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Volume LXXIV • No. 1906 • January 5, 1976 


Address by Assistant Secretary Rogers 1^ 


Statements by Ambassador Moynihan and Text of Draft Resolution 21 


For index see inside back cover 


Vol. LXXIV, No. 1906 
January 5, 1976 

For s«le by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 


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The Department of State BULLETI, 
a weekly publication issued by tt 
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Public Affairs, provides tfte public ail 
interested agencies of tfie governmet 
witfi information on developments I 
tfie field of U.S. foreign relations a,l 
on tfie work of tfie Department a I 
tlie Foreign Service. 
Tfie BULLETIN includes select I 
press releases on foreign policy, issu I 
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ment, and statements, address, 
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officers of tlie Department, as well i 
special articles on various pfiases f 
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United States is or may become i 
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Publications of tfie Department ' 
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international relations are also listt. 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of December 9 

Prt'ss release n96 dated December 9 

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and gentle- 
men, before I go to your questions I thought 
it would be helpful to review some of the 
SALT issues that have been raised. I will 
not get into a debate with aspirants to po- 
litical office, either statewide or national. 
Therefore I will not deal with specific testi- 
mony that may have been given except to 
note that no opportunity was presented to 
any member of the Administration to pre- 
sent the truth. What I would like to do is to 
deal with categories of assertions that have 
been made and then to explain the real state 
if affairs with respect to them. 

The assertions have been made that there 
lave been massive Soviet violations, that 
:he Administration colluded with the Soviet 
Union in masking these violations, that the 
A.dministration has not pursued the issue of 
violations diplomatically, and that senior 
officials, especially the President, have not 
jeen kept informed about the facts with re- 
spect to these violations. 

I would like to discuss with you the pro- 
•edures that the government is following 
vith respect to SALT compliance and illus- 
rate them with one or two examples. 

First of all it is important to keep in mind 
hat with respect to SALT or with respect 
.0 the strategic forces on both sides, we are 
iealing with military establishments of 
neat technical complexity that are con- 
itantly engaged in military activities. These 
nilitary establishments, moreover, on both 
udes are in the process of constant change 
io that there is great fluidity in what one 
)bserves. We are not dealing with a static 
situation; we are dealing with a fluid situa- 
ion. Therefore, too, the information that is 
>btained has to go through various stages of 

The first information about any event is 
usually extraordinarily illusive and ambigu- 
ous, and one part of the process of the gov- 
ernment is to refine the information until 
we reach a point at which senior officials 
can make a reasonable decision. I believe it 
is a good working hypothesis to assume that 
government is not run by conspiracy but by 
serious people trying to come to serious con- 
clusions about difficult topics, especially 
when the charge of a violation of a formal 
agreement is not a minor matter to be intro- 
duced into the diplomatic discourse. 

Now, first of all, what is meant by a vio- 
lation? There are several meanings that can 
be attached to the notion of violation that 
are being used interchangeably in the cur- 
rent debate. 

A violation can be a deliberate violation 
of a SALT limitation, aimed at increasing 
the Soviet strategic capability in ways which 
the agreement was intended to preclude. 

Second, a violation can be an action in- 
consistent with the sense or the spirit of the 
agreement and tending to undermine its 
viability even though it is not prohibited by 
the agreement. There can be borderline situ- 
ations where a technical violation cannot be 
established but where the activity strains 
the interpretation of particular provisions. 

Third, there can be unintended violations 
occurring, for example, through negligence 
of higher officials responsible for insuring 
compliance by their subordinate organiza- 

Fourth, there can be actions not banned 
by an agreement but which complicate veri- 
fication of the agreement. 

Fifth, there can be ambiguous activities 
resulting from differing interpretations of 
the provisions of the agreements. 

Sixth, there can be activities that are 

anuary 5, 1976 

assessed as ambiguous due to inadequate in- 
formation or misinterpretation of informa- 
tion which suggests a violation where in fact 
none exists. 

I want to repeat that many compliance 
issues will arise initially as ambiguous ac- 
tivities which could apply to any of these 
categories. Our policy is to seek clarification 
of ambiguous situations as soon as there is 
a tangible basis for doing so and to resolve 
ambiguities as quickly as possible in order 
to preclude development of a more serious 

Now to go to the procedures for handling 
allegations of violations. Any one of these 
categories would be initially reported in in- 
telligence channels, either from the Central 
Intelligence Agency or from the Department 
of Defense. The Department of State and 
the White House have no independent means 
of acquiring any of this information. 

There is no instance in which a reported 
violation was not immediately — an alleged 
violation — was not immediately reported to 
the President. And we have searched all the 
files of all the incidents. 

I will in a minute discuss the handling of 
intelligence, and I would like to talk now 
about the procedures that are followed. 

In order to deal with the problem of com- 
pliance, there are four institutions. There is 
a special intelligence committee, which was 
established by the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency in the summer of 1973. 
This committee makes a quarterly report on 
the problem of SALT compliance. This com- 
mittee — I'm looking now for how many 
meetings it has held — well, it has met quar- 
terly since July '73, so you can figure it out 
for yourselves, and all of its reports have 
gone directly to the President as well as to 
every senior member of the Administration 
that is dealing with the problem of strategic 

In addition, there are three other bodies. 
There is the Verification Panel of the NSC 
[National Security Council]. There is the 
Verification Panel's Working Group. And 
there is, of course, the NSC itself. 

The Verification Panel Working Group of 
the NSC has met on SALT matters 11 times 

since the middle of 1973. The Verification 
Panel has met four times on SALT matters 
— has met four times on compliance issues 
exclusively since 1973. But in addition, it 
has met 40 times on SALT matters since 
1973. Each of these meetings, each of these 
40 meetings, is preceded by a CIA briefing 
that includes all compliance issues. So that, 
in addition to the four formal meetings, 
there were 40 meetings of the Verification 
Panel where whatever compliance issues 
existed at the time were brought to the 
attention of the Verification Panel. 

The President has been briefed on com- 
pliance matters 10 times since the middle 
of 1973, six times in the Administration of 
President Ford. There has been one NS( 
meeting solely devoted to compliance issues, 
and parts of others. 

The procedure is that the working group 
will attempt to determine what is going on 
and will devise either options or recom- 
mendations for consideration by the Veri- 
fication Panel. The Verification Panel then 
reviews it and makes a recommendation or 
defines options. 

In all the meetings that I have described 
of the Verification Panel there was never a 
split decision. The allegation that individuals 
or departments have held up consideration 
of compliance issues, have obscured consid- 
eration of compliance issues, have refused to 
deal with compliance issues, is a total false- 
hood. All the decisions of the Verification 
Panel with respect to compliance have been 
unanimous. That is to say, they were agreed 
to by the Department of Defense, by the 
Chiefs of Staff, by the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, by the Central In- 
telligence Agency, and by the State Depart- 

There is no doubt that there may have 
been differences of opinion in the working 
group as these papers were being considered. 
I am not familiar with these disagreements, 
because unless they are passed on to the 
Verification Panel there would be no par- [ 
ticular reason for me to deal with them. 

Let me now turn to the handling of in- 
telligence. First of all, I think it is impor- 
tant to understand how the flow of informa- 

Department of State Bulletin 

tion to the President is handled, because it 
is a rather grave matter if it can be alleged 
that information is being kept from the 
President of the United States. The flow of 
information to the President is handled in 
the following way. 

The President receives daily, unabbrevi- 
ated and without a covering summary, the 
President's daily brief and the daily intelli- 
gence bulletin of the Central Intelligence 
Agency. These are placed on his desk to- 
gether with separate notes from various 
departments every morning and waiting for 
him when he comes to his office. 

In the period of the Presidency of Presi- 
dent Ford he has had, until recently, the 
practice of reading those two intelligence 
summaries in the presence not of a member 
of the National Security Council staff, but in 
the presence of a representative of the Cen- 
tral Intelligence Agency. Therefore any in- 
telligence item that would deal with compli- 
ance would come to his immediate attention. 
And in compiling a list of the various com- 
pliance issues, it is apparent that the Presi- 
dent's daily bulletin would reflect the in- 
formation of the Central Intelligence Agency, 
as you would expect, within no more than 
two weeks of its first appearance on a tech- 
nical level. 

Secondly, any memorandum from a Cab- 
inet member or from the head of an agency 
is transmitted to the President, usually in 
those cases with a summary by the NSC 
staff on top of it. But never is the summary 
alone sent to the President. Therefore, any 
Cabinet member, any member of the Joint 
Chiefs, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, 
the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, all have the opportunity, and know 
they have the opportunity, to address the 
President directly. Never has the Assistant 
to the President held up any memorandum 
from any of these individuals or any other 
memorandum addressed to the President by 
the head of an agency. 

However, there is no memorandum in the 
files by any of these individuals, by any 
Chief of Staff of any of the services, by 
any head of any department, raising any of 
the issues that have been alleged in recent 

testimony. There is nobody who has claimed 
that the issue of compliance was not being 
adequately pursued. There is nobody who 
has objected to the handling of the informa- 
tion. There has been no reclama of any of 
the decisions of the Verification Panel, ex- 
cept in one case where one department that 
had first recommended one course of action 
— that course of action being not to protest 
a seeming issue of noncompliance because it 
wanted to protect its sources of intelligence 
— later changed its mind and recommended 
that the issue be raised in the Standing Con- 
sultative Commission. 

When that Department changed its mind, 
the President agreed with that new position, 
and the decision of the Verification Panel 
was changed. 

The reason there have been so few NSC 
meetings on the subject is because the deci- 
sions of the Verification Panel have always 
been unanimous and because no member of 
the Panel has ever appealed to the Presi- 
dent with a contrary view. 

With respect to the handling of intelli- 
gence, all intelligence concerning alleged 
noncompliance was immediately distributed 
to all the members of the Verification Panel 
and by them to those of their senior mem- 
bers that were concerned with SALT. 

For the period that a preliminary investi- 
gation was going on, the intelligence was 
not distributed in the technical publications 
that were addressed to those whose primary 
responsibility was not concerned with SALT 
at a level below the Cabinet level. The long- 
est time this ever took place was a period of 
two months, and usually the so-called hold 
has been for a period of about a week or 
two to permit the refinement of intelligence. 

There has been no case in which the in- 
telligence was not distributed in the quar- 
terly intelligence publication that was con- 
cerned with the question of SALT monitor- 
ing. And in no case was intelligence kept 
from members of the Verification Panel. 

Even during the period that this refine- 
ment was going on, the United States did not 
feel itself precluded from taking diplomatic 
action. For example, in one instance, which 
I will get into in a minute in greater detail, 

January 5, 1976 

in one instance there were reports of un- 
identified construction in Soviet missile 
fields. We received this report on June 20 
[1973] at a time when Brezhnev [Leonid I. 
Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union] was in the United States. It 
seemed improbable that the Soviet Union 
would violate the agreement by blatantly 
building additional missile silos, and there- 
fore a further study of the subject was 

Nevertheless, on June 26 the United 
States sent a note to the Soviet Union in the 
Presidential channel raising the issue of that 
construction, even before we had begun our 
detailed examination of the issue. In that 
case the distribution of that information was 
kept out of those journals that went to indi- 
viduals not concerned with SALT matters 
until August 8, when it was generally dis- 
tributed. In that interval two American 
notes had been sent to the Soviet Union in 
the Presidential channel raising that issue. 

Now, as I have pointed out, the issue of 
compliance is an extremely complicated one, 
and in rummaging through the files of vari- 
ous departments it is not difficult to find 
memoranda written by subordinates who 
have no idea of what is going on in the 
overall picture, who will write down their 
own perceptions of what they think is hap- 
pening — usually in the modern form of 
memoranda of conversation to themselves 
that nobody ever sees, on which no one can 
ever comment, and which appear three years 
later in a context that no one can ever dis- 

But let us take the case of these missile 
silos. There appeared in the summer of 1973 
in a number of Soviet missile fields, the be- 
ginning of some construction that clearly 
looked like additional silos. If these had been 
converted into missile silos, there was no 
question that they would have represented 
a clear violation of the agreement. 

The construction of a silo generally takes 
two years to complete. And it is important 
for you to keep in mind in any event that 
almost any of these noncompliance events 
extend over a time span that, to be signifi- 

cant, is months and usually years, so that 
those of us who are engaged in policymak- 
ing, and not rhetoric, must have an oppor- 
tunity to study the problem before we draw 
any final conclusions, and we do have this 

Now, when we approached the Soviet 
Union within six days of receiving that in- 
formation in the White House, we were told 
that these would be command and control 
silos and that as the construction proceeded 
it would become increasingly evident that 
they would be command and control silos. 

This, incidentally, was also the judgment 
of our intelligence community. Our intelli- 
gence community believed that almost cer- 
tainly these were command and control silos. 
The question being raised was whether, at 
some later time, they could be converted into 
missile silos. 

It is also fair to point out that the Soviet 
Union in reply raised certain questions about 
certain ambiguities in American practices 
which we were not excessively anxious to 
have publicized and which accounted for the 
fact that these exchanges were conducted in 
a rather less dramatic manner than some 
people might have thought appropriate. 

There were six exchanges in this channel 
of increasing specificity, in which we began 
to advance criteria which could be met in 
order to assure us that these silos were in 
fact intended for command and control. This 
extended over a period of a year. At that 
point in 1974, we moved the discussion from 
the Presidential channel to the Standing 
Consultative Commission and made formal 
representations building on the previous ex- 

We have since received assurances, and I 
believe it is the unanimous opinion of all 
agencies, that we are dealing with command 
and control silos. We have been given cri- 
teria which seem to us for the time being 
adequate; and there is no agency that today 
disputes that this issue is for the time being 
quiescent, though we will be vigilant in 
making certain that any unusual construc- 
tion activity at these silos would raise pro- 
found questions. 

For a variety of reasons, including the 

Department of State Bulletin 

fact that the information about alleged non- 
compliance inevitably involves sensitive in- 
telligence, I cannot go through all of the 
allegations that have been made; though I 
vould perhaps mention one other, which is 
;he most serious one and which comes clos- 
st to the borderline of a possible violation, 
ivhich has to do with the testing of certain 
mtiaircraft radars in what might be con- 
idered an ABM [antiballistic missile] mode. 
The issue is complicated by the fact that, 
it American insistence, the ABM treaty in- 
;ludes a provision that antiaircraft radar 
;ould be used — could be tested — in a manner 
n space for range-instrumentation purposes. 
: might point out that this was our idea, 
ind if we had not included that, that issue 
)f the SA-5 radar could have been more 
•apidly resolved. 

We received information that some test- 
ng was going on with respect to the SA-5 
•adar in 1973. At that time it was routinely 
listributed, and nobody paid any attention 
it because it was not put into connection 
vith a possible ABM testing program. Be- 
ween Aprili and June 1974 some more tests 
ook place which at least raised the problem 
hat the radar might be tracking incoming 
nissiles. That clearly is not permitted by 
he treaty, though it raises an ambiguity 
vith respect to whether this is done for 
ange-instrumentation purposes. 

In any event, several meetings of the 

vorking group and the Verification Panel 

ook place. The first decision in December 

.974 was, on the recommendation of the 

defense Department and the Central In- 

-elligence Agency, that this issue not be 

•aised because we did not wish to reveal the 

'liource of our intelligence. 

" In January 1975 the Defense Department 

(l "eversed itself and recommended that the 

■ ssue be raised. As a result, the issue was 

S "aised in February 1975. Since then, within 

>' i 17-day period after we had raised the issue, 

? ;his activity has stopped — has not since 

I' oeen resumed. It was at the borderline of 

• v^iolation, but it has now stopped. 

There are other issues, some having to do 

with unilateral American statements which 

' the Soviet Union specifically disavowed. I 

think it is at least open to question whether 
the United States can hold the Soviet Union 
responsible for its own statements when the 
Soviet Union has asserted that it does not 
accept that interpretation. Therefore the 
issue of SALT compliance has been handled 
in a serious manner. It stands to reason 
that no responsible U.S. official could wish 
to make an agreement with the Soviet Union 
and permit the Soviet Union to violate it 
with impunity. It stands to reason that the 
United States would not accept noncompli- 
ance with an agreement that had any con- 
ceivable impact on the strategic equation. 

I would, in fact, suggest that this debate 
of the allegation in which some violations 
are invented, and in which the lack of vigi- 
lance of the Administration is asserted, may 
tempt the very noncompliance which it 
claims to seek to avoid, because it may create 
the impression that the U.S. Government 
would make a serious agreement on a matter 
affecting the survival of the United States 
and that its senior oificials would then col- 
lude in a violation of this agreement. 

Let no foreign government believe that 
this is conceivable. And I think the time has 
come that we deal with each other more 

I want to make just one other point be- 
fore I go to your questions. That point con- 
cerns the endless allegations that a secret 
agreement was made with the Soviet Union 
respecting 70 missiles to be placed on sub- 
marines that by now are 30 years old, or 25 
years old, that have not been off the coast 
of the United States since 1967. 

On the face of it this charge should be 
too absurd to require any commentary. I 
dealt with it at great length in a press con- 
ference on June 24, 1974, and June 26, 1974. 
It concerned a highly technical issue: which 
missiles were eligible for retirement as part 
of those that had to be dismantled in order 
to shift from land-based to submarine mis- 
siles and whether and what kind of new 
missiles could be placed on submarines with- 
out being counted. 

I refer you all to this press conference if 
you want to go into the technical complexi- 
ties of this issue, except to say there was no 

' January 5, 1976 

secret agreement, that whatever there was 
in that interpretative statement was stated 
publicly by me at the press conference that 
I gave in Moscow the night the SALT agree- 
ment was signed on May 26, 1972. It was 
repeated in a discussion of the Verification 
Panel on June 5, 1972. It was contained, 
practically verbatim, in a note distributed 
to all the agencies on June 19, 1972, and it 
was testified to by Gerard Smith [then Di- 
rector of the U.S. Arms Control and Dis- 
armament Agency and head of the U.S. 
delegation to the Strategic Arms Limita- 
tion Talks] before the Jackson committee in 
July 1972. There was no secret agreement. 

Some overawed technocrats found what 
they thought was a loophole by which, if the 
Soviets wanted to design a missile that they 
didn't have anywhere for just that one cate- 
gory of diesel submarines that was 25 years 
old, they might conceivably place it on that 
submarine. We, of course, would never have 
accepted this. 

When we raised this loophole with the 
Soviet Union, even though they thought it 
was — shall we put it kindly — a rather 
strained interpretation, they nevertheless 
closed the loophole, and despite some rather 
excited testimony last week, let me say flatly 
that no price was paid for closing a loophole 
that did not exist and that we would never 
have accepted and that ran counter to the 
whole record of the discussion. 

I think I can stop at this point and take 
your questions on this or any other topic. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, to what extent is politics 
interfering today with your attempts to tvork 
out a neiv SALT agreement? And do you see 
a deadline beyond ivhich it would be, be- 
cause of the political campaigns, impossible 
to make any real progress on a treaty? 

Secretary Kissinger: As Secretary of 
State it is my obligation to recommend to 
the President what I believe to be in the 
national interest. My recommendations are 
not affected by the political situation; and I 
have, so far, seen no evidence that his deci- 
sions are affected by the political situation. 

I cannot say that the debate that is going 
on greatly enhances the atmosphere of con- 

fidence in the country, but our recommenda- 
tions are not affected by the political situ- 
ation. We are not operating against a dead 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can I just change tht 
subject for a moment? Have you proposec 
to the Israeli Government, as reported today, 
that it should drop its boycott of the Securiti 
Council debate? And also, do you see am 
indications the PLO [Palestine Liberation 
Organization] may be shifting its attitude 
with regard to its recognition, or nonrecog 
nition, of Israel's right to existence? 

Secretary Kissinger: I will answer thi 
question, but may I then recommend tha 
we take all SALT questions and then go ti 
all other questions? I will answer this one 

The United States has indicated to th' 
Israeli Government that it would be bette 
served if it participated in the Securit; 
Council debate, though it is of course clea 
that the Israeli Government may not wisl 
to be in the room while the PLO delegate i 
actually speaking. 

This position of ours has been clear. Ou 
attitude with respect to the PLO is ur 
changed. I haven't reaffirmed it for about 4 
hours, so it is about time that I do it again 
We will not deal with the PLO, negotiat ' 
with the PLO, or urge Israel to deal wit 
the PLO, as long as the PLO does not recog 
nize the existence of Israel and as long a,b 
the PLO does not accept Security Counc 
Resolutions 242 and 338. 

That will be our attitude during the Secu ^ 
rity Council debate, and I would like t 
stress again that the only resolutions tha' 
the United States considers relevant for th 
Security Council debate are Resolutions 24 
and 338 and we will not accept any resolu 
tion that tries to introduce any element tha 
goes beyond 242 and 338. 

Now on SALT? 

Q. Yes, notv on SALT — do you have an 
evidence today that the Soviet Union is pre 
pared to offer, in your own words, a reason '' 
able and serious counterproposal to the las 
American proposal that tvas made to th 

Department of State Bulletil '"i 


Secretanj Kissinger: The exchanges which 
re have had with the Soviet Union since 
rovember indicate that the Soviet Union 
ealizes that no settlement is possible on the 
asis of its present proposal and that it is 
'illing to negotiate on the basis of the prop- 
sition that it must modify its position and 
aat we are then also prepared to look at 
ur position. And it is on this basis that a 
rip by me to Moscow has been discussed. 

Q. Are there plans for such a trip in the 
nmediate future? 

Secretary Kissinger: I would expect such 
trip to take place within the next four 
'eeks — 

Q. Mr. Secretary — 

Secretary Kissinger: — four to five weeks. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your discussion car- 
ter, you made some reference to the fact that 
t one point — as I recall, after the evidence 
ad emerged that the Soviets ivere building 

certain kind of silo — at one point the 
evicts raised some questions about Ameri- 
m practices that we, as I understood you, 
>ere not anxious to publicize. Could you tell 
s any more about what those practices 
light have been? 

Secretary Kissinger: No, the basic point 
nat I wanted to make is this: It was in our 
iterest — we were interested, as long as 
aere was no conclusive evidence, to keep 
ne debate on the confidential level and to 
ermit both sides to raise with each other 
echnical issues in which they could raise 
uestions and clarify questions. 

I would say that the issues that the Soviet 
Inion raised did not in fact involve viola- 
lons of the agreement by the United States, 
ut from the point of view of Soviet pho- 
agraphy, they might not have been self- 
vident. And it is therefore one of those 
6sues where ambiguous evidence is pro- 
'uced in good faith that can be clarified by 
urther exchanges. 

There have been no American violations 
f the agreement, except in the technical 
lense that I have described. 

Q. Are they satisfied ivith your response 

anuary 5, 1976 

Secretary Kissinger: It is still being dis- 
cussed, but I think we are making prog- 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you touched most lightly 
on the strongest issue, which is a continuing 
07ie in Congress, ivhich is a claim that Soviet 
performance on the agreement has failed to 
live up to your own assurances of what you 
told Congress the Soviet Union was expected 
to do. 

Secretary Kissinger: I said — 

Q. You referred to the unilateral agree- 
ments — one of the issues ivhich is a continu- 
ing one up there, of course, is the question of 
conversion of Soviet light missiles to heavy 
missiles. Could you deal broadly with the 
question which you only touched on earlier, 
of the unilateral statements and the Soviet 
nonagreement and nonperformance on those 
unilateral statements? 

Secretary Kissinger: All right, let me first 
deal with another issue. One of the argu- 
ments that is being made is that the SALT 
agreement was sloppily negotiated — between 
myself and Dobrynin [Anatoly F. Dobrynin, 
Soviet Ambassador to the United States], 
usually — and that we are now suffering from 
the draftsmanship, from that draftsman- 

Well, first of all, I do not believe that the 
SALT agreement was sloppily negotiated. 
But in any event, the text of the agreement 
was negotiated in Helsinki. There is not one 
paragraph in that document that was 
drafted by any other group than the negoti- 
ating teams in Helsinki, which included 
representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
the Defense Department, the State Depart- 
ment — and indeed all interested agencies — 
and which was backstopped by a technical 
panel here. 

So that the charge that documents were 
drafted in the absence of technical advisers 
is absolutely ludicrous. 

Now, the exchanges that took place be- 
tween Dobrynin and me, first of all, were 
confined to very few matters and usually 
concerned a question of principle, such as 
whether offensive weapons should be dealt 

with simultaneously with defensive weapons 
or whether they should be dealt with sepa- 
rately. That question, strange as it may 
seem today, took three months of exchanges 
to settle, and those of you who followed 
SALT matters will remember that at the 
end of May 1971, it was settled with an 
agreement in principle that offensive and 
defensive negotiations should proceed in 
parallel. That did not require great technical 

As soon as that decision was made, it was 
shifted to the SALT delegation in Helsinki, 
and all the implementing negotiation of that 
was conducted in Helsinki. 

Then on my visit to Moscow in April 1972, 
the Soviet Union made a proposal and for 
the first time — in which for the first time 
they agreed to include submarine missiles in 
the offensive count and proposed a proce- 
dure by which this could be accomplished 
by the retirement of land-based or other mis- 

I might add that one of the most ardent 
advocates of this particular solution is a 
prospective candidate for the Senate — from 
Virginia, in case any of you have any ques- 
tion of whom I am talking about [laughter] 
— because he did not wish to build any addi- 
tional nuclear submarines at that time. 

This general proposal was brought back 
by me from Moscow, was put before the Na- 
tional Security Council at a meeting in which 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director 
of the Arms Control Agency and our chief 
negotiator were represented. Specific in- 
structions were given how to work out the 
technicalities of it, and it then was worked 
out in detail in Helsinki. 

Those were the two areas in which I was 
most active. 

Now let us deal with the specific issue of 
the conversion of light to heavy missiles. 

In the agreement there is a provision 
which was also put in, in part at our request 
— but at any rate which we accepted without 
any difficulty — to the effect that the exist- 
ing silos could be increased by 15 percent in 
the process of modernization. This is the 
only legal requirement of the agreement; 
that is, if either side increased any of its 

silos by more than 15 percent it would b( 
in violation of the agreement. 

There is no charge that this has beer 
done. In fact, it has not been done. The in- 
telligence community agrees that the in 
crease in silo dimensions in the moderniza- 
tion program of the Soviet Union does no1 
exceed 15 percent. 

The United States added another uni- 
lateral statement to the effect that if ir 
these SS-11 holes a missile were placec 
which was significantly larger than th( 
SS-11 that we — I don't know what phras« 
we used, at any rate, that we — 

Q. "Significantly larger"? 

Secretary Kissinger: "Significantly larger' 
was the phrase. I don't know whether w( 
used the phrase, "We consider this a viola 
tion— " 

Q. Substantially larger? 

Secretary Kissinger: No, "significantb 
larger" is the phrase. But I don't knov 
whether we said it's a violation or what w( 
said, what the specific — incidentally, tha 
statement was drafted by the delegation. 

Q. But wasn't it on your instruction, 
from — 

Secretary Kissinger: That unilateral state 

Q. That was issued by the delegation, as . 
recall, the last day of the negotiations, jus 
to finish up the piece of paper. 

Secretary Kissinger: Wait a minute, le' 
me make clear — I don't want to play a game 

I agreed with everything the delegatior 
did. I think the delegation did a good job 
Everything that the delegation did was fi- 
nally approved in the White House. 

The text of it, however, was not draftee 
by me, but approved by me ; and I am there- 
fore fully behind it. I am simply trying tc 
get the sequence straight. 

Now, for about a year, our intelligenct 
indicated that the two new Soviet missiles 
that were being developed, the SS-17 and 
19, were about 15 to 20 percent larger than 
the ones that had existed in 1972. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Q. Yes. 

Secretary Kissinger: Fifteen to twenty 
percent — don't hold me to these precise fig- 
ures, because I am doing it from memory. 
But it is in that range, and it is always with 
an inaccuracy factor. 

Starting in the middle of 1974, it became 
apparent that at least one of them, the 
SS-19, could be as much as 40 percent 
larger. So we had the dilemma that we have 
a missile that is larger, by that percentage, 
than the SS-11 put into a hole that is not, 
however, in violation of the agreement, by a 
better utilization of existing space and more 
efficient use of fuel ; and that raises a serious 

We are attempting — the assurances I 
gave in 1972, which were based on the pro- 
vision of the agreement, obviously dealt with 
the missiles we then knew. We obviously did 
not know in '72 what missiles the Soviet 
Union would be testing in '74 ; and the ques- 
tions I was asked were always concerned 
with whether the Soviet Union would be 
able to put the SS-9 into the SS-11 hole, the 
SS-11 hole being the smaller one. And all 
of my answers, obviously, had to be directed 
toward the missiles I knew and not toward 
the missiles that came along two years later. 

With respect to the SS-19, we are at- 
tempting to put limitations on this in the 
current round of SALT negotiations; and it 
is in that category, which Secretary Schles- 
inger [James R. Schlesinger, former Secre- 
tary of Defense] has also described, of no 
specific violation but of being sufficiently 
ambiguous to raise some questions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, a three-part question. 
What evidence do you have that the Soviet 
Union realizes no settlement is possible on 
the basis of its last known existing proposal? 
Secondly, do you have reason to believe that 
there is now, or soon will be, a new Soviet 
proposal? And what are the prospects for a 
new SALT agreement within the next three 
or four months? 

Secretary Kissinger: If I go to Moscow — 
or the fact that I say that I will in all prob- 
ability go to Moscow indicates that I have 
evidence that the Soviet Union will not in- 

sist on its last proposal, because otherwise 
there would be no point in going. 

Q. But is there a new one in the works? 

Secretary Kissinger: When that proposal 
will be surfaced — whether it will be surfaced 
then, when I am there, or whether it will be 
surfaced ahead of time — that remains for 

Your second question? What was it? 

Q. The second part: Is there a new pro- 

Secretary Kissinger: At any rate, since I 
have stated that we will not accept their last 
proposal, if there is no new proposal, there 
will be no settlement. There is no possibility 
of our accepting the last Soviet proposal. 

Now, what do I think the chances are? I 
believe that if both sides make a serious 
effort that the diff'erences should be solved. 
The Soviet Union must make a serious effort, 
and we are prepared to make a serious ef- 
fort. I am moderately optimistic. 

Q. Well, even to be talking about going 
to Moscow, you must know something that 
we don't. You would not go there just for 
the ivinter weather. Do you have a reason 
to believe that if you — 

Secretary Kissinger: I said I had reason 
to believe that they will not insist on their 
last proposal. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the neivs reports in con- 
nection with Admiral Zumivalt's [Elmo R. 
Zumwalt, Jr., former Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions] testimony carry the phrase here that 
the admiral suggested that "Mr. Kissinger's 
lack of candor" — and I am quoting from a 
news report, sir — "sprang from a personal 
and political commitment to the success of 
the detente policy" ivhich made him, quote, 
"reluctant to report the actual facts." How 
do you react to that, sir? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have stated how we 
have handled information, and I think my 
statement makes it absolutely clear that 
the admiral got carried away by his political 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned, among 

January 5, 1976 

the possible violations, Soviet interference 
tcith national means of inspection. Have they 
interfered ivith our — 

Secretary Kissinger: No, I have listed that 
as a — 

Q. A possibility, yes. Have they interfered, 
or are they noiv attempting to interfere, with 
our national means of inspection? And while 
I have the floor, how are you doing on the 
threshold test ban, and what are the pros- 
pects in that agreement? 

Secretary Kissinger: The question of inter- 
ference with national means of detection: 
there has been a Soviet program from the 
middle — it dates back from the middle of 
the 1960's — to make photography and other 
means of detection more complicated. 

There have been some actions since the 
SALT agreement in that category. Several 
of those have been raised with the Soviet 
Union. Some of those that have been raised 
have been ended. None of those, up to now, 
have fundamentally interfered with our na- 
tional means of detection. 

Q. Are they currently trying to interfere? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, you know there 
are so many separate things going on, there 
is always an effort. We have several things 
befoi-e them at this moment. I have said 
that, up to now, nothing has decisively 
interfered with our national means of de- 

And the second question is: How are we 
doing on the test ban? 

Q. And what are the prospects of getting 
a settlement on that quickly? There is a 
deadline on that, I believe, coming up. 

Secretary Kissinger: We are negotiating 
it. There are only one or two issues left, and 
therefore it can be settled any time, but it 
hasn't been settled yet. 

Q. Aren't those the same issues, though, 
that existed last July? 

Secretary Kissinger: That's true. And so 
either they will be settled, or they will not 
be settled. And I know that is going to be 
the headline tonight. [Laughter.] 


Q. Mr. Secretary, I think you know that 
this issue to which you have addressed your- 
self here this afternoon is so complex that 
many of us — and probably most of the mem- 
bers of the public — are unable to understand 
the details that you are referring to. I won- 
der if — 

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but they can 
understand the procedures to which I am 
referring, and those are perfectly plain. 

Q. I am just wondering, Mr. Secretary, if , 
you tvould address yourself to the various 
political charges, or the various charges that 
you claim arise from political motives, and 
in simple language, categorically deny them, 
if that be the — 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I am not saying 
all of them arise from political motives. 
Some do, some don't. 

But I don't want to go into the question of 
motives. I think I have dealt with all the 
essential charges. The charge that informa- 
tion has been deliberately withheld is false. 
The charge that the President was not 
briefed is false. The charge that either I as 
Secretary of State or as Assistant to the 
President have refused to deal with compli- 
ance issues is false. The charge that there 
were secret agreements is essentially false. 

And I think these are the major items; if 
there is anyone else who wants to ask or if 
I have left one out I will be glad to— 

Q. // / may just follow up: Why do you 
say " essentialhj" false? 

Secretary Kissinger: Because there was an 
interpretative statement that for some rea- 
son was not distributed to the bureaucracy, 
even though the essence of it was distrib- 
uted to the bureaucracy, and even though 
the bureaucracy was instructed to testify 
as to its contents. Why it was not distrib- 
uted, I cannot for the life of me remember 
now. But the bureaucracy was told that such 
an interpretative statement would be nego- 
tiated, its content was distributed to it, so 
technically speaking this was not seen, but 
the content was known. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, tivo questions. On SALT 
Two — ju^t so that I am clear — you said you 

Department of State Bulletin 

would probably go to Moscow within four to 
five weeks. Is it a fair assumption that you 
are not going on this trip you leave on, to- 
morroiv ? 

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct. 

Q. And if so, ivhat has happened? I think 
you left the impression you would go to Mos- 
cow before Christmas. Was there some slip- 
page or some bureaucratic problem here or 
in the Soviet Union? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think there is 
no sense going to Moscow until we have our 
positions prepared in great detail and until 
we are confident also that on the Soviet side 
there is sufficient understanding of what is 
needed. And given the travel schedules of 
all of the key members here, it seemed on 
the whole best not to hurry the process and 
to move at a pace that permitted a very de- 
tailed examination of all of the issues. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the second part of that 
question deals with another ambiguity, or 
what-have-you; it's the charge that the 
Soviets have perhaps built another ABM 
test site at Kamchatka. Can you address this? 

Secretary Kissinger: This is an issue that 
is now under discussion with the Soviet 
Union, and I simply want to explain the 
issue. It is one of these technical issues. 

There is no dispute that the radar in 
Kamchatka faces the Soviet Union, and not 
the United States. And therefore we are 
dealing with a test radar. The ABM treaty 
requires that ABM testing could take place 
only at agreed test ranges, and we listed 
ours. The Soviet Union didn't list theirs. 

Q. You listed one for them. 

Secretary Kissinger: We unilaterally listed 
one for them, and the Soviet Union gave an 
ambiguous reply to that, saying what their 
test ranges were was generally known; but 
they would not confirm or deny the one we 
gave for them. And I think we claimed two 
for ourselves. 

If the Soviet Union had claimed the 
Kamchatka range for itself at that time, 
there would be no problem. If the Soviet 
Union told us today that the Kamchatka 

range is an ABM test range, then — suppos- 
ing we were satisfied about the characteris- 
tics of the radar — there would be no signifi- 
cant problem. 

So here we are dealing with a technical 
issue of what an agreed test range is — since 
there is no disagreement that the radar in 
Kamchatka faces into the Soviet Union and 
therefore must be used for some sort of 
internal tracking. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, isn't it true that you 
wouldn't have made these very important 
announcements here today and this report 
on intelligence and evaluation and how it all 
works if it hadn't been for the investigations 
on Capitol Hill? 

Secretary Kissinger: I didn't say anything 
about the investigations on Capitol Hill. 

Q. Yes, I know you didn't — but I mean 
this obviously is a reply to them. Right? 

Secretary Kissinger: I did not criticize 
the investigations. 

Q. No, I didn't say you did. But I say, isn't 
it a good thing that we have had all this 
come out today, and isn't it true that it 
wouldn't have come out had it not been for 
the investigations up there? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, then the ques- 
tion is whether it could have come out with- 
out some of the wild charges that were 

But be that as it may, I am not criticizing 
the efi'ort of the Congress to get clarity 
about how the intelligence process operates. 
And to the extent that my briefing today 
was elicited by the Congress, I have no ob- 
jection if you give some credit to them. 

Q. Do you think this will take care of the 
subpoena now? You say you think this will 

Secretary Kissinger: No, no, on the sub- 
poena — the subpoena has nothing to do with 
this. The subpoena concerns covert opera- 
tions and recommendations of Secretaries of 
State when I was not in office — it has noth- 
ing to do with any recommendations I made 
— recommendations of a previous decade, to 
previous Presidents. 

January 5, 1976 


The President has exercised executive 
privilege with respect to that. I am under 
instructions from the President with respect 
to it. The resolution of this issue is between 
the White House and the committee. It is 
not an issue that concerns any actions while 
I have been Secretary of State, and it has 
nothing to do with the SALT issue. It has 
to do with the subject of covert operations, 
and the reason the President has exercised 
executive privilege is because he believed 
that recommendations of Cabinet members 
to the President should be protected. 

But I am not expressing a personal opin- 
ion on that subject. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can we turn to another 

Secretary Kissinger: Can we wind this up 
fairly soon? I have some luncheon guests 
upstairs who are getting restless. 

Q. All right. Mr. Kissinger, on the subject 
of Angola, you and the President have made 
some accusations. A protest has been made 
to the Soviet Union about alleged interven- 
tion. There's comments about Cuban inter- 
vention there. Isn't it about time that you 
told Its roughly ivhat the United States has 
done in the way of helping forces in Angola, 
and since ivhen? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have said that the 
United States has tried to be helpful to some 
neighboring countries. Whatever we have 
done has started long after massive Soviet 
involvement became evident. So this is not 
a case that really lends itself to great dis- 
pute on that subject, because the Soviet 
Union has been active there in this manner 
since March. But I would rather not go any 
further until we see what can be done in 
the present diplomatic effort. 

Q. What can be done, Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, that's what we 
are trying — 

Q. What are the available opportunities 
open to the United States — 

Secretary Kissinger: That's what we are 
trying to find out. We have stated repeatedly 

that outside powers should stay out of An- 
gola and, especially, extracontinental powers 
should stay out of Angola. 

Q. What do you mean, Mr. Secretary, when 
you say whatever we have done started long 
after the massive — what has the United 
States done? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have said that we 
try to give some assistance to neighboring 
countries — not South Africa — but I don't 
want to go any further. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, before we say "thank 
you" — sotne of my colleagues seem about to 
bury Mr. Brezhnev. Can you give us your 
latest estimate of the state of his health? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have received no 
communication from the Soviet Government 
about the health of Mr. Brezhnev, as has 
been alleged. My visit to the Soviet Union 
has absolutely nothing to do with any com- 
ments regarding his state of health. Our 
impression is that he is in active charge and 
that he will continue beyond the Party Con- 

U.S. Replies to Soviet Proposal 
on Middle East Peace Conference 

Folloiving is the text of a note delivered 
to the Embassy of the U.S.S.R. at Washing- i 
ton on December 1. 

The Government of the United States has 
carefully examined the message received 
from the Government of the Soviet Union ' 
on November 9, 1975, on the subject of re- 
convening the Middle East Peace Conference 
at Geneva and wishes to convey the follow- 
ing reply. 

The United States shares the concern for 
further progress toward a comprehensive 
settlement of the conflict in the Middle East. 
The United States is also of the view that 
all of the issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
including the Palestinian issue, must be re- 
solved if a lasting peace in the Middle East 
is to be achieved. The issue is how most 


Department of State Bulletin 


ffectively to move toward that goal. 

The United States agrees that a resump- 
ion of the Geneva Peace Conference after 
areful preparation would serve the goal of 
chieving progress in the settlement of the 
onflict. The goal of a reconvened Confer- 
nce should be the achievement of a com- 
rehensive political settlement of the Middle 
last conflict. 

The Soviet Union has proposed that the 
LS. and the USSR as Co-chairmen take a 
)int initiative to reconvene the Geneva 
eace Conference. The United States is con- 
ilting with the parties to determine their 
lews and will be prepared to consult with 
le Soviet Government on how best to pre- 
are the agenda and procedures for a re- 
jnvened Conference and to deal with the 
uestion of participation in the Conference. 

With respect to the Soviet position on 
alestinian participation at the Geneva Con- 
?rence, the U.S. has always held the view 
lat legitimate Palestinian interests must be 
iken into account in an overall settlement, 
he United States cannot agree, however, 
lat the Co-chairmen of the Conference 
m alter the definition of the participants 
I the Conference initially agreed to by the 
•iginal participants. 

The Soviet Union will recall that the iden- 
cal letters presented by the Permanent 
epresentatives of the U.S. and the USSR 
) the Secretary General of the United Na- 
ons on December 18, 1973 stated: "The 
arties have also agreed that the question 
f other participants from the Middle East 
rea will be discussed during the first stage 
f the Conference." As no decision was 
eached at the Conference in December 1973 
jncerning possible additional participation, 
lis remains a subject for discussion among 
le original participants. It also remains the 
iew of the United States that the appro- 
riate UN resolutions to serve as the basis 
or negotiations leading toward a peace 
ettlement, and the ones which the parties 
ave accepted for this purpose, are Security 
'ouncil Resolutions 242 and 338. It would 
herefore not be appropriate to introduce 
ther resolutions not accepted by all parties 
or this purpose. 

As a practical way of proceeding, the 
United States proposes a preparatory con- 
ference of those who have participated so 
far in negotiations looking toward a settle- 
ment within the Geneva Conference frame- 
work. In addition to the United States and 
the Soviet Union, such a preparatory con- 
ference could include Egypt, Jordan, Syria, 
and Israel and could consider agenda, pro- 
cedures, and the matter of participation in 
a subsequent full conference, with a view 
toward laying the foundation for negotia- 
tion of an overall settlement. The United 
States is also prepared to consider holding 
bilateral consultations with the USSR in 
advance of such a preparatory conference, 
and solicits the views of the Soviet Union 
on this possible approach. 

United States and Poland Hold Talks 
on Northeastern Pacific Fisheries 

Joint U.S.-Polish Communique ' 

Delegations of the Polish People's Republic 
and the United States met in Washington, 
D.C., December 3-6 to discuss fisheries mat- 
ters of mutual concern in the Northeastern 
Pacific Ocean off the coast of the United 
States. The Polish delegation was headed by 
Vice Minister Edwin Wisniewski of the Min- 
istry of Foreign Trade and Shipping. Head 
of the American delegation was Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State Rozanne L. 

A new Agreement concerning 1976 Polish 
fishing activities off the United States Pa- 
cific coast was initialed on December 9 and 
10, 1975. The new Agreement will be signed 
in Washington at an early date. 

Both delegations expressed satisfaction 
with the new Agreement, which represents 
continuing significant cooperation between 
the two Governments and substantial prog- 
ress in the conservation of fisheries stocks 
off the Pacific Coast of the United States. 

'Issued on Dec. 10 (text from press release 600). 

anuary 5, 1976 



Three Aspects of U.S. Relations With Latin America 

Address by William D. Rogers 

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs 

Governor [Reubin] Askew, Congressman 
[Dante B.] Fascell, Congressman [Claude 
D.] Pepper, Mayor [Maurice] Ferre, distin- 
guished guests: I was delighted that you 
should ask me to come to Miami today to 
say a word or two by way of despedida to 
those of you who are setting off this after- 
noon on your goodwill trip to Colombia and 

Your visit is important. You will carry 
the message to Latin America of the central 
significance of Florida and particularly of 
this great city to our relations with the 
hemisphere. You will see once again the 
vibrance and subtlety of these two great 
nations. And your being there, as leaders of 
this country, most significantly will sym- 
bolize once again for Latin America the 
importance we attach to Latin America. 

I intend to touch on three aspects of that 
relationship. The first is Panama; the sec- 
ond, our economic relations; and finally, the 
future of the inter-American system. 

First, Panama. President Lopez Michelsen 
of Colombia, whom you will see I gather, 
recently made a state visit to Washington. 
It was a considerable success. 

At the White House banquet, in his meet- 
ings with House and Senate leadership, and 
elsewhere, he said, with the tact and sensi- 
tivity which is his trademark, that Panama 
is the one continental problem we face. He 
meant, by that, that the need to design a 
new relationship between Panama and the 
United States is the single issue of inter- 

' Made before the Greater Miami Chamber of Com- 
merce and the International Center of Greater Miami 
at Miami, Fla., on Dec. 4. 



American relations on which all the natioq 
of Latin America are most united. 

As you know. Ambassador Ellswort' 
Bunker is now engaged in an effort to wor 
out a new canal treaty with Panama, 
would replace the existing treaty of 190 
which no longer corresponds to the realil 
of today's world; it does not accommoda' 
the enormous changes which have occurrt* 
during the past 70 years. 

We are negotiating because we are co> 
vinced that a new and more equitable trea1 
is essential to best protect our national i 
terest in Panama. In essence our fund 
mental interest is a canal that is ope 
secure, neutral, and efficiently operated. 

In today's world the extensive rights tl 
United States acquired in 1903 to act as " 
it were the sovereign" over a strip of Pan. 
manian territory are not only unnecessai 
to that fundamental national interest, bi 
this also flies in the face of the need i 
maintain an open canal. The 1903 arrang 
ment is an increasing source of conflict n( 
only in Panama but in the entire hemispher 
as you will certainly hear in both Venezue 
and Colombia. In recent years Panamania 
consent to our presence in the original fori 
prescribed in the 1903 treaty has decline 
significantly. Failure to recognize this rea 
ity and to adjust our relationship coul 
threaten the very interests we are seekiii 
to preserve — the availability of the canal I 
the world's waterborne commerce. 

The February 1974 statement of princ 
pies signed by Secretary Kissinger ar 
Panamanian Foreign Minister Tack provide 
the framework for a new treaty relationshi 

Department of State Bullet! 



•hich we believe will restore the important 
] gradient of Panamanian consent to our 
j'esence while giving us the treaty rights we 
i-ed. In essence the principles provide that: 

— Panama would grant the United States 
te rights, facilities, and lands necessary to 
cntinue operating and defending the canal 
ir the treaty period; 

— For its part the United States would 
iturn to Panama jurisdiction over its terri- 
try and arrange for Panamanian participa- 
t)n over time in canal operation and de- 

— The new treaty would provide for any 
epansion of canal capacity that may even- 
tally be needed and give Panama a more 
(uitable share of the benefits resulting 
fjm use of its geographic location. 

Substantive negotiations on the major 
i;ues within the framework of these prin- 
oles have been underway since June 1974. 
^e have already reached general agreement 

< some issues, such as jurisdiction, the 
ijhts we shall require for operation and 
(fense, and Panamanian participation in 
lese functions. Some of the most difficult 

< estions, such as duration, the lands and 
nters we shall require for operation and 

< fense, and economic benefits to Panama, 
ie still unresolved. 

But we are persuaded that a new treaty 
nbodying the concept of constructive part- 
1 rship contained in these principles should 
lovide a practical means of reconciling our 
htional interests and assuring that the 
( nal remains open, efficient, and secure. 

As the President said on October 7 in 
'noxville: ^ 

For three Administrations — President Johnson, 
•esident Nixon, and myself — negotiations have been 
>ing on with the Government of Panama concerning 
at problem. If you will refresh your memory, you 
ill recall there were serious riots in Panama, I 
ink in 1965. Around 30 people were killed, including 
me Americans. Now, these negotiations are going 
I have taken the position that we will not accept 

'For the transcript of an interview with President 
3rd recorded at Knoxville, Tenn., on Oct. 7 for tele- 
sion broadcast that evening, see Weekly Compila- 
on of Presidential Documents dated Oct. 13, 1975, 

inuary 5, 1976 

— and I would not recommend to the Senate — any 
proposal that interfered with the national security 
of the Canal, that would interfere with the opera- 
tions of the Canal. 

I would not, under any circumstances, do anything 
in the negotiations or submit a proposal to the Senate 
that undercut our national security. 

The negotiations, he added, are going for- 
ward within these principles. The Admin- 
istration is dedicated to the success of this 
effort. We think we can find, in those nego- 
tiations, a new treaty relationship with 
Panama which will indeed protect and en- 
hance the fundamental national interests of 
both parties. 

I think you will see no better evidence 
during your visit of the relevance of this 
venture to our relations throughout the 
hemisphere, and most particularly with 
Venezuela and Colombia. We had better 
succeed, for the consequences are not pleas- 
ant to contemplate. 

Latin American Development Needs 

Now let me turn to a second area of im- 
portance to our relations with the hemi- 
sphere — economics. Here, we have some- 
thing to show for our recent efforts. 

The inter-American issues of the future 
are largely economic issues. Political and 
security problems have dominated our rela- 
tionships within the hemisphere in the past. 
Today the burning aspiration of Latin Amer- 
ica is development. It is in terms of whether 
they bode well or ill for Latin America's 
economic growth that our own policies are 
now being tested. 

In general, the Latin American countries 
are not among the "poorest of the poor" in 
global terms. They are the middle-class 
countries ; they have already achieved a con- 
siderable degree of industrial development. 
These are nations which are fully part of 
the world economy. Their future economic 
development depends on broad relationships 
with the economies of industrialized coun- 
tries, and they are better able to take ad- 
vantage of such a relationship than those 
lowest on the development ladder. 

Thus the development needs of Latin 
America are not less than those of the 
poorer countries. But they are different. 


They must have trade opportunities that 
reflect their needs and possibilities. With- 
out exporting they cannot import. 

They also need capital. Investment is the 
key to growth ; and in many, probably most, 
of these countries, because they still have 
only a modest standard of living, domestic 
savings are not adequate to maintain satis- 
factory levels of growth. 

Thirdly, they need technology. They must 
be able to draw on the technological ad- 
vances made in the industrial countries to 
increase their productivity and reach 
higher levels of industrialization. 

New U.S. Economic Policies 

It is in this context that the initiatives 
of the recent U.N. General Assembly sev- 
enth special session take on special impor- 
tance for the nations of Latin America. As 
Secretary Kissinger stated, many of the 
U.S. proposals delivered at the beginning of 
that session were particularly designed with 
the needs of Latin America in mind. The 
proposals, many of which were included in 
the final agreed resolution of the session, 
are largely directed at improving the func- 
tioning of the market to better serve the 
needs of the LDC's [less developed coun- 
tries] rather than at creating new mecha- 
nisms to meet development needs. The suc- 
cessful implementation of these proposals 
will be a difficult, long-term task. I would 
like to review with you the progress being 
made on some of the major initiatives as 
they relate to Latin America. 

One of the major concerns of the develop- 
ing countries of the area has been the wide 
year-to-year fluctuations in export earnings, 
particularly for primary products. These 
swings in earnings have badly disrupted de- 
velopment plans and are doing so now. For 
many of the Latin American countries, the 
vulnerability to cyclical changes in exports 
was not only a matter of primary products ; 
several have become significant exporters of 
manufactured goods, the demand for which 
is sharply afi'ected by economic conditions 
in the industrialized countries. So as a 
result of the current world economic crisis, 
in part caused by the huge increase in the 

cost of energy last year, many Latin Amer 
ican countries are now experiencing seven 
balance-of-payments problems. 

As a partial answer to this problem, Sec- 
retary Kissinger at the special session pro 
posed the creation of a development securitj 
facility within the International Monetarj 
Fund. The facility would provide protectior 
against disruption of overall export earnings 
for both primary and manufactured prod 
ucts. The Executive Directors of the IMF 
have this proposal, as well as a proposal foi 
creation of a trust fund to finance grants foi 
the poorest countries, under active consider 
ation. We hope they can reach agreemeni 
within the next few months. 

The development security facility, if es- 
tablished, would be a step toward ameliorat- 
ing the problem of unstable export earnings 
from primai-y commodities. In addition, th( 
Secretary also proposed that there be a pro 
ducer-consumer forum for consideration ol 
key commodities and that we move on a case 
by-case basis in an effort to strengthen th( 
market functions for both buyers anc 
sellers. This represents a major advance ii 
U.S. policy. 

Because of the importance of the U.S 
market for Latin America, the implementa 
tion of our generalized system of prefer 
ences on January 1 will also be of specia 
significance. It will provide new export op- 
portunities for the hemisphere. 

There are other proposals made at the 
seventh special session which, when devel- 
oped, will be valuable to the Latin Americar 
countries. A special working group of the ^ 
IMF-IBRD [International Monetary Fund- 
International Bank for Reconstruction and ' 
Development] Development Committee is 
considering means of facilitating access to 
world capital markets by LDC's. As Latin 
America moves beyond large-scale conces- 
sional lending, capital market borrowings 
will be a major source of development funds. 
They could obtain special benefit from the 
proposed expansion of the International 
Finance Corporation to strengthen its sup- 
port for private investment in LDC's, and 
the creation of an International Investment' 
Trust which would attract capital for invest- 


Department of State Bulletin 

ment in public, private, and mixed enter- 
prises in LDC's. 

These proposals represent some of the 
important economic initiatives set forth, in 
major part in the Kissinger address of Sep- 
tember 1 at the U.N. seventh special session. 
They meet some of the concern of the na- 
tions of the hemisphere. 

There is no more important issue, as I 
have said, for our relations with the hemi- 
sphere. It is vital that we support, and 
cooperate with, the development aspirations 
of the hemisphere, as you will see in the 
course of your trip. So we tend to think we 
scored something of an important break- 
through with these new U.S. economic poli- 
cies this fall. 

Wide Range of OAS Activities 

The same cannot be said for the third 
matter I would like to touch on — the Or- 
ganization of American States and its char- 

For the better part of the last three years, 
representatives of 24 American states have 
been trying to draft a new charter for the 
Organization of American States. Their 
goal: to modernize the organization, which 
is the centerpiece of the inter-American 

The OAS, oldest surviving international 
organization, traces its roots back to 1890, 
and its history has been one of high ac- 
complishment. In its best known role, the 
organization has traditionally provided a 
place the governments of this hemisphere 
can meet to consult on common problems, 
including some thorny ones — human rights, 
family planning — sometimes as an adjunct 
to bilateral or other multilateral fora, but 
. more often as the prime locus for discussion. 
I The inter-American system began that 
way — as a series of conferences. In the past, 
these high-level meetings, now called Assem- 
blies, have produced agreements in a number 
of sensitive security, political, and economic 

Almost 30 years ago in Rio de Janeiro, 
one of these meetings yielded a hemispheric 
mutual security pact, the Rio Treaty. Al- 
though born in response to the Nazi threat. 

the treaty during the 1950's drew renewed 
vitality from the commonly held apprehen- 
sions of the cold war. But even today, in a 
world of reduced military tension, the Rio 
Treaty has demonstrated its staying power, 
perhaps attributable more now to recogni- 
tion of growing power imbalances within 
Latin America itself than to fear of extra- 
territorial aggression. The member states 
reaffirmed their support for an updated Rio 
Treaty at San Jose this last summer. 

A 1948 agreement on the peaceful settle- 
ment of disputes symbolized the commit- 
ment within the inter-American system to 
reduce and control strife among the member 
states, just as the Rio Treaty was conceived 
primarily as a defense against extrahemi- 
spheric aggression. The organization's suc- 
cessful efforts to stop quickly the fighting 
in 1969 between El Salvador and Honduras 
show the continuing need for the OAS as a 
peacekeeper and its ability to act with dis- 

But more and more, especially during the 
last decade, as I have said, economic prob- 
lems have become the central issues of the 
hemisphere. A 1967 revision of the OAS 
Charter set down some general principles of 
economic relations, and it provided for some 
new machinery to relate to the development 
process. But, as we shall see, formal agree- 
ments do not guarantee success. 

The OAS has also served as an umbrella 
for the activities of a myriad of technical 
organizations which bring together special- 
ists from throughout the hemisphere. These 
have produced concrete benefits in, for exam- 
ple, telecommunications, tourism promotion, 
ports and harbors, and trade facilitation. 

I have used these examples because they 
happen to be the subjects of OAS meetings 
going on at various places in the hemisphere 
at this very moment. A complete list of OAS 
technical activities would reveal an astound- 
ing range of subjects under consideration at 
the expert level. This fact is a unique fea- 
ture of the organization. 

Finally, the OAS carries out numerous 
additional projects. Specialized organizations 
work in the fields of health ; agriculture ; the 
problems of women, children, and Indians; 

January 5, 1976 


as well as social and economic development; 
educational, scientific, and cultural coopera- 
tion; and human rights. 

The organization, in short, is big. And it 
does a great deal. It spends almost $100 
million a year, $65 million of which comes 
from the United States. It employs 1,500 
people stationed throughout the member 

As you can see from this, a gamut of 
hemispheric concerns has found their way 
into the inter-American system. This span 
of involvement has created a unique heri- 
tage. Can it be sustained in a world of 
change ? 

In 1973, a mere three years after the last 
major modification of the charter entered 
into force, uneasiness over the organization's 
relevance to a changing world led members 
to agree to yet another study of the organi- 
zation. Why so soon? What are the factors 
promoting this presumed need for frequent 
self-examination? And what were the re- 

The OAS groups a diverse polity. It brings 
together 25 distinct nations. The differences 
among us are marked, though we share the 
same hemisphere and all won our independ- 
ence from extracontinental overlords. Most 
of the members are, economically speaking, 
among the world's middle class, but some 
are truly poor. In terms of size, consider 
Brazil and Grenada. The four major lan- 
guages mirror different cultural heritages. 
Alaska and Argentina are almost poles apart, 
in more than just geography. The diversity 
has been growing. 

These variations have introduced a new 
and significant element to inter-American 
relations for the future. In an earlier, less 
complicated time, it was an unquestioned 
principle that all member states should as- 
pire to liberal representative democracy. 
This consensus has given way to acceptance 
of what in the OAS has been dubbed a 
plurality of ideologies. At San Jose in July, 
we agreed to incorporate the principle of 
ideological pluralism in the Rio Treaty. 

Moreover, fast-moving events in the rest 
of the globe during this decade have also 

begun to strain the inter- American system: 
the emergence of a multipolar world, new 
economic power centers such as the oil pro- 
ducers, the spectacular growth of transna- 
tional enterprises, the boom of the early 
seventies, and the bust that we are now 
suffering through. These have affected tra- 
ditional perceptions of international relation- 
ships in the hemisphere. 

U.S. global policies during the last few 
years have also been noted by the Latins. 
Detente has changed the context of inter- 
American security cooperation. Many saw 
President Nixon's proposal for a "mature 
partnership" as a form of neglect anything 
but benign. Economically, bilateral assist- 
ance to Latin America from the United 
States stagnated; Colombia has just decided 
to phase out direct U.S. aid entirely, for 
example. Various congressional amendments 
sought to protect U.S. private ventures 
abroad by threatening reduction or elimina- 
tion of assistance. The 10 percent surcharge 
imposed on all imports in 1971 applied 
equally to our OAS allies and struck at the 
"special relationship" concept we had touted. 
The slow-paced implementation of trade re- 
form, at least until the Secretary's special 
session address, was viewed by Latins as 
belying our promises to give their economic 
interests special weight. 

Issues in Charter Reform 

The study to revise the structure and 
purpose of the OAS was begun in 1973 at 
Latin initiative, in the context of those 
world changes. 

The Latins were motivated to the study in 
large part as a reaction to policy in the eco- 
nomic realm, which, as I have said, is the 
key to our future relationship. 

The United States looms large in the eco- 
nomic life of Latin America — so large in 
fact that it is not surprising that the special 
committee created by the 1973 mandate con- 
centrated on curbing specific U.S. actions 
which they regard as interfering with their 
own ability to cope with foreign economic 

One of these efforts became known by the 


Department of State Bulletin 

code phrase "collective economic security." 
Peru took the lead in urging that collective 
economic security be written into the OAS 
Charter. It advanced the theory that when 
a state takes measures which have negative 
effects on another's economy, it may commit 
a form of aggression. A tribunal of other 
states should sit in judgment. If a majority 
agrees that an offense has occurred, the 
tribunal should assess damages. 

A draft treaty placed before the study 
committee made clear this potential equa- 
tion of economic policy with military aggres- 
sion. The drafters had in mind such exam- 
ples as our 10 percent surcharge and Con- 
gress' requirement that we cut assistance 
in cases of uncompensated confiscation of 
U.S. property or fishing vessels. We of 
course do not believe that these actions can 
be labeled aggression. We could hardly 
agree, therefore, to create a court and a 
judge and jury to try us for actions which 
we consider to be sovereign acts to defend 
legitimate U.S. interests. 

Another charter-reform sticking point re- 
lates to the conduct of transnational enter- 
prises. The issue here is Latin America's 
venerable Calvo doctrine. This juridical no- 
tion holds that foreign investors may have 
no recourse to their own governments in 
disputes over expropriation. The decisions of 
host country courts are final. We of course 
recognize that local law obtains; but we be- 
lieve that international obligations, includ- 
ing the responsibility of a state to protect 
its citizens, must be taken into account. 

But, more importantly, we do not believe 
that these contentious issues of principle 
and doctrine, as important as they are, can 
be injected into the OAS Charter in the 
absence of any agreement between ourselves 
and the Latin Americans regarding their 

On the other hand, we do believe that a 
modernized inter-American system can con- 
tinue to play a significant and creative role 
in inter-American relations even in the ab- 
sence of agreement on the concepts of inter- 
national law relating to certain economic 
issues. This is so in terms of peacekeeping 

and conflict management. It is so in terms 
of support for the development efforts of 
Latin America. 

And it is so in the area of human rights, 
where, we are persuaded, the organization 
can make a major contribution. The stand- 
ards of human rights are international 
standards, laid down in the Inter-American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man; and it is particularly appropriate, 
therefore, that the determination whether 
countries are abiding by those standards be 
in the first instance through international 

In short, we find that the charter-reform 
effort to date, which has cost several million 
dollars, has raised more questions than it 
has answered about the extent to which we 
can agree on the nature and type of coop- 
erative relationship we want within the 
inter-American system. The final draft 
which has emerged from the OAS labors of 
the last three years does little to advance 
the common vision of an OAS which is an 
effective instrument of regional cooperation. 
As the Mexican Representative has said in 
recent days, the organization faces its "mo- 
ment of truth." 

The United States therefore proposed late 
last week that we drop the new OAS Charter 
draft and begin over again. This time, we 
should embrace the objective of making the 
OAS capable of responding to the hemi- 
sphere's aspirations for the future, within 
the limits of those goals and objectives upon 
which we and Latin America can agree. 

We are now approaching other govern- 
ments of the hemisphere. Our Ambassador 
to the OAS, William Mailliard, and Deputy 
U.S. Representative Robert White are in 
Latin America now. They will be visiting 
capitals throughout the hemisphere during 
your own trip, including both Caracas and 
Bogota. I will be going to Mexico in a few 
hours. Our purpose will be to explore with 
other foreign ministries whether there 
exists a consensual vision of a truly effec- 
tive, relevant OAS for the future. 

There is no more important common effort 
on the inter-American agenda. 

January 5, 1976 


U.S.-Yugoslav Board on Scientific 
and Technological Cooperation Meets 

Joint Statement * 

The U.S.-Yugoslav Joint Board on Scien- 
tific and Teciinological Cooperation met at 
the Department of State, Washington, D.C., 
December 4-5, for its regular semiannual 

The Board reviewed over 100 ongoing 
projects in a wide range of fields, such as 
agriculture, health, basic sciences, technol- 
ogy, ecology, transportation, and others. The 
Board also approved additional funding for 
16 projects, worth approximately 8.5 mil- 
lion dinars ($500,000), to be financed from 
the U.S.-Yugoslav Joint Fund established 
in accordance with the agreement on scien- 
tific and technological cooperation which the 
two countries signed on May 18, 1973. 

The Board reiterated its belief that scien- 
tific and technological cooperation between 
the U.S. and Yugoslavia has been very suc- 
cessful; and it expressed the hope that new 
sources of funding can be found to extend 
the program beyond 1977-78, when most of 
the current projects will expire. 

The United States was represented by Mr. 
William A. Root, Acting Director, Office of 
Soviet and Eastern European Scientific and 
Technological Affairs, Department of State, 
and Dr. Herman Chinn, Scientific Attache, 
American Embassy, Belgrade. 

Yugoslavia was represented by Dr. Edo 
Pirkmajer, Secretary General, Research 
Community of Slovenia, and Chairman of 

' Issued on Dec. 5 (press release 593). 

the Board, and Mr. Milos Rajacic, Scienlific 
Counselor, Yugoslav Embassy, Washington. 
The Board tentatively scheduled its next 
meeting in Yugoslavia in late June 1976. 

U.S. and Argentina Establish 
Bilateral Working Groups 

Press release 611 dated December 16 

Argentine Ambassador Rafael M. Vazquez 
and Assistant Secretary William D. Rogers 
met on December 16 to implement a series 
of bilateral working groups between Argen- 
tina and the United States. The meeting re- 
sulted from a decision made by the Argen- 
tine Foreign Minister and the Secretary of 
State when they met in New York last Sep- 
tember, to place greater emphasis on areas 
of potential collaboration between the two 

Ambassador Vazquez and Assistant Sec- 
retary Rogers moved to establish informal 
working groups in the fields of trade, invest- 
ment and finance, culture and tourism, agri- 
culture, and science and technology. These 
working groups will be constituted both in 
Buenos Aires and Washington, to permit 
representatives of the private sector, as well 
as government officials, to participate in the 
task of improving U.S.-Ai'gentine relations. 

The Ambassador and the Assistant Sec- 
retary pointed to the bilateral memorandum 
of understanding on cooperation in the 
health sciences, which is to be signed shortly 
in Buenos Aires, as the kind of mutually 
productive relationship which can be fos- 
tered by the working groups. 


Department of State Bulletin 


U.S. Vetoes Unbalanced Security Council Resolution 
Concerning Israeli Air Attacks in Lebanon 

Following are statements made in the 
U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representa- 
tive Daniel P. Moynihan on December U, 5, 
and 8, together with the text of a draft reso- 
lution which loas vetoed by the United States 
on December 8. 


First Statement of December 4 

USUN prtss release 174 dated December 4 

The U.S. delegation has insisted upon a 
vote on the issue of inviting representatives 
of the Palestine Liberation Organization to 
appear before the Security Council.' As a 
matter of principle, we shall vote against 
their being invited to appear. 

We have witnessed a concerted attempt 
to disregard the rules of procedure and to 
accord to the Palestine Liberation Organi- 
zation a role greater even than that which 
over the years the Council has granted to 
observer governments and a role greater by 
far than has in more recent times been 
granted to the spokesmen of legitimate na- 
tional libei'ation movements invited here 
under rule 39. 

' The Council had before it a letter from the Perma- 
nent Representative of Egypt requesting "an urgent 
meeting of the Security Council to discuss the Israeli 
aggression against the Palestinian refugee camps in 
Lebanon" and "the participation of the Palestine Lib- 
eration Organization in the debate during the discus- 
sion of this item" (U.N. doc. S/11893), as well as a 
letter from the Permanent Representative of Leba- 
non requesting an urgent meeting of the Council 
(U.N. doc. S/11892). 

The United States is not prepared to agree 
to an ad hoc departure from the rules of 
procedure tailored to meet the asserted 
needs of the Palestine Liberation Organiza- 

What is more important, my government 
is not prepared to acquiesce in an action 
which will undermine the negotiating proc- 
ess, which is the only process that can lead 
to peace. For the representatives of the 
Palestine Liberation Organization have re- 
peatedly, and as recently as the day before 
yesterday, told the General Assembly of 
their disdain for systematic negotiation. 

They have openly declared their hostility, 
indeed their contempt, for the work of this 
Council. They categorically rejected Security 
Council Resolution 242, which for years has 
served as the only agreed basis for sarious 
negotiation. And now we find the Palestine 
Liberation Organization citing actions taken 
in the General Assembly and the Security 
Council as the basis for still further erosion 
of the negotiating process. 

For these fundamental reasons, we are 
totally opposed to inviting the Palestine 
Liberation Organization. To do so will dis- 
serve the search for peace in the Middle East. 

The noblest and most fundamental aim of 
the Security Council is to achieve peace and 
security. In the case of the Middle East, my 
government is dedicated to active leadership 
in the pursuit of that goal. My government 
has long maintained that the legitimate 
interests of the Palestinian people must be 
reflected in the arrangements that will bring 
peace and security to the Middle East. 

The effort which has been made to flout 

January 5, 1976 


the procedures of this Council and to disre- 
gard entirely the sensitivities of the people 
of the State of Israel can only complicate 
the search for peace. We urge all who share 
the hope for a just peace in the Middle East 
to withhold their support from this egre- 
gious attempt to use this body to deal with 
an amorphous terrorist organization as 
though it were a concrete entity with the 
attributes of a sovereign government. 
The United States will vote "No." ^ 

Second Statement of December 4 ^ 

USUN prtss release 175 dated December 4 

I intervene briefly in the interest of keep- 
ing the record straight with respect to some 
of the things which have been said here this 

The distinguished Representative of Iraq 
asserted that the decision of the Security 
Council in September to hear the two Viet- 
Nams is a precedent for the proposal to in- 
vite what is called the full participation of 
the Palestine Liberation Organization. 

Mr. President, the Vietnamese case was 
entirely different. First, what the Council 
did in that case was to invite the Viet-Nams 
to make a statement to the Council after the 
vote, not to participate fully. 

Second, that invitation was extended on a 
nonobjection basis. The President very prop- 
erly paused and, after a moment, said, "Since 
there is no objection, it is so decided." There 
are objections here. 

Third, although the then President of the 
Council made no reference to any rule of the 
Council's rules of procedures when the 
Council invited the Viet-Nams, there was no 
reason for him to have done so. We knew 
under what rule we acted. The fact is that 

" The Council on Dec. 4 adopted by a vote of 9 to 3 
(Costa Rica, U.K., U.S.), with 3 abstentions (France, 
Italy, Japan), the procedural proposal for the par- 
ticipation of the PLO in the debate. Under article 27 
of the U.N. Charter, decisions of the Council on 
procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative 
vote of nine members. 

^ For further statements made by Ambassador 
Moynihan on Dec. 4, see USUN press release 175. 

the legal basis of the invitation was rule 39. 
As the distinguished Representative of Italy 
has said today, there can be no other basis 
under the rules as they so stand. 

Finally, in this regard, Mr. President, 
whether we believe there are one or two 
Vietnamese states, there certainly is at least 
one such state. But there does not now exist 
any state of Palestine, nor does the Palestine 
Liberation Organization claim that there 
exists a state of Palestine. The PLO cannot 
therefore be treated properly as the govern- 
ment of a state. 

Finally, Mr. President, I should like to 
adumbrate certain concerns about refer- 
ences which have been made here this after- 
noon to what was agreed or not agreed in 
the private consultations which the Council 
has held prior to this formal meeting. 

I regret to say, Mr. President, that the 
recollections of the U.S. delegation are very 
much at variance at a number of points with 
the recollections of other members of this 
Council. I regret this because it must surely 
be a sign that we have a faulty memory. 

I do not in any way mean to suggest that 
there has been misrepresentation, much lees 
that there has been deliberate misrepre- 
sentation. But there is on our part some 
distress that our recollections and under- 
standings should be so at variance with those 
of other members of the Council. 

And it must be the fact, Mr. President, 
that if the creative practice which the Coun- 
cil has evolved of meeting in private and 
without the maintenance of a record is to 
become the source of subsequent confusion, 
even disagreement and conceivably even the 
quest for advantage in consequence of the 
absence of a record, then clearly the dis- 
position of some members of this Council to 
continue that practice will have been dimin- 
ished, and a creative innovation in our pro- 
cedures will perhaps commence to decline. 

I make that point only, Mr. President, in 
the most open and nonaccusatory manner, 
simply to say that it seems to me that it is 
not useful in this debate to make reference 
to earlier agreements which are now at this 
point not a matter of record. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Statement of December 5 

USUN pitss release 176 dated December 5 

Once again we meet to consider the trag- 
edy of violence and counterviolence in the 
Middle East and the dilemma which it poses 
for all of us. Surely no one can listen to the 
accounts of actions which involve the maim- 
ing and killing of innocent civilians without 
feeling the utmost compassion for those 
concerned. How satisfying it would be if we 
felt that through what we say and do here 
we could break this vicious circle which has 
brought so much tragedy to so many people 
over the last quarter century. 

Surely, however, as responsible member.s 
of the international community charged with 
serious obligations under the U.N. Charter, 
we must recognize we do not accomplish this 
by condemning isolated acts. The attacks we 
are considering today do not occur in isola- 
tion. There is always cause and effect. 

My delegation considers that all loss of 
innocent human life is reprehensible, and we 
are prepared to deplore it in strong terms 
whether it occurs from the acts of organized 
groups or of governments. 

We would remind the Council that orga- 
nizations which carried out recent acts of 
violence against citizens of Israel have pub- 
licly acknowledged their responsibility for 
those acts, just as the Government of Israel 
has acknowledged its responsibility for the 
attacks which are now before us. I make 
these points not to condone or excuse Israel's 
recent massive air attacks, which by their 
nature could not avoid taking irtnocent vic- 
tims. We neither condone nor excuse them. 
But we must deal with them in context and 
not in isolation. 

So let me be quite clear, Mr. President: 
the United States deeply deplores these at- 
tacks, just as we have consistently deplored 
those despicable terrorist incidents which 
have caused the loss of life in Israel. 

We are prepared to support an appropri- 
ate resolution which registers the strongest 
disapproval of this Council of all acts of vio- 
lence in the Middle East, particularly those 
which result in the death of innocent civil- 

ians, and which calls on all parties to refrain 
from any action that might endanger peace 

Certainly there is nothing all of us would 
wish to see more than an end to this sense- 
less slaughter. But on reflection I think most 
of you would agree that there is only one 
way to do this, and that is to bring peace 
to the area. 

That, Mr. President, is precisely what my 
government has been devoting its most in- 
tensive efforts to try to do over the past two 
years. We remain committed to that goal. 
We will persevere in our efforts to achieve 
it. We believe we have made progress, but 
we recognize that much remains to be 

One of the unhappy features of the situa- 
tion we are dealing with today is the disrup- 
tive effect it has on the efforts to move fur- 
ther toward a peace agreement. The tensions 
and passions generated by the recurring 
cycle of violence are hardly conducive to the 
type of atmosphere that will permit the 
parties concerned to arrive at that accommo- 
dation of opposing views which is the pre- 
requisite of a peace agreement. 

Our task is to weigh deliberately how our 
reactions can best advance that reconcilia- 
tion of views. It will not be accomplished 
through the adoption of one-sided resolu- 
tions which leave one party believing it is 
the victim of discrimination and bias on the 
part of the United Nations. It will be facili- 
tated if this body renders impartial, rea- 
soned, and reasonable judgments on the 
issues properly within its competence. It is 
our duty to react in the most responsible 
and constructive way that we can con- 

Statement Before the Vote, December 8 

USUN puss release 182 dated December 8 

At the outset of this present debate in the 
Security Council concerning the complaints 
of Lebanon and Egypt about Israeli raids in 
Lebanon, the United States spoke briefly 
but, we hope, consistently — consistent with a 
position we have maintained throughout the 

January 5, 1976 


long and often heartbreaking duration of 
this conflict which is nearly coeval with the 
existence of the United Nations itself. 

We stated that we considered that all loss 
of innocent human life was reprehensible, 
that we were prepared to deplore in strong 
terms such loss of life, whether it occurs 
from the acts of governments or from the 
acts of organized groups. We made no dis- 
tinction, as indeed no distinction could be 
made, with respect to the value or the ex- 
tent of the loss of the life of a Lebanese 
child any more than the loss of the life of an 
Israeli or Syrian or Egyptian child. 

We asked on that occasion, Mr. President, 
if it were not possible for the Council to 
join in this perception which all of us shared. 
None of us around this table in this Council 
chamber think otherwise; none of the na- 
tions or that organization seated at this 
table would share a different view. 

We said on that occasion that: 

We are prepared to support an appropriate resolu- 
tion which registers the strongest disapproval of this 
Council of all acts of violence in the Middle East, 
particularly those which result in the death of inno- 
cent civilians, and which calls on all parties to refrain 
from any action that might endanger peace negotia- 

Now, Mr. President, we said this in our 
capacity as a member of the Council, but I 
think it will be granted that ours is a spe- 
cial concern in this regard owing simply to 
the fact that we are also the member of the 
Council which is seeking, in the role of 
mediator, to bring about peace in the Middle 
East. We are trying to mediate this seem- 
ingly unending conflict. And we cannot see 
mediation as in any way advanced by a one- 
sided resolution, a resolution which would 
persuade one party or another party that 
an imbalance had occurred, that an injustice 
was being done. It is only the evenhanded- 
ness of the United Nations, just as it is the 
evenhandedness of the mediator, that bears 
any promise of success. 

In the past, Mr. President, this Council 
has seen and understood and acted upon this 
fundamental requirement of responsible be- 
havior; to wit, the requirement of even- 

handedness and balance. The most recent 
occasion on which a Security Council resolu- 
tion of this kind has been before us was in 
April of 1974, when we adopted Resolution 
347 in a context not dissimilar from the 
present context: violence and countervio- 
lence, and violence counter to the counter- 
violence, then violence counter to that. It is 
not new to human history, certainly not to 
that of the Middle East. 

On that occasion the Security Council 
acted in a manner which was resolute but 
fair, concrete but balanced. Resolution 347 
was adopted by 13 votes to none in opposi- 
tion, such that the whole of the Council may 
be said to have approved this course of ac- 
tion. And, Mr. President, nothing a year and 
a half later should suggest to us that there 
was anything imprudent about what we did. 
To the contrary, it stands as an example of 
responsible behavior, seeking effective re- 
sults. We all know this; there is no govern- 
ment at this table that does not know this. 

It is not required of me to do anything 
more than to say what we also all know, 
which is that the resolution before us is not 
balanced, will not be perceived as fair; it will 
not advance the cause of peace, and to that 
extent it cannot be seen as responsible. 

We speak not just as a government but as 
a government seeking to bring peace in the 
role of mediator. That is our role in the 
Middle East. It is never an easy one. We find 
ourselves called upon to make pleas to you 
for perspective and balance. 

We fully understand that there are gov- 
ernments at this table that do not feel bal- 
anced at this moment. We can understand 
why they would not. Yet we as mediators 
say, even so, it is not the moment that 
matters, it is the progress we are making 
toward a just and lasting peace. The ques- 
tion is: Will the action we take today add 
to that progress, encourage it, facilitate it, 
or will it do otherwise? 

And so, Mr. President, the United States, 
the mediator country, would like to suggest 
two simple amendments to the resolution 
before us. We have asked the Secretariat to 
circulate the amendments without delay; 


Department of State Bulletin 

and I am sure it is doing its very best, as it 
always does, and here indeed they are. 

Mr. President, these are not unfamiliar 
amendments. To the contrary, the language 
will be familiar to you, sir, and to a number 
of the members of the Council, to most of 
the members of the Council, for the very 
simple reason that most members of this 
Council have already voted for these amend- 
ments. These amendments have won the 
approval of every permanent member of this 
Council which voted on them. They won the 
approval of all those members elected to the 
Council who were here last year, and they 
won the approval of all the other elected 
members who were there at the time, all of 
this with the exception of one permanent 
and one elected member who chose not to 
participate in the vote. But among the par- 
ticipating nations, the vote was unanimous. 

Mr. President, the U.S. amendments would 
add to our present resolution, which has 
three operative paragraphs, a fourth and a 
fifth. Th^ fourth paragraph reads as follows : 

Condemns all acts of violence, especially those 
which result in tbe tragic loss of innocent civilian 
life, and urges all concerned to refrain from any 
further acts of vidlence; 

Paragraph 5 reads: 

Calls upon all parties to refrain from any action 
which might endanger negotiations aimed at achiev- 
ing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East; 

I repeat, sir, these are operative para- 
graphs which the Security Council has al- 
ready voted upon and did so in a similar 
situation — a not dissimilar situation — a year 
and a half ago. There is no one present at 
this table who opposed those paragraphs. 

The purpose of the fourth paragraph, very 
simply, would be to provide balance in those 
acts which we condemn, reflecting nothing 
more than our true feelings and our stated 
position — that we condemn all acts of vio- 

I cannot imagine that any government 
would not be willing to condemn and deplore 
violence which leads to the loss of innocent 
lives, and I simply point out that there is not 
a government at this table which did other- 

wise when faced with the possibility — more 
than the possibility, the necessity — of doing 
so a year and a half ago. 

Finally, the fifth operative paragraph 
would call on all parties to refrain from any 
action that would endanger the negotiations 
aimed at achieving a just and lasting peace 
in the Middle East. I remind you, sir, these 
negotiations have not failed in the year and 
a half since this resolution was adopted. To 
the contrary, extraordinarily difficult, dense, 
but in the end successful negotiation has 
brought the condition of peace, the absence 
of violence, stability, to the Sinai, and similar 
efforts are soon to be undertaken, we cannot 
doubt, with respect to the Syrian-Israeli 
border and their relations. 

In those circumstances, Mr. President, in 
the name of sanity, in the name of peace, 
the United States proposes these amend- 
ments and asks for a vote. 

Statement After the Vote, December 8 

USUN press release 183 dated December 8 

As has been clear in what I have said 
here tonight and what my delegation has 
done today, this is an outcome which is dis- 
appointing to the United States. On Decem- 
ber 4, when this matter first arose, we spoke 
briefly, plainly, and we asked for balance. 
All day long, as my distinguished friend the 
Representative from the Cameroon has said, 
we spoke in private meetings with members 
of this Council, asking for some measure of 
balance in this resolution. We were not suc- 

We introduced measures familiar to the 
Council, part of the Council's record, which 
we thought would provide balance. The dis- 
tinguished Representative of Italy asked for 
12 hours that we might recess, adjourn if 
you will, to talk further about these pro- 
posals, and we voted with five other mem- 
bers of the Council for such an adjournment. 
But it was not the wish of a majority. 

Mr. President, the United States strongly 
deplores the Israeli actions which were 
brought to our attention by the Govern- 
ments of Lebanon and Egypt through the 

January 5, 1976 


offices of their distinguished Ambassadors 
who are with us tonight. But we also be- 
heve that the problem of the loss of innocent 
life from incursions from Lebanon and other 
neighboring states of Israel should also be 
condemned. This is part of the cycle of vio- 
lence with which we are dealing and which 
the United States, as a mediating power, 
hopes to bring to an end. 

We worked strenuously for a balanced 
resolution, and we have reluctantly had to 
veto the resolution as it now stands, which 
as we have made clear from the beginning, 
we did not consider to be balanced. 


The Security Council, 

Having considered the question inscribed in its 
agenda at the 1859th meeting, 

Having noted the contents of the letter of the 
Permanent Representative of Lebanon (S/11892) and 
of the letter of the Permanent Representative of 
Egypt (S/11893), 

Having heard the statements of the Permanent 
Representatives of Lebanon, Egypt, the Syrian Arab 
Republic and the representative of the Palestine Lib- 
eration Organization, 

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, 

Deploring Israel's defiance of these resolutions, 

Grieved at the tragic loss of human life caused 
by indiscriminate and massive Israeli air attacks, 

Gravely concerned about the deteriorating situa- 
tion resulting from Israel's violation of Lebanon's 
sovereignty and territorial integrity and of Security 
Council resolutions. 

Convinced that Israeli massive air attacks against 
Lebanon were premeditative in nature, 

1. Strongly condemns the Government of Israel 
for its premeditated air attacks against Lebanon in 
violation of its obligations under the United Nations 
Charter and of Security Council resolutions; 

2. Calls upon Israel to desist forthwith from all 
military attacks against Lebanon; 

3. Issues once again a solemn warning to Israel 
that if such attacks were repeated, the Council 
would have to consider taking appropriate steps and 
measures to give effect to its decisions. 

'U.N. doc. S/11898; the draft resolution was not 
adopted owing to the negative vote of a permanent 
member of the Council, the vote being 13 in favor, 
1 against (U.S.), with 1 abstention (Costa Rica). 

U.S. Votes Against General Assembly 
Resolution on the Middle East 

Following is a statemeyit made in plenary 
session of the U.N. General Assembly by 
U.S. Representative W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., 
on December 4, together with the text of a 
resolution adopted by the Assembly on De- 
cember 5. 


USUN press release 171 dated December 4 I 

This General Assembly plenary continues 
to focus our attention on one of the most 
sensitive and difficult problems we face as a 
global community: the situation in the Mid- 
dle East. We have already discussed aspects 
of this issue on various occasions during the 
current session, and the Security Council 
and committees of the Assembly are at this 
moment working on Middle Eastern issues. 
I therefore do not need to dwell on the seri- 
ousness of the Middle East situation nor on 
its importance to us all; the issue is heavy 
upon us. 

Nor do I really need to tell you what U.S. 
policy is in the Middle East. Since the sign- 
ing of the new Egyptian-Israeli agreement 
of September 4, 1975, U.S. policy in the 
Middle East has been elaborated several 
times by Secretary of State Kissinger, most 
notably in his address before this Assembly 
on September 22. He has explained our view 
of that agreement and what the United 
States is prepared to do next. It may be 
useful, nevertheless, to reiterate here some 
of the main points of that position in order 
to demonstrate once again the determination 
of the United States to go forward in the 
pursuit of a peaceful settlement. 

Our conclusion after the October war of 
1973 was that to have approached all the 
issues pertaining to all the countries in- 
volved was nearly futile until a minimum of 
confidence had been established. The United 
States believed that we should proceed step 
by step with the parties that were ready to 


Department of State Bulletin 

negotiate, and on issues that allowed some 
room for maneuver. We believed that, once 
into the process, the parties would have a 
stake in its success and that momentum 
would be created which could produce bepe- 
fits and agreements that would be kept. We 
considered that in the end this step-by-step 
approach would bring about conditions 
which could then lead to a final overall 
settlement. This has been our goal from the 
beginning and remains our goal today. 

Since October 1973, there has been more 
progress toward peace than at any time since 
the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The United Nations has played an important 
role in making that progress possible and in 
assuring that gains achieved were not lost. 
Security Council Resolution 338 launched a 
negotiating process and the first Geneva 
Conference. Agreements to separate forces 
and to create buffer zones in support of the 
'cease-fires were negotiated between Egypt 
and Israel in January 1974 and between 
Syria and Israel in May 1974. A further 
agreement, not the direct outcome of war 
but as a step toward peace, was signed in 
September 1975 between Egypt and Israel. 

We have said and we will say again that 
these are only steps in a continuing process. 
We have made notable progress, but the task 
is in no way finished. We are determined to 

The question before us all is: Where do 
we go from here and how? The United 
States is convinced answers to this question 
can be found. 

President Ford has made it clear that the 
United States will assist the parties in any 
way it can, as the parties desire, to achieve 
a negotiated settlement within the frame- 
work established by Security Council Reso- 
lutions 242 and 338. We are fully aware that 
all the basic issues must be met and that 
there will be no permanent peace unless it 
deals with the concern of the parties for 
their territorial integrity, political independ- 
ence, and right to exist in peace and takes 
into account the legitimate interests of all 
concerned, including the Palestinians. We 

remain ready to help in further negotiations 
between Syria and Israel. We are ready to 
consult and discuss the possibilities of a re- 
convened Geneva Conference. We are ready 
and willing to explore any practical method 
of advancing the cause of peace, including a 
preparatory conference of the original par- 
ticipants in the Geneva Conference to dis- 
cuss agenda procedures, participation, and 
other matters relevant to a resumption of 
the Geneva Conference. This is the policy of 
the United States. We shall execute it vigor- 

The resolution before us for our consider- 
ation does not, in the view of the United 
States, help us in the process toward peace 
we support. We shall vote against it. Its one- 
sided condemnation of one of the parties to 
the Arab-Israeli dispute and its departure 
from the accepted negotiating framework 
established by Security Council Resolutions 
242 and 338 make further settlement be- 
tween those parties more difficult. It calls 
upon the Security Council to implement cer- 
tain resolutions that deal with problems that 
can only be solved by negotiation. That is 
the task before us all: to get to the serious 
work of negotiation among the i>arties in 
which real progress can be made. Resolu- 
tions such as the one before us today can 
only exacerbate the situation. 

Further, it adds to the series of one-sided 
resolutions which are a disservice to our- 
selves and to this institution. It would take 
us one step further in destroying credibility 
throughout the world that the General As- 
sembly is truly going about its business. 
These irresponsible resolutions do not take 
into account the legitimate concerns of one 
of the parties and lead us into a domain re- 
moved from the reality where a settlement 
can be achieved. 

Let us turn away from empty rhetoric 
and resolutions. Let us commit ourselves to 
a practical process of negotiations, which 
continues to hold out the best hope for 
reaching that objective so essential to the 
peoples of the Middle East and indeed of the 
entire world. 

January 5, 1976 



The General Assembly, 

Having considered the item entitled "The situation 
in the Middle East", 

Guided by the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations and resolutions of the 
United Nations as well as those principles of inter- 
national law which prohibit the occupation or acqui- 
sition of territory by the use of force, and which 
consider any military occupation, however temporary, 
or any forcible annexation of such territory, or part 
thereof, as an act of aggression. 

Gravely concerned at the continuation of the Is- 
raeli occupation of Arab territories and Israel's per- 
sistent denial of the inalienable national rights of the 
Palestinian people, 

Recalling relevant resolutions of the General As- 
sembly and the Security Council, particularly those 
concerning the inalienable national rights of the 
Palestinian people and its right to participate in any 
efforts for peace, 

Convinced that the early reconvening of the Peace 
Conference on the Middle East with the participation 
of all the parties concerned, including the Palestine 
Liberation Organization, is essential for the realiza- 
tion of a just and lasting settlement in the region. 

Convinced that the present situation prevailing in 
the Middle East continues to constitute a serious 
threat to international peace and security, and that 
urgent measures should be taken in order to ensure 
Israel's full compliance with relevant resolutions of 
the General Assembly and the Security Council on 
the questions of Palestine and the Middle East, 

Recognizing that peace is indivisible and that a 
just and lasting settlement of the question of the 
Middle East must be based on a comprehensive solu- 
tion under the auspices of the United Nations, which 
takes into consideration all aspects of the Middle 
East conflict, including, in particular, the enjoyment 
by the Palestinian people of its inalienable national 
rights, as well as the total withdrawal from all the 
Arab territories occupied since June 1967, 

1. Reaffirms that the acquisition of territory by 
force is inadmissible and therefore all territories 
thus occupied must be returned; 

2. Condemns Israel's continued occupation of Arab 
territories in violation of the Charter of the United 
Nations, the principles of international law and re- 
peated United Nations resolutions; 

3. Requests all States to desist from supplying 
Israel with any military or economic aid as long as 
it continues to occupy Arab territories and deny the 
inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people; 

4. Requests the Security Council, in the exercise 
of its responsibilities under the Charter, to take all 

'U.N. doc. A/RES/3414 (XXX) adopted by the 
Assembly on Dec. 5 by a rollcall vote of 84 to 17 
(U.S.), with 27 abstentions. 

necessary measures for the speedy implementation, 
according to an appropriate time-table, of all relevant 
resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security 
Council aiming at the establishment of a just and 
lasting peace in the region through a comprehensive 
settlement, worked out with the participation of all 
parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation 
Organization, and within the framework of the 
United Nations, which ensures complete Israeli with- 
drawal from all the occupied Arab territories as well 
as full recognition of the inalienable national rights 
of the Palestinian people and the attainment of those 

5. Requests the Secretary-General to inform all 
concerned, including the Co-Chairmen of the Peace 
Conference on the Middle East, and to follow up the 
implementation of the present resolution and report 
thereon to the Security Council and to the General 
Assembly at its thirty-first session. 

U.N. Disengagement Observer Force 
in Israel-Syria Sector Extended 

Following are statements made in the U.N. 
Security Council on November 30 by U.S. 
Representative Daniel P. Moynihan, together 
with the text of a resolution adopted by the 
Council that day. 


Statement Before the Vote 

USUN press release 165 dated November 30 

Mr. President [Yakov Malik, of the 
U.S.S.R.] : I should like to express my grati- 
tude to you for the opportunity I now have 
to be the first of the many members — first, 
I am sure, of what will prove to be all of the 
other members of this Council — to express 
appreciation to my brother from Guyana, 
and his colleagues from Mauritania, from 
Tanzania, and Cameroon, for the valiant 
efforts which they have made to bring about | 
this result. These required a great deal of 
them and were an expression of their com- 
mitment to the work of this Council, which 
we all share and, in their performance this 
past three days, certainly admire. 

Mr. President, with respect to the reso- 
lution before us, the United States wishes 


Department of State Bulletin 

to make clear that we are not agreeing to 
this resolution, which includes a provision 
calling for a Security Council debate on the 
situation in the Middle East, out of any de- 
sire for such a debate in this setting — much 
less out of any intention, howsoever remote, 
of seeing a transfer of the negotiations be- 
tween the two parties to the UNDOF [U.N. 
Disengagement Observer Force] arrange- 
ments to the Security Council. 

We have agreed, we are agreeing, solely 
out of deference to the right of the Security 
Council to take up any matter it desires to 
take up. We consider that this resolution is 
taken without prejudice whatsoever to the 
Geneva formula or to the negotiations by 
the parties through intermediaries. 

With respect to the matter of relevant 
U.N. resolutions, the United States considers 
that only Security Council Resolutions 242 
and 338 are in fact relevant to the situation 
in the Middle East. 

Statement After the Vote 

USUN press release 166 dated November 30 

I am sure you would agree, sir, that the 
only words which would truly serve to ex- 
press the admiration and the gratitude and 
the respect which we all have for the Sec- 
retary General at this moment would be 
brief words. His labors have been herculean, 
and I assume, if today is no different from 
other days, they are not yet concluded. My 
government, sir, would join wholly in the 
tributes paid to you. 

My delegation wishes also to make clear 
that the United States, Mr. President, does 
not support the statement of the Council 
President- — of yourself, sir — indicating that 
the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organiza- 
tion] will be invited to participate in the 
January session.' This statement in any 

' The following statement was read by the Presi- 
dent of the Council after the vote: 

"It is the understanding of the majority of the 
Security Council that when it reconvenes on 12 Janu- 
ary 1976 in accordance with paragraph (a) of Secu- 
rity Council resolution 381 (1975) the representatives 
of the Palestine Liberation Organization will be in- 
vited to participate in the debate." 

event did not report a decision, but was 
merely a summation of the views of some 
members of the Council. We do not consider 
that the extraneous matters which have 
been introduced into the Council's action to- 
day can have the effect of changing either 
the negotiating framework, the basis for 
these negotiations, or the participants in 

Mr. President, I should like also to note 
that subparagraph (a) of the operative 
paragraph, properly read, declares the inten- 
tion of the Security Council to debate the 
question of whether or not the Middle East 
problem does in fact include the Palestinian 
question. Such, Mr. President, is the role of 
the comma in English composition. 

Nonetheless, and finally, to the parties 
concerned and to this Council, the United 
States pledges its continued efforts to fur- 
ther the process toward peace in the Middle 
East. We do that with the indispensable 
support of UNDOF, of its commander, its 
officers, and its men, and of course, once 
again, you, Mr. Secretary General, and those 
not less valiant colleagues whom you have 
brought as your associates on the 38th floor. 


The Security Council, 

Having considered the report of the Secretary- 
General (S/11883 and Add.l) on the United Nations 
Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), 

Having noted the discussions of the Secretary- 
General with all parties concerned on the situation 
in the Middle East, 

Expressing concern over the continued state of 
tension in the area. 

Decides : 

(a) To reconvene on 12 January 1976, to continue 
the debate on the Middle East problem including the 
Palestinian question, taking into account all relevant 
United Nations resolutions; 

(b) To renew the mandate of UNDOF for another 
period of six months; 

(c) To request the Secretary-General to keep the 
Security Council informed on further developments. 

"U.N. doc. S/RES/381 (1975); adopted by the 
Council on Dec. 1 by a vote of 13 (U.S.) to 0, with 
the People's Republic of China and Iraq not partici- 
pating in the vote. 

January 5, 1976 


United States Urges Increase 
in Contributions to UNRWA 

Following i« a statement made in the Spe- 
cial Political Committee of the U.N. General 
Assembly by U.S. Representative Barbara 
M. White on November 18, together with the 
text of a resolution adopted by the commit- 
tee on November 20 and by the Assembly on 
December 8. 


USUN prtss releast 152 (corr. 1) dated November 18 

Sir John Rennie, the distinguished Com- 
missioner General of the United Nations Re- 
hef and Works Agency (UNRWA), has told 
us that the Agency is facing a crisis un- 
equaled in its 25 years of existence. My 
delegation believes that this somber warning 
is one which must be heeded by every na- 
tion represented in this room today. We are 
faced not solely or even predominantly with 
the possibility that an organization of tested 
merit is in deep trouble. No, Mr. Chairman, 
the prospect we face is much more impor- 
tant, much more pressing, and potentially 
much more tragic ; for we are discussing the 
lives of the million and a half refugees who 
depend so directly on UNRWA. In very 
practical terms, we must face the fact that 
unless very strenuous efforts are made, the 
lives of the refugees could be dramatically 
changed for the worse, particularly by the 
elimination of the major part of UNRWA's 
educational services. 

It is UNRWA's schools which will suffer 
especially if expenditures must be reduced 
to the level of contributions which UNRWA 
estimates for this year and the years ahead. 
There can be no other way in 1976, for 
example, to reduce a budget of $140 million 
to accommodate a deficit of $55 million. We 
cannot allow this to happen. 

UNRWA's schools mean more than a 
quarter of a million schoolchildren and over 
4,300 vocational students — of whom 92 per- 

cent will be employed upon graduation. 
UNRWA's schools also mean over 8,000 
teachers, all of them refugees themselves. 
UNRWA's schools mean, finally, the employ- 
ment now and upon graduation of thousands 
of refugees each year, providing better and 
useful lives not only for themselves but for 
the thousands more who are or will be de- 
pendent upon them. 

And there is yet a further consequence: 
the education provided by UNRWA is a dy- 
namic in what for 25 years has been an 
otherwise static situation. While the search 
for a political solution for the future of the 
refugees continues, UNRWA has already 
addressed that future by giving the refugees 
and their children some of the resources to 
meet it. 

Mr. Chairman, education is among the 
most vital services that UNRWA provides. 
With the strong support of the refugees 
themselves, UNRWA has decided to give the 
maximum support to its schools, even at the 
cost of greater austerity in its other serv- 
ices. It is for this reason that for many years 
UNRWA expenditures on education have 
equaled 37 percent of the total budget, an 
amount roughly equal to that spent on 

The Commissioner General was quite cor- 
rect, in noting UNRWA's anniversary this 
year, that 25 years of refugee status can be 
no occasion for celebration. However, to 
UNRWA's great credit, it is also true that 
although that status tragically continues, the 
Agency has made it possible for thousands 
of the refugees to acquire the modern skills 
to support constructive lives. The members 
of the United Nations must not allow this 
possibility to be destroyed. 

In 1975 half of those members, including 
many countries well able to give, contributed 
nothing to UNRWA. Many other members 
have made only nominal contributions. The 
Commissioner General has asked, with every 
justification, that UNRWA's chronic finan- 
cial weakness be ended. This requires — let 
us acknowledge it here and now — that 


Department of State Bulletin 

UNRWA's income must rise annually to 
meet the increases in costs from factors such 
as inflation and currency devaluation over 
which the Agency has no control. 

Let me note here that the United States 
has responded to the appeals by the Secre- 
tary General and the Commissioner General 
in 1975 with two special contributions in 
addition to our regular pledge.' The total 
amounted to nearly 40 percent of all govern- 
ment contributions to UNRWA. However, 
all members of the United Nations must now 
respond if regular increases of this size are 
to be met. Undercontributors and noncon- 
tributors must take their part of the respon- 
sibility which their votes in the General As- 
sembly for UNRWA resolutions over the 
years have created. 

It is our challenge, our commitment, and 
our responsibility to sustain the hope 
UNRWA has brought to those it serves. Let 
us, all of us, discharge that duty together. 

The U.S. delegation introduces draft reso- 
lution A/SPC/L.335 in full recognition of 
the situation described by Commissioner 
General Sir John Rennie. In doing so, we call 
upon all member states of the United Na- 
tions to make the most generous efforts pos- 
sible to meet the anticipated needs of 


The General Assembly, 

Recalling its resolution 3331 (XXIX) of 17 Decem- 
ber 1974 and all previous resolutions referred to 
therein, including resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 

Taking note of the annual report of the Commis- 
sioner-General of the United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near 

' On Nov. 26 in a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee 
of the General Assembly for the Announcement of 
Voluntary Contributions to the U.N. Relief and 
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near 
East, Daniel P. Moynihan, U.S. Representative to the 
United Nations, announced the U.S. pledge of $26.7 
million to UNRWA for calendar year 1976. For his 
statement in the ad hoc committee, see USUN press 
release 160 dated Nov. 26. 

East, covering the period from 1 July 1974 to 30 
June 1975, 

1. Notes with deep regret that repatriation or 
compensation of the refugees as provided for in para- 
graph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) 
has not been effected, that no substantial progress 
has been made in the programme endorsed by the 
Assembly in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) of 
26 January 1952 for the reintegration of refugees 
either by repatriation or resettlement and that, there- 
fore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a 
matter of serious concern; 

2. Expresses its thanks to the Commissioner-Gen- 
eral and to the staff of the United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 
Near East for their continued dedicated and effective 
efforts under difficult circumstances to provide essen- 
tial services for the Palestine refugees, and to the 
specialized agencies and private organizations for 
their valuable work in assisting the refugees; 

3. Notes with regret that the United Nations Con- 
ciliation Commission for Palestine has been unable 
to find a means of achieving progress in the imple- 
mentation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly 
resolution 194 (III) and requests the Commission to 
exert continued efforts towards the implementation 
of that paragraph and to report as appropriate, but 
no later than 1 October 1976; 

4. Directs attention to the continuing seriousness 
of the financial position of the United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 
Near East, as outlined in the Commissioner-General's 
report ; 

5. Notes with profound concern that, despite the 
commendable and successful efforts of the Commis- 
sioner-General to collect additional contributions, this 
increased level of income to the United Nations Re- 
lief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in 
the Near East is still insufficient to cover essential 
budget requirements in the present year, and that, 
as presently foreseen levels of giving, deficits will 
recur each year; 

6. Calls upon all Governments as a matter of ur- 
gency to make the most generous efforts possible to 
meet the anticipated needs of the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in 
the Near East, particularly in the light of the budg- 
etary deficits projected in the Commissioner-General's 
report, and therefore urges non-contributing Govern- 
ments to contribute regularly and contributing Gov- 
ernments to consider increasing their regular con- 

= A/RES/3419 B (XXX) (text from U.N. doc. A/ 
SPC/L.335, draft resolution); adopted by the com- 
mittee on Nov. 20 by a vote of 79 to 0, with 2 absten- 
tions, and by the Assembly on Dec. 8 by a vote of 
121 to 0, with 1 abstention. 

January 5, 1976 



Department Discusses Grain Exports 
and Reserves Negotiations 

Following is a statement by Thomas 0. 
Enders, Assistant Secretary for Economic 
and Business Ajfairs, made before the Sub- 
committee on International Resources, Food, 
and Energy of the House Committee on 
International Relations on December 3.^ 

Mr. Chairman [Representative Charles C. 
Diggs, Jr.] : I appreciate the committee's 
invitation to appear today to comment on 
the Administration's policy on grain export 
sales and management. In these comments, 
I will seek to respond, within my compe- 
tence, to the issues raised in your letter of 
October 30 to Assistant Secretary [for Con- 
gressional Relations Robert J.] McCloskey. 
Those were: 

— The basis for determining availabiUty 
of grains for concessional exports under the 
Food for Peace program. 

— The importance of grain exports as a 
source of foi'eign exchange. 

— The policy process as applied to food 
matters and grain exports. 

— The status of grain reserves negotia- 

I would like to begin with a few general 
comments about U.S. export policy as it ap- 
plies to grain. The same principles of multi- 
lateralism and nondiscrimination apply to 
grain as to the export of other U.S. prod- 
ucts. Full production and improved competi- 
tiveness over the past several years have 
allowed American farmers to expand grain 
exports in response to growing world de- 
mand, and our policy is to maintain the 

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

gains that we have recently enjoyed on 
world markets. 

The large majority of foreign buyers of 
American grain have generally free access 
to our market. The one exception to this 
policy is the agreement with the Soviet 
Union. In this case, because of the Soviet 
record of highly irregular and potentially 
disruptive grain purchases, it was necessary 
to obtain a long-term commitment from 
them on annual demand and to establish an 
arrangement to monitor purchases during 
years of peak demand. The Soviet commit- 
ment to purchase at least 6 million tons is 
unconditional. On the other hand, the agree- 
ment enables the United States to lower the 
amount it will supply below 6 million tons, 
should expected supply in this country fall 
below the 225-million-ton level. 

With respect to the food aid program, 
Public Law 480 (the Agricultural Trade De- 
velopment and Assistance Act of 1954, as 
amended), provides that the Secretary of 
Agriculture shall determine the type and 
quantity of commodities available for con- 
cessional sales. This determination only sets 
the limits for what may be programed as 
food aid. It is the budgetary decision of the 
President that determines the size of our 
food aid program. Since it is the prerogative 
of the Secretary of Agriculture to make 
food aid commodity determinations, I be- 
lieve it would be more appropriate for fur- 
ther comment on this aspect of the com- 
mittee's interest to be made by the spokes- 
man for that Department. 

Export of agricultural commodities has 
long been one of the mainstays of U.S. 
foreign trade. The export of grains, always 
a significant item in our balance of pay- 
ments, has been an increasingly important 
foreign exchange earner in recent years. 
Grain export earnings grew from $2.6 bil- 
lion to $10 billion between 1970 and 1974, 
almost a fourfold increase — against a 130 
percent gain in the value of our total ex- 
ports, from $43 to $98 billion. Without the 
$10.3 billion earned from grain sales abroad 
last year, the $3.4 billion deficit we expe- 
rienced on current account would have been 


Department of State Bulletin 

much greater. Our ability to sustain the im- 
port of raw materials and fuels required by 
industry and other foreign goods sought by 
the American consumer would have been 
diminished. In addition to an increase in unit 
value, the volume of grain exports has 
doubled in this decade, and the United 
States, this year, will supply about 50 per- 
cent of world wheat exports and 55 percent 
of feed grains. The significant increase 
^xpected in grain exports this year from 
k-ecord crops in wheat and corn will further 
strengthen our balance of payments and 
allow us to meet a growing world demand 
for food. 

These facts underscore the important 
position of agriculture, and grains in par- 
ticular, in our foreign economic policy. I 
oelieve that some of the discussion we have 
fieard in recent weeks about who makes for- 
eign agricultural policy simply reflects a 
greater public awareness of the interna- 
;ional importance of U.S. agriculture. The 
formulation of policy and the decisionmak- 
ng process within the Administration have 
lot changed. Our delegation that negotiated 
:he agreement with the Soviet Union on 
irain supply was headed by Under Secre- 
tary of State Robinson and included senior 
Department of Agriculture officials. Our 
Darticipation in international eff"orts under- 
;aken over the past year to solve world food 
aroblems has been fully coordinated, involv- 
ng the participation of all interested agen- 
cies. The Department of Agriculture retains 
ts traditional role in both the domestic and 
foreign aspects of agricultural policy. 

In response to your expressed interest, 
Mr. Chairman, and because it is a major U.S. 
initiative in dealing with world food needs, 
[ would like to summarize the status of work 
jn establishing a grain reserves system. 

Building on the principles outlined by Sec- 
retary Kissinger in his September speech to 
the seventh special session of the U.N. Gen- 
eral Assembly, the United States presented 
k detailed proposal for a system of nation- 
ally held food grain reserves to a working 
group of the International Wheat Council 
|(IWC) that has the negotiation of elements 

January 5, 1976 

of a new wheat agreement under considera- 
tion. Our proposal is designed to establish 
a system to increase assurance that ade- 
quate food supplies will be available to all 
countries despite global production fluctua- 
tions. Twice in this decade unpredictable 
shortfalls in world grain production have 
sharply reduced available supplies, causing 
widely fluctuating prices and altered con- 
sumption and trading patterns. In those 
situations, with food-importing countries 
competing for scarce supplies, the most seri- 
ously affected have been the more economi- 
cally vulnerable developing countries. Our 
proposal for a 30-million-ton world security 
resei-ve stock of wheat and rice, held by 
importers and exporters alike, would create 
a reserve adequate to offset at least 90 per- 
cent of production shortfalls in food grains. 

As I have stated, our reserves proposal is 
currently before the IWC working group, 
and those discussions have not yet reached 
a conclusive stage. We hope that the Wheat 
Council, meeting this week in London, will 
agree to accelerate the pace of those dis- 
cussions so that we can move to actual nego- 
tiations early next year. 

There is an important procedural obstacle, 
however, posed by the European Commu- 
nity. The EC has taken the view that pro- 
posals having to do with grain stocks should 
be negotiated in the context of trade issues 
in the multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) 
and has not been willing to continue discus- 
sions in London. We prefer the Wheat Coun- 
cil forum for negotiation of a grain reserves 
system because of its functional experience 
and expertise in grain matters and because 
of its membership, which includes the 
U.S.S.R. We also believe that a reserves 
system aimed at improving world food secu- 
rity is urgently required and therefore 
should be determined apart from other con- 
tentious issues involving international grain 
trade. To meet the EC's concerns, we have 
stated our willingness to take the results 
of a food security reserves negotiation into 
full account in the MTN. But so far this 
offer has not unblocked the reserves nego- 
tiations. We wonder whether the EC is 


really committed to acting to improve world 
food security. Our bilateral contacts with 
the EC have continued up to this time in 
an effort to convince it that progress on a 
reserves system is an essential part of the 
common commitment to attacking the food 
problem the EC and we made at the World 
Food Conference one year ago. 

Polar Bear Conservation Agreement 
Transmitted to the Senate 

Message From President Ford ' 

To the Senate of the United States: 

I am pleased to transmit for the Senate's 
advice and consent to ratification the Agree- 
ment on the Conservation of Polar Bears, 
done at Oslo, November 15, 1973. 

I am also transmitting, for the informa- 
tion of the Senate, the report of the Depart- 
ment of State with respect to the agreement. 

This agreement, negotiated by the five 
circumpolar nations, the United States, Can- 
ada, Denmark, Norway and the Soviet 
Union, provides a plan of protection for 
polar bears consisting of a prohibition of 
hunting, killing or capturing the mammals 
subject to specified exceptions. It also pro- 
vides for the countries involved to cooperate 
and consult with each other on research in- 
volving management and conservation of 
polar bears. 

This agreement implements one of the 
mandates of the Marine Mammal Protection 
Act of 1972 which, in Section 108, calls for 
development of bilateral or multilateral 
agreements for the protection of marine 
mammals, including polar bears. No legisla- 
tion is necessary to implement the agree- 
ment, since the protections of the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act of 1972 exceed the 
requirements of the agreement. 

'Transmitted on Nov. 28 (text from White House 
press release dated Nov. 29); also printed as S. Ex. I, 
94th Cong., 1st sess., which includes the text of the 
agreement and the report of the Department of State. 


In addition to being the first international 
agreement to focus on the conservation of 
polar bears, this agreement is the first to be 
negotiated by the circumpolar nations ex- 
clusively. I recommend that the Senate give 
early and favorable consideration to this 

Gerald R. Ford. 

The White House, November 28, 1975. 


Current Actions 



Convention on international civil aviation. Done af 

Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into forcf 

April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591. 

Adherence deposited: Papua New Guinea, Decern 
ber 15, 1975. 
Protocol relating to an amendment to the conventioi 

on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591). Done 

at Rome September 15, 1962. Entered into forci 

September 11, 1975. 

Proclaimed by the President: December 16, 1975. 
Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizun 

of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 1970 

Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 7192. 

Notification of succession: Papua New Guinea 
December 15, 1975 (with a reservation). 
Convention for the suppression of unlawful act 

against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon 

treal September 23, 1971. Entered into force Janu 

ary 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. 

Notification of succession: Papua New Guinea ' 
December 15, 1975 (with a reservation). 

Consular Relations 

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done a 
Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force Marc 
19, 1967; for the United States December 24, 196i 
TIAS 6820. 

Notification of succession: Papua New Guinea 
December 4, 1975. 


Convention establishing a Customs Cooperation Coun 
cil, with annex. Done at Brussels December IE 

Department of State Bulleti 


1950. Entered into force November 4, 1952; for the 
United States November 5, 1970. TIAS 7063. 
Accession deposited: Sierra Leone, November 6, 


Diplomatic Relations 

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at 
Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 
1964; for the United States December 13, 1972. 
TIAS 7502. 

Notification of succession: Papua New Guinea, 
Ij December 4, 1975. 


Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the Constitu- 
tion of the World Health Organization of July 22, 
1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). 
Adopted at Geneva May 22, 1973.' 
Acceptances deposited: Iceland, December 5, 1975; 
Qatar, December 8, 1975. 

Maritime Matters 

invention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 
1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 
Accession deposited: Guinea, December 3, 1975. 


Convention of the World Meteorological Organiza- 
tion. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. En- 
tered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052. 
Accession deposited: Papua New Guinea, Decem- 
ber 15, 1975. 

^Jarcotic Drugs 

'rotocol amending the single convention on narcotic 
drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972. 
Entered into force August 8, 1975. TIAS 8118. 
Ratification deposited: Guatemala, December 9, 

Scean Dumping 

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by 
dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. 
Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Wash- 
ington December 29, 1972. Entered into force 
August 30, 1975. 
Proclaimed by the President: December 15, 1975. 

Privileges and Immunities 

Convention on the privileges and immunities of the 
United Nations. Done at New York February 13, 
1946. Entered into force September 17, 1946; for 
the United States April 29, 1970. TIAS 6900. 
Notification of succession : Papua New Guinea, 
December 4, 1975. 

Safety at Sec 

Convention on the international regulations for pre- 
venting collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London 
October 20, 1972.' 

Instrument of acceptance signed by the President : 
December 12, 1975. 

Amendment to chapter VI of the international con- 
vention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 
5780). Adopted at London November 20, 1973.' 
Instrument of acceptance signed by the President: 
December 15, 1975. 
Amendments to chapters II, III, IV and V of the 
international convention for the safety of life at 
sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at London Novem- 
ber 20, 1973.' 

Instrument of acceptance signed by the President : 
December 15, 1975. 


Convention on international liability for damage 
caused by space objects. Done at Washington, 
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into 
force September 1, 1972; for the United States 
October 9, 1973. TIAS 7762. 

Accession deposited: Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, December 18, 1975 (applicable to Berlin 

Convention on registration of objects launched into 
outer space. Opened for signature at New York 
January 14, 1975.' 
Signature: Poland, December 4, 1975. 


Protocol of provisional application of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Concluded at 
Geneva October 30, 1947. Entered into force Janu- 
ary 1, 1948. TIAS 1700. 

De facto application: Surinam, November 25, 



Treaty on extradition. Signed at Washington May 14, 

Instrument of ratification signed by the President : 
December 16, 1975. 


Treaty on extradition, as amended by exchange of 
notes of June 28 and July 9, 1974. Signed at Wash- 
ington December 3, 1971. 

Instrument of ratification signed by the President: 
December 12, 1975. 


Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and 
the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes on income and capital. Signed at Reykjavik 
May 7, 1975. Entered into force December 26, 1975. 
Proclaimed by the President: December 12, 1975. 


Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and 
the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 

Not in force. 

{January 5, 1976 


taxes on income, with related notes. Signed at 
Washington October 8, 1974." 

Instrumeixt of ratification signed by the President : 
December 15, 1975. 
Agreement regarding fisheries in the northeastern 
Pacific Ocean ofl" the coast of the United States, 
with annexes and agreed minutes. Signed at Wash- 
ington December 16, 1975. Enters into force Janu- 
ary 1, 1976. 


Convention with respect to taxes on income. Signed 
at Washington December 4, 1973.' 
Instrument of ratification signed by the President : 
December 15, 1975. 


Convention on matters of taxation, with related 
letters. Signed at Washington June 20, 1973.' 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Decem- 
ber 15, 1975. 
Convention on matters of taxation, with related 
letters. Signed at Washington June 20, 1973.' 
Instrument of ratification signed by the President : 
December 17, 1975. 


GPO Sales Publications 

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock 
number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20U02. 
A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or 
more copies of any one publication mailed to the 
same address. Remittances, payable to the Superin- 
tendent of Docutnents, must accompany orders. 
Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, 
are subject to change. 

Trade — Meat Imports. Agreement with El Salvador, 
TIAS 8104. 5 pp. 2bt (Cat. No. 89.10:8104). 

Narcotic Drugs — Cooperative Arrangements to Curb 
Illegal Traffic. Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 8108. 
19 pp. 40c'. (Cat. No. S9.10:8108). 

' Not in force. 











t612 12/16 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: December 15-21 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 


Kissinger: remarks, Fiirth, 

NATO ministerial meeting com- 
munique, Brussels, Dec. 12. 

Learson sworn in as Ambassador 
at Large and Special Repre- 
sentative of the President for 
the Law of the Sea Conference 
(biographic data). 

Kissinger: arrival, Paris. 

U.S. and Argentina establish bi- 
lateral working groups. 

Kissinger: Conference on Inter- 
national Economic Cooperation, 

U.S. and Poland sign new fish- 
eries agreement. 

Kissinger: interview by ABC, 
CBS, NBC, Paris. 

Shipping Coordinating Commit- 
tee (SCC), Subcommittee on 
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 
working group on radiocommu- 
nications, Jan. 15. 

Study Groups 10 and 11 of the 
U.S. National Committee for 
the International Radio Con- 
sultative Committee (CCIR), 
Jan. 15. 

Study Group 5 of the U.S. Na- 
tional Committee for the CCIR, 
Jan. 16. 

Kissinger, MacEachen: remarks, 

Kissinger, MacEachen: joint 
statement, Paris. 

Davis sworn in as Ambassador to 
Switzerland (biographic data). 

U.S. statement in response to 
announcement of U.K. import 

U.S., Canada, U.K., Japan, and 
the U.S.S.R. continue discus- 
sions on the Interim Convention 
on Conservation of North Pa- 
cific Fur Seals of 1957. 

SCC, SOLAS, working group on 
subdivision and stability, Jan. 

Schaufele sworn in as Assistant 
Secretary for African Affairs 
(biographic data). 

*616 12/17 

*617 12/17 









t622 12/18 



* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX January 5, 1976 Vol. LXXIV, No. 1906 

Angola. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer- 
ence of December 9 1 

Argentina. U.S. and Argentina Establish Bi- 
lateral Working Groups 20 


Department Discusses Grain Exports and Re- 
ser\'es Negotiations (Enders) 32 

Polar Bear Conservation Agreement Trans- 
mitted to the Senate (message from Presi- 
dent Ford) 34 

Disarmament. Secretary Kissinger's News Con- 
ference of December 9 1 

Economic Affairs 

Department Discusses Grain Exports and Re- 
serves Negotiations (Enders) 32 

Three Aspects of U.S. Relations With Latin 
America (Rogers) 14 

United States and Poland Hold Talks on North- 
eastern Pacific Fisheries (joint communique) 13 

Environment. Polar Bear Conservation Agree- 
ment Transmitted to the Senate (message 
from President Ford) 34 

Food. Department Discusses Grain Exports and 
Reserves Negotiations (Enders) 32 

Intelligence. Secretary Kissinger's News Con- 
ference of December 9 1 


U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in Israel- 
Syria Sector Extended (Moynihan, text of 
resolution) 28 

U.S. Vetoes Unbalanced Security Council Reso- 
lution Concerning Israeli Air Attacks in 
Lebanon (Moynihan, text of draft resolution) 21 

Latin America. Three Aspects of U.S. Relations 
With Latin America (Rogers) 14 

Lebanon. U.S. Vetoes Unbalanced Security 
Council Resolution Concerning Israeli Air 
Attacks in Lebanon (Moynihan, text of draft 
resolution) 21 

Middle East 

U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in Israel- 
Syria Sector Extended (Moynihan, text of 
resolution) 28 

U.S. Replies to Soviet Proposal on Middle East 
Peace Conference (text of U.S. note) ... 12 

United States Urges Increase in Contributions 
to UNRWA (White, text of resolution) . . 30 

U.S. Vetoes Unbalanced Security Council Reso- 
lution Concerning Israeli Air Attacks in 
Lebanon (Moynihan, text of draft resolution) 21 

U.S. Votes Against General Assembly Resolu- 
tion on the Middle East (Bennett, text of 
resolution) 26 

Military Affairs. Secretary Kissinger's News 
Conference of December 9 1 

Organization of American States. Three As- 
pects of U.S. Relations With Latin America 
(Rogers) 14 

Panama. Three Aspects of U.S. Relations With 
Latin America (Rogers) 14 

Poland. United States and Poland Hold Talks 
on Northeastern Pacific Fisheries (joint com- 
munique) 13 

Presidential Documents. Polar Bear Conserva- 
tion Agreement Transmitted to the Senate . 34 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications .... 36 

Refugees. United States Urges Increase in 
Contributions to UNRWA (White, text of 
resolution) 30 

Science and Technology. U.S.- Yugoslav Board 
on Scientific and Technological Cooperation 
Meets (joint statement) 20 

Syria. U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in 
Israel-Syria Sector Extended (Moynihan, 
text of resolution) 28 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 34 

Polar Bear Conservation Agreement Trans- 
mitted to the Senate (message from Presi- 
dent Ford) 34 


Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of 
December 9 1 

U.S. Replies to Soviet Proposal on Middle East 

Peace Conference (text of U.S. note) ... 12 

United Nations 

U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in Israel- 
Syria Sector Extended (Moynihan, text of 
resolution) 28 

United States Urges Increase in Contributions 
to UNRWA (White, text of resolution) . . 30 

U.S. Vetoes Unbalanced Security Council Reso- 
lution Conceming Israeli Air Attacks in 
Lebanon (Moynihan, text of draft resolution) 21 

U.S. Votes Against General Assembly Resolu- 
tion on the Middle East (Bennett, text of 
resolution) 26 

Yugoslavia. U.S.-Yugoslav Board on Scientific 
and Technological Cooperation Meets (joint 
statement) 20 

Name Index 

Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr 26 

Enders, Thomas O 32 

Ford, President 34 

Kissinger, Secretary 1 

Moynihan, Daniel P 21, 28 

Rogers, William D 14 

White, Barbara M 30 

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Volume LXXIV 

No. 1907 • January 12, 1976 


Statement by Secretary Kissinger and Text of Final Communique 
of the Conference on International Economic Cooperation 37 



For index see inside back cover 


Vol. LXXIV, No. 1907 
January 12, 1976 

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a weekly publication issued by tf 
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lEnergy, Raw Materials, and Development: The Search for Common Ground 

The Conference on International Eco- 
lomic Cooperation met at Paris December 
'6-19. Secretary Kissinger headed the U.S. 
ielegation December 16-17. Following is 
Secretary Kissinger's statement for the open- 
ng session of the conference on December 
'6, together ivith the text of the final coni- 
nunique of the conference. 


ress release 612 dated December 16: as prepared for delivery 

The challenge of our time is to build a 
table and just international structure. This 
ask has two principal dimensions. There is 
he imperative of peace — the more traditional 
iroblems of building security, resolving con- 
licts, easing tensions. These issues dominate 
he agenda of relations between East and 
Vest. No less urgent is the imperative of 
ustice — the compelling requirements of 
lobal economic progress and social advance, 
^hese are now the major issues in the rela- 
ionship between North and South. They, 
00, carry the potential for either conflict or 
rder. Neither the goal of peace nor that of 
ocial justice can be achieved in isolation. 
Ve must succeed in both quests or we will 
ucceed in neither. 

Social justice and economic progress are 
ur concerns at this conference. We meet 
lere to launch the dialogue that has been so 
iften urged and so long awaited. The con- 
ening of this meeting should itself be a 
eason for hope. For we believe it represents 
[i commitment to the path of conciliation. It 
jlemonstrates a recognition that consumer 
ind producer, industrial and agricultural, 
leveloped and developing, rich and poor, 
nust together address the challenges of the 
global economy. 

anuary 12, 1976 

The United States will work with dedica- 
tion and energy for a positive outcome. We 
will do so in our own self-interest and in the 
interest of a more just and prosperous com- 
munity of nations. We will do our utmost to 
help mobilize the world's resources and the 
talents of men and women everywhere in the 
service of economic progress and common 

In the past two years we have all learned 
that no nation or group of nations can solve 
its economic problems in isolation. In a world 
which is becoming increasingly interdepend- 
ent, we have witnessed that inflation and 
recession affect us all. We have seen that no 
country can achieve redress by exporting its 
economic difficulties or by exacting an exorbi- 
tant economic price from others. 

But our deepest challenge is political. Eco- 
nomic distress magnifies the problems of gov- 
ernment in all our countries, clouding the 
prospects of social peace and democratic in- 
stitutions. We have seen that national eco- 
nomic problems thus become international; 
they spawn clashes of interest and protec- 
tionist pressures that strain the fabric of 
collaboration even among traditional friends. 
We have all come to understand that, if un- 
resolved, the competing claims of developed 
and developing, consumer and producer, will 
thwart any effort to build a stable and pro- 
gressive international structure. 

Our future depends now not on blind eco- 
nomic forces, but on choices that statesmen 
make. The world's nations can struggle in 
national or ideological contention — or they 
can acknowledge their interdependence and 
act out of a sense of community. The United 
States has chosen the path of cooperation. 

The United States, as the world's strongest 
economy, has demonstrated its resilience; 


we are on the road to recovery. We might 
best survive any new round of economic war- 
fare. But it is my country's conviction that 
tests of strength benefit no nation. The ap- 
proach that we took at the seventh special 
session of the U.N. General Assembly in 
September reflects our vision of a more posi- 
tive future. 

The special session reached consensus on 
an impressive range of economic problems. 
This commitment to cooperation can become 
a benchmark in human affairs — if its spirit is 
carried forward. We owe our people solu- 
tions, not slogans. So let us set to work. Let 
us implement the consensus of the special 
session and take up its unfinished tasks. Let 
us make this conference a decisive step to- 
ward their achievement. 

The Road to This Conference 

We are here because two years ago the 
international structure was gravely tested 
by a crisis in energy. No problem on the 
international agenda is more crucial to the 
world economy. As this conference demon- 
strates, it has led us to a much broader con- 
sideration of the range of related issues. 

The unprecedented expansion of the global 
economy in the decades since World War II 
relied upon the plentiful supply of energy at 
reasonable prices. It produced economic 
growth, fostered industrialization, and en- 
couraged development in every quarter of 
the globe. 

Thus the energy crisis — caused by a com- 
bination of the 1973 embargo and the fivefold 
increase in the price of oil — has dealt a seri- 
ous blow to global stability and prosperity. 

Inflation, recession, and payments balances 
significantly worsened in all the industrial- 
ized world and in those developing nations 
which had realized substantial progress 
toward industrialization. The poorest of the 
developing countries, struggling to make 
modest steps toward progress, were dealt 
the cruelest blow of all. Their hopes for 
growth were, and continue to be, thwarted. 
Their development planning has been dis- 
rupted. Even their agricultural production 
has been undermined by the increased cost 

of petrochemical fertilizers. For the vasi 
majority of the developing world, economi( 
justice was poorly served. 

In response to the energy crisis, the Unitec 
States sought first to reach a consensu; 
among the industrialized nations. We workec 
together to assure basic security agains 
future arbitrary disruptions in oil supply an( 
against potential oil-induced financial difii 
culties. We pledged ourselves to long-tern 
cooperation in energy conservation and th' 
development of alternative energy supplies 
We agreed not to resort to protectionis 
measures; and we began unprecedented co 
operation in our economic policies, as drama 
tized by the recent economic summit i 

These actions were not taken in a spirit o 
confrontation. Most are prudent steps of sell 
protection which have effect only if cor 
frontation is provoked by others. Other 
involve an urgent program for the develoj 
ment of alternative sources to the benefit c 

But the collaboration of the industrii 
countries has always been conceived as onl 
part of a larger program for economic proj 
ress. From the beginning, we have foresee 
an effort to develop a constructive dialogt 
leading to close and mutually beneficial lonj 
term economic ties with oil-producing natior 
— so that our investment and technical su] 
port would contribute to their developmei 
and their prosperity would contribute to th 
worldwide expansion of trade and develo] 
ment. We recognize that the only durab' 
basis for constructive relations is an ec(' 
nomic system which fosters the prosperit 
of all. Each of us has a stake in the progrej 
of others. 

Last April, at the invitation of the Pres 
dent of France, we agreed to begin this di: 
cussion. The industrial nations wanted 1 
focus on energy. The oil-producing and oth( i 
developing nations wanted to give equ^ 
priority to a wider range of developmei 
issues, including prices and markets f( 
other raw materials, and to international 1 
nancial questions. The industrial nations r 
garded these issues as too varied and comple 
to be addressed effectively in a single forur 


Department of State Bulleti 

Tie April preparatory conference failed to 
r:oncile these positions. 

To demonstrate its desire for a construc- 
te and cooperative solution the United 
Bites worked closely with other participants 
;i developing a mutually satisfactory ar- 
Mgement: energy, the concerns of the less 
i /eloped countries about raw materials, 
i/elopment, and related financial matters 
vuld be addressed as part of a discussion 
):global economic problems, while maintain- 
i: enough distinction between them for a 
jiful dialogue. 

The United States is committed to a seri- 
)■; and wide-ranging program of cooperation 
\h the developing world. My country 
ilerstands full well, and has shown in its 
my proposals, that this dialogue must en- 
mpass issues of concern to all sides — in- 
;! ding the needs of the many nations not in 
1 endance here. For us, this clearly requires 
I iscussion of the effects of energy prices 
)i the world economy. For cooperation de- 
)• ds on mutual respect, mutual understand- 
I, and mutual benefit. 

"'o this end, at the seventh special session 
)1 the U.N. General Assembly three months 
H; the United States made a series of pro- 
X als in several areas : 

-To insure the economic security of de- 
/oping countries against shortfalls in ex- 
it t earnings, food shortages, and natural 
ii isters ; 

-To accelerate their economic growth by 
r)roving their access to capital markets, 
:€inology, and foreign investment; 

-To better the conditions of trade and 
nestment in key commodities on which 
nny of their economies are dependent and 
x;et an example in the vital area of food ; 

-To improve the world trading system 
ti make it better serve development goals, 
u; realize through the multilateral trade 
Kotiations a strengthening of developing- 
■cntry participation; and 

-To address the especially urgent needs 
lithe poorest countries devastated by cur- 
rtjt economic conditions. 

I^he seventh special session ended on a 
Q'ie of conciliation and cooperation. The 

Wuary 12, 1976 

spirit of the session was carried forward to 
the October preparatory conference in Paris, 
where the declaration laid the basis for our 
meeting today. 

This will be the attitude of the United 
States here. Progress has been made in many 
areas, and this conference must move us for- 

The Work of the Commissions 

The four commissions that this conference 
is establishing have much work before them : 

— The Commission on Energy should pro- 
mote an effective world balance between 
energy demand and supply. It should work 
for practical cooperation among industrial- 
ized and developing countries to develop new 
energy supplies. And it should lay the foun- 
dations of a mutually beneficial long-term 
relationship between energy producers and 

— The Commission on Raw Materials 
should work to establish the conditions for 
stable longrun supplies of raw materials 
vital to global progress at prices that are 
remunerative to producers and fair to con- 

— The Commission on Development should 
strive to accelerate economic development in 
all nations, especially the poorest. In par- 
ticular, it should bring together industrial 
nations and oil-wealthy nations to provide 
financial support for the development initia- 
tives of the U.N. special session. 

— The Commission on Finance should ad- 
dress financial issues as they relate to the 
work of the other three commissions. It 
should seek to strengthen the sense of shared 
financial responsibility for the health and 
growth of the international economy. 

With a cooperative approach, the commis- 
sions can give direction and impetus to re- 
lated activity in other forums and organiza- 
tions, under whose jurisdiction a number of 
these issues fall. They can serve as clearing- 
houses for information and motivate other 
organizations doing similar work. They can 
identify areas where necessary work is not 


being done and devise new initiatives where 

The United States will support progress 
on a broad range of topics in the context of 
the four commissions. But we have a special 
interest in the following areas: 

— First, the price of oil and the security 
of oil supply as they affect the international 
economy ; 

— Second, the serious balance-of-payments 
problems of developing countries ; 

— Third, the conditions of international in- 
vestment ; 

— Fourth, the issues of key commodities, 
especially food ; 

— Fifth, the problems of trade; and 

— Sixth, the urgent needs of the poorest 

Let me discuss each of these in turn. 


First, energy. The application of science 
and technology to tap the vast energy poten- 
tial imprisoned beneath the earth, radiated 
by the sun, generated by the movement of 
wind and water across the earth's surface, or 
locked in the core of matter is fundamental 
to the hopes of millions to pull themselves 
above a bare struggle for existence. For the 
expansion of the global economy for both 
developed and developing countries depends 
heavily on our harnessing and efficiently 
employing the world's energy resources. 

Some nations are particularly well en- 
dowed with these resources; some have the 
scientific and technological expertise to ex- 
plore and utilize that potential. The inter- 
national flow of energy, investment capital 
required to produce it, and goods produced 
from fuels have become in effect a global 
energy system which sustains all our econo- 
mies. Only through international coopera- 
tion can all nations benefit from these 
processes and can the world economy harness 
its energy resources most effectively. 

The United States is committed to a co- 
operative approach. We have much to offer. 
We have produced more energy than any 
other nation in the history of mankind, our 

energy science and technology are the mc ; 
advanced, and we have tremendous potent I 
for future energy development in our coi'- 
try and abroad. The United States also h; 
much to gain from cooperation. Our ener- 
needs are the world's largest; our ability i 
raise living standards for all our citiz€; 
depends on greater energy production a I 
the more efficient use of energy resources 
This dialogue and this conference hf ; 
these tasks: 

— First, it is time to reach a common ev ■ 
uation of the relationship between changes i 
energy prices and the stability and perfor ■ 
ance of the world economy. 

The abrupt and arbitrary increase in 1 s 
price of oil has been a major factor in ra i 
of inflation and unemployment unpreceden I 
since the 1930's. It has led to serious balan • 
of-payments deficits, indirectly throi i 
global recession and directly through hig! • 
priced imports. 

By extraordinary eft'ort, the indust 1 
countries, on the whole, put their payme 5 
back in balance over the last year, althoi i 
at a high cost to the well-being of tl r 
peoples. Thus the immediate burden of ; 
massive petrodollar deficit is now bo ; 
largely by the developing countries wh i 
have little or no oil resources. 

Developing countries, by definition, tent ) 
have less of a margin to reduce consumpt , 
to restructure energy use, or to shift 5 
alternative sources when the oil price ri; . 
They are the most vulnerable — and the ir t 

A lower oil price would make possible m e 
rapid economic recovery around the gk !. 
It would assist the developing countries 1 
easing their enormous balance-of -payme s 
burden and their debt burden and increas % 
foreign demand for their exports. A lo' r 
price, along with stability of supply, wod 
also benefit producer nations over the I'k 
term by easing the urgency for consum g 
countries to develop alternative supy 

Conversely, any further increase in pri3 
would seriously hamper economic recov('. 
retard international trade, compound the i- 


Department of State Bull 

nal difficulties of many countries, weaken 
ability of the advanced nations to assist 
developing, and strain the fabric of inter- 
ncional cooperation. 

!t is time for a serious discussion of this 
isue. We are prepared to make a sustained 
elDrt to achieve understanding. 

-Second, we must collaborate to find new 

ices of energy and intensify our conser- 
■ ion efforts. All consuming countries, de- 
vtoped and developing, must use energy 
■nre efficiently and develop more abundant 
snplies. Producers need to prepare their 
scnomies for the day when they will have 
ajiausted their easily accessible oil reserves. 

ndividually, the industrialized countries 
ii accelerating the development of their 
m energy sources. The United States is de- 
I'oping its conventional fuels and also new 
screes, including nuclear power, to replace 
''c^il fuels. We have committed massive re- 
screes to research and devoted our best 
:a'nts to this effort; we expect it to result 
m substantial increase in U.S. energy pro- 
lition. In Europe, major efforts have been 
a iched along the same lines, with the 
N' "th Sea as the most dramatic example 
)f he potential. The development of alterna- 
;i'' energy sources is vital. 

II the near future, the industrial countries 
■V take the first steps toward welding these 
liional programs into a coherent cooperative 
3rgram. These programs are designed to 
Jimote conservation and to accelerate the 
Uelopment of alternative energy supplies 
-hjugh large-scale joint projects and coop- 
er tion in research and development. We will 
leionstrate our commitment to the maxi- 
nm development of new energy by agree- 
i^ not to permit imported oil to be sold in 
)i internal markets below a common mini- 
um safeguard price. 

'his effort will bring a better balance to 
:h world energy market. But as it gathers 
aiport, it will bring important benefits to 
''eloping as well as industrial countries. 

■ programs that the industrial countries 
undertaking, and those that many de- 
oping countries have within their poten- 
1 to undertake, can lead to additional and 
rojre secure supplies of energy, which can 

be a spur to their prosperity and develop- 
ment. All nations will have access to a larger 
pool of energy resources, and there will be 
less competition for oil. The efforts of de- 
veloping countries to increase their own pro- 
duction of energy, if supported, can be the 
single most important step they take to 
secure their development for future genera- 

At the seventh special session of the Gen- 
eral Assembly, the United States proposed 
an International Energy Institute. Through 
such an organization, the developed coun- 
tries and OPEC countries [Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries] can assist 
poorer developing nations to utilize energy 
more efficiently, increase their own produc- 
tion, and improve allocation and distribution 
of existing resources. It could identify cur- 
rent or new energy technologies most rele- 
vant to their special needs. The institute can 
help oil-producing countries to improve the 
use of their own energy. 

Using the most advanced techniques of 
analysis, the institute could help assess all 
countries' energy resources and require- 
ments. Staffed by experts drawn from gov- 
ernment, industry, and academic life in both 
industrialized and developing countries, it 
could provide training for local and regional 
technicians or specialists in energy problems. 
It could become a central point of contact 
where policymakers and experts could ex- 
change ideas on plans and programs. 

We see the institute as a first bridge be- 
tween the massive effort the industrialized 
countries have now launched to develop al- 
ternative sources of energy and the effort 
which the developing countries must now 

In addition, the United States has sug- 
gested a number of other means by which 
the talents and experience of the developed 
nations, collectively and individually, can as- 
sist developing states to find and exploit new 
energy sources and conserve their national 
patrimony. We will advance these proposals 
in the Energy Commission. We anticipate a 
full exchange of views on their scope and 

Oil producers and nations with the tech- 

J«i|oary 12, 1976 


nology to help develop oil resources share an 
interest in cooperation on conservation and 
exploration. But this cooperation will be 
easier to forge in a stable energy market 
with a more appropriate structure of energy 

— Third, the United States seeks a greater 
participation and contribution of the oil- 
producing countries in the international 
economy. With the extraordinary transfer 
of wealth that has taken place, it is in the 
common interest that the oil-producing na- 
tions be constructive members, not challen- 
gers, of the world economic system, that in- 
vestment and the latest technology be made 
available to them on a reimbursable basis 
for their development programs, and that 
the flow of goods and services be enhanced 
between producing and consuming countries. 

We believe that these three issues — a 
better understanding of the effects of oil 
price increases on the world economy; coop- 
eration on conservation and new production ; 
and the orderly integration of OPEC econo- 
mies into the global economy — are priority 
tasks for the energy forum. 

Balance of Payments 

The balance-of-payments problems of de- 
veloping countries are an immediate and 
urgent task for this conference to address, 
closely related to the energy issue. Current 
projections indicate that the developing 
world in 1976 will be collectively in deficit 
by about $35 billion. Bilateral and multilat- 
eral aid, along with direct investment, will 
finance roughly $25 billion of this. The ques- 
tion is whether borrowing from international 
capital markets can again this year make up 
the remainder. If not, some countries will 
be forced to reduce imports, cut back de- 
velopment programs, and further mortgage 
their future. The deficits of the developing 
countries thus could endanger not only their 
own well-being but also the stability of the 
international trade and financial system. 

A multitude of ideas and proposals are al- 
ready before us. Let us address steps that 
can be taken now. 

— First, the members of the IMF [Inte 
national Monetary Fund] should prompt 
agree on the details of the Trust Fund whi( 
the United States has proposed to furni; 
concessional financing for the poorest cou 
tries. It would provide these countries a 
ditional resources of $l-$2 billion a ye£ 
using the profits from IMF gold sales as w 
as national contributions. We are well on t 
way to resolving outstanding issues on IIV 
gold; let us take final action on the Tru 
Fund in January. 

- — Second, the members of the IMF shoi 
complete negotiations next month on t 
new development security facility. T 
United States made this major proposal 
provide more substantial financing to cot 
tries facing temporary shortfalls in expc 
earnings due to the world business cy 
or commodity fluctuations. We proposed tl 
on September 1 ; its realization in Janua 
would be an impressive demonstration 
international resolve and responsiveness. 

— Third, the IMF should approve a oi 
third increase in member quotas, thus ( 
panding its potential financing for all me 

Final approval can and must be taken 
each of these proposals at the meeting 
the IMF Interim Committee in Jamaica 
early January. Together with substani 
unused regular drawings still available < 
developing countries, these measures \ I 
add significantly to the capacity of deveL" 
ing countries to sustain their needed impo I 
and their development programs. 

But however substantial these faciliti , 
they may not be enough. Once the Tn ; 
Fund and these other proposals have b(i 
implemented in January, we must determ i 
how best to respond to the remaining ):■ 
ance-of -payments problems of the develop) ! 
countries. The United States is committed ) 
finding a constructive solution. 

Our specific response will depend in pt 
on whether there is a general across-t- 
board financing problem or one concentr- 
ing on a few countries. One promising ■ 
proach would be to expand the credit tU 
developing countries can draw from the II'' 
by liberalizing the rules governing access J 


Department of State Bulled 

regular IMF resources. The IMF Board could, 
for example, increase the size of each credit 
drawing, base them on expanded new quotas, 
or add a new drawing beyond those now 
available. Decisions on such proposals will 
aeed to be based on close analysis of their 
jffect on the financial integrity of the IMF. 
Secretary [of the Treasury William E.] 
5imon will present our analysis and pro- 
posals for increased use of the IMF at the 
nterim Committee meeting. 

We cannot emphasize enough the need for 
mmediate action in this area to supplement 
he long-term proposals which have already 
)een made. The responsibility does not lie 
vith the industrialized countries alone. We 
annot be expected to bear the major bur- 
lens for remedying balance-of -payments 
iroblems in which the actions of others play 
uch a significant role. There is a collective 
bligation to act; there must be a joint pro- 
:ram involving the industrialized as well 
s the oil-producing countries. 

ivestment and Technology for Development 

The balance-of-payments deficits of the 
eveloping countries will perhaps moderate 
s the global economy recovers from reces- 
ion. But sustained economic growth re- 
uires the continuous application of capital, 
echnology, and management skills to de- 
elopment needs. 

Private investment has always been a 
lajor factor in the growth of the global econ- 
my. My own country has benefited from 
oreign investment throughout its history, 
"oday more than ever, the developing coun- 
ries need this capital in addition to the 
mited supply of official development assist- 

To make this possible, governments of 
eveloping countries need better access to 
/orld capital markets. The United States 
as urged that technical assistance and ex- 
lertise be provided to developing countries 
hat are ready to enter long-term private 
apital markets for the first time. We have 
(iroposed a major expansion of the resources 
'if the World Bank's International Finance 
'orporation (IFC) to strengthen the private 

anuary 12, 1976 

sector in developing countries and to enhance 
their international competitiveness for pri- 
vate capital. We have recommended crea- 
tion of an international investment trust to 
mobilize private portfolio capital for invest- 
ment in local enterprises. And we are con- 
tributing to the work of the IMF-World 
Bank Development Committee to assist in 
removing impediments to developing coun- 
tries' access to capital markets. 

But we also believe that one of the most 
important vehicles for transferring capital, 
technology, and management skills to where 
they are most needed is private enterprise. 
There simply is not enough governmental 
capital available. Because of ideological con- 
siderations, these private enterprises oper- 
ate in an investment climate increasingly 
clouded by unpredictable national legislation 
and uncertain rules of the game. 

In this environment everybody suffers. 
Host countries are deprived of the capital 
resources, technology, and management 
which these enterprises uniquely provide, 
as well as a source of tax revenue. Home 
countries are deprived of the overseas 
markets, investment income, and the new 
ideas and techniques which come with 
foreign contact. And the enterprises them- 
selves are squeezed at both ends, making 
overseas investment less worthwhile for 
them and reducing their contribution to 
home and host country alike and to the 
global product. 

The United States has taken an active part 
in international eff'orts to facilitate inter- 
national investment on a basis that serves 
the interests of all parties. We are willing to 
explore voluntary guidelines for the be- 
havior of both transnational enterprises and 
governments. At the United Nations I stated 
four basic principles that should be included : 

— Transnational enterprises must obey 
local law and refrain from unlawful interven- 
tion in the domestic affairs of host coun- 

— Host governments must treat these en- 
terprises equitably, without discrimination 
among them, and in accordance with inter- 
national law. 

— Both governments and businesses must 


respect the contractual obligations they free- 
ly undertake. 

— Principles for transnational enterprises 
should apply to domestic enterprises where 

But efforts should not be limited to gen- 
eral guidelines for investment. Other re- 
medial measures are possible. 

Taxation is one such area. Because they 
operate in multiple jurisdictions, transna- 
tional enterprises may sometimes be subject 
to either double taxation or inappropriate 
tax incentives. The result in either case is 
that investment patterns are distorted. We 
must find ways to enable both host and home 
countries to coordinate their tax policies and 
make them more equitable to each other and 
to productive enterprises. 

A second area for improvement is inter- 
governmental consultation on investment 
disputes. This is especially important to de- 
veloping countries whose progress is depend- 
ent on a climate conducive to an adequate 
flow of investment. It is time to develop 
generally accepted international rules for the 
settlement of investment disputes and the 
arbitration of differences and other guide- 
lines for dealing with problems arising be- 
tween governments and enterprises. The 
United States recommends that the World 
Bank's International Center for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes be given a greater 
role in solving important investment contro- 

International assistance for development 
must also focus on the advancement, selec- 
tion, and application of modern technology. 
Many countries in the developing world are 
already on the path of industrialization. 
They have proved their capacity to take 
advantage of the vast storehouse of modern 
technology. The United States encourages 
this endeavor. We have long been in the fore- 
front of the effort to train more managers, 
technicians, and researchers in the develop- 
ing countries to carry this forward. 

Most technology transfer takes place 
through international investment and the 
operations of transnational entei-prises on a 
licensing, equity, or contract basis. The 
United States understands the concern of 


many developing countries not to become the 
repository of obsolescent technology. Tech- 
nology must be suited to local needs, the 
terms and conditions must be mutually ac- 
ceptable, and it must be effectively managed 
and utilized. Developing countries must be 
enabled to make their own informed choices 
of foreign or domestic technology, to adapt 
it to their own needs and conditions, and to 
manage its application skillfully. This tech- 
nology transfer requires the development of 
human capabilities — the management and 
skills that constitute the infrastructure of 
technological development. 

People — their training and their place- 
ment in a country's management systems- 
are the key to making technology a produc- 
ing resource. International cooperation car 
make no greater contribution to develop- 
ment than to foster the training of a corps 
of specialists in each country competent tc 
select, bargain for, and manage technologies 
We see this requirement as an importani 
topic for consideration by the Commission or 
Development, and we will make concret( 
proposals to this end. 


A healthy global economy requires tha 
both producers and consumers find protec 
tion against the cycle of raw materials sur 
plus and shortage which chokes growth am 
disrupts planning. We must insure mon 
reliable supplies of vital commodities oi 
terms fair to all. j 

The problem is most urgent in food, man 
kind's most critical need. The cycles of feas | 
and famine, widely fluctuating prices of basi 
foodstuffs, and breakdowns in the system o 
storage and transportation continue to af 
flict mankind. These show few signs of abat 
ing. And in the long run, growth in demani | 
for food threatens to outrun the expansioi 
of supply. 

As the world's largest producer and e» 
porter of food, the United States recognize 
its special responsibility. At home, we hav' 
been committed to policies of maximum foo( 
production and have removed all productioi 
restraints ; internationally, we have propose< 
a system of grain reserves to help moderat 

Department of State Bulletiit 

fluctuations in world prices and supplies. 

We believe that our grain reserves pro- 
posal can be a model for cooperation on other 
commodity problems. It takes into account 
the interests of producers and consumers. It 
makes special provision for the concerns of 
developing countries. Its reliance on buffer 
stocks minimizes the distortion of trade and 
improves the efficiency of the market. We 
nowf await the cooperation and commitment 
3f others to help implement this proposal. 

Most importantly, we are increasing our 
assistance to developing countries — not 
nerely for short-term relief but to help them 
300st their own agricultural production. Our 
jilateral aid programs in this area have 
)een expanded greatly. We also strongly 
iupport the proposal first made by oil-export- 
ng countries for an International Fund for 
Agricultural Development. We have an- 
lounced our willingness to make a contribu- 
ion of $200 million, or one-fifth of the world- 
vide goal of $1 billion. 

Other commodities are of critical impor- 
ance to many countries, either as producers 
>r consumers. Many developing countries 
lepend crucially on earnings from commod- 
ty exports to lift their people above subsist- 
■nce levels, to support basic social programs, 
ind to finance the beginnings of industriali- 
ation. The solution to commodity issues will 
ffect not only the developing countries but 
.Iso the industrial countries — who are in 
act the largest producers, consumers, and 
xporters of commodities. The economies of 
11 countries are affected by the instabilities 
f the market — the vulnerability of agricul- 
ural commodities to the vagaries of weather 
nd shifts in world demand, the sensitivity 
if agricultural and mineral markets to fluc- 
uations in the business cycle in industrial 
ountries, and the higher prices of critical 
nergy imports. 
At the seventh special session a consensus 
vas achieved that commodity issues should 
)e approached cooperatively. The U.S. posi- 
ion is that a realistic and constructive ap- 
iroach will require that we: 

— Establish producer-consumer forums 
or discussions of key commodities; 
— Reduce obstacles to producers' access to 

markets and to consumers' access to sup- 
plies ; 

— -Rely more on buffer stocks, where fea- 
sible and necessary, in preference to restric- 
tions on trade and production ; 

— Improve the productivity and market- 
ability of agricultural raw materials; and 

— Expand worldwide production capacity 
in other key commodities. 

We now stand ready to cooperate in estab- 
lishing producer-consumer forums to discuss 
copper, bauxite, and other commodities. We 
plan to address the question of supply and 
mai'ket access in the multilateral trade ne- 
gotiations in the next several months. We 
have proposed that the IFC and the IBRD 
[International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (World Bank)] make available 
increased financing for mineral development 
and look forward to progress in the near fu- 
ture. We plan to support the U.N. Revolving 
Fund for Natural Resources Exploration. 
Finally, we have proposed establishment of 
an organization to finance and coordinate 
research on nonfood tropical products to im- 
prove their productivity and competitiveness. 

We look forward to additional discussion 
of these measures in the Raw Materials Com- 
mission of this conference. 


An expanding and more open international 
trading system is a principal factor in the 
growth and development of both developed 
and developing nations. We are committed 
to the strengthening of this system so it can 
better serve the needs of the international 
community and include importantly the de- 
veloping nations. 

Trade enables nations to earn their own 
way. It is most consistent with national dig- 
nity and with the efficiency of the economic 

Over the last five years, in a major step of 
international cooperation, all the major in- 
dustrial nations have committed themselves 
to establish a generalized system of tariff 
preferences, giving developing countries bet- 
ter access to the markets of all industrial 

January 12, 1976 


The United States will implement its gen- 
eralized system of preferences in two weeks' 
time. Under this system we will eliminate 
duties on 2,724 tariff items, representing 
some 19 percent of dutiable non-oil imports 
from eligible countries in 1974. This will open 
up significant potential new markets for the 
products of developing countries in the 
United States. 

Tropical products are a promising area of 
export expansion for many developing coun- 
tries. The international trading system 
should encourage this expansion. In the mul- 
tilateral trade negotiations in Geneva, work 
is beginning on a package of tariff conces- 
sions on tropical products for early imple- 
mentation. We attach much importance to 
this effort. 

Tariff escalation — the process by which 
tariffs are progressively increased on goods 
as they move higher on the ladder of process- 
ing — is an obstacle to the exports and in- 
dustrialization of many developing countries. 
At the U.N. special session, we proposed 
that reduction, or in some cases elimination, 
of tariff escalation be an important goal for 
the multilateral trade negotiations. The ef- 
fort to identify and negotiate specific 
changes will begin next year. 

This effort, however, is related in our view 
to the issue of access to supply of raw mate- 
rials. Consumers cannot be expected to im- 
prove access to their markets for finished 
products if they face restrictions on supplies 
of related raw materials. Thus the Geneva 
negotiations must also improve access to 
supply as well as access to markets. 

Reducing or eliminating nontariff barriers 
to trade is another major task facing the 
international trading community. We will 
make a particular effort to negotiate special 
and differential treatment for developing 
countries in this area. 

An improved and strengthened world trad- 
ing system would not be complete, however, 
if it did not insure greater sharing by de- 
veloping countries of both benefits and re- 
sponsibilities. Developing countries should 
gradually take on the normal obligations of 

reciprocity and trade rules as they progress. 

The multilateral trade negotiations are 
the most effective forum for pursuing all 
these objectives. 

The United States put forward proposals 
in many of these areas at the recent meet- 
ing of the Trade Negotiations Committee in 
Geneva as goals for 1976. The developing 
countries will also benefit from progress in 
all other areas of the negotiations, which 
we now hope will be completed in 1977. 

The United States is committed to a role 
of leadership in the multilateral trade nego- 
tiations. We will seek rapid progress for the 
benefit of both developing and developed 
countries. I believe that this conference and 
its relevant commissions should endorse the 
work of the multilateral trade negotiations. 
It should provide continued support for the 
negotiations by monitoring and contributing 
ideas to the work in Geneva. 

Global Poverty 

Our deliberations here must address the 
plight of the one-quarter of mankind whose 
lives are overwhelmed by poverty and hun- 
ger and numbed by insecurity and despair 
This group has suffered immeasurably froir 
high prices of food and fuel. Their export 
revenues have been seriously undermined 
by global recession. 

In these regions less than one person ir 
five is literate; one baby in ten dies in child- 
hood, and in some areas closer to one out oi 
two; life expectancy is less than 50 years; 
and birth rates continue to be intolerably 
high. Public expenditures for education and 
health care are low — and their per capita 
income has been declining for the last four 

And so today, alongside the Third World 
with its increasing power and assertiveness^ 
there has come into being a fourth world; 
where human beings still struggle for bare 

In one international conference after 
another, we have all pointed to the fourth 
world with sincere intentions of giving im- 


Department of State Bulletin' 

mediate help, providing long-term assistance, 
and devising special arrangements. We have 
agreed that this is a major test of a just 
international structure. It is time for all of 
us here to act on our words. Three areas 
need immediate action: 

— First, many of the poorest cannot fi- 
nance balance-of-payments deficits because 
they cannot gain access to capital markets 
)r because of high interest rates on what 
ittle finance they can obtain. The Trust 
?'und which the United States proposed in 
;he IMF to provide up to $2 billion for 
;mergency relief is of special benefit to them. 
!iet us reach a consensus to create this Trust 
^und at next month's IMF meeting in 

— The second area for immediate action 
s food aid. No obligation is more basic than 
lur insuring that the poorest are fed. This 
iscal year the United States expects to pro- 
•ide more than 6 million tons of food aid — 
r more than 60 percent of the 10-million-ton 
rlobal target set by the World Food Confer- 
nce and a 20 percent increase over last 
ear's contribution. Others must donate 
heir fair share. 

— Third, the poorest countries need pref- 
rential and expanded access to oflicial con- 
essionary financial aid. The United States 
/ill do its part. More than 70 percent of our 
ilateral development assistance now goes 
low-income countries. The concessional 
nancing of the international financial insti- 
utions should also be expanded. At the 
eventh special session, my government 
ledged to support the fifth IDA [Inter- 
ational Development Association] replen- 
5hment and the regional development banks. 
Ve are making every effort to secure con- 
ressional appropriations for funds already 
ommitted. We hope that the traditional and 
ew donors will help the poorest through 
nancial contributions to both bilateral and 
multilateral programs. 

Let us urgently rededicate ourselves to 
ction on behalf of the poorest among us. 
iuch action is the responsibility of the entire 

world community — not just the industrial 
countries but also the more affluent in the 
developing world. While no one commission 
will be dealing with the totality of problems 
of the fourth world, each commission has a 
responsibility to be conscious of the need for 
special consideration for the poorest. 


Ladies and gentlemen: The nations and 
economies of the world are many; our dif- 
ferences are great. But our reasons for pull- 
ing together are far greater. Therefore our 
dialogue here must be candid, but with a 
positive spirit and cooperative attitude. The 
prosperity, the progress, and indeed the 
security of the world may depend upon 
whether we succeed in finding realistic 
answers to the kinds of problems before us 
at this conference. For lasting peace around 
the globe will depend not only on containing 
conflict but mounting progress. It requires 
not merely the preservation of stability but 
the fulfillment of human aspirations. 

The issues we face are often technical, but 
their implications could not be more pro- 
found. They go to the heart of our future. 
Only rarely in history does mankind con- 
sciously swing out from familiar, well- 
marked paths to move in new directions. 
Only rarely does humanity comprehend as 
clearly as we do today that change is immi- 
nent and that the direction to be taken is 
subject to human decision. The nations of 
the world face such an opportunity now. 

We have the possibility of forging inter- 
national relationships that will govern world 
affairs for the next several decades. We can 
bring together developed and developing, 
producer and consumer, in common endeav- 
ors — or we can go our separate ways, with 
every one of us paying the price for a lack 
of vision in lower standards of living and 
increased international tensions. Mutual 
interest should bring us together; only blind- 
ness can keep us apart. 

The American people have always believed 
in a world of conciliation rather than a world 

lanuary 12, 1976 


ruled by intimidation, pressure, or force. My 
country, in spite of its own strengths and 
advantages, has chosen the path of cooper- 
ation. We will remain committed to that 
path. But we cannot travel it alone; others 
will have to join us. All of us here must base 
our policies on the reality that we have a 
practical and moral stake in each other's 

I am confident of our cooperation and of 
our success. The result will be a fair and 
prosperous world economy of benefit to all 
nations, and with it new hope, opportunity, 
and justice for all peoples. 


1. The Conference on International Economic Co- 
operation met in Paris at ministerial level, from 
December 16 to December 19. Representatives of the 
following 27 members of the Conference took part; 
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Cameroon. 
Canada, EEC [European Economic Community], 
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Japan, 
Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United States, Venezuela, 
Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia. The ministerial repre- 
sentatives who attended the conference welcomed the 
presence of the Secretary-General of the United 

2. The work of the Conference was opened by H. E. 
the President of the French Republic, Mr. Valery 
Giscard d'Estaing. 

3. The Hon. Allan J. MacEachen, Secretary of 
State for External Affairs of Canada, and Dr. Manuel 
Perez-Guerrero, Minister of State for International 
Economic Affairs of Venezuela, co-chairmen of the 
Conference on International Economic Cooperation, 
presided at the ministerial meeting. 

4. The ministerial representatives at the Confer- 
ence expressed their views with regard to the inter- 
national economic situation. They made suggestions 
as to how the problems which they had identified 
might be resolved. Attention was drawn to the 
plight of the most seriously affected countries. They 
recognized that the Conference on International 
Economic Cooperation provides a unique opportunity 
to address these problems and to further interna- 
tional economic cooperation for the benefit of all 
countries and peoples. 

5. The Conference decided to initiate an intensified 

international dialogue. To this end, it establishes 
four Commissions (on energy, raw materials, de 
velopment and financial affairs) which will mee 
periodically through the coming year. It was agree 
that each of the four Commissions would consist o 
fifteen members, ten of them representing develop 
ing countries, five of them representing industrial 
ized countries. 

6. The Commissions shall start their work on Fel 
ruary 11, 1976. Preparation for the work of the fou 
commissions shall be reviewed at a meeting of th 
co-chairmen of the Conference and of the four Con 
missions after consultation with the other partic 
pants in the Conference. This meeting will tak 
place on January 26, 1976 within the framework ( 
the general guidelines contained in paragraphs 10-1 
of the final declaration of the Second Preparator 
Meeting which are approved by the Conference.' 

7. The Conference agreed that the following pai 
ticipants should serve on the Commissions: 

— Energy: Algeria, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, EE( 
India, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Japan, Saudi Arabi; 
Switzerland, United States, Venezuela, Zaire. 

— Raw materials: Argentina, Australia, Cameroo 
EEC, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Spai 
United States, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambi 

— Development: Algeria, Argentina, Cameroo 
Canada, EEC, India, Jamaica, Japan, Nigeria, Pak 
stan, Peru, Sweden, United States, Yugoslavia, Zair 

— Finance: Brazil, EEC, Egypt, India, Indonesi 
Iran, Iraq, Japan, Mexico, Pakistan, Saudi Arabi 
Sweden, Switzerland, United States, Zambia. 

The co-chairmen of the Commissions will be: 

— Energy: Saudi Arabia and United States. 
— Raw materials: Japan and Peru. . 

— Development: Algeria and EEC. | 

— Finance: EEC and Iran. 

Joint meetings of the co-chairmen of the Conferen 
and of the Commissions may be held if the nei 

8. It was agreed that members of the Conferen^ 
who wish to follow the work of a Commission 
which they do not belong should be entitled to a 
point a representative in the capacity of audit 
without the right to speak. 

9. The Conference decided that a number of inte 
governmental functional organizations which a 
directly concerned with the problems to be consider! 
would be able to make a useful contribution to the 
consideration. It therefore invited these organizatioi 
(United Nations Secretariat, OPEC, lEA, UNCTAl 

'Issued at Paris on Dec. 19 (unofficial text). 

- For text of the final declaration of the secoi 
preparatory meeting issued at Paris on Oct. 16, 197 
see Bulletin of Nov. 10, 1975, p. 668. 


Department of State Bulleti 

SELA) ' to be represented on a permanent basis in 
:he relevant commissions. Their observers will have 
;he right to speak but not the right to vote and 
lence will not participate in the formation of a con- 
sensus. Each commission may, in addition, invite 
ippropriate intergovernmental functional organiza- 
ions to participate as observers ad hoc in the exami- 
lation of specific questions. 

10. The Conference decided to establish an inter- 
national secretariat with an exclusively administra- 
ive and technical function on the basis of proposals 
i)ut forward by the two co-chairmen. It named Mr. 
Jernard Guitton [of France] as head of the secre- 
ariat and approved plans for its organization and 
perational procedures. The financial costs arising 
irom the establishment of the secretariat and from 
uture meetings of the Conference will be borne by 
lembers of the Conference on the basis of a formula 
greed by the Conference. 

11. It was agreed that the four Commissions 
hould meet in Paris. Subsequent meetings of the 
ommissions will be convened by their co-chairmen. 

12. One or several meetings of the Conference at 
le level of government officials may be held at 
■ast six months after this ministerial meeting. The 
[inisterial Conference agreed to meet again at min- 
iterial level in about twelve months time. 

13. The Conference adopted the rules of procedure 
^commended by the Preparatory Meeting which 
re based on the principle of consensus, according to 
hich decisions and recommendations are adopted 
hen the chair has established that no member dele- 
ation has made any objection. English, Arabic, 
panish and French are the official and working 
nguages of the Conference. The rules of procedure 
pply to all the bodies of the Conference. 

14. The Conference took note of the resolution of 
le General Assembly entitled "Conference on Inter- 
itional Economic Cooperation" (Resolution 3515 
ICXX)) and agreed to make reports available to 
le 31st session of the U.N. General Assembly. 

15. The members of the Conference paid special 
ibute to President Giscard d'Estaing for the action 
! had taken to bring about the dialogue which is 
)w engaged and expressed their warm appreciation 
' the Government of France for its hospitality and 
ir the efforts and obligations it had undertaken in 
•der to make the Ministerial Conference a success. 

''Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries; 
iternational Energy Agency; United Nations Con- 
iirence on Trade and Development; Organization for 
iconomic Cooperation and Development; Food and 
griculture Organization; General Agreement on 
ariffs and Trade; United Nations Development Pro- 
ram; United Nations Industrial Development Or- 
mization; International Monetary Fund; Interna- 
onal Bank for Reconstruction and Development; 
atin America Economic System. 

anuary 12, 1976 

The Common Challenge in the Search 
for an Enduring Peace 

Folloiving are remarks made by Secretary 
Kissinger at Fuerth, Federal Republic of 
Germany, on December 15 upon accepting 
Fuerth's Gold Medal for Distinguished Na- 
tive Citizens. 

Press release 607 dated December 15 

Mr. Foreign Minister, Mr. Minister-Presi- 
dent, Mr. Lord Mayor, distinguished guests, 
friends: This is not the first time in the last 
35 years that I have paid a sentimental visit 
to Fuerth. I enjoyed a brief but warm stay in 
1959. I have often exchanged letters with 
your distinguished Lord Mayor and his prede- 
cessor and have been encouraged and 
strengthened by their good wishes in many 
periods of my public life. When the honor I 
am now receiving was first offered to me, I 
accepted with pleasure. 

I am proud to be here as the Secretary of 
State of perhaps the only country in the 
world where it is possible for an adopted son 
to have the opportunity for responsibility 
and service that I have enjoyed. I am happy 
to share this occasion with my family, my 
parents, who have never lost their attach- 
ment to this city in which they spent the 
greater part of their lives. I believe that my 
visit here exemplifies the extraordinary re- 
birth of friendship between the American 
people and the German people. 

This is why the central role in this event 
of my colleague and friend Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher means so much to me. The partner- 
ship that he and I carry out every day in 
international affairs is given a deeper quality 
by the personal affection and comradeship 
that exists between us. 

Our generation has witnessed — and has 
no excuse ever to forget — the dark force of 
brutality and raw power at large in the mod- 
ern world. As I stand here today, suffering is 
still dominant in many parts of the globe. Of 
all the species on this planet, man alone has 
inflicted on himself the great part of his own 


Yet our generation, more than any other, 
also has the possibility and indeed the im- 
perative of something better. We live in a 
world of some 150 sovereign nations, in an 
era of both instant communication and ideo- 
logical competition and in the shadow of 
nuclear cataclysm. No longer can we afford 
to submit to an assumed inevitability of his- 
tory's tragedy. The interdependence of states 
links our societies, our economies, and our 
destinies; we will either progress together 
or we will decline together. 

Much has happened from which we can 
take hope and courage. Free societies have 
come closer to the dream of well-being and 
justice than any earlier period has witnessed. 
Our two nations have moved from bitter 
conflict to peace and from peace to reconcili- 
ation and common endeavor. We have been 
leaders in the quest for peace — in Europe 
and in the world. 

Our common challenge is to help build an 
international structure of relationships 
which keeps continents stable and nations 
secure, which ties nations to each other by 
bonds of mutual interest, which fosters the 
habits of restraint and moderation in inter- 
national conduct, which gives free rein to 
man's striving for freedom and justice. Our 
goal is a peace which all — the small as well 
as the large — have a share of shaping; a 
peace that will endure because all — the 
strong as well as the weak — have a stake in 
making it last. 

We know that such a peace will not come — 
nor can it be maintained — without effort and 
courage. We must be conciliatory without 
weakness and tolerant without moral con- 
fusion; we must temper strength with wis- 
dom and seek justice while respecting the 
sense of justice of others. Posterity will not 
forgive either truculence or the failure to 

act firmly in defense of interest and princi- 
ples. Posterity will not forgive either illusions 
or the failure to grasp opportunities that 
come fleetingly and may never return. 

In our search for a peaceful world we must 
never forget: 

— That freedom must be vigilantly de- 
fended ; 

— That stability depends on restraint 
among as well as within nations; 

— That no nation or group of nations can 
achieve satisfaction of its needs alone; 

— That the best must not become the 
enemy of the good; and 

— Above all, that every great achievement 
is an ideal before it becomes a reality. 

Thus in its deepest sense this simple cere- 
mony, which shows to what extent we have 
overcome an unhappy past, symbolizes as 
well the future for which we must strive— 
a world of nations which find pride in then 
reconciliations, not their power; an era ir 
which convictions are the source of mora 
strength rather than of intolerance or hatred 

One of America's first and greatest leaders 
Benjamin Franklin, expressed a universa 
hope of human society: 

. . . God grant that not only the love of liberty 
but a thorough knowledge of the rights of men, ma: 
pervade all nations of the earth, so that a philoso 
pher may set his foot anywhere on its surface an( 
say, "This is my country." 

Human history has not yet reached thi; 
ideal. But we must persevere until what i; 
now unfamiliar becomes natural, what is nov 
a vision of peace becomes a reality and ou 
legacy to our children. 

In this spirit— and on behalf of my famil: 
as well — I accept your distinction and shal 
treasure it. I am honored and moved anc 


Department of State Bulletii 

Secretary Kissinger Attends NATO Ministerial Meeting 

Secretary Kissinger headed the U.S. dele- 
gation to the regular ministerial meeting of 
the North Atlantic Council at Brussels 
December 11-12. Folloiving are remarks to 
the press by Secretary Kissinger and Greek 
Foreign Minister Diniitrios Bitsios after a 
bilateral meeting on December 11; remarks 
to the press by Secretary Kissinger and 
Turkish Foreign Minister Ihsan Sabri Cag- 
layangil after a bilateral meeting on Decem- 
ber 12; an interview with Secretary Kissin- 
ger for German television conducted on 
December 12; a neivs conference held by 
Secretary Kissinger on December 12; and 
the text of a communique issued at the con- 
clusion of the North Atlantic Council meet- 
ing on December 12. 


Press release 603 dated December 11 

Q. [Unintelligible] on the Cyprus situa- 
tion ? 

Secretary Kissinger: The Foreign Minis- 
ter and I had a very friendly talk and re- 
viewed the Cyprus situation and general 
relationships between Greece and the United 
States. With respect to the Cyprus situation, 
the United States feels that the time for 
negotiations is here and that there are really 
no further obstacles to negotiations. We 
strongly support resumption of the inter- 
communal talks between the two communities 
and a solution based on justice and equity 
and respecting the sense of dignity of both 
communities. And we will use all our efforts 
in that direction. 

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, would you agree 
that there are no obstacles to negotiations 
with Turkey? 

Foreign Minister Bitsios: I would say 
there are no more obstacles of the kind that 
the Turkish Government was putting for- 
ward before. You remember — elections and 
all of that. And I fully agree on the line 
which the Secretary of State took. We think 
that it is high time that the negotiations be 
resumed, for a solution. The situation cannot 
go on in Cyprus like that. I think the repre- 
sentatives of the communities must sit down 
for meaningful negotiations. 

Q. Does that mean that you now expect 
meaningful negotiations to get underway? 

Foreign Minister Bitsios: You must be 
two; that's inevitable. I explained to you our 

Q. The Turks have been interested in en- 
larging the intercommunal talks. How do 
you regard that proposal? 

Foreign Minister Bitsios: 
statement last Saturday. 

I have made a 

Q. And could you repeat that statement 
for us today? 

Foreign Minister Bitsios: I don't see any 
reason why we should change the existing 

Q. But that forms an obstacle then, be- 
cause you have one position and the Turks 
have another. 

Secretary Kissinger: I will talk to the 
Turkish Foreign Minister tomorrow. I be- 
lieve that if the existing forum resumes, 
modalities can be found by which the other 
interested nations can be related to it. The 
issues seem to me sufficiently clearly defined 
now. A package deal is necessary, and it 
should not be delayed on the issue of the 
modalities of the negotiations, particularly 

January 12, 1976 


as it is my impression that one will be able 
to relate the various parties to it in the 
proper way. 


Press relt-ase 604 dated December 12 

Secretary Kissinger: The Foreign Minis- 
ter and I had a very constructive talk in the 
atmosphere of friendship that characterizes 
the relationship between the United States 
and Turkey. We discussed bilateral relation- 
ships, and I am very hopeful that we will 
solve the question of the American bases in 
Turkey and the mutual defense relationship 
in the very near future. 

With respect to the Cyprus problem, we — 
I am very hopeful that negotiations can be 
started in the near future. I believe that the 
differences between the parties are relatively 
— the procedural differences between the 
parties are relatively small and that a solu- 
tion can be found this afternoon when the 
Foreign Minister of Turkey and the Foreign 
Minister of Greece meet to resume the com- 
munal talks in an appropriate setting. So I 
am very pleased with this talk. 

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: [In 
French.] I share the opinion of my colleague. 
I think that we have had a very constructive 
negotiation, especially in bilateral relations. 
I hope — after having had a negotiation with 
my Greek colleague — that perhaps we can 
advance a little in our relations. 

Q. Mr. Minister, do you speak English? 

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: My Eng- 
lish is very poor. I am very sorry. 

Secretary Kissinger: That's a trick to give 
time to think while I talk. [Laughter.] 

Q. Why are yoji confident, Mr. Secretary, 
about the bases question? 

Secretary Kissinger: Because we reviewed 
the issues that divide us or that are still un- 
solved, and I believe that they are manage- 
able. I am going to meet with our Ambassa- 
dor to Turkey tomorrow in London, and we 

will be giving him new instructions. And I 
have invited the Foreign Minister of Turkey 
to come to the United States at the end of 
January, and I am extremely hopeful that 
whatever differences remain will be solved 
on that occasion. 

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: [Statement 
in Turkish.] 

Secretary Kissinger: Valeriani [Richard 
Valeriani, NBC News], ask a question on 

Q. In what language? 

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: [Inter- 
preter's ti'anslation from Turkish.] In rela- 
tion to our bilateral relations with the United 
States, I join the views expressed by Secre- 
tary of State Kissinger, and I hope that in 
the near future we can solve these problems 
and find a compromise. 

Q. [In French.'] When do you have the 
meeting with the Greek Minister? 

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: [In 
French.] Today at 3 o'clock. 

Q. [In French.] Here? 

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: No, at 

Secretary Kissinger: Nice of you to have 

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: Thank you. 

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: [Says fare- 
well in Turkish.] 

Q. [Repeats Turkish farewell.] 

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: Bravo. No 
need to translate. 

Q. [Inaudible question on negotiations on 

Secretary Kissinger: I am quite confident 
that we can get the communal talks started 
again in order that some real impetus will 
now be given to them. It is more than just 

Q. Will you be able to report back to the 
President, loho can report to Congress that 
you have got real progress going now? 


Department of State Bulletin 

Secretary Kissinger: I think we have 


'less release 605 dated December 12 

Q. The NATO states ivill make the offer 
n Vienna also to withdraw nuclear weapons 
ironi Western Europe. Isn't this a dangerous 
■oncession ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Let me explain it in 
English. I do not believe that it goes too far, 
lecause we will be offering a category of 
weapons of which, due to modernization, 
ome have become dispensable, in return for 
withdrawal of substantial Soviet ground 
orces. But the United States remains firmly 
ommitted to a strong local defense in Eu- 
ope, and the United States will under no 
ircumstances participate in anything that 
'ill lead to the denuclearization either of 
lurope or of any part of Europe. 

Q. You are just leaving the Deutschland- 
'ssen [Allied meeting on Berlin and Ger- 
lany]. The responsibility of the Westeryi 
'ates was underlined during that meeting. 
*oes this hide the fear that the friendship 
greement between the Soviet Union and 
erlin ivoidd influence the representation of 
ie four powers? 

Secretary Kissinger: It is not directed at 
ny particular event. It is a permanent fea- 
ire of the four-ix)wer relationship that the 
•eedom of Berlin is central to all of our 
ohcies and of course the precondition for 
ny relaxation of tensions. 

Q. One of the most important conditions 
) keep the alliayice capable of defense is to 
nify weapons. What do you think of the 
eclaration of the European states in this 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we strongly 
Ivor it, and we are pleased that the Euro- 
eans will discuss the problem first among 

' Secretary Kissinger answered in English questions 
osed in German. The German Foreign Minister, 
ans-Dietrich Genscher, was interviewed on the 
ime program. 

themselves and then will solve it in close 
coordination with the United States. And I 
think it is a significant step toward the 
strengthening of NATO. 

Q. How serious is the offer of the United 
States to buy iveapons in Europe? 

Secretary Kissinger: It is a serious offer. 
It of course depends on the ability of the 
Europeans to rationalize their production 
and to produce them at comparable prices. 
Both should be possible. 

Q. Weren't you disappointed over what 
came out of the Helsinki Conference? 

Secretary Kissinger: Frankly, not particu- 
larly. I didn't expect too much, and I was not 

Q. What part ivill and has the European 
Community to play in world politics? 

Secretary Kissinger: For the United 
States, the relationship between the United 
States and Western Europe is absolutely 
central. We support European integration, 
and we think that the relationship which is 
now developing between Europe and the 
United States is creating a community of ob- 
jectives and parallel policies to which we 
attach great importance. We think that secu- 
rity and progress in the world requires a 
strong, unified, and economically developing 


Press release 606 dated December 12 

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and gentle- 
men, the U.S. delegation considers this meet- 
ing to have been very successful. It was 
conducted in the spirit of friendship and close 
consultation which characterizes the relation- 
ship in the North Atlantic community. The 
communique speaks for itself, and therefore 
I will go straight to your questions. 

Q. There are reports in both the Netv York 
Times and Washington Post today of U.S. 
contributions of $50 million to Angola in 

January 12, 1976 


recent months. Could you respond to those 
reports ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have not had the 
privilege of reading either of these distin- 
guished newspapers today, and I will not go 
into any details. I have stated — the other day 
— that the United States cannot be indiffer- 
ent to massive Soviet supplies of arms and 
is in contact with other interested African 

Q. Mr. Secretary, on that point, could you 
amplify this aspect of it? Do you have any 
concern that there ivill develop in Angola, 
if there is not already, a war of proxy be- 
tween the major powers? And in addition to 
that, how would you distinguish betiveen the 
degree of major-power involvement in An- 
gola and the Viet-Nam situation, the Viet- 
Nam history? 

Secretary Kissinger: The United States 
wishes that the situation in Angola be 
handled as an African problem, and it would 
support a solution in which no outside power 
participates and in which the Organization 
of African Unity will cooperate with the 
parties inside Angola to find an African 

The United States did not beconrie con- 
cerned until there had already taken place 
substantial Soviet involvement and the in- 
troduction of massive outside equipment and 
later the introduction of Cuban forces. 

I think, as I have pointed out repeatedly, 
there should not be a war by proxy of the 
great powers. I do not think it is a situation 
analogous to Viet-Nam, because in Viet-Nam 
the conflict had a much longer and more 
complicated history; but the United States 
cannot be indifferent to what is going on in 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you frequently say that 
the United States should not be indifferent. 
But in what manner ivould the United States 
respond? Can you tell us what sort of coun- 
termeasures the United States might take 
in this situation? 

Secretary Kissinger: The United States 
favors a solution in which all of the parties 


in Angola can negotiate with each other free 
of outside interference and in which th( 
problem of Angola is handled as an Africai 
issue. The United States will support anj 
solution in this direction. Failing that, th( 
United States will try to prevent one partj 
by means of massive introduction of outside 
equipment from achieving dominance. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, on a previous occasioi 
you mentioned the possibility that the An 
golan involvement of the Soviet Unioi 
couldn't help but affect other aspects of th 
Soviet-American relationship. Do you see i 
at any point as endangering the entire polic. 
of detente? 

Secretary Kissinger: Incidentally, I ough 
to make one thing clear. The press report 
yesterday gave the impression that all of th 
afternoon session was devoted to Angola. Th 
afternoon session yesterday was devoted t 
East-West relations, in which Angola playe^ 
a relatively minor role. So, this is a NAT( 
meeting. This is not a meeting of Africa | 
problems, and I think this should be clearl 
understood. ! 

It cannot but affect relations between th 
United States and the Soviet Union, as 
stated publicly before, if the Soviet Unio 
engages in a military operation or massivel 
supports a military operation thousands o 
miles from Soviet territory in an area wher 
there are no historic Russian interests an 
where it is therefore a new projection o 
Soviet power and Soviet intei-ests. 

But again let me emphasize to you, ladie 
and gentlemen, that this was a NATO meal 
ing, in which Angola played a relatively ir 
significant role and was used only as a 
illustration of more general problems. 

Q. Mr. Secretary General [sic], did yo 
talk about Spain, or did you propose bring 
ing Spairi closer to NATO? 

Secretary Kissinger: We did not have at 
opportunity to go into the problem of Spaiii 
and the future relationship of Spain in anjl 
formal sense. The United States favors ' 
closer relationship of Spain both to the Ati 
lantic organization as well as to Wester* 

Department of State Bulletii 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I tvonder if you could 
expand a bit, amplify this extreme concent 
the United States has over Angola. Why /.s- 
fhis situation so different? You referred to 
\distance, but after all the Soviet Union has 
massively armed many countries in the ivorld 
and I don't remember this type of strong 
talk from the United States. What is it about 
Angola — 

Secretary Kissinger: Should I point out 
again to you, ladies and gentlemen, that this 
was a NATO meeting? You may have re- 
ceived certain briefings yesterday. The sub- 
ject was not Angola. The subject was the 
Western alliance, and while I am glad to 
inswer questions on Angola, I want to point 
jut that it is being raised by you, ladies and 
gentlemen, much more acutely than it was 
-aised by us. 

Q. This has continued as a process now of 
ieveral weeks where the United States has 
}een extremely concerned publicly. 

Secretary Kissinger: It makes a difference 
vhether the Soviet Union is arming a coun- 
Ty or whether it is arming a faction in a 
■ountry. It makes a difference whether the 
Soviet Union is operating in an area of tradi- 
ional relationships or whether it is attempt- 
ng to establish a new pattern of dominance. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the last time you at- 
ended a NATO meeting, just before it you 
'xpressed your conviction that Portugal 
vould not easily remain a member of the 
dliance because it was going Communist. 
Vhat is your assessment now? What has 
leen Soviet behavior with respect to Portu- 
lal, and what does that mean in terms of 
ingola ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I hope that the non- 
\merican members here noted the single- 
nindedness with which the American press 
)ursues its obsessions. Now, first let me 
nake clear I did not say the last time that 
'ortugal could not easily remain a member 
)f NATO because it was going Communist. I 
iaid it the other way around. I said if Portu- 
ral went Communist, it could not easily re- 
nain a member of NATO. 
j I believe that, on the whole, the situation in 

Portugal has improved. The danger of Portu- 
gal going Communist seems less. The possi- 
bility of a pluralistic evolution seems better. 
So, therefore, this particular danger which 
I referred to last time is not as acute as it 
was then. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you didn't answer about 
the Soviet Union's role in Portugal. 

Secretary Kissinger: I think that the So- 
viet Union's role in Portugal is not as acute 
as its role in Angola. 

Q. Will the U.S. bases in Turkey reopen? 
And when? And to ivhat extent do you con- 
sider them inoperative ever since they were 
closed ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Closed bases are 
generally inoperative. But I had a very good 
talk with the Foreign Minister of Turkey 
this morning. I expect that the negotiations 
about the bases will soon be given a new 
impetus, and I have invited the Foreign Min- 
ister to come to Washington by the end of 
January. I hope that we will be able to con- 
clude the negotiations by then. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I assume that you men- 
tioned the Middle East in your discussion. 
If this is correct, are you happy about the 
state of affairs in the Middle East now as a 
result of your step-by-step diplomacy? Isn't 
there any change of heart from the part of 
the United States regarding the Palestinians 
and the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organi- 
zation'] to accelerate the process of peace in 
the Middle East? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think the 
Middle East was designed to inspire happi- 
ness, and therefore I cannot say I have 
reached that state of contentment with if. 

With respect to the Palestinians, I have 
not repeated the American position for 48 
hours and never in Brussels. So let me say 
that the United States cannot change its 
position until the Palestinians recognize the 
existence of Israel and until they accept the 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. 
At that point we will look at our position 

lanuary 12, 1976 


Q. Do theij have to recognize Israel before 
Israel recognizes them, or must this come 
simidtaneouslij? For you cannot ask the 
Palestinians. It's fair enough that both of 
them recognize each other at the same time, 
isn't it? 

Secretarii Kissinger: It is in the context 
that the United States can look at its posi- 
tion, but not under present circumstances — 
in the context that I have given. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think that the 
■"ttands of Greece and Turkey are more co7i- 
ciliatory noiv for the solution of the prob- 
lems between the two countries and that of 
Cyprus ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Having talked to the 
Foreign Ministers of both Greece and Tur- 
key, I have the impression that the conditions 
for a resumption of the communal talks are 
good. Of course, they will meet each other 
this afternoon, and it would be a rash man 
who would predict what happens when an 
actual interaction occurs between Greek and 
Turkish representatives. 

My impression is that the conditions for a 
resumption of communal talks are good and 
that both Foreign Ministers recognize the 
importance of making rapid progress towai'd 
a settlement. We believe that a package deal 
is necessary and that it should take into 
account the sense of dignity of both commu- 
nities. We will use our influence in that di- 

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you got any netv 
evidence from the Soviet Union which makes 
you confident that you ivill be ready to go in 
four or five iveeks, as you had said you woidd, 
on SALT? Also, what assurance is there that 
the conflicts within the U.S. Government on 
SALT will be resolved tvithin four or five 
weeks ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I wouldn't describe 
the discussions in the American Government 
as "conflict." The issues are technically 
complicated and require careful study. I am 
confident that we will come up with a solu- 
tion that will have support of all the agen- 

As I have pointed out, going to Moscow is 
based on the presupposition that both sides 
will be prepared to modify their positions; 
and therefore it is based on the assumption, 
indeed on the knowledge, that the Soviet 
Union, as well as we, will be prepared to 
modify the last positions which each side 
took. I'm quite confident that the date that 
has been indicated, or the approximate date, 
will be maintained. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that Angola 
ivas a minor issue in the discussion and the 
main topic was East-West relations. So, 
after this discussion, what is your assess- 
ment of the present status of East-West re- 
lations ? 

Secretary Kissinger: There are worrying 
elements such as Angola. There remains, 
nevertheless, the necessity to attempt to im- 
prove relations between East and West on 
the basis of reciprocity, and there is a recog- 
nition on the part of all allies that the process 
of improvement of relations requires an 
undiminished concern for Western security. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said yesterday that 
the United States supports the resumption 
of the intercommunal talks, but you also 
mentioned something about a way of relat- 
ing other interested parties to it at a later 
state. What would you envisage by that? 

Secretary Kissinger: The most interested 
parties, of course, are the Governments of 
Greece and Turkey, and this is a question 
that the Foreign Ministers of Greece and 
Turkey will deal with this afternoon. It is 
my impression, having talked to both of 
them, that they are approaching a consensus 
on this, and I expect that this problem will 
be solved. But I'd leave it up to them to an- 
nounce the details. 

Q. Yesterday you expressed your concern 
about the Communist pressure on the south- 
ern countries of the alliance. What is your 
opinion on the Italian situation and also, in 
your opinion, what would be the conse- 
quences for the alliance of having participa- 
tion of the Italian Communists in the gov- 
ernment, which, as you know very well, is 
not terribly improbable for the futurel 


Department of State Bulletin 

Secretanj Kissinger: I did not yesterday 
express any opinion on the questions which 
you raised. Of course, we consider the Italian 
domestic situation a matter for Itahans to 
decide— all the more so as our advice is 
likely to have the opposite effect from the 
one we wish to bring about. But if I were 
fonning a government in Italy, which is un- 
likely, I would not move in the direction of a 
"historic compromise." 

The ptesa: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 


1. The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial 
session in Brussels on 11 and 12 December, 1975. 

2. Ministers noted that there had been encouraging 
features in the development of East-West relations 
during recent months. They reaffirmed their determi- 
nation to persevere in their efforts to place relations 
mth the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries 
3n a more stable basis. 

At the same time they noted that the beneficial 
effects of detente can develop only in so far as all 
che countries concerned do their best to reduce the 
risk of confrontation in both the political and mili- 
tary fields. 

In the political sphere, detente requires tolerance 
»nd mutual understanding, and accordingly demands 
;hat the natural contest of political and social ideas 
should not be conducted in a manner incompatible 
vith the letter and spirit of the Final Act of Hel- 
sinki. Furthermore, Ministers considered that at- 
;empts to take advantage of tension in any part of 
;he world could have a negative impact on detente. 

In the military sphere. Ministers viewed with con- 
•em, as on previous occasions, the continued rapid 
growth of the power of the land, air and naval 
'orces of the Warsaw Pact, which exceeds its ap- 
Jarent defensive needs. They emphasized that de- 
ente and security are closely linked. In these cir- 
cumstances they stressed the need to preserve the 
lefensive strength of the Alliance which is importaTit 
is a deterrent not only against military aggression 
3Ut also against political pressure. 

Ministers reaffirmed that the solidarity of the 
Alliance and the security which it provides are es- 
sential conditions for the improvement of East-West 
"elations, and they restated the determination of 
:heir Governments, expressed in the Ottawa Declara- 
-ion, to maintain and improve the efl^ciency of their 

"Issued at Brussels on Dec. 12 (text from press 
-elease 608 dated Dec. 15). 

3. Ministers welcomed the adoption of the Final 
Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe [CSCE] which provides guidelines for an 
evolution of relations between the participating 
states and between their peoples towards greater 
understanding and cooperation. They noted the fact 
that the results of the Conference apply throughout 
Europe, including, subject to Quadripartite rights 
and responsibilities, Berlin. The Allies attach high 
priority to the full implementation of the Final Act 
by all signatories in improving relations between 
states, in applying confidence building measures, in 
encouraging closer economic cooperation, and in 
lowering barriers between people. Noting that only a 
short time had elapsed since Helsinki, Ministers 
hoped that substantial progress would be seen during 
the coming months. 

In accordance with the provisions of the Final Act, 
the Allies concerned have already notified all CSCE 
participants of a number of military maneuvers and 
have invited observers. The Allies look for the imple- 
mentation of such measures also by the members of 
the Warsaw Pact. 

4. Ministers heard a report from the United States 
Secretary of State on the continuing U.S. efforts to- 
wards the further limitation of strategic offensive 
arms. The Ministers expressed satisfaction with the 
substantial progress made since the Vladivostok Sum- 
mit towards a SALT II Agreement. They expressed 
the hope that further efforts would lead to the con- 
clusion of a satisfactory agreement. The Ministers 
also expressed appreciation for continuing consulta- 
tions within the Alliance with respect to strategic 
arms limitation. 

5. Ministers of the participating countries reviewed 
the state of the negotiations in Vienna on Mutual 
and Balanced Force Reductions. They recalled that 
it is the aim of these negotiations to contribute to 
a more stable relationship and to strengthening of 
peace and security in Europe. 

These Ministers stressed again that the existing dis- 
parities in ground force manpower and tanks are the 
most destabilizing factor in Central Europe and that 
any agreement must deal adequately with these dis- 
parities. They reconfirmed, therefore, the Allied pro- 
posal to establish in the area of reductions approxi- 
mate parity in ground forces in the form of a com- 
mon collective ceiling for ground force manpower 
on each side. A first phase reductions agreement 
concerning United States and Soviet ground forces 
as proposed by the participating Allies would be an 
important and practical step towards this goal. 

With a view to achieving these objectives, they 
approved important additional proposals and author- 
ized their presentation at the appropriate moment in 

These Ministers reiterated their resolve to pursue 
vigorously all the Allied objectives in order to as- 
sure undiminished security for all parties. They pro- 
ceed on the premise that the additional proposals will 
lead to the achievement of these objectives. 

{lanuary 12, 1976 


These Ministers noted with satisfaction that Al- 
lied solidarity has continued to prove itself in 
these negotiations. They reaffirmed the principle 
that NATO forces should not be reduced except in 
the context of a Mutual and Balanced Force Reduc- 
tions agreement with the East. 

6. The Ministers took note of the Declaration made 
by the Governments of France, the United Kingdom 
and the United States on 14 October, 1975, that the 
rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers for 
Berlin and Germany as a whole remain unaffected by 
the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual 
Assistance concluded by the USSR and the GDR on 
the 7 October, 1975. They shared the view of the 
Government of the Federal Republic of Germany 
that its policy to work for a state of peace in Europe 
in which the German nation will regain its unity 
through free self-determination, is fully consistent 
with the Final Act of Helsinki. 

Ministers underlined the essential connection be- 
tween the situation relating to Berlin and detente, 
security and cooperation throughout Europe. 

They emphasized in particular, that traffic and ties 
between Western sectors of Berlin and the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the representation abroad 
of the interests of those sectors by the Federal Re- 
public of Germany continue to be important elements 
of the viability of the city. 

7. Ministers reviewed developments in the Mediter- 
ranean area since their last meeting. They expressed 
concern at the possible dangers of new tensions that 
could affect the balance of forces in this region. They 
reaffirmed the importance they attach to the con- 
tinuation of efforts designed to achieve an overall 
settlement resulting in a just and durable peace in 
the Middle East. 

Ministers took note of the report on the situation 
in the Mediterranean prepared on their instructions. 
They requested the Council to keep this question 
under review and to report back to them again at the 
next meeting. 

8. The issue of the present fisheries dispute be- 
tween Iceland and the United Kingdom was raised 
and discussed. 

9. Ministers discussed various aspects of problems 
related to armaments and standardization with the 
aim of improving the military capability of the Alli- 
ance and of making more effective use of available 
resources, especially in view of the increasing pres- 
sures in national budgets. They agreed that the exam- 
ination of these questions would be pursued by the 
Council and the other competent bodies of the Alli- 
ance in accordance with established procedures. They 
agreed to form for a limited time an ad hoc com- 
mittee under the Council to prepare a specific pro- 
gram of action covering the interoperability of mili- 
tary equipment. 

10. Ministers took note of the progress achieved by 
the Committee on the Challenges of Modem Society 
(CCMS). They endorsed resolutions on coastal water 
pollution and oil spills, noting the determination of 
the member countries to continue to combat pollution 
of the seas and to enhance the quality of the marine 
environment. Ministers noted and endorsed the initi- 
ation of a pilot study open to interested nations on 
the relationship between food and health, and the 
continuation of other studies relating to the environ- 
ment and to energy. They noted the important con- 
tribution of the CCMS to effective international co- 
operation in areas of major concern to our societies. 

11. Ministers reaffirmed the attachment of their 
nations to the democratic principles on which their 
free institutions are founded. They expressed their 
confidence in the ability of their countries to sur- 
mount the problems of our time. They considered the 
cohesion and vitality of the Alliance to be a sure 
source of mutual support and solidarity. 

12. The next Ministerial session of the North At- 
lantic Council will be held in Oslo on 20 and 21 May, 

U.S.-Canada Joint Statement 
Issued at Paris 

Following is the text of a joint statemem 
by Secretary Kissinger and Canadian Sec 
retary of State for External Affairs Allai 
MacEachen issued at the conclusion of t 
bilateral meeting at Paris on December 17 

Press release 619 dated December 17 

The United States and Canada have a lonj 
history of friendship and cooperation. Bot? 
of our Governments have the intention t( 
continue the process of consultation anc 
negotiation which enables us to surmount 
the inevitable economic strains that aris( 
from time to time between these two majoi 
economies. The recent meetings in Ottawj 
between the two Foreign Ministers and th< 
excellent relations between President Fore 
and Prime Minister Trudeau give the high' 
est confidence that our relations will continu* 
to be managed in a way that will strengthei 
even further our friendship and cooperation 


Department of State Bulletii' 


irst Progress Report on Cyprus 
ubmitted to the Congress 

tessage From President Ford ' 

'o the Congress of the United States: 

I am submitting, pursuant to Public Law 
4-104, the first of a series of reports on 
fforts this Administration is making to help 
esolve the Cyprus problem. Subsequent 
rogress reports, as required by this legis- 
ition, will be forwarded to you at sixty-day 
In his speech before the U.N. General As- 
smbly on September 25 [22], 1975, the 
ecretary of State outlined the Administra- 
on's policy on the complex Cyprus problem 
s follows: 

The details of a Cyprus settlement are for the two 
immunities themselves to decide. However, in keep- 
ig with U.N. resolutions which the United States 
is fully supported, the following principles are 

A settlement must preserve the independence, sov- 
•eignty, and territorial integrity of Cyprus; 

It must insure that both the Greek-Cypriot and the 
urkish-Cypriot communities can live in freedom and 
ave a large voice in their own affairs; 

The present dividing lines cannot be permanent, 
here must be agreed territorial arrangements which 
iflect the economic requirements of the Greek-Cypriot 
)mmunity and take account of its self-respect; 

There must be provisions for the withdrawal of 
)reign military forces other than those present 
nder the authority of international agreements; and, 

There must be security for all Cypriots; the needs 
nd wishes of the refugees who have been the princi- 
al victims and whose tragic plight touches us all 
lust be dealt with speedily and with compassion. 

These elements, which we consider essen- 
ial to a settlement, are consistent with the 
spirations of the overwhelming majority 

'Transmitted on Dec. 8 (text from White House 
ress release). 

of the people of Cyprus. Beyond that, only 
the Cypriot people can decide how to rebuild 
and preserve their sovereign, independent 
nation so it may again serve the interests of 
all its citizens. 

With this appreciation of both the oppor- 
tunities and limitations of U.S. action, I 
declared immediately following enactment 
of P.L. 94-104 on October 6 that the United 
States would make a major effort to en- 
courage a resumption of the Cyprus negotia- 
tions and to facilitate progress by all the 
parties involved — Greece, Turkey and Cy- 
prus — toward a peaceful and equitable solu- 
tion. I also stated that the United States 
would undertake whatever role the parties 
themselves wanted us to play in achieving 
a settlement. 

Immediately thereafter, we took a number 
of steps through diplomatic channels aimed 
at helping the parties find a basis for re- 
suming the intercommunal talks under the 
aegis of U.N. Secretary General Waldheim. 
As a first step, I wrote directly to the Prime 
Ministers of Greece and Turkey to stress the 
importance the United States attaches to 
the resumption of the intercommunal Cyprus 
talks and to emphasize our wish that the 
Cyprus problem be removed as a source of 
instability in the Eastern Mediterranean. My 
letters were followed by a series of commu- 
nications from Secretary Kissinger to the 
Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey and 
to President Makarios of Cyprus. In each of 
these communications, an effort was made 
to define the differences as we saw them be- 
tween the negotiating positions of the other 
parties and to urge that an effort be made 
to narrow the gap. 

The Secretary of State, during the past 
sixty days, also has consulted extensively 
with several of our major European allies 
who have engaged in corresponding and 
complementary initiatives with the Greek, 

anuary 12, 1976 


Turkish and Cypriot governments. Parallel 
initiatives also were undertaken during this 
period by the European Community. 

These initiatives have not produced a 
major breakthrough ; but taken together 
they have advanced prospects for a nego- 
tiated settlement. A new appreciation now 
exists in Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia that 
delay in resuming the intercommunal talks 
will harden attitudes and make future prog- 
ress more difficult. In each capital, there is a 
desire to begin anew an earnest search for 
a solution. Each party also has a realistic 
understanding of what it must do to make 
progress possible. 

In Ankara, the Turkish Foreign Minister 
announced on October 21, shortly after the 
Turkish senatorial elections, that the time 
was opportune to search for a solution and 
that all aspects for a settlement could be 
discussed at the intercommunal talks. Tur- 
key has also indicated that it would encour- 
age the Turkish Cypriots to engage in mean- 
ingful negotiations within the intercom- 
munal framework. There is also a recogni- 
tion in Ankara that a discussion of their 
position on territory is essential once the 
intercommunal talks have been resumed and 
that troop reductions as well as steps to re- 
solve the refugee issue are essential in- 
gredients to any Cyprus settlement. 

Similar meaningful changes have occurred 
in the Greek and Greek-Cypriot negotiating 
positions with respect to such subjects as 
the organization of the future central gov- 
ernment and the division of responsibilities 
and delegation of authority to the future re- 
gional administrations. 

In sum, we have seen, as have our princi- 
pal Western allies, a narrowing of differences 
on most of the key issues necessary to nego- 
tiate a Cyprus solution. The range of dis- 
agreement between the parties now seems to 
us surmountable. Under such circumstances, 
it should have been possible in November to 
bring the parties back to the negotiating 
table. Howevei-, once a date had been sched- 
uled in New York for the Cyprus debate at 
the U.N. General Assembly, the parties felt 


compelled to await the outcome before sit 
ting down with the U.N. Secretary Genera 
to resume actual negotiations. 

Now that the United Nations has com 
pleted its consideration of the Cyprus ques 
tion and passed a new resolution calling fc 
intercommunal negotiations, efforts t( 
schedule new talks are underway. We havi 
consulted U.N. Secretary General Waldhein 
and the Governments of Greece, Turkey, an( 
Cyprus. Our common interest is to have re 
newed negotiations of sufficient depth an( 
duration to allow full discussion of all ke; 
substantive issues. There is every reason t 
believe this kind of negotiation will begii 
in the very near future. To facilitate thi 
effort, I have asked the Secretary of Stat 
to give special emphasis to the subject o 
Cyprus negotiations when he meets witl 
the Turkish and Greek Foreign Minister 
during the NATO Ministerial meeting i 
Brussels in the second week of December. 

We now find ourselves at an importar 
juncture in the search for a Cyprus settk 
ment. The negotiating framework which ha 
emerged finally should allow early and oi 
derly discussion of the most serious sul 
stantive issues, including refugees whic 
hold the key to a final settlement. We hav 
succeeded in moving to this point in larg 
part because, since early October, the Unite 
States has been free to resume an activi 
evenhanded role among all the parties. Th 
outcome of the resumed Cyprus negotii 
tions may depend upon our ability to mair 
tain this role in the months ahead. 

An important beginning has been mad 
in the past sixty days toward the elusiv 
goal of a peaceful, equitable, and endurin 
Cyprus solution. In the days ahead, I believ 
our efforts will bring results if we continu 
to have the support and understanding c 
the Congress. I intend to review with you i 
subsequent reports the progress that ha 
been made in the common quest to restor 
peace and stability to the island of Cyprui 

Gerald R. Ford. 
The White House, December 8, 1975. 


Department of State Bulleti 


'resident ReafRrms Recommendations 

'or Assistance to Greece 

Following is the text of identical letters 
lated December 8 from President Ford to 

• Speaker of the House Carl Albert, Chairman 
1/ the Senate Committee on Appropriations 
'ohn L. McClellan, and Chairman of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations John 

Weekly Compilation ol Presidential Documents dated December lo 

Pursuant to Section 2(b)(2) of P.L. 94- 
04, I am pleased to submit to the Congress 
ay recommendations for economic and mili- 
ary assistance to Greece for fiscal year 

The bonds between the United States and 
Ireece have historically been close and deep, 
toth countries were linked together as allies 
1 World World II. They later cooperated in 
efeating the communist guerrilla movement 
1 Greece in the late 1940's. Subsequently, 
ireece sent a military force to Korea to 
ssist the United Nations' effort against the 
ommunist aggression. In 1952, Greece 

; 3ined NATO. The bonds between our two 
ations are not only political, but ethical and 

, ultural as well. The peoples of Greece and 
Ke United States cherish a common heritage 
nd a common belief in freedom and human 

i: ignity. 

' My Administration has worked with the 
ew Greek Government in this spirit of 

I i riendship and alliance to identify areas in 
'hich we might be of assistance and, there- 
y, advance our common interests. Following 

ir onsultations with the Greek Government, 
'e began consideration of a program aimed 
t assisting Greece economically. We sup- 
orted increased financial assistance for 
Greece at the International Monetary Fund 
nd World Bank. For fiscal year 1975, we 
Iso raised the level of military credit as- 
istance to Greece from $71 million to $86 
lillion. In addition, to increase the amount 
f Export-Import Bank lending to Greece, 

* he Bank Chairman visited Athens last 
; pring to discuss with Greek businessmen 


anuary 12, 1976 

and officials ways in which Greece could take 
better advantage of the Bank's programs. 
This visit was followed by a further Export- 
Import Bank mission in November. 

The Greek Government itself has moved 
vigorously to confront its most serious prob- 
lems. It has dramatically reduced the level 
of inflation. It has reversed the decline in 
its Gross National Product. In addition, it 
has moved to restore public confidence in the 
military establishment as a non-political 
force capable of defending Greece's security 

At the same time, the government in 
Athens has made clear to this Administra- 
tion its need for increased levels of assist- 
ance for the current fiscal year. Based on 
that request and in keeping with the spirit 
of Congressional debate preceding passage 
of P.L. 94-104, I sent an expert team to 
Athens from the Department of State and 
the Agency for International Development 
in October to consult with senior Greek offi- 
cials on that Nation's most urgent needs for 
economic and military assistance. 

The team of experts concluded that 
Greece, faced with continued domestic eco- 
nomic difliiculties and a need to modernize 
its military establishment, merited increased 
U.S. support for fiscal year 1976. Based on 
Greek requests and the findings of our own 
experts, I submitted to the Congress on 
October 30, 1975, a request for fiscal year 
1976 for $50 million in grant military aid, 
$90 million in FMS credit and $65 million as 
a supporting assistance loan. This latter loan 
is designed specifically to ease Greece's 
temporary balance of payment diflSculties. 

This package of assistance is justified on 
three grounds. First, it will help strengthen 
the foundation of representative democracy 
in Greece. Second, it will demonstrate our 
interest in modernizing and improving the 
Greek armed forces, and will be consistent 
with our stated desire that Greece return at 
an early date to a full participation within 
the NATO Alliance. Finally, it will assist the 
Greek Government and the Greek people in 
a moment of critical economic need. 


Based on my review of Greece's need as 
well as our overall budgetary situation, I 
have concluded that my proposals of October 
30 are appropriate for this fiscal year. I 
strongly urge the Congress to give them 
early and favorable consideration. 

Gerald R. Ford. 

President Ford Reports to Congress 
on Turkish Opium Poppy Control 

Following is the text of identical letters 
dated December 8 from President Ford to 
Speaker of the House Carl Albert, Chairman 
of the Senate Committee on Appropriations 
John L. McClellan, and Chairman of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations John 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated December IS 

Pursuant to Public Law 94-104, discussions 
have been held with the Government of Tur- 
key on effective means of preventing diver- 
sion of the Turkish opium poppy crop into 
illicit channels. These discussions continue 
long-standing consultations between the Gov- 
ernments of the United States and the Re- 
public of Turkey on suppression of the illegal 
intei-national traffic in narcotics. 

The Government of Turkey is aware of our 
concern and that of other nations of the 
world regarding the terrible plight of drug 
abuse. This concern has been made known to 
successive Governments of Turkey by this 
and previous Administrations, by many other 
governments, and by the United Nations. 

I have been encouraged by reports from 
our Embassy in Ankara, from the Drug En- 
forcement Administration and from the 
United Nations, indicating the Government 
of Turkey's efforts to keep poppy cultivation 
under effective control thus far have been 
successful. I have received no evidence to 
date that there has been any illicit diversion 
of the current Turkish crop. 

When Turkey permitted the resumption of 
poppy cultivation in 1974, the production of 
opium gum was forbidden and the poppy 

straw harvesting process was adopted in 
stead. At the same time, Turkey imple 
mented stringent inspections and controls o 
the poppy crop. The poppy straw procesi 
makes control of the crop much easier. I 
has been used successfully in several coun 
tries to facilitate efforts to prevent illici 
diversion from legal opium poppy growinj 
areas. Turkey has reissued the same contrc 
decree to cover next year's crop. We expec 
the controls to be as effective as before, be 
cause of the introduction of more moder 
communications and surveillance equipmen 
and more experience in administering th 

The United Nations Fund for Drug Abus 
Control has provided Turkey with technics 
assistance in meeting the requirements c 
the poppy straw process. I believe the Unite 
States should continue to support the goo 
work of the United Nations Fund for Dru 
Abuse Control in its assistance to Turke 
and other countries in combating the divei 
sion of legally produced opiates from legit 
mate pharmaceutical uses. 

I also share the views of the majority i 
the Congress that close bilateral cooperatic 
with Turkey is essential to prevent illicit d 
version of poppy crops. In July of this yej 
at our meeting in Helsinki, I discussed wit 
Prime Minister Demirel my continuing de« 
concern about the ravages of drug abuse ar 
the need to suppress diversion of opiates in1 
illicit channels. Prime Minister Demir 
strongly concurred in my views and aflfirme 
his personal commitment to the preventic 
of illicit diversion of opiates from his coui 

On October 29, following enactment ( 
Public Law 94-104, I sent a letter to t\ 
Prime Minister of Turkey urging that a 
ready existing discussions between our tw 
governments on opium poppy controls be ii 
tensified in the period ahead. On Novembf 
28, Prime Minister Demirel sent me a ver 
positive response confirming his earlier a. 
surance that he fully supports continuiii 
effective poppy controls and maintaining 
dialogue between the two governments c 
this vital subject. 

Since the passage of Public Law 94-10 


Department of State Bullet 

discussion and meetings on poppy controls 
have been held with Turkish Government 
officials at many levels. Ambassador Macom- 
ber has reviewed the issue with the Turkish 
Prime Minister. Additionally, the Deputy 
Chief of Mission and the Embassy Narcotics 
Control Coordinator have met with the Turk- 
ish Foreign Ministry's Director of Narcotics 
Control Affairs. The U.S. AID poppy special- 
ist in Ankara has held consultations with 
Turkish Soils Product Office and Agriculture 
Ministry officials in Ankara, Izmir, and in the 
poppy growing areas. In addition, the Re- 
gional Director of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration in Ankara has been in con- 
tinuing contact with high Turkish law en- 
forcement officials. Our Ambassador and his 
staff will continue these meetings and dis- 
cussions on poppy controls. 

I believe the desire of the Congress that 
meaningful discussions be conducted with 
the Government of Turkey on insuring con- 
tinued effective poppy controls have been 
met by the actions described above. 

Gerald R. Ford. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

'4th Congress, 1st Session 

[nternational Development and Food Assistance Act 
of 1975. Report of the Senate Committee on For- 
eign Relations, together with supplemental views, 
to accompany H.R. 9005; S. Kept. 94-406; October 
1, 1975; 80 pp. Report of the Senate Committee on 
Agriculture and Forestry to accompany H.R. 9005; 
S. Rept. 94-434; October 28, 1975; 90 pp. 

Vlilitary Construction Appropriation Bill, 1976. Re- 
port of the House Committee on Appropriations, 
together with separate views, to accompany H.R. 
10029. H. Rept. 94-530. October 3, 1975. 67 pp. 

Protecting the Ability of the United States To Trade 
Abroad. Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
International Trade of the Senate Committee on 
Finance. October 6, 1975. 71 pp. 

Peace Corps Authorization for Fiscal Year 1976 and 
the Transition Quarter. Report of the Senate Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations to accompany H.R. 
6334. S. Rept. 94-412. October 7, 1975. 10 pp. 

Magnuson Fisheries Management and Conservation 

1 Act. Report of the Senate Committee on Commerce 

I to accompany S. 961. S. Rept. 94-416. October 7, 
1975. 66 pp. 


jJanuary 12, 1976 

U.S. Gives Views on Cyprus 
in General Assembly Debate 

Follotving are statements made in plenary 
session of the U.N. General Assembly by 
U.S. Representative W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., 
on November lA and by U.S. Representative 
Albert W. Sherer, Jr., on November 20, to- 
gether with the text of a resolution adopted 
by the Assembly on November 20. 


USUN press release 147 dated November 14 

The events of the year since the General 
Assembly last debated the question of Cy- 
prus have much to tell us of the stubborn 
complexities of this issue as they have been 
measured against the capabilities of our 
organization. The parties to the Cyprus 
question are deeply and sincerely committed. 
They remain deeply and sincerely divided as 
well, despite the persistent and dedicated 
efforts of this organization. The past year 
has witnessed acts of understanding, hope, 
and statesmanship. It has also witnessed 
acts of prejudice, of fear, and of recalcitrance. 

The United States remains committed to 
intercommunal negotiations under Resolu- 
tion 3212 as by far the best method for 
reaching a settlement which will be perma- 
nently acceptable to both communities on 
Cyprus. It is important, as we see it, that 
both communities exercise the flexibility and 
statesmanship necessary to resume these 
negotiations at the earliest possible moment. 
We recognize the difficulties which all parties 
have encountered in the past in participat- 
ing, and in making progress, in these talks. 
Some of these difficulties have now been 
overcome. As to the other difficulties, we 
emphasize that the parties have an obliga- 
tion to set them aside and proceed with seri- 


ous negotiations. This is an obligation of the 
parties both to each other and to the inter- 
national community which has devoted the 
time, resources, and manpower of this or- 
ganization to assisting them. 

The United States admires and appreci- 
ates the patience, persistence, and skill 
which the Secretary General and his per- 
sonal representatives on Cyprus have exer- 
cised in their work with all the parties in 
furtherance of the intercommunal talks. We 
also salute the gallantry, devotion, and imag- 
inative use of resources shown by Com- 
mander Prem Chand and the men of UNFI- 
CYP [United Nations Peacekeeping Force in 
Cyprus] in their dedicated service to the re- 
duction of tension and the support of hu- 
manitarian activities in this difficult year on 

Mr. President, the United States hopes 
and will do its full share to insure that this 
debate and its outcome bring home to all the 
parties concerned their obligation — calmly, 
constructively, but unmistakably. The re- 
sponsibility which these U.N. members have 
under the charter for the peaceful settle- 
ment of disputes has in this case been made 
more specific and more demanding by the 
continuing efforts of the United Nations and 
particularly of the Secretary General. The 
United States looks foi-ward to supporting 
what we hope will be a unanimous resolu- 
tion of this Assembly asserting its convic- 
tion that the intercommunal talks must re- 
convene at once and must move promptly 
toward the settlement for which all the 
suffering people of Cyprus and we here have 
waited long enough. 


USUN press release 155 dated November 20 

The United States greatly regrets that 
the Assembly was unable to write a resolu- 
tion on Cyprus acceptable to all the parties 
concerned. We believe that such a resolution 
would have provided an appropriate basis 
for the negotiation of a Cyprus settlement. 
Since no resolution was acceptable to all of 

the parties, we abstained on draft resolution 

However, we note that the resolution 
adopted today refers to General Assembly 
Resolution 3212. Under that resolution, and 
under Security Council Resolutions 370 and 
367, the Secretary General retains a clear 
mandate from both bodies to continue his 
mission of good offices to the parties and 
particularly to encourage them to proceed 
with the intercommunal talks. 

We sincerely hope, and urge, that the 
representatives of the two communities will 
cooperate fully and effectively with the Sec- 
retary General in achieving progress toward 
a just settlement of the Cyprus issue. Such 
a settlement has been asked for by the 
United Nations, is ardently desired by the 
American people, and has been awaited all 
too long by the people of Cyprus. 


The General Assembly, 

Having considered the question of Cyprus, 

Having heard the statements in the debate and 
taking note of the report of the Special Political 

Noting with concern that four rounds of talks 
between the representatives of the two communities 
in pursuance of Security Council resolution 367 
(1975) of 12 March 1975 have not yet led to a 
mutually acceptable settlement, 

Deeply concerned at the continuation of the crisis 
in Cyprus, 

Mindful of the need to solve the Cyprus crisis 
without further delay by peaceful means in accord- 
ance with the purposes and principles of the United 

1. Reaffirms the urgent need for continued efforts 
for the effective implementation in all its parts of 
General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) of 1 No- 
vember 1974 endorsed by the Security Council in its 
resolution 365 (1974) of 13 December 1974 and, to 
that end; 

2. Calls once again upon all States to respect the 
sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and 
non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and to 
refrain from all acts and interventions directed 
against it; 

'U.N. doc. A/RES/3395 (XXX) (A/L.775); 
adopted by the Assembly on Nov. 20 by a vote of 117 
to 1 (Turkey), with 9 abstentions (U.S.). 

"U.N. doc. A/10352. [Footnote in original.] 


Department of State Bulletin 

[2 3. Demands the withdrawal without further delay 
of all foreign armed forces and foreign military pres- 
ence and personnel from the Republic of Cyprus, 
and the cessation of all foreign interference in its 

4. Calls upon the parties concerned to undertake 
urgent measures to facilitate the voluntary return 
of all refugees to their homes in safety and to settle 
all other aspects of the refugee problem; 

5. Calls for the immediate resumption in a mean- 
ingful and constructive manner of the negotiations 
between the representatives of the two communities, 
under the auspices of the Secretary-General, to be 
conducted freely on an equal footing with a view to 
reaching a mutually acceptable agreement based on 
their fundamental and legitimate rights; 

6. Urges all parties to refrain from unilateral 
actions in contravention of resolution 3212 (XXIX), 
including changes in the demographic structure of 

7. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his 
role in the negotiations between the representatives 
of the two communities; 

8. Also requests the Secretary-General to bring 
the present resolution to the attention of the Secu- 
rity Council and to report on its implementation as 
soon as appropriate and not later than 31 March 

9. Calls tipon all parties to continue to co-operate 
fully with the United Nations Peace-keeping Force 
in Cyprus; 

10. Decides to remain seized of this question. 


U.S. Supports Continuation 
of U.N. Force in Cyprus 

f! Folloiving is a statement made in the U.N. 
Security Council by U.S. Representative 
Albert W. Sherer, Jr., on December 13, to- 
gether tvith the text of a resolution adopted 
by the Council that day. 



USUN press release 186 dated December 13 

In the consultations which have preceded 
this meeting, the United States has stressed 
two views. 

First, we agree with the Secretary-Gen- 
eral that the renewal of UNFICYP [U.N. 
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus] is essential. 
UNFICYP remains a vital factor in the 
preservation of stability on the island. With- 

January 12, 1976 

out stability the direct negotiations between 
the parties, which we consider indispensable, 
cannot be expected to progress. 

Secondly, we recognize that the agreement 
of the concerned parties to the resolution by 
which UNFICYP is renewed is important 
both to those negotiations and to the con- 
tinuance of UNFICYP's effectiveness. 

We are accordingly particularly pleased 
that in the course of the long and skillful 
consultations conducted by the Security 
Council President and the Secretary Gen- 
eral, the parties most directly concerned, 
whatever their difficulties, have accepted the 
resolution which we have just adopted. We 
urge that this spirit be continued and that 
the parties will not only provide effective 
cooperation with UNFICYP in Cyprus but 
also will contribute to the speedy resumption 
and progress of the intercommunal negotia- 

We have had occasion to remark here be- 
fore that the question of Cyprus is one 
which has placed particularly great demands 
upon the time and resources of the United 
Nations. The arduous consultations which 
have preceded this meeting have now given 
the members of this Council a direct expe- 
rience of the nature of the extended efforts 
which the Secretary General has repeatedly 
made to further understanding and negotia- 
tions among the parties. 

Speaking from our own experience, I 
would like to say once again that the United 
States deeply appreciates the skillful and 
painstaking thought and action which the 
Secretary General has given to this issue. Ho 
has our full support for the further actions 
which he has informed the Council that he 
intends to take. 

In this connection, I wish also to reaffirm 
the respect and admiration which my gov- 
ernment feels for the dedication and gal- 
lantry of the commander and men of UNFI- 
CYP. As the Secretary General's report 
m.akes unmistakably clear, the operations of 
the Force in all parts of Cyprus have again 
done honor to the high tradition and stand- 
ing of U.N. peacekeeping. 

We leave this debate with a renewed sense 
that the unstinted response which so many 


in the United Nations have made to the re- 
quirements of the Cyprus problem now 
places a compelling obligation on members — 
and most especially upon the immediate 
parties — to progress rapidly toward its solu- 
tion. On this matter, our organization has 
done everything, and more, that could rea- 
sonably be asked of it. Those who have so 
benefited by its work can now fairly be 
asked to repay its efforts with their own. 


The Security Cou7icil, 

Noting from the report of the Secretary-General 
of 8 December 1975 (S/11900 and Add.l) that in 
existing circumstances the presence of the United 
Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed 
not only to maintain the cease-fire but also to facili- 
tate the continued search for a peaceful settlement, 

Noting from the report the conditions prevailing 
in the island, 

Noting further that, in paragraph 68 of his report, 
the Secretary-General has expressed the view that 
in the present circumstances the best available means 
of making progress towards a settlement is through 
continued talks between the representatives of the 
two communities and that such talks can only be 
fruitful if the interlocutors are ready and authorized 
to engage in meaningful negotiations on all essential 
aspects of a settlement of the Cyprus problem, 

Noting also the concurrence of the parties con- 
cerned in the recommendation by the Secretary- 
General that the Security Council extend the station- 
ing of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in 
Cyprus for a further period of six months. 

Noting that the Government of Cyprus has agreed 
that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island 
it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 
15 December 1975, 

Noting that General Assembly resolution 3395 
(XXX) of 20 November 1975 reaffirmed the urgent 
need for continued efforts for the effective imple- 
mentation in all its parts of General Assembly 
resolution 3212 (XXIX) of 1 November 1974 which 
was endorsed by the Security Council in its resolu- 
tion 365 (1974) of 13 December 1974, 

1. Reaffirins the provisions of resolution 186 
(1964) of 4 March 1964, as well as subsequent reso- 
lutions and decisions on the establishment and 
maintenance of the United Nations Peace-keeping 

Force in Cyprus and on other aspects of the situation | 
in Cyprus; 

2. Reaffirms its resolutions 365 (1974) of 13 
December 1974 and 367 (1975) of 12 iVIarch 1975 
and calls for their urgent and effective implementa- 

3. Urges the parties concerned to act with the ut- 
most restraint and to continue and accelerate deter- 
mined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives 
of the Security Council; 

4. Extends once more the stationing in Cyprus of 
the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, established 
under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a 
further period ending 15 June 1976 in the expectation 
that by then sufficient progress towards a final solu- 
tion will make possible a withdrawal or substantial | 
reduction of the Force; i 

5. Appeals again to all parties concerned to ex- 
tend their full co-operation to the United Nation^ 
Peace-keeping Force in its continuing performance of 
its duties; 

6. Requests the Secretary-General to continue the 
mission of good offices entrusted to him by paragrapli 
6 of resolution 367 (1975), to keep the Security 
Council informed of the progress made and to submit j 
a report not later than 31 March 1976. I 


•U.N. doc. S/RES/383 (1975); adopted by the 
Council on Dec. 13 by a vote of 14-0, with the Peo- 
ple's Republic of China not participating in the vote. 

United States and Poland Sign 
New Fisheries Agreement 

Pie^s release 613 (Corr.) dated December 16 

The United States and Poland signed on 
December 16 in Washington a new fisheries 
agreement concerning Polish fishing off the 
Pacific coast of the United States. 

The new agreement is the first bilateral 
transition agi'eement in implementation of 
the new U.S. fisheries initiative. The U.S. 
fisheries initiative was announced by Secre- 
tary Kissinger in a speech to the American 
Bar Association Convention in Montreal, ' 
Canada, last August. The Secretary described 
proposals in Congress to establish a 200-mile 
fishing zone by unilateral action as "ex- I 
tremely dangerous" and incompatible with I 
efforts to solve fisheries problems in the i 
Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea. 


Department of State Bulletin 

To conserve the fish and protect our fishing indus- 

<y while the treaty is being negotiated (Secretary 
Kissinger said) the United States will negotiate 
ii terim arrangements with other nations to conserve 
'.te fish stocks, to insure effective enforcement, and 

l| protect the livelihood of our coastal fishermen. 

'lese agreements will be a transition to the eventual 

:0-mile zone. 

The first step in the new initiative was suc- 
I'ssfully completed at the meeting of the 
jiternational Commission for the Northwest 
.tlantic Fisheries in October. Among other 
lings, member countries (other than the 
Inited States) that fish off the U.S. Atlantic 
(ast agreed to reduce their catch in 1976 
1' 34 percent over 1975. In succeeding nego- 
litions, the United States will continue to 
jirsue the objectives and principles of the 
Iheries initiative. 

The agreement with Poland includes, for 
1e first time, principles that will govern 
iture fishing off the Pacific coast of the 
hited States by Pohsh fishermen. These 
linciples are based on the consensus emerg- 
i^ from the U.N. Conference on the Law of 

"te Sea concerning legal and jurisdictional 
canges in the regime of fisheries manage- 
unt within 200 miles of coastal countries. 
The new principles are designed to adjust 
fture Polish fishing to the new regime. 
I'land agrees that the United States will 
ctermine the total allowable catch for 
secies off the Pacific coast on the basis of 
te best available scientific evidence. Within 
tis total, which will be set to insure the 
eective conservation of the stocks, Ameri- 
cn fishermen will have a preference to that 

' prt of the total they are able to harvest, 
iiy surplus within the total will be allocated 

■ aiong foreign fishermen. 

In the elaboration of these principles, sub- 

sintial new restrictions and controls affect- 

i? Polish fishing operations in the North 

licific, designed to protect resources off the 

- IS. coast and the special interests of U.S. 
Ihermen, were agreed to by Poland. 
Under terms of the former agreement, 
bland harvested 42,500 metric tons of hake 
(' the U.S. Pacific coast in 1975. Under the 
) w agreement, Poland's hake quota has been 

Ijiduced in 1976 by 39 percent, to 26,000 

nuary 12, 1976 

metric tons. Poland also agreed to reduce its 
fishing effort by a similar percentage in 
terms of numbers of days that its fishing 
and processing vessels will engage in the 
hake fishery. Under this arrangement, Poland 
will move its fleet seaward off the U.S. coast 
when it has reached its hake quota or the 
agreed number of vessel-days, whichever 
occurs first. This measure will serve to pro- 
tect certain important coastal species, such 
as rockfish, which are taken incidentally by 
foreign countries while fishing for hake. 

Even with the new restrictions and con- 
trols in the Polish fishery, the total harvest 
of Pacific hake is, however, in excess of 
maximum sustainable yield level since, in 
addition to Poland, several other foreign 
countries are engaged in the hake fishery. 
Therefore the United States will seek to re- 
duce the catches made by other nations in 
future negotiations to protect the hake stock. 

Poland also agreed to reduce the total 
number of vessels it plans to license for oper- 
ation off the U.S. Pacific coast in 1976 from 
15 to 12 and to reduce the number of fishing 
and processing vessels that will be permitted 
in various areas and times off the U.S. coast 
from 11 to 8. 

A provision in the former agreement pro- 
hibiting fisheries by Poland on Pacific salmon, 
halibut, rockfish, blackcod, flounders and 
soles. Pacific mackerel, shrimp, and conti- 
nental shelf resources was expanded to in- 
clude Pacific herring as well in 1976. 

New area and time restrictions have also 
been incorporated in the new agreement. For 
example, Poland agreed to refrain from fish- 
ing year-round from 38° 30' N. latitude off 
the coast of northern California south to the 
U.S.-Mexico border to help protect rockfish 
and juvenile hake stocks. In the Gulf of 
Alaska, Poland agreed to refrain from fish- 
ing in certain areas and times, similar to 
provisions in the U.S. agreements with Japan 
and the Soviet Union, to protect halibut and 
other groundfish stocks and to reduce fishing 
gear conflicts. 

In addition, Poland agreed to refrain from 
fishing for a nine-month period in a large 
area between 147° W. and 157° W. longitude 


in the vicinity of Kodiak Island, Alaska. 

Other restrictions and measures contained 
in the former agreement, including a volun- 
tary inspection scheme, conciliation of gear 
loss and vessel damage claims, and the op- 
portunity to place U.S. observers aboard 
Polish vessels to collect scientific data, are 
continued in tlie 1976 agreement. 

The new agreement was signed on behalf 
of the United States by Miss Rozanne Ridg- 
way, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans 
and Fisheries Affairs, Department of State, 
who headed the U.S. delegation. The Polish 
Charge d'Affaires a.i., Minister Jozef Wie- 
jacz, signed for the Polish People's Republic. 
The agreement will be effective for one year, 
starting January 1, 1976. 

cations and government documents between state 
Adopted at Paris December 3, 1958. Entered in 
force May 30, 1961; for the United States June 
1968. TIAS 6439. 
Ratification deposited: Belgium, October 22, 197 


Arrangement regarding international trade in te 
tiles, with annexes. Done at Geneva December 2 
1973. Entered into force January 1, 1974, excf] 
for article 2, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, which enten 
into force April 1, 1974. TIAS 7840. 
Acceptance deposited: Portugal for Macao, Decer 
ber 1, 1975. 


Protocol modifying and further extending the whp; 
trade convention (part of the international whe: 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done . 
Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into fon 
June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisioi 
and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions. 
Ratification deposited: Ecuador, December 2 

Current Actions 




Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon- 
treal September 23, 1971. Entered into force Janu- 
ary 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. 
Ratification deposited: Turkey, December 23, 1975. 


Agreement on an international energy program. Done 
at Paris November 18, 1974." 

Notification of consent to be bound deposited: 
Switzerland, November 8, 1975. 


Convention concerning the international exchange of 
publications. Adopted at Paris December 3, 1958. 
Entered into force November 23, 1961; for the 
United States June 9, 1968. TIAS 6438. 
Ratification deposited: Belgium, October 22, 1975. 

Convention concerning the exchange of official publi- 


Understanding concerning principles applying to ce 
tain rocket launches and similar experiments ; 
Cape Perry, Northwest Territories (Operatii 
"Periquito"). Effected by exchange of notes : 
Ottawa November 24 and 25, 1975. Entered in 
force November 25, 1975. 


Memorandum of understanding relating to the pr( 
vision of advisory technical assistance to Iran i 
organizing its civil emergency preparedness capj | 
bility. Signed at Tehran November 22, 1975. Ei 
tered into force November 22, 1975. 


Memorandum of understanding on an interim agree 
ment relating to compensation for the Marcon 
Mining Company, with annex. Signed at Lim 
December 11, 1975. Entered into force Decembe 
11, 1975. 

' Not in force. 


Department of State Bullet 



INDEX January 12, 1976 Vol. LXXIV, No. 1907 

Vmerican Principles. The Common Challenge in 
the Search for an Enduring Peace (Kissinger) 49 

ingola. Secretary Kissinger Attends NATO 
Ministerial Meeting (Kissinger, Bitsios, 
Caglayangil, communique) 51 

.'anada. U.S.-Canada Joint Statement Issued 
at Paris (text) 58 

ommodities. Energy, Raw Materials, and De- 
velopment: The Search for Common Ground 
(Kissinger, text of final communique of Con- 
ference on International Economic Cooper- 
ation) 37 


ongressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

Policy 63 

irst Prigress Report on Cyprus Submitted to 
the Congress (message from President Ford) 59 
resident Ford Reports to Congress on Turkish 
Opium Poppy Control (text of letter) ... 62 
resident Reaffirms Recommendations for As- 
sistance to Greece (text of letter) .... 61 


rst Progress Report on Cyprus Submitted to 
the Congress (message from President Ford) 59 
■cretary Kissinger Attends NATO Ministerial 
Meeting (Kissinger, Bitsios, Caglayangil, 

communique) 51 

S. Gives Views on Cyprus in General Assem- 
bly Debate (Bennett, Sherer, text of reso- 
lution) 63 

S. Supports Continuation of U.N. Force in 
Cyprus (Sherer, text of resolution) ... 65 

!veloping Countries 

lergy. Raw Materials, and Development: The 
Search for Common Ground (Kissinger, text 
Df final communique of Conference on Inter- 
lational Economic Cooperation) 37 

'. onomic Affairs. Energy, Raw Materials, and 
Development: The Search for Common Ground 
(Kissinger, text of final communique of 
Conference on International Economic Co- 
)peration) 37 

"^ lited States and Poland Sign New Fisheries 
Agreement 66 

] ergy. Energy, Raw Materials, and Develop- 
nent: The Search for Common Ground (Kis- 
singer, text of final communique of Confer- 
mce on International Economic Cooperation) 37 

I reign Aid. President Reaffirms Recommenda- 
ions for Assistance to Greece (text of letter) 61 

i rmany. The Common Challenge in the Search 
'or an Enduring Peace (Kissinger) .... 49 


Ijsident Reaffirms Recommendations for As- 
istance to Greece (text of letter) .... 61 

S ;retary Kissinger Attends NATO Ministerial 
Heetmg (Kissinger, Bitsios, Caglayangil, 
ommunique) 51 

Fernational Organizations and Conferences. 

Energy, Raw Materials, and Development: 
The Search for Common Ground (Kissinger, 
ext of final communique of Conference on 
nternational Economic Cooperation) ... 37 

I w of the Sea. United States and Poland Sign 
"few Fisheries Agreement 66 

J Idle East. Secretary Kissinger Attends 
MTO Ministerial Meeting (Kissinger, 
Jitsios, Caglayangil, text of communique) . 51 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Secretary 
Kissinger Attends NATO Ministerial Meet- 
ing (Kissinger, Bitsios, Caglayangil, text of 
communique) 51 

Poland. United States and Poland Sign New 
Fisheries Agreement 66 

Presidential Documents 

First Progress Report on Cyprus Submitted to 
the Congress 59 

President Ford Reports to Congress on Turkish 

Opium Poppy Control (text of letter) ... 62 

President Reaffirms Recommendations for As- 
sistance to Greece (text of letter) .... 61 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 68 

United States and Poland Sign New Fisheries 
Agreement 66 


President Ford Reports to Congress on Turkish 

Opium Poppy Control (text of letter) ... 62 

Secretary Kissinger Attends NATO Ministerial 
Meeting (Kissinger, Bitsios, Caglayangil, 
communique) 51 

U.S.S.R. Secretary Kissinger Attends NATO 
Ministerial Meeting (Kissinger, Bitsios, 
Caglayangil, text of communique) .... 51 

United Nations 

U.S. Gives Views on Cyprus in General Assem- 
bly Debate (Bennett, Sherer, text of reso- 
lution) 63 

U.S. Supports Continuation of U.N. Force in 
Cyprus (Sherer, text of resolution) ... 65 

Name Index 

Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr 63 

Bitsios, Dimitrios 51 

Caglayangil, Ihsan Sabri 51 

Ford, President 59, 61, 62 

Kissinger, Secretary 37, 49, 51 

Sherer, Albert W., Jr 63, 65 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: December 22-28 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Sabject 

*625 12/22 U.S. National Committee for the 
International Radio Consulta- 
tive Committee, Feb. 5. 

*626 12/22 Secretary's Advisory Committee 
on Private International Law 
Study Group on Negotiable In- 
struments, Jan. 23. 

t627 12/23 Kissinger: news conference. 

*628 12/24 Samuel W. Lewis sworn in as 
Assistant Secretary for Inter- 
national Organization Affairs 
(biographic data). 

*Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 


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of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 




Volume LXXIV 

No. 1908 • January 19, 1976 


Statement by Ambassador Moynihan 80 


Statement by Carmen R. Maymi and Text of Resolution 86 



Statement by Deputy Secretary Ingersoll 90 


For index see inside back cover 


Vol. LXXIV, No. 1908 
January 19, 1976 

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ficretary Kissinger's News Conference of December 23 

ii'^s release 627 dated December 23 

\Q. Mr. Secretary, noiv that continued U.S. 
(d to the anti-Soviet factions in Angola 
H'ins doubtful, are there any other ways the 
luited States can bring pressure to bear on 
!(' Soviets to stop supporting the Popular 
iovement [Popular Movement for the Liber- 
,\ion of Angola (MPLA)]? 

Secretary Kissinger: We should not have 

I idea that we can substitute in our bilateral 

, ilations with the Soviet Union for the situ- 

sion on the ground. As far as the situation 

the ground is concerned, the United 

■iates will make every effort with what is 

i the pipeline and what is still available. It 

^ 11 also continue the diplomatic efforts that 

, '3re started prior to the events of last week 

. Jid that have become severely complicated 

the congressional action. If these do not 

ceeed by the time that the Congress re- 

nis, we will go back to the Congress and 

esent the situation as it then exists. 

I I As far as our relations with the Soviet 

' nion are concerned, we consider the actions 

Angola incompatible with a relaxation of 

nsions, and they are certain to affect our 

lationship unless a diplomatic solution is 


Q. Mr. Secretary, do you plan to go to 
(i.^coiv sometime after the first of the year? 

Secretary Kissinger: My present plans are 
ji go to Moscow in the second half of Janu- 
!'y to discuss primarily SALT and other 
jsues, but we will have to see what the 

tuation is in January. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect that visit 
> be complicated by the events in Angola, 
■)ecifically the congressional action on An- 
ola? Will that make it harder? 

anuary 19, 1976 

Secretary Kissinger: The congressional 
action on Angola makes the situation in 
Angola much more difficult. As a result, it 
will also hurt our negotiating position with 
the Soviet Union. We will have to make a 
judgment later on, when the diplomatic 
moves that are now in progress will have 
had an opportunity to play themselves out, 
just how serious the effect will have been. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it true, as published 
this morning, that the CIA has found that 
Israel's request for American aid has been 
greatly inflated and that, should it receive 
the $2.3 billion requested in U.S. assistance, 
it would have a budget surplus of $500 mil- 
lion ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, I don't 
know who is on the distribution list for 
what reports. I don't know whether I am on 
all the distribution lists that some of the 
press people are. 

The reports that I am familiar with and 
the studies that I have seen indicate that, 
even at the level of $2.3 billion that we have 
requested, Israel will have to engage in an 
austerity program in order to make ends 
meet. And our figure was based on an inter- 
departmental study which came to the con- 
clusion that the figure that we requested 
from the Congress enables Israel to meet 
its needs on an austerity basis. We have 
never heard of a figure that enables Israel 
to achieve a surplus. And of course we would 
not support that. But we have no evidence 
whatever for that. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you say you con- 
sider the Soviet actions in Angola incompati- 
ble with detente, what does that mean? What 
is the "or else," and how incompatible? 


Secretary Kissinger: Let us make a few 
observations here about detente. And let us 
separate two things: The relationship with 
the Soviet Union that is inherent in the rela- 
tion of two superpowers and, secondly, those 
relations that are subject to decisions and 
that we can regulate in terms of Soviet be- 

The basic problem in our relations with 
the Soviet Union is the emergence of the 
Soviet Union into true superpower status. 
That fact has become evident only in the 
1970's. As late as the Cuban missile crisis, 
the disparity in strategic power between the 
United States and the Soviet Union was 
overwhelming in our favor. In the seventies 
and eighties the Soviet Union will have 
achieved, and is on the road to achieving, 
effective strategic equality, which means 
that whoever may be ahead in the damage 
they can inflict on the other, the damage to 
the other in a general nuclear war will be 
of a catastrophic nature. 

This being the case — in the past the emer- 
gence of a country into superpower status, 
such as, for example, imperial Germany vis- 
a-vis Great Britain, has generally led to war. 
Under the conditions of the nuclear age, it 
must not lead to war. That is a fact of the 
period that any Administration, and any 
opponent of the Administration, would have 
to face if they had to assume responsibility. 
How to manage the emergence of Soviet 
power without sacrificing vital interests is 
the preeminent problem of our period. That 
part of the Soviet-American relationship 
cannot be abolished. That is inherent in the 

The second problem we have is whether 
we can accelerate this process of moderating 
this potential conflict by conscious acts of 
policy. This has been called detente. In this 
respect, it requires conscious restraint by 
both sides. If one side does not practice re- 
straint, then the situation becomes inher- 
ently tense. We do not confuse the relaxation 
of tensions with permitting the Soviet Union 
to expand its sphere by military means. And 
that is the issue, for example, in Angola. 
The danger to detente that we face now is 
that our domestic disputes are depriving us 

of both the ability to provide incentives fc 
moderation, such as in the restrictions o 
the Trade Act, as well as of the ability 1' 
resist military moves by the Soviet Unioi: 
as in Angola. | 

If the Soviet Union continues action suci 
as Angola we will, without any questio, 
resist. And failure to resist can only let 
other countries to conclude that their situ, 
tion is becoming increasingly precarious- 
because in Angola we are not talking aboi 
American participation ; we are talkii 
about giving military and financial assis 
ance to people who are doing the fightin ■ 
to local people who are doing the fighting, i 

To return to your question, unless tl 
Soviet Union shows restraint in its foreij 
policy actions, the situation in our relatio 
ship is bound to become more tense, ai 
there is no question that the United Stat ' 
will not accept Soviet military expansion 1 
any kind. I 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in a democracy, wh 
there is this kind of conflict between t 
executive branch and the legislative bran 
and the legislative branch is not moving a 
is not responding to your requests and 
your entreaties, how is that eventually 
solved? I mean, you can't act without d 

Secretary Kissinger: It will become : 
solved when the consequences of these ; 
tions become apparent. The danger is t? 
they usually become apparent too late. 

We warned and warned about the imi 
cations of the amendments with respect 
Soviet trade. The end result was that t 
Ti-ade Act could not be implemented, or t 
trade agreement could not be implement 
and the people who were supposed to •■ 
helped were hurt in the sense that Jewi. 
emigration from the Soviet Union fell frd 
38,000 to 10,000. 

We warned and warned about the imj- 
cations of the Turkish aid cutoff, and it i 
now perfectly evident that our relatici 
with Turkey have been damaged beyond a' 
immediate hope of recovei-y, though we hn 
made some progress. 

And we are warning now that what ? 


Department of State Bulled 

appeiiing in Angola has nothing to do with 
le local situation in Angola. We were pre- 
,ared to accept any outcome in Angola before 
lassive arms shipments by the Soviet Union 
ad the introduction of Cuban forces oc- 
♦irred. We are not opposed to the MPLA as 
!ich. We make a distinction between the 
;ictions in Angola and the outside inter- 
■nition. We can live with any of the fac- 
lons in Angola, and we would never have 
jven assistance to any of the other factions 
i other great powers had stayed out of it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, if these congressional 
straints on action in Angola by us, or for 

.iigola, are not removed — and there isn't 

iuj sign that they are going to be — hotv can 
III make your statement stick that the 
nited States will not accept Soviet military 

rpansion of any kind? It ties your hands, 

lies it not? 

Secretary Kissin,ger: It ties our hands, but 
1 is my conviction that if one does not dis- 
( arge one's responsibilities in one place, 
lie will be forced to do so elsewhere under 
lore difficult circumstances. The problem 
'ill not go away. The situation will become 
lore difficult. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, to follow that up, if I 
luld ask a complicated question on that: I 
i ought that one of the lessons of Viet-Nam 

as that the United States is no longer going 
i be the policeman for the world. There are 
■I vital U.S. interests at all in Angola. You 
■ id that publicly. The Russians have a long 
.story of failures in Africa. Why is it neces- 
. ry every time the Russians get involved 
iiy where in the world, even in places where 
.merican interests are not affected, that you 
:el that you are compelled to go confront 
• em? 

And. in connection with that, if you con- 
■der it .so important, ivhy do you do it in a 
iandestine way? Why don't you take it to 

e Congress and say, "This is important; 

e need money for it," and have it debated 
the beginning, instead of having it blow 
a in your face? 

Secretary Kissinger: May I separate out 
)me of the strands of this exposition? 

inuary 19, 1976 

First, the phrase that the United States 
cannot be the world's policeman is one of 
those generalities that needs some refine- 
ment. The fact of the matter is that security 
and progress in most parts of the world de- 
pend on some American commitment. 

Now, with respect to Angola, the issue, I 
repeat, is not whether a pro-Soviet faction 
is becoming dominant in Angola. The U.S. 
policy until well into the summer was to stay 
out of Angola, to let the various factions 
work out their own arrangements between 
themselves. We accepted in Mozambique 
without any difficulty a pro-Marxist faction 
that came to power by indigenous means, or 
perhaps with some minimum outside sup- 
port, in the Frelimo [Front for the Libera- 
tion of Mozambique]. What happened be- 
tween March and the middle of the summer 
was a massive introduction of Soviet mili- 
tary equipment, which was then followed 
by Soviet advisers and large numbers of 
Cuban troops — large at least in relation to 
what it takes in Angola to affect the situa- 

Therefore the issue is not whether the 
country of Angola represents a vital interest 
to the United States. The issue is whether 
the Soviet Union, backed by a Cuban expedi- 
tionary force, can impose on two-thirds of 
the population its own brand of government. 
And the issue is not whether the United 
States should resist it with its own military 
forces. Nobody ever suggested the introduc- 
tion of American military forces. The Presi- 
dent has made it clear that under no circum- 
stances will we introduce American military 
forces. The issue is whether the United 
States will disqualify itself from giving a 
minimal amount of economic and military 
assistance to the two-thirds of the popula- 
tion that is resisting an expeditionary force 
from outside the hemisphere and a massive 
introduction of Soviet military equipment. 

If the United States adopts as a national 
policy that we cannot give even military and 
economic assistance to people who are trying 
to defend themselves without American 
military forces, then we are practically in- 
viting outside forces to participate in every 
situation in which there is a possibility for 


foreign intervention. And we are therefore 
undermining any hope of political and inter- 
national order. 

Now, as far as the Congress is concerned, 
let us keep in mind we are talking about 
trivial sums. We are talking about tens of 
millions of dollars. And there is something 
wrong if one says that, if one approves tens 
of millions of dollars, the next thing you 
know is you will have spent $150 billion and 
have 500,000 troops there. A country must 
know how to make distinctions. We are 
talking about tens of millions of dollars in a 
situation in which our whole strategy was 
to produce a negotiated solution, of which 
the first step was going to be the speech I 
made in Detroit at the end of November. 

We did it in a clandestine way because we 
did not want to have a public confrontation 
if we could avoid it. 

Nor is it correct to say that the Congress 
did not know about it. Congressional com- 
mittees were briefed on 25 separate occa- 
sions about what we were doing in Angola. 
Every stage of additional expenditures was 
put before the six congressional committees 
that have supervisory responsibilities. Some 
of them have designated only two members 
to receive these briefings ; others have desig- 
nated as many as 13 members to receive 
these briefings. But the designation is not 
the Administration's decision ; it is the deci- 
sion of the Congress. But six congressional 
committees were briefed at least 25 times. 
In addition, the two intelligence committees 
were briefed, I believe, a total of four times, 
two each. And I briefed the Church commit- 
tee myself for two and a half hours. 

So we followed the procedures that had 
been established. We were expecting to 
bring this matter to a negotiated solution, 
without a huge controversy, in a reasonably 
brief period of time. 

And again, we should remember that this 
whole controversy is breaking out about 
American equipment asked for by African 
countries to support other Africans, and 
which amounts to some tens of millions of 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I just tvant to check. 
You have left the impression that if the 


Soviets continue in their current support i|! 
Angola, your trip to Moscoiv would he n 
jeonardy later this month, or it might rn\ 
take place. 

Tne second point is, if indeed the Angola, 
situation is really a test between the Sovi^ 
Union and the United States, why not go ij 
the heart of the issue on a question like gra:, 
shipments to the Soviet Union arid thini^ 
like that, in which the Soviet Union has \ 
direct interest and some pressure can ^^ 
brought to bear? j 

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is I 
rather curious method to say "You go aherj 
and take over Angola with 5,000 foreij 1 
troops, but in the meantime we will sta I 
harassing you with some other things." 

We are talking to the Soviet Union with 
the context of our overall relationship, a) 
there is no question that our overall rel | 
tionship will suffer if we do not find an ac ' j 
quate solution to the Angolan proble ' 
Where it will suffer and in what ways, I £ I 
not prepared to say. I have not said that t ' I 
trip to Moscow will be in jeopardy. I sf ' ' 
we will have to look at the situation clof 
to the time of the trip before we can answ 
the question whether it is in jeopardy or n ' 

The question of strategic arms limitatic 
is a matter that is in our mutual inten 
and that should not be lightly discarded. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have often said th 
no policy can he effective without Americ 
public support. Unless you can shoiv soi 
clear and compelling national interest 
volved in Angola, hoiv do you propose 
loin American public support? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think I have sho^ 
— in my view, what I have said here tl 
morning shows — a clear and compelli 
American national interest to do the thin > 
that we had wanted to do, which were mir ' 
expenditures compared to what is involv I 

We are talking about, I repeat, tens 
millions of dollars. We are not talking abc: 
an American expeditionary force. We are i: 
talking about a major American invol'- 

The debate has been misrepresented, ' ( 

Department of State Bulle* I 


Mich American assistance to indigenous 
Irces becomes an American commitment to 
irht a war. That is not the case. 

And therefore, if we do not succeed in 
cnvincing the public or the Congress, then 
V3 will certainly lose. And then the question 
i— then we will certainly lose on this issue, 
iid then we will face the problem that is 
£ivays faced in these cases. Those who are 
tv'ing to resist are doing so because they 
Vint to prevent a worse contingency. If they 
culd prove that worse contingency without 
; y question, everybody would agree with 
tern. A danger avoided can never be demon- 

Therefore, if those of us who hold the 
\2w that I have described here are correct, 
\! will face more serious dislocations and 
cngers further down the road. And when 
te dangers become serious enough, they 
^\l unify the American people and the Con- 
fess and the executive. 

We are trying to avoid that contingency 
iiva arising. If we turn out to be wrong 
I d the Congress is right, I will be delight- 

Q. M?-. Secretary, implicit in all of these 
I estions, though, is the fact that Viet-Nam 
Igayi as a very minor involvement, began 
ith material assistance, not just military 
tsistance. Implicit in all of this is the 
I'der standing that if in fact you are not 
i ccessftd tvith the tens of millions of dol- 
Irs, that the next request then ivill be for 
Indreds of millions of dollars. Hoiv do you 
ispond to that? 

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, the situ- 
;ions in Angola and in Viet-Nam are totally 
In Viet-Nam, we were involved with a 
fate of some size that had fought a civil 
vir for decades and that had shown a sub- 
fan tial ability to conduct its own war 
■ rainst the French and against its own 
)ponents in the country. In Viet-Nam, in 
ct, the analogy, if there is any, is the So- 
et support for Hanoi. And if the Soviet 
inion had taken the position the Senate is 
3w taking vis-a-vis Hanoi, namely, that they 
ould not support them once we got involved, 

then we would certainly have won the war. 

Now, in Angola we are dealing with three 
factions, none of them very large, none of 
them very well organized. Without outside 
support, the war would end on the basis that 
the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
has proposed, through some sort of coalition 
among the local forces. That is all that we 
want. We have no permanent interests in 
Angola and, I repeat again, we have no ob- 
jection to the MPLA as long as it is an 
African organization. 

Now, the only way we would have to come 
back for more and more funds is if the So- 
viet Union decided, on its side, to put hun- 
dreds of millions of dollars into Angola. If 
the Soviet Union were prepared to do this 
in an area 8,000 miles away from its borders 
in which it has no historical interest, if it 
were willing to fight a proxy war with the 
United States that far away from its 
borders, then we better know about it. Then 
we can make all sorts of decisions. 

It was our belief, and it remains our be- 
lief, that this is a situation that can be 
solved by negotiation. And if we have the 
minimum degree of unity in this country 
and the minimum degree of confidence in 
ourselves, it will be resolved. But if a coun- 
try is afraid to spend $10 million lest it 
spend $10 billion, then it is getting itself 
into great difficulties. 

And let us not fool ourselves about what 
happened in Viet-Nam. We did not start in 
Viet-Nam with a few hundred men and wake 
up one morning and have 500,000 troops 
there. Every step in Viet-Nam was a con- 
scious decision that was publicly known and 
to which there was no significant objection 
when there was time to do something about 

There is no possibility that the same 
thing could happen in Angola, when even the 
first step has produced such an intense de- 
bate. And therefore I would warn against 
our putting ourselves — against drawing 
such facile analogies to Viet-Nam. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can we switch to the 
Middle East for a minute and ask you if the 
United States has asked the Rabin [Yitzhak 
Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel] govern- 

anuary 19, 1976 


tnent not to allow further settlements in the 
Golan Heights or, Indeed, if the United 
States has suggested anything in this regard 
to the Rabin government? 

Secretary Kissinger: I do not want to 
comment about Presidential messages. It 
has been our general policy to point out that 
the creation of new settlements on the Golan 
Heights and elsewhere complicates the diplo- 
matic process. And we have from time to 
time brought this to the attention of the 
Israeli Government. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you spoke earlier of the 
emergence in this decade of the Soviet Union 
as a superpower, and you also spoke about 
detente as an effort to modify Soviet be- 
havior by conscious acts of policy. Why are 
you waiting to affect the overall relationship 
of detente through those means by which we 
reinforce the Soviet ability to grow as a 
■superpower — in other ivords through eco- 
nomic and food shipments, in which the So- 
viets can then divert their resources into 
becoming a military superpower? 

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, Ameri- 
can credits to the Soviet Union have been 
minimal and have always been tied to specific 
projects which, in our judgment, did not 
affect the basic Soviet strategic position. 
The major amounts of credits to the Soviet 
Union from the outside world have come 
from the West Europeans and Japan, and 
not from the United States. 

With respect to grain shipments, the sale 
of grain to the Soviet Union does not enable 
them to divert resources. It affects their 
standard of consumption and the happiness 
of the population, but it would not basically 
affect the Soviet strategic position. 

The fact we have to face is that the Soviet 
Union, as a major industrial power, will de- 
velop, inevitably, associated military capa- 
bilities. The Soviet Union has been prepared 
to spend a greater percentage of its gross 
national product for military forces than 
the United States and has therefore been 
able to translate it into stronger forces for 
each new conflict than the United States. 
That is not a result of detente; that is a re- 
sult of domestic priorities in the two coun- 

tries which we have it in our power t 
change and which we should change. 

We have to make a decision whether, witl 
an emerging superpower, we should conduc 
our foreign policy entirely on the basis o 
unbridgeable hostility or whether, througl 
a combination of moderation or creating ir 
centives for moderation, and firmness whe 
challenged, channel the inevitable competi 
tion into a direction which prevents wha 
has generally happened when a new supei 
power emerged — namely, a war. And a wa 
under present circumstances would hav 
catastrophic consequences for all of humai 

Now, this is the problem of detente. An 
I must stress again we are being deprive 
now of both the incentives for moderatio 
and the capacity to resist, and this must lea 
to an extremely dangerous situation. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is Cuba's militay-y intei 
vention in Angola going to result, in yoit 
view, in an indefinite postponement of ov 
normalization of trade and diplomatic reU 
tions ? 

Secretary Kissinger: We will not continu 
the process of normalization until Cuba 
forces return to Cuba. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, how can you say you ai 
going to continue to press for more and fret 
trade and to change the trade reform act i 
get rid of some of the restrictions on trad 
with the Soviets at the same time tve ar 
trying to meet them tvith firmness in Ai 

Secretary Kissinger: We are not likely t 
press for that at this time. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is the confrontation bt 
tween Congress and the Administration o 
Angola crucial enough for you to resig 

Secretary Kissinger: I do not want to giv 
them an incentive for more confrontatioi 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you say anythin 
about those diplomatic moves you were met 
tioning in order to achieve the solution i 
Angola? Can you say what they are? Ar 



Department of State Bulleti 

hcij especially in the direction of the Or- 
tanization of African Unity? 

Secretary Kissinqer: We believe that the 
ippropriate sohition in Angola should be 
;ought by the Organization of African 
Jnity. It should be done on the basis that 
he three factions in Angola should agree 
imong themselves on an appropriate coali- 
ion or anything else that they agree among 
hemselves — that foreign forces, as I said 
he other day, from the Soviet Union, from 
'uba, and from South Africa should be 
vithdrawn from Angola. Under those condi- 
ions, Angola will cease being a significant 
nterest of the United States, and we will 
ooperate with its economic development as 
lart of our overall African policy. 

We have no national objectives in estab- 
shing a pro-American or pro-Western gov- 
rnment in Angola. We want an African 
overnment that is not imposed by anybody 
rom the outside. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the Soviet re- 
ponse when you talk about the need for 
estraint in Angola and suggest that broader 
'etente relations, bilateral relations, may be 
ndangered by this? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we were only 
t the beginning of the diplomatic process 
.'hen we got diverted into congressional 
learings. But so far, obviously, the response 
las not been conclusive. 

Q. Do yon see any sign of moderation, of 
eduction of arms shipments? 

Secretary Kissinger: My view was that a 
olution was achievable in the relatively 
lear future, especially if we could have pur- 
ued it with quiet diplomacy. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, on your basic problem 
lere ivith the Congress and the public, isn't 
t going to be necessary, in order to have a 
yrayer of marshaling any support, for the 
idminist ration to come cleaner ivith the 
niblic than it has about what it is involved 
jW in Angola — the time sequence, exactly 
■vhat it has put in, whether there is any at- 
empt to recruit mercenaries, the numbers 
)/ advisers? You say the Soviet Union is 

^ January 19, 1976 

blocking an attempt at a coalition govern- 
ment. The Soviet Union claims that it is the 
United States that foreclosed an attempt to 
have a coalition government in the earlier 
period of this year. 

Secretary Kissinger: That is untrue. 

Q. Well, the public is really bereft of facts 
on the record here to deal ivith this situation. 
Is it not possible to have some more candor 
about it? You said that the basic situation in 
Viet-Nam tvas open and known. Certainly, 
that cannot be said very clearly here about 

Secretary Kissinger: The situation in An- 
gola, you have to remember, was not a major 
enterprise. The situation in Angola was one 
that was resoluble by diplomatic means. 

It is absolutely untrue that a coalition 
government was offered by the Soviet Union 
earlier this year, or by anybody else earlier 
this year, and rejected by the United States. 
It has been the fixed American policy to 
foster a coalition among the parties. It has 
been the fixed American policy to support 
the OAU in its efforts to bring about con- 
ciliation among the parties. And at no time 
has the United States attempted for any 
particular group to prevail. It was only mas- 
sive Soviet intervention that has prevented 

We had hoped that on the relatively small 
scale that the operation was conducted — 
and with the very extensive congressional 
briefing that was going on — that to escalate 
the problem too much would complicate its 

It is perfectly clear now that, if we go 
back to the Congress for additional support, 
we will have to put the facts in all their 
details before the Congress. 

But I would also point out that there is an 
area in which confidential diplomacy must 
have an opportunity to operate or every 
problem becomes that much more difficult. 

Q. Mr. Secretary — 
Q. Mr. Secretary — 

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Binder [David 
Binder, New York Times] first. 



Q. Mr. Secretary, isn't it a fact that a year 
ago the primary outside forces engaged in 
Angola — that is, the supplies and advisers — 
were China and the Soviet Union and that 
the Chinese withdreiv sometime in the sum- 
mer and that the United States more or less 
filled the gap left by the Chinese? 

Secretary Kissinger: That is, with all re- 
spect, a rather superficial way of putting it. 
Our involvement — and again, I must repeat 
— our involvement is relatively small finan- 
cial support to African countries that have 
asked us to help other Africans. It is not a 
commitment of American forces in Angola. 
Ours occurred when a very substantial influx 
of Soviet forces, extending over many 
months, beyond any capacity of the Chinese 
to match, seemed to create a situation where 
an outside power imposed its solution on the 
country. It was not coordinated with the 
Chinese. It was not discussed with the Chi- 
nese. It was done for our own reasons. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, why do you consistently 
minimize any reference to South Africa's in- 
volvement in your statements on Angola? 
Are you less concerned about South African 
involvement than Soviet involvement? And 
what diplomatic pressures, if any, are you 
taking to get South Africa to ivithdraw? 

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that the re- 
moval of South African forces is a relatively 
simpler matter than the removal of Cuban 
and Soviet forces. And the United States, 
I have stated publicly, and I have repeated 
it today, is in favor of the removal of both 
Cuban and South African forces, and of all 
outside intervention. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any realistic 
hope or expectation of getting money from 
Congress to continue your efforts in Angola; 
and two, if you do not, these dangers that 
you warn of, what practical consequences 
anight there be? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we are going 
to make a major effort, both diplomatically 
and on the ground, to make do with what we 
have, to generate as much support from 

other countries as we can. And we have had 
very positive responses from many African 
countries over the last few days. And we will , 
also make our views known to those coun- 
tries that will attend the OAU summit meet- 
ing on January 10 and 12. So we are not 
operating on the assumption that it must 
necessarily fail. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you can have a diplo- 
matic dialogue with the Soviet Union by 
hinting that detente or SALT or other initi-' 
atives are threatened. But what pressure 
points do you have with the Cubans, who 
have 5,000 or 6,000 expeditionary troops'' 
there ? 

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, let us 
keep in mind one thing: that SALT anc 
what I described as detente is in our com- 
mon interest. It is not a favor we grant t( 
the Soviet Union. It is an inherent necessitj 
of the present period. Avoiding nuclear wai 
is not a favor we do anybody. Avoiding nu 
clear war without giving up any interests i; 
the problem that we face now. 

As far as Cuba is concerned, we have m , 
particular additional pressure points. And oi 
the other hand, we do not believe that Cub; 
would do what it is doing except under So 
viet advice. \ 

President Deplores Senate Cutoff 
of Additional Funds for Angola 

Statement by President Ford^ 

The Senate decision to cut off additiona 
funds for Angola is a deep tragedy for al 
countries whose security depends upon th 
United States. Ultimately, it will profoundl; 
aff'ect the security of our country as well. 

How can the United States, the greates 
power in the world, take the position tha 

' Made to correspondents in the press briefing roor 
at the White House on Dec. 19 (text from Whit 
House press release). 


Department of State Bulletil 


ts Soviet Union can operate with impunity 
nmy thousands of miles away with Cuban 
ti)ops and massive amounts of military 
eaipment, while we refuse any assistance 
t(the majority of the local people, who ask 
oly for military equipment to defend them- 
stves ? 

The issue in Angola is not, never has been, 
ai never will be a question of the use of 
L3- forces. The sole issue is the provision 
o: modest amounts of assistance to oppose 
nflitary intervention by two extraconti- 
aital powers ; namely, the Soviet Union and 

Phis abdication of responsibility by a 
iTJority of the Senate will have the gravest 
c< (sequences for the long-term position of 
tl United States and for international 
oier in general. A great nation cannot es- 
ii<e its responsibilities. Responsibilities 
alindoned today will return as more acute 
cues tomorrow. 

therefore call upon the Senate to reverse 
it position before it adjourns. Failure to do 
3(will, in my judgment, seriously damage 
tl national interest of the United States. 

Pisident Ford's News Conference 
December 20 

''olloiving is an excerpt relating to foreign 
pdcy from the transcript of a neivs confer- 
ee e held by President Ford in the press 
b.efing room at the White House on Decem- 
b, 20} 

}. Mr. President, yesterday you isstied a 
attement about your sentiments on what the 
S'late has done on Angola. 

^resident Ford: I said it fairly strongly. 

). You sure did. After you did it. Dr. Kis- 
^iger said something a little more — even 

For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila- 
ti[ of Presidential Documents dated Dec. 29, 1975, 

stronger over at the State Department 
around five o'clock. He said the responsibil- 
ity for the conduct of foreign policy is not 
altered or affected simply because Congress 
has taken an action. I don't knoiv quite how 
to read that, but I can read that once you 
spend the money that is in the pipeline there 
isn't any more. What is the U.S. policy 
toward Angola going to be, given the fact 
that you are going to run out of money in 
about two months? 

President Ford: Our fundamental purpose 
in Angola was to make sure that the people 
of Angola decide their own fate, establish 
their own government, and proceed as an 
independent nation. We think it is funda- 
mentally very unwise, very harmful, for any 
foreign power, such as the Soviet Union is 
obviously doing and as Cuba is doing, to try 
to dominate any government in that country. 
All we want is for the majority of the people 
in Angola to decide for themselves what 
they want. 

Now, unfortunately because the Soviet 
Union has spent literally millions and mil- 
lions of dollars and unfortunately because 
Cuba has anywheres from 4,000 to 6,000 
combat troops in Angola, we think this is a 
setback for the people in Angola. Now, I 
take this problem very seriously. 

Q. Well, what is to be done with your 
hands tied, so to speak? 

President Ford: Well, the Congress un- 
fortunately has tied our hands, and I think 
it is a serious mistake. I feel very strongly 
that a great country like the United States 
should have flexibility to help those people 
in any one country to decide their own fate. 
And the action of the Congress is crucial in 
that it has deprived us of helping a majority 
of the people in Angola to make their own 

And the problem that I foresee on a 
broader basis is a good many countries 
throughout the world consider the United 
States friendly and helpful, and we have 
over a period of time helped to maintain free 
governments around the world. Those coun- 

Jliuary 19, 1976 


tries that have depended on us — and there 
are many — can't help but have some mis- 
givings because the Congress has refused 
any opportunity for us in Angola to help a 
majority of the people. And they can't help 
but feel that the same fate might occur as 
far as they are concerned in the future. 

I hope the House of Representatives will 
have a different view, and we are certainly 
going to try and get the House of Repre- 
sentatives to reverse the Senate action. 

Q. If not, are we through there? 

President Ford: I never say we are 
through; but the action of the Senate has 
seriously handicapped any effort that we 
could make to achieve a negotiated settle- 
ment so that the people of Angola could have 
a free and independent government. 

Q. Mr. President, on that subject, ivhy did 
we not start earlier in making public our op- 
position to what the Soviet Uyiion was doing 
there and telling this country how much 
money and what effort ive were making 
there, and can you tell us how much money 
we spent there? 

President Ford: I don't think it is wise for 
me to discuss in any detail what we have 
done or contemplated doing. It was a legiti- 
mate covert operation where not one Ameri- 
can military personnel was involved in the 
operation, and we had no intention whatso- 
ever of ever sending any U.S. military per- 
sonnel there. But to discuss any further 
details than that I think, in this case as in 
any other covert action case, the President 
just should not discuss it publicly. 

Q. Mr. President, now that the Soviet 
Union is persisting, despite what the Con- 
gress did on our side, in pouring equipment 
and material into Angola, do you see now the 
possibility that this anight seriously harm 
any chance for a completion of SALT Two? 

President Ford: The persistence of the 
Soviet Union in Angola with a hundred mil- 
lion dollars' or more worth of military aid 

certainly doesn't help the continuation c 

Now I will add another comment. As 
said earlier, there are between 4,000 an 
6,000 Cuban combat military personnel i 
Angola. The action of the Cuban Goveri 
ment in sending combat forces to Ango 
destroys any opportunity for improvemei 
in relations with the United States. Th( 
have made a choice. It, in effect, and I met 
very literally, has precluded any improv 
ment in relations with Cuba. 

Q. Mr. President, do you see any possib.\ 
ity that this matter could be taken to tt\ 
United Nations or worked on from the dipl 
matic standpoint now? 

President Ford: We certainly intended 
try to get diplomatic efforts underway ai 
to help in the diplomatic area, but I thii 
our influence in trying to get a diploma! 
solution is severely undercut by the actL 
of the U.S. Senate. 

Now, there is a meeting in early Janua 
of the Organization of African Uni 
[Unity] — the foreign ministers of that ( 
ganization — they are meeting the first we 
or so in Africa. We hope that they will ta 
some action to let the Angolans themseh 
decide this. In addition, there is a meeti 
later in January of the heads of govei, 
ments of the OAU. That body, of course, i i 
the one that could do the most. And I knt | 
that there are a number of African stai I 
who have apprehension about a forei 
power dominating a country as rich and i 
tentially strong as Angola. And so I c 
assure you to the extent that we can ha; 
any impact in diplomatic areas we are a 
tainly going to maximize our efforts. 

But I repeat that what the Senate ( 
yesterday undercuts very, very seriou! ' 
any impact we can have in the diploma ' 

Q. Mr. President, a couple of months a> 
there were some efforts by the Administ- 
tion to try and warm relations with Cuba- 
Dr. Kissinger made some statements, I i- 


Department of State Build 



mve. It in apparent noiv that at that very 
vne the Cubans had to be gearing up or 
I'eir that theij were probably at least con- 

II ring sending troops to Angola. Did our 
iteUigence pick up this fact, and was there 
(.11 cause and effect? Were we in effect try- 

/ to persuade them not to participate in 
^igola, and were we off'ering friendship to 
tern in return for their not participating? 

President Ford: The sending of military 
[rsonnel by Cuba to Angola is a rather 
i:ent development in any magnitude. The 
sitements made by the Secretary indicat- 
i r that if there was a softening, a change 
c the part of Cuba, it would be reciprocated 
V us, was made before there was any sig- 

kant military involvement by Cuba in 
i >gola. 

[ wanted to be on the record and as force- 
f as I can say. The action of the Cuban 
(vernment in the effort that they made to 
g; Puerto Rico free and clear from the 
I ited States and the action of the Cuban 
(vernment to involve itself in a massive 
nlitary way in Angola with combat troops 
els, as far as I am concerned, any efforts 
a all to have friendlier relations with the 
C vernment of Cuba. 

3. Sir, I don't think you answered my 
Qistion. Can you tell me if the efforts were 
c mected in any ivay with the Cuban efforts? 

^resident Ford: I thought I answered it. 

3. / am sorry. 

3. Mr. President — 

President Ford: To be very specific and 
S)rt, no. 

Death of Generalissimo Franco, 
Chief of State of Spain 

Generalissimo Francisco Franco, Chief of 
State of the Spanish State, died at Madrid 
November 19. Following are statements by 
President Ford and Secretary Kissinger is- 
sued on November 20. 


White House press release dated November 20 

It was with sorrow that I learned of the 
death of Generalissimo Francisco Franco, 
who led his country for almost four decades 
through a significant era in Spanish history. 
With his passing, I express deepest sym- 
pathy to his wife and family on behalf of 
the Government and people of the United 

We wish the Spanish people and the Gov- 
ernment of Spain well in the period ahead. 
The United States, for its part, will continue 
to pursue the policy of friendship and co- 
operation which has formed the touchstone 
for the excellent relations existing between 
our two countries. 


Press release 575 dated November 20 

The death of General Franco ends an era 
in Spanish history. At this solemn moment, 
I offer my sincere condolences to the widow 
and family of the Chief of State, to Prince 
Juan Carlos, and to the Spanish people. 

[nuary 19, 1976 



U.S. Discusses Angola in U.N. General Assembly 

Following is a statement made in plenary 
session of the U.N. General Assembly by 
U.S. Representative Daniel P. Moynihan on 
December 8 during the debate on proposed 
amendments to a resolution recommended by 
the Special Political Committee under agenda 
item 53, Policies of apartheid of the Govern- 
ment of South Africa.^ 

USUN press rebase 180 (corr. 1) dated December 8 

Mr. President, fellow delegates: The Gen- 
eral Assembly of the United Nations is ap- 
proaching another moment of truth, a test 
of our capacity to meet the obligations which 
the Charter of the United Nations imposes 
upon us, reposes in us. And we shall see, 
perhaps before this day is out, whether, 
faced with this moment of truth, the Gen- 
eral Assembly of the United Nations settles 
for a big lie — the big lie that intervention in 
the country of Angola is that of one nation 
only, in the face of the enormous fact that 
this is not true. 

' On Nov. 28 the Assembly had postponed the vote 
on draft resolution F, Situation in South Africa, 
recommended by the Special Political Committee in 
its report on agenda item 53 (U.N. doc. A/10342). 
On Dec. 8 the Representative of Madagascar intro- 
duced amendments (U.N. doc. A/L.784) cosponsored 
by seven African countries to add a preambular para- 
graph referring to "direct intei-vention of South 
African armed forces in Angola" and an operative 
paragraph condemning that intervention. On Dec. 8 
the Representative of Zaire introduced subamend- 
ments (U.N. doc. A/L.786) rewording the preambu- 
lar paragraph to refer to "direct intervention of 
certain foreign Powers, including South Africa, in 
Angola" and the operative paragraph to condemn 
"all foreign intervention in Angola, including the 
intervention of South African armed forces . . . ." 
The amendments and subamendments were with- 
drawn on Dec. 10 and the resolution was adopted by 
a rollcall vote of 101 to 15 (U.S.), with 16 absten- 
tions (A/RES/3411 G (XXX)). 

This moment of truth comes at a partic 
larly poignant time for each of us. We ha^ 
reached a moment long desired, long work( 
for, when one of the great injustices of mo 
ern history was being righted. Step by stf 
and with their own proud cooperation, hono 
able cooperation, the European natioi 
which in the course of the late 18th and thi 
19th, and some earlier, centuries had taki 
over every inch of the African Contine 
save only the ancient kingdom of Ethiopia- 
the European colonizers who had come 
conquer every square foot of Africa sa 
only Ethiopia — have now left Africa. Mc 
have left in good repute and with good a: 
strong and friendly feelings and ties th 
endure with the areas, now nations, whi 
they had come to occupy. And with the c 
parture of Spain from Sahara on the 28 
of February next, there remains but o 
tiny area of European-controlled territo 
in all of the continent. In effect the era 
colonization has ended. The General Assei 
bly has played an honorable and disti 
guished role in bringing about that tern 

But at just the moment when the Eui 
pean colonizers of the 17th and 18th a 
19th centuries have departed — at just th 
moment — a new European colonizing, co 
nial, imperial nation appears on the con 
nent of Africa, armed, aggressive, involv 
in the direct assault upon the lands and t 
people of Africa. The European colon 
power is back, a new colonial power mo 
mighty than any that ever preceded it. ■ 
has come with its arms, with its armies, wi 
its technology, with its ideology; and ) 
colonization of Africa commences, or mo; 
accurately, the effort now to recoloni; 
Africa commences. 


Department of State Bullet' 


The question is whether it will succeed. 
The enormous and critically important ques- 
tion is whether African nations themselves 
vvill allow themselves to be parties to a new 
European conquest. 

Now, Mr. President, we are very much 
iware of the alleged role, as it is asserted 
be, of the nation of South Africa in some of 
he goings-on right now in Angola. We have 
lot seen evidence presented to this Assem- 
)ly, but no doubt it can and will be; other- 
vise we could not imagine there would have 
)een the amendment which we have before 
IS and which we are discussing. We assume 
he sponsors of that amendment will bring 
vidence before us and we can consider it. 
"Ay government will consider it with no 
difficulty whatever, considering its view, 
ifhich is shared by almost all of the mem- 
bers of this Assembly, about the nature of 
he regime in South Africa. 

Our detestation for the abominable prac- 
ice of apartheid does not need to be re- 
tated. I would just call your attention to 
he fact that it is a member of the U.S. 
elegation to this General Assembly who 
his year was denounced by name by the 
'rime Minister of South Africa. Only an 
imerican delegate was denounced by South 
ifrica so far in this Assembly, so far as I 
m aware. There may be others; but there 
5 no question that my good friend, and a 
reat American, Clarence Mitchell was de- 
ounced by name. And there is equally no 
uestion that, accused of having stated un- 
I'uths by the Prime Minister of South Af- 
ica, Mr. Mitchell, a free American in a free 
assembly, came to this podium and in a 
iwyer-like and detailed way spelled out, 
amed names, cited dates and places and 
iws, spelled out our profound disagreement 
.'ith that system, and answered the charge 
hat our disagreement was not based upon 
acts. The facts were presented from this 
orum by an American delegate. 

We are proud of that delegate and proud 
f his presentation, and we are not unaware 
f the fact that it was one of the first occa- 
ions in this General Assembly in which 
uch facts have been brought to this oodium. 

Now, as I say, we have not yet had the 

<anuary 19, 1976 

facts about South African intervention. We 
will welcome such information as it appears 
before the Assembly. 

My purpose, however, is to introduce some 
facts about the whole of the situation. Now, 
it is well known to the members of this As- 
sembly that the Organization of African 
Unity has condemned all intervention in An- 
gola — all intervention. The OAU has done 
this and was right to have done it. The 
United States of America for one has con- 
demned all intervention in Angola, and we 
are happy to join the OAU in that matter. 

Which of the great powers, as they are 
called, of the world has not condemned all 
intervention in Angola? You know very well 
which has not. It is the Soviet Union which 
has not, the European power now engaged 
in colonial expansion in the continent of 

In Pravda, on December 4, a commentary 
by Mr. E. Kapskiy, and the Soviet Deputy 
Permanent Representative Kharlamov's 
statement here on November 26, the Soviet 
Government, far from condemning interven- 
tion, has acknowledged it, saying that it is 
assisting its friends in Angola and saying 
that it would continue to do so. Europeans 
on the continent of Africa with European 
arms, fighting Africans — this is what is 
happening, gentlemen. 

Two African Presidents have spoken of 
illegal Soviet overflights bringing equipment 
over their lands to the area. Angolan free- 
dom fighters have captured some of the in- 
vading force; photographs have appeared in 
the press. No secret. But let me be more 
specific, and let me share with you informa- 
tion which is known to all the world. It 
would be well for me to stand here and re- 
port what American diplomatic or intelli- 
gence services might have gathered as 
information, and many of us here could do 
more, or at least as well ; but that would be 
in the nature of somewhat arcane informa- 

Let me read to you from the front page 
of the New York Times, certainly one of the 
world's great newspapers and, I need hardly 
remind the members of this Assembly, 


hardly a spokesman for the U.S. Govern- 

What is on the front page of today's New 
York Times? The article is headed "Cubans" 
— which are a Western Hemisphere nation, 
of course — "with Soviet Arms" — that's a 
European nation — "Said to Turn Angola 
Tide." I will read to you the report from 
Washington by Mr. David Binder, a distin- 
guished American journalist who has cov- 
ered European affairs as well as American 
affairs. Mr. Binder writes: 

A Cuban expeditionary force equipped with Soviet 
armored vehicles and rocket launchers is turning the 
tide of civil war in favor of the Popular Movement 
for the Liberation of Angola, according to American 

The officials, who are assigned to watching devel- 
opments in Angola, made this estimate on the basis 
of information reaching here through intelligence 
channels as well as from friendly governments. 

They said Cuban infantry and artillery units had 
spearheaded columns of the Popular Movement in 
their advance north of Luanda, the old Portuguese 
colonial capital (you change masters but not capitals, 
is that it?) against the National Front for the Lib- 
eration of Angola. 

The National Front has set up a coalition govern- 
ment in Huambo — formerly Nova Lisboa — with the 
National Union for the Total Independence of An- 
gola. Both the National Union, known as Unita, 
and the National Front have been fighting the 
Soviet-armed and Cuban-aided troops of the Popular 
Movement, which has proclaimed itself sovereign and 
has its capital in Luanda. 

Now, listen to this, fellow delegates: 

The Popular Movement has pushed more than 50 
miles up the coast during the last 10 days . . . cap- 
turing the town of Caxito and moving toward the 
Atlantic port of Ambriz. 

Cuban infantry and artillery units, the American 
officials said, have been responsible for advances in 
the south-central battle area where they are con- 
testing for control of the 896-mile Renguela railroad, 
which links the countries of Zaire and Zambia to 
the large Angolan harbor of Lobito. 

Understand that the two nations, Zambia 
and Zaire, will find if this movement is suc- 
cessful that their port of exports for their 
products and imports or other matters is 
controlled by the new colonial power. 

In that area, the Popular Movement's forces, 
stiffened by the Cubans, have been fighting sizable 
numbers of men of the National Union, who are said 

here to be supplemented by soldiers from South 

Did you read that? There appear to be 
soldiers from South Africa working with the 
National Union. 

The Cubans and the Popular Movement are said 
to have taken the town of Cangumbe, which is on 
the rail line. 

Then it says: 

[Correspondents in Angola, however, say they 
have seen no evidence that South African soldiers 
are actually fighting there, though the South African 
Government has admitted giving training and logisti- 
cal support.] [Brackets in original.] 

So we have a dispute about how many 
South Africans, if there are any. But we can 
get evidence. We have an amendment which 
assumedly is based on evidence. 

"The Cubans are involved everywhere," an Ameri- 
can official observed. A Latin-American official who 
has just arrived here from Havana said today that 
Cuban officials had told him that 3,100 soldiers are 
now serving in Angola. He said Cuban soldiers had 
also been seen south of Luanda in a third battle 
region, centered around the rich agricultural belt 
between Gabela and Quibala. 

Well, this story goes on this way — bu1 
remember, we are now getting stories froir 
American officials, so you can discount their 
a little bit perhaps : 

Both officials said there was clear evidence thai 
the Soviet Union was continuing large-scale ship- 
ments of military supplies directly to Luanda by seJ 
and by air. 

Of course Pravda has confirmed this 
European arms landing, supporting Euro 
pean expeditionary forces in Africa, gentle 
men. That is what is happening today. 

The last big Soviet airlift to Luanda occurred las' 
Monday, the officials here said, when several hugi 
AN-22 transports came in. 

Now, that is a summary of news fron 
Washington. The New York Times also ha( 
this morning a report from Angola itself 
from Huambo, an area not under Populai 
Movement control, by an American journal 
ist, Michael T. Kaufman. I wonder if oui 
anti-imperialists would listen to me while 
talk about this, please, for another moment 


Department of State Bulletir 


those of us who are so enthusiastic to see 
imperialism end, will they pay a little atten- 
tion to this new imperialism? 
From Huambo, December 4: 

! As seen from here, the Popular Movement for the 
I Liberation of Angola, aided by vast quantities of 
Soviet arms and by Cuban fighting men, has made 
sharp military advances on three fronts in recent 

Now note, fellow delegates, I am not try- 
ing to persuade you to take the winning side 
in this argument. It is not clear which is the 
winning side. We are talking about what is 
the right side, the claim which every act of 
this General Assembly in 30 years surely 
attests, which is that flie European coloniza- 
tion of Africa must end. But it says here, 
"aided by vast quantities of Soviet arms" — 
European arms — "and by Cuban fighting 
men, there have been great advances" — 

[Ambassador Moynihan was interrupted on a point 
Df order by the Representative of Madagascar.] 

Thank you, Mr. President. As I under- 
stand your ruling, sir, the distinguished 
representative from Madagascar will speak 
following me or shortly thereafter. Thank 
you, Mr. President; thank you, sir. 

I do not wish extensively to incur upon 
the delegates' time or the Assembly's time, 
but I simply do want to make the point 
which Mr. Holden Roberto, the President of 
the National Front for the Liberation of 
Angola, made — a freedom fighter if ever 
there was one, a distinguished member of 
his people — and this is what he has to say: 
"This is a war of men against weapons — we 
have the men and they have the weapons." 

Now, if ever there was a man who ap- 
peared in the country of Angola, a leader of 
his people, it is this very Holden Roberto. 
And what has he said? He said, "This is a 
war of men against weapons — we have the 
men and they have the weapons." And who 
are the men ? They are African men. And 
what are the weapons being used against 
them? They are European weapons — Euro- 
pean weapons. And if this Assembly will not 
face this fact, then what is the good of this 

Now, I think we will. I think there are 

men and women of courage in this room who 
will. But if we then do not, think of what 
history will say about us. And they will not 
face only the colonization of southwestern 
Africa, they will perhaps one day even face 
up to the colonization by the same nation on 
the northeastern coast, Somalia, where the 
Institute for the Study of Conflict has noted 
that this same European nation has landed 
150 T-35 tanks, up to 100 T-54 tanks, 300 
armored personnel carriers, 200 coastal bat- 
teries, 50 MIG's, a squadron of Ilyushin-28 
bombers, six patrol boats, and two guided- 
missile patrol boats, and a batch of SA-2 
surface-to-air missiles. 

Now, let me sum up. We are faced with a 
situation properly the concern of this As- 
sembly. An independent nation has been 
invaded by foreigners, foreign troops, for- 
eign arms. One group of African countries 
has brought to our attention the prospect 
that a nation, South Africa, has been in- 
volved. We await their evidence. That evi- 
dence will be carefully considered by my 
delegation. And I remind the delegates that 
my delegation has insistently and in detail 
stated its abhorrence of the social system in 
South Africa. And we have other informa- 
tion of invasion by another country, two 
other countries. 

Now, are we going to pay attention to 
those? I think we should pay attention to 
the words of my distinguished colleague and 
my predecessor at this podium. Ambassador 
Mutuale of Zaire, who spoke with pride of 
his nation's role in the liberation of the 
African people from the colonial yoke. Those 
were his words, and he clearly meant that 
his nation did not mean to be party to the 
reimposition of that colonial yoke by a great 
European power with its armies and its 
weapons already on the northeast coast and 
southwest coast of that continent. 

Ambassador Mutuale said, how can two 
different standards, two different treat- 
ments, discriminatory treatments, be ad- 
mitted to so fundamental a norm of interna- 
tional relations, he said, as the duty to avoid 
interference in the internal affairs of an- 
other country? He asked, how can it be 
tolerated? Ambassador Mutuale said no 

January 19, 1976 


intervention can be justified in Angola. He 
said there cannot be two yardsticks. 

Fellow delegates, if the strong and true 
words of the Ambassador of Zaire are ig- 
nored today, do not be surprised if the pro- 
nouncements of this General Assembly are 
ignored by the rest of the world from today 
on. We face a moment of truth. It is time 
to tell the truth. If we settle for a big lie, 
we will have earned the contempt which the 
world will heap upon us and which history 
will record as having been our due. 

U.S. Gives Views on U.N. Resolution 
on Human Rights in Chile 

folloiving is a statement rnade in Commit- 
tee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) 
of the U.N. General Assembly on November 
11 by U.S. Representative Leonard Garment, 
counselor to the U.S. delegation, together 
ivith the text of a resolution adopted by the 
committee on November 11 and by the As- 
sembly on December 9. 


USUN press release 142 dated November 11 

The United States will vote for the reso- 
lution before us. The vote of the U.S. dele- 
gation in favor of the draft resolution 
dealing with the protection of human rights 
in Chile is a vote for human rights, a vote in 
support of the purpose assigned to this 
organization under the charter "to achieve 
international cooperation ... in promoting 
and encouraging respect for human rights 
and for fundamental freedoms for all . . . ." 

Our vote reflects deep concern over re- 
ports which continue to come to this organi- 
zation from many credible sources about 
violations of basic human rights taking place 
in Chile. My government is of the opinion 
that these reports deserve to be addressed 
by appropriate U.N. action. 

It was because of our desire to find the 
best means for bringing the influence of 
world opinion to bear in a positive way on 

that situation that my government gave its 
strong support to the establishment of an 
ad hoc working group by the U.N. Commis- 
sion on Human Rights. The promise of that 
government to welcome the visit of the ad 
hoc working group to Chile was, we thought, 
a hopeful sign that more rapid progress in 
bringing about an improvement of the situ- 
ation there would occur. Consequently, my 
government was deeply disappointed that 
the visit of the working group to Chile did 
not take place. The position we take today 
has been greatly influenced by that develop- 

I should point out that, unlike other drafts 
on the situation in Chile which have beer 
informally circulated and to which my dele- 
gation has objected because of their objec- 
tionable intervention in the internal affairs 
of that government, the draft resolution 
before us draws attention to specific provi- 
sions of international instruments to which 
Chile as well as other members of the United 
Nations is party. These international instru- 
ments are among the most important 
achievements of this organization during its 
existence. We regard this resolution as a 
positive attempt to give meaning to these 
human rights instruments through its call 
on the Chilean authorities to give full re- 
spect to them. 

Mr. Chairman, having noted the reasons 
why my government has voted for this reso- 
lution, I wish to record some of the doubts 
we have had about the resolution. 

First of all, we have been hesitant about 
the approach embodied in the resolution 
which focuses specifically upon certain con- 
ditions which are stated to exist in that 
country. I reiterate our concern that resolu- 
tions of this nature must not go too far in 
their prescription of specific measures of 
correction. We raise this point to draw at- 
tention to the importance of avoiding actions 
which can be seen as attempting to involve 
the organization too directly in matters of 
domestic concern, as against resolutions 
which correctly apply agreed human rights 

We also note that this Assembly by this 
resolution singles out for particular atten- 


Department of State Bulletin 

tion the human rights situation in one coun- 
try. This leaves the impression that the 
United Nations is willing to overlook situa- 
tions involving gross violations of human 
rights in other countries, some of which are 
among the loudest and most belligerent 
critics of Chile. 

We object to this approach because it is 
not evenhanded. To put it bluntly, for some 
it is an act of blatant hypocrisy. In our 
view, the United Nations should address 
problems of this nature in a more general 
fashion which will emphasize the need to 
protect human rights on a worldwide basis 
rather than adopt a selective and necessarily 
one-sided approach. However, while we re- 
ject and abhor the flagrant application of a 
double standard in the field of human rights, 
we cannot say that the United Nations 
should remain silent in the case of Chile. 

My delegation reached its decision to vote 
for this resolution after a careful weighing 
of the resolution's positive and negative as- 
pects. We cast our vote in the manner we 
hope will have the best influence in promot- 
ing the cause of human rights. We are hope- 
ful that the Government of Chile will take 
heed of the strong concern in the world 
which the vote on this resolution reflects. 
We hope that its adoption will strengthen 
respect for human rights in Chile, a respect 
which has characterized the long and proud 
tradition of the Chilean people. We trust it 
will strengthen the cause of human rights 


Protection of human rights in Chile 

The General Assembly, 

Conscious of its responsibility under the Charter 
of the United Nations to promote and encourage re- 
spect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for all, 

'A/RES/3448 (XXX) (text from U.N. doc. A/ 
10284/Add.l, report of the Third Committee (part II) 
on agenda item 12, Report of the Economic and Social 
Council); adopted by the committee on Nov. 11 by a 
rollcall vote of 88 (U.S.) to 11, with 20 abstentions, 
and by the Assembly on Dec. 9 by a recorded vote 
of 95 (U.S.) to 11, with 23 abstentions. 

Recalling that, in accordance with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, everyone has the right 
to life, liberty and security of person and the right 
not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or 
exile or to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. 

Recalling that, in its resolution 3219 (XXIX) of 
6 November 1974, the General Assembly expressed 
its deepest concern about reported constant and 
flagrant violations of basic human rights and funda- 
mental freedoms in Chile and urged the authorities 
in that country to take all necessary steps to restore 
and safeguard those rights and freedoms, 

Noting that the General Conference of the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organi- 
zation, at its eighteenth session, the General Con- 
ference of the International Labour Organisation, at 
its sixtieth session, the World Conference of the 
International Women's Year and the Sub-Commission 
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, at its twenty-eighth session, called for the 
cessation of violations of human rights and funda- 
mental freedoms in Chile, 

Noting that, in its resolution 8 (XXXI) of 27 
February 1975, the Commission on Human Rights, 
after expressing its serious concern about the con- 
tinuing reports of violations of human rights in 
Chile, decided to establish an ad hoc working group 
to inquire into the present situation of human rights 
in that country on the basis of all available evidence, 
including a visit to Chile, and appealed to the author- 
ities of Chile to extend its full co-operation to the 

Having considered the report of the Secretary- 
General under resolution 3219 (XXIX) " and, in 
particular, the progress report submitted by the 
Ad Hoc Working Group on the Situation of Human 
Rights in Chile,' 

Convinced that the progress report contains evi- 
dence on which to conclude that flagrant and con- 
stant violations of basic human rights and funda- 
mental freedoms have taken place and continue to 
take place in Chile, 

Expressing its appreciation to the Chairman and 
members of the Ad Hoc Working Group for their 
report which has been prepared in a commendable 
manner, notwithstanding the refusal of the Chilean 
authorities to permit the Group to visit the country, 

Reaffirming its condemnation of all forms of tor- 
ture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 

1. Expresses its profound distress at the constant, 
flagrant violations of human rights, including the 
institutionalized practice of torture, cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary 
arrest, detention and exile, to which the progress 
report brings additional evidence, which have taken 

•U.N. doc. A/10295. [Footnote in original.] 
'U.N. doc. A/10285. [Footnote in original.] 

January 19, 1976 


place and, according to existing evidence, continue 
to take place in Chile; 

2. Calls on the Chilean authorities to take, without 
delay, all necessary measures to restore and safe- 
guard basic human rights and fundamental freedoms 
and fully to respect the provisions of the interna- 
tional instruments to which Chile is a party and, to 
this end, to ensure that: 

(a) The state of siege or emergency is not used 
for the purpose of violating human rights and funda- 
mental freedoms, contrary to article 4 of the Inter- 
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; 

(b) Adequate measures are taken to end the in- 
stitutionalized practice of torture and other forms of 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish- 
ment in full respect of article 7 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; 

(c) The rights of all persons to liberty and secu- 
rity of person, in particular the rights of those who 
have been detained without charge or in prison solely 
for political reasons, as provided for in article 9 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, are fully guaranteed and steps are taken to 
clarify the status of those individuals who are not 
accounted for; 

(d) No one shall be held guilty of any criminal 
offence on account of any act or omission which did 
not constitute a criminal offence, under national or 
international law, at the time when it was committed, 
contrary to article 15 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights; 

(e) No one, in accordance with article 15, para- 
graph 2, of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, shall be arbitrarily deprived of Chilean na- 

(f) The right to freedom of association, including 
the right to form and join trade unions, shall be 
respected in accordance with article 22 of the Inter- 
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; 

(g) The right to intellectual freedoms, as provided 
for in article 19 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, shall be guaranteed; 

3. Deplores the refusal of the Chilean authorities 
to allow the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Situation 
of Human Rights in Chile to visit the country, not- 
withstanding previous solemn assurances given by 
the authorities in this regard and urges them to 
honour these assurances; 

4. hivites the Commission on Human Rights to 
extend the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group 
established under resolution 8 (XXXI), as presently 
constituted, to enable it to report to the General 
Assembly at its thirty-first session and to the Com- 
mission on Human Rights at its thirty-third session 
on the situation of human rights in Chile and, in 
particular, any developments which occur to re- 
establish respect for human rights and fundamental 

5. Requests the President of the thirtieth session 
of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations to assist in any way they may 
deem appropriate in the re-establishment of basic 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in Chile. 

U.S. Welcomes Adoption by U.N. 
of Declaration on Torture 

Following is a statement made in Commit- 
tee III (Social, Huntanitarian and Cidtural) 
of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Rep- 
resentative Carmen R. Maymi on November 
28, together with the text of a resolution 
adopted by the committee on November 28 
and by the Assembly on December 9. 


USUN pre?s release 164 dated November 28 

In his address before the General Assem- 
bly September 22, Secretary of State Kissin- 
ger underscored the persistent and serious 
problem of torture in the world. He urged 
the Assembly to adopt the draft declaration 
on protection of all persons from being sub- 
jected to torture. He also encouraged this 
Assembly to go further and tackle the prob- 
lem of implementation. His proposal was 
progressive. He suggested that a group of 
experts be appointed by the Secretary Gen- 
eral to study the nature and extent of tor- 
ture in the world today and to report back 
to the next Assembly. 

My delegation welcomes the adoption of 
the declaration. This is a step of major im- 
portance. It is an accomplishment which 
underlines the gravity of the problem of 
torture in the world and demonstrates our 
collective determination to do something 
about it. This declaration reinforces the 
complete and unconditional prohibition 
against torture set forth in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and in the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Now 
there can be no possible loophole through 
which government officials responsible for ■ 


Department of State Bulletin 

torture can escape condemnation by the 
international community. 

Drafting of texts, however, is but the first 
step the United Nations must take to com- 
bat the problem of torture. Now that the 
principles have been set forth, we must con- 
sider the most effective approach to insure 
that they are observed. The challenge still 
before us is to organize and concentrate the 
concern of the world community. 

My delegation had hoped that this com- 
mittee might have decided upon measures 
for implementation. The inexorable factor of 
time, however, has forced us to conclude 
that this committee would not be able to 
give adequate attention to a major progres- 
sive proposal in the area of implementation. 
We intend to pursue this matter again in 
this Assembly and perhaps in other human 
rights forums. We will be consulting with 
other interested delegations to develop our 
ideas in a form which we hope will receive 
widespread support. 

The resolution contained in document 
A/C.3/L.2187/Rev.l, introduced by the 
Greek delegation, contains a number of re- 
quests to various U.N. bodies to carry for- 
ward the work to eliminate the practice of 
torture. My delegation wholeheartedly sup- 
ported it. We note in particular the request 
addressed to the Commission on Human 
Rights in operative paragraph 2.' 

The resolution recognizes that our task 
is not finished. Much remains to be done. We 
hope that during this coming year our work 
in this area will go ahead as called for by 
this resolution and also that the Subcommis- 
sion on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities will continue to 
make its important contribution. With such 

'Draft resolution A/C.3/L.2187/Rev.l, as orally 
amended, was adopted by the committee on Nov. 28 
and by the Assembly on Dec. 9 without a vote (A/ 
RES/3453 XXX)). Operative paragraph 2 requests the 
Commission on Human Rights to study the question 
of torture and any necessary steps for "Ensuring the 
effective observance of the Declaration . . ." and 
"The formulation of a body of principles for the 
protection of all persons under any form of deten- 
tion or imprisonment. . . ." 

progress the 31st General Assembly will be 
in a better position to decide upon further 
measures to combat the practice of torture. 


The General Assembly, 

Considering that, in accordance with the principles 
proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, 
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal 
and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace 
in the world, 

Considering that these rights derive from the in- 
herent dignity of the human person. 

Considering also the obligation of States under 
the Charter of the United Nations, in particular 
Article 55, to promote universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental free- 

Having regard to article 5 of the Universal Decla- 
ration of Human Rights and article 7 of the Inter- 
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, both 
of which provide that no one may be subjected to 
torture, or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment. 

Adopts the Declaration on the Protection of All 
Persons from being subjected to Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish- 
ment, the text of which is annexed to the present 
resolution, as a guideline for all States and other 
entities exercising effective power. 


Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from 
being subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, In- 
human or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 

Article 1 

1. For the purpose of this Declaration, torture 
means any act by which severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted 
by or at the instigation of a public official on a per- 
son for such purposes as obtaining from him or a 
third person information or confession, punishing 
him for an act he has committed or is suspected of 
having committed, or intimidating him or other per- 
sons. It does not include pain or suffering arising 
only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanc- 

= A/RES/3452 (XXX) (text from U.N. doc. A/ 
10408, report of the Third Committee on agenda item 
74, Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment in relation to detention and 
imprisonment) ; adopted by the committee on Nov. 28 
and by the Assembly on Dec. 9 by acclamation. 

January 19, 1976 


tions to the extent consistent with the Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. 

2. Torture constitutes an aggravated and deliberate 
form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 

Article 2 

Any act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or de- 
grading treatment or punishment is an offence to 
human dignity and shall be condemned as a denial 
of the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations 
and as a violation of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. 

Article 3 

No State may permit or tolerate torture or other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish- 
ment. Exceptional circumstances such as a state of 
war or a threat of war, internal political instability 
or any other public emergency may not be invoked 
as a justification of torture or other cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment. 

Article U 

Each State shall, in accordance with the provisions 
of this Declaration, take effective measures to pre- 
vent torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment from being practised within 
its jurisdiction. 

Article 5 

The training of law enforcement personnel and of 
other public officials who may be responsible for 
persons deprived of their liberty shall ensure that 
full account is taken of the prohibition against tor- 
ture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treat- 
ment or punishment. This prohibition shall also, 
where appropriate, be included in such general rules 
or instructions as are issued in regard to the duties 
and functions of anyone who may be involved in the 
custody or treatment of such persons. 

Article 6 

Each State shall keep under systematic review 
interrogation methods and practices as well as ar- 
rangements for the custody and treatment of persons 
deprived of their liberty in its territory, with a view 
to preventing any cases of torture or other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 

Article 7 

Each State shall ensure that all acts of torture 
as defined in article 1 are offences under its criminal 
law. The same shall apply in regard to acts which 
constitute participation in, complicity in, incitement 
to or an attempt to commit torture. 

Article 8 
Any person who alleges he has been subjected to 

torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treat- 
ment or punishment by or at the instigation of a 
public official shall have the right to complain to, 
and to have his case impartially examined by, the 
competent authorities of the State concerned. 

Article 9 

Wherever there is reasonable ground to believe 
that an act of torture as defined in article 1 has been 
committed, the competent authorities of the State 
concerned shall promptly proceed to an impartial 
investigation even if there has been no formal com- 

Article 10 

If an investigation under article 8 or article 9 
establishes that an act of torture as defined in article 
1 appears to have been committed, criminal proceed- 
ings shall be instituted against the alleged offender 
or offenders in accordance with national law. If an 
allegation of other forms of cruel, inhuman or de- 
grading treatment or punishment is considered to be 
well founded, the alleged offender or offenders shall 
be subject to criminal, disciplinary or other appro- 
priate proceedings. 

Article 11 

Where it is proved that an act of torture or other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish- 
ment has been committed by or at the instigation of 
a public official, the victim shall be afforded redress 
and compensation, in accordance with national law. 

Article 12 

Any statement which is established to have been 
made as a result of torture or other cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment may not be 
invoked as evidence against the person concerned or 
against any other person in any proceedings. 

United States Supports Admission 
of Surinam to the United Nations 

Following is a statement made in plenary 
session of the U.N. General Assembly on 
December 4 by U.S. Representative Pearl 
Bailey, Special Adviser to the U.S. delega- 

USUN press release 173 dated December 4 

Just as we warmly supported Surinam's 
candidacy in the Secui'ity Council, the 
United States has cosponsored wholeheart- 
edly the resolution on the admission of 
Surinam to membership in the United Na- 


Department of State Bulletin 

itions. We extend our enthusiastic greetings 
to Surinam as the newest member of the 
United Nations.' 

Surinam's achievement of independence is 
a tribute to the dedication and capacity of 
her elected leaders and their commitment 
to the well-being of their people. It is also 
a tribute to the progressive policies of the 
Government of the Kingdom of the Nether- 

The United States and Surinam have his- 
torical links which go back to the early- 
colonial days of the Western Hemisphere, 
(n fact, in 1667 the colonies of Surinam and 
Nieuw Amsterdam, as New York was called 
it the time, were exchanged by the then 
metropolitan powers. The U.S. consulate in 
Surinam, established in 1790, was elevated 
an Embassy on November 25, 1975, when 
Surinam became an independent nation. 

Mr. President, as host country repre- 
;entative, my delegation extends a warm 
velcome to Surinam's representatives at this 
leadquarters. My delegation offers a par- 
icularly cordial welcome and greeting to 
Mme Minister Arron, Mrs. Arron, and the 
)ther members of the Surinam delegation 
vho have come to the United Nations on this 
listoric occasion. 

It is the sincere hope of my delegation 
hat this day marks the beginning of even 
:loser and friendlier ties between the Gov- 
ernment of the United States and the Gov- 
■rnment of Surinam as we engage in a 
ommon effort to realize the goals of the 
Charter of the United Nations. 

Surinam's diverse and capable population, 
ich natural resources, and varied agricul- 
ural production, along with a commitment 
liberal trade policies, provide the basis 
or continued economic development. The 
hew republic's long history of democratic 
traditions and self-government, including 
he establishment of a legislative council 
)ver a century ago, are grounds for antici- 
mtion that Surinam will make important 
ontributions to the United Nations. 

it' j 'The Assembly on Dec. 4 adopted by acclamation 
,1 ]i resolution (A/RES/3413 (XXX)) admitting Suri- 
,_ (lam to membership in the United Nations. 

Mr. President, my delegation wishes Suri- 
nam all the benefits of independence and 
membership in the United Nations. We look 
forward to a strong Surinam contribution in 
the deliberations and activities of our or- 

Once again: Welcome, Surinam. 

And before this is over, I would like to 
say something, gentlemen. I watched your 
delegation, dear Surinam, walk in. I watched 
you as you proceeded around there and down 
the aisle. You walked very proudly, and I 
felt very proud to watch you walk in, be- 
cause you walked with something that men 
should walk with. It is called dignity. No 
one looked back; everyone looked forward. 
That's the only way that men should walk. 

United Nations Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as 
those listed below) may be consulted at depository 
libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publica- 
tions may be purchased from the Sales Section of 
the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 

General Assembly 

Status of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, the International Cove- 
nant on Civil and Political Rights and the Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. Report of the Secretary General. 
A/10196. September 9, 1975. 8 pp. 

Succession of states in respect of treaties. Report of 
the Secretary General containing comments and ob- 
servations of member states. A/10198. September 
11, 1975. 26 pp. 

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the 
region of the Middle East. Report of the Secretary 
General containing replies received from govern- 
ments. A/10221. September 12, 1975. 7 pp. 

Letter dated September 4, 1975, from the Permanent 
Representatives of Ghana and Italy, as representa- 
tives of the countries exercising the chairmanship 
of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group (ACP) 
and the presidency of the European Economic Com- 
munity (EEC), transmitting the text of the ACP- 
EEC Convention of Lome, signed on February 28, 
1975. A/AC.176/7. September 16, 1975. 84 pp. 

United Nations Fund for Namibia. Report of the 
Secretary General. A/10229. September 23, 1975. 
10 pp. 

{January 19, 1976 



Department Discusses the Role of East-West Trade 
in U.S. Foreign Relations 

Statement by Deputy Secretary Robert S. Ingersoll ' 

I am pleased to have this opportunity to 
appear before the committee today to speak 
about the role of East-West trade in our 
foreign relations. 

As you are aware, our relations with the 
Communist countries entered a new phase 
more than three years ago. Progress in 
political relations was marked by the Berlin 
settlement, advances in the arms control 
negotiations, and the Moscow summit in the 
spring of 1972. This opened the way for 
progress in trade and economic relations, 
which led to the conclusion of the commei'- 
cial agreements with the Soviet Union later 
that year. Not only in the U.S.S.R. but in 
China and East Europe as well, we have re- 
garded the development of trade and eco- 
nomic relations as the natural outgrowth of 
political progress. 

The development of East-West trade 
brings important economic benefits. Our 
exports of industrial and agricultural goods 
to this fast-growing market still represent 
less than 3 percent of our total exports, but 
they create earnings for American firms and 
jobs for our farmers and workers. These 
countries are sources of valuable raw mate- 
rials, like metals and petroleum products. 
The economic benefits of this trade have 
been described by other participants in these 
hearings in detail. 

' Made before the Senate Committee on Commerce 
on Dec. 12. The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will be avail- 
able from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 


East-West trade also improves the ei 
vironment for future progress on politic; 
issues. Trade relations, like cultural an 
scientific relations, can bring expansion ( 
contact, continuing interchange, and a d( 
gree of interdependence, which contribul 
to the growth of shared interests, greate 
stability, and mutual restraint. 

We must be careful, however, to assess th 
political implications of East-West trac 
realistically. We should not overestimate tl 
political leverage we can obtain from oi 
economic relations with these countries. T? 
U.S. share in East-West trade is relatival 
small. For the vast majority of traded good 
the Communist countries can find sources ( 
supply outside the United States. 

In order to insure that any of the speci; 
restrictions we may place on trade and 1 
nancial relations with Communist countrit 
are eff'ective, we should keep our policit 
and practices reasonably consistent wit 
those of other Western industrialized coui 

We should also not try to tie individu; 
trade transactions to specific political coi 
cessions, for example, concessions on arn 
control issues. The temptation to do this ca 
be great if we have something to sell th; 
the other side wants very badly. Even 
political concessions could be extracted i 
this way, they would be likely to evaporat 
once the terms of the commercial tran; 
action had been met. We would then be lei 
with a business deal in which we had give I 
away some real economic benefits in retur 

Department of State Bulleti 

01' vague political promises. Trade trans- 
ctions, like political and arms agi'eements, 
lUst be able to stand on their own merits. 

We also have to remember that neither 
he United States, nor its allies (who are 
leavily engaged in trade with the Commu- 
ist world), nor the Communist countries 
lemselves are prepared to relinquish basic 
iterests or fundamental principles for the 
like of trade. 

I We recognize that Communist govern - 

iients, some more than others, engage in 

ractices which are incompatible with our 

ileals. We and the Communist states still 

Ijgard ourselves as engaged in a struggle 

ijtween antagonistic systems. 

But the existence of differences between 

> and the Communists, profound as they 

ay be, should not deter us from cautiously 

eking ways to discover and cultivate our 

immon interests. This applies to restrain- 

g the strategic arms race, to dealing with 

e global problems of food, energy, and the 

ivironment, and to the expansion of our 

ade and economic relations. It also con- 

ibutes to confining the struggle between 

ir systems so that we avoid resorting to 

rce and armed conflict. 

If we approach East-West trade in this 

alistic way, I believe that it can have an 

direct, but broad and long-lasting, payoff. 

has benefits above and beyond the sum 

tal of the transactions involved. Over time, 

creased trade can erode the autarkic 

ndencies of the Communist countries and 

i them more closely into the world eco- 

imic system. 

East-West trade can have a real impact 

'1 the economies of the Communist coun- 

ies and on their economic decisionmaking. 

') increase their exports to the United 

lates — as all of them, and especially the 

!)viet Union, wish to do — they must devote 

1 sources and skills to production and mar- 

'ting of the kinds of goods and services 

liich are salable on the American market. 

creased acceptance by these countries of 

e responsibilities inherent in more normal 

ade relations would reduce their capacity 

ir, and their interest in, disrupting the 

lade and economic system created by the 

Western countries over the past 30 years. 

Thus, over time, U.S. trade with Commu- 
nist countries can help to build a continuing 
relationship — a relationship which the Com- 
munist countries have an interest in main- 
taining and which they would find costly to 
repudiate. In this way, trade adds an element 
of restraint and stability to our overall rela- 
tions. The failure to permit trade to develop 
normally not only reduces our potential eco- 
nomic gains but also inhibits progress to- 
ward these political goals. 

Structure of Policy and Legislation 

It is logical that if we seek to expand 
trade with the Communist countries over the 
coming years, we will need at the same time 
to develop a structure of policy and legisla- 
tion to support this expanded trade. Such a 
structure must permit steady progress 
toward more normal relations, on the basis 
of mutual benefit. Since not all problems can 
be foreseen, the structure must also permit 
the resolution of disputes and take into ac- 
count the very basic differences between 
market and nonmarket systems. 

The Trade Act of 1974 offers such a 
structure. It provides that most-favored- 
nation (MFN) tariff treatment can be ex- 
tended to non-market-economy countries 
only on the basis of a trade agreement. Such 
a trade agreement must provide safeguards 
against the possible disruption of our mar- 
kets; it must protect industrial property 
rights and copyrights; it must insure ar- 
rangements for the settlement of commer- 
cial disputes ; it must facilitate trade 
promotion; and it must be subject to sus- 
pension or termination for reasons of na- 
tional security. 

To protect our security interests, the 
present structure of unilateral and multi- 
lateral strategic export controls must also 
be maintained. 

Some changes in existing legislation are 
required, however, if we are to create a legal 
structure which will permit improvement in 
our trade relations with the non-market- 
economy countries. For example, we favor 
legislation to allow for nondiscriminatory. 

inuary 19, 1976 


nonconcessional financing of trade, which is 
essential to the maintenance of our com- 
petitive position. We also favor modification 
of section 408 of the Trade Act to give us 
greater flexibility in our relations with 
Czechoslovakia. Since the Johnson Debt De- 
fault Act of 1934 no longer serves its origi- 
nal purpose of protecting American investors 
against defaulting governments, considera- 
tion might be given to its repeal. The repeal 
of section 511 of the Trade Agreements 
Extension Act of 1951, which embargoes the 
importation of certain furs from the 
U.S.S.R. and China, would remove an obso- 
lete impediment to trade. 

Varied Effects of Existing Legislation 

In East Europe, the effect of existing 
legislation has varied from country to coun- 
try. Poland and Yugoslavia, with which the 
United States has had GATT [General 
Agreement on Tariff's and Trade] relations 
for a number of years, were exempt from 
the provisions of section 402 of the Trade 
Act, and our trade and political relations 
with those countries have continued to 

Romania, continuing to pursue its inde- 
pendent foreign policy, negotiated a trade 
agreement with us under the provisions of 
the Trade Act; and so the general improve- 
ment in U.S.-Romanian relations noted over 
several years continues. 

Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and 
the German Democratic Republic, following 
the Soviet lead, have stated that they are 
not prepared to negotiate trade agreements 
under the emigration provisions of the Trade 
Act. Although U.S. trade with most of these 
countries has increased in recent years in 
the absence of MEN, the full potential of 
their markets cannot be enjoyed by Ameri- 
can exporters so long as we are not in a 
position to extend MEN to their products 
coming into our country. 

It is not easy to quantify these losses, but 
we do know the extension of MEN is clearly 
encouraging trade expansion with Poland 
and Romania, where total trade turnover in 
each case is expected to triple between 1974 

and 1977. Our inability to proceed towarc \ 
normalization of trade relations with thes( 
other four countries reduces our flexibilitj 
and our capacity for developing appropriatt 
and effective policies. It thus involves not 
only economic loss for both sides but also { 
political irritant. 

The Trade Act has not directly affectec 
our trade or political relations with th( 
People's Republic of China. The Shangha. 
communique of 1972 continues to serve a; 
the framework for the development of oui 
trade. At this stage of our relationship witl 
the P.R.C., a broad understanding of hov 
trade relations should develop is not ye 

The Administration fully supports the ob 
jectives of section 402 of the Trade Act . 
and we share the views of those who believi 
that the United States must work to brinj 
about increased emigration from the U.S.S.R 

Lost Opportunities in U.S. -Soviet Trade 

Since the passage of the Trade Act, bot! 
the United States and the U.S.S.R. hav , 
tried to sustain trade. We have, howevei : 
paid an economic and political price in op 
portunities lost. The rise in overall trade i 
1975 points not to a continuing dynamism i 
our commercial relationship, but to greatl; 
increased grain sales and deliveries of in 
dustrial goods ordered before 1975. Severa 
major orders have been diverted from Amer 
ican companies this year, and in some case 
we have been told plainly that the switcl 
was politically motivated. 

While we have cut off the flow of govern 
ment-sponsored credits to the U.S.S.R. \ 
Western Europe and Japan have been com 
peting with each other to offer more, an( 
the total available to be drawn on is nov 
some $10 billion. Not surprisingly, tradi 
flows along the same lines as these credits 
Since the last Eximbank loans were ex 
tended in May of 1974, the U.S. share o:i 
new Soviet orders of machinery and equip 
ment from Western countries has fallei 
from its 1973 level of about 22 percent t( 
about 14 percent in the first 10 months Oi 


Department of State Bulletii 

Our inability to use the facilities of the 
Export-Import Bank to finance our trade 
vith the Soviet Union also has broader im- 
)lications. Providing access to Eximbank 
acilities is not a one-way concession. Exim- 
)ank loans are tied to U.S. exports and to 
pacific projects, whereas the credits that 
he Soviet Union can obtain commerciallj' 
,t only slightly higher interest rates are 
lot. Through the Export-Import Bank, we 
an also control the flow of credit in ways 
hat we cannot in private financial markets. 

Our inability to grant most-favored-nation 
reatment to the Soviet Union also involves 
)st opportunities. The Soviets would prefer 
3 pay for their imports with increased ex- 
orts, instead of financing them with costly 
redits. By discriminating against Soviet 
xports, we limit the expansion of our mu- 
lal trade. In doing so, we inhibit the growth 
f our own exports, and we forgo some of 
le indirect political benefits that come from 
II expanding trade relationship. The absence 
f MFN also makes long-term projects, in 
hich repayment takes the form of products 
roduced, less attractive with the United 
tates than they are with countries which 
oply a nondiscriminatory tariff. 

An additional economic price has been the 
?ssation of Soviet payments of their lend- 
ase obligations. The lend-lease agreement 
cached in 1972 provided for the payment 
' three installments totaling $48 million by 
ily 1, 1975. These have been paid in full, 
he repayment of the balance of $674 mil- 
Dn was made conditional on our granting 
lost-favored-nation tariff treatment to the 
oviet Union. This will not be paid until 
[FN is extended. 

Finally, the trade agreement would have 
rotected American industry more fully 
?ainst market disruption resulting fi-om 
aviet imports. It would also have encour- 
?ed the use of procedures for the arbitra- 
on of commercial disputes. These benefits 
re not available to us as long as the agree- 
lent remains in abeyance. 

We regret these lost opportunities. We 

so recognize, however, that Soviet emigra- 
on policies are a matter of continuing 
i)ncern to the public, the Congress, and the 

Administration. The future evolution of 
these policies will be watched closely. We 
share the urgent desire of the Congress to 
find a way out of the dilemma which will 
achieve our primary humanitarian purpose. 
Our concern for basic human rights is last- 
ing, not transient. 

We hope to work closely with the Con- 
gress not only on overcoming the legislative 
impasse but on all aspects of our economic 
relations with non-market-economy coun- 
tries. Congress should play a key role in 
East-West trade, as it does in other areas of 
trade policy. We would welcome any sugges- 
tions for improvements in the consultative 
arrangements between the Administration 
and the Congress so that we can work more 
closely together. 

U.S. -Soviet Grain and Oil Arrangements 

In addition to our efforts to develop an 
overall structure of policy and legislation to 
support the expansion of East-West trade, 
there are times when we need to develop 
special arrangements to deal with special 
problems. One such special case was the 
grain agreement which Under Secretary 
Robinson signed in Moscow on October 20. 
It is designed to deal with the recurrent 
problem of the sudden large grain purchases 
which the Soviets make when their harvests 
fall short of their needs. These purchases 
have periodically disrupted world markets, 
pushed up prices, and forced the President 
to impose various ad hoc restrictions on 
grain exports. 

The Soviets have agreed to purchase at 
least 6 million tons of grain per year, and 
they can purchase an additional 2 million 
tons without government-to-government 
consultations. More, of course, can be pur- 
chased on the basis of such consultations. 
We are not obliged to sell if our grain supply 
falls below a specific level. Sales will be at 
market prices prevailing at the time of the 
purchase. The agreement involves no U.S. 
Government credits. 

Under this agreement, our farmers will 
be able to take advantage of the large Soviet 
market on a regular basis without price ef- 

anoary 19, 1976 


fects harmful to the American consumer. 
At the same time, the U.S.-Soviet maritime 
agreement, which is still under renegotia- 
tion but which we hope will be renewed 
before the end of the year, enables U.S. 
shipping to carry a fair share of the grain 
cargoes at profitable rates. 

The grain agreement is a positive step in 
our relations with the Soviet Union. It en- 
courages a long-term interrelationship be- 
tween our two economies, involving implicit 
political constraints. 

The Department of State played a role in 
the negotiation of the grain agreement that 
was consistent with the role we play in 
other areas of international economic policy. 
Under Secretary Robinson led our negotiat- 
ing team, pursuant to instructions developed 
in the White House by an interagency team. 
He worked closely at every stage with the 
Department of Agriculture, relying heavily 
on the expertise and sound judgment of the 
Assistant Secretary of Agriculture [for 
International Affairs and Commodity Pro- 
grams], Richard Bell, who was with him in 

We decided that it was appropriate to 
conclude this as an executive agreement in- 
stead of a treaty. It does not affect U.S. law, 
and no new legislation is required to imple- 
ment the commitments that we made. We 
also had a strong interest in obtaining a firm 
Soviet commitment upon signature. 

At the time we signed the grain agree- 
ment, we exchanged letters of intent with 
the Soviets on an agreement for the supply 
of oil. We expect these negotiations to begin 
in the near future. 

The oil agreement we envisage would give 
us an option — not a commitment — to pur- 
chase up to 10 million metric tons of Soviet 
crude or petroleum products each year. This 
would represent about 200,000 barrels per 
day — only 3 percent of our annual imports. 
We should not, however, underrate the sig- 
nificance of such an agreement. It would 
mean a net increase in the amount of oil 
available to the free world and would repre- 
sent a further diversification of our sources 
of supply. 

Although the U.S.S.R. is now the world's 

largest oil producer, with production averaj 
ing about 9.5 million barrels per day, we d 
not expect it to become a major oil exporte 
Its exports are now 2.3 million barrels pe 
day. Most of this goes to Eastern Europi 
Unless the Soviet Union can exploit majc 
new sources, we expect its exports to dimii 
ish in coming years as its own economy d( 
velops and its consumption increases a( 

It is not realistic to expect the Soviets t 
give us a sizable discount on the oil that the 
sell us. They do, after all, have other potei 
tial hard-currency buyers, and we are m 
giving them a discount on our grain. Hov 
ever, the price will have to be set at a lev^ 
that we find satisfactory in order for th 
purchases to be made. 

In conclusion, the Department of Stat 
continues to believe that the Peterson ri 
port of August 1972 is the proper guide i 
our economic relations with the Soviet Unic 
and Eastern Europe.- The report states tha 

Closer economic ties bear both cause and efFe 
relationships to relaxation of political tension. Ir 
provement in political relationships is a prerequisi 
for improved economic relationships, but, once 
place, economic ties create a community of intere 
which in turn improves the environment for furth 
progress on the political side. 

If political accords with the Communi 
countries are to endure, they must be bu 
tressed by concrete progress, by tangib 
benefits, and by economic self-interest. 

If we are to preserve the gains of tl 
recent past we must improve the basis ( 
our trade and economic relations with t\ 
Soviet Union and other Communist coui 
tries. As Secretary Kissinger said in h 
testimony before the Senate Foreign Rel; 
tions Committee last year:^ 

We face an opportunity that was not possible '. 
years, or even a decade, ago. If that opportunity 
lost, its moment will not quickly come again. Indee 
it may not come at all. 

In sum, I believe that we must take add 

■ U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relationships in a Nc 
Era, by Peter G. Peterson, then Secretary of Con 
merce (U.S. Government Printing Office). 

^ For Secretary Kissinger's statement of Sept. 1 
1974, see Bulletin of Oct. 14, 1974, p. 505. 


Department of State Bulieti 


;ional steps to promote both liberalized emi- 
gration and improved economic and political 
•elations with the East. If you in the Con- 
gress share this view I hope that you will 
iTiake suggestions as to how and when we 
should proceed in order to move toward both 
hese goals. They need not be contradictory 
)bjectives, as long as we concentrate on the 
esults we seek and are pragmatic in the 
ipproach we adopt. 

>enate Asked To Approve Convention 
or Conservation of Antarctic Seals 

Message From President Ford ' 

> the Senate of the Uyiited States: 

I am pleased to transmit for the Senate's 
dvice and consent to ratification the Con- 
ention for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Seals, with Annex, done at London June 1, 
972. I transmit also, for the information of 
he Senate, the report of the Department of 
itate with respect to the Convention. 

Though commercial sealing has not yet 
tarted in the water and on the sea ice in 
Uitarctica, this Convention provides some 
aluable protection for seals of that region. 
t prohibits entirely the commercial taking 
f three species of Antarctic seals and sets 
onservation limits on the taking of three 
ther species. It prohibits sealing in the 
/ater, except in limited quantities for scien- 
ific research. It sets aside reserves where 
10 sealing can take place and forbids sealing 
ntirely during six months of the year. More 
mportantly, it sets up the machinery to give 
he necessary warning when catch limits are 
)eing approached. It obligates the Parties 
it that point to prevent further sealing by 
heir nationals and vessels. Provision is also 
nade for adoption of additional controls, in- 
luding an effective system of inspection, if 

'Transmitted on Dec. 17 (text from Weekly Com- 
lilation of Presidential Documents dated Dec. 22); 
iilso printed as S. Ex. K, 94th Cong., 1st sess., which 
includes the texts of the convention and the report 
j)f the Department of State. 

commercial sealing starts in the area. There 
is nothing in the Convention to prevent a 
Party from adopting for its nationals and 
vessels more stringent controls than pro- 
vided in the Convention. The United States 
has done this in the Marine Mammal Pro- 
tection Act of 1972. While that legislation 
is in effect, and until the Parties decide to 
adopt controls and inspection procedures, in 
accordance with Article VI, no new legisla- 
tion is needed to implement the Agreement. 
Unfortunately in recent years, it has often 
been only after a species or class of wildlife 
has become severely depleted or even endan- 
gered that international conservation meas- 
ures have been initiated. This Convention 
represents a unique opportunity for the 
world community to put into practice the 
hard learned lessons of the past and to act 
prospectively to protect the seals of Ant- 
arctica. I urge the Senate to give the Con- 
vention its prompt and favorable considera- 

Gerald R. Ford. 

The White House, December 17, 1975. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

94th Congress, 1st Session 

Early-Warning System in Sinai; hearings before the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; October 
6-7, 1975; 264 pp. Report of the committee, to- 
gether with individual views, to accompany S.J. 
Res. 138; S. Rept. 94-415; October 7, 1975; 20 pp. 

Potential Impact of the Proposed 200-Mile Fishing 
Zone on U.S. Foreign Relations. Special oversight 
report of the House Committee on International 
Relations, together with additional and minority 
views, on H.R. 200, the Marine Fisheries Conserva- 
tion Act of 1975. H. Rept. 94-542. October 8, 1975. 
18 pp. 

Amending Sections 2734a(a) and 2734b(a) of Title 
10, United States Code, To Provide for Settlement, 
Under International Agreements, of Certain Claims 
Incident to the Noncombat Activities of the Armed 
Forces, and For Other Purposes. Report of the 
House Committee on the Judiciary to accompany 
H.R. 7896. H. Rept. 94-543. October 8, 1975. 9 pp. 

The Amendments to the Convention for the Safety 
of Life at Sea, 1960. Report of the Senate Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations to accompany S. Ex. 
K, 93-2. S. Ex. Rept. 94-9. October 22, 1975. 3 pp. 

Uanuary 19, 1976 



Current Actions 



Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the return of 
astronauts, and the return of objects launched into 
outer space. Opened for signature at Washington, 
London, and Moscow April 22, 1968. Entered into 
force December 3, 1968. TIAS 6599. 
Aecessioyt deposited: France, December 31, 1975. 


Protocol for the continuation in force of the inter- 
national coffee agreement 1968, as amended and 
extended, with annex. Approved by the Interna- 
tional Coffee Council at London September 26, 
1974. Entered into force October 1, 1975. 
Accessions deposited: Ireland, November 3, 1975; 
Liberia, December 12, 1975. 


Convention on international trade in endangered 

species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. 

Done at Washington March 3, 1973. Entered into 

force July 1, 1975. 

Ratifications deposited: Ghana, November 14, 
1975; Madagascar, August 20, 1975; Morocco, 
October 16, 1975; Niger, September 8, 1975. 

Accession deposited: German Democratic Repub- 
lic, October 9, 1975. 


Customs convention on containers, 1972, with annexes 
and protocol. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972. 
Entered into force December 6, 1975.^ 
Ratification deposited: Canada, December 10, 1975. 


Protocol revising the convention of November 22, 
1928, relating to international expositions, with 
appendix and annex. Done at Paris November 30, 

Ratification deposited: Austria, October 21, 1975. 
Accession deposited: Morocco, October 30, 1975. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic 
drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972. 
Entered into force August 8, 1975. 
Ratification, deposited: South Africa, December 
16, 1975. 

Ocean Dumping 

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by 
dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. 
Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Wash- 
ington December 29, 1972. Entered into forct- 
August 30, 1975. 

Ratification deposited: Union of Soviet Sociali-t 
Republics, December 30, 1975. 


Convention on international liability for damagf 
caused by space objects. Done at Washington, Lon- 
don, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into 
force September 1, 1972; for the United Stat..- 
October 9, 1973. TIAS 7762. 
Accession deposited: France, December 31, 1975. 

Convention on registration of objects launched int.- 
outer space. Opened for signature at New York 
January 14, 1975.= 

Signature : Denmark, December 12, 1975. 
Ratification deposited: France, December 17, 1975 



Agreement concerning shrimp, with annexes, agreei 
minutes, and exchange of notes. Signed at Brasili; 
March 14, 1975. 

Instrument of ratification signed by the President . 
December 22, 1975. 


Agreement modifying the arrangement of Septembew 
27, 1974 (TIAS 7934), concerning trade in cotton* 
wool, and man-made fiber textiles, with record oil 
discussions. Effected by exchange of notes a" 
Washington December 19, 1975. Entered into forc< 
December 19, 1975. 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

Agreement extending the agreement of February 26 
1975 (TIAS 8021), on certain fishery problems or 
the high seas in the western areas of the middlf 
Atlantic Ocean. Effected by exchange of notes a1 
Washington December 18 and 30, 1975. Enterec 
into force December 30, 1975. 

Agreement regarding certain maritime matters, wit! 
related letters and memorandums. Signed at Wash- 
ington and Moscow December 29, 1975. Enterec 
into force January 1, 1976. 

Convention on matters of taxation, with relatec 
letters. Signed at Washington June 20, 1973. 
Ratifications exchanged: December 30, 1975. 
Enters info force: January 29, 1976, effective Jan- 
uary 1, 1976. 

' Not in force for the United States. 
' Not in force. 


Department of State Bulletin 

JdEX Januai-y 19, 1976 Vol. LXXIV, No. 1908 


1-esident Deplores Senate Cutoff of Additional 
Funds for Angola (statement) 76 

1-esident Ford's News Conference of December 
20 (excerpts) '^'^ 

.'■cretary Kissinger's News Conference of 
December 23 69 

i.S. Discusses Angola in U.N. General As- 
sembly (Moynihan) 80 

'jitarctica. Senate Asked To Approve Conven- 
tion for Conservation of Antarctic Seals 
(message from President Ford) 95 

tiile. U.S. Gives Views on U.N. Resolution 
on Human Rights in Chile (Garment, text 
of resolution) 84 


(ngressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

Policy 95 

1 partment Discusses the Role of East-West 

Trade in U.S. Foreign Relations (Ingersoll) 90 


lesident Ford's News Conference of December 

'I (excerpts) "77 

etary Kissinger's News Conference of 
December 23 69 

lonomic Affairs. Department Discusses the 
Role of East-West Trade in U.S. Foreign 
Relations (Ingersoll) 90 

1 vironment. Senate Asked To Approve Con- 
.ention for Conservation of Antarctic Seals 
message from President Ford) 95 

1 rope. Department Discusses the Role of 
East-West Trade in U.S. Foreign Relations 
Ingersoll) 90 

liman Rights 

13. Gives Views on U.N. Resolution on Human 
Rights in Chile (Garment, text of resolution) 84 

IS. Welcomes Adoption by U.N. of Declaration 
)n Torture (Maymi, text of resolution) . . 86 

] ael. Secretary Kissinger's News Conference 
)f December 23 69 

lesidential Documents 

1 ath of Generalissimo Franco, Chief of State 
)f Spain 

lesident Deplores Senate Cutoff of Additional 
Funds for Angola 

lesident Ford's News Conference of December 
10 (excerpts) 

fnate Asked To Approve Convention for Con- 
servation of Antarctic Seals 

5uth Africa 

f cretary Kissinger's News Conference of 
December 23 69 

IS. Discusses Angola in U.N. General As- 
sembly (Moynihan) 80 

1'ain. Death of Generalissimo Franco, Chief 
3f State of Spain (statements by President 
Ford and Secretary Kissinger) 79 
rinam. United States Supports Admission of 
.Surinam to the United Nations (Bailey) . . 88 


Trade. Department Discusses the Role of 
East-West Trade in U.S. Foreign Relations 
(Ingersoll) 90 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 9" 

Senate Asked to Approve Convention for Con- 
sei-vation of Antarctic Seals (message from 
President Ford) 95 

|T c o o 

Department Discusses the Role of East-West 
Trade in U.S. Foreign Relations (Ingersoll) 90 

President Ford's News Conference of December 
20 (excerpts) • '^'^ 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of 
December 23 69 

U.S. Discusses Angola in U.N. General As- 
sembly (Moynihan) 80 

United Nations 

United Nations Documents 89 

U.S. Discusses Angola in U.N. General As- 
sembly (Moynihan) 80 

U.S. Gives Views on U.N. Resolution on Human 

Rights in Chile (Garment, text of resolution) 84 

United States Supports Admission of Surinam 

to the United Nations (Bailey) 88 

U.S. Welcomes Adoption by U.N. of Declara- 
tion on Torture (Maymi, text of resolution) 86 

Name Index 

Bailey, Pearl „ 88 

Ford, President 76, 77, 79, 95 

Garment, Leonard 84 

Ingersoll, Robert S 90 

Kissinger, Secretary 69, 79 

Maymi, Carmen R 86 

Moynihan, Daniel P 80 

Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: Dec. 29-Jan. 4 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 


Kissinger: Washington Star in- 

Foreign investment and national- 

Pine Arts Committee, Jan. 17. 

Shipping Coordinating Commit- 
tee, Subcommittee on Maritime 
Law, Feb. 3. 

U.S. -Japan textile agreement. 

Joan Braden appointed as Con- 
sumer Affairs Coordinator (bio- 
graphic data). 

No. Date 

*629 12/29 

*630 12/30 

*631 12/31 

*632 12/31 

*'633 12/31 
*634 12/31 

■ Not printed. 

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U.S. government printing office 



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Washington, D.C. 20402. 




Volume LXXIV 

No. 1909 • January 26, 1976 


Excerpt From Address 97 




Statement by Assistant Secretary Habib 106 


Statements by Carmen R. Maymi and Text of Resolution 110 


For index see inside back cover 


Vol. LXXIV, No. 1909 
January 26, 1976 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington. D.C. 20402 


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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
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reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN Is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the wortc of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selectei 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
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included concerning treaties and inter- 
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United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
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international relations are also listed. 

{resident Ford Addresses American Farm Bureau Federation 

Following is an excerpt from an address 
I President Ford made before the conven- 
on of the AmeyHcan Farm Bureau Federa- 
on at St. Louis, Mo., on January 5.' 

Today, I want to remind those who would 
inimize our national strength that over 
le-half of the grain moving across interna- 
onal boundaries throughout the world is 
•own by you, the American farmer. And we 
•e proud of your efforts and your results. 

But if we want dependable export markets 
>r our food, the United States must be a 
iliable supplier. On two occasions since I 
icame President, the government was 
•reed to temporarily restrain farm exports. 

recognize that these actions resulted in 
)nfusion and concern among some of our 

The first government interruption came in 
ctober of 1974 when the Soviet Union 
iddenly, and without any notice whatso- 
;er, entered our markets to buy at a time 
hen we had a short crop in some areas, 
he government was forced to intervene to 
arn Soviet intentions. This was in the in- 
•rest of our livestock producers and our 
igular grain-buying customers overseas 
[id the American public. Accordingly, con- 
tacts with the Soviet Union were renego- 
ated to change the proportion of corn and 
heat for export. 

These actions headed oiT the danger of 
Jen more severe legislative restrictions by 
le Congress. 

Last summer, the Soviets suffered another 
xtremely short crop. They again turned to 
le U.S. farmers for supplementary grain 

i ' For the complete text, see Weekly Compilation of 
jresidential Documents dated Jan. 12, 1975. 

supplies. A temporary hold on new sales to 
the Soviets was made only after they had 
become our largest foreign customer by pur- 
chasing 9.8 million metric tons of grain — 
375 million bushels. 

There was, as you know, deep concern at 
that time about our own corn crop. Although 
the wheat harvest was nearly completed by 
July, our feed grain crop was still somewhat 
uncertain. Dry weather had already dam- 
aged corn in the western corn belt. Thei'e 
was no way of knowing if we would have a 
repeat of the drought or an early freeze 
which hit the corn crop the previous year. 

Again, a temporary hold on new grain 
sales to the Soviets and, later, to Poland 
was taken, I can assure you, with extreme 
reluctance. Pressures in the Congress were 
increasing to halt all private grain sales and 
put agricultural exports in the hands of a 
government management and control board. 
I did not, and do not, want the government 
running your business 365 days a year, year 
in and year out. 

It was a unique situation that required 
corrective action and long-term solution. 
The temporary hold on the new sales per- 
mitted us to work out a five-year agreement 
with the Russians. Since then — since then, 
in the open market we have made substan- 
tial new sales to the Soviet Union and to 
Poland. Right now, ships filled with U.S. 
grain are now backed up at foreign ports 
waiting to be unloaded. There is every like- 
lihood that we may sell even more this year 
to the Soviet Union. 

This new agreement now assures that the 
Russians will purchase at least 6 million 
metric tons of U.S. corn and wheat each 
year for the next five years. This is more 
than a bushel a person in terms of the en- 

ionuary 26, 1976 


tire U.S. population. Poland has also indi- 
cated it will buy about 100 million bushels 
of U.S. grain annually for the next five 

In addition to the annual Russian pur- 
chase commitment of 228 million bushels of 
wheat and corn, this agreement provides an 
option to purchase an additional 76 million 
bushels annually. All purchases will be at 
market prices through the private sector. 
If the Russians wish to purchase more than 
304 million bushels in any year, it is possible 
under the agreement. There is no arbitrary 
and inflexible ceiling. For example, we have 
already sold them more than 500 million 
bushels out of the current 1975 crop. 

This agreement is in the interest of both 
the American farmer and the American 
consumer. It prevents the Soviets from dis- 
rupting our markets. As we have seen over 
the years, disruptive and unpredictable pur- 
chases led to such problems as congressional 
demands for export control and the refusal 
of unions to handle grain shipments. 

We have now assured American grain 
producers that at planting time they will 
have a much more reliable indication of how 
large an export market there will be at 
harvest time, and that is good for all of us. 
The American livestock producer will have 
a better idea of his feed supply. The Amer- 
ican consumer will know that grain will be 
moving overseas in a regular flow and be 
assured there will be adequate food at home. 

We have transformed occasional and er- 
ratic customers into regular customers. We 
have averted an outcry every year that the 
Russians are coming to make secret pur- 
chases in our markets. The private market- 
ing system has been preserved. Record 
exports are moving right now. 

The alternatives were and are intolerable. 
The prospects of massive pileups at docks 
with crops backed up all the way to local 
elevators is totally unacceptable. 

I ask you: Should we run an obstacle 
course through Congress and other road- 
blocks each year on whether to sell any 
grain to the Soviet Union? I say no, and I 

hope you do, too. Should we turn our crop 
over to a government control board to man- j 
age and sell overseas? I emphatically say no, 
and I hope you do, too. 

Some in Congress and elsewhere are now 
questioning the wisdom of grain sales to the 
Soviet Union because the Soviets are inter- 
vening militarily in the newly independent 
African country of Angola. Our commitment 
to work with all nations, including the So- 
viet Union, to lessen the risk of war and to 
achieve greater stability is a sincere and 
constructive undertaking, but it is a com- 
mitment which must be honored by both 
sides. There cannot be a lessening of world 
tension if the Soviet Union, by military sup- 
port and other means, attempts to expand 
its sphere of influence thousands and thou- 
sands of miles from its borders. 

The United States will not cease its ef- 
forts, diplomatic and otherwise, to stabilize 
the military situation in Angola and promote 
a quick and peaceful settlement. We favor an 
immediate cease-fire and an end to all, all, 
all outside intervention and a government of 
national unity, permitting the solution of 
the Angolan problem by the Angolans them- 
selves. We are working closely with many 
other African countries to bring this about 
— countries that realize, perhaps better 
than the U.S. Congress, that our continued 
effort to counter Soviet and Cuban action is 
crucial to any hope of a fair solution. 

The Soviet Union must realize that the 
Soviet attempt to take unilateral advantage 
of the Angolan problem is inconsistent with 
the basic principles of U.S.-Soviet relations. 
If it continues, damage to our broader rela- 
tions will be unavoidable. 

You, the farmers of America, understand 
the importance of America's relations with 
the rest of the world. You know we cannot 
abdicate our responsibilities for maintaining 
peace and progress. 

I emphasize, however, that it is a serious 
mistake to assume that linking our export of 
grain to the situation in Angola would serve 
any useful purpose whatsoever. In fact, 
withholding grain already under contract, 


Department of State Bulletin 

already sold, would produce no immediate 
gain in diplomatic leverage. American grain, 
while important to the U.S.S.R., is not vital 
to them. The Soviet Union has survived for 
nearly 60 years, including years of total 
Western economic embargo, without Ameri- 
can grain. The impact of a grain cutoff 
would be felt only after a long, long period. 
It would not produce the needed short-term 

There is not the slightest doubt that if we 
tried to use grain for leverage, the Soviets 
could get along without American grain and 
ignore our views. This was emphatically and 
quite dramatically demonstrated by theij- 
attitude toward the U.S. Trade Act provi- 
sions of 1972 on emigration from the Soviet 

The linkage of grain [with] diplomacy 
would mean disruption and hardship for 
you, the farmer, a serious increase in ten- 
sions between the world's two superpowers, 
and no effect whatsoever in Angola. 

U.S.-Soviet rivalry in some areas around 
the world has unfortunately not ceased. The 
answer is to take other appropriate limited 
measures necessary to block and stop Soviet 
actions that we find unacceptable. And we 

Now, in these complicated and controver- 
sial times, it is imperative that you maintain 
the freedom to market crops and to find 
customers wherever you can. Strong agri- 
cultural exports are basic to America's farm 
policy and the freedom of every farmer to 
manage his own farm. You should be re- 
warded, not punished, for producing each 
year much more than we consume at home. 

You must — and I emphasize must — export 
two-thirds of each year's wheat crop or cut 
back production. You must export 50 per- 
cent of your soybeans or cut back produc- 
tion. You must be able to export more than 
55 percent of your rice crop or cut back 
production. You must be able to export 40 
percent of your cotton or cut back produc- 
tion. You must export at least one-fourth 
of your feed grain or cut back production. 

In short, you must export to keep farming 

profitable in America. You must export if we 
are to keep a favorable balance of U.S. inter- 
national trade. You must export if you are 
to prosper and the world is to eat. This is 
the farm policy that is bringing new life to 
our rural countryside. 

Food, as all of you know, is now our num- 
ber-one source of foreign exchange. Farm 
exports last year totaled nearly $22 billion. 
Our favorable $12 billion balance in inter- 
national agricultural trade offsets deficits in 
nonagricultural trade. It strengthens the 
American dollar abroad. This helps to pay 
for the petroleum and other imports that 
are vitally essential to maintain America's 
high standard of living. 

We have heard much in the 1970's of 
"petropower," the power of those nations 
with vast exportable petroleum resources. 
Today, let us consider a different kind of 
power — agripower, the power to grow. Agri- 
power is the power to maintain and to im- 
prove the quality of life in a new world 
where our fate is interdependent with the 
fate of others in this globe. 

People throughout the world can reduce 
the consumption of petroleum with some 
sacrifice, but they cannot reduce the con- 
sumption of food without widespread starva- 
tion. Indeed, the world's population will 
nearly double by the year 2000. By coping 
with hunger, we can assure a better future 
for all the peoples of the world. 

Gen. George C. Marshall, in outlining his 
European recovery plan at Harvard Univer- 
sity in 1947, said that "Our policy is di- 
rected not against any country or doctrine 
but against hunger, poverty, desperation, 
and chaos." General Marshall's words are 
today reflected in our foreign policy. 

The credibility of the United States — our 
credibility around the world — rests upon our 
vast resources as much as our defenses. As 
we assess our strength for peace, America's 
farming families stand shoulder to shoulder 
with our men and women in uniform as they 
do the job for all of us. And we thank you 
for your contribution. 

January 26, 1976 


President Ford Interviewed for NBC Television 

Following is the transcript of an interview 
with President Ford by John Chancellor and 
Tom Brokaw of NBC Netvs tvhich ivas re- 
corded at the White House on January 3 for 
the NBC Neivs special program on foreign 
policy broadcast on January 5. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated January 12 

Mr. Brokaiv: Mr. President, do you think 
that it is possible for you to make decisions 
in the name of national security if those 
decisions do not reflect the popular will of 
the people? 

President Ford: It does make it somewhat 
difficult, Tom, but I think it is the responsi- 
bility of a President to fully inform the 
American people and convince them that 
what we are seeking to do in foreign policy 
is in our best interests, and if a President 
carries out that responsibility, then he can 
and will have the support of the American 

Mr. Brokaw: Is that the situation now in 
Angola? Do you have to convince the Ameri- 
can people of what you consider to be the 
national security of the United States there? 

President Ford: I believe there is a need 
and necessity for that. I don't believe that 
enough Americans understand the great re- 
sponsibilities we have as a nation on a 
worldwide basis, and that includes, of course, 
Africa as a whole. What we really want and 
what we are seeking to do in Angola is to 
get an African solution to an African prob- 
lem. And through bilateral negotiations, 
through working with the Organization of 
African Unity, through relations with the 
Soviet Union and others, we are trying to 
achieve that African solution to an African 

Mr. Brokaw: Mr. President, the Soviet 

Union quite clearly has signaled in a Tass 
article that it wants all major powers to 
withdraw militarily from Angola. Has Mos- 
cow privately communicated that to you as 

President Ford: We are working with all 
powers, including the Soviet Union, to try 
and permit the Angolan people, the three 
different groups there at the present time, 
to get a decision or solution that will reflect 
a majority view of the Angolan people. And 
we are doing it, as I indicated, with a num- 
ber of major powers, including the Soviet 
Union, as well as the many, many African 
countries that are a part of the Organiza- 
tion of African Unity. 

Mr. Brokaw: But as a result of this Tass 
article, is it your understanding now that 
Russia is prepared to break off its military 
.support and to have Cuba quit sending 
troops as well to Angola? 

President Ford: I don't believe we can say 
categorically that that is their intention. 
We are simply working with them because 
a continuation of that confrontation is de- 
stabilizing; it is, I think, inconsistent with 
the aims and objectives of detente. And we 
are making some headway, but I can't say 
categorically that the end result is what we 
want it to be at the present time. 

Mr. Brokaw: Mr. President, in a recent 
speech. Secretary Kissinger said there is a 
gray area between foreign policy and na- 
tional security which, he said, ive deny our- 
selves at great risk to our national security. 
I suppose that training foreign mercenaries 
for use in Angola might be called part of 
that gray area. Are we training foreign 
mercenaries for v^e in Angola? 

President Ford: The United States is not 


Department of State Bulletin 

training foreign mercenaries in Angola. We 
do expend some Federal funds — or U.S. 
funds — in trying to be helpful, but we are 
not training foreign mercenaries. 

Mr. Brokaw: Are we financing the train- 
ing of foreign mercenaries? 

President Ford: We are working with 
other countries that feel they have an inter- 
est in giving the Angolans an opportunity 
to make the decision for themselves, and I 
think this is a proper responsibility of the 
Federal Government. 

Mr. Brokaw: Mr. President, while you 
may disagree with the results of the Senate 
vote on Angola, do you agree that it 'prob- 
ably represents the ivill of the American 

President Ford: It may at this time. But I 
will repeat, as I said a few moments ago, the 
American people, I think, if told and fully 
informed as to the role and responsibility 
and the aims and objectives of the American 
Government in trying to let the Angolans 
and the Africans come to a solution, I think 
in time the American people will support 
what we have been trying to do in Angola. 

Mr. Brokaw: Mr. President, in the past 
the congressional role in foreign policy has 
been largely confined to a few chairmen and 
senior Tnennbers. Now the process has been 
broadened considerably. You are formerly a 
man of Congress. Do you think that is a 
healthy sign? 

President Ford: I think Congress, under 
the Constitution, does have a proper role in 
foreign policy, but I don't think our fore- 
fathers who drafted that Constitution ever 
envisioned that 535 Members of the House 
and Senate could execute foreign policy on 
a day-to-day basis. I think the drafters of 
the Constitution felt that a President had 
to have the opportunity for decisiveness, for 
flexibility, for continuity in the execution of 
foreign policy and somehow we have to mesh 
the role and responsibility of the Congress, 
which is proper, with the opportunity for 
the President to carry out that foreign pol- 
icy in the best interests of the United States. 

Now, there have been some instances in 
recent months where I think the actions of 
the Congress have hampered, interfered 
with, the execution of foreign policy, and let 
me cite one or two examples. 

The action of the Congress about a year 
ago has harmed the opportunity of many to 
emigrate from the Soviet Union. I noticed 
just the other day that the emigration from 
the Soviet Union is down this year, includ- 
ing many reductions in the emigration of 
Soviet Jews from Russia. I think the action 
of the Congress was harmful in that regard. 

It is my judgment that in the case of con- 
gressional action on Turkish aid, they have 
slowed down the potential solution to the 
Cyprus problem. 

In some respects, and I emphasize "some," 
the action of the Congress has hurt our 
efforts in the intelligence field, although the 
Congress in some respects in this area has 
illuminated what were — and I think we all 
recognize — some abuses in the intelligence 

But overall, there has to be a better under- 
standing of the role of the Congress and the 
role of the President, and they have to be 
meshed if we are going to be successful. 

Mr. Chancellor: Mr. President, is it be- 
cause of Viet-Nam and the fact that Presi- 
dent Johnson and, to some degree. President 
Nixon had a lot of control over Viet-Nam, 
and the Congress had very little control of it 
that you are in this fix? 

President Ford: I believe some of the in- 
stances that I have cited, John, are an after- 
math of the trauma of Viet-Nam. Congress 
really asserted itself in the latter days of 
the Viet-Nam war. We all understand why; 
and Congress, having whetted its appetite, 
so to speak, I think in the last few months 
has continued to do some things that have 
been harmful in the execution on a day-to- 
day basis of our foreign policy. 

Mr. Brokaxv: Mr. President, as a result of 
the Soviet role in Angola, the fact that the 
SALT talks [Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks] now have bogged down somewhat, the 
fact that the spirit and the letter of the 

January 26, 1976 


Helsinki agreement have not been fully car- 
ried out by Russia, are you now less enthusi- 
astic about the prospects for detente? 

President Ford: I am not at all, and I 
think it would be very unwise for a Presi- 
dent — me or anyone else — to abandon de- 
tente. I think detente is in the best interest 
of this country. It is in the best interest of 
world stability, world peace. 

We have to recognize there are deep ideo- 
logical differences between the United States 
and the Soviet Union. We have to recognize 
they are a superpower militarily and indus- 
trially just as we are. And when you have 
two superpowers that have such great influ- 
ence, it is in the best interests of those two 
countries to work together to ease tensions, 
to avoid confrontation where possible, to 
improve relations on a worldwide basis. 

And for us to abandon this working rela- 
tionship and to go back to a cold war, in my 
opinion, would be very unwise for we in the 
United States and the world as a whole. 

Mr. Brokatv: But ivon't you be under a lot 
of domestic political pressure in this election 
year to change your attitude about detente? 

President Ford: I think it would be just 
the reverse; because when we look at de- 
tente — with the Berlin agreement of 1971, 
with SALT One, which put to some extent 
a limitation on nuclear development, et 
cetera — and when I look at the benefits that 
can come from the Vladivostok agreement 
of 1974, it is my opinion that we must con- 
tinue rather than stop. 

And if the American people take a good 
calculated look at the benefits from de- 
tente, I think they will support it rather 
than oppose it; and politically, I think any 
candidate who says "abandon detente" will 
be the loser in the long run. 

Mr. Brokaw: Mr. President, the historian 
Will Durant has said that a statesman can't 
afford to be a moralist as ivell. Briefly, do 
you agree with that statement? 

President Ford: I don't believe there is 
any necessary conflict between the two. We 
have to be pragmatic at the same time. We 
have to be practical as we meet these specific 

problems. But if you lose your moral value, 
then I think you have destroyed your capa- 
bility to carry out things in a practical way. 

Mr. Chancellor: Mr. President, I ivonder 
if I could ask you a question about the 
United Nations, ivhich seems to have less 
utility in the world these days than it did' 
when it began, and also about some of the 
pressure groups that we find both within the 
United Nations and as you see these pressure 
groups in foreign affairs — / am thinking, 
for example, of the influence of American 
Jeivs, of the growing influence of Arabs, of 
various groups. Aren't those groups kind of 
closing in on you, or do you feel that some- 
times, sir? 

President Ford: I believe that substantial 
progress, John, was made in the United Na- 
tions in the seventh special session late in 
1975. That was a very constructive session 
of the United Nations which sought to bring 
together the developing, as well as the de- 
veloped, nations. 

This was constructive. Now, it is true that 
subsequent to that there were some very 
vitriolic debates, there were some very seri- 
ous diff'erences that developed in the United 
Nations from various pressure groups. 

I would hope that in the future some of 
this conflict would subside and there would 
be a more constructive effort made to solve 
the problems, and since I am always an opti- 
mist — and I think it is important and neces- 
sary for a President to be that — I think that 
as we move in the United Nations in the 
future that we can calm some of the voices 
and get to some of the answers. 

And so this country's foreign policy in the 
United Nations will be aimed in that direc- 
tion, and if we follow what we did in the 
seventh special session and what we are 
trying to do now, I think these pressure 
groups will recognize that words are not the 
answer but solutions will be to the benefit of 
all parties concerned. 

Mr. Chancellor: In your history of public 
life, as a Member of Congress, Mr. President, 
and now as the President, do you find that 
organized groups play a greater role now in 
terms of our foreign affairs, or trying to 


Department of State Bulletin 

influence them, than they did when you 

President Ford: To some degree, yes. I 
think highly organized, very articulate pi'es- 
sure groups can, on occasion, tend to distort 
the circumstances and can hamper rather 
than help in the solution. 

I don't believe those pressure groups nec- 
essarily represent the American people as a 
whole. So a President, myself included, has 
to look at the broad perspective and not 
necessarily in every instance respond to the 
pressure groups that are well intentioned 
but who have a limited perspective, or scope. 

And as we move ahead, we are going to 
try and predicate our foreign policy on the 
best interests of all the people in this coun- 
try, as well as our allies and our adversaries, 
rather than to respond to a highly articu- 
late, a very tightly organized pressure group 
of any kind. 

We cannot let America's policies be predi- 
cated on a limited part of our population or 
our society. 

President Ford's Year-End Meeting 
With Reporters 

Follotving are excerpts relating to foreign 
policy from the transcript of President 
Ford's question-and-answer session with 23 
reporters in the Oval Office at the White 
House on December 31. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated January 5 

In foreign policy, we had, of course, a set- 
back in Southeast Asia. But if you take a 
look at what has been accomplished else- 
where, whether it is in NATO, where we have 
convinced our allies that the American 
people are going to stand strong in that area 
— they absolutely believe that the United 
States is going to be a firm partner. And I 
think the personal relationship with leaders 
in Western Europe is as good, if not better, 
than any time in the last 20 or 30 years. 

If you look to the Pacific, despite the 
problems in Viet-Nam, our relationship with 
Japan is the best in the history of this coun- 
try. We have kept faith with other countries 
in the whole Pacific area, and they believe 
that the United States will stand in the 
future firmly for the freedom that they have 
and the opportunities for a better life for 
all of their people. 

Q. Mr. President, in 1972, we and the Rus- 
sians signed a pledge in Moscow — 

President Ford: What year was that? 

Q. In 1972, ive signed a pledge with the 
Russians, both sides agreeing not to raise 
tensions anywhere in the world — detente. 
The Russians say that detente does not mean 
that the status quo around the ivorld stays 
the same. We know it isn't the same in An- 
gola. Aren't they breaking the rules on 
detente there, and how do we stand? 

President Ford: Both Secretary Kissinger 
and I have spoken out very strongly against 
the Soviet activity in Angola, and I reaffirm 
it today. I think what is being done in An- 
gola by the Soviet Union in conjunction 
with the Cubans is not constructive from 
the point of view of detente. 

We couldn't be any firmer publicly than 
we have been in that regard. But I think we 
have an obligation to continue to work with- 
in the framework of detente because there 
are some other benefits that have accrued. 
I think SALT One was a step forward, and 
if SALT Two can be negotiated on a mutual 
basis, it will be constructive within the 
framework of detente. But, I reaffirm, An- 
gola is an example of where I think detente 
has not worked the way it should work, and 
we strongly object to it. 

Q. Is it possible, sir, that detente may 
simply end up being agreements on nuclear 
iveapons and nothing else? 

President Ford: I hope not. I think it 
ought to have a far broader implication. I 
think detente can be helpful, just as an 
example, in the longrun solution in the 
Middle East. And there are some good signs 

January 26, 1976 


that it is helping to moderate certain influ- 
ences in the Middle East. 

Q. Mr. President, your predecessor sat in 
this office and, in May of 1970, warned 
against the United States of America be- 
coming a pitiful, helpless giant. In a sense, 
our speaking out on Angola is about all we 
can do. The United States, seemingly oper- 
ating tvithin the frametvork of detente, 
seems to be powerless to do anything else 
other than speak out in offering statements 
by the President and by the Secretary of 
State. Have we, therefore, in effect, reached 
a kind of status in the world where we are a 
pitiful, helpless giant in the continent of 

President Ford: I don't think we are a 
pitiful, helpless giant in Africa. We have a 
great many countries that look to us and 
work with us and, I think, are sympathetic 
to what we are trying to do in conjunction 
with them. There are some African states 
that obviously don't look toward us, but look 
toward the Soviet Union. 

I think we would have been in a stronger 
position to find a compromise in Angola if 
the Senate had not taken the action that it 
took. Nevertheless, despite that setback, we 
are maximizing the utilization of funds that 
are available, small as they are. And we are 
moving as strongly as possible in the area 
of diplomatic initiatives with the OAU [Or- 
ganization of African Unity], on a bilateral 
basis with African states, with other coun- 
tries throughout the world that have an 
interest in Africa. 

I certainly think, despite the handicap of 
the Senate action, we are going to do every- 
thing we possibly can. And we certainly are 
not a pitiful giant in this process. 

Q. Mr. President, can I follow that one up? 

President Ford: Surely. 

Q. You said you would do everything we 
possibly can. Would this include the use of — 
rethinking of the sales of grain as a political 
weapon or as a diplomatic tool? 

President Ford: I think the grain sale with 
the Soviet Union, the five-year agreement, 
is a very constructive part of the policy of 

detente. It certainly is constructive from the 
point of view of American agriculture. We 
have a guarantee of 6 million tons a year 
with a top limit of some 8 million tons. It, I 
think, over the long haul will be looked upon 
as a very successful negotiation. I see no 
reason at this time, certainly under the cir- 
cumstances existing today, for any revision 
of that negotiated agreement. 

Q. Mr. President, why is it necessary for 
you to rule out any improvement in our rela- 
tions with Cuba, when what they are doing 
in Angola is essentially no different than 
what the Soviet Union is doing or South 
Africa is doing. But especially what evil have 
the Cubans done? 

President Ford: It is pretty hard for me 
to see what legitimate interest Cuba has in 
sending some 6,000 well-equipped, well- 
trained military personnel to Angola. I just ,i 
don't see what their interest is. And it cer- ' 
tainly doesn't help our relations with Cuba 
when they know that we think it is in the 
best interests of the three parties in that 
country to settle their differences them- 

Q. You say it is not standing in the way 
of detente with the Soviet Union; it has not 
broken off our relations with South Africa 
and what they are doing there. Why is Cuba 
singled out for apparently a more strict 
treatment? I 

President Ford: I think that is very simple. 
We have had a period of what, 13 years of 
very few, if any, contacts with the Govern- 
ment of Cuba and many, many differences, 
and there were some prospects — I say were 
some prospects — for gradual improvement. 
But when we are trying to resolve differ- 
ences in Angola, they are seeking to expand 
the conflict there with active military per- 
sonnel. It just is such a different view from 
our own. I don't see how, under those cir- 
cumstances, we can feel that we can work 
with them in the future in this hemisphere 
or elsewhere. 

Q. Mr. President, have you hinted at some 
progress with the Russians on Angola. Is 


Department of State Bulletin 

that true? I mean, do you have some under- 

President Ford: I can only say that we 
have presented very forcefully our view that 
what is being done there is contrary to de- 
tente. I think there is a better solution. As 
I said yesterday — and I will repeat today — 
we are maximizing our effort diplomatically, 
broadly as well as bilaterally. 

United States Official Killed 
in Athens 

Following are texts of a statement read to 
neivs correspondents on December 23 by 
Robert L. Funseth, Director, Office of Press 
Relations, and a statement by President 
Ford issued at Vail, Colo., that day. 

Q. Mr. President, you mentioned Viet-Nam 
at the beginning. I wonder tvhether we could 
have one more look back at that tvar. I am 
sure history is going to be asking this ques- 
tion. I think it will. Whatever happened to 
the domino theory, which I think you once 
espoused? Looking back, did it really ever 
have any validity, or does it continue to have 
a validity? 

President Ford: I think it can have valid- 
ity, and the situation that developed in Laos, 
as you well know, the coalition government 
there has dissolved, been overcome. I know 
that there are countries in Southeast Asia 
that were fearful that it might be a reality. 
We were able to reaffirm our presence at the 
present time as well as in the future in the 
Pacific, or Southeast Asia. And thus far we 
have been able to preclude what I honestly 
felt might have taken place. 

Outside of some weakening in some coun- 
tries, the domino theory has not taken place, 
and we are fortunate. I am glad that that 
theory has been disproven, but it took some 
strong action and I think some leadership 
by this country to handle the matter. 


Richard S. Welch, a Special Assistant to 
the Ambassador and First Secretary at the 
U.S. Embassy in Athens, was shot to death 
by three unidentified assailants this after- 
noon, December 23, 1975. 

Secretary Kissinger has sent a message 
of condolence to Mr. Welch's widow, who 
resided with him in Athens. 

The Greek Government has conveyed to 
us its outrage at this barbaric act and has 
given us its assurances that all possible 
means are being taken to apprehend the 
criminals responsible. 


White House press release (Vail, Colo.) dated December 23 

I was shocked and horrified by the terror- 
ist murder of Mr. Richard Welch outside his 
home in Athens, Greece. Mr. Welch has long 
been a dedicated official of the U.S. Govern- 
ment, and the hearts of all Americans go out 
to his family in sympathy and in gratitude 
for a life given in devoted service to his 

January 26, 1976 



Department Outlines Development of U.S. Relationship 
With the People's Republic of China 

Statement by Philip C. Habib 

Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs * 

Before discussing the President's recent 
trip to Peking, I believe it will be useful to 
outline in general terms our relationship 
with the People's Republic of China. 

A fundamental goal of U.S. foreign policy 
is to promote an international order of peace, 
justice, and prosperity for all. In pursuing 
this objective, our approach proceeds from 
the premise that peace depends on a stable 
global equilibrium. Nowhere is this more 
important than in the Pacific, where the 
security concerns of four great powers — the 
United States, the Soviet Union, China, and 
Japan — intersect, and where the United 
States has important interests and responsi- 

The normalization of U.S. relations witli 
the People's Republic of China is a crucial 
element in preserving this equilibrium. For 
over two decades our relations with this 
country, which represents nearly one-quar- 
ter of mankind, were based on hostility and 
mutual suspicion. Gradually leaders on both 
sides came to realize that this posture 
served the interests of neither country and 
was incompatible with the changes that had 
taken place in the world over the last 25 

' Made before the Special Subcommittee on Investi- 
gations of the House Committee on International 
Relations on Dec. 17. The complete transcript of the 
hearings will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 

Since 1971, we have managed through our 
joint efforts to overcome the legacy of the 
past and to work out a relationship of mu- 
tual respect between the United States and 
China. As Secretary Kissinger stated in his 
speech to the U.N. General Assembly on 
September 22, 1975 : 

There is no relationship to which the United 
States assigns greater significance than its new ties 
with the People's Republic of China. We believe that 
the well-being and progress of a quarter of humanity 
is an important element in global stability. 

Although this is not the occasion for a 
review of the entire history of U.S.-P.R.C. 
relations, it is important to remember that 
the Communist victory in China, the emer- 
gence of a seemingly monolithic Sino-Soviet 
bloc, and the outbreak of the Korean war 
in 1950 served to freeze our relationship 
with the People's Republic of China into the 
basic form it was to retain for over 20 years. 

Throughout this period the Taiwan issue 
remained the overriding problem between 
Peking and Washington. While there was a 
gradual evolution in official Washington 
thinking in favor of seeking an accommoda- 
tion with the People's Republic of China, 
hopes for progress were frustrated by the 
sharply divergent views between the two 
sides, by our involvement in the Viet-Nam 
conflict, and by the outbreak of the cultural 
revolution in China, which for a time com- 
plicated Peking's relations with the outside 
world in general. Throughout this period 
we maintained contact with the People's 


Department of State Bulletin 

Republic of China through the ambassa- 
dorial-level talks that began in Geneva in 
1955 and were later moved to Warsaw, but 
the exchanges in this forum failed to narrow 
the differences between the two sides. 

In the late 1960's, however, the U.S. Gov- 
ernment undertook a number of steps de- 
signed to relax tension between the United 
. States and the People's Republic of China 
ill areas such as trade and travel. In the 
spring of 1971 these moves were recipro- 
cated by Peking's invitation to an American 
table tennis team to visit the People's Re- 
public of China, a step that was followed 
I shortly by Dr. Kissinger's first visit to 
Peking in July 1971 and President Nixon's 
announcement that he would visit China in 

To understand why, after two decades of 
confrontation and isolation, the United 
I States and the People's Republic of China 
were finally able to agree to move toward 
normalization, we should recall the global 
context in which the move took place. 

There had been basic changes in the inter- 
national environment — and our understand- 
ing of that environment — since 1950. The 
U.S.S.R. had risen to a position of global 
power. There had been a shift in the nuclear 
balance between the United States and the 
Soviet Union in the direction of parity, and 
China itself had developed a nuclear capa- 

Of no less importance was the fact that 
the close Sino-Soviet relationship of the 
1950's had dissolved, and the schism between 
Peking and Moscow had reached the point 
of open military clashes on the Sino-Soviet 
border by the spring of 1969. These clashes 
came shortly after the Soviet intervention 
in Czechoslovakia in 1968, which Moscow 
justified in terms of a universalist formula 
that made such intervention a duty to pre- 
vent backsliding from Soviet-approved So- 
cialist norms. These developments clearly 
contributed to Peking's preoccupation with 
its own security. 

The United States, for its part, was end- 
ing its involvement in the Viet-Nam war. 
Our troop presence in Indochina was begin- 
ning to decline, and as we looked to the post- 

war future in Asia, it was increasingly clear 
that we should try to involve the People's 
Republic of China in a new structure of 
peace in Asia characterized by mutual re- 
straint of the great powers. Not only was 
the freedom of action of U.S. diplomacy 
severely constrained by the absence of rela- 
tions with the People's Republic of China, 
but growing urgency was attached to the 
task of preventing dangerous miscalcula- 
tions by the new and emerging nuclear 
power in China. 

These changes in the international en- 
vironment enabled the United States and 
the People's Republic of China to arrive at 
a new appreciation of their relationship in 
which common elements were seen to pre- 
dominate over the differences flowing from 
our varying societies, philosophies, and posi- 
tions in the world. 

In essence there are three aspects of our 
relations with the People's Republic of 
China. The first is the geopolitical aspect, 
reflected in our common recognition that the 
overall security of the international order 
would be better maintained if the United 
States and China had a relationship of dia- 
logue with each other than if they were in a 
position of permanent hostility. The second 
aspect concerns those factors affecting the 
full normalization of our relations, the most 
important of which is the question of Tai- 
wan. The third concerns the mutually bene- 
ficial bilateral ties we have established in 
areas such as trade and scientific and cul- 
tural exchanges. 

President Nixon's visit to the People's 
Republic of China in February 1972 dealt 
with all three of these aspects. The results 
of his visit were set forth in the Shanghai 
communique, a document which continues 
to form the basis for the new and durable 
relationship that has emerged between our 
two countries. The communique was an 
unusual document, since it outlined the 
differences between the two countries. More 
importantly, however, the communique re- 
corded certain broad principles of interna- 
tional relations to which both subscribed. 

Both sides agreed that despite differences 
in social systems and foreign policies, coun- 

January 26, 1976 


tries should conduct their relations on the 
basis of respect for the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of all states, nonaggres- 
sion against other states, equality and mu- 
tual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. They 
agreed that international disputes should be 
settled on this basis without resorting to the 
use or threat of force. 

With these principles in mind, the United 
States and the People's Republic of China 
jointly stated that: 

— Progress toward the normalization of 
relations between China and the United 
States is in the interest of all countries. 

— Both wish to reduce the danger of inter- 
national military conflict. 

— Neither should seek hegemony in the 
Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to 
efforts by any other country or group of 
countries to establish such hegemony. (Dur- 
ing Secretary Kissinger's visit to the Peo- 
ple's Republic of China in November 1973, 
the two sides reiterated this point and ex- 
panded it to include opposition to efforts to 
establish hegemony in any part of the 

— Neither is prepared to negotiate on be- 
half of any third party or to enter into 
agreements or understandings with the 
other directed at other states. 

On the crucial question of Taiwan, both 
sides stated their positions clearly. The 
United States acknowledged that all Chinese 
on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain 
there is but one China of which Taiwan is a 
part. The U.S. Government did not challenge 
this position. It reaffirmed its interest in a 
peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue by 
the Chinese themselves, and with this pros- 
pect in mind, it affirmed the ultimate objec- 
tive of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and 
military installations from Taiwan. In the 
meantime, the United States stated that it 
would progressively reduce its military pres- 
ence on Taiwan as tension in the area dimin- 

Finally, the Shanghai communique laid 
the foundation for tangible improvement in 
U.S.-P.R.C. relations. It was agreed that the 
two sides would facilitate bilateral ex- 

changes in such fields as science, technology, 
culture, sports, and journalism. They under- 
took to facilitate the progressive develop- 
ment of trade and agreed that the two gov- 
ernments would maintain contact through 
various channels, including sending a senior 
U.S. representative to Peking periodically 
to exchange views on issues of common con- 

Developments since the Shanghai commu- 
nique was signed have confirmed that our 
relationship with the People's Republic of 
China is on a sound basis. There have been 
extensive exchanges of scientific and tech- 
nological delegations, of sports teams and 
performing arts groups. In February of 
1973, we agreed with the Chinese on the 
reciprocal exchange of Liaison Offices, which 
provides us with a means for conducting our 
day-to-day bilateral relations. Trade rose 
from a base of zero in 1970 to nearly a bil- 
lion dollars in 1974. Members of Congress, 
State Governors, and other representative 
Americans have visited the People's Repub- 
lic of China. And Secretary Kissinger has 
had important conversations with Chinese 
leaders in New York as well as China, on 
many occasions. 

There are, of course, a number of unre- 
solved bilateral issues, including the prob- 
lem of Taiwan. It will take time to resolve 
these, although the direction of our policy 
is clear. We have approached normalization 
of our bilateral relations with the People's 
Republic of China in accordance with the 
position we stated in the Shanghai commu- 
nique that the ultimate resolution of the 
Taiwan question is for the Chinese them- 
selves to decide and that the resolution 
should be by peaceful means. For our part, 
we have progressively reduced our forces in 
the Taiwan area as tensions in Asia have 

We have continuing disagreements with 
the People's Republic of China in ideology 
and varying national interests which lead to 
differences in our respective foreign policies. 
We make no attempt to hide these. This is 
only natural, and each side will inevitably 
determine its own policies according to its 
own situation and perception of its national 


Department of State Bulletin 

interest. At the same time, the fundamental 
geopolitical considerations that caused us to 
work out the present relationship remain 
valid and lend it a degree of stability it 
might otherwise lack. 

President Ford's recent visit to the Peo- 
ple's Republic of China should be viewed in 
this context. Extensive changes had oc- 
curred in both countries and the world since 
President Nixon's visit in 1972. Both sides 
recognized the importance of sustaining the 
dialogue between the top leaders of the two 
countries and reviewing our respective per- 
ceptions of the international situation which 
contributed so much to bringing our two 
countries closer together. 

The President's visit confirmed that while 
U.S.-P.R.C. relations are not yet normalized, 
they are good and will be gradually im- 
proved. The discussions naturally centered 
on the international aspects of the relation- 
ship, to which both sides attach primary 
significance. The talks demonstrated the 
existence of important points in common, 
although there were of course some differ- 
ences in view. 

President Ford reaffirmed the determina- 
tion of the United States to complete the 
normalization of relations with the People's 
Republic of China on the basis of the Shang- 
hai communique, which P.R.C. Vice Premier 
Teng Hsaio-p'ing described as remaining 
"full of vitality today." Overall, the discus- 
sions significantly promoted the objectives 
which the United States and the People's 
Republic of China share with regard to both 
our bilateral relations and the international 

The United States is confident that we can 
continue to build a relationship with the 
People's Republic of China which advances 
the national interests of both countries. This 
relationship must be founded on mutuality 
as well as realism, which is a firmer basis 
than sentiment for sound and durable ties. 
As President Ford said in his speech in 

Hawaii on December 7 this year, our rela- 
tionship with the People's Republic of China 
"is becoming a permanent feature of the 
international political landscape. It benefits 
not only our two peoples but all peoples of 
the region and the entire world." 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

93d Congress, 2d Session 

Multinational Corporations and United States For- 
eign Policy. Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Multinational Corporations of the Senate Commit- 
tee on Foreign Relations on investments by multi- 
national companies in the Communist bloc countries. 
Part 10. June 17^uly 22, 1974. 405 pp. 

94th Congress, 1st Session 

Increased U.S. Participation in the Inter-American 
Development Bank. Report of the House Commit- 
tee on Banking, Currency and Housing, together 
with supplemental views, to accompany H.R. 9721. 
H. Rept. 94-541. October 8, 1975. 49 pp. 

Report by Congressional Advisers to the Seventh 
Special Session of the United Nations. Submitted 
to the House Committee on International Relations 
and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 
October 13, 1975. 67 pp. 

International Labor Organization Convention and 
Recommendation Concerning the Prevention and 
Control of Occupational Hazards Caused by Car- 
cinogenic Substances and Agents. Communication 
from the Assistant Secretary of State for Con- 
gressional Relations transmitting the texts of In- 
ternational Labor Organization convention no. 139 
and recommendation no. 147. H. Doc. 94-280. Octo- 
ber 9, 1975. 16 pp. 

International Labor Organization Convention and 
Recommendation Concerning Paid Educational 
Leave. Communication from the Assistant Secre- 
tary of State for Congressional Relations trans- 
mitting the texts of International Labor Organiza- 
tion convention no. 140 and recommendation no. 
148. H. Doc. 94-281. October 9, 1975. 18 pp. 

The Convention on the International Regulations for 
Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972. Report of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accom- 
pany Ex. W, 93-1. S. Ex. Rept. 94-8. October 22, 
1975. 10 pp. 

January 26, 1976 



United States Discusses Fulfillment of Goals 
of International Women's Year in the U.N. 

Following are statements made in Com- 
mittee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cul- 
tural) of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. 
Representative Carmen R. Maymi on Decem- 
ber 3 and December 5, together with the text 
of a resolution adopted by the committee on 
December 5 and by the Assembly on Decem- 
ber 15. 


Statement of December 3 

USUN press release 170 dated December 3 

My delegation has looked forward to the 
day when the General Assembly would be- 
gin work on the item for the World Confer- 
ence of the International Women's Year.' 
For too long the world community has failed 
to perceive sexual discrimination as one of 
the most widespread deprivations of human 

From its inception, the United Nations 
under article 1 of the charter has held a 
mandate to encourage respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all, 
without distinction as to sex. Yet during 
this period the United Nations has not 

' For U.S. statements at the World Conference of 
the International Women's Year at Mexico City on 
June 20 and July 2, texts of resolutions sponsored or 
cosponsored by the United States, and text of the 
World Plan of Action for the Implementation of the 
Objectives of the International Women's Year, see 
Bulletin of Aug. 18, 1975, p. 233. 

exerted the leadership nor have its members 
availed themselves of the opportunities to 
move as rapidly as possible to end discrimi- 
nation against women at all levels, social 
and economic levels, in law and in practice, 
even in the U.N. system itself, which has 
continued discriminatory practices in the 
international civil service despite pleas for 
equal opportunities. 

As a result of this discrimination women 
have been repeatedly denied the opportunity 
to make their full contribution to our soci- 
eties. The result has been that all people 
have suffered. Adequate solutions to prob- 
lems have not been reached, nor has the 
genius of women been channeled into society. 

It is not an overstatement to say that 
women of countries at every stage of de- 
velopment and at every social and economic 
level looked forward to the World Women's 
Conference as an instrument that would 
help to change and improve their lives. 
Women have awaited the day when this ses- 
sion of the General Assembly will put its 
weight behind a call for action. 

At the Mexico City Conference there was 
full agreement that discrimination against 
women is incompatible with human dignity 
and with the welfare of the family, that it 
prevents women's participation on equal 
terms with men in all aspects of the life of 
their countries, and that it is an obstacle to 
the full development of women's potentiali- 
ties in service to humanity as well as to 
their self -fulfillment as human persons. 

The world conference reminded us of the 


Department of State Bulletin 

great contribution made by women in social, 
political, economic, and cultural life and of 
the part they play, along with men, in the 
rearing of children. But it also reminded us 
of the U.N.'s commitment to the attain- 
ment of human rights for women as well as 
men. It reminded us of the necessity to in- 
sure the universal recognition, in law and in 
fact, of the principle of the equality of men 
and women. It noted further that it is the 
primary responsibility of governments and 
peoples of individual countries to insure the 
advancement of women within the process 
of national development. 

The conference stressed that only through 
a sustained international commitment to 
improving standards of living of the poorest 
in each community can women, who consti- 
tute a disproportionately high number of 
this group, live in dignity and justice free 
from hunger and poverty. Significantly, it 
noted that changes in the social and eco- 
nomic structures of societies cannot, of 
themselves, insure the elimination of dis- 
crimination against women or their full 
integration into their society. 

Nevertheless, despite very full delibera- 
tions and recommendations of the World 
Conference of the International Women's 
Year, we still hear in these halls the ques- 
tion: "What is it that women want?" 

Madam Chairperson, what women want 
has been highlighted in every member coun- 
try during this significant year; and we, as 
women, have found a new understanding 
among ourselves in expressing these needs. 
We hope that it has helped men to under- 
stand as well. 

Women want to be treated as full, equal, 
and responsible members of society. They 
want the underutilization of half of the 
world's human resources to cease. 

Women want the right to make their con- 
tribution to economic and social development 
on an equal basis with men with human dig- 
nity. They want to share equally in its re- 
wards. Their full participation in the vari- 
ous economic, political, social, and cultural 
sectors is an important indication of the 

dynamic progress of peoples and their de- 

Women want equal access to education 
and to vocational guidance and training in 
order to widen their choice of employment 

Women want removal of the age-old 
stereotyped concepts of their role ; they want 
freedom of choice to enter the occupations 
from which they have been excluded in the 

Women want the same opportunities as 
men for promotion to decisionmaking and 
policymaking positions within all spheres of 
economic, social, and political activity. 

Women want a narrowing of the wide gap 
in earnings between women and men, and 
they want equal pay for work of equal value. 

Women want all elements of the U.N. sys- 
tem to support projects that will reduce the 
heavy burden placed on women in the de- 
veloping countries. This will enable them to 
enter more productive activities at levels 
commensurate with their skills, and it will 
increase their earning power. 

Women want assurances that their child- 
bearing capacity will not be used as an ex- 
cuse to limit their role in society and force 
on them alone child-rearing responsibilities. 
They want men to share actively in the re- 
sponsibilities of child rearing and in family 

Women want the right to develop their 
potentialities and to exercise options in life 
without discrimination as equal partners 
with men in fulfilling national economic and 
social needs. They ask member governments 
and the United Nations to take those rights 
fully into account and to make adequate 
provision for the improvement of their sit- 

Madam Chairperson, we see no mystery in 
what women want. Nor was this a mystery 
to the men and women who gathered at the 
World Conference. Although they spoke 
different languages, embraced various faiths, 
represented different degrees of develop- 
ment and different economic levels, they 
were united by a broad mutuality of inter- 

January 26, 1976 


ests in their common determination to as- 
sert their rights, to assist each other, 
and to exercise solidarity by urging appro- 
priate action from governments, the U.N. 
system, nongovernmental organizations, and 
other groups working toward the achieve- 
ment of these goals. 

These are the goals toward which the plan 
of action and most of the resolutions are 

The role of women in development was 
one of the principal concerns of the confer- 
ence, not only because justice and equal 
rights demand their full participation, but 
also because the development process re- 
quires it. Indeed, this process cannot succeed 
if any nation ignores one-half of its human 
potential. The goals of equality for women 
and their integration into the development 
process are inextricably interrelated. Each 
is indispensable to the other. 

In our own bilateral AID [Agency for 
International Development] programs we 
have sought to give tangible form to this 
conviction. By statute and by administrative 
regulations, our AID programs are now re- 
quired to give priority to programs which 
integrate women into the national econo- 
mies of their countries. Our AID missions 
are required to submit impact statements 
indicating the effects of proposed programs 
on women. 

Another important initiative of the con- 
ference concerned the practices of the 
United Nations itself as an employer. The 
United States was pleased to cosponsor 
Resolution 8, "The Situation of Women in 
the Employ of the United Nations and Spe- 
cialized Agencies." 

Everyone in this committee knows that the 
United Nations still falls short of the ideals 
it proclaims on equality for women; surely 
this is the year for launching the needed 
steps so that the United Nations as an em- 
ployer will set standards of which all can be 
proud. A resolution adopted this week in the 
Fifth Committee should provide an impor- 
tant impetus to needed action.^ 

We also wish to note the valuable work of 

the Standing Committee on the Employment 
of Women in the Secretariat, a group re- 
porting to the Joint Advisory Committee on 
Personnel. The standing committee, created 
in response to a recommendation of the 
Fifth Committee during the 29th General 
Assembly, began work last spring and has 
since produced two reports. We urge both 
the Secretariat and member states to give 
priority attention to its recommendations. 

Resolutions and plans of action do not of 
themselves change the world. Implementa- 
tion and the call for implementation are not 
the same thing. Ultimately, the significance 
of what we are doing here today will depend 
upon our ability to retain the consensus 
evident at Mexico City that the U.N. system 
should become an effective instrument for 
sustained action to improve the condition 
of women worldwide. It will depend even 
more on what governments and organiza- 
tions and individuals, both men and women, 
around the world do to carry out commit- 
ments that have been made. 

Madam Chairperson, I have spoken up to 
now about the excellent work of the confer- 
ence. Unfortunately, it is necessary also to 
refer to other than constructive aspects. 

The United States objected strongly to 
the efforts of some to politicize the confer- 
ence, and we have no wish to politicize the 
question here. I will only remark how deeply 
the people of the United States objected to 
the references to Zionism in the Declaration 
of Mexico and to the wording of a few of 
the resolutions of the conference.^ The in- 
jection of divisive issues was disruptive, 
was not germane to the substance of the 
conference itelf, and weakened the very posi- 
tive achievements and impact of the con- 

" A resolution on employment of women in the 
Secretariat of the United Nations was adopted by 
Committee V (Administrative and Budgetary) on 
Dec. 1 and by the Assembly on Dec. 8 (A/RES/3416 

' For text of the declaration, plans of action, reso- 
lutions, decisions, and recommendation adopted by 
the conference, see U.N. doe. E/5725, Report of the 
World Conference of the International Women's Year. 


Department of State Bulletin 

It does no credit to our work that some 
delegations persistently raise divisive issues 
that only divert us from the job at hand. 
Confrontation, not positive action, seems 
their objective. We deeply want to concen- 
trate on our common goals and objectives 
and work together to achieve them. How- 
ever, as necessary, we will not shrink from 
our responsibility to oppose those resolutions 
or provisions of resolutions which we cannot 
accept — some of which even violate the very 
principles on which the United Nations was 

The World Plan of Action was recognized 
from the start as the single most important 
document of the conference. And we wish to 
commend Mrs. Helvi Sipila, Secretary Gen- 
eral of the conference and Mrs. Margaret 
Bruce, Deputy Secretary General, as well as 
the U.N. Commission on the Status of 
Women for the excellent preparatory work 
done on the World Plan of Action. The plan 
of action was amended by minor modifica- 
tions and adopted by consensus in Commit- 
tee I and in plenary. We see this consensus 
as extremely significant. Effectiveness will 
of course depend upon the extent to which 
it is translated into action. 

Fortunately, we are now on the verge of 
declaring a "Decade for Women: Equality, 
Development and Peace." We intend to de- 
vote this Decade to the implementation of 
the programs and projects which will bring 
about the fulfillment of the goals of Inter- 
national Women's Year and the World Plan 
of Action. This will not occur on its own; 
the Decade will need strong and enduring 
supporters. Like the plan itself, the Decade's 
success will depend upon cooperation and 
determination by all. 

Finally, let me say a few words about what 
is being done in the United States. Individ- 
uals and organizations representing labor 
unions, women's groups, the educational 
community, and private industry have 
worked intensively and jointly to plan for 
the national observance of the Year. 

Women throughout our country joined 
women throughout the world in the plan- 

ning for a nongovernmental conference in 
sessions running concurrently with the 
world conference. Six thousand persons came 
to Mexico from all over the world to express 
their views on the need to eliminate dis- 
crimination against women. 

President Ford appointed a National 
Commission for the Observance of Interna- 
tional Women's Year and has given the 
Commission a mandate to plan "An Agenda 
for the Future." The Commission has or- 
ganized a series of working groups to re- 
view the status of women in these relevant 
areas: international interdependence, women 
in power, enforcement of the laws, child de- 
velopment, reproductive freedom, the mass 
media, the arts and humanities, the concerns 
of homemakers, and women in employment. 
The Commission is already submitting rec- 
ommendations and will submit its report to 
him early in 1976 to indicate the need for 
necessary action or appropriate legislation. 

In the case of the Women's Bureau, of 
which I am the Director, our concern will be 
for a forceful enforcement of the antidis- 
crimination laws and Executive orders that 
now exist in order to eliminate sex discrimi- 
nation in employment, to promote employ- 
ment opportunities for women especially in 
the areas from which they have been ex- 
cluded in the past, and to take action to 
recognize the contribution of all women 
workers to the economy of our country. 

Other Federal agencies have established 
machinery to monitor and implement non- 
discrimination on the basis of sex. Some of 
these include a Special Assistant to the 
President of the United States for Women 
and an Office of Women's Programs in the 
White House; the Women's Bureau in our 
Department of Labor, established in 1920; a 
Women's Action Program in the Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare; and a 
Federal Women's Program Coordinator to 
monitor employment practices in every gov- 
ernmental body. We also have citizens ac- 
tively involved in this machinery, including 
a President's Advisory Council on the Status 
of Women, Advisory Councils to the Secre- 

January 26, 1976 


taries of Labor, Defense, and Health, Educa- 
tion, and Welfare. 

On the nongovernmental level, women's 
groups and other organizations have been 
tremendously motivated by the World Plan 
of Action. These organizations are develop- 
ing their own agendas for action. In i-ecent 
months they have independently produced 
and distributed thousands of copies to 
women thi'oughout the country. Special ship- 
ments have gone to opinionmakers and deci- 
sionmakers in American organizational life 
and will soon reach a wider distribution 
throughout the country. 

Ultimately, it is actions such as these, 
taken by individuals and groups determined 
to improve the condition of women, that 
represent the greatest strength of the inter- 
national women's movement. It is our hope 
that the activities of the U.N. system to 
implement the World Plan of Action will 
spur these efforts in each country through- 
out the world. 

Statements of December 5 

USUN press release 177 dated December 5 

Explanation of Vote on Draft Resolution 

My delegation will abstain on resolution 
A/C.3/L.2195.'' The United States strongly 
supports steps to implement the World Plan 
of Action through a Decade of sustained na- 
tional, regional, and international action. 
Some of the wording in what is an otherwise 
workmanlike resolution is. however, unac- 
ceptable to us. 

Counterproductive and divisive issues, de- 
tracting from the needed consensus to ad- 
vance equality for women, have once again 
been introduced. 

In operative paragraph 1, we had re- 
quested the deletion of the final clause. The 
positions taken by my government in Mexico 
City remain firm. We object to any sugges- 
tion of giving blanket endorsement to all 

* The resolution was adopted by the committee on 
Dec. 5 by a rollcall vote of 97 to 2, with 22 absten- 
tions (U.S.) after separate votes on operative para- 
graphs 1 and 2, which the U.S. voted against. 

resolutions which resulted from the confer- 
ence or to the Declaration of Mexico. 

We will vote against operative paragraph j 
2 because of an undesirable ambiguity in its 
call for action to implement not only the 
World Plan of Action but also, and I quote, 
"related resolutions." Indeed, this phrase, 
"related resolutions," appears in a number 
of places in the text. 

The United States interprets the phrase 
"related resolutions" to refer to those reso- 
lutions adopted at the Mexico City Confer- 
ence which have a direct and relevant bear- 
ing on the World Plan of Action. We do not 
consider as related to the plan, or to the 
work to be accomplished during the Decade, 
the political resolutions that were adopted 
at Mexico City, including those with provi- 
sions on Palestinian women, elimination of 
Zionism, alleged human rights violations by 
Israel, the Panama Canal, natural resources 
and right of nationalization (without quali- 
fication), general and complete disarmament 
(without adequate controls), the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States, and 
the new international economic order. 

Since certain other delegations may not 
make the same interpretation, it is our in- 
tention to make clear the strength of our 
views by voting against the ambiguity of 
the last phrase in the second operative para- 

I must record one comment on the World 
Plan of Action, which the United States 
strongly supports. At the time the plan was 
adopted at Mexico City, the United States 
wholeheartedly favored the Decade To Com- 
bat Racial Discrimination, which is endorsed 
in paragraph 186 of the plan. Since that 
time, as is well known in this committee, the 
U.N. General Assembly has tragically and 
falsely equated Zionism wth racism. Ac- 
cordingly, the United States no longer sup- 
ports that Decade. Of this there should not 
be the slightest doubt. Needless to say, we 
remain committed to the elimination of 
racial discrimination as that term was 
understood prior to this General Assembly. 

In conclusion, I would like to say that my 
delegation recognizes and applauds the ef- 
forts of all who have worked long and hard 


Department of State Bulletin 

to produce reasonable and concrete programs 
which will have a significant impact on 
achieving the goals of the Decade for 

Explanation of Vote on Draft Resolution 

My delegation voted "no" on resolutions 
A/C.3/L.2194 and 2196.^ There is language 
in both resolutions which we are unable to 

The United States deplores the growing 
tendency to introduce a corrupted language 
of political morality which has become to- 
tally devoid of meaning. This trend is evi- 
dent in both resolutions, but we most em- 
phatically object to the repeated calls for 
the "elimination of racism." The elimination 
of racism, and the original moral imperative 
it once implied, have been turned into a 

We are not deceived by what has hap- 
pened in these resolutions. It has happened 
before, not only in the United Nations but 
in every international forum where totali- 
tarian regimes have banded together to 
press their vision upon the world. They do 
so by preying on the self-critical nature of 
liberal society and its continuous quest for 
improvement. They do so by insuring that 
every time we set out to condemn some fail- 
ing in our societies we end by having to 
condemn what is good about them as well. 
They do so by confusing and corrupting the 
language of political morality; and by doing 
so, they erode our capacity to defend those 
things that bear defending. 

= Draft resolution A/C.3/L.2194/Rev.l, entitled 
"Women's participation in the strengthening of inter- 
national peace and security and in the struggle 
against colonialism, racism, racial discrimination, 
foreign aggression, occupation and all forms of for- 
eign domination," was adopted by the committee on 
Dec. 5 by a vote of 73 to 27 (U.S.), with 22 absten- 
tions, and by the Assembly on Dec. 15 by a recorded 
vote of 90 to 21 (U.S.), with 22 abstentions (A/RES/ 
3519 (XXX)). Draft resolution A/C.3/L.2196, en- 
titled "Equality between men and women and the 
elimination of discrimination against women," was 
adopted by the committee on Dec. 5 by a vote of 88 
to 2 (U.S.), with 26 abstentions, and by the Assem- 
bly on Dec. 15 by a vote of 102 to 3 (U.S.), with 26 
abstentions (A/RES/3521 (XXX)). 

But we are aware of this. We know it 
when we see it, we know of its long past, 
and we will speak out when it appears. We 
are not going to permit our best impulses 
to be turned into tools of our detraction. 


World Conference of the International Women's Year 

The General Assembly, 

Recalling its resolution 3010 (XXVII) of 18 De- 
cember 1972 in which it proclaimed the year 1975 
International Women's Year, 

Recalling also Economic and Social Council reso- 
lutions 1849 (LVI) and 1851 (LVI) of 16 May 1974 
convening an international conference during the 
International Women's Year as a focal point of the 
international observance of the Year, 

Recalling further its resolutions 3276 (XXIX) and 
3277 (XXIX) of 10 December 1974 as well as Eco- 
nomic and Social Council resolution 1959 (LIX) of 
28 July 1975 concerning the World Conference of the 
International Women's Year, 

Recalling the importance of the participation of 
women in the implementation of the decisions of the 
General Assembly at its sixth and seventh special 
sessions as well as in the implementation of the 
Programme of Action on the Establishment of the 
New International Economic Order, 

Having considered the report of the Conference, 

Having considered also the note by the Secretary- 
General on the establishment of an international re- 
search and training institute for the advancement 
of women,' 

Convinced that the Conference, through the adop- 
tion of the Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of 
Women and their Contribution to Development and 
Peace, 1975, the World Plan of Action for the Imple- 
mentation of the Objectives of the International 
Women's Year and other resolutions, has made a 
valuable and constructive contribution towards the 
achievement of the threefold objectives of the Year, 

•A/RES/3520 (XXX) (A/C.3/L.2195) (text from 
U.N. doc. A/10474, report of the Third Committee on 
agenda items 75, International Women's Year, and 
76, Status and role of women in society) ; adopted 
by the Assembly on Dec. 15 by a rollcall vote of 107 
to 1, with 26 abstentions (U.S.), after separate votes 
on operative paragraphs 1 and 2, which the U.S. 
voted against. The U.S. supported resolutions en- 
titled "Improvement of the economic status of women 
for their effective and speedy participation in the 
development of their countries" (A/RES/3522 
(XXX)); "Women in rural areas" (A/RES/3623 
(XXX)); and "Measures for the integration of 
women in development" (A/RES/3524 (XXX)). 

'U.N. doc. A/10340. 

January 26, 1976 


namely the promotion of equality between men and 
women, ensuring the full integration of women in 
the total development effort, the promotion of 
women's contribution to the development of friendly 
relations and co-operation among States and the 
promotion of their contribution to the strengthening 
of world peace, 

Considering the valuable and constructive contri- 
butions towards the implementation of the threefold 
objectives of the International Women's Year made 
by conferences and seminars held during the Year, 

Convinced also that the promotion of development 
objectives and the solution of crucial world economic 
and social problems should contribute significantly 
to the improvement in the situation of women, in 
particular that of women in rural areas and in low- 
income groups. 

Convinced further that women must play an im- 
portant role in the promotion, achievement and 
maintenance of international peace. 

Considering that the decisions and recommenda- 
tions of the Conference should be translated into 
concrete action without delay by States, organiza- 
tions of the United Nations system and intergovern- 
mental and non-governmental organizations. 

Recalling that the Conference stressed the impor- 
tant role of regional commissions in the implementa- 
tion of the World Plan of Action and related resolu- 

Convinced that periodic and comprehensive re- 
views and appraisals of progress made in meeting 
the goals of the World Plan of Action and related 
resolutions endorsed by the Conference are of crucial 
importance for their effective implementation and 
should be undertaken at regular intervals by Gov- 
ernments and by the organizations of the United 
Nations system within an agreed time frame. 

Noting that the Conference recommended the con- 
tinuing operation of the Commission on the Status 
of Women or some other representative body, within 
the structure of the United Nations, designed specif- 
ically to deal with matters relating to the status of 
women, so as to ensure the implementation of con- 
tinuing projects designed to carry out the pro- 
g^rammes set forth in the World Plan of Action, 

1. Takes note of the report of the World Confer- 
ence of the International Women's Year, including 
the Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women 
and their Contribution to Development and Peace, 
1975, the World Plan of Action for the Implementa- 
tion of the Objectives of the International Women's 
Year, the regional plans of action, and the resolu- 
tions and other recommendations adopted by the 
Conference, and endorses the action proposals con- 
tained in these documents; 

2. Proclaims the period 1976-1985 United Nations 
Decade for Women: Equality, Development and 

Peace, to be devoted to effective and sustained na- 
tional, regional and international action to implement 
the World Plan of Action and related resolutions; 

3. Calls upon Governments, as a matter of ur- 
gency, to examine the recommendations contained in 
the World Plan of Action and related resolutions, 
including action to be taken at the national level, 
such as: 

(a) The establishment of short-term, medium- term 
and long-term targets, and priorities to this end, 
taking into account the guidelines set forth in chap- 
ters I and II of the World Plan of Action, including 
the minimum objectives recommended for achieve- 
ment by 1980; 

(b) The adoption of national strategies, plans and 
programmes for the implementation of the recom- 
mendations within the framework of over-all develop- 
ment plans, policies and programmes; 

(c) The undertaking of regular reviews and ap- 
praisals of progress made at the national and local 
levels in achieving the goals and objectives of the 
World Plan of Action within the framework of over- 
all development plans, policies and programmes; 

4. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to 
the relevant organs of the United Nations and to the 
organizations of the United Nations system the deci- 
sions and recommendations of the Conference; 

5. Invites all relevant organizations of the United 
Nations system concerned: 

(a) To submit, within the framework of the Ad- 
ministrative Committee on Co-ordination their pro- 
posals and suggestions to the Economic and Social 
Council at its sixth-second session for implementing 
the World Plan of Action and related resolutions 
during the United Nations Decade for Women: Equal- 
ity, Development and Peace; 

(b) To develop and implement, during the first 
half of the decade 1976-1985, under the auspices of 
the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination, a 
joint interagency medium-term programme for the 
integration of women in development, which should 
co-ordinate and integrate activities undertaken in 
accordance with subparagraph (a) above, with spe- 
cial emphasis on technical co-operation in pro- 
grammes relating to women and development; 

(c) To render, in accordance with requests of 
Governments, sustained assistance in the formulation, 
design, implementation and evaluation of projects 
and programmes which would enable women to be 
integrated in national and international development; 

6. Calls upon the regional commissions to develop 
and implement, as a matter of priority, effective 
strategies to further the objectives of the World 
Plan of Action at the regional and subregional levels. 


Department of State Bulletin 

bearing in mind their respective regional plans of 

7. Urges all financial institutions and all inter- 
national, regional and subregional development banks 
and bilateral funding agencies to accord high priority 
in their development assistance, in accordance with 
requests of Governments, to projects that would pro- 
mote the integration of women in the development 
process, in particular women in the rural areas, as 
well as the achievement of equality of women and 
men, priority being given to countries with limited 
financial means; 

8. Urges non-governmental organizations, at the 
national and international levels, to take all possible 
measures to assist in the implementation of the 
World Plan of Action and related resolutions within 
their particular areas of interest and competence; 

9. Decides in principle, in accordance with reso- 
lution 26 adopted by the Conference, to establish, 
under the auspices of the United Nations, an Inter- 
national Institute on Research and Training for the 
Advancement of Women, which would be financed 
through voluntary contributions and would collabo- 
rate with appropriate national, regional and inter- 
national economic and social research institutes; 

10. Invites the Secretary-General therefore to 
appoint, with due consideration to the principle of 
equitable geographical distribution, a group of five 
to ten experts to draw up, in consultation with the 
representatives of existing regional centres and/or 
institutes for research and training which have simi- 
lar objectives and goals, the terms of reference and 
structural organization of the Institute, giving spe- 
cial consideration to the needs of women of develop- 
ing countries, and requests the Secretary-General to 
report to the Economic and Social Council at its 
sixtieth session on the basis of the recommendations 
of the group of experts; 

11. Affirms that a system-wide review and ap- 
praisal of the World Plan of Action should be under- 
taken biennially, and that such reviews and appraisals 
should constitute an input to the process of review 
and appraisal of progress made under the Interna- 
tional Development Strategy for the Second United 
Nations Development Decade, taking into account the 
Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order and the decisions re- 
sulting from the sixth and seventh special sessions 
of the General Assembly; 

12. Affirms that the General Assembly and other 
relevant bodies should also consider biennially the 
progress achieved in the promotion of the full equal- 
ity of women with men in all spheres of life in 
accordance with international standards and, in par- 
ticular, the participation of women in political life 
and in international co-operation and the strengthen- 
ing of international peace; 

13. Expresses the hope that the Ad Hoc Committee 

on the Restructuring of the Economic and Social 
Sectors of the United Nations System, which will 
consider the report of the Group of Experts on the 
Structure of the United Nations System (E/AC.62/9), 
will take full account of the need to implement the 
World Plan of Action and related resolutions of the 
World Conference of the International Women's Year 
as well as the requirements of the United Nations 
Decade for Women : Equality, Development and Peace, 
and appeals to the Ad Hoc Committee to ensure that 
the machinery designed to deal with questions relat- 
ing to women should be strengthened, taking into ac- 
count, in particular, the role of the Commission on 
the Status of Women and the procedures established 
for system-wide review and appraisal of the World 
Plan of Action; 

14. Decides to include in the provisional agenda 
of its thirty-first session an item entitled "United 
Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development 
and Peace"; 

15. Invites the Secretary-General to submit a 
progress report to the General Assembly at its thirty- 
first session on the measures taken to implement the 
World Plan of Action and related resolutions, and on 
the progress achieved in initiating the procedures 
for the Plan's review and appraisal by Member States, 
the United Nations organs, the regional commissions, 
the specialized agencies and other intergovernmental 
organizations concerned; 

16. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure, if 
possible within existing resources, that the Secre- 
tariat unit responsible for women's questions pos- 
sesses adequate personnel and budgetary resources 
in order to discharge its functions under the World 
Plan of Action in co-operation with all organizations 
of the United Nations system; 

17. Requests further the Secretary-General, in the 
light of paragraph 16 above, to take into account the 
requirements of the World Plan of Action and re- 
lated resolutions of the Conference in preparing 
revised estimates for 1977 and the medium-term plan 
for 1978-1981 and to report thereon to the General 
Assembly at its thirty-first session, in accordance 
with established procedures; 

18. Urges all States, the organizations of the 
United Nations system and intergovernmental and 
non-governmental organizations concerned, as well as 
the mass communications media, to give widespread 
publicity to the achievements and significance of the 
Conference at the national, regional and international 

19. Requests the Secretary-General, as a matter 
of high priority, to issue, within existing resources, 
in the official languages of the United Nations, a 
simplified version of the World Plan of Action as a 
booklet, which would highlight the targets, goals and 
main recommendations for action by Governments, 
the United Nations system and non-governmental 

January 26, 1976 


organizations, and which would explain the relevance 
of the implementation of the World Plan of Action 
to the daily lives of men and women throughout the 
world ; 

20. Decides to convene, at the mid-term of the 
United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, De- 
velopment and Peace, in 1980, a world conference of 
all States to review and evaluate the progress made 
in implementing the objectives of the International 
Women's Year as recommended by the World Con- 
ference of the International Women's Year and, 
where necessary, to readjust existing programmes 
in the light of new data and research available. 

U.S. Gives Views on Question 
of Review of U.N. Charter 

Following is a statement made in Com- 
mittee VI (Legal) of the U.N. General As- 
sembly on November 14 by U.S. Representa- 
tive Monroe Leigh, ivho is Legal Adviser of 
the Department of State. 

USUN press release 148 dated November 14 

My delegation believes that the items cur- 
rently before us on charter review and 
strengthening the role of the United Nations 
are the most important ones before the 
Legal Committee this year. The views we 
expressed on this item last year were care- 
fully considered.' Since then we have re- 
viewed our position more than once. We re- 
viewed it in connection with our reply to the 
Secretary General's request for comments 
on charter review - and in connection with 
our preparations for the meeting of the Ad 
Hoc Committee on the Charter of the United 
Nations. We have reflected further on these 
issues in light of the session of the ad hoc 
committee which was held last summer. 

Our further reflections have reinforced 
our original views. We continue to view the 
question of charter review with both skepti- 
cism and concern. 

Our skepticism as to the utility of review 

' For a U.S. statement made in Committee VI on 
Dec. 5, 1974, see Bulletin of Jan. 27, 1975, p. 120. 
= U.N. doc. A/10113. 

of the charter is not based on any belief 
that the United Nations is functioning per- 
fectly or in the manner hoped for in 1945. 
Far from it. The United Nations, for all its 
successes in the field of peace and security 
and somewhat more sustained successes in 
certain economic and social fields, can and 
must do a far better job to meet the urgent 
and immediate needs of the world. To ac- 
complish that goal, however, we must avoid 
hasty and ill-considered actions which serve 
no useful purpose. 

Impediments to greater effectiveness of 
this organization do not lie in any restric- 
tions or limitations imposed by the charter. 
Those impediments are found in the political 
will of states which interpret and apply the 
charter's provisions. Common sense, good 
will, and a sense of responsiveness to the 
common interests of mankind are not to be 
legislated. They will not be evoked by modi- 
fication of the charter; on the contrary, the 
present text of the U.N. Charter both allows 
and encourages those elusive qualities as 
much or more than any modifications we 
have heard discussed. 

Our doubts about this charter review 
exercise are based on a concern that the 
United Nations will lose even that degree of 
consensus which we now share. We do not 
seek to maintain the status quo of 1945, or 
1975. The charter was conceived as a docu- 
ment which could stand the test of time by 
growing with evolving needs. It was con- 
ceived not merely as a constitutive treaty, 
but as a constitutional instrument. 

It has evolved, moreover, in central fields 
such as the eff'ective functioning of the 
Security Council, peacekeeping, and human 
rights, including self-determination. 

The reopening of questions on matters to 
which we have all freely agreed on various 
occasions in the past is hardly likely to 
widen areas of agreement among us. It is 
far more likely to lead to a hardening of 
positions and thus become the enemy of that 
evolutionary development which has been 
one of the strengths of the institution. 

For example, although article 27 provides 


Department of State Bulletin 

that decisions of the Security Council on 
nonprocedural matters require the concur- 
ring votes of the permanent members, in 
practice that requirement has significantly 
evolved to permit Security Council decisions 
notwithstanding permanent-member absten- 
tions or declarations of nonparticipation as 
alternatives to the veto. If article 27 were 
construed, as it reasonably might have been, 
to require the affirmative vote of each of the 
permanent members, the results of the work 
of the Security Council would certainly have 
been far different today. 

We view this evolution both as a positive 
contribution to the work of the Council, and 
hence to members of the United Nations in 
general, and as an excellent example of how 
the language of the charter permits impor- 
tant evolutionary changes without requiring 
textual changes. 

Attempts to meet particular problems of 
our moment in history by charter amend- 
ment are likely to restrict the charter's abil- 
ity to continue flexibly to meet the needs 
of the future. If we attempt to develop 
specific and detailed proposals for today, we 
could undo the genius of the accomplishment 
of 1945. That accomplishment was not 
simply to provide a charter to deal with the 
contingencies of 1946; it was farsighted 
enough to provide our basic guidelines for 
the future by allowing scope for historical 
change. We would remind those who say 
that if revisions of the charter made in 1975 
prove inappropriate in 1980 we can make 
further changes, that constant tinkering 
with a constitutional document can serve to 
destroy that institutional stability which is 
the sine qua non of the healthy growth and 
development of a parliamentary institution. 

Finally and perhaps most immediately, it 
is our concern that preoccupation with con- 
stant tinkering with the constitutional 
structure of the institution runs the great 
risk of diverting attentions and concerns 
from the urgent problems with which the 
institution can and must deal. 

The United States has repeatedly ex- 
pressed its willingness to consider measures 

for the improvement of the functioning of 
the United Nations and of its ability to 
perform its charter responsibilities. It is, 
however, our firm conviction that an exer- 
cise of introspection or examination of pos- 
sible improvements can usefully be under- 
taken only with the broad agreement of all 
concerned, principally because any improve- 
ments, by definition, will require that broad 
agreement if they are to be at all effective. 
The complete lack of success of the ad hoc 
committee last summer demonstrates, in our 
view, that circumstances were not then ripe 
for serious work. There was in that instance 
not even agreement on whether some effort 
should be undertaken, much less on what 
should be done. In those circumstances no 
amount of good will or hard work could have 
produced a productive session of the ad hoc 
committee. I need not detail the unproduc- 
tive nature of the exercise, since the com- 
mittee's report ^ demonstrates that conclu- 
sion. No useful purpose can be served by 
repeating that experience. 

Therefore we are not convinced this is the 
appropriate time to convene a committee, 
particularly in light of the extraordinarily 
busy schedule in the international legal field, 
including among others the many informal 
and formal meetings in connection with the 
law of the sea and the ongoing work in 
connection with the Diplomatic Conference 
on Reaffirmation and Development of Inter- 
national Humanitarian Law Applicable in 
Armed Conflicts. We could see some utility 
in a committee which would follow up on 
the work of the committee on rationalization 
of the procedure of the Assembly and 
examine the wealth of governmental com- 
ments already submitted in the context of 
strengthening the role of the United Na- 
tions. In this connection, Mr. Chairman, we 
believe that it is not necessary to agree with 
all of the proposals put forward by Ro- 
mania * in order to acknowledge that we all 
owe them a debt of appreciation for having 

' U.N. doc. A/10033. 
'U.N. doc. A/C.6/437. 

January 26, 1976 


initiated the item and provided us with much 
food for thought. 

In this context, a major area of concern 
to all members of the United Nations, and 
an area where we might constructively con- 
centrate our energies, is strengthening and 
development of measures for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes. There is, moreover, 
no doubt this can be done wholly within the 
existing language of the U.N. Charter and 
the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice. No area is more critical, and cer- 
tainly few areas contain more promise if we 
are able to demonstrate a basic positive 
political will. 

This committee has in the past looked at 
the functioning and role of the International 
Court of Justice. The Court itself recently 
modified its own rules of procedure in po- 
tentially significant ways. We should look 
very closely at the numerous and varied 
opportunities which the Court machinery 
provides for peaceful settlement of disputes, 
and we should insure that all states in the 
international community are fully aware of 
those possibilities. In this connection, we call 
the attention of the international community 
to the fact that the Court in its most recent 
advisory opinion appears to have given the 
Eastern Carelia precedent ^ a richly deserved 
final burial, thus clearly opening up vast 
new areas for treatment via the advisory- 
opinion route. 

We recognize that some states are not yet 
prepared fully to accept the Court as a 
means of dispute settlement. To those who 
have hesitated to have recourse to the Court 
for fear it would apply a form of law created 
by another era, I would merely urge a care- 
ful reading of the recent jurisprudence of 
the Court. 

We also recognize that there are some 
disputes which can best be solved, or at least 
initially ameliorated, by other means. We 
must consequently also examine fully the 
many other existing and potential facilities 

^ Status of Eastern Carelia, P.C.I.J., Series B, 
No. 5, 23 July 1923. 

for dispute settlement, including the reasons 
why they are too infrequently used and pos- j 
sible steps we might take to encourage the 
willingness and ease with which states might i 
regularly resort to them as a customary and 
attractive means of resolving disputes peace- 

At what might be regarded as the oppo- 
site end of the spectrum from judicial settle- 
ment is negotiation between the parties. It 
seems to us that even this seemingly simple 
and direct method might benefit from an 
exploration in terms of modern approaches 
to problem solving. 

Certainly we should take another look at 
the various approaches pursuant to which 
the participation of a third party is invited 
not with a view to deciding the dispute but 
with a view to inducing the parties to decide 
as among themselves. This approach would 
involve good offices and mediation. Good 
oflfices normally implies merely bringing the 
parties together and urging them to try 
harder, while mediation is suggestive of a 
more active participation by the third party. 
Clearly the Secretary General has made re- 
cent important contributions in this field. 
Are there other devices that can be used? 
Are there special techniques that can be 
examined ? 

There are also possibilities in the form of 
factfinding and inquiry. This can be en- 
visaged in terms of bilateral inquiry or in 
the classical sense envisioned in the Hague 
Conventions of 1899 and 1907 or pursuant 
to factfinding as discussed in various Gen- 
eral Assembly resolutions. 

Conciliation is another step in the process 
of third-party involvement. Is the concilia- 
tion mechanism set forth in the Vienna Con- 
vention on the Law of Treaties something 
we should include in all treaties; is it some- 
thing which should be established as an 
independent institution of general applica- 
tion? Do the existing institutions provide a 
useful resource, or are changes required? 

Are there untapped possibilities in the 
field of arbitration? Certainly an increasing 
number of purely commercial disputes are 


Department of State Bulletin 

settled in this way. Is there some reason 
, why states in our interdependent and poten- 
1^ tiaily self-destructive world should not take 
i another in-depth look at the possibilities of 
jjthis technique of dispute settlement? 

There is clearly much to be done in the 
field of dispute settlement and prevention 
and much to be done in terms of making the 
U.N. system more effective. We must seek 
to accomplish as much as is humanly pos- 
sible within the existing charter before dis- 
tracting ourselves with more ambitious and 
less likely schemes involving amendments 
to the charter.** 

U.S. Gives Views on U.N. Resolution 
on Transnational Corporations 

Following is a statement made in Com- 
mittee II (Economic and Financial) of the 
U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representa- 
tive Jacob M. Myerson on December i. 
together ivith the text of a resolution adopted 
by the committee on December h and by the 
Assembly on December 15. 


USUN press release 172 dated December 4 

In the course of his statement before the 
seventh special session, Secretary Kissinger 
set forth in some detail the views of my gov- 
ernment regarding transnational corpora- 
tions. I would only quote now one short part 
of that statement: 

For our part, the United States is prepared to 
meet the proper concerns of governments in whose 

" In a resolution adopted by consensus by the com- 
mittee on Dec. 2 and by the Assembly on Dec. 15 
(A/RES/3499 XXX)), it was decided that the Ad 
Hoc Committee on the Charter of the United Nations 
"should be reconvened as a Special Committee on the 
Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthen- 
ing of the Role of the Organization" and that its 
membership should be enlarged by five states. 

territories transnational enterprises operate. We 
affirm that enterprises must act in full accordance 
with the sovereignty of host governments and take 
full account of their public policy. Countries are en- 
titled to regulate the operations of transnational 
enterprises within their borders. But countries wish- 
ing the benefits of these enterprises should foster the 
conditions that attract and maintain their productive 

One such area of concern — of deep con- 
cern to my government as well as to others 
— arises from reports of corrupt practices 
involving multinational enterprises and for- 
eign officials or private parties. We condemn 
corrupt practices in the strongest terms. 
They are contrary to and tend to erode the 
best values of our respective societies. They 
may also have adverse effects on relations 
among states. 

Accordingly, the U.S. Government is pre- 
pared to cooperate closely with other gov- 
ernments to deal with this problem effec- 
tively and fairly. However, we wish to 
emphasize our view that no international 
action can substitute for the basic responsi- 
bility of each country to establish clear 
standards of behavior and to enforce them 
evenly and fairly against foreign nationals 
and its own citizens alike. Those govern- 
ments which are prepared to take such effec- 
tive and evenhanded measures will find that 
they have the sympathy and cooperation of 
the U.S. Government. 

I would like on this occasion to make clear 
that in the view of my government, private 
enterprise — and this includes transnational 
enterprises — has a vital role to play in the 
expansion of the world economy and in the 
development of all countries. We believe that 
most corporations are performing these 
functions very well. Thus, while some com- 
panies have been involved in practices which 
must be condemned, we must be careful not 
to respond in such a way as to destroy the 
vast benefits private companies bring to the 
international economy. 

It was with these considerations in mind 
that my delegation submitted for considera- 
tion by this committee the draft resolution 
dealing with transnational corporations con- 

January 26, 1976 


tained in L.1435.' We had no reason to doubt 
that it was a similar concern which prompted 
the cosponsors of the resolution contained in 
L.1437 to act. This assumption proved to be 
true as in the ensuing negotiations we were 
able to reach agreement on a single text. 

Under these circumstances, Mr. Chairman, 
the draft resolution sponsored by my gov- 
ernment — contained in L.1435 — may be 
withdrawn from consideration. Our purposes 
have been achieved by the achievement of 
consensus on the resolution contained in 

I would like to make some comments on 
the latter document, not by way of reserva- 
tion, but to make explicit our understanding 
of the text: 

— I think that we all agree on the con- 
demnation of corrupt practices, including 
bribery. The blame for such acts must be 
shared equally by all who participate. Thus, 
we interpret the reference to bribery wher- 
ever it appears in the text to cover all as- 
pects — the offering, the payment, the solici- 
tation, the acceptance of illegal payments. 

— As I indicated earlier, we believe that 
states have not only the right but also the 
responsibility to enact legislation against 
corrupt practices and to enforce such meas- 
ures through legal action. It is important 
that such legislation clearly define the of- 
fenses and establish specific measured pen- 
alties appropriate to particular offenses and 
that offenders should be prosecuted through 
the courts on the basis of evidence and due 
process of law. The United States will co- 

' Draft resolution A/C.2/L.1435, submitted by the 
United States and later withdrawn, contained the 
following operative paragraphs: 

1. Condemns the offering or solicitation of bribes 
and other corrupt practices by enterprises, or their 
encouragement by government officials or individuals; 

2. Requests the Economic and Social Council to 
instruct the Commission on Transnational Corpora- 
tions to include this issue in its programme of work 
to be submitted to the Council at its sixtieth session; 

3. Calls upon relevant governmental and non- 
governmental organizations to co-operate with efforts 
to resolve this problem. 

operate with legitimate law enforcement 
activities of host governments, but we wil) 
oppose arbitrary acts of economic reprisal 
on the basis of uncorroborated charges. 

— The question of the appropriate role of 
home governments in cooperating with host 
governments to eradicate corrupt practices 
is a complex one. For example, we have 
strong reservations about the feasibility or 
propriety of home countries enacting extra- 
territorial legislation to deal with this prob- 
lem. As is suggested in the resolution, we do 
believe that this is an area for cooperative 
action between governments and pledge our 
support to such efforts. We also believe that 
these issues need to be carefully examined 
in the U.N. Commission on Transnational 
Corporations. In this forum, as elsewhere, 
the United States will work for a construc- 
tive and effective solution to these problems. 

— Finally, Mr. Chairman, my delegation 
fully supports the concept of information 
exchange in particular cases within the con- 
text of established legal procedures. We do 
have doubts, however, about the efficacy and 
appropriateness of a blanket multilateral 
approach to information exchange. 

If I could quote once more from Secretary 
Kissinger's statement at the special session: 

The United States believes that just solutions are 
achievable — and necessary .... The capacity of the 
international community to deal with this issue con- 
structively will be an important test of whether the 
search for solutions or the clash of ideologies will 
dominate our economic future. 

Mr. Chairman, my delegation joined in the 
consensus approval of this resolution be- 
cause we believe that it does represent an 
example of dealing constructively with the 

I cannot close, Mr. Chairman, without ex- 
pressing my delegation's appreciation to the 
cosponsors of the resolution which has now 
been approved and in particular to their 
principal negotiator, Mr. Parsi [Farrokh 
Parsi, of Iran], for their cooperation in 
facilitating development of a consensus text 
on this important subject. 


Department of State Bulletin 


Measures against corrupt practices of transnational 
and other corporations, their intermediaries and 
others involved 

The General Assembly, 

Concerned by the corrupt practices of certain 
transnational and other corporations, their intermedi- 
aries and others involved, 

Recalling paragraph 4 (g) of the Declaration on 
the Establishment of a New International Economic 
Order which provides for the regulation and super- 
vision of the activities of transnational corporations, 

Recalling also the provisions of section V of the 
Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order emphasizing, inter 
alia, the need to formulate, adopt and implement the 
code of conduct referred to in the report of the Com- 
mission on Transnational Corporations on its first 

Recalling further the provisions of the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States according to 
which such corporations should not operate in a 
manner that violates the laws and regulations of the 
host countries, 

Recalling Economic and Social Council resolutions 
1721 (LIII) of 28 July 1972, 1908 (LVII) of 2 August 
1974 and 1913 (LVII) of 5 December 1974, 

Recalling the report of the United Nations Com- 
mission on Transnational Corporations on its first 

1. Condemns all corrupt practices, including 
bribery, by transnational and other corporations, 
their intermediaries and others involved in violation 
of the laws and regulations of the host countries; 

2. Reaffirms the right of any State to adopt legis- 
lation and to investigate and take appropriate legal 
action, in accordance with its national laws and 
regulations, against transnational and other corpora- 
tions, their intermediaries and others involved for 
such corrupt practices; 

3. Calls upon both home and host Governments to 
take, within their respective national jurisdictions, 
all necessary measures which they deem appropriate, 
including legislative measures, to prevent such cor- 
rupt practices and to take consequent measures 
against the violators; 

4. Calls upon Governments to collect information 
on such corrupt practices, as well as on measures 
taken against such practices, and to exchange in- 

= A/RES/3514 (XXX) (A/C.2/L.1437/Rev.l) (text 
from U.N. doc. A/10467, report of the Second Com- 
mittee on agenda item 12, Report of the Economic 
and Social Council); adopted by the committee on 
Dec. 4 and by the Assembly on Dec. 15 without a 

formation bilaterally and, as appropriate, multi- 
laterally, particularly through the United Nations 
Centre on Transnational Corporations; 

5. Calls upon home Governments to co-operate 
with Governments of the host countries to prevent 
such corrupt practices, including bribery, and to 
prosecute, within their national jurisdictions, those 
who engage in such acts; 

6. Requests the Economic and Social Council to 
direct the Commission on Transnational Corporations 
to include in its programme of work the question of 
corrupt practices of transnational corporations and 
to make recommendations on ways and means where- 
by such corrupt practices can be effectively prevented; 

7. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a 
report to the General Assembly at its thirty-first 
session, through the Economic and Social Council, on 
the implementation of the present resolution. 


Current Actions 


Atomic Energy 

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
as amended. Done at New York October 26, 1956. 
Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873, 5284, 
Acceptance deposited: Tanzania, January 6, 1976. 


International convention for safe containers (CSC), 
with annexes. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972.' 
Ratification deposited: Romania (with statement), 
November 26, 1975. 


Agreement on an international energy program. Done 
at Paris November 18, 1974.' 
Notifications of consent to be bound deposited: 

Canada, December 17, 1975; Sweden, December 

18, 1975. 


Constitution of the World Health Organization, as 
amended. Done at New York July 22, 1946. Entered 

'Not in force. 

January 26, 1976 


into force April 7, 1948; for the United States 
June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086. 
Acceptance deposited: Comoros, December 9, 1975. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic 
drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972. 
Entered into force August 8, 1975. TIAS 8118. 
Ratification deposited: Chile, December 19, 1975. 

Oil Pollution 

International convention on civil liability for oil pollu- 
tion damage. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. 
Entered into force June 19, 1975." 
Ratification deposited: Spain, December 8, 1975. 


Convention on registration of objects launched into 
outer space. Opened for signature at New York 
January 14, 1975.' 
Signature: Mexico, December 19, 1975. 


International telecommunications convention, with 
annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremoli- 
nos October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 

Ratifications deposited: Liberia, Yugoslavia, Sep- 
tember 22, 1975; Thailand, October 8, 1975.' 

Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 
1959, as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590, 
7435), to establish a new frequency allotment plan 
for high-frequency radiotelephone coast stations, 
with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva 
June 8, 1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976." 
Notifications of approval: Fiji, September 25, 
1975; German Democratic Republic, September 
22, 1975. 


Arrangement regarding international trade in tex- 
tiles, with annexes. Done at Geneva December 20, 
1973. Entered into force January 1, 1974, except 
for article 2, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 which entered 
into force April 1, 1974. TIAS 7840. 
Acceptance deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, De- 
cember 10, 1975. 

United Nations Charter 

Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the 
International Court of Justice. Signed at San Fran- 
cisco June 26, 1945. Entered into force October 24, 
1945. 59 Stat. 1031. 

Admission to membership : Comoros, November 12, 


Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat 
trade convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at 
Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force 
June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions 
and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions. 

Instrument of ratification signed by the President: 

December 22, 1975. 
Accessions deposited: El Salvador, January 7, 

1976; Luxembourg, January 5, 1976. 
Ratification deposited: United States, January 5, 

Protocol modifying and further extending the food 
aid convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at 
Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force 
June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions, 
and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions. 
Instrument of ratification signed by the President : 

December 22, 1975. 
Accession deposited: Luxembourg, January 5, 

Ratification deposited: United States, January 5, 



China, Republic of 

Agreement modifying the agreement of May 21, 1975 
(TIAS 8033), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and 
man-made fiber textiles and apparel products. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington De- 
cember 31, 1975. Entered into force December 31, 


Agreement for exchanges in the fields of education 
and culture. Signed at Rome December 15, 1975. 
Enters into force at such time as Italy has notified 
the United States that the formalities required by 
Italian law have been fulfilled. 


Agreement amending annex C of the mutual defense 
assistance agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS 
2016). Effected by exchange of notes at Oslo 
November 21 and December 1, 1975. Entered into 
force December 1, 1975. 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

Agreement amending the civil air transport agree- 
ment of November 4, 1966, as amended (TIAS 
6135, 7658, 8058). Effected by exchange of notes 
at Moscow December 4 and 22, 1975. Entered into 
force December 22, 1975. 

United Kingdom 

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and 
the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes on income and capital gains. Signed at Lon- 
don December 31, 1975. Enters into force after the 
expiration of 30 days following the date on which 
instruments of ratification are exchanged. 

' Not in force. 

' Not in force for the United States. 

' With reservations made at time of signing. 


Department of State Bulletin 

I^DEX January 26, 1976 Vol. LXXIV, No. 1909 

igriculture. President Ford Addresses Ameri- 
can Farm Bureau Federation (excerpt) . . 97 


resident Ford Addresses American Farm 

Bureau Federation (excerpt) 97 

•resident Ford Interviewed for NBC Television 100 
resident Ford's Year-End Meeting With Re- 
porters (excerpts from transcript of question- 
and-answer session) 103 

'hina. Department Outlines Development of 
U.S. Relationships With the People's Repub- 
lic of China (Habib) 106 


longressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy 109 

)epartment Outlines Development of U.S. 
Relationships With the People's Republic of 
China (Habib) 106 

;uba. President Ford's Year-End Meeting 
With Reporters (excerpts from transcript of 
question-and-answer session) 103 

ilconomic Affairs. U.S. Gives Views on U.N. 
Resolution on Transnational Corporations 
(Myerson, text of resolution) 121 

Greece. United States Official Killed in Athens 
(Ford, Department statement) 105 

Suman Rights. United States Discusses Ful- 
fillment of Goals of International Women's 
Year in the U.N. (Maymi, text of resolution) 110 

'residential Documents 

'resident Ford Addresses American Farm 
Bureau Federation (excerpt) 97 

'resident Ford Interviewed for NBC Television 100 

'resident Ford's Year-End Meeting With Re- 
porters (excerpts) 103 

Jnited States Official Killed in Athens ... 105 

'reaty Information. Current Actions .... 123 


'resident Ford Addresses American Farm 
Bureau Federation (excerpt) 97 

'resident Ford Interviewed for NBC Television 100 

'resident Ford's Year-End Meeting With Re- 
porters (excerpts from transcript of question- 
and-answer session) 103 

Jnited Nations 

'resident Ford Interviewed for NBC Television 100 
Jnited States Discusses Fulfillment of Goals 

of International Women's Year in the U.N. 

(Maymi, text of resolution) 110 

U.S. Gives Views on Question of Review of 
U.N. Charter (Leigh) 118 

U.S. Gives Views on U.N. Resolution on Trans- 
national Corporations (Myerson, text of 
resolution) 121 

Name Index 

Ford, President 97, 100, 103, 105 

Habib, Philip C 106 

Leigh, Monroe 118 

Maymi, Carmen R 110 

Myerson, Jacob M 121 

Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: January 5-1 1 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Mo. Date 


*1 1/5 U.S.-Republic of China textile agree- 

*2 1/5 Robert L. Funseth named Special 
Assistant for Press Relations and 
spokesman of the Department (bio- 
graphic data). 

*3 1/6 William J. Porter sworn in as Am- 
bassador to Saudi Arabia (bio- 
graphic data). 

*4 1/7 U.S. Advisory Commission on Inteiv 
national Educational and Cultural 
Affairs, Los Angeles, Calif., Feb. 2. 

*5 1/7 Study Group 7 of the U.S. National 
Committee for the International 
Radio Consultative Committee, Feb. 

*6 1/7 Ocean Affairs Advisory Committee, 
Feb. 10. 

t7 1/8 Kissinger: death of Premier Chou En- 

*8 1/9 Mary Olmsted sworn in as Ambassa- 
dor to Papua New Guinea (bio- 
graphic data). 

*Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

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U.S. government printing office 



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Washington, D.C. 20402. 




Volume LXXIV • No. I9IO • February 2, 1976 

OF JANUARY 14 125 

Statement by Avibassador Moynihan 
in the Closing Plenary Session of the 30th General Assembly 139 




For index see inside back cover 


Vol, LXXIV, No. 1910 
February 2, 1976 

For 3ale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 


52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 
domestic $42.50, foreign $53.16 
Single copy 85 cents 
Use of funds for printing this publication 
approved by the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget (January 29, 1971). 
Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers* Guide to Periodica) Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart' 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 

>ecretary Kissinger's News Conference of January 14 

ress lelease 13 dated January 14 

Secretary Kissinger: I have two state- 
nents, a brief one and a somewhat lengthier 

I was grieved to learn this morning of the 
leath of Prime Minister Razak of Malaysia, 
ie was a good friend of the United States, 
I most effective leader of his country, and 
he voice of peace and moderation in South- 
east Asia. We are extending our condolences 
o his widow and to the Government of 

The second statement deals with the U.S. 
ittitude toward Soviet actions in Angola and 
oward the SALT negotiations. 

The United States holds the view that the 
'ssence of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, if it 
s to proceed toward a genuine easing of 
ensions, is that neither side will seek to 
)btain unilateral advantage vis-a-vis the 
)ther, that restraint will govern our respec- 
ive policies, and that nothing will be done 
hat could escalate tense situations into 
confrontation between our two countries. 

It is the U.S. view that these principles of 
•nutual relations are not simply a matter of 
ibstract good will. They are at the very 
leart of how two responsible great powers 
Tfiust conduct their relations in the nuclear 

It must be clear that when one great 
power attempts to obtain a special position 
of influence based on military intervention 
and irrespective of original motives, the 
other power will sooner or later act to offset 
this advantage. But this will inevitably lead 
to a chain of action and reaction typical of 
other historic eras in which great powers 
maneuvered for advantage only to find them- 
selves sooner or later embroiled in major 
crises and, indeed, in open conflict. 

It is precisely this pattern that must be 

broken if a lasting easing of tensions is to 
be achieved. 

Whatever justification in real or alleged 
requests for assistance the Soviet Union 
may consider to have had in intervening and 
in actively supporting the totally unwar- 
ranted Cuban introduction of an expedition- 
ary force into Angola, the fact remains that 
there has never been any historic Soviet or 
Russian interest in that part of the world. 
It is precisely because the United States is 
prepared to accept principles of restraint for 
itself that it considers the Soviet move in 
Angola as running counter to the crucial 
principles of avoidance of unilateral advan- 
tage and scrupulous concern for the inter- 
ests of others which we have jointly enunci- 

The United States considers such actions 
incompatible with a genuine relaxation of 
tensions. We believe that this is a wholly 
unnecessary setback to the constructive 
trends in U.S.-Soviet relations which we can- 
not believe is ultimately in the Soviet or the 
world interest. 

The question arises whether, in the light 
of Angola and its implications for Soviet- 
American relations, it is consistent with our 
policy to go to Moscow and to negotiate on 
SALT. There are two points that need to be 
made in this context. 

First, we have never considered the lim- 
itation of strategic arms as a favor we grant 
to the Soviet Union, to be turned on and off 
according to the ebb and flow of our rela- 
tions. It is clear that the continuation of an 
unrestrained strategic arms race will lead 
to neither a strategic nor a political advan- 
tage. If this race continues, it will have pro- 
found consequences for the well-being of all 
of humanity. 

Limitation of strategic arms is therefore 

February 2, 1976 


a permanent and global problem that cannot 
be subordinated to the day-to-day changes 
in Soviet-American relations. 

At the same time, it must be understood 
on both sides that if tensions increase over 
a period of time, the general relationship 
will deteriorate, and therefore the SALT 
negotiations will also be affected. 

Second, we must consider the long-term 
consequences of a failure of the SALT nego- 
tiations. If the interim agreement lapses, 
the Soviets will be free of several severe re- 
straints. They can add heavy ICBM's with- 
out restrictions. They can build more 
submarines without dismantling old ICBM's. 
There will be no equal ceiling of 2,400. The 
immediate impact would be that the numeri- 
cal gap frozen in SALT One, and equalized in 
Vladivostok, would again become a factor, 
facing us with the choice of either large 
expenditures in a strategically and politically 
unproductive area or a perceived inequality 
with its political implications. 

Of course we will not negotiate any agree- 
ment that does not achieve strategic equal- 
ity for the United States and that we can- 
not defend as being in the national interest. 
Nor does it mean that Angola or similar 
situations, will, if continued, not impinge on 
SALT as well as the general relationship. 
But it does mean that the general objective 
of a more orderly and stable nuclear rela- 
tionship is in the interests of the United 
States and in the interests of the world and 
cannot be easily abandoned. This is why the 
President has decided that I should go to 
Moscow to negotiate on SALT, and we ex- 
pect that the talks will be conducted in the 
same spirit by the Soviet side. 

Now I will go to your questions. 

U.S.-Soviet Relations and Angola 

Q. Mr. Secretary, does the fact that you 
are going to Moscow now mean that you 
have forwarded a new proposal to the Krem- 
lin on SALT? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have not yet for- 
warded a new proposal to Moscow on SALT, 
but we expect to do so before I go there, 
within the next day or two. 



Q. Mr. Secretary, what is standing in th 
ivay of a compromise that would point th 
ivay to a treaty at this point? 

Secretary Kissinger: The obstacle to a 
agreement results primarily from issues th? 
could not be considered fully at Vladivostc 
because the technology was not yet deve 
oped at that time. Primarily the issues coi 
cern how to deal with the Soviet "Backfire 
bomber and how to deal with the America 
cruise missiles ; whether and how to cour 
them ; whether and what restraints to ac- 
cept. These are fundamentally the outstam 
ing issues. Most other issues have eithe 
been settled in principle or in detail. 

Q. Excuse me, if I may follow up. But the 
was the case seveml months ago, and yo 
didn't go to Moscow. Now you are goin^ 
Does this mean that at least these two ouv 
standing issues are pretty much settled? 

Secretary Kissinger: There has been n 
discussion with the Soviets except that thi 
Soviets have assured us that they are pra 
pared to modify their last position, and o^ 
that basis, we hope to be able to work ou 
some solution. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you saying that yO' 
are making Soviet restraint in Angola a qui 
pro quo for any successful conclusion to th 
SALT treaty, or are you not saying that? 

Secretary Kissinger: I am saying tw 
things: I am saying that Soviet actions i 
Angola, if continued, are bound to affect th 
general relationship with the United States 
that a substantial deterioration of that rela 
tionship can also, over time, affect the stra 
tegic arms talks. 

At this point, however, I would also main 
tain that the limitation of strategic arms i 
not a concession we make to the Sovie 
Union but it is an objective that is in ou: 
interest and it is in the world interest and i 
is in the interest of world peace. So we wil 
pursue the negotiations in the presem 

Q. To follow up, if there is no change ir 
the Soviet position on Angola, would yov 
then expect that there could be a successfm 
SALT Txvo negotiation later on? 

Department of State Bulletir 




Secretary Kissinger: We would have to 
ace this in the light of the circumstances 

hat may exist later. 


Q. Mr. Secretary, you have been sending 
it his message — you and the President have 
;j >een sending this message to Moscoiv now 
or several weeks. Have you had any indica- 
ion whatsoever that the Soviets might be 
nterested in a diplomatic solution to Angola, 
md secondly, are you ivilling to discuss this 
vith the Soviets when you go to Moscow? 

Secretary Kissinger: It is a close race be- 
;ween the messages we send and the deteri- 
)ration of our domestic position; and mes- 
sages that are not backed up at home lose a 
'air amount of their credibility. 

We are prepared to discuss Angola, and 
we have had some exchanges with the Soviet 
Union on Angola in recent weeks which we 
ivill have to clarify. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is the fact that you are 
going to Moscow — can that be taken as a 
mre thing that you will reach an agreement, 
or is there still the possibility of failure? 

Secretary Kissinger: There is the possi- 

Ioility of failure. We do not know the details 
of the Soviet position, and on the other 
■riand, we assume that the Soviet Union 
would not invite the Secretary of State to 
negotiate with Mr. Brezhnev [Leonid I. 
Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union] unless a major effort would 
be made to come to an agreement. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it your expectation 
that if things go as you anticipate that you 
IV ill be able to conclude an agreement in 
Moscow? Will you set out for us ivhat you 
are aiming at? Are you aiming at an agree- 
ment in principle? 

Secretary Kissinger: No, there cannot be 
a final agreement in Moscow. The most that 
is achievable in Moscow is an agreement in 
principle similar to the Vladivostok agree- 
ment but covering the outstanding issues 
such as Backfire and cruise missiles and to 
relate them to Vladivostok. And then there 
will have to be technical discussions at 

Geneva to work out the detailed provisions. 
And that, under the best of circumstances, 
would take another two to three months. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I am curious as to how 
you are going to conduct these parallel nego- 
tiations with the Soviets. On the one hand, 
you are indicating that the success of SALT 
may hinge on Soviet activities in Angola. On 
the other hand, you are going to Moscoiv in 
a few days presumably to conclude an agree- 
ment in principle. Hoiv can you do that 
ivithout knowing what the Soviet reaction in 
Angola is? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have made clear in 
my statement that the regulation of nuclear 
arms in the strategic field between the 
United States and the Soviet Union is not a 
benefit we confer on the Soviet Union. It is 
a generic problem of world order that must 
be settled at some point and for which con- 
ditions are propitious now because of a long 
record of negotiation and because technol- 
ogy is at a point where it is possible to ac- 
cept certain restraints now which might 
then have to wait for another cycle of tech- 
nology before they can be made effective. 

The point I am making is that if there is 
a general deterioration in our relationship, 
it could affect SALT. In any event, what- 
ever is agreed in Moscow will take several 
months to negotiate in greater detail. 

Q. If I could just follow up for a second, 
please — in other ivords, you are not saying, 
then, that if there is not some Soviet pull- 
back in Angola before the termination of 
your trip to Moscoiv, that that is going to 
have an adverse effect on SALT. 

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that messages 
not backed up at home lose certain credibil- 
ity, I think. We are now entering a Presi- 
dential election year. Isn't it likely that those 
messages will continue not to be backed up, 
and ivhat impact ivill that have on foreign 
policy in general? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have always be- 
lieved very strongly that the foreign policy 
of the United States must reflect the perma- 
nent values and interests of the United 

February 2, 1976 


states. It is not a partisan foreign policy. 
And to the best of my ability, I have at- 
tempted to conduct this office in a manner 
that can make it achieve bipartisan support. 

It would therefore be a tragedy if during 
this election year we did not find some means 
to put some restraint on our domestic de- 
bates in the field of foreign policy and to 
find some means of common action. 

As soon as the Congress returns I will 
talk to several of the leaders to see what 
cooperation is possible to put at least some 
restraint on partisan controversy, because 
the penalties we will pay for lack of unity 
will have to be paid for many years. 

But it is a problem. I agree with you. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what exactly is it that 
you are asking the Soviets to do in Angola? 
Are you asking them to totally cease arms 
shipments to the MPLA [Popular Movement 
for the Liberation of Angola'] ? Are you ask- 
ing them to get the Cubans out of there? Or 
would you be satisfied with something less 
than that — that they, for example, moderate 
the amount of arms that they are sending 
and take some of the Cubans out? 

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, let us 
get some idea of the dimensions of what the 
Soviet Union has done. 

The Soviet Union has sent close to 200 
million dollars' worth of military equipment 
to Angola in the last nine months, which 
equals the total amount of all military equip- 
ment sent to all the rest of sub-Saharan 
Africa by all other countries. So that is not 
a minor infusion of military force. In addi- 
tion to that, between 5,000 and 7,000 Cuban 
military forces are in Cuba — are in Angola 
— in fact, they seem to be everywhere ex- 
cept in Cuba. The fighting in the northern 
front in Angola is conducted almost entirely 
by Cuban forces and without even a pretense 
of any significant MPLA participation. 

Now, that is a significant international 
event for which there are no clever explana- 
tions and from which other countries must 
draw certain conclusions. 

As far as the United States is concerned, 
our position is that there should be a cease- 
fire; that all foreign forces should be with- 

drawn. We are even prepared to discuss a '( 
phasing, by which South African forces are 
withdrawn first, if there is a stated brief 
interval after which all other forces are 
withdrawn ; that there should be negotia- 
tions between the main factions; that all 
outside powers, including, of course, the 
United States, cease their military interven- 
tion. And we are prepared to agree to the 
end of all military shipments. 

If the issue comes down to nominal ship- 
ments for a normal government by African 
standards, this is something about which we 
are prepared to negotiate. 

We want to get the great powers out of 
Angola. We want to return it as an African 
problem. And we are prepared to accept any 
solution that emerges out of African efforts. 

Our concern about Angola is the demon- | 
stration of a Soviet willingness to intervene 
with what for conditions is a very 
substantial military infusion of military , 
force — plus an expeditionary force — while ! 
the United States paralyzes itself by declar- ' 
ing a fraction of this as a "massive involve- 
ment" of the United States, when we have 
declared that there is no possibility of any ' 
American military forces or advisers going i 
there. And that is an event of considerable ' 
international significance — both the Soviet 
action and the American reaction. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, to follow that up, yow 
spoke of the need to break the pattern of 
action and reaction that could build toward 
crisis. Isn't that what the Seriate was trying 
to do, to break that pattern? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, you can always 
break the pattern of action and reaction by 
yielding. Our idea is to maintain the inter- 
national equilibrium — not to give temptation 
for aggressive and irresponsible action — 
and at the same time to establish principles 
of mutual restraint. Certainly it is always 
possible to solve these problems in the short 
term by declaring that they do not exist. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, two questions. I am not 
sure I have this exactly right, but didn't you 
say at a previous press conference that the 
United States would not table another SALT 


Department of State Bulletin 

roposal unless the Riissians tabled another 
ne first? And secondly, have all the niem- 
■ers of the NSC [National Sectmty Council] 
)id the Verification Panel signed off on this 
'CIV proposal that we plan to offer in Mos- 

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the 
irst question, I said that the United States 
annot table a new proposal simply because 
he Soviets had rejected the old one. We 
lave been given a clear promise that there 
vould be a significant modification in the 
soviet position. Under these conditions, we 
ire prepared to put forward a modification 
if our position, because we would prefer to 
legotiate from our position rather than 
rom some other. 

We have made clear — and I can repeat it 
lere — that if the Soviets do not modify their 
ast position, there can be no agreement. 
\nd the position which we will forward to 
hem will be substantially different from the 
ast Soviet position. So it will require — 

Q. Substantially different from their last 

Secretary Kissinger: It will also be some- 
vhat different from our position. It is an 
lonest attempt to find a solution that takes 
nto account the real concerns of all sides. 

With respect to our internal discussions, 
; will not have a clear picture until I have 
•ead all the newspaper articles that will 
jmerge over the next few weeks, which are 
nvariably more dramatic than the discus- 
^ions which in fact take place. 

But my impression is that there is una- 
nimity on the course that we are pursuing. 
We have had very good meetings. We have 
had two Verification Panel meetings, two 
NSC meetings. There will probably be an- 
other NSC meeting before I go, just to 
review the bidding. And I would say that 
the government is operating, until the Sun- 
day editions, with complete unanimity. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
don't provide much drama for you, but arc 
they signing on to this proposal? 

Secretary Kissinger: The Joint Chiefs of 
Staff are signing on to this proposal, yes. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you recommend 
conclusion of a new SALT agreement with 
the Soviets if Soviet and Cuban forces are 
still in Angola? 

Secretary Kissinger: 1 am going to Mos- 
cow in order to see whether the deadlock in 
these negotiations can be broken. We should 
not play with the strategic arms limitation 
negotiations. It is a matter that is of pro- 
found concern for the long-term future. It 
is in an area in which no significant advan- 
tages can be achieved by either side but in 
which the momentum of events can lead to 
consequences that could be very serious. 
And therefore we will not use it lightly for 
bargaining purposes in other areas. 

On the other hand, obviously if the gen- 
eral relationship deteriorates, then it could 
over a period of time even affect the Stra- 
tegic Arms Limitation Talks. But I think we 
should make every effort to avoid that. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you and your people 
have been talking to the Soviet Union about 
tvhat they are doing in Angola. How would 
you describe — or what are your impressions 
of the Soviet attitude toivard a lessening or 
a decrease of their role there that would be 
satisfactory to us? 

Secretary Kissinger: We are exploring 
with the Soviet Union now what steps can 
be taken in the wake of the OAU [Organi- 
zation of African Unity] meeting, and we 
have had some exploratory talks, some of 
which would offer the possibility of progress. 
But we would have to be sure that we under- 
stand the meaning that the Soviets attach 
to some of their ideas. 

Q. One folloivup. If the Soviet Union rvants 
the Cuban expeditionary force out, xvould 
that bring about its departure? 

Secretary Kissinger: That's their problem. 

Q. But you must have an opinion. 

Secretary Kissinger: I think major powers 
have a responsibility to think about the con- 
sequences they will face when they engage 
their troops or troops of their friends. It is 
a lesson we have had to learn; it may be a 
lesson that the Soviet Union should learn. 

February 2, 1976 


Q. Mr. Secretary, two additional points on 
Angola. There have been totally contradic- 
tory reports from the United States and 
from the Soviet Union about the presence of 
Soviet vessels off Angola. U.S. officials say 
they are there. The Soviet Union says this 
is a total fabrication. 

Secondly, the outcome of the OAU meet- 
ing — what is the U.S. perception of ivhether 
that has enhanced or retarded the prospect 
of a diplomatic movement from here on? 

Secretary Kissinger: There is no question 
that there are some Soviet vessels off An- 
gola — or at least they were yesterday. I 
haven't seen today's report. 

There was a cruiser heading south, which 
is now in port in Guinea. So we don't know 
whether it will continue to head south or 
whether it will move to another destination. 
That would be the largest Soviet vessel that 
has been off southern Africa in many years. 
But we are not sure yet whether it will con- 
tinue to move south. When the original an- 
nouncements were made, it was heading 
south. It has since put in at the port in 

What was your other question? 

Q. The Soviet Union has denied that it has 
any .ships there. Where do you go from that 
kind of a standoff? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, if there are no 
ships there and if we should wake up one 
morning and find there are no ships there, 
we will agree with them. And that will end 
the debate. We are not going to pursue — it's 
a good way to make the ships disappear. 

Q. The second point was your perception 
of the outcome of the OAU meeting. Has 
that advanced or retarded the diplomatic 
prospects ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think — considering 
events in this country in recent weeks and 
the difficulty we have had to give a clear 
indication of what the United States could 
do, considering the massive Cuban and 
Soviet lobbying effort that went on at the 
OAU meeting — it is remarkable that half of 

the members of the OAU substantiallj ij 

agreed with our perception of the problem' 
which is to say, not to recognize any of th« 
factions and to bring about an end of for- 
eign intervention. 

We think, moreover, that a vast majoritj 
of the OAU members favor an end of for- 
eign intervention, if one can separate thai 
problem from some of the local issues 

So we think that there is a considerable 
African support for the main lines of oui 
policy, which is, after all, to leave African ^ 
problems to the African nations and to in- ! 
sulate Africa from great-power confronta 

We do not want anything for the Unitec 
States. We are not opposed to the MPLA as 
an African movement; we are opposed tc 
the massive foreign intervention by which I 
a victory of the MPLA is attempted to bt 

So I believe that this position — which ir 
its totality is supported by, after all, half of [ 
the African states in the face of much dis- 
couraging news from here — is in its majoi | 
elements supported by more than half ol 
the African states. And we hope that s 
diplomatic solution can be built on that. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the Middle East- 
could you take a question on the Middle East 

Q. Well, more like Angola. 

Secretary Kissinger: All right. Let me get( 
somebody there. Henry [Henry Trewhitt. 
Baltimore Sun]. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, given the congressional 
attitudes on foreign affairs in general, do 
you intend to talk to any leaders of Congress 
before you go to Moscoiv to negotiate fur- 
ther, and is there any danger that a repudia- 
tion by Congress of a SALT agreement 
might be comiterproductive to the very ob- 
jectives you're seeking for the long term? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have been briefing 
congressional leaders on SALT negotiations 
consistently. There has been no significant 
new development in the negotiating process, 


Department of State Bulletin 

but I will no doubt be in touch with some of 
the senior members of the Senate. 

As far as repudiation of an agreement is 
concerned, it would of course be a very seri- 
ous matter since, in any event, one of the 
biggest foreign policy problems we now face 
is the question from other countries of who 
speaks for the United States. Somebody has 
to speak for the United States, and there 
can be no foreign policy without authority. 

So if an agreement were repudiated, it 
would accelerate this very dangerous tend- 
ency ; but we do not have an agreement yet. 

U.S.-People's Republic of China Relationship 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your assessment, how 
will the death of Prime Minister Chou En-lai 
affect relations bettveen the United States 
land China and between China and the Soviet 
Union, and how do you view the return of 
the helicopter pilots by the Chinese to the 
.Soviet Union? 

Secretary Kissinger: The relationship be- 
tween the United States and the People's 
Republic of China is based on the permanent 
interests of both countries, and even though 
my admiration for Prime Minister Chou 
En-lai is well known, I do not believe that it 
was his personality, alone or principally, that 
was the basis of that relationship. So I 
would think that the main lines of our rela- 
tionship to the People's Republic of China 
can continue along well-established lines. 
And, certainly, as far as the United States 
is concerned, as I said in my speech to the 
General Assembly, there is no relationship 
to which we attach greater importance than 
the relationship with the People's Republic 
of China. 

On the other hand, we should have no 
illusions on what that relationship is based. 
There is no question that the interest the 
People's Republic of China has in a relation- 
ship with the United States depends on its 
assessment of the relevance of the United 
States to problems of concern to the People's 
Republic of China. And to the degree that 
the United States seems less able to play a 

major international role, for whatever rea- 
son, to that extent the leaders in Peking, 
who are extremely sophisticated, will draw 
conclusions from it. 

And it is this, and not the issue of per- 
sonalities, that will affect the final judg- 
ments that will be made. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, on that last point then, 
how can there be no movement on Taiwan, 
as there has been none over the last couple 
of years — how is that relationship then rele- 
vant for China? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first of all, I 
am not saying there has been no movement 
over recent years. 

Secondly, one would have to say that there 
are other issues that are considered more 
important by the People's Republic of China, 
in the present phase of its relationship with 
the United States, than Taiwan. 

Q. Can you give us some examples? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the overall per- 
formance of the United States with respect 
to the world equilibrium. 

Middle East Issues 

Q. Do you see any chance that in the U.N. 
Security Council debate that is now going on 
in the Middle East that anything construc- 
tive could come out, either for Israel or for 
the United States; and would you say that 
the polarization that seems to be occurring 
as a result of that debate bettveen Israel and 
the Palestinians, the PLO [Palestine Libera- 
tion Organization^, has hastened the need 
for a reconvening of the Geneva Conference? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the United 
States supports the reconvening of the 
Geneva Conference, or of a preparatory con- 
ference to discuss the reconvening of the 
Geneva Conference. 

I do not want to prejudge the outcome of 
a debate which is still going on, but from 
what we have seen, the resolutions that are 
at this moment being talked about seem not 
too promising. 

On the other hand, the United States 

February 2, 1976 


strongly supports progress toward peace in 
the Middle East and will make efforts, when 
this debate is concluded, to begin the nego- 
tiating process in whatever forum can be 

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you see the 
possibilities noiv of either Syrian or Israeli 
intervention in Lebanon? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we have stated 
repeatedly that we support the independence 
and sovereignty of Lebanon and the right of 
the communities within Lebanon to lead 
their own lives. We would believe that any 
outside military intervention, from whatever 
quarter, would involve the gravest threat to 
peace and stability in the Middle East; and 
we have left the parties concerned in no 
doubt that the United States would oppose 
any military intervention from whatever 

Q. Mr. Secretanj, earlier you said that the 
United States would favor a South African 
withdrawal even in advance of ivithdrawal 
by the other foreign forces. Can we infer 
from this that there's been some sort of work 
on a timetable or some coordination with 
South Africa about its presence there? 

Secretary Kissinger: No. The United 
States favors the withdrawal uncondition- 
ally of all foreign forces — South African, 
Cuban, Soviet, and whatever other foreign 
forces could be there. 

The United States in a general negotiation 
might even — could even support a phased 
withdrawal, as long as the interval were 
sufficiently short and it is not just an excuse 
to permit the Cubans to take over all of 
Angola, which is what the military fighting 
is now coming down to in Angola. But this 
refers to diplomatic possibilities; it does not 
refer to any understanding between us and 
South Africa. 

Q. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 
Q. Mr. Secretary, this being the first neivs 
conference for 1975, I wonder if I coidd walk 

you out on the limb a bit. What do you think 
will happen in — 

Secretary Kissinger: This is '76. 

Q. Seventy-six. What do you think will 
happen in '76 insofar as a Syrian disengage- 
ment? Do you think in fact there ivill be o 
SALT agreement in '76? And how do you 
think the Angola crisis will eventually endi 

Secretary Kissinger: This is an absolutely 
no-win question. 

I think we have the possibility of a SALT 
agreement that is in the national interest 
and that, with a rational debate in which 
the alternatives are clearly put, can be sold 
to the American public and to the American 

At any rate, as far as the United States 
is concerned, we will be working in that 
direction. I cannot speak until I have seen 
the Soviet position; I cannot make a flat 

With respect to Angola, I think the major 
powers have a responsibility to show great 
restraint, and I think the African countries 
have a great opportunity to keep great- 
power rivalries out of their continent and 
have an opportunity also not to permit out- 
side expeditionary forces to become the 
dominant event. A greater degree of unity 
in this country would help us achieve this 
objective. And under present conditions we 
have severe difficulties due to our domestic 

With respect to a disengagement agree- 
ment between Syria and Israel, we of course 
support negotiations between Syria and 
Israel on this subject. Syria has declared so 
repeatedly that it would not negotiate alone 
— and only in an Arab context — that I would 
think that a separate agreement between 
Syria and Israel, without involving some 
other parties, is now less likely than would 
have seemed the case a few months ago. 

Do you still say "Thank you"? 

Q. I do again. Thank you very much. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Death of Premier Chou En-lai 
of People's Republic of China 

Premier- Chou En-lai of the People's Re- 
public of China died at Peking on January 8. 
Following are statements by President Ford 
and Secretary Kissinger issued on January 8. 


white House press releast- dated January 8 

Premier Chou En-lai will be long remem- 
bered as a remarkable leader who has left 
his imprint not only on the history of mod- 
ern China but also on the world scene. 

We Americans will remember him espe- 
cially for the role he played in building a 
new relationship between the People's Re- 
public of China and the United States. We 
are confident that this relationship will con- 
tinue to develop on the foundation of under- 
standing and cooperation which he helped 
to establish. 

The United States offers its condolences 
to the Government and people of the People's 
Republic of China. 


Press release 7 dated January 8 

It was with a deep sense of loss that I 
learned of the passing away of Premier 
Chou En-lai. The People's Repubhc of China 
has lost one of its great leaders, and the 
world has lost one of the most remarkable 
statesmen of modern times. 

It was my privilege to have had many 
discussions with Premier Chou when our 
two countries were first establishing, and 
then developing, a new relationship to sup- 
plant the suspicion and hostility that had 
existed for so many years. I was impressed 
by his dedication to the interests of his 
country, by his deep understanding of 
world affairs, and by his rare combination of 
intellectual acuity and personal charm. 

The United States is pledged to continue 
to develop our relationship with the People's 
Republic of China on the basis of the princi- 
ples and objectives which Premier Chou 
helped establish. 

Death of Prime Minister Razak 
of Malaysia 

Following is a statement by President 
Ford issued on January 15. 

white House press release dated January 15 

I was saddened to learn of the untimely 
death of Malaysian Prime Minister Tun 
Abdul Razak on January 14. Prime Minister 
Razak, distinguished Southeast Asian leader, 
was well known and respected for his vision 
and dedication to peace. Malaysia's many 
friends will feel his loss deeply. The Ameri- 
can people join me in extending condolences 
and sympathy to his widow and to the Gov- 
ernment and people of Malaysia. 

I have designated our Ambassador to 
Malaysia, Francis T. Underhill, Jr., as my 
special representative at Prime Minister 
Razak's funeral in Kuala Lumpur January 16. 

February 2, 1976 


Foreign Minister Allon of Israel Visits Washington 

Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the State of 
Israel, visited Washington January 7-8. 
Folloiuing is an exchange of toasts between 
Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister 
Allon at a dinner at the Department of State 
on January 7. 


Yigal, who is an old friend of mine and a 
good friend of all of us here, is in the United 
States for one of his periodic visits in order 
to prepare with us the discussions at the 
Security Council, which will take place next 

And there has been, in the press and else- 
where, a great deal of discussion about what 
we may be facing at the Security Council in 
our meetings this week. But I think that 
anybody who knows our relationship, as 
countries and as individuals, can be sure 
that this meeting that takes place at the 
Security Council next week deals with one 
of the objectives that's dear to the hearts 
of Israel and dear to the hearts of the 
United States- — which is how to promote 
peace in the Middle East. 

The United States has been committed to 
producing progress toward peace on the 
basis of two Security Council resolutions: 
Security Council Resolution 242, Security 
Council Resolution 338. 

This is the only basis on which the United 
States will move toward peace. It has pro- 
vided a reliable framework that can account 
for the interests and concerns of all of the 
parties. And therefore what Yigal and we 
have to discuss this week concerns only the 
essentially technical question of how the 
Security Council discussions can lead to the 
reopening of the Geneva Conference, or per- 

haps a preparatory conference to the Genevai 
Conference, which we'll then negotiate on 
the basis of those two resolutions. 

But this, as I pointed out, is an essentially 
technical diplomatic question. The more 
fundamental question is how to move an 
area that for 30 years has been torn by war 
toward some consciousness of peace. And 
there can be no people in the world that 
more yearns for peace than the people of 

Some of you have heard me talk about my 
visits to Yigal's kibbutz in 1961. Yigal and I 
met at Harvard in 1957, right after the war 
of '56. We've been close friends since. And 
I visited him at his kibbutz in 1961. And I 
saw the fishermen out on the lake right 
under the Golan Heights, and I will never 
forget what the courage meant to me of 
these people who went out night after night. 
And I remember being taken around this 
kibbutz, where every square inch reminded 
somebody of somebody who had died for it 
or suffered for it. 

And therefore we of course understand 
what this process of peace must mean to a 
people whose country was a dream before 
they could ever have the courage to go there 
and whose margin of security is so narrow 
that they cannot afford many of the ex- 
periments that are given to more favored 

And since we're close friends, we some- 
times disagree. We can afford to disagree, 
because we know that as far as the United 
States is concerned, there can be no settle- 
ment that does not assure a secure Israel 
that can survive in recognized borders — and 
recognized by all, by people in the area and 
by anybody who aspires to become a party 
to any negotiation. 

We have always known that only a strong 
Israel can afford to run the risks inherent 


Department of State Bulletin 

in the peace process. And I think, however, 
that every American has to know that only 
a strong America can contribute to the peace 
process and that to the degree that other 
countries begin to question America's ability 
to shape events, to the degree that America 
ceases to be a relevant factor in world af- 
fairs, somebody, somewhere along the line, 
will have to pay in blood and sacrifice- 
Americans and friends of America. 

So the deep problem we face if we want 
to move the world toward peace is not only 
whether America will be reliable — which is 
guaranteed by our affection, by our knowl- 
edge, and by the fact that nobody could face 
himself if he had impaired the survivability 
or security of Israel — but also the question 
is whether with all the good intentions in 
the world America can stay relevant and 
strong enough. 

That is not a problem for Israelis ; that is 
a problem for Americans, and they should 
remember that our capital is not inexhausti- 

But I want you to know, Yigal, that on 
the course of moving toward peace, we will 
move together. We will reconcile our views. 
We can afford to discuss them in complete 

And, after all, when we think back to 
where we were at some times in 1970 and 
during dark days in 1973 and how we've 
come through the war and how far we've 
really come already on the road toward 
peace, we know we can go the rest of the 
way together — arduously, painfully, confi- 
dently, and successfully. 

So it is always a joy to welcome you here. 
And I'd like all of you to join me in a toast 
to our friend, the Foreign Minister of Israel, 
and to the friendship of Israel and the 
United States. 


It was very kind of Henry to remind me 
of our good days at Harvard, when both of 
us were a little younger and probably none 
of us thought the day might come when we 
may negotiate relations and plans between 

our two countries. But I remember at the 
end of that exciting seminar Henry gave me 
a lift from Boston to New York, and he 
drove the car and I took the risk [laughter] 
and joined him, and on our way we discussed 
the last war — which unfortunately was not 
the last — the war of 1956 in Sinai, and I 
made a complaint. I said, "You see, Henry, 
twice we won the war — in 1948-49 and in 
1956. And twice we lost the peace." 

And my complaint was directed not 
against Henry but against the Secretaries 
of State of those respective years who made 
us withdraw from Sinai without getting 
peace first. And Henry said, "You know, 
Yigal, if Heaven forbid, and there is another 
war and you take Sinai again, don't with- 
draw unless you get peace." [Laughter.] 
Henry, this was one of the lessons I learned 
from you [laughter], and you are going to 
pay for it now. [Laughter.] 

Really, that seminar was for me a revela- 
tion. It was one of my very first visits to 
this great country. It gave me an oppor- 
tunity to get to know a little bit of America, 
some idea about international relations, and 
to get acquainted with many friends who 
remained friends from all over the world — 
including some of the Arab countries. May- 
be, when a day comes and we shall be able 
to exchange Ambassadors with our neigh- 
bors, one or two of them may show up — I 
hope not in Tel Aviv but in Jerusalem — as 

Meanwhile, until this dream is being 
materialized, the great problem is, first, how 
to avert another war and, secondly, how to 
progress toward peace. 

I read in the papers a couple of weeks ago 
that one of your experts gave a testimony 
to a joint committee of the Congress in 
which he tried to persuade his listeners — I 
hope not successfully — that as far as the 
balance of strength between Israel and her 
neighbors is concerned, the Israelis have 
already enough means of warfare, or means 
of defense. 

When I took the details of that testimony, 
I found out that it wasn't quite a correct 
analysis. When it came to the Israeli side, 
he brought into account also the weapons 

February 2, 1976 


we ordered and which will supply us through 
the pipeline for the next few years, while 
he ignored the pipelines of the other coun- 
tries. Secondly, he excluded a few of our 
neighboring countries by explaining they 
were not important. 

But, basically, I think, his conclusions 
were wrong in one particular aspect which 
I would like to stress here and now: When 
the Israelis speak about a "balance of 
strength," we never even pretend to have a 
numerical balance. We take it as an axiom 
that if numerically the balance is one against 
two and a half — or one against three — in 
favor of the other side, this can be con- 
sidered as a balance of strength. 

But not only this. What is needed in our 
particular situation is not only to secure 
Israel's victory in case it is being attacked 
but, if possible, to deter the other side from 
attacking altogether. 

And therefore it would be wrong to judge 
or to measure the balance of strength only 
in terms of whether the Israelis can win or 
— God forbid — may lose. The major problem 
— and this is the statesmanship— is how to 
avert war, how to deter the other side from 
taking the initiative. 

Henry has done a great job in both ways, 
first, to help us to help ourselves— ever since 
he entered the White House and later on in 
his dual capacity — and, secondly, how to 
clear the way toward a political settlement 
in the area. 

And this is exactly the combination which 
is needed for the Middle East. 

As far as we are concerned, we have to 
combine both: the possibility of a war and 
the perpetual effort to achieve peace or, in 
other woi-ds, to prepare for war as if it is 
inevitable but at the same time to work for 
peace as if it is attainable. 

And thanks to the fact that we have a 
rationalistic society, we can combine those 
contradictions — which really do not contra- 
dict each other ; they complement each other. 

Only a strong Israel which can defend 
itself — by itself, for itself — may convince 
the other side that any other war will be 

futile and there is no alternative to peace. 

As a farmer I know that there is a simi- 
larity between diplomacy and farming. First, 
you need a lot of patience to plow the soil, 
to seed it, to cultivate it — in our country, 
to irrigate it — and sometime in the future, 
if there are no troubles, you may harvest it. 

And when Henry undertook upon himself, 
on behalf of this great country, to bring 
about a political settlement in our area, he 
mobilized his patience, his skill, his vision. 
And, indeed, we mustn't underestimate the 
importance of the three agreements which 
have been signed during the last one and a 
half years: two disengagement agreements, 
one with Egypt and one with Syria, and one 
special agreement, which is being called 
wrongly an "interim agreement" — but it 
really isn't of an interim nature — between 
Israel and Egypt. And all of us hope that 
this is not the last achievement. This is a 
hopeful beginning. 

If these agreements were possible, why 
should we count out further agreements in 
the future ? If we are strong enough, if there 
is the good will — and wherever there is the 
will, there is a way. And I truly and sin- 
cerely believe that peace is badly needed by 
all countries in our region. We need it badly; 
I'm sure our neighbors need it badly. 

What is necessary is a trustworthy friend 
of ours and of our neighbors, at one an(i the 
same time, who can help to pave the way 
toward an agreement. But this can be done 
not only by a skillful person. This skillful 
person should represent a strong, united 
power. History determined that the United 
States of America, thank God, is a major 
power in the world. 

And the future of democracy of many 
societies, many countries, and the future of 
freedom and happiness of many people in 
the world depend on the credibility and 
prosperity of the United States of America. 

America cannot afford isolationism. Amer- 
ica must not isolate herself from her many 
friends who look upon her in many corners 
of the world, in many continents — practi- 
cally all continents. They need America, and 


Department of State Bulletin 

Amei'ica needs them. And I see no reason on 
.earth why the United States should isolate 

This is not an accidental comment. Many 
of us in the world, in all continents, are 
watching events in this country and cannot 
but hope that you will overcome the diffi- 
culties which will enable America — as Henry 
said — to shape events in the world. This is 
a tremendous historical responsibility, and 
I'm pretty sure that America will live up to 
its historic duty. 

I don't want to elaborate now on the 
forthcoming debate of the Security Council. 
I listened with great interest to what Henry 
had to say about it, and I couldn't agree 
more. We have to do our best that the forth- 
coming meeting of the Security Council will 
reopen the way for further progress in our 
area. And I am pretty sure that once the 
political momentum is being regained, fur- 
ther achievements will be gained by all 
parties concerned for the benefit of all of us. 

And I do wish this country and the rest 
of the world that Henry will be able to come 
back this great effort — one of the greatest 
efforts toward peace in our area, as well as 
in other areas of the world. Even for this 
alone we deserve to have another toast. 

For your health, Henry, for peace in the 
Middle East and in the world at large. 

U.S. Regrets U.K. Measures 
Restricting Imports 

U.S. statement ' 

The United States regrets that the British 
Government has taken restrictive import ac- 
tions. Such actions are a matter of concern 
anytime they are taken. They are a matter 
of particular concern when economic diffi- 
culties around the world are subjecting most 
governments to pressures to solve their do- 

' Issued on Dec. 18 (press release 621). 

mestic employment problems by restricting 

We note that the United Kingdom is ex- 
periencing a particularly difficult economic 
situation and the announced measures are 
limited, and we assume that they will be 
temporary. We expect a detailed explanation 
of these measures in the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and in the Or- 
ganization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). 

We are evaluating the impact of these 
measures on our own trade. In our consulta- 
tions in the GATT and the OECD, we will 
review the potential impact of the announced 
measures on the overall trading system. In 
the course of these discussions, we will 
examine with the British authorities how 
distortions to international trade can be kept 
to a minimum. We will seek continuing inter- 
national surveillance of these measures to 
assure that they are removed at the earliest 
possible time. 

We note that footwear and textiles cov- 
ered by the proposed restrictions are par- 
ticularly sensitive, not only for the United 
Kingdom but for the United States and 
many other countries as well. In this connec- 
tion, the Multi-Fiber Arrangement exists to 
provide both order and expanding markets 
in textiles. It would be particularly unfortu- 
nate if these measures were to weaken the 
Multi-Fiber Arrangement. We hope that all 
countries, particularly the European Commu- 
nity, will meet their responsibilities under 
the arrangement. 

With respect to color TV tubes and sets 
and portable monochrome sets, we note that 
no restrictions were actually imposed. The 
proposed system of surveillance should not 
be used as a device to restrict imports. 

Protectionism is a serious danger in a 
world economy weakened by recession. No 
trade restrictions can therefore be taken 
lightly. Any restrictions that are imposed 
must be strictly justifiable in terms of the 
problem faced and must be consonant with 
domestic laws and international rules. There 

February 2, 1976 


can be no complacency even by those not 
directly affected. 

The shared objective of all countries at 
this critical juncture should be to avoid the 
spread of restrictive import actions and re- 
actions. Countries should therefore reinforce 
their efforts to adhere to the OECD trade 
pledge. In the longer term, safeguard proce- 
dures to deal more effectively with situations 
such as this should be developed in the 
multilateral trade negotiations in Geneva. 

U.S. Policy on Foreign Investment 
and Nationalization Reiterated 

Department Statement ' 

There have been significant developments 
during the past year concerning foreign in- 
vestments by U.S. private firms. The Secre- 
tary, at the seventh special session of the 
U.N. General Assembly on September 1 and 
at the Conference on International Economic 
Cooperation on December 16, emphasized 
the U.S. belief that foreign private invest- 
ment can make a very substantial contribu- 
tion to economic development. There have 
also been a number of actual or contemplated 
nationalizations involving U.S. firms, and 
ensuing settlement negotiations. In these 
circumstances, the Department wishes to re- 
iterate pertinent U.S. policy. 

The President of the United States, in 
January 1972, drew attention to the impor- 
tance which the United States attaches to 
respect for the property rights of its na- 
tionals. He stated that the policy of the 
United States concerning expropriatory acts 
includes the position that: 

Under international law, the United States has a 
right to expect: 

— That any taking of American private property 

will be nondiscriminatory; 

— That it will be for a public purpose; and 

— That its citizens will receive prompt, adequate, 

and effective compensation from the expropriating 



^ Issued on Dec. 30 (text from press release 630). 

With regard to current or future exprO' 
priations of property or contractual interests 
of U.S. nationals, or arrangements for "par 
ticipation" in those interests by foreign gov 
ernments, the Department of State wishes to 
place on record its view that foreign in- 
vestors are entitled to the fair market value' 
of their interests. Acceptance by U.S. na- 
tionals of less than fair market value does 
not constitute acceptance of any other 
standard by the U.S. Government. As a con- 
sequence, the U.S. Government reserves its 
rights to maintain international claims for 
what it regards as adequate compensation 
under international law for the interests 
nationalized or transferred. ^ 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

94th Congress, 1st Session 

Reappraisal of Project Independence Blueprint. 
Hearing before the Joint Economic Committee. 
March 18, 1975. 120 pp. 

U.S. Defense Contractors' Training of Foreign Mili- 
tary Forces. Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
International Political and Military Affairs of the 
House Committee on International Relations. 
March 20, 1975. 55 pp. 

The Activities of American Multinational Corpora- 
tions Abroad. Hearings before the Subcommittee 
on International Economic Policy of the House 
Committee on International Relations. June 5- 
September 30, 1975. 330 pp. 

Atlantic Convention Resolution. Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on International Organizations of 
the House Committee on International Relations 
on H.J. Res. 606, Joint Resolution to call an Atlan- 
tic Convention. September 8, 1975. 121 pp. 

The Press and Foreign Policy. Panel discussion be- 
fore the Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy 
Research and Development of the House Committee 
on International Relations. September 24, 1975. 
34 pp. 

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons. 
Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela- 
tions to accompany S. Ex. L, 93-2. S. Ex. Rept. 
94-10. October 22, 1975. 4 pp. 

Towards Project Interdependence: Energy in the 
Coming Decade. Prepared for the Joint Committee 
on Atomic Energy by Dr. Herman T. Franssen, 
Ocean and Coastal Resources Project, Congressional 
Research Service, Library of Congress. December 
1975. 249 pp. 

Department of State Bulletin 

he Lessons of the Seventh Special Session 
and the 30th U.N. General Assembly 

Following is a statement made in the clos- 
ng plenary session of the 30th U.N. General 
Assembly by U.S. Representative Daniel P. 
Moynihan on December 17. 

JSUN preffs release 190 dated December 17 

None will learn with surprise that for the 
United States, at very least, the 30th Gen- 
eral Assembly has been a profound, even 
alarming disappointment. This splendid hall 
has, since the opening of the Assembly, been 
repeatedly the scene of acts which we re- 
gard as abominations. We have not sought 
to conceal this view. Nor is it our view alone. 
Throughout the world individuals and gov- 
ernments have observed this General As- 
sembly with dismay. 

Unquestionably, our distress was deep- 
ened by the contrast between this regular 
Assembly session and the special session 
which preceded it. In the recent history, per- 
haps in the whole history, of the United 
Nations there has not been a more striking, 
even exhilarating example of what the Gen- 
eral Assembly can accomplish than the 
example of the seventh special session. In 
two weeks of intensive, determined, and 
hardheaded negotiations, we worked out a 
set of principles and programs for the eco- 
nomic advance of the poorer nations of the 
world that will take us a decade to put into 

The United States took a lead in this 
enterprise, from the opening statement of 
the Secretary of State to the concluding 
dense and detailed agreement, which incor- 
porated no fewer than 28 proposals we had 
initially set forth. 

In the general debate of the 30th session 

that followed, one speaker after another rose 
to extol the achievement of the special ses- 
sion. Praise was unanimous — from every 
bloc, from nations of every size and condi- 
tion. The Assembly was honored this year 
by the visit of His Majesty King Olav of 
Norway, who appropriately made the last 
such general statement: 

The successful conclusion of the seventh special 
session of the General Assembly has initiated a 
universal and cooperative process to effect changes 
in international economic relations which may have 
a far-reaching impact on the daily life of millions 
around our globe. 

Both Assemblies are now concluded, and 
the time is at hand to ask whether anything 
can be learned from them. For we do not 
want them forgotten. To the contrary, there 
are events that occurred in the 30th Assem- 
bly which the United States will never for- 
get. Even so, we turn our attention just now 
to the question of whether it will be possible 
to avoid such events in the future. In that 
spirit, we would like to offer two general 
comments. We offer them in a spirit of 
reconciliation and of shared concern. We are 
trying to learn, and we ask if others will not 
seek to learn with us. 

Limitations of the General Assembly 

The first lesson is the most important, 
which is that the General Assembly has 
been trying to pretend that it is a parlia- 
ment, which it is not. It is a conference made 
up of representatives sent by sovereign 
governments which have agreed to listen 
to its recommendations — recommendations 
which are, however, in no way binding. 

February 2, 1976 


It is usual to use the term "recommenda- 
tory" to describe the Assembly's powers, 
but for present purposes it seems more use- 
ful simply to say that there has been an 
agreement to take into consideration — to 
listen to — such proposals as the Assembly 
may make. For this directs our attention to 
the reality that unless such recommenda- 
tions have the effect of persuading, they 
have no effect at all. Resolutions that con- 
demn, that accuse, that anathematize, do 
not bring us any nearer to agreement. They 
have the opposite effect. 

Hence the lesson of the seventh special 
session. What took place among us on that 
occasion was a negotiation. It was self- 
evident — money is said to clear the mind ! — 
that no party to the negotiation was going 
to pay the least subsequent attention to any 
proposal to which he had not agreed. On the 
other hand, the authority of the unanimous 
agreement reached at the end of the session 
was very considerable. The United Nations 
on that occasion had served as a setting for 
reaching consensus — a very different thing 
from recording division, which is what so 
often happens. 

Why is this lesson not self-evident, as it 
clearly was to those who drafted the 
charter? Here we come to the second of the 
general comments the United States would 
wish to offer in this closing statement. It is 
not an agreeable matter of which we now 
speak, nor yet one easily explained. Yet we 
must make the effort to state our views 
fully if we are to ask others to seek to 
understand them. 

The Nature of the Crisis of the U.N. 

The crisis of the United Nations is not to 
be found in the views of the majority of its 
members. Rather, it resides in the essential 
incompatibility of the system of govern- 
ment which the charter assumes will rule 
the majority of its members and the system 
of government to which the majority in fact 

The charter assumes that most of the 
members of the General Assembly will be 
reasonably representative governments, com- 

mitted at home no less than abroad to the 
maintenance of representative institutions. 

It may be asked: How do we know? The 
answer has no greater — or lesser — authority 
than that of history and experience. The 
charter was conceived by an embattled 
American President and his British com- 
rade-in-arms. American statesmen helped to 
draft the charter. American scholars may 
just possibly claim preeminence in their 
study and interpretation of the charter. 
Certainly the bulk of such scholarship has 
been American. 

This is not, perhaps, surprising. Among 
the nations of the world we are the one 
most to be identified with constitutional 
government, in the sense of a written 
charter setting forth the powers and duties 
of government, a charter that is repeatedly 
amended and continuously interpreted. We 
would like to think that our long and really 
quite dedicated concern with constitutional 
representative government has given us at 
least some sense of such matters. 

There are others whose experience of 
representative government is just as long 
or just as intense, and we feel that such 
nations may also be expected to speak with 
knowledge and insight. They have, in a 
sense, earned the right to do so. 

Such nations or, more accurately, the gov- 
ernments of such nations, being of necessity 
sensitive to the nature of their own national 
institutions, will be similarly sensitive to 
the claims made by larger, multinational 

Observe, for example, the great care and 
lengthy debate which has attended the de- 
velopment of multinational bodies among 
the nations of Western Europe. Genuine 
power, true authority, has been transferred 
from national to international bodies, but 
only with great and deserved caution. The 
parliaments of European nations slowly 
satisfied themselves that political and social 
conditions in that region had indeed evolved 
to the point where individuals were pre- 
pared, for certain purposes, to submit to the 
authority of supranational bodies. But they 
came to this judgment slowly and on the 
basis of fact. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Those who have submitted to this disci- 
line — and obviously, at the level of indi- 
iduals, this is not a variety of understand- 
ig confined to citizens of parliamentary 
tates — will readily enough understand that 
,e General Assembly has not attained to 
nything like the degree of acceptance and 
if.uthority among its constituent members 
ii hat warrants any transfer of genuine power 
f a parliamentary nature. 

Now, and for the foreseeable future, it 
an only be a recommendatory body, a con- 
ereftce which adopts positions to which 
; rovernments have agreed to listen. There 
s a certain evolution in these matters, and 
learly the General Assembly has made some 
iny movement in a parliamentary direction. 
?ut to pretend we are further than we are 
vill serve only to set back what progress 
las in truth been made. 

This goes to the question of legitimacy. 

Vhat powers does an assembly have? How 

; lave they been conferred? How is it peri- 

•dically reconfirmed that the population — 

; le it of individuals or governments or what- 

, !ver — over which such powers are exercised 

loes indeed consent to that exercise? 

This process — of definition, of conferral, 
)f confirmation — is the essence of a repre- 
lentative institution. Those who understand 
t will readily enough understand what can 
md cannot be accomplished through the 
nstrumentality of the General Assembly. 

rhe Heart of the Matter 

And now to the heart of the matter. Many 
g-overnments — most governments — now rep- 
resented in the General Assembly seem dis- 
posed to use this body as if it had powers 
which the General Assembly does not have, 
to enforce policies of a nature which the 
General Assembly ought not, at this stage, 
even to consider. 

It took our 18th-century Congress well 
I into the 19th century before it felt that 
political society in America had advanced 
to the point where an income tax could be 
imposed, and even then the act was declared 
uncorstitutional ; so that Congress was 
forced to await the 20th century to success- 

fully impose such a tax in peacetime. Now, 
some see that as progress; others do not. 
But all see that the evolution of true con- 
sent is the first process of effective govern- 
ment. By contrast, before its third decade 
was out the General Assembly of the United 
Nations was proclaiming a New Interna- 
tional Economic Order. 

There is a reason for this, of which we 
speak at the risk of offense but having no 
desire to offend ; the reason is that most of 
the governments represented in the Gen- 
eral Assembly do not themselves govern by 
consent. Assemblies for them, and for their 
peoples, are places in which decrees are 
announced. Where it is felt that "majori- 
ties" are needed to attest to the decree, well, 
such majorities are readily enough sum- 

We put the simple test. In how many of 
the 144 members of the United Nations is 
there a representative body which both has 
the power and periodically exercises the 
power of rejecting a decision of the govern- 
ment? Only a handful. By one competent 
count, there are now 28, possibly 29, func- 
tioning, representative democracies in the 
world, and one is not a member of the 
United Nations. Such governments will by 
instinct pay the gi'eatest heed to winning 
consent, including winning consent in the 
General Assembly. Consent is the very es- 
sence of their being. Other governments will 
not pay such heed. At home they rule by 
decree, and it seems wholly natural to seek 
to emulate the same practice in the General 

We dare to believe that this reality is 
better known and understood in this Assem- 
bly than it might at first appear. If only a 
handful of the nations represented here have 
representative governments today, most of 
them — truly! — have had such in the life of 
the United Nations. This is a mournful fact 
for those of us committed to democratic in- 

At their height, perhaps 15 years ago, 
there were two or three times as many 
democratic governments in the world as 
there are today. But this very fact suggests 
that there are still memories in most of the 

February 2, 1976 


nations of the world as to just what repre- 
sentative institutions were like and that 
correspondingly there exists a much more 
widespread understanding of their nature 
than might at first appear. 

Let it be clear that we do not entertain 
any delusions about a grand revival of 
democracy. We do not expect a reversal of 
its decline in the near term. (What we do 
hope to see, and hope to encourage, is more 
societies which will do something to protect 
some civil rights, even if they deny most 
political rights.) But we do think it is pos- 
sible for there to be a greater understanding 
among members at large of the nature of a 
representative institution and the corre- 
sponding limits of the General Assembly. 
We would seek this understanding not to 
restrict what the United Nations can accom- 
plish but, rather, to accentuate the positive 
and concentrate on real possibilities rather 
than to squander the opportunity that does 
exist by the mindless pretense of legislative 

It may be that this objective would be 
well served if a "parliamentary caucus" 
were established within the General Assem- 
bly. This would be a group of nations con- 
stituted, let us say, along the lines of the 
membership criteria of the Council of Eu- 
rope, which would attend not so much to 
policy issues as to institutional ones. Its 
concern would be to seek to encourage those 
practices and approaches which enhance the 
effectiveness of the General Assembly and 
to discourage, both by example and by pro- 
nouncement, those which do not. 

Progress on Human Rights Issues 

Surely we might especially hope to do this 
in the area of human rights. Let us accept 
the fact that the ideal of liberal democracy 
has sustained huge losses in the last decade. 
It is not likely that more than a few nations 
which are not democracies today will become 
democracies in the course of the last quar- 
ter of the century, so that we must expect 
continued difficulties in the General Assem- 
bly of the sort I have described. 

Very well then, let us concentrate on 


things we can do. Of these, the most im g 
portant is that of establishing some minima 
international standards by which govern 
ments treat their citizens. 

Let us, for example, try to agree tha 
governments should not torture their sub 
jects. Many do. Perhaps most do. And yet 
as Gaston Thorn, our wholly admirable anc 
universally admired President, said yester 
day, we did make progress on human right 
at this Assembly. 

Specifically we adopted, unanimously, b^^ 
resolution against "torture and other cruel 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punish 
ment in relation to detention and imprison 
ment." Citizens throughout the world may 
in years to come point to their governments 
concurrence with that resolution as they 
demand rights or beg for mercy and human 
ity in their own societies. 

The United States hoped for more prog- 
ress than we actually made. This year, forr|f, 
example, we introduced a new practice with 
respect to the venerable issue of apartheid. 
It has seemed to us that our standard prac- 
tice of mere denunciation has suffered from 
diminishing effectiveness. 

Instead, this year the United States 1=' 
brought into the General Assembly what 
was in effect a bill of particulars. With re- 
spect to violations of the standards of civil 
liberties which we would hope to see at- 
tained in South Africa — and throughout the 
world — we named prisoners, specified dates, 
cited statutes, quoted judges, described sen- 
tences, identified jails. There are indeed 
political prisoners in South Africa. But we 
feel they are no longer unknown political 
prisoners. We hope other nations may fol- 
low our precedent of lawyerlike, documented 
presentation of such issues. 

For there are political prisoners the world 
over. Here again, the United States this 
year took an unprecedented initiative in 
submitting a resolution calling for amnesty 
for all political prisoners. We were not suc- 
cessful. But we said we would be back next 
year, and we will be. We will be there, and 
we may be equally sure that the political 
prisoners will be there also. 

Confession is good for the soul, and we 


Department of State Bulletin 

jnfess to not having handled this issue well 
iiough. There are more members in this 
.ssembly that would support an amnesty 
reposal than the half-dozen who told us 
ley would support ours. And if it should 
rove the case that it was American spon- 
orship that held off many, then clearly we 
rill make no claims to sponsorship next 

me. But our determination in this matter 
5, if anything, strengthened by the feeling 
hat we achieved so little this time. 

We are not perfect, and we make no pre- 
ense to perfection. What we hope for, what 
ome of us pray for, is simply that we 
hould be concerned and engaged. 

And on the issue of political prisoners we 
re just that. We are strengthened by the 
xtraordinary statement of Andrei D. 
sakharov, this year's winner of the Nobel 
eace Prize and the recipient two years ago 
»f the award of the International League 
or the Rights of Man. Speaking of his hope 
"or the final victory of the principles of 
oeace and human rights, he said : 

The best sign that such hopes can come true would 
»e a general political amnesty in all the world, 
liberation of all prisoners of conscience everywhere. 
The struggle for a general political amnesty is the 
truggle for the future of mankind. 

And so we will be back. 
Farewell. We wish you peace in the New 



Current Actions 



Convention on the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards. Done at New York June 
10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959; for the 
United States December 29, 1970. TIAS 6997. 
Extended to: Faroe Islands and Greenland, Janu- 
ary 1, 1976. 

Atomic Energy 

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
as amended. Done at New York October 26, 1956. 
Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873, 5284, 

Acceptance deposited: United Arab Emirates, 
January 15, 1976. 


Universal copyright convention, as revised. Done at 
Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 
1974. TIAS 7868. 

Protocol 1 annexed to the universal copyright con- 
vention, as revised, concerning the application of 
that convention to works of stateless persons and 
refugees. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into 
force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868. 

Protocol 2 annexed to the universal copyright con- 
vention, as revised, concerning the application of 
that convention to the works of certain interna- 
tional organizations. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. 
Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868. 
Accession deposited: Morocco, October 28, 1975. 


Constitution of the World Health Organization. Done 
at New York July 22, 1946, as amended. Entered 
into force April 7, 1948; for the United States 
June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086. 
Acceptance deposited: Cape Verde, January 5, 
Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the Constitution 
of the World Health Organization, as amended 
(TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva May 
22, 1973.' 

Acceptances deposited: Burma, Morocco, Decem- 
ber 30, 1975; Tanzania, Tunisia, Western Samoa, 
January 6, 1976. 

Maritime Matters 

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as 
amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). 
Adopted at London October 17, 1974.' 
Acceptance deposited: Madagascar, December 29, 

Narcotic Drugs 

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at 
Vienna February 21, 1971.' 
Ratification deposited: Holy See, January 7, 1976. 

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic 
drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972. En- 
tered into force August 8, 1975. 
Ratifications deposited: Holy See, January 7, 1976; 
Monaco, December 30, 1975. 

Program-Carrying Signals — Distribution by 


Convention relating to the distribution of programme- 
carrying signals transmitted by satellite. Done at 
Brussels May 21, 1974.' 
Ratification deposited: Kenya, January 6, 1976. 

' Not in force. 

February 2, 1976 


Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of all 
forms of racial discrimination. Done at New York 
December 21, 1965. Entered into force January 4, 
Ratification deposited: Italy, January 5, 1976. 

Sea, Exploration of 

Protocol to the convention of September 12, 1964 
(TIAS 7628), for the International Council for the 
Exploration of the Sea. Done at Copenhagen Au- 
gust 13, 1970. 

Ratification deposited: Spain, November 12, 1975. 
Entered into force: November 12, 1975. 

Seabeds Disarmament 

Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nu- 
clear weapons and other weapons of mass destruc- 
tion on the seabed and ocean floor and in the 
subsoil thereof. Done at Washington, London, and 
Moscow February 11, 1971. Entered into force May 
18, 1972. TIAS 73.37. 

Ratification deposited: Netherlands, January 14, 

Terrorism — Protection of Diplomats 

Convention on the prevention and punishment of 
crimes against internationally protected persons, 
including diplomatic agents. Done at New York 
December 14, 1973.' 
Accession deposited: Cyprus, December 24, 1975. 

United Nations Charter 

Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the 
International Court of Justice. Signed at San Fran- 
cisco June 26, 1945. Entered into force October 24, 
1945. 59 Stat. 1031. 

Admission to metnhership: Surinam, December 4, 



Agreement supplementing the commercial air trans- 
port agreement of January 8, 1947, as amended 
(TIAS 1606, 2196). Effected by exchange of notes 
at Quito December 31, 1975. Entered into force 
December 31, 1975. 


Germany, Federal Republic of 

Agreement extending the agreement of April 13 
1973, as amended and extended (TIAS 7605, 7804) 
relating to travel group charters and advanc, 
booking charters. Effected by exchange of letter; 
at Bonn-Bad Godesberg December 30, 1975. Enterec 
into force December 30, 1975. 

Agreement on social security, with final protocol 
Signed at Washington January 7, 1976. Enters intc 
force on the first day of the second month follow- 
ing the month in which the instruments of ratifi- 
cation are exchanged. 

Hong Kong 

Agreement amending the agreement of July 25, 1974 
(TIAS 7897), relating to trade in cotton, wool and 
man-made fiber textiles. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Hong Kong December 15 and 22, 1975. 
Entered into force December 22, 1975. 


Agreement extending the air transport agreement of 
August 15, 1960, as amended and extended (TIAS 
4675, 7167). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Mexico and Tlatelolco December 10 and 15, 1975. 
Entered into force December 15, 1975. 


Agreement extending the agreement of July 11, 1973 
(TIAS 7771), relating to travel group charter 
flights and advance booking charter flights. Ef- 
fected by exchange of letters at The Hague Decem- 
ber 11 and 30, 1975. Entered into force December 
30, 1975. 


Agreement relating to the continued operation of 
Loran-A stations owned and operated by the 
Philippines. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Manila November 3 and December 15, 1975. En- 
tered into force December 15, 1975, effective Janu- 
ary 1, 1975. 


' Not in force. 

' Not in force for the United States. 

•■' Extended to Netherlands Antilles. 


Department of State Bulletin 

•EX February 2, 1976 Vol LXXIV, No. 1910 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference 
anuary 24 125 

[a. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer- 
of January 24 125 

of Premier Chou En-lai of People's Re- 
itj^^iic of China (statements by President 

and Secretary Kissinger) 133 

ry Kissinger's News Conference of 
[uary 24 125 

:ss. Congressional Documents Relating 
'oreign Policy 138 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference 
anuary 24 125 

^^nament. Secretary Kissinger's News Con- 

nce of January 24 125 

Itnomic Affairs 

Policy on Foreign Investment and Nation- 
lization Reiterated (Department statement) 138 
S. Regrets U.K. Measures Restricting Im- 
•orts (statement) 137 

man Rights. The Lessons of the Seventh 
Special Session and the 30th U.N. General 
assembly (Moynihan) 139 

, lel. Foreign Minister Allon of Israel Visits 
Vashington (Allon, Kissinger) 134 

> laysia 

Eath of Prime Minister Razak of Malaysia 

statement by President Ford) 133 

- letary Kissinger's News (Conference of 

anuary 24 125 

ildle East 
_ reign Minister Allon of Israel Visits Wash- 

ngton (Allon, Kissinger) 134 

:retary Kissinger's News Conference of 
anuary 24 125 

;sidential Documents 

ath of Premier Chou En-lai nf People's Re- 

mblic of China 133 

ath of Prime Minister Razak of Malaysia . 133 

ade. U.S. Regrets U.K. Measures Restricting 
mports (statement) 137 

eaty Information. Current Actions .... 143 

3.S.R. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer- 
nce of January 24 125 

lited Kingdom. U.S. Regrets U.K. Measures 
Restricting Imports (statement) 137 

United Nations. The Lessons of the Seventh 
Special Session and the 30th U.N. General 
Assembly (Moynihan) 139 

Name Index 

Allon, Yigal 134 

Ford, President 133 

Kissinger, Secretary 125, 133, 134 

Moynihan, Daniel P 139 

Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: January 12-18 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

*9 1/12 Regional foreign policy conference, 
Houston, Tex., Jan. 28. 

*10 1/13 Government Advisory Committee 
on International Book and Library 
Programs, Feb. 12. 

*11 1/13 Advisory Committee on Transna- 
tional Enterprises, Feb. 5. 

*'12 1/10 State Department receives Frank- 
lin portrait. 
13 1/14 Kissinger: news conference. 

*14 1/14 Shipping Coordinating Committee 
(SCC), Subcommittee on Safety 
of Life at Sea (SOLAS), working 
group on ship design and equip- 
ment, Feb. 11. 

*15 1/15 Advisory Committee for U.S. Par- 
ticipation in the U.N. Conference 
on Human Settlements (Habitat), 
Feb. 5. 

*16 1/15 SCC, SOLAS, working group on 

container onerations, Feb. 11. 
17 1/16 Joint State-Treasury statement on 

^Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

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U.S. government printing office 



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Volume LXXIV • No. 1911 

February 9, 1976 

Excerpt From President Ford's Address to the Congress 145 



Address by Deputy Secretary Ingersoll H.7 


For index see inside back cover 


Vol. LXXIV, No. 1911 
February 9, 1976 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington. D.C. 20402 


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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
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reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 

The State of the Union 

Address by President Ford to the Congress (Excerpt) * 

The protection of the lives and property 
of Americans from foreign enemies is one of 
my primary responsibilities as President. In 
a world of instant communications and inter- 
continental ballistic missiles, in a world 
economy that is global and interdependent, 
our relations with other nations become 
more, not less, important to the lives of 

America has had a unique role in the 
world since the day of our independence 200 
years ago. And ever since the end of World 
War II we have borne successfully a heavy 
responsibility for insuring a stable world 
order and hope for human progress. 

Today, the state of our foreign policy is 
sound and strong. 

— We are at peace, and I will do all in my 
power to keep it that way. 

— Our military forces are capable and 
ready. Our military power is without equal. 
And I intend to keep it that way. 

— Our principal alliances, with the indus- 
trial democracies of the Atlantic community 
and Japan, have never been more solid. 

— A further agreement to limit the stra- 
tegic arms race may be achieved. 

— We have an improving relationship with 
China, the world's most populous nation. 

— The key elements for peace among the 
nations of the Middle East now exist. 

— Our traditional friendships in Latin 
America, Africa, and Asia continue. 

' Delivered on Jan. 19 (text from Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents dated Jan. 26). 

— We have taken the role of leadership in 
launching a serious and hopeful dialogue 
between the industrial world and the devel- 
oping world. 

— We have helped to achieve significant 
reform of the international monetary sys- 

We should be proud of what America, 
what our country, has accomplished in these 
areas, and I believe the American people are. 

The American people have heard too much 
about how terrible our mistakes, how evil 
our deeds, and how misguided our purposes. 
The American people know better. 

The truth is we are the world's greatest 
democracy. We remain the symbol of man's 
aspiration for liberty and well-being. We are 
the embodiment of hope for progress. 

I say it is time we quit downgrading our- 
selves as a nation. Of course it is our re- 
sponsibility to learn the right lesson from 
past mistakes. It is our duty to see that they 
never happen again. But our greater duty 
is to look to the future. The world's troubles 
will not go away. 

The American people want strong and 
effective international and defense policies. 

In our constitutional system, these poli- 
cies should reflect consultation and accom- 
modation between the President and the 
Congress. But in the final analysis, as the 
framers of our Constitution knew from hard 
experience, the foreign relations of the 
United States can be conducted effectively 
only if there is strong central direction that 
allows flexibility of action. That responsibil- 
ity clearly rests with the President. 

February 9, 1976 


I pledge to the American people policies 
which seek a secure, just, and peaceful 
world. I pledge to the Congress to work with 
you to that end. 

We must not face a future in which we 
can no longer help our friends, such as An- 
gola, even in limited and carefully controlled 
ways. We must not lose all capacity to re- 
spond short of military intervention. 

Some hasty actions of the Congress dur- 
ing the past year — most recently in respect 
to Angola — were, in my view, very short- 
sighted. Unfortunately, they are still very 
much on the minds of our allies and our 

A strong defense posture gives weight to 
our values and our views in international 
negotiations ; it assures the vigor of our 
alliances; and it sustains our efforts to pro- 
mote settlements of international conflicts. 

Only from a position of strength can we 
negotiate a balanced agreement to limit the 
growth of nuclear arms. Only a balanced 
agreement will serve our interests and mini- 
mize the threat of nuclear confrontation. 

The defense budget I will submit to the 
Congress for fiscal year 1977 will show an 
essential increase over the current year. It 
provides for real growth in purchasing 
power over this year's defense budget, which 
includes the cost of the all-volunteer force. 

We are continuing to make economies to 
enhance the efficiency of our military forces, 
but the budget I will submit represents the 
necessity of American strength for the real 
world in which we live. 

As conflict and rivalry persist in the 
world, our U.S. intelligence capabilities must 
be the best in the world. 

The crippling of our foreign intelligence 
services increases the danger of American 
involvement in direct armed conflict. Our 
adversaries are encouraged to attempt new 
adventures while our own ability to moni- 
tor events and to influence events short of 
military action is undermined. 

Without effective intelligence capability, 
the United States stands blindfolded and 

In the near future, I will take actions to 
reform and strengthen our intelligence com- 
munity. I ask for your positive cooperation. 
It is time to go beyond sensationalism and 
insure an effective, responsible, and respon- 
sive intelligence capability. 

Tonight I have spoken about our problems 
at home and abroad. I have recommended 
policies that will meet the challenge of our 
third century. I have no doubt that our 
Union will endure — better, stronger, and 
with more individual freedom. We can see 
forward only dimly — one year, five years, a 
generation perhaps. Like our forefathers, we 
know that if we meet the challenges of our 
own time with a common sense of purpose 
and conviction, if we remain true to our 
Constitution and to our ideals, then we can 
know that the future will be better than the 

Letters of Credence 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
People's Republic of Benin (formerly Da- 
homey), Setondji Thomas Boya, presented 
his credentials to President Ford on Janu- 
ary 23.' 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Kingdom of Nepal, Padma Bahadur Khatri, 
presented his credentials to President Ford 
on January 23.' 

Papua New Guinea 

The newly appointed Ambassador of 
Papua New Guinea, Paulias N. Matane, pre- 
sented his credentials to President Ford on 
January 23.* 

' For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the 
President's reply, see Department of State press 
release dated Jan. 23. 


Department of State Bulletin 

e Executive and the Congress in Foreign Policy: 
fif onflict or Cooperation? 

Address by Deputy Secretary Robert S. Ingersoll * 

Almost a year ago Secretary Kissinger 
poke to this Council. He spoke of the ar- 
val of a new era of interdependence in 
orld affairs; the inextricable relationship 
tween American security and prosperity 
d that of the world ; and our need, despite 
.6 foreign policy setbacks of the past dec- 
ide and the public preoccupation with 
omestic problems, to continue a responsible 
nd active American role in world affairs. 
[e recalled the bipartisan consensus of the 
nmediate postwar period which had pro- 
uced such creative and successful Ameri- 
an world leadership and invited the Con- 
ress to a new national partnership in the 
anduct of our foreign policy. 

Together with new conceptions of foreign policy 
he said), we must define new principles of execu- 
ve-legislative relations — principles which reconcile 
16 unmistakable claims of congressional supervi- 
ion and the urgent requirements of purposeful 
.merican world leadership. 

Today I would like to talk to you about 
luch the same subject — the relationship 
letween the executive and the Congress in 
oreign policy. 

I do not intend simply to repeat Secretary 
Cissinger's remarks. Still less would I want 
disagree with what he said. But the fact 
s, as you all know, that 1975 has not been 
he year in which the era of national part- 

' Made before the Los Angeles World Affairs 
ilouncil at Los Angeles, Calif., on Jan. 22 (text 
rom press release 21). 

nership on foreign policy began. Rather, 
1975 has been a year of conflict and tension 
between executive and legislative branches 
on foreign policy issues. Many would antici- 
pate that 1976, an election year, promises 
more of the same. 

But the importance of responsible Ameri- 
can involvement in world affairs has not 
diminished during the past year, nor will the 
world stop while we conduct our quadren- 
nial election ritual. And bipartisan coopera- 
tion and national consensus are as vital as 
ever to the effectiveness of any foreign pol- 
icy we pursue. So I think this subject de- 
serves another look today. 

In these remarks I will examine the 
underlying causes of the continuing differ- 
ences between the Congress and the execu- 
tive and discuss some of the specific institu- 
tional problems which arose or continued 
during the past year, such as the coherence 
of congressional foreign policy actions, the 
effect of legislative restrictions aimed at 
modifying the behavior of foreign govern- 
ments, and the handling of classified infor- 

Finally, I will try to assess prospects for 
foreign policy bipartisanship in 1976 and 

Underlying Causes of the Differences 

The possibility of conflict and tension be- 
tween the executive and legislative branches 
over foreign policy was built into the Con- 

February 9, 1976 


stitution. Many years ago the constitutional 
scholar Edward S. Corwin wrote: 

What the Constitution does, and all that it does, 
is to confer upon the President certain powers capa- 
ble of affecting our foreign relations, and certain 
other powers of the same general nature upon the 
Senate, and still other such powers upon the Con- 
gress; but which of these organs shall have the 
decisive and final voice in determining the course of 
the American nation is left for events to resolve. 

Sometimes I go back to the office and re- 
flect on this thought after a particularly 
tough day on Capitol Hill. 

Of course, the Constitution does not actu- 
ally require conflict between the Presidency 
and the Congress. Nor do political party 
rivalries such as our present one lead in- 
evitably to foreign policy disputes. It was an 
unelected President and an opposition-con- 
trolled Congi-ess, locked in confrontation on 
many other issues, which together launched 
the creative foreign policy initiatives of the 
1946-48 period. But what permitted biparti- 
san cooperation in that era, after the ex- 
perience of isolationism, appeasement, and 
war, was broad national consensus on our 
fundamental policy objectives of containing 
Soviet Communist expansionism and assist- 
ing the economic and political recovery of 
the European democracies. 

Conversely, what inhibits bipartisan co- 
operation today is the divisive and chasten- 
ing experience of Viet-Nam and Watergate 
and the lack of public consensus about Amer- 
ica's future role in the world. 

Ten public opinion analysts recently told 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
that Americans are increasingly preoccupied 
with domestic matters. For example, in a 
1964 survey of what most concerned the 
American people, international issues pre- 
empted the top five spots. A decade later, in 
1974, no foreign policy issue ranked higher 
than 17th. More recently, NBC's excellent 
three-hour special on foreign policy on the 
evening of January 5 finished third in the 
ratings, behind the CBS situation comedy 
lineup and an ABC program on the Olym- 
pics, even though NBC had prudently waited 
until the Monday-night football season was 

over before putting on the special. Perha 
it should have been narrated by Howa 

The pollsters indicated that America; 
want a close correlation between oversej 
involvement and American national inte 
ests, are not enthusiastic about military a 
to foreign governments, and are extreme 
skittish about any commitment which cou 
lead to the use of American troops abroad. 

Other pubhc opinion surveys indicate 
general decline in confidence in government 
institutions. So it is only fair to say that tl 
Congress elected in 1974 — and taking offii 
in early 1975 just before Secretary Kissingi 
spoke to you — has probably been reflectin 
public opinion in ending our military ii 
volvement in Indochina, opposing any ii 
volvement in Angola, viewing with skepti 
cism any commitments we made in conne^ 
tion with the Sinai agreement, seeking 1 
limit and attach restrictions to our securiti 
assistance program, and exhibiting grea 
dislike for secrecy in our foreign relations. 

On the other hand, the pollsters reports 
that the public was aware of the relation 
ship between events and trends overseas an' 
in the United States and rejected a retur 
to isolationism. The Administration, c 
course, shares that view, believing that ev& 
though we can no longer dominate the worl< 
as we did for many years after World War I 
we cannot ignore it either. 

I will not attempt to convince you in d»« 
tail of the relationship between America 
security and prosperity and that of thi 
world, and the need for a responsibly activ 
foreign policy, since I note that Secretar 
Kissinger covered these points in last year' 
speech. If he couldn't convince you, no on | 
can ; and if an audience such as this does no 
believe it, then the country is in deepe 
trouble than any of us had suspected. 

Another cause of the lack of consensu 
and bipartisanship is the increasing com 
plexity of the foreign policy issues we fac€ 
with the new agenda of international eco 
nomic interdependence superimposed on th^ ' 
traditional agenda of political and militar: i 


Department of State Bulletli 

valries. We can no longer overwhelm these 
oblems with the application of superior 
ilitary power or economic resources and 
lerefore must often pursue subtle policies 
I deal with them, policies which are inher- 
itly difficult to explain to the public. 
It is most difficult to explain, and to gen- 
ate popular enthusiasm for, today's more 
lanced policies: 

— Detente with the Soviet Union calls for 
Taring the Soviets positive incentives for 
oderate behavior and cooperation with the 
'est, but at the same time it calls for con- 
nuing firmness in dealing with Soviet op- 
)rtunism in places like Angola and the 
Middle East. 

— The defense of our economy and foreign 
ilicy from excessive foreign pressure re- 
lires us to try to improve relations with 
le oil-exporting countries to give them a 
jsitive stake in the health of the world 
•onomy; yet at the same time we are try- 
ig to coordinate actions with the other oil- 
nporting countries to reduce OPEC's [Or- 
mization of Petroleum Exporting Coun- 
ies] control of the price of oil. 
— Our desire to strengthen world prosper- 
y and stability leads us toward a dialogue 
ith the less developed countries on energy, 
)mmodities, development, and other issues; 
et at the same time we are reacting 
;rongly against confrontationist rhetoric 
lid double moral standards from the Third 

Even though we naturally believe these 
olicies are the best suited for the problems 
ley address, we recognize that they may 
ot make an audience stomp and cheer. 

leed for Coherent Foreign Policy in Congress 

Whatever the reasons for the lack of con- 
ensus and bipartisanship, it is clear to all 
hat the Congress is determined to play a 
lore active role in the formulation and the 
mplementation of foreign policy: 

— The War Powers Act, passed in 1973, 
equires Presidential reporting to the Con- 

gress on the commitment of American 
troops overseas, as we did during the 
Mayaguez incident, and permits the Con- 
gress to force their withdrawal. 

— Executive agreements must now be re- 
ported to the Congress, and the Congress 
tends to insist that any important agree- 
ment be submitted as a treaty, which must 
be approved by two-thirds of Senators pres- 
ent and voting. 

— An increasing number of restrictions 
have been placed on security assistance, in- 
cluding a congressional veto of any specific 
arms ti'ansaction over $50 million to any 
specific country. An overall ceiling is being 
proposed for arms transfers. 

—1974 legislation requires the Admin- 
istration to report covert foreign policy 
operations to six congressional committees. 

But just as the Congress has increased its 
activity and assumed new responsibilities in 
foreign policy, its internal mechanisms and 
structure for dealing with these tasks are 
breaking down: 

— The traditional hierarchy of the leader- 
ship and committee chairmen has been chal- 
lenged by the newer members, but no alter- 
nate structure has been erected in its place. 

— The complex nature of international 
issues has blurred existing lines of commit- 
tee jurisdiction and led to the creation of 
new select committees, such as the two com- 
mittees on intelligence. 

— Interest groups such as the Democratic 
Caucus, the Black Caucus and other ethnic 
groups, the group led by Congressman 
[Donald M.] Eraser which is concerned with 
greater attention to human rights, and other 
ad hoc coalitions on specific issues cannot 
focus their influence on any single leader- 
ship group or committee. The Administra- 
tion finds it difficult to respond quickly and 
effectively to their concerns. 

The general result has been that the 
executive, in attempting to inform or to con- 
sult with the Congress, is often unsure as 
to whom to contact or which committees to 
work with. 

-ebruary 9, 1976 


There is an ever-increasing series of de- 
mands for Secretary Kissinger iiimself to 
testify or meet personally groups and indi- 
viduals. He recently estimated that he 
spends about one-fourth of his time on con- 
gressional relations. It seems he spends 
more time shuttling between the Depart- 
ment and Capitol Hill than between Cairo 
and Tel Aviv. The Secretary, and many of 
us, are involved in seemingly countless in- 
formal meetings and working meals at the 
Department and elsewhere. But no matter 
how hard we try, we keep getting caught in 
jurisdictional disputes among congressional 
committees or criticized for not consulting 
with some committee or group. 

But what is more serious for the nation 
as a whole is that the structural confusion 
leads to incoherence in congressional for- 
eign policy. 

For example, I think most Americans, in- 
cluding the Administration and Congress, 
share a desire that the Soviet Union con- 
form more closely to internationally ac- 
cepted norms of behavior, in both internal 
and foreign policies. More specifically, we 
favor freedom of emigration. And we oppose 
Soviet meddling in the affairs of developing 
countries like Angola, in areas heretofore 
relatively free of great-power intervention. 

The Administration is pursuing a policy, 
generally known as detente, which seeks to 
achieve this goal by providing incentives for 
moderate and reasonable Soviet behavior 
and at the same time discouraging Soviet 

Yet one temporary coalition in the Con- 
gress imposed the Soviet emigration amend- 
ment — the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the 
Trade Act — which, without increasing emi- 
gration, has made it much more difficult for 
us to use increased U.S.-Soviet trade to 
create vested interests in the U.S.S.R. who 
have a stake in cooperation with the United 
States and, therefore, restraint in Soviet 
foreign policy. Now another temporary 
coalition wants to stop activities in Angola 
which were intended to demonstrate to the 
Soviets that they cannot exploit detente for 
unilateral advantage. 

Taken together, these congressionally im- 

posed policies strike both the carrot and th 
stick from the Administration's hands; ye 
it is difficult to imagine what positive an 
coherent alternative policy these congre; 
sional coalitions could agree on in our reh 
tions with the Soviet Union. It seems to in 
that the greater the role the Congress ii > 
sists on playing in foreign policy, the greate ' j 
its obligation to see that its actions are coi ll 
sistent one with another. 

Impact of Legislative Restrictions "r 

The legislative process can contribute el ' 
f ectively to the definition of our f oreig i ' 
policy goals. But congressional efforts t '' 
legislate day-to-day and week-to-week coi 
duct of foreign relations have often prove • 
detrimental because they were too publii.' 
too drastic, or too undiscriminating. The r( ' 
suits of such legislative sanctions during th 
last year tend to confirm this view. Fc 
example : 

— The Trade Act provision which exclude 
OPEC members from the generalized systei i , 
of tariff preferences for less developed coui ■ 
tries has not prevented a further increase i I 
the official price of oil. But it has complicate 
our relations with OPEC members such i 
Iran, Indonesia, Nigeria, Venezuela, ar 
Ecuador, all of which sold oil to us througl 
out the Arab boycott. Latin American coui ^ 
tries have taken the side of Venezuela an 
Ecuador on this issue. j 

— Because of the Trade Act provisic : ' 
which links most-favored-nation treatmei j 
and export credits to explicit Soviet assu;i 
ances on emigration, the bilateral trad » 
agreement has not taken effect. Soviet lenc 
lease repayments, which are linked to th 
agreement, have been suspended by Moscov 
The American share in Soviet trade with th 
West has dropped from 20 percent in 197 
and 1974 to 15 percent in 1975; and froi 
what American businessmen tell us, the 
lost over $1 billion in Soviet orders last yeai 
Meanwhile, Soviet emigration is down froi 
35,000 in 1973, to 20,000 in 1974, to onl 
13,000 in 1975. 

— Last year's foreign aid legislation cor 
tained an amendment, section 502B, statin 


Department of State Bulleti 

the sense of Congress that "except in ex- 
traordinary circumstances, the President 
shall substantially reduce or terminate se- 
curity assistance" — that is, military train- 
ing or the sale or grant of equipment — "to 
any government which engages in a con- 
sistent pattern of gross violations of inter- 
nationally recognized human rights . . . ." 
The President must tell the Congress why 
security assistance to such governments 
should not be reduced or ended. Thus 502B 
requires the U.S. Government to hold 
friendly and allied governments to human 
rights standards rarely attained by their 
potential adversaries or indeed by the pres- 
ent-day majority of U.N. members. If they 
fail to measure up, we are required to end 
military aid or cut it from the level which 
the Congress has already authorized in pur- 
suit of our national security interests. In 
other words, the left hand of Congress seeks 
to take away what the right hand of Con- 
gress has given. In our view, few govern- 
ments can be expected to respond as we 
might desire to such public U.S. Govern- 
ment judgments on their internal affairs, 
and therefore this provision advances 
neither human rights nor security. 

— Last February, despite our pleas, the 
Congress cut off arms transfers to Turkey, 
including items that nation had already paid 
for, to force concessions on Cyprus. The 
cutoff triggered a wave of Turkish anti- 
Americanism and a later Turkish Govern- 
ment decision to suspend American use of a 
number of Turkish bases. Now the Congress 
has partially lifted the embargo, but the 
damage will never be completely repaired. 
Our current base negotiations with them are 
extremely tough. This affects the security 
of the southern flank of NATO and of the 
eastern Mediterranean, as as well as intelli- 
gence gathering important to our efforts to 
protect our own security and monitor com- 
pliance with arms control agreements. 
Meanwhile, there has been no progress in 
Cyprus; in fact, some would suggest that 
the embargo stiffened the Turkish bargain- 
ing position. 

We realize of course that the Congress 

has taken these actions partly because of 
frustration at executive branch efforts to 
achieve the same objectives through quiet 
diplomacy. We would contend that given the 
inherent limits on the ability of the United 
States to modify the behavior of sovereign 
governments, we have done about as well 
as could be expected on these issues. But 
legislative restrictions, because they are in- 
herently provocative, tend to create a back- 
lash from the governments we are seeking 
to influence; because they are enacted in 
isolation, without adequate consideration of 
our overall foreign policy interests, they 
often have unintended adverse consequences 
in other areas. 

The Handling of Classified Information 

As congressional oversight of foreign pol- 
icy increases, so do problems relating to the 
handling and public release of classified in- 
formation transmitted from the executive 
to the Congress. This Administration has 
provided unprecedented amounts and kinds 
of classified information to the Congress in 
recent months. Some committees have re- 
spected the confidentiality of this informa- 
tion; other committees, or their individual 
members, have not. I am not adopting a 
"less-leaky-than-thou" posture toward the 
Congress. Nevertheless we are distressed to 
see some of this information find its way into 
the press shortly after we transmit it to the 
Congress or published by Congress without 
our concurrence. 

We know that there are dangers in over- 
classification and that the "national secu- 
rity" justification for secrecy has been 
abused in the past to protect erring officials. 
But we cannot ignore the dangers arising 
from the inability to protect properly classi- 
fied information. 

The publication of information revealing 
intelligence-gathering methods and their 
effectiveness, as one committee did in a 
report on the 1973 Middle East war, over our 
protest, allows the unwitting sources of such 
intelligence to take effective countermeas- 
ures in the future. 

February 9, 1976 


Likewise, the publication of the texts of 
diplomatic exchanges, as one committee did, 
despite our objection, in its report on the 
1975 Sinai agreement, can freeze the posi- 
tions of the protagonists and inhibit the 
process of negotiation and compromise. 

The leaking of covert operations by indi- 
vidual Congressmen — who themselves are 
unwilling to take public responsibility for 
their actions — makes these operations im- 
possible. The Administration believes that 
we should maintain a covert action capabil- 
ity, for certain situations and under appro- 
priate congressional oversight, as an alter- 
native to either inaction or open involve- 
ment. But in effect, our foreign policy in 
these areas can gyrate out of executive and 
congressional control and become subject to 
the veto by leak of individual members of 


The lack of bipartisanship and consensus 
I have described should be a source of con- 
cern to all Americans who are interested in 
effective American participation in world 
affairs. This deficiency requires action by 
the executive, the Congress, and the public, 
particularly foreign-policy-oriented organi- 
zations such as the World Affairs Council. 

For our part, the Administration recog- 
nizes that the Congress has a proper con- 
stitutionally based role in the formulation 
of foreign policy through advice and consent 
to nominations and treaties, through legis- 
lation and appropriations. It also has re- 
sponsibilities for oversight of policy imple- 
mentation. We are complying with current 
legislation requiring us to inform or con- 
sult with the Congress. We are determined 
to pursue partnership with the Congress, 
and we are involving an increasing number 
of officers at all levels of the Department in 
these consultations so that both sides will 
understand each other's attitudes and re- 

We hope that the Congress will find a way 
to organize itself to exercise its foreign pol- 
icy responsibilities more effectively. The 

structures and procedures are for the Con- 
gress to decide, but I would suggest two pos- 
sibly relevant models: 

— The first is the recently created Budget 
Committees of both Houses, which are now 
charged with establishing budget ceilings 
and an overview of the budgetary process 
which was previously diffused among many 
different committees. 

— The second model is the executive 
branch's National Security Council, includ- 
ing representatives of all interested depart- 
ments and agencies, which studies national 
security issues and gives the President co- 
herent analysis and recommendations on the 
policy options available to him. 

If the Congress could establish a structure 
to deal with the overall foreign policy pic- 
ture, as well as related procedural issues 
such as consultation with the executive and 
the handling of classified material, its ac- 
tions would be less piecemeal, less subject 
to special pleading, and more internally con- 

It is the conventional wisdom that noth- 
ing much can be accomplished on major 
foreign policy issues in an election year. But 
our electorate need not — indeed, should not 
— passively accept this traditional state of 
affairs. I believe that organizations such as 
the World Affairs Council can play a useful 
role in the election debate by asking candi- 
dates their views not only on substantive 
foreign policy issues but also on the insti- 
tutional and procedural problems I have 
discussed today. 

America would benefit from a serious na- 
tional dialogue among the people and be- 
tween the branches of government about the 
international challenges we face, the limits 
and possibilities of American action, the 
proper division of authority and responsi- 
bility for our foreign policy, and the rela- 
tionships among the responsible institu- 

Such a debate can lay the foundations for 
a consensus on the broad outlines of a for- 
eign policy for the early years of our third 


Depariment of State Bulletin 

President Urges Redoubled Efforts 
Against Illicit Drug Traffic 

Statement by President Ford ' 


,jp Drug abuse is a tragic national problem 

hich saps our nation's vitality. It is also a 
•'major contributor to our growing crime rate. 
All of us must redouble our efforts to com- 
bat this problem. 

Earlier this week I met with Representa- 
tive Charles B. Rangel and other Members 
of the Congress to discuss the problem of 
drug abuse. The Congressmen reported the 
growing availability and use of illicit drugs 
and expressed their concern about the con- 
tinuing flow of drugs across the southwest 
border from Mexico and their continuing 
concern about a possible resurgence of her- 
oin traffic from Turkey. 

Aware of the worsening situation, last 
spring I directed a high-priority review of 
the entire Federal effort in drug law enforce- 
ment, treatment and prevention, and inter- 
national control. The resulting White Paper 
on Drug Abuse contained a frank assessment 
of where we are in these efforts, as well as 
a number of comprehensive recommenda- 
tions to improve our response to this critical 
problem. I endorse the white paper, and the 
budget I will submit in January will request 
sufficient funds to implement all of its major 

This Administration already has begun to 
take strong action to deal with the mount- 
ing threat, however. I have spoken with 
Presidents Echeverria of Mexico and Lopez 
Michelsen of Colombia and with Prime Min- 
ister Demirel of Turkey in an effort to 
strengthen cooperation of other nations in- 
volved in the fight against illicit drug traffic. 

Because of my particular concern about 
the problem of Mexican heroin, I am direct- 
ing Secretary of State Kissinger to express 
to the Mexican Government my personal 
concern that we explore opportunities for 

'Issued at Vail, Colo., on Dec. 26 (text from White 
House press release, Vail). 

improved control. I have also directed the 
Domestic Council Drug Abuse Task Force to 
present me with specific recommendations 
for improving our ability to control drug 
trafficking along the southwest border. 

I call upon the Congress to enact my pro- 
posal for mandatory minimum sentences for 
drug traffickers so those who are spreading 
this evil throughout our communities will 
be put behind bars, where they belong. And 
I urge the Congress to ratify the Conven- 
tion on Psychotropic Substances so we can 
fulfill our obligations to the other nations of 
the world to see that strong international 
controls exist for all drugs. In the weeks 
ahead I will send to the Congress a compre- 
hensive message on drug abuse establishing 
a framework for a broad government re- 
sponse to the problem. 

U.S. Relations With Sri Lanka: 
Friendship and Mutual Respect 

Following are remarks by Alfred L. Ather- 
ton, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Near East- 
ern and South Asian Affairs, tvhich were 
recorded at Washington for broadcast on 
December 16 by the Sri Lanka Broadcasting 

I am pleased to extend my congratulations 
to the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation 
on the completion of 50 years of service. As 
the United States begins to celebrate its 
Bicentennial year, I am happy to have this 
opportunity to talk about the friendship and 
good relations which our two countries 

As we approach the last quarter of the 
20th century, the world is entering a new 
era, one quite different from the post-World 
War II period which saw the end of colonial- 
ism in Asia and Africa and a global cold 
war. The challenges ahead will be those of 
cooperation rather than confrontation — how 
to maintain and strengthen the structure of 
global peace in a multipolar world and how 

February 9, 1976 


to provide a more satisfactory standard of 
living for all nations. 

What Ceylonese and Americans have 
learned in building our own bilateral rela- 
tionship can be of value in meeting these 
broader challenges. At times, in the 1950's 
and 1960's, discord and disagreement existed 
between us. Fortunately, we have both come 
to accept that our common interests, aspira- 
tions, and shared values transcend the dif- 
ferences between us. Today our relations are 
friendly because we have learned to appreci- 
ate and to respect each other's interests and 

What are the principles that guide Amer- 
ica's policies toward Sri Lanka? They are: 

First, we accept your commitment to non- 
alignment and recognize the important posi- 
tion your country holds as the host for the 
1976 nonaligned summit conference. Dr. 
Kissinger summed up our views in a speech 
last year when he said : ' 

The United States accepts nonalignment. In fact, 
America sees a world of free, independent, sovereign 
states as being decidedly in its own national interest. 
Support of national independence and the variety 
that goes with it has become a central theme of 
American foreign policy. 

Second, we seek no special privileges or 
special role in South Asia or Sri Lanka. We 
want the nations of the region to live at 
peace with one another and to develop their 
distinct national identities free from exter- 
nal interference. We welcome Sri Lanka's 
policy of seeking balanced relations with the 
United States and with other powers. 

Third, we support your efforts to accel- 
erate national development. We have sought 
to play a constructive role through our eco- 
nomic assistance in backing your programs 
to provide a better standard of living for all 
of your citizens. Nineteen seventy-five, in 
fact, marks the 25th anniversary of economic 
cooperation between our two countries. 

Finally, Americans feel a special affinity 
toward Sri Lanka because of our common 
adherence to the democratic principles of 

government and all that these imply. We may 
live halfway around the globe from one 
another, but as your Prime Minister, Mrs. 
Bandaranaike, has said: "Our two countries 
have many things in common, including a 
devotion to the parliamentary system of gov- 
ernment and free elections." |i 

Common interests, mutual respect, and 
shared endeavors are thus the foundations 
on which our friendship rests. The United 
States will do its part to sustain this rela- 

The world today is marked by the inter- 
dependence of all nations, a common fate for 
all mankind, and by problems which trans- 
cend national boundaries and thus cannot be 
solved by purely national efforts. As our two 
governments address the problems of our ^ 
time, the dialogue between the United States 
and Sri Lanka contributes significantly to 
the search for agreement and compromise 
between developed and developing countries. 
A willingness to take into account other 
views in spite of differences is a fundamental 
necessity if the world is to settle the critical 
issues facing it through peaceful means. 

The United States values its relations with 
Sri Lanka and has every expectation that 
they will remain warm and friendly. We can 
aim at nothing less than continued coopera- 
tion and dialogue if we are to meet the re- 
quirements of our time, the requirements of 
our two nations. 

May the friendship of America and Sri 
Lanka prosper in the years ahead. 

President Ford Pays Tribute | 

to Indochina Refugee Program ' 

Statement by President Ford ' i 

Eight months ago, I initiated a program I 
designed to open America's doors to refu- 
gees from Indochina seeking a new life. To 
facilitate their entry, I ordered the estab- 

' For Secretary Kissinger's address at New Delhi 
on Oct. 28, 1974, see Bulletin of Nov. 25, 1974, 
p. 740. 

' Issued at Vail, Colo., on Dec. 24 (text from White 
House press release. Vail). 


Department of State Bulletin 

lishment of four reception centers in the 
United States to house the refugees tempo- 
rarily until sponsors came forward to assist 

The last remaining refugees departed the 
reception center at Fort Chaffee, Ark., on 
Saturday, December 20. The closing of that 
reception center marks the successful con- 
clusion of our organized resettlement pro- 
gram. Since its inception in April, over 
130,000 refugees passed through these 
camps before settling in communities in 
every state of the Union. 

The success of this massive undertaking 
was due mainly to the open-hearted gener- 
osity of the American people, who both indi- 
vidually and through their churches and 
civic groups came forward to sponsor these 
newest members of our society. 

But the program could not have succeeded 
without the efforts of those who worked 
long hours in this humanitarian cause. The 
nation owes a special tribute to the Inter- 
agency Task Force for Indochina Refugees 
which I set up on April 18 to coordinate 
refugee evacuation, reception, and resettle- 
ment and to the voluntary agencies which 
handled the sponsorship of the refugees in 
American society. To those thousands of 
military and civilians, volunteers, and re- 
settlement agency personnel who dedicated 
these past months to the refugees, we owe 
heartfelt thanks. Their work reflects the 
truly humanitarian achievement of public 
agencies and the private sector working in 
harmony. This demonstration of strength 
will continually reinforce the refugees as 
they begin their journey toward becoming 
fully self-sufficient and contributing mem- 
bers of our nation's communities. 

Initial fears that the refugees would be- 
come an ongoing problem are now allayed. 
The refugees have proven themselves to be 
hard-working and industrious people with 
a thirst for education and a deep-seated de- 
sire to improve themselves. I am confident 
that they will follow the example of former 
immigrants who have so richly contributed 
to the character and strength of the Ameri- 
can system. 

The warmth and generosity that have 

characterized the welcome that Americans 
have given to the refugees serve as a re- 
affirmation of American awareness of the 
roots and the ideals of our society. 

President Ends Temporary Limitation 
on Imports of Meat From Canada 


Termination of Temporary Quantitative Lim- 
itation ON the Importation Into the United 
States of Certain Beef and Veal From Canada 

Whereas, Proclamation No. 4335 of November 16, 

1974, issued pursuant to Section 252(a) of the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1882(a)) in re- 
sponse to unjustifiable restrictions imposed by Canada 
on meat imports from the United States, limited 
imports into the United States of certain cattle, 
beef, veal, swine and pork from Canada, and whereas 
that Proclamation inserted item 945.03 into subpart 
B of part 2 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules 
of the United States (TSUS), and 

Whereas, Canada has now lifted those unjustifi- 
able restrictions on meat imports from the United 
States, and 

Whereas, Section 255(b) of the Trade Expansion 
Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1885(b)) authorizes the 
President to terminate in whole or in part any 
proclamation made pursuant to Section 252 of the 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1882(a)), 

Whereas, Proclamation No. 4382 of August 5, 

1975, terminated those parts of Proclamation No. 
4335 pertaining to the importation of cattle, swine 
and pork from Canada and 

Whereas, I deem it necessary and appropriate to 
terminate the remaining restrictions proclaimed in 
Proclamation No. 4335, specifically those imposing 
temporary quantitative limitations on the importa- 
tion into the United States of certain beef and veal 
from Canada, in order to encourage trade between 
the United States and Canada. 

Now, Therefore, I. Gerald R. Ford, President of 
the United States of America, acting under authority 
vested in me by the Constitution and statutes, in- 
cluding Section 255(b) of the Trade Expansion Act 
of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1885(b)) do hereby proclaim that: 

1) Proclamation No. 4335 is terminated. 

2) Subpart B of part 2 of the Appendix to the 
TSUS is amended as follows: 

(a) By deleting the superior heading immediately 
preceding item 945.03. 

(b) By deleting item 945.03. 

' No. 4410, 41 Fed, Reg. 749. 

February 9, 1976 


3) This Proclamation is effective with respect to 
articles entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for 
consumption after 12:01 a.m. EST, January 1, 1976. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand this thirty-first day of December in the year of 
our Lord nineteen hundred and seventy-five and of 
the Independence of the United States of America 
the two hundredth. 

Gerald R. Ford. 


Department Discusses Formulation 
of Foreign Agricultural Policy 

Statement by Charles W. Robinson 
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs ^ 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear 
today to comment on the process of foreign 
agricultural policy formulation. 

Your invitation to the Department of 
State to participate in a hearing of a sub- 
committee of the Senate Committee on Agri- 
culture and Forestry highlights the increas- 
ingly important relationship between agri- 
cultural policy and our overall foreign policy. 

In my present position, I am especially 
aware that agriculture is a central and im- 
portant contributor to the success of U.S. 
foreign economic policy. Agricultural ex- 
ports have accounted for a substantial share 
of total U.S. exports, and they have in- 
creased rapidly in recent years. In 1975 U.S. 
agricultural exports were valued at an esti- 
mated $21.8 billion, compared with $7.2 bil- 
lion in 1970. The estimated $13 billion sur- 
plus in U.S. agricultural trade contributed 
mightily to our record trade surplus last 

' Made before the Subcommittee on Foreign Agri- 
cultural Policy of the Senate Committee on Agricul- 
ture and Forestry on Jan. 22. The complete transcript 
of the hearings will be published by the committee 
and will be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20402. 

The splendid contribution of U.S. agricul- 
ture to American economic strength inter- 
nationally has been possible under the 
Administration's policies of strengthening 
markets at home and abroad for our agri- 
cultural production. These policies have 
proved mutually beneficial for the American 
farmer, the American consumer, the Amer- 
ican taxpayer, and for our trading partners 
abroad. The expansion of agricultural ex- 
ports has permitted us to pursue a policy 
based on dismantling the decades-old system 
of production restraints. Fuller pi'oduction 
has enabled us to serve the growing foreign 
demand for U.S. agricultural output while 
at the same time providing ample supplies 
for American consumers. 

The competitiveness of U.S. agriculture 
in world markets has been enhanced by 
monetary adjustments during the 1970's. 
We intend to maintain the gains which 
American farmers have recently enjoyed 
abroad. To this end, the United States will 
insist that agriculture shares in the benefits 
of trade liberalizations which result from 
the multilateral trade negotiations currently 
underway in Geneva. 

There have of course been a few limited 
exceptions to our open market policy for 
exports in recent years. In 1973 soybean ex- 
ports to all countries were restricted briefly 
under the Export Administration Act, and 
in 1974 grain sales to the Soviet Union were 
temporarily suspended by exporters at the 
request of the Administration. 

In 1975, large Soviet purchases (nearly 
10 million tons) early in the crop year and 
the prospect of even larger, potentially dis- 
ruptive purchases by the U.S.S.R. and other 
Eastern European countries required a 
temporary suspension of U.S. grain trans- 
actions with the Soviets. This permitted the 
overall assessment of supply and demand 
which was necessary to assure that addi- 
tional sales to those countries would not 
bring about significant grain shortages else- 
where in the world. The suspension also 
provided the time necessary to obtain a long- 
term commitment from the Soviets on an- 
nual purchases from the United States. Both 
decisions — to request suspension of sales to 


Department of State Bulletin 

the Soviets and to conclude an agreement 
with them — were taken by the President 
after full consultation with appropriate Cab- 
inet officers and White House staff. Time 
has confirmed the wisdom of these decisions. 

This agreement will moderate the single 
most volatile factor in the international 
grain market. As a result, American farmers 
can plan on a Soviet market for at least 6 
million metric tons of wheat and corn annu- 
ally. This factor supports our objective of 
strong foreign markets. In regularizing 
Soviet purchases from year to year, the 
agreement will measurably reduce the pros- 
pect of unpredictable and massive swings in 
Soviet purchasing patterns. This improve- 
ment in international markets will make it 
easier for the United States to maintain an 
open market policy. This was a unique 
agreement to handle a unique situation. 

We have witnessed an evolution in the 
world agi'icultural situation in recent years 
as governments, in most developed countries, 
at least, have turned attention away from 
the problems of agricultural surplus toward 
the problems of shortages. 

It is obviously vitally important that the 
United States respond effectively to develop- 
ments in the evolving world agricultural 
situation and that we anticipate future prob- 
lems and opportunities. Thus we have sought 
institutional mechanisms which would bring 
together the various elements of the Admin- 
istration which have responsibility for the 
diverse aspects of economic, agricultural, 
and foreign policy. We have begun this 
process with the knowledge that certain re- 
sponsibilities cannot be delegated. The 
Secretary of State, for example, could not 
"spin off" a portion of his overall responsi- 
bility for foreign policy any more than the 
Secretary of Agriculture could relinquish an 
important portion of his authority in agri- 
cultural policy. Balanced decisionmaking is 
necessary to serve the national interest, and 
we have carefully designed coordinating 
mechanisms which bring together key re- 
sponsible officials to consult on solutions to 
problems that span the interests of more 
than one agency. 

These consultations have been used to 

reach joint decisions or to formulate recom- 
mendations to the President for decision. 
The principal examples of such coordinating 
groups are : 

— The Economic Policy Board-National 
Security Council Food Committee created 
last September by the President. It includes 
the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Agricul- 
ture, Labor, and Commerce; the Chairman 
of the Council of Economic Advisers; the 
Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget; the Assistant to the President for 
Economic Affairs; the Executive Director 
of the Council on International Economic 
Policy; and the Assistant to the President 
for National Security Affairs. Established 
to monitor sales of feed grains and wheat to 
the Soviet Union, the Committee played an 
important role during the U.S.-Soviet grain 
negotiations in formulating instructions to 
the U.S. negotiators. It has a continuing 
mandate to develop and maintain data on 
grain production and exports. 

— The Food Deputies Group of the Eco- 
nomic Policy Board meets weekly, bringing 
together representatives of all domestic and 
foreign agencies with a substantial interest 
in food policy. 

— The International Food Review Group, 
chaired by the Secretary of State with the 
Secretary of Agriculture as Vice Chairman. 
The IFRG and its working group at the as- 
sistant-secretary level were established to 
coordinate U.S. followup activities to the 
World Food Conference. 

We found during the summer months that 
the formulation and execution of grain ex- 
port policy required several high-level inter- 
agency meetings. These took place both be- 
fore August 11, when Secretary [of Agri- 
culture Earl L.] Butz announced the tempo- 
rary suspension of sales to the Soviet Union, 
and frequently thereafter until the President 
announced conclusion of the grain agreement 
on October 20. This process was successful 
in insuring that the agreement served both 
the interests of domestic producers and con- 
sumers and foreign policy considerations. 

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. grain agreement which 
resulted removed a major element of uncer- 

February 9, 1976 


tainty from international grain markets. We 
expect that this agreement will simplify 
both foreign policy and agricultural policy 
issues involving foreign grain trade. We do 
not anticipate a need to depart from the 
policies of full production and open markets 
which have created unprecedented agricul- 
tural productivity in the United States and 
made this country the largest exporter of 
food the world has known. It is our firm in- 
tention to avoid such a departure. 

We believe that the long-term agreement 
with the U.S.S.R. will provide substantial 
benefits for U.S. food producers and con- 
sumers and for our maritime industry, 
which will participate in grain shipments. 
The interagency process which guided these 
negotiations assured balanced consideration 
of both domestic and foreign policy inter- 

President Ford Urges Continuation 
of Grant Military Assistance 

Message to the Congress ' 

To the Congress of the United States: 

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, en- 
acted by the 93rd Congress on December 
30, 1974, expresses the sense of the Con- 
gress that the policies and purposes of the 
military assistance program should be "re- 
examined in light of changes in world con- 
ditions and the economic position of the 
United States in relation to countries re- 
ceiving such assistance." Section 17(a) of 
the act expresses the view that the program, 
except for military education and training 
activities, "should be reduced and termi- 
nated as rapidly as feasible consistent with 
the security and foreign policy require- 
ments of the United States." 

To give efi'ect to section 17(a) of the act, 
the Congress directed that I submit to the 
first session of the 94th Congress a detailed 

'Transmitted on Jan. 20 (text from White House 
press release). 

plan for the "reduction and eventual elimi- 
nation of the present military assistance 
program." In the intervening period, the two 
foreign affairs committees are considering 
draft legislation that would arbitrarily ter- 
minate grant military assistance programs 
after September 30, 1977, unless authorized 
by the Congress. 

I have stressed repeatedly in my messages 
to the Congress and in my reports to the 
American people, the need for constancy 
and continuity in our foreign policy, and, in 
particular, in our relationship with nations 
which turn to us for necessary support in 
meeting their most pressing security needs. 
Since World War II, the United States has 
extended such assistance to friends and 
allies. This policy has contributed immeasur- 
ably to the cause of peace and stability in 
the world. Many countries which once re- 
ceived grant military assistance have 
achieved self-sufficiency in providing for 
their security interests, and grant military 
assistance to a number of current recipients 
is being reduced or eliminated. 

I firmly believe that grant military assist- 
ance in some form will remain a basic re- 
quirement for an effective U.S. foreign pol- 
icy for the foreseeable future. In the Middle 
East and elsewhere, we must maintain our 
flexibility to respond to future assistance 
requirements which cannot now be reckoned 
with precision. It will continue to be in our 
interest to be able to meet the legitimate 
security requirements of countries who can- 
not shoulder the full burden of their own 
defense and grant assistance will continue 
to be needed to assist countries that provide 
us essential military bases and facilities. 
These requirements will not disappear; they 
are the necessary result of the unsettled 
state of the world and of our role as a world 

Nevertheless, in recognition of the ex- 
pressed sense of the Congress, I have, in 
preparing the 1977 budget and legislative 
program, reexamined the policies, purposes, 
and scope of the military assistance program 
with a view to reducing or terminating any 
country programs no longer essential to the 
security and foreign policy interests of the 


Department of State Bulletin 

Jnited States. As a consequence of this re- 
>iew, the 1977 military assistance budget 
•equest will reflect a 28 percent reduction 
)elow the 1976 request, the termination of 
rrant materiel assistance to Korea, and 
'limination of five small grant programs in 
^^atin America. Furthermore, our prelimi- 
lary estimate of the 1978 requirements in- 
Hcates that additional reductions and some 
idditional program terminations should be 
reasible in the absence of unfavorable se- 
curity or economic development in the coun- 
;ries concerned. 

I must emphasize, however, that offsetting 
increases in foreign military sales credits 
will be required in most instances to meet 
the legitimate military needs of our friends 
and allies at a time when much of their mili- 
tary equipment is reaching obsolescence and 
prices of new equipment are increasing dras- 
tically. Moreover, the capacities of many of 
these grant military aid recipients to assume 
additional foreign exchange costs because of 
reduced military aid are limited by the 
necessity to cope with higher oil prices as 
well as the impact of the recession in the 
developed countries on their exports. In 
these circumstances, I believe the interests 
of the United States in the continued se- 
curity of these countries are better served 
by a gradual reduction of grant military as- 
sistance attuned to the particular circum- 
stances of each country than by an arbitrary 
termination of all such assistance on a given 

I Finally, I must emphasize that in this un- 
' certain and unpredictable era we must main- 
tain our national strength and our national 
purposes and remain faithful to our friends 
and allies. In these times, we must not deny 
ourselves the capacity to meet international 
crises and problems with all the instruments 
now at our disposal. I urge the Congress to 
preserve the authorities in law to provide 
grant military aid, an instrument of our na- 
tional security and foreign policy that has 
served the national interest well for more 
than 30 years. 

Gerald R. Ford. 

The White House, January 20, 1976. 


Current Actions 



Protocol for the continuation in force of the inter- 
national coffee agreement 1968, as amended and 
extended, with annex. Approved by the Interna- 
tional Coffee Council at London September 26, 
1974. Entered into force October 1, 1975. 
Acceptance deposited: United States, January 7, 

Ratification deposited: Haiti, December 29, 1975. 


Agreement on an international energy program. 
Done at Paris November 18, 1974. 
Notification of consent to be bound deposited: 

United States, January 9, 1976. 
Entered into force: January 19, 1976. 


Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the Constitu- 
tion of the World Health Organization of July 22, 
1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). 
Adopted at Geneva May 22, 1973.' 
Acceptances deposited: Ethiopia, January 9, 1976; 
Paraguay, January 15, 1976. 


Telephone regulations, with appendices and final 
protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered 
into force September 1, 1974." 

Senate advice and consent to ratification, ivith 
declarations: January 22, 1976. 

Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annex and 
final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. 
Entered into force September 1, 1974.° 
Senate advice and consent to ratification, with 
declarations: January 22, 1976. 

International telecommunication convention with an- 
nexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos 
October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 

Senate advice and consent to ratification, with 
declaration: January 22, 1976. 

Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 
1959, as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590, 
7435), to establish a new frequency allotment plan 
for high-frequency radiotelephone coast stations, 
with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva 
June 8, 1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976." 

' Not in force. 

' Not in force for the United States. 

February 9, 1976 


Senate advice and consent to ratification, with 
reservation: January 22, 1976. 

Terrorism — Protection of Diplomats 

Convention on the prevention and punishment of 
crimes against internationally protected persons, 
including diplomatic agents. Done at New York 
December 14, 1973.' 

Ratification deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, January 15, 1976. 


Geneva convention for amelioration of condition 

of wounded and sick in armed forces in the field ; 

Geneva convention for amelioration of the condition 

of wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of 

armed forces at sea; 

Geneva convention relative to the treatment of 

prisoners of war; 
Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian 
persons in time of war. 

Done at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into 

force October 21, 1950; for the United States 

February 2, 1956. TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, and 

3365, respectively. 

Notification of accession: Qatar, January 12, 1976. 

Women — Political Rights 

Convention on the political rights of women. Done 
at New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force 
July 7, 1954.= 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: Janu- 
ary 22, 1976. 

Inter-American convention on the granting of politi- 
cal rights to women. Signed at Bogota May 2, 
1948. Entered into force April 22, 1949.^^ 
Senate advice and co7isent to ratification: Janu- 
ary 22, 1976. 

World Heritage 

Convention concerning the protection of the world 
cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris 
November 16, 1972. Entered into force December 
17, 1975. 
Ratification deposited: Morocco, October 28, 1975. 



Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles and 
cotton textile products, with annexes. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Cairo December 30, 1975. 
Entered into force December 30, 1975; effective 
January 1, 1975. 

Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles, as 
extended (TIAS 7828, 8004). Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Washington May 10, 1974. 
Entered into force May 10, 1974. 
Terminated: January 1, 1975. 




Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool anc 
man-made fiber textiles and textile products, witl 
annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Bang- 
kok December 29, 1975. Entered into force Decem- 
ber 29, 1975; effective January 1, 1976. 

Agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles, with 
annex, as amended (TIAS 7299, 8053). Effected 
by exchange of notes at Bangkok March 16, 1972 
Entered into force March 16, 1972; effective April|(iei 
1, 1972. 
Terminated: January 1, 1975. 




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Department of State Bulletin 

WEX February 9, 1976 Vol. LXXIV, No. 1911 

riculture. Department Discusses Formulation 

f Foreign Agricultural Policy (Robinson) 156 

lin. Letters of Credence (Boya) .... 146 

lada. President Ends Temporary Limitation 
11 Imports of Meat From Canada (procla- 
lation) 155 


■artment Discusses Formulation of Foreign 

;ricultural Policy (Robinson) 156 

Executive and the Congress in Foreign Pol- 
v: Conflict or Cooperation?' (Ingersoll) . 147 
ident Ford Urges Continuation of Grant 
.lilitary Assistance (message to the Con- 
rress) 158 

E)nomic Affairs. President Ends Temporary 
jimitation on Imports of Meat From Canada 
proclamation) 155 

Freign Aid. President Ford Urges Continua- 
ion of Grant Military Assistance (message 
the Congress) 158 

'' icotics Control. President Urges Redoubled 
efforts Against Illicit Drug Traffic (state- 
nent) 153 

? pal. Letters of Credence (Khatri) .... 146 

i pua New Guinea. Letters of Credence 
Matane) 146 

I .\sidential Documents 

I ?sident Ends Temporary Limitation on Im- 

)orts of Meat From Canada (proclamation) 155 
1 -sident Ford Pays Tribute to Indochina 

lefugee Program 154 

1 3sident Ford Urges Continuation of Grant 

Vlilitary Assistance 158 

1 ssident Urges Redoubled Efforts Against 

llicit Drug Traffic 153 

' e State of the Union (excerpt) 145 

1 Mications. GPO Sales Publications .... 160 

1 fugees. President Ford Pays Tribute to Indo- 
■hina Refugee Program (statement) . . . 154 

li Lanka. U.S. Relations With Sri Lanka: 
Friendship and Mutual Respect (Atherton) . 153 

' eaty Information. Current Actions .... 159 

■ S.S.R. Department Discusses Formulation of 
Foreign Agricultural Policy (Robinson) . 156 

Name Index 

Atherton, Alfred L., Jr 153 

Boya, Setondji Thomas 146 

Ford, President 145, 153, 154, 155, 158 

Ingersoll, Robert S 147 

Khatri, Padma Bahadur 146 

Matane, Paulias N 146 

Robinson, Charles W 156 

Checklist of Department of State 

Press Releases: January 19-25 

Press releases may be obtained from the 

Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 


n, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date 


tl8 1/20 

Kissinger: departure, Andrews Air 

Force Base, Jan. 19. 

tl9 1/20 

Kissinger, Jorgensen: news confer- 

ence, Copenhagen. 

t20 1/21 

Kissinger: luncheon toast, Moscow. 

21 1/22 

Ingersoll: Los Angeles World Af- 

fairs Council. 

*22 1/22 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. to resume oil 

negotiations Jan. 26. 

*23 1/22 

Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission, 

Jan. 26. 

*24 1/22 

Kissinger: remarks, Moscow. 

t25 1/23 

Kissinger: news conference, Brus- 


*26 1/23 

Shipping Coordinating Committee, 

Subcommittee on Safety of Life 

at Sea, working group on fishing 

vessels, Feb. 20. 

*27 1/24 

Program for official visit of the 

Prime Minister of Israel, Jan. 26- 

Feb. 6. 

* Not pr 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington. dc. 20402 



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Volume LXXIV • No. 1912 • February 16, 1976 



Statement by Secretary Kissinger 17 U 


Statements by Ambassador Moynihan in the U.N. Security Council, 
Department Statement, and Text of Draft Resolution 189 


For index see inside back cover 


Vol. LXXIV, No. 1912 
February 16, 1976 

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a weekly publication issued by tl 
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Public Affairs, provides tlie public a) 
interested agencies of tfte governme, 
witfi information on developments 
tfie field of U.S. foreign relations ai 
on tfie work of tfie Department ai 
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Tfie BULLETIN includes seleeti 
press releases on foreign policy, itsui 
by tfte Wftite House and the Depot 
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TJecretary Kissinger Visits Copenhagen, Moscow, Brussels, and Madrid 

Secretary Kissinger left Washington Jan- 
lary 19 for a visit to Etirope and returned 
January 25. Following are his remarks at 
Andreivs Air Force Base upon his departure, 
lis press conference tvith Danish Prime 
llinister Anker Jorgensen at Copenhagen on 
[January 20, his toast at a luncheon given 
nj Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gro- 
nyko at Moscow on January 21, the text of a 
oint communique issued at Moscow on Janu- 
iry 23, the Secretary's neivs conference at 
\'ATO Headquarters at Brussels on Janu- 
iry 23, his exchange of remarks with Spanish 
"oreign Minister Jose Maria de Areilza upon 
u-rival at Madrid on January 2U, his news 
conference with the Spanish Foreign Min- 
ster that day, and his toast at a dinner given 
)jj the Foreign Minister that evening. 


Press release 18 dated January 20 

The President has asked me to go to Mos- 
cow to see whether any progress can be made 
in limiting the nuclear arms race. Limiting 
the nuclear arms race and ending it is in 
the interest of all Americans and in the in- 
terest of the world. 

But I am also going to Moscow to make 
clear to my hosts that the United States 
will not accept Soviet intervention in other 
parts of the world and that the continuation 
of such measures must lead to a deteriora- 
tion in U.S.-Soviet relations. 

Thank you. 


Press release 19 dated January 20 

Prime Minister Jorgensen: I will start 
this little press briefing to say it has been 
a pleasure for us to have Mr. Kissinger here 
in a too-short stay but we are well satisfied 
because Mr. Kissinger has time for it. I 
think the best we can do is to give the word 
to Mr. Kissinger, and he can tell you some- 
thing about the problems we have discussed. 

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister 
and Mr. Foreign Minister: First of all I 
would like to express my appreciation, and 
also on behalf of all my colleagues, for the 
very warm and friendly reception we have 
had here. I have read some of the specula- 
tions in the Danish press about the reason 
for my visit here, and I wish I were as com- 
plicated and profound as the newspapers 
give me credit for. 

This meeting came about because the 
Prime Minister visited us in Washington in 
November. He suggested that on my next 
visit through Copenhagen on the way some- 
where, I should spend some time, come into 
town, and continue the very good exchange 
that he and I had and he and the President 
have had on the occasion of his visit. It is 
pure coincidence that I am here the day after 
the conclusion of the meeting of the Euro- 
pean Socialist parties. 

The Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, 
and our government have had the closest con- 
sultations on a whole range of the subjects 
of common interest. And it is in the nature 

February 16, 1976 


now of international politics that there are 
no longer purely bilateral issues. The peace 
of the world is of great consequence for a 
country like Denmark. This is why today 
we discussed the following issues: We dis- 
cussed East-West relations and what we ex- 
pect to achieve on the trip to Moscow; we 
discussed the situation in Africa, with par- 
ticular emphasis on the problem of Angola; 
we discussed the future evolution of the 
European Community, and I think we agree 
that the relations between Europe and the 
United States are extremely good at this 
moment. Consultations between Europe and 
the United States are close. 

I expressed the American position that 
we favor European unity, we will do every- 
thing we can to encourage it, but ultimately 
it is for the Europeans to achieve. I ex- 
pressed my appreciation to the Prime Min- 
ister and the Foreign Minister for the very 
constructive role that Denmark has played 
both in achieving European unity and in en- 
couraging the dialogue between Europe and 
the United States. 

Finally, and it is the last topic and the one 
that did not take most of the time, the Prime 
Minister gave me an account of the meeting 
of the European Socialist parties, and we 
exchanged ideas on some of the problems 
that emerged out of this meeting. And 1 
want to make clear that if the meeting had 
not taken place, I would still have visited 
here and that the subjects we had to discuss 
had nothing to do with meetings of Euro- 
pean political parties, but with world peace, 
Atlantic cooperation, European evolution. 
And with this perhaps, Mr. Prime Minister, 
we should answer some questions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you satisfied with 
the Socialist parties' decision to leave it to 
each NATO country whether or not they 
want Communists in their government? 

Secretary Kissinger: The domestic evolu- 
tion of European countries has to be for 
each European country itself to determine. 
On the other hand, when we are asked for our 
opinion, we give our views, and we will not 
falsify our views. Our view is that the partici- 

pation of Communist parties in Europeai 
governments will have consequences foi 
NATO, will have consequences for inter 
national politics in general. Having said that 
I agree that it is up to each government tc 
decide for itself how to proceed. 

Q. Can you see a reason that the first stepf- 
for peace you made in the Middle East can 
be damaged by the war notv in Lebanon? 

Secretary Kissinger: The question is 
whether I believe that the steps toward 
peace that have been taken in the Middle 
East could be jeopardized by the war, the 
conflict in Lebanon. Of course the conflict inil 
Lebanon is a tragedy for the country and fori 
the community that lives in Lebanon. Sec- 
ondly, it has the potential of drawing in out- 
side powers and therefore it could jeopardize* 
all that has been achieved in recent years. 

The United States has warned all the in- 
terested parties — and I want to repeat it 
here — against any unilateral act that could 
lead to an expansion of the conflict in Leb- 
anon to wider areas, and the United States 
will oppose any unilateral act by any country 
that would lead to an expansion of hostilities. 

Further than this, we believe that the in- 
ternational community has an obligation to 
end the killing that is going on in Lebanon 
and to use its mediating efforts to permit 
both communities to coexist in peace as they 
have for so many decades and to put an end 
to the civil strife that now goes on. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, there are rumors that 
you are contemplating taking up the step-by- 
step diplomacy in the Middle East again. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, not before I 
have i-estored my sanity from the last. 

Q. Are you going to discuss the Mideast 
situation with the Russian — with the Soviet 
leaders as for the Sectirity Council meeting 
in those days? 

Secretary Kissinger: No doubt the ques- 
tion of the Middle East will come up, but the 
possibility of cooperation in political fields 
between the United States and the Soviet 


Department of State Bulletin 

Union is complicated by the situation in 

Q. In the latest issue of Foreign Affairs 
quarterly, Mr. Paul Nitze is ivriting the 
United States is moving toward the posture 
of the minimum deterrent in which we — 
that is, the United States — would be conced- 
ing to the Soviet Union the potential for 
military and political victory if deterrence 
fails. Have you any comments on that state- 

Secretary Kissinger: I totally disagree 
with this. The United States has maintained 
very large strategic forces and will never 
concede to the Soviet Union the possibilities 
of military victory. But what has to be ac- 
cepted is the fact that, with the multiplica- 
tion of strategic forces on both sides, the 
limit of what can be strategically significant 
will inevitably be reached. This does not 
mean that you cannot do additional damage, 
but it means that at a certain level of cas- 
ualties that you have hundreds of millions of 
casualties on both sides. Additional incre- 
ments will not make a significant political 
difference, and therefore it is our belief that 
we must maintain the strategic balance. 

We will never concede strategic superi- 
ority to the Soviet Union. But we must also 
attempt to limit the arms race in strategic 
nuclear weapons, and this is a necessity not 
only for the United States and the Soviet 
Union but for the world at large. This is the 
reason I am going to Moscow. It is all the 
more important because we have to 
strengthen other forces within the strategic 
nuclear context. 

Q. [Deals with trade liberalization policies 
and protectionist measures or pressures in 
the United States.'] 

Secretary Kissinger: The U.S. Govern- 
ment is not always unanimous before it takes 
decisions, but the policies that I have out- 
lined on behalf of the U.S. Administration in 
September remain valid. 

Secondly, in trade negotiations we will 
pursue what we hope will be considered 
liberal and progressive policies based on our 

convictions that the global economy has be- 
come interdependent; that no nation can 
survive by pursuing its own narrow national 

Q. Mr. Secretary, ivhen you said that your 
visit to Moscow ivill be complicated by the 
situation in Angola, what cards do you have 
to play? 

Secretary Kissinger: I pointed out before 
1 left that both superpowers have their re- 
sponsibilities to conduct themselves with 
restraint in other parts of the world. The 
gains they can make in one place will surely 
be offset by gains the other country makes 
some other place, but a policy of offsetting 
gains will lead to the traditional conflicts 
that have always led to the risk of wars, and 
this is what all farsighted statesmen now 
have an obligation to avoid. It is in this spirit 
that we will attempt to conduct our discus- 
sions in Moscow. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, ivith Angola and with 
complaints about continuous Soviet military 
buildup, which optimistic signs bring you to 
Moscoio now? 

Secretary Kissinger: I am going to Mos- 
cow because the necessities of world peace 
are not affected by our electoral process or 
by the day-to-day changes in politics. The 
Soviet military buildup is partly a result of 
the growth of Soviet industry and the 
growth of Soviet technology, and it is well 
within our capabilities to match it. We have 
an obligation to make sure that the Soviet 
Union does not gain a military advantage, 
and we will do our utmost to prevent it. I 
am going to Moscow in an attempt to keep 
open the options for a more peaceful future, 
and that is an obligation any national leader 
has at this moment. 


Press release 20 dated January 21 

Mr. Foreign Minister, ladies and gentle- 
men: I have not counted it precisely, but 

February 16, 1976 


there must now have been more than 15 
occasions, during less than four years, when 
we have visited each other in our respective 
countries or met in third countries to discuss 
the serious issues of our times. As in the 
past, my associates and I appreciate your 
hospitality and the thoughtful arrangements 
you have made for our stay here. 

Our meetings, though not without their 
relaxing moments, have always concentrated 
on the hard tasks we face together. The dis- 
cussions I am having on this occasion with 
your General Secretary, you, and your col- 
leagues are no exception. 

Since the beginning of our new relation- 
ship, our two countries have recognized the 
enoi'mous and fateful special responsibility 
resting upon us as the most powerful nations 
of the world to manage our affairs so that a 
secure peace can be built. Three years ago, 
at the summit meeting of 1972, we concluded 
significant first agreements to limit defen- 
sive and offensive strategic weapons; we 
enunciated principles to govern our relations 
so that not only we ourselves would benefit 
from them but that security and peace every- 
where would be strengthened ; we signed sev- 
eral bilateral cooperative agreements. Since 
then. President Ford has carried our rela- 
tionship forward, building on those first 
accomplishments; our frequent contacts at 
the highest levels are a part of that process. 

Today, we are faced with the challenge of 
giving fresh momentum to our dialogue, on 
issues that are much more complex. For we 
have learned already that the evolution we 
have mapped out is not automatic; it re- 
quires persevering effort, imagination, and 
courage, and above all, that scrupulous re- 
spect for the interests of all concerned to 
which we have so often referred in our joint 
documents and in our meetings. 

Our discussions here on this occasion are 
focused once again on the limitation of stra- 
tegic arms. We must give substance and 
binding force to the accords agreed upon 
by the President and the General Secretary 
in Vladivostok 14 months ago. On the success 
of this effort depends the fulfillment of the 
commitment we have both made before the 


whole world that we will achieve not on! 
the limitation but the actual reduction ( 
the levels of strategic offensive arms. 

Each of us, Mr. Foreign Minister, mu? 
if we fail, answer — to his own people, to tl 
world at large, and to history — the que 
tion: Did this or that specific, possibly qui 
technical issue, justify the failure or pr,j 
longed delay of the total effort — did we cj 
everything in our power to spare mankir 
the burdens and risks of a nuclear arn 

I can assure you that this question hi 
been asked many times in the deliberatioi 
of my government; and in answering it 
ourselves, honestly and with the full respm 
sibility inherent in our positions, we ha^ 
strengthened our resolve to seek an equitabi 
and mutually acceptable outcome. We bi 
lieve we have a right to ask a similar ai| 
proach from you. Our task is a common oni 
just as success in its accomplishment w: 
be to our common advantage and failua 
will leave us both losers. 

Strategic arms limitation is perhaps tl 
most concrete task we face together, but 
is far from the only one. In recent weeks ^ 
have found ourselves with differing or o| 
posing views on important issues bearing a 
international peace and security. We belief 
that the restraint, and respect for ea(( 
other's interests, and the understandin, 
concerning the avoidance of crisis situation 
and the acquisition of unilateral advanta; 
remain at the core of the search for a stab 
world order. 

These principles are part of our sped* 
responsibility. They must be applied to spu 
cific situations wherever they arise, for th« 
must be the norm of international conduct 
peace is to be secure and lasting. 

We know from history that great powei 
will not long accept a diminution of the 
security or inroads into their interests ar 
that sooner or later they will seek — and fir 
— compensation in some other place or maj 
ner. But it is precisely this chain of actid 
and reaction that has led to catastrophe i 
the past and which must be broken if tH 
disasters of history are not to be repeate«! 

Department of State Bulletii 

e have said to each other and the world 

hat we understand these stark realities. 

lO we must act in accordance with them. 

If we do so, the vistas before us and man- 

ind are filled with the most promising 

irospects. The choice, Mr. Minister, is ours. 

iVe have the capacity to translate our words 

•e md our expressed sentiments into deeds 

iki md living long-term policies. That is the 

an listoric challenge before us, and that is 

[low we see these meetings this week. 
\ So it is in this spirit — of accomplishment 
til )ut of greater tasks yet to be accomplished, 
it )f determination to fulfill the obligations 
pj placed before us by history to contribute to 
^j a just and secure peace — that I ask you to 
join me in raising your glasses. To your 
iriealth, Mr. Minister, and that of your col- 
, leagues ; the wisdom and statesmanship that 
we owe it to ourselves and future genera- 
, tions to display. 

t lANUARY 23 

I, Press release 24A dated January 23 

On 20-23 January in Moscow discussions 

■ took place between General Secretary of the 
' CPSU Central Committee L.I. Brezhnev, 
i Politburo Member and Minister of Foreign 

■ Affairs of the USSR A.A. Gromyko and the 
United States Secretary of State Henry A. 

The talks touched upon a broad range of 
questions of mutual interest to the United 
States of America and the Soviet Union. 
Taking part in the discussions were, on the 
American side, Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Am- 
bassador of the U.S.A. to the USSR; Helmut 
Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department 
of State; Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant 
Secretary of State for European Affairs; 
William Hyland, Deputy Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs; 
James P. Wade, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense and others ; and on the Soviet 
side, V.V. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Minister 
of Foreign Affairs; G.M. Korniyenko, 
: Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; A.F. 

Dobrynin, Ambassador of the USSR to the 
U.S.A.; A.M. Alexandrov, Assistant to the 
General Secretary of the Central Committee 
of the CPSU, and others. 

Both sides are in agreement that the 
course of further strengthening and develop- 
ment of relations between the U.S.A. and 
the USSR would serve the interests of the 
peoples of both countries and is an essential 
factor in the cause of relaxation of inter- 
national tension and the strengthening of 
peace. In the course of the negotiations 
special attention was devoted to examination 
of concrete questions relating to the work- 
ing-out of a new long-term agreement be- 
tween the U.S.A. and the USSR on limitation 
of strategic offensive weapons, on the basis 
of the agreement reached during the negoti- 
ations between the President of the U.S.A. 
and the General Secretary of the CPSU 
Central Committee in Vladivostok in Novem- 
ber 1974. Progress was attained on a number 
of these questions, and it was agreed that 
negotiations will be continued with the aim 
of finding mutually acceptable solutions to 
the remaining problems. 

During examination of the status of ne- 
gotiations on reduction of armed forces and 
armaments in Central Europe, both sides 
had in mind the task of facilitating progress 
in these negotiations. There was also an ex- 
change of views on a number of other urgent 
international problems. 

The negotiations took place in a business- 
like and constructive atmosphere. Both sides 
consider the exchange of views to have been 


Press release 25 dated January 23 

Secretary Kissinger: Before we start, I 
would like to say that this is the last time 
I will be here while Ambassador [David K. 
E.] Bruce is representing the United States. 
He is one of the great men in American di- 
plomacy. We will miss him enormously here, 
but even though he periodically threatens 

February 16, 1976 


to retire, we will press him into service for 
something or other when we can catch him 

Now we will go to your questions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there are reports that 
you have come hack from Moscow with a 
Russian suggestion for loivering the Vladi- 
vostok ceiling by some amount, and I ivon- 
der if you could confirm that and expand 
on it? 

Secretary Kissinger: I cannot go into the 
details of the negotiations here. The possi- 
bility in certain contexts together with other 
arrangements of lowering the ceiling was 
discussed, but I would like to stress that this 
is in the context of agreement on several 
other issues, and I cannot go any further 
into it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, ivhat are the major un- 
resolved issues noiv holding up agreement? 

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, as I 
said at the Moscow airport, a number of 
issues were resolved and were passed on to 
Geneva for technical implementation. Prog- 
ress of some significance was made on other 
issues, and some other issues still remain to 
be resolved. The general category of prob- 
lems connected with "Backfire" and certain 
aspects of cruise missiles still requires further 
study, though progress has been made with 
respect to some aspects of it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you discuss the 
Middle East this time also — as a whole or 
in particular because of the Lebanese prob- 
lem ? 

Secretary Kissinger: There was a general 
discussion of the Middle East primarily as 
it relates to the peace process in the Middle 
East. I hope you realize that these discus- 
sions are supposed to be confidential. 

Q. [Inaudible.] 

Secretary Kissinger: To ask NATO to 
intervene in Lebanon? That suggestion was 
not made in Moscow. [Laughter.] 

Q. On the question of a visit by Mr. Brezh 
nev [Leonid L Brezhnev, General Secre- 
tary of the Central Committee of th 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union] t 
Washington or to the United States — in you 
opinion, if there is a satisfactory agreemen 
on SALT matters and also if Angola is in ( 
very unsatisfactory condition from the U.S 
point of vieiv, do you still envisage a Brezh 
nev visit? 

Secretary Kissinger: This is a doubh 
hypothetical question. 

We do not assume that Angola must re 
main in an unsatisfactory state as far as th( 
United States is concerned in a genera 
sense. We have always made clear that ouj 
relationship with the Soviet Union depend; 
on restraint in other areas; and I hav( 
stated publicly on a number of occasions thai 
if any country does not exercise restraint ii 
one area it could set off a process of actioi 
and reaction that can only undermine inter 
national stability and the prospects of a U.S. 
Soviet rapprochement. 

As of now, we are planning, if a satis- 
factory agreement is reached, to invite th( 
General Secretary to the United States. This 
is the plan on which we have been opera- 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask yov 
two questions. Are you going to sign or con- 
clude tomorroiv in Madrid the Hispano- 
American, agreement concerning Americay. 
bases in Spain, and hoiv much money is in- 
volved? The second question is this one — iv 
the Presidential election in the United States, 
if the Republicans win do you plan to resign 
as Secretary of State? 

Secretary Kissinger: What do you think 
I am going to do if the Democrats win? 

With respect to the first question, we 
have been negotiating with Spain an agree- 
ment of cooperation which includes the bases 
but extends to other areas as well, and I 
am hopeful that we may be able to sign it 
on the occasion of my visit to Spain to- 


Department of State Bulletin 

I morrow. The exact amount that is involved 1 
think we should leave for the occasion of my 
visit to Spain, since some details still have 
to be worked out. 

With respect to your second question, I 
am grateful that you give me so much time 
— until the end of this year. The usual ques- 
tion I am asked in the United States is what 
I intend to do next month. [Laughter.] 

Q. Mr. Secretary, to follow up on the first 
I part of that question, this agreement ivith 
Spain has been described as a defense treaty. 
Is that an accurate description? 

Secretary Kissinger: No, it is not an accu- 
rate description. It is not a defense treaty; 
it is a treaty of cooperation. We will prob- 
ably submit it to the Senate in treaty form, 
but it is not a mutual defense treaty. 

Q. Would you give us your appraisal of 
the current state of U.S. detente relation- 
ships — ivhat you have learned as a result of 
your meeting and your current assess- 

Secretary Kissinger: Our impression is 
that the Soviet leaders are interested in 
continuing the detente relationship and to 
strengthen it. We believe that the negotia- 
tions with respect to strategic arms limita- 
tions made a positive contribution to that 
end. At the same time we have repeatedly 
expressed our view that Soviet and Cuban 
actions in Angola are not helpful to the 
detente relationship. 

So I would have to call attention to both 
the pluses and the minuses. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, during the course of the 
meeting this afternoon, sir, did you ask the 
allies to make any approaches — diplomatic 
steps or any other actions — to affect the 
course of events in Angola? 

Secretary Kissinger: No. Most of the time 
this afternoon was spent on my giving my 
evaluation to my colleagues and the Am- 
bassadors here of my meetings in Moscow. 
I also gave them the American evaluation 

of the situation in Angola. We made no re- 
quest for any particular step, and the meet- 
ing was not in that context. 

While we are talking about this after- 
noon's meeting, I would like to express my 
appreciation that all but two of my col- 
leagues came here and thereby gave us an 
opportunity to underscore the great impor- 
tance we attach to political cooperation 
within the NATO alliance and the close rela- 
tionship that in fact exists. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it your expectation 
that a SALT agreement could be reached 
ivith the Soviet Union this year? 

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that a SALT 
agreement with the Soviet Union this year 
is possible. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it possible that the 
new Soviet proposal to reduce the Vladivo- 
stok ceiling might serve as a way of break- 
ing the deadlock over the cruise-Backfire- 
bomber dilemma? 

Secretary Kissinger: I would like to make 
clear that the prospect of reduction is in 
the context of several other elements of the 
agreement, and it may or may not be in- 
cluded in the final agreement. We will now 
study carefully the specific Soviet proposals 
to see whether they lend themselves to ad- 
aptation or a response that can bridge the 
remaining differences. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you get a foreivam- 
ing of the possible Soviet anstver to NATO's 
proposal tabled in Vienna last December for 
the troop reductions in the center of Europe? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think I got some 
indication of what the answer is likely to be ; 
and I conveyed it to my colleagues, who of 
course never reveal what goes on inside the 
NATO Council meeting room. 

Q. A positive answer or a negative one? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't think I 
should discuss it. At any rate, it will be given 
to us in a few days. 

February 16, 1976 


Q. Mr. Secretary General, did you have 
the impression in Moscow — 

Secretary Kissinger: You are giving me 
too high a title. [Laughter.] 

Q. Did you have the impression in Moscoiv 
that the countries of the Warsatv Pact are 
atvare of having taken a lead in the field of 
armaments? If they are aware of this, why 
do you think that they continue to arm 
themselves so rapidly? [Questiori asked in 

Secretary Kissinger: This is not a subject 
that was discussed, but it is my impression 
that in the Communist world the level of 
sophistication has not yet been reached 
where people believe that an accretion of 
power is not politically useful and therefore 
they continue to increase their arms. And 
we have an obligation to match it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, lohat is your opinion 
about the meeting ivhich is going to take 
place in Paris tomorroiv and the day after 
tomorroxv among Socialists in the Mediter- 
ranean area and ivhich is going probably to 
close the links between Communists and 
Socialists in the Mediterranean area of Eu- 
rope ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I do not want 
to be offensive, but I did not realize there 
was such a meeting going on. They did not 
ask my opinion before they called the meet- 
ing, which wounds me deeply. [Laughter.] 
Therefore, I do not know exactly what is 
planned for the discussion. I have trouble 
enough dealing with states without getting 
involved with political parties. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you have the occa- 
sion today to have any separate talks with 
the Turkish Foreign Minister? 

Secretary Kissinger: I had a brief talk 
with the Turkish Foreign Minister, and I 
emphasized to him again the strong Ameri- 
can interest in a rapid and equitable solution 
of the Cyprus problem, and he expressed 
his own views on the subject. Of course, we 
shall meet again in Washington on February 

Q. What are you planning to do this eve 
ning, please? [Laughter.} 

Secretary Kissinger: That subject is stil 
under discussion. [Laughter.] 


Press release 28 dated January 26 

Secretary Kissinger 

Mr. Foreign Minister: It is a particulai 
pleasure for me to visit Spain on this oc- 
casion. And we can underline the commu- 
nity of interests that exists between Spain 
and the United States, and then we can take 
an important step toward bringing Spaip 
closer to the Atlantic community and to the 
European Community. 

Spain, which has contributed so much to 
the Western civilization, must in our view, 
be an integral part of all Western relation- 
ships. And the United States is happy that on- 
this occasion today, we can participate in 
this process. I look forward to my conver- 
sations with His Majesty, with the Prime 
Minister, and of course, with the Foreign 
Minister, where we will be discussing the 
hopeful evolution that we all expect for 
Spain and in the relationship between Spain 
and its traditional friends. 

Foreign Minister Areilza 

Mr. Secretary: It is a great pleasure for 
me to meet you at the Madrid airport, where' 
you have been a number of times during the 
last two years. 

Your presence here has a particular mean- 
ing because it underlines the profound 
friendship and the feelings of fair coopera- 
tion existing between our two countries. 

The Spanish Government and the whole 
of Spain are happy to have you among us. 
And they expect that this afternoon, in an 
act that I venture to describe as historic, 
we shall sign our names at the bottom of a 
document that underlines the essential 
friendship and cooperation between our two 

That is all, Mr. Secretary. 


Department of State Bulletin 



Press release 29 dated January 26 

Foreign Minister Areilza: Only a few 
moments ago, Mr. Kissinger, Secretary of 
State of the United States of America, and 
myself signed a Treaty of Friendship and 
PCooperation Between the United States and 

I think it is very important for us to con- 
sider this treaty as a capital step along the 
way of a new formal cooperation between 
our two countries. Then, I believe that this 
is capital not only because it inaugurates 
the coming of a new era to our relatioTis 
but also because, in the 200 years since its 
independence, the United States has only 
signed six treaties. This is now the seventh ; 
and, I believe, this is the most significant of 

I believe also that this treaty is significant 
in the sense that the time of isolation is over. 
I believe that it has become necessary for 
all countries to become linked with the re- 
maining members of the international com- 
munity, and I think that it has become 
necessary to strengthen the ties that link 
countries to the utmost both in the formal 
aspects and as regards contacts. This, I 
think, has been the object which we have 
finally achieved after so many months of 

I think this treaty is also important be- 
cause it underlines the true main character- 
istics which, in my mind, are prevalent in 
the relation between our two countries. 
Alongside, I think it underlines the will 
of the joint pursuit of cooperation, and in 
order to obtain the defense of the values 
which are common to us, and also because it 
reflects the balance which has finally been 

Now ladies and gentlemen, I would finally 
like to thank you for your presence in this 
historical palace of Santa Cruz and to wel- 
come Mr. Kissinger to this house once 

Mr. Kissinger, after this short statement 
on my part, will make another statement, 
after which there will be time for all of you 

to pose as many questions as you want, both 
to Mr. Kissinger and to myself. I must, how- 
ever, underline one thing. Due to the very 
tight schedule of the Secretary of State, it 
will become necessary at a given moment 
to put an end to this press conference, and 
I will indicate when the end is near, so you 
can see that the questions are finally going 
to be the last ones. 
Thank you. 

Secretary Kissiyiger: Mr. Minister, ladies 
and gentlemen: The United States is very 
pleased by the completion of these important 
negotiations today through the signatures 
which the Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
I have just placed on the Treaty of Friend- 
ship and Cooperation Between Spain and the 
United States. 

I regard the completion of this treaty as 
an event of great importance. The treaty 
covers a wide range of relations between 
our two countries. It does not relate to de- 
fense matters only but, rather, to the total- 
ity of our relations in many diverse fields. 
It reflects the strong desire of both countries 
for a closer friendship and a wider and more 
enriched cooperation. For its part, the 
United States will pursue the objectives of 
the treaty with great earnestness. 

Today's event comes at a moment when 
Spain is undergoing the excitement, the in- 
spiration, and the challenge of a new era. It 
is my hope that this treaty will be seen as a 
clear sign of our moral support for Spain at 
this particular time. This country faces the 
delicate task of striking a balance between 
evolution and stability as it moves foi-ward 
on the new course which is being charted. 
I have the greatest confidence that the proud 
and dynamic people of Spain will success- 
fully meet the tasks which lie ahead and that 
Spain will increasingly enter the mainstream 
of those values which link the Western woi-ld 
in a common cause. 

It is my conviction that this Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation will give added 
strength to our historic bilateral ties and 
we will also contribute to the deepening of 
Spain's role in Western Europe. 

Spain can be sure that in the United 

February 16, 1976 


States she has a close friend and confident 

Q. Mr. Secretary, ivhen do you expect 
NATO will be ready to accept Spain as a 

Secretary Kissinger: Before I answer any 
questions, I would like to tell the Foreign 
Minister that in the splendid Spanish hospi- 
tality that we have experienced here, I must 
only deplore that our correspondents that 
travel with me must now insist that press 
conferences in Washington be held in a hall 
of similar dignity and of similar artistic 
value. After 400 years more of history we 
may find such a hall, that the privilege of 
towering over our correspondents is one that 
is well worth waiting for. 

The United States has supported and will 
of course increasingly support the participa- 
tion of Spain in NATO. The rapidity with 
which this objective can be achieved depends 
in part upon the evolution that I have de- 
scribed in my statement and in which the 
United States will give sympathetic encour- 

Q. Why is this agreement, which always 
has been an executive agreement in the past, 
now in a treaty form? 

Secretary Kissinger: This treaty in terms 
of subject matter is of wider scope and 
greater formality than the previous exec- 
utive agreements and it therefore symbolizes 
the firmness with which we consider these 
ties. And we believe, also, that the legislative 
branch should be given an opportunity to 
reflect this formality in a more solemn form 
of treaty ratification which our Constitution 

Q. Will the United States have the right 
to use the bases here in the event of hostili- 
ties in the Middle East? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have not, in nego- 
tiating this treaty, spelled out particular 
contingencies in which these bases can be 
used, nor have we negotiated particular re- 

strictions. Therefore this is not a matter 
which is ripe for discussion today. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, during your stay in 
Brussels, have you had an opportunity to 
discuss tvith your colleagues in the Atlantic 
Council the content of this treaty, and if so, 
ivhat has been the reaction of your allies 
regarding possible Spanish participation in 
their efforts? 

Secretary Kissinger: On this occasion the 
purpose of my visit to Brussels was to brief 
my colleagues about my visit to Moscow 
and not primarily to discuss the subject of 
Spain's participation in NATO. We have in- 
formed our allies at various stages of our 
negotiations, and we have also informed 
them of the final conclusion of the treaty. 
But we have not had a formal discussion 
about Spain's participation since the con- 
elusion of this treaty. 

Q. Once the treaty is ratified, what ivill be 
the difference in practice between the U.S. 
response to an attack on Spain and the' 
U.S. response to an attack on a NATO ally?' 

Secretary Kissinger: The American re-< 
action to an attack on a friendly country al- 
ways has two components : a legal component 
and a moral and political component. That' 
is to say, it depends on what our legal obli- 
gation is and also on the importance we at- 
tach to the relationship and to the country. 

It is clear that the legal obligation inher- 
ent in this treaty is not of the same order 
as the legal obligation in the NATO treaty. 
But it is also clear that the political impor- 
tance that we attach to our relationship with 
Spain is reflected in this treaty and would 
be a major factor in our decisions, whatever 
the legal obligations. 

Q. In view of the situation at present in 
Angola and of the black reaction about it, 
is NATO still to be considered interesting for 
newcomers such as Spain, or can ive vieiv the 
fisheries agreement with the Soviet Union 
as a kind of balance? 


Department of State Bulletin 

Foreign Minister Areilza: I must say that 
we have nevei- asked for entrance into 
NATO; but whatever the decision is, when 
it comes it will be a question to be decided 
by the government at that time, according to 
the best interests of Spain. But I must also 
add that before this treaty, with other ex- 
ecutive agreements that we have had so far, 
we have been linked to the largest and most 
important member of NATO ; and therefore 
this can be interpreted as a counterpart to 
the strategic interest and as our contribu- 
tion to the strategic interest of the whole 
Western defense system. 

Now if you are asking me about whether 
we are interested in joining NATO or not, 
I must answer you that we are interested, 
because I understand that NATO is equiva- 
lent to the strategic and military infrastruc- 
ture which underlies the European Economic 
Community, of which we would like to be- 
come members. And to finish, I would only 
like to add that I don't believe that fish, 
even though it is fresh fish, should constitute 
a counterbalance of military strategy. 

Q. I would like to address a question to 
Secretary Kissinger, and that is: ivhat are 
the reasons that have led you to change the 
reaching of an executive agreement in the 
sense of making it a treaty and also to ask 
both governments what are the reasons that 
provide an increased significance and im- 
portance and enrichment to what just a few 
months ago appeared to be at variance? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have already ex- 
plained our reason for submitting it to the 
Senate as a treaty, which is to reflect the 
increased formality and range of the rela- 
tionship which has been designed in the 
background. The reason on the American 
side why we have proceeded in this fashion, 
after extended negotiations, is that in the 
new period that Spain is entering and in the 
evolution that we are encouraging, we want 
to reflect the sympathy and moral support 
of the United States. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, doesn't this treaty 


directly link Spain tvith NATO via the 
United States even tho7igh Spain is obviously 
not a member of NATO? 

Secretary Kissinger: The treaty provides 
a mechanism through the Council that is 
being formed to promote the coordination 
between the U.S.-Spanish effort and the 
NATO effort. It therefore provides a means 
of coordination which, of course, each indi- 
vidual NATO country will have to decide 
for itself as far as the organization as a 
whole is concerned. But it does reflect the 
importance that the United States attaches 
to the role of Spain in the defense of the 
Atlantic area. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is the treaty somehow 
related to the [garbled^ ? 

Secretary Kissinger: The treaty was 
signed today, and it is completed, and it 
stands on its own feet. As far as the United 
States is concerned, I have indicated our 
support for the political evolution that is 
beginning to take place here that will, we 
hope, increasingly link Spain to those human 
and political values on which the unity of 
the West has relied ; and we are attempting 
with this treaty to indicate our moral sup- 
port for these efforts. 

Q. [ 

Secretary Kissinger: The talks with the 
Spanish leaders are still in progress. The 
U.S. view as to the direction of this evolu- 
tion is clear. The pace of the evolution de- 
pends on conditions which the Spanish Gov- 
ernment, in which we have confidence, is in 
a better position to judge than we are. 

Q. Mr. Minister, recently the President of 
the Spanish Government, Mr. Arias Na- 
varro, has revealed to both Americans and 
Spaniards that the bases in Spain are con- 
sidered a part of the infrastructure of 
NATO, the deterrent power of NATO, and 
he qualified the situation as both illogical 
and unjust. Hoiv long do you think this situ- 
ation is going to continue? 

February 16, 1976 


Foreign Minister Areilza: I believe that 
the situation has finished today. And I say 
this because in the treaty that we have 
signed there is for the first time a clause 
which makes a reference to the organic link 
between both countries, which is one of the 
primary objectives to be reached by both 
the United States and Spain. Therefore I 
think that for the first time the existence of 
such a link is recognized along with the 
logical necessity to end a situation that 
President Arias qualified as unjust and il- 

Q. Mr. Secretary, has the possible trip of 
President Ford to Spain during this year 
been discussed today? And if not, do you 
think it will be interesting? 

Secretary Kissinger: The close ties be- 
tween Spain and the United States always 
make it interesting for an American Presi- 
dent to visit Spain. Of course, President 
Ford this year is engaged in many preoc- 
cupying domestic activities. But I am sure 
he would sympathetically consider an invi- 
tation for 1977. And in the meantime, we 
look forward to welcoming His Majesty the 
King to the United States during this year. 

Q. What ivould be the meaning both for 
the United States and Spain on the fact that 
Rota ivould no longer be a base for nuclear 
submarines in 1979? 

Foreign Minister Areilza: It has the 
meaning that it has been a Spanish petition, 
specifically made to the United States, which 
has been accepted by the United States even 
with the risk that involves its strategic 
mechanism. I believe that this is now speci- 
fied in the treaty; it is a petition that was 
made beforehand and has finally been 

Secretary Kissinger: If I could dare say 
that the United States accepted the Spanisli 
request because also by 1979 the range of 
the missiles carried on American submarines 
will be of a nature that the significance of 
the forward base will become much less. 


Press release 30 dated January 26 

Mr. Foreign Minister, Excellencies, aiu 
distinguished guests: The delights of Span 
ish hospitality as well as the needs of policj 
drew me to come to Spain. It is a great 
personal pleasure to be here. 

The treaty we have negotiated and signed 
today is, I believe, a milestone in the rela- 
tionship of both our countries. 

The tenacity that made Spain great was 
made vividly evident to us, Mr. Foreign Min- 
ister, in the negotiation of this treaty. Your 
predecessor, Seiior Cortina, was a tough 
negotiator, and it was fitting and gracious 
of you to pay tribute to him. You carried 
on the negotiation with equal skill and, I 
must add, with equal tenacity, and the suc- 
cessful outcome owes much to your dedica- 

With your warm hospitality, Mr. Foreign 
Minister, have come warm words of welcome, 
spoken with a clarity and grace rare in our 
day. I greatly appreciate these words. I know 
they represent the sincere aspirations of 
both countries to deepen and strengthen a 
relationship that is rooted both in mutual 
national interest and in the human ties to 
which my own nation, celebrating its Bicen- 
tennial, owes so much of its heritage. 

I must say to our Spanish friends that 
your Foreign Minister is a remarkable asset. 
He explains Spain's aspirations and foreign 
policy with equal eloquence in French, Ger- 
man, and English. Our colleagues tell me 
something even more notable about your 
Foreign Minister — no matter what language 
he is speaking, his foreign policy is the same. 
This is truly remarkable. 

The Foreign Minister has before him a 
great task; he has set out to level the 
Pyrenees. In demolishing the myth that 
Europe begins at the Pyrenees, making them 
a simple, though magnificent, mountain 
range, the Spanish will have done the rest 
of Europe, as well as Spain, a signal service. 


Department of State Bulletin 


His Majesty King Juan Carlos I, in his 
inaugural message from the throne, made 
clear the philosophical necessity of this ef- 
fort. It is true, as he said, that the idea of 
Europe would be incomplete without Spain, 
that the Spanish are Europeans, and that 
the Spanish and the other Europeans should 
draw the necessary conclusions from this 
fact. My government recognizes this and 
supports Spain's efforts to make it a reality, 
for indeed the Spanish share with the rest 
of Western civilization the common heritage 
of respect for human dignity. 

Benjamin Franklin once said: 

. . . God grant that not only the love of liberty, 
but a thorough knowledge of the rights of men, 
may pervade all nations of the earth, so that a 
philosopher may set his foot anywhere on its sur- 
face and say ''This is my country." 

Therefore the United States supports 
Spain's progress, out of the simple under- 
standing that we are all part of a wider 
Atlantic community, one based on a com- 
munity of interests and shared ideals that 
must be preserved and protected lest the 
chaos that is abroad in the world engulf our 
own societies. 

The diversity of Western culture — and the 
Spanish heritage is one of the principal 
founts of culture in the Western world — 
enriches our lives. But historical truths and 
present challenges require us to enhance the 
commonality of our aspirations and institu- 
tions. In so doing we preserve for those who 
come after us the values and the achieve- 
ments of Western civihzation, under which 
our singular national identities can flourish. 

Mr. Foreign Minister, I congratulate you 
on the clarity and consistency of the vision 
of Spain's interests which you have set 
forth in public and in private. It takes a 
great effort of will and compassion to bind 
up the wounds, in Abraham Lincoln's phrase, 
and in time reunite a people in prosperity 
and political consensus so that they may 

pursue in tranquillity their private and 
public interests. 

That spirit, looking toward "an effective 
consensus of national concord," in the words 
of His Majesty, is much in evidence, and it 
has called forth hope and praise in the other 
nations of Europe as well as in my own 

What Spain does is up to Spain. Others 
should not interfere. The United States — and 
I speak for President Ford, the American 
Government, and the American people — sup- 
ports your King, his government, and his 
people in the endeavor to lead Spain on a 
path of political and social development, with 
new ties to the rest of Europe and the At- 
lantic community that give full sweep to the 
talents and the aspirations of the Spanish 

I know these tasks will not be easy. We 
are confident that you will have the wisdom 
— and will be given the understanding — to 
find a Spanish road to full integration with 
Europe and the Atlantic community for the 
benefit of Spain and the Western world. 

In this context, the work that we are com- 
pleting this weekend takes on a wider mean- 
ing. It fortifies and enriches a bilateral re- 
lationship that takes on its greatest impor- 
tance as a major linkage among two nations 
of the Atlantic community. I think that 
it will be quite obvious to all that through 
this treaty the interests of Spain have been 
enhanced in the forging of a balanced re- 
lationship of benefit to both nations. This 
treaty is an earnest of my country's support 
for the path upon which Spain has em- 

Therefore, Mr. Foreign Minister, I am 
extremely grateful to you this evening. I 
would like now to propose a toast to His 
Majesty King Juan Carlos I, to the success 
of the course that he set forth so eloquently, 
and to the close friendship between our 

February 16, 1976 



Implications of Angola for Future U.S. Foreign Policy 

Statement by Secretary Kissinger ^ 

I appear before you not to score debating 
points in an abstract contest over executive- 
legislative prerogative. What faces us is a 
congressional decision of potentially grave 
magnitude taken after the executive branch 
had complied with all legal requirements for 
the kind of operation involved in Angola and 
after eight congressional committees had 
been briefed over 20 times without fore- 
shadowing any opposition in principle. The 
issue is not "victory" of one branch over an- 
other. The issue is what constitutes a victory 
for the national interest. 

I welcome this opportunity to explain the 
global significance of what is now happening 
in Angola, the events that have brought us 
to this point, the U.S. objectives, and the 
major consequences which can result if we 
fail to pursue those objectives. 

The Soviet Union's massive and unprece- 
dented intervention in the internal affairs of 
Africa — with nearly 200 million dollars' 
worth of arms and its military technicians 
and advisers, with 11,000 Cuban combat 
troops, and with substantial sea and airlift 
and naval cover in adjacent waters — is a mat- 
ter of urgent concern. Not only are the inter- 
ests of the countries directly affected at 
stake but also the interests of all nations in 
preserving global stability — which is the pre- 

'- Made before the Subcommittee on African Affairs 
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 
Jan. 29 (text from press release 40). The complete 
transcript of the hearings will be published by the 
committee and will be available from the Superin- 
tendent of Documents. U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

condition for all else mankind aspires to: 

In recent years the United States has 
sought to help build a new international 
order less tied to the traditional patterns ofj 
power balances. It was the United States 
which took the initiative in seeking to re 
solve the most dangerous problems of oun 
time by negotiation and cooperation rather 
than by force of arms. It was we who sawi 
that the historical necessity of this period! 
required a more stable relationship betweent 
the two nations that possess the capacity tor 
destroy civilization. 

We have sought — and with some successes — 
to build more constructive relations with the* 
U.S.S.R. across a broad range: to contain 
strategic arms; to institutionalize coopera- 
tion in economic, scientific, and cultural 
fields; to reduce tensions in areas where our 
vital interests impinge on one another; andl 
to avoid destabilizing confrontations in pe- 
ripheral areas of the globe — such as Angola. 
The classical pattern of accumulating mar- 
ginal advantages must be overcome andl 
mankind must build more constructive pat- 
terns if catastrophe is to be avoided. No 
one has been more dedicated than the 
President and I to working for these 

But our efforts have been founded upon 
one fundamental reality: peace requires a 
sense of security, and security depends upon 
some form of equilibrium between the great 
powers. And that equilibrium is impossible 
unless the United States remains both strong 


Department of State Bulletin 

and determined to use its strength when re- 
quired. This is our historic responsibility, 
for no other nation has the capacity to act 
in this way. While constantly seeking oppor- 
tunities for conciliation, we need to demon- 
strate to potential adversaries that coopera- 
tion is the only rational alternative. Any 
other course will encourage the trends it 
seeks to accommodate; a challenge not met 
today will tempt far more dangerous crises 

If a continent such as Africa, only recently 
freed from external oppression, can be made 
the arena for great-power ambitions, if im- 
mense quantities of arms can affect far-off 
1 events, if large expeditionary forces can be 
transported at will to dominate virtually 
helpless peoples — then all we have hoped for 
in building a more stable and rational inter- 
national order is in jeopardy. 

The effort of the Soviet Union and Cuba 
to take unilateral advantage of a turbulent 
local situation where they have never had 
any historic interests is a willful, direct as- 
sault upon the recent constructive trends in 
U.S.-Soviet relations and our efforts to im- 
prove relations with Cuba. It is an attempt 
to take advantage of our continuing domestic 
division and self-torment. Those who have 
acted so recklessly must be made to see that 
their conduct is unacceptable. 

The history of the postwar period should 
give us pause. Military aggression, direct or 
indirect, has frequently been successfully 
dealt with, but never in the absence of a local 
balance of forces. U.S. policy in Angola has 
sought to help friends achieve this balance. 
Angola represents the first time since the 
aftermath of World War II that the Soviets 
have moved militarily at long distances to 
impose a regime of their choice. It is the first 
time that the United States has failed to 
respond to Soviet military moves outside 
their immediate orbit. And it is the first time 
that Congress has halted the executive's ac- 
tion while it was in the process of meeting 
this kind of threat. 

Thus to claim that Angola is not an im- 
portant country or that the United States 
has no important interests there begs the 

principal question. The objectives which the 
United States has sought in Angola have not 
been aimed at defending, or acquiring, intrin- 
sic interests in that country. We are not 
opposing any particular faction. We could 
develop constructive relations with any An- 
golan government that derives from the will 
of the people. We have never been involved 
militarily in Angola. We are not so involved 
now. We do not seek to be so involved in the 

Our objective is clear and simple: to help 
those African countries and those groups 
within Angola that would resist external ag- 
gression by providing them with needed 
financial support. Those whom we seek to as- 
sist are our friends; they share our hopes 
for negotiated solutions and for African self- 
determination. They played a larger role 
than the MPLA [Popular Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola] in striving toward 
Angolan independence. 

But our deeper concern is for global sta- 
bility. If the United States is seen to emas- 
culate itself in the face of massive, unprece- 
dented Soviet and Cuban intervention, what 
will be the perception of leaders around the 
world as they make decisions concerning 
their future security? 

Will they feel they can proceed to develop 
their nations in an international climate 
which fosters cooperation and self-determi- 
nation? How will they adjust their conduct 
in the context of such events? And what 
conclusion will an unopposed superpower 
draw when the next opportunity for inter- 
vention beckons? 

America's modest direct strategic and 
economic interests in Angola are not the cen- 
tral issue. The question is whether America 
still maintains the resolve to act responsibly 
as a great power — prepared to face a chal- 
lenge when it arises, knowing that preven- 
tive action now may make unnecessary a 
more costly response later. 

Let there be no mistake about it — the cul- 
prits in the tragedy that is now unfolding 
in Angola are the Soviet Union and its client 
state Cuba. But I must note with some sad- 
ness that by its actions the Congress has de- 

February 16, 1976 


prived the President of indispensable flexi- 
bility in formulating a foreign policy which 
we believe to be in our national interest. And 
Congress has ignored the crucial truth that 
a stable relationship with the Soviet Union 
based on mutual restraint will be achieved 
only if Soviet lack of restraint carries the 
risk of counteraction. 

The consequences may well be far-reach- 
ing and substantially more painful than the 
course we have recommended. When one 
great power attempts to obtain special posi- 
tions of influence based on military interven- 
tions, the other power is sooner or later 
bound to act to offset this advantage in some 
other place or manner. This will inevitably 
lead to a chain of action and reaction typical 
of other historic eras in which great powers 
maneuvered for advantage, only to find 
themselves sooner or later embroiled in a 
major crisis and often in open conflict. 

It is precisely this pattern that must be 
broken — and that we wanted to break until 
stopped — if a lasting easing of tensions is to 
be achieved. And if it is not broken now, we 
will face harder choices and higher costs in 
the future. 

It is in this context that we have framed 
our goals in Angola. Simply put, we wish 
to see : 

— A cease-fire, ending the tragic bloodshed 
in that country; 

— Withdrawal of outside forces — Soviet, 
Cuban, and South African ; 

— -Cessation of foreign military involve- 
ment; and 

— Negotiations among the Angolan fac- 

We are prepared to accept any solution 
that emerges from African efforts. And we 
are ready to offer economic assistance to the 
people of Angola when a legitimate govern- 
ment is established there. 

We have consistently advocated such 
a government representing all three factions 
in Angola. We have never opposed participa- 
tion by the Soviet-backed Popular Movement 
for the Liberation of Angola, the MPLA. 
What we do oppose is the massive Soviet and 

Cuban intervention and their expressed aim 
of denying the other two groups any part in - 
governing the country. Our overriding goal ; 
has been to assure that Africans shape their ; 
own destiny and that traditional colonialism'! 
not be replaced by a more modern version. 

For the United States to be found wanting r 
as a credible friend, precisely at a time when 
moderate African states have clearly and . 
repeatedly expressed their hope that Amer- 
ica provide the necessary balance to the So- 
viet Union and Cuba, will have a major im- : 
pact on those countries on the continent of 
Africa which resisted all pressures and stuck 
by their position even after the Senate cut : 
off aid; on our allies in other parts of the : 
world who look to us for security ; on other 
countries that seek ties with us primarily be- : 
cause they see us as the guardian of inter 
national equilibrium. 

The Record of Events in Angola 

Let me briefly recount the course of 
events that has led us to this point. 

In 1961, the United States declared its 
support for self-determination in Portugal's 
African territories. At the time, the Na- 
tional Front for the Liberation of Angola, 
FNLA, was a leading force in the struggle 
for Angolan independence. Looking to the 
future, we sought to develop a relationship 
with the FNLA through providing it 
some financial, nonmilitary assistance. The 
U.S.S.R. had already established links with 
the Popular Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola, MPLA, through the Portuguese 
Communist Party. j 

The MPLA began military action against 
the Portuguese in the midsixties. The Na- 
tional Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola, UNITA, an offshoot of the FNLA, 
also began to fight on a small scale in the 
late 1960's. Although these various uncoor- 
dinated insurgency efforts caused consider- 
able diflSculties for Portugal, they posed no 
serious military threat to the dominance of 
Portuguese military forces in Angola. 

However, the overthrow of the Portu- 
guese Government in April 1974 and the 


Department of State Bulletin 

growing strength of the Portuguese Com- 
munist Party apparently convinced Moscow 
that a "revolutionary situation" was devel- 
oping in Angola. The Soviet Union began to 
exploit this situation in the fall of 1974 
through shipments of some arms and equip- 
ment to the MPLA. The United States re- 
ceived requests for support from other An- 
golan elements at that same time, but turned 
them down. 

The prospect of an independent Angola 
was clouded by the intense rivalry of the 
FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA which had de- 
veloped over the years. Concerned about the 
three factions' failure to end their bitter 
quarrel, leaders of other African countries 
prevailed upon them to come together with 
Portugal and seek agreement. This effort led 
to the Alvor Accord of January 1975. Under 
its terms a transitional coalition government 
was to be established and charged with pre- 
iparing for a peaceful turnover of power by 
integrating the military forces of the three 
movements, writing a constitution, and or- 
ganizing an election to take place before 
independence, scheduled for November 11, 

This was the moment, when Portugal was 
trying to organize a peaceful transition to 
independence, for the exercise of restraint 
by all outside parties. But the U.S.S.R. and 
Portuguese Communists decided to put the 
MPLA in power in Angola through stepped- 
up shipments of arms. With this kind of en- 
couragement, the MPLA had little incentive 
to fulfill the terms of the Alvor Accord, 
which would have prevented it from domi- 
nating any future coalition government. 

It is no coincidence that major violence 
! broke out in March 1975 when large ship- 
ments of Soviet arms began to arrive — thou- 
sands of infantry weapons, machineguns, 
bazookas, and rockets. On March 23 the first 
of repeated military clashes between the 
MPLA and FNLA occurred. They increased 
in frequency in April, May, and June, when 
delivei'ies of Communist arms and equip- 
ment, including mortars and armored vehi- 
cles, escalated by air and sea. In May the 
MPLA forced the FNLA out of the areas 

north and east of Luanda and in June took 
effective control of Cabinda. On July 9 all-out 
civil war began when the MPLA attacked 
the FNLA and UNITA, driving i)oth organi- 
zations out of Luanda, thereby ending the 
short-lived coalition government. By mid- 
July the military situation radically favored 
the MPLA. 

As the military position of the FNLA and 
UNITA deteriorated, the Governments of 
Zaire and Zambia grew more and more con- 
cerned about the implications for their own 
security. Those two countries turned to the 
United States for assistance in preventing 
the Soviet Union and Cuba from imposing a 
solution in Angola, becoming a dominant in- 
fluence in south-central Africa, and threaten- 
ing the stability of the area. 

It was at this point that President Ford 
decided to respond to requests for help and 
to provide military assistance to the FNLA 
and UNITA forces through neighboring 
black African countries. 

In August intelligence reports indicated 
the presence of Soviet and Cuban military 
advisers, trainers, and troops, including the 
first Cuban combat troops. If statements by 
Cuban leaders are to be believed, a large 
Cuban military training program began in 
Angola in June, and Cuban advisers were 
probably there before then. By September 
the MPLA offensive had forced UNITA out 
of several major central and southern Ango- 
lan cities. It controlled most of the coastline 
except for a strip in the far north, much of 
the south, and a wide belt running from 
Luanda to the Zaire border in the east. 

In early September the poorly equipped 
UNITA forces turned in desperation to 
South Africa for assistance against the 
MPLA, which was overrunning UNITA's 
ethnic areas in the south. South Africa re- 
sponded by sending in military equipment, 
and some military personnel, without con- 
sultation with the United States. 

The UNITA forces launched a successful 
counteroffensive which swept the MPLA out 
of the southern and most of the central part 
of Angola. In the north the FNLA also made 
significant advances. By Independence Day — 

February 16, 1976 


November 11 — the MPLA controlled only the 
former colonial capital of Luanda and a 
narrow belt across north-central Angola. 

In October massive increases in Soviet and 
Cuban military assistance began to arrive. 
More Cuban troops were ferried to Angola. 
Cuba inaugurated its own airlift of troops 
in late October. And the MPLA declared 
itself the Government of Angola, in viola- 
tion of the Alvor Accord. 

In the hope of halting a dangerously esca- 
lating situation, the United States — using 
the leverage provided by our financial sup- 
port — undertook a wide range of diplomatic 
activity pointing toward a summit of the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
scheduled for January 1976. Starting in Oc- 
tober we made several overtures to the 
Soviet Union, expressing our concern over 
the scale and purpose of their intervention. 
We offered to use our influence to bring 
about the cessation of foreign military as- 
sistance and to encourage an African solu- 
tion if they would do the same. Their 
responses were evasive but not totally 

We began to voice our concerns and our 
hmited objectives publicly. Beginning with a 
speech in Detroit on November 24 we pointed 
out that Soviet continuation of an interven- 
tionist policy must inevitably threaten our 
other relationships and that our sole objec- 
tive was an African resolution of an African 

The Administration undertook a new 
series of congressional consultations on the 
extent of our help to the Angolan factions 
resisting Soviet and Cuban aggression. I 
briefed the NATO Foreign Ministers and 
obtained significant understanding and sup- 
port. Our diplomatic efforts with foreign 
governments, especially African govern- 
ments, culminated with a mission by Assist- 
ant Secretary [for African Affairs William 
E.] Schaufele to five African countries and 
the dispatch of letters from President Ford to 
32 African heads of state, as well as the 

^For Secretary Kissinger's address at Detroit, 
Mich., on Nov. 24, 1974, see Bulletin of Dec. 15, 
1975, p. 841. 

Secretary General of the OAU, stating 
America's policy. 

Throughout this period the U.S. principles 
for a solution to the Angolan tragedy were 
unambiguous and straightf oi-ward : 

— Angola is an African problem and 
should be left to Africans to solve. 

— Foreign military involvement only esca- 
lates and prolongs the warfare there and 
should be ended. 

— OAU efforts to promote a cease-fire 
should be supported. 

—The United States pursues no unilateral 
interests in Angola and is exclusively con- 
cerned with seeing the people of that coun- 
try live in peace, independence, and well- 

— Angola should be insulated from great- 
power conflict. 

Our diplomacy was effective so long as we 
maintained the leverage of a possible mili- 
tary balance. African determination to op- 
pose Soviet and Cuban intervention was 
becoming more and more evident. On De- 
cember 9 President Ford made a formal pro- 
posal to the Soviet Government through 
their Ambassador. Indeed, it appeared as if 
the Soviet Union had begun to take stock. 
They halted their airlift from December 9 
until December 24. 

By mid-December we were hopeful that 
the OAU would provide a framework for 
eliminating the interference of outside 
powers by calling for an end to their inter- 
vention. At that point, the impact of our 
domestic debate ovenvhelmed the possibili- 
ties of diplomacy. After the Senate vote to 
block any further aid to Angola, the Cubans 
more than doubled their forces and Soviet 
military aid was resumed on an even larger 
scale. The scope of Soviet-Cuban interven- 
tion increased drastically; the cooperative- 
ness of Soviet diplomacy declined. 

The weight of Soviet aid and advisers 
and the massive Cuban expeditionary force 
began to tip the scales of battle in Decem- 
ber. By this point, most of the effective 
fighting for the MPLA was being done by 
Cubans. It was clear that the U.S.S.R., 
Cuba, and the MPLA hoped to achieve a 


Department of State Bulletin 

decisive military victory on the eve of the 
Organization of African Unity's extraordi- 
nary summit conference in Addis Ababa a 
few weeks ago. Yet notwithstanding theii- 
reverses, the FNLA-UNITA forces still con- 
trolled about 70 percent of the territory and 
70 percent of the population of Angola at 
the time of the conference. An OAU Recon- 
ciliation Commission, which had met earlier 
in 1975, took the position that none of the 
movements should be recognized as the gov- 
ernment of Angola. The Commission called 
for a cease-fire and the formation of a gov- 
ernment of national unity. Thus, those gov- 
ernments who recognized the MPLA were 
in violation of a decision of the OAU. 

At the January OAU summit, 22 members 
of the OAU advocated recognition of 
the MPLA and condemnation of South 
Africa. But they were opposed, in an unusual 
demonstration of solidarity, by 22 other 
members who held out for a more balanced 
resolution, one that would include the fol- 
lowing points: 

1. An immediate cease-fire; 

2. Condemnation of South Africa and im- 
mediate withdrawal of all South African 
forces ; 

3. Withdrawal of all foreign forces; 

4. An end to the supply of arms to all 
factions ; and 

5. Reconciliation of all factions, with the 
aim of establishing a government of national 

The United States regarded this program 
as reasonable and responsive to the facts of 
the situation. But the Soviet Union and 
Cuba urged MPLA supporters to refuse to 
accept this solution. The summit ended in 

The United States Position 

This, then, is the significance of Angola 
and the record to date. In elaborating further 
the U.S. position, I want to respond directly 
to some of the issues raised in the current 

Our principal objective has been to re- 
spond to an unprecedented application of 

Soviet poiver achieved in part through the 
expeditionary force of a client state. 

During 1975 the Soviet Union is estimated 
to have contributed nearly 200 million dol- 
lars' worth of military assistance to Angola. 
This equals the entire amount of all military 
aid from all sources to sub-Saharan Africa 
in 1974. 

Soviet arms have included infantry weap- 
ons — machineguns, bazookas, mortars, and 
recoilless rifles — armored personnel carriers, 
heavy artillery, light and medium tanks, 
truck-mounted multitube rocket launchers, 
helicopters, and light aircraft. There are un- 
confirmed reports that the Soviet Union will 
provide the MPLA with MIG-21 aircraft to 
be piloted by Cubans. 

A total of at least 46 flights of Soviet 
heavy and medium military transports have 
ferried Soviet military equipment from the 
U.S.S.R. to Luanda and Congo (Brazzaville), 
while a steady stream of Soviet and Cuban 
aircraft has continued to bring Cuban troops 
across the Atlantic. Soviet naval involve- 
ments clearly related to the Angolan event 
have continued in west African waters for 
several weeks. 

The implications of Cuba's unprecedented 
and massive intervention cannot be ignored. 
It is a geopolitical event of considerable sig- 
nificance. For the first time, Cuba has sent 
an expeditionary force to another nation on 
another continent. About 11,000 Cuban mili- 
tary personnel have been sent to Angola. 

If allowed to proceed unchecked, this bla- 
tant power play cannot but carry with it far- 
reaching implications — including the impact 
it will have on the attitudes and future con- 
duct of the nations of this hemisphere. In- 
deed, friend and foe alike cannot fail to con- 
trast the sending of a large Cuban expedi- 
tionary force with our apparent inability to 
provide even indirect financial assistance. 
The failure of the United States to respond 
eff'ectively will be regarded in many parts of 
the world as an indication of our future 
determination to counter similar Communist 

We have been asked why we do not re- 
spond with other pressures on the Soviet 

February 16, 1976 


The first answer is that many of the links 
the Administration has tried to forge — such 
as trade and credit, which would have pro- 
vided incentives for restraint and levers for 
penalties — have been precluded by earlier 
congressional actions. But two other instru- 
ments have been suggested: wheat sales 
and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. 

A moratorium was placed on wheat sales 
for four months in 1975. To use this device 
every three months is to blunt it perma- 
nently. Above all, economic measures take 
too much time to affect a fast-moving situa- 
tion like Angola; any longer term impact 
would be of little use to those immediately 
threatened. We should also ponder whether 
we want to return to the situation, now pre- 
vented by the grain agreement, in which the 
U.S.S.R. can capriciously enter and leave the 
U.S. grain trade. 

As for the Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks, we have never considered these to be 
a favor which we grant to the Soviet Union 
to be turned on and off according to the ebb 
and flow of our relations. The fact is that 
limiting the growth of nuclear arsenals is 
an overriding global problem that must be 
dealt with urgently for our own sake and for 
the sake of world peace. 

Still, we have made clear that a continua- 
tion of actions like those in Angola must 
threaten the entire web of Soviet-U.S. rela- 
tions. In this sense, both negotiations and 
the overall relationship are in long-term 
jeopardy unless restraint is exercised. But 
there is no substitute for a local balance; 
indirect pressures can succeed only if rapid 
local victories are foreclosed. 

Have we really thought through the impli- 
cations of our decisions? Do we really want 
the world to conclude that if the Soviet 
Union chooses to intervene in a massive way, 
and if Cuban or other troops are used as 
an expeditionary force, the United States 
will not be able to muster the unity or re- 
solve to provide even financial assistance to 
those who are threatened? Can those faced 
with such a threat without hope of assist- 
ance from us be expected to resist? Do we 
want our potential adversaries to conclude 

that, in the event of future challenges, Amer- 
ica's internal divisions are likely to deprive 
us of even minimal leverage over develop- 
ments of global significance? 

Our second objective is to help our friends 
in black Africa who oppose Soviet and Cuban 

Only in recent years has Africa become 
free of great-power rivalry ; it must not once 
again become an arena in which the ambi- 
tions of outside forces are pursued. We have 
sought with our African friends to maintain 
a local balance of power so there can be no 
imposed solution that would deprive the 
Angolan people of the right to determine 
their own destiny. 

We are told that we need not concern our- 
selves, because in the final analysis and at 
some indefinite date in the future, African 
nationalism will reassert itself and drive out 
foreign influence. Even were this to prove 
true, it still ignores the fact that govern- 
ments under pressure will be forced to yield 
whenever a threat develops. Those who are 
threatened cannot afford to wait; they must 
decide whether to resist or to adjust. Advice 
which counsels patience and confidence in 
the verdict of history is a mockery to those 
who are concerned for the fate of their coun- 
try today. History rarely helps those who 
do not help themselves. 

Some charge that we have acted in collu- 
sion with South Africa. This is untrue. We 
had no foreknowledge of South Africa's in- 
tentions and in no way cooperated with it 
militarily. Nor do we view South African in- 
tervention more benevolently than we do the 
intervention of other outside powers. Indeed, 
we have formally proposed that the removal 
of outside forces begin with those of South 
Africa and have asked — in vain — for an in- 
dication of how soon thereafter Soviet and 
Cuban forces would be withdrawn. 

It is also claimed that because of our sup- 
port for the side which later felt itself com- 
pelled to seek the aid of South Africa, we 
have lost influence in black Africa. One can- 
not generalize so easily about the perceptions 
of the African people, as the firm stand at 
Addis Ababa of 22 OAU members against 


Department of State Bulletin 

AU recognition of the MPLA should dem- 
iistrate. Behind this stand, which coincided 
ith the U.S. position, was awareness that 
\e MPLA represented only a minority of 
.iigolans, and also a genuine apprehension 
ver Soviet and Cuban, as well as Soutli 
.frican, intervention. Indeed, it is our in- 
.bility to support our African friends that 
•ill cost us influence in Africa. 
We are firmly convinced that, had there 
pen no outside interference initiated by the 

■ ioviet Union, the Africans would have found 

■ [leir own solution. No single movement 
7ould have been strong enough to take over. 

' 'he resulting solution would have been more 
epresentative of the people of Angola than 
I government imposed by an outside power 
nd representing only a minority faction. 
The outcome in Angola will have repercus- 
ions throughout Africa. The confidence of 

' ountries neighboring Angola — Zambia and 
aire — as well as other African countries, in 
lie will and power of the United States will 

■ e severely shaken if they see that the Soviet 
Jnion and Cuba are unopposed in their at- 
empt to impose a regime of their choice on 
mgola. They and others elsewhere may well 
djust their policies to what they consider 
be the forces of the future. 

The means ice have chosen have been lim- 
*erf, and explained to Congress. 

Our immediate objective was to provide 
average for diplomatic efforts to bring about 

just and peaceful solution. They were not 
onceived unilaterally by the United States; 
hey represented support to friends who re- 
[Uested our financial assistance. 

We chose covert means because we wanted 
keep our visibility to a minimum; we 
ranted the greatest possible opportunity for 
m African solution. We felt that overt assist- 
mce would elaborate a formal doctrine 
ustifying great-power intervention — aside 
rom the technical issues such as in what 
)udgetary category this aid should be given 
ind how it could be reconciled with legisla- 
;ive restrictions against the transfer of 
U.S. arms by recipients. 

The Angola situation is of a type in which 
diplomacy without leverage is impotent, yet 

direct military confrontation would involve 
unnecessary risks. Thus it is precisely one of 
those gray areas where covert methods are 
crucial if we are to have any prospect of in- 
fluencing certain events of potentially global 

We chose a covert form of response with 
the greatest reluctance. But in doing so, we 
were determined to adhere to the highest 
standard of executive-legislative consulta- 
tion. Eight congressional committees were 
briefed on 24 separate occasions. We sought 
in these briefings to determine the wishes of 
Congress. While we do not claim that every 
member approved our actions, we had no 
indication of basic opposition. 

Between July and December 1975 we dis- 
cussed the Angolan situation on numerous 
occasions with members of the foreign rela- 
tions comittees and the appropriations com- 
mittees of both Houses and the committees 
of both Houses that have CIA oversight re- 
sponsibilities. The two committees investi- 
gating CIA activities — the Church Commit- 
tee and the Pike Committee — were also 
briefed. Altogether more than two dozen 
Senators, about 150 Congressmen, and over 
100 staff members of both Houses were in- 
formed. I am attaching to my statement a 
list of all the briefings carried out.^ 

Mr. Chairman, where are we now? 

We are told that by providing money and 
arms in Angola we are duplicating the mis- 
takes we made in Viet-Nam. Such an argu- 
ment confuses the expenditure of tens of 
millions of dollars with the commitment of 
U.S. troops. If we accept such a gross distor- 
tion of historj^ — if we accept the claim that 
we can no longer do anything to aid our 
friends abroad because we will inevitably do 
too much — then the tragedy of Viet-Nam 
will indeed be monumental. 

We will have lost all ability to respond to 
anything less than direct and substantial 
challenge. And having lost that ability, we 
will eventually discover that by failing to 
respond at an early stage, our ultimate re- 
sponse will have to be greater and the stakes 

'Not printed here; for text, see press release 40. 

February 16, 1976 


will be higher. If we do not exercise our re- 
sponsibilities to maintain the international 
balance, if Congress and the executive are 
unable to act in concert when vital national 
interests are affected, then world security 
may well be seriously undermined. 

Many of the members of this committee 
have expressed their general support for our 
policy of easing tensions with the Soviet 
Union. We in the executive branch are grate- 
ful for that support. But this process cannot 
be divided into those segments which the 
Soviets will honor and those which we will 
allow them to ignore. What the United 
States does when confronted with a chal- 
lenge like Angola can be of great significance 
in shaping our future relationship with the 
Soviet Union. A demonstration of a lack of 
resolve could lead the Soviets to a great 
miscalculation thereby plunging us into a 
major confrontation which neither of us 
wants. Credibility determines, to a great de- 
gree, what a nation can accomplish without 
a resort to force. And as credibility is re- 
duced, the eventual need to resort to force 
increases. And in the end, we are all the 

The United States must make it clear that 
Angola sets no precedent ; this type of action 
will not be tolerated elsewhere. This must be 
demonstrated by both the executive and the 
Congress — in our national interest and in the 
interest of world peace. 

To the Soviet Union and to Cuba, the 
Administration says: We will continue to 
make our case to the American public. We 
will not tolerate wanton disregard for the 
interests of others and for the cause of 
world peace. 

To the American people, the Administra- 
tion says: The time has come to put aside 
self-accusation, division, and guilt. Our own 
country's safety and the progress of man- 
kind depend crucially upon a united and de- 
termined America. Today, as throughout our 
200 years, the world looks to us to stand up 
for what is right. By virtue of our strength 
and values we are leaders in the defense of 
freedom; without us there can be neither 
security nor progress. 

To the Congress, the Administration says : 


Whatever our past disagreements, let th 
Congress and the executive now resolve ; 
shape a cooperative relationship that w' 
enable the United States to play a respoi 
sible international role. Both branches wi 
have to do their share in restoring the kin 
of nonpartisan support that has served ou 
foreign policy so well in the past. 

On the issue of Angola, the Administra 
tion is now seriously considering overt finan 
cial aid, and we will soon be consulting wit 
the Congress on this possibility. But what 
ever that decision, let us work together wit 
an appreciation of the larger interests ir 
volved and with a sense of national respon 
sibility. A united America cannot be ignore 
by our adversaries. Together we will pn- 
serve the independence of those who fac 
the prospect of oppression. Together we wi 
hearten the friends of liberty and peac 

President Ford Reiterates 
U.S. Objective in Angola 

Following is the text of a letter date 
January 27 from President Ford to Speake 
of the House Carl Albert. 

White House press release dated January 27 

January 27, 1976. 


Dear Mr. Speaker: I want to expreff 
to you and to your colleagues in the Housi 
my grave concern over the internationi* 
consequences of the situation in Angola. I 
the absence of effective Western assistanci 
the two largest political movements in th 
country will be destroyed by Soviet arma 
ments and a Cuban expeditionary force. 

This imposition of a military solution i 
Angola will have the most profound Ion 
range significance for the United States 
The US cannot accept as a principle of iw 
ternational conduct that Cuban troops am 
Soviet arms can be used for a blatant inten 
vention in local conflicts, in areas thousan(U 
of miles from Cuba and the Soviet Unioir 
and where neither can claim an historic n; 

Department of State Bulletil 

onal interest. If we do so, we will send a 

' lessage of irresolution not only to the 

' jaders of African nations but to United 

'* tates allies and friends throughout the 

^ ' rorld. 

°" The facts are clear. In the fall of 1974, 
' 16 USSR began to increase its military as- 
istance in Angola. During the period from 
f_ larch to December 1975, the Soviet Union 
nd Cuba provided almost $200 million in 
reapons and other military assistance to a 
linority faction in Angola. The Cubans 
ave dispatched more than 10,000 combat 
roops, which are right now actively en- 
aged in the effort to destroy opposing fac- 
ions — factions which command the loyal- 
ies of more than 60% of the population and 
ccupy a major part of Angola's territory. 
i'or the United States to turn its back on 
equests for help from these people would 
e an abdication of our responsibility to 
lay a positive role in international affairs. 
The United States has no intention of 
nterfering in internal African affairs. The 
Jnited States' objective in Angola is to en- 
ble the people of that land to determine for 
"hemselves their political future. Until the 
ate summer of 1975 the US provided no 
ailitary assistance to any group. Since then 
he United States has provided modest 
imounts of assistance to forces opposing the 
lOviet/Cuban-backed effort, solely to enable 
he indigenous majority to stabilize the 
nilitary situation and to create conditions 
or a negotiated solution. As was demon- 
strated at the recent meeting of the Organi- 
;ation of African Unity, a clear majority 
)f the sub-Saharan African countries clearly 
supported this effort to offset Soviet-Cuban 
ntervention. The US assistance, small as it 
A^as, began to reverse the tide and block the 
Soviet-backed effort to take over the country 
3y force. However, in September and Octo- 
ber, the Soviet Union, with the help of a 
Cuban expeditionary force, massively esca- 
lated the conflict. In response the Admin- 
istration sought, through consultation with 

the appropriate Congressional Committees, 
to gain approval for the reprogramming of 
$28 million to continue our assistance. (The 
matter of our assistance in Angola was the 
subject of 25 separate contacts with eight 
Congressional Committees.) In concert with 
this proposal, the Administration launched a 
determined diplomatic effort to bring an 
end to the fighting and to find a means to 
bring about a negotiated settlement accept- 
able to all of the Angolan parties. Unfortu- 
nately, this effort was substantially under- 
mined by the vote of the Senate in December 
1975 to cut off US assistance to Angola. 

As I have stated on a number of occasions, 
the US seeks no special advantage in Angola, 
nor are we opposed to the MPLA faction 
per se. Our sole objective has been to pre- 
serve the opportunity for this Angolan 
problem to be resolved by Angolans, and not 
through the application of brute military 
force by the Soviet Union and Cuba. I be- 
lieve that resistance to Soviet expansion by 
military means must be a fundamental ele- 
ment of US foreign policy. There must be 
no question in Angola or elsewhere in the 
world, of American resolve in this regard. 
The response of the United States is a 
matter of fundamental concern to our 
friends and allies everywhere. The failure 
of the US to take a stand will inevitably 
lead our friends and supporters to conclu- 
sions about our steadfastness and resolve. It 
could lead to a future Soviet miscalculation 
based upon its perception of that resolve. It 
would make Cuba the mercenaries of up- 
heavals everywhere. 

I bring my most serious concerns over the 
course of events in Angola and the signifi- 
cance of a Soviet victory there to your at- 
tention. I strongly urge the House of Rep- 
resentatives to take them into account in 
its deliberations on Angola today and vote 
to disagree with the Senate amendment to 
the Defense Appropriations Act. 

Gerald R. Ford. 

February 16, 1976 


Department Discusses Global Inflation and National Policy 

Statement by Charles W. Robinson 
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs ' 

Thank you for inviting me to discuss today 
the problem of global inflation and its impli- 
cations for national policy. This is an im- 
mense subject with many implications for 
policy. I will focus on some of the principal 
issues, particularly those related to our for- 
eign policy concerns. 

Improvements in international economic 
arrangements, important though they may 
be, cannot substitute for the sound manage- 
ment of our own afl'airs. The primary battle 
against inflation must be fought and won at 

Yet the recent inflation has been a truly 
international phenomenon. The forces of in- 
flation were felt worldwide and very rapidly 
transmitted across international borders; 
they had important repercussions on our in- 
ternational relations; and they provide im- 
portant lessons for future economic co- 

We all appreciate that inflation has done 
major damage to our economy, our standard 
of living, and our social institutions. It has 
also been a significant source of international 
discord. For just as domestic groups and 
individuals often see inflation as the damage 
other people are doing to them, creating so- 
cial conflict and resentment, so nations react 
similarly to inflationary forces coming from 

' Made before the Subcommittee on African Af- 
fairs of the Finance and Resources of the Senate 
Committee on Finance on Jan. 26. The complete 
transcript of the hearings will be published by the 
committee and will be available from the Superin- 
tendent of Documents. U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 


abroad. During inflationary times, countriai 
tend to lose sight of the mutual benefit 
gained from trade with others and concen 
trate on their complaints against foreigners 
International cooperation can, I believe, plan 
a significant role in controlling inflation 
Equally, our eff'orts to control inflation can 
also provide an environment in which coopen 
ation can thrive. 

Let us review the record on inflation. Th» 
gradual tendency toward acceleration i) 
price increases which had been developing i: 
the late 1960's picked up speed as we en 
tered the 1970's. For a while we seemed t 
be doing better. But then a convergence o 
several factors led to the inflationary explc 
sion of 1973, and especially 1974. One facto 
was the broad and excessive expansion in th 
industrial countries. Another was the largr^ 
increase in prices of energy and food. 

The large increase in energy prices, o 
course, reflected the impact of the OPE<i 
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries] cartel, which I will discuss latepi 

The sharp rise in food prices, on the othe- 
hand, reflected fundamental changes in th: 
underlying world supply-and-demand balanc 
of agricultural products, particularly grains- 
World production failed to keep pace witl" 
rising world demand for grain. Poor crop; 
in 1973 and 1974 actually resulted in a de 1 
cline in world production. Meanwhile, de 
mand for food, especially grains, continuec 
to grow, spurred by increased population 
rising incomes in most countries, and deci . 
sions by other nations, particularly th( 
U.S.S.R. and Eastern European states, t( 


Department of State Bulletir 

•,tress improvement in the diets of their 
copulations. In the United States, consumers 
•ompeted with other buyers for world sup- 
plies and shared in the worldwide increase 
n food prices. 

In addition to the general increase in world 
lemand, exchange rate changes in the 1970's 
•esulted in additional foreign demand for 
U.S. grain, one of America's most compet- 
itive exports. Farm incomes during the 
period increased appreciably, and the United 
States obtained substantial foreign exchange 
, Earnings which were used to pay for other 
needed imports. 

Although the pattern of inflation in the 
3ECD [Organization for Economic Coopera- 
tion and Development] area as a whole was 
very similar, in comparison with the United 
States the record of the other OECD coun- 
tries has been somewhat worse — and in the 
sase of a few countries, considerably worse. 
, The striking thing has been the similarity 
' ,of the experience. This clearly has reflected 
the operation of important common causes — 
particularly those mentioned above — and 
their interaction through a closely linked 
international transmission mechanism. 

I will not try to provide a complete de- 
scription of the causes and the international 
transmission mechanism which spread the 
impact among countries. I will instead focus 
on two topics: 

— The role of international cartels in the 
recent inflation and their role in the future. 
What policies are called for? 

— The role of interdependence and the 
need for better cooi'dination of demand man- 
agement policies. 

Inflation and the OPEC Cartel 

I It is well known that the recent large oil 
price increases instituted by the OPEC cartel 
have been a major factor in recent inflation. 
They came, of course, very rapidly, on top of 
an inflation rate that was already high, and 
in a period where overall demand was strong. 
It is clear, however, that the strength of de- 
mand did not account for the fourfold in- 

crease in oil prices in the latter part of 1973 ; 
it is even more obvious that it did not ac- 
count for the smaller increases put into ef- 
fect since then in the face of sharply weaken- 
ing demand. 

These price increases therefore were basic- 
ally autonomous events, with a major impact 
on the rate of inflation. We cannot pretend 
to know precisely the full extent of this 
impact. One can, however, arrive at a reason- 
able estimate of the direct impact of the 
1973-74 oil price increase. One expert esti- 
mate puts the impact of the oil price in- 
creases themselves, and the associated in- 
creases in prices of domestically produced 
energy, on OECD consumer prices at 31/2 
percent — about half the acceleration in 
OECD prices between 1973 and 1974. The 
indirect impact, however, is much more dif- 
ficult to estimate. New impetus was clearly 
given to the wage-price spiral and to in- 
flationary expectations. This impact, which 
we are still feeling, may well have been as 
large or larger than the direct effect. 

Can we expect cartel action to produce 
similar inflationary shocks in the future? 
Probably not of this magnitude. It seems 
unlikely that the OPEC countries will try to 
repeat their 1973-74 increase. They may 
nevertheless attempt to institute smaller in- 
creases, perhaps tied to some index of im- 
port prices. 

Other raw materials producers may try to 
emulate the OPEC success. However, we do 
not believe that producers of other commodi- 
ties possess anything like the degree of 
market power which the OPEC countries 
have wielded. Their actions therefore are 
unlikely to provide a significant one-time im- 
pact on the rate of inflation like that of the 
oil price increase. 

Although, in the foreseeable future, 
cartels are not likely to provide another 
major force accelerating the rate of infla- 
tion, the efforts to form cartels and push 
raw materials prices upward might be 
troublesome for our attempts to control in- 
flation or to build broad structures of inter- 
national cooperation generally. Even if their 
only goal were to maintain raw materials 

February 16, 1976 


prices constant in real terms with respect 
to an index of prices of imported goods and 
they were to succeed, this, like any indexa- 
tion arrangement, would increase the prob- 
lems of bringing inflation under control. In 
effect, a vicious circle between increases in 
industrial prices and prices of raw materials 
would be established, leading to a perpetua- 
tion of inflation well after the initial causes 
had been dealt with. 

This, of course, is far from the only argu- 
ment against indexation of raw materials 
prices. Indexation of the price of any com- 
modity, which has the effect of freezing its 
price relative to prices of other goods, will 
almost certainly lead to harmful distortions 
in resource allocation. In fact, given dynamic 
changes in supply-and-demand conditions 
and large-scale substitution possibilities, it 
would be extremely difl[icult, probably im- 
possible, and certainly very expensive to 
maintain a fixed relative price over any ex- 
tended period. 

The policy implications of this discussion 
of cartel action seem to be clear. First, a 
strong, cooperative energy policy is required 
in the OECD area to reduce the scope for 
further unilateral exercise of OPEC market 
power. Second, to make clear that cartels are 
not the answer, we must pursue the dialogue 
with the oil producers and with non-oil-ex- 
porting less developed countries, respond- 
ing in a constructive way to their legitimate 

The industrial nations have collectively 
designed a program to meet the challenge 
of the oil crisis. We are cooperating through 
the Paris-based International Energy 
Agency on an energy strategy with three 
major components: 

— Measures to stockpile oil and share oil 
supplies in emergencies such as another oil 
embargo ; 
— Conservation of energy; and 
— The development of new energy sources. 

In addition, within the OECD we have 
agreed to establish a Financial Support 
Fund to provide contingency financing to 
countries experiencing severe balance-of- 




payments problems in the wake of the o 

Over time, this integrated program shou 
greatly reduce our vulnerability to actioi 
by the cartel of oil-exporting countries, 
does not represent, however, a stance < 
confrontation with OPEC. Rather, we era 
phasize constructive dialogue between o; 
consumers, including both developed and d 
veloping nations, and oil producers. . 
ministerial conference in December launche 
this dialogue on firm footing. It will procee" 
through the parallel work of four commiv 
sions dealing with energy, raw material 
development, and finance. 

The leaders who met at Rambouill( 
agreed that a cooperative relationship an 
improved understanding between developin 
nations and the industrial world is fund; 
mental to the welfare of both. The economic 
of developing nations depend vitally on our 
while their growth in turn contributes 1 ; 
our own prosperity. L 

The oil crisis had a particularly severe iiT; <, 
pact on developing nations. Higher oil price ; 
dealt them a staggering blow. In additioi 
their exports were dampened by the depre; 
sive effect more expensive oil had on th 
economies of developed countries. |' 

In his speech at the seventh special se; • ' 
sion of the U.N. General Assembly, Seen 
tary of State Kissinger underscored our coi 
cern for the economic security and growt 
of the developing countries. He outlined 
practical program to achieve these joir 
objectives. Some required increased contr 
butions from the United States, other ir 
dustrial countries, and oil producers. But th 
thrust of our program is to provide the df 
veloping countries greater opportunities t 
earn their own way through increased trade 
investment, and capital market opportu > 

If the developing nations themselves pur 
sue sound policies, this program will go ; 
long way toward putting their developmen 
efforts on a sound footing. It should alsi 
entail moving from an atmosphere of tensioi ■ 
to one of concrete cooperation to improve tht 
welfare of the developing countries and t( 

Department of State Bulleti 


egrate them more fully in an inter- 
tional economy which serves the interests 
all participants and thereby supports in- 
•national cooperation generally. 

irdependence and Policy Coordination 

and Growing economic interdependence among 

:ers untries — as indicated by the trend toward 

junti :reasing importance of international trade 

pru d investment flows, more rapid transpor- 

onii tion and communication among countries, 

iteij d more integrated capital markets — has 

•engthened the links through which in- 

tionary impulses are transmitted between 

untries. The major links generally recog- 

zed are: 

1. Increased demand for imports, which 

ay lead to excess demand in the exporting 


12. The prices of internationally traded 

lods affecting costs, consumer prices 

ectly, and prices of competing goods. 
3. Monetary or liquidity effects of inter- 
tional capital flows and the overall balance 


It should be noted that the factors under 
oint 3 tend to be much more important 
tider a system of relatively fixed rates than 
ider floating rates. Frequently, direct price 
fects tend to be dampened by depreciation 
the currency of the exporting country, 
id it is well recognized that floating ex- 
lange rates give nations a good deal more 
' )ntrol over domestic monetary and liquidity 

The international transmission of infla- 
on, however, does not necessarily mean 
lat world inflation is greater as a result of 
iterdependence. During most of the post- 
war years, in fact, quite the opposite was 
rue; interdependence was a factor for sta- 
ility. This was true broadly for two basic 
easons : 

First, fluctuations in demand conditions 
rere not closely synchronized. Therefore the 
xcess demand from one country tended to 
;pill over and be met out of the excess pro- 

ductive capacity of another country — thus 
dampening inflation. 

Secondly, the United States was generally 
a force for price stability in those years. 

Our relatively stable internal prices, our 
dominant influence on world markets, and 
our reasonably stable monetary conditions all 
tended to exert a powerful stabilizing force 
in the rest of the industrialized world. 

Unfortunately both these factors changed 
during the past 10 years. Beginning in the 
mid-1960's with the excessive and inflation- 
ary expansion in 1965-66, 1968, and 1972- 
73, U.S. prices rose more rapidly, and we 
ceased to be an anchor of price stability. 

In the latest expansion, during 1972-73, 
another relatively new phenomenon became 
critical. This was the virtually simultaneous 
strong expansion of all the major industrial- 
ized countries. There was therefore no place 
for excess demand to be siphoned off; price 
acceleration in one country was propagated 
through international trade, accelerating the 
price-wage spiral in other countries. 

This simultaneous expansion created a 
particularly rapid rise in the prices of in- 
dustrial materials. Existing capacities in 
this sector were just not geared to the simul- 
taneous rapid expansion of output in North 
America, Europe, and Japan. In previous 
years this underlying shortage of capacity 
in the basic materials sector had been ob- 
scured by the fact that not many economies 
had been operating at high levels at the same 
time. But in 1972-73 this was changed, and 
spot prices for industrial materials (in 
dollar terms) tripled between the end of 
1971 and mid-1974. 

Thus the interdependence of the inter- 
national economy was of critical importance 
in the recent inflation. It is not clear 
whether or not the simultaneous rapid ex- 
pansion was a one-time annual occurrence 
or whether it is a sign of increasing syn- 
chronization in the future. What is clear is 
that, in designing their stabilization policies, 
countries have need of a great deal more 
coordination of policy measures than in the 
past. In particular, it will be necessary to 
take into account not just domestic capacity 

February 16, 1976 


limitations but worldwide capacity limita- 

The machinery for greater coordination, 
of course, already exists. In one important 
forum, policymaking officials of the in- 
dustrial countries have, for some time, met 
regularly in the OECD to compare notes on 
policies and prospects. They have been as- 
sisted in this by a high-quality professional 
secretariat. But the will to coordinate has 
not always been sufficient. The lessons of the 
recent past, however, are having their im- 
pact: the Rambouillet summit, I think, deep- 
ened our appreciation of interdependence and 
resulted in a commitment to strengthen 
efforts for closer international cooperation. 

Mr. Chairman, I have only given a brief 
treatment to some international aspects of 
the problem of controlling inflation. As I 
said at the outset, sound domestic policy, 
particularly monetary and fiscal policies, 
must be at the heart of any long-term solu- 
tion to the problem of global inflation. But 
there is also an increasing need for us to 
take the international dimensions of this 
problem into account. I have tried to con- 
ti-ibute to your consideration of this vital 
question by pointing out some of these inter- 
national factors. 

Annual Food for Peace Report 
Transmitted to Congress 

Message From President Ford ' 

To the Congress of the United States: 

I am pleased to transmit to the Congress 
the 1974 annual report on agricultural ex- 
port activities carried out under Public Law 
480 (Food for Peace). This program has 
supported the foreign policy and humani- 
tarian objectives of the United States, pro- 
viding assistance to alleviate hunger and 
promoting economic progress in the develop- 
ing nations. 

Throughout the year, the Food for Peace 


'Transmitted on Jan. 28 (text from White House 
press release) ; also printed as H. Doc. 94-352, 94th 
Cong., 2d sess., includes the text of the report. 

program demonstrated its flexibility in 
changing agricultural situation. Because 
the continuing tightness of commodity su 
plies in the United States, shipments durh 
the year were somewhat restricted. Th 
was especially true of wheat and whe 
product shipments. However, our food don 
tions to the drought-stricken African cou 
tries remained substantial. In both East ai 
West Africa, U.S. food aid represent 
about 40 percent of the total supplied by tl 
international community. The level of U. 
contributions to the World Food Progra* 
and the U.S. voluntary agencies was mai 
tained. Title I concessional sales progran 
were continued in such countries as Bang! 
desh, Israel, and Pakistan, and in Indochin 
New Title I programs were started in Egyp 
Syria, and Chile. 

The Food for Peace program continues 
be a major portion of the overall U.S. fo|^,^ 
eign aid efl'ort. Concessional sales progran 
encourage recipient countries to establi; 
self-help objectives, and provide valuab 
support to economic development. Most > . 
these programs contain provisions for agi 
cultural market development activitie 
which are being used as conditions warrar 
although the need for such activities h; 
lessened because of strong commercial d 
mand. The Title II donation program co 
tinues its emphasis on improving the nuti 
tion of pregnant and nursing mothei 
babies, and preschool children. 

As this report indicates, the Public La 
480 program completed its 20th year i 
operation continuing to parform its vit 
role in rendering humanitarian assistance ' 
the disaster-stricken, promoting econom 
development in the poor nations, contribu 
ing to the development and expansion ( 
foreign markets for U.S. agricultural con 
modities, and supporting our foreign polic 
objectives around the world. It remains 
key element of our foreign assistance pn 
gram and a vital link in the improving ec( 
nomic relations between this country an 
the developing world. 

Gerald R. Ford. 

The White House, January 28, 1976. I 


Department of State Bulleti 



jj, nited States Vetoes Change in Framework 
'<» r Middle East Negotiations 

Following are statements made in the 
N. Security Council by U.S. Representa- 
p, ve Daniel P. Moynihan on January 12, 19, 
id 26 and a statement issued by the De- 
rtment on January 26, together with the 
xt of a draft resolution ivhich was vetoed 
I the United States on January 26. 


atement of January 12 

SUN press release 3 dated January 12 

I would like, Mr. President, to thank you 
»r the opportunity to state the view of the 
nited States with respect to the motion 
hich you, sir, have presented.' 

As will be recalled, Mr. President, on 
fecember 4, 1975, the last occasion on 
hich the Council dealt with Middle East 
fairs, it was proposed to invite the Pales- 
ne Liberation Organization (PLO) to par- 
cipate in that debate with "the same 
ights of participation as are conferred 
hen a Member State is invited to partici- 
ate under rule 37." The same proposal, Mr. 
'resident, has been made today. 


' The President of the Council proposed on Jan. 12 
hat the representative of the Palestine Liberation 
)rganization be invited to participate in the debate, 
le stated that "This proposal is not being put for- 
rard under rule 37 or rule 39 ... , but, if it is 
dopted by the Council, the invitation to the Pales- 
ine Liberation Organization . . . will confer on it 
he same rights of participation as are conferred 
vhen a member state is invited to participate under 
■ule 37." 

The proposal of December 4, 1975, elicited 
strong objections from some members of the 
Council, including the United States. Our 
position today is unchanged from that of four 
weeks ago. 

What is at issue today in significant 
measure is the integrity of the processes of 
the Security Council. We have already seen 
a startling decline in the confidence with 
which the processes of the General Assembly 
are viewed. Seeking to create precedents, 
while at the same time not adhering to the 
rules, can erode the Council's influence and 
authority as has occurred in the Assembly. 
It is in nobody's interest for this same proc- 
ess to take hold in the Security Council. 

Rule 37 of our provisional rules states 

Any Member of the United Nations which is not 
a member of the Security Council may be invited, 
as a result of a decision of the Security Council, to 
participate, without vote, in the discussion of any 
question brought before the Security Council when 
the Security Council considers that the interests of 
that Member are specially affected or when a Mem- 
ber brings a matter to the attention of the Security 
Council in accordance with Article 35 (1) of the 

Mr. President, it goes without saying that 
a member of the United Nations is a state. 
We do not have members, and the charter 
does not provide for members, which are not 
states. The Palestine Liberation Organiza- 
tion is not a state. It does not administer a 
defined territory. It does not have the attri- 
butes of a government of a state. It does 
not claim to be a state. This is the basic 
relevant fact we have here with respect to 
the proposal before us. 

When we were faced with the similar pro- 

February 16, 1976 


posal on December 4, it elicited, as I have 
said, tiie strongest protest from several 
members of the Council, including the 
United States. I described it as a "concerted 
attempt to disregard the rules of procedure 
and to accord to the Palestine Liberation 
Organization a role greater even than that 
which over the years the Council has granted 
to observer governments and a role gi'eater 
by far than has in more recent times been 
granted to the spokesmen of legitimate na- 
tional liberation movements invited here 
under rule 39." ^ 

I said then and I repeat that the United 
States is not prepared to agree and we do 
not believe this Council should agree to an 
ad hoc departure from the rules of proce- 
dure which ignores the needs of this institu- 
tion. Unfortunately, despite our opposition 
and authoritative statements by other per- 
manent members and elected members of 
the Council, rule and precedent were ignored 
on December 4 to extend the invitation as 

I wish to emphasize at this point that I 
am not addressing the question of whether 
our proceedings are of interest to the Pales- 
tinian people. The U.S. view that the legiti- 
mate interests of the Palestinian people are 
an intrinsic part of the problem of lasting 
peace in the Middle East is well known and 
is unchanged. This is not the matter I am 
addressing. It is not my intention to deal 
with this matter today at all. 

The specific issue before us, Mr. President, 
is our responsibility to the integrity of 
Security Council procedures and to the 
future effectiveness of this body. If we take 
liberties with those procedures and, under 
the influence of immediate political positions 
with respect to a given question before this 
Council, establish or reaffirm unwise prece- 
dents, this will come back to haunt us. I 
want to stress that a decision to invite the 
PLO to participate in our deliberations, not 
under existing Council rules, but as if it 

' For statements by Ambassador Moynihan made 
in the Security Council on Dec. 4, 1975, see Bulletin 
of Jan. 5, 1976, p. 21. 


were a member state with the same righl 
as a member state of the United Natio. 
would open a veritable Pandora's box 
future difficulties. 

Were that box to be opened, there a 
groups in all parts of the world that cou 
seek to participate in our proceedings as 
they were member states. No nation repp 
sented at this table, including my own, wouAjr 
necessarily be immune from the pernicioK |ji 

Mr. President, I repeat: The Palestii 
Liberation Organization is not a state; 
does not claim to be a state. For the mo 
elemental of reasons, only member states cu 
participate in our proceedings as mernb" 
states — unless, of course, we change tl 
rules, whereupon we shall look forward 
welcoming the dissident factions and natio) 
alities of half the world, for in point of fao« 
roughly half of the nations in the world fa«i ^ 
serious to extreme problems of internal w i) 
hesion, owing to internal ethnic conflict. Thi 
is true of more than half the present mem 
bers of the Security Council. 

Moreover, the PLO, which is not a stati 
much less a member state, suffers from a 
additional disability in seeking to participaK 
in the work of this Council. It does n( 
recognize the right to exist of the State ( 
Israel, which is a member state, and who: 
right to exist is guaranteed by the charto 
which this Council is pledged to uphold. 

Finally, the PLO, which is not a state, ar 
which does not recognize the right to exi; 
of Israel, which is a member state, furth( 
refuses to acknowledge the authority of th 
Council, which in Resolutions 242 and 33 
has undertaken to uphold the rights of th 
states of the Middle East. 

My government is not prepared to go alon 
with an action which will undermine th 
negotiation process, which is the only pro( 
ess that can lead to peace. The represents 
fives of the Palestine Liberation Organize 
tion have repeatedly told the General As 
sembly of their hostility for systematii 
negotiations and their hostility for the wor 
of this Council. They categorically rejectee 
Security Council Resolution 242, which foi 

Department of State Bulletii 


m M 


Irs has served and continues to serve as 
only agreed basis for serious negotia- 

[r. President, the Security Council is the 
^stone of the United Nations. It can act 
has done so with distinction in ways 
lich have been essential to peace, especially 
[the Middle East. The preservation of its 
jgrity and effectiveness deserves our care 


'he Council should not repeat its mistaken 

hoc decision of December 4. The United 

ites asks that a vote be taken on your 

»tion, Mr. President. The United States 

[1 vote against the motion.^ 

|itement of January 19 

JN press release 7 dated January 19 

have followed with great interest the 
rse of the debate and have noted atten- 
ely the statements and positions laid be- 
e us by both concerned and interested 
rties. It is certain, Mr. President, that the 
ue before us — the issue of peace in the 
sti iddle East — remains one of the most com- 
m Bx and difficult issues that can be imagined. 
dp >me of the statements presented to this 
s I Duncil have taken us back to the origins of 
ite 16 problem, and we have considered it from 
vki [any dimensions. 

art If there are two main things we can leani 
i rem the events which have been reviewed 
ring the past week in this Council, one is 
rely that war, violence, terrorism, and re- 
rt to force have seriously aggravated this 
oblem over the last several decades and we 
e now dealing with the consequences of 
is violence. Another lesson is that the rela- 
ively rare but very significant steps which 
lave been made toward interim arrange- 
nents to avoid war and toward long-range 
leaceful solutions have been possible only 

'The Council on Jan. 12 adopted by a vote of 11 
I 1 (U.S.), with 3 abstentions (France, Italy, 
J.K.), the proposal to invite the representative of 
he PLO to participate in the debate. Under article 
17 of the U.N. Charter, "Decisions of the Council on 
procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative 
rote of nine members" and are not subject to the 

when parties to this problem could operate 
within an agreed framework. 

The basic truths before us are that, to 
avoid conflict, there must be contact and 
negotiations and that to maintain a negotiat- 
ing process there must be a framework with- 
in which the parties have agreed to negotiate. 

One of the greatest contributions this 
Council has made in its notable history was 
to establish that framework. In 1967, after 
months of negotiation and effort, Security 
Council Resolution 242 was adopted. In 1973 
it was reaffirmed and augmented by Resolu- 
tion 338. These two resolutions, and the will 
to apply them, have been the foundation for 
the progress that has been made, and they 
continue to provide hope for the future. 

Our discussions over these last days have 
offered many possibilities of changes to or 
augmentation of these resolutions and varia- 
tions for the basic framework. We have 
listened to the ideas put forward ; we under- 
stand the sentiments and concerns behind 
many of them. 

But in spite of these interests and con- 
cerns, we cannot escape the reality of the 
situation that when all parties have agreed 
to a framework, all of them must agree to 
changes in that framework. Changes im- 
posed on the parties and unacceptable to any 
one of them, however great the good will, 
will not work. 

That framework reflects the enormous 
complexities and interrelationships of the 
issues involved in a settlement; and to 
modify one part of it risks destroying it en- 
tirely. We believe it would be a setback for 
the chances of achieving true peace in the 
Middle East for this Council to conclude its 
current debate by adopting resolutions which 
would have the effect of leaving no commonly 
accepted basis for further negotiation. 

Where would we go from there? With the 
increasing complexity of each step and each 
year, the process of building a new founda- 
tion for peace, of establishing a new process, 
becomes a more difficult task. It is for this 
reason that the United States feels that en- 
dangering this agreed framework in order to 
achieve results here in this Council which 

February 16, 1976 


would in themselves not guarantee a solution 
or even progress toward that solution is not 
worth the risk. 

We believe that there is enough leeway in 
the present arrangements to achieve prog- 
ress if there is the will to use them, that all 
the problems before us can be dealt with 
most effectively by the negotiating process, 
and that such changes as may be required 
in our approach must be worked out in the 
Geneva process. 

It is at Geneva or at a preparatory confer- 
ence that matters of procedure, such as the 
question of additional participants, and of 
substance can and should be addressed. Hav- 
ing succeeded in establishing an agreed 
framework of procedures and principles for 
a settlement and in creating conditions for 
the establishment of the Geneva Conference 
as a forum in which the implementation of 
those principles can be negotiated, the Coun- 
cil should not now seek to prejudge the work 
of that conference. 

As we have stated before, the United 
States is prepared to cooperate with all the 
states involved on all the issues. We are 
aware that there can be no durable solution 
unless we make every effort to promote a 
solution of the key issues of a just and last- 
ing peace in that area on the basis of Se- 
curity Council Resolutions 242 and 338, tak- 
ing into account the legitimate interests of 
all the peoples of the area including the 
Palestinian people and respect for the rights 
to independent existence of all states in the 

We are committed to a peace settlement 
which resolves all of the issues in the con- 
flict — withdrawal from occupied territories, 
the right of all states in the area to live 
within secure and recognized borders, recip- 
rocal obligations of the parties to live in 
peace with each other, and all the other 
questions which must be dealt with in the 
negotiating process. We are also aware that 
all of these elements are inextricably tied 
together by Resolutions 242 and 338 in what 
the distinguished former Representative of 
the U.K. Lord Caradon described as "a bal- 
anced whole." 


My government is dedicated to make evi 
effort to achieve progress toward peace 
the Middle East in this year. We have lean 
and profited from the deliberations of t 
Council and the ideas that have been j 
forth here. We believe our strongest du 
however, is to preserve the process for pe, 
that we have all worked so hard to constr 
and to use it so that the problems before 
can be met and overcome. 

We are confident that progress can 
made, and we are committed to achieve 
The peace and safety of the world dems 
nothing less. Our actions both in the Coui 
and afterward will be guided by our b 
judgment of what is necessary to advai 
toward and avoid impeding achievement 
this objective. 

Statement on U.K. Amendment, January 26 

USUN press release 11 dated January 26 

The United States has made clear that « 
responsibility to the Middle East is si) 
that we are required, even if we stand alo» 
to preserve the framework for negotiatio 
established in Security Council Resolutio 
242 and 338. 

Far from preserving that framework, U 
I'esolution before us would commence 
destruction. It proposes a fundamental s| 
irremediable diminishment of the circul 
stances of one of the parties. Fundamen* 
rights are elided, equitable entitlements it 
impaired, and fundamental expectations a 
of a sudden enshrouded in doubt. Th« 
rights, these entitlements, and these expeci 
tions were incorporated in Resolutions 2 
and 338. 

However unintentionally, Mr. President,, 
is our feeling that this case is so clear tbl 
it would be inappropriate, would be inco) 
patible, for the same documents to all ■ 
these rights, entitlements, and expectatio ; 
and at the same time seek to reaffirm the , 
In that circumstance, Mr. President, t ! 
United States will abstain on the ameii' 
ment of the United Kingdom.* 

* The amendment submitted by the Representati i 


Department of State Bulled 


[ement in Explanation of Vote 
Draft Resolution, January 26 

N press release 10 dated January 26 

'he United States has not lightly cast a 

:ative vote against the resolution that was 

ore us. We voted "no" only after long and 

iscientious consideration and with the 

lization that we must keep foremost in 

id a greater goal beyond this Council 

imber. I want to make clear our reasons 

voting as we did — and the seriousness 

;h which my government first weighed the 

ws expressed in this debate. 

\.s witness to our intent and purpose, the 

partment of State of the United States 

this moment is releasing a statement that 

ire completely sets out U.S. views on where 

s debate has left us in our search for a 

ddle East peace. 

'i To briefly state that position, we con- 

cided that our responsibility to seek further 

pgress toward an overall peace settlement 

i the Middle East required us, even if we 

)od alone, to preserve the framework for 

igotiations established in Security Council 

"(solutions 242 and 338. The provisions that 

■re before us were such that we considered 

e negotiating framework would have been 

ered in ways that would have been seri- 

sly harmful to the future of the peace- 

' aking process. 

' We understand the reasons behind many 

■' the ideas that have been presented here, 

' id we are not closing the door to the intro- 

' iction into the negotiating process of con- 

• derations that have not yet been addressed. 

ather, we wish to emphasize that it is bet- 

■I r to go forward with the agreed basis that 

)es exist, to utilize it to the best of our 

)ility, and to see it evolve in a manner that 

' the United Kingdom provided for the addition of 
new operative paragraph to read as follows: 

"3. Reaffirms the principles and provisions of its 
jsolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) and declares 
lat nothing in the foregoing provisions of this res- 
lution supersedes them." 

The amendment was not adopted by the Council, 
he vote being 4 in favor (France, Italy, Sweden, 
J.K.) and 2 against (People's Republic of China, 
ibya), with 9 abstentions (U.S.). 

will make it more useful rather than running 
the risk of destroying it. 

On January 19, Mr. President, I made be- 
fore this Council a short statement of the 
U.S. position on changes to the agreed frame- 
work for negotiation. I said then that changes 
imposed — whatever the intentions and with 
whatever justification, but nevertheless im- 
posed — would not work. That is a point that 
I would like to make again today. The U.S. 
negative vote on the resolution was not based 
on antipathy to the aspirations of Pales- 
tinians but, rather, on the conviction that the 
passage of that resolution would not amelio- 
rate their condition nor be the most effective 
way of addressing the long-neglected prob- 
lem of their future in the context of an over- 
all settlement. 

It is not a question of whether but how to 
make progress toward the goal we all profess. 
On behalf of the United States, sir, I wish 
to thank the President of the Council for his 
statesmanship and leadership that has piloted 
us all through important and far-ranging 
deliberations. I wish to congratulate all 
members who have spoken here for the 
thoughtfulness and measured tones of their 
positions. Surely this approach is construc- 
tive and helpful to the parties that must soon 
proceed to negotiation of all the issues before 
them— to matters of procedure, the question 
of additional participation, and the matters of 
substance such as withdrawal from occupied 
territories, the right of all states in the area 
to live within secure and recognized borders, 
and reciprocal obligations of the parties to 
live in peace with each other. 

When we first began our deliberations, the 
United States made it clear that we wished 
to avoid confrontation and to produce posi- 
tive results to aid in the search for peace. 
Many, we know, will be disappointed that we 
do not have a resolution to use and to refer 
to, but for our part let me say that we have 
nonetheless profited from the various views 
that have been expressed and we have in- 
creased our understanding of the enormous 
complexities before us all. 

Armed with the positive suggestions that 
have been made, fortified by the seriousness 

February 16, 1976 


and concern of all who have participated, the 
United States pledges to you — to you all and 
to the United Nations — that we will perse- 
vere in the search for peace, that we will 
make use of the framework for negotiation 
that has been preserved, and that we will do 
our best. We need the cooperation of all of 
you to make these efforts succeed. I hope 
you will join us and help us in this quest; 
and as it recommences, for the United States 
it is a matter of special import to know that 
we have the unfailing and determined efforts 
of the Secretary General with us in this 


Press release 32 dated January 26 

At the conclusion of the Security Council's 
consideration of the Middle East problem, it 
is important to turn from the debates that 
have taken place in New York and look to 
the year ahead. In doing so we must ask 
ourselves. Where has this debate left us in 
our search for a Middle East peace? The 
United States has perhaps a particular re- 
sponsibility to do this because, in being 
faithful to its concept of the search for 
peace, it has felt obliged to veto a resolution 
that others believed mapped out a preferable 
route. We did not do so lightly, nor in a 
spirit of negation. We believed that with 
this resolution the Council would have 
blocked the surer and the tested way to a 
settlement in favor of one that would not 
have worked. It is important that it be under- 
stood why we believed this to be the case and, 
more especially, how we see the process con- 
tinuing within the framework that we have, 
with our vote, preserved. 

There is surely no other problem of our 
time that has seen so much effort devoted 
to a solution and where the successes and 
the failures are so evident as guides for our 
future endeavors. There has been no lack of 
resolutions, no lack of plans; but looking 
back over the years, we can discern those 
few developments that have gradually con- 
structed a basis, a framework, for whatever 
progress has been made in all this time. 

In 1967 the Security Council devised Reso- 

lution 242, which contained the fundame 
principles that should be applied in orde 
establish a just and lasting peace in 
Middle East, including withdrawal from 
cupied territories; termination of all cl; 
or states of belligerency ; acknowledgmen 
the sovereignty, territorial integrity, 
political independence of every state in 
area ; and respect for the right of every s 
to live in peace within secure and recogn 
boundaries free from threats or acts of fo 
The comprehensiveness, fairness, and 
ance of Resolution 242 have won it ace 
ance by all the Middle East states dire 
involved in the conflict in addition to 
proval by the outside world. One of the g: 
values of the resolution is its wide ace 
ance, despite the differences each side 
over its meaning. 

In 1973, the Security Council approve 
resolution that complemented Resolution 
by establishing a negotiating process 
tween the parties as the means of implemi 
ing the principles set forth in the ear 
resolution. This was, of course, Resolu 
338, which also won wide acceptance ; 
with Resolution 242, formed a negotial 
basis and framework that had been lacP 
since the early years of the Middle I 

The decision was then taken to provic 
specific forum — a concrete context — for 
negotiating process. The parties agreed 
participate in a conference at Geneva ur 
the cochairmanship of the United States 
the Soviet Union. The nature of the con 
ence reflected recognition of the fact t 
the negotiating process, if it was to h 
any chance of success, had to be based on 
consent and voluntary participation of 
the parties. The composition of the con; 
ence, accordingly, was itself a matter 
agreement among all the parties. 

Finally, as the parties confronted 
substance of the problem, they decided 
approach it in stages rather than all at oi 
The United States was pleased that, at 
request of the parties, it could play a help 
role in this step-by-step negotiating proct 
keeping always in mind that each step ^ 
taken within the Geneva framework ; 


Department of State Bull< n 

ih a view to insuring the ultimate success 
the Geneva Conference. It was always 
ognized that moving directly to an over- 
approach was an alternative to which the 
ties could turn at any time, and there was 
doubt that an overall settlement, what- 
r the approach, was the end goal of all 
cerned, including the United States. 
And what was the result? For the first 
Mj ne in 25 or more years, genuine progress 
ofi IS made toward a resolution of the im- 
3iii jnsely deep and complex problems that con- 
lii tute the Middle East question. Through 
k e courage and statesmanship of the Gov- 
1 tj nments of Egypt, Israel, and Syria — and 
'k\ )rking within this common framework — 
ao reements were reached, concessions made 
!i(i( return for other concessions; land was 
1 turned on the basis of binding agreements. 
Less tangible, but perhaps more important, 
is the progress in the attitudes of the 
luntries of the Middle East. In the long 
story of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is a 
•w and relatively recent development that 
linion in the Arab world has begun to think 
terms of recognizing a sovereign Israel 
id that Israel has begun to see peace as a 
iigible goal rather than a distant hope. 
^ e are fully aware that only a start has 
'en made, that many problems remain to 
' dealt with and resolved. It was the nature 
■ the process that the easier issues would be 
jalt with first and the more difficult and 
)mplex left until later, when the momentum 
' the process itself would be working for 
5. The U.S. Government is committed to de- 
)te itself to the resolution of these remain- 
ig issues as it has to the issues that have 
Iready been resolved. 

There would be no chance of further prog- 

, 3SS, however, if this negotiating framework, 

ainfully erected over years of trial and 

rror, were not left intact. Whatever its 

Tiperfections, however great the temptation 

i ,0 tamper with the resolutions and the 

, lieneva formula that constitute it, if it were 

allied apart now it could not be put back to- 

, :ether and the clock would have been turned 

)ack to the years of futility in which no 

)asis existed for negotiation to take place. 

The negotiating framework is sufficiently 

flexible that it can provide the basis for 
negotiating fair and durable solutions to all 
the issues involved. The issues of with- 
drawal, of borders, of the termination of 
states or claims of belligerency, of reciprocal 
obligations to peace, of the right to live in 
peace within secure and recognized boun- 
daries — all these and more — must be care- 
fully considered. Reciprocity is a fundamen- 
tal concept in this process. All of the princi- 
ples must be clothed with substance and 
given practical form. The nature of peace 
must be defined for all the peoples involved. 

If there are limitations in the present 
framework, they result from the attitudes 
of the parties. What is needed is that all the 
parties go on from here to work out the sub- 
stance of the solutions and that if any party 
feels there is a need to reconsider the frame- 
work in order to proceed further, that this 
emerge from negotiations among the parties 
in the Geneva context. 

It is evident from the debate that led to 
the convening of the Security Council that 
there is concern on the part of some of the 
parties to the dispute, shared by members of 
the Council, regarding those aspects of the 
Middle East problem that relate particu- 
larly to the Palestinian people and their fu- 
ture. It is important that we work to develop 
a common understanding of this particularly 
complex issue. The Palestinian question was 
for many years considered primarily a refu- 
gee problem. It is widely accepted today that 
this is only one aspect of a larger question. 
The United States has repeatedly afl^rmed its 
recognition that there will be no permanent 
peace unless it includes arrangements that 
take into account the legitimate interests of 
the Palestinian people. The United States is 
prepared to work with all the parties toward 
a solution of all the issues yet remaining, 
including the issue of the future of the Pal- 
estinian people. We have no preconceptions 
as to the nature of such a solution as it in- 
volves them, which can only be worked out 
as part of the negotiating process. But we 
recognize that a solution must take into ac- 
count their aspirations within the framework 
of principles laid down in Resolutions 242 
and 338. 

February 16, 1976 


This issue, as is the case with the other 
issues, can be successfully dealt with, how- 
ever, only by maintaining the momentum of 
practical progress in the negotiating process. 
We look to this process to clarify issues and 
to help develop a reasonable and accepted 
definition of Palestinian interests, without 
which negotiation on this aspect of the ovei'- 
all problem cannot be successfully addressed. 
However, it is not realistic to expect one 
party to the dispute to agree to the participa- 
tion of another in the negotiations if the 
latter's policy is to seek the disappearance of 
the former as a state. As far as the United 
States is concerned, no negotiating frame- 
work is viable that calls the existence of the 
State of Israel into question. 

We appreciate that, at this stage, the par- 
ticular negotiating means that have been 
used so successfully to date present difficul- 
ties to one or another of the parties. We have 
therefore suggested an informal preparatory 
conference of the present Geneva parties 
looking toward a convening of the Geneva 
Conference, in which the parties can discuss 
questions relating to the agenda, procedures, 
and participants of the formal conference 
without prejudice to their positions on the 
conference itself. What is important is to 
continue the process. The goals all want to 
achieve cannot be achieved without move- 
ment, but at the same time there is no short- 
cut. They require the cooperation of both 
sides at every stage. 

We understand also that the process ap- 
pears at times to be unduly slow. When one 
looks at the issues that lie ahead one is 
tempted, indeed, to question whether we 
shall ever deal with them all. But when one 
looks back over the years and sees how much 
more has been accomplished in the last two 
years than in the quarter of a century that 
came before, he is encouraged to hope that 
the process we are engaged in will in fact 
lead us where we all want to go. The years 
1974 and 1975 were years of signal accom- 
plishment. The United States is firmly and 
irrevocably committed to progress in the 
negotiation of a settlement. In keeping with 
this commitment, it will do all it can to press 

ahead this year to consolidate what has b« 
achieved and lay the groundwork for rai 
progress. We believe that we have an oblj 
tion to keep open and intact the negotiat: 
framework and to assist in developing 
common understanding of the problems tl 
i-emain before us. We are confident tl 
progress leading to an eventual solution 
all the issues is possible, utilizing — and, 
fact, only by utilizing — the present frar 
work ; and we are committed to assist 
every way we can to facilitate such progr© 
We will be active in the months ahe. 
and our efforts will be seen to speak i 




The Security Coiincil, 

Having considered the item entitled "The Mid 
East problem including the Palestinian questio 
in accordance with its resolution 381 (1975) 
30 November 1975, 

Having heard the representatives of parties c\ 
cerned, including the Palestinian Liberation Orga 
zation, representative of the Palestinian people, 

Convinced that the question of Palestine is 
core of the conflict in the Middle East, 

Expressing its concern over the continuing deta 
oration of the situation in the Middle East, 
deeply deploring Israel's persistence in its occul 
tion of Arab territories and its refusal to implem| 
the relevant United Nations resolutions. 

Reaffirming the principle of inadmissibility of i| 
quisition of territories by the threat or use of foil 

Reaffirming further the necessity of the establil 
ment of a just and lasting peace in the region ba| 
on full respect for the Charter of the United 
tions as well as for its resolutions concerning ll 
problem of the Middle East including the questj^ 
of Palestine, 

1. Affirms: 

(a) That the Palestinian people should be enablj 
to exercise its inalienable national right of se 
determination, including the right to establish 
independent state in Palestine in accordance wi| 
the Charter of the United Nations; 

= U.N. doc. S/11940; the draft resolution was 
adopted owing to the negative vote of a permane 
member of the Council, the vote being 9 in favor, 
against (U.S.), with 3 abstentions (Italy, Swedt 
U.K.). The People's Republic of China and Lib; 
did not participate in the vote. 


Department of State Bullet 





b) The right of Palestinian refugees wishing to 
rn to their homes and live at peace with their 
;hbours to do so and the right of those choosing 
to return to receive compensation for their prop- 


c) That Israel should withdraw from all 
ih territories occupied since June 1967; 

d) That appropriate arrangements should be 
blished to guarantee, in accordance with the 

irter of the United Nations, the sovereignty, 
ritorial integrity and political independence of all 
tes in the area and their right to live in peace 
;hin secure and recognized boundaries; 

Decides that the provisions contained in para- 

iph 1 should be taken fully into account in all 

ernational efforts and conferences organized with- 

the framework of the United Nations for the 

blishment of a just and lasting peace in the 

Iddle East; 

Requests the Secretary-General to take all the 
icessary steps as soon as possible for the imple- 
imtation of the provisions of this resolution and 
1 report to the Security Council on the progress 

4. Decides to convene within a period of six 
>nths to consider the report by the Secretary-Gen- 
Lil regarding the implementation of this resolution, 
id in order to pursue its responsibilities regard- 
g such implementation. 

Meeting of IMF Interim Committee 
leld in Jamaica 

Following is the text of a press commu- 
i(iue issued at Kingston, Jamaica, and 

'ashington on January 8 at the conclusion 
f the fifth 'meeting of the Interim Commit- 
'e of the Board of Governors of the Inter- 
ational Monetary Fund. Secretary of the 
'reasnry William E. Simon headed the U.S. 
elegation to the meeting. 

1. The Interim Committee of the Board of Gov- 
mors of the International Monetary Fund held its 
fth meeting in Kingston, Jamaica on January 7-8, 
976 under the chairmanship of Mr. Willy de Clercq, 
■linister of Finance of Belgium, who was selected 
)y the Committee to succeed Mr. John Turner of 
Canada as Chairman. Mr. H. Johannes Witteveen, 
vlanaging Director of the Fund, participated in the 
neeting. The following observers attended during 
;he Committee's discussions: Mr. Henri Konan Bedie, 
Jhairman, Bank-Fund Development Committee, Mr. 
3. D. Arsenis representing the Secretary-General, 

UNCTAD, Mr. Wilhelm Haferkamp, Vice-President, 
EC Commission, Mr. Mahjoob A. Hassanain, Chief, 
Economics Department, OPEC, Mr. Rene Larre, Gen- 
eral Manager, BIS, Mr. Emile Van Lennep, Secre- 
tary-General, OECD, Mr. F. Leutwiler, President, 
National Bank of Switzerland, Mr. Olivier Long, 
Director General, GATT, and Mr. Robert S. Mc- 
Namara, President, IBRD.' 

2. The Committee endorsed the recommendations 
contained in the report of the Executive Directors on 
the Sixth (Jeneral Review of Quotas and the pro- 
posed resolution on increases in the quotas of indi- 
vidual members to be submitted to the Board of 
Governors for its approval. In this connection, the 
Committee reaffirmed its view that the Fund's hold- 
ings of each currency should be usable in the Fund's 
operations and transactions in accordance with its 
policies. Appropriate provisions for this purpose will 
be included in the draft amendments of the Fund's 
Articles. To give effect to the Committee's view in 
the period before the amendments become effective, 
it was agreed that, within six months after the date 
of the adoption of this resolution, each member shall 
make arrangements satisfactory to the Fund for the 
use of the member's currency in the operations and 
transactions of the Fund in accordance with its poli- 
cies, provided that the Executive Directors may 
extend the period within which such arrangements 
shall be made. 

3. The Committee considered the question of the 
implementation of the agreement reached at its 
fourth meeting regarding the disposition of a part 
of the Fund's holdings of gold. It was agreed that 
action should be taken to start without delay the 
simultaneous implementation of the arrangements 
referred to in paragraph 6 of the press communique 
issued by the Committee on August 31, 1975." The 
sales of gold by the Fund should be made in public 
auctions according to an appropriate timetable over 
a four-year period. It is understood that the Bank 
for International Settlements would be able to bid 
in these auctions. 

4. In its discussion of the world economic situation 
and outlook, the Committee noted that recovery from 
the severe international recession of 1974-75 was 
now under way in much of the industrial world. 
Nevertheless, current rates of both unemployment 
and inflation were still unacceptably high. The Com- 
mittee called on the industrial countries, especially 
those in relatively strong balance of payments posi- 

' Abbreviation guide: BIS, Bank for International 
Settlements; EC, European Community; GATT, Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IBRD, Inter- 
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development; 
OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development; OPEC, Organization of Petroleum Ex- 
porting Countries; UNCTAD, United Nations Con- 
ference on Trade and Development. 

- For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 22, 1975, p. 450. 

February 16, 1976 


tions, to conduct their policies so as to ensure a 
satisfactory and sustained rate of economic expan- 
sion in the period ahead while continuing to combat 

A special source of concern to the Committee was 
the deterioration in the external position of the 
primary producing countries, especially the devel- 
oping ones. The general picture for the developing 
countries in 1975 was again one of large balance of 
payments deficits on current account, financed 
through heavy external borrowing and through the 
use of reserves already eroded by the inflation in 
recent years. With large current account deficits 
still in prospect this year, the Committee felt that 
the ability of many developing countries to maintain 
an adequate flow of imports in 1976, and to follow 
appropriate adjustment policies, would also depend 
on the availability of adequate credit from the Fund. 

5. The Committee welcomed the recent decision of 
the Executive Directors liberalizing the Compensa- 
tory Financing Facility. Under the new decision the 
Fund will be prepared to authorize drawings up to 
75 per cent of a member's quota, as against 50 per 
cent under the 1966 decision. Maximum drawings 
in any one year are raised from 25 per cent to 50 
per cent of quota. Moreover, the decision enables the 
Fund to render assistance under the facility at an 
earlier stage of the development of a shortfall. 

6. The Committee noted the report of the Execu- 
tive Directors on their review of the Fund's policies 
on the use of its resources, and also on the Trust 
Fund for the benefit of the low income members. 
After consideration of the issues involved, the Com- 
mittee reached the following conclusions: 

(a) It was agreed that the necessary steps should 
be taken to establish the Trust Fund without delay. 
Its resources would be derived from the profits of the 
sales of the Fund's gold, which should be augmented 
by voluntary national contributions. It was agreed 
that the amount of gold available for sale in ac- 
cordance with the agreement reached by the Com- 
mittee at its fourth meeting should be disposed of 
over a four-year period. The resources of the Trust 
Fund should be used to provide balance of payments 
assistance on concessionary terms to members with 
low per capita incomes. Initially, eligible members 
would be those with per capita incomes in 1973 not 
in excess of SDR [special drawing rights] 300. 

(b) It was further agreed, that, until the effective 
date of the amendment of the Articles, the size of 
each credit tranche should be increased by 45 per 
cent, which would mean that total access under the 
credit tranches would be increased from 100 per cent 
to 145 per cent of quota, with the possibility of 
further assistance in exceptional circumstances. The 
present kinds of conditionality for the tranches 
would remain unchanged. The Fund will in due 
course consider again the question of access to the 
Fund's resources if it becomes evident that the needs 
of members make it advisable to re-examine this 

7. The Committee noted the report of the E> 
tive Directors on amendment, welcomed the proj 
made toward the solution of the outstanding is; 
and commended them for the voluminous and 
cessful work that they had done in order to aci 
a major revision of the Articles. In particula. 
welcomed the agreement that has been reache> 
provisions concerning the important problem of 
change rates. In this i-espeet, it has endorsed a 
Article IV of the Articles of Agreement which e; 
lishes a system of exchange arrangements. The 
system recognizes an objective of stability anc 
lates it to achievement of greater underlying st 
ity in economic and financial factors. The Comm 
considered the remaining issues on which its j 
ance has been requested by the Executive Direc 
and agreed as follows: 

(a) The amended Articles of Agreement si 
include a provision by which the members of 
Fund would undertake to collaborate with the 1 
and with other members in order to ensure 
their policies with respect to resei-ve assets v. \$ 
be consistent with the objectives of promoting b^ ;r 
international surveillance of international liqu ,y 
and making the special drawing right the prini al 
reserve asset in the international monetary syste 

(b) The amended Articles would contain an 
abling provision under which the Fund wouk 
able to sell any part of the gold left after the di 
bution of 50 million ounces in accordance with 
arrangements referred to in paragraph 3 above, 
use the profits (1) to augment the general resoi 
of the Fund for immediate use in its ordinary oj ] 
tions and transactions, or (2) to make balanc 
payments assistance available on special term 
developing members in difficult circumstances 
the occasion of such sales the Fund would havf 
power to distribute to developing members a po 
of the profits on the basis of their quotas or to t 
a similar distribution by the direct sale of gol 
them at the present oflficial price. Any decisioi 
such a distribution should be taken by an 85 
cent majority of the total voting power. T 
powers of the Fund would be in addition to the pi 
that the Fund would have under another enal 
provision to restitute to all members, on the has )f 
present quotas and at the present official price, ly 
part of the gold left after the disposition of th id 
million ounces referred to above. 

(c) Decisions of the Fund on the use of the pr ts 
from the sale of its gold in the regular operat is 
and transactions of the Fund should be taken 1 a 
70 per cent majority of the total voting power id 
on decisions on use of the profits in other operat is 
and transactions by an 85 per cent majority of le 
total voting power. 

(d) The Executive Directors are urged to rev n, 
during the final stage of their work on the d ft 
amendments, the majorities for operational decis is 
that do not reflect compromises of a political c' r- 
acter with a view to considering the reductior if 


Department of State Bull n 

We, of the number and size of the special major- 
that would be required under the amended 
lies for such operational decisions. Such a review 
d be completed within the coming weeks and 
d not delay the completion of the comprehensive 

The majority required for the adoption of de- 
is on the method of valuation of the SDR under 
mended Articles should be 70 per cent of the 
voting power, with the exception of decisions 
ving a change in the principle of valuation or a 
amental change in the application of the princi- 
n effect, which should be taken by an 85 per 
majority of the total voting power. 
I The Executive Directors should continue their 
deration of the subject of a substitution ac- 
without delaying completion of the compre- 
ive draft amendment. 

) With respect to the obligation of participants 
le Special Drawing Account to reconstitute their 
ings of special drawing rights, it was agreed 
the amended Articles should authorize the Fund 
eview the rules for reconstitution at any time 
to adopt, modify, or abrogate these rules by a 
er cent majority of the total voting power. 

I The Committee requested the Executive Di- 
ors to complete their work on amendment in the 
t of the guidance given by the Committee, and 
!Cts that the Executive Directors will be able to 

it a comprehensive draft amendment for the 
foval of the Board of Governors, together with 

port, within the coming weeks. 


.rrent Actions 



inrnational coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. 
Lpproved by the International Coffee Council 
)ecember 3, 1975. Open for signature at U.N. 
leadquarters January 31 through July 31, 1976. 
Inters into force definitively on October 1, 1976, 
f, by that date, governments representing at least 
exporting members holding at least 80 percent 
f the votes of the exporting members and at least 
importing members holding at least 80 percent 
if the votes of the importing members have de- 
losited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, 
•r approval; provisionally, on October 1, 1976, if 
governments meeting the above requirements have 

deposited instruments of ratification, acceptance, 
or approval or notifications containing an under- 
taking to apply the agreement provisionally and 
to seek ratification, acceptance, or approval. 

Maritime Matters 

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as 
amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). 
Adopted at London October 17, 1974.' 
Acceptances deposited: India, Switzerland, Janu- 
ary 16, 1976. 


Convention for the protection of producers of phono- 
grams against unauthorized duplication of their 
phonograms. Done at Geneva October 29, 1971. 
Entered into force April 18, 1973; for the United 
States March 10, 1974. TIAS 7808. 
Notification from World Intellectual Property Or- 
ganization that ratification deposited: Luxem- 
bourg, December 8, 1975. 

Property — Intellectual 

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Prop- 
erty Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 
1967. Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the 
United States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932. 
Ratification deposited: Greece, December 4, 1975. 


Agreement relating to the repression of the circula- 
tion of obscene publications, signed at Paris May 
4, 1910, as amended by the protocol signed at Lake 
Success May 4, 1949. Entered into force September 
15, 1911, and May 4, 1949. 37 Stat. 1511; TIAS 

Notification of succession: Lesotho, November 28, 

Sea, Exploration of 

Protocol to the convention of September 12, 1964 
(TIAS 7628), for the International Council for 
the Exploration of the Sea. Done at Copenhagen 
August 13, 1970. Entered into force November 12, 
Proclaimed by the President: January 24, 1976. 


International telecommunication convention with 
annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torre- 
molinos October 25, 1973. Entered into force Jan- 
uary 1, 1975.= 
Accession deposited: Comoros, January 5, 1976. 

Terrorism — Protection of Diplomats 

Convention on the prevention and punishment of 
crimes against internationally protected persons, 
including diplomatic agents. Done at New York 
December 14, 1973.' 

Ratification deposited: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic, January 20, 1976. 

' Not in force. 

' Not in force for the United States. 

broary 16, 1976 



Arrangement regarding international trade in tex- 
tiles, with annexes. Done at Geneva December 20, 
1973. Entered into force January 1, 1974, except 
for article 2, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, which entered 
into force April 1, 1974. TIAS 7840. 
Ratification deposited: Egypt, January 6, 1976. 

Protocol amending the General Agreement on Tar- 
iffs and Trade to introduce a part IV on trade and 
development, and to amend annex I. Done at 
Geneva February 8, 1965. Entered into force June 
27, 1966. TIAS 6139. 
Acceptance deposited: Senegal, December 31, 1975. 

Declaration on the provisional accession of Colombia 
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
Done at Geneva July 23, 1975. Entered into force 
January 22, 1976.- 

Protocol for the accession of Paraguay to the proto- 
col relating to trade negotiations among develop- 
ing countries. Done at Geneva November 17, 1975. 
Enters into force on the 30th day following the 
day upon which it shall have been signed by Para- 

Proces-verbal extending the declaration on the pro- 
visional accession of the Philippines to the Gen- 
ral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at 
Geneva November 21, 1975. Entered into force Jan- 
uary 6, 1976; for the United States January 19, 

Tenth proces-verbal extending the declaration on the 
provisional accession of Tunisia to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva 
November 21, 1975. Entered into force January 8, 
1976; for the United States January 19, 1976. 


Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat 
trade convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at 
Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force 
June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions 
and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions. 
Proclaimed by the President: January 24, 1976. 
Ratification deposited: Finland, January 23, 1976. 

Protocol modifying and further extending the food 
aid convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at 
Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force 
June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions 
and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions. 
Proclaimed by the President: January 24, 1976. 
Ratification deposited: Finland, January 23, 1976. 



Treaty of friendship and cooperation, with supple- 
mentary agreements and related notes. Signed at 
Madrid January 24, 1976. Enters into force upon 
the exchange of instruments of ratification. 

- Not in force for the United States. 


GPO Sales Publications 

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Background Notes: Short, factual summaries whi 
describe the people, history, government, econon 
and foreign relations of each country. Each contai 
a map, a list of principal government officials a 
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list. (A complete set of all Background Notes ct 
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Saudi Arabia 

Cat. No. S1.123:K 
Pub. 8024 6 

Cat. No. S1.123:S 
Pub. 7835 6 

Cat. No. S1.123:S^ 
Pub. 8132 7 

International Civil Aviation. Protocol with OtI 
Governments amending article 56 of the convent 
of December 7, 1944. TIAS 8092. 4 pp. 25<t. (Cat. 1 

Air Charter Services. Agreement with the Uni 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
tending the agreement of March 30, 1973, 
amended and extended, and the related letter 
March 29, 1974. TIAS 8102. 3 pp. 25«'. (Cat. 1 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Sri Lan 
TIAS 8107. 30 pp. 45«^. (Cat. No. 89.10:8107). 

Aeronautical Research — Augmentor Wing Syste 

Agreement with Canada extending the agreement 
October 19 and November 10, 1970. TIAS 8109. 6 
25«(. (Cat. No. S9.10:8109). 

Trade — Meat Imports. Agreement with Austra' 
TIAS 8110. 9 pp. 30^ (Cat. No. 89.10:8110). 

Refugee Relief in the Republic of Viet-Nam, La 
and the Khmer Republic. Agreement with the Int 
national Committee of the Red Cross amending t 
agreement of February 20 and March 16 and 
1975, as amended. TIAS 8111. 2 pp. 25(J. (Cat. 1 


Department of State Bulle i 

JDEX February 16, 1976 Vol. LXXIV, No. 1912 

rica. Implications of Angola for Future U.S. 
Foreign Policy (Kissinger) 174 


) plications of Angola for Future U.S. For- 
ngn Policy (Kissinger) 174 

lesident Ford Reiterates U.S. Objective in 
Angola (letter to Speaker of the House) . . 182 

{cretary Kissinger Visits Copenhagen, Mos- 
:ow, Brussels, and Madrid (Areilza, Jorgen- 
sen, Kissinger, joint U.S.-Soviet communique) 161 


/inual Food for Peace Report Transmitted to 
Congress (message from President Ford) . . 188 

Apartment Discusses Global Inflation and Na- 
tional Policy (Robinson) 184 

liplications of Angola for Future U.S. For- 
eign Policy (Kissinger) 174 

lesident Ford Reiterates U.S. Objective in 
Angola (letter to Speaker of the House) . . 132 

tiba. Implications of Angola for Future U.S. 
Foreign Policy (Kissinger) 174 

mmark. Secretary Kissinger Visits Copen- 
hagen, Moscow, Brussels, and Madrid 
(Areilza, Jorgensen, Kissinger, joint U.S.- 
Soviet communique) 161 

isarmament. Secretary Kissinger Visits 
Copenhagen, Moscow, Brussels, and Madrid 
(Areilza, Jorgensen, Kissinger, joint U.S.- 
Soviet communique) 161 

' :onomic Affairs 

, apartment Discusses Global Inflation and Na- 
tional Policy (Robinson) 184 

eeting of IMF Interim Committee Held in 
Jamaica (press communique) 197 

oreign Aid. Annual Food for Peace Report 
Transmitted to Congress (message from 
President Ford) 188 

iternational Organizations and Conferences. 

Meeting of IMF Interim Committee Held 

in Jamaica (press communique) 197 

[iddle East. United States Vetoes Change in 
Framework for Middle East Negotiations 
(Moynihan, Department statement, text of 
draft Security Council resolution) .... 189 

'orth Atlantic Treaty Organization. Secre- 
tary Kissinger Visits Copenhagen, Moscow, 
Brussels, and Madrid (Areilza, Jorgensen, 
Kissinger, joint U.S.-Soviet communique) . 161 

'residential Documents 

innual Food for Peace Report Transmitted to 
Congress (message from President Ford) . 188 

'resident Ford Reiterates U.S. Objective in 
Angola (letter to Speaker of the House) . . 182 

•ublications. GPO Sales Publications ... 200 

ipain. Secretary Kissinger Visits Copenhagen, 
Moscow, Brussels, and Madrid (Areilza, 
Jorgensen, Kissinger, joint U.S.-Soviet 
communique) 161 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 199 


Implications of Angola for Future U.S. For- 
eign Policy (Kissinger) 174 

Secretary Kissinger Visits Copenhagen, Mos- 
cow, Brussels, and Madrid (Areilza, Jorgen- 
sen, Kissinger joint U.S.-Soviet communique) 161 

United Nations. United States Vetoes Change 
in Framework for Middle East Negotiations 
(Moynihan, Department statement, text of 
draft Security Council resolution) .... 189 

Name Index 

Areilza, Jose Maria de 161 

Ford, President 182, 188 

Jorgensen, Anker 161 

Kissinger, Secretary 161, 174 

Moynihan, Daniel P 189 

Robinson, Charles W 184 

Checklist of Department of State 

Press Releases: Jan. 26-Feb. 1 

Press releases may be obtained from the 

Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 

Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date 


24A 1/23 

Joint U.S.-Soviet communique. 

28 1/26 

Kissinger, Areilza: arrival, Madrid, 

Jan. 24. 

29 1/26 

Kissinger, Areilza: news conference, 

Madrid, Jan. 24. 

30 1/26 

Kissinger: toast, Madrid, Jan. 24. 

*31 1/26 

U.S. and India sign cotton textile 

agreement, Jan. 22. 

32 1/26 

Department statement at conclusion 

of Security Council Middle East 


*33 1/22 

U.S. and Hong Kong sign textile 

agreement, Dec. 22. 

t34 1/27 

Kissinger, Rabin: toasts. 

*35 1/28 

Secretary's Advisory Committee on 

Private International Law, Study 

Group on Arbitration, New York, 

Feb. 26. 

*36 1/28 

Shipping Coordinating Committee, 

Subcommittee on Safety of Life 

at Sea, working group on bulk 

chemicals, Feb. 24. 

*37 1/28 

Advisory Panel on Folk Music and 

Jazz, Mar. 3. 

*SS 1/28 

Advisory Panel on Academic Music, 

Mar. i. 

*39 1/29 

U.S. request to U.S.S.R. for war 

crimes evidence. 

40 1/29 

Kissinger: Subcommittee on Africa, 

Senate Committee on Foreign Re- 


t41 1/29 

U.S.-Canada transit pipeline agree- 


t42 1/30 

Kissinger: Senate Committee on 


* Not pr 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

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washington. dc. 204o2 


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Washington, D.C. 20402. 






Volume LXXIV • No. 1913 • February 23, 1976 



Address by Secretary Kissinger 201 



Statement by Secretary Kissinger 
Before the Senate Committee on Finance 2SJf 



For index see inside back cover 

j^fc.r »-'•>«• 




Vol. LXXIV, No. 1913 
February 23, 1976 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 


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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
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STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
OfRee of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
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included concerning treaties and inter- 
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United States is or may become a 
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Publications of the Department of 
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The Permanent Challenge of Peace: U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union 

Address by Secretary Kissinger ' 

America enters its third century and its 
48th Presidential election with unmatched 
physical strength, a sound foreign policy de- 
sign — yet scarred by self-doubt. In the past 
decade and a half, we have seen one Presi- 
dent assassinated, another driven from office, 
and a third resign. We have lived through 
the agony of Viet-Nam and Watergate. We 
are still struggling to overcome the bitter- 
ness and division that have followed in 
their wake. We face no more urgent task 
than to restore our national unity and our 
national resolve. 

For we, the strongest free nation, cannot 
afford the luxury of withdrawing into our- 
selves to heal our wounds. Too much depends 
upon us — peace or war, prosperity or depres- 
sion, freedom or tyranny. Too much is at 
stake for America to paralyze itself tearing 
up the past, seeking sensational headlines in 
the present, or offering panaceas for the 
future. For our own well-being — American 
lives and American jobs — will be affected if 
we permit our domestic disunity and turmoil 
to cause us to falter in meeting our inter- 
national responsibilities. 

And so it is imperative that the national 
debate in this election year — the greatest 
demonstration of how free people govern 
themselves— strengthen, not undermine, our 
confidence and our capacity to carry out an 
effective national policy. It is essential that 
we quickly rebuild our national unity, the 

' Made at San Francisco, Calif., on Feb. 3 before 
a luncheon sponsored by the Commonwealth Club of 
San Francisco and the World Affairs Council of 
Northern California (text from press release 44). 

sense that we are all part of a shared 

It is in this spirit that I intend today to 
discuss America's relations with the world's 
other superpower, the Soviet Union. In re- 
cent months that relationship has become, 
as it should be, an important part of our 
national debate. I want to explain the Ad- 
ministration's view of the conditions that 
gave rise to the policy known as detente, 
the goals we seek, and the relationship of 
our Soviet policy to the overall design of 
American diplomacy. 

The United States is today confronted by 
one challenge unprecedented in its own his- 
tory and another challenge without precedent 
in the history of the world. America finds 
itself for the first time permanently and ir- 
revocably involved in international affairs. 
At the same time, the catastrophic nature of 
nuclear war imposes upon us a necessity 
that transcends traditional concepts of di- 
plomacy and balance of power: to shape a 
world order that finds stability in self- 
restraint and, ultimately, cooperation. 

For the first century and a half of our 
history, our peace and security were pro- 
vided for us by two oceans, the shield of the 
British Navy, and equilibrium among the 
European powers. The success of our democ- 
racy at home, and the absence of direct 
threat from abroad, nourished our sense of 
uniqueness and fostered the illusion that it 
was up to America to choose whether and 
when we would participate in the world. 

Since De Tocqueville it has been a cliche 
that Americans, as a people, are slow to 
arouse but that, once aroused, we are a tre- 

February 23, 1976 


mendous and implacable force. Thus, even 
when we ventured forth in foreign affairs, 
we identified our exertion as a temporary 
disruption of our tranquillity. Our history, 
except for the Civil War, was without the 
tragedies and the sense of practical external 
limits that so colored the experience of al- 
most every other people. 

Our successes seemed to teach us that any 
problem could be solved once and for all by 
determined effort. We considered peace nat- 
ural, stability normal, and foreign involve- 
ment appropriate only so long as needed to 
remove some temporary threat or disorder. 
We entered World War I as "the war to end 
war" and to "make the world safe for democ- 
racy." We fought World War II until "un- 
conditional surrender." 

Even in the first 25 years after World 
War II, an era of great creativity and un- 
precedented American engagement in for- 
eign affairs, we acted as if the world's secu- 
rity and economic development could be con- 
clusively insured by the commitment of 
American resources, know-how, and effort. 
We were encouraged, even impelled, to act as 
we did by our unprecedented predominance 
in a world shattered by war and the collapse 
of the great colonial empires. We considered 
our deployment of troops in Europe and 
elsewhere to be temporary. We thought that 
the policy of containment would transform 
the Soviet Union and that a changed 
Soviet society would then evolve inexorably 
into a compatible member of a harmonious 
international community. 

At the same time, the central character 
of moral values in American life always 
made us acutely sensitive to the purity of 
means — and when we disposed of overwhelm- 
ing power we had a great luxury of choice. 
Our moral certainty made compromise difl!i- 
cult; our preponderance often made it seem 

Today, while we still have massive 
strength, we no longer enjoy meaningful nu- 
clear supremacy. We remain the world's 
most productive and innovative economy — 
but we must now share leadership with 
Western Europe, Canada, and Japan ; we 
must deal with the newly wealthy and devel- 

oping nations ; and we must make new choices 
regarding our economic relations with the 
Communist countries. Our democratic princi- 
ples are still far more valued by the world's 
millions than we realize, but we must also 
compete with new ideologies which assert 
progressive goals but pursue them by 
oppressive methods. 

Today, for the first time in our history, 
we face the stark reality that the challenge 
is unending, that there is no easy and 
surely no final answer, that there are no 
automatic solutions. We must learn to con- 
duct foreign policy as other nations have 
had to conduct it for so many centuries — 
without escape and without respite, knowing 
that what is attainable falls short of the 
ideal, mindful of the necessities of self- 
preservation, conscious that the reach of 
our national purpose has its limits. This is a 
new experience for Americans. It prompts 
nostalgia for a simpler past. As before in 
our history, it generates the search for scape- 
goats, holding specific policies responsible 
for objective conditions. 

It is precisely because we no longer pre- 
dominate but must pursue a long-term course 
that there is a premium today on our con- 
stancy and purposefulness. We cannot afford 
to swing recklessly between confrontation 
and abdication. We must not equate tough 
rhetoric with strong action, nor can we wish 
away tough realities with nostalgic hopes. 
We can no longer act as if we engage our- 
selves in foreign affairs only when we choose, 
or only to overcome specific problems, so i 
that we can then shift our priorities back to 
our natural concern with ourselves. The real- 
ity is that there can be no security without 
our vigilance and no progress without our 

It is in this context that U.S.-Soviet rela- 
tions must be seen. 

The Contemporary Challenge of Relations 

The issue of how to deal with the Soviet 
Union has been a central feature of Ameri- 
can policy for three decades. What is new 
today is the culmination of 30 years of post- 
war growth of Soviet industrial, technologi- 


Department of State Bulletin 

cal, and military power. No American policy 
caused this; no American policy could have 
prevented it. But American policy can keep 
this power from being used to expand Soviet 
influence to our detriment; we have the ca- 
pacity to enable allies and friends to live with 
a sense of security ; we possess the assets to 
advance the process of building an inter- 
national order of cooperation and progress. 
We must do so, however, in unprecedented 
conditions. In previous periods, rivalry be- 
tween major powers has almost invariably 
led to war. In our time, when thermonuclear 
weapons threaten casualties in the hundreds 
of millions, such an outcome is unthinkable. 
We must manage a fundamental clash of 
ideologies and harness the rivalry of the nu- 
clear superpowers, first into coexistence, and 
then mold coexistence into a more positive 
and cooperative future. For as President 
Kennedy once said:^ 

... in the final analysis our most basic common 
link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all 
breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's 
future. And we are all mortal. 

In the period after World War II, our 
nightmare was that the Soviet Union, after 
consolidating its occupation of Eastern 
Europe, might seek to spread its control to 
other contiguous areas in Europe and Asia. 
Our policies therefore sought to build alli- 
ances and positions of military strength 
from which we could contain and isolate the 
Soviet Union. In this manner the Soviet 
Union might be forced to settle for peace; 
transformations might occur within Soviet 
society that would curb expansionist tend- 
encies and make the U.S.S.R. over time 
into a more cooperative participant in the 
international system. 

These policies served us and our allies 
well. Soviet expansion was checked. Behind 
our shield of security and with our assist- 
ance, our friends and allies in Western 
Europe restored their economies and rebuilt 
their democratic institutions. 

Yet the hope that these policies would 

- For President Kennedy's address at American 
University, Washington, D.C., on June 10, 1963, see 
Bulletin of July 1, 1963, p. 2. 

produce permanent stability, positive evolu- 
tion of the Soviet system, and greater nor- 
mality was only partially realized. In the 
immediate postwar period, the aggressive- 
ness of Soviet ideology in the Stalinist era 
obscui'ed some of the real weaknesses of the 
Soviet state. Indeed, as late as 1962 during 
the Cuban missile crisis, the United States 
enjoyed a five-to-one superiority in strategic 
missiles, a three-to-one superiority in stra- 
tegic bombers, total naval superiority every- 
where, and rough equality on the ground in 

Gradually, with the acquisition of nuclear 
technology and the transformation of the 
international system through decolonization, 
the Soviet Union began to emerge as a first- 
class military power. 

In strategic military terms the U.S.S.R. 
has achieved a broad equality with the 
United States, as was inevitable for a large 
nation whose rulers were prepared to impose 
great sacrifices on their people and to give 
military strength the absolute top priority 
in resources. With only half of our gross 
national product, Soviet military expendi- 
tures exceed those of the United States. 

For the first time in history, the Soviet 
Union can threaten distant places beyond 
the Eurasian landmass — including the United 
States. With no part of the world outside 
the range of its military forces, the U.S.S.R. 
has begun to define its interests and objec- 
tives in global terms. Soviet diplomacy has 
thrust into the Middle East, Africa, and 
Asia. This evolution is now rooted in real 
power, rather than a rhetorical manifestation 
of a universalist doctrine which in fact has 
very little validity or appeal. 

Coping with the implications of this 
emerging superpower has been our central 
security problem for the last several years. 
This condition will not go away. And it will 
perhaps never be conclusively "solved." It 
will have to be faced by every Administra- 
tion for the foreseeable future. 

Our policy must deal with the conse- 
quences. The emergence of ambitious new 
powers into an existing international struc- 
ture is a recurrent phenomenon. Historically, 
the adjustment of an existing order to the 

February 23, 1976 


arrival of one or more new actors almost 
invariably was accompanied by war — to im- 
pede the upstart, to remove or diminish 
some of the previously established actors, to 
test the balance of forces in a revised sys- 
tem. But in the nuclear era, when casual- 
ties in a general nuclear war will involve 
hundreds of millions in a matter of days, the 
use of force threatens utter catastrophe. It 
is our responsibility to contain Soviet power 
without global war, to avoid abdication as 
well as unnecessary confrontation. 

This can be done, but it requires a delicate 
and complex policy. We must strive for an 
equilibrium of power, but we must move be- 
yond it to promote the habits of mutual re- 
straint, coexistence, and ultimately coopera- 
tion. We must stabilize a new international 
order in a vastly dangerous environment, but 
our ultimate goal must be to transform 
ideological conflict into constructive partici- 
pation in building a better world. 

This is what is meant by the process 
called detente — not the hunger for relaxa- 
tion of tension, not the striving for agree- 
ments at any price, not the mindless search 
for friendly atmosphere which some critics 
use as naive and dangerous caricatures. 

The policies pursued by this Administra- 
tion have been designed to prevent Soviet 
expansion but also to build a pattern of rela- 
tions in which the Soviet Union will always 
confront penalties for aggression and also 
acquire growing incentives for resti'aint. 
These goals are well within our capacities. 
Soviet power is evolving with considerable 
unevenness. Soviet society is no longer 
totally cut ofi" from contact with oi" the in- 
fluences of the world around it, nor is it 
without its own needs for outside relation- 
ships. It is the great industrial democracies, 
not the Soviet Union, that are the engine of 
the world economy and the most promising 
partners for the poorer nations. 

The industrial democracies, if they face 
their challenges with confidence, if they do 
not mesmerize themselves with the illusion 
of simple solutions, possess vast strengths to 
contain Soviet power and to channel that 
power in constructive directions. 

Our essential task is to recognize the 

need for a dual policy that simultaneously 
and with equal vigor resists expansionist 
drives and seeks to shape a more construc- 
tive relationship. We must prevent the Soviet 
Union from translating its growing strength 
into global or regional preponderance. But 
we must do so without escalating every 
crisis into a massive confrontation. In re- 
cent years, the United States has firmly re- 
sisted attempts by the Soviet Union to estab- 
lish a naval base in Cuba, to impede the 
access routes to Berlin, to exploit the explo- 
sive situation in the Middle East. Recently 
we have sought to halt blatant intervention 
in Angola — until prevented from doing so by 
congressional action. 

At the same time, we have a historic obli- 
gation to mankind to engage the Soviet 
Union in settlements of concrete problems 
and to push back the shadow of nuclear ca- 
tastrophe. At the very least we owe it to 
our people to demonstrate that their gov- 
ernment has missed no opportunity to 
achieve constructive solutions and that 
crises which have occurred were unavoid- 
able. For whatever the rhetoric, Americans 
will not support confrontations they con- 
sider contrived. 

This is why the United States has set 
forth principles of responsible relations in 
the nuclear age: Respect for the interests of 
all, restraint in the uses of power, and ab- 
stention from efforts to exploit instability or 
local conflicts for unilateral advantage. The 
United States has sought to give life to these 
principles in major negotiations on arms 
control, the prevention of accidental war, 
and in the settlement of political issues such 
as Berlin. And we have begun to construct a 
network of cooperative agreements in a va- 
riety of functional areas — economic, scien- 
tific, medical, environmental, and others 
— which promise concrete benefits if political 
conditions permit their full implementation 
and further development. 

It has been our belief that, with patience, 
a pattern of restraints and a network of 
vested interests can develop which will give 
coexistence a more hopeful dimension and 
make both sides conscious of what they 
would stand to lose by reverting to the poli- 


Department of State Bulletin 

tics of pressure, confrontation, and crisis. 

This policy reflects the deepest aspira- 
tions of the American people. 

In the early 1970's when current U.S.- 
Soviet relations were shaped, our nation had 
already passed through traumatic events and 
was engaged in an anguishing war. There 
were riots in the streets and on the campuses 
demanding rapid progress toward peace. 
Every new defense program was challenged 
— including the ABM [antiballistic missiles], 
which was approved by only one vote, the 
development of multiple warheads, the Tri- 
dent submarine, and the B-1 bomber. Suc- 
cessive Congresses passed resolutions urging 
the Administration to reorder our national 
priorities away from defense. We were con- 
tinually attacked for not making concessions 
in the SALT talks [Strategic Arms Limita- 
tion Talks]. The Congress and many inter- 
est groups pressed continually for the open- 
ing up of East-West trade and agitated 
against the Administration's approach of 
linking progress in economic relations with 
prior progress in political relations. Through- 
out the course of 1970 and 1971, we were in- 
volved in a series of ci'ises with the Soviet 
Union and were often accused of provoca- 
tion or bellicosity in the process. 

Thus, only a few short years ago, the 
pressures in this country and from our allies 
were oveinvhelmingly to move rapidly toward 
better relations with Moscow. We resisted 
these pressures then, just as we now refuse 
to let ourselves be stampeded in the opposite 
direction. In the Administration's view the 
country needs a balanced policy, combining 
firmness and conciliation, strong defense and 
arms control, political principles and eco- 
nomic incentives. And it must be a policy for 
the long term that the American people can 
sustain, offering promise of a constructive 

It is therefore ironic that our national de- 
bate seems now in many respects to have 
come full circle. The conditions in which de- 
tente originated are largely forgotten. 
Those who pressed for concessions and uni- 
lateral restraint toward Moscow now accuse 
the government of being too conciliatory. 
Those who complain about our failure to re- 

spond with sufficient vigor to Soviet moves 
are often the very ones who incessantly seek 
to remove this country's leverage for influ- 
ence or action — through restrictions on 
trade and credit, through weakening our 
intelligence capabilities, through prevent- 
ing aid to friends who seek to resist Soviet 

The restrictions on trade and credit are 
a case in point. The human rights issue is a 
matter of deep and legitimate concern to all 
Americans. But the congressional attempt 
to link it openly with economic relations, 
without subtlety or understanding of Soviet 
politics, both deprived us of economic levers 
and sharply reduced Soviet emigration. 
Other industrial countries have stepped in 
to provide credits and technology, with less 
concern for the objective of inducing politi- 
cal restraint which we had envisaged. 

So let us understand the scope and limits 
of a realistic policy: 

— We cannot prevent the growth of So- 
viet power, but we can prevent its use for 
unilateral advantage and political expansion. 

— We cannot prevent a buildup of Soviet 
forces, but we have the capacity, together 
with our allies, to maintain an equilibrium. 
We cannot neglect this task and then blame 
the Soviet Union if the military balance 
shifts against us. 

— We have the diplomatic, economic, and 
military capacity to resist expansionism, but 
we cannot engage in a rhetoric of confronta- 
tion while depriving ourselves of the means 
to confront. 

— We must accept that sovereign states, 
especially of roughly equal power, cannot im- 
pose unacceptable conditions on each other 
and must proceed by compromise. 

— We must live with the reality of the 
nuclear threat, but we have it in our power 
to build a new relationship that transcends 
the nuclear peril. 

So let us end the defeatist rhetoric that 
implies that Soviet policy is masterful, 
purposeful, and ovez'whelming while Ameri- 
can policy is bumbling, uncertain, and weak. 
Let us stop pretending that somehow tough 

February 23, 1976 


rhetoric and contrived confrontations show 
confidence in America. The opposite is true. 
Those who are prepared to base their poHcy 
on reahty, those who assert that the Ameri- 
can people will support a complex policy of 
firmness and conciliation and that this pol- 
icy will succeed, show a real faith in our 
capacities and our future. We have a design 
and the material assets to deal with the 
Soviet Union. We will succeed if we move 
forward as a united people. 

Against this background let me discuss 
two current issues that illustrate the two 
strands of policy that we are concurrently 

— The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 
ill which we are seeking to shape a more 
positive future. 

— The Angolan situation, where we are 
attempting to curb Soviet expansionism. 

Strategic Arms Limitation 

There is one central fact that distinguishes 
our era from all previous historical periods : 
the existence of enormously destructive 
weapons that can span unlimited distances 
almost instantaneously. No part of the globe 
is beyond reach. No part of the globe would 
be spared the effects of a general nuclear 

For centuries it was axiomatic that in- 
creases in military power could be trans- 
lated into almost immediate political advan- 
tage. It is now clear that new increments of 
strategic weaponry do not automatically lead 
to either political or military gains. Yet, in 
the nature of things, if one side expands its 
strategic arsenal, the other side will inevita- 
bly match it. The race is maintained partly 
because a perceived inequality is considered 
by each side as politically unacceptable even 
though it has become difficult to define pre- 
cisely what purely military purpose is served. 

We thus face a paradox: At current and 
foreseeable levels of nuclear arms, it be- 
comes increasingly dangerous to invoke them. 
In no crisis since 1962 have the strategic 
weapons of the two sides determined the out- 
come. Today these arsenals increasingly find 
their purpose primarily in matching and de- 

terring the forces of the opponent. For under 
virtually no foreseeable circumstance could 
the United States — or the Soviet Union — 
avoid 100 million dead in a nuclear exchange. 
Yet the race goes on because of the difficulty 
of finding a way to get off the treadmill.^ 

This condition imposes a unique and 
heavy responsibility on the leaders of the 
two nuclear super-powers. Sustaining the 
nuclear competition requires endless invoca- 
tions of theoretical scenarios of imminent or 
eventual nuclear attack. The attempt to 
hedge against all conceivable contingencies, 
no matter how fanciful, fuels political ten- 
sions and could well lead to a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. The fixation on potential strategic 
arms imbalances that is inherent in an un- 
restrained arms race diverts resources into 
strategically unproductive areas — particu- 
larly away from forces for local defense, 
where shortfalls and imbalances could indeed 
be turned rapidly to our disadvantage. If 
no restraint is developed, the competition in 
strategic arms can have profound conse- 
quences for the future of international rela- 
tions and indeed of civilization. 

The United States therefore has sought 
and achieved since 1963 a series of arms 
control agreements which build some re- 
straint into nuclear rivalry. There was a 
significant breakthrough to limit strategic 
weapons in 1972. If the 1974 Vladivostok 
accord leads to a new agreement, an even 
more important advance will have been made. 

Yet, at this critical juncture, the Ameri- 
can people are subjected to an avalanche of 
charges that SALT is a surrender of Ameri- 
can interests. There are assertions that the 
United States is falling behind in the stra- 

- To be sure, there exist scenarios in planning 
papers which seek to demonstrate how one side 
could use its strategic forces and how in some pre- 
sumed circumstance it would prevail. But these 
confuse what a technician can calculate with what a 
responsible statesman can decide. They are invari- 
ably based on assumptions such as that one side 
would permit its missile silos to be destroyed with- 
out launching its missiles before they are actually 
hit — on which no aggressor would rely where forces 
such as those possessed by either the United States 
or the U.S.S.R. now and in the years ahead are 
involved. [Footnote in original.] 


Department of State Bulletin 

• tegic competition and that SALT has con- 
;ltributed to it. There are unsupportable 
charges that the Soviets have systemati- 
cally violated the SALT agreements. 

None of this is accurate. What are the 

First of all, American policy decisions in 
the 1960's set the level of our strategic 
forces for the 1970's. We then had the 
choice between continuing the deployment of 
large, heavy-throwweight missiles like the 
Titan or Atlas or undertaking development 
and deployment of large numbers of smaller, 
more flexible ICBM's [intercontinental bal- 
listic missiles] or combinations of both types. 
The Administration then in office chose to 
rely on an arsenal of 1,000 small, sophisti- 
cated, and highly accurate ICBM's and 656 
submarine-launched missiles on 41 boats, 
along with heavy bombers ; we deployed them 
rapidly and then stopped our buildup of 
launchers unilaterally in the 1960's when 
the programs were complete. Only 54 of the 
heavy Titans were retained and still re- 
main in the force. 

The Soviets made the opposite decision ; 
they chose larger, heavier missiles ; they 
continued to build up their forces through 
the 1960*s and 1970's ; they passed our 
numerical levels by 1969-70 and continued 
to add an average of 200 missiles a year 
until stopped by the first SALT agreement. 

Thus, as a consequence of decisions made 
a decade ago by both sides, Soviet missiles 
are superior in throwweight while ours are 
superior in reliability, accuracy, diversity, 
and sophistication and we possess larger 
numbers of warheads. In 1972 when the 
SALT agreement was signed, the Soviet 
Union was still building at the rate of 90 
land-based and 120 sea-based launchers a 
year — while we were building none, as a re- 
sult of our own repeatedly reaffirmed uni- 
lateral decisions of a decade previously. 
Since new Amei'ican programs to redress the 
balance had only recently been ordered, there 
was no way to reduce the numerical gap be- 
fore the late seventies when more modern 
sea-based missiles and bombers were sched- 
uled to become operational. 

The interim SALT agreement of 1972 

froze overall numbers of launchers on both 
sides for five years, thereby limiting the 
momentum of Soviet programs without af- 
fecting any of ours. It stopped the Soviet 
buildup of heavy missile launchers. It forced 
the Soviets to agree to dismantle 210 older 
land-based missiles to reach permitted ceil- 
ings on missile-carrying submarines. The 
agreed-upon silo limitations permitted us to 
increase the throwweight of our own mis- 
siles, if we decided on this avenue of im- 
proving our strategic forces. We have so 
far chosen not to do so, although, through 
research and development, we retain the 
option. By any measure, the SALT agree- 
ments pi-evented the then-evolving gap in 
numbers from widening while enabling us 
to retain our advantage in other categories 
and easing the problem of redressing the 
balance when new programs became opera- 
tional. What no negotiation could do is re- 
verse by diplomacy the results of our own 
longstanding decisions with respect to 
weapons design and deployment. 

Moreover, the SALT agreements ended for 
an indefinite period the prospect of a 
dangerous and uncertain competition in 
antiballistic missile defense — a competition 
that promised no strategic advantage, but 
potentially serious instabilities and the ex- 
penditure of vast sums of money. 

The first SALT agreements were therefore 
without question in the American national 
interest. In the five-year respite gained by 
the 1972 interim agreement, it was our in- 
tention to negotiate a long-term pact on of- 
fensive weapons that would firmly fix both 
sides at an equal level once our new pro- 
grams became operational. This is precisely 
what President Ford achieved at Vladivostok 
in November 1974. 

In this accord in principle, both sides 
agreed on a ceiling of 2,400 strategic weap- 
ons covering strategic systems and heavy 
bombers — but not counting any of our for- 
ward-based aircraft in Europe, or our allies' 
strategic weapons, many of which can reach 
Soviet soil. The ceiling of 2,400 is lower than 
the level the Soviet Union already has 
reached ; it would require the dismantling of 
many Soviet weapons, while the planned 

February 23, 1976 


levels and composition of our forces would 
not need to be reduced or changed. An equal 
ceiling of 1,320 was placed on numbers of 
strategic weapons with multiple warheads. 
Soviet heavy missile launchers will remain 
frozen. These limits would cap the strategic 
competition in numbers for a 10-year period, 
yet preserve all the programs we need to 
assure deterrence and strategic sufficiency. 

Obviously no single agreement can solve 
every problem. This is not a question of loop- 
holes, but of evolving technology, with re- 
spect to which we intend to remain vigilant. 
We will negotiate carefully to make certain 
that the national interest and national secu- 
rity are protected. But if we succeed in turn- 
ing the Vladivostok accord into a 10-year 
agreement, we will have crossed the thresh- 
old between total unrestrained competition 
and the difficult but promising beginning of 
long-term strategic equilibrium at lower 
levels of forces. The United States and the 
Soviet Union have already agreed to turn 
to reductions in strategic forces in the next 
phase of the negotiations, starting in 1977. 

One would have thought that these ac- 
complishments would speak for themselves. 
Instead, they have triggered a flood of 
charges which mislead the American people 
and our friends, give a wrong impression of 
irresoluteiiess to our adversaries, and com- 
plicate the prospects for a new agreement 
that is in the overriding national interest. 

No charge is more irresponsible and po- 
tentially more dangerous than the allegation 
that the United States has knowingly toler- 
ated violations of the first SALT agree- 

What are the facts? A Standing Consult- 
ative Commission was created by the agree- 
ments of 1972 precisely to consider disputes 
or ambiguities in implementation. Such inci- 
dents were almost certain to arise in a first, 
quite limited agreement between longstand- 
ing adversaries possessing weapons systems 
of great complexity whose growth is verified 
not by some neutral policing mechanism but 
by each side's own intelligence systems. 
Every questionable activity that has arisen 
has been systematically analyzed by this 
government and considered by the President 

and his advisers. Whenever any question re- 
mained, it was then promptly raised with the 
Soviets. All instructions to the American 
representative on the Consultative Commis- 
sion reflected the unanimous views of all U.S. 
agencies concerned and the data and assess- 
ment produced jointly by them. No one had 
a bias in favor of absolving the Soviets — an 
inherently malicious charge. No one pre- 
vented all questionable or suspicious activi- 
ties from being raised with the Soviets. And 
not all the questioned activities were on the 
Soviet side. 

All of these issues have been and will con- 
tinue to be seriously handled and dealt with 
through a process that has proved effective. 
Yet irresponsible charges continue to lump 
together incidents that have been explained 
or are still being considered with wild allega- 
tions that have no foundation. They some- 
times put foi-ward inaccurate figures and 
data which often can be refuted only by 
divulging sensitive intelligence information. 
Yet with all the recent flurry of allegations, 
no recommendations are made of what 
countermeasures we should take or how to 
assess the significance of any given alleged 

In what way do the alleged violations af- 
fect the strategic equation ? In what manner, 
if any, have we been foreclosed from pro- 
tecting ourselves? Would those who inaccu- 
rately allege violations simply throw over al 
the agreements regardless of the benefits 
they provide the United States? Would they 
halt the negotiation of further agreements? 
What purpose is served by leading our pub- 
lic and the Soviet Union to believe — totally 
incorrectly — that the United States is blind 
to violations or that its government deliber- 
ately deceives its people? Can anyone seri- 
ously believe that this Administration which 
has strenuously resisted Communist ad- 
vances in every part of the world — and is 
often strongly criticized for it — would ignore 
Soviet violations of a formal agreement? 

I can assure you that this Administration 
will not tolerate violations. It will continue 
to monitor Soviet compliance meticulously. 
It will pursue energetically all ambiguities 
or signs of noncompliance. But it will not 


Department of State Bulletin 

be driven by demagoguery to make false or 

I hasty judgments. No department or agency 

charged with responsibihty for this problem 

I holds the view that any violations have 


As we assess SALT we must face squarely 
one question: What is the alternative to the 
agreement we have and seek? If the SALT 
process falters, we must consider what new 
or additional strategic programs we would 
undertake, their likely cost, and above all, 
their strategic purpose. 

An accelerated strategic buildup over the 
next five years could cost as much as an ad- 
ditional $20 billion. Failing a satisfactory 
agreement, this will surely be the path we 
must travel. It would be a tragically missed 
opportunity. For in the process of such a 
buildup, and the atmosphere it would en- 
gender, it would be difficult to return to 
serious negotiations for some time. Tensions 
are likely to increase ; a new, higher baseline 
will emerge from which future negotiations 
would eventually have to begin. And in the 
end, neither side will have gained a strategic 
advantage. At the least, they will have 
wasted resources. At worst, they will have 
increased the risks of nuclear war. 

Of course the Soviet Union must ponder 
these alternatives as well. Their sense of re- 
sponsibility must equal ours if there is to 
be an equitable and durable agreement based 
on strict reciprocity. We consider a SALT 
agreement important, but we will take no 
chances with our national security. 
Let me sum up: 

' — We will never stand for the violation 
of a solemn treaty or agreement, and we will 
remain alert. 

— We will never tolerate a shift in the 
strategic balance against us — by violations 
of agreements, by unsatisfactory agree- 
ments, or by neglect of our own programs. 
We will spend what is necessary to maintain 
strategic sufficiency. 

— The President is determined to pursue 
the effort to negotiate a saner strategic bal- 
ance on equitable terms — because it is in our 
interest and because we have an obligation 
to our own people and to world peace. 

The Soviet Union and Angola 

As the United States strives to shape a 
more hopeful world, it can never forget that 
global stability and security rest upon an 
equilibrium between the great powers. If the 
Soviet Union is permitted to exploit oppor- 
tunities arising out of local conflicts by mil- 
itary means, the hopes we have for progress 
toward a more peaceful international order 
will ultimately be undermined. 

This is why the Soviet Union's massive 
and unprecedented intervention in the in- 
ternal affairs of Africa with nearly 200 mil- 
lion dollars' worth of military equipment, its 
advisers, and its transport of the large ex- 
peditionary force of 11,000 Cuban combat 
troops must be a matter of urgent concern. 

Angola represents the first time that the 
Soviets have moved militarily at long dis- 
tance to impose a regime of their choice. It 
is the first time that the United States has 
failed to respond to Soviet military moves 
outside the immediate Soviet orbit. And it 
is the first time that Congress has halted 
national action in the middle of a crisis. 

When one great power tips the balance of 
forces decisively in a local conflict through 
its military intervention — and meets no 
resistance — an ominous precedent is set, of 
grave consequence even if the intervention 
occurs in a seemingly remote area. Such a 
precedent cannot be tolerated if a lasting 
easing of tensions is to be achieved. And if 
the pattern is not broken now, we will face 
harder choices and higher costs in the 

The United States seeks no unilateral 
goals in Angola. We have proposed a cease- 
fire ; withdrawal of all outside forces, Soviet, 
Cuban, and South African; cessation of 
foreign military involvement, including the 
supply of equipment; and negotiations 
among all three Angolan factions. This ap- 
proach has the support of half the nations 
of Africa. 

Last summer and fall, to halt a danger- 
ously escalating situation, the United States 
provided financial support through African 
friends to those in Angola — the large major- 
ity — who sought to resist Soviet and Cuban 

February 23, 1976 


domination. Using this as leverage, we un- 
dertook an active diplomacy to promote an 
African solution to an African problem. We 
acted quietly, to avoid provoking a major 
crisis and raising issues of prestige. 

At first it was feared that the Soviet- 
backed faction, because of massive Soviet aid 
and Cuban mercenaries, would dominate 
totally by Independence Day, November 11. 
Our assistance prevented that. African de- 
termination to oppose Soviet and Cuban 
intervention became more and more evident. 
On December 9 the President warned Mos- 
cow of the consequences of continued med- 
dling and offered to cooperate in encouraging 
a peaceful outcome that removed foreign 
influence. The Soviet Union appeared to have 
second thoughts. It halted its airlift from 
December 9 until December 24. 

At that point, the impact of our domestic 
debate overwhelmed the possibilities of di- 
plomacy. It was demanded that we explain 
publicly why our effort was important — and 
then our effort was cut off. After the Senate 
vote to block further aid to Angola, Cuba 
more than doubled its forces and Soviet mil- 
itary aid was resumed on a large scale. The 
cooperativeness of Soviet diplomacy declined. 
Since then the situation has continued to de- 

As our public discussion continues, certain 
facts must be understood. The analogy with 
Viet-Nam is totally false; this nation must 
have the maturity to make elementary dis- 
tinctions. The President has pledged that no 
American troops or advisers would be sent 
to Angola, and we were prepared to accept 
legislative restrictions to that effect, in ad- 
dition to the War Powers Act which already 
exists. What was involved was modest as- 
sistance to stabilize the local balance of 
forces and make possible a rapid political 
settlement in cooperation with African 

It is charged that the Administration 
acted covertly, without public acknowledg- 
ment. That is correct ; for our purpose was to 
avoid an escalated confrontation that would 
make it more difficult for the Soviets to back 

down, as well as to give the greatest possible 
scope for an African solution. Angola was 
a case where diplomacy without leverage 
was likely to be impotent, yet direct military 
confrontation would involve needless risks. 
This is precisely one of those gray areas 
where unpublicized methods would enable us 
to influence events short of direct conflict. 

And we complied totally with Congress' 
new standard of executive-legislative con- 
sultation on secret activities. Beginning in 
July, and through December, we discussed 
the Angolan situation and what we were do- 
ing about it with more than two dozen Sena- 
tors, 150 Congressmen, and over 100 staff 
members of both Houses. Eight congres- 
sional committees were briefed on 24 sepa- 
rate occasions. We sought in these briefings 
to determine the wishes of Congress, and 
there was little sign of active opposition to 
our carefully limited operations. 

It is said that the Russians will inevitably 
be eased out by the Africans themselves 
over a period of time. This may or may not 
prove true. But such an argument, when 
carried to its logical conclusion, implies that 
we can abandon the world to interventionist 
forces and hope for the best. And reliance on 
history is of little solace to those under 
attack, whose future is being decided now. 
The degree of Soviet and Cuban intervention 
is unprecedented; they will have effectively 
determined the outcome. There is no evi- 
dence to support the claim that they will be 
quickly removed or that other nations may 
not draw damaging conclusions dangerous 
to our long-term interests. 

It is maintained that we should meet the 
Soviet threat in Angola through escalated 
methods of pressure such as altering our 
position on SALT or grain sales. But these 
arrangements benefit us as well as the 
Soviet Union and are part of the long-term 
strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union. 
History has proved time and again that ex- 
pansion can be checked only when there is 
a local balance of forces; indirect means 
can succeed only if rapid local victories are 
foreclosed. As the President has pointed 


Department of State Bulletin 

out, the Soviet Union has survived for 
nearly 60 years without American grain; 
it could do so now. Cutting off grain would 
still lose Angola. We would duplicate the 
experience of the Trade Act, which inter- 
rupted the trade relationship with the 
U.S.S.R. to insure emigration — and ended up 
with neither. 

Let us not bemuse ourselves with facile 
slogans about not becoming the world's 
policeman. We have no desire to play such 
a role. But it can never be in our interest to 
let the Soviet Union act as the world's 
policeman. There are many crises in the 
world where the United States cannot and 
should not intervene. But here we face a 
blatant Soviet and Cuban challenge, which 
could have been overcome if we had been 
allowed to act prudently with limited means 
at the early stage. By forcing this out onto 
center stage, our divisions simultaneously 
escalated the significance of the crisis and 
guaranteed our impotence. 

To claim that Angola is not an important 
country, or that the United States has no 
important interests there, begs the principal 
question. If the United States is seen to 
waver in the face of massive Soviet and 
Cuban intervention, what will be the percep- 
tion of leaders around the world as they 
make decisions concerning their future 
security? And what conclusions will an un- 
opposed superpower draw when the next 
opportunity for intervention beckons? 

Where are we now? The government has a 
duty to make clear to the Soviet Union and 
Cuba that Angola sets no precedent, that 
this type of action will not be tolerated again. 
It must reassure adjacent countries they 
will not be left exposed to attack or pressure 
from the new Soviet-Cuban foothold. Con- 
gress and the executive must come together 
on this proposition — in the national interest 
and in the interest of world peace. 

The Administration will continue to make 
its case, however unpopular it may be tem- 
porarily. Let no nation believe that Ameri- 
cans will long remain indifferent to the 
dispatch of expeditionary forces and vast 

supplies of arms to impose minority govern- 
ments — especially when that expeditionary 
force comes from a nation in the Western 

National Strength and the Debate at Home 

We live in a world without simple answers. 
We hold our values too dear to relinquish 
defending them ; we hold human life too dear 
to cease the quest for a secure peace. The 
first requirement of stability is to maintain 
our defenses and the balance of power. But 
the highest aim of policy in the nuclear age 
must be to create out of the sterile equilib- 
rium of force a more positive i-elationship of 

America has the material assets to do 
the job. Our military might is unmatched. 
Our economic and technological strength 
dwarfs any other. Our democratic heritage 
is envied by hundreds of millions around the 

Our problems therefore are of our own 
making — self-doubt, division, irresolution. 
We must once again become a confident, 
united, and determined people. 

Foreign countries must be able to deal 
with America as an entity, not as a complex 
of divided institutions. If our divisions para- 
lyze our international efforts, it is America 
as a whole that will suffer. We have no more 
urgent task than restoring the partnership 
between the American people, the Congress, 
and the executive. A new partnership can 
enable the President of the United States, in 
his constitutionally determined role, to ad- 
dress the world with the central authority of 
the spokesman of a united and purposeful 

Debate is the essence of democracy. But 
restraint is the cement of national cohesion. 
It is time to end the self-torment and obses- 
sion with our guilt which has threatened to 
paralyze us for too many years. It is time to 
stop dismantling our national institutions 
and undermining our national confidence. 

Let us learn — even in an election year — 
the self-discipline to shape our domestic de- 

February 23, 1976 


bates into a positive, not a destructive, proc- 

One of the forgotten truths of our history 
is that our Founding Fathers were men of 
great sophistication in foreign affairs. They 
understood the balance of power ; they made 
use of the divisions of Europe for the ad- 
vantage of our own Revolution. They under- 
stood the need for a strong executive to con- 
duct the nation's diplomacy. They grasped 
that America required economic, political, 
and moral links with other nations. They 
saw that our ideals were universal, and they 
understood and welcomed the impact of the 

American experiment on the destinies of all 

In our age, whose challenges are without 
precedent, we need once again the wisdom 
of our Founding Fathers. Our ideals must 
give us strength — rather than serve as an 
excuse for abdication. The American people 
want an effective foreign policy. They want 
America to continue to help shape the inter- 
national order of the coming generation ac- 
cording to our ideals. We have done great 
things as a united people. We have it in our 
power to make our third century a time of 
vibrancy and hope and greatness. 

Questions and Answers Following the Secretary's Address at San Francisco 

Press release 44A dated February 3 

John B. Bates, president, Commonwealth 
Club: . . . I tvould like to first say that this, 
too, is a shared responsibility between the 
Commonwealth Club and the Wojid Affairs 
Council. We have tried to screen out the many 
questions we have received and not duplicate 
them and get down to what we believe is 
representative of all of the questions that 
have been submitted to its. 

First of all, Mr. Secretary, quite a few 
questions on what has happened to Atnbassa- 
dor Moynihan [U.S. Representative to the 
U.N. Daniel P. Moynihan']. [Laughter.'] 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, let me say first 
of all that Ambassador Moynihan is a close 
friend of mine over many years. Like many 
Harvard professors, he has his tempera- 
mental side and is unusually sensitive to 
criticism. [Laughter.] 

But let me say that I recommended Am- 
bassador Moynihan for his present position 
after reading an article in Commentary 
magazine that he had written in which he 
outlined the policy that he thought we should 
pursue at the United Nations. We therefore 
knew exactly what he would do; and he was 
sent to New York to carry out the policies 
which he, in fact, carried out. Indeed, last 

July before he assumed office I made a speech 
in Milwaukee in somewhat more pedantic 
language than he uses. [Laughter.] I out- 
lined essentially the same considerations. 

So Ambassador Moynihan carried out with 
very great distinction the instructions of 
the President and the Secretary of State and 
gave them his own inspired cast. [Laughter.] 

I think he made a major contribution to 
American foreign policy. He has told us that 
he wishes to return to Harvard because if 
he did not at this time he would lose his 
tenure position irrevocably. And with the 
most enormous reluctance, the President and 
I had to go along with a repeatedly and 
insistently made request that we accept his 
resignation. There were no policy disagree- 
ments, and his successor will be instructed 
to carry out the same policies — though, of 
course, there's only one Pat Moynihan in the 
United States. [Laughter.] 

Q. There ivas a recent article in Pravda 
somewhat critical of you, Mr. Secretary, and 
I have this question. Did the recent Pravda 
article lose amjthing in its translation? Why 
do you think the article ivas printed at this 
time ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, of course, I 
don't think that the editors of Pravda 


Department of State Bulletin 

understand the policies of my father in clip- 
ping newspaper articles or they wouldn't 
have written it, because my father has the 
rule that any author is given two chances. 
The second time they write an unfavorable 
article he deletes it from the scrapbooks he 
keeps. [Laughter.] So I want to make clear 
to Pravda that if they want to stay in my 
father's clipping file, they better stop here. 

I don't know whether the article lost any- 
thing in the translation, but I think I got 
the message, [aughter.] 

There is no complete unanimity of views 
between us and the Soviet Union on Angola, 
but I can only repeat: The United States is 
dedicated to improving its relationship with 
the Soviet Union. The United States believes 
that it has a historic obligation, even in the 
face of domestic pressures here, to construct 
a new international set of relationships 
which reduces the risk of war. But the 
United States will not let this effort be used 
by any country to try to achieve unilateral 
advantages or to exploit local instabilities by 
its military forces. So the Soviet Union will 
have to choose. We are prepared for a posi- 
tive policy of genuine coexistence, but we 
are not prepared to have coexistence used 
as a cover for seeking unilateral advantages 
in various parts of the globe. 

Q. We've spent a lot of your time discussing 
Angola, Mr. Secretary, but this may be a 
little different twist to it. Is it possible that 
the Angola issue is an internal matter? If so, 
tvhy not let the Soviets find out, as ive did in 
Viet-Nam ? 

Secretary Kissinger: There are two big 
differences. The first is the United States 
would never have got itself engaged even 
financially — which is all we have ever done 
in Angola, with very modest sums — but we 
would not have done even that much in an 
internal struggle in Angola. 

In Mozambique — another Portuguese col- 
ony of a similar evolution — the United 
States, immediately after independence, rec- 
ognized a government very similar in com- 
position to the one the Soviet Union is now 
supporting in Angola. 

We are prepared to work with any govern- 
ment that emerges by African processes. 
What concerns us in Angola is the massive 
introduction of an amount of Soviet military 
equipment larger than all the other African 
countries received from all sources in the 
last year and the introduction of 11,000 
Cuban combat troops who are doing all of 
the fighting— the fighting is not done by 
Africans; the fighting is done mostly by 
Cubans. So what we face is the imposition of 
a minority government by a foreign force. 

Now, the analogy to Viet-Nam would be 
correct if we were permitted to give finan- 
cial assistance to those who are resisting — 
which is what the Soviet Union did for the 
North Vietnamese. In that case, the Soviet 
Union and Cuba might well have found out 
in Angola that this kind of action does not 
pay. But when massive forces are introduced 
and the United States does not even con- 
tribute financial support, then the outcome is 
inevitable. And the inevitable outcome, we 
must now make sure, should not lead to 
similar situations in other countries. That 
is our overwhelming concern. And the rea- 
son I speak so much about Angola is not to 
affect decisions which the Congress has 
already made but to prevent similar situa- 
tions from arising in other parts of the 

Q. One more question on Angola, Mr. Sec- 
retary, and then we'll leave Angola aside: 
Why have the Cubans become involved? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I do not want 
to pretend that I can read the inscrutable 
Cuban mind. [Laughter.] I think the 
Cubans have become involved in Angola 
through revolutionary zeal, through their 
belief that they are a pristine revolutionary 
force that must support revolutions every- 
where. And this is a phenomenon which we 
must reflect about very seriously. There are 
Cuban forces of much smaller size all over 
Africa. There are some Cuban forces in 
South Yemen. 

These are matters to which we cannot be 
indifferent, because it can lead to enormous 
instabilities all over the world, especially 
when it is done by a small Caribbean coun- 

February 23, 1976 


try backed by revolutionary zeal and Soviet 

Q. To what extent has the secrecy abroga- 
tion in the United States adversely affected 
our diplomatic endeavors? 

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that every 
democracy has to strike a balance between 
giving its public enough information so that 
they can make meaningful decisions and to 
make sure that the public understand the 
real reasons for governmental actions but, 
on the other hand, retain a capacity for some 
secrecy in its diplomacy. 

Nobody in this audience who runs a busi- 
ness or a law office or any other enterprise 
could possibly conduct his affairs if every 
memorandum that is written internally, if 
every communication with some other or- 
ganization, were immediately put on the 
public record. And yet this is the condition 
we increasingly face in Washington today. 
Every memorandum that comes across one's 
desk one has to look at not just from the 
point of its merit but from the point of view 
of how it looks in the newspapers, and the 
result of that will be not more openness. The 
result will be that no memoranda will be 
written [laughter] and that the business 
will be conducted largely orally and then 
people will put unilateral memoranda in 
their files and even more confusion will 
result. [Laughter.] 

So I believe that other governments must 
be able to tell us their candid assessments 
without having to worry that every com- 
munication to us immediately gets into the 
pubhc domain. 

Now, how to strike a balance between 
necessary secrecy and the temptation of gov- 
ernments to cover up their mistakes behind 
the cloak of secrecy — which is a legitimate 
concern — this is something to which we now 
have to address ourself. But an element of 
secrecy is absolutely essential. 

Q. To what extent do you think that the 
KGB has infiltrated the U.S. Congress? 

Secretary Kissinger: I may be courageous, 
but I'm not reckless. [Laughter.] 

Q. When all is said and done, isn't your 
Near East diplomacy basically a matter of 
taking American money and paying both 
sides not to fight? [Laughter.] 

Secretary Kissinger: We experienced in 
1973 that a Middle East war can have the 
most di'astic consequences. The Middle East 
war in 1973 cost us about $3 billion directly, 
about $10-$15 billion indirectly. It increased 
our unemployment and contributed to the 
deepest recession we have had in the post- 
war period. So we know what the cost of a 
war is. 

Secondly, the aid we are giving to Israel 
is not a payment for agreements. In the post- 
war period, supporting the survival and se- 
curity of Israel has been a fundamental na- 
tional policy. And therefore it would have 
to be continued whether or not there are 
agreements. So the aid to Israel should not 
be considered as a payment for agreements 
but as a part of a fundamental national 

The only other large recipients in the 
Middle East are Egypt and Jordan. We be- 
lieve that it is overwhelmingly in our na- 
tional interest that Egypt has broken its 
longstanding intimate ties with the Soviet 
Union and that it has contributed to a mod- 
erate and peaceful evolution in the Middle 
East. And there again we're not paying 
Egypt for this. We're not paying Egypt for 
an agreement. We are contributing to the 
possibility of Egypt concentrating on a more 
moderate course because the alternatives for 
the United States would be much more dras- 
tic. Every war in the Middle East has in- 
volved the risk of a confrontation with the 
Soviet Union. Every war in the Middle East 
has strained our relations with our allies 
and created enormous international turmoil. 

Our policy is not to pay people not to 
fight; our policy is to construct a more peace- 
ful relationship in the Middle East and to 
use the sums that we would have to pay 
anyway under conditions of tension in a 
constructive way to bring about a peaceful 

Q. What mutual concessions would enable 


Department of State Bulletin 

Israel and the PLO [Palestine Liberation 
Organization^ to establish detente? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we have taken 
the position that until the PLO recognizes 
the existence of Israel, we cannot ask Israel 
to negotiate with it — nor can we ourselves 
participate in a diplomatic process involving 
the PLO. So we believe that the minimum 
condition is that the PLO accept the exist- 
ence of Israel and accept the validity of the 
U.N. Security Council resolutions on which 
the peace process in the Middle East is 

Q. Why does not this country use American 
wheat as an instrument of foreign policy? 

Secretary Kissinger: We find very often 
that we are told abstractly that we should 
use American economic power in order to in- 
fluence foreign policy decisions of other 
countries. But we also find that when we 
attempt to do so, we would inevitably inter- 
rupt private markets and private arrange- 
ments because there is no way of using our 
economic power without some degree of 
governmental control. 

Now, with respect to the wheat deal to 
the Soviet Union, it is not generally realized 
that there was a voluntary restraint on sales 
to the Soviet Union from July through Octo- 
ber while we were negotiating a long-term 
agreement and that in many parts of the 
country and in many sections of the Con- 
gress this voluntary restraint is looked upon 
with great disfavor. We believe that the long- 
term agreement that was made with the 
Soviet Union over a five-year period intro- 
duces some stability into our markets. It 
creates a cutoff point during emergency sit- 
uations in which further negotiations would 
have to be conducted before we would agree 
to the sale of additional wheat. 

We believe that the circumstances that 
have so far existed have not justified the 
cutoff of wheat, because the cutoff would not 
have been effective in any time frame rele- 
vant to, for example, the issues of Ango- 

We believe that — and we have said so re- 
peatedly — if the relations with the Soviet 
Union deteriorate drastically — which we 
would hope strongly to avoid — it will affect 
our other relationships. But at the present 
time it was an excessive reaction which 
would not have helped in relation to the 
Angola problem. 

Q. I have questions on tvhat is our Latin 
American policy — which is a general question 
— and then, specifically: Do we continue to 
plan to give the Panama Canal away? 

Secretary Kissinger: I could make a great 
headline by saying "Yes." [Laughter.] 

Let me explain what is at issue in the 
Panama Canal negotiation. Our concern with 
the Panama Canal issue is to avoid a situa- 
tion in which the United States is drawn into 
a confrontation with all of Latin America, in 
which American military force will have to 
be used to fight a guerrilla war in the West- 
ern Hemisphere, as long as an honoi'able al- 
ternative presents itself. What we are nego- 
tiating now — and incidentally, with the 
agreement of all of the agencies of the U.S. 
Government — is an arrangement in which 
the defense of the Panama Canal will be 
jointly exercised between the United States 
and Panama for an extended period of time — 
for a very extended period of time — while 
the operation of the canal is turned over 
during a shorter period of time. 

But the essential American defense inter- 
ests can be maintained, in our view, through 
this cooperative arrangement while avoid- 
ing a situation in which the Panama Canal 
becomes a rallying ground of all of Latin 
American resentment against the United 
States. We will not make an agreement in 
which our essential interests in free transit 
through the Panama Canal are jeopardized, 
but we will make a serious effort to see 
whether we can make a stabler arrange- 
ment. All of this will have to be put before 
the Congress and will be explored in the 
greatest detail with the Congress while 
we're negotiating it, and the negotiations 
are likely to take some period of time. 

February 23, 1976 



Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at San Francisco February 3 

Press release 46 dated February 3 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, my question is — some 
critics of the cause of detente seem, to take 
the vieiv in this case that the Soviet Union 
may be less strict in its overt relationship 
ivith the United States. I take it from your 
remarks today that yon do not share this 
vietv ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I say that it's not a 
question to be settled in the abstract. We 
have concrete ideas of what is needed to 
have an equitable SALT agreement. We 
have specific ideas of the restraint that is 
needed in the conduct of international affairs. 

We will pursue these ideas. If we can 
realize them, this will be a test of whether 
the Soviet Union is interested in real relaxa- 
tion of tension. If not, they are not; but 
what we want to avoid is an abstract debate 
in this country. We want to keep people's 
attention focused on the fact that, beyond 
all our internal controversies, we do have an 
obligation to build a stabler world and that 
we cannot give up on that. 

Q. {Inaudible.'] 

Secretary Kissinger: They have already 
gone, and we have always proposed that 
South African forces should go. And we 
have made it clear that all foreign forces — 
South African, Cuban, and Soviet — should 
go. In fact, we have publicly proposed that 
we would support a negotiation in which 
South African forces would leave first, and 
the others follow. It is our understanding 
that the South African forces have with- 
drawn to their border. 

Q. [Inaudible.] 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know what 
sources close to Ambassador Moynihan that 
could be. I have stated innumerable times 

my high regard for Ambassador Moynihan. 
I think the Washington press corps knows 
what I have said about Ambassador Moyni- 
han. I don't believe anybody will be able 
to cite one example of my undercutting 
Ambassador Moynihan, disagreeing with 
Ambassador Moynihan. In fact, I would hap- 
pily trade his press for mine. [Laughter.] 
And if I could confine the leaking against me 
in the State Department to the level of the 
leakage against him, I would be in great 

Q. What did you mean when you said he's 
overly sensitive? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think all of us Har- 
vard professors are very sensitive to criti- 
cism. We are used to adoring students. 

Q. [Inaudible.] 

Secretary Kissinger: We hear little about 

Q. Yes. 

Secretary Kissinger: I am going to be visit- 
ing Peru in the near future. Their Foreign 
Minister, as it happens, is a good personal 
friend of mine. He was the first foreign min- 
ister, as it happened, whom I saw after I 
was sworn in as Secretary of State. I have 
high regard for him. 

I have respect for the foreign policy of 
Peru. And I think that a constructive non- 
alignment is one that the United States has 
never opposed. 

What we oppose is rigid bloc voting in the 
United Nations. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the late Rabin 
visit to Washington, tvhat's your concept of 
the future of peacemaking efforts in the 
Middle East? Would it be Geneva or quiet 
diplomacy — or ivhat's your concept? 


Department of State Bulletin 

Secretary Kissinger: I do not know what 
our capacities for quiet diplomacy are at 
this particular moment. I am going to see 
Prime Minisiter Rabin again tonight in Los 
Angeles, and we will have a sort of a wrap- 
up session. 

What forum will be chosen depends of 
course on what is possible. The United 
States is prepared to go to Geneva. The 
United States is also prepared to encourage 
other steps that the parties could agree 

After further talks with the Prime Min- 
ister and after his return to Israel for an 
opportunity to talk to his colleagues, we will 
then approach other countries. And only out 
of that can we be sure of what process is 
going to develop. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, considering the strength 
of the MPLA [Popular Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola] in Angola, do you think 
the additional U.S. aid you've asked for ivill 
make a significant difference in the new 
emerging government of Angola? 

Secretary Kissinger: So far we have not 
asked for any aid. We have simply indicated 
what would be needed. We have not made 
any formal request. 

Secondly, I think it is technically in- 
correct to speak of the strength of the 
MPLA. I think it is correct to speak of the 
strength of the Cuban forces which do most 
of the fighting for the MPLA. But we have 
not made a formal request to the Congress. 
We do have a concern, however, that what is 
happening in Angola not set a precedent in 
other parts of the world or in Africa. 

Q. Coidd you, Mr. Secretary, amplify those 
remarks? Where else could Angola set a 
precedent? What area is a trouble spot? 

Secretary Kissinger: I do not want to pre- 
dict where it could happen. We simply want 
to make clear there are many local situa- 
tions, there are many places of tensions 
where the introduction of outside forces 
could tip the balance, or where the introduc- 
tion of massive military equipment could. 

I do not want to indicate those ahead of 

time, but we want to make clear what our 
general concern is. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you attempt to 
comment on Rita Hauser as a replacement 
for Ambassador Moynihan? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have not had a 
chance to review the list with the President. 
I have had some exchanges with the White 
House, but until the President has made a 
decision I do not think I should comment on 

Q. Mr. Secretary, tomorroiv the Secretary 
of Transportation is going to announce a de- 
cision on whether the landing rights on the 
Concorde are granted. What's your position 
on the Concorde? What ivould be the diplo- 
matic consequences of the granting of land- 
ing rights? 

Secretary Kissinger: We were asked by the 
Secretary of Transportation to state our 
view on the foreign policy implications. He 
has the responsibility to make his judgment 
on the basis of those, plus environmental 
factors, plus all the other considerations for 
which he is responsible. 

We stated to him that the foreign policy 
implications of depriving Britain and France 
of access to American aii-ports, on a vehicle 
of high technology of which they're rather 
proud, would be difficult. But, on the other 
hand, the decision is one that Secretary Cole- 
man has to make and he has to consider 
many considerations — many factors — in ad- 
dition to the factors that I am responsible 

Q. [Inaudible.] 

Secretary Kissinger: I have stated the for- 
eign policy considerations. He is the one that 
has to make the final decision. 

Q. Will the United States have an easier 
time of it in the United Nations ivithout 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan as our representa- 

Secretary Kissinger: I think that Ambassa- 
dor Moynihan did a distinguished job. I think 
Ambassador Moynihan carried out what he 
was sent there to do. He was sent there on 

February 23, 1976 


the basis of an article In Commentary that 
outlined exactly in fact what he did, so no- 
body was surprised by his actions. 

I think his impact was useful and healthy, 
and I think that his successor will carry out 
essentially the same policies. 

Therefore I think our role in the United 
Nations will be no easier than it was when 
Ambassador Moynihan was there, except as 
the success of the policies with which he was 
identified takes hold. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, has the United States 
any view on the reported conflict between Mr. 
Rabin and Peres regarding the military needs 
of Israel? 

Secretary Kissinger: I am not aware of 
any conflict between Prime Minister Rabin 
and Defense Minister Peres. I must say we 
are so busy in our own internal problems 
that we cannot get involved in those of 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the course of your fre- 
quent contacts ivith your NATO allies, what 
is your opinion — to let the Western Euro- 
pean governments know that the United 
States would be adamantly opposed to any 
coalition governments which ivould bring in 
any such major parties as the Communist 
parties of Italy or France? What makes you 
think that the European governments relish 
or eveyi adhere to such domestic criteria on 
the part of the United States? 

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, your 
basic premise is wrong. On my return from 
Moscow, the issue of the participation of 
Communist parties in the governments of 
Western Europe did not arise at all. The 
meeting with the NATO allies was confined 
entirely to a report on my visit to Moscow. 
On previous occasions, when we were asked 
for our opinion, we have given it — but never 
in a governmental context. It is up to the 
governments concerned to make those deci- 

If somebody asks our view of what the 
consequences will be — we are usually asked 
by the press — we give those views. But we 
have not done it in the NATO Council. 

Q. The State Department reportedly pro- 

posed the filing of an antitrust suit against 
Bechtel Corporation in relation to the Arab 
boycott. The State Department also has pro- 
posed amendmeyits that will change the lan- 
guage of the export-most-favored act which 
makes the boycott against Israel against the 
law. Why does the State Department propose 
these antiboycott amendments? 

Secretary Kissinger: This is not exactly 
correct. It is in the nature of things that 
when other agencies in the government 
undertake steps which they think may have 
a foreign policy implication they will ask our 

In the case of the Bechtel case, the At- 
torney General asked the view of the State 
Department as to what the foreign policy 
implications would be. We made clear, both 
publicly and in our opinion to the Attorney 
General, that we did not claim any right to 
interfere with the judicial process, or that 
our opinion should aff"ect the judicial process. 
But being asked what our view was — I think 
anybody can tell you that the impact on 
Saudi Arabia and Saudi-U.S. relations will 
not be all that favorable. 

Having stated our opinion, the Attorney 
General then proceeded — as was his duty — 
with applying the law as he sees it. 

With respect to boycott, I do not know 
exactly what specific provisions you are 
talking about. We have supported — strongly 
supported — the Presidential statement which 
sets down the basic guidelines on the boy- 
cott. On some specific measures we have the 
view that they would have a serious impact 
on our relations with the countries concerned 
and might interfere and complicate the proc- 
ess of a moderate evolution toward peace 
in the Middle East. 

But, again, the State Department has the 
responsibility to express the foreign policy 
implications. Others that have other respon- 
sibilities can then weigh those in relation to 
other priorities. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, what is your estimation 
of the independent military strength of the 
MPLA without Russian aid? Would the com- 
bined forces of the FNLA [National Front 
for the Liberation of Angola'] and UNITA 


Department of State Bulletin 

[National Union for the Total Independence 
of Angola] be a defeatable force ivithotit a 
unilateral — 

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, now that 
the Cuban forces have been active, I would 
have thought that without the introduction 
of Cuban forces — without the introduction 
of any outside forces — the most likely result 
would have been a stalemate in which each 
of these Angolan forces would have domi- 
nated the area from which it drew its 
strength in terms of the tribal areas. 

So in terms of numbers, probably UNITA 
— having the largest tribal area — would 
probably have had the largest numbers in a 
one-man-one-vote situation. The probable out- 
come, without foreign intervention, would 
have been a coalition between the three 
factions and some working out of the domes- 
tic processes by African standards, in which 
perhaps one or the other might have become 
dominant; and this is something we could 
have lived with. 

We have made no effort in any African 
country to prevent the coming into power 
by indigenous means of any particular group. 
And we immediately established in Mozam- 
bique — as I pointed out previously — we im- 
mediately established relations with FRE- 
LIMO [Front for the Liberation of Mozam- 
bique] , which has views not all that different 
from the MPLA. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, on Angola, what do you 
expect the Soviet reaction to be to the tougher 
policy that you outlined today in the speech? 

Secretary Kissinger: We hope that the 
Soviet Union will consider very seriously the 
consequences of actions that may have been 
taken for even understandable reasons in 
the early phases and to keep in mind that 
the two superpowers must restrain their 
conduct or else the potentiality for conflict, 
misunderstanding, and tension is too great. 
And we hope that this is a lesson that the 
Soviet Union will learn from Angola. 

I cannot stress enough: We believe that 
the problem of peace must be solved at some 
time. We are prepared to do it now. But we 

are not prepared to do it on the basis of one 
side gaining unilateral advantages. 

Q. What happens if the Cubans are not able 
to continue to receive aid to their side? 

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that the 
Cubans should be removed. I believe that the 
Cubans must cease their massive interven- 
tions in other parts of the world, and we will 
face the problem of what will happen if it 
continues when it arises. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, due to the activities of 
publications like Counterspy, has the State 
Department had to provide new covers or 
withdraw some of its agents, or CIA agents, 
in Embassies around the ivorld? 

Secretary Kissinger: The State Depart- 
ment does not have CIA agents. 

Q. But would you say that there are no 
CIA agents in the Embassies — in certain 
Embassies around the tvorld? 

Secretary Kissinger: I would not comment 
on how cover is provided for CIA agents. I 
must say that the conduct of intelligence is 
essential for any great power. It is conducted 
by every major country, and we will do our 
best to continue legitimate intelligence func- 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you say how you 
hope the Soviets ivill recognize detente? 

Secretary Kissinger: By showing restraint 
in the future and by ending the intervention 
in Angola as rapidly as possible. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, what leverage or power 
do we have if the Congress is not going to 
financially support the anti-Communist fac- 
tions there? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have played 
stronger hands since I have been connected 
with foreign policy. You cannot conduct 
foreign policy without leverage, and our 
leverage has been drastically reduced. But 
we have to deal with the situation that we 

Q. Do you mean that before further talks 
on SALT proceed, before the next step is 

February 23, 1976 


going to be realized, the Angolan situation 
tvill he stabilized — is that what you're saying? 

Secretary Kissinger: No. I am saying- — 
have stated previously — that to bring the 
strategic arms race under control is not a 
favor that we do for the Soviet Union. And I 
have attempted to explain why it is not a 
favor we do to the Soviet Union. 

I have also stated that if relations keep 
deteriorating that obviously other relations 
will be affected — whether or not they are a 
favor to the Soviet Union. We are still pre- 
pai-ed to persevere in bringing negotiations 
of strategic arms limitations to a conclusion. 
And I do not want to discuss in detail what 
specific steps will be taken if the restraint is 
not exercised by the other side. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you sounded in your 
speech a little bit frustrated with American 
policy in Congress. Can you give us an assess- 
ment of your own satisfaction with your job, 
and are you contemplating anything like Mr. 
Moynihan did? [Laughter.] 

Secretary Kissinger: I have given up my 
position at Harvard [laughter], so I do not 
necessarily have that option. 

No — I do not sound frustrated with the 
job. I believe it is the duty of national leaders 
to make clear to the public what the prob- 
lems are that we face. The Congress has a 
major responsibility in the shaping of for- 
eign policy. It has to be done in partnership 

between the executive and the legislative. 
It is my obligation to explain what the issues 

I have no plan to follow Mr. Moynihan to 
Harvard or to follow him out of government. 

The press: Thank you, Dr. Kissinger. 

U.S. and Canada Initial Draft Text 
of Transit Pipeline Agreement 

Joint Statement ' 

On January 28, the chief U.S. and Cana- 
dian negotiators initialed a draft text of a 
general agreement covering transit pipe- 
lines. This agreement would provide govern- 
ment-to-government assurances on a recip- 
I'ocal basis regarding noninterference with 
and nondiscriminatory treatment of hydro- 
carbons transported in present or future 
pipelines which cross the territory of either 

The ad referendum agreement will now 
be referred to the two Governments for 
their review and approval. As part of the 
U.S. procedure, consultations within the 
executive branch, with the Congress, and 
with interested parties will be undertaken 
prior to final approval. 

' Issued on Jan. 29 (text from press release 41). 


Department of State Bulletin 

Prime Minister Rabin of Israel Visits the United States 

Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of the State 
of Israel made an official visit to the United 
States January 26-February 5. He met with 
President Ford and other government offi- 
cials at Washington January 27-30. Folloiv- 
ing are an exchange of greetings between 
President Ford and Prime Minister Rabin at 
a ivelcoming ceremony on the South Lawn of 
the White House on January 27, toasts ex- 
changed by Secretary Kissinger and the 
Prime Minister at a luncheon at the Depart- 
ment of State that day, toasts exchanged by 
the President and the Prime Minister at a 
dinner at the White House that evening, their 
exchange of remarks at a receptiori given by 
the Prime Minister on January 29, and an 
address made by Prime Minister Rabin be- 
fore a joint meeting of the Congress on Jan- 
uary 28. 


Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated February 2 

President Ford 

Mr. Prime Minister and Mrs. Rabin: 
Shalom. Mrs. Ford and I are very delighted 
to welcome both of you to Washington, our 
good friends of many years, and we are de- 
lighted to see you on this occasion despite the 
weather. We hope your visit here and across 
our nation, Mr. Prime Minister, will renew 
many happy memories and deepen the rela- 
tionship of our two countries. We are proud 
to have both of you as our guests. 

As in the past, Mr. Prime Minister, we 
meet today in a spirit of warm good will. 
Your visit gives me the opportunity to re- 
affirm on behalf of all of the American peo- 
ple the enduring friendship of our two coun- 

tries, the traditional commitment of the 
United States to Israel's security and sur- 
vival, and the dedication of the United States 
to seek, with Israel's cooperation, a peaceful, 
comprehensive, and just solution to the con- 
flict in the Middle East. 

The United States and Israel share a very 
deep devotion to democratic ideals, a special 
affinity as two kindred peoples, and common 
moral and political values that flow from the 
great Judeo-Christian heritage. 

Just as you and I have been friends for 
many years, Mr. Prime Minister, our two 
nations are friends. For almost 30 years 
since and even before your independence, our 
two peoples have worked together in many 
fields. My strongest desire is that we con- 
tinue to work together in the future. Today 
our cooperation is more necessary than ever 
in the quest for an enduring peace in the 
Middle East. 

In the agreements we have ah'eady 
achieved by working together, we have estab- 
lished a sound basis for further movement 
toward an ultimate peace settlement. With 
statesmanship and courage, Mr. Prime Min- 
ister, you have taken the first steps. 

The wisdom and determination that you 
and your nation have so amply displayed thus 
far will be required in even greater degree 
in the days ahead. Our tasks remain urgent 
and important. I know that the people of 
Israel yearn for peace. All of us share a great 
responsibility — Israel, its Arab neighbors, 
and the United States. Our task is to realize 
this goal together, with realism and with 
justice. Let us seize this historic opportunity 
to help translate hopes into reality. 

I welcome your visit, Mr. Prime Minister. 
We can in the next several days deepen our 
mutual understanding and trust. We can help 
to advance the process of peace. We can en- 

February 23, 1976 


hance even further the unique friendship of 
our two countries. And if other nations also 
do their part, this year will be recorded in 
history as another year of steady progress 
toward the fulfillment of our common dream 
— the peace that is so fervently desired 
throughout the Middle East and by the 
entire world. 

Mr. Prime Minister, I look forward to our 
discussions and to the pleasure of your com- 
pany. On behalf of all Americans, I extend 
our heartiest welcome to you and to Mrs. 

Prime Minister Rabin 

Mr. President, Mrs. Ford: My wife and 1 
appreciate very much your personal wel- 
come, especially on such a day. According 
to the Jewish tradition, rain means blessing. 

It is a pleasure to be back in Washington 
and to see around me so many friends. My 
thanks go to you, Mr. President, for your in- 
vitation that enables me to meet with you to 
express to you respect and friendship. 

I am looking forward to our talks, for I 
know they will advance our common purpose. 
The purpose is peace — peace in the world 
and, more specifically, peace between Israel 
and the Arab countries. Toward that end, 
the Government of Israel commits its 

Mr. President, when the history of this 
period will be written, your name will be 
given a permanent place as the leader of the 
free world who led the struggle for a better, 
more decent, and more peaceful world for 
people to live in. Your personal involvement 
in the cause for peace and stability in the 
Middle East has been untiring. 

Your efforts have not been without re- 
sults. Under your guidance, America has 
played an indispensable role in helping to 
bring about what we all hope will prove to 
be the beginning of the peace process. We 
know that it is complex. We know that it is 
not without risks. But I want to assure you, 
Mr. President, that we, Israel, will continue 
to do all that can reasonably be done to help 
to move that process along. 

Your friendship, your wisdom, the energy 
you devote for peace, and the efl'orts you 
make for the welfare of my own democratic 
people move me to express to you our sin- 
cere gratitude. 

I am told, Mr. President, that by your in- 
vitation I am the first head of government to 
visit the United States in your Bicentennial 
Year. This is a special honor for me. It af- 
fords me the opportunity to bring a partic- 
ular message of friendship to all commu- 
nities across your great country, including 
the Jewish community, with whom we have 
a profound historic spiritual tie. 

The message I carry is "Shalom to Amer- 
ica" on the occasion of your Bicentennial 
celebration. It is a celebration we are making 
in Israel, too. We do so because of the debt 
that Israel and the whole free world owes to 
this great country. We do so because of the 
spirit of liberty, peace, and democracy that 
gave birth to free America 200 years ago. 
And we do so because it is identical to the 
spirit that gave rebirth to my own free Israel 
28 years ago. 

Mr. President, I am deeply gratified for 
your invitation and hospitality which enables 
me to deliver this message to you personally. 


Press release 34 dated January 27 

Secretary Kissinger 

Mr. Prime Minister, Mrs. Rabin, distin- 
guished guests: It is a great pleasure to 
welcome the Rabins, who are all old friends 
of ours, back to Washington. We have worked 
together for so long that when an Israeli 
party arrives here we meet old friends of 
many circumstances. For example, we could 
immediately identify all the security officers 
that took care of us. [Laughter.] And Nancy 
was looking for the security officer who could 
open coke bottles with his teeth, which will 
show you of the way we get intimidated when 
we visit Israel. [Laughter.] And Mrs. Rabin 
mumbles to me, "the quahty of the security." 


Department of State Bulletin 

I haven't been defended by any security of- 
ficer with his teeth in Israel yet. [Laughter.] 

There are also so many members of the 
Israeli press here that I have a real dilemma 
— because I have a friend who hates flying, 
and he says that when a stewardess comes 
out of the pilot's compartment with a serious 
face he is convinced they are going to crash 
and that she can't even give the impression 
that things are going well, but when she 
comes out smiling, then he's in a real panic 
because then he is absolutely convinced that 
things are desperate and that she has been 
instructed to cheer them up. [Laughter.] 

So what can I say about our meetings? 

The truth is that the Prime Minister and 
his friends here have worked together for a 
long time. I spent many hours with the 
Prime Minister when he was Ambassador 
here in discussing not only the problems of 
Israel in the Middle East but the relation- 
ship of the international situation to the 
prospects of peace. And when our other 
Israeli friends are here, it is a different re- 
lationship than we have with any other 
country because we know each other so well 
and we have talked together so much that 
we can afford occasionally this or that dis- 
agreement. And sometimes because it is a 
family quarrel it takes on an intensity that 
is exaggerated. 

I want to emphasize right away that there 
are no quarrels going on at this moment and 
that I am talking about the past and not the 
present, although having given that assur- 
ance, I am positive that I have created many 
more doubts. [Laughter.] 

But the fact of the matter is that no 
people can want peace more desperately than 
a country that has never known a state of 
peace in its entire history and that has had 
to fight wars at almost intervals of five 
years. So that the issue of whether there 
should be peace doesn't need to be discussed 
between us. 

How to achieve peace in a situation of 
enormous complexity and how to balance the 
territorial changes, which are tangible, 
against the commitments to peace, which are 

intangible — that is a problem that requires 
great imagination and great dedication. And 
when one looks at the legacy of a genera- 
tion of distrust and at the influence of out- 
side powers whose intentions are not always 
benign, then we know, both of us, that we 
have a complex and long-term issue before 

Now, our friend the Prime Minister is 
here this time when there isn't any immedi- 
ate crisis, when there isn't a particular nego- 
tiation on which we must achieve a specific 
result. He is here to discuss with us how we 
imagine the evolution toward peace in the 
Middle East, how we can reach an objective 
on which we both agree. And we can talk in 
a relaxed atmosphere because we have the 
capacity for decision. 

The United States made clear last night 
that it will not accept changes in the frame- 
work of negotiations that prejudge the out- 
come. We will not participate or encourage a 
negotiating process in which as an entrance 
price into negotiations the fundamental is- 
sues should already be determined by groups 
of countries that are not parties to the 

Now that we have made clear what we 
will not encourage, we can talk in a freer 
atmosphere about what can happen in the 
years ahead. I think the talks this morning 
were conducted in a very friendly atmos- 
phere, and I am confident that this visit will 
be extremely helpful to both of our countries 
and to the long-term prospects for peace in 
the Middle East. 

The United States is committed to the 
security and survival of Israel. The United 
States will work with Israel on joint policies 
to maintain the security and to achieve a 
lasting peace in the Middle East. It is in this 
spirit that we welcome the Rabins here, in 
the consciousness that for all Americans it 
is a question of moral necessity to make cer- 
tain that, whatever happens, this democracy 
in the Middle East that shares our values 
will be secured and maintained. 

So I would like to propose a toast to the 
Prime Minister and Mrs. Rabin and to the 
lasting friendship between Israel and the 
United States. 

February 23, 1976 


Prime Minister Rabin 

Mr. Secretary, Mrs. Kissinger, distin- 
guished guests: I would like to thank the 
Secretary and Mrs. Kissinger in the name of 
my wife and myself for this pleasant gather- 
ing and for the good meal. I have not spent 
since I have taken this post as a Prime Minis- 
ter so many days in the United States as 
the Secretary spent in Israel; therefore I 
can't pretend that I know all the details that 
come with such a visit. But I would like also 
to open my remarks by saying something 
personally to the Secretary. 

As he said, I believe that we have learned 
to know each other. When I served here as 
the Israeli Ambassador and after that, even 
though from time to time we have had some 
differences of opinion — but I believe that we 
have no doubt whatsoever in the way that 
he conducted the policy of this government 
in his capacity at the White House and now 
as Secretary of State, in the real efforts that 
he has made to bring about more stability, 
in the efforts to create better conditions for 
peace for all peoples in the area. And for 
that I would like to thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

As you have said, there is something which 
cannot be always explained when it comes 
to the relations of the greatest democracy 
with the only democracy in the Middle East. 
It has started many years ago, and it has 
been developed to the kind of relations that 
we, as a small country, are very proud of. 
And I believe that the cooperation between 
our two countries has contributed to the 
stability in the area and to the encourage- 
ment of the prospects of peace. I believe 
that what has been done in the last year was 
an outcome of an effort, even though there 
were ups and downs through '75 but toward 
the end the results proved to be the right 

Still, the Ai'ab-Israeli conflict is a very 
complicated one, and it is not so easy to offer 
simple formulas how to solve it. Sometimes 
it looks simpler than it is. From our point 
of view, we, as the Secretary said, have 
never entertained one day of peace. We have 
experienced many wars. And therefore 

please understand our sensitivity when it 
comes to our capability to be able to defend 
ourselves by ourselves. 

Please understand the amount of suspicion 
that might seem to people from the outside a 
little bit exaggerated when we have to ex- 
change words for something tangible, which 
is territories — not as real estate but as de- 
fensive lines that make our capability to 
defend ourselves better. But I can assure 
you, Mr. Secretary, and all those who are 
here that for the sake of a real peace, Israel 
will not shrink from any risks, will take 
upon itself many concessions, but one will be 
sure that the purpose is a real peace. 

I believe that the way that the talks have 
been conducted through the years of coopera- 
tion between our two countries and espe- 
cially today, I believe that this is the way to 
conduct talks when the common goal is the 
same — to achieve peace. But at the same 
time, as long as peace has not been achieved, 
to be in a position that those who want to ex- 
ploit the tension in the area will not be able 
to pursue a policy of war with a hope of 

I believe everywhere in the world you 
can't achieve peace but from the standpoint 
of strength. It is a struggle between total- 
itarian concepts and democratic way of life. 
And in coping with totalitarian concepts, de- 
mocracies have to try their best to reach 
agreements and understandings. But it 
can't be done from the standpoint of weak- 
ness. I don't want to apply to anything ex- 
cept when it comes to our problem. And I 
know one thing for sure, with a weak Israel 
no one will negotiate, and only a strong 
Israel is a help for peace. 

I would like to pray and hope that there 
will be continuation of the present under- 
standing, continuation of the common effort 
to achieve peace, and continuation of the 
effort, as long as peace has not been achieved, 
to be able to overcome the differences when- 
ever they come up. 

And in this spirit I would like to raise my 
glass to the Secretary, to Mrs. Kissinger, and 
to the friendship between our two countries. 
And as we say in Hebrew: "L'chaim." 


Department of State Bulletin 


i-ekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated February 2 

resident Ford 

Mr. Prime Minister and Mrs. Rabin and 
istinguished guests: It is again a pleasure 
n- us to say shalom. 

Betty and I have, of course, and all of our 
uests feel a very special warmth as far as 
bu, Mr. Prime Minister, and Mrs. Rabin 
re concerned. And our friendship on a 
ersonal basis has been one of long stand- 
iig and a very enjoyable and very pleasant 

Your five years in Washington as the 
listinguished Ambassador of Israel created 
'lany and very warm friendships. Betty and 
are two of those friends, and we are deeply 
irateful for that relationship. And we are 
3viously delighted to be your hosts tonight. 

We are very proud that you are the first 
ead-of-government guest during our Bi- 
Mitennial Year. And I think that tells us 
)mething. The celebration of our nation's 
istory gives Americans a deeper apprecia- 
on of basic values that we share with the 
tate of Israel — the tribute that your country 
id ours pay to these ideals you expressed 
1 Philadelphia last night. 

Both of our nations have had a very pain- 
il birth as well as growth. As havens for 
len and women fleeing persecution, both of 
jr nations find their vitality as well as their 
;rength today in a commitment to freedom 
nd a commitment to democracy and the 
jirit of free peoples. 

Both of our nations, Mr. Prime Minister, 
ave tasted the bitter fruits of war and the 
truggles that are necessary to preserve 
idependence and security. Both of us know 
all well in today's world that eternal vigi- 
ince is the price of liberty. And we, indi- 
idually and collectively, will not fail. 

I applaud your statesmanship, Mr. Prime 
linister. You have shown it over and over 
gain. It has contributed so much that has 
een achieved so far. I am gratified that our 
ersonal friendship and relationship now 
acilitates the closest consultation on the 

very complex problems that we face in the 
problems ahead. 

From the moment of Israel's independence, 
all of America's Presidents, as well as the 
major political parties, have identified with 
your freedom and your progress. 

America now completes its second century. 
Israel counts its heritage in thousands and 
thousands of years and its modern history in 
decades. Yet our heritage — your country and 
mine — are the same. 

I think we must take inspiration from 
the Founding Fathers of both our nations 
and the principles of justice and freedom 
which they have passed down to you as well 
as to myself for the survival of those princi- 
ples, which is our major responsibility. You 
are dedicated to that end, Mr. Prime Minis- 
ter, and all of your people are likewise. And 
they are an inspiration to all of us. 

Israel, Mr. Prime Minister, like the United 
States, has stuck to its principles and per- 
severed with courage and determination. The 
unbreakable spirit of the people of Israel re- 
mains its strongest defense. And as we re- 
flect on this Bicentennial Year, we are both 
mindful of the indispensable role that the 
United States has played in the world as a 
guardian of stability and defender of free- 

I want to tell you, Mr. Prime Minister, 
that I am determined, as I think most Amer- 
icans are, that America will remain sti'ong 
and America will remain committed to its 
allies and to its world responsibilities. 

I know that Israel and our other friends 
and allies depend upon America's strength 
and America's commitment. Our two nations 
have been working together for peace in the 
Middle East. No peacemaking process, as you 
well know, is easy, but important steps have 
been taken. And we are proud of the role 
that America has played in working with 
your country. 

I know that all Americans deeply desire to 
see the process continued toward its goal of 
a just and secure peace. 

The United States has demonstrated many, 
many times, including yesterday in the 
United Nations, that we will oppose measures 

ebruary 23, 1976 


that we consider unrealistic or unworkable or 
that make peace harder to achieve. But we 
have demonstrated at the same time we are 
committed to seek and to support positive 
measures, positive moves toward peace. 

We will continue the hopeful effort in 
which we are jointly engaged. 

You and I began our discussions this morn- 
ing in a spirit of friendship and a spirit of 
common desire for peace. You stated this 
morning, and many times otherwise, your na- 
tion's views eloquently and persuasively. 

Ladies and gentlemen, I ask that you join 
me in a toast to the Prime Minister of Israel 
and to Mrs. Rabin, to the enduring friend- 
ship between Israel and the United States, 
and to a just and lasting peace in the Middle 
East. In the ancient toast of the Jewish 
people: "L'chaim." 

Prime Minister Rabin 

Mr. President and Mrs. Ford, distin- 
guished guests: First allow me in the name 
of my wife and myself to thank you, Mr. 
President, and you, Mrs. Ford, for your kind 
invitation to come over to this country as 
your guests. 

We also cherish our personal friendship 
for the time that I served here as the Israeli 
Ambassador. I remember that many times I 
used to come to your office as the Minority 
Leader in the House to ask for your advice, 
to get a better understanding about what 
was going on in this country. And I always 
came out of your office more encouraged 
about America, about the Congress, about 
your determination to do what you believed 
that should be done here in this country as 
well as this country's policies toward the 
world, toward securing peace and freedom 
wherever and whenever it is possible. 

Since you took this office, awesome respon- 
sibility of the President of the United States, 
this is the third meeting between us here. 
And we have discussed through this period 
every possibility, everything that can be 
done to encourage every option, every avenue 

to move from war toward peace, to achie 
tranquillity and stability in the area as lo; 
as peace has not been achieved. And I c 
predated always your attitude that whe 
ever there is a confrontation the efforts 
bring about peace must be done from t 
standpoint of strengths because no tota 
tarian regime will tolerate a weak dem( 
racy. And only a strong democracy can e 
pect to achieve peace with dignity, pea 
that is worthwhile. 

I am especially glad, as you mentione^ 
Mr. President, that I am the first head [ 
government to be your official guest in t\ 
Bicentennial Year. I am glad, especially, 1 
cause I think I represent even though a ve 
small democracy but it is the only one th 
exists in the Middle East. 

Before we came over, I found that wh 
you got your independence 200 years ago, t 
total population of then the United Stat 
was 3 million, which is exactly [laughtc 
the population of Israel today. And I fou 
that your growth came as a result of the ( 
termination of the Founding Fatht 
to build a country, but in addition to that, 
maintaining the basic principle of open gai 
to waves of immigrants. And your count ' 
grew up by the waves of immigrants tl ; 
came to this great country. We maintain t 
same policy. And we have grown throu 
immigration and will continue to gr 
through immigration. 

In the last li/o years we have taken cert; 
steps through the good offices of the U 
Government under your guidance in the 
fort to bring about certain moves towf 
peace. I believe that on our part we did c ' 
share. We have taken risks in the hope tl : 
a better future might be built not only 1 
Israel but for the whole Middle East, for i 
countries and for all peoples there. 

We are in a country in which war mig ; 
be imminent. We have fought four ma; ' 
wars in the last 28 years, and between thi i 
we have never entertained one day of pea 
And after 28 years of war, believe me, I\ . 
President, if there is something that •! 


Department of State Bulle i 

pire to, that we desire, that we are longing 
r, it is to achieve a real peace. 
Allow me to add that when I stayed in 
is country I learned one thing — that the 
,guest word in the English dictionary is 
leace" because so many interpretations are 
ven to this word. And therefore one has 
be careful when the word is uttered and 
practical and meaningful interpretation is 
ven to that. 

And, therefore, for us the meaning of 

ace that we want to achieve is peace that 

ill give us, as well as to our neighbors, a 

nse of security to live the way that we pre- 

r to live in our own country and they in 

eir own. 

''We have done something to bring stabili- 

,!tion to the area, but still the road to peace 

Jifortunately is still long. And it will require 

(urage, determination, and skill to navigate 

e ship of hope of peace until it will be a 

lal one. And in facing all these complex 

foblems one has not to lose his hope but at 

e same time to have no illusions in coping 

• th the difficulties that should be overcome. 

After the first talk that I had with you, 

r. President, I believed that we realize the 

ifficulties. We are determined to do every- 

ing to find ways to cope with these diffi- 

i Ities. And I can assure you, Mr. President, 

at on the part of Israel every effort will 

' done to find ways to cooperate with you 

the efforts to bring about peace to the 

;, ea which has suffered so much from wars 

■ the last years. 

Allow me also, Mr. President, to thank you 

■rsonally in the name of the people of Israel 

V your support through the years, to your 

ipport to Israel and to the cause of peace in 

le area in your capacity as the President 

the United States. You mentioned what 

ippened yesterday, and I am encouraged 

fy what happened today. And I would like to 

''lank you very, very much. 

''' And allow me to raise my glass to the 

' resident of the United States and to the 

■"•iendship between our two countries. 



Weekly Comiiilation of Presidential Documents dated February 2 

Prime Minister Rabin 

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: I 
would like to thank you, Mr. President, for 
your kind invitation to come as official guests 
of you to this country. I would like to thank 
you very much for the time that you have 
allotted for the discussion that we have had 
in the last three days about the problems 
that we face in our region and in the effort 
to move toward peace. 

I am sure that the talks have helped and 
I hope will advance the cause of peace. I 
think these kind of relations that you offer 
to me on a personal basis as well as in the 
relations between our two countries will be 
an encouragement to the cause of peace in 
the area. And I would like to thank you very, 
very much for your personal interest, per- 
sonal help, in doing so. 

And, Mr. President, toward the end of my 
visit in Washington, again thank you very, 
very much. 

President Ford 

Mr. Prime Minister and Mrs. Rabin: I am 
delighted to be here and to see so many, 
many of your friends. We, of course, are 
very pleased that you are in the United 
States. I feel, as you do, that the discussions 
we have had in the three days have been 
very meaningful. I believe they will be very 
productive. It has been a fine experience for 
me to renew our personal friendship that 
existed over a period of years when you were 
the Ambassador for Israel. It has been for 
you, I am sure, a great experience to renew 
your acquaintances with your many, many 
friends on Capitol Hill. And I am certain, 
from what I have heard from some of my 
old friends, your presentation to the Con- 
gress yesterday in joint session was out- 
standing. In fact, I heard it was so good that 

! ibruary 23, 1976 


I am not sure I want to make a state of the 
Union up there. [Laughter.] 

But let me reiterate what we have said 
both privately and publicly. The United 
States, at the present time, as it has been 
under five previous Presidents, is dedicated 
to the survival and the security of Israel. We 
mean it. At the same time, we are dedicated 
to working with you in moving forward to 
real peace in the Middle East. 

You have been staunch and steadfast in 
your dedication on behalf of your country 
and at the same time have shown great 
statesmanship and leadership in that very 
difficult area of the world. I can't thank you 
enough for the opportunity to work with you 
in the efforts that involve both your country 
and ours aimed at the achievement of the 
kind of life that is needed and necessary for 
all peoples in the Middle East. 

You have done an outstanding job as an 
Ambassador, and it is a great pleasure and 
privilege for me to work with you on behalf 
of what we all have to do in that very diffi- 
cult area, the Middle East. 

I thank you for the hospitality tonight. I 
hope and trust, as I am sure it will be, that 
as you travel around the United States in 
the next seven days, you will receive as warm 
a welcome everywhere as you have received 
in our Nation's Capital. 

Thank you very much. 


Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, distinguished 
Members of Congress: I come to you from Jerusalem 
with the greetings of my people in this, your Bi- 
centennial Year. 

Two days ago, I stood before Independence Hall to 
pay tribute in the name of Israel to the Fathers of 
the American Revolution. There. I saw the Biblical in- 
scription on the Liberty Bell which is so familiar to 
me in its original Hebrew — Ukratem dror ba'aretz 
I'chol yoshveha — "Proclaim Liberty Throughout All 
the Land Unto All the Inhabitants Thereof." We, 

' Text from the Congressional Record of Jan. 28, 
p. H398. 

Israel, celebrate with you that great message Ameri 
proclaimed 200 years ago. i 

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, I thank you 
for the invitation that has brought me here todf, 
and I appreciate your expressions of welcome. 

Standing here in this great hall, I am aware th 
you are the heirs of a two-century-old tradition 
free government by the people. Free people evei 
where acknowledge their debt to your Declaration 
Independence, which emphasizes the natural right 
all peoples to establish governments of their o\ 

Our declaration of independence, building on i\ 
right, adds to it the principle that the Jewish peoj 
shall preserve its integrity and restore its natiot 
existence in its own land, despite the holocaust 

The first principle reflects the essence of the Ame 
can Revolution, the second the essence of the Zion 

The war of 1776 and the war of 1948 were bf 
battles of liberation. What made them into revo 
tions was the human vision that fired them. It w 
a vision not only to win freedom but also to constn 
new societies in freedom. In our case, it was the rev 
of an ancient nation to put an end, once and for all, 
homelessness, helplessness, and holocaust. It was 1 
assertion of our right to self-determination, to reti 
to Zion, to reclaim it of the desolation of 20 centuri 
to gather in the oppressed of our scattered sons a 
daughters, and to build there a new society inspii 
by the values of the old. 

This is the Zionist vision. 

From the days when John Adams expressed 
hope for the return of Jewish independence, from 
days when Mark Twain first saw the land of Israel 
"a land of ruin," to the present day, the United Sta 
has shown sympathy for this vision. Congress as 
expression of America, has consistently acted to g 
that sympathy substance. For this, I extend to you 
gratitude of the people of Israel. 

Israel could well say of itself what Thomas Jeff 
son said of America: 

"... our ancestors . . . possessed a right, wh 
nature has given to all men, of departing from 
country in which chance, not choice has placed tht 
of going in quest of new habitations and of th 
establishing new societies. . . ." 

When these words were spoken, America was 
the midst of its nationbuilding through immigrati 
It was to continue for another 150 years. We an 
century into ours. Our Statue of Liberty is a refu[ 
immigrant barge. 

For both of our new societies, immigration beca 
pioneering. Israel's contemporary folk heroes, 1 
yours, are those who mastered wastelands and W' 
out to build communities in empty places. 

In a society of pioneering, democracy springs fri 


Department of State Bulle 

! ■ frontier itself. Our common heritage — founded 
i.jn the Biblical ethic — gave the democratic experi- 
I e its unique expression. It proclaimed the dignity 

I worth of every individual. Though different in 
111. our respective institutions share this common 

There are all too few nations in the world that up- 
l d these democratic foiTns and objectives. We are a 
r her small family. We did not expect to be so a 
fsieration ago. 

^ generation ago, the world was engulfed in a great 

Ar. In the contest between nations, it was perhaps 

L'reatest of battles between the forces of good 

I I list the forces of evil. When it was over, a con- 
ns effort was made to extend the principles of 

jieriiational justice and decency to all peoples, large 
al small. Its concrete expression was the Charter 
o.'the United Nations. 

\t the generation's end, the United Nations finds 

ir in crisis. The words of its charter have been 
^licd and devalued. Israel has learned that it can 
ei)ect no justice from the United Nations in its 
{isent form. Its moral resources have been eroded by 
e ortion and appeasement which again intrude upon 
tj international scene. None of us in the free world 
1^'e fared well in this climate. 

^he present combination of circumstances has 
peed my own people in the front line. But I believe 
t t the consequences extend to the whole democratic 
f lily and, ultimately, to the peace and welfare of 
nnkind. Given the acute political, economic, and 
s ial stresses of our times, never has the interde- 
p dence of our democratic community been greater. 

ienjamin Franklin might well have been speaking 
IS when he said: We must all hang together or we 
»' I all hang separately. 

say this as a representative of a small democracy 
b the representatives of the biggest and strongest 
us all. President Ford's leadership is making a 
c cial contribution to the peace of the world and to 
t cause of peace in the Middle East. His efforts 
h d out the hope for a more secure and stable world 
a [ a better place for people to live in. 

'here is no freedom, nor shall there be peace in 
t ; world, without a United States strong and con- 
fi'nt in its purpose. World peace rests upon your 
f titude. Upon it rests the hope that honest dialogue 
c move forward with societies having other systems 
rule. We welcome any form of international dia- 
1< ue to reduce the suspicions and tensions between 
n ions. For in the end, our common cause as democ- 
r ies is a struggle for mankind and not against any 
P'tion of it. 

ilr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, from this rostrum 
Ileclare that, however difficult the road, however 
h'd the challenge, and however complex the process, 
lael will strive with all its being to contribute to 
t' peace of the world by pressing ahead with its 
ejrt for peace with the Arab countries. This is the 

ving goal of all our policies. 

We know of your concern and national interest in 
the stability of our area, and I wish to say to you 
that we seek to be sensitive to them. I believe that 
certain steps we have pursued have also contributed 
to that interest. We see the expression of that interest 
— through the advancement of the human and eco- 
nomic welfare of the peoples of our region — as a 
positive development and as a hope for progress 
toward peace itself. 

We express our confidence that such developing ties 
need not be, and must not be, at the cost of Israel's 
vital interest of liberty and security. And if, in 
the pursuit of our shared goals, differences do arise 
from time to time, then let us recall Jefferson's wis- 
dom that "every difference of opinion is not a dif- 
ference of principle." 

The principle of which I speak is the resolution of 
a conflict that has lasted too long. Let me share 
with you my thinking on what has, thus far, stood 
in the way of a solution to it. 

If I were to be asked to state in a word what is 
the heart and the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict, I 
would say this: It is the refusal of the Arab coun- 
tries to reconcile themselves to the right of existence 
of one small viable sovereign Jewish state in the 
land of our people's birth; by Jewish state I mean an 
independent, democratic society, secular in the equal- 
ity of all its citizens, Jew and non-Jew alike, before 
the law and founded upon historic Jewish values. 

By stating this, I am saying that the question of 
territory, the matter of boundaries, the issue of 
maps, were not, and are not. the true obstacles to 

Twenty-nine years ago, in 1947, we accepted a very 
truncated partitioned territory upon which to rebuild 
our Jewish statehood. It was not because of its shape 
or size that the Arab leaders rejected that United 
Nations partition plan. They went to war against us 
because they rejected our very right to freedom as 
an independent people. 

Against great odds and with much sacrifice, we won 
our war of independence. The stakes were incredibly 
high. Defeat would have meant national holocaust 
and the eclipse of the Jewish people in history. 

And just as every war reaps its inevitable tragic 
crop of refugees, so did the Arab war against Israel 
produce two refugee problems of almost equal size 
— an Arab one, and a Jewish one from Arab countries. 

After our war of independence, in 1949 we signed 
armistice agreements with our neighbors. We be- 
lieved, naively, that these would soon lead to a 
negotiated peace. They did not. We were ready to 
settle for the fragile armistice lines as peace bound- 
aries. But as a matter of principle, the Arabs would 
not negotiate the end of the conflict because they 
refused to reconcile themselves to a Jewish inde- 
pendent state. 

So, in 1956, another war was impo-^ed upon us. 
Again we won it. At its end, we agreed to evacuate 
the Sinai Peninsula. Did Israel's withdrawal from all 

»3ruary 23, 1976 


the territories occupied in tlie war lead to peace ? It 
did not even lead to a negotiation. 

So, in 1967, Arab ai-mies again massed along those 
fragile frontiers that had invited past aggression. 
Again we won a victory in a war we did not seek. 

Then came 1973. Again we were attacked — this 
time a surprise attack. But this time we were not 
exposed to those weak amiistice lines which our 
neighbors had recognized only as targets of invasion. 
Israel now had defensive depth. 

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, until 1967, Israel 
did not hold an inch of the Sinai Peninsula, the West 
Bank, the Gaza Strip, or the Golan Heights. Israel 
held not an acre of what is considered disputed ter- 
ritory. And yet we enjoyed no peace. Year after 
year Israel called for — pleaded for — a negotiated 
peace with the Arab governments. Their answer was 
a blank refusal and more war. 

The reason was not a conflict over territorial 
claims. The reason was, and remains, the fact that a 
free Jewish state sits on territory at all. 

It is in this context that the Palestinian issue 
must be appraised. That issue is not the obstacle to 
peace, as some would suggest. Certainly it has to be 
solved in the context of the final peace. But to assert 
that this is the key to peace, the formula for peace, 
or the breakthrough to peace is to misread the 
realities. It is to put the legendary cart before the 

The Palestinian issue began with, and is a product 
of, the overall Arab posture on the legitimacy of a 
Jewish State of Israel. Only when that posture 
changes will the Palestinian issue be constructively 
and finally tackled. 

The clock of history cannot be put back. It was not 
Israel that prevented the establishment of a Pales- 
tinian state in 1947, as the partition plan had pro- 
posed. What did prevent it was the Arab declaration 
of war on the plan itself because it called for the 
creation of a Jewish state. 

For 19 years no Arab government saw fit to 
establish a Palestinian state, even though the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip were under Arab control. 
Neither was there a Palestinian demand to do so. In 
January 1964, the organization that calls itself the 
PLO was established by the Arab heads of state. 
Yet, even then, statehood in those territories, then 
held by Jordan and Egypt, was never the objective. 
We know what the objective is. It is written large 
into the Palestinian covenant, which is their binding 
constitution. Every paragraph of it spits out the 
venom calling for Israel's destruction. 

These are the truths that lie at the heart and the 
core of the Arab-Israel conflict. And since, to date, 
the Arab version of peace does not depart from these 
truths, no honest being can blame us for refusing to 
cooperate in our own national suicide. 

Peace will come when the Arab leaders finally cross 

the Rubicon from aggressive confrontation to h: 
monious reconciliation. Then, there is no problem i, 
tween us that cannot be solved in negotiation. Tl, 
includes, too, the Palestinian issue, within the g ^ 
graphic and political context of peace with Jord, ,1 
When I say Jordan, I do not discount Palestin , 
representation in the peace delegation of that coi. 
try. And when I say geography, I do not discoun 
negotiation concerning the future final peace bou 
aries of the territories involved. ; 

For the genuine peace we seek, Israel is ready i 
give up much and to compromise much on territc. 
In a negotiation whose sincere shared goal is fii 
reconciliation, we shall go more than halfway i 
assure its success. 

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, a short time :i , 
from this very rostrum. President Sadat wisely 
clared: "there is no substitute for direct person 
person contacts that go deep into the heart of all ■ 
problems which invoke our common concern and c • 
ture our imagination."" I wish that he would di t 
those words to me as well as to you, the Congrcs. ; 
the United States. I would then know that the w ; 
of true peacemaking has finally begun. 

I today declare: I am ready to meet with any A j 
head of government, at any time and at any pi . 
for the pui'pose of peace talks. 

I do not know when peace will finally come. Bu 1 
this I am certain: It will be our future strength I t 
will largely determine the resources of peace in r 
region. Weakness is no prescription for negotiat i. 
If it be perceived that Israel is not weak, so shall r 
neighbors perceive the wisdom of mutual comproii ' 
reconciliation, and peace. 

What, therefore, does Israel propose as the ' ' 
step in the eff'ort for peace? Israel proposes thr 
convening of the Geneva Peace Conference in ace >■ 
ance with the letter of invitation from the i i 
Secretary General to the parties to the conferenci 

The basis for the conference has to be foundei n 
two fundamental principles — on Security Coi il 
Resolutions 242 and 338 as they were accepte( y 
Israel and by the other parties and powers concei i 
The second principle is that the parties to the coi 'I 
must be the parties to the peacemaking process, le 
negotiations for peace must be conducted bet\ n 
ourselves — the Government of Israel and the n( v 
boring Arab governments. 

There are some who tell us that — here and t ? 
— a change toward realism is perhaps slowly ei • 
ing. I pray there is some truth to this. 

Israel is determined to encourage what ?r 

- For an address by President Anwar al-Sada of 
the Arab Republic of Egypt made before a ; nt 
meeting of the Congress on Nov. 5, 1975, see Bu E- 
TIN of Nov. 24, 1975, p. 728. 


Department of State Bui ii 

•mptoms there may be to move that process along, 
^is is why we entered into the interim agreement 
•th Egypt. We did so to encourage the trend to- 
■■rd greater realism. Our aim in the agreement is 
t promote conditions of stability and trust which, 
i) hope, will produce, in time, a climate for genuine 
jace negotiations. 

[n the light of what I said and under the given 
tiditions of regional tension, the pursuit of this 
rlicy calls for taking risks. It has required our 

kinjT tangible concessions for concessions far less 

ii;il)le. We have done so because we believe it is 
issary to take measured risks not only in case of 
vr but also for the sake of peace. 

Thus, in a very few weeks' time, the defense forces 
olsrael will carry out a withdrawal in Sinai. We have 
aeady handed to Egypt proper the oilfields on the 
Clf of Suez and the coastal link to them. With that, 
lael has given up its single oil resource. We have 
aieed to these measures not in return for peace, 
even in return for an end to the state of war. We 
what we did in the hope that it will move us 
sne steps closer to peace. 

Congress, I know, is familiar with these measures, 
ley are major elements of the recent Israel-Egypt 
Ereement, negotiated through the good offices of 
■ United States. May I say that the limited Ameri- 

1 civilian technical presence — requested by both 
p ties — and which Congress authorized in the con- 
t t of this agreement is a contribution toward the 
cise of peace. That presence has no function or re- 
Finsibility in case of war. And I wish to add with 
€ phasis that if a condition of hostilities does arise, 

I vill be the first to call for its removal. This is a 
r tter of fundamental doctrine for Israel. We alone 
E ' responsible for our ovm defense. This is how it 
1 ; been; this is how it must be. I believe it to be the 
€ ence of our political relationship. 

^r. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, throughout the 
3 irs. we have found here, in Congress, a wisdom and 
c 'p understanding of our nationbuilding and defense 
T 'ds and the economic burdens arising from them. 

I I as a people, we turn to ourselves before we turn 
'-i others. 

I' The Government of Israel is engaged in a tough 
I )gram of economic measures. 

-.ast year we reduced private consumption by al- 
I st 5 percent, and we will reduce it by another 5 
I -cent this year. We have put on ourselves a heavy 
Irden of taxation. This year the government will 
( lect in taxes some 70 percent of all our national 
i ome. I am told this is almost twice as much as it 
iin America. 

( mention these as only a few of the many ex- 
-Jiples within a comprehensive economic policy in- 
tcing more austerity and higher production. We 
rsall continue this policy — difficult though it be — 
i- this is what we require of ourselves to do. 

Peace, not war, is our tradition. We see no glory in 
battle. I was once a soldier, not by choice but by 
necessity. I know the horrors of war, the waste, and 
the agony. I know what peace can bring to all the 
peoples of our region through open boundaries, pro- 
jection of economic cooperation, the conquest of dis- 
ease, and the free flow of ideas, people, and products. 

Even now. before peace, we declare our readiness 
to promote its climate by unilaterally opening our 
ports for the free passage of goods to and from our 
immediate neighbors. 

We open our hospitals to our neighboring sick. We 
declare open our institutions of research for all the 
countries in the Middle East wishing to share knowl- 
edge in the fields of agriculture and water develop- 

We, the people of our region, are destined to live 
together for all time, for never again shall there be a 
Middle East without a State of Israel. 

The going has not been easy, and the challenge 
ahead will not be easy. But we are an old people, and 
there is no sacrifice too great to protect the freedom 
we have won and the new society we have created. 
I believe Americans, above all, can understand this 

Three hundred years ago, celebrating their first 
years of survival after much suffering, your Pilgrim 
Fathers wrote these lines: 

"We have made a clearing in the wilderness; and 
another year will see a broader clearing, a better 
garnering. We have made a good beginning in a 
hostile world." 

So do we, the first generation of free Israel, descen- 
dants of 2,000 years of unhappy wandering, declare 
we have made a good beginning in a rather hostile 

America has helped us greatly. In loyalty to its 
Founding Fathers, this Republic of the United States 
has given tangible meaning to human values in the 
charting of its policies. By virtue of this, Israel pays 
you tribute as you enter into the third century of 

Permit me to express that tribute to the Congress 
through the words of an American Jew, a soldier in 
the Revolutionary War. Jonas Phillips, in 1787, wrote 
this prayer: 

"May the almighty God of our fathers Abraham, 
Isaac and Jacob, imbue this noble assembly with wis- 
dom . . . and may they have the satisfaction to see 
that their present toil and labor for the welfare of 
the United States be approved throughout all the 
world and particularly by the United States of 

This is the sincere sentiment of friendship Israel 
brings you this day. 

M'bruary 23, 1976 


U.S. Sinai Support Mission 


Establishing the United States Sinai Support 

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the 
Constitution and statutes of the United States of 
America, including the Joint Resolution of October 
13, 1975 (Public Law 94-110, 89 Stat. 572, 22 U.S.C. 
2441 note), the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as 
amended (22 U.S.C. 2151 ct scq.), including but not 
limited to Sections 531, 621, 633, 901, and 903 there- 
of (22 U.S.C. 2346, 2381, 2.393, 2441, 2443), and 
section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, and 
as President of the United States of America, it is 
hereby ordered as follows : 

Section 1. (a) In accordance with the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and notwith- 
standing the provisions of Part I of Executive Order 
No. 10973, as amended, there is hereby established 
the United States Sinai Support Mission, herein- 
after referred to as the Mission." 

(b) The Mission shall, in accordance with the For- 
eign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, the Joint 
Resolution of October 13, 1975, and the provisions of 
this order, carry out the duties and responsibilities 
of the United States Government to implement the 
"United States Proposal for the Early Warning Sys- 
tem in Sinai" in connection with the Basic Agree- 
ment between Egypt and Israel, signed on Septem- 
ber 4, 1975, and the Annex to the Basic Agreement, 
subject to broad policy guidance received through 
the Assistant to the President for national security 
affairs, and the continuous supervision and general 
direction of the Secretary of State pursuant to Sec- 
tion 622(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 
as amended (22 U.S.C. 2382(c)). 

(c) It shall be the duty and responsibility of the 
Mission to ensure that the United States role in the 
Early Warning System enhances the prospect of 
compliance in good faith with the terms of the 
Egyptian-Israeli agreement and thereby promotes 
the cause of peace. 

(d) At the head of the Mission there shall be a 
Director, who shall be appointed by the President." 
The Director shall be a Special Representative of 
the President. There shall also be a Deputy Director, 
who shall be appointed by the President. The Deputy 
Director shall perform such duties as the Director 
may direct, and shall serve as the Director in the 
case of a vacancy in the office of the Director, or 
during the absence or disability of the Director. 

(e) The Director and Deputy Director shall re- 
ceive such compensation, as permitted by law, as 
the President may specify. 

Sec. 2. (a) The Director shall exercise immediate 
supervision and direction over the Mission. 

(b) The Director may, to the extent permitted by 

law, employ such staff as may be necessary 

(c) The Director may, to the extent permitted 
law and the provisions of this order, enter into 
contracts as may be necessary to carry out the 
poses of this order. 

(d) The Director may procure the temporary 
intermittent services of experts or consultants 
accordance with the provisions of Section 626 of 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended 
U.S.C. 2386), and section 3109 of title 5 of 
United States Code. 

(e) As requested by the Director, the agencies 
the Executive branch shall, to the extent permi 
by law and to the extent practicable, provide 
Mission with such administrative services, infon 
tion, advice, and facilities as may be necessary 
the fulfillment of the Mission's functions under 

Sec. 3. (a) In accordance with the provision 
Section 633 of the Foreign Assistance Act of ' 
as amended (22 U.S.C. 2393), it is hereby de 
mined to be in furtherance of the purposes of 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 
the functions authorized by that act and requ 
by this order, may be performed, subject to the 
visions of subsection (b) of this Section, by 
Director without regard to the following spec 
provisions of law and limitations of authority 

(1) Section 3648 of the Revised Statutes 
amended (31 U.S.C. 529). 

(2) Section 3710 of the Revised Statutes 
U.S.C. 8). 

(3) Section 2 of Title III of the Act of Mar( 
1933 (47 Stat. 1520, 41 U.S.C. 10a). 

(4) Section 3735 of the Revised Statutes 
U.S.C. 13). 

(5) Section 3679 of the Revised Statutes 
amended (31 U.S.C. 665, Section 3732 of the 
vised Statutes, as amended (41 U.S.C. 11), and 
tion 9 of the Act of June 30, 1906 (34 Stat. 76 
U.S.C. 627), so as to permit the indemnificatic 
contractors against unusually hazardous risk: 
defined in Mission contracts, consistent, to the 
tent practicable, with regulations prescribed bj 
Department of Defense pursuant to the provi 
of the Act of August 28, 1958, as amended 
U.S.C. 1431 et seq.) and Executive Order No. 1 
of November 14, 1958, as amended. 

(6) Section 302(a) of the Federal Property 
Administrative Services Act of 1949, as ame 
(41 U.S.C. 252(a)), so as to permit the Sinai 

^No. 11896; 41 Fed. Reg. 2067. 

= For text of Executive Order No. 10973, Ac 
istration of the Foreign Assistance Act and Re 
Functions, see Bulletin of Nov. 27, 1961, p. 90 

" On Jan. 15 President Ford announced the apfi 
ment of C. William Kontos as Director of the U 
States Sinai Support Mission and Special Repres- 
tive of the President. For biographic data, 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 
Jan. 19, 1976, p. 39. 


Department of State Bui 

lit Mission to utilize the procurement regulations 
jomulgated by the Department of Defense pursu- 
it to Section 2202 of Title 10 of the United States 

(7) Section 304(b) of the Federal Property and 
.Iniinistrative Services Act of 1949, as amended 

I U.S.C. 254(b)), so as to permit the payment of 

s in excess of the prescribed fee limitations but 

thing herein contained shall be construed to con- 

-tute authorization hereunder for the use of the 

<i;t-plus-a-percentage-of-cost system of contracting. 

(8) Section 305 of the Federal Property and Ad- 
nnistrative Sei^ices Act of 1949, as amended (41 
TS.C. 255). 

(9) Section 901(a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 
H6, as amended (46 U.S.C. 1241(a)). 

(b) It is directed that each specific use of the 
V ivers of statutes and limitations of authority 
athorized by this Section shall be made only when 
c.ermined in writing by the Director that such use 
ii specifically necessary and in furtherance of the 
prposes of this Order and in the interests of the 
liited States. 

5EC. 4. (a) There is hereby established the Sinai 
^eragency Board, hereinafter referred to as the 
lard, which shall be composed of the following: 

(1) The Secretary of State or his representative. 

(2) The Secretary of Defense or his representa- 

(3) The Administrator, Agency for International 
1 velopment, or his representative. 

(4) The Director of the United States Arms Con- 
t 1 and Disarmament Agency or his representative. 

(5) The Director of Central Intelligence or his 
1 )resentative. 

(6) The Director of the United States Sinai Sup- 
) -.t Mission or his representative. 

(b) The Director of the United States Sinai Sup- 
J't Mission or his representative shall be Chairman 
< the Board. 

(c) The President may from time to time desig- 
1 te others to serve on, or participate in the activi- 
1 s of, the Board. The Board may invite representa- 
I es of other departments and agencies to partici- 
] te in its activities. 

(d) The Board shall meet at the call of the Chair- 
iin to assist, coordinate, and advise concerning the 
!:ivities of the United States Sinai Support Mis- 


Sec. 5. The Secretary of State shall, pursuant to 
'; provisions of Executive Order No. 10973, as 
i lended, including Part V thereof, and this order, 
jovide from funds made available to the President 
15 funds necessary for the activities of the United 
iates Sinai Support Mission. 

Sec. 6. All activities now being undertaken by the 
cretary of State to implement the "United States 
oposal for the Early Warning System in Sinai" 
all be continued until such time as the Mission has 
come operational and the Director requests the 

transfer of those activities to the Mission. The Sec- 
retary of State may exercise any of the authority 
or responsibility vested in the Director, by this 
order, in order to continue the performance of activ- 
ities related to the Early Warning System until 
transferred to the Director. All such activities under- 
taken by the Secretary of State shall be deemed to 
have been taken by the Director. 

Gerald R. Ford. 

The White House, January 13, 1976. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

94th Congress, 1st Session 

Protocol for the Continuation in Force of the Inter- 
national Coffee Agreement of 1968, as extended. 
Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela- 
tions to accompany Ex. B, 94-1. S. Ex. Rept. 94-11. 
October 22, 1975. 11 pp. 

The 1975 Brazilian Shrimp Agreement. Report of 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to ac- 
company Ex. D, 94-1. S. Ex. Rept. 94-12. October 
22, 1975. 6 pp. 

The Amendments to Certain Articles of the Conven- 
tion on the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consulta- 
tive Organization. Report of the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations to accompany Ex. F, 94-1. 
S. Ex. Rept. 94-13. October 22, 1975. 4 pp. 

Indochina Refugee Children Assistance Act of 1975. 
Report of the Senate Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare to accompany S. 2145. S. Rept. 
94-432. October 22, 1975. 16 pp. 

Security Supporting Assistance for Zaire. Hearing 
before the Subcommittees on African Affairs and 
Foreign Assistance of the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations. October 24, 1975. 49 pp. 

United States Grain and Oil Agreements With the 
Soviet Union. Hearing before the House Committee 
on International Relations. October 28, 1975. 71 pp. 

The United States and China. A report to the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee and the House Inter- 
national Relations Committee by the seventh con- 
gressional delegation to the People's Republic of 
China. October 28, 1975. 68 pp. 

Implementing Patent Cooperation Treaty. Report of 
the House Committee on the Judiciary to accom- 
pany S. 24. H. Rept. 94-592. October 29, 1975. 
32 pp. 

Two-Hundred-Mile Fishing Zone. Hearing before 
the Subcommittee on Oceans and International En- 
vironment of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations. October 31, 1975. 443 pp. 

Resolution Relating to the President's Trip to China 
and American MIA's and POW's. Report of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accom- 
pany S. Res. 251. S. Rept. 94-457. November 18, 
1975. 2 pp. 

jbruary 23, 1976 


U.S. Responsibilities in a Changing World Economy 

Statement by Secretary Kissinger ' 

I welcome this opportunity to testify be- 
fore this distinguished committee which 
plays such a critical role in a wide range of 
international economic issues. Continuing ex- 
change between this committee and the State 
Department is essential if our policy is to 
reflect the totality of our national interest. 
I hope my testimony today will signal the 
beginning of a process of more active col- 

Our foreign economic policies affect vitally 
every American: the farmer, the working- 
man, the entrepreneur, and the consumer. 
They affect our economic prosperity and our 
security as a nation. 

Our economic policies are a critical ele- 
ment in the construction of a stable world 
order. The maintenance of peace, historically 
a function of our military strength, is in- 
creasingly dependent as well on our economic 

The 20th-century revolution in technology, 
transportation, communication, and world 
economic development has multiplied the 
pressure points among nations and the po- 
tential for conflict. It has stirred a ground 
swell of demands from those nations and 
peoples that have not shared fully in the 
world's economic progress. It has inspired 
growing concern about access to the world's 
natural resources and disputes over the dis- 
tribution of the economic benefits that come 

' Made before the Senate Committee on Finance 
on Jan. 30 (text from press release 42). The com- 
plete transcript of the hearings will be published 
by the committee and will be available from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

from these resources. Our economies, insti 
tions, and daily lives are vulnerable to 
economic policies of others. 

At the same time, the United States 
the world's most powerful economy. Toget 
with our allies among the industrial dem 
racies, we are the engine of global prosp 
ity, technological innovation, and the b 
hope for widening economic opportunity 
millions around the globe. 

We could withstand an era of internatio 
economic warfare better than any. But 
heritage and our aspirations demand mi 
of us than the mere search for survival 
a world of resentment and despair. Inde 
such a world could not but ultimately und 
mine the stability and peace upon which 
else we seek to do in the world is based, 
prospect for our children's well-being and 
the future of the values we cherish will 
dim unless we take the lead in seeking a i 
era of international economic cooperatior 

Foreign economic policy is thus a crit 
element in our overall foreign policy and 
the pursuit of our broadest national ob; 

At the present time we face a series' 
economic challenges that must be met if 
are to have a stable world order: 

— Inflation and recession have spr 
throughout the world, threatening 
world's trading and financial system and 
health of our social institutions. Recov 
is now underway in much of the indust; 

— The stunning increase in the price of 
has transferred massive wealth to a s; 
group of producer countries. It has inte; 


Department of State Bull* 

j world recession, exacerbated world in- 
pn, and created serious problems of debt, 
^cing, and balance-of-payments adjust- 

The premises of the postwar e