full equal-
ity of women with men in all spheres of life in
accordance with international standards and, in par-
ticular, the participation of women in political life
and in international co-operation and the strengthen-
ing of international peace;

13. Expresses the hope that the Ad Hoc Committee

on the Restructuring of the Economic and Social
Sectors of the United Nations System, which will
consider the report of the Group of Experts on the
Structure of the United Nations System (E/AC.62/9),
will take full account of the need to implement the
World Plan of Action and related resolutions of the
World Conference of the International Women's Year
as well as the requirements of the United Nations
Decade for Women : Equality, Development and Peace,
and appeals to the Ad Hoc Committee to ensure that
the machinery designed to deal with questions relat-
ing to women should be strengthened, taking into ac-
count, in particular, the role of the Commission on
the Status of Women and the procedures established
for system-wide review and appraisal of the World
Plan of Action;

14. Decides to include in the provisional agenda
of its thirty-first session an item entitled "United
Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development
and Peace";

15. Invites the Secretary-General to submit a
progress report to the General Assembly at its thirty-
first session on the measures taken to implement the
World Plan of Action and related resolutions, and on
the progress achieved in initiating the procedures
for the Plan's review and appraisal by Member States,
the United Nations organs, the regional commissions,
the specialized agencies and other intergovernmental
organizations concerned;

16. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure, if
possible within existing resources, that the Secre-
tariat unit responsible for women's questions pos-
sesses adequate personnel and budgetary resources
in order to discharge its functions under the World
Plan of Action in co-operation with all organizations
of the United Nations system;

17. Requests further the Secretary-General, in the
light of paragraph 16 above, to take into account the
requirements of the World Plan of Action and re-
lated resolutions of the Conference in preparing
revised estimates for 1977 and the medium-term plan
for 1978-1981 and to report thereon to the General
Assembly at its thirty-first session, in accordance
with established procedures;

18. Urges all States, the organizations of the
United Nations system and intergovernmental and
non-governmental organizations concerned, as well as
the mass communications media, to give widespread
publicity to the achievements and significance of the
Conference at the national, regional and international
levels;

19. Requests the Secretary-General, as a matter
of high priority, to issue, within existing resources,
in the official languages of the United Nations, a
simplified version of the World Plan of Action as a
booklet, which would highlight the targets, goals and
main recommendations for action by Governments,
the United Nations system and non-governmental

January 26, 1976

117

organizations, and which would explain the relevance
of the implementation of the World Plan of Action
to the daily lives of men and women throughout the
world ;

20. Decides to convene, at the mid-term of the
United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, De-
velopment and Peace, in 1980, a world conference of
all States to review and evaluate the progress made
in implementing the objectives of the International
Women's Year as recommended by the World Con-
ference of the International Women's Year and,
where necessary, to readjust existing programmes
in the light of new data and research available.

U.S. Gives Views on Question
of Review of U.N. Charter

Following is a statement made in Com-
mittee VI (Legal) of the U.N. General As-
sembly on November 14 by U.S. Representa-
tive Monroe Leigh, ivho is Legal Adviser of
the Department of State.

USUN press release 148 dated November 14

My delegation believes that the items cur-
rently before us on charter review and
strengthening the role of the United Nations
are the most important ones before the
Legal Committee this year. The views we
expressed on this item last year were care-
fully considered.' Since then we have re-
viewed our position more than once. We re-
viewed it in connection with our reply to the
Secretary General's request for comments
on charter review - and in connection with
our preparations for the meeting of the Ad
Hoc Committee on the Charter of the United
Nations. We have reflected further on these
issues in light of the session of the ad hoc
committee which was held last summer.

Our further reflections have reinforced
our original views. We continue to view the
question of charter review with both skepti-
cism and concern.

Our skepticism as to the utility of review

' For a U.S. statement made in Committee VI on
Dec. 5, 1974, see Bulletin of Jan. 27, 1975, p. 120.
= U.N. doc. A/10113.

of the charter is not based on any belief
that the United Nations is functioning per-
fectly or in the manner hoped for in 1945.
Far from it. The United Nations, for all its
successes in the field of peace and security
and somewhat more sustained successes in
certain economic and social fields, can and
must do a far better job to meet the urgent
and immediate needs of the world. To ac-
complish that goal, however, we must avoid
hasty and ill-considered actions which serve
no useful purpose.

Impediments to greater effectiveness of
this organization do not lie in any restric-
tions or limitations imposed by the charter.
Those impediments are found in the political
will of states which interpret and apply the
charter's provisions. Common sense, good
will, and a sense of responsiveness to the
common interests of mankind are not to be
legislated. They will not be evoked by modi-
fication of the charter; on the contrary, the
present text of the U.N. Charter both allows
and encourages those elusive qualities as
much or more than any modifications we
have heard discussed.

Our doubts about this charter review
exercise are based on a concern that the
United Nations will lose even that degree of
consensus which we now share. We do not
seek to maintain the status quo of 1945, or
1975. The charter was conceived as a docu-
ment which could stand the test of time by
growing with evolving needs. It was con-
ceived not merely as a constitutive treaty,
but as a constitutional instrument.

It has evolved, moreover, in central fields
such as the eff'ective functioning of the
Security Council, peacekeeping, and human
rights, including self-determination.

The reopening of questions on matters to
which we have all freely agreed on various
occasions in the past is hardly likely to
widen areas of agreement among us. It is
far more likely to lead to a hardening of
positions and thus become the enemy of that
evolutionary development which has been
one of the strengths of the institution.

For example, although article 27 provides

118

Department of State Bulletin

that decisions of the Security Council on
nonprocedural matters require the concur-
ring votes of the permanent members, in
practice that requirement has significantly
evolved to permit Security Council decisions
notwithstanding permanent-member absten-
tions or declarations of nonparticipation as
alternatives to the veto. If article 27 were
construed, as it reasonably might have been,
to require the affirmative vote of each of the
permanent members, the results of the work
of the Security Council would certainly have
been far different today.

We view this evolution both as a positive
contribution to the work of the Council, and
hence to members of the United Nations in
general, and as an excellent example of how
the language of the charter permits impor-
tant evolutionary changes without requiring
textual changes.

Attempts to meet particular problems of
our moment in history by charter amend-
ment are likely to restrict the charter's abil-
ity to continue flexibly to meet the needs
of the future. If we attempt to develop
specific and detailed proposals for today, we
could undo the genius of the accomplishment
of 1945. That accomplishment was not
simply to provide a charter to deal with the
contingencies of 1946; it was farsighted
enough to provide our basic guidelines for
the future by allowing scope for historical
change. We would remind those who say
that if revisions of the charter made in 1975
prove inappropriate in 1980 we can make
further changes, that constant tinkering
with a constitutional document can serve to
destroy that institutional stability which is
the sine qua non of the healthy growth and
development of a parliamentary institution.

Finally and perhaps most immediately, it
is our concern that preoccupation with con-
stant tinkering with the constitutional
structure of the institution runs the great
risk of diverting attentions and concerns
from the urgent problems with which the
institution can and must deal.

The United States has repeatedly ex-
pressed its willingness to consider measures

for the improvement of the functioning of
the United Nations and of its ability to
perform its charter responsibilities. It is,
however, our firm conviction that an exer-
cise of introspection or examination of pos-
sible improvements can usefully be under-
taken only with the broad agreement of all
concerned, principally because any improve-
ments, by definition, will require that broad
agreement if they are to be at all effective.
The complete lack of success of the ad hoc
committee last summer demonstrates, in our
view, that circumstances were not then ripe
for serious work. There was in that instance
not even agreement on whether some effort
should be undertaken, much less on what
should be done. In those circumstances no
amount of good will or hard work could have
produced a productive session of the ad hoc
committee. I need not detail the unproduc-
tive nature of the exercise, since the com-
mittee's report ^ demonstrates that conclu-
sion. No useful purpose can be served by
repeating that experience.

Therefore we are not convinced this is the
appropriate time to convene a committee,
particularly in light of the extraordinarily
busy schedule in the international legal field,
including among others the many informal
and formal meetings in connection with the
law of the sea and the ongoing work in
connection with the Diplomatic Conference
on Reaffirmation and Development of Inter-
national Humanitarian Law Applicable in
Armed Conflicts. We could see some utility
in a committee which would follow up on
the work of the committee on rationalization
of the procedure of the Assembly and
examine the wealth of governmental com-
ments already submitted in the context of
strengthening the role of the United Na-
tions. In this connection, Mr. Chairman, we
believe that it is not necessary to agree with
all of the proposals put forward by Ro-
mania * in order to acknowledge that we all
owe them a debt of appreciation for having

' U.N. doc. A/10033.
'U.N. doc. A/C.6/437.

January 26, 1976

119

initiated the item and provided us with much
food for thought.

In this context, a major area of concern
to all members of the United Nations, and
an area where we might constructively con-
centrate our energies, is strengthening and
development of measures for the peaceful
settlement of disputes. There is, moreover,
no doubt this can be done wholly within the
existing language of the U.N. Charter and
the Statute of the International Court of
Justice. No area is more critical, and cer-
tainly few areas contain more promise if we
are able to demonstrate a basic positive
political will.

This committee has in the past looked at
the functioning and role of the International
Court of Justice. The Court itself recently
modified its own rules of procedure in po-
tentially significant ways. We should look
very closely at the numerous and varied
opportunities which the Court machinery
provides for peaceful settlement of disputes,
and we should insure that all states in the
international community are fully aware of
those possibilities. In this connection, we call
the attention of the international community
to the fact that the Court in its most recent
advisory opinion appears to have given the
Eastern Carelia precedent ^ a richly deserved
final burial, thus clearly opening up vast
new areas for treatment via the advisory-
opinion route.

We recognize that some states are not yet
prepared fully to accept the Court as a
means of dispute settlement. To those who
have hesitated to have recourse to the Court
for fear it would apply a form of law created
by another era, I would merely urge a care-
ful reading of the recent jurisprudence of
the Court.

We also recognize that there are some
disputes which can best be solved, or at least
initially ameliorated, by other means. We
must consequently also examine fully the
many other existing and potential facilities

^ Status of Eastern Carelia, P.C.I.J., Series B,
No. 5, 23 July 1923.

for dispute settlement, including the reasons
why they are too infrequently used and pos- j
sible steps we might take to encourage the
willingness and ease with which states might i
regularly resort to them as a customary and
attractive means of resolving disputes peace-
fully.

At what might be regarded as the oppo-
site end of the spectrum from judicial settle-
ment is negotiation between the parties. It
seems to us that even this seemingly simple
and direct method might benefit from an
exploration in terms of modern approaches
to problem solving.

Certainly we should take another look at
the various approaches pursuant to which
the participation of a third party is invited
not with a view to deciding the dispute but
with a view to inducing the parties to decide
as among themselves. This approach would
involve good offices and mediation. Good
oflfices normally implies merely bringing the
parties together and urging them to try
harder, while mediation is suggestive of a
more active participation by the third party.
Clearly the Secretary General has made re-
cent important contributions in this field.
Are there other devices that can be used?
Are there special techniques that can be
examined ?

There are also possibilities in the form of
factfinding and inquiry. This can be en-
visaged in terms of bilateral inquiry or in
the classical sense envisioned in the Hague
Conventions of 1899 and 1907 or pursuant
to factfinding as discussed in various Gen-
eral Assembly resolutions.

Conciliation is another step in the process
of third-party involvement. Is the concilia-
tion mechanism set forth in the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties something
we should include in all treaties; is it some-
thing which should be established as an
independent institution of general applica-
tion? Do the existing institutions provide a
useful resource, or are changes required?

Are there untapped possibilities in the
field of arbitration? Certainly an increasing
number of purely commercial disputes are

120

Department of State Bulletin

settled in this way. Is there some reason
, why states in our interdependent and poten-
1^ tiaily self-destructive world should not take
i another in-depth look at the possibilities of
jjthis technique of dispute settlement?

There is clearly much to be done in the
field of dispute settlement and prevention
and much to be done in terms of making the
U.N. system more effective. We must seek
to accomplish as much as is humanly pos-
sible within the existing charter before dis-
tracting ourselves with more ambitious and
less likely schemes involving amendments
to the charter.**

U.S. Gives Views on U.N. Resolution
on Transnational Corporations

Following is a statement made in Com-
mittee II (Economic and Financial) of the
U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representa-
tive Jacob M. Myerson on December i.
together ivith the text of a resolution adopted
by the committee on December h and by the
Assembly on December 15.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR MYERSON

USUN press release 172 dated December 4

In the course of his statement before the
seventh special session, Secretary Kissinger
set forth in some detail the views of my gov-
ernment regarding transnational corpora-
tions. I would only quote now one short part
of that statement:

For our part, the United States is prepared to
meet the proper concerns of governments in whose

" In a resolution adopted by consensus by the com-
mittee on Dec. 2 and by the Assembly on Dec. 15
(A/RES/3499 XXX)), it was decided that the Ad
Hoc Committee on the Charter of the United Nations
"should be reconvened as a Special Committee on the
Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthen-
ing of the Role of the Organization" and that its
membership should be enlarged by five states.

territories transnational enterprises operate. We
affirm that enterprises must act in full accordance
with the sovereignty of host governments and take
full account of their public policy. Countries are en-
titled to regulate the operations of transnational
enterprises within their borders. But countries wish-
ing the benefits of these enterprises should foster the
conditions that attract and maintain their productive
operation.

One such area of concern — of deep con-
cern to my government as well as to others
— arises from reports of corrupt practices
involving multinational enterprises and for-
eign officials or private parties. We condemn
corrupt practices in the strongest terms.
They are contrary to and tend to erode the
best values of our respective societies. They
may also have adverse effects on relations
among states.

Accordingly, the U.S. Government is pre-
pared to cooperate closely with other gov-
ernments to deal with this problem effec-
tively and fairly. However, we wish to
emphasize our view that no international
action can substitute for the basic responsi-
bility of each country to establish clear
standards of behavior and to enforce them
evenly and fairly against foreign nationals
and its own citizens alike. Those govern-
ments which are prepared to take such effec-
tive and evenhanded measures will find that
they have the sympathy and cooperation of
the U.S. Government.

I would like on this occasion to make clear
that in the view of my government, private
enterprise — and this includes transnational
enterprises — has a vital role to play in the
expansion of the world economy and in the
development of all countries. We believe that
most corporations are performing these
functions very well. Thus, while some com-
panies have been involved in practices which
must be condemned, we must be careful not
to respond in such a way as to destroy the
vast benefits private companies bring to the
international economy.

It was with these considerations in mind
that my delegation submitted for considera-
tion by this committee the draft resolution
dealing with transnational corporations con-

January 26, 1976

121

tained in L.1435.' We had no reason to doubt
that it was a similar concern which prompted
the cosponsors of the resolution contained in
L.1437 to act. This assumption proved to be
true as in the ensuing negotiations we were
able to reach agreement on a single text.

Under these circumstances, Mr. Chairman,
the draft resolution sponsored by my gov-
ernment— contained in L.1435 — may be
withdrawn from consideration. Our purposes
have been achieved by the achievement of
consensus on the resolution contained in
L.1437/Rev.l.

I would like to make some comments on
the latter document, not by way of reserva-
tion, but to make explicit our understanding
of the text:

— I think that we all agree on the con-
demnation of corrupt practices, including
bribery. The blame for such acts must be
shared equally by all who participate. Thus,
we interpret the reference to bribery wher-
ever it appears in the text to cover all as-
pects— the offering, the payment, the solici-
tation, the acceptance of illegal payments.

— As I indicated earlier, we believe that
states have not only the right but also the
responsibility to enact legislation against
corrupt practices and to enforce such meas-
ures through legal action. It is important
that such legislation clearly define the of-
fenses and establish specific measured pen-
alties appropriate to particular offenses and
that offenders should be prosecuted through
the courts on the basis of evidence and due
process of law. The United States will co-

' Draft resolution A/C.2/L.1435, submitted by the
United States and later withdrawn, contained the
following operative paragraphs:

1. Condemns the offering or solicitation of bribes
and other corrupt practices by enterprises, or their
encouragement by government officials or individuals;

2. Requests the Economic and Social Council to
instruct the Commission on Transnational Corpora-
tions to include this issue in its programme of work
to be submitted to the Council at its sixtieth session;

3. Calls upon relevant governmental and non-
governmental organizations to co-operate with efforts
to resolve this problem.

operate with legitimate law enforcement
activities of host governments, but we wil)
oppose arbitrary acts of economic reprisal
on the basis of uncorroborated charges.

— The question of the appropriate role of
home governments in cooperating with host
governments to eradicate corrupt practices
is a complex one. For example, we have
strong reservations about the feasibility or
propriety of home countries enacting extra-
territorial legislation to deal with this prob-
lem. As is suggested in the resolution, we do
believe that this is an area for cooperative
action between governments and pledge our
support to such efforts. We also believe that
these issues need to be carefully examined
in the U.N. Commission on Transnational
Corporations. In this forum, as elsewhere,
the United States will work for a construc-
tive and effective solution to these problems.

— Finally, Mr. Chairman, my delegation
fully supports the concept of information
exchange in particular cases within the con-
text of established legal procedures. We do
have doubts, however, about the efficacy and
appropriateness of a blanket multilateral
approach to information exchange.

If I could quote once more from Secretary
Kissinger's statement at the special session:

The United States believes that just solutions are
achievable — and necessary .... The capacity of the
international community to deal with this issue con-
structively will be an important test of whether the
search for solutions or the clash of ideologies will
dominate our economic future.

Mr. Chairman, my delegation joined in the
consensus approval of this resolution be-
cause we believe that it does represent an
example of dealing constructively with the
issue.

I cannot close, Mr. Chairman, without ex-
pressing my delegation's appreciation to the
cosponsors of the resolution which has now
been approved and in particular to their
principal negotiator, Mr. Parsi [Farrokh
Parsi, of Iran], for their cooperation in
facilitating development of a consensus text
on this important subject.

122

Department of State Bulletin

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ^

Measures against corrupt practices of transnational
and other corporations, their intermediaries and
others involved

The General Assembly,

Concerned by the corrupt practices of certain
transnational and other corporations, their intermedi-
aries and others involved,

Recalling paragraph 4 (g) of the Declaration on
the Establishment of a New International Economic
Order which provides for the regulation and super-
vision of the activities of transnational corporations,

Recalling also the provisions of section V of the
Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order emphasizing, inter
alia, the need to formulate, adopt and implement the
code of conduct referred to in the report of the Com-
mission on Transnational Corporations on its first
session,

Recalling further the provisions of the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States according to
which such corporations should not operate in a
manner that violates the laws and regulations of the
host countries,

Recalling Economic and Social Council resolutions
1721 (LIII) of 28 July 1972, 1908 (LVII) of 2 August
1974 and 1913 (LVII) of 5 December 1974,

Recalling the report of the United Nations Com-
mission on Transnational Corporations on its first
session,

1. Condemns all corrupt practices, including
bribery, by transnational and other corporations,
their intermediaries and others involved in violation
of the laws and regulations of the host countries;

2. Reaffirms the right of any State to adopt legis-
lation and to investigate and take appropriate legal
action, in accordance with its national laws and
regulations, against transnational and other corpora-
tions, their intermediaries and others involved for
such corrupt practices;

3. Calls upon both home and host Governments to
take, within their respective national jurisdictions,
all necessary measures which they deem appropriate,
including legislative measures, to prevent such cor-
rupt practices and to take consequent measures
against the violators;

4. Calls upon Governments to collect information
on such corrupt practices, as well as on measures
taken against such practices, and to exchange in-

= A/RES/3514 (XXX) (A/C.2/L.1437/Rev.l) (text
from U.N. doc. A/10467, report of the Second Com-
mittee on agenda item 12, Report of the Economic
and Social Council); adopted by the committee on
Dec. 4 and by the Assembly on Dec. 15 without a
vote.

formation bilaterally and, as appropriate, multi-
laterally, particularly through the United Nations
Centre on Transnational Corporations;

5. Calls upon home Governments to co-operate
with Governments of the host countries to prevent
such corrupt practices, including bribery, and to
prosecute, within their national jurisdictions, those
who engage in such acts;

6. Requests the Economic and Social Council to
direct the Commission on Transnational Corporations
to include in its programme of work the question of
corrupt practices of transnational corporations and
to make recommendations on ways and means where-
by such corrupt practices can be effectively prevented;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a
report to the General Assembly at its thirty-first
session, through the Economic and Social Council, on
the implementation of the present resolution.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
as amended. Done at New York October 26, 1956.
Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873, 5284,
7668.
Acceptance deposited: Tanzania, January 6, 1976.

Containers

International convention for safe containers (CSC),
with annexes. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972.'
Ratification deposited: Romania (with statement),
November 26, 1975.

Energy

Agreement on an international energy program. Done
at Paris November 18, 1974.'
Notifications of consent to be bound deposited:

Canada, December 17, 1975; Sweden, December

18, 1975.

Health

Constitution of the World Health Organization, as
amended. Done at New York July 22, 1946. Entered

'Not in force.

January 26, 1976

123

into force April 7, 1948; for the United States
June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086.
Acceptance deposited: Comoros, December 9, 1975.

Narcotic Drugs

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic
drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972.
Entered into force August 8, 1975. TIAS 8118.
Ratification deposited: Chile, December 19, 1975.

Oil Pollution

International convention on civil liability for oil pollu-
tion damage. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969.
Entered into force June 19, 1975."
Ratification deposited: Spain, December 8, 1975.

Space

Convention on registration of objects launched into
outer space. Opened for signature at New York
January 14, 1975.'
Signature: Mexico, December 19, 1975.

Telecommunications

International telecommunications convention, with
annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremoli-
nos October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1,
1975.'

Ratifications deposited: Liberia, Yugoslavia, Sep-
tember 22, 1975; Thailand, October 8, 1975.'

Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva,
1959, as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590,
7435), to establish a new frequency allotment plan
for high-frequency radiotelephone coast stations,
with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva
June 8, 1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976."
Notifications of approval: Fiji, September 25,
1975; German Democratic Republic, September
22, 1975.

Trade

Arrangement regarding international trade in tex-
tiles, with annexes. Done at Geneva December 20,
1973. Entered into force January 1, 1974, except
for article 2, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 which entered
into force April 1, 1974. TIAS 7840.
Acceptance deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, De-
cember 10, 1975.

United Nations Charter

Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the
International Court of Justice. Signed at San Fran-
cisco June 26, 1945. Entered into force October 24,
1945. 59 Stat. 1031.

Admission to membership : Comoros, November 12,
1975.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat
trade convention (part of the international wheat
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at
Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force
June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions
and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions.

Instrument of ratification signed by the President:

December 22, 1975.
Accessions deposited: El Salvador, January 7,

1976; Luxembourg, January 5, 1976.
Ratification deposited: United States, January 5,

1976.
Protocol modifying and further extending the food
aid convention (part of the international wheat
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at
Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force
June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions,
and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions.
Instrument of ratification signed by the President :

December 22, 1975.
Accession deposited: Luxembourg, January 5,

1976.
Ratification deposited: United States, January 5,

1976.

BILATERAL

China, Republic of

Agreement modifying the agreement of May 21, 1975
(TIAS 8033), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and
man-made fiber textiles and apparel products.
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington De-
cember 31, 1975. Entered into force December 31,
1975.

Italy

Agreement for exchanges in the fields of education
and culture. Signed at Rome December 15, 1975.
Enters into force at such time as Italy has notified
the United States that the formalities required by
Italian law have been fulfilled.

Norway

Agreement amending annex C of the mutual defense
assistance agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS
2016). Effected by exchange of notes at Oslo
November 21 and December 1, 1975. Entered into
force December 1, 1975.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Agreement amending the civil air transport agree-
ment of November 4, 1966, as amended (TIAS
6135, 7658, 8058). Effected by exchange of notes
at Moscow December 4 and 22, 1975. Entered into
force December 22, 1975.

United Kingdom

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and
the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to
taxes on income and capital gains. Signed at Lon-
don December 31, 1975. Enters into force after the
expiration of 30 days following the date on which
instruments of ratification are exchanged.

' Not in force.

' Not in force for the United States.

' With reservations made at time of signing.

124

Department of State Bulletin

I^DEX January 26, 1976 Vol. LXXIV, No. 1909

igriculture. President Ford Addresses Ameri-
can Farm Bureau Federation (excerpt) . . 97

>ngola

resident Ford Addresses American Farm

Bureau Federation (excerpt) 97

•resident Ford Interviewed for NBC Television 100
resident Ford's Year-End Meeting With Re-
porters (excerpts from transcript of question-
and-answer session) 103

'hina. Department Outlines Development of
U.S. Relationships With the People's Repub-
lic of China (Habib) 106

'ongress

longressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 109

)epartment Outlines Development of U.S.
Relationships With the People's Republic of
China (Habib) 106

;uba. President Ford's Year-End Meeting
With Reporters (excerpts from transcript of
question-and-answer session) 103

ilconomic Affairs. U.S. Gives Views on U.N.
Resolution on Transnational Corporations
(Myerson, text of resolution) 121

Greece. United States Official Killed in Athens
(Ford, Department statement) 105

Suman Rights. United States Discusses Ful-
fillment of Goals of International Women's
Year in the U.N. (Maymi, text of resolution) 110

'residential Documents

'resident Ford Addresses American Farm
Bureau Federation (excerpt) 97

'resident Ford Interviewed for NBC Television 100

'resident Ford's Year-End Meeting With Re-
porters (excerpts) 103

Jnited States Official Killed in Athens ... 105

'reaty Information. Current Actions .... 123

J.S.S.R.

'resident Ford Addresses American Farm
Bureau Federation (excerpt) 97

'resident Ford Interviewed for NBC Television 100

'resident Ford's Year-End Meeting With Re-
porters (excerpts from transcript of question-
and-answer session) 103

Jnited Nations

'resident Ford Interviewed for NBC Television 100
Jnited States Discusses Fulfillment of Goals

of International Women's Year in the U.N.

(Maymi, text of resolution) 110

U.S. Gives Views on Question of Review of
U.N. Charter (Leigh) 118

U.S. Gives Views on U.N. Resolution on Trans-
national Corporations (Myerson, text of
resolution) 121

Name Index

Ford, President 97, 100, 103, 105

Habib, Philip C 106

Leigh, Monroe 118

Maymi, Carmen R 110

Myerson, Jacob M 121

Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: January 5-1 1

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Mo. Date

Sabjcet

*1 1/5 U.S.-Republic of China textile agree-
ment.

*2 1/5 Robert L. Funseth named Special
Assistant for Press Relations and
spokesman of the Department (bio-
graphic data).

*3 1/6 William J. Porter sworn in as Am-
bassador to Saudi Arabia (bio-
graphic data).

*4 1/7 U.S. Advisory Commission on Inteiv
national Educational and Cultural
Affairs, Los Angeles, Calif., Feb. 2.

*5 1/7 Study Group 7 of the U.S. National
Committee for the International
Radio Consultative Committee, Feb.
3-4.

*6 1/7 Ocean Affairs Advisory Committee,
Feb. 10.

t7 1/8 Kissinger: death of Premier Chou En-
lai.

*8 1/9 Mary Olmsted sworn in as Ambassa-
dor to Papua New Guinea (bio-
graphic data).

*Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

Superintendent of Documents
U.S. government printing office

WASHINGTON, DC. 20402

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YJ:

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXIV • No. I9IO • February 2, 1976

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE
OF JANUARY 14 125

THE LESSONS OF THE SEVENTH SPECIAL SESSION
AND THE 30th U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Statement by Avibassador Moynihan
in the Closing Plenary Session of the 30th General Assembly 139

BostD

RuieriiU.

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol, LXXIV, No. 1910
February 2, 1976

For 3ale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office

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PRICE:

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Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may be
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STATE BULLETIN as the source will be
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in
the Readers* Guide to Periodica) Literature.

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of U.S. foreign relations and
on the work of the Department and
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart'
ment, and statements, addresses,
and news conferences of the President
and the Secretary of State and other
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>ecretary Kissinger's News Conference of January 14

ress lelease 13 dated January 14

Secretary Kissinger: I have two state-
nents, a brief one and a somewhat lengthier
me.

I was grieved to learn this morning of the
leath of Prime Minister Razak of Malaysia,
ie was a good friend of the United States,
I most effective leader of his country, and
he voice of peace and moderation in South-
east Asia. We are extending our condolences
o his widow and to the Government of
tialaysia.

The second statement deals with the U.S.
ittitude toward Soviet actions in Angola and
oward the SALT negotiations.

The United States holds the view that the
'ssence of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, if it
s to proceed toward a genuine easing of
ensions, is that neither side will seek to
)btain unilateral advantage vis-a-vis the
)ther, that restraint will govern our respec-
ive policies, and that nothing will be done
hat could escalate tense situations into
confrontation between our two countries.

It is the U.S. view that these principles of
•nutual relations are not simply a matter of
ibstract good will. They are at the very
leart of how two responsible great powers
Tfiust conduct their relations in the nuclear
3ra.

It must be clear that when one great
power attempts to obtain a special position
of influence based on military intervention
and irrespective of original motives, the
other power will sooner or later act to offset
this advantage. But this will inevitably lead
to a chain of action and reaction typical of
other historic eras in which great powers
maneuvered for advantage only to find them-
selves sooner or later embroiled in major
crises and, indeed, in open conflict.

It is precisely this pattern that must be

broken if a lasting easing of tensions is to
be achieved.

Whatever justification in real or alleged
requests for assistance the Soviet Union
may consider to have had in intervening and
in actively supporting the totally unwar-
ranted Cuban introduction of an expedition-
ary force into Angola, the fact remains that
there has never been any historic Soviet or
Russian interest in that part of the world.
It is precisely because the United States is
prepared to accept principles of restraint for
itself that it considers the Soviet move in
Angola as running counter to the crucial
principles of avoidance of unilateral advan-
tage and scrupulous concern for the inter-
ests of others which we have jointly enunci-
ated.

The United States considers such actions
incompatible with a genuine relaxation of
tensions. We believe that this is a wholly
unnecessary setback to the constructive
trends in U.S.-Soviet relations which we can-
not believe is ultimately in the Soviet or the
world interest.

The question arises whether, in the light
of Angola and its implications for Soviet-
American relations, it is consistent with our
policy to go to Moscow and to negotiate on
SALT. There are two points that need to be
made in this context.

First, we have never considered the lim-
itation of strategic arms as a favor we grant
to the Soviet Union, to be turned on and off
according to the ebb and flow of our rela-
tions. It is clear that the continuation of an
unrestrained strategic arms race will lead
to neither a strategic nor a political advan-
tage. If this race continues, it will have pro-
found consequences for the well-being of all
of humanity.

Limitation of strategic arms is therefore

February 2, 1976

125

a permanent and global problem that cannot
be subordinated to the day-to-day changes
in Soviet-American relations.

At the same time, it must be understood
on both sides that if tensions increase over
a period of time, the general relationship
will deteriorate, and therefore the SALT
negotiations will also be affected.

Second, we must consider the long-term
consequences of a failure of the SALT nego-
tiations. If the interim agreement lapses,
the Soviets will be free of several severe re-
straints. They can add heavy ICBM's with-
out restrictions. They can build more
submarines without dismantling old ICBM's.
There will be no equal ceiling of 2,400. The
immediate impact would be that the numeri-
cal gap frozen in SALT One, and equalized in
Vladivostok, would again become a factor,
facing us with the choice of either large
expenditures in a strategically and politically
unproductive area or a perceived inequality
with its political implications.

Of course we will not negotiate any agree-
ment that does not achieve strategic equal-
ity for the United States and that we can-
not defend as being in the national interest.
Nor does it mean that Angola or similar
situations, will, if continued, not impinge on
SALT as well as the general relationship.
But it does mean that the general objective
of a more orderly and stable nuclear rela-
tionship is in the interests of the United
States and in the interests of the world and
cannot be easily abandoned. This is why the
President has decided that I should go to
Moscow to negotiate on SALT, and we ex-
pect that the talks will be conducted in the
same spirit by the Soviet side.

Now I will go to your questions.

U.S.-Soviet Relations and Angola

Q. Mr. Secretary, does the fact that you
are going to Moscow now mean that you
have forwarded a new proposal to the Krem-
lin on SALT?

Secretary Kissinger: We have not yet for-
warded a new proposal to Moscow on SALT,
but we expect to do so before I go there,
within the next day or two.

126

jte

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is standing in th
ivay of a compromise that would point th
ivay to a treaty at this point?

Secretary Kissinger: The obstacle to a
agreement results primarily from issues th?
could not be considered fully at Vladivostc
because the technology was not yet deve
oped at that time. Primarily the issues coi
cern how to deal with the Soviet "Backfire
bomber and how to deal with the America
cruise missiles ; whether and how to cour
them ; whether and what restraints to ac-
cept. These are fundamentally the outstam
ing issues. Most other issues have eithe
been settled in principle or in detail.

Q. Excuse me, if I may follow up. But the
was the case seveml months ago, and yo
didn't go to Moscow. Now you are goin^
Does this mean that at least these two ouv
standing issues are pretty much settled?

Secretary Kissinger: There has been n
discussion with the Soviets except that thi
Soviets have assured us that they are pra
pared to modify their last position, and o^
that basis, we hope to be able to work ou
some solution.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you saying that yO'
are making Soviet restraint in Angola a qui
pro quo for any successful conclusion to th
SALT treaty, or are you not saying that?

Secretary Kissinger: I am saying tw
things: I am saying that Soviet actions i
Angola, if continued, are bound to affect th
general relationship with the United States
that a substantial deterioration of that rela
tionship can also, over time, affect the stra
tegic arms talks.

At this point, however, I would also main
tain that the limitation of strategic arms i
not a concession we make to the Sovie
Union but it is an objective that is in ou:
interest and it is in the world interest and i
is in the interest of world peace. So we wil
pursue the negotiations in the presem
framework.

Q. To follow up, if there is no change ir
the Soviet position on Angola, would yov
then expect that there could be a successfm
SALT Txvo negotiation later on?

Department of State Bulletir

jf(

W

rl

Secretary Kissinger: We would have to
ace this in the light of the circumstances

hat may exist later.

]J

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have been sending
it his message — you and the President have
;j >een sending this message to Moscoiv now
or several weeks. Have you had any indica-
ion whatsoever that the Soviets might be
nterested in a diplomatic solution to Angola,
md secondly, are you ivilling to discuss this
vith the Soviets when you go to Moscow?

Secretary Kissinger: It is a close race be-
;ween the messages we send and the deteri-
)ration of our domestic position; and mes-
sages that are not backed up at home lose a
'air amount of their credibility.

We are prepared to discuss Angola, and
we have had some exchanges with the Soviet
Union on Angola in recent weeks which we
ivill have to clarify.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is the fact that you are
going to Moscow — can that be taken as a
mre thing that you will reach an agreement,
or is there still the possibility of failure?

Secretary Kissinger: There is the possi-

Ioility of failure. We do not know the details
of the Soviet position, and on the other
■riand, we assume that the Soviet Union
would not invite the Secretary of State to
negotiate with Mr. Brezhnev [Leonid I.
Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union] unless a major effort would
be made to come to an agreement.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it your expectation
that if things go as you anticipate that you
IV ill be able to conclude an agreement in
Moscow? Will you set out for us ivhat you
are aiming at? Are you aiming at an agree-
ment in principle?

Secretary Kissinger: No, there cannot be
a final agreement in Moscow. The most that
is achievable in Moscow is an agreement in
principle similar to the Vladivostok agree-
ment but covering the outstanding issues
such as Backfire and cruise missiles and to
relate them to Vladivostok. And then there
will have to be technical discussions at

Geneva to work out the detailed provisions.
And that, under the best of circumstances,
would take another two to three months.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I am curious as to how
you are going to conduct these parallel nego-
tiations with the Soviets. On the one hand,
you are indicating that the success of SALT
may hinge on Soviet activities in Angola. On
the other hand, you are going to Moscoiv in
a few days presumably to conclude an agree-
ment in principle. Hoiv can you do that
ivithout knowing what the Soviet reaction in
Angola is?

Secretary Kissinger: I have made clear in
my statement that the regulation of nuclear
arms in the strategic field between the
United States and the Soviet Union is not a
benefit we confer on the Soviet Union. It is
a generic problem of world order that must
be settled at some point and for which con-
ditions are propitious now because of a long
record of negotiation and because technol-
ogy is at a point where it is possible to ac-
cept certain restraints now which might
then have to wait for another cycle of tech-
nology before they can be made effective.

The point I am making is that if there is
a general deterioration in our relationship,
it could affect SALT. In any event, what-
ever is agreed in Moscow will take several
months to negotiate in greater detail.

Q. If I could just follow up for a second,
please — in other ivords, you are not saying,
then, that if there is not some Soviet pull-
back in Angola before the termination of
your trip to Moscoiv, that that is going to
have an adverse effect on SALT.

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that messages
not backed up at home lose certain credibil-
ity, I think. We are now entering a Presi-
dential election year. Isn't it likely that those
messages will continue not to be backed up,
and ivhat impact ivill that have on foreign
policy in general?

Secretary Kissinger: I have always be-
lieved very strongly that the foreign policy
of the United States must reflect the perma-
nent values and interests of the United

February 2, 1976

127

states. It is not a partisan foreign policy.
And to the best of my ability, I have at-
tempted to conduct this office in a manner
that can make it achieve bipartisan support.

It would therefore be a tragedy if during
this election year we did not find some means
to put some restraint on our domestic de-
bates in the field of foreign policy and to
find some means of common action.

As soon as the Congress returns I will
talk to several of the leaders to see what
cooperation is possible to put at least some
restraint on partisan controversy, because
the penalties we will pay for lack of unity
will have to be paid for many years.

But it is a problem. I agree with you.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what exactly is it that
you are asking the Soviets to do in Angola?
Are you asking them to totally cease arms
shipments to the MPLA [Popular Movement
for the Liberation of Angola'] ? Are you ask-
ing them to get the Cubans out of there? Or
would you be satisfied with something less
than that — that they, for example, moderate
the amount of arms that they are sending
and take some of the Cubans out?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, let us
get some idea of the dimensions of what the
Soviet Union has done.

The Soviet Union has sent close to 200
million dollars' worth of military equipment
to Angola in the last nine months, which
equals the total amount of all military equip-
ment sent to all the rest of sub-Saharan
Africa by all other countries. So that is not
a minor infusion of military force. In addi-
tion to that, between 5,000 and 7,000 Cuban
military forces are in Cuba — are in Angola
— in fact, they seem to be everywhere ex-
cept in Cuba. The fighting in the northern
front in Angola is conducted almost entirely
by Cuban forces and without even a pretense
of any significant MPLA participation.

Now, that is a significant international
event for which there are no clever explana-
tions and from which other countries must
draw certain conclusions.

As far as the United States is concerned,
our position is that there should be a cease-
fire; that all foreign forces should be with-

drawn. We are even prepared to discuss a '(
phasing, by which South African forces are
withdrawn first, if there is a stated brief
interval after which all other forces are
withdrawn ; that there should be negotia-
tions between the main factions; that all
outside powers, including, of course, the
United States, cease their military interven-
tion. And we are prepared to agree to the
end of all military shipments.

If the issue comes down to nominal ship-
ments for a normal government by African
standards, this is something about which we
are prepared to negotiate.

We want to get the great powers out of
Angola. We want to return it as an African
problem. And we are prepared to accept any
solution that emerges out of African efforts.

Our concern about Angola is the demon- |
stration of a Soviet willingness to intervene
with what for tho.se conditions is a very
substantial military infusion of military ,
force — plus an expeditionary force — while !
the United States paralyzes itself by declar- '
ing a fraction of this as a "massive involve-
ment" of the United States, when we have
declared that there is no possibility of any '
American military forces or advisers going i
there. And that is an event of considerable '
international significance — both the Soviet
action and the American reaction.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to follow that up, yow
spoke of the need to break the pattern of
action and reaction that could build toward
crisis. Isn't that what the Seriate was trying
to do, to break that pattern?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, you can always
break the pattern of action and reaction by
yielding. Our idea is to maintain the inter-
national equilibrium — not to give temptation
for aggressive and irresponsible action —
and at the same time to establish principles
of mutual restraint. Certainly it is always
possible to solve these problems in the short
term by declaring that they do not exist.

Q. Mr. Secretary, two questions. I am not
sure I have this exactly right, but didn't you
say at a previous press conference that the
United States would not table another SALT

128

Department of State Bulletin

roposal unless the Riissians tabled another
ne first? And secondly, have all the niem-
■ers of the NSC [National Sectmty Council]
)id the Verification Panel signed off on this
'CIV proposal that we plan to offer in Mos-
ow?

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the
irst question, I said that the United States
annot table a new proposal simply because
he Soviets had rejected the old one. We
lave been given a clear promise that there
vould be a significant modification in the
soviet position. Under these conditions, we
ire prepared to put forward a modification
if our position, because we would prefer to
legotiate from our position rather than
rom some other.

We have made clear — and I can repeat it
lere — that if the Soviets do not modify their
ast position, there can be no agreement.
\nd the position which we will forward to
hem will be substantially different from the
ast Soviet position. So it will require —

Q. Substantially different from their last
msition?

Secretary Kissinger: It will also be some-
vhat different from our position. It is an
lonest attempt to find a solution that takes
nto account the real concerns of all sides.

With respect to our internal discussions,
; will not have a clear picture until I have
•ead all the newspaper articles that will
jmerge over the next few weeks, which are
nvariably more dramatic than the discus-
^ions which in fact take place.

But my impression is that there is una-
nimity on the course that we are pursuing.
We have had very good meetings. We have
had two Verification Panel meetings, two
NSC meetings. There will probably be an-
other NSC meeting before I go, just to
review the bidding. And I would say that
the government is operating, until the Sun-
day editions, with complete unanimity.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
don't provide much drama for you, but arc
they signing on to this proposal?

Secretary Kissinger: The Joint Chiefs of
Staff are signing on to this proposal, yes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you recommend
conclusion of a new SALT agreement with
the Soviets if Soviet and Cuban forces are
still in Angola?

Secretary Kissinger: 1 am going to Mos-
cow in order to see whether the deadlock in
these negotiations can be broken. We should
not play with the strategic arms limitation
negotiations. It is a matter that is of pro-
found concern for the long-term future. It
is in an area in which no significant advan-
tages can be achieved by either side but in
which the momentum of events can lead to
consequences that could be very serious.
And therefore we will not use it lightly for
bargaining purposes in other areas.

On the other hand, obviously if the gen-
eral relationship deteriorates, then it could
over a period of time even affect the Stra-
tegic Arms Limitation Talks. But I think we
should make every effort to avoid that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you and your people
have been talking to the Soviet Union about
tvhat they are doing in Angola. How would
you describe — or what are your impressions
of the Soviet attitude toivard a lessening or
a decrease of their role there that would be
satisfactory to us?

Secretary Kissinger: We are exploring
with the Soviet Union now what steps can
be taken in the wake of the OAU [Organi-
zation of African Unity] meeting, and we
have had some exploratory talks, some of
which would offer the possibility of progress.
But we would have to be sure that we under-
stand the meaning that the Soviets attach
to some of their ideas.

Q. One folloivup. If the Soviet Union rvants
the Cuban expeditionary force out, xvould
that bring about its departure?

Secretary Kissinger: That's their problem.

Q. But you must have an opinion.

Secretary Kissinger: I think major powers
have a responsibility to think about the con-
sequences they will face when they engage
their troops or troops of their friends. It is
a lesson we have had to learn; it may be a
lesson that the Soviet Union should learn.

February 2, 1976

129

Q. Mr. Secretary, two additional points on
Angola. There have been totally contradic-
tory reports from the United States and
from the Soviet Union about the presence of
Soviet vessels off Angola. U.S. officials say
they are there. The Soviet Union says this
is a total fabrication.

Secondly, the outcome of the OAU meet-
ing— what is the U.S. perception of ivhether
that has enhanced or retarded the prospect
of a diplomatic movement from here on?

Secretary Kissinger: There is no question
that there are some Soviet vessels off An-
gola— or at least they were yesterday. I
haven't seen today's report.

There was a cruiser heading south, which
is now in port in Guinea. So we don't know
whether it will continue to head south or
whether it will move to another destination.
That would be the largest Soviet vessel that
has been off southern Africa in many years.
But we are not sure yet whether it will con-
tinue to move south. When the original an-
nouncements were made, it was heading
south. It has since put in at the port in
Guinea.

What was your other question?

Q. The Soviet Union has denied that it has
any .ships there. Where do you go from that
kind of a standoff?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, if there are no
ships there and if we should wake up one
morning and find there are no ships there,
we will agree with them. And that will end
the debate. We are not going to pursue — it's
a good way to make the ships disappear.

Q. The second point was your perception
of the outcome of the OAU meeting. Has
that advanced or retarded the diplomatic
prospects ?

Secretary Kissinger: I think — considering
events in this country in recent weeks and
the difficulty we have had to give a clear
indication of what the United States could
do, considering the massive Cuban and
Soviet lobbying effort that went on at the
OAU meeting — it is remarkable that half of

lit
the members of the OAU substantiallj ij

agreed with our perception of the problem'
which is to say, not to recognize any of th«
factions and to bring about an end of for-
eign intervention.

We think, moreover, that a vast majoritj
of the OAU members favor an end of for-
eign intervention, if one can separate thai
problem from some of the local issues

So we think that there is a considerable
African support for the main lines of oui
policy, which is, after all, to leave African ^
problems to the African nations and to in- !
sulate Africa from great-power confronta
tion.

We do not want anything for the Unitec
States. We are not opposed to the MPLA as
an African movement; we are opposed tc
the massive foreign intervention by which I
a victory of the MPLA is attempted to bt
achieved.

So I believe that this position — which ir
its totality is supported by, after all, half of [
the African states in the face of much dis-
couraging news from here — is in its majoi |
elements supported by more than half ol
the African states. And we hope that s
diplomatic solution can be built on that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the Middle East-
could you take a question on the Middle East
noiv?

Q. Well, more like Angola.

Secretary Kissinger: All right. Let me get(
somebody there. Henry [Henry Trewhitt.
Baltimore Sun].

Q. Mr. Secretary, given the congressional
attitudes on foreign affairs in general, do
you intend to talk to any leaders of Congress
before you go to Moscoiv to negotiate fur-
ther, and is there any danger that a repudia-
tion by Congress of a SALT agreement
might be comiterproductive to the very ob-
jectives you're seeking for the long term?

Secretary Kissinger: I have been briefing
congressional leaders on SALT negotiations
consistently. There has been no significant
new development in the negotiating process,

130

Department of State Bulletin

but I will no doubt be in touch with some of
the senior members of the Senate.

As far as repudiation of an agreement is
concerned, it would of course be a very seri-
ous matter since, in any event, one of the
biggest foreign policy problems we now face
is the question from other countries of who
speaks for the United States. Somebody has
to speak for the United States, and there
can be no foreign policy without authority.

So if an agreement were repudiated, it
would accelerate this very dangerous tend-
ency ; but we do not have an agreement yet.

U.S.-People's Republic of China Relationship

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your assessment, how
will the death of Prime Minister Chou En-lai
affect relations bettveen the United States
land China and between China and the Soviet
Union, and how do you view the return of
the helicopter pilots by the Chinese to the
.Soviet Union?

Secretary Kissinger: The relationship be-
tween the United States and the People's
Republic of China is based on the permanent
interests of both countries, and even though
my admiration for Prime Minister Chou
En-lai is well known, I do not believe that it
was his personality, alone or principally, that
was the basis of that relationship. So I
would think that the main lines of our rela-
tionship to the People's Republic of China
can continue along well-established lines.
And, certainly, as far as the United States
is concerned, as I said in my speech to the
General Assembly, there is no relationship
to which we attach greater importance than
the relationship with the People's Republic
of China.

On the other hand, we should have no
illusions on what that relationship is based.
There is no question that the interest the
People's Republic of China has in a relation-
ship with the United States depends on its
assessment of the relevance of the United
States to problems of concern to the People's
Republic of China. And to the degree that
the United States seems less able to play a

major international role, for whatever rea-
son, to that extent the leaders in Peking,
who are extremely sophisticated, will draw
conclusions from it.

And it is this, and not the issue of per-
sonalities, that will affect the final judg-
ments that will be made.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on that last point then,
how can there be no movement on Taiwan,
as there has been none over the last couple
of years — how is that relationship then rele-
vant for China?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first of all, I
am not saying there has been no movement
over recent years.

Secondly, one would have to say that there
are other issues that are considered more
important by the People's Republic of China,
in the present phase of its relationship with
the United States, than Taiwan.

Q. Can you give us some examples?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the overall per-
formance of the United States with respect
to the world equilibrium.

Middle East Issues

Q. Do you see any chance that in the U.N.
Security Council debate that is now going on
in the Middle East that anything construc-
tive could come out, either for Israel or for
the United States; and would you say that
the polarization that seems to be occurring
as a result of that debate bettveen Israel and
the Palestinians, the PLO [Palestine Libera-
tion Organization^, has hastened the need
for a reconvening of the Geneva Conference?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the United
States supports the reconvening of the
Geneva Conference, or of a preparatory con-
ference to discuss the reconvening of the
Geneva Conference.

I do not want to prejudge the outcome of
a debate which is still going on, but from
what we have seen, the resolutions that are
at this moment being talked about seem not
too promising.

On the other hand, the United States

February 2, 1976

131

strongly supports progress toward peace in
the Middle East and will make efforts, when
this debate is concluded, to begin the nego-
tiating process in whatever forum can be
arranged.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you see the
possibilities noiv of either Syrian or Israeli
intervention in Lebanon?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we have stated
repeatedly that we support the independence
and sovereignty of Lebanon and the right of
the communities within Lebanon to lead
their own lives. We would believe that any
outside military intervention, from whatever
quarter, would involve the gravest threat to
peace and stability in the Middle East; and
we have left the parties concerned in no
doubt that the United States would oppose
any military intervention from whatever
quarter.

Q. Mr. Secretanj, earlier you said that the
United States would favor a South African
withdrawal even in advance of ivithdrawal
by the other foreign forces. Can we infer
from this that there's been some sort of work
on a timetable or some coordination with
South Africa about its presence there?

Secretary Kissinger: No. The United
States favors the withdrawal uncondition-
ally of all foreign forces — South African,
Cuban, Soviet, and whatever other foreign
forces could be there.

The United States in a general negotiation
might even — could even support a phased
withdrawal, as long as the interval were
sufficiently short and it is not just an excuse
to permit the Cubans to take over all of
Angola, which is what the military fighting
is now coming down to in Angola. But this
refers to diplomatic possibilities; it does not
refer to any understanding between us and
South Africa.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Q. Mr. Secretary, this being the first neivs
conference for 1975, I wonder if I coidd walk

you out on the limb a bit. What do you think
will happen in —

Secretary Kissinger: This is '76.

Q. Seventy-six. What do you think will
happen in '76 insofar as a Syrian disengage-
ment? Do you think in fact there ivill be o
SALT agreement in '76? And how do you
think the Angola crisis will eventually endi
[Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger: This is an absolutely
no-win question.

I think we have the possibility of a SALT
agreement that is in the national interest
and that, with a rational debate in which
the alternatives are clearly put, can be sold
to the American public and to the American
Congress.

At any rate, as far as the United States
is concerned, we will be working in that
direction. I cannot speak until I have seen
the Soviet position; I cannot make a flat
prediction.

With respect to Angola, I think the major
powers have a responsibility to show great
restraint, and I think the African countries
have a great opportunity to keep great-
power rivalries out of their continent and
have an opportunity also not to permit out-
side expeditionary forces to become the
dominant event. A greater degree of unity
in this country would help us achieve this
objective. And under present conditions we
have severe difficulties due to our domestic
situation.

With respect to a disengagement agree-
ment between Syria and Israel, we of course
support negotiations between Syria and
Israel on this subject. Syria has declared so
repeatedly that it would not negotiate alone
— and only in an Arab context — that I would
think that a separate agreement between
Syria and Israel, without involving some
other parties, is now less likely than would
have seemed the case a few months ago.

Do you still say "Thank you"?

Q. I do again. Thank you very much.

132

Department of State Bulletin

Death of Premier Chou En-lai
of People's Republic of China

Premier- Chou En-lai of the People's Re-
public of China died at Peking on January 8.
Following are statements by President Ford
and Secretary Kissinger issued on January 8.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT FORD

white House press releast- dated January 8

Premier Chou En-lai will be long remem-
bered as a remarkable leader who has left
his imprint not only on the history of mod-
ern China but also on the world scene.

We Americans will remember him espe-
cially for the role he played in building a
new relationship between the People's Re-
public of China and the United States. We
are confident that this relationship will con-
tinue to develop on the foundation of under-
standing and cooperation which he helped
to establish.

The United States offers its condolences
to the Government and people of the People's
Republic of China.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY KISSINGER

Press release 7 dated January 8

It was with a deep sense of loss that I
learned of the passing away of Premier
Chou En-lai. The People's Repubhc of China
has lost one of its great leaders, and the
world has lost one of the most remarkable
statesmen of modern times.

It was my privilege to have had many
discussions with Premier Chou when our
two countries were first establishing, and
then developing, a new relationship to sup-
plant the suspicion and hostility that had
existed for so many years. I was impressed
by his dedication to the interests of his
country, by his deep understanding of
world affairs, and by his rare combination of
intellectual acuity and personal charm.

The United States is pledged to continue
to develop our relationship with the People's
Republic of China on the basis of the princi-
ples and objectives which Premier Chou
helped establish.

Death of Prime Minister Razak
of Malaysia

Following is a statement by President
Ford issued on January 15.

white House press release dated January 15

I was saddened to learn of the untimely
death of Malaysian Prime Minister Tun
Abdul Razak on January 14. Prime Minister
Razak, distinguished Southeast Asian leader,
was well known and respected for his vision
and dedication to peace. Malaysia's many
friends will feel his loss deeply. The Ameri-
can people join me in extending condolences
and sympathy to his widow and to the Gov-
ernment and people of Malaysia.

I have designated our Ambassador to
Malaysia, Francis T. Underhill, Jr., as my
special representative at Prime Minister
Razak's funeral in Kuala Lumpur January 16.

February 2, 1976

133

Foreign Minister Allon of Israel Visits Washington

Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the State of
Israel, visited Washington January 7-8.
Folloiuing is an exchange of toasts between
Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister
Allon at a dinner at the Department of State
on January 7.

TOAST BY SECRETARY KISSINGER

Yigal, who is an old friend of mine and a
good friend of all of us here, is in the United
States for one of his periodic visits in order
to prepare with us the discussions at the
Security Council, which will take place next
week.

And there has been, in the press and else-
where, a great deal of discussion about what
we may be facing at the Security Council in
our meetings this week. But I think that
anybody who knows our relationship, as
countries and as individuals, can be sure
that this meeting that takes place at the
Security Council next week deals with one
of the objectives that's dear to the hearts
of Israel and dear to the hearts of the
United States- — which is how to promote
peace in the Middle East.

The United States has been committed to
producing progress toward peace on the
basis of two Security Council resolutions:
Security Council Resolution 242, Security
Council Resolution 338.

This is the only basis on which the United
States will move toward peace. It has pro-
vided a reliable framework that can account
for the interests and concerns of all of the
parties. And therefore what Yigal and we
have to discuss this week concerns only the
essentially technical question of how the
Security Council discussions can lead to the
reopening of the Geneva Conference, or per-

haps a preparatory conference to the Genevai
Conference, which we'll then negotiate on
the basis of those two resolutions.

But this, as I pointed out, is an essentially
technical diplomatic question. The more
fundamental question is how to move an
area that for 30 years has been torn by war
toward some consciousness of peace. And
there can be no people in the world that
more yearns for peace than the people of
Israel.

Some of you have heard me talk about my
visits to Yigal's kibbutz in 1961. Yigal and I
met at Harvard in 1957, right after the war
of '56. We've been close friends since. And
I visited him at his kibbutz in 1961. And I
saw the fishermen out on the lake right
under the Golan Heights, and I will never
forget what the courage meant to me of
these people who went out night after night.
And I remember being taken around this
kibbutz, where every square inch reminded
somebody of somebody who had died for it
or suffered for it.

And therefore we of course understand
what this process of peace must mean to a
people whose country was a dream before
they could ever have the courage to go there
and whose margin of security is so narrow
that they cannot afford many of the ex-
periments that are given to more favored
nations.

And since we're close friends, we some-
times disagree. We can afford to disagree,
because we know that as far as the United
States is concerned, there can be no settle-
ment that does not assure a secure Israel
that can survive in recognized borders — and
recognized by all, by people in the area and
by anybody who aspires to become a party
to any negotiation.

We have always known that only a strong
Israel can afford to run the risks inherent

134

Department of State Bulletin

in the peace process. And I think, however,
that every American has to know that only
a strong America can contribute to the peace
process and that to the degree that other
countries begin to question America's ability
to shape events, to the degree that America
ceases to be a relevant factor in world af-
fairs, somebody, somewhere along the line,
will have to pay in blood and sacrifice-
Americans and friends of America.

So the deep problem we face if we want
to move the world toward peace is not only
whether America will be reliable — which is
guaranteed by our affection, by our knowl-
edge, and by the fact that nobody could face
himself if he had impaired the survivability
or security of Israel — but also the question
is whether with all the good intentions in
the world America can stay relevant and
strong enough.

That is not a problem for Israelis ; that is
a problem for Americans, and they should
remember that our capital is not inexhausti-
ble.

But I want you to know, Yigal, that on
the course of moving toward peace, we will
move together. We will reconcile our views.
We can afford to discuss them in complete
frankness.

And, after all, when we think back to
where we were at some times in 1970 and
during dark days in 1973 and how we've
come through the war and how far we've
really come already on the road toward
peace, we know we can go the rest of the
way together — arduously, painfully, confi-
dently, and successfully.

So it is always a joy to welcome you here.
And I'd like all of you to join me in a toast
to our friend, the Foreign Minister of Israel,
and to the friendship of Israel and the
United States.

TOAST BY FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON

It was very kind of Henry to remind me
of our good days at Harvard, when both of
us were a little younger and probably none
of us thought the day might come when we
may negotiate relations and plans between

our two countries. But I remember at the
end of that exciting seminar Henry gave me
a lift from Boston to New York, and he
drove the car and I took the risk [laughter]
and joined him, and on our way we discussed
the last war — which unfortunately was not
the last — the war of 1956 in Sinai, and I
made a complaint. I said, "You see, Henry,
twice we won the war — in 1948-49 and in
1956. And twice we lost the peace."

And my complaint was directed not
against Henry but against the Secretaries
of State of those respective years who made
us withdraw from Sinai without getting
peace first. And Henry said, "You know,
Yigal, if Heaven forbid, and there is another
war and you take Sinai again, don't with-
draw unless you get peace." [Laughter.]
Henry, this was one of the lessons I learned
from you [laughter], and you are going to
pay for it now. [Laughter.]

Really, that seminar was for me a revela-
tion. It was one of my very first visits to
this great country. It gave me an oppor-
tunity to get to know a little bit of America,
some idea about international relations, and
to get acquainted with many friends who
remained friends from all over the world —
including some of the Arab countries. May-
be, when a day comes and we shall be able
to exchange Ambassadors with our neigh-
bors, one or two of them may show up — I
hope not in Tel Aviv but in Jerusalem — as
Ambassadors.

Meanwhile, until this dream is being
materialized, the great problem is, first, how
to avert another war and, secondly, how to
progress toward peace.

I read in the papers a couple of weeks ago
that one of your experts gave a testimony
to a joint committee of the Congress in
which he tried to persuade his listeners — I
hope not successfully — that as far as the
balance of strength between Israel and her
neighbors is concerned, the Israelis have
already enough means of warfare, or means
of defense.

When I took the details of that testimony,
I found out that it wasn't quite a correct
analysis. When it came to the Israeli side,
he brought into account also the weapons

February 2, 1976

135

we ordered and which will supply us through
the pipeline for the next few years, while
he ignored the pipelines of the other coun-
tries. Secondly, he excluded a few of our
neighboring countries by explaining they
were not important.

But, basically, I think, his conclusions
were wrong in one particular aspect which
I would like to stress here and now: When
the Israelis speak about a "balance of
strength," we never even pretend to have a
numerical balance. We take it as an axiom
that if numerically the balance is one against
two and a half — or one against three — in
favor of the other side, this can be con-
sidered as a balance of strength.

But not only this. What is needed in our
particular situation is not only to secure
Israel's victory in case it is being attacked
but, if possible, to deter the other side from
attacking altogether.

And therefore it would be wrong to judge
or to measure the balance of strength only
in terms of whether the Israelis can win or
— God forbid — may lose. The major problem
— and this is the statesmanship— is how to
avert war, how to deter the other side from
taking the initiative.

Henry has done a great job in both ways,
first, to help us to help ourselves— ever since
he entered the White House and later on in
his dual capacity — and, secondly, how to
clear the way toward a political settlement
in the area.

And this is exactly the combination which
is needed for the Middle East.

As far as we are concerned, we have to
combine both: the possibility of a war and
the perpetual effort to achieve peace or, in
other woi-ds, to prepare for war as if it is
inevitable but at the same time to work for
peace as if it is attainable.

And thanks to the fact that we have a
rationalistic society, we can combine those
contradictions — which really do not contra-
dict each other ; they complement each other.

Only a strong Israel which can defend
itself — by itself, for itself — may convince
the other side that any other war will be

futile and there is no alternative to peace.

As a farmer I know that there is a simi-
larity between diplomacy and farming. First,
you need a lot of patience to plow the soil,
to seed it, to cultivate it — in our country,
to irrigate it — and sometime in the future,
if there are no troubles, you may harvest it.

And when Henry undertook upon himself,
on behalf of this great country, to bring
about a political settlement in our area, he
mobilized his patience, his skill, his vision.
And, indeed, we mustn't underestimate the
importance of the three agreements which
have been signed during the last one and a
half years: two disengagement agreements,
one with Egypt and one with Syria, and one
special agreement, which is being called
wrongly an "interim agreement" — but it
really isn't of an interim nature — between
Israel and Egypt. And all of us hope that
this is not the last achievement. This is a
hopeful beginning.

If these agreements were possible, why
should we count out further agreements in
the future ? If we are strong enough, if there
is the good will — and wherever there is the
will, there is a way. And I truly and sin-
cerely believe that peace is badly needed by
all countries in our region. We need it badly;
I'm sure our neighbors need it badly.

What is necessary is a trustworthy friend
of ours and of our neighbors, at one an(i the
same time, who can help to pave the way
toward an agreement. But this can be done
not only by a skillful person. This skillful
person should represent a strong, united
power. History determined that the United
States of America, thank God, is a major
power in the world.

And the future of democracy of many
societies, many countries, and the future of
freedom and happiness of many people in
the world depend on the credibility and
prosperity of the United States of America.

America cannot afford isolationism. Amer-
ica must not isolate herself from her many
friends who look upon her in many corners
of the world, in many continents — practi-
cally all continents. They need America, and

136

Department of State Bulletin

Amei'ica needs them. And I see no reason on
.earth why the United States should isolate
itself.

This is not an accidental comment. Many
of us in the world, in all continents, are
watching events in this country and cannot
but hope that you will overcome the diffi-
culties which will enable America — as Henry
said — to shape events in the world. This is
a tremendous historical responsibility, and
I'm pretty sure that America will live up to
its historic duty.

I don't want to elaborate now on the
forthcoming debate of the Security Council.
I listened with great interest to what Henry
had to say about it, and I couldn't agree
more. We have to do our best that the forth-
coming meeting of the Security Council will
reopen the way for further progress in our
area. And I am pretty sure that once the
political momentum is being regained, fur-
ther achievements will be gained by all
parties concerned for the benefit of all of us.

And I do wish this country and the rest
of the world that Henry will be able to come
back this great effort — one of the greatest
efforts toward peace in our area, as well as
in other areas of the world. Even for this
alone we deserve to have another toast.

For your health, Henry, for peace in the
Middle East and in the world at large.
L'chaim.

U.S. Regrets U.K. Measures
Restricting Imports

U.S. statement '

The United States regrets that the British
Government has taken restrictive import ac-
tions. Such actions are a matter of concern
anytime they are taken. They are a matter
of particular concern when economic diffi-
culties around the world are subjecting most
governments to pressures to solve their do-

' Issued on Dec. 18 (press release 621).

mestic employment problems by restricting
imports.

We note that the United Kingdom is ex-
periencing a particularly difficult economic
situation and the announced measures are
limited, and we assume that they will be
temporary. We expect a detailed explanation
of these measures in the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and in the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD).

We are evaluating the impact of these
measures on our own trade. In our consulta-
tions in the GATT and the OECD, we will
review the potential impact of the announced
measures on the overall trading system. In
the course of these discussions, we will
examine with the British authorities how
distortions to international trade can be kept
to a minimum. We will seek continuing inter-
national surveillance of these measures to
assure that they are removed at the earliest
possible time.

We note that footwear and textiles cov-
ered by the proposed restrictions are par-
ticularly sensitive, not only for the United
Kingdom but for the United States and
many other countries as well. In this connec-
tion, the Multi-Fiber Arrangement exists to
provide both order and expanding markets
in textiles. It would be particularly unfortu-
nate if these measures were to weaken the
Multi-Fiber Arrangement. We hope that all
countries, particularly the European Commu-
nity, will meet their responsibilities under
the arrangement.

With respect to color TV tubes and sets
and portable monochrome sets, we note that
no restrictions were actually imposed. The
proposed system of surveillance should not
be used as a device to restrict imports.

Protectionism is a serious danger in a
world economy weakened by recession. No
trade restrictions can therefore be taken
lightly. Any restrictions that are imposed
must be strictly justifiable in terms of the
problem faced and must be consonant with
domestic laws and international rules. There

February 2, 1976

137

can be no complacency even by those not
directly affected.

The shared objective of all countries at
this critical juncture should be to avoid the
spread of restrictive import actions and re-
actions. Countries should therefore reinforce
their efforts to adhere to the OECD trade
pledge. In the longer term, safeguard proce-
dures to deal more effectively with situations
such as this should be developed in the
multilateral trade negotiations in Geneva.

U.S. Policy on Foreign Investment
and Nationalization Reiterated

Department Statement '

There have been significant developments
during the past year concerning foreign in-
vestments by U.S. private firms. The Secre-
tary, at the seventh special session of the
U.N. General Assembly on September 1 and
at the Conference on International Economic
Cooperation on December 16, emphasized
the U.S. belief that foreign private invest-
ment can make a very substantial contribu-
tion to economic development. There have
also been a number of actual or contemplated
nationalizations involving U.S. firms, and
ensuing settlement negotiations. In these
circumstances, the Department wishes to re-
iterate pertinent U.S. policy.

The President of the United States, in
January 1972, drew attention to the impor-
tance which the United States attaches to
respect for the property rights of its na-
tionals. He stated that the policy of the
United States concerning expropriatory acts
includes the position that:

Under international law, the United States has a
right to expect:

— That any taking of American private property

will be nondiscriminatory;

— That it will be for a public purpose; and

— That its citizens will receive prompt, adequate,

and effective compensation from the expropriating

country.

on'

^ Issued on Dec. 30 (text from press release 630).
138

With regard to current or future exprO'
priations of property or contractual interests
of U.S. nationals, or arrangements for "par
ticipation" in those interests by foreign gov
ernments, the Department of State wishes to
place on record its view that foreign in-
vestors are entitled to the fair market value'
of their interests. Acceptance by U.S. na-
tionals of less than fair market value does
not constitute acceptance of any other
standard by the U.S. Government. As a con-
sequence, the U.S. Government reserves its
rights to maintain international claims for
what it regards as adequate compensation
under international law for the interests
nationalized or transferred. ^

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

94th Congress, 1st Session

Reappraisal of Project Independence Blueprint.
Hearing before the Joint Economic Committee.
March 18, 1975. 120 pp.

U.S. Defense Contractors' Training of Foreign Mili-
tary Forces. Hearings before the Subcommittee on
International Political and Military Affairs of the
House Committee on International Relations.
March 20, 1975. 55 pp.

The Activities of American Multinational Corpora-
tions Abroad. Hearings before the Subcommittee
on International Economic Policy of the House
Committee on International Relations. June 5-
September 30, 1975. 330 pp.

Atlantic Convention Resolution. Hearing before the
Subcommittee on International Organizations of
the House Committee on International Relations
on H.J. Res. 606, Joint Resolution to call an Atlan-
tic Convention. September 8, 1975. 121 pp.

The Press and Foreign Policy. Panel discussion be-
fore the Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy
Research and Development of the House Committee
on International Relations. September 24, 1975.
34 pp.

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons.
Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions to accompany S. Ex. L, 93-2. S. Ex. Rept.
94-10. October 22, 1975. 4 pp.

Towards Project Interdependence: Energy in the
Coming Decade. Prepared for the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy by Dr. Herman T. Franssen,
Ocean and Coastal Resources Project, Congressional
Research Service, Library of Congress. December
1975. 249 pp.

Department of State Bulletin

he Lessons of the Seventh Special Session
and the 30th U.N. General Assembly

Following is a statement made in the clos-
ng plenary session of the 30th U.N. General
Assembly by U.S. Representative Daniel P.
Moynihan on December 17.

JSUN preffs release 190 dated December 17

None will learn with surprise that for the
United States, at very least, the 30th Gen-
eral Assembly has been a profound, even
alarming disappointment. This splendid hall
has, since the opening of the Assembly, been
repeatedly the scene of acts which we re-
gard as abominations. We have not sought
to conceal this view. Nor is it our view alone.
Throughout the world individuals and gov-
ernments have observed this General As-
sembly with dismay.

Unquestionably, our distress was deep-
ened by the contrast between this regular
Assembly session and the special session
which preceded it. In the recent history, per-
haps in the whole history, of the United
Nations there has not been a more striking,
even exhilarating example of what the Gen-
eral Assembly can accomplish than the
example of the seventh special session. In
two weeks of intensive, determined, and
hardheaded negotiations, we worked out a
set of principles and programs for the eco-
nomic advance of the poorer nations of the
world that will take us a decade to put into
practice.

The United States took a lead in this
enterprise, from the opening statement of
the Secretary of State to the concluding
dense and detailed agreement, which incor-
porated no fewer than 28 proposals we had
initially set forth.

In the general debate of the 30th session

that followed, one speaker after another rose
to extol the achievement of the special ses-
sion. Praise was unanimous — from every
bloc, from nations of every size and condi-
tion. The Assembly was honored this year
by the visit of His Majesty King Olav of
Norway, who appropriately made the last
such general statement:

The successful conclusion of the seventh special
session of the General Assembly has initiated a
universal and cooperative process to effect changes
in international economic relations which may have
a far-reaching impact on the daily life of millions
around our globe.

Both Assemblies are now concluded, and
the time is at hand to ask whether anything
can be learned from them. For we do not
want them forgotten. To the contrary, there
are events that occurred in the 30th Assem-
bly which the United States will never for-
get. Even so, we turn our attention just now
to the question of whether it will be possible
to avoid such events in the future. In that
spirit, we would like to offer two general
comments. We offer them in a spirit of
reconciliation and of shared concern. We are
trying to learn, and we ask if others will not
seek to learn with us.

Limitations of the General Assembly

The first lesson is the most important,
which is that the General Assembly has
been trying to pretend that it is a parlia-
ment, which it is not. It is a conference made
up of representatives sent by sovereign
governments which have agreed to listen
to its recommendations — recommendations
which are, however, in no way binding.

February 2, 1976

139

It is usual to use the term "recommenda-
tory" to describe the Assembly's powers,
but for present purposes it seems more use-
ful simply to say that there has been an
agreement to take into consideration — to
listen to — such proposals as the Assembly
may make. For this directs our attention to
the reality that unless such recommenda-
tions have the effect of persuading, they
have no effect at all. Resolutions that con-
demn, that accuse, that anathematize, do
not bring us any nearer to agreement. They
have the opposite effect.

Hence the lesson of the seventh special
session. What took place among us on that
occasion was a negotiation. It was self-
evident — money is said to clear the mind ! —
that no party to the negotiation was going
to pay the least subsequent attention to any
proposal to which he had not agreed. On the
other hand, the authority of the unanimous
agreement reached at the end of the session
was very considerable. The United Nations
on that occasion had served as a setting for
reaching consensus — a very different thing
from recording division, which is what so
often happens.

Why is this lesson not self-evident, as it
clearly was to those who drafted the
charter? Here we come to the second of the
general comments the United States would
wish to offer in this closing statement. It is
not an agreeable matter of which we now
speak, nor yet one easily explained. Yet we
must make the effort to state our views
fully if we are to ask others to seek to
understand them.

The Nature of the Crisis of the U.N.

The crisis of the United Nations is not to
be found in the views of the majority of its
members. Rather, it resides in the essential
incompatibility of the system of govern-
ment which the charter assumes will rule
the majority of its members and the system
of government to which the majority in fact
adheres.

The charter assumes that most of the
members of the General Assembly will be
reasonably representative governments, com-

mitted at home no less than abroad to the
maintenance of representative institutions.

It may be asked: How do we know? The
answer has no greater — or lesser — authority
than that of history and experience. The
charter was conceived by an embattled
American President and his British com-
rade-in-arms. American statesmen helped to
draft the charter. American scholars may
just possibly claim preeminence in their
study and interpretation of the charter.
Certainly the bulk of such scholarship has
been American.

This is not, perhaps, surprising. Among
the nations of the world we are the one
most to be identified with constitutional
government, in the sense of a written
charter setting forth the powers and duties
of government, a charter that is repeatedly
amended and continuously interpreted. We
would like to think that our long and really
quite dedicated concern with constitutional
representative government has given us at
least some sense of such matters.

There are others whose experience of
representative government is just as long
or just as intense, and we feel that such
nations may also be expected to speak with
knowledge and insight. They have, in a
sense, earned the right to do so.

Such nations or, more accurately, the gov-
ernments of such nations, being of necessity
sensitive to the nature of their own national
institutions, will be similarly sensitive to
the claims made by larger, multinational
bodies.

Observe, for example, the great care and
lengthy debate which has attended the de-
velopment of multinational bodies among
the nations of Western Europe. Genuine
power, true authority, has been transferred
from national to international bodies, but
only with great and deserved caution. The
parliaments of European nations slowly
satisfied themselves that political and social
conditions in that region had indeed evolved
to the point where individuals were pre-
pared, for certain purposes, to submit to the
authority of supranational bodies. But they
came to this judgment slowly and on the
basis of fact.

140

Department of State Bulletin

Those who have submitted to this disci-
line — and obviously, at the level of indi-
iduals, this is not a variety of understand-
ig confined to citizens of parliamentary
tates — will readily enough understand that
,e General Assembly has not attained to
nything like the degree of acceptance and
if.uthority among its constituent members
ii hat warrants any transfer of genuine power
f a parliamentary nature.

Now, and for the foreseeable future, it
an only be a recommendatory body, a con-
ereftce which adopts positions to which
; rovernments have agreed to listen. There
s a certain evolution in these matters, and
learly the General Assembly has made some
iny movement in a parliamentary direction.
?ut to pretend we are further than we are
vill serve only to set back what progress
las in truth been made.

This goes to the question of legitimacy.

Vhat powers does an assembly have? How

; lave they been conferred? How is it peri-

•dically reconfirmed that the population —

; le it of individuals or governments or what-

, !ver — over which such powers are exercised

loes indeed consent to that exercise?

This process — of definition, of conferral,
)f confirmation — is the essence of a repre-
lentative institution. Those who understand
t will readily enough understand what can
md cannot be accomplished through the
nstrumentality of the General Assembly.

rhe Heart of the Matter

And now to the heart of the matter. Many
g-overnments — most governments — now rep-
resented in the General Assembly seem dis-
posed to use this body as if it had powers
which the General Assembly does not have,
to enforce policies of a nature which the
General Assembly ought not, at this stage,
even to consider.

It took our 18th-century Congress well
I into the 19th century before it felt that
political society in America had advanced
to the point where an income tax could be
imposed, and even then the act was declared
uncorstitutional ; so that Congress was
forced to await the 20th century to success-

fully impose such a tax in peacetime. Now,
some see that as progress; others do not.
But all see that the evolution of true con-
sent is the first process of effective govern-
ment. By contrast, before its third decade
was out the General Assembly of the United
Nations was proclaiming a New Interna-
tional Economic Order.

There is a reason for this, of which we
speak at the risk of offense but having no
desire to offend ; the reason is that most of
the governments represented in the Gen-
eral Assembly do not themselves govern by
consent. Assemblies for them, and for their
peoples, are places in which decrees are
announced. Where it is felt that "majori-
ties" are needed to attest to the decree, well,
such majorities are readily enough sum-
moned.

We put the simple test. In how many of
the 144 members of the United Nations is
there a representative body which both has
the power and periodically exercises the
power of rejecting a decision of the govern-
ment? Only a handful. By one competent
count, there are now 28, possibly 29, func-
tioning, representative democracies in the
world, and one is not a member of the
United Nations. Such governments will by
instinct pay the gi'eatest heed to winning
consent, including winning consent in the
General Assembly. Consent is the very es-
sence of their being. Other governments will
not pay such heed. At home they rule by
decree, and it seems wholly natural to seek
to emulate the same practice in the General
Assembly.

We dare to believe that this reality is
better known and understood in this Assem-
bly than it might at first appear. If only a
handful of the nations represented here have
representative governments today, most of
them — truly! — have had such in the life of
the United Nations. This is a mournful fact
for those of us committed to democratic in-
stitutions.

At their height, perhaps 15 years ago,
there were two or three times as many
democratic governments in the world as
there are today. But this very fact suggests
that there are still memories in most of the

February 2, 1976

141

nations of the world as to just what repre-
sentative institutions were like and that
correspondingly there exists a much more
widespread understanding of their nature
than might at first appear.

Let it be clear that we do not entertain
any delusions about a grand revival of
democracy. We do not expect a reversal of
its decline in the near term. (What we do
hope to see, and hope to encourage, is more
societies which will do something to protect
some civil rights, even if they deny most
political rights.) But we do think it is pos-
sible for there to be a greater understanding
among members at large of the nature of a
representative institution and the corre-
sponding limits of the General Assembly.
We would seek this understanding not to
restrict what the United Nations can accom-
plish but, rather, to accentuate the positive
and concentrate on real possibilities rather
than to squander the opportunity that does
exist by the mindless pretense of legislative
omnipotence.

It may be that this objective would be
well served if a "parliamentary caucus"
were established within the General Assem-
bly. This would be a group of nations con-
stituted, let us say, along the lines of the
membership criteria of the Council of Eu-
rope, which would attend not so much to
policy issues as to institutional ones. Its
concern would be to seek to encourage those
practices and approaches which enhance the
effectiveness of the General Assembly and
to discourage, both by example and by pro-
nouncement, those which do not.

Progress on Human Rights Issues

Surely we might especially hope to do this
in the area of human rights. Let us accept
the fact that the ideal of liberal democracy
has sustained huge losses in the last decade.
It is not likely that more than a few nations
which are not democracies today will become
democracies in the course of the last quar-
ter of the century, so that we must expect
continued difficulties in the General Assem-
bly of the sort I have described.

Very well then, let us concentrate on

iBt

things we can do. Of these, the most im g
portant is that of establishing some minima
international standards by which govern
ments treat their citizens.

Let us, for example, try to agree tha
governments should not torture their sub
jects. Many do. Perhaps most do. And yet
as Gaston Thorn, our wholly admirable anc
universally admired President, said yester
day, we did make progress on human right
at this Assembly.

Specifically we adopted, unanimously, b^^
resolution against "torture and other cruel
inhuman or degrading treatment or punish
ment in relation to detention and imprison
ment." Citizens throughout the world may
in years to come point to their governments
concurrence with that resolution as they
demand rights or beg for mercy and human
ity in their own societies.

The United States hoped for more prog-
ress than we actually made. This year, forr|f,
example, we introduced a new practice with
respect to the venerable issue of apartheid.
It has seemed to us that our standard prac-
tice of mere denunciation has suffered from
diminishing effectiveness.

Instead, this year the United States 1='
brought into the General Assembly what
was in effect a bill of particulars. With re-
spect to violations of the standards of civil
liberties which we would hope to see at-
tained in South Africa — and throughout the
world — we named prisoners, specified dates,
cited statutes, quoted judges, described sen-
tences, identified jails. There are indeed
political prisoners in South Africa. But we
feel they are no longer unknown political
prisoners. We hope other nations may fol-
low our precedent of lawyerlike, documented
presentation of such issues.

For there are political prisoners the world
over. Here again, the United States this
year took an unprecedented initiative in
submitting a resolution calling for amnesty
for all political prisoners. We were not suc-
cessful. But we said we would be back next
year, and we will be. We will be there, and
we may be equally sure that the political
prisoners will be there also.

Confession is good for the soul, and we

142

Department of State Bulletin

jnfess to not having handled this issue well
iiough. There are more members in this
.ssembly that would support an amnesty
reposal than the half-dozen who told us
ley would support ours. And if it should
rove the case that it was American spon-
orship that held off many, then clearly we
rill make no claims to sponsorship next

me. But our determination in this matter
5, if anything, strengthened by the feeling
hat we achieved so little this time.

We are not perfect, and we make no pre-
ense to perfection. What we hope for, what
ome of us pray for, is simply that we
hould be concerned and engaged.

And on the issue of political prisoners we
re just that. We are strengthened by the
xtraordinary statement of Andrei D.
sakharov, this year's winner of the Nobel
eace Prize and the recipient two years ago
»f the award of the International League
or the Rights of Man. Speaking of his hope
"or the final victory of the principles of
oeace and human rights, he said :

The best sign that such hopes can come true would
»e a general political amnesty in all the world,
liberation of all prisoners of conscience everywhere.
The struggle for a general political amnesty is the
truggle for the future of mankind.

And so we will be back.
Farewell. We wish you peace in the New
Year.

>,

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Arbitration

Convention on the recognition and enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards. Done at New York June
10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959; for the
United States December 29, 1970. TIAS 6997.
Extended to: Faroe Islands and Greenland, Janu-
ary 1, 1976.

Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
as amended. Done at New York October 26, 1956.
Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873, 5284,
7668.

Acceptance deposited: United Arab Emirates,
January 15, 1976.

Copyright

Universal copyright convention, as revised. Done at
Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10,
1974. TIAS 7868.

Protocol 1 annexed to the universal copyright con-
vention, as revised, concerning the application of
that convention to works of stateless persons and
refugees. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into
force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.

Protocol 2 annexed to the universal copyright con-
vention, as revised, concerning the application of
that convention to the works of certain interna-
tional organizations. Done at Paris July 24, 1971.
Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.
Accession deposited: Morocco, October 28, 1975.

Health

Constitution of the World Health Organization. Done
at New York July 22, 1946, as amended. Entered
into force April 7, 1948; for the United States
June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086.
Acceptance deposited: Cape Verde, January 5,
1976.
Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the Constitution
of the World Health Organization, as amended
(TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva May
22, 1973.'

Acceptances deposited: Burma, Morocco, Decem-
ber 30, 1975; Tanzania, Tunisia, Western Samoa,
January 6, 1976.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as
amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490).
Adopted at London October 17, 1974.'
Acceptance deposited: Madagascar, December 29,
1975.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at
Vienna February 21, 1971.'
Ratification deposited: Holy See, January 7, 1976.

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic
drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972. En-
tered into force August 8, 1975.
Ratifications deposited: Holy See, January 7, 1976;
Monaco, December 30, 1975.

Program-Carrying Signals — Distribution by

Satellite

Convention relating to the distribution of programme-
carrying signals transmitted by satellite. Done at
Brussels May 21, 1974.'
Ratification deposited: Kenya, January 6, 1976.

' Not in force.

February 2, 1976

143

Racial Discrimination

International convention on the elimination of all
forms of racial discrimination. Done at New York
December 21, 1965. Entered into force January 4,
1969.=
Ratification deposited: Italy, January 5, 1976.

Sea, Exploration of

Protocol to the convention of September 12, 1964
(TIAS 7628), for the International Council for the
Exploration of the Sea. Done at Copenhagen Au-
gust 13, 1970.

Ratification deposited: Spain, November 12, 1975.
Entered into force: November 12, 1975.

Seabeds Disarmament

Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nu-
clear weapons and other weapons of mass destruc-
tion on the seabed and ocean floor and in the
subsoil thereof. Done at Washington, London, and
Moscow February 11, 1971. Entered into force May
18, 1972. TIAS 73.37.

Ratification deposited: Netherlands, January 14,
1976."

Terrorism — Protection of Diplomats

Convention on the prevention and punishment of
crimes against internationally protected persons,
including diplomatic agents. Done at New York
December 14, 1973.'
Accession deposited: Cyprus, December 24, 1975.

United Nations Charter

Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the
International Court of Justice. Signed at San Fran-
cisco June 26, 1945. Entered into force October 24,
1945. 59 Stat. 1031.

Admission to metnhership: Surinam, December 4,
1975.

BILATERAL

Ecuador

Agreement supplementing the commercial air trans-
port agreement of January 8, 1947, as amended
(TIAS 1606, 2196). Effected by exchange of notes
at Quito December 31, 1975. Entered into force
December 31, 1975.

%

Germany, Federal Republic of

Agreement extending the agreement of April 13
1973, as amended and extended (TIAS 7605, 7804)
relating to travel group charters and advanc,
booking charters. Effected by exchange of letter;
at Bonn-Bad Godesberg December 30, 1975. Enterec
into force December 30, 1975.

Agreement on social security, with final protocol
Signed at Washington January 7, 1976. Enters intc
force on the first day of the second month follow-
ing the month in which the instruments of ratifi-
cation are exchanged.

Hong Kong

Agreement amending the agreement of July 25, 1974
(TIAS 7897), relating to trade in cotton, wool and
man-made fiber textiles. Effected by exchange of
notes at Hong Kong December 15 and 22, 1975.
Entered into force December 22, 1975.

Mexico

Agreement extending the air transport agreement of
August 15, 1960, as amended and extended (TIAS
4675, 7167). Effected by exchange of notes at
Mexico and Tlatelolco December 10 and 15, 1975.
Entered into force December 15, 1975.

Netherlands

Agreement extending the agreement of July 11, 1973
(TIAS 7771), relating to travel group charter
flights and advance booking charter flights. Ef-
fected by exchange of letters at The Hague Decem-
ber 11 and 30, 1975. Entered into force December
30, 1975.

Philippines

Agreement relating to the continued operation of
Loran-A stations owned and operated by the
Philippines. Effected by exchange of notes at
Manila November 3 and December 15, 1975. En-
tered into force December 15, 1975, effective Janu-
ary 1, 1975.

IB

' Not in force.

' Not in force for the United States.

•■' Extended to Netherlands Antilles.

144

Department of State Bulletin

•EX February 2, 1976 Vol LXXIV, No. 1910

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference
anuary 24 125

[a. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer-
of January 24 125

of Premier Chou En-lai of People's Re-
itj^^iic of China (statements by President

and Secretary Kissinger) 133

ry Kissinger's News Conference of
[uary 24 125

:ss. Congressional Documents Relating
'oreign Policy 138

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference
anuary 24 125

^^nament. Secretary Kissinger's News Con-

nce of January 24 125

Itnomic Affairs

Policy on Foreign Investment and Nation-
lization Reiterated (Department statement) 138
S. Regrets U.K. Measures Restricting Im-
•orts (statement) 137

man Rights. The Lessons of the Seventh
Special Session and the 30th U.N. General
assembly (Moynihan) 139

, lel. Foreign Minister Allon of Israel Visits
Vashington (Allon, Kissinger) 134

> laysia

Eath of Prime Minister Razak of Malaysia

statement by President Ford) 133

- letary Kissinger's News (Conference of

anuary 24 125

ildle East
_ reign Minister Allon of Israel Visits Wash-

ngton (Allon, Kissinger) 134

:retary Kissinger's News Conference of
anuary 24 125

;sidential Documents

ath of Premier Chou En-lai nf People's Re-

mblic of China 133

ath of Prime Minister Razak of Malaysia . 133

ade. U.S. Regrets U.K. Measures Restricting
mports (statement) 137

eaty Information. Current Actions .... 143

3.S.R. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer-
nce of January 24 125

lited Kingdom. U.S. Regrets U.K. Measures
Restricting Imports (statement) 137

United Nations. The Lessons of the Seventh
Special Session and the 30th U.N. General
Assembly (Moynihan) 139

Name Index

Allon, Yigal 134

Ford, President 133

Kissinger, Secretary 125, 133, 134

Moynihan, Daniel P 139

Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: January 12-18

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

No. Date Subject

*9 1/12 Regional foreign policy conference,
Houston, Tex., Jan. 28.

*10 1/13 Government Advisory Committee
on International Book and Library
Programs, Feb. 12.

*11 1/13 Advisory Committee on Transna-
tional Enterprises, Feb. 5.

*'12 1/10 State Department receives Frank-
lin portrait.
13 1/14 Kissinger: news conference.

*14 1/14 Shipping Coordinating Committee
(SCC), Subcommittee on Safety
of Life at Sea (SOLAS), working
group on ship design and equip-
ment, Feb. 11.

*15 1/15 Advisory Committee for U.S. Par-
ticipation in the U.N. Conference
on Human Settlements (Habitat),
Feb. 5.

*16 1/15 SCC, SOLAS, working group on

container onerations, Feb. 11.
17 1/16 Joint State-Treasury statement on
commodities.

^Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

Superintendent of Documents
U.S. government printing office

WASHINGTON, DC. 20402

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

postage and fees paid
Department of State STA-501

Special Fourth-Class Rate
Book

Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted
service, please renew your subscription promptly
when you receive the expiration notice from the
Superintendent of Documents. Due to the time re-
quired to process renewals, notices are sent out 3
months in advance of the expiration date. Any prob-
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mediate attention if you write to. Superintendent
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402.

/

(3:

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/?//

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXIV • No. 1911

February 9, 1976

THE STATE OF THE UNION
Excerpt From President Ford's Address to the Congress 145

THE EXECUTIVE AND THE CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY

CONFLICT OR COOPERATION?

Address by Deputy Secretary Ingersoll H.7

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXXIV, No. 1911
February 9, 1976

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington. D.C. 20402

PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,

domestic $42.50, foreign $53.15

Single copy 85 cents

Use of funds for printing this publication
approved by the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget (January 29, 1971).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may be
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of U.S. foreign relations and
on the work of the Department and
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses,
and news conferences of the President
and the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
international affairs and the functions
of the Department. Information is
included concerning treaties and inter-
national agreements to which the
United States is or may become a
party and on treaties of general inter-
national interest.

Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.

The State of the Union

Address by President Ford to the Congress (Excerpt) *

The protection of the lives and property
of Americans from foreign enemies is one of
my primary responsibilities as President. In
a world of instant communications and inter-
continental ballistic missiles, in a world
economy that is global and interdependent,
our relations with other nations become
more, not less, important to the lives of
Americans.

America has had a unique role in the
world since the day of our independence 200
years ago. And ever since the end of World
War II we have borne successfully a heavy
responsibility for insuring a stable world
order and hope for human progress.

Today, the state of our foreign policy is
sound and strong.

— We are at peace, and I will do all in my
power to keep it that way.

— Our military forces are capable and
ready. Our military power is without equal.
And I intend to keep it that way.

— Our principal alliances, with the indus-
trial democracies of the Atlantic community
and Japan, have never been more solid.

— A further agreement to limit the stra-
tegic arms race may be achieved.

— We have an improving relationship with
China, the world's most populous nation.

— The key elements for peace among the
nations of the Middle East now exist.

— Our traditional friendships in Latin
America, Africa, and Asia continue.

' Delivered on Jan. 19 (text from Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated Jan. 26).

— We have taken the role of leadership in
launching a serious and hopeful dialogue
between the industrial world and the devel-
oping world.

— We have helped to achieve significant
reform of the international monetary sys-
tem.

We should be proud of what America,
what our country, has accomplished in these
areas, and I believe the American people are.

The American people have heard too much
about how terrible our mistakes, how evil
our deeds, and how misguided our purposes.
The American people know better.

The truth is we are the world's greatest
democracy. We remain the symbol of man's
aspiration for liberty and well-being. We are
the embodiment of hope for progress.

I say it is time we quit downgrading our-
selves as a nation. Of course it is our re-
sponsibility to learn the right lesson from
past mistakes. It is our duty to see that they
never happen again. But our greater duty
is to look to the future. The world's troubles
will not go away.

The American people want strong and
effective international and defense policies.

In our constitutional system, these poli-
cies should reflect consultation and accom-
modation between the President and the
Congress. But in the final analysis, as the
framers of our Constitution knew from hard
experience, the foreign relations of the
United States can be conducted effectively
only if there is strong central direction that
allows flexibility of action. That responsibil-
ity clearly rests with the President.

February 9, 1976

145

I pledge to the American people policies
which seek a secure, just, and peaceful
world. I pledge to the Congress to work with
you to that end.

We must not face a future in which we
can no longer help our friends, such as An-
gola, even in limited and carefully controlled
ways. We must not lose all capacity to re-
spond short of military intervention.

Some hasty actions of the Congress dur-
ing the past year — most recently in respect
to Angola — were, in my view, very short-
sighted. Unfortunately, they are still very
much on the minds of our allies and our
adversaries.

A strong defense posture gives weight to
our values and our views in international
negotiations ; it assures the vigor of our
alliances; and it sustains our efforts to pro-
mote settlements of international conflicts.

Only from a position of strength can we
negotiate a balanced agreement to limit the
growth of nuclear arms. Only a balanced
agreement will serve our interests and mini-
mize the threat of nuclear confrontation.

The defense budget I will submit to the
Congress for fiscal year 1977 will show an
essential increase over the current year. It
provides for real growth in purchasing
power over this year's defense budget, which
includes the cost of the all-volunteer force.

We are continuing to make economies to
enhance the efficiency of our military forces,
but the budget I will submit represents the
necessity of American strength for the real
world in which we live.

As conflict and rivalry persist in the
world, our U.S. intelligence capabilities must
be the best in the world.

The crippling of our foreign intelligence
services increases the danger of American
involvement in direct armed conflict. Our
adversaries are encouraged to attempt new
adventures while our own ability to moni-
tor events and to influence events short of
military action is undermined.

Without effective intelligence capability,
the United States stands blindfolded and
hobbled.

In the near future, I will take actions to
reform and strengthen our intelligence com-
munity. I ask for your positive cooperation.
It is time to go beyond sensationalism and
insure an effective, responsible, and respon-
sive intelligence capability.

Tonight I have spoken about our problems
at home and abroad. I have recommended
policies that will meet the challenge of our
third century. I have no doubt that our
Union will endure — better, stronger, and
with more individual freedom. We can see
forward only dimly — one year, five years, a
generation perhaps. Like our forefathers, we
know that if we meet the challenges of our
own time with a common sense of purpose
and conviction, if we remain true to our
Constitution and to our ideals, then we can
know that the future will be better than the
past.

Letters of Credence

Benin

The newly appointed Ambassador of the
People's Republic of Benin (formerly Da-
homey), Setondji Thomas Boya, presented
his credentials to President Ford on Janu-
ary 23.'

Nepal

The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Kingdom of Nepal, Padma Bahadur Khatri,
presented his credentials to President Ford
on January 23.'

Papua New Guinea

The newly appointed Ambassador of
Papua New Guinea, Paulias N. Matane, pre-
sented his credentials to President Ford on
January 23.*

' For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the
President's reply, see Department of State press
release dated Jan. 23.

146

Department of State Bulletin

e Executive and the Congress in Foreign Policy:
fif onflict or Cooperation?

Address by Deputy Secretary Robert S. Ingersoll *

Almost a year ago Secretary Kissinger
poke to this Council. He spoke of the ar-
val of a new era of interdependence in
orld affairs; the inextricable relationship
tween American security and prosperity
d that of the world ; and our need, despite
.6 foreign policy setbacks of the past dec-
ide and the public preoccupation with
omestic problems, to continue a responsible
nd active American role in world affairs.
[e recalled the bipartisan consensus of the
nmediate postwar period which had pro-
uced such creative and successful Ameri-
an world leadership and invited the Con-
ress to a new national partnership in the
anduct of our foreign policy.

Together with new conceptions of foreign policy
he said), we must define new principles of execu-
ve-legislative relations — principles which reconcile
16 unmistakable claims of congressional supervi-
ion and the urgent requirements of purposeful
.merican world leadership.

Today I would like to talk to you about
luch the same subject — the relationship
letween the executive and the Congress in
oreign policy.

I do not intend simply to repeat Secretary
Cissinger's remarks. Still less would I want
0 disagree with what he said. But the fact
s, as you all know, that 1975 has not been
he year in which the era of national part-

' Made before the Los Angeles World Affairs
ilouncil at Los Angeles, Calif., on Jan. 22 (text
rom press release 21).

nership on foreign policy began. Rather,
1975 has been a year of conflict and tension
between executive and legislative branches
on foreign policy issues. Many would antici-
pate that 1976, an election year, promises
more of the same.

But the importance of responsible Ameri-
can involvement in world affairs has not
diminished during the past year, nor will the
world stop while we conduct our quadren-
nial election ritual. And bipartisan coopera-
tion and national consensus are as vital as
ever to the effectiveness of any foreign pol-
icy we pursue. So I think this subject de-
serves another look today.

In these remarks I will examine the
underlying causes of the continuing differ-
ences between the Congress and the execu-
tive and discuss some of the specific institu-
tional problems which arose or continued
during the past year, such as the coherence
of congressional foreign policy actions, the
effect of legislative restrictions aimed at
modifying the behavior of foreign govern-
ments, and the handling of classified infor-
mation.

Finally, I will try to assess prospects for
foreign policy bipartisanship in 1976 and
beyond.

Underlying Causes of the Differences

The possibility of conflict and tension be-
tween the executive and legislative branches
over foreign policy was built into the Con-

February 9, 1976

147

stitution. Many years ago the constitutional
scholar Edward S. Corwin wrote:

What the Constitution does, and all that it does,
is to confer upon the President certain powers capa-
ble of affecting our foreign relations, and certain
other powers of the same general nature upon the
Senate, and still other such powers upon the Con-
gress; but which of these organs shall have the
decisive and final voice in determining the course of
the American nation is left for events to resolve.

Sometimes I go back to the office and re-
flect on this thought after a particularly
tough day on Capitol Hill.

Of course, the Constitution does not actu-
ally require conflict between the Presidency
and the Congress. Nor do political party
rivalries such as our present one lead in-
evitably to foreign policy disputes. It was an
unelected President and an opposition-con-
trolled Congi-ess, locked in confrontation on
many other issues, which together launched
the creative foreign policy initiatives of the
1946-48 period. But what permitted biparti-
san cooperation in that era, after the ex-
perience of isolationism, appeasement, and
war, was broad national consensus on our
fundamental policy objectives of containing
Soviet Communist expansionism and assist-
ing the economic and political recovery of
the European democracies.

Conversely, what inhibits bipartisan co-
operation today is the divisive and chasten-
ing experience of Viet-Nam and Watergate
and the lack of public consensus about Amer-
ica's future role in the world.

Ten public opinion analysts recently told
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
that Americans are increasingly preoccupied
with domestic matters. For example, in a
1964 survey of what most concerned the
American people, international issues pre-
empted the top five spots. A decade later, in
1974, no foreign policy issue ranked higher
than 17th. More recently, NBC's excellent
three-hour special on foreign policy on the
evening of January 5 finished third in the
ratings, behind the CBS situation comedy
lineup and an ABC program on the Olym-
pics, even though NBC had prudently waited
until the Monday-night football season was

over before putting on the special. Perha
it should have been narrated by Howa
Cosell.

The pollsters indicated that America;
want a close correlation between oversej
involvement and American national inte
ests, are not enthusiastic about military a
to foreign governments, and are extreme
skittish about any commitment which cou
lead to the use of American troops abroad.

Other pubhc opinion surveys indicate
general decline in confidence in government
institutions. So it is only fair to say that tl
Congress elected in 1974 — and taking offii
in early 1975 just before Secretary Kissingi
spoke to you — has probably been reflectin
public opinion in ending our military ii
volvement in Indochina, opposing any ii
volvement in Angola, viewing with skepti
cism any commitments we made in conne^
tion with the Sinai agreement, seeking 1
limit and attach restrictions to our securiti
assistance program, and exhibiting grea
dislike for secrecy in our foreign relations.

On the other hand, the pollsters reports
that the public was aware of the relation
ship between events and trends overseas an'
in the United States and rejected a retur
to isolationism. The Administration, c
course, shares that view, believing that ev&
though we can no longer dominate the worl<
as we did for many years after World War I
we cannot ignore it either.

I will not attempt to convince you in d»«
tail of the relationship between America
security and prosperity and that of thi
world, and the need for a responsibly activ
foreign policy, since I note that Secretar
Kissinger covered these points in last year'
speech. If he couldn't convince you, no on |
can ; and if an audience such as this does no
believe it, then the country is in deepe
trouble than any of us had suspected.

Another cause of the lack of consensu
and bipartisanship is the increasing com
plexity of the foreign policy issues we fac€
with the new agenda of international eco
nomic interdependence superimposed on th^ '
traditional agenda of political and militar: i

148

Department of State Bulletli

valries. We can no longer overwhelm these
oblems with the application of superior
ilitary power or economic resources and
lerefore must often pursue subtle policies
I deal with them, policies which are inher-
itly difficult to explain to the public.
It is most difficult to explain, and to gen-
ate popular enthusiasm for, today's more
lanced policies:

— Detente with the Soviet Union calls for
Taring the Soviets positive incentives for
oderate behavior and cooperation with the
'est, but at the same time it calls for con-
nuing firmness in dealing with Soviet op-
)rtunism in places like Angola and the
Middle East.

— The defense of our economy and foreign
ilicy from excessive foreign pressure re-
lires us to try to improve relations with
le oil-exporting countries to give them a
jsitive stake in the health of the world
•onomy; yet at the same time we are try-
ig to coordinate actions with the other oil-
nporting countries to reduce OPEC's [Or-
mization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
ies] control of the price of oil.
— Our desire to strengthen world prosper-
y and stability leads us toward a dialogue
ith the less developed countries on energy,
)mmodities, development, and other issues;
et at the same time we are reacting
;rongly against confrontationist rhetoric
lid double moral standards from the Third
^rld.

Even though we naturally believe these
olicies are the best suited for the problems
ley address, we recognize that they may
ot make an audience stomp and cheer.

leed for Coherent Foreign Policy in Congress

Whatever the reasons for the lack of con-
ensus and bipartisanship, it is clear to all
hat the Congress is determined to play a
lore active role in the formulation and the
mplementation of foreign policy:

— The War Powers Act, passed in 1973,
equires Presidential reporting to the Con-

gress on the commitment of American
troops overseas, as we did during the
Mayaguez incident, and permits the Con-
gress to force their withdrawal.

— Executive agreements must now be re-
ported to the Congress, and the Congress
tends to insist that any important agree-
ment be submitted as a treaty, which must
be approved by two-thirds of Senators pres-
ent and voting.

— An increasing number of restrictions
have been placed on security assistance, in-
cluding a congressional veto of any specific
arms ti'ansaction over $50 million to any
specific country. An overall ceiling is being
proposed for arms transfers.

—1974 legislation requires the Admin-
istration to report covert foreign policy
operations to six congressional committees.

But just as the Congress has increased its
activity and assumed new responsibilities in
foreign policy, its internal mechanisms and
structure for dealing with these tasks are
breaking down:

— The traditional hierarchy of the leader-
ship and committee chairmen has been chal-
lenged by the newer members, but no alter-
nate structure has been erected in its place.

— The complex nature of international
issues has blurred existing lines of commit-
tee jurisdiction and led to the creation of
new select committees, such as the two com-
mittees on intelligence.

— Interest groups such as the Democratic
Caucus, the Black Caucus and other ethnic
groups, the group led by Congressman
[Donald M.] Eraser which is concerned with
greater attention to human rights, and other
ad hoc coalitions on specific issues cannot
focus their influence on any single leader-
ship group or committee. The Administra-
tion finds it difficult to respond quickly and
effectively to their concerns.

The general result has been that the
executive, in attempting to inform or to con-
sult with the Congress, is often unsure as
to whom to contact or which committees to
work with.

-ebruary 9, 1976

149

There is an ever-increasing series of de-
mands for Secretary Kissinger iiimself to
testify or meet personally groups and indi-
viduals. He recently estimated that he
spends about one-fourth of his time on con-
gressional relations. It seems he spends
more time shuttling between the Depart-
ment and Capitol Hill than between Cairo
and Tel Aviv. The Secretary, and many of
us, are involved in seemingly countless in-
formal meetings and working meals at the
Department and elsewhere. But no matter
how hard we try, we keep getting caught in
jurisdictional disputes among congressional
committees or criticized for not consulting
with some committee or group.

But what is more serious for the nation
as a whole is that the structural confusion
leads to incoherence in congressional for-
eign policy.

For example, I think most Americans, in-
cluding the Administration and Congress,
share a desire that the Soviet Union con-
form more closely to internationally ac-
cepted norms of behavior, in both internal
and foreign policies. More specifically, we
favor freedom of emigration. And we oppose
Soviet meddling in the affairs of developing
countries like Angola, in areas heretofore
relatively free of great-power intervention.

The Administration is pursuing a policy,
generally known as detente, which seeks to
achieve this goal by providing incentives for
moderate and reasonable Soviet behavior
and at the same time discouraging Soviet
troublemaking.

Yet one temporary coalition in the Con-
gress imposed the Soviet emigration amend-
ment— the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the
Trade Act — which, without increasing emi-
gration, has made it much more difficult for
us to use increased U.S.-Soviet trade to
create vested interests in the U.S.S.R. who
have a stake in cooperation with the United
States and, therefore, restraint in Soviet
foreign policy. Now another temporary
coalition wants to stop activities in Angola
which were intended to demonstrate to the
Soviets that they cannot exploit detente for
unilateral advantage.

Taken together, these congressionally im-

posed policies strike both the carrot and th
stick from the Administration's hands; ye
it is difficult to imagine what positive an
coherent alternative policy these congre;
sional coalitions could agree on in our reh
tions with the Soviet Union. It seems to in
that the greater the role the Congress ii >
sists on playing in foreign policy, the greate ' j
its obligation to see that its actions are coi ll
sistent one with another.

Impact of Legislative Restrictions "r

The legislative process can contribute el '
f ectively to the definition of our f oreig i '
policy goals. But congressional efforts t ''
legislate day-to-day and week-to-week coi
duct of foreign relations have often prove •
detrimental because they were too publii.'
too drastic, or too undiscriminating. The r( '
suits of such legislative sanctions during th
last year tend to confirm this view. Fc
example :

— The Trade Act provision which exclude
OPEC members from the generalized systei i ,
of tariff preferences for less developed coui ■
tries has not prevented a further increase i I
the official price of oil. But it has complicate
our relations with OPEC members such i
Iran, Indonesia, Nigeria, Venezuela, ar
Ecuador, all of which sold oil to us througl
out the Arab boycott. Latin American coui ^
tries have taken the side of Venezuela an
Ecuador on this issue. j

— Because of the Trade Act provisic : '
which links most-favored-nation treatmei j
and export credits to explicit Soviet assu;i
ances on emigration, the bilateral trad »
agreement has not taken effect. Soviet lenc
lease repayments, which are linked to th
agreement, have been suspended by Moscov
The American share in Soviet trade with th
West has dropped from 20 percent in 197
and 1974 to 15 percent in 1975; and froi
what American businessmen tell us, the
lost over $1 billion in Soviet orders last yeai
Meanwhile, Soviet emigration is down froi
35,000 in 1973, to 20,000 in 1974, to onl
13,000 in 1975.

— Last year's foreign aid legislation cor
tained an amendment, section 502B, statin

150

Department of State Bulleti

the sense of Congress that "except in ex-
traordinary circumstances, the President
shall substantially reduce or terminate se-
curity assistance" — that is, military train-
ing or the sale or grant of equipment — "to
any government which engages in a con-
sistent pattern of gross violations of inter-
nationally recognized human rights . . . ."
The President must tell the Congress why
security assistance to such governments
should not be reduced or ended. Thus 502B
requires the U.S. Government to hold
friendly and allied governments to human
rights standards rarely attained by their
potential adversaries or indeed by the pres-
ent-day majority of U.N. members. If they
fail to measure up, we are required to end
military aid or cut it from the level which
the Congress has already authorized in pur-
suit of our national security interests. In
other words, the left hand of Congress seeks
to take away what the right hand of Con-
gress has given. In our view, few govern-
ments can be expected to respond as we
might desire to such public U.S. Govern-
ment judgments on their internal affairs,
and therefore this provision advances
neither human rights nor security.

— Last February, despite our pleas, the
Congress cut off arms transfers to Turkey,
including items that nation had already paid
for, to force concessions on Cyprus. The
cutoff triggered a wave of Turkish anti-
Americanism and a later Turkish Govern-
ment decision to suspend American use of a
number of Turkish bases. Now the Congress
has partially lifted the embargo, but the
damage will never be completely repaired.
Our current base negotiations with them are
extremely tough. This affects the security
of the southern flank of NATO and of the
eastern Mediterranean, as as well as intelli-
gence gathering important to our efforts to
protect our own security and monitor com-
pliance with arms control agreements.
Meanwhile, there has been no progress in
Cyprus; in fact, some would suggest that
the embargo stiffened the Turkish bargain-
ing position.

We realize of course that the Congress

has taken these actions partly because of
frustration at executive branch efforts to
achieve the same objectives through quiet
diplomacy. We would contend that given the
inherent limits on the ability of the United
States to modify the behavior of sovereign
governments, we have done about as well
as could be expected on these issues. But
legislative restrictions, because they are in-
herently provocative, tend to create a back-
lash from the governments we are seeking
to influence; because they are enacted in
isolation, without adequate consideration of
our overall foreign policy interests, they
often have unintended adverse consequences
in other areas.

The Handling of Classified Information

As congressional oversight of foreign pol-
icy increases, so do problems relating to the
handling and public release of classified in-
formation transmitted from the executive
to the Congress. This Administration has
provided unprecedented amounts and kinds
of classified information to the Congress in
recent months. Some committees have re-
spected the confidentiality of this informa-
tion; other committees, or their individual
members, have not. I am not adopting a
"less-leaky-than-thou" posture toward the
Congress. Nevertheless we are distressed to
see some of this information find its way into
the press shortly after we transmit it to the
Congress or published by Congress without
our concurrence.

We know that there are dangers in over-
classification and that the "national secu-
rity" justification for secrecy has been
abused in the past to protect erring officials.
But we cannot ignore the dangers arising
from the inability to protect properly classi-
fied information.

The publication of information revealing
intelligence-gathering methods and their
effectiveness, as one committee did in a
report on the 1973 Middle East war, over our
protest, allows the unwitting sources of such
intelligence to take effective countermeas-
ures in the future.

February 9, 1976

151

Likewise, the publication of the texts of
diplomatic exchanges, as one committee did,
despite our objection, in its report on the
1975 Sinai agreement, can freeze the posi-
tions of the protagonists and inhibit the
process of negotiation and compromise.

The leaking of covert operations by indi-
vidual Congressmen — who themselves are
unwilling to take public responsibility for
their actions — makes these operations im-
possible. The Administration believes that
we should maintain a covert action capabil-
ity, for certain situations and under appro-
priate congressional oversight, as an alter-
native to either inaction or open involve-
ment. But in effect, our foreign policy in
these areas can gyrate out of executive and
congressional control and become subject to
the veto by leak of individual members of
Congress.

Conclusion

The lack of bipartisanship and consensus
I have described should be a source of con-
cern to all Americans who are interested in
effective American participation in world
affairs. This deficiency requires action by
the executive, the Congress, and the public,
particularly foreign-policy-oriented organi-
zations such as the World Affairs Council.

For our part, the Administration recog-
nizes that the Congress has a proper con-
stitutionally based role in the formulation
of foreign policy through advice and consent
to nominations and treaties, through legis-
lation and appropriations. It also has re-
sponsibilities for oversight of policy imple-
mentation. We are complying with current
legislation requiring us to inform or con-
sult with the Congress. We are determined
to pursue partnership with the Congress,
and we are involving an increasing number
of officers at all levels of the Department in
these consultations so that both sides will
understand each other's attitudes and re-
quirements.

We hope that the Congress will find a way
to organize itself to exercise its foreign pol-
icy responsibilities more effectively. The

structures and procedures are for the Con-
gress to decide, but I would suggest two pos-
sibly relevant models:

— The first is the recently created Budget
Committees of both Houses, which are now
charged with establishing budget ceilings
and an overview of the budgetary process
which was previously diffused among many
different committees.

— The second model is the executive
branch's National Security Council, includ-
ing representatives of all interested depart-
ments and agencies, which studies national
security issues and gives the President co-
herent analysis and recommendations on the
policy options available to him.

If the Congress could establish a structure
to deal with the overall foreign policy pic-
ture, as well as related procedural issues
such as consultation with the executive and
the handling of classified material, its ac-
tions would be less piecemeal, less subject
to special pleading, and more internally con-
sistent.

It is the conventional wisdom that noth-
ing much can be accomplished on major
foreign policy issues in an election year. But
our electorate need not — indeed, should not
— passively accept this traditional state of
affairs. I believe that organizations such as
the World Affairs Council can play a useful
role in the election debate by asking candi-
dates their views not only on substantive
foreign policy issues but also on the insti-
tutional and procedural problems I have
discussed today.

America would benefit from a serious na-
tional dialogue among the people and be-
tween the branches of government about the
international challenges we face, the limits
and possibilities of American action, the
proper division of authority and responsi-
bility for our foreign policy, and the rela-
tionships among the responsible institu-
tions.

Such a debate can lay the foundations for
a consensus on the broad outlines of a for-
eign policy for the early years of our third
century.

152

Depariment of State Bulletin

President Urges Redoubled Efforts
Against Illicit Drug Traffic

Statement by President Ford '

i

,jp Drug abuse is a tragic national problem

hich saps our nation's vitality. It is also a
•'major contributor to our growing crime rate.
All of us must redouble our efforts to com-
bat this problem.

Earlier this week I met with Representa-
tive Charles B. Rangel and other Members
of the Congress to discuss the problem of
drug abuse. The Congressmen reported the
growing availability and use of illicit drugs
and expressed their concern about the con-
tinuing flow of drugs across the southwest
border from Mexico and their continuing
concern about a possible resurgence of her-
oin traffic from Turkey.

Aware of the worsening situation, last
spring I directed a high-priority review of
the entire Federal effort in drug law enforce-
ment, treatment and prevention, and inter-
national control. The resulting White Paper
on Drug Abuse contained a frank assessment
of where we are in these efforts, as well as
a number of comprehensive recommenda-
tions to improve our response to this critical
problem. I endorse the white paper, and the
budget I will submit in January will request
sufficient funds to implement all of its major
recommendations.

This Administration already has begun to
take strong action to deal with the mount-
ing threat, however. I have spoken with
Presidents Echeverria of Mexico and Lopez
Michelsen of Colombia and with Prime Min-
ister Demirel of Turkey in an effort to
strengthen cooperation of other nations in-
volved in the fight against illicit drug traffic.

Because of my particular concern about
the problem of Mexican heroin, I am direct-
ing Secretary of State Kissinger to express
to the Mexican Government my personal
concern that we explore opportunities for

'Issued at Vail, Colo., on Dec. 26 (text from White
House press release, Vail).

improved control. I have also directed the
Domestic Council Drug Abuse Task Force to
present me with specific recommendations
for improving our ability to control drug
trafficking along the southwest border.

I call upon the Congress to enact my pro-
posal for mandatory minimum sentences for
drug traffickers so those who are spreading
this evil throughout our communities will
be put behind bars, where they belong. And
I urge the Congress to ratify the Conven-
tion on Psychotropic Substances so we can
fulfill our obligations to the other nations of
the world to see that strong international
controls exist for all drugs. In the weeks
ahead I will send to the Congress a compre-
hensive message on drug abuse establishing
a framework for a broad government re-
sponse to the problem.

U.S. Relations With Sri Lanka:
Friendship and Mutual Respect

Following are remarks by Alfred L. Ather-
ton, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Near East-
ern and South Asian Affairs, tvhich were
recorded at Washington for broadcast on
December 16 by the Sri Lanka Broadcasting
Corporation.

I am pleased to extend my congratulations
to the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation
on the completion of 50 years of service. As
the United States begins to celebrate its
Bicentennial year, I am happy to have this
opportunity to talk about the friendship and
good relations which our two countries
enjoy.

As we approach the last quarter of the
20th century, the world is entering a new
era, one quite different from the post-World
War II period which saw the end of colonial-
ism in Asia and Africa and a global cold
war. The challenges ahead will be those of
cooperation rather than confrontation — how
to maintain and strengthen the structure of
global peace in a multipolar world and how

February 9, 1976

153

to provide a more satisfactory standard of
living for all nations.

What Ceylonese and Americans have
learned in building our own bilateral rela-
tionship can be of value in meeting these
broader challenges. At times, in the 1950's
and 1960's, discord and disagreement existed
between us. Fortunately, we have both come
to accept that our common interests, aspira-
tions, and shared values transcend the dif-
ferences between us. Today our relations are
friendly because we have learned to appreci-
ate and to respect each other's interests and
views.

What are the principles that guide Amer-
ica's policies toward Sri Lanka? They are:

First, we accept your commitment to non-
alignment and recognize the important posi-
tion your country holds as the host for the
1976 nonaligned summit conference. Dr.
Kissinger summed up our views in a speech
last year when he said : '

The United States accepts nonalignment. In fact,
America sees a world of free, independent, sovereign
states as being decidedly in its own national interest.
Support of national independence and the variety
that goes with it has become a central theme of
American foreign policy.

Second, we seek no special privileges or
special role in South Asia or Sri Lanka. We
want the nations of the region to live at
peace with one another and to develop their
distinct national identities free from exter-
nal interference. We welcome Sri Lanka's
policy of seeking balanced relations with the
United States and with other powers.

Third, we support your efforts to accel-
erate national development. We have sought
to play a constructive role through our eco-
nomic assistance in backing your programs
to provide a better standard of living for all
of your citizens. Nineteen seventy-five, in
fact, marks the 25th anniversary of economic
cooperation between our two countries.

Finally, Americans feel a special affinity
toward Sri Lanka because of our common
adherence to the democratic principles of

government and all that these imply. We may
live halfway around the globe from one
another, but as your Prime Minister, Mrs.
Bandaranaike, has said: "Our two countries
have many things in common, including a
devotion to the parliamentary system of gov-
ernment and free elections." |i

Common interests, mutual respect, and
shared endeavors are thus the foundations
on which our friendship rests. The United
States will do its part to sustain this rela-
tionship.

The world today is marked by the inter-
dependence of all nations, a common fate for
all mankind, and by problems which trans-
cend national boundaries and thus cannot be
solved by purely national efforts. As our two
governments address the problems of our ^
time, the dialogue between the United States
and Sri Lanka contributes significantly to
the search for agreement and compromise
between developed and developing countries.
A willingness to take into account other
views in spite of differences is a fundamental
necessity if the world is to settle the critical
issues facing it through peaceful means.

The United States values its relations with
Sri Lanka and has every expectation that
they will remain warm and friendly. We can
aim at nothing less than continued coopera-
tion and dialogue if we are to meet the re-
quirements of our time, the requirements of
our two nations.

May the friendship of America and Sri
Lanka prosper in the years ahead.

President Ford Pays Tribute |

to Indochina Refugee Program '

Statement by President Ford ' i

Eight months ago, I initiated a program I
designed to open America's doors to refu-
gees from Indochina seeking a new life. To
facilitate their entry, I ordered the estab-

' For Secretary Kissinger's address at New Delhi
on Oct. 28, 1974, see Bulletin of Nov. 25, 1974,
p. 740.

' Issued at Vail, Colo., on Dec. 24 (text from White
House press release. Vail).

154

Department of State Bulletin

lishment of four reception centers in the
United States to house the refugees tempo-
rarily until sponsors came forward to assist
them.

The last remaining refugees departed the
reception center at Fort Chaffee, Ark., on
Saturday, December 20. The closing of that
reception center marks the successful con-
clusion of our organized resettlement pro-
gram. Since its inception in April, over
130,000 refugees passed through these
camps before settling in communities in
every state of the Union.

The success of this massive undertaking
was due mainly to the open-hearted gener-
osity of the American people, who both indi-
vidually and through their churches and
civic groups came forward to sponsor these
newest members of our society.

But the program could not have succeeded
without the efforts of those who worked
long hours in this humanitarian cause. The
nation owes a special tribute to the Inter-
agency Task Force for Indochina Refugees
which I set up on April 18 to coordinate
refugee evacuation, reception, and resettle-
ment and to the voluntary agencies which
handled the sponsorship of the refugees in
American society. To those thousands of
military and civilians, volunteers, and re-
settlement agency personnel who dedicated
these past months to the refugees, we owe
heartfelt thanks. Their work reflects the
truly humanitarian achievement of public
agencies and the private sector working in
harmony. This demonstration of strength
will continually reinforce the refugees as
they begin their journey toward becoming
fully self-sufficient and contributing mem-
bers of our nation's communities.

Initial fears that the refugees would be-
come an ongoing problem are now allayed.
The refugees have proven themselves to be
hard-working and industrious people with
a thirst for education and a deep-seated de-
sire to improve themselves. I am confident
that they will follow the example of former
immigrants who have so richly contributed
to the character and strength of the Ameri-
can system.

The warmth and generosity that have

characterized the welcome that Americans
have given to the refugees serve as a re-
affirmation of American awareness of the
roots and the ideals of our society.

President Ends Temporary Limitation
on Imports of Meat From Canada

A PROCLAMATION'

Termination of Temporary Quantitative Lim-
itation ON the Importation Into the United
States of Certain Beef and Veal From Canada

Whereas, Proclamation No. 4335 of November 16,

1974, issued pursuant to Section 252(a) of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1882(a)) in re-
sponse to unjustifiable restrictions imposed by Canada
on meat imports from the United States, limited
imports into the United States of certain cattle,
beef, veal, swine and pork from Canada, and whereas
that Proclamation inserted item 945.03 into subpart
B of part 2 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules
of the United States (TSUS), and

Whereas, Canada has now lifted those unjustifi-
able restrictions on meat imports from the United
States, and

Whereas, Section 255(b) of the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1885(b)) authorizes the
President to terminate in whole or in part any
proclamation made pursuant to Section 252 of the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1882(a)),
and

Whereas, Proclamation No. 4382 of August 5,

1975, terminated those parts of Proclamation No.
4335 pertaining to the importation of cattle, swine
and pork from Canada and

Whereas, I deem it necessary and appropriate to
terminate the remaining restrictions proclaimed in
Proclamation No. 4335, specifically those imposing
temporary quantitative limitations on the importa-
tion into the United States of certain beef and veal
from Canada, in order to encourage trade between
the United States and Canada.

Now, Therefore, I. Gerald R. Ford, President of
the United States of America, acting under authority
vested in me by the Constitution and statutes, in-
cluding Section 255(b) of the Trade Expansion Act
of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1885(b)) do hereby proclaim that:

1) Proclamation No. 4335 is terminated.

2) Subpart B of part 2 of the Appendix to the
TSUS is amended as follows:

(a) By deleting the superior heading immediately
preceding item 945.03.

(b) By deleting item 945.03.

' No. 4410, 41 Fed, Reg. 749.

February 9, 1976

155

3) This Proclamation is effective with respect to
articles entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for
consumption after 12:01 a.m. EST, January 1, 1976.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my
hand this thirty-first day of December in the year of
our Lord nineteen hundred and seventy-five and of
the Independence of the United States of America
the two hundredth.

Gerald R. Ford.

THE CONGRESS

Department Discusses Formulation
of Foreign Agricultural Policy

Statement by Charles W. Robinson
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs ^

I appreciate the opportunity to appear
today to comment on the process of foreign
agricultural policy formulation.

Your invitation to the Department of
State to participate in a hearing of a sub-
committee of the Senate Committee on Agri-
culture and Forestry highlights the increas-
ingly important relationship between agri-
cultural policy and our overall foreign policy.

In my present position, I am especially
aware that agriculture is a central and im-
portant contributor to the success of U.S.
foreign economic policy. Agricultural ex-
ports have accounted for a substantial share
of total U.S. exports, and they have in-
creased rapidly in recent years. In 1975 U.S.
agricultural exports were valued at an esti-
mated $21.8 billion, compared with $7.2 bil-
lion in 1970. The estimated $13 billion sur-
plus in U.S. agricultural trade contributed
mightily to our record trade surplus last
year.

' Made before the Subcommittee on Foreign Agri-
cultural Policy of the Senate Committee on Agricul-
ture and Forestry on Jan. 22. The complete transcript
of the hearings will be published by the committee
and will be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20402.

The splendid contribution of U.S. agricul-
ture to American economic strength inter-
nationally has been possible under the
Administration's policies of strengthening
markets at home and abroad for our agri-
cultural production. These policies have
proved mutually beneficial for the American
farmer, the American consumer, the Amer-
ican taxpayer, and for our trading partners
abroad. The expansion of agricultural ex-
ports has permitted us to pursue a policy
based on dismantling the decades-old system
of production restraints. Fuller pi'oduction
has enabled us to serve the growing foreign
demand for U.S. agricultural output while
at the same time providing ample supplies
for American consumers.

The competitiveness of U.S. agriculture
in world markets has been enhanced by
monetary adjustments during the 1970's.
We intend to maintain the gains which
American farmers have recently enjoyed
abroad. To this end, the United States will
insist that agriculture shares in the benefits
of trade liberalizations which result from
the multilateral trade negotiations currently
underway in Geneva.

There have of course been a few limited
exceptions to our open market policy for
exports in recent years. In 1973 soybean ex-
ports to all countries were restricted briefly
under the Export Administration Act, and
in 1974 grain sales to the Soviet Union were
temporarily suspended by exporters at the
request of the Administration.

In 1975, large Soviet purchases (nearly
10 million tons) early in the crop year and
the prospect of even larger, potentially dis-
ruptive purchases by the U.S.S.R. and other
Eastern European countries required a
temporary suspension of U.S. grain trans-
actions with the Soviets. This permitted the
overall assessment of supply and demand
which was necessary to assure that addi-
tional sales to those countries would not
bring about significant grain shortages else-
where in the world. The suspension also
provided the time necessary to obtain a long-
term commitment from the Soviets on an-
nual purchases from the United States. Both
decisions — to request suspension of sales to

156

Department of State Bulletin

the Soviets and to conclude an agreement
with them — were taken by the President
after full consultation with appropriate Cab-
inet officers and White House staff. Time
has confirmed the wisdom of these decisions.

This agreement will moderate the single
most volatile factor in the international
grain market. As a result, American farmers
can plan on a Soviet market for at least 6
million metric tons of wheat and corn annu-
ally. This factor supports our objective of
strong foreign markets. In regularizing
Soviet purchases from year to year, the
agreement will measurably reduce the pros-
pect of unpredictable and massive swings in
Soviet purchasing patterns. This improve-
ment in international markets will make it
easier for the United States to maintain an
open market policy. This was a unique
agreement to handle a unique situation.

We have witnessed an evolution in the
world agi'icultural situation in recent years
as governments, in most developed countries,
at least, have turned attention away from
the problems of agricultural surplus toward
the problems of shortages.

It is obviously vitally important that the
United States respond effectively to develop-
ments in the evolving world agricultural
situation and that we anticipate future prob-
lems and opportunities. Thus we have sought
institutional mechanisms which would bring
together the various elements of the Admin-
istration which have responsibility for the
diverse aspects of economic, agricultural,
and foreign policy. We have begun this
process with the knowledge that certain re-
sponsibilities cannot be delegated. The
Secretary of State, for example, could not
"spin off" a portion of his overall responsi-
bility for foreign policy any more than the
Secretary of Agriculture could relinquish an
important portion of his authority in agri-
cultural policy. Balanced decisionmaking is
necessary to serve the national interest, and
we have carefully designed coordinating
mechanisms which bring together key re-
sponsible officials to consult on solutions to
problems that span the interests of more
than one agency.

These consultations have been used to

reach joint decisions or to formulate recom-
mendations to the President for decision.
The principal examples of such coordinating
groups are :

— The Economic Policy Board-National
Security Council Food Committee created
last September by the President. It includes
the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Agricul-
ture, Labor, and Commerce; the Chairman
of the Council of Economic Advisers; the
Director of the Office of Management and
Budget; the Assistant to the President for
Economic Affairs; the Executive Director
of the Council on International Economic
Policy; and the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs. Established
to monitor sales of feed grains and wheat to
the Soviet Union, the Committee played an
important role during the U.S.-Soviet grain
negotiations in formulating instructions to
the U.S. negotiators. It has a continuing
mandate to develop and maintain data on
grain production and exports.

— The Food Deputies Group of the Eco-
nomic Policy Board meets weekly, bringing
together representatives of all domestic and
foreign agencies with a substantial interest
in food policy.

— The International Food Review Group,
chaired by the Secretary of State with the
Secretary of Agriculture as Vice Chairman.
The IFRG and its working group at the as-
sistant-secretary level were established to
coordinate U.S. followup activities to the
World Food Conference.

We found during the summer months that
the formulation and execution of grain ex-
port policy required several high-level inter-
agency meetings. These took place both be-
fore August 11, when Secretary [of Agri-
culture Earl L.] Butz announced the tempo-
rary suspension of sales to the Soviet Union,
and frequently thereafter until the President
announced conclusion of the grain agreement
on October 20. This process was successful
in insuring that the agreement served both
the interests of domestic producers and con-
sumers and foreign policy considerations.

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. grain agreement which
resulted removed a major element of uncer-

February 9, 1976

157

tainty from international grain markets. We
expect that this agreement will simplify
both foreign policy and agricultural policy
issues involving foreign grain trade. We do
not anticipate a need to depart from the
policies of full production and open markets
which have created unprecedented agricul-
tural productivity in the United States and
made this country the largest exporter of
food the world has known. It is our firm in-
tention to avoid such a departure.

We believe that the long-term agreement
with the U.S.S.R. will provide substantial
benefits for U.S. food producers and con-
sumers and for our maritime industry,
which will participate in grain shipments.
The interagency process which guided these
negotiations assured balanced consideration
of both domestic and foreign policy inter-
ests.

President Ford Urges Continuation
of Grant Military Assistance

Message to the Congress '

To the Congress of the United States:

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, en-
acted by the 93rd Congress on December
30, 1974, expresses the sense of the Con-
gress that the policies and purposes of the
military assistance program should be "re-
examined in light of changes in world con-
ditions and the economic position of the
United States in relation to countries re-
ceiving such assistance." Section 17(a) of
the act expresses the view that the program,
except for military education and training
activities, "should be reduced and termi-
nated as rapidly as feasible consistent with
the security and foreign policy require-
ments of the United States."

To give efi'ect to section 17(a) of the act,
the Congress directed that I submit to the
first session of the 94th Congress a detailed

'Transmitted on Jan. 20 (text from White House
press release).

plan for the "reduction and eventual elimi-
nation of the present military assistance
program." In the intervening period, the two
foreign affairs committees are considering
draft legislation that would arbitrarily ter-
minate grant military assistance programs
after September 30, 1977, unless authorized
by the Congress.

I have stressed repeatedly in my messages
to the Congress and in my reports to the
American people, the need for constancy
and continuity in our foreign policy, and, in
particular, in our relationship with nations
which turn to us for necessary support in
meeting their most pressing security needs.
Since World War II, the United States has
extended such assistance to friends and
allies. This policy has contributed immeasur-
ably to the cause of peace and stability in
the world. Many countries which once re-
ceived grant military assistance have
achieved self-sufficiency in providing for
their security interests, and grant military
assistance to a number of current recipients
is being reduced or eliminated.

I firmly believe that grant military assist-
ance in some form will remain a basic re-
quirement for an effective U.S. foreign pol-
icy for the foreseeable future. In the Middle
East and elsewhere, we must maintain our
flexibility to respond to future assistance
requirements which cannot now be reckoned
with precision. It will continue to be in our
interest to be able to meet the legitimate
security requirements of countries who can-
not shoulder the full burden of their own
defense and grant assistance will continue
to be needed to assist countries that provide
us essential military bases and facilities.
These requirements will not disappear; they
are the necessary result of the unsettled
state of the world and of our role as a world
power.

Nevertheless, in recognition of the ex-
pressed sense of the Congress, I have, in
preparing the 1977 budget and legislative
program, reexamined the policies, purposes,
and scope of the military assistance program
with a view to reducing or terminating any
country programs no longer essential to the
security and foreign policy interests of the

158

Department of State Bulletin

Jnited States. As a consequence of this re-
>iew, the 1977 military assistance budget
•equest will reflect a 28 percent reduction
)elow the 1976 request, the termination of
rrant materiel assistance to Korea, and
'limination of five small grant programs in
^^atin America. Furthermore, our prelimi-
lary estimate of the 1978 requirements in-
Hcates that additional reductions and some
idditional program terminations should be
reasible in the absence of unfavorable se-
curity or economic development in the coun-
;ries concerned.

I must emphasize, however, that offsetting
increases in foreign military sales credits
will be required in most instances to meet
the legitimate military needs of our friends
and allies at a time when much of their mili-
tary equipment is reaching obsolescence and
prices of new equipment are increasing dras-
tically. Moreover, the capacities of many of
these grant military aid recipients to assume
additional foreign exchange costs because of
reduced military aid are limited by the
necessity to cope with higher oil prices as
well as the impact of the recession in the
developed countries on their exports. In
these circumstances, I believe the interests
of the United States in the continued se-
curity of these countries are better served
by a gradual reduction of grant military as-
sistance attuned to the particular circum-
stances of each country than by an arbitrary
termination of all such assistance on a given
date.

I Finally, I must emphasize that in this un-
' certain and unpredictable era we must main-
tain our national strength and our national
purposes and remain faithful to our friends
and allies. In these times, we must not deny
ourselves the capacity to meet international
crises and problems with all the instruments
now at our disposal. I urge the Congress to
preserve the authorities in law to provide
grant military aid, an instrument of our na-
tional security and foreign policy that has
served the national interest well for more
than 30 years.

Gerald R. Ford.

The White House, January 20, 1976.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Coffee

Protocol for the continuation in force of the inter-
national coffee agreement 1968, as amended and
extended, with annex. Approved by the Interna-
tional Coffee Council at London September 26,
1974. Entered into force October 1, 1975.
Acceptance deposited: United States, January 7,

1976.
Ratification deposited: Haiti, December 29, 1975.

Energy

Agreement on an international energy program.
Done at Paris November 18, 1974.
Notification of consent to be bound deposited:

United States, January 9, 1976.
Entered into force: January 19, 1976.

Health

Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the Constitu-
tion of the World Health Organization of July 22,
1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086).
Adopted at Geneva May 22, 1973.'
Acceptances deposited: Ethiopia, January 9, 1976;
Paraguay, January 15, 1976.

Telecommunications

Telephone regulations, with appendices and final
protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered
into force September 1, 1974."

Senate advice and consent to ratification, ivith
declarations: January 22, 1976.

Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annex and
final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973.
Entered into force September 1, 1974.°
Senate advice and consent to ratification, with
declarations: January 22, 1976.

International telecommunication convention with an-
nexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos
October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1,
1975.=

Senate advice and consent to ratification, with
declaration: January 22, 1976.

Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva,
1959, as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590,
7435), to establish a new frequency allotment plan
for high-frequency radiotelephone coast stations,
with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva
June 8, 1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976."

' Not in force.

' Not in force for the United States.

February 9, 1976

159

Senate advice and consent to ratification, with
reservation: January 22, 1976.

Terrorism — Protection of Diplomats

Convention on the prevention and punishment of
crimes against internationally protected persons,
including diplomatic agents. Done at New York
December 14, 1973.'

Ratification deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, January 15, 1976.

War

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition

of wounded and sick in armed forces in the field ;

Geneva convention for amelioration of the condition

of wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of

armed forces at sea;

Geneva convention relative to the treatment of

prisoners of war;
Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian
persons in time of war.

Done at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into

force October 21, 1950; for the United States

February 2, 1956. TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, and

3365, respectively.

Notification of accession: Qatar, January 12, 1976.

Women — Political Rights

Convention on the political rights of women. Done
at New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force
July 7, 1954.=

Senate advice and consent to ratification: Janu-
ary 22, 1976.

Inter-American convention on the granting of politi-
cal rights to women. Signed at Bogota May 2,
1948. Entered into force April 22, 1949.^^
Senate advice and co7isent to ratification: Janu-
ary 22, 1976.

World Heritage

Convention concerning the protection of the world
cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris
November 16, 1972. Entered into force December
17, 1975.
Ratification deposited: Morocco, October 28, 1975.

BILATERAL

Egypt

Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles and
cotton textile products, with annexes. Effected by
exchange of notes at Cairo December 30, 1975.
Entered into force December 30, 1975; effective
January 1, 1975.

Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles, as
extended (TIAS 7828, 8004). Effected by ex-
change of notes at Washington May 10, 1974.
Entered into force May 10, 1974.
Terminated: January 1, 1975.

.

Ji"

Thailand

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool anc
man-made fiber textiles and textile products, witl
annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Bang-
kok December 29, 1975. Entered into force Decem-
ber 29, 1975; effective January 1, 1976.

Agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles, with
annex, as amended (TIAS 7299, 8053). Effected
by exchange of notes at Bangkok March 16, 1972
Entered into force March 16, 1972; effective April|(iei
1, 1972.
Terminated: January 1, 1975.

iJ

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and foreign relations of each country. Each contains
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Pub. 8578 4 pp.

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Pub. 7669 4 pp.

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Pub. 7751 11 pp.

Nuclear Proliferation — Questions and Answers. Ques-
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TIAS 8106. 9 pp. SO(f. (Cat. No. S9.10:8106).

160

Department of State Bulletin

WEX February 9, 1976 Vol. LXXIV, No. 1911

riculture. Department Discusses Formulation

f Foreign Agricultural Policy (Robinson) 156

lin. Letters of Credence (Boya) .... 146

lada. President Ends Temporary Limitation
11 Imports of Meat From Canada (procla-
lation) 155

igress

■artment Discusses Formulation of Foreign

;ricultural Policy (Robinson) 156

Executive and the Congress in Foreign Pol-
v: Conflict or Cooperation?' (Ingersoll) . 147
ident Ford Urges Continuation of Grant
.lilitary Assistance (message to the Con-
rress) 158

E)nomic Affairs. President Ends Temporary
jimitation on Imports of Meat From Canada
proclamation) 155

Freign Aid. President Ford Urges Continua-
ion of Grant Military Assistance (message
0 the Congress) 158

'' icotics Control. President Urges Redoubled
efforts Against Illicit Drug Traffic (state-
nent) 153

? pal. Letters of Credence (Khatri) .... 146

i pua New Guinea. Letters of Credence
Matane) 146

I .\sidential Documents

I ?sident Ends Temporary Limitation on Im-

)orts of Meat From Canada (proclamation) 155
1 -sident Ford Pays Tribute to Indochina

lefugee Program 154

1 3sident Ford Urges Continuation of Grant

Vlilitary Assistance 158

1 ssident Urges Redoubled Efforts Against

llicit Drug Traffic 153

' e State of the Union (excerpt) 145

1 Mications. GPO Sales Publications .... 160

1 fugees. President Ford Pays Tribute to Indo-
■hina Refugee Program (statement) . . . 154

li Lanka. U.S. Relations With Sri Lanka:
Friendship and Mutual Respect (Atherton) . 153

' eaty Information. Current Actions .... 159

■ S.S.R. Department Discusses Formulation of
Foreign Agricultural Policy (Robinson) . 156

Name Index

Atherton, Alfred L., Jr 153

Boya, Setondji Thomas 146

Ford, President 145, 153, 154, 155, 158

Ingersoll, Robert S 147

Khatri, Padma Bahadur 146

Matane, Paulias N 146

Robinson, Charles W 156

Checklist of Department of State

Press Releases: January 19-25

Press releases may be obtained from the

Office of Press Relations, Department of State,

Washingto

n, D.C. 20520.

No. Date

Subject

tl8 1/20

Kissinger: departure, Andrews Air

Force Base, Jan. 19.

tl9 1/20

Kissinger, Jorgensen: news confer-

ence, Copenhagen.

t20 1/21

Kissinger: luncheon toast, Moscow.

21 1/22

Ingersoll: Los Angeles World Af-

fairs Council.

*22 1/22

U.S. and U.S.S.R. to resume oil

negotiations Jan. 26.

*23 1/22

Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission,

Jan. 26.

*24 1/22

Kissinger: remarks, Moscow.

t25 1/23

Kissinger: news conference, Brus-

sels.

*26 1/23

Shipping Coordinating Committee,

Subcommittee on Safety of Life

at Sea, working group on fishing

vessels, Feb. 20.

*27 1/24

Program for official visit of the

Prime Minister of Israel, Jan. 26-

Feb. 6.
inted.

* Not pr

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

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u.s. government printing office

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'■3:

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Vf/J^

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXIV • No. 1912 • February 16, 1976

SECRETARY KISSINGER VISITS COPENHAGEN, MOSCOW,
BRUSSELS, AND MADRID 161

IMPLICATIONS OF ANGOLA FOR FUTURE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Statement by Secretary Kissinger 17 U

UNITED STATES VETOES CHANGE IN FRAMEWORK
FOR MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS

Statements by Ambassador Moynihan in the U.N. Security Council,
Department Statement, and Text of Draft Resolution 189

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIf'

Vol. LXXIV, No. 1912
February 16, 1976

For ule by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office

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Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may be
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature,

The Department of State BVLLETh
a weekly publication issued by tl
Office of Media Services, Bureau
Public Affairs, provides tlie public a)
interested agencies of tfte governme,
witfi information on developments
tfie field of U.S. foreign relations ai
on tfie work of tfie Department ai
tfie Foreign Service.
Tfie BULLETIN includes seleeti
press releases on foreign policy, itsui
by tfte Wftite House and the Depot
ment, and statements, addresst
and news conferences of tfte Presid*,
and the Secretary of State and oth
officers of the Department, as well i
special articles on variotis phases
international affairs and the functioi
of the Department. Information
included concerning treaties and inte
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United States is or may become
party and on treaties of general inte
national interest.

Publications of the Department (
State, United Nations documents, rni'
legislative material in the field <
international relations are also listei

TJecretary Kissinger Visits Copenhagen, Moscow, Brussels, and Madrid

Secretary Kissinger left Washington Jan-
lary 19 for a visit to Etirope and returned
January 25. Following are his remarks at
Andreivs Air Force Base upon his departure,
lis press conference tvith Danish Prime
llinister Anker Jorgensen at Copenhagen on
[January 20, his toast at a luncheon given
nj Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gro-
nyko at Moscow on January 21, the text of a
oint communique issued at Moscow on Janu-
iry 23, the Secretary's neivs conference at
\'ATO Headquarters at Brussels on Janu-
iry 23, his exchange of remarks with Spanish
"oreign Minister Jose Maria de Areilza upon
u-rival at Madrid on January 2U, his news
conference with the Spanish Foreign Min-
ster that day, and his toast at a dinner given
)jj the Foreign Minister that evening.

DEPARTURE, ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE,
lANUARY 19

Press release 18 dated January 20

The President has asked me to go to Mos-
cow to see whether any progress can be made
in limiting the nuclear arms race. Limiting
the nuclear arms race and ending it is in
the interest of all Americans and in the in-
terest of the world.

But I am also going to Moscow to make
clear to my hosts that the United States
will not accept Soviet intervention in other
parts of the world and that the continuation
of such measures must lead to a deteriora-
tion in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Thank you.

NEWS CONFERENCE, COPENHAGEN,
JANUARY 20

Press release 19 dated January 20

Prime Minister Jorgensen: I will start
this little press briefing to say it has been
a pleasure for us to have Mr. Kissinger here
in a too-short stay but we are well satisfied
because Mr. Kissinger has time for it. I
think the best we can do is to give the word
to Mr. Kissinger, and he can tell you some-
thing about the problems we have discussed.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister
and Mr. Foreign Minister: First of all I
would like to express my appreciation, and
also on behalf of all my colleagues, for the
very warm and friendly reception we have
had here. I have read some of the specula-
tions in the Danish press about the reason
for my visit here, and I wish I were as com-
plicated and profound as the newspapers
give me credit for.

This meeting came about because the
Prime Minister visited us in Washington in
November. He suggested that on my next
visit through Copenhagen on the way some-
where, I should spend some time, come into
town, and continue the very good exchange
that he and I had and he and the President
have had on the occasion of his visit. It is
pure coincidence that I am here the day after
the conclusion of the meeting of the Euro-
pean Socialist parties.

The Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister,
and our government have had the closest con-
sultations on a whole range of the subjects
of common interest. And it is in the nature

February 16, 1976

161

now of international politics that there are
no longer purely bilateral issues. The peace
of the world is of great consequence for a
country like Denmark. This is why today
we discussed the following issues: We dis-
cussed East-West relations and what we ex-
pect to achieve on the trip to Moscow; we
discussed the situation in Africa, with par-
ticular emphasis on the problem of Angola;
we discussed the future evolution of the
European Community, and I think we agree
that the relations between Europe and the
United States are extremely good at this
moment. Consultations between Europe and
the United States are close.

I expressed the American position that
we favor European unity, we will do every-
thing we can to encourage it, but ultimately
it is for the Europeans to achieve. I ex-
pressed my appreciation to the Prime Min-
ister and the Foreign Minister for the very
constructive role that Denmark has played
both in achieving European unity and in en-
couraging the dialogue between Europe and
the United States.

Finally, and it is the last topic and the one
that did not take most of the time, the Prime
Minister gave me an account of the meeting
of the European Socialist parties, and we
exchanged ideas on some of the problems
that emerged out of this meeting. And 1
want to make clear that if the meeting had
not taken place, I would still have visited
here and that the subjects we had to discuss
had nothing to do with meetings of Euro-
pean political parties, but with world peace,
Atlantic cooperation, European evolution.
And with this perhaps, Mr. Prime Minister,
we should answer some questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you satisfied with
the Socialist parties' decision to leave it to
each NATO country whether or not they
want Communists in their government?

Secretary Kissinger: The domestic evolu-
tion of European countries has to be for
each European country itself to determine.
On the other hand, when we are asked for our
opinion, we give our views, and we will not
falsify our views. Our view is that the partici-

pation of Communist parties in Europeai
governments will have consequences foi
NATO, will have consequences for inter
national politics in general. Having said that
I agree that it is up to each government tc
decide for itself how to proceed.

Q. Can you see a reason that the first stepf-
for peace you made in the Middle East can
be damaged by the war notv in Lebanon?

Secretary Kissinger: The question is
whether I believe that the steps toward
peace that have been taken in the Middle
East could be jeopardized by the war, the
conflict in Lebanon. Of course the conflict inil
Lebanon is a tragedy for the country and fori
the community that lives in Lebanon. Sec-
ondly, it has the potential of drawing in out-
side powers and therefore it could jeopardize*
all that has been achieved in recent years.

The United States has warned all the in-
terested parties — and I want to repeat it
here — against any unilateral act that could
lead to an expansion of the conflict in Leb-
anon to wider areas, and the United States
will oppose any unilateral act by any country
that would lead to an expansion of hostilities.

Further than this, we believe that the in-
ternational community has an obligation to
end the killing that is going on in Lebanon
and to use its mediating efforts to permit
both communities to coexist in peace as they
have for so many decades and to put an end
to the civil strife that now goes on.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, there are rumors that
you are contemplating taking up the step-by-
step diplomacy in the Middle East again.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, not before I
have i-estored my sanity from the last.
[Laughter.]

Q. Are you going to discuss the Mideast
situation with the Russian — with the Soviet
leaders as for the Sectirity Council meeting
in those days?

Secretary Kissinger: No doubt the ques-
tion of the Middle East will come up, but the
possibility of cooperation in political fields
between the United States and the Soviet

162

Department of State Bulletin

Union is complicated by the situation in
Angola.

Q. In the latest issue of Foreign Affairs
quarterly, Mr. Paul Nitze is ivriting the
United States is moving toward the posture
of the minimum deterrent in which we —
that is, the United States — would be conced-
ing to the Soviet Union the potential for
military and political victory if deterrence
fails. Have you any comments on that state-
ment?

Secretary Kissinger: I totally disagree
with this. The United States has maintained
very large strategic forces and will never
concede to the Soviet Union the possibilities
of military victory. But what has to be ac-
cepted is the fact that, with the multiplica-
tion of strategic forces on both sides, the
limit of what can be strategically significant
will inevitably be reached. This does not
mean that you cannot do additional damage,
but it means that at a certain level of cas-
ualties that you have hundreds of millions of
casualties on both sides. Additional incre-
ments will not make a significant political
difference, and therefore it is our belief that
we must maintain the strategic balance.

We will never concede strategic superi-
ority to the Soviet Union. But we must also
attempt to limit the arms race in strategic
nuclear weapons, and this is a necessity not
only for the United States and the Soviet
Union but for the world at large. This is the
reason I am going to Moscow. It is all the
more important because we have to
strengthen other forces within the strategic
nuclear context.

Q. [Deals with trade liberalization policies
and protectionist measures or pressures in
the United States.']

Secretary Kissinger: The U.S. Govern-
ment is not always unanimous before it takes
decisions, but the policies that I have out-
lined on behalf of the U.S. Administration in
September remain valid.

Secondly, in trade negotiations we will
pursue what we hope will be considered
liberal and progressive policies based on our

convictions that the global economy has be-
come interdependent; that no nation can
survive by pursuing its own narrow national
interests.

Q. Mr. Secretary, ivhen you said that your
visit to Moscow ivill be complicated by the
situation in Angola, what cards do you have
to play?

Secretary Kissinger: I pointed out before
1 left that both superpowers have their re-
sponsibilities to conduct themselves with
restraint in other parts of the world. The
gains they can make in one place will surely
be offset by gains the other country makes
some other place, but a policy of offsetting
gains will lead to the traditional conflicts
that have always led to the risk of wars, and
this is what all farsighted statesmen now
have an obligation to avoid. It is in this spirit
that we will attempt to conduct our discus-
sions in Moscow.

Q. Mr. Secretary, ivith Angola and with
complaints about continuous Soviet military
buildup, which optimistic signs bring you to
Moscoio now?

Secretary Kissinger: I am going to Mos-
cow because the necessities of world peace
are not affected by our electoral process or
by the day-to-day changes in politics. The
Soviet military buildup is partly a result of
the growth of Soviet industry and the
growth of Soviet technology, and it is well
within our capabilities to match it. We have
an obligation to make sure that the Soviet
Union does not gain a military advantage,
and we will do our utmost to prevent it. I
am going to Moscow in an attempt to keep
open the options for a more peaceful future,
and that is an obligation any national leader
has at this moment.

TOAST BY SECRETARY KISSINGER,
MOSCOW, JANUARY 21

Press release 20 dated January 21

Mr. Foreign Minister, ladies and gentle-
men: I have not counted it precisely, but

February 16, 1976

163

there must now have been more than 15
occasions, during less than four years, when
we have visited each other in our respective
countries or met in third countries to discuss
the serious issues of our times. As in the
past, my associates and I appreciate your
hospitality and the thoughtful arrangements
you have made for our stay here.

Our meetings, though not without their
relaxing moments, have always concentrated
on the hard tasks we face together. The dis-
cussions I am having on this occasion with
your General Secretary, you, and your col-
leagues are no exception.

Since the beginning of our new relation-
ship, our two countries have recognized the
enoi'mous and fateful special responsibility
resting upon us as the most powerful nations
of the world to manage our affairs so that a
secure peace can be built. Three years ago,
at the summit meeting of 1972, we concluded
significant first agreements to limit defen-
sive and offensive strategic weapons; we
enunciated principles to govern our relations
so that not only we ourselves would benefit
from them but that security and peace every-
where would be strengthened ; we signed sev-
eral bilateral cooperative agreements. Since
then. President Ford has carried our rela-
tionship forward, building on those first
accomplishments; our frequent contacts at
the highest levels are a part of that process.

Today, we are faced with the challenge of
giving fresh momentum to our dialogue, on
issues that are much more complex. For we
have learned already that the evolution we
have mapped out is not automatic; it re-
quires persevering effort, imagination, and
courage, and above all, that scrupulous re-
spect for the interests of all concerned to
which we have so often referred in our joint
documents and in our meetings.

Our discussions here on this occasion are
focused once again on the limitation of stra-
tegic arms. We must give substance and
binding force to the accords agreed upon
by the President and the General Secretary
in Vladivostok 14 months ago. On the success
of this effort depends the fulfillment of the
commitment we have both made before the

164

whole world that we will achieve not on!
the limitation but the actual reduction (
the levels of strategic offensive arms.

Each of us, Mr. Foreign Minister, mu?
if we fail, answer — to his own people, to tl
world at large, and to history — the que
tion: Did this or that specific, possibly qui
technical issue, justify the failure or pr,j
longed delay of the total effort — did we cj
everything in our power to spare mankir
the burdens and risks of a nuclear arn
race?

I can assure you that this question hi
been asked many times in the deliberatioi
of my government; and in answering it
ourselves, honestly and with the full respm
sibility inherent in our positions, we ha^
strengthened our resolve to seek an equitabi
and mutually acceptable outcome. We bi
lieve we have a right to ask a similar ai|
proach from you. Our task is a common oni
just as success in its accomplishment w:
be to our common advantage and failua
will leave us both losers.

Strategic arms limitation is perhaps tl
most concrete task we face together, but
is far from the only one. In recent weeks ^
have found ourselves with differing or o|
posing views on important issues bearing a
international peace and security. We belief
that the restraint, and respect for ea((
other's interests, and the understandin,
concerning the avoidance of crisis situation
and the acquisition of unilateral advanta;
remain at the core of the search for a stab
world order.

These principles are part of our sped*
responsibility. They must be applied to spu
cific situations wherever they arise, for th«
must be the norm of international conduct
peace is to be secure and lasting.

We know from history that great powei
will not long accept a diminution of the
security or inroads into their interests ar
that sooner or later they will seek — and fir
— compensation in some other place or maj
ner. But it is precisely this chain of actid
and reaction that has led to catastrophe i
the past and which must be broken if tH
disasters of history are not to be repeate«!

Department of State Bulletii

e have said to each other and the world

hat we understand these stark realities.

lO we must act in accordance with them.

If we do so, the vistas before us and man-

ind are filled with the most promising

irospects. The choice, Mr. Minister, is ours.

iVe have the capacity to translate our words

•e md our expressed sentiments into deeds

iki md living long-term policies. That is the

an listoric challenge before us, and that is

[low we see these meetings this week.
\ So it is in this spirit — of accomplishment
til )ut of greater tasks yet to be accomplished,
it )f determination to fulfill the obligations
pj placed before us by history to contribute to
^j a just and secure peace — that I ask you to
join me in raising your glasses. To your
iriealth, Mr. Minister, and that of your col-
, leagues ; the wisdom and statesmanship that
we owe it to ourselves and future genera-
, tions to display.

JOINT U.S.-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE, MOSCOW,
t lANUARY 23

I, Press release 24A dated January 23

On 20-23 January in Moscow discussions

■ took place between General Secretary of the
' CPSU Central Committee L.I. Brezhnev,
i Politburo Member and Minister of Foreign

■ Affairs of the USSR A.A. Gromyko and the
United States Secretary of State Henry A.
Kissinger.

The talks touched upon a broad range of
questions of mutual interest to the United
States of America and the Soviet Union.
Taking part in the discussions were, on the
American side, Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Am-
bassador of the U.S.A. to the USSR; Helmut
Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department
of State; Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant
Secretary of State for European Affairs;
William Hyland, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs;
James P. Wade, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense and others ; and on the Soviet
side, V.V. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Minister
of Foreign Affairs; G.M. Korniyenko,
: Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; A.F.

Dobrynin, Ambassador of the USSR to the
U.S.A.; A.M. Alexandrov, Assistant to the
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the CPSU, and others.

Both sides are in agreement that the
course of further strengthening and develop-
ment of relations between the U.S.A. and
the USSR would serve the interests of the
peoples of both countries and is an essential
factor in the cause of relaxation of inter-
national tension and the strengthening of
peace. In the course of the negotiations
special attention was devoted to examination
of concrete questions relating to the work-
ing-out of a new long-term agreement be-
tween the U.S.A. and the USSR on limitation
of strategic offensive weapons, on the basis
of the agreement reached during the negoti-
ations between the President of the U.S.A.
and the General Secretary of the CPSU
Central Committee in Vladivostok in Novem-
ber 1974. Progress was attained on a number
of these questions, and it was agreed that
negotiations will be continued with the aim
of finding mutually acceptable solutions to
the remaining problems.

During examination of the status of ne-
gotiations on reduction of armed forces and
armaments in Central Europe, both sides
had in mind the task of facilitating progress
in these negotiations. There was also an ex-
change of views on a number of other urgent
international problems.

The negotiations took place in a business-
like and constructive atmosphere. Both sides
consider the exchange of views to have been
useful.

NEWS CONFERENCE AT NATO HEADQUARTERS,
BRUSSELS, JANUARY 23

Press release 25 dated January 23

Secretary Kissinger: Before we start, I
would like to say that this is the last time
I will be here while Ambassador [David K.
E.] Bruce is representing the United States.
He is one of the great men in American di-
plomacy. We will miss him enormously here,
but even though he periodically threatens

February 16, 1976

165

to retire, we will press him into service for
something or other when we can catch him
unaware.

Now we will go to your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there are reports that
you have come hack from Moscow with a
Russian suggestion for loivering the Vladi-
vostok ceiling by some amount, and I ivon-
der if you could confirm that and expand
on it?

Secretary Kissinger: I cannot go into the
details of the negotiations here. The possi-
bility in certain contexts together with other
arrangements of lowering the ceiling was
discussed, but I would like to stress that this
is in the context of agreement on several
other issues, and I cannot go any further
into it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, ivhat are the major un-
resolved issues noiv holding up agreement?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, as I
said at the Moscow airport, a number of
issues were resolved and were passed on to
Geneva for technical implementation. Prog-
ress of some significance was made on other
issues, and some other issues still remain to
be resolved. The general category of prob-
lems connected with "Backfire" and certain
aspects of cruise missiles still requires further
study, though progress has been made with
respect to some aspects of it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you discuss the
Middle East this time also — as a whole or
in particular because of the Lebanese prob-
lem ?

Secretary Kissinger: There was a general
discussion of the Middle East primarily as
it relates to the peace process in the Middle
East. I hope you realize that these discus-
sions are supposed to be confidential.
[Laughter.]

Q. [Inaudible.]

Secretary Kissinger: To ask NATO to
intervene in Lebanon? That suggestion was
not made in Moscow. [Laughter.]

Q. On the question of a visit by Mr. Brezh
nev [Leonid L Brezhnev, General Secre-
tary of the Central Committee of th
Communist Party of the Soviet Union] t
Washington or to the United States — in you
opinion, if there is a satisfactory agreemen
on SALT matters and also if Angola is in (
very unsatisfactory condition from the U.S
point of vieiv, do you still envisage a Brezh
nev visit?

Secretary Kissinger: This is a doubh
hypothetical question.

We do not assume that Angola must re
main in an unsatisfactory state as far as th(
United States is concerned in a genera
sense. We have always made clear that ouj
relationship with the Soviet Union depend;
on restraint in other areas; and I hav(
stated publicly on a number of occasions thai
if any country does not exercise restraint ii
one area it could set off a process of actioi
and reaction that can only undermine inter
national stability and the prospects of a U.S.
Soviet rapprochement.

As of now, we are planning, if a satis-
factory agreement is reached, to invite th(
General Secretary to the United States. This
is the plan on which we have been opera-
ting.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask yov
two questions. Are you going to sign or con-
clude tomorroiv in Madrid the Hispano-
American, agreement concerning Americay.
bases in Spain, and hoiv much money is in-
volved? The second question is this one — iv
the Presidential election in the United States,
if the Republicans win do you plan to resign
as Secretary of State?

Secretary Kissinger: What do you think
I am going to do if the Democrats win?
[Laughter.]

With respect to the first question, we
have been negotiating with Spain an agree-
ment of cooperation which includes the bases
but extends to other areas as well, and I
am hopeful that we may be able to sign it
on the occasion of my visit to Spain to-

166

Department of State Bulletin

I morrow. The exact amount that is involved 1
think we should leave for the occasion of my
visit to Spain, since some details still have
to be worked out.

With respect to your second question, I
am grateful that you give me so much time
— until the end of this year. The usual ques-
tion I am asked in the United States is what
I intend to do next month. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, to follow up on the first
I part of that question, this agreement ivith
Spain has been described as a defense treaty.
Is that an accurate description?

Secretary Kissinger: No, it is not an accu-
rate description. It is not a defense treaty;
it is a treaty of cooperation. We will prob-
ably submit it to the Senate in treaty form,
but it is not a mutual defense treaty.

Q. Would you give us your appraisal of
the current state of U.S. detente relation-
ships— ivhat you have learned as a result of
your meeting and your current assess-
ment?

Secretary Kissinger: Our impression is
that the Soviet leaders are interested in
continuing the detente relationship and to
strengthen it. We believe that the negotia-
tions with respect to strategic arms limita-
tions made a positive contribution to that
end. At the same time we have repeatedly
expressed our view that Soviet and Cuban
actions in Angola are not helpful to the
detente relationship.

So I would have to call attention to both
the pluses and the minuses.

Q. Mr. Secretary, during the course of the
meeting this afternoon, sir, did you ask the
allies to make any approaches — diplomatic
steps or any other actions — to affect the
course of events in Angola?

Secretary Kissinger: No. Most of the time
this afternoon was spent on my giving my
evaluation to my colleagues and the Am-
bassadors here of my meetings in Moscow.
I also gave them the American evaluation

of the situation in Angola. We made no re-
quest for any particular step, and the meet-
ing was not in that context.

While we are talking about this after-
noon's meeting, I would like to express my
appreciation that all but two of my col-
leagues came here and thereby gave us an
opportunity to underscore the great impor-
tance we attach to political cooperation
within the NATO alliance and the close rela-
tionship that in fact exists.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it your expectation
that a SALT agreement could be reached
ivith the Soviet Union this year?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that a SALT
agreement with the Soviet Union this year
is possible.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it possible that the
new Soviet proposal to reduce the Vladivo-
stok ceiling might serve as a way of break-
ing the deadlock over the cruise-Backfire-
bomber dilemma?

Secretary Kissinger: I would like to make
clear that the prospect of reduction is in
the context of several other elements of the
agreement, and it may or may not be in-
cluded in the final agreement. We will now
study carefully the specific Soviet proposals
to see whether they lend themselves to ad-
aptation or a response that can bridge the
remaining differences.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you get a foreivam-
ing of the possible Soviet anstver to NATO's
proposal tabled in Vienna last December for
the troop reductions in the center of Europe?

Secretary Kissinger: I think I got some
indication of what the answer is likely to be ;
and I conveyed it to my colleagues, who of
course never reveal what goes on inside the
NATO Council meeting room.

Q. A positive answer or a negative one?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't think I
should discuss it. At any rate, it will be given
to us in a few days.

February 16, 1976

167

Q. Mr. Secretary General, did you have
the impression in Moscow —

Secretary Kissinger: You are giving me
too high a title. [Laughter.]

Q. Did you have the impression in Moscoiv
that the countries of the Warsatv Pact are
atvare of having taken a lead in the field of
armaments? If they are aware of this, why
do you think that they continue to arm
themselves so rapidly? [Questiori asked in
French.']

Secretary Kissinger: This is not a subject
that was discussed, but it is my impression
that in the Communist world the level of
sophistication has not yet been reached
where people believe that an accretion of
power is not politically useful and therefore
they continue to increase their arms. And
we have an obligation to match it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, lohat is your opinion
about the meeting ivhich is going to take
place in Paris tomorroiv and the day after
tomorroxv among Socialists in the Mediter-
ranean area and ivhich is going probably to
close the links between Communists and
Socialists in the Mediterranean area of Eu-
rope ?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I do not want
to be offensive, but I did not realize there
was such a meeting going on. They did not
ask my opinion before they called the meet-
ing, which wounds me deeply. [Laughter.]
Therefore, I do not know exactly what is
planned for the discussion. I have trouble
enough dealing with states without getting
involved with political parties.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you have the occa-
sion today to have any separate talks with
the Turkish Foreign Minister?

Secretary Kissinger: I had a brief talk
with the Turkish Foreign Minister, and I
emphasized to him again the strong Ameri-
can interest in a rapid and equitable solution
of the Cyprus problem, and he expressed
his own views on the subject. Of course, we
shall meet again in Washington on February
11.

Q. What are you planning to do this eve
ning, please? [Laughter.}

Secretary Kissinger: That subject is stil
under discussion. [Laughter.]

ARRIVAL, MADRID, JANUARY 24

Press release 28 dated January 26

Secretary Kissinger

Mr. Foreign Minister: It is a particulai
pleasure for me to visit Spain on this oc-
casion. And we can underline the commu-
nity of interests that exists between Spain
and the United States, and then we can take
an important step toward bringing Spaip
closer to the Atlantic community and to the
European Community.

Spain, which has contributed so much to
the Western civilization, must in our view,
be an integral part of all Western relation-
ships. And the United States is happy that on-
this occasion today, we can participate in
this process. I look forward to my conver-
sations with His Majesty, with the Prime
Minister, and of course, with the Foreign
Minister, where we will be discussing the
hopeful evolution that we all expect for
Spain and in the relationship between Spain
and its traditional friends.

Foreign Minister Areilza

Mr. Secretary: It is a great pleasure for
me to meet you at the Madrid airport, where'
you have been a number of times during the
last two years.

Your presence here has a particular mean-
ing because it underlines the profound
friendship and the feelings of fair coopera-
tion existing between our two countries.

The Spanish Government and the whole
of Spain are happy to have you among us.
And they expect that this afternoon, in an
act that I venture to describe as historic,
we shall sign our names at the bottom of a
document that underlines the essential
friendship and cooperation between our two
countries.

That is all, Mr. Secretary.

168

Department of State Bulletin

NEWS CONFERENCE, MADRID, JANUARY 24

it

Press release 29 dated January 26

Foreign Minister Areilza: Only a few
moments ago, Mr. Kissinger, Secretary of
State of the United States of America, and
myself signed a Treaty of Friendship and
PCooperation Between the United States and
■Spain.

I think it is very important for us to con-
sider this treaty as a capital step along the
way of a new formal cooperation between
our two countries. Then, I believe that this
is capital not only because it inaugurates
the coming of a new era to our relatioTis
but also because, in the 200 years since its
independence, the United States has only
signed six treaties. This is now the seventh ;
and, I believe, this is the most significant of
all.

I believe also that this treaty is significant
in the sense that the time of isolation is over.
I believe that it has become necessary for
all countries to become linked with the re-
maining members of the international com-
munity, and I think that it has become
necessary to strengthen the ties that link
countries to the utmost both in the formal
aspects and as regards contacts. This, I
think, has been the object which we have
finally achieved after so many months of
negotiations.

I think this treaty is also important be-
cause it underlines the true main character-
istics which, in my mind, are prevalent in
the relation between our two countries.
Alongside, I think it underlines the will
of the joint pursuit of cooperation, and in
order to obtain the defense of the values
which are common to us, and also because it
reflects the balance which has finally been
achieved.

Now ladies and gentlemen, I would finally
like to thank you for your presence in this
historical palace of Santa Cruz and to wel-
come Mr. Kissinger to this house once
again.

Mr. Kissinger, after this short statement
on my part, will make another statement,
after which there will be time for all of you

to pose as many questions as you want, both
to Mr. Kissinger and to myself. I must, how-
ever, underline one thing. Due to the very
tight schedule of the Secretary of State, it
will become necessary at a given moment
to put an end to this press conference, and
I will indicate when the end is near, so you
can see that the questions are finally going
to be the last ones.
Thank you.

Secretary Kissiyiger: Mr. Minister, ladies
and gentlemen: The United States is very
pleased by the completion of these important
negotiations today through the signatures
which the Minister of Foreign Affairs and
I have just placed on the Treaty of Friend-
ship and Cooperation Between Spain and the
United States.

I regard the completion of this treaty as
an event of great importance. The treaty
covers a wide range of relations between
our two countries. It does not relate to de-
fense matters only but, rather, to the total-
ity of our relations in many diverse fields.
It reflects the strong desire of both countries
for a closer friendship and a wider and more
enriched cooperation. For its part, the
United States will pursue the objectives of
the treaty with great earnestness.

Today's event comes at a moment when
Spain is undergoing the excitement, the in-
spiration, and the challenge of a new era. It
is my hope that this treaty will be seen as a
clear sign of our moral support for Spain at
this particular time. This country faces the
delicate task of striking a balance between
evolution and stability as it moves foi-ward
on the new course which is being charted.
I have the greatest confidence that the proud
and dynamic people of Spain will success-
fully meet the tasks which lie ahead and that
Spain will increasingly enter the mainstream
of those values which link the Western woi-ld
in a common cause.

It is my conviction that this Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation will give added
strength to our historic bilateral ties and
we will also contribute to the deepening of
Spain's role in Western Europe.

Spain can be sure that in the United

February 16, 1976

169

States she has a close friend and confident
supporter.

Q. Mr. Secretary, ivhen do you expect
NATO will be ready to accept Spain as a
member?

Secretary Kissinger: Before I answer any
questions, I would like to tell the Foreign
Minister that in the splendid Spanish hospi-
tality that we have experienced here, I must
only deplore that our correspondents that
travel with me must now insist that press
conferences in Washington be held in a hall
of similar dignity and of similar artistic
value. After 400 years more of history we
may find such a hall, that the privilege of
towering over our correspondents is one that
is well worth waiting for.

The United States has supported and will
of course increasingly support the participa-
tion of Spain in NATO. The rapidity with
which this objective can be achieved depends
in part upon the evolution that I have de-
scribed in my statement and in which the
United States will give sympathetic encour-
agement.

Q. Why is this agreement, which always
has been an executive agreement in the past,
now in a treaty form?

Secretary Kissinger: This treaty in terms
of subject matter is of wider scope and
greater formality than the previous exec-
utive agreements and it therefore symbolizes
the firmness with which we consider these
ties. And we believe, also, that the legislative
branch should be given an opportunity to
reflect this formality in a more solemn form
of treaty ratification which our Constitution
provides.

Q. Will the United States have the right
to use the bases here in the event of hostili-
ties in the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: We have not, in nego-
tiating this treaty, spelled out particular
contingencies in which these bases can be
used, nor have we negotiated particular re-

strictions. Therefore this is not a matter
which is ripe for discussion today.

Q. Mr. Secretary, during your stay in
Brussels, have you had an opportunity to
discuss tvith your colleagues in the Atlantic
Council the content of this treaty, and if so,
ivhat has been the reaction of your allies
regarding possible Spanish participation in
their efforts?

Secretary Kissinger: On this occasion the
purpose of my visit to Brussels was to brief
my colleagues about my visit to Moscow
and not primarily to discuss the subject of
Spain's participation in NATO. We have in-
formed our allies at various stages of our
negotiations, and we have also informed
them of the final conclusion of the treaty.
But we have not had a formal discussion
about Spain's participation since the con-
elusion of this treaty.

Q. Once the treaty is ratified, what ivill be
the difference in practice between the U.S.
response to an attack on Spain and the'
U.S. response to an attack on a NATO ally?'

Secretary Kissinger: The American re-<
action to an attack on a friendly country al-
ways has two components : a legal component
and a moral and political component. That'
is to say, it depends on what our legal obli-
gation is and also on the importance we at-
tach to the relationship and to the country.

It is clear that the legal obligation inher-
ent in this treaty is not of the same order
as the legal obligation in the NATO treaty.
But it is also clear that the political impor-
tance that we attach to our relationship with
Spain is reflected in this treaty and would
be a major factor in our decisions, whatever
the legal obligations.

Q. In view of the situation at present in
Angola and of the black reaction about it,
is NATO still to be considered interesting for
newcomers such as Spain, or can ive vieiv the
fisheries agreement with the Soviet Union
as a kind of balance?

170

Department of State Bulletin

Foreign Minister Areilza: I must say that
we have nevei- asked for entrance into
NATO; but whatever the decision is, when
it comes it will be a question to be decided
by the government at that time, according to
the best interests of Spain. But I must also
add that before this treaty, with other ex-
ecutive agreements that we have had so far,
we have been linked to the largest and most
important member of NATO ; and therefore
this can be interpreted as a counterpart to
the strategic interest and as our contribu-
tion to the strategic interest of the whole
Western defense system.

Now if you are asking me about whether
we are interested in joining NATO or not,
I must answer you that we are interested,
because I understand that NATO is equiva-
lent to the strategic and military infrastruc-
ture which underlies the European Economic
Community, of which we would like to be-
come members. And to finish, I would only
like to add that I don't believe that fish,
even though it is fresh fish, should constitute
a counterbalance of military strategy.

Q. I would like to address a question to
Secretary Kissinger, and that is: ivhat are
the reasons that have led you to change the
reaching of an executive agreement in the
sense of making it a treaty and also to ask
both governments what are the reasons that
provide an increased significance and im-
portance and enrichment to what just a few
months ago appeared to be at variance?

Secretary Kissinger: I have already ex-
plained our reason for submitting it to the
Senate as a treaty, which is to reflect the
increased formality and range of the rela-
tionship which has been designed in the
background. The reason on the American
side why we have proceeded in this fashion,
after extended negotiations, is that in the
new period that Spain is entering and in the
evolution that we are encouraging, we want
to reflect the sympathy and moral support
of the United States.

Q. Mr. Secretary, doesn't this treaty

in-

directly link Spain tvith NATO via the
United States even tho7igh Spain is obviously
not a member of NATO?

Secretary Kissinger: The treaty provides
a mechanism through the Council that is
being formed to promote the coordination
between the U.S.-Spanish effort and the
NATO effort. It therefore provides a means
of coordination which, of course, each indi-
vidual NATO country will have to decide
for itself as far as the organization as a
whole is concerned. But it does reflect the
importance that the United States attaches
to the role of Spain in the defense of the
Atlantic area.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is the treaty somehow
related to the [garbled^ ?

Secretary Kissinger: The treaty was
signed today, and it is completed, and it
stands on its own feet. As far as the United
States is concerned, I have indicated our
support for the political evolution that is
beginning to take place here that will, we
hope, increasingly link Spain to those human
and political values on which the unity of
the West has relied ; and we are attempting
with this treaty to indicate our moral sup-
port for these efforts.

Q. [Garbled.li

Secretary Kissinger: The talks with the
Spanish leaders are still in progress. The
U.S. view as to the direction of this evolu-
tion is clear. The pace of the evolution de-
pends on conditions which the Spanish Gov-
ernment, in which we have confidence, is in
a better position to judge than we are.

Q. Mr. Minister, recently the President of
the Spanish Government, Mr. Arias Na-
varro, has revealed to both Americans and
Spaniards that the bases in Spain are con-
sidered a part of the infrastructure of
NATO, the deterrent power of NATO, and
he qualified the situation as both illogical
and unjust. Hoiv long do you think this situ-
ation is going to continue?

February 16, 1976

171

Foreign Minister Areilza: I believe that
the situation has finished today. And I say
this because in the treaty that we have
signed there is for the first time a clause
which makes a reference to the organic link
between both countries, which is one of the
primary objectives to be reached by both
the United States and Spain. Therefore I
think that for the first time the existence of
such a link is recognized along with the
logical necessity to end a situation that
President Arias qualified as unjust and il-
logical.

Q. Mr. Secretary, has the possible trip of
President Ford to Spain during this year
been discussed today? And if not, do you
think it will be interesting?

Secretary Kissinger: The close ties be-
tween Spain and the United States always
make it interesting for an American Presi-
dent to visit Spain. Of course, President
Ford this year is engaged in many preoc-
cupying domestic activities. But I am sure
he would sympathetically consider an invi-
tation for 1977. And in the meantime, we
look forward to welcoming His Majesty the
King to the United States during this year.

Q. What ivould be the meaning both for
the United States and Spain on the fact that
Rota ivould no longer be a base for nuclear
submarines in 1979?

Foreign Minister Areilza: It has the
meaning that it has been a Spanish petition,
specifically made to the United States, which
has been accepted by the United States even
with the risk that involves its strategic
mechanism. I believe that this is now speci-
fied in the treaty; it is a petition that was
made beforehand and has finally been
granted.

Secretary Kissinger: If I could dare say
that the United States accepted the Spanisli
request because also by 1979 the range of
the missiles carried on American submarines
will be of a nature that the significance of
the forward base will become much less.

TOAST BY SECRETARY KISSINGER,
MADRID, JANUARY 24

Press release 30 dated January 26

Mr. Foreign Minister, Excellencies, aiu
distinguished guests: The delights of Span
ish hospitality as well as the needs of policj
drew me to come to Spain. It is a great
personal pleasure to be here.

The treaty we have negotiated and signed
today is, I believe, a milestone in the rela-
tionship of both our countries.

The tenacity that made Spain great was
made vividly evident to us, Mr. Foreign Min-
ister, in the negotiation of this treaty. Your
predecessor, Seiior Cortina, was a tough
negotiator, and it was fitting and gracious
of you to pay tribute to him. You carried
on the negotiation with equal skill and, I
must add, with equal tenacity, and the suc-
cessful outcome owes much to your dedica-
tion.

With your warm hospitality, Mr. Foreign
Minister, have come warm words of welcome,
spoken with a clarity and grace rare in our
day. I greatly appreciate these words. I know
they represent the sincere aspirations of
both countries to deepen and strengthen a
relationship that is rooted both in mutual
national interest and in the human ties to
which my own nation, celebrating its Bicen-
tennial, owes so much of its heritage.

I must say to our Spanish friends that
your Foreign Minister is a remarkable asset.
He explains Spain's aspirations and foreign
policy with equal eloquence in French, Ger-
man, and English. Our colleagues tell me
something even more notable about your
Foreign Minister — no matter what language
he is speaking, his foreign policy is the same.
This is truly remarkable.

The Foreign Minister has before him a
great task; he has set out to level the
Pyrenees. In demolishing the myth that
Europe begins at the Pyrenees, making them
a simple, though magnificent, mountain
range, the Spanish will have done the rest
of Europe, as well as Spain, a signal service.

172

Department of State Bulletin

I

His Majesty King Juan Carlos I, in his
inaugural message from the throne, made
clear the philosophical necessity of this ef-
fort. It is true, as he said, that the idea of
Europe would be incomplete without Spain,
that the Spanish are Europeans, and that
the Spanish and the other Europeans should
draw the necessary conclusions from this
fact. My government recognizes this and
supports Spain's efforts to make it a reality,
for indeed the Spanish share with the rest
of Western civilization the common heritage
of respect for human dignity.

Benjamin Franklin once said:

. . . God grant that not only the love of liberty,
but a thorough knowledge of the rights of men,
may pervade all nations of the earth, so that a
philosopher may set his foot anywhere on its sur-
face and say ''This is my country."

Therefore the United States supports
Spain's progress, out of the simple under-
standing that we are all part of a wider
Atlantic community, one based on a com-
munity of interests and shared ideals that
must be preserved and protected lest the
chaos that is abroad in the world engulf our
own societies.

The diversity of Western culture — and the
Spanish heritage is one of the principal
founts of culture in the Western world —
enriches our lives. But historical truths and
present challenges require us to enhance the
commonality of our aspirations and institu-
tions. In so doing we preserve for those who
come after us the values and the achieve-
ments of Western civihzation, under which
our singular national identities can flourish.

Mr. Foreign Minister, I congratulate you
on the clarity and consistency of the vision
of Spain's interests which you have set
forth in public and in private. It takes a
great effort of will and compassion to bind
up the wounds, in Abraham Lincoln's phrase,
and in time reunite a people in prosperity
and political consensus so that they may

pursue in tranquillity their private and
public interests.

That spirit, looking toward "an effective
consensus of national concord," in the words
of His Majesty, is much in evidence, and it
has called forth hope and praise in the other
nations of Europe as well as in my own
country.

What Spain does is up to Spain. Others
should not interfere. The United States — and
I speak for President Ford, the American
Government, and the American people — sup-
ports your King, his government, and his
people in the endeavor to lead Spain on a
path of political and social development, with
new ties to the rest of Europe and the At-
lantic community that give full sweep to the
talents and the aspirations of the Spanish
people.

I know these tasks will not be easy. We
are confident that you will have the wisdom
— and will be given the understanding — to
find a Spanish road to full integration with
Europe and the Atlantic community for the
benefit of Spain and the Western world.

In this context, the work that we are com-
pleting this weekend takes on a wider mean-
ing. It fortifies and enriches a bilateral re-
lationship that takes on its greatest impor-
tance as a major linkage among two nations
of the Atlantic community. I think that
it will be quite obvious to all that through
this treaty the interests of Spain have been
enhanced in the forging of a balanced re-
lationship of benefit to both nations. This
treaty is an earnest of my country's support
for the path upon which Spain has em-
barked.

Therefore, Mr. Foreign Minister, I am
extremely grateful to you this evening. I
would like now to propose a toast to His
Majesty King Juan Carlos I, to the success
of the course that he set forth so eloquently,
and to the close friendship between our
peoples.

February 16, 1976

173

THE CONGRESS

Implications of Angola for Future U.S. Foreign Policy

Statement by Secretary Kissinger ^

I appear before you not to score debating
points in an abstract contest over executive-
legislative prerogative. What faces us is a
congressional decision of potentially grave
magnitude taken after the executive branch
had complied with all legal requirements for
the kind of operation involved in Angola and
after eight congressional committees had
been briefed over 20 times without fore-
shadowing any opposition in principle. The
issue is not "victory" of one branch over an-
other. The issue is what constitutes a victory
for the national interest.

I welcome this opportunity to explain the
global significance of what is now happening
in Angola, the events that have brought us
to this point, the U.S. objectives, and the
major consequences which can result if we
fail to pursue those objectives.

The Soviet Union's massive and unprece-
dented intervention in the internal affairs of
Africa — with nearly 200 million dollars'
worth of arms and its military technicians
and advisers, with 11,000 Cuban combat
troops, and with substantial sea and airlift
and naval cover in adjacent waters — is a mat-
ter of urgent concern. Not only are the inter-
ests of the countries directly affected at
stake but also the interests of all nations in
preserving global stability — which is the pre-

'- Made before the Subcommittee on African Affairs
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on
Jan. 29 (text from press release 40). The complete
transcript of the hearings will be published by the
committee and will be available from the Superin-
tendent of Documents. U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

condition for all else mankind aspires to:
accomplish.

In recent years the United States has
sought to help build a new international
order less tied to the traditional patterns ofj
power balances. It was the United States
which took the initiative in seeking to re
solve the most dangerous problems of oun
time by negotiation and cooperation rather
than by force of arms. It was we who sawi
that the historical necessity of this period!
required a more stable relationship betweent
the two nations that possess the capacity tor
destroy civilization.

We have sought — and with some successes —
to build more constructive relations with the*
U.S.S.R. across a broad range: to contain
strategic arms; to institutionalize coopera-
tion in economic, scientific, and cultural
fields; to reduce tensions in areas where our
vital interests impinge on one another; andl
to avoid destabilizing confrontations in pe-
ripheral areas of the globe — such as Angola.
The classical pattern of accumulating mar-
ginal advantages must be overcome andl
mankind must build more constructive pat-
terns if catastrophe is to be avoided. No
one has been more dedicated than the
President and I to working for these
principles.

But our efforts have been founded upon
one fundamental reality: peace requires a
sense of security, and security depends upon
some form of equilibrium between the great
powers. And that equilibrium is impossible
unless the United States remains both strong

174

Department of State Bulletin

and determined to use its strength when re-
quired. This is our historic responsibility,
for no other nation has the capacity to act
in this way. While constantly seeking oppor-
tunities for conciliation, we need to demon-
strate to potential adversaries that coopera-
tion is the only rational alternative. Any
other course will encourage the trends it
seeks to accommodate; a challenge not met
today will tempt far more dangerous crises
tomorrow.

If a continent such as Africa, only recently
freed from external oppression, can be made
the arena for great-power ambitions, if im-
mense quantities of arms can affect far-off
1 events, if large expeditionary forces can be
transported at will to dominate virtually
helpless peoples — then all we have hoped for
in building a more stable and rational inter-
national order is in jeopardy.

The effort of the Soviet Union and Cuba
to take unilateral advantage of a turbulent
local situation where they have never had
any historic interests is a willful, direct as-
sault upon the recent constructive trends in
U.S.-Soviet relations and our efforts to im-
prove relations with Cuba. It is an attempt
to take advantage of our continuing domestic
division and self-torment. Those who have
acted so recklessly must be made to see that
their conduct is unacceptable.

The history of the postwar period should
give us pause. Military aggression, direct or
indirect, has frequently been successfully
dealt with, but never in the absence of a local
balance of forces. U.S. policy in Angola has
sought to help friends achieve this balance.
Angola represents the first time since the
aftermath of World War II that the Soviets
have moved militarily at long distances to
impose a regime of their choice. It is the first
time that the United States has failed to
respond to Soviet military moves outside
their immediate orbit. And it is the first time
that Congress has halted the executive's ac-
tion while it was in the process of meeting
this kind of threat.

Thus to claim that Angola is not an im-
portant country or that the United States
has no important interests there begs the

principal question. The objectives which the
United States has sought in Angola have not
been aimed at defending, or acquiring, intrin-
sic interests in that country. We are not
opposing any particular faction. We could
develop constructive relations with any An-
golan government that derives from the will
of the people. We have never been involved
militarily in Angola. We are not so involved
now. We do not seek to be so involved in the
future.

Our objective is clear and simple: to help
those African countries and those groups
within Angola that would resist external ag-
gression by providing them with needed
financial support. Those whom we seek to as-
sist are our friends; they share our hopes
for negotiated solutions and for African self-
determination. They played a larger role
than the MPLA [Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola] in striving toward
Angolan independence.

But our deeper concern is for global sta-
bility. If the United States is seen to emas-
culate itself in the face of massive, unprece-
dented Soviet and Cuban intervention, what
will be the perception of leaders around the
world as they make decisions concerning
their future security?

Will they feel they can proceed to develop
their nations in an international climate
which fosters cooperation and self-determi-
nation? How will they adjust their conduct
in the context of such events? And what
conclusion will an unopposed superpower
draw when the next opportunity for inter-
vention beckons?

America's modest direct strategic and
economic interests in Angola are not the cen-
tral issue. The question is whether America
still maintains the resolve to act responsibly
as a great power — prepared to face a chal-
lenge when it arises, knowing that preven-
tive action now may make unnecessary a
more costly response later.

Let there be no mistake about it — the cul-
prits in the tragedy that is now unfolding
in Angola are the Soviet Union and its client
state Cuba. But I must note with some sad-
ness that by its actions the Congress has de-

February 16, 1976

175

prived the President of indispensable flexi-
bility in formulating a foreign policy which
we believe to be in our national interest. And
Congress has ignored the crucial truth that
a stable relationship with the Soviet Union
based on mutual restraint will be achieved
only if Soviet lack of restraint carries the
risk of counteraction.

The consequences may well be far-reach-
ing and substantially more painful than the
course we have recommended. When one
great power attempts to obtain special posi-
tions of influence based on military interven-
tions, the other power is sooner or later
bound to act to offset this advantage in some
other place or manner. This will inevitably
lead to a chain of action and reaction typical
of other historic eras in which great powers
maneuvered for advantage, only to find
themselves sooner or later embroiled in a
major crisis and often in open conflict.

It is precisely this pattern that must be
broken — and that we wanted to break until
stopped — if a lasting easing of tensions is to
be achieved. And if it is not broken now, we
will face harder choices and higher costs in
the future.

It is in this context that we have framed
our goals in Angola. Simply put, we wish
to see :

— A cease-fire, ending the tragic bloodshed
in that country;

— Withdrawal of outside forces — Soviet,
Cuban, and South African ;

— -Cessation of foreign military involve-
ment; and

— Negotiations among the Angolan fac-
tions.

We are prepared to accept any solution
that emerges from African efforts. And we
are ready to offer economic assistance to the
people of Angola when a legitimate govern-
ment is established there.

We have consistently advocated such
a government representing all three factions
in Angola. We have never opposed participa-
tion by the Soviet-backed Popular Movement
for the Liberation of Angola, the MPLA.
What we do oppose is the massive Soviet and

Cuban intervention and their expressed aim
of denying the other two groups any part in -
governing the country. Our overriding goal ;
has been to assure that Africans shape their ;
own destiny and that traditional colonialism'!
not be replaced by a more modern version.

For the United States to be found wanting r
as a credible friend, precisely at a time when
moderate African states have clearly and .
repeatedly expressed their hope that Amer-
ica provide the necessary balance to the So-
viet Union and Cuba, will have a major im- :
pact on those countries on the continent of
Africa which resisted all pressures and stuck
by their position even after the Senate cut :
off aid; on our allies in other parts of the :
world who look to us for security ; on other
countries that seek ties with us primarily be- :
cause they see us as the guardian of inter
national equilibrium.

The Record of Events in Angola

Let me briefly recount the course of
events that has led us to this point.

In 1961, the United States declared its
support for self-determination in Portugal's
African territories. At the time, the Na-
tional Front for the Liberation of Angola,
FNLA, was a leading force in the struggle
for Angolan independence. Looking to the
future, we sought to develop a relationship
with the FNLA through providing it
some financial, nonmilitary assistance. The
U.S.S.R. had already established links with
the Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola, MPLA, through the Portuguese
Communist Party. j

The MPLA began military action against
the Portuguese in the midsixties. The Na-
tional Union for the Total Independence of
Angola, UNITA, an offshoot of the FNLA,
also began to fight on a small scale in the
late 1960's. Although these various uncoor-
dinated insurgency efforts caused consider-
able diflSculties for Portugal, they posed no
serious military threat to the dominance of
Portuguese military forces in Angola.

However, the overthrow of the Portu-
guese Government in April 1974 and the

176

Department of State Bulletin

growing strength of the Portuguese Com-
munist Party apparently convinced Moscow
that a "revolutionary situation" was devel-
oping in Angola. The Soviet Union began to
exploit this situation in the fall of 1974
through shipments of some arms and equip-
ment to the MPLA. The United States re-
ceived requests for support from other An-
golan elements at that same time, but turned
them down.

The prospect of an independent Angola
was clouded by the intense rivalry of the
FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA which had de-
veloped over the years. Concerned about the
three factions' failure to end their bitter
quarrel, leaders of other African countries
prevailed upon them to come together with
Portugal and seek agreement. This effort led
to the Alvor Accord of January 1975. Under
its terms a transitional coalition government
was to be established and charged with pre-
iparing for a peaceful turnover of power by
integrating the military forces of the three
movements, writing a constitution, and or-
ganizing an election to take place before
independence, scheduled for November 11,
1975.

This was the moment, when Portugal was
trying to organize a peaceful transition to
independence, for the exercise of restraint
by all outside parties. But the U.S.S.R. and
Portuguese Communists decided to put the
MPLA in power in Angola through stepped-
up shipments of arms. With this kind of en-
couragement, the MPLA had little incentive
to fulfill the terms of the Alvor Accord,
which would have prevented it from domi-
nating any future coalition government.

It is no coincidence that major violence
! broke out in March 1975 when large ship-
ments of Soviet arms began to arrive — thou-
sands of infantry weapons, machineguns,
bazookas, and rockets. On March 23 the first
of repeated military clashes between the
MPLA and FNLA occurred. They increased
in frequency in April, May, and June, when
delivei'ies of Communist arms and equip-
ment, including mortars and armored vehi-
cles, escalated by air and sea. In May the
MPLA forced the FNLA out of the areas

north and east of Luanda and in June took
effective control of Cabinda. On July 9 all-out
civil war began when the MPLA attacked
the FNLA and UNITA, driving i)oth organi-
zations out of Luanda, thereby ending the
short-lived coalition government. By mid-
July the military situation radically favored
the MPLA.

As the military position of the FNLA and
UNITA deteriorated, the Governments of
Zaire and Zambia grew more and more con-
cerned about the implications for their own
security. Those two countries turned to the
United States for assistance in preventing
the Soviet Union and Cuba from imposing a
solution in Angola, becoming a dominant in-
fluence in south-central Africa, and threaten-
ing the stability of the area.

It was at this point that President Ford
decided to respond to requests for help and
to provide military assistance to the FNLA
and UNITA forces through neighboring
black African countries.

In August intelligence reports indicated
the presence of Soviet and Cuban military
advisers, trainers, and troops, including the
first Cuban combat troops. If statements by
Cuban leaders are to be believed, a large
Cuban military training program began in
Angola in June, and Cuban advisers were
probably there before then. By September
the MPLA offensive had forced UNITA out
of several major central and southern Ango-
lan cities. It controlled most of the coastline
except for a strip in the far north, much of
the south, and a wide belt running from
Luanda to the Zaire border in the east.

In early September the poorly equipped
UNITA forces turned in desperation to
South Africa for assistance against the
MPLA, which was overrunning UNITA's
ethnic areas in the south. South Africa re-
sponded by sending in military equipment,
and some military personnel, without con-
sultation with the United States.

The UNITA forces launched a successful
counteroffensive which swept the MPLA out
of the southern and most of the central part
of Angola. In the north the FNLA also made
significant advances. By Independence Day —

February 16, 1976

177

November 11 — the MPLA controlled only the
former colonial capital of Luanda and a
narrow belt across north-central Angola.

In October massive increases in Soviet and
Cuban military assistance began to arrive.
More Cuban troops were ferried to Angola.
Cuba inaugurated its own airlift of troops
in late October. And the MPLA declared
itself the Government of Angola, in viola-
tion of the Alvor Accord.

In the hope of halting a dangerously esca-
lating situation, the United States — using
the leverage provided by our financial sup-
port— undertook a wide range of diplomatic
activity pointing toward a summit of the
Organization of African Unity (OAU)
scheduled for January 1976. Starting in Oc-
tober we made several overtures to the
Soviet Union, expressing our concern over
the scale and purpose of their intervention.
We offered to use our influence to bring
about the cessation of foreign military as-
sistance and to encourage an African solu-
tion if they would do the same. Their
responses were evasive but not totally
negative.

We began to voice our concerns and our
hmited objectives publicly. Beginning with a
speech in Detroit on November 24 we pointed
out that Soviet continuation of an interven-
tionist policy must inevitably threaten our
other relationships and that our sole objec-
tive was an African resolution of an African
problem.^

The Administration undertook a new
series of congressional consultations on the
extent of our help to the Angolan factions
resisting Soviet and Cuban aggression. I
briefed the NATO Foreign Ministers and
obtained significant understanding and sup-
port. Our diplomatic efforts with foreign
governments, especially African govern-
ments, culminated with a mission by Assist-
ant Secretary [for African Affairs William
E.] Schaufele to five African countries and
the dispatch of letters from President Ford to
32 African heads of state, as well as the

^For Secretary Kissinger's address at Detroit,
Mich., on Nov. 24, 1974, see Bulletin of Dec. 15,
1975, p. 841.

Secretary General of the OAU, stating
America's policy.

Throughout this period the U.S. principles
for a solution to the Angolan tragedy were
unambiguous and straightf oi-ward :

— Angola is an African problem and
should be left to Africans to solve.

— Foreign military involvement only esca-
lates and prolongs the warfare there and
should be ended.

— OAU efforts to promote a cease-fire
should be supported.

—The United States pursues no unilateral
interests in Angola and is exclusively con-
cerned with seeing the people of that coun-
try live in peace, independence, and well-
being.

— Angola should be insulated from great-
power conflict.

Our diplomacy was effective so long as we
maintained the leverage of a possible mili-
tary balance. African determination to op-
pose Soviet and Cuban intervention was
becoming more and more evident. On De-
cember 9 President Ford made a formal pro-
posal to the Soviet Government through
their Ambassador. Indeed, it appeared as if
the Soviet Union had begun to take stock.
They halted their airlift from December 9
until December 24.

By mid-December we were hopeful that
the OAU would provide a framework for
eliminating the interference of outside
powers by calling for an end to their inter-
vention. At that point, the impact of our
domestic debate ovenvhelmed the possibili-
ties of diplomacy. After the Senate vote to
block any further aid to Angola, the Cubans
more than doubled their forces and Soviet
military aid was resumed on an even larger
scale. The scope of Soviet-Cuban interven-
tion increased drastically; the cooperative-
ness of Soviet diplomacy declined.

The weight of Soviet aid and advisers
and the massive Cuban expeditionary force
began to tip the scales of battle in Decem-
ber. By this point, most of the effective
fighting for the MPLA was being done by
Cubans. It was clear that the U.S.S.R.,
Cuba, and the MPLA hoped to achieve a

178

Department of State Bulletin

decisive military victory on the eve of the
Organization of African Unity's extraordi-
nary summit conference in Addis Ababa a
few weeks ago. Yet notwithstanding theii-
reverses, the FNLA-UNITA forces still con-
trolled about 70 percent of the territory and
70 percent of the population of Angola at
the time of the conference. An OAU Recon-
ciliation Commission, which had met earlier
in 1975, took the position that none of the
movements should be recognized as the gov-
ernment of Angola. The Commission called
for a cease-fire and the formation of a gov-
ernment of national unity. Thus, those gov-
ernments who recognized the MPLA were
in violation of a decision of the OAU.

At the January OAU summit, 22 members
of the OAU advocated recognition of
the MPLA and condemnation of South
Africa. But they were opposed, in an unusual
demonstration of solidarity, by 22 other
members who held out for a more balanced
resolution, one that would include the fol-
lowing points:

1. An immediate cease-fire;

2. Condemnation of South Africa and im-
mediate withdrawal of all South African
forces ;

3. Withdrawal of all foreign forces;

4. An end to the supply of arms to all
factions ; and

5. Reconciliation of all factions, with the
aim of establishing a government of national
unity.

The United States regarded this program
as reasonable and responsive to the facts of
the situation. But the Soviet Union and
Cuba urged MPLA supporters to refuse to
accept this solution. The summit ended in
impasse.

The United States Position

This, then, is the significance of Angola
and the record to date. In elaborating further
the U.S. position, I want to respond directly
to some of the issues raised in the current
debate.

Our principal objective has been to re-
spond to an unprecedented application of

Soviet poiver achieved in part through the
expeditionary force of a client state.

During 1975 the Soviet Union is estimated
to have contributed nearly 200 million dol-
lars' worth of military assistance to Angola.
This equals the entire amount of all military
aid from all sources to sub-Saharan Africa
in 1974.

Soviet arms have included infantry weap-
ons— machineguns, bazookas, mortars, and
recoilless rifles — armored personnel carriers,
heavy artillery, light and medium tanks,
truck-mounted multitube rocket launchers,
helicopters, and light aircraft. There are un-
confirmed reports that the Soviet Union will
provide the MPLA with MIG-21 aircraft to
be piloted by Cubans.

A total of at least 46 flights of Soviet
heavy and medium military transports have
ferried Soviet military equipment from the
U.S.S.R. to Luanda and Congo (Brazzaville),
while a steady stream of Soviet and Cuban
aircraft has continued to bring Cuban troops
across the Atlantic. Soviet naval involve-
ments clearly related to the Angolan event
have continued in west African waters for
several weeks.

The implications of Cuba's unprecedented
and massive intervention cannot be ignored.
It is a geopolitical event of considerable sig-
nificance. For the first time, Cuba has sent
an expeditionary force to another nation on
another continent. About 11,000 Cuban mili-
tary personnel have been sent to Angola.

If allowed to proceed unchecked, this bla-
tant power play cannot but carry with it far-
reaching implications — including the impact
it will have on the attitudes and future con-
duct of the nations of this hemisphere. In-
deed, friend and foe alike cannot fail to con-
trast the sending of a large Cuban expedi-
tionary force with our apparent inability to
provide even indirect financial assistance.
The failure of the United States to respond
eff'ectively will be regarded in many parts of
the world as an indication of our future
determination to counter similar Communist
interventions.

We have been asked why we do not re-
spond with other pressures on the Soviet
Union.

February 16, 1976

179

The first answer is that many of the links
the Administration has tried to forge — such
as trade and credit, which would have pro-
vided incentives for restraint and levers for
penalties — have been precluded by earlier
congressional actions. But two other instru-
ments have been suggested: wheat sales
and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

A moratorium was placed on wheat sales
for four months in 1975. To use this device
every three months is to blunt it perma-
nently. Above all, economic measures take
too much time to affect a fast-moving situa-
tion like Angola; any longer term impact
would be of little use to those immediately
threatened. We should also ponder whether
we want to return to the situation, now pre-
vented by the grain agreement, in which the
U.S.S.R. can capriciously enter and leave the
U.S. grain trade.

As for the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks, we have never considered these to be
a favor which we grant to the Soviet Union
to be turned on and off according to the ebb
and flow of our relations. The fact is that
limiting the growth of nuclear arsenals is
an overriding global problem that must be
dealt with urgently for our own sake and for
the sake of world peace.

Still, we have made clear that a continua-
tion of actions like those in Angola must
threaten the entire web of Soviet-U.S. rela-
tions. In this sense, both negotiations and
the overall relationship are in long-term
jeopardy unless restraint is exercised. But
there is no substitute for a local balance;
indirect pressures can succeed only if rapid
local victories are foreclosed.

Have we really thought through the impli-
cations of our decisions? Do we really want
the world to conclude that if the Soviet
Union chooses to intervene in a massive way,
and if Cuban or other troops are used as
an expeditionary force, the United States
will not be able to muster the unity or re-
solve to provide even financial assistance to
those who are threatened? Can those faced
with such a threat without hope of assist-
ance from us be expected to resist? Do we
want our potential adversaries to conclude

that, in the event of future challenges, Amer-
ica's internal divisions are likely to deprive
us of even minimal leverage over develop-
ments of global significance?

Our second objective is to help our friends
in black Africa who oppose Soviet and Cuban
intervention.

Only in recent years has Africa become
free of great-power rivalry ; it must not once
again become an arena in which the ambi-
tions of outside forces are pursued. We have
sought with our African friends to maintain
a local balance of power so there can be no
imposed solution that would deprive the
Angolan people of the right to determine
their own destiny.

We are told that we need not concern our-
selves, because in the final analysis and at
some indefinite date in the future, African
nationalism will reassert itself and drive out
foreign influence. Even were this to prove
true, it still ignores the fact that govern-
ments under pressure will be forced to yield
whenever a threat develops. Those who are
threatened cannot afford to wait; they must
decide whether to resist or to adjust. Advice
which counsels patience and confidence in
the verdict of history is a mockery to those
who are concerned for the fate of their coun-
try today. History rarely helps those who
do not help themselves.

Some charge that we have acted in collu-
sion with South Africa. This is untrue. We
had no foreknowledge of South Africa's in-
tentions and in no way cooperated with it
militarily. Nor do we view South African in-
tervention more benevolently than we do the
intervention of other outside powers. Indeed,
we have formally proposed that the removal
of outside forces begin with those of South
Africa and have asked — in vain — for an in-
dication of how soon thereafter Soviet and
Cuban forces would be withdrawn.

It is also claimed that because of our sup-
port for the side which later felt itself com-
pelled to seek the aid of South Africa, we
have lost influence in black Africa. One can-
not generalize so easily about the perceptions
of the African people, as the firm stand at
Addis Ababa of 22 OAU members against

180

Department of State Bulletin

AU recognition of the MPLA should dem-
iistrate. Behind this stand, which coincided
ith the U.S. position, was awareness that
\e MPLA represented only a minority of
.iigolans, and also a genuine apprehension
ver Soviet and Cuban, as well as Soutli
.frican, intervention. Indeed, it is our in-
.bility to support our African friends that
•ill cost us influence in Africa.
We are firmly convinced that, had there
pen no outside interference initiated by the

■ ioviet Union, the Africans would have found

■ [leir own solution. No single movement
7ould have been strong enough to take over.

' 'he resulting solution would have been more
epresentative of the people of Angola than
I government imposed by an outside power
nd representing only a minority faction.
The outcome in Angola will have repercus-
ions throughout Africa. The confidence of

' ountries neighboring Angola — Zambia and
aire — as well as other African countries, in
lie will and power of the United States will

■ e severely shaken if they see that the Soviet
Jnion and Cuba are unopposed in their at-
empt to impose a regime of their choice on
mgola. They and others elsewhere may well
djust their policies to what they consider
0 be the forces of the future.

The means ice have chosen have been lim-
*erf, and explained to Congress.

Our immediate objective was to provide
average for diplomatic efforts to bring about

just and peaceful solution. They were not
onceived unilaterally by the United States;
hey represented support to friends who re-
[Uested our financial assistance.

We chose covert means because we wanted
0 keep our visibility to a minimum; we
ranted the greatest possible opportunity for
m African solution. We felt that overt assist-
mce would elaborate a formal doctrine
ustifying great-power intervention — aside
rom the technical issues such as in what
)udgetary category this aid should be given
ind how it could be reconciled with legisla-
;ive restrictions against the transfer of
U.S. arms by recipients.

The Angola situation is of a type in which
diplomacy without leverage is impotent, yet

direct military confrontation would involve
unnecessary risks. Thus it is precisely one of
those gray areas where covert methods are
crucial if we are to have any prospect of in-
fluencing certain events of potentially global
importance.

We chose a covert form of response with
the greatest reluctance. But in doing so, we
were determined to adhere to the highest
standard of executive-legislative consulta-
tion. Eight congressional committees were
briefed on 24 separate occasions. We sought
in these briefings to determine the wishes of
Congress. While we do not claim that every
member approved our actions, we had no
indication of basic opposition.

Between July and December 1975 we dis-
cussed the Angolan situation on numerous
occasions with members of the foreign rela-
tions comittees and the appropriations com-
mittees of both Houses and the committees
of both Houses that have CIA oversight re-
sponsibilities. The two committees investi-
gating CIA activities — the Church Commit-
tee and the Pike Committee — were also
briefed. Altogether more than two dozen
Senators, about 150 Congressmen, and over
100 staff members of both Houses were in-
formed. I am attaching to my statement a
list of all the briefings carried out.^

Mr. Chairman, where are we now?

We are told that by providing money and
arms in Angola we are duplicating the mis-
takes we made in Viet-Nam. Such an argu-
ment confuses the expenditure of tens of
millions of dollars with the commitment of
U.S. troops. If we accept such a gross distor-
tion of historj^ — if we accept the claim that
we can no longer do anything to aid our
friends abroad because we will inevitably do
too much — then the tragedy of Viet-Nam
will indeed be monumental.

We will have lost all ability to respond to
anything less than direct and substantial
challenge. And having lost that ability, we
will eventually discover that by failing to
respond at an early stage, our ultimate re-
sponse will have to be greater and the stakes

'Not printed here; for text, see press release 40.

February 16, 1976

181

will be higher. If we do not exercise our re-
sponsibilities to maintain the international
balance, if Congress and the executive are
unable to act in concert when vital national
interests are affected, then world security
may well be seriously undermined.

Many of the members of this committee
have expressed their general support for our
policy of easing tensions with the Soviet
Union. We in the executive branch are grate-
ful for that support. But this process cannot
be divided into those segments which the
Soviets will honor and those which we will
allow them to ignore. What the United
States does when confronted with a chal-
lenge like Angola can be of great significance
in shaping our future relationship with the
Soviet Union. A demonstration of a lack of
resolve could lead the Soviets to a great
miscalculation thereby plunging us into a
major confrontation which neither of us
wants. Credibility determines, to a great de-
gree, what a nation can accomplish without
a resort to force. And as credibility is re-
duced, the eventual need to resort to force
increases. And in the end, we are all the
losers.

The United States must make it clear that
Angola sets no precedent ; this type of action
will not be tolerated elsewhere. This must be
demonstrated by both the executive and the
Congress — in our national interest and in the
interest of world peace.

To the Soviet Union and to Cuba, the
Administration says: We will continue to
make our case to the American public. We
will not tolerate wanton disregard for the
interests of others and for the cause of
world peace.

To the American people, the Administra-
tion says: The time has come to put aside
self-accusation, division, and guilt. Our own
country's safety and the progress of man-
kind depend crucially upon a united and de-
termined America. Today, as throughout our
200 years, the world looks to us to stand up
for what is right. By virtue of our strength
and values we are leaders in the defense of
freedom; without us there can be neither
security nor progress.

To the Congress, the Administration says :

182

Whatever our past disagreements, let th
Congress and the executive now resolve ;
shape a cooperative relationship that w'
enable the United States to play a respoi
sible international role. Both branches wi
have to do their share in restoring the kin
of nonpartisan support that has served ou
foreign policy so well in the past.

On the issue of Angola, the Administra
tion is now seriously considering overt finan
cial aid, and we will soon be consulting wit
the Congress on this possibility. But what
ever that decision, let us work together wit
an appreciation of the larger interests ir
volved and with a sense of national respon
sibility. A united America cannot be ignore
by our adversaries. Together we will pn-
serve the independence of those who fac
the prospect of oppression. Together we wi
hearten the friends of liberty and peac
everywhere.

President Ford Reiterates
U.S. Objective in Angola

Following is the text of a letter date
January 27 from President Ford to Speake
of the House Carl Albert.

White House press release dated January 27

January 27, 1976.

<

Dear Mr. Speaker: I want to expreff
to you and to your colleagues in the Housi
my grave concern over the internationi*
consequences of the situation in Angola. I
the absence of effective Western assistanci
the two largest political movements in th
country will be destroyed by Soviet arma
ments and a Cuban expeditionary force.

This imposition of a military solution i
Angola will have the most profound Ion
range significance for the United States
The US cannot accept as a principle of iw
ternational conduct that Cuban troops am
Soviet arms can be used for a blatant inten
vention in local conflicts, in areas thousan(U
of miles from Cuba and the Soviet Unioir
and where neither can claim an historic n;

Department of State Bulletil

onal interest. If we do so, we will send a

' lessage of irresolution not only to the

' jaders of African nations but to United

'* tates allies and friends throughout the

^ ' rorld.

°" The facts are clear. In the fall of 1974,
' 16 USSR began to increase its military as-
istance in Angola. During the period from
f_ larch to December 1975, the Soviet Union
nd Cuba provided almost $200 million in
reapons and other military assistance to a
linority faction in Angola. The Cubans
ave dispatched more than 10,000 combat
roops, which are right now actively en-
aged in the effort to destroy opposing fac-
ions — factions which command the loyal-
ies of more than 60% of the population and
ccupy a major part of Angola's territory.
i'or the United States to turn its back on
equests for help from these people would
e an abdication of our responsibility to
lay a positive role in international affairs.
The United States has no intention of
nterfering in internal African affairs. The
Jnited States' objective in Angola is to en-
ble the people of that land to determine for
"hemselves their political future. Until the
ate summer of 1975 the US provided no
ailitary assistance to any group. Since then
he United States has provided modest
imounts of assistance to forces opposing the
lOviet/Cuban-backed effort, solely to enable
he indigenous majority to stabilize the
nilitary situation and to create conditions
or a negotiated solution. As was demon-
strated at the recent meeting of the Organi-
;ation of African Unity, a clear majority
)f the sub-Saharan African countries clearly
supported this effort to offset Soviet-Cuban
ntervention. The US assistance, small as it
A^as, began to reverse the tide and block the
Soviet-backed effort to take over the country
3y force. However, in September and Octo-
ber, the Soviet Union, with the help of a
Cuban expeditionary force, massively esca-
lated the conflict. In response the Admin-
istration sought, through consultation with

the appropriate Congressional Committees,
to gain approval for the reprogramming of
$28 million to continue our assistance. (The
matter of our assistance in Angola was the
subject of 25 separate contacts with eight
Congressional Committees.) In concert with
this proposal, the Administration launched a
determined diplomatic effort to bring an
end to the fighting and to find a means to
bring about a negotiated settlement accept-
able to all of the Angolan parties. Unfortu-
nately, this effort was substantially under-
mined by the vote of the Senate in December
1975 to cut off US assistance to Angola.

As I have stated on a number of occasions,
the US seeks no special advantage in Angola,
nor are we opposed to the MPLA faction
per se. Our sole objective has been to pre-
serve the opportunity for this Angolan
problem to be resolved by Angolans, and not
through the application of brute military
force by the Soviet Union and Cuba. I be-
lieve that resistance to Soviet expansion by
military means must be a fundamental ele-
ment of US foreign policy. There must be
no question in Angola or elsewhere in the
world, of American resolve in this regard.
The response of the United States is a
matter of fundamental concern to our
friends and allies everywhere. The failure
of the US to take a stand will inevitably
lead our friends and supporters to conclu-
sions about our steadfastness and resolve. It
could lead to a future Soviet miscalculation
based upon its perception of that resolve. It
would make Cuba the mercenaries of up-
heavals everywhere.

I bring my most serious concerns over the
course of events in Angola and the signifi-
cance of a Soviet victory there to your at-
tention. I strongly urge the House of Rep-
resentatives to take them into account in
its deliberations on Angola today and vote
to disagree with the Senate amendment to
the Defense Appropriations Act.
Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford.

February 16, 1976

183

Department Discusses Global Inflation and National Policy

Statement by Charles W. Robinson
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs '

Thank you for inviting me to discuss today
the problem of global inflation and its impli-
cations for national policy. This is an im-
mense subject with many implications for
policy. I will focus on some of the principal
issues, particularly those related to our for-
eign policy concerns.

Improvements in international economic
arrangements, important though they may
be, cannot substitute for the sound manage-
ment of our own afl'airs. The primary battle
against inflation must be fought and won at
home.

Yet the recent inflation has been a truly
international phenomenon. The forces of in-
flation were felt worldwide and very rapidly
transmitted across international borders;
they had important repercussions on our in-
ternational relations; and they provide im-
portant lessons for future economic co-
operation.

We all appreciate that inflation has done
major damage to our economy, our standard
of living, and our social institutions. It has
also been a significant source of international
discord. For just as domestic groups and
individuals often see inflation as the damage
other people are doing to them, creating so-
cial conflict and resentment, so nations react
similarly to inflationary forces coming from

' Made before the Subcommittee on African Af-
fairs of the Finance and Resources of the Senate
Committee on Finance on Jan. 26. The complete
transcript of the hearings will be published by the
committee and will be available from the Superin-
tendent of Documents. U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

#1

abroad. During inflationary times, countriai
tend to lose sight of the mutual benefit
gained from trade with others and concen
trate on their complaints against foreigners
International cooperation can, I believe, plan
a significant role in controlling inflation
Equally, our eff'orts to control inflation can
also provide an environment in which coopen
ation can thrive.

Let us review the record on inflation. Th»
gradual tendency toward acceleration i)
price increases which had been developing i:
the late 1960's picked up speed as we en
tered the 1970's. For a while we seemed t
be doing better. But then a convergence o
several factors led to the inflationary explc
sion of 1973, and especially 1974. One facto
was the broad and excessive expansion in th
industrial countries. Another was the largr^
increase in prices of energy and food.

The large increase in energy prices, o
course, reflected the impact of the OPE<i
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries] cartel, which I will discuss latepi

The sharp rise in food prices, on the othe-
hand, reflected fundamental changes in th:
underlying world supply-and-demand balanc
of agricultural products, particularly grains-
World production failed to keep pace witl"
rising world demand for grain. Poor crop;
in 1973 and 1974 actually resulted in a de 1
cline in world production. Meanwhile, de
mand for food, especially grains, continuec
to grow, spurred by increased population
rising incomes in most countries, and deci .
sions by other nations, particularly th(
U.S.S.R. and Eastern European states, t(

184

Department of State Bulletir

•,tress improvement in the diets of their
copulations. In the United States, consumers
•ompeted with other buyers for world sup-
plies and shared in the worldwide increase
n food prices.

In addition to the general increase in world
lemand, exchange rate changes in the 1970's
•esulted in additional foreign demand for
U.S. grain, one of America's most compet-
itive exports. Farm incomes during the
period increased appreciably, and the United
States obtained substantial foreign exchange
, Earnings which were used to pay for other
needed imports.

Although the pattern of inflation in the
3ECD [Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development] area as a whole was
very similar, in comparison with the United
States the record of the other OECD coun-
tries has been somewhat worse — and in the
sase of a few countries, considerably worse.
, The striking thing has been the similarity
' ,of the experience. This clearly has reflected
the operation of important common causes —
particularly those mentioned above — and
their interaction through a closely linked
international transmission mechanism.

I will not try to provide a complete de-
scription of the causes and the international
transmission mechanism which spread the
impact among countries. I will instead focus
on two topics:

— The role of international cartels in the
recent inflation and their role in the future.
What policies are called for?

— The role of interdependence and the
need for better cooi'dination of demand man-
agement policies.

Inflation and the OPEC Cartel

I It is well known that the recent large oil
price increases instituted by the OPEC cartel
have been a major factor in recent inflation.
They came, of course, very rapidly, on top of
an inflation rate that was already high, and
in a period where overall demand was strong.
It is clear, however, that the strength of de-
mand did not account for the fourfold in-

crease in oil prices in the latter part of 1973 ;
it is even more obvious that it did not ac-
count for the smaller increases put into ef-
fect since then in the face of sharply weaken-
ing demand.

These price increases therefore were basic-
ally autonomous events, with a major impact
on the rate of inflation. We cannot pretend
to know precisely the full extent of this
impact. One can, however, arrive at a reason-
able estimate of the direct impact of the
1973-74 oil price increase. One expert esti-
mate puts the impact of the oil price in-
creases themselves, and the associated in-
creases in prices of domestically produced
energy, on OECD consumer prices at 31/2
percent — about half the acceleration in
OECD prices between 1973 and 1974. The
indirect impact, however, is much more dif-
ficult to estimate. New impetus was clearly
given to the wage-price spiral and to in-
flationary expectations. This impact, which
we are still feeling, may well have been as
large or larger than the direct effect.

Can we expect cartel action to produce
similar inflationary shocks in the future?
Probably not of this magnitude. It seems
unlikely that the OPEC countries will try to
repeat their 1973-74 increase. They may
nevertheless attempt to institute smaller in-
creases, perhaps tied to some index of im-
port prices.

Other raw materials producers may try to
emulate the OPEC success. However, we do
not believe that producers of other commodi-
ties possess anything like the degree of
market power which the OPEC countries
have wielded. Their actions therefore are
unlikely to provide a significant one-time im-
pact on the rate of inflation like that of the
oil price increase.

Although, in the foreseeable future,
cartels are not likely to provide another
major force accelerating the rate of infla-
tion, the efforts to form cartels and push
raw materials prices upward might be
troublesome for our attempts to control in-
flation or to build broad structures of inter-
national cooperation generally. Even if their
only goal were to maintain raw materials

February 16, 1976

185

prices constant in real terms with respect
to an index of prices of imported goods and
they were to succeed, this, like any indexa-
tion arrangement, would increase the prob-
lems of bringing inflation under control. In
effect, a vicious circle between increases in
industrial prices and prices of raw materials
would be established, leading to a perpetua-
tion of inflation well after the initial causes
had been dealt with.

This, of course, is far from the only argu-
ment against indexation of raw materials
prices. Indexation of the price of any com-
modity, which has the effect of freezing its
price relative to prices of other goods, will
almost certainly lead to harmful distortions
in resource allocation. In fact, given dynamic
changes in supply-and-demand conditions
and large-scale substitution possibilities, it
would be extremely difl[icult, probably im-
possible, and certainly very expensive to
maintain a fixed relative price over any ex-
tended period.

The policy implications of this discussion
of cartel action seem to be clear. First, a
strong, cooperative energy policy is required
in the OECD area to reduce the scope for
further unilateral exercise of OPEC market
power. Second, to make clear that cartels are
not the answer, we must pursue the dialogue
with the oil producers and with non-oil-ex-
porting less developed countries, respond-
ing in a constructive way to their legitimate
requirements.

The industrial nations have collectively
designed a program to meet the challenge
of the oil crisis. We are cooperating through
the Paris-based International Energy
Agency on an energy strategy with three
major components:

— Measures to stockpile oil and share oil
supplies in emergencies such as another oil
embargo ;
— Conservation of energy; and
— The development of new energy sources.

In addition, within the OECD we have
agreed to establish a Financial Support
Fund to provide contingency financing to
countries experiencing severe balance-of-

186

J(

\i

payments problems in the wake of the o
crisis.

Over time, this integrated program shou
greatly reduce our vulnerability to actioi
by the cartel of oil-exporting countries,
does not represent, however, a stance <
confrontation with OPEC. Rather, we era
phasize constructive dialogue between o;
consumers, including both developed and d
veloping nations, and oil producers. .
ministerial conference in December launche
this dialogue on firm footing. It will procee"
through the parallel work of four commiv
sions dealing with energy, raw material
development, and finance.

The leaders who met at Rambouill(
agreed that a cooperative relationship an
improved understanding between developin
nations and the industrial world is fund;
mental to the welfare of both. The economic
of developing nations depend vitally on our
while their growth in turn contributes 1 ;
our own prosperity. L

The oil crisis had a particularly severe iiT; <,
pact on developing nations. Higher oil price ;
dealt them a staggering blow. In additioi
their exports were dampened by the depre;
sive effect more expensive oil had on th
economies of developed countries. |'

In his speech at the seventh special se; • '
sion of the U.N. General Assembly, Seen
tary of State Kissinger underscored our coi
cern for the economic security and growt
of the developing countries. He outlined
practical program to achieve these joir
objectives. Some required increased contr
butions from the United States, other ir
dustrial countries, and oil producers. But th
thrust of our program is to provide the df
veloping countries greater opportunities t
earn their own way through increased trade
investment, and capital market opportu >
nities.

If the developing nations themselves pur
sue sound policies, this program will go ;
long way toward putting their developmen
efforts on a sound footing. It should alsi
entail moving from an atmosphere of tensioi ■
to one of concrete cooperation to improve tht
welfare of the developing countries and t(

Department of State Bulleti

Uk

egrate them more fully in an inter-
tional economy which serves the interests
all participants and thereby supports in-
•national cooperation generally.

irdependence and Policy Coordination

and Growing economic interdependence among

:ers untries — as indicated by the trend toward

junti :reasing importance of international trade

pru d investment flows, more rapid transpor-

onii tion and communication among countries,

iteij d more integrated capital markets — has

•engthened the links through which in-

tionary impulses are transmitted between

untries. The major links generally recog-

zed are:

1. Increased demand for imports, which

ay lead to excess demand in the exporting

untries.

12. The prices of internationally traded

lods affecting costs, consumer prices

ectly, and prices of competing goods.
3. Monetary or liquidity effects of inter-
tional capital flows and the overall balance

payments.

It should be noted that the factors under
oint 3 tend to be much more important
tider a system of relatively fixed rates than
ider floating rates. Frequently, direct price
fects tend to be dampened by depreciation
the currency of the exporting country,
id it is well recognized that floating ex-
lange rates give nations a good deal more
' )ntrol over domestic monetary and liquidity
)nditions.

The international transmission of infla-
on, however, does not necessarily mean
lat world inflation is greater as a result of
iterdependence. During most of the post-
war years, in fact, quite the opposite was
rue; interdependence was a factor for sta-
ility. This was true broadly for two basic
easons :

First, fluctuations in demand conditions
rere not closely synchronized. Therefore the
xcess demand from one country tended to
;pill over and be met out of the excess pro-

ductive capacity of another country — thus
dampening inflation.

Secondly, the United States was generally
a force for price stability in those years.

Our relatively stable internal prices, our
dominant influence on world markets, and
our reasonably stable monetary conditions all
tended to exert a powerful stabilizing force
in the rest of the industrialized world.

Unfortunately both these factors changed
during the past 10 years. Beginning in the
mid-1960's with the excessive and inflation-
ary expansion in 1965-66, 1968, and 1972-
73, U.S. prices rose more rapidly, and we
ceased to be an anchor of price stability.

In the latest expansion, during 1972-73,
another relatively new phenomenon became
critical. This was the virtually simultaneous
strong expansion of all the major industrial-
ized countries. There was therefore no place
for excess demand to be siphoned off; price
acceleration in one country was propagated
through international trade, accelerating the
price-wage spiral in other countries.

This simultaneous expansion created a
particularly rapid rise in the prices of in-
dustrial materials. Existing capacities in
this sector were just not geared to the simul-
taneous rapid expansion of output in North
America, Europe, and Japan. In previous
years this underlying shortage of capacity
in the basic materials sector had been ob-
scured by the fact that not many economies
had been operating at high levels at the same
time. But in 1972-73 this was changed, and
spot prices for industrial materials (in
dollar terms) tripled between the end of
1971 and mid-1974.

Thus the interdependence of the inter-
national economy was of critical importance
in the recent inflation. It is not clear
whether or not the simultaneous rapid ex-
pansion was a one-time annual occurrence
or whether it is a sign of increasing syn-
chronization in the future. What is clear is
that, in designing their stabilization policies,
countries have need of a great deal more
coordination of policy measures than in the
past. In particular, it will be necessary to
take into account not just domestic capacity

February 16, 1976

187

limitations but worldwide capacity limita-
tions.

The machinery for greater coordination,
of course, already exists. In one important
forum, policymaking officials of the in-
dustrial countries have, for some time, met
regularly in the OECD to compare notes on
policies and prospects. They have been as-
sisted in this by a high-quality professional
secretariat. But the will to coordinate has
not always been sufficient. The lessons of the
recent past, however, are having their im-
pact: the Rambouillet summit, I think, deep-
ened our appreciation of interdependence and
resulted in a commitment to strengthen
efforts for closer international cooperation.

Mr. Chairman, I have only given a brief
treatment to some international aspects of
the problem of controlling inflation. As I
said at the outset, sound domestic policy,
particularly monetary and fiscal policies,
must be at the heart of any long-term solu-
tion to the problem of global inflation. But
there is also an increasing need for us to
take the international dimensions of this
problem into account. I have tried to con-
ti-ibute to your consideration of this vital
question by pointing out some of these inter-
national factors.

Annual Food for Peace Report
Transmitted to Congress

Message From President Ford '

To the Congress of the United States:

I am pleased to transmit to the Congress
the 1974 annual report on agricultural ex-
port activities carried out under Public Law
480 (Food for Peace). This program has
supported the foreign policy and humani-
tarian objectives of the United States, pro-
viding assistance to alleviate hunger and
promoting economic progress in the develop-
ing nations.

Throughout the year, the Food for Peace

«l

'Transmitted on Jan. 28 (text from White House
press release) ; also printed as H. Doc. 94-352, 94th
Cong., 2d sess., includes the text of the report.

program demonstrated its flexibility in
changing agricultural situation. Because
the continuing tightness of commodity su
plies in the United States, shipments durh
the year were somewhat restricted. Th
was especially true of wheat and whe
product shipments. However, our food don
tions to the drought-stricken African cou
tries remained substantial. In both East ai
West Africa, U.S. food aid represent
about 40 percent of the total supplied by tl
international community. The level of U.
contributions to the World Food Progra*
and the U.S. voluntary agencies was mai
tained. Title I concessional sales progran
were continued in such countries as Bang!
desh, Israel, and Pakistan, and in Indochin
New Title I programs were started in Egyp
Syria, and Chile.

The Food for Peace program continues
be a major portion of the overall U.S. fo|^,^
eign aid efl'ort. Concessional sales progran
encourage recipient countries to establi;
self-help objectives, and provide valuab
support to economic development. Most > .
these programs contain provisions for agi
cultural market development activitie
which are being used as conditions warrar
although the need for such activities h;
lessened because of strong commercial d
mand. The Title II donation program co
tinues its emphasis on improving the nuti
tion of pregnant and nursing mothei
babies, and preschool children.

As this report indicates, the Public La
480 program completed its 20th year i
operation continuing to parform its vit
role in rendering humanitarian assistance '
the disaster-stricken, promoting econom
development in the poor nations, contribu
ing to the development and expansion (
foreign markets for U.S. agricultural con
modities, and supporting our foreign polic
objectives around the world. It remains
key element of our foreign assistance pn
gram and a vital link in the improving ec(
nomic relations between this country an
the developing world.

Gerald R. Ford.

The White House, January 28, 1976. I

188

Department of State Bulleti

ity
dm

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

jj, nited States Vetoes Change in Framework
'<» r Middle East Negotiations

Following are statements made in the
N. Security Council by U.S. Representa-
p, ve Daniel P. Moynihan on January 12, 19,
id 26 and a statement issued by the De-
rtment on January 26, together with the
xt of a draft resolution ivhich was vetoed
I the United States on January 26.

ATEMENTS BY AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN
I THE SECURITY COUNCIL

atement of January 12

SUN press release 3 dated January 12

I would like, Mr. President, to thank you
»r the opportunity to state the view of the
nited States with respect to the motion
hich you, sir, have presented.'

As will be recalled, Mr. President, on
fecember 4, 1975, the last occasion on
hich the Council dealt with Middle East
fairs, it was proposed to invite the Pales-
ne Liberation Organization (PLO) to par-
cipate in that debate with "the same
ights of participation as are conferred
hen a Member State is invited to partici-
ate under rule 37." The same proposal, Mr.
'resident, has been made today.

t

' The President of the Council proposed on Jan. 12
hat the representative of the Palestine Liberation
)rganization be invited to participate in the debate,
le stated that "This proposal is not being put for-
rard under rule 37 or rule 39 ... , but, if it is
dopted by the Council, the invitation to the Pales-
ine Liberation Organization . . . will confer on it
he same rights of participation as are conferred
vhen a member state is invited to participate under
■ule 37."

The proposal of December 4, 1975, elicited
strong objections from some members of the
Council, including the United States. Our
position today is unchanged from that of four
weeks ago.

What is at issue today in significant
measure is the integrity of the processes of
the Security Council. We have already seen
a startling decline in the confidence with
which the processes of the General Assembly
are viewed. Seeking to create precedents,
while at the same time not adhering to the
rules, can erode the Council's influence and
authority as has occurred in the Assembly.
It is in nobody's interest for this same proc-
ess to take hold in the Security Council.

Rule 37 of our provisional rules states
that:

Any Member of the United Nations which is not
a member of the Security Council may be invited,
as a result of a decision of the Security Council, to
participate, without vote, in the discussion of any
question brought before the Security Council when
the Security Council considers that the interests of
that Member are specially affected or when a Mem-
ber brings a matter to the attention of the Security
Council in accordance with Article 35 (1) of the
Charter.

Mr. President, it goes without saying that
a member of the United Nations is a state.
We do not have members, and the charter
does not provide for members, which are not
states. The Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion is not a state. It does not administer a
defined territory. It does not have the attri-
butes of a government of a state. It does
not claim to be a state. This is the basic
relevant fact we have here with respect to
the proposal before us.

When we were faced with the similar pro-

February 16, 1976

189

posal on December 4, it elicited, as I have
said, tiie strongest protest from several
members of the Council, including the
United States. I described it as a "concerted
attempt to disregard the rules of procedure
and to accord to the Palestine Liberation
Organization a role greater even than that
which over the years the Council has granted
to observer governments and a role gi'eater
by far than has in more recent times been
granted to the spokesmen of legitimate na-
tional liberation movements invited here
under rule 39." ^

I said then and I repeat that the United
States is not prepared to agree and we do
not believe this Council should agree to an
ad hoc departure from the rules of proce-
dure which ignores the needs of this institu-
tion. Unfortunately, despite our opposition
and authoritative statements by other per-
manent members and elected members of
the Council, rule and precedent were ignored
on December 4 to extend the invitation as
proposed.

I wish to emphasize at this point that I
am not addressing the question of whether
our proceedings are of interest to the Pales-
tinian people. The U.S. view that the legiti-
mate interests of the Palestinian people are
an intrinsic part of the problem of lasting
peace in the Middle East is well known and
is unchanged. This is not the matter I am
addressing. It is not my intention to deal
with this matter today at all.

The specific issue before us, Mr. President,
is our responsibility to the integrity of
Security Council procedures and to the
future effectiveness of this body. If we take
liberties with those procedures and, under
the influence of immediate political positions
with respect to a given question before this
Council, establish or reaffirm unwise prece-
dents, this will come back to haunt us. I
want to stress that a decision to invite the
PLO to participate in our deliberations, not
under existing Council rules, but as if it

' For statements by Ambassador Moynihan made
in the Security Council on Dec. 4, 1975, see Bulletin
of Jan. 5, 1976, p. 21.

190

were a member state with the same righl
as a member state of the United Natio.
would open a veritable Pandora's box
future difficulties.

Were that box to be opened, there a
groups in all parts of the world that cou
seek to participate in our proceedings as
they were member states. No nation repp
sented at this table, including my own, wouAjr
necessarily be immune from the pernicioK |ji
consequences.

Mr. President, I repeat: The Palestii
Liberation Organization is not a state;
does not claim to be a state. For the mo
elemental of reasons, only member states cu
participate in our proceedings as mernb"
states — unless, of course, we change tl
rules, whereupon we shall look forward
welcoming the dissident factions and natio)
alities of half the world, for in point of fao«
roughly half of the nations in the world fa«i ^
serious to extreme problems of internal w i)
hesion, owing to internal ethnic conflict. Thi
is true of more than half the present mem
bers of the Security Council.

Moreover, the PLO, which is not a stati
much less a member state, suffers from a
additional disability in seeking to participaK
in the work of this Council. It does n(
recognize the right to exist of the State (
Israel, which is a member state, and who:
right to exist is guaranteed by the charto
which this Council is pledged to uphold.

Finally, the PLO, which is not a state, ar
which does not recognize the right to exi;
of Israel, which is a member state, furth(
refuses to acknowledge the authority of th
Council, which in Resolutions 242 and 33
has undertaken to uphold the rights of th
states of the Middle East.

My government is not prepared to go alon
with an action which will undermine th
negotiation process, which is the only pro(
ess that can lead to peace. The represents
fives of the Palestine Liberation Organize
tion have repeatedly told the General As
sembly of their hostility for systematii
negotiations and their hostility for the wor
of this Council. They categorically rejectee
Security Council Resolution 242, which foi

Department of State Bulletii

there

m M
)ernicJ

thei

Irs has served and continues to serve as
only agreed basis for serious negotia-
is.

[r. President, the Security Council is the
^stone of the United Nations. It can act
has done so with distinction in ways
lich have been essential to peace, especially
[the Middle East. The preservation of its
jgrity and effectiveness deserves our care

attention.

'he Council should not repeat its mistaken

hoc decision of December 4. The United

ites asks that a vote be taken on your

»tion, Mr. President. The United States

[1 vote against the motion.^

|itement of January 19

JN press release 7 dated January 19

have followed with great interest the
rse of the debate and have noted atten-
ely the statements and positions laid be-
e us by both concerned and interested
rties. It is certain, Mr. President, that the
ue before us — the issue of peace in the
sti iddle East — remains one of the most com-
m Bx and difficult issues that can be imagined.
dp >me of the statements presented to this
s I Duncil have taken us back to the origins of
ite 16 problem, and we have considered it from
vki [any dimensions.

art If there are two main things we can leani
i rem the events which have been reviewed
ring the past week in this Council, one is
rely that war, violence, terrorism, and re-
rt to force have seriously aggravated this
oblem over the last several decades and we
e now dealing with the consequences of
is violence. Another lesson is that the rela-
ively rare but very significant steps which
lave been made toward interim arrange-
nents to avoid war and toward long-range
leaceful solutions have been possible only

'The Council on Jan. 12 adopted by a vote of 11
I 1 (U.S.), with 3 abstentions (France, Italy,
J.K.), the proposal to invite the representative of
he PLO to participate in the debate. Under article
17 of the U.N. Charter, "Decisions of the Council on
procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative
rote of nine members" and are not subject to the
/eto.

when parties to this problem could operate
within an agreed framework.

The basic truths before us are that, to
avoid conflict, there must be contact and
negotiations and that to maintain a negotiat-
ing process there must be a framework with-
in which the parties have agreed to negotiate.

One of the greatest contributions this
Council has made in its notable history was
to establish that framework. In 1967, after
months of negotiation and effort, Security
Council Resolution 242 was adopted. In 1973
it was reaffirmed and augmented by Resolu-
tion 338. These two resolutions, and the will
to apply them, have been the foundation for
the progress that has been made, and they
continue to provide hope for the future.

Our discussions over these last days have
offered many possibilities of changes to or
augmentation of these resolutions and varia-
tions for the basic framework. We have
listened to the ideas put forward ; we under-
stand the sentiments and concerns behind
many of them.

But in spite of these interests and con-
cerns, we cannot escape the reality of the
situation that when all parties have agreed
to a framework, all of them must agree to
changes in that framework. Changes im-
posed on the parties and unacceptable to any
one of them, however great the good will,
will not work.

That framework reflects the enormous
complexities and interrelationships of the
issues involved in a settlement; and to
modify one part of it risks destroying it en-
tirely. We believe it would be a setback for
the chances of achieving true peace in the
Middle East for this Council to conclude its
current debate by adopting resolutions which
would have the effect of leaving no commonly
accepted basis for further negotiation.

Where would we go from there? With the
increasing complexity of each step and each
year, the process of building a new founda-
tion for peace, of establishing a new process,
becomes a more difficult task. It is for this
reason that the United States feels that en-
dangering this agreed framework in order to
achieve results here in this Council which

February 16, 1976

191

would in themselves not guarantee a solution
or even progress toward that solution is not
worth the risk.

We believe that there is enough leeway in
the present arrangements to achieve prog-
ress if there is the will to use them, that all
the problems before us can be dealt with
most effectively by the negotiating process,
and that such changes as may be required
in our approach must be worked out in the
Geneva process.

It is at Geneva or at a preparatory confer-
ence that matters of procedure, such as the
question of additional participants, and of
substance can and should be addressed. Hav-
ing succeeded in establishing an agreed
framework of procedures and principles for
a settlement and in creating conditions for
the establishment of the Geneva Conference
as a forum in which the implementation of
those principles can be negotiated, the Coun-
cil should not now seek to prejudge the work
of that conference.

As we have stated before, the United
States is prepared to cooperate with all the
states involved on all the issues. We are
aware that there can be no durable solution
unless we make every effort to promote a
solution of the key issues of a just and last-
ing peace in that area on the basis of Se-
curity Council Resolutions 242 and 338, tak-
ing into account the legitimate interests of
all the peoples of the area including the
Palestinian people and respect for the rights
to independent existence of all states in the
area.

We are committed to a peace settlement
which resolves all of the issues in the con-
flict— withdrawal from occupied territories,
the right of all states in the area to live
within secure and recognized borders, recip-
rocal obligations of the parties to live in
peace with each other, and all the other
questions which must be dealt with in the
negotiating process. We are also aware that
all of these elements are inextricably tied
together by Resolutions 242 and 338 in what
the distinguished former Representative of
the U.K. Lord Caradon described as "a bal-
anced whole."

Iiiii

My government is dedicated to make evi
effort to achieve progress toward peace
the Middle East in this year. We have lean
and profited from the deliberations of t
Council and the ideas that have been j
forth here. We believe our strongest du
however, is to preserve the process for pe,
that we have all worked so hard to constr
and to use it so that the problems before
can be met and overcome.

We are confident that progress can
made, and we are committed to achieve
The peace and safety of the world dems
nothing less. Our actions both in the Coui
and afterward will be guided by our b
judgment of what is necessary to advai
toward and avoid impeding achievement
this objective.

Statement on U.K. Amendment, January 26

USUN press release 11 dated January 26

The United States has made clear that «
responsibility to the Middle East is si)
that we are required, even if we stand alo»
to preserve the framework for negotiatio
established in Security Council Resolutio
242 and 338.

Far from preserving that framework, U
I'esolution before us would commence
destruction. It proposes a fundamental s|
irremediable diminishment of the circul
stances of one of the parties. Fundamen*
rights are elided, equitable entitlements it
impaired, and fundamental expectations a
of a sudden enshrouded in doubt. Th«
rights, these entitlements, and these expeci
tions were incorporated in Resolutions 2
and 338.

However unintentionally, Mr. President,,
is our feeling that this case is so clear tbl
it would be inappropriate, would be inco)
patible, for the same documents to all ■
these rights, entitlements, and expectatio ;
and at the same time seek to reaffirm the ,
In that circumstance, Mr. President, t !
United States will abstain on the ameii'
ment of the United Kingdom.*

* The amendment submitted by the Representati i

192

Department of State Bulled

Dr

[ement in Explanation of Vote
Draft Resolution, January 26

N press release 10 dated January 26

'he United States has not lightly cast a

:ative vote against the resolution that was

ore us. We voted "no" only after long and

iscientious consideration and with the

lization that we must keep foremost in

id a greater goal beyond this Council

imber. I want to make clear our reasons

voting as we did — and the seriousness

;h which my government first weighed the

ws expressed in this debate.

\.s witness to our intent and purpose, the

partment of State of the United States

this moment is releasing a statement that

ire completely sets out U.S. views on where

s debate has left us in our search for a

ddle East peace.

'i To briefly state that position, we con-

cided that our responsibility to seek further

pgress toward an overall peace settlement

i the Middle East required us, even if we

)od alone, to preserve the framework for

igotiations established in Security Council

"(solutions 242 and 338. The provisions that

■re before us were such that we considered

e negotiating framework would have been

ered in ways that would have been seri-

sly harmful to the future of the peace-

' aking process.

' We understand the reasons behind many

■' the ideas that have been presented here,

' id we are not closing the door to the intro-

' iction into the negotiating process of con-

• derations that have not yet been addressed.

ather, we wish to emphasize that it is bet-

■I r to go forward with the agreed basis that

)es exist, to utilize it to the best of our

)ility, and to see it evolve in a manner that

' the United Kingdom provided for the addition of
new operative paragraph to read as follows:

"3. Reaffirms the principles and provisions of its
jsolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) and declares
lat nothing in the foregoing provisions of this res-
lution supersedes them."

The amendment was not adopted by the Council,
he vote being 4 in favor (France, Italy, Sweden,
J.K.) and 2 against (People's Republic of China,
ibya), with 9 abstentions (U.S.).

will make it more useful rather than running
the risk of destroying it.

On January 19, Mr. President, I made be-
fore this Council a short statement of the
U.S. position on changes to the agreed frame-
work for negotiation. I said then that changes
imposed — whatever the intentions and with
whatever justification, but nevertheless im-
posed— would not work. That is a point that
I would like to make again today. The U.S.
negative vote on the resolution was not based
on antipathy to the aspirations of Pales-
tinians but, rather, on the conviction that the
passage of that resolution would not amelio-
rate their condition nor be the most effective
way of addressing the long-neglected prob-
lem of their future in the context of an over-
all settlement.

It is not a question of whether but how to
make progress toward the goal we all profess.
On behalf of the United States, sir, I wish
to thank the President of the Council for his
statesmanship and leadership that has piloted
us all through important and far-ranging
deliberations. I wish to congratulate all
members who have spoken here for the
thoughtfulness and measured tones of their
positions. Surely this approach is construc-
tive and helpful to the parties that must soon
proceed to negotiation of all the issues before
them— to matters of procedure, the question
of additional participation, and the matters of
substance such as withdrawal from occupied
territories, the right of all states in the area
to live within secure and recognized borders,
and reciprocal obligations of the parties to
live in peace with each other.

When we first began our deliberations, the
United States made it clear that we wished
to avoid confrontation and to produce posi-
tive results to aid in the search for peace.
Many, we know, will be disappointed that we
do not have a resolution to use and to refer
to, but for our part let me say that we have
nonetheless profited from the various views
that have been expressed and we have in-
creased our understanding of the enormous
complexities before us all.

Armed with the positive suggestions that
have been made, fortified by the seriousness

February 16, 1976

193

and concern of all who have participated, the
United States pledges to you — to you all and
to the United Nations — that we will perse-
vere in the search for peace, that we will
make use of the framework for negotiation
that has been preserved, and that we will do
our best. We need the cooperation of all of
you to make these efforts succeed. I hope
you will join us and help us in this quest;
and as it recommences, for the United States
it is a matter of special import to know that
we have the unfailing and determined efforts
of the Secretary General with us in this
matter.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT ISSUED JANUARY 26

Press release 32 dated January 26

At the conclusion of the Security Council's
consideration of the Middle East problem, it
is important to turn from the debates that
have taken place in New York and look to
the year ahead. In doing so we must ask
ourselves. Where has this debate left us in
our search for a Middle East peace? The
United States has perhaps a particular re-
sponsibility to do this because, in being
faithful to its concept of the search for
peace, it has felt obliged to veto a resolution
that others believed mapped out a preferable
route. We did not do so lightly, nor in a
spirit of negation. We believed that with
this resolution the Council would have
blocked the surer and the tested way to a
settlement in favor of one that would not
have worked. It is important that it be under-
stood why we believed this to be the case and,
more especially, how we see the process con-
tinuing within the framework that we have,
with our vote, preserved.

There is surely no other problem of our
time that has seen so much effort devoted
to a solution and where the successes and
the failures are so evident as guides for our
future endeavors. There has been no lack of
resolutions, no lack of plans; but looking
back over the years, we can discern those
few developments that have gradually con-
structed a basis, a framework, for whatever
progress has been made in all this time.

In 1967 the Security Council devised Reso-

lution 242, which contained the fundame
principles that should be applied in orde
establish a just and lasting peace in
Middle East, including withdrawal from
cupied territories; termination of all cl;
or states of belligerency ; acknowledgmen
the sovereignty, territorial integrity,
political independence of every state in
area ; and respect for the right of every s
to live in peace within secure and recogn
boundaries free from threats or acts of fo
The comprehensiveness, fairness, and
ance of Resolution 242 have won it ace
ance by all the Middle East states dire
involved in the conflict in addition to
proval by the outside world. One of the g:
values of the resolution is its wide ace
ance, despite the differences each side
over its meaning.

In 1973, the Security Council approve
resolution that complemented Resolution
by establishing a negotiating process
tween the parties as the means of implemi
ing the principles set forth in the ear
resolution. This was, of course, Resolu
338, which also won wide acceptance ;
with Resolution 242, formed a negotial
basis and framework that had been lacP
since the early years of the Middle I
problem.

The decision was then taken to provic
specific forum — a concrete context — for
negotiating process. The parties agreed
participate in a conference at Geneva ur
the cochairmanship of the United States
the Soviet Union. The nature of the con
ence reflected recognition of the fact t
the negotiating process, if it was to h
any chance of success, had to be based on
consent and voluntary participation of
the parties. The composition of the con;
ence, accordingly, was itself a matter
agreement among all the parties.

Finally, as the parties confronted
substance of the problem, they decided
approach it in stages rather than all at oi
The United States was pleased that, at
request of the parties, it could play a help
role in this step-by-step negotiating proct
keeping always in mind that each step ^
taken within the Geneva framework ;

194

Department of State Bull< n

ih a view to insuring the ultimate success
the Geneva Conference. It was always
ognized that moving directly to an over-
approach was an alternative to which the
ties could turn at any time, and there was
doubt that an overall settlement, what-
r the approach, was the end goal of all
cerned, including the United States.
And what was the result? For the first
Mj ne in 25 or more years, genuine progress
ofi IS made toward a resolution of the im-
3iii jnsely deep and complex problems that con-
lii tute the Middle East question. Through
k e courage and statesmanship of the Gov-
1 tj nments of Egypt, Israel, and Syria — and
'k\ )rking within this common framework —
ao reements were reached, concessions made
!i(i( return for other concessions; land was
1 turned on the basis of binding agreements.
Less tangible, but perhaps more important,
is the progress in the attitudes of the
luntries of the Middle East. In the long
story of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is a
•w and relatively recent development that
linion in the Arab world has begun to think
terms of recognizing a sovereign Israel
id that Israel has begun to see peace as a
iigible goal rather than a distant hope.
^ e are fully aware that only a start has
'en made, that many problems remain to
' dealt with and resolved. It was the nature
■ the process that the easier issues would be
jalt with first and the more difficult and
)mplex left until later, when the momentum
' the process itself would be working for
5. The U.S. Government is committed to de-
)te itself to the resolution of these remain-
ig issues as it has to the issues that have
Iready been resolved.

There would be no chance of further prog-

, 3SS, however, if this negotiating framework,

ainfully erected over years of trial and

rror, were not left intact. Whatever its

Tiperfections, however great the temptation

i ,0 tamper with the resolutions and the

, lieneva formula that constitute it, if it were

allied apart now it could not be put back to-

, :ether and the clock would have been turned

)ack to the years of futility in which no

)asis existed for negotiation to take place.

The negotiating framework is sufficiently

flexible that it can provide the basis for
negotiating fair and durable solutions to all
the issues involved. The issues of with-
drawal, of borders, of the termination of
states or claims of belligerency, of reciprocal
obligations to peace, of the right to live in
peace within secure and recognized boun-
daries— all these and more — must be care-
fully considered. Reciprocity is a fundamen-
tal concept in this process. All of the princi-
ples must be clothed with substance and
given practical form. The nature of peace
must be defined for all the peoples involved.

If there are limitations in the present
framework, they result from the attitudes
of the parties. What is needed is that all the
parties go on from here to work out the sub-
stance of the solutions and that if any party
feels there is a need to reconsider the frame-
work in order to proceed further, that this
emerge from negotiations among the parties
in the Geneva context.

It is evident from the debate that led to
the convening of the Security Council that
there is concern on the part of some of the
parties to the dispute, shared by members of
the Council, regarding those aspects of the
Middle East problem that relate particu-
larly to the Palestinian people and their fu-
ture. It is important that we work to develop
a common understanding of this particularly
complex issue. The Palestinian question was
for many years considered primarily a refu-
gee problem. It is widely accepted today that
this is only one aspect of a larger question.
The United States has repeatedly afl^rmed its
recognition that there will be no permanent
peace unless it includes arrangements that
take into account the legitimate interests of
the Palestinian people. The United States is
prepared to work with all the parties toward
a solution of all the issues yet remaining,
including the issue of the future of the Pal-
estinian people. We have no preconceptions
as to the nature of such a solution as it in-
volves them, which can only be worked out
as part of the negotiating process. But we
recognize that a solution must take into ac-
count their aspirations within the framework
of principles laid down in Resolutions 242
and 338.

February 16, 1976

195

This issue, as is the case with the other
issues, can be successfully dealt with, how-
ever, only by maintaining the momentum of
practical progress in the negotiating process.
We look to this process to clarify issues and
to help develop a reasonable and accepted
definition of Palestinian interests, without
which negotiation on this aspect of the ovei'-
all problem cannot be successfully addressed.
However, it is not realistic to expect one
party to the dispute to agree to the participa-
tion of another in the negotiations if the
latter's policy is to seek the disappearance of
the former as a state. As far as the United
States is concerned, no negotiating frame-
work is viable that calls the existence of the
State of Israel into question.

We appreciate that, at this stage, the par-
ticular negotiating means that have been
used so successfully to date present difficul-
ties to one or another of the parties. We have
therefore suggested an informal preparatory
conference of the present Geneva parties
looking toward a convening of the Geneva
Conference, in which the parties can discuss
questions relating to the agenda, procedures,
and participants of the formal conference
without prejudice to their positions on the
conference itself. What is important is to
continue the process. The goals all want to
achieve cannot be achieved without move-
ment, but at the same time there is no short-
cut. They require the cooperation of both
sides at every stage.

We understand also that the process ap-
pears at times to be unduly slow. When one
looks at the issues that lie ahead one is
tempted, indeed, to question whether we
shall ever deal with them all. But when one
looks back over the years and sees how much
more has been accomplished in the last two
years than in the quarter of a century that
came before, he is encouraged to hope that
the process we are engaged in will in fact
lead us where we all want to go. The years
1974 and 1975 were years of signal accom-
plishment. The United States is firmly and
irrevocably committed to progress in the
negotiation of a settlement. In keeping with
this commitment, it will do all it can to press

ahead this year to consolidate what has b«
achieved and lay the groundwork for rai
progress. We believe that we have an oblj
tion to keep open and intact the negotiat:
framework and to assist in developing
common understanding of the problems tl
i-emain before us. We are confident tl
progress leading to an eventual solution
all the issues is possible, utilizing — and,
fact, only by utilizing — the present frar
work ; and we are committed to assist
every way we can to facilitate such progr©
We will be active in the months ahe.
and our efforts will be seen to speak i
themselves.

trei

i.

TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION

The Security Coiincil,

Having considered the item entitled "The Mid
East problem including the Palestinian questio
in accordance with its resolution 381 (1975)
30 November 1975,

Having heard the representatives of parties c\
cerned, including the Palestinian Liberation Orga
zation, representative of the Palestinian people,

Convinced that the question of Palestine is
core of the conflict in the Middle East,

Expressing its concern over the continuing deta
oration of the situation in the Middle East,
deeply deploring Israel's persistence in its occul
tion of Arab territories and its refusal to implem|
the relevant United Nations resolutions.

Reaffirming the principle of inadmissibility of i|
quisition of territories by the threat or use of foil

Reaffirming further the necessity of the establil
ment of a just and lasting peace in the region ba|
on full respect for the Charter of the United
tions as well as for its resolutions concerning ll
problem of the Middle East including the questj^
of Palestine,

1. Affirms:

(a) That the Palestinian people should be enablj
to exercise its inalienable national right of se
determination, including the right to establish
independent state in Palestine in accordance wi|
the Charter of the United Nations;

= U.N. doc. S/11940; the draft resolution was
adopted owing to the negative vote of a permane
member of the Council, the vote being 9 in favor,
against (U.S.), with 3 abstentions (Italy, Swedt
U.K.). The People's Republic of China and Lib;
did not participate in the vote.

196

Department of State Bullet

to!

b

leni!

ah
eali

b) The right of Palestinian refugees wishing to
rn to their homes and live at peace with their
;hbours to do so and the right of those choosing
to return to receive compensation for their prop-

thr

c) That Israel should withdraw from all
ih territories occupied since June 1967;

d) That appropriate arrangements should be
blished to guarantee, in accordance with the

irter of the United Nations, the sovereignty,
ritorial integrity and political independence of all
tes in the area and their right to live in peace
;hin secure and recognized boundaries;

Decides that the provisions contained in para-

iph 1 should be taken fully into account in all

ernational efforts and conferences organized with-

the framework of the United Nations for the

blishment of a just and lasting peace in the

Iddle East;

Requests the Secretary-General to take all the
icessary steps as soon as possible for the imple-
imtation of the provisions of this resolution and
1 report to the Security Council on the progress
ihieved;

4. Decides to convene within a period of six
>nths to consider the report by the Secretary-Gen-
Lil regarding the implementation of this resolution,
id in order to pursue its responsibilities regard-
g such implementation.

Meeting of IMF Interim Committee
leld in Jamaica

Following is the text of a press commu-
i(iue issued at Kingston, Jamaica, and

'ashington on January 8 at the conclusion
f the fifth 'meeting of the Interim Commit-
'e of the Board of Governors of the Inter-
ational Monetary Fund. Secretary of the
'reasnry William E. Simon headed the U.S.
elegation to the meeting.

1. The Interim Committee of the Board of Gov-
mors of the International Monetary Fund held its
fth meeting in Kingston, Jamaica on January 7-8,
976 under the chairmanship of Mr. Willy de Clercq,
■linister of Finance of Belgium, who was selected
)y the Committee to succeed Mr. John Turner of
Canada as Chairman. Mr. H. Johannes Witteveen,
vlanaging Director of the Fund, participated in the
neeting. The following observers attended during
;he Committee's discussions: Mr. Henri Konan Bedie,
Jhairman, Bank-Fund Development Committee, Mr.
3. D. Arsenis representing the Secretary-General,

UNCTAD, Mr. Wilhelm Haferkamp, Vice-President,
EC Commission, Mr. Mahjoob A. Hassanain, Chief,
Economics Department, OPEC, Mr. Rene Larre, Gen-
eral Manager, BIS, Mr. Emile Van Lennep, Secre-
tary-General, OECD, Mr. F. Leutwiler, President,
National Bank of Switzerland, Mr. Olivier Long,
Director General, GATT, and Mr. Robert S. Mc-
Namara, President, IBRD.'

2. The Committee endorsed the recommendations
contained in the report of the Executive Directors on
the Sixth (Jeneral Review of Quotas and the pro-
posed resolution on increases in the quotas of indi-
vidual members to be submitted to the Board of
Governors for its approval. In this connection, the
Committee reaffirmed its view that the Fund's hold-
ings of each currency should be usable in the Fund's
operations and transactions in accordance with its
policies. Appropriate provisions for this purpose will
be included in the draft amendments of the Fund's
Articles. To give effect to the Committee's view in
the period before the amendments become effective,
it was agreed that, within six months after the date
of the adoption of this resolution, each member shall
make arrangements satisfactory to the Fund for the
use of the member's currency in the operations and
transactions of the Fund in accordance with its poli-
cies, provided that the Executive Directors may
extend the period within which such arrangements
shall be made.

3. The Committee considered the question of the
implementation of the agreement reached at its
fourth meeting regarding the disposition of a part
of the Fund's holdings of gold. It was agreed that
action should be taken to start without delay the
simultaneous implementation of the arrangements
referred to in paragraph 6 of the press communique
issued by the Committee on August 31, 1975." The
sales of gold by the Fund should be made in public
auctions according to an appropriate timetable over
a four-year period. It is understood that the Bank
for International Settlements would be able to bid
in these auctions.

4. In its discussion of the world economic situation
and outlook, the Committee noted that recovery from
the severe international recession of 1974-75 was
now under way in much of the industrial world.
Nevertheless, current rates of both unemployment
and inflation were still unacceptably high. The Com-
mittee called on the industrial countries, especially
those in relatively strong balance of payments posi-

' Abbreviation guide: BIS, Bank for International
Settlements; EC, European Community; GATT, Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IBRD, Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development;
OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development; OPEC, Organization of Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries; UNCTAD, United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development.

- For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 22, 1975, p. 450.

February 16, 1976

197

tions, to conduct their policies so as to ensure a
satisfactory and sustained rate of economic expan-
sion in the period ahead while continuing to combat
inflation.

A special source of concern to the Committee was
the deterioration in the external position of the
primary producing countries, especially the devel-
oping ones. The general picture for the developing
countries in 1975 was again one of large balance of
payments deficits on current account, financed
through heavy external borrowing and through the
use of reserves already eroded by the inflation in
recent years. With large current account deficits
still in prospect this year, the Committee felt that
the ability of many developing countries to maintain
an adequate flow of imports in 1976, and to follow
appropriate adjustment policies, would also depend
on the availability of adequate credit from the Fund.

5. The Committee welcomed the recent decision of
the Executive Directors liberalizing the Compensa-
tory Financing Facility. Under the new decision the
Fund will be prepared to authorize drawings up to
75 per cent of a member's quota, as against 50 per
cent under the 1966 decision. Maximum drawings
in any one year are raised from 25 per cent to 50
per cent of quota. Moreover, the decision enables the
Fund to render assistance under the facility at an
earlier stage of the development of a shortfall.

6. The Committee noted the report of the Execu-
tive Directors on their review of the Fund's policies
on the use of its resources, and also on the Trust
Fund for the benefit of the low income members.
After consideration of the issues involved, the Com-
mittee reached the following conclusions:

(a) It was agreed that the necessary steps should
be taken to establish the Trust Fund without delay.
Its resources would be derived from the profits of the
sales of the Fund's gold, which should be augmented
by voluntary national contributions. It was agreed
that the amount of gold available for sale in ac-
cordance with the agreement reached by the Com-
mittee at its fourth meeting should be disposed of
over a four-year period. The resources of the Trust
Fund should be used to provide balance of payments
assistance on concessionary terms to members with
low per capita incomes. Initially, eligible members
would be those with per capita incomes in 1973 not
in excess of SDR [special drawing rights] 300.

(b) It was further agreed, that, until the effective
date of the amendment of the Articles, the size of
each credit tranche should be increased by 45 per
cent, which would mean that total access under the
credit tranches would be increased from 100 per cent
to 145 per cent of quota, with the possibility of
further assistance in exceptional circumstances. The
present kinds of conditionality for the tranches
would remain unchanged. The Fund will in due
course consider again the question of access to the
Fund's resources if it becomes evident that the needs
of members make it advisable to re-examine this
question.

7. The Committee noted the report of the E>
tive Directors on amendment, welcomed the proj
made toward the solution of the outstanding is;
and commended them for the voluminous and
cessful work that they had done in order to aci
a major revision of the Articles. In particula.
welcomed the agreement that has been reache>
provisions concerning the important problem of
change rates. In this i-espeet, it has endorsed a
Article IV of the Articles of Agreement which e;
lishes a system of exchange arrangements. The
system recognizes an objective of stability anc
lates it to achievement of greater underlying st
ity in economic and financial factors. The Comm
considered the remaining issues on which its j
ance has been requested by the Executive Direc
and agreed as follows:

(a) The amended Articles of Agreement si
include a provision by which the members of
Fund would undertake to collaborate with the 1
and with other members in order to ensure
their policies with respect to resei-ve assets v. \$
be consistent with the objectives of promoting b^ ;r
international surveillance of international liqu ,y
and making the special drawing right the prini al
reserve asset in the international monetary syste

(b) The amended Articles would contain an
abling provision under which the Fund wouk
able to sell any part of the gold left after the di
bution of 50 million ounces in accordance with
arrangements referred to in paragraph 3 above,
use the profits (1) to augment the general resoi
of the Fund for immediate use in its ordinary oj ]
tions and transactions, or (2) to make balanc
payments assistance available on special term
developing members in difficult circumstances
the occasion of such sales the Fund would havf
power to distribute to developing members a po
of the profits on the basis of their quotas or to t
a similar distribution by the direct sale of gol
them at the present oflficial price. Any decisioi
such a distribution should be taken by an 85
cent majority of the total voting power. T
powers of the Fund would be in addition to the pi
that the Fund would have under another enal
provision to restitute to all members, on the has )f
present quotas and at the present official price, ly
part of the gold left after the disposition of th id
million ounces referred to above.

(c) Decisions of the Fund on the use of the pr ts
from the sale of its gold in the regular operat is
and transactions of the Fund should be taken 1 a
70 per cent majority of the total voting power id
on decisions on use of the profits in other operat is
and transactions by an 85 per cent majority of le
total voting power.

(d) The Executive Directors are urged to rev n,
during the final stage of their work on the d ft
amendments, the majorities for operational decis is
that do not reflect compromises of a political c' r-
acter with a view to considering the reductior if

198

Department of State Bull n

We, of the number and size of the special major-
that would be required under the amended
lies for such operational decisions. Such a review
d be completed within the coming weeks and
d not delay the completion of the comprehensive
amendment.

The majority required for the adoption of de-
is on the method of valuation of the SDR under
mended Articles should be 70 per cent of the
voting power, with the exception of decisions
ving a change in the principle of valuation or a
amental change in the application of the princi-
n effect, which should be taken by an 85 per
majority of the total voting power.
I The Executive Directors should continue their
deration of the subject of a substitution ac-
without delaying completion of the compre-
ive draft amendment.

) With respect to the obligation of participants
le Special Drawing Account to reconstitute their
ings of special drawing rights, it was agreed
the amended Articles should authorize the Fund
eview the rules for reconstitution at any time
to adopt, modify, or abrogate these rules by a
er cent majority of the total voting power.

I The Committee requested the Executive Di-
ors to complete their work on amendment in the
t of the guidance given by the Committee, and
!Cts that the Executive Directors will be able to

it a comprehensive draft amendment for the
foval of the Board of Governors, together with

port, within the coming weeks.

TREATY INFORMATION

.rrent Actions

MULTILATERAL

:fee

inrnational coffee agreement 1976, with annexes.
Lpproved by the International Coffee Council
)ecember 3, 1975. Open for signature at U.N.
leadquarters January 31 through July 31, 1976.
Inters into force definitively on October 1, 1976,
f, by that date, governments representing at least
0 exporting members holding at least 80 percent
f the votes of the exporting members and at least
0 importing members holding at least 80 percent
if the votes of the importing members have de-
losited their instruments of ratification, acceptance,
•r approval; provisionally, on October 1, 1976, if
governments meeting the above requirements have

deposited instruments of ratification, acceptance,
or approval or notifications containing an under-
taking to apply the agreement provisionally and
to seek ratification, acceptance, or approval.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as
amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490).
Adopted at London October 17, 1974.'
Acceptances deposited: India, Switzerland, Janu-
ary 16, 1976.

Phonograms

Convention for the protection of producers of phono-
grams against unauthorized duplication of their
phonograms. Done at Geneva October 29, 1971.
Entered into force April 18, 1973; for the United
States March 10, 1974. TIAS 7808.
Notification from World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization that ratification deposited: Luxem-
bourg, December 8, 1975.

Property — Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14,
1967. Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the
United States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.
Ratification deposited: Greece, December 4, 1975.

Publications

Agreement relating to the repression of the circula-
tion of obscene publications, signed at Paris May
4, 1910, as amended by the protocol signed at Lake
Success May 4, 1949. Entered into force September
15, 1911, and May 4, 1949. 37 Stat. 1511; TIAS
2164.

Notification of succession: Lesotho, November 28,
1975.

Sea, Exploration of

Protocol to the convention of September 12, 1964
(TIAS 7628), for the International Council for
the Exploration of the Sea. Done at Copenhagen
August 13, 1970. Entered into force November 12,
1975.
Proclaimed by the President: January 24, 1976.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with
annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torre-
molinos October 25, 1973. Entered into force Jan-
uary 1, 1975.=
Accession deposited: Comoros, January 5, 1976.

Terrorism — Protection of Diplomats

Convention on the prevention and punishment of
crimes against internationally protected persons,
including diplomatic agents. Done at New York
December 14, 1973.'

Ratification deposited: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic, January 20, 1976.

' Not in force.

' Not in force for the United States.

broary 16, 1976

199

Trade

Arrangement regarding international trade in tex-
tiles, with annexes. Done at Geneva December 20,
1973. Entered into force January 1, 1974, except
for article 2, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, which entered
into force April 1, 1974. TIAS 7840.
Ratification deposited: Egypt, January 6, 1976.

Protocol amending the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade to introduce a part IV on trade and
development, and to amend annex I. Done at
Geneva February 8, 1965. Entered into force June
27, 1966. TIAS 6139.
Acceptance deposited: Senegal, December 31, 1975.

Declaration on the provisional accession of Colombia
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Done at Geneva July 23, 1975. Entered into force
January 22, 1976.-

Protocol for the accession of Paraguay to the proto-
col relating to trade negotiations among develop-
ing countries. Done at Geneva November 17, 1975.
Enters into force on the 30th day following the
day upon which it shall have been signed by Para-
guay.

Proces-verbal extending the declaration on the pro-
visional accession of the Philippines to the Gen-
ral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at
Geneva November 21, 1975. Entered into force Jan-
uary 6, 1976; for the United States January 19,
1976.

Tenth proces-verbal extending the declaration on the
provisional accession of Tunisia to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva
November 21, 1975. Entered into force January 8,
1976; for the United States January 19, 1976.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat
trade convention (part of the international wheat
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at
Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force
June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions
and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions.
Proclaimed by the President: January 24, 1976.
Ratification deposited: Finland, January 23, 1976.

Protocol modifying and further extending the food
aid convention (part of the international wheat
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at
Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force
June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions
and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions.
Proclaimed by the President: January 24, 1976.
Ratification deposited: Finland, January 23, 1976.

BILATERAL

Spain

Treaty of friendship and cooperation, with supple-
mentary agreements and related notes. Signed at
Madrid January 24, 1976. Enters into force upon
the exchange of instruments of ratification.

- Not in force for the United States.

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Background Notes: Short, factual summaries whi
describe the people, history, government, econon
and foreign relations of each country. Each contai
a map, a list of principal government officials a
U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a readi
list. (A complete set of all Background Notes ct
rently in stock— at least 140— $21.80; 1-year si
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copies of those listed below are available at 30^ ea

Kenya . .
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Switzerland

Cat. No. S1.123:K
Pub. 8024 6

Cat. No. S1.123:S
Pub. 7835 6

Cat. No. S1.123:S^
Pub. 8132 7

International Civil Aviation. Protocol with OtI
Governments amending article 56 of the convent
of December 7, 1944. TIAS 8092. 4 pp. 25<t. (Cat. 1
S9.10:8092).

Air Charter Services. Agreement with the Uni
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
tending the agreement of March 30, 1973,
amended and extended, and the related letter
March 29, 1974. TIAS 8102. 3 pp. 25«'. (Cat. 1
S9.10:8102).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Sri Lan
TIAS 8107. 30 pp. 45«^. (Cat. No. 89.10:8107).

Aeronautical Research — Augmentor Wing Syste

Agreement with Canada extending the agreement
October 19 and November 10, 1970. TIAS 8109. 6
25«(. (Cat. No. S9.10:8109).

Trade — Meat Imports. Agreement with Austra'
TIAS 8110. 9 pp. 30^ (Cat. No. 89.10:8110).

Refugee Relief in the Republic of Viet-Nam, La
and the Khmer Republic. Agreement with the Int
national Committee of the Red Cross amending t
agreement of February 20 and March 16 and
1975, as amended. TIAS 8111. 2 pp. 25(J. (Cat. 1
89.10:8111).

200

Department of State Bulle i

JDEX February 16, 1976 Vol. LXXIV, No. 1912

rica. Implications of Angola for Future U.S.
Foreign Policy (Kissinger) 174

i'lgola

) plications of Angola for Future U.S. For-
ngn Policy (Kissinger) 174

lesident Ford Reiterates U.S. Objective in
Angola (letter to Speaker of the House) . . 182

{cretary Kissinger Visits Copenhagen, Mos-
:ow, Brussels, and Madrid (Areilza, Jorgen-
sen, Kissinger, joint U.S.-Soviet communique) 161

(ngress

/inual Food for Peace Report Transmitted to
Congress (message from President Ford) . . 188

Apartment Discusses Global Inflation and Na-
tional Policy (Robinson) 184

liplications of Angola for Future U.S. For-
eign Policy (Kissinger) 174

lesident Ford Reiterates U.S. Objective in
Angola (letter to Speaker of the House) . . 132

tiba. Implications of Angola for Future U.S.
Foreign Policy (Kissinger) 174

mmark. Secretary Kissinger Visits Copen-
hagen, Moscow, Brussels, and Madrid
(Areilza, Jorgensen, Kissinger, joint U.S.-
Soviet communique) 161

isarmament. Secretary Kissinger Visits
Copenhagen, Moscow, Brussels, and Madrid
(Areilza, Jorgensen, Kissinger, joint U.S.-
Soviet communique) 161

' :onomic Affairs

, apartment Discusses Global Inflation and Na-
tional Policy (Robinson) 184

eeting of IMF Interim Committee Held in
Jamaica (press communique) 197

oreign Aid. Annual Food for Peace Report
Transmitted to Congress (message from
President Ford) 188

iternational Organizations and Conferences.

Meeting of IMF Interim Committee Held

in Jamaica (press communique) 197

[iddle East. United States Vetoes Change in
Framework for Middle East Negotiations
(Moynihan, Department statement, text of
draft Security Council resolution) .... 189

'orth Atlantic Treaty Organization. Secre-
tary Kissinger Visits Copenhagen, Moscow,
Brussels, and Madrid (Areilza, Jorgensen,
Kissinger, joint U.S.-Soviet communique) . 161

'residential Documents

innual Food for Peace Report Transmitted to
Congress (message from President Ford) . 188

'resident Ford Reiterates U.S. Objective in
Angola (letter to Speaker of the House) . . 182

•ublications. GPO Sales Publications ... 200

ipain. Secretary Kissinger Visits Copenhagen,
Moscow, Brussels, and Madrid (Areilza,
Jorgensen, Kissinger, joint U.S.-Soviet
communique) 161

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 199

U.S.S.R.

Implications of Angola for Future U.S. For-
eign Policy (Kissinger) 174

Secretary Kissinger Visits Copenhagen, Mos-
cow, Brussels, and Madrid (Areilza, Jorgen-
sen, Kissinger joint U.S.-Soviet communique) 161

United Nations. United States Vetoes Change
in Framework for Middle East Negotiations
(Moynihan, Department statement, text of
draft Security Council resolution) .... 189

Name Index

Areilza, Jose Maria de 161

Ford, President 182, 188

Jorgensen, Anker 161

Kissinger, Secretary 161, 174

Moynihan, Daniel P 189

Robinson, Charles W 184

Checklist of Department of State

Press Releases: Jan. 26-Feb. 1

Press releases may be obtained from the

Office of Press Relations, Department of State,

Washington, D.C. 20520.

No. Date

Snbjeet

24A 1/23

Joint U.S.-Soviet communique.

28 1/26

Kissinger, Areilza: arrival, Madrid,

Jan. 24.

29 1/26

Kissinger, Areilza: news conference,

Madrid, Jan. 24.

30 1/26

Kissinger: toast, Madrid, Jan. 24.

*31 1/26

U.S. and India sign cotton textile

agreement, Jan. 22.

32 1/26

Department statement at conclusion

of Security Council Middle East

debate.

*33 1/22

U.S. and Hong Kong sign textile

agreement, Dec. 22.

t34 1/27

Kissinger, Rabin: toasts.

*35 1/28

Secretary's Advisory Committee on

Private International Law, Study

Group on Arbitration, New York,

Feb. 26.

*36 1/28

Shipping Coordinating Committee,

Subcommittee on Safety of Life

at Sea, working group on bulk

chemicals, Feb. 24.

*37 1/28

Advisory Panel on Folk Music and

Jazz, Mar. 3.

*SS 1/28

Advisory Panel on Academic Music,

Mar. i.

*39 1/29

U.S. request to U.S.S.R. for war

crimes evidence.

40 1/29

Kissinger: Subcommittee on Africa,

Senate Committee on Foreign Re-

lations.

t41 1/29

U.S.-Canada transit pipeline agree-

ment.

t42 1/30

Kissinger: Senate Committee on

Finance,
inted.

* Not pr

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

Superintendent of Documents

u.s. government printing office

washington. dc. 204o2

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

postage and fees paid
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Special Fourth-Class Rate
Book

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Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted
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/^/

/?/3

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXIV • No. 1913 • February 23, 1976

THE PERMANENT CHALLENGE OF PEACE :

U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION

Address by Secretary Kissinger 201

PRIME MINISTER RABIN OF ISRAEL VISITS THE UNITED STATES 221

U.S. RESPONSIBILITIES IN A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY

Statement by Secretary Kissinger
Before the Senate Committee on Finance 2SJf

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY'

-icnts

For index see inside back cover

j^fc.r »-'•>«•

s.>rvlf

I

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXXIV, No. 1913
February 23, 1976

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402

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Note: Contents of this publication are not
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The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
OfRee of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of U.S. foreign relations and
on the work of the Department and
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses,
and news conferences of the President
and the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
international affairs and the functions
of the Department. Information is
included concerning treaties and inter-
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United States is or may become a
party and on treaties of general inter-
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Publications of the Department of
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The Permanent Challenge of Peace: U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union

Address by Secretary Kissinger '

America enters its third century and its
48th Presidential election with unmatched
physical strength, a sound foreign policy de-
sign— yet scarred by self-doubt. In the past
decade and a half, we have seen one Presi-
dent assassinated, another driven from office,
and a third resign. We have lived through
the agony of Viet-Nam and Watergate. We
are still struggling to overcome the bitter-
ness and division that have followed in
their wake. We face no more urgent task
than to restore our national unity and our
national resolve.

For we, the strongest free nation, cannot
afford the luxury of withdrawing into our-
selves to heal our wounds. Too much depends
upon us — peace or war, prosperity or depres-
sion, freedom or tyranny. Too much is at
stake for America to paralyze itself tearing
up the past, seeking sensational headlines in
the present, or offering panaceas for the
future. For our own well-being — American
lives and American jobs — will be affected if
we permit our domestic disunity and turmoil
to cause us to falter in meeting our inter-
national responsibilities.

And so it is imperative that the national
debate in this election year — the greatest
demonstration of how free people govern
themselves— strengthen, not undermine, our
confidence and our capacity to carry out an
effective national policy. It is essential that
we quickly rebuild our national unity, the

' Made at San Francisco, Calif., on Feb. 3 before
a luncheon sponsored by the Commonwealth Club of
San Francisco and the World Affairs Council of
Northern California (text from press release 44).

sense that we are all part of a shared
enterprise.

It is in this spirit that I intend today to
discuss America's relations with the world's
other superpower, the Soviet Union. In re-
cent months that relationship has become,
as it should be, an important part of our
national debate. I want to explain the Ad-
ministration's view of the conditions that
gave rise to the policy known as detente,
the goals we seek, and the relationship of
our Soviet policy to the overall design of
American diplomacy.

The United States is today confronted by
one challenge unprecedented in its own his-
tory and another challenge without precedent
in the history of the world. America finds
itself for the first time permanently and ir-
revocably involved in international affairs.
At the same time, the catastrophic nature of
nuclear war imposes upon us a necessity
that transcends traditional concepts of di-
plomacy and balance of power: to shape a
world order that finds stability in self-
restraint and, ultimately, cooperation.

For the first century and a half of our
history, our peace and security were pro-
vided for us by two oceans, the shield of the
British Navy, and equilibrium among the
European powers. The success of our democ-
racy at home, and the absence of direct
threat from abroad, nourished our sense of
uniqueness and fostered the illusion that it
was up to America to choose whether and
when we would participate in the world.

Since De Tocqueville it has been a cliche
that Americans, as a people, are slow to
arouse but that, once aroused, we are a tre-

February 23, 1976

201

mendous and implacable force. Thus, even
when we ventured forth in foreign affairs,
we identified our exertion as a temporary
disruption of our tranquillity. Our history,
except for the Civil War, was without the
tragedies and the sense of practical external
limits that so colored the experience of al-
most every other people.

Our successes seemed to teach us that any
problem could be solved once and for all by
determined effort. We considered peace nat-
ural, stability normal, and foreign involve-
ment appropriate only so long as needed to
remove some temporary threat or disorder.
We entered World War I as "the war to end
war" and to "make the world safe for democ-
racy." We fought World War II until "un-
conditional surrender."

Even in the first 25 years after World
War II, an era of great creativity and un-
precedented American engagement in for-
eign affairs, we acted as if the world's secu-
rity and economic development could be con-
clusively insured by the commitment of
American resources, know-how, and effort.
We were encouraged, even impelled, to act as
we did by our unprecedented predominance
in a world shattered by war and the collapse
of the great colonial empires. We considered
our deployment of troops in Europe and
elsewhere to be temporary. We thought that
the policy of containment would transform
the Soviet Union and that a changed
Soviet society would then evolve inexorably
into a compatible member of a harmonious
international community.

At the same time, the central character
of moral values in American life always
made us acutely sensitive to the purity of
means — and when we disposed of overwhelm-
ing power we had a great luxury of choice.
Our moral certainty made compromise difl!i-
cult; our preponderance often made it seem
unnecessary.

Today, while we still have massive
strength, we no longer enjoy meaningful nu-
clear supremacy. We remain the world's
most productive and innovative economy —
but we must now share leadership with
Western Europe, Canada, and Japan ; we
must deal with the newly wealthy and devel-

oping nations ; and we must make new choices
regarding our economic relations with the
Communist countries. Our democratic princi-
ples are still far more valued by the world's
millions than we realize, but we must also
compete with new ideologies which assert
progressive goals but pursue them by
oppressive methods.

Today, for the first time in our history,
we face the stark reality that the challenge
is unending, that there is no easy and
surely no final answer, that there are no
automatic solutions. We must learn to con-
duct foreign policy as other nations have
had to conduct it for so many centuries —
without escape and without respite, knowing
that what is attainable falls short of the
ideal, mindful of the necessities of self-
preservation, conscious that the reach of
our national purpose has its limits. This is a
new experience for Americans. It prompts
nostalgia for a simpler past. As before in
our history, it generates the search for scape-
goats, holding specific policies responsible
for objective conditions.

It is precisely because we no longer pre-
dominate but must pursue a long-term course
that there is a premium today on our con-
stancy and purposefulness. We cannot afford
to swing recklessly between confrontation
and abdication. We must not equate tough
rhetoric with strong action, nor can we wish
away tough realities with nostalgic hopes.
We can no longer act as if we engage our-
selves in foreign affairs only when we choose,
or only to overcome specific problems, so i
that we can then shift our priorities back to
our natural concern with ourselves. The real-
ity is that there can be no security without
our vigilance and no progress without our
dedication.

It is in this context that U.S.-Soviet rela-
tions must be seen.

The Contemporary Challenge of Relations

The issue of how to deal with the Soviet
Union has been a central feature of Ameri-
can policy for three decades. What is new
today is the culmination of 30 years of post-
war growth of Soviet industrial, technologi-

202

Department of State Bulletin

cal, and military power. No American policy
caused this; no American policy could have
prevented it. But American policy can keep
this power from being used to expand Soviet
influence to our detriment; we have the ca-
pacity to enable allies and friends to live with
a sense of security ; we possess the assets to
advance the process of building an inter-
national order of cooperation and progress.
We must do so, however, in unprecedented
conditions. In previous periods, rivalry be-
tween major powers has almost invariably
led to war. In our time, when thermonuclear
weapons threaten casualties in the hundreds
of millions, such an outcome is unthinkable.
We must manage a fundamental clash of
ideologies and harness the rivalry of the nu-
clear superpowers, first into coexistence, and
then mold coexistence into a more positive
and cooperative future. For as President
Kennedy once said:^

... in the final analysis our most basic common
link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all
breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's
future. And we are all mortal.

In the period after World War II, our
nightmare was that the Soviet Union, after
consolidating its occupation of Eastern
Europe, might seek to spread its control to
other contiguous areas in Europe and Asia.
Our policies therefore sought to build alli-
ances and positions of military strength
from which we could contain and isolate the
Soviet Union. In this manner the Soviet
Union might be forced to settle for peace;
transformations might occur within Soviet
society that would curb expansionist tend-
encies and make the U.S.S.R. over time
into a more cooperative participant in the
international system.

These policies served us and our allies
well. Soviet expansion was checked. Behind
our shield of security and with our assist-
ance, our friends and allies in Western
Europe restored their economies and rebuilt
their democratic institutions.

Yet the hope that these policies would

- For President Kennedy's address at American
University, Washington, D.C., on June 10, 1963, see
Bulletin of July 1, 1963, p. 2.

produce permanent stability, positive evolu-
tion of the Soviet system, and greater nor-
mality was only partially realized. In the
immediate postwar period, the aggressive-
ness of Soviet ideology in the Stalinist era
obscui'ed some of the real weaknesses of the
Soviet state. Indeed, as late as 1962 during
the Cuban missile crisis, the United States
enjoyed a five-to-one superiority in strategic
missiles, a three-to-one superiority in stra-
tegic bombers, total naval superiority every-
where, and rough equality on the ground in
Europe.

Gradually, with the acquisition of nuclear
technology and the transformation of the
international system through decolonization,
the Soviet Union began to emerge as a first-
class military power.

In strategic military terms the U.S.S.R.
has achieved a broad equality with the
United States, as was inevitable for a large
nation whose rulers were prepared to impose
great sacrifices on their people and to give
military strength the absolute top priority
in resources. With only half of our gross
national product, Soviet military expendi-
tures exceed those of the United States.

For the first time in history, the Soviet
Union can threaten distant places beyond
the Eurasian landmass — including the United
States. With no part of the world outside
the range of its military forces, the U.S.S.R.
has begun to define its interests and objec-
tives in global terms. Soviet diplomacy has
thrust into the Middle East, Africa, and
Asia. This evolution is now rooted in real
power, rather than a rhetorical manifestation
of a universalist doctrine which in fact has
very little validity or appeal.

Coping with the implications of this
emerging superpower has been our central
security problem for the last several years.
This condition will not go away. And it will
perhaps never be conclusively "solved." It
will have to be faced by every Administra-
tion for the foreseeable future.

Our policy must deal with the conse-
quences. The emergence of ambitious new
powers into an existing international struc-
ture is a recurrent phenomenon. Historically,
the adjustment of an existing order to the

February 23, 1976

203

arrival of one or more new actors almost
invariably was accompanied by war — to im-
pede the upstart, to remove or diminish
some of the previously established actors, to
test the balance of forces in a revised sys-
tem. But in the nuclear era, when casual-
ties in a general nuclear war will involve
hundreds of millions in a matter of days, the
use of force threatens utter catastrophe. It
is our responsibility to contain Soviet power
without global war, to avoid abdication as
well as unnecessary confrontation.

This can be done, but it requires a delicate
and complex policy. We must strive for an
equilibrium of power, but we must move be-
yond it to promote the habits of mutual re-
straint, coexistence, and ultimately coopera-
tion. We must stabilize a new international
order in a vastly dangerous environment, but
our ultimate goal must be to transform
ideological conflict into constructive partici-
pation in building a better world.

This is what is meant by the process
called detente — not the hunger for relaxa-
tion of tension, not the striving for agree-
ments at any price, not the mindless search
for friendly atmosphere which some critics
use as naive and dangerous caricatures.

The policies pursued by this Administra-
tion have been designed to prevent Soviet
expansion but also to build a pattern of rela-
tions in which the Soviet Union will always
confront penalties for aggression and also
acquire growing incentives for resti'aint.
These goals are well within our capacities.
Soviet power is evolving with considerable
unevenness. Soviet society is no longer
totally cut ofi" from contact with oi" the in-
fluences of the world around it, nor is it
without its own needs for outside relation-
ships. It is the great industrial democracies,
not the Soviet Union, that are the engine of
the world economy and the most promising
partners for the poorer nations.

The industrial democracies, if they face
their challenges with confidence, if they do
not mesmerize themselves with the illusion
of simple solutions, possess vast strengths to
contain Soviet power and to channel that
power in constructive directions.

Our essential task is to recognize the

need for a dual policy that simultaneously
and with equal vigor resists expansionist
drives and seeks to shape a more construc-
tive relationship. We must prevent the Soviet
Union from translating its growing strength
into global or regional preponderance. But
we must do so without escalating every
crisis into a massive confrontation. In re-
cent years, the United States has firmly re-
sisted attempts by the Soviet Union to estab-
lish a naval base in Cuba, to impede the
access routes to Berlin, to exploit the explo-
sive situation in the Middle East. Recently
we have sought to halt blatant intervention
in Angola — until prevented from doing so by
congressional action.

At the same time, we have a historic obli-
gation to mankind to engage the Soviet
Union in settlements of concrete problems
and to push back the shadow of nuclear ca-
tastrophe. At the very least we owe it to
our people to demonstrate that their gov-
ernment has missed no opportunity to
achieve constructive solutions and that
crises which have occurred were unavoid-
able. For whatever the rhetoric, Americans
will not support confrontations they con-
sider contrived.

This is why the United States has set
forth principles of responsible relations in
the nuclear age: Respect for the interests of
all, restraint in the uses of power, and ab-
stention from efforts to exploit instability or
local conflicts for unilateral advantage. The
United States has sought to give life to these
principles in major negotiations on arms
control, the prevention of accidental war,
and in the settlement of political issues such
as Berlin. And we have begun to construct a
network of cooperative agreements in a va-
riety of functional areas — economic, scien-
tific, medical, environmental, and others
— which promise concrete benefits if political
conditions permit their full implementation
and further development.

It has been our belief that, with patience,
a pattern of restraints and a network of
vested interests can develop which will give
coexistence a more hopeful dimension and
make both sides conscious of what they
would stand to lose by reverting to the poli-

204

Department of State Bulletin

tics of pressure, confrontation, and crisis.

This policy reflects the deepest aspira-
tions of the American people.

In the early 1970's when current U.S.-
Soviet relations were shaped, our nation had
already passed through traumatic events and
was engaged in an anguishing war. There
were riots in the streets and on the campuses
demanding rapid progress toward peace.
Every new defense program was challenged
— including the ABM [antiballistic missiles],
which was approved by only one vote, the
development of multiple warheads, the Tri-
dent submarine, and the B-1 bomber. Suc-
cessive Congresses passed resolutions urging
the Administration to reorder our national
priorities away from defense. We were con-
tinually attacked for not making concessions
in the SALT talks [Strategic Arms Limita-
tion Talks]. The Congress and many inter-
est groups pressed continually for the open-
ing up of East-West trade and agitated
against the Administration's approach of
linking progress in economic relations with
prior progress in political relations. Through-
out the course of 1970 and 1971, we were in-
volved in a series of ci'ises with the Soviet
Union and were often accused of provoca-
tion or bellicosity in the process.

Thus, only a few short years ago, the
pressures in this country and from our allies
were oveinvhelmingly to move rapidly toward
better relations with Moscow. We resisted
these pressures then, just as we now refuse
to let ourselves be stampeded in the opposite
direction. In the Administration's view the
country needs a balanced policy, combining
firmness and conciliation, strong defense and
arms control, political principles and eco-
nomic incentives. And it must be a policy for
the long term that the American people can
sustain, offering promise of a constructive
future.

It is therefore ironic that our national de-
bate seems now in many respects to have
come full circle. The conditions in which de-
tente originated are largely forgotten.
Those who pressed for concessions and uni-
lateral restraint toward Moscow now accuse
the government of being too conciliatory.
Those who complain about our failure to re-

spond with sufficient vigor to Soviet moves
are often the very ones who incessantly seek
to remove this country's leverage for influ-
ence or action — through restrictions on
trade and credit, through weakening our
intelligence capabilities, through prevent-
ing aid to friends who seek to resist Soviet
aggression.

The restrictions on trade and credit are
a case in point. The human rights issue is a
matter of deep and legitimate concern to all
Americans. But the congressional attempt
to link it openly with economic relations,
without subtlety or understanding of Soviet
politics, both deprived us of economic levers
and sharply reduced Soviet emigration.
Other industrial countries have stepped in
to provide credits and technology, with less
concern for the objective of inducing politi-
cal restraint which we had envisaged.

So let us understand the scope and limits
of a realistic policy:

— We cannot prevent the growth of So-
viet power, but we can prevent its use for
unilateral advantage and political expansion.

— We cannot prevent a buildup of Soviet
forces, but we have the capacity, together
with our allies, to maintain an equilibrium.
We cannot neglect this task and then blame
the Soviet Union if the military balance
shifts against us.

— We have the diplomatic, economic, and
military capacity to resist expansionism, but
we cannot engage in a rhetoric of confronta-
tion while depriving ourselves of the means
to confront.

— We must accept that sovereign states,
especially of roughly equal power, cannot im-
pose unacceptable conditions on each other
and must proceed by compromise.

— We must live with the reality of the
nuclear threat, but we have it in our power
to build a new relationship that transcends
the nuclear peril.

So let us end the defeatist rhetoric that
implies that Soviet policy is masterful,
purposeful, and ovez'whelming while Ameri-
can policy is bumbling, uncertain, and weak.
Let us stop pretending that somehow tough

February 23, 1976

205

rhetoric and contrived confrontations show
confidence in America. The opposite is true.
Those who are prepared to base their poHcy
on reahty, those who assert that the Ameri-
can people will support a complex policy of
firmness and conciliation and that this pol-
icy will succeed, show a real faith in our
capacities and our future. We have a design
and the material assets to deal with the
Soviet Union. We will succeed if we move
forward as a united people.

Against this background let me discuss
two current issues that illustrate the two
strands of policy that we are concurrently
pursuing:

— The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks,
ill which we are seeking to shape a more
positive future.

— The Angolan situation, where we are
attempting to curb Soviet expansionism.

Strategic Arms Limitation

There is one central fact that distinguishes
our era from all previous historical periods :
the existence of enormously destructive
weapons that can span unlimited distances
almost instantaneously. No part of the globe
is beyond reach. No part of the globe would
be spared the effects of a general nuclear
exchange.

For centuries it was axiomatic that in-
creases in military power could be trans-
lated into almost immediate political advan-
tage. It is now clear that new increments of
strategic weaponry do not automatically lead
to either political or military gains. Yet, in
the nature of things, if one side expands its
strategic arsenal, the other side will inevita-
bly match it. The race is maintained partly
because a perceived inequality is considered
by each side as politically unacceptable even
though it has become difficult to define pre-
cisely what purely military purpose is served.

We thus face a paradox: At current and
foreseeable levels of nuclear arms, it be-
comes increasingly dangerous to invoke them.
In no crisis since 1962 have the strategic
weapons of the two sides determined the out-
come. Today these arsenals increasingly find
their purpose primarily in matching and de-

terring the forces of the opponent. For under
virtually no foreseeable circumstance could
the United States — or the Soviet Union —
avoid 100 million dead in a nuclear exchange.
Yet the race goes on because of the difficulty
of finding a way to get off the treadmill.^

This condition imposes a unique and
heavy responsibility on the leaders of the
two nuclear super-powers. Sustaining the
nuclear competition requires endless invoca-
tions of theoretical scenarios of imminent or
eventual nuclear attack. The attempt to
hedge against all conceivable contingencies,
no matter how fanciful, fuels political ten-
sions and could well lead to a self-fulfilling
prophecy. The fixation on potential strategic
arms imbalances that is inherent in an un-
restrained arms race diverts resources into
strategically unproductive areas — particu-
larly away from forces for local defense,
where shortfalls and imbalances could indeed
be turned rapidly to our disadvantage. If
no restraint is developed, the competition in
strategic arms can have profound conse-
quences for the future of international rela-
tions and indeed of civilization.

The United States therefore has sought
and achieved since 1963 a series of arms
control agreements which build some re-
straint into nuclear rivalry. There was a
significant breakthrough to limit strategic
weapons in 1972. If the 1974 Vladivostok
accord leads to a new agreement, an even
more important advance will have been made.

Yet, at this critical juncture, the Ameri-
can people are subjected to an avalanche of
charges that SALT is a surrender of Ameri-
can interests. There are assertions that the
United States is falling behind in the stra-

- To be sure, there exist scenarios in planning
papers which seek to demonstrate how one side
could use its strategic forces and how in some pre-
sumed circumstance it would prevail. But these
confuse what a technician can calculate with what a
responsible statesman can decide. They are invari-
ably based on assumptions such as that one side
would permit its missile silos to be destroyed with-
out launching its missiles before they are actually
hit — on which no aggressor would rely where forces
such as those possessed by either the United States
or the U.S.S.R. now and in the years ahead are
involved. [Footnote in original.]

206

Department of State Bulletin

• tegic competition and that SALT has con-
;ltributed to it. There are unsupportable
charges that the Soviets have systemati-
cally violated the SALT agreements.

None of this is accurate. What are the
facts?

First of all, American policy decisions in
the 1960's set the level of our strategic
forces for the 1970's. We then had the
choice between continuing the deployment of
large, heavy-throwweight missiles like the
Titan or Atlas or undertaking development
and deployment of large numbers of smaller,
more flexible ICBM's [intercontinental bal-
listic missiles] or combinations of both types.
The Administration then in office chose to
rely on an arsenal of 1,000 small, sophisti-
cated, and highly accurate ICBM's and 656
submarine-launched missiles on 41 boats,
along with heavy bombers ; we deployed them
rapidly and then stopped our buildup of
launchers unilaterally in the 1960's when
the programs were complete. Only 54 of the
heavy Titans were retained and still re-
main in the force.

The Soviets made the opposite decision ;
they chose larger, heavier missiles ; they
continued to build up their forces through
the 1960*s and 1970's ; they passed our
numerical levels by 1969-70 and continued
to add an average of 200 missiles a year
until stopped by the first SALT agreement.

Thus, as a consequence of decisions made
a decade ago by both sides, Soviet missiles
are superior in throwweight while ours are
superior in reliability, accuracy, diversity,
and sophistication and we possess larger
numbers of warheads. In 1972 when the
SALT agreement was signed, the Soviet
Union was still building at the rate of 90
land-based and 120 sea-based launchers a
year — while we were building none, as a re-
sult of our own repeatedly reaffirmed uni-
lateral decisions of a decade previously.
Since new Amei'ican programs to redress the
balance had only recently been ordered, there
was no way to reduce the numerical gap be-
fore the late seventies when more modern
sea-based missiles and bombers were sched-
uled to become operational.

The interim SALT agreement of 1972

froze overall numbers of launchers on both
sides for five years, thereby limiting the
momentum of Soviet programs without af-
fecting any of ours. It stopped the Soviet
buildup of heavy missile launchers. It forced
the Soviets to agree to dismantle 210 older
land-based missiles to reach permitted ceil-
ings on missile-carrying submarines. The
agreed-upon silo limitations permitted us to
increase the throwweight of our own mis-
siles, if we decided on this avenue of im-
proving our strategic forces. We have so
far chosen not to do so, although, through
research and development, we retain the
option. By any measure, the SALT agree-
ments pi-evented the then-evolving gap in
numbers from widening while enabling us
to retain our advantage in other categories
and easing the problem of redressing the
balance when new programs became opera-
tional. What no negotiation could do is re-
verse by diplomacy the results of our own
longstanding decisions with respect to
weapons design and deployment.

Moreover, the SALT agreements ended for
an indefinite period the prospect of a
dangerous and uncertain competition in
antiballistic missile defense — a competition
that promised no strategic advantage, but
potentially serious instabilities and the ex-
penditure of vast sums of money.

The first SALT agreements were therefore
without question in the American national
interest. In the five-year respite gained by
the 1972 interim agreement, it was our in-
tention to negotiate a long-term pact on of-
fensive weapons that would firmly fix both
sides at an equal level once our new pro-
grams became operational. This is precisely
what President Ford achieved at Vladivostok
in November 1974.

In this accord in principle, both sides
agreed on a ceiling of 2,400 strategic weap-
ons covering strategic systems and heavy
bombers — but not counting any of our for-
ward-based aircraft in Europe, or our allies'
strategic weapons, many of which can reach
Soviet soil. The ceiling of 2,400 is lower than
the level the Soviet Union already has
reached ; it would require the dismantling of
many Soviet weapons, while the planned

February 23, 1976

207

levels and composition of our forces would
not need to be reduced or changed. An equal
ceiling of 1,320 was placed on numbers of
strategic weapons with multiple warheads.
Soviet heavy missile launchers will remain
frozen. These limits would cap the strategic
competition in numbers for a 10-year period,
yet preserve all the programs we need to
assure deterrence and strategic sufficiency.

Obviously no single agreement can solve
every problem. This is not a question of loop-
holes, but of evolving technology, with re-
spect to which we intend to remain vigilant.
We will negotiate carefully to make certain
that the national interest and national secu-
rity are protected. But if we succeed in turn-
ing the Vladivostok accord into a 10-year
agreement, we will have crossed the thresh-
old between total unrestrained competition
and the difficult but promising beginning of
long-term strategic equilibrium at lower
levels of forces. The United States and the
Soviet Union have already agreed to turn
to reductions in strategic forces in the next
phase of the negotiations, starting in 1977.

One would have thought that these ac-
complishments would speak for themselves.
Instead, they have triggered a flood of
charges which mislead the American people
and our friends, give a wrong impression of
irresoluteiiess to our adversaries, and com-
plicate the prospects for a new agreement
that is in the overriding national interest.

No charge is more irresponsible and po-
tentially more dangerous than the allegation
that the United States has knowingly toler-
ated violations of the first SALT agree-
ments.

What are the facts? A Standing Consult-
ative Commission was created by the agree-
ments of 1972 precisely to consider disputes
or ambiguities in implementation. Such inci-
dents were almost certain to arise in a first,
quite limited agreement between longstand-
ing adversaries possessing weapons systems
of great complexity whose growth is verified
not by some neutral policing mechanism but
by each side's own intelligence systems.
Every questionable activity that has arisen
has been systematically analyzed by this
government and considered by the President

and his advisers. Whenever any question re-
mained, it was then promptly raised with the
Soviets. All instructions to the American
representative on the Consultative Commis-
sion reflected the unanimous views of all U.S.
agencies concerned and the data and assess-
ment produced jointly by them. No one had
a bias in favor of absolving the Soviets — an
inherently malicious charge. No one pre-
vented all questionable or suspicious activi-
ties from being raised with the Soviets. And
not all the questioned activities were on the
Soviet side.

All of these issues have been and will con-
tinue to be seriously handled and dealt with
through a process that has proved effective.
Yet irresponsible charges continue to lump
together incidents that have been explained
or are still being considered with wild allega-
tions that have no foundation. They some-
times put foi-ward inaccurate figures and
data which often can be refuted only by
divulging sensitive intelligence information.
Yet with all the recent flurry of allegations,
no recommendations are made of what
countermeasures we should take or how to
assess the significance of any given alleged
violation.

In what way do the alleged violations af-
fect the strategic equation ? In what manner,
if any, have we been foreclosed from pro-
tecting ourselves? Would those who inaccu-
rately allege violations simply throw over al
the agreements regardless of the benefits
they provide the United States? Would they
halt the negotiation of further agreements?
What purpose is served by leading our pub-
lic and the Soviet Union to believe — totally
incorrectly — that the United States is blind
to violations or that its government deliber-
ately deceives its people? Can anyone seri-
ously believe that this Administration which
has strenuously resisted Communist ad-
vances in every part of the world — and is
often strongly criticized for it — would ignore
Soviet violations of a formal agreement?

I can assure you that this Administration
will not tolerate violations. It will continue
to monitor Soviet compliance meticulously.
It will pursue energetically all ambiguities
or signs of noncompliance. But it will not

208

Department of State Bulletin

be driven by demagoguery to make false or

I hasty judgments. No department or agency

charged with responsibihty for this problem

I holds the view that any violations have

occurred.

As we assess SALT we must face squarely
one question: What is the alternative to the
agreement we have and seek? If the SALT
process falters, we must consider what new
or additional strategic programs we would
undertake, their likely cost, and above all,
their strategic purpose.

An accelerated strategic buildup over the
next five years could cost as much as an ad-
ditional $20 billion. Failing a satisfactory
agreement, this will surely be the path we
must travel. It would be a tragically missed
opportunity. For in the process of such a
buildup, and the atmosphere it would en-
gender, it would be difficult to return to
serious negotiations for some time. Tensions
are likely to increase ; a new, higher baseline
will emerge from which future negotiations
would eventually have to begin. And in the
end, neither side will have gained a strategic
advantage. At the least, they will have
wasted resources. At worst, they will have
increased the risks of nuclear war.

Of course the Soviet Union must ponder
these alternatives as well. Their sense of re-
sponsibility must equal ours if there is to
be an equitable and durable agreement based
on strict reciprocity. We consider a SALT
agreement important, but we will take no
chances with our national security.
Let me sum up:

' — We will never stand for the violation
of a solemn treaty or agreement, and we will
remain alert.

— We will never tolerate a shift in the
strategic balance against us — by violations
of agreements, by unsatisfactory agree-
ments, or by neglect of our own programs.
We will spend what is necessary to maintain
strategic sufficiency.

— The President is determined to pursue
the effort to negotiate a saner strategic bal-
ance on equitable terms — because it is in our
interest and because we have an obligation
to our own people and to world peace.

The Soviet Union and Angola

As the United States strives to shape a
more hopeful world, it can never forget that
global stability and security rest upon an
equilibrium between the great powers. If the
Soviet Union is permitted to exploit oppor-
tunities arising out of local conflicts by mil-
itary means, the hopes we have for progress
toward a more peaceful international order
will ultimately be undermined.

This is why the Soviet Union's massive
and unprecedented intervention in the in-
ternal affairs of Africa with nearly 200 mil-
lion dollars' worth of military equipment, its
advisers, and its transport of the large ex-
peditionary force of 11,000 Cuban combat
troops must be a matter of urgent concern.

Angola represents the first time that the
Soviets have moved militarily at long dis-
tance to impose a regime of their choice. It
is the first time that the United States has
failed to respond to Soviet military moves
outside the immediate Soviet orbit. And it
is the first time that Congress has halted
national action in the middle of a crisis.

When one great power tips the balance of
forces decisively in a local conflict through
its military intervention — and meets no
resistance — an ominous precedent is set, of
grave consequence even if the intervention
occurs in a seemingly remote area. Such a
precedent cannot be tolerated if a lasting
easing of tensions is to be achieved. And if
the pattern is not broken now, we will face
harder choices and higher costs in the
future.

The United States seeks no unilateral
goals in Angola. We have proposed a cease-
fire ; withdrawal of all outside forces, Soviet,
Cuban, and South African; cessation of
foreign military involvement, including the
supply of equipment; and negotiations
among all three Angolan factions. This ap-
proach has the support of half the nations
of Africa.

Last summer and fall, to halt a danger-
ously escalating situation, the United States
provided financial support through African
friends to those in Angola — the large major-
ity— who sought to resist Soviet and Cuban

February 23, 1976

209

domination. Using this as leverage, we un-
dertook an active diplomacy to promote an
African solution to an African problem. We
acted quietly, to avoid provoking a major
crisis and raising issues of prestige.

At first it was feared that the Soviet-
backed faction, because of massive Soviet aid
and Cuban mercenaries, would dominate
totally by Independence Day, November 11.
Our assistance prevented that. African de-
termination to oppose Soviet and Cuban
intervention became more and more evident.
On December 9 the President warned Mos-
cow of the consequences of continued med-
dling and offered to cooperate in encouraging
a peaceful outcome that removed foreign
influence. The Soviet Union appeared to have
second thoughts. It halted its airlift from
December 9 until December 24.

At that point, the impact of our domestic
debate overwhelmed the possibilities of di-
plomacy. It was demanded that we explain
publicly why our effort was important — and
then our effort was cut off. After the Senate
vote to block further aid to Angola, Cuba
more than doubled its forces and Soviet mil-
itary aid was resumed on a large scale. The
cooperativeness of Soviet diplomacy declined.
Since then the situation has continued to de-
teriorate.

As our public discussion continues, certain
facts must be understood. The analogy with
Viet-Nam is totally false; this nation must
have the maturity to make elementary dis-
tinctions. The President has pledged that no
American troops or advisers would be sent
to Angola, and we were prepared to accept
legislative restrictions to that effect, in ad-
dition to the War Powers Act which already
exists. What was involved was modest as-
sistance to stabilize the local balance of
forces and make possible a rapid political
settlement in cooperation with African
countries.

It is charged that the Administration
acted covertly, without public acknowledg-
ment. That is correct ; for our purpose was to
avoid an escalated confrontation that would
make it more difficult for the Soviets to back

down, as well as to give the greatest possible
scope for an African solution. Angola was
a case where diplomacy without leverage
was likely to be impotent, yet direct military
confrontation would involve needless risks.
This is precisely one of those gray areas
where unpublicized methods would enable us
to influence events short of direct conflict.

And we complied totally with Congress'
new standard of executive-legislative con-
sultation on secret activities. Beginning in
July, and through December, we discussed
the Angolan situation and what we were do-
ing about it with more than two dozen Sena-
tors, 150 Congressmen, and over 100 staff
members of both Houses. Eight congres-
sional committees were briefed on 24 sepa-
rate occasions. We sought in these briefings
to determine the wishes of Congress, and
there was little sign of active opposition to
our carefully limited operations.

It is said that the Russians will inevitably
be eased out by the Africans themselves
over a period of time. This may or may not
prove true. But such an argument, when
carried to its logical conclusion, implies that
we can abandon the world to interventionist
forces and hope for the best. And reliance on
history is of little solace to those under
attack, whose future is being decided now.
The degree of Soviet and Cuban intervention
is unprecedented; they will have effectively
determined the outcome. There is no evi-
dence to support the claim that they will be
quickly removed or that other nations may
not draw damaging conclusions dangerous
to our long-term interests.

It is maintained that we should meet the
Soviet threat in Angola through escalated
methods of pressure such as altering our
position on SALT or grain sales. But these
arrangements benefit us as well as the
Soviet Union and are part of the long-term
strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union.
History has proved time and again that ex-
pansion can be checked only when there is
a local balance of forces; indirect means
can succeed only if rapid local victories are
foreclosed. As the President has pointed

210

Department of State Bulletin

out, the Soviet Union has survived for
nearly 60 years without American grain;
it could do so now. Cutting off grain would
still lose Angola. We would duplicate the
experience of the Trade Act, which inter-
rupted the trade relationship with the
U.S.S.R. to insure emigration — and ended up
with neither.

Let us not bemuse ourselves with facile
slogans about not becoming the world's
policeman. We have no desire to play such
a role. But it can never be in our interest to
let the Soviet Union act as the world's
policeman. There are many crises in the
world where the United States cannot and
should not intervene. But here we face a
blatant Soviet and Cuban challenge, which
could have been overcome if we had been
allowed to act prudently with limited means
at the early stage. By forcing this out onto
center stage, our divisions simultaneously
escalated the significance of the crisis and
guaranteed our impotence.

To claim that Angola is not an important
country, or that the United States has no
important interests there, begs the principal
question. If the United States is seen to
waver in the face of massive Soviet and
Cuban intervention, what will be the percep-
tion of leaders around the world as they
make decisions concerning their future
security? And what conclusions will an un-
opposed superpower draw when the next
opportunity for intervention beckons?

Where are we now? The government has a
duty to make clear to the Soviet Union and
Cuba that Angola sets no precedent, that
this type of action will not be tolerated again.
It must reassure adjacent countries they
will not be left exposed to attack or pressure
from the new Soviet-Cuban foothold. Con-
gress and the executive must come together
on this proposition — in the national interest
and in the interest of world peace.

The Administration will continue to make
its case, however unpopular it may be tem-
porarily. Let no nation believe that Ameri-
cans will long remain indifferent to the
dispatch of expeditionary forces and vast

supplies of arms to impose minority govern-
ments— especially when that expeditionary
force comes from a nation in the Western
Hemisphere.

National Strength and the Debate at Home

We live in a world without simple answers.
We hold our values too dear to relinquish
defending them ; we hold human life too dear
to cease the quest for a secure peace. The
first requirement of stability is to maintain
our defenses and the balance of power. But
the highest aim of policy in the nuclear age
must be to create out of the sterile equilib-
rium of force a more positive i-elationship of
peace.

America has the material assets to do
the job. Our military might is unmatched.
Our economic and technological strength
dwarfs any other. Our democratic heritage
is envied by hundreds of millions around the
world.

Our problems therefore are of our own
making — self-doubt, division, irresolution.
We must once again become a confident,
united, and determined people.

Foreign countries must be able to deal
with America as an entity, not as a complex
of divided institutions. If our divisions para-
lyze our international efforts, it is America
as a whole that will suffer. We have no more
urgent task than restoring the partnership
between the American people, the Congress,
and the executive. A new partnership can
enable the President of the United States, in
his constitutionally determined role, to ad-
dress the world with the central authority of
the spokesman of a united and purposeful
America.

Debate is the essence of democracy. But
restraint is the cement of national cohesion.
It is time to end the self-torment and obses-
sion with our guilt which has threatened to
paralyze us for too many years. It is time to
stop dismantling our national institutions
and undermining our national confidence.

Let us learn — even in an election year —
the self-discipline to shape our domestic de-

February 23, 1976

211

bates into a positive, not a destructive, proc-
ess.

One of the forgotten truths of our history
is that our Founding Fathers were men of
great sophistication in foreign affairs. They
understood the balance of power ; they made
use of the divisions of Europe for the ad-
vantage of our own Revolution. They under-
stood the need for a strong executive to con-
duct the nation's diplomacy. They grasped
that America required economic, political,
and moral links with other nations. They
saw that our ideals were universal, and they
understood and welcomed the impact of the

American experiment on the destinies of all
mankind.

In our age, whose challenges are without
precedent, we need once again the wisdom
of our Founding Fathers. Our ideals must
give us strength — rather than serve as an
excuse for abdication. The American people
want an effective foreign policy. They want
America to continue to help shape the inter-
national order of the coming generation ac-
cording to our ideals. We have done great
things as a united people. We have it in our
power to make our third century a time of
vibrancy and hope and greatness.

Questions and Answers Following the Secretary's Address at San Francisco

Press release 44A dated February 3

John B. Bates, president, Commonwealth
Club: . . . I tvould like to first say that this,
too, is a shared responsibility between the
Commonwealth Club and the Wojid Affairs
Council. We have tried to screen out the many
questions we have received and not duplicate
them and get down to what we believe is
representative of all of the questions that
have been submitted to its.

First of all, Mr. Secretary, quite a few
questions on what has happened to Atnbassa-
dor Moynihan [U.S. Representative to the
U.N. Daniel P. Moynihan']. [Laughter.']

Secretary Kissinger: Well, let me say first
of all that Ambassador Moynihan is a close
friend of mine over many years. Like many
Harvard professors, he has his tempera-
mental side and is unusually sensitive to
criticism. [Laughter.]

But let me say that I recommended Am-
bassador Moynihan for his present position
after reading an article in Commentary
magazine that he had written in which he
outlined the policy that he thought we should
pursue at the United Nations. We therefore
knew exactly what he would do; and he was
sent to New York to carry out the policies
which he, in fact, carried out. Indeed, last

July before he assumed office I made a speech
in Milwaukee in somewhat more pedantic
language than he uses. [Laughter.] I out-
lined essentially the same considerations.

So Ambassador Moynihan carried out with
very great distinction the instructions of
the President and the Secretary of State and
gave them his own inspired cast. [Laughter.]

I think he made a major contribution to
American foreign policy. He has told us that
he wishes to return to Harvard because if
he did not at this time he would lose his
tenure position irrevocably. And with the
most enormous reluctance, the President and
I had to go along with a repeatedly and
insistently made request that we accept his
resignation. There were no policy disagree-
ments, and his successor will be instructed
to carry out the same policies — though, of
course, there's only one Pat Moynihan in the
United States. [Laughter.]

Q. There ivas a recent article in Pravda
somewhat critical of you, Mr. Secretary, and
I have this question. Did the recent Pravda
article lose amjthing in its translation? Why
do you think the article ivas printed at this
time ?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, of course, I
don't think that the editors of Pravda

212

Department of State Bulletin

understand the policies of my father in clip-
ping newspaper articles or they wouldn't
have written it, because my father has the
rule that any author is given two chances.
The second time they write an unfavorable
article he deletes it from the scrapbooks he
keeps. [Laughter.] So I want to make clear
to Pravda that if they want to stay in my
father's clipping file, they better stop here.
[Laughter.]

I don't know whether the article lost any-
thing in the translation, but I think I got
the message, [aughter.]

There is no complete unanimity of views
between us and the Soviet Union on Angola,
but I can only repeat: The United States is
dedicated to improving its relationship with
the Soviet Union. The United States believes
that it has a historic obligation, even in the
face of domestic pressures here, to construct
a new international set of relationships
which reduces the risk of war. But the
United States will not let this effort be used
by any country to try to achieve unilateral
advantages or to exploit local instabilities by
its military forces. So the Soviet Union will
have to choose. We are prepared for a posi-
tive policy of genuine coexistence, but we
are not prepared to have coexistence used
as a cover for seeking unilateral advantages
in various parts of the globe.

Q. We've spent a lot of your time discussing
Angola, Mr. Secretary, but this may be a
little different twist to it. Is it possible that
the Angola issue is an internal matter? If so,
tvhy not let the Soviets find out, as ive did in
Viet-Nam ?

Secretary Kissinger: There are two big
differences. The first is the United States
would never have got itself engaged even
financially — which is all we have ever done
in Angola, with very modest sums — but we
would not have done even that much in an
internal struggle in Angola.

In Mozambique — another Portuguese col-
ony of a similar evolution — the United
States, immediately after independence, rec-
ognized a government very similar in com-
position to the one the Soviet Union is now
supporting in Angola.

We are prepared to work with any govern-
ment that emerges by African processes.
What concerns us in Angola is the massive
introduction of an amount of Soviet military
equipment larger than all the other African
countries received from all sources in the
last year and the introduction of 11,000
Cuban combat troops who are doing all of
the fighting— the fighting is not done by
Africans; the fighting is done mostly by
Cubans. So what we face is the imposition of
a minority government by a foreign force.

Now, the analogy to Viet-Nam would be
correct if we were permitted to give finan-
cial assistance to those who are resisting —
which is what the Soviet Union did for the
North Vietnamese. In that case, the Soviet
Union and Cuba might well have found out
in Angola that this kind of action does not
pay. But when massive forces are introduced
and the United States does not even con-
tribute financial support, then the outcome is
inevitable. And the inevitable outcome, we
must now make sure, should not lead to
similar situations in other countries. That
is our overwhelming concern. And the rea-
son I speak so much about Angola is not to
affect decisions which the Congress has
already made but to prevent similar situa-
tions from arising in other parts of the
world.

Q. One more question on Angola, Mr. Sec-
retary, and then we'll leave Angola aside:
Why have the Cubans become involved?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I do not want
to pretend that I can read the inscrutable
Cuban mind. [Laughter.] I think the
Cubans have become involved in Angola
through revolutionary zeal, through their
belief that they are a pristine revolutionary
force that must support revolutions every-
where. And this is a phenomenon which we
must reflect about very seriously. There are
Cuban forces of much smaller size all over
Africa. There are some Cuban forces in
South Yemen.

These are matters to which we cannot be
indifferent, because it can lead to enormous
instabilities all over the world, especially
when it is done by a small Caribbean coun-

February 23, 1976

213

try backed by revolutionary zeal and Soviet
logistics.

Q. To what extent has the secrecy abroga-
tion in the United States adversely affected
our diplomatic endeavors?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that every
democracy has to strike a balance between
giving its public enough information so that
they can make meaningful decisions and to
make sure that the public understand the
real reasons for governmental actions but,
on the other hand, retain a capacity for some
secrecy in its diplomacy.

Nobody in this audience who runs a busi-
ness or a law office or any other enterprise
could possibly conduct his affairs if every
memorandum that is written internally, if
every communication with some other or-
ganization, were immediately put on the
public record. And yet this is the condition
we increasingly face in Washington today.
Every memorandum that comes across one's
desk one has to look at not just from the
point of its merit but from the point of view
of how it looks in the newspapers, and the
result of that will be not more openness. The
result will be that no memoranda will be
written [laughter] and that the business
will be conducted largely orally and then
people will put unilateral memoranda in
their files and even more confusion will
result. [Laughter.]

So I believe that other governments must
be able to tell us their candid assessments
without having to worry that every com-
munication to us immediately gets into the
pubhc domain.

Now, how to strike a balance between
necessary secrecy and the temptation of gov-
ernments to cover up their mistakes behind
the cloak of secrecy — which is a legitimate
concern — this is something to which we now
have to address ourself. But an element of
secrecy is absolutely essential.

Q. To what extent do you think that the
KGB has infiltrated the U.S. Congress?
[Laughter.']

Secretary Kissinger: I may be courageous,
but I'm not reckless. [Laughter.]

Q. When all is said and done, isn't your
Near East diplomacy basically a matter of
taking American money and paying both
sides not to fight? [Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger: We experienced in
1973 that a Middle East war can have the
most di'astic consequences. The Middle East
war in 1973 cost us about $3 billion directly,
about $10-$15 billion indirectly. It increased
our unemployment and contributed to the
deepest recession we have had in the post-
war period. So we know what the cost of a
war is.

Secondly, the aid we are giving to Israel
is not a payment for agreements. In the post-
war period, supporting the survival and se-
curity of Israel has been a fundamental na-
tional policy. And therefore it would have
to be continued whether or not there are
agreements. So the aid to Israel should not
be considered as a payment for agreements
but as a part of a fundamental national
policy.

The only other large recipients in the
Middle East are Egypt and Jordan. We be-
lieve that it is overwhelmingly in our na-
tional interest that Egypt has broken its
longstanding intimate ties with the Soviet
Union and that it has contributed to a mod-
erate and peaceful evolution in the Middle
East. And there again we're not paying
Egypt for this. We're not paying Egypt for
an agreement. We are contributing to the
possibility of Egypt concentrating on a more
moderate course because the alternatives for
the United States would be much more dras-
tic. Every war in the Middle East has in-
volved the risk of a confrontation with the
Soviet Union. Every war in the Middle East
has strained our relations with our allies
and created enormous international turmoil.

Our policy is not to pay people not to
fight; our policy is to construct a more peace-
ful relationship in the Middle East and to
use the sums that we would have to pay
anyway under conditions of tension in a
constructive way to bring about a peaceful
settlement.

Q. What mutual concessions would enable

2!4

Department of State Bulletin

Israel and the PLO [Palestine Liberation
Organization^ to establish detente?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we have taken
the position that until the PLO recognizes
the existence of Israel, we cannot ask Israel
to negotiate with it — nor can we ourselves
participate in a diplomatic process involving
the PLO. So we believe that the minimum
condition is that the PLO accept the exist-
ence of Israel and accept the validity of the
U.N. Security Council resolutions on which
the peace process in the Middle East is
based.

Q. Why does not this country use American
wheat as an instrument of foreign policy?

Secretary Kissinger: We find very often
that we are told abstractly that we should
use American economic power in order to in-
fluence foreign policy decisions of other
countries. But we also find that when we
attempt to do so, we would inevitably inter-
rupt private markets and private arrange-
ments because there is no way of using our
economic power without some degree of
governmental control.

Now, with respect to the wheat deal to
the Soviet Union, it is not generally realized
that there was a voluntary restraint on sales
to the Soviet Union from July through Octo-
ber while we were negotiating a long-term
agreement and that in many parts of the
country and in many sections of the Con-
gress this voluntary restraint is looked upon
with great disfavor. We believe that the long-
term agreement that was made with the
Soviet Union over a five-year period intro-
duces some stability into our markets. It
creates a cutoff point during emergency sit-
uations in which further negotiations would
have to be conducted before we would agree
to the sale of additional wheat.

We believe that the circumstances that
have so far existed have not justified the
cutoff of wheat, because the cutoff would not
have been effective in any time frame rele-
vant to, for example, the issues of Ango-
la.

We believe that — and we have said so re-
peatedly— if the relations with the Soviet
Union deteriorate drastically — which we
would hope strongly to avoid — it will affect
our other relationships. But at the present
time it was an excessive reaction which
would not have helped in relation to the
Angola problem.

Q. I have questions on tvhat is our Latin
American policy — which is a general question
— and then, specifically: Do we continue to
plan to give the Panama Canal away?

Secretary Kissinger: I could make a great
headline by saying "Yes." [Laughter.]

Let me explain what is at issue in the
Panama Canal negotiation. Our concern with
the Panama Canal issue is to avoid a situa-
tion in which the United States is drawn into
a confrontation with all of Latin America, in
which American military force will have to
be used to fight a guerrilla war in the West-
ern Hemisphere, as long as an honoi'able al-
ternative presents itself. What we are nego-
tiating now — and incidentally, with the
agreement of all of the agencies of the U.S.
Government — is an arrangement in which
the defense of the Panama Canal will be
jointly exercised between the United States
and Panama for an extended period of time —
for a very extended period of time — while
the operation of the canal is turned over
during a shorter period of time.

But the essential American defense inter-
ests can be maintained, in our view, through
this cooperative arrangement while avoid-
ing a situation in which the Panama Canal
becomes a rallying ground of all of Latin
American resentment against the United
States. We will not make an agreement in
which our essential interests in free transit
through the Panama Canal are jeopardized,
but we will make a serious effort to see
whether we can make a stabler arrange-
ment. All of this will have to be put before
the Congress and will be explored in the
greatest detail with the Congress while
we're negotiating it, and the negotiations
are likely to take some period of time.

February 23, 1976

215

k

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at San Francisco February 3

Press release 46 dated February 3

Q. Dr. Kissinger, my question is — some
critics of the cause of detente seem, to take
the vieiv in this case that the Soviet Union
may be less strict in its overt relationship
ivith the United States. I take it from your
remarks today that yon do not share this
vietv ?

Secretary Kissinger: I say that it's not a
question to be settled in the abstract. We
have concrete ideas of what is needed to
have an equitable SALT agreement. We
have specific ideas of the restraint that is
needed in the conduct of international affairs.

We will pursue these ideas. If we can
realize them, this will be a test of whether
the Soviet Union is interested in real relaxa-
tion of tension. If not, they are not; but
what we want to avoid is an abstract debate
in this country. We want to keep people's
attention focused on the fact that, beyond
all our internal controversies, we do have an
obligation to build a stabler world and that
we cannot give up on that.

Q. {Inaudible.']

Secretary Kissinger: They have already
gone, and we have always proposed that
South African forces should go. And we
have made it clear that all foreign forces —
South African, Cuban, and Soviet — should
go. In fact, we have publicly proposed that
we would support a negotiation in which
South African forces would leave first, and
the others follow. It is our understanding
that the South African forces have with-
drawn to their border.

Q. [Inaudible.]

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know what
sources close to Ambassador Moynihan that
could be. I have stated innumerable times

my high regard for Ambassador Moynihan.
I think the Washington press corps knows
what I have said about Ambassador Moyni-
han. I don't believe anybody will be able
to cite one example of my undercutting
Ambassador Moynihan, disagreeing with
Ambassador Moynihan. In fact, I would hap-
pily trade his press for mine. [Laughter.]
And if I could confine the leaking against me
in the State Department to the level of the
leakage against him, I would be in great
shape.

Q. What did you mean when you said he's
overly sensitive?

Secretary Kissinger: I think all of us Har-
vard professors are very sensitive to criti-
cism. We are used to adoring students.

Q. [Inaudible.]

Secretary Kissinger: We hear little about
Peru?

Q. Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: I am going to be visit-
ing Peru in the near future. Their Foreign
Minister, as it happens, is a good personal
friend of mine. He was the first foreign min-
ister, as it happened, whom I saw after I
was sworn in as Secretary of State. I have
high regard for him.

I have respect for the foreign policy of
Peru. And I think that a constructive non-
alignment is one that the United States has
never opposed.

What we oppose is rigid bloc voting in the
United Nations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the late Rabin
visit to Washington, tvhat's your concept of
the future of peacemaking efforts in the
Middle East? Would it be Geneva or quiet
diplomacy — or ivhat's your concept?

216

Department of State Bulletin

Secretary Kissinger: I do not know what
our capacities for quiet diplomacy are at
this particular moment. I am going to see
Prime Minisiter Rabin again tonight in Los
Angeles, and we will have a sort of a wrap-
up session.

What forum will be chosen depends of
course on what is possible. The United
States is prepared to go to Geneva. The
United States is also prepared to encourage
other steps that the parties could agree
upon.

After further talks with the Prime Min-
ister and after his return to Israel for an
opportunity to talk to his colleagues, we will
then approach other countries. And only out
of that can we be sure of what process is
going to develop.

Q. Mr. Secretary, considering the strength
of the MPLA [Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola] in Angola, do you think
the additional U.S. aid you've asked for ivill
make a significant difference in the new
emerging government of Angola?

Secretary Kissinger: So far we have not
asked for any aid. We have simply indicated
what would be needed. We have not made
any formal request.

Secondly, I think it is technically in-
correct to speak of the strength of the
MPLA. I think it is correct to speak of the
strength of the Cuban forces which do most
of the fighting for the MPLA. But we have
not made a formal request to the Congress.
We do have a concern, however, that what is
happening in Angola not set a precedent in
other parts of the world or in Africa.

Q. Coidd you, Mr. Secretary, amplify those
remarks? Where else could Angola set a
precedent? What area is a trouble spot?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not want to pre-
dict where it could happen. We simply want
to make clear there are many local situa-
tions, there are many places of tensions
where the introduction of outside forces
could tip the balance, or where the introduc-
tion of massive military equipment could.

I do not want to indicate those ahead of

time, but we want to make clear what our
general concern is.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you attempt to
comment on Rita Hauser as a replacement
for Ambassador Moynihan?

Secretary Kissinger: I have not had a
chance to review the list with the President.
I have had some exchanges with the White
House, but until the President has made a
decision I do not think I should comment on
possibilities.

Q. Mr. Secretary, tomorroiv the Secretary
of Transportation is going to announce a de-
cision on whether the landing rights on the
Concorde are granted. What's your position
on the Concorde? What ivould be the diplo-
matic consequences of the granting of land-
ing rights?

Secretary Kissinger: We were asked by the
Secretary of Transportation to state our
view on the foreign policy implications. He
has the responsibility to make his judgment
on the basis of those, plus environmental
factors, plus all the other considerations for
which he is responsible.

We stated to him that the foreign policy
implications of depriving Britain and France
of access to American aii-ports, on a vehicle
of high technology of which they're rather
proud, would be difficult. But, on the other
hand, the decision is one that Secretary Cole-
man has to make and he has to consider
many considerations — many factors — in ad-
dition to the factors that I am responsible
for.

Q. [Inaudible.]

Secretary Kissinger: I have stated the for-
eign policy considerations. He is the one that
has to make the final decision.

Q. Will the United States have an easier
time of it in the United Nations ivithout
Daniel Patrick Moynihan as our representa-
tive?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that Ambassa-
dor Moynihan did a distinguished job. I think
Ambassador Moynihan carried out what he
was sent there to do. He was sent there on

February 23, 1976

217

the basis of an article In Commentary that
outlined exactly in fact what he did, so no-
body was surprised by his actions.

I think his impact was useful and healthy,
and I think that his successor will carry out
essentially the same policies.

Therefore I think our role in the United
Nations will be no easier than it was when
Ambassador Moynihan was there, except as
the success of the policies with which he was
identified takes hold.

Q. Mr. Secretary, has the United States
any view on the reported conflict between Mr.
Rabin and Peres regarding the military needs
of Israel?

Secretary Kissinger: I am not aware of
any conflict between Prime Minister Rabin
and Defense Minister Peres. I must say we
are so busy in our own internal problems
that we cannot get involved in those of
Israel.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the course of your fre-
quent contacts ivith your NATO allies, what
is your opinion — to let the Western Euro-
pean governments know that the United
States would be adamantly opposed to any
coalition governments which ivould bring in
any such major parties as the Communist
parties of Italy or France? What makes you
think that the European governments relish
or eveyi adhere to such domestic criteria on
the part of the United States?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, your
basic premise is wrong. On my return from
Moscow, the issue of the participation of
Communist parties in the governments of
Western Europe did not arise at all. The
meeting with the NATO allies was confined
entirely to a report on my visit to Moscow.
On previous occasions, when we were asked
for our opinion, we have given it — but never
in a governmental context. It is up to the
governments concerned to make those deci-
sions.

If somebody asks our view of what the
consequences will be — we are usually asked
by the press — we give those views. But we
have not done it in the NATO Council.

Q. The State Department reportedly pro-

posed the filing of an antitrust suit against
Bechtel Corporation in relation to the Arab
boycott. The State Department also has pro-
posed amendmeyits that will change the lan-
guage of the export-most-favored act which
makes the boycott against Israel against the
law. Why does the State Department propose
these antiboycott amendments?

Secretary Kissinger: This is not exactly
correct. It is in the nature of things that
when other agencies in the government
undertake steps which they think may have
a foreign policy implication they will ask our
views.

In the case of the Bechtel case, the At-
torney General asked the view of the State
Department as to what the foreign policy
implications would be. We made clear, both
publicly and in our opinion to the Attorney
General, that we did not claim any right to
interfere with the judicial process, or that
our opinion should aff"ect the judicial process.
But being asked what our view was — I think
anybody can tell you that the impact on
Saudi Arabia and Saudi-U.S. relations will
not be all that favorable.

Having stated our opinion, the Attorney
General then proceeded — as was his duty —
with applying the law as he sees it.

With respect to boycott, I do not know
exactly what specific provisions you are
talking about. We have supported — strongly
supported — the Presidential statement which
sets down the basic guidelines on the boy-
cott. On some specific measures we have the
view that they would have a serious impact
on our relations with the countries concerned
and might interfere and complicate the proc-
ess of a moderate evolution toward peace
in the Middle East.

But, again, the State Department has the
responsibility to express the foreign policy
implications. Others that have other respon-
sibilities can then weigh those in relation to
other priorities.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, what is your estimation
of the independent military strength of the
MPLA without Russian aid? Would the com-
bined forces of the FNLA [National Front
for the Liberation of Angola'] and UNITA

218

Department of State Bulletin

[National Union for the Total Independence
of Angola] be a defeatable force ivithotit a
unilateral —

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, now that
the Cuban forces have been active, I would
have thought that without the introduction
of Cuban forces — without the introduction
of any outside forces — the most likely result
would have been a stalemate in which each
of these Angolan forces would have domi-
nated the area from which it drew its
strength in terms of the tribal areas.

So in terms of numbers, probably UNITA
— having the largest tribal area — would
probably have had the largest numbers in a
one-man-one-vote situation. The probable out-
come, without foreign intervention, would
have been a coalition between the three
factions and some working out of the domes-
tic processes by African standards, in which
perhaps one or the other might have become
dominant; and this is something we could
have lived with.

We have made no effort in any African
country to prevent the coming into power
by indigenous means of any particular group.
And we immediately established in Mozam-
bique— as I pointed out previously — we im-
mediately established relations with FRE-
LIMO [Front for the Liberation of Mozam-
bique] , which has views not all that different
from the MPLA.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, on Angola, what do you
expect the Soviet reaction to be to the tougher
policy that you outlined today in the speech?

Secretary Kissinger: We hope that the
Soviet Union will consider very seriously the
consequences of actions that may have been
taken for even understandable reasons in
the early phases and to keep in mind that
the two superpowers must restrain their
conduct or else the potentiality for conflict,
misunderstanding, and tension is too great.
And we hope that this is a lesson that the
Soviet Union will learn from Angola.

I cannot stress enough: We believe that
the problem of peace must be solved at some
time. We are prepared to do it now. But we

are not prepared to do it on the basis of one
side gaining unilateral advantages.

Q. What happens if the Cubans are not able
to continue to receive aid to their side?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that the
Cubans should be removed. I believe that the
Cubans must cease their massive interven-
tions in other parts of the world, and we will
face the problem of what will happen if it
continues when it arises.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, due to the activities of
publications like Counterspy, has the State
Department had to provide new covers or
withdraw some of its agents, or CIA agents,
in Embassies around the ivorld?

Secretary Kissinger: The State Depart-
ment does not have CIA agents.

Q. But would you say that there are no
CIA agents in the Embassies — in certain
Embassies around the tvorld?

Secretary Kissinger: I would not comment
on how cover is provided for CIA agents. I
must say that the conduct of intelligence is
essential for any great power. It is conducted
by every major country, and we will do our
best to continue legitimate intelligence func-
tions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you say how you
hope the Soviets ivill recognize detente?

Secretary Kissinger: By showing restraint
in the future and by ending the intervention
in Angola as rapidly as possible.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, what leverage or power
do we have if the Congress is not going to
financially support the anti-Communist fac-
tions there?

Secretary Kissinger: We have played
stronger hands since I have been connected
with foreign policy. You cannot conduct
foreign policy without leverage, and our
leverage has been drastically reduced. But
we have to deal with the situation that we
confront.

Q. Do you mean that before further talks
on SALT proceed, before the next step is

February 23, 1976

219

going to be realized, the Angolan situation
tvill he stabilized — is that what you're saying?

Secretary Kissinger: No. I am saying- —
have stated previously — that to bring the
strategic arms race under control is not a
favor that we do for the Soviet Union. And I
have attempted to explain why it is not a
favor we do to the Soviet Union.

I have also stated that if relations keep
deteriorating that obviously other relations
will be affected — whether or not they are a
favor to the Soviet Union. We are still pre-
pai-ed to persevere in bringing negotiations
of strategic arms limitations to a conclusion.
And I do not want to discuss in detail what
specific steps will be taken if the restraint is
not exercised by the other side.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you sounded in your
speech a little bit frustrated with American
policy in Congress. Can you give us an assess-
ment of your own satisfaction with your job,
and are you contemplating anything like Mr.
Moynihan did? [Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger: I have given up my
position at Harvard [laughter], so I do not
necessarily have that option.

No — I do not sound frustrated with the
job. I believe it is the duty of national leaders
to make clear to the public what the prob-
lems are that we face. The Congress has a
major responsibility in the shaping of for-
eign policy. It has to be done in partnership

between the executive and the legislative.
It is my obligation to explain what the issues
are.

I have no plan to follow Mr. Moynihan to
Harvard or to follow him out of government.

The press: Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

U.S. and Canada Initial Draft Text
of Transit Pipeline Agreement

Joint Statement '

On January 28, the chief U.S. and Cana-
dian negotiators initialed a draft text of a
general agreement covering transit pipe-
lines. This agreement would provide govern-
ment-to-government assurances on a recip-
I'ocal basis regarding noninterference with
and nondiscriminatory treatment of hydro-
carbons transported in present or future
pipelines which cross the territory of either
country.

The ad referendum agreement will now
be referred to the two Governments for
their review and approval. As part of the
U.S. procedure, consultations within the
executive branch, with the Congress, and
with interested parties will be undertaken
prior to final approval.

' Issued on Jan. 29 (text from press release 41).

220

Department of State Bulletin

Prime Minister Rabin of Israel Visits the United States

Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of the State
of Israel made an official visit to the United
States January 26-February 5. He met with
President Ford and other government offi-
cials at Washington January 27-30. Folloiv-
ing are an exchange of greetings between
President Ford and Prime Minister Rabin at
a ivelcoming ceremony on the South Lawn of
the White House on January 27, toasts ex-
changed by Secretary Kissinger and the
Prime Minister at a luncheon at the Depart-
ment of State that day, toasts exchanged by
the President and the Prime Minister at a
dinner at the White House that evening, their
exchange of remarks at a receptiori given by
the Prime Minister on January 29, and an
address made by Prime Minister Rabin be-
fore a joint meeting of the Congress on Jan-
uary 28.

REMARKS AT WELCOMING CEREMONY,
JANUARY 27

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated February 2

President Ford

Mr. Prime Minister and Mrs. Rabin:
Shalom. Mrs. Ford and I are very delighted
to welcome both of you to Washington, our
good friends of many years, and we are de-
lighted to see you on this occasion despite the
weather. We hope your visit here and across
our nation, Mr. Prime Minister, will renew
many happy memories and deepen the rela-
tionship of our two countries. We are proud
to have both of you as our guests.

As in the past, Mr. Prime Minister, we
meet today in a spirit of warm good will.
Your visit gives me the opportunity to re-
affirm on behalf of all of the American peo-
ple the enduring friendship of our two coun-

tries, the traditional commitment of the
United States to Israel's security and sur-
vival, and the dedication of the United States
to seek, with Israel's cooperation, a peaceful,
comprehensive, and just solution to the con-
flict in the Middle East.

The United States and Israel share a very
deep devotion to democratic ideals, a special
affinity as two kindred peoples, and common
moral and political values that flow from the
great Judeo-Christian heritage.

Just as you and I have been friends for
many years, Mr. Prime Minister, our two
nations are friends. For almost 30 years
since and even before your independence, our
two peoples have worked together in many
fields. My strongest desire is that we con-
tinue to work together in the future. Today
our cooperation is more necessary than ever
in the quest for an enduring peace in the
Middle East.

In the agreements we have ah'eady
achieved by working together, we have estab-
lished a sound basis for further movement
toward an ultimate peace settlement. With
statesmanship and courage, Mr. Prime Min-
ister, you have taken the first steps.

The wisdom and determination that you
and your nation have so amply displayed thus
far will be required in even greater degree
in the days ahead. Our tasks remain urgent
and important. I know that the people of
Israel yearn for peace. All of us share a great
responsibility — Israel, its Arab neighbors,
and the United States. Our task is to realize
this goal together, with realism and with
justice. Let us seize this historic opportunity
to help translate hopes into reality.

I welcome your visit, Mr. Prime Minister.
We can in the next several days deepen our
mutual understanding and trust. We can help
to advance the process of peace. We can en-

February 23, 1976

221

hance even further the unique friendship of
our two countries. And if other nations also
do their part, this year will be recorded in
history as another year of steady progress
toward the fulfillment of our common dream
— the peace that is so fervently desired
throughout the Middle East and by the
entire world.

Mr. Prime Minister, I look forward to our
discussions and to the pleasure of your com-
pany. On behalf of all Americans, I extend
our heartiest welcome to you and to Mrs.
Rabin.

Prime Minister Rabin

Mr. President, Mrs. Ford: My wife and 1
appreciate very much your personal wel-
come, especially on such a day. According
to the Jewish tradition, rain means blessing.

It is a pleasure to be back in Washington
and to see around me so many friends. My
thanks go to you, Mr. President, for your in-
vitation that enables me to meet with you to
express to you respect and friendship.

I am looking forward to our talks, for I
know they will advance our common purpose.
The purpose is peace — peace in the world
and, more specifically, peace between Israel
and the Arab countries. Toward that end,
the Government of Israel commits its
energies.

Mr. President, when the history of this
period will be written, your name will be
given a permanent place as the leader of the
free world who led the struggle for a better,
more decent, and more peaceful world for
people to live in. Your personal involvement
in the cause for peace and stability in the
Middle East has been untiring.

Your efforts have not been without re-
sults. Under your guidance, America has
played an indispensable role in helping to
bring about what we all hope will prove to
be the beginning of the peace process. We
know that it is complex. We know that it is
not without risks. But I want to assure you,
Mr. President, that we, Israel, will continue
to do all that can reasonably be done to help
to move that process along.

Your friendship, your wisdom, the energy
you devote for peace, and the efl'orts you
make for the welfare of my own democratic
people move me to express to you our sin-
cere gratitude.

I am told, Mr. President, that by your in-
vitation I am the first head of government to
visit the United States in your Bicentennial
Year. This is a special honor for me. It af-
fords me the opportunity to bring a partic-
ular message of friendship to all commu-
nities across your great country, including
the Jewish community, with whom we have
a profound historic spiritual tie.

The message I carry is "Shalom to Amer-
ica" on the occasion of your Bicentennial
celebration. It is a celebration we are making
in Israel, too. We do so because of the debt
that Israel and the whole free world owes to
this great country. We do so because of the
spirit of liberty, peace, and democracy that
gave birth to free America 200 years ago.
And we do so because it is identical to the
spirit that gave rebirth to my own free Israel
28 years ago.

Mr. President, I am deeply gratified for
your invitation and hospitality which enables
me to deliver this message to you personally.

TOASTS AT LUNCHEON GIVEN BY
SECRETARY KISSINGER, JANUARY 27

Press release 34 dated January 27

Secretary Kissinger

Mr. Prime Minister, Mrs. Rabin, distin-
guished guests: It is a great pleasure to
welcome the Rabins, who are all old friends
of ours, back to Washington. We have worked
together for so long that when an Israeli
party arrives here we meet old friends of
many circumstances. For example, we could
immediately identify all the security officers
that took care of us. [Laughter.] And Nancy
was looking for the security officer who could
open coke bottles with his teeth, which will
show you of the way we get intimidated when
we visit Israel. [Laughter.] And Mrs. Rabin
mumbles to me, "the quahty of the security."

222

Department of State Bulletin

I haven't been defended by any security of-
ficer with his teeth in Israel yet. [Laughter.]

There are also so many members of the
Israeli press here that I have a real dilemma
— because I have a friend who hates flying,
and he says that when a stewardess comes
out of the pilot's compartment with a serious
face he is convinced they are going to crash
and that she can't even give the impression
that things are going well, but when she
comes out smiling, then he's in a real panic
because then he is absolutely convinced that
things are desperate and that she has been
instructed to cheer them up. [Laughter.]

So what can I say about our meetings?
[Laughter.]

The truth is that the Prime Minister and
his friends here have worked together for a
long time. I spent many hours with the
Prime Minister when he was Ambassador
here in discussing not only the problems of
Israel in the Middle East but the relation-
ship of the international situation to the
prospects of peace. And when our other
Israeli friends are here, it is a different re-
lationship than we have with any other
country because we know each other so well
and we have talked together so much that
we can afford occasionally this or that dis-
agreement. And sometimes because it is a
family quarrel it takes on an intensity that
is exaggerated.

I want to emphasize right away that there
are no quarrels going on at this moment and
that I am talking about the past and not the
present, although having given that assur-
ance, I am positive that I have created many
more doubts. [Laughter.]

But the fact of the matter is that no
people can want peace more desperately than
a country that has never known a state of
peace in its entire history and that has had
to fight wars at almost intervals of five
years. So that the issue of whether there
should be peace doesn't need to be discussed
between us.

How to achieve peace in a situation of
enormous complexity and how to balance the
territorial changes, which are tangible,
against the commitments to peace, which are

intangible — that is a problem that requires
great imagination and great dedication. And
when one looks at the legacy of a genera-
tion of distrust and at the influence of out-
side powers whose intentions are not always
benign, then we know, both of us, that we
have a complex and long-term issue before
us.

Now, our friend the Prime Minister is
here this time when there isn't any immedi-
ate crisis, when there isn't a particular nego-
tiation on which we must achieve a specific
result. He is here to discuss with us how we
imagine the evolution toward peace in the
Middle East, how we can reach an objective
on which we both agree. And we can talk in
a relaxed atmosphere because we have the
capacity for decision.

The United States made clear last night
that it will not accept changes in the frame-
work of negotiations that prejudge the out-
come. We will not participate or encourage a
negotiating process in which as an entrance
price into negotiations the fundamental is-
sues should already be determined by groups
of countries that are not parties to the
negotiation.

Now that we have made clear what we
will not encourage, we can talk in a freer
atmosphere about what can happen in the
years ahead. I think the talks this morning
were conducted in a very friendly atmos-
phere, and I am confident that this visit will
be extremely helpful to both of our countries
and to the long-term prospects for peace in
the Middle East.

The United States is committed to the
security and survival of Israel. The United
States will work with Israel on joint policies
to maintain the security and to achieve a
lasting peace in the Middle East. It is in this
spirit that we welcome the Rabins here, in
the consciousness that for all Americans it
is a question of moral necessity to make cer-
tain that, whatever happens, this democracy
in the Middle East that shares our values
will be secured and maintained.

So I would like to propose a toast to the
Prime Minister and Mrs. Rabin and to the
lasting friendship between Israel and the
United States.

February 23, 1976

223

Prime Minister Rabin

Mr. Secretary, Mrs. Kissinger, distin-
guished guests: I would like to thank the
Secretary and Mrs. Kissinger in the name of
my wife and myself for this pleasant gather-
ing and for the good meal. I have not spent
since I have taken this post as a Prime Minis-
ter so many days in the United States as
the Secretary spent in Israel; therefore I
can't pretend that I know all the details that
come with such a visit. But I would like also
to open my remarks by saying something
personally to the Secretary.

As he said, I believe that we have learned
to know each other. When I served here as
the Israeli Ambassador and after that, even
though from time to time we have had some
differences of opinion — but I believe that we
have no doubt whatsoever in the way that
he conducted the policy of this government
in his capacity at the White House and now
as Secretary of State, in the real efforts that
he has made to bring about more stability,
in the efforts to create better conditions for
peace for all peoples in the area. And for
that I would like to thank you, Mr. Secretary.

As you have said, there is something which
cannot be always explained when it comes
to the relations of the greatest democracy
with the only democracy in the Middle East.
It has started many years ago, and it has
been developed to the kind of relations that
we, as a small country, are very proud of.
And I believe that the cooperation between
our two countries has contributed to the
stability in the area and to the encourage-
ment of the prospects of peace. I believe
that what has been done in the last year was
an outcome of an effort, even though there
were ups and downs through '75 but toward
the end the results proved to be the right
ones.

Still, the Ai'ab-Israeli conflict is a very
complicated one, and it is not so easy to offer
simple formulas how to solve it. Sometimes
it looks simpler than it is. From our point
of view, we, as the Secretary said, have
never entertained one day of peace. We have
experienced many wars. And therefore

please understand our sensitivity when it
comes to our capability to be able to defend
ourselves by ourselves.

Please understand the amount of suspicion
that might seem to people from the outside a
little bit exaggerated when we have to ex-
change words for something tangible, which
is territories — not as real estate but as de-
fensive lines that make our capability to
defend ourselves better. But I can assure
you, Mr. Secretary, and all those who are
here that for the sake of a real peace, Israel
will not shrink from any risks, will take
upon itself many concessions, but one will be
sure that the purpose is a real peace.

I believe that the way that the talks have
been conducted through the years of coopera-
tion between our two countries and espe-
cially today, I believe that this is the way to
conduct talks when the common goal is the
same — to achieve peace. But at the same
time, as long as peace has not been achieved,
to be in a position that those who want to ex-
ploit the tension in the area will not be able
to pursue a policy of war with a hope of
success.

I believe everywhere in the world you
can't achieve peace but from the standpoint
of strength. It is a struggle between total-
itarian concepts and democratic way of life.
And in coping with totalitarian concepts, de-
mocracies have to try their best to reach
agreements and understandings. But it
can't be done from the standpoint of weak-
ness. I don't want to apply to anything ex-
cept when it comes to our problem. And I
know one thing for sure, with a weak Israel
no one will negotiate, and only a strong
Israel is a help for peace.

I would like to pray and hope that there
will be continuation of the present under-
standing, continuation of the common effort
to achieve peace, and continuation of the
effort, as long as peace has not been achieved,
to be able to overcome the differences when-
ever they come up.

And in this spirit I would like to raise my
glass to the Secretary, to Mrs. Kissinger, and
to the friendship between our two countries.
And as we say in Hebrew: "L'chaim."

224

Department of State Bulletin

OASTS AT WHITE HOUSE DINNER, JANUARY 27

i-ekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated February 2

resident Ford

Mr. Prime Minister and Mrs. Rabin and
istinguished guests: It is again a pleasure
n- us to say shalom.

Betty and I have, of course, and all of our
uests feel a very special warmth as far as
bu, Mr. Prime Minister, and Mrs. Rabin
re concerned. And our friendship on a
ersonal basis has been one of long stand-
iig and a very enjoyable and very pleasant
ne.

Your five years in Washington as the
listinguished Ambassador of Israel created
'lany and very warm friendships. Betty and
are two of those friends, and we are deeply
irateful for that relationship. And we are
3viously delighted to be your hosts tonight.

We are very proud that you are the first
ead-of-government guest during our Bi-
Mitennial Year. And I think that tells us
)mething. The celebration of our nation's
istory gives Americans a deeper apprecia-
on of basic values that we share with the
tate of Israel — the tribute that your country
id ours pay to these ideals you expressed
1 Philadelphia last night.

Both of our nations have had a very pain-
il birth as well as growth. As havens for
len and women fleeing persecution, both of
jr nations find their vitality as well as their
;rength today in a commitment to freedom
nd a commitment to democracy and the
jirit of free peoples.

Both of our nations, Mr. Prime Minister,
ave tasted the bitter fruits of war and the
truggles that are necessary to preserve
idependence and security. Both of us know
all well in today's world that eternal vigi-
ince is the price of liberty. And we, indi-
idually and collectively, will not fail.

I applaud your statesmanship, Mr. Prime
linister. You have shown it over and over
gain. It has contributed so much that has
een achieved so far. I am gratified that our
ersonal friendship and relationship now
acilitates the closest consultation on the

very complex problems that we face in the
problems ahead.

From the moment of Israel's independence,
all of America's Presidents, as well as the
major political parties, have identified with
your freedom and your progress.

America now completes its second century.
Israel counts its heritage in thousands and
thousands of years and its modern history in
decades. Yet our heritage — your country and
mine — are the same.

I think we must take inspiration from
the Founding Fathers of both our nations
and the principles of justice and freedom
which they have passed down to you as well
as to myself for the survival of those princi-
ples, which is our major responsibility. You
are dedicated to that end, Mr. Prime Minis-
ter, and all of your people are likewise. And
they are an inspiration to all of us.

Israel, Mr. Prime Minister, like the United
States, has stuck to its principles and per-
severed with courage and determination. The
unbreakable spirit of the people of Israel re-
mains its strongest defense. And as we re-
flect on this Bicentennial Year, we are both
mindful of the indispensable role that the
United States has played in the world as a
guardian of stability and defender of free-
dom.

I want to tell you, Mr. Prime Minister,
that I am determined, as I think most Amer-
icans are, that America will remain sti'ong
and America will remain committed to its
allies and to its world responsibilities.

I know that Israel and our other friends
and allies depend upon America's strength
and America's commitment. Our two nations
have been working together for peace in the
Middle East. No peacemaking process, as you
well know, is easy, but important steps have
been taken. And we are proud of the role
that America has played in working with
your country.

I know that all Americans deeply desire to
see the process continued toward its goal of
a just and secure peace.

The United States has demonstrated many,
many times, including yesterday in the
United Nations, that we will oppose measures

ebruary 23, 1976

225

that we consider unrealistic or unworkable or
that make peace harder to achieve. But we
have demonstrated at the same time we are
committed to seek and to support positive
measures, positive moves toward peace.

We will continue the hopeful effort in
which we are jointly engaged.

You and I began our discussions this morn-
ing in a spirit of friendship and a spirit of
common desire for peace. You stated this
morning, and many times otherwise, your na-
tion's views eloquently and persuasively.

Ladies and gentlemen, I ask that you join
me in a toast to the Prime Minister of Israel
and to Mrs. Rabin, to the enduring friend-
ship between Israel and the United States,
and to a just and lasting peace in the Middle
East. In the ancient toast of the Jewish
people: "L'chaim."

Prime Minister Rabin

Mr. President and Mrs. Ford, distin-
guished guests: First allow me in the name
of my wife and myself to thank you, Mr.
President, and you, Mrs. Ford, for your kind
invitation to come over to this country as
your guests.

We also cherish our personal friendship
for the time that I served here as the Israeli
Ambassador. I remember that many times I
used to come to your office as the Minority
Leader in the House to ask for your advice,
to get a better understanding about what
was going on in this country. And I always
came out of your office more encouraged
about America, about the Congress, about
your determination to do what you believed
that should be done here in this country as
well as this country's policies toward the
world, toward securing peace and freedom
wherever and whenever it is possible.

Since you took this office, awesome respon-
sibility of the President of the United States,
this is the third meeting between us here.
And we have discussed through this period
every possibility, everything that can be
done to encourage every option, every avenue

to move from war toward peace, to achie
tranquillity and stability in the area as lo;
as peace has not been achieved. And I c
predated always your attitude that whe
ever there is a confrontation the efforts
bring about peace must be done from t
standpoint of strengths because no tota
tarian regime will tolerate a weak dem(
racy. And only a strong democracy can e
pect to achieve peace with dignity, pea
that is worthwhile.

I am especially glad, as you mentione^
Mr. President, that I am the first head [
government to be your official guest in t\
Bicentennial Year. I am glad, especially, 1
cause I think I represent even though a ve
small democracy but it is the only one th
exists in the Middle East.

Before we came over, I found that wh
you got your independence 200 years ago, t
total population of then the United Stat
was 3 million, which is exactly [laughtc
the population of Israel today. And I fou
that your growth came as a result of the (
termination of the Founding Fatht
to build a country, but in addition to that,
maintaining the basic principle of open gai
to waves of immigrants. And your count '
grew up by the waves of immigrants tl ;
came to this great country. We maintain t
same policy. And we have grown throu
immigration and will continue to gr
through immigration.

In the last li/o years we have taken cert;
steps through the good offices of the U
Government under your guidance in the
fort to bring about certain moves towf
peace. I believe that on our part we did c '
share. We have taken risks in the hope tl :
a better future might be built not only 1
Israel but for the whole Middle East, for i
countries and for all peoples there.

We are in a country in which war mig ;
be imminent. We have fought four ma; '
wars in the last 28 years, and between thi i
we have never entertained one day of pea
And after 28 years of war, believe me, I\ .
President, if there is something that •!

226

Department of State Bulle i

pire to, that we desire, that we are longing
r, it is to achieve a real peace.
Allow me to add that when I stayed in
is country I learned one thing — that the
,guest word in the English dictionary is
leace" because so many interpretations are
ven to this word. And therefore one has
be careful when the word is uttered and
practical and meaningful interpretation is
ven to that.

And, therefore, for us the meaning of

ace that we want to achieve is peace that

ill give us, as well as to our neighbors, a

nse of security to live the way that we pre-

r to live in our own country and they in

eir own.

''We have done something to bring stabili-

,!tion to the area, but still the road to peace

Jifortunately is still long. And it will require

(urage, determination, and skill to navigate

e ship of hope of peace until it will be a

lal one. And in facing all these complex

foblems one has not to lose his hope but at

e same time to have no illusions in coping

• th the difficulties that should be overcome.

After the first talk that I had with you,

r. President, I believed that we realize the

ifficulties. We are determined to do every-

ing to find ways to cope with these diffi-

i Ities. And I can assure you, Mr. President,

at on the part of Israel every effort will

' done to find ways to cooperate with you

the efforts to bring about peace to the

;, ea which has suffered so much from wars

■ the last years.

Allow me also, Mr. President, to thank you

■rsonally in the name of the people of Israel

V your support through the years, to your

ipport to Israel and to the cause of peace in

le area in your capacity as the President

the United States. You mentioned what

ippened yesterday, and I am encouraged

fy what happened today. And I would like to

''lank you very, very much.

''' And allow me to raise my glass to the

' resident of the United States and to the

■"•iendship between our two countries.

'chaim.

REMARKS AT RECEPTION GIVEN BY
PRIME MINISTER RABIN, JANUARY 29

Weekly Comiiilation of Presidential Documents dated February 2

Prime Minister Rabin

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: I
would like to thank you, Mr. President, for
your kind invitation to come as official guests
of you to this country. I would like to thank
you very much for the time that you have
allotted for the discussion that we have had
in the last three days about the problems
that we face in our region and in the effort
to move toward peace.

I am sure that the talks have helped and
I hope will advance the cause of peace. I
think these kind of relations that you offer
to me on a personal basis as well as in the
relations between our two countries will be
an encouragement to the cause of peace in
the area. And I would like to thank you very,
very much for your personal interest, per-
sonal help, in doing so.

And, Mr. President, toward the end of my
visit in Washington, again thank you very,
very much.

President Ford

Mr. Prime Minister and Mrs. Rabin: I am
delighted to be here and to see so many,
many of your friends. We, of course, are
very pleased that you are in the United
States. I feel, as you do, that the discussions
we have had in the three days have been
very meaningful. I believe they will be very
productive. It has been a fine experience for
me to renew our personal friendship that
existed over a period of years when you were
the Ambassador for Israel. It has been for
you, I am sure, a great experience to renew
your acquaintances with your many, many
friends on Capitol Hill. And I am certain,
from what I have heard from some of my
old friends, your presentation to the Con-
gress yesterday in joint session was out-
standing. In fact, I heard it was so good that

! ibruary 23, 1976

227

I am not sure I want to make a state of the
Union up there. [Laughter.]

But let me reiterate what we have said
both privately and publicly. The United
States, at the present time, as it has been
under five previous Presidents, is dedicated
to the survival and the security of Israel. We
mean it. At the same time, we are dedicated
to working with you in moving forward to
real peace in the Middle East.

You have been staunch and steadfast in
your dedication on behalf of your country
and at the same time have shown great
statesmanship and leadership in that very
difficult area of the world. I can't thank you
enough for the opportunity to work with you
in the efforts that involve both your country
and ours aimed at the achievement of the
kind of life that is needed and necessary for
all peoples in the Middle East.

You have done an outstanding job as an
Ambassador, and it is a great pleasure and
privilege for me to work with you on behalf
of what we all have to do in that very diffi-
cult area, the Middle East.

I thank you for the hospitality tonight. I
hope and trust, as I am sure it will be, that
as you travel around the United States in
the next seven days, you will receive as warm
a welcome everywhere as you have received
in our Nation's Capital.

Thank you very much.

ADDRESS BY PRIME MINISTER RABIN
TO THE CONGRESS, JANUARY 28 '

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, distinguished
Members of Congress: I come to you from Jerusalem
with the greetings of my people in this, your Bi-
centennial Year.

Two days ago, I stood before Independence Hall to
pay tribute in the name of Israel to the Fathers of
the American Revolution. There. I saw the Biblical in-
scription on the Liberty Bell which is so familiar to
me in its original Hebrew — Ukratem dror ba'aretz
I'chol yoshveha — "Proclaim Liberty Throughout All
the Land Unto All the Inhabitants Thereof." We,

' Text from the Congressional Record of Jan. 28,
p. H398.

Israel, celebrate with you that great message Ameri
proclaimed 200 years ago. i

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, I thank you
for the invitation that has brought me here todf,
and I appreciate your expressions of welcome.

Standing here in this great hall, I am aware th
you are the heirs of a two-century-old tradition
free government by the people. Free people evei
where acknowledge their debt to your Declaration
Independence, which emphasizes the natural right
all peoples to establish governments of their o\
choosing.

Our declaration of independence, building on i\
right, adds to it the principle that the Jewish peoj
shall preserve its integrity and restore its natiot
existence in its own land, despite the holocaust
history.

The first principle reflects the essence of the Ame
can Revolution, the second the essence of the Zion
Revolution.

The war of 1776 and the war of 1948 were bf
battles of liberation. What made them into revo
tions was the human vision that fired them. It w
a vision not only to win freedom but also to constn
new societies in freedom. In our case, it was the rev
of an ancient nation to put an end, once and for all,
homelessness, helplessness, and holocaust. It was 1
assertion of our right to self-determination, to reti
to Zion, to reclaim it of the desolation of 20 centuri
to gather in the oppressed of our scattered sons a
daughters, and to build there a new society inspii
by the values of the old.

This is the Zionist vision.

From the days when John Adams expressed
hope for the return of Jewish independence, from
days when Mark Twain first saw the land of Israel
"a land of ruin," to the present day, the United Sta
has shown sympathy for this vision. Congress as
expression of America, has consistently acted to g
that sympathy substance. For this, I extend to you
gratitude of the people of Israel.

Israel could well say of itself what Thomas Jeff
son said of America:

"... our ancestors . . . possessed a right, wh
nature has given to all men, of departing from
country in which chance, not choice has placed tht
of going in quest of new habitations and of th
establishing new societies. . . ."

When these words were spoken, America was
the midst of its nationbuilding through immigrati
It was to continue for another 150 years. We an
century into ours. Our Statue of Liberty is a refu[
immigrant barge.

For both of our new societies, immigration beca
pioneering. Israel's contemporary folk heroes, 1
yours, are those who mastered wastelands and W'
out to build communities in empty places.

In a society of pioneering, democracy springs fri

228

Department of State Bulle

! ■ frontier itself. Our common heritage — founded
i.jn the Biblical ethic — gave the democratic experi-
I e its unique expression. It proclaimed the dignity

I worth of every individual. Though different in
111. our respective institutions share this common
.■I'tive.

There are all too few nations in the world that up-
l d these democratic foiTns and objectives. We are a
r her small family. We did not expect to be so a
fsieration ago.

^ generation ago, the world was engulfed in a great

Ar. In the contest between nations, it was perhaps

L'reatest of battles between the forces of good

I I list the forces of evil. When it was over, a con-
ns effort was made to extend the principles of

jieriiational justice and decency to all peoples, large
al small. Its concrete expression was the Charter
o.'the United Nations.

\t the generation's end, the United Nations finds

ir in crisis. The words of its charter have been
^licd and devalued. Israel has learned that it can
ei)ect no justice from the United Nations in its
{isent form. Its moral resources have been eroded by
e ortion and appeasement which again intrude upon
tj international scene. None of us in the free world
1^'e fared well in this climate.

^he present combination of circumstances has
peed my own people in the front line. But I believe
t t the consequences extend to the whole democratic
f lily and, ultimately, to the peace and welfare of
nnkind. Given the acute political, economic, and
s ial stresses of our times, never has the interde-
p dence of our democratic community been greater.

ienjamin Franklin might well have been speaking
0 IS when he said: We must all hang together or we
»' I all hang separately.

say this as a representative of a small democracy
b the representatives of the biggest and strongest
0 us all. President Ford's leadership is making a
c cial contribution to the peace of the world and to
t cause of peace in the Middle East. His efforts
h d out the hope for a more secure and stable world
a [ a better place for people to live in.

'here is no freedom, nor shall there be peace in
t ; world, without a United States strong and con-
fi'nt in its purpose. World peace rests upon your
f titude. Upon it rests the hope that honest dialogue
c move forward with societies having other systems
0 rule. We welcome any form of international dia-
1< ue to reduce the suspicions and tensions between
n ions. For in the end, our common cause as democ-
r ies is a struggle for mankind and not against any
P'tion of it.

ilr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, from this rostrum
Ileclare that, however difficult the road, however
h'd the challenge, and however complex the process,
lael will strive with all its being to contribute to
t' peace of the world by pressing ahead with its
ejrt for peace with the Arab countries. This is the

ving goal of all our policies.

We know of your concern and national interest in
the stability of our area, and I wish to say to you
that we seek to be sensitive to them. I believe that
certain steps we have pursued have also contributed
to that interest. We see the expression of that interest
— through the advancement of the human and eco-
nomic welfare of the peoples of our region — as a
positive development and as a hope for progress
toward peace itself.

We express our confidence that such developing ties
need not be, and must not be, at the cost of Israel's
vital interest of liberty and security. And if, in
the pursuit of our shared goals, differences do arise
from time to time, then let us recall Jefferson's wis-
dom that "every difference of opinion is not a dif-
ference of principle."

The principle of which I speak is the resolution of
a conflict that has lasted too long. Let me share
with you my thinking on what has, thus far, stood
in the way of a solution to it.

If I were to be asked to state in a word what is
the heart and the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict, I
would say this: It is the refusal of the Arab coun-
tries to reconcile themselves to the right of existence
of one small viable sovereign Jewish state in the
land of our people's birth; by Jewish state I mean an
independent, democratic society, secular in the equal-
ity of all its citizens, Jew and non-Jew alike, before
the law and founded upon historic Jewish values.

By stating this, I am saying that the question of
territory, the matter of boundaries, the issue of
maps, were not, and are not. the true obstacles to
peace.

Twenty-nine years ago, in 1947, we accepted a very
truncated partitioned territory upon which to rebuild
our Jewish statehood. It was not because of its shape
or size that the Arab leaders rejected that United
Nations partition plan. They went to war against us
because they rejected our very right to freedom as
an independent people.

Against great odds and with much sacrifice, we won
our war of independence. The stakes were incredibly
high. Defeat would have meant national holocaust
and the eclipse of the Jewish people in history.

And just as every war reaps its inevitable tragic
crop of refugees, so did the Arab war against Israel
produce two refugee problems of almost equal size
— an Arab one, and a Jewish one from Arab countries.

After our war of independence, in 1949 we signed
armistice agreements with our neighbors. We be-
lieved, naively, that these would soon lead to a
negotiated peace. They did not. We were ready to
settle for the fragile armistice lines as peace bound-
aries. But as a matter of principle, the Arabs would
not negotiate the end of the conflict because they
refused to reconcile themselves to a Jewish inde-
pendent state.

So, in 1956, another war was impo-^ed upon us.
Again we won it. At its end, we agreed to evacuate
the Sinai Peninsula. Did Israel's withdrawal from all

»3ruary 23, 1976

229

the territories occupied in tlie war lead to peace ? It
did not even lead to a negotiation.

So, in 1967, Arab ai-mies again massed along those
fragile frontiers that had invited past aggression.
Again we won a victory in a war we did not seek.

Then came 1973. Again we were attacked — this
time a surprise attack. But this time we were not
exposed to those weak amiistice lines which our
neighbors had recognized only as targets of invasion.
Israel now had defensive depth.

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, until 1967, Israel
did not hold an inch of the Sinai Peninsula, the West
Bank, the Gaza Strip, or the Golan Heights. Israel
held not an acre of what is considered disputed ter-
ritory. And yet we enjoyed no peace. Year after
year Israel called for — pleaded for — a negotiated
peace with the Arab governments. Their answer was
a blank refusal and more war.

The reason was not a conflict over territorial
claims. The reason was, and remains, the fact that a
free Jewish state sits on territory at all.

It is in this context that the Palestinian issue
must be appraised. That issue is not the obstacle to
peace, as some would suggest. Certainly it has to be
solved in the context of the final peace. But to assert
that this is the key to peace, the formula for peace,
or the breakthrough to peace is to misread the
realities. It is to put the legendary cart before the
horse.

The Palestinian issue began with, and is a product
of, the overall Arab posture on the legitimacy of a
Jewish State of Israel. Only when that posture
changes will the Palestinian issue be constructively
and finally tackled.

The clock of history cannot be put back. It was not
Israel that prevented the establishment of a Pales-
tinian state in 1947, as the partition plan had pro-
posed. What did prevent it was the Arab declaration
of war on the plan itself because it called for the
creation of a Jewish state.

For 19 years no Arab government saw fit to
establish a Palestinian state, even though the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip were under Arab control.
Neither was there a Palestinian demand to do so. In
January 1964, the organization that calls itself the
PLO was established by the Arab heads of state.
Yet, even then, statehood in those territories, then
held by Jordan and Egypt, was never the objective.
We know what the objective is. It is written large
into the Palestinian covenant, which is their binding
constitution. Every paragraph of it spits out the
venom calling for Israel's destruction.

These are the truths that lie at the heart and the
core of the Arab-Israel conflict. And since, to date,
the Arab version of peace does not depart from these
truths, no honest being can blame us for refusing to
cooperate in our own national suicide.

Peace will come when the Arab leaders finally cross

the Rubicon from aggressive confrontation to h:
monious reconciliation. Then, there is no problem i,
tween us that cannot be solved in negotiation. Tl,
includes, too, the Palestinian issue, within the g ^
graphic and political context of peace with Jord, ,1
When I say Jordan, I do not discount Palestin ,
representation in the peace delegation of that coi.
try. And when I say geography, I do not discoun
negotiation concerning the future final peace bou
aries of the territories involved. ;

For the genuine peace we seek, Israel is ready i
give up much and to compromise much on territc.
In a negotiation whose sincere shared goal is fii
reconciliation, we shall go more than halfway i
assure its success.

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, a short time :i ,
from this very rostrum. President Sadat wisely
clared: "there is no substitute for direct person
person contacts that go deep into the heart of all ■
problems which invoke our common concern and c •
ture our imagination."" I wish that he would di t
those words to me as well as to you, the Congrcs. ;
the United States. I would then know that the w ;
of true peacemaking has finally begun.

I today declare: I am ready to meet with any A j
head of government, at any time and at any pi .
for the pui'pose of peace talks.

I do not know when peace will finally come. Bu 1
this I am certain: It will be our future strength I t
will largely determine the resources of peace in r
region. Weakness is no prescription for negotiat i.
If it be perceived that Israel is not weak, so shall r
neighbors perceive the wisdom of mutual comproii '
reconciliation, and peace.

What, therefore, does Israel propose as the ' '
step in the eff'ort for peace? Israel proposes thr
convening of the Geneva Peace Conference in ace >■
ance with the letter of invitation from the i i
Secretary General to the parties to the conferenci

The basis for the conference has to be foundei n
two fundamental principles — on Security Coi il
Resolutions 242 and 338 as they were accepte( y
Israel and by the other parties and powers concei i
The second principle is that the parties to the coi 'I
must be the parties to the peacemaking process, le
negotiations for peace must be conducted bet\ n
ourselves — the Government of Israel and the n( v
boring Arab governments.

There are some who tell us that — here and t ?
— a change toward realism is perhaps slowly ei •
ing. I pray there is some truth to this.

Israel is determined to encourage what ?r

- For an address by President Anwar al-Sada of
the Arab Republic of Egypt made before a ; nt
meeting of the Congress on Nov. 5, 1975, see Bu E-
TIN of Nov. 24, 1975, p. 728.

230

Department of State Bui ii

•mptoms there may be to move that process along,
^is is why we entered into the interim agreement
•th Egypt. We did so to encourage the trend to-
■■rd greater realism. Our aim in the agreement is
t promote conditions of stability and trust which,
i) hope, will produce, in time, a climate for genuine
jace negotiations.

[n the light of what I said and under the given
tiditions of regional tension, the pursuit of this
rlicy calls for taking risks. It has required our

kinjT tangible concessions for concessions far less

ii;il)le. We have done so because we believe it is
issary to take measured risks not only in case of
vr but also for the sake of peace.

Thus, in a very few weeks' time, the defense forces
olsrael will carry out a withdrawal in Sinai. We have
aeady handed to Egypt proper the oilfields on the
Clf of Suez and the coastal link to them. With that,
lael has given up its single oil resource. We have
aieed to these measures not in return for peace,
even in return for an end to the state of war. We
what we did in the hope that it will move us
sne steps closer to peace.

Congress, I know, is familiar with these measures,
ley are major elements of the recent Israel-Egypt
Ereement, negotiated through the good offices of
■ United States. May I say that the limited Ameri-

1 civilian technical presence — requested by both
p ties — and which Congress authorized in the con-
t t of this agreement is a contribution toward the
cise of peace. That presence has no function or re-
Finsibility in case of war. And I wish to add with
€ phasis that if a condition of hostilities does arise,

I vill be the first to call for its removal. This is a
r tter of fundamental doctrine for Israel. We alone
E ' responsible for our ovm defense. This is how it
1 ; been; this is how it must be. I believe it to be the
€ ence of our political relationship.

^r. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, throughout the
3 irs. we have found here, in Congress, a wisdom and
c 'p understanding of our nationbuilding and defense
T 'ds and the economic burdens arising from them.

I I as a people, we turn to ourselves before we turn
'-i others.

I' The Government of Israel is engaged in a tough
I )gram of economic measures.

-.ast year we reduced private consumption by al-
I st 5 percent, and we will reduce it by another 5
I -cent this year. We have put on ourselves a heavy
Irden of taxation. This year the government will
( lect in taxes some 70 percent of all our national
i ome. I am told this is almost twice as much as it
iin America.

( mention these as only a few of the many ex-
-Jiples within a comprehensive economic policy in-
tcing more austerity and higher production. We
rsall continue this policy — difficult though it be —
i- this is what we require of ourselves to do.

Peace, not war, is our tradition. We see no glory in
battle. I was once a soldier, not by choice but by
necessity. I know the horrors of war, the waste, and
the agony. I know what peace can bring to all the
peoples of our region through open boundaries, pro-
jection of economic cooperation, the conquest of dis-
ease, and the free flow of ideas, people, and products.

Even now. before peace, we declare our readiness
to promote its climate by unilaterally opening our
ports for the free passage of goods to and from our
immediate neighbors.

We open our hospitals to our neighboring sick. We
declare open our institutions of research for all the
countries in the Middle East wishing to share knowl-
edge in the fields of agriculture and water develop-
ment.

We, the people of our region, are destined to live
together for all time, for never again shall there be a
Middle East without a State of Israel.

The going has not been easy, and the challenge
ahead will not be easy. But we are an old people, and
there is no sacrifice too great to protect the freedom
we have won and the new society we have created.
I believe Americans, above all, can understand this
truth.

Three hundred years ago, celebrating their first
years of survival after much suffering, your Pilgrim
Fathers wrote these lines:

"We have made a clearing in the wilderness; and
another year will see a broader clearing, a better
garnering. We have made a good beginning in a
hostile world."

So do we, the first generation of free Israel, descen-
dants of 2,000 years of unhappy wandering, declare
we have made a good beginning in a rather hostile
world.

America has helped us greatly. In loyalty to its
Founding Fathers, this Republic of the United States
has given tangible meaning to human values in the
charting of its policies. By virtue of this, Israel pays
you tribute as you enter into the third century of
independence.

Permit me to express that tribute to the Congress
through the words of an American Jew, a soldier in
the Revolutionary War. Jonas Phillips, in 1787, wrote
this prayer:

"May the almighty God of our fathers Abraham,
Isaac and Jacob, imbue this noble assembly with wis-
dom . . . and may they have the satisfaction to see
that their present toil and labor for the welfare of
the United States be approved throughout all the
world and particularly by the United States of
America."

This is the sincere sentiment of friendship Israel
brings you this day.

M'bruary 23, 1976

231

U.S. Sinai Support Mission
Established

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER'

Establishing the United States Sinai Support
Mission

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the
Constitution and statutes of the United States of
America, including the Joint Resolution of October
13, 1975 (Public Law 94-110, 89 Stat. 572, 22 U.S.C.
2441 note), the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended (22 U.S.C. 2151 ct scq.), including but not
limited to Sections 531, 621, 633, 901, and 903 there-
of (22 U.S.C. 2346, 2381, 2.393, 2441, 2443), and
section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, and
as President of the United States of America, it is
hereby ordered as follows :

Section 1. (a) In accordance with the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and notwith-
standing the provisions of Part I of Executive Order
No. 10973, as amended, there is hereby established
the United States Sinai Support Mission, herein-
after referred to as the Mission."

(b) The Mission shall, in accordance with the For-
eign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, the Joint
Resolution of October 13, 1975, and the provisions of
this order, carry out the duties and responsibilities
of the United States Government to implement the
"United States Proposal for the Early Warning Sys-
tem in Sinai" in connection with the Basic Agree-
ment between Egypt and Israel, signed on Septem-
ber 4, 1975, and the Annex to the Basic Agreement,
subject to broad policy guidance received through
the Assistant to the President for national security
affairs, and the continuous supervision and general
direction of the Secretary of State pursuant to Sec-
tion 622(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
as amended (22 U.S.C. 2382(c)).

(c) It shall be the duty and responsibility of the
Mission to ensure that the United States role in the
Early Warning System enhances the prospect of
compliance in good faith with the terms of the
Egyptian-Israeli agreement and thereby promotes
the cause of peace.

(d) At the head of the Mission there shall be a
Director, who shall be appointed by the President."
The Director shall be a Special Representative of
the President. There shall also be a Deputy Director,
who shall be appointed by the President. The Deputy
Director shall perform such duties as the Director
may direct, and shall serve as the Director in the
case of a vacancy in the office of the Director, or
during the absence or disability of the Director.

(e) The Director and Deputy Director shall re-
ceive such compensation, as permitted by law, as
the President may specify.

Sec. 2. (a) The Director shall exercise immediate
supervision and direction over the Mission.

(b) The Director may, to the extent permitted by

law, employ such staff as may be necessary

(c) The Director may, to the extent permitted
law and the provisions of this order, enter into
contracts as may be necessary to carry out the
poses of this order.

(d) The Director may procure the temporary
intermittent services of experts or consultants
accordance with the provisions of Section 626 of
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended
U.S.C. 2386), and section 3109 of title 5 of
United States Code.

(e) As requested by the Director, the agencies
the Executive branch shall, to the extent permi
by law and to the extent practicable, provide
Mission with such administrative services, infon
tion, advice, and facilities as may be necessary
the fulfillment of the Mission's functions under
order.

Sec. 3. (a) In accordance with the provision
Section 633 of the Foreign Assistance Act of '
as amended (22 U.S.C. 2393), it is hereby de
mined to be in furtherance of the purposes of
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended,
the functions authorized by that act and requ
by this order, may be performed, subject to the
visions of subsection (b) of this Section, by
Director without regard to the following spec
provisions of law and limitations of authority

(1) Section 3648 of the Revised Statutes
amended (31 U.S.C. 529).

(2) Section 3710 of the Revised Statutes
U.S.C. 8).

(3) Section 2 of Title III of the Act of Mar(
1933 (47 Stat. 1520, 41 U.S.C. 10a).

(4) Section 3735 of the Revised Statutes
U.S.C. 13).

(5) Section 3679 of the Revised Statutes
amended (31 U.S.C. 665, Section 3732 of the
vised Statutes, as amended (41 U.S.C. 11), and
tion 9 of the Act of June 30, 1906 (34 Stat. 76
U.S.C. 627), so as to permit the indemnificatic
contractors against unusually hazardous risk:
defined in Mission contracts, consistent, to the
tent practicable, with regulations prescribed bj
Department of Defense pursuant to the provi
of the Act of August 28, 1958, as amended
U.S.C. 1431 et seq.) and Executive Order No. 1
of November 14, 1958, as amended.

(6) Section 302(a) of the Federal Property
Administrative Services Act of 1949, as ame
(41 U.S.C. 252(a)), so as to permit the Sinai

^No. 11896; 41 Fed. Reg. 2067.

= For text of Executive Order No. 10973, Ac
istration of the Foreign Assistance Act and Re
Functions, see Bulletin of Nov. 27, 1961, p. 90

" On Jan. 15 President Ford announced the apfi
ment of C. William Kontos as Director of the U
States Sinai Support Mission and Special Repres-
tive of the President. For biographic data,
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents
Jan. 19, 1976, p. 39.

232

Department of State Bui

lit Mission to utilize the procurement regulations
jomulgated by the Department of Defense pursu-
it to Section 2202 of Title 10 of the United States
t'de.

(7) Section 304(b) of the Federal Property and
.Iniinistrative Services Act of 1949, as amended

I U.S.C. 254(b)), so as to permit the payment of

s in excess of the prescribed fee limitations but

thing herein contained shall be construed to con-

-tute authorization hereunder for the use of the

<i;t-plus-a-percentage-of-cost system of contracting.

(8) Section 305 of the Federal Property and Ad-
nnistrative Sei^ices Act of 1949, as amended (41
TS.C. 255).

(9) Section 901(a) of the Merchant Marine Act,
H6, as amended (46 U.S.C. 1241(a)).

(b) It is directed that each specific use of the
V ivers of statutes and limitations of authority
athorized by this Section shall be made only when
c.ermined in writing by the Director that such use
ii specifically necessary and in furtherance of the
prposes of this Order and in the interests of the
liited States.

5EC. 4. (a) There is hereby established the Sinai
^eragency Board, hereinafter referred to as the
lard, which shall be composed of the following:

(1) The Secretary of State or his representative.

(2) The Secretary of Defense or his representa-
te.

(3) The Administrator, Agency for International
1 velopment, or his representative.

(4) The Director of the United States Arms Con-
t 1 and Disarmament Agency or his representative.

(5) The Director of Central Intelligence or his
1 )resentative.

(6) The Director of the United States Sinai Sup-
) -.t Mission or his representative.

(b) The Director of the United States Sinai Sup-
J't Mission or his representative shall be Chairman
< the Board.

(c) The President may from time to time desig-
1 te others to serve on, or participate in the activi-
1 s of, the Board. The Board may invite representa-
I es of other departments and agencies to partici-
] te in its activities.

(d) The Board shall meet at the call of the Chair-
iin to assist, coordinate, and advise concerning the
!:ivities of the United States Sinai Support Mis-

n.

Sec. 5. The Secretary of State shall, pursuant to
'; provisions of Executive Order No. 10973, as
i lended, including Part V thereof, and this order,
jovide from funds made available to the President
15 funds necessary for the activities of the United
iates Sinai Support Mission.

Sec. 6. All activities now being undertaken by the
cretary of State to implement the "United States
oposal for the Early Warning System in Sinai"
all be continued until such time as the Mission has
come operational and the Director requests the

transfer of those activities to the Mission. The Sec-
retary of State may exercise any of the authority
or responsibility vested in the Director, by this
order, in order to continue the performance of activ-
ities related to the Early Warning System until
transferred to the Director. All such activities under-
taken by the Secretary of State shall be deemed to
have been taken by the Director.

Gerald R. Ford.

The White House, January 13, 1976.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

94th Congress, 1st Session

Protocol for the Continuation in Force of the Inter-
national Coffee Agreement of 1968, as extended.
Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions to accompany Ex. B, 94-1. S. Ex. Rept. 94-11.
October 22, 1975. 11 pp.

The 1975 Brazilian Shrimp Agreement. Report of
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to ac-
company Ex. D, 94-1. S. Ex. Rept. 94-12. October
22, 1975. 6 pp.

The Amendments to Certain Articles of the Conven-
tion on the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consulta-
tive Organization. Report of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations to accompany Ex. F, 94-1.
S. Ex. Rept. 94-13. October 22, 1975. 4 pp.

Indochina Refugee Children Assistance Act of 1975.
Report of the Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare to accompany S. 2145. S. Rept.
94-432. October 22, 1975. 16 pp.

Security Supporting Assistance for Zaire. Hearing
before the Subcommittees on African Affairs and
Foreign Assistance of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations. October 24, 1975. 49 pp.

United States Grain and Oil Agreements With the
Soviet Union. Hearing before the House Committee
on International Relations. October 28, 1975. 71 pp.

The United States and China. A report to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and the House Inter-
national Relations Committee by the seventh con-
gressional delegation to the People's Republic of
China. October 28, 1975. 68 pp.

Implementing Patent Cooperation Treaty. Report of
the House Committee on the Judiciary to accom-
pany S. 24. H. Rept. 94-592. October 29, 1975.
32 pp.

Two-Hundred-Mile Fishing Zone. Hearing before
the Subcommittee on Oceans and International En-
vironment of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations. October 31, 1975. 443 pp.

Resolution Relating to the President's Trip to China
and American MIA's and POW's. Report of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accom-
pany S. Res. 251. S. Rept. 94-457. November 18,
1975. 2 pp.

jbruary 23, 1976

233

U.S. Responsibilities in a Changing World Economy

Statement by Secretary Kissinger '

I welcome this opportunity to testify be-
fore this distinguished committee which
plays such a critical role in a wide range of
international economic issues. Continuing ex-
change between this committee and the State
Department is essential if our policy is to
reflect the totality of our national interest.
I hope my testimony today will signal the
beginning of a process of more active col-
laboration.

Our foreign economic policies affect vitally
every American: the farmer, the working-
man, the entrepreneur, and the consumer.
They affect our economic prosperity and our
security as a nation.

Our economic policies are a critical ele-
ment in the construction of a stable world
order. The maintenance of peace, historically
a function of our military strength, is in-
creasingly dependent as well on our economic
strength.

The 20th-century revolution in technology,
transportation, communication, and world
economic development has multiplied the
pressure points among nations and the po-
tential for conflict. It has stirred a ground
swell of demands from those nations and
peoples that have not shared fully in the
world's economic progress. It has inspired
growing concern about access to the world's
natural resources and disputes over the dis-
tribution of the economic benefits that come

' Made before the Senate Committee on Finance
on Jan. 30 (text from press release 42). The com-
plete transcript of the hearings will be published
by the committee and will be available from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

from these resources. Our economies, insti
tions, and daily lives are vulnerable to
economic policies of others.

At the same time, the United States
the world's most powerful economy. Toget
with our allies among the industrial dem
racies, we are the engine of global prosp
ity, technological innovation, and the b
hope for widening economic opportunity
millions around the globe.

We could withstand an era of internatio
economic warfare better than any. But
heritage and our aspirations demand mi
of us than the mere search for survival
a world of resentment and despair. Inde
such a world could not but ultimately und
mine the stability and peace upon which
else we seek to do in the world is based,
prospect for our children's well-being and
the future of the values we cherish will
dim unless we take the lead in seeking a i
era of international economic cooperatior

Foreign economic policy is thus a crit
element in our overall foreign policy and
the pursuit of our broadest national ob;
tives.

At the present time we face a series'
economic challenges that must be met if
are to have a stable world order:

— Inflation and recession have spr
throughout the world, threatening
world's trading and financial system and
health of our social institutions. Recov
is now underway in much of the indust;
world.

— The stunning increase in the price of
has transferred massive wealth to a s;
group of producer countries. It has inte;

234

Department of State Bull*

j world recession, exacerbated world in-
pn, and created serious problems of debt,
^cing, and balance-of-payments adjust-

The premises of the postwar economic
jm are being challenged by the nations
16 Third World in a variety of interna-
il bodies. Their rhetoric is often bitter
accusatory, their tactics confrontational.

'^e must respond to these challenges f irm-
ind constructively. The United States
i: play a leading role if our basic national
tj-ests are to be protected. If we fail to
fe the lead, our destiny may be determined
■ Ijy the drift of events than by con-
is design.

(iiig with pursuit of our broadest foreign

. v goals, we have very important econom-

terests of individual Americans to pro-

Our international energy policies deter-

whether Americans will have regular

'.lies and stable prices for energy re-

i es so vital for our continued economic

' perity.

Our relations abroad can provide the
lican farmer with stable and growing
11 markets and the American consumer
i.i more stability in food prices.
- Our commodity policy can assure us of
;gular supply and reasonable prices for
( critical raw materials that we import
II stable and expanding markets for those
i we export.

■ Our foreign policies in money, trade,
II investment can give growing opportuni-
i for Americans whose livelihood depends

I xpanding export markets for manufac-

II d and technology-intensive items. Our
•1 ies can provide the American consumer

ide range of goods and services from
Y-h to choose and protection against high
•13S and the monopolistic practices of
I'ial interest groups.

lere may be occasions, however, when
)iific economic interests are in opposition
I 'Ur larger foreign policy goals and eco-
»l ic disputes with a particular country are
itonflict with our larger foreign policy in-

terests in that particular country. This
points up the need for effective coordination
within our government of our specific and
larger policy goals. It is not surprising that
the positions of departments and agencies
may clash. Indeed, it would be strange if
they did not. Each department looks at is-
sues from the perspective of its interests and
goals. What is necessary is to bring these
conflicts to a resolution.

We have various formal and informal
mechanisms for resolution of differences.
The formal mechanisms include the Council
on International Economic Policy, the Eco-
nomic Policy Board, the National Security
Council, and the Trade Policy Committee. In
fact, interagency consultation takes place on
a continuing basis and at all levels. The
agencies try to reach agreement without bur-
dening the President needlessly. But when
serious conflicts cannot be resolved, the
President makes the decision. He does so on
the basis of our total national interest and
objectives.

It has been my experience that the coor-
dination of foreign economic policy in this
Administration has been outstanding, and it
is a misreading of the situation to believe
that occasional differences mean disarray.
Differences lead to compromise and decision.
The end result of the process is a coherent
foreign economic policy.

Our approach to foreign economic policy
has three basic elements :

— Building stronger economic ties with
our industrial allies;

— Constructing a stable and mutually ben-
eficial economic relationship with the Com-
munist nations; and

— Providing opportunities for the less de-
veloped nations to share in both the benefits
and the responsibilities of the world economic
system.

The meeting of the leaders of six major
industrialized democracies in Rambouillet,
France, last November was a significant
foreign policy event. They agreed to coordi-
nate their economic policies more closely to
assure a stable and durable recovery. They
confirmed their commitment to the OECD

liuory 23, 1976

235

[Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development] trade pledge. And they con-
curred in the basic elements of an agreement
on monetary reform that was accepted by
the IMF [International Monetary Fund] In-
terim Committee in Jamaica on January 9.

Our relations with the Communist nations
can be stabilized and more prudent behavior
on the part of the Soviet Union and its allies
can be encouraged by closer economic ties.

The grain agreement that we negotiated
with the Soviet Union was a major step in
building a better relationship. It provides an
assured export market for our farmers. Yet
by putting our grain trade with the Soviet
Union on a more regular basis, it protects
our consumers from the wild swings in grain
prices caused by large and erratic Soviet
purchases. And it puts the Soviet Union on
notice that the economic benefits of our re-
lationship require an atmosphere of accom-
modation and understanding between East
and West.

Unfortunately, the ability of this country
to use the process of normalizing trade with
the Communist countries as a flexible and
constructive element in East-West relation-
ships is reduced by the provisions of title IV
of the Trade Act. These provisions, in estab-
lishing a single issue in East-West relations
as the governing condition for normalizing
trade, close the door on the use of the trade
relationship over a wider range of issues and
interests.

The relations of the industrialized nations
with the developing world is a pi'oblem of
particular concern at the moment, and our
policy deserves a fuller elaboration to this
committee.

Relations With Developing Countries

Over the last few years the industrial
countries have been the object of mounting
criticism by much of the developing world,
which believes that the international eco-
nomic system and the policies of the indus-
trial nations have denied them opportunities
for advancement. The hostility of some Third
World spokesmen and bloc voting have made

constructive discussion in U.N. forumsl
tween the industrial and developing wc
almost impossible.

The developing countries are not a nat
bloc. They comprise more than 100 coun
which differ widely in income, econ(
structure, and level of development. In re
years they have not pursued their real
varied interests in U.N. forums. They 1
combined instead to confront and accuse
developed world of exploiting them.

The radicalization of the Third World
its consolidation into an antagonistic bl(
neither in our political nor our economii
terest. A world of hostile blocs is a worl
tension and disorder. Developing coun
can play a spoiler's role in the world «
omy, attempting to restrict the suppl;
critical materials, subjecting foreign in'
ment to harassment and confiscation, thv
ing our efforts to restructure the world t
and monetary system. Clearly, it is in
national interest — and in the world int(
— that economic relations between the
veloped and developing nations be condi
in a cooperative way and that each ha
realistic appreciation of what can be doi
advance mutual interests.

In addressing this problem, our objec
have been fourfold: to change the at
phere in which discussions between th(
veloped and developing countries are
from confrontation to cooperation ; to ch
the substance of the discussions from
ology to consideration of practical act
to encourage the developing countries to
sue their real and varied interests in a
istic way; and to shift the locus of di;
sions and actions insofar as possible t( 'A
rums in which participants can be expM
to act responsibly.

At the U.N. special session, we se a
agenda for future discussions between li
rich and the poor countries with a b/
range of practical proposals that serve ll
mutual interests of both. Our proposals il
developed in consultation with Membei,!
Congress who met with me during the :n
mer months preceding the special ses )i
I am aware of your concern, Mr. Chair ai

236

Department of State Bu

we did not at that time consult directly
your committee, and I regret that we
lot do so.
ir initiatives were addressed to five

To moderate the instability in the world

)my that impedes the development of

poor countries ;

To accelerate their economic growth by

iding improved access to capital and
»)iology and improvement in the condi-
! of private foreign investment;
-To make the world trading system
t r serve the needs of development;

To improve the conditions of trade and
•;tment in key commodities; and

To address the special needs of the pooi'-

uuntries.

each of these areas we offered concrete
ions to developing-country problems

are consistent with our own economic
sophy and our own economic interests,
tried to make the developing countries
e that the existing economic system can
ler their welfare and that they have a
i in its effectiveness. We were, I believe,
;ructive and forthcoming as is fitting
. great nation and as is necessary if we
0 encourage the developing countries to

to the real, not the rhetorical, world.
\y view, we achieved our objectives at
U.N. special session,
e special session was an important event
le slow process of encouraging the de-
tiing countries to pursue their varied in-
'ts in a realistic way; but it was only a
ming.

B need to move ahead to give effect to
initiatives, and we need to maintain a
nuing dialogue with the developing
fl. We have begun a new dialogue with
9 countries and with the oil-exporting
tries in the Conference on International
lomic Cooperation (CIEC) which met in
3 last December. We look to the confer-
, with its four commissions on energy,

materials, development, and related
icial issues, to consider seriously many
ar U.N. proposals that have not yet been
lemented.

,ljjary 23, 1976

Unlike the broad U.N. forums in which
developing nations vastly outnumber the
industrial democracies and vie with each
other to escalate their demands, the com-
missions will be small — 15 members in each
— and focused on specific issues. We think
the discussions will be more balanced as a
result.

The CIEC and its commissions are a one-
year experiment. The success of the experi-
ment will depend on the willingness of
member governments to use the commis-
sions for di.scussions of practical solutions to
concrete problems, solutions that take due
account of the interests of all the countries
concerned.

We are pursuing our special session ini-
tiatives and dialogue in many other appropri-
ate forums — among them the International
Monetary Fund, the multilateral trade ne-
gotiations (MTN) , the World Bank, and pro-
ducer-consumer commodity groups — with
some success. Thus, the IMF, with the sup-
port of its developing as well as industrial-
ized members, has already acted favorably
on several of our key initiatives, notably:

— The establishment of a Trust Fund to
provide concessional balance-of-payments
assistance to the poorest countries;

— The substantial liberalization of ar-
rangements to stabilize the export earnings
of developing countries; and

— Increased access to IMF credit (from
100 to 145 percent of quota).

I would like to put some of our other in-
itiatives, especially those in the trade, com-
modity, investment, and energy areas, in
proper context by outlining the general poli-
cies that guide us in these areas.

Trade

The multilateral trade negotiations rep-
resent a major foreign policy initiative.
Their results will affect our relations with
all our trading partners. They will affect our
domestic — and international — prosperity. My
colleagues have already discussed problems
and progress in these negotiations. I would
like to talk about the developing countries.

237

The developing countries have been play-
ing an increasingly important role in our
trade— a fact w^hich I believe we tend to
overlook. They now account for about one-
third of our total trade and, more impor-
tantly, for 90 percent of our total trade sur-
pluses in recent years. While recession has
been depressing our exports of manufactures
to developed countries, our exports of these
items to developing countries have been in-
creasing— supporting employment and in-
come in the United States. Central to the de-
velopment objectives of the developing
countries is expanding markets for their ex-
ports. Without these opportunities to earn
foreign exchange, they will not be able to
continue taking an increasing share of our
exports.

Trade, therefore, forms a vital and two-
way link in our relations with these coun-
tries. The committee, I believe, fully appre-
ciates this point and adopted section 106 of
the Trade Act to stress the interest we have
in mutually beneficial trade agreements with
developing countries. To make this a reality,
however, we must also recognize that the
needs of the developing countries are dif-
ferent, requiring transitional special and dif-
ferential treatment which accords with their
individual development status.

This is the principle underlying the
Congress' action in extending temporary
generalized tariff preferences to these coun-
tries. It is the principle I stated in the U.N.
special session. In both cases account is
taken of the fact that our goal is the develop-
ment of these countries to the point where
they can participate more fully in the world
trading system, sharing both its rights and
obligations. Some are already nearer this
point than others.

The different levels of development among
these countries were taken into account by
Congress in our generalized system of pref-
erences (GSP). In that system, developing
countries cease to enjoy preferential treat-
ment for products they can sell in our market
in substantial volume, as defined in the com-

petitive-need provisions of the Trade »
indicating that they have become com
tive as exporters of these products. W(
tend to see that similar provisions are n
in other forms of special and differe,|
treatment which may be agreed to. I

With regard to our system of genera'"
preferences, we continue to support ame \.
tory legislation, such as that which has %
introduced by Senator Bentsen, which wlj
waive the OPEC-exclusion [Organizatio '
Petroleum Exporting Countries] provi
title V of the Trade Act for those U ;[
members that did not participate in k
1973 oil embargo.

The blanket exclusion of OPEC counij
has had a noticeable adverse effect on ij
relations with important countries sue ij
Indonesia, Venezuela, and Ecuador — c n-
tries that did not participate in the iS
embargo — and has diminished the oval
favorable impact of GSP on our rela oj
with developing countries. The GSP d ?J
has become a major issue between the U; ;£
States and practically all of Latin Am ca
and is by all odds the most divisive fact k
the hemisphere in the trade field; it has 8*
affected United States relations with
bers of ASEAN [Association of Soub ■
Asian Nations]. Furthermore, it ca> i
shadow on the North-South dialogue tl i
just beginning in the Conference on I a-
national Economic Cooperation. The pr- !i(
provision has led to support and symi i'
among other LDC's [less developed
tries] for the OPEC countries. Ameiu
of the OPEC-exclusion provision is ii t-
United States national interest.

Commodities

The United States has assumed the le ais
ship role in the area of international itt
modity pohcy. The reason is clear: w<lK
the world's largest producer, consumer nl
trader of commodities. We are importir ;ip
increasing amount of our raw material )«
sumption each year. It is thus in our i ei

238

Department of State BtMil

to insure that commodity markets func-
efficiently, that they offer incentives
plan and invest for the future and not
ult in shortages and inflationary prices
orrow.

iVe have several specific concerns for

aiich we are continuing to develop policies.

"■"/rsf, as a major consumer we are con-

lu'd with security of supply at reasonable

( cs. While we are not generally concerned

h the possibility of successful OPEC-type

11 ion in raw materials, we recognize that

. lateral attempts to leverage industrial

iisumers may occur and could, in a few

OS, be economically disruptive. We intend

uv, address this issue through supply access

nirotiations in the MTN, as the Congress has

z1\ir]y legislated.

second, we are concerned that an uncertain

I estment climate in the developing world,

\\ ell as the increasing cost of mineral ex-

I ration and exploitation, will undermine

I iiuate private investment flows for min-

1 development.

)ur response has been on two levels. We
e expressed a willingness to improve the
ii| estment climate in the developing world
bi discussing guidelines for the behavior of
l> h multinationals and governments, by call-
i) for a multilateral investment insurance
t 'iicy, and by using what leverage we have
> settle investment disputes by third-party
a titration. We have also proposed that the
V'rld Bank Group — both the IBRD [Inter-
Q ional Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
» nent] and the IFC [International Finance
C"poration] — become more involved in min-
e J financing in the LDC's. These institu-
tas would mobilize private resources, act-
ir where necessary as the middleman be-
t';en foreign countries and U.S. companies.
"hird, we must direct attention to those
E'timodities whose prices fluctuate exces-
3 ely with severe inflationary effects on our
&n economy. We are prepared to give con-
3-eration to means of moderating fluctua-
te ns, ranging from a better exchange of in-
fj'mation between producers and consumers

to formal arrangements in specific commodi-
ties, where appropriate.

Fourth, we recognize that for many com-
modities the dominant problem may not be
volatile prices but competition from syn-
thetics, declining or sluggish secular demand,
or overproduction as new suppliers enter the
market. The remedies in such cases would be
measures such as diversification, improved
productivity, or better marketing practices.
Each commodity has its particular charac-
teristics and problems peculiar to it and
must be considered individually. We have
therefore proposed that there be a producer-
consumer forum for each key commodity to
consider what can be done to promote the
efficiency, growth, and stability of its market.

Negotiations have been completed on a
new coffee agreement, which contains sub-
stantial improvements from both consumer
and producer viewpoints. We will submit this
shortly to the President for decision. The new
cocoa agreement contains insufficient protec-
tion for consumers, and its price provisions
are too rigid. We are asking for renegotia-
tion. We will shortly submit the tin agree-
ment, which is a treaty, for advice and con-
sent by the Senate.

International Investment

Transnational enterprises have been im-
portant instruments for growth in both the
industrial and developing countries. They
contribute not only scarce capital but also
scarce technology, management, and market-
ing skills. In recognition of these benefits,
the industrial countries, including the United
States, have maintained an open policy on
international investment.

The developing countries are ambivalent
about private foreign investment. They want
it for the benefits it brings, but they are un-
easy about it — and in particular about the
transnational company, which is the major
instrument for international investment —
because of its power and global outlook.

Many of the most successful developing

Piroary 23, 1976

239

p

countries have taken advantage of foreign
private investment. In general the results
have been more rapid modernization and a
strengthened private sector. We remain
convinced that developing countries would be
well served by offering a secure climate
for foreign investment, but the choice re-
mains theirs, as do the costs of forgoing
investment.

The benefits deriving from transnational
enterprises make it important that govern-
ments deal with legitimate concerns about
these companies. One major concern is that
these enterprises may deviate from proper
standards of business behavior. There have
also been serious instances of apparent dis-
regard for national law with respect in par-
ticular to illicit payments. I am aware of
the keen interest of members of this com-
mittee on this issue as reflected in Senate
Resolution 265.

The United States has taken the lead in
dealing with these concerns because of our
commitment to an open international sys-
tem for investment and trade. We are active
in efl!'orts within the OECD to work out
guidelines defining reasonable standards of
business practices for transnational enter-
prises. Our delegation to the multilateral
trade negotiations has also raised this issue
in that forum. Such guidelines can provide
the basis for better understanding between
governments and enterprises and thus assist
in preserving a favorable climate for inter-
national investment.

In my address to the U.N. special session,
I said that the United States is willing to
pursue discussion of international guidelines
for transnational entei'prises within the
United Nations. We are willing to address
the concerns of developing countries, in par-
ticular that transnational enterprises con-
tribute to the development process. At the
same time, we believe that any U.N. guide-
lines should be balanced. In particular they
should include not only the obligations of
enterprises but also those of governments
to treat the enterprises equitably and in ac-
cordance with international law ; they should
apply equally to domestic and international

240

enterprises and to private and public firm
wherever appropriate ; they should stress t\
obligation of all parties to carry through (
undertakings freely entered upon.

Energy

Two years have passed since the o:
exporting countries sent shock wav«
through the world economy by the abrui
and enormous increase in the price of oil,
those two years we have:

— Created the International Enerj
Agency, a potentially dynamic center f
energy cooperation;

— Established a comprehensive emergens
program to increase the ability of lEA mer
bers to withstand the economic impact
another embargo;

— Negotiated a Financial Support Fund
meet problems posed by the huge finance
accumulations of the oil-producing countria
and

— Established the long-term lEA progr?
to accelerate the shift in supply and dema
for world energy that will eventually end o
vulnerability to arbitrary OPEC control o\
world prices.

The 18 countries of the Internatioi'
Energy Agency are meeting today in Paris
the establishment of a program for loi
term cooperation in the field of energy. T'
long-term program will tie together and
inforce our respective national efforts to
duce our excessive dependence on import
oil.

The adoption of this long-term progr;
will complete the basic design for consuM
country cooperation in energy which is a c«
tral pillar of U.S. international energy polil
Having completed this framework for
operation among the industrial democracil
we are now ready to begin a dialogue wi
the oil producers and the non-oil-producii
developing countries.

On February 11, the Energy Commissi
of the Conference on International Econo;
Cooperation will meet in Paris under the
chairmanship of Saudi Arabia and the Unit

Department of State Bulk

I

Itates. We approach this dialogue in a spirit
' constructive cooperation, aware of our
,vn vital interests but convinced that our
iterests and those of the oil producers can
:> harmonized.

ext Steps

The attainment of our objective of substi-
iting cooperation for North-South confron-
tion will depend importantly on the ability
the Administration and the Congress,
orking together, to translate our proposals
to concrete policies and action.
We will need authority from the Congress
I replenish the resources of the regional
]nding institutions and to subscribe new
ipital to the International Finance Corpora-
on.

In the commodity area, we will be seeking
le advice and consent of the Senate to
.S. membership in the International Tin
greement and in other international com-
odity agreements that we determine are
insistent with our interests. We will be com-
g to this committee for implementing leg-
iation where such legislation is required.
)ffee is an example.

In the trade area we are acting in full
■mpliance with the letter and spirit of the
rade Act of 1974, and our proposals will
ime to the Congress in accordance with the
rms of that legislation. We will be con-
ilting with the Congress and this committee
1 a continuing basis.

Clearly, the success of our efforts in
orth-South diplomacy depends on partner-
lip between the Administration and the
ongress. The role of this important commit-
e is critical.

The success of our efforts in North-South
plomacy depends also on more systematic
forts by us to insure that each developing
tmntry understands that our bilateral rela-
ons with it include that country's behavior
)ward us in international meetings and, in
articular, its votes there on issues of highest
nportance to us. I have asked each of our
Imbassies overseas to make clear to its host
overnment that one of the factors by which

we will measure the value which that govern-
ment attaches to its relations with us will
be its statements and votes on that fairly
limited number of issues which we indicate
are of importance to us in international
forums. In view of the growing importance
to us of certain issues, of both economic and
political significance, now dealt with increas-
ingly in multilateral forums, it must be ex-
pected that the United States will be weigh-
ing this factor more heavily in making new
commitments within bilateral relation-
ships.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, we have major economic
interests abroad to promote, interests on
which many American jobs and American
prosperity depend.

Generally speaking, those interests are
best promoted by encouraging among coun-
tries the same freedom of economic exchange
we have within this country. Because we
have by far the greatest economy, only we
can take the lead in moving the international
economy in this direction. We must not fail
to exercise that responsibility.

But our leadership role must not and does
not prevent us from using our economic
power to make sure that American traders
and investors get a fair opportunity.

The developing countries are a special case.
If we want them to join the open economic
system of which the United States is the
center, we have to make it more accessible
to them. This is the key to the proposals I
made at the seventh special session: to use
new trading, investment, and commodity
measures rather than large-scale new aid to
accelerate their development.

These policies can bring important bene-
fits to us : new trading and investment oppor-
tunities for Americans and better protection
against inflation. To developing countries the
impact of these policies can be crucial. But
if it is right for us to adopt these policies, the
developing countries must realize that they
are not unconditional. They, too, must accept
obligations as members of the international

sbruary 23, 1976

241

system that grow as their economies grow.
By this approach I am hopeful that we
can create between developing and industrial
countries a new relationship of confidence
and equality in which expanding investment
and two-way trade will accelerate growth
in both the North and the South.

U.S. Commodities Policy Restated
by State and Treasury Departments

Joiyit State-Treasury Department Statement '

We have been asked for a restatement of
U.S. commodity policy. Our policy, as set
forth in Secretary Kissinger's statement at
the seventh special session of the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly, is based on the following
main interests:

1. We seek assured supplies at reasonable
prices. This requires not only supply com-
mitments from exporting countries but ade-
quate investment in new production capacity.

2. We are concerned about excessive price
fluctuations since, on the one hand, this can
impede adequate investment and, on the
other hand, can contribute to severe infla-
tionary pressures.

3. We recognize the importance of com-
modity earnings to producing countries and
especially to developing countries who are
significantly dependent on raw material ex-
ports.

For these reasons we have proposed a
number of measures in the commodity field:

1. We have proposed that the World Bank
Group, especially the International Finance
Corporation, take the lead in bringing to-
gether private and public capital as well as
technical, managerial, and financial exper-
tise to finance new minerals development.

2. We are seeking supply access commit-
ments in the multilateral trade negotiations.

3. Because no one formula will apply to all

'Issued on Jan. 16 (text from press release 17).

commodities, we propose to discuss new -
rangements for individual commodities on
case-by-case basis. ,

4. We have expressed our intention J
participate actively in negotiations for r
commodity agreements on tin, cocoa, cofi
and sugar.

— We will sign the new tin agreement, i
it will be submitted to the Senate for adv
and consent.

— ^We do not propose to sign the n
International Cocoa Agreement in its pi
ent form. We consider the agreement to
deficient in a number of respects and h;
suggested that certain of its provisions «■
renegotiated. We are awaiting the react n
of other countries.

— -We are reviewing the new Internatic il
Coff'ee Agreement, which contains subst •
tial improvements. An analysis of the i v
agreement and a recommendation for e
President is being prepared.

— Negotiations for a new Internatic il
Sugar Agreement will commence in Septi i-
ber of this year.

5. We proposed a substantial improvem t
in the International Monetary Fund's ci i-
pensatory finance facility. At the rec t
IMF meeting in Jamaica a substantial i-
provement was agreed upon to help stabi e
the earnings from commodity trade.

6. We are continuing to examine in the I F
an improvement of its arrangements foi i-
nancing buffer stocks.

As this enumeration of measures den i-
strates, there is no one single approach :o
commodity trade problems. We reject pr ;■
fixing arrangements that distort the mar t,
restrict production, and waste resour s.
But this should not be the central issue.

The main point is that we are prepare( o
consider measures that will improve e
functioning of markets and will direi y
meet the problems of raw material produc 's
and consumers. In this regard, we seek e
establishment of consumer-producer fori !S
for each key commodity to promote > i-
ciency, growth, and stability of particir
markets.

242

Department of State B

uIlM

Supports U.N. Resolution on Situation in Namibia

' Ununng are statements made in the U-N.
ritji Council by U.S. Representative
rl P. Moynihan on January 29 and 30,
'hrr ivith the text of a resolution adopted
1 1 Council on January 30.

CEMENTS BY AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN
HE SECURITY COUNCIL

oment of January 29

I press release 13 dated January 29

:'iie Security Council has before it four
!!■ questions as it ponders what construc-
V steps it may take regarding the future
:, 'Namibia. These four questions are as
inane and timely today as they were a
year ago — indeed, as they were almost
( cade ago when, as many of my distin-
i hed colleagues have remarked at this
oicil table, the General Assembly de-
asd that South Africa had forfeited its
i; date for Namibia. These four questions

Whether there is a real commitment by
oh Africa to a course of self-determina-
c for the people of Namibia and respect
)i their rights;

The timing of steps toward self-deter-
liition once that principle is accepted by
o;h Africa;

The question of whether all Namibians
f whatever color, political affiliation, or
) al origin would have their voices heard in
ermining the future of their nation;
n

The U.N. role in the process of self-
eirmination.

Over the past year there have been indi-
cations from the South African Government
that it is finally recognizing its international
obligations in Namibia and the need to im-
plement a process of self-determination in
that territory. Statements by the South
African Government suggest that South
Africa may finally be beginning to heed the
international outcry against its continuing
illegal occupation of Namibia. The distin-
guished U.N. Commissioner for Namibia
[Sean McBride] , who is present in this Coun-
cil chamber, has told us that he, too, senses
that diff"erences over Namibia have nar-
rowed, are narrowing, and can continue to
narrow.

For our part the U.S. delegation has every
expectation, given the temper and tone of the
debate we have had so far, and the con-
structive nature of the suggestions that have
been made, that we will emerge in agreement
with a resolution that will indeed constitute
a further narrowing such as the Commis-
sioner has envisaged. I would not like to let
this opportunity pass without expressing the
enormous respect with which the U.S. Gov-
ernment holds the work of Mr. McBride.

Yet, despite these encouraging signs, we
still have no clear answers from the South
African Government on the four major ques-
tions I have posed. South Africa has re-
mained silent or ambiguous in its response
to these questions. There has been no defin-
itive statement by South African authorities
on the timing of steps toward self-determi-
nation— and here I allude to the comment of
my distinguished colleague the Ambassador
of Pakistan as to the uncertainty of the
term "as soon as possible." Many Namibian
groups have been excluded from the steps

* uary 23, 1976

243

so far taken ; South Africa continues to deny
the United Nations a role in the transition.

This past September, South Africa con-
vened a constitutional conference in Wind-
hoek to decide on the future of the territory.
While representatives of ethnic groups took
an active part in this conference, significant
groups in Namibia were not allowed repre-
sentation. Political groups including SWAPO
[South West Africa People's Organization],
the Namibian National Convention, and
others having support of significant por-
tions of the Namibian population were not
permitted to participate. No U.N. observer
was able to monitor the proceedings of the
conference. For our part, the United States
finds that this conference as presently consti-
tuted cannot be regarded as a definitive ex-
ercise of self-determination. We have told
this to the South African Government in
clear and unmistakable terms.

On the other hand, the constitutional con-
ference at Windhoek was a start. The consti-
tutional history of my own country goes
back some two centuries, and I believe we
have learned from that history to pay re-
spectful attention to any beginning, what-
soever its patronage, howsoever uncertain.
Nor is the United Nations today comprised of
nations whose governments can boast such
an impeccable constitutional pedigree as to
warrant our collective disdain for whatever
has so far occurred in Namibia. There is no
democracy there; there is no democracy in
most places. Yet still, in Namibia, men and
women travel hopefully. This is no small
thing; indeed it is a great thing, and the
United States, for one, looks forward to
welcoming them to the company of free peo-
ple, and devoutly hopes to see their freedom
flourish.

We believe accordingly that it is now more
than ever incumbent on South Africa to an-
nounce a straightforward and unambiguous
plan by which Namibians will be allowed to
make a free choice of their political future.
The United States believes that a single
electoral process should be held throughout

Namibia, with the careful supervision o:
United Nations, to allow the Namibian
pie to decide on the future constitut
structure of their country. Recognizing
wide ethnic and political diversity of
mibia — a condition of that nation whi(
by no means singular, but a condition i
theless — such a decision could come
after a period in which all the peop
Namibia and all political and ethnic gi
were allowed to elaborate their views ai
campaign for their views.

Only through an exchange of views a
discussion of their political future wil
people of Namibia ever be able to ma
genuine choice over their future cons
tional status. Only through careful
supervision will the international commi
be assured that the self-determination
ess has been executed freely without u
pressure or interference by outside fc
The United States believes that this si
vision should be worked out as soon as pof
between the United Nations and the Go'
ment of South Africa and encourages
parties to meet and make the nece:
arrangements.

My government has made this pof
clear to the Government of South Afri
the highest levels. We have tried to im
on the South African Government
urgency of resolving the Namibian que
quickly and peacefully. Most recentl
October 23, my government, in coordin
with the Governments of the United ]
dom and France, outlined such an elec
process to the South African Foreign
ister. While continuing to press South A
in diplomatic channels, we also have
tinued to sustain our present policies to
South Africa. We continue to discourage
investment in Namibia. We continue to '
hold U.S. Government protection of Ai
can investments based on rights acq:
through the South African Governmen
ter 1966 — which we have done since the M
resolution of the General Assembly term ati
ing the South African trusteeship. Ii id'

244

Department of State Builil

itj

1, the U.S. Government continues to
bit the shipment of American arms and
iry equipment to South Africa. We con-
to enforce and observe this embargo
ecause we are required to do so by any
lational enactment — we are not. We
lue, however, to invite all nations who
iire to join us in this voluntary policy of
ng arms to the South African Govern-
which is our policy,
so wish to put to rest at this point the
•e suggestion which we have heard with
frequency in the halls— though happily
t this conference table— that the United
s is in some way interested in establish-
lilitary bases in Africa, even in that
of Africa where Namibia is located.
! are suggestions that invite incredulity
response, but as they continue to be
they arouse not a little suspicion that
is some quality of what psychoanalysts
rejection- which is to say that there
be people who, themselves desiring to
ish bases, assume that everyone else
as well. Well, the United States does

(Conclusion, Mr. President, let me say
the United States believes that this
:il has a serious and unique responsi-
for Namibia and a singular opportu-
ne believe that it is incumbent that the
HI reiterate the shared views of its
•ers on the future of Namibia. It is our
(to foster a peaceful resolution of the
bian problem and to encourage publicly
'ocess of self-determination in the area,
at territory, in that nation. While it is
1 discouraging that South Africa has
loved quickly to bring the people of
bia to self-determination with U.N.
vision, we must not let up pressing
Africa to make just that decision. Let
ft abandon our efforts to make a peace-
llution to the Namibian problem and let
•ive to impress upon the South African
•nment the urgency and the justice of
E the Namibian people decide their own

Statement of January 30

USUN press release 14 dated January 30

Mr. President [Salim A. Salim, of Tan-
zania] : In response to your appeal and to
the superb example of leadership and con-
structive involvement which you have shown
throughout this debate, my delegation lim-
ited our statement yesterday to a discussion
of developments in Namibia and South Afri-
can policies there.

I want to make it clear that it is in the
context of Namibia, and in that context
alone, that the United States has decided to
vote affirmatively on the resolution which the
Council has just adopted. In precisely the
spirit of the statement just made by my dis-
tinguished colleague the Representative of
the United Kingdom, let me say that had
we been discussing Angola, as some of our
distinguished colleagues have sought to do
in spite of your discouragement, it would
have been incumbent upon this Council to
examine all foreign intervention, including
the non-African forces which are currently
fighting there.

The resolution we have adopted reflects the
view long held by my government regai'ding
South African presence in Namibia and the
view that the Namibian people, under
U.N. supervision, must promptly be al-
lowed to exercise freely their right to self-
determination.

The United States believes, Mr. President,
that the correct intei-pretation of operative
paragraphs 7, 8, and 9 concerning the means
of U.N. supervision and control of the free
elections in Namibia must be based on a
reading of these three paragraphs together,
as would be proper. It is clear that the Coun-
cil is leaving open the exact form of U.N.
supervision of these elections, leaving it to
be worked out subsequently by the United
Nations. We believe in this way the Council
wisely avoids prejudging the exact nature
of the U.N. role until this matter can be
specifically considered.

tiry 23, 1976

245

TEXT OF RESOLUTION '

The Security Council,

Having heard the statement by the President of
the United Nations Council for Namibia,

Having considered the statement by Mr. Moses M.
Garoeb, Administrative Secretary of the South West
Africa People's Organization (SWAPO).

Recalling General Assembly resolution 2145
(XXI) of 27 October 1966, which terminated South
Africa's mandate over the Territory of Namibia, and
resolution 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967, which estab-
lished a United Nations Council for Namibia, as well
as all other subsequent resolutions on Namibia, in
particular, resolution 3295 (XXIX) of 13 December
1974 and resolution 3399 (XXX) of 26 November
1975,

Recalling Security Council resolutions 245 (1968)
of 25 January and 246 (1968) of 14 March 1968, 264
(1969) of 20 March and 269 (1969) of 12 August
1969, 276 (1970) of 30 January, 282 (1970) of 23
July, 283 (1970) and 284 (1970) of 29 July 1970, 300
(1971) of 12 October and 301 (1971) of 20 October
1971, 310 (1972) of 4 February 1972 and 366 (1974)
of 17 December 1974,

Recalling the advisory opinion of the International
Court of Justice of 21 June 1971 that South Africa
is under obligation to withdraw its presence from the
Territory,

Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United
Nations over Namibia,

Concerned at South Africa's continued illegal oc-
cupation of Namibia and its persistent refusal to
comply with resolutions and decisions of the General
Assembly and the Security Council, as well as with
the advisory opinion of the International Court of
Justice of 21 June 1971,

Gravely concerned at South Africa's brutal re-
pression of the Namibian people and its persistent
violation of their human rights, as well as its efforts
to destroy the national unity and territorial integrity
of Namibia, and its aggressive military build-up in
the area,

Strongly deploring the militarization of Namibia
by the illegal occupation regime of South Africa,

1. Condemns the continued illegal occupation of
the Territory of Namibia by South Africa;

2. Condemns the illegal and arbitrary application
by South Africa of racially discriminatory and repres-
sive laws and practices in Namibia;

3. Condemns the South African military build-up
in Namibia and any utilization of the Territory as a
base for attacks on neighbouring countries;

4. Demands that South Africa put an end forth-
with to its policy of bantustans and the so-called
homelands aimed at violating the national unity and
the territorial integrity of Namibia;

5. Further condemns South Africa's failure to

'U.N. doc. S/RES/385
mously on Jan. 30.

(1976); adopted unani-

comply with the terms of Security Council res'
366 (1974) of 17 December 1974;

6. Further condemyis all attempts by South
calculated to evade the clear demand of the
Nations for the holding of free elections under
Nations supervision and control in Namibia;

7. Declares that in order that the people of
bia be enabled to freely determine their own
it is imperative that free elections under the
vision and control of the United Nations be h'
the whole of Namibia as one political entity;

8. Further declares that in determining th<
time-table and modalities for the elections in ;
ance with paragraph 7 above, there shall be ad
time to be decided upon by the Security Cour
the purposes of enabling the United Nations to
lish the necessary machinery within Namibia
pervise and control such elections, as well as to
the people of Namibia to organize politically )
purpose of such elections;

9. Demands that South Africa urgently n
solemn declaration accepting the foregoing pro
for the holding of free elections in Namibia
United Nations supervision and control, undei
to comply with the resolutions and decisions
United Nations and with the advisory opinion
International Court of Justice of 21 June 1
regard to Namibia, and recognizing the ter
integrity and unity of Namibia as a nation;

10. Reiterates its demand that South Afric
the necessary steps to effect the withdrawal,
cordance with resolutions 264 (1969), 269 (196
366 (1974), of its illegal administration mainta
Namibia and to transfer power to the pec
Namibia with the assistance of the United N

11. Demands again that South Africa, pend
transfer of powers provided for in the pri
paragraph :

(a) Comply fully in spirit and in practice w
provisions of the Universal Declaration of
Rights;

(b) Release all Namibian political prisons
eluding all those imprisoned or detained in coi
vidth offences under so-called internal securit;
whether such Namibians have been charged c
or are held without charge and whether held in
bia or South Africa;

(c) Abolish the application in Namibia of
cially discriminatory and politically repressiv
and practices, particularly bantustans and horn

(d) Accord unconditionally to all Namibiai
rently in exile for political reasons full facilit
return to their country without risk of arrest,
tion, intimidation or imprisonment;

12. Decides to remain seized of the matter
meet on or before 31 August 1976 for the purj
reviewing South Africa's compliance with the
of this resolution and, in the event of non-com
by South Africa, for the purpose of consi
the appropriate measures to be taken und
Charter.

I

246

Department of State Blel^

rted Nations Documents:
l^elected Bibliography

eographed or processed documents (such as
', listed below) may be consulted at depository
ries in the United States. U.N. printed publica-
may be purchased from the Sales Section of
United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
7.

rity Council

■r dated October 30, 1975, from the Permanent
presentative of the United States conveying a
)ort of the United Nations Command in Korea
icerning the maintenance of the armistice agree-
nt of 1953 during the period September 1974-
gust 1975. S/11861. October 31, 1975. 7 pp.
Tts by the Secretary General in pursuance of
;urity Council Resolution 377 (1975) relating to
situation concerning Western Sahara. S/11863;
tober 31, 1975; 5 pp. S/11876; November 12,
rS; 2 pp. S/11880; November 19, 1975; 12 pp.
ial report of the Security Council committee
ablished in pursuance of Resolution 253 (1968)
icerning the question of Southern Rhodesia on
! expansion of sanctions against Southern Rho-
iia. S/11913. December 15, 1975. 15 pp.

eral Assembly

id session of the Diplomatic Conference on Re-

irmation and Development of International Hu-

iiiitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts.

port of the Secretary General. A/10195. Sep-

«ber 5, 1975. 137 pp.

e tution of Works of Art to Countries Victims of

1 propriation. Report of the Secretary General

( itaining replies received from member states.

, 10224. September 23, 1975. 10 pp.

:« mres and activities undertaken in connection

' th the International Women's Year. Report of

1 ' Secretary General containing information on

; ivities of states, organizations of the U.N. sys-

II, intergovernmental organizations, and non-

vernmental organizations. A/10263. October 2,

75. Ill pp.

ti erm review of the Disarmament Decade. Report

I the Secretary General containing replies re-

A ved from governments. A/10294. October 16,

: 75. 42 pp.

ear dated October 13, 1975, from the Permanent
. :presentative of Dahomey transmitting resolu-
■ns adopted at the 25th ordinary session of the
'uncil of Ministers of the Organization of African
lity, July 18-25, 1975, and the 12th ordinary
Msion of the Assembly of Heads of State and
Dvemment, July 28-August 1, 1975. A/10297.
Ktober 16, 1975. 35 pp.

iiBria governing multilateral financing of housing
d human settlements. Report of the Secretary
:neral. A/10225. October 17, 1975. 59 pp.

Report of the Special Committee To Investigate
Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of
the Population of the Occupied Territories.
A/10272. October 27, 1975. 36 pp.

United Nations program of assistance in the teach-
ing, study, dissemination, and wider appreciation
of international law. Report of the Secretary Gen-
eral. A/103S2. November 14, 1975. 24 pp.

Consideration of the economic and social situation in
the Sudano-Sahelian region stricken by drought
and measures to be taken for the benefit of that
region. A/10346. November 14, 1975. 9 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Bills of Lading

Protocol to amend the international convention for
the unification of certain rules of law relating to
bills of lading signed at Brussels August 25, 1924
(51 Stat. 233). Done at Brussels February 23, 1968.'
Signature: Denmark, November 20, 1975.
Ratifications deposited: Denmark, November 20,
1975;= Switzerland, December 11, 1975.

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, pro-
duction and stockpiling of bacteriological (biologi-
cal) and toxin weapons and on their destruction.
Done at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10,
1972. Entered into force March 26, 1975. TIAS 8062.
Ratification deposited: Sweden, February 5, 1976.

Maritime Matters

Amendment of article VII of the convention on facili-
tation of international maritime traffic, 1965 (TIAS
6251). Adopted at London November 19, 1973.'
Acceptance deposited: Switzerland, December 30,
1975.

Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by
dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes.
Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Wash-
ington December 29, 1972. Entered into force
August 30, 1975. TIAS 8165.
Ratification deposited: Hungary, February 5,

1976.
Accessions deposited: Cuba, December 1, 1975;

Zaire, September 16, 1975.

' Not in force.

' Applicable to Faroe Islands.

Uruary 23, 1976

247

Oil Pollution

International convention on civil liability for oil pollu-
tion damage. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969.
Entered into force June 19, 1975.''
Ratification deposited: Panama, January 7, 1976.

Amendments to the international convention for the
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London
October 21, 1969."

Acceptances deposited: Netherlands, December 29,
1975; ' Panama, January 7, 1976.

Property — Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial
property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at
Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12
entered into force May 19, 1970; for the United
States August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30
entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United
States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923.
Notification from World Intellectual Property
Organization that ratification deposited : Tunisia
(with a reservation), January 12, 1976.

Publications

Convention concerning the international exchange of
publications. Done at Paris December 3, 1958.
Entered into force November 23, 1961; for the
United States June 9, 1968. TIAS 6438.
Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, November 21,
1975."

Safety at Sea

Convention on the international regulations for pre-
venting collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London
October 20, 1972."

Ratifications deposited: Belgium, December 22,
1975; Switzerland, December 30, 1975.

Amendments to chapters II, III, IV, and V of the
international convention for the safety of life at
sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at London Novem-
ber 20, 1973.'

Amendment to chapter VI of the international con-
vention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS
5780). Adopted at London November 20, 1973.'
Acceptayices deposited: United States, February 3,
1976.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement relating to the International Telecom-
munications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), with
annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 1971.
Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.
Accession deposited: Qatar, February 2, 1976.

Operating agreement relating to the International
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intel-
sat), with annex. Done at Washington August 20,

1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. T

7532.

Signature: Qatar, February 2, 1976.

BILATERAL

Iran

Agreement extending the agreement of Octobe
1947, as amended and extended (TIAS 1666, 1
2068, 2947, 3112, 3520, 6594. 6886. 7070. 7207, 7
7765), relating to a military mission. Effectec
exchange of notes at Tehran November 13. 1
and January 18. 1976. Entered into force J
ary 18, 1976. effective March 21, 1976.

Romania

Convention with respect to taxes on income. Si)
at Washington December 4, 1973.
Ratifications exchanged: January 26, 1976.
Enters into force: February 26, 1976.

' Not in force.

' Not in force for the United States.
* Extended to the Netherlands Antilles.
"Anplicable to Surinam and the Netherlands
Antilles.

Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: February 2-8

Press releases may be obtained from tl
Office of Press Relations, Department of Stat
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Mo. Date Subject

t43 2/2 lEA Governing Board adopts loni

term energy policy.
44 2/3 Kissinger: Commonwealth Club ■

San Francisco and the World A

fairs Council of Northern Califo

nia, San Francisco.
44A 2/3 Kissinger: questionsi and answe

following address.
145 2/2 Kissinger: panel discussion with Bli

Ribbon 400, Los Angeles.
46 2/3 Kissinger: news conference. S:

Francisco.
t47 2/4 Kissinger: University of Wyomin

Laramie, Wyo.
t48 2/4 Kissinger: questions and answe

following address.
*49 2/4 U.S.-Thailand textile agreement.
^SO 2/5 Thomas O. Enders sworn in as Ar

bassador to Canada (biograph

data).
fSl 2/5 Kissinger: Senate Committee <

Government Operations.
*52 2/6 James W. Hargrove sworn in

Ambassador to Australia (hi

graphic data).
t53 2/6 Kissinger: Joint Committee i

Atomic Energy.
*54 2/6 Deane R. Hinton sworn in as U.

Representative to European Cor

munities (biographic data).
*55 2/6 Shipping Coordinating Committe

Subcommittee on Safety of Life :

Sea, working group on radiocon

munication. Mar. 18.

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

248

Department of State Bui'

^February 2S, 1976 Vol. LXXIV, No. 1913

irmanent Challenge of Peace: U.S. Policy
ard the Soviet Union (Kissinger) . . . 201
ons and Answers Following the Secre-
's Address at San Francisco .... 212
ary Kissinger's News Conference at San
icisco February 3 216

on. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer-
at San Francisco February 3 . . . . 216

. U.S. and Canada Initial Draft Text of
isit Pipeline Agreement (joint statement) 220

odities

lommodities Policy Restated by State and
isury Departments (joint statement) . 242
Responsibilities in a Changing World
lomy (Kissinger) 234

ess

essional Documents Relating to Foreign

;y 233

Responsibilities in a Changing World
lomy (Kissinger) 234

ons and Answers Following the Secre-

's Address at San Francisco 212

ary Kissinger's News Conference at San
icisco February 3 216

tping Countries. U.S. Responsibilities in
langing World Economy (Kissinger) . . 234

nament. The Permanent Challenge of
:e: U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union
isinger) 201

mic Affairs

nd Canada Initial Draft Text of Transit
line Agreement (joint statement) . . . 220
Responsibilities in a Changing World
lomy (Kissinger) 234

Prime Minister Rabin of Israel Visits
United States (Ford, Rabin, Kissinger) 221

; East

ons and Answers Following the Secre-

's Address at San Francisco 212

ary Kissinger's News Conference at San

ncisco February 3 216

iinai Support Mission Established (Exec-

e order) 232

Namibia. U.S. Supports U.N. Resolution on
Situation in Namibia (Moynihan, text of
resolution) 243

Panama. Questions and Answers Following the

Secretary's Address at San Francisco . . . 212

Peru. Secretary Kissinger's News Conference
at San Francisco February 3 216

Presidential Documents

Prime Minister Rabin of Israel Visits the
United States 221

U.S. Sinai Support Mission Established (Exec-
utive order) 232

South Africa. U.S. Supports U.N. Resolution
on Situation in Namibia (Moynihan, text
of resolution) 243

Trade

U.S. Commodities Policy Restated by State and
Treasury Departments (joint statement) . . 242

U.S. Responsibilities in a Changing World
Economy (Kissinger) 234

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 247

U.S.S.R.

The Permanent Challenge of Peace: U.S. Policy

Toward the Soviet Union (Kissinger) . . . 201

Questions and Answers Following the Secre-
tary's Address at San Francisco 212

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at San
Francisco February 3 216

U.S. Responsibilities in a Changing World
Economy (Kissinger) 234

United Nations

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at San

Francisco February 3 216

United Nations Documents 247

U.S. Supports U.N. Resolution on Situation in
Namibia (Moynihan, text of resolution) . . 243

Name Index

Ford, President 221, 232

Kissinger, Secretary . . . 201, 212, 216, 221, 234

Moynihan, Daniel P 243

Rabin, Yitzhak 221

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u.s. government printing office

washington, dc. 20402

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»

%

/?/Y

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXIV • No. 1914 • March 1, 1976

AMERICA'S DESTINY: THE GLOBAL CONTEXT
Address by Secretary Kissinger 2A9

CONGRESS AND THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Statement by Secretary Kissinger 27U

THE AFRICAN DIMENSION OF THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT
Statement by Assistant Secretary Schaufele 278

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover ^■Jpe^inTpnrip^^ ,,< i )!-.cumencs

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLET I

i

Vol. LXXIV, No. 1914
March 1, 1976

For sale by the Superintendent of Doeumenta

U.S. Government Printing Office

WashinBton. D.C. 20402

PRICE:

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domestic $42.50. foreign $53.16

Single copy 85 cents

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approved by the Director of the Office of

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Note: Contents of this publication are not

copyrighted and items contained herein may be

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF

STATE BULLETIN as the source will be

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

The Department of State BVLLE1 1,
a weekly publication issued by t
Office of Media Services, Bureau i
Public Affairs, provides the public i
interested agencies of the governn li
with information on development n
the field of U.S. foreign relations i
on the work of the Department i
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes seU i
press releases on foreign policy, i$. 4
by the White House and the Dei '•
ment, and statements, addre i,
and news conferences of the Presi i(
and the Secretary of State and i ir
officers of the Department, as we »
special articles on various phase tl
international affairs and the func v
of the Department. Informatio
included concerning treaties and I
national agreements to which
United States is or may beeor
party and on treaties of general i
national interest.
Publications of the Departmen
State, United Nations documents,
legislative material in the fiel
international relations are also li <i

il

i

America's Destiny: The Global Context

Address by Secretary Kissinger

It is good to be here in the West. The
leople of this land remind me once again
hat America is not the cynical, confused,
.nd tired nation so many in Washington
rould have us believe it is. Instead, as I have
0 often seen in my trips, the American peo-
ple continue to have pride in their country.
"hey know that America has done more for
he world, and for peace, over the past 30
ears than any nation in history. They know
.e have given more of our resources, fed
lore of the starving, taken in more immi-
rants, and educated more people from other
uids than any other nation before us.
The American people are tired of hearing
ow evil we are, how terrible are our mis-
akes, and how misguided our purposes,
'hey know better. And they want better.
It is true that we have passed through a
ecade and more of tragedy— we have been
ntness to assassination; we have suffered
hrough a tragic war that shattered our
omestic unity; and we have endured our
reatest constitutional crisis since the Civil
Var.

But we have come through these difficult
imes with our institutions as strong as ever.
Ve remain the world's greatest democracy;
ve continue to be the bastion to which other
lations look for their protection; and we
■emain the symbol of hope to the millions
iround the world who live in tyranny and
)overty but yearn for freedom and
)rosperity.
America, from its birth, has meant much

' Made at the University of Wyoming, Laramie,
*Vyo.. on Feb. 4 (text from press release 47).

to the world. The Founding Fathers were
animated by a sense of obligation, and of
mission, to other peoples and to posterity.
Our Revolution, our independence, and our
democracy set examples which excited and
encouraged imitation around the globe.
America represented an inspiration and the
most important political experiment of
modern history — the spectacle of successful
self-government, economic opportunity, so-
cial equality, civil and i-eligious liberty, and
the tremendous capacities of a free people
to shape their own destiny.

Later in our history these values affected
the world in a new way — as a powerful mag-
net drawing great tides of immigration. It
was a movement of ideas as well as people,
which not only shaped this nation but vastly
altered the assumptions and social struc-
tures of the Old World.

In recent decades, America's impact on the
world has been more immediate. For much
of this century, global peace and prosperity
have depended upon our contribution. When
World War II ended, we took the lead in
helping a shattered globe rebuild from devas-
tation. We shaped the commercial and finan-
cial system that spread prosperity and
economic opportunity to far corners of the
world. We built peacetime alliances to main-
tain global stability and defend the values
we share with the great industrial democra-
cies. We resisted aggression. We mediated
conflicts. We helped ease the process of de-
colonization. And we led the fight against
disease, hunger, ignorance, and the forces of
oppression and terror that have scarred this
century.

V^orch 1, 1976

249

No other nation has made such a contribu-
tion. No other nation can make such a con-
tribution now. The best hope for a planet
still beset by war, poverty, and tyranny is a
strong, committed, vigilant America.

We must never forget that in serving
peace and progress we both serve ourselves
and live up to our best traditions.

We declared our independence in "decent
respect to the opinions of mankind." Our
Founding Fathers were sophisticated states-
men who understood the European balance
of power and knew how our country could
profit from it. Our independence was not won
by American arms alone. The shrewd diplo-
macy of Franklin and Jefferson led to the
involvement of Britain's enemies — France,
Spain, and Russia — and eventually engi-
neered the only defeat Britain suffered in
the modern era. We then cut loose from our
temporary allies when John Jay won the
British Crown's recognition and liquidated
the residual problems of our war with
England.

For more than three decades after we
gained our independence, we lived in an age
of international turmoil that saw us go to
the brink of war with France and suffer the
capture of our capital by Britain. Again,
alert to new opportunities provided by
changes on the international scene, we
moved astutely to take advantage of them.
The effective elimination of France and
Spain from the hemisphere, the expansion
of Russia in the Pacific Northwest, and the
growing disaffection of Great Britain from
the European powers led us in 1823 to con-
cert the Monroe Doctrine with Great Britain.

Thereafter, for the hundred years be-
tween Waterloo and 1914, America benefited
from the existence of a world balance of
power, presided over by Britain, which
maintained global stability and prevented
international war. In the words of Prime
Minister Canning, the doctrine "called the
New World into existence to redress the
balance of the Old."

Thus, the balance of power in Europe and
our skill in using it protected the young
United States; it enabled us, in reliance
upon the British Navy, to turn our back on

the Atlantic and open the continent befc
us.

Theodore Roosevelt noted that long i
fore Jefferson negotiated an end to I
French claim to Louisiana, foreign clai?
had been effectively undermined by t
great western movement of Americans a
the free communities they quickly foundi
But the consolidation of their pioneeri
achievement was made possible by the
negotiations and by the subsequent series
remarkable diplomatic successes. The £
nexation of Florida, the Oregon bounda
settlement with Great Britain, the Trea
of Guadelupe Hidalgo, the Gadsden Purcha
Secretary of State Seward's purchase
Alaska from Russia — all were triumphs
diplomacy during decades when most citize
believed America did not have, or need,
foreign policy.

Indeed, our very achievements in deali
with the world brought Americans under t
sway of a shared mythology. As a socie
made up of men and women who had fled t
persecutions and power politics of the (
World, Americans — whether Mayflower i
scendants or refugees from the failed revo
tions of 1848 — came to assume that we w(
beyond the reach of the imperatives of t
ditional foreign policy.

While our security continued to be assui
by our place in the international structi
of the time, we became bemused by the po]
lar belief that President Monroe's obligat:
to defend the Western Hemisphere and,
deed, almost any obligation we might cho(
to assume, depended on unilateral Americ
decisions to be entered into or ended entir
at our discretion. Shielded by two oceans a '
enriched by a bountiful nature, we p
claimed our special situation as universa
valid even while other nations with a n;
rower margin of sui-vival knew that th '
range of choice was far more limited.

The preoccupation of other nations w:
security only reinforced our sense of uniqi
ness. We came increasingly to regard dip
macy with suspicion. Arms and allian(i
were seen as immoral and reactionary. >
gotiations were considered less a means
reconciling our ideals with our interests th i .

250

Department of State Bulle

ri

Wevice to entangle us in the endless quar-
BS of a morally questionable world. Our
ijitive inclination for straightforwardness
:o jbught increasing impatience with diplo-
ti»cy, whose essential attribute is ambiguity
! m compromise.

is;i{n this atmosphere even the purchase of

luajaska — which excluded Russia from our

eetfitinent — was regarded in its day as a

i'ijvering folly explainable only in terms of

■if:|finerican gullibility in the face of Old World

emlomatic guile. Congress was prevailed

Btuon only with the greatest difficulty to pro-

rMe the $7 million to complete the deal.

i^e mythology of American ineptitude in its

i-dblomatic pursuits has carried into the 20th

"itury. Will Rogers was always assured of

.laugh when he cracked, "America never

1( t a war and never won a conference."

V th the humility for which I am famous, I

0 course reject this attitude.

Forgetful of the wisdom and skilled
sitecraft by which the Founding Fathers
■vn our independence and secured our safety,
ai disdainful of the techniques by which
a nations — even the United States — must
p^serve their interests, America entered the
r2:h century — the most complex and turbu-
li t time in history — largely unprepared for
t! part we would be called upon to play.

As Lord Bryce said in his "American
( mmonwealth," America had been sailing
"i a summer sea," but a cloud bank was
' 1 the horizon and now no longer distant, a
tie of mists and shadows, wherein dangers
r ly be concealed whose form and magnitude
S3 can scarcely conjecture."

( >. Ascendancy: Maintaining Global Stability

[n the early years of this century, America
S3med to face a choice between continued
(tachment and active involvement in world
J airs. But this was more apparent than

1 il, for the Pax Britannica on which we had
Hied for so long was coming to an end. We
1 d become — almost without noticing it — the
^)rld's major economic power. Increasingly,
^! were the only democratic nation with
efficient power to maintain a precarious
■orld balance. But nothing in our experi-

ence had equipped us to recognize our new
responsibility. We continued to reject the
demands of the politics of security and ab-
horred alliances as contrary to American
pi'inciples. In the place of foreign policy we
fell back on our tradition of law, in repeated
and unsuccessful attempts to legislate solu-
tions to international conflicts. Many
thought that power and principle were
forever incompatible.

Our entry into World War I was produced
by real geopolitical interests, such as freedom
of the sea and the threat of the domination
of Europe by a hostile power; but we chose
to interpret our participation in legal and
idealistic terms — we fought the war "to end
war." The inevitable disillusion with an im-
perfect outcome led to a tide of isolationism.
We responded again with moral and legal
gestures — humanitarian relief, new dis-
armament schemes, the Kellogg-Briand Pact
to ban war — at a time when the very nature
of the international order was being brought
into question by the convulsions of the new
century. We sought security in aloofness,
just as we looked for scapegoats — rooting
out the so-called "munitions makers" — to
explain why we had ever engaged in such an
undertaking as the First World War. The
Great Depression drew our energies further
inward to deal with the problems of our own
society, even while economic upheaval simul-
taneously generated overwhelming perils
abroad.

Our refusal to admit that foreign policy
should be related to interests led us, in the
years between the wars, to treat allies as
rivals, whose armaments had to be limited
because they contributed to international
tensions. On the brink of World War II, iso-
lationism had been transformed from a com-
fortable assumption to a deeply felt convic-
tion. Just as the world was about to impinge
upon us as never before, we had virtually
abandoned the basic precautions needed to
preserve our national security. Only with
the greatest difficulty could President Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt begin to assert international
leadership openly and take steps against the
mounting global threat by preparing Amer-
ica for war.

larch 1, 1976

251

World War II was well undei-way before
we were shocked out of isolation by external
attack. Total victory, and the refusal to
consider the security of the postwar world
in terms of any notion of equilibrium, ill
prepared us for the war's aftermath — when
the destruction of Europe's traditional power
centers suddenly drew Soviet power into the
heart of the European Continent.

Yet in the first postwar years America
found within itself extraordinary capacities
of statesmanship and creativity. Leaders of
both parties and many backgrounds — Tru-
man and Eisenhower, Vandenberg and
Marshall, Acheson and Dulles — built a na-
tional consensus for responsible American
world leadership, for a foreign policy based
on both principle and pragmatism.

Albert Einstein said at the outset of the
nuclear age that "everything has changed,
except our mode of thinking." To cope with
a world whose basic conditions were so
I'adically altered was a task comparable in
magnitude to that which faced the Founding
Fathers. When Dean Acheson said he was
"present at the creation," he referred not
only to the creation of our postwar policy
but to a new era in the history of mankind.

American foreign policy had come full
circle. With sophistication, the Founding
Fathers had manipulated the balance of
power to gain our independence and then
drew on the international system to assure
our survival. A century and a quarter of
almost total security had tempted us into
isolationism. And now, after two World Wars
in this century, we have learned that the
responsibilities — and the burdens — of world
leadership are inescapable.

Americans can be enormously proud of
what their country has accomplished in the
postwar decades to build a more stable, se-
cure, and prosperous world. The recovery
of Western Europe and Japan, the creation
and revitalization of peacetime alliances, the
shaping of the global trade and monetary
system, the economic advance of newer and
poorer nations, the measui-es to control the
nuclear arms race — these comprise an en-
during achievement of American statesman-
ship.

America has been thrust into the rol
global leadership with a dual responsibil
we must maintain our security and gli
peace by the traditional methods of bah
of power and diplomacy. But we know
nuclear war could destroy civilization,
therefore we must go beyond traditii
foreign policy to shape a more coopera
world reflecting the imperatives of in
dependence and justice.

The Traditional Agenda of War and Peace ^

Our well-being begins with strengthit
home. To keep America strong and sec t,
we will maintain the military power net id
to meet any challenge. But security caijt
be achieved in isolation. Our close ties Ai
the industrial democracies of Western i-
rope, Canada, and Japan have been ^6
cornerstone of world stability and peace ir
a generation. We share a common conp-
tion of human dignity, a common interes i
peace and prosperity, and a common cor t-
tion of linked destiny. Today we and v
allies look beyond military issues to j it
endeavors across a broad range of hu ,ii
activity : we have coordinated our diplon ;y
to ease global tensions, our policies for o-
nomic growth, and our eff'orts in new fi Is
such as energy. ||

A secure and stable world requires as f
that we seek a reconciliation of intei Is
with potential adversaries. We shall n ii'
lose sight of the fact that in an age thi t-
ened by thermonuclear extinction, the se. ;ti
for peace is a moral imperative ; withoi it
nothing else we do will be of enduring v; e.

Peace, to be stable and durable, must i :e
on a more reliable basis the relations e-
tween nations that possess the powei to
destroy our planet. The suspicion and riv 7
of two generations will not soon be s\?t
away, and we have no illusions about le
continuing moral and ideological com it
But we will spare no effort to seek reli 1«
reciprocal measures for containing the sa-
tegic arms race; we will continue to pu «
cooperative arrangements across a ^ is
range of technical, cultural, and commeial
fields to deepen the mutual stake in peac

252

Department of State Bui in

rogress toward relaxation of tensions,
our overall attitude toward those who
Id oppose us, have always depended upon
rained and responsible conduct on their
— on issues where America's interests
affected directly, as in Europe, as well
n peripheral conflicts, such as Angola,
no nation misconstrue America's com-
nent to an easing of tensions as a license
ish in troubled waters. Let no country
ive that Americans will long remain in-
;rent to the dispatch of expeditionary
es and vast amounts of materiel to im-
; minority governments — especially when
; expeditionary force comes from a nation
he Western Hemisphere. Americans may
e'low to rouse, but they will do their duty
niacably once a threat is clear.

the world is to remain at peace and
dince in progress, an active American role
r^'he world is essential. The Middle East is
ejiaps the most critical example. We must
involved there because of our historical
n moral commitment to Israel, because of
1 important interests and friendships in
ti Arab world, because continued instabil-
■iln the Middle East strains our relations
allies and risks severe global economic
ii)cation, and because continuing crisis
iss direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation.

le broad implications and imminent dan-
•e of regional conflicts such as those in
u ola and the Middle East have compelled
so play an active part. But it would be
n ng to conclude from this that the United
t es seeks to operate as the world's police-
1; . There are innumerable local conflicts
r ind the globe in which we neither have

0 seek any role. We do not seek to police
h world — but neither will we accept it if
h Soviet Union attempts to do so.

he Soviet and Cuban pattern of conduct
n ifrica, if continued in other areas, could
rivel global security. The tensions of the

1 die East, if not overcome, could threaten
lial peace. With prudence and wisdom, we
a prevent dangers to our wider interests
;\ engaging ourselves now at far less cost
h 1 we will inevitably have to pay later if
'"(abdicate responsibility. We cannot escape
h fundamental reality that it is the United

States, alone among the free nations of the
world, that is capable of — and therefore re-
sponsible for — maintaining the global bal-
ance against those who would seek hegemony
and shaping a new world of hope and prog-
ress.

The New Agenda

True progress requires more than secu-
rity. We must seek to break past patterns of
confrontation and response. It is no longer
possible for America or any other nation to
achieve its purposes by physical power
alone; in today's world, influence derives not
only from military strength but also from
economic, social, and political factors, from
the ability to inspire other nations with the
conviction that they have a stake in a shared
future.

On a shrinking planet of diff"used power
and linked destinies, we are called upon to
demonstrate vision and patience. Our genera-
tion has the opportunity to shape a new
international order. If we succeed, the pros-
pects for America and the world are bright.
If we fail, the world will be shaped by others
who do not share our principles; our period
will witness mounting conflict and suffer-
ing.

We can approach these new challenges
with confidence. Our technological advance,
our managerial genius, our achievements in
science and medicine, the productivity of our
farms and industries, our physical resources,
our commitment to the rule of law, insure
for us a role of leadership. And we have been
demonstrating the resiliency of our economy
by emerging from a global recession faster
and more steadily than any other nation.

Fundamental to our well-being is inter-
national economic cooperation. In the past
few years, Americans have seen clearly just
how much international economic relations
determine the progress of all nations, includ-
ing our own. The oil embargo of 1973 and
the subsequent price increases with their
devastating global consequences have re-
minded us to what extent far-off events
affect our prosperity and how important
international economic cooperation is for our

*'ch 1, 1976

253

own well-being and for the prosperity of the
rest of the world.

The United States has taken far-reaching
steps to lay the foundations for international
economic cooperation:

— We have worked closely with the other
great industrial democracies on trade,
energy, and monetary refonn.

— We have organized a comprehensive
international program to expand food pro-
duction in developing countries and to chan-
nel resources, including the new wealth of
the oil producers, into improving the fi-
nancing, production, storage, and distribu-
tion of food.

— We have developed and implemented a
strategy to end our domestic and interna-
tional energy vulnerability. We have joined
with the other industrial consuming coun-
tries in solidarity programs to protect us
against further oil embargoes and against
destabilizing movements of assets held by
oil-producing countries. Only last week the
International Energy Agency, a group of
industrial consuming countries brought to-
gether at our initiative, adopted a sweeping
program of cooperative action. We consider
this one of the most significant cooperative
efforts of the past decade. The industrial
democracies will now begin to coordinate
their research and development effort to de-
velop alternative supplies of energy, both
nuclear power and the more exotic sources
such as synthetic and solar energy.

— And the United States has presented to
the U.N. General Assembly special session a
comprehensive and practical program for a
multilateral effort to promote economic de-
velopment.

Thus we have not only tackled the tradi-
tional issues of peace and war but made a
good beginning in helping to fashion more
cooperative relationships in new dimensions
of world concern.

The structure of our foreign policy is
sound and ready to encounter the future.

But America cannot hope to shape the
future of the world unless we are a confident
and united people.

America's Imperative: Domestic Unity

For more than three decades America
despite setbacks and mistakes, condu'
a remarkably effective foreign policy,
have done so because we recognized, i
when we disagreed, that what we did be>
our borders was done in the name of «
nation as a whole. Partisan interests \?
channeled into positive accomplishments. I\
acted as a confident people. We did not d(o
ourselves; we did not consume ourselveii
self-hatred.

That was the ultimate underpinning j
the role of world leadership that was thi
upon us; it was the true measure of ji
greatness. It is a strength we must not |i

History has made America the reposi (]
and guardian of the best values of manl- d-
for no other free nation is strong enoii/
replace us. Without our commitment
can be no progress. We must have the sts l^
ness to oppose military pressures and lel
vision to work for a more peaceful inte a-
tional order. Moderation has meaning k
when practiced by the strong, and stre w
has purpose only when tempered by :
ciliation.

These twin strands of firmness and i:
ciliation reflect the permanent interest •:
our nation. Yet our ability to pursue e ^
course has been, in recent months, inc .;
ingly threatened. A strong, coherent, ;
effective international role is jeopardize i'
acrimonious controversy which thv ♦
serious discussion of the great issue
by the growing tendency of too many ii i:
Congress not only to supervise but to 1 i>
late the day-to-day conduct of foreign p( y

The slogans of a past we thought we aii
transcended are suddenly reappearing. V-
now hear again that suffering is prolo t
by American involvement, that injusti
perpetuated by American commitments, :
defense spending is wasteful at best and '''■
duces conflict at worst, that Americai
telligence activities are immoral, that ;
necessary confidentiality of diplomacy
plot to deceive the public, that flexibili
cynical, and that tranquillity is someho
be brought about by an abstract puril

254

Department of State Bu li^

(jve for which history offers no example,
these attitudes shape our policies, we
deprive our diplomacy of its essential
; conciliatory policies and firm measures
will be undermined by growing doubt
t the steadiness of our national will. An
sphere of suspicion and a lack of even
most elementary confidentiality will
e impossible the management of the gov-

fnent and the conduct of negotiation. If
ational consensus does not exist, our

»l'y will be driven by narrow interest

•Jips and shoi't-term political considera-

an era when the danger of war has
reduced but the rivalry of communism
freedom continues, the gray area be-
n foreign policy and overt conflict con-
es to be important and, indeed, takes on
^asing significance. Yet leaks, sensa-
il investigations, and the demoralization
ir intelligence services — at a time when
adversaries are stepping up their own
ts — are systematically depriving our
rnment of the ability to respond.
1 effective foreign policy requires a
ig national government which can act
assurance and speak with confidence on
If of all Americans. But when the exec-
! is disavowed repeatedly and publicly,
r governments wonder who speaks for
rica and what an American commit-
i means. Our government is in danger
rogressively losing the ability to shape
ts, and a great nation that does not
e history eventually becomes its victim.
)0 much depends upon a strong and con-
t America to allow this state of affairs
3ntinue. When America abdicates from
ing the future, when its policy falls
to the passions of the moment and the
of pressure groups, it disheartens
ids, emboldens adversaries, and gives
e to the wavering and thus undermines
"national order.

e must restore our unity while the es-
ial structure of our foreign policy is
sound and before irreparable damage is
' to it. We retain the capacity, if we have
will, to prevent military expansion by

our adversaries. Our alliances with the in-
dustrialized nations have never been more
solid. A further agreement to limit the stra-
tegic arms race is within reach. We are well
launched on a durable and improving rela-
tionship with the world's most populous na-
tion. The elements for peace in the Middle
East exist. A dialogue with the developing
world has begun on a hopeful note. The
threat of war around the globe has been re-
duced. The principal danger we face is our
domestic divisions.

The American people have a right to de-
mand of their leaders in and out of govern-
ment an end to the destructive debate that
has in recent months come to mark our po-
litical process. They know, as the world
knows, that the United States is still a great
country. And they know how much damage
these continuing attacks on their country's
institutions have done and will do to under-
mine America's ability to keep the peace.

We have every obligation to draw the
right lessons from our past mistakes and to
see that they never happen again. But we
have an equally compelling duty to remem-
ber that a faltering of will on the part of a
country that has for decades been the prin-
cipal guarantor of peace and progress can
have disastrous consequences for the pros-
pects of a better and safer world.

America now finds itself in a world of
proliferating, often competitive, and some-
times threatening power. We must often
make choices that will not solve but only
manage problems; we must occasionally
make compromises that by definition will not
produce ideal results. We need confidence, in
ourselves to master a complicated period in
which the United States can no longer over-
whelm problems with resources — when it
needs purpose, firmness, coherence, flexibil-
ity, imagination, and above all, unity.

The formulation and conduct of our for-
eign policy must of course be the product of
consultation and accommodation between the
Congress and the President. Neither branch
can, alone, determine the course we will pur-
sue abroad. The Congress, entitled by the
letter and spirit of the Constitution and by

trf:h 1, 1976

255

the practices of 200 years, must be an equal
partner in the process.

But if that partnership is to flourish, each
branch must respect the role of the other,
and each must recognize the limitations —
constitutional and practical — on its author-
ity. The Congress can set broad guidelines
and decide basic policies. But the Congress
does not have the organization, the informa-
tion, or the responsibility for deciding the
tactical questions that arise daily in the con-
duct of our foreign relations or for execut-
ing a coherent, consistent, comprehensive
policy. The President has this responsibility
and must be permitted to exercise it on be-
half of the entire nation. For in the last
analysis, the United States, when it deals
with other nations, must speak with one
voice.

It is time we recognize that, increasingly,
our difficulties abroad are largely of our own
making. If America is to be safe, we must
cease dismantling and demoralizing our in-
telligence services. If America is to preserve
its values and maintain the global balance of
stability, we must have a strong defense.
And if America is to help build a world en-
vironment in which our citizens can thrive
and be free, we cannot deny ourselves the
essential tools of policy. Without these our
only option is to retreat, to become an iso-
lated fortress island in a hostile and turbu-
lent global sea, awaiting the ultimate con-
frontation with the only response we will
not have denied ourselves — massive retalia-
tion. Our branches of government, special
interests, and ordinary citizens must pursue
their legitimate concerns with an under-
standing that there are basic overriding
national interests which, if neglected, will
render pointless all else we do.

In our age, whose challenges are without
precedent, we need once again the wisdom
of our Founding Fathers. Our pragmatic
tradition must help us understand reality
and shape it, rather than be diverted by an
obsession with technical detail or method
without purpose. Our love of our country
must inspire us to persevere with dedication
and unity and not to consume our substance
in civil strife. Our idealism should remind

us that we remain the beacon of hope ;?
all those who love liberty and that this i.
poses a heavy responsibility upon us.

Our international role is not a burden t
protects the lives and well-being of ;,r
people. It has been a historical success, i
our first two centuries we have done grt
things as a united people. We can accc-
plish even moi'e in our third century. Am.
ica remains the strongest nation in e
world ; our government continues to be e
noblest experiment undertaken by man; ^e
still are an inspiration to all the woris
millions who are much less fortunate tin
we. Our past achievements should be t
prologue to the exciting future that crovs
in upon us. It is, in the final analysis, p
to us.

Letters of Credence

Barbados

The newly appointed Ambassador )f
Barbados, Maurice A. King, presented is
credentials to President Ford on February i.'

Central African Republic

The newly appointed Ambassador of le
Central African Republic, Christophe Mai- u,
presented his credentials to President I 'd
on February 9.'

Peru

The newly appointed Ambassador from le
Republic of Peru, Carlos Garcia-Bedoya, e-
sented his credentials to President Fon )n
February 9.'

Thailand

The newly appointed Ambassador of he
Kingdom of Thailand, Upadit Pachariyg-
kun, presented his credentials to Presimt
Ford on February 9.'

' For texts of the Ambassador's remarks anc'Si
President's reply, see Department of State pres re-
lease dated Feb. 9.

256

Department of State Bultix!:

I

Lestions and Answers Following the Secretary's Address at Laramie

s release 48 dated February 4

). Mr. Secretary, if you could establish
guiding principle for the conduct of
\nrican foreign policy for the next 200
ns, what would that rule be?

Secretary Kissinger: In my job you do
"11 if you can establish the principle for the

a 200 hours. [Laughter.]
would say that the guiding principle we
wuld have to have is to have the wisdom to
uierstand the world in which we live and,
a the same time, to develop a vision of the
k d of world we want to bring about. The
piblem in foreign policy is always to main-
tii enough of the structure that exists
V hout explosion and yet not permit stagna-
t 11 to arise, because the greatest creations
a' those that were revisions when they
vre originated. So I would say the guiding
p nciples would have to be a combination

0 realism and vision of the future, and that
i: Qot easy to achieve.

J. // my history serves me correctly, 10
J irs ago there were only five countries in
t tvorld that possessed mtclear capabilities.

1 has already been shotvn by India, which
h r exploded its first nuclear device, and
t re are approximately nine other countries
f t are in the process of developing theirs.

I I correct, sir?

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct.

J. In relationship to these countries, par-
tularly Egypt, Israel, Pakistan — those sit-
itions are critical there — hoiv ivould the
I ited States, under the nuclear prolifera-
tn act, control these countries?

Secretary Kissinger: Let me not get into
i lividual countries, because it touches great
sisitivities among the countries I men-

tioned and the ones I don't mention are
offended because they are excluded.
[Laughter.]

But I agree with you that one of the
basic problems of our period is the spread of
nuclear technology. If we think we had a
difficult world to manage in the last 30 years
with two, three, four, and then five nuclear
powers, what it will be like when scores of
countries have nuclear weapons — if that
should come about — is a nightmare.

What we are attempting to do is to en-
courage all the world's nuclear exporters to
set up common standards that would govern
the conditions under which nuclear tech-
nology is being exported so that countries
cannot use peaceful nuclear technology
which is acquired abroad, as India did, to
develop nuclear explosives.

We have made rather good progress in
developing some agreement in which the
nuclear exporters will establish common
principles. The problem is whether the pace
of negotiations will keep up with the pace
of technology, and if it doesn't, then many
countries, including some of those you men-
tioned, will acquire nuclear weapons, and
we would live in a very unstable world.

Q. This morning Secretary of Transporta-
tion William. Coleman announced that he 7vas
giving partial permission for the supersonic
transport to land in this country. I under-
stand that he gave 16 months' temporary ap-
proval for the SST to land at JFK Airport
in New York and at Dulles Airport near
Washington. I was tvondering if you could
tell us tvhen you heard this decision and also
what effect do you think this will have on
international relations, particularly ivith
Britain and France.

Secretary Kissinger: I heard about this

iirch 1, 1976

257

decision for the first time in my motel room
iiere in Laramie, just as I was walking out
the door to go to a very fine lunch with your
president. I had no advance warning of the
decision.

I think that the decision will be well re-
ceived in Britain and France. While I have
no responsibility for weighing all of the fac-
tors, I put before Secretary Coleman the
foreign policy considerations that he should
weigh. I have not seen the actual text of it
yet, but if it is what I have been told, I
think it will have a favorable impact.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the draftsmanship of
the ABM [antiballistic missile'] and SALT
One agreements urns under great attack by
Mr. Schlesinger [James R. Schlesinger,
former Secretary of Defense'], Admiral Zum-
iralt [Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., former Chief
of Naval Operations], and others. They are
claiming the final agreements were so poorly
and sloppily drafted by our side that a num-
ber of violations have come from this.

We know, Mr. Secretary, that you did in
fact have to secretly patch up the SALT One
agreement by concluding a "backchannel
protocol" between Ambassador [Anatoliy F.]
Dobrynin and yourself on the issue of
whether SALT One language prohibits the
Soviets from arming 210 of their diesel-class
submarines with SSM-13 missiles.

By the ivay, you concealed that "backhand
protocol" for 11 months. It was not knoivn
to our SALT negotiators until it tvas told
them by the Russians. Yet you adamantly
maintained that the documents of SALT
and ABM treaties are competently drafted,
and at the same time the many alleged vio-
lations of the SALT and ABM you have dis-
missed— and continue to dismiss — even
though some clearly violated unilateral state-
ments you gave the Congress and the Ameri-
can public. There are specifics — you ivill not
go into them., but the question is coming.
This is the question the Republican Party
has had to face on Watergate and has to face
now. Is there any integrity in those docu-
ments? Were they properly drafted, or are
you ignoring and trying to hide the violations

258

of the Sornets in this important, critical are
to our defense?

Secretary Kissinger: For a few momen;
I thought 1 was back at Harvard. [Laugi
ter.]

Let me answer the various statement
that have been made. First, the SALT agre(
ment was drafted by the SALT delegation i
Helsinki, a delegation which contains men
bers of the Department of Defense, the Joii
Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligent
Agency, and the Arms Control and Disarm;
ment Agency. Every word of that agreemei
was drafted by the delegation, and it w;
backed up in Washington.

Secondly, some of the people whom yc
mention, when they were in a position >
high responsibility, did not make any of tl
charges that they are making now that tht
are out of of!ice. Incidentally, Secretai
Schlesinger has never made the charges th
you have mentioned. So, under the impact
their own political aspirations, they ha
suddenly discovered things that, when th
were in high military positions, they nev
called to the attention of the President
anybody else. I will not get into that sort
dispute.

What I want to say is this. In 1972, t||
United States faced this situation — in
1960's a series of decisions had been ma
by which the United States was going
build missiles that were small, sophis
cated, and flexible. In the 1960's, the decisi
was made that we would build a thousand
these land-based missiles called Minutenr
and 650 submarine-based missiles. We bu :
those and stopped the buildup in the 196(
The Soviet Union made the opposite decisi(
The Soviet Union made large missiles a
did not stop the buildup.

In the 1970's, when this Administrati i
came into office, there were no strategic p ■
grams. We started a whole new set of st •
tegic programs that, however, could i '.
become operational until the late 197( •
Therefore, in 1972, a SALT agreement vi
negotiated which froze the buildup on bd
sides. That meant in practice that a Sovt
buildup that was going on at the rate of 2 )

Department of State Bulli

I

missiles a year was stopped. No single Ameri-
can program was stopped.

Now, with respect to violations, this is an
issue of enormous technical complexity, and
it is an issue about which it is easy to be
■demagogic. But nobody in his right mind
can believe that an Administration that has
resisted Communist expansion every place
in the world would deliberately collude with
the Soviet Union in hiding violations.

Every violation, every charge of violation,
is systematically examined by the govern-
ment and by all of the agencies that are
responsible for the SALT project. Every
allegation of noncompliance is then brought
to the attention of the Soviet Union. All of
these issues are being dealt with, and no
serious administration will stand for viola-
tion. But no serious American should engage
in demagoguery that gives the impression
that we would stand for a violation and gives
the impression that a serious effort has not
been made to deal with the fundamental
questions of the arms race.

Q. Mr. Kissinger, I'd like to know if ijov
fhink Mr. Ford ivill he reelected, number
one; and if he is not, in what direction ivill
you turn your energies later?

Secretary Kissinger: Let me say first of
all that I consider foreign policy a non-
partisan effort. I personally believe that
President Ford will be nominated and
elected, so that the premise of your question
will not inevitably arise. But when I do leave
office, I would like to dedicate myself to help-
ing whoever is in office or whoever succeeds
me to obtain the national consensus and
the national unity behind our foreign policy
which I have described as essential in our
foreign policy and which we need to deal
with the problems of our period.

Q. I woidd like to ask about our commit-
ment to NATO, and hoiv much it is sup-
ported by us. Our son is in Turkey in a
NATO unit and has had quite a time ivith —

Secretary Kissinger: I could not hear that.

Q. They have a hard time with supply.

Secretary Kissinger: There are two prob-
lems here: our relationship to NATO and
our relationship to Turkey.

Our relationship to NATO belongs to the
foundation of our foreign policy, and there-
fore we have always believed that to keep
our European allies free of the danger of
military attack is the condition for every-
thing else we do. Therefore those Americans
who serve abroad in fulfillment of our NATO
commitment are laying the basis for every-
thing else that is being done in our foreign
policy.

At the same time, we have had strains in
our relationship with Turkey as a result of
the conflict between Greece and Turkey and
as a result of some congressional actions that
were taken last year in which we cut off
military supplies to Turkey. And Turkey in
retaliation closed down the operation of our
bases and in some respects made conditions
there somewhat more difficult.

We are making a major effort to restore
this relationship, and we expect the Turkish
Foreign Minister to come to Washington
next week. We hope that we can settle at
least some of the outstanding issues then.

Senator McGee: The next question is here
in the press section. And will you identify
yourself as you ask your question?

Q. My name is Saundra Gustoiv, and I
work with the Laramie Daily Boomerang.

Secretary Kissinger: I beg your pardon.
Senator McGee was giving me the answer
before I addressed the question. [Laughter.]

Q. I'm Saundra Gustow with the Laramie
Daily Boomerang. My question is this: In
the past, the French have had to give up Al-
geria, and now both French and Americans
are out of Viet-Nam. Do you think Russian
support in Angola ivill backfire, too? Do you
think the Angolans will not want any for-
eign poiver, including Russia?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that basically
the African countries want to determine
their own future. But I think also that under
conditions in Africa, the presence of 11,000

March 1, 1976

259

Cuban combat forces, backed up with hun-
dreds of millions of dollars of Soviet equip-
ment, has the practical effect of imposing a
minority government on a population which
will find it very difficult to shake it off. And
even if after five or some other period of
years they should do it, other countries that
are threatened now or in the immediate
future will have to draw some lessons from
these events.

Therefore the United States must insist
that the sending of expeditionary forces, the
imposition of minority government, what-
ever may happen in Angola, not become the
pattern of international relations. And, if we
can achieve this, then perhaps the evolution
in Angola can be in a direction where later
on the Russians and Cubans will play a lesser
role.

But our basic concern is that — in a world
in which there are so many explosive local
situations — if we permit the Soviet Union
to exploit this, together with Cuban expedi-
tionary forces, we could have a very danger-
ous world in which to live.

Q. How involved do you think we will get
in Angola?

Secretary Kissinger: The President has
repeatedly stated that— Well, right now we
are barred by the Congress from even giving
money. But the President has repeatedly
stated that we would not send troops. He is
willing to accept any legal restrictions on
the use of troops, and it may well be very
late in the day to do anything in Angola.
But we should not draw great comfort from
this, because failure to act in time in one
area may mean that we will have to do
more some other place, sometime later.

But our basic concern now is not with the
past. Our basic concern is to make sure this
does not become a precedent for other areas.

Senator McGee: We have a wheels-up com-
mitment that the Secretary is a prisoner of
and to, and we will set the ground rule now :
two more questions as the terminal point.
The next question is over here to the left.

Q. I was wondering why isn't or why can't
our agricultural products be used more as a

bargaining chip in our dealings with othi
countries ?

Secretary Kissinger: We hear that que
tion quite often, why we are not using Otj
agricultural products more as a bargaining

To some extent they are bemg used as ''^
bargaining chip. But what one has to r( Q
member is that when you use products as ■ '
bargaining chip you are then interferin
with the free market system because th
only way you can use them as a bargainir
chip is to restrict our farmers from sellir
their grain. Otherwise you are not doin
anything. If we do this, as indeed we di'
last year for a period of four months, not t
law but through a voluntary restraint pn
gram, we face enormous domestic oppositio
And if you had to sit through some of tl
congressional hearings that I do, you wou
find that even that voluntary restraint pr
gram that we had in force for four montl
last year was extremely unpopular in certa
parts of the country.

I find this sort of proposition which yc
have made is usually made in nonagricultur
parts of the country. But the long-ter
agreement which we have made with tl
Soviet Union is in part designed to enab
us, before large purchases can be made
the United States by people who are not tr
ditional purchasers — we have an opportuni
to negotiate it and therefore have an oppo
tunity to bring other considerations in
play.

Q. How do you answer assertions in ti
press, most notably the Eastern press, th
outgoing U.N. Ambassador Moynihan d
not have the full support of the State D
partment and hence felt like he could not i ,
his job at the United Nations? f

Secretary Kissinger: Ambassador Moyr
han is a very good friend of mine. He wi
appointed as Ambassador to India on ir
recommendation. When I was made Seer
tary of State, I offered him two positions I
the State Department, but he was not wil
ing at that time to leave the Embassy
India.

260

Department of State Bullet

le then returned to Harvard, since he
i;l been very reUictant to give up his
aire position at Harvard, and within six
■ iiths we called him back in order to serve
r the United Nations.

n the United Nations he performed a job
iiich he foreshadowed in an article in
" nmentary magazine on the basis of which
u was offered the job to begin with. In
ler words, what Ambassador Moynihan
I: at the United Nations was exactly what
uwas sent there to do.

I^ow, inevitably, in an organization that
s-ather traditional, as is the State Depart-
nnt, a man of the artistic temperament and
v'ds of Ambassador Moynihan is not con-
lijred the usual occurrence. And therefore
ts quite possible that here and there some
nl'ordinate official mumbled that the normal
)i cesses of diplomacy had not provided for
:i kind of methods in which Ambassador
Mynihan specializes.

do not pay great attention to it, because
:ly mumble about me, too. I think that
Aibassador Moynihan had full support
i!Dng the people who mattered and whose
i\ port he needed. That is, he had the full
i\ port of the President, he had my full sup-
p< t, he had the full support of the Assistant
S retary for International Organizations.

lince what he was doing was novel, it was
CI troversial. That is inevitable. But Am-
b sador Moynihan did a distinguished job.
V are proud to have had him in this posi-
tii. He has told us that he resigned from
it lecause once again he did not want to give
a his tenure position at Harvard. I have no
p son to doubt this ; and I wrote him a let-
ti yesterday in which I told him that as
k g as I am in public service and in a posi-
ti 1 to do so, he would be called on again and
aiin to serve his country.

}. In the consideration of his replacement,
tiugh, will his methods be pursued at the
Lited Nations?

Secretary Kissinger: There are no two Pat
lynihans in the country. [Laughter.]

3ut the basic American policy, which I
hvQ already outlined in a speech in July
lit year before Moynihan accepted his posi-

tion— or started his work in his position —
the basic American policy of resisting bloc
confrontation, the basic policy of standing
up against unfounded allegations, which was
the reason that he was sent there — that
policy will certainly be continued.

Senator McGee: Thank you, Mr. Secre-
tary.

lEA Governing Board Adopts
Long-Term Energy Program

Press release 43 dated February 2

The Governing Board of the International
Energy Agency on January 30 decided to
adopt a program of long-term cooperation in
the field of energy. The United States was
represented by Assistant Secretary for
Economic and Business Affairs Thomas 0.
Enders.

The new program provides a framework
within which national efforts to reduce our
excessive dependence on imported energy
can be tied together and reinforced. It is in-
tended to insure that the costs and benefits
of these efforts are shared equitably. It as-
serts the solidarity of the consuming coun-
tries in the energy crisis and is intended to
help accelerate the shift in supply and de-
mand for world energy that will eventually
end our vulnerability to arbitrary OPEC
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries] control over world oil prices. The
program expires in November 1984, the term
of the agreement founding the International
Energy Agency. Under the new program,
the lEA member countries have agreed:

— To create a framework to facilitate the
execution of joint energy development proj-
ects drawing together technology, capital,
and manpower from two or more lEA
countries;

— To consider on a case-by-case basis
guai-anteeing access to a portion of the off-
take to other lEA countries that join in
large-scale projects which substantially in-
crease energy production over what it other-
wise would be;

l> reh 1, 1976

261

— To undertake not to allow imported oil
to be sold in our domestic economies below a
common fixed price of $7 per barrel. This
minimum safeguard price is a standby sys-
tem designed to protect our commitment to
the development of new conventional energy
in Alaska, the North Sea, etc., against dis-
ruption from dumping or predatory pricing
by oil-exporting countries;

— To cooperate in conservation through
the fixing of joint conservation targets and
the intensive review of national conservation
pi-ograms to maintain progress toward these
targets, reinforce national efforts, and
exchange conservation experience and
expertise ;

— To cooperate in energy research and de-
velopment, including assistance in develop-
ing-country R. & D. programs, the elabora-
tion of an overall lEA R. & D. strategy,
intensified information exchanges, and joint
projects; and

— To make best efforts not to introduce
new discrimination against other lEA mem-
bers as regards access to energy technology,
investment opportunities, and production.

This long-term cooperative program calls
for reviews, exchanges of information, and
the setting of group targets which are clearly
within the authority of the executive. With
respect to the commitment on nondiscrimina-
tion and access, it is understood in the Inter-
national Energy Agency that the "best
endeavors" formula applies to the executive
but does not bind the Congress. We would
not be under any obligation to seek elimina-
tion of any existing legislation or regulations.
The executive branch has been given the au-
thority to permit exports of energy to for-
eign participants in joint projects in certain
circumstances. In some cases, congressional
authorization would be required. The
United States has made clear to its lEA
partners that we are willing to consider pos-
sible joint projects in all areas, although
environmental and other factors constrain
the United States more in some areas than
in others.

The commitment to maintain a minima
safeguard price is subject to the availabi p
of appropriate authority; that is, the c -
mitment is to maintain the minimum s
guard price if authority is available oi
seek authority at an appropriate time in 11 t
of oil market developments if such authoi y
is not available.

Over the past two years a central elemti
of U.S. international energy policy has bn'
the development of an overall framework 'i
consumer country cooperation. The adopin
of this long-term agreement completes e
basic design of this policy. Other element; if
the framework already in place include:

— Creation in 1974 of the Internaticd
Energy Agency, which provides an inst i-
tional center for energy cooperation;

— Establishment in 1974 of an Integra id
emergency program committing the imi-
trial countries to large-scale oil stockpi g
and common allocation and conservation :-
forts in the event of a new oil embargo ; d

— Agreement in 1975 on a $25 bil n
OECD [Organization for Economic Coopi i-
tion and Development] Financial Supj 't
Fund to meet the threat posed by the h 'e
financial accumulations of the oil-produc g
countries.

Energy policy has become a central i-
ture in our relationship with Wesi n
Europe, Japan, and other industrial d
countries. With this cooperative framew k
completed, these countries will now ent( a
new comprehensive multilateral dialc e
with the oil producers and non-oil-produ( g
developing countries.

Under the auspices of the Conference n
International Economic Cooperation, n
Energy Commission, jointly chaired by e
United States and Saudi Arabia, will hold :3
initial meeting in Paris on February 11. e
United States believes that the new comi s-
sion provides a forum for constructive < i-
sideration by consumer and producer cc i-
tries of energy-related issues in an effor o
arrive at pragmatic and mutually accept; le
results.

262

i

Department of Slate Bullin

I

f>cretary Kissinger Interviewed by Panel at Los Angeles

'following is the transcript of an interview
'h Secretary Kissinger by a panel at a
cling at Los Angeles, Calif., on February
jionsored by the Blue Ribbon 400. Mem-
s (if the panel were Robert 0. Anderson,
innan of the board, Atlantic Richfield
: Edward W. Carter, chairman of the
rd. Carter, Hawley and Hale Department
ris. Inc.; Anthony Day, editor of the edi-
iiil page, Los Angeles Times; Simon
'iiii, chairman of the executive committee,
\V Inc.; and Paul Ziffren, Los Angeles
iniey, moderator.^

r • itlease 45 dated February 2

//•. Anderson: Mr. Secretary, with Am-

siidor Moynihan's resignation from the

'trd Nations, it ivould appear that the

cfice use of that organization continues

1 1 dine. I wonder if there is any possibil-

II f a coyitinuation of the meetings that

■} President had outside of Paris tvith the

h ds of state — with the developed countries

I rating as an ad hoc committee or as a

II ji that would be able to get some of the

'I igs underway that are of utmost urgency

it 7 more interdependent world.

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, let me
this occasion to say I am glad to be
ire I spent so many pleasant hours and
sre I have so many friends. And I want
thank Mrs. Chandler for inviting me.
Jow, with respect to your question, first
all, as I have repeatedly stated, Ambas-
or Moynihan is a close personal friend of
le who was appointed to this position
er I read an article of his in Commentary

Introductory remarks by Mrs. Norman Chandler,
horary president of the Blue Ribbon 400, and Mr.
Z ren are not printed here.

magazine, in which he said what should be
done at the United Nations. And we thought
the best thing to do would be to let him do it.

So there was no surprise about his actions
there. And they carried out our policy ; they
had our full support. And given the fact
there's only one Pat Moynihan on hand, they
will be carried out by his successor — though
I'm sure with less flamboyance and verve.

Now, as far as the United Nations is con-
cerned, we stated that the bloc voting — the
tendency to pursue fixed positions — would
damage the United Nations. This was said
already in a speech by me last July. This is
a policy we will continue. The United Na-
tions cannot do many of the things which
originally were claimed for it. On the other
hand, it has uses, and we must not give up
on it.

But it cannot substitute for the close asso-
ciation of the industrial democracies. This
is what happened outside of Paris at Ram-
bouillet, where the heads of government —
of the United States, Britain, France, the
United Kingdom, Japan, and Italy — met.
They dealt with the relationship between the
economic progress and the democratic insti-
tutions of their countries. I think it was an
extremely successful meeting. We plan to
continue this kind of meeting. And so I
would expect that there will be others in
the years — in the months to come. And this
kind of cooperation, while it isn't exactly
dealing with the subject that the United
Nations was designed for, will be at the core
of our foreign policy.

Mr. Carter: Mr. Secretary, are there ways
in which you believe the United States could
consider modifying its laws or practices to
strengthen the ability of the State Depart-
ment, the White House, to conduct the na-

»ireh 1, 1976

263

tion's foreign policy while adequately pre-
serving accountability to Congress and the
public ?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think it's a
question of legal procedures. It is a question
of the practices that have developed and are
developing. I think we have to keep in mind
what it is that the Congress can do and what
it is that the executive must do. The Con-
gress is designed to pass laws. It passes
these laws by various interest groups com-
ing together on specific subjects that are
trading off various considerations.

The essence of foreign policy is design,
timing, sense of proportion — the proportion
in the long-range view. The attempt by the
Congress to conduct day-to-day foreign pol-
icy must lead to a lack of coherence and to a
set of random actions. The Congress must
participate in the setting of the guidelines
and in the approval of basic direction. But
if the tendencies of the last year or two
continue, if there are a series of legislative
actions that prescribe specific steps, the au-
thority of the United States and the conduct
of its foreign policy will decline to a point
where crises are inevitable and where for-
eign governments will deal not with the Ad-
ministration in office but will set up a series
of liaison offices to deal with the Congress.

It is clear that the pendulum had swung
too far toward executive authority in the
sixties. It is equally clear that we are in
great danger of its swinging in the other
direction. And I want to stress this has noth-
ing to do with this Administration. The
consequence of what I fear will not show
up for a year or two. The erosion that will
occur will not be visible for a year or two —
or maybe even three — but foreign govern-
ments must be able to know whom they
deal with. There must be some consistency in
our action, and we do not have it by present
procedures.

Western European Communist Parties

Mr. Day: Mr. Secretary, there's a tre-
mendous debate going on in Washington
about the nature of the West European Com-
munist parties 30 years after the ivar, with

the Italian Communists — noiv the head
the Spanish Communists — some of t
French say that they are fundamentally d;'
ferent than they ivere 30 years ago in t\
hot days of the cold war. They say the den,
crats essentially will cooperate with NAT
What is your vieiv of this? Do you think t
change is fundamental or not?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, there are fr
separate problems. One is the role of t'
participation of these Communist parties
the political lives of their country, which
essentially a decision that the country has
make. The second is : What is the view of t :
Administration with respect to either ti
nature of the Communist parties or th ■
role in government — even if we can't i
much about our views?

Now, whether the Communist parties hj i
changed or not is something that no ( \
can really know at this moment, because ;
this moment prudence coincides with 1;
policy that they're adopting. It is in th •
interest to claim that they have chang .

I personally find it hard to believe tit
Communist parties, which after all dist-
guish themselves from the other Socia t
parties because they insisted that a minoi i
had to seize power and advance the coursf f
history — that those parties have sudde i^
become democratic Socialists or have u \
the democratic process in coming to pov ',
which will permit the democratic process 3
reverse the course of history.

But leaving that issue aside, I have e
gravest doubt whether the participation f
Communists in West European governmc s
is compatible with the nature of the Atla; c
alliance which we have now. These par s
reflect a set of social priorities which rr t
weaken Western defense. They reflect a 't
of attitudes which will make it extren y
difficult to participate in the NATO Coui 1,
for example, in the kinds of frank briefi s
and exchanges that have grown up c r
years. Even if one moderate power gets : o
office in one of these countries, it will s( a
precedent for many of the other counti s.

Finally, we ought to remember that e n
if they are relatively independent of ]\3-
cow — which may or may not be true— it

J

264

Department of State Bull in

I

veil if they are, the foreign policy — say, of
'ugoslavia — while oriented toward independ-
nce, is certainly not as close to us, to put
; mildly, in other parts of the world — and I
ay this only because we are here in public
laughter] — as that of our NATO allies.
0, on the whole, if Communist parties par-
icipate in a major way in the governments
f Western Europe, it will, in our view, lead
5 a substantial change in the nature of
illied relationships.

I want to make clear that it is not a deci-
ion that the United States can make. But
' we are asked, as you ask me, then we
ave to express our view. And our view is
Itiat this will make a major change in the
elationships of the Western World.

Dr. Ramo: Mr. Secretary, if you had it to

0 over again on any major policy decision

1 which you have participated — not count-
\ig the decision to go to Washington iyi the
\rst place — would you do it differently?
^Laughter.'i

Secretary Kissinger: That's —

Dr. Ramo: That's part one. [Laughter.']

Secretary Kissinger: That — no; I think
ou should have skipped it. [Laughter.] I
link it's a very good question, which I've
een too busy to ask myself systematically
itely. [Laughter.]

I have no doubt there are some things that
might have done differently — especially as
11 the decisions that one makes are taken
nder an enormous pressure of time and
smetimes with incomplete information. But,
n the whole, I'd have to say that the major
nes of the policy I would do again.

Mr. Anderson: The disposition of Arctic
as has been an issue of considerable inter-
st here on the West Coast for the last few
-six to eight months. One is the so-called
ll-American route through Alaska — that's
y water to the West Coast — and the alterna-
ive is a land route essentially through Can-
\da to the Midwest. I don't want to put you
w the spot on this; but from the point of
•ieic of the State Department, is there any
'reference to an all-U.S. route?

Secretary Kissinger: To tell you the truth,
I was in Alaska a few weeks ago and some-
one asked me this question — a few months
ago — and I didn't even know what the
problem was. And I danced around in an
extraordinary manner. Now I know what
the problem is, but I know I shouldn't give
an answer to it. [Laughter.]

Soviet and Cuban Involvement in Angola

Mr. Carter: Mr. Secretary, would you care
to speculate on what political, military, or
economic effects might fall from both public
and congressional pressure on the Admin-
istration to diminish U.S. involvement in
Angola ?

Secretary Kissinger: Let me make clear
what our concern has been in Angola. The
United States was not opposed to the group
that is backed by the Soviet Union because
it is Marxist. In fact, it wasn't opposed to
this group at all. A similar group took over
in Mozambique — the so-called FRELIMO
[Front for the Liberation of Mozambique]
group — without any opposition by the United
States and with immediate recognition by the
United States once the government was
established after independence.

Our concern in Angola is that the Soviet
Union, between March 1975 and the end of
the year, introduced 200 million dollars'
worth of military equipment into Angola —
which is more than all of the military equip-
ment that all other countries sent to black
Africa. Secondly, it introduced, or it partici-
pated in the introduction of, 11,000 Cuban
combat troops.

So what we are seeing in Angola is not
a war of national liberation, out of which
the United States would have stayed totally,
but the attempt by two countries that are
far away, that have no historical role there,
to impose a minority government. And the
impact of this happening unopposed on other
African countries, on Asian countries — and
also European countries — is a matter of the
gravest concern. If the Soviet Union, using
expeditionary forces of its allies, can operate
in this manner over long distances, then the

*areh 1, 1976

265

areas closer to home, where it is even more
difficult militarily to resist — a very danger-
ous precedent is set.

So there was never any question of the
introduction of American forces. We were
dealing with relatively small amounts of
money to be given to black African countries
at their request, to assist the majority of
the Angolan population — which did not
want to be taken over in this manner.

Congress has now decided that this can-
not be done, and the consequences will be
what I described. Now that this has oc-
curred, we have an obligation to make clear
that this action does not set a precedent, or
we will remember that Angola set in motion
a train of events that could be potentially
extremely serious.

I know that there has been relatively little
public support. I know that there has been
no congressional support. But we in office
had an obligation to describe the situation
as we saw it. And I think when the conse-
quences become apparent, it will be realized
that the concerns were justified.

Mr. Day: Mr. Secretary, since Congress
has already turned you down and smce
there's to date no sign of support for the
Angolan proposal which you make, why then
did you go back last tveek and at least sug-
gest the idea of overt support for Angola?
Do you think there's a chance in the world
that you ivould get it? If not, ivhy say our
prestige is in some ivay committed to our
actions here, if you don't really think that
the Congress is going to support your ver-
sion of the prestige? In other tvords —

Secretary Kissinger: It's not a question of
our version of prestige. It is a question of
what the consequences of certain actions will
be. Those consequences will occur whether
we predict them or we don't predict them;
to pretend that by predicting certain con-
sequences you bring them about is simply
putting your head in the sand.

I was asked. I didn't volunteer to go to the
Congress. I was asked by Senator Clark,
who's head of the African Subcommittee,
to appear. It was an occasion I would not
have minded missing. [Laughter.] But hav-

ing been asked to appear, I had to give, no
our version of prestige, but our view of th
national interest and of the interest of worl
peace.

We believed — and I continue to believe-
that under the conditions that existed i
December, we had a good chance of endin
the foreign involvement in Angola by th
methods which we were then pursuinj
through obtaining a resolution at the mee'
ing of the Organization of African Unit
that would have ended foreign interventioi
We had no intention of being involved thei
in any substantial way. All that we wei
talking about were some tens of millions (
dollars of American financial assistance t
black African countries.

Having been asked to testify, I had 1
state our views. In stating our views, I ha
to say that since the secret funding was r
longer possible — a secret funding that ha
been discussed with some 25 Senators ar
over a hundred Congressmen before v
undertook it, in which eight congression
committees have been briefed 24 differei
times, so the real secrecy was extreme
limited [laughter] — having been precludt
from this version of secret operations, I hj
to say that if we proceed we will do
overtly. I did not say we would ask for it;
said we would have to consider asking for .

And I must say if one looks at the dipl
matic situation which we now face, wh<
11,000 Cuban troops with massive Sovi
equipment — a fantastic force for Africa — a
moving through Angola, I think the publ
must understand that we must do certa
things to retain a minimum of diplomat
influence over events, even though our rea
ing of the congressional mood is not like
to be very different from yours.

Mr. Day: Are you going then to ask f^
overt money?

Secretary Kissinger: We haven't decidt
yet. We haven't asked yet.

U.S. Forces in Western Europe

Dr. Ramo: Mr. Secretary, let's move a fe
thousand miles north to Western Eurot

266

Department of State BulleM

he ivay things are moving there — I'm
linking of Portugal, Greece, and Turkey —
nd n-ith the way Congress is moving, is it
'lite likely that you will face important op-
•>sition to the continuation of American
•oops in Western Europe on this ivhole con-
pt of a tie with Western European nations
ir the defense of Europe in which they
■diridually spend a smaller fraction of their
-OSS national product for defense than we

Secretary Kissinger: Well, actually, in
ortugal the situation has improved enor-
ously over the last year, and democratic
•Qcesses are beginning to work there. I be-
3ve that our ties to Western Europe are
le essence of our foreign policy and that if
'estern Europe should feel insecure it
ould then adopt a position of semineutral-
m in which its Communist parties would
■come much more active and we would find
at a continent like this, with its economic
iwer, could be an extremely disturbing ele-
ent in the world.

It is imperative for us to keep our close
iilitical and military and economic ties with
'estern Europe, and for that the presence
American troops is essential. So I hope
ese tendencies you describe do not de-
lop. And if they develop, we would have
resist them.

'■ain Sales to the Soviet Union

. Mr. Anderson: Mr. Secretary, the neiv So-
et five-year plan is not the document of a
ghly successful country and is a rework

: I d a reappraisal of the objectives. Ayid
.rgely growing out of their agricultural
ilures and the tremendous shortfall in
eir grain crop last year, and climatic con-
tions at the moment look as if this would
repeated again.
They have limited financial resources for

; sh purposes — may be needing credit and
ip. I just wonder if they fall on more diffi-
It days, as it ivould appear particularly in
e food sector, if this is going to drive them
the wall and make them more dangerous
-or do you think they might become more
■operative?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it is hard to
predict, and it depends on the alternatives
that were presented — that are presented. I
think that if the Soviet Union needs grain
from the West — if it needs economic bene-
fits, this should be used by the West to nego-
tiate the political arrangements which we
consider to be desirable, particularly to move
things toward a more stable and peaceful
world.

And we have the possibility of doing that
in the new grain agreement because that
agreement does not provide for purchases
of an emergency nature but, rather, for
regular purchases in ordinary conditions. So
if a new emergency develops, a new negotia-
tion would have to be conducted; and the
same is true in the case of economic credits.
So our policy has generally been to tie eco-
nomic events to political progress, and we
would continue to do that.

The Middle East

Mr. Carter: Mr. Secretary, would you care
to comment on the probable impact of the
present internal unrest of Lebanoyi on the
prospects for, and the timetable for, final
settlement of the Israeli conflict?

Secretary Kissinger: What is happening
in Lebanon is a terrible tragedy, because
here was the most peaceful country, the
country that most enjoyed a condition of
peace in the Arab world and maybe in the
entire Middle East. Its two communities,
Christian and Moslem, coexisted with rela-
tive ease.

Since the civil war started we estimate
that more than 10,000 people have been
killed and some 20,000 have been wounded —
and if you consider that the total population
of the country is only about 21/2-3 million,
this is an enormous number of casualties.

The conflict in Lebanon has of course ab-
sorbed the energies of the surrounding coun-
tries. Syria has played a major role. Israel
has not played an active role; but it is gen-
erally understood that if there should be a
major invasion from Syria, the danger of an
Israeli move would be very grave.

t arch 1, 1976

267

So the problem in Lebanon is to keep the
situation from involving the surrounding
countries and at the same time to end the
civil war.

The recent armistice seems to have
helped; but on the whole, the situation in
Lebanon is a disturbing influence and one
that is not helpful to move them toward a
Middle East settlement, because it raises
very serious danger that Lebanon may be-
come a confrontation state, with the large
number of Palestinians that live there.

Mr. Ziffren: What are the prospects in the
Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: What do I think in
tei-ms of the Middle East prospects?

The Middle East — we have two problems:
the procedural problem of who is to do the
negotiating and the substantive problem of
what should be negotiated.

The procedural problem of who should do
the negotiating generally revolves around
the issue of whether the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization (PLO) should participate
at a reconvened Geneva Conference.

Substantive issues are so manifold — fron-
tiers, Palestinians, Jerusalem, the reciprocal
guarantees of peace on the part of the Arab
countries, international guarantees, and so
forth.

Our view with respect to the Palestinians
has been that unless the Palestinians recog-
nize the existence of Israel and its right to
exist as a state, it is impossible to ask Israel
to participate in the negotiations with them.
We cannot ask Israel to negotiate with a
group that is dedicated to their destruction.

With respect to frontiers and all the other
issues, our policy up to now has been to try
to segment them into as many individual
issues as we can, because we thought this was
more manageable, it would maintain a mo-
mentum of progress, and it would give the
possibilities that later on we could settle the
remaining issues in the best possible frame-
work.

For a variety of reasons, this has become
much less likely now. So what we will prob-
ably find at some point is some large inter-
national conference in which all interna-

tionals— in which all of these issues will t
handled simultaneously. And the grou
which brings together all these strong-willt ;
people will certainly test the sanity of ar
mediator. [Laughter.]

Mr. Day: Mr. Secretary, on the Midd
East, Israelis say — at least some Israelis sa
— that the PLO, even though it may somedo
say it recognizes the State of Israel, w\
never really, in its heart, concede that. Ar,
so to establish a Palestinian state of the
domination is really just to put a dagger im
Israel's heart.

But do you think it is possible that tl
forces of history and circumstances are g^
ing to force the PLO to live in some kind (
uneasy, but nevertheless, relationship wi\
Israel? Do you think everything is tendit
that ivay?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it is very hai
to predict. Until 1973, no Arab state wi
willing to accept the existence of Israel-
even the 1967 frontiers. Then several of tl
Arab states changed. What the PLO may (
in the future, I wouldn't want to predict.

The U.S. position is, and will remain, th;
until the PLO states that it definitely a
cepts the existence of Israel and the U.l
Security Council resolutions that set out tl
negotiating framework, we have no decisic
to make. After that, we will look at tl
circumstances as they exist.

U.S.-Soviet Relations

Lh'. Ramo: This question is about deten
with the Soviet Union. I think you will fo
give anyone ivho suggests that it is a contr
versial subject in the United States. [Laug
ter.'i

There are those ivho believe that %■
haven't gotten very much out of efforts
detente — arid that moreover it is very da
gerous to pursue such a policy.

Can you tell us ivhat you think are tl
principal gains that we have gotten fro
pursuing detente and what you consid<
under reasonable, favorable, but realist
circumstances the maximum that you won
hope the United States would get from pu

268

Department of State Bullet

suing such a policy — and if there are any
alternatives to detente?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first of all, you
have to ask me what detente is.

Curiously — one of the curious aspects of
the present situation is the mercurial change
of the mood. When we came to Washington
in 1969, there were hundreds of thousands
of people in the street demonstrating for
peace. For three years we were assailed
monthly with the accusation that the gov-
ernment was too tough, it was reckless, risk-
ing the American future. Now, suddenly,
three years later, the mood has changed;
and the impression is created that the gov-
ernment is giving away needlessly conces-
sions to the Soviet Union.

Let's get clear, first of all, what we are
"rying to do. We face a historic problem we
iid not create and which no American Ad-
ministration can remove — which is the fact
;hat after 60 years in power, through the
jvolution of technology and industry the
Soviet Union has become a superpower. It
las weapons that can reach every part of
,he globe, for the first time in Russian his-
;ory. It has a navy that can traverse the
;eas, for the first time in Russian history. It
las the largest land army in the world.

These are facts which we did not create,
vhich no American policy can remove. It is
m uncomfortable experience for Americans
;o deal with a country of roughly the same
strength. We have never had to do this in
)ur history.

Secondly, we face the fact that nuclear
.veapons are destructive in a way that is
ibsolutely unprecedented in history. A war
"ought with nuclear weapons would kill hun-
Ireds of millions in a matter of days. If you
;hink of the impact that the two World Wai-s
lave had on Europe, in which the casualties
(Vould be minor, really minor to what would
jccur in a nuclear war, you can see the re-
sponsibility that any American leader con-
:erned with the future of this country must
nave.

Therefore we have two problems. The first
problem is to prevent the Soviet Union from
using this growing power to achieve political

gains. The second problem is to manage
these relationships in a way that is different
from the way it used to be, traditionally.
Traditionally, when two countries of roughly
equal magnitude competed with each other,
a war was inevitable. Now a war must not
happen; and therefore we must contain So-
viet power and at the same time we must
look for new international arrangements
that go beyond power politics to a more co-
operative international structure.

This is what we mean by the policy of de-
tente.

And therefore, when you ask what is
America getting out of it, what we intend
to get out of it is an option for a more peace-
ful and saner and safer world. This cannot
be measured every day.

Many of the things that people complain
about are the inevitable result of the growth
of Soviet power that I described. This new-
est of them could have been avoided by
American action.

When the Soviet Union makes a move to-
ward expansion, we resist, as we are trying
to do in Angola — against public and congres-
sional opposition — as we did in Jordan in
1970 and as we did in Cuba in 1970 and as
we did in 1973 during the Middle East crisis.
But at the same time we are trying to build
a more constructive relationship.

I do not see any unilateral advantage that
the Soviet Union has gained from this. This
is not a favor we do for the Soviet Union,
and I do not know what the alternative is. I
don't know whether the people want to go
back to the confrontations of the Berlin
crisis, whether a country that has just gone
through Viet-Nam, Watergate, the intelli-
gence investigations, and endless domestic
turmoil wants to contrive crises in which its
domestic structure will be tested. If the So-
viet Union behaves aggressively, we will
resist.

But I must say that whether this Admin-
istration brings it to a completion or not,
some Administration must deal with the
problem of peace. Because in a nuclear age,
tough rhetoric unsupported with a vision of
the future is just too dangerous.

March 1, 1976

269

The People's Republic of China

Mr. Anderson: Mr. Secretary, you justi-
fied the shift in the Soviet posture from one
of a defensive military position to one of a
very, very powerful offensive, exteryial capa-
bility. Do you see a similar pattern develop-
ing in China? Or is China more interested
in maintaining their current internal de-
fensive position?

Secretary Kissinger: China is at the be-
ginning of its industrial and economic evo-
lution; and therefore its present position —
the reach of China's power — is confined to
the immediately contiguous areas and the
perils to China's security impel it to keep its
military force within the country.

What China may do if in 20 years it has
the same capabilities or analogous capabili-
ties to what the Soviet Union possesses to-
day, I would not want to speculate. But the
policies of the country are inevitably related
to its physical strength, and the Chinese are
an extraordinarily talented, extraordinarily
sophisticated, and extremely tough people.

Mr. Ziffren: Do you think that Chou
en-Lai — the death of Chou en-Lai will make a
difference in China?

Secretary Kissinger: Of course personal
relations are not supposed to play a role in
foreign policy. But I had very great affec-
tion for Chou en-Lai, and I thought he was
one of the greatest men that I have dealt
with in public life, or in any other context.

But I think as far as the main lines of
policy are concerned, they will not be af-
fected by the death of Chou en-Lai — but his
style and skill, the subtlety, will certainly
be missed; and that will certainly make it,
personally, somewhat more complicated.

But the main lines of Chinese-American
relations depend on the mutual interests of
the two countries. We were brought to-
gether by necessity and we are held together
by certain shared interests. .

Mr. Carter: Mr. Secretary, if you don't
mind, I tvould like to turn to the Angolan
question for just a minute.

Are you more concerned about the effect
of the congressional unwillingness to sup-
port the Administration's policy there with

respect to the symbolism that it projects for
our other friends and allies around the
world? Or are you more concerned about the
creation of a beachhead there? Or are yoh
even more concerned about some natural re-
sources that are to be gained by the other
side or perhaps some combination of thest
or other things?

Decisive Feature of Angolan Situation

Secretary Kissinger: The natural re-
sources are important, but they are not the
decisive feature.

The decisive feature is that in the condi-
tions of the growing power that I have de-
scribed, when the Soviet Union engages ir
an adventure at such long distances on such
a substantial scale, but nevertheless on s
scale easily manageable because it is at the
very far end of their supply line, if tht
United States does not do what is necessarj
— ^and I repeat, what was necessary was
absolutely trivial compared to other foreigr
policy efforts we have made — then the prece
dent may be set that will affect the foreigr
policies of many other countries, in Africa
in Asia. It is something that certainly Chim
will watch, and it is something that Europ(
will watch.

I am confident that it will be seen, as th(
months and years develop, that it woulc
have been relatively easy to do what wa;
necessary in Angola. But failing to do i
there will cost us more somewhere else.

Defense Expenditures

Mr. Day: Mr. Secretary, after the Secre
tary of Defense, Mr. [James R.I Schlesinger
left office one of his supporters very stronglx
argued that the Ford Administration wa;
not providing enough money in its budge,
for defense and not as much as Schlesingei
and the Joint Chiefs ivanted, and there wat
a whole argument raging on this. What — ii
your view of the responsibility for meeting
the Soviet Union — what is your view of th
general level of the American defens(
budget ?

I

270

Department of State Bulletir

Secretary Kissinger: Well, of course we
have one massive handicap in our defense
budget. This is that we have to spend nearly
60 percent of our budget on personnel. The
Soviet Union spends only about 30 percent,
less than 30 percent, of their budget on per-
sonnel. So at comparable levels of expendi-
ture, the Soviet Union can translate it much
more effectively into useful military hard-
ware.

The second problem is to determine what
jkinds of weapons are most useful for the
purposes of foreign policy. Or to put it an-
jther way — what sorts of threats are they
most likely to face? Now, it is my view that
from the point of view of foreign policy, the
threats we are most likely to face are in so-
called "peripheral areas" — well, I don't want
;o list them, but certainly in the Middle East
—-and that America's capacity to intervene
[Ocally is of decisive or potentially decisive
importance. Therefore, over the next 10
vears, in my view, we have to strengthen
>ur conventional forces.

I do not believe that in the field of stra-
egic forces it is so easy to calculate what a
lecisive advantage is, and at the level of
! asualties that I have described earlier it is
*ery complicated to believe that any respon-
ible national leader would easily resort to
trategic nuclear weapons. So this is why I
relieve that that area should be constrained
ly arms limitations negotiations.

Now, on the whole, our defense budgets,
hough large in absolute numbers, have been
n the skimpy side in terms of our needs. I
ave generally agreed with Secretary
chlesinger about the order of magnitude of
^hat was required. I might quibble about the
istribution within this. And I support a
ubstantial military establishment, espe-
ially in the field of conventional forces.

I

oreign Assistance

Dr. Ramo: A slight shift aivay from that
uestion, but based on it: we have in the past
upported numerous nations, both with mili-
iry products from the United States and
Iso economic aid, peacetime aid. Now, we
idn't much care, when ive ivere very power-

fid, whether they .supported our ivorld policy
or not. It didn't matter if they didn't. And
we even, perhaps, obtained a subtle kind of
advantage by having the image loith them of
being philanthropists or being idealists, of
not being concerned about their position.

But now the situation is somewhat differ-
ent. Why do we go on supporting nations
who disturb the world situation by opposing
our obviously superior tvorld policies?
{Laughter.']

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I suppose there
is an element of masochism involved.
[Laughter.]

I don't know exactly what nations you are
talking about and what sort of support you
have in mind. In general, I would like to
think, though it is probably not correct, that
in helping other nations we serve our own
purposes and that there is a reason related to
our own national interests.

But we have made clear, and I have said it
again last week in congressional testimony,
that we will certainly gear our own relation-
ships to other countries to the degree of
support they give us on the issues that we
consider essential.

So on the whole, I think the condition you
describe is no longer quite so valid. There
are some countries in the world in whose
independence we have an interest, however
obnoxiously they may behave, because the
alternative to their independence is worse.
So in both cases we may have to give sup-
port, not because we like their policies but
because we prefer their existence.

Improvement in the International Situation

Mr. Anderson: Mr. Secretary, you have
been on the firing line for seven years on
national policy which particularly is related
to security. The big changes — detente, Rus-
sia, China, the end of the war in Viet-Nam.
— have been major changes.

Are you more secure now in the world
that you live in today or less secure in the
ivorld you live in today — 1969 versus 1976?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is impor-
tant to compare the world of 1969 with the

\arch 1, 1976

271

world today, because we do have a tendency
to take things for gi'anted.

In 1969 the Soviet Union had just occu-
pied Czechoslovakia. In the first two years of
being in office we had two crises on the ac-
cess routes to Berlin. We had a Soviet sub-
marine base being built in Cuba. We had
two Middle East crises, one of which brought
us to the verge of war. We had not only "no
relations," we had absolutely no contact with
the People's Republic of China — we didn't
even know how to contact them, and spent a
year trying to figure out how to do it. We
had 550,000 troops in Viet-Nam. We had
serious problems in our relations with
Europe.

Now, since then, whatever you may say
about detente, it is at least a healthy thing
— or at least some progress — ^that we are
arguing about whether we are getting
enough out of an improving relationship
with the Soviet Union. We have a new rela-
tionship with the People's Republic of China.
We managed to extricate ourselves, even if
people think it took too long, from Southeast
Asia. We have a new approach to the devel-
oping nations. And for the first time in 30
years, progress has been made toward peace
in the Middle East.

It is not enough. A lot more has to be
done. But above all, we have to remember
what I said earlier — that the biggest un-
solved problem of our time is to build a new
international structure which is less de-
pendent upon the accidents of power politics.
That task we have just begun.

But on the whole I think that the building
blocks for a new world are there, and the
international situation is much better than
it was. The domestic situation — faith in our-
selves— is much worse than it was, as a re-
sult of Viet-Nam, Watergate and its after-
math. Our biggest problem is to restore our
national confidence so that we can build the
world that I have tried to describe.

Mr. Carter: Mr. Secretary, there seems to
have been historically a very disappointing
coordination bettveen the foreign policy and
the economic policy of the United States.
Having viewed in recent years the draynatic
coordination practiced in these fields by

Japan, by others around the world, and rec'
ognizing the interrelationship being forcec
upon the world economically, I am wonder
ing if ive should not be moving perhaps evet
more swiftly toward using economics as ar
instrument of foreign policy than ive havi *
in the past, and I recognize that you havi
appointed a strong Under Secretary for Eco
nomic Affairs and perhaps you are movini.
in that direction.

Coordination of Economic and Foreign Policy

I

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it is absoluteh
true that as war becomes less likely, othe;
forms of power or interrelationships becomi
more important. It is also true that ou
economy is one of our greatest assets.

But it is finally true that we have thi
dilemma that when you use your economi
strength for foreign policy purposes, i
means that somebody must husband it an(
somebody must have the right to use it—
which means that somebody in the privat ,
sector cannot do what he wants. Because i
you permit the private sector to do what , ^
ever they want, then you mostly get a sor
of a generalized benefit from your economy ■'
but not one that you can target on a specif!
problem.

Therefore you find the situation that yo
get great editorials on cutting off grain sale
to the Soviet Union on either seacoast; bu
when last summer we induced the grai
traders to exercise voluntary restraint fo
four months, for many reasons, includin
the impact it would have on our consumer
— and to help our negotiations for the Ion
term — that we were getting under the mos
extreme pressure from the Midwester
states.

And when I appeared before the Senat
Finance Committee last week, I was no
treated too gently because — precisely, I be
lieve — allegedly I was attempting to us
agriculture or whatever for foreign polio;
purposes.

On the whole, I believe that it is impor
tant to establish a closer coordination be
tween economic policy and foreign policj
The meeting in Rambouillet to which Mi

272

Department of State Bullelii

Aderson referred was really quite a success

i I this regard.
We get into the most unbelievable donny-

tooks in Washington about jurisdiction
len one tries to establish a relationship
.ween foreign policy and economic policy.
But in fact, good progress is being made
this direction. Though how we can use
it tremendous economic power that we
1 e and how we can use a private economy

J public purposes — this is one of the prob-

leis that we have not yet fully solved.

Mr. Carter: Should the coordination be in
'/ White House, the State Department, or
7 Treasury?

Secretary Kissinger: How can you ask?
[ lughter.]

4r. Carter: I only asked, just so it could
itconfirmed.

lecretary Kissinger: Since November, I
\) against having it in the White House.
[]iughter.]

'ispects for Building a World Community

Ir. Day: Mr. Secretary, if President Ford
's lected in November, will you plan to con-
tiie in your cu7Tent job? Or is this your
'a year, no matter how the election comes
n?

ecretary Kissinger: Inconceivable as it
Tiyf be to my father, I may not be asked,
[liughter.] My problem is that I don't
^it to make myself a lameduck too early,
ri.ughter.]

Ir. Day: Not in anticipation of your re-
tni to university life, Mr. Secretary, never-
'h ess a long-range and more philosophical
nstion than the others that have been
ned: if you take a long-range look at the
■V id with your scholarly hat on and look
Uthe population problems and the under-
keloped world coming into its own in the
^ese of finding tools for an aggressive action
It for control of the limited natural re-
screes of the ivorld, with economic loar
I'tiy to replace, at any time, the military
W'iare — / guess my question is asking what

your feeling is about a hope for the world,
because it would appear, would it not, that
all the elements are still there and are going
to be there, and if all of your policies have
been perfect and if, indeed, great progress
has been made, it would appear that it would
be very easy for a successor of yours to have
a lesser record.

Secretary Kissinger: I would think, look-
ing at it as a professor, that over a historic
period we have enormous potentiality for
chaos.

We have the developing nations at the
very beginning of their evolution, with great
resentment and great temptation to band
together for economic warfare. We have the
unsolved problem of nuclear weapons; we
have the emerging problem of nuclear pro-
liferation. We have the growth of Soviet
power; the beginning of the growth of Chi-
nese power ; the fact that Europe and Japan,
though our relations with them now are
better than they have been in decades, still
have to find a permanent orientation. All of
this has great danger.

On the other hand, we do have the possi-
bility to shape that future. We showed last
year how one speech laying out a program
of relations with the developing countries
managed to create a new atmosphere, which
is not due to the brilliance of the speech but
to the necessities that exist and to the fact
that if one recognizes these necessities they
can still be shaped.

The United States, while it is no longer
predominant, is still a country that is power-
ful enough to shape the course of world
events in the economic and political fields
and to put some restraint on proliferation
and on military competition.

And I have to say quite candidly that my
biggest worry now is what is going on in the
United States domestically — that we can
never do this unless we can rebuild some
degree of national unity, unless we can
understand that without the United States
there can be no security and there can be no
progress and that these long-term dangers
and opportunities cannot be realized without
it.

So I would say that, however successful

^ ch 1, 1976

273

whatever may have happened in the last
few years, it is just the first mile on a very
long road which cannot be carried out with-
out an informed and a dedicated and a united
public. And that is all the more necessary
because the qualities of our leaders — the
quality is apt to fluctuate, and therefore un-
less we have this degree of public support

and public demand we may have great di
culties.

But if we do have it, I genuinely belie
that we can build for the first time in hum
history a world community in which m',
nations feel a sense of participation a
most people will feel more secure than th
have in the past.

THE CONGRESS

Congress and the U.S. Intelligence Community

Statement by Secretary Kissinger

I welcome this opportunity to appear be-
fore this committee to give you my views on
the relationship I hope will develop between
the Congress and the U.S. intelligence
community.

It is essential that a sounder relationship
between the executive and the Legislature
evolve. The present relationship has reached
a point where the ability of the United
States to conduct a coherent foreign policy
is being eroded. This is certainly true in
the intelligence field. One has only to look at
the recent leakage — indeed, oflncial publica-
tion— of highly classified material and the
levying of unsubstantiated charges and
personal attacks against the executive to see
the point the relationship has reached and
the harm we are doing to ourselves.

This situation must be unacceptable to us

' Made before the Senate Committee on Government
Operations on Feb. 5 (text from press release 51).
The complete transcript will be published by the
committee and will be available from the Superin-
tendent of Public Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

3

!

!

in both branches of the government, ancr
must be unacceptable to the Ameri( a
people. m

Fundamental changes are taking placer
the world at an unprecedented rate. > v
centers of power are emerging, altering r ■
tions among older power centers. Grow j
economic interdependence makes each of s
vulnerable to financial and industrial t:
bles in countries formerly quite remote fi
us. And, most important, we are work z
hard to establish more rational and reli; e
relationships with powers whose values d
interests are alien and inimical to us d
who, in some cases, have the power o
destroy us.

The conduct of foreign policy in this c^ i-
plex and fast-changing situation requ s
that there be close coordination and mul il
trust between Congress and the execu e
branch and a large measure of trust in b h
branches by the American people.

I am aware of the benefits of a cerl n
amount of dynamic tension between e
branches of our government. Indeed, e

274

Department of State Bull "

Iiunding Fathers designed this into the

(Histitution with the principle of the sepa-

tion of powers. But there is an adverse im-

ict on the public mind in this country and

I our national image abroad when this bene-

ial tension deteriorates into confrontation.

e have recently seen this happen. This is

ly I hope this committee and the Congress

a whole, with help and suggestions from

16 executive, can construct an oversight

lechanism for U.S. intelligence that can

lling an end to the strife, distrust, and con-

tsion that have accompanied the investiga-

t)ns of the past year.

I look to the development of means by
\iich Congress can participate more fully
ij the guidance and review of the intelligence
jtivities of this government and by which
1e executive can dii-ect and conduct those
^tivities with the confidence of being in
82p with Congress in this vital area of our
j reign affairs.

Our foreign policy must cope with com-
]3x problems of nuclear and conventional
;ms races; traditional and ideological dis-
1 tes which can trigger wider wars and
i'eeping economic dislocations; emerging
1 w nations which can become the arena for
) eat-power contests ; environmental pollu-
1 n\, food shortages, and energy maldistribu-
Ims which affect the lives of hundreds of
illions; and financial shifts which can
ireaten the global economic order. In the
:e of these great challenges our goals are
' foster the growth of a rationally ordered
' )rld in which states of diverse views and
( jectives can cooperate for the common
Inefit. We seek a world based on justice and
■ e promotion of human dignity.
We cannot pursue these goals in this haz-
. dous world unless we are secure, and we
I nnot be secure unless we are strong and
. jrt. Our ability to be both strong and alert
I pends in part on good intelligence.
To be strong, we must know as precisely
■■ possible how we are threatened. In this
i:e of highly sophisticated and expensive
'3apons systems, we cannot afford to arm
irselves against all possible threats; we
ust concentrate on those that are most
cely in order to save our resources for

other programs that make our country eco-
nomically, socially, and moi-ally strong.

To be alert is not just a matter of know-
ing where the dangers of war and change
are increasing, basic as that knowledge is.
We must have the knowledge essential to
our ability to try to help reduce the dangers
to peace. Intelligence is crucial to the future
of this nation.

To help construct a more cooperative world
we must understand trends and possibilities.
Intelligence is an indispensable tool in this
effort.

The intelligence on which such judgments
must be based can come only from a highly
professional intelligence service supported
l)y Congress and the people of this country.
President Ford expressed it very well in the
state of the Union address when he said :

As conflict and rivalries persist in the world, our
U.S. intelligence capabilities must be the best in the
world.

The crippling of our foreign intelligence services
increases the danger of American involvement in
direct armed conflict. Our adversaries are encouraged
to attempt new adventures while our own ability to
monitor events and to influence events short of mili-
tary action is undermined.

Without effective intelligence capability, the United
States stands blindfolded and hobbled.

Let me give you just two examples.

Our policy to establish a more rational
and reliable relationship with the Soviet
Union — commonly referred to as detente —
would be impossible without good intelli-
gence. Indeed, our confidence in the SALT
agreements is based in large measure on the
specific provisions which permit each side
to check on the compliance of the other
through national technical means of verifica-
tion.

Similarly, without excellent intelligence
the United States would not have been able
to play the leading role in seeking to bring
about a negotiated settlement of the conflict
in the Middle East. All agree that a new
conflict there could bring the United States
and the Soviet Union to the brink of war.

As I have repeatedly said, this nation's
foreign policy must reflect the values, aspira-
tions, and perceptions of its people; it must
have broad public support. The American

arch 1, 1976

275

people must have confidence not only in our
policies but also in the institutions which
formulate and carry out those policies. This
means that our foreign policy must reflect
consultation and accommodation between the
executive and legislative branches. But
each branch has its special responsibilities as
well. The executive must provide strong cen-
tral direction of foreign policy and must con-
sult with the Congress. Congress must pro-
vide mature counsel and must protect the
confidentiality of its consultations with the
executive.

That brings me to the question this com-
mittee is addressing: How should a democ-
racy provide for control of its intelligence
activities which, if they are to be effective,
must operate in secret?

It is not my place as Secretary of State
to recommend how the Congress should or-
ganize its oversight eff'ort; but for over-
sight to be eff'ective and constructive, condi-
tions must be created which will promote
mutual trust in dealing with the necessarily
sensitive aspects of intelligence information
and operations. Both overseers and those
overseen must be able to feel sure that in-
formation given in confidence will remain in
confidence. No other single condition for suc-
cess is as important as this. The system can-
not function in the atmosphere of distrust
that has prevailed in recent months.

Rather than make specific proposals for
oversight, I would prefer to set forth some
general principles which I believe are im-
portant and should be given serious consid-
eration.

First, I believe that the goal of congres-
sional oversight should be to insure that the
intelligence activities of the United States
are grounded in the basic values, percep-
tions, and aspirations of the people of this
country as well as in a clear view of the
national interest.

Congress has a particular responsibility in
insuring that this is so, because intelligence
does not lend itself to extensive public or
media debate. This requires that the public
have great confidence in the congressional
oversight mechanism. Americans must be

assured that their constitutional rights wi
not be abridged by intelligence operation;
I welcome congressional oversight because
believe it will build public confidence in oi
intelligence system, and we in the executiv
branch can benefit from the wise counsi
oversight can provide. But correction of th
errors of the past must not take the fon
of controls in the future that would stif
intelligence.

Second, I believe we must maintain tl-
proper constitutional perspective.

Under the Constitution the conduct (
foreign relations is the responsibility of i\
President as the nation's chief executi^
officer. Congressional oversight must not ii
fringe on the President's responsibility f(
intelligence in a way which would violate tl
principle of the separation of powers. Tl
Constitution is written as it is for practic
as well as for political reasons.

Congress is a deliberative and lawmakii
body, not an executive organ, and it is n^
organized to provide day-to-day operation
direction to ongoing intelligence program
Any proposal based on the idea of executi'
management by Congress is, in my jud
ment, a mistake.

Existing legislation requires the Preside
to determine that covert action operatic
are important to national security and to gi
timely notice of those operations to appi
priate bodies of the Congress. I believe i\
is adequate for oversight. I recommend th
this or a similar arrangement be continu
but that it be concentrated in the oversig
committee.

Third is the crucial matter that the i
formation provided to the congressioi
oversight body must in many cases rema
secret.

Much of this information is highly clas
fied and is gathered from intelligen
sources and methods whose continued exii
ence must be protected by seci-ecy at ■
times. Much of the information is suppli
us in confidence by foreign governments a;
services whose cooperation could be lost 1
public exposure. Some of it also bears ■
U.S. plans or policies whose effectiveness c

276

Department of State Bulle'

tends on continued protection from dis-
ilosure.

Unauthorized release of such information
ould do great damage to national security
nd our foreign policy. Protection of it is a
iesponsibility both the Congress and the
xecutive must share.

I strongly believe that any legislation to
stablish an oversight committee must in-
lude safeguards for the protection of this
.ensitive and important information. Classi-
led information given to the Congress should
ot be made public without the concurrence
f the President or his representative.

As a related point, I would like to state
ly agreement with Mr. Colby [William E.
'olby, former Director of Central Intelli-
ence] that it is essential to establish pro-
edures and sanctions to prevent unauthor-
:ed disclosure of classified material. Legisla-
ition for this purpose is currently under
onsideration in the executive branch. It
'ould provide for the prosecution of govern-
lent employees, in both the Congress and the
xecutive, who disclose such information
'ithout authority.

Fourth, and last, I believe the best over-
ight is concentrated oversight — ideally by
joint committee.

The benefits of such an arrangement are
umerous: it would permit rapid responses
oth ways between the Congress and the
itelligence community when time is crucial ;
: would reduce the chance of leaks by limit-
ig the number of people with access to sen-
itive information ; it would encourage maxi-
lum sharing of information; and it would
ermit a rapid development of expertise to
acilitate penetrating and effective over-
ight.

If a joint committee is not possible, I ask
hat you keep the principle and benefits of
oncentration in mind and limit oversight to
he minimum number of committees required
0 conduct oversight effectively.
In concluding, I would like to express
gain my fervent hope that we can rapidly
nd the divisive debate over the intelligence
ommunity which has been so harmful over
he past year. I hope this committee will

quickly complete its task of establishing
effective oversight so that we can all turn to
the real challenges that face us in this
dangerous world.

I stand ready to help in any way I can, and
I am ready to answer any questions you may
have.

Supplementary Extradition Treaty
With Spain Transmitted to Senate

Message From President Ford '

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and
consent of the Senate to ratification, I trans-
mit herewith a supplementary treaty on ex-
tradition between the United States and
Spain, signed at Madrid on January 25,
1975.

The supplementary treaty modifies our
treaty on extradition with Spain by increas-
ing from 30 to 45 days the period of time
during which a person may be provisionally
arrested and detained pending presentation,
through diplomatic channels, of documents
in support of an extradition request. This
change is in keeping with modern extradition
treaties and is intended to prevent the re-
lease of an arrested person for lack of prop-
erly prepared extradition papers.

I transmit also for the information of the
Senate the report of the Department of
State with respect to this supplementary
treaty.

I recommend that the Senate give early
and favorable consideration to the supple-
mentary treaty, and give its advice and
consent to ratification.

Gerald R. Ford.

The White House, February 3, 1976.

'Transmitted on Feb. 3 (text from White House
press release); also printed as S. Ex. B, 94th Cong.,
2d sess., which includes the texts of the treaty and
the report of the Department of State.

'^arch 1, 1976

277

The African Dimension of the Angolan Conflict

Statement by William E. Schaufele, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs

Mr. Chairman [Senator Richard C.
Clark] : When Secretary Kissinger met
with you and your distinguished colleagues
on January 29, he asked you to look at what
is happening in Angola in its larger global
context. He discussed the implications of
Moscow's effort to obtain a position of spe-
cial influence in central Africa through mili-
tary intervention by Cuban proxy. There is
little that I can say either to add to or de-
tract from this global analysis of what An-
gola means in the context of our future rela-
tions with the U.S.S.R.

What I would like therefore to do today
is to examine the African dimension of this
conflict in greater detail. At the risk of bor-
ing you with some history, I would like to
convey our perception of how the Angolan
conflict developed from being an African to
being an international problem.

As you know, a part of our basic policy
for many years in Africa has been to do what
we could to insulate that continent from
great-power conflicts. We have sought to
avoid confrontation except when it was
forced upon us. In the case of the Soviet and
Cuban thrust into Angola, we feel that the
confrontation was forced upon us.

Within a purely African context, we are
not opposed to the Popular Movement for
the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). In fact,

' Made before the Subcommittee on African Affairs
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on
Feb. 6. The complete transcript of the hearings will
be published by the committee and will be available
from the Superintendent of Documents. U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office. Washington, D.C. 20402.

before our consulate officers left Luanda las'
November, they had more contact with rep
resentatives of the MPLA than with th
other two political movements, the Nationj
Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA
and the Union for the Total Independence c
Angola (UNITA). What we oppose is th
MPLA's effort, as a minority political mov(
ment, to impose itself as the government c
Angola, with the help of Soviet arms and
Cuban proxy army, on the majority i
Angola.

A few words will perhaps help us undei
stand why the U.S.S.R. and Cuba should 1:
prepared to underwrite a minority politic
movement thousands of miles from horn
According to a Soviet handbook, "Afric
Today," published in 1962, the MPLA wi
founded in 1956 "on the initiative of tl
Communist Party and the allied Party >
Joint Struggle of the Africans of Angola
a clandestine anti-Portuguese organizatio
This was a period of growing Soviet intere
in Africa, where the process of decoloniz
tion was unfolding and Moscow evident
saw opportunities to implant its influence
place of the departing metropole powers.

There are obvious parallels between Sovi
efforts to move in on the Congo after ind
pendence in 1960 and Moscow's behavior
Angola today. In that case, the Sovie
worked through the Belgian Communi
Party and their own Central Committee a
paratus concerned with relations with foreif
Communists. This time Moscow work(
through the Portuguese Communist Part
following the overthrow of the Caetai

278

Department of State Bullet

•egime and the temporary ascendancy in
Portugal of a radical military leadership
,'vith close ties to the Communists.
' In 1964 the MPLA began to receive finan-
.'ial and military assistance through Portu-
fuese Communist Party leaders. Moscow
lad previously financed an MPLA leader,
Daniel] Chipenda, who now is allied with
he FNLA. Moscow slackened its aid in the
■arly 1970's when the MPLA was in the mid-
He of one of its periodic power struggles
|)ut at a time when the "national liberation"
truggle against Portugal was still in full
wing. When the Soviets decided to renew
iull-scale assistance to the MPLA in 1974,
his was no contribution to "national lib-
ration" with independence around the
orner; it was a cynical move for political
lower after Portugal had already agreed to
Lngolan independence.

I Based on my 17 years of work with Africa,
am convinced that the Africans could have
/orked out some consensus agreement
ringing the factions together in Angola if
hey had been left to themselves. It was the
oviet decision, in my judgment, to step up
rms aid to what it apparently regarded as
n organization in which it had influence
hich destroyed Portugal's effort through
lie Alvor accord of January 1975 to establish

provisional coalition government embrac-
ig the three factions. With the prospect of
eing a minority partner in a post-independ-
nce government and the promise of Soviet
rms, the MPLA had no incentive to
Dmpromise.

It was precisely this sort of lack of re-
traint in pursuit of unilateral advantage in

situation of opportunity which the U.S.S.R.
nd this country solemnly agreed to avoid in
rie declaration of principles which they
igned in May 1972 in Moscow.

To argue that the Soviet and Cuban inter-
ention represented a response to action
iken by this government, by Zaire, or by
outh Africa ignores the facts and the
hronology. I would suggest this line of argu-
lent begs the question of our unwillingness
0 face our responsibilities as the only power
II the world able — if willing — to protect

weaker nations against Soviet intervention
in their domestic political quarrels.

Chronology of Events

A succinct chronology of events in Angola
that led up to our decision to provide assist-
ance to the FNLA and UNITA forces and
subsequent developments should make per-
fectly clear — and I want to emphasize these
points — that our actions were reactive to
those of the Soviet Union and Cuba, independ-
ent of those of South Africa, and designed to
achieve a military situation which would pro-
mote a government of national unity com-
posed of all three factions.

The Soviet Union began extensive rearm-
ing of the MPLA, then based in Congo
(Brazzaville), in October 1974. Previous
to this, we had 7-ejected requests to provide
military support to the FNLA. The Soviet
arms shipments continued up through the
January 1975 independence talks among the
Portuguese and the three liberation move-
ments which culminated in the Alvor accord.

In January 1975 we provided funds to the
FNLA for political purposes, reflecting our
judgment that the FNLA was at a dis-
advantage operating in Luanda, an MPLA-
dominated city. This sum was to be doled out
over many months and was insignificant
compared to Moscow's military aid.

During the skii-mishes between the FNLA
and MPLA in February and the major bat-
tles of March and April, we noticed an in-
creasing tendency on the part of the MPLA
forces to ignore the cease-fires called for by
the leaders of all three movements and to
act independently to achieve their maximum
military goals. From March through May,
not only did the quantity of the Soviet and
Communist-bloc arms flow increase, reflect-
ing delivery decisions taken several months
earlier, but the nature of the weaponry
escalated as well, with quantities of large
mortars and several armored vehicles
showing up inside Angola by May.

MPLA intransigence increased along with
the Soviet aid in June and July, and on July
9 the MPLA drove the FNLA and UNITA

\arch 1, 1976

279

completely out of Luanda, thereby destroying
even the pretext of a coalition government.
After separate pleas from Zambia and Zaire,
each of which saw their security threatened
by the specter of a Soviet-supported MPLA,
we reversed our earher decision not to pro-
vide military support to any faction, and on
July 18 we authorized the use of covert funds
for the FNLA and UNITA forces. Our goal
was to strengthen the two movements suffi-
ciently to preserve a military balance and
thereby encourage the establishment of a
compromise coalition government. We hoped,
at the same time, to signal the seriousness of
our concern by this decision to the Soviets and
allow them to scale down their intervention
without open confrontation.

After our decision was made but before
any U.S. assistance could become apparent,
the first Cuban forces arrived in Angola in
August as part of an arrangement among
the Soviet Union, the MPLA, and Cuba to
enable the MPLA to extend its military con-
trol over all of the nation.

It was at about this same time that South
African forces occupied several damsites in-
side Angola that are connected with a joint
Portuguese-South African hydroelectric
project in Angola and Namibia. Later, prob-
ably in late September, the South Africans
apparently decided to intervene militarily in
the conflict. We had nothing to do with their
decision, were not consulted, and were not
aware of their involvement in the fighting
until after their entry. Large numbers of
Cuban forces, including combat units, ar-
rived in Angola almost simidtaneoiislij with
the South Africans. This coincidence, plus
reports from Cuban prisoners taken in An-
gola, indicates that the Cuban decision to
intervene with combat forces was made, and
forces dispatched, before the South Africans
undertook their own intervention.

Commencing in late October, there was
again a marked increase in the quantity and
sophistication of the Soviet weapons, with
tanks, rockets, and a large number of ar-
mored vehicles pouring in to be manned by
the Cuban forces. This escalation has con-
tinued until now, except for a halt of some
two weeks from December 9 to 25 when the

Soviet Government may have been reevaluat
ing its position in the light of ever firmei
U.S. military and diplomatic signals whic\
the Secretary has already outlined to you 1
However, the vote of this body on Decembe ,
19 provided a general indication to everyon.
that U.S. ability and willingness to provid^
assistance was highly questionable.

At this point the FNLA has been drivei
back to the northern corner of its previousl:
held territory and UNITA forces are stil
strongly resisting the MPLA advance i:
the south even with reduced resources ani
against over 11,000 well trained and equipped
Cuban troops. Savimbi [Jonas Savimbi, o
UNITA] has said that he will carry on th
battle against the MPLA again from th
bush if he cannot get any outside assistanc(

Reactions in Africa

U

Our African friends — and even son:
countries which are not so friendly — ai
acutely aware of the implications for the
security of Soviet and Cuban interventic
including a massive expeditionary force i
Africa. After all, there are few developir
countries which do not have to deal wit
radical internal factions which would 1
quite capable of calling upon the U.S.S.R.
assist them in the name of "proletarit_
internationalism." ||

Even some of our critics are visibly di
turbed by the turn of events in Angola. T'
weekly magazine Jeime Afrique [Paris
which is usually quite critical of the Unit
States, sharply attacked the MPLA in i
January 30 edition for allowing itself to t
come a pawn on the Soviet internation
chessboard, stating that it did "not belie
that the MPLA, very much a minori
movement, politically and ethnically, w
able to govern all of Angola alone or to pi
serve the independence of the country."
its issue a week earlier the Jeune Afnq
editorial, which also criticized U.S. polic
stated :

The strategy of the MPLA that we cannot suppi
is: The monopolization of power on the very day
independence, at the predictable, therefore accept'
price of a civil war by a minority and Commun

280

Department of State Bulle

jilitical party, with massive military and human
jsistance from far-off foreign places (except ideo-
^ically), against all the neighboring countries.
It is absolutely without precedent and one cannot
e how it can succeed or. in addition, how it can be
fended.

The Nigerian Herald complained on Janu-
■y 30 of the uncritical view then taken of
)viet activity in Africa. It argued that if
ngola were to go Socialist, it should not be
; force of arms. There are many other
<:amples I could cite of public support for
(ir position, not the least of which was the
iticle in the New Republic, reprinted in the
"ashington Star last Sunday, by Colin
)!gum, a highly respected authority on
irica often critical of our African policy.

I can tell you frankly from my meetings

ith five chiefs of state during my visit to
irica in December, and from numerous
jports from our Ambassadors, that the 22
(iuntries which followed existing OAU pol-
'if to recognize no faction during the sum-
lit of the Organization of African Unity
leeting in Addis Ababa this past January
ie watching closely to see whether the
liited States will be prepared to support its
'lends in Africa — or whether they should
:w adjust their policies to what they con-
(ive of as new realities.

No one questions our power; but certainly
uny leaders around the world — friends,
litics, and adversaries — question whether
'; still have the will to use our power in
tfense of what appear to them as obvious
.nerican, not merely African, interests. As
< e distinguished African leader expressed
i to our Ambassador, it is ironic that when
l.lf of Africa is for once actively looking to
I e United States for support and leadership,
'e U.S. Government has its hands tied and
innot respond. Pleas to "do something" can
1 heard from all corners of Africa.

In the first place, of course, it is the coun-

ies neighboring the Communist military
liildup in Angola and Congo (Brazzaville) —

mely, Zaire, Zambia, and Gabon — which

■' e particularly concerned for their security.

supporting the FNLA and UNITA, and

e idea of a coalition government, Zambia
■ id Zaire wish to insure that Angola, which
introls an important outlet for their econo-

mies, the Benguela Railroad, is run by a sov-
ereign African government which is not de-
pendent on foreign powers who pursue their
own special interests in central and southern
Africa.

Extension of Soviet Influence

We are told that we are overreacting —
that the Africans will never be Communists
and we should not worry about what the
Soviets are doing. This argument misses the
whole point of Moscow's strategy in less de-
veloped areas like Africa. When the Soviets
speak about changing the "correlation of
forces" in the world, they are talking about
extending their influence in countries where
it has not been strong before and, conversely,
neutralizing Western influence in countries
where it was previously dominant. It is true
that Moscow claims to see this as a long, slow
process growing out of internal social and
other conflicts. It also believes, however,
that Communist countries have a certain
role to play as "midwives of progress" assist-
ing leftist forces in each country.

We know well from other Soviet press ar-
ticles this year that the FNLA and UNITA
forces are what the upside-down Soviet
lexicon calls "reactionaries" and "sphtters."
The same sort of language was used to de-
scribe the vast majority of the Czech peo-
ple when they also resisted Soviet efforts to
impose a minority Soviet-style democracy.

Angola is an illustration of how the
U.S.S.R. now feels it can behave in one of
these conflict situations in Africa. The issue
here is not merely one of principle: real
democracy versus totalitarianism, something
which used to concern American liberals.
But it is also a basic question of how social
change is to come about in the developing
world. We and the Soviets can both agree
that many changes are needed, and we also
thought we had agreed to use mutual re-
straint and avoid trying to take unilateral
advantage of each other in future conflict
situations; but certainly the sending of a
12,000-man Cuban army to Angola to pro-
mote "progressive" social change is a curi-
ous form of restraint.

arch 1, 1976

281

Now we are hearing from various MPLA
leaders, reputedly the more moderate ones,
that they have no intention of selling out to
the Russians, that they will respect our eco-
nomic interests, that they want to have
close relations with us, et cetera. I would
simply note that these statements come at a
time of divisive internal debate in the United
States and when the MPLA feels sure it will
win the conflict but is aware of other African
concern about the foreign presence. No one
knows exactly what will happen in Angola.
But it is reasonable to assume that countries
with an expeditionary force in place are in
the best position to call the shots.

Some say that African nationalism will
take care of the Russians and the Cubans
and cite countries where excessive Soviet
influence has been eliminated.

But there is no precedent in Africa for a
government of a newly independent African
state which owes its very existence to the
Soviet Union. Certainly the fact that the
Soviet Union was permitted to mount such a
massive intervention from neighboring
Congo (Brazzaville) would not indicate that
its influence has seriously diminished in the
10 years it has had a privileged position
there.

Certainly the fact that there are some
3,300 Soviet military and civilian advisers in
certain African states would not indicate
that this influence is diminishing. Certainly
the fact that Soviet military assistance de-
liveries have been three times their delivery
of economic assistance is a clear indication
of what they really seek in Africa.

I will not pretend to predict in what cate-
gory an MPLA government might fall, ex-
cept to note that with the obhgations it will
have incurred it may become one of the most
dependent African governments on the
continent. This dependence and Soviet-
Cuban ambitions in Africa lead me to ques-
tion whether we will be seeing any early de-
parture of this foreign army. I hope I am
wrong.

Only now are many Americans and Afri-
cans beginning to see the implications of the
presence of 12,000 Cubans in Angola. When
the Cuban Deputy Prime Minister announced

during the OAU summit meeting that Cu
would continue to send its troops to Angc
as long as Neto [Agostinho Neto, of t
MPLA] wanted them, the Daily Mail
Lusaka exploded at this arrogant insisten
that Cuba "would continue to send troops
Angola to kill Africans whether the 0/
liked it or not."

Risks in U.S. Failure To Respond

I tell you very frankly, as one who 1;
spent many years in Africa and with Afi
cans and who has also spent the equivak,
of many days talking to African leaders i
diff'erent viewpoints about the Angolan pn-
lem, I am very concerned. I believe that f
had a good chance in the fall to persuade 1 1
Soviets that they would have to choose ,■
tween the priorities of detente and tht
self-assumed role as champion of "natio J
liberation" in central and southern Afri.
But we never had the opportunity to find o .

On the ground in Angola, the lack of •
phisticated military equipment in quantits
sufficient to handle Soviet rockets, tan,
and now planes has placed the FNLA <■ i
UNITA forces in an increasingly desper i
situation. Further recognitions of the MP i
flow directly from this deteriorating milifc f
situation and the belief that the Uni 1
States will not provide the response to 1 -
ance Soviet-Cuban intervention.

The results are too easily predictable:

— Two groups representing a majoi y
of Angolans are prevented from their rij -
ful participation in the government of n
independent nation because of outside in -
vention and the inability of the Uni i
States adequately to respond.

— Moscow and Havana may see themsei s
shortly in a position to pursue their an i-
tions elsewhere under the dangerously r ;■
taken notion that in succeeding once t y
can succeed again.

— In the post-Angolan atmosphere of '•
security and disillusionment with the lacl if
U.S. support, the states neighboring Anj a
— Zaire and Zambia — would be under gut
pressure to seek an accommodation i-

282

Department of State Bull in

i

p

hntageous to them or see their vital
cj^to the ocean threatened.

-Other African states would adjust to
Ki realities of power so vividly demon-
Ited in Angola by the Soviet airlift and
i-,Cuban expeditionary force.

-Those Soviet officials who pushed this
1 ional liberation" struggle on the heels
■'/■iet-Nam will have been proven right.
Kied, the sweeping returns in Africa from

Ivement in a single internal power strug-
ecan only encourage similar adventures
S'vhere.

-And in the last analysis we risk bring-
ijon other confrontations in the future
[i(!r conditions less advantageous to us and
103 dangerous to us all.

; share what I think is your wish, Mr.
h rman, that such problems could be re-
)hd without the use of arms, that Afri-
u be allowed to solve their own problems,
\i the United States not get involved in
it'nal politics in Africa or elsewhere, that
j: attention be devoted to peaceful and
jossful evolution in Africa. But it takes
V to tango — and while we are gyrating on
uiloor, the Soviet Union has taken some-
iM down the garden path. The African at-
tile, based on its perception of Soviet
9'!r, will make it even more difficult for
i :ans to realize their own legitimate as-
ir ;ions without outside interference.

.; this juncture, if the Congress is deter-
li 'd not to provide the wherewithal suc-
?s "uUy to resist this Soviet-Cuban effort to
it)lish their influence by force in this
a: of Africa, I believe it is imperative that
i€ bers of this Congress express their deep
)i3rn about the possibility that either of
i< 3 two countries might engage in similar
d' ntures elsewhere. To my knowledge that
Jiern, which I know exists, has not sur-
M 1 in any public hearings in which I have
a icipated. In fact the debate has largely
et directed at U.S. involvement. Secondly,

ige you seriously to consider what the
red States can and should do to counter
It effects of our unwillingness to meet our
eionsibilities in Angola on our relation-
al: s in Africa and on the security of our
nids there.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

94th Congress, 1st Session

The U.S. Proposal for an International Grain Re-
serves System. Report of a staff study mission to
the September 29-30, 1975, meeting of the Inter-
national Wheat Council Preparatory Group sub-
mitted to the House Committee on International
Relations. November 1975. 20 pp.

International Commodity Agreements. A Report of
the U.S. International Trade Commission to the
Subcommittee on International Trade of the Senate
Committee on Finance. November 1975. 189 pp.

A Resolution to Protect the Ability of the United
States to Trade Abroad. Report of the Senate
Committee on Finance to accompany S. Res. 265.
S. Rept. 94-444. November 5, 1975. 5 pp.

Tax Conventions With Iceland, Poland, and Romania.
Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions to accompany Ex. E, 94-1; Ex. A, 94-1; Ex.
B, 93-2. S. Ex. Rept. 94-15. November 11, 1975.
14 pp.

Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year
1976. Conference report to accompany S. 1517. H.
Rept. 94-660. November 13, 1975. 32 pp.

Extradition Treaty With Australia. Report of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accom-
pany Ex. F, 93-2. S. Ex. Rept. 94-16. November
18, 1975. 4 pp.

Extradition Treaty With Canada. Report of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accom-
pany Ex. G, 93-21. S. Ex. Rept. 94-17. November
18, 1975. 4 pp.

Protocols for the Further Extension of the Inter-
national Wheat Agreement, 1971. Report of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accom-
pany Ex. C, 94-1. S. Ex. Rept. 94-18. November
18, 1975. 17 pp.

Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Lead-
ers. An interim report of the Senate Select Com-
mittee To Study Governmental Operations With
Respect to Intelligence Activities together with
additional, supplemental, and separate views. S.
Rept. 94-465. November 20, 1975. 349 pp.

Sense of the House Regarding Status of the Baltic
States. Report of the House Committee on Inter-
national Relations to accompany H. Res. 864. H.
Rept. 94-677. November 20, 1975. 4 pp.

Veto of Act Providing for Protection of Foreign Dip-
lomatic Missions and Increasing Size of the Exec-
utive Protective Service. Message from the Presi-
dent of the United States vetoing H.R. 12. H.
Doc. 94-312. December 1, 1975. 4 pp.

International Development and Food Assistance Act
of 1975. Conference report to accompany H.R. 9005.
H. Rept. 94-691. December 4, 1975. 41 pp.

Fisheries Management and Conservation Act. Report
of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, to-
gether with supplemental and minority views, to
accompany S. 961. S. Rept. 94-515. Decepiber 8,
1975. 14 pp.

»t h 1, 1976

283

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Fiji

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. ]
fected by excliange of notes at Suva December
1975, and January 9, 1976. Entered into fo
Januai-y 9. 1976.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Convention on matters of taxation, with rela
letters. Signed at Washington June 20, 1973. ]
tered into force January 29, 1976, effective Ja:
ary 1, 1976.
Proclaimed by the President: January 22. 1976

Astronauts

Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the return
of astronauts, and the return of objects launched
into outer space. Opened for signature at Wash-
ington. London, and Moscow April 22, 1968. Entered
into force December 3, 1968. TIAS 6.599.
Acceptance effective: European Space Agency.
December 31. 1975.

Exhibitions

Protocol revising the convention of November 22,
1928, relating to international expositions, with
appendix and annex. Done at Paris November 30,
1972.'
Accession deposited: German Democratic Republic

(with reservation and declaration), December 16,

1975.

Load Lines

International convention on load lines. 1966. Done at
London April 5. 1966. Entered into force July 21,
1968. TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720.
Accession deposited: Ecuador, January 12, 1976.

BILATERAL

Belgium

Agreement extending the memorandum of under-
standing of October 17, 1972 (TIAS 7479), on the
regulation of passenger charter air services. Ef-
fected by exchange of letters at Brussels Decem-
ber 29, 1975, and January 16. 1976, Entered into
force January 12, 1976.

' Not in force.

Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: February 9-15

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations. Department of State.
Washington, D.C. 20520.

No. Date Bnbiect

*56 2/9 U.S.-Egypt textile agreement.

*57 2/10 Anthony C. E. Quainton sworn ir
as Ambassador to the Central
African Republic (biographic
data).

*58 2/9 Galen L. Stone sworn in as Deputj
U.S. Representative to the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agencj
(biographic data).

*59 2/10 Robert Anderson sworn in as Am-
bassador to Morocco (biographic
data).

^eO 2/11 Joseph A. Greenwald sworn in a;
Assistant Secretary for Econoraii
and Business Affairs (biographi'
data).

*61 2/12 Study Group 1. U.S. National Com
mittee for the International Tele
graph and Telephone Consultativ-
Committee (CCITT), Mar. 11.

*62 2/12 Study Group 1, U.S. National Com
mittee for CCITT, Mar, 10.

*63 2/12 30-day seminar on adult and con
tinning education with repre
sentatives of 11 nations beginnini
Feb. 15.

t64 2/12 Kissinger: news conference.

*65 2/13 Albert B. Fay sworn in as Ambas
sador to Trinidad and Tobag
(biographic data).

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

284

Department of State Bull|

IIDEX March 1, 1976 Vol. LXXIV, No. 19H.

iriculture. Questions and Answers Following

the Secretary's Address at Laramie .... 257

merican Principles. America's Destiny: The
Global Context (Kissinger) 249

iigola

le African Dimension of the Angolan Conflict

(Sehaufele) 278

aestions and Answers Following the Secre-
tary's Address at Laramie 257

cretai^y Kissinger Interviewed by Panel at

Los Angeles 263

iirbados. Letters of Credence (King) . . . 256

intra! African Republic. Letters of Credence
(Maidou) 256

liina. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed by
Panel at Los Angeles 263

(ingress

'le African Dimension of the Angolan Conflict
(Sehaufele) 278

.nerica's Destiny: The Global Context (Kis-
singer) 249

Ingress and the U.S. Intelligence Community
(Kissinger) 274

( ngressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 283

. cretary Kissinger Interviewed by Panel at
Los Angeles 263

. pplementary Extradition Treaty With Spain
Transmitted to Senate (message from Presi-
dent Ford) 277

sarmament. Questions and Answers Follow-
ing the Secretary's Address at Laramie . . 257

onomic Affairs. Secretary Kissinger Inter-
viewed by Panel at Los Angeles 263

lergy. lEA Governing Board Adopts Long-
Term Energy Program 261

irope. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed by
Panel at Los Angeles 263

tradition. Supplementary Extradition Treaty
With Spain Transmitted to Senate (message
from President Ford) 277

Foreign Aid. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed
by Panel at Los Angeles 263

Intelligence. Congress and the U.S. Intelligence
Community (Kissinger) 274

International Organizations and Conferences.

lEA Governing Board Adopts Long-Term
Energy Program 261

Lebanon. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed by
Panel at Los Angeles 263

Middle East. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed

by Panel at Los Angeles 263

Peru. Letters of Credence (Garcia-Bedoya) . . 256

Presidential Documents. Supplementary Extra-
dition Treaty With Spain Transmitted to
Senate 277

Spain. Supplementary Extradition Treaty With
Spain 'Transmitted to Senate (message from
President Ford) 277

Thailand. Letters of Credence (Pachari-

yangkun) 256

Treaty Information. CuiTent Actions .... 284

Turkey. Questions and Answers Following the

Secretary's Address at Laramie 257

U.S.S.R.

Questions and Answers Following the Secre-
tary's Address at Laramie 257

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed by Panel at
Los Angeles 263

United Nations. Secretary Kissinger Inter-
viewed by Panel at Los Angeles 263

Name Index

Ford, President 277

Garcia-Bedoya, Carlos 256

King, Maurice A 256

Kissinger, Secretai-y 249, 257, 263, 274

Maidou, Christophe 256

Pachariyangkun, Upadit 256

Sehaufele, William E.. Jr 278

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3:

7?/S

ITHE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ULLETIN

^olume LXXIV

No. 1915

March 8, 1976

[SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF FEBRUARY 12 285

PRESIDENT FORD ANNOUNCES PLANS FOR REORGANIZATION
OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 292

UNITED STATES ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH AFRICA

Statement by Assistant Secretary Schaufele 295

BostCE IVclic Library
Superint<n(1ont Lif l^ocwrnents

APRi ijVd/b

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXXIV, No. 1915
March 8, 1976

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing OfBce

Washington, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes.

domestic $42.50. foreign $53.16

Single copy 85 cents

The Secretary of State has determined that
the publication of this periodical is necessary
in the transaction of the public business re-
quired by law of this Department. Use of
funds for printing this periodical has been
approved by the Director of the Office of Man-
agement and Budget through .lanuai-y 31. 1981.
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may be
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

The Department of State BVLLETIl
a weekly publication issued by tl
OfRce of Media Services, Bureau i
Public Affairs, provides t/te public oi
interested agencies of tfie governmei
with information on developments
the field of U.S. foreign relations m
on the work of the Department at
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes select*
press releases on foreign policy, issm
by the White House and the Depm
ment, and statements, address*
and news conferences of the Presidtt
and the Secretary of State and oth
officers of the Department, as well i
special articles on various phases
international affairs and the functio:
of the Department. Information
included concerning treaties and intt
national agreements to which t
United States is or may become
party and on treaties of general intt
national interest.
Publications of the Department
State, United Nations documents, ai
legislative material in the field
international relations are also list*

iecretary Kissinger's News Conference of February 12

i(s^ release 64 dated February 12

Secretary Kissinger: I would like to make

liiief statement on Guatemala.

This is my first opportunity to express
uhlicly our government's and my personal
i.vmpathy for the people of Guatemala in the
nparalleled tragedy which has befallen
lem and their country.

Americans have always traditionally re-
Kinded generously in thought and deed to
le needs of the suffering. Reflecting that
unianitarian spirit, our government, joined
y its citizens and charitable organizations,
mounting a major effort to assist the
overnment and people of Guatemala to ease
le suffering caused by the earthquake.

I will visit Guatemala on February 24 in
mnection with my Latin American trip.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the State Department
lokesman has this tveek consistently re-
ised to comment on the reports of the
icrowave bugging of the Embassy in Mos-
iic. Will you now tell us the fact's and what
^tion you have taken to get the Russians to
ase this activity, which has been going on
If years? Also, could you discuss the radia-
0)1 hazard that is involved in this?

Secretary Kissinger: This issue is a mat-
r of great delicacy which has many rami-
:ations. Our overwhelming concern is of
lurse the health and welfare of State De-
utment and other personnel in Moscow.
'e have made unilateral efforts to reduce
ly dangers, and we are also engaged in
scussions on the subject. But I do not be-
eve it would serve these purposes if I
ent into any greater detail.

Q. May I follow it up, please, because
idiation in the minds of many Americans

means radioactivity? Can you rule out that
this is radioactivity?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not know
exactly. These matters have to be related to
accepted health levels, and they have to be
related also to the safety standards over a
period of time. I would not use the word
"radioactivity."

Q. Mr. Secretary, in light of the diplo-
matic and military successes of the Popular
Movement in Angola, is the United States
prepared to follotv the OAU [Organization
of African Unity'] line and recognize the
MPLA [Popular Movement for the Libera-
tioyi of Angola] as the legitimate government
of Angola or at least open diplomatic con-
tacts ivith them?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States
has declared consistently that its objection
was not to the MPLA as an organization nor
to its political views as such. Our objection
has been to the imposition of a minority
government by what is now 12,000 Cuban
troops and nearly 300 million dollars' worth
of Soviet equipment. Since January alone the
Soviet Union has introduced over 100 million
dollars' worth of military equipment into
Angola.

Those facts will not be changed by the
military victory that will inevitably result
when one side is deprived of restraint and
the other is given no opportunity to resist.

What the United States will do when
a de facto situation exists, we will decide
under those circumstances. But I have said
before our objection is to the outside imposi-
tion of a government and not to the African
component of the government itself.

arch 8, 1976

285

Q. Mr. Secretary, last year you spoke elo-
quently of the principles that give purpose
to our strength —

Secretary Kissinger: I beg your pardon?

Q. Last year you gave a number of
speeches dealing with the principles that give
purpose to American strength. In your opin-
ion, what are these basic principles of Amer-
ican constitutional democracy, and how do
you conform your official conduct and that
of the State Department to the dictates of
these principles?

Secretary Kissinger: I haven't seen this
gentleman in over a year and a half, and I
think we will go to another question.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if I could ask another
question.

Secretary Kissinger: Certainly.

Q. Specifically, in a government such as
ours, which functions by the consent of the
governed, do you feel that public officials
such as yourself have a duty to fully, cur-
rently, and truthfully iyiform the public, their
employers, so that the consent ivill be in-
formed and not blind?

Secretary Kissinger: What was the last?

Q. — coyiseyit of the governed will be in-
formed consent and not blind consent.

Secretary Kissinger: In a democracy the
government has an obligation to keep the
public informed and to get support by the
existing constitutional processes. In a de-
mocracy also, it is not possible to have
effective government unless there is a mini-
mum of restraint and a minimum of decency
in the public debate so that the essential
element of confidence that must exist if a
society is to get through its difficulties is
preserved.

Developments in SALT Talks

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us ivhat the
status of the SALT talks [Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks'] is, the prospects for your
return to Moscow?

Secretary Kissinger: As we have point<
out, in the SALT talks there were a numb
of propositions made in Moscow, and a nut
ber of proposals were made by the Sovi
Union in reply to the propositions that •,
have advanced. These moved matters fc
ward somewhat.

We are now studying the Soviet reply, ai
we are developing a position to transmit
the Soviet Union within the next week or ;
After we have a Soviet reply, we will
able to judge how close we are to an agn
ment and what the next step should be.

Charges of Business Corruption Abroad

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the question of t
Lockheed reports, could I ask you a thri
part question, please?

What effect do you think these revelati('
will have on both the diplomatic and ci
nomic interests of the United States abroa

Tivo, could you tell us about a letter tl
was published in the Neiv York Times y
terday which says that you supported ph ■
by Lockheed that the names of officials
whom it had made payoffs, along with i
names of their countries, be kept secret?

And three, could you tell us ivhen the 1
partment first became aware of th
matters?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not have
exact answer to your last question. We •
came aware of these matters some mon ;
ago when we were asked about the fore i
policy implications of some of these revt •
tions. And we pointed out that the impli
tions for the domestic stability and the
mestic situation of other countries could ?
extremely serious.

The impact of these revelations has bi i
serious. On the other hand, we not only J
not condone these actions ; we strongly c ■
demn them. We think it is an inappropri e
way to conduct business, and we regret v^ /
much that these actions, if they are true, i
fact took place.

Q. Coidd I take you back to part two f
that, sir, as to why you thought not revi ■

286

Department of State Built n

big the names, that the names be kept secret,
/rrts in the interest of the United States?

Secretary Kissinger: Because the revela-
tion by a congressional committee of the
names of senior officials of other countries
is bound to have serious consequences in
tliose countries. And that is a matter that we
thought the committee should keep in mind.

But I repeat: This has nothing to do with
our approving or condoning the actions that
are revealed in those reports, if they are
true — which I do not know.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the same point, sir,
does it disturb you at all that an American
■ompany was engaging in activities involv-
iifl foreign officials, including in many cases
ightwing officials, that from your statement
,vas apparemtly imknown to U.S. intelligence
officials or the State Department?

Secretary Kissinger: It disturbs me. I
hink it is a matter that should not take
)lace and we must make every effort to
irevent in the future.

Aiddle East Negotiations

Q. Mr. Secretary, what are your future

''lans for any .sort of negotiations regarding

^he Middle East situation, and also can you

onfirm reports of meetings between Israeli

nd Jordanian officials concerning the West

lank?

Secretary Kissinger: I think other gov-
rnments have to confirm or deny meetings
hat they may be having. We are not in-
olved in any such activities.

We have had full and, on the whole, satis-
actory talks with Prime Minister Rabin.
i^e will have some more exchanges with the
5raeli Government, and then we will bring
ack our Ambassadors from the Middle
last, from the Arab countries, for consulta-
!on to discuss what the next move should
e. And we will then convey our best judg-
lent of the various opportunities that are
vailable to all of the parties within the
5urse of the next month.

Mr. Lisagor [Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily
fews] .

Angola and African Concerns

Q. Mr. Secretary, a representative of Zaire
lias been here talking to the President and
yourself. Does this Administration plan some
overt course of policy in relation to those
countries that surround Angola?

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to overt
actions as they apply to Angola, I do not
think it has been generally understood — the
difficulty that any overt request would have
from a legal point of view because it would
in effect say that the United States is asking
for funds for some country to intervene in
a civil war in some other country. So that
part of it is a matter of extreme legal and
political difficulty.

The second problem we now face is that,
as a result of this war and of the Cuban
and Soviet intervention, there is grave con-
cern in countries like Zaire and Zambia and
other countries of Africa that this pattern
might be repeated or that the weapons that
have been accumulated there might be used
for purposes beyond the borders of Ango-
la.

We are talking to the Governments of Zaire
and Zambia, and we will be talking to other
governments, to make sure that we under-
stand what they consider their necessities
and to do the best that we can to prevent the
pattern of Angola from setting a precedent
for the rest of Africa. And when I go to
Africa later this year, this is one of the
subjects that I plan to discuss.

Q. Can I follow that up by asking if they
are requesting specific American actions
notv ?

Secretary Kissinger: If they request spe-
cific American action now, we would take
it very seriously and we would of course dis-
cuss it fully with the Congress.

Relations With the Soviet Union

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have gone to quite
a bit of trouble in the last few loeeks to set
forth your vieivs about the kind of debate on
foreign policy that ought to take place in
1976, particularly with reference to the

larch 8, 1976

287

Soviet Union. How do you feel, having done
that, about the statements ivhich have re-
cently been made that the only result of de-
tente is advantages to the Soviet Union and
the abiliti/ of the United States to sell some
Pepsi-Colas in Siberia?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that there are
a lot of candidates and they all have a prob-
lem about getting into the headlines. I
cannot spend my time answering every can-
didate making some political charge.

I believe that the Administration has at-
tempted to set forth our overall philosophy,
tied to our interpretation of realities. I be-
lieve that a debate ought to deal with some
other version of reality, with some other
concepts, and not with slogans. And I think
that the relationship between the United
States, the Soviet Union, and the People's
Republic of China is too delicate, too impor-
tant for the peace of the world, to be used for
simply partisan sloganeering.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the president of an out-
fit called Hudson Engineering in New Jersey
claims that he has seen Soviet trawlers using
sonic equipment testing for oil off the Jersey
coast. Mr. Hudson claims to have been in
touch with the State Department and to have
heard from the State Department that the
Soviets have tried to begin talks on this sub-
ject and that such talks are in fact under-
u-ay. Would you respond, please?

Secretary Kissinger: I never heard this,
and I will have to check into it. I have never
heard this argument.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you comment,
please, on two things — Angola and the Mos-
cow Embassy affair? Do these have a cumu-
lative effect which at least affects the climate
in xvhich the other aspects of detente, such
as SALT, proceed?

Secretary Kissinger: The Moscow Em-
bassy affair, I have tried to point out, is a
matter of great complexity and sensitivity.

Angola, we have stressed since November,
is a pattern of behavior that the United
States will not accept — that if continued it
will have serious consequences for any
possibility of easing of relations with the

288

Soviet Union, and if continued, and if it be-
comes a pattern, must affect other relation-
ships.

U.S.-P.R.C. Relations

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you comment on
recent changes in Peking and on ivhat effect
this might have on U.S. -China relations?

Secretary Kissinger: We were not previ-
ously consulted before these changes were
made. Indeed, at the risk of undermining
our reputation for foreseeing things, we
were surprised by the changes.

We believe that the basic foreign policy/
of the People's Republic of China, as well as*
ours, depends on the basic conception of the
national interests of both countries. Those
interests will determine the policies; and
their personalities, in this sense, play a sec-
ondary role. So we expect that the basic
lines of our foreign policy, as the basic lines
of Chinese policy, will continue.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you saw former Presi-
dent Nixon in San Clemente before it wab
announced that he was going to go to Chinai
What do you think of his trip, and what doe^
it mean for American-Chinese relational
What are the Chinese trying to tell us bi
that invitation?

Secretary Kissinger: When I saw Presi
dent Nixon he did not tell me that a tri)
by him to the People's Republic of China wa
imminent. He talked in very general term
of his intentions eventually to take a trif
but not that it was as imminent as it turnei
out to be.

President Nixon was responsible for th
opening to China, and I believe this to hav
been one of the major American diplomat!
initiatives of the recent period. The Chines
are undoubtedly attempting to underline th
importance they attach to this relationship
by their invitation.

This Administration has repeatedly mad
clear that we attach very great slgnificanc
to the relationship with the People's Republi
of China, and therefore we consider anythinj
that symbolizes this to be, on the whol
helpful. On the other hand, President Nixo5

Department of State Bulleti

is going there as a private citizen, and what
the intentions of the Chinese were, beyond
wliat I have stated, is really a matter that
they have not discussed with us.

Q. Mr. Secretary, going back to Angola,
)io)o that the MPLA seems to have ivon a
military rictory, how serious a setback do
ijon think this is for the United States, and
what lessons does this tell the rest of the
ii-orld about the attitudes and divisions in
Washington?

Cuban Forces and Soviet Arms in Angola

Secretai-y Kissinger: The MPLA did not
.score a military victory. Cuba scored a mili-
tary victory, backed by the Soviet Union.
Almost all of the fighting was done by
Cuban forces.

What it should make clear is that we can
conduct foreign policy only as a united peo-
ple, that these victories and setbacks that I
am being asked about are not victories and
setbacks for the Administration, they are
setbacks for the United States — and not so
much for the United States as for those who
have to make the decision what to do in
] similar circumstances when similar pressures
appear again.

It cannot be in the interest of the United
States to establish the principle that Soviet
arms and Cuban expeditionary forces can
appear in situations of turmoil. As we look
around the world at areas of potential con-
flict, it cannot be in the interest of the United
States to create the impression that, in times
3f crisis, either threats or promises of the
United States may not mean anything be-
:ause our divisions may paralyze us.

So, leaving aside the merit of the particu-
lar argument as between one branch or the
3ther, the absolute requirement of the
United States is to come together on a unified
position, and this cannot wait for our elec-
toral process to work itself out.

Q. Following up on that, Mr. Secretary,
^here is a catchphrase that has been kicking
iround the hemisphere for about 12 years —
\'^he export of revolution — with reference to
Cuba. Premier Castro denies that he is ex-

porting revolution. The Soviets deny they are
exporting revolution. Premier Castro this
ireek in Havana was saying this. Do you feel
that the Soviet Union and Cuba are attempt-
ing to export, if not revolution, at least their
system in the Angola matter?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not care what
label you give it. There are 12,000 Cuban
troops and hundreds of millions of dollars of
Soviet equipment in a situation that, had it
been left alone, would have led to some
African solution of a coalition of all of the
factions in which over a period of time one
or the other might have prevailed, but in a
local context.

This is a pattern which, as one looks at
other parts of the world, would have the
gravest consequences for peace and stability,
and it is one which the United States treats
with indiff"erence only at the risk of buying
graver crises at higher cost later on.

Q. Well, if you had your "druthers," what
would you do vis-a-vis Cuba?

Secretary Kissinger: We stated our pref-
erences in December, when the situation, in
our judgment, was manageable and nego-
tiable. It did not get out of hand until our
domestic divisions deprived us of diplomatic
leverage.

What we will do in the future is not for
me to say right now, except that we cannot
leave the impression that we will be in-
different to a continuation of these eflforts.

And if we continue to speak about Angola
it is not because we have any illusions about
what is going on in Angola, but because we
want the American public to understand —
we want other countries to understand — that
at least the executive branch understands
what the problem is and that it will exercise
its responsibilities in a democracy to try to
bring home to the public and to the Congress
what our future obligations may be.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been a pub-
lished account of the Pike committee report,
including dozens of charges against you,
ranging from the allegation that your policy
resulted in a ivillful massacre of Kurds, and
also that your practices of ivithholding in-

March 8, 1976

I

289

formation on the SALT talks produced com-
ments by ijOK lohich are at variance ivith the
facts, which of course is a euphemism for
lying. Can you direct yourself specifically to
any of these charges so that we can run
through them?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, of course, it is
extremely difticult to reply to charges in a
leaked document. And I do not know what
version of the Pike committee report is now
being circulated.

The Pike committee report presents two
problems. One, the use of highly classified
information in violation of an agreement be-
tween the executive branch and the legisla-
tive branch. Secondly, the use of classified
information in a manner that is so distorted,
so geared to preconceived ideas, that the
total impact is to produce a malicious lie.

And therefore, even where documents in
themselves are correct, they are taken so
out of context and they are so fitted into a
preconceived pattern that we are facing here
a new version of McCarthyism.

Q. Mr. Secretary, may I ask a question? It
is indicative of the general interest that until
HOW no question has been asked aboid Latin
America. Why are you going to Latin
America? And in connection with the previ-
ous discussion on Angola and the role of
Cuban troops, are you going to take this up
and possibly propose putting Cuba back into
the hemispheric diplomatic doghouse?

Secretary Kissinger: The trip to Latin
America has been planned for a long time,
and it had to be postponed on a number of
occasions because overwhelming other events
occurred. It is designed to discuss primarily
hemispheric problems: the relationship of
Latin America to the United States; the
relationship of the Western Hemisphere in
which we are facing the problems of the
traditional hemispheric pattern in a world
of interdependence, in which the regional
concerns of some of the countries are now
competing with the interests in the develop-
ing world in general, and in which in Latin
America we deal with countries of similar
backgrounds, similar histories, but a differ-
ent economic development. So that how we

290

manage this relationship is of very great
importance.

What is happening in Angola may or may
not come up. It is not the primary purpose of
my trip. I am not traveling through Latin
America in order to line up Latin Americans
on the Cuban problem.

It is clear that the evolution toward nor-
malization of relations with Cuba, which had
started last year and with which we had
been prepared to cooperate, has been inter-
rupted. But we are not going to Latin
America on a crusade against Cuba.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did the United States
eyicourage the Kurds to expect our support
and then suddenly doublecross them?

Secretary Kissinger: That is a total false-
hood. But it is impossible in these covert
operations to explain the truth without
creating even more difficulties. But the
charges that have been made are utterlj
irresponsible.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the U.N. resolutiom
concerning Namibia, what would be the U.S
position if the military operations now ir
Angola extend through the frontier to Nami
bia and involve now South African troop;
against Cubans or against Angolans?

Secretary Kissinger: This is a problen
that we have not yet had to face. But I cai
only say we cannot look with equanimity t'
the sending of Cuban expeditionary force
around the world.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the West German Re
public and the United States have just con
eluded an international treaty on social seen
rity matters. Before this treaty was signeo
about 1 billion dollars' worth of insuranc
policies held by American citizens were can
celed by the West German Government
These people are notv in suspense. Cannot
some pressure be borne on the West Germai
Government to reinstitute them into theii
contractual rights?

Secretary Kissinger: At the risk of undea
mining public confidence, I do not kno'.
what you are talking about. [Laughter.] W
will look into this.

Department of State Bulletil

Q. Mr. Secretary, referring to your char-
derizatioii of the Pike committee leaks,
■ )idd you tell us to ivhat extent they ivill
ffect your conduct of the foreign policy of
lis country?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that the
isuse of highly classified information in a
■ndentious, misleading, and totally irrespon-
ble fashion must do damage to the foreign
)licy of the United States and has already
,)ne damage to the foreign policy of the
nited States. As far as my conduct of for-
«gn policy is concerned, the best I can do is
1 recommend what I believe to be in the na-
bnal interest, to defend it within the gov-
tnment and to the public as best as I can,
;id then let the democratic process and
Istory sort it out.

Q. Mr. Secretary, given the irreconcilable
iish between your enemies, those ivho attack

II. and your own determination to continue
jveign policy as you best see fit, at which
] int — a7id I hope you won't dismiss it again
,th a joke — at tvhich point does it become
i cessary for you to consider ivhether you
I effect should not step doivn in the interest
' American foreign policy?

\Secretary Kissinger: If I should conclude
I at it is in the interest of American for-
<fn policy, I would step down.
But what one also has to consider is
\ lether the style of public debate should be
1at any public figure can be destroyed by
13 most irresponsible and flagrant charges,
id that then the argument should be made
tat the effectiveness is affected because
t;ally irresponsible and essentially untrue
carges are made. That, too, has to be
\ ighed.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you receive a gift
fym General Barzani [Gen. Midlah Mus-
t)ha Barzani, Kurdish leader'}, and if so
v.ere is it?

Secretary Kissinger: This is a question —

Q. Folloiving up Mr. Marder's [Murrey
hrder, Washington Posf] question. He
eked you in generalities; I'm asking you for
r tails.

Secretary Kissinger: General Barzani sent
a gift to the White House which was never
in my possession, which I have never re-
ceived, which I never in any way dealt with,
which was kept in the White House in some
regular procedure. And I have never received
a gift either from General Barzani or a gift
I kept from any other foreign leader.

And I think it is a disgrace to believe,
and to imply, that the United States would
conduct foreign policy because of gifts that
senior officials may receive.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the status of the
negotiations with the Soviet Union on our
buying oil from them?

Secretary Kissinger: We are negotiating
the purchase of 10 million tons of oil a year,
which is about 3 percent of our total imports.
This involves a number of issues — price,
shipping rates, and related matters. There is
a particular interest in it because our ship-
ping is going to the Soviet Union anyway,
delivering grain, and could therefore be ad-
vantageously used on the return trip carry-
ing oil.

The negotiations are still in process. There
is an agreement that 10 million tons a year
will be available if we can agree on a price
that is advantageous to the United States
or surrounding benefits that will make this
competitive with other purchases.

Q. Don't you think the price is below ivhat
the OPEC countries are charging?

Secretary Kissinger: One has to look at
the overall package, including all the re-
lated matters, before one can make a judg-
ment whether it is a competitive deal.

Q. Mr. Secretary, at the initiative of the
Soviet Union, the press credentials of the
Radio Free Europe correspondents in Inns-
bruck were lifted by the International Olym-
pic Committee. I ivonder whether or not you
think that is a violation of the Helsinki
agreement?

Secretary Kissinger: I have not considered
this. But of course as you know we support
Radio Free Europe, and we have always
encouraged it.

hreh 8, 1976

291

President Ford Announces Plans for Reorganization
of Intelligence Community

Folloiving is the opening statement from a
news conference held by President Ford on
February 17, together with the text of a mes-
sage transmitted to the Congress on Febru-
ary 18.

NEWS CONFERENCE OPENING STATEMENT,
FEBRUARY 17'

For over a year the nation has engaged in
exhaustive investigations into the activity
of the CIA and other intelligence units of
our government. Facts, hearsay, and closely
held secrets — all have been spread out on
the public record.

We have learned many lessons from this
experience, but we must not become obsessed
with the deeds of the past. We must act for
the future.

Tonight I am announcing plans for the
first majoi- reorganization of the intelligence
community since 1974.

First, I am establishing by Executive
order a new command structure for foreign
intelligence.- Henceforth, overall policy di-
rections for intelligence will rest in only one
place: the National Security Council, consist-
ing of the President, the Vice President, the
Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense.
Management of intelligence will be conducted
by a single new committee. That committee
will be chaired by the Director of Central
Intelligence, George Bush. To monitor the
performance of our intelligence operations,

^ For the transcript of questions and answers which
followed, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents dated Feb. 23.

- For text of Executive Order 11905, signed Feb. 18,
see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents
dated Feb. 23.

I am creating a new, independent Oversight
Board to be made up of private citizen;
Former Ambassador Robert Murphy wi
chair the Board and two other distinguishe
citizens — Steve Ailes and Leo Cherne — wi
be the members. All of these units, the N£
tional Security Council, the Committee o
Foreign Intelligence, and the Oversigh
Board, will be responsible to me, so that th
President will continue to be ultimately ai
countable for our intelligence activities.

Second, to improve the performance of th
intelligence agencies and to restore publ
confidence in them, I am issuing a compn
hensive set of public guidelines which wi
serve as legally binding charters for our ii
telligence agencies. The charters will provir
stringent pi-otections for the rights of Ame
ican citizens. I will soon meet with congre
sional leaders to map out legislation to pr
vide judicial safeguards against electron
surveillance and mail openings. I will al;
support legislation that would prohibit a
tempts on the lives of foreign leaders
peacetime.

Third, tomorrow I will send to the Co'
gress special legislation to safeguard critic
intelligence secrets. This legislation wou
make it a crime for a government employ<
who has access to certain highly classifii
information to reveal that information ir
properly.

I have been guided by two imperative
As Americans we must not and will not tc
erate actions by our government which w
abridge the rights of our citizens. At tl
same time, we must maintain a strong ai
effective intelligence capability in the Uniti
States. I will not be a party to the dismani
ing of the CIA or other intelligence agencie

To be effective, our foreign policy must 1

I

292

Department of State Bullet' \^

tl

based upon a clear understanding of the
international environment. To operate with-
out adequate and timely intelligence infor-
mation will cripple our security in a world
that is still hostile to our freedoms.

Nor can we confine our intelligence to the
question of whether there will be an immi-
nent military attack. We also need informa-
tion about the world's economy, about politi-
cal and social trends, about food supply,
population growth, and certainly about
terrorism.

To protect our security diplomatically,
militarily, and economically, we must have
a comprehensive intelligence capability. The
United States is a peace-loving nation, and
our foreign policy is designed to lessen the
threat of war as well as aggression. In recent
years we have made substantial progress
toward that goal, in the Middle East, in
Europe, in Asia, and elsewhere throughout
the world.

Yet we also recognize that the best way
to secure the peace is to be fully prepared
to defend our interests. I believe fervently in
peace through strength. A central pillar of
our strength, is, of course, our armed forces.
But another great pillar must be our intelli-
gence community — the dedicated men and
j women who gather vital information around
the world and carry out missions that ad-
vance our interests in the world.

The overriding task now is to rebuild the
confidence as well as the capability of our
intelligence sei'vices so that we can live
securely in peace and freedom.

|.

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, FEBRUARY 18

white House press release dated February 18

To the Congress of the United States:

By virtue of the authority vested in me by Article
11, Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution, and other
provisions of law. I have today issued an Executive
3rder pertaining to the organization and control of
the United States foreign intelligence community.
Phis order establishes clear lines of accountability
for the Nation's foreign intelligence agencies. It sets
forth strict guidelines to control the activities of
these agencies and specifies as well those activities
in which they shall not engage.

In carrying out my Constitutional responsibilities

to manage and conduct foreign policy and provide
for the Nation's defense, I believe it essential to
have the best possible intelligence about the capa-
bilities, intentions and activities of governments and
other entities and individuals abroad. To this end.
the foreign intelligence agencies of the United States
play a vital role in collecting and analyzing informa-
tion related to the national defense and foreign
policy.

It is equally as important that the methods these
agencies employ to collect such information for the
legitimate needs of the government conform to the
standards set out in the Constitution to preserve and
respect the privacy and civil liberties of American
citizens.

The Executive Order I have issued today will in-
sure a proper balancing of these interests. It estab-
lishes government-wide direction for the foreign in-
telligence agencies and places responsibility and ac-
countability on individuals, not institutions.

I believe it will eliminate abuses and questionable
activities on the part of the foreign intelligence
agencies while at the same time permitting them
to get on with their vital work of gathering and
assessing information. It is also my hope that these
steps will help to restore public confidence in these
agencies and encourage our citizens to appreciate
the valuable contribution they make to our national
security.

Beyond the steps I have taken in the Executive
Order, I also believe there is a clear need for some
specific legislative actions. I am today submitting
to the Congress of the United States proposals which
will go far toward enhancing the protection of true
intelligence secrets as well as regularizing proce-
dures for intelligence collection in the United States.

My first proposal deals with the protection of in-
telligence sources and methods. The Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence is charged, under the National
Security Act of 1947, as amended, with protecting
intelligence sources and methods. The Act, however,
gives the Director no authorities commensurate with
this responsibility.

Therefore, I am proposing legislation to impose
criminal and civil sanctions on those who are author-
ized access to intelligence secrets and who willfully
and wrongfully reveal this information. This legisla-
tion is not an "Official Secrets Act", since it would
affect only those who improperly disclose .secrets, not
those to whom secrets are disclosed. Moreover, this
legislation could not be used to cover up abuses and
improprieties. It would in no way prevent people
from reporting questionable activities to appropriate
authorities in the Executive and Legislative Branches
of the government.

It is essential, however, that the irresponsible and
dangerous exposure of our Nation's intelligence
secrets be stopped. The American people have long
accepted the principles of confidentiality and secrecy
in many dealings — such as with doctors, lawyers and
the clergy. It makes absolutely no sense to deny this

Moreh 8, 1976

293

same protection to our intelligence secrets. Openness
is a hallmark of our democratic society, but the
American people have never believed that it was
necessary to reveal the secret war plans of the De-
partment of Defense, and I do not think they wish
to have true intelligence secrets revealed either.

I urge the adoption of this legislation with all pos-
sible speed.

Second, I support proposals that would clarify and
set statutory limits, where necessary, on the activi-
ties of the foreign intelligence agencies. In particu-
lar, I will support legislation making it a crime to
assassinate or attempt or conspire to assassinate a
foreign official in peacetime. Since it defines a crime,
legislation is necessary.

Third, I will meet with the appropriate leaders of
Congress to try to develop sound legislation to deal
with a critical problem involving personal privacy —
electronic surveillance. Woi'king with Congressional
leaders and the Justice Department and other Execu-
tive agencies, we will seek to develop a procedure for
undertaking electronic surveillance for foreign in-
telligence purposes. It should create a special pro-
cedure for seeking a judicial warrant authorizing
the use of electronic surveillance in the United States
for foreign intelligence purposes.

I will also seek Congressional support for sound
legislation to expand judicial supei^vision of mail
openings. The law now permits the opening of United
States mail, under proper judicial safeguards, in the
conduct of criminal investigations. We need authority
to open mail under the limitations and safeguards
that now apply in order to obtain vitally needed
foreign intelligence infonnation.

This would require a showing that there is prob-
able cause to believe that the sender or recipient is
an agent of a foreign power who is engaged in spy-
ing, sabotage or terrorism. As is now the case in
criminal investigations, those seeking authority to
examine mail for foreign intelligence purposes will
have to convince a federal judge of the necessity to
do so and accept the limitations upon their authoriza-
tion to examine the mail provided in the order of the
court.

Fourth. I would like to share my views regarding
appropriate Congressional oversight of the foreign
intelligence agencies. It is clearly the business of
the Congress to organize itself to deal with these
matters. Certain principles, however, should be rec-
ognized by both the Executive and Legislative
Branches if this oversight is to be effective. I be-
lieve good Congressional oversight is essential so
that the Congress and the American people whom
you represent can be assured that the foreign in-
telligence agencies are adhering to the law in all of
their activities.

Congress should seek to centralize the responsi-

bility for oversight of the foreign intelligence com-
munity. The more committees and subcommittees
dealing with highly sensitive secrets, the greater the
risks of disclosure. I recommend that Congress estab-
lish a Joint Foreign Intelligence Oversight Commit-
tee. Consolidating Congressional oversight in one
committee will facilitate the efforts of the Admin-
istration to keep the Congress fully informed of
foreign intelligence activities.

It is essential that both the House and the Senate
establish firm rules to insure that foreign intelli-
gence secrets will not be improperly disclosed. There
must be established a clear process to safeguard
these secrets and effective measures to deal with un-
authorized disclosures.

Any foreign intelligence information transmitted
by the Executive Branch to the Oversight Committee,
under an injunction of secrecy, should not be uni-
laterally disclosed without my agreement. Respect
for the integrity of the Constitution requires adher-
ence to the principle that no individual member, nor
committee, nor single House of Congress can overrule
an act of the Executive. Unilateral publication of
classified information over the objection of the Presi-
dent, by one committee or one House of Congress,
not only violates the doctrine of separation of powers,
but also effectively overrules the actions of the other
House of Congress, and perhaps even the majority
of both Houses.

Finally, successful and effective Congressional over-
sight of the foreign intelligence agencies depends on
mutual trust between the Congress and Executive.
Each branch must recognize and respect the rights
and prerogatives of the other if anything is to be
achieved.

In this context, a Congressional requirement to
keep the Oversight Committee "fully" informed is
more desirable and workable as a practical matter
than formal requirements for notification of specific
activities to a large number of committees. Spe-
cifically. Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act,
which has resulted in over six separate committee
briefings, should be modified as recommended by the
Commission on the Organization of the Government
for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, and reporting
should be limited to the new Oversight Committee.

Both the Congress and the Executive Branch rec-
ognize the importance to this Nation of a strong
intelligence service. I believe it urgent that we take
the steps I have outlined above to insure that Amer-
ica not only has the best foreign intelligence service
in the world, but also the most unique — one which
operates in a manner fully consistent with the Con-
stitutional rights of our citizens.

Gerald R. Ford.

The White House, February 18, 1976.

294

Department of State Bulletin fl||

United States Economic Relations With Africa

Address by William E. Schaiifele, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs '

Assistant Secretaries of State for African
Affairs customarily focus their maiden
speeches before the African-American
Chamber of Commerce on the state of our
economic relations with Africa even if, as in
my case, they are weak in that field. How-
ever, even I recognize that our primary long-
term interests in Africa are — and will un-
doubtedly remain — economic. We must not
let the present political problems in southern
Africa distort our perception of that reality.

Recent progress on the three major facets
of our economic relations with Africa —
trade, investment, and development assist-
ance— is certainly encouraging. But prob-
lems still persist.

Our latest data indicate that 1975 was a
good year for U.S. trade relations with
Africa. Africa's share of U.S. trade con-
tinued to grow. During the first nine months
of 1975, the value of our exports to Africa
increased by 42 percent, but the value of
our imports grew by only 27 percent. On an
annual basis, this trend would result in a
$200 million reduction in our trade deficit
with Africa in 1975 — the first such reduc-
tion since 1972, when our balance-of-pay-
ments deficits with Africa started.

As far as we can determine, this is not a
temporary phenomenon caused either by de-
pressed import demand within our own
economy or by increased exports of food or
other goods needed because of drought or
other disasters. We are particularly encour-
aged that the growth in our exports to

' Made before the African- American Chamber of
Commerce at New York, N.Y., on Feb. 18.

Africa last year was primarily in manufac-
tured goods. There was only a small increase
in U.S. exports of agricultural commodities
in the first nine months of 1975. Moreover,
the decrease in value of our coffee and cop-
per imports from Africa — due to supply dis-
ruptions and reduced market demand, re-
spectively— was more than offset by the
increased value of our imports of African
petroleum, diamonds, cocoa, manganese, and
aluminum. Although this is small solace for
African exporters of coffee and copper, on a
continental scale these facts lead us to con-
clude that the favorable shift in our trade
relations with Africa during 1975 may well
represent a sustainable trend.

We also welcome the fact that our growth
in exports was spread over most of our 17
principal trading partners in sub-Saharan
Africa. Seven countries (Nigeria, Zambia,
Ivory Coast, Tanzania, Gabon, Cameroon,
and Guinea) increased the value of their im-
ports from the United States by more than
50 percent. Five others (Zaire, Ghana,
Sudan, Liberia, and Ethiopia) registered
20-50 percent increases. These increases
cannot be explained merely as the result of
inflation. Clearly, there is growing demand
for U.S. exports in Africa, particularly from
the newly rich oil producers.

Unfortunately, there is a disturbing ob-
verse to our improved trade account. Except
for the oil producers, most of our principal
trading partners in sub-Saharan Africa are
under varying degrees of pressure in their
balance-of-payments accounts. Moreover,
commercial means for financing balance-of-
payments deficits cannot exceed prudent

March 8, 1976

295

levels of risk assumption. For these reasons
the United States took a leading role in the
recently approved liberalization of IMF
[International Monetary Fund] compensa-
tory financing mechanisms. African coun-
tries should greatly benefit from this in-
creased borrowing power to sustain their
development eflforts. The new IMF Trust
Fund, in particular, can off"er substantial
concessional financing to the 26 sub-Saharan
African countries deemed by the United Na-
tions to be "most seriously affected" by the
recent increase in oil prices.

Pragmatic Approach to Commodity Problems

Our support of this liberalized IMF fi-
nancing reflects our recognition of the im-
portance of commodity earnings to develop-
ing countries which are significantly
dependent on raw material exports and the
problems that excessive price fluctuations
pose for their development.

African countries, however, share the con-
tention of their LDC [less developed coun-
try] brethren everywhere that they have
not received fair prices for their commodity
exports. They seek commodity arrangements
designed to raise commodity prices and to
prevent disastrous price declines such as
recently occurred with copper. Our response
to these demands is pragmatic. We seek
assured supplies at reasonable prices per-
mitting adequate investment in new produc-
tive capacity.

Our specific planned or proposed measures
in the commodity field include the following:

— We have proposed that the World Bank
Group, especially the International Finance
Corporation, take the lead in bringing to-
gether private and public capital as well as
technical, managerial, and financial exper-
tise to finance new minerals development.

— In the multilateral trade negotiations
we are seeking LDC commitments to pro-
vide us with nondiscriminatory access to
their raw materials.

— Because no one formula will apply to all
commodities, we propose the establishment
of producer-consumer forums for every key

commodity, including coffee, and will be dis-
cussing new arrangements for individual
commodities on a case-by-case basis.

— We participated in the recent cofi'ee
agreement negotiations and are now consid-
ering within the Administration whether or
not to sign.

— We will sign the new tin agreement, and
it will be submitted to the Senate for its
advice and consent.

— We do not propose to sign the new Inter-
national Cocoa Agreement in its present
form. We consider the Agreement to be
cumbersome, if not unworkable, in a number
of respects and have suggested that certain
of its provisions be renegotiated. We are
awaiting the reaction of other countries.

Clearly, U.S. relations with sub-Saharan
Africa during the next few years will be
significantly conditioned by our joint will-
ingness and ability to avoid ideological con-
frontations in seeking mutually acceptable
pragmatic solutions to commodity problems.

Investment Trends

Prospects for the investment aspect of
U.S. economic relations with sub-Sarahan
Africa are more uncertain. During the
decade ending in 1974, U.S. investment in
the region almost tripled, to just under $3
billion. Most of this increase occurred dur-
ing the eight-year period ending in 1972,
when our investment in black Africa grew
faster than in South Africa.

Investment growth leveled off in 1973 to
a greater degree in black Africa than in
South Africa. During 1974 the 25 percent
increase in U.S. investment in South Africa
was partially offset by a 15 percent reduc-
tion in U.S. investment in black Africa. This
reduction was entirely accounted for by a
$220 million decrease in U.S. direct invest-
ment in Nigeria as a result of the transfer
of equity in U.S. petroleum firms to the
Nigerian Government. Excluding this net
disinvestment in Nigeria, there was a small
increase of $26 million in U.S. investment
elsewhere in black Africa. As a consequence
of these developments. South Africa's share

(

296

Department of State Bulletin

L)f U.S. direct investment in sub-Saharan
Africa increased from 38 percent in 1972,
to 47 percent in 1973, and to 56 percent in
1974.

It seems likely that the future trend in
the overall level of U.S. investment in black
Africa will reflect to a large extent what
happens in the extractive sector, which ac-
counts for over two-thirds of U.S. direct
investment in the region. There could be
additional U.S. disinvestment in this sector,
Ifor instance, as governments seek greater
direct participation. At the same time, U.S.
firms are exploring for petroleum and min-
erals in a number of African countries; and
new discoveries could lead to new U.S. in-
^'estment.

Investment in other sectors will probably
continue to expand. There is no indication,
lowever, that it could expand rapidly enough
)utside the extractive sector to reverse the
•ecent trend toward an increasing propor-
;ion of U.S. investment in South Africa
compared to black Africa. At present much
)f black Africa enjoys neither the market
lemand nor related infrastructure required
"or a substantial expansion in U.S. invest-
Tient in manufacturing.

We believe that African countries must
!xercise the political will to establish viable
•egional markets as their only hope for
eventual economic independence. Most Afri-
•an countries individually lack sufficiently
arge populations to justify manufacturing
slants of the minimum efficient size. In the
■neantime, their development will depend on
ncreased trade relations with developed
;ountries to buy what they need and finance
vhat they buy.

If trade is the vehicle of development, the
;ransnational corporation can undoubtedly
3e its most efficient potential engine. As the
lational version of the corporation reduced
:he distortion arising from the separation
)f regional markets within the United States
it the end of the last century, so the inter-
national version offers the only proven
sffective means for reducing similar distor-
tions on a global basis. It is clear that the
creation in Africa of a more favorable en-
vironment for U.S. investment, particularly

in the extractive sector, can enlarge the
contribution U.S. investment can make to
African development.

Africans place great weight on technology
transfer and the training of their human
resources. The U.S. Government is actively
engaged in the transfer of publicly owned
technology to African countries and in the
training of African nationals through our
development assistance programs. Neverthe-
less, we see no way to respond fully to Afri-
can desires in the absence of a mutually
acceptable role for U.S. private investment.
The bulk of U.S. technology is the private
property of U.S. firms. These firms also
possess the pool of managerial talent re-
quired to apply corporate technology and to
train others in its use.

Development Assistance

It is appropriate to consider the develop-
ment assistance aspect of U.S. economic re-
lations with sub-Saharan Africa last. Income
from trade and investment is substantially
larger than aid receipts. Sub-Saharan African
export receipts from the United States now
reach almost $6 billion per year. New U.S.
investment, which plays an important role
in promoting sub-Saharan African exports,
now totals between $100 million and $200
million per year.

Compared to these combined trade and
investment receipts, U.S. bilateral AID
[Agency for International Development] and
Public Law 480 [Food for Peace] assistance
to the region is modest, averaging about
$250 million per year over the past three
fiscal years. To obtain a complete picture of
our concessional assistance to black Africa,
there should be added the approximately
one-third U.S. share of IDA [International
Development Association] credits. Our share
of such credits last year was about $140
million.

This comparison of commercial and con-
cessional dollar flows does not mean aid is
unimportant. To the contrary, concessional
assistance is urgently required by the poor-
est states in sub-Saharan Africa. These

Warch 8, 1976

297

states generally lack the export potential to
finance their development through trade.

Sub-Saharan Africa contains 18 of the
world's 29 poorest states. They benefit from
the new congressional mandate that requires
our bilateral assistance to be concentrated
on the welfare of the poorest people in the
poorest countries. Thus, black Africa's share
of our assistance has been growing in recent
years, and we expect this trend to continue.
Furthermore, U.S. support of the Interna-
tional Fund for Agricultural Development,
a major proposal of the World Food Confer-
ence, demonstrates our willingness to seek
new multilateral approaches to African prob-
lems.

One development assistance problem has
increasingly concerned the African Bureau
in recent years. The congressional aid man-
date requires a global shift away from cap-
ital transfers for infrastructure. However,
compared with other parts of the developing
world, infrastructure deficiencies in Africa,
particularly in transportation, are relatively
more important and intimately related to
problems of rural development and trade
promotion. An abrupt deemphasis of aid for
infrastructure is not consistent with the
needs in this sector.

We perceive the issue to be one of insur-
ing that a critical gap is not created in de-
velopment assistance for sub-Saharan Af-
rica. In their own development plans and
priorities, African countries necessarily give
a very high priority to remedying their
infrastructure deficiencies. Unless we — that
is, the United States and other donor coun-
tries— can find an appropriate response to
Africa's infrastructure needs, especially as
they relate to agriculture, we are risking
failure in efi'orts in development in other
sectors.

In general we believe multilateral solu-
tions may be the most promising approach,
given the huge costs involved in transporta-
tion infrastructure. Our proposed member-
ship in the African Development Fund, the
soft-loan affiliate of the African Develop-
ment Bank, constitutes one integral element
in this strategy. The House has already
approved legislation authorizing a $25 mil-

lion U.S. contribution to the Fund, and w(
expect the Senate to follow suit shortly. Wi
will then seek appropriation authority fo:
membership during the current fiscal year
I urge you to support our efforts in the Con
gress in this regard.

Role of Government and Business

In conclusion, increased trade in both di
rections is the core reality of the growin;
interdependence between the United State
and Africa. We believe that increased in
vestment is a prerequisite to increased ani
more diversified trade relations. Trade am
investment are essentially your business
We in government must strive to translat
the trade goals we share with the African
into mutually acceptable means to achiev
them.

In this regard, we are pleased to note tha
Nigeria is recovering from an attempte
coup in a fashion which demonstrates th
viability of Nigerian institutions. The Unite
States continues to attach great importanc
to strengthening relations with this impoi
tant country and does not intend to allc
the attempted coup to affect our policies c
attitudes toward Nigeria.

The Overseas Private Investment Corpr
ration is also actively encouraging inves
ment in black Africa, particularly in tic
countries which have defined a role for pr
vate investment in their development pro
ess and those where basic infrastructure
in place. OPIC is taking a group of 15-^
U.S. executives to four West African ecu:
tries — Cameroon, Nigeria, Ghana, and Ivoi
Coast — in late March to survey firsthand ii
vestment opportunities in the area. Tl
group will be composed of executives fro
agribusiness, textiles, forestry, and ligl
manufacturing companies, plus a few mil
erals companies new to West Africa. Th
will be a first for OPIC in Africa and su]
plements OPIC's traditional project finan
ing and insurance activities.

Development assistance, which is essei
tially government's business, clearly has a
essential supporting role to play in the;
efforts. Business and government workir

298

Department of State Bulleti

i

together must insure that sufficient develop-
ment assistance is made available in the
form required to render our growing eco-
nomic interdependence mutually beneficial to
both the United States and Africa.

I am convinced of Africa's growing impor-
tance to American commercial interests.
Therefore I urge you to redouble your efforts
to expand American commerce with that
vast continent. The reciprocal advantage
which both Americans and Africans can de-
rive from it will assuredly help provide a
firm basis for the friendly relations we seek
there.

U.S. Makes $188 Million Pledge
to World Food Program for 1977-78

I Following is a statement made in the 1976
pledging conference of the U.N.-Food and
Agriculture Organization World Food Pro-
gram (WFP) at U.N. Headquarters on
February i by U.S. Representative Richard
E. Bell, ivho is Assistant Secretary of Agri-
cnltvre for International Affairs and Com-
modity Programs.

USUN press release 16 dated Februai-y 4

As nations today make their pledges to
the World Food Program, we launch the
15th year of service under its auspices. In
those years we have witnessed unparalleled
growth in world agricultural trade. Increases
in production and trade must continue as
world population rises to new levels and as
economic growth generates increases in per
capita consumption.

Events of the past two years have done
much to focus world attention on the need
to expand production. With recognition of
the fact that long-range solutions to the
problem of feeding a growing world must be
faced on a global level, a first positive step
has now been taken which may correct the
imbalance in production between developing
and developed nations. A new emphasis is
being given to the development of a world
food strategy, and we are hopeful that all

nations will effectively support this effort.

The World Food Program, with its record
in providing multilateral food assistance,
has been given new responsibilities as a re-
sult of the World Food Conference in Rome
in 1974. The program's Intergovernmental
Committee has been reconstituted as the
Committee on Food Aid Policies and Pro-
grams and now will assume greater respon-
sibilities in dealing with critical world food
needs. To assure that the WFP can ac-
complish this task, it has a 1977-78 bien-
nium resource target of $750 million, a large
increase over the 1975-76 pledge target.
When this target is achieved, more than $2.5
billion will have been committed for the
program's use since the beginning.

The decision to increase substantially the
World Food Program's biennium resource
target for the 1977-78 period challenges the
program itself to make even greater efforts
to insure that these resources are used in the
most efficient way. We would therefore en-
courage every effort to impi-ove the manage-
ment of the program's projects. We greatly
appreciate the work done so far in evaluating
these projects; such evaluations help both
the World Food Progi-am managers and the
donor countries. We would like to see the
program continue and strengthen these
evaluations. These, plus other reports from
the program, are necessary if donors are to
react constructively in helping to improve
the program.

Our current food assistance program
places great stress on the need to help the
neediest people in the poorest countries.
These people, often in hard-to-reach rural
areas, are the ones most likely to be left
out of the development process. We suggest
that the World Food Program as well might
focus greater attention on the most needy.
While we realize that these groups are the
most difficult to reach, this fact must not
deter us.

We recognize that there is a role for WFP
to play in emergencies, but we think the
bulk of emergency assistance will still need
to be handled on a government-to-govern-
ment basis. Too great a focus on emergency
aid in WFP could detract from the program's

March 8, 1976

299

ability to favorably influence economic de-
velopment through sound, well-conceived
projects which are a part of the overall
development aims of recipient nations.

The pledges today, then, must support
our willingness to accept this challenge. The
level of the 1977-78 biennium pledging tar-
get has increased significantly; and all na-
tions, both traditional donors and new
donors, must respond if this eff"ort is to
prove successful.

The United States today makes just such
a pledge. For the 1977-78 biennium, the
United States pledges commodities, shipping
services, and cash totaling $188 million
toward the $750 million pledge target for the
1977-78 period. This pledge includes $155
million in commodities.

The United States also will provide ship-
ping services to transport one-half of the
commodities provided by the United States
to the World Food Program. The value of
such services is presently estimated at $30
million for the 155 million dollars' worth of
commodities. The United States also will
contribute $3 million in cash, which may be
utilized, together with cash pledges of other
nations, to provide services and administra-
tive direction of the program's 1977-78 bi-
ennium. This pledge is subject to congres-
sional appropriation and to the condition
that the U.S. contribution cannot exceed
approximately 25 percent of the total contri-
butions of all governments.

For planning purposes, the World Food
Program may assume that the kinds of
commodities provided by the United States
will likely be essentially the same as those
being provided for the 1975-76 biennium.
The kinds and quantities of commodities to
be supplied are to be worked out with the
Executive Director of the World Food Pro-
gram on the basis of requirements and avail-
abilities at the time the commodities are
needed and in accordance with the applicable
U.S. laws and regulations. The pledge will
be subject to the availability of funds and
commodities.

We are looking forward to continued co-
operation with other participating nations
as the World Food Program implements the

300

objectives of meeting basic food require
ments. The support of the United State.--
like that of other contributing nations, cor
sists of more than commodities, services, an
cash provided. It also includes a commit
ment to the basic objective of the prograr
— to provide food aid for economic and socigi
development.

This effort cannot be undertaken by on
nation or by a small group of nations. Thi
must truly be a multilateral effort. Th
interdependence of nations also must mea
a joint sharing of responsibilities. Once i
may have been an act of generosity to mak
a pledge to the World Food Program ; toda
a nation's pledge of assistance signals tha
it takes seriously its responsibilities as
member of the family of nations.

United Nations Documents:
A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such c-
those listed below) may be consulted at depositor'
libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publico
tions may be purchased from the Sales Section i
the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.']
10017.

Security Council

Eighth report of the Security Council committ*
established in pursuance of Resolution 253 (196*
concerning the question of Southern Rhodesi
S/11927. January 8, 1976. 103 pp.

Letter dated January 9, 1976, from the Permane*
Representative of the U.S.S.R. transmitting
statement by the Soviet Government on the Middl
East. S/11928. January 12, 1976. 3 pp.

General Assembly

Question of diplomatic asylum. Report of the Seer
tary General. A/10139. Part I; September 2, 197
35 pp. Part I/Add. 1; October 9, 1975; 2 pp. Pa
II; September 22, 1975; 189 pp.

Scientific work on peace research. Report of tl
Secretary General containing replies received fro
governments and specialized agencies and inte
national institutions associated with the Uniti
Nations. A/10199. September 27, 1972. 131 pp.

Cooperation between the United Nations and tl
Organization of African Unity. Report of tl
Secretary General. A/10254. September 30, 197
21 pp.

Department of State Bulleti

THE CONGRESS

icretary Kissinger Urges Approval of Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act

statement by Secretary Kissinger^

I am pleased to have this opportunity to
tstify on behalf of the Department of State
jj support of the Nuclear Fuel Assurance
n of 1975.

Since its creation in 1946, the Joint Com-
rttee on Atomic Energy has played a
uique and highly constructive role not only

the establishment of nuclear power as a
njor, viable energy source but also in en-
a ing the United States to provide leader-

p in international nuclear cooperation
uier effective guarantees and safeguards.
J late Resolution 221, which you cospon-

ed, Mr. Chairman [Senator John 0. Pas-
l e], calling for further strengthening of
s eguards and other measures against pro-
liiration, is a timely and important addition
1 3ur nonproliferation policy. The legislation
y I are considering now can be another
n estone in the development of our peaceful
n;lear program.

The Department of State attaches the
h hest importance to the earliest possible
psage of this measure which will enable
tl United States to reassert its traditional
hiership in international nuclear coopera-
tii.

''rom our foreign policy standpoint, nu-

ir cooperation obtains a number of impor-
Ci t benefits to the United States, the most
s)nificant of which are:

Made before the Joint Committee on Atomic
E rgy on Feb. 6 (text from press release 53). The
cc plete transcript of the hearings will be published
o:the committee and will be available from the
S'erintendent of Documents. U.S. Government
P iting Office, Washington, D.C. 20520.

— Strong support to our efforts to stem
further proliferation of nuclear weapons
and other military uses of the atom.

— Relieving the pressures on both our-
selves and our partners abroad for increas-
ing dependence on imported oil.

— Contributing to the economy of the
United States and strengthening our bal-
ance-of-trade position.

In this nuclear cooperation, the ability of
the United States to supply uranium enrich-
ment services for power reactor programs
abroad — as well as for itself — on a depend-
able long-term basis is, I believe, the key in-
gredient. The proposed Nuclear Fuel Assur-
ance Act will fill an indispensable role in
pursuit of our foreign policy objectives by
maintaining the United States in its long-
standing position as the world's foremost
supplier of such enrichment services.

Our policy of sharing the peaceful bene-
fits of nuclear energy with others has been
the key factor in the development of an un-
precedented network of international agree-
ments, arrangements, and institutions which
have, to an encouraging degree, enabled us
to avoid the unrestrained proliferation of
nuclear weapons. Because of our position of
leadership, other key international suppliers
of nuclear equipment and material have
been influenced to follow the U.S. example
and require peaceful-use guarantees and
safeguards on their exports. Since the tech-
nology available from these suppliers is the
most highly advanced, nations embarking
on nuclear power programs have generally

l^rch 8, 1976

301

been willing to accept such safeguards and
controls as an adjunct to obtaining this
technology, rather than developing indig-
enous programs which would not be subject
to safeguards.

It is not an overstatement that effective
application of this policy, including our bi-
lateral cooperative arrangements, the crea-
tion of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, the development and acceptance of
international safeguards, and the widespread
adoption of the Nonproliferation Treaty
have all been made easier by our capability
and willingness to furnish uranium-enriching
services along with other elements essential
to peaceful nuclear development.

In foreign policy terms, however, the bene-
fits of U.S. nuclear cooperation, in which our
enrichment supply capability has been the
key ingredient, go beyond even the crucial
issue of advancing our nonproliferation ob-
jectives. I have already noted the importance
of nuclear power to fulfilling our own energy
needs, as well as those of our partners. We
are fortunate that nuclear power has become
a reality as an alternative energy source at
this time, when not merely our economic
well-being but our very independence of
judgment and action are threatened by an
excessive and growing dependence on im-
ported energy sources whose availability and
price are not within our control. In the near
term, there are limited options available to
avoid further dependence on imported oil,
and nuclear power will have to play a vital
role if we are to avoid having U.S. policies
subject to intolerable outside pressures.

I want to stress that these additional bene-
fits are secured not at the expense of, but in
parallel with, the primary objective of ad-
vancing our nonproliferation policy. We do
not trade off our nonproliferation goals to
advance other political or economic objec-
tives, and there is no inconsistency between
the two.

Just as nuclear energy is important to us,
so it is to our partners abroad, whose well-
being is closely tied to our own and who often
draw for their essential energy needs on the
same limited resources as do we. Out of the
energy crisis has emerged an enhanced

understanding of the benefits — in fact, t
absolute necessity — of interdependence if ■
are to avoid the stultifying effects of d
tated prices and insecurity of energy suppi
on our economic health and our politi i
well-being.

One of the outcomes of this understand:';
has been the formation of the Internatio 1
Energy Agency (lEA). By 1985, the me-
bers of this group are expected to be obta-
ing about 400,000 megawatts of their vil
power needs fi'om nuclear power sourc.
In seeking alternatives to ever-expand {
dependence on imported oil, expanded usef
nuclear power is a major element of ;
lEA's strategy. But this plan will be viae
only if adequate supplies of nuclear fuel ( i
be made available. Thus the United Stas
is serving its own interests by creating i
framework which will enable it to return j
the international enrichment services m -
ket, offering such services abroad under c( -
parable terms and conditions to those av •
able to domestic customers.

Today, unfortunately, our ability to •
fluence worldwide nuclear development q
directions favorable to our own interest; s
being gravely limited by our inability to -
sure the supply of enrichment services r
additional nuclear projects abroad.

We should not underestimate the impl ,-
tions of this fact. The image of the most 1-
vanced industrial power in the world, wl h
was responsible for the very developmen f
nuclear energy, no longer able to meet s
own or other nations' future enrichn .t
needs is hardly calculated to generate ( i-
fidence in our economic strength, our po !■
cal resolve, or our decisionmaking proc
es.

Beyond this, our current inability to ]
vide enrichment services has prevented is
from consolidating our early leadershifiR
this market, which can contribute sig i-
cantly to our economic health and strengt n
our balance-of -trade position, while sen g
to advance our nonproliferation objecti s.
U.S. foreign exchange revenues to date f ti
the sale of enriched uranium and enrichn it
services have reached $1.1 billion, and o r-
seas contracts now in force are expecteco

t

302

Department of State Butltn

giierate revenues in the order of $17.6 bil-
|;n over their Hfetime, at present price
I'els.

The economic benefits of our uranium

, licl^ment supply arrangements are not

itined to these contractual revenues alone,

ice our ability to provide nuclear fuel is

al to the sale of U.S. reactors and related

mIs and services abroad. To date, such

OS are estimated to have brought us reve-

es of over $2 billion. Over the next two

a-i a half decades, these sales could — if we

t? able to take advantage of the oppor-

fctiities presented — total $140 billion. In the

pj)cess, thousands of jobs to support these

BJjrseas sales will be created and maintained.

rhe implications of this for our economic

i^ll-being in an increasingly competitive

nld are enormous. But these expectations

. threatened unless U.S. reactor vendors

a in a position to assure a long-term supply

enrichment services for the plants which

y are seeking to sell.

"he characteristics of the enrichment serv-

industry do not allow mistakes to be

ily reversed or lost opportunities to be

ily recovered. The enormous investment

I nuclear reactors themselves, as well as

: enrichment facilities, dictates the use of

leg-term contracts which create both an

aiured supply for reactor operators and an

a;ured market for the enrichment plant

Oirator. Thus, opportunities not initially

aiiired are lost forever.

Jntil a few years ago, the United States

w ; essentially the world's only supplier of

eiiched uranium for nuclear power reactor

fil. Today, the U.S.S.R. is actively in the

IT 'ket, a British-Dutch-German group,

another group headed by the French are

. structing commercial-scale enrichment fa-

oi;ies, and major programs which could lead

' uch facilities are underway in as many as

ee or more other nations.

'here is no question that these develop-

its, while responsive in part to national-

:• motivations and a desire by enrichment

IS to diversify their sources of supply,

(i: e been spurred by uncertainty over the

acquacy and availability of supply from the

U.ted States. Their scale and rate of

I

eh 8, 1976

growth will therefore respond in the future
to uranium enrichment developments in the
United States. Failure to bring new U.S.
enrichment plants into being on a timely
basis would do significant damage to our
nonproliferation objectives by giving further
impetus to alternative sources of enrichment
supply and forcing customers to turn away
from the United States.

I have concentrated so far on the need to
expand our enrichment capacity at a rate
which will insure that future capacity keeps
up with domestic and foreign demand. This
is the fundamental objective of the proposed
Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act and is of over-
riding importance both to our domestic and
international goals. I should like to turn now
to several additional features of the proposed
program which are of direct international
significance.

The proposed Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act
is far more than a plan for the next incre-
ments of uranium enrichment capacity in
the United States, important as that aspect
is. Like other landmark U.S. legislation in
the nuclear field, the Nuclear Fuel Assurance
Act involves a policy decision which is essen-
tial to the future growth and development
of the nuclear industry. That decision is
that uranium enrichment, like every other
activity of the civil nuclear industry — with
exception of radioactive waste management
— and in keeping with the fundamental na-
ture of our economy, should henceforth be
undertaken in the United States by private
industry. While this decision may appear to
involve fundamentally domestic considera-
tions, it has important implications for our
international nuclear cooperation as well.

Under our private enterprise system, ca-
pacity expansion in response to increased
demands normally is provided with few
transitional problems, given adequate eco-
nomic incentives. This capability to respond
to growing needs without resort to our com-
plex governmental procedures can serve our
foreign policy — including nonproliferation
objectives — as well as our domestic interests.

Knowledgeable private and governmental
authorities responsible for nuclear power de-
velopments abroad are well aware that in the

303

United States the continuity needed to assure
that the requirements of an expanding mar-
ket are met is best provided by industry
rather than by government. I am convinced,
therefore, that the earhest possible estab-
lishment of a private enrichment industry
will greatly enhance the credibility of the
United States as a reliable source of enrich-
ment. Based on the current state of our
technical and economic knowledge and the
schedule on which new enrichment demands
must be filled, this will require commerciali-
zation of both the gaseous diffusion and
centrifuge processes. The Nuclear Fuel As-
surance Act will serve this pui-pose.

Another key feature of the proposed legis-
lation is the governmental guarantees and
assurances to insure the early and success-
ful launching of a viable private enrichment
industry. This factor should rapidly rebuild
confidence on the part of both foreign and
domestic users of enrichment services in the
reliability of the United States as a nuclear
fuel supplier.

From this standpoint, the most important
aspects of the proposed legislation are those
enabling the government to supply and war-
rant its technology and to assume the assets
and liabilities of the private venture should
it be threatened with failure. These features,
coupled with the President's pledge that
orders placed with a private entity will be
filled as the services are needed, are neces-
sary to instill that confidence.

A third important feature is that foreign
investment is not precluded for either the
gaseous diffusion or centrifuge enrichment
facilities whose construction the act will
bring about. Aside from the importance of
such investment in facilitating the successful
execution of any of the uranium enrichment
projects under consideration, we consider it
important to encourage foreign investment
in private U.S. uranium enrichment facilities
within the limits, of course, defined by the
Atomic Energy Act. We plan to reasonably
limit foreign investment and access to en-
richment services both on an individual na-
tion and overall participation basis. To dis-
courage or exclude foreign participation

would be inconsistent with our tradition
support for freedom of investment oppc
tunities and with the necessity for inte
dependence in meeting the challenges of t
energy crisis. There can be no more effect!
assurance both of the reliability of our su
ply undertakings and their international i\
ceptability than the existence of a healtli
level of foreign investment in U.S. uraniuij
enrichment facilities.

In connection with at least one of the cc
templated projects — the UEA [Uranii
Enrichment Associates] gaseous diffusi
plant — foreign investment is expected to
an essential ingredient in enabling the pn
ect to go forward. Several countries ha
indicated an interest in participation in tl
undertaking. Their final decision will depe
on a number of complex issues, including <
pected requirements for enrichment servic
available financial resources, and the attn
tiveness of alternative means of meeti
these needs. This committee can exert a po
five influence on these deliberations by i
pressing at the eai'liest possible date suppi ;
for the program as a whole, includi ; I
the element of foreign investment in 1 1 ,
projected enterprises. ■

I should like to emphasize that the qii ■
tion of foreign investment in any U.S. •
richment facilities under the Nuclear F I
Assurance Act is a separate issue from '.
transfer of sensitive enrichment technolo .
The act authorizes no such transfer, ; I
foreign participation will take place with t
any governmental commitment whatsoe f
for the transfer of enrichment technolo .
Access to U.S. enrichment technology by ■ r
partners abroad may, under certain carefi '
controlled circumstances, serve U.S. fore i
policy interests, but any proposals tow i
this end would be dealt with as a separ i
issue which would be subject to congi -
sional review.

Similarly, the establishment of a priv e
enrichment industry in the United Sts s
will have no adverse effect on existing T I.
policies and programs designed to avoid p ■ ,
liferation. Appropriate agreements for <•
operation would continue to be required i'

304

Department of State Bulln

i

transfers of the uranium-enriching services
abroad, and all of the normal guarantees and
safeguards controls would be applied to such
transfers. Given the benefit to U.S. nonpro-
liferation objectives discussed previously,
mr national security will be enhanced,
rather than endangered, by the earliest pos-
sible passage and implementation of the
>Tuclear Fuel Assurance Act.

In proposing this legislation [on June 26,
1975], President Ford described the nation
IS at a crossroads. The Congress and this
•ommittee have shown strong leadership in
:he past in support of the development of a
■.trong, competitive private nuclear industry
■apable of asserting America's nuclear leader-
;hip throughout the world. The challenge
oday — in the face of an energy crisis that
yill remain with us for the indefinite future
—is greater than ever. I urge the committee
0 continue its leadership by giving prompt
pproval to the Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act.

econd Progress Report on Cyprus
ubmitted to the Congress

lessage From President Ford '

'o the Congress of the United States:
Pursuant to Public Law 94-104, I am
ubmitting the second report on the prog-
ess of Cyprus negotiations and the efforts
lis Administration is making to help find a
isting settlement. In my first report, on
•ecember 8, 1975, I outlined the Adminis-
•ation's policy toward the complex Cyprus
roblem, and indicated in detail the major
ffort we have made to encourage a resump-
on of the Cyprus negotiations between the
reek and Turkish Cypi'iot communities.
In that report, I also stated that Secretary
•issinger planned to place special emphasis
n Cyprus during his meetings with the
reek and Turkish Foreign Ministers at the

'Transmitted on Feb. 5 (text from White House
ress release).

NATO Ministerial meetings in Brussels in
December. He did this, and in the course of
these meetings, he found a desire on the part
of both sides to move forward. Indeed, the
constructive spirit which characterized those
discussions was translated on December 12
into an agreement by the Foreign Ministers
of Gi-eece and Turkey to seek the prompt re-
sumption of the intercommunal talks. Acting
on instructions from their governments, the
Greek and Turkish permanent repi-esenta-
tives to the U.N. thereupon called on Secre-
tary General Waldheim to begin a discussion
aimed at resolving questions relative to the
timing, venue, and content of intercommunal
talks. Subsequently, discussions between
United Nations oflScials and the two Cypriot
communities were initiated, and have been
sustained over the past month. The task of
resolving the existing differences was not an
easy one, but the efforts of the Secretary
General have resulted in the parties in-
dicating their agreement to a resumption
of the intercommunal talks in Vienna on
February 17.

Throughout December and January the
United States has urged upon all the parties
the earliest possible resumption of Cyprus
negotiations. We have been joined in this
effort by our European allies. Major assist-
ance was also provided by Chairman Morgan
and membei's of the House Committee on
International Relations who visited Athens
and Ankara in mid-January. On January 23
in Brussels Secretary Kissinger again saw
the Turkish Foreign Minister who confirmed
Turkey's support for the resumption of the
intercommunal talks.

The decision to resume the intercommunal
negotiations is encouraging, and there have
been other positive developments during the
past sixty days. The Turkish government
announced on January 31 that during the
first week in February an additional 2,000
Turkish troops will be withdrawn from
Cyprus, thus bi-inging Turkish troop pres-
ence down approximately 12,000 since mid-
1974 to a figure below 30,000. Meanwhile,
Greece and Turkey have begun a process of
reconciliation.

larch 8, 1976

305

Meetings have been organized at various
levels in December and January to discuss
outstanding Greco-Turkish bilateral differ-
ences, including the problems of air space
and of resource development in the Aegean.
An improved climate between Greece and
Turkey will surely have a beneficial effect on
the Cyprus question.

Developments in December and January
have convinced us that the process of bring-
ing a lasting and just solution to the island
of Cyprus is moving in the right direction,
though the pace has been slower than any
of us desire. The knowledge that thousands
of refugees are enduring a second winter in
temporary shelters is reason enough to move
faster — and try harder. This we intend to do.

I believe it important that the talks
which begin later this month provide the
basis for the development of a negotiating
atmosphere conducive to prompt considera-
tion of all the key issues. I intend to stress
this point in the weeks ahead. In this regai-d
I am looking forward to meeting with For-
eign Minister Caglayangil of Turkey on Feb-
ruary 11. His visit to Washington will pro-
vide us with a timely opportunity to review
bilateral issues as well as the Cyprus
question.

I know that during the recent Congres-
sional recess, members of both Houses vis-
ited the Eastern Mediterranean, and came
away with a greater appreciation of the
complexities of the Cyprus situation and the
attitudes and concerns of all the parties. At
the same time, these legislators were able
to convey our shared conviction that no more
time should be lost in the search for a
solution.

The action of the Congress on October 2,
easing restrictions on military shipments to
Turkey, has proved valuable in restoring
momentum toward a negotiated Cyprus set-
tlement. If we are to continue to play a key
role with the parties, the support and under-
standing of the Congress is essential. Con-
tinued cooperation between the Executive
Branch and the Congress on this critical

issue will serve the common quest to ensure
that the people of Cyprus can build a pros-
perous future in a secure and stable
environment. M

Gerald R. Ford.

The White House, February 5, 1976.

U.S.-Egypt Income Tax Convention
Transmitted to the Senate

Message From President Ford '

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith, for Senate advice and
consent to ratification, the Convention signed
at Washington on October 28, 1975, betweer
the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Aral
Republic of Egypt for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fisca
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income.

There is no convention on this subjec
presently in force between the United States
and Egypt.

The Convention is similar in most essen
tial respects to other recent United State:
income tax treaties.

I also transmit, for the information of thi
Senate, the report of the Department o
State with respect to the Convention.

Conventions such as this one are an ini
portant element in promoting closer economi
cooperation between the United States an
other countries. I urge the Senate to ac
favorably on this Convention at an earl;
date and to give its advice and consent t
ratification.

Gerald R. Ford.

The White House, February ll, 1976.

306

'Transmitted on Feb. 11 (text from White Rous)
press release); also printed as S. Ex. D, 94th Cong
2d sess., which includes the texts of the conventio)
and the report of the Department of State.

Department of State Bulleti

(i^partment Discusses U.S. Relations With Canada

Statement by Richard D. Vine

Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs '

am delighted to have the opportunity to

reiew with you today the current state of

\-Canadian relations. Considerable atten-

1 has been devoted to the relationship in

press in recent weeks, which has tended

t( focus, not surprisingly, on some of the

1 erences at issue between the two coun-

.1 would like to discuss these bilateral

) stions in order to clarify what is — and is

— at issue and also to place these ques-

i 18 into the larger perspective of U.S.-

C ladian relations.

jecretary Kissinger, during his visit to

f>awa last October, agreed with the Cana-

!i Secretary of State for External Affairs

t "the special relationship" between the

tod States and Canada was probably

i\ d. On the other hand they quickly

a| eed that relations between our two coun-

ti s had to be characterized as unique. This

e: hange illustrates that, while it may be

iicult to define the relationship, both gov-

ei ments recognize that the unparalleled

ir irdependence between Canada and the

U ted States calls for close and coordinated

IT aagement of our affairs.

Canada and the United States probably
!r!rface and interact more extensively and
ir greater depth than any other two coun-
biis of the globe:

«Iade before the Subcommittee on International
P' tical and Military Affairs of the House Commit-
> on International Relations on Jan. 28. The com-
■ transcript of the hearings will be published by
c ummittee and will be available from the Super-
in ndent of Documents. U.S. Government Printing
0 -e, Washington, D.C. 20402.

— We are the world's greatest trading
partnership and each other's best customer,
in commerce now approaching $50 billion
annually.

— The United States is the primary
source of foreign investment for Canada and
the principal recipient of Canadian foreign
investment in return.

— The comings and goings across our
5,500-mile frontier now number more than
70 million crossings each year.

— There is a network of relationships —
personal, family, business, financial, local,
state, law enforcement, interagency, formal
and informal — which affects virtually every
aspect of life in both countries.

This interaction is generally appreciated;
the degree to which it is carried out with
ready ease, good will, and full cooperation is
not. The areas where differences do arise
bilaterally are relatively few. They cause
concern, attract attention, and tend to ob-
scure the fundamental good health the rela-
tionship enjoys. As the United States deals
with the differences that arise, we must do
so in ways that preserve the healthy en-
vironment that generally surrounds them.

In international affairs as well as bilateral
relations, U.S. and Canadian action is gen-
erally complementary and coordination close.
Each country independently pursues its na-
tional interests as we deal with the global
political, security, and economic challenges
that confront us. Sometimes our priorities
and responsibilities differ, occasionally they
conflict ; but most often, given the similarity

Vrch 8, 1976

307

of our societies and of the values and goals
each of us is pursuing, our international in-
tei-ests are parallel, and the United States
finds in Canada an ally and friend whose ac-
tions reinforce our own to the advantage of
our mutual objectives.

Canada is one of the big seven industrial
democracies, a major trading nation, a lead-
ing donor of foreign assistance. With us, it
is a member of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization], the OECD [Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development],
and the International Energy Agency. It is
serving as the industrial-country cochair-
man in the Confei-ence on International Eco-
nomic Cooperation.

In all of these undertakings our major in-
terests are parallel and mutually reinforcing.
This is true as well in such vital areas as the
multilateral trade negotiations, nonprolifera-
tion efforts, and significant issues before the
United Nations. I cite this setting merely to
recall, without belaboring the point, that in
our international affairs as in our bilateral
relations, U.S. and Canadian interests tend
to coincide, our representatives work closely
together, and as each country pursues its
own objectives, the United States regularly
finds that Canadian activities support our
own to a significant degree. Here again, the
United States must keep this perspective in
mind as we approach the solution of specific
issues.

The U.S. -Canadian Defense Relationship

I would like to cite one ai-ea of significant
cooperation in more detail, for I think it will
be of particular interest to this subcommit-
tee. This is the U.S.-Canadian defense rela-
tionship, bilaterally and in NATO.

The year 1975 was a watershed for Cana-
dian defense policy; for the basic agreement
for North American air defense was sched-
uled to expire, and Canada carried out a
comprehensive defense structure review to
reassess its security priorities and the re-
sources, organization, and equipment needs
to achieve them. Canada is no less subject to
competing economic and political pressures
than is the United States, but by its defense

decisions in 1975 Canada in effect has
affirmed its continuing commitment to 1
critical role it plays in hemisphere defen
in multilateral security, and in keeping
peace in troubled areas.

In 1975 Canada renewed its bilate
agreement with the United States for jo
North American air defense for an additio
five-year period. As a result of its defe:
review, Canada decided to maintain
diminished its land and air forces assigi
to NATO and to modernize their equipme
it adopted a comprehensive long-range pj'
gram of military modernization involvg
substantial annual increases in equipmit
expenditures (including purchase of pa'ol
aircraft from the United States at a tdl
cost approaching $1 billion) as well as iil
annual growth in the defense budget foia
number of years to come ; and it renewed ;!i
forces in U.N. peacekeeping activities.

These decisions were taken at a time)f
severe budgetary restraint and reduced j /-
ernment expenditure in Canada. They re] ^•
sent a solid commitment to stand firm in te
free-world defense effort which is extren y
gratifying to the United States.

Improvement in Bilateral Relationship

With this background in mind, I wdd
like to focus on more recent development in
the bilateral relationship.

First, Ambassador Porter's supposed e-
marks in Ottawa a month ago created q te
a storm. It is, however, true that mud 3f
the press discussion was based on thing! le
did not say rather than remarks he mad( In
context, the only point the Ambassador iis
trying to make was that some Cana( in
measures to protect their economy or t ir
cultural identity were producing uneasiin
business and congressional circles in le
United States. Some reporters chose to ;iy
this as the American Ambassador asser ig
that U.S.-Canadian relations were deterioit-
ing. This was surely not what the Amba a^
dor intended, for in fact the reverse is tie.
Relations between the United States (id
Canadian Governments are very good inted
and have improved markedly over the st

308

Department of State Bunin<

, LI or more, as has the ability of the two
iiitries to address the problems we share

uui effective and constructive manner.

iA immber of factors have contributed to
s change. First, excellent personal rela-
iis have developed between government
(If IS. This direction was set by President
1(1 and Prime Minister Trudeau when they
t ill December 1974. In that and subse-
■iit meetings, they estabUshed a personal
)|i(irt to an extent which had not existed
s(ime time. They reviewed some of our
luing problems, like the then-existing re-
iDcal controls on meat imports, and di-
ti'd that these be resolved at the working

■.els.

Hcretary Kissinger and the Canadian Sec-
ary of State for External Affairs, Allan

t cEachen, have also established a very

^e working relationship. The Secretary

^ had MacEachen down here and visited

awa himself in mid-October. The two go

of their way to see each other at inter-

i ional conferences. They met again in
ussels last Saturday [January 24].
Phis quickened pace of interchange has
■n reflected throughout the government.
1975 the Secretary of the Treasury, the
letary of Defense, the FEA [Federal
ergy Administration] Administrator, the
'cial Trade Representative, and other sen-
officials visited Ottawa for consultations,
ile Canadian Finance Ministers Turner
I Macdonald, Minister of Commerce and
iustry Gillespie, Minister of Agriculture
lelan, and Environment Minister Sauve all
Ited Washington. This was in marked
itrast to the previous year, when high-
el contacts between our two governments
re at a low ebb.

The tone of the relationship has also im-
•ved as the result of changes in other
ces which had served to irritate relations.
r example, the import surcharge and de
to dollar devaluation imposed by the
ited States in August 1971 marked the
it time in recent history that there was
ther advance consultation with, nor a
K"ial exception for, the Canadians in such
major move. The U.S. action heightened
nadian concern at their perceived vulner-

ability to the United States, and it has taken
some time for this sensitivity to begin to
abate.

A separate, very positive factor has been
the end of the U.S. involvement in Viet-Nam,
which had alienated considerable Canadian
opinion.

Finally, the onset of a major recession in
both countries has served to remind Cana-
dians of the continued interdependence of
our economies; and although this common
threat could have led to beggar-thy-neighbor
reactions, in fact it reinforced bilateral
cooperation.

Progress on Agenda of Problems

Perhaps the most important consequence
of this improved atmosphere has been the
clear net improvement in the management
of the agenda of problems between us. In-
dependently and together, our two Secre-
taries of State have stressed the need for
open and frank consultation in advance of
any action by one country that might affect
the other. This joint commitment to seek
together ways in which the objectives of one
country can be met at the least cost to the
other is beginning to be implemented as we
deal with specific issues.

For example, after some initial problems
in communication, we have consulted closely
with Canada on its cutbacks of oil supplies
in the face of diminishing Canadian produc-
tion and rising Canadian demand.

One result is an agreement to facilitate
private oil-exchange arrangements to meet
the supply problems of northern-tier refiner-
ies. We have also received assurances from
the Canadians that should they need to phase
out natural gas exports, they will work
closely with us to mitigate the impacts in
the United States. They have also assured
us that every effort will be made to avoid gas
cutbacks during the current heating season.

The initialing yesterday of an ad refer-
endum agreement covering transit pipelines
for oil and gas, and the close consultations
we have maintained as each government con-
tinues to review alternatives for transmis-
sion of Arctic gas, illustrate the extent to

(ireh 8, 1976

309

which the two countries can continue to co-
operate closely even in areas where our
priorities and needs may differ or sometimes
conflict.

Other areas where consultation is Vjeing
actively pursued include:

— Joint studies of the long-term outlook in
the North American automobile industry in
light of changed circumstances such as en-
vironmental and energy considerations.

— An end to the exceptional controls in
both countries on meat exports after nearly
18 months, and a return to normal trade
patterns.

— After several years of poor communica-
tion, the recent initiation of bilateral con-
sultations on the border TV problem and on
alternative means of achieving Canadian
goals while reducing the adverse impact of
Canada's policy of deleting commercials from
cable transmissions of U.S. broadcasts.

In other problem areas as well we have
made considerable progress:

— The United States, after considerable
delay has moved towai'd completion of pollu-
tion control measures as agreed under the
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, vir-
tually removing that problem as a source of
friction.

— We have achieved joint agreement sub-
mitting the potential transboundary impacts
of the Garrison Diversion Project for con-
sideration and recommendations by the In-
ternational Joint Commission. This has mate-
rially improved the prospect of reaching a
mutually acceptable solution to this emo-
tionally charged issue.

— Many of the longstanding differences
between the United States and Canada on
law of the sea issues have been resolved or
narrowed and we are working increasingly
in terms of perceived common interests on
fisheries and law of the sea matters.

Areas of Concern

Despite these signs of progress, on the
other side of the ledger bilateral problems
remain which have not lent themselves to
easy solution.

One such is bill C-58, which is still und
discussion in the Canadian Parliament a
which will withdraw tax deductions fn
Canadian advertisers in foreign (i.e., U.i
publications published in Canada, in partis
lar Time magazine and Reader's Digest,
well as for advertisers on commercial U
radio and TV stations.

This is a sensitive issue In Canada sii
it goes to the question of heavy U.S. cultu
influence. Since the matter essentially
volves the nondiscriminatory application
internal revenue laws, we have no grour
for objection. The rather vague and see
ingly shifting administrative determinatio
of what might constitute the required Cai
dian content under this law caused soi
rancor, however, since this administrati
judgment, even more than the legislati
itself, could force the affected periodicals
cease doing business in Canada after a lo
history of publication there.

A separate area of concern involves leg
lation introduced by the Province of S;
katchewan in November which would ;
thorize the provincial government to pi
chase or expropriate some or all of the assi
of the potash-mining companies in the pn
ince. Six of these firms are American owm
Some 70 percent of all the potash process
into fertilizer for use in American agric
ture is supplied by Saskatchewan. The thn
of this expropriation and the possibility
cartel-like manipulation of potash expo
have caused considerable unease in 1
American business and agriculture comn
nities.

It was problems of this nature that A
bassador Porter had in mind in the remai
I mentioned earlier. While there are so;
difficult issues here, I am confident we v
be able to work out reasonable solutions w
the Canadians.

We must also recognize that similar
lateral issues will continue to arise betwe
our two countries. This is inevitable in
relationship as extensive as ours. The si
prising thing is that differences between
do not occur more, rather than less, fi
quently. There is widespread concern
Canada at the extent of U.S. ownership a

r -

I

310

Department of State Bullei '

oiitrol of Canadian industry, even as the
lenefits which U.S. investment has brought
re recognized. There is also considerable
ireoccupation in Canada with the omnipres-
iice of U.S. books, periodicals, movies, and
'\' broadcasts — in a word, fear of U.S. cul-
iiral dominance. These two threats inter-
wine with many of our problems and often
aise prickly sensitivities.

The preoccupation with a distinct Cana-
ian identity and the fear of dominance by
,heir massive neighbor to the south is a
leality in present-day Canada which U.S.
olicy must take account of, just as Cana-
ian policy cannot be indifferent to the im-
act in the United States of the actions it
ikes to protect and promote Canadian eco-
omic and cultural objectives.

Of the many facets of our Canadian rela-

ons, the area most likely to give rise to

ilateral differences over the foreseeable

iture is this Canadian effort to promote

>cpanded economic and cultural autonomy.

,his is a legitimate national objective which

le United States can understand and sym-

ithize with. To the extent the process takes

j ace without contravening international

' id bilateral commitments or discriminating

jainst U.S. interests, there is little basis

ir U.S. protest in any event. Nonetheless,

itional controls can rarely be expanded

ithout some impact, usually adverse, on

itablished interests in the areas of control.

The U.S. Government has a responsibility
I protect the American interests affected to
le extent possible and appropriate. We will
mtinue to encourage Canadians to view our
:tensive interdependence less as a threat
• encroachment than as a process which
is brought real benefits to both our na-
t)ns and which should continue to serve
)th countries well. We will continue to en-
•urage the regular process, which Canada
)pears to have come more and more to
:cept, of working closely together in an
fort to mitigate the adverse impact of na-
onal policies.

': The United States is no less committed
> this process than we would wish Canada
' be. In this spirit of consultation and ac-
immodation, I am confident the United

States and Canada will continue to be able
to manage the differences between our two
countries constructively and in a way that
enables the larger interests we share to
prosper.

TREATY INFORA^ATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Labor

Instrument for the amendment of the constitution
of the International Labor Organization. Done at
Montreal October 9, 1946. Entered into force April
20, 1948. TIAS 1868.

Admission to membership: Saudi Arabia, Janu-
ary 12, 1976.

Phonograms

Convention for the protection of producers of phono-
grams against unauthorized duplication of their
phonograms. Done at Geneva October 29, 1971.
Entered into force April 18, 1973; for the United
States March 10, 1974. TIAS 7808.
Notification from Woi-ld Intellectual Property

Organization that ratification deposited: Kenya,

January 21, 1976.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with an-
nexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos
October 25. 1973. Entered into force January 1,
1975.'
Accessions deposited: Albania, January 5, 1976,

with reservations and declaration; Guinea-Bissau,

January 15, 1976.

Tin

Fifth international tin agreement, with annexes.
Done at Geneva June 21. 1975. Open for signature
at U.N. Headquarters from July 1, 1975. to April
30, 1976, inclusive. Enters into force definitively
as soon after June 30, 1976, as instruments of rati-
fication, approval, acceptance, or accession have
been deposited by governments representing at
least six producing countries holding together at
least 950 votes as set out in annex A and at least
nine consuming countries holding together at least
300 votes as set out in annex B.

' Not in force for the United States.

arch 8, 1976

311

Trade

Protocol for the accession of the People's Republic
of Bangladesh to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, with annex. Done at Geneva November
7, 1972. Entered into force December 16, 1972.
TIAS 7552.

Acceptance deposited: New Zealand, January 23,
1976.

Arrangement regarding international trade in tex-
tiles, with annexes. Done at Geneva December 20,
1973. Entered into force January 1, 1974, except
for article 2. paragraphs 2. 3, and 4, which entered
into force April 1, 1974. TIAS 7840.
Accession deposited: Thailand, February 4, 1976.

BILATERAL

Chile

Agreement relating to relief from double taxation on
earnings derived from the operation of aircraft.
Effected by exchange of notes at Santiago Decem-
ber 29 and 31, 1975. Entered into force January 30.
1976; effective January 1, 1975.

France

Agreement extending the agreement of May 7, 1973,
as amended and extended (TIAS 7617, 7815), re-
lating to travel group charter flights and advance
booking charter flights. Effected by exchange of
notes at Paris December 29 and 31, 1975. Entered
into force December 31, 1975.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may he ordered by catalog or stock
nuinber from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
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more copies of any one publication mailed to the
same address. Remittances, payable to the Superin-
tendent of Documents, must accompany orders.
Prices shown below, which include domestic postage,
are subject to change.

Finance — Housing. Agreement with Portugal. TIAS
8095. 11 pp. 50^. (Cat. No. 89.10:8095).

Fisheries in the Western Region of the Middle At-
lantic Ocean. Agreement with the Polish People's Re-
public. TIAS 8099. 61 pp. 75<*. (Cat. No. 89.10:8099).

Privileges and Immunities. Agreement with the
Union, of Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS 8115. 4
pp. 254. (Cat. No. 89.10:8115).

312

Aviation — Joint Financing of Certain Air Navigatic
Services in Iceland and in Greenland and the Fan
Islands. Agreement with Other Governments amen
ing the agreements done at Geneva September
1956, as amended. TIAS 8122. 3 pp. 25<f. (Cat. K
89.10:8122).

Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: February 16—22

Press releases may be obtained from the
Oflice of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

No. Date Subject

t66 2/16 Kissinger: arrival, Caracas.

t67 2/17 Kissinger: U.S.-Venezuelan Sym-
posium II.

*68 2/17 Shipping Coordinating Committee
(SCC), Subcommittee on Safety
of Life at Sea (SOLAS), work-
ing group on safety of naviga-
tion. Mar. 10.

*69 2/17 Willard A. De Pree sworn in as
Ambassador to Mozambique (bio-
graphic data).

*70 2/17 SCC, SOLAS, working group on
standards of training and watch-
keeping. Mar. 10.

*71 2/17 U.S. Advisory Commission on Inter-
national Educational and Cultural
Affairs, Mar. 15.

t72 2/18 Kissinger: news conference, Cara-
cas, Feb. 17.

t73 2/18 U.8.-Venezuela joint press release.

*74 2/18 Kissinger: departure, Caracas.

*75 2/18 U.S. and Greece terminate textile*
agreement.

^76 2/19 U.S.-Soviet fisheries talks begin
Feb. 17.

*77 2/19 Regional foreign policy conference,
Memphis, Tenn., Mar. 10.

*78 2/19 Anne L. Armstrong sworn in as»
Ambassador to the U.K. (biO'
graphic data).

t79 2/19 Kissinger: toast, Lima, Feb. 18.

t80 2/19 Kissinger: news conference, Lima.

*81 2/19 Kissinger: departure, Lima.

t82 2/19 Kissinger: toast, Brasilia.
83 2/19 Department to study role of scienc€(|
and technology in foreign affairs*

*84 2/19 Kissinger: arrival, Brasilia.

t85 2/20 International Coffee Agreement
1976.

*86 2/20 SCC, SOLAS, working group or
ship design and equipment
Mar. 17.

t87 2/21 U.S.-Brazil memorandum of under-
standing.

t88 2/21 Kissinger: remarks at signing cere-
mony.

t89 2/21 Kissinger: news conference, Bra-
silia.

t90 2/21 Sonnenfeldt: Bicentennial Confer-
ence on German-American Re-
lations, Eichholz, Federal Re-
public of Germany, Feb. 20.

*Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

Department of State Bull*

JDEX March 8, 1976 Vol. LXXIV, No. 1915

frica
cretary Kissinger's News Conference of

February 12 285

nitod States Economic Relations With Africa
(Sehaufele) 295

tngola. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer-
jence of February 12 285

lomic Energy. Secretary Kissinger Urges
Approval of Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act
(statement before Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy) 301

<inada. Department Discusses U.S. Relations
With Canada (Vine) 307

(lina. Secretary Kissinger's News Conference
of February 12 285

(ngress

partment Discusses U.S. Relations With

lada (Vine) 307

. ident Ford Announces Plans for Reorgani-
'.ation of Intelligence Community (opening
tatement from news conference, message

the Congress) 292

lid Progress Report on Cyprus Submitted
0 the Congress (message from President

^ord) 305

i:retary Kissinger Urges Approval of Nu-
•lear Fuel Assurance Act (statement before
foint Committee on Atomic Energy) . . . 301
: rretary Kissinger's News Conference of

''ebruary 12 285

1 x-Egypt Income Tax Convention Trans-
nitted to the Senate (message from Presi-
lent Ford) 306

( ba. Secretary Kissinger's News Conference
f February 12 285

< prus. Second Progress Report on Cyprus
iubmitted to the Congress (message from
'resident Ford) 305

) armament. Secretary Kissinger's News Con-
erence of February 12 285

] momic Affairs

1 ited States Economic Relations With Africa
Schaufele) 295

1 ).-Egypt Income Tax Convention Trans-
litted to the Senate (message from Presi-
ent Ford) 306

Egypt. U.S.-Egypt Income Tax Convention
Transmitted to the Senate (message from
President Ford) 306

Food. U.S. Makes $188 Million Pledge to World
Food Program for 1977-78 (Bell) .... 299

Guatemala. Secretary Kissinger's News Con-
ference of February 12 285

Intelligence. President Ford Announces Plans
for Reorganization of Intelligence Commu-
nity (opening statement from news con-
ference, message to the Congress) .... 292

Latin America. Secretary Kissinger's News
Conference of February 12 285

Middle East. Secretary Kissinger's News Con-
ference of February 12 285

Presidential Documents

President Ford Announces Plans for Reorgani-
zation of Intelligence Community .... 292

Second Progress Report on Cyprus Submitted
to the Congress 305

U.S.-Egypt Income Tax Convention Trans-
mitted to the Senate 306

Publications. GPO Sales Publications .... 312

Treaty Information

Current Actions 311

U.S.-Egypt Income Tax Convention Trans-
mitted to the Senate (message from Presi-
dent Ford) 306

U.S.S.R. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer-
ence of February 12 285

United Nations

United Nations Documents 300

U.S. Makes $188 Million Pledge to World
Food Program for 1977-78 (Bell) .... 299

Name Index

Bell, Richard E 299

Ford. President 292, 305, 306

Kissinger, Secretary 285, 301

Schaufele, William E., Jr 295

Vine, Richard D 307

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'■J:

%

W

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXIV

No. 1916

March 15, 1976

THE AMERICAS IN A CHANGING WORLD
Address by Secretary Kissinger at Macuto, Venezuela 313

BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES : THE GLOBAL CHALLENGE
Toast by Secretary Kissinger at Brasilia 322

SECRETARY KISSINGER VISITS SIX LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

Remarks and News Conferences in Venezuela, Peru,

Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Guatemala 327

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see ijiaide ^(iisiceovei''--

S-ix-nuuundent of Documents

A?,^ 2 2

■ L

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETII

Vol. LXXIV, No. 1916
March 15, 1976

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U.S. Government Printing Office

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rhe Americas in a Changing World

Address by Secretary Kissinger

I am most pleased to be here today, at the

nvitation of President Perez. This sympo-

ium is symbohc of the effort of our two

lations to strengthen our ties and to consult

n issues of deep concern to our two peoples.

come here not merely to demonstrate my

ountry's interest in its relationships with

ou but to address with you the global chal-

nges to our common future.

The Western Hemisphere has for centuries

i^mbolized man's readiness to grasp his own

estiny. When I placed a wreath at the tomb

f Simon Bolivar yesterday, I recalled the

3pth of his faith and wonder at the future

' the Americas. Today, more than a century

ter, the promise of our hemisphere is more

ive than ever — and more important to each

' our countries and to the world.

Today I want to discuss with you the chal-

nges that history has posed to our hemi-

Dheric friendship, the efforts we have made

the recent period to address these chal-

nges, and the compelling responsibility we

ce today and tomorrow.

I have come to this continent because the

nited States believes that Latin America

IS a special place in our foreign policy.

This belief is the product of history. We

on our national independence together in

te same era. We confronted the similar chal-

ages of pioneer peoples developing the re-

|urces of bountiful unexplored continents.

le shaped democratic institutions and

turred economic growth, conscious that we

"^nefited greatly from our relationship with

<!ch other. We have long shared a common

Made before the U.S.-Venezuelan Symposium II
Macuto. Venezuela, on Feb. 17.

interest in shielding our hemisphere from
the intrusion of others. We led the world in
building international organizations to serve
our cooperative endeavors for both collective
security and economic progress.

The United States has always felt with
Latin America a special intimacy, a special
bond of collaboration, even in the periods of
our isolation from world affairs. Even now,
when our countries are major participants
in world affairs, when our perceptions of
contemporary issues are not always identi-
cal, there remains a particular warmth in
the personal relationships among our leaders
and a special readiness to consider the views
of our neighbors. On many issues of U.S.
policy — economic, political, or security — the
American people and Congress give special
consideration to our hemispheric ties.

The problem we face today is that history,
and indeed the very gi'owth and success we
have all achieved, have complicated our rela-
tionship. What used to be a simple percep-
tion of hemispheric uniqueness, and a self-
contained exclusive relationship, has become
enmeshed in the wider concerns we all now
have in the rest of the world.

— The United States is conscious of a
global responsibility to maintain the world
balance of power, to help resolve the age-old
political conflicts that undermine peace, and
to help shape a new international order en-
compassing the interests and aspirations of
the 150 nations that now comprise our
planet. And so our vision now reaches be-
yond the Western Hemisphere. We have
major alliances with the Atlantic community
and Japan, as well as this hemisphere; we

nch 15, 1976

313

have growing ties of friendship with many
nations. In a nuclear age, we have an in-
escapable responsibility to manage and sta-
bilize our relations with the major Commu-
nist powers and to try to build a safe and
more constructive future. The problem of
peace in this generation means for us, the
United States, a permanent involvement in
world affairs in all their dimensions — main-
taining security, promoting a healthy trade
and monetary system and economic develop-
ment, and creating a stable and just and
universal system of political relations.

— At the same time, Latin American na-
tions have grown in power and influence and
become major forces in their own right on
the world scene. This is one of the most strik-
ing events of this era. Your economies are
among the most advanced of the developing
world. But your role is not a product of eco-
nomic strength alone; its roots are deeper:
your traditions of personal and national
dignity, concern for legal principle, and your
history of peace. Your sense of regional
identity has become more important — to
you — and to the world. We accept and re-
spect these developments, and the new or-
ganizations, like SELA [Latin American
Economic System], which now speak to
your own collective interests. We trust that
they will not be used for confrontation; for
that could complicate our relations and hin-
der solutions to problems. We are confident
that the increased sense of Latin American
identity, and the institutions which serve it,
can be a constructive and vital force for co-
operation on a wider basis. This will be our
attitude toward these institutions.

— The countries of Latin America have
done more than grow internally and strength-
en their regional associations. They have
established new ties outside the hemi-
sphere— trade relations with the European
Community and Japan and a growing sense
of solidarity with developing nations in
Africa and Asia. Such global involvement is
inevitable; inevitably also, it creates new
and conflicting pressures on more traditional
friendships.

— The challenge of economic development
has become a worldwide concern and is being

314

addressed on a global, and not simply hem
spheric, basis. Venezuela is now cochairma
of the Conference on International EconomJ
Cooperation (CIEC) and has discharged thi
responsibility with great wisdom. Similail;
the energies of the United States are increa:
ingly focused on international organizatioi
and issues of global scope. We have ma(
major and comprehensive proposals to tl
U.N. General Assembly special session, tl
World Food Conference, and the ConfereiK
on International Economic Cooperation. R'
cent events have taught us all that glob,
prosperity is indivisible; no nation can pro
per alone.

— Finally, the United States continues
this era to feel a special concern for its hem
spheric relations. Our profound conviction
that if we cannot help to solve the burnii
issues of peace and progress with those wii
whom we have such longstanding ties
sentiment and experience of collaboratio
we have little hope of helping to solve the
elsewhere. To put it positively, we fe
strongly that our cooperation as equals
this hemisphere can be a model for cooper
tion in the world arena.

The challenge we face is that we must re
oncile these distinct but intersecting dime
sions of concern. We must define anew t
nature and purposes of our hemisphei
condition. We must understand its meani:
and its promise. We must adapt it to o
new global condition. We must summon
develop it, and use it for our comm»
objectives.

The United States values its bilateral ti
with your countries, without any intent!
of pursuing them in order to break up yo
regional solidarity. We want to preser
our hemispheric ties and adapt them to t
moral imperatives of this era- — without Y
gemony, free of complexes, aimed at a betf
future.

All the nations of the hemisphere are ir
ture countries. The variety of intersect!
relationships and concerns reflects the vit
ity of our nations and the increasingly !;
portant roles we play in the world. We in t
Americas are granted by history a uniq
opportunity to help fashion what your F(

Department of State Bullei

1

If
Si

.'igii Minister lias called a "new equilibrium"
mong all nations.

>ialogue and Progress

The experience of our recent past has
L^iuch to teach us.

■ During the early 1960's, the Alliance for

h'rogress stimulated great expectations of

iapid development. The enthusiasm with

i(i/hich our countries embraced the Alliance

Charter clearly exceeded our collective perse-

erance and understated the magnitude of

lie challenge. But great human and financial

ssources were mobilized ; new institutions

'ere created that remain basic instruments

)r cooperation. And ultimately the Alliance

ift an even greater moral imprint. By the

id of the 1960's, internal development and

)cial change had become an imperative for

I governments in Latin America, regardless
' political coloration. The United States is
-cud of its contribution.

In this decade, this hemisphere has been
A^ept up in the tides of the global economy
lat now have an increasing significance to
ir national plans and expectations.

At Vina del Mar in 1969, the nations of
fltin America staked out a new agenda of
•sues reflecting what we have since come to

II interdependence — the conditions of world
ade, multinational corporations, and tech-
•logy transfer — as well as more traditional
sues such as economic assistance. In the
■irit of inter-American cooperation, the
nited States attempted to respond. My gov-
nment endorsed, and worked for, measures

improve Latin America's access to our

markets and those of other industrial coun-

ies, to improve the flow of private capital,

reform the inter-American system, and to

sure consideration for Latin American

ncerns in international forums.

Less than a month after becoming Secre-

ry of State in 1973, I called for a new dia-

?ue between Latin America and the United

ates to reinvigorate our relations by ad-

essing together the new challenges of an

iterdependent world. I believed that in the

1 st the United States had too often sought

1 decide unilaterally what should be done

about inter-American relations. I felt that
Latin America must have a stake in our
policies if those policies were to be successful.
I said that we were ready to listen to all
Latin American concerns in any forum.

Latin America chose to conduct the dia-
logue on a strictly multilateral basis, pre-
senting common positions to the United
States. First in Bogota, then in Mexico City,
the agenda of issues that had been set out in
Viiia del Mar was updated to account for
changed circumstances and new concerns. At
Tlatelolco, and again in Washington, I joined
my fellow Foreign Ministers in informal
meetings, supplementing our regular en-
counters in the OAS and United Nations. A
thorough and heartening dialogue took place.
For the next 12 months, U.S. and Latin
American representatives met in a continu-
ous series of political and technical discus-
sions. These meetings were interrupted
almost precisely a year ago in reaction to
certain provisions of the U.S. Trade Act of
1974, tjie very act that implemented the sys-
tem of generalized preferences first proposed
in Villa del Mar.

All of us have something to learn from
this experience.

First, we can now see that the new dia-
logue, as it was conducted, only partially met
the psychological requirements of our mod-
ern relationship.

The United States was prepared to work
with the other nations of the hemisphere to
improve and perfect the undeniable com-
munity that has existed under the name of
the inter-American system for almost a cen-
tury. Yet the explicitness of our approach to
the concept of community led many in Latin
America to think that the United States
wanted to maintain or create a relationship
of hegemony. This misunderstanding ob-
scured the reality that the hemisphere was in
transition, between dependence and inter-
dependence, between consolidation and polit-
ical growth, and that the old community
based on exclusivity was being transformed
into a more open community based on mutual
interests and problem solving.

The Latin American nations still seemed
to think that the United States, with its

arch 15, 1976

315

great strengths and responsibilities, could
act unilaterally to resolve all issues, that any
compromise was surrender, that Latin
America should propose and the United
States should respond. The United States, on
the other hand, looked upon dialogue as a
prolonged process of give-and-take in which
progress would come incrementally as our
representatives analyzed the problems and
negotiated solutions.

Latin America demanded quick results :
each meeting became a deadline by which
time the United States had to show "results"
or be judged lacking. But as economic diffi-
culties beset us all in a period of world
recession, it became obvious that if Latin
American aspirations were expressed to the
people of the United States in terms of cate-
gorical and propagandistic demands, they
could not elicit a sufficiently positive
response.

Both sides oversimplified the nature of the
problem : the Latin American nations did not
always perceive that the issues were among
the most difficult that the international com-
munity has faced because they go to the
heart of the structure and interaction of en-
tire societies. The United States did not
sufficiently take into account that Latin
America had experienced years of frustra-
tion in which lofty promises by the United
States had been undone by the gradualism of
the American political system, which re-
sponds less to abstract commitments than to
concrete problems. Hence the charge of ne-
glect on one side and the occasional feeling on
the other side of being besieged with
demands.

But if the new dialogue has not yet
yielded results, it nevertheless expresses a
constructive mode of dealing with our prob-
lems and realizing the aspirations of the
hemisphere. The United States is prepared
to make a major effort to invigorate our
hemispheric ties. My trip here underlines
that purpose.

We have learned something basic about
the hemisphere itself. In the past, both the
United States and Latin America have acted
as if the problems of the hemisphere could
be solved exclusively within the hemisphere.

316

Today, the Americas — North and South-
recognize that they require a global as well
a regional vision if they are to resolve the
problems. For the United States a horn
geneous policy toward an entity call'
"Latin America" presents new problems,
terms both of global concerns and of the re
diversity of Latin America. Nor can the bu
den of adjustment to a new hemispheric eqi
librium be borne wholly by the United Staff
We are prepared to make a major contril)
tion, and we are willing to cooperate ful
with Latin American regional institutio
that come into being to this end.

Both sides need a new approach. T
United States is prepared to give more s,\
tematic consideration to Latin Americ;
quest for regional identity. On the otli
hand, Latin America must overcome its o\
apprehensions about our policies. In the pa:
whenever we emphasized the regional aspec
of our relationships, we have been accus
of forcing problems into an inter-Amerir
system which we dominated; when we ei
phasized the bilateral mode, we were accus
of a policy of divide and rule. Each side nni
understand the problems and purposes of t
other.

We thus all know our challenge. \
must now turn it into our opportunity. .
far as the United States is concerned, we a:
prepared to make a major effort to bu:
upon our historic ties a cooperative effort
construct a better future.

Interdependence and Our Common Future

Where do we go from here? What is t
answer? Wherein lies the purpose of o
relationship in the modern era?

Our starting point must be to recogni
that an era of interdependence makes C(
laborative endeavor more, not less, importa
to any country that wishes to preserve co
trol over its own national destiny.

We in this hemisphere won our glory
fighting for national independence and d
fending it in the face of foreign threats ; \
have built societies embodying the traditi(
of democracy; we have dedicated our hum;
energies to the development of our natur

Department of State Bullet)

•esources, with impressive results.

Yet even as we celebrate our birth as na-
ions and our centuries of achievement, we
mcounter a new challenge to our independ-
nce. It comes not from foreign armies, but
rom gaps and strains revealed within the
ery international economic system that each
)f our nations, in its own way, has done
nuch to create.

Since the Enlightenment, which produced
he faith in reason and progress that in-
pired our revolutions, we have all believed
hat the growth of a global economy would
urture a world community bringing univer-
al advancement. Yet now we find that the
iternational system of production — which
till has the potential to provide material
rogress for all — has become subject to un-
srtainties and inefficiencies and international
inflicts.

Nowhere is this challenge more vivid than
1 Latin America. With the higher stage of
Bvelopment that your economies have
cached has come the awareness of greater
alnerability to fluctuations in export earn-
igs, to increases in the costs of imports, and
I the ebb and flow of private capital. Yet
our more complex and more open econo-
ies can also respond more vigorously to,
id profit more readily from, positive trends

the world economic system.

Interdependence for the Americas is there-
re a positive force and an opportunity. We
ust manage it, harness it, and develop it
r our common benefit.

Our economic dilemmas give rise, in our
nes, to political imperatives. Rapidly

anging external events affect all our peo-
les profoundly — their livelihoods, their ma-
irial standards, their hopes for the future,
id most fundamentally, their confidence that
r systems of government can successfully
'.counter thc» challenges before us. And the
quirement for action is political will.

Our societies derive their strength from
le consent and dedication of our peoples,
m our democratic system cope with the
rains of social change and the frustrations

what is inevitably a long historical proc-
!s? Can nations find the wisest path in an
a when our problems are too vast to be

irch 15, 1976

solved by any nation acting alone? Will we
succumb to the temptation of unilateral ac-
tions advantageous in their appearance but
not their reality? Can we reconcile our di-
versity and the imperative of our collabora-
tion?

I believe we have every cause for optimism.
The requirements of interdependence make
patent the genius of our special hemispheric
traditions, our values, and our institutions.
Pluralism and respect for the rights of otTiers
are indispensable to the harmony of the in-
ternational order. For to seek to impose radi-
cal changes without the consent of all those
who would be affected is to ignore political
reality. Equally, to deny a voice to any who
are members of the international community
is to insure that even positive achievement
will ultimately be rejected.

Therefore the traditions of this hemi-
sphere— democracy, justice, human and na-
tional dignity, and free cooperation — are
precisely the qualities needed in the era of
global interdependence. National unity with-
out freedom is sterile ; technological progress
without social justice is corrupt; nationalism
without a consciousness of the human com-
munity is a negative force.

Therefore our permanent quest for prog-
ress in this hemisphere must take into ac-
count global as well as regional realities. It
must reflect the differing interests of each
country. And our global efforts respectively
must draw on the vitality of our own rela-
tionships as a source of dynamism, strength,
and inspiration.

The United States has attempted to make
a constructive contribution in this context.

Last September in New York, addressing
the Latin American Foreign Ministers at-
tending the U.N. General Assembly, I
pointed out that several of our initiatives
before the seventh special session had been
designed to be particularly relevant to Latin
American concerns. And I pledged that in
the necessary negotiations in other forums,
and in all aspects of our relations, we would
remember that each Latin American country
was different and we would be responsive to
the distinctive national interests of our
friends in the hemisphere.

317

My New York comments raised contradic-
tory speculations. The explicit introduction
of global considerations into our Latin Amer-
ican policy was variously interpreted as im-
plying either that the United States denied-
the existence of a special relationship with
Latin America or that it sought to build on
that relationship to constitute a new bloc in
world affairs. The recognition of the unique-
ness of each country, and particularly my
statement that no "single formula" could
encompass our desire for warm and produc-
tive relations with each nation in the hemi-
sphere, were interpreted by some to imply
that the United States was about to embark
on a new crusade to maintain its power
through a policy of special bilateral deals de-
signed to divide the countries of Latin Amer-
ica against one another and preclude their
ties with countries outside the hemisphere.

These speculations reflect the suspicions
and uncertainties of a fluid global environ-
ment. They reflect problems we must jointly
overcome. They do not reflect U.S. policy.

The fundamental interests of the United
States require an active and constructive
role of leadership in the task of building
peace and promoting economic advance. In
this hemisphere the legacy of our history is
a tradition of civilized cooperation, a habit of
interdependence, that is a sturdy foundation
on which to seek to build a more just inter-
national order. And it is absurd to attempt
to create a broader world community by
tearing down close cooperative relations
that have already existed in our part of the
globe.

Therefore the United States remains com-
mitted to our common pledge at Tlatelolco to
seek "a new, vigorous spirit of inter-Ameri-
can solidarity." - This must mean today not
an artificial unanimity or unrealistic pleas for
unilateral action. As we agi'eed at Tlatelolco,
interdependence has become a physical and
moral imperative: it is a reality of mutual
dependence and a necessity of cooperation on
common problems. To face real problems, we
must now deal effectively among ourselves ;
we must identify our real needs and priori-

- For text of the Declaration of Tlatelolco, see
Bulletin of Mar. 18, 1974, p. 262.

318

ties — given the hemisphere's diversity, th;
can often be achieved bilaterally and .su
regionally better than regionally.

In this spirit of working solidarity, t!
United States pledges itself:

— To take special cognizance of the distin
tive requirements of the more industrializ'
economies of Latin America, and of the >
gion as a whole, in our efforts to build a mo
equitable international order. We believe tl
major Latin American countries need vo
cessional foreign assistance less than tlb
need support for their drive to participate
the international economy on a more eqii
footing with the industrialized nations,
help overcome fluctuations in export ear
ings and continued import and debt-servicii
needs, we have secured a development sec
rity facility in the IMF [International Mor
tary Fund] and a substantial increase in i
cess to IMF resources. To facilitate access
long-temi development capital on commerc
terms, we have proposed a new internatioi
investment trust and have begun a progr£
of technical assistance to countries enteri
established capital markets.

In a similar vein, we support expandl
capitalization of international financial ina
tutions such as the International Final*
Corporation and the Inter-American Devek
ment Bank. A U.S. contribution of $2
billion to a new multi-year replenishment
the Inter-American Development Bank
now before the U.S. Congress. Presid*
Ford has given his full support.

To promote the growth and market stal
ity of commodities of importance to La^
America, we favor producer-consumer
operation in specific commodities and a
duction in the barriers to increased proce
ing of raw materials in exporting countri

We are prepared to undertake other prac
cal steps:

l

8

The nations of Latin America have shoii
considerable interest in the transfer of mt
ern technology. We support this, in princi
and in practice. The challenge here, as el
where, is to develop mechanisms to achif
practical results. It may be that SELA
turn to this question and suggest the mea

Department of State Bulla

f which we could cooperate. We ai-e pre-
Jired to respond positively.
In addition we must recognize that tlie
•ivate sector, private initiative, and private
pital can play important roles in the de-
opment and application of new scientific
id technological advances to local needs and
nditions. The degree to which private capi-
is prepared to devote its considerable re-
urces of talent and knowledge to this task
11 depend on the climate for its participa-
»n. It is for this reason that we state again
r willingness to discuss codes of conduct
lich can provide guidelines for the be-
vior of transnational enterprises. No sub-
t is more sensitive or more vital — for the
vate sector has played the critical role in
nging about growth ; its resources exceed
far those now available for governmental
. Yet for it to be effective the proper
nronment must be created. This is a major
t for our cooperative efforts.
Co increase trading opportunities we now
■mit many industrial products of develop-
' countries to enter the United States
hout duty. And we favor special and dif-
entiated treatment in the multilateral
de negotiations through concentration on
ducts of interest to Latin America. This is
eady apparent in the talks we have had on
pical products. On all such multilateral
les we are prepared to have prior con-
cation with the nations of Latin America.

-To maintain direct assistance to the
diest nations in this hemisphere still op-
|«3sed by poverty and natural disaster. The
,t bulk of our bilateral concessional as-
,nce to Latin America — nearly $300 mil-
annually — is now allocated to the re-
li's poorest nations to meet basic needs in
1th, education, and agriculture. At this
>nent, the United States has joined other
itries in a massive response to the devas-
ang earthquake in Guatemala. In addition
continue to support expansion of multi-
ral concessional assistance through the
d for Special Operations of the Inter-
erican Development Bank and the soft-
windows of other international financial
itutions active in Latin America. These
vities, supplemented by new programs in

agricultural development and to assist
balance-of-payments shortfalls, make an im-
portant contribution to our common responsi-
bility toward the neediest.

In this regard let me mention the critical
problem of food — which is especially impor-
tant to Latin America, where food production
over recent years has barely kept pace with
population.

Following my proposal of a year ago, the
Inter-American Development Bank estab-
lished the International Group for Agricul-
tural Development in Latin America. This
hemispheric agricultural consultative group
will consist of major donors and all Latin
American nations and focus on overcoming
constraints to agricultural growth and rural
development in the hemisphere. The first
meeting is scheduled for May in Mexico, and
preparatory work will begin next week.

The United States attaches great impor-
tance to this effort. It is crucial if Latin
America is to fulfill its potential as a food-
suii)lus region. It can be another powei'ful
example of how inter-American cooperation
can show the way toward solving mankind's
most urgent problems.

— To support Latin American regional and
subregional efforts to organize for coopera-
tion and integration. The United States has
provided technical and financial assistance to
the movement of regional and subregional
integration, including the development banks
of the Andean Pact, the Central American
Common Market, and the Caribbean Com-
mon Market. We are eager to assist these
integration movements and others that may
arise in the future. In addition, we see in
SELA a new possibility for cooperation
among the nations of Latin America on
common regional problems and projects. We
welcome SELA and will support its efforts
at mutual cooperation as its members may
deem appropriate.

— To negotiate on the basis of parity and
dignity our specific differences tvith each and
every state, both bilaterally and, where ap-
propriate, multilaterally. We intend to solve
problems before they become conflicts. We
stand ready to consult with other govern-
ments over investment disputes when those

ch 15, 1976

319

disputes threaten relations between our gov-
ernments. As you all know, the United States
and Panama are continuing to move forward
in their historic negotiations on a Panama
Canal treaty to establish a reliable long-term
relationship between our two nations. In the
interim between now and the final Law of
the Sea Conference, we will continue to at-
tempt to find solutions to issues relating to
fisheries and the seas which have complicated
our relations in the past. It is the earnest
hope of my country that within a year a
Treaty of Caracas will be signed on the law
of the sea.

— To enforce our commitment to mutual
f^ecuritii and the Bolivarian ideal of regional
integrity against those who would seek to
undermine solidarity, threaten independence,
or export violence. Last July at San Jose the
nations of the Americas agreed upon re-
visions to the Inter-American Treaty of Re-
ciprocal Assistance, the Rio Treaty. In so
doing, they reaffirmed their commitment to
take collective action against aggression —
whether it comes from without or within the
hemisphere. The United States regards this
treaty as a solemn international obligation.
We are resolved to carry out the commit-
ment it places upon us.

— To work to modernize the inter-Ameri-
can system to respond to the needs of our
times, to give direction to our common ac-
tions. The member states have already taken
a major step forward in revising and re-
affirming the Rio Treaty. In the months
ahead, the OAS will be considering the report
of its special committee on reform. More
is at stake than the text of the charter; the
member states are also beginning to focus
on the structure and processes of the organi-
zation itself. The United States believes that
the OAS has an important future of service
to the hemisphere. We stand ready to work
with others to modernize and strengthen it,
to make it a more eff'ective instrument for
regional cooperation.

The application of these principles is a
matter of common concern. We have had a
special relationship for 150 years and more;

the very intimacy of our ties imposes upc
us the duty of rigorous and responsible sel
assessment. We should set ourselves co!
crete deadlines— to complete the proce.
before the end of this year.

We should use the months ahead constru
tively and productively. It is time that all
us in the hemisphere put aside slogans ai
turn from rhetoric to resolve. Let us go b
yond the debate whether the United Stat
is patronizing or neglecting or seeking
dominate its neighbors. Let us not dispu
whether the Latin American nations a
being unreasonable or peremptory or see
ing to line up against their northern partnt

Instead, let us focus on our goals and t
need for common effort and get down
serious business. Many forums and forms a
available. I propose that we identify the mc
fruitful areas for our common effort and s
ourselves the goal of major accomplishme
this year. At the OAS meeting in June, ^
can review where we stand and discuss wh
further needs to be done. At the last Gene;
Assembly we adopted the informal style
the new dialogue, successfully, to facilits
open and frank discussions of major issui
I propose that we do so again and that
concentrate, at this next ministerial meetii
on the nature of our fundamental relati(
ship.

Our common problems are real enough
common response will give living reality
the heritage and promise of the hemisph
and the enduring truth that the nations
this hemisphere do indeed have — ^and i
continue to have — a special relationship.

The United States and Venezuela

The ties between the United States {
Venezuela illustrate the sound foundat
upon which we can build. Our democrat
our economic strength, our tradition of tr
and working together, give us hope ; it is i
duty to go forward together. This is
strong desire of my country.

We have set an example together. (
collaboration is traditional, extensive, int<
sive, and — patently — mutually beneficial,

fl

320

Department of State BulM^j

Venezuela is a country at peace in a conti-
nent at peace. Its considerable energies can
happily be directed toward the highest as-
pirations of human well-being in the spirit of
its democratic ideals. Now those ideals have
been given new strength by the acquisition
of new prosperity and power.

Last December in Paris, 27 nations gath-
ered in the Conference on International Eco-
nomic Cooperation, a milestone in the world's
struggle to manage the challenges of inter-
dependence.

Decisions in CIEC are to be taken by con-
sensus rather than by majority vote. The
structure of the conference reflects the di-
versity of nations. It is not a club of the
powerful: the developing countries as well
as the industrialized participate on a fully
equal basis. It is representative, but not so
unwieldy as to frustrate all practical action.
It is a tribute to common sense and to the
-strength of our collective commitment to
achieve real solutions and real progress for
our peoples and for the world.

Appropriately, Venezuela- — whose leaders
have long projected a vision of greater de-
mocracy among nations as well as within
their own country — is now cochairman of
CIEC.

Since the early days of our nation when
Francisco de Miranda befriended George
Washington, Venezuela's and the United
States' struggle for liberty, national dignity,
and progress have been intertwined. Only a
few miles up this coast at Puerto Cabello,
there is a monument to 10 North Americans
who lost their lives in the first attempt by
Miranda to win Venezuelan independence.
And Henry Clay, whose statue stands in
Caracas, expressed the enduring wish of my
nation when he wrote to Simon Bolivar in
1828:

. . . the interest which was inspired in this country
Iby the arduous struggles of South America, arose
iprincipally from the hope, that, along with its inde-
ipendence, would be established free institutions, in-
isuring all the blessings of civil liberty.

We have a right to be proud, for these
hopes are a living reality. Few societies have
transformed themselves so profoundly and

so rapidly as our two countries. And those
transformations have been neither aimless
nor ideological, but the dynamic product of
institutions created by free peoples.

Venezuela and the United States have
built an economic relationship that is sturdy
and valuable to both sides — and is increas-
ingly so. Venezuela has for decades been an
important and reliable supplier of energy to
the United States— through World War II
and the recent oil embargo. The U.S. private
sector has participated actively in the dy-
namic growth of the Venezuelan economy.

We recognize that we often have differing
perspectives and diflfering interests. At times
the fervor of our respective convictions has
led us to disagree even when our interests
basically coincided. Venezuela and the United
States can debate without confrontation. We
can discuss without rancor, as friends. And
most importantly, we can pursue our respec-
tive goals with a dignity born of mutual
respect.

Like a masterpiece by Soto or Otero, our
relationship is therefore a shimmering and
changing pattern of reality. My discussions
with your distinguished President Carlos
Andres Perez and Foreign Minister Escovar
have convinced me that the farsighted
prophecy of the Liberator speaks for both
our countries. Bolivar envisioned a world
"imbibing the American principles and see-
ing the effects of liberty on the prosperity of
the American peoples. . . ."

We have it in our power to transform such
a world from a dream into a practical reality.
All great achievements began as dreams.
With realism, reason, and the will to work
together, we can insure that the dreams of
Bolivar and Jefferson, of Miranda and Wash-
ington, will endure — for our two countries,
for the hemisphere, and for all mankind.

The challenge for both our nations now is
to draw new inspiration from the long tradi-
tion that unites us, to bring into harmony
the diverse roles we are destined to play in
world afl"airs. There is little we can accom-
plish apart; there are tremendous things we
can achieve together.

March 15, 1976

321

Brazil and the United States: The Global Challenge

Toast by Secretary Kissinger '

At such a moment, I must begin by ex-
pressing how much I regret that my dear
friend Ambassador Araujo Castro is not
with us here tonight.- He contributed so
much to the friendship between Brazil and
the United States that has brought us to"
this occasion. He was a diplomat of insight
and a man of humanity. He served his coun-
try well. I shall miss his counsel.

Some of you may have wondered, as my
staff certainly did, whether I would ever get
here. But I never doubted for a minute that
1 would one day be sitting at this table with
my good friend Foreign Minister Silveira. I
was much too afraid of his sardonic com-
ments to let him down again.

Antonio, our conversations and exchanges
have demonstrated to me why the skill of
Brazilian diplomacy commands such extraor-
dinary respect in international affairs. My
only criticism is that applying their own
high standards and the superior subtlety of
the Latin mind they sometimes give us too
much credit for complexity.

There has never been any doubt in my
mind that Brazil's diplomats speak for a na-
tion of greatness — a people taking their place
in the front rank of nations, a country of
continental proportions with a heart as mas-
sive as its geography, a nation now playing
a role in the world commensurate with its
great history and its even greater promise.
My country welcomes Brazil's new role in
world affairs.

' Given at a dinner at Brasilia on Feb. 19 hosted
by Foreign Minister Antonio Francisco Azeredo da
Silveira (text from press release 82).

- Brazilian Ambassador to the United States Joao
Augusto de Araujo Castro died at Washington on
Dec. 9, 1975.

322

It is for this reason, Mr. Minister, that I
am so pleased to have the opportunity to say
something about how our two nations may
face together in the years to come the issues
of our complex modern world and how the
institution of consultation which we shall
establish liere during my visit will, I am con-
fident, give meaning and strength and per-
manence to our cooperation.

Mr. Minister, our two nations have much
to accomplish together. We both are vitally
concerned and involved in the world's re-
sponse to the fundamental challenges with
which history has confronted this genera-
tion— building a new and peaceful inter-
national order and insuring justice and
Ijrosperity for all peoples.

Today the United States and Brazil to-
gether face a complex and changing world.
The international order of previous centuries
has broken down under the pressures of two
World Wars and the inexorable process of
decolonization. The bipolar order of the last
generation has eroded. The industrial na-
tions of the West now deal with each other
on a new and more equal basis of cooperation
and shared initiative; the Communist world
has fragmented and is beset with economic
difficulties even as the Soviet Union emerges
as a military superpower. And around the
globe new voices awaken our humane con-
cern for the fate of our fellow men through-
out our shrinking planet.

The traditional association of our two na-
tions, and the warm friendship that con-
tinually has inspired it, are among our most
precious resources. At the same time, our bi-
lateral relations must now be infused with a
global vision and planned to encompass a
worldwide sweep. We have only begun to:

Department of State BuUetini

realize the potential of vigorous collaboration
witii the major nations of the West in shap-
ing international order in the era before us.

At the core of my country's concerns is the
imperative of world peace.

At the core of Brazil's concerns are the
new issues of global interdependence.

These two central tasks of our time pro-
vide Brazil and the United States each with
a special role and responsibility and new
possibilities of cooperation.

The Challenge of Peace and Prosperity

The United States today is confronted by
one challenge unprecedented in its own his-
tory and another challenge unprecedented in
the history of the world. The United States
has finally come to recognize that it is per-
manently and irrevocably involved in world
affairs outside the Western Hemisphere. At
the same time, the catastrophic nature of
nuclear war imposes upon us a necessity that
transcends traditional concepts of diplomacy
and balance of power : to shape a world order
that finds a stability in self-restraint, peace
in justice, and progress in global cooperation.

Not all nations may choose a global re-
sponsibility, but every nation has a vital
stake in its success.

The United States, uniquely among the na-
tions of the free world, bears a heavy re-
sponsibility to maintain the global balance of
ipower and to resist expansionism.

All nations which value independence must

irecognize and oppose attempts to upset the

(global equilibrium on which the dignity and

(security of nations depends. Peace cannot

survive attempts to exploit turbulent local

♦situations for unilateral political or military

"advantage. We cannot accept the dispatch of

large expeditionary forces and vast amounts

of war materiel to impose solutions in local

conflicts on faraway continents. Nor can we

be indifferent if a nation of this hemisphere

makes it a systematic practice to intervene

to exacerbate such conflicts around the globe.

The United States is determined, as a matter

if principle, to resist such dangerous and

irresponsible actions.

At the same time we shall never forget

that the world cannot rely indefinitely on a
peace that rests exclusively on the precarious
balance of power, on a stability based on
pressure or threats of mutual extermination.
Our people and the people of the world de-
mand something better. Overcoming the
problem of nuclear war is the moral impera-
tive of our age. Our ultimate purpose is to
look beyond the crises of the moment to
shape a structure of international relations
that offers our children the hope of a better
and less cataclysmic future. We will never
settle for the uneasy equilibrium of an armed
truce. We shall never cease striving for a
peace in which future generations will know
tliat theirs is an era of true reconciliation.

There will be and can be no condominium
with the other nuclear superpower. On the
contrary, the people of my country will never
forget that our ties with our friends and
allies are the foundation of the edifice we
seek to build. As we meet the responsibili-
ties of security, the energies of all nations
are freed for the positive endeavors of
human betterment. All nations therefore have
a stake in peace. For in today's world, peace
is global; the breakdown of order on this
shrinking planet ultimately affects the hopes
and dreams and well-being of us all.

With solidarity in their commitment to
peace, all countries are summoned to make
their unique and necessary contribution to
the realization of the positive aspirations of
all mankind.

The Challenge of Interdependence

For these are the new goals toward which
tlie nations of the world are turning — and
among the most impressive, this great coun-
try. Brazil, emerging on the world scene,
stands astride the great international chal-
lenge of our time: the gap between the de-
veloped and developing worlds. Brazil, which
is itself both industrial and developing, mir-
rors the world in its vastness, diversity, and
potential. Brazil has brought to the great
task of economic and social advance, to the
uplifting of its people, not only its stagger-
ing resources but a boundless energy.

And Brazil also begins with strong ties of

*March 15, 1976

323

friendship with the nations of Latin Amer-
ica, with the great industrial powers, and
with the aspiring nations of the Third World.
In Latin America, Brazil's significant politi-
cal and economic role has long been recog-
nized. With the industrial nations, Brazil has
been an advocate of needed change in the
institutions and practices of the global eco-
nomic system. With the developing coun-
tries, Brazil has worked for a greater voice
and participation for all in the open economic
system that has fostered progress for a
generation and spread it to the far corners
of the world.

Thus, in today's interdependent world the
traditional motto of Brazil's flag — Order and
Progress — takes on new meaning.

Tlie United States, for its part, also has
accepted the challenge of cooperation on an
equal basis between all nations — industrial
and developing. North and South, rich and
poor alike.

At the U.N. General Assembly special ses-
sion on development, my government set
forth a comprehensive program of measures
to improve security against economic cycles
and natural disasters, to stimulate growth,
to improve the conditions of trade, particu-
larly in key commodities which are central
to developing economies, and to address ur-
gently the special needs of the poorest na-
tions. We are convinced that in the last
analysis it is justice that insures tran-
quillity; it is hope that inspires men to the
fulfillment of their age-old dreams.

We were encouraged to see at that special
session that the shrill idiom of the North-
South debate has begun to give way to more
rational discourse and an enduring sense
that we are in fact a world community. Ap-
peals to outmoded ideologies are giving way
to the study of practical proposals. Your
Foreign Minister has always advocated this.
Brazil, he has said, is not beguiled by the
"illusion of formal and rhetorical victories
in international forums," but is interested in
practical progress.

My country shares that commitment.

The U.S. and Brazil in an Interdependent World

Mr. Minister: My country shares with
yours the conviction that our efforts together
can now make a decisive contribution to a
new era of progress for the world. It is a
prospect worthy of our peoples. Therefore
we shall nurture our ties with you — in this
hemisphere and in the world. Ours will not
be a relationship of automatic unanimity, but
of equality, mutual respect, and common
endeavor in a host of areas.

We are already playing important roles
together in a variety of international forums
— in the Conference on International Ecd-
nomic Cooperation, in the multilateral trade
negotiations in Geneva, in the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund. Our
recent past demonstrates that we, and the
world, have much to gain by our working
together in this way.

— At Kingston in January, Brazil and the
United States were prominent in achieving
the far-reaching reform of the International
Monetary Fund that was adopted by broad
consensus. By these new measures, the mone-
tary reserves of the developing world will
increase appreciably and the prospects for
world economic growth be enhanced.

— The United States and Brazil each have
a vital stake in the outcome of the Law of
the Sea Conference. I am hopeful that we
will see a successful conclusion of this his-
toric global negotiation this year. Brazil'?
voice is vital in those deliberations, and we
i.re in close touch.

— Finally, and most recently, in London
Brazil and the United States successfully,
composed our differences and helped to nego-
tiate a commodity agreement — on coffee—
that serves the interests of consumers anc
producers alike. President Ford has decidec
that the United States will sign the Inter-
national Coffee Agreement. My government
supports it, and I am confident that our Con-
gress will endorse it.

But whatever the successes of the imme-
diate past, the need for us to find commor
ground is more urgent than ever. No coun-

324

Department of State Bulletir

ly — not even countries as vast as the United
^tates and Brazil — can hope to impose uni-
atoral solutions on the problems now on the
Aorld's agenda.

National trade policies, in particular, have
;reated recurring difficulties. To some extent
■ ihese problems are cyclical — reflecting the
emporary global economic downturns, as
veil as a growing awareness in the United
states of the long-term possibilities of Bra-
ilian growth and competitive capacity.

The United States is determined to over-
ome these difficulties; we are prepared to
nake every effort to do so through multi-
ateral arrangements and commitments. We
lelieve that both our countries must achieve
nutual solutions to these trade issues and
mild upon them toward a new period of
nternational economic cooperation.

Trade is only one of the many issues

vhich summon our two nations to a higher

evel of collaboration and cooperation. This

the reason, Mr. Minister, why I am hon-

ired to have the opportunity shortly to exe-

ute wich you our new formal agreement

istablishing a metiianisii of regular consul-

lations between our two couiarip"; at the

ainisterial level. The mechanism that we

(stablish will engage us in the kind of inti-

late and intensive deliberations on major

" /orld and bilateral issues which the scope of

' m- respective international interests and

" esponsibilities requires.

We have long been improving our consul-
ations, in keeping with the growing signifi-
, ance of our relationship. Fifteen months ago
/e instituted consultations on the planning
taff level. Last July we established an Eco-
omic Consultative Group with a special sub-
Toup on trade. We now cap these efforts
.ith a demonstration and institutionalization
f political will.

Our new procedure of consultation will not
:uarantee automatic solutions. But as we ad-
ress the bilateral issues between us, and the
3sues in major international negotiations in
k-hich our nations are called upon to partici-
late, our exchange of views takes on new

I

arch 15, 1976

and serious importance. Our consultation will
strengthen the efficacy of our cooperation
toward common objectives. Our joint efforts
could well mean the difference that insures
success in world councils of the future.

— This mechanism will serve us well in
the search for solutions to the trade prob-
lems which have emerged between us. One
of the fundamental principles of U.S. for-
eign policy has been support for the drive
of the more industrialized countries of Latin
America — ^foremost among them Brazil — to
compete on a more equal footing in the
global arena. The contradictions generated
by export subsidies in Brazil and counter-
vailing duties in the United States must not
be allowed to become serious, divisive issues.
They must be addressed by both sides in the
light of the fundamental political require-
ments of our total relationship and of the
cooperative international order that we both
seek to build. To this end, we will discuss a
binding international commitment on the
issues of subsidies and countervailing duties
to be ultimately negotiated at Geneva under
the authority of the Trade Act of 1974.

— In addition, our consultation can be em-
ployed to explore ways of coordinating the
policies of our governments to promote the
fullest dedic^don of private and public re-
sources to the transfer of scientific and tech-
nological advances in the interests of Brazil's
long-term development.

— We also foresee that our consultations
might reach as well into the areas of energy,
space, and ocean resources development — all
of which hold out immense promise of bene-
fits for all mankind.

We shall bring to the table in these con-
sultations the full range of political consid-
erations— the basic character of our bilateral
relations with Brazil and our links with the
hemisphere and the world. We- shall be pre-
pared to consult on all major events of inter-
national significance. For it is, in the end,
the deeper spirit of our political understand-
ing which gives ultimate purpose and value

325

to all we may undertake on these technical
issues.

We conceive of this consultation not as a
process in which one side states claims and
the other side defends an established posi-
tion but, rather, as a true exchange reflect-
ing our equality, our world perspectives, and
the benefits that both sides will surely gain
from common endeavor. Neither side can nor
should prescribe to the other what its basic
stance toward the rest of the world should
be. But each side will surely benefit from
knowing fully the views of the other and is
likely to give them weight.

History suggests that the relations of the
United States with Latin America are often
characterized more by high-sounding princi-
ples than by practical concrete action. Let
us insure in this instance that the consulta-
tive machinery which we are establishing
between our nations becomes, in reality, a
continuing basis for cooperative efforts of
real meaning to our peoples. For, even with
the best intentions, principles are not trans-
lated into reality unless governments on a
regular basis assign themselves concrete
and specific tasks which engage the interests
and will of their citizens. In this manner we
shall discover the form and the promise of
our future relationship.

Mr. Foreign Minister, I first visited Brazil
over a decade ago. I was struck by the un-
bounded confidence and breadth of vision of
the people I met. These reminded me of the
moral strengths that marked the earlier
generations that built the United States.

And I could only conclude that your natioi
like mine, was destined for greatness.

Nowhere can one sense more deeply th
creative spirit of the Americas than in Bn
silia. Here, where once there was only sol
tude, now stands this exciting cosmopolita
world capital.

In the Old World a frontier was a bounc
ary ; in the New World it was and always wi
be an opportunity. This is a hemisphere c
promise and discovery, summoning forth th
true spirit and courage of a people.

Our hope and dynamism, the vibrancy an
industry of the diverse peoples that make u
our nations, our common struggle agains
nature, want, and oppression — all these ai
the elements of a matchless epic of worl
history. They are the guarantee that oi
endeavor, which has achieved so much in th
past, can be even more fruitful as we wor
together on the frontiers of the futur
What we elect to do together can have vai
meaning to a world that yearns for a frea
demonstration of what strong and free n*
tions working together with a vision (
global responsibility can accomplish.

We welcome Brazil to her rightful share
role of international leadership. May w
strengthen our collaboration in the pursuj
of a more secure, prosperous, and just worll

Gentlemen, I ask you to rise and join m
in a toast to the President of Brazil, Generr
Ernesto Geisel, to my colleague and friei>
Foreign Minister Silveira, and to the permv
nent friendship of the peoples of Brazil ais
the United States.

326

Department of State Bulletl

li

It

i

Secretary Kissinger Visits Six Latin American Countries

Secretary Kissinger visited Venezuela
February 16-18, Peru February 18-19,
h'azil February 19-22, Colombia February
'2-23, Costa Rica February 23-2^., and
Guatemala February 2U. Following are re-
narks, toasts, and news conferences by Sec-
etary Kissinger, together ivith the texts of
■ U.S. -Venezuela joint press release and a
l.S.-Brazil memorandum of understanding.

I.RRIVAL, CARACAS, FEBRUARY 16

if^s release 66 dated February 16

Since with respect to the art of oratory,
lie United States is an underdeveloped coun-
jcy, I take the hberty of reading some of my
smarks.
It is a great pleasure for me to be here in
enezuela, the nation that gave freedom and
ope to the people of this continent through
le leadership of its most distinguished son,
imon Bolivar. And it is particularly appro-
date, therefore, that it should be here that
have the first opportunity to reaffirm in
juth America the very special ties between
le United States and the nations of this
jmisphere.

Our two nations have much in common, not
ily in the form of our national heroes, but
so in what they represent for mankind—
iman freedom, dignity, and equality under
w. The strong historical friendship and co-
leration between Venezuela and the United
;ates reflect the common interest of our
'ople and the mutual esteem in which we
)ld democracy.

Although we face some issues today over
iiich we may disagree, I am confident that
3 can, through patience and mutual trust,
solve these differences to the satisfaction
' our two sovereign nations. I look forward

to talks with your esteemed President, Car-
los Andres Perez, as well as the opportunity
to continue the cordial and constructive dis-
cussions I've had in Washington with your
distinguished Foreign Minister and your Min-
ister of State for International Economic
Affairs.

I fully subscribe to the view so eloquently
enunciated by President Perez that we must
create a world of cooperation and avoid the
dangerous confrontations that arise from a
world hobbled by injustice and contradictions.
The nations of this hemisphere, which with
all their differences have so many common
ties, can make a major contribution to a
world of peace and progress and justice. It is
in this spirit that I come to Venezuela today.

Thank you for your warm welcome.

NEWS CONFERENCE, CARACAS, FEBRUARY 17

Press release 72 dated February 18

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said during the
course of the meeting at La Guzmania, the
Presidential mansion, that one of the pur-
poses of your trip to Latin America and the
result thereof ivould be to propose to the
U.S. Congress the elimination of the dis-
crvminatory clause in the Trade Act that
negatively affects Venezuela and Ecuador.
What specifically do you propose to tell Con-
gress so that Congress may accept your sug-
gestion?

The second question is that you announced
that the type of activity that Cuba has en-
gaged in in the case of Angola is something
that could not take place. However, Cuba has
just approved a new Constitution wherein it
supports the struggle for independence of
other countries. What do you propose to do
in this respect?

arch 15, 1976

327

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the
first question, the Administration has re-
peatedly emphasized to the Congress that it
opposes the discriminatory aspects of the
Trade Act as they apply to Venezuela and
Ecuador ; and several amendments have been
introduced, including one by Senator Bentsen
from Texas in the Senate which we under-
stand is being considered these days by the
Senate Finance Committee, to remove this
particular discriminatory aspect.

When I return, I will of course report to
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and
to the House International Relations Commit-
tee, and I will emphasize in strong terms to
both of them the unfortunate impact that
these discriminatory pieces of legislation
have had on our relationship in Latin Amer-
ica. Of course it occurs occasionally that the
Congress does not see things my own way,
though it is hard for me to conceive. But we
think with respect to these discriminatory
laws that the prevalent mood in the Congress
agrees with the position that I have advanced
here.

Second, with respect to Cuba, I do not
know what the meaning of that phrase is in
the Cuban Constitution. Cuba has every right
to support politically and ideologically what-
ever it chooses. However, I am convinced that
once the American people understand that
Cuba assumes the right to intervene mili-
tarily in the affairs of other parts of the
world, we will not stand idly by. This is a
matter which we have brought before the
American public — which we will continue to
bring before the American public and before
the Congress.

Q. I would like to ask you what are the
reasons for the delay in the efforts to estab-
lish a relationship with Latin America on
the part of the United States. Why has this
delay been so extended? Is it that the United
States can concern itself only when it has
more time on its hands than it needs for its
other pressing matters, or is there any spe-
cific reason for this attention span?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, there has
not been a delay, in that as soon as I became
Secretary of State I proposed, within a

328

month, what came to be called the new dia^
logue, and a series of meetings took place be^
tween the Foreign Ministers of the Western
Hemisphere and then a series of meetings ol
working groups which were interrupted last
year as a result of actions which were not the
decision of our Administration, but were the
result of the interplay of a congressional ad
and the reaction of Latin American countries
particularly Ecuador and Venezuela, which
refused to attend the meeting which was
scheduled for Buenos Aires. This was on(
reason why I did not take a trip which hac
been scheduled for a meeting of Foreigi
Ministers.

And then there were two other events las
year that created a crisis which unfortu
nately had to be dealt with urgently. Ou'
was a critical situation, or a need for rapi(
negotiations, in the Middle East which cause(
me to postpone a trip ; and then the other wa
the collapse of Viet-Nam, which also was no
foreseen. I regretted it profoundly, and
stayed in close contact with my colleagues i
the Western Hemisphere. It is sometimes th
case that urgent problems take precedenc
over important problems, but it does nc
mean that there is any lack of interest or lac-
of concern in our relationships.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I am the correspondev
for Premsa Latina. My question is: Does tl
inclusion of a visit [to Brazil] in the court
of your present trip to Latin America mec
that the U.S. Administration continues
believe in President Nixon's statement th
wherever Brazil leans or goes, the rest >
Latin America might folloiv; or are you gi
ing down there to ask them for an explan<
tion of what the relationship may have bet
loith the "Frente de Liberacion de Angola'

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to tl
first part of your question, we consider Bras,
an extremely important country, a gra
country with which we maintain friend
relations.

What the impact is on other Lat
American countries is for other Latin Am©
ican countries to decide, and we believe th.
there are many authentic leaders in Lat
America, and the United States will not a

Department of State Bullet

Sec
iftl
W
iiiit
liJi,
Bit:

point one Latin American country as the
leader of Latin America. This is up to the
countries of Latin America to decide in work-
ing out their own internal relationships. We
believe we can have friendly and constructive
and close relations with many of the coun-
tries of Latin America.

Secondly, with respect to the MPLA [Pop-
ular Movement for the Liberation of An-
gola], the United States has stated repeat-
edly that our opposition was not to the
MPLA. The United States has stated re-
peatedly that we are prepared to work with
any authentic African movement or any gov-
ernment that emerges out of authentic Afri-
can governmental processes. We recognized
immediately the FRELIMO [Front for the
Liberation of Mozambique] in Mozambique
which, in its orientation, is substantially
parallel to that of the MPLA.

Our objection in Angola was the massive
introduction of thousands of Cuban soldiers
and massive introduction of Soviet military
equipment, which had the practical conse-
quence of imposing a minority government
on a country by foreign arms and foreign ex-
peditionary forces sent from thousands of
miles away. As far as the MPLA is con-
cerned, in its African manifestation, we have
repeatedly stated that we could work with it.

Now, I am obviously not going to Brazil or
to any other country on this trip to call them
to account for actions they have a right to
take in the sovereign exercise of their for-
eign policy. Therefore this is not an issue
which I will raise. I am not here to discuss
the past. I am here to discuss the future.

Q. There has been speculation, Dr. Kissin-
ger, regarding the talks held tvith President
Perez, that you discussed the possibility or
the need of exploiting and developing the
Orinoco Tar Basin in exchange for tech-
nology.

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, let me
say that the very extensive talks I had with
your President were extremely helpful to me
in understanding the problems of Venezuela
and in understanding the possibilities that
exist for Western Hemisphere cooperation.
We discussed a wide variety of subjects.

March 15, 1976

The President raised with me the issue of
the tar belt and described to me the plans he
has for analyzing how it can contribute to
Venezuelan development. He did not ask me
for my opinion on the subject, and he sim-
ply described his own development plans with
respect to this, and I listened to it with in-
terest and pointed out that we had similar
possibilities and we were developing — we
were looking Into the problem of technology
for ourselves. But there was no discussion
whatsoever about an exchange of technology
between Venezuela and the United States or
any conditions placed on how Venezuela
should go about developing its own national
resources.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the people of the Amer-
icas have been following ivith interest and
have been alert to the progress of the con-
versations that are being held betiveen the
United States and Panama. Hoiv do you see
these conversations at present? What do you
see as the outcome?

Secretary Kissinger: We are engaged in
very serious negotiations to see whether a
mutually satisfactory new treaty can be ne-
gotiated. These negotiations are taking place,
and they are making progress, and they will
be conducted with great seriousness by the
United States, as they have been also by the
Government of Panama.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is a report in the
Venezuelan press that you asked President
Perez if he ivoxdd loiver the price of Ven-
ezuelan oil in a way similar to that ivhich
Iran has done. Was that subject raised in
your discussions at all?

Secretary Kissinger: That subject did not
come up. The question of energy was dis-
cussed, not with specific reference to Vene-
zuela's oil prices but with respect to the gen-
eral problem of the relation of energy to
other aspects of the international economy,
such as is being discussed at the Paris
Conference.

Q. There are vieivs that have been ex-
pressed through the media in Venezuela and
have also been reflected in communications

329

through the netvs agencies regarding the
extraordinary security iwecautions taken on
the occasion of the visit of the Secretary of
State to Venezuela. My questiori is: Coidd
you explain to us ivhether you had, through
the U.S. Department of State, any informa-
tion or news regarding the possibility of an
attempt on your life? Or has this display of
U.S. security agents been simply a demon-
stration of friendship toward Latin Ameri-
can countries?

Secretary Kissinger: I never look at in-
formation about the security situation, so I
am not familiar with any particular informa-
tion with respect to security. I also do not
control the number of security agents that
accompany me. I suppose they feel that I am
easily lonely and therefore try to prevent my
usual melancholy from expressing itself — I
will probably live to regret this. Let's make
this the last question.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, it is known that once
the strength and skill of the Cuban army
became apparent in Angola that American
Ambassadors were asked to consult ivith
their foreign governments. Does that mean
that .some kind of joint policy or agreement
is being worked out with reference to future
military interventions like Cuba, should
there be any?

Secretayji Kissinger: We are not in the
process at this moment of organizing a joint
policy with respect to any future Cuban
move. We are .stating, however, the view of
our Administration that this is an unaccept-
able mode of behavior, and we state this view
in response to questions. We are not volun-
teering it, and we are not asking any govern-
ment to take any specific action at this
moment.

Q. Mr. Secretary, accoj-ding to cables origi-
nating from Washington, you are quoted as
stating that countries receiving U.S. aid
7vould have to agree with the United States
in international forums. Shoidd that be con-
sidered simply a notice or a threat?

Secretary Kissinger: It may be that you
have your Harvard professors confused, but

330

we are not buying votes in the United Na- j
tions. Our attitude toward countries will have
to be determined by their overall relations to
us and not by each individual vote in the
United Nations.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, my country, Ecuador, is
one that has been claiming a 200-mile terri-
torial sea together ivith Peru and Chile in
order to develop our fisheries and other nat-
ural resources in the sea. It is my under-
standing that the Congress of the United
States is in the process of approving a simi-
lar law to protect a similar 200-mile area
along the coast of the United States. The
second question that I have is: If the United
States should approve such a law, providing
for 200 miles, would this mean the end of
the presence of tuna boats fishing along our
coastal borders?

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the
200-mile zone, the United States, in the Law
of the Sea Conference, supports a 200-mile
economic zone — not territorial sea, but a 200-
mile economic zone — and we hope that we
can delay congressional action on this matter
until we can determine what will happen at
the Law of the Sea Conference that is begin-
ning in the middle of March. I do not want to
speculate what our fishermen will do.

The principle of the economic zone is that
countries can regulate the fishing by licenses
and other means. It does not mean that they
are necessarily excluded. The strong hope of
our Administration is that there will be an
international agreement which is equally ap-
plicable to all countries rather than a series
of unilateral laws with different shades of
interpretation.

U.S.-VENEZUELA JOINT PRESS RELEASE,
FEBRUARY 18

Press release 73 dated February 18

Caracas — The United States expressed its
deep commitment to seek a new, vigorous
spirit of intei'-American solidarity, believing
that the common experience and aspirations
of the nations of the Americas provide a

Department of State Bulletin

unique advantage, and that hemispheric co-
operation is central to the effort to build a
greater world community.

To build upon the special strength of
hemisphere cooperation in addressing the
new global challenges of interdependence,
Venezuela and the United States agreed
today to new and closer cooperation in en-
ergy research, educational development, and
control of smuggling and unlawful use of
dangerous drugs. The two countries also
agreed to begin discussions looking towai'd
the negotiation of a science and technology
agreement.

Foreign Minister Ramon Escovar Salom
and U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kis-
singer announced that Venezuela had ac-
cepted the United States invitation to send
a team of highly qualified energy experts to
survey in depth United States research in
energy technology — coal, nuclear, solar, oil
shale extraction, geothermal, and wind.

In January 1975, the then Secretary of
Interior Rogers Morton proposed in Boston
at the first U.S.-Venezuelan symposium on
bilateral relations that Venezuela share
the benefits of advanced United States re-
search in energy technology in view of the
strong and mutual interests of both in the
energy field. The officials said that the forth-
coming trip of the Venezuelan energy experts
would be the first step in implementing what
has become known in Venezuela as "the
Morton offer."

The two Ministers further agreed to under-
take new programs in the area of educational
development and planning, consisting of a
high-level exchange of scholars and coopera-
tive research projects. The Venezuelan For-
eign Minister informed the Secretary of
State of the Scholarship Fund which Vene-
zuela has placed at the disposal of Latin
American and Caribbean countries.

The Ministers discussed details of a bi-
lateral narcotics agreement to provide for
intensified cooperative efforts to stem the
unlawful use of and smuggling of narcotics
and dangerous drugs. It is expected that this
agreement will be signed in the near future.

Drawing upon their close bond as nations

committed to democracy, Venezuela and the
United States affirm their belief that the in-
stitutions and processes of democracy are
essential if mankind's future is to be en-
hanced by freedom, equal justice and human
dignity.

TOAST, LIMA, FEBRUARY 18 '

Although this is my first visit to Peru, I
feel I am among old friends. In September
1973, Miguel Angel de la Flor was the first
Foreign Minister I met after becoming Sec-
retary of State. Since then Miguel Angel and
I have seen each other regularly at the
United Nations, at the OAS, in Mexico, and
most recently in Paris, where Peru was
elected cochairman of the Raw Materials
Commission of the Conference on Inter-
national Economic Cooperation.

Once I admired his uniform, suspecting
that he wore it to intimidate me. Miguel re-
plied he would make a special exception for
me, as a civilian, to join his legion — to join
him at the head of the greater battle facing
mankind: the struggle against poverty and
underdevelopment.

Mr. Minister: The United States this year
celebrates its bicentennial ; Peru is the cradle
of civilization in South America. Yet it is
only relatively recently that both our coun-
tries have found themselves deeply engaged
in world affairs. And it is still more recently
that we have begun to understand that the
conduct of foreign policy in the world is a
challenge as multifaceted and unending as it
is inescapable.

The United States fully accepts the awe-
some responsibilities that inevitably befall
it as the strongest free nation of the world.
We see ourselves as the defender of democ-
racy and the independence of smaller na-
tions against aggression. We see ourselves,
together with the other nuclear superpower,
as obligated to maintain global stability and
to seek realistic ways to reduce international
tensions.

' Given at a dinner hosted by the Peruvian Foreign
Minister (text from press release 79 dated Feb. 19).

March 15, 1976

331

But our responsibilities do not end with
the control of nuclear weapons or the con-
tainment of East-West conflicts. Our vital
interests and security — and our highest
moral convictions — are directly aff'ected by
the evolving relationship between North and
South, rich and poor, industrialized and de-
veloping. We are therefore committed, in our
own enlightened self-interest, to foster a
new and more progressive international sys-
tem— based on coexistence and cooperation
— to replace the colonial and bipolar orders
that successively have been eroded by his-
tory.

I have come to Peru convinced that the
nations of Latin America and the United
States are essential participants in the task
that history has assigned to this generation.
Unlike most other nations in the world, we
of the Americas share a common experience.
This palace was built when our countries
were both colonies. We both won our inde-
pendence in revolutions which took place in
the early part of the modern era. Unlike
most other nations, we shared a civility of
peace and of mutual respect long before the
present evolution of the world's division into
industrialized and developing nations. There-
fore we start as friends.

Since Peru's revolutionary process began
— and continuing now under the leadership
of President Morales Bermudez — Peru has
brought fresh vision to many contemporary
international issues. That projection, like
our own, derives from the recognition that
international realities are no less essential
to the formulation of national policy and to
the attainment of national well-being than
domestic realities.

Peru has chosen a nonaligned path. The
United States accepts nonalignment as a
legitimate national course. Indeed, our global
interest is well served by a world of thriving
independent states, secure in their national
destinies against the hegemonial designs of
any nation.

Yet too often nations which chose non-
alignment to shield themselves from the
pressures of powerful global blocs have
tended to form a rigid, ideological, confron-

tationist bloc of their own. The variety of
the world's nations is too great, and our com-
mon problems too urgent, for such outmoded
practices ; they only deepen our divisions and
impair our mutual progress.

I am confident that our common dedica-
tion to cooperation, already implicit in our
respective efforts to reform the inter-Amer-
ican system and to bring the Law of the Sea
Conference to a useful conclusion this year,
will intensify in the future.

My discussions here today enable me to
better appreciate Peru's drive to shape an
interdependent world that gives full scope
to independence. This afternoon I saw many
signs of the greatness of the rich civilization
that flourished in this land before the Euro-
pean conquest. And through my friendship
with your Foreign Minister, I have come to
appreciate the aspirations and the new dyna-
mism of revolutionary Peru.

I can therefore understand why Peru has
elected not to model itself on other nations
but to draw on its own strengths in seeking
fulfillment of its national destiny. Inspired
by its unique past and the genius of its peo-
ple, Peru has chosen its own path that is
neither capitalist nor Communist. Rather,
recalling Tupac Amaru, Peru is struggling
to fulfill what Basadre has called the "prom-
ise of Peruvian history."

The United States, itself committed to the
ideal of equality of opportunity, is fully sym-
pathetic with Peru's struggle to create a
social democi'acy attuned to the needs of all
its people. Though we differ — in ideology, in
culture, in income and wealth, in govern-
mental structure — our two nations can none-
theless cooperate to achieve goals they hold
in common.

Indeed, the partnership of two strong
countries is the most fruitful partnership of
all.

For such cooperation to be meaningful,
there must first be understanding. We must
respect each other's perspectives, each other's
necessities, each other's seriousness. This is
not a theoretical consideration. Our legal
and political requirements have come into
conflict a number of times since your revo-

332

Department of State Bulletin

lutionary process began. Not without effort
— on both sides — we have managed to sur-
mount most of these conflicts.

If we do not continue to seek to compose
difficulties between us honorably and to
mutual advantage, if our realism gives way
to passion, we run the risk of deceiving our-
selves and losing what we seek to achieve
for our peoples. There is common ground on
the basis of equality. There can be shared
success on the basis of solutions to common
problems. The United States, for its part,
will spare no effort to resolve any differences
that arise on the basis of dignity, equality,
and mutual respect.

The United States today approaches the
world, and this hemisphere, not with the
impulse to overwhelm problems with re-
sources or to disguise differences with as-
sistance programs, but with patience, ma-
turity, compassion, and a willingness to
identify genuine mutualities of interest.

Diversity and disagreement are features
of a world of independent nations. But the
interdependence of our security and eco-
nomic progress makes our working together
also a practical necessity. We have never lost
respect for each other or a dedication to
solve problems cooperatively, and we must
never do so.

The people of the United States are pro-
foundly convinced that the world's future
is at stake. The talents and energy of our
people have given us the means for material
progress that can all but eradicate famine,
poverty, disease, and — as we proved to-
gether in facing the 1970 earthquake — alle-
viate the dreadful consequences of natui'al
disaster. History will judge us cruelly if we
fail to draw from these blessings the great-
est possible human benefit. To paraphrase an
ancient Quechua saying, "Even the stones
would cry." Not our power, but our wisdom,
is challenged.

Peru, it is clear even on this brief visit,
has committed itself with determination to
build a better life for its own people. Its
leadership within the Third World demon-
strates concern that transcends its own
borders. At times the fervor of those con-

victions has conflicted with some of ours,
even when our fundamental interests have
not.

Despite the unique role that each of us
plays, my visit convinces me more than ever
that our shared goals can dominate our
differences. It is up to us to translate our
people's ideals into concrete achievements
through negotiation, not confrontation;
through common effort, not discord.

Ladies and gentlemen, I propose a toast
to the greatness of Peru, to our respect and
understanding for each other, and to the
greatness of what we can achieve together.

NEWS CONFERENCE, LIMA, FEBRUARY 19

Press release 80 dated February 19

Secretary Kissinger: May I make the fol-
lowing suggestions. Could we have the first
group of questions from the Peruvian jour-
nalists, and then we will take some from the
American journalists.

Before we take any questions, I would
like to repeat what I have already said
earlier and what I am going to say again to-
night. I would like to express my apprecia-
tion to the President and the Government
of Peru for the very warm and cordial re-
ception that I have received and for the
very constructive and useful talks we have
had.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, recent news items from
Washington, D.C., report that President
Ford has instructed the reorganization of the
CIA. Does this mean a restructuring of U.S.
security policies and also a commitment of
no further interference in other countries'
affairs ?

Secretary Kissinger: The reorganization
that was ordered by the President indicates
that the President wants to deal with two
problems: how to make sure that there is
even greater executive control over intel-
ligence operations and also how to regulate
the relationships between the intelligence
organizations and the Congress with respect
to the activities of the CIA. The charges that

March 15, 1976

333

have been made have been sensationalized
and in many parts are inaccurate.

Q. The United States has adopted meas-
ures against the Government of Peril, among
them the refusal to sell arms, weapons; re-
strictions on trade; economic boycotts in
international credit organizations; and
others. With respect to each and every one
of these points, I tvonld like to know whether
Secretary Kissinger has during the course
of the day brought up any solutions as an
expression of U.S. good will in terms of our
bilateral relations.

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that the
question is based on a misapprehension. The
United States has not engaged in a policy
of pressure against the Government in Peru.

As I stated at the airport, as I will have
occasion to repeat again, the United States
supports the objectives of the Peruvian revo-
lution and is willing to cooperate with any
country that pursues an authentic national
path toward development. We think that in
a world that requires peace and progress, the
ability of countries that may have different
views about their internal organizations to
cooperate on the basis of equality is
essential.

With respect to specifics, the United
States in fact sold, I believe, close to 70 mil-
lion dollars' worth of military equipment to
Peru in the last year and a half. There are
no bans at this moment on any of our facili-
ties.

The difficulty is that there are certain
legislative requirements, some of which the
Administration has not favored, which go
into effect if certain measures are taken in
other countries. We are making very great
efforts to avoid having to resort to these
legislative mandates, and they are at this
moment not in effect. The policy of the Ad-
ministration toward Peru is to seek a mode
of cooperation and to work together in the
Western Hemisphere and bilaterally on con-
structive programs.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, your visit has created
great expectation and interest, especially re-
garding the motivational reason for it. Can

334

it be considered a preamble for better rela-
tions between the United States and Latin
America?

Secretary Kissinger: My motivations are
generally not as complicated as the subtlety
of the Latin mind seems to believe, but
basically my visit here is to underhne the
importance the United States attaches to the
relationships within the Western Hemi-
sphere as well as to relations with Peru. We
are prepared to work together with the coun-
tries of the hemisphere either bilaterally or
in existing forums on common solutions to
common problems. What we should avoid is
to make too many rhetorical declarations
and to work out some concrete programs
which can engage the day-to-day activity of
our governments, so that we do not exhaust
ourselves in formal declarations, and begin to
get to work on our common problems.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, several countries havi
reported in Latin America, and also some
charges have originated in the Congress oj
the United States, which accuse the Govern-
ment of the United States of overthrotvinc,
the Allende government. What is your re
sponse to this question. Dr. Kissinger?

Secretary Kissinger: My recollection i;
that the committee of Congress that wa;
looking into this question specifically state(
that the U.S. Government did not overthrov
the Allende government and that corre
sponds to the fact the United States has ai
interest in maintaining the democratic insti
tutions in Chile but it did not feed or en
courage the coup that overthrew Allende.

Q. The fact, Mr. Secretary, that the in
telligence services of the United States hav
supported the FNLA [National Front fo
the Liberation of Angola'] and — the Holde,
Roberto movement — and the activities v,
Angola have produced, we tvould like t
know whether the U.S. Government feel
that the cooperation or presence of the racis
government of Pretoria is one that has pre
duced reactions amongst the U.S. black com
munity and other progressive groups in th
United States?

Department of State Bulletii

li

!l

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, there
are a number of totally wrong assumptions
in that question. The United States was in
favor of an African solution to the problem
of Angola. The United States did not support
any military action in Angola until a massive
Soviet and Cuban intervention had already
taken place, in which case we responded to
requests of several African governments for
their support.

The United States has formally proposed
on a number of occasions that all foreign in-
tervention in South Africa should immedi-
ately cease, that all foreign governments
should stop supplying arms in Angola, and
that the various groups in Angola should
negotiate among each other their own solu-
tion to this problem.

The United States had no interest in An-
gola except to keep it free of great-power
competition. And it was the massive inter-
vention of the Soviet Union which sent in
more arms into Angola than all other foreign
Igovernments have sent into all of the rest
of Africa during the course of the year and
a large expeditionary force from this hemi-
sphere.

The United States opposed South African
intervention as well as all other foreign in-
tervention. And the U.S. interest was to keep
Africa free of great-power rivalry.

As far as the black population in the
United States is concerned, we are certain
that it looks at our foreign policy from a
national point of view and that there will be
different points of view within the black
oopulation, as there are in the rest of the
population, but that there is not a unified
oosition.

Q. Secretary Kissinger, you have said that
lou have not decided whether to attend the
OAS conference in Chile in June. Could you
iell us, please, on ivhat basis you will make
ijour decision and ivhether that has anything
•0 do with the situation regarding human
-ights in Chile?

Secretary Kissinger: My basic plan is to
loin my colleagues of the Western Hemi-
iphere at the annual meeting of the Minis-

terial Council of the OAS, as has been tradi-
tional. I have not yet made my final schedule
for June, because it is a month of many con-
flicting international meetings, but I am in
the process of attempting to work it out.
With respect to the human rights question
in Chile and elsewhere, the United States has
consistently supported a greater degree of
human rights, and we have made our views
known.

Q. My question has reference to what you
said in Business Week in December — that
the aid of the United States in food has im-
portance for moral and humanitarian rea-
sons.- I understand th.at in 1973 the National
Security Council, ivhich you head, ordered a
comprehensive study of the food policy of
the United States and the political implica-
tions of the dependence of Third World
countries on the United States as a supplier
of food. The Washingto7i Post last year said
that the food aid program exists as an arm
of Kissinger's foreign policy. Whether that
is true or not I don't knoiv — that is Mr. Dan
Morgan's statement. My question is, can the
food aid program of the United States be an
arm of foreign policy and at the same time
a humanitarian and a moral policy?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, the Pres-
ident heads the National Security Council,
and not his Assistant for National Security.
The role of the Assistant for National Secu-
rity is to make sure that all the choices are
presented to the President and all the agen-
cies are always present at the meetings of the
National Secui'ity Council so that they can
see very easily whether all the choices are
properly presented. But this is a technical
bureaucratic point.

In terms of substance, in my first speech
after I became Secretary of State, I proposed
a World Food Conference, which then took
place the following year. I am convinced that
the United States, as the greatest exporter
of food in the world, has a special responsi-
bility to use its surpluses to demonstrate the

- For an interview with Secretary Kissinger pub-
lished in the Jan. 13, 1975, issue of Business Week,
see Bulletin of Jan. 27, 1975, p. 97.

tiMarch 15, 1976

335

importance of interdependence and to use
them in a way that is constructive and that
helps bring about a better and more progres-
sive world.

Secondly, the surpluses of the United
States, great as they are, can make only a
relatively small difference to the world food
problem, and therefore I have consistently
supported an increase in the food aid of the
United States, of which over 70 percent is
not given on the basis of any administrative
discretion.

But we have strongly supported programs
to build up world food reserves in order to
cushion the effects of emergencies, coopei'a-
tive programs to increase world food pro-
duction— because as I said, the total gap
between consumption and production is
about 25 million tons; the United States
can contribute at most 6-7 million tons to
meet this shortfall.

We have supported within the Western
Hemisphere the creation of a special agricul-
tural group. All of these efforts are an at-
tempt to deal with one of the profound hu-
man and social problems of our time and are
not related to any short-term political goals.
Indeed, they cannot be related to any short-
term political goals, because they will take
many years to take effect. But we do have
the overwhelming problem of interdepend-
ence and the use of scarce resources for the
benefit of mankind, and we hope that the
United States will discharge its obligations
in a responsible and, above all, a humane
manner.

REMARKS FOLLOWING SIGNING MEMORANDUM
OF UNDERSTANDING, BRASILIA, FEBRUARY 21

Press release 88 dated Febi-uary 21

Of the many international undertakings
that I have signed as Secretary of State,
none has given me greater pleasure than this
agreement today which my very good friend
Antonio [Brazilian Foreign Minister Antonio
F. Azeredo da Silveira] and I have been dis-
cussing for two years. In the charmingly
persistent and conciliatorily clear manner of

336

Bi-azilian diplomacy, Antonio has insisted to
me in the two years that I have known him
that the United States must pay greatei
attention to Latin America and also that thf
relations between Brazil and the United
States can be of very great significance tc
the peace and progress of the entire world

We share the sentiment because in thf
world today we have the problem of how t(
prevent conflict and we have the problem oj
how to bring about progress. And it is im
portant whether they will be solved by thos(
who respect the individual and who bast
their policies on concerns for the humai
personality or whether they will be solvec
by those who believe in impersonal force:
and who carry out their programs withou
love and without hatred — simply in pursu
ance of an abstract bureaucratic conception

There is no country in which human quali
ties are more pronounced, in which the hu
man personality is more expressive, thai
this great country that I have had the hono
to visit for the last few days. And there ar
no two peoples whose concern for huma:
dignity and for the basic values of man i
more profound in the day-to-day lives o
their people than Brazil and the Unite*
States. So what we are committing ourselves
to is not just a series of technical undei
standings but an expression of confidence i
the individual human spirit.

In relations between the United States an
Brazil and in the relations between tb
United States and Latin America, there ha\
often been high-sounding declarations. W
are determined that this document which w
have signed today shall be put into imm(
diate practice. Its test will be whether in th
months ahead we can make concrete proj
ress on the specific issues that concern ou
people, the hemisphere, and the world.

The Foreign Minister has already referre
to some of the groups that are already i
existence. We have decided yesterday t
form immediately another group dealin
with energy and a second one dealing wit
scientific and technical cooperation. Ministt
[of Mines and Energy Shigeaki] Ueki anfju;
some experts have kindly accepted our ii
vitation to visit Washington in the very nea

Department of State Bullet) l|j

1

ill

ture to discuss a very broad agenda. Sec-
ary [of the Treasury William E.] Simon
coming here this spring, and we are plan-
\g a meeting of the overall commission
fore too many months have passed.
[ am extremely satisfied with the talks we
ve had here, which cover the entire range
our relationships, with special emphasis
the problems of development and eco-
mc growth for our countries, for the
■nisphere and in a local framework. What
are doing here is not an exclusive ar-
igement, but something that we are pre-
ed to do, each of us, with other nations
similar objectives as well.

have been deeply moved, Mr. Foreign
:iister, not only by the extraordinary tech-
al competence of my counterparts here —
ause I have become used to that — but by
friendship, matter-of-factness, absence
complexities, and extraordinary human
ids with which all conversations from a
•sident on have been discussed and con-
'ted. So we leave here not simply with a
tical determination that this relationship
11 be deepened but with a human neces-
that these contacts will grow more and
•e profound.

L great deal of the credit for this belongs

he persistence, subtlety, and charm of my

if nd and colleague the Brazilian Foreign

I ister, who makes his approaches to us

n so painless that I told him yesterday

^ discussions tend to reduce themselves

0 ;he rate at which we yield to his pro-

ic ds. But I want to emphasize that I leave

Jisilia with the warmest of feelings, that

3k forward to frequent and regular con-

■ ^ with the Foreign Minister and with his

J 'agues.

etween two countries of this size, one of

! li is growing with enormous rapidity,

lences are from time to time absolutely

Hi itable. This document will not remove

differences, but it will strengthen our

rmination that they will be overcome

1 the attitude that our friendship and

ed objectives must always guide our

"sions in specific cases. This is the deter-

naiation with which I return to Washing-

and we have reaffirmed it to ourselves

on several occasions since my arrival here.
It remains for me only to thank the Govern-
ment of Brazil, my friends in the Govern-
ment of Brazil, for the manner in which the
talks have been prepared, for the extraordi-
nary kindnesses that have been shown to us,
and for the great human warmth so char-
acteristic of Brazil but also so particular to
our friendship.

U.S.-BRAZIL MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING

Press release 87 dated February 21

Memorandum of Understanding Concerning
Consultations on Matters op Mutual Interest

The Government of the Federative Republic of
Brazil and the Government of the United States of
America:

Inspired by the long tradition of friendship and
cooperation between their two peoples;

Reaffirming the need to give wider expression to
the solidarity of the Western World and the benefits
to be derived from a constructive interpretation of
the concept of interdependence among all nations;

Recognizing the responsibility of their two coun-
tries to pursue their shared goal of a just and en-
during solution to international problems;

Convinced of the importance to the sound develop-
ment of their respective policies of close and fre-
quent consultations on matters of common interest;

And believing that these considerations call for
the establishment of a flexible mechanism permitting
open and active communication at the cabinet level,
have arrived at the following understanding:

1. The two Governments will normally hold con-
sultations semi-annually, on the full range of foreign
policy matters including any specific issue that may
be raised by either side. Economic, political, security,
cultural, legal, educational and technological sub-
jects, whether bilateral or multilateral, may be dis-
cussed within the political framework afforded by
the consultations.

2. These consultations will normally be held alter-
nately in Brazil and in the United States on dates to
be mutually determined. Special meetings may be
called by mutual agreement.

3. The consultations will be conducted by the Min-
ister of Foreign Relations on the part of the Federa-
tive Republic of Brazil and by the Secretary of State
on the part of the United States of America. The
Chairman of the meeting will be the chief of the
delegation of the host country.

4. Each delegation will be composed of such other
high-ranking officials, including cabinet members.

»^>xh 15, 1976

337

as may be appropriate to the agenda to be discussed.

5. After review of matters of common interest by
the delegations, the chiefs of the delegations may
propose to their respective governments measures
deemed pertinent and appropriate.

6. By joint decision, study groups or working
groups may be established to examine particular
questions of current interest or to help carry for-
ward special projects.

7. Each party will establish such internal arrange-
ments as it deems appropriate to follow through on
the agreed conclusions and recommendations that
may arise from the consultations.

8. In addition to these consultations at the cabinet
level, consultations will be carried forward on an
on-going basis through normal diplomatic channels.
These channels will be used for the preparation of a
mutually acceptable agenda for the consultations.

9. The foregoing arrangements will complement
and in no way replace or detract from the existing
channels for transacting business.

10. This memorandum will come into operation
upon signature by the Foreign Minister of the Fed-
erative Republic of Brazil and of the Secretary of
State of the United States of America.

Signed in duplicate at Brasilia this twenty-first
day of February. 1976. in the Portuguese and Eng-
lish languages.

For the Government of the Federative Republic of
Brazil:

Antonio F. Azeredo da Silveira

For the Government of the United States of America:

Henry A. Kissinger

NEWS CONFERENCE, BRASILIA,
FEBRUARY 21

Press release 89 dated February 21

Q. Mr. Secretary, in some of your recent
speeches, mainly the one in California and
the speech you made here yesterday at the
Foreign Office, yoit said that actions along
the lines of the Cuban action in Angola would
no longer be tolerated. At the same time
there seems to be no indication on Capitol
Hill as to any change regarding a more ac-
tive participation of the United States. Hotv
do you explain that?

Secretary Kissinger: Fir.st of all, I want
to emphasize what I have said at various
other stops. My trip to Latin America was
planned long before the Angolan adventure

338

by Cuba. I am not here to line up support i
the American position with respect to Cul
I am here to strengthen the relationship )
tween the United States and Latin Amer
and between the United States and Bra:
And the other issue is incidental to it.

Secondly, when the issue of Angola w
discussed in the U.S. Congress, it was d
cussed within the context of the local si
ation in an African country, within the ci
text of the debate going on in America ab(
how the United States should act in si
ations, whether by covert or by overt mea
One reason for the repeated statements
the President and myself is to explain to 1
American people what is involved and
bring about a clearer understanding of 1
potential global implications of what we ;
discussing, and we believe that this und
standing is growing.

And we believe that, in a democracy,
national leaders, we have no choice except
bring home our convictions to the Amerii
people. And as I said in my San Franci
speech, I am confident that once the An:
ican people understand what is at issue, tl
will act, as they have always acted, with
determination that is necessary.

it

Q. Noiv that the situation in Angola
ready is defined, ivhat would be lacking
the U.S. government to recognize the MP
as the government of all Angola?

Secretary Kissinger: The United Stj
has repeatedly stated that its objections
events in Angola were not related to
MPLA as an African organization, but to
massive introduction of outside forces s(
ing to impose one group over the other. '
United States remains concerned about
presence of massive numbers of Cuban foi
— and Soviet technicians, in much sma
numbers — in Angola. We will watch eve;
including the actions of other African cc
tries that are most immediately concert
and we will take our decisions in the ligh
the actions of the authorities in Angola
of the views of other countries with wh
we have been closely associated.

Q. In Europe they call you a new Foi

i

k

I

Department of State Bull

dies. They also say that you are trying to
vire /h the world the policy of the "big
ck." I icoidd like to know whether you
ree or not with this and whether you give
; the reasons for your anstver.

Secretary Kissinger: I am being variously
ticized for being too hard on the Com-
mist countries and being too soft on the
mmunist countries. There are those in
nerica who claim that we are being too
nciliatory to the Soviet Union and there
i those in America and in Europe who say

are not conciliatory enough.
Our problem is we are living in a world
ich is quite novel for many Americans, in
it we now have to have a permanent en-
^ement in international affairs and that
0, for the first time in our history, we
ve to deal with a country of roughly equal
ength, in the Soviet Union — so that for
! first time in American history we have to
iduct diplomacy of a permanent balanc-
•, continuous character. This creates cer-
n psychological resentments against the
rid so different from our historical expe-
nee.

i\nd it is therefore no surprise that those

(0 were very comfortable with the cold

fr and who had become very familiar with

id divisions and rhetorical declarations —

t they should be uncomfortable. And it is

1 1 not surprising that those who believe

1, simply, declarations for peace unre-

■il to any concept of equilibrium can ad-

ite matters, too, should be uncomfortable.

"hose critics in Europe to whom you refer

a generally those who want us to support

tl entry into the governments of their

:•( iitries of the Communist party. Now, I

1 ik that the United States has never vol-

■- eered an opinion on that subject, but

II we are asked our opinion on whether

■\ lielieve that the participation of Commu-

ii t parties in certain governments in

irope will not have considerable effect, we

liound to state the truth.

\])d the truth is that the participation of

nmunist parties in European govern-

irnts will bring about a new situation,

wether or not these Communist parties

claim to be, or are in fact, somewhat inde-
pendent of Moscow; because I can think of
many governments that are independent of
Moscow that nevertheless pursue policies
quite different from those of the moral and
political community that now, to a consider-
able extent, exists in the North Atlantic.

Up to now it has never been an initiative
by the United States. We state that such an
event will change the character of the rela-
tionship not because we wish it, but because
this is a fact.

But beyond this particular question which
you raise, it is a fundamental question of
how we can bring about a new approach to
international relations in the face of the
traditional polarization between two groups:
one that believes that all you need to end the
problem of communism is to strike a rhetor-
ical bellicose stand ; another group who be-
lieves that all you need to bring about peace
is to strike a rhetorical pacific stance. And
this is the nature of our debate.

Q. My question, to some extent, repeats
that of my colleague, but I ivill ask anyway,
because I would like to obtain a more ex-
plicit answer if possible. You stated Thurs-
day, on the question of the Soviet-Cuban
intervention in Angola, that the United
States had decided, as a question of principle,
to resist such dangerous and irresponsible
actions. Should it be understood that the
United States will resist the next Soviet-
Cuban intervention in Africa militarily or
that the United States ivill vehemently pro-
test with words only and will call a new
Helsinki Conference aiming in sanctifying
the inviolability of the borders established
by the Soviet Union and Cuba in Africa?

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, I just want
the questioner to know that I understood the
sarcasm of the question. But, first of all, I
would like to make clear that the Helsinki
declaration dealt exclusively with Europe.
Secondly, and before I get to the specific
question, the United States has pursued a
two-pronged policy. It has attempted to mod-
erate potentially aggressive conduct by
establishing certain international codes or

»*rch 15, 1976

339

principles to which nations should adhere.
But we have never had any illusions that
simple declarations of objectives can be a
substitute for geopolitical inequalities. And
therefore, side by side with attempting to
bring about a more conciliatory world, we
have done our utmost to make sure that the
world in which we live, which is not fully
conciliatory, does not provide temptations
for aggression.

And again I would like to call your atten-
tion to the fact that if you look at the nature
of our debate in America you will find that
the concerns are expressed on both of these
points, on both the point of attempting to
resist and on the point of trying to create
a new environment.

We do believe that we cannot stand for ex-
pansionism. But we also believe that a con-
stant attempt to balance forces will sooner
or later lead to a confrontation, and there-
fore we want to move to a new set of ar-
rangements. And Helsinki should be seen in
that context, without illusion.

Now, with respect to your specific ques-
tion, I think you will understand that it
would not be appropriate for a Secretary of
State to describe exactly what we would do
in circumstances that have not yet arisen,
that cannot be foretold. But it would be our
determination to do what is eff'ective, and
not to have a post mortem on a failure, but
to do what is necessary to prevent the suc-
cess of another similar effort.

Q. In the text of your speech which the
American Embassy has distributed, it was
said that the United States ivould sign the
International Coffee Agreement. In your
speech at the dinner at Itamaraty you
omitted this poiyit. Why?

Secretary Kissinger: The American press
that is traveling with me will tell you that
in almost every speech I sometimes omit a
paragraph or two in order to shorten the
delivery. In this particular case, in order to
be perfectly frank, while I wanted to convey
to the Brazilian Government that we will
sign this agreement, I thought perhaps it
was not specifically delicate at such a meet-

ing to give the impression that our relati
ship depended on coffee, and as if the pol
of this country exhausted itself in the a
of one agricultural commodity. And, the
fore, while we will sign the agreement, wl
the President has made this decision,
while the printed text of my speech is '
official expression of American policy i
will be carried out, I thought it was perh;
somewhat more politic not to read that pa
graph as if something which we consider
wider importance could be summed up ii
traditional export of Brazil.

But in any case, what we have — what
in the text of our policy, and the Presid
has already, I believe, transmitted his
tentions of signing this agreement — or i
very soon — to the Congress.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you explain u
you did not inform your good friend U
ister Azeredo da Silveira before November
about the presence of Cuban soldiers in i
gola? Isn't this exchange of informatio'
usual practice in the relations ami
friends ?

Secretary Kissinger: Foreign Minis
Silveira and I are engaging in a very ad
correspondence, and we make an efforl
think on the whole successful, of inform
each other of major events. We do not ne(
sarily ask for Brazilian support on ev(
thing that we do.

With respect to the Cuban interventioi
Angola, the full extent of it did not becc
apparent to us until the second half of Oi'
ber. We were aware of some hundreds
Cubans — Cuban advisers — earlier, but
that time we thought it was still within
context of an essentially African struggl
that is to say, where various African 1
tions might ask for outside support t
might be significant, but not so important
to dilute the essentially African naturei
the conflict.

It was only toward the end of Octo
that, putting together various pieces of
telligence, it became clear to us that we w
not dealing with advisers, but with an
peditionary force. And we. then, given

340

Department of State BulM

fact that bureaucracies do not move with
enormous rapidity, we then informed some
Df our closer friends of that fact. It is also
important to remember that the Cuban inter-
vention accelerated very rapidly. As late as
the middle of December there were only
about four to five thousand Cubans — I am
talking about December now, the middle of
December — there were only about four to
five thousand Cubans in Angola. Today there
ire 11 to 12 thousand, so that a more-than-

oubling of the Cuban force took place after
the middle of December in Angola. So that
the full character of the struggle, that is to

ay the fact that we were no longer dealing
A'ith foreign countries helping their friends,
Dut with foreign countries imposing their

riends on the rest of the country, was not

eally fully clear to us until just before we
nformed the Brazilian Foreign Minister.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have singled out
Jrazil as the most important country in
'Mtin America and on the verge of becoming
t world power. How about human rights?
Aren't you concerned with the matter?

Secretary Kissinger: It is not my obliga-
ion here publicly to discuss Brazilian domes-
ic developments, but I had an opportunity
esterday in my conversations to learn from
arious Brazilian officials their ideas about
he evolution of this country in the political
ield and their perception of the role of hu-
man rights in this respect.

Q. There is evidence that Brazil's trade
alance cannot stand, loithout great trauma
or the country, a general trade deficit —
mrticularly with the United States — similar
0 that of last year. In vietv of this and of
ihe multiplicity of forces ivhich decide
whether U.S. trade policy should be more or
>ess protectionist, more or less liberal, we
isk: When can we expect that the coopera-
tion between Brazil and United States, tvhich
was restated today, loill become more opera-
ive in terms of commercial efforts? Is there
noney involved in it?

During this iveekend, the United States
las adopted the policy of balancing its trade
■elations with Brazil, tvhich have been ex-

tremely negative for our country. The United
States invites Brazil to join slowly the club
of the powerful. The invitation is also good
for the club of the rich?

Secretary Kissinger: There is no question
that when the economy of a country develops
at the rate and at the scale of the Brazilian
economy, that there will be occasional un-
evenness. There is also no question that from
time to time this will conflict with estab-
lished patterns in the United States. It would
be insulting to you to pretend otherwise. The
problem is not that there will not be mis-
understandings, disagreements, and occa-
sionally even conflicts. The question is
whether there exists the political will to re-
move those.

With respect to the very last part of your
question, I believe that it is Brazil's destiny,
quite frankly, no matter what the United
States does, to join the club of the rich. This
may be painful to some theoreticians, but
it is, in my personal judgment, unavoidable
and to be desired. But in the interval until
this occurs, a great deal depends on the wis-
dom of the policy of the United States.

Now, as you know, we have certain legis-
lative requirements that are more or less
automatically triggered in the case of par-
ticular events in other countries. We had
extensive talks about the issue that you
raised — the issue of the trade balance —
which in part is also a temporary phenom-
enon until adjustments can be made in the
Brazilian supplies of raw materials. But
nevertheless it is real enough. We had ex-
tensive talks; the Brazilian side, if I may
say so, was extraordinarily well prepared,
and we approached it from the point of view
not of being able to eliminate that imbalance
immediately, but of reducing it and of pre-
venting some American actions that have
been sometimes harmful but, even more
frequently, more irritating than they were
harmful.

The Brazilian side came up with a number
of general ideas that we think are extremely
helpful and that we want to study in the
United States. And that, if not those ideas,
then some other ideas that will, in my judg-

Vtarch 15, 1976

341

ment, lead to a solution — hopefully lead to a
solution — of some of the most irritating
problems that have existed.

We are determined in any event to have
our decisions in those matters guided by the
overall principles that we have enunciated
here, and we will begin immediately an ex-
amination in the United States of these
particular issues. When your Ministers come
to Washington, and when our Secretary of
the Treasury comes here, we hope that
significant progress can be made. From my
point of view, I think we had very useful
talks with your economic ministers yester-
day afternoon that were conducted in a
really constructive atmosphere on both sides.

Q. One of the most irritating points in
economic relations between Brazil and the
United States recently has been the U.S.
surcharge on imports of shoes. And one of
the options available to you to get rid of this
and to circumvent the Trade Act legislation
is to go to Geneva and to negotiate; although
this wouldn't have great economic impact,
it tvould have considerable symbolic impact
in improving U.S. -Brazilian relations. Do
you intend to do that?

Secretary Kissinger: You know the prob-
lem of countervailing duties is triggered ac-
cording to our law by the complaints of the
private sector and is not an action that is
usually originated, in fact it is never origi-
nated, by the government. We are concerned
here with a specific provision of the Ameri-
can law. But we are prepared to discuss with
Brazil the general question of the nature of
subsidies and their relationship to counter-
vailing duties. We are at the very beginning
of this process of discussion, and our eco-
nomic agencies in Washington must ob-
viously have an opportunity to study it and
to participate in those discussions. So all I
will say is that we discuss various ap-
proaches to this issue that may ofl'er some
hope that this particular irritation can be
eased if not eliminated.

Q. What do you think are the implications
and what do you think tvill be the repercus-

342

Slows of the Congress' decision to cut off
military aid to Chile?

Secretary Kissinger: I think you can ap-
preciate that I am conducting extensive
enough public discussions with the Congress
in the United States not to feel the absolute
necessity to conduct them also in Brasilia.
My understanding is that, so far, this has
been only a vote of the Senate and has not
been a congressional action. I will have the
opportunity when I return to have further
discussions with congressional leaders, so I
will reserve judgment until I have an op
portunity to explore it.

Q. In your dealings with the governments
of Latin America and your attempts to
establish a new relationship tvith them, you
2vill inevitably be dealing with a number of
governments that are subject to accusations
that they do violate human rights. Without
regard to the specifics of the host country,
do you plan any initiative to demonstrate tt
the peoples of these countries that have such
grievances that their rights are being vio-
lated, that the United States sympathizet
with their aspirations?

Secretary Kissinger: We have stated oui
views on the human rights issue repeatedly
and I have answered a question on that be
fore. The United States supports the dignit;
and respect of the individual and democrat! Jas
processes, and all governments understan
our views in this.

i

lit

'■p

Q. Mr. Secretary, if you'll take a non
Latin-American question. Former Presiden
Nixon has just flown to China. Could yo:
give us your appraisal of ivhat his trip ma-
mean for U.S.-China relations? Specificalli
is there any possibility that if Presiden
Nixon sees the netv Prime Minister of Chini
he will discuss with him his impressions o
his visit [sic] ?

UVIl

tes

Secretary Kissinger: I have been askfr
this question repeatedly in the Unite*
States. We were not consulted about tb
trip ahead of time, and we did not kno\
about the trip until it was announced, so i
did not represent an action by the Unite*

Department of State Bulleti

at a.

iitk

states. If the Government of the People's
Republic of China has invited former Presi-
dent Nixon, who has the historic merit of
initiating that relationship, if the Govern-
ment of the People's Republic of China in-
vited him in order to underline the impor-
tance that they attach to the relationship,
we are in favor of any act that stresses the
significance either side attaches to the re-
lationship, even if we did not know about
the particular method that was chosen.

As far as talking to President Nixon after
he returns, we will of course wish to learn
about the nature of his discussions and about
tiis impressions. The particular method that
will be used to learn of these views we will
decide after the former President has re-
turned to the United States.

Q. [inaudible'\ have noiv all agreed to con-
sult in advance on all matters of global po-
itical significance in the spirit of coopera-
ion. One of the highest preoccupations of
ike United States is Cuban military adven-
tures overseas. Is it logical to assume there-
iore that when these discussions or consulta-
mns occur, you tvill seek Brazil's support
tor your position about Cuba?

Secretary Kissinger: I want to stress, in
Ihe strongest possible terms, that my visit
(0 this hemisphere is not to enlist support
jgainst Cuba. The visit to this hemisphere
tas been planned for a long time. The discus-
jions about this consultative arrangement
CO back two years. They were started dur-
ng a period when the United States was
noving toward normalization of relations
'rith Cuba and had repeatedly indicated its
nllingness to normalize relations with Cuba.
ik.nd I do not want to turn our Western Hemi-
phere policy or our Brazilian policy into an
bsession with a small Caribbean country.

If there are specific causes for concern
bout Cuba and if the United States feels
liat action is called for, we will undoubtedly
iscuss this matter with other interested
-atin American states. And, of course, we
nil discuss such a matter with an old friend
'hich sees things in these respects fairly
arallel, as Brazil. But this is not the reason

for this document we signed. This document
was prepared before there was any concern
with Cuba, and we do not need it to deal
with Cuba.

TOAST, BOGOTA, FEBRUARY 23 '

As I am coming to the end of my trip
through South America, I would like to say
how very moved I have been by the very
warm and human reception that I have re-
ceived everywhere, a reception which goes
beyond what may be published in communi-
ques or in press and formal statements but
which represents the true relationship be-
tween Latin America and the United States.
And in no country has the reception been
more personal and warm than here in
Colombia.

I had the privilege of staying in the home
of your President and having discussions
which were philosophical, relaxed, and which
went to the heart of each problem in an
atmosphere of substantial agreement and
total cordiality.

As for your Foreign Minister, from the
first time we met last year in the United
States, I have entertained a very special ad-
miration for him. In some respects we came
to our present responsibilities by similar
paths as authors, teachers, and historians.
But when I saw how your Minister presided
over the rhetorical extravaganza of the OAS
General Assembly last May and thought
about my own experience the year before in
Atlanta, I knew he had qualities of patience
and forbearance which I could never hope to
emulate. With respect to the qualities of for-
bearance and patience, and I'm sure many
others, my staflf completely agrees with this
judgment.

You are, Mr. Minister, by common consent
one of the leaders in foreign relations in the
Americas, and I am honored to be here by
your side.

I want to tell you, Mr. Foreign Minister,
how delighted I am to be here. The visit of

" Given at a dinner at the U.S. Ambassador's resi-
dence (text from press release 94 dated Feb. 24).

^arch 15, 1976

343

your President to the United States a few
brief mouths ago was far more productive
even than we had hoped it would be. The
talks were expanded beyond what we had
originally planned. And we decided then that
we should renew our conversations at the
earliest opportunity.

My visit here, Mr. Minister, is an effort
built on the very considerable contribution
which your President made by his earlier
trip to the United States to the improvement
in understanding between the United States
and Latin America. In his statement to
President Ford, with considerable perception
and warmth, he talked about three themes:
the significance of responsibility, of order,
and of diversity in the affairs of nations.

I have given considerable thought to your
President's statement since his trip to our
country. He was right when he said that we
share a commitment to these three principles.
He was also right in stressing their impor-
tance to world peace and to the new, more
just and more humane world order to which
both Colombia and the United States are
committed.

Permit me to add a few comments of my
own about your President's important state-
ment.

First, as to responsibility, both our na-
tions are conscious of our broad responsi-
bilities beyond our own hemisphere. In
another century De Tocqueville remarked of
my country, and perhaps of the New World
in general, that "Expectancy is the keynote
of American foreign policy ; it consists much
more in abstaining than in doing."

But we can no longer abstain. The United
States is permanently and irrevocably en-
gaged in the world. Our power confers upon
us a dual responsibility:

— To maintain international security in
an age when nuclear war could destroy
civilization and

— To grasp the opportunity, which peace
offers us all, to work together in a spirit of
cooperation to build a world order which is
more humane and just, one which takes full
account of the dignity of each nation and the
inalienable rights of each of our citizens.

344

The task we face today — indeed, the pur-
pose of my trip — is to search out the leader-
ship and the initiatives which will forge a
common pact for bettering the condition of
man. It is with this in mind that I have come
to your country.

We, together with you and your neighbors
in this hemisphere, begin the quest with a
great advantage. This continent is a conti-
nent of peace. The nations of South America
do not threaten each other. When states
start down the road of pressure and threat
— as some others have recently — it is a no-
table event in the history of the hemisphere,
raising concern and the need for attention.
This continent, unlike almost all the others,
has not been historically preoccupied with
international tensions and conflicts. It has
been able to focus its energies on our posi-
tive responsibility of building a system of
international cooperation. That sense of in-
ternational responsibility is one of the treas-
ures of our hemisphere tradition.

Order, as your President wisely said, is
our second common commitment.

A peaceful and progressive world system
depends, in the first instance, on law and on
the settled practice of nations. For it is only
under law that nations can pursue policies
of restraint and conciliation and expect that
others will do likewise and so reconcile their
political and economic interests for the com-
mon progress of mankind.

Colombia is the nation of Santander, whc
said "if arms have given us our independ-
ence, laws will give us our liberty." It was
Santander who renounced his soldierly hon-
ors to build schools, libraries, and museums
— the foundations of Colombia's distinctive
modern culture.

When President Lopez visited Washing-
ton, he expressed the hope that our twc
countries "will find a sense of partnership
within a legal system based on impersonal
and abstract rules within which there wil
always be the right to dissent." There is nc
better formula to guide our efforts in re
vitalizing the inter-American system. True
to its own tradition of respect for inter-
national law and orderly process among na-

i>

:iff

iie

Department of State Bulletir

«f|

)ns, Colombia has been in the forefront of
Forts first to create, and now to revitalize,
e Organization of American States. The
lited States will strongly support Colom-
a's efforts to make the OAS a more effective
strument of our common will.
There are other areas where we can col-
aorate as well:

— Commodities. Neither Colombia nor the
lited States felt an immediate need for a
ffee agreement. Yet both of us shared a
ig-range interest in working out an agree-
jnt that would provide equity to producers
d consumers alike. We have succeeded.

—Lata of the Sea Negotiations. No nation
the hemisphere has played a more active
d constructive role than Colombia. We
11 work closely with you over the next few
)nths for a historic multilateral agreement
establish a progressive regime of law for
e world's oceans, seas, and deep seabeds.
) issue is more important for the long-term
ibility and cooperative progress of nations.

— Narcotics. Our nations have a common
;erest in the control of illegal trafficking

drugs. Your country's cooperation in this
Itical area has been central to the inter-
Itional effort to curb the flow of dangerous
ags across international boundaries. For

s, you have the gratitude of the people

my country.

— Human Rights. We are both democra-
■s. We share the common conviction that
; instruments, and ends, of all our policies
! the human beings who are our citizens,
d not some blind force of history. And we
irefore know that the ultimate vitality and

V tue of our civilization is the extent to

V ich its governments are responsive to the
^ ise of human dignity and respect. Under
' ■ American Declaration on the Rights and
1 ties of Man, the United States and Colom-
b, are committed to nurture political and
hman rights everywhere. We will continue
t work with you in the common effort to
eaand the writ of justice and human de-
cicy, not only in this hemisphere but
t 'oughout the world.

The last of the themes your President
struck in Washington was that of diver-
sity.

There is no simple formula for a hemi-
sphere policy, no single solution to the prob-
lems of the Americas, no one slogan to en-
compass all the variety of our relationships
and goals. The rich variety of this hemi-
sphere is always a striking experience for
any visitor from the United States. I have
seen it this week. It is palpable. My country
understands it, accepts it, and welcomes it.
Indeed, the United States knows as well as
any nation that from diversity in this hemi-
sphere can come both creativity and
strength, if we will bend our common will to
the task which is ahead.

For our part, we shall move to vitalize our
policy throughout the Americas and foster
our hemispheric ties. We will also continue
to make a special effort to strengthen our
bilateral ties with each American state. We
are prepared to this end to develop special
consultative procedures with each nation of
the Americas, if it is desired, adapted to the
character and intensity of our differing re-
lationships.

We count Colombia as a nation to which
we have very special links : our common ded-
ication to democracy, our commitment to the
cause of human rights, the civility of our
mutual discourse, and our firm dedication to
a new and more just international order.

Mr. Minister: There is much work to be
done to construct the kind of peaceful and
cooperative world for which we all yearn.
You and we have a great part to play. Colom-
bia has undertaken, and you,, Mr. Minister,
are carrying out, responsibilities of states-
manship and leadership in this hemisphere.
You are in the forefront of the effort to con-
struct a new order. And Colombia's unique
spirit and voice exemplify the richness of
this hemisphere and of the creative possi-
bilities of a world of diversity.

Mr. Minister, in proposing a toast to your
health and success, I offer a toast to Colom-
bia, its people, and to our joint efforts to
work together on all the issues challenging
our modern world.

fiirch 15, 1976

345

ARRIVAL, SAN JOSE, FEBRUARY 23

Press release 9S dated Februaiy 24

As you know, Mr. Foreign Minister, to-
morrow we start our electoral campaign in
the United States, and it is a lucky thing
for our candidates that you are not eligible.

Ladies and gentlemen, you will have seen
what your Foreign Minister has put me
through at our repeated meetings. It has
been my experience at meetings of Foreign
Ministers of the Western Hemisphere to
deliver a speech to which the Foreign Minis-
ter of Costa Rica replied and no matter what
I try to do his eloquence far outshown mine.
This time he has put me into a more difficult
position. He has spoken iirst.

Mr. Foreign Minister, I feel indeed, as you
stated in your conclusion, that I am visiting
a friend, visiting a personal friend, and I am
visiting a fellow democracy, which, what-
ever the difference is in scale, shares our
values, supports common purposes, and has
the courage to stand for its convictions in
bilateral relations, in hemispheric forums,
and in international organizations. Not least,
as a member of the Security Council, Costa
Rica has proved that a nation of strong con-
victions and fundamental human principles
can play an important role in the world re-
gardless of what those might say who calcu-
late only by technical and impersonal factors.

In your eloquent remarks you called atten-
tion to the principal problems of the con-
temporary world, which are to prevent ag-
gression, to build the peace, and to create
a more progressive relationship among
states. Democracies do not have to be afraid,
nor do they have to apologize for searching
every avenue toward peace, but neither
should they delude themselves and close
their eyes in the face of aggression. And
also, the free countries have to work to-
gether to build a better world. And the na-
tions of the Western Hemisphere, sharing a
similar history, united by common ideals,
and inspired by those of them that have led
the way toward respect for human dignity,
have a special opportunity to achieve this.

Mr. Foreign Minister, you and I discussed

this meeting here in Costa Rica nearly a ye
ago, and you suggested that we invite re
resentatives from the other Central Ame;
can Republics to join us. It was a fortuna
idea and a happy end to my visit to Lat
America.

I want you to know what a great persor
joy it is for me to see you, how moved I w
by your eloquent remarks, and how much
look forward to spending time with you a;
getting to know your President and yo
country.

Thank you.

TOAST, SAN JOSE, FEBRUARY 24 ^

The opportunity I have had for discussio
with President Oduber and Foreign Minisi
Facio, and my bilateral meetings today wi
my colleagues from the Central Americ
nations and Panama, are a fitting culmh
tion of my Latin American trip.

Here in Central America, I know I am
my way home. For the history and dreams
this region have long been interwoven wi
those of my country. Our past provides
a heritage of considerable achievement a
a precious advantage to us as we engage 1
future. We have the responsibility to bu
upon the positive record of our cooperat:
for the benefit of each of our peoples and :
the advancement of mankind.

For a decade. Central America has bt
a region of progress. Industrialization, a^,
cultural diversification, new institutions, i
above all, a growing confidence of purpi
have brought your countries to a new thrc
old of development.

You are proving yourselves pioneers
the processes of international cooperation,
the Central American Common Market j
have shown the world how nations can co
bine their efi'orts to promote more rapid e
nomic development and international pea"
You have begun to construct durable Cent 1
American institutions — technological, edu •

s

i

' Given at a luncheon hosted by President Dai 1
Oduber Quiros of Costa Rica (text from press rele '.
100).

4

346

Department of State Bullc|*.

anal, legal, and cultural — all of which help

lower the barriers between nations. Your

mmitment to a new treaty will provide

esh impulse to your integration and can

a model for others around the world.

Yet your nations — as well as any on earth

•know that success is fragile in the modern

)rld. You know that national independence

quires constant vigilance and solidarity

th others who share your commitment to

f-determination. Your economies know the

pact of external circumstances over which

u have little influence; your societies feel

e pressures of population growth and of

pid urbanization. One of your nations has

it its soldiers to help keep the peace in a

jional conflict halfway around the world

lich threatens international stability. Two

your countries know the anguish here in

! isthmus of a still-unresolved war. Such

nflicts arouse the concern of others — as is

rays the case wherever peace breaks down.

le role of the OAS in encouraging a solu-

n has been an impressive example of the

ue of our inter-American system.

Most tragically, three times in the past

'ee years Central America has been struck

inatural disaster. Hurricanes have brought

faring in Honduras; earthquakes have

.aged Nicaragua; and today our hearts

pained by the terrible calamity which

struck our friends in Guatemala.

he United States knows the obstacles

I face. We welcome, and we pledge our

81'port for, your continued progress and in-

t« ration. My country respects what you

h. e achieved and the uniqueness and sov-

eiignty of each of your countries.

\^e are all serious people. We have dif-
ftjnces of perspective and interest, and we
w continue to have them; for differences
inevitable when responsible and sover-
-.i 1 nations committed to the well-being of
thr citizens confront the diflficulties of an
inu-dependent world. But we also know that
tl time has come to resolve, in a fair and
m;ure way, the problems of the past and
P» them behind us as we look to our common
flare,
'he negotiations now underway to mod-

ernize the relationship between my country
and Panama are just such an effort. My
country is determined to continue those
negotiations in good faith to our ultimate
objective of a new relationship which re-
spects the national interests of both the
United States and Panama.

The United States will also continue to
cooperate in the development efforts in Cen-
tral America. Our bilateral assistance pro-
grams here are among the largest in the
hemisphere. As you seek to fulfill the aspi-
rations of your people for a better life, you
may depend upon the friendship and support
of my country.

The United States will be a steady friend
— not only in moments of catastrophe but
over the long tei-m in your struggle for de-
velopment. Responding to the tragedy in
Guatemala, President Ford has asked Con-
gress to authorize a new grant of $25 mil-
lion so that we can move beyond relief of the
immediate emergency to the difficult process
of rebuilding. And our established develop-
ment aid programs will continue as well — in
Guatemala and throughout the region, par-
ticularly to assist your efforts to help the
rural poor.

As we increasingly dedicate ourselves to
human betterment, we cannot neglect the
reality that no nation can hope to advance
if it is not secure. Our collective security is
the bedrock of our relations. Last July, here
in San Jose, the countries of this hemisphere
successfully completed the modernization of
the Rio Treaty — a visible symbol of our de-
termination to maintain and strengthen this
relationship.

I assure you that the United States re-
mains dedicated to the principle of collective
security. Recent events have shown that
foreign adventurism is not dead ; expedition-
ary forces may still be sent across the oceans
to intei-vene in, and impose their will upon,
the domestic affairs of other countries. The
United States will not tolerate a challenge
to the solemn treaty principle of noninter-
vention in this hemisphere.

I prepare now to go to Guatemala, where
I shall extend the sympathy and the admi-

«*ch 15, 1976

347

ration of the United States for the Guate-
malan people at this time of great suffering.
I then shall return to my own country.

This will be the last prepared statement
I will make during my trip. This visit has
been enormously valuable to me. I have
learned much, and I return to my country
with a deeper understanding of the strengths
and difficulties, aspirations and conflicts,
glories and anguish of the hemisphere :

— In Venezuela, I saw and heard of the
growing sense of common destiny and soli-
darity within Latin America. I made clear
that we welcomed this and that we were pre-
pared to work with new Latin American in-
stitutions of cooperation.

—In Peru, I learned something of the
creative diversity of the hemisphere. Our
policy, I said, is to respect the sovereignty
of each Latin American state, to conciliate
differences before they become conflicts, and
to support the authentic development efforts
of the nations of the hemisphere.

— In Brazil, I came face to face with the
reality that a number of nations of the
Americas are emerging onto the world
scene, with broadened international interests
and international responsibilities. As a dem-
onstration that we are prepared to develop
new machinery of consultation with these
nations, adapted to the special circumstances
of our relations with each, I signed a new
and formal memorandum of agreement on
consultation with Brazil. I pointed out that
we are prepared to enter into similar ar-
rangements with other states if they so de-
sire. And I stressed that, in enhancing our
bilateral relationships with the nations of
the Americas, we would not diminish the
momentum toward integration and soli-
darity within Latin America or our willing-
ness to work with Latin American institu-
tions and organizations.

— In Colombia yesterday, the Foreign Min-
ister put foi'ward a suggestion for what
could become a new element in our inter-
American relationship. He proposed that we
explore the possibility of arrangements be-
tween the United States and the nations of

348

Latin America to expand trade within t
hemisphere as a central mission and purpo
of the inter-American system. The Unit
States is prepared to look carefully at tl
imaginative suggestion. We shall set up
task force immediately to study its ran
fications. For his part, the Colombi
Foreign Minister will begin consultation wi
other Latin American countries. At the sai
time, the United States will be discussi
this proposal with him and with you a
other Latin American nations. All of us v
then be able to advance concrete and prac
cal ideas for discussion at the General 1
sembly meeting of the Organization
American States.

— Finally, in Costa Rica, I have seen ;
other example of democracy at work a
reaffirmed once again, as I have elsewhe
the importance of our inter-American cc
mitment to human rights and the dign
of man.

My trip has strengthened my deep c
viction that our common reality is our c
ative diversity; that our task is to fo
our geographical and historical bonds i
shared pui^pose and endeavor; and that
common responsibility is to build upon
special bond to make cooperation and pr
ress in this hemisphere a model and a c
tribution to a new era of internatic
achievement.

The United States regards its hemisph*
ties and responsibilities with a special
riousness. In a spirit of solidarity, we h
pledged ourselves:

— To respond to the special economic ne
of the more industrialized nations of
hemisphere ;

— To assist the efforts of the need
nations to advance themselves;

— To support Latin American regional
subregional efforts to organize for coopt-
tion and integration;

— To negotiate our differences with
nation or nations, on the basis of mutual
spect and sovereign equality, either bi
erally or multilaterally ;

Department of State Bull

— To maintain our firm commitment to
mutual security against any who would un-
dermine our common effort, threaten inde-
pendence, or export violence; and

— To modernize and strengthen our inter-
American system.

These are the pledges we make. We shall
spare no effort to turn them into concrete
programs in the months ahead. We should —
together — set ourselves an agenda for action.
I firmly believe that if all nations of the
Americas can commit themselves anew to
responsible cooperation in these areas, we
shall together be responsive to the deepest
needs as well as to the highest aspirations
of all mankind:

— Peace is both possible and the indispen-
sable precondition of all our hopes for the
future.

— The global economy must both grow and
be fair, bringing benefit and opportunity to
all peoples.

— Basic human rights must be preserved,
cherished, and defended if peace and pros-
perity are to be more than hollow achieve-
ments. The responsibilities of men and na-
tions in this era require, more than ever, the
full and free dedication of the talent, energy,
creative thought, and action of men and wo-
men, free from fear and repression, to the
tasks of our time.

— The essential political requirement for
progress in all these areas of common con-
cern is the readiness of nations to consult
and cooperate with each other on the basis
of sovereign equality, mutual respect, and
the commitment to our common success.

These, then, are the tasks before us and
the principles by which we are guided. It is
up to us, as individuals and as nations,
whether we shall build upon the progress we
have made and turn the decade ahead into
one of mankind's great eras of achievement.

On my trip, I have seen much of the prom-
ise, the emergent power, and the moral force
of this hemisphere. I have learned from it.
I have explained some of the goals and con-

March 15, 1976

cerns of my country. And I have confirmed
my own longstanding conviction that the
modern challenges of economic and social
progress and relations between developed
and developing countries have more possi-
bility of being met successfully in this hemi-
sphere than in any other part of the world.
Therefore I propose a toast: To the dis-
tinguished Foreign Ministers of the Central
American Republics ; to the progress of your
nations; and to the cooperative effort to
achieve peace and well-being for the peoples
of this hemisphere and for all mankind.

NEWS CONFERENCE, SAN JOSE,
FEBRUARY 24

Press release 99 dated February 25

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and gentle-
men, I simply would like to express my very
deep appreciation to the President and
Foreign Minister of Costa Rica for the very
warm reception we have had here and for
arranging the meeting with my colleagues
from the Central American Republics, who
also have had the courtesy of coming to the
ail-port to see me off.

I am extremely pleased with the meetings
that we have had, and I think it was a very
fitting end to my trip through Latin Amer-
ica, which I am confident will lead to the
strengthening of ties in the Western Hemi-
sphere.

Now I would like to take some questions,
but I would like first to take some questions
from the Costa Rican press or other Central
American journalists present, and then after
we have taken some of those, I will recognize
one or two of the North American contin-
gent, who are here to prove — to demonstrate
the intensity with which we conduct our in-
ternal debates.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the committee investi-
gating the overthroiv of the AUende regime
in Chile has indicated that you ivere instru-
mental in this process during the Nixon Ad-
ministration. Given the results of some of

349

the findings of this committee, ive would like
to ask what is your opinion loith regard to
the concept of self-determination of peoples?

Secretary Kissinger: As I have had occa-
sion to point out repeatedly in the United
States, several of the congressional commit-
tees get carried aw^ay in their findings when
they deal with personalities. In any event,
the Senate committee specifically found that
the United States did not generate the over-
throw of the Allende government. My own
view is that countries should determine their
own future free of foreign military inter-
vention.

Q. The Seriate has vetoed any participa-
tion or intervention on the part of the United
States in the military area in the events in
Angola. I woidd like to ask you, sir, what is
yoiir opinion ivith regard, to the role of the
Senate in the conduct of international pol-
icy, and how does this affect the Ford Ad-
ministration in this area?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not think it is
appropriate for me in a foreign country to
engage in a debate over the Senate. I will
say, however, that what the United States
was concerned about in Angola was the mas-
sive intervention of a Cuban expeditionary
foi'ce and the dispatch of large quantities
of Soviet equipment which have transformed
what was a minority faction in Angola into
the dominant faction. So that what we are
seeing here is the imposition by foreign
force of a minority group as the Government
of Angola. We did not oppose any of the
groups in Angola as long as they reached
their objectives by African methods or with-
in an African context.

Secondly, we did not ask for American
military intervention but rather for money
to support black African countries that were
concerned about the Cuban adventure. We
believe that a mistake was made, and we are
now calling the attention of the American
people and of other countries to the global
consequences of these developments.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the efforts to reform

350

li

the OAS Charter the United States has
taken a position contrary to the concept of
introducing into a reformed charter the
matter of economic security of the Latin
American countries. In your speech in Cara-
cas announcing a netv path in relations with
Latin America, can we take this to mean that
there has been a change of heart on the part
of the United States and that the United
States now ivould approve of incorporating
the concept in a neiv treaty of the economic
security of these nations?

Secretary Kissinger: Our objection has
been that the phrase "collective economic
security" is a very vague and loaded phrase
which can be used for different purposes by
different countries. Our general approach to
all these issues, as was expressed at the
seventh special session of the General As-
sembly, is to deal with concrete problems |ij
i)i a constructive and cooperative manner.

With respect to the relationship with
Latin America I offered in Caracas — and 1
reiterated it again here today — cooperatior
on transfer of technology, cooperation on a
code of multinational cooperation, assistance
to the hemisphere. I call again attention to-
day to my colleagues from the Central Amer-
ican Republics to the important proposa
made by the Colombian Foreign Ministei
yesterday for a special study of trade rela
tions within the Western Hemisphere. Al
these concrete measures we are prepared t(
take, but we are not prepared to accep
general slogans that can be used in unpre
dictable manners.

Last question from the Latin side anc
then I will take two questions from thi
North American side.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it was once said during
the Nixon Administration that where Brazi
goes, so goes the rest of Latin America. Dt
you think that Brazil as a country is the bes
example, as a nation, for Latin America
And the second question, by what means di
you think that the American Governmen
could bring about arrangements tvhereb'i
the Latin American governments could ret

Department of State Bulletii

?ive more revenues or more equitable
rices for the commodity exports upon which
ley depend particularly in the case of the
lore needy nations?

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to
razil or any other country, the United
tates will not or cannot appoint any one
3untry as the leader of Latin America. The
'nited States is prepared to have special
jnsultative arrangements with any nation of
le Western Hemisphere where our relation-
lips have reached a level of complexity or
itensity where such relationships are neces-
iry. But even when we have these special
msultative arrangements, they are not
leant to the exclusion of hemispheric ties,
ad they are not intended to confer a special
Dsition of leadership on any one country,
econdly, I have spoken at every stop about
le basic principles which govern the U.S.
)nduct in the Western Hemisphere and the
asic values for which the United States

ands, which include respect for human
Ights and for the dignity of the individual.

With respect to commodities, the United
tates has declared its willingness to have
tse-by-case commodity studies and has al-
;ady agreed to sign the coffee agi-eement
ad signed the tin agreement, and we are
'epared to have discussions on other
»mmodities.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Rabbi Baruch [Korjf],
iho is well knoivn in the United States as
friend of President Nixon, said today con-
trning Mr. Nixon's visit to China: "I don't
link he really wanted to go noiv, but the
Viinese ivanted the trip to coincide with the
mrth anniversary of his visit, and the State
epartment vieived this as a unique oppor-
inity to learn about the political ferment in
\hina." Did you or any official of the State
department in any way give Mr. Nixon this
npression or in any way urge him to go to
hina?

Secretary Kissinger: I will say three
lings. One, it is not a particularly elevating
icperience to be forced to exhibit our domes-

tic torments before foreign audiences at
every stop. Two, I did not know, nor did any-
one else in the Department of State until an
hour before the announcement was made, of
President Nixon's planned trip to the Peo-
ple's Republic of China. Three, we welcomed
the statement by the Acting Premier of the
People's Republic of China reaffirming their
continued interest in the principles of the
Shanghai communique and in the process
of normalization of relations with the United
States.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I ivonder if I might just
follow that up by this point. It has been
suggested that you did see Mr. Nixon just
before he announced that the trip would
take place. Is it possible that anything you
might have said would give him the impres-
sion that it ivould be useful for the United
States for him to go?

Secretary Kissinger: No, it is not possible,
and I have discussed this at a press con-
ference in Washington. We will take one
more question on the American Civil War.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that your Latin
American tour is not an anti-Cuba campaign,
and you have also said that Cuba has be-
haved respomsibly in the hemisphere in re-
cent years. Yet today you seemed to bring
the specter of Cuban intervention in Latin
America. Do you have any indication that
the Castro Government is going to reneiv its
activities in this area, or was it just rhetoric?

Secretary Kissinger: I called attention to
the principle of collective security, in which
no group of nations is more interested than
the Republics of Central America, each of
whom is individually weak with respect to
outside intervention, and each of whom is
dependent on the principle of any specific
indication — of any specific action that is be-
ing planned, but it is to make clear what the
U.S. attitude is for contingencies that might
arise, but have not yet occurred.

I am afraid I am already late for my plane
and I want to thank you all very much for
the reception I have had here.

{(arch 15, 1976

351

DEPARTURE, GUATEMALA, FEBRUARY 24

Press release 102 dated February 24

Secretary Kissinger: When one sees a
catastrophe of the scale that has affected
Guatemala, one does not deal with a political
problem, but with a human problem; and
what concerns us now is how we can give
expression to our concern, to our sympathy,
and to the tremendous needs that have sud-
denly arisen in this country.

What we have seen in this country has
been very moving, but the President showed
me pictures of a catastrophe far transcend-
ing what is possible to observe in the city,
and he has also described to me the efforts
that are being made by the Government of
Guatemala and by the people of Guatemala
to build a better future.

As far as the United States is concerned,
we will do our utmost to respond to the
coui'age of the people of Guatemala. I have
been very impressed by the insistence of the
President in his private talks as well as in
the remarks he made here, that this problem
will be solved primarily by the people and
the Government of Guatemala and that it is
not in the first instance for outsiders.

I am happy that starting tomorrow an
American engineer battalion will arrive here
to work on the road between Guatemala City
and El Rancho. We have agreed that we
would study your immediate needs prior to
the rainy season and then longer term needs
during the course of this year. I will be dis-
cussing this with President Ford when I see
him tomorrow, but the major message that
I would like to bring to you is not one of
material assistance, but of the dedication of
the Americans that I have been privileged
to meet here who have reached out to be of
assistance and to have been privileged to
assist Guatemala in its hour of need. And
this reflects the spirit of friendship and
human sympathy between our two peoples.
And I will bring back to the United States
the steadfastness and dedication of your
leaders and of the people that I have had an
opportunity to observe here.

Thank you very much.

I will be pleased to take two or three

352

questions, but we must be brief, because w
must get back to the United States at
reasonable hour, and we'll take them onl
from the Guatemalan press.

Q. What is the estimate of the sum th
United States ivill give?

Secretary Kissinger: As you know, tY
President has just requested $25 million i
emergency aid, and our regular aid is (
course continuing, and several projects wi
be going forward within the next few day
But what we will do is, our Ambassado
working with your planning group, will d
velop within the next two weeks a propos
to send to Washington. In the meantime
will be taking up the problem with Presidei
Ford and our officials, and we will have
better estimate of the amount that can 1
discussed after these studies are complete

i(

Q. What is the U.S. position on Belize?

Secretary Kissinger: Your President andl
had an opportunity to discuss this, and I h;
previously in the day discussed it with yo
Foreign Minister. The United States is
good friend of Guatemala and is also a gO'
friend of Great Britain. We will do our be
to bring about an amicable solution since ■>
would hope very much that two close frien
of the United States not drive matters to
point of confrontation. But it is in this spi
that we will keep in touch with both sic
during their negotiations and do what be
sides agree might be helpful.

Q. Are there any conditions to assure i
help you promise is channeled properly?

■i

1

Secretary Kissinger: There are no poli
cal conditions of any kind attached to wh;
ever assistance has been given or will
given. There will be technical discussic
between our Embassy and Guatemalan
ficials in order to determine where the U
aid could be most useful in the program
self-help that your President has describi
But the United States is assisting in a spil
of friendship and cooperation and will atta
no conditions of any kind.

Department of State Bulk

uatemala Disaster Relief Act
ransmitted to the Congress

Iest<age From President Ford *

'o the Congress of the United States:
On February 4th a devastating earthquake
truck Guatemala. That earthquake, together
fith its aftershocks, has left over 22,000
ead, more than 75,000 injured, and one
lillion homeless.

The United States has a special responsi-
ility to help meet the urgent needs in Guate-
lala. Immediate aid has already been ex-
inded by U.S. agencies, both public and
rivate, including:

— Emergency shelters, medical supplies
id food provided by the Agency for Inter-
ational Development.

— Transportation and medical facilities
•ovided by the Department of Defense.
— Food distribution, medical services, and
;her disaster relief activities provided by
amerous private voluntary agencies.

Last week I dispatched my Special Coor-
nator for International Disaster Assistance
-AID Administrator Daniel Parker — to
uatemala for a firsthand review of the sit-
ition. He has now^ reported to me and to
ongressional Committees on the extent of
image and need. Both the Senate and the
ouse of Representatives have passed resolu-
pns expressing sympathy for the people of
Uatemala in their hour of distress and urg-
ig development of a comprehensive U.S.
(sponse. The Secretary of State will visit
le Republic of Guatemala on February 24 to
fpress further our support for the people of
uatemala.

I am now proposing urgent and specific
tion to turn these expressions of sympathy
Ito tangible assistance. The proposed $25
lllion "Guatemala Disaster Relief Act of
W which I am sending herewith repre-
nts an immediate humanitarian response of
1.6 United States to the victims of this trag-

' Transmitted on Feb. 19 (text from White House
less release).

lorch 15, 1976

edy who have been injured or have lost their
relatives, their homes and possessions, and
in many cases their very means of existence.
This legislation, and the ensuing appropria-
tion, will enable us to respond to the human
tragedy in Guatemala. Our response will re-
flect America's concern for the people of
Guatemala.

Gerald R. Ford.

The White House, February 19, 1976.

International Coffee Agreement
To Be Signed by the United States

Department Statement *

As Secretary Kissinger announced in
Brasilia February 19, the President has au-
thorized U.S. signature of the International
Coffee Agreement, 1976. The agreement is
open for signature at U.N. Headquarters in
New York. Our Ambassador to the United
Nations will be instructed to sign the agree-
ment shortly.

The International Coff'ee Agreement, 1976,
is the outgrowth of nearly a year of negotia-
tions between 43 exporting countries and 18
importing countries at the International Cof-
fee Organization in London. All the exporting
countries are developing countries, and coffee
is the largest nonpetroleum export from the
developing world. In 1974, world coffee ex-
ports amounted to over $4 billion, and U.S.
imports of coffee totaled $1.5 billion.

The purpose of the new agreement is to
help provide a stable flow of coffee onto the
market. It will encourage producers to restore
adequate production levels. It contains no
fixed price objectives and will not raise prices
above long-term market trends.

The major operating mechanism of the
new International Coffee Agreement is a pro-
vision for export quotas whenever supplies
are in sui*plus. However, unlike previous cof-
fee agreements, the mechanism is automati-

' Issued on Feb. 20 (text from press release 85).

353

cally suspended when prices rise sharply.

The current situation in coffee markets is
one of record high prices. This situation re-
sulted from a disastrous frost in the coffee-
growing regions of Brazil which severely
damaged or destroyed over half of the esti-
mated 2.9 billion coffee trees in that country.
Over half a billion trees have already been
uprooted in Brazil. Moreover, the frost came
at a time when world coffee stocks were rela-
tively low. Since the frost, markets have
been further troubled by events in other
major coffee-producing countries, such as the
civil war in Angola, serious floods in Colom-
bia, and the disruption of internal transpor-
tation in Guatemala by the earthquake.

Because prices are so high, the agreement
will enter into force on October 1, 1976, with
quotas in suspense. We expect they will
remain in suspense until the late 1970's, when
the coffee trees now being planted in Brazil
and elsewhere yield their first fruit. In the
meantime, there will be no interference with
the free flow of available coffee to the market.

On the contrary, in the immediate future
the agreement will provide producers addi-
tional incentives to supply available coffee to
member consuming-country markets. Export
performance during the next two years will
be a significant factor in the eventual calcula-
tion of individual exporting-country quotas.
This and other features of the new agreement
will tend to exert a dampening effect on
prices.

The agreement will enter into force Octo-
ber 1, 1976, for a period of six years. Dur-
ing the third year of the agreement, each
member must specify its intention to continue
participation or it automatically ceases to
participate on October 1, 1979. Thus, the
United States and other members have an
opportunity to review their continued par-
ticipation at the midpoint.

Since the negotiations ended in December
1975, the Administration has conducted a
rigorous interagency review of its provisions
and concluded that it is a substantial im-
provement over earlier coffee agreements and
is consistent with our interests as coffee con-
sumers. After signature, the President will
submit the agreement to the Senate for its

354

advice and consent to ratification and wil
subsequently request implementing legisla
tion from both Houses of Congress throug-:
September 30, 1979.

U.S.-lsrael Income Tax Convention
Transmitted to the Senate

Message From President Ford '

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith, for Senate advice ar
consent to ratification, the Convention signc
at Washington on November 20, 1975, b
tween the Government of the United Stat
of America and the Government of the Sta
of Israel with respect to taxes on incorr
Also I desire to withdraw from the Sena
the Convention for the avoidance of dout
taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion wi
respect to taxes on income between the Go
ernment of the United States of Ameri
and the Government of Israel which w
signed at Washington on June 29, 19
(Executive F, 89th Congress, 1st Session

There is no convention on this subj(
presently in force between the United Sta1
and Israel.

The Convention signed on November '.
1975, is similar in many essential respe^
to other recent United States income 1
treaties.

I also transmit, for the information of 1
Senate, the report of the Department
State with respect to the Convention.

Conventions such as this one are an i
portant element in promoting closer econon
cooperation between the United States i
other countries. I urge the Senate to
favorably on this Convention at an early d
and to give its advice and consent
ratification.

Gerald R. Ford)
The White House, February 11, 1976

'Transmitted on Feb. 11 (text from White Ho
press release); also printed as S. Ex. C, 94th Coi
1st sess., which includes the texts of the conveni
and the report of the Department of State.

Department of State BulK

I

tongressional Documents
lelating to Foreign Policy

Ith Congress, 1st Session

le Persian Gulf, 1975: The Continuing Debate on
Arms Sales. Hearings before the Special Subcom-
mittee on Investigations of the House Committee
on International Relations. June 10-July 29. 1975.
261 pp.

S. Policy Toward Southern Africa. Hearings be-
fore the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. June 11-
July 29, 1975. 527 pp.

reign Assistance Authorization: Arms Sales Issues.
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign As-
sistance of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions. June 17-December 5, 1975. 670 pp.
■onomic Aid Allocations for Syria and Compliance
With Section 901 of the Foreign Assistance Act.
Hearing before the Special Subcommittee on In-
vestigations of the House Committee on Interna-
tional Relations. June 25, 1975. 44 pp.
iclear Proliferation: Future U.S. Foreign Policy
Implications. Hearings before the Subcommittee on
International Security and Scientific Affairs of the
House Committee on International Relations. Octo-
ber 21-November 5. 1975. 506 pp.
mmonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.
Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations on H.J. Res. 549, To approve the cove-
nant to establish a Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands in political union with the United
States of America, and for other purposes. Novem-
ber 5, 1975. 201 pp.

IS. Trade Embargo of Vietnam: Church Views.
Hearing before the Subcommittee on International
{Trade and Commerce of the House Committee on
'International Relations. November 17. 1975. 47 pp.
iman Rights in Haiti. Hearing before the Subcom-
mittee on International Organizations of the House
Committee on International Relations. November
(18, 1975. 137 pp.

Ilia in a New Era: Implications for Future U.S.

llPoliey. Report of a study mission to Asia, August

lll-13, 1975, conducted by Representative Lester L.

1*1 "Wolff. Submitted to the House Committee on Inter-
national Relations. December 8, 1975. 75 pp.
:x Convention With the U.S.S.R. Report of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accom-

{ pany Ex. T, 93-1. S. Ex. Rept. 19. December 11,
1975. 38 pp.

I ;deral Ocean Program. Message from the President
of the United States transmitting the 1974 Annual

. Report on the Federal Ocean Program. H. Doc.

' 94-321. December 11, 1975. 151 pp.

j ickground Information on the Use of U.S. Armed
Forces in Foreign Countries. 1975 Revision. Pre-
pared by the Foreign Affairs Division, Congres-

i ' sional Research Service, Library of Congress, for
i the Subcommittee on International Security and

- Scientific Affairs of the House Committee on Inter-
national Relations. 84 pp.

International Telecommunication Convention and Re-
vised Telegraph, Telephone, and Radio Regulations.
Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions to accompany Ex. J, 93-2; Ex. E, 93-2; Ex.
G. 94-1. S. Ex. Rept. 94-22. January 16, 1976. 17 pp.

94th Congress, 2d Session

Crisis on Cyprus — 1976: Crucial Year for Peace. A
staff report prepared for the use of the Subcom-
mittee To Investigate Problems Connected With
Refugees and Escapees of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary. January 19, 1976. 104 pp.

East-West Foreign Trade Board Third Quarterly Re-
port. Communication from the Chairman of the
Board transmitting the Board's third quarterly
report on trade between the United States and non-
market economies, pursuant to section 411(c) of
the Trade Act of 1974. H. Doc. 94-335. January 19,
1976. 37 pp.

International Finance. Annual Report of the Na-
tional Advisory Council on International Monetary
and Financial Policies, covering the period July 1,
1974-June 30, 1975. H. Doc. 94-348. 304 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
as amended. Done at New York October 26, 1956.
Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873, 5284.
7668.
Acceptance deposited: Qatar, February 27, 1976.

Maritime Matters

Amendment of article VII of the convention on facili-
tation of international maritime traffic, 1965 (TIAS
6251). Adopted at London November 19. 1973."
Acceptance deposited: Belgium, January 13, 1976,

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat
trade convention (part of the intemational wheat
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at
Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force
June 19. 1975. with respect to certain provisions
and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions.
Acceptance deposited: Japan, February 20, 1976.

Not in force.

^iareh 15, 1976

355

Protocol modifying and further extending the food
aid convention (part of the international wheat
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at
Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force
June 19. 1975. with respect to certain provisions,
and July 1. 1975, with respect to other provisions.
Acceptance deposited: Japan (with reservation).
February 20, 1976.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

BILATERAL

Austria

Agreement amending the interim agreement of
November 6. 1973 (TIAS 7751), concerning accept-
ance of transatlantic air traffic organized and
operated pursuant to advance charter (TGC or
ABC) rules. Effected by exchange of letters at
Vienna December 10 and 22, 1975. Entered into
force December 22, 1975.

Ecuador

Agreement on mapping, charting and geodesy.
Signed at Quito February 19. 1976. Entered into
force February 19. 1976.

India

Agreement modifying the agreement of August 6.
1974 (TIAS 7915; 25 UST 2383), relating to trade
in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes
at Washington January 20 and 22, 1976. Entered
into force January 22. 1976.

Ireland

Agreement extending the agreement of June 28 and
29, 1973 (TIAS 7662), relating to travel group
charter flights and advance booking charter flights.
Effected by exchange of letters at Dublin Decem-
ber 23, 1975. and January 9, 1976. Entered into
force January 9. 1976.

Pakistan

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of August 7. 1975. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Islamabad Febru-
ary 5, 1976. Entered into force February 5, 1976.

United Kingdom

Agreement concerning a U.S. naval support facility
on Diego Garcia. British Indian Ocean Territory,
with plan, related notes, and supplementary ar-
rangements. Effected by exchange of notes at
London February 25. 1976. Entered into force
February 25. 1976.

Agreement relating to the construction, maintenance
and operation of a limited naval communications
facility on Diego Garcia, with plan. Effected by
exchange of notes at London October 24, 1972.
Entered into force October 24, 1972. TIAS 7481.
Terminated: February 25. 1976.

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stc
number from the Superintendent of Documents, U
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 'ZOk
A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100
more copies of any one publication mailed to
same address^ Remittances, payable to the Super
tendent of Documents, must accompany orde
Prices shown below, which include domestic posta
are subject to change.

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries wh
describe the people, history, government, econor
and foreign relations of each country. Each conta
a map, a list of principal government officials
U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a read
list. (A complete set of all Background Notes c
rently in stock— at least 140— $21.80; 1-year si
scription service for approximately 77 updated
new Notes— $23.10; plastic binder— $1.50.) Sin
copies of those listed below are available at 30^ ea

Albania

Bulgaria

Central African Republic

Ethiopia

San Marino

Korea, Republic of . .

Cat. No. S1.123:AL1
Pub. 8217 4 pp.

Cat. No. S1.123:B87
Pub. 7882 6 pp.

Cat. No. S1.123:C33
Pub. 7970 6 pp.

Cat. No. S1.123:ET3
Pub. 7785 4 pp.

Cat. No. S1.123:SA5
Pub. 8661 4 pp.

Cat. No. S1.123:K84
Pub. 7782 6 pp.

Environmental Warfare — Questions and Answi
Pamphlet by the U.S. Arms Control and Disari
ment Agency containing information on envir
mental warfare such as definitions of terms, sta
of the draft convention banning use of environmer
modification techniques for hostile purposes, the
vironmental effects of nuclear warfare, etc. Pub.
10 pp. 40.*. (Stock No. 002-000-00053-9).

Trade — Meat Imports. Agreement with Panai
TIAS 8112. 7 pp. 30«'. (Cat. No. 89.10:8112).

Trade — Meat Imports. Agreement with New Zeala
TIAS 8113. 8 pp. 30«*. (Cat. No. S9.10:8113).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Bangi
desh amending the agreement of October 4, 1974,
amended. TIAS 8114. 5 pp. 25«(. (Cat. No. S9.
8114).

356

Department of State Bulle

-NDEX March 15, 1976 Vol. LXXIV, No. 1916

Lngola. Secretary Kissinger Visits Six Latin
American Countries (Kissinger, U.S.- Vene-
zuela joint press release, U.S.-Brazil memo-
randum of understanding) 327

trazil

Irazil and the United States: The Global
Challenge (Kissinger) . 322

ecretary Kissinger Visits Six Latin American
Countries (Kissinger. U.S.-Venezuela joint
press release, U.S.-Brazil memorandum of
understanding) 327

olombia. Secretary Kissinger Visits Six Latin
American Countries (Kissinger. U.S.-Vene-
zuela joint press release. U.S.-Brazil memo-
randum of understanding) 327

ommodities. International Coffee Agreement
To Be Signed by the United States (Depart-
ment statement) 353

ongress

ongressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 355

uatemala Disaster Relief Act Transmitted to

the Congress (message from President Ford) 353

.S.-Israel Income Tax Convention Trans-
mitted to the Senate (message from Presi-
dent Ford) 354

9Sta Rica. Secretary Kissinger Visits Six
Latin American Countries (Kissinger. U.S.-
Venezuela joint press release, U.S.-Brazil
memorandum of understanding) 327

uba. Secretary Kissinger Visits Six Latin
American Countries (Kissinger, U.S.-Vene-
zuela joint press release, U.S.-Brazil memo-
randum of understanding) 327

conomic Affairs

icretary Kissinger Visits Six Latin American
Countries (Kissinger, U.S.-Venezuela joint
press release, U.S.-Brazil memorandum of

understanding) 327

.S.-Israel Income Tax Convention Trans-
mitted to the Senate (message from Presi-
dent Ford) 354

3reign Aid. Guatemala Disaster Relief Act
Transmitted to the Congress (message from
President Ford) 353

uatemala

uatemala Disaster Relief Act Transmitted to
the Congress (message from President Ford) 353
!cretary Kissinger Visits Six Latin American
Countries (Kissinger, U.S.-Venezuela joint
press release, U.S.-Brazil memorandum of
understanding) 327

rael. U.S.-Israel Income Tax Convention
Transmitted to the Senate (message from
President Ford) 354

itin America. The Americas in a Changing
World (Kissinger) 313

aru. Secretary Kissinger Visits Six Latin
American Countries (Kissinger, U.S,-Vene-
zuela joint press release, U,S. -Brazil memo-
randum of understanding) 327

residential Documents

uatemala Disaster Relief Act Transmitted to

the Congress 353

S.-Israel Income Tax Convention Transmitted

to the Senate 354

Publications. GPO Sales Publications .... 356

Treaty Information

Current Actions 355

International Coffee Agreement To Be Signed

by the United States (Department statement) 353
U.S.-Israel Income Tax Convention Trans-
mitted to the Senate (message from Presi-
dent Ford) 354

Venezuela

The Americas in a Changing World (Kissinger) 313
Secretary Kissinger Visits Six Latin American
Countries (Kissinger, U.S.-Venezuela joint
press release, U.S.-Brazil memorandum of
understanding) 327

Name Index

Ford, President 353, 354

Kissinger, Secretary 313, 322, 327

Chec

(list of Department of State

Press

Releases: February 23-29

Press releases may be obtained from the

Office of Press Relations, Department of State,

Washington

D.C. 20520.

Xo.

Date

Snbjeot

*^1

2/24

Department announces hearings
on consumer representation plan,
Feb. 25.

*92

2/24

U.S.-Japan Joint Planning and
Coordination Committee for Co-
operation in Environmental Pro-
tection. Feb. 26-27.

*93

2/24

Kissinger: departure, Rio de Jane-
iro, Feb. 22.

94

2/24

Kissinger: toast, Bogota, Feb. 23.

*95

2/24

Kissinger: departure, Bogota, Feb.

23.
Kissinger: arrival, San Jose, Feb.

23.
Secretary's Advisory Committee

96

2/24

*97

2/24

on Private International Law.

Study Group on Maritime Bills

of Lading, Mar. 26.

*98

2/24

Shipping Coordinating Committee,
Committee on Ocean Dumping,
Mar. 25.

99

2/25

Kissinger: news conference. San
Jose, Feb. 24.

100

2/24

Kissinger: toast, San Jose.

*101

2/24

Kissinger: arrival, Guatemala.

102

2/24

Kissinger: departure, Guatemala.

no3

2/25

Broadcast executives from 12 na-
tions to participate in 53-day
radio project beginning Feb. 29.

tl04

2/27

1976 "Treaties in Force" released.

no5

2/27

International Council for the Ex-
ploration of the Sea.

ited.

* Not prii

t Held for

a later issue of the Bulletin.

Superintendent of Documents
U.S. government printing office

WASHINGTON. DC. 20402

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

postage and fees paid
Department of State STA-501

Special Fourth-Class Role
Book

Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted
service, please renew your subscription promptly
when you receive the expiration notice from the
Superintendent of Documents. Due to the time re-
quired to process renewals, notices are sent out 3
months in advance of the expiration date. Any prob-
lems involving your subscription will receive im-
mediate attention if you write to: Superintendent
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402.

'J:

%

/?/?

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXIV

No. 1917

March 22, 1976

LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES

Statement by Secretary Kissinger

Before the House Committee on International Relations 357

A COMMON HERITAGE, A COMMON CHALLENGE : THE ATLANTIC LINK
Address by Counselor Helmut C. Sonnenfeldt 367

DEPARTMENT DISCUSSES U.S.-SAUDI ARABIA DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP

Statement by Assistant Secretary Atherton 377

- \

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLET 1 1

Vol. LXXIV, No. 1917
March 22, 1976

For Bale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

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domestic $42.50, foreign $53.16

Single copy 85 cents

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the publication of this periodical is necessary
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STATE BULLETIN as the source will be
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The Department of State BVLLETi
a weekly publication issued by i
Office of Media Services, Bureau
Public Affairs, provides tfte public e
interested agencies of tlie governmi
witfi information on developments
tfie field of U.S. foreign relations t
on tfie work of tite Department t
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Tfie BULLETIN includes selec
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included concerning treaties and iw
national agreements to which
United States is or may becomi
party and on treaties of general in*
national interest.
Publications of the Department
State, United Nations documents,
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international relations are also lis t

Latin America and the United States

Statement by Secretary Kissinger

I am happy to be able to report to this
L-ommittee about my recent trip to Latin
America. I am prepared to answer questions
311 other subjects as well — some, perhaps, in
I'xecutive session — but I have concentrated
m- prepared remarks on our hemispheric
elations.

The Western Hemisphere is, for us, a re-
gion of special ties and special interests. We
iave always felt a bond of intimacy and of
ollaboration in this hemisphere. We share
I common origin in the struggle against for-
'ipn tyranny, a common tradition in the
leritage of Western civilization, and com-
non purposes in our mutual security and in
Hir cooperative efforts to improve the lot of
he people of this part of the world.

Latin America is changing. The nations of
>atin America are experiencing, each in its
\vn particular way, the stress of transition
-internally from the rigid to the dynamic,
iiternationally from dependence to inter-
iependence.

The quality of their ties to our country is
hanging in the process. The United States
5 experiencing a more open relationship with
he nations of Latin America, a relationship
vhich now turns not on the memories of an
arlier age of tutelage, on pretensions by us
0 hegemony, or on national inequality, but

' Made before the House Committee on Interna-
■ional Relations on Mar. 4 (text from press release
11). The complete transcript of the hearings will
[€ published by the committee and will be available
pom the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-
lient Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

•

arch 22, 1976

on mutual respect, common interests, and
cooperative problem solving.

Yet, though our ties with them may be
changing, the nations of Latin America have
a new meaning and importance for us, for
they are emerging in their own right on the
global scene. This is so because:

— They are increasingly important factors
in world commodity, mineral, and energy
markets.

— They hold the potential to become a re-
gion for increased agricultural output, to
feed the world's hungry.

— And perhaps most noteworthy, they are
playing a more significant role in the politi-
cal councils of the world, not merely because
of their enhanced economic strength but also
because of their growing solidarity with the
other developing countries of Africa and
Asia and their juridical traditions of per-
sonal respect, national dignity, and inter-
national collaboration which count for so
much in the arenas of world politics.

Our policy in the Americas in the years
ahead must recognize these new realities —
of change in Latin America and of the fun-
damental importance of Latin America to the
world interests of the United States. We
cannot take the nations of this hemisphere
for granted. We should put aside earlier
temptations to crusade. We must create a
new, healthier relationship. We can accept
and indeed welcome the emergence of the
nations of Latin America into global impor-
tance. And we must preserve our special
hemispheric ties, without slogans, so that

357

our cooperation as equals in this hemisphere
can be a model for cooperation in the world
arena.

The inter-American experience of the re-
cent past has helped illuminate these impera-
tives of our future relationships with Latin
America.

In the 1960's, the Alliance for Progress
rallied the energies and enthusiasms of peo-
ple throughout the Americas. By 1969, its
promises had begun to fade, and the nations
of Latin America gathered together at Vina
del Mar to stake out a new agenda of issues
between us. In 1973, shortly after I became
Secretary of State, I called for a new dia-
logue between the United States and Latin
America. At the meetings in Mexico City
and Washington, the Foreign Ministers of
the Americas met to discuss the Vina del
Mar issues. Those meetings, however, were
interrupted almost exactly a year ago, by
the enactment of the Trade Act and the
exclusion of Venezuela and Ecuador from the
generalized system of preferences (GSP).

Yet, if the new dialogue did not yield final
results, it did teach some lessons about our
future efforts to perfect the undeniable
community which exists in this part of the
world. For it demonstrated:

— On the one hand, the difficulties which
await both the United States and Latin
America when the two sides attempt to re-
duce the complexity of their relationships to
a series of demands for quick and categorical
responses; and

— On the other, that the regular, recur-
ring nonrhetorical examination of our com-
mon problems together is a constructive
mode of dealing with them.

My trip to Latin America was an effort
to do just that. It had been unfortunately
delayed by other problems which were ur-
gent as well as important, but circumstances
combined, in the end, to make the timing
rather more propitious than might other-
wise have been the case.

— In Venezuela, I saw a country not con-
tent to husband its own affluence but deter-
mined to promote the common destiny of

Latin America. I made clear that we wel-
comed this and that we were confident that
as long as they served higher purposes thai
confrontation we were prepared to cooperatf
with regional organizations and institution
which expressed the increased sense of soli
clarity and common purpose within Latii
America.

— Brazil is an emerging world power wit!
broadened international interests and le
sponsibilities, not by virtue of our grantiiii
them that rank, but by the reality of wHm
Brazil has accomplished. The memorandum ^ '
understanding which I signed with the Bra
zilian Foreign Minister, establishing proce
dures for consultation between our two gov
ernments on issues of common substantiv
concern, was a recognition of that plain fad
The bilateral relationship between th
United States and Brazil is becoming mor
important and more complex all the time
at the same time Brazil's voice and influenc
in world councils is also growing.

It was in recognition of Brazil's new worl
role that we institutionalized the increase
consultations which will be required, just ;!
we have with the nations of Wester
Europe, Canada, and Japan. The Brazilia
consultative agreement is bilateral,
touches only our relations with Brazil. Whl
it reflects the reality of Brazil's internation
status, it does not afi'ect our relations will
any other country or represent an attem]
to manage Latin America by proxy.

I explained to the Presidents of the othn
countries which I visited that we are pr
pared to enter into similar arrangemeni
with other nations in the Western Henn
sphere if they so desire. In enhancing t*
lateral relationships in this way with specil'
nations of the Americas, we will not diminii;
the sense of solidarity within Latin Amerii
or our willingness to work with Lat:
American institutions.

— Peru's unique experiment of intern
development and social change demonstrate
the creative worth of the diversity in tbj
hemisphere. We accept the sovereignty
each Latin American state. Our policy, I sai
is to support the aspirations and objectiv
of their program of social change, to co

358

Department of State Bullell

ciliate differences before they become con-
'flicts, and to cooperate with the authentic
t development efforts of each of the nations
of the hemisphere.

— In Colombia, I saw at first hand another
' of the hemisphere's practicing democracies,
a nation with whom we have the warmest of
relations and with whom we can discuss
woi-ld political and security issues without
loniplexes and with considerable profit. The
' single serious matter on our mutual agenda
is trade, for improved access to our markets
' and to those of the other developed countries
: is vital to the success of that democracy.
The Colombian Foreign Minister has put for-
ward an imaginative suggestion for expand-
nji commerce within the hemisphere, and
,ve are considering it with care. I might also

■ idd that we discussed Colombia's cooperation
n the effort to control the illegal traffic of
langerous drugs.

— In Costa Rica, I saw another example
)f Latin American democracy at work. Ad-
hessing the Foreign Ministers of all the
"eiitral American states, I said that basic

■ luman rights within the Americas must be
)ieserved, cherished, and defended if peace
nd prosperity are to be more than hollow
chievements. I also observed that the prob-
?ms we confront require more than ever the
ull and free dedication of the talent, energy,
reative thought, and action of men and
v'omen free from fear and repression.

— Though I had not taken the initiative on
he matter, I had found in each of my previ-
us stops concern over what the dispatch of
he Cuban force to Angola might signify for
he nations of this hemisphere. Accoi'dingly,
n Costa Rica I also emphasized that no na-
ion can hope to advance if it is not secure,
ind I restated our own firm commitment to
he Rio Treaty and to the principle of collec-
ive security in the hemisphere.

— Finally, in Guatemala, I had the oppor-
Linity to see at first hand the tragic effects
f the earthquakes of February 4-6: a
ew of the 80,000 Guatemalans who were
' aaimed and injured; some of the 1 million
iow without homes, who are living in tents
nd makeshift shelters; and something of

the heroic efforts of our own countrymen to
help that stricken land. I pledged to Guate-
mala our support, not only in the moment of
tragedy but for the long term as well, and I
cited the $25 million emergency package
now before the Congress as an expression of
this intent of the American people.

Throughout my trip, I emphasized that
the United States regards our hemispheric
ties and responsibilities with a special
seriousness and special hope. In a spirit of
solidarity, I pledged that we should :

— -Respond to the development needs of the
moi'e industrialized nations of the hemi-
sphere, and to the region as a whole, in the
areas of trade and international finance;

— Assist on concessional terms the efforts
of the neediest nations to advance them-
selves ;

— Support and work with Latin American
regional efforts to organize for cooperation
and integration;

— Negotiate our differences with any na-
tion or nations on the basis of mutual respect
and sovereign equality;

— Maintain our firm commitment to mu-
tual security against any who would under-
mine our common effort, threaten independ-
ence, or export violence and terror; and

— Modernize and strengthen the inter-
American system by working with the other
member states to develop new structures
and processes in the OAS itself and with
other organizations to meet the new realities
of our hemisphere.

These six points met with a positive re-
sponse throughout my visit.
It was apparent to me:

— That there is a strong regard and spe-
cial respect for the United States in the
countries I visited, upon which we can
build ;

— That while the United States has as-
sumed security responsibilities and the na-
tions of Latin America are determined for
their part to concentrate on meeting the im-
peratives of rapid growth, our interests
and views intersect over a wide range of
issues ;

^arch 22, 1976

359

— That our common heritage and our
shared aspirations and values of human
respect and dignity make it possible for us
to cooperate for the common good;

— That, for this purpose, the essential
political requirement for progress in these
areas of common concern is the readiness of
nations to consult and cooperate with each
other on the basis of sovereign equality ; and

— That, with consultation and coopera-
tion, mankind's hope of meeting the chal-
lenges of economic and social progress and of
remaking relations between developed and
developing countries is brightest and most
promising here in this hemisphere.

The executive branch is directing itself in
a serious way to these goals. We have al-
ready held a series of interagency meetings,
involving Treasury, STR [Office of the Spe-
cial Representative for Trade Negotia-
tions], Defense, and Commerce, at the State
Department. We have compiled an inventory
of each of the issues discussed in all my
talks, and we are tasking specific offices,
bureau.s, and departments with the responsi-
bility for the concrete steps necessary to
respond with action programs.

Within the week, the Brazil-U.S. trade
subgroup established by the new consulta-
tive mechanism will hold a two-day meeting
here in Washington and will focus on the
question of export subsidies and countervail-
ing duties. Beyond that, the Foreign Min-
isters of all the member states will have an
opportunity to discuss these issues collegially
at the General Assembly of the OAS in June.
We intend to take full advantage of that
occasion to insure that the U.S. position on
the hemisphere's problems be defined well
before that meeting in order that its delib-
erations shall be as productive and specific
us possible.

We will be consulting the Congress in the
weeks ahead, as these plans take concrete
shape. Some of the outlines of what should
be done are already clear, as are the impor-
tant role and responsibility of the Congress

for the success of our Latin American pol
cies in the years ahead:

— The legislative threat of political r
taliation by cutting off the U.S. market >
stopping multilateral aid projects, directt
to states which do not follow our principl(
in nationalizing property within their bo
ders, is still a matter of concern in Lat
America. I have suggested that if Lat
America and the United States could devel(
a multinational code regulating both nation
and corporate behavior in investments ai
investment disputes, this would enhance tl
confidence in the Congress that compens
tion issues, at least, could be settled witho
the need for automatic statutory retaliatiolj

—As to trade policy, the system of ge'"
eralized preferences in the Trade Act was ;
important advance in our relationship wi
Latin America, for their development aspii
tions depend on improved access to woi
markets, including our own. The exclusion
Venezuela and Ecuador from GSP did se
ous damage to the United States in the ey ;
of Latin America. We hope that Congrt ,
can give early and sympathetic considerati ;
to repealing this legislation.

— I found considerable fear that our tra ■
policies are becoming generally more prot ■
tionist, as reflected by new countervaili t
duty actions, escape clause cases, and otl '
restrictive measures taken with regard )
imports from Latin America in the p. :
year under the Trade Act. I also found n
evidence of a willingness to conciliate ;i 1
compromise some of the outstanding tr; !
disputes if the United States is in a posit i
to respond reciprocally in a spirit of mut 1
accommodation. We will be examining th' i
Latin American concerns and ideas and ci -
suiting with the Congress about the gene 1
policy issues and about specific legislat ?
remedies if we determine that furtl r
legislation is essential.

— Latin America is still intensely int -
ested in solving the problem of fluctuate
commodity export earnings. The fact tl t
the Administration will be requesting ti t

360

Department of State Built"

;he Congress approve U.S. participation in
:he new International Coffee Agreement and
^ he International Tin Agreement has been
, videly applauded in the hemisphere. I am
j, :onfident that congressional consent will be
j^ forthcoming ; for these agreements are of
J dtal importance to Colombia, Brazil, and
Central America, in the case of the coffee
Lgreement, and to Bolivia, in the case of the
in accord, and will be seen throughout the
lemisphere as an earnest of our sincere de-
ire to cooperate in their development efforts.
,!|5eyond that, I pointed out that the United
itates is prepared to work with other coun-
ries on a case-by-case approach to other
ommodities and that in selecting commodi-
ies for such consideration, we would pay
^articular attention to those items of inter-
st to the nations of Latin America.
— Exports take time. Meanwhile, the na-
ions of Latin America continue to need con-
iderable development assistance, on non-
oncessional terms in the case of most, to
inance essential imports and capital invest-
lients. This session. Congress has before it
he legislation to authorize and appropriate
unds for our development assistance efforts
hrough the Inter-American Development
liank, the World Bank complex, and the
^.gency for International Development. The
pgislation providing for replenishment of
He ordinary capital and the Fund for Spe-
(ial Operations of the Inter-American De-
(elopment Bank is of particular importance
0 our Latin American policy, for that Bank
! now the single most important source of
Ifficial development capital for the nations of
ne hemisphere.

— And as I mentioned earlier, there is also
lefore you the President's special request
br legislation to provide $25 million for the
elief of the suffering and homeless in
•ruatemala. I cannot stress the urgency of
inis legislation too much, for the wet season
.1 the highlands is fast approaching, and
nless the 1 million homeless get roofs over
leir heads, the rains will add new human
lisery and suffering in that stricken

Harch 22, 1976

land. Later today a subcommittee of your
committee will be hearing testimony on be-
half of the proposal. I urge your full sup-
port for this first effort to bring timely as-
sistance to the victims of this disaster. We
will report to you at a later date about the
need for U.S. assistance in the subsequent
rehabilitation and reconstruction phases of
the disaster.

— Beyond these issues are a series of im-
portant hemispheric political considerations.
Not the least of these is the extent to which
Cuba's action in Angola may constitute an
ominous precedent for intervention in this
hemisphere and thus invoke our solemn
treaty responsibilities.

On this and on other matters, we propose
to meet regularly with the Congress.

No policy, in this region of the world or
elsewhere, can succeed without the under-
.standing, support, and cooperation of this
body. Legislation, whether for good or ill, is
a vital — indeed, often a decisive — instrument
of the foreign policy of the United States.
We know that nurturing the understanding
and support of the House and the Senate
falls in major part to us in the executive.
We consider it a basic responsibility to
continue to work with you on hemispheric
issues.

For there is much the United States can do
of tangible benefit for the people of Latin
America and for the common global good
without massive sacrifice to ourselves.

In this hemisphere, there is a promise, an
emergent power, and a moral force. The
United States and Latin America share pre-
cious common bonds of history and outlook.
Our task is not an onerous task, for it is one
which serves the mutual interests of this
country and Latin America. Our task is to
forge those common bonds into a sense of
shared purpose and endeavor so that this
hemisphere can truly be a model for and a
contribution to the general order, harmony,
and prosperity to which the peoples of all the
world aspire.

361

U.S.-Spain Cooperation Treaty
Transmitted to the Senate

Following is the text of President Ford's
message to the Senate of February 18, to-
gether with the text of the report of the
Department of State submitted to President
Ford on February 6.

PRESIDENT FORD'S MESSAGE TO THE SENATE '

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and
consent of the Senate to ratification, I trans-
mit herewith the Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation between the United States of
America and Spain, signed at Madrid on
January 24, 1976, together with seven Sup-
plementary Agreements and eight related
exchanges of notes. For the information of
the Senate, I transmit also the report of the
Department of State with respect to the
Treaty.

I believe this Treaty will promote United
States interests and objectives relating to
Spain and western security. With the advice
and consent of the Senate to ratification, the
Treaty would serve to provide a firm basis
for a new stage in United States-Spanish re-
lations, reflecting United States support for
and encouragement of the important evolu-
tion which has begun in Spain and to which
the Spanish Government renewed its com-
mitment in connection with the signing of
the Treaty. The Treaty reflects the mutual
conviction of Spain and the United States
that the proper course of this evolution
should include, as major objectives, the in-
tegration of Spain into the institutions of
Europe and the North Atlantic defense sys-
tem and should include a broadly based coop-
erative relationship with the United States
in all areas of mutual interest. The Treaty
should contribute positively to the achieve-
ment of these goals.

^Transmitted on Feb. 18 (text from White House
press release) ; also printed as S. Ex. E. 94th Cong..
2d sess.. which includes the texts of the treaty, seven
Supplementary Agreements, eight related exchanges
of notes, and the report of the Department of State.

362

In the area of western security, the agree-
ment provides for a continuation of the im-
portant contribution made by Spain through
facilities and related military rights accorded
United States forces on Spanish territory,
The agreement reflects a careful balancing oi
Spanish concerns with the changing require-
ments of United States military deployment
As a new development of the United States-
Spanish defense relationship, the Treatj
establishes mechanisms and guidelines, sue?
as those reflected in the provisions dealing
with military planning and coordination, t(
help develop an active Spanish contributioi
to western security, a contribution whicl
complements and is coordinated with exist
ing arrangements. The Treaty does not ex
pand the existing United States defense com
mitment in the North Atlantic Treaty are;
nor does it create an additional bilateral one
Finally, the Treaty pledges military assist
ance to the Spanish armed forces in thei
program of upgrading and modernization
The major portion of that assistance is in thi
form of loan repayment guarantees. Th
actual cost to the United States taxpayer i
expected to be far lower than the figure
listed in the agreement.

I recommend that the Senate give promp
consideration to the Treaty and consent t
its ratification.

Gerald R. Ford.

The White House, Febrziary 18, 1976.

REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Department of State,
Washington, February 6, 1976.

The President,
The White House.

I have the honor to submit to you, with a view t
its transmission to the Senate for advice and conser
to ratification, the Treaty of Friendship and Coopers
tion between the United States of America and Spail
signed at Madrid on January 24, 1976, together wit
its seven Supplementary Agreements and its eig}
related exchanges of notes. This agreement woul
supersede the 1970 Agreement between the Unite
States and Spain on Friendship and Cooperatioi
which expired on September 26, 1975, at which tim
a one-year transitional period began.

The new agreement is in the form of a Treat;

Department of State Bulletil

This solemn form was deemed appropriate not only
because of the wide scope and importance of the
subject matter covered but also because both Spanish
imi United States authorities wanted to assure the
roundest political basis for the new stage in United
states-Spanish relations symbolized by the agree-
iii'iit.

The Treaty covers a broad spectrum of areas of
nutual concern in United States-Spanish relations,
vitli specific articles and supplementary agreements
reating cooperation in the areas of economic affairs,
'ducation and culture, science and technology, and
lefense matters. It also provides an institutional
ramework to enhance the effectiveness of coopera-
ion in all these areas. The principal new elements of
ubstance are in this institutional area, and include
he creation of a high-level United States-Spanish
pouncil, to oversee the implementation of the entire
greement. and a set of subordinate bodies, including
oiiit committees for the various areas of cooperation
nd a Combined Military Coordination and Planning
tatf. The agreement specifies the military and non-
lilitary assistance to be given Spain over the five-
ear initial term of the agreement, and grants to
le United States essentially the same rights to use
lilitary facilities in Spain which it enjoyed under
le 1970 arrangements. The principal changes in
lilitary facilities are a reduction and relocation of
nited States tanker aircraft within Spain and
stablishment of a date for withdrawal of the nuclear
ibmarine squadron from the Rota Naval Base.
Article I of the Treaty, together with Supple-
entary Agreement Number One, and a related ex-
laiige of notes, establishes the United States-Span-
h Council, under the joint chairmanship of the
>cretary of State of the United States and the
oreign Minister of Spain. The Council, which is to
eet at least semi-annually, will have headquarters
Madrid, a permanent secretariat, and pemianent
presentatives serving as deputies to the Chairmen
assure its ability to function in their absence. An
ipoi-tant aspect of the new arrangement is the
tegration of the military cooperation into the
)uncil structure.

Article II. together with Supplementary Agree-
ent Number Two. calls for the development of
3ser economic ties between the United States and
lain, placing emphasis on cooperation in those
:lds which facilitate development. In this connec-
)n, the agreement takes into account the current
adiness of the Export-Import Bank to commit
edits and guarantees of approximately $450 mil-
in to Spanish companies. The agreement also speci-
■s general principles to guide United States-Spanish
lations in the economic field.

Article III, together with Supplementary Agree-
ent Number Three and a related exchange of notes,
■ovides for a broad program of scientific and tech-
cal cooperation for peaceful purposes with principal
iphasis on areas having significance to the social
id economic welfare of the peoples of Spain and

the United States as well as to developmental prog-
ress. A total of $23 million would be provided by the
United States in the form of grant to support this
five-year program. One of the first matters of con-
cern in scientific and technological cooperation will
be studies relating to a solar energy institute which
Spain wishes to establish, with some seed money
for the studies being drawn from the U.S. grant.

Article IV of the Treaty, together with Supple-
mentary Agreement Number Four and a related
exchange of notes, provides for a continuation and
expansion of educational and cultural cooperation.
The agreement contemplates a grant from the
United States in the amount of $12 million to sup-
port this five-year program, which is considered to
be of particular importance in strengthening the
relationship between the United States and Spain.

Articles V and VI of the Treaty, together with
Supplementary Agreements Five, Six and Seven.
and related exchanges of notes, deal with coopera-
tion in the area of defense. The defense relationship
which these provisions represent is one woven firmly
into the fabric of existing United States philosophy
and planning for the defense of the North Atlantic
area. It represents a decision to assist Spain in de-
veloping a role which will contribute actively to that
defense, and provides transitional institutions to pre-
pare the way for an appropriate Spanish role in
NATO. These provisions do not constitute a secu-
rity guarantee or commitment to defend Spain. They
do, however, constitute a recognition of Spain's im-
portance as a part of the Western World.

To this end, a Combined Planning and Coordina-
tion Staff, with no command functions, is provided
for by Supplementary Agreement Number Five,
which sets forth a carefully drawn mandate and
geographic area of common concern. All activities
of the staff focus on the contingency of a general
attack on the West. There is no commitment, ex-
press or implied, in the drawing up of the contin-
gency plans.

To further the purposes of the Treaty, Spain
grants the United States the right to use and main-
tain for military purposes those facilities in or
connected with Spanish military installations which
the United States has heretofore enjoyed, with the
exception that the number of KC-135 tankers in
Spain will be reduced to a maximum of five and the
remaining tankers relocated; and that the nuclear
submarines will be withdrawn from Spain by July 1,
1979. a date which corresponds with our changing
requirements. In addition, the United States under-
takes not to store nuclear devices or their compo-
nents on Spanish soil. Details concerning the facili-
ties granted are set forth in Supplementary Agree-
ment Number Six. a related exchange of notes
which includes U.S. military strength levels au-
thorized in Spain, and an exchange of notes con-
firming United States military overflight rights and
rights to use facilities in Spain for military aircraft
transiting to third countries.

arch 22, 1976

363

The details of the military assistance to be pro-
vided Spain are set forth in Supplementary Agree-
ment Number Seven and a related exchange of notes.
Under these arrangements, the United States would
provide to Spain, over the five-year initial term of
the Treaty, repayment guarantees under the Foreign
Military Sales program for loans of $600 million,
$75 million in defense articles on a grant basis, $10
million in military training on a grant basis, and a
U.S. Air Force contribution, on a cost-sharing basis,
of up to $50 million for the aircraft control and
warning network used by the U.S. Air Force in
Spain. In addition, provision is made to transfer to
Spain five naval vessels and 42 F4E aircraft on terms
wliich benefit that country.

The notes exchanged include United States assur-
ances to Spain on settlement of damage claims which
might result from nuclear incidents involving a
United States nuclear powered warship reactor.
These assurances are based on Public Law 93-513.
Finally, there is an exchange of notes relating to the
possible transfer of petroleum storage and pipeline
facilities presently used by United States forces in
Spain.

Associated with the Treaty and its supplementary
agreements and exchanges of notes are an Agree-
ment on Implementation and procedural annexes
thereto which regulate such matters as the status
of United States forces in Spain and the use of the
facilities there. These documents are being provided
to the Congress for its information.
Respectfully submitted,

Henry A. Kissinger.

Department Urges Senate Approval
of U.S.-Spain Cooperation Treaty

Folloiving is a statement by Ambassador
at Large Robert J. McCloskey, Assistant
Secretary for Congressional Relations, made
before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relatiotis on March <?.'

I am very pleased to have this opportunity
to appear before you this morning on the
proposed treaty with Spain. I have consulted
previously with many of you individually
while the negotiations were in progress and
after its signing, and with the Subcommittee
on Europe. I would hope the end result re-
flects this process, which I have found of
great benefit to me as a negotiator. This is

364

my first opportunity to meet with the full
committee on this treaty.

I believe the committee already has Secre-
tary Kissinger's letter to the President and
the President's letter transmitting the treaty
to the Senate for ratification. I would like
to briefly desci'ibe the background from
which the treaty emerged and identify its
principal elements.

This important agreement establishes for
the United States a new complex of relation-
ships at a time when Spain is entering a new
era in its long history. By this complex oj
relationships we shall contribute to the se-
curity of the United States and to the de-
fense of the West in general. The treaty i;
also a vehicle for expanded cooperation be
tween the two parties in economic, cultural
technological, and other fields as well ai
defense.

Our other partner in this treaty, the Span
ish Government, clearly believes that ou
new relationship and our expanded coopera
tion in diverse fields will also be of positiv
benefit to it as Spain begins the process o
restoring democracy in Spain and returnin,
to the councils of Western Europe. We sup
port both of these objectives as being in th
interest of the United States, and we believ
this treaty to be strong evidence of thi
support.

It is significant that the new agreemer-i
is in the form of a treaty. In large part th:
resulted from the sound counsel of membei
on this committee and your colleagues thf
the legislative branch should have an oppo:
tunity to review the substance and purposf
of this agreement and, if it chooses, to ei
dorse them in the most formal way und(»
our Constitution.

The treaty form also is appropriate for tb
wide scope and importance of the subjec
matter covered. It satisfies the desire of bott
Spain and the United States to assure th
soundest political basis for the new era i

iti

' The complete transcript of the hearings will
published by the committee and will be availab
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Cover
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Department of State Bullet; \\

U.S.-Spanish relations symbolized by the
agreement, as well as for its specific under-
takings.

This new agreement goes beyond what we
were negotiating with the previous regime:
it is a treaty ; it has a more substantial non-
military element; and it explicitly looks to-
ward eventual Spanish entry into NATO.

The proposed treaty embodies a broader
relationship with Spain than under the past
agreements. This is not just a military or
bases agreement. It provides an institution
and establishes structures to give meaning
to our mutual desire for closer cooperation.
It explicitly recognizes and endorses Spain's
new and growing ties with the Atlantic
community, including proposed links with
the European Economic Community as well
as with NATO. It would provide additional
funding for new programs in science, tech-
nology, education, and culture, including
seed money for a major solar energy re-
search effort from which we could benefit as
much as Spain. It specifically notes that the
Export-Import Bank is prepared to commit
some $450 million worth of loans and guar-
antees to Spanish companies, and it recog-
nizes the important contribution such loans
Ihave made to Spain's development as well as
:to our own export efforts.

In addition to the enriched nonmilitary
(relationships, the treaty also establishes a
defense relationship — an expansion of the
tearlier basing arrangement, if you will —
twhich is very important to U.S. security in-
iterests, and yet whose cost to the U.S. tax-
payer is modest. The largest element in the
military assistance to Spain is a guarantee
of $600 million in credits at nonconcessional
Interest rates. The proposed assistance is as
follows :

1. $600 million ($120 million per year)
in U.S. Government guarantees of credits for
ipurchases of military equipment.

2. $75 million ($15 million per year) in
(grants for military equipment.

3. $10 mUlion ($2 million per year) in
grants for military training.

4. $50 million on a cost-sharing basis as

March 22, 1976

the U.S. Air Force share for modernization
of the jointly used Spanish air control and
warning system. This modernization pro-
gram keeps the system compatible with the
NADGE [NATO Air Defense Ground En-
vironment System] system of the NATO
countries. Because the U.S. Air Force needs
the system for its own use, this item is out-
side the pure assistance category.

5. $35 million ($7 million per year) in
grants for programs in education and culture
and in science and technology, including re-
search in solar energy.

The treaty also provides that we will help
Spain to obtain five naval vessels and to lease
42 F-4E aircraft.

Turning from assistance to the facilities
we will use, the treaty would grant to us
essentially the same rights in Spain which
we have enjoyed under the 1970 agreement.
The major changes would be the withdrawal
of the tanker wing from Spain, leaving a
detachment at Zaragoza, and the withdrawal
of the nuclear-missile submarines from Rota
by July 1, 1979. These changes, while modi-
fying the U.S. military presence in Spain,
will not impair the important military capa-
bilities we have to fulfill our strategic and
general purpose requirements in that part of
the world.

The defense relationship set out in the
treaty reflects and supports our overall ap-
proach to the defense of the North Atlantic
area. The treaty is intended to help Spain
contribute even more effectively to Western
defense efforts, moving from a passive to an
active role and eventually leading, we hope,
to Spain's entry into NATO. To these ends
we plan to establish a Combined Coordina-
tion and Planning Staff to develop contin-
gency plans for a Spanish role in the event
of a general attack on the West. We also
will work with the Spanish Government to
develop means to coordinate our bilateral
activities more closely with those of NATO.

These provisions do not constitute a
security guarantee or commitment to defend
Spain. The Spanish understand and have
publicly confirmed that the United States

365

has not undertaken here a security commit-
ment to Spain. The Combined Coordination
and Planning Staff would have no command
functions, and there is no commitment or
understanding regarding implementation of
any contingency plans. Therefore, the new
treaty would not represent any enlargement
of the existing U.S. defense commitments in
the North Atlantic area, nor would it create
any obligations for NATO or the other in-
dividual allies regarding Spain. Our NATO
allies have been kept informed of our
progress in the negotiations, and to my
knowledge have not objected to the provi-
sions of the treaty.

Mr. Chairman, the Administration is
firmly convinced the treaty will benefit U.S.
interests in Spain and Europe by giving
positive impetus to the transition now under-
way in Spain. We also believe that transition
will facilitate the development of a more con-
structive and harmonious association between
Spain and the other West European coun-
tries. That is the broader objective of our
policy. Of course, this can hardly be a
straight-line development, and it will be very
important in the process that the Spanish
Government be able to count on understand-
ing and encouragement from its neighbors
and from the United States.

In conclusion, I would say that the United
States supports Spain's progress toward de-
mocracy out of a dedication to human rights
and out of the simple understanding that we
are all part of a wider Atlantic community
whose strength and cohesion demands that
high standards in these matters be met and
maintained by all members. The treaty is a
clear sign of our moral support for Spain at
this time. Moreover, the treaty will con-
tribute to a deepening of Spain's role in
Western Europe, thereby benefiting Amer-
icans, Spaniards, and other Europeans alike.
I trust that the committee will agree and
that the Senate will give its advice and con-
sent to ratification.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to address a
few additional remarks to a question which,
I gather, has quite recently become the sub-
ject of some concern. I refer to the question

of procedures for authorizing and funding
the assistance contemplated for Spain which
appears to arise from submission of the
agreement to the Senate as a treaty. I must
say I am somewhat surprised by the concern
because we had no intention, through this
submission, of imposing on the Congress any
particular modality of authorization and
funding. While we have submitted a treaty,
we see merit in having the House of Repre-
sentatives participate as well. If the Con-
gress prefers an additional authorizing bill
as a vehicle for this participation, perhaps
in the form of a joint resolution, we would
welcome it and lend our support.

Our principal concern would be to assure
that any additional authorization reinforces
the action of the Senate in advising and con-
senting to the entire agreement rather than
seeming to reserve judgment about such an
essential part of it as the assistance package.

We would hope that this concern would be
shared and accommodated in any recom-
mended action. In our view, it argues for any
authorization to be for the five-year term of
the treaty.

Letters of Credence

Denmark

The newly appointed Ambassador of Den*
mark. Otto Rose Borch, presented his creden
tials to President Ford on February 24.'

Japan

The newly appointed Ambassador o
Japan, Fumihiko Togo, presented his creden
tials to President Ford on Februaiy 24.'

Switzerland

The newly appointed Ambassador of thij
Swiss Confederation, Raymond Probst, pre
sented his credentials to President Ford o
February 24.'

' For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and thff'''*'
President's reply, see Department of State press n^*'"'
lease dated Feb. 24.

ljii((

366

Department of State Bulleti

m\

A Common Heritage, A Common Challenge: The Atlantic Link

Address by Helmut C. Sonnenfeldt
Coutiselor of the Department '

Today we are gathered here, in the heart
of Europe, to celebrate 200 years of Ameri-
can independence — independence from Eu-
rope, let us recall. Yet we also meet at a time
when the ties between Europe and America
are more numerous and in many ways closer
than they ever have been. I speak not only
of our cultural and ethnic ties, which have
never been broken, but also of our unparal-
leled economic exchange, political consulta-
tion, and military cooperation, much of
which is of more recent origin. This inter-
dependence is the hallmark of our age, and
the relationship between the United States
and Europe is perhaps its highest and most
constructive form. Let us examine, there-
fore, how this new Atlantic relationship has
evolved and where it is leading.

Two hundred years ago America was mov-
ing toward the final break in its principal
political bond with Europe — its allegiance to
the British Crown and its subordination to
the British Parliament. On July 4, 1776,
America proclaimed its independence from
the mother country and struck out on a new
path. Half a decade of fighting still lay be-
fore it and yet another war with Britain in
1812. But once America had conclusively
won the independence that it had proclaimed
on that brave day, it was left, free of serious
axternal threats, to grow and prosper for
more than a century. Shielded by vast oceans
and on occasion by the British Navy, favored

Made before the Bicentennial Conference on Ger-
man-American Relations at Eichholz, Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, on Feb. 20 (text from press release
90 dated Feb. 21).

March 22, 1976

by the balance of power in Europe, and con-
fident of its own destiny, America stood dis-
tant and aloof.

Then, in the opening decades of the 20th
century, the European balance of power col-
lapsed, just as modern technology shattered
forever the barriers of time and space be-
hind which America had for so long been
sheltered. America found itself for the first
time in its history unable to either accept or
ignore events in Europe. We began to pay
the price necessary to influence them. That
price — in blood and treasure — was not by
European standards very high, but it was
more than Americans could then perma-
nently accept.

Once the immediate threat was past, the
perhaps inevitable reaction came. Unwilling
to pay the long-term price necessary to help
maintain a stable balance of power in Eu-
rope, America first proposed to substitute
an international system which largely ig-
nored the realities of power as a determinant
of international conduct. Failing in this,
tiring of the effort, and unable to count upon
the old natural barriers to insulate it from
Europe, America sought to erect artificial
new barriers by a legislatively decreed neu-
trality.

The folly of America's flight from reality
was brought home to our people with over-
whelming force, and at tragic cost, by the
holocaust of World War II. Indeed, even be-
fore that war, the shocks of our Great De-
pression had graphically shown that Amer-
ica could not insulate itself from events
beyond its shores. Once again America found
itself unable to either ignore or accept or,

367

even less, control developments in the world
around it. Once again it was forced to pay
the price necessary to help restore a peace
which it had failed to help maintain.

Lessons twice taught are well learned.
Those who remember the terrible costs of
that war realize how incomparably lighter
are the burdens of maintaining the peace.
Europeans and Americans alike have shoul-
dered these burdens willingly now for more
than three decades.

Thirty Years of Atlantic Achievement

It is during these last 30 years that U.S.-
European relations have achieved the scope
and intensity which we now consider normal.
It is during these 30 years that the great
ocean which once divided us has bound us
together into that community of nations
which today bears its name.

The Atlantic community is not a single
institution or a rigid structure, but a web
of relationships among diverse nations
which yet share common values and inter-
ests. These relationships are carried forward
in NATO, within the European Community,
between the European Community and other
European and American states, and in nu-
merous other bilateral and multilateral
forums. Let us now examine what this ex-
traordinary association of peoples and na-
tions has achieved and what it is destined to
achieve. Is our unity of purpose and action
permanent or transitory? These are some
of the questions I will try to answer today.

The political order which grew out of the
ashes of World War II has been in most re-
spects amazingly successful. Within it, there
have been virtually undisturbed peace, con-
tinuous economic development, and the ex-
pansion of personal liberty. These are ac-
complishments almost without parallel in
history. They are the direct consequence of
the perhaps unique forms of cooperation
that all of us brought to the challenges of
the postwar period.

It is tempting to believe that our future
will be much like our recent past: progress
at home, equilibrium abroad. Certainly this
must be the goal. But its attainment is not

368

automatic. We must recognize that the inter-
national environment in which we live has
in many ways changed and is still changing.
There has been a geometrical expansion in
the number of participants — from a few
dozen sovereign nations to over 150. The
international structure must now accommo-
date the diverse and often conflicting aspira-
tions, interests, and values of these nations.
Three decades have also brought major
changes to Europe, America, and the Soviet
Union. If the Atlantic community is to cope
with the challenges of the next quarter
century as successfully as it has with those
of the last, we must understand and adjust
to these changes.

It is in Europe that this transformation
is most evident. From economic collapse,
political vacuum, and moral confusion, Eu-
rope has emerged economically strong, po-
litically cohesive, and morally reborn. We
welcome this, for it means that Europe is no
longer a junior associate but, rather, a vig-
orous and mature partner in our common
quest for security, peace, and well-being.

The Soviet Union, too, has not ceased to
grow and develop. It recovered from its
grievous wartime wounds and, with enor-
mous determination and energy, set out or
a path of building the sinews of power anc
industrial might. And while its ideology anc
system have hardly exerted the attraction;
and appeals that its rulers expected, thi
Soviet Union has steadily evolved from be
ing a major power on the Eurasian landmas
to the status of a superpower on a globa
scale.

Yet while the power that it has amassei
and will undoubtedly continue to amass i
formidable, the Soviet system has developer
unevenly and is far from being withou
shortcomings. It is no longer hermeticall;
sealed off from the outside world, and if i
is to evolve into the modern society towari
which its people strive, it must place con
siderable reliance on various forms of cc
operation with the outside world. This ha>
been recognized by the Soviet leadership, an
it is precisely here where the opportunitie
lie for shaping realistic and pragmatic reb
tionships based on our strength and unit

lili

roi

Department of State Bulletin

llSl

fills

in which our own interests will be safe-
uuarded and peace maintained.

In absolute terms the ability of the United
States to play its part in meeting the new
Soviet challenge has not diminished over the
past 30 years. On the contrary, it has stead-
ily increased. Even in relative terms, and
taking account of Soviet growth, the United
States alone, and even more so the United
States and Europe together, maintain a clear
margin of potential power.

Nevertheless the situation is qualitatively
different than it was 30 or even 15 years
\gn. In 1945 the United States had a tre-
nendous surplus of resources which it could
md did use to meet its new global responsi-
)iiities. Because of the incredible expansion
)f America's wartime industries, the United
states was at that time producing perhaps
)0 percent more than its citizens were con-
uiming. This gap allowed us to transfer ex-
ensive resources for the reconstruction of
ilurope while at the same time improving
he standard of living of our own citizens at
I rapid rate.

Over the years the gap between what
America produces and what its citizens con-
ume has steadily narrowed. The American
conomy has grown continuously, but our
tandard of living has grown even faster. As
onsumer expectations rise, the surplus of
esources available for commitment abroad
larrows. The political choices which leaders
nust make become harder. New programs
re more hotly debated. As late as the 1960's,
America thought it could fight a major war
a Viet-Nam without new taxes or inflation.
'oday we realize that our resources, though
nmense and still growing, are nevertheless
mited.

Competing domestic priorities are not
oing to cause America to reduce its inter-
ational commitments, including those in
]ui-ope. But it is not reasonable to expect
1 the future the kind of massive new pro-
rams with which we sought to solve prob-
Bms in the past. Indeed, many of the prob-
?ms which we and other members of the
i.t]antic community face do not lend them-
elves to "solution" by massive commit-
ments of resources.

The Atlantic Agenda

Let us turn then to a discussion of these
problems, to the agenda before the Atlantic
community. Our fundamental goals are
clear: to maintain our security and thereby
the peace; to promote our prosperity; to
build a more just world economic order; and
to preserve our democratic systems. In each
of these areas, success will depend on our
ability to cooperate closely.

To Maintain Our Security and Build
the Peace

The continued growth of Soviet power pre-
sents the West with its principal security
challenge. We are confronted with the con-
tinuing necessity to protect our interests
and resist the expansionary tendencies of a
Soviet Union that has achieved substantial
strategic parity with the West and an en-
hanced ability to project its power at great
distance. Given the imperatives of a nuclear
age, we have an interest in approaching this
task in a manner which minimizes the risks
of war and builds a more constructive long-
term relationship with the Soviet Union.

Secretary Kissinger addressed this, the
central challenge of our time, in a major
speech given in San Francisco a little over
two weeks ago:

It is our responsibility (he said) to contain Soviet
power without global war, to avoid abdication as
well as unnecessary confrontation.

This can be done, but it requires a delicate and
complex policy. We must strive for an equilibrium
of power, but we must move beyond it to promote
the habits of mutual restraint, coexistence, and ulti-
mately cooperation. We must stabilize a new inter-
national order in a vastly dangerous environment,
but our ultimate goal must be to transform ideologi-
cal conflict into constructive participation in building
a better world.

The term "detente" has come into common
usage to characterize policies adopted in this
eff'ort to cope with the emergence of Soviet
global power while promoting the habits of
restraint. Unfortunately, the term lends it-
self to oversimplification, since while relaxa-
tion of tensions and diminishing of the fre-
quency and intensity of crises are involved,
the relationship is in fact much more com-

larch 22, 1976

369

plex and dynamic. Restraint in the uses of
power is not automatic or a matter of good
will. It must be based on a cool calculus of
interests — of benefits and risks.

If East-West relations are to show lasting
improvement, the nations of the West must
be willing both to provide benefits for re-
sponsible behavior and to impose risks and
costs for irresponsible behavior. It is in this
respect that present Soviet conduct in An-
gola is of particular concern. In Angola, the
Soviets are using military means to deter-
mine the outcome of a civil war in an impor-
tant African country. Angola may be far
away from Europe or America. It is equally
far from the Soviet Union. All of us in the
West must be clear that this kind of action,
if acquiesced in, could establish dangerous
precedents which would directly damage our
interests. These interests will be respected
only if they are seen to be protected. We
must insure that the Soviets and others
understand that the exploitation of this or
that opportunity to gain unilateral advan-
tage undermines all efforts to achieve
greater mutual restraint and increases the
risk of serious confrontation.

From the late 1940's through the early
1960's, the West met and successfully over-
came a series of Soviet expansionary moves.
Whether these confrontations occurred in
Central Europe over Berlin, or around Cuba
over the emplacement of Soviet missiles,
Western diplomacy succeeded, among other
reasons, because it was backed by both ade-
quate strategic and local forces. Beginniiig
in the late 1960's and taking advantage of
the Soviet Union's desire to expand and
normalize its contacts with the West, we
have sought to engage the Soviet Union in
an array of negotiations, relationships, and
arrangements, all of which are designed to
create a web of further incentives for re-
straint. These actions have been designed to
supplement, not replace, the diplomatic and
military efforts by which we have histori-
cally met and contained the growth of So-
viet power. Our interest has been to lower
the level and frequency of confrontations,
decrease the danger of war, and gradually
build up a more stable structure of peace.

Thus, through carefully expanded eco-
nomic relations, preferably undertaken har-
moniously among major industrialized coun-
tries, we have tried to maximize Soviet
awareness of what would be in jeopardy and
to create ties between the Soviets and the
external world which they would choose to
sever only at substantial costs. In increasing
our contacts with the Soviet people we have
sought to create incentives throughout So-
viet society for the maintenance of coopera-
tive relations with the West. Finally, in
engaging the Soviets directly on funda-
mental security issues, we seek to maintain
the balance of power at a less precarious
level.

Central to this effort are the talks aimed
at limiting the U.S. and Soviet strategic
arsenals.

This issue presents an essential test:
whether the world's two nuclear super-
powers will be able to translate their common
interest in self-preservation into arrange^
ments which will lessen the uncertainties of
open-ended competition and the threat of
nuclear war. A milestone was reached in
May 1972 when both countries agreed tc
forgo territorial defense against offensive
missiles. While not removing all the dangers
in the U.S.-Soviet strategic military rela-
tionship, this treaty did confront both side;
with the stark fact that their peoples an
to remain utterly vulnerable to missile at
tack. For the defensive-minded Russian.
it was not an insignificant psychological stej
that, in the interest of greater stability, thi
vulnerability was to be sanctioned by ;
treaty with its principal competitor. Th
Soviets also committed themselves at thi
time to end the numerical growth of thei
offensive missile programs and agreed to ai
arrangement which would require them t
dismantle older missiles if they acquired th
permitted number of sea-based missiles.

Now we are engaged in the second stagrfjiie
of the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitatio
Talks] process, working out a treaty to pu
equal ceilings on offensive missiles anc
equally significant, on their most poten
qualitative aspect — MIRV'ed warheads. Pro;
ress continues to be made. If the talks sue

If,

irta
(I,

370

Department of State Bulletinid,'

ceed as we hope, then for some 10 years the
respective numerical strengths of the strate-
gic force programs will be stabilized, pos-
sibly even reduced, and in any case more
easily calculated, thus reducing uncertainty
in the decision process. In regard to these
negotiations, we have kept in close touch
with our allies who obviously have a major
stake in agreements affecting the security
of all of us.

Simultaneously with the regulation of
strategic competition, we are negotiating on
force reductions in Central Europe. In con-
trast to SALT, however, MBFR [mutual and
balanced force reductions] is a multilateral
negotiation in which our allies directly par-
ticipate. We have a right to expect that the
major proposal recently made by the West-
irn allies in Vienna will lead to active nego-
iations on mutual and balanced force re-
ductions, including a move of corresponding
mportance by the Warsaw Pact. Our objec-
;ive here, as in SALT, is to strengthen mili-
ary stability and to enhance security. Any
Agreement that may be negotiated must ad-
vance us toward that objective.

The United States also joined its Euro-
pean allies in negotiations leading to the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in
■Surope (CSCE). Progress in Berlin was
made a prerequisite for our going ahead
vith these talks, and substantial concessions
lesulted, leading to the quadripartite agree-
ment and considerable improvement in the
dtuation of the city.

In the CSCE Final Act, the West for the
.rst time secured Soviet and Eastern Euro-
pean recognition that human rights issues
ire a legitimate topic of international dis-
ourse. The West also received a number of
(olitical commitments from the East to take
lertain steps on these issues. Implementa-
ion, although slow, has started. We now
lave a benchmark against which to measure
Eastern performance in the various areas
overed in the CSCE Final Act, and we will
pntinue to press for the maximum attain-
Ible implementation. Finally, the West se-
iured specific Soviet recognition of the prin-
ciple of peaceful change of frontiers in
lurope. Indeed, in its broadest sense, CSCE

is and must continue to be part of the com-
plex long-term process of change, involving
a wide range of contacts, negotiations, and
agreements, whereby relations between East
and West become increasingly normal and
responsive to the needs and aspirations of
all the peoples concerned. It is, to repeat, a
long-term process, and there will undoubt-
edly be disappointments and setbacks as well
as achievements and advances. It is a proc-
ess that all of us have an interest in encour-
aging with patience, realism, and care.

The future of Germany remains as funda-
mental to the East-West equation in the
present era as it was at the height of the
cold war. Together with our NATO allies, we
have worked to overcome the divisions of
Germany and Europe. It is a profoundly
humanitarian goal as well as an integral
part of the overall endeavor to build re-
straint into East-West relations. In this con-
text, we have long supported the efforts of
successive German governments to achieve
normalization and reconciliation through a
series of agreements with their neighbors
to the East. Carrying the heavy burdens of
history they do, this has often been a pain-
ful process for all concerned. Yet it is one of
the impei'atives of our era, and we welcome
the progress that has been made by our
German allies since the first steps in 1955
in their relations with Poland, Czechoslo-
vakia, and the Soviet Union.

The policies we are pursuing do not offer a
finite solution to the problem of the growth
of Soviet power, but a means of dealing with
it so that our security will be preserved and
peace maintained. The construction of a
more durable, more stable international
order is a process both dynamic and incre-
mental, which will, if it is properly under-
stood, act to unite rather than divide the At-
lantic community.

The successful execution of our policies
depends, above all, on the maintenance of an
equilibrium of power. The Atlantic commu-
nity must pay continuing attention to the
maintenance of credible deterrence and ef-
fective defense capability. In an age of awe-
some nuclear weaponry, when conventional
foixes have taken on even greater impor-

larch 22, 1976

371

tance, each alliance partner must carry its
weight and be perceived by all the others as
doing so. At a time when the Soviet Union
has attained substantial strategic parity
with the West, the maintenance of adequate
local forces takes on decisive importance.

Hopefully, current alliance discussions on
standardization and interoperability of
weapon systems can lead to a more effective
use of our inevitably limited resources. In
any case, the NATO connection remains at
the very heart of U.S.-European collabora-
tion. Whatever else we are to do in common
must proceed on this bedrock of collective
defense. In this respect, I wish to salute the
contribution of the Federal Republic and the
stalwart support which the Bmideswehr has
received from all the German political
parties.

To Promote Our Prosperity

If peace is our first goal, our second must
be to promote that prosperity upon which
our security, our liberty, and the creation of
a more just world order depend. Together
the industrial democracies have been the en-
gine of global economic growth, accounting
for 65 percent of the world's production and
70 percent of its trade. Our success has been
based on adherence to certain fundamental
principles which we all share:

— That the individual initiative of our
people is our greatest I'esource;

— That the free market can provide the
most effective mechanism for regulating the
flow of goods and services; and

— That each of our countries can only at-
tain sustained economic growth in full co-
operation with the rest.

We have each adapted these principles to
the temperament and needs of our people,
the historic patterns of our societies, and
the national resources of our countries. Our
several economies have developed differently,
but at the same time they have all shared in
a level of sustained growth never equaled
in history.

At Rambouillet the leaders of the world's
six largest industrialized democracies agreed

372

that the world's current economic difficulties
— increased energy costs, inflation, reces-
sion, and unemployment — require more, not
less, cooperation for their solution. Already
Rambouillet has led to Jamaica, where we
achieved agreement on the form of the new
international monetary order to replace the
Bretton Woods system. We need now to pro-
vide an impulse to the still-laggard multi-
lateral trade negotiations in Geneva.

We do encounter from time to time differ
ences on economic issues among us, growing
out of real differences in our resources and
needs. But differences should not lead to a
destructive rivalry. We must continue to
seek to work in harmony even where differ-
ences exist, because otherwise we undermine
the foundations of our common security and
political affinity.

Our common task is to restore public con
fidence in the resumption of sustained eco
nomic growth in Western Europe and th(
United States. The rapid expansion of th(
U.S. economy over the past two quarters
and substantial evidence of a turnaround ii
Europe, are cause for encouragement. Evei
as the recession wanes, however, the specte
of protectionism remains a serious concerr
The United States is anxious to build on th
improved communication and comprehensio
which has emerged in U.S.-European Con:
munity trade relations in the past two t
three years. The United States and th
Community are committed to the OEC
[Organization for Economic Cooperation an
Development] trade pledge to prevent art
ficial stimulation of exports or restrictior
on imports.

Thus far, our governments have bee '"
generally successful in not permitting pr
tectionist pressures on both sides of the A
lantic to be translated into protectioni;
measures. We must insure that this remaii
the case, and we must continue to work t
gether in the OECD, the multilateral tra(
negotiations, the United Nations Conferem
on Trade and Development, and other forun
to restore sustained economic growth to oi
own nations and the world economy in ge'
eral.

h
k

%

Department of State Bullet

142:

^D Build a More Just World Economic Order

Events of the past several years, particu-
arly the 1973 oil crisis, demonstrate that
ustained growth among the industrialized
ountries requires cooperative relations with
he developing nations who supply much of
ur raw materials and purchase much of our
lanufactured products.

The nations of the Atlantic community
ave embarked on a major effort to help
uild a more just world economic order, one
hich will reduce present disparities and
reate additional opportunities for all na-
ions of the world. We have accepted this
isk not because we are responsible for the
overty which plagues so much of mankind
-for we are not — but because our help is
eeded if their plight is to be remedied,
bviously, all those in a position to do so
lUst contribute, particularly the newly
ch oil-producing nations. But in the long
m only a development strategy which com-
nes local efforts with Western technology,
'estern investment, and access to Western
larkets offers the Third World any hope of
Ivancement.

At the seventh special session of the
mited Nations last fall. Secretary Kissinger
Fered a detailed program for the future.

e have in the succeeding months proceeded

a variety of international organizations to
ve substance to the many proposals we
lade during that Assembly session. We have
(SO cooperated in the creation of a new
♦rum for North-South dialogue — the Con-
(rence on International Economic Coopera-
on, whose Commissions on energy, raw
materials, development, and related mone-
try issues have begun to meet in Paris. Our
isk now is to insure that these various initi-

ives do not lose headway.

■) Preserve Our Democratic Systems

Our final, most fundamental, goal must be
^e preservation of human freedom. This is

never-ending process. The Atlantic com-
(unity is an association of democracies —
>me new, some old, some well established,
tme less so. All of us can take great pride in

arch 22, 1976

the fact of our liberty. None of us can afford
to take it for granted.

Whether and how to encourage the
growth of democratic values and institu-
tions is a grave and delicate problem. Fun-
damentally, each nation must find its own
path. It is difficult to draw the line between
well-meaning advice and foreign interfer-
ence. Even the most ardent democrat will
resent and reject the latter. Thus, efforts
to promote freedom in other countries often
have counterproductive effects. Yet free
men cannot remain indifferent to the fate
of democracy elsewhere, even if they are
sometimes powerless to affect it.

As democratic nations, we can certainly
all take great satisfaction in the restoration
of democracy in Greece and in the trend of
events in Portugal and Spain. The fervor
with which the peoples of these countries
seek their freedom is a demonstration of the
vigor and continued attraction of the
democratic system.

European Unity and the Atlantic Relationship

The Atlantic nations confront the ambi-
tious agenda I have just outlined at a time
when our own internal relationships con-
tinue to evolve. Thus, the European Com-
munity has recently grown from six to nine
member states. The scope of the Commu-
nity's activities, and particularly the politi-
cal coordination among its members, con-
tinues to expand. At the same time, relations
between the Nine and other European states
seeking membership or association are also
progressing. Finally, the relationship be-
tween Europe and the United States con-
tinues to develop in line with these European
evolutions.

Speaking from some experience, I believe
that transatlantic consultation has devel-
oped successfully and in some respects is
more extensive and intensive than ever be-
fore. This is due, I think, largely to the
pragmatic view now taken on both sides of
the Atlantic concerning the contents and
forms for these consultations, as well as to
the underlying appreciation shared by us

373

all that our destinies are inextricably linked.
In view of the complex issues with which we
must deal, and the competing domestic de-
mands with which all of us must cope, I be-
lieve the present level of transatlantic coop-
eration represents an achievement of major
significance.

As you know, the United States has sup-
ported and welcomes movement toward
European unity as a contribution both to
Western strength and cohesion and to a
stable and prosperous global order. The pace
and precise nature of community building is
for Europeans to decide. For our part, we
have a natural interest in both your develop-
ment and your policies. We believe that the
links between us are so strong and our fun-
damental interests and values so much in
common that serious consultation will most
often produce common or mutually suppor-
tive policies.

In assuring that the Atlantic relationship
keeps pace with the continued European
evolution, we must take care that our basic
ties never become obscured in theoretical,
even theological, efforts to define precisely
the shape which our present or future rela-
tions should take. The United States will con-
tinue to work with European institutions and
respond to European initiatives as they
emerge, our attitude being determined by
the contribution which can be made to the
promotion of our common interests.

A Community of Free Peoples

Ours are open societies, ever seeking new
ways to fulfill the aspirations of our citizens
and ever dependent on the popular will. In-
deed, we are revolutionary societies, with a
great capacity for innovation and renewal. If
we are to be true to our heritage of dedica-
tion to freedom and justice, we — the democ-
racies of the West — must draw upon the
moral and material assets we share and dem-
onstrate we are able to master the challenges
of the complex era we have entered.

In this time of accelerating change, when
problems can rarely be solved conclusively
and the choices are often narrow and am-
biguous, all governments within the Atlantic

374

community must devote increased efforts to
promoting the public consensus which sup-
ports our policies and unites our action. It
was Jean Jacques Rousseau who once said
that: "As soon as any man says of the affairs
of state, 'what does it matter to me?' the
state may be given up as lost." It is our task
today to demonstrate to our peoples why thf
Atlantic alliance, and the other multiple rela-
tionships which bind the United States anc
Europe, continue to be of vital importance tc
them.

We must always remember that the Atlan
tic community is a free association of fref
peoples. Our policies are not governed solely
by strategic or geopolitical considerations bu
also by an underlying commitment to sharec
interests and common values. Thus, the long
term abihty of our community to endure de
pends primarily on a consensus not only with
in our nations but among them. It require
that each of us perceive that the other i
pulling his full weight. It requires that eacl
of us perceive that the other is pursuing th
same fundamental goals. The future of th
democracies and the survival of the value
we represent will depend upon our abilit
to agree on objectives and work together t
achieve them.

Much rests on our ability to maintain thi
public consensus in support of our effort;
Our collective economic growth, our commo
defense measures, our political and ideolog
cal cohesion, are indispensable to the creatio
of a more stable, more durable internation;
structure. We in the West hold the only hoj
for a better life for that great majority (
mankind who live on the borders of destiti
tion, starvation, and despair. We remain tt
sole beacon of hope for those who would 1:
free from the chains of dictatorship an
oppression.

For 30 years we have borne these burder
in common. I can offer you no short-ten
hope of definitive solution to many of th
problems confronting us today. I am certai;
however, that combined, our unparalleU
moral, intellectual, economic, and political ei
ergies will assure us progress toward th
more peaceful, more just world order that y»
seek.

if

i

ft

Department of State Bullet<

Humanitarian Aid to Angola
Discussed by Department

Statement by William E. Schanfele, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs '

Thank you for this opportunity to appear
)efore your subcommittee to address the
luestion of U.S. disaster assistance to An-
ola. I understand this is a followup to hear-
ngs you held in November when the then
\.cting Assistant Secretary, Ed Mulcahy,
vho is accompanying me today, stated our
lolicy on humanitarian aid for that country.
Since November the effects of the civil
var have been much more widespread,
ouching nearly every city in the country and
ausing about 250,000 rural Angolans to
save their homes and fields. This is true in
he north, where members of the Bakongo
ribe have once again fled from their home-
mds into Zaire. In the populous central
ighlands, where over 40 percent of Angola's
opulation resides, many other thousands
lave fled south toward Namibia or melted
iito the bush as the Cuban-led MPLA [Popu-
ir Movement for the Liberation of Angola]
flvance continues. Some reports speak of a
efugee column 75 kilometers long com-
Dsed of 90,000 people heading south to join
n estimated 12,000 already being cared for
ly the South African Government.

In addition to the problem of displaced
ersons in the north and south, there are
")od shortages in Luanda and environs and,
i fields are left untended, prospects of simi-
r shortages elsewhere in the interior,
urther, the hundreds of thousands of Ba-
ongo who returned to the north of Angola
the past year after over a decade of exile
Zaire haven't yet had an opportunity to
tablish the strong agricultural base they
eed to retain self-sufl[iciency in food pro-
action. We thus see the provision of food

Made before the Subcommittee on International
esources. Food, and Energy of the House Committee
International Relations on Feb. 26. The complete
anscript of the hearings will be published by the
himittee and will be available from the Superin-
ifiident of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
iRce, Washington. D.C. 20402.

as perhaps the single most pressing need in
Angola at this time.

To our knowledge, there has been rela-
tively limited physical damage to the infra-
structure of the country. The ports and most
airports remain intact; and the extensive
road network was little aff'ected by the fight-
ing, although there are reports some high-
way bridges were destroyed by UNITA
[National Union for the Total Independence
of Angola] to slow up the Cuban advance.
We believe the most serious effect of the
fighting on the economy has been on the
Benguela Railway, which in normal times
transports much of Zaire's and Zambia's
copper and other foreign trade commodities
as well as essential imports for the interior
of Angola. We understand several rail
bridges located in the extreme eastern por-
tion of Angola and a major rail bridge on the
Angolan-Zairian frontier have been damaged
in the recent fighting. However, we have no
reports on the extent of destruction nor how
long it will take to restore full service.

The overall economy of the nation was
brought to a standstill by the war. Oil pro-
duction ceased, as did most of the coffee har-
vesting and mining operations of both dia-
monds and iron ore. A primary cause of this
disruption was the exodus of 90 percent of
the Portuguese population, which took away
technicians, managers, and other trained
personnel required to run the economy.

The United States has contributed
$675,000 for disaster relief within Angola,
exclusive of the $7.5 million expended for
the airlift of Portuguese to Lisbon that was
completed on November 4. Six hundred
thousand dollars of our disaster assistance
has been given to the International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in three install-
ments, in August and November of 1975 and
in January 1976. We have been informed by
the ICRC that they will require an additional
$6.4 million for an expanded relief effort in
Angola during the first six months of this
year. They contemplate augmenting their
present three medical teams with 10 addi-
tional mobile teams, each consisting of a
doctor and a nurse; supplying 100 tons of
drugs and medical supplies; supplementing

arch 22, 1976

375

food supplies; and providing 300 tons of
blankets and clothing. In this regard we
stand ready, as we have stated several times
before, to donate additional funds and food
to international efforts to ease the plight of
refugees in Angola, and we are presently pre-
paring a response to this latest ICRC appeal.

I wish to point out that this ICRC effort
will aid refugees still within Angola, includ-
ing those now encamped in extreme southern
Angola, but is not designed to aid those refu-
gees who have fled into Zaire. We under-
stand the U.N. High Commissioner for Refu-
gees has representatives in Zaire evaluating
this problem and will shortly be presenting
recommendations for a program to aid these
people. We have asked our Embassy in Kin-
shasa and our mission in Geneva to stay in
close contact with the UNHCR representa-
tives on this matter. We, of course, intend
to respond favorably to this appeal as well.

Looking to the future, Mr. Chairman, I
can assure you this Administration will give
prompt and generous consideration to fur-
ther requests from international organiza-
tions and private volunteer groups for hu-
manitarian aid for all areas in Angola. There
have never been strings attached to our
humanitarian assistance to the ICRC, which
has labored valiantly and, I might add, under
very dangerous circumstances to assist the
homeless and deprived in all areas of An-
gola. We look to appropriate U.N. agencies
to assist in resettlement and rehabilitation,
goals we endorse and will support.

Beyond these immediate humanitarian
goals, further aid considerations clearly de-
pend on an independent evaluation of the
needs in Angola and on the evolution of the
political and economic situation in that
country and the region.

U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty
Transmitted to the Senate

Message From President Ford '

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice an
consent of the Senate to ratification,
transmit herewith the Extradition Treat;
Between the Government of the Unite
States of America and the Government of th
United Kingdom of Great Britain ani
Northern Ireland, together with a Protocc
of Signature and an exchange of notes
signed at London on June 8, 1972. I transmi
also, for the information of the Senate, th
report of the Department of State with n
spect to the Treaty.

The Treaty, one of a series of extraditio
treaties being negotiated by the Unite
States, significantly updates the presen
extradition relations between the Unite
States and the United Kingdom and adds 1
the list of extraditable offenses both na
cotic offenses, including those involvir
psychotropic drugs, and aircraft hijacking
The Treaty will make a significant coil
tribution to the international effort to co:
trol narcotics traffic and aircraft hijackin
I recommend that the Senate give early ai
favorable consideration to the Treaty ai
give its advice and consent to ratificatio

Gerald R. Ford.

The White House, February 3, 1976.

'Transmitted on Feb. 3 (text from White Hoi;
press release) ; also printed as S. Ex. A, 94th Con
2d sess.. which includes the texts of the trea'
protocol of signature, and exchange of notes a
the report of the Department of State.

376

Department of State Bulle) 1

Department Discusses U.S.-Saudi Arabia Defense Relationship

Statement hy Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.

Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs '•

I am pleased to have this opportunity to
appear before you to respond to any ques-
tions you may have about the sales of de-
fense articles and services to Saudi Arabia
for which letters of offer are now before the
ongress. First I would like to explain briefly
(vhy the Administration considers these pro-
oosals to be in the national interest.

Saudi Arabia carries considerable weight,
us you know, both politically in the Middle
5ast and on a world scale in the financial
md energy areas. We proceed from the
jicmise that it is in our interest to maintain
:nod- — and by that I mean mutually bene-
icial — relations with Saudi Arabia.
Our ties to the Saudis are broadly based
nd cover many areas of common interest,
icluding that of national security and self-
efense. As should always be the case if our
elationships with other countries are to be
oundly based, U.S.-Saudi relations are a
wo-way street, and I think it is important
3 look at what is valuable in that relation-
liip for Saudi Arabia and what is valuable
) the United States.

The Saudis see a number of advantages in
leir relations with us, probably most signifi-
intly on the political level. Profoundly anti-
ommunist and vigorously opposed to the
xpansion of destabilizing influences in the

' Made before the Subcommittee on International
slitical and Military Affairs of the House Commit-
e on International Relations on Feb. 23. The com-
ete transcript of the hearings will be published by
e committee and will be available from the Super-
tendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
ffice, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Middle East, Saudi Arabia looks to the
United States as a nation of world stature
with which it shares common principles in
that regard.

Saudi Arabia has supported our peace ef-
forts in the Middle East, I'ecognizing as we
do that failure to achieve a just and lasting
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict carries
with it a high risk that there will be a new
war and that that in turn will greatly en-
hance opportunities for Soviet and radical
influence in the region.

The United States has long been a signifi-
cant factor in the development of Saudi
economic strength, through the activities of
U.S. companies in both the oil sector and
elsewhere. Thus the Saudis look to us for a
major input to their ambitious development
plans. They are accustomed to and prefer
American technology, American products,
and American management. They like what
they see, and by and large they hope we will
assume a major role in their $142 billion
five-year development plan announced last
year.

I would emphasize that this aspect of our
relations is more than simply economic or
commercial; it is based on mutual respect
and confidence built up over many years.
That kind of respect and confidence can be a
more precious commodity than the most
persuasive economic factors.

Similarly, in the financial field, a long
history of mutual confidence has led the
Saudis to look to us for both advice and ade-
quate and profitable capital markets for their
surplus oil revenues.

arch 22, 1976

I

377

What, then, are the advantages for the
United States in our relationship with Saudi
Arabia?

As I indicated above, there are similarities
in our view of the world strategic equation.
We, too, seek to limit the expansion of Soviet
and radical influence in the Middle East, be-
cause it presents a threat to the stability and
security of that region, where vital U.S.
interests are at stake.

Like the Saudis, we see the trend toward
moderation on the part of a number of Arab
governments, over the past two years in
particular, as a most significant factor in the
progress we have made thus far toward
peace. Saudi Arabia has been a strong sup-
porter of that trend, both politically and
economically. Like us, they do not want to
see a regression to the polarization and dis-
unity among the Arabs which existed in the
past and which create an atmosphere in
which militancy flourishes and progress to-
ward peace is frustrated.

In all of these important respects we see
Saudi policy as paralleling our own. Indeed,
in both the political and the economic fields
the Saudis have been able to make a contri-
bution to moderation — and thus to progress
toward peace — which has been supportive
of our policies. In dealing with those issues
on which differences exist between Saudi
Arabia and the United States — and we do
deal with them frankly and constructively —
it is important that we both keep in mind the
importance of preserving the larger frame-
work of interests and objectives we share.

Saudi oil policy has been basically advan-
tageous to the United States, despite the oil
price increases which Saudi Arabia has gone
along with and which we continue to feel are
unjustified. Saudi Arabia has acted as a
strong moderating force within OPEC [Or-
ganization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries] against even greater increases and
has maintained production levels which are
well beyond its economic needs. With oil
availabilities declining in the Western Hemi-
sphere, Saudi Arabia can be expected to be-
come an increasingly important source for
our own oil imports.

378

In the economic and financial fields, the
advantages for us of close U.S.-Saudi rela-
tions are self-evident: multibiflion-dollar
trade and business opportunities for Ameri-
can companies, both here and in Saudi
Arabia, and very large amounts of capital
for growing U.S. needs.

Beyond these mutually beneficial political
and economic ties, an integral part of U.S.-
Saudi relations has been a military supply
and training relationship which goes back
over a quarter of a century. It began shortly
after the Second World War, which had
highlighted in dramatic fashion Saudi
Arabia's strategic and economic importance
to the United States, to Western Europe,
and to Japan.

Although our ties to Saudi Arabia had
begun in the thirties, we began after the
war to develop a more broadly based relation-
ship. That relationship included a military
aspect almost from the beginning, because
our strategic interests led us to request and
receive base facilities at Dhahran, whik
Saudi interests led them to request and re'»
ceive advisory and training assistance from
us for their military forces. It is importan'
to remember that this security relationshij
thus pi-edated the advent of the Arab
Israeli conflict and was founded on reason,
totally unrelated to that conflict.

Saudi Arabia's military forces at that tim
were composed largely of traditional deser
warriors employing age-old cavalry an
ground tactics — forces which were very el
fective in certain situations but which wer
little suited to any sort of modern defens
needs. That situation persisted through th
fifties and even into the sixties ; to some es
tent, it is still true today.

Thus, for many years our military suppl
and training programs in Saudi Arabia wer
relatively low level and concentrated on iir
proving the eff'ectiveness of the traditionji
small-scale Saudi militai-y units. Virtually
modern weapons were involved.

In 1965, primarily as a result of hostility *
between Saudi Arabia and Egypt over tb "'^f
civil war in Yemen, the Saudis turned to v
for modern air defense equipment, and w

al

*pii

Hie

iterii

Ueiii

Department of State Bulletf '^'i'

provided a limited amount of such weaponry.
Til more recent years, the Saudis began an
ambitious program to modernize other exist-
ing arms of their military structure and have
used European as well as American equip-
ment for such modernization. Finally, in
1974, at their request, the U.S. Department
of Defense carried out a survey of Saudi
defense needs over the next 10 years.

That survey, among other things, was in-
tended to bring some order and priority into
their military planning, and it has suc-
ceeded in so doing. But I would emphasize
that we are still talking about relatively
^mall and limited forces, forces which are not
nearly the size of those of other states in the
irea: Syria, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, and Israel.
Among the letters of offer now before the
"ongress, those for military equipment and
■elated services are fully in line with the
ecommendations of that 1974 survey. Saudi
\ labia has a small number of conventional
nfantry brigades, of 5,000 men each. The
■tters of offer for tanks, APC's [armored
ersonnel carriers]. Dragon missiles, and
'ulcan guns are in response to a Saudi re-
uest that we assist them to mechanize two
f those brigades along the lines on which
I.S. units are organized and with similar
iiuipment. At the time that recommendation
as made in the 1974 survey, we considered
a reasonable step in the direction of
nodernization for a force which was, as I
lave said, quite small and without modern
fluipment.

Thus, when the Saudis requested this ma-
«riel and training in mid-1975, we agreed in
rinciple. If these sales are carried through,
ne Saudis will have, in the late seventies,
wo brigades with a small integral tank force
I each, with APC-type vehicles for mobility,
ad with integral antitank and antiaircraft
(ipability. Deliveries for the bulk of major
[uipment will begin in 1977 for APC's and
078 for tanks.

The Maverick missiles proposed for sale
> Saudi Arabia are to be used on the F-5
ircraft which we have sold them. The
laverick is consistent with our survey rec-
nmendations ; while it is a very modern

f

rch 22, 1976

weapon, its principal advantage is its accu-
racy, rather than the firepower which it
represents.

Finally, the two Corps of Engineers cases
are similar to those which the corps has
managed in Saudi Arabia for some years
now. The great bulk of the money forecast
to be spent for those cases is not for work
to be performed by the corps itself, but for
disbursement to contractors and sub-
contractors. Under a bilateral agreement
concluded in 1965, the corps manages con-
struction projects, sets specifications, super-
vises design work, reviews contractor bids,
supervises contract performance, and dis-
burses moneys to contractors on satisfactory
completion of work. Corps personnel are not
involved in the actual construction, and of
course all costs are paid by the Saudi Govern-
ment. Finally, it is important to note that
these projects do not involve the purchase or
transfer of any weaponry.

One corps case is for the construction of
two cargo-handling facilities. Port conges-
tion in Saudi Arabia is a major bottleneck
to Saudi development. At Saudi request, the
corps proposes to construct two facilities —
one on the Red Sea near Jidda and one on the
Persian Gulf — to facilitate the import of
construction materials. Eventually, these
ports are likely to revert to civilian uses, for
which they are also suited, and they will thus
contribute to the overall economic develop-
ment of the country.

The second corps case is for naval facili-
ties. As some members of the committee
know, we undertook in 1972 a program to
build a small modern coastal force for the
Saudi Navy. At present, that navy is al-
most nonexistent, with a few patrol boats
stationed at Dhahran. This program calls
for the construction of a naval headquarters
at Riyadh and naval facilities at Jidda, on
the Red Sea, and at Jubail, on the Persian
Gulf. These onshore and offshore facilities —
ship docking and repair facilities ; break-
waters ; housing, training, maintenance, and
administrative buildings ; desahnization
plants; schools; messhalls; and so on — will
be comparatively expensive, especially at

379

Jubail, which is presently little more than an
area of desert coastline. This amendment to
the previously approved FMS [foreign mili-
tary sales] case for construction will cover
onshore facilities, primarily at Jidda and
Jubail.

Mr. Chairman, we have previously out-
lined before this subcommittee the general
criteria which we apply to arms sale deci-
sions for the gulf area. Certain criteria were
particularly pertinent to our decision to go
ahead with the letters of offer now before
the committee, and I would like to touch
briefly on them :

The Balance of Forces: We have looked
carefully at the relative balance of forces
in Saudi Arabia and its neighbors and con-
clude that these sales would not significantly
affect that balance. In fact, to the extent that
strengthening Saudi ground forces in a
limited way enhances the Saudi security
role with respect to its smaller neighbors in
the Arabian Peninsula, the impact would be
positive. As far as other neighboring states
are concerned, it is important to bear in
mind that we are talking here about mecha-
nizing Saudi brigades. Israel, Iran, Iraq,
Syria, and Jordan each measure their ground
forces in corps or armies or, at least,
divisions.

Legitimacij of Defense Requirements: The
basic Saudi motivation in wishing to modern-
ize its limited defense forces is simple: with
territory approximately as large as the
United States east of the Mississippi, with
resources valued at about $1.5 trillion at
current prices, and with limited military ca-
pability, Saudi leaders clearly realize that
they have much to protect and little to pro-
tect it with. They are strongly opposed to and
deeply concerned about possible future intru-
sion of radical influences, already present to
the north and south of them in the gulf and
the peninsula. They see that they have an
important security role to play, along with
Iran, in preventing such further intrusion.
And I believe they realize that they cannot
play a significant regional security role
without some credible military force behind
their policy. In these terms, we see their

380

I

present requests as reasonable and rational,
albeit limited and relatively small, and well
within their capability to absorb and employ
effectively.

Transferability: We are aware of concerns
held by some on this account. There is of
course no ultimate guarantee that military
equipment we sell to one state will not be
transferred to another. But there are seri- j
ous constraints. First, there are the legal
and political restraints inherent in our FMS
procedures. There is nothing in our experi-
ence thus far to suggest that the Saudis in-
tend to do anything other than respect our
FMS agreements on this score. On the con-
trary, they have in fact chosen non-U.S.
suppliers for military equipment which they
have purchased for other Arab countries.
Beyond this, however, thei'e are serious
technical limitations to effective transfer. I
say "effective," because we must distinguish
between transfer of hardware as such and
transfer of capability. To transfer hardware,
one needs only move it from one place to
another. But the transfer of capability — the
only meaningful kind of transfer — implies
the ability to transfer the hardware and the
necessary supporting services, training or
trained . manpower, sources of supply for
spares and ammunition, and so forth. Ir
these vital areas the equipment we are pro-
posing to sell would need U.S. support foi
some time to come; it would be extremelj
diflJicult to transfer it in ways not authorizec
by us and to have it effectively employed.

Mr. Chairman, to the extent that there
may be an inclination to see proposals of tht
kind under consideration today purely ii
terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict, I sugges
that this would be an incomplete perspective
To undei'stand Saudi Arabia's interest ii
modernizing its armed forces and our inter
est in assisting it to do so, I believe thre^
broader points must be stressed:

— First, Saudi Arabia's vast terrain, iti
resources, and the fact that its armed forcet
today are small and are not equipped as .
modern force.

— Second, the fact that Saudi Arabi
looks to its military relationship with th'

Department of State Bulletii

United States as an integral part of a
broader relationship, which has important
benefits for the United States with respect
to our peacemaking efforts in the Middle
East, energy, finance, and trade.

— Third, the fact that refusal on our part
to provide the Saudis with these reasonable
amounts of advice and equipment would be
seen as a conscious and witting step away
from our present close relationship, and such
a refusal would, moreover, be essentially
iri'elevant to the question of whether or not
they acquire equipment of this kind. With
rare exceptions, everything we sell Saudi
Arabia in the military field is available
from other suppliers, and of course they
have the money to pay for it. Thus, the
question is not "Should Saudi Arabia have
this equipment and these services?" but
"Saudi Arabia is in a position to acquire
these types of equipment and services ;
ishould they come from the United States or
Ifrom another nation?"

Mr. Chairman, to summarize, the pro-
1 posed sales we are discussing today are part
and parcel of our overall relationship with
Saudi Arabia. We believe that they are rea-
sonable in the Saudi context and that they
will not significantly affect the balance of
forces in the region. They will, moreover,
contribute to the larger purposes which are
served by our good relations with the
Saudis.

Department Describes Guidelines
'or Nuclear Exports

Folloiving is a statement by George S.
'est, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military
iffairs, made before the Subcommittee on
irms Control, hiternational Organizations,
'nd Security Agreements of the Senate Com-
nittee on Foreign Relations on February 2A-^

I am grateful for the opportunity to ap-
)ear again before the committee to discuss
luclear export matters.

Members of the committee are already
veil aware, from my own previous testimony

as well as from a number of official and un-
official sources, that we have been engaged in
an effort with other nuclear-exporting
countries to devise a common set of stand-
ards concerning safeguards and other related
controls associated with peaceful nuclear
exports. I am glad to be able to report to the
committee that we have made substantial
progress.

I think it is important to recognize that
what is involved here is not a single self-
contained activity seeking a permanent solu-
tion to the problem of nuclear proliferation,
but part of an evolutionary process. The
nature of the problem, the technology which
creates it, and the policies and mechanisms
which will be effective in dealing with it, are
all subject to change. It is therefore highly
important that we continue this process and
that we do nothing which might jeopardize
the willingness of other countries to continue
the process.

For reasons which I am confident the
committee will understand, I cannot discuss
in open session the policies and positions of
other governments or the substance of the
discussions we have had with them. The
consultations are regarded as sensitive by a
number of the participants, and we have
undertaken to protect their confidentiality
and privacy.

At the same time, we recognize that Con-
gress has a vital interest in what we are
doing. I would like, therefore, to describe in
some detail certain minimum principles
which the United States has decided to apply
to its future nuclear exports as a result of
our consultations with other suppliers.
These principles include the following:

— The requirement that recipients must
apply IAEA [International Atomic Energy
Agency] safeguards on nuclear exports from
the United States. This includes facilities
and certain equipment as well as special
nuclear material.

— The requirement that recipients give

^ The complete transcript of the hearings will be
published by the committee and will be available
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. (Jov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

I

Aarch 22, 1976

381

assurances that they will not use our exports
to make nuclear explosives for any purpose.

— The requirement that recipients have
adequate physical security for imported nu-
clear facilities and materials to prevent
theft and sabotage.

— The requirement that recipients give
assurances that they will also require the
above conditions on any retransfer of our
exports or transfers of material or equip-
ment derived from our exports.

In addition, with regard to sensitive ex-
ports (which include fuel enrichment, spent-
fuel reprocessing, and heavy water produc-
tion) :

— We intend to exercise restraint in sup-
ply of these exports, particularly when we
believe such exports would add significantly
to the risk of proliferation.

— Through our supply conditions and
other initiatives, we will encourage the con-
cept of multilateral regional facilities for
reprocessing and enrichment so as to limit
the number of such facilities and to site such
facilities in order to insure effective applica-
tion of safeguards and physical security.

— In those cases where we export sensitive
facilities, equipment, and/or technology, we
will require assurances from recipients that
any sensitive facilities built using trans-
ferred technology will be safeguarded.

— Finally, we will require recipients to ob-
tain our consent for retransfer of any sensi-
tive nuclear materials or sensitive equip-
ment or technology to a third country.

The foregoing are minimum standards
which the United States will apply to its
nuclear exports. Most of these are consistent
with current U.S. practice. In addition, we
are prepared to adopt more stringent con-
straints when appropriate.

Again, I would emphasize that we view
our overall nonproliferation efforts, our dis-
cussions with other concerned counti'ies, and
the results that flow from these as an evolu-
tionary process. We have no pat answers to
the proliferation problem — only a conviction

that if we are to successfully cope with the
problem, the United States must continue
to work with other concerned countries to
develop a fabric of political commitments,
safeguards, and controls on nuclear exports.

Laos To Be Removed From List
for Generalized Tariff Preferences

Folloiving is the text of identical letters
sent by President Ford on February 26 to
Speaker of the House Carl Albert and Presi-
dent of the Senate Nelson A. Rockefeller.

white House press release dated February 26

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. Presi-
dent:) In accordance with the requirements
of section 502(a)(2) of the Trade Act of
1974, I herewith notify the House of Repre-
sentatives (Senate) of my intention to with-
draw the designation of Laos as a beneficiary
developing country for purposes of the Gen-
eralized System of Preferences by amending
Executive Order No. 11888 of November 24
1975.

The considerations which entered into mj
decision were based upon the provisions o:
section 504(b) and 502(b)(1) of the Tradi
Act. Section 504(b) of that Act states:

The President shall, after complying with the re
quirements of section 502(a)(2), withdraw or sue
pend the designation of any country as a beneficiar
developing country if, after such designation, h
determines that as the result of changed circunr
stances such country would be barred from designs
tion as a beneficiary developing country under se<
tion .502(b). . . .

Section 502(b)(1) states that:

. . . the President shall not designate any countr
a beneficiary developing country under this section-
if such country is a Communist country, unless (Ak
the products of such country receive nondiscrimini
tory treatment, (B) such country is a contractin
party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trac
and a member of the International Monetary Funi
and (C) such country is not dominated or controlle
by international communism. . . .

!i'

ito
Sal

382

Department of State Bulleti

tfti

As a result of changed circumstances,
Laos would be barred from designation as a
lioiieficiary developing country under section
502(b) (1), quoted above.

A diplomatic note is being prepared for
delivery to the Government of Laos on or
about the same date as that of the delivery
of this letter, notifying that Government of
my intention to terminate the country's
beneficiary status, together with the consid-
erations entering into my decision, as re-
quired by section 502(a)(2) of the Trade
Act.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford.

Department To Study Role of Science
and Technology in Foreign Affairs

Press release 83 dated February 19

The Department of State has initiated a
study under the direction of the Under Sec-
I'etary for Economic Affairs, Charles W.
Robinson, to examine the role of science and
technology in foreign affairs. The study will
make recommendations defining the appro-
priate functions and concerns of the Depart-
ment, and especially of its Bureau of Oceans
md International Environmental and Scien-
tific Affairs (OES), in this area. Under a
.'ecent organizational realignment, the OES
Bureau now reports to the Under Secretary.

Both substantive and organizational rela-
;ionships will be investigated to insure the
■nost effective utilization of science and
;echnology in support of U.S. foreign policy
)bjectives. Questions to be considered in-
;lude the proper guidance to other agencies,
;he most efficient division of operational re-
;ponsibilities, the promotion of national inter-
ists through international technological
nterchange, the impact of technology on
breign policy, the utilization of technological
initiatives for foreign policy objectives, and
he optimal internal staflling and organiza-
ional structure.

The study will be conducted by Dr. T.
Keith Glennan, former Administrator of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion, Commissioner of the Atomic Energy
Commission, and U.S. Representative to the
International Atomic Energy Agency, who
will call upon various experts for assistance
as appropriate.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Coffee

Intemational coffee agreement 1976, with annexes.
Approved by the International Coffee Council
December 3, 1975. Open for signature at U.N.
Headquarters January 31 through July 31. 1976.'
Signature: United States, February 27, 1976.

Safety at Sea

Convention on the international regulations for pre-
venting collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London
October 20, 1972.'

Accession deposited: Netherlands, February 4,
1976.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement relating to the International Telecommu-
nications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT),
with annexes. Done at Washington August 20,
1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS
7532.
Accession deposited: Bangladesh, March 1, 1976.

Operating agreement relating to the International
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (IN-
TELSAT), with annex. Done at Washington
August 20, 1971. Entered into force February 12,
1973. TIAS 7532.

Signature : Ministry of Posts, Telephones and
Telegraphs of Bangladesh. March 1, 1976.

World Heritage

Convention concerning the protection of the world
cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris

' Not in force.

March 22, 1976

383

November 16. 1972. Entered into force December

17, 1975.

Proclaimed by the Preside7if: March 1, 1976.

BILATERAL

PUBLICATIONS

Korea

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities.
Signed at Seoul February 18. 1976. Entered into
force February 18, 1976.

Kuwait

Technical security arrangement. Signed at Kuwait
January 18. 1976. Entered into force January 18,
1976.

Mexico

Agreement relating to the provision of two heli-
copters by the United States to support U.S.-
Mexican efforts to curb the production and traffic
in illegal narcotics. Effected by e.xchange of letters
at Mexico October 24 and 29, 1975. Entered into
force October 29, 1975.

Agreement relating to the provision of aircraft by
the United States to support U.S.-Mexican efforts
to curb the production and traffic in illegal nar-
cotics. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico
January 29, 1976. Entered into foi'ce January 29.
1976.

Agreement relating to the provision of supplie.s.
equipment, and services by the United States to
support U.S.-Mexican efforts to curb the produc-
tion and traffic in illegal narcotics. Effected by ex-
change of letters at Mexico February 4, 1975.
Entered into force February 4, 1976.

Romania

Convention with respect to taxes on income. Signed
at Washington December 4. 1973. Entered into
force February 26, 1976.
Proclaimed by the President: February 25, 1976.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Agreement on certain fishery problems on the high
seas in the western areas of the middle Atlantic
Ocean, with annex and related letters. Signed at
Washington March 1. 1976. Entered into force
March 1. 1976. except that articles II. VI, VII,
and X shall enter into force April 1. 1976.

384

GPO Sales Publications

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number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, B.C. 201,02.
A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or
more copies of any one publication mailed to the
same address. Remittances, payable to the Superin-
tendent of Documents, must accompany orders.
Prices shown below, which include domestic postage,
are subject to change.

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which
describe the people, history, government, economy,
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains
a map, a list of principal government officials and
U.S. diplomatic and consular oflicers, and a reading
list. (A complete set of all Background Notes cur-
rently in stock— at least 140— $21.80; 1-year sub-
scription service for approximately 77 updated or
new Notes— $23.10; plastic binder— $1.50.) Single
copies of those listed below are available at 30(^ each.

Cameroon
Ghana .

Cat. No. S1.123:C14/2
Pub. 8010 6 pp.

Cat. No. S1.123:G34
Pub. 8089 7 pp.

Establishment of a Joint Commercial Commission.

Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics. TIAS 8116. 9 pp. SO<t. (Cat. No. S9.10:8116).

Onchocerciasis Fund. Agreement with Other Govern-
ments. TIAS 8117. 95 pp. $1.20. (Cat. No. 89.10:8117)

Amendment of the Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs, 1961. Protocol with Other Governments. TIAS
8118. 137 pp. $2.00. (Cat. No. 39.10:8118).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Syria
TIAS 8119. 30 pp. 45«(. (Cat. No. 89.10:8119).

Narcotic Drugs — Equipment and Training to Curl
Illegal Traffic. Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 8125
6 pp. 25<!. (Cat. No. 89.10:8125).

Department of State Bulletii

INDEX March 22, 1976 Vol. LXXIV, No. 1917

Angola. Humanitarian Aid to Angola Dis-
cussed by Department (Schaufele) .... 375

Atomic Energy. Department Describes Guide-
lines for Nuclear Exports (Vest) .... 381

Congress

Department Describes Guidelines for Nuclear
Exports (Vest) 381

Department Discusses U.S. -Saudi Arabia De-
fense Relationship (Atherton) 377

Department Urges Senate Approval of U.S.-
Spain Cooperation Treaty (McCloskey) . . 364

Humanitarian Aid to Angola Discussed by De-
partment (Schaufele) 375

Laos To Be Removed From List for General-
ized Tariff Preferences (letter from Presi-
dent Ford to Speaker of the House and
President of the Senate) 382

Latin America and the United States (Kis-
singer) 357

U.S.-Spain Cooperation Treaty Transmitted to
the Senate (Ford. Kissinger) 362

U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty Transmitted to
the Senate (message from President Ford) 376

Denmark. Letters of Credence (Borch) . . . 366

Department and Foreign Service. Department
To Study Role of Science and Technology in
Foreign Affairs 383

Europe. A Common Heritage, A Common Chal-
lenge: The Atlantic Link (Sonnenfeldt) . . 367

Extradition. U.S.-U.K, Extradition Treaty
Transmitted to the Senate (message from
President Ford) 376

Foreign Aid

Department Discusses U.S. -Saudi Arabia De-
fense Relationship (Atherton) 377

Humanitarian Aid to Angola Discussed by
Department (Schaufele) 375

Japan. Letters of Credence (Togo) 366

Laos. Laos To Be Removed From List for
Generalized Tariff Preferences (letter from
President Ford to Speaker of the House and
President of the Senate) 382

Latin America. Latin America and the United
States (Kissinger) 357

Presidential Documents

Laos To Be Removed From List for General-
ized Tariff Preferences 382

U.S.-Spain Cooperation Treaty Transmitted to
the Senate 362

U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty Transmitted to
the Senate 376

Publications. GPO Sales Publications .... 384

Saudi Arabia. Department Discusses U.S. -Saudi
Arabia Defense Relationship (Atherton) . . 377

Science and Technology. Department To Study
Role of Science and Technology in Foreign
Affairs 383

Spain

Department Urges Senate Approval of U.S.-
Spain Cooperation Treaty (McCloskey) . . 364

U.S.-Spain Cooperation Treaty Transmitted to
the Senate (Ford, Kissinger) 362

Switzerland. Letters of Credence (Probst) . . 366

rrade. Laos To Be Removed From List for Gen-
eralized Tariff Preferences (letter from
President Ford to Speaker of the House and
President of the Senate) 382

Treaty Information

Current Actions 383

Department Urges Senate Approval of U.S.-
Spain Cooperation Treaty (McCloskey) . . 364

U.S.-Spain Cooperation Treaty Transmitted to
the Senate (Ford, Kissinger) 362

U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty Transmitted to

the Senate (message from President Ford) 376

U.S.S.R. A Common Heritage, A Common Chal-
lenge: The Atlantic Link (Sonnenfeldt) . . 367

United Kingdom. U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty
Transmitted to the Senate (message from
President Ford) 376

Name Index

Atherton, Alfred L., Jr 377

Borch, Otto Rose 366

Ford, President 362, 376, 382

Kissinger, Secretary 357, 362

McCloskey, Robert J 364

Probst, Raymond 366

Schaufele, William E., Jr 375

Sonnenfeldt, Helmut C 367

Togo, Fumihiko 366

Vest, George S 381

Chee

klist

of Department of State

Press

Releases: March 1-7

Press releases may be obtained from the

Office of Press Relations, Department of State,

Washmgton, D.C. 20520.

NO.

Date

Snbiect

*106

3/1

J. Owen Zurhellen, Jr., sworn in as
Ambassador to Surinam (bio-
graphic data).

no7

3/1

Shipping Coordinating Committee
(SCO, April 29.

*108

3/1

sec. Subcommittee on Safety of
Life at Sea, working group on
subdivision and stability, Mar. 31.

*109

3/1

sec, U.S. National Committee for
the Prevention of Marine Pollu-
tion, May 14.

110

3/1

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Atlantic fisheries
agreement.

111

3/4

Kissinger: House International Re-
lations Committee.

*-112

3/4

John A. Shaw sworn in as Inspector
General of Foreign Assistance
(biographic data).

tll3

3/4

Sisco: Senate Budget Committee.

1114

3/5

Ingersoll: Subcommittee on Priori-
ties and Economy in Government
of the Joint Economic Committee.

*115

3/5

Rozanne L. Ridgway sworn in as
Ambassador for Oceans and Fish-
eries Affairs (biographic data).

tll6

3/6

Kissinger: interview, Sigma Delta
Chi, Atlanta.

tll7

3/7

Kissinger: interview, U.S. News
and World Report.

mted.

* Not pr

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

Superintendent of Documents
U.S. government printing office

WASHINGTON. DC, 20402

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXXIV

No. 1918

March 29, 1976

SECRETARY KISSINGER INTERVIEWED BY SIGMA DELTA CHI PANEL

AT ATLANTA 385

SECRETARY KISSINGER DISCUSSES U.S. NONPROLIFERATION STRATEGY
Statement Before the Senate Committee on Government Operations 405

DEPARTMENT PROPOSES TWO NEW ACTIONS

TO DEAL WITH INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM OF BRIBERY

Statement by Deputy Secretary Ingersoll 412

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
Address by Robert A. Fearey 394

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

i

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXXIV, No. 1918
March 29, 1976

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Secretary Kissinger Interviewed by Sigma Delta Chi Panel at Atlanta

Following is the transcript of an intervieiv
with Secretary Kissinger by a panel of mem-
bers of Sigma Delta Chi professional jour-
nalistic society at Atlanta, Ga., on March 6.
Members of the panel loere Cay-roll Dadis-
man, editor, the Columbns (Ga.) Enquirer;
3iU Landrey, foreign affairs editor, the St.
'Petersburg (Fla.) Times; John Pruitt, an-
chor man, WSB-TV, Atlanta; and Bill Shipp,
associate editor, the Atlanta Constitution.
Former Secretary Dean Rusk was moderator.

Press release llfi dated March 6

Mr. Rusk: I am delighted to be in my

lometoivn of Atlanta as a guest of Sigma

lelta Chi. I am very pleased indeed to be

ble to introduce the Honorable Henry Kis-

inger. Secretary of State.

I think we ivill go right into our questions.

will turn first to our friend and colleague

ir. John Pruitt.

Mr. Pruitt: Mr. Secretary, a number of

residential candidates tvere attacking the

olicy of detente with the Sonnet Union.

hey claim it is a one-way street in favor of

le Soviets and that Russia has been able to

'pand its sphere of influence, as in Angola,

id its military power under detente. Presi-

mt Ford has even dropped the word "de-

nte" from his campaign vocabidary. The

lestion is: Has detente been a success for

»me Soviet Union and a failure for the United

ates ?

\ Secretary Kissinger: I think we ought to
Imember that the basic interests of the
liited States are permanent and do not
Idect Presidential campaigns. And I hope
|at all candidates will keep that in mind

they progress.
BWhat is the policy that has been called
latente"? It has these elements:

It recognizes that the United States and
the Soviet Union are both strong powers,
neither of which can impose its will on the
other.

Second, it is based on the determination
by the United States not to permit any ex-
pansion of the Soviet sphere by military
force or military pressure.

Third, it is based on the realization that
a nuclear war with modern weapons would
have catastrophic consequences and there-
fore it has to be our objective to prevent
the erosion of the American and free-world
position without a nuclear holocaust.

That is a complicated position, a compli-
cated policy, and it can therefore be easily
attacked in a demagogic way.

I do not believe that the Soviet Union
has made any unilateral gains. I do not
believe that the United States is not still
the strongest nation in the world. I think
it is essential not to create any illusion in
the world that the United States is either
weak or irresolute. The policy we have been
pursuing is complex, but it has been suc-
cessful and we will continue to pursue it.

Viet-Nam and Angola

Mr. Landrey: Mr. Secretary, in the past
two years the U.S. Congress has repudiated
your position on basically two major ques-
tions— they have been called questions of war
and peace — on the last-minute aid to Viet-
Nam and now Angola. Do you have any fur-
ther reflections on your original position in
those? What do you think about them
now ?

Secretary Kissinger: I would like to stress
that it is important for Americans to keep

lirch 29, 1976

385

in mind that whatever setbacks we have
suffered in the recent past we have in-
flicted on ourselves. They have not been
inflicted on us by a foreign country.

Now, with respect to Viet-Nam, it was my
position and the position of the Adminis-
tration in which I served — as it was the
position of the previous Administration —
that the United States should not leave
Viet-Nam under dishonorable conditions.

We had achieved this. Last year, in the
final phase of the war in Viet-Nam when
the North Vietnamese, in flagrant violation
of all agreements, had sent 19 of their 20
divisions into the South, I did argue that
whatever the outcome it should not be pro-
duced by the failure of the United States to
give aid. And it was my view that the
United States should do its utmost, once
the collapse became inevitable, to rescue as
many Vietnamese as we could.

I do not regret this position. I do not
believe that it was compatible with Ameri-
can principles to cut off' ammunition to the
defenders of Phnom Penh, even when the
outcome was foreordained. But at least
Viet-Nam was a matter which we then de-
cided to put behind us on a bipartisan basis,
and no spokesman of the Administration
has ever referred to it in criticism of the
Congress or anyone else.

As far as Angola was concerned, the
United States was prepared to accept any
outcome that resulted from African decisions
and any decision of the Organization of Afri-
can Unity. Our basic concern was the massive
introduction of Soviet military equipment
in amounts larger than all the military
equipment introduced by all other powers
into the rest of black Africa and the intro-
duction of a Cuban expeditionary force of
12,000 men. And I believe that it was a
tragedy — for which we will pay for a long
time — that the United States did not permit
aid to be given, financial aid to be given, to
those black African states and those people
in Angola who were willing to resist this.

I believe that our position with respect to
Angola will unfortunately be vindicated by

events in more serious crises that will arise
in the future.

Mr. Shipp: Mr. Secretary, there is evi-
dence that Cuba intends to keep a permanent
military presence in Angola. In your opin-
ion, does that mean that we will see more of
Soviet-armed Cubans in Africa — Mozayn-
bique, Rhodesia — and even the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: We have no informa-
tion as to Cuban intentions in Angola or else-
where. But I would like to repeat again thai
the United States will not accept any fur
ther Cuban military adventures, that th(
United States will not accept the introduc
tion of Cuban military forces in other part,
of the world.

The Soviet Union must consider that an
policy of relaxation of tensions is incompat
ible with the massive introduction of armj
ments and the continual encouragement c.J;;:
this kind of turmoil. 'fv

Former President Nixon's Visit to P.R.C.

Mr. Dadisman: Mr. Secretary, do you 6,
lieve the best interests of the United Stat\
and the objectives of our foreign policy we I
served by former President Nixon's rece\
visit to the People's Republic of China?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, Presidi
Nixon went to China as a private citiz<
He did not ask our opinion before he we
He did not inform us until the announ
ment was imminent and had, in fact, alreg
been communicated to us by the Chin^
Government. He therefore went in a priv
capacity and not in order to serve the t
eign policy of the United States.

On the whole, if foreign governments w
to communicate with us, they should dc
through established channels.

While former President Nixon was
China, the Chinese leaders made a numbei
pronouncements regarding their view
U.S.-Chinese relations and the future
these relations, which we considered <
structive and which we welcome. We

Ui

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Fe liavi
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386

Department of State BullP29, {9;

note of these statements and as I said, we
welcome them. But the visit as such was a
private visit.

Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements

Mr. Pruitt: Mr. Secretary, do you have any
specific details about the Soviets cheating on
SALT One, and what is the outlook for SALT
Two?

Secretary Kissinger: There is no agency of
the U.S. Government, no department of
the U.S. Government, which holds the view
that there were Soviet violations of the
SALT One agreement. There exist, of
course, in any agreement of this complexity,
with military forces of this nature, various
gray areas — either of ambiguous technology
or of ambiguous interpretation of the
agreement.

None of these so far would affect the
American national security. Nevertheless
?ach of these cases is being energetically
jursued ; and those that have not yet been
;atisfactorily resolved will be put before the
5tanding Consultative Commission, which
las established by the SALT One agree-
ment, in order to deal with the issue of pos-
iible or alleged violations.
With respect to SALT Two, we believe
hat it is in the interest of the United States
nd in the interest of mankind that a ceiling
9 placed on the elaboration of armaments,
le numbers of armaments, of a category
lat can already do catastrophic damage to
le United States, the Soviet Union, and the
!st of mankind.

Therefore we are prepared to make an
:reement that puts a ceiling, an equal ceil-
g, on both sides. And we think that if such
. agreement could be achieved it would be
the interest of both sides.
We have made a proposal to the Soviet
lion in response to ideas that the Soviets
t before us which the Soviet Government
now considering. Until we have their re-
inse I cannot judge what the possibilities
agreement are.

But I would like to stress that our position
has the unanimous support of all agencies of
the government — the military, the Arms
Control agency, and the State Department.

Mr. Landrey: Mr. Secretary, I ivould like
to go back to Africa. Are ive going to recog-
nize the black liberation movements noiv try-
ing to gain power in South West Africa and
in Rhodesia? And what can tve do if the
Cubans are in there?

Possible Cuban Activity in Southern Africa

Secretary Kissinger: The United States
favors majority rule in Rhodesia. The
United States supports the U.N. resolutions
with respect to Namibia, or South West
Africa. With respect to Rhodesia, it is our
view that the time in which negotiations are
possible is rapidly running out, and we there-
fore urge the authorities in Rhodesia to show
flexibility and to move foi-ward in the nego-
tiations.

On the other hand, whatever our views on
the merits of the problem, I want to empha-
size once again that we do not accept the
proposition that the Cuban military forces
armed by the Soviet Union can make them-
selves the enforcer of the views of other
countries and that we cannot accept the
proposition that they can appear in every
part of the world to foster turmoil or to
exploit conflict. And therefore I would
sharply distinguish our position with respect
to the authorities in Rhodesia from our po-
sition with respect to Cuban military inter-
vention.

We support actively a successful out-
come of the negotiations that are now going
on, and we are urging the authorities in
Rhodesia to keep in mind that the time for
a settlement is running out. But we do not
accept the proposition that Cuba has a right
to intervene in this conflict.

Events in People's Republic of China

Mr. Shipp: Mr. Secretary, could you tell us
what you think the significance is in the Peo-

kch 29, 1976

387

pie's Republic of China — M?-. Hiia becoming
the Acting Premier in place of Teng Hsiao-
p'ing? Is that a signal for a second Cultural
Revolution ?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I bet in China
they are trying to analyze our domestic tur-
moil in the same way.

I have no clear view about what is meant —
what the significance is of the appointment of
the Acting Prime Minister of China. During
a toast a few weeks ago, the Acting Prime
Minister described the events as a continu-
ation of the Cultui'al Revolution, but he also
stressed — which is what is of significance to
us — that it does not affect the foreign policy
of the People's Republic of China and that
the lines established by the Shanghai com-
munique— that is to say, the basic princi-
ples of U.S.-Chinese relations — will remain
intact.

As far as the United States is concerned,
our concern with respect to the People's
Republic of China is its foreign policy and
not its domestic policy. And therefore as long
as the main lines of the foreign policy con-
tinue, we cannot get involved in making
judgments about personalities.

Allegations of Business Corruption

Mr. Dadisman: Mr. Secretary, is the State
Department playing any role — or do you see
any role of the State Department — in helping
to resolve the crises that have developed in
some of our allies as a result of the Lockheed
payoff scandals?

Secretary Kissinger: No, the State Depart-
ment is not playing a direct role in this.
Those of our allies or other friendly coun-
tries that have requested information with
respect to these allegations have been re-
ferred to the Justice Department and the
SEC [Securities and Exchange Commission],
and their requests will be handled by estab-
lished American judicial procedures without
intervention by the State Department.

In my capacity as Secretary of State, I
must point out that the impact of these
allegations — some of them unsubstantiat-

ed— on the domestic structure of some close
allies has been extremely serious and may
have consequences that affect foreign policy
as well.

This is not a judgment on the merits of the
case. And I repeat: We will handle any re-
quest for information by established Ameri-
can judicial proceedings, and the State
Department will not get involved in this.

But, as Secretary of State, I must point
out what the consequences are.

Panama Canal Negotiations

Mr. Pruitt: Mr. Secretary, could you brinA
us up to date on the negotiations concernimX
the Panama Canal, and do you think thl
American people are going to accept relirm
quishing the Canal Zone in Panama? \k

iltii

ret

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the issue is nc]
relinquishing the Canal Zone to Panama, nc
is the issue, as has been presented, a debai
between the United States and Torrij(
[Brig. Gen. Omar Torrijos, Head of Cover
ment] in Panama. The issue is whether tl
United States wants to confront all of tl
Latin American states, all of whom are bac
ing the Panama negotiations, without havi:
first explored whether our security interej
and our interests in the operations of t
canal can be safeguarded by other means.

The United States is determined to sa
guard our security interests in the Ca
Zone and those vital interests related to 1
operation of the canal.

Under three Administrations over
period of 10 years, negotiations have b
going on. These negotiations are now p
ceeding. It is too early for me to tell whet
the negotiations can succeed. If they she
succeed, we will submit them to the C
gress, in the light of all the conditions t
enter into them. And I think the Cong)
will see that our essential security and o]
ational interests will be preserved. But iB
too early to do this, though we are keeip
the Congress constantly and currently
formed as to the status of negotiations, ^ksh
I cannot yet say they will succeed

■"Us.

388

Department of State Buh

*»,l»7,

Communist Parties in Western Europe

Mr. Landrey: Mr. Kissinger, you have been
quoted several times as expressing concern
about the possibility of Communist participa-
tion in the Governments of Italy and France.
And currently there is a political uproar in
France because this concern was apparently
expressed to Ga.ston Defferre of the French
Socialist Party. What can we really do in the
situation, and what do you see the dangers
as being?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have heard
allegations that this view was expressed to
Gaston Defferre of the French Socialist
Party. If so, it was not done by instructions
from Washington.

I have to separate two things: One,
whether we are actively participating in the
domestic policies of the countries that are
close friends, like Italy and France, by giving
advice to political parties; and second, what
is our view if somebody asks our opinion.

With respect to the first question, obvi-
ously the political evolution of Italy and
ii'rance is for the Italians and the French to
lecide. It is not a matter for the decision of
'he United States. On the other hand, if
omebody asks our opinion, then I am bound

0 say that significant participation by the
Communist parties in the governments of
tiese or other countries is bound to afi'ect
ie relationship with the United States. It

1 bound to affect the NATO relationship,
nd it is bound to bring about a change of
riorities in those countries that will change
le nature of the world as we now know it.

If the countries concerned wish to do this,
is their business. But if we are being asked

encourage it, then we cannot participate

this.

tman Rights in Eastern Europe

IIMr. Shipp: From the Helsinki agreement,
\ve there been any substantive effects in
yms of less repression — things are eased up
tin Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union?

pecretary Kissinger: 1 don't have the sta-

tistics with me, but there has been some
improvement with respect to the reunifica-
tion of families. There has been some im-
provement with respect to journalists, for
example, in receiving multiple-entry visas.
There has been some relaxation in certain
categories of emigration.

It has not gone as far as we would wish,
but there has been some progress with re-
spect to these issues in the Soviet Union —
somewhat less so, actually, with respect to
some of the countries of Eastern Europe.

We are monitoring this constantly, and we
are periodically calling it to the attention of
the various signatories of the Helsinki agree-
ment. And we are using the Helsinki agree-
ment as a means to encourage a greater
concern for these human problems in East-
ern Europe.

Mr. Shipp: May I ask you another question
in that connection? Has the practical effect
of the Jackson amendment to the Trade Act
been to help or hamper emigration from the
Soviet Union?

Secretary Kissinger: In 1969 the emigra-
tion of Jews from the Soviet Union was 400.
In 1973, by the methods which we had con-
sidered the most effective — which is quiet
representation and separation from the
American political process — that emigration
had been raised to 38,000 a year. After the
Jackson amendment became the major issue,
the emigration was gradually reduced. It is
now at the level of 11,000.

I would therefore have to judge that the
practical effect has been to lower rather than
to increase the rate of emigration.

Possible Report by Former President Nixon

Mr. Dadisman: Mr. Secretary, I would like
to return to the Nixon China visit. I recog-
nize, of course, that Mr. Nixon is a private
citizen now, as you said; but he ivas treated
as much more than a private citizen in the
People's Republic and his visit certainly dreiv
much more attention and had more impact
than the visit of any other private citizen.
Could you tell us whether you think that the

ittVlrch 29, 1976

389

result of the visit paid more dividends to the
United States or tvas more a negative influ-
ence? If Mr. Nixon had asked you before-
hand whether he should go or not, what
would have been your advice?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have my
hands full advising President Ford. [Laugh-
ter.]

We obviously didn't originate the idea, and
that may be some indication of how it related
to our conception of the conduct of foreign
policy. But beyond that, I think — He didn't
ask my advice and —

Mr. Dadisman: Excuse me. What kinds of
information do you think you may be able
to get that will be usefid? I understand that
he is going to write a report.

Secretary Kissinger: Former President
Nixon, of course, spoke with Chairman Mao
for an hour and 40 minutes, and he had
meetings lasting about 10 hours, I under-
stand, with the Acting Prime Minister. None
of us have had an opportunity to talk to the
Acting Prime Minister, and I do not recall
even having met him. So it is a matter, of
course, of considerable interest to us what
he said and what his interpretation of inter-
national events is.

We have not yet received the written re-
port that President Nixon said he would sub-
mit to us, and therefore we cannot judge at
this point what it will add to the information
we have from our own sources. But it would
be in that area that we would look for in-
formation.

Middle East Issues

Mr. Pruitt: Mr. Secretary, Foreign Policy
magazine says that President Ford has told
Egyptian President Sadat the American ob-
jective in the Sinai is to have Israel ivith-
draw to its pre-1967 boundaries. Is that
true ?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, this article —
which I frankly have not had a chance to
study — is based on a collection of miscella-
neous interviews which the author had with
many people.

390

Obviously I cannot be in a position of com-
menting on conversations which the Presi-
dent may have had with other heads of
government, but I can say that the Ameri-
can position with respect to final boundaries
has been repeatedly stated. And it is that
the final boundaries should be negotiated
between the parties concerned ; that we sup-
port Security Council Resolution 242, which
calls for secure and recognized borders; am
that we are leaving it to the parties to giv(
these terms complete context. This has beei
our public position, and this remains ou
position.

Mr. Shipp: Mr. Secretary, do you detec
any change in Israel's attitude of refusing t
negotiate directly with the PLO [Palestin
Liberation Organization'] ?

Secretary Kissinger: I have not found an
change in that attitude. And the America
attitude has been and remains that unle;
the PLO recognizes the relevant Securit
Council resolutions and the existence of t\\
State of Israel, we have no decision to mal
in that respect either.

Mr. Rusk: Well, our thanks to our distvi
guished panel — Mr. Shipp, Mr. Dadismal
Mr. Pruitt, Mr. Landrey — and very special |
our thanks to the distinguished Secretary
State who has been ivith us today. We a\
glad to take some questions from the flc \
within the time we have available.

fei
jarai

»re,

Cuban Interventionism

Q. Dr. Kissinger, at the beginning of yc
remarks you said ive are determined — i
United States is determined — to stop Sot
expansion by military force or pressure,
several times you said we cannot acc|
Cuban intervention. Can you translate
diplomatic language a little further into w.
actions the United States would take to f\
vent Cuban intervention in Rhodesia, s\
or any other country in Latin America?

And the second question which I havei
ask is: because of all the political primar\
do you plan to resign soon? [Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to

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■first
DPEC

Department of State BuliWjj .

second question, how can I be so heartless as
to deprive the candidates of something to
talk about? [Laughter.]

And with respect to the first question,
when I say we are determined to prevent
expansion, that does not mean we have to
do it by military means. In fact, the history
of the postwar period has been that when
aggressive countries have clearly recognized
that the United States would resist expan-
sion, then war could be avoided.

What we would do, in given circumstances,
in particular Cuban actions — whether we act
locally or elsewhere — would depend, obvi-
ously, on the circumstances ; and it is not a
matter that it would be useful for me to talk
about.

My purpose in speaking so clearly and ex-
plicitly is to leave no doubt in anybody's
mind about our views so that there would
not be any action taken on the basis of mis-
apprehensions of American intentions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the grain agreement
with the Soviet Union. My question: Does
that guarantee us a Soviet market for
American wheat for five years? And if so,
\ihow much?

Secretary Kissinger: The grain agreement
guarantees us a market for five years to a
minimum of 6 million tons a year, with the
•Soviet option to buy 2 million tons a year
pore, which are guaranteed. If the Soviet
Union wishes to buy beyond 8 million tons,
;hen they must negotiate with us again in
(he light of the requirements of other na-
Uons and our own domestic requirements.
?ut we are guaranteed the sale of 6 million
ons a year for a period of five years.

Q. I forgot — ivhat price?

Secretary Kissinger: The price will be at
tie then market price.

Q. At the ivhat?

Secretary Kissinger: At the market price.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, I have tivo brief ques-
lons. First of all, it is ividely rumored that
e OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Ex-
Hing Countries'] nations are traveling to
nama City this iveekend for a secret meet-

tttf

ing. Can you confirm if this is true and, if
so, what the ptirpose is? And will you
attend?

Secretary Kissinger: I have been harassed
with questions about this meeting in Panama
City — the alleged meeting in Panama City.
Nobody has told me about it. Nobody has
told the Air Force about it, which has the
air base down there — or if they have, the
Air Force is not telling me.

I cannot find out what this is all about,
and I am as certain as I can be about any-
thing that there is no OPEC meeting going
on in Panama City. In fact, I received so
many questions on this issue that I even
checked with Panama City, Panama, just to
see if there was something going on down
there. [Laughter.]

Sale of C-130's to Egypt

Q. My second question is: Ambassador
Dinitz of Israel asked the State Department
last night to register Israel's formal objec-
tions to the Ford Administration's plan to
sell six C-130's to Egypt. What is going to
be your reply to Israel?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first of all, what
Ambassador Dinitz indicated was Israel's ob-
jection to a military supply relationship to
Egypt, not to any specific individual sale. Of
course, the decision of what to sell to other
countries has to be a decision that is taken
in the American national interest, in light of
all the considerations of our relationship to
the Arab world — the relationship of Egypt,
the previous relationship of Egypt to the
Soviet Union — and other matters.

The United States has made a decision
with respect to only one matter; namely, the
sale of six C-130's to Egypt. It has made no
decision with respect to the sale of any other
item. And we will proceed with that sale of
the C-130's and submit this in a formal re-
quest to the Congress within the next few
weeks.

With respect to other sales of other items,
this is a matter that we will take up if we
decide to do it later on. But it is not a de-
cision that has now been made.

sreh 29, 1976

391

Q. Under Secretary Sisco was quoted as
saying this ivas the beginning of a military
relationship between the United States and
Egypt. Is that correct? Is that your position?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I outrank
Under Secretary Sisco. [Laughter.]

I think where the confusion arose was as
follows. When we discussed with the Con-
gress the question of the sale of the six
C-130's, in order to give the Congress as
frank and honest a feel for what we had in
mind we explained to them the kind of mili-
tary supply that might be considered in the
future, if it ever became necessary or desir-
able from the American point of view — so
that rather than answer in a piecemeal fash-
ion the question that would inevitably arise
for what else we had in mind, we told them
two things : One, we had nothing specific in
mind right now ; second, we gave some idea
of the sort of categories that further down
the road might be considered as a means of
reassuring them that we were not entering a
massive relationship at this moment. And if
you look at this briefing, you will see that
this was the thrust of it.

But I repeat: The policy of the United
States now is to sell six C-130's. This does
not imply any other decisions. And if any
other decisions are made, there will be a
formal discussion with the Congress on the
subject.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, Seyiator Barry Goldivater
has been very critical of President Nixon
going to Communist China as a private citi-
zen. You have said that the U.S. Government
officially thinks that former President Nixon
was in fact a private citizen. My question is
this: Do you think that as a private citizen
he was in violation of Federal law in discuss-
ing foreign policy ivith Communist China?
And do you think he should have done Amer-
ica a favor and stayed in Communist China?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not believe that
President Nixon was in violation of Federal
law in going to China, and it is not a viola-
tion of Federal law to speak about foreign
policy in foreign countries — although there
have been occasions in recent years when
perhaps I wished it had been. [Laughter.]

392

i

But what the Logan Act prohibits, and to
our knowledge it has never been enforced,
is for a private citizen to negotiate in a for-
eign country.

So I do not believe there has been a viola-
tion of the law. And former President Nixon
has now returned to San Clemente, so that
your second question is moot.

Mr. Rusk: If any one of us in this room
had gone to Peking recently and had the
talks that Mr. Nixon had, ivouldn't you ivant
to know what they said ivhen any of us got
back?

Secretary Kissinger: If any private citizen
had spent 10 hours with the new Acting
Prime Minister of China and nearly two
hours with Chairman Mao, we of course
would want to know what was said — and
when it was said to somebody who, after all
has considerable experience in foreign policy
it is a matter of interest to us what th*
leaders of China considered important t(i
convey.

Q. Mr. Secretary, ivhat tvould you tell th
Russians about the degree of significance v.
President Ford's abandonment of the wor
"detente"? And does it represent any chang
in American policy toward the Soviet Union

li
Secretary Kissinger: President Ford ha

explained that the reason he felt that tbfini

word "detente" was not appropriate was b;

cause no one knew what it meant. He ga'

a speech last summer in Minneapolis

which he pointed out that the wo:

"detente" was of foreign derivation ai

therefore did not lend itself to easy compr

hension by Americans. And in his remar

last Monday, he simply picked up this idl

again. And given the quadrennial exciteme

which we are now approaching, it was giv

a significance which he did not intend

President Ford has stated that the poli

of seeking peace while remaining strong,

the policy of negotiations with our advi

saries — will be continued. Our policy is

prevent the translation of military power |

to political advantage, but it is also to sft

a world in which peace is achieved by me

other than constant confrontations. A

He

Nr,

Department of State Bulk

i!9,i

those twin prongs of our foreign policy we
believe reflect permanent interests of the
American people, and they will be continued.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the latest de-
velopment in your investigation into the
harmful rays beamed against the U.S. Em-
bassy in Moscow?

Secretary Kissinger: This is an issue
that involves some rather sensitive intel-
ligence matters, and therefore we have been
reluctant to discuss it publicly while we are
attempting to safeguard the health of our
employees — a matter which we have sub-
stantially done — and while we are trying to
negotiate a solution to this difficulty.

If these negotiations should prove impos-
sible to conclude, we will then of course
have to be more explicit in our explanations.
But while these negotiations are going on,
I would prefer not to go further than to say :
One, that our principal concern is the health
and safety of our employees, which we have
lubstantially safeguarded now ; and second,
;o end the condition that has brought about
;his question — and we are in the process of
legotiating that now.

U.S.-Japan Environmental Protection
!^ommittee Meets at Washington

' 1 oint Communique '

The first meeting of the Joint Planning
I id Coordination Committee was held Feb-
Jiary 26-27, 1976, in Washington, D.C. The
"'laeeting was convened in pursuance of the
"'Tgreement between the Government of the

Jnited States of America and the Govern-

;eiii|

^1

ment of Japan on Cooperation in the Field
of Environmental Protection signed August
5, 1975. Article 2 states that "A Joint Plan-
ning and Coordination Committee will be
established to discuss major environmental
policy issues, to coordinate and review activi-
ties and accomplishments under this Agree-
ment, and to make necessary recommenda-
tions to the two governments with regard to
the implementation of this Agreement."

Dr. Russell Peterson, Chairman of the
Council on Environmental Quality, led the
United States delegation. Mr. Kanetsugu
Kido, Vice-Minister, Environment Agency,
led the Japanese delegation.

Several basic procedures for the imple-
mentation of the bilateral agreement were
discussed and agreed upon.

Projects presently under way under the
bilateral agreement were discussed and
briefly evaluated. The two delegations en-
gaged in exchange of information and views
concerning environmental impact assess-
ments, toxic chemicals, particularly PCB's
[polychlorinated biphenyls] and heavy met-
als and their transport through the environ-
ment. The two sides exchanged views
concerning possible proposals for new project
activity in the areas of Stationary Sources
Pollution Control Technology and Technol-
ogy for Closed Systemization on Industrial
Waste Liquid Treatment.

The Japanese delegation expressed their
appreciation for the hospitality extended to
them by the United States Government and
stated that they would welcome the United
States delegation in Tokyo for the second
meeting of the Joint Committee within the
next year.

Issued on Mar. 11 (text from press release 120).

^rch 29, 1976

393

International Terrorism

Address by Robert A. Fearey '

First let me say how much I appreciate
your invitation to be here today. The World
Affairs Council is a widely known and highly
respected forum. I welcome the opportunity
to discuss how our government views the
problem of international terrorism and how
we are meeting it.

My topic is international terrorism. I shall
not be specifically addressing the indigenous,
or national, form of terrorism, such as we
see in Northern Ireland, Argentina, and
many other countries and which accounts
for most terrorism today. Nevertheless a
good deal of what I shall say about inter-
national terrorism will apply also to the
indigenous form.

What precisely is "international terror-
ism" ? It has three characteristics.

First, as with other forms of terrorism, it
embodies an act which is essentially crim-
inal. It takes the form of assassination or
murder, kidnaping, extortion, arson, maim-
ing, or an assortment of other acts which
are commonly regarded by all nations as
criminal.

Secoyid, international terrorism is politi-
cally motivated. An extremist political
group, convinced of the rightness of its
cause, resorts to violent means to advance
that cause — means incorporating one of the
acts I have just cited. Often the violence is
directed against innocents, persons having
no personal connection with the grievance
motivating the terrorist act.

And third, international terrorism tran-

scends national boundaries, through the
choice of a foreign victim or target, commis-
sion of the terrorist act in a foreign country,
or effort to influence the policies of a foreign
government. The international terrorist
strikes abroad or at a diplomat or other
foreigner at home, because he believes he
can thereby exert the greatest possible pres-
sure on his own or another government or on
world opinion.

The international terrorist may or may
not wish to kill his victim or victims. In
abduction or hostage-barricade cases he
usually does not wish to kill — though he
often will find occasion to do so at the outse
to enhance the credibility of his threats. I:
other types of attacks innocent deaths ar(»|ii
his specific, calculated, pressure-shock objec
tive. Through brutality and fear he seeks t(
impress his existence and his cause on thi
minds of those who can, through action o.
terror-induced inaction, help him to achiev
that cause.

An example: On September 6, 1970, th
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestin
hijacked three airliners flying from Euro;
to New York, diverted them to airports i
the Middle East, and moments after the;
passengers had been evacuated, blew the]|?fst
up. The terrorists' purposes were:

list
lies,
litliiii

' Made at Los Angeles, Calif., on Feb. 19 before the
Los Angeles World Affairs Council and the World
Affairs Council of Orange County. Mr. Fearey is
Special Assistant to the Secretary and Coordinator
for Combating Terrorism.

— To attract world attention to the Palei
tinian cause;

— To convince the world that the Palei
tinians could not be ignored in a Middle Eatj
settlement or there would be no lastir
settlement; and |iloi,(|

— To demonstrate that they had destruPted j
tive powers which they were prepared to us
not just against Israel but far afield againi

394

Department of State Bullet 92;

I

other governments and peoples, until their
aims were achieved.

Another recent and vivid example: Last
December 21, five professional international
terrorists — a Venezuelan, two Palestinians,
and two Germans — took control of the OPEC
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries] ministers and their staffs in
Vienna, killing three persons in the process,
demanded and received publicity for their
"Arab rejectionist" cause over the Austrian
national radio, and finally released the last
of their understandably shaken hostages in
Algeria. Their purpose appears to have been
to pressure the more moderate Middle East
governments into tougher oil and anti-
Israel policies.

Historical Origin

Terrorism as a form of violence for polit-
cal ends is as old as history, probably older,
[t is said to have acquired its modern name
rem the French Reign of Terror of the mid-
,790's. The first use of international terror-
ism is hard to pinpoint. However, the histo-
iians among you will recall the Moroccan
<ebel Raisuli's kidnaping of an American and
in Englishman in 1904 in a successful at-
mpt to force the U.S. and British Govern-
ents to pressure France into compelling
e Sultan of Morocco to comply with
aisuli's ransom, prisoner-release, and other
mands.

Perhaps the opening phase of the inter-

tional terrorist threat we face today,

|tiough itself a reaction to oppression and

nrror, was the hijackings by freedom-seek-

escapees from the East European Com-

nist countries in the middle and late

ties. In the early sixties the stream of

jackings from the United States to Cuba

menced. Terrorist groups around the

irld saw the potential for publicity in hi-

ikings and began to use them for atten-

in-getting political objectives. Beginning

jlabout 1968, Palestinian and other violence-

ented political groups in several parts of

world began to extend their terrorist

ivities to countries — or to the diplomats

of countries — not directly involved in the
dispute giving rise to the violence.

Modern Terrorism

The years since 1968 have seen a progres-
sive development of the employment of inter-
national terrorism for the attainment of
national, ethnic, or world revolutionary
political goals. They have also seen a marked
development of intelligence, training, finan-
cial, and operational collaboration among
terrorist groups in different parts of the
world. And they have seen such groups take
increasingly telling advantage of technolog-
ical advances which afford the terrorist op-
portunities he never had before:

Air Transport. Two or three individuals
can take control of a large airplane with 200-
300 passengers, divert it wherever they
wish, and blow it up when they get there,
with or without its passengers aboard. Or a
loaded aircraft can be downed by a bomb
placed in its hold. Little wonder that the air-
plane has figured in so many terrorist acts of
the last 15 years.

Communications. Today's television, ra-
dio, and press enable a terrorist to achieve
an almost instantaneous horrified, attention-
riveted audience for his action. Since public
attention to his cause is usually one of his
key objectives, communications advances
have been critically valuable to the terrorist.

Weapoyis. New types of weapons are con-
stantly adding to terrorists' capabilities. A
leading example: the Soviet SA-7 heat-seek-
ing rocket, equivalent of our Red Eye, easily
portable by one man, capable of bringing
down commercial aircraft. Two of these
weapons were found in the hands of Arab
terrorists at the end of a runway in Rome in
1973 ; fortunately they were found in time.
Another key terrorist weapon: plastic ex-
plosives.

Targets. Finally, our complex and inter-
dependent modern world society presents a
plethora of vulnerable, damaging targets for
terrorists. Large aircraft are one such tar-
get. But there are also supertankers, electric
power grids, gaslines, nuclear power plants,

krch 29, 1976

395

and others. Modern terrorists can cause de-
struction far beyond anything possible in
earher, simpler ages.

The U.S. Response

So beginning about 1968, our government
faced a clear problem of terrorist use of air-
craft, of modern communications media, of
powerful light-weight precision weapons, and
of cooperation among terrorist groups in dif-
ferent countries, all to achieve political shock
effects in an increasingly interdependent and
vulnerable world. The danger grew, with a
mounting series of kidnapings, bombings,
murders, and shoot-outs, by Palestinians,
Croatians. Tupamaros, Cubans, Turks, and
others. In September 1972, 11 Israeli athletes
were killed, along with five terrorists, at the
Munich Olympic games before an appalled
TV audience of hundreds of millions.

Our government had until that time pur-
sued a number of antiterrorist efforts,
mainly in the hijacking area. But with
Munich, President Nixon and Secretary of
State Rogers decided to adopt a more sys-
tematic approach. The President directed
Secretary Rogers to chair a "Cabinet Com-
mittee to Combat Terrorism" and also to
establish an operating arm of the Commit-
tee called the Cabinet Committee Working
Group. The Working Group originally con-
sisted of senior representatives of the 10
Cabinet Committee members, but 12 other
agencies concerned with different aspects of
terrorism have since been added.

The Cabinet Committee and Working
Group have a broad mandate to devise and
implement the most effective possible means
to combat terrorism at home and abroad. The
Cabinet Committee meets as required, and
the Working Group has met 101 times. It is
the coordinating forum for the entire U.S.
Government antiterrorism effort. When a
terrorist abduction of an American abroad or
of a foreigner in the United States occurs,
we set up and run a task force in the State
Department's Operations Center. A similar,
complementary task force is established in
the concerned U.S. Embassy abroad. We
have, unfortunately, gained considerable ex-

396

perience in coping with such incidents after
hostage cases in Port-au-Prince, Khartoum,
Guadalajara, Cordoba, Santo Domingo,
Kuala Lumpur, Beirut, and other places.

Means of Combating Terrorism

What have we learned from our study of
terrorism and from our practical experience
with it? How does one combat terrorism?
Basically in three ways:

Intelligence. If you can learn his plans
ahead of time, you can sometimes forestall
the terrorist. It was through intelligence
that the terrorists armed with SA-7's were
apprehended at the edge of the airport in
Rome before they could destroy their in-
tended Israeli Airlines target. The CIA, the
FBI, and other intelligence agencies coordi-
nate their antiterrorist efforts through the
Cabinet Committee Working Group.

Physical Security of Target Installations
and People. Here again, we have improved
our position significantly since 1972. U.S
civil airport security has been strengthened
to the point where, in combination with bi
lateral and multilateral antihijacking con
ventions, we have not had a successfu
commercial hijacking in the United State
in three years — though there was, o
course, the recent terrible bombing at L
Guardia. The security of our diplomat! i
posts abroad has been upgraded wit Ijjt
armored limousines, more marine guard L ,

iiir

irisi

!ei
nil

closed-circuit TV systems, careful briefin
of personnel, et cetera.

Apprehension and Punishment of Terra-
ists. To achieve this key objective we see
international cooperation. The threat is i;
ternational and can be met only by inte"
national means. A major focus of U.S. effomj
and initiative with other nations has bedtj
in the antihijacking area. We took the lejljt),,
in negotiating in the International Ci^lfij^
Aviation Organization three conventions li^^y
hijacking and aircraft sabotage. The gel
eral idea of all these conventions, now raJSotl],
fied or adhered to by about 70 countries, Worisi
to deter terrorists by internationaliziillappi
their criminal acts and thus providing IcMliiii,

Department of State BulletL{|..

means of apprehending and punishing them.
But we have not been altogether success-
ful in this purpose. Hijacking has declined
sharply, but more because of improved air-
port security than the antihi jacking con-
ventions— except for our highly effective
bilateral agreement with Cuba. Too few
countries are willing to arrest, try, and se-
verely punish international hijackers and
saboteurs, or indeed international terror-
ists of any kind. U.S. efforts for the adop-
tion of enforcement mechanisms to give the
international aircraft-hijacking and sabo-
tage conventions sanctions teeth, by deny-
ing air services to noncomplying countries,
have been completely unavailing. A U.S.-
proposed convention in the 1972 U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly which would have obliged
participating states to prosecute or extra-
dite international terrorists coming under
their control, at safe haven destinations or
in other ways, won the support of only
about half a dozen nations. It did, however,
serve as the genesis of the U.N. convention
to protect diplomats and foreign officials,
adopted in 1973 but still awaiting the ne-
cessary ratifications to come into effect.

The Rand Corporation recently calcu-
lated, on the basis of experience since 1968,
that there is an 80 percent chance that an
nternational terrorist involved in a kidnap-
ng will escape death or capture. The ter-
1 'orist kidnaper has a close to even chance
1 hat all or some of his ransom demands will
■ j )e granted. Worldwide publicity, normally
; ' n important terrorist objective, is achieved
i'n almost every case. For all crimes of ter-
itorism (as opposed to just kidnaping), the
^fijverage sentence for the small proportion
' 1 1 f terrorists caught and tried is less than
i' jB months.

ri In a word, outside the hijacking area, our
W id a small but, hopefully, growing number
! i • other governments' efforts to make ter-
ii^)rism unprofitable for the terrorists have
(i; \\ ade little headway.

^, I) So these are the ways we seek to combat
rrorism: intelligence, physical security,
,d apprehension and punishment of terror-
s. In addition, and very importantly, we

encourage and assist other nations to alle-
viate the inequities and frustrations from
which international terrorism mainly —
though by no means entirely — arises. Un-
fortunately, effective action to reduce these
inequities and frustrations is in many in-
stances a very long-term proposition. The
ti'end in most countries and regions is the
other way. The awakening political con-
sciousness of oppressed, poverty-stricken,
or otherwise frustrated peoples on every
continent threatens an increasing resort to
terrorism in areas now relatively free of it.

U.S. Policies in Terrorist Incidents

From time to time Americans abroad are
assassinated or abducted by international
terrorist groups. What are our policies in
such incidents?

With respect to assassinations, we seek
to deter or thwart such attacks through in-
telligence warning and physical security,
both in cooperation with the host govern-
ment. If an American is nevertheless assas-
sinated, we do our utmost to insure that
the murderer is brought to justice and that
intelligence and security measures in that
country affecting American citizens are
intensified.

With respect to abductions, our policies
were made very clear by Secretary Kis-
singer at Vail last August. He said:

The problem that arises in the case of terrorist
attacks on Americans has to be seen not only in rela-
tion to the individual case but in relation to the
thousands of Americans who are in jeopardy all over
the world. In every individual case, the overwhelm-
ing temptation is to go along with what is being
asked.

On the other hand, if terrorist groups get the im-
pression that they can force a negotiation with the
United States and an acquiescence in their demands,
then we may save lives in one place at the risk of
hundreds of lives everywhere else.

Therefore it is our policy . . . that American
Ambassadors and American officials not participate
in negotiations on the release of victims of terrorists
and that terrorists know that the United States will
not participate in the payment of ransom and in the
negotiation for it.

The following month, at Orlando, the
Secretary said :

irch 29, 1976

397

When Americans are captured, we are always in
great difficulty because we do not want to get into
a position where we encourage terrorists to capture
Americans in order to get negotiations started for
their aim. So our general position has been — and it
is heartbreaking in individual cases, always heart-
breaking— that we will not, as a Government, nego-
tiate for the release of Americans that have been
captured.

... we will not negotiate . . . because there are
so many Americans in so many parts of the world —
tourists, newsmen, not only officials — that it would
be impossible to protect them all unless the kid-
napers can gain no benefit from it.

For these reasons, the U.S. Government
has not and will not pay ransom, release
prisoners, or otherwise yield to terrorist
blackmail. Nor will it negotiate with respect
to any of these matters. We urge the same
policy on other governments, private com-
panies, and individuals. We rely for the safe
return of American hostages on the re-
sponsibility under traditional international
law of a host government to protect all
persons within its territories, including the
safe release of hostages. We consider it the
host government's sovereign right to decide
during an incident how it will fulfill this
responsibility.

This may sound somewhat cold and un-
feeling. But you may be sure that those of
us charged with managing cases of Ameri-
cans abducted abroad feel keenly both the
plight of the hostage and our government's
legal and moral responsibility to exert every
appropriate effort for his safe return. The
local U.S. Embassy abroad, and the task
force at home, go to work with all the ex-
perience, energy, and imagination they can
muster. They stay in close and continuous
contact with the host government, support-
ing it with all practicable intelligence,
equipment, technical services, and other
assistance and advice it may request,
except advice on how it should respond to
demands from the abductors. This decision
we consider to be the exclusive responsi-
bility of the host government, taken in
awareness, however, of our own govern-
ment's policy not to accede to terrorist
demands.

Sometimes a host government proves un-
willing or unable effectively to discharge its

responsibility to secure the hostage's re-
lease, perhaps because he has been seized by
a rebel or outlaw group within the country.
In such cases we do not wring our hands
helplessly. We may nominate an inter-
mediary to the host government, we may
enlist the assistance of a third government,
or we may ourselves conduct discussions
with the abductors. But if we hold such dis-
cussions they are strictly confined to such
matters as the well-being of the hostage
and to humanitarian and other factors argu-
ing for his unconditional release. There are
no negotiations. The host government is
kept closely informed.

So we do not allow ourselves to be ren-
dered helpless as a result of our no-conces-
sions policies or the failure of a host gov-
ernment to fulfill its obligations under inter-
national law. Sometimes the terrorist has
decided in advance to execute the hostage
or stubbornly holds to his demands to the
point of fulfilling his threat to execute. But
in the more typical case the terrorist is no1
anxious to kill the hostage and when h(
sees, usually over time, that he is not goinji
to succeed in his blackmail effort, he wil
begin to have second thoughts and event
will move toward release. We recently wit
nessed this process in the Netherlands
British, and Irish Governments' patient bu
firm handling of the Moluccan, Balcomt
Street, and Herrema incidents. 1975 saw a
encouraging trend of greater firmness by
number of NATO Governments in the
handling of terrorist incidents. It also saw
welcome trend of a higher level of terrori
arrests and trials and of sterner laws again
terrorism, notably in Germany.

Some argue that we are misreading tl
situation — that acceding to terrorist d
mands to save an American hostage's li!|
would have no, or insignificant, effect on t'
safety of other Americans abroad or on o
effort to combat international terrorisi
Such reasoning is tempting, but I for o
would be reluctant to assume the respon
bility of following it. On the other hand, '
have repeated, convincing evidence th
our government's no-negotiations, no-c(
cessions policies are widely known by t

pui
pen
'fierf

ival

tas

ifova

398

Department of State Bullei <^,

I

It 25

rorist groups abroad, that they are be-
lieved, and that they are having important
deterrent effect.

The United States has not yet had to face
seizures or attacks within its own terri-
tories by international terrorist groups.
Would our government, as a host govern-
ment responsible for dealing with such in-
cidents at home, practice the same firm no-
concessions policies it has urged on other
governments, including when our own citi-
zens have been abducted abroad?

The answer is yes. We are convinced of
the soundness of these policies. And we
have seen other governments, faced with a
series of terrorist incidents of a type we
have thus far been spared, arrive by hard
experience at the conclusion that firmness is
the only course. We have dealt as firmly as
the law allows with domestic terrorist or-
ganizations, such as the Black Panthers,
Symbionese Liberation Army, Weather
Underground, and Puerto Rican Liberation
Armed Force. I do not think you will find
your government wanting if, unhappily, the
international terrorist menace reaches our
shores.

I have discussed the international terror-
ist threat and the U.S. response to that
threat. What are the principal issues and
requirements as we look to the future?

International Cooperation Against Terrorists

First, how are we to achieve more effec-
tive international cooperation for the appre-
hension, trial, and punishment of inter-
national terrorists ?

This objective is as intractable as it is
central. Most countries apparently remain
unwilling to apply strict legal sanctions to
international terrorists. In the Third World,
where most of the difficulty lies, many coun-
itries sympathize with the political aspira-
Itions of groups which practice terrorism.
There is the sympathy of Arab governments
for the Palestinian cause, including ap-
proval of terrorist attacks on Israel and, in
the case of the radical Arab governments,
approval and support of Palestinian terror-
ist attacks in Europe and elsewhere as well.

There is the sympathy of newly independ-
ent countries, many of which used terror-
ism to help achieve their freedom, for anti-
colonial terrorist groups. And there is the
sympathy of practically all Third World
governments for terrorists striking against
repressive authoritarian regimes, particu-
larly in the developed world. Third World
governments generally accept the terrorists'
argument that the weak and oppressed,
with their pleas for justice unheeded, and
lacking the means for conventional war,
have no alternative to terrorism — that ter-
rorism in a perceived "just" cause is not
criminal but patriotic and heroic.

We, with our Judeo-Christian tradition,
can understand this reasoning up to a point,
but we can never accept it. We believe
there can be no justification, in any circum-
stances, for the deliberate killing of inno-
cent individuals. We recognize that the al-
ternatives to terrorism, centering on peace-
ful protest, constructive proposals, and
negotiation, often involve frustration and
delay. But we believe that, in an inter-
dependent world attempting to move away
from violence before it is too late, they
offer the only acceptable means of change.

For different reasons than those put for-
ward by Third World countries, most ad-
vanced countries are also disinclined to com-
mit themselves to clear and unequivocal
sanctions against terrorists. Sometimes
they are inhibited by political or commercial
interests from offending governments that
support or condone terrorism. Or they are
concerned that if they convict and imprison
terrorists this will attract more terrorists
to their territories seeking, through fur-
ther violence, to free their comrades. Or
they are reluctant to see rights of political
asylum weakened. The Communist giants,
the Soviet Union and China, appear to share
our conviction that hijacking, aircraft
sabotage, and other forms of international
terrorism are a criminal threat to civilized
society and should be stopped. But they
also share the Third World's belief that
terrorism as an instrument of "wars of na-
tional liberation" is acceptable, and they
support such terrorism.

(March 29, 1976

399

A succession of major international ter-
rorist incidents during 1975, culminating in
the seizures in Vienna and the Nether-
lands, appears to have somewhat enhanced
awareness of the common danger presented
by international terrorism.

Venezuela and Colombia have jointly
proposed a new consideration of the prob-
lem by the General Assembly in the fall.
Our government earnestly hopes that this
increased awareness and concern is wide-
spread and that antiterrorism proposals in
the 1976 General Assembly will find a differ-
ent atmosphere and reception from that
accorded the convention we proposed in
1972. In an address in Montreal last August
Secretary Kissinger urged the United Na-
tions once again to take up and adopt our
1972 proposals, or some similar convention,
as a matter of the highest priority. In De-
cember our representative on the U.N.
Sixth Committee reiterated this position.

All stand to suffer if the present appar-
ently heightened interest in the control of
international terrorism is allowed to die
without result and has to be reawakened
by further terrorist acts of even more seri-
ous proportions than those suffered in
1975.

Effectiveness of Terrorism

A second question: How effective has in-
ternational terrorism been for the terror-
ists' purposes?

Clearly, international terrorists have had
tactical successes, as recently at Kuala
Lumpur and Vienna, achieving their objec-
tives of publication or broadcasting of mani-
festos, release of imprisoned comrades, or
extortion of ransom. And these successes
have been achieved at small cost to the ter-
rorists— most have escaped to safe havens,
or, if caught, have later been rescued by
comrades or served very short terms. On
the other hand, international terrorist
groups have fruitlessly suffered suicidal
losses in attacks within Israel. And such
groups operating in Europe and elsewhere
have in a number of cases suffered heavy

400

casualties while achieving none of their
purposes, except dubious publicity, as in the
Baader-Meinhof seizure of the German Em-
bassy in Stockholm last April or the earlier
mentioned South Moluccan, Balcombe
Street, and Herrema incidents.

How about terrorist groups' attainment
of their fundamental political goals — the
causes their abductions and attacks are in-
tended to serve?

Here, too, the overall record is hardly a
source of encouragement for terrorists.
Certainly the Baader-Meinhof Gang and the
Japan Red Army have not succeeded in ad-
vancing their nihilist, world revolution
cause significantly. The kidnapings and
murders of U.S. and other diplomats in
Brazil, Guatemala, Argentina, and else-
where have won the terrorists no discern-
ible political gains. The terrorism perpe-
trated by South Moluccan extremists in the
Netherlands achieved world publicity, as
sensational crimes are wont to do. But the
terrorism was essentially negative in its
consequences for the South Moluccan cause,, |ti
embarrassing the group's responsible mem-
bers and outraging the Netherlands Gov-
ernment and people.

As for Palestinian terrorism, the Pales-.
tinian cause is unquestionably more wideljf
known as a result of Palestinian terrorism
than it othei-wise would be. But against this<
must be set the revulsion of all civilized
peoples over the crimes committed by Pal
estinian terrorist groups at Lod, Munich;
Khartoum, within Israel, and elsewhere

Ui

And terrorist attacks have contributed ir
portantly to the hatred and bitternes
which impede a Middle East settlemer
from which the Palestinians might hope ti j '
achieve their goal of a Palestinian state jj..
The decline in Palestinian terrorism withi ,.
the past two years suggests that the mor ^
moderate Palestinian leaders have come i a. '
part, at least, to share the view that te> t,
rorism is counterproductive to the attaii »,
ment of Palestinian objectives. j.

International terrorism, in short, is ijL .

success story, for the Palestinians, th
South Moluccans, or any other group.

-Tke

Department of State Bulle1|4,

»Aj}

Seriousness as a World Problem

A third questions, then, is: How deeply
need we be concerned about international
terrorism as a world problem?

Up to now international terrorism's toll
in dead and wounded and property damage
has been relatively small. This is true of all
forms of terrorism, compared with the
casualties and property losses of even the
most minor conventional wars. But it is
particularly true of international terrorism.
It has been estimated that some 800 people
have been killed, including terrorists, and
some 1,700 injured, in all international ter-
rorist incidents from 1968 through the pres-
ent. Year by year this is no more than the
crime rate of one moderate-sized American
city, intolerably high as that rate is. Prop-
erty damage, principally in destroyed air-
craft, has been equally limited.

But international terrorism's limited toll
in lives and property thus far is only part
of the story. There are a number of things
we should note and ponder:

— Most of the world's airports are now
manned by guards and inspectors, aided
where possible by expensive X-ray ma-
■hines. Even so, no air traveler is secure
'rom terrorist attack.

— U.S. and other nations' Embassies in
Beirut, Buenos Aires, Nicosia, and many
)ther capitals are heavily guarded, in sharp
ontrast with, and derogation of, their dip-
omatic function. Diplomats can no longer
0 about their business in any capital with-
ut varying degrees of fear of being kid-
aped or killed.
— The world's leading statesmen work
nd travel under costly and inhibiting
3strictions.

— Mail received at potential target ad-
resses, such as my own government de-
Artment, must be X-rayed for explosives
jfore delivery.

— State authority is weakened as govern-
ents accede to terrorist demands for re-
ase of prisoners, ransom, and publicity.
— The principles and standards of justice
•e impaired as the perpetrators of horrible

acts of violence are given short sentences
or let free.

None of these conditions has reached
critical proportions. But in combination
they signal a potential for mounting, seri-
ous erosion of world order if we do not
succeed in bringing the international terror-
ist threat under control.

Future of Terrorism

So, finally, what of the future?

I just noted terrorism's, particularly in-
ternational terrorism's, relatively small toll
in killed and wounded and property damage.
This could soon begin to change. New weap-
ons are constantly enlarging terrorists' de-
structive capabilities.

Particularly rapid advances are being
made in individual weapons development as
we and other advanced nations seek to
equip our foot soldiers with increased,
highly accurate firepower. There is obvious
risk of growing quantities of these weap-
ons coming into the hands of terrorists,
weapons which are as capable of being em-
ployed against civil aircraft, supertankers,
motorcades, and speakers' podiums as
against military targets. The Soviet SA-7
heat-seeking, man-portable missile has al-
ready, as I mentioned, been found in the
hands of terrorists.

And there are more serious hazards. As
nuclear power facilities multiply, the quan-
tity and geographical dispersion of pluto-
nium and other fissionable materials in the
world will increase greatly. The possibility
of credible nuclear terrorist threats based
on illicitly constructed atomic bombs, stolen
nuclear weapons, or sabotage of nuclear
power installations can be expected to grow.
Even more plausible would be threats based
on more readily and economically produced
chemical and biological agents, such as
nerve gas and pathogenic bacteria.

Would terrorists actually use such weap-
ons? Probably not. They could already have
attacked cities with toxic aerosols, for ex-
ample, but have not done so. Terrorists, at
least the rational ones, fundamentally seek

arch 29, 1976

401

to influence people, not kill them. The death
of thousands, or tens of thousands, of per-
sons could produce a tremendous backlash
against those responsible and their cause.
But the possibility of credible nuclear,
chemical, and biological threats, particu-
larly by anarchists, is real. Though the
chances of such threats being carried out
may be small, the risk is there and must
be met.

There is a further danger — one of inter-
national terrorist groups for hire, which we
may already be seeing in an incipient stage.
A government might employ such groups
to attack, alarm, or subvert another gov-
ernment or international organization.
Powerful pressures might be brought to
bear through a small, deniable expenditure
by the aggressor government.

The future, some believe, holds a pros-
pect of reduced resort to open warfare but
of a high level of subversive and terroristic
violence and insecurity originating with
governments or subgovernmental elements
using, or threatening to use, against our
vulnerable modern societies, the frighten-
ing small, or even more frightening mass-
effect, weapons I have cited. A world of
many Ulsters might be statistically safer
for the average man than the world of the
past 60 years of repeated major conflicts.
But it would be a more nerve-wracking and
unsettled world of continuing low-level vio-
lence and threatened mass-destruction ter-
rorist attack.

Conclusion

In conclusion, man's inhumanity to man
is not confined to war. Terrorism, too, in-
flicts brutal suffering on the innocent. We
see its toll daily in atrocious acts of in-
digenous or international terrorism.

To combat the latter the United States
presented to the 1972 General Assembly the
carefully formulated draft Convention for
the Prevention and Punishment of Certain
Acts of International Terrorism, which I

mentioned earlier. The idea of the conven-
tion was simple. States, we felt, should be
left to deal themselves, under their domes-
tic law, with acts of terrorism against per-
sons within their own territories, except
diplomats and other internationally pro-
tected persons. However, when terrorists
sought to export terrorism by blackmailing
states through acts committed on the ter-
ritory of other states or in international air
or waters, international law should impose
obligations on the states parties to the con-
vention to prosecute or extradite such ter-
rorists coming under their control. Had this
convention come into force with a full
range of parties, international terrorism
would have been dealt a heavy, perhaps
fatal, blow. There would today be no safe
havens.

Instead our proposal foundered in a dis-
cussion of definitions and of the causes of
international terrorism. It was argued that
we had ignored the problem of terrorism
practiced by repressive governments — state
terrorism — to which group terrorism is
often a response. It was further argued that
international terrorism practiced in a just
cause, such as the self-detennination of
peoples and human rights, could not be
considered criminal.

Our reply to the first of these arguments
was, and is, that there is a wealth of exist-
ing law and ongoing effort in the field of
state action, including state terrorism.
Though these laws and effort have not
given us a perfect world, mixing of the
problem of international terrorism with the
problem of state terrorism would not assist
the reduction of either.

With respect to the causes of terrorism,
we have pointed out that none of the many
states which have won their independence!
the hard way, including our own nation, f
engaged in the type of international vio-
lence which our draft convention seeks to I
control. Our proposal is carefully restricted!
to the problem of the spread of violence tc|
persons and places far removed from the-

402

Department of State BulletirJ

scene of struggles for self-determination.
We have further noted that even when the
use of force may be legally justified, there
are some means which must not be used,
especially when directed against innocents.
This principle has long been recognized in
the rules of war. Certainly if a state acting
in a situation where its very survival may be
at stake is legally precluded from resorting
to atrocities, individuals or groups purport-
edly seeking to advance some self-deter-
mined cause should be similarly limited.

Terrorism is an affront to civilization.
Like piracy, it must be seen as outside the
law. In Secretary Kissinger's words last
August in Montreal, "It discredits any po-
litical objective that it purports to serve
and any nations which encourage it." The
United States is not wedded to its 1972 pro-
posal, but it is firmly wedded to that most
precious of human rights, the right of the
innocent person to life. It is time — past
time — for the international community
genuinely to address the affliction of inter-
national terrorism and to take effective ac-
tion against it. The technological inter-
dependence of the modern world enables the
terrorist to carry out and publicize acts of
terrorism in ways that were beyond reach
a few decades ago. The international com-
munity must catch up with this moderniza-
tion of barbarism before it is victimized by
acts of terrorism as yet only imagined.

President Ford Establishes
Mew Agricultural Policy Groups

Following is a fact sheet issued by the
Vhite House ]n'ess office on March 5.

President Ford has announced [at Spring-
ield, 111., on March 5] a reorganization of
he Administration's agricultural policy-
laking machinery.

A new Agricultural Policy Committee is

being formed with Secretary Butz as Chair-
man. The Committee will include:

Secretary of Agriculture — Chairman

Secretary of State

Secretary of the Treasury

Secretary of Commerce

Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs

Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs

Chaii'man of the Council of Economic Advisers

Assistant to the President for National Security

Affairs
Director of the Office of Management and Budget
Special Assistant to the President for Consumer

Affairs
Executive Director of the Council on International

Economic Policy

This new Committee is being formed to
consolidate agricultural policymaking into
one group, which will report directly to the
President and will advise him on the formu-
lation, coordination, and implementation of
all agricultural policy. The scope of the
Committee will include both domestic and
international issues.

The new Committee replaces the Interna-
tional Food Review Group, chaired by the
Department of State, and the EPB/NSC
[Economic Policy Board; National Security
Council] Food Committee, cochaired by the
Departments of State and the Treasury.

The EPB/NSC Food Committee was cre-
ated on September 9, 1975, to develop nego-
tiating strategy for American grain sales to
the Soviet Union and to monitor those nego-
tiations. This Committee has been chaired
jointly by the Secretary of State and the
Secretai-y of the Treasury. Other members
include:

Secretary of Agriculture

Secretary of Labor

Secretary of Commerce

Director of the Office of Management and Budget

Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers

Executive Director of the Council on International

Economic Policy
Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs
Assistant to the President for National Security

Affairs

The International Food Review Group was
established on November 12, 1974, to coor-

larch 29, 1976

403

dinate the followup to the World Food Con-
ference. The IFRG has been chaired by the
Secretary of State. Other members include:

Secretary of the Treasury

Secretary of Agriculture

Deputy Secretary of Stat*'

Assistant to the President for Economic Alfairs

Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers

Director of the Office of Management and Budget

Executive Director of the Council on International

Economic Policy
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations
Assistant to the President for National Security

Affairs

The Food Deputies Group, which currently
provides staff-level assistance to the Eco-
nomic Policy Board in agricultural policy
matters, will become the Agricultural Policy
Working Group. This Working Group will
provide the Agricultural Policy Committee
with staff assistance by monitoring agricul-
tural developments and preparing issue
papers and other analyses.

The Food Deputies Group was created to
monitor agricultural developments and to
prepare materials on selected issues being
considered by the Economic Policy Board.
This group is chaired by a member of the
Council of Economic Advisers and includes
representatives of the:

Department of Agriculture

Department of the Treasury

Department of State

Department of Commerce

Office of Management and Budget

Council on International Economic Policy

Domestic Council

National Security Council

Special Representative fur Trade Negotiations

Council on Wage and Price Stability

United Nations Documents:
A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as
those listed heloxv) may he consulted at depository
libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publica-
tions may be purchased from the Sales Section of
the United Nations, United Natiojis Plaza, N.Y.
10017.

Security Council

Letter dated January 22. 1976, from the Permanent
Representative of the Libyan Arab Republic trans-
mitting the Declaration of Dakar on Namibia and
Human Rights adopted by the Dakar International
Conference on Namibia and Human Rights held
January 5-8, 1976. S/11939. January 23. 1976.
12 pp.

Letter dated January 26, 1976, from the Permanent
Representative of the Netherlands transmitting
the outlines of the demarche undertaken on the
eve of the Security Council debate on Namibia by
the Netherlands Ambassador to South Africa on
behalf of the nine countries of the European Com-
munity. S/11945. January 27, 1976. 2 pp.

Letter dated January 27, 1976, from the Permanent
Representative of South Africa in connection with
"the current consideration by the Security Council
of the question of South West Africa." S/11948.
January 27, 1976. 17 pp. South West Africa Sur-
vey. 1974. S/11948/ Add.l. January 27, 1976. 70 pp.

General Assembly

Alternative approaches and ways and means within
the United Nations system for improving the effec-
tive enjoyment of human rights and fundamental
freedoms. Report of the Secretary General.
A/10235. October 7, 1975. 58 pp.

Letter dated October 24, 1975, from the Permanent
Representative of Chile transmitting a report pre-
pared by the Government of Chile on the situation
regarding human rights in that country. A/C.3/639'
October 27, 1975. 74 pp.

404

Department of Stale BulletiJ

THE CONGRESS

Secretary Kissinger Discusses U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy

Statement by Secretary Kissinger

I

I welcome this opportunity to speak to
you on tile subject of nuclear proliferation
— one of the most urgent problems facing
the United States and the world community
and one which will vitally affect the secu-
rity of all nations for the rest of this
century.

As the committee is aware, your con-
cerns over the dangers posed by further
nuclear proliferation are widely and deeply
shared throughout the U.S. Government. To
?onvey to you both the seriousness with
A'hich we view this issue and the steps we
ire taking to deal with the proliferation
)roblem, I propose to address the following
(uestions in my statement:

First, how does nonproliferation fit into
he framework of our overall foreign pol-
T?

Second, what multilateral efforts to deter
, roliferation have already been initiated,
nd what further measures do we con-
!mplate?

Third, what actions are we taking as a
latter of U.S. national policy to reinforce
id e.xtend our international nonprolifera-
on activities?

Fourth, how do we assess the longer term
•ospects for containing further nuclear
■read through an evolving diplomatic and
chnical strategy?

Made before the Senate Committee on Govem-
1 nt Operations on IWar. 9 (text from press release
i)). The complete transcript of the hearings will
' published by the committee and will be available
fm the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
eiment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Before turning to these broader aspects
of nonproliferation, I should note that I
fully approve of the position on Senate
bill 1439 set forth by Deputy Secretary
Ingersoll before the committee. For the
reasons outlined during his January 30
appearance, we cannot support this bill.

Nonproliferation Perspectives

Nonproliferation has been a primary for-
eign policy goal of the United States
through six Administrations, with major
accomplishments stemming from U.S. ini-
tiatives demonstrating the seriousness
with which this policy has been pursued. I
cite, for example, the adoption of bilateral
safeguards and controls in our government-
to-government cooperative agreements, the
establishment of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, and
the entering into force of the nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty. As a result of these
steps, the number of nuclear-weapon states
has been substantially limited.

After I assumed the oflice of Secretary of
State, however, it became apparent that
changing circumstances warranted a new
look at our nonproliferation strategy:

—Other industrialized states were enter-
ing the international nuclear market, there-
by challenging our longstanding dominance
as a commercial nuclear exporter and
threatening to diminish the ultimate effect
of our national safeguards and control
policies.

'jrch 29, 1976

405

— The oil crisis has stimulated many
developing as well as developed states to
accelerate their peaceful nuclear power pro-
grams, both as a means of lowering the cost
of generating electrical energy and reduc-
ing their reliance on imported petroleum
products.

— The nuclear test by India underscored
the fact that additional states, even those
not part of the highly industrialized world,
were capable of using nuclear technology
to construct explosives.

In my speech to the U.N. General As-
sembly in September of 1974, I underscored
our concerns over the rapid spread of nuclear
technology with potential explosive implica-
tions. I chose this forum to address the
pressing problem of proliferation since it is
clear that the danger of further nuclear-
explosive spread is a problem vital to every
nation on this planet. At that time, I
warned against complacency by observing
that:

The world has grown so accustomed to the exist-
ence of nuclear weapons that it assumes they will
never be used. But today, technology is rapidly ex-
panding the number of nuclear weapons in the hands
of major powers and threatens to put nuclear-explo-
sive technology at the disposal of an increasing
number of other countries.

Let me emphasize that pursuit of a vig-
orous nonproliferation strategy remains a
fundamental dimension of this Administra-
tion's overall foreign policy:

— We see the need to reduce the danger
of nuclear war as the centerpiece of our
policy. If additional states acquired nuclear
weapons, global stability would be en-
dangered, and regional conflicts would run
the risk of leading to nuclear war, with
potentially catastrophic consequences not
only for the nations involved but for all
major powers.

— We view the peaceful settlement of
regional conflicts and a more stable world
order as crucial U.S. objectives. Yet a
world of many nuclear powers would result
in heightened political tensions and in-
creased instabilities flowing from fears that
nuclear weapons might be used, whether

deliberately or through miscalculation.

— We support the worldwide goal of find-
ing alternative sources of energy to reduce
reliance on oil. Yet a progressive pattern of
proliferation could set back, if not cripple
entirely, the continued growth of peaceful
nuclear energy to serve mankind's needs, as
exporters and importers alike came to
lose confidence in the ability of the inter-
national system to find eff'ective techniques
for realizing the peaceful benefits of nuclear
energy while eliminating its inherent se-
curity risks.

To meet these new dangers, I emphasized
in my 1974 U.N. General Assembly speech
— and again a year later before the same
forum — the importance the United States
attaches to nonproliferation. In both ad-
dresses, I outlined practical steps we saw
as necessary to move forward effectively
and comprehensively in this vital field.
These included proposals for the major
suppliers to strengthen nuclear safeguards;
efforts to gain the widest possible support]
for the international safeguard system and:
the Nonproliferation Treaty; physical se-
curity measures to protect nuclear material
against theft or diversion ; and steps to
prevent the unrestrained spread of sensi
five nuclear facilities, such as national re
processing plants.

I am pleased to take this opportunity fc
report to this committee on the progre*
we have made and the problems we stii
face. There have been solid accomplish
ments to date, and I will go into the detail
of these successes in a few moments. Bi<
we are far from complacent, and ev&
as we consolidate our gains, we seek 1
strengthen our nonproliferation strategy. I|

I do not have to tell this committee ho
difficult it is to devise a strategy that C£_j
guarantee success in preventing the nun«jj
ber of nuclear-weapon states from increaMu
ing during the coming decades. But I ca Ij '
not emphasize too strongly our belief thif
the effort can and must be made to conta
nuclear spread, even if we cannot be certaB ,
of completely and effectively blocking ad(
tional nuclear proliferation.

406

Department of State BulleWj^ ,

It is within the foregoing framework
that we have mounted a major effort dur-
ing the past two years to strengthen the
worldwide nonproHferation regime. This
strategy has had two reinforcing elements:

— Multilateral actions to move forward
with other states in meeting the nonpro-
Hferation challenge; and

— National nuclear export policies to in-
sure that the United States continues to
exert responsible leadership in nonproHf-
eration.

Let me now describe in some detail the
^key elements of our nonproHferation strat-
egy, what has been accomplished during the
past two years, and what needs to be
done to further advance our position.

Multilateral Strategy

Suppliers Consultation. I have noted earlier

hat the United States, practically speak-

ng, does not have complete, unilateral free-

lom of action with respect to its nuclear

xport policy. Other major industrial pow-

rs have the capacity and desire to con-

ribute to the world's needs for peaceful

uclear energy, and they fully recognize

le need to safeguard their assistance.

It is important, however, that safeguards

3t become an element of commercial com-

3tition. U.S. constraints by themselves

ill have little effect if other nuclear sup-

iers decline to exercise the same restraint.

1 recognition of this, we have pursued a

)licy of consulting with other nuclear-

:porting countries in an effort to devise

common set of standards concerning safe-

ards and other related controls associated

nth peaceful nuclear exports. I believe

se efforts have met with a significant

ree of success.

luAs a result of these consultations, the

ited States has decided to adopt, as a

tter of national policy, certain principles

jlich will govern our future nuclear ex-

s. We have been informed that a num-

of other countries intend to do the

e. As other Administration witnesses

e testified in recent weeks before an-

other Senate committee, these principles
include:

— Provisions for the application of IAEA
safeguards on exports of material, equip-
ment, and technology;

— Prohibitions against using assistance
for any nuclear explosions including those
for "peaceful purposes";

— Requirements for physical security
measures on nuclear equipment and ma-
terials ;

— Application of restraint in the trans-
fer of sensitive technologies (such as en-
richment and reprocessing) ;

— Encouragement of multinational re-
gional facilities for reprocessing and en-
richment; and

— Special conditions governing the use
or retransfer of sensitive material, equip-
ment, and technology.

These are significant principles which
have moved the level and comprehensive-
ness of international nonproHferation con-
trols substantially beyond where they were
only a few short years ago. But it is
important to recognize that further efforts
are needed to improve and extend these
principles and that our efforts are part of
a progressive and evolving process which
we win continue in close consultation with
other suppliers.

NPT Adherence. A second important ele-
ment of our international nonproHferation
strategy is our effort to secure the widest
possible adherence to the NonproHferation
Treaty. Adherence to the NPT is a key
element in prevention of nuclear prolifera-
tion because it involves a comprehensive
commitment by non-nuclear-weapon states
not to develop nuclear explosives — a com-
mitment verified by IAEA safeguards on
all peaceful nuclear facilities in that coun-
try— and also because it requires safe-
guards on nuclear exports.

While NPT adherence is still far from
universal, nearly 100 states are now party
to the treaty. The past 18 months have
seen a number of important new adherents,
including the Federal Republic of Germany,
Italy, the Benelux countries, the Republic

ole"

Irch 29, 1976

407

of Korea, Libya, and Venezuela, as well as
submission of the treaty by Japan, which
has already signed the treaty, to the Diet
for ratification.

We must continue to do whatever we
can to increase support for this most im-
portant treaty in the hope that non-nuclear-
weapon states who see the disadvantages
of acquiring nuclear weapons will pei'ceive
that their national interest would best be
served by adherence.

IAEA Safeguards. Another essential fea-
ture of our international strategy — and, in-
deed, one that unde)-pins the progress we
have made in consultations with other sup-
pliers and one that is basic to the Non-
proliferation Treaty itself — is the compre-
hensive safeguards system of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency. Even in
the case of recipient states not party to
the NPT, the IAEA system provides inter-
nationally recognized safeguards arrange-
ments to insure that nuclear exports are
used for peaceful purposes.

IAEA safeguards entail techniques to
account for nuclear materials, reinforced
by containment and surveillance measures.
Agency experts conduct onsite inspections
to verify, through independent means, that
safeguards material and facilities are be-
ing used for declared purposes. These
safeguards can provide a high degree of
assurance that any significant diversions
will be detected and thus provide a real
deterrent.

While a safeguards system cannot pro-
vide absolute assurance that all conceivable
diversions, however modest, will be de-
tected, it does not have to. What it must
do — and what the IAEA accomplishes with
confidence — is expose the would-be diverter
to a high risk of detection.

We recognize that some question the ade-
quacy of the international controls related
to nuclear facilities and materials that have
evolved over the years. However, in the
one instance where a nuclear device was
exploded through the use of equipment
obtained from outside, safeguards did not
exist on the facility or its products. Con-

sequently, the question of adequacy of
safeguards in this case simply did not arise.
In fact, since the inception of safeguards,
we know of no nation that has acquired
nuclear weapons through any diversion of
nuclear material subject to either bilateral
or IAEA safeguards.

We believe that the IAEA system — with
the active technical, financial, and political
support of key suppliers and all nations in-
terested in using nuclear energy for peace-
ful purposes — will continue to fulfill this
requirement. Indeed, the IAEA safeguards
system continues to be a most vital and
singularly important element in the battery
of constraints developed over the years in
support of our nonproliferation objectives.

Sensitive Exports. Another element in our
international strategy is designed to meet
what is perhaps the most troublesome non^
proliferation issue confronting us; name
ly, dealing with sensitive technologies, sucj-
as reprocessing, enrichment, and heavj
water production. The problem has beei
made more acute as more countries becomi
interested in acquiring these sensitive fa
cilities. In terms of proliferation risks, plu
tonium-reprocessing plants abroad pose th
most immediate problem. This is unfo:
tunate, since for most countries — tho&
without very large nuclear power program
— the economic benefits of reprocessin
spent fuel remain dubious.

As a result of growing perceptions (
the direct proliferation risks, suppliers i
well as recipients appear to be exercisir
increasing restraint in such sensitive are;
and have concluded rigorous safeguard
agreements. In this regard, we great
welcomed Korea's decision not to acqui
a national reprocessing facility and ho]
that it will enhance multilateral efforts
develop alternatives to national capabilitif

One course of action which might me
the future reprocessing needs of certa
countries in a potentially economic mann
and at the same time alleviate some of o
concerns regarding the proliferation
such facilities is the concept of a mul
national fuel-cycle center serving regioi

408

Department of State Bulle#ik29

needs, to which I have given my personal
support before the U.N. General Assembly
last year.

Such plants — involving management, op-
eration, and perhaps ownership by more
than one country — would reduce the incen-
tive for small and inefficient national plants
and provide useful added assurances
against unilateral abrogation of nonprolif-
eration undertakings, particularly if co-
located with other parts of the fuel cycle
such as the fabrication and storage of nu-
clear materials. They would also facilitate
the application of international safeguards.
The IAEA is currently carrying out a study
of the multinational concept.

Physical Security. The final key element of
our international nonproliferation strategy
concerns the question of physical security
of nuclear facilities and materials and spe-
cifically the concern that a subnational or
terrorist group might seize nuclear mate-
rials.

We have received excellent cooperation

in our consultations with other countries

designed to insure that adequate physical

ecurity measures are applied. Major sup-

oliers are including provisions in their nu-

|;lear cooperation agreements which specif i-

|;ally require adequate levels of physical

Jiecurity systems in recipient countries to

)rotect nuclear materials and equipment.

experts from member countries are assist-

ng the IAEA in developing an authorita-

ive body of knowledge on the establish-

lent of eff'ective national physical security

ystems.

Also, we are pursuing our proposal of

11 international convention, setting stand-

ds to protect the physical security of

luclear materials, that might serve to facil-

«ate international collaboration and greater

aiformity of practice in this area.

lis. National Strategy

liBasic Premise. I have been discussing
|iose multilateral measures we are pursu-
in support of our nonproliferation ob-
Ictives. U.S. national policies and prac-

tices in this area reflect our special concern
with the problem of nonproliferation and
are, in some respects, more stringent than
those of some other supplier nations.

The basic premise of U.S. nuclear co-
operation for over 20 years has been world-
wide cooperation in the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy under effective controls.
Our approach has been to offer long-term
assurances of enriched uranium supply, ac-
companied by the especially economical U.S.
reactor technology, in exchange for agree-
ment on effective safeguards arrangements.

In this connection, as I testified before
another committee of the Congress last
month in support of the Administration's
proposed Nuclear Fuel Assurances Act,
many of the positive advances we have
made in pursuit of our nonproliferation
objectives can be traced directly to our
capability and willingness to furnish en-
riched uranium on a reliable and long-term
basis, along with other elements essential
to peaceful nuclear development.

Policy Elements. As I observed earlier, our
policies with regard to nuclear exports are
fully consistent with the principles adopted
as a result of supplier consultations and,
in fact, in some areas go beyond them. For
example, in the areas of reprocessing, en-
richment, and heavy water production ac-
tivities, our basic approach has been to
avoid the export of such sensitive technol-
ogies. To insure adequate control, the ex-
ecutive branch instituted, in 1972, special
regulations governing all proposed trans-
actions in these areas.

With regard to the general problem of
reprocessing, the United States is providing
significant technical and financial support
to the IAEA in connection with its study
of the concept of multinational regional
fuel-cycle centers. We are also urging that
relevant groups of countries initiate dis-
cussions of the potential of this concept
among themselves.

In the area of international safeguards,
I would note that in his most recent energy
message, the President outhned the Ad-
ministration's decision to make special con-

nch 29, 1976

409

tributions of up to a total of $5 million
in the next five years to help strengthen
the Agency's safeguards program. We will,
of course, continue research programs and
technical support activities aimed at assist-
ing the IAEA to develop more effective safe-
guards procedures.

Pursuant to the physical security meas-
ures we have adopted as a result of sup-
plier consultations, the United States has
adopted the policy that significant quanti-
ties of sensitive nuclear materials will not
be approved for export unless adequate
physical protection measures are applied in
the recipient countries, and U.S. physical
security teams have visited numerous coun-
tries in this connection to observe their
protection systems.

Proposals for Severe Constraints. Against
the backdrop of the strategies that we are
pursuing internationally and as a matter
of U.S. national policy, I believe it appro-
priate that I respond to some of the critics
of our nuclear export policies who have
called for what I believe to be overly severe
constraints which would seriously set back,
rather than advance, our nonproliferation
eiforts. These proposals range from a com-
plete moratorium on our nuclear exports,
to an embargo on nuclear transfers to
non-NPT parties, to proposals to agree
to nuclear exports to states not party to
the NPT only if they have accepted ap-
proved IAEA safeguards on all their peace-
ful nuclear programs.

In essence, it is our view that adoption
of any of these proposals would, for ex-
ample :

— Violate the spirit, if not the letter,
of a number of international undertakings
to cooperate in peaceful nuclear programs,
including article IV of the Nonprolifera-
tion Treaty;

■ — Damage our political relationships well
beyond the nuclear area with a large num-
ber of countries who have entered into
long-term arrangements with us;

— Cast further doubt on the credibility
of U.S. supply commitments and the con-
stancy of our policy at precisely the mo-

ment when we can least afford such doubts;

— Reduce the influence we are now able
to bring to bear in support of our nonpro-
liferation objectives inasmuch as it is un-
likely that such proposals will be supported
by all major suppliers; and

— Might well result in the breakdown of
supplier cooperation and a return to rel-
atively uncontrolled competition among
other supplier countries.

I have commented negatively on these
proposals, not because I question the moti-
vation and concern that underlie them bu1
because I do not believe they would achievi
our nonproliferation objectives. The prob
lems of proliferation are complicated an(
not susceptible to quick and easy solutions

To avoid the further spread of nuclear
weapon capabilities will require the diligen
pursuit of complex political and technics
measures which minimize the pressures fc
proliferation and, at the same time, erec
effective controls against it. This Admii
istration is firmly committed to this objei
five, and I know we can count on tli^^
Congress to work with us in insuring
can achieve this vital goal.

Proliferation Prognosis

The arrangements I have described ai ''I
designed to inhibit and detect any diva
sion. There remains the question of me{
ures that could be applied in the event
a demonstrated diversion of nuclear n
terial to nonpeaceful purposes or other v
lations of a nonproliferation or safeguai
undertaking. This is a question of imp
tance, since treaty assurances against p
liferation, even when backed by effect
safeguards, could lose much of their det
rent power if nations come to believe tit
violations of such arrangements would
be viewed with seriousness by the int
national community.

Under the Statute of the Internatio
Atomic Energy Agency, all further pe£
ful nuclear assistance would be discontin i
in the event a state violated its IAEA sii-
guards commitments. If U.S. nuclear ]ji

iliii
aol

h

it:

410

Department of State BullAilij;

terial was involved, our bilateral agree-
ments call for halting further assistance.
The IAEA Statute also provides for suspen-
sion of membership in the Agency in the
event of a violation and reporting to the
U.N. Security Council. In addition, both our
bilateral agreements and the IAEA Statute
include the right to call for the return of
supplied materials and equipment.

These actions are substantial. The dis-
continuance of supply to a country which
has committed a major portion of its elec-
trical energy generation to nuclear energy
is in itself a significant disincentive to any
violation. More generally, I can assure you
that the United States would treat a viola-
tion of one of its agreements with the
utmost gravity. And I am confident that the
world community at large would view such
an action with comparable concern.

However, these considerations do not re-
lieve us of the need to insure that we have
taken all available and practical preventive
measures to forestall the spread of nuclear
A'eapons. To this end, as I have indicated,
ve have strengthened and standardized the
;ystem of safeguards and controls in our
lational policies and through multilateral
nitiatives ; identified the improvements
leeded to further diminish the likelihood
hat peaceful nuclear technology will be used
0 build explosives; and established pro-
edural and institutional arrangements to
nable us to consolidate our gains and move
Dward our future goals.
Perhaps most fundamentally, we recog-
ize that proliferation is not a problem to

be addressed solely through the technical
and legal framework of safeguards and ex-
port controls — vital as these avenues may
be. There is a direct link, as I have stressed,
between our efforts in nonproliferation and
our broader efforts to construct a more se-
cure international climate.

If countries remain convinced that re-
gional and global tensions can be reduced
through cooperation, that disputes can be
resolved in a peaceful manner, and that
their legitimate security requirements can
be met, there will be no need for them to
develop nuclear weapons.

To be successful in our nonproliferation
endeavors, we must sustain and build upon
the multilateral and national policy founda-
tions we have established. As I indicated
earlier, this requires constant attention to
consultations with other nuclear suppliers,
peaceful nuclear cooperation with recipi-
ents, and constructive support for inter-
national mechanisms which can lend per-
manence to our nonproliferation policies.

This task warrants the most vigorous
U.S. and international efforts. We hope to
work constructively with the Congress in
continuing to develop and implement a bal-
anced U.S. nonproliferation strategy — bal-
anced in the need to maintain our influence
through prudent and reliable national ex-
port policies, the importance of pursuing
a multilateral as well as a national ap-
proach, and the recognition that our over-
all foreign objectives can reinforce our non-
proliferation goals as we work to create a
more stable world order.

irch 29, 1976

411

Department Proposes Two New Actions

To Deal With International Problem of Bribery

Statement by Deputy Secretary Robert S. Ingersoll '

I am pleased to be here today to discuss a
serious problem which bears directly on U.S.
foreign relations and economic interests: the
revelations about alleged corrupt practices
involving U.S. multinationals abroad.

First, let me again state emphatically that
the Department of State condemns in the
strongest terms any and all corrupt practices
involving corporations, whether U.S. or
foreign. We have stated this position in sev-
eral forums recently, but I want to reiterate
it here as the basis for all the comments I
make to you today. The Department's view
— and my own personal view as one with
experience in business and government — is
that bribes or other illicit payments cannot
be condoned. Moreover, this is not a new
policy. The Department of State has never
condoned such payments.

— They are ethically wrong.

— Their disclosure can unfairly tarnish
the reputations of responsible American
businessmen.

— They make it more difficult for the U.S.
Government to assist U.S. firms in the law-
ful pursuit of their legitimate business inter-
ests abroad.

— ^^They encumber our relations with
friendly foreign governments.

' Made before the Subcommittee on Priorities and
Economy in Government of tlie Joint Economic Com-
mittee on Mar. 5 (text from press release 114). The
complete transcript of the hearings will be published
by the committee and will be available from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

— They are, in the long run, bad business.

f

III

as firms involved in such practices risk los;
of contracts, sales, and even property.

— They contribute to a deterioration o
the general investment climate.

The U.S. Government has taken the pos
tion that any investor who makes illega
payments cannot look to the United State
to protect him from legitimate law enforce
nient actions by the responsible authoritia
of either the host country or of the Unita
States. We support cooperation by the U.I
agencies investigating these cases with r
sponsible foreign authorities seeking 1:
foi-mation consistent with the requiremeni
of the laws and procedural fairness.

However, the U.S. Government will p:
vide appropriate diplomatic protection
American nationals abroad who are n
treated fairly in accordance with interr
tional law. We are concerned at threats
extrajudicial sanctions which may be d
proportionate to the offense and based
unproved allegations. We do not believe tt
economic retaliation is an appropriate :
sponse to payments which, although cont:
versial, are either lawful under the forei
law concerned or, if unlawful, are subject
specific civil or criminal penalties prescriV
by that law. Of course, we also oppose si-
retaliation for failure to make such pnl
ments, as alleged in some recent cases. T|
Department of State has a responsibility
assist American businessmen who ytj
treated unfairly.

In international discussions of enterpi
behavior, the United States has supper
two basic principles:

itidi

res|

412

Department of State Bull<M29

,11

— First, all sovereign states have the
right to supervise and regulate the activity
of foreign investors in their territory, con-
sistent with the minimum standards of
justice called for by international law; and

— Second, investors must respect the laws
of the nations in which they operate and
conduct themselves as good corporate citi-
zens of these nations, refraining from im-
proper interference in their internal affairs.

Unfortunately, however, in these matters
foreign investors and traders are not always
faced with clear-cut choices in unambiguous
circumstances. Instead, they frequently find
themselves operating under unclear rules
and local customs and business methods far
removed from those learned in business
school. A foreign investor who receives "sug-
gestions" from officials of the host govern-
nent is placed in a difficult position. Many
6 'ourageous businessmen have refused to go
ilong with questionable practices abroad and,
n some cases, have had to forgo business
■pportunities as a result.

We are told that businessmen from other

ountries take the view that what we call

eil improper" payments are a basic require-

lent of the societies in which they operate

nd represent centuries-old practices which

0 amount of indignation or legislation can

nange. These businessmen are reluctant to

eijupport either domestic or international

jgal action for fear that such measures

ould not only do no good but would also

irden commerce and provide a dangerous

tstrument for selective application against

dividual corporations. Some American

'Ojlisinessmen may share this point of view,

[(lit it increasing numbers are concluding that

me action is necessary to deal with the

;uation.

What can be done? Obviously, the prin-
jal responsibility for dealing with criminal
ts in foreign countries is that of the
ivernments directly concerned. But we, too,
ve a responsibility to make sure that U.S.
vs regulating corporate behavior are
forously enforced and that official U.S.
i)grams in foreign countries are effectively
maged to guard against these practices.

The responsible U.S. agencies are already
taking significant steps. The Securities and
Exchange Commission and the Internal
Revenue Service are giving the problem
vigorous attention, and their efforts can be
expected to have a substantial deterrent
effect.

The Departments of State and Defense
have taken steps to insure that foreign gov-
ernments who purchase defense articles and
services under the foreign military sales
(FMS) program are fully informed of any
agents' fees that are included in the price
of the goods sold. Under the applicable reg-
ulations, the foreign government is notified
of any such fee at the time of the Depart-
ment of Defense offer to sell. If the foreign
government responds that the fee is unac-
ceptable, the American supplier is advised
that the Department of Defense will not con-
sider the fee an allowable cost under the
contract.

In several cases foreign governments have
established a general policy that contingent
fees are not to be allowed on FMS cases.
The U.S. Government has responded to that
policy by adopting a regulation with respect
to such countries that no contingent fee
will be allowed as an item for reimburse-
ment unless it is specifically approved in ad-
vance by the purchasing government. We
believe that our procedures on FMS trans-
actions can be further improved and support
the concept of systematic reporting along
the general lines of the pending amend-
ments to the security assistance bill. Of
course, it is important that any such legisla-
tion respect the legitimate need for confiden-
tiality of business information the public
disclosure of which could harm the com-
petitive position of American companies.

But this is an international problem, and
significant progress will come only on a
broad scale. It is tempting to try to deal
with the situation unilaterally, but there
are serious risks for the United States in
such an approach. There is widespread rec-
ognition in the Congress that such unilat-
eral action would put U.S. companies at a
serious disadvantage in the export trade.

frch 29, 1976

413

Senate Resolution 265, adopted by a vote
of 93-0 last November 12, takes note of the
trade-distorting effect of corrupt practices
and calls upon the executive branch to nego-
tiate a multilateral agreement to deal with
the problem.

We have seen dramatic evidence in recent
weeks of the potential consequences of dis-
closure in the United States of events which
affect the vital interests of foreign govern-
ments. Preliminary results have included
serious political crises in friendly countries,
possible cancellation of major overseas
orders for U.S. industries, and the risk of
general cooling toward U.S. firms abroad.
Many foreign commentators and opinion-
makers have expressed concern about the
effects of U.S. processes in their countries
and suggested that the United States has a
responsibility to take into account the in-
terests of its allies when it is cleaning up
its own house.

I wish to state for the record that grievous
damage has been done to the foreign rela-
tions of the United States by recent dis-
closures of unsubstantiated allegations
against foreign officials. As I said, we do not
condone, nor does the U.S. Government con-
done, bribery by American corporations
overseas. On the other hand, it is a fact that
public discussion in this country of the al-
leged misdeeds of officials of foreign govern-
ments cannot fail to damage our relations
with these governments.

We think there are many advantages to
a multilateral approach which is based on
international agreement both as to the basic
standards to be applied in international trade
and investment and the procedures to cur-
tail corrupt practices. A coordinated action
by exporting and importing countries would
be the only effective way to inhibit improper
activities of this kind internationally. An
international agreement would also help
insure that action would be taken against
those who solicit or accept payments as well
as those who offer or make them.

As a first step, we have negotiated strong
language condemning bribery as part of the
voluntary guidelines for multinational enter-
prises which are being drawn up in the

OECD [Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development].

However, in the area of criminal law, such
as in the matter of bribery, more is needed.
Effective action, consistent with individual
rights, must be in accordance with estab
lished legal procedures. Thus, in this area,
we favor action pursuant to national law
and international agreement.

Therefore I am taking this occasion to
announce that the United States is proposing]
a multilateral agreement on corrupt prac-
tices.

The agreement would be based inter alia
on the following principles:

—It would apply to international trad(
and investment transactions with govern
ments ; i.e., government procurement am
such other governmental actions affectinj
international trade and investment as ma;
be agreed ;

— It would apply equally to those whi|
offer or make improper payments and thoi
who request or accept them;

— Host (importing) governments woul'|
agree

1. To establish clear guidelines conceriJ
ing the use of agents in connection witll
government procurement and other co>|
ered transactions ; and

2. To establish appropriate criminJ
penalties for bribery and extortion I'j
enterprises and officials ;

— Governments would cooperate and ej
change information to help eradicate su
corrupt practices ;

— Uniform provisions would be agre]
for disclosure by enterprises, agents, ai|
officials of political contributions, gifts, af
payments made in connection with cover[
transactions.

Our delegation to the second session
the U.N. Commission on Transnatio
Corporations, now meeting in Lima, has b(j
instructed to call for such an agreement.

At this point, I would like to say a fl
words about the Lockheed case. A number!
foreign governments have expressed gri
concern about disclosui-es resulting frl

I

Wi

414

Department of State Bulli|

*»,19

Senate investigations, or reports attributed
to those investigations, that are said to im-
plicate high officials. These governments have
requested the Department of State's assist-
ance to obtain the documentation necessary
to investigate these allegations.

The Department has always cooperated
Ifully with foreign governments whose in-
terests are affected by these disclosures.
[But we do not have the coi-porate documents
n question. These, where they exist, are held
)y Lockheed, by the Senate subcommittee
)n multinationals, or by the SEC subject to
I court order.

Press reports have given the erroneous im-
iression that the State Department has not
leen responsive to the requests of foreign
overnments for information developed on
his matter. This is not the case. The Depart-
lent has been concerned that premature
ublic disclosure of unsubstantiated charges
gainst foreign officials might unfairly dam-
ge the rights of individuals and cause
irious problems in U.S. relations with other
)untries. However, we have never ques-
oned the need for friendly foreign gov-
nments to have access to the information
carry on their own legitimate investi-
itions, and we have taken appropriate
9ps to facilitate that access.
:In recent days we have been consulting
■gently with the SEC and with the Depart-
mt of Justice to develop a procedure that
luld facilitate the exchange of information
th interested foreign governments. Under
s procedure, the Department of Justice
uld enter into cooperative arrangements
:h the responsible law enforcement
Micies of other interested governments, as
las done in past cases of interest to more
m one government. It will arrange for the
:hange of information in accordance with
traditional procedures established to pro-
t the integrity of criminal investigations

'OVi

and the rights of individuals affected. That
is to say, foreign law enforcement officials
would be expected to assure that information
secured from U.S. sources would be treated
on a confidential basis until such time as the
foreign law enforcement agency had decided
that it wished to proceed with a criminal
prosecution against a particular individual.

Should any exchange of information re-
quire modification of the court order in the
SEC-Lockheed case, the government will be
prepared to propose suitable amendments to
the court.

Finally, let me say that the Department
of Justice is already making inquiries to
determine whether overseas payments and
related activities by Lockheed have involved
violations of U.S. law. This matter is being
pressed with vigor. It should be understood,
however, that foreign governments have an
equal interest in prosecuting offenses against
their laws, and in some cases the nature of
the alleged wrongdoing is such that foreign
law enforcement officials have an even more
urgent need to proceed than U.S. law en-
forcement officials. These varying priorities
will have to be resolved by mutual discussion
between our Department of Justice and for-
eign law enforcement ofliicials.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we are pro-
posing two new actions to deal with the
international bribery problem:

— ^First, a multilateral agreement to be
negotiated within the U.N. system to help
deter and punish such activities by enter-
prises, agents, and government officials.

— Second, a framework for bilateral co-
operation with foreign law enforcement
agencies with which we can make satis-
factory arrangements for the exchange of
evidence.

We are hopeful that these initiatives will
prove to be effective.

yal

kh 29, 1976

415

Department Discusses Foreign Indebtedness to the United States

Statement by Paul H. Boeker

Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Finance and Development'

I welcome the opportunity to appear be-
fore this subcommittee to discuss the issue
of foreign indebtedness to the United States.
I would like to discuss the importance of
debt within the context of our overall foreign
economic relations as well as describe the
Department of State's responsibilities for
debt collection and renegotiation. I will also
address some of the problems we are encoun-
tering in carrying out our policy.

Outstanding indebtedness of foreign
countries on U.S. Government credits (exclu-
sive of indebtedness arising from World
War I) totaled approximately $35.2 billion
as of June 30, 1975, of which $34.5 billion
related to long-term debt with maturities of
over one year. This debt encompasses many
different categories of loans, with the terms
of lending reflecting the purpose of the pro-
gram under which the loan was extended.
Humanitarian or development loans are, for
example, highly concessional, while loans by
the Export-Import Bank are at market-
related rates consistent with the Bank's leg-
islative mandate to provide official financing
for U.S. exports comparable to that of our
major competitors. The original indebted-
ness of foreign governments to the United
States arising from World War I was ap-
proximately $12.2 billion. After taking into
account interest charges of $14.6 billion

' Made before the Subcommittee on Legislation and
National Security of the House Committee on Gov-
ernment Operations on Mar, 4. The complete tran-
script of the hearings will be published by the com-
mittee and will be available from the Superintendent
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402.

416

and repayments of $2.8 billion, the outstand:
ing balance as of June 30, 1975, totaled mor
than $24 billion.

The objective of our foreign policy is t
protect the interests of the United States-
among which are the assets represented b
foreign debts. We expect these debts t
be repaid, and we believe any delinquencif
should be pursued vigorously. To do othe:
wise would be contrary to the interests (
our overall foreign policy and a structui
of relationships based on mutual respect ar
mutual responsibilities.

There is an inherent relationship b
tween the management of our bilateral rel
tions and our success in debt collection. T'
enhancement of debt repayment prospec
is an ongoing consideration in foreign poll
management. Our performance in collect!
debt is best in countries where we maint
good bilateral I'elations; and converse
countries where relations have been brok
frequently constitute serious debt collect)
problems.

In their loan and guarantee operations, 1
U.S. lending agencies give full considerat:
to protecting the U.S. taxpayer's right
expect full repayment of all debts. In c
tacts with debtor nations, they stress tl
the United States extends credits on the
sumption that agreed repayment schedu
will be fully adhered to.

i:

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toll

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lire,

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«ve 5

Debt Arrearages

In the vast majority of cases, debts '
to the United States since the Second W(
War have been honored and repaid on sch
ule. Arrearages, in relation to overall T

W St,

Utea

Department of State BuIN

*!9,

',li

foreign debt, indicate a delinquency rate
which compares favorably with the best per-
formance on debt collection in the private
sector. As of June 30, 1975, principal and
interest due and unpaid 90 days or more
totaled $636 million. Without questioning
the seriousness of any delinquent debt, it is
important to place the problem in proper
perspective. For example, of the approxi-
mately $64 billion in long-term U.S. Govern-
nent credits extended since 1940, repay-
nents of over $42 billion (including $12
jillion in interest) have been received, while
tnly $25 million in principal — all on loans to
longovernment entities — has been written
ff as uncollectable.

Naturally, the interests of the United
Itates would be best served by the elimina-
ion of all arrearages. Thus, when lending
gencies have exhausted their usual means
f collecting overdue payments, the Depart-
lent of State and U.S. Embassies overseas
ave the responsibility of pursuing collection
liforts. In June, we reminded our Embas-

es of the importance we attach to timely
spayments of debt. We also emphasized
lat we continue to regard a significant re-
action in outstanding arrearages as a major
•M epartment objective. At the same time, we
minded key lending agencies that we were
xious to provide any assistance that would
cilitate the collection of overdue accounts.
I would now like to discuss some of the
ore important arrearage problems we face,
so doing, I believe it is important to stress
it much of the Department's effort — and
•at of U.S. Embassies — is of an ongoing
ture, based on the need to remind debtor
/ernments continuously of the importance
attach to prompt debt repayment. We
ieve such contacts are an effective way
iprevent most collection problems, and re-
ive any that may arise.
(\.lmost $200 million of the $636 million
irdue debts as of June 30, 1975, stems
m logistical support provided by the
Sted States to other nations during the
rean conflict. While the United States has
ched formal agreements for repayment of
Korean conflict assistance with 14 coun-
ts, the accounts of six countries (Colom-

era

lenl
In

tki

bia, Ethiopia, Greece, the Philippines, Thai-
land, and Turkey) have never been regular-
ized. The history of these Korean conflict
claims is complex and presents a unique
situation as illustrated by the fact that the
Tenth Report of the Committee on Govern-
ment Operations (1973) noted "There is
no reason for continuing to carry these
claims on U.S. Treasury records."

The Department of State, together with
the Department of the Treasury and the
Department of Defense, has been reviewing
this issue since last July. There is some
doubt that the six nations ever agreed or
implied willingness to pay for the logistical
support. We have reached the same con-
clusion as did the 1973 committee report
and believe it desirable to remove the claims
from the category of outstanding debt. We
think that special statutory authority is de-
sirable to permit us to effect such a change.
In this regard, we encourage and would
fully support action by this subcommittee
to initiate the necessary legislation.

Excluding the Korean conflict logistical
support claims, the largest individual coun-
try arrearages relate to debt attributable to
the Republic of China, Cuba, and Iran.

The Chinese delinquencies total approxi-
mately $96 million and involve a number of
issues, including the proper allocation of
claims between the Republic of China and the
People's Republic of China, the correct evalu-
ation of the claims, and the problems of gov-
ernment succession.

Given our pohtical relationships with
Cuba, it has not been feasible for us to nego-
tiate settlement of Cuba's $68 million debt
to the U.S. agencies, most to the Export-
Import Bank. Nevertheless, we intend to
pursue the debt as well as outstanding U.S.
private claims against Cuba as soon as the
state of our bilateral relations permits.

The Department is according priority at-
tention to settlement of the $35 million
Iranian arrearage. The arrearage relates to
lend-lease and surplus property debt, on
which payments were halted during the pe-
riod of instability of the 1950's. This arrear-
age is proving particularly difficult to re-
solve. In 1973, the Iranians indicated their

lalelfpch 29, 1976

417

desire to postpone settlement to permit them
to present us with claims against the U.S.
Government stemming from damages to
Iranian railways by Allied military forces
during World War II. In December 1974,
the Iranians presented us with a note detail-
ing claims totaling approximately $172 mil-
lion. The Iranians wanted discussion of our
lend-lease debt to coincide with discussion
of their claims against us.

In high-level contacts with the Iranian
Government, we continue to urge strongly
that the lend-lease debt be settled in full.
We have been discussing the Iranian claim
but have stressed that we see no legal or
factual connection between this claim and
the lend-lease and surplus property debt.
(We do not believe the evidence submitted
to date by Iran supports their claim against
the U.S. Government.) The Iranians have
not disputed the validity of their obligation
to the United States, and in response to
Department initiatives they paid $750,000 in
March 1973 and $1.8 million in October 1975.
They have stated, however, that further pay-
ments would be contingent on negotiation of
their claims against the United States. We
have welcomed the latest payment on the
lend-lease debt but continue to emphasize the
importance of fully settling the debt.

There has been considerably more prog-
ress in the case of Egypt. The Government
of Egypt has been making serious efforts to
eliminate arrearages owed to the United
States. Outstanding arrearages fell from ap-
proximately $60 million at yearend 1974 to
$5 million at yearend 1975. The American
Embassy in Cairo, which has been an impor-
tant factor in this improvement, continues
to pursue the matter vigorously.

American Embassies in Islamabad and
Dacca also played active roles in helping to
finalize the complex bilateral debt agree-
ments just signed with Pakistan and Bang-
ladesh. These agreements reduce outstand-
ing arrearages by about $60 million and
implement a multilateral understanding
among creditor countries resulting from the
unique circumstances that arose from the
1971 war, the independence of Bangladesh,

418

and the desire of the creditor countries t(
insure full servicing of the prewar Pakistai
debt.

The Korean conflict logistical suppor
claims and the country situations describe
above account for approximately 75 perceii
of the arrearages reported on June 30, 197'
The remaining 25 percent are attributable t
several dozen countries. Many reflect admii
istrative or technical billing difficultif
rather than serious collection problems. Th
Department takes all arrearages seriousl;
regardless of size, and is willing to tal
whatever action appears appropriate to faci
itate timely debt collections. I recall one ca;
last year, for example, when we deemed
necessary to have one of our Ambassado
intervene at the highest levels of a foreij
government in an attempt to settle a Ion
standing arrearage of less than $100,0'
owed to the Department of Defense. T.
Ambassador was, I might add, successful
his efforts.

Debt Rescheduling

The issue of "debt rescheduling" desen
specific mention. Recognizing that extraor
nary circumstances may require a modifi
tion of loan terms to reflect a change in C'
ditions in a borrowing country, the Congr
has provided authority for debt reschedul
for each U.S. Government lending progr;
It is U.S. Government policy, however,
confine the use of this authority to exi
tional situations where debt reschedulin
judged to enhance the probability of repf''.
ment of debt owed to the United States ;
alternative courses of action are clearly
beneficial to U.S. interests.

Eligibility for debt relief has tradition,
been based on a case-by-case examinatior
individual debt problems as they arise. 1
is normally done in a multilateral fra
work to insure equal treatment am
creditors.

The uniqueness of debt rescheduling
evidenced by the fact that during the i
two years — which were particularly difR'

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Department of State BuImj^.

f

years for most developing countries — the
United States participated in multilateral
debt renegotiation for only three countries:
Chile, Pakistan, and India. In Chile's case,
the choices open to the creditors were either
jito reschedule or to accept default. Chile is
j currently meeting its 1976 debt obligations
to the United States on schedule. Negotia-
tions with Pakistan were the result of the
?xceptional circumstances that arose from
the 1971 war. The United States agreed to
eschedule approximately one-third of the
1974 dollar debt service owed by India; sub-
;equently India met fully its debt service to
he United States in 1975.

The executive branch is of course fully
omplying with section 4 of the Foreign Dis-
ster Assistance Act of 1974 requiring Con-
ressional notification prior to entering into
ny negotiations with any foreign govern-
lent regarding the cancellation, renegotia-
ion, rescheduling, or settlement of debt
wed to the United States under the Foreign
issistance Act of 1961.

eveloping-Country Debt

Since approximately two-thirds of U.S.
;bt is owed by developing countries, the
ibt-servicing prospects of these countries
re of particular importance.
In order to help finance their current
count deficits, and thus minimize their
imediate impact on development prospects,
16 non-oil developing countries have in-
eased their external debt substantially. In
■|75, principal and interest payments on
ternal debt absorbed about one-fifth of the
port earnings of the non-oil developing
untries, with the ratio far above this level

certain countries. Loans on commercial
cms constitute an increasingly large com-
nent of new debt and will in due course
tse the debt service ratios of some coun-

s rather substantially,
'"rejections of debt-servicing prospects are

cult, in view of the wide diversity of
|rt situations. A relatively small number of

ntries continue to account for the bulk of

private market borrowings. These countries
generally have productive, diversified econo-
mies and the economic potential to generate
adequate export earnings to service their
debt. They are also likely to take advantage
quickly of renewed growth in industrial
countries. Moreover, the financing measures
approved by the recently concluded Interim
Committee meeting of the IMF [Interna-
tional Monetary Fund] should tend to in-
crease the creditworthiness of these coun-
tries.

Some countries may have difficulty coping
with accelerating debt service in the next
five years. Countries whose exports depend
largely on depressed commodities or have
serious political problems which restrict
policy options will be particularly vulnerable.
The implementation of appropriate domestic
policies within borrowing countries, as well
as the actions of the international commu-
nity in the areas of finance and development,
will also be major factors in determining the
severity of any financing problems which
arise in individual countries.

The economic difficulties facing many de-
veloping countries have stimulated increased
pressure for more generalized debt relief
and made "debt" a major issue in the North-
South dialogue. Many developing countries
now view debt relief as a potential means
of alleviating their balance-of-payments defi-
cits and/or supplementing what they con-
sider to be inadequate flows of development
assistance.

The United States has taken a firm stand
opposing generalized debt rescheduling, and
we have stressed firmly that our insistence
on the case-by-case approach is not subject
to negotiation.

Debt Owed by the Member Countries of OPEC

During the past year, we have had nu-
merous congressional inquiries regarding
debt owed to the United States by the mem-
ber countries of OPEC [Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries].

As of June 30, 1975, the indebtedness of

m

ch 29, 1976

419

the member countries of OPEC on U.S. Gov-
ernment loans and credits totaled approxi-
mately $2.9 billion, of which about 45 percent
was owed to the Export-Import Bank. Both
past and present lending policy recognizes
the significant differences in the economic
prospects of the OPEC members as well as
taking into account the totality of U.S. po-
litical and economic policy toward these
countries.

Even before the surge in petroleum prices,
concessional assistance to OPEC members
was largely confined to three low-income
countries, particularly Indonesia, but also
Nigei-ia and Ecuador. In the case of Indo-
nesia, which received by far the largest
share of concessional loans going to OPEC
members, the country's poverty and need has
been only marginally mitigated by increased
oil revenues.

The U.S. Agency for International Devel-
opment recently inaugurated a system of
annually reviewing the position of all coun-
tries with outstanding loan balances to de-
termine on a case-by-case basis whether any
should be asked to accelerate repayment of
AID loans. The ultimate determination as to
whether or not to make such a request takes
into account overall U.S. interests in the
debtor country — political, economic, and
commercial — as well as its ability to repay
its AID debt at a faster rate.

Negotiations for accelerated repayment of
AID loans are in process with Venezuela,
and we are optimistic about their successful
conclusion. In view of the fact that a number
of other major issues have been pending
with Iran, the State Department does not
believe that this particular matter should be
raised with Iran at this time. The Depart-
ment is regularly reviewing this position.

U.S. Claim Against France

In 1973, the House Committee on Govern-
ment Operations recommended that the De-
partment of State should intensify its efforts
to reach a satisfactory settlement of the U.S.

claim against France arising from relocatioi
of U.S. bases outside France in 1966. I woulc
like therefore to describe to the subcommit
tee some of the details of the agreemen
signed with the Government of France oi
June 12, 1975.

The agreement states that the Frencl
Government will pay $100 million to tli
United States over a period of five year:
beginning in June 1975. These payments ai
in settlement of the claim submitted by th
United States in 1968 following the deni;
of further U.S. use of French military facil
ties in which the United States had made
significant investment prior to 1966. Th
French Government made its initial paymei
of $20 million to the United States on Jur
25, 1975.

Approximately 36 percent of the receip
from France are to be transferred by tl
Department of State each year to the a
count of NATO. This is in accordance wi
an undertaking to reimburse NATO frc
any such receipts in partial compensation f
an extraordinary NATO undertaking to
nance about $100 million in U.S. relocati
projects. These would normally have be
financed solely by the United States.

The United States remains a party to i
separate multilateral NATO claim agaii
France, related to the investment by 1
NATO Infrastructure Fund in the impro
ment of military facilities in France. Tl
far there has been no French approach t
settlement of this NATO claim. We beli
that the French Government intends nexl
settle the bilateral claim by Canada. Th
has been some indication that the Fre
would like to reach this settlement bef
turning to the NATO claim.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me as,
you that the Department of State takes
responsibilities in the area of foreign c
very seriously. On pursuit of arrearages
prudent use of debt renegotiation to pres(
our assets, we think our record is a good
but we will continue to press for imprc
results wherever we can.

Bit

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420

Department of State BulVi!,!;;^

National Defense and Foreign Policy

Statement by Joseph J. Siseo
Under' Secretary for Political Affairs '

111 the letter which Senators Muskie and
Bellmon addressed to Secretary Kissinger
inviting him to appear before this commit-
tee, the key issue before the committee was
identified as what spending was appropriate
for detente, deterrence, and defense. The
letter went on to say this cannot be deter-
mined without an understanding of our un-
derlying security goals and objectives. To
put the issue in perspective, the committee
asked the Secretary to discuss the relation-
ship between our foreign policy and our mil-
itary missions and posture. I will address
nyself very briefly to this key question so as
io allow maximum opportunity for a full
exchange with the members of the com-
Tiittee.

First, let me say at the outset that one of

ihe preconceptions of simpler periods in

American history has been the conviction

hat we can pursue only one strand of policy

t a time — either firmness or conciliation,

ither containment of adversaries or the

^arch for improved relations with them.

he fact is that we do not have such a choice.

/■e must pursue both. Our objective is to

laintain a global balance and thereby pro-

ipct our interests. This cannot be accom-

lished without military strength. But,

lually, in an age of nuclear weapons we

ust try to move beyond an equilibrium of

■rces and dangerous confrontations to a

ore positive future. In carrying out this

isign, which President Ford has referred to

peace through strength and negotiations,

i need strong strategic and conventional

rces and vigorous alliances.

Made before the Senate Committee on the Budget
Mar. 5 (text from press release 113). The com-
te transcript of the hearings will be published
the committee and will be available from the
f perintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
nting Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Itreh 29, 1976

The first order of business is the impera-
tive of deterring, and thereby avoiding,
thermonuclear war. However competitive we
are with the Soviet Union and however
ideologically opposed, neither can attempt to
impose its will on the other without an in-
tolerable risk of mutual annihilation. A
central pillar of our foreign policy is to adapt
our thinking to the reality of this modern
age: to maintain sufl^cient strategic nuclear
power to deter nuclear attack and to build
a network of ties to our potential adversaries
that will help promote negotiated solutions
rather than a series of dangerous confronta-
tions like those that marked the cold war.

Thus, this Administration will see to it
that we continue to have strategic power
second to none, while at the same time we
seek means to contain the spiraling strategic
arms race. The United States has been en-
gaged in intensive efforts to limit strategic
arms. SALT One was an important begin-
ning. In the SALT Two talks, our aim is to
put a ceiling on qualitative as well as
quantitative expansion of strategic forces,
which uncontrolled can jeopai'dize the peace.
To support this efl"ort, we also seek to engage
the Soviet Union at many levels of contact
and cooperation with the outside world in
cultural, technological, and commercial fields
and thereby provide them with incentives
for restraint.

Our efforts to build a more rational and
long-term relationship with the Soviet Union
and a stable world order rest on the indis-
pensable foundation of military strength.
The policy we are pursuing seeks to balance
firmness with conciliation, effective defense
with effective arrangements for controlling
arms. We cannot prevent the growth of
Soviet power, but we do have the capacity to
prevent its use for unilateral advantage and
political expansion. We cannot prevent a
buildup of Soviet forces, but we have the
capacity, together with our allies, to main-
tain an equilibrium. We have the diplomatic,
economic, and military capacity to resist
expansionism; and we must be careful not

421

to deprive ourselves of the means to con-
front it, if necessary. I believe few — friends
or foes — in the world doubt our capacity.
The world knows well — even if we forget
here at home — that we have a combination
of military strength, economic power, and
technological genius that no other nation can
match. But serious doubts have arisen re-
garding our will and purpose.

In short, to protect our national interests,
we need to maintain our strength and be
perceived to be ready to use it, if necessary,
if a reasonably stable world order is to be
achieved and maintained. To this end, our
defense budget must help assure that the
military balance of power will be maintained
and provide the capability to counter threats
to our interests, for anything less than this
balance and capability is an invitation for
others to challenge us.

At the same time, we are not alone in our
efforts. We are joined with others who share
our values. Our close ties with the industrial
democracies of the West and Japan are es-
sential to maintaining a global balance of
power, which is the precondition of peace.
We must maintain these alliances, for no
nation can maintain its security in isolation.

Our security planning problems would be
simplified if we faced only a strategic nuclear
challenge from the Soviet Union. In an era
when nuclear war becomes more and more
unthinkable, when global Soviet strength,
influence, and ambitions are growing, how-
ever, the threat we face is far more diversi-
fied and complex. If maintenance of the
strategic balance is essential, as it is in re-
lations between the superpowers, there is
also a need for general purpose forces and
strategic mobile forces with particular ref-
erence to the situation in Europe, in North-
east Asia, and in various trouble spots in
the world.

The presence of our troops in Europe is
critical to the security of the continent and
to all else we do to try to moderate the con-
duct of the Soviet Union. The Soviets con-
tinue to focus the strongest elements of
their power on Western Europe. Warsaw
Pact forces are substantial and well trained.
Recent qualitative improvements, especially

422

in armored vehicles and tactical aircraft
have increased pressures on NATO defenses
These defenses must remain strong and con
fident enough to discourage attack or defea
that attack should it occur.

In Asia, American military strength con
tinues to be essential to preserving a stabl
balance of power. It provides a bulwar
against the potential threat of Soviet powei
helps to protect Japan and our other allie
in the region, and serves to deter othe
threats, notably in Korea. In addition,
strong American military presence in tY
Pacific as well as globally is important to i
in our relations with the People's Republ
of China. American power makes us a crei
ible partner for the Chinese in the multipol;
world.

In the Middle East, a renewal of Ara
Israeli hostilities could lead to a confront
tion between the U.S.S.R. and the Unit
States. American forces serve as a deterre
to the Soviet Union, and our security assii
ance programs are significant in helping
assure Israel's security and survival, in i
proving and strengthening U.S. relatic
with Arab states, in deterring a resumpti
of hostilities, and in bulwarking the cent
diplomatic role of the United States in 1'|
Arab-Israeli problem.

In Africa and in other farflung areas
the world, we face a new threat — the en;-
gence of the Soviet Union as an extraterr
rial power. Angola, a country far from 1
torical Soviet designs, is an example of gr^
ing Soviet economic and military power,
eluding the emergence of a formidable "1
water" navy, being used for political
when such opportunity arises. In con<
with our allies, we will require undiminis
attention to our own global conventii
forces and to our vigilance and our wil
order to check the extraterritorial spreai
Soviet power as it flows toward areas
perceived Soviet opportunity. Particul
after a period in which the world has
nessed the debacle in Indochina and So
advances in Angola, the perception of An
can power needs to be reinforced. The Ur
States must project an image of stren
purpose, and steadfastness, or then

A

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Department of State iuA

»J97|

serious risk that our adversaries may be
tempted to further adventurism.

In short, we firmly believe that military
strength and our alliances are the funda-
mental foundations for the goal of reducing
I tension between the major powers and build-
ing a more peaceful world.

MULTILATERAL

iviation

jnvention on international civil aviation. Done at
Chicago December 7, 1944, Entered into force April
4, 1947. TIAS 1591.
Adherence deposited: Surinam. March 5, 1976.

tnservation

'" freement on the conservation of polar bears. Done
ipfi at Oslo November 15, 1973.

Approval deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics. February 26, 1976.

Enters into force: May 26, 1976.'

■nsular Relations

inna convention on consular relations. Done at
''ienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March
9, 1967; for the United States December 24. 1969.
IAS 6820.

Vccessions deposited: Jamaica, February 9, 1976;
Turkey, February 19, 1976.

el momic Cooperation

•eement establishing a financial support fund of
16 Organization for Economic Cooperation and
evelopment. Done at Paris April 9, 1975."
cceptance deposited: Canada, February 23. 1976.
atificafiovs deposited: Denmark, July 23, 1975;
^iNew Zealand December 2, 1975;= Norway,
January 19. 1976; Sweden, December 23, 1975;
Switzerland, December 10. 1975,

art*

Ith

sndments to articles 34 and 55 of the Constitution
the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946,
amended. TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086. Adopted at
meva May 22, 1973.°

ceptances deposited: Bangladesh, February 26,
j{j,^976; Bulgaria, January 27, 1976; Mauritius,
January 26, 1976; Nepal, February 10, 1976; New
Zealand, February 19, 1976.

»«• «h 29, 1976

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as
amended, on the International Maritime Consulta-
tive Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted
at London October 17, 1974.=
Acceptances deposited: Chile, February 11, 1976;

Cyprus, February 24. 1976; United States.

February 11, 1976.

Nuclear Weapons — Nonproliferation

Treaty on nonprolifei-ation of nuclear weapons. Done
at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968.
Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS 6839.
Ratification deposited: Singapore. March 10, 1976.

Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by
dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes.
Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Wash-
ington December 29, 1972. Entered into force
August 30, 1975. TIAS 8165.

Extended by United Kingdom to: Bailiwick of
Jersey, March 5, 1976.

Property — Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial
property of March 20. 1883. as revised. Done at
Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12
entered into force May 19, 1970; for the United
States August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30
entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United
States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6293.
Notification from World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization that accession deposited: Turkey,
February 16, 1976 (articles 1 through 12 ex-
cepted).

Property — Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14.
1967. Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the
United States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.
Accessio7i deposited: Turkey. February 12, 1976.

Refugees

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at
New York January 31, 1967. Entered into force
October 4, 1967; for the United States November
1, 1968, TIAS 6577.

Accession deposited: Guinea-Bissau, February 11,
1976,

Space

Convention on registration of objects launched into
outer space. Opened for signature at New York
January 14, 1975. =

Signatures: Bulgaria, February 4. 1976; Federal
Republic of Germany, March 2, 1976.

' Not for the United States.
' Not in force.

" Does not extend to Cook Island, Nine and the
Tokelau Islands.

423

Telecommunications

Partial revision of the 1959 radio regulations, as
amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332. 6590), on space
telecommunications, with annexes. Done at Geneva
July 17, 1971. Entered into force January 1, 1973.
TIAS 7435.

Notification of approval: Brazil. December 19,
1975.

Telephone regulations, with appendices and final
protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered
into force September 1, 1974.*
Notification of approval: Brazil, December 16,
1975.

Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annex, and
final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11. 1973.
Entered into force September 1, 1974.'
Notification of approval: Brazil, December 16,
1975.

International telecommunication convention with
annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos
October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1,
1975."

Ratification deposited: Central African Republic,
January 5, 1976.

Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva,
1959, as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590,
7435), to establish a new frequency allotment plan
for high-frequency radio telephone coast stations,
with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva
June 8, 1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976.'
Notifications of approval : Mozambique. December
26, 1975; Thailand, December 29, 1975.

Terrorism — Protection of Diplomats

Convention on the prevention and punishment of
crimes against internationally protected persons,
including diplomatic agents. Done at New York
December 14, 1973."

Ratification deposited: Byelorussian Soviet Social-
ist Republic. February 5, 1976.

BILATERAL

Bangladesh

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of September 11, 1975
(TIAS 8191). Effected by exchange of notes at
Dacca February 23, 1976. Entered into force
February 23, 1976.

Brazil

Memorandum of understanding concerning consulta-
tions on matters of mutual interest. Signed at
Brasilia February 21, 1976. Entered into force
February 21, 1976.

Egypt

Agreement on health cooperation, with annex. Signed
at Washington October 28, 1975. Entered into

force provisionally October 28, 1975; definitively
January 20, 1976.

Hungary

Agreement providing for consultations should export;
of cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles anc
apparel products from Hungary cause market dis
ruption in the United States. Effected by exchangi
of notes at Budapest February 12 and 18. 1976
Entered into force February 18, 1976.

Yugoslavia

Agreement providing for consultations should export
of cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles an
apparel products from Yugoslavia cause market dis
ruption in the United States. Effected by exchang
of notes at Belgrade January 14, 1976. Entere
into force January 14, 1976.

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Department of State Buj

INDEX March 29, 1976 Vol LXXIV, No. 1918

Africa. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed by
Sigina Delta Chi Panel at Atlanta ....

Agriculture. President Ford Establishes New
Agricultural Policy Groups (White House
fact sheet)

Angola. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed by
Sigma Delta Chi Panel at Atlanta ....

Atomic Energy. Secretary Kissinger Discusses
U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy (statement)

China. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed by
Sigma Delta Chi Panel at Atlanta ....

Congress

Department Discusses Foreign Indebtedness
to the United States (Boeker)

Department Proposes Two New Actions To
Deal With International Problem of Bribery
(Ingersoll)

National Defense and Foreign Policy (Sisco)

Secretary Kissinger Discusses U.S. Nonpro-
liferation Strategy (statement)

uba. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed by
Sigma Delta Chi Panel at Atlanta ....

Sconomic Affairs

department Discusses Foreign Indebtedness to
the United States (Boeker)

department Proposes Two New Actions To
Deal With International Problem of Bribery
(Ingersoll)

Invironment. U.S.-Japan Environmental Pro-
tection Committee Meets at Washington
(joint communique)

Igypt. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed
Sigma Delta Chi Panel at Atlanta . .

ranee. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed
Sigma Delta Chi Panel at Atlanta . .

aly. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed
Sigma Delta Chi Panel at Atlanta . .

ipan. U.S.-Japan Environmental Protection
Committee Meets at Washington (joint
communique)

iddle East. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed
by Sigma Delta Chi Panel at Atlanta . . .

Iljtary Affairs. National Defense and For-
sign Policy (Sisco)

imibia. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed by
a Delta Chi Panel at Atlanta ....

(ima. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed by
?ma Delta Chi Panel at Atlanta ....

lications. GPO Sales Publications ....

Iiern Rhodesia. Secretary Kissinger Inter-
fewed by Sigma Delta Chi Panel at Atlanta

orism. International Terrorism (Fearey)

Ity Information. Current Actions ....

by
by

by

385

403
385
405
385

416

412

421

405
385

416

412

393

385
385
385

m

393

385

421

385

385
424

385
394
423

U.S.S.R. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed by

Sigma Delta Chi Panel at Atlanta .... 385

United Nations. United Nations Documents 404

Name Index

Boeker, Paul H 416

Fearey, Robert A 394

Ingersoll, Robert S 412

Kissinger, Secretary 385, 405

Sisco, Joseph J 421

Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: March 8-14

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

No. Date Snbjeot

*118 3/8 Marquita M. Maytag sworn in as
Ambassador to Nepal (bio-
graphic data).

119 3/9 Kissinger: Senate Committee on

Government Operations.

120 3/11 Japan-U.S.A. Joint Planning and

Coordination Committee for Co-
operation in Environmental Pro-
tection: joint communique.

tl21 3/11 Kissinger: World Affairs Council,
Boston, Mass.

*121A3/11 Henry Cabot Lodge: introduction
of Secretary Kissinger.

*121B3/11 Kissinger: questions and answers
following address.

tl22 3/11 U.S. signs Fifth International Tin
Agreement.

*123 3/11 U.S.-Canada meeting on Flathead
River-Cabin Creek mining de-
velopment.

*124 3/11 Secretary of State's Advisory
Committee on Private Interna-
tional Law Study Group on
Agency, Champaign, 111., Apr. 10.

*125 3/12 Program for official visit of Prime
Minister Liam Cosgrave of Ire-
land, Mar. 17-22. (Addenda to
program: 125 A-C.)

*126 3/12 Shipping Coordinating Committee,
Subcommittee on Safety of Life
at Sea, working group on car-
riage of dangerous goods, Apr. 8.

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

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