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Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

BOSTON 
PUBLIC 
UBRARY 




(^"V 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 









Volume LXXV, 


Nos 


. 1932- 


1957 














July 5, 1976-December 27, 


1976 


















INDEX 












timber 


Date 


of Issue 


Pages 






Number 


Date 


ofi 


ssue 


Pages 


1932 


July 


5, 


1976 


1-^0 






1945 


Oct. 


4, 


1976 


409-440 


1933 


July 


12, 


1976 


41-72 






1946 


Oct. 


11, 


1976 


441^68 


1934 


July 


19, 


1976 


73-104 






1947 


Oct. 


18, 


1976 


469-496 


1935 


July 


26, 


1976 


105-148 






1948 


Oct. 


25, 


1976 


497-540 


1936 


Aug. 


2, 


1976 


149-188 






1949 


Nov. 


1, 


1976 


541-572 


1937 


Aug. 


9, 


1976 


18^-216 






1950 


Nov. 


8, 


1976 


573-596 


1938 


Aug. 


16, 


1976 


217-256 






1951 


Nov. 


15, 


1976 


597-628 


1939 


Aug. 


23, 


1976 


257-284 






1952 


Nov. 


22, 


1976 


629-652 


1940 


Aug. 


30, 


1976 


285-304 






1953 


Nov. 


29, 


1976 


653-676 


1941 


Sept. 


6 


1976 


305-332 






1954 


Dec. 


6, 


1976 


677-700 


1942 


Sept. 


13, 


1976 


333-348 






1955 


Dee. 


13, 


1976 


701-724 


1943 


Sept. 


20, 


1976 


349-376 






1956 


Dec. 


20, 


1976 


725-744 


1944 


Sept. 


27, 


1976 


377-408 






1957 


Dec. 


27, 


1976 


745-760 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 






:j 



Correction for Volume LXXV 

The editor of the Bulletin wishes to call attention to the following 
error in volume LXXV: 

October 25, p. 500, col. 2: In line 21, the word "with" should read 
"within." 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Publication 8895 

Released April 1977 



' sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 
Price: 52 issues plus semiannual indexes, domestic $42.50, foreign $53.15; single copy 85 cents 



INDEX 

Volume LXXV, Numbers 1932-1957, July 5, 1976-December 27, 1976 > 



Abu Dhabi, U.S. technical assistance 
agreement re collecting and con- 
serving water supplies from sur- 
face runoff, 347 
Acheson, Dean: PR 531, 10/27 
(quoted); Kissinger, 574, PR 530, 
10/26; McCloskev, 139; Reston 
■"^ (quoted), PR 530, 10/26 
Acheson, Mrs. Dean, remarks at dedi- 
cation of Dean Acheson Audito- 
rium, PR 531, 10/27 
Acker, Gary (Schaufele). 342 
Adams, John (Queen Elizabeth II), 

198 
Advisory committees, notice of meet- 
ings. Nee Notices of meetings 
Afghanistan (Robinson), 492 
Agricultural commodities, sale of, 
bilateral agreement with U.S., 
467 
Visit of Secretary Kissinger, joint 
statement. 316 
Africa i.see also names of itidividual 
coimtries): 
Communist influence, question of 

(Kissinger), 111, 513, 515, 518 
Economic development: Bolen, 618; 
Kissinger, 46, 262, 351, 354, 
559; Scranton, 202 
European assistance fund, pro- 
posed: Kissinger, 46, 82, 
113, 126-127, 263. 264, 355, 
560, PR 314, 6/21, PR 419, 
9/17; Schmidt, 385 
Regional cooperation (Kis- 
singer), 355, 358 
U.S. aid (Kissinger), 263 
Foreign Relations of the United 
States. 19i8, volume V, The 
Near East, South Asia, and Af- 
rica, part 2, released, 700 
Great-power rivalry, avoidance of 
(Kissinger), 46, 260, 351, 415, 
501, 530, 553, 559, 561, 576, PR 
353, 7/22, PR 463, 9/23, PR 514, 
10/15 
Horn of Africa countries 
(Schaufele), 300 



Africa — Continued 

Human rights (Kissinger), PR 443, 

9/16 
Non-African military intervention, 
question of(Kissinger),46, 517, 
518, 522, 727 
Sahel relief: Bolen, 618; Kissinger, 
82, 126, 263, 355, 560; Scranton, 
202 
Security problems (Kissinger), 357 
Southern (see also Namibia, 
Rhodesia and South Africa): 
African governments and black 
African leaders, U.S. consul- 
tations; Kissinger, 94, 96, 
259, 260, 353, 359, 377, 401, 
411, 511, 516, 519, 520, 529, 
561, 576, 610, PR 439, 9/16, 
PR 450, 9/20, PR 451, 9/20, 
PR 468, 9/23; Scranton, 202 
African solution; Bolen, 617; Kis- 
singer, 158, 409, 512, 517, 

518, 520, 527, 561, PR 353, 
7/22, PR 463, 9/23; Rogers, 
533, 536 

African summit meeting, Tan- 
zania (Kissinger), 379, 380, 
383, 512, PR 412, 9/4, PR 419, 
9/17 

European interests and role (Kis- 
singer), 127, 325, 411, PR 
419, 9/17 

Human rights, self-determina- 
tion, and racial justice; 292; 
Bolen, 616; Kissinger, 96, 97, 
325, 351, 559; Mbwale, PR 
439, 9/16; Scranton, 184, 202 

National liberation movements 
(Kissinger), 356, 379, 412, 
415, 513, 518, 520, 561, 576 

Negotiations, prospects and prog- 
ress; Bolen, 617; Ford, 385, 
481; Kissinger, 121, 126, 167, 
170, 239, 349, 377, 403, 511, 

519, 527, PR 411, 9/3, PR 412, 
9/4, PR 415, 9/5, PR 417, 9/7, 
PR 420, 9/7, PR 422, 9/7, PR 
459, 9/22, PR 466, 9/23; Lord, 



Africa — Continued 
Southern — Continued 

Peaceful solution, need for 

(Kaunda), PR 443, 9/16 
Racial violence: Bolen, 616; Kis- 
singer, 349, 409, 641; Rogers, 
532 
U.S. mercenaries, question of re- 
cruitment (Kissinger), 240 
Soviet role (Kissinger), 706, PR 514, 

10/15 
U.S. basketball coach Tobias, com- 
mendation, PR 396, 8/25 
U.S. policy; Kissinger, 41, 46, 126, 
131, 151, 218, 239, 245, 257, 351, 
500, 511, 518, 530, 559, 605, 706, 
PR 353, 7/22, PR 439, 9/16. PR 
453, 9/22. PR 463, 9/23; Mwale, 
PR 439, 9/16; Scranton, 201 
U.S. trade investment: Bolen, 619; 

Kissinger, 560 
Visits of Secretary Kissinger; Ford, 
385; Kissinger, 259, 361, 383, 
409, 500, 511, PR 422, 9/7, PR 
432, 9/13, PR 443, 9/16, PR 465, 
9/23 
Personal diplomacy (Kissinger), 

411 
Presidential elections, effect (Kis- 
singer), 413, 610, 641 
African Development Bank; 
Landsat study in Benin, Ghana, and 
Upper Volta, grant agreement, 
216 
U.S. contribution; Bolen, 619; Kis- 
singer, 356 
African Development Fund 

(McGovern), 590 
Agricultural surpluses, U.S. use in 
overseas programs, agreements 
with: Afghanistan, 467; Chile, 675; 
Egypt, 104, 651, 675; Ethiopia, 71; 
Guinea, 540; Honduras, 71; In- 
donesia, 39, 104, 467, 675, 759; Is- 
rael, 495, 572; Italy, 71; Jamaica, 
627; Jordan, 148; Korea, 439; 
Pakistan, 439, 572; Portugal, 376, 
723; Sri Lanka, 675; Syria, 40, 
540; Tanzania, 148; Tunisia, 40; 
Zambia, 408 



' With this index, the Department of State begins a listing by subject matter of press releases not printed in the 
Bulletin. Entries for such releases include the number and date (for example, PR 307, 6/17). Volume LXXV covers 
the period June 14-December 11, 1976. Copies of press releases may be obtained fi'om the Office of Press Relations, Depart- 
ment of State, Washington, D.C. 20420. 



Index, July 5-December 27, 1976 



761 



Agriculture {see also Agricultural 

surpluses and name of product): 

Agricultural development, bilateral 

agreements with: Dominican 

Republic, 651; Egypt, 744; 

Haiti, 651; Kenya, 256; Peru, 

723 

Cooperation agreement with Iran: 

315; Ansary, 308 
Crop production, bilateral agree- 
ment with Mali, 188 
Doukkala-Zemamra sprinkler irri- 
gation system, bilateral agree- 
ment with Morocco, 188 
Feeder roads as means of promoting 
increased agricultural develop- 
ment, bilateral agreements 
with: Colombia, 187; Haiti, 188 
Foodgrain crops and cropping sys- 
tems, improvement of produc- 
tion technology, bilateral 
agreement with Nepal, 467 
Improved water and land use, loan 

agreement with Peru, 723 
International Fund for Agricultural 
Development: 624; Bolen, 621 
Greenwald, 298; Kissinger, 504 
McGovern, 591; Robinson, 288 
Rogers, 655 
International plant protection con- 
vention (1951); Cuba, 38; 
Mexico, 438; Papua New 
Guinea, 438 
Sericulture technology and im- 
proved seed development pro- 
gram, agreements with Thai- 
land, 596 
Small farmer development, bilateral 
agreements with: Bolivia, 187; 
Colombia, 284; Ghana, 744; 
Zaire, 724 
Small-scale irrigation, bilateral 
agreement with Bangladesh, 
651 
U.S. agricultural policy (Katz), 483 
Water management practices in 
selected regions of Egypt, grant 
agreement with Egypt, 304 
Alaska pipeline, question of route 

(Ford), 162 
Algeria, treaties, agreements, etc., 

103, 216, 256, 650, 651, 744 
American ideals: Kissinger, 257, 265, 
598, 602; Lewis, 194; Scranton, 
746 
Andean Pact (Kissinger), 16 
Andersen, Hans G., 231 
Andreotti, Giulio, program for U.S. 

visit, PR 578, 12/3 
Angola: Bolen, 619, 620; Kissinger, 46, 
259, 260 
Cuban military intervention and 
continued presence of troops: 
Kissinger, 26, 30, 48, 158, 172, 
239, 265, 350, 359, 401, 513, 516, 
520, 704; Luers, 58; Scranton, 
742; Sherer, 100 



762 



Angola — Continued 
Execution of Daniel Gearhart and 
effect on U.S. relations: Kis- 
singer, 163, 165, 167, 171; Nes- 
sen, 163; Schaufele, 342 
Genocide, guerrilla war, question of: 

Kissinger, 704; Scranton, 742 
Mercenaries recruited in U.S., alle- 
gations: Kissinger, 341; 
Schaufele, 341 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 439, 571 
U.N. membership: 
U.S. abstention (Scranton), 742 
U.S. veto (Sherer), 99 
U.S. relations, question of (Kis- 
singer), 359 
Ansary, Hushang, 307 
Antarctic treaty (1959), recommenda- 
tions re furtherance of principles 
and objectives (1975), South Af- 
rica, 347 
Antitrust cooperation agreement with 
Federal Republic of Germany, 
signature, 102 
ANZUS: 292; Robinson, 285 
25th Council meeting, communique, 
289 
Arab-Israeli conflict (see also United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency 
for Palestine Refugees in the 
Near East and names of indi- 
vidual countries): Kissinger, 306, 
PR .591, 12/8 
Arab boycott of Israel and question 
of cooperation of U.S. business 
(Kissinger), 369 
Arms shipments: Atherton, 477; 

Kissinger, 228 
European role (Kissinger), 708 
Geneva conference, question of re- 
sumption (Kissinger), 95, 502, 
707, PR 504, 10/8 
Israel security and survival: Ather- 
ton, 174, 477; Ford (quoted), 
175; Kissinger, 597, 605, 693 
Israeli-occupied territories: 
Security Council consensus 
statement: Kissinger, 693; 
Sherer, 692; text of state- 
ment, 693 
World Health Assembly action on 
health care report (Scranton), 
37 
Lebanon, Middle East settlement, 
effect on: Atherton, 177; Kis- 
singer, 164, 236, 563, PR 514, 
10/15; Lord, 682 
Negotiations: 
Arab role: Atherton, 478; Kis- 
singer, 172, 563 
Personal satisfaction (Kissinger), 

128 
Prospects and progress: Ather- 
ton, 176; Kissinger, 131, 151, 
160, 164, 218, 314, 350, 402, 
501, 601, 707, PR 419, 9/7 
Step-by-step approach (Kis- 
singer), 236, 502, 545, 562, 
601 



Arab-Israeli conflict — Continued 

Palestinian rights, question of: j 

Atherton, 178; Kissinger, 647 

U.S. veto of unbalanced Security 

Council resolution: 695; 

Sherer, 143 

Peace, need, basis: Atherton, 175; 

Kissinger, 545, 562; Sherer, 143 

Soviet role and influence, question 

of (Kissinger), 367 
U.N. Emergency Force: 
One-year extension (Sherer), 647 
Transfer of certain foreign excess 
property of Sinai Support , 
Mission, agreement re, 652 ! 
U.N. role (Kissinger), 501 ! 

Arentoft, John, 712 
Argentina: 
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 

231 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 572, 
700 
Armaments: 
Arms race (Kissinger), 228, 522 
M48A5 tanks and M113A1 armored 
personnel carriers, loan agree- 
ment with Portugal, 71 
U.S. sales policy: Atherton, 475; 
Habib, 447; Kissinger, 228, 244, 
371, 549, 606, 642 
Arms control and disarmament (Kis- 
singer), 131,499, 710 
Chemical weapons prohibition, 
U.S. -Soviet consultations, 423 
Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, U.S., 15th annual report, 
transmittal (Ford), 345 
Armstrong, Oscar V., 457 
ASEAN. See Association of Southeast 

Asian Nations 
Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia 
(see also names of individual 
countries): 
Economic development (Kissinger), 

224 
Foreign Relations of the United 
States, ins, volume V, The 
Near East, South Asia, and Af- 
rica, part 2, released, 700 
Harvard East Asia Conference (Kis- 
singer), 573, 575 
Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh 
common market, question of 
(Kissinger), 319 
Security, U.S. interests: Ford 
(quoted), 470; Habib, 449; Kis- 
singer, 219 
U.S. policy, relations, and role: 
Atherton, 479; Hummel, 469; 
Kissinger, 216, 350; Lord, 685 
Asian Development Bank: Hummel, 
471; Kissinger, 225, 504; 
McGovern, 590; Robinson, 288 
Articles of agreement establishing 
(1965), Cook Islands, 304 
Association of Southeast Asian Na- 
tions: 290, 292; Hummel, 471; Kis- 
singer, 221; Robinson, 288 



Department of State Bulletini 



Alherton, Alfred L. , Jr. , 174, 429, 475 
lAustralia: 

Foreign investment policy, 293 

Japan, relations: 289-290; Robinson, 
286 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 39, 70, 
147, 304, 347, 467, 539, 675, 759 

U.S. relations (Robinson), 285 

U.S. visit of Prime Mini.ster Fraser: 
joint statement, 291; program, 
PR 350, 7/22 
Austria, treaties, agreements, etc., 
39, 103, 256, 329, 330, 438, 495, 
744, 759 
Aviation: 

Aeronautical facilities and services 
in Greenland, agreement with 
Denmark, 596 

Air navigation services in Greenland 
and the Faroe Islands, agree- 
ment (1956): 
Amendment of article V, 284 
Amendment of part IV of annex I, 
539 

Air navigation services in Iceland, 
joint financing, amendment to 
1956 agreement, 284 

Air passenger charter services, 
bilateral agreements with: Ire- 
land, 39, 102; U.K., 37 

Air transport agreements with: 
Lebanon, 71; Poland, 439; Ven- 
ezuela, 628 

Air transportation, international, 
U.S. policy statement (Ford), 
488 

Aircraft, 18 Lockheed P-3 long- 
range patrol aircraft, purchase 
by Canada, bilateral agree- 
ment, 284 

Airworthiness certificates, recip- 
rocal acceptance, agreements 
with: Brazil, 147; Poland, 675; 
Romania, 760 

Goose Bay airport, use of facilities, 
bilateral agreement with 
Canada, 187, 759 

Hijacking agreement with U.S., 
Cuban cancellation (Kissinger), 
537, 577 

International civil aviation, conven- 
tion (1944), Cape Verde, 347 
Protocol (1971), Iraq, 103 

International recognition of rights 
in aircraft, convention (1948), 
Lu.xembourg, 103 

Offenses and certain other acts 
committed on board aircraft, 
convention (1963): Ireland, 
Papua New Guinea, Turkey, 103 

Suppression of unlawful acts against 
safety of civil aviation, conven- 
tion (1971): Barbados, 627; Bel- 
gium, France, 303; Gabon, 146; 
Indonesia, 376 

Suppression of unlawful seizure of 
aircraft, convention (1970): 
Bahamas, 329; Indonesia, 376 



Aviation — Continued 

U.K. -U.S. civil aviation dispute re 
winter season traffic, resolu- 
tion, PR 511, 10/14 



B 



Bacon, Sir Francis (quoted), 614 
Bacon, George (Schaufele), 342 
Bahamas: 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 70, 71, 

329,330,331,438,651 
U.S. Ambassador (Olson), PR 567, 
11/23 
Bahrain: 
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 

713 
Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization, conven- 
tion (1948) and amendments, ac- 
ceptance, 495 
U.S. Ambassador (Cluverius), PR 
509, 10/14 
Bailey, Pearl, 755 
Baker, Howard H., Jr., 510 
Balaguer, Joaquin (quoted), 14, 18 
Balance of payments: 122; Ford, 118; 
Rogers, 751; Simon, 119, 120 
Africa (Kissinger), 356 
Latin America (Rogers), 753 
Zaire, bilateral loan agreement, 216 
Balloon program, transatlantic, mem- 
orandum of understanding (1976), 
466 
Bangladesh: 
Karnaphuli Power Station, hy- 
drogenerating unit, agreement 
with U.S., 596 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 39, 70, 

596, 651, 723 
U.S. Ambassador (Masters), PR 
500, 10/7 
Barbados, treaties, agreements, etc., 

103, 256, 495, 572, 627 
Barnard, Robert, 541 
Beatty, Warren (Luers), 215 
Becker, Ralph E. , sworn in as Ambas- 
sador to Honduras, PR 458, 9/22 
Belgium: 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 39, 70, 
256, 303, 304, 330, 347, 438, 539 
U.S. MAAG's terminated, 336 
Benin, international coffee agreement 
(1976), provisional application, 
539 
Bennett, W. Tapley , Jr. , 185, 373, 510, 

668 
Berlin: Genscher, PR 598, 12/10; Kis- 
singer, PR 598, 12/10 
Berlin agreement: Kissinger, 130, 384; 

Schmidt, 384 
Bermuda, treaties, agreements, etc., 

256 
Bhutto, Ali (quoted), 737 
Bibow, Rolf, 647 

Bicentennial: Queen Elizabeth II, 197; 
Ford, 245; Kekkonen, 337; Kis- 
singer, 18, 149, 217, 509; Lewis, 



Index, July 5-December 27, 1 976 



Bicentennial — Continued 

195; Schmidt, 246; Scranton, 205; 
Tolbert, 482 
Australian studies at Harvard Uni- 
versity, endowment of chair, 
293; Robinson, 285; visit of Aus- 
tralian ballet, Robinson, 285 
Federal Republic of Germany, es- 
tablishment of Albert Einstein 
Spacearium of Smithsonian Air 
and Space Museum, 246 
Finnish participation (Ford), 337 
Iran, scholarship funds, 316 
U.K. gift of Bicentennial bell 

(Ford), 197 
U.S. -U.K. Bicentennial arts fellows 
named, PR 334, 6/28 
Big-power responsibility: 291; Kis- 
singer, 31, 149, 155, 258, 265, 350, 
498, 518, 597; Lewis, 192; Lord, 
679 
Bindzi, Benoit, 739 
Biological and toxin weapons, conven- 
tion (1972): Sierra Leone, 103; 
Togo, 674 
Black, Creed C, 363, 364 
Blake, James J., sworn in as Ambas- 
sador to Iceland, PR 355, 7/23 
Blake, William (quoted), 732 
Bloch, Dora: Bennett, 185; Kissinger, 

168 
Blumenfeld, Erik, 707 
Bodine, William W., Jr., 363 
Boeker, Paul, 134 
Bolen, David B., 616 
Bolivia (Robinson), 492 
Access to sea: 23; Kissinger, 21 
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 13 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 187, 

304,438, 651, 723, 759 
Visit of Secretary Kissinger: Kis- 
singer, 20; U.S. -Bolivia joint 
communique, 23 
Boster, Davis Eugene, sworn in as 
Ambassador to Guatemala, PR 
475, 9/28 
Botswana (Bolen), 618 
U.S. Ambassador (Norland), PR 
569, 11/24 
Boyatt, Thomas (Kissinger), 169 
Bradford, William G., sworn in as 
Ambassador to Chad, PR 491, 10/1 
Bradsher, Henry S., 606 
Brazil: 
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 

132 
Balance of payments (Rogers), 753 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 71, 147, 

216. 304, 571, 744 
U.S. -Brazil Joint Groups on Scien- 
tific and Technological Coopera- 
tion and Energy Technology, 
first meetings, joint statement, 
493 
Brokaw, Tom, 528 
Brown, Frederick Z., 293, 392, 453 
Brzezinski, Zbigniew (Kissinger), 242 
Buali, Abdulaziz Abdulrahman, 713 



763 



Buehan, Alastair: (quoted) 105, 107; 
Kissinger, 105 

Bulgaria, treaties, agreements, etc., 
304, 438, 700, 759 

Bui-ma, drug control programs: Hum- 
mel, 473; Robinson, 491 

Burundi: 
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 

739 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 304, 376 

Business practices, restrictive, 
agreement with Federal Republic 
of Germany re mutual coopera- 
tion, 147 

Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Repub- 
lic, treaties, agreements, etc., 
347, 376, 438, 466 

Byrne, Patricia M., sworn in as Am- 
bassador to Mali, PR 502, 10/8 



Caglayangil, Ihsan, remarks following 
meeting with Secretary Kis- 
singer, PR 596, 12/10 
Callaghan, James, remarks on 
Rhodesia, PR 467, 9/23, PR 468, 
9/23 
Cambodia. See Khmer Republic 
Cameroon: 
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 

739 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 38, 539, 
674 
Canada: 
Communications Technology Satel- 
lite (CTS), cooperative launch- 
ing: Bennett, 668; Reis, 208 
Goose Bay airport, bilateral agree- 
ment re use of, 187, 759 
Great Lakes levels discussions, PR 

457, 9/22 
IJC Garrison Diversion Unit, delay 

in final report, PR 385, 8/16 
St. Lawrence Seaway consultations, 

PR 580, 12/3 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 39, 103, 
104, 147, 187, 284, 304, 329, 331, 
407, 495, 539, 723, 759 
U.S. -Canada border television dis- 
cussions, PR 499, 10/7 
U.S. -Canadian meeting on the Pop- 
lar River, PR 348, 7/13 
U.S. maritime boundaries, 667 
U.S. relations (Kissinger), 227, 350 
Cape Verde: 
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 

231 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 347, 

376, 439, 651 
U.S. Ambassador (Wells), PR 513, 
10/15 
Carter, Jimmy (Kissinger), 165, 235, 

367, 709, PR 596, 12/10 
Carter, Rosalynn: PR 579, 12/3; Kis- 
singer, 749 
Casals, Pablo (quoted), 615 
Caulfield, Tom, 553 



764 



Central African Republic, treaties, 

agreements, etc., 304, 571 
Central Intelligence Agency (Kis- 
singer), 578 
Central Treaty Organization (Kis- 
singer), 45 
Chad: 
U.S. Ambassador (Bradford), PR 

491, 10/1 
World Health Organization con- 
stitution (1946), amendments to 
articles 34 and 55, acceptance, 
674 
Chatty, Habib, 612 
Chile: 
Alleged U.S. arms sales and arms 

factory (Kissinger), 19 
Allende regime, question of U.S. in- 
terference (Kissinger), 30, 125, 
579 
Fonner Ambassador Letelier, mur- 
der of (Kissinger), 578 
Human rights (Kissinger), 3, 43, 

339, 608 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 70, 675, 

744 
U.S. military and economic aid, re- 
strictions (Kissinger), 4, 339 
(quoted) 
Visit of Secretary Kissinger, 23 
China: 
America's Cultural Experiment in 
Chi)ia. 19!,2-19J,9. by Wilma 
Fairbank, PR 398, 8/26 
People's Republic of: 
Asian-Pacific role, 290, 292 
India, relations (Atherton), 480 
Mao Tse-tung, death of: Ford, 

416; Kissinger, 416 
Sino-Soviet relations: Hummel, 
475; Kissinger, 417, 608, 641, 
711 
Southeast Asian states, relations 

(Hummel), 469, 492 
Soviet attack, question of (Kis- 
singer), 642 
Taiwan, essentially internal 
Chinese affair (Kissinger), 
229, 240 
U.S. arms sales, question of (Kis- 
singer), 579, 609 
U.S. relations: 292; Kissinger, 
151, 222, 319, 350, 372, 499, 
500, 605, 705; Lord, 681,682 
Changes in Chinese leadership, 
question of effect (Kis- 
singer), 128, 417, 575, 580, 
PR 514, 10/15 
Visit of President Ford or Secre- 
tary Kissinger, question of 
(Kissinger), 417, 575 
World security and (Kissinger), 
608 
Republic of: Hummel, 454; Kis- 
singer, 240, 372, 580; Robinson, 
288 
Fisheries agreement with U.S., 
joint statement, 494 



China — Continued 
Republic of — Continued , 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 407^ 

439 

U.S. nuclear policies (Hummel) 
454 
Chirac, Jacques (Kissinger, remark^ 

following meeting), PR 323, 6/23| 
Chou En-lai (Kissinger), 128 
Christiansen, Arne, 705 
Churchill, Winston (quoted), 157 
Churchill Research Range, agreemen 

with Canada, 407 

Civilian persons in time of war 

Geneva convention (1949): Papu. 

New Guinea, Sao Tome and Prin 

cipe, 187; Surinam, 744 

Claims, Egypt, agi'eement re claims o 

U.S. nationals, 38, 627 

Entry into force, PR 535, 10/29 

Cluverius, Wat T., sworn in as Am 

bassador to Bahrain, PR 509 

10/14 

Coffee agreement, international 

(1976): Kissinger, 7 

Current actions: Angola, 571; Ausrf 

tralia, 304, 539; Austria, 2561 

Belgium, 304, 539; Benin, 539 

Bolivia, 438, 723, 759; Brazil! 

571; Burundi, 304, 376; Came 

roon, 38, 539; Canada, 304, 7231 

Central African Republic, 3041 

571; Congo, 539; Costa Rica 

723; Denmark, 146, 533 

Dominican Republic, 146, 571' 

627; Ecuador, 304, 571; El Sal 

vador, 38, 347; Ethiopia, 304 

539, 759; European Economi 

Community, 304, 571; Finland 

304, 539; France, 539; Gabon 

304, 627; Germany, Federal Re 

public of, 539; Ghana, 304, 5391 

627; Guatemala, 539; Guinea 

304, 539, 627; Haiti, 38, 72: 

Honduras, 571, 627, 723; India 

438, 723; Indonesia, 438, 53f 

627; Ireland, 438, 571; Israe 

304; Italy, 304, 539; Ivor 

Coast, 304, 723; Jamaica, 43^ 

539; Japan, 304, 539; Kenya 

438, 539; Liberia, 539; Lu.xem 

bourg, 304, 539; Madagascar 

Me-xico, 539; Netherlands, Ne\ 

Zealand, 304, 723; Nigeria, 304 

539, 723; Norway, 304; Panama 

304, 723; Papua New Guinea 

69, 256; Paraguay, 571, 627 

Peru, 438; Portugal, 438, 723 

Rwanda, 571, 743; Sierr; 

Leone, 256, 571, 759; Spain 

256, 539; Sweden, 438; Switzer 

land, 723; Tanzania, 38, 539 

Togo, 571; Trinidad and Tobago 

38, 438; Uganda, 304, 723; U.K. 

376; U.S., 347, 466, 539; Ven 

ezuela, 304, 723; Yugoslaviai 

Zaire, 304, 539 

U.S. ratification urged (Green- 

wald), 273 



{» 



litil 



CX 



Department of State Bulletip 



!l 



■(iluinbia: 

Coca growing and cocaine produc- 
tion (Robinson), 492 
Tifuties, agreements, etc., 38, 

1S7, 256, 284, 329 
r S. Ambassador (Sanchez), PR 

:;58, 7/29 
iiliiiiibo nonaligned summit meeting: 
Department, 394; Kissinger, 356, 
402 
olumbus, Christopher (quoted), 557 
'unimodity trade (see also name of 

niiiniiodity): 
Aliica: Bolen, 618; Kissinger, 356 
Case-by-case consideration: 133; 
Katz, 485; Kissinger, 7, 81, 90; 
Rogers, 657 
Latin America, U.S. proposals (Kis- 
singer), 6, 16, 22, 43 
Price or production indexation, U.S. 
position: 133; Boel<er, 135; Katz. 
484; Rogers, 657 
UNCTAD consensus resolution: 
i:?3; Boeker, 135; Bolen, 621; 
Kissinger, 90 
U.S. position: Greenwald, 271, 294; 

Katz, 485; Kissinger, 726 
U.S. summary of UNCTAD resolu- 
tion on commodities (Boeker), 
138 
'ommunity development and training 
program, agreement with Bolivia, 
651 
'omoros, treaties, agreements, etc., 

330, 466, 627 
(iiitro, international coffee agreement 
(1976), provisional application, 
539 
'ongress, U.S.: 
Congress-executive relations: Ford, 
199, 200; Kissinger, 124; 
McCloskey, 139 
Documents relating to foreign pol- 
icy, lists, .36, 101, 146, 173, 215, 
255, 282, 303, 328, 346, 372, 406, 
437, 494, 565, 626, 650, 674, 722, 
754 
Foreign policy role and effect on 
legislation: Kissinger, 241, 260, 
706; McCloskey, 140 
Legislation: 
Bretton Woods Agreements Act, 

signature (Ford), 626 
Foreign Assistance and Related 
Programs Appropriations 
Act, 1976, signature (Ford), 
199 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act of 1976, signature: Ford, 
648; Leigh, 649 
Immigration and Nationality Act 
amendments of 1976, signa- 
ture (Ford), 639 
Prevention and Punishment of 
Crimes Against Internation- 
ally Protected Persons, Act 
for, signature (Ford), 554 



Congress, U.S. — Continued 
Legislation — Continued 
Security Assistance and Arms 
Export Control Act of 1976, 
signature (Ford), 198 
Whale Conservation and Protec- 
tion Study Act, signature, 
(Ford), 625 
Legislation, proposed; 
African Development Bank, ap- 
propriations: Kissinger, 356; 
McGovern, 590 
International navigational rules 

act, veto (Ford), 586 
Lebanon, humanitarian aid, ap- 
propriation requests: De- 
partment, 460; Habib, 267 
Multinational corporations, taxa- 
tion of foreign payments 
(Feldman), 697 
Turkey, defense cooperation 
agreement, appropriations 
urged: Ford, 60: Habib, 424 
UNRWA, U.S. contribution 

(Sherer), 144 
U.S. business practices in Arab 
boycott of Israel (Kissinger), 
369 
Senate: 
Advice and consent: 
Authentication of documents 
convention (1960), ratifica- 
tion urged (Ford), 281 
Fifth international tin agree- 
ment, ratification urged: 
Ford, 179; Greenwald, 276 
Income tax convention with Re- 
public of Korea, ratification 
urged (Ford), 437 
International coffee agi'eement, 
1976, ratification urged 
(Greenwald), 273 
International wheat agreement, 
1976 protocol, ratification 
urged (Greenwald), 279 
North Pacific fur seal conven- 
tion, 1976 protocol, ratifica- 
tion urged (Ford), 281 
Nuclear threshold test ban ti'e- 
aty and peaceful nuclear 
explosions treaty with 
Soviet Union, ratification 
urged (Ford), 269 
Psychotropic convention (1971), 
ratification urged (Robin- 
son), 492 
Terrorism, international con- 
ventions on, signature 
(Ford), 554 
U.K. -U.S. income tax conven- 
tion, i-atification urged 
(Ford), 145 
Confirmation, 510 
State Department relations (Mc- 
Closkey), 142 
Conservation: 
Antarctic seals, convention (1972), 
U.S., 438 



llndex, July 5-December 27, 1976 



Conservation — Continued 

Endangered species of wild fauna 
and flora, international trade in, 
convention (1973): Australia, 
India, .347; Iran, 627; Norway, 
347; Soviet Union, 627; U.K., 
Zaire, 347 
Migratory birds and their environ- 
ment, bilateral agreement with 
Soviet Union, 760 
North Pacific fur seals, 1976 pro- 
tocol to interim convention: 
Current actions; Canada, Japan, 
539; Soviet Union, 572; U.S., 
438, 539, 651 
Entry into force, 572, PR 536, 

10/29 
U.S. ratification urged (Ford), 
281 
Polar bears, agreement (1973), 

U.S., 438, 539, 650, 743 
Whale Conservation and Protection 
Study Act, signature (Ford), 
625 
Consular relations, Vienna convention 
(1963): Equatorial Guinea, 438; 
Zaire, 407 
Containers: 
Customs convention (1972): Bul- 
garia, Byelorussian S.S.R., 
Soviet Union, 438; Switzerland, 
627; Ukrainian S.S.R., 438; 
U.S., 438, 571 
Safe containers (CSC), international 
convention (1972): Bulgaria, 
759; Byelorussian S.S.R., 466; 
Germany, Federal Republic of, 
329: Soviet Union, 407; Ukrain- 
ian S.S.R., 466; U.S., 4:38. 571 
Cook Islands, Asian Development 

Bank, membership, 304 
Copyright convention, universal 

(1971), Colombia, 329 
da Costa, Amaro, 703 
Costa Rica: 

Tr'eaties, agreements, etc., 70, 188, 

467, 723 
U.S. MAAG's terminated, 336 
Council of European Communities, 
fifth international tin agreement 
(1975), intention to ratify, 304 
Cranberg, Gil, 552 
Crespo Gutierrez, Alberto, 13 
Crigler, T. Frank, sworn in as Ambas- 
sador to Rwanda, PR 480, 9/29 
Crisis management: Kissinger, 703; 

Lord, 682; Robinson, 441 
Cronkite, Walter, interview with Sec- 
retary Kissinger, PR 469, 9/23 
Crosland, Anthony, 521 
Cuba (Rogers), 753 
Angola, effect on U.S. relations 

(Kissinger), 26, 553 
Communist influence on Caribbean 
countries, question of: Kis- 
singer, 28; Luers, 49 
Hijacking agreement with U.S., 
cancellation (Kissinger), 573, 
577 



765 



Cuba — Continued 

Human rights (Kissinger), 4, 43, 339 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 38, 103, 
216, 331 
Cultural relations: 

Cultural property, prohibition of il- 
licit import, export, and trans- 
fer of ownership, convention 
(1970), Nepal, 571 

Multiregional journalists project, 
27th annual study/travel pro- 
gram, PR 386, 8/18 

Multiregional TV project, PR 408, 
9/1 

U.S. Advisory Commission on In- 
ternational Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, release of 12th 
annual report, PR 512, 10/14 

U.S. -Egypt Joint Working Group on 
Education and Culture, meet- 
ing, 713 

U.S. -Federal Republic of Germany 
mayoral conference on culture 
and urban development, PR 
479, 9/28 

U.S. -Japan Conference on Cultural 
and Educational Interchange, 
eighth meeting, 65 

U.S. -U.K. Bicentennial arts fellows 
named, PR 334, 6/28 

World cultural and natural heritage, 
protection, convention (1972), 
Poland, 572 
Customs: 

Commercial samples and advertis- 
ing material, importation, in- 
ternational convention (1952), 
Cuba (with reservation), 103 

Customs convention (1972): Bul- 
garia, Byelorussian S.S.R., 
Soviet Union, 438; Switzerland, 
627; Ukrainian S.S.R., 438; 
U.S., 438, 571 

Mutual assistance between customs 
services, bilateral agreements 
with: Austria, 759; Mexico, 627 
Cyprus: 

International Court, referral (Kis- 
singer), 324 

Negotiations, progress, and U.S. 

support: Habib, 427; Kissinger, 

93, 241, 623 (quoted), PR 596 

12/10; McGovern, 721 

European role (van der Stoel), 323 

Fourth, fifth, and sixth progress 

reports (Ford), 62, 404, 622 

Refugees and U.S. humanitarian aid 
(Ford), 405, 623 

UNFICYP (Ford), 623 
Six-month extension: Sherer, 63; 
text of Security Council res- 
olution, 64 

U.S. military intervention at begin- 
ning of Cyprus problem, ques- 
tion of (Kissinger), 240 

U.S. principles for permanent set- 
tlement: Ford, 623; Kissinger, 
89, 323, 503; Sherer, 64 



766 



Czechoslovakia: 
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 13 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 70, 103, 
304, 439, 572, 743 



da Costa, Amaro, 703 
Debt-rescheduling negotiations: 

Boeker, 136; Kissinger, 505 
Defense, national (Kissinger), 231 
Army and strategic forces (Kis- 
singer), 108 
Defense spending (Kissinger), 552 
U.S. forces abroad, reduction, ques- 
tion of (Kissinger), 367 
U.S. secondary position, question of 
(Kissinger), 243 
de Freitas, Sir Geoffrey, 704 
de Guiringaud, Louis, PR 597, 12/10 
Democracy and democratic principles: 

Kissinger, 26; Reinhardt, 661 
Denmark: 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 39, 146, 
147, 304, 347, 438, 539, 596, 674 
U.S. MAAG's terminated, 336 
Dennis, Francis A. W., 231 
Development: 
Feasibility studies, project agree- 
ment with Bangladesh, 723 
OAS Special Assembly on develop- 
ment, proposed (Kissinger), 5, 9 
Dickman, Francois, sworn in as Am- 
bassador to United Arab Emi- 
rates, PR 486, 9/30 
Diego Garcia facilities, 290, 292 
Digest of United States Practice in In- 
ternational Law, 1975, released, 
675 
Diggs, Charles C. (Laise), 254 
Diplomatic relations, Vienna conven- 
tion (1961): Equatorial Guinea, 
438; Yemen, 743 
Diplomatic representatives, U.S. Spe- 
cial Representative to Lebanon 
(Seelye), designation, 98?(, 
Diplomatic representatives in the 
U.S., credentials: Argentina, 231 
Bahrain, 713; Bolivia, 13; Brazil 
132; Burundi, Cameroon, 739 
Cape Verde, 231; Czechoslovakia 
13; Fiji, 713; Gabon, 739 
Guatemala, 132; Ireland, 231 
Lesotho, 739; Liberia, 231 
Malaysia, 132; Mali, 739; Niger, 
Rwanda, Sudan, 713; Yemen 
Arab Republic, 13 
Diplomats, protection of, convention 
(1973): Ford, 554 
U.S. ratification, 572, 627 
Disaster relief (Kissinger), 505 
Drought, food aid agreements with: 

Mauritania, Niger, 71 
Guatemala, earthquake relief ef- 
forts, agreement with U.S.: 
284, 723; Kissinger, 16, 43 



Disaster relief — Continued 
Honduras, recovery and reconstruc- 
tion from effects of Hurricane 
"Fifi," loan agreement with 
U.S., 104 
Italy, earthquake victims, U.S. as- 
sistance, 71 
Dominican Republic: 
Balance of payments (Rogers), 753 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 146, 

187, 188, 571, 627, 651 
Visit of Secretary Kissinger (Kis- 
singer), 14, 19 
Donsker, Monroe D., election as vice 
chairman of Board of Foreign 
Scholarships, PR 471, 9/24 
Double taxation, conventions for 
avoidance of: Ford, 145; Korea, 
Republic of, 71; Poland, 148, 256; 
U.K., 376 
Drugs, narcotic: 
International control, U.S. pro- 
grams and objectives (Robin- 
son), 489 
Mexico, illicit drug control: 35; Kis- 
singer, 34; Luers, 212; Robin- 
son, 490 
Bilateral agreements, 256, 376, 
439, 572 
Psychotropic sub.stances convention 
(1971): 
Current actions. Federal Republic 

of Germany, 674 
Ratification urged (Robinson), 4921 
Single convention on narcotic 
drugs (1961): Barbados, 103; 
Indonesia, 438 
Protocol amending: Barbados, 
103; Canada, 329; Indonesia, 
438; Luxembourg, 596; Togo, 
699; Tunisia, 147; Zaire, 407 
Suppression of illegal narcotics pro- 
duction and traffic, bilateral 
agreement with Costa Rica, 188 
U.S. citizens, consequences of being 
involved with drugs abroad 
(Luers), 214 
Duarte, Juan Pablo (Kissinger), 18 
Dubs, Adolph, 478 



East-West relations: Genscher, PR 
598, 12/10; Kissinger, 21, 45, 
109, 111, 127, 153, 382, PR 598, 
12/10; Schmidt, .382, .384 
Economic relations: 123; Ford, 118; 
Kissinger, 78, 92, 112, 119, 152, 
PR 315, 6/22; Robinson, 287, 
443, 444; Rogers, 659 
Humanitarian versus economic or 
military issues (Kissinger), 323, 
326-327 
Echeven-ia Alvarez, Luis (Kissinger), 

27 
Economic and Social Council, U.N.: 
Documents, lists, 210 



Department of State Bulletin 



Kiniiumic and Social Council — Con. 

Enlargement, amendment to article 
61 of U.N. Charter, Cuba, 331 

Intei'governniental group for pre- 
vention of illicit payments: 
Boeker, 137; Feldman, 696; 
Nessen, 338; PR 559, 11/16 

Re.structuring, proposed (Scran- 
ton), 205 

61st session (Scranton), 201 
Economic policy and relations (Rog- 
ers), 6.53 

F'conomic, industrial, and technical 
cooperation, agreement with 
Romania, 744, 758 

Economic Cooperation, U.S. -Iran 
Joint Commission, agreed min- 
utes of third session, PR 368, 
8/7 

Economic development programs, 
loan agreement with Syria, 675, 
760 

Foreign Relations of the United 
States. 191,9, volume I, Na- 
tional Security Affairs, Foreign 
Economic Policy, released, 652 

Foreign specialists' study of key 
U.S. economic sectors, PR 481, 
9/29 

Restrictive business practices, 
agreement with Federal Repub- 
lic of Germany, 408 

Trade, investment, and financial 
matters, U.S. -Brazil joint 
communique, 71 
Economy, world {see also Less de- 
veloped countries): Bolen, 620; 
Kissinger, 31, 74, 503; Lord, 683; 
McGovem, 587; Robinson, 441 

Conference on International Eco- 
nomic Cooperation (CIEC), 
Paris: Greenwald, 296; Kis- 
singer, 91, 505; McGovern, 590; 
Rogers, 654, 657; Scranton, 204 

Currency fluctuations: 122; Kis- 
singer, 121, 158; Simon, 121 

Inflation, recession: Ford, 118; Kis- 
singer, 74, 119, 259, 263; Rog- 
ers, 653, 751 

Puerto Rico discussions: 292; Ford, 

116, 117, 118; Kissinger, 46, 74, 

92, 119, 152, 324; Robinson, 443; 

Rogers, 654; Scranton, 204 

European participation, question 

of (Kissinger), 93, 708 
Joint declaration, text, 121 
Ecuador: 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 39, 304, 
439, 571 

U.S. Trade Act, proposed amend- 
ment (Kissinger), 6, 8 
Education: 

Board of Foreign Scholarships, 
chairman and vice chairman, 
election, PR 471, 9/24 

Bolivia, bilateral agreement re im- 
provement of rural education, 
187 



Education — Continued 
Portugal, bilateral agreement re 

construction of schools, 495 
U.S. Advisory Commission on In- 
ternational Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, release of 12th 
annual report, PR 512, 10/14 
U.S. -Egypt Joint Working Group on 
Education and Culture, meet- 
ing, 713 
U.S. -Japan Conference on Cultural 
and Educational Interchange, 
eighth meeting, 65 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization, U.N.: 
Constitution (1945): Mozambique, 
Papua New Guinea, Seychelles, 
Surinam, 743 
19th general conference (Rein- 

hardt), 661 
Structure and operations (Rein- 
hardt). 665 
Egypt: 
Claims of U.S. nationals, agree- 
ment, 38 
Entry into force, PR 535, 10/29 
InteiTnediary role in U.S. evacua- 
tion of citizens from Lebanon 
(Kissinger), 94 
Misr Spinning and Weaving Com- 
pany facilities, modernization, 
bilateral agreement with U.S., 
723 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 39, 70, 
71, 104, 147, 216, 304, 627, 651, 
675, 723, 743, 744 
U.S. -Egypt Joint Working Group on 
Education and Culture, meet- 
ing, 713 
U.S.-Egypt Joint Working Group on 
Technology, Research and De- 
velopment, fifth meeting, joint 
statement, 754 
Eisa, Omer Sahh, 713 
Eisenhower, Dwight D. (Kissinger), 

547 
El Salvador: 
Textile agreement, termination, PR 

563, 11/18 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 38, 347, 

407, 744 
U.S. Ambassador (Lozano), PR 376, 
8/13 
Elizabeth II, Queen of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, visit to U.S.: 
196, 197; program, PR 335, 6/28 
Energy sources and problems: 123; 
Kissinger, 81; Robinson, 443, 445; 
Rogers, 658 
Alternate sources (see also Nuclear 
energy): Kissinger, 77, 91, 709; 
Reis, 210 
Hydrogenerating unit at Kar- 
naphule Power Station, 
bilateral loan agreement 
with Bangladesh, 39 



Energy sources — Continued 
Alternate sources — Continued 
Solar energy: 
Information on programs on 
generation and transmis- 
sion by means of space 
technology (Bennett), 671 
Solar energy and gas, U.S. -Iran 
agreement on cooperation: 
315; Ansary, 308 
Solar heating and cooling sys- 
tems in buildings, memo- 
randum of understanding 
(1974), Jamaica, 38 
Thermal power plant near Is- 
maila, grant agi'eement with 
Egypt, 216 
Balance of payments, effect (Si- 
mon), 120 
Egypt, bilateral agreement re con- 
struction of National Energy 
Control Center, 744 
International Energy Agency; Kis- 
singer, 240, 709; Rogers," 655 
lEA-French cooperation, question 

of (Kissinger), 93 
International Energy Institute, 
proposed: Ford, 634; Kissinger, 
728; Robinson, 445; Rogers, 655 
International energy problems, 
agreement (1974): Austria, 329; 
Belgium, 347; Greece, 674 
Less developed countries, effect: 
Kissinger, 259, 263, 505; Ro- 
gers, 657, 752 
OECD cooperation, U.S. proposal 

(Kissinger), 77 
U.S. energy legislation, need for: 
Kissinger, 465; Lord, 683; 
Robinson, 445; Rogers, 658 
Washington State natural gas bill 
(Kissinger), 226 
Environmental problems and control 
{see also Oil pollution): 
Environmental modification tech- 
niques for hostile purposes, 
prohibition, draft treaty 
(Ford), 345 
Foreign environmentalists study/ 
observation tour of U.S.. PR 
537, 10/29 
Impact of fluorocarbons on 
stratospheric ozone layer, 
N AS report, PR 430, 9/13" 
Radioactive waste disposal at sea 

(Grant), 343 
U.S. -Canada Garrison Diversion 
Unit, delay in final report, PR 
385, 8/16 " 
Equatorial Guinea, treaties, agree- 
ments, etc., 438 
Ethiopia: 
Somali, relations (Schaufele), 300 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 71, 147, 

216, 304, 539, 759 
U.S. relations (Schaufele), 301 
Europe (see also East-West relations 
and names of individual coun- 
tries): 



Index, July 5-December 27, 1976 



767 



Europe — Continued 
Commission on Security and Coop- 
eration in Europe, executive 
branch Commissioner-Observ- 
ers, announcement, 581 
Eastern: 
Autonomy (Kissinger), 244 
Brezhnev doctrine of limited 

sovereignty (Kissinger), 167 
Communist Party meeting. East 

Berlin (Kissinger), 166 
Human rights: Kissinger, 153, 
645, 711. PR 504, 9/8; Rogers, 
659; Scranton, 747 
Radio Free Europe and Radio 

Liberty (Kissinger), 405 
Soviet divisions, presence (Kis- 
singer), 574 
U.S. relations (Kissinger), 111, 
153 
Final Act of Helsinki (Kissinger), 

323, 405, 645, 711 
Global role (Kissinger), 127 
Mutual and balanced force reduc- 
tions: Ford, 345; Kissinger, 228, 
499, 710 
Unification (Kissinger), 107, 705, 

PR 590, 12/8 
Western: 
Communist parties, participation 
in government (see also 
Italy), question of effect (Kis- 
singer), 157, 367, 709 
Security (Kissinger), 108, 220 
U.S. relations (Kissinger), 44, 
106, 128, 350, PR 598, 12/10 
European Economic Community: Kis- 
singer, PR 590, 12/8, PR 593, 12/9, 
PR 598, 12/10; Schmidt, 385; 
Soames, PR 590, 12/8 
Puerto Rico economic summit, ques- 
tion of participation (Kissinger), 
93, 708 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 39, 304, 
571 
European Space Agency, U.S. 
cooperative projects (Reis), 208 
Excess property transfer, bilateral 

agreements with Mexico, 759 
Export-Import Bank (Bolen), 621 
Exports: 
Export credits, U.S. declaration on 

official support, 48 
U.S., UTI munitions export license, 
PR 352, 7/22 
Extradition, bilateral agreements 
with: Finland, 104; Spain, 71, 304; 
U.K., 72,439, 627, 724 



Fairbank, .John, 573 

Fairbank, Wilma, PR 398, 8/26 

Feldman, Mark B., 696 

Fiji, Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 

713 
Finland: 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 39, 104, 
304, 495, 539, 596, 651, 723 



Finland — Continued 

U.S. visit of President Kekkonen, 
336, :337; progi-am, PR 357, 7/28 
Fish and fisheries: 
Fisheries off coast of U.S., bilateral 
agreements with: China, Re- 
public of, 439; German Demo- 
cratic Republic, 539, 565; Po- 
land, 284, 299; Romania, 760: 
Soviet Union, 743, 744 
International whaling convention 
(1946), New Zealand, 39 
Amendments to paragraphs 1, 
6(a)(4), (5), (6), 6(b)(3), 
6(c)(2), 11-14, 15(c), 21, 23(1) 
(c), (23) (2)(b), 596 
North Pacific fur seal convention, 
protocol (1976) to interim con- 
vention, U.S. ratification urged 
(Ford), 281 
Northwest Atlantic fisheries, inter- 
national convention (1949), 
notice of intention to withdraw: 
Canada, 103; U.S., 103, 146 
200-mile fisheries zones: 
Canada, notice of implementation, 

666 
U.S.: 299, 758; Kissinger, 401 
U.S. -Korea fisheries agreement ini- 
tialed, PR 599, 12/10 
U.S. -Mexico fisheries agreement, 

758, 760 
U.S. -Republic of China agreement, 

joint statement, 494 
Whale Conservation and Protection 
Study Act, signature (Ford), 
625 
Food and Agriculture Organization, 

U.N. (Lewis), 195 

Food production and shortages: 

Greenwald, 298; Lord, 683; 

McGovem, 591; Rogers, 653, 658 

Grain reserves: Greenwald, 298; 

Katz, 485; McGovem, 592 
U.S. food aid: Greenwald, 298; Kis- 
singer, 504; McGovem, 592 
Bilateral agreements with: 
Mauritania, Niger, 71; Tan- 
zania, 40 
Ford, Gerald: 
Addresses, remarks, and state- 
ments: 
Africa, U.S. good offices, 385, 481 
Alaskan pipeline, question of 

route, 162 
Asia, 470 (quoted) 
Bretton Woods Agreements Act, 

signature, 626 
China, People's Republic of, death 

of Mao Tse-tung, 416 
Energy, oil prices, 161 
Foreign Assistance Appropria- 
tions Act of 1976, signature, 
199 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities 

Act of 1976, signature, 648 
Immigration and Nationality Act 
Amendments of 1976, signa- 
ture, 639 



Ford, Gerald — Continued 
Addresses — Continued 
International air transportation, 

policy statement, 488 
Israel: 
Rescue of hijacking victims, 

160, 161, 162 
U.S. commitment, 175 (quoted) 
Lebanon: 
Evacuation of American citi- 
zens, 99 
U.S. Ambassador Meloy and 
Counselor Waring, regrets 
at murders of, 98, 99, 
554 
MIA's, 247, 418 

National League of Families of 
American Prisoners and Mis- 
sing in Southeast Aisa, re- 
marks, 247 
Nuclear nonproliferation, 346, 

436, 629 
Nuclear policy, 629 
Olympic games, 161 
Puerto Rico summit meeting, 116, 

117, 118 
Rhodesia, 528 
SALT, 162, 345 

Security Assistance and Arms 
Export Control Act of 1976, 
signature, 198 
Terrorism conventions, U.S. 

ratification, 554 
U.K., standby agreement with 

IMF, proposed, 660 
Whale Conservation and Protec- 
tion Study Act, signature, 625 
Correspondence, Israeli rescue of 
hijacking victims, expression of 
satisfaction, 160 
Meetings with Heads of State and 
officials of, remarks and joint 
communiques: Australia, 291; 
Finland, 336; Germany, Federal 
Republic of, 245; Liberia, 481; 
U.K., 196 
Memorandum of disapproval. Inter- 
national Navigational Rules 
Act, 586 
Messages and reports to Congress: 
Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, 15th annual report, 
transmittal, 345 
Authentication of documents con- 
vention (1960), ratification 
urged, 281 
Cyprus, fourth progress report, 
62; fifth progress report, 
404; sixth progress report, 
622 
Income tax convention with 
Korea, ratification urged, 437 
North Pacific fur seal convention, 
1976 protocol, ratification 
urged, 281 
Threshold test ban treaty and nu- 
clear peaceful explosions trea- 
ty with Soviet Union, ratifi- 
cation urged, 269 



768 



Department of State Bulletin 



old, Gerald — Continued 
Messages — Continued 
Tin agreement, fifth interna- 
tional, ratification urged, 179 
Turkey, defense cooperation 
agreement appropriations 
urged, 60 
U.K. -U.S. income ta.x convention, 

transmittal, 145 
U.N., 30th annual report of U.S. 
participation, transmittal, 
537 
World Weather Program report, 
transmittal, 624 
Nrws conference, transcript, 161 
onl. Jack, PR 579, 12/3 
difign aid: McGovern, 589; Parker, 

7:i5: Robinson, 442; Stever, 731 
Fureign Assistance and Related 
Programs Act of 1976, signature 
(Ford), 199 
'oreign policy, U.S.; 
Achievements and opportunities; 
Kissinger, 128, 238, 580, 605, 
PR 598, 12/10; Lord, 681 
Assistant to the President and Sec- 
i-etary of State, functions con- 
trasted (Kissinger), 366 
Black American leaders, talks to 

(Kissinger), 359, 368 
Conduct of (Kissinger), 124, 131, 
150, 165, 232, 541, 544, 579, PR 
598, 12/10 
Congress-e.xecutive relations; Ford, 
199, 200; Kissinger, 124, 241, 
260; McCloskey, 139 
Congressional documents relating 
to, lists, 36, 101, 146, 173, 215, 
255, 282, 303. 328, 346, 372, 406, 
437, 494, 565, 626, 650, 674, 
722, 754 
Credibility (Kissinger), 551 
Election year, question of effect 
(Kissinger), 91, 125, 132, 229, 

234, 366, 396, 402, 578, 579, 610, 
641, 646 

Governor Carter, foreign policy 
statements (Kissinger), 165, 

235, 367, 549, 606, 643, 645 
Intervention, question of conditions 

justifying (Kissinger), 125, 548 

Kissinger, influence, question of 
(Kissinger), 371, 551 

Misleading information in foreign 
newspapers, question of (Kis- 
singer), 552 

Morality versus pragmatism (Kis- 
singer), 126, 156, 365, 542, 546, 
597 

Presidential candidates' debates 
(Kissinger), 165, 549, 574, 577 

Presidential responsibility (Kis- 
singer), 240, 574, 581 

Principles, objectives, and purpose; 
Kissinger, 26, 124, 149, 217, 
229, 258, 363, 551, 555, 608, 726; 
Lord, 677 

jindex, July 5-December 27, 1976 



F'oi'eign policy, U.S. — Continued 
Regional foreign policy conference, 

Oct. 21, 1976, PR 477, 8/28 
Review; Kissinger, 598; Lord, 677 
Stability (Kissinger), 150, 165, 327, 

363, 644, PR 598, 12/10 
U.S. town meetings and public dis- 
cussions (Kissinger), 171, 546, 
547. 611 
Fareigii Relations of the United 
States, 19iS, volume I, General; 
The United Nations, part 2, re- 
leased, 348, PR 399, 8/27 
Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 191,8, volume V, The Near 
East, South Asia, and Africa, 
part 2, released, 700 
Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 191,9, volume I, National 
Security Affairs, Foreign Eco- 
nomic Policy, released, 652 
Foreign Service; Henderson, PR 531, 
10/27; Kissinger, PR 530, 10/26 
Overseas assignments, actions to 
prevent discrimination in 
(Laise), 254 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 
1976; signature. Ford, 648; Leigh, 
649 
France; 
lEA cooperation, question of (Kis- 
singer), 93 
Nuclear sales to Pakistan, proposed 
(Kissinger), 319, 320, 322, PR 
374, 8/11, PR 419, 9/7 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 39, 303, 

304, 539 
U.S. MAAG's terminated, 336 
U.S. relations; de Guiringaud, PR 
597, 12/10; Kissinger, PR 323, 
6/23, PR 597, 12/10 
Visit of Secretary Kissinger (Kis- 
singer), 381, PR 312, 6/20, PR 
314,6/21, PR 374, 8/11, PR 417, 
9/7 
Fraser, J. Malcolm, visit to U.S.; 291; 

program, PR 350, 7/22 
de Freitas, Sir Geoffrey, 704 
French Territory of the Afars and 
Issas (F.T.A.I.); Schaufele, 300, 
302 
Frydenlund, Knut, remarks following 
meeting with Secretary Kis- 
singer, PR 592, 12/9 
Funseth, Robert L., 359, 749 



Gabon (Bolen), 618, 620 
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 

739 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 146, 
304, 495, 627 
Gearhart, Daniel; Kissinger, 163, 165, 
167, 171; Nessen, 163; Schaufele, 
342 
General Assembly, U.N.; 
Documents, lists, 210 



General Assembly, U.N. — Continued 
Ford address, question of (Kis- 
singer), 402 
Seventh special session: Ford, 537; 
Kissinger, 504; McGovern, 588; 
Scranton, 203 
31st session; 
Agenda, 567 

U.S. delegation, confirmation, 510 
Geneva conventions (1949) on treat- 
ment of sick, wounded and ship- 
wrecked armed forces, prisoners 
of war, and civilian persons: 
Papua New Guinea, Sao Tome and 
Principe, 187; Surinam, 744 
Protocol on accounting for POW's 
and MIA's, proposed (Habib), 
253 
Genocide, convention (1948), Ireland, 

103 
Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, remarks 
during visits with Secretary Kis- 
singer: 97, PR 420, 9/7, PR 598, 
12/10 
German Democratic Republic: 
Austrian border incident, question 

of (Kissinger), 326 
Fisheries agreement with U.S., 

joint statement, 565 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 256, 
329, 376, 539, 759 
Germany, Federal Republic of; 
Antitrust cooperation agreement 

with U.S., signature, 102 
Meetings of U.S. Secretary Kis- 
singer and South African Prime 
Minister Vorster (Kissinger), 
95, PR 325, 6/23 
NASA Helios-2 cooperative launch- 
ing: Bennett, 668; Reis, 208 
Special Bonn-Washington relation- 
ship, question of (Kissinger), 
127 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 38, 39, 
104, 147, 216, 304, 329, 330, 408, 
438, 539, 572, 674, 675 
U.S. Ambassador (Stoessel), PR 

494, 10/5 
U.S. -Germany mayoral conference 
on cultural and urban develop- 
ment, PR 479, 9/28 
U.S. MAAG's terminated, 336 
U.S. relations (Kissinger), 45 
U.S. visit of Chancellor Schmidt; 
Ford, 245; Schmidt, 245 
Joint statement on mutual defense 

issues, 247 
Program, PR 343, 7/9; correction, 
PR 343-A, 7/12 
Visit of Secretary Kissinger (Kis- 
singer), 382, PR 420, 9/7 
Ghana (Bolen), 620 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 187, 

304, 330, 539, 627, 699, 744 
U.S. Ambassador (Smith), PR 548, 
11/8 
Giraud, Pierre, 708 
Giscard d'Estaing, Valery (Kis- 



769 



Giscard d'Estaing — Continued 

singer, remarks following meet- 
ing), PR 314, 6/21 
Gissler, Sig, 541 

Global balance of power: Kissinger, 
107, 159, 307, 364, 498; Lord, 681; 
Robinson, 442 
Goodhart, Philip, 706 
Goodhew, Victor, 711 
Granger, John, 375 
Grant, Lindsey, 343 
Gray, John D., introduction of John 
E. Reilly, President of the 
Chicago Council on Foreign Rela- 
tions, PR 339- A, 7/6 
Greece: 
Aegean Sea dispute with Turkey: 
Bennett, 373: Habib, 427, 428; 
Security Council resolution, 
text, 374 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 39, 103, 

330, 540, 674 
Turkey, relations: Caglayangil, PR 
596, 12/10; Habib, 426; Kis- 
singer, 323, 327, 703, PR 596, 
12/10 
U.S. defense agreement, negotia- 
tions (Habib), 426 
U.S. relations (Kissinger), 125 
Green, Marshall, 419 
Greenberg, Paul, 541 
Greenwald, Joseph A., 271, 294 
Grenada, World Health Organization 
constitution (1946), amendments 
to articles 34 and 55, acceptance, 
329 
Griesinger, Annemarie, 712 
Grillo, Gustav Marcello (Schaufele), 

342 
Guatemala: 
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 

132 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 39, 70, 

104, 284, 539, 723, 743 
U.S. Ambassador (Boster), PR 475, 

9/28 
U.S. earthquake disaster relief: 
284, 723; Kissinger, 16, 43 
Guinea (Bolen), 618, 620 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 304, 
539, 540, 627, 651 
Guinea-Bissau: 
General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, protocol of provisional 
application, 439 
U.S. Ambassador (Wells), PR 513, 
10/15 
de Guiringaud, Louis, PR 597, 12/10 
Gunella, Aristide, 709 
Guyana, Cuban relations and influ- 
ence, question of (Luers), 49, 52 
Gwertzman, Bernard, 411 



H 



Habib, Philip C, 249, 266, 392 
(quoted), 424, 447, PR 313, 6/21 



Habib, Philip — Continued 
Under Secretary of State for Polit- 
ical Affairs, sworn in as, PR 
338, 7/1 
Haiti: 
Textile agreement with U.S., 
amendment, text, PR 470, 9/23 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 38, 188, 
216, 467, 651, 723 
Hall, John W., 65/( 
Hammarskjold, Dag (quoted), 720 
Hassan, Crown Prince of Jordan, re- 
marks following meeting with 
Secretary Kissinger, PR 591, 
12/8 
Health and medical research: 
Biomedical research and technol- 
ogy, bilateral agreement with 
Federal Republic of Germany, 
572 
NAMRU-2 projects, U.S.- 
Philippines agreement re con- 
tinuation, 71 
Nutrition/health early warning 
system project and access road 
construction, grant agreement 
with Ethiopia, 216 
Sanitation, bilateral agreement 

with Portugal, 495 
U.S. -Iran cooperation in, agree- 
ment: 316; Ansary, 309 
Veteran's Memorial Hospital and 
other health care services for 
veterans, U.S. -Philippines 
agreement re use of, 71 
World Health Assembly action on 
health care report on Israeli- 
occupied territories (Scran- 
ton), 37 
World Health Organization 
(Lewis), 195 
Constitution (1946): 
Amendments to articles 24 and 

25, Surinam, 572 
Amendments to articles 34 and 
55: Argentina, 572; Chad, 
674; German Democratic 
Republic, 256; Grenada, 
329; Israel, 495; Kenya, 
627; Korea, Republic of, 
743; Laos, Madagascar, 
539; Malta, 256; 

Mauritania, 627; Philip- 
pines, 495; Rwanda, 743; 
Zaire, 329 
Hempstone, Smith, 551 
Henderson, Loy, dedication of Loy 
Henderson International Confer- 
ence Room: PR 531, 10/27; Kis- 
singer, PR 530, 10/26 
Hendsch, Shirley, designation as 
Agency Director for Interna- 
tional Women's Programs, PR 
324, 6/23 
Herman, George, 606 
Herter, Christian (Lord), 677 
Hess, Stephen, 510 
High seas, convention (1958), acces- 



770 



High seas, convention — Continued ; 

sion, Mongolia, 650 
Hills, Carla A., 461 
Honduras: 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 71, 104, 

331, 571, 627, 723 
U.S. Ambassador (Becker), PR 
458, 9/22 
Hong Kong (Robinson), 288 
Housing: 
Republic of Korea, bilateral 
guaranty loan agreement, 651 
U.N. Conference on Human Set- 
tlements (Habitat); Hills, 
(quoted), 461; Schiff, 461 
U.S. -Iran cooperation: 316; An- 
sary, 308 
Hua Kuo-feng (Kissinger), PR 514, 

10/15 
Human rights: Kissinger, 1, 506, 558, 
602, 608; Lewis, 195, 718 
Eastern Europe: Kissinger, 153, 
645, 711; Rogers, 659; Scran- 
ton, 747 
Freedom of information and ex- 
pression (Reinhardt), 663 
India (Atherton), 479, 480 
Iran (Atherton), 429 
Korea (Kissinger), 366 
Latin America (Kissinger), 2, 17 

19, 22, 29, 43, 339 
Need for U.N. action: Kissinger 

509; Scranton, 745 
North Korea (Armstrong), 457 
Human Settlements (Habitat), U.N 
Conference on: Hills (quoted) 
461; Schiff, 461 
Hummel, Arthur W., Jr., 386, 454 
469, 582 
Assistant Secretary of State for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
sworn in as, PR 346, 7/12 
Hungary, treaties, agreements, etc. 

38, 103, 743 
Hupp, Robert P., 510 
Hydrographic and nautical cartog 
raphy, agreement with Hon 
duras, 627 
Hydrographic Organization, Interna 
tional, convention (1967 
Nigeria, 103 



Iceland: 
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 

231 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 69, 284 
U.S. Ambassador (Blake), PR 355, 
7/23 
Immigration and Nationality Act 
Amendments of 1976, signature 
(Ford), 639 
Imports, U.S.: 
Meat imports, limitation, agree- 
ments with: Australia, 147; 
Costa Rica, 467; Dominican 
Republic, 188; Guatemala, 104; 



Department of State Bulletin 



liiiports, U.S. — Continued 
Meat — Continued 

Haiti, 216; Honduras, 331: 
Me.xico, 148; Panama, 216 
Meat imports negotiations meet- 
ing, PR 582, 12/3 
Specialty steel from Japan, limita- 
tion of, agreement; 71, 744; 
Sherer, 100 
Sugar, increase in customs duties 

(Ford), 564 
r.S. footwear industry, adjust- 
ment assistance to (Kissinger), 
8 
liuiime taxes, agreements with: 
Korea, 437; Philippines, 540; 
I'.K., 145; World Intellectual 
I'roperty Organization, 652: World 
.Meteorological Organization, 724 
India: 
ATS-6 educational program: Ben- 
nett, 669; Reinhardt, 664 
Human rights (Dubs), 479, 480 
Internal trends (Dubs), 478 
Nuclear explosions (Kissinger), 319 
Pakistan and Bangladesh relations 

(Dubs), 480 
Satellite Instructional Television 
Experiment (SITE): Reis, 207 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 69, 70, 

256, 330, 347, 438, 723 
U.S. MAAG's terminated, 336 
I'.S. nuclear fuel sales, question of 

(Kissinger), 321 
ndian Ocean, Soviet military pres- 
ence, 290 
Indochina (see also Vietnam): Kis- 
singer, 223, 228 
Missing in action: Ford, 247; 

Habib, 249; Kissinger, 400 
Refugees (Picker), 757 
Indonesia (Robinson), 288 
Consultations with U.S., 145, PR 

326, 6/24 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 39, 104, 
304, 347, 376, 438, 439, 467, 
539, 627, 675, 743, 759 
U.S. relations and aid (Hummel), 
471, 474 
Industrial and agricultural produc- 
tion, loan agreement with Egypt, 
71, 147 
Industrial democracies [see also Less 
developed countries: North- 
South relations, and Organiza- 
tion for Economic Cooperation 
and Development): Buchan 
(quoted), 105; Ford, 116, 197, 
246; Kissinger, 73, 89, 105, 110, 
112, 131, 218, 264, 356, 605, PR 
312, 6/20, PR 312-A, 6/20; Rog- 
ers, 655, 751 
Pacific Basin (Robinson), 286 
U.S. alliances, importance: Kis- 
singer, 151 , 259, 498; Lord, 679 
•i Industrial property, protection of, 
■i I convention of Paris (1883, as re- 
l\ vised): Bahamas, 438; Ghana, 



I ndustrial property — Continued 

Libya, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
187 
Inter-American Development Bank: 
Kissinger, 504; McGovern, 590 
Agreement establishing (1959): 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Federal Republic of Germany, 
Israel, Japan, Netherlands, 
Spain, Switzerland, U.K. 
Yugoslavia, 438 
Interregional capital stock agree- 
ment, amendments (1976), 187 
Interdependence of modern world: 
Bolen, 617; Kissinger, 25, 32, 48, 
218, 350, 364, 497, 505, 602; 
Lewis, 191, 714; Lord, 680; 
Reinhardt, 661; Robinson, 441 
International Atomic Energy 
Agency: Ford, 346, 631; Grant, 
344; Hummel, 456; Irving, 690; 
Kissinger, 506 
International Bank for Reconstruc- 
tion and Development (Kis- 
singer), 504 
Articles of agreement (1945), Com- 
oros, 627 
International Civil Aviation Organi- 
zation (Kissinger), 508 
International Committee of the Red 
Cross: 
Accounting for POW's and MIA's, 

role (Habib), 253 
Lebanon aid and U.S. support 
(Habib), 267 
International Cotton Institute, arti- 
cles of agreement (1966), Iran, 
699 
International Court of Justice: 
Aegean Sea dispute, question of ad- 
judication: Bennett, 373; Kis- 
singer, 324 
Statute of (1945), Seychelles, 596 
International Development Associa- 
tion: Bolen, 619: McGovern, 590 
International Finance Corporation 

(McGovern), 590 
International Industrialization Insti- 
tute, proposed: Kissinger, 728; 
Parker, 737 
International Labor Organization, 
U.S. proposed withdrawal 
(Ford), 538 
International law (Lewis), 717 
Digest of United States Practice in 
International Law, 1975, re- 
leased, 675 
International Monetary Fund: 
Greenwald, 295; Kissinger, 75 
Articles of agreement (1945), Com- 
oros, 466 
Bretton Woods Agreements Act, 

signature (Ford), 626 
Compensatory finance facility, and 
IMF trust fund: Bolen, 620; 
Kissinger, 504; McGovern, 589; 
Rogers, 654 
Italian and U.K. loans, proposed: 



Int. Monetary Fund — Continued 
Italian-U.K. Loans — Continued 
Ford, 660; Rogers, 656, 751 
International Resources Bank, pro- 
posed: 133, 134: Boeker, 135: Bo- 
len, 619, 621; Greenwald, 297; 
Kissinger, 6, 24, 76, 81, 225, 728; 
McGovern, 590; Robinson, 288, 
444; Rogers, 654; Scranton, 204 
International Security Assistance 
and Arms Export (Control Act of 
1976, bilateral agreements re eli- 
gibility under: Ecuador, In- 
donesia, Kenya, 439 
Investment guaranties, bilateral 

agreement with Oman, 495 
Investment of private capital abroad: 
Ford, 118; Kissinger, 76, 727 
Africa: Bolen, 619; Kissinger, 355, 

356 
Brazil, trade, investment, and fi- 
nancial matters, U.S. -Brazil 
joint communique, 71 
Indonesia (Hummel), 474 
Iran: 314; Ansary, 309 
Mexico (Luers), 54 
OECD declaration on international 
investment and multinational 
enterprises, and decision of the 
Council: Kissinger, Richard- 
son, Simon, 403; texts, 83, 88 
Pacific Basin (Robinson), 286 
Peru, Marcona Mining Company is- 
sue, agreement (Department), 
487 
South Africa (Rogers), 534 
Southeast Asia (Hummel), 471 
Iran: 
Economic and social reform, review 

(Atherton), 430 
Financial center, proposed (An- 
sary), 313 
Human rights (Atherton), 429 
Intelligence services in U.S., ques- 
tion of activities (Kissinger), 
640 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 284, 

304, 627, 699 
U.S. -Iran Joint Commission for 
Economic Cooperation: An- 
sary, 307; Kissinger, 305 
Agreed minutes of third session: 

304; text, PR 368, 8/7 
Text of communique, 314 
U.S. military aid: Habib, 447: Kis- 
singer, 311, 312, 313, 371, 549 
Visit of Secretary Kissinger (Kis- 
singer), 305 
Iraq, treaties, agreements, etc., 70, 

103, 723, 759 
Ireland: 
Air charter agreement, announce- 
ment, 102 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 39, 70, 
103, 304, 347, 407, 438, 571, 759 
Irving, Frederick, 375, 687 
Israel; 
Arms supply to Christians in Leba- 



ndex, July 5-December 27, 1976 



771 



Israel — Continued 

non, question of (Kissinger), 

647 
Economic and political stability, 

grant agreements with U.S., 

540 
Rescue of hostages in Uganda, U.S. 

position: 695: Bennett, 185: 

Ford, 160, 161, 162; Kissinger, 

158, 164, 166, 237; Scranton, 

181 
Security Council draft resolu- 
tions, texts, 196 
U.S. role, question of (Kis- 
singer), 237 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 304, 

438, 466, 495, 540, 572, 744 
U.S. economic and military aid 

Atherton, 175; Habib, 448; Kis 

singer, 94, 578 
U.S. relations; Atherton, 174 

Rabin (quoted), 179 
Italy; 
Economic problems (Rogers), 656 

751 
Election results (Kissinger), 89, 93 

120, 128, 166, 325 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 39, 71 

216, 304, 539, 540 
U.S. aid, question of (Kissinger) 

119, 325 
U.S. -Italian scientific meeting on 

Senesco problem, PR 445, 9/17 
U.S. MAAG's terminated, 336 
U.S. visit of Giulio Andreotti, pro- 
gram, PR 578, 12/3 
Ivory Coast; 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 304, 

723 
U.S. Ambassador (Stearns), PR 

508, 10/13 



Jamaica; 

Balance of payments (Rogers), 753 

Cuban relations and influence, 
question of (Luers), 50 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 38, 438, 
539, 627, 651 
James, Charles A., sworn in as Am- 
bassador to Niger, PR 534, 10/29 
Japan; 

Asian role and influence (Hummel), 
470, 585 

Australian relations; 289-290, 292; 
Robinson, 286 

Eighth U.S. -Japan Conference on 
Cultural and Educational In- 
terchange, meeting, 65 

Pacific Basin trade (Robinson), 286 

Soviet pilot, question of asylum in 
U.S. (Kis.singer), PR 419, 9/7 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 39, 71, 
103, 147, 216, 304, 330, 376, 
438, 539, 627, 744 

U.S. imports of specialty steel, lim- 



Japan — Continued 

itations, 71, 100, 744 

U.S. relations; Hummel, 582; Kis- 
singer, 107, 128, 151, 350; 
Lord, 685 

U.S. security relations; Hummel, 
584; Kissinger, 220 

Yen devaluation, question of (Si- 
mon), 121 
Jefferson, Thomas (quoted), 196 

Portrait, gift to State Department, 
PR 521, 10/18 
Johanes, Jaromir, 13 
Jordan, treaties, agreements, etc., 

38, 148 
Juarez, Benito (quoted), 35 
Judicial matters; 

General Tire and Rubber Company 
and the Firestone Tire and 
Rubber Company, mutual as- 
sistance in administration of 
justice, bilateral agreement 
with Me.xico, 188 

Lockheed Aircraft Corporation 
matter, agreements re proce- 
dures for mutual assistance in 
administration of justice with; 
Australia, 467; Belgium, 39; 
Germany, Federal Republic of, 
539; Greece, 39: Italy, 540; 
Spain, 284 

Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and 
McDonnell Douglas Corpora- 
tion matters, mutual assistance 
in administration of justice, 
bilateral agreement with Tur- 
key, 188, 495 

Mutual assistance in criminal mat- 
ters, agreement with Switzer- 
land, 72, 188, 256, 304 

Service abroad of judicial and e.\- 
trajudicial documents in civil or 
commercial matters, Spain, 723 

Taking of evidence abroad in civil 
or commercial matters, con- 
vention (1970); Spain, 723; 
U.K., 347 



Kashmir (Kissinger), 320 
Katz, Julius L.; 483; Greenwald, 273 
Assistant Secretary of State for 
Economic and Business Af- 
fairs, sworn in as, PR 460, 9/23 
Kaunda, Kenneth David, remarks on 

southern Africa, PR 443, 9/16 
Keeley, Robert V., sworn in as Am- 
bassador to Mauritius, PR 307, 
6/17 
Kekkonen, Urho, visit to U.S.; 336, 

337; program, PR 357, 7/28 
Kenya (Bolen), 620 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 39, 147, 

256, 438, 439, 495, 539, 627 
U.S. military aid; Kissinger, 171, 
264; Schaufele, 303 



772 



Kenya — Continued 
U.S. relations (Schaufele), 302 
Visit of Secretary Kissinger; Kis- 
singer, PR 459, 9/22, PR 465, 
9/23, PR 466, 9/23; Osogo, PR 
459, 9/22, PR 466, 9/23 
Keynes, John Maynard (quoted), 683 
Khmer Republic; Hummel, 472; Kis- 
singer, 228 
MIA's, accounting (Habib), 251 
U.S. bombing during Indochina 
war (Kissinger), 129 
Killen, D. J., 289 
Kissinger, Henry A.; 
Addresses, remarks, and state- 
ments; 
Africa (for details, see Africa); 
Economic development, 262, 

351.354, 559 
European coordinated aid, 
proposed, 46, 82, 113, 
126-127,263,264,355,560, 
PR 314, 6/21, PR 419, 9/7 
Regional development, 355, 

358 
Southern: 
Meetings with Prime Mini.';- 
ter Vorster, 93, 95, 121, 
127, 260, 349, 358, 400, 
514, PR 312-A, 6/20, PR 
323, 6/23, PR 325, 6/23, 
PR411,9/3, PR415, 9/5, 
PR 417, 9/7, PR 422, 9/7 , 
Negotiations, prospects and 
progress, 96, 126, 158, 
167, 170, 239, 245, 259, 
325, 377, 409, 415, 511, 
518, 520, 527, 529, 561, 
576, 610, 641, PR 412, 
9/4, PR 417, 9/7, PR 419, 
9/7, PR 420, 9/7, PR 424, 
9/10, PR 432, 9/13, PK 
439, 9/16, PR 443, 9/16, 
PR450,9/20,PR466,9/23 
U.S. mercenaries, question of 

recruitment, 24(3 
U.S. policy, relations, role, 46, 
96, 126, 158, 239, 257, 500, 
511, 530, 553, 559, 561, 
641, 706, PR 353, 7/22, PR 
453, 9/J2, PR 459, 9/22, PR 
463, 9/23, PR 514, 10/15 
African Development Bank, 356 
Angola, 46, 259, 260, 359, 704, 
706 
Allegations of recruitment of 
mercenaries in U.S., 341 
(quoted) 
Cuban intervention and con- 
tinued military presence, 
26, 30, 48, 158, 172, 239, 
265, 350, 359, 401, 513, 
516, 520, 704 
Execution of Daniel Gearhart, 
163, 165, 167, 171 
Arab-Israeli conflict, 172, 306, 
369, PR 591, 12/8 



Department of State Bulletii 



Kissinger, Henry A. — Continued 
Addresses — Continued 
Arab-Israeli conflict — Con. 
Geneva conference, question of 

reconvening, 95, 502, 707 
Israeli-occupied territories, 

693 
Lebanon crisis, effect on, 164, 

236, 563 
Negotiations, prospects and 
progress, 128, 131, 151, 
160, 172, 218, 236, 314, 
350, 402, 501, 545, 562, 
601, 708 
Palestinian rights, 647 
Arms control, 228, 552, 710 
Asia, 216, 224, 319, 350 
Harvard East Asia Confer- 
ence, 573, 575 
Berlin agreement, 130, 384 
Bloch, Dora, 168 
Boyatt, Thomas, 169 
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 242 
Cambodia, 228 
U.S. bombing of during In- 
dochina war, 129 
Canada, 227, 350 
Carter, Jimmy, 165, 235, 367, 
709, PR 596, 12/10 
11 Chile, 19 

Alleged interference with Al- 

lende regime, 125, 579 
Former Ambassador Letelier, 

murder of, 578 
Human rights, 3, 43, 339, 608 
China, People's Republic of: 
Change of leadership, effect on 
U.S. relations, question of 
128, 417. 575, 580 
Mao Tse-tung, death of, 416 
U.S. arms sales, question of, 

579, 609 
U.S. relations, 151, 222, 229, 
240, 319, 350, 372, 499, 
500, 605, 705 
World security and, 608 
CIA, 578 
Collective security, 16, 42, 107, 

152 
Colombo nonaligned summit, 

356, 402 
Commodity trade, 16, 22. 43, 81, 

90, 726 
Conference on International 
Economic Cooperation, 91, 
505 
Continuation in office, question 
of, 233, 324, 577, PR 514, 
10/15 
Criticism of, 131, 233 
Cuba: 
Cancellation of U.S. hijacking 

agreement, 573, 577, 578 
Human rights, 4, 43, 339 
Influence on Caribbean coun- 
tries, 28 



Index, July 5-December 27, 1976 



Kissinger. Henry A.— Continued 
Addresses — Continued 
Cuba — Continued 

U.S. relations, 26, 553 
Cyprus, 89, 93, 240, 323. 503, PR 

596, 12/10 
Defense spending, 552 
East-West relations, 21, 44, 78, 
92, 111, 119, 127, 152, 323. 
326-327. 382, PR 315. 6/22. 
PR 598, 12/10 
Economic development, 31, 74. 

503 

Economic meeting, Puerto Rico, 

46, 74, 92. 119, 152, 324, 708 

Energy, 81. 259, 263, 465, 505 

Alternate sources, 77, 91, 709 

International Energy Agency, 

93, 240, 709 
Second Arab oil embargo, 

question of, 240, 607, 709 
Washington State natural gas 
bill, 226 
Europe, 44, 105, 127, 228, 350, 
499, 705, 710, PR 590, 12/8, 
PR 598, 12/10 
Eastern, 111, 153, 167, 244, 
574, 504, 9/8 
Communist Party meeting in 
East Berlin, 166 
Humanitarian versus economic 
or political issues, 323, 
327, 405, 645, 711 
Western: 
Communist parties partici- 
pation in governments, 
question of effect on 
NATO, 157, 367, 709 
Security, 108, 220 
European Economic Community, 

PR 590. 12/8. PR 593, 12/9 
Fishing zone, U.S. 200-mile ex- 
tension, 401 
Foreign policy, 26, 149, 217, 241, 
258, 260, 555, 597, 607, 610, 
701, 726 
Achievements, 128, 238, 580, 

605 
Assistant to the President and 
Secretary of State roles 
compared, 366 
Black leaders, meetings with, 

359, 368 
Conduct of, 124, 131. 231. 232. 
541. 544, 579, PR 598, 
12/10 
Credibility. 551 
Election year, question of ef- 
fect, 91. 125. 132,229.232, 
366, 396, 403, 578, 579, 
610,641,646, PR 353, 7/22 
Executive authority, effect of 
Vietnam and Watergate, 
124 
Governor Carter's statements 
on, 165. 235. 367, 549, 606, 
643. 645 



Kissinger. Henry A. — Continued 
Addresses — Continued 
Foreign policy — Continued 
Intervention, question of con- 
ditions justifying, 125, 548 
Kissinger influence, question 

of, 371, 551 
Morality versus pragmatism, 
126, 156, 365, 542, 546, 597 
Presidential candidates' de- 
bates, 165, 549, 574, 577 
Presidential responsibility, 

240, 574, 581 
Public discussions, 171, 546, 

547 
Stability, 150, 165, 327. 363, 
644, PR 598, 12/10 
France, 93. PR 323. 6/23, PR 419, 

9/7. PR 597, 12/10 
Future plans, question of, 577, 
578, 580, 611, 642, PR 353, 
7/22, PR 586, 12/6 
Geneva Conference of the Com- 
mittee on Disarmament, 499 
Germany, Federal Republic of, 
45, 382 
Special Bonn-Washington rela- 
tionship, question of, 127 
Greek-Turkish relations. 323, 

327, 703 
Historian and statesman, view- 
point as, 132 
Human rights, 1, 506, 558, 602, 
608 
Eastern Europe, 153, 645, 711, 

PR 504, 9/8 
Korea, 366 

Latin America, 2, 17, 19, 22, 
29, 43, 339, 608 
Indochina, 223. 228 
Industrial democracies, 73. 89, 
105, 110, 112, 131, 151, 218, 
259, 264, 356, 498, 503, 605, 
PR 312, 6/20, PR312-A,6/20 
lEA-French relations, 93 
Iran: 
Intelligence services, question 

of activities, 640 
U.S. military sales. 311, 312, 

313. 371, 549 
U.S. relations and trade. 305. 
309 
Israel: 
Arab boycott and question of 
American business prac- 
tices. 369 
Rescue and hijacking victims 
from Entebbe airport. 158. 
164, 166. 237 
U.S. economic and military aid. 
94. 578 
Italy, 119 
Elections. 89. 93, 120, 128, 166. 
325 
Japan, relations, 107, 128, 151, 
220, 350 



773 



Kissinger, Henry A.— Continued 
Addresses — Continued 
Kenya, U.S. aircraft sales, 171, 

264 
Korea, Republic of, 221 , 238, 367, 
550 
Bribery of U.S. officials, ques- 
tion of, 646 
Human rights, 366 
Korean Peninsula, 219, 222, 237, 
502, PR 353, 7/22 
Panmunjom incident, 414 
Latin America: 
Charter of Economic Rights 

and Duties of States, 28 
U.S. relations, interests, role, 
1, 5, 14, 19, 41, 155, 244, 
555 
Law of the sea conference, 33, 
327, 333, 335, 397, 400, 451, 
507 
Deep sea mining, 334, 370, 395, 
397, 400, 452, 507 
Lebanon, 90, 91, 160, 164, 230, 
314, PR 314, 6/21, PR 316, 
6/22 
Arab forces, 28, 121, 646, PR 

314, 6/21 
Evacuation of Americans, 90, 

94, 314, PR 312-A, 6/20 
Israeli arms supplies to Chris- 
tians in Lebanon, question 
of, 647 
Soviet arms supplies, 546 
U.S. Ambassador Meloy and 
Counselor Waring, mur- 
ders of, 98, 546, PR 310, 
6/19 
U.S. military intervention, 

question of, 546, 547 

U.S. primary objectives, 29, 

160, 236, 325, 401, 414, 

502, 563, 646 

Less developed countries, 14, 21, 

75,80,259,263,334,351,725 

General debt moratorium, 

question of, 230, 402 
Group of 77, 326 
North-South relations, 20, 21, 
24, 31, 79, 113, 119, 120, 
131, 152, 154, 503, 556, 
560, 563, 602, 726 
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation 
matter, 326 

Mexico, 30 
American prisoners, 27 
Communist influence, question 

of, 581, PR 579, 12/3 
Drug control, 34 
Mexican workers in U.S., 33, 

234 
U.S. relations, 749, PR 574, 

11/29, PR 577, 12/2, PR 

579, 12/3 



Kissinger, Henry A. — Continued 
Addresses — Continued 
Mozambique, 27, 359, 516 
Multinational corporations, 76, 

326, 403, 643, 728 
Namibia, 47, 158, 170, 239, 259, 
261, 324, 351, 358, 360, 365, 
377, 380, 384, 403, 409, 413, 
500, 514, 516, 518, 521, 524, 
559, 561, 596c, PR 419, 9/7, 
PR 504, 10/8 
South West Africa People's 
Organization (SWAPO), 
378, 379, 384, 409, 415, 
500, 521, 559, 576, 593 
(quoted) 
National defense, 108, 231, 243, 

367, 552 
NATO, 44, 46, 109, 127, 152, 157, 
701, 705, 709, PR 597, 12/10, 
PR 598, 12/10 
North-South relations, 20, 21, 24, 
31, 79, 113, 119, 120, 131, 
152, 154, 503, 556, 560, 563, 
602, 726 
Norway, 45, PR 592, 12/9 
Nuclear proliferation, problem 

of, 226, 309, 319, 322, 505 
OAS, 556 
General Assembly, 1, 5, 10, 33, 
41, 156, 339 
Olympic games, 234 
OPEC oil pricing, 244, 645, 711 
Second Arab oil embargo, 
question of, 240, 607, 709 
U.S. arms sales, 244, 371, 549 
Organization for Economic Coop- 
eration and Development, 
75, 264, 355, 403, 505 
Ministerial meeting, 46, 73, 89, 
91, 113, PR 312, 6/20, PR 
312-A, 6/20, PR 315, 6/21, 
PR 323. 6/23 
Pakistan, 319, PR 369, 8/8 
French nuclear weapons sale, 
317, 320, 322, PR 419, 9/7 
Panama Canal negotiations, 21, 

243, 574 
Personal diplomacy, conduct of, 

544 
Political prisoners, 603 
Amnesty, question of proposal 
at General Assembly, 402 
Cuba, 43 
Portugal, 704 

Presidential elections, Soviet or 
Chinese preferences, ques- 
tion of. 369 
Public support, 131 
Puerto Rico summit, 46, 74, 92, 
119, 152,324 
EEC participation, question 
of, 93, 708 
A. Philip Randolph award (Roy 
Wilkins), 349 



Kissinger, Henry A. — Continued 
Addresses — Continued 
Republican Party "morality" 

plank, 365 
Rhodesia, 259, 351, 410, 415, 524, 
561, 576, 704, PR 419, 9/7, 
PR 420, 9/7 
Byrd amendment, question of 

repeal, 97, 170, 414 
Financial guarantees plan, 
proposed, 380, 410, 415, 
514, 526, 530, 543, 561, PR 
412, 9/4 
Geneva conference, prospects, 
514, 516, 522, 529, 610, 
640, 704, PR 467, 9/23, PR 
468, 9/23, PR 469, 9/23, PR 
483, 9/29, PR 484, 9/29 
Meeting of Secretary Kissinger 
and Ian Smith, 379, 382, 
401, 416, 517, 519 
Negotiated settlement, need 
for, prospects, and U.S. 
support, 47, 158, 170, 239, 
260, 262, 358, 360, 377, 
383, 409, 413, 521, 543, 
559, PR 412, 9/4, PR 448, 
9/19, PR 483, 9/29, PR 484, 
9/29, PR 504, 10/8, PR 514, 
10/15 
Smith acceptance of principle 
of majority rule, 500, 520, 
526, 528, 561, 704 
South Africa, role, 352, 409, 

526, 529, 559 

U.K. responsibility and role, 
45, 96, 121, 127, 260, 325, 
327, 349, 351, 378, 401, 
412, 500, 518, 522, 524, 

527, 530, PR 467, 9/23, PR 
483, 9/29 

SALT, 110, 130, 153, 350, 499 
SALT Two, 169, 228, 324, 605, 

646, 710 
Saudi Arabia, 172, 369, 549 
Science and technology: 
Latin America, 6, 9, 17, 43, 728 
U.N. conference, 9, 505 
U.S. National Conference, 725 
Shuttle diplomacy, 411 
Sino-Soviet relations, 417, 609, 

641. 711 
South Africa, 261, 325, 365, 409, 
412, 516, 530, 544, 559, PR 
443, 9/16, PR 463, 9/23, PR 
469, 9/23 
Apartheid, 94, 261, 325, 352, 
358, 360, 365, 501, 566 
(quoted) 
Meetings with Prime Minister 
Vorster, 93, 95, 121, 127, 
260, 349, 358, 377, 400, 
514, PR 312-A, 6/20, PR 
323, 6/23, PR 411, 9/3, PR 
415, 9/5, PR 417, 9/7 



774 



Department of State Bulletin 



Kissinger, Henry A. — Continued 
Addresses — Continued 
South Africa — Continued 
Republic of Transkei, non- 
recognition, 642 
U.S. private arms sales, ques- 
tion of, 642 
Southeast Asia, 221 
Soviet Union, 29, 108, 549, 550 
Economy, 78 
Jewish emigration, 242, 603, 

608 
Military expansion. 111, 159, 

704 
Soviet pilot in Japan, question 
ofU.S. asylum, PR 419, 9/7 
U.S. credits and sales, 241 
U.S. Embassy, Soviet mi- 
crowave signals, 168, 170 
U.S. relations, 109, 125, 129, 
151, 158, 218, 229, 258, 
350, 499, PR 514, 10/15 
U.S. trade, 553 
State Department: 
Dean Acheson Auditorium and 
Loy Henderson Interna- 
tional Conference Room, 
dedication, PR 530, 10/26 
Recruitment of blacks, 360 
Sweden, 45 
Taiwan, 240, 372, 580 
Terrorism, 2, 4, 158, 235, 368, 

400, 453 (quoted), 508 
Thailand, 228, 578 
Trade, 75, 263, 356 
U.S. policies, 7, 16, 34, 229, 

504, 553, 607 
U.S. Trade Act restrictions, 6, 
8, 313 
Tunisian-U.S. Joint Commission, 

meeting, 611 
U.N., 159, 230, 497, 709 
UNCTAD fourth conference, 6, 

90, 133, 504, 728 
United Nations Day, 1976, 614 
U.S. arms sales policies, 244, 

371, 549, 606, 642 
U.S. secondary position, ques- 
tion of, 243" 
Vance, Cyrus, 749, PR 586, 12/6, 
PR 596, 12/10, PR 597, 12/10, 
PR 598, 12/10 
Vietnam, 219 
MIA's, failure to account for 
and effect on U.S. rela- 
tions, 30, 224, 400, 413, 
548, 573 
Vietnam war, 124, 128, 129, 225, 

228, 550 
Watergate, 124, 128, 129, 371 
Wiretapping, 644 
World problems, 1, 21, 31, 131, 

150. 259, 615 
Yugoslavia, U.S. security inter- 
ests, 606, 609, 643 



Kissinger, Henry A.— Continued 
Addresses — Continued 

Zumwalt, Elmo, 243, 551 
Correspondence and messages: 
Israeli-occupied Arab ter- 
ritories. Security Council 
consensus statement, 695 
Law of the sea conference, 327 
OECD declaration on invest- 
ment, 403 
Radio Free Europe and Radio 
Liberty, 405 
Interviews, transcripts, 124, 237, 
363, 528, 541, 606, PR 463, 
9/23, PR 469, 9/23, PR 514, 
10/15 
Introduction to address before 
Chicago Council on Foreign Re- 
lations and Mid-City Commit- 
tee, PR 339- A, 7/6 
Meetings with U.N. Secretary 
General Waldheim, 399, PR 
483, 9/29, PR 484, 9/29 
News conferences, transcripts, 19, 
20, 25, 89, 95, 119, 164, 307, 
318, 322, 358, 377, 382, 409, 
511, 519, 521, 573, 640, PR 353, 
7/22, PR 504, 10/8 
Questions and answers, 157, 226, 
703, PR 315, 6/22, PR 316, 6/22, 
PR 412, 9/4, PR 484, 9/29 
Visits to: 
Afghanistan, 316 
Africa: Ford, 385; Kissinger, 361, 
383, 409, 413, 511, PR 419, 
9/7, PR 422, 9/7, PR 439, 
9/16, PR 450, 9/20, PR 451, 
9/21, PR 453, 9/22, PR 459, 
9/22, PR 465, 9/23, PR 466, 
9/23; Rogers, 532 
Europe, 44 
France, PR 312, 6/20, PR 314, 

6/21 
Iran, 305 

Latin America, 14, 41 
Mexico, 25, 30, 749, PR 574, 
11/29, PR 577, 12/2, PR 579, 
12/3 
Netherlands, 322 
Pakistan, 317, PR 369, 8/8 
Kluane Lake, Yukon Territory, seis- 
mograph station, agreement with 
Canada, 407 
Kombila, Rene, 739 
Koniotakis, Constantin, 703 
Korea, Democratic Republic of, 

human rights (Armstrong), 457 
Korea, Republic of (Robinson), 288 
August 18 incident at Panmunjom 
and murder of U.S. officers; 
Brown, 392; Department, 392, 
394; Hummel, 386; Kissinger, 
414 



Korea, Republic of — Continued 
Bribery of U.S. officials, question 

of (Kissinger), 646 
Fisheries agreement with U.S. ini- 
tialed, PR 599, 12/10 
Human rights (Kissinger), 366 
Income tax agreement with U.S. 

(Ford), 437 
Security of, and U.S. support: 393; 
Habib (quoted), 392; Hummel, 
386; Kissinger, 221, 238, 367, 
550 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 39, 71, 
439, 651, 723, 743, 744 
Korean Peninsula, problems (Kis- 
singer), 219, 222, 237, 502 
Krall, Lothar, 711 
Kristofferson, Kris (Luers), 215 



Laise, Carol C, 254 
Laos (Hummel), 472 
MIA's accounting (Habib), 251 
World Health Organization con- 
stitution (1946), amendments 
to articles 34 and 55, accept- 
ance, 539 
Latin America {see also names of in- 
dividual countries): 
Alliance for Progress (Kissinger), 

244 
Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States (1974): 35; 
Kissinger, 28 
Economic development: Kissinger, 

5, 155; Rogers, 752 
Human rights (Kissinger), 2, 17, 

19, 22, 29, 43, 339 
Soviet relations: Kissinger, 372; 

Luers, 56 
U.S. relations, policy, and role: 
Kissinger, 5, 14, 41, 128, 151, 
155, 218, 244, 350, 555; Luers, 
58 
Visit of Secretary Kissinger: 14; 
Kissinger, 14, 19, 23, 25 
Law of the sea: 
Conference: Greenwald, 297; 
Hummel, 470; Kissinger, 33, 
327, 333, 397, 401, 451, 507; 
Lewis, 195; Lord, 684; Robin- 
son, 445; Rogers, 659 
Deep sea mining and proposed 
International Seabed Re- 
source Authority: Green- 
wald, 297; Kissinger, 334, 
370, 395, 397, 400, 452, 507; 
Robinson, 445; Rogers, 659 
Review conferences, proposed 
(Kissinger), 398, 400 
High seas, convention (1958), Mon- 
golia, 650 



Index, July 5-December 27, 1976 



775 



Law of the sea — Continued 

South Pacific Forum Joint Declara- 
tion, 290 
Lawrence, Loren E., 214 
Lebanon: 292; Kissinger, 314 

Arab forces (Kissinger), 28, 121, 
646, PR 314, 6/21 

French force, proposed (Kis- 
singer), 92, 121, PR 314, 6/21 

Integrity and unity, U.S. support: 
Department, 459; Kissinger, 
29, 160, 236, 401, 414, 502, 563, 
646, PR 419, 9/7 

Middle East settlement, effect on: 
Atherton, 177; Kissinger, 164, 
236, 563, PR 514, 10/15; Lord, 
682 

Negotiations, prospects; Kissinger, 
90, 91, 325; Sherer, 692 

Roundtable conference, proposed 
(Kissinger), 92, 160, 172, 326, 
PR 316, 6/22 

Soviet arms supply (Kissinger), 546 

Stateless refugees (Habib), 268 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 71, 700 

U.S. Ambassador Meloy and Coun- 
selor Waling, murders of: Foi'd, 
98, 99, 554; Habib, PR 313, 
6/21; Kissinger, 98, 546, PR 
310, 6/19; Sherer, 143 

U.S. arms shipments from West 
German bases, question of 
(Kissinger), 230 

U.S. evacuation of American citi- 
zens; Ford, 99; Kissinger, 90, 
94, 314, PR 312-A, 6/20 

U.S. humanitarian aid; Depart- 
ment, 460; Scranton, 699 

U.S. military intervention, ques- 
tion of (Kissinger), 546, 547, 
PR 314, 6/21 
Leigh, Monroe, 581, 649 
Lesotho: 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 
739 

Universal Postal Union constitu- 
tion (1964), second additional 
protocol, 744 

U.S. Ambassador (Norland), PR 
569, 11/24 
Less developed countries (see also 
Commodity trade. Science and 
technology. United Nations Con- 
ference on Trade and Develop- 
ment, and names of individual 
countries): Kissinger, 259, 351; 
Lewis, 192 

Development process: Kissinger, 
31, 80, 503; Stever, 730 

ECOSOC, 61st session (Scranton), 
201 

General debt moratorium, question 
of (Kissinger), 230, 402 

Group of 77; Kissinger, 326; Schiff, 
464 

Intermediate technology (Stever), 
734 

Nationalism (Bolen), 617 



Less developed countries — Con. 
New International Economic Order 
and the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States, 
U.S. position: Boeker, 135, 
136; McGovern, 588 
North-South relations: 123, 292; 
Greenwald, 272, 294; Hummel, 
471; Kissinger, 20, 21, 24, 31, 
79, 113, 119, 120, 131, 152,154, 
503, 556, 560, 563, 602, 726; 
Lewis, 194; Lord, 680; Parker, 
735; Reinhardt, 661; Robinson, 
287, 442; Rogers, 657; Scran- 
ton, 203; Stever, 729 
Pacific Basin (Robinson), 288 
Revenue sharing from deep sea 
mining, proposed (see also Law 
of the sea): Kissinger, 334 
Southeast Asia, 469 
U.S. bilateral aid (Kissinger), 263 
Lewis, Samuel W.. 189, 714 
Liberia (Bolen), 618, 620 
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 

231 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 38, 539, 

675 
U.S. visit of President Tolbert; 
Ford, 481; Tolbert, 482; pro- 
gram, PR 444, 9/17 
Libya, treaties, agreements, etc., 

187, 304, 330 
Lincoln, Abraham (quoted), 257, 678 
Load lines, international convention 
(1966): Algeria, 650: Bahamas, 
329; Seychelles, 650 
Amendments (1971): Ireland, 347; 
Israel, 438; Poland, 347 
Loory, Stuart, 552 
Loran-A stations, continued opera- 
tion, agreement with Philippines, 
700 
Loran-C station near Williams Lake, 
B.C., agreement with Canada re 
construction and maintenance, 39 
Lord, Winston, 677 
Low, Stephen, sworn in as Ambas- 
sador to Zambia, PR 391, 8/20 
Lowitz, Donald, election as chairman 
of Board of Foreign Scholarships, 
PR 471, 9/24 
Lozano, Ignacio E., Jr., sworn in as 
Ambassador to El Salvador, PR 
376, 8/13 
Luers, William H., 49, 211 
Luxembourg (Kissinger), 45 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 39, 103, 
304, 539, 596, 675 

M 

MacFarquhar, Roderick, 705 
Madagascar, treaties, agreements, 

etc 70 539 
Mailliard, William S., 339 
Makeka, Thabo R., 739 
Malaysia; Hummel, 473; Robinson, 

288 



Malaysia — Continued 
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 
132 
Maldives, Universal Postal Union 
constitution (1964), ratification of 
second additional protocol, 495 
Maldonado Gularte, Federico Abun- 

dio, 132 
Mali: 
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 

739 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 147, 

188 
U.S. Ambassador (Byrne), PR 502, 
10/8 
Malta, treaties, agreements, etc., 

256, 699 
Mapping, charting and geodesy, 

agreement with Canada, 495 
Marcona Mining Company, agree- 
ment re compensation for ex- 
propriated assets, agreement 
with Peru: 540, 760; Department, 
487; entry into force, 760 
Marine pollution (see also Oil pollu- 
tion): Kissinger, 452 
Marine pollution by substances 
other than oil, intervention on 
the high seas, protocol (1973): 
Sweden, Tunisia, 284 
Maritime matters: 
Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization conven- 
tion (1948): Bahamas, 329; 
Bahrain, 495; Cape Verde, 376; 
Morocco, 495; Surinam, 596 
Amendments (1974): Bahrain, 
495; Belgium, 256; Brazil, 
304; Cameroon, 674; Cape 
Verde, 376; Czechoslovakia, 
743; Denmark, 347; Egypt, 
743; Finland, 650; Ghana, 
627, 699; Indonesia, 743; Is- 
rael, 466; Korea, Republic of, 
723; Libya, 304; Malta, 699; 
Morocco, 495; Nigeria, 146; 
Oman, Peru, 743; Surinam, 
759; Tanzania, 539 
International maritime traffic, 
facilitation of, convention 
(1965): Bahamas, 329; India, 
69; Iraq, 759 
Amendment of article VII; Fin- 
land, 596; New Zealand, 376; 
Soviet Union, 743 
Tonnage measurement of ships, in- 
ternational convention (1969): 
Algeria, 651; Bahamas, 331; 
Colombia, 256; Poland, 331; 
Romania, 103 
Mastei's, Edward E., sworn in as 
Ambassador to Bangladesh, PR 
500, 10/7 
Mattick, Kurt, 710 
Mauritania (Bolen), 618 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 71, 
187, 627 
Mauritius: 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 187 



776 



Department of State Bulletin 



Mauritius — Continued 

U.S. Ambassador (Keeley), PR 
307. 6/17 
Maw, Carlyle E., 488 
M'Bow, Amadou Mahtar (quoted), 

666 
McAlister, Wanda, 232 
McCall, Tom, 232 

McCloskey, Robert J.: 139; sworn in 
as Ambassador to the Nether- 
lands, PR 428, 9/10 
McCullough, John G., 363, 366 
McGovern, George, 510, 587, 721 
Meloy, Francis E., Jr.: Ford, 98, 99, 
554; Habib, PR 313, 6/21; Kis- 
singer, 98, 546, PR 310, 6/19; 
Sherer, 143 
Meteorological observation program, 

agreement with Mexico, 651 
Mexico: 
American prisoners in Mexican 
jails: 36; Kissinger, 27; Luers, 
211 
Amnesty legislation on 1968 stu- 
dent riots (Luers), 54 
Communist political influence, 
question of: Kissinger, 581, PR 
579, 12/3; Luers, 52 
Drug control programs and U.S. 
assistance: 35; Kissinger, 34; 
Luers, 212; Robinson, 490 
Execution of penal sentences (sanc- 
tions) treaty: 
Agreement on draft text, PR 

547, 11/5 
Signature, 750 
Migrant workers in U.S.: Kis- 
singer, 33, 234; Luers, 212 
Operation of U.S. Citizens Band 

(CB) equipment, PR 418, 9/7 
President Lopez Portillo, inaugu- 
ration: Kissinger, 749, PR 574, 
11/29, PR 577, 12/2, PR 579, 
12/3; Rogers, 751 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 148, 
188, 256, 376, 438, 439, 539, 
572, 627, 651 
U.S. fisheries and provisional 
maritime boundaries agree- 
ments, 758, 760 
U.S. immigration: Ford, 639; Lord, 

685 
U.S. -Mexico Science and Technol- 
ogy Commission, second meet- 
ing, joint statement, 375 
Visit of Secretary Kissinger: Kis- 
singer, 25, 30, 749, PR 574, 
11/29, PR 577, 12/2, PR 579, 
12/3; text of U.S. -Mexico joint 
communique, 35 
Military assistance: 
Agreement with Greece re eligibil- 
ity for military assistance and 
payment for sale of defense ar- 
ticles, 540 
Military Assistance Advisory 
Groups, termination of eleven 
MAAG's, announcement, 336 



Military assistance — Continued 
Military training exchange pro- 
gram, bilateral agreement 
with Australia, 759 
Miller, G. William, chairman of first 
panel of National Meeting on Sci- 
ence, Technology and Develop- 
ment, PR 549, 11/9 
Miner, Thomas, introduction of Sec- 
retary Kissinger to Chicago 
Council on Foreign Relations and 
the Mid-America Committee, PR 
339- A, 7/6 
Mongolia, high seas convention 

(1958), accession, 650 
Morgan, Robert, 711 
Morgan-Giles, Morgan, 702 
Morocco, treaties, agreements, etc., 

188. 495. 744 
Mozambique: 
Angola contrasted (Kissinger), 27, 

516 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 439, 

743 
U.S. aid: Kissinger, 359; 
McGovern, 590 
Mugabe, Robert (Kissinger), 577 
Multinational corporations (see also 
under Judicial matters): Kis- 
singer, 76 
Code of conduct, proposed: Kis- 
singer, 728; Lord, 683; Robin- 
son, 286 
Illicit payments (Robinson), 446 
EC(DSOC intergovernmental 
group: Boeker, 137; 
Feldman, 696; Nessen, 338; 
PR 559, 11/16 
Treaty, proposed: Feldman, 696; 
Kissinger, 76; McGovern, 
591; Scranton, 204 
U.S. legislation and program: 
Feldman, 697; Kissinger, 643 
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation: 

Hummel, 585; Kissinger, 326 
OECD Declaration, on Interna- 
tional Investment and Multi- 
national Enterprises; with an- 
nex: Kissinger, Simon, 
Richardson, 403; text, 83, 87 
U.N. information center, pro- 
posed: Kissinger, 76; Rogers, 
654 
UNCTAD conference resolution, 
explanation of U.S. abstention 
(Boeker), 136 
Musieh, Arnaldo T., 231 
Mutawakkil, Yahya M. al-, 13 
Mutual defense: 
Bilateral agreements with: Bel- 
gium, 304; Japan, 147 
U.S. -Federal Republic of Germany 
joint statement, 247 
Muzorewa, Abel (Kissinger), 577 
Mwale, Siteke, remarks on southern 

Africa, PR 439, 9/16 
Myerson, Jacob M., 201?i, 510, 566, 
722 



N 



Namibia: Kaunda, PR 443, 9/16; Kis- 
singer, 351, PR 419, 9/7, PR 504, 
9/8 
Background (Kissinger), 352 
Geneva conference, question of 

(Kissinger), .381 
German interests (Kissinger), 412 
Illegal administration by South Af- 
rica: Kissinger, 261; Scranton, 
283, 593; Security Council res- 
olutions, texts, 283, 594 
Independence, question of date 
(Kissinger), 352, 358, 403, 516, 
518 
Negotiations, prospects (Kissinger), 
47, 158, 170, 239, 259, 324, 360, 
378, 380, 409, 413, 500, 596c 
Racial violence: Bolen, 616; Kis- 
singer, 377, 524 
Self-determination (Kissinger), 261, 

325 
South West Africa People's Organi- 
zation (SWAPO), (Kissinger), 
378, 379, 384, 409, 415, 500, 521, 
559, 576, 593 (quoted) 
U.N. role (Kissinger), 382, 500, 559 
NASA (National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration): Bennett, 
668; Reis, 207 
Nauru, international regulations 
(1960) for preventing collisions at 
sea, amendments (1967), accept- 
ance, 330 
Near and Middle East, Arab states, 

U.S. relations (Atherton), 175 
Nepal, treaties, agreements, etc., 467, 

571 
Nessen, Ronald H., 163, 339 
Netherlands: 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 39, 70, 

103, 304, 438, 723 
U.S. Ambassador (McCloskey), PR 

428, 9/10 
U.S. MAAG's terminated, 336 
Visit of Secretary Kissinger: Kis- 
singer, 322; van der Stoel, 322 
New Zealand, treaties, agreements, 

etc., 39, 284, 304, 376, 723 
Newly independent nations: Kis- 
singer, 154; Lewis, 716 
Nicaragua, GATT, provisional acces- 
sion of Colombia, declaration, 70 
Nguza Karl-I-Bond, PR 453, 9/22 
Niger (Bolen), 618 
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 

713 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 71, 331, 

744 
U.S. Ambassador (James), PR 534, 
10/29 
Nigeria (Bolen), 618, 620 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 70, 103, 
146, 304, 347, 439, 539, 723 
Nokes, Richard, 232 
Nonalignment (Kissinger), 14, 264, 

356 
Norland, Donald R., PR 569, 11/24 



Index, July 5-December 27, 1976 



777 



North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(Kissinger). 109, 152, PR 597, 
12/10, PR 598, 12/10 
Notices of meetings: 

Communist participation in West 
European governments, ques- 
tion of effect (Kissinger), 157, 
709 

Ministerial meeting, Oslo, summary 
(Kissinger), 44, 46 

Parliamentarians meeting (Kis- 
singer), 701 

Special Bonn-Washington relation- 
ship, question of (Kissinger), 
127 

Turkey, importance to: Ford, 61; 
Habib, 424 

Weapons standardization, proposed 
(Kissinger), 701, 705, 708 
Norw'ay (Kissinger), PR 592, 12/9 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 39, 147, 
304, 347 

U.S. MAAG's terminated, 336 

U.S. relations (Kissinger), 45 

Advisory Committee for U.S. par- 
ticipation in the U.N. Confer- 
ence on Human Settlements 
(Habitat). PR 321. 6/23 

Advisory Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 
PR 515, 10/15 

Advisory Committee on Interna- 
tional Intellectual Property, PR 
474, 9/27 

Advisory Committee on the Law of 
the Sea, PR 406, 9/1, PR 454, 
9/22 

Advisory Committee on Transna- 
tional Enterprises, PR 495, 10/5 

Advisory Committee to the U.S. 
National Section of the Inter- 
American Tropical Tuna Com- 
mission, PR 389, 8/18 

Advisory Committee to the U.S. 
National Section of the Interna- 
tional Commission for the Con- 
servation of Atlantic Tunas, PR 
487, 10/1 

Advisory Committee to the U.S. 
National Section of the Interna- 
tional North Pacific Fisheries 
Commission, PR 395, 8/24 

Advisory Panel on Folk Music and 
Jazz, PR 434, 9/14 

Advisory Panel on Music, PR 425, 
9/10 

Fine Arts Committee, PR 555, 
11/10, PR 571, 11/26 

Government Advisory Committee 
on International Book and Li- 
brary Programs, PR 319, 6/23, 
PR 442, 9/17 

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Ad- 
visory Committee, PR 462, 
9/23, PR 524, 10/22, PR 538, 
10/29 



Notices of meetings — Continued 
Ocean Affairs Advisory Committee, 

PR 594, 12/9 
Overseas Schools Advisory Council, 

PR 522, 10/22 
Secretary of State's Advisory Com- 
mittee on Private International 
Law, PR 363, 8/4 
Shipping Coordinating Committee: 
Committee on Ocean Dumping, 

PR 393, 8/24, PR 550, 11/10 
Open meetings, PR 331, 6/25, PR 
379, 8/17, PR 380, 8/17, PR 
444, 9/17 
Subcommittee on Maritime Law, 

PR 426, 9/10, PR 540, 11/3 
Subcommittee on Safety of Life at 
Sea: 
Working group on bulk chemi- 
cals, PR 333, 6/25, PR 584, 
12/6 
Working group on carriage of 
dangerous goods, PR 503, 
10/8, PR 585, 12/6 
Working group on container 

transport, PR 431, 9/13 
Working group on fire protec- 
tion, PR 387, 8/18 
Working group on life-saving 

appliances, PR 388, 8/18 
Working group on radiocom- 
munications, PR .349, 7/20, 
PR 390, 8/19, PR 456, 9/22, 
PR 517, 10/15, PR 557, 
11/15 
Working group on safety of fish- 
ing vessels, PR 381, 8/17, 
PR 544, 11/4 
Working group on safety of 

navigation, PR 516, 10/15 
Working group on ship design 
and equipment, PR 342, 
7/8, PR 383, 8/17, PR 488, 
10/1, PR 489, 10/1 
Working group on standards of 
training and watchkeeping, 
PR 384, 8/17, PR 507, 10/12 
Working group on subdivision 
and stability, PR 427, 9/10, 
PR 527, 10/22 
Subcommittee on Tonnage Meas- 
urement, PR 359, 7/30 
U.S. National Committee for the 
Prevention of Marine Pollu- 
tion, PR 506, 10/12, PR 520, 
10/18 
U.S. Advisory Commission on In- 
ternational Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, PR 337, 6/30, 
PR 401, 8/30, PR 493, 10/4, PR 
505, 10/12 
U.S. National Committee for the In- 
ternational Radio Consultative 
Committee (CCIR), PR 546, 
11/4 
Study Group 1, PR 394, 8/24 



Notices of meetings — Continued 
U.S. National Committee — Con. 
Study Group 4, PR 392, 8/23 
Study Group 5, PR 552, 11/10 
Study Group 6, PR 320, 6/23, PR 

424, 9/10 
Study Group 7, PR 440, 9/17, PR 

541, 11/3 
Study Group 9, PR 545, 11/4 
Study Groups 10 and 11, PR 558, 
11/15 
U.S. National Committee for the In- 
ternational Telegraph and Tele- 
phone Consultative Committee 
(CCITT), PR 382, 8/17 
Study Group 1, PR 553, 11/10 
Study Groups 3 and 4, PR 542, 

11/3 
Study Group 5, PR 332, 6/25, PR 
461, 8/23, PR 554, 11/10 
Nuclear energy, peaceful uses (Kis- 
singer), 91 
Cooperation with Iran: 315; Ansary, 

308; Kissinger, 309, 310 
Liquid metal-cooled fast breeder 
reactors, agreement with Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany, 104 
Nuclear field, information, agree- 
ment with Canada, 539 
Nuclear policy: Ford, 629; Irving, 
687; Kissinger, 226, 507 
Republic of China (Hummel), 454 
Radioactive-waste disposal at sea 
(Grant), :343 
Nuclear nonproliferation: 290; Ford, 
346, 629; Hummel, 454; Irving, 
688; Kissinger, 226, 309, 319, 322, 
505; Lord, 684 
Treaty (1968): Ford, 346, 436 
Current actions: Bahamas, 329; 
Surinam, 147 
Nuclear testing: 
Nuclear test ban treaty (1963), 

Bahamas, 329 
Threshold test ban treaty and peace- 
ful nuclear explosions treaty, 
ratification urged (Ford), 269 
Nuclear war, dangers of: Kissinger, 
29, 158, 231, 232, 498, 541, 600; 
Lewis, 194 
Nujoma, Sam (Kissinger), 576 
Nzeyimana, Laurent, 739 



Ocean dumping convention (1972): 
Grant, 343 
Current actions: Byelorussian 
S.S.R., 347; Denmark, exten- 
sion to the Faroe Islands, 674; 
German Democratic Republic, 
329; Ukrainian S.S.R., 347; 
Yugoslavia, 69-70 
Oil pollution: 
Bermuda, agreement re assistance 
by U.S. Coast Guard in event 
of major oil spills, 256 



778 



Department of State Bulletin 



Oil pollution— Continued 
Civil liability for oil pollution dam- 
age, international convention 
(1969): Bahamas, Greece, 330; 
Japan, Yugoslavia, 216 
International fund for compensa- 
tion for oil pollution damage, 
international convention 
(1971): Bahamas, Japan, 330 
Intervention on the high seas in 
cases of oil pollution casual- 
ties, international convention 
(1969): Bahamas, 330; Cuba, 
216; Finland, 495; Poland, 216 
Prevention of pollution of the sea 
by oil, international convention 
(1954): Argentina, 699; 
Bahamas, 329-330; Bulgaria 
(with reservation), 699 
Amendments (1969): Algeria, 
216; Bahamas, Ghana, 
Greece, Libya, Yugoslavia, 
330 
Amendments (1971); Algeria, 
651; Italy, 216; Soviet Union, 
743; Yugoslavia, 330 
Olson, Jack B., sworn in as Ambas- 
sador to Bahamas. PR 567, 11/23 
Olympic games: Ford, 161; Kissinger, 

234 
Oman, treaties, agreements, etc., 

495, 743 
Organization for Economic Coopera- 
tion and Development; Kissinger, 
264, 355, 505; Robinson, 443; Rog- 
ers, 751 
Declaration on International In- 
vestment and Multinational 
Enterprises, with annex, and 
decisions of the Council: Kis- 
singer, 76, 403; Richardson. 
403; Simon, 403; texts, 83, 87 
Financial Support Fund; Kissinger, 
75; Rogers, 656 
Agreement (1975): Austria, 103; 
Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, 38; Greece, 103; Ice- 
land, 69 
Ministerial meeting, Paris: Kis- 
singer, 46, 73, 89, 92, 113, PR 
312, 6/20, PR 312-A, 6/20, PR 
315, 6/21, PR 323, 6/23; Scran- 
ton, 204 
Organization of African Unity (Kis- 
singer), 521 
Organization of American States 
(Kissinger), 556 
Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (Kissinger), 3, 
5, 33, 43, 339 
Reform, modernization, and re- 
structure, proposed (Kis- 
singer), 10, 18, 42, 43 
Sixth regular General Assembly 
(Kissinger), 1, 33, 41, 156 



Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries: 
Price increases, question of, and ef- 
fect; Ford, 161; Kissinger, 244, 
645, 711; Lord, 683; Rogers, 
653, 656, 751 
Second Arab oil embargo, question 

of (Kissinger), 240, 607, 709 
U.S. arms sales policy: Habib, 447; 
Kissinger, 244, 371, 549 
Osogo, James, remarks on southern 
Africa, PR 459, 9/22, PR 466, 
9/23 
Outer space: 
Exploration of, treaty (1967): Ben- 
nett, 670; Reis, 206 
Current actions: Bahamas, 331; 
Singapore, 407 
International liability for damage 
caused by space objects, con- 
vention (1972); Reis, 206 
Current actions: Belgium, 304; 
Chile, 744; Czechoslovakia, 
439; Sweden, 38 
Mars landing: Bennett, 668; Reis, 

207 
Moon treaty, draft (Reis), 210 
Registration of objects launched 
into outer space, convention 
(1975): 
Current actions: Canada, 331; 
Niger, 330; Singapore, 439; 
Sweden, 38; U.S., 70, 284, 466 
Entry into force, 466 
U.S. ratification (Reis), 206 
Rescue and return of astronauts, 
agreement (1968); Reis, 206 
Current actions: Bahamas, 329; 
Singapore, 407 
Space shuttle attached i-emote ma- 
nipulator system, agreement 
with Canada, 104 
Space Transportation System and 

Spacelab (Bennett), 668 
U.N. Environment Program inter- 
national meeting on strato- 
spheric ozone layer, PR 575, 
12/1 
U.S. cooperative programs and ac- 
tivities (Reis), 207 

Overseas Private Investment Corpo- 
ration (Bolen), 621 



Pacific Basin; 290; Hummel, 470, 475; 

Robinson, 285 
Pakistan; 
Drug control program (Robinson), 

491 
French sale of nuclear reprocessing 
plant and problems and prolif- 
eration (Kissinger), 319, 320, 
322, PR 419, 9/7 
India, relations (Dubs), 480 



Pakistan — Continued 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 39, 439, 

572 
U.S. military and economic aid; 
Habib, 449; Kissinger, 318, 320, 
PR 369, 8/8 
Visit of Secretary Kissinger (Kis- 
singer), 317, 318, PR 369, 8/8 
Palmer, Alison, designation as Agency 
Director for International Labor 
Organization Affairs, PR 347, 7/12 
Palmer, Ronald D., sworn in as Am- 
bassador to Togo, PR 478, 9/28 
Panama: 
Canal treaty, proposed; Kissinger, 
21, 243, 574; Luers, 54; Rogers, 
754 
Joint U.S. -Panama report, 12 
Communist political influence, ques- 
tion of (Luers), 54 
Panama City water supply system, 

bilateral agreement re, 40 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 216, 
304, 331, 723 
Papua New Guinea, treaties, agree- 
ments, etc., 38, 69, 103, 187, 256, 
438, 743 
Paraguay: 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 39, 571, 

627 
U.S. MAAG's terminated, 336 
Parker, Daniel, 735 
Patents: 
Patent cooperation treaty (1970), 
Federal Republic of Germany, 
330 
Strasbourg agreement re interna- 
tional patent classification 
(1971): German Democratic 
Republic, Japan, 376 
PBEC (Pacific Basin Economic Coun- 
cil): Robinson, 286 
Peace Corps, Africa (Bolen), 619 
Peacock, Andrew, 289 
Peru (Robinson), 492 
Balance of payments (Rogers), 753 
Communist political influence, ques- 
tion of (Luers), 55 
Marcona Mining Company, agree- 
ment: 540; Department, 487 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 104, 
256, 438, 540. 723, 743 
Peterson, Lawrence, 229 
Peterson, Russell W., 461 
Philippines: Kissinger, 228, PR 577, 
12/2; Robinson, 288 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 71, 304, 

495, 700, 759 
U.S. use of bases (Hummel), 470, 
474 
Phonograms, protection against unau- 
thorized duplication, convention 
(1971), Guatemala, 743 
Picker, Jean, 756 
Pinheiro, Joao Baptista. 132 



Index, July 5-December 27, 1976 



779 



Poland: 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 70, 148, 
216, 256, 284, 304, 331, 347, 439, 
572. 675 
U.S. fishery conservation zone, 
agreement on Polish fishing, 
299 
Political prisoners (Kissinger), 603 
Amnesty proposal, question of 

(Kissinger), 402 
Cuba (Kissinger), 43 
Iran (Atherton), 435 
Poor, James G., 581 
Population problems and control 
(Green), 419 
Bangladesh, bilateral project 
agreement re Population Con- 
trol Program, 39 
U.S. (Green), 419 
Portugal: 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 71, 256, 

376, 438, 495, 723 
U.S. economic aid (Kissinger), 704 
Postal matters: 
Money orders and postal travellers' 
checks agreement (1974): 
Algeria, 744; Austria, 495; Cape 
Verde, 651; Comoros, 330; 
Guinea, 651; Hungary, 744; 
Italy, 304; Niger, 744; Togo, 
330; Vatican City State, 495; 
Yugoslavia, 330 
Universal Postal Union, constitu- 
tion (1964), with final protocol: 
Cape Verde, 651; Colombia, 38; 
Comoros, 330; Liberia, Papua 
New Guinea, 38 
Additional protocol (1964), Papua 

New Guinea, 38 
Second additional protocol (1974): 
Algeria, 744; Austria, Bar- 
bados, 495; Comoros, 330; 
Ghana, 304; Guinea, 651; 
Hungary, 744; India, 330; Is- 
rael, 744; Italy, 304; Jamaica, 
651; Jordan, 38; Lesotho, 744; 
Maldives, 495; Niger, 744; 
Papua New Guinea, Swazi- 
land, 38; Togo, 330; Vatican 
City State, 495; Yugoslavia, 
330 
U.S. income tax reimbursements 
procedure, agreement with 
U.S., 348 
Poston, Ersa Hines, 510 
Presidential election {see also under 
Foreign policy): Kissinger, 149, 
597 
Soviet or Chinese preferences, 
question of (Kissinger), 369 
Prisoners of war, Geneva conventions 
(1949): Papua New Guinea, Sao 
Tome and Principe, 187; Surinam, 
744 
Proclamation by the President, United 

Nations Day, 1976, Ui-U). 510 
Protection of nationals (Scranton), 
181, 184 



Psilos, Dimmede, 709 
Public documents, foreign, convention 
(1960) abolishing requirement of 
legalisation, U.S. ratification 
urged (Ford), 281 
Publications: 
Congressional documents relating to 
foreign policy, lists, 36, 101, 
146, 173, 215, 255, 282, 303, 328, 
346, 372, 406, 437, 494, 565, 626, 
650, 674, 722, 754 
State Department: 
America's Cultural Experiment 
i)i China, 19J,2-19J,9, re- 
leased, PR 398, 8/26 
Digest of United States Practice 
in International Law, 1975, 
released, 675 
Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 19i8, volume I, Gen- 
eral; The United Nations, 
part 2, released, 348 
Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 19i8, volume V, The 
Near East. South Asia, and 
Africa, part 2, released, 700 
Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 19i9. volume I, Na- 
tional Security Affairs, 
Foreign Economic Policy, re- 
leased, 652 
Treaties arid Other International 
Agreements of the United 
States of America 1776-19J,9, 
General Index, released, 40 
U.N. documents, list, 210 
Puerto Rico: Department, 394; Ford, 
117 



Q 



Qatar, World Intellectual Property 
Organization, convention (1967), 
accession, 70 



Rabin, Yitzhak (quoted), 179 
Racial discrimination: 

Apartheid: 284 Kaunda, PR 443, 
9/16; Kissinger, 94, 261, 325, 
352, 358, 360, 365, 501, 566 
(quoted); Myerson, 566; Rogers, 
535; Scranton, 202, 747; Sherer, 
59; Sullivan, 362 
Security Council resolution, text, 
60 
Decade for Action to Combat Ra- 
cism and Racial Discrimination, 
U.S. nonparticipation: Ford, 
538; Myerson, 566 
International convention (1965) on 
elimination: Ethiopia, 147; 
Liberia, 674; Zaire, 103 
Randolph, A. Philip award, Roy Wil- 

kins (Kissinger), 349 
Rawls, Nancy v., 510 



Reed, John H., sworn in as Ambas- 
sador to Sri Lanka, PR 308, 6/18 
Refugees, status of, protocol (1967): 
Iran, 284; Portugal, 256; Uganda, 
572 
Reilly, John E., introduction of special 
guests to Chicago Council on 
Foreign Relations and the Mid- 
America Committee, PR 339-A, 
7/6 
Reinhardt, John E., 661 
Reis, Herbert K., 206 
Reston, Scotty, remarks on Dean 
Acheson (quoted), PR 530, 10/26 
Rhodesia: Kaunda, PR 443, 9/16; Kis- 
singer, 351, PR 419, 9/7; Sullivan, 
362 
Byrd amendment (Kissinger), 97, 

170, 414 
Financial guarantees plan, pro- 
posed: Kissinger, 380, 410, 415, 
514, 526, 530, 543, 561, PR 412, 
9/4; Rogers, 534; Schmidt, 383 
Geneva conference, prospects (Kis- 
singer), 640, 704; PR 483, 9/29, 
PR 484, 9/29 
German interests: Kissinger, PR 

420, 9/7; Schmidt, 383 
Guerrilla activity: Bolen, 616; Kis- 
singer, 158, 259, 260, 377, 403, 
410, 522, 524, PR 469, 9/23 
Interim government, proposed (Kis- 
singer), 561, 704 
Ian Smith as head of, question of 
(Crosland), 525 
International economic support, 

proposed, 531 
Liberation movements (Kissinger), 

415, 576 
Negotiated settlement, need for, 
prospects, and U.S. support: 
Bolen, 617; Kissinger, 47, 158, 
170, 239, 260, 262, 358, 360, 377, 
383, 409, 413, 521, 543, 559, PR 
412, 9/4, PR 448, 9/19, PR 483, 
9/29, PR 484, 9/29, PR 504, 10/8, 
PR 514, 10/15; McGovern, 590; 
Rogers. 532, 533 
Date for independence, question 

of (Crosland), 523, 524, 525 
Meeting of Secretary Kissinger 
and Ian Smith (Kissinger). 
379. 382, 401, 416, 517, 519 
Negotiations: modifications and 
procedi'ral questions, ques- 
tion of: Crosland, 523, 524; 
Kissinger, 514, 516, 522, 529, 
610, 641, PR 467, 9/23, PR 
468, 9/23, PR 469, 9/23 
Smith acceptance of principle of 
majority rule: Callaghan, PR 
467, 9/23, PR 468, 9/23; Cros- 
land, 522; Ford, 528; Kis- 
singer, 500, 520, 526, 528, 
561, 704; Rogers, 533 
South Africa, role (Kissinger), 
352, 409, 526, 529, 559 



780 



Department of State Bulletin 



Rhodesia — Continued 
U.K. responsibility and role: Cros- 
land, 521; Ford, 528; Kissinger, 
45, 96, 121, 127, 260, 325, 327, 
349, 351, 378, 401, 412, 500, 518, 
522, 524, 527, 530, PR 467, 9/23, 
PR 483, 9/29; Rogers, 533 
Richardson, Elliot T., 403 
Roads (feeder) and bridges and 
strengthening of road mainte- 
nance capability, loan agreement 
with Philippines, 304 
Robinson, Charles W.: 285, 289, 441, 

489; Kissinger, 727 
Roethke, Theodore (quoted), 226 
Rogers, William D.: 532, 653, 751; Kis- 
singer, 349, 360, 384 
Under Secretary for Economic Af- 
fairs, sworn in as, PR 309, 6/18 
Romania: 
Economic agreement with U.S., 

signature, 758 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 103, 
439, 723, 744 
Rosenthal, Harold (Brown), 293 
Rou.x, Claude, 706 
Rwanda: 
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 

713 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 571, 743 
U.S. Ambassador (Crigler), PR 480, 
9/29 
Rystrom, Kenneth, 232 



Safety at sea: 
International convention for safety 
of life at sea (1960): Bahamas, 
330; German Democratic Re- 
public, 759; India, 256; Seychel- 
les, 651 
Amendments (1966), Bahamas, 

330 
Amendments (1967): Austria, 
Bahamas, Belgium, Nauru, 
330 
Amendments (1968): Austria, 

Bahamas, 330 
Amendments (1971); Israel, 572; 

U.K., 330 
Amendments to chapters II, III, 
IV, and V (1973): Israel, 572; 
U.K., 330 
Amendment to chapter VI (1973): 
Czechoslovakia, 572; U.K., 
330 
International navigational rules act, 

veto (Ford), 586 
International regulations for pre- 
venting collisions at sea: 
Convention (1960): Algeria, 216, 

651; Bahamas, 330 
Convention (1972): Bahamas, 330; 
Germany, Federal Republic 
of, 216; U.S., 759 



Index, July 5-December 27, 1 976 



SALT. See Strategic arms limitation 

talks 
Sanchez, Philip V., sworn in as Am- 
bassador to Colombia, PR 358, 
7/29 
Santayana, George (quoted), 598 
Sao Tome and Principe, treaties, 

agreements, etc., 187, 439, 743 
Satellites: 
ATS-6 educational program in India: 

Bennett, 669; Reinhardt, 664 
Direct TV broadcasting, principles: 

Bennett, 670; Reis. 210 
International Telecommunication 
Satellite Organization (IN- 
TELSAT): 
Agreement and operating agree- 
ment (1971): China, Republic 
of (withdrawal), 407; Mali, 
147 
Headquarters agreement (1976), 
744 
Loran-A stations, continued opera- 
tions, agreement with Philip- 
pines, 700 
Loran-C station near Williams 
Lake, B.C., agreement with 
Canada re construction and 
maintenance, 39 
Rawinsonde observation station in 
San Jose, bilateral agreement 
with Costa Rica, 188 
Remote sensing projects: Bennett, 
669, 671; Parker, 737; Reis, 208 
Landsat related study, bilateral 
grant agreement with African 
Development Bank, 216 
Surveys of earth resources, 

agreement with Brazil, 216 
Tracking and telemetry facility on 
island of Mahe, agreement 
with Seychelles, 188 
U.S. cooperative programs and ac- 
tivities: Bennett, 668; Reis, 207 
Saudi Arabia: 
Influence on oil prices: Atherton, 
476; Habib, 449; Kissinger, 369 
Technical cooperation in manpower 
training and development, proj- 
ect agreement with U.S., 148 
U.S. military sales, proposed: 
Atherton, 475; Habib, 448; Kis- 
singer, 549 
U.S. relations (Kissinger), 173 
U.S. visit of Prince Abdallah (Kis- 
singer), 172 
Savitch, Jessica, 363, 366 
Scelsi, Michael N., 673 
Schaufele, William E.: 300, 341; Ford, 
385; Kissinger, 167, 349, 360, 381, 
383, 384, 577 
Schieffer, Bob, 606 
Schiff, Stanley D., 461 
Schlesinger, James R. (Kissinger), 
415, 580 



Schmidt, Helmut, visit to U.S.: 245, 
246, 382; program, PR 343, 7/9, 
PR .343-A, 7/12 
Science and technology: 
Cooperation in, bilateral agreement 

with Korea, 744 
Latin American needs and U.S. pro- 
posals (Kissinger), 6, 9, 17, 43, 
728 
Science and technology museums, 
visit of overseas professionals, 
PR 497, 10/6 
Technical and feasibility study, 
grant agreement with Egypt, 
216, 723 
Technical consultations and train- 
ing, bilateral agreements with: 
Portugal, 495; Romania, 744 
Technical cooperation: 
Iran-U.S.; 315, 316; Ansary, 308 
Saudi Arabia-U.S. agreement, 
148 
Transatlantic balloon program, 
memorandum of understanding, 
407 
U.N. Conference, 1979: Kissinger, 
9, 505; McGovern, 592; 
Reinhardt, 662 
UNCTAD conference resolutions on 
transfer of technology, U.S.- 
Group B statements, texts 
(Boeker), 137 
U.S. -Egypt Joint Working Group on 
Technology, Research and De- 
velopment, fifth meeting, joint 
statement, 754 
U.S.-Me.xico Science and Technol- 
ogy Commission, second meet- 
ing, joint statement, 375 
U.S. national meeting, 1977: Kis- 
singer, 725; Parker, 736; 
Stever, 730; PR 549, 11/9 
U.S. research and development 
program (Stever), 733 
Scranton, William W. (Kissinger), 167 
Statements and correspondence; 
Angola, U.N. membership, 742 
ECOSOC meeting, statement on 
relations with developing 
countries, 201 
Human rights, U.N. role, 745 
Israeli rescue of hijacking victims 
from Entebbe airport, U.S. 
position, 181 
Lebanon relief programs, U.S. re- 
sponse, 699 
Namibia, Security Council resolu- 
tion condemning South Afri- 
can actions, U.S. veto, 593 
UNRWA, U.S. 1976 pledge com- 
pleted, 338 
Vietnam, U.S. veto of U.N. mem- 
bership, 740, 741 
World Health Assembly action on 
health care in Israeli-occupied 
territories, 37 



781 



Scranton, William W.— Continued 
Statements — Continued 
Zambia, South African incursion, 
U.S. position, 282 
U.S. representative to General As- 
sembly, confirmation, 510 
Seabed disarmament, treaty (1971), 

Singapore, 407 
Security (Kissinger), 107, 152, 318 
Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 19i9, volume I, Na- 
tional Security Affairs, Foreign 
Econotnic Policy, released, 652 
Security Assistance and Arms Ex- 
port Control Act of 1976, signa- 
ture (Ford), 198 
Security Council, U.N.: 
Consensus statement on occupied 
Arab territories: Kissinger, 
693, 706; Sherer, 692; text of 
statement, 693 
Resolutions, draft: 
Hijacking of French aircraft de- 
plored, 186 
Israeli rescue of hijacking victims 
from Entebbe airport con- 
demned, 186 
Palestinian rights, 144 

U.S. veto, 144h 
South Africa failure to act in 
Namibia, condemnation, 594 
Resolutions, texts: 
Aegean Sea dispute between 

Greece and Turkey, 374 
South Africa, killings and violence 
against African people con- 
demned, 60 
UNFICYP, six-month extension, 

64 
Zambia, incursion by South Africa 
condemned, 283 
U.S. summary of blocking of unac- 
ceptable Security Council 
measures: 695; Kissinger, 706 
Seelye, Talcott, dSn 
Seychelles: 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 188, 

596, 650, 651, 743 
U.N. membership (Scranton), 201 
Sherer, Albert W., Jr., 59, 63, 99, 143, 

510, 647, 692, 756k 
Shlaudeman, Harry W. , sworn in as 
Assistant Secretary of State for 
Inter-American Affairs, PR 318, 
6/22 
Sierra Leone, treaties, agreements, 

etc., 103, 256, 571, 759 
Sima, Ibrahima, 739 
Simon, William E., 119, 133, 403 
Singapore: Hummel, 474; Robinson, 
288 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 407, 439 
Sino-Soviet relations: Hummel, 475; 
Kissinger, 417, 608, 641, 711 



782 



Slave trade and slavery, suppression: 

Convention (1926): Bahamas, 70; 

Barbados, 495 

Protocol amending (1953): 

Bahamas, 70; Barbados, 572; 

Spain, 700 

Supplementary convention (1956), 

Bahamas, 70 
White slave traffic, agreement 
(1904), and protocol (1910), 
Bahamas, 71 
Smith, Robert P., sworn in as Ambas- 
sador to Ghana, PR 548, 11/8 
Soames, Sir Christopher, remarks on 
EEC-U.S. relations, PR 590, 12/8 
Somalia: 
Ethiopia, relations (Schaufele), 300 
U.S. relations (Schaufele), 301 
Sommer, Theo, 124 
South Africa (see also Namibia): 
Antarctic treaty (1959), recommen- 
dations re furtherance of princi- 
ples and objectives, 347 
Apartheid: 284; Kaunda, PR 443, 
9/16; Kissinger, 94, 261, 325, 
352, 358, 360, 365, 501, 566 
(quoted); Mwale, PR 439, 9/16; 
Rogers, 535; Scranton, 202; 
Sherer, 59; Sullivan, 362 
Security Council resolution, text, 
60 
Currency devaluation, question of 

(Kissinger), 412 
Human rights: Bolen, 617; Kis- 
singer, 354; Sherer, 59 
Incursion into Zambia: Scranton, 
282; Security Council resolu- 
tion, text, 283 
Not colonial entity: Kissinger, 261, 

325, 358, 365; Rogers, 536 
Political, economic and social 
change, need for: (Kissinger), 
366, 516, 530, 544, 599, PR 323, 
6/23, PR 443, 9/16, PR 469, 9/23 
Prime Minister Vorster, meetings 
with Secretary Kissinger: Kis- 
singer, 93, 95, 121, 127, 260, 
349, 358, 377, 400, 514, PR 
312-A, 6/20, PR 323, 6/23, PR 
325, 6/23, PR 411, 9/3, PR 415, 
9/5, PR 417, 9/2: Rogers, 536 
Racial clashes: Bolen, 616; Kis- 
singer, 261, 325, 352 
Republic of Transkei, U.S. non- 
recognition (Kissinger), 642 
U.S. interests (Rogers), 534 
U.S. investment (Bolen), 620 
U.S. private arms sales, alleged 

(Kissinger), 642 
Visit of Secretary Kissinger (Kis- 
singer), 379, 519 

Soviet Union (see also Strategic arms 
limitation talks): 
ABM .systems, limitation of, pro- 
tocol (1974), 148 



Soviet Union — Continued 

Chemical weapons prohibition, 
U.S. -Soviet consultations, 423 

Economy (Kissinger), 78 

Fisheries agreement with U.S., 
joint statement, 743 

Human rights (Scranton), 747 

Ideological and geopolitical chal- 
lenge: Genscher, PR 598, 12/10; 
Kissinger, 29, 111, 153 

Jewish emigration (Kissinger), 242, 
603, 608 

Kama River Truck Complex, bilat- 
eral agreement re establish- 
ment of Temporary Purchasing 
Commission, 540 

Latin America relations (Luers), 56 

Military aid (Kissinger), 549, 550 

Southeast Asia, influence (Hum- 
mel), 470 

Soviet pilot in Japan, question of 
U.S. asylum (Kissinger), PR 
419, 9/7 

Superpower status (Kissinger), 108, 
159 

Threshold test ban treaty, and 
peaceful nuclear explosions trea- 
ty, U.S. ratification urged 
(Ford), 269 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 70, 148, 

407, 438, 540, 572, 627, 743, 744 
U.S. Ambassador (Toon), PR 588, 

12/8 
U.S. credits and grain sales (Kis- 
singer), 241 
U.S. Embassy, Soviet microwave 
signals and question of amount 
of radiation (Kissinger), 168, 
170 
U.S. relations (Kissinger), 158, 350, 
PR 514, 10/15 
Coexistence (Kissinger), 499 
Containment (Kissinger), 125 
Detente (Kissinger), 109, 129, PR 

514, 10/15 
Dual nature: Kissinger, 151, 218, 
553; Lord, 681 
U.S. strategic balance (Kissinger), 

159, 258 
U.S. trade (Kissinger), 553 
As bargaining weapon, question 
of (Kissinger), 229, 553 
Spaak-Davis, Antoinette, 708 
Spain: 
Cotton textile agreement with 
Spain, termination, text of 
notes, PR 565, 11/22 
Friendship and cooperation treaty 
with U.S., current actions, 72, 

408, 467, 572 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 71, 256, 
284, 304, 408, 438, 467, 539, 572, 
675, 700, 723 

U.S. -Spanish Council, inaugural 
session, joint communique, 563 
Sprague, Mansfield, 581 



Department of State Bulletin 



Sn Lanka: 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 596, 675 
r.S. Ambassador (Reed), PR 308, 
6/18 
State Department: 
Advisory committees, summary re- 
ports of closed meetings, avail- 
ability, 200 
Assistant Secretary of State for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
(Hummel), PR 346, 7/12 
Assistant Secretary of State for 
Economic and Business Affairs 
(Katz), PR 460, 9/23 
Assistant Secretary of State for 
Inter-American Affairs 

(Shlaudeman), PR 318, 6/22 
Dean Acheson Auditorium, dedica- 
tion: Acheson, Mrs. Dean, PR 
531, 10/27: Kissinger, PR 530, 
10/26 
International Labor Organization 
Affairs, Agency Directorate 
for, establishment, PR 347, 7/12 
International Women's Program, 
Agency Directorate for, estab- 
lishment, PR 324, 6/23 
Jefferson portrait, gift of Canada 
Life Assurance Company, PR 
521, 10/18 
Loy Henderson International Con- 
ference Room, dedication: Hen- 
derson, PR 531, 10/27; Kis- 
singer, PR 530, 10/26 
Publications. See under Publica- 
tions 
Recommendations by junior officials 

(Kissinger), 169 
Recruitment of blacks (Kissinger), 

360 
Secretary of State-designate 

(Vance): Kissinger, 749 
Under Secretary for Economic Af- 
fairs (Rogers), PR 309, 6/18 
Under Secretary of State for Politi- 
cal Affairs (Habib), PR 338, 7/1 
Stearns, Monteagle, sworn in as Am- 
bassador to Ivory Coast, PR 508, 
10/13 
Sterling, Donald, 232 
Stever, H. Guyford, 729 
Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., sworn in as 
Ambassador to Federal Republic 
of Germany, PR 494, 9/5 
Stone, C. Sumner, 363, 365 
Strategic arms limitation talks: 290; 
Ford, 162; Kissinger, 110, 153, 
350, 499 
SALT Two: 
Backfire and cruise missile issues 

(Kissinger), 169, 324 
Progress, question of: Ford, 345; 
Kissinger, 169, 228, 324, 605, 
646, 710 
U.S. national interests (Kissinger), 
130 



Stroud, Joseph, 541 

Sudan, U.S. relations (Schaufele), 303 

Sullivan, Leon H.: 358,362; Kissinger, 

368 
Surinam, treaties, agreements, etc., 

147, 256, 572, 596, 743, 744, 759 
Swaziland; 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 38, 439 
U.S. Ambassador (Norland), PR 
569, 11/24 
Sweden: 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 38, 284, 

304,438 
U.S. relations (Kissinger), 45 
Switzerland, treaties, agreements, 
etc., 39, 72, 188, 256, 304, 438, 
495, 627, 723 
Syria, treaties, agreements, etc., 40, 
216, 439, 540, 675 



Taiwan. See China: Republic of 
Talboys, B.E.,289 
Tanzania; 
Treaties, agreements, etc., ;38, 40, 

70, 148, 539 
Visit of Secretary Kissinger (Kis- 
singer), 511 
Tariffs and trade, general agreement 
on: 
Accession of Japan, protocol (1955), 

Austria, 744 
Accessions, provisional: 
Colombia, declaration: Chile, 
Egypt, Nicaragua, Poland, 70 
Tunisia, declaration, Romania, 
723 
Tenth proces-verbal: Egypt, 70; 
Finland, 723; India, Poland, 
70; Romania, 723 
Provisional application, protocol 
(1947): Angola, Cape Verde, 
Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, 
Sao Tome and Principe, 439 
Technology. See Science and technol- 
ogy 
Telecommunications: 

Frequency modulation broadcast- 
ing in 88 to 108 MHz band, 
agreement with Mexico, 572 
International telecommunication 
convention (1973): Bangladesh, 
Madagascar, 70 
International Telecommunications 
Union, third-party exchanges 
between ITU and amateur sta- 
tions under U.S. jurisdiction, 
special arrangement, 147 
Licensed amateur radio operations, 
reciprocal granting of authori- 
zation to operate in either coun- 
try, agreement with Philip- 
pines, 700 
Radio Ceylon facilities, agreement 
with Sri Lanka, 596 



Telecommunications — Continued 

Radio communications between 
amateur stations on behalf of 
third parties, agreement with 
Swaziland, 439 

Radio regulations, Geneva, 1950, 
partial revision to establish new 
frequency allotment plan for 
high-frequency radiotelephone 
coast stations (1974): Iraq, 70; 
Ireland, 759; Kenya, 147; New 
Zealand, 284; Tanzania, 70; 
U.S., 147 

Telegraph regulations (1973) and 
telephone regulations (1973): 
Byelorussian S.S.R., 376; U.S., 
147 

U.S. -Canada border television dis- 
cussions, PR 499, 9/7 

U.S. Citizens Band (CB) equipment, 

operation in Mexico, PR 418, 9/7 

Tennyson, Alfred Lord (quoted), 677 

Terrorism: Brown, 453; Kissinger, 2, 

4, 235, 368, 400, 453 (quoted), 508; 

Picker, 757 

Diplomats, protection of, conven- 
tion (1973): Ford, 554 
Current actions: German Demo- 
cratic Republic, Philippines, 
759 
U.S. ratification, 572, 627 

International convention in hijack- 
ing, need for: Kissinger, 158, 
236, 369, 400; Scranton, 183 

Iran (Atherton), 433 

Israeli rescue of hostages in En- 
tebbe airport, U.S. position: 
Bennett, 185; Ford, 161; Kis- 
singer, 158, 1(54, 166; Scranton, 
181 
U.S. role, question of, 237 

Lebanon, murders of U.S. embassy 
officials: Ford, 98, 554; Kis- 
singer, 98 

Mexican terrorist organizations 
(Luers), 53 

Prevention and punishment, con- 
vention (1971): Canada, 331; 
Dominican Republic, 187; U.S., 
572, 596, 723 
U.S. ratification (Ford), 554 

Terrorist attack on Istanbul Airport 
(Brown), 293 
Textiles: 

Cotton, wool, and man-made fiber 
textiles, trade in, bilateral 
agreement with Haiti, 467; text, 
PR 470, 9/23 

Cotton textiles, termination of 
bilateral agreements: El Sal- 
vador, 407; Spain, PR 565, 11/22 

International Cotton Institute, arti- 
cles of agreement (1966), Iran, 
699 



I Index, July 5-December 27, 1 976 



783 



Textiles— Continued 

International trade in, arrange- 
ment (1973); Guatemala. 
Paraguay, Uruguay, 39 
Market description from exports of 
textiles or textile products, 
agreement with Spain on con- 
sultations, 675 
Thailand: Hummel, 471, 473; Kis- 
singer, 228, 578; Robinson, 288 
Drug control programs and U.S. 

assistance (Robinson), 491 
Sericulture technology and im- 
proved seed development pro- 
gram, agreements with U.S. 
596 
Thornton, William, painter of portrait 
of Thomas Jefferson, PR 521, 
10/18 
Tin agreement (Kissinger), 7, 22 
Current actions: Austraha, 70, 304, 
675; Belgium, 70, 304; Bolivia, 
Bulgaria, 304; Canada, 147; 
Council of European Com- 
munities, 304; Czechoslovakia, 
70, 304; Denmark, 147, 304, 347; 
France, 304; Germany, Federal 
Republic of, 304, 675; Hungary, 
38; India, 256; Indonesia, 304. 
347; Ireland, 70. 304; Japan, 
103; Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
70, 304; Nigeria, 70, 304, 347; 
Poland, 304; Romania, 439; 
Soviet Union, 70; Turkey, 304; 
U.K., 147; U.S., 103, 439, 539, 
651; Yugoslavia, 70, 304 
Provisional entry into force, 147 
U.S. ratification urged: Ford, 179; 
Greenwald, 276 
Tobias, Herbert V., Jr., commenda- 
tion for basketball tour in Africa, 
PR 396, 8/25 
Togo: 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 330, 

571,674, 699 
U.S. Ambassador (Palmer), PR 478, 
9/28 
Tolbert, William R., 481; program for 

U.S. visit, PR 444, 9/17 
Tonnage measurement of ships, in- 
ternational convention (1969): 
Algeria, 651; Bahamas, 331; Col- 
ombia, 256; Poland, 331; 
Romania, 103 
Toon, Malcolm, sworn in as Ambas- 
sador to Soviet Union, PR 588, 
12/8 
Tourism, World Tourism Organiza- 
tion, statutes (1970): Algeria, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 

Netherlands, 103; U.S., 284 
Trade: 122; Katz, 483; Kissinger, 75 
Generalized system of preferences, 
UNCTAD conference resolu- 
tion on manufacture and semi- 
manufacture, U.S. position 
(Boeker), 137 



Trade — Continued 
Multilateral trade negotiations; 123, 
293; Boeker, 135; Bolen, 621; 
Hummel, 583; Katz, 486; Kis- 
singer, 8, 75, 263, 356, 504; 
McGovern, 589; Robinson, 287; 
Rogers, 654 
OAS special inter-American com- 
mission for trade cooperation, 
proposed (Kissinger), 9, 17 
Pacific Basin (Robinson), 286 
U.S. (Rogers), 655 
Africa (Bolen), 619 
As economic weapon, question of 

(Kissinger), 229, 553, 607 
Iran: 314; Ansary, 307, 312; Kis- 
singer, 309, 311 
Japan (Hummel), 583 
Philippines (Hummel), 474 
South Africa (Rogers), 534 
Southeast Asia (Hummel), 470 
Trade Act generalized prefer- 
ences: Boeker, 137; Bolen, 
621; Kissinger. 34, 504; 
McGovern, 589; Rogers, 654 
Removal of discriminatory fea- 
tures, proposed amend- 
ments re: 
Ecuador and Venezuela (Kis- 
singer), 6, 8 
Iran: 315; Kissinger, 313 
Jackson-Vanik amendment 
(Rogers), 6.59 
Treaties, agreements, etc.: 

Current actions, 38, 69, 103, 146, 
187, 216, 256, 284, 303, 329, 347, 
376, 407, 438, 466, 495, 539, 571, 
596, 627, 650, 674, 699, 723, 743, 
759 
Treaties and Other International 
Agreements of the United States 
of America 1776-19^9, General 
Index, released, 40 
Trinidad and Tobago, treaties, agree- 
ments, etc., 38, 147,438 
Tunisia: 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 39, 40, 

147, 284 
U.S. -Tunisian Joint Commission, 
meeting: Chatty, 612; Kis- 
singer, 611; text of joint com- 
munique, 613 
Turkey: 
Defense cooperation agreement 
with U.S., appropriations 
urged: Ford, 60; Habib, 424 
Greece, relations: Caglayangil, PR 
596, 12/10; Habib, 426; Kis- 
singer, 323, 327, 703, PR 596, 
12/10 
Terrorist attack at Istanbul Airport 

(Brown), 293 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 103, 
188, 304, 495 



Ubalijoro, Bonaventure, 713 
Uganda: 
Israeli rescue of hostages, U.S. po- 
sition: 695; Bennett, 185; Ford, 
160, 161, 162; Kissinger, 158, 
164, 166; Scranton, 181 
Security Council draft resolu- 
tions, texts, 186 
U.S. role, question of, 237 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 304, 
572, 723 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, 
treaties, agreements, etc., 347, 
438, 466 
UNFICYP. See under Cyprus 
United Arab Emirates, U.S. Ambas- 
sador (Dickman), PR 486, 8/30 
United Kingdom: 
British pound, question of (Simon), 

121 
Civil aviation dispute with U.S. re 
winter season traffic, resolu- 
tion, PR 511, 10/14 
IMF standby agreement, proposed: 

Ford, 660; Rogers, 656, 751 
Income tax convention with U.S., 

ratification urged (Ford), 145 
Passenger charter air services, un- 
derstanding with U.S., an- 
nouncement, 37 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 39, 72, 
147, 330, 347, 376, 438, 439, 467, 
627, 724 
U.S. visit of Queen Elizabeth II: 
Queen Elizabeth II, 197; Ford, 
196; program, PR 335, 6/28 
United Nations: 
Accomplishments, problems, and 
role: Ford, 538; Kissinger, 159, 
230, 497; Lewis, 189, 714; 
McGovern, 587; Scranton, 745 
Charter, amendments to articles 61 

and 109, Cuba, 331 
Documents, list, 210 
Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 19Jt8, volume I, General; 
The United Nations, released, 
348 
Liberation movements' appearance, 
U.S. procedural position (Kis- 
singer), 709 
Membership. Lewis, 189; Scranton, 
201 
Angola: Sherer, 99; Kissinger, 401 
U.S. abstention (Scranton), 742 
Seychelles: 596; Scranton, 201 
Vietnam, question of: Hummel, 
472; Kissinger, 400, 413, 573 
U.S. veto (Scranton), 740, 741 
POW's and MIA's, role in account- 
ing for (Habib), 253 
U.S. 1975 participation, report, 
transmittal (Ford), 537 



784 



Department of State Bulletin 



I iiited Nations — Continued 

U.S. role and influence (Lewis), 189 
United Nations Children's Fund 
(McGovern), 590 
U.S. 1977 pledge (Scelsi), 673 
United Nations Committee on Peace- 
ful Uses of Outer Space: Bennett, 
668; Reis, 206 
United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development, fourth confer- 
ence: Greenwald, 272; Kissinger, 
6; Scranton, 202 
Consensus on commodities, U.S. po- 
sition: 133-134: Katz, 486: Kis- 
singer, 90 
U.S. summary (Boeker), 135 
Economic cooperation, resolution, 

U.S. position (Boeker), 136 
Integrated program of (Greenwald), 

296 
Joint statement by Secretary Kis- 
singer and Treasury Secretary 
Simon, 133 
Preparatory meetings on com- 
modities: 138; Boeker, 135; 
McGovern, 589 
U.S. -Group B statements on resolu- 
tions on transfer of technology: 
Boeker, 137; Kissinger, 728 
U.S. proposals: Greenwald, 297: 

Kissinger, 504 
U.S. statement of reservations, ex- 
planations, and interpretations 
(Boeker), 134 
United Nations Day, 1976, proclama- 
tion: Ford, 510; Kissinger, 614 
United Nations Development Pro- 
gram, U.S. pledge: McGovern, 
589; Myerson, 722 
United Nations Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (Robinson). 288 
United Nations Emergency Force. 

See under Arab-Israeli conflict 
United Nations Environment Program 

(McGovern), 590 
United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse 

Control (Robinson), 492 
United Nations High Commissioner 

for Refugees (Picker), 756 
United Nations Natural Resources 
Fund, U.S. pledge (Myerson), 722 
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in 

Cyprus, 63, 64, 623 
United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in 
the Near East: Bailey, 755; Scran- 
ton, ISA: Sherer, 144 
U.S. 1976 pledge completed: 15Gn; 
Scranton, 338 
United Nations Revolving Fund for 
Natural Resources Exploration 
(McGovern), 590 
United Nations Trust Fund for Africa, 
U.N. -U.S. basic agreement, 304 



»lndex, July S-December 27, 1976 



Uruguay: 
International trade in textiles, ar- 
rangement (1973), 39 
U.S. MAAG's terminated. .336 



Vaky, Viron P., sworn in as Ambas- 
sador to Venezuela, PR 341, 7/7 
Valeriani, Richard, exchange of re- 
marks with Secretary Kissinger, 
528, PR 315, 6/22 
Van der Stoel, Max, remarks following 
meeting with Secretary Kis- 
singer, 322, PR 593, 12/9 
Vance, Cyrus (Kissinger), 749, PR 
586, 12/6, PR 596, 12/10, PR 598, 
12/10 
Meetings with Secretary Kissinger 
(Kissinger), PR 586, 12/6, PR 
587, 12/7, PR 597, 12/10 
Varela, Raul Querido, 231 
Vatican City State, treaties, agree- 
ments, etc., 495 
Venezuela: 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 304, 

628, 723 
U.S. Ambassador (Vaky), PR 341, 

7/7 
U.S. Trade Act, proposed amend- 
ment (Kissinger), 6, 8 
Vietnam (Kissinger). 219 
MIA's, failure to account for and ef- 
fect on U.S. relations: Ford, 
418; Habib, 250; Hummel, 472; 
Kissinger, 30, 224, 413, 548, 
573; Scranton, 740, 741 
Relations with Southeast Asian 

states (Hummel), 472 
U.N. membership, question of: 
Hummel, 472; Kissinger, 400, 
413, 573 
U.S. veto (Scranton), 740, 741 
Vietnam war: 
Personal feelings at end of (Kis- 
singer), 128, 129 
Results for U.S.: Kissinger, 124, 
225, 228, 550; McCloskey, 139 
Voice of Amarica, Japanese employees 
of the Okinawa Office, agreement 
re enrollment in Employment In- 
surance Scheme of Japan, 627 
Vorster, Balthazar Johannes. See 

under South Africa 
Vunibobo, Berenado, 713 

W 

Waldheim, Kurt: 399; Kissinger, PR 
484, 9/29, PR 504, 10/8 

Walentynowicz, Leonard F., 214 

Wall, Patrick, 708 

Walters, Barbara, interview with Sec- 
retary Kissinger, PR 514, 10/15 

Waring, Robert 0.: Ford, 98, 99, 554: 
Habib, PR 313, 6/21; Kissinger, 
98, PR 310, 6/19 



Water supplies from surface runoff, 
technical assistance agreement 
with Abu Dhabi, 347 
Watergate (Kissinger), 124, 128, 129, 

371 
Wells, Melisa F., sworn in as Ambas- 
sador to Cape Verde and Guinea- 
Bissau, PR 513, 10/15 
Whaling. See under Fish and fisheries 
Wheat: 
Food aid convention: 
Protocol (1975) modifying and ex- 
tending, Ireland, 70 
Protocol (1976) modifying and ex- 
tending: Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, European 
Economic Community, Fin- 
land, France, 39; German 
Democratic Republic, 539; 
Germany, Federal Republic 
of, 39; Ireland, 39, 407; Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, Nether- 
lands, 39; Switzerland, 495; 
U.K., 39, 467; U.S., 39, 347 
Wheat trade convention: 

Protocol (1975) modifying and ex- 
tending: Austria, 39; Ireland, 
70; Syria, 216 
Protocol (1976) extending U.S. 
ratification urged (Green- 
wald), 279 
Protocol (1976) modifying and ex- 
tending: Algeria, 256; Austra- 
lia, 39; Barbados, 256; Bel- 
gium, 39; Brazil, 744; Canada, 
39; Costa Rica, 70; Denmark, 
39; Dominican Republic, 187; 
Ecuador, 39; El Salvador, 
744; Egypt, 39, 723; European 
Economic Community, Fin- 
land, France, 39; Germany, 
Federal Republic of, 39, 539; 
Greece, 39; Guatemala, 70; 
Iraq, 723; Ireland, 39, 407; 
Italy, Japan, 39; Kenya, 39, 
495; Korea, Republic of, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
39; Nigeria, 439; Norway, 
39, 147; Pakistan, 39; 
Panama, 331; Peru, 104, 256; 
Switzerland, 39, 495; Syria, 
439; Trinidad and Tobago, 
147; Tunisia, 39; U.K., 39, 
467; U.S., 39, 347 
White, E.B. (quoted), 680 
Wilkins, Roy (Kissinger), .349 
Williams, Alan Lee, 709 
Winthrop, John (quoted), 677 
Wiretapping (Kissinger), 644 
Women: 
Department of State Agency Direc- 
torate for International 
Women's Programs, PR 324, 
6/23 



785 



Women — Continued 

International Women's Year: Ford, 

537; Lewis, 195 
Political rights, convention (1953): 
Luxembourg, 675; Morocco, 744 
Political rights, inter-American 

convention (1948), U.S., 376 
Women leaders study /tour of U.S., 
PR 414, 9/7 
World change: Lord, 678; Robinson, 

441 
World Intellectual Property Organiza- 
tion, 187, 376, 743 
Convention (1967): Bahamas, 651; 
Libya, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
187; Qatar, 70 
Income tax reimbursement agree- 
ment with U.S., 652 
World Meteorological Organization: 
Convention (1947): Sao Tome and 

Principe, 743; Surinam, 256 
Income tax reimbursement agree- 
ment with U.S., 724 
World order (Kissinger), 107, 154, 

224, 258, 497, 542, 599, 725 
World peace: Kissinger, 31, 218, 318, 
363, 541, 600; Lord, 680 



World problems (Kissinger), 1, 21, 31, 
131, 150, 259, 615 

World Weather Program (Ford), 624 

Wortman, Sterling, chairman of sec- 
ond panel of National Meeting on 
Science, Technology and De- 
velopment, PR 549, 11/9 

Wounded and sick, armed forces, 
Geneva convention (1929), Papua 
New Guinea, 187 

Wounded and sick, and shipwrecked in 
armed forces, Geneva conventions 
(1949): Papua New Guinea, Sao 
Tome and Principe, 187; Surinam, 
744 

Wright, Andre J., 713 



Yemen Arab Republic; 
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 13 
Vienna convention of diplomatic re- 
lations (1961), accession, 743 

Yugoslavia: 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 70, 216, 
304, 330, 438, 539 



Yugoslavia — Continued 

U.S. security interests (Kissinger), 
606, 609, 643 



Zain Azraai, Bin Zainal Abidin, 132 
Zaire (Rolen), 618, 619, 620 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 103, 
216, 304, 329, 347, 407, 539, 724 
U.S. military aid (Kissinger), 264 
Visit of Secretary Kissinger (Kis- 
singer), 519, PR 453, 9/22 
Zakarian, John, 541 
Zambia (Bolen), 618, 619, 620 
Agricultural commodities, sales of, 

agreement with U.S., 408 
South African incursion: Scranton, 
282; Security Council resolu- 
tion, text, 283 
U.S. aid (McGovem), 590 
U.S. Ambassador (Low), PR 391, 

8/20 
Visits of Secretary Kissinger (Kis- 
singer), 517, PR 439, 9/16, PR 
450, 9/20, PR 451, 9/21 
Zimbabwe. See Rhodesia 
Zumwalt, Elmo R. (Kissinger), 243, 
551 



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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXXV 



No. 1932 • July 5, 1976 



SECRETARY KISSINGER ATTENDS OAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT SANTIAGO 
Statements and U.S.-Panama Report 1 

SECRETARY KISSINGER VISITS FOUR LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
Remarks, News Conferences, and Joint Communiques IJf 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 

For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



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the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



Vol. LXXV, No. 1932 
July 5, 1976 

The Department of State BULLETIN 
a weekly publication issued by th 
Office of Media Services, Bureau t 
Public Affairs, provides tfie public an 
interested agencies of ttie governma 
witfi information on developments i 
tfte field of UJS. foreign relations m 
on tfte work of tfie Department m 
tfie Foreign Service. 
Tfte BULLETIN includes select* 
press releases on foreign policy, issm 
by tfte Wltite House and tlte Depar 
ment, and statements, addressti 
and news conferences of the Preside* 
and the Secretary of State and othi 
officers of the Department, as well i 
special articles on various phases 
international affairs and the functio, 
of the Department. Information 
included concerning treaties and inte* 
national agreements to which iH 
United States is or may become 
party and on treaties of general intt< 
national interest. 
Publications of the Department 
State, United Nations documents, m 
legislative material in the field 
international relations are also UaU 



Secretary Kissinger Attends OAS General Assembly at Santiago 



The sixth regular General Assembly of the 
Organization of American States met at 
Santiago, Chile, June i-18. Secretary Kissin- 
ger headed the U.S. delegation June 7-9. 
Folloiving are statements made before the 
Assembly by Secretary Kissinger on June 8 
md 9 and his statement circulated by the 
U.S. delegation on June 11, together tvith the 
'ext of a joint report presented to the As- 
iembly by the United States and Panama on 
June 9. 

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY- KISSINGER, JUNE 8, 
3N HUMAN RIGHTS 

>ress itleast 293 dated June 8 

One of the most compelling issues of our 
;ime, and one which calls for the concerted 
iction of all responsible peoples and nations, 
is the necessity to protect and extend the 
fundamental rights of humanity. 

The precious common heritage of our 
Western Hemisphere is the conviction that 
human beings are the subjects, not the 
abjects, of public policy, that citizens must 
not become mere instruments of the state. 

This is the conviction that brought mil- 
lions to the Americas. It inspired our peoples 
to fight for their independence. It is the 
commitment that has made political free- 
dom and individual dignity the constant and 
cherished ideal of the Americas and the envy 
Df nations elsewhere. It is the ultimate proof 
that our countries are linked by more than 
geography and the impersonal forces of 
history. 

Respect for the rights of man is written 
into the founding documents of every nation 
of our hemisphere. It has long been part of 
the common speech and daily lives of our 



July 5, 1976 



citizens. And today, more than ever, the suc- 
cessful advance of our societies requires the 
full and free dedication of the talent, energy, 
and creative thought of men and women who 
are free from fear of repression. 

The modern age has brought undreamed- 
of benefits to mankind — in medicine, in tech- 
nological advance, and in human communica- 
tion. But it has spawned plagues as well, in 
the form of new tools of oppression, as well 
as of civil strife. In an era characterized by 
terrorism, by bitter ideological contention, 
by weakened bonds of social cohesion, and by 
the yearning for order even at the expense 
of liberty, the result all too often has been 
the violation of fundamental standards of 
humane conduct. 

The obscene and atrocious acts system- 
atically employed to devalue, debase, and 
destroy human life during World War II 
vividly and ineradicably impressed the re- 
sponsible peoples of the world with the 
enormity of the challenge to human rights. 
It was precisely to end such abuses and to 
provide moral authority in international af- 
fairs that a new system was forged after 
that war — globally in the United Nations and 
regionally in a strengthened inter-American 
system. 

The shortcomings of our efforts in an 
age which continues to be scarred by forces 
of intimidation, terror, and brutality — 
fostered sometimes from outside national 
territories and sometimes from inside — have 
made it dramatically clear that basic human 
rights must be preserved, cherished, and 
defended if peace and prosperity are to be 
more than hollow technical achievements. 
For technological progress without social 
justice mocks humanity; national unity 



without freedom is sterile; nationalism 
without a consciousness of human commu- 
nity — which means a shared concern for 
human rights — refines instruments of op- 
pression. 

We in the Americas must increase our 
international support for the principles of 
justice, freedom, and human dignity; for 
the organized concern of the community of 
nations remains one of the most potent 
weapons in the struggle against the degrada- 
tion of human values. 

The Human Rights Challenge in the Americas 

The ultimate vitality and virtue of our 
societies spring from the instinctive sense 
of human dignity and respect for the rights 
of others that have long distinguished the 
immensely varied peoples and lands of 
this hemisphere. The genius of our inter- 
American heritage is based on the funda- 
mental democratic principles of human and 
national dignity, justice, popular participa- 
tion, and free cooperation among different 
peoples and social systems. 

The observance of these essential princi- 
ples of civility cannot be taken for granted 
even in the most tranquil of times. In periods 
of stress and uncertainty, when pressures on 
established authority grow and nations feel 
their very existence is tenuous, the practice 
of human rights becomes far more difficult. 

The central problem of government has 
always been to strike a just and effective 
balance between freedom and authority. 
When freedom degenerates into anarchy, the 
human personality becomes subject to arbi- 
trary, brutal, and capricious forces. When 
the demand for order overrides all other 
considerations, man becomes a means and 
not an end, a tool of impersonal machinery. 
Clearly, some forms of human suffering are 
intolerable no matter what pressures nations 
may face or feel. Beyond that, all societies 
have an obligation to enable their people to 
fulfill their potentialities and live a life of 
dignity and self-respect. 

As we address this challenge in practice, 
we must recognize that our efforts must 



engage the serious commitment of our 
.societies. As a source of dynamism, strength, ■ 
and inspiration, verbal posturings and self- 
righteous rhetoric are not enough. Human 
rights are the very essence of a meaningful 
life, and human dignity is the ultimate pur- 
pose of government. No government can ig- 
nore terrorism and survive, but it is equally 
true that a government that tramples on the 
rights of its citizens denies the purpose of 
its existence. 

In recent years and even days, our news- 
papers have carried stories of kidnapings, 
ambushes, bombings, and assassinations. 
Terrorism and the denial of civility have 
become so widespread, political subversions 
so intertwined with official and unofficial 
abuse and so confused with oppression and 
base criminality, that the protection of indi- I 
vidual rights and the preservation of human j -' 
dignity have become sources of deep concern 
and — worse — sometimes of demoralization 
and indifference. 

No country, no people — for that matter no 
political system — can claim a perfect record 
in the field of human rights. But precisely 
because our societies in the Americas have 
been dedicated to freedom since they 
emerged from the colonial era, our short- 
comings are more apparent and more signifi- 
cant. And let us face facts. Respect for the 
dignity of man is declining in too many coun- 
tries of the hemisphere. There are several 
states where fundamental standards of hu- 
mane behavior are not observed. All of us 
have a responsibility in this regard, for the 
Americas cannot be true to themselves un- 
less they rededicate themselves to belief in 
the worth of the individual and to the de- 
fense of those individual rights which that 
concept entails. Our nations must sustain 
both a common commitment to the human 
rights of individuals and practical support 
for the institutions and procedures necessary 
to insure those rights. j 

The rights of man have been authorita- 
tively identified both in the U.N.'s Univer- I 
sal Declaration of Human Rights and in the i 
OAS's American Declaration of the Rights i 
and Duties of Man. There will, of course, 1 



Department of State Bulletin 



always be differences of view as to the 
precise extent of the obligations of govern- 
jnent. But there are standards below which 
no government can fall without offending 
fundamental values, such as genocide, of- 
ficially tolerated torture, mass imprisonment 
jr murder, or the comprehensive denial of 
oasic rights to racial, religious, political, or 
pthnic groups. Any government engaging in 
such practices must face adverse interna- 
■ional judgment. 

The international community has created 
important institutions to deal with the chal- 
enge of human rights. We hei'e are all par- 
ticipants in some of them: the United Na- 
tions, the International Court of Justice, the 
DAS, and the two Human Rights Commis- 
sions of the United Nations and the OAS. In 
Europe, an even more developed interna- 
:ional institutional structure provides other 
.iseful precedents for our effort. 

Pi'ocedures alone cannot solve the prob- 
em; but they can keep it at the forefront 
)f our consciousness, and they can provide 
:ertain minimum protection for the human 
jersonality. International law and experience 
lave enabled the development of specific 
orocedures to distinguish reasonable from 
arbitrary government action on, for example, 
the question of detention. These involve ac- 
cess to courts, counsel, and families ; prompt 
release or charge ; and if the latter, fair and 
public trial. Where such procedures are fol- 
owed, the risk and incidence of unintentional 
government error, of officially sanctioned tor- 
:ure, of prolonged arbitrary deprivation of 
iberty, are drastically reduced. Other im- 
portant procedures are habeas corpus or 
jmparo, judicial appeal, and impartial review 
)f administrative actions. And there are the 
orocedures available at the international 
evel: appeal to, and investigations and rec- 
)mmendations by, established independent 
Dodies such as the Inter-American Commis- 
sion on Human Rights, an integral part of 
;he OAS and a symbol of our dedication to 
:he dignity of man. 

The Intei--American Commission has built 
m impressive record of sustained, independ- 
ent, and highly pi'ofessional work since its 



establishment in 1960. Its importance as 
n primary procedural alternative in dealing 
with the recurrent human rights problems of 
this hemisphere is considerable. 

The United States believes this Commis- 
sion is one of the most important bodies of 
the Organization of American States. At the 
same time, it has a role which touches upon 
the most sensitive aspects of the national 
policies of each of the member governments. 
We must insure that the Commission func- 
tions so that it cannot be manipulated for 
international politics in the name of human 
rights. We must also see to it that the Com- 
mission becomes an increasingly vital instru- 
ment of hemispheric cooperation in defense 
of human rights. The Commission deserves 
the support of the Assembly in strengthen- 
ing further its independence, evenhanded- 
ness, and constructive potential. 

Reports of the Human Rights Commission 

We have all read the two reports submit- 
ted to this General Assembly by the Com- 
mission. They are sobering documents, for 
they provide serious evidence of violations of 
elemental international standards of human 
rights. 

In its annual report on human rights in 
the hemisphere, the Commission cites the 
rise of violence and speaks of the need to 
maintain order and protect citizens against 
armed attack. But it also upholds the defense 
of individual rights as a primordial function 
of the law and describes case after case of 
serious governmental actions in derogation 
of such rights. 

A second report is devoted exclusively to 
the situation in Chile. We note the Commis- 
sion's statement that the Government of 
Chile has cooperated with the Commission, 
and the Commission's conclusion that the in- 
fringement of certain fundamental rights in 
Chile has undergone a quantitative reduction 
since the last report. We must also point out 
that Chile has filed a comprehensive and 
responsive answer that sets forth a number 
of hopeful prospects which we hope will soon 
be fully implemented. 



luly 5, 1976 



Nevertheless the Commission has asserted 
that violations continue to occur; and this is 
a matter of bilateral as well as international 
attention. In the United States, concern is 
widespread in the executive branch, in the 
press, and in the Congress, which has taken 
the extraordinary step of enacting specific 
statutory limits on U.S. military and eco- 
nomic aid to Chile. 

The condition of human rights as assessed 
by the OAS Human Rights Commission has 
impaired our relationship with Chile and will 
continue to do so. We wish this relationship 
to be close, and all friends of Chile hope that 
obstacles raised by conditions alleged in the 
report will soon be removed. 

At the same time, the Commission should 
not focus on some problem areas to the 
neglect of others. The cause of human dig- 
nity is not served by those who hypocrit- 
ically manipulate concerns with human 
rights to further their political preferences 
nor by those who single out for human rights 
condemnation only those countries with 
whose political views they disagree. 

We are persuaded that the OAS Commis- 
sion, however, has avoided such temptations. 

The Commission has worked and reported 
widely. Its survey of human rights in Cuba 
is ample evidence of that. Though the report 
was completed too late for formal considera- 
tion at this General Assembly, an initial 
review confirms our worst fears of Cuban 
behavior. We should commend the Commis- 
sion for its eff'orts — in spite of the total lack 
of cooperation of the Cuban authorities — to 
unearth the truth that many Cuban political 
prisoners have been victims of inhuman 
treatment. We urge the Commission to con- 
tinue its efforts to determine the truth about 
the state of human rights in Cuba. 

In our view, the record of the Commission 
this year in all these respects demonstrates 
that it deserves the support of the Assembly 
in strengthening further its independence, 
evenhandedness, and constructive potential. 

We can use the occasion of this General 
Assembly to emphasize that the protection 



of human rights is an obligation not simply 
of particular countries whose practices have 
come to public attention. Rather, it is an 
obligation assumed by all the nations of the 
Americas as part of their participation in the 
hemispheric system. 

To this end, the United States proposes 
that the Assembly broaden the Commission's 
mandate so that instead of waiting for com- 
plaints it can report regularly on the status 
of human rights throughout the hemisphere. 

Through adopting this proposal, the na- 
tions of the Americas would make plain our 
common commitment to human rights, in- 
crease the reliable information available tc 
us, and offer more effective recommendations 
to governments about how best to improvt 
human rights. In support of such a broad- 
ened effort, we propose that the budget anc 
staff of the Commission be enlarged. Bj 
strengthening the contribution of this body 
we can deepen our dedication to the specia 
qualities of rich promise that make our hem 
isphere a standard-bearer for freedom 
loving people in every quarter of the globe. 

At the same time, we should also considei 
ways to strengthen the inter-American sys 
tern in terms of protection against terrorism 
kidnaping, and other fonns of violent threati 
to the human personality, especially thos(' 
inspired from the outside. 

Necessity for Concern and Concrete Action 

It is a tragedy that the forces of changi 
in our century — a time of unparalleled hu 
man achievement — have also visited upoi 
many individuals around the world a nev 
dimension of intimidation and suffering. 

The standard of individual liberty of con 
science and expression is the proudest herit 
age of our civilization. It summons all na 
tions. But this hemisphere, which for cen 
turies has been the hope of all mankind, has 
a special requirement for dedicated commit 
ment. 

Let us then turn to the great task befon 
us. All we do in the world — in our search 



Department of State Bulletin 



or peace, for greater political cooperation, 
or a fair and flourishing economic system — 
s meaningful only if linked to the defense of 
he fundamental freedoms which permit the 
ullest expression of mankind's creativity. 
^0 nations of the globe have a greater re- 
ponsibility. No nations can make a greater 
ontribution to the future. Let us look deeply 
V- it bin ourselves to find the essence of our 
luman condition. And let us carry forward 
lie great enterprise of liberty for which this 
lemisphere has been — and will again be — the 
lOiiored symbol everywhere. 



TATEMENT BY SECRETARY KISSINGER, JUNE 9, 
>N COOPERATION FOR DEVELOPMENT 

i-ess release 296 dated June It 

For two centuries, the peoples of this 
emi sphere have been forging a record of 
ooperation and accomplishment of which we 
an be proud. It is a record which gives good 
ause for the confidence we bring to the 
asks we face today. But of greater impor- 
ance is the truly special relationship we have 
jchieved. The ties of friendship, mutual re- 
ard, and high respect that we have forged 
ere set this hemisphere apart. The bond 
etween the American republics is un- 
latched in the world today in both depth 
nd potential. 

First, we have maintained the awareness 
hat our destinies are linked — a recognition 
f the reality that we are bound by more 
han geography and common historical ex- 
erience. We are as diverse as any associa- 
ion of nations, yet this special relationship 
i known to us all, almost instinctively. 

Second, ours is a hemisphere of peace. In 
other region of the world has interna- 
ional conflict been so rare, or peaceful and 
Ifective cooperation so natural to the fabric 
f our relationships. 

Third, we work together with a unique 
pirit of mutual respect. I personally am im- 
iiensely grateful for the warm and serious 
elationships I have enjoyed with my col- 



leagues and other Western Hemisphere 
leaders. I am convinced that this sense of 
personal amistad can play a decisive role in 
the affairs of mankind, and nowhere more 
so than in our hemisphere. 

Fourth, we share the conviction that there 
is much to do and that working together for 
concrete progress is the surest way to get it 
done. Even our criticism presumes the feasi- 
bility of cooperation. 

Fifth, we respect each other's independ- 
ence. We accept the principle that each na- 
tion is — and must be — in charge of its own 
future; each chooses its mode of develop- 
ment; each determines its own policies. But 
we know that our capacity to achieve our 
national goals increases as we work togeth- 
er. 

Sixth, despite the differences among our 
political systems, our peoples share a com- 
mon aspiration for the fulfillment of indi- 
vidual human dignity. This is the heritage of 
our hemisphere and the ideal toward which 
all our governments have an obligation to 
strive. 

Finally, and of immediate importance, we 
are achieving a new and productive balance, 
based on real interests, in our relations with- 
in the Americas, within other groupings, and 
with the rest of the world. All of us have ties 
outside the hemisphere. But our interests 
elsewhere do not impede our hemispheric 
efforts. Our traditions of independence and 
diversity have served us well. 

This is both a strength and a challenge to 
us now, as this Assembly takes up the issue 
of development. 

The United States is dedicated to cooper- 
ate in development throughout the world. 
But as we seek to make progress in all our 
global development efforts, we recognize 
close and special ties to the nations of the 
Americas. We regard the concerns of this 
hemisphere as our first priority. 

It is for this reason that we support the 
suggestions which have been made for a 
Special Assembly of the OAS to be devoted 
to hemispheric cooperation for development. 



Jly 5, 1976 



Such an Assembly should deal with concrete 
problems capable of practical solutions. To 
this end, the United States proposes that a 
preparatory meeting of experts be held in 
advance of the Special Assembly. 

But we do not intend to delay our efforts 
while we await the processes of international 
institutions and conferences. The U.S. Ad- 
ministration will begin now: 

— First, to give special attention to the 
economic concerns of Latin America in every 
area in which our executive branch possesses 
the power of discretionary decision. 

— Second, to undertake detailed consulta- 
tions with Latin Amerian nations to coordi- 
nate our positions on all economic issues of 
concern to the hemisphere prior to the con- 
sideration of those issues in major inter- 
national forums. 

— Third, to consider special arrangements 
in the hemisphere in economic areas of par- 
ticular concern to Latin America, such as the 
transfer and development of technology. 

— In addition, we will put forth every 
effort to bring about the amendment of the 
U.S. Trade Act to eliminate the automatic 
exclusion of Ecuador and Venezuela from the 
generalized system of preferences. 

The United States is prepared to proceed 
in these four areas whatever may occur in 
other development forums. But this Assem- 
bly offers an excellent opportunity to ad- 
vance our joint progress. The United States 
believes that there are three major issues 
that this Assembly should address: com- 
modities, trade, and technology. These in- 
volve : 

— More stable and beneficial conditions for 
the production and marketing of primary 
commodities upon which the economic aspi- 
rations of so many countries in Latin Amer- 
ica rely; 

— Expansion of the trade opportunities 
and capabilities that are an essential part 
of the development strategies of all countries 
in the hemisphere; and 

— Improved arrangements for the develop- 
ment, acquisition, and utilization of higher 



technology to speed the modernization of the 
liemisphere. 

Let me address each of these issues in 
turn. 

Commodities 

Most of our members depend heavily on 
the production and export of primary com- 
modities for essential earnings. Yet produc- 
tion and export of these resources are 
vulnerable to the cycles of scarcity and glut, 
underinvestment and overcapacity, that dis- 
rupt economic conditions in both the develop- 
ing and the industrial world. 

At the U.N. Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) last month, we 
joined in the common commitment to search 
for concrete, practical solutions in the in- 
terests of both producers and consumers. 

Despite reservations about some aspects 
of the final resolution at Nairobi, the Unitec 
States believes that the final commodities 
resolution of the conference represented ; 
major advance in the dialogue between Nortl 
and South; we will participate in the majoi 
preparatory conferences on individual com 
modities and in the preparatory conferenci 
on financing. 

One key element, however, is missing fron 
the final catalogue of Nairobi's proposals 
machinery to spur the flow of new invest 
ment for resource production in the develop 
ing countries. The United States made a pro 
posal aimed at that problem — an Interna, 
tional Resources Bank. A resolution to studj 
the IRB was rejected by a vote that can bes 
be described as accidental. Ninety nation: 
abstained or were absent. Those nations o 
Latin America that reject such self-defeat 
ing tactics can make a special contributioi 
to insure that the progress of all is not de 
feated by the sterile and outmoded confron 
tational tactics of a few. 

As a contribution to the commitment wi 
undertook at Nairobi to deal comprehensivelj 
with commodities problems, the Unitet 
States proposes that the nations of the hem 
isphere undertake a three-part program tc 



Department of State Bulletin 



secure the contribution of commodities to 
development in this hemisphere. 

First, I propose that we estabUsh a region- 
al consultative mechanism on commodities. 
This mechanism could well be under the 
aegis of the OAS. It should bring together 
experts with operational responsibilities and 
experience. The inter-American commodities 
mechanism could precede, or at least supple- 
ment, those established with a global man- 
date, where we are prepared to exchange 
views regularly and in depth on the state of 
commodities markets of most interest to us 
— including coffee, grains, meat, and the 
minerals produced in this hemisphere. Our 
objective will be to concert our information 
on production and demand in order to make 
the best possible use of our investment re- 
sources. These consultations will provide us 
with an early-warning system to identify 
problems in advance and enable us to take 
appropriate corrective action nationally, 
I regionally, or through worldwide organiza- 
tions. 

Second, I propose we give particular at- 
itention to global solutions for commodities 
I important to one or more countries of the 
jhemisphere. The United States has signed 
|the Coffee and Tin Agreements; it is crucial 
to the coffee- and tin-producing countries of 
ithis hemisphere that those agreements be 
implemented in a fashion that will most ap- 
propriately contribute to their development. 

In Nairobi and at other forums the United 
States proposed that we examine on a global 
basis other commodities of particular impor- 
tance to Latin America — bauxite, iron ore, 
and copper. I suggest that we in the hemi- 
sphere have a special role to play in consider- 
ing how these steps might be taken and in 
identifying other high-priority subjects for 
global commodity discussions. 

Third, I propose that the consultative 
group take a new look at the problem of in- 
suring adequate investment in commodities 
in this hemisphere under circumstances that 
respect the sovereignty of producers and 
provide incentive for investment. We should 
examine all reasonable proposals, especially 
those which would help to assure effective 



resource-development financing. If global 
solutions are not possible, we are willing to 
consider regional mechanisms. 

Trade 

Trade has been an engine of growth for 
all countries ; and for many developing coun- 
tries — above all, those in Latin America — 
it i.s an essential vehicle of development. Rec- 
ognizing the importance of trade to sus- 
tained growth, the United States has taken, 
within our global trade policy, a number of 
initiatives of particular significance to Latin 
America. We have reduced trade barriers, 
especially those affecting processed goods ; 
provided preferential access to our market 
for many exports of developing countries ; 
worked in the multilateral trade negotiations 
in Geneva for reduction of barriers, giving 
priority to tropical products; and recognized 
in our general trade policy the special needs 
of developing countries. 

Today, at this Assembly, we can begin to 
consider ways in which our commitment to 
trade cooperation can contribute to economic 
progress in our hemisphere. The United 
States .sees three key areas which this or- 
ganization could usefully address : 

— The need to provide opportunities for 
developing countries to expand and diversify 
exports of manufactured and semiprocessed 
goods ; 

—The need to promote the hemisphere's 
trade position through the multilateral trade 
negotiations at Geneva; and 

— ^The need for effective regional and sub- 
regional economic integration. 

Let me turn to each of these three points. 

No single element is more important to 
Latin America's trade opportunities than the 
health of the U.S. economy. I can confirm to 
you today that our economy is in full re- 
covery, with prospects brighter than they 
have been for years. 

The preferences system contained in the 
U.S. Trade Act has been in effect since Jan- 
uary. It gives Latin American countries 
duty-free entry on more than 1 billion dollars' 



July 5, 1976 



worth of their exports to the United States. 
Even more important, it provides vast op- 
portunities for Latin America to diversify 
into new product areas in its exports to the 
United States. 

In addition to the effort we will undertake 
to end the exclusion of Ecuador and Vene- 
zuela from the benefits of the U.S. Trade Act, 
President Ford has asked me to state today 
that : 

— He will make every effort to add to the 
preferences system products that are of 
direct interest to Latin America. 

— The executive branch will bend every 
effort to accommodate the export interests of 
Latin America in all matters in which we 
have statutory discretion. President Ford's 
recent choice of adjustment assistance 
rather than import restrictions in response 
to the petition of the U.S. footwear in- 
dustry clearly demonstrates the commitment 
of the U.S. Government to a liberal trade 
policy and the use of the Trade Act to ex- 
pand trade in the hemisphere. 

—The President will direct the U.S. De- 
partment of Commerce to respond positively 
to requests from your governments for as- 
sistance in the development of export promo- 
tion programs. The Department of Commerce 
will make available technical advice on pro- 
motion techniques and personnel training 
to help develop new markets for Latin Amer- 
ican exports worldwide. 

The United States believes that the multi- 
lateral trade negotiations in Geneva warrant 
the special attention of Latin America. Our 
view is that the international codes on sub- 
sidies and countervailing duties and on safe- 
guards actions now being negotiated should 
recognize the special conditions facing de- 
veloping countries. To this end: 

— The United States will seek agreement 
at Geneva that the code on countervailing 
duties and subsidies now being negotiated 
should contain special rules to permit de- 
veloping countries to assist their exports 
under agreed criteria for an appropriate 



time linked to specific development objec- 
tives. 

— The United States next month will pro- 
pose that the safeguards code under negotia- 
tion in Geneva grant special treatment to 
developing countries that are minor suppliers 
or new entrants in a developed-country 
market during the period that safeguards 
are in effect. 

— The United States will send a trade 
policy team to Latin America shortly to 
identify ways to promote increased hemi- 
sphere trade through the Geneva negotia- 
tions ; we are prepared to intensify consulta- 
tions in Geneva and Washington with Latin 
American delegations to explore both general 
issues and positions for specific meetings. 

Finally, the United States supports the 
concept and practice of regional and sub- 
regional economic integration as a means 
of magnifying the positive impact of trade 
on development. Expanded trade, based on 
the development of industries that will be 
able to compete successfully within and out- 
side the integration area, will strengthen the 
growth process of participating countries. 
We seek means to support the far-reaching 
integration plans that have been drawn up 
in the hemisphere — for the Andean Group, 
the Caribbean Community, the Central 
American Common Market, and the Latin 
American Free Trade Area. 

We are ready to support responsible ef- 
forts to further integration. The administra- 
tion of U.S. trade laws and the improvement 
of our preferences system on matters such 
as rules of origin are two possible incentives, 
to greater Latin American integration. Wej 
welcome your views as to a further U.S. role 
toward enhancing the momentum of eco- 
nomic integration in Latin America. 

We are not persuaded, however, that we 
have fully exploited all the possibilities of 
how best to provide expanded trade oppor- 
tunities to Latin America. We know that the 
issue is complex and that it involves not 
only expanded access to the markets of the 
United States but also measures to enhance 



Department of State Bulletin 



opportunities for Latin American products 
in Europe and Japan and throughout Latin 
America itself. 

Some permanent expert forum is neces- 
sary. We therefore propose that within the 
OAS there be established a special inter- 
American commission for trade cooperation. 
If the suggestion for a Special Assembly on 
cooperation for development prospers, we 
think that Assembly should set guidelines 
for the functioning of the commission. We 
see the commission as an opportunity, in 
major part through the multilateral trade 
negotiations in Geneva, to bring together 
those policy-level officials most familiar with 
the actual trade problems and opportunities 
for trade creation under a firm mandate to 
seek innovative means of cooperating to ex- 
pand exports — expanding, in short, on a 
regular and long-term basis the catalogue 
of trade-expansion proposals I have elabo- 
rated above. 

Technology 

Technology is basic to economic develop- 
ment. It is technology that enables us to 
master the raw gifts of nature and trans- 
form them into the products needed for the 
well-being of our peoples. 

But technology is not evenly distributed. 
There are impediments to its development, 
to its transfer, and most importantly, to its 
effective utilization. The United States be- 
lieves that technology should become a prime 
subject of hemispheric cooperation. The 
countries in this region have reached stages 
of development that enable them to adapt 
and create modern technologies. Our poten- 
tial thus matches the urgency of practical 
needs. 

At this point, what are the new directions 
we should take together? We have three pro- 
'posals. The United States believes we in the 
hemisphere should : 

— Take immediate advantage of promising 
global initiatives. To seek maximum benefit 
from the U.N. Conference on Science and 



Development set for 1979, we propose that 
the nations here today undertake prepara- 
tory consultations on that subject in the 
Economic Commission for Latin America, 
whose meeting has been prescribed as a 
regional forum within the conference pro- 
gram. We will enlist the experience and re- 
sources of leading U.S. technology institu- 
tions in this hemispheric preparatory eff"ort. 
— Increase public and private contacts on 
research, development, and the application 
of technology. To this end, the United States 
will: 

Open a technology exchange service for 
Latin America to provide information on 
U.S. laws and regulations relating to tech- 
nology flows and to sources of public and 
private technology; 

Explore cooperative ventures in which 
small and medium-sized U.S. firms would 
provide practical technologies to individual 
Latin American firms, along with the man- 
agement expertise needed to select, adapt, 
and exploit those technologies; and 

Expand and strengthen Latin America's 
access to the National Technical Informa- 
tion Service and other facilities of the 
technology information network of the 
U.S. Government, which covers 90 percent 
of the technical information that flows 
from the $20 billion worth of research 
that the U.S. Government sponsors an- 
nually. 

— Develop new regional and subregional 
structures of consultation and cooperation 
on problems of technology. To this end, the 
United States proposes: 

First, that we establish a consultative 
group under the OAS to address and pro- 
vide recommendations on information 
problems that Latin America faces in ac- 
quiring technology. 

Second, that the OAS, in line with the 
UNCTAD IV consensus, establish a region- 
al center on technology. The center would 
facilitate cooperative research and devel- 
opment activities, drawing on both public 



July 5, 1976 



and private sources. It could stimulate ex- 
changes of qualified technical personnel. 
And it could begin to attack the problem of 
incentives to the thousands of technologi- 
cally trained Latin Americans now living 
abroad to return to and serve with their 
own countries. In the view of the United 
States, such a center should be a coopera- 
tive enterprise requiring commitment and 
contributions in funds, technological re- 
sources, and personnel from all of the 
countries that take part. To get us under- 
way, I propose that we convene a group of 
experts to examine the need, feasibility, 
characteristics, and role of an inter-Amer- 
ican technology center and report to us 
before the next OAS General Assembly. 

The Importance of Cooperative Development 

Economic development is a central con- 
cern of all nations today. The community of 
nations has become, irrevocably, a single 
global economy. We know that peace and 
progress will rest fundamentally on our 
ability to forge patterns of economic coopera- 
tion that are fair, productive, and open to 
all. 

We in this hemisphere have a special op- 
portunity and responsibility to advance the 
recent favorable mood and the practical 
achievements in cooperation between the de- 
veloped and developing nations. We start 
from a firmer foundation today; our pros- 
pects for working together are brighter than 
ever before — more so in this hemisphere 
than in any other region of the world. We 
should have reason for confidence in our 
ability to advance our own people's well- 
being, while simultaneously contributing to 
a more prosperous world. It is in this sense 
that I have sought today to advance our 
practical progress in important areas. 

The United States stands ready to give its 
sister republics in the hemisphere special at- 
tention in the great task of cooperation for 
development. We shall make a major effort 
to prepare for the Special Assembly on de- 



10 



velopment. We shall listen to your proposals, 
work with you in a serious and cooperative 
spirit of friendship, and commit ourselves 
to carry on the great heritage of the Amer- 
icas as we go forward together. 



SECRETARY KISSINGER'S STATEMENT 
ON REFORM OF THE OAS > 

The Organization of American States is 
the cornerstone of the inter-American sys- 
tem, the oldest institution of regional co- 
operation in the world. Its member states 
have exceptional ties of respect and a com- 
mon heritage, and a considerable stake in 
maintaining those ties for the future. 

The inter-American system pioneered the 
principles of nonintervention and collective 
security among cooperating sovereign states. 
Because the Americas also have enormous 
vitality and achievement, we have a major 
opportunity and obligation to continue to 
provide an example and impetus to the global 
search for better ways to mediate the com- 
mon destiny of mankind. 

Many ask, why think of OAS reform? 
Why, some wonder, does our Secretary Gen- 
eral refer to an "identity crisis" in his latest 
annual report? 

The answer lies in the fact that the pace 
and complexity of the international and do- 
mestic changes of the recent past have made 
the organization as it is presently constituted 
less effective as an instrument of our respec- 
tive foreign policies and less significant to 
the real issues of the new inter-American 
agenda than our minimum efforts deserve. 

This hemisphere is unique; there is no 
other grouping like it in the world. We have 
indeed a special relationship. The funda- 
mental purpose of the OAS must be to con- 
tinue to nurture and strengthen our funda- 
mental, shared values. We must have an 
organization that reflects our permanent and 



' Circulated by the U.S. delegation and released on 
June 11 (text from press release 302). 



Department of State Bulletinj 



irrevocable engagement to work together and 
maintain our continent as a hemisphere of 

R peace, cooperation, and development. 

er- I The United States is committed to the 
OAS. We have pledged to make it a contin- 
ually more effective instrument for action 
in pursuit of the common goals of prosperity 
and human dignity. 

It was to that end that the member states 

igreed three years ago to an effort to I'e- 

. form, restructure, and modernize the OAS. 

;.. The results of that effort are disappointing. 

[> A proposed new draft of the Charter of the 

If! DAS has emerged from the Permanent Coun- 
■il. I regret to say that it is one that our 
government could neither sign nor recom- 
nend that our Senate ratify. It includes pre- 

■i; ;criptive and hortatory statements of gen- 
ial principle which are as poorly defined as 
hey are ominous. No effort is made in the 
lew charter draft to come to grips with the 
leed to modernize or improve the structure 
)f the organization. We believe the real 
-hortcomings of the OAS have yet to be 

- idequately addressed. 

We propose a new effort to reform, mod- 
■rnize, and restructure the organization. We 

- hink that effort should concentrate not on 
■-. vords, but on three major substantive is- 

;ues: structure, membership, and finance. 

\. As to structure, 

The United States would like to advance 
^.j our points as possible guidelines for the 
pp( 'uture effort, in the interest of moderniza- 
j i( ion of the organization. 

'''■ 1. The purposes of the organization should 
^ )e stated simply and clearly in the new 
' barter. 
''" Those purposes should be: 

— The promotion of cooperation for devel- 
ipment ; 

— The maintenance of the peace and secu- 
,, ity of our region ; and 

— The preservation of our common tradi- 
ion of respect for human dignity and the 
ights of the individual. 



2. The structure of the organization serv- 
ing these goals should be flexible. 

We should write a constitutive document 
for the organization which will serve us well 
into the future. That an organization finds it 
necessary to rewrite its charter every 5 to 10 
years does not speak well for that organiza- 
tion's sense of its role or function. We are 
now in an age of great change. Our efforts 
in the coming years to achieve the three 
basic goals of the organization will take place 
under rapidly changing circumstances. Thus, 
flexibility and adaptability must be the key 
considerations guiding the reform effort. We 
should not hamstring ourselves with a char- 
ter brimfull of the details of the day, with 
procedural minutiae, or with regulatory pre- 
scriptions hindering our ability to meet con- 
tingencies. 

3. The governance of the organization 
should be in the hands of the Ministers. 

Over the years, the proliferation of func- 
tions assigned haphazardly to the OAS has 
produced an overelaborated organization that 
is ponderous and unresponsive. Instead of 
closer and more frequent contact between 
Foreign Ministers in ways that truly reflect 
our foreign policies as we are attempting to 
manage them from our respective capitals, 
we find ourselves insulated from each other 
by a plethora of councils and committees 
with conflicting mandates and a cumbersome 
permanent bureaucracy. 

To strengthen communication, we must 
cut through the existing organizational un- 
derbrush and replace it with a structure 
capable of responding to the authentic for- 
eign policies of our governments as ex- 
pressed directly by Foreign Ministers and of 
relating concretely to our institutions and the 
needs of our peoples. Particularly, the three- 
council system has not fulfilled the hopes 
which led to its adoption in 1967. 

The General Assembly, as the central pil- 
lar of the inter-American system, might well 
be convened more frequently, perhaps twice 
a year, with special additional sessions to 
consider our common concerns, particularly 



uly 5, 1976 



11 



the great challenges of cooperation for de- 
velopment. As contacts at the ministerial 
level intensify, the need for an elaborate 
structure of councils will disappear. Our 
encounters at the General Assembly will 
offer sufficient opportunities to set organiza- 
tional policy. 

This is all of the organizational super- 
structure we really need. A leaner, more re- 
sponsive organization would be serviced by 
a smaller expert Secretariat responsive to 
the guidelines established by the General 
Assembly and the functional committees the 
General Assembly may create. 

4. We should improve the OAS mecha- 
nisms for promoting respect for human 
rights in the Americas. 
B. As to membership, 

To insure that the OAS represents all of 
the peoples of our region, we should open 
up the organization to the newly independent 
states and those which may become inde- 
pendent, both on the continent and in the 
Caribbean. Although these questions of 
membership require further study, we be- 
lieve article 8 of the present charter, which 
automatically excludes certain states, is an 
anachronism and should be removed. 

C. As to financing, 

A serious effort to reform the Organiza- 
tion of American States should include a re- 
view of present provisions for its financing. 

You are all aware of the critical attention 
the Congress of the United States has 
focused on the proportion of the organiza- 
tion's cost the United States is now bearing. 
Obviously, this has been a factor in recent 
U.S. budget cuts affecting the OAS. We do 
not claim that the United States is paying 
too much or more than its fair share of the 
cost in terms of our relative ability to pay. 
It is only that it is wrong and damaging for 
an organization of two dozen— soon to be 
25_sovereign states, whose purpose is to 
advance the interests of each, to be so 
heavily dependent on the contributions of a 



single member. It places the organization in 
a vulnerable position and projects a false 
image of the OAS. 

It is important to find some basis for OAS 
financing that will, over time, reduce the 
U.S. share of the assessed costs while insur- 
ing that the activities of the OAS in the vital 
development assistance field are not 
weakened. 

The United States is committed to the 
Organization of American States. We know 
that it provides an institutional base which 
will continue to be vital to our common prog- 
ress. In these years of great change, the 
nations of the world have seen fresh proof of 
an old truth— that the most durable and 
responsive institutions are those which bear 
a lighter burden of bureaucratic machinery 
and whose procedures permit the flexibility 
required for swift and imaginative action. 

We believe our proposals can help bring 
the drawn-out reform debate to a successfu 
conclusion over the course of the next year 
And we believe this is the kind of organiza 
tion we can and must have if we in th( 
Americas are to fulfill our promise and oui 
responsibility to advance international co 
operation in an era of interdependence. 



JOINT U.S.-PANAMA REPORT ^ 

For the past twelve years, with the support of th 
OAS, Panama and the United States have maintaine. 
an active negotiating process with respect to th- 
new regime for the Panama Canal. By virtue of th 
Joint Declaration of April 3, 1964,' both countrie 
pledged their word to work out a new treaty—; 
treaty new not only in its date of entry into force 
but also in the mentality which it will reflect; tha 
is, it will be in accord with the evolution experience, 
by the international community. 

We are negotiating because both countries feel th 
need to build a new relationship which gives ful 
regard to the aspiratipns of the Panamanian people 

■ Presented to the General Assembly on June 9 b;i 
the Governments of the Republic of Panama am, 
the United States (text from press release 295). ; 

» For text, see Bulletin of Apr. 27, 1964, p. 65ei 



12 



Department of State Bulletii 



the interests of both nations and the principles and 
objectives of the Charter of the UN. And we are 
negotiating in deference to the unanimous views of 
our sister republics in the Western Hemisphere. 

We are working on the basis that every negotiation 
concerning an old problem is a transaction towards 
new formulas of justice; and that progress can only 
be achieved when a spirit of compromise between 
the parties exists as a result of their understanding 
of new realities and, above all, when they seek a 
balancing of interests within a reasonable period of 
time. 

The negotiating process has confirmed the dedica- 
tion of both parties to the eight principles agreed 
oil by their authorized representatives on February 
7, 1974.* The two countries reported to this Assembly 
last year that significant progress had been made in 
this process of balancing the interests of both parties 
in accordance with the eight principles. We are 
pleased to report that during the past year the 
parties have made further significant progress on 
the highly complex issues before them. 

Differences remain between the two parties on 
important issues — the period of duration of the 
new treaty and arrangements in the land and water 
areas comprising the Panama Canal Zone. 

The Republic of Panama and the United States 
are anxious to complete these negotiations as soon 
as possible and recognize that the other nations rep- 
resented in this Assembly share that desire. But we 
have recognized that the complexity of the issues 
remaining before us requires the most careful and 
painstaking negotiating efforts if we are to achieve 
a treaty which is truly just and equitable — a treaty 
which will balance the respective interests of both 
countries and those of the other nations of the 
Hemisphere and the world in such a way as to 
definitely eliminate the potential for causes of con- 
flict in the future. It is in this sense that both 
Governments are in agreement with the concept ex- 
pressed by General Torrijos [Brig. Gen. Omar Tor- 
rijos, Head of Government of Panama] that we are 
not simply seeking any new treaty — we are seeking 
a treaty that will fully meet our common goals in 
the future and be seen by our sister republics as 
reflecting a new era of cooperation in the Americas. 
The United States and the Republic of Panama re- 



iterate their commitment to continue their most 
serious efforts to achieve such a treaty as promptly 
as possible. 

The negotiation offers both peoples a peaceful 
alternative for the solution of a prolonged disagree- 
ment between them, and both Governments are con- 
vinced that it is their responsibility to explore to the 
utmost this path which offers such real possibihties 
for a satisfactory agreement which will cement on 
solid foundations the friendship and cooperation 
between our two countries. 

If we continue the serious work presently being 
carried out and if we maintain the reciprocal good 
will of both missions towards reaching a solution 
to the pending problems, we cherish the hope that 
soon we will be able to advise you that a treaty has 
been agreed upon, a treaty which not only all Ameri- 
ca, but the entire world, awaits as an effective con- 
tribution to consolidate peace and friendship amongst 
all peoples. 



Letters of Credence 

Bolivia 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Bolivia, Alberto Crespo Gutier- 
rez, presented his credentials to President 
Ford on May 21.' 

Czechoslovakia 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Jaromir 
Johanes, presented his credentials to Presi- 
dent Ford on May 21.' 

Yemen Arab Republic 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Yemen Arab Republic, Yahya M. al-Muta- 
wakkil, presented his credentials to Presi- 
dent Ford on May 21." 



' For text of a joint statement initialed at Panama 
on Feb. 7, 1974, by Secretary Kissinger and Pana- 
manian Foreign Minister Juan Antonio Tack, see 
Bulletin of Feb. 25, 1974, p. 184. 



' For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the 
President's reply, see Department of State press 
release dated May 21. 



July 5, 1976 



13 



Secretary Kissinger Visits Four Latin American Countries 



Secretary Kissinger visited the Dominican 
Republic June 6; Bolivia June 7 ; Chile June 
7-9, where he headed the U.S. delegation to 
the sixth regular OAS General Assembly at 
Santiago: and Mexico June 10-13. Following 
are remarks and neivs conferences by Sec- 
retary Kissinger, together with the texts of 
joint communiques issued in Bolivia and 
Mexico.^ 



ARRIVAL STATEMENT, SANTO DOMINGO, 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, JUNE 6 

Press release 2s,i dated June i; 

Mr. Foreign Minister: It is a great honor 
for me to begin my second trip within this 
hemisphere within four months with our 
friends in the Dominican Republic. 

President Ford has sent me on this 
journey to underline the special ties which 
the United States feels with its sister re- 
publics in the Western Hemisphere, the im- 
portance we attach to the dialogue that is 
growing up between us, and our conviction 
that if we here in the Western Hemisphere 
cannot solve the problems between developed 
and developing nations, it is very difficult to 
solve them in the world at large. 

We are tied together by a similar history, 
by a long tradition of cooperation, and by 
the conviction that in this hemisphere, above 
all others, human dignity and human rights 
must always be respected. 

All these subjects will be discussed at the 
forthcoming session of the General Assem- 
bly, which my colleague your Foreign Minis- 



' Other press releases relating to Secretary 
Kissinger's trip are 286 of June 6, 290 and 292 of 
June 7, 297 of June 11, 298 of June 10, and .S04 of 
June 12. 



14 



ter and I are planning to attend. But I am 
here to say also that in a world in which 
nonalignment is respected and in which we 
are prepared to cooperate with nonalignedl 
nations, we nevertheless greatly value andl 
appreciate those nations that have alwaysi 
been our friends. 

We were greatly impressed and moved by 
the remarks of your distinguished President 
on February 27 in his Independence Day 
message when he said: 

In an era in which a certain strident nationalism 
and certain pseudo anti-imperialist poses are fashion- 
able, we are not ashamed of our friendship with tha 
United States. We have identified with the destiny 
of that great nation. 

We reciprocate this feeling, and it is tci 
strengthen that friendship between our two 
peoples and to deepen our relationship that 
I have come here. I look forward to my talks i 
with your leaders, and I thank you for the i 
very gracious reception that Mrs. Kissingen 
and I have received. 



TOAST BY SECRETARY KISSINGER, 
SANTO DOMINGO, JUNE 6' 

I appreciate very much the warm welcomf 
you have given me. I am pleased to have this 
opportunity to visit the Dominican Republic 
This beautiful island holds a special mean 
ing for all the peoples of the Americas. Foi 
here culminated the most momentous voyagt 
of discovery in all human history, and hen 
began the modern history of our hemisphere 

A great chronicler of Columbus' voyages 
the late Samuel Eliot Morison, pointed oul 
that the most remarkable aspect of Colum- 



' Given at a luncheon hosted by President Joaquii 
Balaguer on June 6 (text from press release 287) 



Department of State Bulletin 



bus' enterprise was its incredible faith in 
its ultimate success. The journey that ended 
on your shores was, above all, the product 
of spiritual courage, of a daring to search 
for an objective whose very existence could 
only be proven through faith. Belief in the 
future is the very symbol and meaning of 
the Americas — the bold readiness to en- 
counter the future and the confident faith 
that human exertion, when directed by prin- 
ciple and liberty, guarantees progress. With 
all our differences, ours has always been the 
hemisphere in which a frontier has always 
been a challenge and not a limit, where man 
came to find dignity and human fulfillment. 

It was in a spirit of commitment to our 
unique hemispheric bond, with a readiness for 
shared endeavor and faith in the success of 
our common future, that I visited Latin 
America four months ago. And it is in this 
spirit that I begin my second trip to Latin 
ilAmerica this year here in the Dominican 
Republic — to continue the work we began 
in February, to strengthen by consultations 
and concrete proposals the impetus of im- 
proving relations between the United States 
and the nations of Latin America, and to help 
make our hemisphere a model of what in- 
terdependent nations can achieve by cooper- 
ative effort. To reach that lofty objective, 
we will need faith, and if I may put it in 
terms which will be familiar to you, we will 
also need hope and, occasionally, a good bit 
of charity toward each other. 

The United States has always regarded 
its relationship with Latin America as a 
central element in its national life — not 
solely as a matter of foreign policy — for too 
much of our history derives from Spanish- 
speaking settlers and too many of our citi- 
zens are of Latin origin for such a relation- 
ship to be characterized as "foreign." 

The sources of our special bond are mani- 
fold : The epic of discovery and settlement, 
our peoples' struggles for national independ- 
ence, our common interest in shielding our 
countries from external intrusion, our work 
together to build international structures for 
cooperation and economic progress, our com- 



mitment to human dignity, and above all, 
our deep cultural and personal ties. 

The depth of these bonds goes beyond 
institutions; they penetrate the soul. The 
United States has always felt with Latin 
America a special intimacy and close friend- 
ship. Today, when our countries are deeply 
involved in world affairs, even when our per- 
ceptions and interests are not always iden- 
tical we continue to draw upon a particular 
warmth in our personal relationships and an 
exceptional respect and regard for each 
other's views and concerns. 

The partnership in our hemisphere — 
shaped by history, tradition, and common 
interest — was formalized, by and large, in a 
series of treaties, and impelled by organiza- 
tional machinery, dedicated to peace and 
security. This shared commitment, given 
form in the Organization of American States, 
is still indispensable to our partnership. 

Today, the evolution of the hemisphere 
and the world impels us to expand the range 
of our concerns beyond the traditional 
agenda of security and peace. It is fortunate 
that our relationship is so deep that it can 
comfortably accommodate the broad range 
of human preoccupations. 

We have come to understand that while 
we must remain strong in our dedication to 
the peace and security of this hemisphere, 
we are at the same time challenged by a new 
agenda of development issues. The growing 
role of the nations of this hemisphere in the 
global economy and in world forums dealing 
with development issues and their unique 
position as the most developed of the devel- 
oping nations provide an unprecedented op- 
portunity to shape the problems of interde- 
pendence. 

To reflect these new perceptions, I pledged 
last February that the United States would: 

— Take special cognizance of the distinc- 
tive requirements of the more industrialized 
economies of Latin America and of the 
region as a whole, in the context of our ef- 
forts to help shape a more equitable inter- 
national order; 

— Assist directly the neediest nations in 



July 5, 1976 



15 



the hemisphere afflicted by poverty and 
natural disaster; 

— Support Latin American regional and 
subregional efforts to organize for coopera- 
tion and integration; 

— Negotiate on the basis of parity and 
dignity our specific differences with each and 
every state, to solve problems before they 
become conflicts; 

— Enforce our commitment to collective 
security and to maintain regional integrity 
against attempts to undermine solidarity, 
threaten independence, or export violence; 
and 

— Work to modernize the inter-American 
system to respond to the needs of our times 
and give direction to our common action. 

Since February the United States has 
worked hard to make progress in each of 
these areas. We have introduced trade, in- 
vestment, and technology proposals of 
special relevance to the countries of this 
hemisphere at global forums in Paris and 
Nairobi. We have responded to the coura- 
geous efforts of the Guatemalan people to re- 
cover from the earthquake that devastated 
their land. We have provided fresh support 
to subregional cooperation in Central Amer- 
ica and are exploring ways of relating more 
effectively to the Andean Pact. And we have 
not only intensified bilateral efforts with 
several countries but have made a special 
effort to prepare for the current meeting of 
the OAS General Assembly, which provides 
a unique opportunity to review our progress 
together and give it common direction. 

I look forward to discussing these and 
other recent global and regional events with 
my colleagues at the General Assembly, and 
I shall be putting forward additional pro- 
posals on a number of key issues to further 
our efforts on a multilateral regional basis 
as well. 

A major element in this second trip is 
that it builds naturally on the first; in Feb- 
ruary I was not only able to state our aims 
but to listen to and gain some understanding 
of your concerns — concerns over trade, the 
transfer of technology, and regional coopera- 



16 



tion. The proposals we plan to present ati 
Santiago reflect that understanding and re 
spond to those concerns and thus represent 
concrete steps in our longstanding partner 
ship. 

Two subjects that are high on the inter 
national agenda are especially relevant 
trade and technology. 



Trade 

The United States is fully aware that 
trade is the indispensable engine of growth 
for the nations of the hemisphere and that 
the United States and the other developed 
countries are the most significant trading 
partners of the region. Trade is the source 
of most of Latin America's foreign exchange 
and so is essential if Latin America is to ac- 
quire the imported capital goods which are 
vital to future industrialization. But trade 
is at the same time the most serious point 
of national vulnerability to external circum- 
stance. Cycles of boom-and-bust, fueled by 
abrupt fluctuations in the prices of commodi- 
ties like sugar and coffee, tin and copper, 
have plagued the development struggle in 
the Americas for decades. 

We are dedicated to the search for effec- 
tive solutions to the problems of interna- 
tional commodity marketing, as I made clear 
in my statement to the UNCTAD IV [fourth 
ministerial meeting of the U.N. Conference 
on Trade and Development] in Nairobi a few 
weeks ago. And we are, as recent decisions 
by President Ford under the Trade Act have 
shown, equally dedicated to a more liberal 
global trading system in which Latin Amer- 
ica will have greater opportunity to expand 
its earnings from nontraditional manufac- 
tured export sales. 

In February I pledged that the United 
States would support Latin America's drive 
for broadened participation in the interna- 
tional economy as a means to assure stable 
growth. During this visit, at the General 
Assembly, I shall : 

— Make clear our determination to ad- 
minister our Trade Act in ways constantly 



Department of State Bulletin 



more favorable to Latin America's exports; 

—Announce our willingness to explore 
with Latin America ways in which, through 
3ur own trade policies, we can offer incen- 
tives for more liberal trade and greater in- 
;egration in Latin America; 

— State our willingness next month, at 
he multilateral trade negotiations in 
Geneva, to consider special safeguards treat- 
nent for certain developing countries and, 
n other ways, to press the trade interests of 
jRtin America at the Geneva conference; 

-Explore several means of expanding 
iVestern Hemisphere commodity production 
md exports; and 

— Propose a new inter-American consulta- 
;ive mechanism on trade so that the inter- 
\.merican system shall enjoy, for the first 
ime, an open, continuing forum for dialogue 
m this the most significant economic rela- 
;ionship of the nations of this hemisphere. 

'ethnology 

Economic development, in the end, means 
limply the expansion of output and the im- 
)rovement in efficiency of the workers, the 
arms, and the factories of our nations. In 
today's world, it is impossible to conceive of 
my long-term growth in a nation which is 
vithout modern technology — the capability 
)f exploiting the insights and discoveries of 
he modern scientific method for the better- 
nent of man's condition. Latin America's 
levelopment aspirations turn on technology, 
)ut as I emphasized during my visit in Feb- 
•uary, it must be technology compatible with 
he conditions of Latin America, nurtured by 
^atin Americans in Latin American institu- 
ions, and capable of thrusting the economies 
)f Latin America into the competitive fore- 
ront of the world's markets. 

At the General Assembly this time, I 
hall: 

— Announce measures to expand Latin 
America's access to our own National Tech- 
lical Information Service; 

— Detail an increased U.S. assistance pro- 
rram for the coming year for the develop- 



ment of indigenous technology capability 
within Latin America; 

— Announce that we are opening a tech- 
nology exchange service for Latin America 
to service requests for information about 
public and privately owned technology in the 
United States; 

— Indicate that we are prepared to mount 
a pilot program of practical technology ex- 
changes between private Latin American and 
U.S. companies; and 

— In general, elaborate for Latin Amer- 
ica the technology initiatives which I sug- 
gested in Nairobi recently and those which 
were approved in the technology resolution 
at UNCTAD IV. 

These steps, which we are prepared to re- 
fine and implement in consultation with the 
other countries of the hemisphere, will not 
only increase the prosperity of our individual 
countries; they will increase their capacity 
to define and maximize the benefits of inter- 
national cooperation and progress. Above all, 
they should strengthen the spirit of coopera- 
tion and partnership. 



Human Rights 

The origins of our hemispheric traditions, 
and the values of our civilization tell us, 
however, that material progress is not suffi- 
cient for the human personality. We of the 
Americas have a special obligation to our- 
selves and the world to maintain and ad- 
vance international standards of justice and 
freedom. 

In February I stated our conviction that 
basic human rights must be preserved, cher- 
ished, and defended in this hemisphere — for 
if they cannot be preserved, cherished, and 
defended here, where the rights and the 
promise of the individual have played such 
a prominent historic role, then they are in 
jeopardy everywhere. 

During this trip I shall stress that the 
struggle for human dignity is central both 
to national development and to international 
cooperation, and I shall propose a strength- 



uly 5, 1976 



17 



ened role for the Inter-American Human 
Rights Commission. 

Our Inter-American System 

We have many forms of cooperation; our 
bilateral and global interactions are increas- 
ing constantly. To give them an added re- 
gional dimension, no organization is more 
important than the Organization of Ameri- 
can States. 

Last February I pledged that we would 
work to modernize the inter-American sys- 
tem to respond to the needs of our times and 
give direction to our common action. Dur- 
ing my current trip I shall urge that we 
increase the frequency of our consultations 
through the General Assembly and elimi- 
nate those other elements of the OAS struc- 
ture that have become anachronistic, and I 
shall propose that these reforms of the OAS 
be considered by a special intergovernmental 
working group on the charter. 

Over the course of the next year, these 
steps should lead to a more flexible and re- 
sponsive instrument of cooperation between 
the United States and the countries of Latin 
America and help bring the drawn-out re- 
form debate to a successful conclusion. 

These proposals will be offered as sin- 
cere, serious attempts to respond to Latin 
American suggestions. 

History has proven time and again how 
difficult it is for those living in an age of 
revolutionary change to pei'ceive the forces 
taking shape around them, much less exer- 
cise influence over their direction and im- 
pact. I beheve that we here in this hemi- 
sphere, because of our partnership of shared 
endeavor and straightforward consultation, 
are closer than any other group of nations 
to understanding the problems we face, more 
able to discuss them in the spirit of a long 
tradition of cooperation, and more willing to 
take the necessary steps to master our com- 
mon destiny. With good will and firm com- 
mitment, we can make a record of progress 
in this hemisphere on the crucial issues of 
an interdependent world which will be a 
model and an inspiration to nations every- 
where. 



18 



The peoples of the Americas, who pio- 
neered these unexplored continents and built 
nations under conditions of great adversity, 
know that progress does not come easily. 
But we know as well that cooperative and 
committed effort and faith in the future are 
the surest means to progress. 

Mr. President, the year 1976 has a special 
meaning for both of us. In the United States, 
it is a Bicentennial year of renewed dedica- 
tion to our ideals. For you, it is a year of 
homage to a great Dominican leader: Juan 
Pablo Duarte. Like Jefferson and Bolivar, 
Juarez and Lincoln, Duarte has given the 
Americas a legacy of love of mankind and 
country. 

You, Mr. President, a distinguished his- 
torian and a scholar of Duarte, have had an 
opportunity which was tragically denied to 
him. For nearly 10 years, you have been al- 
lowed to direct the fortunes of your coun- 
try, to lead it away from political and eco- 
nomic unrest toward peace, prosperity, and j 
liberty. 

During the first four years of this decade 
alone, the people of the Dominican Republic 
enjoyed a real annual increase in per capita 
income of nearly 8 percent, one of the high- 
est rates of progress not just in this hemi- 
sphere but the world. This growth has en- 
abled you to resist subsequent dislocations 
in the global economy and to make greai 
strides in institutional development anc 
culture as well. 

In less fortunate times, when stability anc 
confidence were threatened, you addressed i 
message to the young people of your coun- 
try. You reminded them of the ideals anc 
aspirations of Duarte and of their obliga- 
tions as inheritors of his hope. You said: 

... To chaos and to lack of confidence by some 
in our own future, we can offer in return politica 
security in the present and in the future; to ignorani 
narrowness, we can offer our abundant confidence 
our faith in progress, our permanent commitment tc 
national conciliation and concord. 

This is also a message to the hemisphere 
It is a message of indomitable faith in the 
future worthy of the heritage and the proud 
achievement of this hemisphere. 

Ladies and gentlemen, I ask you to joir 

Department of State Bulletin 



aui 



me as I propose a toast on behalf of the 
President and people of the United States: 
To His Excellency, Dr. Joaquin Balaguer, 
President of the Dominican Republic, to the 
enduring friendship between our two 
countries, to the prosperity and well-being of 
the Dominican people, and to the voyage to 
the future upon which we in the Americas 
have embarked and which will lead us to a 
new world of peace, dignity, justice, and 
progress for all our peoples. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, SANTO DOMINGO, JUNE 6 

ess release 288 dated June 6 

Q. There is one basic question: What is the 
real purpose of your visit to the Dominican 
Republic? 



Secretary Kissinger: As I indicated at the 
airport, this is my second visit to Latin 
America in four months, and I am trying to 
see as many countries of the Western Hemi- 
sphere as I can during this year to create a 
basis for a new relationship between the 
United States and the countries of the 

™ Western Hemisphere. 

I am using the occasion of the General 
Assembly in Santiago to stop here to ex- 
change views with an old friend of the 
United States, a country that plays a cen- 
tral role in the Caribbean area and whose 
problems are characteristic of many of the 
smaller countries of this region. This is the 

'"Ibasic purpose of my visit in Santo Domingo. 
The lai-ger purpose is to establish a rela- 
tionship between the United States and its 

'"iWestern Hemisphere neighbors, to contrib- 
ute to the dialogue between the developed 
and the developing nations, and to help con- 
struct in this hemisphere a model of what 
the relationship in the world at large can be 
over a period of time. 

In any case, it is a pleasure for me to 
visit a country with which we have no bi- 
lateral problems and from which we don't 
want anything and also to have the oppor- 
tunity to visit a capital which has shown 
great friendship. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, today you stated that the 
July 5, 1976 



matter of human rights is a matter that is 
rital for continued cooperation in the region. 
Does this mean that the United States will 
not provide economic assistance to Chile in 
view of the demonstrated and systematic 
violations of human rights by the goveryi- 
ment of General Pinochet? 

Secretary Kissinger: The United States 
has made clear and will make clear again in 
Santiago its commitment to human rights, 
and it will make some specific proposals on 
how to advance them in the Western 
Hemisphere. We are not here to discuss 
questions related to interruption of eco- 
nomic assistance or economic matters. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder ivhether you 
coidd please explain the neio role of the Do- 
minican Republic ivithin the context of this 
new policy that you have expressed in the 
area of the Latin American Continent and, 
very specifically, the role of this country in 
the Caribbean area. We have heard receyitly 
and there has been some evidence of efforts 
or trends to stop the establishment of blocs 
of producers of raw materials. On the other 
hand, we have heard of the role of an arms 
or ammunition factory that is being run by 
some Cuban exiles and there are rumors that 
the CIA has something to do with it. We 
would like to know what the role of this 
factory is in the Caribbean and with respect 
to Latin America and the area in general. 
There has been late news of arms shipments 
made to Chile and that this was a sale ef- 
fected by the United States through the 
Dominican Republic. Could you comment? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have never heard 
of any arms sales to Chile by way of the 
Dominican Republic, and that, in any case, 
would be against our laws. So I don't believe 
that this is possible. I have also never heard 
of an arms factory established by Cuban 
exiles, but there are many things under the 
sun that I haven't heard of, though it's very 
rare for me to admit it. 

The role of the Dominican Republic can 
be, as it has been traditionally, one of mod- 
eration and cooperation. We are not attempt- 
ing to stop the formation of producer blocs. 



19 



but the producers cannot complain if the 
consumers then also create organizations of 
their own. Our basic theme is not to tell 
other countries how to organize themselves. 
Our basic theme is that relations between 
producers and consumers cannot be settled 
by confrontation, everybody will suffer, but 
most of all the poorest countries. And this 
is why we have made, constantly, proposals 
to encourage a dialogue and to take into 
account the concerns of the developing coun- 
tries and why we believe that in the last 15 
months considerable progress in that direc- 
tion has been made. 

We have a long flight ahead of us, so if 
I could ask for only two more questions. 

Q. What other fundamental or primary 
benefits are or could he offered to the Gov- 
ernment of the Dominican Republic in the 
social and economic order in connection with 
your visit, Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary Kissinger: I did not come here 
in order to make a commercial deal with 
the Dominican Republic. I came here to visit 
old friends, to discuss the general principles 
of hemispheric cooperation, and to deal with 
a few specific problems of direct import to 
our countries. 

I believe that the benefits to the Domini- 
can Republic will develop from the general 
program of hemispheric cooperation that 
we are trying to develop and our general 
readiness to deal with the special concerns 
of the Dominican Republic with an attitude 
of friendship. But you should not present 
this as if I had come here on a sort of com- 
mercial mission in which we asked some- 
thing of the Dominican Republic and then 
paid a certain amount for it. This is not the 
sort of visit it was. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you feel you're in a 
position to affirm and state that the United 
States will not repeat the type of activity 
that we ivere subjected to during the 1965 
experience — that is to say that no new armed 
intervention ivill ever be carried out in our 
own territory — or do you feel that circum- 
stances could lead to a repetition of such type 
of activity? 



20 



Secretary Kissinger: One of the celebrated 
candidates in the American political cam- 
paign has just announced that he has made 
a new discovery, which is never to answer a 
hypothetical question. I have so few oppor- 
tunities to agree with him that I would like 
to record my agreement. 

But to answer your hypothetical ques- 
tion — we are not looking for opportunities 
for military intervention. And we are trying 
to build a relationship of cooperation in this 
hemisphere. 

May I use this occasion to thank the 
Dominican Government, its President, For- 
eign Minister, and all the people we have 
met for the extraordinarily warm reception 
that we have received here. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, SANTA CRUZ, BOLIVIA, 
JUNE 7 

Press release 291 dated June 7 

Q. With ivhom did you confer last night 
and today, and what ivere the subjects? 

Secretary Kissinger: Before I answer the 
question I want to take this opportunity to 
thank the Bolivian Government on behalf of 
my colleagues for the reception we have 
had here. I already had an opportunity to 
express my views at City Hall. I would like 
to repeat again how touched we all have 
been by the very friendly reception we have 
had here. 

In answer to your question, last evening 
I had a very brief talk with the Foreign 
Minister. This morning I met for about 
two hours with the President, the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, the Finance Minister, 
and two others of their associates, and I 
was accompanied by Under Secretary Maw, 
Assistant Secretary Rogers, and our Am- 
bassador to Bolivia. 

We reviewed the topics that are covered 
in the communique — that is, the progress of 
economic development; bilateral issues be- 
tween the United States and Bolivia; and 
some substantial discussion on narcotics 
control, which is a matter of great concern 
for both our countries. Also, Secretary lij 

Department of State Bulletin III 



logei's met with the Minister of Finance last 
light to go into some more details on the 
conomic subjects that were also discussed 
his morning. 

Q. Mr. Secretary of State, two points I 
vould like to ask you about, and they concern 
—they are matters of special concern to all 
jatin American countries. The first point 
efers to the landlocked nature of Bolivia and 
ts desires to gain access to the sea. The sec- 
nd one refers to the matter of Panamanian 
lesires to assert sovereignty over the canal 
rea. I ivoidd like to ask you specifically rvhat 
teps the United States is contemplating to 
Ind a solution to these ttvo problems and, 
dditionally, what type of support is the 
Inited States intending tvhen you say that 
he United States does support Bolivia's de- 
ires to have access to the sea? 

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the 
jsue of Panama, three American Presi- 
ents have been negotiating with Panama 
a order to see whether it is possible to 
econcile the American interests of free and 
ninterrupted passage through the canal 
ath Panamanian aspirations. We do this 
ot only because of the concerns of the 
ountry of Panama but because of our con- 
ictions that all of the countries of the 
Vestern Hemisphere are watching these 
egotiations at this time for the new and 
f qual relationship that we are attempting to 
stablish with the countries of the Western 
f lemisphere. 

!ii We are negotiating seriously. So far no 
lit onclusions have been reached, but we are 
ei roceeding on a serious exploration to see 
r, /hether the interests of both the United 
litates and Panama and the concerns of all 
if. if the countries of the Western Hemisphere 
' an find an expression that strengthens the 
ies of the Western Hemisphere and assures 
r£ ree access and passage through the canal. 
li i.s you know, this has been the subject of 
considerable debate in the United States, 
ti ut we believe that we are acting in the 
(i ational interests and in the Western Hemi- 
n phere's interests, and we are proceeding 
!; rith these negotiations. 



As for the Bolivian access to the sea, you 
know better than I that this is a complicated 
problem involving Chile, Bolivia, and Peru 
that all three countries have to agree. It is 
our understanding that some preliminary 
understandings have been reached between 
Chile and Bolivia and are now being dis- 
cussed with Peru. 

The United States watches these negotia- 
tions with sympathy, and it hopes that a 
successful conclusion can be achieved, in the 
belief that this will help the tranquillity and 
cooperation in the Southern Cone. We will 
certainly express these views to all inter- 
ested parties and to all other colleagues in 
Santiago. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, of all of your diplomatic 
undertakings, which one ivould you consider 
the most positive in your pursuit of tvorld 
peace, and could you tell us tvhat are the most 
recent steps and most recent efforts under- 
taken by you in order to seek peace in the 
world? 

Seci-etary Kissinger: I would not want to 
make a judgment between the various ac- 
tivities with respect to peace, because if the 
world is to become more peaceful several 
things have to be done simultaneously. The 
relationship between the industrial democ- 
racies has to be strengthened. The relation- 
ship between the industrialized countries and 
the developing countries has to grow into 
one of cooperation so that the world is not 
forever divided between those who are ad- 
vanced and those who are struggling for 
progress. And finally, relations between 
ideological adversaries — between East and 
West — have to follow some rules of restraint. 
If we do not make progress in all of these 
areas simultaneously, then we have great 
difficulty speaking of an improvement of 
world peace. 

In addition to the structural problems, 
there are specific areas such as the Middle 
East and now Africa, and I believe that it 
is — that America has an obligation to use 
its influence and its power to attempt to 
ease conflicts, to mediate rivalries, and to 
move these specific issues closer to a peace- 
ful resolution. 



uly 5, 1976 



21 



Q. In Bolivia, Mr. Secretary, tin is a most 
important basic product, and the high cost 
of production of this mineral makes it of 
great significance to our country. Tin, there- 
fore, and the ivorld tin situation are of great 
significance. The Fifth International Tin 
Agreement established a voting system that 
p7'0vides a virtual veto right to the United 
States. Bolivia has announced its intention 
not to ratify such an agreement because of 
the manner in ivhich it ivould affect its in- 
terests. This implies the right of the United 
States to veto the positions of some minor 
nations. Woiddn't this be, Mr. Secretary, in 
contradiction to some of the principles that 
you stated during the course of the Nairobi 
Conference ? 

Secretary Kissinger: The issue of com- 
modities is one of the principal problems in 
the relations between the developed and the 
developing nations. The United States under- 
stands the concern of the producers of pri- 
mary products and especially of countries 
that are dependent on — to a large extent — 
on the single commodities — commodity — to 
avoid excessive fluctuations in the price, and 
therefore, frankly, after some internal de- 
bate, we have agreed to join a number of 
commodity agreements. Some have already 
been concluded, and we have agreed to dis- 
cuss others. We have signed [inaudible]. 

We do not consider that our voting per- 
centage in fact constitutes a veto. And in 
any event, having joined the agreement, it 
would be our intention to realize its objec- 
tive, which is to prevent exti-eme fluctua- 
tions of the prices and to enable the produc- 
ers of the primary commodities to stabilize 
their income. I frankly am not aware of the 
fact that Bolivia has indicated that it would 
not ratify the agreement, and I would regret 
it if it were true, because one of the prin- 
cipal reasons for our joining the agreement 
is precisely to help countries like Bolivia. 
We ourselves are not tin producers. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I have read in a publica- 
tion of the U.S. Information Service entitled 
"Latin America in a Changing World" and 



have noted that in all of your public state- 
ments during the course of your visits to 
Veneztiela, Peril, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, you have made references to the ynatter 
of human rights and to the need for the obser- 
vation of human rights in order to promote 
peace and encourage progress among the 
peoples of the ivorld. How, Mr. Secretary, do 
you think that the United States can require 
— demand — of countries that do not respect 
such human rights, that they do so, as has 
been on occasion suggested by Democratic 
Senator Kennedy? And I suggest that this 
is not on my part an effort to interfere in 
the internal politics of another country. 

Secretary Kissinger: Before I answer the 
last expression, may I thank everybody for 
the extreme courtesy with which the inter- 
view has been conducted — a method that I 
am considering introducing in the Depart- 
ment of State — and I hope that the Ameri- 
can correspondents here have paid great at- 
tention to the politeness with which every- 
thing has been conducted here. 

Now, to answer your question. I think the 
problem of human rights is not primarily a 
question of preserving the peace, because 
peace can also be preserved in the absence 
[inaudible]. The problem of human rights 
arises from the moral positions of the West- 
ern Hemisphere, in that all of the founding 
documents of all of our republics have 
called attention to the importance of 
human dignity and personal freedom. This 
is the hemisphere to which people came to 
escape oppression elsewhere, and we can only 
be true to our history and to the human im- 
peratives of our time by implementing the 
demands for the respect for human dignity. 
I will make a statement on this subject at 
the meeting in Santiago, and I will indicate 
the U.S. position with respect to it and 
what methods we believe can be used for 
the time being to advance the cause of hu- 
man rights in the Western Hemisphere. But 
I do believe that this hemisphere has a spe- 
cial obligation by virtue of its tradition and 
by virtue of its basic belief to promote the 
advancement of human rights. 



22 



Department of State Bulletin 



U.S.-BOLIVIA JOINT COMMUNIQUE, JUNE 7' 

His Excellency the Secretary of State of the 
United States of America, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, 
at the invitation of the Government of Bolivia, 
visited the city of Santa Cruz de la Sierra on the 
6th and 7th of June, 1976. During his visit, he was 
received by His Excellency the President of the 
Republic of Bolivia, General Hugo Banzer Suarez, 
with whom he held cordial conversations on matter.^; 
of mutual interest to both countries. 

After a friendly dialogue between the Secretary 
of State of the United States and His Excellency the 
Minister of Foreign Relations and Worship of the 
Republic of Bolivia, General Oscar Adriazola Valda, 
the following Communique was issued: 

Both sides reaffirmed the close ties of friendship 
between their peoples and their governments, and 
expressed satisfaction at the high level of under- 

i standing and cooperation existing between the two 

: nations. 

: In this spirit. His Excellency the President of 
,the Republic of Bolivia, General Hugo Banzer 

I Suarez, and the Minister of Foreign Relations and 

: Worship, General Oscar Adriazola Valda, outlined 
for the Secretary of State of the United States the 
scope of the Bolivian proposal for peace, develop- 

I ment, and integration in the Southern Cone, intended 

; to resolve Bolivia's geographic isolation by provid- 
ing sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. 
i The Secretary of State manifested great interest 
in this important subject, and stated that the 
Government of the United States views with satis- 
ifaction the progress which has been achieved up to 
{the present toward reaching a definite solution 
that will satisfy the interests of the concerned 
i parties. 

The Secretary of State also emphasized that a 
I negotiated solution to this century-old problem would 
constitute a substantial contribution to the peace 
and development of the South American conti- 
nent. 

The Chancellor of the Republic of Bolivia informed 
the Secretary of State of the United States of Amer- 
ica that he had studied with great interest the 
speech given by Dr. Kissinger during the general 
debate at UNCTAD IV which took place in Kenya, 
in which he made known important proposals with 
regard to raw materials, trade, and financing; and 
expressed his desire that these proposals achieve an 
effective application within the framework of the 
United Nations system of cooperation for develop- 
ment. 
The Governments of Bolivia and the United States 



^ Signed at Santa Cruz de la Sierra by President 
Banzer and Secretary Kissinger (text from press 
release 289). 



recognize the importance of international agree- 
ments on raw materials between producing countries 
and consuming countries. The United States has 
recognized for its part the importance of the income 
derived from exports of raw materials for countries 
in the process of development, such as Bolivia. The 
Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State agreed 
that the existing integration processes in Latin 
America should receive the necessary support since 
they constitute appropriate mechanisms for achiev- 
ing inter-regional economic equilibrium, accelerat- 
ing development and promoting joint activities for 
the achievement of harmonious and balanced 
progress. 

The Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State 
agreed on the necessity to increase the efforts of both 
Governments to combat and eradicate the manu- 
facture and traffic of dangerous substances. They 
also resolved to explore the means of encouraging 
the socio-economic development of the zones produc- 
ing coca leaves so that such cultivation can be 
gradually reduced. 

They agreed on emphasizing the need to augment 
substantially the capacity of developing countrie.s, 
like Bolivia, to apply science and technology to their 
economic development programs. Likewise, they out- 
lined the necessity to strengthen the mechanisms 
of cooperation in favor of the relatively less de- 
veloped countries. 

Both countries look forward to a prompt and 
successful conclusion of the Conference on the Law 
of the Sea on the basis of a consensus which satis- 
fies the interests of the entire international com- 
munity. 

The Government of the United States reaffirms its 
willingness to consult with Bolivia with regard to 
its plans for sales of tin and other products from its 
strategic reserves and states that such sales will 
be made with due regard for protection against 
avoidable disruption of usual markets. 



REMARKS AT ECLA HEADQUARTERS, 
SANTIAGO, CHILE, JUNE 9 

Press release 296A dated June 9 

Mr. Secretary [Enrique V. Iglesias, Ex- 
ecutive Secretary of ECLA, the U.N. Eco- 
nomic Commission for Latin America], I 
appreciate very much the complimentary re- 
marks that you have made, and I would like 
you and your distinguished staff to know 
that while it is a meeting of the General As- 
sembly of the Organization of American 
States that brings me to Santiago at this 
time, I value this opportunity to meet with 



July 5, 1976 



23 



you and to visit this renowned fountainhead 
of ideas. 

You have much of which to be proud. 
You, Mr. Secretary, with all your well-known 
energy and wisdom have followed and suc- 
cessfully built upon the work of your very 
capable predecessors, [Raul] Prebisch, [Jose 
Antonio] Mayobre, and [Cai-los] Quintana. 
These men, like you, were well known within 
and beyond our hemisphere as statesmen. 
My colleagues and I have great respect for 
the work you have done and for the tremen- 
dous accomplishments of the Economic 
Commission for Latin America. This center 
of study and action has done much to ignite 
the consciences of men everywhere to take 
on the challenges of economic development. 
Your approach is progressive, and especially 
because it is nonpolitical, it is effective. 

As is only to be expected, we have at times 
not seen eye to eye with regard to certain 
problems or the prescriptions for dealing 
with them. But we have avoided ideological 
postures. Our thinking and, I believe, yours 
have evolved; in the process we have moved 
closer together with respect to many, if not 
most, essentials. We have listened and 
learned as this institution has led the move- 
ment for economic integration among the 
developing countries of this hemisphere. We 
have worked together on trade and develop- 
ment, and we have agreed with your shift 
in emphasis from import-substitution to 
export-oriented strategies. 

The problem of economic development is 
not primarily a technical issue. It is pro- 
foundly a political and moral issue. It is not 
possible to build a world community which 
is divided between the rich and the poor. If 
we are to live in a world of peace and justice, 
all nations must have a sense of participa- 
tion, and all nations must have the con- 
sciousness that the world community either 
takes into account their concerns or at least 
listens to their concerns. 

This is why we attach such extreme im- 
portance to the dialogue that is now taking 
place between the developed and developing 
nations ; for regardless of technical solutions 
we find, the spirit we can help engender can 
contribute to a world of peace and to a sense 



of community. And this is why we are con- 
cerned when there are attitudes of confron- 
tation or technical majorities, because it is 
the essense of an international structure 
that solutions cannot be imposed by one 
group on another but that a consensus must 
be established in which all share. 

The nations of Latin America have a very 
special role to play in this process. They are 
among the most developed of the develop- 
ing nations or among the least developed 
of the developed nations. They belong to 
the Organization of American States, and 
they are tied to us, a country which has a 
great concern with security and global 
equilibi'ium. But they are also a part of 
other groupings of the so-called Third World, 
and they can, therefore, in important re- 
spects act as a bridge between the views of 
the different groups that exist in the world 
today. 

In the field of development, the United 
States has offered important proposals for 
dealing with current international economic 
difficulties. At the seventh special session of 
the U.N. General Assembly we put forth 
suggestions, and agreement was reached on 
a number of measures designed to enhance 
economic security and to cope with the 
cycles that in the past have devastated ex- 
port earnings and undermined development, 
and we dealt with other issues relating to 
trade, technology, and capital flows. 

In Nairobi, we advocated a comprehensive 
plan for addressing major commodity issues 
and set forth additional proposals for deal- 
ing with technology and other requirements 
for development. Our proposal for the estab- 
lishment of an International Resources Bank 
failed for reasons of an accidental majority. 
But I cannot scold every forum that I 
meet on this topic. I think we have made 
our point. 

The more fundamental problem I would 
like to put to this distinguished group is 
how to relate these general proposals for 
global development, which are important, to 
the special requirements of the Western 
Hemisphere. 

My colleagues and I are doing a great deal 
of thinking on how, in a global context of 



24 



Department of State Bulletin 



development, we can at the same time reflect 
the special ties and the special values and 
the particular institutions that have grown 
up in this hemisphere — how we can avoid 
being caught between the extremes of dog- 
matic globalism and dogmatic regionalism. 
We favor regional integration of the Western 
Hemisphere or of the nations of Latin 
America, either in subregional groupings or 
in regional groupings; and we are going to 
give very serious study to how, within a 
global framework, we can spur the very spe- 
cial concerns for development of our old 
friends and associates in the hemisphere. 

Today, at the meeting of the OAS Gen- 
eral Assembly, I made some specific pro- 
posals of what can be done within the frame- 
work of existing legislation and within the 
discretion that our executive has, but I also 
pointed out that at the special session on 
development that has been proposed by sev- 
eral members at the General Assembly and 
that we assume will take place next spring, 
the United States will be prepared to ad- 
dress the more fundamental questions that 
I'm putting to my friends here: how to re- 
late the global concerns for development 
Iwith the regional concerns of the Western 
Hemisphere, because it would be wrong to 
I waste the traditions of cooperation and the 
I special relationships that have grown up in 
this hemisphere. 

I am providing your Executive Secretary 
with a copy of the paper in which we made 
a series of comments and recommendations 
regai-ding cooperation for development, and 
I hope that ECLA will find that it can play 
a role with regard to some of the arrange- 
ments we suggested on vital issues; for 
example, on technology for development. 
-We hope also that you will not feel yourself 
iconfined to the proposals that we have made 
iand will feel free to offer your own sugges-' 
Itions. In looking at the record, the danger 
that you will feel yourself confined by our 
proposals is minimal. 

The nations of this hemisphere are bound 
by historical and other special ties and in- 
terests. The United States consequently 
supported and has been interested in the 
work of ECLA since its founding in 1948. 



I would also like to i-eciprocate the very 
warm words of the Secretary General, whose 
dedication to the cause of peace we admire 
and whose indefatigable efforts in all areas 
of world problems we support.^ I wish you 
and the Executive Secretary the very best 
as you carry on your important work, and 
I would like to thank you for this very warm 
reception I have had here. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, MEXICO CITY, JUNE 11 

Piess release 300 dated June H 

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and gentle- 
men, having read some of your commen- 
taries, I know you have many questions. I 
would like, however, to take this oppor- 
tunity to express again my very great joy 
to be in this country which I love so much 
and of which I have so many happy personal 
memoi-ies and with which we've been so 
closely tied officially. Especially I would like 
to express my appreciation to my good 
friend, your distinguished President, whose 
contribution to peace and progress and jus- 
tice is well known around the world and from 
whose friendship and frank opinions we have 
all benefited greatly. And now I'll be glad to 
answer your questions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you ivant to 
obtain from Mexico? Do you ivant Mexico to 
be subjected to you, or do you ivant its friend- 
ship? [Laughter.} 

Secretary Kissinger: You have to remem- 
ber America is a pragmatic people, and I 
know you are a heroic people, so I am not 
here to attempt anything so foolhardy as to 
attempt the subjugation of Mexico, and 
that has never succeeded. In all seriousness, 
the big international problem in the world 
today is that for the first time in history 
international relations have become global. 

For the first time world peace has to be 
built on the basis of a community of nations 



' Roberto Guyer, personal representative of U.N. 
Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, conveyed a mes- 
sage from the Secretary General. 



July 5, 1976 



25 



that feel that they have a sense of partici- 
pation and a sense of justice. That can only 
be done by the voluntary cooperation of 
other countries, and in this sense, Mexico 
and the United States — that have had a very 
complicated history and in which paternal- 
ism w^as not always asked — have a special 
opportunity to demonstrate how two great 
peoples can cooperate on the basis of equality. 
And if we do not cooperate on the basis of 
equality, we can achieve nothing. 

Q. When you speak of the dictatorship of 
the majorities, could ive apply the same con- 
cept to the majorities in the United States 
ivith reference to their own political life? 

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, there is a 
difference between the domestic — the con- 
duct of domestic affairs and the conduct of 
international affairs. 

In domestic affairs in a democratic coun- 
try, it has proved to be the most equitable 
system to let the majority determine the de- 
cisions of the people. This works especially 
in countries where the minority has an op- 
portunity to become the majority. In coun- 
tries where there is a permanent minority 
and a permanent majority along racial lines, 
it also has its problems. Internationally, 
when we have used the phrase "the dictator- 
ship of the majority," we have applied it to 
situations in which a numerical grouping of 
countries composed of countries of very un- 
equal status, whose total population might 
be very small, attempted to impose their will 
on a minority, without whose willing cooper- 
ation it is not possible to achieve anything. 

I believe that in the problems of develop- 
ment especially, but in all international prob- 
lems, the art of foreign policy is to obtain 
the willing cooperation of all those without 
whose cooperation progress is not possible. 
And if one is looking for parliamentary-type 
victories in a situation in which there is no 
ability to enforce those victories, one is 
working essentially for propaganda and not 
for substance. And therefore we have inter- 
nationally expressed concern about unofficial 
majorities. On the other hand, we are pre- 
pared to work out cooperative solutions, and 



26 



I believe in the international field one should 
proceed by consensus and not by imposition 
— either imposition by power or imposition 
by majority. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have information 
that Cuba is in fact withdraiving its troops 
from Angola, and if this is the case, does this 
inspire you to resume your efforts to improve 
relations with Cuba? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have had infor- 
mation through the Swedish Prime Minister 
and other statements that were made to vari- 
ous other countries that Cuba intends to 
withdraw troops at a rather slow I'ate from 
Angola. We have not yet been able to achieve 
a conclusive confirmation, especially a con- 
firmation of whether there is a net return 
or whether there is a rotation. So, at this 
point it would be premature for us to draw 
any conclusions. 

We had, in principle, been prepared to ex- 
plore the normalization of relations with 
Cuba as long as Cuba conducted its affairs 
as a national Latin American or Western 
Hemisphere state and not as a country ex- 
porting revolutionary activities. The intro- 
duction of large military organized contin- 
gents in Angola has created a very serious 
situation in our relationship with Cuba. 

At this moment the withdrawal is of toe 
small proportions to permit us to draw an> 
conclusions. I would say that the precondi- 
tion for any improvement in our relations 
with Cuba is the total withdrawal of all or- 
ganized military units from Angola. 

Q. I have two questions to ask of you, Mr 
Secretary. You have made reference to tho 
fact that the United States would never per- 
mit another situation like the situation o; 
Angola; that is to say, that it would not per- 
mit the interference of Cuban troops in any 
country and also in countries of Latin Amer- 
ica. Hoiv is it that the United States can 
determine ichat the internal policy of a coun- 
try is to be and what it will permit and not 
permit internationally? 

Secondly, I woidd like to refer to President 
Echeverria's visit in 1971 to the United 



Department of State Bulletin 



X at ions, when he proposed the admittance 
into the United Nations of the People's Re- 
public of China. At that time, the United 
States opposed the suggestion that was made 
bij President Echeverria, and the United 
States said that the two Chinas shoidd 
he admitted. At that point, President Eche- 
I'crria responded that sovereignty is indi- 
visible and that therefore there could only 
be one China. Now, with reference to all 
of this, I would like to know hoiv you vieiv 
President Echeverria at this particular point 
because of this reply and this stand. Is there 
(Duj resentment on your part? 

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the 
first question, we do not assume the right to 
intervene in the domestic pohcies of other 
countries. For example, in Mozambique, the 
group that took over — got the government 
of Mozambique — is in its pohtical views as 
different from our predominant views as the 
MPLA [Popular Movement for the Libera- 
tion of Angola] in Angola. Nevertheless we 
recognized it as soon as it came into office 
and have established improved relations with 
the Government of Mozambique. We are pre- 
pared and are making every effort to im- 
prove the relationship further. 

The situation in Angola is not an internal 
affair. It is the massive introduction of at 
least 15,000 Cuban combat troops in a coun- 
try thousands of miles away from Cuba, in a 
civil war situation. When I say we do not 
wish to see any more Angolas, I do not mean 
the internal struggles of Angola. I mean the 
introduction of outside military forces, sup- 
ported by the Soviet Union, encouraged by 
the Soviet Union, and acting as surrogates 
for the Soviet Union. This is what the United 
States will oppose. 

Now, with respect to President Echeverria, 
I think you must have seen from our greet- 
ings that we consider each other personal 
friends. I have very high regard for Presi- 
dent Echeverria and great respect for the 
role that Mexico has played internationally. 
Of course, Mexico, being an independent sov- 
ereign country which is not governed by 
weakminded individuals, has its own views on 



a number of international problems. Those 
views do not always coincide with ours. 
When we differ, we intend to discuss our dif- 
ferences. Sometimes we succeed in eliminat- 
ing the differences. But sometimes we do not. 
In those cases, each country pursues its 
own policy. Nothing has happened so far, and 
nothing is likely to happen that I can fore- 
see that will affect the basic friendship that 
exists between Mexico and the United States. 
We do not have resentment of President 
Echeverria. We have the highest regard for 
him, and I personally have great affection 
for him. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what can you tell us 
about negotiations regarding conditions in 
Mexican jails, conditions that Americans are 
held in? Are they going ivell, and what are 
those conditions? 

Secretary Kissinger: The distinguished 
Foreign Minister of Mexico and his associ- 
ates and my associates and I had, as you 
know, an extensive discussion yesterday eve- 
ning on a large number of bilateral issues. 
The problem of prisoners was part of that 
discussion. 

I think it is important to point out that in 
fact more Mexicans are held in American 
prisons than Americans in Mexican prisons. 
And we discussed how to alleviate the gen- 
eral situation of individuals being held in 
prison in a foreign country. The Mexican 
side presented a number of rather ingenious 
and interesting proposals which we would 
like to study carefully and on which we are 
going to begin, in the near future, intensive 
bilateral discussions. 

I can say that the discussions yesterday 
were conducted in a very constructive spirit, 
with the recognition by each side of the sov- 
ereignty of the other, but also with an atti- 
tude of good will to settle what is a very com- 
plicated problem; and I am hopeful that we 
can make progress on this. 

Q. Mr. Secretary of State, I would like to 
mention that during the third UNCTAD 
[U.N. Conference on Trade and Develop- 
menf] , which took place in Santiago de Chile, 



July 5, 1976 



27 



President Echeverria proposed a charter, the 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States. This ivas in April 1972. Later on, in 
December 197 A and against the will and vote 
of the United States, this charter was ap- 
proved by 120 countries within the United 
Nations. My question is the following: Do 
you not believe that an attitude such as this 
one taken by the United States is going to 
bring on the unpopularity of the United 
States tvithin the United Nations ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, we cannot 
finally make our foreign policy on the basis 
of popularity or unpopularity, any more than 
any other nation can. We have to follow our 
best judgment of what we consider to be in 
the national interest and in the world in- 
terest. 

With respect to the proposal of President 
Echeverria for a charter, I was very at- 
tracted to the concept. And in two speeches 
at the U.N. General Assembly, I supported 
the concept that President Echeverria put 
forward, and so did the U.S. Government. 

In the elaboration of the charter a number 
of provisions were included that we felt were 
simply not acceptable and were against some 
basic principles of our foreign policy and of 
our foreign economic policy. We would have 
been prepared, if it had been possible to ar- 
range, to vote on different items in the char- 
ter, rather than for the charter as a whole. 
We had offered to vote on individual items, 
in which case we could have supported, I 
think, 98 percent of the charter and simply 
voted against the provisions with which we 
disagreed, if we had not been also forced to 
vote on the entire charter. 

So it is a concept which we supported. 
There are three or four provisions in it with 
which we disagreed. The majority of the pro- 
visions we could have supported, and it was 
one of those issues where, I believe, with a 
different parliamentary management, we 
could have achieved a more satisfactory out- 
come. But I would like to say now that the 
United States did not oppose the concept of 



28 



the charter, nor does it oppose the over- 
whelming majority of the provisions in the 
charter. And we, at the time that it was pro- 
posed, took an opportunity to commend Pres-i 
ident Echeverria for his initiating it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is the United States con- 
cerned that Cuba is trying to expand its in- 
fluence in the Caribbean, particularly by in- 
fluencing the Governments of Jamaica and 
Guyana ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I would like to make 
a distinction between the diplomatic active 
ties of a country and the military activities' 
of Cuba — Cuban diplomatic activities ano 
Cuban political efforts to gain influence ir 
matters that are subject to our foreign poll 
icy. And we are sufficiently self-confidenli 
that we believe that we can sustain a politi 
cal competition with a country like Cuba. Ouii 
concern is the military infiltration or thti 
movement of military units by Cuba. This we 
would oppose. We have seen no evidence oi 
the movement of organized Cuban military 
units within the Western Hemisphere. As foii 
other Cuban influence, this is a matter tha 
we will deal with in diplomatic channels. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us you 
assessment of the implications of the en 
trance of other Arab armies into Lebano: 
with the Syrians? And, additionally, couh 
you give us some feeling as to ivhat you fei 
the implications are of a possible militar, 
defeat of the PLO [Palestine Liberation 
Organization] in Lebanon? Would it mak 
renewed negotiations easier or more difficult 

Secretary Kissinger: The primary Amer 
ican interest in Lebanon is to bring an eni 
to the fighting and to end the suffering o 
the Lebanese people that has gone on to 
long and that has exacted an enormous an( 
exorbitant toll of human life. 

At an earlier period, we endorsed the ide; 
of an Arab force as one means of bringinj 
about security. In this particular case, we d( 
not know the composition of the force, noi 
do we know the attitude of the Syrian Gov 



Department of State Bulletit 



eniment toward the force. And we are at- 
tempting to clarify these issues and also the 
role that that force is going to play before 
we take a final position, but we would gener- 
ally support efforts that have a promise to 
end the fighting. 

As for the exact military situation — who 
is winning — the United States does not look 
at this problem from the point of view of 
wiiat helps the negotiating process. We have 
no clear view of what the military situation 
is, since we are receiving very confused re- 
ports. 

Our primary objective is to put an end to 
the fighting, to do it in a manner that re- 
spects the sovereignty and integrity of Leb- 
anon, enables the Moslem and Christian com- 
munities to live side by side with each other; 
and our attitude toward specific measures 
will be governed by those principles. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I have tivo questions to 
ask. The first question is: What is your 
opinion in reference to the junta, a military 
Chilean junta? Does your presence in Chile 
signify in any way your support for the gov- 
fiiiment of Augusto Pinochet? And my see- 
on r! question is the following: Do you foresee 
that the moment will come when the United 
States and Rtissia will come to a confronta- 
tion in any one of the countries outside the 
United States and Russia that are having a 
difficult time? 

Secretary Kissinger: I visited Chile to- 
gether with the Foreign Ministers of every 
other Western Hemisphere country except 
Mexico to attend the General Assembly of 
the Organization of American States, as I 
have every year since I became Secretary of 
State. While I was in Chile, I stated the basic 
i position of the United States with respect to 
j human rights throughout the Western Hemi- 
! sphere and called attention to the fact that 
jthe constituent documents of every one of 
the American republics calls attention to the 
I protection of the individual, as you would ex- 
pect in a hemisphere to which millions fled 
from oppression. I had an opportunity to dis- 



cuss our views with respect to Chile in that 
statement, and I had an opportunity to dis- 
cuss the matter privately also with the 
Chilean Government. 

At the same time, as Latin Americans you 
will understand that it is more in conformity 
with the dignity of my oath to enable them 
to make their decisions as Chilean decisions, 
and we have been told that there will be a 
constitutional act forthcoming that takes 
into greater account the concern for human 
rights that many countries in the Western 
Hemisphere have expressed. And we want 
to wait for this constitutional act before we 
express any judgment. 

With respect to the relationship of the 
United States and the Soviet Union, we are 
ideological opponents. We confront each 
other politically and ideologically in various 
parts of the world. At the same time, we also 
possess nuclear weapons, and we have the 
capacity to destroy humanity. And there- 
fore we have an obligation, unprecedented in 
history, to conduct our competition in a way 
that reduces and, in time, eliminates the 
dangers of nuclear war. It is therefore the 
basic policy of our government to use every 
opportunity to seek to bring about a world 
that is based on something more stable than 
a balance of terror and in which we strive 
for conditions of peace that depend on some- 
thing other than a pure equilibrium of 
power. No responsible American leader can 
do anything else. And this is a political duty, 
and it is a moral duty that any American 
leader, of whatever party, will have. 

[Secretary turns to next questioner.] I 
know she's been waiting to destroy me for 
45 minutes. [Laughter.] 

Q. I have two questions to ask. I want to 
know why it is that you consider that the 
participation of Cuba or the solidarity shown 
by Cuba in the Angola case is intervention 
and why you do not consider that the partici- 
pation of the United States in the Chilean 
case is similar intervention. Aside from that, 
I 2vant to point out that you signed the peace 



July 5, 1976 



29 



agreements in Paris in the Viet-Nam case 
and that it was for this reason that you ivere 
aivarded the Nobel Prize. The agreements 
have not been complied tvith. I would like to 
know ivhether you are ready to give back the 
-prize tintil the agreements are complied with. 
Secretary Kissinger: I knew that the ques- 
tion would not be entirely friendly when I 
recognized you. 

The Cuban action in Angola was the intro- 
duction of massive organized military units 
into a civil war. The U.S. position was that 
all outside countries, including the United 
States, should stay out of that civil war and 
that the parties in that civil war should set- 
tle their disputes. And half of the countries 
of the Organization of African Unity agreed 
with our point of view. 

With respect to the situation in Chile, it 
will be impossible ever to catch up with the 
mass of misleading information that has 
been put out in many quarters. Basically, 
what the United States attempted to do was 
to enable the democratic parties and news- 
papers of Chile to survive until the 1976 elec- 
tions in the face of confiscatory taxation. 
And that was the principal thrust of the 
American effort in Chile. 

With respect to the Viet-Nam Peace 
Agreement, I think there must be limits to 
hypocrisy. The only clause of the peace 
agreement that the Vietnamese are still talk- 
ing about is the clause that speaks about the 
principle that the United States would assist 
North Vietnamese economic recovery. Every 
other clause of that agreement has been sys- 
tematically, flagrantly, totally violated by 
the North Vietnamese. And I have never yet 
seen an international situation in which one 
government had the colossal nerve to insist 
that the one provision that still exists must 
be observed, when it has totally violated 
every other provision of the agreement. 

And, therefore, if North Viet-Nam wants 
to talk to us, we have indicated a willingness 
to talk, especially after they have fulfilled 
the requirement of the Paris accord with re- 
spect to the missing-in-action. But it is ab- 



surd to insist that the one remaining clause 
of the Paris accord should be observed, when 
all others have been flagrantly violated by 
the Vietnamese. 



TOAST BY SECRETARY KISSINGER, 
MEXICO CITY, JUNE 1 1 ' 

I want to begin by saying that it gives me 
the greatest satisfaction to be able tonight 
to reciprocate to my Mexican friends a small 
measure of the hospitality which this great 
and beautiful country has so warmly ex- 
tended to me on so many occasions in the 
past. I spent my honeymoon here; I have 
deep professional and personal ties to Mexico. 

I have never come to this land without 
sensing deeply both the glory of Mexico's 
ancient past and its dynamism today — the 
thousands of years of civilization that cul- 
minated in the panorama of splendor that so 
awed the first conquistadors and now the vi- 
brant course of modern Mexico, whose strug- 
gle for political and economic independence, 
dignity, and social justice has won for it the 
admiration of the community of nations as 
well as a growing role of leadership in inter- 
national afi'airs. 

The impact which Mexico is making on 
our interdependent world, as all of us here 
know, is attributable in large part to the 
boundless energy and broad vision of Presi- 
dent Luis Echeverria. He is an inspirational 
leader. I have had the privilege of working 
with him for nearly six years. He will be 
remembered in history for his great contri- 
butions to peace, progress, and justice. 

Tonight I want to discuss two great tasks 
which are deep and permanent concerns of 
our two nations ; both bear the personal mark 
of President Echeverria: 

— The global challenge of helping to con- 
struct a new and peaceful international order 



= Given at a dinner hosted by Secretary Kissinger 
in honor of President Luis Echeverria Alvarez (text 
froni press release 301 A). 



30 



Department of State Bulletin 



)ffering justice and prosperity to all peoples; 
ind 

—The state of the special, indeed unique, 
)ond between the United States and Mexico. 

The United States respects and values Mex- 

co's role on the world scene. We also cherish 
)ur close historical, practical, and personal 
;ies as neighbors. There is no conflict be- 

ween these realities. Indeed, they offer our 
;wo nations a precious advantage as we ap- 
jroach together the great issues of our time. 
Mexico and the United States are inde- 
pendent and self-confident nations. We are 
nature enough to encounter the trials of our 

ra without crises of identity and without al- 
owing differences permanently to divide us. 
We are serious enough to disagree without 
rancor, creative enough to cooperate without 
threatening each other's independence. In 
this, we are truly at the frontiers of West- 

rn civilization. As North American nations 
ive are irrevocably linked by geography, his- 
tory, interest, and principle. We need sign no 
iocuments to insure our kinship of thought 
and action as free and friendly peoples. We 
tiave a relationship all the more special for 
being unwritten. 

Global Challenges: Peace, Prosperity, Justice 

History has presented this generation with 
two great and unique challenges : the impera- 
tive of peace in the nuclear age and the need 
to give purpose to peace by helping to shape 

new structure of international relations 
that speaks to the positive aspirations of all 
peoples. 

Every nation has a stake in, and a respon- 
sibility for, the problem of global peace. Each 
has its special circumstances and its special 
role. 

The United States, uniquely among the 
free nations of the world, bears a heavy re- 
sponsibility to maintain the balance of sta- 
bility upon which world peace depends. This 
is why we are committed to oppose the forces 
of intimidation and oppression whenever 
they threaten the global equilibrium. But we 



July 5, 1976 



know, as Mexico knows, that peace is tenu- 
ous and progress is fragile without a curb on, 
and eventually an end to, the arms race. This 
is why we have embarked on the difficult and 
complex negotiations to limit strategic arms, 
to reduce these arms, and to ease the eco- 
nomic burden of the arms race. 

Mexico, whose voice is heard by all the 
major groupings of the world's nations, also 
bears a responsibility for peace. Mexico has 
been among the staunchest proponents of 
disarmament and the use of national re- 
sources for development rather than the ac- 
cumulation of arms. Mexico was the leader 
in negotiating the Treaty of Tlatelolco estab- 
lishing a iiuclear-weapons-free zone in Latin 
America. And Mexico has raised its voice in 
support of the dignity, security, and self- 
determination of nations threatened by ex- 
ternal intervention. 

But the ultimate purpose of nations is to 
look beyond a peace that rests exclusively on 
a precarious balance of power to a new era 
of international economic cooperation. We 
must offer our children the hope of a better 
future by mastering the great economic and 
social challenge of building a new, equitable, 
and productive relationship among all na- 
tions and particularly those of North and 
South. 

The problem of economic development is 
not merely a technical but a profoundly po- 
litical and moral issue. It is not possible to 
build a world community which is divided 
between the rich and the poor. If we are to 
live in a world of peace and justice, all na- 
tions must have the consciousness that the 
world community listens to their concerns. 

This is why we attach such importance 
to the dialogue now taking place between the 
developed and developing nations. For be- 
yond the technical solutions we may reach, 
the spirit we help engender can contribute to 
a world of peace and to a sense of commu- 
nity. This is why we are disturbed by atti- 
tudes of confrontation and concerned by 
those who seek gains through technical ma- 
jorities. It is the essence of an effective in- 



31 



ternational structure today in our interde- 
pendent world that solutions cannot be 
imposed by one group on another but that a 
consensus must be established in which all 
share. By continuing to grow in strength and 
international participation, Mexico, and in- 
deed all the nations of Latin America, can in 
important respects act as a bridge between 
the different groups that exist in the world 
today. 

The United States has accepted the chal- 
lenge of an interdependent world. We are 
committed to the cause of cooperation on an 
equal basis between all nations — whatever 
their stage of development. We have pursued 
this course at the seventh special session of 
the U.N. General Assembly, in the Confer- 
ence on International Economic Cooperation, 
at Kingston in January, at Nairobi last 
month. There have been setbacks, of course, 
but we believe a new and positive atmos- 
phere has been created, and we join with 
your President in the view that the serious 
and responsible nations of the world now 
have an unprecedented opportunity to ad- 
vance mankind's age-old dreams of a better 
life. 

The United States knows that while our 
specific approaches to these problems may 
differ, Mexico shares our aspirations for a 
better world of peace and prosperity. Mexico 
has used its growing international influence 
to focus on the great global efforts to secure 
peace and enhance the quality of human life. 
Mexico's example is proud and compelling, 
not only for the peoples of the Americas but 
for all who value peace, prosperity, and 
justice. 

Mexico's economic growth and progress 
have made it a vital force in international 
affairs. Mexico had a major influence on the 
course of the seventh U.N. special session 
and is an active participant in all interna- 
tional efforts to accelerate development 
through a fair and cooperative global eco- 
nomic system. Mexico's energetic promotion 
of the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States — which you yourself in- 
spired, Mr. President — itself symbolizes the 
need for a new awareness that interdepend- 
ence is not a slogan, but a reality. 



32 



And since the Revolution of 1910, Mexico 
has presented the international community 
with the example of a proudly independent 
nation committed to progress and social jus- 
tice. Today Mexico's voice is heard and 
heeded in the leading councils of the world. 

It is my profound conviction that Mexico 
and the United States together have a price- 
less advantage upon which to base common 
efforts in virtually every major area of 
human and international concern. Mexico's 
history, economic growth, institutional sta- 
bility, and political imagination enable it to 
bring independent new dimensions to the 
global cooperation so essential to our shared 
hopes for a less divided and more prosperous 
world. 

— The United States believes that the uni- 
versal search for an enduring structure oil 
peace for all peoples is possible only if it is 
based upon the free commitment of strong;! 
stable, and responsible nations. Mexico'gi 
growing national strength and development 
and deepening participation in global coun- 
cils strengthen the voice of this hemisphere 
and have given a special projection to thed 
nations of North America in the vital de-; 
bates of our time on such matters as disar- 
mament and global security. 

— ^The higher stage of economic progressip 
that Mexico has attained has brought it intc^ 
the company of economies which are vulner- 
able to global inflation, to sudden fluctuations 
in world patterns of supply and demand, tc 
important technological change and invest- 
ment capital shortages. At the same time, 
our economies are among the world's most 
open and flexible. We can respond to change 
quickly and effectively. We have the oppor- 
tunity and the responsibility and the will to 
shape the course of economic events rather 
than to acquiesce in the stale determinism 
that paralyzes so many nations of the world. 
In the key areas of finance, technology, in- 
vestment, and trade, the United States and 
Mexico, and with us the other nations of the 
hemisphere, have outstripped the world as a 
whole. Our habits of practical cooperation 
give us a head start. The efforts we take 
together can thus make a special and positive 

Department of State Bulletin 



:uiitribution to the course of development 
iroLind the world. 

— Beyond peace and prosperity lies a 
leeper universal aspiration for dignity and 
ustice. Our two countries are both commit- 
1(1 to the rule of law and extending the 
each of international law in world affairs. 
This is most urgently needed with regard to 
ho last great frontiers of our planet — the 
icruns. They are the common heritage of 
iiankind, but they can become arenas for 
•onflict if not governed by law. The differ- 
Mues between us on the issues involved have 
ed to tensions, but they are issues which na- 
ions everywhere will have to solve. Our two 
lations have a special advantage and thus a 
special responsibility to reach agreement on 
)ur differences in the context of a rapid and 
HR'cessful conclusion to the Law of the Sea 
(inference this year. We have agreed to 
irgent consultations on this important 
ssLie. 

And we have as well an obligation to the 
ieeper sources of our common humanity. No 
peoples have been more dedicated to the 
■ause of human dignity and liberty than 
lurs. The struggle to secure the peace or to 
,viden prosperity ultimately will have no 
neaning unless the peoples of the world can 
Husue their aspirations without fear, in so- 
•ieties which foster the fundamental rights 
){ mankind. 

At the General Assembly of the Organiza- 
ifin of American States in Santiago earlier 
his week, I reaffirmed the unequivocal com- 
Tiitment of the United States to the Ameri- 
can Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man. The United States endorsed the reports 
presented there by the Inter-American Hu- 
;man Rights Commission, whose powers we 
[proposed be broadened. We did so in the rec- 
ognition that the precious heritage of our 
Western Hemisphere is the conviction that 
tiuman beings are the subjects, not the ob- 
jects, of public policy; that citizens must not 
je the mere instruments of the state. 

The traditions of our two countries and 
3ur heritage as free American republics 
places upon us a special trust to defend and 
:arry forward the principle that progress is 



sterile unless it enhances the areas of human 
freedom. 

These are some of the great global chal- 
lenges we both face. Let me turn now to the 
bilateral process through which we shape our 
progress as friends and partners. 

U.S.-Mexico Independence and Interdependence 

The imperatives of the relationship of 
Mexico and the United States are not to be 
found in words, but in geography. Our 
shared destiny is literally written in stone. 
But the special relationship we have today 
represents as well an achievement of human 
will and responsibility. 

The work we are doing together serves not 
only to strengthen our own ties; it is a dem- 
onstration to the world that two nations can 
resolve, in a reasoned and responsible man- 
ner, problems of acute sensitivity in areas 
touching upon national sovereignty, eco- 
nomic advantage, and human concern. 

Let me briefly review the record of shared 
effort we have compiled and the work yet 
before us in each of these three areas. 

First, how many nations of the world could 
accept as natural and comfortable an unde- 
fended boundary of nearly 2,000 miles? Our 
active day-to-day cooperation along our bor- 
der is a rare phenomenon. Through the 
years, our joint International Boundary and 
Water Commission has solved major prob- 
lems of shifting boundaries, flood control, 
and water distribution. The solution of the 
Chamizal and other territorial issues, the 
resolution of the problem of Colorado River 
salinity, and the coordination of air traffic 
control along our border have all been ap- 
proached cordially, persistently, and con- 
structively. This is a record of which we can 
be proud and on which we can build as we 
take up further aspects of cooperation along 
the border, such as widened cooperation on 
search and rescue operations and pi'oblems 
affecting the environment. 

Second, we have acted and are acting with 
mutual respect and great responsibility on 
issues of substantial economic interest, such 
as the desire of Mexican workers to seek 
employment in the United States and of 
Mexican exporters to sell in our country's 



luly 5, 1976 



33 



markets. After decades of relatively satis- 
factory accommodation to the question of 
undocumented workers, we now face a num- 
ber of new issues requiring mutual study 
and heightened cooperation — and that must 
take into account the legitimate concerns 
both of the people of the United States and 
the human rights of Mexican citizens. 

We share Mexico's concern over your large 
trade deficit in 1975. The economic recovery 
in the United States and the continuation of 
the forward-looking attitude which now in- 
forms U.S. trade policy will serve, I am con- 
fident, to bring our trade accounts closer 
into balance. Even more important, the U.S. 
Trade Act's generalized system of prefer- 
ences will expand Mexico's access to our 
market. Indeed, Mexico, with over a half 
billion dollars' worth of exports eligible for 
duty-free treatment, should be the primary 
beneficiary of our new tariff system which 
gives products of developing countries com- 
petitive advantage over products of devel- 
oped nations. 

Third, both our nations have acted with 
heart and with vision on matters of deep 
human concern. We have combined our ef- 
forts with increasing success against the 
international narcotics trade, which has vic- 
timized so many citizens of both our coun- 
tries. The effort of the Mexican Government 
to stop the production and trafficking of 
dangerous drugs in Mexico can stand as a 
model for the world. We are proud to be 
able to support you in your increasingly 
effective program of narcotics control. A i-e- 
lated issue now before us concerns the need 
to prosecute narcotics violators to the full 
extent of the law while at the same time 
insuring the observance of their legal and 
human rights. We have had useful talks 
about improving the situation of nationals 
of our two nations imprisoned in the other 
country. 

And, more positively, we have strength- 
ened the cultural relations between our two 
nations. We share deep ethnic, linguistic, 
intellectual, and historical ties. Mexico's 
early recognition of the importance of pre- 
serving a nation's cultural heritage has in- 



spired similar efforts around the world and 
won the admiration of the millions who ex- 
perience firsthand, as I shall tomorrow, the 
glories of your Mayan past. The treaty on 
the protection of cultural property between 
the United States and Mexico has been in 
force since 1970 and has proven effective. 
We are proud to assist Mexico's efforts to 
defend its cultural patrimony as a sustain- 
ing value for future generations. 

As we look to the future we are witness- 
ing a growth of balanced two-way exchanges 
which range across the spectrum of intellec- 
tual and cultural life, from the arts to the 
humanities to technology. While increasing 
numbers of Mexicans are studying in the 
United States, more U.S. students are learn- 
ing at Mexican universities than in any 
other nation. Each of us is developing a 
greater appreciation of the creative experi- 
ence and achievement of the other — in 
science, music, literature, and the visual arts. 
We are prepared to move ahead even more 
vigorously to promote cultural exchange and 
cultural understanding, recognizing that 
they are powerful forces affecting the qual- 
ity and tone of the future course of our 
relationship. 

All these are issues of immediate and di- 
rect concern to our two nations. But they are 
also variations on the large themes of sover- 
eignty, economic interest, and human con- 
cern that affect nations everywhere. Our 
struggles and our successes in dealing effec- 
tively and creatively with our own inter- 
dependence are relevant to the rest of the 
increasingly interdependent world in which 
we live. 

In a period when mankind faces inter- 
national pi'oblems which are not only com- 
plex but fraught with ultimate risks, it is 
unrealistic as well as unwise to expect easy 
solutions. What we can and must seek to 
bring about is an atmosphere — in bilateral, 
regional, and global relations — in which 
problems are addressed positively and con- 
structively, in which divergent views are 
expressed openly and freely without wound- 
ing and sterile rhetoric, and in which the 
objective is an effort to solve problems prag- 



34 



Department of State BulletinI 



matically, not aggravate them ideologically. 

Our long record of experience together 
makes clear that cooperative effort serves 
us both much better than recrimination or 
unilateral action. Although our differences 
over the years of our respective independence 
as nations have at times been enormous, in 
this last half century we have done as much 
to achieve a positive atmosphere of coopera- 
tion as any two nations in the world. The 
United States and Mexico are engaged today 
by preference as well as necessity. 

In the future as in the past our suc- 
cess will be founded upon a fundamental 
continuity of purpose, of effort, of policy. 
That continuity is reflected today by your 
forward-looking "Plan Basico" and in the 
United States by the permanent interests of 
our foreign policy in maintaining global peace 
while building for a new era of economic 
cooperation and human justice. With this 
continuity and in this spirit we can continue 
to provide an example to the world of the 
way neighbors ought to conduct themselves, 
not only geographic neighbors such as we 
but all nations — for on this shrinking planet 
all peoples are neighbors. 

Mr. President, friends: A short distance 
from my office in the Department of State in 
Washington is a statue of Benito Juarez on 
which are engraved his words, "Respect for 
the rights of others is peace." 

But Benito Juarez also knew that the 

J mere absence of war is not enough. The rela- 
:tions of states today must have an economic 
and a moral dimension as well. In the hearts 
of men and women, peace means an abiding 
sense of security and freedom from external 
intimidation; it also means the hope of 
widening economic opportunity; and it means 
conditions which foster the growth of social 
justice for all. These are values and causes 
which Mexicans and Americans hold in com- 
mon and hold dear and which you, Mr. Presi- 
dent, have done so much to promote. 

I ask you to join me tonight in a toast to 
these values we share; to the distinguished 
President of Mexico, our good friend, Luis 
Echeverria ; to the United Mexican States ; 
and to the permanent and productive friend- 



ship of the people of Mexico and the United 
States. 

Viva Mexico. 



U.S.-MEXICO JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED 
AT MEXICO CITY, JUNE 1 1 

Press release 303 datetl June 11 

The President of the United Mexican States, 
Luis Echeverria, and the Secretary of State of the 
United States, Henry A. Kissinger, met today to 
discuss a broad range of issues. The spirit of the 
talks was warm and friendly. Both agreed that 
relations between Mexico and the United States are 
being carried out in a climate of mutual respect 
and good neighborship and they emphasized the need 
to maintain these relations at the highest level, as 
befits two nations which share the same human 
and political values, and, especially, the same faith 
in independence and democracy. 

The President and the Secretary discussed world 
issues which require the most urgent effort in inter- 
national cooperation on the part of all nations. They 
were in agreement that the gap between the rich 
and poor countries is a danger to peace, as ominous 
as an unbridled arms race. On this subject, they said 
that it is essential to take steps to accelerate eco- 
nomic development based upon justice and equity. 

The Secretary explained to the President several 
initiatives which he had put forth at the UNCTAD 
IV meeting in Nairobi and at the recent General 
Assembly of the Organization of American States, 
to further the economic development of the develop- 
ing countries. 

President Echeverria offered the Secretary his 
ideas on the scope of the Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties of States, which, for Third World coun- 
tries, constitutes the basis for a new international 
economic order, and one of the essential elements for 
world peace. 

The Secretary of State recalled that the United 
States had given its support, from the very begin- 
ning, to the Charter's concept, in spite of the fact 
that it has not been able to give it its complete 
approval, due to the fact that some of its provisions 
are not compatible with basic principles of his 
country's foreign policy. 

The President and the Secretary also touched upon 
other important matters in the field of bilateral re- 
lations between both countries, including the follow- 
ing: 

(1) The illicit traffic in drugs between the two 
countries. The Secretary expressed his warm ap- 
preciation for the efforts and cooperation of Mexico 
in the battle to eradicate this activity. They ex- 
amined, with concern, not only the demand for 
drugs in parts of the United States, but also the 



July 5, 1976 



35 



financing of production, which is provided from 
various major urban centers in the United States. 

(2) The question of American prisoners detained 
in Mexican jails — the majority of whom have been 
apprehended in the course of the permanent 
campaign which Mexico is carrying out against 
illegal drug traffic. Mexico has proposed several 
possible remedies to this problem, which take into 
account the plight of the considerable number of 
Mexicans detained in United States jails. The Sec- 
retary assured the President that the United States 
would study these proposals with care, and offered 
that representatives of the United States would 
meet soon with the appropriate Mexican authorities 
for further consideration of the Mexican initiatives. 

(3) Trade relations between Mexico and the 
United States. The Secretary agreed that the United 
States would give early consideration to several 
suggestions by Mexico to improve the trade balance 
between the two countries, which is adverse to 
Mexico. 

At the end of the talks, the President requested 
the Secretary to transmit to the President and the 
people of the United States, his warm congratula- 
tions on the occasion of the two hundredth anni- 
versary of the Declaration of Independence, and ex- 
pressed his best wishes for the continued progress 
and well-being of the people of the United States, 
on the basis of the same historic ideas which in- 
spired the Founding Fathers two hundred years ago 
in their struggle for independence, democracy and 
liberty for all peoples. 

The Secretary transmitted to the President the 
admiration of the American people for Mexico's own 
proud record in its commitment for social justice, 
progress and the rule of law. 

Finally, the Secretary expressed his personal ap- 
preciation for the spirit of hospitality shown him 
by the Government of Mexico and its people. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

94th Congress, 1st and 2d Sessions 

Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and 
China— 1975. Hearings before the Subcommittee 
on Priorities and Economy in Government of the 
Joint Economic Committee. Executive sessions. 
June 18-July 21, 1975. Part 1. 177 pp. 

Americans Missing in Southeast Asia. Hearings 
before the House Select Committee on Missing 
Persons in Southeast Asia. Part 1; September 23- 
October 23, 1975; 125 pp. Part 2; November 5- 
December 17, 1975; 312 pp. 

United States-Soviet Union-China: The Great Power 
Triangle. Hearings before the Subconunittee on 
Future Foreign Policy Research and Development 



of the House Committee on International Relations. J| 
Part I. October 21, 1975-March 10, 1976. 149 pp. 

Military Sales to Saudi Arabia — 1975. Hearings , )| 
before the Subcommittee on International Political 
and Military Affairs of the House Committee on 
International Relations. November 4-December 17, 
1975. 42 pp. 

International Security Assistance Act of 1976. Hear- 
ings before the House Committee on International 
Relations on H.R. 11963; November 6, 1975-Feb- 
ruary 19, 1976; 973 pp. Report of the committee, 
together with supplemental, additional, and dis- | 
senting views; H. Rept. 94-848; February 24, 
1976; 113 pp. 

United States-China Relations: The Process of Nor- 
malization of Relations. Hearings before the Spe- 
cial Subcommittee on Investigations of the House 
Committee on International Relations. November 18, 
1975-February 2, 1976. 230 pp. 



94th Congress, 2d Session 

Foreign Investment and American Jobs. Hearings 
before the Subcommittee on International Economic 
Policy of the House Committee on International 
Relations. Part I. January 27-February 4, 1976. 
91 pp. 

Oversight Hearings on U.S. Foreign Trade Policy. 
Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance, 
January 29-February 4, 1976. 513 pp. 

State Department Authorization for Fiscal Year 
1977. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter- 
national Operations of the House Committee on 
International Relations. February 9-24, 1976. 155 
pp. 

Managing International Disasters: Guatemala. Hear- 
ings and markup before the Subcommittee on Inter- 
national Resources, Food, and Energy of the House 
Committee on International Relations on H.R. 
12046, to provide for relief and rehabilitation assist- 
ance to the victims of the earthquakes in Guate- 
mala, and for other purposes; February 18-March 
4, 1976; 97 pp. Report of the committee to accom- 
pany H.R. 12046; H. Rept. 94-891; March 11, 1976; 
6 pp. 

Waiver of Countervailing Duties on Swiss Emmen- 
thaler and Gruyere Cheese. Communication from 
the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Enforce- 
ment, Operations, and Tariff Affairs). H. Doc, 94- 
379. February 23, 1976, 8 pp. 

A New Panama Canal Treaty: A Latin America 
Imperative. Report of a study mission to Panama 
November 21-23, 1975, submitted to the House 
Committee on International Relations. February 
24, 1976. 60 pp. 
U.S. Information Agency Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Year 1976, Report of the House Committee on 
International Relations to accompany H.R. 11598. 
H. Rept. 94-849. February 25, 1976. 5 pp. 
To Amend Further the Peace Corps Act. Hearing 
before the House Committee on International Re- 
lations; February 26, 1976; 52 pp. Report of the 
committee to accompany H.R. 12226; H. Rept. 94- 
874; March 4, 1976; 8 pp. 



36 



Department of State Bulletin 



Ambassador Scranton Comments 
on World Health Assembly Action 

Following is a statement by William W. 
Scranton, U.S. Representative to the United 
Nati07is, issued on May 21. 

JSUN press release u8 dated May :;i 

From time to time U.N. agencies make de- 
jisions which are of critical importance to 
:he entire U.N. system. The recent decisions 
oy the World Health Assembly in Geneva 
show how the politicization of U.N. agencies 
lot only denigrates the agencies but is po- 
;entially ruinous to the United Nations as 
i whole. 

The World Health Assembly refused to 
consider the report of three eminent physi- 
nans on the situation in the occupied terri- 
;ories as it related to the health care of the 
nhabitants. Israel permitted an investiga- 
ion by the individual physicians, but not as 
i committee. The WHA now has gone on to 
lemand that the committee as a whole visit 
;he occupied territories — in other words, the 
;ame men should go back and see the same 
:hings, but this time as a ti'io. Perhaps the 
node by which Israel chose to cooperate 
vith the WHA was less than perfect. The 
<ey point is that Israel chose to cooperate. 
[t met the WHA more than halfway. 

How did the WHA respond to this effort 
it cooperation? 

It responded by placing shortrun, irrele- 
vant considerations ahead of health con- 
;erns. It refused to consider the report of 
he physicians it itself had designated. It 
idopted instead a highly political resolution 
vhich deals mostly with Israeh behavior in 
natters unrelated to health in occupied ter- 
ritories. The United Nations has appropriate 
bodies, such as the Security Council, for the 
landling of political issues, and the situa- 
ion in the West Bank area is under active 
onsideration in the Security Council at this 
ime. 

The absence of balance, the lack of per- 
.pective, and the introduction by the WHA 
>f political issues irrelevant to the responsi- 
)ilities of the WHA do no credit to the 



United Nations. Indeed, this is precisely the 
:;ort of politicized action which decreases re- 
spect for the U.N. system. 

How long will there be any respect what- 
soever for the United Nations if such politi- 
cization becomes pervasive in areas where it 
clearly does not belong, particularly in the 
health matters, one of humanity's greatest 
concerns? A person's, a people's, a nation's 
health is more important than all the extra- 
neous politicizing in the world. 

Clearly the WHA action is a gross politi- 
cal interference in matters of health care. 
This misuse of U.N. agencies must stop if 
the U.N. system is not to be dangerously 
eroded. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



U.S. and U.K. Reach Understanding 
on Acceptance of Air Charters 

Department Announcement ' 

The United States and the United King- 
dom concluded on April 28 a memorandum 
of understanding on passenger charter air 
services, under which each government will, 
with some exceptions, accept as charter- 
worthy transatlantic charter traffic originat- 
ing in the territory of the other and orga- 
nized and operated in accordance with the 
other's charterworthiness criteria. 

The understanding was brought into force 
by an exchange of diplomatic notes in Lon- 
don. The understanding is not an exchange 
of economic rights, but it is expected to pro- 
vide stability in the U.S.-U.K. charter 
market and to facilitate the operation of 
charter flights, including the recently 
authorized one-stop inclusive tour charter, 
between both countries by the air carriers 
of both countries during 1976. 



'Issued on May 12 (text from press release 245, 
which includes the text of the memorandum of under- 
standing). 



uly 5, 1976 



37 



U.S. and Egypt Sign Agreement 
on Claims of U.S. Nationals 

Press release 219 dated May 3 

The Governments of the United States of 
America and of the Arab RepubHc of Egypt 
have, on May 1, signed an agreement ad ref- 
erendum providing for the payment of a 
himp sum of $10 million in compensation of 
private claims of nationals of the United 
States. The agreement is subject to the 
further approval of the two governments 
and will enter into force upon an exchange 
of notes stating each government's final ap- 
proval of the agreement. 

Covered by this agreement is the claim of 
the American Mission in Egypt (United 
Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.), which 
is being settled to its complete satisfaction. 

This agreement marks another step in the 
continually improving relations between the 
two countries and will contribute to mutually 
beneficial economic relations. It should in 
particular assist in creating an atmosphere 
of confidence to attract American invest- 
ment and technology in Egypt. 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 



Agriculture 

International plant protection convention. Done at 
Rome December 6, 1951. Entered into force April 
3, 1952; for the United States August 18, 1972. 
TIAS 7465. 
Ratification deposited: Cuba, April 14. 1976." 

Coffee 

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. 
Done at London December 3, 1975." 
Sig7iatnres : Cameroon, Haiti. June 3, 1976; El 

Salvador, June 4, 1976; Tanzania, Trinidad and 

Tobago, June 9, 1976. 

Economic Cooperation 

Agreement establishing a financial support fund of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. Done at Paris April 9, 1975.^^ 



Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, June 8, 1976.^ 

Energy 

Memorandum of understanding concerning coopera- 
tive information exchange relating to the develop- 
ment of solar heating and cooling systems in 
buildings. Formulated at Odeillo, France, October 
1-4, 1974. Entered into force July 1, 1975. TIAS 
8202. 
Signature: Jamaica, May 19, 1976. 

Postal 

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union, with 
final protocol. Done at Vienna July 10, 1964. 
Entered into force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5881. 
Ratifications deposited: Colombia, May 11, 1976; 

Liberia, September 16, 1975. 
Accession deposited: Papua New Guinea, May 4, 

1976. 
Additional protocol to the constitution of the Uni- 
versal Postal Union with final protocol signed at 
Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881). Signed at 
Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force Julyi 
1, 1971, except for article V, which entered into, 
force January 1, 1971. TIAS 7150. 
Accession deposited: Papua New Guinea, May 4, 

1976. 
Second additional protocol to the constitution of the 
Universal Postal Union of July 10, 1964 (TIAS 
5881, 7150), general regulations with final protocol 
and annex, and the universal postal convention 
with final protocol and detailed regulations. Done 
at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force Jan- 
uary 1, 1976. 
Accessio7i deposited: Papua New Guinea (wit! 

reservations). May 4, 1976. 
Ratifications deposited: Jordan, May 10. 1976 

Swaziland, May 7, 1976. 

Space 

Convention on international liability for damagi 
caused by space objects. Done at Washington 
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entere( 
into force September 1, 1972; for the Unite( 
States October 9, 1973. TIAS 7762. 
Accession deposited: Sweden, June 15, 1976.' 

Convention on registration of objects launched intc 
outer space. Opened for signature at New Yorl 
January 14, 1975." 
Signature : Sweden. June 9. 1976. 
Ratification deposited: Sweden. June 9, 1976. 

Tin 

Fifth international tin agreement, with annexes 
Done at Geneva June 21, 1975.° 
Ratification deposited: Hungary, June 8. 1976. 



' With reservation and declaration. 

" Not in force. 

" Applicable to Land Berlin. 

' With declaration. 



38 



Department of State Bulleti 



Jl' 



rade 

.rrangement regarding international trade in tex- 
tiles, with annexes. Done at Geneva December 20, 
1973. Entered into force January 1, 1974, except 
for article 2, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, which 
entered into force April 1, 1974. TIAS 7840. 
Acceptances deposited: Paraguay (ad referen- 
dum), May 17, 1976; Uruguay, May 11, 1976. 
Ratification deposited: Guatemala, May 19, 1976. 

Inhaling 

iternational whaling convention and schedule of 
whaling regulations. Done at Washington Decem- 

' ber 2, 1946. Entered into force November 10, 1948. 
TIAS 1849. 

Notification of adherence: New Zealand, June 15. 
1976. 

rotocol to the international whaling convention of 
December 2, 1946 (TIAS 1849). Done at Washing- 
ton November 19, 1956. Entered into force May 
4, 1959. TIAS 4228. 

Notification of adherence: New Zealand, June 15, 
1976. 

/heat 

rotocol modifying and further extending the wheat 
trade convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washing- 
ton March 25, 1975. Entered into force June 19, 
1975, with respect to certain provisions and July 
1, 1975, with respect to other provisions. TIAS 
8227. 

Ratification deposited: Austria. June 15, 1976. 
rotocol modifying and further extending the wheat 
trade convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 8227). Done at 
Washington March 17, 1976. Entered into force 
June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions, 
and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions. 
Ratifications deposited: Australia, June 11, 1976; 
Canada, Republic of Korea, June 16, 1976; Pak- 
istan, June 17, 1976; Ecuador, June 18, 1976. 
.Accession deposited: Denmark, June 17, 1976." 
Declarations of provisional application deposited: 
Finland, June 11, 1976; Switzerland, June 15, 
1976; Greece, Kenya, June 16, 1976; Belgium,'' 
European Economic Community,'^ France," Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany," Ireland,^ Italy," Lux- 
embourg," Netherlands,"" Tunisia, United King- 
dom,"' United States,* June 17, 1976; Egypt, 
Japan," Norway, June 18, 1976. 
rotocol modifying and further extending the food 
aid convention (part of the international wheat 
'agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 8227). Done at 
Washington March 17, 1976. Entered into force 
June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions, 
and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions. 
Ratifications deposited: Australia, June 11, 1976; 

Canada, June 16, 1976. 
Declarations of provisional application deposited: 
Finland, June 11, 1976; Switzerland, June 15, 
1976; Belgium, European Economic Community, 



ily 5, 1976 



France, Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands," United King- 
dom, United States,' June 17, 1976; Japan," 
June 18, 1976. 
Accession deposited: Denmark, June 17, 1976. 



BILATERAL 

Bangladesh 

Loan agreement relating to installation of a 50- 
megawatt hydrogenerating unit at Karnaphuli 
Power Station, Kaptai, with annex. Signed at 
Dacca May 28, 1976. Entered into force May 28, 
1976. 

Project agreement relating to support for the Pop- 
ulation Control Program of Bangladesh, with an- 
nexes. Signed at Dacca May 31, 1976. Entered 
into force May 31, 1976. 

Belgium 

Procedures for mutual assistance in the administra- 
tion of justice in connection with the Lockheed 
Aircraft Corporation matter. Signed at Washing- 
ton May 21, 1976. Entered into force May 21, 1976. 

Canada 

Agreement relating to the construction, operation, 
and maintenance of a Loran-C station in the vicin- 
ity of Williams Lake, British Columbia, with an- 
nex. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa May 
28 and June 3, 1976. Entered into force June 3, 
1976. 

Greece 

Procedures for mutual assistance in the administra- 
tion of justice in connection with the Lockheed 
Aircraft Corporation matter. Signed at Washing- 
ton May 20, 1976. Entered into force May 20, 1976. 

Indonesia 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of April 19, 1976. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Jakarta May 26 
and 28, 1976. Entered into force May 28, 1976. 

Ireland 

Agreement relating to air passenger charter services. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Dublin May 11 
and 28, 1976. Entered into force May 28, 1976. 



' With declaration. 

" With statement. 

° For the Kingdom in Europe. 

■ Applicable to Dominica, Saint Christopher, Nevis 
and Anguilla, Saint Vincent, Belize, Bermuda, British 
Virgin Islands, Hong Kong, Montserrat, Saint Helena 
and Dependencies, Seychelles, and Tuvalu. 



39 



Panama 

Agreement amending the loan agreement of May C, 
1969, as amended, relating to the Panama City 
water supply system. Signed at Panama June 2, 
1976. Entered into force June 2, 1976. 

Syria 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of April 20, 1976. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Damascus June 2 
and 3, 1976. Entered into force June 3, 1976. 

Tanzania 

Agreement relating to the transfer of food grain to 
Tanzania to assist in alleviating the shortage 
caused by prolonged drought. Signed at Dar es 
Salaam April 13, 1976. Entered into force April 
13, 1976. 

Tunisia 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. 
Signed at Tunis June 7, 1976. Entered into force 
June 7, 1976. 



PUBLICATIONS 



Department Releases General Index 
for 1776-1949 Treaty Compilation 

Press release 167 dated April 9 

The Department of State released on April 9 the 
"General Index" to its series "Treaties and Other 
International Agreements of the United States of 
America 1776-1949," compiled under the direction of 
Charles I. Bevans, formerly Assistant Legal Adviser 
for Treaty Affairs. 

The 119-page index is volume 13 of the series. The 
first four volumes in the Bevans series, released in 
1969 and 1970, contain the texts of multilateral 
treaties and other international agreements entered 
into by the United States from 1776 to 1950. Volumes 
5 through 12, released 1971 to 1974, contain bilateral 
agreements for that period, grouped alphabetically 
by country. Agreements concluded since 1949 are not 
included, because they are available in the annual 
statutory volumes "United States Treaties and Other 
International Agreements." 

Copies of volumes 1 through 13 of the Bevans 
series are for sale by the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing- 
ton, D.C. 20402. Price (domestic postpaid): vol. 1, 
$8.50; vol. 2, $10.25; vol. 3, $11.75; vol. 4, $8.25; vol. 



40 



5, $9.75; vol. 6, $11.00; vol. 7, $11.00; vol. 8, $11.00; 
vol. 9, $11.00; vol. 10, $11.00; vol. 11, $14.35; vol. 12, 
$15.15; vol. 13, $4.60. Volume 13 is Department of 
State publication 8830 (Stock No. 044-0000-1326-6). 



GPO Sales Publications 

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock 
number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20J,02. 
A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or 
more copies of any one publication mailed to the 
same address. Remittances, payable to the Superin- 
tendent of Documents, must accompany orders. 
Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, 
are subject to change. 

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains' 
a map, a list of principal government officials and iji 
U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading 
list. (A complete set of all Background Notes cur- I 
rently in stock — at least 140 — $21.80; 1-year sub- 
scription service for approximately 77 updated or 
new Notes— $23.10; plastic binder— $1.50.) Single 
copies of those listed below are available at 35(f each. 



Bahamas 
Netherlands 
Norway . . 
Upper Volta 
Zambia . . 



World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer 
1965-1974. This report, the eighth in a series, pro 
vides worldwide statistical information on nationa 
military spending and armed forces, Internationa 
transfers of arms, and other comparative data. Pub 
84. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
76 pp. $1.80. (Stock No. 002-000-00054-7). 

Fisheries. Agreement with the Union of Soviet So ' 
cialist Republics extending the agreements of Febru 
ary 21, 1973, as extended. TIAS 8150. 5 pp. 50^ 
(Cat. No. 89.10:8150). 

Frequency Modulation Broadcasting. Agreement witl 
Mexico amending the agreement of November 9 
1972. TIAS 8152. 5 pp. 50(f. (Cat. No. 39.10:8152). |< 

Air Transport Services. Agreement with Malaysii 
amending the agreement of February 2. 1970. TIAf 
8157. .'> pp. 35«». (Cat. No. S9.10:8157). 

Trade Relations. Agreement with the Socialist Re 
public of Romania. TIAS 8159. 43 pp. 75*. (Cat. No 
89.10:8159). 



Cat. 


No. 


S1.123:B14 


Pub. 


8329 


4 pp 


Cat. 


No. 


81.123:N3f 


Pub. 


7960 


7 pp 


Cat. 


No. 


S1.123:N8; 


Pub. 


8228 


4 pp 


Cat. 


No. S1.123:UP6\ 


Pub. 


8201 


4 pp 


Cat. 


No. 


S1.123:Z 


Pub. 


7841 


6 pp 



Department of State Builetii 



INDEX Jvly 5, 1976 Vol. LXXV, No. 1932 



Aviation. U.S. and U.K. Reach Understanding 
on Acceptance of Air Charters 37 

Bolivia 

Letters of Credence (Crespo) 13 

Secretary Kissinger Visits Four Latin Amer- 
ican Countries (remarks, toasts, news con- 
ferences, and U.S.-Bolivia and U.S.-Mexico 
joint communiques) 14 

Jhile. Secretary Kissinger Visits Four Latin 
American Countries (remarks, toasts, news 
conferences, and U.S.-Bolivia and U.S.-Mex- 
ico joint communiques) 14 

I'laims. U.S. and Egypt Sign Agreement on 
Claims of U.S. Nationals 38 

'ommodities. Secretary Kissinger Attends 
OAS General Assembly at Santiago (Kis- 
singer, U.S.-Panama report) 1 

ongress. Congressional Docimients Relating 
to Foreign Policy 36 

1 ;uba. Secretary Kissinger Visits Four Latin 
\ American Countries (remarks, toasts, news 
conferences, and U.S.-Bolivia and U.S.-Mex- 
ico joint communique) 14 

Czechoslovakia. Letters of Credence (Johanes) 13 

)eveloping Countries. Secretary Kissinger 
Attends OAS General Assembly at Santiago 
(Kissinger, U.S.-Panama report) .... 1 

)ominican Republic. Secretary Kissinger Visits 
Four Latin American Countries (remarks, 
toasts, news conferences, and U.S.-Bolivia 
and U.S.-Mexico joint communiques) ... 14 

kxtnomic Affairs. Secretary Kissinger Attends 
OAS General Assembly at Santiago (Kissin- 
ger, U.S.-Panama report) 1 

!gypt. U.S. and Egypt Sign Agreement on 
Claims of U.S. Nationals 38 

(uman Rights. Secretary Kissinger Attends 
OAS General Assembly at Santiago (Kissin- 
ger, U.S.-Panama report) 1 

srael. Ambassador Scranton Comments on 
World Health Assembly Action (statement). 37 

.atin America 

ecretary Kissinger Attends OAS General As- 
sembly at Santiago (Kissinger, U.S.-Panama 
report) 1 

ecretary Kissinger Visits Four Latin Amer- 
ican Countries (remarks, toasts, news con- 
ferences, and U.S.-Bolivia and U.S.-Mexico 
joint communiques) 14 

ebanon. Secretary Kissinger Visits Four 
Latin American Countries (remarks, toasts, 
news conferences, and U.S.-Bolivia and U.S.- 
Mexico joint communiques) 14 

lexico. Secretary Kissinger Visits Four Latin 
American Countries (remarks, toasts, news 
conferences, and U.S.-Bolivia and U.S.- 
Mexico joint communiques) 14 

rganization of American States 
ecretary Kissinger Attends OAS General 
Assembly at Santiago (Kissinger, U.S.- 
Panama report) 1 



Secretary Kissinger Visits Four Latin Ameri- 
can Countries (remarks, toasts, news con- 
ferences, and U.S.-Bolivia and U.S.-Mexico 
joint communique) 14 

Panama. Secretary Kissinger Attends OAS 
General Assembly at Santiago (Kissinger, 
U.S.-Panama report) 1 

Publications 

Department Releases General Index for 1776- 

1949 Treaty Compilation 40 

GPO Sales Publications 40 

Trade. Secretary Kissinger Attends OAS Gen- 
eral Assembly at Santiago (Kissinger, U.S.- 
Panama report) 1 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 38 

U.S. and Egypt Sign Agreement on Claims 

of U.S. Nationals 38 

U.S. and U.K. Reach Understanding on Ac- 
ceptance of Air Charters 37 

United Kingdom. U.S. and U.K. Reach Under- 
standing on Acceptance of Air Charters . . 37 

United Nations. Ambassador Scranton Com- 
ments on World Health Assembly Action 
(statement) 37 

Yemen, Letters of Credence (Mutawakkil) . . 13 

Name Index 

Crespo Gutierrez, Alberto 13 

Johanes, Jaromir 13 

Kissinger, Secretary 1, 14 

Mutawakkil, Yahya M. al- 13 

Scranton, William W 37 



Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: June 14—20 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 2O520. 

No. Date Sabjee* 

t305 6/16 Kissinger: statement on murder 
of Ambassador to Lebanon 
Francis E. Meloy, Jr., Robert O. 
Waring, and Zohair Moghrabi. 

t306 6/17 Kissinger: House Committee on 
International Relations. 

*307 6/17 Robert V. Keeley sworn in as 
Ambassador to Mauritius (bio- 
graphic data). 

*308 6/18 John H. Reed sworn in as Am- 
bassador to Sri Lanka (bio- 

*309 6/18 William D. Rogers sworn in as 
Under Secretary for Economic 
Affairs (biographic data). 

t310 6/19 Kissinger: remarks at services for 
Ambassador Meloy and Robert 
O. Waring, Andrews AFB. 

t312 6/20 Kissinger: arrival, Paris. 

t312A 6/20 Kissinger: departure, Andrews 
AFB. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



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^ 



/■3: 





THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXXV 



No. 1933 



July 12, 1976 



SECRETARY KISSINGER REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON HIS VISITS 
TO LATIN AMERICA, WESTERN EUROPE, AND AFRICA Ul 

DEPARTMENT DISCUSSES ALLEGATIONS OF COMMUNIST INFLUENCE 
IN CERTAIN WESTERN HEMISPHERE COUNTRIES 

Statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary Luers 49 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 

i„.^L-j;'. .''■•■■■'■■- '■ 
For index see inside back cover 



Superintendent ct Dueuaicrii.t 

AUG 1 1 I9fm 

DtPOSlTOKY 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETlf 

II 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documente 

U.S. Government Printine OfRce 

Washington. D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 

domestic $42.50, foreign $53.15 

Single copy 85 cents 

The Secretary of State has determined that 
the publication of this periodical is necessary 
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funds for printing this periodical has been 
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agement and Budget through .January 31. 1981. 
Note: Contents of this publication are not 
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STATE BULLETIN as the source -will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



Vol. LXXV, No. 1933 
July 12, 1976 



II 



The Department of State BVLLETU 
a weekly publication issued by th 
Office of Media Services, Bureau t 
Public Affairs, provides tfie public on 
interested agencies of tlie governmei 
with information on developments i 
the field of U.S. foreign relations an 
on the work of the Department m 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selecU 
press releases on foreign policy, istu 
by tlie White House and the JDe, " 
ment, and statements, addri 
and news conferences of the Presi 
and the Secretary of State and oth 
officers of the Department, as well 
special articles on various phase 
international affairs and the func 
of the Department. Informatiol 
included concerning treaties and 
national agreements to which 
United States is or may become 
party and on treaties of general il| 
national interest. 
Publications of the Departmem 
State, United Nations documents, m 
legislative material in the field 
international relations are also 



1 



Secretary Kissinger Reports to Congress on His Visits 
to Latin America, Western Europe, and Africa 

Statement by Secretary Kissinger ' 



I am happy to be able to report to this 
Kimmittee on our foreign policy with regard 
to three important areas which I have 
i('i ontly visited — Latin America, Western 
Etiiope, and Africa. 

I believe that our relations with Latin 
America and with Western Europe are 
stronger and more promising than they have 
Ijci'n in a decade. In Africa we have re- 
sponded to a dangerously deteriorating situa- 
lion with a policy that offers hope for south- 
ern Africa to undergo peaceful change with 
justice without submitting to external inter- 
/I'lition and opportunities for progress in the 
Hst of Africa without following radical 
luctrines. 



.atin America 

Let me take up with you our policy toward 
each of these areas. 

In March, I reported to you on the vast 
■hauges evident to me during my trip to 
Latin America in February. These changes 
ire opening the way to a new constructive 
elationship between the United States and 
.atin America. The quality of that relation- 
ship was evident at the meeting of the OAS 
ieneral Assembly in Santiago, from which 

have just returned. The atmosphere — of 
nutual respect and perceived common in- 



Submitted to the House Committee on Interiia- 
ional Relations on June 17 (text from press release 
106). The complete transcript will be published by 
[he committee and will be available from the Super- 
itendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
>fflce, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



terest— was better at the 1976 OAS General 
Assembly than at any other inter-American 
meeting I have ever attended. 

Ours is a special relationship in this hemi- 
sphere. The unique experience we share in 
the Americas — the finding and opening of 
new continents, the forging of nations free 
from colonial domination, the shared human 
and moral principles of the New World — 
creates special ties for the United States and 
Latin America. 

As in all families, there are periods of 
creativity and times of stress. Ours is no 
exception. The United States has passed 
through a variety of phases in its relation- 
ship to Latin America. Not all have been pro- 
ductive in recent years. Sometimes, when we 
were active, when we attempted to organize 
massive transfers of resources to meet Latin 
American development needs directly, we 
were seen as attempting to dominate the 
hemisphere. When our policies were other- 
wise — when we were less involved in Latin 
American problems and more inclined to let 
Latin American nations work out their own 
solutions alone — we were looked upon as 
neglecting our obligations. 

The 1930's, the 1940's, and even the 1950's 
were decades in which this nation indulged 
in the pretense of tutelage. Li the 1960's 
the Alliance for Progress rallied the energies 
and enthusiasms of people throughout the 
Americas to the development effort. But by 
1969 its promises had begun to fade. 

Thus, even as Latin America began to 
realize its own maturity and experience a 



JHly 12, 1976 



41 



period of massive economic growth — and 
with it greater self-respect — the United 
States moved into a period of lower profile, 
which we maintained until the inauguration 
of the new dialogue in 1974. That period 
drew to a close with the meeting at Tlatelolco, 
in Mexico [February 18-23, 1974], in which 
we began a process of dialogue with the 
hemisphere once again. 

At the outset, admittedly, the dialogue had 
a character of inquiring into what the United 
States could do for Latin America. But it 
became obvious that, as a result of the major 
changes and considerable progress in Latin 
America during the 1960's and early 1970's, 
we were now able to deal with the major 
nations of Latin America with a new mutu- 
ality of respect and equality of sovereignty 
quite impossible 20 years ago or even 10. 

In the last two years, we have built 
steadily on this new relationship. We have 
taken advantage of it to put forward new 
initiatives in the political and the economic 
areas which we could not have considered a 
decade or more ago. The culmination of this 
new policy effort was the meeting at Santi- 
ago last week. 

The constructive attitude in Santiago and 
the remarkably good tone to our relation- 
ships throughout the hemisphere are attrib- 
utable in great part to three factors: 

— The United States, since the inaugura- 
tion of the new dialogue early in 1974, is 
again active as an equal partner in inter- 
American councils; 

— We have a coherent policy that address- 
es the entire catalogue of hemispheric 
issues; and 

— We have a vision of the future of our 
relationship. 

It is that, I believe, which has reassured 
Latin America that the political relation- 
ship with the United States — the basic 
solidarity of the Western Hemisphere — is 
again increasingly vital. 

With our political and moral relationship 
once again sound, we have a basis for co- 
opei-ation with Latin America in the area 



of most pressing concern, that of economic 
development. 

The countries of Latin America are among 
the most developed of the developing nations 
and have been growing rapidly. Latin Amer- I 
ica has quintupled its collective gross prod- 
uct since 1950. At this rate, in 10 years 
Latin America will have attained the eco- 
nomic strength which Europe had in 1960. 
Its economies, furthermore, are increasingly 
important in world commodity, mineral, and 
energy markets and in trade in manufac- 
tured goods. Success in the struggle for de- 
velopment of the poorer countries of the 
world, when it comes, will come first in Latin 
America. For this reason, we must focus 
our attention and our energies there. 

To address the changing nature of our 
relationship with Latin America and to deal 
with the expanding range of our common 
concerns, I set forth in Latin America last 
February six elements of our policy. I said 
the United States would: 

— Take special cognizance of the distinctive 
requirements of the more industrialized 
economies of Latin America, and of the re- 
gion as a whole, in the context of our efforts 
to help shape a more equitable international 
order ; 

— Assist directly the neediest nations in 
the hemisphere afflicted by poverty and 
natural disaster; 

— Support Latin American regional and 
subregional efforts to organize for coopera- 
tion and integration; 

— Negotiate on the basis of parity and 
dignity our specific differences with each and 
every state, to solve problems before they 
become conflicts ; 

— Enforce our commitment to collective 
security and to maintain regional integrity 
against attempts to undermine solidarity, 
threaten independence, or export violence; 
and 

— Work to modernize the inter-American 
system to respond to the needs of our times 
and give direction to our common action. 

Since February, in furtherance of these! 
objectives, the United States has introduced 



42 



Department of State Bulletinii 



trade, investment, and technology proposals 
lOf special relevance to this hemisphere at 
CIEC [Conference on International Eco- 
nomic Cooperation] in Paris and at UNCTAD 
IV [fourth ministerial meeting of the U.N. 
Conference on Trade and Development] in 
(Nairobi. We responded to the efforts of the 
Guatemalan people to recover from the 
earthquake that devastated their land. We 
have provided fresh support to subregional 
cooperation in Central America and are ex- 
ploring ways of relating more effectively to 
the Andean Pact. And at last week's Gen- 
eral Assembly of the Organization of 
American States at Santiago, we advanced 
3ur common interests in three important 
;ireas: cooperation for development, reform 
jf the inter-American system, and human 
rights. 

To speed cooperation for development in the 
Americas, we stressed three major topics for 
action: commodities, trade, and technology. 

The economic aspirations of most coun- 
:ries in Latin America depend upon stable 
conditions for the production and marketing 
)f primary commodities. At Santiago we 
proposed a three-point program designed to 
mprove regional consultations on commodi- 
ties markets; derive greater hemispheric 
benefits from global commodity arrange- 
nents; and improve resource financing, 
Mther on a global or regional basis. 

To expand trade opportunities and capa- 
jilities, we offered proposals to help develop- 
ng nations expand and diversify exports of 
nanufactured and semiprocessed goods, 
promote the hemisphere's trade position 
:hrough the Geneva negotiations, and sup- 
port needed regional and subregional eco- 
jiomic integration. 

And we proposed a number of new ideas to 
ptimulate the development, acquisition, and 
itilization of technology in the moderniza- 
tion of the hemisphere. 

To improve the inter-American system, we 
nrculated proposals — the most far-reaching 
he United States has ever put fonvard — 
vhich would simplify the organization by 
;trengthening the foreign ministers meet- 
ngs in the periodic General Assemblies, 



uly 12, 1976 



eliminate the standing councils, open the 
OAS to wider membership in the hemi- 
sphere — particularly the new states of the 
Caribbean — ^and increase the Latins' share 
of the budget. Such steps, we believe, could 
lead to a leaner and more flexible and re- 
sponsive organization which could better pro- 
mote the mutual security, economic progress, 
and human rights of the Americas. 

And on the centrally important issue of 
human rights, I addressed the special re- 
sponsibility of our nations to preserve, cher- 
ish, and defend fundamental human values — 
for if such values cannot be preserved, 
cherished, and defended in this hemisphere, 
where the rights and the promise of the in- 
dividual have played such a historic role, 
then they are in jeopardy everywhere. 

At Santiago, the United States reaffirmed 
our unequivocal commitment to the Ameri- 
can Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man. We endorsed the reports presented 
there by the Inter-American Human 
Rights Commission: its annual report, 
which cites the rise of violence and terror 
in many nations of Latin America, its re- 
port on Chile, and its report — submitted too 
late for official consideration by the OAS 
Assembly — concerning the inhuman treat- 
ment of political prisoners in Cuba and the 
refusal of Cuba to cooperate with the 
Commission. 

The United States emphasized our belief 
that the protection of human rights in the 
hemisphere is an obligation of every nation 
and not simply of particular nations whose 
practices have come to public attention or 
whose ideology — on whichever side of the 
political spectrum — is unpopular. 

The contrast between the respective 
treatment of the Human Rights Commis- 
sion's work by the Governments of Chile and 
Cuba demonstrates the importance of this 
principle. The Government of Chile cooper- 
ated with the Commission; the Govei-nment 
of Cuba did not. The Government of Chile 
did nothing to prevent widespread publica- 
tion in that country of information about the 
Commission's report and about the OAS dis- 
cussion of the issue. Needless to say, there 



43 



has been nothing comparable in the govern- 
ment-controlled media in Cuba. Most impor- 
tant, the Commission noted a quantitative 
improvement in the situation in Chile since 
its last report. 

For these reasons, I believe we can best 
enhance the prospects for further human 
rights progress in Chile by continuing a bal- 
anced policy by working in the area of hu- 
man rights and by assisting that government 
to meet the economic problems before it. We 
have made it clear to the Government of 
Chile that the condition of human rights in 
that country impairs our relationship. Ac- 
tions which would further undermine our 
relationship could eliminate the practical 
possibilities for betterment of economic con- 
ditions. 

Mr. Chairman, our efforts in Latin 
America over the past several months have 
considerably advanced our practical progress 
and provided a firm foundation of policy for 
the years ahead. We have moved into a new 
phase of profound interest, active initiatives, 
and comprehensive proposals for altering the 
inter-American relationship, a phase which 
is more compatible with the new cooperative 
spirit in the hemisphere. 

We have come to the end of a critical era 
and are marking the beginning of a new one. 
The United States can now deal with Latin 
America in a new spirit. We need not hold 
back on major initiatives for fear of inspir- 
ing old notions of paternalism. With con- 
sultation and cooperation, our hopes of 
meeting the challenges of economic and so- 
cial progress in an age of interdependence 
and of building a sound and beneficial rela- 
tionship between developed and developing 
nations are brightest and most promising 
here in this hemisphei'e. 

Europe 

Let me turn briefly now to Europe. 

In late May I attended the NATO Minis- 
ters' meeting in Oslo and held a series of 
meetings with European leaders. 

I do not need to rehearse at length to this 
committee why the countries of Westei'n 
Europe are important to the United States 



44 



lit 
h 

silt 



and to all our international endeavors,: I 
Throughout the postwar period we have f 
recognized that the security of Western 
Europe is inseparable from our own. Oub 
economies are inextricably linked ; we have 
had repeated demonstrations that economic 
performance on one side of the Atlantic will 
in time affect both. Most of all, these are the 
peoples who share our most fundamental 
cultural and political heritage and its values, 
and they share our vision of the kind o| 
world we want to live in 

While cooperating in a defensive allianed|ji 
which for durability and vitality is probab^ 
unique in the history of sovereign states, th( 
Atlantic nations also have been coordinatingiu 
efforts gradually to improve relations with sti 
regimes in Eastern Europe whose values ano n 
aims are very different from our own. W« 
have recognized from the outset that this 
difl^cult undertaking could only proceed fron 
a basis of Western strength and cohesion. 

Now, with the growth of Soviet militarjjf 
power, with a proliferation of potentially 
explosive regional tensions, with the emew 
gence of new power centers based on controjg 
of vital economic resources, with growing dei fit 
mands for redistribution of the worldV M 
wealth, and with common economic and so( fe 
cial problems ahead, it is more importanl fe 
than ever that our consultations with ouii 
closest allies be constant and our cooperation 
constant 

This does not mean that the North Atlani 
tic states will see all problems in identica he 
ways or always adopt identical policies. II 
does mean that only by understanding onu 
another's interests and perspectives can w« 
maintain that essential harmony in our polii 
cies which will enable us to deal construci j1j1( 
tively both with the Communist world an«i 
with the demands of the developing statesi 

Three years ago, the United States calle( 
for a reaffirmation of European-Americai Im, 
solidarity. We believed that it was impera> 
tive to reafhrm the central place of Westen 
unity in all that we were about to do. 

Over the course of these last few years, '. 
believe that the West has achieved an exi 
traordinary cohesion and resolve. It is a sigr 
of strength that doctrinal disputes over re | 



Department of State Bulletir 



tt 



"''■ lefining our relationship or the modes of our 
^^ :onsultation have given way to concerted 
*'*: ittacks on the actual problems before us. 
ft' Economic, security, and political issues 
'" lave crowded upon us, and we have re- 
*^ iponded together: in the solidarity displayed 
" )y the Western countries in the declaration 
■f'li it the NATO summit in May 1975; in im- 
* )roving cooperation on defense issues; in 
"''' mified positions before and during the Hel- 
"•l inki summit in July 1975; in the Vienna 
legotiations on mutual and balanced force 
''2J 'eductions; in continuing allied consultations 
'■ m SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation 
^'t; Talks] ; in intensified political consultations 
ia% n refusing to bow to the temptation of pro- 
ectionism in trade; in the network of com- 
non energy institutions created rapidly in 
■esponse to the challenge of the oil cartel; 
n the Rambouillet economic summit of last 
ffii slovember ; and in the continuing series of 
nultilateral negotiations with the develop- 
ng countries in both new and old inter- 
lational forums. 

At the NATO meeting last month there 
vas firm agreement that our common se- 
•urity rests on the foundation of Western 
;olidarity and strength and that continuing 
lefense efforts will be necessary to counter 
Soviet assertiveness and induce restraint in 
soviet behavior. There was broad agreement 
hat efforts to seek stability and improve- 
nents in East-West relations should con- 
inue but that such efforts, too, must be 
)ased on a clear foundation of military 
strength and resolve. I was, in addition, 
struck by the growing appreciation among 
ill NATO members that military, economic, 
md political developments around the 
j:lobe can have the most direct impact on 
he security and prosperity of the North 
\tlantic states. 

At the May meeting we discussed and 
;ound basic agreement on a wide range of 
ssues: the importance of peaceful evolu- 
:ion in Africa; the centrality of our com- 
nitment to the security of Europe; the im- 
3ortance we attach to implementation of the 
[lelsinki Final Act; the need for close con- 
3ultations on SALT; the necessity to con- 
tinue efforts toward mutual and balanced 



force reductions; the situation in the Medi- 
terranean; the high-level attention we 
should give to the question of military 
standardization; and most important, our 
continuing commitment to shared values, the 
basic cement that has held our alliance to- 
gether for nearly 30 years. 

My bilateral visits to Norway, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Sweden, and Luxem- 
bourg and the London meeting of CENTO 
[Central Treaty Organization] Foreign 
Ministers considerably furthered, I believe, 
the process of strengthened ties between 
America and Western Europe. 

In Norway we discussed that country's 
growing role as a major oil producer and the 
importance of close consultations on the com- 
plicated question of international exploita- 
tion of the considerable resources of the 
Svalbard, or Spitsbergen, Archipelago. 

In Germany we reaffirmed our shared 
views on East-West relations and the need 
to approach this subject from a foundation 
of strength. I believe that U.S.-German rela- 
tions have never been better. 

Swedish-American relations over the past 
decade have not always been friendly. While 
we cannot hope to wholly reconcile all our 
different perspectives, I believe that our talks 
helped each side better understand the con- 
ditions under which the other must conduct 
its foreign policy. Our relations with 
Sweden have improved significantly over the 
past year, and I expressed the hope in 
Stockholm that this process will continue. 

The importance and prestige of Luxem- 
bourg in Europe far exceed its size. My dis- 
cussions with Prime Minister Thorn dealt 
primarily with international issues, on which 
I found it valuable to hear the views of an 
ally that presents a European point of view 
in an impartial, effective manner. And at 
CENTO, I conveyed our continued support 
for the alliance and for peace and stability 
in the treaty region. 

Today, Europe's role on global issues is 
strong and effective. Europe's interest in the 
Far East, in the Middle East, and in Africa 
is growing and welcome to us. [U.K.] Prime 
Minister Callaghan's initiatives for a nego- 
tiated settlement in Rhodesia based on ma- 



July 12, 1976 



45 



jority rule, [French] President Giscard 
d' Estaing's proposal for a Western fund for 
coordinated assistance to African economic 
development, and [Federal German] Chan- 
cellor Schmidt's initiatives in the economic 
field are examples of creative European 
statesmanship which the United States wel- 
comes and respects. We gain — and the world 
gains — from Europe's counsel and long ex- 
perience in a global framework. 

At the NATO meeting in Oslo we took up 
issues of security; next week I will return 
to Europe to attend the OECD [Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment] meeting, where we will work to 
strengthen cooperation among the industrial- 
ized countries of the West and on our ap- 
proach to the developing nations. 

In a few days' time, President Ford will 
meet in Puerto Rico with his colleagues the 
heads of government of Britain, Canada, 
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Italy, and Japan in what is now becoming a 
regular process of economic discussions at 
the highest political level. 

These meetings are symbolic of how far 
we have come in the last few years in con- 
solidating cooperation among the industrial 
democracies and extending it into new 
spheres of common endeavor. They also dem- 
onstrate the understanding we share that 
the complexities of modern global manage- 
ment require, above all, a determined effort 
by our governments to prove that we have 
the ability to meet new challenges. 

This kind of cooperation is the corner- 
stone of American foreign policy. It has been 
so for 30 yeare. It will continue to be so. 

Africa 

Finally, let me discuss briefly what we are 
trying to do in our African policy. Our aims 
are: 

— To avoid a race war which would have 
inevitably tragic consequences for all con- 
cerned ; 

— To do all we can to prevent foreign in- 
tervention in what must remain an African 
problem ; 



46 



— To promote peaceful cooperation among 
the communities in southern Africa; and 
— To prevent the I'adicalization of Africa. 

In 1974 President Ford ordered a review 
of our policy toward Africa. As part of this 
effort I announced one year ago that I would; 
visit Africa in the spring of 1976. Last Sep- 
tember, I set forth the fundamental elements 
of our policy toward Africa to members of 
the Organization of African Unity assem- 
bled in New York for the United Nations. 1 
said then that America had three major 
concerns : 

— That the African Continent be free of 
great-power rivalry or conflict; 

— That all of the continent should have 
the right of self-determination; and 

— That Africa attain prosperity for its 
people and become a strong participant in th€ 
global economic order, an economic partner 
with a growing stake in the international 
system. 

Late last year the situation in Africa toot 
on a new and serious dimension. For th( 
first time since the colonial era was largelj 
brought to an end in the early 1960's, exter 
nal interventions had begun to control anc 
direct an essentially African problem. 

In the hope of halting a dangerously esca 
lating situation in Angola, we undertook— 
until halted by the impact of our domestii 
debate — a wide range of diplomatic and othei 
activity pointing toward a cessation of for 
eign intervention and a negotiated Africa: 
solution. 

By the first months of this year, Soviet 
Cuban intervention had contributed to ai 
increasingly dangerous situation turning th( 
political evolution away from African aspira- 
tions and toward great-power confrontation 

— The Soviets and Cubans had imposec 
their solution on Angola. Their forces wer{ 
entrenched there. The danger was real thai 
African states, seeing the Soviet and Cubar 
presence on the scene, might be driven in i 
radical direction. 

— With the end of the Portuguese era ir 
Africa, pressure was building on Rhodesia 

Department of State Bulletin 



regarded by Africans as the last major ves- 
tige of colonialism. Events in Angola en- 
couraged radicals to press for a military 
solution in Rhodesia. 

— With radical influence on the rise and 
with immense outside military strength ap- 
parently behind the radicals, even moderate 
and responsible African leaders — firm pro- 
ponents of peaceful change — began to con- 
clude there was no alternative but to em- 
brace the cause of violence. By March of this 
year, guerrilla actions took on ever larger 
dimensions. 

— We saw ahead the prospect of war fed 
and perhaps conducted by outside forces ; we 
were concerned about a continent politically 
embittered and economically estranged from 
the West ; and we saw ahead a process of 
radicalization which would place severe 
strains on our allies in Europe and Japan. 

— There was no prospect of successfully 
shaping events in the absence of positive 
programs of our own for Africa. 

It was for these reasons that President 
Ford determined that an African trip which 
had long been planned as part of an unfold- 
|ing process of policy development had a 
compelling focus and urgency. We had these 
aims: 

— To provide moderate African leaders 
with an enlightened alternative to the grim 
prospects so rapidly taking shape before 
I them — prospects which threatened African 
unity and independence and indicated grow- 
ing violence and widening economic distress ; 

— To work for a solution that would per- 
mit all of the communities in Africa — black 
or white — to coexist on the basis of justice 
and dignity ; 

—To give friendly and moderate African 
governments the perception that their as- 
pirations could be achieved without resort 
to massive violence or bloodshed, and that 
their hopes for prosperity and opportunity 
can best be realized through association 
with the West; and 

— To promote solutions based on majority 
rule and minority rights which would en- 
able diverse communities to live side by side. 



In short, we sought to show that there was 
a moderate and peaceful road open to fulfill 
African aspirations and that America could 
be counted on to cooperate constructively in 
the attainment of these objectives. 

My trip addressed the three major issues 
facing Africa: 

— Whether the urgent problems of south- 
ern Africa will be solved by negotiation or 
by war; 

— Whether Africa's economic development 
will take place on the basis of self-respect 
and open opportunity or through perpetual 
relief or the radical regimentation of socie- 
ties; and 

— Whether the course of African unity 
and self-determination will once again be 
distorted by massive extracontinental inter- 
ference. 

I believe that the 10-point policy we set 
forth in Lusaka in late April and the other 
proposals we made in Africa to enhance 
self-sustaining economic growth make up a 
platform which moderate Africans can sup- 
port and which serves interests we share — 
for peace, justice, and progress and for an 
Africa free from outside interference: 

— The possibility for negotiated settle- 
ments in Rhodesia and Namibia has been 
enhanced. Time is running out, and formi- 
dable barriers remain. But if continued re- 
sponsible efforts are made by all sides, the 
burning questions of southern Africa still 
can be solved without immense loss of life, 
suffering, and bitterness and with giving 
each community an opportunity for a dig- 
nified life. 

— African hopes for independence and the 
integrity of their continent have been 
raised. Big-power intervention can only 
undermine unity, set African against Afri- 
can, and heighten the risk of conflict. Our 
policy on this clearly accords with African 
concerns as reflected in the suspicion and 
apprehension with which influential African 
leaders have regarded the large Cuban 
presence in Angola. We may now be seeing 
the results of that concern, and our clear 
position, as we receive an increasing num- 



July 12, 1976 



47 



ber of reports that Cuban troops may begin 
to leave. However, we do not yet have clear 
evidence that this process is underway in 
any meaningful fashion. We will be care- 
fully watching the pace and extent of any 
Cuban withdrawals. 

— Our African policy is thus an important 
element in our overall international effort to 
help build a structure of relations which 
fosters peace, widening prosperity, and fun- 
damental human dignity. 

Mr. Chairman, Africa is of immense size, 
strategically located, with governments of 
substantial significance in numbers and 
growing influence in the councils of the 
world. The interdependence of America and 
our allies with Africa is increasingly obvi- 
ous. In the past months we have seen a 
major international crisis develop in this im- 
portant area of the world, and we have 
moved to deal with it. We have taken the 
initiative to offer a peaceful road to the fu- 
ture. We have told much of the world that 
America continues to have a positive vision 
and will play a crucial and responsible role 
in the world. 

I believe that our policy initiatives were 
necessary, that they can be effective, that 
they are beneficial to the interests of the 
United States; and I believe that they are 
right. 

But the new beginning in our African pol- 
icy will require dedication and effort on our 
part if it is to come to a positive fruition. 
The Administration is determined to follow 
through on our initiatives and the promising 
beginnings that have been made. We look to 
the Congress for encouragement and for 
active support in this crucial enterprise. 



U.S. Declaration on Official Support 
for Export Credits Issued 

Folio iving is a U.S. declaration on official 
support for export credits issued on June 9. 

Press release 294 dated June 9 

At the end of their economic conference 
in November 1975 at Rambouillet, France, 
the heads of state and governments of 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States declared 
that their governments would intensify ef- 
forts to achieve a prompt conclusion of dis- 
cussions then underway among themselves 
and Canada concerning export credits. Re- 
newed discussions among these governments 
have resulted in a consensus that counter- 
productive competition must be avoided with 
respect to government-supported export 
credits. 

Recognizing this consensus, the U.S. Gov- 
ernment wishes to declare that it fully sup- 
ports the principle of cooperation in order to 
reduce counterproductive competition in 
government-supported export credits. The 
guidelines for Eximbank-supported credits 
for civilian goods and services will be set 
forth in a declaration by the Export-Import 
Bank of the United States under its statu- 
tory authority. The U.S. Government intends 
to apply the same guidelines to any other 
official export credit support program for 
similar goods and services. 

The U.S. Government invites other gov- 
ernments to apply similar guidelines so as 
to broaden the attempt to reduce counter- 
productive competition in government-sup- 
ported export credits. 



48 



Department of State Bulletin 



Department Discusses Allegations of Communist Influence 
in Certain Western Hemisphere Countries 



Statement by Willia^n H. Luers 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs ' 



I am happy to be able to discuss with you 
today some of the concerns arising from re- 
cent public allegations about an increase in 
Communist influence in certain countries in 
tlie Western Hemisphere. 

I would prefer first to deal with these al- 
legations specifically on a country-by-country 
basis. Then I will discuss briefly our general 
perception of social, political, and economic 
developments in the region. And if you have 
any patience or time left I will respond to 
questions you may have. 

In discussing the countries where these 
allegations are pertinent, I hope the commit- 
tee will understand that we are not sitting 
in judgment on the performance, the poli- 
tics, or the economic organization of these 
countries. They represent themselves. The 
counti'ies in question are intensely dedicated 
to their own independence. They are, for the 
most part, open nations with pluralistic soci- 
eties and systems. As such we wish them 
well as they address the problems of social 
and economic development confronting them. 
But we are not responsible for the solutions 
they evolve. Nor are we responsible for keep- 
ing ourselves posted in minute detail about 



' Made before the Subcommittee on International 
Political and Military Affairs of the House Commit- 
tee on International Relations on June 15. The com- 
plete transcript of the hearings will be published by 
the committee and will be available from the Super- 
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



July 12, 1976 



internal developments in the countries of the 
hemisphere. The period when we could con- 
sider ourselves the "watchdog" and "police- 
man" of the hemisphere has passed. 

What we must concern ourselves with are 
those trends which might: 

— Aff"ect the national security of the 
United States. 

— Impact negatively on specific U.S. in- 
terests. 

— Disrupt the peace and invoke our com- 
mitments under international treaties, such 
as the Rio Treaty [Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance], 

Commonwealth Caribbean Nations 

With these caveats in mind, let me turn to 
the Caribbean first. My emphasis here will be 
on the so-called Commonwealth Caribbean 
countries and of course on Cuba. 

Excluding Cuba and Guyana, none of the 
independent nations of the Caribbean has a 
domestic Communist Party of significant 
electoral strength. Nor do we feel that the 
extrahemispheric Communist powers exer- 
cise significant influence in any of these na- 
tions, except for Cuba. 

The governments of the Commonwealth 
Caribbean nations have committed them- 
selves to programs of wide-reaching social 
and economic change. One — Guyana — has an- 
nounced that it is seeking to create a "Marx- 
ist-Leninist" society for its people. There is 



49 



no indication at the present time, however, 
that this "Marxist-Leninist" society has 
much in common with the Soviet, East Eu- 
ropean, Chinese, or Cuban variants. 

Implementation of the programs for 
change in these Commonwealth Caribbean 
nations has generally involved increased 
state participation in, or control of, impor- 
tant sectors of their respective economies. It 
has also been accompanied by closer relations 
with Cuba, including acceptance, in some 
cases, of Cuban technical assistance, ex- 
changes of personnel, and expanded diplo- 
matic and trade relations. 

We have not noted, however, an equiva- 
lent increase in political authoritarianism. 
Democratic political and legal institutions, 
including respect for civil liberties and hu- 
man rights, have generally been maintained. 

The two specific cases you have asked me 
to discuss are Guyana and Jamaica. 

Guyana has just celebrated the 10th an- 
niversary of its independence. The Guyanese 
Government, under the leadership of Prime 
Minister Forbes Burnham, has moved stead- 
ily toward state ownership of the most im- 
portant sectors of the economy. Agreements 
wei-e reached in 1971 and 1975 with the for- 
eign bauxite and alumina producers, includ- 
ing one U.S. company, for government take- 
over of their facilities. The last remaining 
large-scale private enterprise in Guyana, a 
British sugar-producing interest, was re- 
cently nationalized. Terms are being nego- 
tiated. 

It is generally believed that the Guyanese 
Government has operated its nationalized 
industries with reasonable efficiency. The 
overall economy of the country is in rela- 
tively good shape, and its international obli- 
gations are being met. The United States 
continues to import calcined bauxite from 
Guyana (375,000 tons in 1975). 

Compared to the tumultuous preindepend- 
ence society, Guyana today is relatively or- 
derly. It is noteworthy that Prime Minister 
Burnham's principal opposition, the Commu- 
nist People's Progressive Party, led by 
Cheddi Jagan, recently announced a policy of 
"critical" support for the Burnham govern- 



50 



ment and returned to participate in the op- 
position in the Guyanese elected parliament. 

Guyana maintains cordial relations with 
the Communist nations; and Soviet, Chinese, 
and Cuban diplomatic missions are located in 
Georgetown. The Chinese have extended 
some economic assistance to Guyana, but the 
Cubans are by far the most active, providing 
technical assistance and participating in a 
number of cultural activities. 

Prime Minister Burnham has repeatedly 
expressed admiration for Fidel Castro and 
for what he regards as the signal accom- 
plishments of the Cuban regime. At the same 
time, however, he has made it clear that 
Guyana's political and economic development 
will not be modeled specifically on any other 
government. Prime Minister Burnham has 
also indicated his readiness to increase co- 
operation with Cuba. 

We do have important differences with the 
Government of Guyana. In international 
bodies Guyana has in recent years frequently 
voted against us on issues of importance to 
us. Guyanese officials have been outspoken 
in criticizing the United States and its poli- 
cies. We do not share common approaches , 
to economic and social development. And we 
doubt that the Marxist-Leninist ideology re- 
cently espoused by the governing PNC [Peo- 
ple's National Congress] party can be fully 
compatible with the open and pluralistic 
Guyanese society. 

But an independent Guyana seeking its 
own path to social progress is no threat to 
this country. We continue to provide eco- 
nomic assistance to Guyana ; we will continue 
to have a profound interest in the well-being 
of the Guyanese people. And we will con- 
tinue to work directly and openly with offi- 
cials of the Government of Guyana to re- 
solve differences and cooperate whenever 
possible. 

In the case of Jamaica, Prime Minister 
Michael Manley was elected to office in 1972 
committed to a program of rectifying the 
uneven distribution of wealth in Jamaica 
and alleviating the chronic unemployment 
problem which has long plagued that island. 
A major objective of the Manley govern- 

Department of State Bulletin 



nient has been to renegotiate the terms of 
operation of the six major bauxite and ahi- 
mina producers there so Jamaica might re- 
ceive greater benefits from those important 
commodities. Some of these negotiations are 
still underway. 

Prime Minister Manley has described his 
program as one of "democratic socialism." 
He has consistently stated that he will pre- 
serve Jamaica's parliamentary system and 
its strong tradition of a free press and re- 
spect for individual rights. 

At the same time, like Mr. Burnham, Mr. 
Manley has taken steps toward closer rela- 
tions with Cuba. Following a visit to Cuba 
last year, Mr. Manley announced that he had 
accepted a Cuban offer to provide technical 
advisers in the fields of school and dam con- 
struction. On March 17, 1976, the Jamaican 
Government also indicated publicly that two 
police officers had been sent to Cuba for 
training. On April 29, in connection with a 
parliamentary inquiry, the Government of 
Jamaica said an additional nine police offi- 
cers had been sent to Cuba as observers. 

Unfortunately, Mr. Manley's economic re- 
foiTTi program has been set back by the 
world recession and by an accompanying fall 
in the demand for aluminum. It has also 
been undercut by sporadic political and crim- 
inal violence which, though largely confined 
to certain parts of Kingston, has probably 
nonetheless had an advei'se effect on the 
island's very important tourism industry. 

Developments in Jamaica have received 
considerable attention and comment in the 
U.S. and world press. Let me discuss some 
of this commentary. Press stories have 
alleged : 

— That Cuban agents are entering Jamaica 
under the guise of technical advisers. Under 
agreements with the Manley government, 
about 100 Cuban advisers are in Jamaica to 
construct an agricultural school and a num- 
ber of small dams, and additional advisers 
are expected to arrive in the future. There 
has been speculation that some of these in- 
dividuals may be intelligence agents. The 
Manley government has repeatedly and pub- 
licly denied this. 



—That Jamaican security personnel are 
l)eing trained in Cuba. Some press accounts 
have referred to an agreement between Cuba 
and Jamaica to train Jamaican security 
forces. As I said earlier, in March and again 
in April the Jamaican Government issued 
clarifications on this question. It said that a 
total of two security officers have received 
training in Cuba, with an additional nine 
having visited Cuba for observational pur- 
poses. The Jamaican Government has also 
pointed out that over 160 personnel have re- 
ceived overseas training in the past 12 
months, the ovei-whelming number of whom 
were trained in the United Kingdom. The 
government has also flatly denied the exist- 
ence of any agreements with Cuba covering 
such training. 

— That several high-ranking Jamaican of- 
ficials or political advisers are Communists. 
This claim has been made in newspaper ar- 
ticles which appeared in the Washington 
Post, the Christian Science Monitor, and 
elsewhere. The authenticity of this allega- 
tion remains open to question. However, it 
would not be surprising if some Marxists 
hold positions of influence in Jamaica, as 
they no doubt do in some other democratic 
countries. 

On the other hand, a different view of de- 
velopments in Jamaica has also appeared in 
the U.S. press. The widely syndicated colum- 
nist Carl Rowan quoted Prime Minister Man- 
ley as saying in January 1976, "I could never 
be a Communist — I am a profoundly demo- 
cratic person." Mr. Manley made similar 
statements to the Wall Street Journal. 

The foregoing themes, together with press 
speculation concerning the increased ties be- 
tween Guyana and Cuba, have drawn strong 
reactions from the Governments of Jamaica 
and Guyana, as well as Barbados. It has been 
suggested by all three that these reports are 
somehow a part of a campaign, by implica- 
tion orchestrated by the U.S. Government, 
to undermine these governments. The term 
"destabilization" has in several recent in- 
stances been used to describe our intentions. 

I would like to use this occasion to state 
that such allegations are totally false. I 



July 12, 1976 



51 



speak for all agencies of the U.S. Govern- 
ment in saying that the United States has 
complete respect for the sovereignty of other 
nations and for the right of other people to 
freely select their own political and economic 
systems. I wish categorically to deny that 
the U.S. Government is doing anything to 
undermine or destabilize the legitimate au- 
thorities or governments of those Caribbean 
countries. If private U.S. citizens are en- 
gaged in such alleged activities, we are pre- 
pared to cooperate fully with the govern- 
ments of the area to bring them to justice. 

The U.S. Government cannot, of course, be 
held responsible for the content of press ar- 
ticles and commentary. However, journalists 
do, on occasion, consult with us on factual 
matters, as well as seek our views of devel- 
opments they regard as important. We are 
well aware of our obligation and responsibil- 
ity to contribute to balanced and accurate 
portrayal of events, and we have taken great 
care to discharge this obligation. 

It is our view that the leadership of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean nations, and I 
would mention specifically Prime Minister 
Manley and Prime Minister Burnham, is 
characterized by a strong interest in bring- 
ing about the modernization of the region. 
The societies involved have emerged from a 
recent environment of colonialism, and their 
leaders are zealously interested in preserv- 
ing their hard-won status of independence. 
On the whole, the governments in question 
have shown no inclination to violate the basic 
human rights of their people, and they have 
shown respect for international legal norms 
in their efforts to reorganize and redirect 
their economies. We believe that any con- 
clusion that these nations may be or have 
become the tools of Cuban and/or Soviet 
masters omits these important factors. 

It is true that the Guyanese Govenmient 
has indicated a strong distaste for capital- 
ism, it has endorsed Cuba's Angola adven- 
ture, and it has established close ties with 
Cuba. The Jamaican democratic system is 
profoundly non-Communist, and the Jamai- 
can economy is still geared almost completely 
to trade with non-Communist countries. Its 



52 



government faces serious social and economic 
problems, but we hope and trust that it will 
manage to deal effectively with these, at the 
same time preserving an open political sys- 
tem and maintaining close and friendly rela- 
tions with the United States. 

Mexico 

With regard to Mexico, we believe that 
recent allegations that the Mexican Govern- 
ment is taking Mexico down the Chilean and 
Cuban road to socialism are unfounded. 
Those who make these allegations cite what 
they characterize as government-supported 
land seizures, policies directed against for- 
eign investment, and the influence of Chilean 
exiles on government policies. 

In discussing Mexico, it must be borne in 
mind that Mexico is a proudly independent 
country. The tenacity with which it holds to 
its independence is heightened by geography 
— it is our neighbor and highly sensitive to 
us and signs of any designs to undermine its 
independence. Decisions Mexico takes to re- 
spond to what it perceives as its internal 
problems are purely Mexican decisions. It 
does not seek or accept influence from for- 
eign sources or proponents of alien ideolo- 
gies. Its political system, which has evolved 
over the 66 years since the Mexican Revolu- 
tion, is eclectic and unique. 

The allegation that Chilean exiles are in- 
fluential in the development of Mexican pol- 
icy and actions can be looked at in context. 
Mexico has a long record of liberalism in 
granting political asylum. At the end of the 
Spanish Civil War, Mexico accepted many 
Republican exiles. It did the same after 1960 
in accepting anti-Castro Cuban exiles; and 
following the overthrow of the Allende gov- 
ernment in Chile, it accepted more than 100 
prominent Chileans, plus a large number oi 
their dependents, and assisted them in find- 
ing gainful employment. 

Some of these exiles were given govern- 
ment positions. But there is no evidence that 
these or any other foreign advisers have sig-i 
nificantly influenced the policies or programs 
of this large and resourceful nation. MexiccI 



Department of State Bulletin 



has a highly organized governing political 
party and a vast reservoir of educated tech- 
nicians who are fully competent to run the 
nation. 

With regard to internal far-leftist organi- 
zations in Mexico, Communist and radical 
Marxist parties are legal but are small and 
weak. The government party, the Institu- 
tional Revolutionary Party (PRI), has been 
successful in encompassing a wide spectrum 
of political thought and activity. Because 
Mexico's own revolutionary tradition is ex- 
pressed by the PRI, it is difficult for the 
Marxist parties to build a following. 

The Mexican Communist Party (PCM) has 
only an estimated 5,000 members, not 
enough under Mexican law to qualify for reg- 
istration. Since 1968, when the Russians in- 
vaded Czechoslovakia, the PCM has followed 
a line relatively independent of Moscow. 
There is also evidence of strain within the 
party over the issue of the degree of support 
to be given to student activism. 

The Popular Socialist Party (PPS) is a 
loosely organized party which claims 75,000 
members. It has carefully refrained from ad- 
jvocating violence or opposing the goals of 
ithe Mexican Revolution. It has endorsed the 
PRI Presidential candidate since 1958, while 
running some of its own congressional and 
gubernatorial candidates. 

The PCM and the PPS have disavowed ter- 
rorism. The principal terrorist organizations 
in Mexico are the 23d of September Commu- 
nist League (which has been disavowed by 
the PCM), the Poor Peoples Army, and the 
Peoples Armed Revolutionary Army. Strong 
Mexican Government antiterrorist measures 
resulted in an abatement of terrorism during 
1975. 

The 23d of September Communist League 
is apparently the only group still active. 
They have claimed credit for several bomb- 
ings, the murder of a police patrolman, and 
the recent kidnaping of the Belgian Ambas- 
'3ador's daughter. The 23d of September 
League is an irritant to the Government of 
Mexico, but not a threat to political stabil- 
|ity. We know of no current Cuban connec- 
tion with these terrorist groups. 



Allegations that recent measures and ac- 
tions by the Government of Mexico are 
"Communist inspired," and against private 
domestic and foreign investment, do not hold 
up under scrutiny. There has of course been 
some controversy within Mexico over some 
of the government's recent proposals, a phe- 
nomenon that is inevitable in an open soci- 
ety in which various sectors do not always 
have identical interests. 

With regard to alleged attacks on private 
property, the Government of Mexico has 
made it clear that it does not accept or tol- 
erate violence as a means of furthering land 
reform any more than it will tolerate pri- 
vate land holdings in excess of the limits im- 
posed by its Constitution. It has also ac- 
knowledged that the so-called "land inva- 
sions" are in part a result of the frustration 
of small farmers over their lack of adequate 
land. In a visit to Sonora on April 21, Presi- 
dent Echeverria forcefully stated that the 
Government of Mexico would not tolerate 
land invasions and reaffirmed his govern- 
ment's commitment to the rule of law in re- 
gard to both squatters and property owners. 
The same theme has been sounded by Jose 
Lopez Portillo, the Presidential candidate of 
the ruling PRI. Thus, while there have been 
land invasions, on occasion stimulated by 
leftist agitators, there is no official endorse- 
ment of such invasions. 

Those who allege a drift toward commu- 
nism in Mexico also cite recent Mexican leg- 
islation — a Law on Human Settlements, 
which was opposed by some sectors in Mex- 
ico as an unconstitutional attack on private 
property. This law essentially gives author- 
ity to the government to regulate exploding 
urban growth through land use planning 
measures accepted in some industrialized 
countries. The Government of Mexico, in 
heeding the criticism expressed by some 
groups in Mexico, proposed some modifica- 
tions of the original proposal by expressly 
stating that the law would not be used to 
expropriate private residences, by creating 
mechanisms to afford relief to property own- 
ers who might be affected, by excluding 
retroactivity, and by reaffirming its commit- 



July 12, 1976 



53 



ment to the concept of private property. 

With regard to the general question of for- 
eign investment, the Government of Mexico 
has made it clear that it wants and needs for- 
eign investment that will be of benefit to 
Mexico's economy and development but does 
not want investment that does not meet its 
needs. Foreign investors, including U.S. in- 
vestors, continue to find investment attrac- 
tive in Mexico under the ground rules estab- 
lished by the Mexican Government. Mexico 
has a healthy and mixed economy with both 
private and public enterprise. The private 
sector within Mexico accounts for the largest 
part of total industrial production apart from 
petroleum, and the government continues to 
encourage its mixed economy. The long- 
range trend in Mexico, as in many countries 
of Western Europe, may well be toward 
greater state involvement in the dominant 
sectors of the economy. But we see little 
chance of dramatic shifts and anticipate that 
the private sector will continue to play a key 
role. 

With regard to allegations that an am- 
nesty of persons jailed as a result of student 
riots in 1968 is evidence of a trend toward 
communism, it should be noted that most of 
the several hundred persons apprehended at 
that time have long since been released from 
jail on bail. The amnesty legislation was wel- 
comed by both the left and right in Mexico 
as a measure which finally put the tragic 
events of 1968 to rest. 

In discussing Mexico, it should be men- 
tioned that some people allege that the 
United States is attempting to "destabilize" 
Mexico. This allegation is of course totally 
false. Mexico's interests, as well as ours, are 
best supported by a stable and economically 
prosperous Mexico, and we are supportive 
and understanding of efforts by the Govern- 
ment of Mexico to come to grips with the 
problems it perceives the need to solve to as- 
sure its economic and social advancement. 

As a final note, relations between the 
United States and Mexico are excellent. We 
have engaged in effective consultation and 
cooperation on numerous questions of mutual 
interest. And when bilateral problems arise. 



54 



as they inevitably must when two sovereign 
countries share 2,000 miles of border, we 
have been able to discuss these problems in 
a frank and friendly manner and together 
seek mutually acceptable solutions. We do 
not foresee any change in this mutually ad- 
vantageous relationship. 

Panama 

As you know, the United States and Pan- 
ama have been trying to negotiate a new 
treaty concerning the Panama Canal for the 
past 12 years. We hope that the new rela- 
tionship that will emerge as a result of this 
effort will be one of cooperation and part- 
nership. 

Recently there have been allegations that 
the Government of Panama is under Com- 
munist influence. Some of this speculation 
resulted from the fact that Chief of Govern- 
ment Torrijos visited Cuba in January of 
this year. Because of the importance of the 
treaty-negotiating effort, we believe it im- 
perative that the record show that the 
charges of Communist influence cannot be 
sustained by a careful examination of the 
facts. 

The present government of Panama, led 
by Gen. Omar Torrijos, came to power in 
1968 by military coup after a period of in- 
tense political agitation. Since then, the Pan- 
amanian Government has expressly rejected 
doctrinaire ideology in favor of reformist 
programs which it believes address Panama's 
social and economic needs. In this sense, the 
government's political orientation can be de- 
scribed as nationalistic, pragmatic, and pop- 
ulist. Through the political structure created 
in the 1972 Constitution, Panama has devel- 
oped a high degree of popular participation 
in public decisionmaking, even at the local 
level. Today the government still appears to 
enjoy considerable popular support. 

Since the 1968 coup all political parties 
have been banned in Panama. This sanction 
applies to the Partido del Pueblo — Panama's 
Communist Party — which never attracted 
many adherents. We do not expect any in- 
crease in its strength in the foreseeable 
future. 

Department of State Bulletin 



Internationally, Panama has attempted to 
broaden its diplomatic contacts in order to 
generate wide international support for its 
canal treaty aspirations. For example, 
Panama recently became a member of the 
nonaligned group of countries, and it main- 
tains diplomatic relations with Cuba. 

Although General Torrijos was cordially 
greeted during his recent visit to Cuba, 
there is no evidence that the Panamanian 
Government will pattern its political, mili- 
tary, or economic system along Cuban lines. 
Prior to and during Torrijos' visit, there was 
speculation regarding Cuban arms sales to 
Panama and Panamanian support for the 
Cuban intervention in Angola. Not only have 
these events not materialized, but General 
Torrijos has expressly separated his gov- 
ernment from the policies of the Cuban 
regime. On his return to Panama he an- 
nounced publicly that Cuba had chosen its 
road to social progress but that Panama had 
chosen another. Also, recent allegations re- 
garding a sizable covert Cuban military 
presence in Panama are rumor and, as such, 
do injustice to the integrity and independ- 
ence of the Panamanian state. 

Despite its attempts to garner inter- 
national support for its national aspirations, 
there is nothing that suggests that Panama 
has succumbed to Communist influence. 
Panama does not maintain diplomatic or eco- 
nomic ties with the Soviet Union and the 
People's Republic of China. Of the Eastern 
European countries, only Poland and Yugo- 
slavia have diplomatic representation in 
Panama; and their missions are modest. 

Today, Panama's economy is one of the 
prime examples of the free entei-prise sys- 
tem in Latin America. Since colonial days, 
Panamanians have utilized the commercial 
advantages of the Isthmus of Panama. In 
fact, public regulation of the financial sec- 
tor of the economy is scant, and government 
policies seek promotion of private invest- 
ment. These factors and Panama's close 
monetary ties to the United States have 
made Panama City — with 73 commercial 
banks — a major financial center in Latin 
America. 



Peru 

Let me now say a few words about Peru, 
whose military government has been identi- 
fied in this country from time to time as pro- 
Communist or tending toward commu- 
nism. 

The military officers who seized power in 
Peru in 1968 were, and remain, highly na- 
tionalistic. Their aim was, and is, to trans- 
form Peruvian society to bring into the life 
of the nation the great bulk of the popula- 
tion which was perceived to be the most 
disadvantaged. 

To this end the revolutionary government 
opted for a form of socialism that borrowed 
as freely from Marx as it did from the papal 
encyclicals. The eclectic system that is evolv- 
ing is a unique Peruvian synthesis of many 
models. The revolution's interpreters define 
it as neither capitalist nor Communist but 
containing elements of both. 

In all aspects of its statist approach to 
the organization of the Peruvian economy, 
the government has insisted that it is moti- 
vated by the principles of humanism and 
Christianity. While political activity is lim- 
ited by the authorities, parties continue to 
exist, although they have no voice in govern- 
ment. The press increasingly has been al- 
lowed greater freedom, especially over the 
past few months. 

While the revolutionary government has 
largely taken over the national means of 
production and has instituted a rather 
thorough-going agrarian reform of the old 
oligarchic latifnndia, a private sector is 
permitted to function. Practically all for- 
eign investment has been nationalized, but 
compensation has been paid the owners; in 
the latest expropriation of an American 
firm, the Marcona Mining Company, last 
year, compensation negotiations are coming, 
we believe, to a successful conclusion. Yet 
nearly $1 billion in U.S. investments in Peru, 
in copper and oil production, have been left 
untouched and as a consequence are expand- 
ing. Except for this, however, it must be 
said that Peru's nationalization policies have 
dried up new foreign investment. 

As a leader of the nonaligned movement. 



July 12, 1976 



55 



Peru's public postures frequently are in op- 
position to our interests; yet Peru has 
played a constructive role in the Third 
World, helping to moderate the more ex- 
treme positions of the radicals in the move- 
ment. Still many Americans are offended by 
what they interpret as Peru's "anti-imperial- 
ist" rhetoric in these fora. Peruvians will 
say their anti-imperialism in foreign policy 
is not anti-American. They insist it is na- 
tionalist and independent, since they are 
neither Communist nor capitalist. 

Peru's new and innovative attempt at re- 
structuring a society was recognized by Sec- 
retary Kissinger when he visited Lima in 
February. Acknowledging that Peru has 
chosen a nonaligned path, he said : ^ 

The United States accepts nonalignment as a 
legitimate national course. Indeed, our global inter- 
est is well served by a world of thriving independ- 
ent states, secure in their national destinies against 
the hegemonial designs of any nation. 

He also said that while our two countries 
differ in ideology, culture, and governmental 
structure, we are "fully sympathetic with 
Peru's struggle to create a social democ- 
racy attuned to the needs of all its people." 

Peru's large acquisitions of Soviet arms 
beginning in 1973 have created some con- 
cern about the direction and orientation of 
Peruvian policies. The increased Soviet pres- 
ence in Peru, along with a continuing Cuban 
presence, raised additional questions. But 
there is no sign that Soviet and Cuban in- 
fluence within the military government has 
increased. 

The Communist Party of Peru (CPP) is 
split into feuding factions: a dominant pro- 
Soviet faction of approximately 2,000 mem- 
bers and an ultramilitant so-called Maoist 
faction of approximately 1,500 members — 
which itself has split on the issue of mili- 
tance. The primary issue which divides the 
factions is support of the military govern- 
ment's Socialist revolution. The pro-Soviet 
CPP supports it as an intermediate step to 
Marxist socialism, while the ultraleft fac- 



" For Secretary Kissinger's toast at a dinner at 
Lima on Feb. 18, see Bulletin of Mar. 15, 1976, 
p. 331. 



tions favor direct action to create a Marxist 
state. 

The main area of strength of the Peru- 
vian Communists is in labor, where Com- 
munist-controlled unions have demonstrated 
the capability of paralyzing key industries — 
notably the mines and metallurgy industry — 
for limited periods of time. Recent govern- 
ment decrees, however, may have curbed the 
unions' strength in the mines. Ultramilitant 
Communists and other Marxists also domi- 
nate the national teachers unions and stu- 
dent organizations on several major univer- 
sity campuses. 

Cuba and the U.S.S.R. support the pro- 
Soviet CPP and its affiliated organizations, 
primarily with cadre training. There are 
100-200 Cubans in Peru, most of whom are 
assigned to the Cuban diplomatic mission or 
are their dependents. In addition, groups of 
Cuban fishermen, who operate off the Peru- 
vian coast under terms of the Cuba-Peru 
fishing agreement of 1973, frequently take 
shore leave in northern Peruvian ports. De- 
spite occasional unsubstantiated reports, we 
do not believe that there are Cuban military 
advisers or Communist bases in Peru. 

Soviet and Cuban Policies and Programs 

I hope these statements have served to 
deal satisfactorily with your concerns about 
specific allegations of Communist influence. 
But they are incomplete without some dis- 
cussion of Cuba and the Soviet Union and 
of the general political and economic environ- 
ment in Latin America, how that shapes our 
perceptions, and what policies we have 
evolved. 

The official Latin American Communist 
parties, never really major political forces in 
most countries of the hemisphere, are now 
divided and without important influence. 
They attract very little indigenous support. 

As for the Soviet Union and Cuba, they 
have in recent years pursued policies and 
programs aimed at improving relations with 
established Latin American governments. As 
a parallel to this approach, they have tended 
to channel their active support to legal and 
"legitimate" local Communist parties and 



56 



Department of State Bulletin 



iiave largely broken off support for guerrilla 
and terrorist groups. We do not at this time 
believe they are contemplating a change in 
this policy or preparing for armed interven- 
tion in the hemisphere. At the same time it 
should be said that not a few Latin American 
governments which experienced serious 
guerrilla outbreaks in the 1960's and 1970's 
continue to believe that terrorist organiza- 
tions now operating in their countries are 
supported from abroad. 

Cuba's attempts have not been all that 
successful on the state-to-state level. During 
1975, Cuba seemed to be making real head- 
way toward wide acceptance by Latin Ameri- 
can governments and a significant role in the 
affairs of the hemisphere. Latin American 
governments welcomed the more pragmatic 
Castro of last year in their drive for all- 
embracing Latin American unity and soli- 
darity. By last fall Cuba had diplomatic 
relations with 12 countries in the hemi- 
sphere. 

However, Castro's Angola adventure re- 
vived some old suspicions about Cuba and 
created some new anxieties. Some Latin 
American governments have never dropped 
their objections to Castro, regarding him as 
a tool of the Soviets. Other governments 
which may have been inclined to reestablish 
diplomatic relations with Cuba have had sec- 
ond thoughts following Castro's decision to 
intervene in Africa. 

It is mainly in certain black English- 
speaking Caribbean countries that Cuba's 
actions in Africa are approved and applauded 
as putting new momentum into the anti- 
colonial and antiwhite struggle in the south- 
ern part of that continent. Themselves con- 
fronted by massive problems of moderniza- 
tion of their societies, the leaders of these 
countries are impressed by the clean streets, 
law and order, and egalitarianism of Cuba. 

But here I must digress. We understand, 
as I indicated, that attraction of Cuba to the 
Commonwealth Caribbean nations, led by 
proud, intelligent, and highly educated men. 
Their social and economic problems are 
crushing. Their urban unemployment and 
population growth are critical. They find eco- 
nomic dependency on tourism and certain 

July 12, 1976 



agricultural crops a reality but also a residue 
of the colonial past. Perhaps even more than 
other developing nations they, because of 
their relatively high literacy and intense 
contact with the developed world, seek a 
formula for rapid modernization. 

Yet the United States has not been of 
great assistance. We have taken many of 
their citizens as immigrants, we have in- 
vested in their industrial, tourist, and agri- 
cultural enterprises, and we have spent 
lavishly in visiting the lovely islands. But 
as a government we have not, aside from a 
few small AID [Agency for International 
Development] programs and our substantial 
support for the Caribbean Development 
Bank, devised special economic programs to 
support the modernization aspirations of 
these very special neighbors in the 
Caribbean. 

These leaders doubtlessly also are aware 
that the Cuban experiment was carried out, 
and was only possible, with an enormous 
amount of aid from the Soviet Union. And if 
the Soviet Union was not prepared to give 
that kind of assistance to Chile under 
Allende to establish a second "Socialist" mod- 
el in the Western Hemisphere, it may also be 
reluctant to do so for possible additional can- 
didates in the Caribbean. Moreover, the 
Caribbean nations know that with that type 
of economic dependency come political costs 
which they, as recently independent nations, 
are not prepared to pay. 

Soviet policy toward the nations of the 
hemisphere in recent years has been de- 
signed to: 

— Strengthen diplomatic and commercial 
ties with most of the Latin American and 
Caribbean states (the Soviets have diplo- 
matic relations with 15 states in Latin 
America and the Caribbean). 

— Support leftist trends and anti-U.S. ac- 
tions of governments through propaganda 
and other means. 

— Expand trade and military sales to in- 
crease influence in certain countries and 
promote cultural and educational exchanges. 

But the Soviets have not significantly in- 
creased their influence in the hemisphere 



57 



outside of Cuba. Independent thinking and 
acting nations of the hemisphere have 
proven themselves fully capable of maintain- 
ing relations with the Soviet Union, taking 
advantage of some trade and credits, but not 
succumbing to increased Soviet influence. 
Increasingly it appears that the Soviet 
Union is irrelevant to much of the Third 
World except as a commodity purchaser and 
a supplier of arms. However, in Latin 
America, only Cuba and Peru have thus far 
elected to purchase Soviet weapons. As a 
source of technology and capital its role is 
minor. In the North-South dialogue over 
trade, commodities, monetary reform, and 
debts, the Soviets have made virtually no 
contribution. 

U.S. Approach 

While Communist parties have not pros- 
pered in the hemisphere, terrorism, urban 
and rural guerrilla movements, increased 
crime, and social unrest have continued to 
plague the hemisphere. Virtually no coun- 
try is without problems of this kind. Genu- 
ine social and economic grievances play a 
large part in this unrest. This is accom- 
panied by a global counterpoint of dis- 
appointed expectations on the part of the 
politically impotent and economically dis- 
franchised throughout the world. Trouble- 
some issues in U.S.-Latin American rela- 
tions — trade, Panama, Cuba — offer oppor- 
tunities for "anti-imperialist" forces to mobi- 
lize opinion against us and, in some cases, 
the government in power in their own 
country. 

Some of the less stable governments in the 
region have sought to capitalize on radical 
sentiment, or at least defend themselves 
from it, by deflecting it externally; i.e., at 
the United States. They are firing at the 
wrong target, however. For it is a plain fact, 
stated often by Secretary Kissinger and 
Assistant Secretary [for Inter-American 
Aft'airs William D.] Rogers, that we are not 
in the business of intervening in the internal 
aff"airs of Latin American states. 

Discussing his earlier trip to Latin Amer- 
ica with the House International Relations 



58 



Committee on March 4, Mr. Kissinger made 
the following statement: 

We accept the sovereignty of each Latin American 
state. Our policy ... is to support the aspirations 
and objectives of their program of social change, 
to conciliate differences before they become con- 
flicts. . . . 

On the same occasion, touching on the 
themes he emphasized on that trip, Mr. 
Kissinger also repeated our pledge to "nego- . 
tiate our differences with any nation or na- 
tions on the basis of mutual respect and 
sovereign equality." 

Obviously this is a policy which accords 
with our own values and history. We have j 
been able to adopt this approach because we ' 
no longer perceive, as we once did, that an 
extrahemispheric power will be able to n 
mount a significant threat to our own vital | 
interests in Latin America or to the stability 1' 
of Latin American states. 

As for Cuba, we are not taking at face 
value the piety of self-serving statements 
currently emanating from Havana. The 
Cubans should indeed withdraw promptly 
from Angola. They should never have gone 
there in the first place. They should never 
have intervened in a distant conflict better 
resolved by African effort alone. If their 
speedy and complete withdrawal becomes a 
fact, we will welcome it. In the meantime we 
will watch events and check our intelligence , 
with great care. 

There should also be no question, as Sec- 
re*;ary Kissinger pointed out in Costa Rica 
during his February trip, that we will honor 
our treaty commitments and security obliga- 
tions in Latin America. As you know, these 
are largely embodied in the Rio Treaty of 
1947, article 3 of which commits signatories 
to regard an armed attack on any American 
state as an attack on all the American states 
and to "assist in meeting the attack." Article 
6 further provides for immediate consulta- 
tion to agree on measures for the common 
defense and maintenance of the peace and 
security of the continent in cases not involv- 
ing armed attack. I regard the existence 
and the reiteration of these commitments as 
an important contribution to the defense and 
internal stability of hemisphere states. 

Department of State Bulletin 



U.S. Joins Security Council Consensus 
on Resolution on South Africa 

Following are statements made in the 
V.N. Security Council by U.S. Representa- 
tirc Albert W. Sherer, Jr., on June 19, to- 
other with the text of a resolution adopted 
III/ the Council that day. 



STATEMENTS BY AMBASSADOR SHERER 



First Statement of June 19 

rsUN press release 64 dated June 19 

The tragic events occurring in South 
Africa are a sharp reminder that when a 
system deprives a people of the basic ele- 
ments of human dignity and expression, only 
the bitterest results can be expected. In 1960, 
over 16 years ago, this Council met to con- 
sider a similar tragedy and called upon the 
Government of the Republic of South Africa 
to initiate measures aimed at bringing about 
racial harmony based on equality in order to 
assure that the present situation did not 
continue or reoccur and to abandon its poli- 
cies of apartheid and racial discrimination. 

Mr. President, my government supported 
that resolution — and in the intervening 
years we have made repeated pleas, to- 
gether with other members of the United Na- 
tions, to the Government of the Republic of 
South Africa to abandon the policies which 
were inevitably leading to the events we 
have witnessed in the last few days. In the 
present circumstances the frustrations of the 
black people could only find an expression in 
the form of rioting which has brought such 
dire consequences. That is part of the trag- 
edy of South Africa. 

My delegation has stated on other occa- 
sions that the basic facts about human 
rights in South Africa are clear and may be 
stated in two propositions: First, the ma- 
jority of South Africans live under a system 
which deprives them of their basic human 
rights and, second, the South African sys- 
tem of laws is designed and administered so 
as to prevent that majority from taking 



effective peaceful action to alter this condi- 
tion of fundamental deprivation. 

We call on the Government of the Repub- 
lic of South Africa to take these events as a 
warning and to learn from them. They must 
abandon a system which is clearly not ac- 
ceptable under any standard of human 
i-ights. There can be no dream of a future 
for a nation of South Africa that does not 
include both white and black working to- 
gether in harmony and equality. Together 
with other members of the Council, we want 
to assure that the dream will not become a 
nightmare such as that we have witnessed 
in recent days. 

Second Statement of June 19 



USUN pn 



dated June 19 



My government has joined the consensus 
in support of the resolution because of our 
strong conviction that apartheid is wrong 
and that tragedy can only follow if South 
Africa persists in its racial policies. 

In joining the consensus, we do so on the 
clear understanding that the language, par- 
ticularly that in operative paragraph 3, falls 
under chapter VI of the charter and does 
not imply any chapter VII determination. 
We would not want our support of this con- 
sensus to be understood by anyone as mean- 
ing that the United States is prepared to 
contemplate chapter VII action. 

In agreeing to this resolution, the United 
States is sensitive to the limits on Security 
Council jurisdiction imposed by article 2, 
paragraph 7, of the charter. By that article's 
terms, no organ of the United Nations is au- 
thorized to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction 
of any state except in cases in which enforce- 
ment measures under chapter VII are to be 
applied. The Council, of course, is not apply- 
ing enforcement measures in this resolution. 

One final point, Mr. President, but a point 
to which my government attaches paramount 
importance. South Africa in its policy of 
apartheid represents a flagrant violation of 
human rights. But it would be wrong, in- 
deed it would be hypocritical, were it not 
said to this Council that South Africa is not 



July 12, 1976 



59 



the only government which pursues delib- 
erate policies which result in flagrant viola- 
tions of human rights. 

I stress this point concerning violations of 
human rights, Mr. President, in order to 
suggest to this Council that, by being arbi- 
trary and selective in its concerns and its 
condemnation, it brings the United Nations 
into disrepute and may even encourage those 
governments which pursue deliberate poli- 
cies whose cruelty in some cases exceeds that 
of apartheid to believe they can do so with 
impunity. 



TEXT OF RESOLUTION < 

The Security Council, 

Having considered the letter by the representa- 
tives of Benin, the Libyan Arab Republic and the 
United Republic of Tanzania, on behalf of the Afri- 
can Group at the United Nations, concerning the 
measures of repression, including wanton killings, 
perpetrated by the apartheid regime in South Africa 
against the African people in Soweto and other 
areas in South Africa (S/12100), 

Having considered also the telegram from the 
President of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar 
addressed to the Secretary-General (S/12101), 

Deeply shocked over large-scale killings and 
wounding of Africans in South Africa, following the 
callous shooting of African people including school 
children and students demonstrating against racial 
discrimination on 16 June 1976, 

Convinced that this situation has been brought 
about by the continued imposition by the South 
African Government of apartheid and racial dis- 
crimination, in defiance of the resolutions of the 
Security Council and the General Assembly, 

1. Strongly condemns the South African Govern- 
ment for its resort to massive violence against and 
killings of the African people including school chil- 
dren and students and others opposing racial dis- 
crimination; 

2. Expresses its profound sympathy to the victims 
of this violence; 

3. Reaffirms that the policy of apartheid is a 
crime against the conscience and dignity of mankind 
and seriously disturbs international peace and secu- 
rity; 

4. Recognizes the legitimacy of the struggle of 
the South African people for the elimination of 
apartheid and racial discrimination; 

5. Calls upon the South African Government 



urgently to end violence against the African people, 
and take urgent steps to eliminate apartheid and 
racial discrimination; 

6. Decides to remain seized of the matter. 



Congress Asked To Approve Defense 
Cooperation Agreement With Turkey 

Message From President Ford ' 

To the Congress of the United States: 

I am hereby requesting that Congress 
approve and authorize appropriations to im- 
plement the Agreement Between the Govern- 
ments of the United States of America and of 
the Republic of Turkey Relative to Defense 
Cooperation Pursuant to Article III of the 
North Atlantic Treaty in Order to Resist 
Armed Attack in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Area, signed in Washington, March 26, 1976, 
and a related exchange of notes. Accord- 
ingly, I am transmitting herewith draft leg- 
islation in the form of a Joint Resolution of 
the Congress for this purpose. 

The United States and Turkey have long 
enjoyed a close mutual security relationship 
under the North Atlantic Treaty, as well as 
bilateral cooperation in accordance with Ar- 
ticle III of that Treaty. The new Agreement, 
like its predecessor, the Defense Cooperation 
Agreement of 1969 which this Agreement 
would supersede, implements the Treaty. It 
has been signed as an executive agreement. 
The Agreement was negotiated with the 
understanding that it would be subject to 
Congressional approval and expressly pro- 
vides that it shall not enter into force until 
the parties exchange notes indicating ap- 
proval of the Agreement in accordance with 
their respective legal procedures. Full Con- 
gressional endorsement of this Agreement 
will give new strength and stability to con- 
tinuing U.S.-Turkish security cooperation 
which has served as a vital buttress on 
NATO's southeast flank for more than two 
decades. 



'U.N. doc. S/RES/392 (1976); adopted by the 
Council by consensus on June 19. 



' Transmitted on June 16 (text from White House 
press release); also printed as H. Doc. 94-531, which 
includes the texts of draft legislation and the agree- 
ment and a related exchange of notes. 



60 



Department of State Bulletin 



The new Agreement is consistent with, but 
not identical to, the preceding Defense Co- 
operation Agreement of 1969. Founded on 
mutual respect for the sovereignty of the 
parties, the Agreement (Articles II and III) 
authorizes U.S. participation in defense 
measures related to the parties' obligations 
arising out of the North Atlantic Treaty. It 
is understood that when the Agreement 
enters into force pursuant to Article XXI, 
activities will resume which were suspended 
by the Government of Turkey in July 1975, 
when the Turkish Government requested 
negotiation of a new defense cooperation 
agreement. 

The Agreement provides a mutually ac- 
ceptable framework for this important se- 
curity cooperation. The installations author- 
ized by the Agreement will be Turkish 
Armed Forces installations under Turkish 
command (Articles IV and V). Article V 
cleai'ly provides for U.S. command and con- 
trol authority over all U.S. armed forces pei'- 
sonnel, other members of the U.S. national 
element at each installation, and U.S. equip- 
ment and support facilities. 

The installations shall be operated jointly. 
In order to facilitate this objective, the 
United States is committed to a program of 
technical training of Turkish personnel. 

Other provisions of the Agreement deal 
with traditional operational and administra- 
tive matters, including: operation and main- 
tenance of the installations ; ceilings on levels 
of U.S. personnel and equipment; import, ex- 
port and in-country supply procedures; sta- 
tus of forces and property questions. 

Article XIX specifies the amounts of de- 
fense support which the United States plans 
to provide Turkey during the first four 
years the Agreement remains in force. We 
have provided such support to this important 
NATO ally for many years to help Turkey 
meet its heavy NATO obligations. The arti- 
cle provides that during the first four years 
the Agreement remains in force, the United 
States will furnish $1,000,000,000 in grants, 
credits and loan guaranties, to be distrib- 
uted equally over these four years in accord- 
ance with annual plans to be developed by 
the Governments. It further provides that 



during the first year of the defense support 
program, $75 million in grants will be made 
available, with a total of not less than $200 
million in grants to be provided over the 
four-year life of the program. The Article 
also sets forth our preparedness to make 
cash sales to Turkey of defense articles and 
services over the life of the Agreement. 

The related exchange of notes details de- 
fense articles we are prepared to sell to the 
Republic of Turkey at prices consistent with 
U.S. law. It further provides for Turkish 
access to the U.S. Defense Communications 
Satellite System, and for bilateral consulta- 
tions regarding cooperation in modernizing 
Turkish defense communications. 

The defense support specified in Article 
XIX and in the related exchange of notes 
will be provided in accordance with contrac- 
tual obligations existing and to be entered 
into by the Governments, and with the gen- 
eral practices applicable to all other recipient 
countries. The accompanying draft legisla- 
tion accordingly provides that the generally 
applicable provisions of our foreign assist- 
ance and military sales Acts will govern this 
defense support, and that it will be exempted 
from the provisions of section 620 (x) of the 
Foreign Assistance Act as amended. The 
draft legislation further provides that it ful- 
fills the requirements of section 36(b) of the 
Foreign Military Sales Act as amended and 
section 7307 of Title 10 of the United States 
Code with respect to the transfer of materiel 
pursuant to the related exchange of notes. 

The Agreement will have a duration of 
four years, and will be extended for subse- 
quent four-year periods in the absence of 
notice of termination by one of the parties. 
As the four-year defense support program 
comes to an end, the Agreement provides for 
consultation on the development of a future 
program as required in accordance with the 
respective legal procedures of the two Gov- 
ernments. Article XXI stipulates the proce- 
dures under which the Agreement can be 
terminated by either party, and provides for 
a one-year period following termination dur- 
ing which the Agreement will be considei-ed 
to remain in force for the purposes of an 
orderly withdrawal. 



July 12, 1976 



61 



This Agreement restores a bilateral rela- 
tionship that has been important to Western 
security for more than two decades. I be- 
lieve it will promote U.S. interests and ob- 
jectives on the vital southeastern flank of 
NATO and provide a framework for bilateral 
cooperation designed solely to reinforce 
NATO and our common security concerns. 
To the extent that the Agreement restores 
trust and confidence between the United 
States and Turkey, it also enhances the 
prospects for a constructive dialogue on 
other regional problems of mutual concern. 

I therefore request that the Congress give 
this Agreement and the accompanying draft 
legislation prompt and favorable considera- 
tion, and approve its entry into force and 
authorize the appropriation of the funds 
necessary for its execution. 

Gerald R. Ford. 

The White House, June 16, 1976. 



Fourth Progress Report on Cyprus 
Submitted to the Congress 

Message from. President Ford * 

To the Congress of the United States: 

Pursuant to Public Law 94-104, I am sub- 
mitting my fourth periodic report on the 
progress of the Cyprus negotiations and the 
efforts this Administration is making to help 
find a lasting solution to the problems of the 
island. In previous reports I have detailed 
the Administration's efforts to revitalize the 
negotiating process so that the legitimate 
aspirations of all parties, and particularly 
those of the refugees, could be accommo- 
dated quickly and in the most just manner 
possible. 

Differences on procedural issues have long 
prevented the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish- 
Cypriot communities from broaching such 
critical issues as territory, the form and 



'Transmitted on June 7 (text from White House 
press relea.se). 



function of the central government and other 
constitutional issues. Throughout the period 
since the hostilities of 1974, we have con- 
sistently urged serious consideration of 
these issues. As my most recent report in- 
dicated, an agreement was reached at the 
February round of the Cyprus intercommu- 
nal talks in Vienna, held under the auspices 
of United Nations Secretary General Wald- 
heim, to exchange negotiating proposals on 
the key substantive issues of the Cyprus 
problem. When both sides submitted pro- 
posals in April to Secretary General Wald- 
heim's Special Representative on Cyprus, a 
new impasse developed which delayed a com- 
plete exchange on the territorial question. 
Additionally, in April, Glafcos Clerides re- 
signed his position as the Greek-Cypriot ne- 
gotiator. These developments, with the 
subsequent appointment of new Greek- 
Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot negotiators, re- 
sulted in the postponement of the next ne- 
gotiating round which had been scheduled to 
take place in Vienna in May. 

On April 15, I invited Greek Foreign Min- 
ister Bitsios to the White House for a very 
useful exchange of views on developments 
relating to Cyprus. 

In addition, the United States and other 
interested parties maintained close contact 
with Secretary General Waldheim to support 
his attempts to resolve these difficulties and 
resume the intercommunal negotiating proc- 
ess. These efforts culminated in discussions 
on the occasion of the Oslo NATO Ministerial 
meeting in late May where Secretary of 
State Kissinger held separate meetings with 
Tui-kish Foreign Minister Caglayangil and 
Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios, following 
which the Greek and Turkish Foreign Minis- 
ters met together to discuss outstanding bi- 
lateral issues including Cyprus. In the course 
of this process, the Secretary of State 
stressed the absolute need to move expedi- 
tiously to discuss the key outstanding 
Cyprus issues. 

The Secretary of State also publicly em- 
phasized our continuing concern that a rapid 
solution of the Cyprus dispute be achieved 
and reiterated the firm position of this Ad- 



62 



Department of State Bulletin 



ministration that the current territorial di- 
vision of the island cannot be permanent. 

Following the meetings in Oslo, views on 
territorial issues were exchanged by the two 
Cypriot communities, and it should now be 
possible to reinitiate the negotiating process 
under the auspices of UN Secretary General 
Waldheim. 

The United States will continue to con- 
tribute actively to these efforts aimed at a 
solution to the Cyprus problem. I remain con- 
vinced that progress can be registered soon 
if mutual distrust and suspicions can be set 
aside and each side genuinely tests the will 
of the other side to reach a solution. For our 
part, we shall remain in touch with Secretary 
General Waldheim and all interested par- 
ties to support the negotiating process. Our 
objective in the period ahead, as it has been 
j I from the beginning of the Cyprus crisis, is 
' to assist the parties to find a just and equi- 
table solution. 



Gerald R. Ford. 



The White House, June 7, 1976. 



U.N. Force in Cyprus Extended 
j for Six Months 

I Folloiving is a statement made in the U.N. 
Security Council by U.S. Representative Al- 
\ bert W. Sherer, Jr., on June 15, together with 
i the text of a resolution adopted by the Coun- 
cil that day. 



STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SHERER 

USUN press release 62 dated June 15 

Tonight's renewal of the mandate of 
the U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP) marks the 30th time that the 
Security Council has taken this action. As 
he has so often done before, the Secretary 
General has stressed the need for flexibility 
and good will in the negotiating process. Once 
again in the report that is before us he urges 



the parties to take into account "not only 
their own interests but also the legitimate 
aspirations and requirements of the opposing 
side." 

Members of this Council must surely echo 
the Secretary General's appeal for greater 
energy, flexibility, and dedication to the 
success of the intercommunal negotiations. 
Over the years too many opportunities have 
been lost because the concessions necessary 
for agreement required high political risks. 
As the body charged with the maintenance 
of international peace — and through its long 
involvement in the Cyprus question — this 
Council has the right to expect that serious 
risks be taken in the search for a lasting 
settlement. 

The Secretary General has again earned 
our admiration for the tireless and imagina- 
tive way in which he has carried out his 
mission of good oflices. The last six months 
have presented very special difficulties. My 
government fully understands, and shares, 
the Secretary General's view that "Before 
reconvening the talks, it is obviously neces- 
sary to have reasonable assurances that they 
will be meaningful and productive." The Sec- 
retary General will, we are certain, lend the 
prestige of his ofl^ce and his personal in- 
genuity to obtaining the assurances neces- 
sary to insure the success of the Cyprus 
talks. 

In straightforward terms, the Secretary 
General has in paragraph 65 of his report 
expressed concern over the situation of 
Greek Cypriots in the north. My delegation 
shares the hope expressed by other members 
of the Council that this situation will im- 
prove in accordance with past agreements 
covering Greek Cypriots in the north. 

In the last two years, Mr. President, the 
United States has doubled its annual con- 
tribution to UNFICYP from $4.8 million to 
$9.6 million a year. We have done this in 
order to maintain quiet on the island and 
insure conditions supportive of the inter- 
communal negotiations. It is accordingly 
with deep concern that we have read in the 
Secretary General's report that the future 
of the Force is imperiled because "voluntary 



'July 12, 1976 



63 



contributions have continued to be made in 
insufficient amounts and by a disappoint- 
ingly small number of Governments . . . ." 
Surely the time has come for governments 
interested in a just Cyprus settlement to 
donate their fair share to UNFICYP. Per- 
manent members of the Security Council 
have a special responsibility to contribute to 
international peace and security. That high 
responsibility cannot be diminished by peace- 
keeping doctrinal considerations stemming 
from different circumstances and an earlier 
era. 

Mr. President, my government remains 
convinced that a just and durable peace in 
Cyprus is not only possible but is deeply de- 
sired by Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike. 
At the last General Assembly, Secretary of 
State Kissinger outlined five principles which 
the United States considers essential to a 
permanent settlement. Let me repeat these 
principles, which are consonant with Gen- 
eral Assembly and Security Council resolu- 
tions on Cyprus: 

— A settlement must preserve the independence, 
sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Cyprus. 

— It must insure that both the Greek Cypriot and 
the Turkish Cypriot communities can live in free- 
dom and have a large voice in their own affairs. 

— The present dividing lines cannot be permanent. 
There must be agreed territorial arrangements 
which reflect the economic requirements of the 
Greek Cypriot community and take account of its 
self-respect. 

— There must be provision for the withdrawal of 
foreign military forces other than those present 
under the authority of international agreements. 

— And there must be security for all Cypriots; 
the needs and wishes of the refugees who have been 
the principal victims and whose tragic plight touches 
us all must be dealt with speedily and with com- 
passion. 

In conclusion, Mr. President, I would like 
to pay tribute to those who make the U.N. 
operation in Cyprus the remarkable com- 
bination of peacekeeping and peacemaking 
that it is. The Secretary General's Special 
Representative, [Javier] Perez de Cuellar, 
Under Secretaries General [Brian G.] Urqu- 
hart and [Roberto Enrique] Guyer and their 
fine staffs. General Prem Chand [Lt. Gen. 
D. Prem Chand] and the officers and men of 
UNFICYP — these people represent, in my 



64 



government's estimate, the very highest 
standards of international service. Their 
conduct reflects the ideals of this organiza- 
tion, and we salute them. 



TEXT OF RESOLUTION > 

The Security Council, 

Noting from the report of the Secretary-General 
of 5 June 1976 (S/12093) that in existing circum- 
stances the presence of the United Nations Peace- 
keeping Force in Cyprus is essential not only to 
help maintain quiet in the island but also to facili- 
tate the continued search for a peaceful settlement. 

Noting from the report the conditions prevailing 
in the island. 

Noting also from the report that the freedom of 
movement of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force 
in Cyprus and its civil police (UNCIVPOL) is still 
restricted in the north of the island, that progress 
is being made in discussions regarding the station- 
ing, deployment and functioning of the United Na- 
tions Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus and expressing 
the hope that those discussions will lead speedily to 
the elimination of all existing difficulties, 

Noting further that, in paragraph 70 of his re- 
port, the Secretary-General expresses the view that 
the best hope of achieving a just and lasting settle- 
ment of the Cyprus problem lies in negotiations be- 
tween the representatives of the two communities 
and that the usefulness of those negotiations de- 
pends upon the willingness of all parties concerned 
to show the necessary flexibility, taking into account 
not only their own interests but also the legitimate 
aspirations and requirements of the opposing side. 

Expressing its concern at actions which increase 
tension between the two communities and tend to 
affect adversely the efforts towards a just and last- 
ing peace in Cyprus, 

Emphasizing the need for the parties concerned 
to adhere to the agreements reached at all previous 
rounds of the talks held under the auspices of the 
Secretary-General and expressing the hope that fu- 
ture talks will be meaningful and productive, 

Noting also the concurrence of the parties con- 
cerned in the recommendation by the Secretary- 
General that the Security Council extend the sta- 
tioning of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force 
in Cyprus for a further period of six months, 

Noting that the Government of Cyprus has 
agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in 
the island it is necessary to keep the Force in 
Cyprus beyond 15 June 1976, 



'U.N. doc. S/RES/391 (1976); adopted by the 
Council on June 15 by a vote of 13-0, with Benin 
and the People's Republic of China not participating 
in the vote. 

Department of State Bulletim 



1. Reaffirms the provisions of resolution 186 
(1964) of 4 March 1964, as well as subsequent reso- 
lutions and decisions on the establishment and main- 
tenance of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force 
in Cyprus and other aspects of the situation in 
Cyprus; 

2. Reaffirms once again its resolution 365 (1974) 
of 13 December 1974, by which it endorsed General 
Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), adopted unani- 
mously on 1 November 1974, and calls once again 
for their urgent and effective implementation and 
that of its resolution 367 (1975); 

3. Urges the parties concerned to act with the 
utmost restraint to refrain from any unilateral or 
other action likely to affect adversely the prospects 
of negotiations and to continue and accelerate de- 
termined co-operative efforts to achieve the objec- 
tives of the Security Council; 

4. Extends once more the stationing in Cyprus of 
the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, estab- 
lished under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), 
for a further period ending 15 December 1976, in the 
expectation that by then sufficient progress towards 
a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or 
substantial reduction of the Force; 

5. Appeals again to all parties concerned to ex- 
tend their fullest co-operation so as to enable the 
United Nations Peace-keeping Force to perform its 
duties effectively; 

6. Requests the Secretary-General to continue the 
mission of good offices entrusted to him by para- 
graph 6 of resolution 367 (1975), to keep the Secu- 
rity Council informed of the progress made and to 
submit a report on the implementation of this reso- 
lution by 30 October 1976. 



J.S.-Japan Cultural Conference 
hlold Eighth Meeting 

Folloiving is the text of a communique 
■ssued at the conclusion of the eighth U.S. 
Japan Conference on Cultural and Educa- 
ional Interchange (CULCON VIII) at 
Washington on May 28.^ 



■ 



I. The Eighth United States-Japan Conference on 
lultural and Educational Interchange was held in 
Washington, May 26-28, 1976. Delegates and spe- 
tialists representing the governments, academic 
;ommunities, mass media, businesses, political com- 
nunities, foundations, and creative arts of the two 
ountries reviewed the state of cultural and educa- 
ional interchange since the last Conference in 
>kyo two years ago and agreed to a number of rec- 
mmendations designed to deepen and widen mutual 
inderstanding. 



II. The Conference agreed that cultural and edu- 
cational ties between the two countries were at the 
heart of the overall U.S.-Japan relationship; that 
the single most effective means of strengthening that 
already vigorous relationship was to further im- 
prove the quality and variety of programs and ex- 
changes over an increasingly broad spectrum of 
both societies. In this connection, the Conference 
was stimulated by the CULCON Symposium held in 
New York on May 24-26. This Symposium, held in 
connection with the Bicentennial, was sponsored by 
the Japan Society in cooperation with the Inter- 
national House of Japan. Its purpose was to "ex- 
plore issues of significant concern to the cultures of 
Japan and the United States". Especially noteworthy 
was the Symposium's success in bringing together 
outstanding younger Japanese and American spe- 
cialists for substantive discussion. 

III. The Conference agreed on the vital impor- 
tance of fostering dialogue between a wider spectrum 
of our two societies and found that the development 
of new intellectual communities, based upon com- 
mon aspirations, but not necessarily similar expe- 
riences, is worthy of pursuit. In this connection, 
it was agreed that the 1977 Joint Committee should 
consider organizing in 1978 a Symposium or similar 
event involving representatives from various seg- 
ments of our two societies. It was suggested that 
this event should involve the mass media in such 
a way as to maximize its impact on both societies. 

IV. The Conference welcomed the establishment in 
October, 1975 of the United States-Japan Friend- 
ship Commission which now joins the Japan Founda- 
tion, established nearly four years ago, as a new 
and major contribution to expand cultural relations 
between the two countries. 

V. Recognizing the need to more fully utilize the 
varied experience of its Panel members on both sides, 
and to plan future CULCON activities with a clearer 
understanding of areas of cultural communication 
needing attention, the Conference agreed that: 

1. The Joint Committee on U.S.-Japan Cultural 
and Educational Cooperation, meeting in the years 
between these biennial Conferences, would set aside 
time for discussion of future developments in our 
two cultures. 

2. A survey would be undertaken in both countries 
to identify possible structural impediments inhibit- 
ing a smooth flow of cultural exchange and com- 



' Paragraph XII of the communique, which in- 
cludes a list of CULCON delegates from the United 
States and Japan, is not printed here. Dr. John W. 
Hall, chairman. Department of History, Yale Uni- 
versity, was chairman of the U.S. panel; Yoshinori 
Maeda, former president of and now honorary ad- 
viser to Nippon Hoso Kyokai (Japan Broadcasting 
Corp.), was chairman of the Japanese panel. A com- 
plete list of delegates was also included in press re- 
lease 265 dated May 24. 



Ilr uly 12, 1976 



65 



munication, for consideration by the 1977 Joint Com- 
mittee meeting. 

VI. The Conference, in keeping with earlier 
CULCON discussions, agreed to establish Library 
and News Media Subcommittees and to further con- 
sider formation of a separate Television Cooperation 
Subcommittee. 

VII. In order to achieve a sharper focus and more 
effective collaboration by both sides, the Conference 
agreed upon a "Statement of Mission" for each of 
the Subcommittees, describing also current areas 
of emphasis. 

VIII. Recognizing the increasing exchange of 
business and professional representatives between 
the two countries, the Conference discussed the need 
to assure that in each country there are adequate 
programs providing training and orientation on the 
society and culture of the other. Several reports de- 
scribing current programs in Japan and the United 
States were submitted to the Conference. The Con- 
ference expressed the hope that this subject would 
be considered at the Japan-U.S. Economic Council 
meeting in Japan in June, 1976. It offered to co- 
operate with the Council in this endeavor. It further 
agreed to discuss developments in this area at the 
1977 meeting of the U.S.-Japan Joint Committee on 
Cultural and Educational Cooperation. 

IX. In the course of deliberations by various Sub- 
committees, it became clear that the number of 
translated works of a literary and scholarly nature 
from Japanese into English remains seriously in- 
adequate. The Conference recommended that both 
sides explore means of alleviating this situation on a 
systematic basis, including the possible establish- 
ment of a joint mechanism to this end. It was agreed 
that progress in this area would be reviewed at the 
1977 Joint Committee meeting. 

X. Recognizing that eight years of experience with 
Joint Committee activities has led to certain minor 
modifications in Committee operations, and being 
aware of the need to describe more clearly the 
relationship between the Joint Committee and 
CULCON meetings, the Conference recommended 
that both governments clarify certain essentially 
administrative aspects of the 1968 Exchange of 
Notes. 

XI. The Conference considered a series of topics 
in the following areas of specialization: 

A. American Studies 

The Subcommittee notes with deep regret the 
passing of one of its members most fondly regarded 
in Japan and the U.S., Professor Norman Holmes 
Pearson of Yale. 

Since the 1975 Joint Committee Meeting, the 
most important single event was the Bicentennial 
Conference on American Studies hosted by the 
Japanese Association for American Studies for the 
Asia and Pacific area. From September 4-7, 1975, 
some one hundred scholars gathered in Fujinomiya 



66 



to discuss the American Revolution, the meaning of 
America to that portion of the globe, and American 
Studies methods. Proceedings have already been 
published in Japanese and at least some of the 
papers will also appear in English. 

The extraordinary success of that conference was 
a primary topic of the Subcommittee as it was con- 
vened in the Foreign Ministry, Tokyo, September 
8, 1975. Other primary concerns were the remark- 
able proliferation of American studies in Japan, as 
revealed by the survey sponsored by the Fulbright 
Commission, and the future of the Kyoto American 
Studies Seminar. 

The Subcommittee has concurred on a revised 
statement of mission which expresses both a theoret- 
ical rationale, as well as a sense of priority issues. 

The Subcommittee was pleased to have contributed 
in some measure to the Symposium of May 24-26, 
1976, at Japan House in New York City. We feel 
that this series of meetings confirms a direction of 
interest the Committee has consistently sought to 
encourage: namely comparative study and coopera- 
tive projects involving groups, individuals, and in- 
stitutions in the two cultures. 

The Subcommittee, both as a group and as a 
collection of individuals, has continued to involve it- 
self in teaching, research, and publication which 
bear on the improved understanding of American 
culture from the Japanese point of view and which 
elicits cooperative efforts and comparative results. 

Reconim endations : 

1. Secure support for the Kyoto American Studies 
Summer Seminar. 

2. Achieve the translation into English and publi- 
cation of Japanese works dealing with American 
civilization. 

3. Realize full regional participation in Americav 
Studies International as it endeavors to facilitate 
regular communication between non-American 
scholars in American Studies. 

4. Develop an agenda of mutual interests with 
both the Japanese Studies and the Library Sub- 
committees. 

B. Education for International Understanding 

The Joint Subcommittee on Education for Inter- 
national Understanding developed a project designed 
to provide a framework of significant ideas pertinent 
to a greater mutual understanding of both Japan 
and the United States. The project brought together 
small teams from each of these countries made up 
of educators and scholars from the U.S. and Japan. 
The goal of the project is to produce a thematic, con- 
ceptual structure upon which will be based accom- 
panying instructional materials that will promote 
mutual understanding and awareness among Jap- 
anese and United States elementary and secondary 
school teachers and students. 

To achieve this end, a Meeting of Representative 

Department of State Bulletin 



Experts on Education for International Understand- 
ing was held in March, 1975 at the East-West 
Center in Hawaii. The schedule and methods of im- 
plementing the proposed three-year joint project 
were discussed. Subsequently, the Phase I (Japanese- 
American joint workshop in the summer of 1975 in 
Hawaii) and the Phase II (field research in each 
other's country) were undertaken. Each team is 
currently preparing a report on the findings. 

In the summer of 1976, a workshop will be held 
at Duke University (North Carolina) where the 
experts of the two countries will review the first 
drafts and prepare final versions of materials for 
use in schools. 

The joint project, which has thus far been suc- 
cessfully implemented, has achieved, among others, 
the following two objectives: (1) A teachers' manual 
and resource materials, the first of this kind to 
better understand each other's country, are cur- 
rently being developed in Japan and the United 
States respectively; and (2) The project has greatly 
stimulated interest in the need for understanding 
each other's country, while concurrently marking 
great progress in developing specific ways and 
means both in research and training. 
it 
litll Recommendations: 

1. This three-year project should be regarded as 
only a beginning for a long-range project in this 
kind of effort. Thus, it is of utmost importance to 
capitalize on the achievements of this project and 
to undertake further practical research in each of 
the two countries on several important problems 
which have been identified in the present on-going 
research project. In relation to this, a new program 
should be considered jointly and/or in each country 
promoting education for mutual understanding 
between the two peoples. It is hoped that feasibility 
of the following projects will be considered in this re- 
gard: (a) The Japanese side would inventory ex- 
isting programs of educational materials develop- 
ment in Japan as a basis for possible joint efforts in 
making selections for use in promoting international 
understanding in the American educational system; 
and (b) Establish effective ways to expand and im- 
prove the exchange of teachers, students (especially 
those of teachers' colleges), teachers' education, and 
educational administrators; also, to prepare adequate 
facilities for hosting visitors to each other's country. 
2. Based upon the significant progress achieved 
by the cooperative effort of the Joint Education 
Subcommittee to date, it is hoped that the natural 
relevance of the follow-up activities proposed for the 
future would lead to positive consideration by various 
organizations whose financial assistance might be 
required. 

C. Japanese Studies 

Responding to an invitation extended at the meet- 
ing of the Joint Committee in Hawaii last summer. 



the Japanese Government sent a high level Survey 
Mission to the United States for a three-week period 
this Spring to study and report on the state of 
Japanese studies in America. Some six organizations 
and twenty-four universities were visited. 

Parallel with this Mission, the American Japanese 
Studies Subcommittee commissioned a questionnaire 
which was sent to all institutions known to be 
engaged in Japanese studies in the United States. 
An interim draft of their findings was made avail- 
able to the Survey Team. 

The analysis of data and the sorting out of im- 
pressions is still in progress, but preliminary reports 
of both surveys were presented at CULCON VIII. 
That the area of Japanese studies had expanded 
significantly was obvious. Over the past five years, 
while American higher education generally registered 
a growth of enrollment of only 14 percent, Jap- 
anese language course enrollments, for example, 
have gone up three fold; and the number of Ameri- 
can institutions offering courses on Japan has 
climbed over the same period by 40 percent to reach 
nearly 200. 

On the other hand, even a preliminary analysis 
of findings reveals a number of problem areas. 
Attention must be given to: (1) Assisting institu- 
tions with minimal Japanese programs; (2) Ex- 
panding Japanese language libraries; (3) The im- 
provement of Japanese language instruction; (4) 
Checking the erosion of interest in the social 
sciences; (5) Supporting publications of research 
finds; and (6) The more effective introduction of 
Japanese studies into the secondary school system 
and also institutions training practitioners in busi- 
ness, law, journalism, education and other profes- 
sions. 

Recommendations : 

1. Each Subcommittee should revise its draft 
report for wider distribution. Thereafter, both Sub- 
committees might consider singularly and together 
what steps and priorities should be taken to advance 
Japanese studies in America. The two Subcom- 
mittees have, however, already identified certain 
areas for future attention. These areas include: (a) 
The identification of abstracting, translating and 
other services needed to improve the accessibility 
in the United States of the products of Japanese 
scholarship; (b) The determination of how Japa- 
nese studies can more effectively be integrated into 
the education of businessmen, lawyers, journalists, 
secondary school educators and other professionals 
in the United States; and (c) The study of the 
adequacy of facilities in Japan for visiting American 
students, researchers and teachers. 

2. In areas of overlapping concern, the Subcom- 
mittee looks forward to close cooperation with the 
American Studies, Library and other CULCON 
Subcommittees. 

3. The need is recognized to expand joint research 



July 12, 1976 



67 



activities and stabilize their financing, particularly 
through the program recommended earlier to the 
Japan Society for the Promotion of Science and the 
Social Science Research Council and American Coun- 
cil of Learned Societies, and the two Subcommittees 
have agreed to include concern for such joint 
research as an ongoing part of their responsibilities. 

D. Library 

The Joint Committee on U.S.-Japan Cultural and 
Educational Cooperation meeting in Hawaii, June 
21-23, 1975, recommended inter alia the establish- 
ment of a Library Subcommittee "to improve access 
of Japanese to American material and American 
access to Japanese materials", and suggested that 
the Subcommittee, when established, should main- 
tain close liaison with other CULCON Subcommit- 
tees in the formulation and implementation of 
Library programs. 

A joint preparatory conference, held in Kyoto 
on October 27, 1975, discussed the following general 
areas of possible activity though without agree- 
ment on priorities: (1) Interchange of personnel 
and publications; (2) Inter-library cooperation; (3) 
Japan documentation center/ American documenta- 
tion centers; (4) Specialized bibliographies; and (5) 
Other areas of binational cooperation in library 
and information science. 

In a subsequent exchange of views, a statement 
of mission and functions was agreed upon incorporat- 
ing the following points: (1) The basic mission 
should be to strengthen mutual understanding 
through encouragement of improved library services 
relating to the two countries; and (2) The basic 
functions should include improving access to library 
materials, assisting in the development of quality 
collections for the study of Japan and the U.S., 
encouraging the exchange of professional ideas, in- 
formation, and library materials, and the publica- 
tion of specialized bibliographies. 

Recommendations : 

1. The Library Subcommittees, working closely 
with other CULCON Subcommittees, and other ex- 
isting organizations and committees in both coun- 
tries, should seek to accomplish the above stated 
mission. 

2. The question of current emphases should be 
determined after further study by the Subcommit- 
tees, in consultation with each other. This process 
should take into consideration special needs as 
identified and expressed by interested parties inside 
and outside CULCON, and be carried out in full 
awareness that unique library and information needs 
in the two countries require differing responses as 
appropriate. 



68 



E. Museum 

The Subcommittee on Museum Exchange is pleased 
with the progress made since CULCON VII. Tangible 
evidence of this progress is found in these specific 
activities: (1) The Japan Bicentennial exhibition of 
"Collected Masterworks from Art Museums of the 
United States", now being developed under the 
leadership of the Cleveland Museum of Art with the 
important cooperation of the Agency for Cultural 
Affairs in Japan; (2) The first meeting of the study 
group on the care of works of art in traveling 
exhibitions and the drafting of a tentative report; 
(3) The enactment by the Congress of the United 
States (and signed into law by the President of the 
United States) of legislation providing a program 
of insurance for art exhibitions brought to the 
United States and for exhibitions from the United 
States under certain conditions; (4) The increase 
in the number of one-man shows and smaller ex- 
hibitions being exchanged by both nations; and (5) 
The plans now under development for further ex- 
changes in the months and years ahead. 

While much remains to be done to encourage the 
continued growth of museum exchange programs 
between the two countries, the progress is pleasing, 
substantial, and the projects encouraging. 

Recommendations : 

1. Implementation of the major Bicentennial ex- 
hibition in Tokyo. 

2. Development and implementation of the Shinto 
art exhibition which will be sponsored in the United 
States by the Japan Society and the Seattle Museum. 

3. Finalization of the report from the study group 
on the care of works of art in traveling exhibi- 
tions. This may require a second meeting to re- 
solve outstanding issues. After this adjustment is 
achieved, the results should be widely disseminated 
to institutions in both nations. 

4. Encouragement of an expanded program of 
museum exchanges between the two countries and 
a monitoring of such activities. 

F. News Media 

Following discussions at the Joint Committee Meet- 
ing in Hawaii in June 1975, thorough considera- 
tion has been given to the formal establishment of a 
joint Subcommittee in the News Media area. 

The exchange of journalists has continued to move 
forward with the realization of the fifth meeting of 
Japanese-American Editors, as sponsored by the 
International Press Institute, which was held in 
November, 1975 at Wingspread, Wisconsin. 

Finally, it was noted that a limited number of 
U.S. news editors took advantage of the exchange 
program with visits in Japan in March, 1975 and 



Department of State Bulletin 



that a group of Japanese news editors came to the 
United States for the counterpart orientation pro- 
gram in November, 1975. 

Recommendations : 

1. Members of the Subcommittee should periodi- 
cally assess the various exchange programs con- 
cerned with the media, with a view toward the im- 
provement and expansion of these programs, both 
in intensity and scope and degree of coverage. 

2. Full utilization be made of The Japan Foreign 
Press Center which is scheduled to be opened this 
coming October in Tokyo's Nippon Press Center. 
This institution will assist the news gathering 
activities of correspondents from all countries. 

G. Television 

The third U.S.-Japan Television Program Festival 
was held in Washington, D.C. in conjunction with 
the 51st National Convention of the National Associ- 
ation of Educational Broadcasters from November 
16th to 19th. A Japanese delegation of 15 television 
executives attended the Festival and also participated 
in the Fourth U.S.-Japan Broadcasting Executives' 
Joint Conference on November 21 in New York at 
Japan House. 

Fifteen sister-station relationships, six of which 
had been newly realized since the last Joint Com- 
mittee meeting, have been established. It was agreed 
to work toward the regular publication of a news- 
letter dealing with sister-station activities. 

During the past year, PBS [Public Broadcasting 
Service] broadcast the 60-minute program "Tenno", 
produced by the BPCJ [Broadcast Programming 
Center of Japan] for the Japan Foundation. It was 
broadcast on the eve of the Emperor's arrival. The 
jlj series entitled "The Japanese Film" has been dis- 
( tributed nationally by PBS for a second time in 
the winter of 1976. The series "Journey to Japan" 
was rebroadcast for in-school use in the fall as well. 

The production of the TV "Japan Study Course" 
by University of Mid-America has progressed with 
jthe cooperation of the Hoso Bunka Foundation, the 
jJapan Foundation, NHK [Nippon Hoso Kyokai 
(Japan Broadcasting Corp.)] and commercial sta- 
tions. By March, 1976, six pilot programs (30 
minutes each) were completed, and the American 
production team visited Japan two times to col- 
lect materials. This series is expected to be com- 
pleted early next year. 

Recommendations : 

1. The establishment of a Japanese Subcommittee 
similar to the existing American Subcommittee will 
De considered after consultation with the Broadcast 
Programming Center of Japan (BPCJ), the Jap- 



luly 12, 1976 



anese Secretariat for Television Cooperation which 
has been functioning as a Subcommittee. 

2. For the Fourth Television Program Festival, 
representatives of the country in which program.s 
are intended to be shown should be involved in a 
pre-screening of programs. This pre-screening would 
be for the purpose of giving suggestions and advis- 
ing on the most suitable American and Japanese 
programs to be shown at the Festival. 

3. During the Fourth Festival, further exploration 
of issues related to the professional concerns of tele- 
vision executives could be made. In this respect, dis- 
cussion of news presentations and visits to experi- 
mental television laboratories might be of interest 
and stimulate further exchange. 

4. Time should be allocated during the Fourth 
Festival for visits to sister-stations by the American 
broadcasters to continue and further cultural ex- 
changes. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 



Coffee 

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. 
Done at London December 3, 1975.' 
Signature: Papua New Guinea. June 10, 1976. 

Economic Cooperation 

Agreement establishing a financial support fund of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. Done at Paris April 9, 1975." 
Ratification deposited: Iceland, June 15, 1976. 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on facilitation of international maritime 
traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965. 
Entered into force March 5, 1967; for the United 
States May 16, 1967. TIAS 6251. 
Accession deposited: India, May 25, 1976. 

Ocean Dumping 

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by 
dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. 



' Not in force. 



69 



Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Wash- 
ington December 29, 1972. Entered into force 
August 30, 1975. TIAS 8165. 
Accession deposited: Yugoslavia, June 25, 1976. 

Property — Intellectual 

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Prop- 
erty Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 
1967. Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the 
United States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932. 
Accession deposited: Qatar, June 3, 1976. 

Slave Trade 

Convention to suppress the slave trade and slavery. 
Concluded at Geneva September 25, 1926. Entered 
into force March 9, 1927; for the United States 
March 21, 1929. TS 778. 

Notification of succession: Bahamas, June 10, 
1976. 

Protocol amending the slavery convention signed at 
Geneva on September 25, 1926, and annex. Done at 
New York December 7, 1953. Entered into force 
December 7, 1953, for the protocol; July 7, 1955, 
for the annex to protocol; for the United States 
March 7, 1956. TIAS 3532. 

Notification of succession: Bahamas, June 10. 
1976. 

Slavery 

Supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery, 
the slave trade and institutions and practices 
similar to slavery. Done at Geneva September 7, 
1956. Entered into force April 30, 1957; for the 
United States December 6, 1967. TIAS 6418. 
Notification of succession: Bahamas, June 10, 
1976. 

Space 

Convention on registration of objects launched into 
outer space. Opened for signature at New York 
January 14, 1975.' 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: June 
21, 1976. 

Telecommunications 

International telecommunication convention, with 
annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torre- 
molinos October 25, 1973. Entered into force Jan- 
uary 1, 1975; for the United States April 7, 1976 
Ratifications deposited: Bangladesh, April 6 
1976;= Madagascar, March 17, 1976. 

Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva 
1959, as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590^ 
7435), to establish a new frequency allotment 
plan for high-frequency radiotelephone coast sta 
tions, with annexes and final protocol. Done at 
Geneva June 8, 1974. Entered into force Janu 
ary 1, 1976.= 

Notifications of approval: Iraq, March 8, 1976; 
Tanzania, March 15, 1976. 



Tin 

Fifth international tin agreement, with annexes. 

Done at Geneva June 21, 1975.' 

Signatures: Nigeria, April 22, 1976; Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, April 23, 1976; * 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, April 26, 
1976; Czechoslovakia,' Yugoslavia, April 27, 
1976; Australia, Ireland, April 28, 1976. 

Accepta7ice deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, June 11, 1976. 

Trade 

Declaration on the provisional accession of Colombia 
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
Done at Geneva July 23, 1975. Entered into force 
January 22, 1976; for the United States May 1, 
1976. 
Acceptances deposited: Egypt, March 17, 1976; 

Poland, April 20, 1976; Chile, April 28, 1976; 

Nicaragua, May 11, 1976. 
Tenth proces-verbal extending the declaration on 
the provisional accession of Tunisia to the Gen- 
era! Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at 
Geneva November 21, 1975. Entered into force 
January 8, 1976; for the United States January 
19, 1976. 
Acceptances deposited: Egypt, March 17, 1976; 

India, March 18, 1976; Poland, April 20, 1976. 

Wheat 

Protocol modifying and further extending the 
wheat trade convention (part of the international 
wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 8227). Done 
at Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force 
June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions, 
and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions. 
Accession deposited: Ireland, June 24, 1976. 

Protocol modifying and further extending the food 
aid convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 8227). Done at 
Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force 
June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions, 
and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions. 
Accession deposited: Ireland, June 24, 1976. 

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat 
trade convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 8227). Done at 
Washington March 17, 1976. Entered into force 
June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions, 
and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions. 
Declarations of provisional application deposited: 
Guatemala, June 15, 1976; Costa Rica, June 23, 
1976. 



' Not in force. 

- With reservation. 

' Not in force for the United States. 

' With declarations. 



70 



Department of State Bulletin! 



forte 



White Slave Traffic 

Agreement for the suppression of the white slave 
traffic. Signed at Paris May 18, 1904. Entered into 
force July 18, 1905; for the United States June 6, 
1908. 35 Stat. 1979. 

Notification of succession : Bahamas, June 10, 
1976. 

Protocol amending the international agreement for 
the suppression of the white slave traffic, signed 
at Paris IMay 18, 1904, and the international con- 
vention for the suppression of the white slave 
traffic signed at Paris May 4, 1910. Done at Lake 
Success May 4, 1949. Entered into force May 4, 
1949; for the United States August 14, 1950. 
TIAS 2332. 

Notification of succession : Bahamas, June 10 
1976. 



BILATERAL 



Brazil 

Joint communique relating to trade, investment, and 
financial matters. Issued at Brasilia May 11, 1976. 
Entered into force May 11, 1976. 

Egypt 

Loan agreement to assist Egypt to increase its in- 
dustrial and agricultural production. Signed at 
Cairo May 22, 1976. Entered into force May 22, 
1976. 

Ethiopia 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. 
Signed at Addis Ababa June 15, 1976. Entered 
into force June 15, 1976. 

Honduras 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, 
relating to the agreement of March 5, 1975 (TIAS 
8037). Signed at Tegucigalpa June 9, 1976. En- 
tered into force June 9, 1976. 

Italy 

Agreement relating to the provision of assistance 
to earthquake victims of Italy. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Rome June 9, 1976. Entered 
into force June 9, 1976. 

Japan 

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports of 
specialty steel from Japan, with annexes, related 
note, and agreed minutes. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Washington June 11, 1976. Entered 
into force June 11, 1976. 

Republic of Korea 

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and 
the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 



taxes on income and the encouragement of inter- 
national trade and investment, with related notes. 
Signed at Seoul June 4, 1976. Enters into force 
30 days following the exchange of ratifications. 

Lebanon 

Agreement extending the air transport agreement 
of September 1, 1972 (TIAS 7546), subject to cer- 
tain understandings. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Beirut and Washington March 29, May 18 
and 25, 1976. Entered into force May 25, 1976. 

Mauritania 

Agreement relating to the transfer of agricultural 
commodities to Mauritania to assist in alleviating 
the shortage caused by prolonged drought. Signed 
at Nouakchott May 28, 1976. Entered into force 
May 28, 1976. 

Niger 

Agreement relating to the transfer of food grains 
to Niger to assist in alleviating the shortage 
caused by prolonged drought. Signed at Niamey 
February 7, 1976. Entered into force February 7, 
1976. 

Agreement amending the agreement of February 7, 
1976, relating to the transfer of food grains to 
Niger to assist in alleviating the shortage caused 
by prolonged drought. Signed at Niamey April 
28, 1976. Entered into force April 28, 1976. 

Philippines 

Agreement relating to the continuation of medical 
and scientific research projects conducted in the 
Philippines by the United States Medical Re- 
search Unit-Two (NAMRU-2). Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Manila May 12 and 21, 1976. 
Entered into force May 21, 1976. 

Agreement amending the agreement of April 4, 
1974 (TIAS 7814), relating to the use of the Vet- 
eran's Memorial Hospital and the provision of 
medical care and treatment and nursing home 
care of veterans by the Philippines and the fur- 
nishing of grants-in-aid by the United States. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Manila May 12 
and 21, 1976. Entered into force May 21, 1976. 

Portugal 

Loan agreement relating to M48A5 tanks and 

M113A1 armored personnel carriers. Signed at 

Washington June 11, 1976. Entered into force 
June 11, 1976. 

Spain 

Supplementary treaty on extradition. Signed at 
Madrid January 25, 1975.' 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: June 
21, 1976. 



' Not in force. 



JJuly 12, 1976 



71 



Treaty of friendship and cooperation, with related 
notes and supplementary agreements. Signed at 
Madrid January 24, 1976/ 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: June 
21, 1976, with declaration. 

Switzerland 

Treaty on mutual assistance in criminal matters 
with related notes. Signed at Bern May 25, 1973.' 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: June 
21, 1976. 

United Kingdom 

Extradition treaty, with schedule, protocol of signa- 
ture, and exchange of notes. Signed at London 
June 8, 1972.^ 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: June 
21, 1976. 



Not in force. 



PUBLICATIONS 



GPO Sales Publications 

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock 
number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Gover7iment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 
A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or 
more copies of any one publication mailed to the 
same address. Remittances, payable to the Superin- 
tendent of Documents, must accompany orders. 
Prices shown below, ivhich include domestic postage, 
are subject to change. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Polish 

People's Republic. TIAS 8164. 5 pp. 35<f. (Cat. No. 

89.10:8164). 

Prevention of Marine Pollution. Convention with 

Other Governments. TIAS 8165. 83 pp. $1.35. (Cat. 

No. S9.10:8165). 

Development of Agricultural Trade. Protocol with the 

Socialist Republic of Romania. TIAS 8167. 12 pp. 35(f. 

(Cat. No. S9.10:8167). 

Cultural Relations. Agreement with the United King- 
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. TIAS 
8168. 5 pp. 35<t. (Cat. No. 89.10:8168). 

Suez Canal — Clearance of Mines and Unexploded 
Ordnance. Arrangement with Egypt amending the 
arrangement of April 13 and 25, 1974. TIAS 8169. 
6 pp. 35(>. (Cat. No. 89.10:8169). 

Trade in Cotton, Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textiles 
and Textile Products. TIAS 8179. 18 pp. 35(f. (Cat. No. 
89.10:8170). 



72 



Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: June 21-27 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 
Mo. Date SnbjMt 

t311 6/21 Kissinger: OECD, Paris. 
*313 6/21 Habib: remarks at funeral of 
Ambassador Meloy and Robert 
0. Waring, National Cathedral, 
Washington. 
*314 6/21 Kissinger: remarks following 
meetmg with President of 
France, Paris. 
*315 6/22 Kissinger, Valeriani: interview, 

Paris. 
*316 6/22 Kissinger: remarks with CBS cor- 
respondent, Paris, June 21. 
t317 6/22 Kissinger: news conference, Paris. 
*gi8 6/22 Harry W. Schlaudeman sworn in 
as Assistant Secretary for Inter- 
American Affairs (biographic 
data). 
*319 6/23 Government Advisory Committee 
on International Book and Li- 
brary Programs, July 29. 
*320 6/23 Study Group 6 of the U.S. Na- 
tional Committee for the Inter- 
national Radio Consultative 
Committee, Boulder, Colo., July 
14. 
*321 6/23 Advisory Committee for U.S. Par- 
ticipation in the U.N. Confer- 
ence on Human Settlements 
(Habitat), July 13. 
t322 6/22 U.S. announces intention to 

withdraw from ICNAF. 
*323 6/23 Kissinger: remarks following 
meeting with Prime Minister of 
France, Paris. 
*324 6/23 New directorate for international 
women's programs established 
in Bureau of International Orga- 
nization Affairs. 
*'325 6/23 Kissinger: remarks following 
meeting with Prime Minister of 
South Africa, Grafenau, Federal 
Republic of Germany. 
*326 6/24 U.S.-Indonesian consultations be- 
gin June 25. 
t327 6/24 Kissinger, Genscher: news con- 
ference, Munich. 
t329 6/25 Kissinger: International Institute 

for Strategic Studies, London. 
1330 6/25 U.S. and Federal Republic of 
Germany sign antitrust coopera- 
tion agreement, June 23. 
*331 6/25 Shipping Coordinating Committee 

(SCO, July 26. 
*'332 6/25 U.S. National Committee for the 
International Telegraph and 
Telephone Consultative Commit- 
tee Study Group 5, July 21. 
*333 6/25 sec Subcommittee on Safety of 
Life at Sea, working group on 
bulk chemicals, July 21. 

^'Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



Department of State Bullet 



INDEX July 12, 1976 Vol. LXXV, No. 19SS 



Africa. Secretary Kissinger Reports to Con- 
gress on His Visits to Latin America, West- 
ern Europe, and Africa 41 

Congress 

Congress Asked To Approve Defense Coopera- 
tion Agreement With Turkey (message from 
President Ford) 60 

Department Discusses Allegations of Commu- 
nist Influence in Certain Western Hemi- 
sphere Countries (Luers) 49 

Fourth Progress Report on Cyprus Submitted 
to the Congress (message from President 
Ford) 62 

Secretary Kissinger Reports to Congress on 
His Visits to Latin America, Western Eu- 
rope, and Africa 41 

Cuba. Department Discusses Allegations of 
Communist Influence in Certain Western 
Hemisphere Countries (Luers) 49 

Cyprus 

Fourth Progress Report on Cyprus Submitted 
to the Congress (message from President 
Ford) 62 

U.N. Force in Cyprus Extended for Six Months 

(Sherer, text of resolution) 63 

Economic Affairs. U.S. Declaration on Official 

Support for Export Credits Issued (text) . 48 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. U.S.-Japan 
Cultural Conference Holds Eighth Meeting 
(communique) 65 

Europe. Secretary Kissinger Reports to Con- 
gress on His Visits to Latin America, West- 
ern Europe, and Africa 41 

Guyana. Department Discusses Allegations of 
Communist Influence in Certain Western 
Hemisphere Countries (Luers) 49 

Jamaica. Department Discusses Allegations of 
Communist Influence in Certain Western 
Hemisphere Countries (Luers) 49 

Japan. U.S.-Japan Cultural Conference Holds 
Eighth Meeting (communique) 65 

Latin America 

Department Discusses Allegations of Commu- 
nist Influence in Certain Western Hemi- 
sphere Countries (Luers) 49 

Secretary Kissinger Reports to Congress on 
His Visits to Latin America, Western Eu- 
rope, and Africa 41 



Mexico. Department Discusses Allegations of 
Communist Influence in Certain Western 
Hemisphere Countries (Luers) 49 

Military Affairs. Congress Asked To Approve 
Defense Cooperation Agreement With Tur- 
key (message from President Ford) ... 60 

Panama. Department Discusses Allegations of 
Communist Influence in Certain Western 
Hemisphere Countries (Luers) 49 

Peru. Department Discusses Allegations of 
Communist Influence in Certain Western 
Hemisphere Countries (Luers) 49 

Presidential Documents 

Congress Asked To Approve Defense Coopera- 
tion Agreement With Turkey 60 

Fourth Progress Report on Cyprus Submitted 
to the Congress 62 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications ... 72 

South Africa. U.S. Joins Security Council Con- 
sensus on Resolution on South Africa 
(Sherer, text of resolution) 59 

Trade. U.S. Declaration on Official Support 

for Export Credits Issued (text) .... 48 
Treaty Information 

Congress Asked To Approve Defense Coopera- 
tion Agreement With Turkey (message from 
President Ford) 60 

Current Actions 69 

Turkey. Congress Asked To Approve Defense 
Cooperation Agreement With Turkey (mes- 
sage from President Ford) 60 

U.S.S.R. Department Discusses Allegations of 
Communist Influence in Certain Western 
Hemisphere Countries (Luers) 49 

United Nations 

U.N. Force in Cyprus Extended for Six Months 

(Sherer, text of resolution) 63 

U.S. Joins Security Council Consensus on 
Resolution on South Africa (Sherer, text 
of resolution) 59 

Name Index 

Ford, President 60, 62 

Kissinger, Secretary 41 

Luers, William H 49 

Sherer, Albert W., Jr 59, 68 






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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXXV 



No. 1934 



July 19, 1976 



THE COHESION OF THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES: 
THE PRECONDITION OF GLOBAL PROGRESS 

Statement by Secretary Kissinger and Text of the OECD Declaration 
on International Investment and Multinational CorTporations 73 

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE AT PARIS JUNE 22 89 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 

For index see inside back cover 



I 

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



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STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



Vol. LXXV, No. 1934 
July 19, 1976 

The Department of State BVLLETIS 
a weekly publication issued by th 
Office of Media Services, Bureau c 
Public Affairs, provides tite public an 
interested agencies of tfte governmen 
witlt information on developments i 
tfte field of U.S. foreign relations an 
on tfte worfc of tfte Department an 
tfte Foreign Service. 
Tfte BULLETIN includes selectt 
press releases on foreign policy, issm 
by tfte Wftite House and tfte Depar 
ment, and statements, addresst 
and neiBS conferences of tfte Presidei 
and tite Secretary of State and otfii 
officers of tfte Department, as well i 
special articles on various pitases • 
international affairs and tfte functio) 
of tfte Department. Information 
included concerning treaties and inte 
national agreements to wfticfi ii 
United States is or may become 
party and on treaties of general inte 
national interest. 
Publications of tfte Department 
State, United Nations documents, oi 
legislative material in tfte field 
international relations are also list* 



■The Cohesion of the Industrial Democracies: 
iThe Precondition of Global Progress 



The Council of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) met at ministerial level at Paris 
June 21-22. Folloiving is a statement made 
before the Council by Secretary Kissinger on 
hine 21, together with the texts of a Declara- 
ion on International Investment arid Multi- 
national Enterprises with its annex (Guide- 
ines for Multinational Enterprises) and 
Decisions on Inter-Governmental Considta- 
lion Procedures on the Guidelines, on Na- 
lional Treatment, and on International In- 
estment Incentives and Disincentives, 
dopted h]i the Council on June 21. 



STATEMENT BY SECRETARY KISSINGER 

!S5 release 311 dated June 21 

The purposeful cooperation of our nations 
as been at the heart of the world's prog- 
ess for three decades. Today, we are chal- 
enged to deepen and advance that common 
effort. The cooperation of the industrial de- 
nocracies is decisive for world peace, pros- 
jerity, and the cause of justice and human 
lignity. 

No group of nations is better equipped to 
Tiaster these challenges. Ours are the socie- 
;ies that launched the two great events that 
^ave birth to the modern age — the political 
•evolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries 
hat shaped today's community of nation- 
states and the Industrial Revolution that 
produced the contemporary world economy. 
Ne share a heritage of pioneering effort in 
ill the nmdern forms of commercial, social, 
ind governmental organization. And we have 
)een able tu pei'ceive and respond to new 



luly 19, 1976 



challenges, especially in giving effect to our 
recognition of the imperatives of inter- 
dependence. 

Our democratic systems have disproved the 
doctrine that only repression and authoritar- 
ianism could advance human well-being. On 
the contrary, the industrial democracies as- 
sembled here have demonstrated conclusively 
that it is in freedom that men achieve the eco- 
nomic advances of which ages have dreamed. 
There is some irony in the fact that after 
years of disparaging our economic system, 
both the Socialist countries and the develop- 
ing countries have turned to us to help them 
advance more rapidly. Today it is the indus- 
trial democracies which primarily have the 
resources, the managerial genius, the ad- 
vanced technology, and the dedication which 
are needed for sustained economic develop- 
ment under any political system. 

The advanced industrial nations have con- 
ducted themselves of late with vigor, deter- 
mination, and a sense of shared purpose. 
Most of the OECD countries are now enter- 
ing a period of economic expansion. We have 
worked together in the process of recovery, 
averting protectionist tendencies in trade 
and the selfish pursuit of oil and raw mate- 
rials at each other's expense. Largely due to 
this, we are recovering quickly and with 
excellent prospects for continued progress. 

We have acted together because we rec- 
ognize that the world economy has become 
global. National interests cannot prosper or 
endure in isolation. And the nations assem- 
bled here are the engines of the world econ- 
omy. Our performance is the pivot around 
which international trade and finance re- 
volve. Our technology and investment are the 



73 



catalysts of development and economic prog- 
ress in developing nations. 

Today the world economy faces new and 
demanding challenges. Our past cooperation 
must be given fresh impetus in our twofold 
task: to improve our performance in areas 
where we have already begun to work to- 
gether and to create mechanisms of coopera- 
tion to deal with new issues and opportuni- 
ties. 

This organization is well suited to this 
task. Its history and durability are a demon- 
stration of the unity and cooperation of the 
industrial democracies. It has provided a 
unique forum and necessary focus for deal- 
ing with the critical link between national 
aspirations and global opportunity. This is 
no accident ; it reflects our fundamental moral 
and political fraternity. Our traditions of 
freedom give moral meaning and political 
purpose to our technical achievements. 

This is why I wish to stress the impor- 
tance of furthering our unity and progress 
through the OECD. The objective is not to 
forge a bloc for our own advantage or for 
purposes of confrontation. It is to shape a 
new international environment based on the 
consciouiiiiess that in an age of interdepend- 
ence national interests can best be served by 
advancing the aspirations of all mankind 
through cooperative efforts. 

Let me discuss three areas of challenge 
and opportunity: 

— Sti'engthening the cohesion and pros- 
perity of the industrialized democracies ; 

— The new issues we face in economic re- 
lations with the Communist world; and 

— The ongoing international effort to pro- 
mote economic development and a construc- 
tive long-term relationship between the in- 
dustrial and developing worlds. 

Relationship of the Industrial Democracies 

Our first and fundamental concern must 
be economic cooperation and progress among 
the industrialized democracies of North 
America, Western Europe, and Asia. To- 
morrow, finance and economic ministers will 
discuss these economic questions in detail. 



74 



Today I want to sketch in broad terms four 
essential areas of our cooperation which have 
the greatest significance for world order and 
the future of the international system: 

— Noninflationary economic growth; 

— Strengthening our open international 
trade and monetary system ; 

— The encouragement of transnational 
investment; and 

— Greater cooperation in energy. 

I shall discuss each of these in turn. 

First, as our nations move to recovery and 
expansion, we must insure steady, noninfla- 
tionary economic growth. Only in this man- 
ner can we resolve conflicting claims on re- 
sources, reinforce the political vitality of our 
institutions, enhance our freedom of action 
in world aft'airs, and enlarge the economic 
horizons of all societies. 

We must overcome cycles of boom and 
stagnation, which in the past have impaired 
productivity, constricted investment, and 
choked oft" our full economic potential. We 
can achieve sustained growth by containing 
inflation. The investment needed to create 
jobs for our growing labor forces will dry 
up in an environment of rapidly and con- 
stantly rising prices. Inflation erodes the 
progress made in raising the standard of liv- 
ing of our peoples; it strains the social fabric 
of our democratic societies. 

The responsibility for noninflationary 
growth rests with national governments. But 
close consultation and collaboration are es- 
sential to insure that national policies are 
complementary and reinforcing; to contrib- 
ute to exchange rate stability among us; to 
give special attention to members that are 
in diflSculty; and to collaborate on policies of 
trade, energy, and relations with the develop- 
ing countries. The summit meeting at Ram- 
bouillet last November made a major con- 
tribution to general recovery and promotion 
of these goals. The summit next week in 
Puerto Rico will assess the progress we have 
made and use it as a point of departure for 
future advances. 

This meeting provides an opportunity for 
the nations assembled here to reafllirm our 

Department of State Bulletin 







joint commitment to an open economic sys- 
tem, to national responsibility, and to inter- 
national cooperation. With sound and con- 
certed policies among us and with efforts to 
coordinate our strategies for expansion, the 
potential for the world's sustained economic 
growth can be realized. 

At last year's OECD ministerial meeting, 
at U.S. recommendation, a Group of Distin- 
guished Economists was set up, chaired by 
Professor [Paul W.] McCracken. It was as- 
signed the task of examining the medium- 
and long-term and structural problems of 
sustained economic growth. It is exploring 
the problems of inflation, investment, struc- 
tural imbalances, and adequate supplies of 
raw materials. We look forward to its con- 
clusions and i-ecommendations. 

Strengthening our trade and monetary 
system also requires enhanced collaboration. 
In recent years, high unemployment and eco- 
nomic uncertainty have revived protectionist 
aressures in many countries; inflation and 
iiastic differences in the performance of 
-nember nations have produced major pay- 
nents imbalances, exchange rate pressures, 
md financial strains. 

The Rambouillet summit and the IMF 
[International Monetary Fund] meeting in 
lamaica last January were milestones in 
idapting the international monetary system 
.0 a new era. We have agreed to new IMF 
•ules to avoid the shocks and disequilibrium 
vhich plagued the Bretton Woods system 
md to insure a smoother functioning of our 
rade and investment. 

Today and tomorrow the OECD nations 
ire continuing close and detailed consulta- 
ions. We will examine both current prob- 
ems and the long-term future, both the 
'xisting institutions and institutional re- 
orm. A recent example of our capacity for 
nnovation was the agreement on the OECD 
'"inancial Support Fund, designed to help us 
I leal cooperatively with serious economic dis- 
. ocatlons aggravated by the oil price rises. 
^he United States is seeking swift ratifica- 
ion of this agreement so that the Fund may 
ome into being soon. 
In trade, two years ago the OECD nations 



jointly undertook an extraordinary political 
commitment to preserve an open economic 
system despite a period of general economic 
difl!iculty. On May 30, 1974, we pledged to 
avoid new restrictions on trade. We rejected 
policies which would tend to shift one na- 
tion's diflSculties onto others. That declara- 
tion strengthened our successful efforts to 
resist protectionist pressures and thus bene- 
fit countries with particularly acute balance- 
of-payments problems. The declaration was 
renewed last year. We should now renew it 
for an additional year. 

Our economic recovery provides significant 
opportunities for further progress: 

— First, the political commitment repre- 
sented by our trade pledge should be the 
basis for wider cooperation among us. The 
United States proposes that this organization 
recommend further areas for common action, 
not only on current trade problems and nego- 
tiations but on the long-term operation of 
our open trading system. 

— Second, all nations assembled here 
should make a political commitment to ac- 
celerate the multilateral trade negotiations 
in Geneva. We are at the point where we 
must move forward at a more rapid pace if 
the negotiations are to reach a successful 
conclusion in 1977. To this end, the United 
States strongly recommends that we reach 
agreement this fall in Geneva on a tariff- 
cutting formula. 

— Third, it is our shared obligation to im- 
prove the conditions of trade for developing 
countries. The postwar trading system was 
built on a consensus among industrial coun- 
tries in which the developing countries did 
not participate and which they now chal- 
lenge in several important respects. We need 
to reexamine the trading system, prepared 
to change or strengthen it where necessary. 
In the multilateral trade negotiations we will 
be negotiating new provisions in such areas 
as non tariff barriers, supply access, the set- 
tlement of disputes, and trade restrictions 
that are justified for balance-of-payments 
purposes. This organization and its mem- 
bers can play a crucial role in building a new 
global consensus on these issues. 



t,|iiy 19, 1976 



75 



Transnational investment is the third area 
calling for close collaboration among the 
industrial nations. 

Investment is the lifeblood of our econo- 
mies and vital to vi'orldwide development. It 
has been a principal source of the economic 
growth and security and prosperity which 
the nations represented here enjoy. It has 
been the single largest source of develop- 
ment capital for Third World nations and a 
powerful force marshaling management and 
technology for their benefit. It has devel- 
oped resources; it has increased income; it 
has provided jobs. Since the midsixties, for- 
eign direct investment has been growing 
faster than international trade and global 
GNP. 

The increasing importance of trans- 
national investment to the global economy 
has been accompanied by no little concern 
over the activities of private investors, par- 
ticularly the multinational corporations. 
Questions have been raised as to how the in- 
ternational firms can serve the national in- 
terests of their hosts as well as their own. 
A few notorious cases of illicit payments 
have stirred apprehension and cast a cloud 
over the overwhelming majority of interna- 
tional firms whose behavior has been beyond 
reproach. 

Governments, too, have impeded the flow 
of capital through inconsistent policies or 
discriminatory treatment of international 
firms. And most industrial countries have 
been under pressure at home to take in- 
creasingly nationalistic positions toward 
international investment. 

If this trend is not halted, we shall face 
a gradual deterioration in the international 
investment climate, with serious conse- 
quences for economic development and the 
global economy. 

It is highly significant, therefore, that this 
organization undertook two related tasks: to 
negotiate voluntary guidelines for multi- 
national firms and to clarify governmental 
responsibilities to preserve and promote a 
liberal investment climate. We are able to 
announce today the acceptance by OECD 
member governments of a declaration on in- 
vestment. This declaration extends the co- 



76 



operation which has characterized our trade 
and monetary relations into the area of 
investment. It includes: 

— Recommended guidelines for the activi- 
ties of multinational corporations; 

— An agreed statement of the basic re- 
sponsibilities of our governments with re- 
spect to transnational investment; 

— Provision for strengthened cooperation 
on the questions of incentives and disincen- 
tives to foreign direct investment; and 

— Provision for increased consultations 
between our governments on all these 
matters. 

The United States strongly endorses this j 
declaration and urges its widest possible 
adoption and observance. 

A framework for investment is now , 
emerging. We must encourage its develop- 
ment. Therefore, in addition to our full sup- 
port for the OECD declaration, the United 
States urges the following policies for our 
nations : 

— -First, we should support the work of the 
U.N. Commission on Transnational Corpora-!'"' 
tions and the related U.N. Information andll* 
Research Center within its Secretariat, ||'^' 
which will develop a comprehensive informa^ 
tion system on issues relating to tranS' 
national corporations. This will contribute 
to a fuller understanding of investment 
issues among all nations. 

— Second, we should review the proposal oft 
the International Resources Bank which the 
United States put forward at UNCTAD 
[U.N. Conference on Trade and Develop' 
nient] at Nairobi last month. While the 
Bank will focus on energy and raw mate- 
rials, its principal features — as a multl 
lateral guarantor against noncommercial risk 
and as a facilitator of production sharing and 
technology transfei- — have important impli 
cations for development generally. 

— Third, we should take strong collective 
measures to eliminate corrupt payments, 
Bribery and extortion are a burden on inter- 
national trade and investment. We reiterate 
our proposal that negotiation of a binding 
international agreement on corrupt practices ""'( 



Department of State Bulletin 



«(r| 



iHgin at next month's session of the U.N. 
Economic and Social Council. 

— Fourth, we should cooperate to restrain 
anticompetitive practices of firms which 
undermine the benefits of our open economic 
system. The United States proposes a dual 
ttt'ort: to reduce international procedural 
obstacles to the enforcement of laws against 
international restrictive business practices 
and to pursue bilateral and multilateral 
agreements for international antitrust co- 
operation similar to that about to be con- 
cluded between the United States and the 
Federal Republic of Germany. 

— Fifth, we should strengthen the woi-k 
of specialized OECD committees which deal 
with investment problems such as harmoniz- 
ing- statistical systems, cataloguing restric- 
tive business practices, improving the ex- 
ciiange of tax information, dealing with tax 
iiaven problems, as well as their work now 
underway on the general topics of technol- 
ogy transfer and short-term capital move- 
ments. 

The fourth crucial sphere of cooperation 
among the industrial nations is energy. The 
cooperation of energy-consuming nations 
has become an imperative, for the last few 
yeai's have demonstrated the economic and 
political costs of loss of control over this 
critical component of industrial growth. 

For the next several years, our nations' 
heavy dependence on imported oil will con- 
tribute to our political and economic vulnera- 
bility. The outlook for reducing our depend- 
ence in the next decade is not encouraging. 
Forecasts based on existing energy pro- 
grams in the industrial countries indicate 
that our imports of OPEC [Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries] oil will in- 
c lease from 27 million barrels a day in 1975 
to as much as 37 million barrels per day by 
1985. At the same time, it has become clear 
that oil reserves, while still large, are finite. 
Thus we must reduce our immediate depend- 
ence on imported oil side by side with be- 
ginning a long-term transition to alternative 
energy systems through the most rapid pos- 
sible development of new and alternative 
soui'ces of energy. 



The industrial counti'ies have begun to re- 
spond to the energy challenge. The difficult 
process of reorienting energy priorities and 
establishing new energy policies has been 
started. When the energy crisis became ap- 
parent, we moved rapidly to set up the new 
International Energy Agency (lEA), within 
the framework of the OECD. Through its 
impetus, a comprehensive structure of tech- 
nical cooperation and policy coordination 
among industrial countries has grown up. At 
the same time, a dialogue with the OPEC 
countries has been started in the Conference 
on International Economic Cooperation 
(C'lEC). And the importance of helping the 
poorer developing countries — especially those 
with limited energy resources — to survive 
the energy crisis has been recognized. 

Despite these accomplishments, our ef- 
forts have fallen far short of our needs. 
They will neither adequately reduce our im- 
mediate energy vulnerability nor achieve a 
satisfactory global balance of energy supply 
and demand over the longer term. The United 
States therefore proposes that OECD mem- 
bers take the following cooperative steps: 

— First, that we establish on an urgent 
basis joint energy production projects to 
pool technical know-how and financing in 
areas such as coal extraction and utilization, 
uranium enrichment, and synthetic fuels. 
Such actions would accord with the commit- 
ments we undertook in the lEA Long-Term 
Program. They will contribute to the early 
availability of commercially attractive addi- 
tional energy sources. 

— Second, that we establish collective and 
individual goals for substantially reduced de- 
pendence on imported oil by 1985. This will 
require agreed targets for additional energy 
production, particularly in the coal and nu- 
clear energy sectors; these represent our 
best hope for substantially reducing our 
energy dependence in the next decade. 

— Third, that we agree to intensify our 
national efforts to reduce the growth in 
demand for energy. 

The United States urges that the Govern- 
ing Board of the IE A launch these efforts on 
a priority basis. Member governments 



July 19, 1976 



77 



should endorse these goals for reduced de- 
pendence and also make the essential polit- 
ical commitments to specific and concrete 
actions to achieve them. We should aim for 
a ministerial meeting in six to nine months 
to accomplish these objectives. The minis- 
terial meeting should also look beyond the 
next decade to the post-oil era and seek ways 
to build on cooperative research and develop- 
ment efforts in such areas as solar power and 
nuclear fusion. OECD countries not members 
of the lEA should be given an opportunity 
to participate fully in this process. 

This agenda — of action for gi'owth, trade 
and monetary affairs, investment, and 
energy — suggests an expanding role and re- 
sponsibility for the OECD. Working to- 
gether, the nations of the OECD face an 
unprecedented opportunity to advance their 
common welfare and prosperity. And from 
this foundation of cooperation we can more 
effectively deal with the issues which in- 
volve us with nations outside the OECD 
I'egion. 

Let me now turn to these relations with 
the rest of the world. 

East-West Economic Relations 

Our relations with the nations of the East 
turn primarily upon political and security 
issues. In the past, trade and economic rela- 
tions with the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe have not been among our central 
concerns. But a new dimension of economic 
interaction between East and West has begun 
to take shape. It is time to act cooperatively 
so that this new economic factor becomes an 
increasingly positive element in the world 
economy. 

The Soviet Union has the second largest 
economy in the world. Together with all 
COMECON [Council of Mutual Economic As- 
sistance] countries, it accounts for about 20 
percent of world output. But despite the size 
of its economy, the Soviet Union is not a 
major factor in the world economic system. 
Its trade is relatively small; it has made 
little contribution to economic development. 

In recent years, however, the Soviet 



78 



bri 



sta 



Union and the countries of Eastern Europe 
have moved toward greater economic contact 
with the West. The basic reason is plain. 
These countries have come to realize that 
they cannot provide for growing consumer 
demand or meet the technological impera- 
tives of the more sophisticated economy they 
seek solely from their own economic re- 
sources. Further, many of the countries of 
Eastern Europe wish to diversify trading pat- 
terns that were established in the aftermath 
of World War II. 

As a result, in the last four years, trade 
between the COMECON countries and the 
OECD countries has increased nearly four- 
fold. Most East European countries now de 
pend on and prefer Western machinery, tecb 
nology, and material imports for the dynamic 
element of their economic growth. And in 
matters of finance, the sudden increase in 
the external debt of the Soviet Union and the 
countries of Eastern Europe has been strik- 
ing. Their net debt to private Western banks 
doubled in 1975 to $15 billion, and their total 
hard currency debt has reached nearly twice 
that amount. 

The most familiar example of the impact 
of Communist countries on the international 
economy has been Soviet shortfalls in the 
production of grain, which has become the 
single most volatile element in the world foo(J L 
picture. In addition the Socialist countriea 
can become an important element in the 
global energy balance. And in an era where 
adequate supplies of many other industrial 
raw materials can no longer be taken for 
granted, the extensive mineral reserves of 
the East can expand resource availability 
worldwide. It is therefore clear that in our 
multilateral efforts to build a strengthened 
international economic system, we will have 
to take account of the potential needs and 
contributions of the centrally planned f 
economies. 

For us, the industrial democracies in the tla 
OECD, the growing economic interaction be- 
tween East and West and the Eastern in- 
fluence on the global economy are realities 
that if arranged wisely can be positive de-| 
velopments, stabilizing relationships andi 



Department of State BulletinlMy 



thi 



tal, 



PI 



p 



Itioadening contacts. At the same time, man- 
aging relations between free economies and 
state trading systems has inevitable compli- 
cations. Dealing with a centrally planned 
economy under strict political direction can 
never be treated simply as a commercial 
enterprise alone. 

Certain principles stand out: 

— All our nations have been engaged in 
tills process. 

— State trading countries must not be 
permitted to use their centrally directed 
systems for unfair advantage, nor should 
they be permitted to play off the industrial 
democracies against each other through 
selective political pressure. 

— Growing East- West trade also presents 
liopeful prospects, both economic and politi- 
cal, if approached with understanding, skill, 
and foresight. 

— In short, it is up to the industrial 
democracies to consult closely and to manage 
this process cooperatively. 

Therefore the United States proposes that 
the OECD nations adopt a systematic work 
program for developing objectives and ap- 
proaches for our economic relations with the 
Communist countries. To this end, some 
progress has already been made; for ex- 
ample, in aligning national export credit 
policies among the industrial countries. If 
we are to face this issue in an intelligent 
and harmonious fashion, many additional 
areas should be examined. Specifically, our 
nations should seek answers to the follow- 
ing questions: 

— How can we insure effective reciprocity 
ill trade between market and nonmarket 
countries? 

— -How do we deal with the problem of 
dumping and other unfair trade practices by 
countries in which prices need not bear a 
relation to costs or market forces? 

— What are the implications of the 
growing external debt of the Communist 
countries? 

— How can the industrial democracies deal 
with possible efforts to misuse economic rela- 



tions for political purposes inimical to their 
interests? 

— What should be the relationship be- 
tween the nations of the East and the multi- 
lateral bodies dealing with economic affairs? 

— How do we take account of the diversity 
of interests and needs that has already ap- 
peared among Eastern countries? 

— And finally, is it possible to bring the 
Soviet Union and the Eastern European 
countries into the process of responsibly 
assisting development in the Third World? 

The United States will elaborate its views 
on these issues at the next meeting of the 
Executive Committee in Special Session. 
The results of our examinations of these 
questions could be embodied in a report to 
the next ministerial meeting of this 
organization. 

Growing East-West trade presents prob- 
lems together with great opportunities. It 
is up to the countries assembled here to 
understand the process and its complexities 
and to manage it cooperatively. In that case, 
it can contribute to the vitality of our econo- 
mies and to the stability of the international 
order. 

The Relationship Between North and South 

One of the most urgent and compelling 
challenges that summon our cooperation is 
the relationship between the industrial and 
the developing nations. The new era of inter- 
national cooperation we seek must include 
economic relations that offer mutual pros- 
perity and widening opportunity for all the 
peoples of the world. 

Every nation has a stake in global stability 
and world peace. But the ultimate good must 
be to look beyond the maintenance of peace 
to a world which offers its children a hope 
of a better future. 

The United States has made its commit- 
ment. We have demonstrated our determina- 
tion at the seventh special session of the 
U.N. General Assembly, at the Conference on 
International Economic Cooperation in Paris, 
at Kingston in January, and at the UNCTAD 
Conference in Nairobi last month. 



I July 19, 1976 



79 



Our efforts begin from the conviction that 
an effective international system must be 
founded upon a consensus among all nations 
and peoples. The world community which is 
our ultimate aspiration can only be realized 
if all nations and peoples can pursue their 
goals with a sense of participation and an 
awareness that their concerns are heeded. 
If we are to live in a stable world, the pre- 
ponderant number of nations must be per- 
suaded that their legitimate concerns are 
taken seriously. 

The poor nations cry out for development. 
Their objectives are clear: economic prog- 
ress, a role in international decisions that af- 
fect them, and an equitable share of global 
economic benefits. The objectives of the in- 
dustrialized nations are equally clear: wid- 
ening prosperity for all peoples produced by 
an open world system of trade and invest- 
ment with expanding markets for North and 
South. We want to see stable and equitable 
development of the world's resources of 
food, energy, and raw materials as the fun- 
damental basis for a prosperous world 
economy. 

Thus, the objectives of the industrial 
democracies and those of the developing 
nations should be complementary. The proc- 
ess of building a world community must 
therefore be shared by nations of both 
North and South and must address the issue 
of economic development in the context of 
growing global prosperity. 

But this is not inevitable. Effective cooper- 
ation presupposes that both sides face cer- 
tain realities without illusion. 

The most critical of these realities is that 
development is a long-term process. Sus- 
tained economic development cannot possibly 
result from any one conference or any one 
set of proposals. It will depend primarily 
upon the internal effort, the domestic policy, 
and the national will of the developing coun- 
tries themselves. In most cases the effort will 
extend over decades. Often this will require 
painful short-term sacrifices for longer term 
gains. Development cannot be created by 
rhetoric or by paz'liamentary victories in in- 
ternational forums. 



80 



Development further requires the sus- 
tained and collective effort of the industrial 
countries. The role of the industrial democ- 
racies is critical, for we possess the largest 
markets and most of the world's capital and 
technology. Thus real development presup- 
poses a serious, unemotional, constructive 
North-South dialogue. 

In such a dialogue it is futile for one party 
to seek to impose solutions to the problems 
of development on another. An atmosphere 
of extortion or pressure, unworkable pro- 
posals, or excessive reliance on parliamen- 
tary maneuvers will ultimately undermine 
public support in the only countries capable 
of contributing effectively to development. 

We of the industrial democracies have a 
special responsibility. What we do — or fail 
to do — is critical to the future of the coun- 
tries of the Third World. If we substitute 
competition among ourselves for a dispas- 
sionate analysis of the issues, the develop- 
ment process will falter. Our resources will 
be inefficiently scattered or misallocated ; 
projects will too often prove fruitless for 
lack of careful analysis or want of wider sup- 
port. We do no one a favor when we substitute 
rhetorical concessions for intelligent and 
realistic proposals that link the interests and 
concerns of both sides in a prospering global 
economy. Those who curry short-term favor 
may mortgage the long-term future. 

It is imperative that the North-South dia- 
logue advance in a way which benefits both 
sides. In the long run, pi'Ogress, stability, 
and peace depend upon it. 

The United States has done its utmost to 
be forthcoming in the dialogue. We have 
strained our domestic processes to develop 
pragmatic proposals to meet real problems 
in our relations with the developing world. 
As our economies improve and as we, to- 
gether with the developing world, identify 
new areas for cooperation, we can look for- 
ward to widening global cooperation which 
can serve the interests of all. 

The spirit of cooperation necessary be- 
tween North and South requires first a com- 
mitment to cooperation among the industrial 
nations. This is not a call for confrontation 

Department of State Bulletin 



ith the Third World. It is an indispensable 
tep we must take if we are not to fragment 
H our efforts and fail in our objectives. 

The United States believes that this or- 
ganization should focus on three areas where 
our cooperation is most necessary and would 
be most effective: 

— We must improve our ability to concert 
our development efforts in international fo- 
rums, fur it is in these meetings that ideas 
are launched, compromises are made, and 
political directions are set. 

— We must enhance our collaboration in 
our bilatei'al and multilateral aid programs; 
for our resources are limited, and closer 
alignment of programs is essential for their 
effectiveness. 

— We must develop a longer term strategy 
for development which integrates the diverse 
strands of North-South policy, including for- 
eign aid, technology transfer, financial pol- 
icy, and trade. For development is a compre- 
hensive and never-ending process with impli- 
cations for every area of the international 
economic system. 

Let me discuss each area in turn. 

First, we must improve the coordination 
of our positions at major international con- 
ferences. Recent unfavorable experiences at 
UNCTAD in Nairobi and at other interna- 
tional forums should make clear the impor- 
tance of this step. We in this organization 
have supporting mechanisms for coordina- 
tion of positions on energy, commodities, 
finance, and development, but their effective- 
ness has been frequently less than adequate. 
For the remainder of this year we will be 
relying on these bodies to continue to sup- 
port our work in the Conference on Interna- 
tional Economic Cooperation. It is therefore 
imperative that we review now our recent 
experience with the objective of strengthen- 
ing the coordinating role of each OECD sup- 
port mechanism as well as the relationship 
among them. 

The United States recommends that the 
Secretary General undertake an immediate 
examination of the issues and present recom- 
mendations to the Executive Committee in 

July 19, 1976 



Special Session on ways in which we may 
more closely align our positions. 

We suggest as well that this organization 
take a more active role in developing views 
on key North-South issues than it has in the 
past. We believe this could most fruitfully 
be done by identifying in advance of inter- 
national meetings specific issues of major 
concern to industrialized countries and ar- 
ranging for consultations to develop mutu- 
ally supporting positions. It makes no sense 
to work out our differences under the pres- 
sure of deadlines and of other participants 
at international conferences. 

The next several months will be a test of 
our ability to work together in a variety of 
international settings. The agenda of confer- 
ences is full. We will be considering on a 
case-by-case basis measures to improve the 
functioning of individual commodity mar- 
kets, including the reduction of excessive 
price fluctuations and methods of buffer 
stock financing. We will also be translating 
the analysis of the first six months of the 
year into concrete results in CIEC. In this 
forum, the United States looks forward to 
visible and concrete achievements in energy, 
raw materials, investment, trade, and meas- 
ures to address the problems of the poorest 
countries. We will want: 

— To explore possibilities for further con- 
sultations on energy, including ways to assist 
developing nations that have no energy 
resources ; 

— To facilitate progress on commodity dis- 
cussions, including ways to improve the 
functioning of individual commodity mar- 
kets ; and 

— To begin work on the International Re- 
sources Bank proposal, which we see as relat- 
ing to the work of all the CIEC commissions, 
particularly those dealing with energy and 
raw materials. 

Second, we must increase the effectiveness 
of our bilateral and multilateral aid efforts 
in addressing specific problems in the devel- 
oping world. The OECD Development Assist- 
ance Committee has done important work to 
improve and coordinate development assist- 



81 



ance policies. There are, as well, over 20 con- 
sultative groups working with regard to 
specific developing nations. We should review 
our coordination in all these areas. We may 
consider streamlining some of those mecha- 
nisms and eliminating duplication. 

We must seek to enhance the coordination 
of assistance policies and programs which 
have a regional or even continental focus. 
The Chtb des Amis du Sahel is a recent suc- 
cessful effort to concert our resources to 
combat the problems of that African sub- 
region. We should explore whether there are 
other regions, in Africa or elsewhere, where 
similar approaches are needed. The recent 
initiati\e by the President of France for 
focusing joint attention on specific problems 
on the African Continent is an example of 
the kind of effort we must make together in 
the future. 

Third, we must devote a major portion of 
our efforts to longer range planning for 
global development. The problem of growth 
will not go away. No one policy will be de- 
cisive; no one conference will devise perma- 
nent solutions. We must begin to focus 
honestly and carefully on the development 
challenge through the distant future. 

A high priority in this effort must be to 
consider together the various development is- 
sues we have been addressing separately. 
Development policies can be either mutually 
reinforcing or they can undermine one an- 
other. We must find a way to look at devel- 
opment as a comprehensive and integrated 
whole, harmonizing our long-range planning 
efforts in trade, aid, investment, and tech- 
nology. These individual policies need to be 
placed into a larger coherent plan so that the 
industrial nations' development efforts can 
more efficiently respond to the most pressing 
issues in the developing world. 

To achieve a more effective integrated de- 
velopment strategy, the United States pro- 
poses that OECD countries decide now to 
review the entire range of North-South is- 
sues which we will be addressing over the 
remainder of this decade and beyond. Over 
the next year we should develop a consistent 
and comprehensive set of objectives and 
strategies. 



82 



At the same time, we should now move to 
strengthen the institutional arrangements 
within this organization for handling North- 
South issues. There should be a central focal 
point in the OECD for consideration of all 
such activities. This will give a greater po- 
litical impetus to our efforts. And it should 
also stimulate greater consideration for the 
needs and interests of developing nations in 
the ongoing work of specialized OECD com- 
mittees. 

The kind of coordination which I have sug- 
gested will require attention at the highest 
levels of our governments. It will, of course, 
also require compromises on policies and pri- 
orities which each of us has developed in the 
past. But it is our best, perhaps our sole, 
chance to accelerate the pace of constructive 
progress in our relations with the Third 
World while not undermining our relations 
with each other. 



The Imperative of Cooperative Action 

The nations assembled in this room pro- 
ceed from two main premises : the interde- 
pendence among the OECD nations and our 
common desire to help shape a new era of 
global economic cooperation among all na- 
tions. 

The central task before the industrialized 
democracies of the OECD is to give new 
focus and purpose to our own cooperative 
economic action. Economics is only part of 
that enterprise. The choices before us and 
the decisions we take will, above all, reflect 
our perception of ourselves as peoples and as 
nations. The tasks are long term, and they 
demand that we extend our line of sight 
beyond immediate technical issues or politi- 
cal controversies to more distant horizons. 

Ours is a time when the centers of global 
power and influence are many and diverse. 
And ours, therefore, is a choice between co- 
operation or chaos. Today more than ever, 
the industrial democracies require leadership 
determined not to adapt to reality, but to 
shape it. Circumstances have provided us 
with a clear understanding of our interde- 
pendence, and our efforts to translate this 
reality into common progress are well begun. 



Department of State Bulletin 



We have every reason for confidence in our 
capacities. 

Our cooperative endeavor, which has ac- 
complished so much in the past, can be even 
more dynamic as we turn to the new and 
long-term challenges of interdependence. 
What we elect to do together is bound to 
have vast meaning to a world that seeks 
progress and justice and needs from all of 
us in this room a fresh demonstration of 
what strong and free nations working to- 
gether can accomplish. 



TEXTS OF DECLARATION, WITH ANNEX, 
AND DECISIONS OF THE COUNCIL > 

Text of Declaration 

Declaration on International Investment 
AND Multinational Enterprises 

The Governments of OECD Member Countries ' 
Considering 

that international investment has assumed in- 
creased importance in the world economy and has 
considerably contributed to the development of their 
countries; 

that multinational enterprises play an important 
role in this investment process; 

that co-operation by Member countries can im- 
prove the foreign investment climate, encourage the 
positive contribution which multinational enterprises 
can make to economic and social progress, and mini- 
mise and resolve difficulties which may arise from 
their various operations; 

that, while continuing endeavours within the 
OECD may lead to further international arrange- 
ments and agreements in this field, it seems ap- 
propriate at this stage to intensify their co-operation 
and consultation on issues relating to international 
investment and multinational enterprises through 
inter-related instruments each of which deals with 
a different aspect of the matter and together con- 
stitute a framework within which the OECD will 
consider these issues: 

Declare : 

I. Guidelines for MNE's 

that they jointly recommend to multinational 



' Adopted on June 21 by the OECD Council meet- 
ing at ministerial level (texts from OECD press 
release PRESS/A(76)20). 

^ The Turkish Government was not in a position to 
participate in this Declaration. [Footnote in original.] 

July 19, 1976 



enterprises operating in their territories the observ- 
ance of the Guidelines as set forth in the Annex 
hereto having regard to the considerations and under- 
standings which introduce the Guidelines and are 
an integral part of them. 

II. National Treatment 

1. that Member countries should, consistent with 
their needs to maintain public order, to protect 
their essential security interests and to fulfil com- 
mitments relating to international peace and secu- 
rity, accord to enterprises operating in their ter- 
ritories and owned or controlled directly or indirectly 
by nationals of another Member country (herein- 
after referred to as "Foreign-Controlled Enter- 
prises") treatment under their laws, regulations 
and administrative practices, consistent with inter- 
national law and no less favourable than that ac- 
corded in like situations to domestic enterprises 
(hereinafter referred to as "National Treatment"). 

2. that Member countries will consider applying 
"National Treatment" in respect of countries other 
than Member countries. 

3. that Member countries will endeavour to ensure 
that their territorial subdivisions apply "National 
Treatment". 

4. that this Declaration does not deal with the 
right of Member countries to regulate the entry 
of foreign investment or the conditions of establish- 
ment of foreign enterprises. 

III. International Investment Incentives 
and Disincentives 

1. that they recognise the need to strengthen their 
co-operation in the field of international direct in- 
vestment. 

2. that they thus recognise the need to give due 
weight to the interests of Member countries affected 
by specific laws, regulations and administrative 
practices in this field (hereinafter called "measures") 
providing official incentives and disincentives to inter- 
national direct investment. 

3. that Member countries will endeavour to make 
such measures as transparent as possible, so that 
their importance and purpose can be ascertained and 
that information on them can be readily available. 

IV. Consultation Procedures 

that they are prepared to consult one another on 
the above matters in conformity with the Decisions 
of the Council relating to Inter-Governmental Con- 
sultation Procedures on the Guidelines for Multi- 
national Enterprises, on National Treatment and on 
International Investment Incentives and Disincen- 
tives. 

V. Review 

that they will review the above matters within 
three years with a view to improving the effec- 
tiveness of international economic co-operation 



83 



among Member countries on issues relating to inter- 
national investment and multinational enterprises. 



Text of Annex to Declaration 

Annex 

to the Declaration of 21st June, 1976 by Govern- 
ments of OECD Member Countries on Interna- 
tional Investment and Multinational Enterprises 

Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 

1. Multinational enterprises now play an im- 
portant part in the economies of Member countries 
and in international economic relations, which is 
of increasing interest to governments. Through inter- 
national direct investment, such enterprises can bring 
substantial benefits to home and host countries by 
contributing to the efficient utilisation of capital, 
technology and human resources between countries 
and can thus fulfil an important role in the pro- 
motion of economic and social welfare. But the 
advances made by multinational enterprises in 
organising their operations beyond the national 
framework may lead to abuse of concentrations of 
economic power and to conflicts with national policy 
objectives. In addition, the complexity of these multi- 
national enterprises and the difficulty of clearly 
perceiving their diverse structures, operations and 
policies sometimes give rise to concern. 

2. The common aim of the Member countries is to 
encourage the positive contributions which multi- 
national enterprises can make to economic and social 
progress and to minimise and resolve the difficulties 
to which their various operations may give rise. In 
view of the transnational structure of such enter- 
prises, this aim will be furthered by co-operation 
among the OECD countries where the headquarters of 
most of the multinational enterprises are established 
and which are the location of a substantial part 
of their operations. The guidelines set out hereafter 
are designed to assist in the achievement of this 
common aim and to contribute to improving the 
foreign investment climate. 

3. Since the operations of multinational enterprises 
extend throughout the world, including countries that 
are not Members of the Organisation, international 
co-operation in this field should extend to all States. 
Member countries will give their full support to ef- 
forts undertaken in co-operation with non-Member 
countries, and in particular with developing countries, 
with a view to improving the welfare and living 
standards of all people both by encouraging the posi- 
tive contributions which multinational enterprises 
can make and by minimising and resolving the prob- 
lems which may arise in connection with their 
activities. 

4. Within the Organisation, the programme of co- 
operation to attain these ends will be a continuing, 
pragmatic and balanced one. It comes within the 



84 



' 



general aims of the Convention on the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(O.E.C.D.) and makes full use of the various 
specialised bodies of the Organisation, whose terms 
of reference already cover many aspects of the role 
of multinational enterprises, notably in matters of 
international trade and payments, competition, taxa 
tion, manpower, industrial development, science and j 
technology. In these bodies, work is being carried 
out on the identification of issues, the improvement 
of relevant qualitative and statistical information 
and the elaboration of proposals for action designed 
to strengthen inter-governmental co-operation. In 
some of these areas procedures already exist through 
which issues related to the operations of multinational 
enterprises can be taken up. This work could result 
in the conclusion of further and complementary 
agreements and arrangements between goveniments. 

5. The initial phase of the co-operation programme 
is composed of a Declaration and three Decisions 
promulgated simultaneously as they are comple- 
mentary and inter-connected, in respect of guide- 
lines for multinational enterprises, national treat- 
ment for foreign-controlled enterprises and inter- 
national investment incentives and disincentives. 

6. The guidelines set out below are recommenda- 
tions jointly addressed by Member countries to multi- 
national enterprises operating in their territories. 
These guidelines, which take into account the prob- 
lems whch can arise because of the international 
structure of these enterprises, lay down standards 
for the activities of these enterprises in the different 
Member countries. Observance of the guidelines is 
voluntary and not legally enforceable. However, 
they should help to ensure that the operations of 
these enterprises are in harmony with national 
policies of the countries where they operate and to- 
strengthen the basis of mutual confidence between 
enterprises and States. 

7. Every State has the right to prescribe the con 
ditions under which multinational enterprises operate 
within its national jurisdiction, subject to interna- 
tional law and to the international agreements tc 
which it has subscribed. The entities of a multina- 
tional enterprise located in various countries are 
subject to the laws of these countries. 

8. A precise legal definition of multinational enter- 
prises is not required for the purposes of the guide- 
lines. These usually comprise companies or other 
entities whose ownership is private, state or mixed, 
established in different countries and so linked 
that one or more of them may be able to exercise 
a significant influence over the activities of others 
and, in particular, to share knowledge and resources 
with the others. The degree of autonomy of each 
entity in relation to the others varies widely from 
one multinational enterprise to another, depending 
on the nature of the links between such entities and 
the fields of activity concerned. For these reasons, 
the guidelines are addressed to the various entities 
within the multinational enterprise (parent corn- 



Department of State Bulletin 



panics and/or local entities) according to the actual 
distribution of responsibilities among them on the 
understanding that they will co-operate and provide 
assistance to one another as necessary to facilitate 
observance of the guidelines. The word "enterprise" 
as used in these guidelines refers to these various 
entities in accordance with their responsibilities. 

9. The guidelines are not aimed at introducing 
differences of treatment between multinational and 
domestic enterprises; wherever relevant they reflect 
good practice for all. Accordingly, multinational and 
domestic enterprises are subject to the same expecta- 
tions in respect of their conduct wherever the guide- 
lines are relevant to both. 

10. The use of appropriate international dispute 
settlement mechanisms, including arbitration, should 
be encouraged as a means of facilitating the resolu- 
tion of problems arising between enterprises and 
Member countries. 

11. Member countries have agreed to establish 
appropriate review and consultation procedures con- 
cerning issues arising in respect of the guidelines. 
When mliltinational enterprises are made subject to 
conflicting requirements by Member countries, the 
governments concerned will co-operate in good faith 
with a view to resolving such problems either within 
the Committee on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises established by the OECD 
Council on 21st January, 1975 or through other 
mutually acceptable arrangements. 

Having Regard to the foregoing considerations, 
the Member countries set forth the following guide- 
lines for multinational enterprises with the under- 
standing that Member countries will fulfil their 
responsibilities to treat enterprises equitably and 
in accordance with international law and inter- 
national agreements, as well as contractual obliga- 
tions to which they have subscribed: 

General Policies 

Enterprises should 

(1) take fully into account established general 
policy objectives of the Member countries in which 
they operate; 

(2) in particular, give due consideration to those 
countries' aims and priorities with regard to eco- 
nomic and social progress, including industrial and 
regional development, the protection of the environ- 
ment, the creation of employment opportunities, the 
promotion of innovation and the transfer of tech- 
nology ; 

(3) while observing their legal obligations con- 
cerning information, supply their entities with sup- 
plementary information the latter may need in 
order to meet requests by the authorities of the 
countries in which those entities are located for 
information relevant to the activities of those enti- 
ties, taking into account legitimate requirements of 
business confidentiality; 

July 19, 1976 



(4) favour close co-operation with the local com- 
munity and business interests; 

(5) allow their component entities freedom to de- 
velop their activities and to e.\ploit their competitive 
advantage in domestic and foreign markets, con- 
sistent with the need for specialisation and sound 
commercial practice; 

(6) when filling responsible posts in each country 
of operation, take due account of individual qualifica- 
tions without discrimination as to nationality, subject 
to particular national requirements in this respect; 

(7) not render — and they should not be solicited 
or expected to render — any bribe or other improper 
benefit, direct or indirect, to any public servant or 
holder of public office; 

(8) unless legally permissible, not make contribu- 
tions to candidates for public office or to political 
parties or other political organisations; 

(9) abstain from any improper involvement in 
local political activities. 

Disclosure of Information 

Enterprises should, having due regard to their 
nature and relative size in the economic context of 
their operations and to requirements of business 
confidentiality and to cost, publish in a form suited to 
improve public understanding a sufficient body ot 
factual information on the structure, activities and 
policies of the enterprise as a whole, as a supple- 
ment, in so far as is necessary for this purpose, to 
information to be disclosed under the national law 
of the individual countries in which they operate. 
To this end, they should publish within reasonable 
time limits, on a i-egular basis, but at least annually, 
financial statements and other pertinent information 
relating to the enterprise as a whole, comprising in 
particular: 

(i) the structure of the enterprise, showing the 
name and location of the parent company, its main 
affiliates, its percentage ownership, direct and in- 
direct, in these affiliates, including shareholding.s 
between them; 

(ii) the geographical areas' where operations 
are carried out and the principal activities carried on 

' For the purposes of the guideline on disclosure of 
information the term "geographical area" means 
groups of countries or individual countries as each 
enterprise determines it appropriate in its particular 
circumstances. While no single method of grouping is 
appropriate for all enterprises, or for all purposes, 
the factors to be considered by an enterprise would 
include the significance of operations carried out in 
individual countries or areas as well as the effects 
on its competitiveness, geographic proximity, eco- 
nomic affinity, similarities in business environments 
and the nature, scale and degree of inter-relationship 
of the enterprises' operations in the various coun- 
tries. [Footnote in original.] 



85 



therein by the parent company and the main affili- 
ates; 

(iii) the operating results and sales by geo- 
graphical area and the sales in the major lines of 
business for the enterprise as a whole; 

(iv) significant new capital investment by geo- 
graphical area and, as far as practicable, by major 
lines of business for the enterprise as a whole; 

(v) a statement of the sources and uses of funds 
by the enterprise as a whole; 

(vi) the average number of employees in each 
geographical area; 

(vii) research and development expenditure for 
the enterprise as a whole; 

(viii) the policies followed in respect of intra- 
group pricing; 

(ix) the accounting policies, including those on 
consolidation, observed in compiling the published 
information. 

Competition 

Enterprises should 

while conforming to official competition rules and 

established policies of the countries in which they 

operate, 

(1) refrain from actions which would adversely 
affect competition in the relevant market by abusing 
a dominant position of market power, by means of, 
for example, 

(a) anti-competitive acquisitions, 

(b) predatory behavior toward competitors, 

(c) unreasonable refusal to deal, 

(d) anti-competitive abuse of industrial property 
rights, 

(e) discriminatory (i.e. unreasonably differen- 
tiated) pricing and using such pricing transactions 
between affiliated enterprises as a means of affecting 
adversely competition outside these enterprises; 

(2) allow purchasers, distributors and licensees 
freedom to resell, export, purchase and develop 
their operations consistent with law, trade conditions, 
the need for specialisation and sound commercial 
practice; 

(3) refrain from participating in or otherwise 
purposely strengthening the restrictive effects of 
international or domestic cartels or restrictive agree- 
ments which adversely affect or eliminate competi- 
tion and which are not generally or specifically ac- 
cepted under applicable national or international 
legislation; 

(4) be ready to consult and co-operate, including 
the provision of information, with competent 
authorities of countries whose interests are directly 
affected in regard to competition issues or investiga- 
tions. Provision of information should be in accord- 
ance with safeguards normally applicable in this 
field. 



Financing 

Enterprises should, in managing the financial and 
commercial operations of their activities, and es- 
pecially their liquid foreign assets and liabilities, 
take into consideration the established objectives of 
the countries in which they operate regarding 
balance of payments and credit policies. 

Taxation 

Enterprises should 

(1) upon request of the taxation authorities of 
the countries in which they operate, provide, in 
accordance with the safeguards and relevant pro- 
cedures of the national laws of these countries, the 
information necessary to determine correctly the 
taxes to be assessed in connection with their opera- 
tions, including relevant information concerning 
their operations in other countries; 

(2) refrain from making use of the particular 
facilities available to them, such as transfer pricing 
which does not conform to an arm's length standard, 
for modifying in ways contrary to national laws the 
tax base on which members of the group are as- 
sessed. 

Employment and Industrial Relations 

Enterprises should 

within the framework of law, regulations and pre- 
vailing labour relations and employment practices, 
in each of the countries in which they operate, 

(1) respect the right of their employees to be 
represented by trade unions and other bona fide 
organisations of employees, and engage in con- 
structive negotiations, either individually or through 
employers' associations, with such employee organi- 
sations with a view to reaching agreements on em- 
ployment conditions, which should include provisions 
for dealing with disputes arising over the interpre- 
tation of such agreements, and for ensuring mutually 
respected rights and responsibilities; 

(2) (a) provide such facilities to representatives 
of the employees as may be necessary to assist in the 
development of effective collective agreements; 

(b) provide to representatives of employees 
information which is needed for meaningful negotia- 
tions on conditions of employment; 

(3) provide to representatives of employees where 
this accords with local law and practice, information 
which enables them to obtain a true and fair view 
of the performance of the entity or, where appropri- 
ate, the enterprise as a whole; 

(4) observe standards of employment and in- 
dustrial relations not less favourable than those 



86 



Department of State Bulletin 



observed by comparable employers in the host coun- 
try; 

(5) in their operations, to the greatest extent 
practicable, utilise, train and prepare for upgrad- 
ing members of the local labour force in co-operation 
with representatives of their employees and, where 
appropriate, the relevant governmental authorities; 

(6) in considering changes in their operations 
which would have major effects upon the livelihood 
of their employees, in particular in the case of the 
closure of an entity involving collective lay-offs or 
dismissals; provide reasonable notice of such changes 
to representatives of their employees, and where ap- 
propriate to the relevant governmental authorities, 
and co-operate with the employee representative and 
appropriate governmental authorities so as to miti- 
gate to the maximum extent practicable adverse 
effects; 

(7) implement their employment policies includ- 
ing hiring, discharge, pay, promotion and training 
without discrimination unless selectivity in respect 
of employee characteristics is in furtherance of 
established governmental policies which specifically 
promote greater equality of employment oppor- 
tunity; 

(8) in the context of bona fide negotiations ' with 
representatives of employees on conditions of em- 
ployment or while employees are exercising a right 
to organise, not threaten to utilise a capacity to 
transfer the whole or part of an operating unit from 
the country concerned in order to influence unfairly 
those negotiations or to hinder the exercise of a right 
to organise; 

(9) enable authorised representatives of their em- 
ployees to conduct negotiations on collective bargain- 
ing or labour management relations issues with 
representatives of management who are authorised 
to take decisions on the matters under negotiation. 

Science and Technology 
Enterprises should 

(1) endeavor to ensure that their activities fit 
satisfactorily into the scientific and technological 
policies and plans of the countries in which they 
operate, and contribute to the development of na- 
tional scientific and technological capacities, includ- 
ing as far as appropriate the establishment and 
improvement in host countries of their capacity to 
innovate; 

(2) to the fullest extent practicable, adopt in the 
course of their business activities practices which 



' Bona fide negotiations may include labour dis- 
putes as part of the process of negotiation. Whether 
or not labour disputes are so included will be deter- 
mined by the law and prevailing employment prac- 
tices of particular countries. [Footnote in original.] 



July 19, 1976 



permit the rapid diffusion of technologies with due 
regard to the protection of industrial and intellectual 
property rights; 

(3) when granting licenses for the use of in- 
dustrial property rights or when otherwise trans- 
ferring technology do so on reasonable terms and 
conditions. 



Texts of Decisions of the Council ^ 

Decision of the Council on Inter-Governmental 
Consultation Procedures on the Guidelines 
FOR Multinational Enterprises 

The Council, 

Having regard to the Convention on the Organisa- 
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development of 
14th December, 1960 and, in particular, to Articles 
2(d), 3 and 5(a) thereof; 

Having regard to the Resolution of the Council of 
21st January, 1975 establishing a Committee on 
International Investment and Multinational Enter- 
prises and, in particular, to paragraph 2 thereof 
[C(74)247(Final)]; 

Taking note of the Declaration by the Governments 
of OECD Member countries of 21st June, 1976 in 
which they jointly recommend to multinational 
enterprises the observance of guidelines for multi- 
national enterprises; 

Recognising the desirability of setting forth pro- 
cedures by which consultations may take place on 
matters related to these guidelines; 

On the proposal of the Committee on International 
Investment and Multinational Enterprises; 

Decides: 

1. The Committee on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises (hereinafter called the 
"Committee") shall periodically or at the request of 
a Member country hold an e.xchange of views on 
matters related to the guidelines and the experience 
gained in their application. The Committee shall 
periodically report to the Council on these matters. 

2. The Committee shall periodically invite the 
Business and Industry Advisory Committee to OECD 
(BIAC) and the Trade Union Advisory Committee to 
OECD (TUAC) to express their views on matters 
related to the guidelines and shall take account of 
such views in its reports to the Council. 

3. On the proposal of a Member country the Com- 
mittee may decide whether individual enterprises 
should be given the opportunity, if they so wish, 
to express their views concerning the application 
of the guidelines. The Committee shall not reach 
conclusions on the conduct of individual enterprises. 

4. Member countries may request that consulta- 



' Turkey abstained on the three decisions. 



87 



tions be held in the Committee on any problem 
arising from the fact that multinational enterprises 
are made subject to conflicting requirements. Gov- 
ernments concerned will co-operate in good faith 
with a view to resolving such problems, either with- 
in the Committee or through other mutually accept- 
able arrangements. 

5. This Decision shall be reviewed within a period 
of three years. The Committee shall make proposals 
for this purpose as appropriate. 

Decision of the Council on National Treatment 

The Council, 

Having regard to the Convention on the Organisa- 
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development of 
14th December, 1960 and, in particular. Articles 
2(c), 2(d), 3 and 5(a) thereof; 

Having regard to the Resolution of the Council of 
21st January, 1975 establishing a Committee on 
International Investment and Multinational Enter- 
prises and, in particular, paragraph 2 thereof 
[C(74)247(Final)]; 

Taking note of the Declaration by the Govern- 
ments of OECD Member countries of 21st June, 1976 
on national treatment; 

Considering that it is appropriate to establish 
within the Organisation suitable procedures for re- 
viewing laws, regulations and administrative prac- 
tices (hereinafter referred to as "measures") which 
depart from "National Treatment"; 

On the proposal of the Committee on International 
Investment and Multinational Enterprises; 

Decides : 

1. Measures taken by a Member country constitut- 
ing exceptions to "National Treatment" (including 
measures restricting new investment by "Foreign- 
Controlled Enterprises" already established in their 
territory) which are in effect on the date of this 
Decision shall be notified to the Organisation within 
60 days after the date of this Decision. 

2. Measures taken by a Member country constitut- 
ing new exceptions to "National Treatment" (in- 
eluding measures restricting new investment by 
"Foreign-Controlled Enterprises" already established 
in their territory) taken after the date of this 
Decision shall be notified to the Organisation within 
30 days of their introduction together with the 
specific reasons therefore and the proposed duration 
thereof. 

3. Measures introduced by a territorial subdivision 
of a Member country, pursuant to its independent 
powers, which constitute exceptions to "National 
Treatment", shall be notified to the Organisation by 
the Member country concerned, insofar as it has 
knowledge thereof, within 30 days of the responsible 
officials of the Member country obtaining such 
knowledge. 

4. The Committee on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises (hereinafter called the 



"Committee") shall periodically review the applica- 
tion of "National Treatment" (including exceptions 
thereto) with a view to extending such application 
of "National Treatment". The Committee shall make 
proposals as and when necessary in this connection. 

5. The Committee shall act as a forum for con- 
sultations, at the request of a Member country, 
in respect of any matter related to this instrument 
and its implementation, including exceptions to "Na- 
tional Treatment" and their application. 

6. Member countries shall provide to the Commit- 
tee, upon its request, all relevant information con- 
cerning measures pertaining to the application of 
"National Treatment" and exceptions thereto. 

7. This Decision shall be reviewed within a period 
of three years. The Committee shall make proposals 
for this purpose as appropriate. 

Decision of the Council on International 
Investment Incentives and Disincentives 

The Council, 

Having regard to the Convention on the Organisa- 
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development of 
14th December, 1960 and, in particular, Articles 
2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 3 and 5(a) thereof; 

Having regard to the Resolution of the Council 
of 21st January, 1975 establishing a Committee on 
International Investment and Multinational Enter- 
prises and, in particular, paragraph 2 thereof 
[C(74)247(Final)]; 

Taking note of the Declaration by the Govern- 
ments of OECD Member countries of 21st June, 1976 
on international investment incentives and disin- 
centives; 

On the proposal of the Committee on International 
Investment and Multinational Enterprises; 

Decides : 

1. Consultations will take place in the framework 
of the Committee on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises at the request of a Mem- 
oer country which considers that its interests may 
be adversely affected by the impact on its flow of 
international direct investments of measures taken 
by another Member country specifically designed 
to provide incentives or disincentives for interna- 
tional direct investment. Having full regard to the 
national economic objectives of the measures and 
without prejudice to policies designed to redress 
regional imbalances, the purpose of the consulta- 
tions will be to examine the possibility of reducing 
such effects to a minimum. 

2. Member countries shall supply, under the con- 
sultation procedures, all permissible information re- 
lating to any measures being the subject of the 
consultation. 

3. This Decision shall be reviewed within a period 
of three years. The Committee on International In- 
vestment and Multinational Enterprises shall make 
proposals for this purpose as appropriate. 



88 



Department of State Bulletin 



Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Paris June 22 



Folloiving is the transcript of a news con- 
ference held by Secretary Kissinger at the 
American Embassy at Paris on June 22} 

Press leleavc 317 (iated June 22 

Secretary Kissinger: This was supposed to 
be a joint conference witli the Secretary of 
the Treasury, but — because of bureaucratic 
confusions, we hadn't realized about his 
plane — he has a fixed departure for Poland, 
and he got delayed at OECD [Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development] . 
So I will answer all technical economic ques- 
tions and produce a major crisis in inter- 
national finance. 

Basically, our attempt at the OECD meet- 
ing was to call attention to the fact that the 
industrial democracies possess the resources 
to have produced the highest standard of 
living for their peoples of any group, the 
resources to advance the growth of the de- 
veloping countries, and indeed the resources 
to which even countries of a different eco- 
nomic philosophy appeal if they want to ac- 
celerate their own advance. 

Therefore the industrial democracies have 
the opportunity, if they coordinate their ef- 
forts, to contribute to the overwhelming 
problem of our period, which is to construct 
an international order — for the first time in 
history on a global basis — in which all or at 
least most nations have a sense of partici- 
pation. 

And at a time when there is so much talk 
about who is on the rise and who is on the 
decline, it is important to take stock of the 
fact that, in the main element of what makes 

' Other press releases relating to the Secretary'.- 
June 20-23 visit to Paris are Nos. 312 and 312A of 
June 20, 314 of June 21, 315 and 316 of June 22, and 
323 of June 23. 



life worthwhile for people, it is the industrial 
democracies that have the capacity to help 
both their own people and all of the rest of 
mankind, if they coordinate their efforts, 
and that this is well within their capabilities. 

This was the major theme of our ap- 
proach ; this is what we asked OECD to join 
us in doing; and this is the basis for an opti- 
mistic appraisal about the prospects of world 
order in the next decade or so. 

With this I will be glad to answer your 
questions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I am sure there ivill he 
a lot of questions about OECD, so I don't 
suppose you'll mind if I ask for your com- 
ments on the Italian elections. 

Secretary Kissinger: You know, 1 didn't 
see the final results of the Italian election 
until this morning, and we have not yet had 
an opportunity to analyze all its nuances and 
to discuss it with our colleagues here and in 
Washington. I would call attention to the 
fact that the democratic parties — that is, the 
non-Communist, non-Fascist parties — have 
something over 56 percent of the vote, so 
that the possibility of forming a majority 
based on democratic parties exists. But the 
Italian parties will now have to discuss 
among themselves about how to proceed. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, ivhat practical measures 
has the Congress of your country provided 
for the survival of the Cyprus Republic? 

Secretary Kissinger: The United States 
has repeatedly stated its views that a settle- 
ment of Cyprus must respect the dignity and 
self-respect of the population, that the divid- 
ing lines cannot be the existing dividing lines 
on Cyprus, and that we are in favor of an 
independent and united Cyprus. 



July 19, 1976 



89 



We have attempted to bring the two par- 
ties together in negotiations at various fo- 
rums. I think it is safe to say that the Greek 
and Turkish negotiators throughout his- 
tory have not found compromise the easiest 
road for dealing with each other. 

But the United States strongly supports a 
negotiated settlement, urges the parties to 
return to negotiations as rapidly as possible, 
and does not exclude putting forward ideas 
of our own once the positions of the two 
sides begin to approach each other more. But 
as long as the gap between the two parties is 
as wide as it is, it is very difficult for the 
United States to put forward a compromise 
proposal. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you feel that tve are 
any closer to a settlement of the Lebanese 
crisis today than ive were three days ago? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't .see what has 
changed in the last three days that would 
make a settlement of the Lebanese crisis 
easier. The problem remains substantially 
what it has been all along. The differences 
between the warring factions in Lebanon 
have proved extremely complicated to recon- 
cile. Secondly, even when there is a central 
government there is the problem of how to 
supply it with a security force that would 
enable it to make its writ run in all of Leb- 
anon. 

We strongly support any initiative that 
bi-ings the conflicting groups together; we 
favor a negotiation among these factions 
and among the various groups; and we 
strongly support a united Lebanon whose in- 
dependence and sovereignty is respected and 
in which the various communities can live in 
security. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in Nairobi the United 
States expressed reservations concerning the 
final agreement. Here the United States has 
refused stabilization of raw materials. Are 
you intending to place back into question 
the matter of the consensus secured at 
UNCTAD \_U.N. Conference on Trade and 
Development'] ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know exactly 



what you're referring to. The United States 
has supported an approach on a case-by-case 
basis to commodities. It has agreed at 
UNCTAD, and it continues to agree, to a 
schedule by which these commodities should 
be negotiated. It has suggested that buffer 
stocks were the most efficient way of doing 
this, and it has agreed to examine funds for 
each commodity with which to do it. The 
United States has expressed reservations 
about a common fund for all commodities 
and has not agreed to proceed with this. But 
the United States is not putting into ques- 
tion the consensus that was achieved at 
UNCTAD. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you supply some- 
thing which may be a footnote — or may be 
more than a footnote — to the Lebanese evac- 
uation? Did the U.S. Government directly 
contact the PLO [Palestine Liberation Or- 
ganization'] or any agency of the PLO to, 
first, arrange for the evacuation and, second, 
to thank them for their support and coopera- 
tion during it? 

Secretary Kissinger: The United States at 
no time has been in direct contact with the 
PLO during the evacuation. The United 
States, of necessity, had to deal through 
various intermediaries with the PLO. That is 
to say, other countries that have relations 
with the PLO contacted the PLO about the 
physical arrangements in an area that was 
controlled by Palestinians. It wasn't only the 
PLO, there were other Palestinian groups 
that controlled the area from which the evac- 
uation took place. 

There has been, to the best of my knowl- 
edge, no direct contact between the United 
States and the PLO on the subject, before or 
subsequently, at any time during the Leba- 
nese [inaudible]. All communications have 
been through intermediaries. And in all 
cases, except for a general expression of 
thanks to all people who helped, there were 
no messages at all. We left it to the interme- 
diaries to arrange what needed to be ar- 
ranged. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, coming back to the 



90 



Department of State Bulletin 



(JECD, does the United States subscribe to 
the OECD thesis that the strategy for the 
rest of this decade calls for only moderate 
(jroivth, which implies continued slack and 
slow improvement in the unemployment rate? 

Secretary Kissinger: I am sorry that my 
friend [Secretary of the Treasury] Bill 
Simon isn't here. But I would suppose that 
any document that we signed we subscribe 
to. Most of the time that is true. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, there has been a lot of 
talk about the CIEC {Conference on Inter- 
national Economic Cooperation'] Conference 
in Paris. What concessions would you like 
to see from the OPEC {Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries'] countries 
on energy, and do you agree with the OPEC 
analysis that nuclear poiver cannot make a 
considerable contribution to the energy bal- 
ance of the industrialized ivorld? 

Secretary Kissinger: We are at this mo- 
ment formulating our detailed positions for 
the CIEC Conference. We have always be- 
lieved and continue to believe that the CIEC 
Conference is the principal instrument 
through which the dialogue between the de- 
veloped and the developing countries should 
take place. And we welcome the initiative 
that brought it into being and brought it to 
Paris. 

We will make serious proposals in all of 
the categories, in all of the four commissions 
in which CIEC is operating. We don't want to 
put it in terms of what concessions do we 
want from any particular group. We will 
rather put it in terms of a coherent program 
in which the concessions of both sides are 
balanced. 

With respect to nuclear power, I think it 
is probably correct that nuclear power by 
itself cannot replace oil as a principal source 
of energy. And it is for this reason that in 
my remarks yesterday I called attention to 
other substitutes for oil. 

But the fact is that with or without the 
energy crisis the reserves of petroleum are 
limited and the industrialized countries and, 
indeed, the i-est of the world have, at most. 



the rest of this century to develop significant 
alternative sources for energy. And this 
must be a major part of our energy program. 

Q. With regard to your remarks in favor 
of negotiations on Lebanon, hoiv ivould you 
assess the prospects for a negotiation noiv? 
And two, is your meeting with American 
Ambassadors from the Middle East tonight 
related in any way to any neiv interrMtioyial 
initiative on a negotiation? 

Secretary Kissinger: Actually, the meet- 
ing with the Ambassadors was arranged be- 
fore the tragic deaths of the two American 
diplomats in Beirut. It seemed to me then 
that it was important to have an opportunity 
to get a firsthand view from our Ambassa- 
dors in those countries in the Middle East 
that are most concerned with the Lebanon 
crisis. And also to give us an opportunity to 
avoid misconceptions about what role the 
United States may or may not have played 
in particular events. 

Out of this meeting today I do not expect 
an American peace initiative for Lebanon; 
but we will continue, as we have in the past, 
to support any peace initiative in Lebanon 
that is promising. The tragedy of Lebanon 
must be ended as rapidly as possible, and our 
Ambassadors will be instructed to use their 
maximum influence and to offer their fullest 
cooperation to the governments in the area 
in that effort. But the meeting today is con- 
fined to Lebanon and is not dealing with Mid- 
dle East peace in general. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in all your negotiations, 
do you find it more difficult now to negotiate 
since it is an election year? 

Secretary Kissinger: My megalomania, of 
course, reaches levels in which an admission 
of inadequacy is next to inconceivable. But 
it is obvious that in an election year other 
countries are asking themselves about the 
continuity of American foreign policy. It is 
my belief that the main lines of our foreign 
policy reflect the permanent interests of the 
United States and will be continued. And I 
must honestly say I have not found that 



July 19, 1976 



91 



there is a significant inhibition to the con- 
duct of our diplomacy, despite the excitement 
that is occurring in the United States. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, regarding Lebanon, can 
you tell us if there is any promise in either 
the French proposal for a roundtable or for 
the French proposal for a French force in 
Lebanon ? 

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the 
idea of a roundtable in Paris, the United 
States does not want to commit itself to any- 
one particular formula. We would certainly 
think that a roundtable in a place that ap- 
pears neutral to most of the participants 
would be an obvious solution. And if all of 
the parties were to agree to come to Paris, 
we would think that was a reasonable venue, 
and we would support it. 

We have not put forward any particular 
locale, but we would not only have no objec- 
tion to Paris, we would think it has some- 
thing to commend it. 

With respect to the French force, as I un- 
derstand the French proposal, it is that if all 
the parties ask for French participation, as 
well as the states most concerned, like Syria 
and Egypt, and if there are conditions of 
cease-fire, then France would be prepared to 
send forces to help assure the cease-fire for a 
limited period of time. 

If all of these conditions are met, the 
United States would believe that a French 
force, especially under the conditions which 
now exist, might play a useful role. It is not, 
however, for us to say whether a French force 
should go to Lebanon. It depends, as Presi- 
dent Giscard himself has pointed out, on the 
wishes of the Arab parties concerned and on 
a prior achievement of a cease-fire. If all of 
those conditions are met, the United States 
would certainly not object to such a force. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, how did the OECD meet- 
ing contribute to the Puerto Rico summit 
that is planned for this iveekend, and tvhat 
do you see as the relationship? 

Secretary Kissinger: The major topics that 
wei'e raised at OECD will also be raised at 



the Puerto Rico summit, and the OECD 
meeting gave an opportunity to exchange in 
a wider circle some of the issues that will be 
discussed intensively in Puerto Rico, and 
they raised the questions which the heads 
of governments will deal with in greater 
detail. 

The basic reason for the summits that 
have taken place within the last year has 
been the conviction that the industrial de- 
mocracies owe it to their people to demon- 
strate that they are in control of their des- 
tinies and that they are willing to coordinate 
their policies both for growth and for devel- 
opment and perhaps also in other spheres of 
economic activity. That will be the basic 
theme of the Puerto Rico summit ; and in this 
sense the OECD meeting should be viewed 
as a preparatory conference, although it was 
obviously not scheduled for that reason. 

Q. You spoke of possible political pressures 
in the East, as a result of the rapid expan- 
sion of East-West trade, on particular West- 
ern comitries. Can you provide us with some 
examples of either ivhere this has taken 
place in the past or hypothetical illustrations 
of how it can happen in the future? 

Secretary Kissinger: What I attempted to 
do in my remarks yesterday was to call at- 
tention to a series of problems that can arise 
over the future. I did not refer to any par- 
ticular difficulties that have in fact occurred. 
It seems to me, however, that when the trade 
between the industrial democracies and the 
state trading systems is increasing at the 
rate that it is, it would be foolhardy not to 
look at the problems that could develop over 
the future. 

Obviously, state trading systems, being 
centrally controlled and subject to immediate 
political direction, can switch their purchases 
rapidly from one country to another; and 
they can, therefore, if the trade has reached 
a certain level, bring about a situation that 
could have economic consequences. They 
could cut off deliveries of what they have 
agreed to do, rapidly. 

And therefore what we would like to do is 
to review the whole range of problems that 



92 



Department of State Bulletin 



could arise and to establish for ourselves 
some guidelines by which the industrial de- 
mocracies could cooperate; because many of 
these difficulties that one foresees could the- 
oretically be dealt with by some of the meth- 
ods that were tried out in the lEA [Interna- 
tional Energy Agency] without any detri- 
ment to the overall level of trade — and, in- 
deed, to its encouragement. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if we might 
ask yon again a little bit more about your 
reaction to the Italian election. Noic you 
said you hare not yet had a chance to study 
the nuances. However, the bare numbers are 
there. I wonder if you could categorize your 
reaction in some tvay. For example, do the 
results in any way justify the alarm that 
you expressed prior to the vote — the alarm, 
that is, of a possible Communist participation 
in the government? 

Secretary Kissinger: I never expressed un- 
provoked alarm. And I think it would be 
important for the European press to under- 
stand that almost all of my comments on the 
subject were elicited with my, I must say, 
not very excessive reluctance. 

But nevertheless, the essential problem 
which we confronted in the spring has not 
been fundamentally changed by the Italian 
election ; namely, whether the necessary re- 
forms in Italy should be carried out by a 
coalition of democratic parties or whether 
they should be carried out with the partici- 
pation of the Communist Party. 

The possibility exists, as I pointed out, on 
the basis of the election, to form a coalition 
of democratic parties, since there is some- 
thing like 56 percent of the parties that are 
neither Communist nor Fascist. It is now up 
to the Italian political parties to decide which 
way they want to direct Itahan politics; and 
beyond this I am not prepared to go today. 

Q. Will the EEC [European Economic 
Community'] participate in the Puerto Rico 
summit ? 

Secretary Kissinger: The participation of 
the EEC is a question that is for the Euro- 
peans to resolve and not for the United 



States, and therefore we will wait to get a 
European reaction. 

Q. Regarding your statements on energy 
yesterday, do you expect non-IEA countries 
like France to join the lEA in an attempt 
to form a common front? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have in fact 
achieved a high degree of cooperation be- 
tween France and the lEA, and we are pre- 
pared to proceed on a pragmatic basis. That 
is to say, we are interested in the results and 
not in the legal structure, and I believe it 
would be possible to work out a parallel pro- 
gram between the lEA and France within 
either the framework of the OECD or 
through bilateral arrangements. We do not 
insist that France join the IE A, and we be- 
lieve that the program we propose is achiev- 
able without formal participation of France. 

Q. Can you elaborate on your statement 
on Cyprus, ivith partic^dar reference to the 
dividing line? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have said before 
that it seems to us that the present dividing 
lines should not be the permanent divid- 
ing lines on Cyprus. What the exact dividing 
lines should be is what the negotiation is 
supposed to accomplish, and we have urged 
both parties to negotiate these issues as rap- 
idly as possible for the sake of the popula- 
tion of Cyprus, which has suffered enough, 
and for the sake of peace in the eastern 
Mediterranean. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us some 
idea of the impact of the events in South 
Africa on your approach to your talks ivith 
Prime Minister Vorster? 

Secretary Kissinger: The purpose of my 
meeting with Prime Minister Vorster has 
been to contribute to a peaceful evolution of 
the problems of South Africa, an evolution 
which would enable all communities there to 
live with each other with recognition of each 
other's dignity and which, at the same time, 
would avoid outside intervention and move 
toward a majority rule, respect for the mi- 
nority rights, and negotiations. The meeting 



July 19, 1976 



93 



with Prime Minister Vorster resulted from 
the fact that all black African leaders with 
whom I spoke on my recent trip urged me to 
bring South Africa into this process. And 
within the United States I was urged by the 
Black Caucus to bring South Africa into this 
process. Last week, after the riots in South 
Africa, I met with 40 African Ambassadors 
in Washington, and they unanimously asked 
me to go ahead despite the riots, because the 
riots underline the urgency of the situation. 

As far as the United States is concerned, 
1 expressed our strong opposition to the sys- 
tem of legalized separation of the races that 
is taking place in South Africa. We joined 
the U.N. Security Council consensus and 
made a separate statement expressing our 
strong opposition to the violence that was 
used ill the face of the demonstrations. And 
we regret that the meeting with the Prime 
Minister is taking place in these circum- 
stances. 

But precisely because South Africa is such 
an essential part of any attempt to bring- 
about a negotiated solution in southern 
Africa, because the problems will not be 
easier four or eight weeks from now, we 
have decided to go ahead with these meet- 
ings — in full consultation with all interested 
black African states, with whose leaders we 
have been in close contact prior to this 
meeting and with whom we hope to be in 
close contact after this meeting. 

The United States is attempting to move 
matters to a solution through negotiation 
rather than through violence. And it will at- 
tempt to do what it can to avoid outside 
intervention and to permit a solution in 
which African problems are solved by Afri- 
can nations, and we are doing this in the 
closest cooperation with all the states of 
Africa. It is in this spirit and not in any 
sense as an endorsement of anything that is 
going on in South Africa — quite the con- 
trary — that I am meeting the South African 
Prime Minister tomorrow. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, back to the Middle East 
for a moment, please. There is a report — / 
have not seen the report fully — out of Israel 
that you have told Ambassador Dinitz that. 



for the transitional quarter, Israel will have 
to get along ivith $200 million instead of the 
$500 million voted by Congress. Now I realize 
that reports get garbled, and as I say, I have 
not seen the report, so could you clarify this? 
Has there been such a decision made by the 
Administration to cut Israel's aid during the 
transitional quarter, and if so, why? 

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, it is in- 
correct to characterize this as cutting Is- 
rael's aid. The problem has been how much 
should be added to aid for Israel during the 
transitional quarter. The President has been 
attempting to work out a compromise with 
interested Members of the Congress on the 
amount of aid for Israel, between the sum of 
$500 million that has been requested by 
Israel as an addition to the sums that have 
already been appropriated and what he feels 
is possible and will still meet his budgetary 
ceiling. To the best of my information, this 
sum is still under negotiation, and therefore 
any particular figure would be incorrect. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you refer to interme- 
diaries between the United States and the 
PLO. May I ask if Egypt played a part in 
this capacity? May I ask you about the pros- 
pect for a Geneva meeting? 

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, "inter- 
mediary" between the United States and the 
PLO is perhaps too sweeping a word. The 
United States had the practical problem of 
evacuating citizens from areas that were 
controlled by Palestinians, and therefore it 
was necessary to make certain technical ar- 
rangements with the Palestinians. In this 
respect the Government of Egypt played an 
extremely helpful role, for which we are very 
grateful, and we dealt with it by stating our 
requirements to the Government of Egypt, 
which then dealt with whatever group they 
felt was necessary to achieve it. 

But they did not pass any messages from 
us to any other group. It was done by the 
Government of Egypt on its own authority. 
There were other Arab governments such as 
the Government of Saudi Arabia and of 
Tunisia that were extremely helpful in ar- 
ranging the evacuation, and we have thanked 



94 



Department of State Bulletin 



them. The President has sent messages to all 
of them. 

With respect to the resumption of the 
Geneva Conference, the United States has 
expressed its view that an extended stagna- 
tion of conditions in the Middle East would 
be dangerous to the peace of the area. We 
therefore support a peace process which in 
our view now should proceed on all fronts, 
either in stages or toward the final settle- 
ment, whichever the parties agree to. 

We are prepared for a resumption of the 
Geneva Conference. We are prepared to do 
it in any other forum that indicates prog- 
ress. We at one point proposed the prepara- 
tory conference in order to examine what 
could be done, but we are openminded in 
this matter. The major objective is to make 
realistic progress, and we are in touch with 
all of the parties in oi'der to achieve it. 



Secretary Comments on Discussions 
With South African Prime Minister 

Secretary Kissinger met ivith Prime Min- 
ister John Vorster of South Africa June 23- 
2Jf at Bodenmais and Grafenau, Federal Re- 
public of Germany. Following is the tran- 
script of a news conference held by Secretary 
Kissinger and Federal German Foreign Min- 
ister Hans-Dietrich Genscher at Furstenfeld- 
bruck Airport on June 2U-^ 

Press ielea!^e 327 dated June 24 

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and gentle- 
men, I primarily want to take this oppor- 
tunity to thank the Government of the Fed- 
eral Republic and the Foreign Minister for 
the arrangements that were made for my 
meeting with the Prime Minister of South 
Africa. The arrangements could not have 
been better, and all the technical arrange- 
ments were extraordinarily efficient, and 
with the complicated transportation arrange- 
ments. We would like to express our appre- 
ciation to the Government of the Federal Re- 
public, to the Chancellor and to the Foreign 



Minister for the personal interest they have 
taken in this. 

I have had a discussion with the Foreign 
Minister here, and of course, as you know, 
the state of our consultation is now such that 
when we don't see each other for three days 
we both become very lonely, and we will see 
each other again this weekend. But I re- 
poi'ted to the Foreign Minister about my con- 
versations with the Prime Minister of South 
Africa and his colleagues, and we also dis- 
cussed the preparations for Puerto Rico, 
where we will of course meet again this 
weekend. 

That is all I want to say now. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us a bit more 
about your discussion.^ with the South Afri- 
can Prime Minister? 

Secretary Kissinger: I can't really add a 
great deal to what has already been said. 
The Prime Minister and I reviewed in great 
detail all of the aspects of the situation in 
southern Africa. From the point of view of 
moving matters toward a solution and avoid- 
ing the threatening conflicts in that area, 
we looked at all the possibilities that have 
been suggested by various parties. 

The Prime Minister has to return to South 
Africa to talk to his colleagues and to reflect 
about matters, and we will follow up 
through other channels and stay in close 
touch to see what can be done to move mat- 
ters forward. 

The United States stands by the policy 
which has been enunciated in Lusaka, and 
any solution in which we participate will be 
in that framework.^ 

Q. Mr. Secretary, hoiv woidd yon charac- 
terize the Prime Minister's reactions? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think it would 
be appropriate for me to characterize the re- 
actions in any other way than that there 
was a full and detailed exploration of all the 
methods that might be used to bring about 
a solution, and I believe there is an under- 
standing of the seriousness of the situation 



' For remarks by Secretary Ki.';singer at Grafenau 
on June 23, see press release 325. 



-■ For Secretary Kissinger's address at Lusaka on 
Apr. 27, see Bulletin of May 31, 1976, p. 672. 



July 19, 1976 



95 



and of the need for — and of the urgency — 
with which the solution must be sought. 

Q. lUnintelligible.'] 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think it is pre- 
mature to discuss this until further dis- 
cussions can have been held, and I will also 
send the Assistant Seci-etary of State foi- 
African Affairs to Africa to report to the 
leaders of the black African countries that 
are most concerned with these matters and 
ask if we can have their opinion. Then we 
can be more specific. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, your speech in Lusaka 
put an emphasis on Rhodesia. Were your 
talks primarily about Rhodesia, or did you 
spend great deal of time on South Africa 
itself? 

Secretary Kissinger: We said that all the 
problems of southern Africa — which in- 
cludes Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa 
— -were discussed. 

Q. Could you expand on the problems of 
South Africa? I am not so sure of what it is 
[unintelligible]. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we have stated, 
1 stated, in Lusaka that the United States is 
against the institutionalized and legalized 
separation of the races. And we, I repeat, 
discussed all the problems of southern 
Africa. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said before the meet- 
ing began that you believe that South Afri- 
ca's participation was necessary to the peace- 
ftd resolution of the probletns of [unintel- 
ligible'] it is your impression that the South 
African [unintelligible] are prepared to par- 
ticipate in a peacef^d resolution? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think that the 
Government of South Africa will have to 
speak for itself, but the discussions started 
from that assumption and were carried out 
in that framework. What in fact can be 
done and what will be done will be deter- 
mined in the next weeks and months, but we 
believe that the process that we have 



started in April is still undei-way after these 
discussions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, did the Prime Minister 
give much inspiration about ivhites [unintel- 
ligible] ? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have always 
stated that a solution in southern Africa 
must take into account not only the claims 
of the majority but the rights of the minor- 
ity and a solution must be sought in the 
framework in which all communities can ex- 
ist within a framework of dignity and self- 
respect. 

Q. [Unintelligible.] 

Secretary Kissinger: The United States 
has stated its views on that subject in the 
U.N. Security Council debate last Saturday, 
and these views are unchanged. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned you will 
talk with [British Prime Minister James] 
Callaghan tomorroiv [unintelligible]. 

Secretary Kissinger: Of course I cannot 
speak for the British Government. I plan to 
see Mr. Crosland [British Foreign Secretary 
Anthony Crosland] and Mr. Callaghan to- 
morrow, and then over the weekend in 
Puerto Rico we will have an opportunity to 
talk to our other colleagues from other 
West European countries. 

I would think that Britain has an impor- 
tant role to play, especially with respect to 
Rhodesia, and I would hope that Britain will 
participate and play a leading role in the 
evolution of the Rhodesian question. But I 
would first like to discuss details of this 
with the Prime Minister and the Foreign 
Secretary. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, your South African [un- 
intelligible]. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't think 
matters have reached a point where any 
specific decisions can be communicated to 
anybody, and of course you will have to keep 
in mind that in this whole process we have 
to stay in touch, both with the Government 
of South Afi-ica as well as with the govern- 



96 



Department of State Bulletin 



meiits of black Africa. We also have to be, 
we intend to be, in the closest touch and 
consultation with West European govern- 
ments that have an interest in this subject, 
and it is quite premature to talk of any 
intermediaries. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said before you set 
out that one of the things you wanted to find 
out -tvas \_unintelligible] separate Rhodesia 
from South West Africa. Do you have a bet- 
ter idea what that is now? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have a better 
idea of the views of the Soutli African Prime 
Minister and his colleagues, but of course he 
will have to speak for himself. I think we 
have made clear that the framework — that 
the process in which we are engaged is 
continuing and that the framework for it is 
unchanged ; and you may be able to draw 
some conclusions from that. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, as a result of these meet- 
ings have you decided ivhen you ivill ask for 
[unintelligible] ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, this is a ques- 
tion for the President to decide in the light 
of the assessment of his legislative advisers 
as to the situation in the Congress. I have 
not so distinguished myself in my under- 
standing of congressional sentiment that my 
recommendations would be decisive. But we 
will undoubtedly ask for it, and — 

Q. There is indeed, but the point is, do the 
discussions do anything about accelerating or 
delaying your recommendations? 

Secretary Kissinger: The discussions that 
took place are essentially not relevant to the 
decision that we will make with respect to 
the Byrd amendment. 

Q. [Unintelligible.'] 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I really think 
that is a question that the Government of 
South Africa has to answer, which perhaps 
is put this way in a slightly extreme form. 
The problem is whether it is possible to 
start an evolution in southern Africa in 
which there are sufficient guarantees for 



minorities so that the political evolution that 
the majority of the people want is bearable 
for the minorities. 

This is the essence of the problem, and 
it should not be viewed in terms of separat- 
ing oneself from any particular group. 

Q. And did. you get an ansiver to that 
question? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as we have an- 
nounced, we discussed all aspects of the 
problems in southern Africa. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you spoke before of set- 
ting up a process as a result of these meet- 
ings. Did you get any final answer? Do you 
feel that you have established this process 
[unintelligible] ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I do not know 
whether there will be any solution; but we 
believe that the process is in motion, and we 
hope, as we have hoped from the beginning, 
to contribute toward a resolution that is 
achieved by negotiation and not by violence 
and which respects the dignity of all the 
peoples in the area. 

And I believe that this process is in 
motion. 

Foreign Minister Genscher: I should like 
to add that the Government of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, like the Government 
of the United States, is undertaking efforts 
to make its contribution toward a peaceful 
solution of the problems besetting southern 
Africa, and we are undertaking these efforts 
together with our partners in the European 
Community. And that is why the informa- 
tion we received from the Secretary of State 
was very important for us, since the Chan- 
cellor is seeing the Prime Minister of South 
Africa tomorrow to expi-ess and put before 
him the views of the Government of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, as I did last 
Tuesday to the Foreign Minister of the Re- 
public of South Africa. Therefore I would 
like to take this opportunity again to thank 
the Secretary of State for the information 
lie has been making available to me. 

Thank you very much. 



July 19, 1976 



97 



U.S. Embassy Officials Murdered 
in Lebanon 

Following are statements made on June 
16 by President Ford and Secretary Kissin- 
ger on the deaths of U.S. Ambassador to 
Lebanon Francis E. Meloy, Jr., Economic 
Counselor Robert 0. Waring, and Embassy 
chauffeur Zohair Moghrabi. 

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT FORD 

Whitt House press i elease dated June 16 

The assassination of our Ambassador in 
Beirut, Francis E. Meloy, Jr., and of our 
Counselor for Economic Affairs, Robert 0. 
Waring, and of their driver is an act of 
senseless, outrageous brutality. I extend to 
their families my own deep sense of sorrow 
and that of all of the American people. 

These men were on their way to meet 
with President-elect Sarkis. They were on a 
mission of peace, seeking to do what they 
could in the service of their country to help 
restore order, stability, and reason to Leba- 
non. Their deaths add another tragedy to the 
suffering which the Lebanense people have 
endured beyond measure. 

These men had lived with danger for many 
weeks and did so with dedication and dis- 
regard of personal safety— as we have come 
to expect of the Foreign Service. 

The goals of our policy must remain un- 
changed. The United States will not be 
deterred in its search for peace by these 
murders. 

I have instructed Secretary Kissinger to 
continue our intensive efforts in this direc- 
tion. I will name a new Ambassador to Leba- 
non within the very near future to resume 
the mission of Ambassador Meloy, which he 
performed so brilliantly.^ I have also in- 
structed the Secretary to get in touch with 
all of the governments in the area and with 
the Lebanese leaders to help identify the 



murderers and to see that they are brought 
to justice. I have also ordered that all ap- 
propriate resources of the United States 
undertake immediately to identify the per- 
sons or group responsible for this vicious act. 
Those responsible for these brutal assassi- 
nations must be brought to justice. At the 
same time, we must continue our policy of 
seeking a peaceful solution in Lebanon. That 
is the way we can best honor the brave men 
who gave their lives for this country and for 
the cause of peace. 

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY KISSINGER 



' On June 22 the White House announced President 
Ford's designation of Talcott Seelye to go to Beirut 
as his Special Representative to take charge of the 
U.S. Embassy temporarily. 



98 



Press lelease 305 dated June 16 

I learned this morning with profound 
sorrow of the kidnaping and brutal murder 
of our Ambassador to Lebanon, Francis E. 
Meloy, Jr., the Economic Counselor of our 
Embassy in Beirut, Robert 0. Waring, 
and the Ambassador's Lebanese chauffeur, 
Zohair Moghrabi. Ambassador Meloy and 
Mr. Waring were — as part of our intensive 
effort to bring peace to Lebanon— on their 
way to a meeting with President-elect Sarkis. 
They disappeared en route; the three bodies 
were later found and their identities con- 
firmed. 

The President's statement expressed the 
shock and revulsion that all of us feel at 
this tragic, cowardly, and senseless act. It 
also expresses our determination not to be 
deterred, by brutal and vicious action, from 
the search for peace. But equally, no nation 
or group should believe that the United 
States will not find ways to protect its > 
diplomatic personnel. 

I have commented before on the particu- 
larly monstrous injustice in violent death 
coming to those engaged in the work of 
peace. The vicious cycle of violence and I 
counterviolence which has engulfed Lebanon 
for months has now cost the American peo- 
ple two of their ablest public servants. 

The two American diplomats had served 
their country long and faithfully at many 
posts throughout the world. Ambassador 
Meloy, at the President's request, had gone 
to Beirut only a few weeks ago from his 

Department of State Bulletin 



previous post in Guatemala on very short 
notice, fully realizing the dangers and chal- 
lenges of this important assignment. Mr. 
Waring had performed brilliantly in Beirut 
over the past year under the most difficult 
and hazardous circumstances. Mr. Moghrabi 
has worked for our Embassy for over 20 
years with distinction and courage. 

These men had faced the necessity of liv- 
ing with constant mortal danger in order to 
carry out their mission. They served the 
cause of peace and died for their cause. 
They did so with the dedication and dis- 
regard of personal safety which we have 
come to expect of our distinguished Foreign 
Service. 

The men, sadly, are gone. But duty re- 
mains. These senseless murders remind us 
of the. urgency of that duty, and of the 
need for a world free of terror and living 
with a consciousness of peace. We shall not 
forget that, and we shall be inspired by the 
courage and sacrifice of our colleagues. 



President Ford Announces Evacuation 
of American Citizens From Lebanon 

Following are statements by President 
Ford issued on June 18 and June 20. 



STATEMENT OF JUNE 18 



White House pi 



elease dated June 18 



Due to the continuing uncertainty of the 
situation in Beirut, I have directed the U.S. 
Embassy there to assist in the departure by 
overland convoy to Damascus of U.S. citizens 
who wish to depart Lebanon at this time. 

The convoy is expected to leave Beirut 
Saturday, and American citizens are being 
alerted both by the Embassy and by broad- 
cast on the Voice of America to be prepared 
for departure at that time, if they so wish. 

The remains of Ambassador Francis Meloy 
and Mr. Robert Waring have been brought 
to Damascus overland. They will be picked 
up by a U.S. plane and returned to the 
United States, arriving on Saturday. 



Only those Embassy officials not essential 
to our continuing operations will be leaving 
Lebanon. The American Embassy in Beirut 
is to remain open to continue our efforts to 
help bring an end to the strife which has 
brought this tragedy to Lebanon. 



STATEMENT OF JUNE 20 

White House press release dated June 20 

The evacuation operation [by sea] in 
Beirut today was completed successfully 
without incident. The success of this opera- 
tion was made possible through the combined 
efforts of our Armed Forces and State De- 
partment personnel both here and in the 
field. 

I want to express my deep appreciation 
and pride in the outstanding performance of 
all the men and women who contributed to 
this effort. We are grateful, as well, for the 
assistance of other governments and in- 
dividuals that facilitated the evacuation. 
The United States will continue to play a 
positive role in seeking to restore stability 
and bring peace to Lebanon. 

I would like to express to all those who 
played a part in the success of this opera- 
tion my heartfelt thanks. 



U.S. Vetoes Admission of Angola 
to the United Nations 

Following is a statement made in the U.N. 
Security Council by U.S. Representative 
Albert W. Sherer, Jr., on June 23. 

USUN press lelease 67 dated June 23 

First of all I would like to thank the many 
Council members who have supported us 
publicly or privately in our desire to post- 
pone consideration of Angola's application 
until a more propitious time. I do not have 
to name the many Council members who 
have been helpful; we all know who they 
are. Regrettably, we also know who on this 
Council has unhelpfully ignored the inter- 
ests of Angola and instead yielded to the 
temptations of short-term political gains. 



July 19, 1976 



99 



Mr. President, the United States feels 
obliged to vote against Angola's application 
at this time because we remain convinced 
that Angola does not yet meet the require- 
ments for membership set forth in article 
4 of the charter.' The continuing presence 
and apparent influence of Cuban troops, mas- 
sive in number in the Angolan context, is the 
basis of our view. There is no justification 
for such a large and armed foreign presence 
in a truly independent African state: 

— Major hostilities have been terminated. 
— South Africa has withdrawn her troops. 
— Neighboring African states have begun 
normalizing relations with Angola. 

We regret that the Angolan Government 
has seen fit, in an apparent spirit of con- 
frontation, to press its application now, be- 
fore time and developments in Angola might 
have permitted a resolution of our concerns. 
This is particularly regrettable since the 
application cannot be acted upon by the 
General Assembly in any event for another 
three months. 



Measures To Limit Imports 
of Specialty Steel Announced 

Folio whig i.s- a statement issued by the 
Office of the Special Representative for Trade 
Negotiations (STR) on June 11. 

STR press release 22ii dated June U 

An agreement limiting U.S. imports of 
specialty steel from Japan was signed on 
June 11 by Ambassador Frederick B. Dent, 
President Ford's Special Representative for 
Trade Negotiations, and His Excellency Fu- 
mihiko Togo, the Ambassador of Japan, at 
Washington. 

Japan has accounted for more than 50 per- 
cent of recent U.S. imports of specialty steel. 



' The Council on June 2.3 voted on the draft resolu- 
tion (S/12110) to recommend the admission of the 
People's Republic of Angola to the United Nations; 
the vote was \'A in favor and 1 (U.S.) against (the 
People's Kepuhlic' of China did not participate in 
the vote). 



The orderly marketing agreement calls for 
U.S. imports of these products from Japan to 
be limited to 66,400 tons for the 12-month 
period from June 14, 1976, to June 13, 1977, 
with 3 percent annual increases in each of 
the two subsequent years. Japan supplied 
78,500 tons in 1975, and 30,900 tons in the 
first four months of 1976. 

Following signature of the U.S.-Japan 
agreement. Ambassador Dent announced 
that the President will proclaim, effective 
June 14,' three-year restraints on U.S. im- 
ports of specialty steel from other foreign 
suppliers, pursuant to his previous deter- 
mination on March 16. These actions are 
based upon a USITC [U.S. International 
Trade Commission] finding that imports are 
a substantial cause of serious injury to the 
domestic industry. The USITC proposed five- 
year quotas as a result of its investigation of 
an escape clause import relief petition filed 
by the alloy tool and stainless (specialty) 
steel industry and the United Steelworkers 
of America under the Trade Act of 1974. 

Quotas imposed are as follows: The quota 
for the period June 14, 1976, to June 13, 
1977, is 147,000 tons, comparable to the 
overall level recommended by the USITC. 
For the 1977-78 period, the total quota is 
151,500 tons; and for 1978-79, 155,900 tons. 

The relief program determined by the 
President provides for immediate reductions 
in total imports from the 1974, 1975, and 
first-third 1976 levels, over which period 
they increased markedly. Imports totaled 
151,200 tons in 1974, 153,700 tons in 1975, 
and wei'e running at an annual rate of 
168,900 tons for the first four months of 
1976. The 1976-77 quota represents reduc- 
tions from those levels of 3 percent, 4 per- 
cent, and 14 percent, respectively. 

Ambassador Dent explained that the pro- 
gram provides for historical-supplier market 
shares, growth factors, new-supplier consid- 
erations, and authority to allocate specific 
product coverages and to reallocate short- 
falls on a basis which will assure equitable 
utilization of the quotas. It is nondiscrimina- 



' For text of Presidential Proclamation No. 4445, 
signed June 11, see 41 Fed. Reg. 24107. 



100 



Department of State Bulletin 



tory and takes into account both U.S. and 
foreign suppliers' trade interests. The pro- 
gram was developed following thorough con- 
sultations with most exporting countries, in- 
cluding the principal suppliers — Japan, the 
European Community (EC), Sweden, and 
Canada — and takes into account the concerns 
of exporting countries. The agreement with 
Japan provides for additional consultations, 
and the United States remains open to con- 
sultations with others. 

Allocations of the quotas generally are 
applied to supplier countries on the basis of 
their proportionate import shares of the U.S. 
market over the five-year period 1971-75. 
Specific allocations are provided for Japan, 
the EC, Sweden, Canada, and all other sup- 
pliers. These quotas will cover five product 
categories: stainless steel sheet and strip, 
plate, bar, and rod; and alloy tool steel. Ex- 
cluded from the quota program is stainless 
steel strip imported for use in the manufac- 
ture of razor blades. The USITC found that 
currently this is not being produced domes- 
tically. This exclusion thus benefits consum- 
ers without jeopardizing effective import re- 
lief of injury to the domestic industry. 

Under the program, the EC is allocated an 
overall quota, covering all nine member 
states, of 32,000 tons. The Swedish quota is 
24,000 tons; Canada's, 12,600. The "basket" 
quota for all other countries as a group is 
12,000 tons. Each of these quotas will be in- 
creased by an additional 3 percent in 
1978-79. 

In announcing the President's action. Am- 
bassador Dent noted that specialty steel ton- 
nage represents less than 2 percent of total 
U.S. steel imports. 

After a review of the USITC findings and 
recommendations by the Cabinet-level Trade 
Policy Committee, the President last March 
instructed Ambassador Dent to seek orderly 
marketing agreements with principal sup- 
plier nations to remedy injury to the domes- 
tic industry in a manner meeting the special 
concerns of each of the nations affected. 

Also in March, the President announced 
his intention to proclaim by June 14 import 
quotas at overall levels comparable to those 
recommended by the USITC but not neces- 



sarily with respect to specific country or 
product category allocations recommended 
by the Commission, in the event that orderly 
marketing agreements were not concluded. 
He also rejected as too inflexible the five- 
year quota system recommended by the 
Commission. 

The President's March determination fur- 
ther provided that any import restraints 
may be relaxed or removed at any time prior 
to June 1979 when he finds — upon the advice 
of the USITC and the Secretaries of Com- 
merce and Labor — that the domestic indus- 
try is regaining a healthy production and 
employment position. 

In order to record and review both the 
effectiveness of the restraint program an- 
nounced on June 11 and the economic condi- 
tion of the domestic industry, a monitoring 
system will be put into effect immediately. 
This system will provide current data on 
production, shipments, employment, man- 
hours worked, imports, exports, prices, and 
consumption, collected on a monthly basis 
and published quarterly. Additional data also 
will be collected and made public on profits, 
investment, capacity, inventories, and orders. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 



94th Congress, 2d Session 

Portugal (Including the Azores) and Spain in Search 
of New Directions. A report by Senator Claiborne 
Pell to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 
March 1976. 22 pp. 

Inter- American Development Bank and African Devel- 
opment Fund Act of 1976. Report of the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany H.R. 
9721. S. Kept. 94-673. March 1, 1976. 31 pp. 

Senate Committee on Intelligence Activities. Report 
of the Senate Committee on Government Operations 
to accompany S. Res. 400, resolution to establish 
a standing committee of the Senate on intelligence 
activities, and for other purposes; S. Rept. 94-67o; 
March 1, 1976; 42 pp. Report of the Senate Com- 
mittee on Rules and Administration, together with 
minority views and recommendations of the Com- 
mittee on the Judiciary, to accompany S. Res. 400; 
S. Rept. 94-770; April 29, 1976; 81 pp. 

International Petroleum Exposition. Report of the 
House Committee on International Relations to ac- 



July 19, 1976 



101 



company H.J. Res. 296. H. Rept. 94-854. March 1, 
1976. 14 pp. 

Spanish Base Treaty. Hearings before the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations on Executive E 
(94th Congress, 2d Session), the Treaty of Friend- 
ship and Cooperation Between the United States 
and Spain, signed at Madrid on January 24, 1976, 
together with its seven supplementary agreements 
and its eight related exchanges of notes; March 
3-24, 1976; 157 pp. Report of the committee to 
accompany Ex. E, 94-2; S. Ex. Rept. 94-25; May 
20, 1976; 11 pp. 

Guatemala Relief and Rehabilitation Act of 1976. 
Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela- 
tions to accompany S. 3056. S. Rept. 94-679. March 
3, 1976. 11 pp. 

Foreign Relations Authorization. Hearing before the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. March 4, 

1976. 101 pp. 

Report of Secretary of State Kissinger on His Trip to 
Latin America. Hearing before the House Commit- 
tee on International Relations. March 4, 1976. 38 pp. 

Communications from the Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury (Enforcement, Operations, and Tariff 
Affairs) transmitting determinations waiving the 
imposition of countervailing duties on imports for a 
temporary period not to extend beyond January 
3, 1979. Waiver of Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Austrian Cheeses; H. Doc. 94-404; 7 pp. Waiver 
of Counter\'ailing Duties on Korean Rubber Foot- 
wear; H. Doc. 94—405; 9 pp. Waiver of Counter- 
vailing Duties on Certain Mexican Steel Plate; H. 
Doc. 94-406; 9 pp. March 11, 1976. 

Proposed Sale of AWAC's to NATO. Hearing before 
the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S. Con. 
Res. 99, expressing the objection of the Congress 
to the proposed sale of 32 airborne early warning 
aircraft to NATO; March 12, 1976; 34 pp. Hear- 
ing before the House Committee on International 
Relations on H. Con. Res. 576; March 18, 1976; 
21 pp. 

First Use of Nuclear Weapons: Preserving Responsi- 
ble Control. Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
International Security and Scientific Affairs of the 
House Committee on International Relations. 
March 16-25, 1976. 246 pp. 

Specialty Steel Import Relief Action. Message from 
the President of the United States transmitting a 
report on the actions he will take with respect to 
stainless and alloy steel products covered by the 
finding of the International Trade Commission. H. 
Doc. 94-409. March 16, 1976. 4 pp. 

Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 

1977. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations to accompany S. 3168. S. Rept. 94-703. 
March 18, 1976. 31 pp. 

Fishery Consei-vation and Management Act of 1976. 
Report of the committee of conference to accom- 
pany H.R. 200. H. Rept. 94-948. March 24, 1976. 
60 pp. 

International Navigational Rules. Report of the House 
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries to 
accompany H.R. 5446. H. Rept. 94-973. March 29, 
1976. 69 pp. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



U.S. and Federal Republic of Germany 
Sign Antitrust Cooperation Agreement 

Press release 330 dated June 25 

The Department of State announced on 
June 25 the signing at Bonn, Federal Repub- 
lic of Germany, on June 23 of an Antitrust 
Cooperation Agreement between the United 
States and the Federal RepubHc of Ger- 
many. The agreement formalizes a long- 
standing practice of cooperation and provides 
for exchange of nonconfidential information, 
assistance in investigations, and coordina- 
tion and noninterference in antitrust mat- 
ters. The agreement is to be carried out by 
the Antitrust Division of the Department of 
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission 
in the United States, and by the Ministry of 
Economy and the Federal Cartel Office in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. 



U.S. and Ireland Reach Understanding 
on Acceptance of Air Charters 

Department Announcement ' 

The United States and Ireland concluded 
on May 28 a memorandum of understanding 
on air passenger charter services under 
which each government will, with some ex- 
ceptions, accept as charterworthy transat- 
lantic charter flights originating in the terri- 
tory of the other government which is 
organized and operated pursuant to the 
charterworthiness rules of the other govern- 
ment. 

The understanding, which supersedes the 
similar but somewhat more limited under- 
standing of June 29, 1973, was brought into 
force by an exchange of notes in Dublin. It 



' Issued on June 4 (text from press release 245, 
which includes the text of the memorandum of 
understanding). 



102 



Department of State Bulletin 



is expected to facilitate the operation of 
charter flights, including the new one-stop 
inclusive tour charters, between the United 
States and Ireland by the airlines of both 
countries. The understanding with Ireland 
is the fourth such agreement the United 
States has concluded to facilitate transat- 
lantic charter operations during 1976. 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Aviation 

Convention on the international recognition of rights 
in aircraft. Done at Geneva June 19, 1948. Entered 
into force September 17, 1953. TIAS 2847. 
Adherence deposited: Luxembourg, December 16, 
1975. 

Convention on offenses and certain other acts com- 
mitted on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo September 
14, 1963. Entered into force December 4, 1969. 
TIAS 6768. 
Ratification deposited: Ireland, November 14, 

1975. 
Accession deposited: Turkey. December 17, 1975. 
Notification of succession: Papua New Guinea. 
November 6, 1975. 

Protocol relating to an amendment to the convention 
on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591), Done 
at New York March 12, 1971. Entered into force 
January 16, 1973. TIAS 7616. 
Ratification deposited: Iraq, February 10, 1976. 

Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the development, 
inoduction and stockpiling of bacteriological 
(biological) and toxin weapons and on their 
destruction. Done at Washington, London, and 
Moscow April 10, 1972. Entered into force March 
26, 1975. TIAS 8062. 

Ratification deposited: Sierra Leone, June 29, 
1976, 

Customs 

Inti'i-national cojivention to facilitate the importation 
iif commercial samples and advertising material. 
Done at Geneva November 7, 1952. Entered into 
force November 20, 1955; for the United States 
October 17, 1957. TIAS 3920. 

Accession deposited: Cuba (with reservation). 
April 26, 1976. 

Economic Cooperation 

Agreement establishing a financial support fund of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. Done at Paris April 9, 1975.' 
Ratifications deposited: Austria, June 22, 1976; 
Greece, June 17, 1976, 



Fisheries 

International convention for the Northwest Atlantic 

fisheries. Done at Washington February 8, 1949. 

Entered into force July 3, 1950. TIAS 2089, 

Notices of intention to withdraw, to be effective 

December 31, 1976. unless withdrawn: United 

States, June 22, 1976; Canada, June 29, 1976. 

Genocide 

Convention on the prevention and punishment of the 
crime of genocide. Done at Paris December 9, 1948. 
Entered into force January 12, 1951.' 
Accession deposited: Ireland, June 22, 1976. 

Hydrographic Organization 

Convention on the International Hydrographic 
Organization, with annexes. Done at Monaco May 

3, 1967. Entered into force September 22, 1970. 
TIAS 6933. 

Accession deposited: Nigeria, May 31, 1976. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at 
New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force 
December 13, 1964; for the United States June 
24, 1967. TIAS 6298. 

Notification of succession: Barbados, June 21. 
1976. 

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic 
drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972. 
Accession deposited: Barbados. June 21, 1976. 

Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of all 
forms of racial discrimination. Done at New York 
December 21, 1965. Entered into force January 

4, 1969.= 

Accession deposited: Zaire, April 21, 1976. 

Tin 

Fifth international tin agreement, with annexes. 
Done at Geneva June 21, 1975.' 
Notification of intention to ratify deposited: 

United States, June 29, 1976, 
Acceptance deposited: Japan, June 17, 1976. 

Tonnage Measurement 

International convention on tonnage measurement 
of ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at London June 
23, 1969,' 

Accession deposited: Romania (with statements), 
May 21, 1976. 

Tourism 

Statutes of the World Tourism Organization, Done 
at Mexico City September 27, 1970. Entered into 
force January 2, 1975; for the United States 
December 12, 1975. 

Declarations of adoption deposited: Algeria, May 
5, 1976; Czechoslovakia (with declaration), 
April 9, 1976; Hungary, September 8, 1975; 
Netherlands. May 10, 1976.' 



July 19, 1976 



' Not in force. 

- Not in force for the United States. 
' For the Kingdom in Europe and the Netherlands 
Antilles. 



103 



Wheat 

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat 
trade convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971. Done at Washington March 17, 
1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect 
to certain provisions and July 1, 1976, with respect 
to other provisions. 

Declaration of provisional application deposited: 
Peru. June 28, 1976. 



BILATERAL 

Canada 

Agreement relating to a cooperative program con- 
cerning the development and procurement of a 
space shuttle attached remote manipulator system, 
with memorandum of understanding. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Washington June 23, 1976. 
Entered into force June 23, 1976. 

Egypt 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of October 28, 1975 
(TIAS 8201). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Cairo June 14, 1976. Entered into force June 14, 
1976. 

Finland 

Extradition treaty. Signed at Helsinki June 11, 1976. 
Enters into force three months after the date of 
the exchange of instruments of ratification. 

Federal Republic of Germany 

Agreement for research and technology in the field 
of liquid metal-cooled fast breeder reactors. Signed 
at Bonn June 8, 1976. Entered into force June 8, 
1976.-' 

Guatemala 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat imports 
from (Juatemala during calendar year 1976. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Guatemala April 
29, 1976, Entered into force April 29, 1976. 

Honduras 

Loan agreement to assist in financing Honduras' 
program for recovery and reconstruction from the 
effects of Hurricane "Fifi." Signed at Tegucigalpa 
February 19, 1975. Entered into force February 
19, 1975. 

Indonesia 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of April 19, 1976. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Jakarta June 14 
and 15, 1976. Entered into force June 15, 1976, 



' Applicable to Land Berlin. 




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Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Tanzania. 
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104 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX July 19, 1976 Vol. LXXV, No. 1934- 



Africa. Secretary Comments on Discussions 
With South African Prime Minister (news 
conference) 

Angola. U.S. Vetoes Admission of Angola to 
the United Nations (Sherer) 

Aviation. U.S. and Ireland Reach Understand- 
ing on Acceptance of Air Charters .... 

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating 
to Foreign Policy 

Cyprus. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer- 
ence at Paris June 22 



Middle East. Secretary Kissinger's News Con- 
ference at Paris June 22 



Department and Foreign Service 

President Ford Announces Evacuation of 

American Citizens From Lebanon (Ford) . 
U.S. Embassy Officials Murdered in Lebanon 

(Ford, Kissinger) 

Developing Countries. The Cohesion of the 
Industrial Democracies: The Precondition of 
Global Progress (Kissinger, texts of OECD 
declaration on international investment and 
multinational enterprises and decisions re- 
lating to the declaration) 

Economic Affairs 

The Cohesion of the Industrial Democracies: 
The Precondition of Global Progress (Kis- 
singer, texts of OECD declaration on in- 
ternational investment and multinational 
enterprises and decisions relating to the 
declaration) 

Measures To Limit Imports of Specialty Steel 
Announced (STR announcement) .... 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at 
Paris June 22 

U.S. and Federal Republic of Germany Sign 
Antitrust Cooperation Agreement .... 

Germany. U.S. and Federal Republic of Ger- 
many Sign Antitrust Cooperation Agreement 

Industrial Democracies. The Cohesion of the 
Industrial Democracies: The Precondition of 
Global Progress (Kissinger, texts of OECD 
declaration on international investment and 
multinational enterprises and decisions re- 
lating to the declaration) . • 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

The Cohesion of the Industrial Democracies: 
The Precondition of Global Progress (Kis- 
singer, texts of OECD declaration on in- 
ternational investment and multinational 
enterprises and decisions relating to the 
declaration) 

Ireland. U.S. and Ireland Reach Understanding 
on Acceptance of Air Charters 

Italy. Secretary Kissinger's News Conference 
at Paris June 22 

Lebanon 

President Ford Announces Evacuation of 
American Citizens From Lebanon (Ford) . 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at 
Paris June 22 

U.S. Embassy Officials Murdered in Lebanon 
(Ford, Kissinger) 



95 

99 

102 

101 

89 



73 
100 



102 
102 



73 
102 



95 



100 



Presidential Documents 

President Ford Announces Evacuation of 

American Citizens From Lebanon .... 

U.S. Embassy Officials Murdered in Lebanon . 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications .... 

South Africa 

Secretary Comments on Discussions With 
South African Prime Minister (news con- 
ference) 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at 
Paris June 22 

Trade. Measures To Limit Imports of Specialty 
Steel Announced (STR announcement) . . 

Treaty Information 

Cui'rent Actions 103 

U.S. and Federal Republic of Germany Sign 

Antitrust Cooperation Agreement .... 102 
U.S. and Ireland Reach Understanding on 

Acceptance of Air Charters 102 

United Nations. U.S. Vetoes Admission of 
Angola to the United Nations (Sherer) . . 99 



Name Index 

Ford, President 98, 99 

Genscher, Hans-Dietrich 95 

Kissinger, Secretary 73, 89, 95, 98 

Sherer, Albert W., Jr 99 



Checklist of 


Department of State 


Press Releases: June 28-July 4 


Press releases may be obtained from the 


Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 


Washington 


D.C. 20520. 


No. Date 


Subject 


*334 6/28 


U.S. and U.K. Bicentennial fellows 




in creative and performing arts 




named. 


*335 6/28 


Program for the state visit of 




Queen Elizabeth II. 


t336 6/30 


Kissinger: interview with Die Zeit. 


*337 6/30 


U.S. Advisory Commission on In- 




ternational Educational and 




Cultural Affairs, Aug. 25. 


*338 7/1 


Philip C. Habib sworn in as 




Under Secretary for Political 




Affairs (biographic data), 
d. 


* Not printt 


t Held for a 


later issue of the Bulletin. 



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(70'^ 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXXV 



No. 1935 



July 26, 1976 



THE WESTERN ALLIANCE : PEACE AND MORAL PURPOSE 

Address by Secretary Kissinger 105 

LEADERS OF MAJOR INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES MEET IN PUERTO RICO 116 

CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY 
Statement by Assistant Secretary McCloskey 139 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 

For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLET I 



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the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



Vol. LXXV, No. 1935 
July 26, 1976 

The Department of State BULLETIK 
a weekly publication issued by tk 
O/Kce of Media Services, Bureau c 
Public Affairs, provides ttte public an 
interested agencies of tlte governmen 
Willi information on developments I 
tlie field of U.S. foreign relations 
on tfte work of tfie Department ai 
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Tlie BULLETIN includes select 
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United States is or may become a 
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Publications of the Department 
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The Western Alliance: Peace and Moral Purpose 



Address by Secretary Kissinger '• 



On my arrival in Washington seven years 
ago, one of my first acts was to gather a 
group of senior scholars of European affairs 
to have them give their advice to a new 
President on relations with our allies. The 
chairman of that group was Alastair Buchan. 

He should not be held responsible for the 
results. But it was only natural to seek his 
counsel. For Alastair was more than a dis- 
tinguished expert; he was a consummate 
man of the West. A Scot by birth, he con- 
sidered himself, and referred to himself, as 
a European. He lived many years in the 
United States and visited us often, applying 
his incisive mind to the study of America 
and its role in the world. He was a champion 
of the importance, indeed, the inevitability, 
of the transatlantic tie between North 
America and Europe. 

Beneath the skeptical air was a passionate 
commitment to the values and traditions we 
cherish as Western civilization. Sir Peter 
Ramsbotham [U.K. Ambassador to the 
United States] said in his eulogy of Alastair 
in Washington that no other countryman of 
his had contributed more to the understand- 
ing of international affairs and the strategic 
implications of nuclear power in the latter 
half of the 20th century. But Alastair's focus 
was not simply the structure of global poli- 
tics and the roots of war; it was the central 
role of the West in preserving peace and 
giving it moral purpose. 



Made at London on June 25 before the Interna- 
tional Institute for Strategic Studies, inaugurating 
the Alastair Buchan memorial lecture series (text 
from press release 329). 



This institute is a monument to his quest. 

Alastair had that combination of intellect 
and compassion known as wisdom. It moti- 
vated the great contribution he made to 
scholarship and to a generation's understand- 
ing of the transformation of international 
relationships. He has left his mark on every 
person in this hall. During the last seven 
years he never hesitated to scold me, in all 
friendship, when he thought that American 
policy did not do justice to the great cause 
of European-American cooperation. 

I would like to think that had he lived he 
would feel that after many starts we have 
made great strides in strengthening the 
unity of the West. And if that were his con- 
viction, I for one would be very proud. 

Alastair wrote: 

Structural changes are occurring in the relative 
power and influence of the major states; there has 
been a quantitative change of colossal proportions 
in the interdependence of Western societies and in 
the demands we make on natural resources; and 
there are qualitative changes in the preoccupations 
of our societies. 

He then posed the question: 

Can the highly industrialized states sustain or 
recover a quality in their national life which not 
only satisfies the new generation, but can act as an 
example or attractive force to other societies ?• 

All of US who wish to honor Alastair's 
memory must do so in the way he would 
want most of all — by proving that the an- 
swer to his question is "Yes." A world that 
cries out for economic advance, for social 
justice, for political liberty, and for a stable 
peace needs our collective commitment and 



July 26, 1976 



105 



contribution. I firmly believe that the indus- 
trial democracies working together have the 
means, if they have the will, to shape crea- 
tively a new era of international affairs. In- 
deed, we are doing so on many fronts 
today, thanks no little to the clarity Alastair 
brought to our purposes and directions. 

A generation ago. Western statesmen 
fashioned new institutions of collaboration to 
stave off a common threat. Our progress 
after 30 years has been striking. Global war 
has been deterred, and all of the industrial 
democracies live with an enhanced sense of 
security. Our economies are the most pros- 
perous on earth; our technology and produc- 
tive genius have proven indispensable for all 
countries seeking to better the welfare of 
their peoples, be they Socialist or develop- 
ing. Our societies represent, more than ever, 
a beacon of hope to those who yearn for 
liberty and justice and progress. In no part 
of the woi'ld and under no other system do 
men live so well and in so much freedom. If 
performance is any criterion, the contest 
between freedom and communism, of which 
so much was made three decades ago, has 
been won by the industrial democracies. 

And yet at this precise moment, we hear 
in our countries premonitions of decline, 
anxieties about the travail of the West and 
the advance of authoritarianism. Can it be 
that our deeper problems are not of re- 
sources but of will, not of power but of 
conception ? 

We who overcame great dangers 30 years 
ago must not now paralyze ourselves with 
illusions of impotence. We have already 
initiated the construction of a new system 
of international relations, this time on a 
global scale ; we must summon the deter- 
mination to work toward it in unity and 
mutual confidence. 

For America, cooperation among the free 
nations is a moral, and not merely a practi- 
cal, necessity. Americans have never been 
comfortable with calculations of interest and 
power alone. America, to be itself, needs a 
sense of identity and collaboration with 
other nations who share its values. 

Our association with Western Europe, 



106 



Canada, and Japan thus goes to the heart of 
our national purpose. Common endeavors 
with our sister democracies raise the goals 
of our foreign policy beyond physical sur- 
vival toward a peace of human progress and 
dignity. The ties of intellectual civilization, 
democratic tradition, historical association, 
and more than a generation of common en- 
deavor bind us together more firmly than 
could any pragmatic conception of national 
interest alone. The unity of the industrial 
democracies has been the cornerstone of 
American foreign policy for 30 years, and 
it will remain so for as far ahead as we 
can see. 

So I would like to pay tribute to Alastair 
this evening by addressing the issues he 
raised : Can America, Europe, and the indus- 
trial democracies meet the challenge of the 
world's future? What is the state of our 
relationship? 

The United States and a United Europe 

In 1973, with Viet-Nam at last behind us, 
and fresh from new initiatives with China 
and the Soviet Union, the United States 
proposed that the collaboration of the indus- 
trial democracies be given new impetus. 
Military security, while still crucial, was noj 
longer sufficient to give content or political 
cohesion to our broader relationship or to 
retain support for it from a new genera- 
tion. We faced important East-West nego- 
tiations on European security and force re- 
ductions, a fresh agenda of international 
economic problems, the challenge of shap- 
ing anew our relationship with the develop- 
ing world, and the need to redefine relations, 
between America and a strengthened and 
enlarged European community. 

It is academic to debate now whether thefiti 
United States acted too theoretically in pro- 
posing to approach these challenges through 
the elaboration of a new Atlantic Declara- 
tion, or whether our European friends acted 
wisely in treating this proposal as a test case 
of European identity. The doctrinal argu- 
ments of 1973 over the procedure for Atlan- 
tic consultations, or whether Europe was 



Department of State Bulletin 



f( 



3xercising its proper global role, or whether 
sconomic and security issues should be 
linked, have in fact been settled by the 
practice of consultations and cooperation un- 
precedented in intensity and scope. The 
reality and success of our common endeavors 
have provided the best definition and re- 
vitalization of our relationship. 

There is no longer any question that 
Euiope and the United States must cooper- 
ate closely under whatever label and that the 
unity of Europe is essential to that process. 

In its early days, the European Com- 
munity was the focus of much American 
idealism, and perhaps of some paternalism, 
as we urged models of federal unity and 
transatlantic burden sharing on our Euro- 
pean friends. By now, leaders on both sides 
of the Atlantic have come to understand 
that European unity cannot be built by 
Americans or to an American prescription; 
it must result from European initiatives. 

The evolution of European initiatives — 
both its successes and its setbacks — in- 
evitably gives rise to new questions about 
whether the United States still welcomes 
European unification. Let me take this occa- 
sion to emphasize our conviction that Euro- 
pean unity is crucial for Europe, for the 
West, and for the world. We strongly support 
and encourage it. 

We have perhaps become a little more 
sophisticated about our contribution to the 
process. We no longer expect that it will 
grow from the desire to ease American 
burdens. If Europe is to carry a part of the 
West's responsibilities in the world, it must 
do so according to its own conceptions and 
in its own interest. 

Alastair Buchan wrote: 

It is impossible to inspire Western Europe to 
political unity or to encourage Japanese self-reliance 
unless they have the freedom and confidence to de- 
fine their interests in every sphere, interests which 
must be reconciled with those of the United States 
but not subordinated to them. 

The United States endorses this princi- 
ple wholeheartedly. It is not healthy for the 
United States to be the only center of initia- 
tive and leadership in the democratic world. 



It is not healthy for Europe to be only a 
passive participant, however close the friend- 
ship and however intimate the consultation. 

We therefore welcome the fact that 
Europe's role in global affairs is gaining in 
vigor and eff'ectiveness. A vital and cohesive 
Western Europe is an irreplaceable weight 
on the scales of global diplomacy; American 
policy can only gain by having a strong part- 
ner of parallel moral purposes. 

Of course we do not want Europe to find 
its identity in opposition to the United 
States. But neither does any sensible Euro- 
pean. Of course there will be disagreements 
between us of tactics and sometimes of per- 
spectives, if not of ends. But I do not be- 
lieve that we Americans have so lost confi- 
dence in ourselves that we must inhibit the 
role of others with whom we may have occa- 
sional differences but who share our highest 
values. The wisest statesmen on the two 
sides of the ocean have always known that 
European unity and Atlantic partnership are 
both essential and mutually reinforcing. 

So let us finally put behind us the debates 
over whether Europe's unity has American 
support. We consider the issue settled. Let 
us, rather, address ourselves to the urgent 
challenges of mutual concern which a unit- 
ing Europe, the United States, and all indus- 
trial democracies must face together — com- 
mon defense, East-West relations, and the 
international economy. 

Security and the Democracies 

Security is the bedrock of all that we do. 
A quarter century ago, the American defense 
commitment to Europe provided the shield 
behind which Western Europe recovered its 
economic health and political vitality. Today, 
our collective defense alliance — and the U.S.- 
Japanese relationship — continue to be essen- 
tial for global stability. But the nature of 
security and strategy has fundamentally 
changed since the time when our alliances 
were founded: 

— The Soviet Union has recovered from 
the devastation of World War II and pressed 
vigorously ahead on the path of industrial 



July 26, 1976 



107 



growth. Possessing resources on a conti- 
nental scale and imposing on its people 
enormous sacrifices in the name of its ideol- 
ogy, the U.S.S.R. has developed its economic 
strength and technology to a point where it 
can match the West in many sectors of in- 
dustrial and military power. It shows no 
signs of changing its priorities. 

For centuries, it was axiomatic that in- 
creases in military power could be trans- 
lated into almost immediate political ad- 
vantage. It is now clear that in strategic 
weaponry, new increments of weapons or 
destructiveness do not automatically lead to 
either military or political gains. The de- 
structiveness of strategic weapons has con- 
tributed to the emergence of nuclear stale- 
mate. Neither side, if it acts with minimum 
prudence, will let the balance tip against it, 
either in an arms race or in an agreement to 
limit arms. 

Beneath the nuclear umbrella, the temp- 
tation to probe with regional forces or proxy 
wars increases. The steady growth of Soviet 
conventional military and naval power and 
its expanding global reach cannot be ignored. 
Conventional forces and military assistance 
to allies assume pivotal importance. We must 
insure that the strength and flexibility of all 
forces capable of local defense are enhanced. 
And we must conduct a prudent and force- 
ful foreign policy that is prepared to use our 
strength to block expansionism. 

These new realities demand from us steadi- 
ness, above all. Democratic societies have 
always fluctuated in their attitude toward 
defense — between complacency and alarmist 
concern. The long leadtimes of modern 
weapons and their complexity make both 
these aberrations dangerous. We cannot 
afford alternation between neglect and bursts 
of frenzy if we are to have a coherent de- 
fense program and public support for the 
necessary exertions. We need an allied de- 
fense posture that is relevant to our dangers, 
credible to lx)th friends and adversaries, and 
justifiable to our peoples. And we must be 
prepared to sustain it over the long term. 
It is imperative that we maintain the pro- 
grams that insure that the balance is pre- 



served. But we owe it to ourselves to see the 
military balance in proper perspective. Com- 
placency may produce weakness, but ex- 
aggeration of danger can lead to a loss of j 
will. To be sure, there has been a steady 
buildup of Soviet military power. But we 
have also seen to the steady growth and im- 
provement of our own forces over the same 
period. 



—We have always had to face Soviet 
ground forces larger than our own, partly 
because of the Soviet Union's definition of its 
needs as a power in the heart of the Eurasian 
landmass, with perceived threats on both 
flanks. Its naval power, while a growing and 
serious problem, is far weaker than com- 
bined allied naval strength in terms of ton- 
nage, firepower, range, access to the sea, 
experience, and seamanship. 

—The United States, for its part, is ex- 
panding its Army from 13 to 16 divisions 
through new measures of streamlining 
forces; we are increasing our combat 
forces in Europe; we plan to station a new 
Army brigade on the critical sector of the 
north German plain ; we are augmenting our 
naval forces. Our European allies have com- 
pleted major programs to build common 
infrastructure. We have undertaken new 
joint efforts of standardization and inter- 
operability of allied forces. 

U.S. strategic forces are superior in; 

accuracy, diversity, reliability, survivability, 
and numbers of separately targetable nu- 
clear warheads. We have a commanding lead' 
in strategic bombers. In addition, there are 
American deployments overseas and the nu- 
clear forces of two Atlantic allies. 

Even with our different priorities, the 

economic and technological base whichi 
underlies Western military strength remains 
overwhelmingly superior in size and capacity! 
for innovation. The Soviet Union suffers en- 
demic weakness in its industry and agricul 
ture; recent studies indicate that this 
chronic inefficiency extends even into their 
military sector to a much greater extent 
than realized before. 

These strengths of ours demonstrate thatf 



108 



Department of State Bulletin] 



uui- present security posture is adequate and 
that it is well within our capacities to con- 
tinue to balance the various elements of 
Soviet power. To maintain the necessai-y de- 
fense is a question of leadership more than 
of power. Our security responsibility is both 
manageable and unending. We must under- 
take significant additional efforts for the in- 
definite future. For as far ahead as we can 
see, we will live in a twilight area between 
tranquillity and open confrontation. 

This is a task for both sides of the At- 
lantic. Our defense effort within the alliance 

I ' will be importantly affected by the degree 
to which the American public is convinced 
that our allies share similar perceptions of 
the military challenge and a comparable 
determination to meet it. The greatest 
threat to the alliance would occur if, for 

' whatever reason — through misreading the 
threat, or inattention to conventional forces, 
or reductions of the defense efforts of allies, 
or domestic developments within NATO mem- 

I bers — U.S. public support for NATO were 
weakened. 

The challenge of building sufficient hard- 

I ware is easier than those of geopolitical 
understanding, political coordination, and 
above all, resolve. In the nuclear age, once 
a change in the geopolitical balance has be- 

I come unambiguous, it is too late to do any- 
thing about it. However great our strength, 
it will prove empty if we do not resist seem- 
ingly marginal changes whose cumulative 
impact can undermine our security. Power 
serves little purpose without the doctrines 
and concepts which define where our inter- 
ests require its application. 

Therefore let us not paralyze ourselves by 
a rhetoric of weakness. Let us concentrate 
on building the understanding of our strate- 

■ gic interests which must underlie any policy. 
The fact is that nowhere has the West been 
defeated for lack of strength. Our setbacks 
have been self-inflicted, either because lead- 
ers chose objectives that were beyond our 
psychological capabilities or because our leg- 
islatures refused to support what the execu- 
tive branch believed was essential. This — 
and not the various "gaps" that appear in the 



American debate in years divisible by four — 
is the deepest security problem we face. 

East-West Relations 

As long ago as the Harmel report of De- 
cember 1967,- the Atlantic alliance has 
treated as its "two main functions" the as- 
surance of military secui'ity and realistic 
measures to reduce tensions between East 
and West. We never considered confronta- 
tion — even when imposed on us by the other 
side — or containment an end in itself. Nor 
did we believe that disagreements with the 
Soviet Union would automatically disappear. 
On the contrary, the very concept of "de- 
tente" has always been applicable only to an 
adversary relationship. It was designed to 
prevent competition fi'om sliding into mili- 
tary hostilities and to create the conditions 
for the relationship to be gradually and 
prudently improved. 

Thus, alliance policy toward the East has 
two necessary dimensions. We seek to pre- 
vent the Soviet Union from transforming its 
military power into political expansion. At 
the same time, we seek to resolve conflicts 
and disputes through negotiation and to 
strengthen the incentives for moderation by 
expanding the area of constructive relations. 

These two dimensions are mutually re- 
inforcing. A strong defense and resistance 
to adventurism are prerequisites for efforts 
of conciliation. By the same token, only a 
demonstrated commitment to peace can sus- 
tain domestic support for an adequate de- 
fense and a vigilant foreign policy. Our pub- 
lic and Congress will not back policies which 
appear to invite crises, nor will they support 
firmness in a crisis unless they are con- 
vinced that peaceful and honorable alterna- 
tives have been exhausted. Above all, we 
owe it to ourselves and to future generations 
to seek a world based on something more 
stable and hopeful than a balance of terror 
constantly contested. 



- For text of the report (annex to the communique 
issued at the conclusion of the December 1967 min- 
isterial meeting of the North Atlantic Council), see 
Bulletin of Jan. 8, 1968, p. 50. 



July 26, 1976 



109 



However we label such a policy, it is im- 
posed by the unprecedented conditions of the 
nuclear age. No statesman can lightly risk 
the lives of tens of millions. Every American 
President, after entering office and seeing 
the facts, has come to President Eisen- 
hower's view that there is no alternative to 
peace. 

Our generation has been traumatized by 
World War II, because we remember that 
war broke out as a result of an imbalance of 
power. This is a lesson we must not forget. 
But neither must we forget the lesson of 
World War I, when war broke out despite an 
equilibrium of power. An international struc- 
ture held together only by a balance of forces 
will sooner or later collapse in catastrophe. 
In our time this could spell the end of civi- 
lized life. We must therefore conduct a di- 
plomacy that deters challenges if possible 
and that contains them at tolerable levels if 
they prove unavoidable — a diplomacy that 
resolves issues, nurtures restraint, and 
builds cooperation based on mutual interest. 

This policy has critics in all our countries. 
Some take for granted the relative absence of 
serious crises in recent years, which the 
policy has helped to bring about, and then 
fault it for not producing the millennium, 
which it never claimed. Some caricature its 
objectives, portraying its goals in more ex- 
alted terms than any of its advocates, and 
then express dismay at the failure of reality 
to conform to this impossible standard. They 
describe detente as if it meant the end of all 
rivalry; when rivalry persists, they conclude 
that detente has failed and charge its advo- 
cates with deception or naivete. They meas- 
ure the success of policy toward adversaries 
by criteria that should be reserved for tra- 
ditional friendships. They use the reality of 
competition to attack the goal of coexistence, 
rather than to illusti'ate its necessity. 

In fact, this policy has never been based on 
such hope or gullibility. It has always been 
designed to create conditions in which a cool 
calculus of interests would dictate restraint 
rather than opportunism, settlement of con- 
flicts rather than their exacerbation. West- 
ern policies can at best manage and shape, 
not assume away, East-West competition. 

110 



A pivot of the East-West relationship is 
the U.S.-Soviet negotiation on limitation of 
strategic arms. Increasingly, strategic forces 
find their function only in deterring and 
matching each other. A continuing buildup of 
strategic arms therefore only leads to fresh 
balances, but at higher levels of expenditures 
and uncertainties. In an era of expanding 
technological possibilities, it is impossible to 
make rational choices of force planning 
without some elements of predictability in 
the sti-ategic environment. Moreover, a con- 
tinuing race diverts resources from other 
needed areas such as forces for regional de- 
fense, where imbalances can have serious 
geopolitical consequences. All these factors 
have made arms limitation a practical inter- 
est of both sides, as well as a factor for 
stability in the world. 

We have made considerable progress to- 
ward curbing the strategic arms race in re- 
cent years. We will continue vigorously to 
pursue this objective in ways which protect 
Western interests and reflect the counsel of 
our allies. 

In defining and pursuing policies of relax- 
ing tensions with the East, the unity of the 
industrial democracies is essential. Our con- 
sultations have been intensive and frequent, 
and the record of Western cohesion in re- 
cent years has been encouraging — in the 
negotiations leading to the Four Powei 
Agreement on Berlin, in the mutual and bal- 
anced force reduction talks, in the SALT 
negotiations [Strategic Arms Limitatior 
Talks], and in the preparation for the Euro- 
pean Security Conference. 

Allied cooperation and the habits of con- 
sultation and coordination which we have 
formed will be even more important in the 
future. For as the policy of relaxing tensions 
proceeds, it wiU involve issues at the hear! 
of all our interests. 

No one should doubt the depth of oui 
commitment to this process. But we alsc 
need to be clear about its limits and about 
our conception of reciprocity: 

— We should require consistent patterns! 
of behavior in different parts of the world 
The West must make it clear that coexist- 

Department of State Bulletin 



line requires mutual restraint, not only in 
Europe and in the central strategic relation- 
ship but also in the Middle East, in Africa, 
in Asia— in fact, globally. The NATO For- 
eign Ministers, at their Oslo meeting last 
month, stressed the close link between sta- 
bility and security in Eui'ope and in the 
world as a whole. We must endorse this not 
only by our rhetoric but above all by our 
actions. 

—We should make clear the tolerable 
definition of global ideological rivalry. We 
do not shrink from ideological competition. 
We have every reason for confidence in the 
indestructible power of man's yearning for 
freedom. But we cannot agree that ideology 
alone is involved when Soviet power is ex- 
tended into areas such as southern Africa in 
the name of "national liberation" or when re- 
gional or local instabilities are generated or 
exploited in the name of "proletarian inter- 
nationalism." 

— We should not allow the Soviet Union 
to apply detente selectively within the alli- 
ance. Competition among us in our diplo- 
matic or economic policies toward the East 
risks dissipating Western advantages and 
opening up Soviet opportunities. We must 
resist division and maintain the closest 
coordination. 

The process of improving East- West rela- 
tions in Europe must not be confined to rela- 
tions with the Soviet Union. The benefits of 
relaxation of tensions must extend to East- 
ern as well as Western Europe. There should 
be no room for misconceptions about U.S. 
policy: 

— We are determined to deal with Eastern 
Europe on the basis of the sovereignty and 
independence of each of its countries. We 
recognize no spheres of influence and no pre- 
tensions to hegemony. Two American Presi- 
dents and several Cabinet officials have vis- 
ited Romania and Poland as well as non- 
aligned Yugoslavia, to demonstrate our stake 
in the flourishing and independence of those 
nations. 

— For the same reason, we will persist in 
our efforts to improve our contacts and de- 



velop our concrete bilateral relations in eco- 
nomic and other fields with the countries of 
Eastern Europe. 

— The United States supports the efforts 
of West European nations to strengthen 
their bilateral and regional ties with the 
countries of Eastern Europe. We hope that 
this process will help heal the divisions of 
Europe which have persisted since World 
War II. 

— And we will continue to pursue meas- 
ures to improve the lives of the people in 
Eastern Europe in basic human terms — such 
as freer emigration, the unification of fami- 
lies, gi'eater flow of information, increased 
economic interchange, and more oppor- 
tunities for ti'avel. 

The United States, in parallel with its 
allies, will continue to expand relationships 
with Eastern Europe as far and as fast as is 
possible. This is a long-term process; it is 
absurd to imagine that one conference by it- 
self can transform the internal structure of 
Communist governments. Rhetoric is no sub- 
stitute for patient and realistic actions. We 
will raise no expectations that we cannot 
fulfill. But we will never cease to assert our 
traditional principles of human liberty and 
national self-determination. 

The course of East-West relations will in- 
evitably have its obstacles and setbacks. We 
will guard against erosion of the gains that 
we have made in a series of diflicult negotia- 
tions ; we will insure that agreements already 
negotiated are properly implemented. We 
must avoid both sentimentality that would 
substitute good will for strength and mock 
toughness that would substitute posturing 
for a clear conception of our purposes. 

We in the West have the means to pursue 
this policy successfully. Indeed, we have no 
realistic alternative. We have nothing to 
fear from competition: If there is a military 
competition, we have the strength to defend 
our interests; if there is an economic com- 
petition, we won it long ago; if there is an 
ideological competition, the power of our 
ideas depends only on our will to uphold them. 

We need only to stay together and stay the 
course. If we do so, the process of East-West 



July 26, 1976 



111 



relations can, over time, strengthen the fab- 
ric of peace and genuinely improve the lives 
of all the peoples around the world. 

Our Economic Strength 

One of the greatest strengths of the in- 
dustrial democracies is their unquestioned 
economic preeminence. Partly because we 
ai-e committed to the free market system 
which has given us this preeminence, we have 
not yet fully realized the possibilities — in- 
deed, the necessity — of applying our eco- 
nomic strength constructively to shaping a 
better international environment. 

The industrial democracies together ac- 
count for 65 percent of the world's produc- 
tion and 70 percent of its commerce. Our 
economic performance drives international 
trade and finance. Our investment, technol- 
ogy, managerial expertise, and agricultural 
productivity are the spur to development and 
well-being around the world. Our enormous 
capacities are multiplied if we coordinate our 
policies and efforts. 

The core of our strength is the vitality 
and growth of our own economies. At the 
Rambouillet economic summit last Novem- 
ber, at the Puerto Rico summit next week, 
in the OECD [Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development], and in many 
other forums, the major democratic nations 
have shown their ability to work together. 

But an extensive agenda still summons us. 
We will require further efforts to continue 
our recovery and promote noninflationary 
growth. We will need to facilitate adequate 
investment and supplies of raw materials. 
We must continue to avoid protectionist 
measures, and we must use the opportunity 
of the multilateral trade negotiations to 
strengthen and expand the international 
trading system. We need to reduce our vul- 
nerability and dependence on imported oil 
through conservation, new sources of energy, 
and collective preparations for possible emer- 
gencies. And we must build on the progress 
made at Rambouillet and at Jamaica last 
January to improve the international mone- 
tary system. 

Our central challenge is to pool our 

112 



strengths, to increase our coordination, and 
to tailor our policies to the long term. On the 
basis of solid cooperation among ourselves, 
we must deal more effectively with the chal- 
lenges of the global economy — such as our 
economic relations with the centrally planned 
Communist economies and with the scores 
of new nations concerned with development. 

East-West economic interchange, while 
small in relative scale, is becoming an im- 
portant economic and political factor. This 
growth reflects our fundamental strength. 
It carries risks and complications, both polit- 
ical and economic. But it also presents op- 
portunities for stabilizing relations and in- 
volving the Communist countries in responsi- 
ble international conduct. If the democracies 
pursue parallel policies — not allowing the 
Communist states to stimulate debilitating 
competition among us or to manipulate the 
process for their own unilateral advantage — 
East-West economic relations can be a factor 
for peace and well-being. 

We must insure that benefits are I'ecipro- 
cal. We must avoid large trade imbalances 
which could open opportunities for political 
pressure. We should structure economic rela- 
tions so that the Communist states will bei 
drawn into the international economic sys- 
tem and accept its disciplines. 

When dealing with centrally controlled! 
state economies, we have to realize that eco- 
nomic relations have a high degree of politi- 
cal content and cannot be conducted solely oni 
the normal commercial basis. Obviously, 
profitability must be one standard, but we 
need a broader strategy, consistent with our 
free enterprise system, so that economic 
relations will contribute to political objec- 
tives. 

The industrial democracies should coordi- 
nate their policies to insure the orderly and 
beneficial evolution of East-West relations. 
To these ends, the United States has pro- 
posed to the OECD that we intensify our 
analyses of the problems and opportunities 
inherent in East- West trade with a view to;j 
charting common objectives and approaches. 

If the economic strength of the industrial 
democracies is important to the Socialist 



: 



Department of State Bulletin I 



lountries, it is vital for the developing 
world. These nations seek to overcome per- 
\ asive poverty and to lift the horizons of 
their peoples. They ask for an equitable 
sliare of global economic benefits and a 
ffieater role in international decisions that 
atl'ect them. 

The process of development is crucial not 
only for the poorer nations but for the in- 
dustrial nations as well. Our own prosperity 
is closely linked to the raw materials, the 
niaikets, and the aspirations of the develop- 
ing countries. An international order can be 
stal)le only if all nations perceive it as fun- 
damentally just and are convinced that they 
have a stake in it. Over the long term, co- 
operative North-South relations are thus 
clearly in the interest of all, and the objec- 
tives of industrial and developing countries 
,s/;«»W be complementary. 

However, the North-South dialogue has 
Ijeen far from smooth. Tactics of pressure 
and an emphasis on rhetorical victories at 
conferences have too often created an at- 
mosphere of confrontation. Such attitudes 
oijscure the fundamental reality that devel- 
opment is an arduous long-term enterprise. 
It will go forward only if both sides face 
fact.s without illusions, shunning both con- 
fi'ontation and sentimentahty. 

Far more is involved than the mechanical 
application of technology and capital to pov- 
erty. There must be within the developing 
cuuntry a sense of purpose and direction, 
determined leadership, and perhaps most im- 
portant, an impulse for change among the 
people. Development requires national ad- 
ministration, a complex infrastructure, a re- 
vised system of education, and many other 
social reforms. It is a profoundly unsettling 
process that takes decades. 

For many new countries it is in fact even 
more difficult than similar efforts by the 
Western countries a century ago, for their 
social and geographic conditions reflect the 
arbitrary subdivisions of colonial rule. Some 
face obstacles which could not be surmounted 
even with the greatest exertions on their 
own. Their progress depends on how well the 
inteinational community responds to the im- 



peratives of economic interdependence. 

It is senseless, therefore, to pretend that 
development can proceed by quick fixes or 
one-shot solutions. Artificial majorities at in- 
ternational conferences confuse the issue. 
Confrontational tactics will in time destroy 
the domestic support in the industrial coun- 
tries for the forward-looking policy which 
the developing countries so desperately need. 

The industrial democracies have special 
responsibilities as well. Development re- 
quires their sustained and collective coopera- 
tion. They represent the largest markets and 
most of the world's technology and capital. 
They have an obligation to show understand- 
ing for the plight of the poorest and the 
striving for progress of all developing na- 
tions. But they do the developing countries 
no favor if they contribute to escapism. If 
they compete to curry favor over essentially 
propagandistic issues, contributions will be 
diluted, resources will go unallocated, and un- 
workable projects will be encouraged. 

The developing countries need from us not 
a sense of guilt but intelligent and realistic 
proposals that merge the interests of both 
sides in an expanding world economy: 

— First, we must develop further the 
mechanisms of our own cooperation. To this 
end the United States has made a number of 
concrete proposals at the recently concluded 
OECD meeting. 

— Second, the industrial democracies 
should coordinate their national aid pro- 
grams better so that we use our respective 
areas of experience and technical skill to best 
advantage. [French] President Giscard 
d'Estaing's proposal for an integrated West- 
ern fund for Africa is an imaginative ap- 
proach to regional development. 

— Third, we should regularly consult and 
work in close parallel in major international 
negotiations and conferences. The Confer- 
ence on International Economic Cooperation ; 
the multilateral trade negotiations; U.N. 
General Assembly special sessions; world 
conferences on food, population, environ- 
ment, or housing; and UNCTAD [U.N. Con- 
ference on Trade and Development] all can 
achieve much more if the industrial democ- 



July 26, 1976 



113 



racies approach them with a clear and co- 
herent purpose. 

— Fourth, we should stop conducting all 
negotiations on an agenda not our own. We 
should not hesitate to put forward our own 
solutions to common problems. 

— And finally, we need a clear longer term 
strategy for development. The diverse ele- 
ments of the process, including various forms 
of assistance, technology transfer, and trade 
and financial policy, must be better inte- 
grated. 

Cooperation among developed countries is 
not confrontation between North and South, 
as is often alleged. The fact is that a respon- 
sible development policy is possible only if 
the industrial democracies pursue realistic 
goals with conviction, compassion, and coor- 
dination. They must not delude themselves or 
their interlocutors by easy panaceas, or mis- 
take slogans for progress. We make the 
greatest contribution to development if we 
insist that the North-South dialogue empha- 
size substance rather than ideology and con- 
centrate on practical programs instead of 
empty theological debates. 



The Future of Democratic Societies 

In every dimension of our activities, then, 
the industrial democracies enter the new era 
with substantial capacities and opportunities. 
At the same time, it would be idle to deny 
that in recent years the moral stamina of the 
West has been seriously challenged. 

Since its beginnings. Western civilization 
has clearly defined the individual's relation- 
ship to society and the state. In southern 
Europe, the humanism of the Renaissance 
made man the measure of all things. In 
northern Europe, the Reformation, in pro- 
claiming the priesthood of all believers and 
off'ering rewards for individual effort, put the 
emphasis on the individual. In England, the 
sense of justice and human rights and re- 
sponsibilities evolved in the elaboration of 
the common law. Two hundred years ago the 
authors of our Declaration of Independence 
drew upon this heritage; to them every hu- 



man being had inalienable rights to life, lib- 
erty, and the pursuit of happiness. The state 
existed to protect the individual and permit 
full scope for the enjoyment of these rights. 

Today in the West, 30 years after the Mar- 
shall plan, our deepest challenge is that a 
new generation must explore again the is- 
sues of liberty and social responsibility, in an 
era when societies have grown vastly in size, 
complexity, and dynamism. 

The modern industrial society, though 
founded in freedom and offering prosperity, 
risks losing the individual in the mass and 
fostering his alienation. The technical com- 
plexity of public issues challenges the func- 
tioning of democracy. Mass media and the 
weakening of party and group structures 
further the isolation of the individual; they 
transform democratic politics, adding new 
elements of volatility and unpredictability. 
The bureaucratic state poses a fundamental 
challenge to political leadership and respon- 
siveness to public will. 

Basic moral questions are raised: How do 
we inspire a questioning new generation in a 
relativistic age and in a society of impersonal 
institutions? Will skepticism and cynicism 
sap the spiritual energies of our civilization 
at the moment of its greatest technical and 
material success? Having debunked author- 
ity, will our societies now seek refuge in false 
simplifications, demagogic certitudes, or ex- 
tremist panaceas? 

These questions are not a prediction but a 
test — a test of the creativity and moral for- 
titude of our peoples and leaders. 

Western civilization has met such tests 
before. In the late 15th century, Europe was 
in a period of gloomy introspection, preoc- 
cupied with a sense of despair and mortality. 
The cities which had sparked its revival fol- 
lowing the Islamic conquests were in de- 
cline. Its territory was being diminished by 
the depredations of a powerful invader from 
the East. Its spiritual, economic, and cultural 
center — Italy — was a prey to anarchy and 
dismemberment. 

And yet Europe at that very moment was 
already well launched on one of the world's 
periods of greatest political and intellectual 



114 



Department of State Bulletin 



advance. The Renaissance and Reformation, 
tlu> great discoveries, the revival of human- 
istic values, the industrial and democratic 
revolutions — these were all to create the 
character and the dynamism of the Western 
civilization of which we, on both sides of the 
Atlantic, are the heirs. 

Similarly today, the West has assets to 
meet its challenges and to draw from them 
the material for new acts of creation. It is 
our nations that have been the vanguard of 
the modern age. Intellectually and morally, it 
is our societies that have proven themselves 
the vast laboratory of the experiment of 
modernization. Above all, it is the Western 
democracies that originated — and keep alive 
today — the vision of political freedom, social 
justice, and economic well-being for all peo- 
ples. None of us lives up to this vision ideally 
or all the time. But the rigorous standard by 
which we judge ourselves is what makes us 
ditl'erent from totalitarian societies, of the 
left or the right. 

This, then, is our moral task: 

— First, as democratic governments we 
must redeem, over and over again, the trust 
of our peoples. As a nation which has ac- 
cepted the burden of leadership, the United 
States has a special responsibility: we must 
overcome the traumas of the recent period, 
eradicate their causes, and preserve the qual- 
ities which world leadership demands. In Eu- 
rope, wherever there has been a slackening in 
governmental responsiveness to the needs of 
citizens, there should be reform and revival. 

— Second, we must confront the complexi- 
ties of a pluralistic world. This calls for more 



than specific technical solutions. It requires 
of leaders a willingness to explain the real 
alternatives, no matter how complicated or 
difficult. And it requires of electorates an 
understanding that we must make choices 
amidst uncertainty, where the outcome may 
be neither immediate nor reducible to simple 
.slogans. 

— Third, we must clarify our attitudes to- 
ward political forces within Western socie- 
ties which appeal to electorates on the 
ground that they may bring greater effi- 
ciency to government. But we cannot avoid 
the question of the commitment of these 
forces to democratic values nor a concern 
about the trends that a decision based on 
temporary convenience would set in motion. 
At the same time, opposition to these forces 
is clearly not enough. There must be a re- 
sponse to legitimate social and economic as- 
pirations and to the need for reforms of 
inadequacies from which these forces derive 
much of their appeal. 

— Finally, the solidarity of the democratic 
nations in the world is essential both as ma- 
terial support and as a moral symbol. There 
could be no greater inspiration of our peoples 
than the reaffirmation of their common pur- 
pose and the conviction that they can shape 
their fortune in freedom. 

We cannot afford either a perilous compla- 
cency or an immobilizing pessimism. Alastair 
Buchan posed his questions not to induce pa- 
ralysis, but as a spur to wiser action and 
fresh achievement. 

We know what we must do. We also know 
what we can do. It only remains to do it. 



July 26, 1976 



115 



Leaders of Major Industrial Democracies Meet in Puerto Rico 



President Ford and Prime Minister Pierre 
Elliott Trudeau of Canada, President Valery 
Giscard d'Estaing of France, Chancellor Hel- 
mut Schmidt of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Prime Minister Aldo Moro of Italy, 
Prime Minister Takeo Miki of Japan, and 
Prime Minister James Callaghan of the 
United Kingdom met at Dorado Beach, 
Puerto Rico, June 27-28. Folloiving are re- 
marks by President Ford upon arrival in 
Puerto Rico on June 26, his remarks pre- 
pared for delivery at the opening session of 
the conference, his remarks at the conclusion 
of the conference on June 28, and the tran- 
script of a news conference held by Secre- 
tary Kissinger and Secretary of the Treasury 
William E. Simon on June 28, together with 
the text of a joint declaration issued at the 
conclusion of the conference. 



PRESIDENT FORD'S REMARKS UPON ARRIVAL, 
SAN JUAN AIRPORT, JUNE 26 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 5 

Mr. Governor, distinguished members of 
the welcoming committee: I thank you for 
the very warm welcome upon my arrival at 
the summit. It is an honor for the United 
States to be the host of this conference. I 
know that world leaders who are joining me 
will be as appreciative of the beauty and the 
hospitality of Puerto Rico as I am. 

In recent years, the industrialized democ- 
racies have become increasingly concerned 
with the questions of economic growth and 
stability. The linkages between our nations 
have multiplied. Our economies have become 
more closely interrelated. Last November at 
Rambouillet, we began a dialogue which rec- 
ognized our mutual concerns and our interre- 



lationships. Today, we come together to 
continue that dialogue. We are fully aware 
of how important it is for us to work to- 
gether to shape policies, to achieve stable 
economic growth, and to respond to the new 
challenges and opportunities which face us 
all. 

Since we last met, we have witnessed sig- 
nificant economic improvements throughout 
the world. Certainly in the United States our 
progress has been better than many pre- 
dicted, but some old problems remain and 
new ones confront us. The very speed of the 
recovery itself serves as a major test of our 
ability to insure long-term stability in our 
economy. 

This is not a test, however, for the United 
States alone. It is the special challenge facing 
the people of all the industrialized democra- 
cies. I welcome the opportunity to meet 
again with the leaders of our major economic 
partners. I am confident that these discus- 
sions will help us to continue our current eco- 
nomic progress and move us ever closer to 
our goal of economic growth and stability 
throughout the world. 

Mr. Governor, this is my first visit as Pres- 
ident to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
It is a fitting moment to reflect on the rich 
and long history of cooperation and participa- 
tion which this island and its people share 
with the United States. That history has 
been built on a simple but fundamental con- 
cept — the right of the people of Puerto Rico 
and the United States freely to determine 
the nature of their ties with one another. 
Over the years we have chosen to have a close 
relationship. We have built this relationship 
around a common citizenship, a common de- 
fense, a common currency, and a common 
market. 



116 



Department of State Bulletin 



Today, we find that the nature of our rela- 
tionship is again, as in the past, a subject of 
free discussion and free debate. This in itself 
is the best testament to the strength of what 
we have built together, and it is the best 
promise that what we together choose to do 
in the future will be beneficial to the people 
of this island. 

There are those, however, who seek to dis- 
tort the facts, to mislead others about our 
relationship with Puerto Rico. The record is 
clear ; the record is open. We are proud of the 
relationship that we have developed together, 
and we invite the world to examine it. We 
commend to its critics the same freedom of 
choice through free and open election which 
is enjoyed by the people of Puerto Rico. 

Those who might be inclined to interfere 
in our freely determined relations should 
know that such an act will be considered an 
intervention in the domestic affairs of Puerto 
Rico and the United States and will be an un- 
friendly act which will be resisted by appro- 
priate means. 

In the midst of this beautiful setting, we 
cannot forget that problems, both political 
and economic, still remain. As we base our 
hopes on freedom of choice and expression 
to help resolve the political problems, so we 
look to cooperation and interdependence to 
overcome our economic problems. 

Mr. Governor, I am hopeful that the work 
of this summit will give a new impetus to the 
growth of our worldwide economy and im- 
prove international cooperation, and thus we 
will have a positive effect on both the United 
States and Puerto Rico. 

Again, I thank you, Mr. Governor, for your 
warm welcome and for your help in hosting 
this summit.' 



PRESIDENT FORD'S REMARKS PREPARED FOR 
OPENING SESSION OF CONFERENCE, JUNE 27 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 5 

On behalf of myself and my colleagues and 
the people of the United States, I welcome 
you to Puerto Rico. We have a formidable 
task ahead of us in these next two days — to 
address major common concerns and to iden- 



tify areas in which improved cooperation 
among us can contribute to the well-being of 
our citizens and to a more secure and pros- 
perous world. 

As we all know, meetings of this sort raise 
anticipations of dramatic results. But the im- 
portant thing about Rambouillet and our 
meeting here today is that they are part of 
an essential and continuing bilateral and 
multilateral effort by the leaders of key in- 
dustrialized democracies to address common 
problems and to improve mutual under- 
standing. 

The complexity of our nations' economies, 
individually and collectively, means that we 
as leaders cannot afford to allow major diffi- 
culties to arise and then, by dramatic meet- 
ings, attempt to resolve them. It requires in- 
stead that we concert our effort to prevent 
problems from arising in the first place — to 
shape the future rather than reacting to it. 
It is with that objective in mind that this 
summit is being held. 

The central economic, political, and secu- 
rity importance of our countries to one an- 
other and to the world confers upon us special 
responsibilities. In the economic area, on 
which we will focus today and tomorrow, our 
strong commitment to shape constructive ap- 
proaches can contribute to the prosperity of 
our peoples, strengthen our broader relation- 
ships, and prove highly beneficial to the 
world at large. 

Recent experience has clearly demon- 
strated that because of the interdependence 
of our nations, common problems are un- 
likely to be solved unless we apply our mu- 
tual efforts. They have, in addition, shown 
that our common interests are far more 
significant than the differences which arise 
among us from time to time. We have, there- 
fore, wisely approached recent problems with 
a political will and spirit of cooperation 
which have not only helped us resolve them 
but which have in fact strengthened con- 
siderably relations among our nations and 



' For a reply by Governor Rafael Hernandez- 
Colon of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, see 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated 
July 5, 1976, p. 1088. 



July 26, 1976 



117 



among the industrialized democracies as a 
whole. 

This conference builds on and can help us 
continue the progress already made. This 
vision and sense of shared purpose which re- 
sults from our meetings will help each of us 
pursue constructive policies at home, with 
respect to our economic partners, and in deal- 
ing with major global issues. 

I am confident that the same positive spirit 
that was developed at Rambouillet will ex- 
tend through our meetings here in Puerto 
Rico and beyond. Much of the world's future 
depends on our constructive cooperation. 



PRESIDENT FORD'S REMARKS AT CONCLUSION 
OF CONFERENCE, JUNE 28 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 5 

We have just concluded two days of very 
productive discussions on a number of issues 
of great importance to us all. Our talks were 
characterized by a seriousness of puiijose, a 
firm desire to improve our understanding of 
one another's views, and a common commit- 
ment to strengthen constructive cooperation 
among all nations. 

During the course of our discussions, we 
reached agreement in several significant 
areas. These are set out in the declaration 
that we have just adopted. 

First, we are confident about the future 
economic and financial outlook for our coun- 
tries. All of us are committed to achieving 
sustainable growth which will reduce unem- 
ployment without jeopardizing our common 
aim of avoiding a new wave of inflation. We 
recognize that the sustained economic expan- 
sion we seek and the resultant increase in 
individual well-being cannot be achieved in 
the context of high inflation rates. 

We agreed that our objective of monetary 
stabiUty must not be undermined by the 
strains of financing payments imbalances. 
Each nation should manage its economy and 
its international monetary affairs so as to 
correct or avoid persistent or structural in- 
ternational payments imbalances. 

We have recognized that problems may 



arise for a few developed countries which 
have special needs, which have not yet re- 
stored domestic economic stability, and 
which face major payments deficits. We 
agreed that if assistance in financing transi- 
tory balance-of-payments deficits is neces- 
sary to avoid general disruptions in economic 
growth, it can best be provided by multi- 
lateral means, in conjunction with a firm 
program for restoring underlying equi- 
librium. 

The industrialized democracies can be 
most successful in helping developing nations 
by agreeing on and working together to im- 
plement sound solutions to their own prob- 
lems, solutions which enhance the efficient 
operation of the international economy. Our 
efforts must be mutually supportive rather 
than competitive. We remain determined to 
continue the dialogue with the developing 
countries to achieve concrete results. 

We agreed on the importance of maintain- 
ing a liberal climate for the flow of interna- 
tional investment. We agreed to examine 
carefully the various aspects of East-West 
economic contacts so that they enhance over- 
all East-West relations. 

Together, the results of our discussions 
represent a significant step forward in coop- 
eration among the industrial democracies. 
They establish positive directions which will 
benefit not only our peoples but the interna- 
tional economy as a whole. 

In conclusion, let me add a personal note. 
I was greatly impressed with the candid and 
friendly atmosphere here. Our countries 
have come through a difficult period. Our 
cooperation during this period has not only 
contributed to the resolution of problems but 
has in fact significantly strengthened rela- 
tions among our countries and among the in- 
dustrialized democracies as a whole. 

We can be proud of this record and of our 
nations' abilities to meet the severe chal- 
lenges we have faced. In my view, the spirit 
of Rambouillet, which was carried forward to 
these meetings in Puerto Rico, has strength- 
ened prospects for progress by the industri- 
alized democracies in a number of key areas. 
If we nurture the sense of common purpose 



118 



Department of State Bulletin 



and vision which has characterized these dis- 
cussions, we have an opportunity to shape 
events and better meet the needs of our citi- 
zens and all the world. 



NEWS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY KISSINGER 
AND TREASURY SECRETARY SIMON, JUNE 28 

Wci'kly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July G 

Secretary Kissinger: Let me say that ba- 
sically the purpose of this conference was to 
enable the leaders of the industrial democ- 
racies, a group of nations that between them 
have 60 percent of the world's GNP, to dis- 
cuss a number of economic issues and to dis- 
cuss a number of issues where economic and 
political considerations merge, such as East- 
West and North-South issues. They dis- 
cussed them in a very free and relaxed 
atmosphere. 

It was not a question of reading prepared 
statements at each other; but as Prime Min- 
ister Callaghan said, there was usually one 
of the leaders who introduced one of the is- 
sues, and then there was a free and easy 
discussion. 

We believe that on the major issues con- 
fronting these countries a large degree of 
understanding was reached that should help 
encourage the economic processes, and it 
should also enable the countries represented 
here to work together on international issues 
such as those that were mentioned in the 
communique. But what no communique can 
reflect is the many conversations that took 
place at the side, the attitude of the partici- 
pants that reflected the conviction that they 
represented paraflel values and the realiza- 
tion that their destinies were linked together. 

With this, let us answer your specific ques- 
tions. 

Q. Can any of you quantify the type of 
iinsistance that is in mind for Italy? 

Secretary Kissinger: There was no specific 
discussion of any particular amount nor 
indeed of the framework within which assist- 
ance can take place. There is a general state- 
ment in this document that we would apply 



to all circumstances in which there are per- 
sistent or temporary disequilibria and per- 
haps Bill can explain its significance better. 
Secretary Simo7i: Well, there is an existing 
agreement in the International Monetary 
Fund that loans can be made on a supplemen- 
tary basis when resources are needed to 
forestall or to cope with a temporary prob- 
lem in the international monetary system 
that is impairing its proper functioning, and 
we discussed the possibility of, if something 
like this were needed — as I believe the com- 
munique says verbatim — what type mech- 
anism should be brought into place for 
transitory financing for balance-of-payments 
purposes under very stringent economic con- 
ditions. 

Q. May I ask the first Secretary [laughter'] 
— given the fact that you said ive should not 
expect any dramatic developments out of 
this, can you give us an idea of any changes 
that might come about as a result of this 
meeting, or any new directions that U.S. 
policy might take? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first of all, one 
cannot expect that the foreign policy of 
major countries can be redesigned every six 
months, and if that were to happen, that 
would be a reason for alarm rather than for 
congratulations. 

On the economic side, all of the countries 
face the situation now that the recession 
which seemed to be the dominant problem at 
Rambouillet has turned to a greater or lesser 
degree in the various countries into a recov- 
ery problem, and the problem that had to be 
discussed was how to sustain this recovery 
without inflation. 

On the East- West trade, this was not dis- 
cussed at Rambouillet at all, and we agreed 
to study the various implications of the rela- 
tionship between state economies and market 
economies so that commerce can develop to 
the mutual benefit and cannot be used for 
political purposes. 

With respect to North-South, there was a 
very full and detailed discussion in the hght 
of the experience which we have all had at 
UNCTAD [U.N. Conference on Trade and 



July 26, 1976 



119 



Development] in Nairobi and at the meeting 
of the Conference on International Economic 
Cooperation in Paris as to how the indus- 
trialized countries, the industrialized democ- 
racies, that between them contribute almost 
the entire development effort — the Socialist 
countries contribute nothing — how those 
countries can cooperate for the mutual 
benefit of both developed and developing 
countries and for the benefit of the world 
economy. That, too, was not an entirely new 
direction, but a new emphasis on which very 
fruitful discussions took place. 

Q. Can you tell us anything, Mr. Secretary, 
about the President's talks ivith Giscard, 
Mora, Callaghan, Miki? 

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, one of the 
great benefits of these meetings is the ability 
to exchange ideas not only in a meeting 
room but on a bilateral basis. And with the 
various leaders there was an exchange be- 
cause, obviously, with the Italian Prime Min- 
ister, there was a discussion of the implica- 
tions of what political developments might 
occur in Italy that could be most conducive 
to reform, and we got the assessment of the 
Italian leaders. 

We will see the Japanese Prime Minister 
again on Wednesday in Washington, so this 
was more in the nature of a preliminary talk. 

The talk with President Giscard d'Estaing 
concerned the review of the entire world 
situation, including some topics that were 
not discussed in the general session, such as 
the Middle East and Africa. And you will re- 
member I said it is only to point out why 
there were no bilaterals with certain other 
people, that the President has seen Prime 
Minister Trudeau two weeks ago and will 
see Chancellor Schmidt two weeks from now. 
So, this is the essence of his conversations. 

Q. Did you get any further in the North- 
South deal, on getting a common approach? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think it is pos- 
sible — nor did we attempt — to get all the 
details of a common approach in a meeting 
of a day and a half, but there was a general 
understanding that there should be a com- 



mon approach or at least a parallel approach. 
There was also a general understanding, as 
the communique reflects, that the developed 
countries can make their best contribution 
by putting forward sound positions rather 
than wait for proposals to be put to them and 
let themselves be driven by the negotiating 
tactics of a particular conference, and it 
was agreed that we would work closely to- 
gether in preparation for other meetings. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the fact that 
much of the developing payment deficit re- 
sults from oil, was that discussed, any stand 
to be taken on that question? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, there was a 
general discussion of the energy problem 
but more from the point of view of what the 
industrial democracies can do to reduce their 
dependence on it, and there were general dis- 
cussions of the economic aspects of balance- 
of-payments deficits which I will let Secre- 
tary Simon answer. 

Secretary Simon: There was one impor- 
tant point, if I understand your question and 
statement correctly, that the balance-of- 
payments problem stems entirely from oil — 
that is not correct. Obviously the quadrupling 
of the oil price had a significant part to play, 
but there are those countries who have not 
sufficiently adjusted their economic pohcies 
to compensate for the increased cost of oil, 
and these adjustments, while difficult politi- 
cally and socially, must indeed be made. And 
it was in that framework — of the responsi- 
bilities of nations in surplus as well as in 
deficit — that we discussed the balance-of- 
payments problems, that President Ford 
explained to the participants this year 
the United States is going to have a dra- 
matic swing of $15-$16 billion in our current 
account balance, from a $12 billion surplus 
last year to approximately $3 billion deficit 
this year. We view this with equanimity and 
indeed — as other countries in surplus posi- 
tions should, too. 

Q. Mr. Secretary Simon, should we inter- 
pret the communique to indicate that Prime 
Minister Miki is receptive to the idea of re- 
valuating the yen? 



120 



Department of State Bulletin 



Secretary Simon: When we talk about re- 
valuation of a currency, the Japanese yen is 
a floating currency that is subjected to the 
market evaluation, if you will, and that is 
what occurs. Now there are occasions which 
— I don't say the Japanese have been guilty 
of — where one can artificially attempt for a 
time to peg a rate, but I have not seen this 
occur, no. Floating rates, the market sets 
the rate. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, ivas there any discussion 
at all of southern Africa and Rhodesia? 

Secretary Kissinger: Not in the meetings 
as such, but at the fringes of the meetings. 

Q. Was there anything decided about it? 

Secretary Kissinger: There was no at- 
tempt made to decide anything. As I pointed 
out after my meetings with Prime Minister 
[of South Africa John] Vorster, he has now 
to consider several problems with his col- 
leagues, and we are consulting various black 
African states and various of our allies be- 
fore we can formulate the precise next move, 
but we also insist that the process which was 
set in motion is still underway and in our 
view has a chance of continuing. 

We also have called attention in Britain, 
and I want to do it here, about the central 
role that Britain can play with respect to 
Rhodesia, and it is a responsibility which we 
have the impression — indeed the British 
Government has said it is willing to exercise. 

Q. Aside from having the agreement that 
there should be a common approach to it, do 
you knoiv already or do you have a hint in 
tvhich direction the North-South — 

Secretary Kissinger: There was a rather 
full discussion of various of the topics that 
have been on the international agenda, and 
experts and others will work on that in the 
spirit of this meeting in the weeks ahead. 

Q. / would like to ask Secretary Simon 
what the prospects are for the British pound 
and how this was discussed at the meeting. 

Secretary Simon: Number one, we don't 
discuss other currencies of other countries. 



That is for obvious reasons. Going back to 
the Jamaica agreement, one of the basic 
tenets of that agreement was that exchange 
rate stability would only be achieved when 
we achieved underlying economic stability; 
and as countries adjust to the durable infla- 
tion problems and other problems today their 
currencies indeed will stabilize, and actuaUy 
most currencies in recent months, since the 
Jamaica agreement, have been remarkably 
stable. There have been a few notable excep- 
tions, due to the fundamental economic 
problems which are being corrected. 

Q. How much of the $5 billion have the 
British draivn down? 

Secretary Simon: I don't have that figure, 
and if I did I am not sure that that figure 
should not be announced, if indeed it should 
be at ah, by the U.K. officials, not by an 
American finance official. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, was there any discussion 
ivith Giscard on the possible French force to 
Lebanon? 

Secretary Kissinger: That issue is not at 
this particular moment acute. The French 
Government knows our attitude, and it is 
parallel to their own, which is to say that, 
if under conditions of cease-fire, if all of the 
parties should invite a French force, and if 
the French Government were prepared to 
send one, it could play a potentially useful 
role, but it is not now being discussed, and 
our impression is that the Arab League force 
will be the principal international instrument 
that is being used. 



TEXT OF JOINT DECLARATION OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, JUNE 28 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 5 

The heads of state and government of Canada, 
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the United States of America 
met at Dorado Beach, Puerto Rico, on the 27th and 
28th of June, 1976, and agreed to the following 
declaration: 



July 26, 1976 



121 



The interdependence of our destinies makes it 
necessary for us to approach common economic prob- 
lems with a sense of common purpose and to work 
toward mutually consistent economic strategies 
through better cooperation. 

We consider it essential to take into account the 
interests of other nations. And this is most particu- 
larly true with respect to the developing countries 
of the world. 

It was for these purposes that we held a broad 
and productive exchange of views on a wide range 
of issues. This meeting provided a welcome oppor- 
tunity to improve our mutual understanding and to 
intensify our cooperation in a number of areas. 
Those among us whose countries are members of 
the European Economic Community intend to make 
their efforts within its framework. 

At Rambouillet, economic recovery was established 
as a primary goal and it was agreed that the desired 
stability depends upon the underlying economic and 
financial conditions in each of our countries. 

Significant progress has been achieved since Ram- 
bouillet. During the recession there was widespread 
concern regarding the longer-run vitality of our 
economies. These concerns have proved to be un- 
warranted. Renewed confidence in the future has 
replaced doubts about the economic and financial 
outlook. Economic recovery is well under way and in 
many of our countries there has been substantial 
progress in combatting inflation and reducing un- 
employment. This has improved the situation in 
those countries where economic recovery is still rela- 
tively weak. 

Our deteiTTiination in recent months to avoid ex- 
cessive stimulation of our economies and new impedi- 
ments to trade and capital movements has contrib- 
uted to the soundness and breadth of this recovery. 
As a result, restoration of balanced growth is within 
our grasp. We do not intend to lose this opportunity. 

Our objective now is to manage effectively a tran- 
sition to expansion which will be sustainable, which 
will reduce the high level of unemployment which 
persists in many countries and will not jeopardize 
our common aim of avoiding a new wave of inflation. 
That will call for an increase in productive invest- 
ment and for partnership among all groups within 
our societies. This will involve acceptance, in accord- 
ance with our individual needs and circumstances, 
of a restoration of better balance in public finance, 
as well as of disciplined measures in the fiscal area 
and in the field of monetary policy and in some cases 
supplementary policies, including incomes policy. 
The formulation of such policies, in the context of 
growing interdependence, is not possible without tak- 
ing into account the course of economic activity in 
other countries. With the right combination of poli- 
cies we believe that we can achieve our objectives 
of orderly and sustained expansion, reducing un- 
employment and renewed progress toward our com- 
mon goal of eliminating the problem of inflation. 



Sustained economic expansion and the resultant in- 
crease in individual well-being cannot be achieved in 
the context of high rates of inflation. 

At the meeting last November, we resolved differ- 
ences on structural reform of the international mone- 
tary system and agreed to promote a stable system 
of exchange rates which emphasized the prerequi- 
site of developing stable underlying economic finan- 
cial conditions. 

With those objectives in mind, we reached specific 
understandings, which made a substantial contribu- 
tion to the IMF [International Monetary Fund] 
meeting in Jamaica. Early legislative ratification of 
these agreements by all concerned is desirable. We 
agreed to improve cooperation in order to further 
our ability to counter disorderly market conditions 
and increase our understanding of economic prob- 
lems and the corrective policies that are needed. We 
will continue to build on this structure of consulta- 
tions. 

Since November, the relationship between the 
dollar and most of the main currencies has been 
remarkably stable. However, some currencies have 
suffered substantial fluctuations. 

The needed stability in underlying economic and 
financial conditions clearly has not yet been restored. 
Our commitment to deliberate, orderly and sustained 
expansion, and to the indispensable companion goal 
of defeating inflation provides the basis for in- 
creased stability. 

Our objective of monetary stability must not be 
undermined by the strains of financing international 
payments imbalances. We thus recognize the impor- 
tance of each nation managing its economy and its 
international monetary affairs so as to correct or 
avoid persistent or structural international payments 
imbalances. Accordingly, each of us affirms his in- 
tention to work toward a more stable and durable 
pajTTients structure through the application of ap- 
propriate internal and external policies. 

Imbalances in world payments may continue in 
the period ahead. We recognize that problems may 
arise for a few developed countries which have spe- 
cial needs, which have not yet restored domestic 
economic stability, and which face major payments 
deficits. We agree to continue to cooperate with 
others in the appropriate bodies on further analysis 
of these problems with a view to their resolution. 
If assistance in financing transitory balance of pay- 
ments deficits is necessary to avoid general disrup- 
tions in economic growth, then it can best be pro- 
vided by multilateral means coupled with a firm pro- 
gram for restoring underlying equilibrium. 

In the trade area, despite the recent recession, 
we have been generally successful in maintaining an 
open trading system. At the OECD [Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development] we re- 
affirmed our pledge to avoid the imposition of new 
trade barriers. 

Countries yielding to the temptation to resort to 



122 



Department of State Bulletin 



commercial protectionism would leave themselves 
open to a subsequent deterioration in their competi- 
tive standing; the vigor of their economies would be 
affected while at the same time chain reactions 
would be set in motion and the volume of world trade 
would shrink, hurting all countries. Wherever de- 
partures from the policy set forth in the recently 
renewed OECD trade pledge occur, elimination of 
the restrictions involved is essential and urgent. 
Also, it is important to avoid deliberate exchange 
rate policies which would create severe distortions 
in trade and lead to a resurgence of protectionism. 

We have all set ourselves the objective of com- 
pleting the Multilateral Trade Negotiations by the 
end of 1977. We hereby reaffirm that objective and 
commit ourselves to make every effort through the 
appropriate bodies to achieve it in accordance with 
the Tokyo Declaration." 

Beyond the conclusion of the trade negotiations we 
recognize the desirability of intensifying and 
strengthening relationships among the major trad- 
ing areas with a view to the long-term goal of a 
maximum expansion of trade. 

We discussed East-West economic relations. We 
welcomed in this context the steady growth of East- 
West trade, and expressed the hope that economic 
relations between East and West would develop their 
full potential on a sound financial and reciprocal 
commercial basis. We agreed that this process war- 
rants our careful examination, as well as efforts on 
our part to ensure that these economic ties enhance 
overall East-West relationships. 

We welcome the adoption, by the participating 
countries, of converging guidelines with regard to 
export credits. We hope that these guidelines will 
be adopted as soon as possible by as many countries 
as possible. 

In the pursuit of our goal of sustained expansion, 
the flow of capital facilitates the efficient allocation 
of resources and thereby enhances our economic 
well-being. We, therefore, agree on the importance 
of a liberal climate for international investment 
flows. In this regard, we view as a constructive de- 
velopment the declaration which was announced 
last week when the OECD Council met at the Min- 
isterial level. 



" For text of the declaration, approved at Tokyo on 
Sept. 14, 1973, by a ministerial meeting of the Con- 
tracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, see Bulletin of Oct. 8, 1973, p. 450. 



In the field of energy, we intend to make efforts 
to develop, conserve and use rationally the various 
energy resources and to assist the energy develop- 
ment objectives of developing countries. 

We support the aspirations of the developing na- 
tions to improve the lives of their peoples. The role 
of the industrialized democracies is crucial to the 
success of their efforts. Cooperation between the two 
groups must be based on mutual respect, take into 
consideration the interests of all parties and reject 
unproductive confrontation in favor of sustained and 
concerted efforts to find constructive solutions to the 
problems of development. 

The industrialized democracies can be most suc- 
cessful in helping the developing countries meet their 
aspirations by agreeing on, and cooperating to imple- 
ment, sound solutions to their problems which en- 
hance the efficient operation of the international 
economy. Close collaboration and better coordination 
are necessary among the industrialized democracies. 
Our efforts must be mutually supportive, not com- 
petitive. Our efforts for international economic co- 
operation must be considered as complementary to 
the policies of the developing countries themselves 
to achieve sustainable growth and rising standards 
of living. 

At Rambouillet, the importance of a cooperative 
relationship between the developed and developing 
nations was affirmed; particular attention was di- 
rected to following up the results of the Seventh 
Special Session of the UN General Assembly, and 
especially to addressing the balance of payments 
problems of some developing countries. Since then, 
substantial progress has been made. We welcome 
the constructive spirit which prevails in the work 
carried out in the framework of the Conference on 
International Economic Cooperation, and also by the 
positive results achieved in some areas at UNCTAD 
IV in Nairobi. New measures taken in the IMF 
have made a substantial contribution to stabilizing 
the export earnings of the developing countries and 
to helping them finance their deficits. 

We attach the greatest importance to the dialogue 
between developed and developing nations in the 
expectation that it will achieve concrete results in 
areas of mutual interest. And we reaffirm our coun- 
tries' determination to participate in this process in 
the competent bodies, with a political will to suc- 
ceed, looking toward negotiations, in appropriate 
cases. Our common goal is to find practical solutions 
which contribute to an equitable and productive re- 
lationship among all peoples. 



July 26, 1976 



123 



Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for Die Zeit of Hamburg 



Folloiving is the transcript of an interview 
ivith Secretary Kissinger on June 25 by 
Theo Sommer which ivas published in the 
tveekly newspaper Die Zeit of Hamburg on 
June 30. 

Press release 336 dated June 30 

Mr. Sommer: Mr. Secretary, the United 
States is celebrating its Bicentennial. During 
the past two centuries, it's been vacillating 
between isolationism and expansionism. What 
does America mean to the world on the 
threshold of its third century"? 

Secretary Kissinger: I wouldn't agree that 
America has been consciously expansionist. 
I think America has been alternating be- 
tween isolationism and a kind of conception 
in which we assumed great responsibility for 
the world's security and economic progress. 
This got us involved in many places, but it 
was not based on a conscious strategy of 
expansionism. 

It is my belief that the biggest change in 
American foreign policy has been that we 
are now permanently involved in foreign 
affairs. This is a new experience for America. 
Previously, whether we were isolationist or 
interventionist — it was always justified in 
America on the grounds that we were deal- 
ing with specific crises which had particular 
solutions, after which we could return home. 
At least we had the option of noninvolve- 
ment. That is now over. 

Mr. Sommer: You don't think we are going 
to see another retreat of America? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think that even if 
we were to see another retreat of America 
the consequences would be so grievous — it 
would have such traumatic consequences — 
that it would only underline what I have 



124 



said. But I don't believe we will see another 
retreat of America. 

Mr. Som7ner: Does the intrusion of domes- 
tic politics and the conflict between the legis- 
lature and the executive branch maim your 
capacity to conduct a rational and calculable 
and reliable foreign policy? 

Secretary Kissinger: The conflict is not 
simply an executive-legislative conflict. It 
was produced by the weakening of executive 
authority as a result of Viet-Nam and 
Watergate. It reflects also the disorganiza- 
tion of the Congress, where there are no 
longer any clear power centers and a large 
number of congressional committees can as- 
sert jurisdiction. And any number of individ- 
ual Congressmen can push their preferences. 
So we are dealing here with a more funda- 
mental problem than an executive-legislative 
conflict. 

Mr. Sommer: Do you regret the passing of 
"the imperial Presidency" and of the "Grand 
Vizier"? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think "the im- 
perial Presidency" is a phrase that was in- 
vented after the fact. You cannot conduct 
foreign policy without authority or without 
some central focal point. And in fact it has 
been conducted this way even in the midst 
of executive-legislative conflict. 

The real problem these days is not the dis- 
mantling of the central point of authority, 
but how a central point of authority can re- 
late itself to congressional concerns. That 
has to be worked out. I regret a state of 
aff'airs which made possible events like the 
Turkish arms embargo, the manner in which 
the Angolan problem was handled, and sev- 
eral other setbacks. 



Department of State Bulletin 



Mr. Sonimer: Is America going to be a 
reliable partner? Is it? Does it have the 
means and the resolve to pull its weight, and 
more specifically, tvhat kind of a situation in 
a foreign country would justify a U.S. inter- 
vention? 

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that after 
the present turmoil is over the United 
States will probably be an even more reliable 
partner, because it is through this turmoil 
that the post-Marshall Plan generation is 
getting its feel for foreign policy and ad- 
justing to the new realities of international 
life. I am basically optimistic that when this 
debate is behind us — and we are in its last 
phase — our foreign policy will be steadier. 

On your second question, it depends on 
what you mean by intervention. I think what 
any great power needs, and what America 
needs, is to understand which geopolitical 
changes are against our interests and should 
be resisted. What to resist and how to resist 
it, you cannot do in a blueprint in the 
abstract. 

Mr. Sommer: Are ive back to containment? 

Secretary Kissinger: Containment has al- 
ways been one aspect of foreign policy in 
the sense that we cannot permit the Soviet 
Union to gain a preponderant strategic ad- 
vantage. On the other hand, whereas in the 
forties and fifties containment was consid- 
ered an end in itself, it is now just the be- 
ginning of wisdom; it is the condition on 
which other constructive policies have to be 
based. 

We used to think that if the Soviet Union 
could be contained long enough, peace would 
break out at some magical moment and all 
problems would disappear. Today we know 
that we cannot permit the Soviets to gain 
military and strategic preponderance. But 
that doesn't solve our foreign policy problem. 

Mr. Sommer: Which side is the United 
States on? Zbigniew Brzezinski, an academic 
and political critic as well as a rival of yours, 
has recently said that the curious thing is 
that the nation committed from its birth to 
independence now feels troubled and even 



threatened, by a world based on self-determi- 
nation and striving for equality, and he says 
that the Administration is taking refuge in 
the notion of a hostile world as it used to take 
refuge in the notion of the cold xoar. 

Secretary Kissinger: This is an election 
year, and many people have to say things to 
distinguish themselves from the present 
policy. I recognize no element of our foreign 
policy in this description. Nor could it be 
supported by anything I have been saying 
in my speeches. 

Where do we say we are living in a hostile 
world? This is not reflected in our policy 
toward Europe, toward Latin America, to- 
ward Africa. Our initiatives at the seventh 
special session of the General Assembly and 
in other international forums were all based 
on the assumption that the United States 
has a particular responsibility to help con- 
struct an international environment in which 
nations can develop themselves along their 
own lines. 

I simply do not recognize this description 
as applying to our policies. 

Mr. Sommer: Hotv do you reconcile the 
postulates of realpolitik and moral considera- 
tions in your handling — no, let's say stabiliz- 
ing — the colonels' regime in Greece, destabi- 
lizing Allende, or in your, some people feel, 
rather late awakening to the African prob- 
lems? 

Secretary Kissinger: First, I can't accept 
your description either that we stabilized 
the colonels' regime in Greece or that we de- 
stabilized Allende. This is a bit of folklore 
that, after having been repeated so often, is 
now an unshakable part of general mythol- 
ogy. You can say that we did not move all- 
out against the colonels, but both our mili- 
tary aid and our diplomatic contacts were 
reduced ; to say that we actively "stabilized" 
the colonels is totally incorrect. 

The same is true with Allende. Allende de- 
stabilized himself. We did not produce the 
inefliciency of his regime. We did not procure 
the decisions of the leadership of the Na- 
tional Assembly. And the President of the 



July 26, 1976 



125 



Supreme Court declared his acts unconstitu- 
tional and refused to vote for his programs. 
Those were Chilean decisions. We did try to 
keep the democratic parties alive in the face 
of much governmental harassment so that 
they could put forward candidates in the 
election of 1976. But we also kept open the 
economic pipeline to Chile, and Allende re- 
ceived over $200 million of aid, plus $100 
million of debt rescheduling to which the 
United States agreed. That is a lot more aid 
disbursements than his successors have re- 
ceived from the United States. 

Now with respect to your specific ques- 
tion on the relationship between realpolitik 
and morality. This is usually stated as a 
dichotomy: Either you conduct realpolitik 
or you conduct a moral policy. The fact is 
that all foreign policy actions, whatever their 
motivation, whether moral or cynical, take 
place in some objective context. And it is the 
obligation of the statesman to understand 
what that objective context is. However 
principled he may be, if he cannot use the 
material at hand, he cannot be effective. 

On the other hand, a policy based only on 
so-called realpolitik is likely to be driven by 
events. And it's likely to become totally ran- 
dom. I would argue that without strong 
moral conviction it is very difficult to con- 
duct a realpolitik, and I believe that you 
need strong moral convictions and a clear 
sense of moral purpose to define the objec- 
tives of foreign policy. Then in every individ- 
ual case you still have to determine what you 
can achieve and how to go about it. And the 
dilemma of the statesman, as contrasted 
with professors, is that a professor can af- 
ford to put down the full complexity and ele- 
gance of his moral elevation; a statesman 
has to achieve his objectives by stages, each 
one of which is likely to be imperfect. So 
there is no inevitable opposition between 
realpolitik and moral principles entirely. 

Mr. Sommer: If you look at the African 
situation in this context — 

Secretary Kissinger: Okay, let's take the 
African situation. When foreign policy is 
discussed today, people speak totally in the 



abstract, as if all foreign policies could have 
been conducted simultaneously and as if 
nothing else were going on in the United 
States. People forget now that we went 
through internal upheavals that had revolu- 
tionary manifestations during the Viet-Nam 
war ; that when we came into office we found 
550,000 Americans in Viet-Nam, that we 
confronted a total freeze in our relationship 
with the Soviet Union and no relationship 
at all with the People's Republic of China, 
and that relations with Europe were in 
rather poor shape. It was inevitable that we 
had to settle the Viet-Nam war first, re-do 
our relationships with Western Europe and 
with the Communist countries before we 
could turn, with energy, to the problems of 
the developing world. No one in America 
would have understood if we had suddenly 
turned our full energies to Africa at a time 
when we had all these other priorities. 

Mr. Sommer: But now you do. 

Secretary Kissinger: Now we do. 

Mr. Sommer: And what are the yardsticks 
by which you measure the situation? 

Secretary Kissinger: There are several as- 
pects to our African policy: of course there 
is the overwhelming problem of southern 
Africa and the challenge of the basic orien- 
tation of the rest of Africa ; and finally there 
is the relationship of Africa to the rest of 
the world. 

With respect to southern Africa, we are 
attempting to bring about a situation in 
which the solution is found through negotia- 
tions rather than conflict, and by African 
nations rather than by outside powers. 
Hopefully, such a solution will achieve the 
aspirations of the African peoples and pro- 
tect the rights of minorities. And if that 
succeeds, that will remove one of the great- 
est incentives, in fact almost the only oppor- 
tunity, for outside intervention. Simultane- 
ously, we are trying to encourage the elabo- 
ration of programs that give the aspirations 
to development a positive content by such 
proposals as the Sahel development scheme, 
support for [French] President Giscard 



126 



Department of State Bulletin 



d'Estaing's idea of an Afi'ican fund, and by 
the expansion of our own development pro- 
gram. And so far I'm rather encouraged by 
the progress we are making with respect to 
southern Africa, or at least I think it is 
possible we can make progress. 

Mr. Sommer: Did your meeting ivith Mr. 
Vorster [Prime Minister John Vorster of 
South Africa] yield any prospects for im- 
provement ? 

Secretary Kissinger: It's an extremely 
delicate situation which presents eveiybody 
with serious dilemmas. I therefore do not 
want to characterize it at this moment, ex- 
cept to say that the process which I've de- 
scribed to you is still going on, that is to say, 
the possibilities of achieving what I de- 
scribed exist, and I would say that with 
the full knowledge of my conversation with 
Prime Minister Vorster. 

Mr. Sommer: What is the role in all this 
for Europe, and tuhat future do you see for 
the transatlantic relationship? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, today I'm giv- 
ing a perhaps excessively long speech on 
that subject at the Institute for Strategic 
Studies. I believe that Europe, finding its 
political unity, should become a major par- 
ticipant in many global problems. 

I would think with respect to southern 
Africa, for example, the cooperation of 
Europe is almost essential. It cannot be done 
effectively as a purely American policy. 

I think Great Britain, with respect to 
Rhodesia — Great Britain, the Common Mar- 
ket, and the United States, with respect to 
other aspects of southern Africa — can give 
perhaps an element of guarantee and of 
stability that the United States by itself 
could not provide. 

On the whole issue of development, the 
close cooperation between Europe and the 
United States is essential. And I think reality 
will bring us to a point where, in East-West 
relations, both political and economic, we 
will have to synchronize our strategy. 

Mr. Sommer: Given the difficulties of pro- 



gressing toioard greater unity in Europe, 
given the problems on the northern and 
the southern flanks, and given the specter of 
Eurocommunism, do you still believe that 
Europe ivill be Marxist in 10 years' time? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have never believed 
that Europe will be Marxist in 10 years' 
time. 

Mr. Sommer: The sentence is ascribed to 
you. 

Secretary Kissinger: The sentence may be 
ascribed to me, but it is part of a general 
mythology of — 

Mr. Sommer: You never said it. 

Secretary Kissinger: I never said it and — 

Mr. Sommer: And you don't believe it. 

Secretary Kissinger: And I don't believe it. 

Mr. Sommer: There are some people in the 
United States who feel that Europe is just 
too bothersome, and probably it will break 
up ayiyway, and NATO might come unstuck, 
and that our best bet would be a strengthen- 
ing of a Bonn-Washington axis. How do you 
feel about that? 

Secretary Kissinger: Throughout my pub- 
lic life I have been a strong advocate of the 
closest ties between Bonn and Washington. 
German leaders, in and out of office, are 
personal friends of mine. Nevertheless I 
think it would be unfortunate for the Fed- 
eral Republic, unfortunate for NATO, and not 
in anybody's interest to turn NATO into a 
special Bonn-Washington relationship. It 
would be too heavy a burden on the Federal 
Republic. It would raise all the suspicions in 
the rest of Europe that a generation of re- 
sponsible German foreign policy has erased. 
And it would encourage the splitting up of 
the West rather than be an element of sta- 
bility. I don't believe it is necessary. I don't 
favor it. I know no German leader who favors 
it. 

Mr. Sommer: Do you see a special role for 
Germany ? 



July 26, 1976 



127 



Secretary Kissinger: Germany, because of 
its strength, inherently plays a vital role. 
And you don't get a special role by being 
handed a piece of paper. Germany has a very 
major role which it has exercised responsibly 
and which it should continue to exercise in 
the existing framework. 

Mr. Sommer: You've involved yourself in 
so many election campaigns this year. Would 
you care to comment on the German election 
campaign? 

Secretary Kissinger: [Laughter.] I said 
I'd confine myself to one election campaign 
at a time, and I have to give preference to 
the United States. 

Mr. Sommer: What is your comment on 
the Italian election results? 

Secretary Kissinger: The Italian election 
result has polarized the situation that led 
to the election by having in effect an anti- 
Communist party and a Communist Party 
with the intermediary parties substantially 
weakened and some of them brought to the 
edge of extinction. There is now almost ex- 
actly the situation that produced the election 
except that now most of the opposition forces 
have moved toward the Communists and the 
anti-Communist forces have moved to a 
slightly lesser extent toward the Christian 
Democrats. But the electoral arithmetic is 
almost the same as in the previous parlia- 
ment. 

Mr. Sommer: So we are not, in your view, 
any nearer to a solution, or to greater stabil- 
ity. 

Secretary Kissinger: I think the dilemma 
remains exactly the same. Major reforms are 
necessary in Italy. If they are carried for- 
ward with the Communists, will it set a 
precedent for many other situations? On the 
other hand, can the non-Communist forces 
create sufficient cohesion to carry out the 
necessary reform programs? We, of course, 
hope that the democratic forces will form a 
government without Communist participa- 
tion and carry out the necessary reforms. 

Mr. Sommer: Looking hack at nearly eight 



years formulating and implementing Amer- 
ican foreign policy, tvhich tvere your greatest 
satisfactions and which your deepest frus- 
trations? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have to begin by 
saying that my present judgments are quite 
unreliable, because when you are in this office 
you react almost athletically. Events keep 
crowding in on you and you have to I'e- 
spond — 

Mr. Sommer: Athletically — 

Secretary Kissinger: — almost like an ath- 
lete, and I'm sure that once I'm out of office 
I will be more reflective. The danger is that 
if I am out of office a long time, I may be re- 
flecting on things that never happened. 

But I would think the greatest immediate 
dramas were the first time I met Chou En-lai, 
or the moment when Le Due Tho handed over 
the proposals which permitted the existing 
governmental structure in Saigon to survive, 
and therefore I knew that the settlement of 
the Viet-Nam war had at last become in- 
evitable. People forget now the enormous 
emotional investment we all had in ending 
the war in Viet-Nam. Other great sources of 
immediate satisfaction were the moments 
when the various Middle East agreements 
were achieved. 

What will probably give me satisfaction 
in the longer term are structural achieve- 
ments : the attempt to create a foreign policy 
based on permanent values and interests. In 
this category I would evaluate our relations 
with Western Europe and Japan, as well as 
our relations with Latin America, quite 
positively. 

Mr. Sommer: Isn't your China policy in 
tatters already with the death of Chou En- 
lai? 

Secretary Kissinger: Absolutely not. Ev- 
erything depends on what you understand 
by our China policy. I believe that without 
Watergate we probably could have made 
more rapid progress in the China policy. 
But on the other hand, it is remarkable how 
well the China policy has survived all the 
turmoil in both countries. And the basic rela- 



128 



Department of State Bulletin 



tionship between China and the United 
States, which is based on certain fundamen- 
tal common interests in the world situation, 
lias been — for all practical purposes — un- 
affected. Things like cultural exchange, 
trade, these are symptoms. They are not the 
underlying reahty. 

Mr. Sommer: Do you have pangs of con- 
science at night about Viet-Nam, or about 
Cambodia, or about other things? 

Secretary Kissinger: What is there to have 
pangs of conscience at night about with 
Viet-Nam? We found 550,000 American 
troops in Viet-Nam, and we ended the war 
without betraying those who in reliance on 
us had fought the Communists. And to re- 
move 550,000 troops under combat condi- 
tions is not an easy matter. 

Mr. Sommer: You don't think it took too 
much time? 

Secretary Kissinger: It was important that 
the war not be ended with the United 
States simply abandoning people whom we 
had encouraged to resist the Communists. 
No one could foresee that Watergate would 
so weaken the executive authority that we 
could not maintain a settlement that in it- 
self was maintainable. And if you look at 
what our opposition was saying during that 
time, their proposals were usually only about 
six months ahead of where we were going 
anyway. Some said we should end the war 
by the end of '71. Well, we ended it by the 
end of '72. After all, it took De Gaulle five 
years to end the Algerian war. And it was a 
very difficult process. 

Now, with respect to Cambodia. It is an- 
other curious bit of mythology. People usual- 
ly refer to the bombing of Cambodia as if it 
had been an unprovoked, secretive U.S. ac- 
tion. The fact is that we were bombing North 
Vietnamese troops that had invaded Cam- 
bodia for many years, that were in unpopu- 
lated areas of Cambodia, that were killing 
many Americans from these sanctuaries, and 
we were doing it with the acquiescence of the 
Cambodian Government, which never once 
protested against it and which, indeed, en- 
couraged us to do it. 



I may have a lack of imagination, but I 
fail to see the moral issue involved and why 
Cambodian neutrality should apply to only 
one country. Why is it moral for the North 
Vietnamese to have 50,000 to 100,000 troops 
in Cambodia, why should we let them kill 
Americans from that territory, and why, 
when the government concerned never once 
protested and indeed told us that if we 
bombed unpopulated areas they would not 
notice, why in all these conditions is there a 
moral issue? 

And finally, I think it is fair to say that in 
the six years of the war, not 10 percent of 
the people were killed in Cambodia as were 
killed in one year of Communist rule. 

Mr. Sommer: To change the tack, how do 
you account for the fact that so many of 
your policies which used to be widely ac- 
claimed are now rather unpopular? For in- 
stance, detente. Is that due to shifts in public 
mood, or is it due to problems inherent in 
these policies? Has detente been a one-way 
street? What is the position of the U.S.S.R. 
today, compared to what it ivas when you 
started? Has detente reached the end of the 
road? How is it going to continue? 

Secretary Kissinger: I would judge that a 
year from now, the policy that has been 
called detente will be seen to be reflecting 
the existing realities, and the only realistic 
and, for that matter, moral policy that the 
West can pursue. 

Memories are brief. Think back to the 
period of the fifties and sixties, when we had 
endless crises over Berlin and other issues, 
crises that led to the edge of confrontation. 

It seems to me axiomatic that when two 
countries possess the capacity to destroy 
civiHzed life, they cannot conduct their 
affairs on the basis of a constant test of 
strength with nuclear weapons. They have 
an obligation to attempt to avoid crises, if 
possible, to moderate crises if they occur, 
and to search for a constructive relationship. 

If they do not do this, it will demoralize 
their publics. They will create "peace move- 
ments," in every country, that accuse their 
governments of having failed in its principal 
obligation of protecting them against a nu- 



July 26, 1976 



129 



clear catastrophe. The very fact that there 
are no significant such movements in any 
Western country today is an important trib- 
ute to existing policy. 

Secondly, where, exactly, has detente 
been a one-way street? What concrete agree- 
ment was to the unilateral benefit of the 
Soviet Union? 

Mr. Sonimer: Your critics quote SALT. 

Secretary Kissinger: What was the alter- 
native to SALT? And indeed, what was the 
essence of SALT? In 1971 the United States 
was involved in the war in Viet-Nam; the 
United States had for five years not begun 
one single new strategic launcher program. 
The Soviet Union was building 120 sea-based 
and about 90 land-based missiles a year. The 
numerical balance was therefore shifting 
with every month against the United States. 
Given long leadtimes, the United States had 
no possibility for at least five years to re- 
dress it. I therefore fail to see why an agree- 
ment that stopped ongoing Soviet programs 
but no U.S. programs, could have been 
against the interests of the United States. A 
much more persuasive case can be made that 
it was unilaterally to the Soviet disadvan- 
tage. But what the Soviets obviously calcu- 
lated was that they were balancing our ca- 
pacity for long-term buildup, not what we 
were actually doing. 

Mr. Sommer: You said in your Dallas 
speech that detente is not paradise, that as 
far as you can see ahead we will be living in 
a twilight between tranquillity and con- 
frontation. 

Secretary Kissinger: That's right. That is 
inherent in the large nuclear arsenals, the 
conflicting ideologies, and in the reality that 
the Russia of its present extent and power, 
even with a different leadership, would still 
be a security problem for us. It is not, after 
all, an invention of the Communists that 
Russia has been a security problem for Eu- 
rope. It has existed at least since the Napo- 
leonic war, if not before then, but every 
statesman has an obligation to ease this con- 
dition or confrontation. And I have every 



confidence that whoever is President next 
year will, in this respect, pursue substantially 
the same policies. 

Mr. Sommer: For Germans, the Berlin 
problem is a litmus test of detente. Are you 
satisfied tvith the situation in and around 
Berlin? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have to separate 
two issues: the legal situation and how 
agreements are being carried out. I believe 
that the Four Power Agreement was a big 
step forward in regularizing the status of 
Berlin and in ending the cycles of crises that 
existed in the fifties and sixties. In the imple- 
mentation of that agreement I believe im- 
provements are possible and, conversely, that 
opportunities remain for what have up to 
now been minor harassments. 

On balance I prefer an existing explicit 
agreement to a potentially explosive situa- 
tion. The Western powers must insist on the 
scrupulous observance of the agreement. And 
they must defend with great tenacity the 
right of Berlin to live. That was true in the 
fifties, and it is true today. But we have a 
better legal basis to do it today, and on the 
whole I think the situation from the legal 
and political point of view is better than it 
was previously. 

Mr. Sommer: Notv our recurrent squabbles 
about the West German right to strengthen 
the ties between West Berlin and the Fed- 
eral Republic, to establish institutions or of- 
fices there. Did the Russians say that this 
was not ivhat they had bargained for and 
this is not the meaning of the Quadripartite 
Agreement? How do you feel about this, and 
how do you feel about the suggestion that 
has been made recently that perhaps there 
should be a second round of negotiations try- 
ing to refine the finer points? 

Secretary Kissinger: A new negotiation on 
Berlin may generate new demands by the 
other side. Our general policy has been to 
support the Government of the Federal Re- 
public. The management of the situation for 
them requires wisdom and restraint by all 
parties. 



130 



Department of State Bulletin 



Mr. Sommer: Restrained in putting 
more — 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to say 
restraint in putting institutions there, 
because obviously the viability of Berlin has 
to be demonstrated. Our general policy has 
been to support the Federal Republic. 

Mr. Sommer: You have never counseled 
taking it easy in that respect. 

Secretary Kissinger: Certainly not as a 
matter of principle. We may have on indi- 
vidual occasions expressed our views to the 
other two allies with special responsibilities 
for Berlin. 

Mr. Sommer: Let me ask you a two- 
pronged question. If President Ford wins 
and if he offers you the job again, ivould you 
take it? And the other part of the question — 
if not, tvhat are the tasks you leave to your 
successor? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I can't go be- 
yond what I've already said on this subject. 
In terms of tasks, I think it is fair to say 
that in foreign policy you can never define a 
terminal point after which problems end. I 
think that the problem of arms control, even 
if there should be a SALT agreement, will 
remain before us. I think that while consider- 
able progress toward peace in the Middle 
East has been made, the task will have to be 
completed. We have moved the African pol- 
icy in the right direction, but it would be 
arrogant to pretend that it could be finished 
in a three- to six-month period. So a succes- 
sor of mine will not lack excitement. 

Mr. Sommer: Will the rules of detente 
have to be extended to outlying areas? 

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. In fact I'm 
speaking about that tonight at the Institute 
for Strategic Studies. 

Mr. Sommer: What nefarious developments 
do you fear most? Do you foresee a North- 
South confrontation? 

Secretary Kissinger: What worries me 
most is a possible loss of will by the industrial 
democracies. I believe that the industrial 



democracies should mobilize their resources 
and coordinate their efforts to deal with the 
vast range of problems before them. They 
have the means to do so. The North-South 
problem can be moved increasingly in a posi- 
tive direction, because it will become increas- 
ingly clear that it is a long-term process 
requiring complex solutions and therefore 
particularly susceptible to the kind of solu- 
tions that the industrial democracies are 
particularly well able to produce. 

Mr. Sommer: Hoio do some of the tenets 
held by Dr. Kissinger at Harvard look in the 
light of your experience in Washington? 
You complained about statesmen being mired 
in the crises of the moment. You said there 
was a conflict betiveen short-term goals and 
long-range purposes. And you said the 20th 
century was not a time for statesmanship. 
Does your experience bear that out? 

Secretary Kissinger: If you conduct foreign 
policy, you cannot avoid dealing with de- 
tails, because if you do, you get over- 
whelmed by events. The problem is whether 
you have enough of a long-range conception 
so that the details do not become ends in 
themselves. I have tried — with what success 
historians will have to judge — to have an 
overriding concept. It can be found in innu- 
merable, maybe pedantic, speeches I have 
given over the years. I don't think it is for 
me to judge the success. It should be done 
by others. 

Mr. Sommer: You criticized Castlereagh 
for ignoring the domestic situation of his 
country and Metternich for overtaxing his. 
Now, didn't you sometimes simultaneously 
commit both mistakes? 

Secretary Kissinger: But you have to re- 
member the evolution of our domestic situa- 
tion. I went through a period of maybe exor- 
bitant praise and then through a period of 
maybe exorbitant criticism. But my public 
opinion polls have held remarkably steady at 
about 60 percent support even in the middle 
of an election year. So when you speak of 
public support, it hasn't been all that lack- 
ing, and much of the debate of foreign policy 



July 26, 1976 



131 



has resulted from domestic conditions that 
were substantially extraneous to foreign 
policy. 

Mr. Sommer: You once told Scotty Reston 
that as a historian you ivere inclined to look 
at the fate of mankind in deep pessimism. 
But as a statesman you ivere battling every 
day to justify a more optimistic viejv. Noio 
has the result of your oivn labors changed 
your pessimistic outlook? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have never said that 
I have a pessimistic outlook. I have said, 
what is after all empirically true, that most 
civilizations that we know anything about 
have eventually declined. All you have to do 
is travel around the world and look at the 
ruins of past cultures to confirm that fact. 

As a historian one has to be conscious of 
the possibility of tragedy. However, as a 
statesman, one has a duty to act as if one's 
country were immortal. I have acted on the 
assumption that our problems are soluble. 
The agenda we have set — in East-West rela- 
tions, in arms control, in development, in 
Africa, Latin America, Europe, and Japan, 
all on the same canvas and more or less at 
the same time — shows considerable optimism 
that our problems are soluble, that our coun- 
try can master its problems. If setting big 
tasks is a sign of confidence, then I would 
say we have conducted an optimistic policy. 
But I would be irresponsible to pretend that 
success is guaranteed. 

Mr. Som,mer: But you do not in your poli- 
cies, in your actual policies, indulge in 
Spenglerian visions of a decline of the West 
and a rise of the new barbarians. 

Secretary Kissinger: These quotations are 
invented by overambitious and unscrupulous 
political candidates. These are not my views. 

Mr. Sommer: How much freedom ivould a 
new Secretary of State or, for that matter, a 
new President have to conduct a new foreign 
policy, American foreign policy? 

Secretary Kissinger: It would be basically 
unfortunate for the United States to pretend 
that every four to eight years it has the op- 
portunity to begin a new foreign policy. 



Nothing could disquiet our friends more 
than the belief that every eight years, no 
matter what they do, the United States 
starts on an entirely new course. 

A great power lives in the real world. At 
some point its assessment of that world must 
reflect permanent realities. And therefore its 
margin for maneuver is limited. Of course, 
new people coming in can bring new ideas to 
familiar problems. They may be able to be 
more imaginative about achieving agreed 
ends. 

I'm not saying that a new Secretary is 
bound by the same tactics, only that one of 
the most important necessities for American 
policy is to give other countries a sense of 
stability. If we bring new people in from 
time to time, they must not rip up every tree 
to see whether the roots are still there. 

Whenever I leave office, I would certainly 
do my best to help my successor achieve this 
continuity. I do not believe that the basic ref- 
erences of foreign policy should be regularly 
challenged, unless there is an overwhelming 
moral issue involved. 



Letters of Credence 

Brazil 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Federative Republic of Brazil, Joao Baptista 
Pinheiro, presented his credentials to Presi- 
dent Ford on June 22.' 

Guatemala 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Guatemala, Federico Abundio 
Maldonado Gularte, presented his credentials 
to President Ford on June 22.' 

Malaysia 

The newly appointed Ambassador of Ma- 
laysia, Zain Azraai Bin Zainal Abidin, pre- 
sented his credentials to President Ford on 
June 22.' 



' For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the 
President's reply, see Department of State press 
release dated June 22. 



132 



Department of State Bulletin 



U.S. Gives Views on UNCTAD IV and Commodities Resolution 



The fourth ministerial meeting of the U.N. 
Conference on Trade and Development ivas 
held at Nairobi May 5-31. Folloiving are a 
joint statement by Secretary Kissinger and 
Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon 
issued at Washingtori on June 1, statements 
made at the final plenary session of the con- 
ference at Nairobi on May 31 by Paul Boeker, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for International 
I Finance and Development, and a U.S.-Group 
B (developed market-economy countries) 
statement, together with a summary of the 
resolution on commodities adopted by the 
conference, prepared by the Bureau of Eco- 
nomic and Business Affairs. 



JOINT STATEMENT BY SECRETARY KISSINGER 
AND TREASURY SECRETARY SIMON, JUNE 1 ' 

The United States went to UNCTAD IV at 
Nairobi in a serious and cooperative spirit. 
In preparation for the conference, we con- 
ducted a thorough review of U.S. interna- 
tional economic policies in which all agencies 
of the government participated. There was 
agreement on a series of proposals of special 
relevance to the developing countries, which 
we presented at UNCTAD. We were repre- 
sented by the most senior delegation in the 
history of UNCTAD meetings, and for the 
first time, the U.S. position was set forth in 
an opening statement by the Secretary of 
State.- In that statement, the United States 
put forward its proposals to deal with the 
problems of the developing world, including 
proposals directly related to commodities, 



'Issued at Washington (text from press release 
279). 

' For Secretary Kissinger's statement at Nairobi 
on May 6, see Bulletin of May 31, 1976, p. 657. 



and at the same time indicated that there 
were certain proposals that we could not ac- 
cept. Throughout the four-week meeting, 
the United States cooperated with other na- 
tions and important progress was made on 
a number of matters before the conference. 

In our review of international commodity 
policies in preparation for the UNCTAD 
meeting, and otherwise, we have tried to 
find ways of meeting the concerns of the de- 
veloping countries, within the framework of 
an efficient international market system. As 
we have made clear at the U.N. conference, 
we are prepared to participate in a case-by- 
case examination of arrangements to im- 
prove the functioning of the international 
commodity markets through a broad range 
of measures appropriate to specific commodi- 
ties, but we have opposed mechanisms to fix 
prices or limit production by intergovern- 
mental action. 

One of the most significant of the U.S. 
proposals addressed the problem of increas- 
ing investment in mineral development. For 
that reason, the United States, in an effort 
to meet the interests of the developing coun- 
tries and the world economy at large, pro- 
posed an International Resources Bank (IRB) 
to facilitate the continued flow of essential 
capital, management, and technology for the 
development of new resources in the LDC's 
[less developed countries]. 

As the conference progressed, a senior 
interagency group in Washington reviewed 
all proposals before the conference with a 
view to accepting as many as possible of the 
suggestions being made by the LDC's and 
other countries consistent with our basic 
principles. 

At the final plenary session an LDC reso- 
lution on commodities was adopted by con- 



July 26, 1976 



133 



sensus. The interagency group authorized 
reservations about parts of this resolution, 
which were read at the conference. Never- 
theless, we joined the consensus because we 
wanted to contribute to the spirit of har- 
mony in the closing sessions of the confer- 
ence and because the resolution contained a 
number of elements of our own comprehen- 
sive approach which had been agreed within 
the government and advanced by Secretary 
Kissinger in his address to the conference 
three weeks earlier. As our reservations in- 
dicate, we did not believe that all aspects 
of the LDC proposals were practical and 
feasible. However, we committed ourselves 
to the search for concrete, practical solutions 
to commodity problems that will be in the 
interests of both producers and consumers. 

It is all the more regrettable, therefore, 
that the resolution proposing further study 
of the International Resources Bank was de- 
feated by two votes, with 31 votes in favor. 
Ninety countries at the last minute ab- 
stained or absented themselves. 

A substantial number of the 33 votes 
against were the Socialist countries, whose 
contribution to the development of the 
poorer countries of the world is negligible. 

Forty-four countries cooperated in this 
effort by abstaining on the International Re- 
sources Bank, and 46 absented themselves — 
almost all of which were the developing coun- 
tries. This does not augur well for the future 
of the dialogue of the worldwide develop- 
ment effort. The United States, whose role 
is so vital, does not expect, when it makes 
major efforts to coopei'ate, that its pi'oposals 
will be subject to accidental majorities. 

If the dialogue between the developing 
and developed countries, to which we attach 
great importance, is to succeed, suggestions 
put foi-ward by the developed nations, such 
as the IRB at UNCTAD, must be treated on 
the merits and with serious consideration. 
The LDC's must not lend themselves to 
parliamentary manipulation by those states 
who contribute nothing to the development 
of the poor nations of the world. 

We will be addressing the problems of re- 



source development financing again in later 
meetings, including the preparatory confer- 
ences contemplated by the commodities reso- 
lution of UNCTAD IV. We will advance the 
IRB proposal again, and we expect that it 
will be considered with the same respect and 
care which the United States will lend to 
the study of the proposals which the LDC's 
will table. 

The United States went to Nairobi with a 
wide range of other proposals aimed at deal- 
ing constructively and pragmatically with 
the urgent problems of the developing world. 
We are gratified that the conference em- 
braced a number of these suggestions, dealing 
with resource and technology transfer and 
trade expansion. We will continue to elabo- 
rate these proposals — as well as the proposal 
for the Resources Bank — in appropriate 
fora, because they are right for the pro- 
found problems we are addressing. 



STATEMENTS BY MR. BOEKER, NAIROBI, MAY 31 

Statement of Reservations, Explanations, 
and Interpretations ^ 

Now that the plenary session of the 
Fourth UNCTAD Conference has completed 
action on the resolutions before it, the U.S. 
delegation would like to express some views 
on certain aspects of those resolutions. My 
delegation has been pleased to join the con- 
sensus on a number of important resolutions 
which we are confident will conti'ibute to 
international economic cooperation and de- 
velopment. The United States, knowing the 
hopes attached to UNCTAD IV by the de- 
veloping countries, has expended significant 
effort to make constructive contributions 
toward the success of this conference. 

The Nairobi Conference marks another 
significant step forward in the era of con- 
structive negotiation launched at the seventh 
special session of the General Assembly. We 

' The statement includes U.S. reservations on the 
commodities resolution and explanations and inter- 
pretations of other resolutions. 



134 



Department of State Bulletin 



have taken major steps by consensus in such 
essential fields as commodities, trade, trans- 
fer of technology, debt, special measures to 
assist the poorest and least developed of the 
developing countries, and in strengthening 
UNCTAD itself. 

The spokesmen for Group B have made 
certain statements on behalf of the group as 
a whole. The United States was associated 
with those statements. 

In addition, Mr. President, I wish to make 
several supplementary observations on par- 
ticular resolutions. These observations are 
made in a constructive spirit. We believe it 
important there be no uncertainty as to the 
views of any country as we increasingly 
broaden areas of agreement. 

Commodities 

The consensus resolution on commodities 
[TD/RES/93(IV)] is a central element of 
this conference. We are all aware of the 
massive effort, by all parties, which has led 
to this text. We can be satisfied that on a 
matter where such disparate views exist, the 
common desire to reach agreement has pro- 
duced consensus. We particularly welcome 
the practical elements of the program of 
work on commodities which it has been for 
some time our policy to support. 

With regard to section IV of this resolu- 
tion, our understanding of the request to the 
Secretary General to convene preparatory 
meetings is that the purpose of such meet- 
ings is to determine the nature of the prob- 
lems affecting particular commodities and to 
determine, without commitment, the meas- 
ures which might be appropriate to each 
product. Such meetings will indicate the 
cases where we can enter into negotiation of 
agreements or other arrangements which 
could encompass a broad range of measures 
to improve trade in commodities. 

It is our further understanding that the 
Secretary General in convening preparatory 
meetings will utilize existing commodity 
bodies. Where there are no such bodies, ad 
hoc groups will be convened. We interpret 
this section to mean that preparatory meet- 



ings will be convened on individual products 
and that the preparatory meetings are con- 
sultations prior to a decision whether to 
enter negotiations. 

A decision on a financial relationship 
among buffer stocks will need to be con- 
sidered in the light of developments on in- 
dividual funds. However, since there may be 
advantages in linking the financial resources 
of individual buffer stocks, we will partici- 
pate, without any commitment, in prepara- 
tory meetings to examine whether further 
arrangements for financing of buffer stocks, 
including common funding, are desirable. 
After the outcome of these preparatory dis- 
cussions we will decide on our participation 
in any negotiating conference. 

We have accepted this resolution on the 
understanding that its various positions, in- 
cluding those on commodity arrangements 
and compensatory financing, do not alter our 
reservations on the concept of indexation. 

We are not indicating in this or other reso- 
lutions of this conference, as far as the 
United States is concerned, any change in 
our known views on the new international 
economic order and the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States. 

We would emphasize the difficulties we see 
related to the concept that production of syn- 
thetics and substitutes should be harmonized 
with supplies of natural resources. 

We regret that this resolution, which is 
supposed to deal with commodity problems 
in an overall sense, does not address the 
problem of supporting development of re- 
sources in developing countries. Failure to 
adopt the proposed resolution regarding the 
International Resources Bank represents a 
similar lack of attention to this task. 

We accept this resolution on commodities 
with these reservations and explanations. 

Multilatei-al Trade Negotiations (MTN) 

Regarding resolution L.113 [TD/RES/ 
91 (IV)] on the multilateral trade negotia- 
tions, we do not view the MTN as the appro- 
priate forum for the consideration of the 
nature or operation of the generalized sys- 



July 26, 1976 



135 



terns of preferences, despite the importance 
we attach to these systems as a means to 
increase trade opportunities for developing 
countries. 

Economic Cooperation Among Developing 
Countries 

With regard to the resolution on economic 
cooperation among developing countries (L. 
117) [TD/RES/92/(IV)], particularly para- 
graph (b)(iii), my delegation will support 
decisions taken by developing countries in 
the understanding that such decisions are 
consistent with international obligations and 
standards. 

Institutional Arrangements 

With respect to the resolution on institu- 
tional arrangements contained in TD/L.118 
[TD/ RES/90 (IV)], we are pleased to be 
able to join in the consensus. 

The United States believes that this reso- 
lution affords an opportunity to transform 
UNCTAD into a more effective organization 
which will serve the interests of all member 
states within its important mandate. We 
urge that the Secretary General of UNCTAD 
undertake early consultations pursuant to 
paragraph 5 of section B with the Secretary 
General of the United Nations so that the 
results can be thoroughly considered before 
the October meeting of the Trade and De- 
velopment Board. 

We also believe that it would be useful 
for the United States to reiterate its position 
on certain issues raised in L.118 and in cer- 
tain other resolutions of the conference. The 
United States, while not supporting the Dec- 
laration and Program of Action for the Es- 
tablishment of a New International Eco- 
nomic Order and the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States, has recognized 
that majority decisions of the General As- 
sembly place obligations on the subsidiary 
bodies of the General Assembly to respond. 

While the United States firmly maintains 
its reservations on these two matters, we will 



continue to work cooperatively to carry out 
those portions with which we agree in 
UNCTAD and elsewhere. 

We have adopted the same attitude to- 
ward the Lima Declaration and Plan of 
Action. 

Debt 

The United States supports the resolution 
[TD/RES/94(IV)] passed on the impor- 
tant question of debt. The policy of the 
United States remains that of engaging in 
debt-rescheduling negotiations in the credi- 
tor club framework only where there is some 
presumption of imminent default. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, the United States 
wishes to make clear, with regard to all of 
the resolutions passed at UNCTAD IV, that 
it will honor the undertakings it has accepted 
during this conference to the full measure 
permitted by relevant laws, policies, and in- 
ternational obhgations. 

Explanation of U.S. Abstention on Resolution 
on Transnational Corporations * 

We would like to explain why we cannot 
support this resolution. Developing countries, 
which consider that transnational corpora- 
tions as well as other private investment 
can be a positive contribution for their de- 
velopment process or plans, should endeavor 
to promote an appropriate investment cli- 
mate. We recognize that the transnational 
corporations should conduct their operations 
in accordance with local laws and in har- 
mony with local policy, but we would also 
like to underline the importance of local laws 
being stable and consistent with inter- 
national laws. 

In regulating the activities of trans- 
national corporations, governments should 
be guided by an understanding of the legiti- 
mate methods of an entity that is often 



'The resolution ( TD/ RES/97 ( IV ) ) was adopted 
on May 31 by a vote of 84-0, with 16 abstentions. 



136 



Department of State Bulletin 



privately owned; otherwise the positive con- 
tributions from such activities to develop- 
ment could be diminished. 

Cooperation among governments can im- 
prove the foreign investment climate, en- 
courage the positive contribution which 
transnational corporations can make to eco- 
nomic and social progress and minimize and 
resolve any difficulties which may arise from 
their various operations. 

For this reason we welcome the decision 
by ECOSOC [U.N. Economic and Social 
Council] to establish a Commission and a 
Center on Transnational Corporations for 
"comprehensive and in-depth consideration 
of issues relating to Transnational Corpora- 
tions." We hope UNCTAD will be available 
to help in this work, particularly through its 
work in fields of restrictive business prac- 
tices and transfer of technology. 

Explanation on Resolution on Manufactures 
and Semimanufactures 

Regarding the resolution on expansion and 
diversification of exports of manufactures 
and semimanufactures of developing coun- 
tries (L.115) [TD/RES/96(IV)], we sub- 
port that provision of the resolution which 
states that the generalized system of pref- 
erences (GSP) should continue beyond the 
initial period of 10 years originally envis- 
aged. Since the legislation authorizing our 
scheme expires in 1985, our GSP will con- 
tinue four years beyond the period envisaged 
in the original GATT [General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade] waiver. As we ap- 
proach the expiration of our legislation, we 
will make a decision as to its prolongation, 
taking into account the evolving needs of 
beneficiary countries. 

The United States views on redeployment 
of industries (section E), as expressed in 
the seventh special session of the U.N. Gen- 
eral Assembly, are unchanged. While we 
favor policies which will facilitate the nor- 
mal evolution of industrial production in re- 
sponse to market forces, our government 



cannot intervene directly in this process. 

With regard to restrictive business prac- 
tices and their international regulation and 
control, we welcome the decision to continue 
work in this area. We believe that in this 
area we should focus principally on situa- 
tions where there is an adverse effect on 
international trade. Other criteria would be 
insufficient, in our view. We also believe that 
multilaterally agreed principles and rules 
should be voluntary. With regard to notifica- 
tion and exchange of information on restric- 
tive business practices, it is our understand- 
ing that these procedures should be recipro- 
cal and at the intergovernmental level. 

Mr. Chairman, we are pleased that it was 
possible to adopt this resolution by consen- 
sus. I should like to state for the record, 
however, that if there had been a vote we 
would have abstained on paragraph (d) of 
section I., A. We do not accept the possible 
implication that some countries are using 
the GSP for coercive purposes. 



U.S.-GROUP B STATEMENTS ON RESOLUTIONS 
ON TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY 

International Code of Conduct on Transfer 
of Technology 

Mr. Chairman : We are pleased to note that 
notwithstanding initial divergent positions 
on questions relating to a code of conduct 
for the transfer of technology, the confer- 
ence has reached a consensus on a resolution 
which enables concrete work on this matter 
to go forward. We are ready and willing to 
engage in negotiations, in accordance with 
the resolution contained in TD/L.128 [TD/ 
RES/89/ (IV)], toward the end of establish- 
ing a code of conduct which sets reasonable 
standards for both governments and enter- 
prises. 

We remain convinced that the establish- 
ment of a voluntary code of conduct would 
best serve the transfer of technology and 
that such a code of conduct should be uni- 



July 26, 1976 



137 



versally applicable — covering all interna- 
tional transfer of technology— and be di- 
rected to source and recipient enterprises 
and their governments. The conference 
agreed not to prejudge the legal character 
of the code, and the resolution contained in 
TD/L.128 is also compatible with the con- 
cept that the code may be entirely volun- 
tary in character and may be adopted as a 
U.N. resolution. 

It is with these understandings in mind 
that we look forward to participating in the 
work of the intergovernmental group that 
has been established by this conference. We 
believe that a code can be produced which 
will make a major and positive contribution 
to the international transfer of technology, 
as well as to strengthening the technological 
capacity of all states, especially developing 
countries. 

We hope that negotiations to come will 
permit further progress and facilitate full 
agreement on this most important matter. 

Strengthening the Technological Capacity of 

Developing Countries 

The members of Group B lend their full 
support to the resolution on strengthenmg 
the technological capacity of developmg 
countries (TD/L.lll and TD/L.lll/Corr. 
1) [TD/RES/87(IV)], which we believe 
contains positive and meaningful measures 
aimed at improving the technological infra- 
structure and capability of developing coun- 

tri6s. 

Mr. Chairman, the members of Group B 
wish to make clear their interpretation of 
paragraph 5(b) (i) of this resolution. We 
support appropriate exchange of information 
on technological alternatives between devel- 
oping countries. It is recognized that much 
of the technological information available to 
governments is developed by enterprises. 
Therefore, we affirm that "appropriate" ex- 
change of "available" information must be 
consistent with contractual agreements and, 
where relevant, respect confidentiality of 
technological information. 



SUMMARY OF RESOLUTION ON COMMODITIES 

In the resolution on commodities, the conference 
took two significant actions: 

1. It established a timetable for preparatory meet- 
ings and a negotiating conference on the possible 
establishment of a common fund to finance buffer 
stocks and other measures; and 

2. It established a timetable for preparatory 
meetings and, as and when required, negotiating 
conferences on a series of commodities. 

Regarding the first of these actions, the confer- 
ence agreed that a negotiating conference should be 
convened by the Secretary General of UNCTAD no 
later than March 1977. This negotiating conference 
will be open to all members of UNCTAD; there is 
no advance commitment by the United States (or 
other UNCTAD members) to attend this conference. 
Before the conference is held, two series of actions 
are specified in the commodities resolution: 

1. By September 30, 1976, member countries are 
invited to transmit to the Secretary General of 
UNCTAD any proposals they may wish to make on 
the objectives and operations of the fund; and 

2. The Secretary General is to convene preparatory 
meetings on the fund proposals to discuss: 

(a) elaboration of objectives; 

(b) financing needs; 

(c) sources of financing; 

(d) mode of operations; and 

(e) decisionmaking and management. 

The commodities resolution noted that differences 
of view persist regarding the objectives and modali- 
ties of a common fund. 

The UNCTAD Secretary General was also re- 
quested by the conference in its commodities reso- 
lution to convene a series of preparatory meetings 
on 18 commodities specified in the resolution in the 
period beginning September 1, 1976, and ending no 
later than February 1976. The commodities included 
in the resolution are: bananas, bauxite, cocoa, coffee, 
copper, cotton and cotton yarns, hard fibers and 
products, iron ore, jute and products, manganese, 
meat, phosphates, rubber, sugar, tea, tropical tim- 
ber, tin, and vegetable oils, including olive oil, and 
oilseeds. Although the resolution refers to the meet- 
ings as "preparatory meetings for international 
negotiations," the resolution also makes clear that 
actual negotiating conferences to be completed by 
the end of 1976 will be called only "as and when 
required." These commodity meetings are to take 
place "in consultation with international organiza- 
tions concerned." 



138 



Department of State Bulletin 



Congress and Foreign Policy 



Statement by Robert J. McCloskey 

Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations 



Dean Acheson, who, among his other con- 
siderable achievements, served for a time as 
what is now called Assistant Secretary for 
Congressional Relations, often remarked 
that what he looked for in the liaison be- 
tween the Congress and the executive was 
a "fair wind." What he meant, of course, is 
that combination of forces in nature without 
which the ship of state has no bearing. On 
infrequent occasions, I have experienced that 
invigorating, heady feeling that comes with 
"fair wind." I'm not certain that I can sum- 
mon quickly to mind the issues that re- 
freshed the air, but I recall the exhilaration. 

Perhaps it needn't be said, Mr. Chairman 
[Representative Lee H. Hamilton] ; however, 
I am certain we would both agree that our 
national interest would prosper if there were 
more clear weather to guide our relationship. 
I see that horizon clearing. 

The genius of the American political sys- 
tem grows out of the simplicity with which 
it is defined in our Constitution. The writers 
of this extraordinary document demon- 
strated uncommon wisdom in determining 
that power should not be concentrated in any 
one of our three branches of government. 
That was well and good. However, historical 
evolution has complicated this design by 



'- Made before the Special Subcommittee on In- 
vestigations of the House Committee on Interna- 
tional Relations on June 22. The complete transcript 
of the hearings will be published by the committee 
and will be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20402. 



introducing new responsibilities and com- 
plexities into the affairs of our respective 
institutions, particularly into the creation 
and conduct of foreign policy. 

As the United States became more in- 
volved in the world the simplicity which de- 
fined the roles of the Congress and the 
executive opened the way not only to ambi- 
guity and dispute but to an entire new world 
of scholarship. This is not a premise from 
which to argue for a more definitive organic 
law any more than it is a defense of the 
axiom that "the President proposes, the Con- 
gress disposes." More to the point, it is an 
acknowledgment of the judgment of scholars 
like Professor Edward S. Corwin, who argue 
that the Constitution presents the two 
branches with "an invitation to struggle for 
the privilege of directing American foreign 
policy." There may be other words to de- 
scribe the issue, but this characterization 
draws it close enough, in my view, for this 
discussion. 

Even without the traumatizing American 
experience in Indochina, the dilemma which 
concerns us was earlier taking shape. What 
Viet-Nam did was to inject fever into the 
struggle and bring it to a confrontation. And 
now our present efforts are directed at mov- 
ing us in the direction of greater reason. If 
we can agree that willingness to compromise 
must be at the heart of any successful policy, 
we will at least be looking in the same direc- 
tion. As vital as compromise is to the politi- 
cal process, so is it to the conduct of affairs 
by governments. All this is more reason, 



July 26, 1976 



139 



then, why we should work to effect it be- 
tween branches of the same government. 

Improper assumptions of power have now- 
been acknowledged by the executive as they 
related to foreign affairs and to domestic is- 
sues as well. I do not need to catalogue the 
transgressions of various Administrations. 
If all haven't been officially acknowledged, 
they are well known and will serve to remind 
that tampering with the truth risks nothing 
less than the life of an Administration. Con- 
gress has demonstrated its outrage and vowed 
it will not tolerate abuses of a similar nature 
again. 

Mr. Chairman, we in the executive branch 
understand that. We are acting scrupulously 
to eliminate the causes of mistrust. We are 
dedicating ourselves to the elimination of 
any cause for mistrust. And I believe we 
have begun to make some repairs in our rela- 
tionship. 

I take some encouragement that our two 
branches are working more cooperatively 
now across a range of issues: new policy 
initiatives for Africa; enhanced U.S. rela- 
tionships in the Iberian Peninsula; submis- 
sion of military base agreements for formal 
congressional approval; participation by 
Members and staff in important international 
conferences. 

Insuring the Congressional Role 

Mr. Chairman, your letter of invitation 
addressed several questions which go to the 
heart of the relationship between our two 
branches in this period in our history. I 
would like to discuss each in turn as we see 
them from the Department of State. 

The role of Congress in foreign policy and 
how it may be insured: If, as I believe, the 
attitude in the executive toward Congress 
was one of neglect or worse, that is no longer 
the case. Indeed, I could prove it hasn't been 
for some time. 

I am here to reaffirm the belief of the De- 
partment of State that the role of the Con- 
gress is quintessential to the formulation of 
foreign policy. Foreign policy must respond 
to the interests, and receive the support, of 

140 



a great majority of our people. In a repre- 
sentative democracy the Congress must be 
involved both in speaking for the people it 
represents and in helping to create within its 
constituencies the consensus necessary for 
the support of foreign policies, once decided 
upon. 

In the ideal sense, it should be possible to 
construct what I tend to think of as an archi- 
tectural partnership between the Congress 
and the executive, one that is designed to 
stimulate the creation of foreign policy. This, 
it seems to me, would maximize the benefits 
to the country. The administration of these 
policies in turn would be conducted by the 
agencies of the Presidency, with primary 
stewardship at the State Department. As its 
part of the coordinating process. Congress 
would from time to time call for a review of 
the policies it helped to create as a means of 
insuring that they are consistent with the 
interests of the electorate. 

The fixed vehicles for insuring the con- 
gressional role already exist in the tradi- 
tional committees — International Relations, 
Foreign Relations, Appropriations, Armed 
Services. Another important, less formal, in- 
stitution would be a close cooperative rela- 
tionship between congressional leadership 
and the Presidency. Even though the text- 
book relationship is an adversary one, Con- 
gress should be able to rely on the word of 
the executive branch, which promises to in- 
sure a proper legislative involvement in the 
policy process. The Presidency will be more 
encouraged in this direction if it can assume 
that congressional leadership can speak with 
confidence on behalf of significant numbers 
of Members. 

Strengths and Weaknesses 

Strengths and weaknesses of Congress in 
foreign policy: Thinking about commenting 
on this reminded me of the man who, after 
his conviction, was told by the king: "I in- 
tend to sentence you to death, but not for 
two years, and I will reconsider if by then 
you have taught my horse to talk." Later, to 
his puzzled friends, the man explained his 
acquiescence : "In these two years I may die 

Department of State Bulletin 



a natural death. Or the king may die. Or the 
liorse may talk." 

"Weakness" is not the first word that 
comes to mind these days when I think about 
the Congress and foreign policy. I am well 
aware that the Congress imposed its consid- 
erable strength — a show of force — as a re- 
sult of executive action with which it 
disagreed. The question is whether it is in 
the national interest to strike with the ax or 
seek remedy with the scalpel. 

Profound questions arise when legislative 
actions are taken like the anti-OPEC [Or- 
ganization of Petroleum Exporting Coun- 
tries] amendment last year, which harmed 
our relations with Latin America but carried 
little or no real penalty for the countries 
which sponsored the oil boycott; or the 
amendment to the trade bill which provoked 
Soviet rejection of our trade agreement and 
rejection of their World War II lend-lease 
debt, coupled with a decrease in the flow of 
emigres; or the military assistance embargo 
against Turkey, which did not stimulate dip- 
lomatic progress on Cyprus. 

The obvious strengths of the Congress re- 
side in its unilateral power to legislate for or 
against policy. Ideally, its actions should re- 
flect the majority will in the country. It is 
an important trust which the Congress en- 
joys. Its other strengths are less tangible 
and representative of the whole than of in- 
dividuals or subcommittee-size groups. This 
has to do with the level of knowledge among 
Members and staff of particular foreign pol- 
icy issues. My colleagues and I at the State 
Department have been used to dealing with 
individual Members and staff officers who are 
impressively well informed and who possess 
highly qualified opinions on given subjects. 
So, in its "strengths," Congress is formi- 
dable. 

Having said this, we find it increasingly 
difl!icult to identify a foreign policy objective 
or position shared by large majorities in Con- 
gress. More often than not we find ourselves 
under roughly equivalent pressures on both 
sides of most issues. When this occurs, we 
frequently encounter inactivity or paralysis, 
which places us in the unenviable position of 



having to attempt to broker differences be- 
tween Members or committees. 

The multiple interests and responsibilities 
of most Members have led to what may 
fairly be regarded as "weakness" in Con- 
gress. Members keep tyrannical schedules 
and oftentimes are not available for that 
briefing or background talk which could 
throw an issue into perspective and permit a 
more considered vote when the buzzer 
sounds. Too often, I fear, votes on interna- 
tional questions are squandered because 
there wasn't enough time to examine the 
problem. 

Improving the Consultative Process 

Improvement of the consultative process 
and how procedures and mechanisms can be 
improved: Ideally, I envisage a joint commit- 
tee of the Congress which assigns itself re- 
sponsibility for leading the Congress on for- 
eign policy issues across the board. This joint 
group would represent all those committees 
which now play a role in international affairs 
— Appropriations, Armed Services, Foreign 
Relations, and the others who, because of 
the increased complexity of our agenda, have 
an acknowledged interest. It would enable 
the Congress, by pooling its resources, to 
create the capacity to treat foreign policy in 
its entirety. I can see many advantages 
growing out of such an arrangement, the 
most important of which could be a genuine 
partnership at senior levels between the Con- 
gress and the executive. I know some Mem- 
bers of both Houses who would support such 
an establishment. 

On our side, I can see being spared the 
often conflicting demands of the large num- 
ber of committees and subcommittees before 
whom we are driven to present repetitive tes- 
timony because lines of jurisdiction between 
and among the many committees are in some 
cases indistinguishable. One advantage to the 
Congi-ess might be the time saved for Mem- 
bers. Another could be the pooling of some 
of the superb staflf officers who now work for 
individual Members or the many committees. 
Equally important, such a prestigious com- 



July 26, 1976 



141 



mittee would greatly influence legislative 
initiatives that depart from the main lines of 
policy in which the Congress and the Admin- 
istration would find adequate basis for agree- 
ment. 

In your letter you also ask how congres- 
sional input in crisis management can be in- 
sured. If the executive were permitted to 
deal continually with such a congressionally 
mandated joint committee, I believe that in- 
evitably the relationship would guarantee 
such an end. 

Having said that, I believe it unrealistic 
to expect any form of consultation — as we 
in the executive branch and you in the Con- 
gress see it from our differing perspectives 
— to ever satisfy everyone, especially in 
crisis situations. Nothing short of full par- 
ticipation in the minute-to-minute planning 
for and reacting to a fast-breaking situation 
would merit description as consultation by 
some. Perhaps we should recognize at the 
very outset that any arrangement will be 
an imperfect one in need of continuing im- 
provement. But we should begin by agreeing 
on a mechanism. 

Despite what I regard as a quantum im- 
provement recently in the general consulta- 
tive process, it could be better. While it will 
require sustained performance on our part, 
at the same time we look for response from 
the Congress. I have to say that sometimes 
it is not there. We would like the privilege 
of coming to the Hill with issues we're inter- 
ested in as well as being summoned because 
of a special interest up here. 

I readily admit that too often Administra- 
tions have abused the word "consultation" 
when describing what in fact has been noti- 
fication to Congress with regard to an action 
or a decision already taken. But like the 
mule that was slammed on the head, we're 
now alert — you have our attention. We can 
and will continue to do better. What we ask 
for is improved organization at your end. 

In the absence of the kind of joint com- 
mittee to which I referred above, we will 
need at least a better match-up of our avail- 
able resources. The executive conducts for- 



eign policy through several agencies, with 
the State Department theoretically preemi- 
nent among them. Regardless of which 
agency motivates a proposal for Presidential 
decision, the policy must be implemented in 
terms of the area or country involved. With 
respect to Europe, as an example, the office 
of the Assistant Secretary of State for Euro- 
pean Afi'airs is the principal protagonist at 
the Washington end. Likewise, in functional 
terms in the Department, the office of the 
Assistant Secretary for Economic and Busi- 
ness Affairs is central to the development of 
international trade policy, U.S. economic pol- 
icy in international institutions, and other 
related policies. 

Until a few years ago, your committee 
had a subcommittee system which paralleled 
our own divisions. The subcommittee which 
you headed, Mr. Chairman, corresponded 
organizationally with our Bureau of Near 
Eastern and South Asian Affairs. Today, 
the subcommittee structure presents us with 
bureaucratic difficulties in matching up our 
resources. As a result it is more, not less, 
difficult to keep Members and staff of the 
subcommittees tied to a close and continuing 
relationship with our bureaus and thereby 
insure maximum cooperation. As matters 
now stand, our people are repeating testi- 
mony before different subcommittees with 
overlapping areas of jurisdiction. 

Developing Broad Consensus on Goals 

What is needed to develop the broadest 
possible consensus on foreign policy goals: 
Many observers of the legislative-executive 
relationship yearn for the kind of harmony 
that would exist if the participants were 
singing from the same sheet of music, like 
a choir of angels. Such a scene is perhaps as 
unrealistic as it is unworldly. 

Shrewd and skeptical judges of human na- 
ture that they were, our forefathers allowed 
for constitutional disharmony and rivalry, 
which is to say they wittingly established an 
adversary relationship. This, we presume, 
was intended to promote liberty and good 



142 



Department of State Bulletin 



government, and at the same time prevent 
tyranny. While this is understandable, we 
must avoid provoking situations in which 
the branches become enemies and spokes- 
men publicly attack one another's motiva- 
tions. It deserves better than for one or 
the other party to cry, "Your end of the 
boat is sinking." There is then the risk that 
the people will tend to believe the charges, 
which could lead to a breakdown of public 
faith in the system. 

Polls today are replete with evidence of 
the discouraging opinion the American pub- 
lic has of government — Congress as well as 
the executive. We owe it to ourselves and to 
all Americans to construct — I hesitate to 
use the word — a consensus on foreign policy 
issues. This cannot be beyond our reach. 

I do not look for "bipartisan foreign pol- 
icy" as a euphemism for congressional sur- 
render of its role in the formulation of for- 
eign policy. To the contrary, you were elected 
to represent the will of the people and to 
exercise your judgment on their behalf. 
When there is a conflict between the articu- 
lated view of the constituents, guidance of 
party leadership, and your own best judg- 
ment, you face hard choices. I am encour- 
aged at the choices you and most of your 
colleagues frequently make. Seldom are these 
choices reached on a strictly partisan basis. 
Certainly the International Relations Com- 
mittee does not line up on a party basis on 
votes of interest to us. 

But we are still a long way from the kind 
of consensus we became comfortable with in 
the 1950's and early 1960's. Detente, arms 
transfers, human rights, the Middle East, 
and the complex issues of trade, aid, and 
commodities in our relationship with the less 
developed countries will continue to generate 
major policy debates within and between the 
two branches. There is more that is worthy 
of us. 

As this debate continues, what we should 
hope is that it be conducted with an im- 
proved spirit of trust that both sides are 
participating with honesty and the best 
interests of the whole country at heart. 



U.S. Vetoes Unbalanced Resolution 
on Palestinian Rights 

Folloiving is a statement made in the U.N. 
Security Council by U.S. Representative Al- 
bert W. Sherer, Jr., on June 29, together with 
the text of a draft resolution tvhich tvas 
vetoed by the United States that day. 

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SHERER 

USUN press lekase 71 dated June 29 

I take this opportunity to thank once again 
all those in this Council who have so gener- 
ously expressed their sympathy to the 
United States on the death of the American 
Ambassador to Lebanon, his Economic Coun- 
selor, and their driver. This terrible act 
brings to reality, as often our words do not, 
the seriousness, the explosiveness, the trag- 
edy, of the whole situation in the Middle 
East. 

The subject that is before us today, the 
report of the Committee on the Exercise of 
the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian 
People, is an eff'ort to come to grips with one 
aspect — a very central aspect — of the Middle 
East conflict. 

My government does not doubt that the 
effort has been well intentioned and that 
members of the committee have worked hard 
and seriously to develop recommendations 
that will pi'omote a Middle East settlement. 
But I must say in all candor, as my delega- 
tion has said before, that the basic approach 
that has been followed strikes us as mis- 
guided. 

The Middle East conflict is probably the 
most complex dispute in the international 
scene. Is it realistic to assume such a prob- 
lem can be resolved by committees, no mat- 
ter how well meaning? Or is it not the duty 
of the United Nations to encourage the par- 
ties to resume negotiations on the serious 
issues that confront them? 

Peace will come about through a negoti- 
ated comprehensive settlement taking into 
account all the issues involved in the Arab- 



July 26, 1976 



143 



Israeli dispute. The framework for this set- 
tlement exists in Security Council Resolu- 
tions 242 and 338. In the numerous meetings 
of this Council since the beginning of the 
year touching various aspects of the Middle 
East situation, the United States has made 
clear its position on the principles that must 
underlie a Middle East settlement, on the 
Palestinian question as a whole, and on the 
situation in the territories occupied by Israel. 

Our position is also clear on the report 
that has occasioned our meeting. We voted 
against General Assembly Resolution 3376 
of November 10, 1975, which created the 
Committee of 20, just as we voted against 
General Assembly Resolution 3236, which it 
seeks to implement. 

Our reason is not lack of concern for the 
Palestinian people. We have consistently 
made clear our concerns on this score and 
our conviction that there must be a solution 
to the Palestinian issue if there is to be a 
lasting settlement. We are convinced that 
resolutions and committee reports are not 
the most effective way of dealing with the 
question of the political future of the Pales- 
tinians. The United States will do its utmost 
to bring about the early resumption of seri- 
ous negotiations looking toward a settlement 
of all the issues, and we believe that it is 
through such negotiations that we must seek 
a solution to the issue of the Palestinians. 

Mr. President, I should like to explain my 
government's position on the draft resolution 
that is before the Council. There are, in our 
view, two fundamental flaws to this reso- 
lution. 

First, the text is totally devoid of balance, 
stressing the rights and interests of one 
party to the Middle East dispute and ignor- 
ing the rights and interests of other parties. 

Second, the draft "affirms the inalienable 
rights of the Palestinian people to self-de- 
termination, including the right of return 
and the right to national independence and 
sovereignty in Palestine . . ." The political 
interests of the Palestinians and their role 
in a flnal Middle East settlement constitute, 
in my government's view, a matter that must 



be negotiated between the parties before it 
can be defined in resolutions of this Council. 

For these reasons, Mr. President, my dele- 
gation intends to vote "No" on the resolution 
before us. 

In closing I would like to second the ap- 
peal made by my British colleague for spe- 
cial contributions to UNRWA [U.N. Relief 
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in 
the Near East], to enable it to continue its 
humanitarian work touching the daily lives 
of Palestinians in need. We are heartened by 
the news of the generous contribution of 
Saudi Arabia and the intentions of the Gov- 
ernments of Japan and the United Kingdom. 
President Ford has submitted a request to 
Congress for substantial additional money to 
add to the U.S. contribution to UNRWA for 
1976. We believe this is an appropriate way 
to deal with immediate Palestinian needs as 
we resolve to make a better future for the 
Palestinian people and the Middle East as a 
whole. 



TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION ' 

The Security Council, 

Having considered the item entitled "The ques- 
tion of the exercise by the Palestinian people of its 
inalienable rights", in accordance with the request 
contained in paragraph 8 of General Assembly reso- 
lution 3376 (XXX) of 10 November 1975, 

Having heard the representatives of the parties 
concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organi- 
zation, representative of the Palestinian people, 

Having considered the report of the Committee 
on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the 
Palestinian People (document S/12090), transmitted 
to the Security Council in accordance with the pro- 
visions of paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolu- 
tion 3376 (XXX), 

Deeply concerned that no just solution to the prob- 
lem of Palestine has been achieved, and that this 
problem therefore continues to aggravate the Arab- 
Israeli conflict, of which it is the core, and to en- 
danger international peace and security. 



^ U.N. doc. S/12119; the draft resolution was not 
adopted owing to the negative vote of a permanent 
member of the Council, the vote being 10 in favor, 
1 against (U.S.), with 4 abstentions (France, Italy, 
Sweden, U.K.). 



144 



Department of State Bulletin 



Recognizing that a just and lasting peace in the 
Middle East cannot be established without the 
achievement, inter alia, of a just solution of the 
problem of Palestine on the basis of the recognition 
of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, 

1. Takes note of the report of the Committee on 
the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Pales- 
tinian People (document S/12090); 

2. Affirms the inalienable rights of the Palestinian 
people to self-determination, including the right of 
return and the right to national independence and 
sovereignty in Palestine, in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations. 



U.S.-lndonesia Consultations 
Held at Washington 

Following is a joint U.S.-lndonesia press 
statement issued at Washington and Jakarta 
on June 29. 

Foredgn Minister Adam Malik of Indo- 
nesia met today with Secretary of State 
Henry A. Kissinger at the conclusion of 
three days of meetings between officials of 
the two governments in Washington. This 
was the first of a series of periodic consulta- 
tions agreed upon by President Suharto and 
President Ford during the latter's visit to 
Indonesia in December 1975. The two Presi- 
dents saw the consultations as a way of ex- 
panding the dialogue between the two gov- 
ernments and of strengthening the close and 
friendly ties between them. 

Following a lunch given by Secretary 
Kissinger for Foreign Minister Malik, the 
two met with their advisers for a wide- 
ranging review of relations between the two 
countries and of the major international 
issues of interest to them. Secretary Kis- 
singer stressed the importance attached by 
the United States to its relations with Indo- 
nesia. Particular emphasis was given to an 
exchange of views on developments in South- 
east Asia. Foreign Minister Malik described 
the ASEAN [Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations] countries' plans for regional 
development projects and the need for exter- 
nal assistance for such projects. 



The two Ministers discussed the various 
aspects of economic relations between the 
United States and Indonesia, including trade 
and investment matters. Indonesia's develop- 
ment requirements were discussed, and the 
United States described its recent proposals 
for greater cooperation with the developing 
nations of the world. 

The Ministers agreed that the next round 
of consultations would be held in Jakarta at 
a mutually convenient time. 

During the preceding two days, officials of 
the Departments of State, Defense, Treas- 
ury, Agriculture, Commerce and other agen- 
cies met with their Indonesian counterparts 
for reviews of the specific policies and pro- 
grams of the two governments. 



U.S.-U.K. Income Tax Convention 
Transmitted to the Senate 

Message From President Ford ' 

To the Senate of the United States: 

I transmit herewith for Senate advice and 
consent to ratification the Convention for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Pre- 
vention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to 
Taxes on Income signed at London on De- 
cember 31, 1975, together with an exchange 
of notes modifying certain provisions of the 
Convention signed at London on April 13, 
1976. 

I also transmit for the information of the 
Senate the report of the Department of State 
with respect to the Convention and the ex- 
change of notes. 

This Convention and exchange of notes 
are designed to modernize the relationship 
with respect to taxes on income which has 
evolved between the United States and the 



'Transmitted on June 24 (text from White House 
press release); also printed as S. Ex. K, 94th Cong., 
2d sess., which includes the texts of the convention 
and exchange of notes and the report of the Depart- 
ment of State. 



July 26, 1976 



145 



United Kingdom from a similar Convention 
signed at Washington on April 16, 1945. 

The Convention with subsequent exchange 
of notes is similar to other recent United 
States income tax treaties, although it does 
have some new features which are described 
in the enclosed report of the Department of 
State. 

Such tax conventions help promote eco- 
nomic cooperation with other countries. I 
urge the Senate to act favorably on this Con- 
vention and exchange of notes at an early 
date and to give its advice and consent to 
ratification. 

Gerald R. Ford. 

The White House, June 2k, 1976 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 



94th Congress, 2d Session 

International Security Assistance and Arms Export 
Control Act of 1976. Hearings before the House 
Committee on International Relations. March 23- 
April 5, 1976. 253 pp. 

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1976. Com- 
munication from the President of the United States 
transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to 
amend title 18, U.S. Code, to authorize applications 
for a court order approving the use of electronic 
surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence informa- 
tion. H. Doc. 94-422. March 24, 1976. 6 pp. 

International Security Assistance. Hearings before 
the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on fiscal 
year 1977 international security assistance pro- 
grams. March 26-April 8, 1976. 148 pp. 

East-West Foreign Trade Board Fourth Quarterly 
Report. Communication from the Chairman of the 
Board transmitting the Board's fourth quarterly 
report on trade between the United States and 
nonmarket economy countries, pursuant to section 
411(c) of the Trade Act of 1974. H. Doc. 94-430. 
March 30, 1976. 109 pp. 

Making Appropriations for Foreign Assistance and 
Related Programs for Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 
1976, and Period Ending September 30, 1976, and 
for Other Purposes. Report of the committee of 
conference to accompany H.R. 12203. H. Rept. 
94-1006. April 2, 1976. 14 pp. 

Guatemala Relief and Rehabilitation Act of 1976. Re- 
port of the committee of conference to accompany 
S. 3056. H. Rept. 94-1009. April 6, 1976. 5 pp. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



U.S. Files Notice of Intent 
To Withdraw From ICNAF 

Press release 322 dated June 22 

The United States on June 22 filed notice 
of its intent to withdraw from the Interna- 
tional Convention for the Northwest Atlan- 
tic Fisheries (ICNAF). 

Ambassador Rozanne L. Ridgway, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and 
Fisheries Affairs, had announced on June 8 
in a Montreal speech to delegates of the 18 
member nations of the International Com- 
mission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 
that the United States would file the notice 
of intent to withdraw. 

Unless the notice of intent to withdraw is 
revoked prior to December 31, 1976, U.S. 
withdrawal will be effective on that date 
under the terms of the convention. 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 



Aviation 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon- 
treal September 23, 1971. Entered into force Janu- 
ary 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. 
Ratification deposited: Gabon, June 29, 1976. 

Coffee 

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. 
Done at London December 3, 1975.^ 
Signatures: Denmark, Dominican Republic, June 
30, 1976. 

Maritime Matters 

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, 
as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285. 
6490). Adopted at London October 17, 1974." 
Acceptance deposited: Nigeria, June 30, 1976. 



' Not in force. 



146 



Department of State Bulletin 



Narcotic Drugs 

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic 
drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972. 
Ratification deposited: Tunisia, June 29, 1976. 

Nuclear Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. 

Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 

1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS 6839. 

Notification of succession deposited: Surinam. 

June 30, 1976, effective November 25, 1975. 

Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of all 
forms of racial discrimination. Done at New York 
December 21, 1965. Entered into force January 4, 
1969.'' 
Accesssion deposited: Ethiopia, June 23, 1976. 

Satellite Communications System 

Agreement relating to the International Telecom- 
munications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), 
with annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 
1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 
7532. 
Accession deposited: Mali, July 6, 1976. 

Operating agreement relating to the International 
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (IN- 
TELSAT), with annex. Done at Washington 
August 20, 1971. Entered into force February 12, 

1973. TIAS 7532. 

Signature : Telecommunications Internationales 
du Mali (T.I.M.) of Mali, July 6, 1976. 

Telecommunications 

Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 
1959, as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590, 
7435), to establish a frequency allotment plan for 
high-frequency radiotelephone coast stations, with 
annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva June 8, 

1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976. 
Notification of approval: Kenya, April 23, 1976. 
Ratification deposited: United States, April 21, 

1976." 
Entered into force for the United States: April 

21, 1976. 
Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annex, and 
final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. 
Ratification deposited: United States, April 21, 

1976.* 
Entered into force for the United States: April 

21, 1976. 
Telephone regulations with appendices and final 
protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered 
into force September 21, 1974. 
Ratification deposited: United States, April 21, 

1976.'' 
Entered into force for the United States: April 

21, 1976. 



' Not in force for the United States. 
' With reservation. 
* With declarations. 



Tin 

Fifth international tin agreement, with annexes. 
Done at Geneva June 21, 1975. 
Ratifications deposited: United Kingdom, June 28, 

1976; Canada, Denmark, June 30, 1976. 
Entered into force provisionally : July 1, 1976. 

Wheat 

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat 
trade convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 8227). Done at 
Washington March 17, 1976. Entered into force 
June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions, 
and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions. 
Accession deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, July 

8, 1976. 
Approval deposited: Norway, July 7, 1976. 



BILATERAL 

Australia 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat imports 
from Australia during calendar year 1976. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Washington June 25 and 
28, 1976. Entered into force June 28, 1976. 

Brazil 

Agreement relating to reciprocal acceptance of air- 
worthiness certifications. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Brasilia June 16, 1976. Entered into force 
June 16, 1976. 

Egypt 

Loan agreement to assist Egypt to increase its in- 
dustrial and agricultural production. Signed at 
Cairo May 22, 1976. Entered into force May 22, 
1976. 

Federal Republic of Germany 

Agreement relating to mutual cooperation regarding 
restrictive business practices. Signed at Bonn 
June 23, 1976. Enters into force one month from 
the date of an exchange of notes wherein the 
parties inform each other that all the domestic 
legal requirements for entry into force have been 
fulfilled. 

International Telecommunications Union 

Special arrangement permitting third-party ex- 
changes between International Telecommunications 
Union and amateur stations under U.S. jurisdic- 
tion. Effected by exchange of letters at Geneva 
and Washington April 28 and June 7, 1976. 
Entered into force June 7, 1976. 

Japan 

Agreement providing for Japan's financial contribu- 
tion for U.S. administrative and related expenses 
for Japanese fiscal year 1976 pursuant to the mu- 
tual defense assistance agreement of March 8, 
1954 (TIAS 2957). Effected by exchange of notes 
at Tokyo June 18, 1976. Entered into force June 
18, 1976. 



July 26, 1976 



147 



Jordan 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of October 14, 1975 
(TIAS 8197). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Amman June 23, 1976. Entered into force June 
23, 1976. 

Mexico 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat im- 
ports from Mexico during calendar year 1976. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico and 
Tlatelolco April 26 and June 11, 1976. Entered into 
force June 11, 1976. 

Poland 

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and 
the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes on income, with related notes. Signed at 
Washington October 8, 1974. 
Ratifications exchanged: June 22, 1976. 
Entered into force: July 23, 1976. 

Saudi Arabia 

Project agreement for technical cooperation in man- 
power training and development, with annexes. 
Signed at Riyadh June 12, 1976. Entered into 
force June 12, 1976. 

Tanzania 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. 
Signed at Dar es Salaam June 15, 1976. Entered 
into force June 15, 1976. 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

Protocol to the treaty of May 26, 1972 (TIAS 7503), 
on the limitation of antiballistic missile systems. 
Signed at Moscow July 3, 1974. Entered into force 
May 24, 1976. 
Proclaimed by the President: July 6, 1976. 



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Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pakistan. 
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Social Security. Agreement with Singapore. TIAS 
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Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Bangla- 
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Trade in Textiles — Consultations on Market Disrup- 
tion. Agreement with Malta. TIAS 8192. 4 pp. 35«f 
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148 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX July 26, 1976 Vol. LXXV, No. 1935 



Africa. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for 
Die Zeit of Hamburg 124 

Brazil. Letters of Credence (Pinheiro) . . . 132 

Cambodia. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed 
for Die Zeit of Hamburg 124 

Chile. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for Die 
Zeit of Hamburg 124 

China. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for 
Die Zeit of Hamburg 124 

Commodities. U.S. Gives Views on UNCTAD 
IV and Commodities Resolution (Kissinger, 
Simon, Boeker, U.S.-Group B statements, 
summary of commodities resolution) . . . 133 

Congress 

Congress and Foreign Policy (McCloskey) . . 139 
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

Policy 146 

U.S.-U.K. Income Tax Convention Transmitted 

to the Senate (message from President Ford) 145 

Economic Affairs 

Leaders of Major Industrial Democracies Meet 
in Puerto Rico (Ford, Kissinger, Simon, 
conference declaration) 116 

U.S. Gives Views on UNCTAD IV and Com- 
modities Resolution (Kissinger, Simon, 
Boeker, U.S.-Group B statements, summary 
of commodities resolution) 133 

The Western Alliance: Peace and Moral Pur- 
pose (Kissinger) 105 

Europe 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for Die Zeit 
of Hamburg 124 

The Western Alliance: Peace and Moral Pur- 
pose (Kissinger) 105 

Germany. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for 
Die Zeit of Hamburg 124 

Greece. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for 
Die Zeit of Hamburg 124 

Guatemala. Letters of Credence (Maldonado 
Gularte) 132 

Indonesia. U.S. -Indonesia Consultations Held 
at Washington (joint press statement) . . 145 

Italy. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for Die 
Zeit of Hamburg 124 

Malaysia. Letters of Credence (Zain Azraai) . 132 

Middle East. U.S. Vetoes Unbalanced Resolu- 
tion on Palestinian Rights (Sherer, text of 
draft U.N. Security Council resolution) . . 143 

Presidential Documents 

Leaders of Major Industrial Democracies Meet 
in Puerto Rico 116 

U.S.-U.K. Income Tax Convention Transmitted 
to the Senate 145 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications .... 148 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 146 

U.S. Files Notice of Intent To Withdraw 

From ICNAF 146 

U.S.-U.K. Income Tax Convention Transmitted 

to the Senate (message from President Ford) 145 



U.S.S.R. 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for Die Zeit 
of Hamburg 124 

The Western Alliance: Peace and Moral Pur- 
pose (Kissinger) 105 

United Nations 

U.S. Gives Views on UNCTAD IV and Com- 
modities Resolution (Kissinger, Simon, 
Boeker, U.S.-Group B statements, summary 
of commodities resolution) 133 

U.S. Vetoes Unbalanced Resolution on Pales- 
tinian Rights (Sherer, text of draft U.N. 
Security Council resolution) 143 

Viet-Nam. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed 
for Die Zeit of Hamburg 124 

'Name Index 

Boeker, Paul 133 

Ford, President 116, 145 

Kissinger, Secretary 105, 116, 124, 133 

Maldonado Gularte, Federico Abundio .... 132 

McCloskey, Robert J 139 

Pinheiro, Joao Baptista 132 

Sherer, Albert W., Jr 143 

Simon, William E 116, 133 

Zain Azraai, Bin Zainal Abidin 132 



Checklist of Department of State 


Press 


Releases: July 5-11 


Press releases may be obtained from the 


Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 


Washington 


D.C. 20520. 


No. 


Date 


BnbjMt 


t339 


7/6 


Kissinger: Chicago Council on 
Foreign Relations and Mid- 
America Committee. 


*g39A 


7/6 


Remarks introducing Secretary 
Kissinger, Chicago. 


t339B 


V/6 


Questions and answers following 
address, Chicago. 


t340 


7/6 


Availability of advisory commit- 
tee reports on closed sessions 
of 1975. 


*341 


7/7 


Viron P. Vaky sworn in as Am- 
bassador to Venezuela (bio- 
graphic data). 


*342 


7/8 


Shipping Coordinating Committee 
Subcommittee on Safety of Life 
at Sea, working group on ship 
design and equipment, Aug. 3-5. 


*343 


7/9 


Program for the official visit of 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of 
the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many. 


t344 


7/9 


Kissinger: toast at luncheon for 
Prince Abdallah of Saudi 
Arabia, July 8. 


t345 


7/10 


Kissinger: news conference, 
ited. 


* Not prii 


t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



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o- 





THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXXV 



No. 1936 



August 2, 1976 



THE FUTURE OF AMERICA'S FOREIGN POLICY 
Address by Secretary Kissinger H9 

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF JULY 10 16^ 

THE UNITED STATES AND THE MIDDLE EAST 
Address by Assistant Secretary Atherton 17 A 

U.S. GIVES VIEWS IN SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE 

ON ISRAELI RESCUE OF HIJACKING VICTIMS AT ENTEBBE AIRPORT 

Statements by Ambassador Scranton and Ambassador Bennett 

and Texts of Draft Resolutions 181 

,,,.^ .cadent of Documents 

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 

For index see inside back cover 



For >ate by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing OfBce 

Washington, B.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

62 issues plus semiannual indexes, 

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Single copy 85 cents 

The Secretary of State has determined that 
the publication of this periodical is necessary 
in the transaction of the public business re- 
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funds for printing this periodical has been 
approved by the Director of the Office of Man- 
agement and Budget through Januai*y 31. 1981. 
Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed In 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLET I 



Vol. LXXV, No. 1936 
August 2, 1976 

The Department of State BVLLETIR 
a weekly publication issued by th 
Office of Media Services, Bureau 
Public Affairs, provides the public ai 
interested agencies of the governmen 
with information on developments 
the field of V.S. foreign relations an 
on the work of the Department an 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes select 
press releases on foreign policy, issm 
by the White House and the Depm 
ment, and statements, addresst 
and news conferences of the Preside! 
and the Secretary of State and othl 
officers of the Department, as well ^ 
special articles on various phases ( 
international affairs and the functioi 
of the Department. Information 
included concerning treaties and inta 
national agreements to which it 
United States is or may become 
party and on treaties of general inte, 
national interest. 
Publications of the Department 
State, United Nations documents, an 
legislative material in the field 
international relations are also Uste 



The Future of America's Foreign Policy 



Address by Secretary Kissinger 



Two days ago this nation joyfully and con- 
fidently celebrated its 200th birthday. And 
in a little less than four months our people 
will go to the polls to elect a President and 
begin charting our course through our third 
century. 

No two events more vividly symbolize our 
contemporary challenge, its hope and its 
promise. For 200 years we struggled to build 
a nation from a wilderness, a sanctuary for 
the oppressed, and a home for all those who 
love liberty and believe in man's right to 
govern himself. And during those 200 years, 
despite occasional setbacks and mistakes, we 
have succeeded in vindicating the dreams of 
the great men who came together in Philadel- 
phia to proclaim a new nation. At home, we 
have created a society more free, just, and 
prosperous than any other on earth. And 
abroad, no nation has done more to defend 
peace, promote prosperity, feed the hungry, 
heal the sick, spread knowledge, welcome 
refugees from tyranny, and champion the 
rights of man. 

The past gives perspective to our en- 
deavors, pride in where we are, and hope for 
what we may become. But the future, as 
always, depends on choices which now are 
ours to make. 

Much will be said in the months between 
now and November about the state of our 
nation. Some of it will make sense; some will 
not. Some of it will reflect reality; some of 



' Made at Chicago, 111., on July 6 before a luncheon 
meeting sponsored by the Chicago Council on For- 
eign Relations and the Mid-America Committee 
(text from press release 339). 



it will not — but rather the desire to create a 
temporary mood or to capitalize on it. 

Let us recall that four years ago we were 
told by some that we had become a nation 
of potential war criminals, that our military 
establishment had passed the bounds of rea- 
son and was out of control, that our foreign 
policy aggressively invited conflict, and that 
we were neglecting the needs of our people. 
That was not true then. It is not true now. 

Today we are told that we have let our 
military position slip to the point that we are 
second rate, that we are being pushed 
around, and that our government is resigned 
to seeking the best available terms. That 
also is not true, and the American people 
know it. They know we remain far and away 
the strongest nation in the world. They know 
that America's dedication to peace and prog- 
ress is essential to the world's security and 
well-being. They learned painfully long ago 
that military conflict abroad threatens 
American lives ; more recently they have 
seen how global economic conflict can 
threaten American jobs and well-being. 

With our defense shield the core of the 
security of free countries, with our economy 
representing a third of the gross national 
product of the entire free world, our actions 
and the confidence of those nations who de- 
pend on us are crucial for the prospects of 
all free peoples. We must avoid a compla- 
cency that is unworthy of our challenges. 
But equally we must resist a rhetoric of im- 
potence which disquiets friends and em- 
boldens adversaries. 

The people of Chicago hardly need a lec- 



August 2, 1976 



149 



ture about the vigor and strength of their 
country. Chicago has been called "the pulse 
of America," "the city of the big shoulders." 
Chicago is a symbol of America's phenomenal 
productivity, energy, and economic power. 
No other city so embodies the sense of Amer- 
ica's fiber. Here is where the skyscraper was 
born; here is where the atomic age began. 
This city is a promontory from which to 
view the world of tomorrow, a world in which 
America must live and which it therefore 
must help to shape. Chicago's excitement is 
a testimony to might and mass and beauty 
and to the raw pursuit of excellence. 

It is clear that before us lies a period of 
potentially unparalleled creativity. This is 
an age of complex and dangerous forces. But 
the United States, and the great industrial 
democracies which share our values and our 
ideals, have the opportunity to give a new 
meaning to the vision of human dignity 
which for centuries has brightened the 
prospects of Western man. 

Thirty years ago, with the Truman doc- 
trine, the Marshall plan, the formation of 
our alliances and new international economic 
institutions, America burst forth on the world 
scene in a great outburst of creative states- 
manship. Because it had conquered the de- 
pression, the generation which shaped our 
postwar policy had faith in the power of 
governmental programs to promote economic 
advance and social progress. Because it had 
won a war whose moral imperatives were 
clear cut, it acted on the assumption that we 
would always face straightforward moral 
choices. That generation was inspired by the 
hope that at some point its exertions could 
end, as our allies became self-sustaining and 
our adversaries mellowed. 

Today, reality is more complex. We have 
learned that economic development cannot 
be achieved overnight or through govern- 
mental projects alone. The nuclear age im- 
poses upon us the inevitability of coexist- 
ence. We now live in a world of greater 
diversity, a world of many centers of power 
and ideology. America, for the first time in 
our history, faces the reality of permanent 
involvement in international affairs. 

The challenges of peace, prosperity, and 



justice are unending; there are no easy and 
no final answers. Good intentions alone do 
not constitute a foreign policy. We must 
learn to conduct foreign policy as other na- 
tions throughout history have had to con- 
duct it — with persistence, subtlety, flexibility, 
nuance, and perseverance; with the knowl- 
edge that what can be achieved at any one 
point will always fall short of the ideal but 
that without ideals the search for the merely 
practical becomes stultifying. We can no 
longer afford to oscillate between isolation in 
preservation of our purity and intervention- 
ism in pursuit of objectives whose attain- 
ment would permit us to withdraw from the 
world. Foreign policy must be conducted not 
as a response to domestic passions, or to 
international crises, but as a long-term en- 
terprise — engaging our best efforts for as 
far ahead as we can see — of building a better 
and safer world. 

Our national objectives and ideals, if they 
are well conceived, cannot change every four 
years or with every new Administration. To 
pretend that they do, or even that they can, 
would make American policy itself a major 
factor of instability in the world. 

Whether we call it "structure" or "archi- 
tecture," whether the process which produces 
policy is solitary or done by committee, the 
nation will have to continue to engage itself 
in managing the transition from the postwar 
international order based primarily on de- 
fense against aggression to a new inter- 
national system which adds to security the 
needs of economic cooperation and political 
consensus on a global scale. 

And we must do so under radically altered 
psychological conditions at home. The gen- 
ei-ation that undertook the great initiatives 
of the postwar period was inspired by the 
recollection of a conflict whose morality was 
unquestioned and whose outcome was conclu- 
sive. The generation that will have to sus- 
tain contemporary foreign policy recalls only 
wars that appeared morally ambiguous and 
whose outcomes were profoundly frustrat- 
ing. Ours is a period much less confident of 
the ability of governments to manage the 
great issues of the era. 

And yet too much depends on us to per- 



150 



Department of State Bulletin 



mit our commitment to falter. We have 
physical strength in abundance. We must 
marshal the vision to put it into the service 
of our ideals. 

The time has come to build a new foreign 
policy consensus similar in scope but differ- 
ent in content from that which sustained our 
previous achievements. Democrats and Re- 
publicans, Congress and the executive, gov- 
ernment and citizen, must once again con- 
duct the foreign policy debate in the spirit of 
partnership — recognizing that we are not at 
war with each other, but engaged in a vital 
national enterprise affecting our future and 
the world at large. Our electoral process can 
do much to strengthen our role in the world 
— both by healing the wounds of the last 
decade and by forging the elements of a new 
nonpartisan consensus in foreign policy. This 
election, whatever its outcome, should be re- 
membered as the time when the American 
people rediscovered their unity in the for- 
mulation and execution of foreign policy. 

Despite the domestic turmoil of recent 
years, much has already been achieved. 

For the first time in a decade and a half, 
we are at peace. Our relations with the in- 
dustrial democracies are the closest they 
have been in 20 years, and our collaboration 
is steadily expanding into new fields. Here 
in the Western Hemisphere, we are forging 
a new association based on equality and mu- 
tual respect. We have inaugurated a hopeful 
new policy in Africa. Important progress to- 
ward peace in the Middle East has been 
made, and the elements for major new ad- 
vances exist. In Asia, our relations with 
Japan have never been better. We have 
opened a new relationship with the People's 
Republic of China that will expand in keep- 
ing with the Shanghai communique. And 
with respect to the Soviet Union we have 
combined vigilance with conciliation, a de- 
termination to resist expansion with a readi- 
ness to build relations on a more stable and 
lasting basis than a balance of terror. 

But great tasks remain: to strengthen 
further the solidarity with our major allies, 
to explore new prospects for reducing ten- 
sions with our adversaries, and to shape the 
new dialogue between the industrial and de- 



veloping nations into a constructive long- 
term relationship of common benefit. 
Let me turn now to these issues. 

The Collaboration of the Democracies 

The collaboration of the industrial democ- 
racies of Western Europe, North America, 
and Japan has been the central core of 
America's foreign relations throughout the 
postwar period. It remains the principal 
focus of our foreign policy today. And it has 
been constantly strengthened in recent years. 

The intensity, regularity, and scope of the 
permanent dialogue among the industrial 
democracies can scarcely be exaggerated. 
President Ford since he has been in office 
has conferred with the leaders of our NATO 
and Japanese allies at four summit meetings 
and over 60 individual meetings, abroad or 
in Washington. I have met with Foreign 
Ministers or heads of government of the in- 
dustrial democracies over 200 times since I 
have been Secretary of State — ^including over 
100 times with leaders of the major nations 
represented at the Puerto Rico summit. This 
solidarity is a record unmatched by any 
other group of independent nations. For 
many years there have been no major dis- 
putes between America and our allies ; today 
there are no significant differences in ap- 
proach or policy. The relations among the 
industrial democi-acies have not been as 
close in many decades — and are far closer 
than they were 10 years ago. 

Of course, frequency of consultation is 
not enough. We must never cease to keep our 
alliances relevant to current conditions. Our 
alliances were formed a generation ago to 
stave off common dangers — the threat of 
Communist aggression and the fear of eco- 
nomic collapse. These goals have been sub- 
stantially achieved. 

Our economies are the most prosperous on 
earth ; we comprise 65 percent of the world 
gross national product and 70 percent of its 
trade. Our technology, managerial skill, and 
productive dynamism have proven to be in- 
dispensable to all nations that seek to de- 
velop their economies and improve the lot of 
their citizens. The developing countries and 



August 2, 1976 



151 



the Socialist countries — despite their habit- 
ual denunciation of the free market system 
— now recognize that they must turn to the 
industrial democracies for trade and assist- 
ance in improving their own economies. 

We confront the agenda before us with 
confidence, aware that our cohesion which 
has brought us this far remains crucial to 
all that we do: 

— We must maintain our common security 
in changed circumstances. For most of the 
postwar period we relied on strategic forces 
for both deterrence and defense. Today, the 
numbers and destructive power of nuclear 
weapons tend to produce a strategic stale- 
mate. Challenges below the strategic nuclear 
level become more dangerous; forces for re- 
gional defense — land, sea, and air — therefore 
grow more important. Our alliance forces 
must reflect these new realities and be 
strengthened in crucial categories. 

— We must continue to coordinate our 
economic strategies to encourage economic 
growth while controlling inflation. In a period 
of growing economic interdependence, we 
cannot aff'ord to have national economic 
policies working at cross-pui'poses. 

— We must develop joint approaches to 
relations with the developing nations. Al- 
most all development in the world today 
gains its impetus from the industrial democ- 
racies. There is no reason for defensiveness. 
If we compete among ourselves for the favor 
of the developing nations, we dissipate our 
own resources and tempt the developing na- 
tions in unproductive and unrealistic direc- 
tions. If the industrial nations cooperate 
among ourselves, we have the best chance 
to bring about cooperative relations between 
developed and developing. Only this can end 
tactics of confrontation and contribute to 
new global arrangements in which all nations 
participate and benefit. 

— Finally, the industrial democracies 
must coordinate our policies with respect to 
East-West trade. The volume of that trade 
has been growing at a rapid rate — more in 
the other industrial democracies than in the 
United States. We must better understand 
the implications of interchange between 



market and centrally controlled economies; 
we must avoid its political exploitation; we 
must study the implications of the mount- 
ing debts of the nonmarket economies; we 
must shape the trade in a direction bene- 
ficial to the overall purposes of the industrial 
democracies. 

This is the meaning of the President's 
meeting 10 days ago with the leaders of 
Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, 
Italy, and Japan at the Puerto Rico economic 
summit. There, as at Rambouillet last No- 
vember, the allied leaders discussed such 
basic issues as how to consolidate our eco- 
nomic recovery and head off" a resurgence of 
inflation. They exchanged views on East- 
West economic relations and the status of 
the dialogue with the developing nations. 
The meeting reflected and promoted the 
growing cooperation of the industrial democ- 
racies. It symbolizes their political will to 
shape their future together. 

All the tasks that I have enumerated here 
grow out of the strength of the industrial 
democracies. And all these tasks are in- 
escapable. We have every reason to face the 
future with confidence. A world that yearns 
for peace and freedom, for economic advance, 
for fundamental human justice, today looks 
to our nations for understanding and for 
leadership. If the democracies remain strong 
and united, we can usher in an era of un- 
precedented peace and progress. 

The Agenda of War and Peace 

Throughout its existence, the Atlantic 
alliance has based its quest for peace on two 
complementary policies. P'irst, we must main- 
tain our defenses, resist military challenges, 
and prevent the Soviet Union from trans- 
forming its military strength into political 
expansion. Second, we must seek to resolve 
conflicts and disputes through negotiation, 
foster habits of restraint in international 
conduct, and expand the area of constructive 
relations. 

However we label such an approach, its 
objectives are imposed by the unprecedented 
conditions of the nuclear age. No statesman 



152 



Department of State Bulletin 



will lightly risk the lives of tens of millions. 
Every President, after entering office and 
seeing the facts, has come to President 
Eisenhower's insight that there is no alter- 
native to peace. 

We have no illusions about the Soviet 
ideological and geopolitical challenge, but 
neither should there be illusions about what 
is needed to deal with it. 

The strength of the West — military, eco- 
nomic, and moral — must be used to shape 
international relationships in accordance 
with our vision of a better world and with a 
full sense of responsibility toward the awful 
cataclysm of nuclear war. We must avoid 
both a sentimentality that would substitute 
good will for strength and mock toughness 
that would substitute posturing for a clear 
perception of our interests. We will maintain 
the balance of power, but we will also recog- 
nize that peace, to be lasting, must rest 
upon more than a balance of terror con- 
stantly contested. Specifically: 

— We will continue to seek a fair and 
reliable agreement on strategic arms limita- 
tion, because this is in our interest and the 
interest of world peace. The President will 
not hesitate to sign an agreement that pro- 
tects our national interests and those of our 
allies. But he will never agree simply for the 
sake of agreement or run risks with our 
national security. 

— We will continue, together with our 
allies, to seek negotiated solutions to East- 
West political problems in order to diminish 
the risks of confrontation. 

— We will continue to develop cooperative 
ties on the basis of reciprocity to foster re- 
sponsible international behavior and a mu- 
tual interest in better political relations. 

It goes without saying that a reduction of 
tensions requires an equivalence of obliga- 
tions and commitments: 

— Agreements reached must be balanced 
and reliable; they must be complied with 
strictly both as to their letter and their 
spirit. 

— There must be consistent patterns of 
behavior in different parts of the world. We 



will not permit the relaxation of tensions to 
be practiced selectively. We cannot accept 
insistence on restraint on strategic arms or 
in Central Europe while tensions are exacer- 
bated in other parts of the world in the name 
of "national liberation" or "proletarian inter- 
nationalism." 

— There must be tolerable definitions of 
ideological rivalry. We do not fear ideological 
competition; indeed, we assume it. We have 
every reason for confidence in the power of 
the idea of freedom. But we cannot agree that 
ideology alone is involved when Soviet mili- 
tary power is exerted in remote areas or 
when ideology is invoked so that regional or 
local instabilities can be exploited. 

— The relaxation of tensions must not be- 
come a subterfuge to play allies off against 
each other. Allied cohesion insures that i-e- 
laxation of tensions is broadly based ; divi- 
sion and competition among us would only 
dissipate our advantages and open up oppor- 
tunities for adversaries. 

In Europe, the relaxation of tensions must 
apply to the Eastern as well as Western half 
of the continent. There should be no room 
for misconceptions about American policy: 

— We are determined to deal with Eastern 
Europe on the basis of the sovereignty and 
independence of each of its countries. We 
recognize no spheres of influence and no pre- 
tentions to hegemony. 

— For this reason, we will continue to de- 
velop our bilateral ties in economic and other 
fields with the nations of Eastern Europe 
and encourage similar efforts on the part of 
our Western European allies. 

— We will continually seek improvements 
in the basic conditions of human life in 
Eastern Europe, in terms of emigration, uni- 
fication of families, freer flow of informa- 
tion, and increased travel and economic 
interchange. 

Improving relations between East and 
West is a long-teiTn process. We pursue it on 
the basis of our purposes and our ideals. We 
will never slacken the quest for peace. 

We can only benefit from the challenge of 
peaceful competition. Nowhere have the in- 



August 2, 1976 



153 



dustrial democracies suffered setbacks be- 
cause of lack of strength. Without exception, 
the problems have been internal; they are 
therefore within our power to remedy. 

We must not so bemuse ourselves with 
rhetoric that we forget that in every cate- 
gory of relevant power, the democracies have 
the means to preserve and foster their objec- 
tives. We need only to stay together and 
stay the course. 

In the military field, we have the strength 
to defend our interests. In the economic 
area, our performance has been overwhelm- 
ingly superior. In the ideological competi- 
tion, it is not our nations, but the East, that 
has shown fear of the power of freedom. 
The winds of change are blowing from the 
West. If we act with wisdom and unity, the 
free nations have it in our power to leave 
our children a safer and more hopeful world 
than the one we found. 

The Emerging Structure of a Global Community 

Within the past decade and particularly 
over the past several years, a new dimension 
of international affairs has moved to center 
stage: the relations between the Northern 
and the Southern Hemispheres. 

For the first time in history the inter- 
national system has become truly global. 
Decolonization and the expansion of the 
world economy have given birth to scores of 
new centers of power and initiative. The 
globe's security and prosperity have become 
more and more indivisible. 

Yet in a world of over 150 sovereign na- 
tions, many of which have only recently 
achieved independence, progress toward 
understanding of our common destiny has 
been halting and uneasy. Too many nations 
still seek to extort what is meaningful only 
if freely offered. Attempts at economic war- 
fare, and sterile disputes between the indus- 
trial and developing nations, have been all 
too characteristic of international confer- 
ences. Such tactics overlook some basic 
realities: 

— Development is an arduous and long- 
term process not susceptible to quick or easy 



solutions. It requires great efforts to bring 
about social change, above all by the develop- 
ing countries themselves. 

— If there is to be any hope of develop- 
ment, the new nations need the sustained 
help of the industrial democracies. The Com- 
munist countries have been to all practical 
purposes irrelevant to this process and clearly 
unwilling to assist it. 

— A serious development effort requires 
cooperation. Confi'ontation and artificial vot- 
ing majorities destroy the psychological 
basis for a sustained relationship. Parlia- 
mentary victories in international forums 
prove empty if they are not followed by the 
willing implementation of the minority. 

The United States has a vital stake in the 
health of the world economic system. We 
need only recall the oil embargo of 1973 to 
know that interdependence is more than 
a slogan. That event helped to produce the 
worst inflation as well as the most severe 
recession of the postwar period. The price 
and supply of energy and raw materials, the 
conditions of trade and investment, the pro- 
tection of the environment, the use of the 
oceans and space — these are all issues on 
which American jobs and livelihood and 
progress depend. And we know as well that 
no structure of international relations can 
be durable if the world remains divided be- 
tween the rich and the poor, the privileged 
and the oppressed, the hopeful and the 
despairing. 

We have offered our cooperation in our 
own interest and in the hope that it will 
help build a better world. But we insist that 
others meet us in the same spirit. We will 
not submit to blackmail or to pressure. We 
will resist hostile resolutions and unwork- 
able proposals. Artificial majorities and 
claims to a monopoly on morality in world 
forum.s will only undermine public support 
here and in the other industrial democracies 
— the only nations capable of contributing 
effectively to development. 

The task is to build a consensus based on 
mutual respect and self-interest. Only in this 
way can we encourage realistic methods of 
international collaboration and lay the foun- 



154 



Department of State Bulletin 



dation for a cooperative international 
economy. 

To this end the United States has in the 
last few years assumed a role of leadership. 
We have offered comprehensive initiatives 
in such areas as energy, food, trade, finance, 
commodities, technology transfer, and the 
special problems of the poorest countries. 
We have done so in many international fo- 
rums: at the seventh special session of the 
U.N. General Assembly last September, at 
the Paris Conference on International Eco- 
nomic Cooperation in December, at the Ja- 
maica conference on world monetary issues 
in January, at the U.N. Conference on Trade 
and Development in Nairobi this spring. Prog- 
ress has been achieved on many of our pro- 
posals; many new institutions and vehicles of 
cooperation are already underway. 

Thus, just as we seek to move beyond a 
balance of power in East-West relations, so 
we are seeking long-term cooperation in 
North-South relations with a view to building 
a genuine world community. 

In this enterprise there is no more im- 
portant place to start than in our own hemi- 
sphere. If we are to build a stable, prosper- 
ous, and just world structure, we will need 
the firm foundations of close bonds with our 
friends in Latin America. 

Our traditional special relationship in the 
hemisphere antedates our cooperation with 
other regions of the developing world. We 
share unique experiences in the Americas — 
the exploration and development of new conti- 
nents, the forging of nations free from colo- 
nial domination, the development of unique 
human and moral ideals. We have shaped 
democratic institutions and spurred eco- 
nomic growth, conscious that we benefited 
greatly from our relationship with each 
other. We have long held a common interest 
in shielding our hemisphere from the intru- 
sion of others. We have led the world in 
building international organizations to serve 
our cooperative endeavors for both collec- 
tive security and economic progress. 

The challenge we face today is that history 
— and indeed the very growth and success 
we have achieved — have complicated our re- 
lationship. What used to be a simple percep- 



tion of hemispheric uniqueness, and a self- 
contained exclusive relationship, has become 
enmeshed in the wider concerns we all now 
have in the rest of the world. 

The United States recognizes its global 
responsibility to maintain the world balance 
of power, to help resolve the age-old political 
conflicts that undermine peace, and to help 
shape a new international order encompass- 
ing the interests and aspirations of the 
more than 150 nations that now comprise 
our planet. 

At the same time, in the sixties and 
seventies Latin American nations have be- 
come steadily more prosperous and self- 
confident. They are now major factors in 
their own right on the world scene. Their 
economies are among the most advanced of 
the developing world — indeed, they can be 
said to constitute a "middle class" among 
the nations of the world, encouraging prog- 
ress but with an increasing stake in stabil- 
ity. They are increasingly important in the 
global economy and the world's political 
forums. And they have a growing sense of 
solidarity with developing nations in Africa 
and Asia. Such global involvement is in- 
evitable; at the same time, it inevitably 
creates new and conflicting pressures on tra- 
ditional friendships. 

The United States has sought to build a 
new framework in our hemispheric relations 
which takes into account new realities with- 
out sacrificing the precious advantage of our 
tradition of collaboration. 

Most important, given the long period of 
neglect, real or perceived, our sister repub- 
lics in the Western Hemisphere now know 
that we care. We have inaugurated a new 
dialogue based on equality and mutual re- 
spect and on a recognition of sovereign 
independence. 

This dialogue does not reflect demands by 
one side and defense of old patterns by the 
other. On the basis of the new Latin Amer- 
ican strength and self-confidence, we now 
deal with one another with a mutuality of 
regard and understanding quite impossible 
a few years or even a decade ago. 

There is a growing recognition that we 



August 2, 1976 



155 



have shared concerns as well as different 
perspectives; that the nations of this hemi- 
sphere, where men sought a haven from 
oppression, have an opportunity to begin a 
new era of cooperation between industrially 
advanced and developing countries. 

In the past few years, the United States 
has offered initiatives to deal coherently 
with the catalogue of hemispheric issues — 
political, economic, and moral. A milestone 
in this process came at the General Assem- 
bly of the Organization of American States 
in Santiago last month, where we presented 
a comprehensive series of proposals: 

— To advance hemispheric cooperation for 
development, including trade opportunities 
and access to contemporary technology; 

— To strengthen joint efforts to deal 
with the issue of human rights in the 
hemisphere; and 

— To modernize our inter-American sys- 
tem of political consultation. 

The United States is demonstrating 
leadership on all these issues. As a result, 
Latin American nations expressed their 
belief at Santiago that a new chapter in 
hemispheric relations is opening up. There 
was a climate of candor, of friendship with- 
out complexes, and of common endeavor. 
Our initiatives no longer raise fears of pa- 
ternalism or domination but are welcomed 
again by our sister republics as reflecting 
mutual interests and our proper role. 

We believe that we have inaugurated a 
new era of inter-American cooperation based 
on equality and mutual benefit. And we be- 
lieve, too, that this can serve as a bridge 
between developed and developing nations 
everywhere and as an example for the world 
community. 

America and the World 

The world has entered a new era. We live 
in a time marked by change and uncer- 
tainty; our age cries out for new patterns 
of order and new efforts to better the hu- 



man condition. The challenges of peace and 
progress and justice require sustained and 
devoted effort from the responsible nations 
of the world and a permanent role of lead- 
ership by the United States. 

The United States has faced challenge be- 
fore. No other people could have celebrated 
its birthday so joyfully or with such opti- 
mism about its future. America has always 
stood for something beyond its own physi- 
cal strength. The heritage we have cele- 
brated this week is a vision of mankind's 
most glorious ideals — the equality of all peo- 
ples and individuals; the right to life, lib- 
erty, and the pursuit of happiness. Only in 
our free countries, where these principles 
are secure, do they sometimes seem plati- 
tudes; to a world in which the majority of 
mankind lives without them, they are the 
burning issues of our time. 

America's success has come from its blend 
of pragmatism and idealism. Our pragmatic 
tradition has helped us confront reality, 
neither blinded by dogma nor daunted by 
challenge. Our idealism has given us not only 
principles to defend but the conviction and 
courage to defend them. In today's world of 
complexity, we need more than ever a moral 
compass to steer by, a sense of conviction 
that enables us to persevere through the 
stages of the attainable toward the ideal 
which will always be beyond. 

The world no longer offers us the sim- 
plicity of detachment or temporary appli- 
cations of overwhelming power. In a world 
of interdependence, of unending challenge, 
and of diversity, we must recognize our per- 
manent involvement. Nor do we have rea- 
son for apology or hesitation. We remain 
the most powerful nation on earth. And 
there is much to accomplish together with 
the other industrial democracies as long as 
we offer the leadership for which all free 
nations long. And other nations will join us 
in collaborative endeavors if they see us — 
the world's most powerful nation — offering 
leadership. 



156 



Department of State Bulletin 



So it is time to put an end to our domes- 
tic divisions, for they are the principal ob- 
stacle to the full realization of our oppor- 
tunities. We have consumed too much of our 
substance in domestic strife; we run the risk 
that in pursuit of such self-absorption we 
will lower our sights. All great achievements 
were dreams before they were realities. The 
truly creative actions do not grow out of 
fine calculations of expediency and techni- 
cal analysis. They require a vision which 
draws men to far horizons. 

Almost 70 years ago Winston Churchill, 
with that blend of optimism and humanity 



that so set him apart from lesser men, de- 
scribed our contemporary challenge: 

What is the use of living, if it be not to strive for 
noble causes and to make this muddled world a 
better place for those who will live in it after we 
are gone ? How else can we put ourselves in har- 
monious relation with the great verities and consola- 
tions of the infinite and the eternal ? And I avow 
my faith that we are marching towards better days. 

So let US avow our faith that we are 
marching toward better days. And through 
that act, America, with its vast strength, its 
optimism and idealism, can make a decisive 
contribution to a world of peace, progress, 
and justice. 



Questions and Answers Following the Secretary's Address at Chicago 



Press release 339B dated July 6 

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you please com- 
ment on what hearing the outcome of last 
week's meeting of European Communist 
Parties has on the future course of our for- 
eign policy and particidarly the hearing it 
has on maintaining the unity with the in- 
dustrial democracies ivhich you have so 
stressed? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have expressed my 
view on the Communist Parties of Western 
Europe on a number of occasions, and I 
found that I became a political issue, even 
in foreign countries. [Laughter.] I feel that 
I can be a political issue in only one country 
at a time, and I have to give preference to 
the United States. [Laughter.] 

But there are two problems in connection 
with the Communist Parties of Western Eu- 
rope: one is their relationship to Moscow; 
and secondly, that they are Communists, re- 
gardless of what their relationship to Mos- 
cow may or may not be. None of these parties 
has disavowed the Leninist principles of po- 
litical organization which have inspired their 
leaders for all of their adult life. For all of 



them, participation in government would 
raise serious problems for NATO, for the 
European Community, and for other multi- 
lateral institutions. 

Nor can one take statements at face value. 
They would have to be tested over a period 
of time. In 1947 the leader of the Czech Com- 
munist Party, Mr. Gottwald, made the fol- 
lowing statement: 

The Czechoslovak Communist Party seeks to at- 
tain socialism, but we are of the opinion that to 
reach socialism there exists not only the method of 
the dictatorship of the proletariat. I believe not only 
that we are capable of attaining socialism by routes 
different from that of the Soviet example, but that 
we have already set off in that direction. The Com- 
munist coalition with other parties is not oppor- 
tunism. With regard to parliamentary institutions, 
they will have no more vigilant guardians than the 
Communists, when they are written into the new 
Constitution. 

A year later Mr. Gottwald overthrew the 
parliamentary institutions. 

So I would have to say that we have to 
look at the actions and not at the rhetoric 
before we make any judgment about the final 
significance of that conference. 



August 2, 1976 



157 



Q. Mr. Secretary, in your estimation tvould 
relaxation of tensions rvith the Soviet Union, 
or detente, if you please — is there a consen- 
sus in which U.S. foreign policy can operate 
and, if so, ichat is it? 

Secretary Kissinger: Since there is press 
here, I want to make it clear that the word 
"detente" was used by the questioner. 
[Laughter.] 

I think that the relations with the Soviet 
Union are a permanent feature of the inter- 
national scene. I think that the avoidance of 
nuclear war must be a permanent objective 
of American foreign policy. And I believe 
that to seek to avoid war by maintaining our 
principles and our interests enables us to 
define the consensus and to obtain public sup- 
port. 

How to do this in every concrete circum- 
stance, of course, requires discussion and 
examination. But in itself, we should not pre- 
tend to ourselves that we have a choice in 
which, suddenly, the problem of the Soviet 
Union will disappear — the problem will be 
with us. It is the responsibility of the gov- 
ernment and of the public, together, to man- 
age it in such a way that we preserve our 
values and the interests of our country and 
of our allies without nuclear war. And we 
can do it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what will he the U.S. 
position on the [IsraeW^ raid to rescue hos- 
tages [at Entebbe] ? And also, Mr. Secre- 
tary, ivhat is your personal view on this 
event? 

Secretary Kissinger: The President has 
expressed the great gratification of the 
American people at the rescue of the hos- 
tages. It is very difficult to establish a gen- 
eral rule in a situation like this. Clearly the 
attack on an airport is an unprecedented at- 
tack. But equally clear is that the hijacking 
of airliners — the holding of a hundred inno- 
cent people for ransom in a situation where 
the host government, at a minimum, proved 
impotent to enforce any accepted interna- 
tional law — indicates that we face here a 
new international problem. 

The United States over a period of years 



has proposed to the United Nations an inter- 
national convention where no country would 
permit hijacked airliners to land or where, 
automatically, hijacked airplanes that do land 
are subject then to arrest and will receive no 
support whatever from the government con- 
cerned. For many years we have failed in 
this effort. 

We believe that it is essential that some 
international arrangement be made to deal 
with terrorism, because it cannot be toler- 
ated that innocent people become the play- 
things of international thugs. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there going to be some 
effort made to maintain the present value of 
the dollar internationally? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have a treaty of 
nonaggression with Secretary [of the Treas- 
ury William E.] Simon, because he holds the 
view that my knowledge of economics is 
an argument against universal suffrage. 
[Laughter.] And the agreement is that if I 
will not speak about economic matters, he 
will take over foreign policy only slowly. 
[Laughter.] 

Q. Mr. Secretary, my question relates to 
southern Africa. Can tve expect our govern- 
ment to take a greater and more realistic 
attitude to the problems in southern Africa 
as they affect the black Africans themselves 
and the interests of the devout democratic 
nations as well? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have, in recent 
months, attempted to adjust our African 
policy to the new realities in southern Af- 
rica. These realities are: that a war is al- 
ready taking place in Rhodesia, which all 
black African countries are supporting; sec- 
ond, that 15,000 Cuban troops were permit- 
ted to land in Angola and that we were 
prohibited by the Congress from opposing 
them; third, that a way must be found to 
permit African problems to be settled within 
an African context, because otherwise there 
will be major international confrontations; 
[and] fourth, that the best hope for the 
white minorities in countries like Rhodesia 
and Namibia is a negotiated solution with 
moderate black leaders, before the radical 



158 



Department of State Bulletin 



elements take over perhaps supported by for- 
eign forces. 

The United States has attempted to put 
an end to the war that has ah-eady been 
going on in southern Africa, to return mat- 
ters to the negotiating table, to permit the 
white minorities and the black majorities to 
work out a method of coexistence, to encour- 
age the moderate African states that are pre- 
pared to settle matters without foreign in- 
tervention and on the basis of the rights of 
all the peoples in these countries. 

We are doing this because without it, the 
warfare is certain to escalate — and the dan- 
ger of foreign intervention is likely to in- 
crease. And a racial conflict of extreme 
violence is likely to break out all over south- 
ern Africa, in which then the coexistence be- 
tween the races becomes impossible. 

So our intent is to mediate and to enable 
the communities to live together and to put 
an end to the cycle of violence that started 
before we made our speeches. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, as you mentioned during 
your talk, there has been some recent criti- 
cism of American defense policy for allegedly 
falling behind the Soviet Union in military 
strength. 

Regardless of the accuracy of this criti- 
cism, others have contended that the more 
important factor is that the Soviet Union is 
perceived by leaders in many parts of the 
world as gaining rapidly in military strength 
and that the military balance is tending in 
its favor. 

Does this problem of perception seriously 
weaken the political influence of the United 
States in the world? 

Secretary Kissinger: Of course there is a 
third factor: it's that the perception of 
many foreign leaders is formed by what is 
said in the United States in the years 
divisible by four. [Laughter.] 

There is no question that the Soviet mili- 
tary strength is growing, as Soviet indus- 
trial strength and its technological basis are 
growing. And therefore the free-world coun- 
tries must make continued eff'orts to main- 
tain the military balance. 

August 2, 1976 



As somebody who has had responsibility 
for diplomacy for many years — no one is 
more convinced than I am that you cannot 
have an eff'ective diplomacy without an ade- 
quate military strength. 

At the same time, we must not talk our- 
selves into a position of impotence. 

In most significant categories of strength 
we are still ahead of the Soviet Union. 

The Soviet Union has always had a very 
large land army. And if we look ahead over 
the next 10 years, as I pointed out in my 
prepared remarks, we must make greater 
efforts, together with our allies, in building 
forces that are suitable for regional defense, 
because the strategic balance is tending 
toward a stalemate. 

But overall, if we look at the total parity 
of sti'ength, the free-world countries cannot 
be defeated by a lack of strength. Their prob- 
lem is to muster the will to mobilize that 
strength. 

I think at this moment the United States' 
strength is adequate to its responsibilities, 
and we have every intention of maintaining 
it in this position as far as we can. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I offer this question most 
respectfully and ask ivhy should the United 
States continue to remain a member and pro- 
vide a major portion of the financial support 
for an organization ivhose charter and prin- 
ciples have become a mockery and the anti- 
thesis of ivhat we as a nation stand for? And 
of course I am referring to the United Na- 
tions. 

Secretary Kissinger: The United States 
has expressed repeatedly its objection to 
many of the tendencies that we now see in 
the United Nations. 

In my remarks today, I pointed out that 
these artificial majorities, one-way morality, 
and the dependence on parliamentary maneu- 
vering cannot be accepted as the normal 
pattern of international relations. We have 
repeatedly pointed out in U.N. votes that we 
will not accept this. 

On the other hand, there is a necessity for 
some meetingplace where views can be ex- 
changed and for some mechanism in which 
crises can be handled rapidly and in which 

159 



discussion can take place without the need 
for formal arrangements. 

So we still believe that the United Nations 
has a useful role to perform, but we shall 
also insist that the United Nations behave 
in a more equitable manner than has been 
the case in recent years. And we will not let 
ourselves be pressured by the artificial 
majorities that can be generated by 
demagoguery. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you foresee a perma- 
nent peace settlement in the Middle East — 
especially in Beirut, Lebanon, in the near 
future? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, there are two 
separate but related problems: one is the 
problem of Lebanon, and the second is the 
overall problem of the Middle East, although 
I recognize that the two are related. 

The tragedy of Lebanon arises from the 
fact that two communities that have co- 
existed for several generations — and used to 
be cited as an example of how different re- 
ligions can live together in the Middle East — 
have gradually fallen into conflict with one 
another, partly because of demographic 
changes, partly because of the influence of 
outside countries. 

The Constitution of Lebanon of the 1930's 
depended, or was based, on certain assump- 
tions about a population ratio which a gen- 
eration since then has altered. So some 
political adjustment was inevitable in 
Lebanon. 

It then became caught up in the politics 
of the area, where various of the factions 
were supported by various of the Arab coun- 
tries and by some other outside countries, 
with the result that Lebanon became a 
microcosm of the larger countries. 

The United States has constantly warned 
against military actions in Lebanon. The 
United States believes in the sovereignty and 
independence and territorial integrity of 
Lebanon and in a political solution which per- 
mits both the Christian and the Moslem 
communities to coexist side by side. 



The missing ingredient has been how an 
outside force could be introduced, or how an 
inside force could be generated, that would 
bring about the authority of the central 
government. 

We favor a roundtable discussion among 
all of the parties. And a new special repre- 
sentative of the President, who went there 
last week, is encouraging all the parties in 
that direction. 

Of course the primary solution has to be 
found among the concerned Arab states and 
cannot be imposed by the United States. But 
I am hopeful that a solution will be found. 

With respect to the Middle East in gen- 
eral, I believe that significant progress has 
been made toward a settlement in the Middle 
East. I believe that conditions are being cre- 
ated in which further progress can be made, 
and I would stress that a permanent peace 
in the Middle East is one of the primary ob- 
jectives of American foreign policy — and one 
of the goals which must be approached on a 
nonpartisan basis in the interest of all 
concerned. 



President Ford Expresses Satisfaction 
at Rescue of Fiijacking Victims 

Following is the text of a letter sent on 
Jidy U by President Ford to Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Rabin of Israel. 

White House press release (Philadelphia, Pa.) dated July 4 

July 4, 1976. 

Dear Mr. Prime Minister: The Ameri- 
can people join me in expressing our great 
satisfaction that the passengers of the Air 
France flight seized earlier this week have 
been saved and a senseless act of terrorism 
thwarted. 

Sincerely, 

Gerald R. Ford. 



160 



Department of State Bulletin 



President Ford's News Conference 
of July 9 

Folloiving are excerpts relating to foreign 
policy from the transcript of a news confer- 
ence held bij President Ford at the White 
House on July 5.' 



to free the hostages, and at the same time 
we reiterated our firm opposition to interna- 
tional terrorism. 

Q. Did we knoiv in advance of that Israeli 
raid? 

President Ford: We did not. 



Q. Mr. President, Governor Reagan made 
the statement when apprised of the Israeli 
rescue raid in Uganda, "This is what Ameri- 
cans used to do." And one of the hostages, 
who is an American citizen, said America 
didn't "give a damn about us, Israel freed 
us." I ivonder, ivhat is your reaction? 

Presidoit Ford: I can assure you that this 
Administration has taken a firm action wher- 
ever we have been confronted with any ille- 
gal international action. The best illustration 
of course is what we did in 1975 in the Maya- 
guez incident. I think that was a clear warn- 
ing to any nation that violates international 
law that this Administration will act swiftly 
and firmly and, I think, successfully. 

Q. If I could follow that up, the State De- 
partment said — ivhe7i asked, "What is the 
United States doing?" — said that they had 
contacted numerous governments, as well as 
the International Red Cross. What else did 
ive do to compare with the Israeli action? 

President Ford: We took whatever action 
we felt was appropriate at that time to indi- 
cate our strong feeling against international 
terrorism, and we asked for the full coopera- 
tion of all governments to make certain that 
the hostages were freed. 

And as you know, we indicated to Prime 
Minister Rabin that we were gratified that 
the Israelis had taken the very specific action 



' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Com- 
pilation of Presidential Documents dated July 12, 
1976, p. 1144. 



Q. Mr. President, when you met tvith the 
Saudi official [Prince Ahdallah bin Abd al- 
Aziz Al-Sa'ud, Second Deputy Prime Min- 
ister} this morning, did he indicate to yon 
that oil prices will be going up again at the 
end of the year, or didn't you discuss this at 
all? 

President Ford: There was no discussion 
of the prospect of any oil price increase. 1 
expressed my appreciation for the action by 
OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries] in not increasing oil prices in 
their recent meeting. I pointed out I thought 
that was in the best interests of the free 
world and that it would be beneficial not only 
to the oil consumers but the oil producers in 
the long run. 



Q. Mr. President, what would you like for 
the International Olympic Committee to do to 
resolve the dispute between Canada and 
Taiwan? 

President Ford: I think it's tragic that 
international politics and foreign policy get 
involved in international sport competition. I 
strongly feel that the Olympics are a healthy 
thing for the world as a whole. Competition 
between athletes from all countries ought to 
be stimulated rather than curtailed. And so 
I hope and trust that the diplomatic problems 
or the international foreign policy problems 
can be resolved so that this healthy compe- 
tition can go on. 

Q. Have you done anything about it? Have 
you contacted the Canadian Government? 



August 2, 1976 



161 



President Ford: I am being kept abreast 
of it, but this is a decision that gets involved 
in Canadian Government decisions on the one 
hand and the International Olympic Commit- 
tee on the other. I have expressed myself 
very clearly that we hope they will continue 
as broadly based as possible. 

Q. Mr. President, do you believe that the 
Israeli violation of Uganda national sover- 
eignty tvas justified? 

President Ford: The Department of State 
and our representatives to the United Na- 
tions will set forth our position very clearly 
in the debate that I think begins today, on 
one or more resolutions before the Security 
Council. I am told that our position is a firm 
one, on good legal grounds, and I will wait 
and let that be expressed by them during the 
debate. 



Q. Mr. President, could we talk about the 
Alaska pipeline another time? Yoti are from 
the Middle West, and when the pipeline act 
ivas passed in Congress — 

President Ford: I voted for it. 

Q. Okay. There ivas quite a debate, though, 
about building a trans-Canada pipeline that 
tvould deliver oil to the Middle West where 
it is needed. There is still talk about that 
and, in fact, there is some legislation. Woidd 
you support legislation to build a pipeline 
from Valdez across Canada to the Middle 
West? 

President Ford: I don't believe that is an 
active possibility. I think you are referring to 
the possibility of a gas pipeline — 

Q. They were going to double-truck it, ap- 
parently. 

President Ford: — from northern Canada 
or northern Alaska to the Middle West as 
one of several alternatives. There are other 
alternatives that would involve bringing the 
gas down to the Gulf of Alaska. 



That matter is before the Federal Power 
Commission at the present time. It is also 
before — in one way or another — before the 
comparable agency in the Canadian Govern- 
ment. 

There is legislation that is being spon- 
sored which I think is good legislation, that 
would expedite the determination as to which 
route is the preferable one. It would be legis- 
lation much like that which was approved for 
the delivei-y of Alaskan oil. 

If that gas is badly needed in the United 
States — and I am not saying on the west 
coast or the Middle West — but I think a de- 
cision has to be expedited. And so I would 
favor such legislation which would expedite 
the determination by the proper authorities 
as to which route was the better of the two 
or which is the best, if there are more than 
two. 

Q. Mr. President, since this is an election 
year, I wonder if you think there is not much 
chance of any startling developments in the 
area of foreign affairs, such as a SALT 
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] agree- 
ment or MBFR [mutual and balanced force 
reductions'], or in any other area? Do you 
think it is very difficult to conduct negotia- 
tions at a time ivhen, frankly, the occupancy 
of the White House is going to be uncertain 
for next year? Are we sort of at a standstill 
for the rest of the year in foreign affairs? 

President Ford: I have said specifically, as 
far as SALT is concerned, if we can get a 
good agreement I will make that agreement 
regardless of any political consequences. We 
are in the process of thoroughly analyzing 
our last proposal, the Soviet Union's reac- 
tion or last proposal. And if we can move for- 
ward on a good SALT agreement, I certainly 
will push for it, because I think it is in the 
national interest and in the best interest of 
mankind as a whole. So politics won't enter 
into any decision as far as SALT is con- 
cerned. I know of no other major areas that 
would have any political consideration as far 
as foreign policy. 



162 



Department of State Bulletin 



Q. Hoiv about the SALT agreement? 

President Ford: I intend to push for it. I 
am not passing judgment as to whether it 
will come or won't come, but we are working 
on it, and I intend to push it. Whether 
we can achieve an agreement or not is un- 
certain. But it is in the best interest of the 
United States and mankind as a whole if we 
can get the right agreement. And I will do 
it regardless of the political atmosphere that 
may prevail here because of our election. 



Statement of July 10 

White House press release (Newport. R.I.) ilateil July lu 

The President strongly condemns the un- 
justified and unwarranted execution of 
Daniel Gearhart by the Government of An- 
gola. This execution, carried out in defiance 
of worldwide pleas for a humane commuta- 
tion of Mr. Gearhart's sentence, will make 
even more difficult any steps toward the nor- 
malization of relations between Angola and 
the United States. 

The President has expressed his sincerest 
condolences to Mr. Gearhart's family. 



Execution of Daniel Gearhart 
in Angola 

FoUo^ving are statements by Ronald H. 
Nessen, Press Secretary to President Ford, 
issued on July 9 and 10 and a statement by 
Secretary Kissinger issued on July 10. 



STATEMENTS BY WHITE HOUSE 
PRESS SECRETARY 

Statement of July 9 

white House press release dated July 9 

The President was shocked to learn that 
Angolan President Neto has refused to com- 
mute the death sentence of Daniel Gearhart 
for alleged mercenary activity in Angola. 
The death sentence is unjustified by the facts 
presented at Mr. Gearhart's trial and unwar- 
ranted by international law. We will continue 
to use every available means in urging Presi- 
dent Neto to reconsider his decision and to 
commute Mr. Gearhart's sentence as an act of 
justice and humanity. 

The President hopes that President Neto 
would reconsider in a humanitarian spirit 
the death sentences of the others which were 
reconfirmed today. 



STATEMENT BY SECRETARY KISSINGER, JULY 10 

I have learned with a deep sense of shock 
that the Angolan authorities have executed 
Daniel Gearhart despite the numerous pleas 
for clemency in his case that it had received 
from the United States, other governments, 
international organizations, and individuals. 

As I said in my press conference this 
morning, there is absolutely no basis in na- 
tional or international law for the action now 
taken by the Angolan authorities. The "law" 
under which Mr. Gearhart was executed was 
nothing more than an internal ordinance of 
the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liber- 
ation of Angola] issued in 1966, when the 
MPLA was only one of many guerrilla 
groups operating in Angola. Furthermore, no 
evidence whatsoever was produced during 
the trial of Mr. Gearhart in Luanda that he 
had even fired a shot during the few days he 
was in Angola before his capture. 

The decision by President Neto to ignore 
both the law and the facts can only be re- 
garded by the United States as a deliberately 
hostile act toward this country and its peo- 
ple. As such, it cannot help but affect ad- 
versely the development of relations between 
the United States and Angola. 

Mrs. Gearhart and her family have my 
deepest condolences on the tragic death of 
her husband. 



August 2, 1976 



163 



Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of July 10 



Press release 345 dated July 10 

Q. Mr. Secretary, good morning. 

Immediatehj after the Israeli raid on En- 
tebbe Airport, President Ford sent a mes- 
sage to Prime Minister Rabin expressing 
U.S. gratification over the rescue of the 
hostages. Since then, the State Department 
seems to have had second thoughts about the 
legality of such operations. Can you explain 
this apparent contradiction in U.S. policy? 

Secretary Kissinger: There is no contra- 
diction in U.S. policy. The President ex- 
pressed gratification about the rescue of the 
hostages. The United States is going to state 
in detail its position with respect to the 
legality and the international implications of 
this operation when Ambassador Scranton 
speaks at the United Nations — I believe it is 
in all likelihood going to be on Monday. 

I stated our view on Tuesday in Chicago, 
in which I pointed out that it is of course an 
unprecedented act for a nation to rescue 
hostages at the airport of another. It is also 
totally unprecedented to deal with the issue 
of terrorism that we now find in the world. 

We have been telling nations for years 
that terrorism must be ended ; and when 
innocent people are being held under condi- 
tions in which the government that controls 
them either is unable or unwilling to co- 
operate against the terrorists, you have a 
situation for which there is no precedent in 
international law and in which various con- 
.siderations must be balanced. That has been 
our position consistently, and there are no 
second thoughts. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have linked the — 
that is, the resolution of the Lebanese con- 
flict with the general Middle East settlement. 
There are reports noiv that U.S. officials are 



depressed, or despair of ever finding a Leba- 
nese settlement. Does that mea7i a Middle 
East settlement is out of the picture? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the depressed 
U.S. officials aren't talking to me, probably 
because they would feel more depressed if 
they did. 

I have pointed out that one of the ele- 
ments in a Middle East settlement is a 
degree of unity among the Arab nations. The 
conflict in Lebanon, in which there is dis- 
agreement among several of the key Arab 
countries, has deflected attention and con- 
cern away from the overall Middle East 
settlement. 

We strongly support a conference in which 
all the parties in Lebanon get together and 
attempt to settle their affairs. 

We are not depressed about the prospects. 
We believe that there are prospects for a 
solution — given some good will and given, 
above all, the increasing realization that none 
of the parties can impose a solution by 
force. 

So we believe that there are possibilities 
of a Lebanese settlement, and we are con- 
vinced that there are prospects for a Middle 
East settlement, and we will be encouraging 
both of these. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have been talking 
about the need for a new consensus in Amer- 
ican foreign policy. In line rvith that, do you 
think it would be a good idea if, after the 
conventions. President Ford, tvhether he is 
nominated or yiot, conferred with Jimmy 
Carter, presuming he will be nominated, and 
Mr. Reagan, if he is nominated, or just him- 
self and Mr. Carter, to discuss how Ameri- 
can foreign policy could proceed in the in- 
terim months? 



164 



Department of State Bulletin 



In other tvords, it has been said that be- 
cause of the elections, it is difficult to get 
progress on any substantive fields in foreign 
police/. But if it ivas possible to ivork out 
some — at least implicit — agreements, ivould 
that be possible? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have been 
calling attention to the importance of a 
national foreign policy ever since my con- 
firmation hearings. This is not a new theme 
for me. 

I have always believed that the foreign 
policy of the United States must reflect per- 
manent interests and permanent values — 
those values and interests cannot change at 
regular intervals. Of course there can be 
tactical disagreements, but at some point 
the lines of American foreign policy ought 
to be set for a considerable period of time. 

This has been my conviction, which I have 
expressed in every speech for over three 
years. 

With respect to the particular solution that 
you put forward, I think this is a decision 
that has to be made after the nominations 
of both parties have been made, and it in- 
volves many considerations. 

I do not believe that the foreign policy is 
being slowed down. 

I also believe that the main lines of some 
of the themes that I have heard from the 
candidates are compatible enough to permit 
progress to be made. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you — 

Q. Mr. Secretary, with respect to the style 
of the conduct of foreign policy, do you think 
it ivould be a good idea, then, after the elec- 
tion, to end your "Lone Ranges'" style of 
diplomacy ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, of course, I 
am very flattered to be constantly put on 
horses by various people. It gives me great 
prestige with my children, who have never 
seen me on one. [Laughter.] 

So, I think we will continue foreign policy 
the way it has been conducted. 



Q. Mr. Secretary, rvhat are the prospects 
for preserving the life of Daniel Gearhart, 
in your estimation, and how far is the United 
States xvilling to go to accomplish this? 

American Under Death Sentence in Angola 

Secretary Kissinger: The United States 
has made enormous efforts. We have ap- 
pealed to over 10 countries. There has been 
a direct appeal to President Neto. There has 
been an appeal through international organi- 
zations like the International Red Cross. 

If one considers that Mr. Gearhart is being 
tried under a law — under a regulation that 
was promulgated in 1966, when the MPLA 
[Popular Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola] was one of many resistance move- 
ments to the Portuguese, one can only feel 
that the legal basis for this action is prob- 
lematical. 

We hope that the decision that was an- 
nounced yesterday is not final, and we ai-e 
appealing it on humanitarian grounds. 

We cannot permit our basic foreign policy 
to be dictated by our concern for the lives of 
Americans — of individual Americans — that 
may be held prisoner, because this would en- 
courage people to take Americans prisoners 
all over the world. But we believe, on hu- 
manitarian grounds, there is a strong case 
for clemency, and we hope that President 
Neto, on reconsideration, will consider it in 
this light and wifl also consider the impact 
on American opinion if he goes through with 
his intention. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have been quoted as 
saying that you could live with the foreign 
policy outlined by Governor Carter. Do you, 
in fact, support the basic outline of the for- 
eign policy as he has laid it doivn, or do you 
find objection to certain points? And if so, 
ivhich ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think this issue is 
stated a little bit upside down. 

We have been talking about foreign policy 
a lot longer than Governor Carter, and if 



August 2, 1976 



165 



there is agreement by him with several of 
the things that have been put forward by 
this Administration, we of course welcome 
support wherever we can find it. 

There have been some indications, some 
hints in the speeches that have not been 
fully elaborated, with which we would dis- 
agree, but I would prefer to wait until they 
are elaborated moi'e before commenting on 
them. 

But the main outlines that I have found 
in the speeches have been fairly consistent 
with the outlines of the foreign policy that 
we have put forward previously. 

Resolution on Terrorism 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there was apparently 
some thought in the State Department last 
week that the United States should seize the 
initiative in the U.N. Security Council de- 
bate that is going on and perhaps iyitroduce 
a resolution condemning terrorism and ask- 
ing for cooperation from other countries. 

In vieiv of the legal debate over the Is- 
raeli actions, has that initiative noiv been 
dropped? 

Secretary Kissinger: You know, I am not 
aware of a legal debate over the Israeli 
action that has been going on here. 

Our position with respect to the Israeli 
action has been consistent from the first 
day. We have maintained it since then, and 
there have been no second thoughts about 
this. 

We are at this moment discussing with 
other countries a resolution which we hope 
to introduce, together with other countries, 
dealing with the subject of terrorism, and 
we have not yet achieved a final consensus 
with all of the other countries. But when 
we do, we will put it forward. 

If we cannot achieve a consensus, we will 
put it forward on our own. 

We believe that the issue of terrorism is 
one that the international community must 
address. It is intolerable that innocent peo- 
ple are being used as hostages for the po- 



litical aims of particular groups. It is a viola- 
tion of the Geneva Convention ' and of all 
basic principles of humanity, and the United 
States will strongly oppose it and will par- 
ticipate in nothing that encourages it. 



Communist Conference in East Berlin 

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you — is your con- 
cern about the participation of Communists 
in the Italian Government m any ivay re- 
lieved by the recent elections and/or by the 
recent events at the Communist Party meet- 
ing in East Berlin, which turned to a rati- 
fication of national communism, and ivould 
you appraise that East Berlin meeting? 

Secretary Kissinger: The outcome of the 
Italian election has tended to polarize Ital- 
ian political life between the Christian Demo- 
crats and the Communists. The Christian 
Democrats did better than had been expected 
by some. The Communists did quite well. 

It is important to remember that the 
non-Communist vote was more than two- 
thirds of the total vote. So one cannot, in 
any sense, speak of a mandate for the Com- 
munists. The Communists had 34 percent of 
the vote; 66 percent was non-Communist. 

Even if you exclude the right-wing non- 
democratic parties, you would still have to 
say that the democratic parties had over 56 
percent of the vote in the Italian Parliament. 
So the technical possibility for constituting 
a government without the participation of 
the Communists exists. 

Our concern about Communist participa- 
tion has been stated, and we have not 
changed our view with respect to that in 
any sense. 

With respect to the conference in East 
Berlin, there are a number of things to keep 
in mind. 

First, the issue concerned the internal or- 
ganization of the Communist movement. It 



' The Secretary meant to refer to the Hague Con- 
vention of 1970 which deals with the unlawful seiz- 
ure of aircraft. [Footnote in transcript.] 



166 



Department of State Bulletin 



did not concern the policies of the individual 
Communist Parties. 

Second, our concern is not only whether 
the parties are controlled from Moscow, but 
also that they are Communist and that their 
philosophy and their basic approach is likely 
to have long-term consequences for the 
Western alliance which we consider un- 
healthy for the Western alliance. 

Third, this is not the first time in history 
that there have been statements about 
"different roads toward Communism." And I 
would urge all of you to read statements 
that were made between 1945 and 1948 by 
the leaders of the Communist Parties of 
Eastern Europe, by Mr. Gottwald, by Mr. 
Gomulka, by Mr. Dimitrov — we have a com- 
pilation of those which we can make avail- 
able next week — in which, in effect, at that 
time they set their different roads toward 
communism: We have chosen in Eastern 
Europe the democratic road; the revolu- 
tionary means or the dictatorship of the 
proletariat is not the inevitable result. 

Now, I am not saying necessarily that the 
views that are expressed now are insincere. 
All I am saying is that it is dangerous to 
judge the long-term orientation of these 
parties by what is said when their interests, 
their electoral interests are so identical with 
what they are now saying. And I do point 
out that this is not the first time that this 
has happened. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to follow 
that up with a question. In 1968 your prede- 
cessor Mr. Dean Rusk described a doctrine 
that has been put forth in the Soviet Union 
as the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sover- 
eignty. Do you think that doctrine still exists, 
folloiving the East Berlin conference? 

Secretary Kissiyiger: I do not think one 
can judge from the East Berlin conference 
whether or not the doctrine still exists. And 
if one judges by the historical record, one 
has to say that historically any attempt by 
Communist Parties in Eastern Europe to 
establish independent positions has been 
dealt with, if necessary, by military force. 



August 2, 1976 



I would not make a final judgment on the 
basis of the East Berlin conference whether 
the Brezhnev doctrine still exists. We, of 
course, hope it does not. And if it does not, 
that would mark a significant change. But I 
think it is totally premature to draw the 
conclusions that I have seen in some of the 
speculations. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, when the President was 
asked yesterday about the comment of one 
of the American hostages in Uganda that, 
quote, "America didn't give a damn about 
us, but Israel freed us," Mr. Ford replied by 
asking us to remember his Administration's 
swift and decisive action ivith regard to the 
Mayaguez, and tvithin hours, on another is- 
sue, the President expressed shock about 
what he termed the unjustified death sen- 
tence of Daniel Gearhart. 

My question is, since Ambassador Scran- 
ton has apparently sanctioned black national- 
ist intrusion into Rhodesia, why can't this 
Administration consider some sort of Maya- 
guez or Israeli action to save Gearhart from 
being what the President terms "unjustifi- 
ably executed"? 

Secretary Kissinger: Each of these circum- 
stances has to be looked at in the condi- 
tions that prevail and in relation to what is 
physically possible. 

We are not elaborating a doctrine by 
which a nation, whenever it has any griev- 
ance against another nation, can enforce it 
by the use of military power. 

With respect to Ambassador Scranton, 
our position is that we are attempting to 
settle the conflict in southern Africa by 
peaceful means. All of our efforts have been 
designed to bring an end to the violence that 
had already started before we enunciated 
our policy. We have urged all of the parties 
in southern Africa to resort to negotiations. 

The efforts we are now undertaking in our 
conversations with the South African Prime 
Minister, in the mission that Ambassador 
Schaufele [William E. Schaufele, Assistant 
Secretary for African Affairs] is now under- 
taking in black Africa, are designed not to 



167 



encourage violence. Quite the opposite. They 
are designed to bring an end to violence and 
to permit the communities in southern Africa 
to coexist under conditions of justice and 
equality. 

Radiation at U.S. Embassy at Moscow 

Q. Mr. Secretary, now that the Depart- 
ment has broken its silence with respect to 
the radiation problem at the U.S. Embassy 
in Moscow, could you please clarify some of 
the aspects of this which have caused a lot 
of concern among Foreign Service personnel 
and the public? 

First, why did the United States wait for 
15 years before making a concerted effort to 
stop the radiation at the U.S. Embassy in 
Moscoic? Second, is the U.S. timidity and 
long silence related to American electronic 
eavesdropping from the roof of that Em- 
bassy, and if so, why doesn't it stop, since 
the Russians already obviou-tly knou- about 
it? 

Secretary Kissinger: I would not accept 
your characterization of "American timid- 
ity" with respect to this signal. There were 
many complicated issues involved, and the 
intensity of the signal did not reach propor- 
tions that required concentrated action until 
the second half of last year. 

At that point the United States — at all 
times, the intensity of the signal was well 
below American safety standards. 

It is now an infinitesimal proportion of 
American safety standards and well below 
levels that exist in many American buildings 
from existing American electronic equip- 
ment. 

Therefore, there is no present danger. 
The level has been significantly reduced. It 
has been reduced to one ten-thousandth of 
the American safety standard, and it was 
never more than a fraction of the American 
safety standard. 

But, ])e that as it may, there are many 
factors involved in the American response. 
And even if some things are known, there 
is not always the possibility to do something 
about them, even when they are known. 



Q. May I follow that up by asking if there 
are no grounds for concern, or very little, as 
the Department said in its statement and as 
you suggest, why are we criticizing the Rus- 
sians for continuing this, "without regard 
for the ivorking life of Americans in Mos- 
coiv"? 

Secretary Kissinger: Because we do not 
believe that a signal of whatever intensity 
aimed at an American installation is an ap- 
pi'opriate procedure. But we have reduced 
the intensity of the signal, partly through 
unilateral action and partly through negotia- 
tion, to an infinitesimal part of the American 
safety standard, and a very small fraction of 
the Soviet safety standard. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, why have the Soviets 
declined, or what have they [inaudiblel given 
you as a reason for not stopping the signal? 

Secretary Kissinger: As I have pointed 
out, there are many complicated issues in- 
volved with respect to the signal and also 
with respect to our own counteractions which 
have been very carefully considered. 

Timidity or concern about our overall 
relations with the Soviet Union has not been 
a factor in these, but we have had to balance 
various advantages and disadvantages for 
the United States, and we have of course 
had to pay primary attention to the health 
of our employees. 

There has been a response in a very sub- 
stantial reduction in the intensity of the 
signal. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you knoiv about 
the fate of Dora Bloch, the ivoman in the 
Kenya — in the Uganda hospital? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have really no 
information beyond what has been printed 
in the newspapers. The last we know is that 
she was taken from the hospital in which 
she was held by two Ugandan plainclothes- 
men, and we have had no account of her 
whereabouts since then. 

The statement that was made on the 
Ugandan radio is obviously untrue. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the House Select Com- 
mittee on Intelligence has charged that you 



168 



Department of State Bulletin 



and Deputy Under Secretary for Manage- 
ment Eagleburger violated Federal laiv by 
interfering ivith the civil right of a State 
Department officer by the name of Thomas 
Boyatt to transmit information to that com- 
mittee. What ivas your response to those 
charges? 

Secretary Kissinger: I am not familiar 
with these charges. Are you talking about 
the report that was not published? 

Q. That is correct. It was published; it 
just ivasn't published by the Congress. It 
was published before [sic] the House Select 
Committee on Intelligence. 

Secretary Kissinger: I am not familiar 
with the charge that we interfered with 
the right of — what is the name of this — ? 

Q. Boyatt. 

Secretary Kissinger: Oh, Thomas Boyatt. 
Well, we went through this at great length. 
The Department took the position that rec- 
ommendations by junior officials to their 
seniors should not be submitted to congres- 
sional committees, because it would lead to 
a situation in which every official would be 
afraid to make his recommendations for fear 
that either then or later he would be haled 
before a congressional committee to account 
for his recommendations. 

We offered to make available any policy- 
making official, any official whose appoint- 
ment had been confirmed by the Congress, 
and let him testify with respect to this par- 
ticular — to any policy matter, and with re- 
spect to any recommendation that had been 
made to him. 

In addition, we offered to the committee, 
and indeed the committee accepted, that we 
would make a compilation of all the recom- 
mendations that had been made on the sub- 
ject, including Mr. Boyatt's recommenda- 
tion, without identifying them by name, so 
that the committee would have before it all 
the recommendations that we had before us, 
without, however, the names of the people 
who had made the recommendations. 



We made such a compilation. We sub- 
mitted it with the approval of the committee 
that voted, I think, nine to five in favor of 
this. Therefore the committee had before it 
all the recommendations that had been made 
to us. 

But, for the protection of the integrity of 
the Foreign Service, we do not believe that 
middle-level officials should be compelled to 
be accountable for their recommendations. 
The responsibility for the recommendations, 
and for the actions that are taken, is, in the 
first instance, that of the Secretary of 
State and, secondly, those other senior offi- 
cials who have a congressional appointment. 

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 

Q. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
have been a cornerstone of your and the 
President's policy. A number of months have 
passed now with no apparent sign of prog- 
ress. Could you give us some indication of 
where we are on this matter? 

Secretary Kissinger: The Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks have settled a large per- 
centage of the outstanding problems. There 
are two major issues that remain — whether 
"Backfires" should be counted in the total 
and how cruise missiles should be either 
counted or limited. 

On these two issues, there has not been a 
final resolution. We have put forward an 
approach. The Soviet Union has put forward 
a different approach, and it has, up to now, 
not been possible to settle, to reconcile, those 
two approaches. 

On the other hand, in Geneva, the teams 
have continued to negotiate on the very 
considerable area on which agreement has 
already been reached, working out the tech- 
nical implementation of the agreements in 
principle that have been achieved, so that 
whenever those two issues of the cruise mis- 
sile and the Backfire are finally resolved, it 
ought to be possible to make — when they are 
conceptually resolved — it ought to be possi- 
ble to make fairly rapid progress toward a 
solution. 



August 2, 1976 



169 



Q. Is there active negotiation on those two 
outstanding issues at this point? 

Sec7-etary Kissinger: On those two issues, 
we are studying the Soviet position. They 
are studying our position. And these two 
issues are still open, and there is no imme- 
diate negotiation going on until we have re- 
studied our position on those two limited — 
on those two issues. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, despite your pronounce- 
ment in Lusaka, thus far since you came 
back from Africa the Administration has 
really made no major push toward getting 
the Byrd amendment repealed. It has paid 
Upservice to it, but really no major Admin- 
istration effort. Is such a major push in the 
offing this session? 

Secretary Kissinger: We will put before 
the Congress the repeal of the Byrd amend- 
ment, but even without the repeal of the 
Byrd amendment, we are making major ef- 
forts to bring about a diplomatic solution to 
the issues of Rhodesia and Namibia and to 
make progress on the whole range of issues 
in southern Africa. And if these diplomatic 
efforts succeed, of course, then it may be 
that over time the issue of the Byrd amend- 
ment could become moot. But we are pro- 
ceeding to make major diplomatic efforts, 
and we will also approach the Congress on 
the Byrd amendment. 

Paramount Factor in Radiation Issue 

Q. Mr. Secretary — 

Secretary Kissinger: The gentleman in the 
rear. 

Q. Sir, returning to the question of the 
microivave signals in Moscow, are you say- 
ing that there is some effort being made to 
achieve a mutual level of eavesdropping back 
and forth? 

Secretary Kissinger: I am not saying there 
is an effort being made to achieve a mutual 
level of eavesdropping. I am saying that in 
making our decisions as to what diplomatic 
approaches to use and what retaliation might 



be appropriate, we have to consider many 
factors, but the paramount factor is the 
health of our employees, which I believe 
has been adequately safeguarded. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, may I ask again, what 
reason do the Soviets give for not stopping 
the signals entirely? Do they say that there 
is no safety factor involved, so it is not the 
Embassy's business, or is it because of cer- 
tain American activity — electronic activity — 
at the site of the Embassy? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think it would 
be appropriate for me to give the content 
of the diplomatic exchanges. But in activities 
of this kind, it is not always easy to obtain 
an admission that it has taken place to begin 
with, and sometimes one can observe de 
facto actions without having a theoretical 
discussion as to whether they are in fact 
taking place. 

Q. Does the fact that the State Department 
went public recently mean that they have 
really given up, or there does not seem to be 
any great chance of getting a stoppage? 

Secretary Kissinger: They have pointed 
out there is no — the best medical judgment 
that we have been able to obtain — and meas- 
ured also against any safety standards that 
any nation has ever devised for this prob- 
lem — what is now going on is an infinitesimal 
amount and a smaller amount than takes 
place in many industrial areas simply by 
walking in the streets. So we are not dealing 
now with a health problem of any kind. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you might not now be 
dealing with a health problem, but I think it 
is a fact that the American standard that 
you quote is a thousand times less stringent 
than the Soviet standard, and the Soviets do 
take into account a great many medical is- 
sues that the United States does not, and 
there was a time last year tvhen the level of 
activity on the Russian part was higher 
than their otvn standard would have per- 
mitted. 

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct, and 
at that point we took very strong action. 



170 



Department of State Bulletin 



Q. Is it not possible then, or are you ac- 
knowledging here that it simply isn't pos- 
sible to demand that the Russians stop this? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have demanded 
that the Russians stop it — 



Q. And they haven' t- 

Secretary Kissinger. 
completely stopped. 



-it has not been 



Proposed Purchase of Aircraft by Kenya 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in vieiv of the tension 
in east Africa, is the United States sending 
any naval imits to the area of Kenya — 
Uganda? And what is your opinion of 
Kenya's proposed purchase of 20 F-SE's 
from the United States? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it would be 
quite a trick to send naval units to Uganda. 
[Laughter.] So I can safely say that none of 
that is being contemplated. 

There have been periodic port calls at 
Mombasa, and there will be a port call by an 
American frigate in the near future. But this 
is not a new development. This is something 
that has taken place in the past. 

With respect to the sale of airplanes to 
Kenya, one has to keep in mind that Kenya 
is surrounded by neighbors that are heavily 
armed by Communist nations, that have 
made territorial claims on Kenya; that 
Kenya has been a country that has pursued a 
very moderate policy — has pursued a policy 
in which the various races and communities 
have been able to live side by side, and it is 
the direction in which we would hope African 
countries in other parts of Africa will also 
evolve. 

So we are sympathetic to some of its mili- 
tary requirements. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, before the California 
primary you canceled a couple of speeches 
because I think the Department said they 
might be viewed as too political. Why do you 
think it is noiv proper to go around the 
country making speeches that will also cer- 
tainly be interpreted as political? 



Secretary Kissinger: Well, at that time it 
was on the Friday before the primary in a 
campaign which was very intense, and it 
seemed to me that to speak, even though it 
was before a nonpartisan forum two days be- 
fore the election — or three days before the 
election — might be viewed as a partisan ef- 
fort. What I'm doing now is a continuation of 
what I've been doing for nearly two years — 
that is, to speak about once a month in some 
part of the country about the main outlines 
of American foreign policy before non- 
partisan forums. 

In the leadership meetings that take place 
off the record, we always invite individuals 
of all political parties and of different views. 
And my effort is to bring before the Ameri- 
can public the nature of our foreign policy. 

And it is not a new effort. It is not 
especially related to the election. 

Effect of Execution on U.S. -Angola Relations 

Q. Mr. Secretary — 

Q. Mr. Secretary, may I clarify an earlier 
answer on the Gearhart matter? You said 
that it ivould not be proper for us to permit 
our foreign policy to become hostage to the 
fate of any one particular individual or 
prisoner, because this would encourage other 
countries to do so. Does this mean that you 
are not — you have not and you will not, in 
any ivay, link the question of future eco- 
nomic aid to Angola to the fate of Mr. Gear- 
hart or any other prisoner? 

Secretary Kissinger: We will not promise 
economic aid to Angola in order to obtain the 
release of Mr. Gearhart. Obviously, the exe- 
cution of Mr. Gearhart will worsen the rela- 
tionship between Angola and the United 
States and slow down any possibilities of 
normalization that may have existed. But 
we are putting our appeal to President Neto 
on humanitarian grounds, and we are not 
negotiating a ransom. 

Q. Well, ive haven't told Mr. Neto lohat 
you're saying here today — that his execution 
would obviously slow down this process of 



August 2, 1976 



171 



admission to the United Nations, for exam- 
ple? 

Secretary Kissinger: I am not talking 
about any particular political conditions that 
we have put before Mr. Neto. Mr. Neto must 
understand — and he certainly has been given 
to understand — that the general attitude of 
Americans toward Angola will be seriously 
affected by his actions in the case of Mr. 
Gearhart. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, has the United States 
noticed yet any net reduction in the presence 
of Cuban troops in Angola? 

Secretary Kissinger: What makes a judg- 
ment very difficult to come by is that there 
is obviously an outflow of some Cuban 
troops, but there's also an inflow of other 
Cubans. And to make a net judgment as to 
how many have returned and how many 
remain has not been easy. 

We've also had unconfirmed reports that 
some of the Cuban troops that are leaving 
Angola are going to other African countries. 
We have not been able to confirm it yet. But 
it is clear that whatever reduction has taken 
place is not significant enough to afi'ect the 
basic situation that the government is being 
significantly supported by a foreign expedi- 
tionary force of, by African standards, very 
substantial dimensions — which is, in turn, 
supported by the Soviet Union — and it is a 
precedent which we find extremely difficult to 
live with. 



Prince Abdallah of Saudi Arabia 
Visits Washington 

Following is a toast by Secretary Kissin- 
ger given at a luncheon in honor of Prince 
Abdallah bin Abd al-Aziz Al-Sa'ud, Second 
Deputy Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia, on 
Jidy 8. 

Press lelease 344 dated July 9 

Your Royal Highness: It is always a great 
privilege for me to welcome friends from 
Saudi Arabia to the United States. 

His Royal Highness pointed out to me that 



I have visited Saudi Arabia 13 times in the 
last three years; I pointed out to him that 
on my first visit I detected a certain suspi- 
ciousness on the part of my host, but I'm 
glad to say that we have developed a rela- 
tionship now of mutual confidence and of per- 
sonal friendship. 

Of course, I always feel a little apologetic 
when I welcome people from Saudi Arabia 
here, because I recognize that as far as hos- 
pitality is concerned, the United States is an 
underdeveloped country. [Laughter.] 

Your Royal Highness is visiting the United 
States at a very important period in the 
relationship between the Arab countries and 
the United States and in the history of the 
Middle East. We are all conscious of the 
tragedy that is taking place in Lebanon, and 
we are also aware of the necessity of making 
progress toward peace in the Middle East. 
The two events are closely related because, 
in all candor, peace in the Middle East cannot 
progress without unity among the Arab na- 
tions. Contrary to what our critics are say- 
ing, the United States favors unity among 
the Arab nations. 

We think that the Kingdom, and His Maj- 
esty in particular, has taken wise initiatives 
in bringing together the Prime Ministers of 
Syria and Egypt and in using the good offices 
of Saudi Arabia to arrange negotiations 
among all of the parties in Lebanon. 

Whatever assistance the United States can 
give these efi'orts, we will be eager to do. 
We believe that the time has come in Lebanon 
for all of the parties to recognize that a con- 
tinuation of the conflict only leads to a need- 
less loss of life and only encourages outside 
forces — that are neither interested in the 
independence of Lebanon nor in progress to- 
ward peace in the Middle East — to exploit the 
situation. I believe, and I have the impres- 
sion that our friends in Saudi Arabia also be- 
lieve, that it is time to have a roundtable 
conference in which all of the parties discuss 
arrangements in which the various commu- 
nities can live together, the independence and 
sovereignty of Lebanon are safeguarded, and 
outside influences are gradually withdrawn. 

As far as the Middle East as a whole is 
concerned, the United States has stated re- 



172 



Department of State Bulletin 



peatedly that we believe important steps 
have been taken toward peace in the Middle 
East. But very major steps remain to be 
taken; and those steps, in our view, and I 
believe in the view of all of the parties now, 
have to be taken on all fronts, so that prog- 
ress towai-d peace can be uniform for all of 
the principal parties concerned. This is the 
attitude with which the United States is ap- 
proaching the problem, and again, I want to 
emphasize that the cooperation between the 
Arab states has to be an important compo- 
nent of this effort. 

As far as our bilateral relations with Saudi 
Arabia are concerned, Saudi Arabia has been 
our oldest friend in the Arab world. We have 
had an uninterrupted relationship of trust 
and confidence, and in the world as it is 
today, it is important that countries know 
that friends of the United States know of our 
interest in their sovereignty, in their pros- 
perity, and in their independence ; and that 
it is known that the United States stands be- 
hind its friends. 

A few years ago, a group at the National 
War College sent a plaque — in brass, since 
only the Saudis can afford gold — with a piece 
of a plank on which the first meeting took 
place between President Roosevelt and the 
King of Saudi Arabia. A few weeks ago, the 
wheel of that ship was presented by Ambas- 
sador [William J.] Porter to the Government 
of Saudi Arabia. It symbolizes the fact that, 
while it may have taken 170 years of our 
history for our leaders to meet the leaders 
of Saudi Arabia, in the last 30 years these 
contacts have been frequent and important 
in the negotiations that I have had the priv- 
ilege of conducting in the Middle East. 

The advice of His Majesty King Faisal, of 
His Majesty King Khalid, and of the Crown 
Prince, Prince Fahd, has been of enormous 
importance. And anyone who knows how 
Saudi diplomacy operates — discreetly and 
unostentatiously — also knows that our Saudi 



friends always do more than they say, and I 
would like to stress that this close relation- 
ship we are dedicated to maintaining and to 
strengthening. 

It is a great privilege. Your Royal High- 
ness, to welcome you to the Department of 
State and to the United States, and I would 
like all of our guests to drink a toast: To His 
Royal Highness and to the growing friend- 
ship between our two peoples. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

94th Congress, 2d Session 

International Security Assistance and Arms Export 
Control Act of 1976. Report of the committee of 
conference to accompany S. 2662. H. Rept. 94-1013. 
April 6, 1976. 78 pp. 

Middle East Assistance. Communication from the 
President of the United States transmitting his 
objections to the Senate action adding to the budget 
for foreign military sales credits and security sup- 
porting assistance for the transition quarter for 
Israel, Eg^pt, Jordan, and Syria. H. Doc. 94-444. 
April 8, 1976. 2 pp. 

U.S. Participation in the OECD Financial Support 
Fund. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, together with minority views, to ac- 
company S. 1907. S. Rept. 94-746. April 9, 1976. 
11 pp. 

Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Act. Report of the Sen- 
ate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs to 
accompany S. 713; S. Rept. 94-754; April 14, 1976; 
54 pp. Joint report of the Senate Committees on 
Commerce, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations, 
together with additional views; S. Rept 94-935; 
June 8, 1976; 28 pp. 

Establishing a Commission on Security and Coopera- 
tion in Europe. Report of the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations to accompany S. 2679; S. Rept. 
94-756; April 23, 1976; 6 pp. Report of the House 
Committee on International Relations; H. Rept. 
94-1149; May 14, 1976; 8 pp. 

To Amend Further the Peace Corps Act. Report of 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to ac- 
company H.R. 12226. S. Rept. 94-757. April 23, 
1976. 24 pp. 

Relations With the Soviet Union. Report of the Sen- 
ate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany 
S. Res. 406. S. Rept. 94-758. April 23, 1976. 4 pp. 



August 2, 1976 



173 



The United States and the Middle East 



Address by Alfred L. Atherton, Jr. 

Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asiati Affairs ' 



It is particularly appropriate, just four 
days before the Bicentennial of our Decla- 
ration of Independence, to be meeting with 
members of an organization whose history 
goes well back into the first century of 
America's independence. For 133 of Amer- 
ica's 200 years, B'nai B'rith has been a 
guardian of the principles of freedom, jus- 
tice, tolerance, and individual dignity which 
are the essence of this nation. 

I do not feel a stranger among you. For 
as long as I can remember, and long before 
I knew what the words "B'nai B'rith" meant, 
that name has been synonymous to me with 
the highest ideals of service and brother- 
hood. 

In more recent years, I have had a fruit- 
ful dialogue with your representatives in 
Washington on the subject I want to speak 
about tonight: U.S. policy in the Middle 
East. This dialogue has helped me under- 
stand the special feeling of American Jews 
for Israel. It has also, I believe, helped 
your representatives understand the com- 
plex considerations which those of us who 
deal daily with the problems of the Middle 
East must weigh in conducting our rela- 
tions with this area of such vital impor- 
tance to our national interests. 

This gathering this evening is an exten- 
sion of that dialogue. I welcome it, and I 
am glad to be here. Thffe kind of interchange 



' Made before the 108th Annual Convention In- 
stallation Banquet of B'nai B'rith, District 6, at 
Omaha, Nebr., on June 30. 



is indispensable to the formulation of for- 
eign policy in a democracy. Foreign poli- 
cies must be based on an informed public 
opinion, and they must have public support, 
if they are to be sustained. I hope my words 
this evening will find a response among you 
that will contribute to the national con- 
sensus we must strive for in the search for 
peace in the Middle East. 

All of us here tonight would agree that the 
security and survival of Israel must be a non- 
negotiable premise of American Middle East 
policy. No significant body of opinion in this 
country would disagree with that premise. 

Our national commitment to Israel's se- 
curity and survival is not at issue. The issue, 
precisely stated, is to define and pursue a 
national policy that puts us in the strongest 
possible position to continue to meet that 
commitment. A responsible Middle East pol- 
icy for America must assure that we retain 
the capacity to influence the course of events 
in the Middle East commensurate with our bi- 
lateral and global responsibilities as a major 
power. 

The United States, with the good will 
which it uniquely has among all the parties 
in the Middle East, is in a position to help 
shape events, to help prevent wars, and to 
help the parties to find their way along the 
hard road to a negotiated peace. To continue 
to play this role, we must pursue policies 
which take into account the broad range of 
American concerns and interests in the Mid- 
dle East. 

It is therefore important, as a starting 



174 



Department of State Bulletin 



point, to identify what those concerns and 
interests are: 

— I have ah-eady mentioned our strong 
commitment to the security and survival of 
Israel. It is a commitment rooted deeply in 
history. It has been reaffirmed by every Ad- 
ministration in this country since the mod- 
ern State of Israel came into existence almost 
30 years ago. As recently as last May 13, 
President Ford told the annual meeting of 
the American Jewish Committee in Washing- 
ton: 

A strong Israel is essential to a stable peace in 
the Middle East. Our commitment to Israel will meet 
the test of American steadfastness and resolve. My 
Administration will not be found wanting. The 
United States will continue to help Israel provide 
for her security. 

A concrete manifestation of President 
Ford's policy toward Israel can be seen in the 
fact that for the fiscal years 1976 and 1977 
he has requested over $4 billion in economic 
and military assistance, compared to a total 
of only $6 billion in U.S. assistance since the 
founding of the State of Israel. 

— We also have good and mutually bene- 
ficial relations with most of the nations of 
the Arab world. This is important to them. 
They seek American technology and mana- 
gerial know-how for their development pro- 
grams. Moderate Arab leaders also look to 
military assistance from the United States 
as a buttress to their moderation and as a 
means of protecting themselves against 
more radical forces in the area. These good 
relations are also important to us. They are 
important economically, for example, in jobs 
created in this country by the growing vol- 
ume of exports to, and investment in, Arab 
countries. They are important in helping 
meet our energy requirements for the years 
ahead. They are also important politically, in 
a world where the interdependence of devel- 
oped and developing nations is a condition for 
the well-being of all. 

Our relations with the Arab world, wisely 
nui'tured, can enhance our ability to 
strengthen the forces of moderation in the 
Middle East and advance the cause of peace. 



A return to the estrangement that so long 
marred our relations with many Arab na- 
tions would, in today's interdependent world, 
have negative effects on our interests extend- 
ing far beyond the Middle East. 

— A third interest of the United States is 
the preservation and strengthening of our 
alliances. Each crisis in the Middle East 
places severe strains on the fabric of those 
alliances. 

— Finally, we have an interest, dictated by 
our global responsibilities in this nuclear 
age, to prevent conflict in the Middle East 
from again becoming a flashpoint of super- 
power confrontation. 

Fundamental Issues in Peace Process 

We cannot pursue our interests in the Mid- 
dle East selectively. Yet so long as the Arab- 
Israeli conflict persists, there are potential 
contradictions among them. 

Simple logic therefore requires us — in- 
deed, impels us — to persevere in the search 
for a comprehensive settlement of the Arab- 
Israeli conflict. In no other way can we 
guard against an evolution of events that 
could bring our multiple interests and con- 
cerns into conflict, benefiting only those, both 
within and outside the region, who seek to 
inflame or polarize or exploit the conflict. An 
Arab-Israeli peace settlement which had the 
strong backing of the United States and of 
the world community generally would con- 
stitute in the long run the best guarantee of 
Israel's security and survival. 

The question we must therefore ask our- 
selves is whether or not conditions exist 
which make a settlement of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict attainable. What are the fundamen- 
tal issues which must be dealt with if there 
is to be tangible progress toward peace? 
Briefly stated, the issues are these: 

— Israel seeks from the Arabs recognition 
of its legitimacy and right to exist, with all 
this implies: an end to belligerency, an end 
to threats of force, and commitments to live 
together in peace and security. 

— The Arab states seek the restoration of 



August 2, 1976 



175 



occupied territories and, in their words, jus- 
tice for the Palestinian people. 

The suspicions between Arabs and Israelis 
are so deep, the absence of meaningful com- 
munication between them so absolute, that 
each tends to put the worst interpretation on 
the stated objectives of the other. When Is- 
rael says it seeks security, the Arabs take 
this to mean that Israel seeks to retain 
major parts, if not all, of the territories oc- 
cupied in the 1967 war. When the Arabs 
speak of the national rights of the Palestin- 
ians, Israelis hear a call for the destruction 
of Israel as a Jewish state. 

Undoubtedly some on both sides do harbor 
such extreme feelings. But there are also 
those who do not. Public opinion is not mono- 
lithic in either Israel or the Arab world; it 
is in flux, and there is a great yearning on 
both sides for an end to the killing and con- 
flict. The present generation of Arab and 
Israeli leaders has an opportunity to lead 
their peoples to a genuine peace between 
them — an opportunity that has not existed 
before and that may not come again soon if 
the present opportunity is missed. 

Achievements and Beginnings 

Support for a peaceful settlement can only 
be consolidated, the true intentions of both 
sides can only be tested, in the give-and-take 
of a process of negotiations between the 
parties that holds out hope for peace. The 
precise form of negotiations — whether face- 
to-face, indirect through a third party, or 
some combination of the two — is less impor- 
tant than the dynamics of the process itself. 

To generate such a process has been the 
central purpose of American diplomacy for 
years, and in particular throughout the ac- 
tive and creative period since the Arab- 
Israeli war of October 1973. Through all the 
drama of shuttle diplomacy, Geneva Confer- 
ence, and debates in the United Nations, our 
efforts have been directed toward this objec- 
tive — to engage Arabs and Israelis in a proc- 
ess of negotiations that they themselves will 
come to recognize as in their own best in- 
terests. 



Because there is so far yet to go, it is easy 
to forget how much has already been 
achieved. Between 1949 and 1974, there were 
no Arab-Israeli negotiations on the funda- 
mental issues and no agreements to which 
they were direct parties. In two short years, 
1974 and 1975, there were four negotiations 
and three agreements — two between Egypt 
and Israel, one between Syria and Israel. 

Measured against the absolutes of final 
peace, the territorial and political distance 
covered by these agreements is modest. In 
psychological terms, it represents a quantum 
leap forward. For the first time in a quarter 
of a century, the rigid mindsets and sterile 
rhetoric that for so many years made prog- 
ress toward peace impossible have given way 
to the beginnings of a new pragmatism and 
of a new vision of what the Middle East 
could be. 

Like all changes that touch the deepest 
emotions, fears, and hopes of nations, that 
demand a break with past patterns of 
thought and behavior and a step into the un- 
knowable future, these fragile beginnings 
have created new tensions and awakened old 
traumas. The internal debate in Israel, the 
dissensions within the Arab world, the travail 
of Lebanon, have in the first instance their 
own internal causes. But it is equally clear 
that these developments, which prolong and 
increase the ferment in the Middle East, are 
infinitely more intense and less amenable to 
solution precisely because they are caught in 
the crosscurrents of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 



Risks of Prolonged Stalemate 

The resumption of negotiations looking to- 
ward a solution of that conflict must remain 
a high priority on the agenda of unfinished 
business in the foreign relations of the 
United States. We cannot change the impera- 
tives of history. If our government does not 
retain the initiative in dealing with these 
issues, we will be forced to respond to the 
initiatives of others, and to events them- 
selves. The same is true of our friends in the 
Middle East, who are much more directly 
concerned. 



176 



Department of State Bulletin 



They recognize, as we do, that time is 
needed to prepare for the difficult decisions 
which lie ahead. We are not today at the mo- 
ment of decision between war and peace. 

But neither can that moment be postponed 
indefinitely. Sometime in the months and 
years ahead the Middle East will come to 
the crossroad where all concerned — ^both 
within and outside the region — must make 
the hard decision whether they will this time 
take the road toward peace or the road to- 
ward yet another Arab-Israeli war. That de- 
cision will confront all concerned with 
difficult and agonizing choices, as they come 
to grips with the basic issues between them 
— the issue of how to live together for the 
first time in peace after so many decades of 
belligerency and war, the issue of territorial 
withdrawals and final borders, and the issue 
of the future of the Palestinian people. 

All these questions are the proper subject 
for negotiations. It would be tragic if the 
world community despaired of the hope that 
Arabs and Israelis could find the answers to 
their own destiny and concluded that peace 
should be imposed on the nations of that 
troubled region. This is not our way. We pre- 
fer to work instead for a peace through ne- 
gotiations among the parties themselves — 
with whatever assistance we and others can 
provide, in whatever forums prove the most 
practical and acceptable. 

But in the absence of a negotiating proc- 
ess, and of the compromises that will be nec- 
essary to make such a process possible, pres- 
sures will grow to seek an alternative way. 
If there is anything the history of this con- 
flict should have taught, it is that the Middle 
East will not stand still. It has experienced 
four wars in 25 years. The intervals be- 
tween wars have grown shorter and have 
been marked by sporadic tension and vio- 
lence, including acts of terrorism which feed 
on the unresolved hatred and frustration of 
the basic conflict. The cost of each successive 
war, in blood and money, has increased ap- 
pallingly ; and each war has had increasingly 
dangerous global economic and political re- 
percussions. It is unthinkable that there 
should be a fifth Arab-Israeli war — and yet 



that is the grim alternative to negotiation, 
compromise, and further progress toward 
peace. 

The risks of moving toward peace are 
great for the leaders on both sides ; witness, 
for example, the storm of criticism unleashed 
against Egypt for President Sadat's states- 
manlike decision, in concluding the most re- 
cent Sinai agreement, to commit Egypt to 
seek a final settlement through peaceful and 
not military means. For Israel, the risks it 
perceives are agonizing. Israelis feel they 
are being asked to exchange something tan- 
gible — territory occupied in 1967 — for some- 
thing intangible — commitments by their 
neighbors to recognize Israel's right to exist 
and to live in peace. Seen through Arab eyes, 
however, these commitments are also tan- 
gible, representing as they do an abandon- 
ment of the claim to recover all of former 
Palestine — a claim which was the unanimous 
Arab position for many years. 

Whatever the risks of moving toward 
peace, the risks in not doing so are infinitely 
greater. I do not need to dwell on the costs 
and risks, should there be another war. But 
consider the costs even in the absence of war, 
not least of all the risk that prolonged stale- 
mate will set in motion forces which will 
undermine moderate leaders in the region, 
seek to isolate the United States and Israel 
in the world, and erode our ability to influ- 
ence the course of events. 

The Balance Sheet for Further Progress 

If there were no alternative to this sce- 
nario of despair, the prospects for the Mid- 
dle East and for the world would be grim 
indeed. I believe, however, that an alternative 
does exist. Let us look at the balance sheet. 

On the one hand, the factors which make 
progress difficult are clear : 

— The Lebanese crisis, which is in a sense 
an Arab crisis, makes more difficult the 
achievement of agreement by the Arab gov- 
ernments on how to move toward a settle- 
ment with Israel. 

— Second, the leadership of the Palestin- 
ian movement has not accepted the frame- 



August 2, 1976 



177 



work for peace hammered out in U.N. debates 
and embodied in Security Council Resolu- 
tions 242 and 338 following the 1967 and 
1973 wars. That framework calls for with- 
drawal from occupied territory and clear rec- 
ognition of Israel's right to exist in the con- 
text of a peace settlement. While the legiti- 
mate interests of the Palestinian people must 
be taken into account in a final settlement, it 
is not reasonable to ask Israel to negotiate 
with them so long as they do not agree that 
part of a final settlement must be an agree- 
ment to live in peace with a sovereign, Jewish 
State of Israel. 

— A third factor is the continuing debate 
in Israel about peace goals ; for example, how 
to deal with the Palestinian issue and what 
should be given up in return for peace. 
Meanwhile, policies such as the continued 
establishment of settlements in occupied ter- 
ritories raise questions in Arab minds about 
Israel's ultimate intentions. 

— Similarly, voices of extremism in the 
Arab world and anti-Israel actions in inter- 
national forums — usually supported for op- 
portunistic reasons by many governments 
not directly involved in the Arab-Israeli con- 
flict — raise questions in Israeli minds about 
ultimate Arab intentions. 

Let us look now at the plus side of the 
ledger : 

— An internationally sanctioned frame- 
work for a negotiated peace exists in Secu- 
rity Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Israel, 
the principal Arab governments concerned, 
and the overwhelming majority of the world 
community — including the United States 
and the Soviet Union — are formally commit- 
ted to and have accepted that framework. 
This framework was explicitly reaffirmed in 
the agreements between Israel, Egypt, and 
Syria. 

— Second, while active negotiations are not 
presently going on, we have been exploring 
with the Arab governments concerned, and 
are prepared to continue to do so, an Israeli 
proposal for negotiations based on the con- 
cept of a termination of the state of war and 
further territorial withdrawals on one or 
more fronts. In our view, this would offer a 



practical way — though not necessarily the 
only way — of continuing the negotiating 
process. 

— Third, for the first time in the history 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and despite con- 
tinued outbursts of shrill rhetoric from some 
quarters, there is today in much of the Arab 
world a moderate leadership which has ac- 
cepted the principle of making peace with 
Israel and no longer espouses the goal of 
Arab sovereignty over all of what was Pal- 
estine. 

— Fourth, the Soviet Union no longer has 
the same position of major influence it once 
enjoyed in certain Arab countries. Arab 
leaders perceive increasingly that while 
Soviet support may help them make war, 
only the United States — of the major pow- 
ers — can produce progress toward peace, and 
the Soviet Union is well aware of the risks to 
it of continuing conflict, including setbacks 
to U.S. -Soviet relations. 

— Fifth, there has been a constructive evo- 
lution in public understanding in this country 
of the complexities of the Middle East con- 
flict, of its shades of gray as well as its blacks 
and whites, and of the importance of con- 
tinued progress toward peace. This strength- 
ens the ability of your government to speak 
with authority in its peacemaking eff'orts. 

— Finally, the United States today enjoys 
the kind of relationship with both sides to 
the conflict which permits us to play a unique 
and positive role to the benefit of all who 
seek a reasonable, just, and lasting peace 
settlement. 

If all the parties concerned act with the 
vision that distinguishes true statesmanship, 
I believe these factors on the plus side of 
the ledger can prevail. This will require diffi- 
cult decisions by Arab and Israeli leaders; it 
will require putting aside dreams of abso- 
lute objectives for the sake of achieving real- 
istic compromises ; it will require each side to 
understand the fears and legitimate national 
aspirations of the other; it will require a 
determined and prolonged test of intentions 
in the crucible of negotiations; and it will 
require that the United States persist in its 
efforts to keep the peace process alive, to 



178 



Department of State Bulletin 



avoid stagnation, to help the parties find soki- 
tions which are in their best interests — and 
ours. The United States will work with Israel 
throughout this process. I want to read you 
a brief quotation : 

I note with satisfaction that (luring the past two 
years, relations between the United States and 
Israel have become closer. 

Our governments have arrived at a common ap- 
proach regarding the desirable political direction on 
the road to peace and in the development of the 
processes of peace .... There has been no erosion 
in the position and attitude vis-a-vis Israel of the 
Administration, the Congress or the American 
public. 

Relations between the United States and Israel 
remain firm. 

This was a statement by Prime Minister 
Rabin in the Knesset on June 15, two weeks 
ago. 

Yet the challenge remains, with all its dan- 
gers and opportunities. The issues are clear, 
and they will neither change nor disapp3ar. 
The imperatives for the nations of the Mid- 
dle East, and for the interests of the United 
States, will be the same tomorrow as they 
are today. Our responsibilities to Israel, to 
ourselves, and to world peace and stability 
therefore leave us no realistic alternative but 
to continue on course, sustained by the hope 
that someday our children will look back on 
this period of history as the time when the 
Middle East — after a quarter century of 
strife — chose the road to peace. 



Fifth International Tin Agreement 
Transmitted to the Senate 

Message From President Ford ' 

To the Senate of the United States: 

I am transmitting herewith, for the ad- 
vice and consent of the Senate to ratifica- 
tion, the Fifth International Tin Agreement, 
which was signed by the United States on 
March 11, 1976. The Fifth International Tin 



'Transmitted on June 23 (text from White House 
press release); also printed as S. Ex. J, 94th Cong., 
2d sess., which includes the texts of the agreement 
and the report of the Department of State. 



Agreement replaces the Fourth International 
Tin Agreement, which expires on June 30, 
1976. The Fifth International Tin Agreement 
is scheduled to come into force July 1, 1976, 
for a period of five years. 

Tin is a critical commodity for the United 
States. We have no mineable reserves and 
must import 80% of our requirements of 
tin, meeting the remainder by recycling tin- 
bearing scrap. In addition, our strategic 
stockpile contains an approximately four 
year supply of tin at current rates of con- 
sumption. We are the world's largest single 
consumer of tin, other large consumers being 
Japan, the European Community, Australia, 
and Canada. Primary tin is produced chiefly 
by six developing countries in Asia, Africa, 
and Latin America. Malaysia is the world's 
largest producer, accounting for about 40% 
of world supplies. Tin is an important source 
of foreign exchange for all these countries 
and vital to the success of their develop- 
ment plans. 

Like its predecessors, the Fifth Inter- 
national Tin Agreement has as its main pur- 
pose stabilizing tin prices within agreed lim- 
its. Previous agi'eements have had some suc- 
cess in achieving this objective, especially 
with regard to the floor price. These agree- 
ments have proved a notable example of 
cooperation between producers and consum- 
ers in seeking solutions to common problems. 
The chief features of the Fifth International 
Tin Agreement are the following : 

— An International Tin Council which 
meets on a regular basis to consider impor- 
tant issues and make decisions. Votes are 
divided equally between producer and con- 
sumer members as groups. Within the two 
groups votes are apportioned among mem- 
bers on the basis of their share of world 
production or consumption. Thus, the larger 
producers and consumers carry more weight 
in the Council's proceedings, but neither pro- 
ducei's nor consumers as a group can domi- 
nate the Council. Normally, decisions require 
a simple majority vote of both producers 
and consumers, but certain important deci- 
sions require a two-thirds majority vote of 
both. As a member of the Council, the United 



August 2, 1976 



179 



states would hold the largest number of 
consumer votes. 

— A buffer stock consisting of at least 
20,000 metric tons of tin or its equivalent in 
money. Sales are made from the buffer stock 
as the tin price approaches the agreed ceil- 
ing in an effort to defend the ceiling, while 
purchases are made as the price approaches 
the agreed floor in order to defend the floor. 
Producer members are required to make con- 
tributions to the buffer stock proportional 
to their share of world production. Consumer 
members may make such contributions on a 
voluntary basis and four — The United King- 
dom, France, Belgium, and the Nethei*- 
lands — have elected to do so. Both during the 
course of the negotiations of the Fifth Inter- 
national Tin Agreement and since that time, 
we have made clear that, should the United 
States elect to join, we would not make a 
contribution to the buffer stock. 

— Provision for the imposition of export 
controls on producers. Export controls are 
usually imposed only after the buffer stock 
of tin metal has risen to over 5,000 metric 
tons as a result of efforts to slow falling 
prices. 

— A requirement that member govern- 
ments consult with the International Tin 
Council before making disposals from na- 
tional stocks. For some years we have con- 
sulted with the International Tin Council as 
a matter of routine before making disposals 
from our strategic stockpile. This require- 
ment, therefore, would not constitute any 
change for us. We have made clear, however, 
that we retain our right to make disposals 
from the stockpile as we see fit. 

The United States did not join any of the 
first four International Tin Agreements. 
However, we participated in the negotiation 
of all but the Second International Tin 
Agreement, where we were an Observer. 



Following the completion of the negotiations 
for the Fifth International Tin Agreement in 
June, 1975, it received careful interagency 
examination and evaluation. As a result of 
that study, I have concluded that joining 
the Fifth International Tin Agreement 
would : 

— Have minimal impact on the American 
economy and carry with it no adverse eco- 
nomic effects. 

— Afford some protection to American in- 
dustry and consumers by enabling the 
United States to influence the decisions of 
an organization that seeks to balance the 
international supply of tin with demand. 

— Provide support for the concept of pro- 
ducer-consumer cooperation, and accommo- 
date the strong desire of both producer and 
consumer members that the United States, 
the world's largest single consumer of tin, 
join them in their work. 

— Constitute a clear demonstration of our 
willingness to join with others in seeking 
solutions to outstanding commodity prob- 
lems on a case-by-case basis, and of our de- 
sire to be forthcoming towards the develop- 
ing world while safeguarding our national 
interests. 

In view of these conclusions, I am con- 
vinced that joining the Fifth International 
Tin Agreement would serve our interests and 
have foreign policy benefits. I am transmit- 
ting a report submitted to me by the Secre- 
tary of State that explains the Fifth Inter- 
national Tin Agreement and our assessment 
of it in greater detail. 

I recommend that the Senate give early 
and favorable consideration to the Fifth 
International Tin Agreement, and grant its 
advice and consent to ratification. 

Gerald R. Ford. 

The White House, June 28, 1976. 



180 



Department of State Bulletin 



U.S. Gives Views in Security Council Debate on Israeli Rescue 
of Hijacking Victims at Entebbe Airp^ort 



Following are statements made in the U.N. 
Security Council by U.S. Representative 
William W. Scranton on July 12 and by U.S. 
Representative W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., on 
July IJf, together with the texts of tivo draft 
resolutions. 



STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCRANTON, 
JULY 12 

USUN press release 81 dated July 12 

This Council has been convened to discuss 
the military operation of Israel to rescue the 
hostages that were held by air hijackers at 
Entebbe Aii'port in Uganda. The Govern- 
ment of Uganda has condemned Israel for 
what is termed "aggression against Uganda." 
Israel has been accused of violating the ter- 
ritorial sovereignty and integrity of Uganda, 
of wantonly destroying sections of Entebbe 
Airport, and of killing a num.ber of Ugandan 
soldiers. These are very grave charges, and 
it is clearly the duty of this Council to con- 
sider them in light of the facts and inter- 
national law. 

As members of this Counci] know, I have 
spoken several times earlier this year in this 
Council defending the principle of territorial 
sovereignty in Africa. I reaffirm that today. 
In addition to that principle, there are other 
basic principles and issues at stake in the 
question that is before us. We must be 
deeply concerned with the problem of air 
piracy and the callous and pernicious use of 
innocent people as hostages to promote polit- 
ical ends. This Council cannot forget that 



the Israeli operation in Uganda would never 
have come about had the hijacking of the 
Air France flight from Athens not taken 
place. 

Let us review the circumstances surround- 
ing the Israeli action at Entebbe Airport. On 
July 4, in order to rescue the remaining 100 
hostages that had been hijacked in the Air 
France airbus and taken to Uganda, Israel 
sent a small military force to Entebbe Air- 
port. This force succeeded in rescuing the 
hostages and returning to Israel. Three of the 
hostages, one Israeli soldier, seven of the 
terrorists, and a number of Ugandan soldiers 
were apparently killed, and several Ugandan 
aircraft were destroyed. The Israeli force 
was on the ground for an hour and a half and 
departed for Israel as soon as it was possible 
to do so in safety. 

Israel's action in rescuing the hostages 
necessarily involved a temporary breach of 
the territorial integrity of Uganda. Normally 
such a breach would be impermissible under 
the Charter of the United Nations. However, 
there is a well-established right to use lim- 
ited force for the protection of one's own na- 
tionals from an imminent threat of injury or 
death in a situation where the state in whose 
territory they are located either is unwill- 
ing or unable to protect them. The right, 
flowing from the right of self-defense, is 
limited to such use of force as is necessary 
and appropriate to protect threatened na- 
tionals from injury. 

The requirements of this right to protect 
nationals were clearly met in the Entebbe 
case. Israel had good reason to believe that 



August 2, 1976 



181 



at the time it acted Israeli nationals were in 
imminent danger of execution by the hi- 
jackers. Moreover, the actions necessary to 
release the Israeli nationals or to prevent sub- 
stantial loss of Israeli lives had not been 
taken by the Government of Uganda, nor 
was there a reasonable expectation such ac- 
tions would be taken. In fact, there is sub- 
stantial evidence that the Government of 
Uganda cooperated with and aided the hi- 
jackers. 

A number of the released hostages have 
publicly related how the Ugandan authori- 
ties allowed several additional terrorists to 
reinforce the original group after the plane 
landed, permitted them to receive additional 
arms and additional explosives, participated 
in guarding the hostages, and according to 
some accounts, even took over sole custody 
of some or all of the passengers to allow the 
hijackers to rest. The ease and success of 
the Israeli effort to free the hostages further 
suggests that the Ugandan authorities could 
have overpowered the hijackers and released 
the hostages if they had really had the desire 
to do so. 

The apparent support given to the hijack- 
ers by the Ugandan authorities causes us to 
question whether Uganda lived up to its in- 
ternational legal obligations under the Hague 
Convention [for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Seizure of Aircraft]. The rights of a state 
carry with them important responsibilities 
which were not met by Uganda in this case. 
The Israeli military action was limited to the 
sole objective of extricating the passengers 
and crew and terminated when that objec- 
tive was accomplished. The force employed 
was limited to what was necessary for that 
rescue of the passengers and crew. 

That Israel might have secured the release 
of its nationals by complying with the ter- 
rorists' demands does not alter these conclu- 
sions. No state is required to yield control 
over persons in lawful custody in its terri- 
tory under criminal charges. Moreover, it 
would be a self-defeating and dangerous pol- 
icy to release prisoners, convicted in some 
cases of earlier acts of terrorism, in order to 
accede to the demands of the terrorists. 

It should be emphasized that this assess- 



mc^it of the legality of Israeli actions de- 
peinds heavily on the unusual circumstances 
of 1 this specific case. In particular, the evi- 
deisice is strong that, given the attitude of 
the^ Ugandan authorities, cooperation with or 
reliance on them in rescuing the passengers 
an^d crew was impracticable. It is to be hoped 
th at these unique circumstances will not 
ai^'ise in the future. We, of course, strongly 
d,efend the concept of national sovereignty 
find territorial integrity. Moreover, the 
TJnited States deplores the loss of life and 
property at Entebbe and extends its sympa- 
thy to those families who were bereaved by 
events originating in acts of terrorism that 
they neither supported nor condoned. 

But the U.S. delegation believes very 
strongly that this Council should address it- 
self to the causes of incidents such as that 
which occurred last week in Uganda. We be- 
ll eve that this Council should once again 
ta ke positive action to put an end to such 
senseless violence. We believe the United 
Nations should do everything within its 
powt^r to insure against a recurrence of this 
brutar,. callous, and senseless international 
crime of hijacking — the crime which gave 
rise to the Israeli action. 

At the very least, it seems to us, this 
Council should immediately record its collec- 
tive view th.at international terrorism — and 
specifically hijacking — must be stopped. 
There is ample precedent for taking such ac- 
tion. The Unit.pd Nations has spoken out 
strongly against hijacking and interference 
with international civil aviation a number of 
times. 

On September 9, 1970, the Security Coun- 
cil adopted by consensus Resolution 286 ap- 
pealing "for the immediate release of all pas- 
sengers and crew without exception, held as 
a result of hijackings . . . ." It called on 
states ''to take all possible legal steps to pre- 
vent further hijackings or any other inter- 
ff;rence with international civil air travel." 
Later in the autumn of 1970 the General 
Assembly adopted its detailed Resolution 
2645 (XXV) condemning "without exception 
whatsoever, all acts of aerial hijacking 
. . . ." The resolution, which the Assembly 
adopted by an overwhelming vote of 105 in 



182 



Department of State Bulletin 



favor and none against, with eight absten- 
tions, further declared that "the exploitation 
of unlawful seizure of aircraft for the pur- 
pose of taking hostages is to be condemned," 
and it called for every effort to make a suc- 
cess out of the then forthcoming Hague Con- 
ference negotiations for an antihijacking 
treaty. 

Again acting by consensus, the Security 
Council on June 20, 1972, stated its grave 
concern "at the threat to the lives of passen- 
gers and crew arising from the hijacking of 
aircraft . . . ." The Council called upon 
states "to deter and prevent such acts and 
to take effective measures to deal with those 
who commit such acts." 

In addition, there already exists an inter- 
national legal obligation for all states to pre- 
vent terrorist acts. The U.N. Declaration on 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among 
States, contained in General Assembly Reso- 
lution 2625 (XXV), declares: 

Every State has the duty to refrain from organiz- 
ing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of 
civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or 
acquiescing in organized activities within its terri- 
tory directed toward the commission of such acts, 
when the acts referred to in the present paragraph 
involve a threat or use of force. 

Concerning air hijacking in particular, 12 
members of this Council have ratified the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 
December 16, 1970. Over half the members 
of the international community have ac- 
cepted this convention, including Uganda and 
Israel. The purpose of the Hague Convention 
is to promote the safety of international 
civil aviation. It seeks to discourage hijack- 
ing by creating the realistic prospect of se- 
vere treatment by states against persons 
hijacking aircraft. 

To achieve this objective the convention 
requires every contracting state to make hi- 
jacking an offense punishable by severe pen- 
alties. Each contracting state is also bound 
to take such measures as may be necessary 
to establish its jurisdiction over the offense 
of hijacking and any other act of violence 
against passengers or crew of a hijacked air- 
craft which comes within its territory. 



According to the convention, a contracting 
state shall take all appropriate measures to 
restore control of the aircraft to its lawful 
commander. It must also facilitate the con- 
tinuation of the journey of the passengers 
and crew as soon as practicable and shall 
without delay return the aircraft and its 
cargo to persons lawfully entitled to its pos- 
session. Finally, it must take the hijackers 
into custody and either prosecute or extra- 
dite them. 

These are high standards — nobody denies 
that — but they are reasonable standards. My 
government does not believe that the Gov- 
ernment of Uganda has lived up to its legal 
obligations under the Hague Convention, to 
which it is a party. 

The United States believes that the United 
Nations should go much further in address- 
ing itself to the evils of international terror- 
ism. In 1972, we proposed a draft convention 
to the General Assembly, which provided, 
inter alia, that a signatory state either pros- 
ecute persons in its jurisdiction who commit 
any acts of international terrorism or extra- 
dite them to the state in which the crime 
was committed. Unfortunately, nothing has 
yet come of our initiative, because of dis- 
agreement over the definition of terrorism. 

With regard to air hijacking in particular, 
the United States has repeatedly pressed in 
the International Civil Aviation Organiza- 
tion for the adoption of an independent con- 
vention enabling states parties to act in 
concert against a state, even if not a party, 
that harbors hijackers or saboteurs or that 
fails to return an aircraft, passengers, or 
crew. We will continue to urge the adoption 
of such a convention, because we believe that 
it could provide for worldwide enforcement 
of the fundamental legal principles that are 
reflected in the Hague Convention. 

Mr. President, this Council can and should 
reaffirm its own stand in opposition to air 
hijacking which was expressed in the Coun- 
cil's consensus decision on hijacking adopted 
on June 20, 1972. Let us condemn the taking 
of innocent people as hostages. Let us de- 
plore the threat to innocent human life at 
the hands of terrorists. Let us also reaffirm 
our dedication to the preservation of the na- 



August 2, 1976 



183 



tional sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
every member state. Most important, let us 
take a firm stand against terrorist hijacking 
— one of the most dangerous threats to peace 
and security in the world today. 

Mr. President, these are the measured and 
considered views of my government concern- 
ing this episode, views with which I totally 
concur. But I ask you and my colleagues here 
to bear with me a few minutes longer, for I 
wish to make some personal comments about 
this episode in the context of the image of 
the United Nations itself and particularly 
the Security Council. 

My tenure here, as you all well know, has 
been of very short duration — approximately 
four months. In that period of time the Se- 
curity Council has been in session almost 
continuously. With rare exceptions the issues 
before it have been exclusively those of the 
Middle East, outstandingly, and southern 
Africa. 

To my Arab friends here and elsewhere: 
the U.S. delegation has made it clear on sev- 
eral occasions that problems in the Middle 
East are by no means totally one-sided. Each 
of us, I am sure, has individual pictures and 
vivid images that dwell in our minds when- 
ever matters — as they have over the last 
four months many times — concerning the 
Middle East confront us. 

In my own personal experience, there is 
outstandingly a visit to a refugee camp 
southwest of Amman, where decent people 
were living under very trying conditions only 
with the help of UNRWA [U.N. Relief and 
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 
Near East], having been expelled from their 
homes in some cases not once but twice, in 
1948 and 1967. And another picture which 
will never leave my mind ever — the condi- 
tion of Karameh after the raid on that 
village. 

On the other hand there is an equally vivid 
picture of Jews with access now to pray at 
the Wailing Wall. Or, even more vivid — and 
you must all remember these — those horrors 
of Buchenwald, Dachau, and Auschwitz. 

To my African friends here and elsewhere : 
on the issue of the liberation of southern 
Africa, my government has put itself 



squarely on the side of those who seek ma- 
jority rule with the determination that it be 
achieved by peaceful means. I am very happy 
that policy has been adopted while I am here. 

But to my Arab and African friends I say 
here and now, loud and strong, there may 
have been mixed pictures concerning some of 
the questions that have confronted the Se- 
curity Council in the immediate past, but to 
my mind there is no doubt on this one, not 
one iota. 

Why do I say that so strongly and so 
deeply? Yes, there was a temporary breach 
of the territorial sovereignty of Uganda, and 
let us hope that that never happens again. 
But there is another value, another judgment 
which surpasses that one in importance. 

Like most of you I have never been the 
head of a nation nor had the responsibilities 
thereof, but I have been accountable for the 
safety and protection of 12 million people in 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. During 
that period of time, even though hardly 
under the same circumstances, I know, there 
were several occasions in which incidents 
concerning the safety, the protection, and 
the lives of Pennsylvanians came to my office. 
Action thereon had to be decided by me, the 
ultimate executive authority in the Common- 
wealth. That was my first and foremost re- 
sponsibility. It is the first and foremost 
responsibility of all governments. 

In this episode, that responsibility lay with 
the Government of Israel to protect her citi- 
zens, hostages threatened with their very 
lives, in mortal danger in a faraway place. 
Those innocent people were subjected to the 
terrorist hijacking of the airplane on which 
they were rightfully flying and further sub- 
jected to a six-day terrorizing experience in 
a foreign country — seeing other persons freed 
while the Jews were forced to remain — sub- 
jected at gunpoint to seven hijacker terrorists 
who know no law — aware that the only pos- 
sibility of freedom came from a government 
whose head had previously rejoiced at the 
slaying of Israeli athletes at Munich, called 
for the extinction of Israel, and praised that 
madman Hitler, who had on his evil con- 
science, if he had a conscience at all, the 
murder of 6 million Jews. 



184 



Department of State Bulletin 



Under such circumstances, it seems to me, 
the Government of Israel invoked one of the 
most remarkable rescue missions in history, 
a combination of guts and brains that has 
seldom if ever been surpassed. It electrified 
millions everywhere, and I confess I was one 
of them. 

Justified, truly justified, because innocent, 
decent people have a right to live and be res- 
cued from terrorists who recognize no law 
and are ready to kill if their demands are 
not met. 

Who has a conscience about this? We 
should. Every single one of us. 

I assume that every one of us wants to do 
all in our power to avoid such episodes in the 
future. This is one episode in a series of cases 
of hijackings by terrorists — about which we 
can do a great deal. I believe that if we really 
want to, the Security Council and the United 
Nations can wipe such episodes off the face 
of this earth. 

As my government has stated in this mes- 
sage I have just finished delivering, we can 
do this ; I pointed out how. We must do this, 
and then and only then will our consciences 
be clear for the future. They will never be 
clear for the past. 



STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR BENNETT, 
JULY 14 

USUN press release 83 dated July 14 

I would like to make several observations 
on the conduct and substance of the debate 
which we are now concluding. The United 
States very much regrets that this Council 
did not take positive action against the crim- 
inal act of hijacking committed last week 
against the Air France aircraft and its pas- 
sengers. 

We believe that the resolution which we 
cosponsored with the United Kingdom was a 
balanced attempt at recording this Council's 
determined opposition to hijacking, as well 
as its respect for the sovereignty and terri- 
torial integrity of states and its concern for 
the loss of human life in this tragic incident. 
We take considerable satisfaction that, with 



a majority of the membership participating 
in the vote, not a single delegation could 
bring itself to vote against such a balanced 
resolution. 

Mr. President, we deeply regret the deaths 
of those on all sides of this controversy, 
those who had no responsibility for the act of 
terrorism which gave rise to the subsequent 
events. We extend our sincere condolences 
once again to all the families concerned, 
and particularly to the family of Mrs. Dora 
Bloch. 

Furthermore, we are most sensitive to the 
major points stressed by our colleagues from 
Africa during this debate — that sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of states must be 
sustained and protected. This is a natural 
and fundamental standard to which my gov- 
ernment fully adheres. As my country re- 
views its history in the year 1976, we 
particularly recall our own keen concern with 
this principle from the very outset of our 
life as a nation. We do not, however, view 
the exceptional nature of the incident at 
Entebbe as unjustified under international 
law. At the same time, we do not see it as a 
precedent which would justify any future un- 
authorized entry into another state's terri- 
tory that is not similarly justified by excep- 
tional circumstances. 

This debate has provided, in our view, a 
valuable opportunity to air the entire ques- 
tion of hijacking and the issues surrounding 
the Israeli operation at Entebbe. The debate 
has heightened public and governmental 
awareness of the real threat which air hi- 
jacking poses to the world today. The Secu- 
rity Council has provided a unique forum for 
a full discussion of what actually happened 
at Entebbe and the antecedent cause of that 
incident. 

One lesson has emerged clearly for all of 
us in this debate. We have had impressed 
upon us the terrible toll in human life and 
property caused by hijacking and the use of 
innocent people as hostages. 

My delegation has been encouraged by sev- 
eral statements made during this debate by 
members of the United Nations who have 
stated their intention to press for action 
against hijacking by this organization. In 



August 2, 1976 



185 



particular, we applaud the statement by the 
Representative of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, who announced that his govern- 
ment will urge action by the 31st General 
Assembly for international measures to pre- 
vent the taking of hostages. My government 
will strongly support the efforts of the Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany, and we shall work 
closely with them and with others to encour- 
age all members of the United Nations to 
support a convention to this end. We are 
pleased to note in that connection that the 
Representative of the U.S.S.R., speaking to 
the Security Council on July 13, said, and I 
quote, "We are ready, along with other states, 
to take new additional measui-es against acts 
of international terrorism." 

The sooner all the member nations of this 
body formally recognize that hijacking is a 
worldwide problem, the sooner we take posi- 
tive steps to do away with this plague of 
international lawlessness, the safer life will 
be for ourselves and for our children. 



TEXTS OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS 



U.S.-U.K. Draft Resolution ' 

The Security Council, 

Noting the letter dated 5 July 1976 from the 
Permanent Representative of Uganda to the United 
Nations (S/12124) and the letter dated 4 July 1976 
from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the 
United Nations (S/12123), 

Recalling its decision on hijacking adopted by 
consensus on 20 June 1972, the Hague Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 
the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Un- 
lawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 
and the Standards and Practices Governing Airport 
Security and Aircraft Safety recommended by the 
International Civil Aviation Organization, 

Reminding all States signatory to the Hague 
and Montreal Conventions of their obligations flow- 
ing from their accession to these agreements, 



'U.N. doc. S/12138; the Council voted on the draft 
resolution on July 14; the vote was 6 in favor (U.S., 
U.K., France, Italy, Japan, Sweden), with 2 absten- 
tions (Panama, Romania); Benin, the People's Re- 
public of China, Guyana, Libya, Pakistan, Tanzania, 
and the U.S.S.R. did not participate in the vote. Nine 
affirmative votes are required for adoption. 



1. Condemns hijacking and all other acts which 
threaten the lives of passengers and crews and the 
safety of international civil aviation and calls upon 
all States to take every necessary measure to pre- 
vent and punish all such terrorist acts; 

2. Deplores the tragic loss of human life which 
has resulted from the hijacking of the French air- 
craft; 

3. Reaffirms the need to respect the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of all States in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations and inter- 
national law; 

4. Enjoins the international community to give 
the highest priority to the consideration of further 
means of assuring the safety and reliability of inter- 
national civil aviation. 

Benin-Llbya-Tanzania Draft Resolution ^ 

The Security Council, 

Having considered the contents of the telegram 
from the current Chainnan of the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU), the Prime Minister of Mauri- 
tius, His Excellency, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam 
(S/12126), and the letter from the President of 
Uganda, His Excellency, Field Marshall Alhaji Dr. 
Idi Amin Dada (S/12124), 

Having heard the statement of the Foreign Min- 
ister of Uganda, 

Haviyig heard the statement of the Foreign Min- 
ister of Mauritius, Chairman of the twenty-seventh 
ordinary session of the OAU Council of Ministers, 

Having also heard the statement of the repre- 
sentative of Israel, 

Bearing in mind that all States Members of the 
United Nations must refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any 
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations Charter, 

Gravely concerned at the premeditated military 
raid committed by Israel against Uganda in viola- 
tion of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. 

Grieved at the tragic loss of human life caused 
by the Israeli invasion of Ugandan territory. 

Gravely concerned also at the damage and de- 
struction done by the Israeli invading forces in 
Uganda, 

1. Condemns Israel's flagrant violation of 
Uganda's sovereignty and territorial integrity; 

2. Demands that the Government of Israel meet 
the just claims of the Government of Uganda for 
full compensation for the damage and destruction 
inflicted on Uganda; 

3. Requests the Secretary-General to follow the 
implementation of this resolution. 



= U.N. doc. S/12139; the draft resolution was with- 
drawn by its sponsors on July 14. 



186 



Department of State Bulletin 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

Finance 

Amendments to the agreement of April 8, 1959, as 
amended, establishing the Inter-American Devel- 
opment Bank with respect to the creation of the 
inter-regional capital stock of the Bank and to 
related matters. Approved at Washington June 1, 
1976. Entered into force June 1, 1976. 

Property — Industrial 

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial 

property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at 

Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 

entered into force May 19, 1970; for the United 

States August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 

entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United 

States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923. 

Notifications from World Intellectual Property 

Organization that accessions deposited: Ghana, 

Libya,' June 28, 1976; Mauritania, June 21, 1976; 

Mauritius, June 24, 1976. 

Property — Intellectual 

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Prop- 
erty Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 
1967. Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the 
United States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932. 
Accessions deposited: Libya, June 28, 1976; 

Mauritania, June 17, 1976; Mauritius, June 21, 

1976. 

Terrorism 

Convention to prevent and punish the acts of terror- 
ism taking the form of crimes against persons and 
related extortion that are of international signifi- 
cance. Signed at Washington February 2, 1971. 
Entered into force October 16, 1973.= 
Ratification deposited: Dominican Republic, May 
25, 1976. 

War 

Convention relating to the treatment of prisoners of 

war; 
Convention for the amelioration of the condition of 
the wounded and sick of armies in the field. 
Done at Geneva July 27, 1929. Entered into force 
June 19, 1931; for the United States August 4, 
1932. TIAS 2021, 2074, respectively. 
Notification of succession: Papua New Guinea, 
April 7, 1976. 
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of 
wounded and sick in armed forces in the field; 



Geneva convention for amelioration of the condition 
of wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of 
armed forces at sea; 
Geneva convention relative to the treatment of pris- 
oners of war; 
Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian 
persons in time of war. 

Done at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force 
October 21, 1950; for the United States Febru- 
ary 2, 1956. TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, and 3365, 
respectively. 
Notification of succession: Papua New Guinea, 

May 26, 1976. 
Accession deposited: Sao Tome and Principe, 
May 21, 1976. 

Wheat 

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat 
trade convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washing- 
ton March 17, 1976. Entered into force June 19, 
1976 with respect to certain parts; with respect 
to remaining parts July 1, 1975; entered into force 
provisionally for the United States June 19, 1976. 
Accession deposited: Dominican Republic, July 
13, 1976. 



BILATERAL 

Bolivia 

Loan agreement relating to the improvement of 
rural education in Bolivia, with annex. Signed at 
La Paz December 29, 1975. Entered into force 
December 29, 1975. 

Loan agreement to assist small farmer organizations 
in Bolivia to strengthen their viability as self- 
sustaining units, with annex. Signed at La Paz 
March 24, 1976. Entered into force March 24, 1976. 

Canada 

Agreement amending and extending the agreement 
of June 29, 1973 (TIAS 7702), relating to the use 
of facilities at Goose Bay airport by the United 
States. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa 
June 28 and 29, 1976. Entered into force July 1, 
1976. 

Colombia 

Loan agreement concerning construction of feeder 
roads as a means of promoting increased agricul- 
tural productivity in Colombia, with annex. Signed 
at Bogota March 12, 1976. Entered into force 
March 22, 1976. 

Guarantee agreement relating to the loan agreement 
of March 12, 1976, concerning construction of 
feeder roads as a means of promoting increased 
agricultural productivity in Colombia. Signed at 
Bogota April 22, 1976, Entered into force April 22, 
1976. 



' With reservation and declaration. 
'■' Not in force for the United States. 



August 2, 1976 



187 



Costa Rica 

Agreement relating to the operation and mainte- 
nance of a rawinsonde observation station at San 
Jose, with memorandum of arrangement dated 
June 28, 1976. Eflfected by exchange of notes at 
San Jose April 29 and June 8, 1976. Entered into 
force June 8, 1976. 

Agreement relating to the provision of additional 
assistance by the United States to support co- 
operative efforts to curb illegal narcotics produc- 
tion and traffic. Effected by exchange of notes at 
San Jose June 21 and 24, 1976. Entered into force 
June 24, 1976. 

Dominican Republic 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat im- 
ports from the Dominican Republic for calendar 
year 1976. Effected by exchange of notes at Santo 
Domingo April 29 and June 30, 1976. Entered into 
force June 30, 1976. 

Haiti 

Loan agreement to assist Haiti in reconstructing 
agricultural feeder roads, with annex. Signed at 
Port-au-Prince June 29, 1976. Entered into force 
June 29, 1976. 

Mali 

Project agreement relating to improvement of crop 
production in Mali, with annexes. Signed at Ba- 
mako June 29, 1976. Entered into force June 29, 
1976. 

Mexico 

Procedures for mutual assistance in the administra- 
tion of justice in connection with the General Tire 
and Rubber Company and the Firestone Tire and 
Rubber Company matters. Signed at Washington 
June 23, 1976. Entered into force June 23, 1976. 

Morocco 

Loan agreement relating to construction of the 
Doukkala-Zemamra sprinkler irrigation system, 
with annex. Signed at Rabat June 14, 1976. En- 
tered into force June 14, 1976. 

Seychelles 

Agreement relating to the establishment, operation 
and maintenance of a tracking and telemetry fa- 
cility on the island of Mahe. Signed at Victoria 
June 29, 1976. Entered into force June 29, 1976. 

Switzerland 

Treaty on mutual assistance in criminal matters with 
related notes. Signed at Bern May 25, 1973." 
Instrument of ratification signed by the Presi- 
dent: July 10, 1976. 

Turkey 

Agreement on procedures for mutual assistance in 
the administration of justice in connection with 



the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and the 
McDonnell Douglas Corporation matters. Signed 
at Washington July 8, 1976. Enters into force in 
the manner provided by the domestic laws of the 
United States and Turkey, respectively. 



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Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, 
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188 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX August 2, 1976 Vol. LXXV, No. 1936 



Africa. Questions and Answers Following the 
Secretary's Address at Chicago 157 

Angola 

Execution of Daniel Gearhart in Angola (state- 
ments by Secretary Kissinger and White 
House Press Secretary) 163 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of 
July 10 164 

Canada. President Ford's News Conference of 
July 9 (excerpts) 161 

Commodities. Fifth International Tin Agree- 
ment Transmitted to the Senate (message 
from President Ford) 179 

Communism 

Questions and Answers Following the Secre- 
tary's Address at Chicago 157 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of 
July 10 164 

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating 

to Foreign Policy 173 

Department and Foreign Service. Secretary 
Kissinger's News Conference of July 10 . . 164 

Developing Countries. The Future of Amer- 
ica's Foreign Policy (Kissinger) 149 

Industrial Democracies. The Future of Amer- 
ica's Foreign Policy (Kissinger) 149 

Israel 

President Ford Expresses Satisfaction at Res- 
cue of Hijacking Victims (letter to Prime 
Minister of Israel) 160 

President Ford's News Conference of July 9 
(excerpts) 161 

Questions and Answers Following the Secre- 
tary's Address at Chicago 157 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of 
July 10 164 

The United States and the Middle East 
(Atherton) 174 

U.S. Gives Views in Security Council Debate 
on Israeli Rescue of Hijacking Victims at 
Entebbe Airport (Bennett, Scran ton, texts of 
draft resolutions) 181 

Lebanon 

Prince Abdallah of Saudi Arabia Visits Wash- 
ington (toast by Secretary Kissinger) . . . 172 

Questions and Answers Following the Secre- 
tary's Address at Chicago 157 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of 
July 10 164 

Middle East. The United States and the 
Middle East (Atherton) 174 

Presidential Documents 

Fifth International Tin Agreement Trans- 
mitted to the Senate 179 

President Ford Expresses Satisfaction at Res- 
cue of Hijacking Victims 160 

President Ford's News Conference of July 9 
(excerpts) 161 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications .... 188 

Saudi Arabia. Prince Abdallah of Saudi Arabia 
Visits Washington (toast by Secretary Kis- 
singer) 172 

Terrorism 

President Ford Expresses Satisfaction at Res- 
cue of Hijacking Victims (letter to Prime 
Minister of Israel) 160 



Questions and Answers Following the Secre- 
tary's Address at Chicago 157 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of 
July 10 164 

U.S. Gives Views in Security Council Debate 
on Israeli Rescue of Hijacking Victims at 
Entebbe Airport (Bennett, Scranton, texts 
of draft resolutions) 181 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 187 

Fifth International Tin Agreement Trans- 
mitted to the Senate (message from Presi- 
dent Ford) 179 

Uganda. U.S. Gives Views in Security Council 
Debate on Israeli Rescue of Hijacking Vic- 
tims at Entebbe Airport (Bennett, Scranton, 
texts of draft resolutions) 181 

U.S.S.R. 

The Future of America's Foreign Policy (Kis- 
singer) 149 

President Ford's News Conference of July 9 
(excerpts) 161 

Questions and Answers Following the Secre- 
tary's Address at Chicago 157 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of 
July 10 164 

United Nations 

Questions and Answers Following the Secre- 
tary's Address at Chicago 157 

U.S. Gives Views in Security Council Debate 
on Israeli Rescue of Hijacking Victims at 
Entebbe Airport (Bennett, Scranton, texts 
of draft resolutions) • . 181 



Name Index 

Atherton, Alfred L., Jr 174 

Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr 181 

Ford, President 160, 161, 179 

Kissinger, Secretary . . . 149, 157, 163, 164, 172 

Nessen, Ronald H 163 

Scranton, William W 181 



Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: July 12-18 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 



No. Date 



Sabject 



*343A 7/12 Correction to itinerary of official 
visit of Federal German Chan- 
cellor Schmidt. 

*346 7/12 Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., sworn in 
as Assistant Secretary for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs (bio- 
graphic data). 

*347 7/12 Office for International Labor Or- 
ganization Affairs established 
in Bureau of International Or- 
ganization Affairs. 

*348 7/13 U.S. and Canada discuss Poplar 
River thermal generation proj- 
ect. 



Not printed. 



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5' 

a- 



6zr\l 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXXV 



No. 1937 



August 9, 1976 



CHANGES AND CHOICES AT THE UNITED NATIONS 
Address by Assistant Secretary Lewis 189 

U.S. DISCUSSES RELATIONS WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 

IN OPENING STATEMENT AT ECOSOC MEETING 

Statement by Ambassador Scranton 201 

DEPARTMENT DISCUSSES U.S. PRISONERS IN MEXICO 
Statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary Luers 211 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 

For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLET I 



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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
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STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
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the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



Vol. LXXV, No. 1937 
August 9, 1976 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by tht 
Office of Media Services, Bureau ot 
Public Affairs, provides tlte public oni 
interested agencies of tlte government 
icitfi information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations am 
on the work of the Department ant 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes seleetu 
press releases on foreign policy, issuet 
by tfie White House and the Depart 
ment, and statements, addresses 
and news conferences of the Presidem 
and the Secretary of State and othei 
officers of the Department, as well w 
special articles on various phases a 
international affairs and the function 
of the Department. Information i 
included concerning treaties and inter 
national agreements to which thi 
United States is or may become i 
party and on treaties of general inter 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department oi 
State, United Nations documents, ant 
legislative material in the field 01 
international relations are also listei 



Changes and Choices at the United Nations 



Address by Samuel W. Lewis 

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs ' 



No people understand better than the 
American people the need to respond crea- 
;ively to the demands of rapid change. 
And no people have been more successful 
:han the American people at finding prac- 
ical solutions to the conflicts which change 
nevitably creates. 

Our own history is characterized by 
Iramatic transformation. We have grown 
rom a small to an immense country. We 
leveloped from an agricultural society to 
in industrial giant. We changed from a 
country of homogeneous racial origins to 
i multiracial society of rich and diverse 
composition. And we have evolved from a 
country preoccupied with its own concerns 
;o a nation burdened with the responsibili- 
;ies of world leadership. 

Beyond our borders, the world itself 
changes with extraordinary rapidity. We 
ire all familiar with the revolutions of our 
entury — in technology, in global com- 
nnunications, in the conflict of ideologies, 
n the creation of mass destruction weap- 
)ns, and in the explosion of population 
rowth. These have produced fears, hopes, 
'erment, and struggle — arousing new ex- 
aectations in places where for centuries 
;here was only mute suffering. 

All of these changes, good and bad, in- 
jvitably create conflict. And conflict re- 
luires that we make choices. This is in- 
jscapable. If we try to avoid making 
choices, that is in itself a choice. 



' Made before the General Federation of Women's 
lubs at Philadelphia, Pa., on June 17 (text from 
Department of State oress release). 



The pace of change throughout the 
world is nowhere more vividly exposed 
than at the United Nations. And because 
the breadth of the U.N.'s work is so central 
to many of our nation's purposes, I think it 
is vital that all of us assess realistically 
the choices — and their consequences — that 
confront us in the United Nations today. 

This afternoon, then, I want to discuss 
with you what I believe to be the most 
important changes with which we must 
cope and the practical choices which fol- 
low from them. Our decisions can shape the 
world system for the rest of this century 
and well into the next. And our future 
security and prosperity are both at stake. 

The Changes Confronting Us 

Among the great changes of the last 
three decades, I would like to focus on 
three which I believe are especially 
important: 

— First, the significance of a U.N. mem- 
bership expanded roughly three times, 
from some 50 to nearly 150 .sovereign 
nations. 

— Second, the change in the role and in- 
fluence of the United States. 

— Third, the changes in the problems 
with which the world community must 
cope, especially at the United Nations. 

When the United Nations was founded 
over 30 years ago, most of its original 51 
members shared Western traditions of 
government and practiced traditional 



^ugust 9, 1976 



189 



forms of diplomacy. Our main preoccupa- 
tion in the early years was to contain 
threats from the Soviet Union and its allies. 
We did well in this task ; most of the world, 
most members of the United Nations, were 
solidly with us. 

In the 1960's dozens of new countries 
emerged from colonialism. We welcomed 
the newly independent states — indeed, we 
were foremost among the major powers in 
pressing for a rapid end to colonial em- 
pires. We did so because the right of peo- 
ples to rule themselves is one of our bed- 
rock beliefs, enshrined 200 years ago by 
Jefferson's pen here at Philadelphia. We 
cannot forget our own first premise. The 
principle of self-rule transcends the incon- 
venience and conflict which we and other 
governments have to endure as new states 
scramble over unfamiliar terrain on the 
road toward their rightful place in the 
family of nations. 

But the consequences for the United 
Nations have been profound. Originally, 
the U.N.'s problems were those of its 
founding members — predominantly West- 
ern countries. Originally, we practiced 
diplomacy there in the traditional mode — 
even allowing for an occasional outburst, 
as when a Soviet leader once employed a 
shoe noisily on his table to capture the 
world's attention. 

Today the United Nations is preoccupied 
with issues important to both new and 
older states — problems of economic links 
between the developing and industrial 
worlds or the process of completing the 
liquidation of colonialism and racial dis- 
crimination in southern Africa. Today, U.N. 
debates feature a rough-and-tumble style 
of diplomacy, practiced by many represent- 
atives of the newer states which have no 
quiet, genteel diplomatic tradition. 

These changes have good and bad as- 
pects. It is good that most of the world is 
now represented in the United Nations and 
that the world body has begun to tackle 
global problems of far-reaching impor- 
tance to the world's peoples, problems 
such as food production, population 



growth, threats to the global environment, 
or the ownership of resources found in the ! 
world's oceans. But it is bad when inter- 
national institutions are misused, when im- 
patience and passion lead to confronta- 
tion, abusive rhetoric, and illusory tests of I 
strength. 

While the United Nations has been 
changing, so also have the past 30 years 
seen fundamental alterations in the role 
and influence of the United States. When 
the United Nations was founded, many , 
former power centers of the world had 
been devastated. U.S. influence and power' 
were overwhelming. Everybody needed 
our help — desperately. And we gave gen- 
erously of our immense wealth. This situa- 
tion of almost total U.S. preponderance 
was, of course, reflected at the United i 
Nations. 

As we all know, the situation hasi 
changed dramatically. Europe and Japan, 
with our assistance, have made brilliant 
recoveries. The economic and military 
strength of the Soviet Union and its allies 
have increased greatly. The People's Re- 
public of China is now a major actor on 
the world scene. And many of the 100 
new countries have become significant par- 
ticipants in the world economy. 

This does not mean that we have become 
in any sense a second-rate nation. We are ; 
still the world's strongest country, mili- 
tarily and economically. The Common- 
wealth of Pennsylvania alone has a greater 
production of goods and services than nine- 
tenths of the world's nations. And more 
important, America and American ideals 
are still a source of hope for much of the 
world. Our creativity and our ability to find 
innovative solutions to new challenges are 
greatly admired. But others are also im- 
portant now and play vital roles along 
with us. This change is reflected in the 
United Nations. Indeed, it would be strange 
if it were not. 

And at the very time when our own rela- 
tive power to control events has lessened, 
we find ourselves confronted by new prob- 
lems of enormous complexity — problems; 



190 



Department of State Bulletin 



which even raise questions about man- 
kind's ability to survive into the 21st 
century. 

Now we must work out how 4 billion 
human beings can better share the re- 
sources of our planet in a way that pro- 
motes global economic growth and pro- 
duces more economic justice for millions 
who have been living at the margin of exist- 
ence. Now we must devise means to pre- 
serve our environment for future genera- 
tions while harnessing and adapting tech- 
nology for economic development rather 
than destruction. And of course some of 
the age-old problems remain as vital, as 
demanding, as ever — the need to contain 
local conflict, to resolve disputes, and to 
avoid world war. 



The Choices Open To Us 

Changes of such vast magnitude inevita- 
bly demand choices. I would like to define 
them by asking three fundamental ques- 
tions, all of which have particular rele- 
vance to our role in the United Nations: 

— First, are we prepared to be realistic 
in confronting the world's problems and in 
recognizing our own strengths and limits? 

— Second, are we prepared to commit 
our energies to cooperative endeavors with- 
in the framework of existing world institu- 
tions? 

— Third, are we prepared to bring to 
bear our special blend of idealism and 
practicality? 

These are big questions. They are well 
worth our honest examination; for our 
answers to them will essentially decide 
whether we play a leading, constructive 
role in solving world problems or whether 
others increasingly take actions without 
our participation which may or may not be 
in our interest. 

First, can we deal realistically ivith our 
problems? This is the most fundamental 
choice we may ever make. For unless we 
look at things honestly, none of the other 



choices we make are likely to do us any 
good. We all know this in our professional 
lives. One cannot manage any enterprise 
effectively and achieve satisfactory results 
unless decisions are based upon an honest 
appraisal of one's own capabilities — and 
an understanding of the interests of others. 

But it has perhaps been harder for 
Americans to keep in mind the inescap- 
able need for realism in the sphere of inter- 
national relations. We have until recently 
been spared the defeats and frustrations 
that others in the world have had to suffer. 
Our country has never been laid waste by 
foreign war. Our people have experienced 
two centuries of economic growth. We 
have enjoyed personal freedoms about 
which many other societies have only 
dreamed. 

Thus we often feel privileged — a little 
apart from the troubles of the rest of the 
world. But now our only realistic option is 
to accept the reality that our problems are 
interwoven with those of others. This is so 
for many reasons : 

— Because local wars, as in the Middle 
East, can easily escalate to world wars. 

— Because global conflict today can de- 
stroy the entire planet in a nuclear holo- 
caust. 

— Because our economic prosperity de- 
pends on cooperation with other countries, 
rich and poor. 

— Because we need the raw materials 
and the markets of many others to con- 
tinue to grow ourselves. To maintain our 
modern industry, for example, we need to 
import not only much of our energy re- 
quirements, but we are now also depend- 
ent on foreign sources for essential mineral 
needs, including more than half the 
nickel, zinc, and tungsten and more than 
three-fourths of the bauxite, manganese, 
cobalt, and tin we consume. 

— And finally, our nation's destiny is 
linked with that of others because we 
could not long survive as a free and crea- 
tive society if we were surrounded by a 
world of hostility and hatred. 



August 9, 1976 



191 



These are the facts of interdependence. 
And our only realistic course is not to deny 
them, but to accept them. For otherwise 
we would be choosing isolation, stagna- 
tion — and the undermining of our confi- 
dence, our values, and even our freedoms. 

To choose realistic options in inter- 
national affairs also means that we must 
accept and understand the limits of our 
own capabilities. This is not easy for 
Americans. Our prestige and comparative 
wealth were so great after the Second 
World War that it seemed we could get 
our way on almost any issue by urging 
enough friendly and grateful countries to 
support our position. And we seemed to 
have virtually unlimited resources to 
throw at every problem. Now, however, 
we must learn to work in a more complex 
environment, knowing that we no longer 
have overwhelming weight. 

We must also face the fact that for the 
foreseeable future the poor nations, im- 
patient to improve their lot, will continue 
to resent the great inequalities existing 
under a world system which they did not 
create. And many will blame the rich 
countries who, in their eyes, were the cre- 
ators of this system and are its main bene- 
ficiaries. 

But let us not forget — the poor coun- 
tries are trying to do something with 
which we Americans deeply sympathize : 
to improve the quality of life for their 
peoples. And they are struggling against 
nearly overwhelming odds. We should rec- 
ognize that these nations vary enormously 
in their history, in their geography, in their 
cultural backgrounds. It is inevitable that 
many will not choose paths to nation- 
building that are the same as ours. Indeed, 
they cannot do so. 

We, however, have nothing to fear 
from diversity. Just as it is sacred to us that 
diversity may flourish within our own 
country, so also must we accept and sup- 
port diversity in the rest of the world. 

Our tasks in the new world environment 
will not be easy. When we want others to 
do something in our interest, we will have 



192 



to show them that it is also in their inter- 
est. We will have to take the time and 
effort to explain our proposals patiently, 
because others will not automatically as- 
sume that we know what's best for them 
or that our and their interests coincide. 
And we will need to show genuine concern 
for the problems of other nations, since 
they cannot be forced to take a sympathet- 
ic view of our problems merely because 
we demand it. Reciprocity is indispensable. 
But these concepts should be very famil- 
iar to Americans. We have been extremely 
successful in business enterprise — as suc- 
cessful as any people in history. It is the 
most fundamental element of realism that 
if you want to make a deal and have it 
stick, it has to be in the genuine interest of 
both parties. 

Our second major choice is this: Are we 
willing to use our great energies and capa- 
bilities to work at solving vital world 
problems through the institutions ivhich 
we took the lead in establishing? This is 
not simply a rhetorical question. We all 
know that the United Nations in recent 
years has been the scene of increasing con- 
frontation. Many therefore have questioned 
whether it remains in our interest to stay 
in the United Nations or at least in some 
of its bodies, like the General Assembly, 
where confrontation has sometimes been 
acute. And many also ask whether we 
should reduce the level of our support by 
withholding financial contributions. 

Let us examine our choices objectively. 
Is it a practical option to turn our back on 
the United Nations? Could we start over 
again to fashion a new organization which 
would serve our interests more effectively, 
which would avoid the contention and 
acrimony we find offensive? 

The answer is "No." 

When the United Nations was founded 
after the Second World War, we estab- 
lished a comprehensive, fair, and balanced 
structure. It was based on fundamental 
principles in which we believe. But since 
we no longer possess the overwhelming in- 
fluence in the world state system that we 

Department of State Bulletin 



could deploy in 1945, we could not con- 
ceivably hope to create today a U.N. 
structure as sound or as balanced as the 
present one. 

Moreover, other nations do not want to 
start all over again. Some might say that 
the newer nations are happy with the 
present system because a new majority of 
small countries now can control what goes 
on at the United Nations. 

There is some truth to this, but not much. 
The majority of small countries does not 
control everything that goes on at the 
United Nations. In fact, they complain 
bitterly about the undue influence of the 
great powers — and in any charter revision 
would seek to reduce it. We retain a veto 
in the U.N.'s most sensitive and important 
body, the Security Council, which can take 
binding decisions on issues of peace and 
security. And actions in a great many other 
U.N. bodies are largely taken by consensus. 
In the 1975 General Assembly, for ex- 
ample, nearly two-thirds of all decisions 
were adopted in this manner. 

This means that we have often been able 
to negotiate satisfactory outcomes with 
the new majority. The examples of trau- 
matic confrontation are very much in the 
minority, even though their reverberations 
sometimes drown out reports on the good 
work done throughout the U.N. system. 

But it is true that there can be, and there 
have been, serious abuses of procedure at 
the United Nations, particularly in some of 
the larger bodies like the General Assem- 
bly. And there have been some egregious 
distortions of truth and applications of a 
double standard of morality. But these 
offenses will not be solved or removed by 
running away from the scene of action. 

If we should turn our back on the United 
Nations, the consequences would be: 

— The organization would struggle on 
without us, and there would undoubtedly 
be more, not less, irresponsibility. World 
problems would be dealt with in a more 
ineffectual way than they are now. and less 
in accord with U.S. interests. 

— In time the world organization would 

August 9, 1976 



probably collapse. It could not long survive 
the absence of the world's strongest and 
economically most advanced country. 

Let there be no doubt about this funda- 
mental point: If there ceased to be a 
United Nations, we would very shortly find 
it essential to create a new world organiza- 
tion. For all of us — rich and poor, large 
and small — would feel the need of a global 
institution to deal with inescapable global 
problems. 

Although we cannot abandon the United 
Nations or realistically hope to negotiate a 
new, more satisfactory U.N. Charter, we 
can work strenuously to improve the ef- 
fectiveness and fairness of the present sys- 
tem. This is the course that we are pursu- 
ing, and we believe it is a choice which 
warrants the support of the American 
l)eople. 

Let me list a few of the steps we are 
taking to enhance our prospects for suc- 
cessful diplomacy in the U.N. arena: 

— First, we are engaged in a new inten- 
sive effort to work with other govern- 
ments on U.N. problems throughout the 
year. Our purpose is to exchange views — 
to persuade, not to coerce. 

— Second, we have begun to speak out 
more forcefully in U.N. forums to defend 
our interests and our country against un- 
warranted attacks. 

— Third, we are making clear to others 
that we expect the same standards of re- 
sponsibility and mutual respect in multi- 
lateral affairs which normally prevail in 
bilateral diplomatic relations. If a govern- 
ment chooses to work unremittingly 
against us, for example, on behalf of some 
abstract notion of bloc solidarity, it will 
know that this can have a cost in our bi- 
lateral relations. 

— Fourth, we are participating energet- 
ically in a new effort at the United Nations 
to restructure the organization's economic 
work and to improve its procedures, includ- 
ing greater use of consensus. 

— Fifth, and most important, we are tak- 
ing the initiative in seeking cooperative. 



193 



practical solutions to the problems of eco- 
nomic interdependence which affect both 
rich and poor countries alike. 

We believe that many nations, though 
not all, will eventually join us in seeking 
practical results rather than expending 
their energies in sterile polemics. Indeed, 
that was their response to Secretary Kissin- 
ger's comprehensive proposals at the his- 
toric seventh special session of the U.N. 
General Assembly last September. At that 
session, American initiatives provided the 
basis for a broad, concrete program, 
adopted by consensus, to promote world 
economic cooperation. We cannot hope to 
eliminate all political conflict from eco- 
nomic forums. But to the extent that we 
offer positive alternatives to the develop- 
ing nations, their incentive to fall back on 
political confrontation can be lessened. 

The last major element of choice I want 
to discuss today is this: Can we bring the 
unique American blend of idealis7n and 
practicality to bear in dealing with world 
problems? The United Nations was 
founded upon the highest ideals. After the 
calamitous suffering of the Second World 
War, people everywhere hoped that the 
new organization would forever spare man- 
kind from the scourge of war. We wanted 
the United Nations to insure universal co- 
operation and justice. 

After 30 years of world turmoil we know 
that our hopes were premature. But this 
does not mean that the choice before us 
now is whether or not to abandon these 
hopes in disgust. The great truths and as- 
pirations embodied in the U.N. Charter re- 
main valid world goals. 

Our real choice is whether we can accept 
that in an imperfect and frustrating world 
we must persevere in seeking gradual 
gains. The accumulated burdens of centu- 
ries of misery and injustice throughout the 
world cannot be wiped out in a few 
decades. 

We all know from experience that last- 



ing progress to bring reality into accord 
with aspiration can be made only gradu- 
ally. The struggle in our own country to 
achieve racial equality continues a century 
after we fought our Civil War over this 
principle. 

Many parallels exist with our participa- 
tion in world affairs. The Charter of the 
United Nations, like our Declaration of In- 
dependence and our Constitution, expresses 
ideals in which we deeply believe: that the i 
strong should not subjugate the weak, that 
there should be justice for all. We should 
sustain the same blend of idealism and pa- 
tient realism in the world and in the United 
Nations that we have applied to advancei 
justice within our own country. 

This is not an abstract point. The chal- 
lenge to blend idealism and realism is be- 
fore us in many specific projects at the 
United Nations. If we are prepared to; 
make realistic choices, if we are prepared 
to throw ourselves into the practical work 
of the United Nations, we can advance 
goals of the highest moral importance. Let' 
me provide a few concrete illustrations: 

— Working for peace, for the avoidancei 
or halting of conflict, must be our para-, 
mount concern. The United Nations, and'i 
especially the Security Council, can help( 
to prevent or stop conflicts that bear the 
seeds of world war. The Council did so in 
1973 when it placed peacekeeping forces" 
between Arab and Israeli armies. In our| 
nuclear age, it is clear that the avoidancei 
of world conflict — which in minutes could! 
destroy the civilization of millennia — is a« 
vital condition for building a world of 
justice. 

— The United Nations can advance the 
search for equitable economic relations be- 
tween rich and poor societies. Practical 
measures of international cooperation can 
be hammered out, and many United Na- 
tions agencies can help developing coun-' 
tries build more self-sufficient economies.! 
Our country is contributing its vast ex- 






194 



Department of State Bulletin < 



perience and technological know-how. It 
should be a source of deep satisfaction to 
Americans that our efforts through the 
United Nations help make possible a life 
of more hope and decency for many whose 
faces we in this room shall never see. 

— An urgent task requiring the practical 
skills mobilized by the U.N.'s Food and 
Agriculture Organization is to help other 
countries increase their production of food. 
Here the moral dimension is obvious. No 
world system can be tolerable if millions 
of persons periodically die of famine or 
cannot achieve their full human potential 
as a result of malnutrition. 

— In the field of health, a U.N. agency 
also works at the boundary between prac- 
ticality and morality. The World Health 
Organization applies modern science to 
combat one of the globe's most tenacious 
enemies: contagious disease. It is a moral 
imperative that Americans support the 
struggle to lift from mankind's shoulders 
the burdens of debilitating and crippling 
disease. 

— The United Nations is sponsoring the 
most complex global negotiation ever at- 
tempted over the future use of more than 
two-thirds of our planet. The Law of the 
Sea Conference — now in its fourth year — 
is dealing directly with urgent issues of 
practicality and equity. The welfare and 
livelihood of millions will be affected by 
the details of arrangements worked out 
regarding fishing, mining, energy extrac- 
tion, pollution, scientific research, and 
many other areas. But the solutions must 
be accepted as fair and just by all partici- 
pants if they are to be enduring. The alter- 
native is chaos and strife. 

— The U.N. Charter and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights set high 
standards for the world's governments in 
the field of human rights, goals with which 
Americans especially can identify. We are 
disappointed at the slowness of progress, 
the difficulty in achieving acceptance of 
solid measures to protect fundamental hu- 



man rights. But the United Nations pro- 
vides an opportunity to raise our voice in 
behalf of goals we know to be inde- 
structible. 

— And I would note one final area in 
which the United Nations has recently 
taken the lead. In the establishment of an 
International Women's Year, the United 
Nations has now begun to marshal forces 
to realize the full rights and potential of 
half the world's people. Moral considera- 
tions are paramount. But there is also a 
practical necessity. To achieve its great 
promise, our civilization must use to the 
fullest the capabilities of women — their 
creativity, their strength, and their com- 
passion. 

These are only a few illustrations of how 
moral goals and practical tasks intersect. 
Let us recognize that the United Nations 
provides a unique opportunity to pursue 
goals in a uniquely American way: ideal- 
ism combined with practicality. 

Advancing U.S. Ideals on a Global Scale 

I have spoken bluntly today about 
choices confronting the United States. It 
seems to me that it is especially important 
in our country — one of the world's greatest 
democracies — that we discuss realistically 
what we are up against in the world and 
what our opportunities are. For it is the es- 
sence of our democratic process that our 
citizens participate in the making of 
choices. 

But our right and our ability to make 
choices must also impose responsibilities. 
We have a duty to look at the facts 
squarely. We have a duty to assess the 
long-range as well as the immediate conse- 
quences of our choices. And we have a duty 
to be true to our traditions. 

One of our strongest traditions has been 
dedication to the pursuit of great moral 
goals in a practical way. I feel privileged 
to have discussed this theme in this 200th 
anniversary year before a group of Ameri- 



August 9, 1976 



195 



cans from all over the country meeting 
here in Philadelphia, the birthplace of our 
nation. 

When our forebears here in this city 
signed the Declaration of Independence 
and the Constitution, they gave life to ex- 
alted and ennobling concepts. They pro- 
claimed our conviction that men and 
women can arrange their affairs in ways 
that protect the deepest aspiration of all 
people : the search for a life of dignity and 
justice. 

That also is what the United Nations is 
all about. It was conceived to realize man- 
kind's most enduring dreams — to supplant 
intimidation and subjugation with persua- 
sion and accommodation — to dissipate fear, 
misery, injustice and to put in their place 
self-fulfillment and respect for human 
rights. 

If we are to be realistic, and we must 
be, we will admit to ourselves that the 
United Nations is far from perfect. Indeed, 
it has a great many imperfections, as do 
all large political institutions. 

But if we are realistic, we will also un- 
derstand that the United Nations, with all 
its imperfections, represents our best 
framework — the only worldwide frame- 
work — for building a safer, more equitable, 
more humane world. We must strengthen 
and improve the United Nations. We can- 
not afford to weaken or abandon it. 

I have faith, as an American celebrating 
our 200th anniversary along with other 
Americans, that our country will make the 
right choices, the responsible choices, 
about our participation in the only world 
organization. And when we do so, we will 
know that we are advancing on a global 
scale those same ideals which were pro- 
claimed here in this city two centuries ago. 

Let me close with the words of Thomas 
Jefferson, who declared: "I believe . . . 
that morality, compassion, generosity, are 
innate elements of the human constitution 
. . . that justice is the fundamental law 
of society . . . ." "I hope and firmly be- 
lieve that the whole world will, sooner or 
later, feel benefit from the issue of our as- 
sertion of the rights of man." 



Queen Elizabeth II Makes State Visit 
to the United States 

Queen Elizabeth II of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland made 
a state visit to the United States Jtdy 6-11. 
Following is an exchange of remarks hetiveen 
President Ford and Queen Elizabeth at a 
welcoming ceremony on the South Lawn of 
the White House 07i July 7.^ 



Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 12 

PRESIDENT FORD 

Your Majesty, Your Royal Highness, 
ladies and gentlemen: On behalf of the 
American people, I am delighted to wel- 
come you and your party to the United 
States and to the White House. 

Your first state visit to America in 1957 
marked the 350th anniversary of the settle- 
ment of Jamestown, the first permanent 
British colony in this new land. You honor 
us again by coming to share our Bicenten- 
nial observance in the new spirit of opti- 
mism and cooperation generated by this 
great occasion. 

During the 169 years between the first 
settlement of Jamestown and our in- 
dependence, 13 colonies prospered, pro- 
tected by the British Navy, enjoying the 
advantage of British commerce and adopt- 
ing British concepts of representative self- 
government. In declaring independence in 
1776, we looked for guidance to our Brit- 
ish heritage of representative govern- 
ment — representative government as well, 
as law. As a sovereign nation, we have kept 
and nurtured the most durable bond of 
all — the bond of idealism in which our new 
nation was conceived. 

Your Majesty's visit symbolizes our deep' 
and continuing commitment to the common 
values of an Anglo-American civilization. 
Your Majesty, for generations our peoples 



' For an exchange of toasts between President 
Ford and Queen Elizabeth II at a White House 
dinner that evening, see Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents dated July 12, 1976, p. 1142. 



196 



Department of State Bulletin 



have worked together, and fought to- 
gether, side by side. As democracies, we 
continue our quest for peace and justice. 

The challenges we now face are differ- 
ent from those that we have confronted to- 
gether and overcome in the past. At stake 
is the future of the industrialized democ- 
racies which have sustained their destiny 
in common for more than a generation. 

At stake is the further extension of the 
blessings of liberty to all humanity in the 
creation of a better world. As new nations 
and old, each set their political course to 
achieve these aims. The principles of hu- 
man dignity and individual rights set forth 
in the Magna Carta and our own Declara- 
tion of Independence remain truly revolu- 
tionary landmarks. 

Your Majesty, the wounds of our part- 
ing in 1776 healed long ago. Americans 
admire the United Kingdom as one of our 
truest allies and best friends. There could 
be no more convincing evidence of that 
friendship than the splendid British con- 
tributions and participation on the occa- 
sion of our Bicentennial. 

Last month, I had the privilege and 
honor to welcome to the White House Rose 
Garden the distinguished delegation of 
the British Parliament who escorted an 
historic copy of the Magna Carta to Amer- 
ica. The loan of this document for our Bi- 
centennial is a gesture that will bring 
pleasure and inspiration to all who view it. 

Yesterday, in Philadelphia, Your Maj- 
esty inaugurated the new Bicentennial bell, 
a gift from the people of Britain to the 
people of the United States, inscribed "Let 
Freedom Ring." It will hang in the Bell 
Tower in Independence National Historical 
Park. When I was in Philadelphia on the 
Fourth of July, I thought what a perfect 
complement the new bell will be to our 
own Liberty Bell and the Centennial bell in 
Independence Hall. 

For these gifts and for many others 
which Britain has honored our historic 
celebration, the American people are 
deeply grateful. Above all, we appreciate 
the personal honor you have so graciously 



demonstrated by visiting our shores at this 
special moment in our history. 

During your visit, you will travel to 
hallowed American landmarks. You will 
observe many changes since you were last 
here. But as you travel throughout our 
land, I trust that you will find something 
else in the United States, a new sense of 
unity, of friendship, of purpose, and tran- 
quillity. 

Something wonderful happened to Amer- 
ica this past weekend. A spirit of unity and 
togetherness deep within the American 
soul sprang to the surface in a way that we 
had almost forgotten. People showed again 
that they care, that they want to live in 
peace and harmony with their neighbors, 
that they want to pull together for the 
good of the nation and for the good of 
mankind. 

This weekend we had a marvelous re- 
affirmation of the American spirit. In the 
days ahead, we would like very much to 
share that spirit with you. 

During your visit in 1957, President 
Eisenhower remarked that America's re- 
spect for Britain was symbolized in our 
affection for the royal family. It is in this 
spirit we welcome Your Majesty's visit as 
a happy occasion for reaffirming our joint 
dedication to freedom, to peace, democ- 
racy, and the well-being of our people. 

Your Majesty, America bids you. Prince 
Philip, and your party a most cordial and 
heartfelt welcome. 



QUEEN ELIZABETH 

Mr. President: Thank you for your wel- 
come to us. We are very pleased to be with 
you and the American people in this most 
important week of your Bicentennial year. 

Our countries have a great deal in com- 
mon. The early British settlers created 
here a society that owes much to its origins 
across the ocean. For nearly 170 years 
there was a formal constitutional link be- 
tween us. Your Declaration of Independ- 
ence broke that link, but it did not for 
long break our friendship. 



August 9, 1976 



197 



John Adams, America's first Ambassa- 
dor, said to my ancestor King George III 
that it was his desire to help with the res- 
toration of "the old good nature and the 
old good humor between our peoples." 

That restoration has long been made, 
and the links of language, tradition, and 
personal contact have maintained it. 

Yesterday, Prince Philip and I were 
deeply moved by the welcome we were 
given in Philadelphia. And now we are 
looking forward to our time in Washington 
and to our visits to New York and Boston 
and to the home of Thomas Jefferson at 
Monticello. We shall have visited the 
four cities that were at the center of events 
200 years ago. We also hope to see some- 
thing of America of 1976 and of the young 
people who will be taking this country 
forward into its third century. 

Mr. President, the British and American 
people are as close today as two peoples 
have ever been. We see you as our strong 
and trusted friend, and we believe that 
you, in turn, will find us as ready as ever 
to bear our full share in defending the 
values in which we both believe. 

That is why we are so happy to be here. 



President Signs Security Assistance 
and Arms Export Control Act 

Statement by President Ford ' 

I have signed into law H.R. 13680, the 
International Security Assistance and Arms 
Export Control Act of 1976. This measure 
authorizes appropriations to carry out se- 
curity assistance and other programs in the 
fiscal years 1976 and 1977, and makes ex- 
tensive changes in the methods, organiza- 
tion, and procedures through which those 
programs are carried out. 

On May 7, 1976, I returned to the Con- 
gress without my approval S. 2662, the 



'Issued on July 1 (text from White House press 
release); as enacted the bill is Public Law 94-329, 
approved June 30, 1976. 



198 



predecessor of the bill which I am signing 
today. I did so because that bill contained 
numerous provisions which would have 
seriously undermined the constitutional re- 
sponsibility of the President for the con- 
duct of the foreign affairs of the United 
States. That bill embodied a variety of re- 
strictions that would have seriously inhib- 
ited my ability to implement a coherent 
and consistent foreign policy, and some 
which raised fundamental constitutional 
difficulties as well. 

The present bill, H.R. 13680, imposes 
new requirements, restrictions, and limita- 
tions on the implementation of security as- 
sistance programs. Many of these new re- 
quirements are based on congressional 
desires to increase the flow of information 
regarding the scope and direction of se- 
curity assistance programs worldwide. 
Others impose new substantive restrictions 
reflecting new policies, or policies not here- 
tofore expressed in law. 

Most of the unacceptable features of the 
earlier bill have either been dropped from 
H.R. 13680 or have been modified into an 
acceptable form. I am pleased to note, for 
example, that this bill does not attempt tc 
impose an arbitrary and unwieldy annua! 
ceiling on the aggregate value of govern- 
ment and commercial arms sales, a ceiling 
which would have served to hinder, rathei 
than foster, our efforts to seek multilateral 
restraints on the proliferation of conven- 
tional weaponry, and which could hav€ 
prevented us from meeting the legitimate 
security needs of our allies and othei 
friendly countries. In addition, the provi- 
sions on discrimination and on humar 
rights in this bill go far toward recognizing 
that diplomatic effoi'ts, rather than abso- 
lute statutory sanctions, are the most effec- 
tive way in which this country can seek 
further progress abroad in these areas ol 
deep concern to all Americans and that the 
executive branch must have adequate flexi- 
bility to make these efforts bear fruit. 

I am especially pleased to note that with 
one exception the constitutionally objec- 
tionable features of S. 2662, whereby au- 

Department of State Bulletin 



Ihorlty conferred on the President by law 
could be rescinded by the adoption of a 
concurrent resolution by the Congress, have 
all been deleted from H.R. 13680. The 
manifest incompatibility of such provisions 
with the express requirements of the Con- 
stitution that legislative measures having 
the force and effect of law be presented to 
the President for approval and, if disap- 
proved, be passed by the requisite two- 
thirds majority of both Houses was per- 
haps the single most serious defect of the 
previous bill and one which went well be- 
yond security assistance and foreign affairs 
in its implications. Moreover, such provi- 
sions would have purported to involve the 
Congress in the performance of day-to- 
day executive functions in derogation of 
the principle of separation of powers, re- 
sulting in the erosion of the fundamental 
constitutional distinction between the role 
of the Congress in enacting legislation 
and the role of the executive in carrying 
it out. 

The one exception to this laudable action 
is the retention in H.R. 13680 of the legis- 
lative-veto provision regarding major gov- 
ernmental sales of military equipment and 
services. This is not a new provision but has 
been in the law since 1974. To date no con- 
current resolution of disapproval under sec- 
tion 36(b) has been adopted, and the 
constitutional question has not been raised 
directly. Although I am accepting H.R. 
13680 with this provision included, I re- 
serve my position on its constitutionality if 
the provision should ever become opera- 
tive. 

In my message of May 7, I expressed my 
serious concern that the termination of 
military assistance and military assistance 
advisory groups after fiscal year 1977 
would result in a serious impact upon our 
relations with other nations whose security 
is important to our own security and who 
are not yet able to bear the entire burden 
of their defense requirements. That con- 
cern remains. H.R. 13680 retains language 
recognizing that it may be necessary and 
desirable to maintain military assistance 

August 9, 1976 



programs and military assistance advisory 
groups in specific countries even after Sep- 
tember 30, 1977. Accordingly, this bill will 
not deter the executive branch from seek- 
ing at the appropriate time the necessary 
authority for the continuation of such pro- 
grams as the national interest of the United 
States may require. 

H.R. 13680 will require that many 
changes be made in present practices and 
policies regarding the implementation of 
security assistance programs. Some of 
these new requirements I welcome as dis- 
tinct improvements over existing law. 
There are others for which the desirabil- 
ity and need is less clear. Nevertheless, I 
shall endeavor to carry out the provisions 
of this bill in a manner which will give ef- 
fect to the intent of the Congress in enact- 
ing them. As time goes by and experience 
is gained, both the executive and the Con- 
gress will come to know which of the pro- 
visions of this bill will be effective and 
workable and which others require modifi- 
cation or repeal. 

This bill recognizes that security assist- 
ance has been and remains a most impor- 
tant instrument of U.S. foreign policy. My 
approval of H.R. 13680 will enable us to 
go forward with important programs in 
the Middle East, in Africa, and elsewhere 
in the world aimed at achieving our goal 
of international peace and stability. 



Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act 
Signed Into Law 

Statement by President Ford ' 

I have signed H.R. 12203, the Foreign 
Assistance and Related Programs Appro- 
priations Act, 1976 and the period ending 
September 30, 1976. The bill appropriates 
funds for a variety of programs in support 
of U.S. foreign policy objectives, most im- 



' Issued on July 1 (text from White House press 
release); as enacted, the bill is Public Law 94-330, 
approved June 30, 1976. 



199 



portantly our pursuit of a peaceful solu- 
tion to the problems of the Middle East. 

Nevertheless, I have serious reservations 
regarding one element of the bill and be- 
lieve it is necessary to comment on why I 
have signed the bill notwithstanding my 
objections to it. 

Title I of the bill contains a provision 
which conditions the availability of appro- 
priated funds, in certain instances, upon 
the acquiescence of the Appropriations 
Committees of each House of Congress. 
This requirement violates the fundamental 
constitutional doctrine of separation of 
powers. While similar provisions have been 
included in congressional enactments and 
have been found objectionable on these 
grounds, this particular requirement is es- 
pecially onerous in that it intrudes upon 
the execution of programs in 19 different 
appropriation categories. 

Since I view this provision as severable 
from what is an otherwise valid exercise 
of legislative authority, and because it is 
presented for my signature in the last week 
of the fiscal year, I am not withholding my 
approval. We shall continue to work with 
the Appropriations Committees, as with all 
committees of the Congress, in a spirit of 
cooperation. We shall continue to keep the 
Congress fully informed on a current basis 
on the execution of the laws. However, we 
shall not concur in a delegation of the pow- 
ers of appropriation to two committees of 
Congress. 



Summary Reports of Closed Meetings 
of Advisory Committees Available 

Press release 340 dated July 6 

Pursuant to Public Law 92-463 and the 
Office of Management and Budget Circular 
A-63 (March 27, 1974), this notice is to ad- 
vise that summary reports have been pre- 
pared covering advisory committee meetings 
or sessions of meetings which wei'e closed to 
the public under 5 U.S.C. 552(b) (1). 

The advisory committees of the Depart- 
ment of State required to file summary re- 
ports for 1975 are: 

Advisory Committee on "Foreign Relations of the 

United States" 
Advisory Committee on the Law of the Sea 
Advisory Committee to the United States Section 

International North Pacific Fisheries Commission 
Advisory Panel on International Law 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Advisory Committee 
Ocean Affairs Advisory Committee 
United States Advisory Commission on International 

Educational and Cultural Affairs 

The reports summarizing the committees' 
discussions are available for inspection 
and/or copying at the Library of Congress, 
Anyone interested in these reports should! 
contact the Rare Book Room, Second Floor, 
Main Building, Library of Congress, 10 First; 
Street, SE., Washington, D.C. 20540, or write 
or telephone the Advisory Committee Man- 
agement Officer, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20520, (area code 202) 632-2297. 



200 



Department of State Bulletin' 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



U.S. Discusses Relations With Developing Countries 
in Opening Statement at ECOSOC Meeting 



Text of Statement by William W. Scranton 
U.S. Representative to the United Nations ' 



On behalf of the Government and the 
people of the United States, I would like 
to express to you, to His Excellency Presi- 
dent Houphouet-Boigny, and to the Gov- 
ernment and people of the Ivory Coast our 
sincere appreciation for your country's 
most generous offer to act as host to the 
Economic and Social Council, for the mag- 
nificent facilities which you have made 
available, and for the wonderful hospital- 
ity which has been extended to us. Such a 
friendly atmosphere cannot fail to facili- 
tate our deliberations. 

It is fitting that, in 1976, the Economic 
and Social Council should be holding its 
first meeting in Africa. When the United 
Nations was created, virtually all of Africa 
and many areas of Asia were under colo- 
nial administration. We have witnessed the 
process of decolonization over the past 30 
years. This has nowhere been more evident 
than in Africa. The membership of the 
United Nations has almost tripled in this 
process, and African states now represent 
almost a third of its total membership. In- 
deed, I wish to welcome on behalf of my 
government the entry of the Seychelles to 
the community of nations this very week. 



' Read before the 61st session of the U.N. Eco- 
nomic and Social Council (ECOSOC) at Abidjan on 
June 30 by Jacob M. Myerson, U.S. Representative 
to the Economic and Social Council (text from USUN 
press release 74 dated July 1). The 61st session of 
ECOSOC met at Abidjan June 30-July 9 and re- 
sumed at Geneva July 12. 

August 9, 1976 



But the importance of Africa is not a 
question of numbers. This continent, with 
all its diversity, symbolizes the challenges 
and the hopes of all of us — to remove those 
last vestiges of colonialism so that all na- 
tions and peoples can choose their own des- 
tiny; to overcome the burdens of economic 
disadvantage so as to permit the full 
development of human and natural re- 
sources; and to fashion a pattern of cooper- 
ation which will permit peoples to maintain 
their respective traditions and principles, 
but to work together in pursuit of a common 
overriding goal of a better life for all 
people. 

The growing importance of independent 
Africa on the international scene, the jus- 
tice of its cause, and the political, eco- 
nomic, and cultural ties that link it to the 
United States and other countries have un- 
derscored the need for us to maintain close 
ties with African governments. 

This perception found expression in Sec- 
retary Kissinger's visit to Africa in April 
and May of this year. The visit came at a 
time of growing crises in southern Africa 
and provided an opportunity for the Sec- 
retary to enunciate at Lusaka our southern 
African policy. He made clear our nation's 
unequivocal support for racial justice and 
self-determination. 

The policy of the United States is based 
on the recognition that the movement of 
Africa to full freedom and human dignity 
will not be complete until racial equality is 



201 



fully established throughout the continent. 

The recent tragic and deplorable events 
in South Africa underline the urgency of 
the situation and the total unacceptability 
of the system of legalized racial discrimi- 
nation that prevails in South Africa. 
Equally, we recognize that the process will 
not be complete until majority rule is fully 
established throughout the African Conti- 
nent. The United States is pledged to sup- 
port these goals by all appropriate and 
peaceful means. 

In his Lusaka statement, Secretary Kis- 
singer set forth specific proposals aimed at 
helping solve the pressing problems of the 
region. He indicated our willingness to 
play a more active role in concert with Af- 
rican governments. 

In this regard, the advice of African 
leaders has been of particular importance 
in developing our initiatives on southern 
Africa, including the recent meeting of 
Secretary Kissinger and Prime Minister 
Vorster [of South Africa] . On these and 
other matters, we shall continue close and 
useful consultation with African govern- 
ments. 

During his African tour, the Secretary 
made two other statements to which we at- 
tach major importance. In Dakar, he called 
for the creation of an international consor- 
tium to undertake a systematic and com- 
prehensive attack on the development 
problems of the Sahel region. And in 
Nairobi at the fourth session of the U.N. 
Conference on Trade and Development 
[UNCTAD IV], he set forth our policy on 
the major North-South development issues. 

I will talk about this in greater detail 
later. But I wish to emphasize now the two 
major themes in our approach to Africa — 
to assist African efforts for liberation and 
for human and economic development. I 
underscore the words "to assist" because 
the basic strategy and the basic effort for 
progress in Africa should and must remain 
in the hands of Africans themselves. 

Just before coming to this conference I 
had the opportunity — and the pleasure — 
of visiting several countries in Africa. This 
trip was undertaken at the suggestion of 



President Ford and Secretary Kissinger, to 
continue our dialogue with African leaders. 
It was of a necessity a series of rapid visits 
to 11 countries and certainly does not qual- 
ify me as an expert. But I would like to 
share with you some of my impressions, 
because I think that they are pertinent to 
the deliberations of this Council. 

African Priorities and Goals 

First, I was most impressed with the pri- 
orities of the national development pro- 
grams of the countries visited. They em- 
phasized : 

— Agricultural development aimed at in- 
suring sufficient food for their people. 

— Health services to reduce infant mor- 
tality, to provide better care throughout 
their citizens' lives, and to increase life ex- 
pectancy. 

— Education, both general education for 
all and in the technical vocational fields, a 
necessity for countries to realize and to 
manage their potential. 

— Social development to preserve basic 
traditions and so that all citizens may bet- 
ter understand and participate effectively 
in the development of their countries. 

These are priorities directed not toward 
the preservation of a system or simply the 
promotion of an ideology but, much more 
importantly, at improving and enhancing 
the quality of life. As such it is develop- 
ment for the highest purpose — for hu- 
manity. 

And what about the development of re- 
sources in Africa? This is my second point. 
One very clear impression is that the sim- 
ple transfer of money is no guarantee of 
purposeful development — in fact, this 
could lead to an international misallocation 
of resources. What is critical is aid to spe- 
cific projects, especially self-help projects, 
which will in fact contribute to national 
development. In this connection, we — both 
developed and developing countries — must 
clarify the conceptual confusion which ex- 
ists between exploitation and development. 
Whether in Africa or elsewhere, exploita- 



202 



Department of State Bulletin 



tion is wrong. It should not and must not 
be the pattern for the future. The devel- 
oped and the developing nations must now 
work together on a resource program 
aimed at increasing the standard of living 
for people in the countries concerned. This 
is not a one-way street. It is to the mutual 
advantage of developed countries as well 
as developing countries, for it produces bet- 
ter markets for products and a healthier 
international economy. 

Thirdly, Mr. President, talks in the coun- 
tries I have just visited underlined the ab- 
solute necessity for a rapid speedup in the 
liberation of all Africa — first and foremost 
because of our humanitarian concern but 
also because the present situation repre- 
sents a basic deterrent to the economic de- 
velopment of the region. 

Finally, Mr. President, I cannot speak of 
my visit to Africa without paying tribute to 
the hospitality of governments and people 
wherever we went, to the vision and com- 
mitment of the leaders with whom we 
talked, and to their willingness to share 
with us their thinking. 

Our talks were characterized by a com- 
mon dedication to peace, cooperation, and 
the betterment of mankind's condition. Our 
areas of agreement are substantial and out- 
weigh any differences of perception or 
policy. This is a "continent of hope," with 
great potential. A way of life for Africans 
in freedom and self-fulfillment is near on 
the horizon. It is within man's grasp. 

Progress in the North-South Dialogue 

Mr. President, one of the basic purposes 
of the United Nations as set forth in the 
charter is "to achieve international cooper- 
ation in solving international problems of 
an economic, social, cultural, or humani- 
tarian character." Our recent efforts in this 
respect have focused primarily on the prob- 
lems of development — those matters em- 
braced by the North-South dialogue. 

One milestone in this dialogue was the 
seventh special session of the General As- 
sembly. On that occasion developed and 
developing nations put aside confrontation 



and declared their common purpose of 
moving forward cooperatively in accord- 
ance with an agreed agenda for action. 
True, there was hard bargaining, but it 
achieved consensus acceptable to all. The 
principles and programs outlined there re- 
main the cornerstone of my government's 
efforts to assist developing nations and to 
strengthen ties of cooperation with them. 

In accordance with the consensus 
reached at the seventh special session, sig- 
nificant and practical steps have been un- 
dertaken or are underway in various U.N. 
and other international forums or through 
the actions of individual countries. The 
actions cover the wide range of problems 
confronting us — compensatory financing, 
funding of international development in- 
stitutions, commodities, trade, technology 
transfer, agricultural production, bilateral 
aid programs, and so on. 

I do not propose to catalogue the specific 
actions now, since the Council is to review 
this matter later in the present session. The 
point that I wish to emphasize is that the 
United States has taken its commitments 
seriously and is genuinely attempting to 
translate the agreed principles into specific 
actions. 

The seventh special session is only a 
milestone, not the end of the road. My 
government is committed to a continuing 
process of negotiation seeking practical 
solutions to real problems. Thus we are 
participating in the Paris Conference on 
International Economic Cooperation, one of 
the principal forums in which the dialogue 
between developed and developing coun- 
tries is being carried out. 

UNCTAD IV represents another mile- 
stone. There were, indeed, positive achieve- 
ments at Nairobi, although the outcome 
failed to satisfy everyone. For example, we 
are aware that even though developed 
countries, including the United States, went 
further than ever before in their commit- 
ment to proceed with work on major as- 
pects of commodity issues — not the least on 
buffer stock financing — some of our friends 
in the developing countries had hoped for 
more. 



August 9, 1976 



203 



The United States for its part was deeply 
disappointed that its proposal for an Inter- 
national Resources Bank — presented at 
UNCTAD IV on behalf of all Group B 
countries [developed market-economy 
countries] — did not receive the considera- 
tion we believe it deserves. We are pursu- 
ing this proposal as one important element 
of any comprehensive approach to com- 
modities problems. We trust that it will re- 
ceive serious and thorough consideration. 

It is in no way intended to preclude other 
approaches nor to compete with any other 
proposal. The purpose of the International 
Resources Bank is to facilitate the flow of 
essential private capital, management, and 
technology into the development of min- 
eral resources in developing countries on a 
basis fully acceptable to such countries — 
one compatible with their sovereignty and 
their national plans. 

In our view this would be of particular 
benefit to countries of Africa and else- 
where. We have recently presented a state- 
ment on the proposed International Re- 
sources Bank to the Paris Conference on 
International Economic Cooperation and 
will be actively following up on this matter. 

In spite of these disappointments and 
with the perspective of a month since Nai- 
robi, UNCTAD IV seems to us to have been 
more successful than many at first imag- 
ined. A number of resolutions were ap- 
proved by consensus, including those on 
debt, technology, and the least developed 
countries, as well as commodities. 

The United States will continue to work 
toward the goals it has accepted and to 
contribute to programs in which it has 
agreed to participate. We will take part in 
the meetings preparatory to UNCTAD's 
March 1977 negotiating conference on 
commodities. We also intend to participate 
fully and actively in the extensive series of 
meetings on the 18 specific commodities set 
forth in the UNCTAD IV commodities reso- 
lution. Where differences persist regarding 
objectives or methods, we shall be pre- 
pared to pursue a discussion with a view 
to reconciliation. 



Mr. President, this month there have 
been two meetings of the industrialized 
countries of considerable significance for 
relations between developed and develop- 
ing countries — the OECD [Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment] ministerial meeting and the Puerto 
Rico summit. These meetings emphasized 
the need for closer coordination between 
participating countries. 

Working together, the industrialized 
countries seek to achieve sustained eco- 
nomic growth, which is directly related to 
the demand for the mineral, agricultural, 
and manufactured products of developing 
countries. They can seek to minimize infla- 
tion and its impact, for example, on the 
cost of developing-country imports. And 
they can better position themselves both 
to initiate proposals and to respond con- 
structively to proposals by the developing 
countries. 

Issues Before ECOSOC 

Mr. President, the 61st session of 
ECOSOC can mark another milestone on 
the road to enhanced cooperation among 
the members of the Council and among de- 
veloped and developing countries gener- 
ally. The Council will have to address a 
broad agenda — one which will give it full 
opportunity to meet the responsibilities 
vested in it by the U.N. Charter. The U.S. 
delegation stands ready to play its full 
part. 

One of the subjects we will be con- 
sidering is the complex of issues related to 
transnational corporations. In the meeting 
of the Commission on Transnational Cor- 
porations in Lima last March, the United 
States proposed a special effort in the 
field of corrupt practices and payments — 
a problem, I should add, that goes beyond 
the question of transnational corporations 
per se. 

My delegation, with the support of 
others, will be submitting a draft resolu- 
tion on this subject at the current session 
of ECOSOC. We are hopeful that it will 
receive full and sympathetic consideration 



204 



Department of State Bulletin 



so that an expert group may be established 
as soon as possible to take up this matter. 

One of the significant results of the 
seventh special session was the decision to 
create the ad hoc committee to examine 
the restructuring of the economic and so- 
cial sectors of the U.N. system. That body 
is now pursuing its deliberations. 

An important aspect of the restructuring 
exercise involves efforts to revitalize the 
ECOSOC so that it may carry out its re- 
sponsibilities more effectively. We have 
made some suggestions in this regard, and 
we shall have additional ideas to present. 
Meanwhile, we are convinced that the 
high quality of the Council's work under 
the distinguished Presidency of the Ivory 
Coast will serve to reinforce our deter- 
mination in this regard. 

Challenges for the Future 

Looking ahead in the next decade, we 
face great challenges. How can we in- 
crease food production in poor countries 
with food deficits? When will the world 
finally have some assurance that economic 
gains will not eventually be wiped out by 
population increases? How can we involve 
the rural poor, the unemployed, the under- 
employed, and women in economic and 
social development? How can the poorer 
countries develop a sound economic base 
for continuing advancement and eventual 
self-reliance in an interdependent world? 

In seeking solutions for these problems, 
we in the United States have redoubled our 



efforts over the past year; we have modi- 
fied some positions, and we have made 
many new proposals. We take pride in 
what we have accomplished, but we will 
not rest on these achievements. 

Mr. President, in four days the United 
States will be celebrating its Bicentennial. 
The men who wrote the Declaration of In- 
dependence assumed that the American 
Revolution was only the beginning of a 
process of liberation and that the ideals set 
forth were applicable to mankind in gen- 
eral. Thus, from its inception the United 
States has favored efforts of others to as- 
sure both their independence and their 
human dignity. As we enter our third cen- 
tury, we are committed to the view that 
independence, individual liberties, and 
human dignity should and must flourish 
everywhere. 

In this session of the Economic and Social 
Council, therefore, let us remember that 
our intentions transcend the specific issues, 
important as each one of them is. Beyond 
them lies a high reality: 

— A world economic system with shared 
interests for all its members. 

— A world system characterized by 
fairness for the weak as well as the strong, 
by compassion for the poor, by the eradi- 
cation of hunger, and by social and eco- 
nomic progress for all. 

These goals can be achieved if nations 
recognize and accept that each bears a 
responsibility toward the others and 
toward mankind. 



August 9, 1976 



205 



U.S. Discusses Progress and Challenges in Space Technology and Law 
in U.N. Outer Space Committee 



The 19th session of the U.N. Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 7net at Neiv 
York June 21-July 9. Following is a state- 
ment made in the committee by U.S. Repre- 
sentative Herbert K. Reis on June 22. 

USUN press release 66 dated June 22 

The U.S. delegation is happy to partici- 
pate in this 19th session of the Committee 
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. 
Since its first session in 1962, this commit- 
tee has established a record of solid 
achievement. It has stimulated inter- 
national cooperation in space and space- 
related activities, educated governments on 
the practical applications of space tech- 
nology, and helped to establish a legal 
regime for space activities characterized 
by freedom of scientific investigation and 
the sharing of information. 

We believe it appropriate on this occa- 
sion to review the current status of the 
four multilateral agreements concerning 
outer space and space activities negotiated 
in the Outer Space Committee. These are 
the Outer Space Treaty, the Astronaut 
Agreement, the Liability Convention, and 
the Registration Convention. As you know, 
the United States is one of the three deposi- 
tary governments for the first three of 
these treaties, while the Secretary General 
is the single depositary for the Registra- 
tion Convention. The information I will 
give is current as of the opening of our 
session, June 21. 

The 1967 Treaty on Principles Govern- 
ing the Activities of States in the Explora- 
tion and Use of Outer Space, including the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, has now 
been ratified or acceded to by 69 states. 



This represents approximately one-half the 
membership of the United Nations. It 
seems reasonable to expect this number to 
grow steadily in view of the increasing 
recognition of the practical applications of 
space technology. 

The 1968 Agreement on the Rescue of 
Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and 
the Return of Objects Launched into Outer 
Space has received 64 ratifications and ac- 
cessions in all, most of them recently; in 
addition, the European Space Agency 
(ESA) has filed a declaration of accept- 
ance under article VI of the agreement. 

The 1972 Convention on International 
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Ob- 
jects has been ratified or acceded to by 40 
countries, but I note that of 37 members of 
the Outer Space Committee only 16 have 
so far become party to this convention. 

Finally, the 1974 Convention on Regis- 
tration of Objects Launched Into Outer 
Space was opened for signature here at the 
United Nations in January 1975. It has 
been signed by 24 countries and has been 
ratified by France, Bulgaria, and Sweden. 

Mr. Chairman, our delegation is pleased 
to be able to report that the Senate of the 
United States yesterday gave its advice and 
consent to the ratification by the President 
of the Registration Convention. The Senate 
took this action unanimously by a vote of 
88 in favor, with none opposed. We appre- 
ciate this action by the Senate and hope 
the Administration will be able shortly to 
deposit the U.S. instrument of ratification 
with the Secretary General. 

We would like to suggest that the Outer 
Space Committee consider recommending 
to our governments that they review the 



206 



Department of State Bulletin 



desirability of accepting the rights and 
obligations contained in these treaty instru- 
ments. While the General Assembly regu- 
larly includes a suggestion in this regard in 
its omnibus resolution on the annual outer 
space agenda item, progress may begin 
better "at home" in this committee. Let us 
encourage those of our governments which 
are not party to these treaties to undertake 
a fresh analysis of them. 

U.S. Cooperative Programs and Activities 

Mr. Chairman, since the last session of 
the committee in June 1975, there have 
been many significant achievements in in- 
ternational outer space cooperation and 
the exploration and use of space. One dra- 
matic example is the Apollo-Soyuz mission, 
successfully completed through coopera- 
tion between the United States and the 
Soviet Union, involving both scientific ex- 
periments and a rendezvous and docking 
program in July 1975. 

Its many engineering and scientific 
achievements included the design and 
flig^ht testing of a universal docking sys- 
tem, which will be required for the opera- 
tion of any large cooperative manned sys- 
tems in the future. Another main product 
is the establishment of an expanded rescue 
capability for future manned flights. A sig- 
nificant satellite and communications engi- 
neering feat involved relay of live televi- 
sion coverage of the Apollo-Soyuz mission 
through the ATS-6 satellite [Applications 
Technology Satellite] and via an earth sta- 
tion near Madrid to television audiences 
around the world. 

Apart from the tangible results of 
Apollo-Soyuz, the participating states and 
the international community as a whole 
have enjoyed a variety of less tangible but 
important benefits, such as the cordial re- 
lations that have grown up among large 
numbers of U.S. and U.S.S.R. men and 
women during the preparation of the mis- 
sion and the good will engendered in astro- 
naut and cosmonaut tours following the 



mission. In another cooperative venture in- 
volving several Eastern European coun- 
tries, the United States contributed scien- 
tific experiments as part of a biological 
satellite payload (Cosmos 782) launched 
by the Soviet Union late last November. 

The establishment of these relations and 
the demonstration of the feasibility of 
joint mi.ssions in space have laid the foun- 
dation for future operations in the interest 
of all countries and have contributed sig- 
nificantly to the implementation of the 
guiding theme of promoting international 
cooperation and understanding as set forth 
in article III of the 1967 Outer Space 
Treaty. 

On August 1, 1975, the Satellite Instruc- 
tional Television Experiment (SITE) was 
inaugurated by the Indian Space Research 
Organization (ISRO). In 1969, NASA 
[National Aeronautics and Space Adminis- 
tration] had undertaken to make an ATS 
satellite available to India for four hours 
every day for one year in order to broad- 
cast programs on family planning, agricul- 
ture, and public health, as well as school 
and adult education programs, to 5,000 
Indian villages. About 2,700 of these vil- 
lages received the programs on conven- 
tional television receivers augmented with 
a low-cost 10-foot-diameter parabolic an- 
tenna, a frequency converter, and a pre- 
amplifier. 

India has had full responsibility for the 
design, development, operation, and main- 
tenance of the ground receiving and trans- 
mitting equipment and for the programing 
of SITE broadcasts. ISRO will also evalu- 
ate the social impact of the experiment. 
The Administrator of NASA recently con- 
firmed on his return from a tour in India 
that the programs are arousing great inter- 
est in the villages, and the experiment 
appears to be highly successful. 

Since the committee's 18th session last 
year, NASA has launched two Viking auto- 
mated spacecraft to orbit and place a 
lander on Mars. The first of these two 
craft entered Martian orbit on June 19. 

A primary objective of the mission is to 



August 9, 1976 



207 



determine whether there are or have been 
living microorganisms either on or below 
the Martian surface. The initial lander, 
which is expected to descend to the Mar- 
tian surface during the first week of July, 
is also intended to provide a spatial and 
spectral characterization of the landing 
site and the surrounding atmosphere. 
Among other experiments, it will make 
geological, biological, and meteorological 
analyses. Several non-U. S. scientists will 
be using data from Viking for scientific 
studies of Mars. 

Another international cooperative pro- 
gram of major significance during the past 
year has involved the successful launching 
by NASA of the Canadian Communications 
Technology Satellite (CTS) in January 
1976. This is an advanced experimental 
communication satellite designed to trans- 
mit at substantially higher power levels 
than standard communication satellites 
and thereby permit the use of smaller re- 
ceiving stations in isolated communities 
and for governmental and industrial opera- 
tions in northern Canada. In addition, a 
Canadian program to contribute a remote 
manipulator system for use on the NASA 
space shuttle continues on schedule. 

The development by the European Space 
Agency of the Spacelab to be launched in 
the space shuttle is proceeding on sched- 
ule. The experimental objectives of the 
first Spacelab flight, scheduled for 1980, 
have been selected jointly by ESA and 
NASA. 

Moreover, under the Helios Cooperative 
Solar Probe Project carried out with the 
Federal Republic of Germany, NASA suc- 
cessfully launched Helios-2 in January 
1976. Helios-1, which was launched in 
1975, has already discovered unexpected 
characteristics of the solar wind as well 
as particle fluxes and cosmic dust concen- 
trations in hitherto unexplored areas in 
pi'oximity to the Sun. Helios-2 will be 
working with its predecessor to extend 
and correlate those investigations in space 
and time. 



Other cooperative projects under study 
or development and involving the United 
States are an Infrared Astronomy Satellite 
with the Netherlands, an X-ray satellite of 
the Explorer class with the United King- 
dom, a space telescope project with the 
European Space Agency, and an out-of- 
the-ecliptic probe with ESA designed to 
examine the astronomical region beyond 
the principal plane of the solar system. 

The past year has also seen marked 
progress in the field of satellite remote sens- 
ing of the natural phenomena and environ- 
ment of the Earth, a subject of principal 
concern to both the Scientific and Techni- 
cal and the Legal Subcommittees at their 
recent sessions. 

Facilities for direct reception of Land- 
sat data are currently in operation in 
Brazil, Canada, Italy, and the United 
States. Chile, Iran, and Zaire have also 
concluded agreements with NASA under 
which they will fund the construction of 
Landsat ground facilities in their countries, 
and a number of other countries are active- 
ly considering establishing such stations in 
1977 and 1978. The United States intends 
to continue to be responsive to the growing 
interest in this network. 

Although not exhaustive, these various 
projects illustrate the advances that are 
being made for the benefit of mankind as 
a whole. In addition, many other countries, 
developed and developing alike, are be- 
coming increasingly capable of exploiting 
space technology for their own purposes. 

In the 10-year period 1965-75 NASA 
conducted more than 40 international re- 
imbursable launches in addition to co- 
operative programs in which funds are 
not exchanged. Five such international re- 
imbursable launches will be conducted in 
1976 and 11 more are scheduled for 1977. 
This level of activity is a clear index to the 
improved capacity of states to benefit from 
space technology. 

The U.N. Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space has made a major 
contribution to these achievements by 



208 



Department of State Bulletin 



creating a climate of international co- 
operation in which space science, explora- 
tion, and applications have been able to 
flourish. 

Work of the Subcommittees 

As the scientists and technicians of the 
world are making impressive progress in 
the exploration of outer space, the mem- 
bers of this committee, through their rep- 
resentatives in the Scientific and Technical 
and the Legal Subcommittees, have also 
been hard at work trying to assess the fu- 
ture technical potential and the organiza- 
tional and legal needs of the international 
community in this area. 

Each of the subcommittees devoted a 
considerable amount of time this year to 
the subject of remote sensing. The work of 
the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee 
in particular was assisted by a series of de- 
tailed and most useful studies written and 
compiled by the Secretariat. 

Although many different aspects of re- 
mote sensing were examined by the Scien- 
tific and Technical Subcommittee, one of 
the most important results of its review was 
the emerging consensus in support of re- 
gional cooperation for the reception, proc- 
essing, and analysis of data. Building on 
the recommendation of its 12th session in 
1975 that training facilities should be com- 
bined with such regional centers, the sub- 
committee noted the expanding number of 
training opportunities being offered by 
states and international organizations in 
order to increase the capability of all coun- 
tries to share in the benefits derived from 
remote sensing of the earth. The subcom- 
mittee specifically noted that "Interna- 
tional cooperation was needed as this was 
the only cost-effective approach for acquir- 
ing the benefits of satellite remote sensing 
for the majority of countries." ' 

The subcommittee also "reaffirmed the 



view that a regional, international and na- 
tional approach would be preferable for 
reception of remote sensing data from sat- 
ellites." The subcommittee cited three ex- 
amples of regional arrangements including 
"(i) a station encompassing a geographic 
zone within a given nation; (ii) a station 
jointly owned and operated by several na- 
tions; (iiij a national station that may 
serve the needs of several States under 
appropriate bilateral or multilateral ar- 
rangements between those States." 

In the view of the United States, the 
practical experience which the interna- 
tional community has gained thus far 
through current experimental programs 
strongly supports the desirability of a co- 
operative international approach to the re- 
ception, development, and sharing of bene- 
fits from remote-sensing data. 

We also believe that the United Nations 
can play a most valuable role in the dis- 
semination of information about the tech- 
nical aspects of remote sensing, about the 
potential benefits in which all countries 
may share, and about how scientists and 
other experts in all countries may apply 
those benefits to their own development 
programs. 

Our delegation has read with consider- 
able attention the note from the Perma- 
nent Mission of India concerning a possible 
regional ground station for remote sensing 
which might be established in India con- 
tained in document A/AC. 105/174. We 
await with interest a fuller exposition of 
this matter by the delegation of India. 

For its part the Legal Subcommittee has 
begun a careful and useful analysis of the 
legal implications of remote sensing. This 
analysis includes the drafting of guiding 
principles in areas where common elements 
have been identified through the discussion 
of legal implications. Five such principles 
have been developed and additional com- 
mon elements identified.^ 



' For the report of the Scientific and Technical 
Subcommittee on the work of its 13th session, see 
U.N. doc. A/AC.105/170. 



- For texts of the draft principles, see annex III 
to U.N. doc. A/AC.105/171, report of the Legal Sub- 
committee on the work of its 15th session. 



August 9, 1976 



209 



As we continue this work, we believe 
that the most constructive progress can be 
made through careful attention to the in- 
terdisciplinary aspects of remote sensing 
and to the need to integrate legal, techni- 
cal, and organizational considerations in 
the development of additional principles. 

We believe it is worth noting that in the 
body of the five principles so far developed, 
the single paragraph unburdened by brack- 
ets reinforces the regional cooperation 
theme. The paragraph reads: "In order to 
maximize the availability of benefits from 
such remote sensing data, States are en- 
couraged to consider agreements for the 
establishment of shared regional facilities." 

The Legal Subcommittee also made sub- 
stantial progress in drafting principles to 
guide broadcasting authorities planning 
the conduct of direct television broadcast- 
ing by satellite. Although certain issues re- 
main to be resolved, the discussions at the 
May session of the subcommittee have been 
useful and productive. 

It may well tax our collective ingenuity 
to develop mutually acceptable solutions to 
the remaining issues, for there are funda- 
mental values involved which require very 
considerable discussion and analysis. For 
the United States as for many other coun- 
tries, the principle of the free and open 
exchange of information and ideas is cen- 
tral. Nevertheless, the Outer Space Com- 
mittee has faced diflficult issues in the past 
and will do so again in the future. We 
hope that in the course of time we will be 
able to develop a consensus in this matter 
as well. 

We also hope the Legal Subcommittee 
will be able to complete its work on the 
draft Moon treaty and add this agreement 
to the growing list of successful products of 
the subcommittee to be approved by the 
Outer Space Committee and endorsed by 
the General Assembly. 

A topic of increasing interest to govern- 
ments is the matter of energy develop- 
ment programs. We have heard interesting 
and stimulating comments in this area by 
several speakers, including our distin- 
guished chairman. Ambassador Janko- 



witsch [Peter Jankowitsch, of Austria] ; 
and there are two papers on the subject 
before the committee at the current ses- 
sion. There is, of course, a great deal of 
work which could be done in this area. 

While it is desirable to employ a certain 
caution as to the scope of a possible study 
by the Outer Space Committee, it may be 
helpful for governments to be asked to 
present at the next session of the Scientific 
and Technical Subcommittee a survey of 
work in progress or planned in each coun- 
try in the area of developing energy re- 
sources or systems in space. 

The agenda of each subcommittee con- 
tinues to be full. Each has important and 
difficult questions of interest to all of our 
governments. The tenor of our work has 
been notably constructive. The U.S. delega- 
tion looks forward to continuing to join in 
the collective effort to explore the many 
important aspects of the peaceful uses of 
outer space. 



United Nations Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 



Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those 
listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries 
in the United States. U.N. printed publications may 
be purchased from the Sales Section of the United 
Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 10017. 



General Assembly 

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: 
Report of the United Nations Expert on Space 
Applications to the Scientific and Technical Sub- 
committee. A/AC.105/163. January 20, 1976. 10 
pp. 
Coordination of outer space activities within the 
United Nations system. Report of the Secretary 
General. A/AC.105/166. February 5, 1976. 18 pp. 
Review of national and cooperative international 
space activities for the calendar year 1975. 
A/AC.105/167; February 20, 1976; 139 pp. 
A/AC.105/167/Add.l; March U, 1976; 22 pp. 



Economic and Social Council 

The establishment of an international research and 
training group for the advancement of wo