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BOSTON 
PUBLIC 
UBRARY 


(^"V 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 

BULLETIN 


Volume  LXXV, 

Nos 

.  1932- 

1957 

July  5,  1976-December  27, 

1976 

INDEX 

timber 

Date 

of  Issue 

Pages 

Number 

Date 

ofi 

ssue 

Pages 

1932 

July 

5, 

1976 

1-^0 

1945 

Oct. 

4, 

1976 

409-440 

1933 

July 

12, 

1976 

41-72 

1946 

Oct. 

11, 

1976 

441^68 

1934 

July 

19, 

1976 

73-104 

1947 

Oct. 

18, 

1976 

469-496 

1935 

July 

26, 

1976 

105-148 

1948 

Oct. 

25, 

1976 

497-540 

1936 

Aug. 

2, 

1976 

149-188 

1949 

Nov. 

1, 

1976 

541-572 

1937 

Aug. 

9, 

1976 

18^-216 

1950 

Nov. 

8, 

1976 

573-596 

1938 

Aug. 

16, 

1976 

217-256 

1951 

Nov. 

15, 

1976 

597-628 

1939 

Aug. 

23, 

1976 

257-284 

1952 

Nov. 

22, 

1976 

629-652 

1940 

Aug. 

30, 

1976 

285-304 

1953 

Nov. 

29, 

1976 

653-676 

1941 

Sept. 

6 

1976 

305-332 

1954 

Dec. 

6, 

1976 

677-700 

1942 

Sept. 

13, 

1976 

333-348 

1955 

Dee. 

13, 

1976 

701-724 

1943 

Sept. 

20, 

1976 

349-376 

1956 

Dec. 

20, 

1976 

725-744 

1944 

Sept. 

27, 

1976 

377-408 

1957 

Dec. 

27, 

1976 

745-760 

THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 


:j 


Correction  for  Volume  LXXV 

The  editor  of  the  Bulletin  wishes  to  call  attention  to  the  following 
error  in  volume  LXXV: 

October  25,  p.  500,  col.  2:  In  line  21,  the  word  "with"  should  read 
"within." 


DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 

Publication  8895 

Released  April  1977 


'  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402 
Price:  52  issues  plus  semiannual  indexes,  domestic  $42.50,  foreign  $53.15;  single  copy  85  cents 


INDEX 

Volume  LXXV,  Numbers  1932-1957,  July  5,  1976-December  27,  1976  > 


Abu  Dhabi,  U.S.  technical  assistance 
agreement  re  collecting  and  con- 
serving water  supplies  from  sur- 
face runoff,  347 
Acheson,     Dean:     PR     531,     10/27 
(quoted);  Kissinger,  574,  PR  530, 
10/26;  McCloskev,  139;  Reston 
■"^      (quoted),  PR  530,  10/26 
Acheson,  Mrs.  Dean,  remarks  at  dedi- 
cation of  Dean  Acheson  Audito- 
rium, PR  531,  10/27 
Acker,  Gary  (Schaufele).  342 
Adams,  John  (Queen  Elizabeth  II), 

198 
Advisory  committees,  notice  of  meet- 
ings. Nee  Notices  of  meetings 
Afghanistan  (Robinson),  492 
Agricultural  commodities,  sale  of, 
bilateral  agreement  with  U.S., 
467 
Visit  of  Secretary  Kissinger,  joint 
statement.  316 
Africa  i.see  also  names  of  itidividual 
coimtries): 
Communist  influence,  question  of 

(Kissinger),  111,  513,  515,  518 
Economic  development:  Bolen,  618; 
Kissinger,  46,  262,  351,  354, 
559;  Scranton,  202 
European  assistance  fund,   pro- 
posed:  Kissinger,   46,   82, 
113,   126-127,  263.  264,  355, 
560,   PR  314,  6/21,   PR  419, 
9/17;  Schmidt,  385 
Regional    cooperation    (Kis- 
singer), 355,  358 
U.S.  aid  (Kissinger),  263 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States.  19i8,  volume  V,  The 
Near  East,  South  Asia,  and  Af- 
rica, part  2,  released,  700 
Great-power  rivalry,  avoidance  of 
(Kissinger),  46,  260,  351,  415, 
501,  530,  553,  559,  561,  576,  PR 
353,  7/22,  PR  463,  9/23,  PR  514, 
10/15 
Horn       of       Africa       countries 
(Schaufele),  300 


Africa — Continued 

Human  rights  (Kissinger),  PR  443, 

9/16 
Non-African  military  intervention, 
question  of(Kissinger),46,  517, 
518,  522,  727 
Sahel  relief:  Bolen,  618;  Kissinger, 
82,  126,  263,  355,  560;  Scranton, 
202 
Security  problems  (Kissinger),  357 
Southern     (see     also     Namibia, 
Rhodesia  and  South  Africa): 
African  governments  and  black 
African  leaders,  U.S.  consul- 
tations;  Kissinger,  94,  96, 
259,  260,  353,  359,  377,  401, 
411,  511,  516,  519,  520,  529, 
561,  576,  610,  PR  439,  9/16, 
PR  450,  9/20,  PR  451,  9/20, 
PR  468,  9/23;  Scranton,  202 
African  solution;  Bolen,  617;  Kis- 
singer,  158,  409,  512,  517, 

518,  520,  527,  561,  PR  353, 
7/22,  PR  463,  9/23;  Rogers, 
533,  536 

African  summit  meeting,  Tan- 
zania (Kissinger),  379,  380, 
383,  512,  PR  412,  9/4,  PR  419, 
9/17 

European  interests  and  role  (Kis- 
singer), 127,  325,  411,  PR 
419,  9/17 

Human  rights,  self-determina- 
tion, and  racial  justice;  292; 
Bolen,  616;  Kissinger,  96,  97, 
325,  351,  559;  Mbwale,  PR 
439,  9/16;  Scranton,  184,  202 

National  liberation  movements 
(Kissinger),  356,  379,  412, 
415,  513,  518,  520,  561,  576 

Negotiations,  prospects  and  prog- 
ress; Bolen,  617;  Ford,  385, 
481;  Kissinger,  121,  126,  167, 
170,  239,  349,  377,  403,  511, 

519,  527,  PR  411,  9/3,  PR  412, 
9/4,  PR  415,  9/5,  PR  417,  9/7, 
PR  420,  9/7,  PR  422,  9/7,  PR 
459,  9/22,  PR  466,  9/23;  Lord, 


Africa — Continued 
Southern — Continued 

Peaceful     solution,     need     for 

(Kaunda),  PR  443,  9/16 
Racial  violence:  Bolen,  616;  Kis- 
singer, 349,  409,  641;  Rogers, 
532 
U.S.  mercenaries,  question  of  re- 
cruitment (Kissinger),  240 
Soviet  role  (Kissinger),  706,  PR  514, 

10/15 
U.S.  basketball  coach  Tobias,  com- 
mendation, PR  396,  8/25 
U.S.  policy;  Kissinger,  41,  46,  126, 
131,  151,  218,  239,  245,  257,  351, 
500,  511,  518,  530,  559,  605,  706, 
PR  353,  7/22,  PR  439,  9/16.  PR 
453,  9/22.  PR  463,  9/23;  Mwale, 
PR  439,  9/16;  Scranton,  201 
U.S.  trade  investment:  Bolen,  619; 

Kissinger,  560 
Visits  of  Secretary  Kissinger;  Ford, 
385;  Kissinger,  259,  361,  383, 
409,  500,  511,  PR  422,  9/7,  PR 
432,  9/13,  PR  443,  9/16,  PR  465, 
9/23 
Personal  diplomacy  (Kissinger), 

411 
Presidential  elections,  effect  (Kis- 
singer), 413,  610,  641 
African  Development  Bank; 
Landsat  study  in  Benin,  Ghana,  and 
Upper  Volta,  grant  agreement, 
216 
U.S.  contribution;  Bolen,  619;  Kis- 
singer, 356 
African         Development         Fund 

(McGovern),  590 
Agricultural  surpluses,  U.S.  use  in 
overseas  programs,  agreements 
with:  Afghanistan,  467;  Chile,  675; 
Egypt,  104,  651,  675;  Ethiopia,  71; 
Guinea,  540;  Honduras,  71;  In- 
donesia, 39,  104,  467,  675,  759;  Is- 
rael, 495,  572;  Italy,  71;  Jamaica, 
627;  Jordan,  148;  Korea,  439; 
Pakistan,  439,  572;  Portugal,  376, 
723;  Sri  Lanka,  675;  Syria,  40, 
540;  Tanzania,  148;  Tunisia,  40; 
Zambia,  408 


'  With  this  index,  the  Department  of  State  begins  a  listing  by  subject  matter  of  press  releases  not  printed  in  the 
Bulletin.  Entries  for  such  releases  include  the  number  and  date  (for  example,  PR  307,  6/17).  Volume  LXXV  covers 
the  period  June  14-December  11,  1976.  Copies  of  press  releases  may  be  obtained  fi'om  the  Office  of  Press  Relations,  Depart- 
ment of  State,  Washington,  D.C.  20420. 


Index,  July  5-December  27,  1976 


761 


Agriculture  {see  also  Agricultural 

surpluses  and  name  of  product): 

Agricultural  development,  bilateral 

agreements  with:  Dominican 

Republic,    651;    Egypt,    744; 

Haiti,  651;  Kenya,  256;  Peru, 

723 

Cooperation  agreement  with  Iran: 

315;  Ansary,  308 
Crop  production,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Mali,  188 
Doukkala-Zemamra  sprinkler  irri- 
gation system,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Morocco,  188 
Feeder  roads  as  means  of  promoting 
increased  agricultural  develop- 
ment,   bilateral    agreements 
with:  Colombia,  187;  Haiti,  188 
Foodgrain  crops  and  cropping  sys- 
tems, improvement  of  produc- 
tion    technology,     bilateral 
agreement  with  Nepal,  467 
Improved  water  and  land  use,  loan 

agreement  with  Peru,  723 
International  Fund  for  Agricultural 
Development:  624;  Bolen,  621 
Greenwald,  298;  Kissinger,  504 
McGovern,  591;  Robinson,  288 
Rogers,  655 
International  plant  protection  con- 
vention   (1951);     Cuba,    38; 
Mexico,     438;     Papua     New 
Guinea,  438 
Sericulture   technology  and   im- 
proved seed  development  pro- 
gram, agreements  with  Thai- 
land, 596 
Small  farmer  development,  bilateral 
agreements  with:  Bolivia,  187; 
Colombia,   284;   Ghana,   744; 
Zaire,  724 
Small-scale  irrigation,   bilateral 
agreement  with  Bangladesh, 
651 
U.S.  agricultural  policy  (Katz),  483 
Water  management  practices  in 
selected  regions  of  Egypt,  grant 
agreement  with  Egypt,  304 
Alaska  pipeline,  question  of  route 

(Ford),  162 
Algeria,  treaties,  agreements,  etc., 

103,  216,  256,  650,  651,  744 
American  ideals:  Kissinger,  257,  265, 
598,  602;  Lewis,  194;  Scranton, 
746 
Andean  Pact  (Kissinger),  16 
Andersen,  Hans  G.,  231 
Andreotti,  Giulio,  program  for  U.S. 

visit,  PR  578,  12/3 
Angola:  Bolen,  619,  620;  Kissinger,  46, 
259,  260 
Cuban  military  intervention  and 
continued  presence  of  troops: 
Kissinger,  26,  30,  48,  158,  172, 
239,  265,  350,  359,  401,  513,  516, 
520,  704;  Luers,  58;  Scranton, 
742;  Sherer,  100 


762 


Angola — Continued 
Execution  of  Daniel  Gearhart  and 
effect  on  U.S.  relations:  Kis- 
singer, 163,  165,  167,  171;  Nes- 
sen,  163;  Schaufele,  342 
Genocide,  guerrilla  war,  question  of: 

Kissinger,  704;  Scranton,  742 
Mercenaries  recruited  in  U.S.,  alle- 
gations:      Kissinger,       341; 
Schaufele,  341 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  439,  571 
U.N.  membership: 
U.S.  abstention  (Scranton),  742 
U.S.  veto  (Sherer),  99 
U.S.   relations,  question  of  (Kis- 
singer), 359 
Ansary,  Hushang,  307 
Antarctic  treaty  (1959),  recommenda- 
tions re  furtherance  of  principles 
and  objectives  (1975),  South  Af- 
rica, 347 
Antitrust  cooperation  agreement  with 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
signature,  102 
ANZUS:  292;  Robinson,  285 
25th  Council  meeting,  communique, 
289 
Arab-Israeli  conflict  (see  also  United 
Nations  Relief  and  Works  Agency 
for  Palestine  Refugees  in  the 
Near  East  and  names  of  indi- 
vidual countries):  Kissinger,  306, 
PR  .591,  12/8 
Arab  boycott  of  Israel  and  question 
of  cooperation  of  U.S.  business 
(Kissinger),  369 
Arms  shipments:  Atherton,  477; 

Kissinger,  228 
European  role  (Kissinger),  708 
Geneva  conference,  question  of  re- 
sumption (Kissinger),  95,  502, 
707,  PR  504,  10/8 
Israel  security  and  survival:  Ather- 
ton, 174,  477;  Ford  (quoted), 
175;  Kissinger,  597,  605,  693 
Israeli-occupied  territories: 
Security     Council     consensus 
statement:  Kissinger,  693; 
Sherer,  692;  text  of  state- 
ment, 693 
World  Health  Assembly  action  on 
health  care  report  (Scranton), 
37 
Lebanon,   Middle  East  settlement, 
effect  on:  Atherton,   177;  Kis- 
singer,  164,  236,  563,  PR  514, 
10/15;  Lord,  682 
Negotiations: 
Arab  role:  Atherton,  478;  Kis- 
singer, 172,  563 
Personal  satisfaction  (Kissinger), 

128 
Prospects  and  progress:  Ather- 
ton, 176;  Kissinger,  131,  151, 
160,  164,  218,  314,  350,  402, 
501,  601,  707,  PR  419,  9/7 
Step-by-step  approach  (Kis- 
singer), 236,  502,  545,  562, 
601 


Arab-Israeli  conflict — Continued 

Palestinian   rights,   question  of:  j 

Atherton,  178;  Kissinger,  647 

U.S.  veto  of  unbalanced  Security 

Council     resolution:     695; 

Sherer,  143 

Peace,  need,  basis:  Atherton,  175; 

Kissinger,  545,  562;  Sherer,  143 

Soviet  role  and  influence,  question 

of  (Kissinger),  367 
U.N.  Emergency  Force: 
One-year  extension  (Sherer),  647 
Transfer  of  certain  foreign  excess 
property  of  Sinai  Support  , 
Mission,  agreement  re,  652      ! 
U.N.  role  (Kissinger),  501  ! 

Arentoft,  John,  712 
Argentina: 
Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials, 

231 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  572, 
700 
Armaments: 
Arms  race  (Kissinger),  228,  522 
M48A5  tanks  and  M113A1  armored 
personnel  carriers,  loan  agree- 
ment with  Portugal,  71 
U.S.  sales  policy:  Atherton,  475; 
Habib,  447;  Kissinger,  228,  244, 
371,  549,  606,  642 
Arms  control  and  disarmament  (Kis- 
singer), 131,499,  710 
Chemical    weapons    prohibition, 
U.S. -Soviet  consultations,  423 
Arms    Control    and    Disarmament 
Agency,  U.S.,  15th  annual  report, 
transmittal  (Ford),  345 
Armstrong,  Oscar  V.,  457 
ASEAN.  See  Association  of  Southeast 

Asian  Nations 
Asia,  South  Asia,  and  Southeast  Asia 
(see  also  names  of  individual 
countries): 
Economic  development  (Kissinger), 

224 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States,  ins,  volume  V,  The 
Near  East,  South  Asia,  and  Af- 
rica, part  2,  released,  700 
Harvard  East  Asia  Conference  (Kis- 
singer), 573,  575 
Pakistan,   India,  and  Bangladesh 
common  market,  question  of 
(Kissinger),  319 
Security,    U.S.    interests:    Ford 
(quoted),  470;  Habib,  449;  Kis- 
singer, 219 
U.S.  policy,  relations,  and  role: 
Atherton,  479;  Hummel,  469; 
Kissinger,  216,  350;  Lord,  685 
Asian  Development  Bank:  Hummel, 
471;      Kissinger,      225,      504; 
McGovern,  590;  Robinson,  288 
Articles  of  agreement  establishing 
(1965),  Cook  Islands,  304 
Association  of  Southeast  Asian  Na- 
tions: 290,  292;  Hummel,  471;  Kis- 
singer, 221;  Robinson,  288 


Department  of  State  Bulletini 


Alherton,  Alfred  L. ,  Jr. ,  174,  429,  475 
lAustralia: 

Foreign  investment  policy,  293 

Japan,  relations:  289-290;  Robinson, 
286 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  39,  70, 
147,  304,  347,  467,  539,  675,  759 

U.S.  relations  (Robinson),  285 

U.S.  visit  of  Prime  Mini.ster  Fraser: 
joint  statement,  291;  program, 
PR  350,  7/22 
Austria,  treaties,  agreements,  etc., 
39,  103,  256,  329,  330,  438,  495, 
744,  759 
Aviation: 

Aeronautical  facilities  and  services 
in  Greenland,  agreement  with 
Denmark,  596 

Air  navigation  services  in  Greenland 
and  the  Faroe  Islands,  agree- 
ment (1956): 
Amendment  of  article  V,  284 
Amendment  of  part  IV  of  annex  I, 
539 

Air  navigation  services  in  Iceland, 
joint  financing,  amendment  to 
1956  agreement,  284 

Air  passenger  charter  services, 
bilateral  agreements  with:  Ire- 
land, 39,  102;  U.K.,  37 

Air  transport  agreements  with: 
Lebanon,  71;  Poland,  439;  Ven- 
ezuela, 628 

Air  transportation,  international, 
U.S.  policy  statement  (Ford), 
488 

Aircraft,  18  Lockheed  P-3  long- 
range  patrol  aircraft,  purchase 
by  Canada,  bilateral  agree- 
ment, 284 

Airworthiness  certificates,  recip- 
rocal acceptance,  agreements 
with:  Brazil,  147;  Poland,  675; 
Romania,  760 

Goose  Bay  airport,  use  of  facilities, 
bilateral  agreement  with 
Canada,  187,  759 

Hijacking  agreement  with  U.S., 
Cuban  cancellation  (Kissinger), 
537,  577 

International  civil  aviation,  conven- 
tion (1944),  Cape  Verde,  347 
Protocol  (1971),  Iraq,  103 

International  recognition  of  rights 
in  aircraft,  convention  (1948), 
Lu.xembourg,  103 

Offenses  and  certain  other  acts 
committed  on  board  aircraft, 
convention  (1963):  Ireland, 
Papua  New  Guinea,  Turkey,  103 

Suppression  of  unlawful  acts  against 
safety  of  civil  aviation,  conven- 
tion (1971):  Barbados,  627;  Bel- 
gium, France,  303;  Gabon,  146; 
Indonesia,  376 

Suppression  of  unlawful  seizure  of 
aircraft,  convention  (1970): 
Bahamas,  329;  Indonesia,  376 


Aviation — Continued 

U.K. -U.S.  civil  aviation  dispute  re 
winter  season  traffic,  resolu- 
tion, PR  511,  10/14 


B 


Bacon,  Sir  Francis  (quoted),  614 
Bacon,  George  (Schaufele),  342 
Bahamas: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  70,  71, 

329,330,331,438,651 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Olson),  PR  567, 
11/23 
Bahrain: 
Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials, 

713 
Intergovernmental  Maritime  Con- 
sultative Organization,  conven- 
tion (1948)  and  amendments,  ac- 
ceptance, 495 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Cluverius),  PR 
509,  10/14 
Bailey,  Pearl,  755 
Baker,  Howard  H.,  Jr.,  510 
Balaguer,  Joaquin  (quoted),  14,  18 
Balance  of  payments:  122;  Ford,  118; 
Rogers,  751;  Simon,  119,  120 
Africa  (Kissinger),  356 
Latin  America  (Rogers),  753 
Zaire,  bilateral  loan  agreement,  216 
Balloon  program,  transatlantic,  mem- 
orandum of  understanding  (1976), 
466 
Bangladesh: 
Karnaphuli   Power  Station,   hy- 
drogenerating  unit,  agreement 
with  U.S.,  596 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  39,  70, 

596,  651,  723 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Masters),  PR 
500,  10/7 
Barbados,  treaties,  agreements,  etc., 

103,  256,  495,  572,  627 
Barnard,  Robert,  541 
Beatty,  Warren  (Luers),  215 
Becker,  Ralph  E. ,  sworn  in  as  Ambas- 
sador to  Honduras,  PR  458,  9/22 
Belgium: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  39,  70, 
256,  303,  304,  330,  347,  438,  539 
U.S.  MAAG's  terminated,  336 
Benin,  international  coffee  agreement 
(1976),   provisional  application, 
539 
Bennett,  W.  Tapley ,  Jr. ,  185,  373,  510, 

668 
Berlin:  Genscher,  PR  598,  12/10;  Kis- 
singer, PR  598,  12/10 
Berlin  agreement:  Kissinger,  130,  384; 

Schmidt,  384 
Bermuda,  treaties,  agreements,  etc., 

256 
Bhutto,  Ali  (quoted),  737 
Bibow,  Rolf,  647 

Bicentennial:  Queen  Elizabeth  II,  197; 
Ford,  245;  Kekkonen,  337;  Kis- 
singer, 18,  149,  217,  509;  Lewis, 


Index,  July  5-December  27,  1 976 


Bicentennial — Continued 

195;  Schmidt,  246;  Scranton,  205; 
Tolbert,  482 
Australian  studies  at  Harvard  Uni- 
versity, endowment  of  chair, 
293;  Robinson,  285;  visit  of  Aus- 
tralian ballet,  Robinson,  285 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  es- 
tablishment of  Albert  Einstein 
Spacearium  of  Smithsonian  Air 
and  Space  Museum,  246 
Finnish  participation  (Ford),  337 
Iran,  scholarship  funds,  316 
U.K.    gift    of    Bicentennial    bell 

(Ford),  197 
U.S. -U.K.  Bicentennial  arts  fellows 
named,  PR  334,  6/28 
Big-power  responsibility:  291;  Kis- 
singer, 31,  149,  155,  258,  265,  350, 
498,  518,  597;  Lewis,  192;  Lord, 
679 
Bindzi,  Benoit,  739 
Biological  and  toxin  weapons,  conven- 
tion (1972):  Sierra  Leone,  103; 
Togo,  674 
Black,  Creed  C,  363,  364 
Blake,  James  J.,  sworn  in  as  Ambas- 
sador to  Iceland,  PR  355,  7/23 
Blake,  William  (quoted),  732 
Bloch,  Dora:  Bennett,  185;  Kissinger, 

168 
Blumenfeld,  Erik,  707 
Bodine,  William  W.,  Jr.,  363 
Boeker,  Paul,  134 
Bolen,  David  B.,  616 
Bolivia  (Robinson),  492 
Access  to  sea:  23;  Kissinger,  21 
Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials,  13 
Treaties,   agreements,  etc.,   187, 

304,438,  651,  723,  759 
Visit  of  Secretary  Kissinger:  Kis- 
singer, 20;  U.S. -Bolivia  joint 
communique,  23 
Boster,  Davis  Eugene,  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  Guatemala,  PR 
475,  9/28 
Botswana  (Bolen),  618 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Norland),  PR 
569,  11/24 
Boyatt,  Thomas  (Kissinger),  169 
Bradford,  William  G.,  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  Chad,  PR  491,  10/1 
Bradsher,  Henry  S.,  606 
Brazil: 
Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials, 

132 
Balance  of  payments  (Rogers),  753 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  71,  147, 

216.  304,  571,  744 
U.S. -Brazil  Joint  Groups  on  Scien- 
tific and  Technological  Coopera- 
tion and  Energy  Technology, 
first  meetings,  joint  statement, 
493 
Brokaw,  Tom,  528 
Brown,  Frederick  Z.,  293,  392,  453 
Brzezinski,  Zbigniew  (Kissinger),  242 
Buali,  Abdulaziz  Abdulrahman,  713 


763 


Buehan,  Alastair:  (quoted)  105,  107; 
Kissinger,  105 

Bulgaria,  treaties,  agreements,  etc., 
304,  438,  700,  759 

Bui-ma,  drug  control  programs:  Hum- 
mel, 473;  Robinson,  491 

Burundi: 
Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials, 

739 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  304,  376 

Business  practices,  restrictive, 
agreement  with  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany  re  mutual  coopera- 
tion, 147 

Byelorussian  Soviet  Socialist  Repub- 
lic, treaties,  agreements,  etc., 
347,  376,  438,  466 

Byrne,  Patricia  M.,  sworn  in  as  Am- 
bassador to  Mali,  PR  502,  10/8 


Caglayangil,  Ihsan,  remarks  following 
meeting   with    Secretary    Kis- 
singer, PR  596,  12/10 
Callaghan,     James,     remarks     on 
Rhodesia,  PR  467,  9/23,  PR  468, 
9/23 
Cambodia.  See  Khmer  Republic 
Cameroon: 
Ambassador  to  U.S.,   credentials, 

739 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  38,  539, 
674 
Canada: 
Communications  Technology  Satel- 
lite (CTS),  cooperative  launch- 
ing: Bennett,  668;  Reis,  208 
Goose  Bay  airport,  bilateral  agree- 
ment re  use  of,  187,  759 
Great  Lakes  levels  discussions,  PR 

457,  9/22 
IJC  Garrison  Diversion  Unit,  delay 

in  final  report,  PR  385,  8/16 
St.  Lawrence  Seaway  consultations, 

PR  580,  12/3 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  39,  103, 
104,  147,  187,  284,  304,  329,  331, 
407,  495,  539,  723,  759 
U.S. -Canada  border  television  dis- 
cussions, PR  499,  10/7 
U.S. -Canadian  meeting  on  the  Pop- 
lar River,  PR  348,  7/13 
U.S.  maritime  boundaries,  667 
U.S.  relations  (Kissinger),  227,  350 
Cape  Verde: 
Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials, 

231 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  347, 

376,  439,  651 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Wells),  PR  513, 
10/15 
Carter,  Jimmy  (Kissinger),  165,  235, 

367,  709,  PR  596,  12/10 
Carter,  Rosalynn:  PR  579,  12/3;  Kis- 
singer, 749 
Casals,  Pablo  (quoted),  615 
Caulfield,  Tom,  553 


764 


Central  African  Republic,  treaties, 

agreements,  etc.,  304,  571 
Central  Intelligence  Agency  (Kis- 
singer), 578 
Central  Treaty  Organization  (Kis- 
singer), 45 
Chad: 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Bradford),  PR 

491,  10/1 
World  Health  Organization  con- 
stitution (1946),  amendments  to 
articles  34  and  55,  acceptance, 
674 
Chatty,  Habib,  612 
Chile: 
Alleged  U.S.  arms  sales  and  arms 

factory  (Kissinger),  19 
Allende  regime,  question  of  U.S.  in- 
terference (Kissinger),  30,  125, 
579 
Fonner  Ambassador  Letelier,  mur- 
der of  (Kissinger),  578 
Human  rights  (Kissinger),  3,  43, 

339,  608 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  70,  675, 

744 
U.S.  military  and  economic  aid,  re- 
strictions (Kissinger),  4,  339 
(quoted) 
Visit  of  Secretary  Kissinger,  23 
China: 
America's  Cultural  Experiment  in 
Chi)ia.  19!,2-19J,9.   by  Wilma 
Fairbank,  PR  398,  8/26 
People's  Republic  of: 
Asian-Pacific  role,  290,  292 
India,  relations  (Atherton),  480 
Mao  Tse-tung,  death  of:  Ford, 

416;  Kissinger,  416 
Sino-Soviet  relations:  Hummel, 
475;  Kissinger,  417,  608,  641, 
711 
Southeast  Asian  states,  relations 

(Hummel),  469,  492 
Soviet  attack,  question  of  (Kis- 
singer), 642 
Taiwan,     essentially     internal 
Chinese  affair  (Kissinger), 
229,  240 
U.S.  arms  sales,  question  of  (Kis- 
singer), 579,  609 
U.S.  relations:  292;  Kissinger, 
151,  222,  319,  350,  372,  499, 
500,  605,  705;  Lord,  681,682 
Changes  in  Chinese  leadership, 
question   of  effect   (Kis- 
singer), 128,  417,  575,  580, 
PR  514,  10/15 
Visit  of  President  Ford  or  Secre- 
tary Kissinger,  question  of 
(Kissinger),  417,  575 
World  security  and  (Kissinger), 
608 
Republic  of:  Hummel,  454;  Kis- 
singer, 240,  372,  580;  Robinson, 
288 
Fisheries  agreement  with  U.S., 
joint  statement,  494 


China — Continued 
Republic  of — Continued  , 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  407^ 

439 

U.S.  nuclear  policies  (Hummel) 
454 
Chirac,  Jacques  (Kissinger,  remark^ 

following  meeting),  PR  323,  6/23|  0 
Chou  En-lai  (Kissinger),  128 
Christiansen,  Arne,  705 
Churchill,  Winston  (quoted),  157 
Churchill  Research  Range,  agreemen 

with  Canada,  407 

Civilian   persons   in   time   of  war 

Geneva  convention  (1949):  Papu. 

New  Guinea,  Sao  Tome  and  Prin 

cipe,  187;  Surinam,  744 

Claims,  Egypt,  agi'eement  re  claims  o 

U.S.  nationals,  38,  627 

Entry  into  force,  PR  535,  10/29 

Cluverius,  Wat  T.,  sworn  in  as  Am 

bassador  to  Bahrain,  PR  509 

10/14 

Coffee    agreement,    international 

(1976):  Kissinger,  7 

Current  actions:  Angola,  571;  Ausrf 

tralia,  304,  539;  Austria,  2561 

Belgium,  304,  539;  Benin,  539 

Bolivia,  438,  723,  759;  Brazil! 

571;  Burundi,  304,  376;  Came 

roon,  38,  539;  Canada,  304,  7231 

Central  African  Republic,  3041 

571;  Congo,  539;  Costa  Rica 

723;     Denmark,     146,     533 

Dominican  Republic,  146,  571' 

627;  Ecuador,  304,  571;  El  Sal 

vador,  38,  347;  Ethiopia,  304 

539,  759;  European  Economi 

Community,  304,  571;  Finland 

304,  539;  France,  539;  Gabon 

304,  627;  Germany,  Federal  Re 

public  of,  539;  Ghana,  304,  5391 

627;  Guatemala,  539;  Guinea 

304,  539,  627;  Haiti,  38,  72: 

Honduras,  571,  627,  723;  India 

438,  723;  Indonesia,  438,  53f 

627;  Ireland,  438,  571;  Israe 

304;    Italy,   304,    539;    Ivor 

Coast,  304,  723;  Jamaica,  43^ 

539;  Japan,  304,  539;  Kenya 

438,  539;  Liberia,  539;  Lu.xem 

bourg,  304,  539;  Madagascar 

Me-xico,  539;  Netherlands,  Ne\ 

Zealand,  304,  723;  Nigeria,  304 

539,  723;  Norway,  304;  Panama 

304,  723;  Papua  New  Guinea 

69,  256;  Paraguay,  571,  627 

Peru,  438;  Portugal,  438,  723 

Rwanda,    571,     743;    Sierr; 

Leone,  256,  571,  759;  Spain 

256,  539;  Sweden,  438;  Switzer 

land,  723;  Tanzania,  38,  539 

Togo,  571;  Trinidad  and  Tobago 

38,  438;  Uganda,  304,  723;  U.K. 

376;  U.S.,  347,  466,  539;  Ven 

ezuela,  304,  723;  Yugoslaviai 

Zaire,  304,  539 

U.S.  ratification  urged  (Green- 

wald),  273 


{» 


litil 


CX 


Department  of  State  Bulletip 


!l 


■(iluinbia: 

Coca  growing  and  cocaine  produc- 
tion (Robinson),  492 
Tifuties,   agreements,   etc.,  38, 

1S7,  256,  284,  329 
r  S.  Ambassador  (Sanchez),  PR 

:;58,  7/29 
iiliiiiibo  nonaligned  summit  meeting: 
Department,  394;  Kissinger,  356, 
402 
olumbus,  Christopher  (quoted),  557 
'unimodity  trade  (see  also  name  of 

niiiniiodity): 
Aliica:  Bolen,  618;  Kissinger,  356 
Case-by-case  consideration:  133; 
Katz,  485;  Kissinger,  7,  81,  90; 
Rogers,  657 
Latin  America,  U.S.  proposals  (Kis- 
singer), 6,  16,  22,  43 
Price  or  production  indexation,  U.S. 
position:  133;  Boel<er,  135;  Katz. 
484;  Rogers,  657 
UNCTAD  consensus  resolution: 
i:?3;  Boeker,   135;  Bolen,  621; 
Kissinger,  90 
U.S.  position:  Greenwald,  271,  294; 

Katz,  485;  Kissinger,  726 
U.S.  summary  of  UNCTAD  resolu- 
tion on  commodities  (Boeker), 
138 
'ommunity  development  and  training 
program,  agreement  with  Bolivia, 
651 
'omoros,  treaties,  agreements,  etc., 

330,  466,  627 
(iiitro,  international  coffee  agreement 
(1976),  provisional  application, 
539 
'ongress,  U.S.: 
Congress-executive  relations:  Ford, 
199,     200;     Kissinger,     124; 
McCloskey,  139 
Documents  relating  to  foreign  pol- 
icy, lists,  .36,  101,  146,  173,  215, 
255,  282,  303,  328,  346,  372,  406, 
437,  494,  565,  626,  650,  674,  722, 
754 
Foreign  policy  role  and  effect  on 
legislation:  Kissinger,  241,  260, 
706;  McCloskey,  140 
Legislation: 
Bretton  Woods  Agreements  Act, 

signature  (Ford),  626 
Foreign  Assistance  and  Related 
Programs     Appropriations 
Act,  1976,  signature  (Ford), 
199 
Foreign  Sovereign  Immunities 
Act  of  1976,  signature:  Ford, 
648;  Leigh,  649 
Immigration  and  Nationality  Act 
amendments  of  1976,  signa- 
ture (Ford),  639 
Prevention  and  Punishment  of 
Crimes  Against  Internation- 
ally Protected  Persons,  Act 
for,  signature  (Ford),  554 


Congress,  U.S. — Continued 
Legislation — Continued 
Security  Assistance  and  Arms 
Export  Control  Act  of  1976, 
signature  (Ford),  198 
Whale  Conservation  and  Protec- 
tion Study  Act,  signature, 
(Ford),  625 
Legislation,  proposed; 
African  Development  Bank,  ap- 
propriations: Kissinger,  356; 
McGovern,  590 
International  navigational  rules 

act,  veto  (Ford),  586 
Lebanon,  humanitarian  aid,  ap- 
propriation requests:   De- 
partment, 460;  Habib,  267 
Multinational  corporations,  taxa- 
tion   of   foreign    payments 
(Feldman),  697 
Turkey,     defense    cooperation 
agreement,   appropriations 
urged:  Ford,  60:  Habib,  424 
UNRWA,     U.S.     contribution 

(Sherer),  144 
U.S.  business  practices  in  Arab 
boycott  of  Israel  (Kissinger), 
369 
Senate: 
Advice  and  consent: 
Authentication  of  documents 
convention  (1960),  ratifica- 
tion urged  (Ford),  281 
Fifth  international  tin  agree- 
ment, ratification  urged: 
Ford,  179;  Greenwald,  276 
Income  tax  convention  with  Re- 
public of  Korea,  ratification 
urged  (Ford),  437 
International  coffee  agi'eement, 
1976,  ratification  urged 
(Greenwald),  273 
International  wheat  agreement, 
1976  protocol,   ratification 
urged  (Greenwald),  279 
North  Pacific  fur  seal  conven- 
tion, 1976  protocol,  ratifica- 
tion urged  (Ford),  281 
Nuclear  threshold  test  ban  ti'e- 
aty  and  peaceful  nuclear 
explosions   treaty   with 
Soviet  Union,  ratification 
urged  (Ford),  269 
Psychotropic  convention  (1971), 
ratification  urged  (Robin- 
son), 492 
Terrorism,  international  con- 
ventions  on,    signature 
(Ford),  554 
U.K. -U.S.  income  tax  conven- 
tion,  i-atification   urged 
(Ford),  145 
Confirmation,  510 
State  Department  relations  (Mc- 
Closkey), 142 
Conservation: 
Antarctic  seals,  convention  (1972), 
U.S.,  438 


llndex,  July  5-December  27,  1976 


Conservation — Continued 

Endangered  species  of  wild  fauna 
and  flora,  international  trade  in, 
convention  (1973):  Australia, 
India,  .347;  Iran,  627;  Norway, 
347;  Soviet  Union,  627;  U.K., 
Zaire,  347 
Migratory  birds  and  their  environ- 
ment, bilateral  agreement  with 
Soviet  Union,  760 
North  Pacific  fur  seals,  1976  pro- 
tocol to  interim  convention: 
Current  actions;  Canada,  Japan, 
539;  Soviet  Union,  572;  U.S., 
438,  539,  651 
Entry  into  force,  572,  PR  536, 

10/29 
U.S.   ratification  urged  (Ford), 
281 
Polar  bears,  agreement  (1973), 

U.S.,  438,  539,  650,  743 
Whale  Conservation  and  Protection 
Study  Act,  signature  (Ford), 
625 
Consular  relations,  Vienna  convention 
(1963):  Equatorial  Guinea,  438; 
Zaire,  407 
Containers: 
Customs  convention  (1972):  Bul- 
garia,  Byelorussian  S.S.R., 
Soviet  Union,  438;  Switzerland, 
627;  Ukrainian  S.S.R.,  438; 
U.S.,  438,  571 
Safe  containers  (CSC),  international 
convention   (1972):   Bulgaria, 
759;  Byelorussian  S.S.R.,  466; 
Germany,  Federal  Republic  of, 
329:  Soviet  Union,  407;  Ukrain- 
ian S.S.R.,  466;  U.S.,  4:38.  571 
Cook  Islands,   Asian  Development 

Bank,  membership,  304 
Copyright    convention,     universal 

(1971),  Colombia,  329 
da  Costa,  Amaro,  703 
Costa  Rica: 

Tr'eaties,  agreements,  etc.,  70,  188, 

467,  723 
U.S.  MAAG's  terminated,  336 
Council  of  European  Communities, 
fifth  international  tin  agreement 
(1975),  intention  to  ratify,  304 
Cranberg,  Gil,  552 
Crespo  Gutierrez,  Alberto,  13 
Crigler,  T.  Frank,  sworn  in  as  Ambas- 
sador to  Rwanda,  PR  480,  9/29 
Crisis  management:  Kissinger,  703; 

Lord,  682;  Robinson,  441 
Cronkite,  Walter,  interview  with  Sec- 
retary Kissinger,  PR  469,  9/23 
Crosland,  Anthony,  521 
Cuba  (Rogers),  753 
Angola,  effect  on  U.S.  relations 

(Kissinger),  26,  553 
Communist  influence  on  Caribbean 
countries,  question  of:  Kis- 
singer, 28;  Luers,  49 
Hijacking  agreement  with  U.S., 
cancellation  (Kissinger),  573, 
577 


765 


Cuba — Continued 

Human  rights  (Kissinger),  4,  43,  339 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  38,  103, 
216,  331 
Cultural  relations: 

Cultural  property,  prohibition  of  il- 
licit import,  export,  and  trans- 
fer of  ownership,  convention 
(1970),  Nepal,  571 

Multiregional  journalists  project, 
27th  annual  study/travel  pro- 
gram, PR  386,  8/18 

Multiregional  TV  project,  PR  408, 
9/1 

U.S.  Advisory  Commission  on  In- 
ternational Educational  and 
Cultural  Affairs,  release  of  12th 
annual  report,  PR  512,  10/14 

U.S. -Egypt  Joint  Working  Group  on 
Education  and  Culture,  meet- 
ing, 713 

U.S. -Federal  Republic  of  Germany 
mayoral  conference  on  culture 
and  urban  development,  PR 
479,  9/28 

U.S. -Japan  Conference  on  Cultural 
and  Educational  Interchange, 
eighth  meeting,  65 

U.S. -U.K.  Bicentennial  arts  fellows 
named,  PR  334,  6/28 

World  cultural  and  natural  heritage, 
protection,   convention  (1972), 
Poland,  572 
Customs: 

Commercial  samples  and  advertis- 
ing material,  importation,  in- 
ternational convention  (1952), 
Cuba  (with  reservation),  103 

Customs  convention  (1972):  Bul- 
garia, Byelorussian  S.S.R., 
Soviet  Union,  438;  Switzerland, 
627;  Ukrainian  S.S.R.,  438; 
U.S.,  438,  571 

Mutual  assistance  between  customs 
services,  bilateral  agreements 
with:  Austria,  759;  Mexico,  627 
Cyprus: 

International  Court,  referral  (Kis- 
singer), 324 

Negotiations,  progress,  and  U.S. 

support:  Habib,  427;  Kissinger, 

93,  241,  623  (quoted),  PR  596 

12/10;  McGovern,  721 

European  role  (van  der  Stoel),  323 

Fourth,  fifth,  and  sixth  progress 

reports  (Ford),  62,  404,  622 

Refugees  and  U.S.  humanitarian  aid 
(Ford),  405,  623 

UNFICYP  (Ford),  623 
Six-month  extension:  Sherer,  63; 
text  of  Security  Council  res- 
olution, 64 

U.S.  military  intervention  at  begin- 
ning of  Cyprus  problem,  ques- 
tion of  (Kissinger),  240 

U.S.  principles  for  permanent  set- 
tlement: Ford,  623;  Kissinger, 
89,  323,  503;  Sherer,  64 


766 


Czechoslovakia: 
Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials,  13 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  70,  103, 
304,  439,  572,  743 


da  Costa,  Amaro,  703 
Debt-rescheduling       negotiations: 

Boeker,  136;  Kissinger,  505 
Defense,  national  (Kissinger),  231 
Army  and  strategic  forces  (Kis- 
singer), 108 
Defense  spending  (Kissinger),  552 
U.S.  forces  abroad,  reduction,  ques- 
tion of  (Kissinger),  367 
U.S.  secondary  position,  question  of 
(Kissinger),  243 
de  Freitas,  Sir  Geoffrey,  704 
de  Guiringaud,  Louis,  PR  597,  12/10 
Democracy  and  democratic  principles: 

Kissinger,  26;  Reinhardt,  661 
Denmark: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  39,  146, 
147,  304,  347,  438,  539,  596,  674 
U.S.  MAAG's  terminated,  336 
Dennis,  Francis  A.  W.,  231 
Development: 
Feasibility  studies,  project  agree- 
ment with  Bangladesh,  723 
OAS  Special  Assembly  on  develop- 
ment, proposed  (Kissinger),  5,  9 
Dickman,  Francois,  sworn  in  as  Am- 
bassador to  United  Arab  Emi- 
rates, PR  486,  9/30 
Diego  Garcia  facilities,  290,  292 
Digest  of  United  States  Practice  in  In- 
ternational Law,  1975,  released, 
675 
Diggs,  Charles  C.  (Laise),  254 
Diplomatic  relations,  Vienna  conven- 
tion (1961):  Equatorial  Guinea, 
438;  Yemen,  743 
Diplomatic  representatives,  U.S.  Spe- 
cial Representative  to  Lebanon 
(Seelye),  designation,  98?(, 
Diplomatic  representatives  in  the 
U.S.,  credentials:  Argentina,  231 
Bahrain,  713;  Bolivia,  13;  Brazil 
132;  Burundi,  Cameroon,  739 
Cape  Verde,  231;  Czechoslovakia 
13;     Fiji,     713;     Gabon,     739 
Guatemala,   132;   Ireland,  231 
Lesotho,   739;   Liberia,    231 
Malaysia,  132;  Mali,  739;  Niger, 
Rwanda,   Sudan,   713;  Yemen 
Arab  Republic,  13 
Diplomats,   protection  of,  convention 
(1973):  Ford,  554 
U.S.  ratification,  572,  627 
Disaster  relief  (Kissinger),  505 
Drought,  food  aid  agreements  with: 

Mauritania,  Niger,  71 
Guatemala,  earthquake  relief  ef- 
forts, agreement  with  U.S.: 
284,  723;  Kissinger,  16,  43 


Disaster  relief — Continued 
Honduras,  recovery  and  reconstruc- 
tion from  effects  of  Hurricane 
"Fifi,"  loan  agreement  with 
U.S.,  104 
Italy,  earthquake  victims,  U.S.  as- 
sistance, 71 
Dominican  Republic: 
Balance  of  payments  (Rogers),  753 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,   146, 

187,  188,  571,  627,  651 
Visit  of  Secretary  Kissinger  (Kis- 
singer), 14,  19 
Donsker,  Monroe  D.,  election  as  vice 
chairman  of  Board  of  Foreign 
Scholarships,  PR  471,  9/24 
Double   taxation,    conventions   for 
avoidance  of:  Ford,   145;  Korea, 
Republic  of,  71;  Poland,  148,  256; 
U.K.,  376 
Drugs,  narcotic: 
International  control,  U.S.  pro- 
grams and  objectives  (Robin- 
son), 489 
Mexico,  illicit  drug  control:  35;  Kis- 
singer, 34;  Luers,  212;  Robin- 
son, 490 
Bilateral  agreements,  256,  376, 
439,  572 
Psychotropic  sub.stances  convention 
(1971): 
Current  actions.  Federal  Republic 

of  Germany,  674 
Ratification  urged  (Robinson),  4921 
Single  convention  on  narcotic 
drugs  (1961):  Barbados,   103; 
Indonesia,  438 
Protocol  amending:  Barbados, 
103;  Canada,  329;  Indonesia, 
438;  Luxembourg,  596;  Togo, 
699;  Tunisia,  147;  Zaire,  407 
Suppression  of  illegal  narcotics  pro- 
duction and  traffic,  bilateral 
agreement  with  Costa  Rica,  188 
U.S.  citizens,  consequences  of  being 
involved  with  drugs  abroad 
(Luers),  214 
Duarte,  Juan  Pablo  (Kissinger),  18 
Dubs,  Adolph,  478 


East-West  relations:  Genscher,  PR 
598,   12/10;  Kissinger,  21,  45, 
109,  111,  127,  153,  382,  PR  598, 
12/10;  Schmidt,  .382,  .384 
Economic  relations:  123;  Ford,  118; 
Kissinger,  78,  92,  112,  119,  152, 
PR  315,  6/22;  Robinson,  287, 
443,  444;  Rogers,  659 
Humanitarian  versus  economic  or 
military  issues  (Kissinger),  323, 
326-327 
Echeven-ia  Alvarez,  Luis  (Kissinger), 

27 
Economic  and  Social  Council,  U.N.: 
Documents,  lists,  210 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Kiniiumic  and  Social  Council — Con. 

Enlargement,  amendment  to  article 
61  of  U.N.  Charter,  Cuba,  331 

Intei'governniental  group  for  pre- 
vention of  illicit  payments: 
Boeker,  137;  Feldman,  696; 
Nessen,  338;  PR  559,  11/16 

Re.structuring,  proposed  (Scran- 
ton),  205 

61st  session  (Scranton),  201 
Economic  policy  and  relations  (Rog- 
ers), 6.53 

F'conomic,  industrial,  and  technical 
cooperation,  agreement  with 
Romania,  744,  758 

Economic  Cooperation,  U.S. -Iran 
Joint  Commission,  agreed  min- 
utes of  third  session,  PR  368, 
8/7 

Economic  development  programs, 
loan  agreement  with  Syria,  675, 
760 

Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States.  191,9,  volume  I,  Na- 
tional Security  Affairs,  Foreign 
Economic  Policy,  released,  652 

Foreign  specialists'  study  of  key 
U.S.  economic  sectors,  PR  481, 
9/29 

Restrictive  business  practices, 
agreement  with  Federal  Repub- 
lic of  Germany,  408 

Trade,  investment,  and  financial 
matters,     U.S. -Brazil    joint 
communique,  71 
Economy,  world  {see  also  Less  de- 
veloped countries):   Bolen,  620; 
Kissinger,  31,  74,  503;  Lord,  683; 
McGovem,  587;  Robinson,  441 

Conference  on  International  Eco- 
nomic Cooperation  (CIEC), 
Paris:  Greenwald,  296;  Kis- 
singer, 91,  505;  McGovern,  590; 
Rogers,  654,  657;  Scranton,  204 

Currency  fluctuations:  122;  Kis- 
singer, 121,  158;  Simon,  121 

Inflation,  recession:  Ford,  118;  Kis- 
singer, 74,  119,  259,  263;  Rog- 
ers, 653,  751 

Puerto  Rico  discussions:  292;  Ford, 

116,  117,  118;  Kissinger,  46,  74, 

92,  119,  152,  324;  Robinson,  443; 

Rogers,  654;  Scranton,  204 

European  participation,  question 

of  (Kissinger),  93,  708 
Joint  declaration,  text,  121 
Ecuador: 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  39,  304, 
439,  571 

U.S.  Trade  Act,  proposed  amend- 
ment (Kissinger),  6,  8 
Education: 

Board  of  Foreign  Scholarships, 
chairman  and  vice  chairman, 
election,  PR  471,  9/24 

Bolivia,  bilateral  agreement  re  im- 
provement of  rural  education, 
187 


Education — Continued 
Portugal,  bilateral  agreement  re 

construction  of  schools,  495 
U.S.  Advisory  Commission  on  In- 
ternational  Educational   and 
Cultural  Affairs,  release  of  12th 
annual  report,  PR  512,  10/14 
U.S. -Egypt  Joint  Working  Group  on 
Education  and  Culture,  meet- 
ing, 713 
U.S. -Japan  Conference  on  Cultural 
and  Educational   Interchange, 
eighth  meeting,  65 
Educational,  Scientific,  and  Cultural 
Organization,  U.N.: 
Constitution  (1945):  Mozambique, 
Papua  New  Guinea,  Seychelles, 
Surinam,  743 
19th  general  conference  (Rein- 

hardt),  661 
Structure  and  operations  (Rein- 
hardt).  665 
Egypt: 
Claims  of  U.S.  nationals,  agree- 
ment, 38 
Entry  into  force,  PR  535,  10/29 
InteiTnediary  role  in  U.S.  evacua- 
tion of  citizens  from  Lebanon 
(Kissinger),  94 
Misr  Spinning  and  Weaving  Com- 
pany facilities,  modernization, 
bilateral  agreement  with  U.S., 
723 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  39,  70, 
71,  104,  147,  216,  304,  627,  651, 
675,  723,  743,  744 
U.S. -Egypt  Joint  Working  Group  on 
Education  and  Culture,  meet- 
ing, 713 
U.S.-Egypt  Joint  Working  Group  on 
Technology,  Research  and  De- 
velopment, fifth  meeting,  joint 
statement,  754 
Eisa,  Omer  Sahh,  713 
Eisenhower,  Dwight  D.  (Kissinger), 

547 
El  Salvador: 
Textile  agreement,  termination,  PR 

563,  11/18 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  38,  347, 

407,  744 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Lozano),  PR  376, 
8/13 
Elizabeth  II,  Queen  of  the  United 
Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and 
Northern  Ireland,  visit  to  U.S.: 
196,  197;  program,  PR  335,  6/28 
Energy  sources  and  problems:  123; 
Kissinger,  81;  Robinson,  443,  445; 
Rogers,  658 
Alternate  sources  (see  also  Nuclear 
energy):  Kissinger,  77,  91,  709; 
Reis,  210 
Hydrogenerating  unit  at  Kar- 
naphule   Power  Station, 
bilateral  loan  agreement 
with  Bangladesh,  39 


Energy  sources — Continued 
Alternate  sources — Continued 
Solar  energy: 
Information  on  programs  on 
generation  and  transmis- 
sion  by   means   of  space 
technology  (Bennett),  671 
Solar  energy  and  gas,  U.S. -Iran 
agreement  on  cooperation: 
315;  Ansary,  308 
Solar  heating  and  cooling  sys- 
tems in  buildings,  memo- 
randum of  understanding 
(1974),  Jamaica,  38 
Thermal  power  plant  near  Is- 
maila,  grant  agi'eement  with 
Egypt,  216 
Balance  of  payments,  effect  (Si- 
mon), 120 
Egypt,  bilateral  agreement  re  con- 
struction of  National  Energy 
Control  Center,  744 
International  Energy  Agency;  Kis- 
singer, 240,  709;  Rogers,"  655 
lEA-French  cooperation,  question 

of  (Kissinger),  93 
International   Energy   Institute, 
proposed:  Ford,  634;  Kissinger, 
728;  Robinson,  445;  Rogers,  655 
International   energy   problems, 
agreement  (1974):  Austria,  329; 
Belgium,  347;  Greece,  674 
Less  developed  countries,  effect: 
Kissinger,  259,  263,  505;  Ro- 
gers, 657,  752 
OECD  cooperation,   U.S.  proposal 

(Kissinger),  77 
U.S.  energy  legislation,  need  for: 
Kissinger,    465;    Lord,    683; 
Robinson,  445;  Rogers,  658 
Washington  State  natural  gas  bill 
(Kissinger),  226 
Environmental  problems  and  control 
{see  also  Oil  pollution): 
Environmental  modification  tech- 
niques for  hostile  purposes, 
prohibition,    draft    treaty 
(Ford),  345 
Foreign  environmentalists  study/ 
observation  tour  of  U.S..  PR 
537,  10/29 
Impact    of    fluorocarbons    on 
stratospheric  ozone   layer, 
N AS  report,  PR  430,  9/13" 
Radioactive  waste  disposal  at  sea 

(Grant),  343 
U.S. -Canada  Garrison  Diversion 
Unit,  delay  in  final  report,  PR 
385,  8/16  " 
Equatorial  Guinea,  treaties,  agree- 
ments, etc.,  438 
Ethiopia: 
Somali,  relations  (Schaufele),  300 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  71,  147, 

216,  304,  539,  759 
U.S.  relations  (Schaufele),  301 
Europe  (see  also  East-West  relations 
and  names  of  individual  coun- 
tries): 


Index,  July  5-December  27,  1976 


767 


Europe — Continued 
Commission  on  Security  and  Coop- 
eration in  Europe,  executive 
branch  Commissioner-Observ- 
ers, announcement,  581 
Eastern: 
Autonomy  (Kissinger),  244 
Brezhnev   doctrine   of  limited 

sovereignty  (Kissinger),  167 
Communist  Party  meeting.  East 

Berlin  (Kissinger),  166 
Human  rights:  Kissinger,   153, 
645,  711.  PR  504,  9/8;  Rogers, 
659;  Scranton,  747 
Radio  Free  Europe  and  Radio 

Liberty  (Kissinger),  405 
Soviet  divisions,  presence  (Kis- 
singer), 574 
U.S.  relations  (Kissinger),  111, 
153 
Final  Act  of  Helsinki  (Kissinger), 

323,  405,  645,  711 
Global  role  (Kissinger),  127 
Mutual  and  balanced  force  reduc- 
tions: Ford,  345;  Kissinger,  228, 
499,  710 
Unification  (Kissinger),  107,  705, 

PR  590,  12/8 
Western: 
Communist  parties,  participation 
in    government    (see    also 
Italy),  question  of  effect  (Kis- 
singer), 157,  367,  709 
Security  (Kissinger),  108,  220 
U.S.   relations  (Kissinger),  44, 
106,  128,  350,  PR  598,  12/10 
European  Economic  Community:  Kis- 
singer, PR  590,  12/8,  PR  593,  12/9, 
PR  598,    12/10;   Schmidt,   385; 
Soames,  PR  590,  12/8 
Puerto  Rico  economic  summit,  ques- 
tion of  participation  (Kissinger), 
93,  708 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  39,  304, 
571 
European    Space    Agency,     U.S. 
cooperative  projects  (Reis),  208 
Excess  property  transfer,  bilateral 

agreements  with  Mexico,  759 
Export-Import  Bank  (Bolen),  621 
Exports: 
Export  credits,  U.S.  declaration  on 

official  support,  48 
U.S.,  UTI  munitions  export  license, 
PR  352,  7/22 
Extradition,  bilateral  agreements 
with:  Finland,  104;  Spain,  71,  304; 
U.K.,  72,439,  627,  724 


Fairbank,  .John,  573 

Fairbank,  Wilma,  PR  398,  8/26 

Feldman,  Mark  B.,  696 

Fiji,  Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials, 

713 
Finland: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  39,  104, 
304,  495,  539,  596,  651,  723 


Finland — Continued 

U.S.   visit  of  President  Kekkonen, 
336,  :337;  progi-am,  PR  357,  7/28 
Fish  and  fisheries: 
Fisheries  off  coast  of  U.S.,  bilateral 
agreements  with:  China,  Re- 
public of,  439;  German  Demo- 
cratic Republic,  539,  565;  Po- 
land, 284,  299;  Romania,  760: 
Soviet  Union,  743,  744 
International  whaling  convention 
(1946),  New  Zealand,  39 
Amendments  to  paragraphs  1, 
6(a)(4),    (5),    (6),    6(b)(3), 
6(c)(2),  11-14,   15(c),  21,  23(1) 
(c),  (23)  (2)(b),  596 
North  Pacific  fur  seal  convention, 
protocol  (1976)  to  interim  con- 
vention, U.S.  ratification  urged 
(Ford),  281 
Northwest  Atlantic  fisheries,  inter- 
national   convention    (1949), 
notice  of  intention  to  withdraw: 
Canada,  103;  U.S.,  103,  146 
200-mile  fisheries  zones: 
Canada,  notice  of  implementation, 

666 
U.S.:  299,  758;  Kissinger,  401 
U.S. -Korea  fisheries  agreement  ini- 
tialed, PR  599,  12/10 
U.S. -Mexico  fisheries  agreement, 

758,  760 
U.S. -Republic  of  China  agreement, 

joint  statement,  494 
Whale  Conservation  and  Protection 
Study  Act,  signature  (Ford), 
625 
Food  and  Agriculture  Organization, 

U.N.  (Lewis),  195 

Food    production    and    shortages: 

Greenwald,    298;    Lord,    683; 

McGovem,  591;  Rogers,  653,  658 

Grain  reserves:  Greenwald,  298; 

Katz,  485;  McGovem,  592 
U.S.  food  aid:  Greenwald,  298;  Kis- 
singer, 504;  McGovem,  592 
Bilateral      agreements     with: 
Mauritania,  Niger,  71;  Tan- 
zania, 40 
Ford,  Gerald: 
Addresses,  remarks,  and  state- 
ments: 
Africa,  U.S.  good  offices,  385,  481 
Alaskan  pipeline,   question  of 

route,  162 
Asia,  470  (quoted) 
Bretton  Woods  Agreements  Act, 

signature,  626 
China,  People's  Republic  of,  death 

of  Mao  Tse-tung,  416 
Energy,  oil  prices,  161 
Foreign  Assistance  Appropria- 
tions Act  of  1976,  signature, 
199 
Foreign  Sovereign  Immunities 

Act  of  1976,  signature,  648 
Immigration  and  Nationality  Act 
Amendments  of  1976,  signa- 
ture, 639 


Ford,  Gerald — Continued 
Addresses — Continued 
International  air  transportation, 

policy  statement,  488 
Israel: 
Rescue  of  hijacking  victims, 

160,  161,  162 
U.S.  commitment,  175  (quoted) 
Lebanon: 
Evacuation  of  American  citi- 
zens, 99 
U.S.  Ambassador  Meloy  and 
Counselor  Waring,  regrets 
at   murders   of,    98,    99, 
554 
MIA's,  247,  418 

National  League  of  Families  of 
American  Prisoners  and  Mis- 
sing in  Southeast  Aisa,  re- 
marks, 247 
Nuclear  nonproliferation,  346, 

436,  629 
Nuclear  policy,  629 
Olympic  games,  161 
Puerto  Rico  summit  meeting,  116, 

117,  118 
Rhodesia,  528 
SALT,  162,  345 

Security  Assistance  and  Arms 
Export  Control  Act  of  1976, 
signature,  198 
Terrorism    conventions,    U.S. 

ratification,  554 
U.K.,  standby  agreement  with 

IMF,  proposed,  660 
Whale  Conservation  and  Protec- 
tion Study  Act,  signature,  625 
Correspondence,  Israeli  rescue  of 
hijacking  victims,  expression  of 
satisfaction,  160 
Meetings  with  Heads  of  State  and 
officials  of,  remarks  and  joint 
communiques:  Australia,  291; 
Finland,  336;  Germany,  Federal 
Republic  of,  245;  Liberia,  481; 
U.K.,  196 
Memorandum  of  disapproval.  Inter- 
national Navigational  Rules 
Act,  586 
Messages  and  reports  to  Congress: 
Arms  Control  and  Disarmament 
Agency,  15th  annual  report, 
transmittal,  345 
Authentication  of  documents  con- 
vention (1960),  ratification 
urged,  281 
Cyprus,  fourth  progress  report, 
62;  fifth  progress  report, 
404;  sixth  progress  report, 
622 
Income    tax    convention    with 
Korea,  ratification  urged,  437 
North  Pacific  fur  seal  convention, 
1976  protocol,  ratification 
urged,  281 
Threshold  test  ban  treaty  and  nu- 
clear peaceful  explosions  trea- 
ty with  Soviet  Union,  ratifi- 
cation urged,  269 


768 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


old,  Gerald — Continued 
Messages — Continued 
Tin   agreement,    fifth   interna- 
tional, ratification  urged,  179 
Turkey,    defense    cooperation 
agreement    appropriations 
urged,  60 
U.K. -U.S.  income  ta.x  convention, 

transmittal,  145 
U.N.,  30th  annual  report  of  U.S. 
participation,   transmittal, 
537 
World  Weather  Program  report, 
transmittal,  624 
Nrws  conference,  transcript,  161 
onl.  Jack,  PR  579,  12/3 
difign  aid:  McGovern,  589;  Parker, 

7:i5:  Robinson,  442;  Stever,  731 
Fureign  Assistance  and   Related 
Programs  Act  of  1976,  signature 
(Ford),  199 
'oreign  policy,  U.S.; 
Achievements  and  opportunities; 
Kissinger,  128,  238,  580,  605, 
PR  598,  12/10;  Lord,  681 
Assistant  to  the  President  and  Sec- 
i-etary  of  State,  functions  con- 
trasted (Kissinger),  366 
Black  American  leaders,  talks  to 

(Kissinger),  359,  368 
Conduct  of  (Kissinger),   124,   131, 
150,  165,  232,  541,  544,  579,  PR 
598,  12/10 
Congress-e.xecutive  relations;  Ford, 
199,  200;  Kissinger,  124,  241, 
260;  McCloskey,  139 
Congressional  documents  relating 
to,  lists,  36,  101,  146,  173,  215, 
255,  282,  303.  328,  346,  372,  406, 
437,  494,  565,  626,  650,  674, 
722,  754 
Credibility  (Kissinger),  551 
Election  year,  question  of  effect 
(Kissinger),  91,  125,  132,  229, 

234,  366,  396,  402,  578,  579,  610, 
641,  646 

Governor  Carter,  foreign  policy 
statements  (Kissinger),  165, 

235,  367,  549,  606,  643,  645 
Intervention,  question  of  conditions 

justifying  (Kissinger),  125,  548 

Kissinger,  influence,  question  of 
(Kissinger),  371,  551 

Misleading  information  in  foreign 
newspapers,  question  of  (Kis- 
singer), 552 

Morality  versus  pragmatism  (Kis- 
singer), 126,  156,  365,  542,  546, 
597 

Presidential  candidates'  debates 
(Kissinger),  165,  549,  574,  577 

Presidential  responsibility  (Kis- 
singer), 240,  574,  581 

Principles,  objectives,  and  purpose; 
Kissinger,  26,  124,  149,  217, 
229,  258,  363,  551,  555,  608,  726; 
Lord,  677 

jindex,  July  5-December  27,  1976 


F'oi'eign  policy,  U.S. — Continued 
Regional  foreign  policy  conference, 

Oct.  21,  1976,  PR  477,  8/28 
Review;  Kissinger,  598;  Lord,  677 
Stability  (Kissinger),  150,  165,  327, 

363,  644,  PR  598,  12/10 
U.S.  town  meetings  and  public  dis- 
cussions (Kissinger),  171,  546, 
547.  611 
Fareigii   Relations   of  the   United 
States,  19iS,  volume  I,  General; 
The  United  Nations,  part  2,  re- 
leased, 348,  PR  399,  8/27 
Foreign   Relations   of  the   United 
States,  191,8,  volume  V,  The  Near 
East,  South  Asia,  and  Africa, 
part  2,  released,  700 
Foreign   Relations   of  the   United 
States,  191,9,  volume  I,  National 
Security  Affairs,  Foreign  Eco- 
nomic Policy,  released,  652 
Foreign  Service;  Henderson,  PR  531, 
10/27;  Kissinger,  PR  530,  10/26 
Overseas  assignments,  actions  to 
prevent     discrimination     in 
(Laise),  254 
Foreign  Sovereign  Immunities  Act  of 
1976;  signature.  Ford,  648;  Leigh, 
649 
France; 
lEA  cooperation,  question  of  (Kis- 
singer), 93 
Nuclear  sales  to  Pakistan,  proposed 
(Kissinger),  319,  320,  322,  PR 
374,  8/11,  PR  419,  9/7 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  39,  303, 

304,  539 
U.S.  MAAG's  terminated,  336 
U.S.  relations;  de  Guiringaud,  PR 
597,  12/10;  Kissinger,  PR  323, 
6/23,  PR  597,  12/10 
Visit  of  Secretary  Kissinger  (Kis- 
singer), 381,  PR  312,  6/20,  PR 
314,6/21,  PR  374,  8/11,  PR  417, 
9/7 
Fraser,  J.  Malcolm,  visit  to  U.S.;  291; 

program,  PR  350,  7/22 
de  Freitas,  Sir  Geoffrey,  704 
French  Territory  of  the  Afars  and 
Issas  (F.T.A.I.);  Schaufele,  300, 
302 
Frydenlund,  Knut,  remarks  following 
meeting    with    Secretary    Kis- 
singer, PR  592,  12/9 
Funseth,  Robert  L.,  359,  749 


Gabon  (Bolen),  618,  620 
Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials, 

739 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  146, 
304,  495,  627 
Gearhart,  Daniel;  Kissinger,  163,  165, 
167,  171;  Nessen,  163;  Schaufele, 
342 
General  Assembly,  U.N.; 
Documents,  lists,  210 


General  Assembly,  U.N. — Continued 
Ford  address,  question  of  (Kis- 
singer), 402 
Seventh  special  session:  Ford,  537; 
Kissinger,  504;  McGovern,  588; 
Scranton,  203 
31st  session; 
Agenda,  567 

U.S.  delegation,  confirmation,  510 
Geneva  conventions  (1949)  on  treat- 
ment of  sick,  wounded  and  ship- 
wrecked armed  forces,  prisoners 
of  war,   and   civilian  persons: 
Papua  New  Guinea,  Sao  Tome  and 
Principe,  187;  Surinam,  744 
Protocol  on  accounting  for  POW's 
and  MIA's,  proposed  (Habib), 
253 
Genocide,  convention  (1948),  Ireland, 

103 
Genscher,  Hans-Dietrich,  remarks 
during  visits  with  Secretary  Kis- 
singer: 97,  PR  420,  9/7,  PR  598, 
12/10 
German  Democratic  Republic: 
Austrian  border  incident,  question 

of  (Kissinger),  326 
Fisheries  agreement  with  U.S., 

joint  statement,  565 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  256, 
329,  376,  539,  759 
Germany,  Federal  Republic  of; 
Antitrust  cooperation  agreement 

with  U.S.,  signature,  102 
Meetings  of  U.S.  Secretary  Kis- 
singer and  South  African  Prime 
Minister  Vorster  (Kissinger), 
95,  PR  325,  6/23 
NASA  Helios-2  cooperative  launch- 
ing: Bennett,  668;  Reis,  208 
Special  Bonn-Washington  relation- 
ship, question  of  (Kissinger), 
127 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  38,  39, 
104,  147,  216,  304,  329,  330,  408, 
438,  539,  572,  674,  675 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Stoessel),  PR 

494,  10/5 
U.S. -Germany  mayoral  conference 
on  cultural  and  urban  develop- 
ment, PR  479,  9/28 
U.S.  MAAG's  terminated,  336 
U.S.  relations  (Kissinger),  45 
U.S.   visit  of  Chancellor  Schmidt; 
Ford,  245;  Schmidt,  245 
Joint  statement  on  mutual  defense 

issues,  247 
Program,  PR  343,  7/9;  correction, 
PR  343-A,  7/12 
Visit  of  Secretary  Kissinger  (Kis- 
singer), 382,  PR  420,  9/7 
Ghana  (Bolen),  620 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  187, 

304,  330,  539,  627,  699,  744 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Smith),  PR  548, 
11/8 
Giraud,  Pierre,  708 
Giscard   d'Estaing,    Valery    (Kis- 


769 


Giscard  d'Estaing — Continued 

singer,  remarks  following  meet- 
ing), PR  314,  6/21 
Gissler,  Sig,  541 

Global  balance  of  power:  Kissinger, 
107,  159,  307,  364,  498;  Lord,  681; 
Robinson,  442 
Goodhart,  Philip,  706 
Goodhew,  Victor,  711 
Granger,  John,  375 
Grant,  Lindsey,  343 
Gray,  John  D.,  introduction  of  John 
E.    Reilly,    President    of   the 
Chicago  Council  on  Foreign  Rela- 
tions, PR  339- A,  7/6 
Greece: 
Aegean  Sea  dispute  with  Turkey: 
Bennett,  373:  Habib,  427,  428; 
Security  Council  resolution, 
text,  374 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  39, 103, 

330,  540,  674 
Turkey,  relations:  Caglayangil,  PR 
596,   12/10;  Habib,  426;  Kis- 
singer, 323,  327,  703,  PR  596, 
12/10 
U.S.  defense  agreement,  negotia- 
tions (Habib),  426 
U.S.  relations  (Kissinger),  125 
Green,  Marshall,  419 
Greenberg,  Paul,  541 
Greenwald,  Joseph  A.,  271,  294 
Grenada,  World  Health  Organization 
constitution  (1946),  amendments 
to  articles  34  and  55,  acceptance, 
329 
Griesinger,  Annemarie,  712 
Grillo,  Gustav  Marcello  (Schaufele), 

342 
Guatemala: 
Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials, 

132 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  39,  70, 

104,  284,  539,  723,  743 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Boster),  PR  475, 

9/28 
U.S.  earthquake  disaster  relief: 
284,  723;  Kissinger,  16,  43 
Guinea  (Bolen),  618,  620 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  304, 
539,  540,  627,  651 
Guinea-Bissau: 
General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade,  protocol  of  provisional 
application,  439 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Wells),  PR  513, 
10/15 
de  Guiringaud,  Louis,  PR  597,  12/10 
Gunella,  Aristide,  709 
Guyana,  Cuban  relations  and  influ- 
ence, question  of  (Luers),  49,  52 
Gwertzman,  Bernard,  411 


H 


Habib,    Philip   C,    249,    266,    392 
(quoted),  424,  447,  PR  313,  6/21 


Habib,  Philip — Continued 
Under  Secretary  of  State  for  Polit- 
ical Affairs,  sworn  in  as,  PR 
338,  7/1 
Haiti: 
Textile    agreement   with    U.S., 
amendment,  text,  PR  470,  9/23 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  38,  188, 
216,  467,  651,  723 
Hall,  John  W.,  65/( 
Hammarskjold,  Dag  (quoted),  720 
Hassan,  Crown  Prince  of  Jordan,  re- 
marks following  meeting  with 
Secretary  Kissinger,  PR  591, 
12/8 
Health  and  medical  research: 
Biomedical  research  and  technol- 
ogy, bilateral  agreement  with 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
572 
NAMRU-2       projects,        U.S.- 
Philippines agreement  re  con- 
tinuation, 71 
Nutrition/health  early  warning 
system  project  and  access  road 
construction,  grant  agreement 
with  Ethiopia,  216 
Sanitation,   bilateral  agreement 

with  Portugal,  495 
U.S. -Iran  cooperation  in,  agree- 
ment: 316;  Ansary,  309 
Veteran's  Memorial  Hospital  and 
other  health  care  services  for 
veterans,     U.S. -Philippines 
agreement  re  use  of,  71 
World  Health  Assembly  action  on 
health  care  report  on  Israeli- 
occupied  territories  (Scran- 
ton),  37 
World       Health       Organization 
(Lewis),  195 
Constitution  (1946): 
Amendments  to  articles  24  and 

25,  Surinam,  572 
Amendments  to  articles  34  and 
55:  Argentina,  572;  Chad, 
674;  German  Democratic 
Republic,  256;  Grenada, 
329;  Israel,  495;  Kenya, 
627;  Korea,  Republic  of, 
743;  Laos,  Madagascar, 
539;  Malta,  256; 

Mauritania,  627;  Philip- 
pines, 495;  Rwanda,  743; 
Zaire,  329 
Hempstone,  Smith,  551 
Henderson,   Loy,  dedication  of  Loy 
Henderson  International  Confer- 
ence Room:  PR  531,  10/27;  Kis- 
singer, PR  530,  10/26 
Hendsch,  Shirley,  designation  as 
Agency  Director  for  Interna- 
tional Women's  Programs,  PR 
324,  6/23 
Herman,  George,  606 
Herter,  Christian  (Lord),  677 
Hess,  Stephen,  510 
High  seas,  convention  (1958),  acces- 


770 


High  seas,  convention — Continued      ; 

sion,  Mongolia,  650 
Hills,  Carla  A.,  461 
Honduras: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  71,  104, 

331,  571,  627,  723 
U.S.   Ambassador  (Becker),  PR 
458,  9/22 
Hong  Kong  (Robinson),  288 
Housing: 
Republic    of    Korea,     bilateral 
guaranty  loan  agreement,  651 
U.N.  Conference  on  Human  Set- 
tlements    (Habitat);     Hills, 
(quoted),  461;  Schiff,  461 
U.S. -Iran  cooperation:  316;  An- 
sary, 308 
Hua  Kuo-feng  (Kissinger),  PR  514, 

10/15 
Human  rights:  Kissinger,  1,  506,  558, 
602,  608;  Lewis,  195,  718 
Eastern  Europe:  Kissinger,  153, 
645,  711;  Rogers,  659;  Scran- 
ton,  747 
Freedom  of  information  and  ex- 
pression (Reinhardt),  663 
India  (Atherton),  479,  480 
Iran  (Atherton),  429 
Korea  (Kissinger),  366 
Latin  America  (Kissinger),  2,  17 

19,  22,  29,  43,  339 
Need  for  U.N.  action:  Kissinger 

509;  Scranton,  745 
North  Korea  (Armstrong),  457 
Human  Settlements  (Habitat),  U.N 
Conference  on:  Hills  (quoted) 
461;  Schiff,  461 
Hummel,  Arthur  W.,  Jr.,  386,  454 
469,  582 
Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for 
East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs 
sworn  in  as,  PR  346,  7/12 
Hungary,  treaties,  agreements,  etc. 

38,  103,  743 
Hupp,  Robert  P.,  510 
Hydrographic  and  nautical  cartog 
raphy,   agreement  with   Hon 
duras,  627 
Hydrographic  Organization,  Interna 
tional,       convention       (1967 
Nigeria,  103 


Iceland: 
Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials, 

231 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  69,  284 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Blake),  PR  355, 
7/23 
Immigration  and  Nationality  Act 
Amendments  of  1976,  signature 
(Ford),  639 
Imports,  U.S.: 
Meat  imports,  limitation,  agree- 
ments with:   Australia,   147; 
Costa  Rica,  467;  Dominican 
Republic,  188;  Guatemala,  104; 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


liiiports,  U.S. — Continued 
Meat — Continued 

Haiti,   216;   Honduras,   331: 
Me.xico,  148;  Panama,  216 
Meat   imports  negotiations  meet- 
ing, PR  582,  12/3 
Specialty  steel  from  Japan,  limita- 
tion of,  agreement;  71,  744; 
Sherer,  100 
Sugar,  increase  in  customs  duties 

(Ford),  564 
r.S.   footwear  industry,  adjust- 
ment assistance  to  (Kissinger), 
8 
liuiime  taxes,   agreements  with: 
Korea,   437;   Philippines,   540; 
I'.K.,   145;    World   Intellectual 
I'roperty  Organization,  652:  World 
.Meteorological  Organization,  724 
India: 
ATS-6  educational  program:  Ben- 
nett, 669;  Reinhardt,  664 
Human  rights  (Dubs),  479,  480 
Internal  trends  (Dubs),  478 
Nuclear  explosions  (Kissinger),  319 
Pakistan  and  Bangladesh  relations 

(Dubs),  480 
Satellite  Instructional  Television 
Experiment  (SITE):  Reis,  207 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  69,  70, 

256,  330,  347,  438,  723 
U.S.  MAAG's  terminated,  336 
I'.S.  nuclear  fuel  sales,  question  of 

(Kissinger),  321 
ndian  Ocean,  Soviet  military  pres- 
ence, 290 
Indochina  (see  also  Vietnam):  Kis- 
singer, 223,  228 
Missing    in    action:    Ford,    247; 

Habib,  249;  Kissinger,  400 
Refugees  (Picker),  757 
Indonesia  (Robinson),  288 
Consultations  with  U.S.,  145,  PR 

326,  6/24 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  39,  104, 
304,  347,  376,  438,  439,  467, 
539,  627,  675,  743,  759 
U.S.  relations  and  aid  (Hummel), 
471,  474 
Industrial  and  agricultural  produc- 
tion, loan  agreement  with  Egypt, 
71,  147 
Industrial  democracies  [see  also  Less 
developed    countries:    North- 
South  relations,  and  Organiza- 
tion for  Economic  Cooperation 
and      Development):      Buchan 
(quoted),   105;  Ford,   116,   197, 
246;  Kissinger,  73,  89,  105,  110, 
112,  131,  218,  264,  356,  605,  PR 
312,  6/20,  PR  312-A,  6/20;  Rog- 
ers, 655,  751 
Pacific  Basin  (Robinson),  286 
U.S.  alliances,  importance:  Kis- 
singer, 151 ,  259,  498;  Lord,  679 
•i  Industrial  property,  protection  of, 
■i  I       convention  of  Paris  (1883,  as  re- 
l\      vised):  Bahamas,  438;  Ghana, 


I  ndustrial  property — Continued 

Libya,  Mauritania,  Mauritius, 
187 
Inter-American  Development  Bank: 
Kissinger,  504;  McGovern,  590 
Agreement  establishing  (1959): 
Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark, 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
Israel,  Japan,   Netherlands, 
Spain,     Switzerland,     U.K. 
Yugoslavia,  438 
Interregional  capital  stock  agree- 
ment, amendments  (1976),  187 
Interdependence  of  modern  world: 
Bolen,  617;  Kissinger,  25,  32,  48, 
218,   350,   364,   497,   505,   602; 
Lewis,    191,    714;    Lord,    680; 
Reinhardt,  661;  Robinson,  441 
International       Atomic       Energy 
Agency:  Ford,  346,  631;  Grant, 
344;  Hummel,  456;  Irving,  690; 
Kissinger,  506 
International  Bank  for  Reconstruc- 
tion   and    Development    (Kis- 
singer), 504 
Articles  of  agreement  (1945),  Com- 
oros, 627 
International  Civil  Aviation  Organi- 
zation (Kissinger),  508 
International  Committee  of  the  Red 
Cross: 
Accounting  for  POW's  and  MIA's, 

role  (Habib),  253 
Lebanon   aid   and    U.S.    support 
(Habib),  267 
International  Cotton  Institute,  arti- 
cles of  agreement  (1966),  Iran, 
699 
International  Court  of  Justice: 
Aegean  Sea  dispute,  question  of  ad- 
judication: Bennett,  373;  Kis- 
singer, 324 
Statute  of  (1945),  Seychelles,  596 
International  Development  Associa- 
tion: Bolen,  619:  McGovern,  590 
International  Finance  Corporation 

(McGovern),  590 
International  Industrialization  Insti- 
tute, proposed:  Kissinger,  728; 
Parker,  737 
International  Labor  Organization, 
U.S.      proposed      withdrawal 
(Ford),  538 
International  law  (Lewis),  717 
Digest  of  United  States  Practice  in 
International  Law,  1975,  re- 
leased, 675 
International      Monetary      Fund: 
Greenwald,  295;  Kissinger,  75 
Articles  of  agreement  (1945),  Com- 
oros, 466 
Bretton  Woods  Agreements  Act, 

signature  (Ford),  626 
Compensatory  finance  facility,  and 
IMF  trust  fund:  Bolen,  620; 
Kissinger,  504;  McGovern,  589; 
Rogers,  654 
Italian  and  U.K.  loans,  proposed: 


Int.  Monetary  Fund — Continued 
Italian-U.K.  Loans — Continued 
Ford,  660;  Rogers,  656,  751 
International  Resources  Bank,  pro- 
posed: 133,  134:  Boeker,  135:  Bo- 
len, 619,  621;  Greenwald,  297; 
Kissinger,  6,  24,  76,  81,  225,  728; 
McGovern,  590;  Robinson,  288, 
444;  Rogers,  654;  Scranton,  204 
International  Security  Assistance 
and  Arms  Export  (Control  Act  of 
1976,  bilateral  agreements  re  eli- 
gibility   under:    Ecuador,    In- 
donesia, Kenya,  439 
Investment   guaranties,    bilateral 

agreement  with  Oman,  495 
Investment  of  private  capital  abroad: 
Ford,  118;  Kissinger,  76,  727 
Africa:  Bolen,  619;  Kissinger,  355, 

356 
Brazil,  trade,  investment,  and  fi- 
nancial matters,  U.S. -Brazil 
joint  communique,  71 
Indonesia  (Hummel),  474 
Iran:  314;  Ansary,  309 
Mexico  (Luers),  54 
OECD  declaration  on  international 
investment  and  multinational 
enterprises,  and  decision  of  the 
Council:   Kissinger,   Richard- 
son, Simon,  403;  texts,  83,  88 
Pacific  Basin  (Robinson),  286 
Peru,  Marcona  Mining  Company  is- 
sue, agreement  (Department), 
487 
South  Africa  (Rogers),  534 
Southeast  Asia  (Hummel),  471 
Iran: 
Economic  and  social  reform,  review 

(Atherton),  430 
Financial  center,  proposed  (An- 
sary), 313 
Human  rights  (Atherton),  429 
Intelligence  services  in  U.S.,  ques- 
tion of  activities  (Kissinger), 
640 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  284, 

304,  627,  699 
U.S. -Iran  Joint  Commission  for 
Economic  Cooperation:  An- 
sary, 307;  Kissinger,  305 
Agreed  minutes  of  third  session: 

304;  text,  PR  368,  8/7 
Text  of  communique,  314 
U.S.  military  aid:  Habib,  447:  Kis- 
singer, 311,  312,  313,  371,  549 
Visit  of  Secretary  Kissinger  (Kis- 
singer), 305 
Iraq,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  70, 

103,  723,  759 
Ireland: 
Air  charter  agreement,  announce- 
ment, 102 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  39,  70, 
103,  304,  347,  407,  438,  571,  759 
Irving,  Frederick,  375,  687 
Israel; 
Arms  supply  to  Christians  in  Leba- 


ndex,  July  5-December  27,  1976 


771 


Israel — Continued 

non,  question  of  (Kissinger), 

647 
Economic  and  political  stability, 

grant  agreements  with  U.S., 

540 
Rescue  of  hostages  in  Uganda,  U.S. 

position:  695:  Bennett,   185: 

Ford,  160,  161,  162;  Kissinger, 

158,  164,  166,  237;  Scranton, 

181 
Security  Council  draft  resolu- 
tions, texts,  196 
U.S.    role,    question    of   (Kis- 
singer), 237 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  304, 

438,  466,  495,  540,  572,  744 
U.S.  economic  and  military  aid 

Atherton,  175;  Habib,  448;  Kis 

singer,  94,  578 
U.S.    relations;    Atherton,    174 

Rabin  (quoted),  179 
Italy; 
Economic  problems  (Rogers),  656 

751 
Election  results  (Kissinger),  89,  93 

120,  128,  166,  325 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  39,  71 

216,  304,  539,  540 
U.S.  aid,  question  of  (Kissinger) 

119,  325 
U.S. -Italian  scientific  meeting  on 

Senesco  problem,  PR  445,  9/17 
U.S.  MAAG's  terminated,  336 
U.S.  visit  of  Giulio  Andreotti,  pro- 
gram, PR  578,  12/3 
Ivory  Coast; 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  304, 

723 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Stearns),  PR 

508,  10/13 


Jamaica; 

Balance  of  payments  (Rogers),  753 

Cuban  relations  and  influence, 
question  of  (Luers),  50 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  38,  438, 
539,  627,  651 
James,  Charles  A.,  sworn  in  as  Am- 
bassador to  Niger,  PR  534,  10/29 
Japan; 

Asian  role  and  influence  (Hummel), 
470,  585 

Australian  relations;  289-290,  292; 
Robinson,  286 

Eighth  U.S. -Japan  Conference  on 
Cultural  and  Educational  In- 
terchange, meeting,  65 

Pacific  Basin  trade  (Robinson),  286 

Soviet  pilot,  question  of  asylum  in 
U.S.  (Kis.singer),  PR  419,  9/7 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  39,  71, 
103,  147,  216,  304,  330,  376, 
438,  539,  627,  744 

U.S.  imports  of  specialty  steel,  lim- 


Japan — Continued 

itations,  71,  100,  744 

U.S.  relations;  Hummel,  582;  Kis- 
singer, 107,  128,  151,  350; 
Lord,  685 

U.S.  security  relations;  Hummel, 
584;  Kissinger,  220 

Yen  devaluation,  question  of  (Si- 
mon), 121 
Jefferson,  Thomas  (quoted),  196 

Portrait,  gift  to  State  Department, 
PR  521,  10/18 
Johanes,  Jaromir,  13 
Jordan,  treaties,  agreements,  etc., 

38,  148 
Juarez,  Benito  (quoted),  35 
Judicial  matters; 

General  Tire  and  Rubber  Company 
and  the  Firestone  Tire  and 
Rubber  Company,  mutual  as- 
sistance in  administration  of 
justice,  bilateral  agreement 
with  Me.xico,  188 

Lockheed  Aircraft  Corporation 
matter,  agreements  re  proce- 
dures for  mutual  assistance  in 
administration  of  justice  with; 
Australia,  467;  Belgium,  39; 
Germany,  Federal  Republic  of, 
539;  Greece,  39:  Italy,  540; 
Spain,  284 

Lockheed  Aircraft  Corporation  and 
McDonnell  Douglas  Corpora- 
tion matters,  mutual  assistance 
in  administration  of  justice, 
bilateral  agreement  with  Tur- 
key, 188,  495 

Mutual  assistance  in  criminal  mat- 
ters, agreement  with  Switzer- 
land, 72,  188,  256,  304 

Service  abroad  of  judicial  and  e.\- 
trajudicial  documents  in  civil  or 
commercial  matters,  Spain,  723 

Taking  of  evidence  abroad  in  civil 
or  commercial  matters,  con- 
vention (1970);  Spain,  723; 
U.K.,  347 


Kashmir  (Kissinger),  320 
Katz,  Julius  L.;  483;  Greenwald,  273 
Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for 
Economic  and   Business  Af- 
fairs, sworn  in  as,  PR  460,  9/23 
Kaunda,  Kenneth  David,  remarks  on 

southern  Africa,  PR  443,  9/16 
Keeley,  Robert  V.,  sworn  in  as  Am- 
bassador to  Mauritius,  PR  307, 
6/17 
Kekkonen,  Urho,  visit  to  U.S.;  336, 

337;  program,  PR  357,  7/28 
Kenya  (Bolen),  620 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  39, 147, 

256,  438,  439,  495,  539,  627 
U.S.  military  aid;  Kissinger,  171, 
264;  Schaufele,  303 


772 


Kenya — Continued 
U.S.  relations  (Schaufele),  302 
Visit  of  Secretary  Kissinger;  Kis- 
singer, PR  459,  9/22,  PR  465, 
9/23,  PR  466,  9/23;  Osogo,  PR 
459,  9/22,  PR  466,  9/23 
Keynes,  John  Maynard  (quoted),  683 
Khmer  Republic;  Hummel,  472;  Kis- 
singer, 228 
MIA's,  accounting  (Habib),  251 
U.S.   bombing  during  Indochina 
war  (Kissinger),  129 
Killen,  D.  J.,  289 
Kissinger,  Henry  A.; 
Addresses,  remarks,  and  state- 
ments; 
Africa  (for  details,  see  Africa); 
Economic  development,  262, 

351.354,  559 
European    coordinated    aid, 
proposed,    46,    82,    113, 
126-127,263,264,355,560, 
PR  314,  6/21,  PR  419,  9/7 
Regional  development,  355, 

358 
Southern: 
Meetings  with  Prime  Mini.';- 
ter  Vorster,  93,  95,  121, 
127,  260,  349,  358,  400, 
514,  PR  312-A,  6/20,  PR 
323,  6/23,  PR  325,  6/23, 
PR411,9/3,  PR415,  9/5, 
PR  417,  9/7,  PR  422,  9/7  , 
Negotiations,  prospects  and 
progress,  96,  126,  158, 
167,  170,  239,  245,  259, 
325,  377,  409,  415,  511, 
518,  520,  527,  529,  561, 
576,  610,  641,  PR  412, 
9/4,  PR  417,  9/7,  PR  419, 
9/7,  PR  420,  9/7,  PR  424, 
9/10,  PR  432,  9/13,  PK 
439,  9/16,  PR  443,  9/16, 
PR450,9/20,PR466,9/23 
U.S.  mercenaries,  question  of 

recruitment,  24(3 
U.S.  policy,  relations,  role,  46, 
96,  126,  158,  239,  257,  500, 
511,   530,   553,   559,   561, 
641,  706,  PR  353,  7/22,  PR 
453,  9/J2,  PR  459,  9/22,  PR 
463,  9/23,  PR  514,  10/15 
African  Development  Bank,  356 
Angola,  46,  259,  260,  359,  704, 
706 
Allegations  of  recruitment  of 
mercenaries  in  U.S.,  341 
(quoted) 
Cuban  intervention  and  con- 
tinued military  presence, 
26,  30,  48,   158,   172,  239, 
265,  350,  359,  401,   513, 
516,  520,  704 
Execution  of  Daniel  Gearhart, 
163,  165,  167,  171 
Arab-Israeli  conflict,   172,  306, 
369,  PR  591,  12/8 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 


Kissinger,  Henry  A. — Continued 
Addresses — Continued 
Arab-Israeli  conflict — Con. 
Geneva  conference,  question  of 

reconvening,  95,  502,  707 
Israeli-occupied   territories, 

693 
Lebanon  crisis,  effect  on,  164, 

236,  563 
Negotiations,  prospects  and 
progress,  128,   131,  151, 
160,   172,  218,  236,  314, 
350,   402,   501,  545,   562, 
601,  708 
Palestinian  rights,  647 
Arms  control,  228,  552,  710 
Asia,  216,  224,  319,  350 
Harvard  East  Asia  Confer- 
ence, 573,  575 
Berlin  agreement,  130,  384 
Bloch,  Dora,  168 
Boyatt,  Thomas,  169 
Brzezinski,  Zbigniew,  242 
Cambodia,  228 
U.S.   bombing  of  during  In- 
dochina war,  129 
Canada,  227,  350 
Carter,  Jimmy,   165,  235,  367, 
709,  PR  596,  12/10 
11         Chile,  19 

Alleged  interference  with  Al- 

lende  regime,  125,  579 
Former  Ambassador  Letelier, 

murder  of,  578 
Human  rights,  3,  43,  339,  608 
China,  People's  Republic  of: 
Change  of  leadership,  effect  on 
U.S.  relations,  question  of 
128,  417.  575,  580 
Mao  Tse-tung,  death  of,  416 
U.S.  arms  sales,  question  of, 

579,  609 
U.S.  relations,   151,  222,  229, 
240,  319,  350,  372,  499, 
500,  605,  705 
World  security  and,  608 
CIA,  578 
Collective  security,  16,  42,  107, 

152 
Colombo  nonaligned   summit, 

356,  402 
Commodity  trade,  16,  22.  43,  81, 

90,  726 
Conference    on    International 
Economic  Cooperation,  91, 
505 
Continuation  in  office,  question 
of,  233,  324,  577,  PR  514, 
10/15 
Criticism  of,  131,  233 
Cuba: 
Cancellation  of  U.S.  hijacking 

agreement,  573,  577,  578 
Human  rights,  4,  43,  339 
Influence  on  Caribbean  coun- 
tries, 28 


Index,  July  5-December  27,  1976 


Kissinger.  Henry  A.— Continued 
Addresses — Continued 
Cuba — Continued 

U.S.  relations,  26,  553 
Cyprus,  89,  93,  240,  323.  503,  PR 

596,  12/10 
Defense  spending,  552 
East-West  relations,  21,  44,  78, 
92,   111,   119,   127,  152,  323. 
326-327.  382,  PR  315.  6/22. 
PR  598,  12/10 
Economic  development,  31,  74. 

503 

Economic  meeting,  Puerto  Rico, 

46,  74,  92.  119,  152,  324,  708 

Energy,  81.  259,  263,  465,  505 

Alternate  sources,  77,  91,  709 

International  Energy  Agency, 

93,  240,  709 
Second    Arab    oil    embargo, 

question  of,  240,  607,  709 
Washington  State  natural  gas 
bill,  226 
Europe,  44,   105,   127,  228,  350, 
499,  705,  710,  PR  590,  12/8, 
PR  598,  12/10 
Eastern,   111,   153,   167,  244, 
574,  504,  9/8 
Communist  Party  meeting  in 
East  Berlin,  166 
Humanitarian  versus  economic 
or  political  issues,  323, 
327,  405,  645,  711 
Western: 
Communist  parties  partici- 
pation in  governments, 
question    of  effect   on 
NATO,  157,  367,  709 
Security,  108,  220 
European  Economic  Community, 

PR  590.  12/8.  PR  593,  12/9 
Fishing  zone,  U.S.  200-mile  ex- 
tension, 401 
Foreign  policy,  26,  149,  217,  241, 
258,  260,  555,  597,  607,  610, 
701,  726 
Achievements,  128,  238,  580, 

605 
Assistant  to  the  President  and 
Secretary  of  State  roles 
compared,  366 
Black  leaders,  meetings  with, 

359,  368 
Conduct  of,  124,  131.  231.  232. 
541.   544,   579,   PR   598, 
12/10 
Credibility.  551 
Election  year,  question  of  ef- 
fect, 91.  125.  132,229.232, 
366,  396,  403,   578,   579, 
610,641,646,  PR  353,  7/22 
Executive  authority,  effect  of 
Vietnam  and  Watergate, 
124 
Governor  Carter's  statements 
on,  165.  235.  367,  549,  606, 
643.  645 


Kissinger.  Henry  A. — Continued 
Addresses — Continued 
Foreign  policy — Continued 
Intervention,  question  of  con- 
ditions justifying,  125,  548 
Kissinger  influence,   question 

of,  371,  551 
Morality  versus  pragmatism, 
126,  156,  365,  542,  546,  597 
Presidential  candidates'  de- 
bates, 165,  549,  574,  577 
Presidential    responsibility, 

240,  574,  581 
Public  discussions,  171,  546, 

547 
Stability,  150,  165,  327.  363, 
644,  PR  598,  12/10 
France,  93.  PR  323.  6/23,  PR  419, 

9/7.  PR  597,  12/10 
Future  plans,  question  of,  577, 
578,  580,  611,  642,  PR  353, 
7/22,  PR  586,  12/6 
Geneva  Conference  of  the  Com- 
mittee on  Disarmament,  499 
Germany,  Federal  Republic  of, 
45,  382 
Special  Bonn-Washington  rela- 
tionship, question  of,  127 
Greek-Turkish  relations.  323, 

327,  703 
Historian  and  statesman,  view- 
point as,  132 
Human  rights,  1,  506,  558,  602, 
608 
Eastern  Europe,  153,  645,  711, 

PR  504,  9/8 
Korea,  366 

Latin  America,  2,  17,  19,  22, 
29,  43,  339,  608 
Indochina,  223.  228 
Industrial  democracies,  73.  89, 
105,  110,  112,  131,  151,  218, 
259,  264,  356,  498,  503,  605, 
PR  312,  6/20,  PR312-A,6/20 
lEA-French  relations,  93 
Iran: 
Intelligence  services,  question 

of  activities,  640 
U.S.  military  sales.  311,  312, 

313.  371,  549 
U.S.  relations  and  trade.  305. 
309 
Israel: 
Arab  boycott  and  question  of 
American  business  prac- 
tices. 369 
Rescue  and  hijacking  victims 
from  Entebbe  airport.  158. 
164,  166.  237 
U.S.  economic  and  military  aid. 
94.  578 
Italy,  119 
Elections.  89.  93,  120,  128,  166. 
325 
Japan,  relations,  107,  128,  151, 
220,  350 


773 


Kissinger,  Henry  A.— Continued 
Addresses — Continued 
Kenya,  U.S.  aircraft  sales,  171, 

264 
Korea,  Republic  of,  221 ,  238,  367, 
550 
Bribery  of  U.S.  officials,  ques- 
tion of,  646 
Human  rights,  366 
Korean  Peninsula,  219,  222,  237, 
502,  PR  353,  7/22 
Panmunjom  incident,  414 
Latin  America: 
Charter  of  Economic  Rights 

and  Duties  of  States,  28 
U.S.  relations,  interests,  role, 
1,  5,  14,  19,  41,  155,  244, 
555 
Law  of  the  sea  conference,  33, 
327,  333,  335,  397,  400,  451, 
507 
Deep  sea  mining,  334,  370,  395, 
397,  400,  452,  507 
Lebanon,  90,  91,   160,  164,  230, 
314,  PR  314,  6/21,  PR  316, 
6/22 
Arab  forces,  28,  121,  646,  PR 

314,  6/21 
Evacuation  of  Americans,  90, 

94,  314,  PR  312-A,  6/20 
Israeli  arms  supplies  to  Chris- 
tians in  Lebanon,  question 
of,  647 
Soviet  arms  supplies,  546 
U.S.  Ambassador  Meloy  and 
Counselor  Waring,  mur- 
ders of,  98,  546,  PR  310, 
6/19 
U.S.   military  intervention, 

question  of,  546,  547 

U.S.  primary  objectives,  29, 

160,  236,  325,  401,  414, 

502,  563,  646 

Less  developed  countries,  14,  21, 

75,80,259,263,334,351,725 

General    debt    moratorium, 

question  of,  230,  402 
Group  of  77,  326 
North-South  relations,  20,  21, 
24,  31,  79,  113,  119,  120, 
131,   152,   154,  503,  556, 
560,  563,  602,  726 
Lockheed  Aircraft  Corporation 
matter,  326 

Mexico,  30 
American  prisoners,  27 
Communist  influence,  question 

of,  581,  PR  579,  12/3 
Drug  control,  34 
Mexican  workers  in  U.S.,  33, 

234 
U.S.  relations,  749,  PR  574, 

11/29,  PR  577,  12/2,  PR 

579,  12/3 


Kissinger,  Henry  A. — Continued 
Addresses — Continued 
Mozambique,  27,  359,  516 
Multinational  corporations,  76, 

326,  403,  643,  728 
Namibia,  47,  158,  170,  239,  259, 
261,  324,  351,  358,  360,  365, 
377,  380,  384,  403,  409,  413, 
500,  514,  516,  518,  521,  524, 
559,  561,  596c,  PR  419,  9/7, 
PR  504,  10/8 
South  West  Africa  People's 
Organization    (SWAPO), 
378,  379,  384,  409,  415, 
500,   521,   559,   576,   593 
(quoted) 
National  defense,  108,  231,  243, 

367,  552 
NATO,  44,  46,  109,  127,  152,  157, 
701,  705,  709,  PR  597,  12/10, 
PR  598,  12/10 
North-South  relations,  20,  21,  24, 
31,  79,  113,  119,  120,  131, 
152,  154,  503,  556,  560,  563, 
602,  726 
Norway,  45,  PR  592,  12/9 
Nuclear  proliferation,  problem 

of,  226,  309,  319,  322,  505 
OAS,  556 
General  Assembly,  1,  5,  10,  33, 
41,  156,  339 
Olympic  games,  234 
OPEC  oil  pricing,  244,  645,  711 
Second    Arab    oil    embargo, 
question  of,  240,  607,  709 
U.S.  arms  sales,  244,  371,  549 
Organization  for  Economic  Coop- 
eration and  Development, 
75,  264,  355,  403,  505 
Ministerial  meeting,  46,  73,  89, 
91,  113,  PR  312,  6/20,  PR 
312-A,  6/20,  PR  315,  6/21, 
PR  323.  6/23 
Pakistan,  319,  PR  369,  8/8 
French  nuclear  weapons  sale, 
317,  320,  322,  PR  419,  9/7 
Panama  Canal  negotiations,  21, 

243,  574 
Personal  diplomacy,  conduct  of, 

544 
Political  prisoners,  603 
Amnesty,  question  of  proposal 
at  General  Assembly,  402 
Cuba,  43 
Portugal,  704 

Presidential  elections,  Soviet  or 
Chinese  preferences,  ques- 
tion of.  369 
Public  support,  131 
Puerto  Rico  summit,  46,  74,  92, 
119,  152,324 
EEC  participation,  question 
of,  93,  708 
A.  Philip  Randolph  award  (Roy 
Wilkins),  349 


Kissinger,  Henry  A. — Continued 
Addresses — Continued 
Republican   Party   "morality" 

plank,  365 
Rhodesia,  259,  351,  410,  415,  524, 
561,  576,  704,  PR  419,  9/7, 
PR  420,  9/7 
Byrd  amendment,  question  of 

repeal,  97,  170,  414 
Financial    guarantees    plan, 
proposed,  380,  410,  415, 
514,  526,  530,  543,  561,  PR 
412,  9/4 
Geneva  conference,  prospects, 
514,   516,   522,   529,   610, 
640,  704,  PR  467,  9/23,  PR 
468,  9/23,  PR  469,  9/23,  PR 
483,  9/29,  PR  484,  9/29 
Meeting  of  Secretary  Kissinger 
and  Ian  Smith,  379,  382, 
401,  416,  517,  519 
Negotiated  settlement,  need 
for,  prospects,  and  U.S. 
support,  47,  158,  170,  239, 
260,  262,  358,  360,  377, 
383,  409,  413,  521,  543, 
559,  PR  412,  9/4,  PR  448, 
9/19,  PR  483,  9/29,  PR  484, 
9/29,  PR  504,  10/8,  PR  514, 
10/15 
Smith  acceptance  of  principle 
of  majority  rule,  500,  520, 
526,  528,  561,  704 
South  Africa,  role,  352,  409, 

526,  529,  559 

U.K.  responsibility  and  role, 
45,  96,  121,  127,  260,  325, 
327,  349,  351,  378,  401, 
412,   500,   518,   522,   524, 

527,  530,  PR  467,  9/23,  PR 
483,  9/29 

SALT,  110,  130,  153,  350,  499 
SALT  Two,   169,  228,  324,  605, 

646,  710 
Saudi  Arabia,  172,  369,  549 
Science  and  technology: 
Latin  America,  6,  9, 17,  43,  728 
U.N.  conference,  9,  505 
U.S.  National  Conference,  725 
Shuttle  diplomacy,  411 
Sino-Soviet  relations,  417,  609, 

641.  711 
South  Africa,  261,  325,  365,  409, 
412,  516,  530,  544,  559,  PR 
443,  9/16,  PR  463,  9/23,  PR 
469,  9/23 
Apartheid,  94,  261,  325,  352, 
358,  360,   365,   501,   566 
(quoted) 
Meetings  with  Prime  Minister 
Vorster,  93,  95,  121,  127, 
260,  349,  358,  377,  400, 
514,  PR  312-A,  6/20,  PR 
323,  6/23,  PR  411,  9/3,  PR 
415,  9/5,  PR  417,  9/7 


774 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Kissinger,  Henry  A. — Continued 
Addresses — Continued 
South  Africa — Continued 
Republic   of  Transkei,   non- 
recognition,  642 
U.S.  private  arms  sales,  ques- 
tion of,  642 
Southeast  Asia,  221 
Soviet  Union,  29,  108,  549,  550 
Economy,  78 
Jewish  emigration,  242,  603, 

608 
Military  expansion.   111,   159, 

704 
Soviet  pilot  in  Japan,  question 
ofU.S.  asylum,  PR  419,  9/7 
U.S.  credits  and  sales,  241 
U.S.    Embassy,    Soviet    mi- 
crowave signals,  168,  170 
U.S.  relations,  109,  125,  129, 
151,    158,  218,   229,  258, 
350,  499,  PR  514,  10/15 
U.S.  trade,  553 
State  Department: 
Dean  Acheson  Auditorium  and 
Loy  Henderson  Interna- 
tional Conference  Room, 
dedication,  PR  530,  10/26 
Recruitment  of  blacks,  360 
Sweden,  45 
Taiwan,  240,  372,  580 
Terrorism,  2,  4,   158,  235,  368, 

400,  453  (quoted),  508 
Thailand,  228,  578 
Trade,  75,  263,  356 
U.S.  policies,  7,  16,  34,  229, 

504,  553,  607 
U.S.  Trade  Act  restrictions,  6, 
8,  313 
Tunisian-U.S.  Joint  Commission, 

meeting,  611 
U.N.,  159,  230,  497,  709 
UNCTAD  fourth  conference,  6, 

90,  133,  504,  728 
United  Nations  Day,  1976,  614 
U.S.  arms  sales  policies,  244, 

371,  549,  606,  642 
U.S.  secondary  position,  ques- 
tion of,  243" 
Vance,  Cyrus,  749,  PR  586,  12/6, 
PR  596,  12/10,  PR  597,  12/10, 
PR  598,  12/10 
Vietnam,  219 
MIA's,  failure  to  account  for 
and  effect  on  U.S.  rela- 
tions, 30,  224,  400,  413, 
548,  573 
Vietnam  war,  124,  128,  129,  225, 

228,  550 
Watergate,  124,  128,  129,  371 
Wiretapping,  644 
World  problems,  1,  21,  31,  131, 

150.  259,  615 
Yugoslavia,  U.S.  security  inter- 
ests, 606,  609,  643 


Kissinger,  Henry  A.— Continued 
Addresses — Continued 

Zumwalt,  Elmo,  243,  551 
Correspondence  and  messages: 
Israeli-occupied      Arab      ter- 
ritories.  Security  Council 
consensus  statement,  695 
Law  of  the  sea  conference,  327 
OECD  declaration  on   invest- 
ment, 403 
Radio  Free  Europe  and   Radio 
Liberty,  405 
Interviews,  transcripts,   124,  237, 
363,  528,  541,  606,  PR  463, 
9/23,  PR  469,  9/23,  PR  514, 
10/15 
Introduction  to  address  before 
Chicago  Council  on  Foreign  Re- 
lations and  Mid-City  Commit- 
tee, PR  339- A,  7/6 
Meetings  with   U.N.   Secretary 
General  Waldheim,  399,  PR 
483,  9/29,  PR  484,  9/29 
News  conferences,  transcripts,  19, 
20,  25,  89,  95,   119,   164,  307, 
318,  322,  358,  377,  382,  409, 
511,  519,  521,  573,  640,  PR  353, 
7/22,  PR  504,  10/8 
Questions  and  answers,  157,  226, 
703,  PR  315,  6/22,  PR  316,  6/22, 
PR  412,  9/4,  PR  484,  9/29 
Visits  to: 
Afghanistan,  316 
Africa:  Ford,  385;  Kissinger,  361, 
383,  409,  413,  511,  PR  419, 
9/7,  PR  422,  9/7,  PR  439, 
9/16,  PR  450,  9/20,  PR  451, 
9/21,  PR  453,  9/22,  PR  459, 
9/22,  PR  465,  9/23,  PR  466, 
9/23;  Rogers,  532 
Europe,  44 
France,  PR  312,  6/20,  PR  314, 

6/21 
Iran,  305 

Latin  America,  14,  41 
Mexico,  25,  30,  749,  PR  574, 
11/29,  PR  577,  12/2,  PR  579, 
12/3 
Netherlands,  322 
Pakistan,  317,  PR  369,  8/8 
Kluane  Lake,  Yukon  Territory,  seis- 
mograph station,  agreement  with 
Canada,  407 
Kombila,  Rene,  739 
Koniotakis,  Constantin,  703 
Korea,    Democratic    Republic   of, 

human  rights  (Armstrong),  457 
Korea,  Republic  of  (Robinson),  288 
August  18  incident  at  Panmunjom 
and  murder  of  U.S.  officers; 
Brown,  392;  Department,  392, 
394;  Hummel,  386;  Kissinger, 
414 


Korea,  Republic  of — Continued 
Bribery  of  U.S.  officials,  question 

of  (Kissinger),  646 
Fisheries  agreement  with  U.S.  ini- 
tialed, PR  599,  12/10 
Human  rights  (Kissinger),  366 
Income  tax  agreement  with  U.S. 

(Ford),  437 
Security  of,  and  U.S.  support:  393; 
Habib  (quoted),  392;  Hummel, 
386;  Kissinger,  221,  238,  367, 
550 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  39,  71, 
439,  651,  723,  743,  744 
Korean  Peninsula,  problems  (Kis- 
singer), 219,  222,  237,  502 
Krall,  Lothar,  711 
Kristofferson,  Kris  (Luers),  215 


Laise,  Carol  C,  254 
Laos  (Hummel),  472 
MIA's  accounting  (Habib),  251 
World  Health  Organization  con- 
stitution (1946),  amendments 
to  articles  34  and  55,  accept- 
ance, 539 
Latin  America  {see  also  names  of  in- 
dividual countries): 
Alliance  for  Progress  (Kissinger), 

244 
Charter  of  Economic  Rights  and 
Duties  of  States  (1974):  35; 
Kissinger,  28 
Economic  development:  Kissinger, 

5,  155;  Rogers,  752 
Human  rights  (Kissinger),  2,  17, 

19,  22,  29,  43,  339 
Soviet  relations:  Kissinger,  372; 

Luers,  56 
U.S.  relations,  policy,  and  role: 
Kissinger,  5,  14,  41,  128,  151, 
155,  218,  244,  350,  555;  Luers, 
58 
Visit  of  Secretary  Kissinger:  14; 
Kissinger,  14,  19,  23,  25 
Law  of  the  sea: 
Conference:     Greenwald,     297; 
Hummel,  470;  Kissinger,  33, 
327,  333,  397,  401,  451,  507; 
Lewis,  195;  Lord,  684;  Robin- 
son, 445;  Rogers,  659 
Deep  sea  mining  and  proposed 
International  Seabed   Re- 
source  Authority:   Green- 
wald, 297;  Kissinger,  334, 
370,  395,  397,  400,  452,  507; 
Robinson,  445;  Rogers,  659 
Review  conferences,  proposed 
(Kissinger),  398,  400 
High  seas,  convention  (1958),  Mon- 
golia, 650 


Index,  July  5-December  27,  1976 


775 


Law  of  the  sea — Continued 

South  Pacific  Forum  Joint  Declara- 
tion, 290 
Lawrence,  Loren  E.,  214 
Lebanon:  292;  Kissinger,  314 

Arab  forces  (Kissinger),  28,  121, 
646,  PR  314,  6/21 

French  force,  proposed  (Kis- 
singer), 92,  121,  PR  314,  6/21 

Integrity  and  unity,  U.S.  support: 
Department,  459;  Kissinger, 
29,  160,  236,  401,  414,  502,  563, 
646,  PR  419,  9/7 

Middle  East  settlement,  effect  on: 
Atherton,  177;  Kissinger,  164, 
236,  563,  PR  514,  10/15;  Lord, 
682 

Negotiations,  prospects;  Kissinger, 
90,  91,  325;  Sherer,  692 

Roundtable  conference,  proposed 
(Kissinger),  92,  160,  172,  326, 
PR  316,  6/22 

Soviet  arms  supply  (Kissinger),  546 

Stateless  refugees  (Habib),  268 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  71,  700 

U.S.  Ambassador  Meloy  and  Coun- 
selor Waling,  murders  of:  Foi'd, 
98,  99,  554;  Habib,  PR  313, 
6/21;  Kissinger,  98,  546,  PR 
310,  6/19;  Sherer,  143 

U.S.  arms  shipments  from  West 
German  bases,  question  of 
(Kissinger),  230 

U.S.  evacuation  of  American  citi- 
zens; Ford,  99;  Kissinger,  90, 
94,  314,  PR  312-A,  6/20 

U.S.  humanitarian  aid;  Depart- 
ment, 460;  Scranton,  699 

U.S.  military  intervention,  ques- 
tion of  (Kissinger),  546,  547, 
PR  314,  6/21 
Leigh,  Monroe,  581,  649 
Lesotho: 

Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials, 
739 

Universal  Postal  Union  constitu- 
tion (1964),  second  additional 
protocol,  744 

U.S.  Ambassador  (Norland),  PR 
569,  11/24 
Less  developed  countries  (see  also 
Commodity  trade.  Science  and 
technology.  United  Nations  Con- 
ference on  Trade  and  Develop- 
ment, and  names  of  individual 
countries):  Kissinger,  259,  351; 
Lewis,  192 

Development  process:  Kissinger, 
31,  80,  503;  Stever,  730 

ECOSOC,  61st  session  (Scranton), 
201 

General  debt  moratorium,  question 
of  (Kissinger),  230,  402 

Group  of  77;  Kissinger,  326;  Schiff, 
464 

Intermediate  technology  (Stever), 
734 

Nationalism  (Bolen),  617 


Less  developed  countries — Con. 
New  International  Economic  Order 
and  the  Charter  of  Economic 
Rights  and  Duties  of  States, 
U.S.   position:   Boeker,   135, 
136;  McGovern,  588 
North-South  relations:  123,  292; 
Greenwald,  272,  294;  Hummel, 
471;  Kissinger,  20,  21,  24,  31, 
79,  113,  119,  120,  131,  152,154, 
503,  556,  560,  563,  602,  726; 
Lewis,  194;  Lord,  680;  Parker, 
735;  Reinhardt,  661;  Robinson, 
287,  442;  Rogers,  657;  Scran- 
ton, 203;  Stever,  729 
Pacific  Basin  (Robinson),  288 
Revenue  sharing  from  deep  sea 
mining,  proposed  (see  also  Law 
of  the  sea):  Kissinger,  334 
Southeast  Asia,  469 
U.S.  bilateral  aid  (Kissinger),  263 
Lewis,  Samuel  W..  189,  714 
Liberia  (Bolen),  618,  620 
Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials, 

231 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  38,  539, 

675 
U.S.  visit  of  President  Tolbert; 
Ford,  481;  Tolbert,  482;  pro- 
gram, PR  444,  9/17 
Libya,  treaties,  agreements,  etc., 

187,  304,  330 
Lincoln,  Abraham  (quoted),  257,  678 
Load  lines,  international  convention 
(1966):  Algeria,  650:  Bahamas, 
329;  Seychelles,  650 
Amendments  (1971):  Ireland,  347; 
Israel,  438;  Poland,  347 
Loory,  Stuart,  552 
Loran-A  stations,  continued  opera- 
tion, agreement  with  Philippines, 
700 
Loran-C  station  near  Williams  Lake, 
B.C.,  agreement  with  Canada  re 
construction  and  maintenance,  39 
Lord,  Winston,  677 
Low,  Stephen,  sworn  in  as  Ambas- 
sador to  Zambia,  PR  391,  8/20 
Lowitz,  Donald,  election  as  chairman 
of  Board  of  Foreign  Scholarships, 
PR  471,  9/24 
Lozano,  Ignacio  E.,  Jr.,  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  El  Salvador,  PR 
376,  8/13 
Luers,  William  H.,  49,  211 
Luxembourg  (Kissinger),  45 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  39,  103, 
304,  539,  596,  675 

M 

MacFarquhar,  Roderick,  705 
Madagascar,  treaties,  agreements, 

etc     70   539 
Mailliard,  William  S.,  339 
Makeka,  Thabo  R.,  739 
Malaysia;  Hummel,  473;  Robinson, 

288 


Malaysia — Continued 
Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials, 
132 
Maldives,  Universal  Postal  Union 
constitution  (1964),  ratification  of 
second  additional  protocol,  495 
Maldonado  Gularte,  Federico  Abun- 

dio,  132 
Mali: 
Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials, 

739 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  147, 

188 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Byrne),  PR  502, 
10/8 
Malta,  treaties,  agreements,  etc., 

256,  699 
Mapping,    charting  and   geodesy, 

agreement  with  Canada,  495 
Marcona  Mining  Company,  agree- 
ment re  compensation  for  ex- 
propriated assets,  agreement 
with  Peru:  540,  760;  Department, 
487;  entry  into  force,  760 
Marine  pollution  (see  also  Oil  pollu- 
tion): Kissinger,  452 
Marine  pollution  by  substances 
other  than  oil,  intervention  on 
the  high  seas,  protocol  (1973): 
Sweden,  Tunisia,  284 
Maritime  matters: 
Intergovernmental  Maritime  Con- 
sultative Organization  conven- 
tion  (1948):    Bahamas,    329; 
Bahrain,  495;  Cape  Verde,  376; 
Morocco,  495;  Surinam,  596 
Amendments  (1974):  Bahrain, 
495;  Belgium,  256;  Brazil, 
304;  Cameroon,  674;  Cape 
Verde,  376;  Czechoslovakia, 
743;  Denmark,  347;  Egypt, 
743;  Finland,  650;  Ghana, 
627,  699;  Indonesia,  743;  Is- 
rael, 466;  Korea,  Republic  of, 
723;  Libya,  304;  Malta,  699; 
Morocco,  495;  Nigeria,  146; 
Oman,  Peru,  743;  Surinam, 
759;  Tanzania,  539 
International  maritime  traffic, 
facilitation    of,     convention 
(1965):  Bahamas,  329;  India, 
69;  Iraq,  759 
Amendment  of  article  VII;  Fin- 
land, 596;  New  Zealand,  376; 
Soviet  Union,  743 
Tonnage  measurement  of  ships,  in- 
ternational convention  (1969): 
Algeria,  651;  Bahamas,  331; 
Colombia,  256;  Poland,  331; 
Romania,  103 
Mastei's,   Edward  E.,   sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  Bangladesh,  PR 
500,  10/7 
Mattick,  Kurt,  710 
Mauritania  (Bolen),  618 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  71, 
187,  627 
Mauritius: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  187 


776 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Mauritius — Continued 

U.S.   Ambassador  (Keeley),   PR 
307.  6/17 
Maw,  Carlyle  E.,  488 
M'Bow,  Amadou  Mahtar  (quoted), 

666 
McAlister,  Wanda,  232 
McCall,  Tom,  232 

McCloskey,  Robert  J.:  139;  sworn  in 
as  Ambassador  to  the  Nether- 
lands, PR  428,  9/10 
McCullough,  John  G.,  363,  366 
McGovern,  George,  510,  587,  721 
Meloy,  Francis  E.,  Jr.:  Ford,  98,  99, 
554;  Habib,  PR  313,  6/21;  Kis- 
singer, 98,  546,   PR  310,  6/19; 
Sherer,  143 
Meteorological  observation  program, 

agreement  with  Mexico,  651 
Mexico: 
American  prisoners  in  Mexican 
jails:  36;  Kissinger,  27;  Luers, 
211 
Amnesty  legislation  on  1968  stu- 
dent riots  (Luers),  54 
Communist   political    influence, 
question  of:  Kissinger,  581,  PR 
579,  12/3;  Luers,  52 
Drug  control  programs  and  U.S. 
assistance:  35;  Kissinger,  34; 
Luers,  212;  Robinson,  490 
Execution  of  penal  sentences  (sanc- 
tions) treaty: 
Agreement  on  draft  text,   PR 

547,  11/5 
Signature,  750 
Migrant  workers  in  U.S.:  Kis- 
singer, 33,  234;  Luers,  212 
Operation  of  U.S.  Citizens  Band 

(CB)  equipment,  PR  418,  9/7 
President  Lopez  Portillo,  inaugu- 
ration: Kissinger,  749,  PR  574, 
11/29,  PR  577,   12/2,  PR  579, 
12/3;  Rogers,  751 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,   148, 
188,  256,  376,  438,  439,  539, 
572,  627,  651 
U.S.    fisheries   and   provisional 
maritime  boundaries  agree- 
ments, 758,  760 
U.S.  immigration:  Ford,  639;  Lord, 

685 
U.S. -Mexico  Science  and  Technol- 
ogy Commission,  second  meet- 
ing, joint  statement,  375 
Visit  of  Secretary  Kissinger:  Kis- 
singer, 25,  30,   749,  PR  574, 
11/29,  PR  577,  12/2,  PR  579, 
12/3;  text  of  U.S. -Mexico  joint 
communique,  35 
Military  assistance: 
Agreement  with  Greece  re  eligibil- 
ity for  military  assistance  and 
payment  for  sale  of  defense  ar- 
ticles, 540 
Military    Assistance    Advisory 
Groups,  termination  of  eleven 
MAAG's,  announcement,  336 


Military  assistance — Continued 
Military  training  exchange  pro- 
gram,  bilateral  agreement 
with  Australia,  759 
Miller,  G.  William,  chairman  of  first 
panel  of  National  Meeting  on  Sci- 
ence, Technology  and  Develop- 
ment, PR  549,  11/9 
Miner,  Thomas,  introduction  of  Sec- 
retary   Kissinger    to    Chicago 
Council  on  Foreign  Relations  and 
the  Mid-America  Committee,  PR 
339- A,  7/6 
Mongolia,    high    seas    convention 

(1958),  accession,  650 
Morgan,  Robert,  711 
Morgan-Giles,  Morgan,  702 
Morocco,  treaties,  agreements,  etc., 

188.  495.  744 
Mozambique: 
Angola  contrasted  (Kissinger),  27, 

516 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  439, 

743 
U.S.       aid:       Kissinger,       359; 
McGovern,  590 
Mugabe,  Robert  (Kissinger),  577 
Multinational  corporations  (see  also 
under  Judicial  matters):  Kis- 
singer, 76 
Code  of  conduct,  proposed:  Kis- 
singer, 728;  Lord,  683;  Robin- 
son, 286 
Illicit  payments  (Robinson),  446 
EC(DSOC     intergovernmental 
group:        Boeker,         137; 
Feldman,  696;  Nessen,  338; 
PR  559,  11/16 
Treaty,  proposed:  Feldman,  696; 
Kissinger,  76;  McGovern, 
591;  Scranton,  204 
U.S.   legislation  and  program: 
Feldman,  697;  Kissinger,  643 
Lockheed  Aircraft  Corporation: 

Hummel,  585;  Kissinger,  326 
OECD  Declaration,  on  Interna- 
tional Investment  and  Multi- 
national Enterprises;  with  an- 
nex:     Kissinger,      Simon, 
Richardson,  403;  text,  83,  87 
U.N.   information  center,  pro- 
posed: Kissinger,  76;  Rogers, 
654 
UNCTAD  conference  resolution, 
explanation  of  U.S.  abstention 
(Boeker),  136 
Musieh,  Arnaldo  T.,  231 
Mutawakkil,  Yahya  M.  al-,  13 
Mutual  defense: 
Bilateral  agreements  with:  Bel- 
gium, 304;  Japan,  147 
U.S. -Federal  Republic  of  Germany 
joint  statement,  247 
Muzorewa,  Abel  (Kissinger),  577 
Mwale,  Siteke,  remarks  on  southern 

Africa,  PR  439,  9/16 
Myerson,  Jacob  M.,  201?i,  510,  566, 
722 


N 


Namibia:  Kaunda,  PR  443,  9/16;  Kis- 
singer, 351,  PR  419,  9/7,  PR  504, 
9/8 
Background  (Kissinger),  352 
Geneva  conference,  question  of 

(Kissinger),  .381 
German  interests  (Kissinger),  412 
Illegal  administration  by  South  Af- 
rica: Kissinger,  261;  Scranton, 
283,  593;  Security  Council  res- 
olutions, texts,  283,  594 
Independence,  question  of  date 
(Kissinger),  352,  358,  403,  516, 
518 
Negotiations,  prospects  (Kissinger), 
47,  158,  170,  239,  259,  324,  360, 
378,  380,  409,  413,  500,  596c 
Racial  violence:  Bolen,  616;  Kis- 
singer, 377,  524 
Self-determination  (Kissinger),  261, 

325 
South  West  Africa  People's  Organi- 
zation (SWAPO),  (Kissinger), 
378,  379,  384,  409,  415,  500,  521, 
559,  576,  593  (quoted) 
U.N.  role  (Kissinger),  382,  500,  559 
NASA  (National  Aeronautics  and 
Space  Administration):  Bennett, 
668;  Reis,  207 
Nauru,   international  regulations 
(1960)  for  preventing  collisions  at 
sea,  amendments  (1967),  accept- 
ance, 330 
Near  and  Middle  East,  Arab  states, 

U.S.  relations  (Atherton),  175 
Nepal,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  467, 

571 
Nessen,  Ronald  H.,  163,  339 
Netherlands: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  39,  70, 

103,  304,  438,  723 
U.S.  Ambassador  (McCloskey),  PR 

428,  9/10 
U.S.  MAAG's  terminated,  336 
Visit  of  Secretary  Kissinger:  Kis- 
singer, 322;  van  der  Stoel,  322 
New  Zealand,  treaties,  agreements, 

etc.,  39,  284,  304,  376,  723 
Newly  independent  nations:   Kis- 
singer, 154;  Lewis,  716 
Nicaragua,  GATT,  provisional  acces- 
sion of  Colombia,  declaration,  70 
Nguza  Karl-I-Bond,  PR  453,  9/22 
Niger  (Bolen),  618 
Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials, 

713 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  71,  331, 

744 
U.S.  Ambassador  (James),  PR  534, 
10/29 
Nigeria  (Bolen),  618,  620 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  70,  103, 
146,  304,  347,  439,  539,  723 
Nokes,  Richard,  232 
Nonalignment  (Kissinger),  14,  264, 

356 
Norland,  Donald  R.,  PR  569,  11/24 


Index,  July  5-December  27,  1976 


777 


North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 
(Kissinger).  109,  152,  PR  597, 
12/10,  PR  598,  12/10 
Notices  of  meetings: 

Communist  participation  in  West 
European  governments,  ques- 
tion of  effect  (Kissinger),  157, 
709 

Ministerial  meeting,  Oslo,  summary 
(Kissinger),  44,  46 

Parliamentarians  meeting  (Kis- 
singer), 701 

Special  Bonn-Washington  relation- 
ship, question  of  (Kissinger), 
127 

Turkey,  importance  to:  Ford,  61; 
Habib,  424 

Weapons  standardization,  proposed 
(Kissinger),  701,  705,  708 
Norw'ay  (Kissinger),  PR  592,  12/9 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  39,  147, 
304,  347 

U.S.  MAAG's  terminated,  336 

U.S.  relations  (Kissinger),  45 

Advisory  Committee  for  U.S.  par- 
ticipation in  the  U.N.  Confer- 
ence on  Human  Settlements 
(Habitat).  PR  321.  6/23 

Advisory  Committee  on  Foreign 
Relations  of  the  United  States, 
PR  515,  10/15 

Advisory  Committee  on  Interna- 
tional Intellectual  Property,  PR 
474,  9/27 

Advisory  Committee  on  the  Law  of 
the  Sea,  PR  406,  9/1,  PR  454, 
9/22 

Advisory  Committee  on  Transna- 
tional Enterprises,  PR  495,  10/5 

Advisory  Committee  to  the  U.S. 
National  Section  of  the  Inter- 
American  Tropical  Tuna  Com- 
mission, PR  389,  8/18 

Advisory  Committee  to  the  U.S. 
National  Section  of  the  Interna- 
tional Commission  for  the  Con- 
servation of  Atlantic  Tunas,  PR 
487,  10/1 

Advisory  Committee  to  the  U.S. 
National  Section  of  the  Interna- 
tional North  Pacific  Fisheries 
Commission,  PR  395,  8/24 

Advisory  Panel  on  Folk  Music  and 
Jazz,  PR  434,  9/14 

Advisory  Panel  on  Music,  PR  425, 
9/10 

Fine  Arts  Committee,  PR  555, 
11/10,  PR  571,  11/26 

Government  Advisory  Committee 
on  International  Book  and  Li- 
brary Programs,  PR  319,  6/23, 
PR  442,  9/17 

Northwest  Atlantic  Fisheries  Ad- 
visory Committee,  PR  462, 
9/23,  PR  524,  10/22,  PR  538, 
10/29 


Notices  of  meetings — Continued 
Ocean  Affairs  Advisory  Committee, 

PR  594,  12/9 
Overseas  Schools  Advisory  Council, 

PR  522,  10/22 
Secretary  of  State's  Advisory  Com- 
mittee on  Private  International 
Law,  PR  363,  8/4 
Shipping  Coordinating  Committee: 
Committee  on  Ocean  Dumping, 

PR  393,  8/24,  PR  550,  11/10 
Open  meetings,  PR  331,  6/25,  PR 
379,  8/17,  PR  380,  8/17,  PR 
444,  9/17 
Subcommittee  on  Maritime  Law, 

PR  426,  9/10,  PR  540,  11/3 
Subcommittee  on  Safety  of  Life  at 
Sea: 
Working  group  on  bulk  chemi- 
cals, PR  333,  6/25,  PR  584, 
12/6 
Working  group  on  carriage  of 
dangerous  goods,  PR  503, 
10/8,  PR  585,  12/6 
Working  group  on  container 

transport,  PR  431,  9/13 
Working  group  on  fire  protec- 
tion, PR  387,  8/18 
Working  group  on  life-saving 

appliances,  PR  388,  8/18 
Working  group  on  radiocom- 
munications,  PR  .349,  7/20, 
PR  390,  8/19,  PR  456,  9/22, 
PR   517,    10/15,    PR   557, 
11/15 
Working  group  on  safety  of  fish- 
ing vessels,  PR  381,  8/17, 
PR  544,  11/4 
Working  group  on  safety  of 

navigation,  PR  516,  10/15 
Working  group  on  ship  design 
and  equipment,  PR  342, 
7/8,  PR  383,  8/17,  PR  488, 
10/1,  PR  489,  10/1 
Working  group  on  standards  of 
training  and  watchkeeping, 
PR  384,  8/17,  PR  507,  10/12 
Working  group  on  subdivision 
and  stability,  PR  427,  9/10, 
PR  527,  10/22 
Subcommittee  on  Tonnage  Meas- 
urement, PR  359,  7/30 
U.S.  National  Committee  for  the 
Prevention  of  Marine  Pollu- 
tion, PR  506,  10/12,  PR  520, 
10/18 
U.S.  Advisory  Commission  on  In- 
ternational Educational  and 
Cultural  Affairs,  PR  337,  6/30, 
PR  401,  8/30,  PR  493,  10/4,  PR 
505,  10/12 
U.S.  National  Committee  for  the  In- 
ternational Radio  Consultative 
Committee  (CCIR),  PR  546, 
11/4 
Study  Group  1,  PR  394,  8/24 


Notices  of  meetings — Continued 
U.S.  National  Committee — Con. 
Study  Group  4,  PR  392,  8/23 
Study  Group  5,  PR  552,  11/10 
Study  Group  6,  PR  320,  6/23,  PR 

424,  9/10 
Study  Group  7,  PR  440,  9/17,  PR 

541,  11/3 
Study  Group  9,  PR  545,  11/4 
Study  Groups  10  and  11,  PR  558, 
11/15 
U.S.  National  Committee  for  the  In- 
ternational Telegraph  and  Tele- 
phone Consultative  Committee 
(CCITT),  PR  382,  8/17 
Study  Group  1,  PR  553,  11/10 
Study  Groups  3  and  4,  PR  542, 

11/3 
Study  Group  5,  PR  332,  6/25,  PR 
461,  8/23,  PR  554,  11/10 
Nuclear  energy,  peaceful  uses  (Kis- 
singer), 91 
Cooperation  with  Iran:  315;  Ansary, 

308;  Kissinger,  309,  310 
Liquid  metal-cooled  fast  breeder 
reactors,  agreement  with  Fed- 
eral Republic  of  Germany,  104 
Nuclear  field,  information,  agree- 
ment with  Canada,  539 
Nuclear  policy:  Ford,  629;  Irving, 
687;  Kissinger,  226,  507 
Republic  of  China  (Hummel),  454 
Radioactive-waste  disposal  at  sea 
(Grant),  :343 
Nuclear  nonproliferation:  290;  Ford, 
346,  629;  Hummel,  454;  Irving, 
688;  Kissinger,  226,  309,  319,  322, 
505;  Lord,  684 
Treaty  (1968):  Ford,  346,  436 
Current  actions:  Bahamas,  329; 
Surinam,  147 
Nuclear  testing: 
Nuclear  test  ban  treaty  (1963), 

Bahamas,  329 
Threshold  test  ban  treaty  and  peace- 
ful nuclear  explosions  treaty, 
ratification  urged  (Ford),  269 
Nuclear  war,  dangers  of:  Kissinger, 
29,  158,  231,  232,  498,  541,  600; 
Lewis,  194 
Nujoma,  Sam  (Kissinger),  576 
Nzeyimana,  Laurent,  739 


Ocean  dumping  convention  (1972): 
Grant,  343 
Current    actions:    Byelorussian 
S.S.R.,  347;  Denmark,  exten- 
sion to  the  Faroe  Islands,  674; 
German  Democratic  Republic, 
329;  Ukrainian  S.S.R.,  347; 
Yugoslavia,  69-70 
Oil  pollution: 
Bermuda,  agreement  re  assistance 
by  U.S.  Coast  Guard  in  event 
of  major  oil  spills,  256 


778 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Oil  pollution— Continued 
Civil  liability  for  oil  pollution  dam- 
age, international  convention 
(1969):  Bahamas,  Greece,  330; 
Japan,  Yugoslavia,  216 
International  fund  for  compensa- 
tion for  oil  pollution  damage, 
international         convention 
(1971):  Bahamas,  Japan,  330 
Intervention  on  the  high  seas  in 
cases  of  oil  pollution  casual- 
ties, international  convention 
(1969):  Bahamas,  330;  Cuba, 
216;  Finland,  495;  Poland,  216 
Prevention  of  pollution  of  the  sea 
by  oil,  international  convention 
(1954):        Argentina,       699; 
Bahamas,   329-330;   Bulgaria 
(with  reservation),  699 
Amendments  (1969):  Algeria, 
216;      Bahamas,      Ghana, 
Greece,  Libya,  Yugoslavia, 
330 
Amendments  (1971);   Algeria, 
651;  Italy,  216;  Soviet  Union, 
743;  Yugoslavia,  330 
Olson,  Jack  B.,  sworn  in  as  Ambas- 
sador to  Bahamas.  PR  567,  11/23 
Olympic  games:  Ford,  161;  Kissinger, 

234 
Oman,  treaties,  agreements,  etc., 

495,  743 
Organization  for  Economic  Coopera- 
tion and  Development;  Kissinger, 
264,  355,  505;  Robinson,  443;  Rog- 
ers, 751 
Declaration  on  International  In- 
vestment and  Multinational 
Enterprises,  with  annex,  and 
decisions  of  the  Council:  Kis- 
singer, 76,  403;  Richardson. 
403;  Simon,  403;  texts,  83,  87 
Financial  Support  Fund;  Kissinger, 
75;  Rogers,  656 
Agreement  (1975):  Austria,  103; 
Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
many, 38;  Greece,  103;  Ice- 
land, 69 
Ministerial  meeting,  Paris:  Kis- 
singer, 46,  73,  89,  92,  113,  PR 
312,  6/20,  PR  312-A,  6/20,  PR 
315,  6/21,  PR  323,  6/23;  Scran- 
ton,  204 
Organization  of  African  Unity  (Kis- 
singer), 521 
Organization  of  American  States 
(Kissinger),  556 
Inter-American  Commission  on 
Human  Rights  (Kissinger),  3, 
5,  33,  43,  339 
Reform,  modernization,  and  re- 
structure,    proposed     (Kis- 
singer), 10,  18,  42,  43 
Sixth  regular  General  Assembly 
(Kissinger),  1,  33,  41,  156 


Organization  of  Petroleum  Exporting 
Countries: 
Price  increases,  question  of,  and  ef- 
fect; Ford,  161;  Kissinger,  244, 
645,  711;  Lord,  683;  Rogers, 
653,  656,  751 
Second  Arab  oil  embargo,  question 

of  (Kissinger),  240,  607,  709 
U.S.  arms  sales  policy:  Habib,  447; 
Kissinger,  244,  371,  549 
Osogo,  James,  remarks  on  southern 
Africa,  PR  459,  9/22,  PR  466, 
9/23 
Outer  space: 
Exploration  of,  treaty  (1967):  Ben- 
nett, 670;  Reis,  206 
Current  actions:  Bahamas,  331; 
Singapore,  407 
International  liability  for  damage 
caused  by  space  objects,  con- 
vention (1972);  Reis,  206 
Current  actions:  Belgium,  304; 
Chile,  744;  Czechoslovakia, 
439;  Sweden,  38 
Mars  landing:  Bennett,  668;  Reis, 

207 
Moon  treaty,  draft  (Reis),  210 
Registration  of  objects  launched 
into  outer  space,  convention 
(1975): 
Current  actions:  Canada,  331; 
Niger,  330;  Singapore,  439; 
Sweden,  38;  U.S.,  70,  284,  466 
Entry  into  force,  466 
U.S.  ratification  (Reis),  206 
Rescue  and  return  of  astronauts, 
agreement  (1968);  Reis,  206 
Current  actions:  Bahamas,  329; 
Singapore,  407 
Space  shuttle  attached  i-emote  ma- 
nipulator system,   agreement 
with  Canada,  104 
Space  Transportation  System  and 

Spacelab  (Bennett),  668 
U.N.  Environment  Program  inter- 
national meeting  on  strato- 
spheric ozone  layer,  PR  575, 
12/1 
U.S.  cooperative  programs  and  ac- 
tivities (Reis),  207 

Overseas  Private  Investment  Corpo- 
ration (Bolen),  621 


Pacific  Basin;  290;  Hummel,  470,  475; 

Robinson,  285 
Pakistan; 
Drug  control  program  (Robinson), 

491 
French  sale  of  nuclear  reprocessing 
plant  and  problems  and  prolif- 
eration (Kissinger),  319,  320, 
322,  PR  419,  9/7 
India,  relations  (Dubs),  480 


Pakistan — Continued 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  39,  439, 

572 
U.S.  military  and  economic  aid; 
Habib,  449;  Kissinger,  318,  320, 
PR  369,  8/8 
Visit  of  Secretary  Kissinger  (Kis- 
singer), 317,  318,  PR  369,  8/8 
Palmer,  Alison,  designation  as  Agency 
Director  for  International  Labor 
Organization  Affairs,  PR  347,  7/12 
Palmer,  Ronald  D.,  sworn  in  as  Am- 
bassador to  Togo,  PR  478,  9/28 
Panama: 
Canal  treaty,  proposed;  Kissinger, 
21,  243,  574;  Luers,  54;  Rogers, 
754 
Joint  U.S. -Panama  report,  12 
Communist  political  influence,  ques- 
tion of  (Luers),  54 
Panama  City  water  supply  system, 

bilateral  agreement  re,  40 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  40,  216, 
304,  331,  723 
Papua  New  Guinea,  treaties,  agree- 
ments, etc.,  38,  69,  103,  187,  256, 
438,  743 
Paraguay: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  39,  571, 

627 
U.S.  MAAG's  terminated,  336 
Parker,  Daniel,  735 
Patents: 
Patent  cooperation  treaty  (1970), 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
330 
Strasbourg  agreement  re  interna- 
tional patent   classification 
(1971):   German   Democratic 
Republic,  Japan,  376 
PBEC  (Pacific  Basin  Economic  Coun- 
cil): Robinson,  286 
Peace  Corps,  Africa  (Bolen),  619 
Peacock,  Andrew,  289 
Peru  (Robinson),  492 
Balance  of  payments  (Rogers),  753 
Communist  political  influence,  ques- 
tion of  (Luers),  55 
Marcona  Mining  Company,  agree- 
ment: 540;  Department,  487 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  104, 
256,  438,  540.  723,  743 
Peterson,  Lawrence,  229 
Peterson,  Russell  W.,  461 
Philippines:  Kissinger,  228,  PR  577, 
12/2;  Robinson,  288 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  71,  304, 

495,  700,  759 
U.S.  use  of  bases  (Hummel),  470, 
474 
Phonograms,  protection  against  unau- 
thorized duplication,  convention 
(1971),  Guatemala,  743 
Picker,  Jean,  756 
Pinheiro,  Joao  Baptista.  132 


Index,  July  5-December  27,  1976 


779 


Poland: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  70,  148, 
216,  256,  284,  304,  331,  347,  439, 
572.  675 
U.S.   fishery  conservation  zone, 
agreement  on  Polish  fishing, 
299 
Political  prisoners  (Kissinger),  603 
Amnesty   proposal,   question   of 

(Kissinger),  402 
Cuba  (Kissinger),  43 
Iran  (Atherton),  435 
Poor,  James  G.,  581 
Population  problems  and  control 
(Green),  419 
Bangladesh,     bilateral     project 
agreement  re  Population  Con- 
trol Program,  39 
U.S.  (Green),  419 
Portugal: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  71,  256, 

376,  438,  495,  723 
U.S.  economic  aid  (Kissinger),  704 
Postal  matters: 
Money  orders  and  postal  travellers' 
checks     agreement      (1974): 
Algeria,  744;  Austria,  495;  Cape 
Verde,   651;  Comoros,   330; 
Guinea,  651;   Hungary,   744; 
Italy,  304;  Niger,  744;  Togo, 
330;  Vatican  City  State,  495; 
Yugoslavia,  330 
Universal  Postal  Union,  constitu- 
tion (1964),  with  final  protocol: 
Cape  Verde,  651;  Colombia,  38; 
Comoros,  330;  Liberia,  Papua 
New  Guinea,  38 
Additional  protocol  (1964),  Papua 

New  Guinea,  38 
Second  additional  protocol  (1974): 
Algeria,  744;  Austria,  Bar- 
bados, 495;  Comoros,  330; 
Ghana,   304;    Guinea,    651; 
Hungary,  744;  India,  330;  Is- 
rael, 744;  Italy,  304;  Jamaica, 
651;  Jordan,  38;  Lesotho,  744; 
Maldives,  495;  Niger,  744; 
Papua  New  Guinea,  Swazi- 
land, 38;  Togo,  330;  Vatican 
City  State,  495;  Yugoslavia, 
330 
U.S.  income  tax  reimbursements 
procedure,  agreement  with 
U.S.,  348 
Poston,  Ersa  Hines,  510 
Presidential  election  {see  also  under 
Foreign  policy):  Kissinger,  149, 
597 
Soviet  or  Chinese  preferences, 
question  of  (Kissinger),  369 
Prisoners  of  war,  Geneva  conventions 
(1949):  Papua  New  Guinea,  Sao 
Tome  and  Principe,  187;  Surinam, 
744 
Proclamation  by  the  President,  United 

Nations  Day,  1976,  Ui-U).  510 
Protection  of  nationals  (Scranton), 
181,  184 


Psilos,  Dimmede,  709 
Public  documents,  foreign,  convention 
(1960)  abolishing  requirement  of 
legalisation,   U.S.   ratification 
urged  (Ford),  281 
Publications: 
Congressional  documents  relating  to 
foreign  policy,  lists,  36,  101, 
146,  173,  215,  255,  282,  303,  328, 
346,  372,  406,  437,  494,  565,  626, 
650,  674,  722,  754 
State  Department: 
America's  Cultural  Experiment 
i)i  China,  19J,2-19J,9,   re- 
leased, PR  398,  8/26 
Digest  of  United  States  Practice 
in  International  Law,  1975, 
released,  675 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States,  19i8,  volume  I,  Gen- 
eral; The  United  Nations, 
part  2,  released,  348 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States,  19i8,  volume  V,  The 
Near  East.  South  Asia,  and 
Africa,  part  2,  released,  700 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States,  19i9.  volume  I,  Na- 
tional    Security     Affairs, 
Foreign  Economic  Policy,  re- 
leased, 652 
Treaties  arid  Other  International 
Agreements  of  the  United 
States  of  America  1776-19J,9, 
General  Index,  released,  40 
U.N.  documents,  list,  210 
Puerto  Rico:  Department,  394;  Ford, 
117 


Q 


Qatar,  World  Intellectual  Property 
Organization,  convention  (1967), 
accession,  70 


Rabin,  Yitzhak  (quoted),  179 
Racial  discrimination: 

Apartheid:  284  Kaunda,  PR  443, 
9/16;  Kissinger,  94,  261,  325, 
352,  358,  360,  365,  501,  566 
(quoted);  Myerson,  566;  Rogers, 
535;  Scranton,  202,  747;  Sherer, 
59;  Sullivan,  362 
Security  Council  resolution,  text, 
60 
Decade  for  Action  to  Combat  Ra- 
cism and  Racial  Discrimination, 
U.S.  nonparticipation:  Ford, 
538;  Myerson,  566 
International  convention  (1965)  on 
elimination:    Ethiopia,    147; 
Liberia,  674;  Zaire,  103 
Randolph,  A.  Philip  award,  Roy  Wil- 

kins  (Kissinger),  349 
Rawls,  Nancy  v.,  510 


Reed,  John  H.,  sworn  in  as  Ambas- 
sador to  Sri  Lanka,  PR  308,  6/18 
Refugees,  status  of,  protocol  (1967): 
Iran,  284;  Portugal,  256;  Uganda, 
572 
Reilly,  John  E.,  introduction  of  special 
guests  to  Chicago  Council  on 
Foreign  Relations  and  the  Mid- 
America  Committee,  PR  339-A, 
7/6 
Reinhardt,  John  E.,  661 
Reis,  Herbert  K.,  206 
Reston,  Scotty,  remarks  on  Dean 
Acheson  (quoted),  PR  530,  10/26 
Rhodesia:  Kaunda,  PR  443,  9/16;  Kis- 
singer, 351,  PR  419,  9/7;  Sullivan, 
362 
Byrd  amendment  (Kissinger),  97, 

170,  414 
Financial  guarantees  plan,  pro- 
posed: Kissinger,  380,  410,  415, 
514,  526,  530,  543,  561,  PR  412, 
9/4;  Rogers,  534;  Schmidt,  383 
Geneva  conference,  prospects  (Kis- 
singer), 640,  704;  PR  483,  9/29, 
PR  484,  9/29 
German  interests:  Kissinger,  PR 

420,  9/7;  Schmidt,  383 
Guerrilla  activity:  Bolen,  616;  Kis- 
singer, 158,  259,  260,  377,  403, 
410,  522,  524,  PR  469,  9/23 
Interim  government,  proposed  (Kis- 
singer), 561,  704 
Ian  Smith  as  head  of,  question  of 
(Crosland),  525 
International  economic  support, 

proposed,  531 
Liberation  movements  (Kissinger), 

415,  576 
Negotiated  settlement,  need  for, 
prospects,  and  U.S.  support: 
Bolen,  617;  Kissinger,  47,  158, 
170,  239,  260,  262,  358,  360,  377, 
383,  409,  413,  521,  543,  559,  PR 
412,  9/4,  PR  448,  9/19,  PR  483, 
9/29,  PR  484,  9/29,  PR  504,  10/8, 
PR  514,  10/15;  McGovern,  590; 
Rogers.  532,  533 
Date  for  independence,  question 

of  (Crosland),  523,  524,  525 
Meeting  of  Secretary  Kissinger 
and  Ian  Smith  (Kissinger). 
379.  382,  401,  416,  517,  519 
Negotiations:  modifications  and 
procedi'ral  questions,  ques- 
tion of:  Crosland,  523,  524; 
Kissinger,  514,  516,  522,  529, 
610,  641,  PR  467,  9/23,  PR 
468,  9/23,  PR  469,  9/23 
Smith  acceptance  of  principle  of 
majority  rule:  Callaghan,  PR 
467,  9/23,  PR  468,  9/23;  Cros- 
land, 522;  Ford,  528;  Kis- 
singer, 500,  520,  526,  528, 
561,  704;  Rogers,  533 
South  Africa,  role  (Kissinger), 
352,  409,  526,  529,  559 


780 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Rhodesia — Continued 
U.K.  responsibility  and  role:  Cros- 
land,  521;  Ford,  528;  Kissinger, 
45,  96,  121,  127,  260,  325,  327, 
349,  351,  378,  401,  412,  500,  518, 
522,  524,  527,  530,  PR  467,  9/23, 
PR  483,  9/29;  Rogers,  533 
Richardson,  Elliot  T.,  403 
Roads    (feeder)    and    bridges   and 
strengthening  of  road  mainte- 
nance capability,  loan  agreement 
with  Philippines,  304 
Robinson,  Charles  W.:  285,  289,  441, 

489;  Kissinger,  727 
Roethke,  Theodore  (quoted),  226 
Rogers,  William  D.:  532,  653,  751;  Kis- 
singer, 349,  360,  384 
Under  Secretary  for  Economic  Af- 
fairs, sworn  in  as,  PR  309,  6/18 
Romania: 
Economic  agreement  with  U.S., 

signature,  758 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  103, 
439,  723,  744 
Rosenthal,  Harold  (Brown),  293 
Rou.x,  Claude,  706 
Rwanda: 
Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials, 

713 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  571,  743 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Crigler),  PR  480, 
9/29 
Rystrom,  Kenneth,  232 


Safety  at  sea: 
International  convention  for  safety 
of  life  at  sea  (1960):  Bahamas, 
330;  German  Democratic  Re- 
public, 759;  India,  256;  Seychel- 
les, 651 
Amendments  (1966),  Bahamas, 

330 
Amendments   (1967):   Austria, 
Bahamas,  Belgium,  Nauru, 
330 
Amendments   (1968):   Austria, 

Bahamas,  330 
Amendments  (1971);  Israel,  572; 

U.K.,  330 
Amendments  to  chapters  II,  III, 
IV,  and  V  (1973):  Israel,  572; 
U.K.,  330 
Amendment  to  chapter  VI  (1973): 
Czechoslovakia,  572;  U.K., 
330 
International  navigational  rules  act, 

veto  (Ford),  586 
International  regulations  for  pre- 
venting collisions  at  sea: 
Convention  (1960):  Algeria,  216, 

651;  Bahamas,  330 
Convention  (1972):  Bahamas,  330; 
Germany,  Federal  Republic 
of,  216;  U.S.,  759 


Index,  July  5-December  27,  1  976 


SALT.  See  Strategic  arms  limitation 

talks 
Sanchez,  Philip  V.,  sworn  in  as  Am- 
bassador to  Colombia,  PR  358, 
7/29 
Santayana,  George  (quoted),  598 
Sao  Tome  and  Principe,  treaties, 

agreements,  etc.,  187,  439,  743 
Satellites: 
ATS-6  educational  program  in  India: 

Bennett,  669;  Reinhardt,  664 
Direct  TV  broadcasting,  principles: 

Bennett,  670;  Reis.  210 
International  Telecommunication 
Satellite    Organization    (IN- 
TELSAT): 
Agreement  and  operating  agree- 
ment (1971):  China,  Republic 
of  (withdrawal),  407;  Mali, 
147 
Headquarters  agreement  (1976), 
744 
Loran-A  stations,  continued  opera- 
tions, agreement  with  Philip- 
pines, 700 
Loran-C   station   near  Williams 
Lake,  B.C.,  agreement  with 
Canada  re  construction  and 
maintenance,  39 
Rawinsonde  observation  station  in 
San  Jose,  bilateral  agreement 
with  Costa  Rica,  188 
Remote  sensing  projects:  Bennett, 
669,  671;  Parker,  737;  Reis,  208 
Landsat  related  study,  bilateral 
grant  agreement  with  African 
Development  Bank,  216 
Surveys    of    earth    resources, 

agreement  with  Brazil,  216 
Tracking  and  telemetry  facility  on 
island  of  Mahe,  agreement 
with  Seychelles,  188 
U.S.  cooperative  programs  and  ac- 
tivities: Bennett,  668;  Reis,  207 
Saudi  Arabia: 
Influence  on  oil  prices:  Atherton, 
476;  Habib,  449;  Kissinger,  369 
Technical  cooperation  in  manpower 
training  and  development,  proj- 
ect agreement  with  U.S.,  148 
U.S.    military    sales,    proposed: 
Atherton,  475;  Habib,  448;  Kis- 
singer, 549 
U.S.  relations  (Kissinger),  173 
U.S.  visit  of  Prince  Abdallah  (Kis- 
singer), 172 
Savitch,  Jessica,  363,  366 
Scelsi,  Michael  N.,  673 
Schaufele,  William  E.:  300,  341;  Ford, 
385;  Kissinger,  167,  349,  360,  381, 
383,  384,  577 
Schieffer,  Bob,  606 
Schiff,  Stanley  D.,  461 
Schlesinger,  James  R.  (Kissinger), 
415,  580 


Schmidt,  Helmut,  visit  to  U.S.:  245, 
246,  382;  program,  PR  343,  7/9, 
PR  .343-A,  7/12 
Science  and  technology: 
Cooperation  in,  bilateral  agreement 

with  Korea,  744 
Latin  American  needs  and  U.S.  pro- 
posals (Kissinger),  6,  9,  17,  43, 
728 
Science  and  technology  museums, 
visit  of  overseas  professionals, 
PR  497,  10/6 
Technical  and  feasibility  study, 
grant  agreement  with  Egypt, 
216,  723 
Technical  consultations  and  train- 
ing, bilateral  agreements  with: 
Portugal,  495;  Romania,  744 
Technical  cooperation: 
Iran-U.S.;  315,  316;  Ansary,  308 
Saudi  Arabia-U.S.  agreement, 
148 
Transatlantic   balloon   program, 
memorandum  of  understanding, 
407 
U.N.  Conference,  1979:  Kissinger, 
9,      505;      McGovern,      592; 
Reinhardt,  662 
UNCTAD  conference  resolutions  on 
transfer  of  technology,   U.S.- 
Group    B   statements,    texts 
(Boeker),  137 
U.S. -Egypt  Joint  Working  Group  on 
Technology,  Research  and  De- 
velopment, fifth  meeting,  joint 
statement,  754 
U.S.-Me.xico  Science  and  Technol- 
ogy Commission,  second  meet- 
ing, joint  statement,  375 
U.S.  national  meeting,  1977:  Kis- 
singer,    725;     Parker,     736; 
Stever,  730;  PR  549,  11/9 
U.S.  research  and  development 
program  (Stever),  733 
Scranton,  William  W.  (Kissinger),  167 
Statements  and  correspondence; 
Angola,  U.N.  membership,  742 
ECOSOC  meeting,  statement  on 
relations   with   developing 
countries,  201 
Human  rights,  U.N.  role,  745 
Israeli  rescue  of  hijacking  victims 
from  Entebbe  airport,  U.S. 
position,  181 
Lebanon  relief  programs,  U.S.  re- 
sponse, 699 
Namibia,  Security  Council  resolu- 
tion condemning  South  Afri- 
can actions,  U.S.  veto,  593 
UNRWA,  U.S.  1976  pledge  com- 
pleted, 338 
Vietnam,  U.S.  veto  of  U.N.  mem- 
bership, 740,  741 
World  Health  Assembly  action  on 
health  care  in  Israeli-occupied 
territories,  37 


781 


Scranton,  William  W.— Continued 
Statements — Continued 
Zambia,  South  African  incursion, 
U.S.  position,  282 
U.S.  representative  to  General  As- 
sembly, confirmation,  510 
Seabed  disarmament,  treaty  (1971), 

Singapore,  407 
Security  (Kissinger),  107,  152,  318 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States,  19i9,  volume  I,  Na- 
tional Security  Affairs,  Foreign 
Econotnic  Policy,  released,  652 
Security  Assistance  and  Arms  Ex- 
port Control  Act  of  1976,  signa- 
ture (Ford),  198 
Security  Council,  U.N.: 
Consensus  statement  on  occupied 
Arab  territories:  Kissinger, 
693,  706;  Sherer,  692;  text  of 
statement,  693 
Resolutions,  draft: 
Hijacking  of  French  aircraft  de- 
plored, 186 
Israeli  rescue  of  hijacking  victims 
from  Entebbe  airport  con- 
demned, 186 
Palestinian  rights,  144 

U.S.  veto,  144h 
South  Africa  failure  to  act  in 
Namibia,  condemnation,  594 
Resolutions,  texts: 
Aegean   Sea  dispute   between 

Greece  and  Turkey,  374 
South  Africa,  killings  and  violence 
against  African  people  con- 
demned, 60 
UNFICYP,  six-month  extension, 

64 
Zambia,  incursion  by  South  Africa 
condemned,  283 
U.S.  summary  of  blocking  of  unac- 
ceptable    Security     Council 
measures:  695;  Kissinger,  706 
Seelye,  Talcott,  dSn 
Seychelles: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  188, 

596,  650,  651,  743 
U.N.  membership  (Scranton),  201 
Sherer,  Albert  W.,  Jr.,  59,  63,  99,  143, 

510,  647,  692,  756k 
Shlaudeman,  Harry  W. ,  sworn  in  as 
Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for 
Inter-American  Affairs,  PR  318, 
6/22 
Sierra  Leone,  treaties,  agreements, 

etc.,  103,  256,  571,  759 
Sima,  Ibrahima,  739 
Simon,  William  E.,  119,  133,  403 
Singapore:  Hummel,  474;  Robinson, 
288 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  407,  439 
Sino-Soviet  relations:  Hummel,  475; 
Kissinger,  417,  608,  641,  711 


782 


Slave  trade  and  slavery,  suppression: 

Convention  (1926):  Bahamas,  70; 

Barbados,  495 

Protocol      amending      (1953): 

Bahamas,  70;  Barbados,  572; 

Spain,  700 

Supplementary  convention  (1956), 

Bahamas,  70 
White   slave   traffic,   agreement 
(1904),   and  protocol  (1910), 
Bahamas,  71 
Smith,  Robert  P.,  sworn  in  as  Ambas- 
sador to  Ghana,  PR  548,  11/8 
Soames,  Sir  Christopher,  remarks  on 
EEC-U.S.  relations,  PR  590,  12/8 
Somalia: 
Ethiopia,  relations  (Schaufele),  300 
U.S.  relations  (Schaufele),  301 
Sommer,  Theo,  124 
South  Africa  (see  also  Namibia): 
Antarctic  treaty  (1959),  recommen- 
dations re  furtherance  of  princi- 
ples and  objectives,  347 
Apartheid:  284;  Kaunda,  PR  443, 
9/16;  Kissinger,  94,  261,  325, 
352,  358,  360,  365,  501,  566 
(quoted);  Mwale,  PR  439,  9/16; 
Rogers,  535;  Scranton,  202; 
Sherer,  59;  Sullivan,  362 
Security  Council  resolution,  text, 
60 
Currency  devaluation,  question  of 

(Kissinger),  412 
Human  rights:  Bolen,  617;  Kis- 
singer, 354;  Sherer,  59 
Incursion  into  Zambia:  Scranton, 
282;  Security  Council  resolu- 
tion, text,  283 
Not  colonial  entity:  Kissinger,  261, 

325,  358,  365;  Rogers,  536 
Political,    economic    and    social 
change,  need  for:  (Kissinger), 
366,  516,  530,  544,  599,  PR  323, 
6/23,  PR  443,  9/16,  PR  469,  9/23 
Prime  Minister  Vorster,  meetings 
with  Secretary  Kissinger:  Kis- 
singer, 93,  95,   121,   127,  260, 
349,  358,  377,  400,  514,  PR 
312-A,  6/20,  PR  323,  6/23,  PR 
325,  6/23,  PR  411,  9/3,  PR  415, 
9/5,  PR  417,  9/2:  Rogers,  536 
Racial  clashes:  Bolen,  616;  Kis- 
singer, 261,  325,  352 
Republic  of  Transkei,  U.S.  non- 
recognition  (Kissinger),  642 
U.S.  interests  (Rogers),  534 
U.S.  investment  (Bolen),  620 
U.S.  private  arms  sales,  alleged 

(Kissinger),  642 
Visit  of  Secretary  Kissinger  (Kis- 
singer), 379,  519 

Soviet  Union  (see  also  Strategic  arms 
limitation  talks): 
ABM  .systems,  limitation  of,  pro- 
tocol (1974),  148 


Soviet  Union — Continued 

Chemical  weapons  prohibition, 
U.S. -Soviet  consultations,  423 

Economy  (Kissinger),  78 

Fisheries  agreement  with  U.S., 
joint  statement,  743 

Human  rights  (Scranton),  747 

Ideological  and  geopolitical  chal- 
lenge: Genscher,  PR  598,  12/10; 
Kissinger,  29,  111,  153 

Jewish  emigration  (Kissinger),  242, 
603,  608 

Kama  River  Truck  Complex,  bilat- 
eral agreement  re  establish- 
ment of  Temporary  Purchasing 
Commission,  540 

Latin  America  relations  (Luers),  56 

Military  aid  (Kissinger),  549,  550 

Southeast  Asia,  influence  (Hum- 
mel), 470 

Soviet  pilot  in  Japan,  question  of 
U.S.  asylum  (Kissinger),  PR 
419,  9/7 

Superpower  status  (Kissinger),  108, 
159 

Threshold  test  ban  treaty,  and 
peaceful  nuclear  explosions  trea- 
ty, U.S.  ratification  urged 
(Ford),  269 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  70,  148, 

407,  438,  540,  572,  627,  743,  744 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Toon),  PR  588, 

12/8 
U.S.  credits  and  grain  sales  (Kis- 
singer), 241 
U.S.  Embassy,  Soviet  microwave 
signals  and  question  of  amount 
of  radiation  (Kissinger),  168, 
170 
U.S.  relations  (Kissinger),  158,  350, 
PR  514,  10/15 
Coexistence  (Kissinger),  499 
Containment  (Kissinger),  125 
Detente  (Kissinger),  109,  129,  PR 

514,  10/15 
Dual  nature:  Kissinger,  151,  218, 
553;  Lord,  681 
U.S.  strategic  balance  (Kissinger), 

159,  258 
U.S.  trade  (Kissinger),  553 
As  bargaining  weapon,  question 
of  (Kissinger),  229,  553 
Spaak-Davis,  Antoinette,  708 
Spain: 
Cotton   textile   agreement   with 
Spain,    termination,   text  of 
notes,  PR  565,  11/22 
Friendship  and  cooperation  treaty 
with  U.S.,  current  actions,  72, 

408,  467,  572 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  71,  256, 
284,  304,  408,  438,  467,  539,  572, 
675,  700,  723 

U.S. -Spanish  Council,  inaugural 
session,  joint  communique,  563 
Sprague,  Mansfield,  581 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Sn  Lanka: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  596,  675 
r.S.  Ambassador  (Reed),  PR  308, 
6/18 
State  Department: 
Advisory  committees,  summary  re- 
ports of  closed  meetings,  avail- 
ability, 200 
Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for 
East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs 
(Hummel),  PR  346,  7/12 
Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for 
Economic  and  Business  Affairs 
(Katz),  PR  460,  9/23 
Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for 
Inter-American  Affairs 

(Shlaudeman),  PR  318,  6/22 
Dean  Acheson  Auditorium,  dedica- 
tion: Acheson,  Mrs.  Dean,  PR 
531,  10/27:  Kissinger,  PR  530, 
10/26 
International  Labor  Organization 
Affairs,  Agency  Directorate 
for,  establishment,  PR  347,  7/12 
International  Women's  Program, 
Agency  Directorate  for,  estab- 
lishment, PR  324,  6/23 
Jefferson  portrait,  gift  of  Canada 
Life  Assurance  Company,  PR 
521,  10/18 
Loy  Henderson  International  Con- 
ference Room,  dedication:  Hen- 
derson, PR  531,  10/27;  Kis- 
singer, PR  530,  10/26 
Publications.  See  under  Publica- 
tions 
Recommendations  by  junior  officials 

(Kissinger),  169 
Recruitment  of  blacks  (Kissinger), 

360 
Secretary      of     State-designate 

(Vance):  Kissinger,  749 
Under  Secretary  for  Economic  Af- 
fairs (Rogers),  PR  309,  6/18 
Under  Secretary  of  State  for  Politi- 
cal Affairs  (Habib),  PR  338,  7/1 
Stearns,  Monteagle,  sworn  in  as  Am- 
bassador to  Ivory  Coast,  PR  508, 
10/13 
Sterling,  Donald,  232 
Stever,  H.  Guyford,  729 
Stoessel,  Walter  J.,  Jr.,  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany,  PR  494,  9/5 
Stone,  C.  Sumner,  363,  365 
Strategic  arms  limitation  talks:  290; 
Ford,  162;  Kissinger,  110,  153, 
350,  499 
SALT  Two: 
Backfire  and  cruise  missile  issues 

(Kissinger),  169,  324 
Progress,  question  of:  Ford,  345; 
Kissinger,  169,  228,  324,  605, 
646,  710 
U.S.  national  interests  (Kissinger), 
130 


Stroud,  Joseph,  541 

Sudan,  U.S.  relations  (Schaufele),  303 

Sullivan,  Leon  H.:  358,362;  Kissinger, 

368 
Surinam,  treaties,  agreements,  etc., 

147,  256,  572,  596,  743,  744,  759 
Swaziland; 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  38,  439 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Norland),  PR 
569,  11/24 
Sweden: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  38,  284, 

304,438 
U.S.  relations  (Kissinger),  45 
Switzerland,  treaties,  agreements, 
etc.,  39,  72,  188,  256,  304,  438, 
495,  627,  723 
Syria,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  40, 
216,  439,  540,  675 


Taiwan.  See  China:  Republic  of 
Talboys,  B.E.,289 
Tanzania; 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  ;38,  40, 

70,  148,  539 
Visit  of  Secretary  Kissinger  (Kis- 
singer), 511 
Tariffs  and  trade,  general  agreement 
on: 
Accession  of  Japan,  protocol  (1955), 

Austria,  744 
Accessions,  provisional: 
Colombia,    declaration:    Chile, 
Egypt,  Nicaragua,  Poland,  70 
Tunisia,  declaration,   Romania, 
723 
Tenth  proces-verbal:  Egypt,  70; 
Finland,  723;  India,  Poland, 
70;  Romania,  723 
Provisional  application,  protocol 
(1947):  Angola,  Cape  Verde, 
Guinea-Bissau,  Mozambique, 
Sao  Tome  and  Principe,  439 
Technology.  See  Science  and  technol- 
ogy 
Telecommunications: 

Frequency  modulation  broadcast- 
ing in  88  to  108  MHz  band, 
agreement  with  Mexico,  572 
International  telecommunication 
convention  (1973):  Bangladesh, 
Madagascar,  70 
International  Telecommunications 
Union,  third-party  exchanges 
between  ITU  and  amateur  sta- 
tions under  U.S.  jurisdiction, 
special  arrangement,  147 
Licensed  amateur  radio  operations, 
reciprocal  granting  of  authori- 
zation to  operate  in  either  coun- 
try, agreement  with  Philip- 
pines, 700 
Radio  Ceylon  facilities,  agreement 
with  Sri  Lanka,  596 


Telecommunications — Continued 

Radio  communications  between 
amateur  stations  on  behalf  of 
third  parties,  agreement  with 
Swaziland,  439 

Radio  regulations,  Geneva,  1950, 
partial  revision  to  establish  new 
frequency  allotment  plan  for 
high-frequency  radiotelephone 
coast  stations  (1974):  Iraq,  70; 
Ireland,  759;  Kenya,  147;  New 
Zealand,  284;  Tanzania,  70; 
U.S.,  147 

Telegraph  regulations  (1973)  and 
telephone  regulations  (1973): 
Byelorussian  S.S.R.,  376;  U.S., 
147 

U.S. -Canada  border  television  dis- 
cussions, PR  499,  9/7 

U.S.  Citizens  Band  (CB)  equipment, 

operation  in  Mexico,  PR  418,  9/7 

Tennyson,  Alfred  Lord  (quoted),  677 

Terrorism:  Brown,  453;  Kissinger,  2, 

4,  235,  368,  400,  453  (quoted),  508; 

Picker,  757 

Diplomats,  protection  of,  conven- 
tion (1973):  Ford,  554 
Current  actions:  German  Demo- 
cratic Republic,  Philippines, 
759 
U.S.  ratification,  572,  627 

International  convention  in  hijack- 
ing, need  for:  Kissinger,  158, 
236,  369,  400;  Scranton,  183 

Iran  (Atherton),  433 

Israeli  rescue  of  hostages  in  En- 
tebbe airport,  U.S.  position: 
Bennett,  185;  Ford,  161;  Kis- 
singer, 158,  1(54,  166;  Scranton, 
181 
U.S.  role,  question  of,  237 

Lebanon,  murders  of  U.S.  embassy 
officials:  Ford,  98,  554;  Kis- 
singer, 98 

Mexican  terrorist  organizations 
(Luers),  53 

Prevention  and  punishment,  con- 
vention (1971):  Canada,  331; 
Dominican  Republic,  187;  U.S., 
572,  596,  723 
U.S.  ratification  (Ford),  554 

Terrorist  attack  on  Istanbul  Airport 
(Brown),  293 
Textiles: 

Cotton,  wool,  and  man-made  fiber 
textiles,  trade  in,  bilateral 
agreement  with  Haiti,  467;  text, 
PR  470,  9/23 

Cotton  textiles,  termination  of 
bilateral  agreements:  El  Sal- 
vador, 407;  Spain,  PR  565, 11/22 

International  Cotton  Institute,  arti- 
cles of  agreement  (1966),  Iran, 
699 


I  Index,  July  5-December  27,  1 976 


783 


Textiles— Continued 

International    trade    in,    arrange- 
ment     (1973);       Guatemala. 
Paraguay,  Uruguay,  39 
Market  description  from  exports  of 
textiles  or  textile  products, 
agreement  with  Spain  on  con- 
sultations, 675 
Thailand:   Hummel,  471,  473;  Kis- 
singer, 228,  578;  Robinson,  288 
Drug  control  programs  and  U.S. 

assistance  (Robinson),  491 
Sericulture  technology  and  im- 
proved seed  development  pro- 
gram, agreements  with  U.S. 
596 
Thornton,  William,  painter  of  portrait 
of  Thomas  Jefferson,  PR  521, 
10/18 
Tin  agreement  (Kissinger),  7,  22 
Current  actions:  Austraha,  70,  304, 
675;  Belgium,  70,  304;  Bolivia, 
Bulgaria,  304;  Canada,   147; 
Council    of   European    Com- 
munities, 304;  Czechoslovakia, 
70,  304;  Denmark,  147,  304,  347; 
France,  304;  Germany,  Federal 
Republic  of,  304,  675;  Hungary, 
38;  India,  256;  Indonesia,  304. 
347;  Ireland,  70.  304;  Japan, 
103;  Luxembourg,  Netherlands, 
70,  304;  Nigeria,  70,  304,  347; 
Poland,   304;   Romania,   439; 
Soviet  Union,  70;  Turkey,  304; 
U.K.,  147;  U.S.,  103,  439,  539, 
651;  Yugoslavia,  70,  304 
Provisional  entry  into  force,  147 
U.S.  ratification  urged:  Ford,  179; 
Greenwald,  276 
Tobias,  Herbert  V.,  Jr.,  commenda- 
tion for  basketball  tour  in  Africa, 
PR  396,  8/25 
Togo: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  330, 

571,674,  699 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Palmer),  PR  478, 
9/28 
Tolbert,  William  R.,  481;  program  for 

U.S.  visit,  PR  444,  9/17 
Tonnage  measurement  of  ships,  in- 
ternational convention  (1969): 
Algeria,  651;  Bahamas,  331;  Col- 
ombia,    256;     Poland,     331; 
Romania,  103 
Toon,  Malcolm,  sworn  in  as  Ambas- 
sador to  Soviet  Union,  PR  588, 
12/8 
Tourism,  World  Tourism  Organiza- 
tion, statutes  (1970):  Algeria, 
Czechoslovakia,  Hungary, 

Netherlands,  103;  U.S.,  284 
Trade:  122;  Katz,  483;  Kissinger,  75 
Generalized  system  of  preferences, 
UNCTAD  conference  resolu- 
tion on  manufacture  and  semi- 
manufacture,  U.S.  position 
(Boeker),  137 


Trade — Continued 
Multilateral  trade  negotiations;  123, 
293;  Boeker,  135;  Bolen,  621; 
Hummel,  583;  Katz,  486;  Kis- 
singer, 8,  75,  263,  356,  504; 
McGovern,  589;  Robinson,  287; 
Rogers,  654 
OAS  special  inter-American  com- 
mission for  trade  cooperation, 
proposed  (Kissinger),  9,  17 
Pacific  Basin  (Robinson),  286 
U.S.  (Rogers),  655 
Africa  (Bolen),  619 
As  economic  weapon,  question  of 

(Kissinger),  229,  553,  607 
Iran:  314;  Ansary,  307,  312;  Kis- 
singer, 309,  311 
Japan  (Hummel),  583 
Philippines  (Hummel),  474 
South  Africa  (Rogers),  534 
Southeast  Asia  (Hummel),  470 
Trade  Act  generalized  prefer- 
ences: Boeker,  137;  Bolen, 
621;    Kissinger.    34,    504; 
McGovern,  589;  Rogers,  654 
Removal  of  discriminatory  fea- 
tures,   proposed   amend- 
ments re: 
Ecuador  and  Venezuela  (Kis- 
singer), 6,  8 
Iran:  315;  Kissinger,  313 
Jackson-Vanik  amendment 
(Rogers),  6.59 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.: 

Current  actions,  38,  69,   103,   146, 
187,  216,  256,  284,  303,  329,  347, 
376,  407,  438,  466,  495,  539,  571, 
596,  627,  650,  674,  699,  723,  743, 
759 
Treaties  and  Other  International 
Agreements  of  the  United  States 
of  America  1776-19^9,  General 
Index,  released,  40 
Trinidad  and  Tobago,  treaties,  agree- 
ments, etc.,  38,  147,438 
Tunisia: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  39,  40, 

147,  284 
U.S. -Tunisian  Joint  Commission, 
meeting:    Chatty,    612;    Kis- 
singer, 611;  text  of  joint  com- 
munique, 613 
Turkey: 
Defense  cooperation  agreement 
with     U.S.,     appropriations 
urged:  Ford,  60;  Habib,  424 
Greece,  relations:  Caglayangil,  PR 
596,  12/10;  Habib,  426;  Kis- 
singer, 323,  327,  703,  PR  596, 
12/10 
Terrorist  attack  at  Istanbul  Airport 

(Brown),  293 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  103, 
188,  304,  495 


Ubalijoro,  Bonaventure,  713 
Uganda: 
Israeli  rescue  of  hostages,  U.S.  po- 
sition: 695;  Bennett,  185;  Ford, 
160,  161,   162;  Kissinger,  158, 
164,  166;  Scranton,  181 
Security  Council  draft  resolu- 
tions, texts,  186 
U.S.  role,  question  of,  237 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  304, 
572,  723 
Ukrainian  Soviet  Socialist  Republic, 
treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  347, 
438,  466 
UNFICYP.  See  under  Cyprus 
United  Arab  Emirates,  U.S.  Ambas- 
sador (Dickman),  PR  486,  8/30 
United  Kingdom: 
British  pound,  question  of  (Simon), 

121 
Civil  aviation  dispute  with  U.S.  re 
winter  season  traffic,  resolu- 
tion, PR  511,  10/14 
IMF  standby  agreement,  proposed: 

Ford,  660;  Rogers,  656,  751 
Income  tax  convention  with  U.S., 

ratification  urged  (Ford),  145 
Passenger  charter  air  services,  un- 
derstanding with   U.S.,   an- 
nouncement, 37 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  39,  72, 
147,  330,  347,  376,  438,  439,  467, 
627,  724 
U.S.  visit  of  Queen  Elizabeth  II: 
Queen  Elizabeth  II,  197;  Ford, 
196;  program,  PR  335,  6/28 
United  Nations: 
Accomplishments,  problems,  and 
role:  Ford,  538;  Kissinger,  159, 
230,    497;    Lewis,    189,    714; 
McGovern,  587;  Scranton,  745 
Charter,  amendments  to  articles  61 

and  109,  Cuba,  331 
Documents,  list,  210 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States,  19Jt8,  volume  I,  General; 
The  United  Nations,  released, 
348 
Liberation  movements'  appearance, 
U.S.  procedural  position  (Kis- 
singer), 709 
Membership.  Lewis,  189;  Scranton, 
201 
Angola:  Sherer,  99;  Kissinger,  401 
U.S.  abstention  (Scranton),  742 
Seychelles:  596;  Scranton,  201 
Vietnam,  question  of:  Hummel, 
472;  Kissinger,  400,  413,  573 
U.S.  veto  (Scranton),  740,  741 
POW's  and  MIA's,  role  in  account- 
ing for  (Habib),  253 
U.S.   1975  participation,  report, 
transmittal  (Ford),  537 


784 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


I  iiited  Nations — Continued 

U.S.  role  and  influence  (Lewis),  189 
United    Nations    Children's    Fund 
(McGovern),  590 
U.S.  1977  pledge  (Scelsi),  673 
United  Nations  Committee  on  Peace- 
ful Uses  of  Outer  Space:  Bennett, 
668;  Reis,  206 
United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade 
and  Development,  fourth  confer- 
ence: Greenwald,  272;  Kissinger, 
6;  Scranton,  202 
Consensus  on  commodities,  U.S.  po- 
sition: 133-134:  Katz,  486:  Kis- 
singer, 90 
U.S.  summary  (Boeker),  135 
Economic  cooperation,  resolution, 

U.S.  position  (Boeker),  136 
Integrated  program  of  (Greenwald), 

296 
Joint  statement  by  Secretary  Kis- 
singer and  Treasury  Secretary 
Simon,  133 
Preparatory    meetings    on    com- 
modities:  138;   Boeker,    135; 
McGovern,  589 
U.S. -Group  B  statements  on  resolu- 
tions on  transfer  of  technology: 
Boeker,  137;  Kissinger,  728 
U.S.  proposals:  Greenwald,  297: 

Kissinger,  504 
U.S.  statement  of  reservations,  ex- 
planations, and  interpretations 
(Boeker),  134 
United  Nations  Day,  1976,  proclama- 
tion: Ford,  510;  Kissinger,  614 
United  Nations  Development  Pro- 
gram, U.S.  pledge:  McGovern, 
589;  Myerson,  722 
United  Nations  Economic  and  Social 
Commission   for  Asia   and   the 
Pacific  (Robinson).  288 
United  Nations  Emergency  Force. 

See  under  Arab-Israeli  conflict 
United  Nations  Environment  Program 

(McGovern),  590 
United  Nations  Fund  for  Drug  Abuse 

Control  (Robinson),  492 
United  Nations  High  Commissioner 

for  Refugees  (Picker),  756 
United  Nations  Natural  Resources 
Fund,  U.S.  pledge  (Myerson),  722 
United  Nations  Peacekeeping  Force  in 

Cyprus,  63,  64,  623 
United  Nations  Relief  and  Works 
Agency  for  Palestine  Refugees  in 
the  Near  East:  Bailey,  755;  Scran- 
ton, ISA:  Sherer,  144 
U.S.  1976  pledge  completed:  15Gn; 
Scranton,  338 
United  Nations  Revolving  Fund  for 
Natural  Resources  Exploration 
(McGovern),  590 
United  Nations  Trust  Fund  for  Africa, 
U.N. -U.S.  basic  agreement,  304 


»lndex,  July  S-December  27,  1976 


Uruguay: 
International  trade  in  textiles,  ar- 
rangement (1973),  39 
U.S.  MAAG's  terminated.  .336 


Vaky,  Viron  P.,  sworn  in  as  Ambas- 
sador to  Venezuela,  PR  341,  7/7 
Valeriani,  Richard,  exchange  of  re- 
marks with  Secretary  Kissinger, 
528,  PR  315,  6/22 
Van  der  Stoel,  Max,  remarks  following 
meeting   with    Secretary   Kis- 
singer, 322,  PR  593,  12/9 
Vance,  Cyrus  (Kissinger),  749,  PR 
586,  12/6,  PR  596,  12/10,  PR  598, 
12/10 
Meetings  with  Secretary  Kissinger 
(Kissinger),  PR  586,   12/6,  PR 
587,  12/7,  PR  597,  12/10 
Varela,  Raul  Querido,  231 
Vatican  City  State,  treaties,  agree- 
ments, etc.,  495 
Venezuela: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  304, 

628,  723 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Vaky),  PR  341, 

7/7 
U.S.  Trade  Act,  proposed  amend- 
ment (Kissinger),  6,  8 
Vietnam  (Kissinger).  219 
MIA's,  failure  to  account  for  and  ef- 
fect on  U.S.   relations:  Ford, 
418;  Habib,  250;  Hummel,  472; 
Kissinger,  30,  224,  413,  548, 
573;  Scranton,  740,  741 
Relations  with  Southeast  Asian 

states  (Hummel),  472 
U.N.   membership,   question  of: 
Hummel,  472;  Kissinger,  400, 
413,  573 
U.S.  veto  (Scranton),  740,  741 
Vietnam  war: 
Personal  feelings  at  end  of  (Kis- 
singer), 128,  129 
Results  for  U.S.:  Kissinger,  124, 
225,  228,  550;  McCloskey,  139 
Voice  of  Amarica,  Japanese  employees 
of  the  Okinawa  Office,  agreement 
re  enrollment  in  Employment  In- 
surance Scheme  of  Japan,  627 
Vorster,  Balthazar  Johannes.  See 

under  South  Africa 
Vunibobo,  Berenado,  713 

W 

Waldheim,  Kurt:  399;  Kissinger,  PR 
484,  9/29,  PR  504,  10/8 

Walentynowicz,  Leonard  F.,  214 

Wall,  Patrick,  708 

Walters,  Barbara,  interview  with  Sec- 
retary Kissinger,  PR  514,  10/15 

Waring,  Robert  0.:  Ford,  98,  99,  554: 
Habib,  PR  313,  6/21;  Kissinger, 
98,  PR  310,  6/19 


Water  supplies  from  surface  runoff, 
technical  assistance  agreement 
with  Abu  Dhabi,  347 
Watergate  (Kissinger),  124,  128,  129, 

371 
Wells,  Melisa  F.,  sworn  in  as  Ambas- 
sador to  Cape  Verde  and  Guinea- 
Bissau,  PR  513,  10/15 
Whaling.  See  under  Fish  and  fisheries 
Wheat: 
Food  aid  convention: 
Protocol  (1975)  modifying  and  ex- 
tending, Ireland,  70 
Protocol  (1976)  modifying  and  ex- 
tending: Australia,  Belgium, 
Canada,  Denmark,  European 
Economic  Community,  Fin- 
land, France,  39;  German 
Democratic  Republic,  539; 
Germany,  Federal  Republic 
of,  39;  Ireland,  39,  407;  Italy, 
Japan,  Luxembourg,  Nether- 
lands, 39;  Switzerland,  495; 
U.K.,  39,  467;  U.S.,  39,  347 
Wheat  trade  convention: 

Protocol  (1975)  modifying  and  ex- 
tending: Austria,  39;  Ireland, 
70;  Syria,  216 
Protocol  (1976)  extending  U.S. 
ratification  urged  (Green- 
wald), 279 
Protocol  (1976)  modifying  and  ex- 
tending: Algeria,  256;  Austra- 
lia, 39;  Barbados,  256;  Bel- 
gium, 39;  Brazil,  744;  Canada, 
39;  Costa  Rica,  70;  Denmark, 
39;  Dominican  Republic,  187; 
Ecuador,  39;  El  Salvador, 
744;  Egypt,  39,  723;  European 
Economic  Community,  Fin- 
land,  France,  39;  Germany, 
Federal  Republic  of,  39,  539; 
Greece,  39;  Guatemala,  70; 
Iraq,  723;  Ireland,  39,  407; 
Italy,  Japan,  39;  Kenya,  39, 
495;    Korea,    Republic    of, 
Luxembourg,   Netherlands, 
39;  Nigeria,   439;   Norway, 
39,      147;      Pakistan,     39; 
Panama,  331;  Peru,  104,  256; 
Switzerland,  39,  495;  Syria, 
439;  Trinidad  and  Tobago, 
147;  Tunisia,  39;  U.K.,  39, 
467;  U.S.,  39,  347 
White,  E.B.  (quoted),  680 
Wilkins,  Roy  (Kissinger),  .349 
Williams,  Alan  Lee,  709 
Winthrop,  John  (quoted),  677 
Wiretapping  (Kissinger),  644 
Women: 
Department  of  State  Agency  Direc- 
torate      for       International 
Women's  Programs,  PR  324, 
6/23 


785 


Women — Continued 

International  Women's  Year:  Ford, 

537;  Lewis,  195 
Political  rights,  convention  (1953): 
Luxembourg,  675;  Morocco,  744 
Political  rights,   inter-American 

convention  (1948),  U.S.,  376 
Women  leaders  study /tour  of  U.S., 
PR  414,  9/7 
World  change:  Lord,  678;  Robinson, 

441 
World  Intellectual  Property  Organiza- 
tion, 187,  376,  743 
Convention  (1967):  Bahamas,  651; 
Libya,  Mauritania,  Mauritius, 
187;  Qatar,  70 
Income  tax  reimbursement  agree- 
ment with  U.S.,  652 
World  Meteorological  Organization: 
Convention  (1947):  Sao  Tome  and 

Principe,  743;  Surinam,  256 
Income  tax  reimbursement  agree- 
ment with  U.S.,  724 
World  order  (Kissinger),  107,  154, 

224,  258,  497,  542,  599,  725 
World  peace:  Kissinger,  31,  218,  318, 
363,  541,  600;  Lord,  680 


World  problems  (Kissinger),  1,  21,  31, 
131,  150,  259,  615 

World  Weather  Program  (Ford),  624 

Wortman,  Sterling,  chairman  of  sec- 
ond panel  of  National  Meeting  on 
Science,  Technology  and  De- 
velopment, PR  549,  11/9 

Wounded  and  sick,  armed  forces, 
Geneva  convention  (1929),  Papua 
New  Guinea,  187 

Wounded  and  sick,  and  shipwrecked  in 
armed  forces,  Geneva  conventions 
(1949):  Papua  New  Guinea,  Sao 
Tome  and  Principe,  187;  Surinam, 
744 

Wright,  Andre  J.,  713 


Yemen  Arab  Republic; 
Ambassador  to  U.S.,  credentials,  13 
Vienna  convention  of  diplomatic  re- 
lations (1961),  accession,  743 

Yugoslavia: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  70,  216, 
304,  330,  438,  539 


Yugoslavia — Continued 

U.S.  security  interests  (Kissinger), 
606,  609,  643 


Zain  Azraai,  Bin  Zainal  Abidin,  132 
Zaire  (Rolen),  618,  619,  620 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  103, 
216,  304,  329,  347,  407,  539,  724 
U.S.  military  aid  (Kissinger),  264 
Visit  of  Secretary  Kissinger  (Kis- 
singer), 519,  PR  453,  9/22 
Zakarian,  John,  541 
Zambia  (Bolen),  618,  619,  620 
Agricultural  commodities,  sales  of, 

agreement  with  U.S.,  408 
South  African  incursion:  Scranton, 
282;  Security  Council  resolu- 
tion, text,  283 
U.S.  aid  (McGovem),  590 
U.S.  Ambassador  (Low),  PR  391, 

8/20 
Visits  of  Secretary  Kissinger  (Kis- 
singer), 517,  PR  439,  9/16,  PR 
450,  9/20,  PR  451,  9/21 
Zimbabwe.  See  Rhodesia 
Zumwalt,  Elmo  R.  (Kissinger),  243, 
551 


786 


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THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 

BULLETIN 


Volume  LXXV 


No.  1932         •        July  5,  1976 


SECRETARY  KISSINGER  ATTENDS  OAS  GENERAL  ASSEMBLY  AT  SANTIAGO 
Statements  and  U.S.-Panama  Report      1 

SECRETARY  KISSINGER  VISITS  FOUR  LATIN  AMERICAN  COUNTRIES 
Remarks,  News  Conferences,  and  Joint  Communiques      IJf 


THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 

For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE  BULLETIN 


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Note:  Contents  of  this  publication  are  not 
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appreciated.  The  BULLETIN  is  indexed  In 
the    Readers'    Guide   to   Periodical    Literature. 


Vol.   LXXV,  No.   1932 
July  5,  1976 

The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN 
a    weekly   publication   issued   by  th 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau  t 
Public  Affairs,  provides  tfie  public  an 
interested  agencies  of  ttie  governma 
witfi  information  on  developments  i 
tfte  field  of  UJS.  foreign  relations  m 
on  tfte  work  of  tfie  Department  m 
tfie  Foreign  Service. 
Tfte     BULLETIN     includes     select* 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy,  issm 
by  tfte  Wltite  House  and  tlte  Depar 
ment,     and     statements,     addressti 
and  news  conferences  of  the  Preside* 
and  the  Secretary  of  State  and  othi 
officers  of  the  Department,  as  well  i 
special  articles  on  various  phases 
international  affairs  and  the  functio, 
of    the   Department.    Information 
included  concerning  treaties  and  inte* 
national    agreements    to    which    iH 
United  States   is   or  may  become 
party  and  on  treaties  of  general  intt< 
national  interest. 
Publications    of    the    Department 
State,  United  Nations  documents,  m 
legislative    material   in    the   field 
international  relations  are  also  UaU 


Secretary  Kissinger  Attends  OAS  General  Assembly  at  Santiago 


The  sixth  regular  General  Assembly  of  the 
Organization  of  American  States  met  at 
Santiago,  Chile,  June  i-18.  Secretary  Kissin- 
ger headed  the  U.S.  delegation  June  7-9. 
Folloiving  are  statements  made  before  the 
Assembly  by  Secretary  Kissinger  on  June  8 
md  9  and  his  statement  circulated  by  the 
U.S.  delegation  on  June  11,  together  tvith  the 
'ext  of  a  joint  report  presented  to  the  As- 
iembly  by  the  United  States  and  Panama  on 
June  9. 

STATEMENT  BY  SECRETARY-  KISSINGER,  JUNE  8, 
3N  HUMAN  RIGHTS 

>ress   itleast   293  dated  June  8 

One  of  the  most  compelling  issues  of  our 
;ime,  and  one  which  calls  for  the  concerted 
iction  of  all  responsible  peoples  and  nations, 
is  the  necessity  to  protect  and  extend  the 
fundamental  rights  of  humanity. 

The  precious  common  heritage  of  our 
Western  Hemisphere  is  the  conviction  that 
human  beings  are  the  subjects,  not  the 
abjects,  of  public  policy,  that  citizens  must 
not  become  mere  instruments  of  the  state. 

This  is  the  conviction  that  brought  mil- 
lions to  the  Americas.  It  inspired  our  peoples 
to  fight  for  their  independence.  It  is  the 
commitment  that  has  made  political  free- 
dom and  individual  dignity  the  constant  and 
cherished  ideal  of  the  Americas  and  the  envy 
Df  nations  elsewhere.  It  is  the  ultimate  proof 
that  our  countries  are  linked  by  more  than 
geography  and  the  impersonal  forces  of 
history. 

Respect  for  the  rights  of  man  is  written 
into  the  founding  documents  of  every  nation 
of  our  hemisphere.  It  has  long  been  part  of 
the  common  speech  and  daily  lives  of  our 


July  5,  1976 


citizens.  And  today,  more  than  ever,  the  suc- 
cessful advance  of  our  societies  requires  the 
full  and  free  dedication  of  the  talent,  energy, 
and  creative  thought  of  men  and  women  who 
are  free  from  fear  of  repression. 

The  modern  age  has  brought  undreamed- 
of benefits  to  mankind — in  medicine,  in  tech- 
nological advance,  and  in  human  communica- 
tion. But  it  has  spawned  plagues  as  well,  in 
the  form  of  new  tools  of  oppression,  as  well 
as  of  civil  strife.  In  an  era  characterized  by 
terrorism,  by  bitter  ideological  contention, 
by  weakened  bonds  of  social  cohesion,  and  by 
the  yearning  for  order  even  at  the  expense 
of  liberty,  the  result  all  too  often  has  been 
the  violation  of  fundamental  standards  of 
humane  conduct. 

The  obscene  and  atrocious  acts  system- 
atically employed  to  devalue,  debase,  and 
destroy  human  life  during  World  War  II 
vividly  and  ineradicably  impressed  the  re- 
sponsible peoples  of  the  world  with  the 
enormity  of  the  challenge  to  human  rights. 
It  was  precisely  to  end  such  abuses  and  to 
provide  moral  authority  in  international  af- 
fairs that  a  new  system  was  forged  after 
that  war — globally  in  the  United  Nations  and 
regionally  in  a  strengthened  inter-American 
system. 

The  shortcomings  of  our  efforts  in  an 
age  which  continues  to  be  scarred  by  forces 
of  intimidation,  terror,  and  brutality — 
fostered  sometimes  from  outside  national 
territories  and  sometimes  from  inside — have 
made  it  dramatically  clear  that  basic  human 
rights  must  be  preserved,  cherished,  and 
defended  if  peace  and  prosperity  are  to  be 
more  than  hollow  technical  achievements. 
For  technological  progress  without  social 
justice    mocks    humanity;    national    unity 


without  freedom  is  sterile;  nationalism 
without  a  consciousness  of  human  commu- 
nity— which  means  a  shared  concern  for 
human  rights — refines  instruments  of  op- 
pression. 

We  in  the  Americas  must  increase  our 
international  support  for  the  principles  of 
justice,  freedom,  and  human  dignity;  for 
the  organized  concern  of  the  community  of 
nations  remains  one  of  the  most  potent 
weapons  in  the  struggle  against  the  degrada- 
tion of  human  values. 

The   Human    Rights   Challenge   in   the   Americas 

The  ultimate  vitality  and  virtue  of  our 
societies  spring  from  the  instinctive  sense 
of  human  dignity  and  respect  for  the  rights 
of  others  that  have  long  distinguished  the 
immensely  varied  peoples  and  lands  of 
this  hemisphere.  The  genius  of  our  inter- 
American  heritage  is  based  on  the  funda- 
mental democratic  principles  of  human  and 
national  dignity,  justice,  popular  participa- 
tion, and  free  cooperation  among  different 
peoples  and  social  systems. 

The  observance  of  these  essential  princi- 
ples of  civility  cannot  be  taken  for  granted 
even  in  the  most  tranquil  of  times.  In  periods 
of  stress  and  uncertainty,  when  pressures  on 
established  authority  grow  and  nations  feel 
their  very  existence  is  tenuous,  the  practice 
of  human  rights  becomes  far  more  difficult. 

The  central  problem  of  government  has 
always  been  to  strike  a  just  and  effective 
balance  between  freedom  and  authority. 
When  freedom  degenerates  into  anarchy,  the 
human  personality  becomes  subject  to  arbi- 
trary, brutal,  and  capricious  forces.  When 
the  demand  for  order  overrides  all  other 
considerations,  man  becomes  a  means  and 
not  an  end,  a  tool  of  impersonal  machinery. 
Clearly,  some  forms  of  human  suffering  are 
intolerable  no  matter  what  pressures  nations 
may  face  or  feel.  Beyond  that,  all  societies 
have  an  obligation  to  enable  their  people  to 
fulfill  their  potentialities  and  live  a  life  of 
dignity  and  self-respect. 

As  we  address  this  challenge  in  practice, 
we   must   recognize   that   our   efforts   must 


engage  the  serious  commitment  of  our 
.societies.  As  a  source  of  dynamism,  strength,  ■ 
and  inspiration,  verbal  posturings  and  self- 
righteous  rhetoric  are  not  enough.  Human 
rights  are  the  very  essence  of  a  meaningful 
life,  and  human  dignity  is  the  ultimate  pur- 
pose of  government.  No  government  can  ig- 
nore terrorism  and  survive,  but  it  is  equally 
true  that  a  government  that  tramples  on  the 
rights  of  its  citizens  denies  the  purpose  of 
its  existence. 

In  recent  years  and  even  days,  our  news- 
papers have  carried  stories  of  kidnapings, 
ambushes,  bombings,  and  assassinations. 
Terrorism  and  the  denial  of  civility  have 
become  so  widespread,  political  subversions 
so  intertwined  with  official  and  unofficial 
abuse  and  so  confused  with  oppression  and 
base  criminality,  that  the  protection  of  indi-  I 
vidual  rights  and  the  preservation  of  human  j  -' 
dignity  have  become  sources  of  deep  concern 
and — worse — sometimes  of  demoralization 
and  indifference. 

No  country,  no  people — for  that  matter  no 
political  system — can  claim  a  perfect  record 
in  the  field  of  human  rights.  But  precisely 
because  our  societies  in  the  Americas  have 
been  dedicated  to  freedom  since  they 
emerged  from  the  colonial  era,  our  short- 
comings are  more  apparent  and  more  signifi- 
cant. And  let  us  face  facts.  Respect  for  the 
dignity  of  man  is  declining  in  too  many  coun- 
tries of  the  hemisphere.  There  are  several 
states  where  fundamental  standards  of  hu- 
mane behavior  are  not  observed.  All  of  us 
have  a  responsibility  in  this  regard,  for  the 
Americas  cannot  be  true  to  themselves  un- 
less they  rededicate  themselves  to  belief  in 
the  worth  of  the  individual  and  to  the  de- 
fense of  those  individual  rights  which  that 
concept  entails.  Our  nations  must  sustain 
both  a  common  commitment  to  the  human 
rights  of  individuals  and  practical  support 
for  the  institutions  and  procedures  necessary 
to  insure  those  rights.  j 

The  rights  of  man  have  been  authorita- 
tively identified  both  in  the  U.N.'s  Univer-  I 
sal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights  and  in  the  i 
OAS's  American  Declaration  of  the  Rights  i 
and   Duties   of  Man.  There  will,  of  course,  1 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


always  be  differences  of  view  as  to  the 
precise  extent  of  the  obligations  of  govern- 
jnent.  But  there  are  standards  below  which 
no  government  can  fall  without  offending 
fundamental  values,  such  as  genocide,  of- 
ficially tolerated  torture,  mass  imprisonment 
jr  murder,  or  the  comprehensive  denial  of 
oasic  rights  to  racial,  religious,  political,  or 
pthnic  groups.  Any  government  engaging  in 
such  practices  must  face  adverse  interna- 
■ional  judgment. 

The  international  community  has  created 
important  institutions  to  deal  with  the  chal- 
enge  of  human  rights.  We  hei'e  are  all  par- 
ticipants in  some  of  them:  the  United  Na- 
tions, the  International  Court  of  Justice,  the 
DAS,  and  the  two  Human  Rights  Commis- 
sions of  the  United  Nations  and  the  OAS.  In 
Europe,  an  even  more  developed  interna- 
:ional  institutional  structure  provides  other 
.iseful  precedents  for  our  effort. 

Pi'ocedures  alone  cannot  solve  the  prob- 
em;  but  they  can  keep  it  at  the  forefront 
)f  our  consciousness,  and  they  can  provide 
:ertain  minimum  protection  for  the  human 
jersonality.  International  law  and  experience 
lave  enabled  the  development  of  specific 
orocedures  to  distinguish  reasonable  from 
arbitrary  government  action  on,  for  example, 
the  question  of  detention.  These  involve  ac- 
cess to  courts,  counsel,  and  families ;  prompt 
release  or  charge ;  and  if  the  latter,  fair  and 
public  trial.  Where  such  procedures  are  fol- 
owed,  the  risk  and  incidence  of  unintentional 
government  error,  of  officially  sanctioned  tor- 
:ure,  of  prolonged  arbitrary  deprivation  of 
iberty,  are  drastically  reduced.  Other  im- 
portant procedures  are  habeas  corpus  or 
jmparo,  judicial  appeal,  and  impartial  review 
)f  administrative  actions.  And  there  are  the 
orocedures  available  at  the  international 
evel:  appeal  to,  and  investigations  and  rec- 
)mmendations  by,  established  independent 
Dodies  such  as  the  Inter-American  Commis- 
sion on  Human  Rights,  an  integral  part  of 
;he  OAS  and  a  symbol  of  our  dedication  to 
:he  dignity  of  man. 

The  Intei--American  Commission  has  built 
m  impressive  record  of  sustained,  independ- 
ent, and  highly  pi'ofessional  work  since  its 


establishment  in  1960.  Its  importance  as 
n  primary  procedural  alternative  in  dealing 
with  the  recurrent  human  rights  problems  of 
this  hemisphere  is  considerable. 

The  United  States  believes  this  Commis- 
sion is  one  of  the  most  important  bodies  of 
the  Organization  of  American  States.  At  the 
same  time,  it  has  a  role  which  touches  upon 
the  most  sensitive  aspects  of  the  national 
policies  of  each  of  the  member  governments. 
We  must  insure  that  the  Commission  func- 
tions so  that  it  cannot  be  manipulated  for 
international  politics  in  the  name  of  human 
rights.  We  must  also  see  to  it  that  the  Com- 
mission becomes  an  increasingly  vital  instru- 
ment of  hemispheric  cooperation  in  defense 
of  human  rights.  The  Commission  deserves 
the  support  of  the  Assembly  in  strengthen- 
ing further  its  independence,  evenhanded- 
ness,  and  constructive  potential. 

Reports    of   the    Human    Rights    Commission 

We  have  all  read  the  two  reports  submit- 
ted to  this  General  Assembly  by  the  Com- 
mission. They  are  sobering  documents,  for 
they  provide  serious  evidence  of  violations  of 
elemental  international  standards  of  human 
rights. 

In  its  annual  report  on  human  rights  in 
the  hemisphere,  the  Commission  cites  the 
rise  of  violence  and  speaks  of  the  need  to 
maintain  order  and  protect  citizens  against 
armed  attack.  But  it  also  upholds  the  defense 
of  individual  rights  as  a  primordial  function 
of  the  law  and  describes  case  after  case  of 
serious  governmental  actions  in  derogation 
of  such  rights. 

A  second  report  is  devoted  exclusively  to 
the  situation  in  Chile.  We  note  the  Commis- 
sion's statement  that  the  Government  of 
Chile  has  cooperated  with  the  Commission, 
and  the  Commission's  conclusion  that  the  in- 
fringement of  certain  fundamental  rights  in 
Chile  has  undergone  a  quantitative  reduction 
since  the  last  report.  We  must  also  point  out 
that  Chile  has  filed  a  comprehensive  and 
responsive  answer  that  sets  forth  a  number 
of  hopeful  prospects  which  we  hope  will  soon 
be  fully  implemented. 


luly  5,  1976 


Nevertheless  the  Commission  has  asserted 
that  violations  continue  to  occur;  and  this  is 
a  matter  of  bilateral  as  well  as  international 
attention.  In  the  United  States,  concern  is 
widespread  in  the  executive  branch,  in  the 
press,  and  in  the  Congress,  which  has  taken 
the  extraordinary  step  of  enacting  specific 
statutory  limits  on  U.S.  military  and  eco- 
nomic aid  to  Chile. 

The  condition  of  human  rights  as  assessed 
by  the  OAS  Human  Rights  Commission  has 
impaired  our  relationship  with  Chile  and  will 
continue  to  do  so.  We  wish  this  relationship 
to  be  close,  and  all  friends  of  Chile  hope  that 
obstacles  raised  by  conditions  alleged  in  the 
report  will  soon  be  removed. 

At  the  same  time,  the  Commission  should 
not  focus  on  some  problem  areas  to  the 
neglect  of  others.  The  cause  of  human  dig- 
nity is  not  served  by  those  who  hypocrit- 
ically manipulate  concerns  with  human 
rights  to  further  their  political  preferences 
nor  by  those  who  single  out  for  human  rights 
condemnation  only  those  countries  with 
whose  political  views  they  disagree. 

We  are  persuaded  that  the  OAS  Commis- 
sion, however,  has  avoided  such  temptations. 

The  Commission  has  worked  and  reported 
widely.  Its  survey  of  human  rights  in  Cuba 
is  ample  evidence  of  that.  Though  the  report 
was  completed  too  late  for  formal  considera- 
tion at  this  General  Assembly,  an  initial 
review  confirms  our  worst  fears  of  Cuban 
behavior.  We  should  commend  the  Commis- 
sion for  its  eff'orts — in  spite  of  the  total  lack 
of  cooperation  of  the  Cuban  authorities — to 
unearth  the  truth  that  many  Cuban  political 
prisoners  have  been  victims  of  inhuman 
treatment.  We  urge  the  Commission  to  con- 
tinue its  efforts  to  determine  the  truth  about 
the  state  of  human  rights  in  Cuba. 

In  our  view,  the  record  of  the  Commission 
this  year  in  all  these  respects  demonstrates 
that  it  deserves  the  support  of  the  Assembly 
in  strengthening  further  its  independence, 
evenhandedness,  and  constructive  potential. 

We  can  use  the  occasion  of  this  General 
Assembly  to  emphasize  that  the  protection 


of  human  rights  is  an  obligation  not  simply 
of  particular  countries  whose  practices  have 
come  to  public  attention.  Rather,  it  is  an 
obligation  assumed  by  all  the  nations  of  the 
Americas  as  part  of  their  participation  in  the 
hemispheric  system. 

To  this  end,  the  United  States  proposes 
that  the  Assembly  broaden  the  Commission's 
mandate  so  that  instead  of  waiting  for  com- 
plaints it  can  report  regularly  on  the  status 
of  human  rights  throughout  the  hemisphere. 

Through  adopting  this  proposal,  the  na- 
tions of  the  Americas  would  make  plain  our 
common  commitment  to  human  rights,  in- 
crease the  reliable  information  available  tc 
us,  and  offer  more  effective  recommendations 
to  governments  about  how  best  to  improvt 
human  rights.  In  support  of  such  a  broad- 
ened effort,  we  propose  that  the  budget  anc 
staff  of  the  Commission  be  enlarged.  Bj 
strengthening  the  contribution  of  this  body 
we  can  deepen  our  dedication  to  the  specia 
qualities  of  rich  promise  that  make  our  hem 
isphere  a  standard-bearer  for  freedom 
loving  people  in  every  quarter  of  the  globe. 

At  the  same  time,  we  should  also  considei 
ways  to  strengthen  the  inter-American  sys 
tern  in  terms  of  protection  against  terrorism 
kidnaping,  and  other  fonns  of  violent  threati 
to  the  human  personality,  especially  thos(' 
inspired  from  the  outside. 

Necessity   for  Concern   and   Concrete   Action 

It  is  a  tragedy  that  the  forces  of  changi 
in  our  century — a  time  of  unparalleled  hu 
man  achievement — have  also  visited  upoi 
many  individuals  around  the  world  a  nev 
dimension  of  intimidation  and  suffering. 

The  standard  of  individual  liberty  of  con 
science  and  expression  is  the  proudest  herit 
age  of  our  civilization.  It  summons  all  na 
tions.  But  this  hemisphere,  which  for  cen 
turies  has  been  the  hope  of  all  mankind,  has 
a  special  requirement  for  dedicated  commit 
ment. 

Let  us  then  turn  to  the  great  task  befon 
us.  All  we  do  in  the  world — in  our  search 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


or  peace,  for  greater  political  cooperation, 
or  a  fair  and  flourishing  economic  system — 
s  meaningful  only  if  linked  to  the  defense  of 
he  fundamental  freedoms  which  permit  the 
ullest  expression  of  mankind's  creativity. 
^0  nations  of  the  globe  have  a  greater  re- 
ponsibility.  No  nations  can  make  a  greater 
ontribution  to  the  future.  Let  us  look  deeply 
V- it  bin  ourselves  to  find  the  essence  of  our 
luman  condition.  And  let  us  carry  forward 
lie  great  enterprise  of  liberty  for  which  this 
lemisphere  has  been — and  will  again  be — the 
lOiiored  symbol  everywhere. 


TATEMENT  BY  SECRETARY  KISSINGER,  JUNE  9, 
>N   COOPERATION    FOR    DEVELOPMENT 

i-ess    release   296   dated   June   It 

For  two  centuries,  the  peoples  of  this 
emi  sphere  have  been  forging  a  record  of 
ooperation  and  accomplishment  of  which  we 
an  be  proud.  It  is  a  record  which  gives  good 
ause  for  the  confidence  we  bring  to  the 
asks  we  face  today.  But  of  greater  impor- 
ance  is  the  truly  special  relationship  we  have 
jchieved.  The  ties  of  friendship,  mutual  re- 
ard,  and  high  respect  that  we  have  forged 
ere  set  this  hemisphere  apart.  The  bond 
etween  the  American  republics  is  un- 
latched in  the  world  today  in  both  depth 
nd  potential. 

First,  we  have  maintained  the  awareness 
hat  our  destinies  are  linked — a  recognition 
f  the  reality  that  we  are  bound  by  more 
han  geography  and  common  historical  ex- 
erience.  We  are  as  diverse  as  any  associa- 
ion  of  nations,  yet  this  special  relationship 
i  known  to  us  all,  almost  instinctively. 

Second,  ours  is  a  hemisphere  of  peace.  In 
0  other  region  of  the  world  has  interna- 
ional  conflict  been  so  rare,  or  peaceful  and 
Ifective  cooperation  so  natural  to  the  fabric 
f  our  relationships. 

Third,  we  work  together  with  a  unique 
pirit  of  mutual  respect.  I  personally  am  im- 
iiensely  grateful  for  the  warm  and  serious 
elationships   I   have  enjoyed   with   my  col- 


leagues and  other  Western  Hemisphere 
leaders.  I  am  convinced  that  this  sense  of 
personal  amistad  can  play  a  decisive  role  in 
the  affairs  of  mankind,  and  nowhere  more 
so  than  in  our  hemisphere. 

Fourth,  we  share  the  conviction  that  there 
is  much  to  do  and  that  working  together  for 
concrete  progress  is  the  surest  way  to  get  it 
done.  Even  our  criticism  presumes  the  feasi- 
bility of  cooperation. 

Fifth,  we  respect  each  other's  independ- 
ence. We  accept  the  principle  that  each  na- 
tion is — and  must  be — in  charge  of  its  own 
future;  each  chooses  its  mode  of  develop- 
ment; each  determines  its  own  policies.  But 
we  know  that  our  capacity  to  achieve  our 
national  goals  increases  as  we  work  togeth- 
er. 

Sixth,  despite  the  differences  among  our 
political  systems,  our  peoples  share  a  com- 
mon aspiration  for  the  fulfillment  of  indi- 
vidual human  dignity.  This  is  the  heritage  of 
our  hemisphere  and  the  ideal  toward  which 
all  our  governments  have  an  obligation  to 
strive. 

Finally,  and  of  immediate  importance,  we 
are  achieving  a  new  and  productive  balance, 
based  on  real  interests,  in  our  relations  with- 
in the  Americas,  within  other  groupings,  and 
with  the  rest  of  the  world.  All  of  us  have  ties 
outside  the  hemisphere.  But  our  interests 
elsewhere  do  not  impede  our  hemispheric 
efforts.  Our  traditions  of  independence  and 
diversity  have  served  us  well. 

This  is  both  a  strength  and  a  challenge  to 
us  now,  as  this  Assembly  takes  up  the  issue 
of  development. 

The  United  States  is  dedicated  to  cooper- 
ate in  development  throughout  the  world. 
But  as  we  seek  to  make  progress  in  all  our 
global  development  efforts,  we  recognize 
close  and  special  ties  to  the  nations  of  the 
Americas.  We  regard  the  concerns  of  this 
hemisphere  as  our  first  priority. 

It  is  for  this  reason  that  we  support  the 
suggestions  which  have  been  made  for  a 
Special  Assembly  of  the  OAS  to  be  devoted 
to  hemispheric  cooperation  for  development. 


Jly  5,  1976 


Such  an  Assembly  should  deal  with  concrete 
problems  capable  of  practical  solutions.  To 
this  end,  the  United  States  proposes  that  a 
preparatory  meeting  of  experts  be  held  in 
advance  of  the  Special  Assembly. 

But  we  do  not  intend  to  delay  our  efforts 
while  we  await  the  processes  of  international 
institutions  and  conferences.  The  U.S.  Ad- 
ministration will  begin  now: 

— First,  to  give  special  attention  to  the 
economic  concerns  of  Latin  America  in  every 
area  in  which  our  executive  branch  possesses 
the  power  of  discretionary  decision. 

— Second,  to  undertake  detailed  consulta- 
tions with  Latin  Amerian  nations  to  coordi- 
nate our  positions  on  all  economic  issues  of 
concern  to  the  hemisphere  prior  to  the  con- 
sideration of  those  issues  in  major  inter- 
national forums. 

— Third,  to  consider  special  arrangements 
in  the  hemisphere  in  economic  areas  of  par- 
ticular concern  to  Latin  America,  such  as  the 
transfer  and  development  of  technology. 

— In  addition,  we  will  put  forth  every 
effort  to  bring  about  the  amendment  of  the 
U.S.  Trade  Act  to  eliminate  the  automatic 
exclusion  of  Ecuador  and  Venezuela  from  the 
generalized  system  of  preferences. 

The  United  States  is  prepared  to  proceed 
in  these  four  areas  whatever  may  occur  in 
other  development  forums.  But  this  Assem- 
bly offers  an  excellent  opportunity  to  ad- 
vance our  joint  progress.  The  United  States 
believes  that  there  are  three  major  issues 
that  this  Assembly  should  address:  com- 
modities, trade,  and  technology.  These  in- 
volve : 

— More  stable  and  beneficial  conditions  for 
the  production  and  marketing  of  primary 
commodities  upon  which  the  economic  aspi- 
rations of  so  many  countries  in  Latin  Amer- 
ica rely; 

— Expansion  of  the  trade  opportunities 
and  capabilities  that  are  an  essential  part 
of  the  development  strategies  of  all  countries 
in  the  hemisphere;  and 

— Improved  arrangements  for  the  develop- 
ment, acquisition,  and  utilization  of  higher 


technology  to  speed  the  modernization  of  the 
liemisphere. 

Let  me  address  each  of  these  issues  in 
turn. 

Commodities 

Most  of  our  members  depend  heavily  on 
the  production  and  export  of  primary  com- 
modities for  essential  earnings.  Yet  produc- 
tion and  export  of  these  resources  are 
vulnerable  to  the  cycles  of  scarcity  and  glut, 
underinvestment  and  overcapacity,  that  dis- 
rupt economic  conditions  in  both  the  develop- 
ing and  the  industrial  world. 

At  the  U.N.  Conference  on  Trade  and 
Development  (UNCTAD)  last  month,  we 
joined  in  the  common  commitment  to  search 
for  concrete,  practical  solutions  in  the  in- 
terests of  both  producers  and  consumers. 

Despite  reservations  about  some  aspects 
of  the  final  resolution  at  Nairobi,  the  Unitec 
States  believes  that  the  final  commodities 
resolution  of  the  conference  represented  ; 
major  advance  in  the  dialogue  between  Nortl 
and  South;  we  will  participate  in  the  majoi 
preparatory  conferences  on  individual  com 
modities  and  in  the  preparatory  conferenci 
on  financing. 

One  key  element,  however,  is  missing  fron 
the  final  catalogue  of  Nairobi's  proposals 
machinery  to  spur  the  flow  of  new  invest 
ment  for  resource  production  in  the  develop 
ing  countries.  The  United  States  made  a  pro 
posal  aimed  at  that  problem — an  Interna, 
tional  Resources  Bank.  A  resolution  to  studj 
the  IRB  was  rejected  by  a  vote  that  can  bes 
be  described  as  accidental.  Ninety  nation: 
abstained  or  were  absent.  Those  nations  o 
Latin  America  that  reject  such  self-defeat 
ing  tactics  can  make  a  special  contributioi 
to  insure  that  the  progress  of  all  is  not  de 
feated  by  the  sterile  and  outmoded  confron 
tational  tactics  of  a  few. 

As  a  contribution  to  the  commitment  wi 
undertook  at  Nairobi  to  deal  comprehensivelj 
with  commodities  problems,  the  Unitet 
States  proposes  that  the  nations  of  the  hem 
isphere  undertake  a  three-part  program  tc 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


secure  the  contribution  of  commodities  to 
development  in  this  hemisphere. 

First,  I  propose  that  we  estabUsh  a  region- 
al consultative  mechanism  on  commodities. 
This  mechanism  could  well  be  under  the 
aegis  of  the  OAS.  It  should  bring  together 
experts  with  operational  responsibilities  and 
experience.  The  inter-American  commodities 
mechanism  could  precede,  or  at  least  supple- 
ment, those  established  with  a  global  man- 
date, where  we  are  prepared  to  exchange 
views  regularly  and  in  depth  on  the  state  of 
commodities  markets  of  most  interest  to  us 
— including  coffee,  grains,  meat,  and  the 
minerals  produced  in  this  hemisphere.  Our 
objective  will  be  to  concert  our  information 
on  production  and  demand  in  order  to  make 
the  best  possible  use  of  our  investment  re- 
sources. These  consultations  will  provide  us 
with  an  early-warning  system  to  identify 
problems  in  advance  and  enable  us  to  take 
appropriate  corrective  action  nationally, 
I  regionally,  or  through  worldwide  organiza- 
tions. 

Second,  I  propose  we  give  particular  at- 
itention  to  global  solutions  for  commodities 
I  important  to  one  or  more  countries  of  the 
jhemisphere.  The  United  States  has  signed 
|the  Coffee  and  Tin  Agreements;  it  is  crucial 
to  the  coffee-  and  tin-producing  countries  of 
ithis  hemisphere  that  those  agreements  be 
implemented  in  a  fashion  that  will  most  ap- 
propriately contribute  to  their  development. 

In  Nairobi  and  at  other  forums  the  United 
States  proposed  that  we  examine  on  a  global 
basis  other  commodities  of  particular  impor- 
tance to  Latin  America — bauxite,  iron  ore, 
and  copper.  I  suggest  that  we  in  the  hemi- 
sphere have  a  special  role  to  play  in  consider- 
ing how  these  steps  might  be  taken  and  in 
identifying  other  high-priority  subjects  for 
global  commodity  discussions. 

Third,  I  propose  that  the  consultative 
group  take  a  new  look  at  the  problem  of  in- 
suring adequate  investment  in  commodities 
in  this  hemisphere  under  circumstances  that 
respect  the  sovereignty  of  producers  and 
provide  incentive  for  investment.  We  should 
examine  all  reasonable  proposals,  especially 
those  which  would  help  to  assure  effective 


resource-development  financing.  If  global 
solutions  are  not  possible,  we  are  willing  to 
consider  regional  mechanisms. 

Trade 

Trade  has  been  an  engine  of  growth  for 
all  countries ;  and  for  many  developing  coun- 
tries— above  all,  those  in  Latin  America — 
it  i.s  an  essential  vehicle  of  development.  Rec- 
ognizing the  importance  of  trade  to  sus- 
tained growth,  the  United  States  has  taken, 
within  our  global  trade  policy,  a  number  of 
initiatives  of  particular  significance  to  Latin 
America.  We  have  reduced  trade  barriers, 
especially  those  affecting  processed  goods ; 
provided  preferential  access  to  our  market 
for  many  exports  of  developing  countries ; 
worked  in  the  multilateral  trade  negotiations 
in  Geneva  for  reduction  of  barriers,  giving 
priority  to  tropical  products;  and  recognized 
in  our  general  trade  policy  the  special  needs 
of  developing  countries. 

Today,  at  this  Assembly,  we  can  begin  to 
consider  ways  in  which  our  commitment  to 
trade  cooperation  can  contribute  to  economic 
progress  in  our  hemisphere.  The  United 
States  .sees  three  key  areas  which  this  or- 
ganization could  usefully  address : 

— The  need  to  provide  opportunities  for 
developing  countries  to  expand  and  diversify 
exports  of  manufactured  and  semiprocessed 
goods ; 

—The  need  to  promote  the  hemisphere's 
trade  position  through  the  multilateral  trade 
negotiations  at  Geneva;  and 

— ^The  need  for  effective  regional  and  sub- 
regional  economic  integration. 

Let  me  turn  to  each  of  these  three  points. 

No  single  element  is  more  important  to 
Latin  America's  trade  opportunities  than  the 
health  of  the  U.S.  economy.  I  can  confirm  to 
you  today  that  our  economy  is  in  full  re- 
covery, with  prospects  brighter  than  they 
have  been  for  years. 

The  preferences  system  contained  in  the 
U.S.  Trade  Act  has  been  in  effect  since  Jan- 
uary. It  gives  Latin  American  countries 
duty-free  entry  on  more  than  1  billion  dollars' 


July  5,  1976 


worth  of  their  exports  to  the  United  States. 
Even  more  important,  it  provides  vast  op- 
portunities for  Latin  America  to  diversify 
into  new  product  areas  in  its  exports  to  the 
United  States. 

In  addition  to  the  effort  we  will  undertake 
to  end  the  exclusion  of  Ecuador  and  Vene- 
zuela from  the  benefits  of  the  U.S.  Trade  Act, 
President  Ford  has  asked  me  to  state  today 
that : 

— He  will  make  every  effort  to  add  to  the 
preferences  system  products  that  are  of 
direct  interest  to  Latin  America. 

— The  executive  branch  will  bend  every 
effort  to  accommodate  the  export  interests  of 
Latin  America  in  all  matters  in  which  we 
have  statutory  discretion.  President  Ford's 
recent  choice  of  adjustment  assistance 
rather  than  import  restrictions  in  response 
to  the  petition  of  the  U.S.  footwear  in- 
dustry clearly  demonstrates  the  commitment 
of  the  U.S.  Government  to  a  liberal  trade 
policy  and  the  use  of  the  Trade  Act  to  ex- 
pand trade  in  the  hemisphere. 

—The  President  will  direct  the  U.S.  De- 
partment of  Commerce  to  respond  positively 
to  requests  from  your  governments  for  as- 
sistance in  the  development  of  export  promo- 
tion programs.  The  Department  of  Commerce 
will  make  available  technical  advice  on  pro- 
motion techniques  and  personnel  training 
to  help  develop  new  markets  for  Latin  Amer- 
ican exports  worldwide. 

The  United  States  believes  that  the  multi- 
lateral trade  negotiations  in  Geneva  warrant 
the  special  attention  of  Latin  America.  Our 
view  is  that  the  international  codes  on  sub- 
sidies and  countervailing  duties  and  on  safe- 
guards actions  now  being  negotiated  should 
recognize  the  special  conditions  facing  de- 
veloping countries.  To  this  end: 

— The  United  States  will  seek  agreement 
at  Geneva  that  the  code  on  countervailing 
duties  and  subsidies  now  being  negotiated 
should  contain  special  rules  to  permit  de- 
veloping countries  to  assist  their  exports 
under    agreed    criteria    for    an    appropriate 


time  linked  to  specific  development  objec- 
tives. 

— The  United  States  next  month  will  pro- 
pose that  the  safeguards  code  under  negotia- 
tion in  Geneva  grant  special  treatment  to 
developing  countries  that  are  minor  suppliers 
or  new  entrants  in  a  developed-country 
market  during  the  period  that  safeguards 
are  in  effect. 

— The  United  States  will  send  a  trade 
policy  team  to  Latin  America  shortly  to 
identify  ways  to  promote  increased  hemi- 
sphere trade  through  the  Geneva  negotia- 
tions ;  we  are  prepared  to  intensify  consulta- 
tions in  Geneva  and  Washington  with  Latin 
American  delegations  to  explore  both  general 
issues  and  positions  for  specific  meetings. 

Finally,  the  United  States  supports  the 
concept  and  practice  of  regional  and  sub- 
regional  economic  integration  as  a  means 
of  magnifying  the  positive  impact  of  trade 
on  development.  Expanded  trade,  based  on 
the  development  of  industries  that  will  be 
able  to  compete  successfully  within  and  out- 
side the  integration  area,  will  strengthen  the 
growth  process  of  participating  countries. 
We  seek  means  to  support  the  far-reaching 
integration  plans  that  have  been  drawn  up 
in  the  hemisphere — for  the  Andean  Group, 
the  Caribbean  Community,  the  Central 
American  Common  Market,  and  the  Latin 
American  Free  Trade  Area. 

We  are  ready  to  support  responsible  ef- 
forts to  further  integration.  The  administra- 
tion of  U.S.  trade  laws  and  the  improvement 
of  our  preferences  system  on  matters  such 
as  rules  of  origin  are  two  possible  incentives, 
to  greater  Latin  American  integration.  Wej 
welcome  your  views  as  to  a  further  U.S.  role 
toward  enhancing  the  momentum  of  eco- 
nomic integration  in  Latin  America. 

We  are  not  persuaded,  however,  that  we 
have  fully  exploited  all  the  possibilities  of 
how  best  to  provide  expanded  trade  oppor- 
tunities to  Latin  America.  We  know  that  the 
issue  is  complex  and  that  it  involves  not 
only  expanded  access  to  the  markets  of  the 
United  States  but  also  measures  to  enhance 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


opportunities  for  Latin  American  products 
in  Europe  and  Japan  and  throughout  Latin 
America  itself. 

Some  permanent  expert  forum  is  neces- 
sary. We  therefore  propose  that  within  the 
OAS  there  be  established  a  special  inter- 
American  commission  for  trade  cooperation. 
If  the  suggestion  for  a  Special  Assembly  on 
cooperation  for  development  prospers,  we 
think  that  Assembly  should  set  guidelines 
for  the  functioning  of  the  commission.  We 
see  the  commission  as  an  opportunity,  in 
major  part  through  the  multilateral  trade 
negotiations  in  Geneva,  to  bring  together 
those  policy-level  officials  most  familiar  with 
the  actual  trade  problems  and  opportunities 
for  trade  creation  under  a  firm  mandate  to 
seek  innovative  means  of  cooperating  to  ex- 
pand exports — expanding,  in  short,  on  a 
regular  and  long-term  basis  the  catalogue 
of  trade-expansion  proposals  I  have  elabo- 
rated above. 

Technology 

Technology  is  basic  to  economic  develop- 
ment. It  is  technology  that  enables  us  to 
master  the  raw  gifts  of  nature  and  trans- 
form them  into  the  products  needed  for  the 
well-being  of  our  peoples. 

But  technology  is  not  evenly  distributed. 
There  are  impediments  to  its  development, 
to  its  transfer,  and  most  importantly,  to  its 
effective  utilization.  The  United  States  be- 
lieves that  technology  should  become  a  prime 
subject  of  hemispheric  cooperation.  The 
countries  in  this  region  have  reached  stages 
of  development  that  enable  them  to  adapt 
and  create  modern  technologies.  Our  poten- 
tial thus  matches  the  urgency  of  practical 
needs. 

At  this  point,  what  are  the  new  directions 
we  should  take  together?  We  have  three  pro- 
'posals.  The  United  States  believes  we  in  the 
hemisphere   should : 

— Take  immediate  advantage  of  promising 
global  initiatives.  To  seek  maximum  benefit 
from   the   U.N.   Conference  on   Science  and 


Development  set  for  1979,  we  propose  that 
the  nations  here  today  undertake  prepara- 
tory consultations  on  that  subject  in  the 
Economic  Commission  for  Latin  America, 
whose  meeting  has  been  prescribed  as  a 
regional  forum  within  the  conference  pro- 
gram. We  will  enlist  the  experience  and  re- 
sources of  leading  U.S.  technology  institu- 
tions in  this  hemispheric  preparatory  eff"ort. 
— Increase  public  and  private  contacts  on 
research,  development,  and  the  application 
of  technology.  To  this  end,  the  United  States 
will: 

Open  a  technology  exchange  service  for 
Latin  America  to  provide  information  on 
U.S.  laws  and  regulations  relating  to  tech- 
nology flows  and  to  sources  of  public  and 
private  technology; 

Explore  cooperative  ventures  in  which 
small  and  medium-sized  U.S.  firms  would 
provide  practical  technologies  to  individual 
Latin  American  firms,  along  with  the  man- 
agement expertise  needed  to  select,  adapt, 
and  exploit  those  technologies;  and 

Expand  and  strengthen  Latin  America's 
access  to  the  National  Technical  Informa- 
tion Service  and  other  facilities  of  the 
technology  information  network  of  the 
U.S.  Government,  which  covers  90  percent 
of  the  technical  information  that  flows 
from  the  $20  billion  worth  of  research 
that  the  U.S.  Government  sponsors  an- 
nually. 

— Develop  new  regional  and  subregional 
structures  of  consultation  and  cooperation 
on  problems  of  technology.  To  this  end,  the 
United  States  proposes: 

First,  that  we  establish  a  consultative 
group  under  the  OAS  to  address  and  pro- 
vide recommendations  on  information 
problems  that  Latin  America  faces  in  ac- 
quiring technology. 

Second,  that  the  OAS,  in  line  with  the 
UNCTAD  IV  consensus,  establish  a  region- 
al center  on  technology.  The  center  would 
facilitate  cooperative  research  and  devel- 
opment activities,  drawing  on  both  public 


July  5,  1976 


and  private  sources.  It  could  stimulate  ex- 
changes of  qualified  technical  personnel. 
And  it  could  begin  to  attack  the  problem  of 
incentives  to  the  thousands  of  technologi- 
cally trained  Latin  Americans  now  living 
abroad  to  return  to  and  serve  with  their 
own  countries.  In  the  view  of  the  United 
States,  such  a  center  should  be  a  coopera- 
tive enterprise  requiring  commitment  and 
contributions  in  funds,  technological  re- 
sources, and  personnel  from  all  of  the 
countries  that  take  part.  To  get  us  under- 
way, I  propose  that  we  convene  a  group  of 
experts  to  examine  the  need,  feasibility, 
characteristics,  and  role  of  an  inter-Amer- 
ican technology  center  and  report  to  us 
before  the  next  OAS  General  Assembly. 

The   Importance  of  Cooperative  Development 

Economic  development  is  a  central  con- 
cern of  all  nations  today.  The  community  of 
nations  has  become,  irrevocably,  a  single 
global  economy.  We  know  that  peace  and 
progress  will  rest  fundamentally  on  our 
ability  to  forge  patterns  of  economic  coopera- 
tion that  are  fair,  productive,  and  open  to 
all. 

We  in  this  hemisphere  have  a  special  op- 
portunity and  responsibility  to  advance  the 
recent  favorable  mood  and  the  practical 
achievements  in  cooperation  between  the  de- 
veloped and  developing  nations.  We  start 
from  a  firmer  foundation  today;  our  pros- 
pects for  working  together  are  brighter  than 
ever  before — more  so  in  this  hemisphere 
than  in  any  other  region  of  the  world.  We 
should  have  reason  for  confidence  in  our 
ability  to  advance  our  own  people's  well- 
being,  while  simultaneously  contributing  to 
a  more  prosperous  world.  It  is  in  this  sense 
that  I  have  sought  today  to  advance  our 
practical  progress  in  important  areas. 

The  United  States  stands  ready  to  give  its 
sister  republics  in  the  hemisphere  special  at- 
tention in  the  great  task  of  cooperation  for 
development.  We  shall  make  a  major  effort 
to  prepare  for  the  Special  Assembly  on  de- 


10 


velopment.  We  shall  listen  to  your  proposals, 
work  with  you  in  a  serious  and  cooperative 
spirit  of  friendship,  and  commit  ourselves 
to  carry  on  the  great  heritage  of  the  Amer- 
icas as  we  go  forward  together. 


SECRETARY  KISSINGER'S  STATEMENT 
ON  REFORM  OF  THE  OAS  > 

The  Organization  of  American  States  is 
the  cornerstone  of  the  inter-American  sys- 
tem, the  oldest  institution  of  regional  co- 
operation in  the  world.  Its  member  states 
have  exceptional  ties  of  respect  and  a  com- 
mon heritage,  and  a  considerable  stake  in 
maintaining  those  ties  for  the  future. 

The  inter-American  system  pioneered  the 
principles  of  nonintervention  and  collective 
security  among  cooperating  sovereign  states. 
Because  the  Americas  also  have  enormous 
vitality  and  achievement,  we  have  a  major 
opportunity  and  obligation  to  continue  to 
provide  an  example  and  impetus  to  the  global 
search  for  better  ways  to  mediate  the  com- 
mon destiny  of  mankind. 

Many  ask,  why  think  of  OAS  reform? 
Why,  some  wonder,  does  our  Secretary  Gen- 
eral refer  to  an  "identity  crisis"  in  his  latest 
annual  report? 

The  answer  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  pace 
and  complexity  of  the  international  and  do- 
mestic changes  of  the  recent  past  have  made 
the  organization  as  it  is  presently  constituted 
less  effective  as  an  instrument  of  our  respec- 
tive foreign  policies  and  less  significant  to 
the  real  issues  of  the  new  inter-American 
agenda  than  our  minimum  efforts  deserve. 

This  hemisphere  is  unique;  there  is  no 
other  grouping  like  it  in  the  world.  We  have 
indeed  a  special  relationship.  The  funda- 
mental purpose  of  the  OAS  must  be  to  con- 
tinue to  nurture  and  strengthen  our  funda- 
mental, shared  values.  We  must  have  an 
organization  that  reflects  our  permanent  and 


'  Circulated  by  the  U.S.  delegation  and  released  on 
June  11   (text  from  press  release  302). 


Department  of  State  Bulletinj 


irrevocable  engagement  to  work  together  and 
maintain  our  continent  as  a  hemisphere  of 

R  peace,  cooperation,  and  development. 

er-  I  The  United  States  is  committed  to  the 
OAS.  We  have  pledged  to  make  it  a  contin- 
ually more  effective  instrument  for  action 
in  pursuit  of  the  common  goals  of  prosperity 
and  human  dignity. 

It  was  to  that  end  that  the  member  states 

igreed  three  years  ago  to  an  effort  to  I'e- 

.  form,  restructure,  and  modernize  the  OAS. 

;..  The  results  of  that  effort  are  disappointing. 

[>  A  proposed  new  draft  of  the  Charter  of  the 

If!  DAS  has  emerged  from  the  Permanent  Coun- 
■il.  I  regret  to  say  that  it  is  one  that  our 
government  could  neither  sign  nor  recom- 
nend  that  our  Senate  ratify.  It  includes  pre- 

■i;  ;criptive  and  hortatory  statements  of  gen- 
ial principle  which  are  as  poorly  defined  as 
hey  are  ominous.  No  effort  is  made  in  the 
lew  charter  draft  to  come  to  grips  with  the 
leed  to  modernize  or  improve  the  structure 
)f  the  organization.  We  believe  the  real 
-hortcomings   of   the   OAS   have   yet   to   be 

-  idequately  addressed. 

We  propose  a  new  effort  to  reform,  mod- 
■rnize,  and  restructure  the  organization.  We 

-  hink  that  effort  should  concentrate  not  on 
■-.  vords,   but  on   three  major  substantive  is- 

;ues:  structure,  membership,  and  finance. 

\.  As  to  structure, 

The  United  States  would  like  to  advance 
^.j  our  points  as  possible  guidelines  for  the 
pp( 'uture  effort,  in  the  interest  of  moderniza- 
j  i(  ion  of  the  organization. 

'''■     1.  The  purposes  of  the  organization  should 
^   )e   stated    simply   and    clearly   in    the   new 
'   barter. 
''"    Those  purposes  should  be: 

— The  promotion  of  cooperation  for  devel- 
ipment ; 

— The  maintenance  of  the  peace  and  secu- 
,,  ity  of  our  region ;  and 

— The  preservation  of  our  common  tradi- 
ion  of  respect  for  human  dignity  and  the 
ights  of  the  individual. 


2.  The  structure  of  the  organization  serv- 
ing these  goals  should  be  flexible. 

We  should  write  a  constitutive  document 
for  the  organization  which  will  serve  us  well 
into  the  future.  That  an  organization  finds  it 
necessary  to  rewrite  its  charter  every  5  to  10 
years  does  not  speak  well  for  that  organiza- 
tion's sense  of  its  role  or  function.  We  are 
now  in  an  age  of  great  change.  Our  efforts 
in  the  coming  years  to  achieve  the  three 
basic  goals  of  the  organization  will  take  place 
under  rapidly  changing  circumstances.  Thus, 
flexibility  and  adaptability  must  be  the  key 
considerations  guiding  the  reform  effort.  We 
should  not  hamstring  ourselves  with  a  char- 
ter brimfull  of  the  details  of  the  day,  with 
procedural  minutiae,  or  with  regulatory  pre- 
scriptions hindering  our  ability  to  meet  con- 
tingencies. 

3.  The  governance  of  the  organization 
should  be  in  the  hands  of  the  Ministers. 

Over  the  years,  the  proliferation  of  func- 
tions assigned  haphazardly  to  the  OAS  has 
produced  an  overelaborated  organization  that 
is  ponderous  and  unresponsive.  Instead  of 
closer  and  more  frequent  contact  between 
Foreign  Ministers  in  ways  that  truly  reflect 
our  foreign  policies  as  we  are  attempting  to 
manage  them  from  our  respective  capitals, 
we  find  ourselves  insulated  from  each  other 
by  a  plethora  of  councils  and  committees 
with  conflicting  mandates  and  a  cumbersome 
permanent  bureaucracy. 

To  strengthen  communication,  we  must 
cut  through  the  existing  organizational  un- 
derbrush and  replace  it  with  a  structure 
capable  of  responding  to  the  authentic  for- 
eign policies  of  our  governments  as  ex- 
pressed directly  by  Foreign  Ministers  and  of 
relating  concretely  to  our  institutions  and  the 
needs  of  our  peoples.  Particularly,  the  three- 
council  system  has  not  fulfilled  the  hopes 
which  led  to  its  adoption  in  1967. 

The  General  Assembly,  as  the  central  pil- 
lar of  the  inter-American  system,  might  well 
be  convened  more  frequently,  perhaps  twice 
a  year,  with  special  additional  sessions  to 
consider  our  common  concerns,  particularly 


uly  5,  1976 


11 


the  great  challenges  of  cooperation  for  de- 
velopment. As  contacts  at  the  ministerial 
level  intensify,  the  need  for  an  elaborate 
structure  of  councils  will  disappear.  Our 
encounters  at  the  General  Assembly  will 
offer  sufficient  opportunities  to  set  organiza- 
tional policy. 

This  is  all  of  the  organizational  super- 
structure we  really  need.  A  leaner,  more  re- 
sponsive organization  would  be  serviced  by 
a  smaller  expert  Secretariat  responsive  to 
the  guidelines  established  by  the  General 
Assembly  and  the  functional  committees  the 
General  Assembly  may  create. 

4.   We   should   improve   the  OAS  mecha- 
nisms   for    promoting    respect    for    human 
rights  in  the  Americas. 
B.  As  to  membership, 

To  insure  that  the  OAS  represents  all  of 
the  peoples  of  our  region,  we  should  open 
up  the  organization  to  the  newly  independent 
states  and  those  which  may  become  inde- 
pendent, both  on  the  continent  and  in  the 
Caribbean.  Although  these  questions  of 
membership  require  further  study,  we  be- 
lieve article  8  of  the  present  charter,  which 
automatically  excludes  certain  states,  is  an 
anachronism  and  should  be  removed. 

C.  As  to  financing, 

A  serious  effort  to  reform  the  Organiza- 
tion of  American  States  should  include  a  re- 
view of  present  provisions  for  its  financing. 

You  are  all  aware  of  the  critical  attention 
the  Congress  of  the  United  States  has 
focused  on  the  proportion  of  the  organiza- 
tion's cost  the  United  States  is  now  bearing. 
Obviously,  this  has  been  a  factor  in  recent 
U.S.  budget  cuts  affecting  the  OAS.  We  do 
not  claim  that  the  United  States  is  paying 
too  much  or  more  than  its  fair  share  of  the 
cost  in  terms  of  our  relative  ability  to  pay. 
It  is  only  that  it  is  wrong  and  damaging  for 
an  organization  of  two  dozen— soon  to  be 
25_sovereign  states,  whose  purpose  is  to 
advance  the  interests  of  each,  to  be  so 
heavily  dependent  on  the  contributions  of  a 


single  member.  It  places  the  organization  in 
a  vulnerable  position  and  projects  a  false 
image  of  the  OAS. 

It  is  important  to  find  some  basis  for  OAS 
financing  that  will,  over  time,  reduce  the 
U.S.  share  of  the  assessed  costs  while  insur- 
ing that  the  activities  of  the  OAS  in  the  vital 
development  assistance  field  are  not 
weakened. 

The  United  States  is  committed  to  the 
Organization  of  American  States.  We  know 
that  it  provides  an  institutional  base  which 
will  continue  to  be  vital  to  our  common  prog- 
ress. In  these  years  of  great  change,  the 
nations  of  the  world  have  seen  fresh  proof  of 
an  old  truth— that  the  most  durable  and 
responsive  institutions  are  those  which  bear 
a  lighter  burden  of  bureaucratic  machinery 
and  whose  procedures  permit  the  flexibility 
required  for  swift  and  imaginative  action. 

We  believe  our  proposals  can  help  bring 
the  drawn-out  reform  debate  to  a  successfu 
conclusion  over  the  course  of  the  next  year 
And  we  believe  this  is  the  kind  of  organiza 
tion  we  can  and  must  have  if  we  in  th( 
Americas  are  to  fulfill  our  promise  and  oui 
responsibility  to  advance  international  co 
operation  in  an  era  of  interdependence. 


JOINT  U.S.-PANAMA  REPORT  ^ 

For  the  past  twelve  years,  with  the  support  of  th 
OAS,  Panama  and  the  United  States  have  maintaine. 
an  active  negotiating  process  with  respect  to  th- 
new  regime  for  the  Panama  Canal.  By  virtue  of  th 
Joint  Declaration  of  April  3,  1964,'  both  countrie 
pledged  their  word  to  work  out  a  new  treaty—; 
treaty  new  not  only  in  its  date  of  entry  into  force 
but  also  in  the  mentality  which  it  will  reflect;  tha 
is,  it  will  be  in  accord  with  the  evolution  experience, 
by  the  international  community. 

We  are  negotiating  because  both  countries  feel  th 
need  to  build  a  new  relationship  which  gives  ful 
regard  to  the  aspiratipns  of  the  Panamanian  people 

■  Presented  to  the  General  Assembly  on  June  9  b;i 
the  Governments  of  the  Republic  of  Panama  am, 
the  United  States  (text  from  press  release  295).     ; 

»  For  text,  see  Bulletin  of  Apr.  27,  1964,  p.  65ei 


12 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 


the  interests  of  both  nations  and  the  principles  and 
objectives  of  the  Charter  of  the  UN.  And  we  are 
negotiating  in  deference  to  the  unanimous  views  of 
our  sister  republics  in  the  Western  Hemisphere. 

We  are  working  on  the  basis  that  every  negotiation 
concerning  an  old  problem  is  a  transaction  towards 
new  formulas  of  justice;  and  that  progress  can  only 
be  achieved  when  a  spirit  of  compromise  between 
the  parties  exists  as  a  result  of  their  understanding 
of  new  realities  and,  above  all,  when  they  seek  a 
balancing  of  interests  within  a  reasonable  period  of 
time. 

The  negotiating  process  has  confirmed  the  dedica- 
tion of  both  parties  to  the  eight  principles  agreed 
oil  by  their  authorized  representatives  on  February 
7,  1974.*  The  two  countries  reported  to  this  Assembly 
last  year  that  significant  progress  had  been  made  in 
this  process  of  balancing  the  interests  of  both  parties 
in  accordance  with  the  eight  principles.  We  are 
pleased  to  report  that  during  the  past  year  the 
parties  have  made  further  significant  progress  on 
the  highly  complex  issues  before  them. 

Differences  remain  between  the  two  parties  on 
important  issues — the  period  of  duration  of  the 
new  treaty  and  arrangements  in  the  land  and  water 
areas  comprising  the  Panama  Canal  Zone. 

The  Republic  of  Panama  and  the  United  States 
are  anxious  to  complete  these  negotiations  as  soon 
as  possible  and  recognize  that  the  other  nations  rep- 
resented in  this  Assembly  share  that  desire.  But  we 
have  recognized  that  the  complexity  of  the  issues 
remaining  before  us  requires  the  most  careful  and 
painstaking  negotiating  efforts  if  we  are  to  achieve 
a  treaty  which  is  truly  just  and  equitable — a  treaty 
which  will  balance  the  respective  interests  of  both 
countries  and  those  of  the  other  nations  of  the 
Hemisphere  and  the  world  in  such  a  way  as  to 
definitely  eliminate  the  potential  for  causes  of  con- 
flict in  the  future.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  both 
Governments  are  in  agreement  with  the  concept  ex- 
pressed by  General  Torrijos  [Brig.  Gen.  Omar  Tor- 
rijos,  Head  of  Government  of  Panama]  that  we  are 
not  simply  seeking  any  new  treaty — we  are  seeking 
a  treaty  that  will  fully  meet  our  common  goals  in 
the  future  and  be  seen  by  our  sister  republics  as 
reflecting  a  new  era  of  cooperation  in  the  Americas. 
The  United  States  and  the  Republic  of  Panama  re- 


iterate their  commitment  to  continue  their  most 
serious  efforts  to  achieve  such  a  treaty  as  promptly 
as  possible. 

The  negotiation  offers  both  peoples  a  peaceful 
alternative  for  the  solution  of  a  prolonged  disagree- 
ment between  them,  and  both  Governments  are  con- 
vinced that  it  is  their  responsibility  to  explore  to  the 
utmost  this  path  which  offers  such  real  possibihties 
for  a  satisfactory  agreement  which  will  cement  on 
solid  foundations  the  friendship  and  cooperation 
between  our  two  countries. 

If  we  continue  the  serious  work  presently  being 
carried  out  and  if  we  maintain  the  reciprocal  good 
will  of  both  missions  towards  reaching  a  solution 
to  the  pending  problems,  we  cherish  the  hope  that 
soon  we  will  be  able  to  advise  you  that  a  treaty  has 
been  agreed  upon,  a  treaty  which  not  only  all  Ameri- 
ca, but  the  entire  world,  awaits  as  an  effective  con- 
tribution to  consolidate  peace  and  friendship  amongst 
all  peoples. 


Letters  of  Credence 

Bolivia 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  the 
Republic  of  Bolivia,  Alberto  Crespo  Gutier- 
rez, presented  his  credentials  to  President 
Ford  on  May  21.' 

Czechoslovakia 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  the 
Czechoslovak  Socialist  Republic,  Jaromir 
Johanes,  presented  his  credentials  to  Presi- 
dent Ford  on  May  21.' 

Yemen  Arab  Republic 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  the 
Yemen  Arab  Republic,  Yahya  M.  al-Muta- 
wakkil,  presented  his  credentials  to  Presi- 
dent Ford  on  May  21." 


'  For  text  of  a  joint  statement  initialed  at  Panama 
on  Feb.  7,  1974,  by  Secretary  Kissinger  and  Pana- 
manian Foreign  Minister  Juan  Antonio  Tack,  see 
Bulletin  of  Feb.  25,  1974,  p.  184. 


'  For  texts  of  the  Ambassador's  remarks  and  the 
President's  reply,  see  Department  of  State  press 
release  dated  May  21. 


July  5,  1976 


13 


Secretary  Kissinger  Visits  Four  Latin  American  Countries 


Secretary  Kissinger  visited  the  Dominican 
Republic  June  6;  Bolivia  June  7 ;  Chile  June 
7-9,  where  he  headed  the  U.S.  delegation  to 
the  sixth  regular  OAS  General  Assembly  at 
Santiago:  and  Mexico  June  10-13.  Following 
are  remarks  and  neivs  conferences  by  Sec- 
retary Kissinger,  together  with  the  texts  of 
joint  communiques  issued  in  Bolivia  and 
Mexico.^ 


ARRIVAL    STATEMENT,    SANTO    DOMINGO, 
DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC,  JUNE  6 

Press    release    2s,i    dated    June    i; 

Mr.  Foreign  Minister:  It  is  a  great  honor 
for  me  to  begin  my  second  trip  within  this 
hemisphere  within  four  months  with  our 
friends  in  the  Dominican  Republic. 

President  Ford  has  sent  me  on  this 
journey  to  underline  the  special  ties  which 
the  United  States  feels  with  its  sister  re- 
publics in  the  Western  Hemisphere,  the  im- 
portance we  attach  to  the  dialogue  that  is 
growing  up  between  us,  and  our  conviction 
that  if  we  here  in  the  Western  Hemisphere 
cannot  solve  the  problems  between  developed 
and  developing  nations,  it  is  very  difficult  to 
solve  them  in  the  world  at  large. 

We  are  tied  together  by  a  similar  history, 
by  a  long  tradition  of  cooperation,  and  by 
the  conviction  that  in  this  hemisphere,  above 
all  others,  human  dignity  and  human  rights 
must  always  be  respected. 

All  these  subjects  will  be  discussed  at  the 
forthcoming  session  of  the  General  Assem- 
bly, which  my  colleague  your  Foreign  Minis- 


'  Other  press  releases  relating  to  Secretary 
Kissinger's  trip  are  286  of  June  6,  290  and  292  of 
June  7,  297  of  June  11,  298  of  June  10,  and  .S04  of 
June  12. 


14 


ter  and  I  are  planning  to  attend.  But  I  am 
here  to  say  also  that  in  a  world  in  which 
nonalignment  is  respected  and  in  which  we 
are  prepared  to  cooperate  with  nonalignedl 
nations,  we  nevertheless  greatly  value  andl 
appreciate  those  nations  that  have  alwaysi 
been  our  friends. 

We  were  greatly  impressed  and  moved  by 
the  remarks  of  your  distinguished  President 
on  February  27  in  his  Independence  Day 
message  when  he  said: 

In  an  era  in  which  a  certain  strident  nationalism 
and  certain  pseudo  anti-imperialist  poses  are  fashion- 
able, we  are  not  ashamed  of  our  friendship  with  tha 
United  States.  We  have  identified  with  the  destiny 
of  that  great  nation. 

We  reciprocate  this  feeling,  and  it  is  tci 
strengthen  that  friendship  between  our  two 
peoples  and  to  deepen  our  relationship  that 
I  have  come  here.  I  look  forward  to  my  talks  i 
with  your  leaders,  and  I  thank  you  for  the  i 
very  gracious  reception  that  Mrs.  Kissingen 
and  I  have  received. 


TOAST  BY  SECRETARY  KISSINGER, 
SANTO   DOMINGO,  JUNE  6' 

I  appreciate  very  much  the  warm  welcomf 
you  have  given  me.  I  am  pleased  to  have  this 
opportunity  to  visit  the  Dominican  Republic 
This  beautiful  island  holds  a  special  mean 
ing  for  all  the  peoples  of  the  Americas.  Foi 
here  culminated  the  most  momentous  voyagt 
of  discovery  in  all  human  history,  and  hen 
began  the  modern  history  of  our  hemisphere 

A  great  chronicler  of  Columbus'  voyages 
the  late  Samuel  Eliot  Morison,  pointed  oul 
that  the  most  remarkable  aspect  of  Colum- 


'  Given  at  a  luncheon  hosted  by  President  Joaquii 
Balaguer  on  June  6   (text  from  press  release  287) 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


bus'  enterprise  was  its  incredible  faith  in 
its  ultimate  success.  The  journey  that  ended 
on  your  shores  was,  above  all,  the  product 
of  spiritual  courage,  of  a  daring  to  search 
for  an  objective  whose  very  existence  could 
only  be  proven  through  faith.  Belief  in  the 
future  is  the  very  symbol  and  meaning  of 
the  Americas — the  bold  readiness  to  en- 
counter the  future  and  the  confident  faith 
that  human  exertion,  when  directed  by  prin- 
ciple and  liberty,  guarantees  progress.  With 
all  our  differences,  ours  has  always  been  the 
hemisphere  in  which  a  frontier  has  always 
been  a  challenge  and  not  a  limit,  where  man 
came  to  find  dignity  and  human  fulfillment. 

It  was  in  a  spirit  of  commitment  to  our 
unique  hemispheric  bond,  with  a  readiness  for 
shared  endeavor  and  faith  in  the  success  of 
our  common  future,  that  I  visited  Latin 
America  four  months  ago.  And  it  is  in  this 
spirit  that  I  begin  my  second  trip  to  Latin 
ilAmerica  this  year  here  in  the  Dominican 
Republic — to  continue  the  work  we  began 
in  February,  to  strengthen  by  consultations 
and  concrete  proposals  the  impetus  of  im- 
proving relations  between  the  United  States 
and  the  nations  of  Latin  America,  and  to  help 
make  our  hemisphere  a  model  of  what  in- 
terdependent nations  can  achieve  by  cooper- 
ative effort.  To  reach  that  lofty  objective, 
we  will  need  faith,  and  if  I  may  put  it  in 
terms  which  will  be  familiar  to  you,  we  will 
also  need  hope  and,  occasionally,  a  good  bit 
of  charity  toward  each  other. 

The  United  States  has  always  regarded 
its  relationship  with  Latin  America  as  a 
central  element  in  its  national  life — not 
solely  as  a  matter  of  foreign  policy — for  too 
much  of  our  history  derives  from  Spanish- 
speaking  settlers  and  too  many  of  our  citi- 
zens are  of  Latin  origin  for  such  a  relation- 
ship to  be  characterized  as  "foreign." 

The  sources  of  our  special  bond  are  mani- 
fold :  The  epic  of  discovery  and  settlement, 
our  peoples'  struggles  for  national  independ- 
ence, our  common  interest  in  shielding  our 
countries  from  external  intrusion,  our  work 
together  to  build  international  structures  for 
cooperation  and  economic  progress,  our  com- 


mitment to  human  dignity,  and  above  all, 
our  deep  cultural  and  personal  ties. 

The  depth  of  these  bonds  goes  beyond 
institutions;  they  penetrate  the  soul.  The 
United  States  has  always  felt  with  Latin 
America  a  special  intimacy  and  close  friend- 
ship. Today,  when  our  countries  are  deeply 
involved  in  world  affairs,  even  when  our  per- 
ceptions and  interests  are  not  always  iden- 
tical we  continue  to  draw  upon  a  particular 
warmth  in  our  personal  relationships  and  an 
exceptional  respect  and  regard  for  each 
other's  views  and  concerns. 

The  partnership  in  our  hemisphere — 
shaped  by  history,  tradition,  and  common 
interest — was  formalized,  by  and  large,  in  a 
series  of  treaties,  and  impelled  by  organiza- 
tional machinery,  dedicated  to  peace  and 
security.  This  shared  commitment,  given 
form  in  the  Organization  of  American  States, 
is  still  indispensable  to  our  partnership. 

Today,  the  evolution  of  the  hemisphere 
and  the  world  impels  us  to  expand  the  range 
of  our  concerns  beyond  the  traditional 
agenda  of  security  and  peace.  It  is  fortunate 
that  our  relationship  is  so  deep  that  it  can 
comfortably  accommodate  the  broad  range 
of  human  preoccupations. 

We  have  come  to  understand  that  while 
we  must  remain  strong  in  our  dedication  to 
the  peace  and  security  of  this  hemisphere, 
we  are  at  the  same  time  challenged  by  a  new 
agenda  of  development  issues.  The  growing 
role  of  the  nations  of  this  hemisphere  in  the 
global  economy  and  in  world  forums  dealing 
with  development  issues  and  their  unique 
position  as  the  most  developed  of  the  devel- 
oping nations  provide  an  unprecedented  op- 
portunity to  shape  the  problems  of  interde- 
pendence. 

To  reflect  these  new  perceptions,  I  pledged 
last  February  that  the  United  States  would: 

— Take  special  cognizance  of  the  distinc- 
tive requirements  of  the  more  industrialized 
economies  of  Latin  America  and  of  the 
region  as  a  whole,  in  the  context  of  our  ef- 
forts to  help  shape  a  more  equitable  inter- 
national order; 

— Assist  directly  the  neediest  nations   in 


July  5,  1976 


15 


the  hemisphere  afflicted  by  poverty  and 
natural  disaster; 

— Support  Latin  American  regional  and 
subregional  efforts  to  organize  for  coopera- 
tion and  integration; 

— Negotiate  on  the  basis  of  parity  and 
dignity  our  specific  differences  with  each  and 
every  state,  to  solve  problems  before  they 
become  conflicts; 

— Enforce  our  commitment  to  collective 
security  and  to  maintain  regional  integrity 
against  attempts  to  undermine  solidarity, 
threaten  independence,  or  export  violence; 
and 

— Work  to  modernize  the  inter-American 
system  to  respond  to  the  needs  of  our  times 
and  give  direction  to  our  common  action. 

Since  February  the  United  States  has 
worked  hard  to  make  progress  in  each  of 
these  areas.  We  have  introduced  trade,  in- 
vestment, and  technology  proposals  of 
special  relevance  to  the  countries  of  this 
hemisphere  at  global  forums  in  Paris  and 
Nairobi.  We  have  responded  to  the  coura- 
geous efforts  of  the  Guatemalan  people  to  re- 
cover from  the  earthquake  that  devastated 
their  land.  We  have  provided  fresh  support 
to  subregional  cooperation  in  Central  Amer- 
ica and  are  exploring  ways  of  relating  more 
effectively  to  the  Andean  Pact.  And  we  have 
not  only  intensified  bilateral  efforts  with 
several  countries  but  have  made  a  special 
effort  to  prepare  for  the  current  meeting  of 
the  OAS  General  Assembly,  which  provides 
a  unique  opportunity  to  review  our  progress 
together  and  give  it  common  direction. 

I  look  forward  to  discussing  these  and 
other  recent  global  and  regional  events  with 
my  colleagues  at  the  General  Assembly,  and 
I  shall  be  putting  forward  additional  pro- 
posals on  a  number  of  key  issues  to  further 
our  efforts  on  a  multilateral  regional  basis 
as  well. 

A  major  element  in  this  second  trip  is 
that  it  builds  naturally  on  the  first;  in  Feb- 
ruary I  was  not  only  able  to  state  our  aims 
but  to  listen  to  and  gain  some  understanding 
of  your  concerns — concerns  over  trade,  the 
transfer  of  technology,  and  regional  coopera- 


16 


tion.  The  proposals  we  plan  to  present  ati 
Santiago  reflect  that  understanding  and  re 
spond  to  those  concerns  and  thus  represent 
concrete  steps  in  our  longstanding  partner 
ship. 

Two  subjects  that  are  high  on  the  inter 
national  agenda  are  especially  relevant 
trade  and  technology. 


Trade 

The  United  States  is  fully  aware  that 
trade  is  the  indispensable  engine  of  growth 
for  the  nations  of  the  hemisphere  and  that 
the  United  States  and  the  other  developed 
countries  are  the  most  significant  trading 
partners  of  the  region.  Trade  is  the  source 
of  most  of  Latin  America's  foreign  exchange 
and  so  is  essential  if  Latin  America  is  to  ac- 
quire the  imported  capital  goods  which  are 
vital  to  future  industrialization.  But  trade 
is  at  the  same  time  the  most  serious  point 
of  national  vulnerability  to  external  circum- 
stance. Cycles  of  boom-and-bust,  fueled  by 
abrupt  fluctuations  in  the  prices  of  commodi- 
ties like  sugar  and  coffee,  tin  and  copper, 
have  plagued  the  development  struggle  in 
the  Americas  for  decades. 

We  are  dedicated  to  the  search  for  effec- 
tive solutions  to  the  problems  of  interna- 
tional commodity  marketing,  as  I  made  clear 
in  my  statement  to  the  UNCTAD  IV  [fourth 
ministerial  meeting  of  the  U.N.  Conference 
on  Trade  and  Development]  in  Nairobi  a  few 
weeks  ago.  And  we  are,  as  recent  decisions 
by  President  Ford  under  the  Trade  Act  have 
shown,  equally  dedicated  to  a  more  liberal 
global  trading  system  in  which  Latin  Amer- 
ica will  have  greater  opportunity  to  expand 
its  earnings  from  nontraditional  manufac- 
tured export  sales. 

In  February  I  pledged  that  the  United 
States  would  support  Latin  America's  drive 
for  broadened  participation  in  the  interna- 
tional economy  as  a  means  to  assure  stable 
growth.  During  this  visit,  at  the  General 
Assembly,  I  shall : 

— Make  clear  our  determination  to  ad- 
minister our  Trade  Act  in  ways  constantly 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


more  favorable  to  Latin  America's  exports; 

—Announce  our  willingness  to  explore 
with  Latin  America  ways  in  which,  through 
3ur  own  trade  policies,  we  can  offer  incen- 
tives for  more  liberal  trade  and  greater  in- 
;egration  in  Latin  America; 

— State  our  willingness  next  month,  at 
he  multilateral  trade  negotiations  in 
Geneva,  to  consider  special  safeguards  treat- 
nent  for  certain  developing  countries  and, 
n  other  ways,  to  press  the  trade  interests  of 
jRtin  America  at  the  Geneva  conference; 

-Explore  several  means  of  expanding 
iVestern  Hemisphere  commodity  production 
md  exports;  and 

— Propose  a  new  inter-American  consulta- 
;ive  mechanism  on  trade  so  that  the  inter- 
\.merican  system  shall  enjoy,  for  the  first 
ime,  an  open,  continuing  forum  for  dialogue 
m  this  the  most  significant  economic  rela- 
;ionship  of  the  nations  of  this  hemisphere. 

'ethnology 

Economic  development,  in  the  end,  means 
limply  the  expansion  of  output  and  the  im- 
)rovement  in  efficiency  of  the  workers,  the 
arms,  and  the  factories  of  our  nations.  In 
today's  world,  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  of 
my  long-term  growth  in  a  nation  which  is 
vithout  modern  technology — the  capability 
)f  exploiting  the  insights  and  discoveries  of 
he  modern  scientific  method  for  the  better- 
nent  of  man's  condition.  Latin  America's 
levelopment  aspirations  turn  on  technology, 
)ut  as  I  emphasized  during  my  visit  in  Feb- 
•uary,  it  must  be  technology  compatible  with 
he  conditions  of  Latin  America,  nurtured  by 
^atin  Americans  in  Latin  American  institu- 
ions,  and  capable  of  thrusting  the  economies 
)f  Latin  America  into  the  competitive  fore- 
ront  of  the  world's  markets. 

At  the  General  Assembly  this  time,  I 
hall: 

— Announce  measures  to  expand  Latin 
America's  access  to  our  own  National  Tech- 
lical  Information  Service; 

— Detail  an  increased  U.S.  assistance  pro- 
rram  for  the  coming  year  for  the  develop- 


ment of  indigenous  technology  capability 
within  Latin  America; 

— Announce  that  we  are  opening  a  tech- 
nology exchange  service  for  Latin  America 
to  service  requests  for  information  about 
public  and  privately  owned  technology  in  the 
United  States; 

— Indicate  that  we  are  prepared  to  mount 
a  pilot  program  of  practical  technology  ex- 
changes between  private  Latin  American  and 
U.S.  companies;  and 

— In  general,  elaborate  for  Latin  Amer- 
ica the  technology  initiatives  which  I  sug- 
gested in  Nairobi  recently  and  those  which 
were  approved  in  the  technology  resolution 
at  UNCTAD  IV. 

These  steps,  which  we  are  prepared  to  re- 
fine and  implement  in  consultation  with  the 
other  countries  of  the  hemisphere,  will  not 
only  increase  the  prosperity  of  our  individual 
countries;  they  will  increase  their  capacity 
to  define  and  maximize  the  benefits  of  inter- 
national cooperation  and  progress.  Above  all, 
they  should  strengthen  the  spirit  of  coopera- 
tion and  partnership. 


Human  Rights 

The  origins  of  our  hemispheric  traditions, 
and  the  values  of  our  civilization  tell  us, 
however,  that  material  progress  is  not  suffi- 
cient for  the  human  personality.  We  of  the 
Americas  have  a  special  obligation  to  our- 
selves and  the  world  to  maintain  and  ad- 
vance international  standards  of  justice  and 
freedom. 

In  February  I  stated  our  conviction  that 
basic  human  rights  must  be  preserved,  cher- 
ished, and  defended  in  this  hemisphere — for 
if  they  cannot  be  preserved,  cherished,  and 
defended  here,  where  the  rights  and  the 
promise  of  the  individual  have  played  such 
a  prominent  historic  role,  then  they  are  in 
jeopardy  everywhere. 

During  this  trip  I  shall  stress  that  the 
struggle  for  human  dignity  is  central  both 
to  national  development  and  to  international 
cooperation,  and  I  shall  propose  a  strength- 


uly  5,  1976 


17 


ened    role    for   the    Inter-American    Human 
Rights  Commission. 

Our  Inter-American  System 

We  have  many  forms  of  cooperation;  our 
bilateral  and  global  interactions  are  increas- 
ing constantly.  To  give  them  an  added  re- 
gional dimension,  no  organization  is  more 
important  than  the  Organization  of  Ameri- 
can States. 

Last  February  I  pledged  that  we  would 
work  to  modernize  the  inter-American  sys- 
tem to  respond  to  the  needs  of  our  times  and 
give  direction  to  our  common  action.  Dur- 
ing my  current  trip  I  shall  urge  that  we 
increase  the  frequency  of  our  consultations 
through  the  General  Assembly  and  elimi- 
nate those  other  elements  of  the  OAS  struc- 
ture that  have  become  anachronistic,  and  I 
shall  propose  that  these  reforms  of  the  OAS 
be  considered  by  a  special  intergovernmental 
working  group  on  the  charter. 

Over  the  course  of  the  next  year,  these 
steps  should  lead  to  a  more  flexible  and  re- 
sponsive instrument  of  cooperation  between 
the  United  States  and  the  countries  of  Latin 
America  and  help  bring  the  drawn-out  re- 
form debate  to  a  successful  conclusion. 

These  proposals  will  be  offered  as  sin- 
cere, serious  attempts  to  respond  to  Latin 
American  suggestions. 

History  has  proven  time  and  again  how 
difficult  it  is  for  those  living  in  an  age  of 
revolutionary  change  to  pei'ceive  the  forces 
taking  shape  around  them,  much  less  exer- 
cise influence  over  their  direction  and  im- 
pact. I  beheve  that  we  here  in  this  hemi- 
sphere, because  of  our  partnership  of  shared 
endeavor  and  straightforward  consultation, 
are  closer  than  any  other  group  of  nations 
to  understanding  the  problems  we  face,  more 
able  to  discuss  them  in  the  spirit  of  a  long 
tradition  of  cooperation,  and  more  willing  to 
take  the  necessary  steps  to  master  our  com- 
mon destiny.  With  good  will  and  firm  com- 
mitment, we  can  make  a  record  of  progress 
in  this  hemisphere  on  the  crucial  issues  of 
an  interdependent  world  which  will  be  a 
model  and  an  inspiration  to  nations  every- 
where. 


18 


The  peoples  of  the  Americas,  who  pio- 
neered these  unexplored  continents  and  built 
nations  under  conditions  of  great  adversity, 
know  that  progress  does  not  come  easily. 
But  we  know  as  well  that  cooperative  and 
committed  effort  and  faith  in  the  future  are 
the  surest  means  to  progress. 

Mr.  President,  the  year  1976  has  a  special 
meaning  for  both  of  us.  In  the  United  States, 
it  is  a  Bicentennial  year  of  renewed  dedica- 
tion to  our  ideals.  For  you,  it  is  a  year  of 
homage  to  a  great  Dominican  leader:  Juan 
Pablo  Duarte.  Like  Jefferson  and  Bolivar, 
Juarez  and  Lincoln,  Duarte  has  given  the 
Americas  a  legacy  of  love  of  mankind  and 
country. 

You,  Mr.  President,  a  distinguished  his- 
torian and  a  scholar  of  Duarte,  have  had  an 
opportunity  which  was  tragically  denied  to 
him.  For  nearly  10  years,  you  have  been  al- 
lowed to  direct  the  fortunes  of  your  coun- 
try, to  lead  it  away  from  political  and  eco- 
nomic unrest  toward  peace,  prosperity,  and  j 
liberty. 

During  the  first  four  years  of  this  decade 
alone,  the  people  of  the  Dominican  Republic 
enjoyed  a  real  annual  increase  in  per  capita 
income  of  nearly  8  percent,  one  of  the  high- 
est rates  of  progress  not  just  in  this  hemi- 
sphere but  the  world.  This  growth  has  en- 
abled you  to  resist  subsequent  dislocations 
in  the  global  economy  and  to  make  greai 
strides  in  institutional  development  anc 
culture  as  well. 

In  less  fortunate  times,  when  stability  anc 
confidence  were  threatened,  you  addressed  i 
message  to  the  young  people  of  your  coun- 
try. You  reminded  them  of  the  ideals  anc 
aspirations  of  Duarte  and  of  their  obliga- 
tions as  inheritors  of  his  hope.  You  said: 

...  To  chaos  and  to  lack  of  confidence  by  some 
in  our  own  future,  we  can  offer  in  return  politica 
security  in  the  present  and  in  the  future;  to  ignorani 
narrowness,  we  can  offer  our  abundant  confidence 
our  faith  in  progress,  our  permanent  commitment  tc 
national  conciliation  and  concord. 

This  is  also  a  message  to  the  hemisphere 
It  is  a  message  of  indomitable  faith  in  the 
future  worthy  of  the  heritage  and  the  proud 
achievement  of  this  hemisphere. 

Ladies  and  gentlemen,  I  ask  you  to  joir 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


aui 


me  as  I  propose  a  toast  on  behalf  of  the 
President  and  people  of  the  United  States: 
To  His  Excellency,  Dr.  Joaquin  Balaguer, 
President  of  the  Dominican  Republic,  to  the 
enduring  friendship  between  our  two 
countries,  to  the  prosperity  and  well-being  of 
the  Dominican  people,  and  to  the  voyage  to 
the  future  upon  which  we  in  the  Americas 
have  embarked  and  which  will  lead  us  to  a 
new  world  of  peace,  dignity,  justice,  and 
progress  for  all  our  peoples. 


NEWS  CONFERENCE,  SANTO  DOMINGO,  JUNE  6 

ess   release   288  dated   June   6 

Q.  There  is  one  basic  question:  What  is  the 
real  purpose  of  your  visit  to  the  Dominican 
Republic? 


Secretary  Kissinger:  As  I  indicated  at  the 
airport,  this  is  my  second  visit  to  Latin 
America  in  four  months,  and  I  am  trying  to 
see  as  many  countries  of  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere as  I  can  during  this  year  to  create  a 
basis  for  a  new  relationship  between  the 
United    States    and    the    countries    of    the 

™  Western  Hemisphere. 

I  am  using  the  occasion  of  the  General 
Assembly  in  Santiago  to  stop  here  to  ex- 
change views  with  an  old  friend  of  the 
United  States,  a  country  that  plays  a  cen- 
tral role  in  the  Caribbean  area  and  whose 
problems  are  characteristic  of  many  of  the 
smaller  countries  of  this  region.  This  is  the 

'"Ibasic  purpose  of  my  visit  in  Santo  Domingo. 
The  lai-ger  purpose  is  to  establish  a  rela- 
tionship between  the  United  States  and  its 

'"iWestern  Hemisphere  neighbors,  to  contrib- 
ute to  the  dialogue  between  the  developed 
and  the  developing  nations,  and  to  help  con- 
struct in  this  hemisphere  a  model  of  what 
the  relationship  in  the  world  at  large  can  be 
over  a  period  of  time. 

In  any  case,  it  is  a  pleasure  for  me  to 
visit  a  country  with  which  we  have  no  bi- 
lateral problems  and  from  which  we  don't 
want  anything  and  also  to  have  the  oppor- 
tunity to  visit  a  capital  which  has  shown 
great  friendship. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  today  you  stated  that  the 
July  5,  1976 


matter  of  human  rights  is  a  matter  that  is 
rital  for  continued  cooperation  in  the  region. 
Does  this  mean  that  the  United  States  will 
not  provide  economic  assistance  to  Chile  in 
view  of  the  demonstrated  and  systematic 
violations  of  human  rights  by  the  goveryi- 
ment  of  General  Pinochet? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  United  States 
has  made  clear  and  will  make  clear  again  in 
Santiago  its  commitment  to  human  rights, 
and  it  will  make  some  specific  proposals  on 
how  to  advance  them  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere.  We  are  not  here  to  discuss 
questions  related  to  interruption  of  eco- 
nomic assistance  or  economic  matters. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  I  wonder  ivhether  you 
coidd  please  explain  the  neio  role  of  the  Do- 
minican Republic  ivithin  the  context  of  this 
new  policy  that  you  have  expressed  in  the 
area  of  the  Latin  American  Continent  and, 
very  specifically,  the  role  of  this  country  in 
the  Caribbean  area.  We  have  heard  receyitly 
and  there  has  been  some  evidence  of  efforts 
or  trends  to  stop  the  establishment  of  blocs 
of  producers  of  raw  materials.  On  the  other 
hand,  we  have  heard  of  the  role  of  an  arms 
or  ammunition  factory  that  is  being  run  by 
some  Cuban  exiles  and  there  are  rumors  that 
the  CIA  has  something  to  do  with  it.  We 
would  like  to  know  what  the  role  of  this 
factory  is  in  the  Caribbean  and  with  respect 
to  Latin  America  and  the  area  in  general. 
There  has  been  late  news  of  arms  shipments 
made  to  Chile  and  that  this  was  a  sale  ef- 
fected  by  the  United  States  through  the 
Dominican  Republic.  Could  you  comment? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  have  never  heard 
of  any  arms  sales  to  Chile  by  way  of  the 
Dominican  Republic,  and  that,  in  any  case, 
would  be  against  our  laws.  So  I  don't  believe 
that  this  is  possible.  I  have  also  never  heard 
of  an  arms  factory  established  by  Cuban 
exiles,  but  there  are  many  things  under  the 
sun  that  I  haven't  heard  of,  though  it's  very 
rare  for  me  to  admit  it. 

The  role  of  the  Dominican  Republic  can 
be,  as  it  has  been  traditionally,  one  of  mod- 
eration and  cooperation.  We  are  not  attempt- 
ing to  stop  the  formation  of  producer  blocs. 


19 


but  the  producers  cannot  complain  if  the 
consumers  then  also  create  organizations  of 
their  own.  Our  basic  theme  is  not  to  tell 
other  countries  how  to  organize  themselves. 
Our  basic  theme  is  that  relations  between 
producers  and  consumers  cannot  be  settled 
by  confrontation,  everybody  will  suffer,  but 
most  of  all  the  poorest  countries.  And  this 
is  why  we  have  made,  constantly,  proposals 
to  encourage  a  dialogue  and  to  take  into 
account  the  concerns  of  the  developing  coun- 
tries and  why  we  believe  that  in  the  last  15 
months  considerable  progress  in  that  direc- 
tion has  been  made. 

We  have  a  long  flight  ahead  of  us,  so  if 
I  could  ask  for  only  two  more  questions. 

Q.  What  other  fundamental  or  primary 
benefits  are  or  could  he  offered  to  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Dominican  Republic  in  the 
social  and  economic  order  in  connection  with 
your  visit,  Mr.  Secretary? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  did  not  come  here 
in  order  to  make  a  commercial  deal  with 
the  Dominican  Republic.  I  came  here  to  visit 
old  friends,  to  discuss  the  general  principles 
of  hemispheric  cooperation,  and  to  deal  with 
a  few  specific  problems  of  direct  import  to 
our  countries. 

I  believe  that  the  benefits  to  the  Domini- 
can Republic  will  develop  from  the  general 
program  of  hemispheric  cooperation  that 
we  are  trying  to  develop  and  our  general 
readiness  to  deal  with  the  special  concerns 
of  the  Dominican  Republic  with  an  attitude 
of  friendship.  But  you  should  not  present 
this  as  if  I  had  come  here  on  a  sort  of  com- 
mercial mission  in  which  we  asked  some- 
thing of  the  Dominican  Republic  and  then 
paid  a  certain  amount  for  it.  This  is  not  the 
sort  of  visit  it  was. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  do  you  feel  you're  in  a 
position  to  affirm  and  state  that  the  United 
States  will  not  repeat  the  type  of  activity 
that  we  ivere  subjected  to  during  the  1965 
experience — that  is  to  say  that  no  new  armed 
intervention  ivill  ever  be  carried  out  in  our 
own  territory — or  do  you  feel  that  circum- 
stances could  lead  to  a  repetition  of  such  type 
of  activity? 


20 


Secretary  Kissinger:  One  of  the  celebrated 
candidates  in  the  American  political  cam- 
paign has  just  announced  that  he  has  made 
a  new  discovery,  which  is  never  to  answer  a 
hypothetical  question.  I  have  so  few  oppor- 
tunities to  agree  with  him  that  I  would  like 
to  record  my  agreement. 

But  to  answer  your  hypothetical  ques- 
tion— we  are  not  looking  for  opportunities 
for  military  intervention.  And  we  are  trying 
to  build  a  relationship  of  cooperation  in  this 
hemisphere. 

May  I  use  this  occasion  to  thank  the 
Dominican  Government,  its  President,  For- 
eign Minister,  and  all  the  people  we  have 
met  for  the  extraordinarily  warm  reception 
that  we  have  received  here. 


NEWS  CONFERENCE,  SANTA  CRUZ,  BOLIVIA, 
JUNE  7 

Press    release  291   dated   June   7 

Q.  With  ivhom  did  you  confer  last  night 
and  today,  and  what  ivere  the  subjects? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Before  I  answer  the 
question  I  want  to  take  this  opportunity  to 
thank  the  Bolivian  Government  on  behalf  of 
my  colleagues  for  the  reception  we  have 
had  here.  I  already  had  an  opportunity  to 
express  my  views  at  City  Hall.  I  would  like 
to  repeat  again  how  touched  we  all  have 
been  by  the  very  friendly  reception  we  have 
had  here. 

In  answer  to  your  question,  last  evening 
I  had  a  very  brief  talk  with  the  Foreign 
Minister.  This  morning  I  met  for  about 
two  hours  with  the  President,  the  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  the  Finance  Minister, 
and  two  others  of  their  associates,  and  I 
was  accompanied  by  Under  Secretary  Maw, 
Assistant  Secretary  Rogers,  and  our  Am- 
bassador to  Bolivia. 

We  reviewed  the  topics  that  are  covered 
in  the  communique — that  is,  the  progress  of 
economic  development;  bilateral  issues  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Bolivia;  and 
some  substantial  discussion  on  narcotics 
control,  which  is  a  matter  of  great  concern 
for    both    our    countries.    Also,     Secretary  lij 

Department  of  State   Bulletin    III 


logei's  met  with  the  Minister  of  Finance  last 
light  to  go  into  some  more  details  on  the 
conomic  subjects  that  were  also  discussed 
his  morning. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary  of  State,  two  points  I 
vould  like  to  ask  you  about,  and  they  concern 
—they  are  matters  of  special  concern  to  all 
jatin  American  countries.  The  first  point 
efers  to  the  landlocked  nature  of  Bolivia  and 
ts  desires  to  gain  access  to  the  sea.  The  sec- 
nd  one  refers  to  the  matter  of  Panamanian 
lesires  to  assert  sovereignty  over  the  canal 
rea.  I  ivoidd  like  to  ask  you  specifically  rvhat 
teps  the  United  States  is  contemplating  to 
Ind  a  solution  to  these  ttvo  problems  and, 
dditionally,  what  type  of  support  is  the 
Inited  States  intending  tvhen  you  say  that 
he  United  States  does  support  Bolivia's  de- 
ires  to  have  access  to  the  sea? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  With  respect  to  the 
jsue  of  Panama,  three  American  Presi- 
ents  have  been  negotiating  with  Panama 
a  order  to  see  whether  it  is  possible  to 
econcile  the  American  interests  of  free  and 
ninterrupted  passage  through  the  canal 
ath  Panamanian  aspirations.  We  do  this 
ot  only  because  of  the  concerns  of  the 
ountry  of  Panama  but  because  of  our  con- 
ictions  that  all  of  the  countries  of  the 
Vestern  Hemisphere  are  watching  these 
egotiations  at  this  time  for  the  new  and 
f  qual  relationship  that  we  are  attempting  to 
stablish  with  the  countries  of  the  Western 
f  lemisphere. 

!ii  We  are  negotiating  seriously.  So  far  no 
lit  onclusions  have  been  reached,  but  we  are 
ei  roceeding  on  a  serious  exploration  to  see 
r,  /hether  the  interests  of  both  the  United 
litates  and  Panama  and  the  concerns  of  all 
if.  if  the  countries  of  the  Western  Hemisphere 
'  an  find  an  expression  that  strengthens  the 
ies  of  the  Western  Hemisphere  and  assures 
r£  ree  access  and  passage  through  the  canal. 
li  i.s  you  know,  this  has  been  the  subject  of 
considerable  debate  in  the  United  States, 
ti  ut  we  believe  that  we  are  acting  in  the 
(i  ational  interests  and  in  the  Western  Hemi- 
n  phere's  interests,  and  we  are  proceeding 
!;  rith  these  negotiations. 


As  for  the  Bolivian  access  to  the  sea,  you 
know  better  than  I  that  this  is  a  complicated 
problem  involving  Chile,  Bolivia,  and  Peru 
that  all  three  countries  have  to  agree.  It  is 
our  understanding  that  some  preliminary 
understandings  have  been  reached  between 
Chile  and  Bolivia  and  are  now  being  dis- 
cussed with  Peru. 

The  United  States  watches  these  negotia- 
tions with  sympathy,  and  it  hopes  that  a 
successful  conclusion  can  be  achieved,  in  the 
belief  that  this  will  help  the  tranquillity  and 
cooperation  in  the  Southern  Cone.  We  will 
certainly  express  these  views  to  all  inter- 
ested parties  and  to  all  other  colleagues  in 
Santiago. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  of  all  of  your  diplomatic 
undertakings,  which  one  ivould  you  consider 
the  most  positive  in  your  pursuit  of  tvorld 
peace,  and  could  you  tell  us  tvhat  are  the  most 
recent  steps  and  most  recent  efforts  under- 
taken by  you  in  order  to  seek  peace  in  the 
world? 

Seci-etary  Kissinger:  I  would  not  want  to 
make  a  judgment  between  the  various  ac- 
tivities with  respect  to  peace,  because  if  the 
world  is  to  become  more  peaceful  several 
things  have  to  be  done  simultaneously.  The 
relationship  between  the  industrial  democ- 
racies has  to  be  strengthened.  The  relation- 
ship between  the  industrialized  countries  and 
the  developing  countries  has  to  grow  into 
one  of  cooperation  so  that  the  world  is  not 
forever  divided  between  those  who  are  ad- 
vanced and  those  who  are  struggling  for 
progress.  And  finally,  relations  between 
ideological  adversaries — between  East  and 
West — have  to  follow  some  rules  of  restraint. 
If  we  do  not  make  progress  in  all  of  these 
areas  simultaneously,  then  we  have  great 
difficulty  speaking  of  an  improvement  of 
world  peace. 

In  addition  to  the  structural  problems, 
there  are  specific  areas  such  as  the  Middle 
East  and  now  Africa,  and  I  believe  that  it 
is — that  America  has  an  obligation  to  use 
its  influence  and  its  power  to  attempt  to 
ease  conflicts,  to  mediate  rivalries,  and  to 
move  these  specific  issues  closer  to  a  peace- 
ful resolution. 


uly  5,  1976 


21 


Q.  In  Bolivia,  Mr.  Secretary,  tin  is  a  most 
important  basic  product,  and  the  high  cost 
of  production  of  this  mineral  makes  it  of 
great  significance  to  our  country.  Tin,  there- 
fore, and  the  ivorld  tin  situation  are  of  great 
significance.  The  Fifth  International  Tin 
Agreement  established  a  voting  system  that 
p7'0vides  a  virtual  veto  right  to  the  United 
States.  Bolivia  has  announced  its  intention 
not  to  ratify  such  an  agreement  because  of 
the  manner  in  ivhich  it  ivould  affect  its  in- 
terests. This  implies  the  right  of  the  United 
States  to  veto  the  positions  of  some  minor 
nations.  Woiddn't  this  be,  Mr.  Secretary,  in 
contradiction  to  some  of  the  principles  that 
you  stated  during  the  course  of  the  Nairobi 
Conference  ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  issue  of  com- 
modities is  one  of  the  principal  problems  in 
the  relations  between  the  developed  and  the 
developing  nations.  The  United  States  under- 
stands the  concern  of  the  producers  of  pri- 
mary products  and  especially  of  countries 
that  are  dependent  on — to  a  large  extent — 
on  the  single  commodities — commodity — to 
avoid  excessive  fluctuations  in  the  price,  and 
therefore,  frankly,  after  some  internal  de- 
bate, we  have  agreed  to  join  a  number  of 
commodity  agreements.  Some  have  already 
been  concluded,  and  we  have  agreed  to  dis- 
cuss others.  We  have  signed  [inaudible]. 

We  do  not  consider  that  our  voting  per- 
centage in  fact  constitutes  a  veto.  And  in 
any  event,  having  joined  the  agreement,  it 
would  be  our  intention  to  realize  its  objec- 
tive, which  is  to  prevent  exti-eme  fluctua- 
tions of  the  prices  and  to  enable  the  produc- 
ers of  the  primary  commodities  to  stabilize 
their  income.  I  frankly  am  not  aware  of  the 
fact  that  Bolivia  has  indicated  that  it  would 
not  ratify  the  agreement,  and  I  would  regret 
it  if  it  were  true,  because  one  of  the  prin- 
cipal reasons  for  our  joining  the  agreement 
is  precisely  to  help  countries  like  Bolivia. 
We  ourselves  are  not  tin  producers. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  I  have  read  in  a  publica- 
tion of  the  U.S.  Information  Service  entitled 
"Latin  America  in  a  Changing  World"  and 


have  noted  that  in  all  of  your  public  state- 
ments during  the  course  of  your  visits  to 
Veneztiela,  Peril,  Bolivia,  Colombia,  Costa 
Rica,  you  have  made  references  to  the  ynatter 
of  human  rights  and  to  the  need  for  the  obser- 
vation of  human  rights  in  order  to  promote 
peace  and  encourage  progress  among  the 
peoples  of  the  ivorld.  How,  Mr.  Secretary,  do 
you  think  that  the  United  States  can  require 
— demand — of  countries  that  do  not  respect 
such  human  rights,  that  they  do  so,  as  has 
been  on  occasion  suggested  by  Democratic 
Senator  Kennedy?  And  I  suggest  that  this 
is  not  on  my  part  an  effort  to  interfere  in 
the  internal  politics  of  another  country. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Before  I  answer  the 
last  expression,  may  I  thank  everybody  for 
the  extreme  courtesy  with  which  the  inter- 
view has  been  conducted — a  method  that  I 
am  considering  introducing  in  the  Depart- 
ment of  State — and  I  hope  that  the  Ameri- 
can correspondents  here  have  paid  great  at- 
tention to  the  politeness  with  which  every- 
thing has  been  conducted  here. 

Now,  to  answer  your  question.  I  think  the 
problem  of  human  rights  is  not  primarily  a 
question  of  preserving  the  peace,  because 
peace  can  also  be  preserved  in  the  absence 
[inaudible].  The  problem  of  human  rights 
arises  from  the  moral  positions  of  the  West- 
ern Hemisphere,  in  that  all  of  the  founding 
documents  of  all  of  our  republics  have 
called  attention  to  the  importance  of 
human  dignity  and  personal  freedom.  This 
is  the  hemisphere  to  which  people  came  to 
escape  oppression  elsewhere,  and  we  can  only 
be  true  to  our  history  and  to  the  human  im- 
peratives of  our  time  by  implementing  the 
demands  for  the  respect  for  human  dignity. 
I  will  make  a  statement  on  this  subject  at 
the  meeting  in  Santiago,  and  I  will  indicate 
the  U.S.  position  with  respect  to  it  and 
what  methods  we  believe  can  be  used  for 
the  time  being  to  advance  the  cause  of  hu- 
man rights  in  the  Western  Hemisphere.  But 
I  do  believe  that  this  hemisphere  has  a  spe- 
cial obligation  by  virtue  of  its  tradition  and 
by  virtue  of  its  basic  belief  to  promote  the 
advancement  of  human  rights. 


22 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


U.S.-BOLIVIA  JOINT  COMMUNIQUE,  JUNE  7' 

His  Excellency  the  Secretary  of  State  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  Dr.  Henry  A.  Kissinger, 
at  the  invitation  of  the  Government  of  Bolivia, 
visited  the  city  of  Santa  Cruz  de  la  Sierra  on  the 
6th  and  7th  of  June,  1976.  During  his  visit,  he  was 
received  by  His  Excellency  the  President  of  the 
Republic  of  Bolivia,  General  Hugo  Banzer  Suarez, 
with  whom  he  held  cordial  conversations  on  matter.^; 
of  mutual  interest  to  both  countries. 

After  a  friendly  dialogue  between  the  Secretary 
of  State  of  the  United  States  and  His  Excellency  the 
Minister  of  Foreign  Relations  and  Worship  of  the 
Republic  of  Bolivia,  General  Oscar  Adriazola  Valda, 
the   following   Communique   was    issued: 

Both  sides  reaffirmed  the  close  ties  of  friendship 
between  their  peoples  and  their  governments,  and 
expressed   satisfaction    at    the   high    level    of   under- 

i  standing  and   cooperation   existing   between   the   two 

:  nations. 

:  In  this  spirit.  His  Excellency  the  President  of 
,the     Republic     of     Bolivia,     General     Hugo     Banzer 

I  Suarez,   and   the   Minister  of   Foreign   Relations  and 

:  Worship,  General  Oscar  Adriazola  Valda,  outlined 
for  the  Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States  the 
scope    of   the    Bolivian    proposal    for   peace,   develop- 

I  ment,  and  integration  in  the  Southern  Cone,  intended 

;  to  resolve  Bolivia's  geographic  isolation  by  provid- 
ing sovereign  access  to  the  Pacific  Ocean. 
i  The  Secretary  of  State  manifested  great  interest 
in  this  important  subject,  and  stated  that  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  views  with  satis- 
ifaction  the  progress  which  has  been  achieved  up  to 
{the  present  toward  reaching  a  definite  solution 
that  will  satisfy  the  interests  of  the  concerned 
i  parties. 

The  Secretary  of  State  also  emphasized  that  a 
I  negotiated  solution  to  this  century-old  problem  would 
constitute  a  substantial  contribution  to  the  peace 
and  development  of  the  South  American  conti- 
nent. 

The  Chancellor  of  the  Republic  of  Bolivia  informed 
the  Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States  of  Amer- 
ica that  he  had  studied  with  great  interest  the 
speech  given  by  Dr.  Kissinger  during  the  general 
debate  at  UNCTAD  IV  which  took  place  in  Kenya, 
in  which  he  made  known  important  proposals  with 
regard  to  raw  materials,  trade,  and  financing;  and 
expressed  his  desire  that  these  proposals  achieve  an 
effective  application  within  the  framework  of  the 
United  Nations  system  of  cooperation  for  develop- 
ment. 
The  Governments  of  Bolivia  and  the  United  States 


^  Signed  at  Santa  Cruz  de  la  Sierra  by  President 
Banzer  and  Secretary  Kissinger  (text  from  press 
release  289). 


recognize  the  importance  of  international  agree- 
ments on  raw  materials  between  producing  countries 
and  consuming  countries.  The  United  States  has 
recognized  for  its  part  the  importance  of  the  income 
derived  from  exports  of  raw  materials  for  countries 
in  the  process  of  development,  such  as  Bolivia.  The 
Foreign  Minister  and  the  Secretary  of  State  agreed 
that  the  existing  integration  processes  in  Latin 
America  should  receive  the  necessary  support  since 
they  constitute  appropriate  mechanisms  for  achiev- 
ing inter-regional  economic  equilibrium,  accelerat- 
ing development  and  promoting  joint  activities  for 
the  achievement  of  harmonious  and  balanced 
progress. 

The  Foreign  Minister  and  the  Secretary  of  State 
agreed  on  the  necessity  to  increase  the  efforts  of  both 
Governments  to  combat  and  eradicate  the  manu- 
facture and  traffic  of  dangerous  substances.  They 
also  resolved  to  explore  the  means  of  encouraging 
the  socio-economic  development  of  the  zones  produc- 
ing coca  leaves  so  that  such  cultivation  can  be 
gradually  reduced. 

They  agreed  on  emphasizing  the  need  to  augment 
substantially  the  capacity  of  developing  countrie.s, 
like  Bolivia,  to  apply  science  and  technology  to  their 
economic  development  programs.  Likewise,  they  out- 
lined the  necessity  to  strengthen  the  mechanisms 
of  cooperation  in  favor  of  the  relatively  less  de- 
veloped countries. 

Both  countries  look  forward  to  a  prompt  and 
successful  conclusion  of  the  Conference  on  the  Law 
of  the  Sea  on  the  basis  of  a  consensus  which  satis- 
fies the  interests  of  the  entire  international  com- 
munity. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  reaffirms  its 
willingness  to  consult  with  Bolivia  with  regard  to 
its  plans  for  sales  of  tin  and  other  products  from  its 
strategic  reserves  and  states  that  such  sales  will 
be  made  with  due  regard  for  protection  against 
avoidable  disruption  of  usual  markets. 


REMARKS  AT  ECLA  HEADQUARTERS, 
SANTIAGO,  CHILE,  JUNE  9 

Press  release   296A   dated  June  9 

Mr.  Secretary  [Enrique  V.  Iglesias,  Ex- 
ecutive Secretary  of  ECLA,  the  U.N.  Eco- 
nomic Commission  for  Latin  America],  I 
appreciate  very  much  the  complimentary  re- 
marks that  you  have  made,  and  I  would  like 
you  and  your  distinguished  staff  to  know 
that  while  it  is  a  meeting  of  the  General  As- 
sembly of  the  Organization  of  American 
States  that  brings  me  to  Santiago  at  this 
time,  I  value  this  opportunity  to  meet  with 


July  5,  1976 


23 


you  and  to  visit  this  renowned  fountainhead 
of  ideas. 

You  have  much  of  which  to  be  proud. 
You,  Mr.  Secretary,  with  all  your  well-known 
energy  and  wisdom  have  followed  and  suc- 
cessfully built  upon  the  work  of  your  very 
capable  predecessors,  [Raul]  Prebisch,  [Jose 
Antonio]  Mayobre,  and  [Cai-los]  Quintana. 
These  men,  like  you,  were  well  known  within 
and  beyond  our  hemisphere  as  statesmen. 
My  colleagues  and  I  have  great  respect  for 
the  work  you  have  done  and  for  the  tremen- 
dous accomplishments  of  the  Economic 
Commission  for  Latin  America.  This  center 
of  study  and  action  has  done  much  to  ignite 
the  consciences  of  men  everywhere  to  take 
on  the  challenges  of  economic  development. 
Your  approach  is  progressive,  and  especially 
because  it  is  nonpolitical,  it  is  effective. 

As  is  only  to  be  expected,  we  have  at  times 
not  seen  eye  to  eye  with  regard  to  certain 
problems  or  the  prescriptions  for  dealing 
with  them.  But  we  have  avoided  ideological 
postures.  Our  thinking  and,  I  believe,  yours 
have  evolved;  in  the  process  we  have  moved 
closer  together  with  respect  to  many,  if  not 
most,  essentials.  We  have  listened  and 
learned  as  this  institution  has  led  the  move- 
ment for  economic  integration  among  the 
developing  countries  of  this  hemisphere.  We 
have  worked  together  on  trade  and  develop- 
ment, and  we  have  agreed  with  your  shift 
in  emphasis  from  import-substitution  to 
export-oriented  strategies. 

The  problem  of  economic  development  is 
not  primarily  a  technical  issue.  It  is  pro- 
foundly a  political  and  moral  issue.  It  is  not 
possible  to  build  a  world  community  which 
is  divided  between  the  rich  and  the  poor.  If 
we  are  to  live  in  a  world  of  peace  and  justice, 
all  nations  must  have  a  sense  of  participa- 
tion, and  all  nations  must  have  the  con- 
sciousness that  the  world  community  either 
takes  into  account  their  concerns  or  at  least 
listens  to  their  concerns. 

This  is  why  we  attach  such  extreme  im- 
portance to  the  dialogue  that  is  now  taking 
place  between  the  developed  and  developing 
nations ;  for  regardless  of  technical  solutions 
we  find,  the  spirit  we  can  help  engender  can 
contribute  to  a  world  of  peace  and  to  a  sense 


of  community.  And  this  is  why  we  are  con- 
cerned when  there  are  attitudes  of  confron- 
tation or  technical  majorities,  because  it  is 
the  essense  of  an  international  structure 
that  solutions  cannot  be  imposed  by  one 
group  on  another  but  that  a  consensus  must 
be  established  in  which  all  share. 

The  nations  of  Latin  America  have  a  very 
special  role  to  play  in  this  process.  They  are 
among  the  most  developed  of  the  develop- 
ing nations  or  among  the  least  developed 
of  the  developed  nations.  They  belong  to 
the  Organization  of  American  States,  and 
they  are  tied  to  us,  a  country  which  has  a 
great  concern  with  security  and  global 
equilibi'ium.  But  they  are  also  a  part  of 
other  groupings  of  the  so-called  Third  World, 
and  they  can,  therefore,  in  important  re- 
spects act  as  a  bridge  between  the  views  of 
the  different  groups  that  exist  in  the  world 
today. 

In  the  field  of  development,  the  United 
States  has  offered  important  proposals  for 
dealing  with  current  international  economic 
difficulties.  At  the  seventh  special  session  of 
the  U.N.  General  Assembly  we  put  forth 
suggestions,  and  agreement  was  reached  on 
a  number  of  measures  designed  to  enhance 
economic  security  and  to  cope  with  the 
cycles  that  in  the  past  have  devastated  ex- 
port earnings  and  undermined  development, 
and  we  dealt  with  other  issues  relating  to 
trade,  technology,  and  capital  flows. 

In  Nairobi,  we  advocated  a  comprehensive 
plan  for  addressing  major  commodity  issues 
and  set  forth  additional  proposals  for  deal- 
ing with  technology  and  other  requirements 
for  development.  Our  proposal  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  an  International  Resources  Bank 
failed  for  reasons  of  an  accidental  majority. 
But  I  cannot  scold  every  forum  that  I 
meet  on  this  topic.  I  think  we  have  made 
our  point. 

The  more  fundamental  problem  I  would 
like  to  put  to  this  distinguished  group  is 
how  to  relate  these  general  proposals  for 
global  development,  which  are  important,  to 
the  special  requirements  of  the  Western 
Hemisphere. 

My  colleagues  and  I  are  doing  a  great  deal 
of  thinking  on  how,  in  a  global  context  of 


24 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


development,  we  can  at  the  same  time  reflect 
the  special  ties  and  the  special  values  and 
the  particular  institutions  that  have  grown 
up  in  this  hemisphere — how  we  can  avoid 
being  caught  between  the  extremes  of  dog- 
matic globalism  and  dogmatic  regionalism. 
We  favor  regional  integration  of  the  Western 
Hemisphere  or  of  the  nations  of  Latin 
America,  either  in  subregional  groupings  or 
in  regional  groupings;  and  we  are  going  to 
give  very  serious  study  to  how,  within  a 
global  framework,  we  can  spur  the  very  spe- 
cial concerns  for  development  of  our  old 
friends  and  associates  in  the  hemisphere. 

Today,  at  the  meeting  of  the  OAS  Gen- 
eral Assembly,  I  made  some  specific  pro- 
posals of  what  can  be  done  within  the  frame- 
work of  existing  legislation  and  within  the 
discretion  that  our  executive  has,  but  I  also 
pointed  out  that  at  the  special  session  on 
development  that  has  been  proposed  by  sev- 
eral members  at  the  General  Assembly  and 
that  we  assume  will  take  place  next  spring, 
the  United  States  will  be  prepared  to  ad- 
dress the  more  fundamental  questions  that 
I'm  putting  to  my  friends  here:  how  to  re- 
late the  global  concerns  for  development 
Iwith  the  regional  concerns  of  the  Western 
Hemisphere,  because  it  would  be  wrong  to 
I  waste  the  traditions  of  cooperation  and  the 
I  special  relationships  that  have  grown  up  in 
this  hemisphere. 

I  am  providing  your  Executive  Secretary 
with  a  copy  of  the  paper  in  which  we  made 
a  series  of  comments  and  recommendations 
regai-ding  cooperation  for  development,  and 
I  hope  that  ECLA  will  find  that  it  can  play 
a  role  with  regard  to  some  of  the  arrange- 
ments we  suggested  on  vital  issues;  for 
example,  on  technology  for  development. 
-We  hope  also  that  you  will  not  feel  yourself 
iconfined  to  the  proposals  that  we  have  made 
iand  will  feel  free  to  offer  your  own  sugges-' 
Itions.  In  looking  at  the  record,  the  danger 
that  you  will  feel  yourself  confined  by  our 
proposals  is  minimal. 

The  nations  of  this  hemisphere  are  bound 
by  historical  and  other  special  ties  and  in- 
terests. The  United  States  consequently 
supported  and  has  been  interested  in  the 
work  of  ECLA  since  its  founding  in  1948. 


I  would  also  like  to  i-eciprocate  the  very 
warm  words  of  the  Secretary  General,  whose 
dedication  to  the  cause  of  peace  we  admire 
and  whose  indefatigable  efforts  in  all  areas 
of  world  problems  we  support.^  I  wish  you 
and  the  Executive  Secretary  the  very  best 
as  you  carry  on  your  important  work,  and 
I  would  like  to  thank  you  for  this  very  warm 
reception  I  have  had  here. 


NEWS  CONFERENCE,  MEXICO  CITY,  JUNE   11 

Piess   release   300  dated  June   H 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Ladies  and  gentle- 
men, having  read  some  of  your  commen- 
taries, I  know  you  have  many  questions.  I 
would  like,  however,  to  take  this  oppor- 
tunity to  express  again  my  very  great  joy 
to  be  in  this  country  which  I  love  so  much 
and  of  which  I  have  so  many  happy  personal 
memoi-ies  and  with  which  we've  been  so 
closely  tied  officially.  Especially  I  would  like 
to  express  my  appreciation  to  my  good 
friend,  your  distinguished  President,  whose 
contribution  to  peace  and  progress  and  jus- 
tice is  well  known  around  the  world  and  from 
whose  friendship  and  frank  opinions  we  have 
all  benefited  greatly.  And  now  I'll  be  glad  to 
answer  your  questions. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  what  do  you  ivant  to 
obtain  from  Mexico?  Do  you  ivant  Mexico  to 
be  subjected  to  you,  or  do  you  ivant  its  friend- 
ship? [Laughter.} 

Secretary  Kissinger:  You  have  to  remem- 
ber America  is  a  pragmatic  people,  and  I 
know  you  are  a  heroic  people,  so  I  am  not 
here  to  attempt  anything  so  foolhardy  as  to 
attempt  the  subjugation  of  Mexico,  and 
that  has  never  succeeded.  In  all  seriousness, 
the  big  international  problem  in  the  world 
today  is  that  for  the  first  time  in  history 
international   relations   have  become  global. 

For  the  first  time  world  peace  has  to  be 
built  on  the  basis  of  a  community  of  nations 


'  Roberto  Guyer,  personal  representative  of  U.N. 
Secretary  General  Kurt  Waldheim,  conveyed  a  mes- 
sage from  the  Secretary  General. 


July  5,  1976 


25 


that  feel  that  they  have  a  sense  of  partici- 
pation and  a  sense  of  justice.  That  can  only 
be  done  by  the  voluntary  cooperation  of 
other  countries,  and  in  this  sense,  Mexico 
and  the  United  States — that  have  had  a  very 
complicated  history  and  in  which  paternal- 
ism w^as  not  always  asked — have  a  special 
opportunity  to  demonstrate  how  two  great 
peoples  can  cooperate  on  the  basis  of  equality. 
And  if  we  do  not  cooperate  on  the  basis  of 
equality,  we  can  achieve  nothing. 

Q.  When  you  speak  of  the  dictatorship  of 
the  majorities,  could  ive  apply  the  same  con- 
cept to  the  majorities  in  the  United  States 
ivith  reference  to  their  own  political  life? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Of  course,  there  is  a 
difference  between  the  domestic — the  con- 
duct of  domestic  affairs  and  the  conduct  of 
international  affairs. 

In  domestic  affairs  in  a  democratic  coun- 
try, it  has  proved  to  be  the  most  equitable 
system  to  let  the  majority  determine  the  de- 
cisions of  the  people.  This  works  especially 
in  countries  where  the  minority  has  an  op- 
portunity to  become  the  majority.  In  coun- 
tries where  there  is  a  permanent  minority 
and  a  permanent  majority  along  racial  lines, 
it  also  has  its  problems.  Internationally, 
when  we  have  used  the  phrase  "the  dictator- 
ship of  the  majority,"  we  have  applied  it  to 
situations  in  which  a  numerical  grouping  of 
countries  composed  of  countries  of  very  un- 
equal status,  whose  total  population  might 
be  very  small,  attempted  to  impose  their  will 
on  a  minority,  without  whose  willing  cooper- 
ation it  is  not  possible  to  achieve  anything. 

I  believe  that  in  the  problems  of  develop- 
ment especially,  but  in  all  international  prob- 
lems, the  art  of  foreign  policy  is  to  obtain 
the  willing  cooperation  of  all  those  without 
whose  cooperation  progress  is  not  possible. 
And  if  one  is  looking  for  parliamentary-type 
victories  in  a  situation  in  which  there  is  no 
ability  to  enforce  those  victories,  one  is 
working  essentially  for  propaganda  and  not 
for  substance.  And  therefore  we  have  inter- 
nationally expressed  concern  about  unofficial 
majorities.  On  the  other  hand,  we  are  pre- 
pared to  work  out  cooperative  solutions,  and 


26 


I  believe  in  the  international  field  one  should 
proceed  by  consensus  and  not  by  imposition 
— either  imposition  by  power  or  imposition 
by  majority. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  do  you  have  information 
that  Cuba  is  in  fact  withdraiving  its  troops 
from  Angola,  and  if  this  is  the  case,  does  this 
inspire  you  to  resume  your  efforts  to  improve 
relations  with  Cuba? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  We  have  had  infor- 
mation through  the  Swedish  Prime  Minister 
and  other  statements  that  were  made  to  vari- 
ous other  countries  that  Cuba  intends  to 
withdraw  troops  at  a  rather  slow  I'ate  from 
Angola.  We  have  not  yet  been  able  to  achieve 
a  conclusive  confirmation,  especially  a  con- 
firmation of  whether  there  is  a  net  return 
or  whether  there  is  a  rotation.  So,  at  this 
point  it  would  be  premature  for  us  to  draw 
any  conclusions. 

We  had,  in  principle,  been  prepared  to  ex- 
plore the  normalization  of  relations  with 
Cuba  as  long  as  Cuba  conducted  its  affairs 
as  a  national  Latin  American  or  Western 
Hemisphere  state  and  not  as  a  country  ex- 
porting revolutionary  activities.  The  intro- 
duction of  large  military  organized  contin- 
gents in  Angola  has  created  a  very  serious 
situation  in  our  relationship  with  Cuba. 

At  this  moment  the  withdrawal  is  of  toe 
small  proportions  to  permit  us  to  draw  an> 
conclusions.  I  would  say  that  the  precondi- 
tion for  any  improvement  in  our  relations 
with  Cuba  is  the  total  withdrawal  of  all  or- 
ganized military  units  from  Angola. 

Q.  I  have  two  questions  to  ask  of  you,  Mr 
Secretary.  You  have  made  reference  to  tho 
fact  that  the  United  States  would  never  per- 
mit another  situation  like  the  situation  o; 
Angola;  that  is  to  say,  that  it  would  not  per- 
mit the  interference  of  Cuban  troops  in  any 
country  and  also  in  countries  of  Latin  Amer- 
ica. Hoiv  is  it  that  the  United  States  can 
determine  ichat  the  internal  policy  of  a  coun- 
try is  to  be  and  what  it  will  permit  and  not 
permit  internationally? 

Secondly,  I  woidd  like  to  refer  to  President 
Echeverria's    visit    in    1971    to    the    United 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


X  at  ions,  when  he  proposed  the  admittance 
into  the  United  Nations  of  the  People's  Re- 
public of  China.  At  that  time,  the  United 
States  opposed  the  suggestion  that  was  made 
bij  President  Echeverria,  and  the  United 
States  said  that  the  two  Chinas  shoidd 
he  admitted.  At  that  point,  President  Eche- 
I'crria  responded  that  sovereignty  is  indi- 
visible and  that  therefore  there  could  only 
be  one  China.  Now,  with  reference  to  all 
of  this,  I  would  like  to  know  hoiv  you  vieiv 
President  Echeverria  at  this  particular  point 
because  of  this  reply  and  this  stand.  Is  there 
(Duj  resentment  on  your  part? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  With  respect  to  the 
first  question,  we  do  not  assume  the  right  to 
intervene  in  the  domestic  pohcies  of  other 
countries.  For  example,  in  Mozambique,  the 
group  that  took  over — got  the  government 
of  Mozambique — is  in  its  pohtical  views  as 
different  from  our  predominant  views  as  the 
MPLA  [Popular  Movement  for  the  Libera- 
tion of  Angola]  in  Angola.  Nevertheless  we 
recognized  it  as  soon  as  it  came  into  office 
and  have  established  improved  relations  with 
the  Government  of  Mozambique.  We  are  pre- 
pared and  are  making  every  effort  to  im- 
prove the  relationship  further. 

The  situation  in  Angola  is  not  an  internal 
affair.  It  is  the  massive  introduction  of  at 
least  15,000  Cuban  combat  troops  in  a  coun- 
try thousands  of  miles  away  from  Cuba,  in  a 
civil  war  situation.  When  I  say  we  do  not 
wish  to  see  any  more  Angolas,  I  do  not  mean 
the  internal  struggles  of  Angola.  I  mean  the 
introduction  of  outside  military  forces,  sup- 
ported by  the  Soviet  Union,  encouraged  by 
the  Soviet  Union,  and  acting  as  surrogates 
for  the  Soviet  Union.  This  is  what  the  United 
States  will  oppose. 

Now,  with  respect  to  President  Echeverria, 
I  think  you  must  have  seen  from  our  greet- 
ings that  we  consider  each  other  personal 
friends.  I  have  very  high  regard  for  Presi- 
dent Echeverria  and  great  respect  for  the 
role  that  Mexico  has  played  internationally. 
Of  course,  Mexico,  being  an  independent  sov- 
ereign country  which  is  not  governed  by 
weakminded  individuals,  has  its  own  views  on 


a  number  of  international  problems.  Those 
views  do  not  always  coincide  with  ours. 
When  we  differ,  we  intend  to  discuss  our  dif- 
ferences. Sometimes  we  succeed  in  eliminat- 
ing the  differences.  But  sometimes  we  do  not. 
In  those  cases,  each  country  pursues  its 
own  policy.  Nothing  has  happened  so  far,  and 
nothing  is  likely  to  happen  that  I  can  fore- 
see that  will  affect  the  basic  friendship  that 
exists  between  Mexico  and  the  United  States. 
We  do  not  have  resentment  of  President 
Echeverria.  We  have  the  highest  regard  for 
him,  and  I  personally  have  great  affection 
for  him. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  what  can  you  tell  us 
about  negotiations  regarding  conditions  in 
Mexican  jails,  conditions  that  Americans  are 
held  in?  Are  they  going  ivell,  and  what  are 
those  conditions? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  distinguished 
Foreign  Minister  of  Mexico  and  his  associ- 
ates and  my  associates  and  I  had,  as  you 
know,  an  extensive  discussion  yesterday  eve- 
ning on  a  large  number  of  bilateral  issues. 
The  problem  of  prisoners  was  part  of  that 
discussion. 

I  think  it  is  important  to  point  out  that  in 
fact  more  Mexicans  are  held  in  American 
prisons  than  Americans  in  Mexican  prisons. 
And  we  discussed  how  to  alleviate  the  gen- 
eral situation  of  individuals  being  held  in 
prison  in  a  foreign  country.  The  Mexican 
side  presented  a  number  of  rather  ingenious 
and  interesting  proposals  which  we  would 
like  to  study  carefully  and  on  which  we  are 
going  to  begin,  in  the  near  future,  intensive 
bilateral  discussions. 

I  can  say  that  the  discussions  yesterday 
were  conducted  in  a  very  constructive  spirit, 
with  the  recognition  by  each  side  of  the  sov- 
ereignty of  the  other,  but  also  with  an  atti- 
tude of  good  will  to  settle  what  is  a  very  com- 
plicated problem;  and  I  am  hopeful  that  we 
can  make  progress  on  this. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary  of  State,  I  would  like  to 
mention  that  during  the  third  UNCTAD 
[U.N.  Conference  on  Trade  and  Develop- 
menf] ,  which  took  place  in  Santiago  de  Chile, 


July  5,  1976 


27 


President  Echeverria  proposed  a  charter,  the 
Charter  of  Economic  Rights  and  Duties  of 
States.  This  ivas  in  April  1972.  Later  on,  in 
December  197 A  and  against  the  will  and  vote 
of  the  United  States,  this  charter  was  ap- 
proved by  120  countries  within  the  United 
Nations.  My  question  is  the  following:  Do 
you  not  believe  that  an  attitude  such  as  this 
one  taken  by  the  United  States  is  going  to 
bring  on  the  unpopularity  of  the  United 
States  tvithin  the  United  Nations  ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Of  course,  we  cannot 
finally  make  our  foreign  policy  on  the  basis 
of  popularity  or  unpopularity,  any  more  than 
any  other  nation  can.  We  have  to  follow  our 
best  judgment  of  what  we  consider  to  be  in 
the  national  interest  and  in  the  world  in- 
terest. 

With  respect  to  the  proposal  of  President 
Echeverria  for  a  charter,  I  was  very  at- 
tracted to  the  concept.  And  in  two  speeches 
at  the  U.N.  General  Assembly,  I  supported 
the  concept  that  President  Echeverria  put 
forward,  and  so  did  the  U.S.  Government. 

In  the  elaboration  of  the  charter  a  number 
of  provisions  were  included  that  we  felt  were 
simply  not  acceptable  and  were  against  some 
basic  principles  of  our  foreign  policy  and  of 
our  foreign  economic  policy.  We  would  have 
been  prepared,  if  it  had  been  possible  to  ar- 
range, to  vote  on  different  items  in  the  char- 
ter, rather  than  for  the  charter  as  a  whole. 
We  had  offered  to  vote  on  individual  items, 
in  which  case  we  could  have  supported,  I 
think,  98  percent  of  the  charter  and  simply 
voted  against  the  provisions  with  which  we 
disagreed,  if  we  had  not  been  also  forced  to 
vote  on  the  entire  charter. 

So  it  is  a  concept  which  we  supported. 
There  are  three  or  four  provisions  in  it  with 
which  we  disagreed.  The  majority  of  the  pro- 
visions we  could  have  supported,  and  it  was 
one  of  those  issues  where,  I  believe,  with  a 
different  parliamentary  management,  we 
could  have  achieved  a  more  satisfactory  out- 
come. But  I  would  like  to  say  now  that  the 
United  States  did  not  oppose  the  concept  of 


28 


the  charter,  nor  does  it  oppose  the  over- 
whelming majority  of  the  provisions  in  the 
charter.  And  we,  at  the  time  that  it  was  pro- 
posed, took  an  opportunity  to  commend  Pres-i 
ident  Echeverria  for  his  initiating  it. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  is  the  United  States  con- 
cerned that  Cuba  is  trying  to  expand  its  in- 
fluence in  the  Caribbean,  particularly  by  in- 
fluencing the  Governments  of  Jamaica  and 
Guyana  ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  would  like  to  make 
a  distinction  between  the  diplomatic  active 
ties  of  a  country  and  the  military  activities' 
of  Cuba — Cuban  diplomatic  activities  ano 
Cuban  political  efforts  to  gain  influence  ir 
matters  that  are  subject  to  our  foreign  poll 
icy.  And  we  are  sufficiently  self-confidenli 
that  we  believe  that  we  can  sustain  a  politi 
cal  competition  with  a  country  like  Cuba.  Ouii 
concern  is  the  military  infiltration  or  thti 
movement  of  military  units  by  Cuba.  This  we 
would  oppose.  We  have  seen  no  evidence  oi 
the  movement  of  organized  Cuban  military 
units  within  the  Western  Hemisphere.  As  foii 
other  Cuban  influence,  this  is  a  matter  tha 
we  will  deal  with  in  diplomatic  channels. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  could  you  give  us  you 
assessment  of  the  implications  of  the  en 
trance  of  other  Arab  armies  into  Lebano: 
with  the  Syrians?  And,  additionally,  couh 
you  give  us  some  feeling  as  to  ivhat  you  fei 
the  implications  are  of  a  possible  militar, 
defeat  of  the  PLO  [Palestine  Liberation 
Organization]  in  Lebanon?  Would  it  mak 
renewed  negotiations  easier  or  more  difficult 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  primary  Amer 
ican  interest  in  Lebanon  is  to  bring  an  eni 
to  the  fighting  and  to  end  the  suffering  o 
the  Lebanese  people  that  has  gone  on  to 
long  and  that  has  exacted  an  enormous  an( 
exorbitant  toll  of  human  life. 

At  an  earlier  period,  we  endorsed  the  ide; 
of  an  Arab  force  as  one  means  of  bringinj 
about  security.  In  this  particular  case,  we  d( 
not  know  the  composition  of  the  force,  noi 
do  we  know  the  attitude  of  the  Syrian  Gov 


Department  of  State  Bulletit 


eniment  toward  the  force.  And  we  are  at- 
tempting to  clarify  these  issues  and  also  the 
role  that  that  force  is  going  to  play  before 
we  take  a  final  position,  but  we  would  gener- 
ally support  efforts  that  have  a  promise  to 
end  the  fighting. 

As  for  the  exact  military  situation — who 
is  winning — the  United  States  does  not  look 
at  this  problem  from  the  point  of  view  of 
wiiat  helps  the  negotiating  process.  We  have 
no  clear  view  of  what  the  military  situation 
is,  since  we  are  receiving  very  confused  re- 
ports. 

Our  primary  objective  is  to  put  an  end  to 
the  fighting,  to  do  it  in  a  manner  that  re- 
spects the  sovereignty  and  integrity  of  Leb- 
anon, enables  the  Moslem  and  Christian  com- 
munities to  live  side  by  side  with  each  other; 
and  our  attitude  toward  specific  measures 
will  be  governed  by  those  principles. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  I  have  tivo  questions  to 
ask.  The  first  question  is:  What  is  your 
opinion  in  reference  to  the  junta,  a  military 
Chilean  junta?  Does  your  presence  in  Chile 
signify  in  any  way  your  support  for  the  gov- 
fiiiment  of  Augusto  Pinochet?  And  my  see- 
on  r!  question  is  the  following:  Do  you  foresee 
that  the  moment  will  come  when  the  United 
States  and  Rtissia  will  come  to  a  confronta- 
tion in  any  one  of  the  countries  outside  the 
United  States  and  Russia  that  are  having  a 
difficult  time? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  visited  Chile  to- 
gether with  the  Foreign  Ministers  of  every 
other  Western  Hemisphere  country  except 
Mexico  to  attend  the  General  Assembly  of 
the  Organization  of  American  States,  as  I 
have  every  year  since  I  became  Secretary  of 
State.  While  I  was  in  Chile,  I  stated  the  basic 
i  position  of  the  United  States  with  respect  to 
j  human  rights  throughout  the  Western  Hemi- 
!  sphere  and  called  attention  to  the  fact  that 
jthe  constituent  documents  of  every  one  of 
the  American  republics  calls  attention  to  the 
I  protection  of  the  individual,  as  you  would  ex- 
pect in  a  hemisphere  to  which  millions  fled 
from  oppression.  I  had  an  opportunity  to  dis- 


cuss our  views  with  respect  to  Chile  in  that 
statement,  and  I  had  an  opportunity  to  dis- 
cuss the  matter  privately  also  with  the 
Chilean  Government. 

At  the  same  time,  as  Latin  Americans  you 
will  understand  that  it  is  more  in  conformity 
with  the  dignity  of  my  oath  to  enable  them 
to  make  their  decisions  as  Chilean  decisions, 
and  we  have  been  told  that  there  will  be  a 
constitutional  act  forthcoming  that  takes 
into  greater  account  the  concern  for  human 
rights  that  many  countries  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere  have  expressed.  And  we  want 
to  wait  for  this  constitutional  act  before  we 
express  any  judgment. 

With  respect  to  the  relationship  of  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union,  we  are 
ideological  opponents.  We  confront  each 
other  politically  and  ideologically  in  various 
parts  of  the  world.  At  the  same  time,  we  also 
possess  nuclear  weapons,  and  we  have  the 
capacity  to  destroy  humanity.  And  there- 
fore we  have  an  obligation,  unprecedented  in 
history,  to  conduct  our  competition  in  a  way 
that  reduces  and,  in  time,  eliminates  the 
dangers  of  nuclear  war.  It  is  therefore  the 
basic  policy  of  our  government  to  use  every 
opportunity  to  seek  to  bring  about  a  world 
that  is  based  on  something  more  stable  than 
a  balance  of  terror  and  in  which  we  strive 
for  conditions  of  peace  that  depend  on  some- 
thing other  than  a  pure  equilibrium  of 
power.  No  responsible  American  leader  can 
do  anything  else.  And  this  is  a  political  duty, 
and  it  is  a  moral  duty  that  any  American 
leader,  of  whatever  party,  will  have. 

[Secretary  turns  to  next  questioner.]  I 
know  she's  been  waiting  to  destroy  me  for 
45  minutes.  [Laughter.] 

Q.  I  have  two  questions  to  ask.  I  want  to 
know  why  it  is  that  you  consider  that  the 
participation  of  Cuba  or  the  solidarity  shown 
by  Cuba  in  the  Angola  case  is  intervention 
and  why  you  do  not  consider  that  the  partici- 
pation of  the  United  States  in  the  Chilean 
case  is  similar  intervention.  Aside  from  that, 
I  2vant  to  point  out  that  you  signed  the  peace 


July  5,  1976 


29 


agreements  in  Paris  in  the  Viet-Nam  case 
and  that  it  was  for  this  reason  that  you  ivere 
aivarded  the  Nobel  Prize.  The  agreements 
have  not  been  complied  tvith.  I  would  like  to 
know  ivhether  you  are  ready  to  give  back  the 
-prize  tintil  the  agreements  are  complied  with. 
Secretary  Kissinger:  I  knew  that  the  ques- 
tion would  not  be  entirely  friendly  when  I 
recognized  you. 

The  Cuban  action  in  Angola  was  the  intro- 
duction of  massive  organized  military  units 
into  a  civil  war.  The  U.S.  position  was  that 
all  outside  countries,  including  the  United 
States,  should  stay  out  of  that  civil  war  and 
that  the  parties  in  that  civil  war  should  set- 
tle their  disputes.  And  half  of  the  countries 
of  the  Organization  of  African  Unity  agreed 
with  our  point  of  view. 

With  respect  to  the  situation  in  Chile,  it 
will  be  impossible  ever  to  catch  up  with  the 
mass  of  misleading  information  that  has 
been  put  out  in  many  quarters.  Basically, 
what  the  United  States  attempted  to  do  was 
to  enable  the  democratic  parties  and  news- 
papers of  Chile  to  survive  until  the  1976  elec- 
tions in  the  face  of  confiscatory  taxation. 
And  that  was  the  principal  thrust  of  the 
American  effort  in  Chile. 

With  respect  to  the  Viet-Nam  Peace 
Agreement,  I  think  there  must  be  limits  to 
hypocrisy.  The  only  clause  of  the  peace 
agreement  that  the  Vietnamese  are  still  talk- 
ing about  is  the  clause  that  speaks  about  the 
principle  that  the  United  States  would  assist 
North  Vietnamese  economic  recovery.  Every 
other  clause  of  that  agreement  has  been  sys- 
tematically, flagrantly,  totally  violated  by 
the  North  Vietnamese.  And  I  have  never  yet 
seen  an  international  situation  in  which  one 
government  had  the  colossal  nerve  to  insist 
that  the  one  provision  that  still  exists  must 
be  observed,  when  it  has  totally  violated 
every  other  provision  of  the  agreement. 

And,  therefore,  if  North  Viet-Nam  wants 
to  talk  to  us,  we  have  indicated  a  willingness 
to  talk,  especially  after  they  have  fulfilled 
the  requirement  of  the  Paris  accord  with  re- 
spect to  the  missing-in-action.  But  it  is  ab- 


surd to  insist  that  the  one  remaining  clause 
of  the  Paris  accord  should  be  observed,  when 
all  others  have  been  flagrantly  violated  by 
the  Vietnamese. 


TOAST   BY  SECRETARY   KISSINGER, 
MEXICO  CITY,  JUNE   1 1  ' 

I  want  to  begin  by  saying  that  it  gives  me 
the  greatest  satisfaction  to  be  able  tonight 
to  reciprocate  to  my  Mexican  friends  a  small 
measure  of  the  hospitality  which  this  great 
and  beautiful  country  has  so  warmly  ex- 
tended to  me  on  so  many  occasions  in  the 
past.  I  spent  my  honeymoon  here;  I  have 
deep  professional  and  personal  ties  to  Mexico. 

I  have  never  come  to  this  land  without 
sensing  deeply  both  the  glory  of  Mexico's 
ancient  past  and  its  dynamism  today — the 
thousands  of  years  of  civilization  that  cul- 
minated in  the  panorama  of  splendor  that  so 
awed  the  first  conquistadors  and  now  the  vi- 
brant course  of  modern  Mexico,  whose  strug- 
gle for  political  and  economic  independence, 
dignity,  and  social  justice  has  won  for  it  the 
admiration  of  the  community  of  nations  as 
well  as  a  growing  role  of  leadership  in  inter- 
national afi'airs. 

The  impact  which  Mexico  is  making  on 
our  interdependent  world,  as  all  of  us  here 
know,  is  attributable  in  large  part  to  the 
boundless  energy  and  broad  vision  of  Presi- 
dent Luis  Echeverria.  He  is  an  inspirational 
leader.  I  have  had  the  privilege  of  working 
with  him  for  nearly  six  years.  He  will  be 
remembered  in  history  for  his  great  contri- 
butions to  peace,  progress,  and  justice. 

Tonight  I  want  to  discuss  two  great  tasks 
which  are  deep  and  permanent  concerns  of 
our  two  nations ;  both  bear  the  personal  mark 
of  President  Echeverria: 

— The  global  challenge  of  helping  to  con- 
struct a  new  and  peaceful  international  order 


=  Given  at  a  dinner  hosted  by  Secretary  Kissinger 
in  honor  of  President  Luis  Echeverria  Alvarez  (text 
froni  press  release  301  A). 


30 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


)ffering  justice  and  prosperity  to  all  peoples; 
ind 

—The  state  of  the  special,  indeed  unique, 
)ond  between  the  United  States  and  Mexico. 

The  United  States  respects  and  values  Mex- 

co's  role  on  the  world  scene.  We  also  cherish 
)ur  close  historical,  practical,  and  personal 
;ies  as  neighbors.  There  is   no  conflict  be- 

ween  these  realities.  Indeed,  they  offer  our 
;wo  nations  a  precious  advantage  as  we  ap- 
jroach  together  the  great  issues  of  our  time. 
Mexico  and  the  United  States  are  inde- 
pendent and  self-confident  nations.  We  are 
nature  enough  to  encounter  the  trials  of  our 

ra  without  crises  of  identity  and  without  al- 
owing  differences  permanently  to  divide  us. 
We  are  serious  enough  to  disagree  without 
rancor,  creative  enough  to  cooperate  without 
threatening  each  other's  independence.  In 
this,  we  are  truly  at  the  frontiers  of  West- 

rn  civilization.  As  North  American  nations 
ive  are  irrevocably  linked  by  geography,  his- 
tory, interest,  and  principle.  We  need  sign  no 
iocuments  to  insure  our  kinship  of  thought 
and  action  as  free  and  friendly  peoples.  We 
tiave  a  relationship  all  the  more  special  for 
being  unwritten. 

Global  Challenges:  Peace,  Prosperity,  Justice 

History  has  presented  this  generation  with 
two  great  and  unique  challenges :  the  impera- 
tive of  peace  in  the  nuclear  age  and  the  need 
to  give  purpose  to  peace  by  helping  to  shape 

new  structure  of  international  relations 
that  speaks  to  the  positive  aspirations  of  all 
peoples. 

Every  nation  has  a  stake  in,  and  a  respon- 
sibility for,  the  problem  of  global  peace.  Each 
has  its  special  circumstances  and  its  special 
role. 

The  United  States,  uniquely  among  the 
free  nations  of  the  world,  bears  a  heavy  re- 
sponsibility to  maintain  the  balance  of  sta- 
bility upon  which  world  peace  depends.  This 
is  why  we  are  committed  to  oppose  the  forces 
of  intimidation  and  oppression  whenever 
they  threaten  the  global  equilibrium.  But  we 


July  5,  1976 


know,  as  Mexico  knows,  that  peace  is  tenu- 
ous and  progress  is  fragile  without  a  curb  on, 
and  eventually  an  end  to,  the  arms  race.  This 
is  why  we  have  embarked  on  the  difficult  and 
complex  negotiations  to  limit  strategic  arms, 
to  reduce  these  arms,  and  to  ease  the  eco- 
nomic burden  of  the  arms  race. 

Mexico,  whose  voice  is  heard  by  all  the 
major  groupings  of  the  world's  nations,  also 
bears  a  responsibility  for  peace.  Mexico  has 
been  among  the  staunchest  proponents  of 
disarmament  and  the  use  of  national  re- 
sources for  development  rather  than  the  ac- 
cumulation of  arms.  Mexico  was  the  leader 
in  negotiating  the  Treaty  of  Tlatelolco  estab- 
lishing a  iiuclear-weapons-free  zone  in  Latin 
America.  And  Mexico  has  raised  its  voice  in 
support  of  the  dignity,  security,  and  self- 
determination  of  nations  threatened  by  ex- 
ternal intervention. 

But  the  ultimate  purpose  of  nations  is  to 
look  beyond  a  peace  that  rests  exclusively  on 
a  precarious  balance  of  power  to  a  new  era 
of  international  economic  cooperation.  We 
must  offer  our  children  the  hope  of  a  better 
future  by  mastering  the  great  economic  and 
social  challenge  of  building  a  new,  equitable, 
and  productive  relationship  among  all  na- 
tions and  particularly  those  of  North  and 
South. 

The  problem  of  economic  development  is 
not  merely  a  technical  but  a  profoundly  po- 
litical and  moral  issue.  It  is  not  possible  to 
build  a  world  community  which  is  divided 
between  the  rich  and  the  poor.  If  we  are  to 
live  in  a  world  of  peace  and  justice,  all  na- 
tions must  have  the  consciousness  that  the 
world  community  listens  to  their  concerns. 

This  is  why  we  attach  such  importance 
to  the  dialogue  now  taking  place  between  the 
developed  and  developing  nations.  For  be- 
yond the  technical  solutions  we  may  reach, 
the  spirit  we  help  engender  can  contribute  to 
a  world  of  peace  and  to  a  sense  of  commu- 
nity. This  is  why  we  are  disturbed  by  atti- 
tudes of  confrontation  and  concerned  by 
those  who  seek  gains  through  technical  ma- 
jorities. It  is  the  essence  of  an  effective  in- 


31 


ternational  structure  today  in  our  interde- 
pendent world  that  solutions  cannot  be 
imposed  by  one  group  on  another  but  that  a 
consensus  must  be  established  in  which  all 
share.  By  continuing  to  grow  in  strength  and 
international  participation,  Mexico,  and  in- 
deed all  the  nations  of  Latin  America,  can  in 
important  respects  act  as  a  bridge  between 
the  different  groups  that  exist  in  the  world 
today. 

The  United  States  has  accepted  the  chal- 
lenge of  an  interdependent  world.  We  are 
committed  to  the  cause  of  cooperation  on  an 
equal  basis  between  all  nations — whatever 
their  stage  of  development.  We  have  pursued 
this  course  at  the  seventh  special  session  of 
the  U.N.  General  Assembly,  in  the  Confer- 
ence on  International  Economic  Cooperation, 
at  Kingston  in  January,  at  Nairobi  last 
month.  There  have  been  setbacks,  of  course, 
but  we  believe  a  new  and  positive  atmos- 
phere has  been  created,  and  we  join  with 
your  President  in  the  view  that  the  serious 
and  responsible  nations  of  the  world  now 
have  an  unprecedented  opportunity  to  ad- 
vance mankind's  age-old  dreams  of  a  better 
life. 

The  United  States  knows  that  while  our 
specific  approaches  to  these  problems  may 
differ,  Mexico  shares  our  aspirations  for  a 
better  world  of  peace  and  prosperity.  Mexico 
has  used  its  growing  international  influence 
to  focus  on  the  great  global  efforts  to  secure 
peace  and  enhance  the  quality  of  human  life. 
Mexico's  example  is  proud  and  compelling, 
not  only  for  the  peoples  of  the  Americas  but 
for  all  who  value  peace,  prosperity,  and 
justice. 

Mexico's  economic  growth  and  progress 
have  made  it  a  vital  force  in  international 
affairs.  Mexico  had  a  major  influence  on  the 
course  of  the  seventh  U.N.  special  session 
and  is  an  active  participant  in  all  interna- 
tional efforts  to  accelerate  development 
through  a  fair  and  cooperative  global  eco- 
nomic system.  Mexico's  energetic  promotion 
of  the  Charter  of  Economic  Rights  and 
Duties  of  States — which  you  yourself  in- 
spired, Mr.  President — itself  symbolizes  the 
need  for  a  new  awareness  that  interdepend- 
ence is  not  a  slogan,  but  a  reality. 


32 


And  since  the  Revolution  of  1910,  Mexico 
has  presented  the  international  community 
with  the  example  of  a  proudly  independent 
nation  committed  to  progress  and  social  jus- 
tice. Today  Mexico's  voice  is  heard  and 
heeded  in  the  leading  councils  of  the  world. 

It  is  my  profound  conviction  that  Mexico 
and  the  United  States  together  have  a  price- 
less advantage  upon  which  to  base  common 
efforts  in  virtually  every  major  area  of 
human  and  international  concern.  Mexico's 
history,  economic  growth,  institutional  sta- 
bility, and  political  imagination  enable  it  to 
bring  independent  new  dimensions  to  the 
global  cooperation  so  essential  to  our  shared 
hopes  for  a  less  divided  and  more  prosperous 
world. 

— The  United  States  believes  that  the  uni- 
versal search  for  an  enduring  structure  oil 
peace  for  all  peoples  is  possible  only  if  it  is 
based  upon  the  free  commitment  of  strong;! 
stable,  and  responsible  nations.  Mexico'gi 
growing  national  strength  and  development 
and  deepening  participation  in  global  coun- 
cils strengthen  the  voice  of  this  hemisphere 
and  have  given  a  special  projection  to  thed 
nations  of  North  America  in  the  vital  de-; 
bates  of  our  time  on  such  matters  as  disar- 
mament and  global  security. 

— ^The  higher  stage  of  economic  progressip 
that  Mexico  has  attained  has  brought  it  intc^ 
the  company  of  economies  which  are  vulner- 
able to  global  inflation,  to  sudden  fluctuations 
in  world  patterns  of  supply  and  demand,  tc 
important  technological  change  and  invest- 
ment capital  shortages.  At  the  same  time, 
our  economies  are  among  the  world's  most 
open  and  flexible.  We  can  respond  to  change 
quickly  and  effectively.  We  have  the  oppor- 
tunity and  the  responsibility  and  the  will  to 
shape  the  course  of  economic  events  rather 
than  to  acquiesce  in  the  stale  determinism 
that  paralyzes  so  many  nations  of  the  world. 
In  the  key  areas  of  finance,  technology,  in- 
vestment, and  trade,  the  United  States  and 
Mexico,  and  with  us  the  other  nations  of  the 
hemisphere,  have  outstripped  the  world  as  a 
whole.  Our  habits  of  practical  cooperation 
give  us  a  head  start.  The  efforts  we  take 
together  can  thus  make  a  special  and  positive 

Department  of  State   Bulletin 


:uiitribution    to   the   course   of   development 
iroLind  the  world. 

— Beyond  peace  and  prosperity  lies  a 
leeper  universal  aspiration  for  dignity  and 
ustice.  Our  two  countries  are  both  commit- 
1(1  to  the  rule  of  law  and  extending  the 
each  of  international  law  in  world  affairs. 
This  is  most  urgently  needed  with  regard  to 
ho  last  great  frontiers  of  our  planet — the 
icruns.  They  are  the  common  heritage  of 
iiankind,  but  they  can  become  arenas  for 
•onflict  if  not  governed  by  law.  The  differ- 
Mues  between  us  on  the  issues  involved  have 
ed  to  tensions,  but  they  are  issues  which  na- 
ions  everywhere  will  have  to  solve.  Our  two 
lations  have  a  special  advantage  and  thus  a 
special  responsibility  to  reach  agreement  on 
)ur  differences  in  the  context  of  a  rapid  and 
HR'cessful  conclusion  to  the  Law  of  the  Sea 
(inference  this  year.  We  have  agreed  to 
irgent  consultations  on  this  important 
ssLie. 

And  we  have  as  well  an  obligation  to  the 
ieeper  sources  of  our  common  humanity.  No 
peoples  have  been  more  dedicated  to  the 
■ause  of  human  dignity  and  liberty  than 
lurs.  The  struggle  to  secure  the  peace  or  to 
,viden  prosperity  ultimately  will  have  no 
neaning  unless  the  peoples  of  the  world  can 
Husue  their  aspirations  without  fear,  in  so- 
•ieties  which  foster  the  fundamental  rights 
){  mankind. 

At  the  General  Assembly  of  the  Organiza- 
ifin  of  American  States  in  Santiago  earlier 
his  week,  I  reaffirmed  the  unequivocal  com- 
Tiitment  of  the  United  States  to  the  Ameri- 
can Declaration  of  the  Rights  and  Duties  of 
Man.  The  United  States  endorsed  the  reports 
presented  there  by  the  Inter-American  Hu- 
;man  Rights  Commission,  whose  powers  we 
[proposed  be  broadened.  We  did  so  in  the  rec- 
ognition that  the  precious  heritage  of  our 
Western  Hemisphere  is  the  conviction  that 
tiuman  beings  are  the  subjects,  not  the  ob- 
jects, of  public  policy;  that  citizens  must  not 
je  the  mere  instruments  of  the  state. 

The  traditions  of  our  two  countries  and 
3ur  heritage  as  free  American  republics 
places  upon  us  a  special  trust  to  defend  and 
:arry  forward  the  principle  that  progress  is 


sterile  unless  it  enhances  the  areas  of  human 
freedom. 

These  are  some  of  the  great  global  chal- 
lenges we  both  face.  Let  me  turn  now  to  the 
bilateral  process  through  which  we  shape  our 
progress  as  friends  and  partners. 

U.S.-Mexico  Independence  and  Interdependence 

The  imperatives  of  the  relationship  of 
Mexico  and  the  United  States  are  not  to  be 
found  in  words,  but  in  geography.  Our 
shared  destiny  is  literally  written  in  stone. 
But  the  special  relationship  we  have  today 
represents  as  well  an  achievement  of  human 
will  and  responsibility. 

The  work  we  are  doing  together  serves  not 
only  to  strengthen  our  own  ties;  it  is  a  dem- 
onstration to  the  world  that  two  nations  can 
resolve,  in  a  reasoned  and  responsible  man- 
ner, problems  of  acute  sensitivity  in  areas 
touching  upon  national  sovereignty,  eco- 
nomic advantage,  and  human  concern. 

Let  me  briefly  review  the  record  of  shared 
effort  we  have  compiled  and  the  work  yet 
before  us  in  each  of  these  three  areas. 

First,  how  many  nations  of  the  world  could 
accept  as  natural  and  comfortable  an  unde- 
fended boundary  of  nearly  2,000  miles?  Our 
active  day-to-day  cooperation  along  our  bor- 
der is  a  rare  phenomenon.  Through  the 
years,  our  joint  International  Boundary  and 
Water  Commission  has  solved  major  prob- 
lems of  shifting  boundaries,  flood  control, 
and  water  distribution.  The  solution  of  the 
Chamizal  and  other  territorial  issues,  the 
resolution  of  the  problem  of  Colorado  River 
salinity,  and  the  coordination  of  air  traffic 
control  along  our  border  have  all  been  ap- 
proached cordially,  persistently,  and  con- 
structively. This  is  a  record  of  which  we  can 
be  proud  and  on  which  we  can  build  as  we 
take  up  further  aspects  of  cooperation  along 
the  border,  such  as  widened  cooperation  on 
search  and  rescue  operations  and  pi'oblems 
affecting  the  environment. 

Second,  we  have  acted  and  are  acting  with 
mutual  respect  and  great  responsibility  on 
issues  of  substantial  economic  interest,  such 
as  the  desire  of  Mexican  workers  to  seek 
employment  in  the  United  States  and  of 
Mexican   exporters  to  sell  in  our  country's 


luly  5,  1976 


33 


markets.  After  decades  of  relatively  satis- 
factory accommodation  to  the  question  of 
undocumented  workers,  we  now  face  a  num- 
ber of  new  issues  requiring  mutual  study 
and  heightened  cooperation — and  that  must 
take  into  account  the  legitimate  concerns 
both  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  and 
the  human  rights  of  Mexican  citizens. 

We  share  Mexico's  concern  over  your  large 
trade  deficit  in  1975.  The  economic  recovery 
in  the  United  States  and  the  continuation  of 
the  forward-looking  attitude  which  now  in- 
forms U.S.  trade  policy  will  serve,  I  am  con- 
fident, to  bring  our  trade  accounts  closer 
into  balance.  Even  more  important,  the  U.S. 
Trade  Act's  generalized  system  of  prefer- 
ences will  expand  Mexico's  access  to  our 
market.  Indeed,  Mexico,  with  over  a  half 
billion  dollars'  worth  of  exports  eligible  for 
duty-free  treatment,  should  be  the  primary 
beneficiary  of  our  new  tariff  system  which 
gives  products  of  developing  countries  com- 
petitive advantage  over  products  of  devel- 
oped nations. 

Third,  both  our  nations  have  acted  with 
heart  and  with  vision  on  matters  of  deep 
human  concern.  We  have  combined  our  ef- 
forts with  increasing  success  against  the 
international  narcotics  trade,  which  has  vic- 
timized so  many  citizens  of  both  our  coun- 
tries. The  effort  of  the  Mexican  Government 
to  stop  the  production  and  trafficking  of 
dangerous  drugs  in  Mexico  can  stand  as  a 
model  for  the  world.  We  are  proud  to  be 
able  to  support  you  in  your  increasingly 
effective  program  of  narcotics  control.  A  i-e- 
lated  issue  now  before  us  concerns  the  need 
to  prosecute  narcotics  violators  to  the  full 
extent  of  the  law  while  at  the  same  time 
insuring  the  observance  of  their  legal  and 
human  rights.  We  have  had  useful  talks 
about  improving  the  situation  of  nationals 
of  our  two  nations  imprisoned  in  the  other 
country. 

And,  more  positively,  we  have  strength- 
ened the  cultural  relations  between  our  two 
nations.  We  share  deep  ethnic,  linguistic, 
intellectual,  and  historical  ties.  Mexico's 
early  recognition  of  the  importance  of  pre- 
serving a  nation's  cultural  heritage  has  in- 


spired similar  efforts  around  the  world  and 
won  the  admiration  of  the  millions  who  ex- 
perience firsthand,  as  I  shall  tomorrow,  the 
glories  of  your  Mayan  past.  The  treaty  on 
the  protection  of  cultural  property  between 
the  United  States  and  Mexico  has  been  in 
force  since  1970  and  has  proven  effective. 
We  are  proud  to  assist  Mexico's  efforts  to 
defend  its  cultural  patrimony  as  a  sustain- 
ing value  for  future  generations. 

As  we  look  to  the  future  we  are  witness- 
ing a  growth  of  balanced  two-way  exchanges 
which  range  across  the  spectrum  of  intellec- 
tual and  cultural  life,  from  the  arts  to  the 
humanities  to  technology.  While  increasing 
numbers  of  Mexicans  are  studying  in  the 
United  States,  more  U.S.  students  are  learn- 
ing at  Mexican  universities  than  in  any 
other  nation.  Each  of  us  is  developing  a 
greater  appreciation  of  the  creative  experi- 
ence and  achievement  of  the  other — in 
science,  music,  literature,  and  the  visual  arts. 
We  are  prepared  to  move  ahead  even  more 
vigorously  to  promote  cultural  exchange  and 
cultural  understanding,  recognizing  that 
they  are  powerful  forces  affecting  the  qual- 
ity and  tone  of  the  future  course  of  our 
relationship. 

All  these  are  issues  of  immediate  and  di- 
rect concern  to  our  two  nations.  But  they  are 
also  variations  on  the  large  themes  of  sover- 
eignty, economic  interest,  and  human  con- 
cern that  affect  nations  everywhere.  Our 
struggles  and  our  successes  in  dealing  effec- 
tively and  creatively  with  our  own  inter- 
dependence are  relevant  to  the  rest  of  the 
increasingly  interdependent  world  in  which 
we  live. 

In  a  period  when  mankind  faces  inter- 
national pi'oblems  which  are  not  only  com- 
plex but  fraught  with  ultimate  risks,  it  is 
unrealistic  as  well  as  unwise  to  expect  easy 
solutions.  What  we  can  and  must  seek  to 
bring  about  is  an  atmosphere — in  bilateral, 
regional,  and  global  relations — in  which 
problems  are  addressed  positively  and  con- 
structively, in  which  divergent  views  are 
expressed  openly  and  freely  without  wound- 
ing and  sterile  rhetoric,  and  in  which  the 
objective  is  an  effort  to  solve  problems  prag- 


34 


Department  of  State  BulletinI 


matically,  not  aggravate  them  ideologically. 

Our  long  record  of  experience  together 
makes  clear  that  cooperative  effort  serves 
us  both  much  better  than  recrimination  or 
unilateral  action.  Although  our  differences 
over  the  years  of  our  respective  independence 
as  nations  have  at  times  been  enormous,  in 
this  last  half  century  we  have  done  as  much 
to  achieve  a  positive  atmosphere  of  coopera- 
tion as  any  two  nations  in  the  world.  The 
United  States  and  Mexico  are  engaged  today 
by  preference  as  well  as  necessity. 

In  the  future  as  in  the  past  our  suc- 
cess will  be  founded  upon  a  fundamental 
continuity  of  purpose,  of  effort,  of  policy. 
That  continuity  is  reflected  today  by  your 
forward-looking  "Plan  Basico"  and  in  the 
United  States  by  the  permanent  interests  of 
our  foreign  policy  in  maintaining  global  peace 
while  building  for  a  new  era  of  economic 
cooperation  and  human  justice.  With  this 
continuity  and  in  this  spirit  we  can  continue 
to  provide  an  example  to  the  world  of  the 
way  neighbors  ought  to  conduct  themselves, 
not  only  geographic  neighbors  such  as  we 
but  all  nations — for  on  this  shrinking  planet 
all  peoples  are  neighbors. 

Mr.  President,  friends:  A  short  distance 
from  my  office  in  the  Department  of  State  in 
Washington  is  a  statue  of  Benito  Juarez  on 
which  are  engraved  his  words,  "Respect  for 
the  rights  of  others  is  peace." 

But    Benito    Juarez    also   knew    that   the 

J  mere  absence  of  war  is  not  enough.  The  rela- 
:tions  of  states  today  must  have  an  economic 
and  a  moral  dimension  as  well.  In  the  hearts 
of  men  and  women,  peace  means  an  abiding 
sense  of  security  and  freedom  from  external 
intimidation;  it  also  means  the  hope  of 
widening  economic  opportunity;  and  it  means 
conditions  which  foster  the  growth  of  social 
justice  for  all.  These  are  values  and  causes 
which  Mexicans  and  Americans  hold  in  com- 
mon and  hold  dear  and  which  you,  Mr.  Presi- 
dent, have  done  so  much  to  promote. 

I  ask  you  to  join  me  tonight  in  a  toast  to 
these  values  we  share;  to  the  distinguished 
President  of  Mexico,  our  good  friend,  Luis 
Echeverria ;  to  the  United  Mexican  States ; 
and  to  the  permanent  and  productive  friend- 


ship of  the  people  of  Mexico  and  the  United 
States. 

Viva  Mexico. 


U.S.-MEXICO   JOINT   COMMUNIQUE    ISSUED 
AT  MEXICO  CITY,  JUNE  1 1 

Press   release  303  datetl   June   11 

The  President  of  the  United  Mexican  States, 
Luis  Echeverria,  and  the  Secretary  of  State  of  the 
United  States,  Henry  A.  Kissinger,  met  today  to 
discuss  a  broad  range  of  issues.  The  spirit  of  the 
talks  was  warm  and  friendly.  Both  agreed  that 
relations  between  Mexico  and  the  United  States  are 
being  carried  out  in  a  climate  of  mutual  respect 
and  good  neighborship  and  they  emphasized  the  need 
to  maintain  these  relations  at  the  highest  level,  as 
befits  two  nations  which  share  the  same  human 
and  political  values,  and,  especially,  the  same  faith 
in  independence  and  democracy. 

The  President  and  the  Secretary  discussed  world 
issues  which  require  the  most  urgent  effort  in  inter- 
national cooperation  on  the  part  of  all  nations.  They 
were  in  agreement  that  the  gap  between  the  rich 
and  poor  countries  is  a  danger  to  peace,  as  ominous 
as  an  unbridled  arms  race.  On  this  subject,  they  said 
that  it  is  essential  to  take  steps  to  accelerate  eco- 
nomic development  based  upon  justice  and  equity. 

The  Secretary  explained  to  the  President  several 
initiatives  which  he  had  put  forth  at  the  UNCTAD 
IV  meeting  in  Nairobi  and  at  the  recent  General 
Assembly  of  the  Organization  of  American  States, 
to  further  the  economic  development  of  the  develop- 
ing countries. 

President  Echeverria  offered  the  Secretary  his 
ideas  on  the  scope  of  the  Charter  of  Economic  Rights 
and  Duties  of  States,  which,  for  Third  World  coun- 
tries, constitutes  the  basis  for  a  new  international 
economic  order,  and  one  of  the  essential  elements  for 
world  peace. 

The  Secretary  of  State  recalled  that  the  United 
States  had  given  its  support,  from  the  very  begin- 
ning, to  the  Charter's  concept,  in  spite  of  the  fact 
that  it  has  not  been  able  to  give  it  its  complete 
approval,  due  to  the  fact  that  some  of  its  provisions 
are  not  compatible  with  basic  principles  of  his 
country's  foreign  policy. 

The  President  and  the  Secretary  also  touched  upon 
other  important  matters  in  the  field  of  bilateral  re- 
lations between  both  countries,  including  the  follow- 
ing: 

(1)  The  illicit  traffic  in  drugs  between  the  two 
countries.  The  Secretary  expressed  his  warm  ap- 
preciation for  the  efforts  and  cooperation  of  Mexico 
in  the  battle  to  eradicate  this  activity.  They  ex- 
amined, with  concern,  not  only  the  demand  for 
drugs  in   parts  of  the   United  States,  but  also  the 


July  5,  1976 


35 


financing    of    production,    which    is    provided    from 
various  major  urban  centers  in  the  United  States. 

(2)  The  question  of  American  prisoners  detained 
in  Mexican  jails — the  majority  of  whom  have  been 
apprehended  in  the  course  of  the  permanent 
campaign  which  Mexico  is  carrying  out  against 
illegal  drug  traffic.  Mexico  has  proposed  several 
possible  remedies  to  this  problem,  which  take  into 
account  the  plight  of  the  considerable  number  of 
Mexicans  detained  in  United  States  jails.  The  Sec- 
retary assured  the  President  that  the  United  States 
would  study  these  proposals  with  care,  and  offered 
that  representatives  of  the  United  States  would 
meet  soon  with  the  appropriate  Mexican  authorities 
for  further  consideration  of  the  Mexican  initiatives. 

(3)  Trade  relations  between  Mexico  and  the 
United  States.  The  Secretary  agreed  that  the  United 
States  would  give  early  consideration  to  several 
suggestions  by  Mexico  to  improve  the  trade  balance 
between  the  two  countries,  which  is  adverse  to 
Mexico. 

At  the  end  of  the  talks,  the  President  requested 
the  Secretary  to  transmit  to  the  President  and  the 
people  of  the  United  States,  his  warm  congratula- 
tions on  the  occasion  of  the  two  hundredth  anni- 
versary of  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  and  ex- 
pressed his  best  wishes  for  the  continued  progress 
and  well-being  of  the  people  of  the  United  States, 
on  the  basis  of  the  same  historic  ideas  which  in- 
spired the  Founding  Fathers  two  hundred  years  ago 
in  their  struggle  for  independence,  democracy  and 
liberty  for  all  peoples. 

The  Secretary  transmitted  to  the  President  the 
admiration  of  the  American  people  for  Mexico's  own 
proud  record  in  its  commitment  for  social  justice, 
progress  and  the  rule  of  law. 

Finally,  the  Secretary  expressed  his  personal  ap- 
preciation for  the  spirit  of  hospitality  shown  him 
by  the  Government  of  Mexico  and  its  people. 


Congressional  Documents 
Relating  to  Foreign  Policy 

94th  Congress,  1st  and  2d  Sessions 

Allocation  of  Resources  in  the  Soviet  Union  and 
China— 1975.  Hearings  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Priorities  and  Economy  in  Government  of  the 
Joint  Economic  Committee.  Executive  sessions. 
June  18-July  21,  1975.  Part  1.  177  pp. 

Americans  Missing  in  Southeast  Asia.  Hearings 
before  the  House  Select  Committee  on  Missing 
Persons  in  Southeast  Asia.  Part  1;  September  23- 
October  23,  1975;  125  pp.  Part  2;  November  5- 
December  17,  1975;  312  pp. 

United  States-Soviet  Union-China:  The  Great  Power 
Triangle.  Hearings  before  the  Subconunittee  on 
Future  Foreign  Policy  Research  and  Development 


of  the  House  Committee  on  International  Relations.       J| 
Part  I.  October  21,  1975-March  10,  1976.  149  pp. 

Military     Sales    to    Saudi    Arabia — 1975.     Hearings      ,  )| 
before  the  Subcommittee  on  International  Political 
and   Military   Affairs  of  the   House   Committee   on 
International  Relations.  November  4-December  17, 
1975.  42  pp. 

International  Security  Assistance  Act  of  1976.  Hear- 
ings before  the  House  Committee  on  International 
Relations  on  H.R.  11963;  November  6,  1975-Feb- 
ruary  19,  1976;  973  pp.  Report  of  the  committee, 
together  with  supplemental,  additional,  and  dis-  | 
senting  views;  H.  Rept.  94-848;  February  24, 
1976;  113  pp. 

United  States-China  Relations:  The  Process  of  Nor- 
malization of  Relations.  Hearings  before  the  Spe- 
cial Subcommittee  on  Investigations  of  the  House 
Committee  on  International  Relations.  November  18, 
1975-February  2,  1976.  230  pp. 


94th  Congress,  2d  Session 

Foreign  Investment  and  American  Jobs.  Hearings 
before  the  Subcommittee  on  International  Economic 
Policy  of  the  House  Committee  on  International 
Relations.  Part  I.  January  27-February  4,  1976. 
91  pp. 

Oversight  Hearings  on  U.S.  Foreign  Trade  Policy. 
Hearings  before  the  Senate  Committee  on  Finance, 
January  29-February  4,  1976.  513  pp. 

State  Department  Authorization  for  Fiscal  Year 
1977.  Hearings  before  the  Subcommittee  on  Inter- 
national Operations  of  the  House  Committee  on 
International  Relations.  February  9-24,  1976.  155 
pp. 

Managing  International  Disasters:  Guatemala.  Hear- 
ings and  markup  before  the  Subcommittee  on  Inter- 
national Resources,  Food,  and  Energy  of  the  House 
Committee  on  International  Relations  on  H.R. 
12046,  to  provide  for  relief  and  rehabilitation  assist- 
ance to  the  victims  of  the  earthquakes  in  Guate- 
mala, and  for  other  purposes;  February  18-March 
4,  1976;  97  pp.  Report  of  the  committee  to  accom- 
pany H.R.  12046;  H.  Rept.  94-891;  March  11,  1976; 
6  pp. 

Waiver  of  Countervailing  Duties  on  Swiss  Emmen- 
thaler  and  Gruyere  Cheese.  Communication  from 
the  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  (Enforce- 
ment, Operations,  and  Tariff  Affairs).  H.  Doc,  94- 
379.  February  23,  1976,  8  pp. 

A  New  Panama  Canal  Treaty:  A  Latin  America 
Imperative.  Report  of  a  study  mission  to  Panama 
November  21-23,  1975,  submitted  to  the  House 
Committee  on  International  Relations.  February 
24,  1976.  60  pp. 
U.S.  Information  Agency  Authorization  Act,  Fiscal 
Year  1976,  Report  of  the  House  Committee  on 
International  Relations  to  accompany  H.R.  11598. 
H.  Rept.  94-849.  February  25,  1976.  5  pp. 
To  Amend  Further  the  Peace  Corps  Act.  Hearing 
before  the  House  Committee  on  International  Re- 
lations; February  26,  1976;  52  pp.  Report  of  the 
committee  to  accompany  H.R.  12226;  H.  Rept.  94- 
874;  March  4,  1976;  8  pp. 


36 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Ambassador  Scranton  Comments 
on  World  Health  Assembly  Action 

Following  is  a  statement  by  William  W. 
Scranton,  U.S.  Representative  to  the  United 
Nati07is,  issued  on  May  21. 

JSUN    press    release    u8   dated   May   :;i 

From  time  to  time  U.N.  agencies  make  de- 
jisions  which  are  of  critical  importance  to 
:he  entire  U.N.  system.  The  recent  decisions 
oy  the  World  Health  Assembly  in  Geneva 
show  how  the  politicization  of  U.N.  agencies 
lot  only  denigrates  the  agencies  but  is  po- 
;entially  ruinous  to  the  United  Nations  as 
i  whole. 

The  World  Health  Assembly  refused  to 
consider  the  report  of  three  eminent  physi- 
nans  on  the  situation  in  the  occupied  terri- 
;ories  as  it  related  to  the  health  care  of  the 
nhabitants.  Israel  permitted  an  investiga- 
ion  by  the  individual  physicians,  but  not  as 
i  committee.  The  WHA  now  has  gone  on  to 
lemand  that  the  committee  as  a  whole  visit 
;he  occupied  territories — in  other  words,  the 
;ame  men  should  go  back  and  see  the  same 
:hings,  but  this  time  as  a  ti'io.  Perhaps  the 
node  by  which  Israel  chose  to  cooperate 
vith  the  WHA  was  less  than  perfect.  The 
<ey  point  is  that  Israel  chose  to  cooperate. 
[t  met  the  WHA  more  than  halfway. 

How  did  the  WHA  respond  to  this  effort 
it  cooperation? 

It  responded  by  placing  shortrun,  irrele- 
vant considerations  ahead  of  health  con- 
;erns.  It  refused  to  consider  the  report  of 
he  physicians  it  itself  had  designated.  It 
idopted  instead  a  highly  political  resolution 
vhich  deals  mostly  with  Israeh  behavior  in 
natters  unrelated  to  health  in  occupied  ter- 
ritories. The  United  Nations  has  appropriate 
bodies,  such  as  the  Security  Council,  for  the 
landling  of  political  issues,  and  the  situa- 
ion  in  the  West  Bank  area  is  under  active 
onsideration  in  the  Security  Council  at  this 
ime. 

The  absence  of  balance,  the  lack  of  per- 
.pective,  and  the  introduction  by  the  WHA 
>f  political  issues  irrelevant  to  the  responsi- 
)ilities    of   the   WHA   do   no   credit   to   the 


United  Nations.  Indeed,  this  is  precisely  the 
:;ort  of  politicized  action  which  decreases  re- 
spect for  the  U.N.  system. 

How  long  will  there  be  any  respect  what- 
soever for  the  United  Nations  if  such  politi- 
cization becomes  pervasive  in  areas  where  it 
clearly  does  not  belong,  particularly  in  the 
health  matters,  one  of  humanity's  greatest 
concerns?  A  person's,  a  people's,  a  nation's 
health  is  more  important  than  all  the  extra- 
neous politicizing  in  the  world. 

Clearly  the  WHA  action  is  a  gross  politi- 
cal interference  in  matters  of  health  care. 
This  misuse  of  U.N.  agencies  must  stop  if 
the  U.N.  system  is  not  to  be  dangerously 
eroded. 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


U.S.  and  U.K.  Reach  Understanding 
on  Acceptance  of  Air  Charters 

Department  Announcement ' 

The  United  States  and  the  United  King- 
dom concluded  on  April  28  a  memorandum 
of  understanding  on  passenger  charter  air 
services,  under  which  each  government  will, 
with  some  exceptions,  accept  as  charter- 
worthy  transatlantic  charter  traffic  originat- 
ing in  the  territory  of  the  other  and  orga- 
nized and  operated  in  accordance  with  the 
other's  charterworthiness  criteria. 

The  understanding  was  brought  into  force 
by  an  exchange  of  diplomatic  notes  in  Lon- 
don. The  understanding  is  not  an  exchange 
of  economic  rights,  but  it  is  expected  to  pro- 
vide stability  in  the  U.S.-U.K.  charter 
market  and  to  facilitate  the  operation  of 
charter  flights,  including  the  recently 
authorized  one-stop  inclusive  tour  charter, 
between  both  countries  by  the  air  carriers 
of  both  countries  during  1976. 


'Issued  on  May  12  (text  from  press  release  245, 
which  includes  the  text  of  the  memorandum  of  under- 
standing). 


uly  5,  1976 


37 


U.S.  and  Egypt  Sign  Agreement 
on  Claims  of  U.S.  Nationals 

Press   release  219  dated  May  3 

The  Governments  of  the  United  States  of 
America  and  of  the  Arab  RepubHc  of  Egypt 
have,  on  May  1,  signed  an  agreement  ad  ref- 
erendum providing  for  the  payment  of  a 
himp  sum  of  $10  million  in  compensation  of 
private  claims  of  nationals  of  the  United 
States.  The  agreement  is  subject  to  the 
further  approval  of  the  two  governments 
and  will  enter  into  force  upon  an  exchange 
of  notes  stating  each  government's  final  ap- 
proval of  the  agreement. 

Covered  by  this  agreement  is  the  claim  of 
the  American  Mission  in  Egypt  (United 
Presbyterian  Church  in  the  U.S.A.),  which 
is  being  settled  to  its  complete  satisfaction. 

This  agreement  marks  another  step  in  the 
continually  improving  relations  between  the 
two  countries  and  will  contribute  to  mutually 
beneficial  economic  relations.  It  should  in 
particular  assist  in  creating  an  atmosphere 
of  confidence  to  attract  American  invest- 
ment and  technology  in  Egypt. 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


Agriculture 

International    plant    protection    convention.    Done    at 
Rome  December  6,  1951.  Entered  into  force  April 
3,   1952;    for  the   United   States   August   18,   1972. 
TIAS  7465. 
Ratification    deposited:    Cuba,    April    14.    1976." 

Coffee 

International   coffee   agreement  1976,  with   annexes. 
Done  at  London  December  3,  1975." 
Sig7iatnres :    Cameroon,    Haiti.    June    3,    1976;    El 

Salvador,  June  4,  1976;  Tanzania,  Trinidad  and 

Tobago,  June  9,  1976. 

Economic  Cooperation 

Agreement  establishing  a  financial  support  fund  of 
the  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development.   Done   at   Paris   April   9,   1975.^^ 


Ratification  deposited:   Federal   Republic   of   Ger- 
many, June  8,  1976.^ 

Energy 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concerning  coopera- 
tive information  exchange  relating  to  the  develop- 
ment of  solar  heating  and  cooling  systems  in 
buildings.  Formulated  at  Odeillo,  France,  October 
1-4,  1974.  Entered  into  force  July  1,  1975.  TIAS 
8202. 
Signature:  Jamaica,   May  19,  1976. 

Postal 

Constitution    of    the    Universal    Postal    Union,    with 
final    protocol.    Done    at    Vienna    July    10,    1964. 
Entered  into  force  January  1,  1966.  TIAS  5881. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Colombia,  May  11,   1976; 

Liberia,  September  16,   1975. 
Accession  deposited:  Papua  New  Guinea,  May  4, 

1976. 
Additional  protocol  to  the  constitution  of  the  Uni- 
versal Postal  Union  with  final  protocol  signed  at 
Vienna  July  10,  1964  (TIAS  5881).  Signed  at 
Tokyo  November  14,  1969.  Entered  into  force  Julyi 
1,  1971,  except  for  article  V,  which  entered  into, 
force  January  1,  1971.  TIAS  7150. 
Accession  deposited:  Papua  New  Guinea,  May  4, 

1976. 
Second  additional  protocol  to  the  constitution  of  the 
Universal  Postal  Union  of  July  10,  1964  (TIAS 
5881,  7150),  general  regulations  with  final  protocol 
and  annex,  and  the  universal  postal  convention 
with  final  protocol  and  detailed  regulations.  Done 
at  Lausanne  July  5,  1974.  Entered  into  force  Jan- 
uary 1,  1976. 
Accessio7i   deposited:    Papua   New   Guinea    (wit! 

reservations).  May  4,  1976. 
Ratifications    deposited:    Jordan,    May    10.    1976 

Swaziland,  May  7,  1976. 

Space 

Convention  on  international  liability  for  damagi 
caused  by  space  objects.  Done  at  Washington 
London,  and  Moscow  March  29,  1972.  Entere( 
into  force  September  1,  1972;  for  the  Unite( 
States  October  9,  1973.  TIAS  7762. 
Accession    deposited:    Sweden,    June    15,    1976.' 

Convention   on   registration   of  objects   launched   intc 
outer   space.    Opened   for   signature  at   New   Yorl 
January  14,  1975." 
Signature :  Sweden.  June  9.  1976. 
Ratification  deposited:  Sweden.  June  9,  1976. 

Tin 

Fifth    international    tin    agreement,    with    annexes 
Done  at  Geneva  June  21,  1975.° 
Ratification  deposited:  Hungary,  June  8.  1976. 


'  With  reservation  and  declaration. 

"  Not  in  force. 

"  Applicable  to  Land  Berlin. 

'  With  declaration. 


38 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


Jl' 


rade 

.rrangement  regarding  international  trade  in  tex- 
tiles, with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  December  20, 
1973.  Entered  into  force  January  1,  1974,  except 
for  article  2,  paragraphs  2,  3,  and  4,  which 
entered  into  force  April  1,  1974.  TIAS  7840. 
Acceptances  deposited:  Paraguay  (ad  referen- 
dum), May  17,  1976;  Uruguay,  May  11,  1976. 
Ratification  deposited:  Guatemala,  May  19,  1976. 

Inhaling 

iternational  whaling  convention  and  schedule  of 
whaling  regulations.  Done  at  Washington  Decem- 

'  ber  2,  1946.  Entered  into  force  November  10,  1948. 
TIAS  1849. 

Notification  of  adherence:  New  Zealand,  June  15. 
1976. 

rotocol  to  the  international  whaling  convention  of 
December  2,  1946  (TIAS  1849).  Done  at  Washing- 
ton November  19,  1956.  Entered  into  force  May 
4,   1959.   TIAS   4228. 

Notification  of  adherence:  New  Zealand,  June  15, 
1976. 

/heat 

rotocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the  wheat 
trade  convention  (part  of  the  international  wheat 
agreement)  1971  (TIAS  7144).  Done  at  Washing- 
ton March  25,  1975.  Entered  into  force  June  19, 
1975,  with  respect  to  certain  provisions  and  July 
1,  1975,  with  respect  to  other  provisions.  TIAS 
8227. 

Ratification  deposited:  Austria.  June  15,  1976. 
rotocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the  wheat 
trade  convention   (part  of  the  international  wheat 
agreement)     1971     (TIAS    7144,    8227).    Done    at 
Washington    March    17,    1976.    Entered    into   force 
June  19,   1976,  with  respect  to  certain   provisions, 
and  July  1,  1976,  with  respect  to  other  provisions. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Australia,  June  11,  1976; 
Canada,  Republic  of  Korea,  June  16,  1976;  Pak- 
istan, June  17,  1976;  Ecuador,  June  18,  1976. 
.Accession  deposited:  Denmark,  June  17,   1976." 
Declarations  of  provisional  application  deposited: 
Finland,   June    11,    1976;    Switzerland,   June    15, 
1976;    Greece,   Kenya,  June   16,   1976;    Belgium,'' 
European    Economic    Community,'^    France,"   Fed- 
eral Republic  of  Germany,"  Ireland,^  Italy,"  Lux- 
embourg," Netherlands,""  Tunisia,   United   King- 
dom,"'   United    States,*    June    17,    1976;    Egypt, 
Japan,"  Norway,  June  18,  1976. 
rotocol  modifying   and  further  extending  the  food 
aid   convention    (part    of    the    international    wheat 
'agreement)     1971     (TIAS    7144,    8227).    Done    at 
Washington    March    17,    1976.    Entered   into   force 
June   19,   1976,  with  respect  to  certain   provisions, 
and  July  1,  1976,  with  respect  to  other  provisions. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Australia,  June  11,  1976; 

Canada,  June   16,   1976. 
Declarations  of  provisional  application  deposited: 
Finland,   June    11,    1976;    Switzerland,   June    15, 
1976;   Belgium,  European  Economic  Community, 


ily  5,  1976 


France,   Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  Ireland, 
Italy,    Luxembourg,    Netherlands,"   United    King- 
dom,   United    States,'    June    17,    1976;    Japan," 
June  18,  1976. 
Accession  deposited:  Denmark,  June  17,  1976. 


BILATERAL 

Bangladesh 

Loan  agreement  relating  to  installation  of  a  50- 
megawatt  hydrogenerating  unit  at  Karnaphuli 
Power  Station,  Kaptai,  with  annex.  Signed  at 
Dacca  May  28,  1976.  Entered  into  force  May  28, 
1976. 

Project  agreement  relating  to  support  for  the  Pop- 
ulation Control  Program  of  Bangladesh,  with  an- 
nexes. Signed  at  Dacca  May  31,  1976.  Entered 
into  force  May  31,  1976. 

Belgium 

Procedures  for  mutual  assistance  in  the  administra- 
tion of  justice  in  connection  with  the  Lockheed 
Aircraft  Corporation  matter.  Signed  at  Washing- 
ton May  21,  1976.  Entered  into  force  May  21,  1976. 

Canada 

Agreement  relating  to  the  construction,  operation, 
and  maintenance  of  a  Loran-C  station  in  the  vicin- 
ity of  Williams  Lake,  British  Columbia,  with  an- 
nex. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Ottawa  May 
28  and  June  3,  1976.  Entered  into  force  June  3, 
1976. 

Greece 

Procedures  for  mutual  assistance  in  the  administra- 
tion of  justice  in  connection  with  the  Lockheed 
Aircraft  Corporation  matter.  Signed  at  Washing- 
ton May  20,  1976.  Entered  into  force  May  20,  1976. 

Indonesia 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of 
agricultural  commodities  of  April  19,  1976.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Jakarta  May  26 
and  28,  1976.  Entered  into  force  May  28,  1976. 

Ireland 

Agreement  relating  to  air  passenger  charter  services. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Dublin  May  11 
and  28,  1976.  Entered  into  force  May  28,  1976. 


'  With  declaration. 

"  With  statement. 

°  For  the  Kingdom  in  Europe. 

■  Applicable  to  Dominica,  Saint  Christopher,  Nevis 
and  Anguilla,  Saint  Vincent,  Belize,  Bermuda,  British 
Virgin  Islands,  Hong  Kong,  Montserrat,  Saint  Helena 
and  Dependencies,  Seychelles,  and  Tuvalu. 


39 


Panama 

Agreement  amending  the  loan  agreement  of  May  C, 
1969,  as  amended,  relating  to  the  Panama  City 
water  supply  system.  Signed  at  Panama  June  2, 
1976.  Entered  into  force  June  2,  1976. 

Syria 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of 
agricultural  commodities  of  April  20,  1976.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Damascus  June  2 
and  3,  1976.  Entered  into  force  June  3,  1976. 

Tanzania 

Agreement  relating  to  the  transfer  of  food  grain  to 
Tanzania  to  assist  in  alleviating  the  shortage 
caused  by  prolonged  drought.  Signed  at  Dar  es 
Salaam  April  13,  1976.  Entered  into  force  April 
13,  1976. 

Tunisia 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities. 
Signed  at  Tunis  June  7,  1976.  Entered  into  force 
June  7,  1976. 


PUBLICATIONS 


Department  Releases  General  Index 
for  1776-1949  Treaty  Compilation 

Press    release    167   dated   April   9 

The  Department  of  State  released  on  April  9  the 
"General  Index"  to  its  series  "Treaties  and  Other 
International  Agreements  of  the  United  States  of 
America  1776-1949,"  compiled  under  the  direction  of 
Charles  I.  Bevans,  formerly  Assistant  Legal  Adviser 
for  Treaty  Affairs. 

The  119-page  index  is  volume  13  of  the  series.  The 
first  four  volumes  in  the  Bevans  series,  released  in 
1969  and  1970,  contain  the  texts  of  multilateral 
treaties  and  other  international  agreements  entered 
into  by  the  United  States  from  1776  to  1950.  Volumes 
5  through  12,  released  1971  to  1974,  contain  bilateral 
agreements  for  that  period,  grouped  alphabetically 
by  country.  Agreements  concluded  since  1949  are  not 
included,  because  they  are  available  in  the  annual 
statutory  volumes  "United  States  Treaties  and  Other 
International  Agreements." 

Copies  of  volumes  1  through  13  of  the  Bevans 
series  are  for  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Washing- 
ton, D.C.  20402.  Price  (domestic  postpaid):  vol.  1, 
$8.50;  vol.  2,  $10.25;  vol.  3,  $11.75;  vol.  4,  $8.25;  vol. 


40 


5,  $9.75;  vol.  6,  $11.00;  vol.  7,  $11.00;  vol.  8,  $11.00; 
vol.  9,  $11.00;  vol.  10,  $11.00;  vol.  11,  $14.35;  vol.  12, 
$15.15;  vol.  13,  $4.60.  Volume  13  is  Department  of 
State  publication  8830  (Stock  No.  044-0000-1326-6). 


GPO  Sales  Publications 

Publications  may  be  ordered  by  catalog  or  stock 
number  from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20J,02. 
A  25-percent  discount  is  made  on  orders  for  100  or 
more  copies  of  any  one  publication  mailed  to  the 
same  address.  Remittances,  payable  to  the  Superin- 
tendent of  Documents,  must  accompany  orders. 
Prices  shown  below,  which  include  domestic  postage, 
are  subject  to  change. 

Background  Notes:  Short,  factual  summaries  which 
describe  the  people,  history,  government,  economy, 
and  foreign  relations  of  each  country.  Each  contains' 
a  map,  a  list  of  principal  government  officials  and  iji 
U.S.  diplomatic  and  consular  officers,  and  a  reading 
list.  (A  complete  set  of  all  Background  Notes  cur-  I 
rently  in  stock — at  least  140 — $21.80;  1-year  sub- 
scription service  for  approximately  77  updated  or 
new  Notes— $23.10;  plastic  binder— $1.50.)  Single 
copies  of  those  listed  below  are  available  at  35(f  each. 


Bahamas 
Netherlands 
Norway     .     . 
Upper   Volta 
Zambia      .     . 


World  Military  Expenditures  and  Arms  Transfer 
1965-1974.  This  report,  the  eighth  in  a  series,  pro 
vides  worldwide  statistical  information  on  nationa 
military  spending  and  armed  forces,  Internationa 
transfers  of  arms,  and  other  comparative  data.  Pub 
84.  U.S.  Arms  Control  and  Disarmament  Agency 
76  pp.  $1.80.  (Stock  No.  002-000-00054-7). 

Fisheries.  Agreement  with  the  Union  of  Soviet  So    ' 
cialist  Republics  extending  the  agreements  of  Febru 
ary  21,   1973,  as  extended.   TIAS   8150.   5   pp.   50^ 
(Cat.  No.  89.10:8150). 

Frequency  Modulation  Broadcasting.  Agreement  witl 
Mexico  amending  the  agreement  of  November  9 
1972.  TIAS  8152.  5  pp.  50(f.  (Cat.  No.  39.10:8152).   |< 

Air  Transport  Services.  Agreement  with  Malaysii 
amending  the  agreement  of  February  2.  1970.  TIAf 
8157.  .'>  pp.  35«».  (Cat.  No.  S9.10:8157). 

Trade  Relations.  Agreement  with  the  Socialist  Re 
public  of  Romania.  TIAS  8159.  43  pp.  75*.  (Cat.  No 
89.10:8159). 


Cat. 

No. 

S1.123:B14 

Pub. 

8329 

4  pp 

Cat. 

No. 

81.123:N3f 

Pub. 

7960 

7  pp 

Cat. 

No. 

S1.123:N8; 

Pub. 

8228 

4  pp 

Cat. 

No.  S1.123:UP6\ 

Pub. 

8201 

4  pp 

Cat. 

No. 

S1.123:Z 

Pub. 

7841 

6  pp 

Department  of  State  Builetii 


INDEX      Jvly  5,  1976       Vol.  LXXV,  No.  1932 


Aviation.  U.S.  and  U.K.  Reach  Understanding 
on  Acceptance  of  Air  Charters 37 

Bolivia 

Letters  of  Credence  (Crespo) 13 

Secretary  Kissinger  Visits  Four  Latin  Amer- 
ican Countries  (remarks,  toasts,  news  con- 
ferences, and  U.S.-Bolivia  and  U.S.-Mexico 
joint     communiques) 14 

Jhile.  Secretary  Kissinger  Visits  Four  Latin 
American  Countries  (remarks,  toasts,  news 
conferences,  and  U.S.-Bolivia  and  U.S.-Mex- 
ico  joint   communiques) 14 

I'laims.  U.S.  and  Egypt  Sign  Agreement  on 
Claims   of   U.S.   Nationals 38 

'ommodities.  Secretary  Kissinger  Attends 
OAS  General  Assembly  at  Santiago  (Kis- 
singer,  U.S.-Panama   report) 1 

ongress.  Congressional  Docimients  Relating 
to    Foreign    Policy 36 

1  ;uba.   Secretary  Kissinger  Visits   Four  Latin 
\    American  Countries   (remarks,  toasts,  news 
conferences,  and  U.S.-Bolivia  and  U.S.-Mex- 
ico joint  communique) 14 

Czechoslovakia.  Letters  of  Credence  (Johanes)  13 

)eveloping  Countries.  Secretary  Kissinger 
Attends  OAS  General  Assembly  at  Santiago 
(Kissinger,    U.S.-Panama    report)    ....  1 

)ominican  Republic.  Secretary  Kissinger  Visits 
Four  Latin  American  Countries  (remarks, 
toasts,  news  conferences,  and  U.S.-Bolivia 
and  U.S.-Mexico  joint  communiques)   ...        14 

kxtnomic  Affairs.  Secretary  Kissinger  Attends 
OAS  General  Assembly  at  Santiago  (Kissin- 
ger,   U.S.-Panama    report) 1 

!gypt.  U.S.  and  Egypt  Sign  Agreement  on 
Claims   of   U.S.   Nationals 38 

(uman  Rights.  Secretary  Kissinger  Attends 
OAS  General  Assembly  at  Santiago  (Kissin- 
ger,  U.S.-Panama   report) 1 

srael.  Ambassador  Scranton  Comments  on 
World  Health  Assembly  Action  (statement).        37 

.atin  America 

ecretary  Kissinger  Attends  OAS  General  As- 
sembly at  Santiago  (Kissinger,  U.S.-Panama 
report)      1 

ecretary  Kissinger  Visits  Four  Latin  Amer- 
ican Countries  (remarks,  toasts,  news  con- 
ferences, and  U.S.-Bolivia  and  U.S.-Mexico 
joint     communiques) 14 

ebanon.  Secretary  Kissinger  Visits  Four 
Latin  American  Countries  (remarks,  toasts, 
news  conferences,  and  U.S.-Bolivia  and  U.S.- 
Mexico joint  communiques) 14 

lexico.  Secretary  Kissinger  Visits  Four  Latin 
American  Countries  (remarks,  toasts,  news 
conferences,  and  U.S.-Bolivia  and  U.S.- 
Mexico   joint    communiques) 14 

rganization  of  American  States 
ecretary    Kissinger    Attends     OAS    General 
Assembly    at    Santiago     (Kissinger,     U.S.- 
Panama  report) 1 


Secretary  Kissinger  Visits  Four  Latin  Ameri- 
can Countries  (remarks,  toasts,  news  con- 
ferences, and  U.S.-Bolivia  and  U.S.-Mexico 
joint  communique) 14 

Panama.  Secretary  Kissinger  Attends  OAS 
General  Assembly  at  Santiago  (Kissinger, 
U.S.-Panama    report) 1 

Publications 

Department  Releases  General  Index  for  1776- 

1949  Treaty  Compilation 40 

GPO  Sales  Publications 40 

Trade.  Secretary  Kissinger  Attends  OAS  Gen- 
eral Assembly  at  Santiago  (Kissinger,  U.S.- 
Panama  report)    1 

Treaty  Information 

Current  Actions 38 

U.S.   and   Egypt   Sign   Agreement   on   Claims 

of    U.S.    Nationals 38 

U.S.  and  U.K.  Reach  Understanding  on  Ac- 
ceptance of  Air  Charters 37 

United  Kingdom.  U.S.  and  U.K.  Reach  Under- 
standing on  Acceptance  of  Air  Charters  .    .        37 

United  Nations.  Ambassador  Scranton  Com- 
ments on  World  Health  Assembly  Action 
(statement)       37 

Yemen,  Letters  of  Credence  (Mutawakkil)  .     .        13 

Name  Index 

Crespo  Gutierrez,  Alberto 13 

Johanes,    Jaromir 13 

Kissinger,    Secretary 1,  14 

Mutawakkil,  Yahya  M.  al- 13 

Scranton,  William  W 37 


Checklist  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  June  14—20 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  2O520. 

No.    Date  Sabjee* 

t305  6/16  Kissinger:  statement  on  murder 
of  Ambassador  to  Lebanon 
Francis  E.  Meloy,  Jr.,  Robert  O. 
Waring,  and  Zohair  Moghrabi. 

t306  6/17  Kissinger:  House  Committee  on 
International  Relations. 

*307  6/17  Robert  V.  Keeley  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  Mauritius  (bio- 
graphic data). 

*308  6/18  John  H.  Reed  sworn  in  as  Am- 
bassador   to    Sri    Lanka     (bio- 

*309  6/18  William  D.  Rogers  sworn  in  as 
Under  Secretary  for  Economic 
Affairs    (biographic   data). 

t310  6/19  Kissinger:  remarks  at  services  for 
Ambassador  Meloy  and  Robert 
O.  Waring,  Andrews  AFB. 

t312    6/20    Kissinger:  arrival,  Paris. 

t312A  6/20  Kissinger:  departure,  Andrews 
AFB. 

*  Not  printed. 

t  Held  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


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/■3: 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 

BULLETIN 


Volume  LXXV 


No.  1933 


July  12,  1976 


SECRETARY  KISSINGER  REPORTS  TO  CONGRESS  ON  HIS  VISITS 
TO  LATIN  AMERICA,  WESTERN  EUROPE,  AND  AFRICA       Ul 

DEPARTMENT  DISCUSSES  ALLEGATIONS  OF  COMMUNIST  INFLUENCE 
IN  CERTAIN  WESTERN  HEMISPHERE  COUNTRIES 

Statement  by  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  Luers       49 


THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 

i„.^L-j;'.  .''■•■■■'■■-  '■ 
For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


Superintendent  ct  Dueuaicrii.t 

AUG  1  1  I9fm 

DtPOSlTOKY 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE  BULLETlf 

II 


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Vol.   LXXV,   No.   1933 
July  12,  1976 


II 


The  Department  of  State  BVLLETU 
a    weekly    publication    issued   by  th 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau  t 
Public  Affairs,  provides  tfie  public  on 
interested  agencies  of  tlie  governmei 
with  information  on  developments  i 
the  field  of  U.S.  foreign  relations  an 
on  the  work  of  the  Department  m 
the  Foreign  Service. 
The     BULLETIN     includes     selecU 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy,  istu 
by  tlie  White  House  and  the  JDe,  " 
ment,      and     statements,     addri 
and  news  conferences  of  the  Presi 
and  the  Secretary  of  State  and  oth 
officers  of  the  Department,  as  well 
special  articles  on  various  phase 
international  affairs  and  the  func 
of    the    Department.     Informatiol 
included  concerning  treaties  and 
national    agreements    to    which 
United   States   is  or   may  become 
party  and  on  treaties  of  general  il| 
national   interest. 
Publications    of    the    Departmem 
State,  United  Nations  documents,  m 
legislative    material   in    the   field 
international  relations  are  also 


1 


Secretary  Kissinger  Reports  to  Congress  on  His  Visits 
to  Latin  America,  Western  Europe,  and  Africa 

Statement  by  Secretary  Kissinger ' 


I  am  happy  to  be  able  to  report  to  this 
Kimmittee  on  our  foreign  policy  with  regard 
to  three  important  areas  which  I  have 
i('i  ontly  visited — Latin  America,  Western 
Etiiope,  and  Africa. 

I  believe  that  our  relations  with  Latin 
America  and  with  Western  Europe  are 
stronger  and  more  promising  than  they  have 
Ijci'n  in  a  decade.  In  Africa  we  have  re- 
sponded to  a  dangerously  deteriorating  situa- 
lion  with  a  policy  that  offers  hope  for  south- 
ern Africa  to  undergo  peaceful  change  with 
justice  without  submitting  to  external  inter- 
/I'lition  and  opportunities  for  progress  in  the 
Hst  of  Africa  without  following  radical 
luctrines. 


.atin   America 

Let  me  take  up  with  you  our  policy  toward 
each  of  these  areas. 

In  March,  I  reported  to  you  on  the  vast 
■hauges  evident  to  me  during  my  trip  to 
Latin  America  in  February.  These  changes 
ire  opening  the  way  to  a  new  constructive 
elationship  between  the  United  States  and 
.atin  America.  The  quality  of  that  relation- 
ship was  evident  at  the  meeting  of  the  OAS 
ieneral  Assembly  in  Santiago,  from  which 

have  just  returned.  The  atmosphere — of 
nutual   respect   and   perceived   common    in- 


Submitted  to  the  House  Committee  on  Interiia- 
ional  Relations  on  June  17  (text  from  press  release 
106).  The  complete  transcript  will  be  published  by 
[he  committee  and  will  be  available  from  the  Super- 
itendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing 
>fflce,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


terest— was  better  at  the  1976  OAS  General 
Assembly  than  at  any  other  inter-American 
meeting  I  have  ever  attended. 

Ours  is  a  special  relationship  in  this  hemi- 
sphere. The  unique  experience  we  share  in 
the  Americas — the  finding  and  opening  of 
new  continents,  the  forging  of  nations  free 
from  colonial  domination,  the  shared  human 
and  moral  principles  of  the  New  World — 
creates  special  ties  for  the  United  States  and 
Latin  America. 

As  in  all  families,  there  are  periods  of 
creativity  and  times  of  stress.  Ours  is  no 
exception.  The  United  States  has  passed 
through  a  variety  of  phases  in  its  relation- 
ship to  Latin  America.  Not  all  have  been  pro- 
ductive in  recent  years.  Sometimes,  when  we 
were  active,  when  we  attempted  to  organize 
massive  transfers  of  resources  to  meet  Latin 
American  development  needs  directly,  we 
were  seen  as  attempting  to  dominate  the 
hemisphere.  When  our  policies  were  other- 
wise— when  we  were  less  involved  in  Latin 
American  problems  and  more  inclined  to  let 
Latin  American  nations  work  out  their  own 
solutions  alone — we  were  looked  upon  as 
neglecting  our  obligations. 

The  1930's,  the  1940's,  and  even  the  1950's 
were  decades  in  which  this  nation  indulged 
in  the  pretense  of  tutelage.  Li  the  1960's 
the  Alliance  for  Progress  rallied  the  energies 
and  enthusiasms  of  people  throughout  the 
Americas  to  the  development  effort.  But  by 
1969  its  promises  had  begun  to  fade. 

Thus,  even  as  Latin  America  began  to 
realize   its   own   maturity  and   experience  a 


JHly  12,   1976 


41 


period  of  massive  economic  growth — and 
with  it  greater  self-respect — the  United 
States  moved  into  a  period  of  lower  profile, 
which  we  maintained  until  the  inauguration 
of  the  new  dialogue  in  1974.  That  period 
drew  to  a  close  with  the  meeting  at  Tlatelolco, 
in  Mexico  [February  18-23,  1974],  in  which 
we  began  a  process  of  dialogue  with  the 
hemisphere  once  again. 

At  the  outset,  admittedly,  the  dialogue  had 
a  character  of  inquiring  into  what  the  United 
States  could  do  for  Latin  America.  But  it 
became  obvious  that,  as  a  result  of  the  major 
changes  and  considerable  progress  in  Latin 
America  during  the  1960's  and  early  1970's, 
we  were  now  able  to  deal  with  the  major 
nations  of  Latin  America  with  a  new  mutu- 
ality of  respect  and  equality  of  sovereignty 
quite  impossible  20  years  ago  or  even  10. 

In  the  last  two  years,  we  have  built 
steadily  on  this  new  relationship.  We  have 
taken  advantage  of  it  to  put  forward  new 
initiatives  in  the  political  and  the  economic 
areas  which  we  could  not  have  considered  a 
decade  or  more  ago.  The  culmination  of  this 
new  policy  effort  was  the  meeting  at  Santi- 
ago last  week. 

The  constructive  attitude  in  Santiago  and 
the  remarkably  good  tone  to  our  relation- 
ships throughout  the  hemisphere  are  attrib- 
utable in  great  part  to  three  factors: 

— The  United  States,  since  the  inaugura- 
tion of  the  new  dialogue  early  in  1974,  is 
again  active  as  an  equal  partner  in  inter- 
American  councils; 

— We  have  a  coherent  policy  that  address- 
es the  entire  catalogue  of  hemispheric 
issues;  and 

— We  have  a  vision  of  the  future  of  our 
relationship. 

It  is  that,  I  believe,  which  has  reassured 
Latin  America  that  the  political  relation- 
ship with  the  United  States — the  basic 
solidarity  of  the  Western  Hemisphere — is 
again  increasingly  vital. 

With  our  political  and  moral  relationship 
once  again  sound,  we  have  a  basis  for  co- 
opei-ation   with   Latin   America  in   the  area 


of  most  pressing  concern,  that  of  economic 
development. 

The  countries  of  Latin  America  are  among 
the  most  developed  of  the  developing  nations 
and  have  been  growing  rapidly.  Latin  Amer-  I 
ica  has  quintupled  its  collective  gross  prod- 
uct since  1950.  At  this  rate,  in  10  years 
Latin  America  will  have  attained  the  eco- 
nomic strength  which  Europe  had  in  1960. 
Its  economies,  furthermore,  are  increasingly 
important  in  world  commodity,  mineral,  and 
energy  markets  and  in  trade  in  manufac- 
tured goods.  Success  in  the  struggle  for  de- 
velopment of  the  poorer  countries  of  the 
world,  when  it  comes,  will  come  first  in  Latin 
America.  For  this  reason,  we  must  focus 
our  attention  and  our  energies  there. 

To  address  the  changing  nature  of  our 
relationship  with  Latin  America  and  to  deal 
with  the  expanding  range  of  our  common 
concerns,  I  set  forth  in  Latin  America  last 
February  six  elements  of  our  policy.  I  said 
the  United  States  would: 

— Take  special  cognizance  of  the  distinctive 
requirements  of  the  more  industrialized 
economies  of  Latin  America,  and  of  the  re- 
gion as  a  whole,  in  the  context  of  our  efforts 
to  help  shape  a  more  equitable  international 
order ; 

— Assist  directly  the  neediest  nations  in 
the  hemisphere  afflicted  by  poverty  and 
natural  disaster; 

— Support  Latin  American  regional  and 
subregional  efforts  to  organize  for  coopera- 
tion and  integration; 

— Negotiate  on  the  basis  of  parity  and 
dignity  our  specific  differences  with  each  and 
every  state,  to  solve  problems  before  they 
become  conflicts ; 

— Enforce  our  commitment  to  collective 
security  and  to  maintain  regional  integrity 
against  attempts  to  undermine  solidarity, 
threaten  independence,  or  export  violence; 
and 

— Work  to  modernize  the  inter-American 
system  to  respond  to  the  needs  of  our  times 
and  give  direction  to  our  common  action. 

Since  February,  in  furtherance  of  these! 
objectives,  the  United  States  has  introduced 


42 


Department  of  State  Bulletinii 


trade,  investment,  and  technology  proposals 
lOf  special  relevance  to  this  hemisphere  at 
CIEC  [Conference  on  International  Eco- 
nomic Cooperation]  in  Paris  and  at  UNCTAD 
IV  [fourth  ministerial  meeting  of  the  U.N. 
Conference  on  Trade  and  Development]  in 
(Nairobi.  We  responded  to  the  efforts  of  the 
Guatemalan  people  to  recover  from  the 
earthquake  that  devastated  their  land.  We 
have  provided  fresh  support  to  subregional 
cooperation  in  Central  America  and  are  ex- 
ploring ways  of  relating  more  effectively  to 
the  Andean  Pact.  And  at  last  week's  Gen- 
eral Assembly  of  the  Organization  of 
American  States  at  Santiago,  we  advanced 
3ur  common  interests  in  three  important 
;ireas:  cooperation  for  development,  reform 
jf  the  inter-American  system,  and  human 
rights. 

To  speed  cooperation  for  development  in  the 
Americas,  we  stressed  three  major  topics  for 
action:  commodities,  trade,  and  technology. 

The  economic  aspirations  of  most  coun- 
:ries  in  Latin  America  depend  upon  stable 
conditions  for  the  production  and  marketing 
)f  primary  commodities.  At  Santiago  we 
proposed  a  three-point  program  designed  to 
mprove  regional  consultations  on  commodi- 
ties markets;  derive  greater  hemispheric 
benefits  from  global  commodity  arrange- 
nents;  and  improve  resource  financing, 
Mther  on  a  global  or  regional  basis. 

To  expand  trade  opportunities  and  capa- 
jilities,  we  offered  proposals  to  help  develop- 
ng  nations  expand  and  diversify  exports  of 
nanufactured  and  semiprocessed  goods, 
promote  the  hemisphere's  trade  position 
:hrough  the  Geneva  negotiations,  and  sup- 
port needed  regional  and  subregional  eco- 
jiomic  integration. 

And  we  proposed  a  number  of  new  ideas  to 
ptimulate  the  development,  acquisition,  and 
itilization  of  technology  in  the  moderniza- 
tion of  the  hemisphere. 

To  improve  the  inter-American  system,  we 
nrculated  proposals — the  most  far-reaching 
he  United  States  has  ever  put  fonvard — 
vhich  would  simplify  the  organization  by 
;trengthening  the  foreign  ministers  meet- 
ngs    in    the    periodic    General    Assemblies, 


uly  12,   1976 


eliminate  the  standing  councils,  open  the 
OAS  to  wider  membership  in  the  hemi- 
sphere— particularly  the  new  states  of  the 
Caribbean — ^and  increase  the  Latins'  share 
of  the  budget.  Such  steps,  we  believe,  could 
lead  to  a  leaner  and  more  flexible  and  re- 
sponsive organization  which  could  better  pro- 
mote the  mutual  security,  economic  progress, 
and  human  rights  of  the  Americas. 

And  on  the  centrally  important  issue  of 
human  rights,  I  addressed  the  special  re- 
sponsibility of  our  nations  to  preserve,  cher- 
ish, and  defend  fundamental  human  values — 
for  if  such  values  cannot  be  preserved, 
cherished,  and  defended  in  this  hemisphere, 
where  the  rights  and  the  promise  of  the  in- 
dividual have  played  such  a  historic  role, 
then  they  are  in  jeopardy  everywhere. 

At  Santiago,  the  United  States  reaffirmed 
our  unequivocal  commitment  to  the  Ameri- 
can Declaration  of  the  Rights  and  Duties  of 
Man.  We  endorsed  the  reports  presented 
there  by  the  Inter-American  Human 
Rights  Commission:  its  annual  report, 
which  cites  the  rise  of  violence  and  terror 
in  many  nations  of  Latin  America,  its  re- 
port on  Chile,  and  its  report — submitted  too 
late  for  official  consideration  by  the  OAS 
Assembly — concerning  the  inhuman  treat- 
ment of  political  prisoners  in  Cuba  and  the 
refusal  of  Cuba  to  cooperate  with  the 
Commission. 

The  United  States  emphasized  our  belief 
that  the  protection  of  human  rights  in  the 
hemisphere  is  an  obligation  of  every  nation 
and  not  simply  of  particular  nations  whose 
practices  have  come  to  public  attention  or 
whose  ideology — on  whichever  side  of  the 
political  spectrum — is   unpopular. 

The  contrast  between  the  respective 
treatment  of  the  Human  Rights  Commis- 
sion's work  by  the  Governments  of  Chile  and 
Cuba  demonstrates  the  importance  of  this 
principle.  The  Government  of  Chile  cooper- 
ated with  the  Commission;  the  Govei-nment 
of  Cuba  did  not.  The  Government  of  Chile 
did  nothing  to  prevent  widespread  publica- 
tion in  that  country  of  information  about  the 
Commission's  report  and  about  the  OAS  dis- 
cussion of  the  issue.  Needless  to  say,  there 


43 


has  been  nothing  comparable  in  the  govern- 
ment-controlled media  in  Cuba.  Most  impor- 
tant, the  Commission  noted  a  quantitative 
improvement  in  the  situation  in  Chile  since 
its  last  report. 

For  these  reasons,  I  believe  we  can  best 
enhance  the  prospects  for  further  human 
rights  progress  in  Chile  by  continuing  a  bal- 
anced policy  by  working  in  the  area  of  hu- 
man rights  and  by  assisting  that  government 
to  meet  the  economic  problems  before  it.  We 
have  made  it  clear  to  the  Government  of 
Chile  that  the  condition  of  human  rights  in 
that  country  impairs  our  relationship.  Ac- 
tions which  would  further  undermine  our 
relationship  could  eliminate  the  practical 
possibilities  for  betterment  of  economic  con- 
ditions. 

Mr.  Chairman,  our  efforts  in  Latin 
America  over  the  past  several  months  have 
considerably  advanced  our  practical  progress 
and  provided  a  firm  foundation  of  policy  for 
the  years  ahead.  We  have  moved  into  a  new 
phase  of  profound  interest,  active  initiatives, 
and  comprehensive  proposals  for  altering  the 
inter-American  relationship,  a  phase  which 
is  more  compatible  with  the  new  cooperative 
spirit  in  the  hemisphere. 

We  have  come  to  the  end  of  a  critical  era 
and  are  marking  the  beginning  of  a  new  one. 
The  United  States  can  now  deal  with  Latin 
America  in  a  new  spirit.  We  need  not  hold 
back  on  major  initiatives  for  fear  of  inspir- 
ing old  notions  of  paternalism.  With  con- 
sultation and  cooperation,  our  hopes  of 
meeting  the  challenges  of  economic  and  so- 
cial progress  in  an  age  of  interdependence 
and  of  building  a  sound  and  beneficial  rela- 
tionship between  developed  and  developing 
nations  are  brightest  and  most  promising 
here  in  this  hemisphei'e. 

Europe 

Let  me  turn  briefly  now  to  Europe. 

In  late  May  I  attended  the  NATO  Minis- 
ters' meeting  in  Oslo  and  held  a  series  of 
meetings  with  European  leaders. 

I  do  not  need  to  rehearse  at  length  to  this 
committee  why  the  countries  of  Westei'n 
Europe  are  important  to  the  United  States 


44 


lit 
h 

silt 


and  to  all  our  international  endeavors,:  I 
Throughout  the  postwar  period  we  have  f 
recognized  that  the  security  of  Western 
Europe  is  inseparable  from  our  own.  Oub 
economies  are  inextricably  linked ;  we  have 
had  repeated  demonstrations  that  economic 
performance  on  one  side  of  the  Atlantic  will 
in  time  affect  both.  Most  of  all,  these  are  the 
peoples  who  share  our  most  fundamental 
cultural  and  political  heritage  and  its  values, 
and  they  share  our  vision  of  the  kind  o| 
world  we  want  to  live  in 

While  cooperating  in  a  defensive  allianed|ji 
which  for  durability  and  vitality  is  probab^ 
unique  in  the  history  of  sovereign  states,  th( 
Atlantic  nations  also  have  been  coordinatingiu 
efforts  gradually  to  improve  relations  with  sti 
regimes  in  Eastern  Europe  whose  values  ano  n 
aims  are  very  different  from  our  own.  W« 
have  recognized  from  the  outset  that  this 
difl^cult  undertaking  could  only  proceed  fron 
a  basis  of  Western  strength  and  cohesion. 

Now,  with  the  growth  of  Soviet  militarjjf 
power,  with  a  proliferation  of  potentially 
explosive  regional  tensions,  with  the  emew 
gence  of  new  power  centers  based  on  controjg 
of  vital  economic  resources,  with  growing  dei  fit 
mands  for  redistribution  of  the  worldV  M 
wealth,  and  with  common  economic  and  so(  fe 
cial  problems  ahead,  it  is  more  importanl  fe 
than  ever  that  our  consultations  with  ouii 
closest  allies  be  constant  and  our  cooperation 
constant 

This  does  not  mean  that  the  North  Atlani 
tic  states  will  see  all  problems  in  identica  he 
ways  or  always  adopt  identical  policies.  II 
does  mean  that  only  by  understanding  onu 
another's  interests  and  perspectives  can  w« 
maintain  that  essential  harmony  in  our  polii 
cies  which  will  enable  us  to  deal  construci  j1j1( 
tively  both  with  the  Communist  world  an«i 
with  the  demands  of  the  developing  statesi 

Three  years  ago,  the  United  States  calle( 
for   a   reaffirmation   of   European-Americai  Im, 
solidarity.  We  believed  that  it  was  impera> 
tive  to  reafhrm  the  central  place  of  Westen 
unity  in  all  that  we  were  about  to  do. 

Over  the  course  of  these  last  few  years,  '. 
believe  that  the  West  has  achieved  an  exi 
traordinary  cohesion  and  resolve.  It  is  a  sigr 
of  strength  that  doctrinal  disputes  over  re  | 


Department  of  State   Bulletir 


tt 


"''■  lefining  our  relationship  or  the  modes  of  our 
^^  :onsultation  have  given  way  to  concerted 
*'*:  ittacks  on  the  actual  problems  before  us. 
ft'  Economic,  security,  and  political  issues 
'"  lave  crowded  upon  us,  and  we  have  re- 
*^  iponded  together:  in  the  solidarity  displayed 
"  )y  the  Western  countries  in  the  declaration 
■f'li  it  the  NATO  summit  in  May  1975;  in  im- 
*  )roving  cooperation  on  defense  issues;  in 
"'''  mified  positions  before  and  during  the  Hel- 
"•l  inki  summit  in  July  1975;  in  the  Vienna 
legotiations  on  mutual  and  balanced  force 
''2J  'eductions;  in  continuing  allied  consultations 
'■  m  SALT  [Strategic  Arms  Limitation 
^'t;  Talks]  ;  in  intensified  political  consultations 
ia%  n  refusing  to  bow  to  the  temptation  of  pro- 
ectionism  in  trade;  in  the  network  of  com- 
non  energy  institutions  created  rapidly  in 
■esponse  to  the  challenge  of  the  oil  cartel; 
n  the  Rambouillet  economic  summit  of  last 
ffii  slovember ;  and  in  the  continuing  series  of 
nultilateral  negotiations  with  the  develop- 
ng  countries  in  both  new  and  old  inter- 
lational  forums. 

At  the  NATO  meeting  last  month  there 
vas  firm  agreement  that  our  common  se- 
•urity  rests  on  the  foundation  of  Western 
;olidarity  and  strength  and  that  continuing 
lefense  efforts  will  be  necessary  to  counter 
Soviet  assertiveness  and  induce  restraint  in 
soviet  behavior.  There  was  broad  agreement 
hat  efforts  to  seek  stability  and  improve- 
nents  in  East-West  relations  should  con- 
inue  but  that  such  efforts,  too,  must  be 
)ased  on  a  clear  foundation  of  military 
strength  and  resolve.  I  was,  in  addition, 
struck  by  the  growing  appreciation  among 
ill  NATO  members  that  military,  economic, 
md  political  developments  around  the 
j:lobe  can  have  the  most  direct  impact  on 
he  security  and  prosperity  of  the  North 
\tlantic  states. 

At  the  May  meeting  we  discussed  and 
;ound  basic  agreement  on  a  wide  range  of 
ssues:  the  importance  of  peaceful  evolu- 
:ion  in  Africa;  the  centrality  of  our  com- 
nitment  to  the  security  of  Europe;  the  im- 
3ortance  we  attach  to  implementation  of  the 
[lelsinki  Final  Act;  the  need  for  close  con- 
3ultations  on  SALT;  the  necessity  to  con- 
tinue  efforts    toward   mutual   and   balanced 


force  reductions;  the  situation  in  the  Medi- 
terranean; the  high-level  attention  we 
should  give  to  the  question  of  military 
standardization;  and  most  important,  our 
continuing  commitment  to  shared  values,  the 
basic  cement  that  has  held  our  alliance  to- 
gether for  nearly  30  years. 

My  bilateral  visits  to  Norway,  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany,  Sweden,  and  Luxem- 
bourg and  the  London  meeting  of  CENTO 
[Central  Treaty  Organization]  Foreign 
Ministers  considerably  furthered,  I  believe, 
the  process  of  strengthened  ties  between 
America  and  Western  Europe. 

In  Norway  we  discussed  that  country's 
growing  role  as  a  major  oil  producer  and  the 
importance  of  close  consultations  on  the  com- 
plicated question  of  international  exploita- 
tion of  the  considerable  resources  of  the 
Svalbard,  or  Spitsbergen,  Archipelago. 

In  Germany  we  reaffirmed  our  shared 
views  on  East-West  relations  and  the  need 
to  approach  this  subject  from  a  foundation 
of  strength.  I  believe  that  U.S.-German  rela- 
tions have  never  been  better. 

Swedish-American  relations  over  the  past 
decade  have  not  always  been  friendly.  While 
we  cannot  hope  to  wholly  reconcile  all  our 
different  perspectives,  I  believe  that  our  talks 
helped  each  side  better  understand  the  con- 
ditions under  which  the  other  must  conduct 
its  foreign  policy.  Our  relations  with 
Sweden  have  improved  significantly  over  the 
past  year,  and  I  expressed  the  hope  in 
Stockholm  that  this  process  will  continue. 

The  importance  and  prestige  of  Luxem- 
bourg in  Europe  far  exceed  its  size.  My  dis- 
cussions with  Prime  Minister  Thorn  dealt 
primarily  with  international  issues,  on  which 
I  found  it  valuable  to  hear  the  views  of  an 
ally  that  presents  a  European  point  of  view 
in  an  impartial,  effective  manner.  And  at 
CENTO,  I  conveyed  our  continued  support 
for  the  alliance  and  for  peace  and  stability 
in  the  treaty  region. 

Today,  Europe's  role  on  global  issues  is 
strong  and  effective.  Europe's  interest  in  the 
Far  East,  in  the  Middle  East,  and  in  Africa 
is  growing  and  welcome  to  us.  [U.K.]  Prime 
Minister  Callaghan's  initiatives  for  a  nego- 
tiated settlement  in  Rhodesia  based  on  ma- 


July  12,   1976 


45 


jority  rule,  [French]  President  Giscard 
d'  Estaing's  proposal  for  a  Western  fund  for 
coordinated  assistance  to  African  economic 
development,  and  [Federal  German]  Chan- 
cellor Schmidt's  initiatives  in  the  economic 
field  are  examples  of  creative  European 
statesmanship  which  the  United  States  wel- 
comes and  respects.  We  gain — and  the  world 
gains — from  Europe's  counsel  and  long  ex- 
perience in  a  global  framework. 

At  the  NATO  meeting  in  Oslo  we  took  up 
issues  of  security;  next  week  I  will  return 
to  Europe  to  attend  the  OECD  [Organization 
for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Develop- 
ment] meeting,  where  we  will  work  to 
strengthen  cooperation  among  the  industrial- 
ized countries  of  the  West  and  on  our  ap- 
proach to  the  developing  nations. 

In  a  few  days'  time,  President  Ford  will 
meet  in  Puerto  Rico  with  his  colleagues  the 
heads  of  government  of  Britain,  Canada, 
France,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
Italy,  and  Japan  in  what  is  now  becoming  a 
regular  process  of  economic  discussions  at 
the  highest  political  level. 

These  meetings  are  symbolic  of  how  far 
we  have  come  in  the  last  few  years  in  con- 
solidating cooperation  among  the  industrial 
democracies  and  extending  it  into  new 
spheres  of  common  endeavor.  They  also  dem- 
onstrate the  understanding  we  share  that 
the  complexities  of  modern  global  manage- 
ment require,  above  all,  a  determined  effort 
by  our  governments  to  prove  that  we  have 
the  ability  to  meet  new  challenges. 

This  kind  of  cooperation  is  the  corner- 
stone of  American  foreign  policy.  It  has  been 
so  for  30  yeare.  It  will  continue  to  be  so. 

Africa 

Finally,  let  me  discuss  briefly  what  we  are 
trying  to  do  in  our  African  policy.  Our  aims 
are: 

— To  avoid  a  race  war  which  would  have 
inevitably  tragic  consequences  for  all  con- 
cerned ; 

— To  do  all  we  can  to  prevent  foreign  in- 
tervention in  what  must  remain  an  African 
problem ; 


46 


— To  promote  peaceful  cooperation  among 
the  communities  in  southern  Africa;  and 
— To  prevent  the  I'adicalization  of  Africa. 

In  1974  President  Ford  ordered  a  review 
of  our  policy  toward  Africa.  As  part  of  this 
effort  I  announced  one  year  ago  that  I  would; 
visit  Africa  in  the  spring  of  1976.  Last  Sep- 
tember, I  set  forth  the  fundamental  elements 
of  our  policy  toward  Africa  to  members  of 
the  Organization  of  African  Unity  assem- 
bled in  New  York  for  the  United  Nations.  1 
said  then  that  America  had  three  major 
concerns : 

— That  the  African  Continent  be  free  of 
great-power  rivalry  or  conflict; 

— That  all  of  the  continent  should  have 
the  right  of  self-determination;  and 

— That  Africa  attain  prosperity  for  its 
people  and  become  a  strong  participant  in  th€ 
global  economic  order,  an  economic  partner 
with  a  growing  stake  in  the  international 
system. 

Late  last  year  the  situation  in  Africa  toot 
on  a  new  and  serious  dimension.  For  th( 
first  time  since  the  colonial  era  was  largelj 
brought  to  an  end  in  the  early  1960's,  exter 
nal  interventions  had  begun  to  control  anc 
direct  an  essentially  African  problem. 

In  the  hope  of  halting  a  dangerously  esca 
lating  situation  in  Angola,  we  undertook— 
until  halted  by  the  impact  of  our  domestii 
debate — a  wide  range  of  diplomatic  and  othei 
activity  pointing  toward  a  cessation  of  for 
eign  intervention  and  a  negotiated  Africa: 
solution. 

By  the  first  months  of  this  year,  Soviet 
Cuban  intervention  had  contributed  to  ai 
increasingly  dangerous  situation  turning  th( 
political  evolution  away  from  African  aspira- 
tions and  toward  great-power  confrontation 

— The  Soviets  and  Cubans  had  imposec 
their  solution  on  Angola.  Their  forces  wer{ 
entrenched  there.  The  danger  was  real  thai 
African  states,  seeing  the  Soviet  and  Cubar 
presence  on  the  scene,  might  be  driven  in  i 
radical  direction. 

— With  the  end  of  the  Portuguese  era  ir 
Africa,  pressure  was  building  on  Rhodesia 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


regarded  by  Africans  as  the  last  major  ves- 
tige of  colonialism.  Events  in  Angola  en- 
couraged radicals  to  press  for  a  military 
solution  in  Rhodesia. 

— With  radical  influence  on  the  rise  and 
with  immense  outside  military  strength  ap- 
parently behind  the  radicals,  even  moderate 
and  responsible  African  leaders — firm  pro- 
ponents of  peaceful  change — began  to  con- 
clude there  was  no  alternative  but  to  em- 
brace the  cause  of  violence.  By  March  of  this 
year,  guerrilla  actions  took  on  ever  larger 
dimensions. 

— We  saw  ahead  the  prospect  of  war  fed 
and  perhaps  conducted  by  outside  forces ;  we 
were  concerned  about  a  continent  politically 
embittered  and  economically  estranged  from 
the  West ;  and  we  saw  ahead  a  process  of 
radicalization  which  would  place  severe 
strains  on  our  allies  in  Europe  and  Japan. 

— There  was  no  prospect  of  successfully 
shaping  events  in  the  absence  of  positive 
programs  of  our  own  for  Africa. 

It  was  for  these  reasons  that  President 
Ford  determined  that  an  African  trip  which 
had  long  been  planned  as  part  of  an  unfold- 
|ing  process  of  policy  development  had  a 
compelling  focus  and  urgency.  We  had  these 
aims: 

— To  provide  moderate  African  leaders 
with  an  enlightened  alternative  to  the  grim 
prospects  so  rapidly  taking  shape  before 
I  them — prospects  which  threatened  African 
unity  and  independence  and  indicated  grow- 
ing violence  and  widening  economic  distress ; 

— To  work  for  a  solution  that  would  per- 
mit all  of  the  communities  in  Africa — black 
or  white — to  coexist  on  the  basis  of  justice 
and  dignity ; 

—To  give  friendly  and  moderate  African 
governments  the  perception  that  their  as- 
pirations could  be  achieved  without  resort 
to  massive  violence  or  bloodshed,  and  that 
their  hopes  for  prosperity  and  opportunity 
can  best  be  realized  through  association 
with  the  West;  and 

— To  promote  solutions  based  on  majority 
rule  and  minority  rights  which  would  en- 
able diverse  communities  to  live  side  by  side. 


In  short,  we  sought  to  show  that  there  was 
a  moderate  and  peaceful  road  open  to  fulfill 
African  aspirations  and  that  America  could 
be  counted  on  to  cooperate  constructively  in 
the  attainment  of  these  objectives. 

My  trip  addressed  the  three  major  issues 
facing  Africa: 

— Whether  the  urgent  problems  of  south- 
ern Africa  will  be  solved  by  negotiation  or 
by  war; 

— Whether  Africa's  economic  development 
will  take  place  on  the  basis  of  self-respect 
and  open  opportunity  or  through  perpetual 
relief  or  the  radical  regimentation  of  socie- 
ties; and 

— Whether  the  course  of  African  unity 
and  self-determination  will  once  again  be 
distorted  by  massive  extracontinental  inter- 
ference. 

I  believe  that  the  10-point  policy  we  set 
forth  in  Lusaka  in  late  April  and  the  other 
proposals  we  made  in  Africa  to  enhance 
self-sustaining  economic  growth  make  up  a 
platform  which  moderate  Africans  can  sup- 
port and  which  serves  interests  we  share — 
for  peace,  justice,  and  progress  and  for  an 
Africa  free  from  outside  interference: 

— The  possibility  for  negotiated  settle- 
ments in  Rhodesia  and  Namibia  has  been 
enhanced.  Time  is  running  out,  and  formi- 
dable barriers  remain.  But  if  continued  re- 
sponsible efforts  are  made  by  all  sides,  the 
burning  questions  of  southern  Africa  still 
can  be  solved  without  immense  loss  of  life, 
suffering,  and  bitterness  and  with  giving 
each  community  an  opportunity  for  a  dig- 
nified life. 

— African  hopes  for  independence  and  the 
integrity  of  their  continent  have  been 
raised.  Big-power  intervention  can  only 
undermine  unity,  set  African  against  Afri- 
can, and  heighten  the  risk  of  conflict.  Our 
policy  on  this  clearly  accords  with  African 
concerns  as  reflected  in  the  suspicion  and 
apprehension  with  which  influential  African 
leaders  have  regarded  the  large  Cuban 
presence  in  Angola.  We  may  now  be  seeing 
the  results  of  that  concern,  and  our  clear 
position,  as  we  receive  an  increasing  num- 


July   12,   1976 


47 


ber  of  reports  that  Cuban  troops  may  begin 
to  leave.  However,  we  do  not  yet  have  clear 
evidence  that  this  process  is  underway  in 
any  meaningful  fashion.  We  will  be  care- 
fully watching  the  pace  and  extent  of  any 
Cuban  withdrawals. 

— Our  African  policy  is  thus  an  important 
element  in  our  overall  international  effort  to 
help  build  a  structure  of  relations  which 
fosters  peace,  widening  prosperity,  and  fun- 
damental human  dignity. 

Mr.  Chairman,  Africa  is  of  immense  size, 
strategically  located,  with  governments  of 
substantial  significance  in  numbers  and 
growing  influence  in  the  councils  of  the 
world.  The  interdependence  of  America  and 
our  allies  with  Africa  is  increasingly  obvi- 
ous. In  the  past  months  we  have  seen  a 
major  international  crisis  develop  in  this  im- 
portant area  of  the  world,  and  we  have 
moved  to  deal  with  it.  We  have  taken  the 
initiative  to  offer  a  peaceful  road  to  the  fu- 
ture. We  have  told  much  of  the  world  that 
America  continues  to  have  a  positive  vision 
and  will  play  a  crucial  and  responsible  role 
in  the  world. 

I  believe  that  our  policy  initiatives  were 
necessary,  that  they  can  be  effective,  that 
they  are  beneficial  to  the  interests  of  the 
United  States;  and  I  believe  that  they  are 
right. 

But  the  new  beginning  in  our  African  pol- 
icy will  require  dedication  and  effort  on  our 
part  if  it  is  to  come  to  a  positive  fruition. 
The  Administration  is  determined  to  follow 
through  on  our  initiatives  and  the  promising 
beginnings  that  have  been  made.  We  look  to 
the  Congress  for  encouragement  and  for 
active  support  in  this  crucial  enterprise. 


U.S.  Declaration  on  Official  Support 
for  Export  Credits  Issued 

Folio iving  is  a  U.S.  declaration  on  official 
support  for  export  credits  issued  on  June  9. 

Press   release   294   dated   June  9 

At  the  end  of  their  economic  conference 
in  November  1975  at  Rambouillet,  France, 
the  heads  of  state  and  governments  of 
France,  Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  the  United 
Kingdom,  and  the  United  States  declared 
that  their  governments  would  intensify  ef- 
forts to  achieve  a  prompt  conclusion  of  dis- 
cussions then  underway  among  themselves 
and  Canada  concerning  export  credits.  Re- 
newed discussions  among  these  governments 
have  resulted  in  a  consensus  that  counter- 
productive competition  must  be  avoided  with 
respect  to  government-supported  export 
credits. 

Recognizing  this  consensus,  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment wishes  to  declare  that  it  fully  sup- 
ports the  principle  of  cooperation  in  order  to 
reduce  counterproductive  competition  in 
government-supported  export  credits.  The 
guidelines  for  Eximbank-supported  credits 
for  civilian  goods  and  services  will  be  set 
forth  in  a  declaration  by  the  Export-Import 
Bank  of  the  United  States  under  its  statu- 
tory authority.  The  U.S.  Government  intends 
to  apply  the  same  guidelines  to  any  other 
official  export  credit  support  program  for 
similar  goods  and  services. 

The  U.S.  Government  invites  other  gov- 
ernments to  apply  similar  guidelines  so  as 
to  broaden  the  attempt  to  reduce  counter- 
productive competition  in  government-sup- 
ported export  credits. 


48 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Department  Discusses  Allegations  of  Communist  Influence 
in  Certain  Western  Hemisphere  Countries 


Statement  by  Willia^n  H.  Luers 

Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for  Inter-American  Affairs ' 


I  am  happy  to  be  able  to  discuss  with  you 
today  some  of  the  concerns  arising  from  re- 
cent public  allegations  about  an  increase  in 
Communist  influence  in  certain  countries  in 
tlie  Western  Hemisphere. 

I  would  prefer  first  to  deal  with  these  al- 
legations specifically  on  a  country-by-country 
basis.  Then  I  will  discuss  briefly  our  general 
perception  of  social,  political,  and  economic 
developments  in  the  region.  And  if  you  have 
any  patience  or  time  left  I  will  respond  to 
questions  you  may  have. 

In  discussing  the  countries  where  these 
allegations  are  pertinent,  I  hope  the  commit- 
tee will  understand  that  we  are  not  sitting 
in  judgment  on  the  performance,  the  poli- 
tics, or  the  economic  organization  of  these 
countries.  They  represent  themselves.  The 
counti'ies  in  question  are  intensely  dedicated 
to  their  own  independence.  They  are,  for  the 
most  part,  open  nations  with  pluralistic  soci- 
eties and  systems.  As  such  we  wish  them 
well  as  they  address  the  problems  of  social 
and  economic  development  confronting  them. 
But  we  are  not  responsible  for  the  solutions 
they  evolve.  Nor  are  we  responsible  for  keep- 
ing ourselves  posted  in  minute  detail  about 


'  Made  before  the  Subcommittee  on  International 
Political  and  Military  Affairs  of  the  House  Commit- 
tee on  International  Relations  on  June  15.  The  com- 
plete transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be  published  by 
the  committee  and  will  be  available  from  the  Super- 
intendent of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


July   12,   1976 


internal  developments  in  the  countries  of  the 
hemisphere.  The  period  when  we  could  con- 
sider ourselves  the  "watchdog"  and  "police- 
man" of  the  hemisphere  has  passed. 

What  we  must  concern  ourselves  with  are 
those  trends  which  might: 

— Aff"ect  the  national  security  of  the 
United  States. 

— Impact  negatively  on  specific  U.S.  in- 
terests. 

— Disrupt  the  peace  and  invoke  our  com- 
mitments under  international  treaties,  such 
as  the  Rio  Treaty  [Inter-American  Treaty  of 
Reciprocal  Assistance], 

Commonwealth  Caribbean  Nations 

With  these  caveats  in  mind,  let  me  turn  to 
the  Caribbean  first.  My  emphasis  here  will  be 
on  the  so-called  Commonwealth  Caribbean 
countries  and  of  course  on  Cuba. 

Excluding  Cuba  and  Guyana,  none  of  the 
independent  nations  of  the  Caribbean  has  a 
domestic  Communist  Party  of  significant 
electoral  strength.  Nor  do  we  feel  that  the 
extrahemispheric  Communist  powers  exer- 
cise significant  influence  in  any  of  these  na- 
tions, except  for  Cuba. 

The  governments  of  the  Commonwealth 
Caribbean  nations  have  committed  them- 
selves to  programs  of  wide-reaching  social 
and  economic  change.  One — Guyana — has  an- 
nounced that  it  is  seeking  to  create  a  "Marx- 
ist-Leninist" society  for  its  people.  There  is 


49 


no  indication  at  the  present  time,  however, 
that  this  "Marxist-Leninist"  society  has 
much  in  common  with  the  Soviet,  East  Eu- 
ropean, Chinese,  or  Cuban  variants. 

Implementation  of  the  programs  for 
change  in  these  Commonwealth  Caribbean 
nations  has  generally  involved  increased 
state  participation  in,  or  control  of,  impor- 
tant sectors  of  their  respective  economies.  It 
has  also  been  accompanied  by  closer  relations 
with  Cuba,  including  acceptance,  in  some 
cases,  of  Cuban  technical  assistance,  ex- 
changes of  personnel,  and  expanded  diplo- 
matic and  trade  relations. 

We  have  not  noted,  however,  an  equiva- 
lent increase  in  political  authoritarianism. 
Democratic  political  and  legal  institutions, 
including  respect  for  civil  liberties  and  hu- 
man rights,  have  generally  been  maintained. 

The  two  specific  cases  you  have  asked  me 
to  discuss  are  Guyana  and  Jamaica. 

Guyana  has  just  celebrated  the  10th  an- 
niversary of  its  independence.  The  Guyanese 
Government,  under  the  leadership  of  Prime 
Minister  Forbes  Burnham,  has  moved  stead- 
ily toward  state  ownership  of  the  most  im- 
portant sectors  of  the  economy.  Agreements 
wei-e  reached  in  1971  and  1975  with  the  for- 
eign bauxite  and  alumina  producers,  includ- 
ing one  U.S.  company,  for  government  take- 
over of  their  facilities.  The  last  remaining 
large-scale  private  enterprise  in  Guyana,  a 
British  sugar-producing  interest,  was  re- 
cently nationalized.  Terms  are  being  nego- 
tiated. 

It  is  generally  believed  that  the  Guyanese 
Government  has  operated  its  nationalized 
industries  with  reasonable  efficiency.  The 
overall  economy  of  the  country  is  in  rela- 
tively good  shape,  and  its  international  obli- 
gations are  being  met.  The  United  States 
continues  to  import  calcined  bauxite  from 
Guyana   (375,000  tons  in  1975). 

Compared  to  the  tumultuous  preindepend- 
ence  society,  Guyana  today  is  relatively  or- 
derly. It  is  noteworthy  that  Prime  Minister 
Burnham's  principal  opposition,  the  Commu- 
nist People's  Progressive  Party,  led  by 
Cheddi  Jagan,  recently  announced  a  policy  of 
"critical"  support  for  the  Burnham  govern- 


50 


ment  and  returned  to  participate  in  the  op- 
position in  the  Guyanese  elected  parliament. 

Guyana  maintains  cordial  relations  with 
the  Communist  nations;  and  Soviet,  Chinese, 
and  Cuban  diplomatic  missions  are  located  in 
Georgetown.  The  Chinese  have  extended 
some  economic  assistance  to  Guyana,  but  the 
Cubans  are  by  far  the  most  active,  providing 
technical  assistance  and  participating  in  a 
number  of  cultural  activities. 

Prime  Minister  Burnham  has  repeatedly 
expressed  admiration  for  Fidel  Castro  and 
for  what  he  regards  as  the  signal  accom- 
plishments of  the  Cuban  regime.  At  the  same 
time,  however,  he  has  made  it  clear  that 
Guyana's  political  and  economic  development 
will  not  be  modeled  specifically  on  any  other 
government.  Prime  Minister  Burnham  has 
also  indicated  his  readiness  to  increase  co- 
operation with  Cuba. 

We  do  have  important  differences  with  the 
Government  of  Guyana.  In  international 
bodies  Guyana  has  in  recent  years  frequently 
voted  against  us  on  issues  of  importance  to 
us.  Guyanese  officials  have  been  outspoken 
in  criticizing  the  United  States  and  its  poli- 
cies. We  do  not  share  common  approaches  , 
to  economic  and  social  development.  And  we 
doubt  that  the  Marxist-Leninist  ideology  re- 
cently espoused  by  the  governing  PNC  [Peo- 
ple's National  Congress]  party  can  be  fully 
compatible  with  the  open  and  pluralistic 
Guyanese  society. 

But  an  independent  Guyana  seeking  its 
own  path  to  social  progress  is  no  threat  to 
this  country.  We  continue  to  provide  eco- 
nomic assistance  to  Guyana ;  we  will  continue 
to  have  a  profound  interest  in  the  well-being 
of  the  Guyanese  people.  And  we  will  con- 
tinue to  work  directly  and  openly  with  offi- 
cials of  the  Government  of  Guyana  to  re- 
solve differences  and  cooperate  whenever 
possible. 

In  the  case  of  Jamaica,  Prime  Minister 
Michael  Manley  was  elected  to  office  in  1972 
committed  to  a  program  of  rectifying  the 
uneven  distribution  of  wealth  in  Jamaica 
and  alleviating  the  chronic  unemployment 
problem  which  has  long  plagued  that  island. 
A  major  objective  of  the  Manley  govern- 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


nient  has  been  to  renegotiate  the  terms  of 
operation  of  the  six  major  bauxite  and  ahi- 
mina  producers  there  so  Jamaica  might  re- 
ceive greater  benefits  from  those  important 
commodities.  Some  of  these  negotiations  are 
still  underway. 

Prime  Minister  Manley  has  described  his 
program  as  one  of  "democratic  socialism." 
He  has  consistently  stated  that  he  will  pre- 
serve Jamaica's  parliamentary  system  and 
its  strong  tradition  of  a  free  press  and  re- 
spect for  individual  rights. 

At  the  same  time,  like  Mr.  Burnham,  Mr. 
Manley  has  taken  steps  toward  closer  rela- 
tions with  Cuba.  Following  a  visit  to  Cuba 
last  year,  Mr.  Manley  announced  that  he  had 
accepted  a  Cuban  offer  to  provide  technical 
advisers  in  the  fields  of  school  and  dam  con- 
struction. On  March  17,  1976,  the  Jamaican 
Government  also  indicated  publicly  that  two 
police  officers  had  been  sent  to  Cuba  for 
training.  On  April  29,  in  connection  with  a 
parliamentary  inquiry,  the  Government  of 
Jamaica  said  an  additional  nine  police  offi- 
cers had  been  sent  to  Cuba  as  observers. 

Unfortunately,  Mr.  Manley's  economic  re- 
foiTTi  program  has  been  set  back  by  the 
world  recession  and  by  an  accompanying  fall 
in  the  demand  for  aluminum.  It  has  also 
been  undercut  by  sporadic  political  and  crim- 
inal violence  which,  though  largely  confined 
to  certain  parts  of  Kingston,  has  probably 
nonetheless  had  an  advei'se  effect  on  the 
island's  very  important  tourism  industry. 

Developments  in  Jamaica  have  received 
considerable  attention  and  comment  in  the 
U.S.  and  world  press.  Let  me  discuss  some 
of  this  commentary.  Press  stories  have 
alleged : 

— That  Cuban  agents  are  entering  Jamaica 
under  the  guise  of  technical  advisers.  Under 
agreements  with  the  Manley  government, 
about  100  Cuban  advisers  are  in  Jamaica  to 
construct  an  agricultural  school  and  a  num- 
ber of  small  dams,  and  additional  advisers 
are  expected  to  arrive  in  the  future.  There 
has  been  speculation  that  some  of  these  in- 
dividuals may  be  intelligence  agents.  The 
Manley  government  has  repeatedly  and  pub- 
licly denied  this. 


—That  Jamaican  security  personnel  are 
l)eing  trained  in  Cuba.  Some  press  accounts 
have  referred  to  an  agreement  between  Cuba 
and  Jamaica  to  train  Jamaican  security 
forces.  As  I  said  earlier,  in  March  and  again 
in  April  the  Jamaican  Government  issued 
clarifications  on  this  question.  It  said  that  a 
total  of  two  security  officers  have  received 
training  in  Cuba,  with  an  additional  nine 
having  visited  Cuba  for  observational  pur- 
poses. The  Jamaican  Government  has  also 
pointed  out  that  over  160  personnel  have  re- 
ceived overseas  training  in  the  past  12 
months,  the  ovei-whelming  number  of  whom 
were  trained  in  the  United  Kingdom.  The 
government  has  also  flatly  denied  the  exist- 
ence of  any  agreements  with  Cuba  covering 
such  training. 

— That  several  high-ranking  Jamaican  of- 
ficials or  political  advisers  are  Communists. 
This  claim  has  been  made  in  newspaper  ar- 
ticles which  appeared  in  the  Washington 
Post,  the  Christian  Science  Monitor,  and 
elsewhere.  The  authenticity  of  this  allega- 
tion remains  open  to  question.  However,  it 
would  not  be  surprising  if  some  Marxists 
hold  positions  of  influence  in  Jamaica,  as 
they  no  doubt  do  in  some  other  democratic 
countries. 

On  the  other  hand,  a  different  view  of  de- 
velopments in  Jamaica  has  also  appeared  in 
the  U.S.  press.  The  widely  syndicated  colum- 
nist Carl  Rowan  quoted  Prime  Minister  Man- 
ley  as  saying  in  January  1976,  "I  could  never 
be  a  Communist — I  am  a  profoundly  demo- 
cratic person."  Mr.  Manley  made  similar 
statements  to  the  Wall  Street  Journal. 

The  foregoing  themes,  together  with  press 
speculation  concerning  the  increased  ties  be- 
tween Guyana  and  Cuba,  have  drawn  strong 
reactions  from  the  Governments  of  Jamaica 
and  Guyana,  as  well  as  Barbados.  It  has  been 
suggested  by  all  three  that  these  reports  are 
somehow  a  part  of  a  campaign,  by  implica- 
tion orchestrated  by  the  U.S.  Government, 
to  undermine  these  governments.  The  term 
"destabilization"  has  in  several  recent  in- 
stances been  used  to  describe  our  intentions. 

I  would  like  to  use  this  occasion  to  state 
that    such    allegations    are    totally    false.    I 


July  12,   1976 


51 


speak  for  all  agencies  of  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment in  saying  that  the  United  States  has 
complete  respect  for  the  sovereignty  of  other 
nations  and  for  the  right  of  other  people  to 
freely  select  their  own  political  and  economic 
systems.  I  wish  categorically  to  deny  that 
the  U.S.  Government  is  doing  anything  to 
undermine  or  destabilize  the  legitimate  au- 
thorities or  governments  of  those  Caribbean 
countries.  If  private  U.S.  citizens  are  en- 
gaged in  such  alleged  activities,  we  are  pre- 
pared to  cooperate  fully  with  the  govern- 
ments of  the  area  to  bring  them  to  justice. 

The  U.S.  Government  cannot,  of  course,  be 
held  responsible  for  the  content  of  press  ar- 
ticles and  commentary.  However,  journalists 
do,  on  occasion,  consult  with  us  on  factual 
matters,  as  well  as  seek  our  views  of  devel- 
opments they  regard  as  important.  We  are 
well  aware  of  our  obligation  and  responsibil- 
ity to  contribute  to  balanced  and  accurate 
portrayal  of  events,  and  we  have  taken  great 
care  to  discharge  this  obligation. 

It  is  our  view  that  the  leadership  of  the 
Commonwealth  Caribbean  nations,  and  I 
would  mention  specifically  Prime  Minister 
Manley  and  Prime  Minister  Burnham,  is 
characterized  by  a  strong  interest  in  bring- 
ing about  the  modernization  of  the  region. 
The  societies  involved  have  emerged  from  a 
recent  environment  of  colonialism,  and  their 
leaders  are  zealously  interested  in  preserv- 
ing their  hard-won  status  of  independence. 
On  the  whole,  the  governments  in  question 
have  shown  no  inclination  to  violate  the  basic 
human  rights  of  their  people,  and  they  have 
shown  respect  for  international  legal  norms 
in  their  efforts  to  reorganize  and  redirect 
their  economies.  We  believe  that  any  con- 
clusion that  these  nations  may  be  or  have 
become  the  tools  of  Cuban  and/or  Soviet 
masters  omits  these  important  factors. 

It  is  true  that  the  Guyanese  Govenmient 
has  indicated  a  strong  distaste  for  capital- 
ism, it  has  endorsed  Cuba's  Angola  adven- 
ture, and  it  has  established  close  ties  with 
Cuba.  The  Jamaican  democratic  system  is 
profoundly  non-Communist,  and  the  Jamai- 
can economy  is  still  geared  almost  completely 
to  trade  with  non-Communist  countries.  Its 


52 


government  faces  serious  social  and  economic 
problems,  but  we  hope  and  trust  that  it  will 
manage  to  deal  effectively  with  these,  at  the 
same  time  preserving  an  open  political  sys- 
tem and  maintaining  close  and  friendly  rela- 
tions with  the  United  States. 

Mexico 

With  regard  to  Mexico,  we  believe  that 
recent  allegations  that  the  Mexican  Govern- 
ment is  taking  Mexico  down  the  Chilean  and 
Cuban  road  to  socialism  are  unfounded. 
Those  who  make  these  allegations  cite  what 
they  characterize  as  government-supported 
land  seizures,  policies  directed  against  for- 
eign investment,  and  the  influence  of  Chilean 
exiles  on  government  policies. 

In  discussing  Mexico,  it  must  be  borne  in 
mind  that  Mexico  is  a  proudly  independent 
country.  The  tenacity  with  which  it  holds  to 
its  independence  is  heightened  by  geography 
— it  is  our  neighbor  and  highly  sensitive  to 
us  and  signs  of  any  designs  to  undermine  its 
independence.  Decisions  Mexico  takes  to  re- 
spond to  what  it  perceives  as  its  internal 
problems  are  purely  Mexican  decisions.  It 
does  not  seek  or  accept  influence  from  for- 
eign sources  or  proponents  of  alien  ideolo- 
gies. Its  political  system,  which  has  evolved 
over  the  66  years  since  the  Mexican  Revolu- 
tion, is  eclectic  and  unique. 

The  allegation  that  Chilean  exiles  are  in- 
fluential in  the  development  of  Mexican  pol- 
icy and  actions  can  be  looked  at  in  context. 
Mexico  has  a  long  record  of  liberalism  in 
granting  political  asylum.  At  the  end  of  the 
Spanish  Civil  War,  Mexico  accepted  many 
Republican  exiles.  It  did  the  same  after  1960 
in  accepting  anti-Castro  Cuban  exiles;  and 
following  the  overthrow  of  the  Allende  gov- 
ernment in  Chile,  it  accepted  more  than  100 
prominent  Chileans,  plus  a  large  number  oi 
their  dependents,  and  assisted  them  in  find- 
ing gainful  employment. 

Some  of  these  exiles  were  given  govern- 
ment positions.  But  there  is  no  evidence  that 
these  or  any  other  foreign  advisers  have  sig-i 
nificantly  influenced  the  policies  or  programs 
of  this  large  and  resourceful  nation.  MexiccI 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


has  a  highly  organized  governing  political 
party  and  a  vast  reservoir  of  educated  tech- 
nicians who  are  fully  competent  to  run  the 
nation. 

With  regard  to  internal  far-leftist  organi- 
zations in  Mexico,  Communist  and  radical 
Marxist  parties  are  legal  but  are  small  and 
weak.  The  government  party,  the  Institu- 
tional Revolutionary  Party  (PRI),  has  been 
successful  in  encompassing  a  wide  spectrum 
of  political  thought  and  activity.  Because 
Mexico's  own  revolutionary  tradition  is  ex- 
pressed by  the  PRI,  it  is  difficult  for  the 
Marxist  parties  to  build  a  following. 

The  Mexican  Communist  Party  (PCM)  has 
only  an  estimated  5,000  members,  not 
enough  under  Mexican  law  to  qualify  for  reg- 
istration. Since  1968,  when  the  Russians  in- 
vaded Czechoslovakia,  the  PCM  has  followed 
a  line  relatively  independent  of  Moscow. 
There  is  also  evidence  of  strain  within  the 
party  over  the  issue  of  the  degree  of  support 
to  be  given  to  student  activism. 

The  Popular  Socialist  Party  (PPS)  is  a 
loosely  organized  party  which  claims  75,000 
members.  It  has  carefully  refrained  from  ad- 
jvocating  violence  or  opposing  the  goals  of 
ithe  Mexican  Revolution.  It  has  endorsed  the 
PRI  Presidential  candidate  since  1958,  while 
running  some  of  its  own  congressional  and 
gubernatorial  candidates. 

The  PCM  and  the  PPS  have  disavowed  ter- 
rorism. The  principal  terrorist  organizations 
in  Mexico  are  the  23d  of  September  Commu- 
nist League  (which  has  been  disavowed  by 
the  PCM),  the  Poor  Peoples  Army,  and  the 
Peoples  Armed  Revolutionary  Army.  Strong 
Mexican  Government  antiterrorist  measures 
resulted  in  an  abatement  of  terrorism  during 
1975. 

The  23d  of  September  Communist  League 
is  apparently  the  only  group  still  active. 
They  have  claimed  credit  for  several  bomb- 
ings, the  murder  of  a  police  patrolman,  and 
the  recent  kidnaping  of  the  Belgian  Ambas- 
'3ador's  daughter.  The  23d  of  September 
League  is  an  irritant  to  the  Government  of 
Mexico,  but  not  a  threat  to  political  stabil- 
|ity.  We  know  of  no  current  Cuban  connec- 
tion with  these  terrorist  groups. 


Allegations  that  recent  measures  and  ac- 
tions by  the  Government  of  Mexico  are 
"Communist  inspired,"  and  against  private 
domestic  and  foreign  investment,  do  not  hold 
up  under  scrutiny.  There  has  of  course  been 
some  controversy  within  Mexico  over  some 
of  the  government's  recent  proposals,  a  phe- 
nomenon that  is  inevitable  in  an  open  soci- 
ety in  which  various  sectors  do  not  always 
have  identical  interests. 

With  regard  to  alleged  attacks  on  private 
property,  the  Government  of  Mexico  has 
made  it  clear  that  it  does  not  accept  or  tol- 
erate violence  as  a  means  of  furthering  land 
reform  any  more  than  it  will  tolerate  pri- 
vate land  holdings  in  excess  of  the  limits  im- 
posed by  its  Constitution.  It  has  also  ac- 
knowledged that  the  so-called  "land  inva- 
sions" are  in  part  a  result  of  the  frustration 
of  small  farmers  over  their  lack  of  adequate 
land.  In  a  visit  to  Sonora  on  April  21,  Presi- 
dent Echeverria  forcefully  stated  that  the 
Government  of  Mexico  would  not  tolerate 
land  invasions  and  reaffirmed  his  govern- 
ment's commitment  to  the  rule  of  law  in  re- 
gard to  both  squatters  and  property  owners. 
The  same  theme  has  been  sounded  by  Jose 
Lopez  Portillo,  the  Presidential  candidate  of 
the  ruling  PRI.  Thus,  while  there  have  been 
land  invasions,  on  occasion  stimulated  by 
leftist  agitators,  there  is  no  official  endorse- 
ment of  such  invasions. 

Those  who  allege  a  drift  toward  commu- 
nism in  Mexico  also  cite  recent  Mexican  leg- 
islation— a  Law  on  Human  Settlements, 
which  was  opposed  by  some  sectors  in  Mex- 
ico as  an  unconstitutional  attack  on  private 
property.  This  law  essentially  gives  author- 
ity to  the  government  to  regulate  exploding 
urban  growth  through  land  use  planning 
measures  accepted  in  some  industrialized 
countries.  The  Government  of  Mexico,  in 
heeding  the  criticism  expressed  by  some 
groups  in  Mexico,  proposed  some  modifica- 
tions of  the  original  proposal  by  expressly 
stating  that  the  law  would  not  be  used  to 
expropriate  private  residences,  by  creating 
mechanisms  to  afford  relief  to  property  own- 
ers who  might  be  affected,  by  excluding 
retroactivity,  and  by  reaffirming  its  commit- 


July  12,   1976 


53 


ment  to  the  concept  of  private  property. 

With  regard  to  the  general  question  of  for- 
eign investment,  the  Government  of  Mexico 
has  made  it  clear  that  it  wants  and  needs  for- 
eign investment  that  will  be  of  benefit  to 
Mexico's  economy  and  development  but  does 
not  want  investment  that  does  not  meet  its 
needs.  Foreign  investors,  including  U.S.  in- 
vestors, continue  to  find  investment  attrac- 
tive in  Mexico  under  the  ground  rules  estab- 
lished by  the  Mexican  Government.  Mexico 
has  a  healthy  and  mixed  economy  with  both 
private  and  public  enterprise.  The  private 
sector  within  Mexico  accounts  for  the  largest 
part  of  total  industrial  production  apart  from 
petroleum,  and  the  government  continues  to 
encourage  its  mixed  economy.  The  long- 
range  trend  in  Mexico,  as  in  many  countries 
of  Western  Europe,  may  well  be  toward 
greater  state  involvement  in  the  dominant 
sectors  of  the  economy.  But  we  see  little 
chance  of  dramatic  shifts  and  anticipate  that 
the  private  sector  will  continue  to  play  a  key 
role. 

With  regard  to  allegations  that  an  am- 
nesty of  persons  jailed  as  a  result  of  student 
riots  in  1968  is  evidence  of  a  trend  toward 
communism,  it  should  be  noted  that  most  of 
the  several  hundred  persons  apprehended  at 
that  time  have  long  since  been  released  from 
jail  on  bail.  The  amnesty  legislation  was  wel- 
comed by  both  the  left  and  right  in  Mexico 
as  a  measure  which  finally  put  the  tragic 
events  of  1968  to  rest. 

In  discussing  Mexico,  it  should  be  men- 
tioned that  some  people  allege  that  the 
United  States  is  attempting  to  "destabilize" 
Mexico.  This  allegation  is  of  course  totally 
false.  Mexico's  interests,  as  well  as  ours,  are 
best  supported  by  a  stable  and  economically 
prosperous  Mexico,  and  we  are  supportive 
and  understanding  of  efforts  by  the  Govern- 
ment of  Mexico  to  come  to  grips  with  the 
problems  it  perceives  the  need  to  solve  to  as- 
sure its  economic  and  social  advancement. 

As  a  final  note,  relations  between  the 
United  States  and  Mexico  are  excellent.  We 
have  engaged  in  effective  consultation  and 
cooperation  on  numerous  questions  of  mutual 
interest.  And  when  bilateral  problems  arise. 


54 


as  they  inevitably  must  when  two  sovereign 
countries  share  2,000  miles  of  border,  we 
have  been  able  to  discuss  these  problems  in 
a  frank  and  friendly  manner  and  together 
seek  mutually  acceptable  solutions.  We  do 
not  foresee  any  change  in  this  mutually  ad- 
vantageous relationship. 

Panama 

As  you  know,  the  United  States  and  Pan- 
ama have  been  trying  to  negotiate  a  new 
treaty  concerning  the  Panama  Canal  for  the 
past  12  years.  We  hope  that  the  new  rela- 
tionship that  will  emerge  as  a  result  of  this 
effort  will  be  one  of  cooperation  and  part- 
nership. 

Recently  there  have  been  allegations  that 
the  Government  of  Panama  is  under  Com- 
munist influence.  Some  of  this  speculation 
resulted  from  the  fact  that  Chief  of  Govern- 
ment Torrijos  visited  Cuba  in  January  of 
this  year.  Because  of  the  importance  of  the 
treaty-negotiating  effort,  we  believe  it  im- 
perative that  the  record  show  that  the 
charges  of  Communist  influence  cannot  be 
sustained  by  a  careful  examination  of  the 
facts. 

The  present  government  of  Panama,  led 
by  Gen.  Omar  Torrijos,  came  to  power  in 
1968  by  military  coup  after  a  period  of  in- 
tense political  agitation.  Since  then,  the  Pan- 
amanian Government  has  expressly  rejected 
doctrinaire  ideology  in  favor  of  reformist 
programs  which  it  believes  address  Panama's 
social  and  economic  needs.  In  this  sense,  the 
government's  political  orientation  can  be  de- 
scribed as  nationalistic,  pragmatic,  and  pop- 
ulist. Through  the  political  structure  created 
in  the  1972  Constitution,  Panama  has  devel- 
oped a  high  degree  of  popular  participation 
in  public  decisionmaking,  even  at  the  local 
level.  Today  the  government  still  appears  to 
enjoy  considerable  popular  support. 

Since  the  1968  coup  all  political  parties 
have  been  banned  in  Panama.  This  sanction 
applies  to  the  Partido  del  Pueblo — Panama's 
Communist  Party — which  never  attracted 
many  adherents.  We  do  not  expect  any  in- 
crease in  its  strength  in  the  foreseeable 
future. 

Department  of  State   Bulletin 


Internationally,  Panama  has  attempted  to 
broaden  its  diplomatic  contacts  in  order  to 
generate  wide  international  support  for  its 
canal  treaty  aspirations.  For  example, 
Panama  recently  became  a  member  of  the 
nonaligned  group  of  countries,  and  it  main- 
tains diplomatic  relations  with  Cuba. 

Although  General  Torrijos  was  cordially 
greeted  during  his  recent  visit  to  Cuba, 
there  is  no  evidence  that  the  Panamanian 
Government  will  pattern  its  political,  mili- 
tary, or  economic  system  along  Cuban  lines. 
Prior  to  and  during  Torrijos'  visit,  there  was 
speculation  regarding  Cuban  arms  sales  to 
Panama  and  Panamanian  support  for  the 
Cuban  intervention  in  Angola.  Not  only  have 
these  events  not  materialized,  but  General 
Torrijos  has  expressly  separated  his  gov- 
ernment from  the  policies  of  the  Cuban 
regime.  On  his  return  to  Panama  he  an- 
nounced publicly  that  Cuba  had  chosen  its 
road  to  social  progress  but  that  Panama  had 
chosen  another.  Also,  recent  allegations  re- 
garding a  sizable  covert  Cuban  military 
presence  in  Panama  are  rumor  and,  as  such, 
do  injustice  to  the  integrity  and  independ- 
ence of  the  Panamanian  state. 

Despite  its  attempts  to  garner  inter- 
national support  for  its  national  aspirations, 
there  is  nothing  that  suggests  that  Panama 
has  succumbed  to  Communist  influence. 
Panama  does  not  maintain  diplomatic  or  eco- 
nomic ties  with  the  Soviet  Union  and  the 
People's  Republic  of  China.  Of  the  Eastern 
European  countries,  only  Poland  and  Yugo- 
slavia have  diplomatic  representation  in 
Panama;  and  their  missions  are  modest. 

Today,  Panama's  economy  is  one  of  the 
prime  examples  of  the  free  entei-prise  sys- 
tem in  Latin  America.  Since  colonial  days, 
Panamanians  have  utilized  the  commercial 
advantages  of  the  Isthmus  of  Panama.  In 
fact,  public  regulation  of  the  financial  sec- 
tor of  the  economy  is  scant,  and  government 
policies  seek  promotion  of  private  invest- 
ment. These  factors  and  Panama's  close 
monetary  ties  to  the  United  States  have 
made  Panama  City — with  73  commercial 
banks — a  major  financial  center  in  Latin 
America. 


Peru 

Let  me  now  say  a  few  words  about  Peru, 
whose  military  government  has  been  identi- 
fied in  this  country  from  time  to  time  as  pro- 
Communist  or  tending  toward  commu- 
nism. 

The  military  officers  who  seized  power  in 
Peru  in  1968  were,  and  remain,  highly  na- 
tionalistic. Their  aim  was,  and  is,  to  trans- 
form Peruvian  society  to  bring  into  the  life 
of  the  nation  the  great  bulk  of  the  popula- 
tion which  was  perceived  to  be  the  most 
disadvantaged. 

To  this  end  the  revolutionary  government 
opted  for  a  form  of  socialism  that  borrowed 
as  freely  from  Marx  as  it  did  from  the  papal 
encyclicals.  The  eclectic  system  that  is  evolv- 
ing is  a  unique  Peruvian  synthesis  of  many 
models.  The  revolution's  interpreters  define 
it  as  neither  capitalist  nor  Communist  but 
containing  elements  of  both. 

In  all  aspects  of  its  statist  approach  to 
the  organization  of  the  Peruvian  economy, 
the  government  has  insisted  that  it  is  moti- 
vated by  the  principles  of  humanism  and 
Christianity.  While  political  activity  is  lim- 
ited by  the  authorities,  parties  continue  to 
exist,  although  they  have  no  voice  in  govern- 
ment. The  press  increasingly  has  been  al- 
lowed greater  freedom,  especially  over  the 
past  few  months. 

While  the  revolutionary  government  has 
largely  taken  over  the  national  means  of 
production  and  has  instituted  a  rather 
thorough-going  agrarian  reform  of  the  old 
oligarchic  latifnndia,  a  private  sector  is 
permitted  to  function.  Practically  all  for- 
eign investment  has  been  nationalized,  but 
compensation  has  been  paid  the  owners;  in 
the  latest  expropriation  of  an  American 
firm,  the  Marcona  Mining  Company,  last 
year,  compensation  negotiations  are  coming, 
we  believe,  to  a  successful  conclusion.  Yet 
nearly  $1  billion  in  U.S.  investments  in  Peru, 
in  copper  and  oil  production,  have  been  left 
untouched  and  as  a  consequence  are  expand- 
ing. Except  for  this,  however,  it  must  be 
said  that  Peru's  nationalization  policies  have 
dried  up  new  foreign  investment. 

As  a  leader  of  the  nonaligned  movement. 


July   12,    1976 


55 


Peru's  public  postures  frequently  are  in  op- 
position to  our  interests;  yet  Peru  has 
played  a  constructive  role  in  the  Third 
World,  helping  to  moderate  the  more  ex- 
treme positions  of  the  radicals  in  the  move- 
ment. Still  many  Americans  are  offended  by 
what  they  interpret  as  Peru's  "anti-imperial- 
ist" rhetoric  in  these  fora.  Peruvians  will 
say  their  anti-imperialism  in  foreign  policy 
is  not  anti-American.  They  insist  it  is  na- 
tionalist and  independent,  since  they  are 
neither  Communist  nor  capitalist. 

Peru's  new  and  innovative  attempt  at  re- 
structuring a  society  was  recognized  by  Sec- 
retary Kissinger  when  he  visited  Lima  in 
February.  Acknowledging  that  Peru  has 
chosen  a  nonaligned  path,  he  said :  ^ 

The  United  States  accepts  nonalignment  as  a 
legitimate  national  course.  Indeed,  our  global  inter- 
est is  well  served  by  a  world  of  thriving  independ- 
ent states,  secure  in  their  national  destinies  against 
the  hegemonial  designs  of  any  nation. 

He  also  said  that  while  our  two  countries 
differ  in  ideology,  culture,  and  governmental 
structure,  we  are  "fully  sympathetic  with 
Peru's  struggle  to  create  a  social  democ- 
racy attuned  to  the  needs  of  all  its  people." 

Peru's  large  acquisitions  of  Soviet  arms 
beginning  in  1973  have  created  some  con- 
cern about  the  direction  and  orientation  of 
Peruvian  policies.  The  increased  Soviet  pres- 
ence in  Peru,  along  with  a  continuing  Cuban 
presence,  raised  additional  questions.  But 
there  is  no  sign  that  Soviet  and  Cuban  in- 
fluence within  the  military  government  has 
increased. 

The  Communist  Party  of  Peru  (CPP)  is 
split  into  feuding  factions:  a  dominant  pro- 
Soviet  faction  of  approximately  2,000  mem- 
bers and  an  ultramilitant  so-called  Maoist 
faction  of  approximately  1,500  members — 
which  itself  has  split  on  the  issue  of  mili- 
tance.  The  primary  issue  which  divides  the 
factions  is  support  of  the  military  govern- 
ment's Socialist  revolution.  The  pro-Soviet 
CPP  supports  it  as  an  intermediate  step  to 
Marxist  socialism,   while   the   ultraleft  fac- 


"  For  Secretary  Kissinger's  toast  at  a  dinner  at 
Lima  on  Feb.  18,  see  Bulletin  of  Mar.  15,  1976, 
p.  331. 


tions  favor  direct  action  to  create  a  Marxist 
state. 

The  main  area  of  strength  of  the  Peru- 
vian Communists  is  in  labor,  where  Com- 
munist-controlled unions  have  demonstrated 
the  capability  of  paralyzing  key  industries — 
notably  the  mines  and  metallurgy  industry — 
for  limited  periods  of  time.  Recent  govern- 
ment decrees,  however,  may  have  curbed  the 
unions'  strength  in  the  mines.  Ultramilitant 
Communists  and  other  Marxists  also  domi- 
nate the  national  teachers  unions  and  stu- 
dent organizations  on  several  major  univer- 
sity campuses. 

Cuba  and  the  U.S.S.R.  support  the  pro- 
Soviet  CPP  and  its  affiliated  organizations, 
primarily  with  cadre  training.  There  are 
100-200  Cubans  in  Peru,  most  of  whom  are 
assigned  to  the  Cuban  diplomatic  mission  or 
are  their  dependents.  In  addition,  groups  of 
Cuban  fishermen,  who  operate  off  the  Peru- 
vian coast  under  terms  of  the  Cuba-Peru 
fishing  agreement  of  1973,  frequently  take 
shore  leave  in  northern  Peruvian  ports.  De- 
spite occasional  unsubstantiated  reports,  we 
do  not  believe  that  there  are  Cuban  military 
advisers  or  Communist  bases  in  Peru. 

Soviet  and  Cuban  Policies  and  Programs 

I  hope  these  statements  have  served  to 
deal  satisfactorily  with  your  concerns  about 
specific  allegations  of  Communist  influence. 
But  they  are  incomplete  without  some  dis- 
cussion of  Cuba  and  the  Soviet  Union  and 
of  the  general  political  and  economic  environ- 
ment in  Latin  America,  how  that  shapes  our 
perceptions,  and  what  policies  we  have 
evolved. 

The  official  Latin  American  Communist 
parties,  never  really  major  political  forces  in 
most  countries  of  the  hemisphere,  are  now 
divided  and  without  important  influence. 
They  attract  very  little  indigenous  support. 

As  for  the  Soviet  Union  and  Cuba,  they 
have  in  recent  years  pursued  policies  and 
programs  aimed  at  improving  relations  with 
established  Latin  American  governments.  As 
a  parallel  to  this  approach,  they  have  tended 
to  channel  their  active  support  to  legal  and 
"legitimate"    local    Communist    parties    and 


56 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


iiave  largely  broken  off  support  for  guerrilla 
and  terrorist  groups.  We  do  not  at  this  time 
believe  they  are  contemplating  a  change  in 
this  policy  or  preparing  for  armed  interven- 
tion in  the  hemisphere.  At  the  same  time  it 
should  be  said  that  not  a  few  Latin  American 
governments  which  experienced  serious 
guerrilla  outbreaks  in  the  1960's  and  1970's 
continue  to  believe  that  terrorist  organiza- 
tions now  operating  in  their  countries  are 
supported  from  abroad. 

Cuba's  attempts  have  not  been  all  that 
successful  on  the  state-to-state  level.  During 
1975,  Cuba  seemed  to  be  making  real  head- 
way toward  wide  acceptance  by  Latin  Ameri- 
can governments  and  a  significant  role  in  the 
affairs  of  the  hemisphere.  Latin  American 
governments  welcomed  the  more  pragmatic 
Castro  of  last  year  in  their  drive  for  all- 
embracing  Latin  American  unity  and  soli- 
darity. By  last  fall  Cuba  had  diplomatic 
relations  with  12  countries  in  the  hemi- 
sphere. 

However,  Castro's  Angola  adventure  re- 
vived some  old  suspicions  about  Cuba  and 
created  some  new  anxieties.  Some  Latin 
American  governments  have  never  dropped 
their  objections  to  Castro,  regarding  him  as 
a  tool  of  the  Soviets.  Other  governments 
which  may  have  been  inclined  to  reestablish 
diplomatic  relations  with  Cuba  have  had  sec- 
ond thoughts  following  Castro's  decision  to 
intervene  in  Africa. 

It  is  mainly  in  certain  black  English- 
speaking  Caribbean  countries  that  Cuba's 
actions  in  Africa  are  approved  and  applauded 
as  putting  new  momentum  into  the  anti- 
colonial  and  antiwhite  struggle  in  the  south- 
ern part  of  that  continent.  Themselves  con- 
fronted by  massive  problems  of  moderniza- 
tion of  their  societies,  the  leaders  of  these 
countries  are  impressed  by  the  clean  streets, 
law  and  order,  and  egalitarianism  of  Cuba. 

But  here  I  must  digress.  We  understand, 
as  I  indicated,  that  attraction  of  Cuba  to  the 
Commonwealth  Caribbean  nations,  led  by 
proud,  intelligent,  and  highly  educated  men. 
Their  social  and  economic  problems  are 
crushing.  Their  urban  unemployment  and 
population  growth  are  critical.  They  find  eco- 
nomic  dependency   on   tourism   and   certain 

July   12,    1976 


agricultural  crops  a  reality  but  also  a  residue 
of  the  colonial  past.  Perhaps  even  more  than 
other  developing  nations  they,  because  of 
their  relatively  high  literacy  and  intense 
contact  with  the  developed  world,  seek  a 
formula  for  rapid  modernization. 

Yet  the  United  States  has  not  been  of 
great  assistance.  We  have  taken  many  of 
their  citizens  as  immigrants,  we  have  in- 
vested in  their  industrial,  tourist,  and  agri- 
cultural enterprises,  and  we  have  spent 
lavishly  in  visiting  the  lovely  islands.  But 
as  a  government  we  have  not,  aside  from  a 
few  small  AID  [Agency  for  International 
Development]  programs  and  our  substantial 
support  for  the  Caribbean  Development 
Bank,  devised  special  economic  programs  to 
support  the  modernization  aspirations  of 
these  very  special  neighbors  in  the 
Caribbean. 

These  leaders  doubtlessly  also  are  aware 
that  the  Cuban  experiment  was  carried  out, 
and  was  only  possible,  with  an  enormous 
amount  of  aid  from  the  Soviet  Union.  And  if 
the  Soviet  Union  was  not  prepared  to  give 
that  kind  of  assistance  to  Chile  under 
Allende  to  establish  a  second  "Socialist"  mod- 
el in  the  Western  Hemisphere,  it  may  also  be 
reluctant  to  do  so  for  possible  additional  can- 
didates in  the  Caribbean.  Moreover,  the 
Caribbean  nations  know  that  with  that  type 
of  economic  dependency  come  political  costs 
which  they,  as  recently  independent  nations, 
are  not  prepared  to  pay. 

Soviet  policy  toward  the  nations  of  the 
hemisphere  in  recent  years  has  been  de- 
signed to: 

— Strengthen  diplomatic  and  commercial 
ties  with  most  of  the  Latin  American  and 
Caribbean  states  (the  Soviets  have  diplo- 
matic relations  with  15  states  in  Latin 
America  and  the  Caribbean). 

— Support  leftist  trends  and  anti-U.S.  ac- 
tions of  governments  through  propaganda 
and  other  means. 

— Expand  trade  and  military  sales  to  in- 
crease influence  in  certain  countries  and 
promote  cultural  and  educational  exchanges. 

But  the  Soviets  have  not  significantly  in- 
creased   their   influence   in    the   hemisphere 


57 


outside  of  Cuba.  Independent  thinking  and 
acting  nations  of  the  hemisphere  have 
proven  themselves  fully  capable  of  maintain- 
ing relations  with  the  Soviet  Union,  taking 
advantage  of  some  trade  and  credits,  but  not 
succumbing  to  increased  Soviet  influence. 
Increasingly  it  appears  that  the  Soviet 
Union  is  irrelevant  to  much  of  the  Third 
World  except  as  a  commodity  purchaser  and 
a  supplier  of  arms.  However,  in  Latin 
America,  only  Cuba  and  Peru  have  thus  far 
elected  to  purchase  Soviet  weapons.  As  a 
source  of  technology  and  capital  its  role  is 
minor.  In  the  North-South  dialogue  over 
trade,  commodities,  monetary  reform,  and 
debts,  the  Soviets  have  made  virtually  no 
contribution. 

U.S.  Approach 

While  Communist  parties  have  not  pros- 
pered in  the  hemisphere,  terrorism,  urban 
and  rural  guerrilla  movements,  increased 
crime,  and  social  unrest  have  continued  to 
plague  the  hemisphere.  Virtually  no  coun- 
try is  without  problems  of  this  kind.  Genu- 
ine social  and  economic  grievances  play  a 
large  part  in  this  unrest.  This  is  accom- 
panied by  a  global  counterpoint  of  dis- 
appointed expectations  on  the  part  of  the 
politically  impotent  and  economically  dis- 
franchised throughout  the  world.  Trouble- 
some issues  in  U.S.-Latin  American  rela- 
tions— trade,  Panama,  Cuba — offer  oppor- 
tunities for  "anti-imperialist"  forces  to  mobi- 
lize opinion  against  us  and,  in  some  cases, 
the  government  in  power  in  their  own 
country. 

Some  of  the  less  stable  governments  in  the 
region  have  sought  to  capitalize  on  radical 
sentiment,  or  at  least  defend  themselves 
from  it,  by  deflecting  it  externally;  i.e.,  at 
the  United  States.  They  are  firing  at  the 
wrong  target,  however.  For  it  is  a  plain  fact, 
stated  often  by  Secretary  Kissinger  and 
Assistant  Secretary  [for  Inter-American 
Aft'airs  William  D.]  Rogers,  that  we  are  not 
in  the  business  of  intervening  in  the  internal 
aff"airs  of  Latin  American  states. 

Discussing  his  earlier  trip  to  Latin  Amer- 
ica with  the  House  International  Relations 


58 


Committee  on  March  4,  Mr.  Kissinger  made 
the  following  statement: 

We  accept  the  sovereignty  of  each  Latin  American 
state.  Our  policy  ...  is  to  support  the  aspirations 
and  objectives  of  their  program  of  social  change, 
to  conciliate  differences  before  they  become  con- 
flicts. .  .  . 

On  the  same  occasion,  touching  on  the 
themes  he  emphasized  on  that  trip,  Mr. 
Kissinger  also  repeated  our  pledge  to  "nego-  . 
tiate  our  differences  with  any  nation  or  na- 
tions on  the  basis  of  mutual  respect  and 
sovereign  equality." 

Obviously  this  is  a  policy  which  accords 
with  our  own  values  and  history.  We  have  j 
been  able  to  adopt  this  approach  because  we  ' 
no  longer  perceive,  as  we  once  did,  that  an 
extrahemispheric  power  will  be  able  to  n 
mount  a  significant  threat  to  our  own  vital  | 
interests  in  Latin  America  or  to  the  stability  1' 
of  Latin  American  states. 

As  for  Cuba,  we  are  not  taking  at  face 
value  the  piety  of  self-serving  statements 
currently  emanating  from  Havana.  The 
Cubans  should  indeed  withdraw  promptly 
from  Angola.  They  should  never  have  gone 
there  in  the  first  place.  They  should  never 
have  intervened  in  a  distant  conflict  better 
resolved  by  African  effort  alone.  If  their 
speedy  and  complete  withdrawal  becomes  a 
fact,  we  will  welcome  it.  In  the  meantime  we 
will  watch  events  and  check  our  intelligence  , 
with  great  care. 

There  should  also  be  no  question,  as  Sec- 
re*;ary  Kissinger  pointed  out  in  Costa  Rica 
during  his  February  trip,  that  we  will  honor 
our  treaty  commitments  and  security  obliga- 
tions in  Latin  America.  As  you  know,  these 
are  largely  embodied  in  the  Rio  Treaty  of 
1947,  article  3  of  which  commits  signatories 
to  regard  an  armed  attack  on  any  American 
state  as  an  attack  on  all  the  American  states 
and  to  "assist  in  meeting  the  attack."  Article 
6  further  provides  for  immediate  consulta- 
tion to  agree  on  measures  for  the  common 
defense  and  maintenance  of  the  peace  and 
security  of  the  continent  in  cases  not  involv- 
ing armed  attack.  I  regard  the  existence 
and  the  reiteration  of  these  commitments  as 
an  important  contribution  to  the  defense  and 
internal  stability  of  hemisphere  states. 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


U.S.  Joins  Security  Council  Consensus 
on  Resolution  on  South  Africa 

Following  are  statements  made  in  the 
V.N.  Security  Council  by  U.S.  Representa- 
tirc  Albert  W.  Sherer,  Jr.,  on  June  19,  to- 
other with  the  text  of  a  resolution  adopted 
III/  the  Council  that  day. 


STATEMENTS  BY  AMBASSADOR  SHERER 


First  Statement  of  June  19 

rsUN   press  release  64  dated   June   19 

The  tragic  events  occurring  in  South 
Africa  are  a  sharp  reminder  that  when  a 
system  deprives  a  people  of  the  basic  ele- 
ments of  human  dignity  and  expression,  only 
the  bitterest  results  can  be  expected.  In  1960, 
over  16  years  ago,  this  Council  met  to  con- 
sider a  similar  tragedy  and  called  upon  the 
Government  of  the  Republic  of  South  Africa 
to  initiate  measures  aimed  at  bringing  about 
racial  harmony  based  on  equality  in  order  to 
assure  that  the  present  situation  did  not 
continue  or  reoccur  and  to  abandon  its  poli- 
cies of  apartheid  and  racial  discrimination. 

Mr.  President,  my  government  supported 
that  resolution — and  in  the  intervening 
years  we  have  made  repeated  pleas,  to- 
gether with  other  members  of  the  United  Na- 
tions, to  the  Government  of  the  Republic  of 
South  Africa  to  abandon  the  policies  which 
were  inevitably  leading  to  the  events  we 
have  witnessed  in  the  last  few  days.  In  the 
present  circumstances  the  frustrations  of  the 
black  people  could  only  find  an  expression  in 
the  form  of  rioting  which  has  brought  such 
dire  consequences.  That  is  part  of  the  trag- 
edy of  South  Africa. 

My  delegation  has  stated  on  other  occa- 
sions that  the  basic  facts  about  human 
rights  in  South  Africa  are  clear  and  may  be 
stated  in  two  propositions:  First,  the  ma- 
jority of  South  Africans  live  under  a  system 
which  deprives  them  of  their  basic  human 
rights  and,  second,  the  South  African  sys- 
tem of  laws  is  designed  and  administered  so 
as   to   prevent    that    majority   from    taking 


effective  peaceful  action  to  alter  this  condi- 
tion of  fundamental  deprivation. 

We  call  on  the  Government  of  the  Repub- 
lic of  South  Africa  to  take  these  events  as  a 
warning  and  to  learn  from  them.  They  must 
abandon  a  system  which  is  clearly  not  ac- 
ceptable under  any  standard  of  human 
i-ights.  There  can  be  no  dream  of  a  future 
for  a  nation  of  South  Africa  that  does  not 
include  both  white  and  black  working  to- 
gether in  harmony  and  equality.  Together 
with  other  members  of  the  Council,  we  want 
to  assure  that  the  dream  will  not  become  a 
nightmare  such  as  that  we  have  witnessed 
in  recent  days. 

Second  Statement  of  June  19 


USUN    pn 


dated  June   19 


My  government  has  joined  the  consensus 
in  support  of  the  resolution  because  of  our 
strong  conviction  that  apartheid  is  wrong 
and  that  tragedy  can  only  follow  if  South 
Africa  persists  in  its  racial  policies. 

In  joining  the  consensus,  we  do  so  on  the 
clear  understanding  that  the  language,  par- 
ticularly that  in  operative  paragraph  3,  falls 
under  chapter  VI  of  the  charter  and  does 
not  imply  any  chapter  VII  determination. 
We  would  not  want  our  support  of  this  con- 
sensus to  be  understood  by  anyone  as  mean- 
ing that  the  United  States  is  prepared  to 
contemplate  chapter  VII  action. 

In  agreeing  to  this  resolution,  the  United 
States  is  sensitive  to  the  limits  on  Security 
Council  jurisdiction  imposed  by  article  2, 
paragraph  7,  of  the  charter.  By  that  article's 
terms,  no  organ  of  the  United  Nations  is  au- 
thorized to  intervene  in  matters  which  are 
essentially  within  the  domestic  jurisdiction 
of  any  state  except  in  cases  in  which  enforce- 
ment measures  under  chapter  VII  are  to  be 
applied.  The  Council,  of  course,  is  not  apply- 
ing enforcement  measures  in  this  resolution. 

One  final  point,  Mr.  President,  but  a  point 
to  which  my  government  attaches  paramount 
importance.  South  Africa  in  its  policy  of 
apartheid  represents  a  flagrant  violation  of 
human  rights.  But  it  would  be  wrong,  in- 
deed it  would  be  hypocritical,  were  it  not 
said  to  this  Council  that  South  Africa  is  not 


July    12,   1976 


59 


the  only  government  which  pursues  delib- 
erate policies  which  result  in  flagrant  viola- 
tions of  human  rights. 

I  stress  this  point  concerning  violations  of 
human  rights,  Mr.  President,  in  order  to 
suggest  to  this  Council  that,  by  being  arbi- 
trary and  selective  in  its  concerns  and  its 
condemnation,  it  brings  the  United  Nations 
into  disrepute  and  may  even  encourage  those 
governments  which  pursue  deliberate  poli- 
cies whose  cruelty  in  some  cases  exceeds  that 
of  apartheid  to  believe  they  can  do  so  with 
impunity. 


TEXT  OF  RESOLUTION  < 

The  Security  Council, 

Having  considered  the  letter  by  the  representa- 
tives of  Benin,  the  Libyan  Arab  Republic  and  the 
United  Republic  of  Tanzania,  on  behalf  of  the  Afri- 
can Group  at  the  United  Nations,  concerning  the 
measures  of  repression,  including  wanton  killings, 
perpetrated  by  the  apartheid  regime  in  South  Africa 
against  the  African  people  in  Soweto  and  other 
areas  in  South  Africa   (S/12100), 

Having  considered  also  the  telegram  from  the 
President  of  the  Democratic  Republic  of  Madagascar 
addressed  to  the  Secretary-General    (S/12101), 

Deeply  shocked  over  large-scale  killings  and 
wounding  of  Africans  in  South  Africa,  following  the 
callous  shooting  of  African  people  including  school 
children  and  students  demonstrating  against  racial 
discrimination  on  16  June  1976, 

Convinced  that  this  situation  has  been  brought 
about  by  the  continued  imposition  by  the  South 
African  Government  of  apartheid  and  racial  dis- 
crimination, in  defiance  of  the  resolutions  of  the 
Security  Council  and  the  General  Assembly, 

1.  Strongly  condemns  the  South  African  Govern- 
ment for  its  resort  to  massive  violence  against  and 
killings  of  the  African  people  including  school  chil- 
dren and  students  and  others  opposing  racial  dis- 
crimination; 

2.  Expresses  its  profound  sympathy  to  the  victims 
of  this  violence; 

3.  Reaffirms  that  the  policy  of  apartheid  is  a 
crime  against  the  conscience  and  dignity  of  mankind 
and  seriously  disturbs  international  peace  and  secu- 
rity; 

4.  Recognizes  the  legitimacy  of  the  struggle  of 
the  South  African  people  for  the  elimination  of 
apartheid  and  racial  discrimination; 

5.  Calls    upon    the    South    African    Government 


urgently  to  end  violence  against  the  African  people, 
and  take  urgent  steps  to  eliminate  apartheid  and 
racial  discrimination; 

6.  Decides  to  remain  seized  of  the  matter. 


Congress  Asked  To  Approve  Defense 
Cooperation  Agreement  With  Turkey 

Message  From  President  Ford ' 

To  the  Congress  of  the  United  States: 

I  am  hereby  requesting  that  Congress 
approve  and  authorize  appropriations  to  im- 
plement the  Agreement  Between  the  Govern- 
ments of  the  United  States  of  America  and  of 
the  Republic  of  Turkey  Relative  to  Defense 
Cooperation  Pursuant  to  Article  III  of  the 
North  Atlantic  Treaty  in  Order  to  Resist 
Armed  Attack  in  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty 
Area,  signed  in  Washington,  March  26,  1976, 
and  a  related  exchange  of  notes.  Accord- 
ingly, I  am  transmitting  herewith  draft  leg- 
islation in  the  form  of  a  Joint  Resolution  of 
the  Congress  for  this  purpose. 

The  United  States  and  Turkey  have  long 
enjoyed  a  close  mutual  security  relationship 
under  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty,  as  well  as 
bilateral  cooperation  in  accordance  with  Ar- 
ticle III  of  that  Treaty.  The  new  Agreement, 
like  its  predecessor,  the  Defense  Cooperation 
Agreement  of  1969  which  this  Agreement 
would  supersede,  implements  the  Treaty.  It 
has  been  signed  as  an  executive  agreement. 
The  Agreement  was  negotiated  with  the 
understanding  that  it  would  be  subject  to 
Congressional  approval  and  expressly  pro- 
vides that  it  shall  not  enter  into  force  until 
the  parties  exchange  notes  indicating  ap- 
proval of  the  Agreement  in  accordance  with 
their  respective  legal  procedures.  Full  Con- 
gressional endorsement  of  this  Agreement 
will  give  new  strength  and  stability  to  con- 
tinuing U.S.-Turkish  security  cooperation 
which  has  served  as  a  vital  buttress  on 
NATO's  southeast  flank  for  more  than  two 
decades. 


'U.N.    doc.    S/RES/392    (1976);    adopted    by    the 
Council  by  consensus  on  June  19. 


'  Transmitted  on  June  16  (text  from  White  House 
press  release);  also  printed  as  H.  Doc.  94-531,  which 
includes  the  texts  of  draft  legislation  and  the  agree- 
ment and  a  related  exchange  of  notes. 


60 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


The  new  Agreement  is  consistent  with,  but 
not  identical  to,  the  preceding  Defense  Co- 
operation Agreement  of  1969.  Founded  on 
mutual  respect  for  the  sovereignty  of  the 
parties,  the  Agreement  (Articles  II  and  III) 
authorizes  U.S.  participation  in  defense 
measures  related  to  the  parties'  obligations 
arising  out  of  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty.  It 
is  understood  that  when  the  Agreement 
enters  into  force  pursuant  to  Article  XXI, 
activities  will  resume  which  were  suspended 
by  the  Government  of  Turkey  in  July  1975, 
when  the  Turkish  Government  requested 
negotiation  of  a  new  defense  cooperation 
agreement. 

The  Agreement  provides  a  mutually  ac- 
ceptable framework  for  this  important  se- 
curity cooperation.  The  installations  author- 
ized by  the  Agreement  will  be  Turkish 
Armed  Forces  installations  under  Turkish 
command  (Articles  IV  and  V).  Article  V 
cleai'ly  provides  for  U.S.  command  and  con- 
trol authority  over  all  U.S.  armed  forces  pei'- 
sonnel,  other  members  of  the  U.S.  national 
element  at  each  installation,  and  U.S.  equip- 
ment and  support  facilities. 

The  installations  shall  be  operated  jointly. 
In  order  to  facilitate  this  objective,  the 
United  States  is  committed  to  a  program  of 
technical  training  of  Turkish  personnel. 

Other  provisions  of  the  Agreement  deal 
with  traditional  operational  and  administra- 
tive matters,  including:  operation  and  main- 
tenance of  the  installations ;  ceilings  on  levels 
of  U.S.  personnel  and  equipment;  import,  ex- 
port and  in-country  supply  procedures;  sta- 
tus of  forces  and  property  questions. 

Article  XIX  specifies  the  amounts  of  de- 
fense support  which  the  United  States  plans 
to  provide  Turkey  during  the  first  four 
years  the  Agreement  remains  in  force.  We 
have  provided  such  support  to  this  important 
NATO  ally  for  many  years  to  help  Turkey 
meet  its  heavy  NATO  obligations.  The  arti- 
cle provides  that  during  the  first  four  years 
the  Agreement  remains  in  force,  the  United 
States  will  furnish  $1,000,000,000  in  grants, 
credits  and  loan  guaranties,  to  be  distrib- 
uted equally  over  these  four  years  in  accord- 
ance with  annual  plans  to  be  developed  by 
the  Governments.  It  further  provides  that 


during  the  first  year  of  the  defense  support 
program,  $75  million  in  grants  will  be  made 
available,  with  a  total  of  not  less  than  $200 
million  in  grants  to  be  provided  over  the 
four-year  life  of  the  program.  The  Article 
also  sets  forth  our  preparedness  to  make 
cash  sales  to  Turkey  of  defense  articles  and 
services  over  the  life  of  the  Agreement. 

The  related  exchange  of  notes  details  de- 
fense articles  we  are  prepared  to  sell  to  the 
Republic  of  Turkey  at  prices  consistent  with 
U.S.  law.  It  further  provides  for  Turkish 
access  to  the  U.S.  Defense  Communications 
Satellite  System,  and  for  bilateral  consulta- 
tions regarding  cooperation  in  modernizing 
Turkish  defense  communications. 

The  defense  support  specified  in  Article 
XIX  and  in  the  related  exchange  of  notes 
will  be  provided  in  accordance  with  contrac- 
tual obligations  existing  and  to  be  entered 
into  by  the  Governments,  and  with  the  gen- 
eral practices  applicable  to  all  other  recipient 
countries.  The  accompanying  draft  legisla- 
tion accordingly  provides  that  the  generally 
applicable  provisions  of  our  foreign  assist- 
ance and  military  sales  Acts  will  govern  this 
defense  support,  and  that  it  will  be  exempted 
from  the  provisions  of  section  620 (x)  of  the 
Foreign  Assistance  Act  as  amended.  The 
draft  legislation  further  provides  that  it  ful- 
fills the  requirements  of  section  36(b)  of  the 
Foreign  Military  Sales  Act  as  amended  and 
section  7307  of  Title  10  of  the  United  States 
Code  with  respect  to  the  transfer  of  materiel 
pursuant  to  the  related  exchange  of  notes. 

The  Agreement  will  have  a  duration  of 
four  years,  and  will  be  extended  for  subse- 
quent four-year  periods  in  the  absence  of 
notice  of  termination  by  one  of  the  parties. 
As  the  four-year  defense  support  program 
comes  to  an  end,  the  Agreement  provides  for 
consultation  on  the  development  of  a  future 
program  as  required  in  accordance  with  the 
respective  legal  procedures  of  the  two  Gov- 
ernments. Article  XXI  stipulates  the  proce- 
dures under  which  the  Agreement  can  be 
terminated  by  either  party,  and  provides  for 
a  one-year  period  following  termination  dur- 
ing which  the  Agreement  will  be  considei-ed 
to  remain  in  force  for  the  purposes  of  an 
orderly  withdrawal. 


July   12,    1976 


61 


This  Agreement  restores  a  bilateral  rela- 
tionship that  has  been  important  to  Western 
security  for  more  than  two  decades.  I  be- 
lieve it  will  promote  U.S.  interests  and  ob- 
jectives on  the  vital  southeastern  flank  of 
NATO  and  provide  a  framework  for  bilateral 
cooperation  designed  solely  to  reinforce 
NATO  and  our  common  security  concerns. 
To  the  extent  that  the  Agreement  restores 
trust  and  confidence  between  the  United 
States  and  Turkey,  it  also  enhances  the 
prospects  for  a  constructive  dialogue  on 
other  regional  problems  of  mutual  concern. 

I  therefore  request  that  the  Congress  give 
this  Agreement  and  the  accompanying  draft 
legislation  prompt  and  favorable  considera- 
tion, and  approve  its  entry  into  force  and 
authorize  the  appropriation  of  the  funds 
necessary  for  its  execution. 

Gerald  R.  Ford. 

The  White  House,  June  16, 1976. 


Fourth  Progress  Report  on  Cyprus 
Submitted  to  the  Congress 

Message  from.  President  Ford  * 

To  the  Congress  of  the  United  States: 

Pursuant  to  Public  Law  94-104,  I  am  sub- 
mitting my  fourth  periodic  report  on  the 
progress  of  the  Cyprus  negotiations  and  the 
efforts  this  Administration  is  making  to  help 
find  a  lasting  solution  to  the  problems  of  the 
island.  In  previous  reports  I  have  detailed 
the  Administration's  efforts  to  revitalize  the 
negotiating  process  so  that  the  legitimate 
aspirations  of  all  parties,  and  particularly 
those  of  the  refugees,  could  be  accommo- 
dated quickly  and  in  the  most  just  manner 
possible. 

Differences  on  procedural  issues  have  long 
prevented  the  Greek-Cypriot  and  Turkish- 
Cypriot  communities  from  broaching  such 
critical    issues   as    territory,    the   form   and 


'Transmitted   on  June  7   (text  from  White   House 
press  relea.se). 


function  of  the  central  government  and  other 
constitutional  issues.  Throughout  the  period 
since  the  hostilities  of  1974,  we  have  con- 
sistently urged  serious  consideration  of 
these  issues.  As  my  most  recent  report  in- 
dicated, an  agreement  was  reached  at  the 
February  round  of  the  Cyprus  intercommu- 
nal  talks  in  Vienna,  held  under  the  auspices 
of  United  Nations  Secretary  General  Wald- 
heim,  to  exchange  negotiating  proposals  on 
the  key  substantive  issues  of  the  Cyprus 
problem.  When  both  sides  submitted  pro- 
posals in  April  to  Secretary  General  Wald- 
heim's  Special  Representative  on  Cyprus,  a 
new  impasse  developed  which  delayed  a  com- 
plete exchange  on  the  territorial  question. 
Additionally,  in  April,  Glafcos  Clerides  re- 
signed his  position  as  the  Greek-Cypriot  ne- 
gotiator. These  developments,  with  the 
subsequent  appointment  of  new  Greek- 
Cypriot  and  Turkish-Cypriot  negotiators,  re- 
sulted in  the  postponement  of  the  next  ne- 
gotiating round  which  had  been  scheduled  to 
take  place  in  Vienna  in  May. 

On  April  15,  I  invited  Greek  Foreign  Min- 
ister Bitsios  to  the  White  House  for  a  very 
useful  exchange  of  views  on  developments 
relating  to  Cyprus. 

In  addition,  the  United  States  and  other 
interested  parties  maintained  close  contact 
with  Secretary  General  Waldheim  to  support 
his  attempts  to  resolve  these  difficulties  and 
resume  the  intercommunal  negotiating  proc- 
ess. These  efforts  culminated  in  discussions 
on  the  occasion  of  the  Oslo  NATO  Ministerial 
meeting  in  late  May  where  Secretary  of 
State  Kissinger  held  separate  meetings  with 
Tui-kish  Foreign  Minister  Caglayangil  and 
Greek  Foreign  Minister  Bitsios,  following 
which  the  Greek  and  Turkish  Foreign  Minis- 
ters met  together  to  discuss  outstanding  bi- 
lateral issues  including  Cyprus.  In  the  course 
of  this  process,  the  Secretary  of  State 
stressed  the  absolute  need  to  move  expedi- 
tiously to  discuss  the  key  outstanding 
Cyprus  issues. 

The  Secretary  of  State  also  publicly  em- 
phasized our  continuing  concern  that  a  rapid 
solution  of  the  Cyprus  dispute  be  achieved 
and  reiterated  the  firm  position  of  this  Ad- 


62 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ministration  that  the  current  territorial  di- 
vision of  the  island  cannot  be  permanent. 

Following  the  meetings  in  Oslo,  views  on 
territorial  issues  were  exchanged  by  the  two 
Cypriot  communities,  and  it  should  now  be 
possible  to  reinitiate  the  negotiating  process 
under  the  auspices  of  UN  Secretary  General 
Waldheim. 

The  United  States  will  continue  to  con- 
tribute actively  to  these  efforts  aimed  at  a 
solution  to  the  Cyprus  problem.  I  remain  con- 
vinced that  progress  can  be  registered  soon 
if  mutual  distrust  and  suspicions  can  be  set 
aside  and  each  side  genuinely  tests  the  will 
of  the  other  side  to  reach  a  solution.  For  our 
part,  we  shall  remain  in  touch  with  Secretary 
General  Waldheim  and  all  interested  par- 
ties to  support  the  negotiating  process.  Our 
objective  in  the  period  ahead,  as  it  has  been 
j  I  from  the  beginning  of  the  Cyprus  crisis,  is 
'  to  assist  the  parties  to  find  a  just  and  equi- 
table solution. 


Gerald  R.  Ford. 


The  White  House,  June  7,  1976. 


U.N.  Force  in  Cyprus  Extended 
j  for  Six  Months 

I      Folloiving  is  a  statement  made  in  the  U.N. 
Security  Council  by  U.S.  Representative  Al- 
\  bert  W.  Sherer,  Jr.,  on  June  15,  together  with 
i  the  text  of  a  resolution  adopted  by  the  Coun- 
cil that  day. 


STATEMENT   BY   AMBASSADOR   SHERER 

USUN  press   release  62   dated  June  15 

Tonight's  renewal  of  the  mandate  of 
the  U.N.  Peacekeeping  Force  in  Cyprus 
(UNFICYP)  marks  the  30th  time  that  the 
Security  Council  has  taken  this  action.  As 
he  has  so  often  done  before,  the  Secretary 
General  has  stressed  the  need  for  flexibility 
and  good  will  in  the  negotiating  process.  Once 
again  in  the  report  that  is  before  us  he  urges 


the  parties  to  take  into  account  "not  only 
their  own  interests  but  also  the  legitimate 
aspirations  and  requirements  of  the  opposing 
side." 

Members  of  this  Council  must  surely  echo 
the  Secretary  General's  appeal  for  greater 
energy,  flexibility,  and  dedication  to  the 
success  of  the  intercommunal  negotiations. 
Over  the  years  too  many  opportunities  have 
been  lost  because  the  concessions  necessary 
for  agreement  required  high  political  risks. 
As  the  body  charged  with  the  maintenance 
of  international  peace — and  through  its  long 
involvement  in  the  Cyprus  question — this 
Council  has  the  right  to  expect  that  serious 
risks  be  taken  in  the  search  for  a  lasting 
settlement. 

The  Secretary  General  has  again  earned 
our  admiration  for  the  tireless  and  imagina- 
tive way  in  which  he  has  carried  out  his 
mission  of  good  oflices.  The  last  six  months 
have  presented  very  special  difficulties.  My 
government  fully  understands,  and  shares, 
the  Secretary  General's  view  that  "Before 
reconvening  the  talks,  it  is  obviously  neces- 
sary to  have  reasonable  assurances  that  they 
will  be  meaningful  and  productive."  The  Sec- 
retary General  will,  we  are  certain,  lend  the 
prestige  of  his  ofl^ce  and  his  personal  in- 
genuity to  obtaining  the  assurances  neces- 
sary to  insure  the  success  of  the  Cyprus 
talks. 

In  straightforward  terms,  the  Secretary 
General  has  in  paragraph  65  of  his  report 
expressed  concern  over  the  situation  of 
Greek  Cypriots  in  the  north.  My  delegation 
shares  the  hope  expressed  by  other  members 
of  the  Council  that  this  situation  will  im- 
prove in  accordance  with  past  agreements 
covering  Greek  Cypriots  in  the  north. 

In  the  last  two  years,  Mr.  President,  the 
United  States  has  doubled  its  annual  con- 
tribution to  UNFICYP  from  $4.8  million  to 
$9.6  million  a  year.  We  have  done  this  in 
order  to  maintain  quiet  on  the  island  and 
insure  conditions  supportive  of  the  inter- 
communal negotiations.  It  is  accordingly 
with  deep  concern  that  we  have  read  in  the 
Secretary  General's  report  that  the  future 
of  the  Force  is  imperiled  because  "voluntary 


'July  12,   1976 


63 


contributions  have  continued  to  be  made  in 
insufficient  amounts  and  by  a  disappoint- 
ingly small  number  of  Governments  .  .  .  ." 
Surely  the  time  has  come  for  governments 
interested  in  a  just  Cyprus  settlement  to 
donate  their  fair  share  to  UNFICYP.  Per- 
manent members  of  the  Security  Council 
have  a  special  responsibility  to  contribute  to 
international  peace  and  security.  That  high 
responsibility  cannot  be  diminished  by  peace- 
keeping doctrinal  considerations  stemming 
from  different  circumstances  and  an  earlier 
era. 

Mr.  President,  my  government  remains 
convinced  that  a  just  and  durable  peace  in 
Cyprus  is  not  only  possible  but  is  deeply  de- 
sired by  Greek  and  Turkish  Cypriots  alike. 
At  the  last  General  Assembly,  Secretary  of 
State  Kissinger  outlined  five  principles  which 
the  United  States  considers  essential  to  a 
permanent  settlement.  Let  me  repeat  these 
principles,  which  are  consonant  with  Gen- 
eral Assembly  and  Security  Council  resolu- 
tions on  Cyprus: 

— A  settlement  must  preserve  the  independence, 
sovereignty,  and  territorial  integrity  of  Cyprus. 

— It  must  insure  that  both  the  Greek  Cypriot  and 
the  Turkish  Cypriot  communities  can  live  in  free- 
dom and  have  a  large  voice  in  their  own  affairs. 

— The  present  dividing  lines  cannot  be  permanent. 
There  must  be  agreed  territorial  arrangements 
which  reflect  the  economic  requirements  of  the 
Greek  Cypriot  community  and  take  account  of  its 
self-respect. 

— There  must  be  provision  for  the  withdrawal  of 
foreign  military  forces  other  than  those  present 
under  the  authority  of  international  agreements. 

— And  there  must  be  security  for  all  Cypriots; 
the  needs  and  wishes  of  the  refugees  who  have  been 
the  principal  victims  and  whose  tragic  plight  touches 
us  all  must  be  dealt  with  speedily  and  with  com- 
passion. 

In  conclusion,  Mr.  President,  I  would  like 
to  pay  tribute  to  those  who  make  the  U.N. 
operation  in  Cyprus  the  remarkable  com- 
bination of  peacekeeping  and  peacemaking 
that  it  is.  The  Secretary  General's  Special 
Representative,  [Javier]  Perez  de  Cuellar, 
Under  Secretaries  General  [Brian  G.]  Urqu- 
hart  and  [Roberto  Enrique]  Guyer  and  their 
fine  staffs.  General  Prem  Chand  [Lt.  Gen. 
D.  Prem  Chand]  and  the  officers  and  men  of 
UNFICYP — these   people   represent,   in   my 


64 


government's  estimate,  the  very  highest 
standards  of  international  service.  Their 
conduct  reflects  the  ideals  of  this  organiza- 
tion, and  we  salute  them. 


TEXT  OF  RESOLUTION  > 

The  Security  Council, 

Noting  from  the  report  of  the  Secretary-General 
of  5  June  1976  (S/12093)  that  in  existing  circum- 
stances the  presence  of  the  United  Nations  Peace- 
keeping Force  in  Cyprus  is  essential  not  only  to 
help  maintain  quiet  in  the  island  but  also  to  facili- 
tate the  continued  search  for  a  peaceful  settlement. 

Noting  from  the  report  the  conditions  prevailing 
in  the  island. 

Noting  also  from  the  report  that  the  freedom  of 
movement  of  the  United  Nations  Peace-keeping  Force 
in  Cyprus  and  its  civil  police  (UNCIVPOL)  is  still 
restricted  in  the  north  of  the  island,  that  progress 
is  being  made  in  discussions  regarding  the  station- 
ing, deployment  and  functioning  of  the  United  Na- 
tions Peace-keeping  Force  in  Cyprus  and  expressing 
the  hope  that  those  discussions  will  lead  speedily  to 
the  elimination  of  all  existing  difficulties, 

Noting  further  that,  in  paragraph  70  of  his  re- 
port, the  Secretary-General  expresses  the  view  that 
the  best  hope  of  achieving  a  just  and  lasting  settle- 
ment of  the  Cyprus  problem  lies  in  negotiations  be- 
tween the  representatives  of  the  two  communities 
and  that  the  usefulness  of  those  negotiations  de- 
pends upon  the  willingness  of  all  parties  concerned 
to  show  the  necessary  flexibility,  taking  into  account 
not  only  their  own  interests  but  also  the  legitimate 
aspirations   and   requirements   of  the   opposing   side. 

Expressing  its  concern  at  actions  which  increase 
tension  between  the  two  communities  and  tend  to 
affect  adversely  the  efforts  towards  a  just  and  last- 
ing peace  in  Cyprus, 

Emphasizing  the  need  for  the  parties  concerned 
to  adhere  to  the  agreements  reached  at  all  previous 
rounds  of  the  talks  held  under  the  auspices  of  the 
Secretary-General  and  expressing  the  hope  that  fu- 
ture talks  will  be  meaningful  and  productive, 

Noting  also  the  concurrence  of  the  parties  con- 
cerned in  the  recommendation  by  the  Secretary- 
General  that  the  Security  Council  extend  the  sta- 
tioning of  the  United  Nations  Peace-keeping  Force 
in  Cyprus  for  a  further  period  of  six  months, 

Noting  that  the  Government  of  Cyprus  has 
agreed  that  in  view  of  the  prevailing  conditions  in 
the  island  it  is  necessary  to  keep  the  Force  in 
Cyprus  beyond   15  June   1976, 


'U.N.  doc.  S/RES/391  (1976);  adopted  by  the 
Council  on  June  15  by  a  vote  of  13-0,  with  Benin 
and  the  People's  Republic  of  China  not  participating 
in  the  vote. 

Department  of  State  Bulletim 


1.  Reaffirms  the  provisions  of  resolution  186 
(1964)  of  4  March  1964,  as  well  as  subsequent  reso- 
lutions and  decisions  on  the  establishment  and  main- 
tenance of  the  United  Nations  Peace-keeping  Force 
in  Cyprus  and  other  aspects  of  the  situation  in 
Cyprus; 

2.  Reaffirms  once  again  its  resolution  365  (1974) 
of  13  December  1974,  by  which  it  endorsed  General 
Assembly  resolution  3212  (XXIX),  adopted  unani- 
mously on  1  November  1974,  and  calls  once  again 
for  their  urgent  and  effective  implementation  and 
that  of  its  resolution  367    (1975); 

3.  Urges  the  parties  concerned  to  act  with  the 
utmost  restraint  to  refrain  from  any  unilateral  or 
other  action  likely  to  affect  adversely  the  prospects 
of  negotiations  and  to  continue  and  accelerate  de- 
termined co-operative  efforts  to  achieve  the  objec- 
tives of  the  Security  Council; 

4.  Extends  once  more  the  stationing  in  Cyprus  of 
the  United  Nations  Peace-keeping  Force,  estab- 
lished under  Security  Council  resolution  186  (1964), 
for  a  further  period  ending  15  December  1976,  in  the 
expectation  that  by  then  sufficient  progress  towards 
a  final  solution  will  make  possible  a  withdrawal  or 
substantial   reduction   of  the    Force; 

5.  Appeals  again  to  all  parties  concerned  to  ex- 
tend their  fullest  co-operation  so  as  to  enable  the 
United  Nations  Peace-keeping  Force  to  perform  its 
duties  effectively; 

6.  Requests  the  Secretary-General  to  continue  the 
mission  of  good  offices  entrusted  to  him  by  para- 
graph 6  of  resolution  367  (1975),  to  keep  the  Secu- 
rity Council  informed  of  the  progress  made  and  to 
submit  a  report  on  the  implementation  of  this  reso- 
lution by  30  October  1976. 


J.S.-Japan  Cultural  Conference 
hlold  Eighth  Meeting 

Folloiving  is  the  text  of  a  communique 
■ssued  at  the  conclusion  of  the  eighth  U.S. 
Japan  Conference  on  Cultural  and  Educa- 
ional  Interchange  (CULCON  VIII)  at 
Washington  on  May  28.^ 


■ 


I.  The  Eighth  United  States-Japan  Conference  on 
lultural  and  Educational  Interchange  was  held  in 
Washington,  May  26-28,  1976.  Delegates  and  spe- 
tialists  representing  the  governments,  academic 
;ommunities,  mass  media,  businesses,  political  com- 
nunities,  foundations,  and  creative  arts  of  the  two 
ountries  reviewed  the  state  of  cultural  and  educa- 
ional  interchange  since  the  last  Conference  in 
>kyo  two  years  ago  and  agreed  to  a  number  of  rec- 
mmendations  designed  to  deepen  and  widen  mutual 
inderstanding. 


II.  The  Conference  agreed  that  cultural  and  edu- 
cational ties  between  the  two  countries  were  at  the 
heart  of  the  overall  U.S.-Japan  relationship;  that 
the  single  most  effective  means  of  strengthening  that 
already  vigorous  relationship  was  to  further  im- 
prove the  quality  and  variety  of  programs  and  ex- 
changes over  an  increasingly  broad  spectrum  of 
both  societies.  In  this  connection,  the  Conference 
was  stimulated  by  the  CULCON  Symposium  held  in 
New  York  on  May  24-26.  This  Symposium,  held  in 
connection  with  the  Bicentennial,  was  sponsored  by 
the  Japan  Society  in  cooperation  with  the  Inter- 
national House  of  Japan.  Its  purpose  was  to  "ex- 
plore issues  of  significant  concern  to  the  cultures  of 
Japan  and  the  United  States".  Especially  noteworthy 
was  the  Symposium's  success  in  bringing  together 
outstanding  younger  Japanese  and  American  spe- 
cialists for   substantive   discussion. 

III.  The  Conference  agreed  on  the  vital  impor- 
tance of  fostering  dialogue  between  a  wider  spectrum 
of  our  two  societies  and  found  that  the  development 
of  new  intellectual  communities,  based  upon  com- 
mon aspirations,  but  not  necessarily  similar  expe- 
riences, is  worthy  of  pursuit.  In  this  connection, 
it  was  agreed  that  the  1977  Joint  Committee  should 
consider  organizing  in  1978  a  Symposium  or  similar 
event  involving  representatives  from  various  seg- 
ments of  our  two  societies.  It  was  suggested  that 
this  event  should  involve  the  mass  media  in  such 
a  way  as  to  maximize  its  impact  on  both  societies. 

IV.  The  Conference  welcomed  the  establishment  in 
October,  1975  of  the  United  States-Japan  Friend- 
ship Commission  which  now  joins  the  Japan  Founda- 
tion, established  nearly  four  years  ago,  as  a  new 
and  major  contribution  to  expand  cultural  relations 
between  the  two  countries. 

V.  Recognizing  the  need  to  more  fully  utilize  the 
varied  experience  of  its  Panel  members  on  both  sides, 
and  to  plan  future  CULCON  activities  with  a  clearer 
understanding  of  areas  of  cultural  communication 
needing  attention,  the  Conference  agreed  that: 

1.  The  Joint  Committee  on  U.S.-Japan  Cultural 
and  Educational  Cooperation,  meeting  in  the  years 
between  these  biennial  Conferences,  would  set  aside 
time  for  discussion  of  future  developments  in  our 
two  cultures. 

2.  A  survey  would  be  undertaken  in  both  countries 
to  identify  possible  structural  impediments  inhibit- 
ing a  smooth  flow   of  cultural   exchange  and  com- 


'  Paragraph  XII  of  the  communique,  which  in- 
cludes a  list  of  CULCON  delegates  from  the  United 
States  and  Japan,  is  not  printed  here.  Dr.  John  W. 
Hall,  chairman.  Department  of  History,  Yale  Uni- 
versity, was  chairman  of  the  U.S.  panel;  Yoshinori 
Maeda,  former  president  of  and  now  honorary  ad- 
viser to  Nippon  Hoso  Kyokai  (Japan  Broadcasting 
Corp.),  was  chairman  of  the  Japanese  panel.  A  com- 
plete list  of  delegates  was  also  included  in  press  re- 
lease 265  dated  May  24. 


Ilr    uly  12,   1976 


65 


munication,  for  consideration  by  the  1977  Joint  Com- 
mittee meeting. 

VI.  The  Conference,  in  keeping  with  earlier 
CULCON  discussions,  agreed  to  establish  Library 
and  News  Media  Subcommittees  and  to  further  con- 
sider formation  of  a  separate  Television  Cooperation 
Subcommittee. 

VII.  In  order  to  achieve  a  sharper  focus  and  more 
effective  collaboration  by  both  sides,  the  Conference 
agreed  upon  a  "Statement  of  Mission"  for  each  of 
the  Subcommittees,  describing  also  current  areas 
of  emphasis. 

VIII.  Recognizing  the  increasing  exchange  of 
business  and  professional  representatives  between 
the  two  countries,  the  Conference  discussed  the  need 
to  assure  that  in  each  country  there  are  adequate 
programs  providing  training  and  orientation  on  the 
society  and  culture  of  the  other.  Several  reports  de- 
scribing current  programs  in  Japan  and  the  United 
States  were  submitted  to  the  Conference.  The  Con- 
ference expressed  the  hope  that  this  subject  would 
be  considered  at  the  Japan-U.S.  Economic  Council 
meeting  in  Japan  in  June,  1976.  It  offered  to  co- 
operate with  the  Council  in  this  endeavor.  It  further 
agreed  to  discuss  developments  in  this  area  at  the 
1977  meeting  of  the  U.S.-Japan  Joint  Committee  on 
Cultural  and  Educational  Cooperation. 

IX.  In  the  course  of  deliberations  by  various  Sub- 
committees, it  became  clear  that  the  number  of 
translated  works  of  a  literary  and  scholarly  nature 
from  Japanese  into  English  remains  seriously  in- 
adequate. The  Conference  recommended  that  both 
sides  explore  means  of  alleviating  this  situation  on  a 
systematic  basis,  including  the  possible  establish- 
ment of  a  joint  mechanism  to  this  end.  It  was  agreed 
that  progress  in  this  area  would  be  reviewed  at  the 
1977  Joint  Committee  meeting. 

X.  Recognizing  that  eight  years  of  experience  with 
Joint  Committee  activities  has  led  to  certain  minor 
modifications  in  Committee  operations,  and  being 
aware  of  the  need  to  describe  more  clearly  the 
relationship  between  the  Joint  Committee  and 
CULCON  meetings,  the  Conference  recommended 
that  both  governments  clarify  certain  essentially 
administrative  aspects  of  the  1968  Exchange  of 
Notes. 

XI.  The  Conference  considered  a  series  of  topics 
in  the  following  areas  of  specialization: 

A.  American  Studies 

The  Subcommittee  notes  with  deep  regret  the 
passing  of  one  of  its  members  most  fondly  regarded 
in  Japan  and  the  U.S.,  Professor  Norman  Holmes 
Pearson  of  Yale. 

Since  the  1975  Joint  Committee  Meeting,  the 
most  important  single  event  was  the  Bicentennial 
Conference  on  American  Studies  hosted  by  the 
Japanese  Association  for  American  Studies  for  the 
Asia  and  Pacific  area.  From  September  4-7,  1975, 
some  one  hundred  scholars  gathered  in  Fujinomiya 


66 


to  discuss  the  American  Revolution,  the  meaning  of 
America  to  that  portion  of  the  globe,  and  American 
Studies  methods.  Proceedings  have  already  been 
published  in  Japanese  and  at  least  some  of  the 
papers  will  also  appear  in  English. 

The  extraordinary  success  of  that  conference  was 
a  primary  topic  of  the  Subcommittee  as  it  was  con- 
vened in  the  Foreign  Ministry,  Tokyo,  September 
8,  1975.  Other  primary  concerns  were  the  remark- 
able proliferation  of  American  studies  in  Japan,  as 
revealed  by  the  survey  sponsored  by  the  Fulbright 
Commission,  and  the  future  of  the  Kyoto  American 
Studies  Seminar. 

The  Subcommittee  has  concurred  on  a  revised 
statement  of  mission  which  expresses  both  a  theoret- 
ical rationale,  as  well  as  a  sense  of  priority  issues. 

The  Subcommittee  was  pleased  to  have  contributed 
in  some  measure  to  the  Symposium  of  May  24-26, 
1976,  at  Japan  House  in  New  York  City.  We  feel 
that  this  series  of  meetings  confirms  a  direction  of 
interest  the  Committee  has  consistently  sought  to 
encourage:  namely  comparative  study  and  coopera- 
tive projects  involving  groups,  individuals,  and  in- 
stitutions in  the  two  cultures. 

The  Subcommittee,  both  as  a  group  and  as  a 
collection  of  individuals,  has  continued  to  involve  it- 
self in  teaching,  research,  and  publication  which 
bear  on  the  improved  understanding  of  American 
culture  from  the  Japanese  point  of  view  and  which 
elicits    cooperative    efforts    and    comparative    results. 

Reconim  endations  : 

1.  Secure  support  for  the  Kyoto  American  Studies 
Summer  Seminar. 

2.  Achieve  the  translation  into  English  and  publi- 
cation of  Japanese  works  dealing  with  American 
civilization. 

3.  Realize  full  regional  participation  in  Americav 
Studies  International  as  it  endeavors  to  facilitate 
regular  communication  between  non-American 
scholars  in  American  Studies. 

4.  Develop  an  agenda  of  mutual  interests  with 
both  the  Japanese  Studies  and  the  Library  Sub- 
committees. 

B.  Education  for  International  Understanding 

The  Joint  Subcommittee  on  Education  for  Inter- 
national Understanding  developed  a  project  designed 
to  provide  a  framework  of  significant  ideas  pertinent 
to  a  greater  mutual  understanding  of  both  Japan 
and  the  United  States.  The  project  brought  together 
small  teams  from  each  of  these  countries  made  up 
of  educators  and  scholars  from  the  U.S.  and  Japan. 
The  goal  of  the  project  is  to  produce  a  thematic,  con- 
ceptual structure  upon  which  will  be  based  accom- 
panying instructional  materials  that  will  promote 
mutual  understanding  and  awareness  among  Jap- 
anese and  United  States  elementary  and  secondary 
school  teachers  and  students. 

To  achieve  this  end,  a  Meeting  of  Representative 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Experts  on  Education  for  International  Understand- 
ing was  held  in  March,  1975  at  the  East-West 
Center  in  Hawaii.  The  schedule  and  methods  of  im- 
plementing the  proposed  three-year  joint  project 
were  discussed.  Subsequently,  the  Phase  I  (Japanese- 
American  joint  workshop  in  the  summer  of  1975  in 
Hawaii)  and  the  Phase  II  (field  research  in  each 
other's  country)  were  undertaken.  Each  team  is 
currently  preparing  a  report  on  the  findings. 

In  the  summer  of  1976,  a  workshop  will  be  held 
at  Duke  University  (North  Carolina)  where  the 
experts  of  the  two  countries  will  review  the  first 
drafts  and  prepare  final  versions  of  materials  for 
use  in  schools. 

The  joint  project,  which  has  thus  far  been  suc- 
cessfully implemented,  has  achieved,  among  others, 
the  following  two  objectives:  (1)  A  teachers'  manual 
and  resource  materials,  the  first  of  this  kind  to 
better  understand  each  other's  country,  are  cur- 
rently being  developed  in  Japan  and  the  United 
States  respectively;  and  (2)  The  project  has  greatly 
stimulated  interest  in  the  need  for  understanding 
each  other's  country,  while  concurrently  marking 
great  progress  in  developing  specific  ways  and 
means  both  in  research  and  training. 
it 
litll  Recommendations: 

1.  This  three-year  project  should  be  regarded  as 
only  a  beginning  for  a  long-range  project  in  this 
kind  of  effort.  Thus,  it  is  of  utmost  importance  to 
capitalize  on  the  achievements  of  this  project  and 
to  undertake  further  practical  research  in  each  of 
the  two  countries  on  several  important  problems 
which  have  been  identified  in  the  present  on-going 
research  project.  In  relation  to  this,  a  new  program 
should  be  considered  jointly  and/or  in  each  country 
promoting  education  for  mutual  understanding 
between  the  two  peoples.  It  is  hoped  that  feasibility 
of  the  following  projects  will  be  considered  in  this  re- 
gard: (a)  The  Japanese  side  would  inventory  ex- 
isting programs  of  educational  materials  develop- 
ment in  Japan  as  a  basis  for  possible  joint  efforts  in 
making  selections  for  use  in  promoting  international 
understanding  in  the  American  educational  system; 
and  (b)  Establish  effective  ways  to  expand  and  im- 
prove the  exchange  of  teachers,  students  (especially 
those  of  teachers'  colleges),  teachers'  education,  and 
educational  administrators;  also,  to  prepare  adequate 
facilities  for  hosting  visitors  to  each  other's  country. 
2.  Based  upon  the  significant  progress  achieved 
by  the  cooperative  effort  of  the  Joint  Education 
Subcommittee  to  date,  it  is  hoped  that  the  natural 
relevance  of  the  follow-up  activities  proposed  for  the 
future  would  lead  to  positive  consideration  by  various 
organizations  whose  financial  assistance  might  be 
required. 

C.  Japanese  Studies 

Responding  to  an  invitation  extended  at  the  meet- 
ing of  the  Joint  Committee  in  Hawaii  last  summer. 


the  Japanese  Government  sent  a  high  level  Survey 
Mission  to  the  United  States  for  a  three-week  period 
this  Spring  to  study  and  report  on  the  state  of 
Japanese  studies  in  America.  Some  six  organizations 
and  twenty-four  universities  were  visited. 

Parallel  with  this  Mission,  the  American  Japanese 
Studies  Subcommittee  commissioned  a  questionnaire 
which  was  sent  to  all  institutions  known  to  be 
engaged  in  Japanese  studies  in  the  United  States. 
An  interim  draft  of  their  findings  was  made  avail- 
able to  the  Survey  Team. 

The  analysis  of  data  and  the  sorting  out  of  im- 
pressions is  still  in  progress,  but  preliminary  reports 
of  both  surveys  were  presented  at  CULCON  VIII. 
That  the  area  of  Japanese  studies  had  expanded 
significantly  was  obvious.  Over  the  past  five  years, 
while  American  higher  education  generally  registered 
a  growth  of  enrollment  of  only  14  percent,  Jap- 
anese language  course  enrollments,  for  example, 
have  gone  up  three  fold;  and  the  number  of  Ameri- 
can institutions  offering  courses  on  Japan  has 
climbed  over  the  same  period  by  40  percent  to  reach 
nearly  200. 

On  the  other  hand,  even  a  preliminary  analysis 
of  findings  reveals  a  number  of  problem  areas. 
Attention  must  be  given  to:  (1)  Assisting  institu- 
tions with  minimal  Japanese  programs;  (2)  Ex- 
panding Japanese  language  libraries;  (3)  The  im- 
provement of  Japanese  language  instruction;  (4) 
Checking  the  erosion  of  interest  in  the  social 
sciences;  (5)  Supporting  publications  of  research 
finds;  and  (6)  The  more  effective  introduction  of 
Japanese  studies  into  the  secondary  school  system 
and  also  institutions  training  practitioners  in  busi- 
ness, law,  journalism,  education  and  other  profes- 
sions. 

Recommendations : 

1.  Each  Subcommittee  should  revise  its  draft 
report  for  wider  distribution.  Thereafter,  both  Sub- 
committees might  consider  singularly  and  together 
what  steps  and  priorities  should  be  taken  to  advance 
Japanese  studies  in  America.  The  two  Subcom- 
mittees have,  however,  already  identified  certain 
areas  for  future  attention.  These  areas  include:  (a) 
The  identification  of  abstracting,  translating  and 
other  services  needed  to  improve  the  accessibility 
in  the  United  States  of  the  products  of  Japanese 
scholarship;  (b)  The  determination  of  how  Japa- 
nese studies  can  more  effectively  be  integrated  into 
the  education  of  businessmen,  lawyers,  journalists, 
secondary  school  educators  and  other  professionals 
in  the  United  States;  and  (c)  The  study  of  the 
adequacy  of  facilities  in  Japan  for  visiting  American 
students,  researchers  and  teachers. 

2.  In  areas  of  overlapping  concern,  the  Subcom- 
mittee looks  forward  to  close  cooperation  with  the 
American  Studies,  Library  and  other  CULCON 
Subcommittees. 

3.  The  need  is  recognized  to  expand  joint  research 


July   12,    1976 


67 


activities  and  stabilize  their  financing,  particularly 
through  the  program  recommended  earlier  to  the 
Japan  Society  for  the  Promotion  of  Science  and  the 
Social  Science  Research  Council  and  American  Coun- 
cil of  Learned  Societies,  and  the  two  Subcommittees 
have  agreed  to  include  concern  for  such  joint 
research  as  an  ongoing  part  of  their  responsibilities. 

D.  Library 

The  Joint  Committee  on  U.S.-Japan  Cultural  and 
Educational  Cooperation  meeting  in  Hawaii,  June 
21-23,  1975,  recommended  inter  alia  the  establish- 
ment of  a  Library  Subcommittee  "to  improve  access 
of  Japanese  to  American  material  and  American 
access  to  Japanese  materials",  and  suggested  that 
the  Subcommittee,  when  established,  should  main- 
tain close  liaison  with  other  CULCON  Subcommit- 
tees in  the  formulation  and  implementation  of 
Library  programs. 

A  joint  preparatory  conference,  held  in  Kyoto 
on  October  27,  1975,  discussed  the  following  general 
areas  of  possible  activity  though  without  agree- 
ment on  priorities:  (1)  Interchange  of  personnel 
and  publications;  (2)  Inter-library  cooperation;  (3) 
Japan  documentation  center/ American  documenta- 
tion centers;  (4)  Specialized  bibliographies;  and  (5) 
Other  areas  of  binational  cooperation  in  library 
and  information  science. 

In  a  subsequent  exchange  of  views,  a  statement 
of  mission  and  functions  was  agreed  upon  incorporat- 
ing the  following  points:  (1)  The  basic  mission 
should  be  to  strengthen  mutual  understanding 
through  encouragement  of  improved  library  services 
relating  to  the  two  countries;  and  (2)  The  basic 
functions  should  include  improving  access  to  library 
materials,  assisting  in  the  development  of  quality 
collections  for  the  study  of  Japan  and  the  U.S., 
encouraging  the  exchange  of  professional  ideas,  in- 
formation, and  library  materials,  and  the  publica- 
tion of  specialized  bibliographies. 

Recommendations  : 

1.  The  Library  Subcommittees,  working  closely 
with  other  CULCON  Subcommittees,  and  other  ex- 
isting organizations  and  committees  in  both  coun- 
tries, should  seek  to  accomplish  the  above  stated 
mission. 

2.  The  question  of  current  emphases  should  be 
determined  after  further  study  by  the  Subcommit- 
tees, in  consultation  with  each  other.  This  process 
should  take  into  consideration  special  needs  as 
identified  and  expressed  by  interested  parties  inside 
and  outside  CULCON,  and  be  carried  out  in  full 
awareness  that  unique  library  and  information  needs 
in  the  two  countries  require  differing  responses  as 
appropriate. 


68 


E.  Museum 

The  Subcommittee  on  Museum  Exchange  is  pleased 
with  the  progress  made  since  CULCON  VII.  Tangible 
evidence  of  this  progress  is  found  in  these  specific 
activities:  (1)  The  Japan  Bicentennial  exhibition  of 
"Collected  Masterworks  from  Art  Museums  of  the 
United  States",  now  being  developed  under  the 
leadership  of  the  Cleveland  Museum  of  Art  with  the 
important  cooperation  of  the  Agency  for  Cultural 
Affairs  in  Japan;  (2)  The  first  meeting  of  the  study 
group  on  the  care  of  works  of  art  in  traveling 
exhibitions  and  the  drafting  of  a  tentative  report; 
(3)  The  enactment  by  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States  (and  signed  into  law  by  the  President  of  the 
United  States)  of  legislation  providing  a  program 
of  insurance  for  art  exhibitions  brought  to  the 
United  States  and  for  exhibitions  from  the  United 
States  under  certain  conditions;  (4)  The  increase 
in  the  number  of  one-man  shows  and  smaller  ex- 
hibitions being  exchanged  by  both  nations;  and  (5) 
The  plans  now  under  development  for  further  ex- 
changes in  the  months  and  years  ahead. 

While  much  remains  to  be  done  to  encourage  the 
continued  growth  of  museum  exchange  programs 
between  the  two  countries,  the  progress  is  pleasing, 
substantial,  and  the  projects  encouraging. 

Recommendations : 

1.  Implementation  of  the  major  Bicentennial  ex- 
hibition in  Tokyo. 

2.  Development  and  implementation  of  the  Shinto 
art  exhibition  which  will  be  sponsored  in  the  United 
States  by  the  Japan  Society  and  the  Seattle  Museum. 

3.  Finalization  of  the  report  from  the  study  group 
on  the  care  of  works  of  art  in  traveling  exhibi- 
tions. This  may  require  a  second  meeting  to  re- 
solve outstanding  issues.  After  this  adjustment  is 
achieved,  the  results  should  be  widely  disseminated 
to   institutions   in   both   nations. 

4.  Encouragement  of  an  expanded  program  of 
museum  exchanges  between  the  two  countries  and 
a   monitoring   of   such   activities. 

F.  News  Media 

Following  discussions  at  the  Joint  Committee  Meet- 
ing in  Hawaii  in  June  1975,  thorough  considera- 
tion has  been  given  to  the  formal  establishment  of  a 
joint  Subcommittee  in  the  News   Media  area. 

The  exchange  of  journalists  has  continued  to  move 
forward  with  the  realization  of  the  fifth  meeting  of 
Japanese-American  Editors,  as  sponsored  by  the 
International  Press  Institute,  which  was  held  in 
November,   1975  at  Wingspread,  Wisconsin. 

Finally,  it  was  noted  that  a  limited  number  of 
U.S.  news  editors  took  advantage  of  the  exchange 
program  with  visits  in  Japan   in   March,   1975  and 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


that  a  group  of  Japanese  news  editors  came  to  the 
United  States  for  the  counterpart  orientation  pro- 
gram  in   November,   1975. 

Recommendations  : 

1.  Members  of  the  Subcommittee  should  periodi- 
cally assess  the  various  exchange  programs  con- 
cerned with  the  media,  with  a  view  toward  the  im- 
provement and  expansion  of  these  programs,  both 
in  intensity  and  scope  and  degree  of  coverage. 

2.  Full  utilization  be  made  of  The  Japan  Foreign 
Press  Center  which  is  scheduled  to  be  opened  this 
coming  October  in  Tokyo's  Nippon  Press  Center. 
This  institution  will  assist  the  news  gathering 
activities  of  correspondents  from  all  countries. 

G.  Television 

The  third  U.S.-Japan  Television  Program  Festival 
was  held  in  Washington,  D.C.  in  conjunction  with 
the  51st  National  Convention  of  the  National  Associ- 
ation of  Educational  Broadcasters  from  November 
16th  to  19th.  A  Japanese  delegation  of  15  television 
executives  attended  the  Festival  and  also  participated 
in  the  Fourth  U.S.-Japan  Broadcasting  Executives' 
Joint  Conference  on  November  21  in  New  York  at 
Japan  House. 

Fifteen  sister-station  relationships,  six  of  which 
had  been  newly  realized  since  the  last  Joint  Com- 
mittee meeting,  have  been  established.  It  was  agreed 
to  work  toward  the  regular  publication  of  a  news- 
letter dealing  with   sister-station   activities. 

During  the  past  year,  PBS  [Public  Broadcasting 
Service]  broadcast  the  60-minute  program  "Tenno", 
produced  by  the  BPCJ  [Broadcast  Programming 
Center  of  Japan]  for  the  Japan  Foundation.  It  was 
broadcast  on  the  eve  of  the  Emperor's  arrival.  The 
jlj  series  entitled  "The  Japanese  Film"  has  been  dis- 
(  tributed  nationally  by  PBS  for  a  second  time  in 
the  winter  of  1976.  The  series  "Journey  to  Japan" 
was  rebroadcast  for  in-school  use  in  the  fall  as  well. 

The  production  of  the  TV  "Japan  Study  Course" 
by  University  of  Mid-America  has  progressed  with 
jthe  cooperation  of  the  Hoso  Bunka  Foundation,  the 
jJapan  Foundation,  NHK  [Nippon  Hoso  Kyokai 
(Japan  Broadcasting  Corp.)]  and  commercial  sta- 
tions. By  March,  1976,  six  pilot  programs  (30 
minutes  each)  were  completed,  and  the  American 
production  team  visited  Japan  two  times  to  col- 
lect materials.  This  series  is  expected  to  be  com- 
pleted   early   next   year. 

Recommendations  : 

1.  The  establishment  of  a  Japanese  Subcommittee 
similar  to  the  existing  American  Subcommittee  will 
De  considered  after  consultation  with  the  Broadcast 
Programming    Center   of   Japan    (BPCJ),    the   Jap- 


luly  12,   1976 


anese    Secretariat   for   Television    Cooperation   which 
has  been  functioning  as  a  Subcommittee. 

2.  For  the  Fourth  Television  Program  Festival, 
representatives  of  the  country  in  which  program.s 
are  intended  to  be  shown  should  be  involved  in  a 
pre-screening  of  programs.  This  pre-screening  would 
be  for  the  purpose  of  giving  suggestions  and  advis- 
ing on  the  most  suitable  American  and  Japanese 
programs  to  be  shown  at  the  Festival. 

3.  During  the  Fourth  Festival,  further  exploration 
of  issues  related  to  the  professional  concerns  of  tele- 
vision executives  could  be  made.  In  this  respect,  dis- 
cussion of  news  presentations  and  visits  to  experi- 
mental television  laboratories  might  be  of  interest 
and  stimulate  further  exchange. 

4.  Time  should  be  allocated  during  the  Fourth 
Festival  for  visits  to  sister-stations  by  the  American 
broadcasters  to  continue  and  further  cultural  ex- 
changes. 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


Coffee 

International   coffee   agreement    1976,   with   annexes. 
Done  at  London  December  3,  1975.' 
Signature:  Papua  New  Guinea.  June  10,  1976. 

Economic  Cooperation 

Agreement  establishing  a  financial   support  fund   of 
the    Organization    for    Economic    Cooperation    and 
Development.   Done   at   Paris   April   9,   1975." 
Ratification  deposited:  Iceland,  June  15,  1976. 

Maritime  Matters 

Convention   on  facilitation  of  international   maritime 
traffic,  with  annex.  Done  at  London  April  9,  1965. 
Entered  into  force  March  5,  1967;  for  the  United 
States  May  16,  1967.  TIAS  6251. 
Accession  deposited:  India,  May  25,   1976. 

Ocean  Dumping 

Convention  on  the  prevention  of  marine  pollution  by 
dumping  of  wastes  and  other  matter,  with  annexes. 


'  Not  in  force. 


69 


Done  at  London,  Mexico  City,  Moscow,  and  Wash- 
ington   December    29,    1972.    Entered     into    force 
August  30,  1975.  TIAS  8165. 
Accession  deposited:  Yugoslavia,  June  25,  1976. 

Property — Intellectual 

Convention  establishing  the  World  Intellectual  Prop- 
erty   Organization.    Done    at    Stockholm    July    14, 
1967.   Entered  into   force   April   26,   1970;   for   the 
United  States  August  25,  1970.  TIAS  6932. 
Accession  deposited:  Qatar,  June  3,  1976. 

Slave  Trade 

Convention  to  suppress  the  slave  trade  and  slavery. 
Concluded  at  Geneva  September  25,  1926.  Entered 
into  force  March  9,  1927;  for  the  United  States 
March  21,  1929.  TS  778. 

Notification    of    succession:    Bahamas,    June    10, 
1976. 

Protocol  amending  the  slavery  convention  signed  at 
Geneva  on  September  25,  1926,  and  annex.  Done  at 
New  York  December  7,  1953.  Entered  into  force 
December  7,  1953,  for  the  protocol;  July  7,  1955, 
for  the  annex  to  protocol;  for  the  United  States 
March  7,  1956.  TIAS  3532. 

Notification    of    succession:    Bahamas,    June    10. 
1976. 

Slavery 

Supplementary  convention  on  the  abolition  of  slavery, 
the  slave  trade  and  institutions  and  practices 
similar  to  slavery.  Done  at  Geneva  September  7, 
1956.  Entered  into  force  April  30,  1957;  for  the 
United  States  December  6,  1967.  TIAS  6418. 
Notification  of  succession:  Bahamas,  June  10, 
1976. 

Space 

Convention  on  registration  of  objects  launched  into 
outer  space.  Opened  for  signature  at  New  York 
January  14,  1975.' 

Senate   advice   and   consent   to   ratification:   June 
21,  1976. 

Telecommunications 

International  telecommunication  convention,  with 
annexes  and  protocols.  Done  at  Malaga-Torre- 
molinos  October  25,  1973.  Entered  into  force  Jan- 
uary 1,  1975;  for  the  United  States  April  7,  1976 
Ratifications  deposited:  Bangladesh,  April  6 
1976;=   Madagascar,   March    17,    1976. 

Partial  revision  of  the  radio  regulations,  Geneva 
1959,  as  amended  (TIAS  4893,  5603,  6332,  6590^ 
7435),  to  establish  a  new  frequency  allotment 
plan  for  high-frequency  radiotelephone  coast  sta 
tions,  with  annexes  and  final  protocol.  Done  at 
Geneva  June  8,  1974.  Entered  into  force  Janu 
ary  1,  1976.= 

Notifications  of  approval:  Iraq,   March  8,   1976; 
Tanzania,  March  15,  1976. 


Tin 

Fifth    international    tin    agreement,    with    annexes. 

Done  at  Geneva  June  21,  1975.' 

Signatures:  Nigeria,  April  22,  1976;  Union  of 
Soviet  Socialist  Republics,  April  23,  1976;  * 
Belgium,  Luxembourg,  Netherlands,  April  26, 
1976;  Czechoslovakia,'  Yugoslavia,  April  27, 
1976;    Australia,    Ireland,   April    28,   1976. 

Accepta7ice  deposited:  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist 
Republics,  June  11,  1976. 

Trade 

Declaration  on  the  provisional  accession  of  Colombia 
to  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade. 
Done  at  Geneva  July  23,  1975.  Entered  into  force 
January  22,  1976;  for  the  United  States  May  1, 
1976. 
Acceptances   deposited:    Egypt,    March    17,    1976; 

Poland,   April   20,    1976;    Chile,   April   28,    1976; 

Nicaragua,  May  11,  1976. 
Tenth  proces-verbal  extending  the  declaration  on 
the  provisional  accession  of  Tunisia  to  the  Gen- 
era! Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade.  Done  at 
Geneva  November  21,  1975.  Entered  into  force 
January  8,  1976;  for  the  United  States  January 
19,  1976. 
Acceptances   deposited:    Egypt,    March    17,    1976; 

India,  March  18,  1976;  Poland,  April  20,  1976. 

Wheat 

Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the 
wheat  trade  convention  (part  of  the  international 
wheat  agreement)  1971  (TIAS  7144,  8227).  Done 
at  Washington  March  25,  1975.  Entered  into  force 
June  19,  1975,  with  respect  to  certain  provisions, 
and  July  1,  1975,  with  respect  to  other  provisions. 
Accession  deposited:  Ireland,  June  24,  1976. 

Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the  food 
aid  convention  (part  of  the  international  wheat 
agreement)  1971  (TIAS  7144,  8227).  Done  at 
Washington  March  25,  1975.  Entered  into  force 
June  19,  1975,  with  respect  to  certain  provisions, 
and  July  1,  1975,  with  respect  to  other  provisions. 
Accession  deposited:  Ireland,  June  24,  1976. 

Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the  wheat 
trade  convention  (part  of  the  international  wheat 
agreement)  1971  (TIAS  7144,  8227).  Done  at 
Washington  March  17,  1976.  Entered  into  force 
June  19,  1976,  with  respect  to  certain  provisions, 
and  July  1,  1976,  with  respect  to  other  provisions. 
Declarations  of  provisional  application  deposited: 
Guatemala,  June  15,  1976;  Costa  Rica,  June  23, 
1976. 


'  Not  in  force. 

-  With   reservation. 

'  Not  in  force  for  the  United  States. 

'  With  declarations. 


70 


Department  of  State  Bulletin! 


forte 


White  Slave  Traffic 

Agreement  for  the  suppression  of  the  white  slave 
traffic.  Signed  at  Paris  May  18,  1904.  Entered  into 
force  July  18,  1905;  for  the  United  States  June  6, 
1908.  35  Stat.   1979. 

Notification    of    succession :    Bahamas,    June    10, 
1976. 

Protocol  amending  the  international  agreement  for 
the  suppression  of  the  white  slave  traffic,  signed 
at  Paris  IMay  18,  1904,  and  the  international  con- 
vention for  the  suppression  of  the  white  slave 
traffic  signed  at  Paris  May  4,  1910.  Done  at  Lake 
Success  May  4,  1949.  Entered  into  force  May  4, 
1949;  for  the  United  States  August  14,  1950. 
TIAS  2332. 

Notification    of    succession :    Bahamas,    June    10 
1976. 


BILATERAL 


Brazil 

Joint  communique  relating  to  trade,  investment,  and 
financial  matters.  Issued  at  Brasilia  May  11,  1976. 
Entered  into  force  May  11,  1976. 

Egypt 

Loan  agreement  to  assist  Egypt  to  increase  its  in- 
dustrial and  agricultural  production.  Signed  at 
Cairo  May  22,  1976.  Entered  into  force  May  22, 
1976. 

Ethiopia 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities. 
Signed  at  Addis  Ababa  June  15,  1976.  Entered 
into  force  June  15,  1976. 

Honduras 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities, 
relating  to  the  agreement  of  March  5,  1975  (TIAS 
8037).  Signed  at  Tegucigalpa  June  9,  1976.  En- 
tered  into  force  June  9,   1976. 

Italy 

Agreement  relating  to  the  provision  of  assistance 
to  earthquake  victims  of  Italy.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Rome  June  9,  1976.  Entered 
into  force  June  9,  1976. 

Japan 

Agreement  relating  to  the  limitation  of  imports  of 
specialty  steel  from  Japan,  with  annexes,  related 
note,  and  agreed  minutes.  Effected  by  exchange 
of  notes  at  Washington  June  11,  1976.  Entered 
into  force  June  11,  1976. 

Republic  of  Korea 

Convention  for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxation  and 
the   prevention    of   fiscal   evasion    with    respect    to 


taxes  on  income  and  the  encouragement  of  inter- 
national trade  and  investment,  with  related  notes. 
Signed  at  Seoul  June  4,  1976.  Enters  into  force 
30  days  following  the  exchange  of  ratifications. 

Lebanon 

Agreement  extending  the  air  transport  agreement 
of  September  1,  1972  (TIAS  7546),  subject  to  cer- 
tain understandings.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Beirut  and  Washington  March  29,  May  18 
and  25,  1976.  Entered  into  force  May  25,  1976. 

Mauritania 

Agreement  relating  to  the  transfer  of  agricultural 
commodities  to  Mauritania  to  assist  in  alleviating 
the  shortage  caused  by  prolonged  drought.  Signed 
at  Nouakchott  May  28,  1976.  Entered  into  force 
May  28,  1976. 

Niger 

Agreement  relating  to  the  transfer  of  food  grains 
to  Niger  to  assist  in  alleviating  the  shortage 
caused  by  prolonged  drought.  Signed  at  Niamey 
February  7,  1976.  Entered  into  force  February  7, 
1976. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  February  7, 
1976,  relating  to  the  transfer  of  food  grains  to 
Niger  to  assist  in  alleviating  the  shortage  caused 
by  prolonged  drought.  Signed  at  Niamey  April 
28,  1976.  Entered  into  force  April  28,  1976. 

Philippines 

Agreement  relating  to  the  continuation  of  medical 
and  scientific  research  projects  conducted  in  the 
Philippines  by  the  United  States  Medical  Re- 
search Unit-Two  (NAMRU-2).  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Manila  May  12  and  21,  1976. 
Entered  into  force  May  21,  1976. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  April  4, 
1974  (TIAS  7814),  relating  to  the  use  of  the  Vet- 
eran's Memorial  Hospital  and  the  provision  of 
medical  care  and  treatment  and  nursing  home 
care  of  veterans  by  the  Philippines  and  the  fur- 
nishing of  grants-in-aid  by  the  United  States. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Manila  May  12 
and  21,  1976.  Entered  into  force  May  21,  1976. 

Portugal 

Loan     agreement    relating    to  M48A5  tanks    and 

M113A1    armored    personnel  carriers.  Signed    at 

Washington  June  11,  1976.  Entered  into  force 
June  11,  1976. 

Spain 

Supplementary  treaty  on  extradition.  Signed  at 
Madrid  January  25,  1975.' 

Senate   advice   and   consent   to  ratification:   June 
21,  1976. 


'  Not  in  force. 


JJuly   12,    1976 


71 


Treaty  of  friendship  and  cooperation,  with  related 
notes  and  supplementary  agreements.  Signed  at 
Madrid  January  24,  1976/ 

Senate   advice   and   consent   to  ratification:   June 
21,  1976,  with  declaration. 

Switzerland 

Treaty    on    mutual    assistance    in    criminal    matters 
with  related  notes.  Signed  at  Bern  May  25,  1973.' 
Senate   advice   and   consent   to   ratification:   June 
21,   1976. 

United  Kingdom 

Extradition  treaty,  with  schedule,  protocol  of  signa- 
ture, and  exchange  of  notes.  Signed  at  London 
June  8,  1972.^ 

Senate   advice   and   consent   to   ratification:   June 
21,  1976. 


Not  in  force. 


PUBLICATIONS 


GPO  Sales  Publications 

Publications  may  be  ordered  by  catalog  or  stock 
number  from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Gover7iment  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 
A  25-percent  discount  is  made  on  orders  for  100  or 
more  copies  of  any  one  publication  mailed  to  the 
same  address.  Remittances,  payable  to  the  Superin- 
tendent of  Documents,  must  accompany  orders. 
Prices  shown  below,  ivhich  include  domestic  postage, 
are  subject  to  change. 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  the  Polish 

People's  Republic.  TIAS  8164.   5  pp.   35<f.    (Cat.  No. 

89.10:8164). 

Prevention    of    Marine    Pollution.    Convention    with 

Other  Governments.   TIAS   8165.  83  pp.  $1.35.    (Cat. 

No.  S9.10:8165). 

Development  of  Agricultural  Trade.  Protocol  with  the 

Socialist  Republic  of  Romania.  TIAS  8167.  12  pp.  35(f. 

(Cat.  No.  S9.10:8167). 

Cultural  Relations.  Agreement  with  the  United  King- 
dom of  Great  Britain  and  Northern  Ireland.  TIAS 
8168.  5  pp.  35<t.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:8168). 

Suez  Canal — Clearance  of  Mines  and  Unexploded 
Ordnance.  Arrangement  with  Egypt  amending  the 
arrangement  of  April  13  and  25,  1974.  TIAS  8169. 
6  pp.  35(>.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:8169). 

Trade  in  Cotton,  Wool  and  Man-Made  Fiber  Textiles 
and  Textile  Products.  TIAS  8179.  18  pp.  35(f.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:8170). 


72 


Checklist  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  June  21-27 

Press    releases    may   be    obtained   from    the 
Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 
Mo.       Date  SnbjMt 

t311    6/21    Kissinger:    OECD,   Paris. 
*313    6/21     Habib:     remarks    at    funeral    of 
Ambassador   Meloy   and   Robert 
0.  Waring,  National  Cathedral, 
Washington. 
*314    6/21    Kissinger:       remarks       following 
meetmg       with       President      of 
France,  Paris. 
*315     6/22     Kissinger,     Valeriani:     interview, 

Paris. 
*316     6/22     Kissinger:  remarks  with  CBS  cor- 
respondent, Paris,  June  21. 
t317     6/22     Kissinger:  news  conference,  Paris. 
*gi8     6/22     Harry  W.   Schlaudeman  sworn  in 
as  Assistant  Secretary  for  Inter- 
American     Affairs      (biographic 
data). 
*319     6/23     Government    Advisory    Committee 
on    International    Book    and    Li- 
brary Programs,  July  29. 
*320     6/23     Study    Group   6    of   the    U.S.    Na- 
tional Committee  for  the  Inter- 
national      Radio       Consultative 
Committee,  Boulder,  Colo.,  July 
14. 
*321     6/23     Advisory  Committee  for  U.S.  Par- 
ticipation   in    the    U.N.    Confer- 
ence     on      Human      Settlements 
(Habitat),  July  13. 
t322     6/22     U.S.       announces       intention       to 

withdraw  from  ICNAF. 
*323     6/23     Kissinger:        remarks       following 
meeting  with  Prime  Minister  of 
France,  Paris. 
*324     6/23     New   directorate   for  international 
women's     programs     established 
in  Bureau  of  International  Orga- 
nization Affairs. 
*'325     6/23     Kissinger:        remarks       following 
meeting  with  Prime  Minister  of 
South  Africa,  Grafenau,  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany. 
*326     6/24     U.S.-Indonesian    consultations    be- 
gin June  25. 
t327     6/24     Kissinger,     Genscher:     news    con- 
ference, Munich. 
t329     6/25     Kissinger:    International    Institute 

for   Strategic    Studies,    London. 
1330     6/25     U.S.     and     Federal     Republic     of 
Germany  sign  antitrust  coopera- 
tion agreement,  June  23. 
*331     6/25     Shipping   Coordinating   Committee 

(SCO,  July  26. 
*'332  6/25  U.S.  National  Committee  for  the 
International  Telegraph  and 
Telephone  Consultative  Commit- 
tee Study  Group  5,  July  21. 
*333  6/25  sec  Subcommittee  on  Safety  of 
Life  at  Sea,  working  group  on 
bulk  chemicals,  July  21. 

^'Not  printed. 

t  Held  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


INDEX       July  12,  1976       Vol.  LXXV,  No.  19SS 


Africa.  Secretary  Kissinger  Reports  to  Con- 
gress on  His  Visits  to  Latin  America,  West- 
ern Europe,  and  Africa 41 

Congress 

Congress  Asked  To  Approve  Defense  Coopera- 
tion Agreement  With  Turkey  (message  from 
President   Ford) 60 

Department  Discusses  Allegations  of  Commu- 
nist Influence  in  Certain  Western  Hemi- 
sphere  Countries    (Luers) 49 

Fourth  Progress  Report  on  Cyprus  Submitted 
to  the  Congress  (message  from  President 
Ford) 62 

Secretary  Kissinger  Reports  to  Congress  on 
His  Visits  to  Latin  America,  Western  Eu- 
rope, and  Africa 41 

Cuba.  Department  Discusses  Allegations  of 
Communist  Influence  in  Certain  Western 
Hemisphere  Countries   (Luers) 49 

Cyprus 

Fourth  Progress  Report  on  Cyprus  Submitted 
to  the  Congress  (message  from  President 
Ford) 62 

U.N.  Force  in  Cyprus  Extended  for  Six  Months 

(Sherer,    text    of    resolution) 63 

Economic  Affairs.  U.S.  Declaration  on  Official 

Support  for  Export  Credits   Issued   (text)    .         48 

Educational  and  Cultural  Affairs.  U.S.-Japan 
Cultural  Conference  Holds  Eighth  Meeting 
(communique) 65 

Europe.  Secretary  Kissinger  Reports  to  Con- 
gress on  His  Visits  to  Latin  America,  West- 
ern Europe,   and   Africa 41 

Guyana.  Department  Discusses  Allegations  of 
Communist  Influence  in  Certain  Western 
Hemisphere    Countries    (Luers) 49 

Jamaica.  Department  Discusses  Allegations  of 
Communist  Influence  in  Certain  Western 
Hemisphere    Countries    (Luers) 49 

Japan.  U.S.-Japan  Cultural  Conference  Holds 
Eighth    Meeting    (communique) 65 

Latin  America 

Department  Discusses  Allegations  of  Commu- 
nist Influence  in  Certain  Western  Hemi- 
sphere   Countries    (Luers) 49 

Secretary  Kissinger  Reports  to  Congress  on 
His  Visits  to  Latin  America,  Western  Eu- 
rope,   and    Africa 41 


Mexico.  Department  Discusses  Allegations  of 
Communist  Influence  in  Certain  Western 
Hemisphere    Countries    (Luers) 49 

Military  Affairs.  Congress  Asked  To  Approve 
Defense  Cooperation  Agreement  With  Tur- 
key   (message   from   President  Ford)    ...         60 

Panama.  Department  Discusses  Allegations  of 
Communist  Influence  in  Certain  Western 
Hemisphere    Countries    (Luers) 49 

Peru.  Department  Discusses  Allegations  of 
Communist  Influence  in  Certain  Western 
Hemisphere    Countries    (Luers) 49 

Presidential  Documents 

Congress  Asked  To  Approve  Defense  Coopera- 
tion Agreement  With  Turkey 60 

Fourth  Progress  Report  on  Cyprus  Submitted 
to   the   Congress 62 

Publications.    GPO    Sales    Publications    ...        72 

South  Africa.  U.S.  Joins  Security  Council  Con- 
sensus on  Resolution  on  South  Africa 
(Sherer,   text   of   resolution) 59 

Trade.    U.S.    Declaration    on    Official    Support 

for   Export   Credits    Issued    (text)    ....        48 
Treaty  Information 

Congress  Asked  To  Approve  Defense  Coopera- 
tion Agreement  With  Turkey  (message  from 
President    Ford) 60 

Current  Actions 69 

Turkey.  Congress  Asked  To  Approve  Defense 
Cooperation  Agreement  With  Turkey  (mes- 
sage from  President  Ford) 60 

U.S.S.R.  Department  Discusses  Allegations  of 
Communist  Influence  in  Certain  Western 
Hemisphere    Countries    (Luers) 49 

United  Nations 

U.N.  Force  in  Cyprus  Extended  for  Six  Months 

(Sherer,    text    of    resolution) 63 

U.S.  Joins  Security  Council  Consensus  on 
Resolution  on  South  Africa  (Sherer,  text 
of   resolution) 59 

Name  Index 

Ford,    President 60,  62 

Kissinger,    Secretary 41 

Luers,   William    H 49 

Sherer,    Albert   W.,   Jr 59,  68 


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THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 

BULLETIN 


Volume  LXXV 


No.  1934 


July  19,  1976 


THE  COHESION  OF  THE  INDUSTRIAL  DEMOCRACIES: 
THE  PRECONDITION  OF  GLOBAL  PROGRESS 

Statement  by  Secretary  Kissinger  and  Text  of  the  OECD  Declaration 
on  International  Investment  and  Multinational  CorTporations     73 

SECRETARY  KISSINGER'S  NEWS  CONFERENCE  AT  PARIS  JUNE  22     89 


THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 

For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


I 

THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE  BULLETIN 


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agement and  Budget  through  January  31.  1981. 
Note:  Contents  of  this  publication  are  not 
copyrighted  and  items  contained  herein  may  be 
reprinted.  Citation  of  the  DEPARTMENT  OF 
STATE  BULLETIN  as  the  source  will  be 
appreciated.  The  BULLETIN  is  indexed  in 
the    Readers'    Guide   to    Periodical    Literature. 


Vol.  LXXV,  No.  1934 
July  19,  1976 

The  Department  of  State  BVLLETIS 
a    weekly   publication    issued   by   th 
Office   of  Media   Services,   Bureau  c 
Public  Affairs,  provides  tite  public  an 
interested  agencies  of  tfte  governmen 
witlt  information  on  developments  i 
tfte  field  of  U.S.  foreign  relations  an 
on  tfte  worfc  of  tfte  Department  an 
tfte  Foreign  Service. 
Tfte     BULLETIN     includes     selectt 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy,  issm 
by  tfte  Wftite  House  and  tfte  Depar 
ment,     and     statements,     addresst 
and  neiBS  conferences  of  tfte  Presidei 
and  tite  Secretary  of  State  and  otfii 
officers  of  tfte  Department,  as  well  i 
special  articles  on  various  pitases  • 
international  affairs  and  tfte  functio) 
of    tfte    Department.     Information 
included  concerning  treaties  and  inte 
national    agreements    to    wfticfi    ii 
United   States   is   or   may   become 
party  and  on  treaties  of  general  inte 
national  interest. 
Publications    of    tfte    Department 
State,  United  Nations  documents,  oi 
legislative    material   in    tfte   field 
international  relations  are  also  list* 


■The  Cohesion  of  the  Industrial  Democracies: 
iThe  Precondition  of  Global  Progress 


The  Council  of  the  Organization  for 
Economic  Cooperation  and  Development 
(OECD)  met  at  ministerial  level  at  Paris 
June  21-22.  Folloiving  is  a  statement  made 
before  the  Council  by  Secretary  Kissinger  on 
hine  21,  together  with  the  texts  of  a  Declara- 
ion  on  International  Investment  arid  Multi- 
national Enterprises  with  its  annex  (Guide- 
ines  for  Multinational  Enterprises)  and 
Decisions  on  Inter-Governmental  Considta- 
lion  Procedures  on  the  Guidelines,  on  Na- 
lional  Treatment,  and  on  International  In- 
estment  Incentives  and  Disincentives, 
dopted  h]i  the  Council  on  June  21. 


STATEMENT    BY    SECRETARY    KISSINGER 

!S5    release   311    dated   June   21 

The  purposeful  cooperation  of  our  nations 
as  been  at  the  heart  of  the  world's  prog- 
ess  for  three  decades.  Today,  we  are  chal- 
enged  to  deepen  and  advance  that  common 
effort.  The  cooperation  of  the  industrial  de- 
nocracies  is  decisive  for  world  peace,  pros- 
jerity,  and  the  cause  of  justice  and  human 
lignity. 

No  group  of  nations  is  better  equipped  to 
Tiaster  these  challenges.  Ours  are  the  socie- 
;ies  that  launched  the  two  great  events  that 
^ave  birth  to  the  modern  age — the  political 
•evolutions  of  the  18th  and  19th  centuries 
hat  shaped  today's  community  of  nation- 
states  and  the  Industrial  Revolution  that 
produced  the  contemporary  world  economy. 
Ne  share  a  heritage  of  pioneering  effort  in 
ill  the  nmdern  forms  of  commercial,  social, 
ind  governmental  organization.  And  we  have 
)een  able   tu   pei'ceive  and   respond   to  new 


luly  19,  1976 


challenges,  especially  in  giving  effect  to  our 
recognition  of  the  imperatives  of  inter- 
dependence. 

Our  democratic  systems  have  disproved  the 
doctrine  that  only  repression  and  authoritar- 
ianism could  advance  human  well-being.  On 
the  contrary,  the  industrial  democracies  as- 
sembled here  have  demonstrated  conclusively 
that  it  is  in  freedom  that  men  achieve  the  eco- 
nomic advances  of  which  ages  have  dreamed. 
There  is  some  irony  in  the  fact  that  after 
years  of  disparaging  our  economic  system, 
both  the  Socialist  countries  and  the  develop- 
ing countries  have  turned  to  us  to  help  them 
advance  more  rapidly.  Today  it  is  the  indus- 
trial democracies  which  primarily  have  the 
resources,  the  managerial  genius,  the  ad- 
vanced technology,  and  the  dedication  which 
are  needed  for  sustained  economic  develop- 
ment under  any  political  system. 

The  advanced  industrial  nations  have  con- 
ducted themselves  of  late  with  vigor,  deter- 
mination, and  a  sense  of  shared  purpose. 
Most  of  the  OECD  countries  are  now  enter- 
ing a  period  of  economic  expansion.  We  have 
worked  together  in  the  process  of  recovery, 
averting  protectionist  tendencies  in  trade 
and  the  selfish  pursuit  of  oil  and  raw  mate- 
rials at  each  other's  expense.  Largely  due  to 
this,  we  are  recovering  quickly  and  with 
excellent  prospects   for  continued   progress. 

We  have  acted  together  because  we  rec- 
ognize that  the  world  economy  has  become 
global.  National  interests  cannot  prosper  or 
endure  in  isolation.  And  the  nations  assem- 
bled here  are  the  engines  of  the  world  econ- 
omy. Our  performance  is  the  pivot  around 
which  international  trade  and  finance  re- 
volve. Our  technology  and  investment  are  the 


73 


catalysts  of  development  and  economic  prog- 
ress in  developing  nations. 

Today  the  world  economy  faces  new  and 
demanding  challenges.  Our  past  cooperation 
must  be  given  fresh  impetus  in  our  twofold 
task:  to  improve  our  performance  in  areas 
where  we  have  already  begun  to  work  to- 
gether and  to  create  mechanisms  of  coopera- 
tion to  deal  with  new  issues  and  opportuni- 
ties. 

This  organization  is  well  suited  to  this 
task.  Its  history  and  durability  are  a  demon- 
stration of  the  unity  and  cooperation  of  the 
industrial  democracies.  It  has  provided  a 
unique  forum  and  necessary  focus  for  deal- 
ing with  the  critical  link  between  national 
aspirations  and  global  opportunity.  This  is 
no  accident ;  it  reflects  our  fundamental  moral 
and  political  fraternity.  Our  traditions  of 
freedom  give  moral  meaning  and  political 
purpose  to  our  technical  achievements. 

This  is  why  I  wish  to  stress  the  impor- 
tance of  furthering  our  unity  and  progress 
through  the  OECD.  The  objective  is  not  to 
forge  a  bloc  for  our  own  advantage  or  for 
purposes  of  confrontation.  It  is  to  shape  a 
new  international  environment  based  on  the 
consciouiiiiess  that  in  an  age  of  interdepend- 
ence national  interests  can  best  be  served  by 
advancing  the  aspirations  of  all  mankind 
through  cooperative  efforts. 

Let  me  discuss  three  areas  of  challenge 
and  opportunity: 

— Sti'engthening  the  cohesion  and  pros- 
perity of  the  industrialized  democracies ; 

— The  new  issues  we  face  in  economic  re- 
lations with  the  Communist  world;  and 

— The  ongoing  international  effort  to  pro- 
mote economic  development  and  a  construc- 
tive long-term  relationship  between  the  in- 
dustrial and  developing  worlds. 

Relationship  of  the  Industrial  Democracies 

Our  first  and  fundamental  concern  must 
be  economic  cooperation  and  progress  among 
the  industrialized  democracies  of  North 
America,  Western  Europe,  and  Asia.  To- 
morrow, finance  and  economic  ministers  will 
discuss   these  economic   questions   in  detail. 


74 


Today  I  want  to  sketch  in  broad  terms  four 
essential  areas  of  our  cooperation  which  have 
the  greatest  significance  for  world  order  and 
the  future  of  the  international  system: 

— Noninflationary  economic  growth; 

— Strengthening  our  open  international 
trade  and  monetary  system ; 

— The  encouragement  of  transnational 
investment;  and 

— Greater  cooperation  in  energy. 

I  shall  discuss  each  of  these  in  turn. 

First,  as  our  nations  move  to  recovery  and 
expansion,  we  must  insure  steady,  noninfla- 
tionary economic  growth.  Only  in  this  man- 
ner can  we  resolve  conflicting  claims  on  re- 
sources, reinforce  the  political  vitality  of  our 
institutions,  enhance  our  freedom  of  action 
in  world  aft'airs,  and  enlarge  the  economic 
horizons  of  all  societies. 

We  must  overcome  cycles  of  boom  and 
stagnation,  which  in  the  past  have  impaired 
productivity,  constricted  investment,  and 
choked  oft"  our  full  economic  potential.  We 
can  achieve  sustained  growth  by  containing 
inflation.  The  investment  needed  to  create 
jobs  for  our  growing  labor  forces  will  dry 
up  in  an  environment  of  rapidly  and  con- 
stantly rising  prices.  Inflation  erodes  the 
progress  made  in  raising  the  standard  of  liv- 
ing of  our  peoples;  it  strains  the  social  fabric 
of  our  democratic  societies. 

The  responsibility  for  noninflationary 
growth  rests  with  national  governments.  But 
close  consultation  and  collaboration  are  es- 
sential to  insure  that  national  policies  are 
complementary  and  reinforcing;  to  contrib- 
ute to  exchange  rate  stability  among  us;  to 
give  special  attention  to  members  that  are 
in  diflSculty;  and  to  collaborate  on  policies  of 
trade,  energy,  and  relations  with  the  develop- 
ing countries.  The  summit  meeting  at  Ram- 
bouillet  last  November  made  a  major  con- 
tribution to  general  recovery  and  promotion 
of  these  goals.  The  summit  next  week  in 
Puerto  Rico  will  assess  the  progress  we  have 
made  and  use  it  as  a  point  of  departure  for 
future  advances. 

This  meeting  provides  an  opportunity  for 
the  nations  assembled  here  to  reafllirm  our 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


0 


joint  commitment  to  an  open  economic  sys- 
tem, to  national  responsibility,  and  to  inter- 
national cooperation.  With  sound  and  con- 
certed policies  among  us  and  with  efforts  to 
coordinate  our  strategies  for  expansion,  the 
potential  for  the  world's  sustained  economic 
growth  can  be  realized. 

At  last  year's  OECD  ministerial  meeting, 
at  U.S.  recommendation,  a  Group  of  Distin- 
guished Economists  was  set  up,  chaired  by 
Professor  [Paul  W.]  McCracken.  It  was  as- 
signed the  task  of  examining  the  medium- 
and  long-term  and  structural  problems  of 
sustained  economic  growth.  It  is  exploring 
the  problems  of  inflation,  investment,  struc- 
tural imbalances,  and  adequate  supplies  of 
raw  materials.  We  look  forward  to  its  con- 
clusions and  i-ecommendations. 

Strengthening  our  trade  and  monetary 
system  also  requires  enhanced  collaboration. 
In  recent  years,  high  unemployment  and  eco- 
nomic uncertainty  have  revived  protectionist 
aressures  in  many  countries;  inflation  and 
iiastic  differences  in  the  performance  of 
-nember  nations  have  produced  major  pay- 
nents  imbalances,  exchange  rate  pressures, 
md  financial  strains. 

The  Rambouillet  summit  and  the  IMF 
[International  Monetary  Fund]  meeting  in 
lamaica  last  January  were  milestones  in 
idapting  the  international  monetary  system 
.0  a  new  era.  We  have  agreed  to  new  IMF 
•ules  to  avoid  the  shocks  and  disequilibrium 
vhich  plagued  the  Bretton  Woods  system 
md  to  insure  a  smoother  functioning  of  our 
rade  and  investment. 

Today  and  tomorrow  the  OECD  nations 
ire  continuing  close  and  detailed  consulta- 
ions.  We  will  examine  both  current  prob- 
ems  and  the  long-term  future,  both  the 
'xisting  institutions  and  institutional  re- 
orm.  A  recent  example  of  our  capacity  for 
nnovation  was  the  agreement  on  the  OECD 
'"inancial  Support  Fund,  designed  to  help  us 
I  leal  cooperatively  with  serious  economic  dis- 
.  ocatlons  aggravated  by  the  oil  price  rises. 
^he  United  States  is  seeking  swift  ratifica- 
ion  of  this  agreement  so  that  the  Fund  may 
ome  into  being  soon. 
In  trade,  two  years  ago  the  OECD  nations 


jointly  undertook  an  extraordinary  political 
commitment  to  preserve  an  open  economic 
system  despite  a  period  of  general  economic 
difl!iculty.  On  May  30,  1974,  we  pledged  to 
avoid  new  restrictions  on  trade.  We  rejected 
policies  which  would  tend  to  shift  one  na- 
tion's diflSculties  onto  others.  That  declara- 
tion strengthened  our  successful  efforts  to 
resist  protectionist  pressures  and  thus  bene- 
fit countries  with  particularly  acute  balance- 
of-payments  problems.  The  declaration  was 
renewed  last  year.  We  should  now  renew  it 
for  an  additional  year. 

Our  economic  recovery  provides  significant 
opportunities  for  further  progress: 

— First,  the  political  commitment  repre- 
sented by  our  trade  pledge  should  be  the 
basis  for  wider  cooperation  among  us.  The 
United  States  proposes  that  this  organization 
recommend  further  areas  for  common  action, 
not  only  on  current  trade  problems  and  nego- 
tiations but  on  the  long-term  operation  of 
our  open  trading  system. 

— Second,  all  nations  assembled  here 
should  make  a  political  commitment  to  ac- 
celerate the  multilateral  trade  negotiations 
in  Geneva.  We  are  at  the  point  where  we 
must  move  forward  at  a  more  rapid  pace  if 
the  negotiations  are  to  reach  a  successful 
conclusion  in  1977.  To  this  end,  the  United 
States  strongly  recommends  that  we  reach 
agreement  this  fall  in  Geneva  on  a  tariff- 
cutting  formula. 

— Third,  it  is  our  shared  obligation  to  im- 
prove the  conditions  of  trade  for  developing 
countries.  The  postwar  trading  system  was 
built  on  a  consensus  among  industrial  coun- 
tries in  which  the  developing  countries  did 
not  participate  and  which  they  now  chal- 
lenge in  several  important  respects.  We  need 
to  reexamine  the  trading  system,  prepared 
to  change  or  strengthen  it  where  necessary. 
In  the  multilateral  trade  negotiations  we  will 
be  negotiating  new  provisions  in  such  areas 
as  non tariff  barriers,  supply  access,  the  set- 
tlement of  disputes,  and  trade  restrictions 
that  are  justified  for  balance-of-payments 
purposes.  This  organization  and  its  mem- 
bers can  play  a  crucial  role  in  building  a  new 
global  consensus  on  these  issues. 


t,|iiy  19,  1976 


75 


Transnational  investment  is  the  third  area 
calling  for  close  collaboration  among  the 
industrial  nations. 

Investment  is  the  lifeblood  of  our  econo- 
mies and  vital  to  vi'orldwide  development.  It 
has  been  a  principal  source  of  the  economic 
growth  and  security  and  prosperity  which 
the  nations  represented  here  enjoy.  It  has 
been  the  single  largest  source  of  develop- 
ment capital  for  Third  World  nations  and  a 
powerful  force  marshaling  management  and 
technology  for  their  benefit.  It  has  devel- 
oped resources;  it  has  increased  income;  it 
has  provided  jobs.  Since  the  midsixties,  for- 
eign direct  investment  has  been  growing 
faster  than  international  trade  and  global 
GNP. 

The  increasing  importance  of  trans- 
national investment  to  the  global  economy 
has  been  accompanied  by  no  little  concern 
over  the  activities  of  private  investors,  par- 
ticularly the  multinational  corporations. 
Questions  have  been  raised  as  to  how  the  in- 
ternational firms  can  serve  the  national  in- 
terests of  their  hosts  as  well  as  their  own. 
A  few  notorious  cases  of  illicit  payments 
have  stirred  apprehension  and  cast  a  cloud 
over  the  overwhelming  majority  of  interna- 
tional firms  whose  behavior  has  been  beyond 
reproach. 

Governments,  too,  have  impeded  the  flow 
of  capital  through  inconsistent  policies  or 
discriminatory  treatment  of  international 
firms.  And  most  industrial  countries  have 
been  under  pressure  at  home  to  take  in- 
creasingly nationalistic  positions  toward 
international  investment. 

If  this  trend  is  not  halted,  we  shall  face 
a  gradual  deterioration  in  the  international 
investment  climate,  with  serious  conse- 
quences for  economic  development  and  the 
global  economy. 

It  is  highly  significant,  therefore,  that  this 
organization  undertook  two  related  tasks:  to 
negotiate  voluntary  guidelines  for  multi- 
national firms  and  to  clarify  governmental 
responsibilities  to  preserve  and  promote  a 
liberal  investment  climate.  We  are  able  to 
announce  today  the  acceptance  by  OECD 
member  governments  of  a  declaration  on  in- 
vestment. This  declaration  extends   the  co- 


76 


operation  which  has  characterized  our  trade 
and  monetary  relations  into  the  area  of 
investment.  It  includes: 

— Recommended  guidelines  for  the  activi- 
ties of  multinational  corporations; 

— An  agreed  statement  of  the  basic  re- 
sponsibilities of  our  governments  with  re- 
spect to  transnational  investment; 

— Provision  for  strengthened  cooperation 
on  the  questions  of  incentives  and  disincen- 
tives to  foreign  direct  investment;  and 

— Provision  for  increased  consultations 
between  our  governments  on  all  these 
matters. 

The  United  States  strongly  endorses  this  j 
declaration    and    urges    its    widest    possible 
adoption  and  observance. 

A  framework  for  investment  is  now  , 
emerging.  We  must  encourage  its  develop- 
ment. Therefore,  in  addition  to  our  full  sup- 
port for  the  OECD  declaration,  the  United 
States  urges  the  following  policies  for  our 
nations : 

— -First,  we  should  support  the  work  of  the 
U.N.  Commission  on  Transnational  Corpora-!'"' 
tions  and  the  related  U.N.  Information  andll* 
Research     Center     within     its     Secretariat,  ||'^' 
which  will  develop  a  comprehensive  informa^ 
tion    system    on    issues    relating    to    tranS' 
national    corporations.    This   will   contribute 
to    a    fuller    understanding    of    investment 
issues  among  all  nations. 

— Second,  we  should  review  the  proposal  oft 
the  International  Resources  Bank  which  the 
United  States  put  forward  at  UNCTAD 
[U.N.  Conference  on  Trade  and  Develop' 
nient]  at  Nairobi  last  month.  While  the 
Bank  will  focus  on  energy  and  raw  mate- 
rials, its  principal  features — as  a  multl 
lateral  guarantor  against  noncommercial  risk 
and  as  a  facilitator  of  production  sharing  and 
technology  transfei- — have  important  impli 
cations  for  development  generally. 

— Third,  we  should  take  strong  collective 
measures  to  eliminate  corrupt  payments, 
Bribery  and  extortion  are  a  burden  on  inter- 
national trade  and  investment.  We  reiterate 
our  proposal  that  negotiation  of  a  binding 
international  agreement  on  corrupt  practices  ""'( 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


«(r| 


iHgin  at  next  month's  session  of  the  U.N. 
Economic  and  Social  Council. 

— Fourth,  we  should  cooperate  to  restrain 
anticompetitive  practices  of  firms  which 
undermine  the  benefits  of  our  open  economic 
system.  The  United  States  proposes  a  dual 
ttt'ort:  to  reduce  international  procedural 
obstacles  to  the  enforcement  of  laws  against 
international  restrictive  business  practices 
and  to  pursue  bilateral  and  multilateral 
agreements  for  international  antitrust  co- 
operation similar  to  that  about  to  be  con- 
cluded between  the  United  States  and  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany. 

— Fifth,  we  should  strengthen  the  woi-k 
of  specialized  OECD  committees  which  deal 
with  investment  problems  such  as  harmoniz- 
ing- statistical  systems,  cataloguing  restric- 
tive business  practices,  improving  the  ex- 
ciiange  of  tax  information,  dealing  with  tax 
iiaven  problems,  as  well  as  their  work  now 
underway  on  the  general  topics  of  technol- 
ogy transfer  and  short-term  capital  move- 
ments. 

The  fourth  crucial  sphere  of  cooperation 
among  the  industrial  nations  is  energy.  The 
cooperation  of  energy-consuming  nations 
has  become  an  imperative,  for  the  last  few 
yeai's  have  demonstrated  the  economic  and 
political  costs  of  loss  of  control  over  this 
critical  component  of  industrial  growth. 

For  the  next  several  years,  our  nations' 
heavy  dependence  on  imported  oil  will  con- 
tribute to  our  political  and  economic  vulnera- 
bility. The  outlook  for  reducing  our  depend- 
ence in  the  next  decade  is  not  encouraging. 
Forecasts  based  on  existing  energy  pro- 
grams in  the  industrial  countries  indicate 
that  our  imports  of  OPEC  [Organization  of 
Petroleum  Exporting  Countries]  oil  will  in- 
c lease  from  27  million  barrels  a  day  in  1975 
to  as  much  as  37  million  barrels  per  day  by 
1985.  At  the  same  time,  it  has  become  clear 
that  oil  reserves,  while  still  large,  are  finite. 
Thus  we  must  reduce  our  immediate  depend- 
ence on  imported  oil  side  by  side  with  be- 
ginning a  long-term  transition  to  alternative 
energy  systems  through  the  most  rapid  pos- 
sible development  of  new  and  alternative 
soui'ces  of  energy. 


The  industrial  counti'ies  have  begun  to  re- 
spond to  the  energy  challenge.  The  difficult 
process  of  reorienting  energy  priorities  and 
establishing  new  energy  policies  has  been 
started.  When  the  energy  crisis  became  ap- 
parent, we  moved  rapidly  to  set  up  the  new 
International  Energy  Agency  (lEA),  within 
the  framework  of  the  OECD.  Through  its 
impetus,  a  comprehensive  structure  of  tech- 
nical cooperation  and  policy  coordination 
among  industrial  countries  has  grown  up.  At 
the  same  time,  a  dialogue  with  the  OPEC 
countries  has  been  started  in  the  Conference 
on  International  Economic  Cooperation 
(C'lEC).  And  the  importance  of  helping  the 
poorer  developing  countries — especially  those 
with  limited  energy  resources — to  survive 
the  energy  crisis  has  been  recognized. 

Despite  these  accomplishments,  our  ef- 
forts have  fallen  far  short  of  our  needs. 
They  will  neither  adequately  reduce  our  im- 
mediate energy  vulnerability  nor  achieve  a 
satisfactory  global  balance  of  energy  supply 
and  demand  over  the  longer  term.  The  United 
States  therefore  proposes  that  OECD  mem- 
bers take  the  following  cooperative  steps: 

— First,  that  we  establish  on  an  urgent 
basis  joint  energy  production  projects  to 
pool  technical  know-how  and  financing  in 
areas  such  as  coal  extraction  and  utilization, 
uranium  enrichment,  and  synthetic  fuels. 
Such  actions  would  accord  with  the  commit- 
ments we  undertook  in  the  lEA  Long-Term 
Program.  They  will  contribute  to  the  early 
availability  of  commercially  attractive  addi- 
tional energy  sources. 

— Second,  that  we  establish  collective  and 
individual  goals  for  substantially  reduced  de- 
pendence on  imported  oil  by  1985.  This  will 
require  agreed  targets  for  additional  energy 
production,  particularly  in  the  coal  and  nu- 
clear energy  sectors;  these  represent  our 
best  hope  for  substantially  reducing  our 
energy  dependence  in  the  next  decade. 

— Third,  that  we  agree  to  intensify  our 
national  efforts  to  reduce  the  growth  in 
demand  for  energy. 

The  United  States  urges  that  the  Govern- 
ing Board  of  the  IE  A  launch  these  efforts  on 
a     priority     basis.     Member     governments 


July   19,  1976 


77 


should  endorse  these  goals  for  reduced  de- 
pendence and  also  make  the  essential  polit- 
ical commitments  to  specific  and  concrete 
actions  to  achieve  them.  We  should  aim  for 
a  ministerial  meeting  in  six  to  nine  months 
to  accomplish  these  objectives.  The  minis- 
terial meeting  should  also  look  beyond  the 
next  decade  to  the  post-oil  era  and  seek  ways 
to  build  on  cooperative  research  and  develop- 
ment efforts  in  such  areas  as  solar  power  and 
nuclear  fusion.  OECD  countries  not  members 
of  the  lEA  should  be  given  an  opportunity 
to  participate  fully  in  this  process. 

This  agenda — of  action  for  gi'owth,  trade 
and  monetary  affairs,  investment,  and 
energy — suggests  an  expanding  role  and  re- 
sponsibility for  the  OECD.  Working  to- 
gether, the  nations  of  the  OECD  face  an 
unprecedented  opportunity  to  advance  their 
common  welfare  and  prosperity.  And  from 
this  foundation  of  cooperation  we  can  more 
effectively  deal  with  the  issues  which  in- 
volve us  with  nations  outside  the  OECD 
I'egion. 

Let  me  now  turn  to  these  relations  with 
the  rest  of  the  world. 

East-West   Economic   Relations 

Our  relations  with  the  nations  of  the  East 
turn  primarily  upon  political  and  security 
issues.  In  the  past,  trade  and  economic  rela- 
tions with  the  Soviet  Union  and  Eastern 
Europe  have  not  been  among  our  central 
concerns.  But  a  new  dimension  of  economic 
interaction  between  East  and  West  has  begun 
to  take  shape.  It  is  time  to  act  cooperatively 
so  that  this  new  economic  factor  becomes  an 
increasingly  positive  element  in  the  world 
economy. 

The  Soviet  Union  has  the  second  largest 
economy  in  the  world.  Together  with  all 
COMECON  [Council  of  Mutual  Economic  As- 
sistance] countries,  it  accounts  for  about  20 
percent  of  world  output.  But  despite  the  size 
of  its  economy,  the  Soviet  Union  is  not  a 
major  factor  in  the  world  economic  system. 
Its  trade  is  relatively  small;  it  has  made 
little  contribution  to  economic  development. 

In     recent     years,    however,     the    Soviet 


78 


bri 


sta 


Union  and  the  countries  of  Eastern  Europe 
have  moved  toward  greater  economic  contact 
with  the  West.  The  basic  reason  is  plain. 
These  countries  have  come  to  realize  that 
they  cannot  provide  for  growing  consumer 
demand  or  meet  the  technological  impera- 
tives of  the  more  sophisticated  economy  they 
seek  solely  from  their  own  economic  re- 
sources. Further,  many  of  the  countries  of 
Eastern  Europe  wish  to  diversify  trading  pat- 
terns that  were  established  in  the  aftermath 
of  World  War  II. 

As  a  result,  in  the  last  four  years,  trade 
between  the  COMECON  countries  and  the 
OECD  countries  has  increased  nearly  four- 
fold. Most  East  European  countries  now  de 
pend  on  and  prefer  Western  machinery,  tecb 
nology,  and  material  imports  for  the  dynamic 
element  of  their  economic  growth.  And  in 
matters  of  finance,  the  sudden  increase  in 
the  external  debt  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  the 
countries  of  Eastern  Europe  has  been  strik- 
ing. Their  net  debt  to  private  Western  banks 
doubled  in  1975  to  $15  billion,  and  their  total 
hard  currency  debt  has  reached  nearly  twice 
that  amount. 

The  most  familiar  example  of  the  impact 
of  Communist  countries  on  the  international 
economy  has  been  Soviet  shortfalls  in  the 
production  of  grain,  which  has  become  the 
single  most  volatile  element  in  the  world  foo(J  L 
picture.  In  addition  the  Socialist  countriea 
can  become  an  important  element  in  the 
global  energy  balance.  And  in  an  era  where 
adequate  supplies  of  many  other  industrial 
raw  materials  can  no  longer  be  taken  for 
granted,  the  extensive  mineral  reserves  of 
the  East  can  expand  resource  availability 
worldwide.  It  is  therefore  clear  that  in  our 
multilateral  efforts  to  build  a  strengthened 
international  economic  system,  we  will  have 
to  take  account  of  the  potential  needs  and 
contributions  of  the  centrally  planned  f 
economies. 

For  us,  the  industrial  democracies  in  the  tla 
OECD,  the  growing  economic  interaction  be- 
tween East  and  West  and  the  Eastern  in- 
fluence on  the  global  economy  are  realities 
that  if  arranged  wisely  can  be  positive  de-| 
velopments,     stabilizing     relationships     andi 


Department  of  State  BulletinlMy 


thi 


tal, 


PI 


p 


Itioadening  contacts.  At  the  same  time,  man- 
aging relations  between  free  economies  and 
state  trading  systems  has  inevitable  compli- 
cations. Dealing  with  a  centrally  planned 
economy  under  strict  political  direction  can 
never  be  treated  simply  as  a  commercial 
enterprise  alone. 

Certain  principles  stand  out: 

— All  our  nations  have  been  engaged  in 
tills  process. 

— State  trading  countries  must  not  be 
permitted  to  use  their  centrally  directed 
systems  for  unfair  advantage,  nor  should 
they  be  permitted  to  play  off  the  industrial 
democracies  against  each  other  through 
selective  political  pressure. 

— Growing  East- West  trade  also  presents 
liopeful  prospects,  both  economic  and  politi- 
cal, if  approached  with  understanding,  skill, 
and  foresight. 

— In  short,  it  is  up  to  the  industrial 
democracies  to  consult  closely  and  to  manage 
this  process  cooperatively. 

Therefore  the  United  States  proposes  that 
the  OECD  nations  adopt  a  systematic  work 
program  for  developing  objectives  and  ap- 
proaches for  our  economic  relations  with  the 
Communist  countries.  To  this  end,  some 
progress  has  already  been  made;  for  ex- 
ample, in  aligning  national  export  credit 
policies  among  the  industrial  countries.  If 
we  are  to  face  this  issue  in  an  intelligent 
and  harmonious  fashion,  many  additional 
areas  should  be  examined.  Specifically,  our 
nations  should  seek  answers  to  the  follow- 
ing questions: 

— How  can  we  insure  effective  reciprocity 
ill  trade  between  market  and  nonmarket 
countries? 

— -How  do  we  deal  with  the  problem  of 
dumping  and  other  unfair  trade  practices  by 
countries  in  which  prices  need  not  bear  a 
relation  to  costs  or  market  forces? 

— What  are  the  implications  of  the 
growing  external  debt  of  the  Communist 
countries? 

— How  can  the  industrial  democracies  deal 
with  possible  efforts  to  misuse  economic  rela- 


tions for  political  purposes  inimical  to  their 
interests? 

— What  should  be  the  relationship  be- 
tween the  nations  of  the  East  and  the  multi- 
lateral bodies  dealing  with  economic  affairs? 

— How  do  we  take  account  of  the  diversity 
of  interests  and  needs  that  has  already  ap- 
peared among  Eastern  countries? 

— And  finally,  is  it  possible  to  bring  the 
Soviet  Union  and  the  Eastern  European 
countries  into  the  process  of  responsibly 
assisting  development  in  the  Third  World? 

The  United  States  will  elaborate  its  views 
on  these  issues  at  the  next  meeting  of  the 
Executive  Committee  in  Special  Session. 
The  results  of  our  examinations  of  these 
questions  could  be  embodied  in  a  report  to 
the  next  ministerial  meeting  of  this 
organization. 

Growing  East-West  trade  presents  prob- 
lems together  with  great  opportunities.  It 
is  up  to  the  countries  assembled  here  to 
understand  the  process  and  its  complexities 
and  to  manage  it  cooperatively.  In  that  case, 
it  can  contribute  to  the  vitality  of  our  econo- 
mies and  to  the  stability  of  the  international 
order. 

The   Relationship   Between   North  and   South 

One  of  the  most  urgent  and  compelling 
challenges  that  summon  our  cooperation  is 
the  relationship  between  the  industrial  and 
the  developing  nations.  The  new  era  of  inter- 
national cooperation  we  seek  must  include 
economic  relations  that  offer  mutual  pros- 
perity and  widening  opportunity  for  all  the 
peoples  of  the  world. 

Every  nation  has  a  stake  in  global  stability 
and  world  peace.  But  the  ultimate  good  must 
be  to  look  beyond  the  maintenance  of  peace 
to  a  world  which  offers  its  children  a  hope 
of  a  better  future. 

The  United  States  has  made  its  commit- 
ment. We  have  demonstrated  our  determina- 
tion at  the  seventh  special  session  of  the 
U.N.  General  Assembly,  at  the  Conference  on 
International  Economic  Cooperation  in  Paris, 
at  Kingston  in  January,  and  at  the  UNCTAD 
Conference  in  Nairobi  last  month. 


I  July  19,  1976 


79 


Our  efforts  begin  from  the  conviction  that 
an  effective  international  system  must  be 
founded  upon  a  consensus  among  all  nations 
and  peoples.  The  world  community  which  is 
our  ultimate  aspiration  can  only  be  realized 
if  all  nations  and  peoples  can  pursue  their 
goals  with  a  sense  of  participation  and  an 
awareness  that  their  concerns  are  heeded. 
If  we  are  to  live  in  a  stable  world,  the  pre- 
ponderant number  of  nations  must  be  per- 
suaded that  their  legitimate  concerns  are 
taken  seriously. 

The  poor  nations  cry  out  for  development. 
Their  objectives  are  clear:  economic  prog- 
ress, a  role  in  international  decisions  that  af- 
fect them,  and  an  equitable  share  of  global 
economic  benefits.  The  objectives  of  the  in- 
dustrialized nations  are  equally  clear:  wid- 
ening prosperity  for  all  peoples  produced  by 
an  open  world  system  of  trade  and  invest- 
ment with  expanding  markets  for  North  and 
South.  We  want  to  see  stable  and  equitable 
development  of  the  world's  resources  of 
food,  energy,  and  raw  materials  as  the  fun- 
damental basis  for  a  prosperous  world 
economy. 

Thus,  the  objectives  of  the  industrial 
democracies  and  those  of  the  developing 
nations  should  be  complementary.  The  proc- 
ess of  building  a  world  community  must 
therefore  be  shared  by  nations  of  both 
North  and  South  and  must  address  the  issue 
of  economic  development  in  the  context  of 
growing  global  prosperity. 

But  this  is  not  inevitable.  Effective  cooper- 
ation presupposes  that  both  sides  face  cer- 
tain realities  without  illusion. 

The  most  critical  of  these  realities  is  that 
development  is  a  long-term  process.  Sus- 
tained economic  development  cannot  possibly 
result  from  any  one  conference  or  any  one 
set  of  proposals.  It  will  depend  primarily 
upon  the  internal  effort,  the  domestic  policy, 
and  the  national  will  of  the  developing  coun- 
tries themselves.  In  most  cases  the  effort  will 
extend  over  decades.  Often  this  will  require 
painful  short-term  sacrifices  for  longer  term 
gains.  Development  cannot  be  created  by 
rhetoric  or  by  paz'liamentary  victories  in  in- 
ternational forums. 


80 


Development  further  requires  the  sus- 
tained and  collective  effort  of  the  industrial 
countries.  The  role  of  the  industrial  democ- 
racies is  critical,  for  we  possess  the  largest 
markets  and  most  of  the  world's  capital  and 
technology.  Thus  real  development  presup- 
poses a  serious,  unemotional,  constructive 
North-South  dialogue. 

In  such  a  dialogue  it  is  futile  for  one  party 
to  seek  to  impose  solutions  to  the  problems 
of  development  on  another.  An  atmosphere 
of  extortion  or  pressure,  unworkable  pro- 
posals, or  excessive  reliance  on  parliamen- 
tary maneuvers  will  ultimately  undermine 
public  support  in  the  only  countries  capable 
of  contributing  effectively  to  development. 

We  of  the  industrial  democracies  have  a 
special  responsibility.  What  we  do — or  fail 
to  do — is  critical  to  the  future  of  the  coun- 
tries of  the  Third  World.  If  we  substitute 
competition  among  ourselves  for  a  dispas- 
sionate analysis  of  the  issues,  the  develop- 
ment process  will  falter.  Our  resources  will 
be  inefficiently  scattered  or  misallocated ; 
projects  will  too  often  prove  fruitless  for 
lack  of  careful  analysis  or  want  of  wider  sup- 
port. We  do  no  one  a  favor  when  we  substitute 
rhetorical  concessions  for  intelligent  and 
realistic  proposals  that  link  the  interests  and 
concerns  of  both  sides  in  a  prospering  global 
economy.  Those  who  curry  short-term  favor 
may  mortgage  the  long-term  future. 

It  is  imperative  that  the  North-South  dia- 
logue advance  in  a  way  which  benefits  both 
sides.  In  the  long  run,  pi'Ogress,  stability, 
and  peace  depend  upon  it. 

The  United  States  has  done  its  utmost  to 
be  forthcoming  in  the  dialogue.  We  have 
strained  our  domestic  processes  to  develop 
pragmatic  proposals  to  meet  real  problems 
in  our  relations  with  the  developing  world. 
As  our  economies  improve  and  as  we,  to- 
gether with  the  developing  world,  identify 
new  areas  for  cooperation,  we  can  look  for- 
ward to  widening  global  cooperation  which 
can  serve  the  interests  of  all. 

The  spirit  of  cooperation  necessary  be- 
tween North  and  South  requires  first  a  com- 
mitment to  cooperation  among  the  industrial 
nations.  This  is  not  a  call  for  confrontation 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ith  the  Third  World.  It  is  an  indispensable 
tep  we  must  take  if  we  are  not  to  fragment 
H  our  efforts  and  fail  in  our  objectives. 

The  United  States  believes  that  this  or- 
ganization should  focus  on  three  areas  where 
our  cooperation  is  most  necessary  and  would 
be  most  effective: 

— We  must  improve  our  ability  to  concert 
our  development  efforts  in  international  fo- 
rums, fur  it  is  in  these  meetings  that  ideas 
are  launched,  compromises  are  made,  and 
political  directions  are  set. 

— We  must  enhance  our  collaboration  in 
our  bilatei'al  and  multilateral  aid  programs; 
for  our  resources  are  limited,  and  closer 
alignment  of  programs  is  essential  for  their 
effectiveness. 

— We  must  develop  a  longer  term  strategy 
for  development  which  integrates  the  diverse 
strands  of  North-South  policy,  including  for- 
eign aid,  technology  transfer,  financial  pol- 
icy, and  trade.  For  development  is  a  compre- 
hensive and  never-ending  process  with  impli- 
cations for  every  area  of  the  international 
economic  system. 

Let  me  discuss  each  area  in  turn. 

First,  we  must  improve  the  coordination 
of  our  positions  at  major  international  con- 
ferences. Recent  unfavorable  experiences  at 
UNCTAD  in  Nairobi  and  at  other  interna- 
tional forums  should  make  clear  the  impor- 
tance of  this  step.  We  in  this  organization 
have  supporting  mechanisms  for  coordina- 
tion of  positions  on  energy,  commodities, 
finance,  and  development,  but  their  effective- 
ness has  been  frequently  less  than  adequate. 
For  the  remainder  of  this  year  we  will  be 
relying  on  these  bodies  to  continue  to  sup- 
port our  work  in  the  Conference  on  Interna- 
tional Economic  Cooperation.  It  is  therefore 
imperative  that  we  review  now  our  recent 
experience  with  the  objective  of  strengthen- 
ing the  coordinating  role  of  each  OECD  sup- 
port mechanism  as  well  as  the  relationship 
among  them. 

The  United  States  recommends  that  the 
Secretary  General  undertake  an  immediate 
examination  of  the  issues  and  present  recom- 
mendations to  the  Executive  Committee  in 

July  19,  1976 


Special  Session  on  ways  in  which  we  may 
more  closely  align  our  positions. 

We  suggest  as  well  that  this  organization 
take  a  more  active  role  in  developing  views 
on  key  North-South  issues  than  it  has  in  the 
past.  We  believe  this  could  most  fruitfully 
be  done  by  identifying  in  advance  of  inter- 
national meetings  specific  issues  of  major 
concern  to  industrialized  countries  and  ar- 
ranging for  consultations  to  develop  mutu- 
ally supporting  positions.  It  makes  no  sense 
to  work  out  our  differences  under  the  pres- 
sure of  deadlines  and  of  other  participants 
at  international  conferences. 

The  next  several  months  will  be  a  test  of 
our  ability  to  work  together  in  a  variety  of 
international  settings.  The  agenda  of  confer- 
ences is  full.  We  will  be  considering  on  a 
case-by-case  basis  measures  to  improve  the 
functioning  of  individual  commodity  mar- 
kets, including  the  reduction  of  excessive 
price  fluctuations  and  methods  of  buffer 
stock  financing.  We  will  also  be  translating 
the  analysis  of  the  first  six  months  of  the 
year  into  concrete  results  in  CIEC.  In  this 
forum,  the  United  States  looks  forward  to 
visible  and  concrete  achievements  in  energy, 
raw  materials,  investment,  trade,  and  meas- 
ures to  address  the  problems  of  the  poorest 
countries.  We  will  want: 

— To  explore  possibilities  for  further  con- 
sultations on  energy,  including  ways  to  assist 
developing  nations  that  have  no  energy 
resources ; 

— To  facilitate  progress  on  commodity  dis- 
cussions, including  ways  to  improve  the 
functioning  of  individual  commodity  mar- 
kets ;  and 

— To  begin  work  on  the  International  Re- 
sources Bank  proposal,  which  we  see  as  relat- 
ing to  the  work  of  all  the  CIEC  commissions, 
particularly  those  dealing  with  energy  and 
raw  materials. 

Second,  we  must  increase  the  effectiveness 
of  our  bilateral  and  multilateral  aid  efforts 
in  addressing  specific  problems  in  the  devel- 
oping world.  The  OECD  Development  Assist- 
ance Committee  has  done  important  work  to 
improve  and  coordinate  development  assist- 


81 


ance  policies.  There  are,  as  well,  over  20  con- 
sultative groups  working  with  regard  to 
specific  developing  nations.  We  should  review 
our  coordination  in  all  these  areas.  We  may 
consider  streamlining  some  of  those  mecha- 
nisms and  eliminating  duplication. 

We  must  seek  to  enhance  the  coordination 
of  assistance  policies  and  programs  which 
have  a  regional  or  even  continental  focus. 
The  Chtb  des  Amis  du  Sahel  is  a  recent  suc- 
cessful effort  to  concert  our  resources  to 
combat  the  problems  of  that  African  sub- 
region.  We  should  explore  whether  there  are 
other  regions,  in  Africa  or  elsewhere,  where 
similar  approaches  are  needed.  The  recent 
initiati\e  by  the  President  of  France  for 
focusing  joint  attention  on  specific  problems 
on  the  African  Continent  is  an  example  of 
the  kind  of  effort  we  must  make  together  in 
the  future. 

Third,  we  must  devote  a  major  portion  of 
our  efforts  to  longer  range  planning  for 
global  development.  The  problem  of  growth 
will  not  go  away.  No  one  policy  will  be  de- 
cisive; no  one  conference  will  devise  perma- 
nent solutions.  We  must  begin  to  focus 
honestly  and  carefully  on  the  development 
challenge  through  the  distant  future. 

A  high  priority  in  this  effort  must  be  to 
consider  together  the  various  development  is- 
sues we  have  been  addressing  separately. 
Development  policies  can  be  either  mutually 
reinforcing  or  they  can  undermine  one  an- 
other. We  must  find  a  way  to  look  at  devel- 
opment as  a  comprehensive  and  integrated 
whole,  harmonizing  our  long-range  planning 
efforts  in  trade,  aid,  investment,  and  tech- 
nology. These  individual  policies  need  to  be 
placed  into  a  larger  coherent  plan  so  that  the 
industrial  nations'  development  efforts  can 
more  efficiently  respond  to  the  most  pressing 
issues  in  the  developing  world. 

To  achieve  a  more  effective  integrated  de- 
velopment strategy,  the  United  States  pro- 
poses that  OECD  countries  decide  now  to 
review  the  entire  range  of  North-South  is- 
sues which  we  will  be  addressing  over  the 
remainder  of  this  decade  and  beyond.  Over 
the  next  year  we  should  develop  a  consistent 
and  comprehensive  set  of  objectives  and 
strategies. 


82 


At  the  same  time,  we  should  now  move  to 
strengthen  the  institutional  arrangements 
within  this  organization  for  handling  North- 
South  issues.  There  should  be  a  central  focal 
point  in  the  OECD  for  consideration  of  all 
such  activities.  This  will  give  a  greater  po- 
litical impetus  to  our  efforts.  And  it  should 
also  stimulate  greater  consideration  for  the 
needs  and  interests  of  developing  nations  in 
the  ongoing  work  of  specialized  OECD  com- 
mittees. 

The  kind  of  coordination  which  I  have  sug- 
gested will  require  attention  at  the  highest 
levels  of  our  governments.  It  will,  of  course, 
also  require  compromises  on  policies  and  pri- 
orities which  each  of  us  has  developed  in  the 
past.  But  it  is  our  best,  perhaps  our  sole, 
chance  to  accelerate  the  pace  of  constructive 
progress  in  our  relations  with  the  Third 
World  while  not  undermining  our  relations 
with  each  other. 


The  Imperative  of  Cooperative  Action 

The  nations  assembled  in  this  room  pro- 
ceed from  two  main  premises :  the  interde- 
pendence among  the  OECD  nations  and  our 
common  desire  to  help  shape  a  new  era  of 
global  economic  cooperation  among  all  na- 
tions. 

The  central  task  before  the  industrialized 
democracies  of  the  OECD  is  to  give  new 
focus  and  purpose  to  our  own  cooperative 
economic  action.  Economics  is  only  part  of 
that  enterprise.  The  choices  before  us  and 
the  decisions  we  take  will,  above  all,  reflect 
our  perception  of  ourselves  as  peoples  and  as 
nations.  The  tasks  are  long  term,  and  they 
demand  that  we  extend  our  line  of  sight 
beyond  immediate  technical  issues  or  politi- 
cal controversies  to  more  distant  horizons. 

Ours  is  a  time  when  the  centers  of  global 
power  and  influence  are  many  and  diverse. 
And  ours,  therefore,  is  a  choice  between  co- 
operation or  chaos.  Today  more  than  ever, 
the  industrial  democracies  require  leadership 
determined  not  to  adapt  to  reality,  but  to 
shape  it.  Circumstances  have  provided  us 
with  a  clear  understanding  of  our  interde- 
pendence, and  our  efforts  to  translate  this 
reality  into  common  progress  are  well  begun. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


We  have  every  reason  for  confidence  in  our 
capacities. 

Our  cooperative  endeavor,  which  has  ac- 
complished so  much  in  the  past,  can  be  even 
more  dynamic  as  we  turn  to  the  new  and 
long-term  challenges  of  interdependence. 
What  we  elect  to  do  together  is  bound  to 
have  vast  meaning  to  a  world  that  seeks 
progress  and  justice  and  needs  from  all  of 
us  in  this  room  a  fresh  demonstration  of 
what  strong  and  free  nations  working  to- 
gether can  accomplish. 


TEXTS  OF  DECLARATION,  WITH  ANNEX, 
AND  DECISIONS  OF  THE  COUNCIL  > 

Text  of  Declaration 

Declaration   on  International   Investment 
AND    Multinational    Enterprises 

The  Governments  of  OECD  Member  Countries  ' 
Considering 

that  international  investment  has  assumed  in- 
creased importance  in  the  world  economy  and  has 
considerably  contributed  to  the  development  of  their 
countries; 

that  multinational  enterprises  play  an  important 
role  in  this  investment  process; 

that  co-operation  by  Member  countries  can  im- 
prove the  foreign  investment  climate,  encourage  the 
positive  contribution  which  multinational  enterprises 
can  make  to  economic  and  social  progress,  and  mini- 
mise and  resolve  difficulties  which  may  arise  from 
their  various   operations; 

that,  while  continuing  endeavours  within  the 
OECD  may  lead  to  further  international  arrange- 
ments and  agreements  in  this  field,  it  seems  ap- 
propriate at  this  stage  to  intensify  their  co-operation 
and  consultation  on  issues  relating  to  international 
investment  and  multinational  enterprises  through 
inter-related  instruments  each  of  which  deals  with 
a  different  aspect  of  the  matter  and  together  con- 
stitute a  framework  within  which  the  OECD  will 
consider  these  issues: 

Declare : 

I.    Guidelines    for    MNE's 

that    they    jointly     recommend     to     multinational 


'  Adopted  on  June  21  by  the  OECD  Council  meet- 
ing at  ministerial  level  (texts  from  OECD  press 
release    PRESS/A(76)20). 

^  The  Turkish  Government  was  not  in  a  position  to 
participate  in  this  Declaration.  [Footnote  in  original.] 

July  19,  1976 


enterprises  operating  in  their  territories  the  observ- 
ance of  the  Guidelines  as  set  forth  in  the  Annex 
hereto  having  regard  to  the  considerations  and  under- 
standings which  introduce  the  Guidelines  and  are 
an  integral  part  of  them. 

II.    National    Treatment 

1.  that  Member  countries  should,  consistent  with 
their  needs  to  maintain  public  order,  to  protect 
their  essential  security  interests  and  to  fulfil  com- 
mitments relating  to  international  peace  and  secu- 
rity, accord  to  enterprises  operating  in  their  ter- 
ritories and  owned  or  controlled  directly  or  indirectly 
by  nationals  of  another  Member  country  (herein- 
after referred  to  as  "Foreign-Controlled  Enter- 
prises") treatment  under  their  laws,  regulations 
and  administrative  practices,  consistent  with  inter- 
national law  and  no  less  favourable  than  that  ac- 
corded in  like  situations  to  domestic  enterprises 
(hereinafter   referred   to   as   "National   Treatment"). 

2.  that  Member  countries  will  consider  applying 
"National  Treatment"  in  respect  of  countries  other 
than  Member  countries. 

3.  that  Member  countries  will  endeavour  to  ensure 
that  their  territorial  subdivisions  apply  "National 
Treatment". 

4.  that  this  Declaration  does  not  deal  with  the 
right  of  Member  countries  to  regulate  the  entry 
of  foreign  investment  or  the  conditions  of  establish- 
ment of  foreign  enterprises. 

III.   International  Investment   Incentives 
and  Disincentives 

1.  that  they  recognise  the  need  to  strengthen  their 
co-operation  in  the  field  of  international  direct  in- 
vestment. 

2.  that  they  thus  recognise  the  need  to  give  due 
weight  to  the  interests  of  Member  countries  affected 
by  specific  laws,  regulations  and  administrative 
practices  in  this  field  (hereinafter  called  "measures") 
providing  official  incentives  and  disincentives  to  inter- 
national   direct    investment. 

3.  that  Member  countries  will  endeavour  to  make 
such  measures  as  transparent  as  possible,  so  that 
their  importance  and  purpose  can  be  ascertained  and 
that  information  on  them  can  be  readily  available. 

IV.    Consultation  Procedures 

that  they  are  prepared  to  consult  one  another  on 
the  above  matters  in  conformity  with  the  Decisions 
of  the  Council  relating  to  Inter-Governmental  Con- 
sultation Procedures  on  the  Guidelines  for  Multi- 
national Enterprises,  on  National  Treatment  and  on 
International  Investment  Incentives  and  Disincen- 
tives. 

V.  Review 

that  they  will  review  the  above  matters  within 
three  years  with  a  view  to  improving  the  effec- 
tiveness    of     international      economic      co-operation 


83 


among  Member  countries  on  issues  relating  to  inter- 
national   investment    and    multinational    enterprises. 


Text  of  Annex  to  Declaration 

Annex 

to  the  Declaration  of  21st  June,  1976  by  Govern- 
ments of  OECD  Member  Countries  on  Interna- 
tional Investment  and  Multinational  Enterprises 

Guidelines    for    Multinational    Enterprises 

1.  Multinational  enterprises  now  play  an  im- 
portant part  in  the  economies  of  Member  countries 
and  in  international  economic  relations,  which  is 
of  increasing  interest  to  governments.  Through  inter- 
national direct  investment,  such  enterprises  can  bring 
substantial  benefits  to  home  and  host  countries  by 
contributing  to  the  efficient  utilisation  of  capital, 
technology  and  human  resources  between  countries 
and  can  thus  fulfil  an  important  role  in  the  pro- 
motion of  economic  and  social  welfare.  But  the 
advances  made  by  multinational  enterprises  in 
organising  their  operations  beyond  the  national 
framework  may  lead  to  abuse  of  concentrations  of 
economic  power  and  to  conflicts  with  national  policy 
objectives.  In  addition,  the  complexity  of  these  multi- 
national enterprises  and  the  difficulty  of  clearly 
perceiving  their  diverse  structures,  operations  and 
policies  sometimes  give  rise  to  concern. 

2.  The  common  aim  of  the  Member  countries  is  to 
encourage  the  positive  contributions  which  multi- 
national enterprises  can  make  to  economic  and  social 
progress  and  to  minimise  and  resolve  the  difficulties 
to  which  their  various  operations  may  give  rise.  In 
view  of  the  transnational  structure  of  such  enter- 
prises, this  aim  will  be  furthered  by  co-operation 
among  the  OECD  countries  where  the  headquarters  of 
most  of  the  multinational  enterprises  are  established 
and  which  are  the  location  of  a  substantial  part 
of  their  operations.  The  guidelines  set  out  hereafter 
are  designed  to  assist  in  the  achievement  of  this 
common  aim  and  to  contribute  to  improving  the 
foreign  investment  climate. 

3.  Since  the  operations  of  multinational  enterprises 
extend  throughout  the  world,  including  countries  that 
are  not  Members  of  the  Organisation,  international 
co-operation  in  this  field  should  extend  to  all  States. 
Member  countries  will  give  their  full  support  to  ef- 
forts undertaken  in  co-operation  with  non-Member 
countries,  and  in  particular  with  developing  countries, 
with  a  view  to  improving  the  welfare  and  living 
standards  of  all  people  both  by  encouraging  the  posi- 
tive contributions  which  multinational  enterprises 
can  make  and  by  minimising  and  resolving  the  prob- 
lems which  may  arise  in  connection  with  their 
activities. 

4.  Within  the  Organisation,  the  programme  of  co- 
operation to  attain  these  ends  will  be  a  continuing, 
pragmatic   and   balanced   one.    It   comes   within   the 


84 


' 


general  aims  of  the  Convention  on  the  Organisation 
for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development 
(O.E.C.D.)  and  makes  full  use  of  the  various 
specialised  bodies  of  the  Organisation,  whose  terms 
of  reference  already  cover  many  aspects  of  the  role 
of  multinational  enterprises,  notably  in  matters  of 
international  trade  and  payments,  competition,  taxa 
tion,  manpower,  industrial  development,  science  and  j 
technology.  In  these  bodies,  work  is  being  carried 
out  on  the  identification  of  issues,  the  improvement 
of  relevant  qualitative  and  statistical  information 
and  the  elaboration  of  proposals  for  action  designed 
to  strengthen  inter-governmental  co-operation.  In 
some  of  these  areas  procedures  already  exist  through 
which  issues  related  to  the  operations  of  multinational 
enterprises  can  be  taken  up.  This  work  could  result 
in  the  conclusion  of  further  and  complementary 
agreements  and  arrangements  between  goveniments. 

5.  The  initial  phase  of  the  co-operation  programme 
is  composed  of  a  Declaration  and  three  Decisions 
promulgated  simultaneously  as  they  are  comple- 
mentary and  inter-connected,  in  respect  of  guide- 
lines for  multinational  enterprises,  national  treat- 
ment for  foreign-controlled  enterprises  and  inter- 
national investment  incentives  and  disincentives. 

6.  The  guidelines  set  out  below  are  recommenda- 
tions jointly  addressed  by  Member  countries  to  multi- 
national enterprises  operating  in  their  territories. 
These  guidelines,  which  take  into  account  the  prob- 
lems whch  can  arise  because  of  the  international 
structure  of  these  enterprises,  lay  down  standards 
for  the  activities  of  these  enterprises  in  the  different 
Member  countries.  Observance  of  the  guidelines  is 
voluntary  and  not  legally  enforceable.  However, 
they  should  help  to  ensure  that  the  operations  of 
these  enterprises  are  in  harmony  with  national 
policies  of  the  countries  where  they  operate  and  to- 
strengthen  the  basis  of  mutual  confidence  between 
enterprises  and   States. 

7.  Every  State  has  the  right  to  prescribe  the  con 
ditions  under  which  multinational  enterprises  operate 
within  its  national  jurisdiction,  subject  to  interna- 
tional law  and  to  the  international  agreements  tc 
which  it  has  subscribed.  The  entities  of  a  multina- 
tional enterprise  located  in  various  countries  are 
subject  to   the   laws  of  these  countries. 

8.  A  precise  legal  definition  of  multinational  enter- 
prises is  not  required  for  the  purposes  of  the  guide- 
lines. These  usually  comprise  companies  or  other 
entities  whose  ownership  is  private,  state  or  mixed, 
established  in  different  countries  and  so  linked 
that  one  or  more  of  them  may  be  able  to  exercise 
a  significant  influence  over  the  activities  of  others 
and,  in  particular,  to  share  knowledge  and  resources 
with  the  others.  The  degree  of  autonomy  of  each 
entity  in  relation  to  the  others  varies  widely  from 
one  multinational  enterprise  to  another,  depending 
on  the  nature  of  the  links  between  such  entities  and 
the  fields  of  activity  concerned.  For  these  reasons, 
the  guidelines  are  addressed  to  the  various  entities 
within    the    multinational    enterprise    (parent    corn- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


panics  and/or  local  entities)  according  to  the  actual 
distribution  of  responsibilities  among  them  on  the 
understanding  that  they  will  co-operate  and  provide 
assistance  to  one  another  as  necessary  to  facilitate 
observance  of  the  guidelines.  The  word  "enterprise" 
as  used  in  these  guidelines  refers  to  these  various 
entities  in  accordance  with  their  responsibilities. 

9.  The  guidelines  are  not  aimed  at  introducing 
differences  of  treatment  between  multinational  and 
domestic  enterprises;  wherever  relevant  they  reflect 
good  practice  for  all.  Accordingly,  multinational  and 
domestic  enterprises  are  subject  to  the  same  expecta- 
tions in  respect  of  their  conduct  wherever  the  guide- 
lines are   relevant   to   both. 

10.  The  use  of  appropriate  international  dispute 
settlement  mechanisms,  including  arbitration,  should 
be  encouraged  as  a  means  of  facilitating  the  resolu- 
tion of  problems  arising  between  enterprises  and 
Member  countries. 

11.  Member  countries  have  agreed  to  establish 
appropriate  review  and  consultation  procedures  con- 
cerning issues  arising  in  respect  of  the  guidelines. 
When  mliltinational  enterprises  are  made  subject  to 
conflicting  requirements  by  Member  countries,  the 
governments  concerned  will  co-operate  in  good  faith 
with  a  view  to  resolving  such  problems  either  within 
the  Committee  on  International  Investment  and 
Multinational  Enterprises  established  by  the  OECD 
Council  on  21st  January,  1975  or  through  other 
mutually   acceptable   arrangements. 

Having  Regard  to  the  foregoing  considerations, 
the  Member  countries  set  forth  the  following  guide- 
lines for  multinational  enterprises  with  the  under- 
standing that  Member  countries  will  fulfil  their 
responsibilities  to  treat  enterprises  equitably  and 
in  accordance  with  international  law  and  inter- 
national agreements,  as  well  as  contractual  obliga- 
tions to  which   they  have   subscribed: 

General  Policies 

Enterprises   should 

(1)  take  fully  into  account  established  general 
policy  objectives  of  the  Member  countries  in  which 
they    operate; 

(2)  in  particular,  give  due  consideration  to  those 
countries'  aims  and  priorities  with  regard  to  eco- 
nomic and  social  progress,  including  industrial  and 
regional  development,  the  protection  of  the  environ- 
ment, the  creation  of  employment  opportunities,  the 
promotion  of  innovation  and  the  transfer  of  tech- 
nology ; 

(3)  while  observing  their  legal  obligations  con- 
cerning information,  supply  their  entities  with  sup- 
plementary information  the  latter  may  need  in 
order  to  meet  requests  by  the  authorities  of  the 
countries  in  which  those  entities  are  located  for 
information  relevant  to  the  activities  of  those  enti- 
ties, taking  into  account  legitimate  requirements  of 
business   confidentiality; 

July  19,  1976 


(4)  favour  close  co-operation  with  the  local  com- 
munity and  business  interests; 

(5)  allow  their  component  entities  freedom  to  de- 
velop their  activities  and  to  e.\ploit  their  competitive 
advantage  in  domestic  and  foreign  markets,  con- 
sistent with  the  need  for  specialisation  and  sound 
commercial  practice; 

(6)  when  filling  responsible  posts  in  each  country 
of  operation,  take  due  account  of  individual  qualifica- 
tions without  discrimination  as  to  nationality,  subject 
to  particular  national   requirements  in  this   respect; 

(7)  not  render — and  they  should  not  be  solicited 
or  expected  to  render — any  bribe  or  other  improper 
benefit,  direct  or  indirect,  to  any  public  servant  or 
holder  of  public  office; 

(8)  unless  legally  permissible,  not  make  contribu- 
tions to  candidates  for  public  office  or  to  political 
parties    or   other   political    organisations; 

(9)  abstain  from  any  improper  involvement  in 
local    political   activities. 

Disclosure  of  Information 

Enterprises  should,  having  due  regard  to  their 
nature  and  relative  size  in  the  economic  context  of 
their  operations  and  to  requirements  of  business 
confidentiality  and  to  cost,  publish  in  a  form  suited  to 
improve  public  understanding  a  sufficient  body  ot 
factual  information  on  the  structure,  activities  and 
policies  of  the  enterprise  as  a  whole,  as  a  supple- 
ment, in  so  far  as  is  necessary  for  this  purpose,  to 
information  to  be  disclosed  under  the  national  law 
of  the  individual  countries  in  which  they  operate. 
To  this  end,  they  should  publish  within  reasonable 
time  limits,  on  a  i-egular  basis,  but  at  least  annually, 
financial  statements  and  other  pertinent  information 
relating  to  the  enterprise  as  a  whole,  comprising  in 
particular: 

(i)  the  structure  of  the  enterprise,  showing  the 
name  and  location  of  the  parent  company,  its  main 
affiliates,  its  percentage  ownership,  direct  and  in- 
direct, in  these  affiliates,  including  shareholding.s 
between  them; 

(ii)  the  geographical  areas'  where  operations 
are  carried  out  and  the  principal  activities  carried  on 

'  For  the  purposes  of  the  guideline  on  disclosure  of 
information  the  term  "geographical  area"  means 
groups  of  countries  or  individual  countries  as  each 
enterprise  determines  it  appropriate  in  its  particular 
circumstances.  While  no  single  method  of  grouping  is 
appropriate  for  all  enterprises,  or  for  all  purposes, 
the  factors  to  be  considered  by  an  enterprise  would 
include  the  significance  of  operations  carried  out  in 
individual  countries  or  areas  as  well  as  the  effects 
on  its  competitiveness,  geographic  proximity,  eco- 
nomic affinity,  similarities  in  business  environments 
and  the  nature,  scale  and  degree  of  inter-relationship 
of  the  enterprises'  operations  in  the  various  coun- 
tries.  [Footnote  in  original.] 


85 


therein  by  the  parent  company  and  the  main  affili- 
ates; 

(iii)  the  operating  results  and  sales  by  geo- 
graphical area  and  the  sales  in  the  major  lines  of 
business  for  the  enterprise  as  a  whole; 

(iv)  significant  new  capital  investment  by  geo- 
graphical area  and,  as  far  as  practicable,  by  major 
lines  of  business  for  the  enterprise  as  a  whole; 

(v)  a  statement  of  the  sources  and  uses  of  funds 
by  the  enterprise  as  a  whole; 

(vi)  the  average  number  of  employees  in  each 
geographical   area; 

(vii)  research  and  development  expenditure  for 
the  enterprise  as  a  whole; 

(viii)  the  policies  followed  in  respect  of  intra- 
group  pricing; 

(ix)  the  accounting  policies,  including  those  on 
consolidation,  observed  in  compiling  the  published 
information. 

Competition 

Enterprises    should 

while    conforming    to    official    competition    rules    and 

established  policies  of  the  countries  in  which  they 

operate, 

(1)  refrain  from  actions  which  would  adversely 
affect  competition  in  the  relevant  market  by  abusing 
a  dominant  position  of  market  power,  by  means  of, 
for  example, 

(a)  anti-competitive  acquisitions, 

(b)  predatory   behavior   toward   competitors, 

(c)  unreasonable   refusal  to  deal, 

(d)  anti-competitive  abuse  of  industrial  property 
rights, 

(e)  discriminatory  (i.e.  unreasonably  differen- 
tiated) pricing  and  using  such  pricing  transactions 
between  affiliated  enterprises  as  a  means  of  affecting 
adversely  competition  outside  these  enterprises; 

(2)  allow  purchasers,  distributors  and  licensees 
freedom  to  resell,  export,  purchase  and  develop 
their  operations  consistent  with  law,  trade  conditions, 
the  need  for  specialisation  and  sound  commercial 
practice; 

(3)  refrain  from  participating  in  or  otherwise 
purposely  strengthening  the  restrictive  effects  of 
international  or  domestic  cartels  or  restrictive  agree- 
ments which  adversely  affect  or  eliminate  competi- 
tion and  which  are  not  generally  or  specifically  ac- 
cepted under  applicable  national  or  international 
legislation; 

(4)  be  ready  to  consult  and  co-operate,  including 
the  provision  of  information,  with  competent 
authorities  of  countries  whose  interests  are  directly 
affected  in  regard  to  competition  issues  or  investiga- 
tions. Provision  of  information  should  be  in  accord- 
ance with  safeguards  normally  applicable  in  this 
field. 


Financing 

Enterprises  should,  in  managing  the  financial  and 
commercial  operations  of  their  activities,  and  es- 
pecially their  liquid  foreign  assets  and  liabilities, 
take  into  consideration  the  established  objectives  of 
the  countries  in  which  they  operate  regarding 
balance  of  payments  and  credit  policies. 

Taxation 

Enterprises  should 

(1)  upon  request  of  the  taxation  authorities  of 
the  countries  in  which  they  operate,  provide,  in 
accordance  with  the  safeguards  and  relevant  pro- 
cedures of  the  national  laws  of  these  countries,  the 
information  necessary  to  determine  correctly  the 
taxes  to  be  assessed  in  connection  with  their  opera- 
tions, including  relevant  information  concerning 
their  operations  in  other  countries; 

(2)  refrain  from  making  use  of  the  particular 
facilities  available  to  them,  such  as  transfer  pricing 
which  does  not  conform  to  an  arm's  length  standard, 
for  modifying  in  ways  contrary  to  national  laws  the 
tax  base  on  which  members  of  the  group  are  as- 
sessed. 

Employment  and  Industrial  Relations 

Enterprises   should 

within  the  framework  of  law,  regulations  and  pre- 
vailing labour  relations  and  employment  practices, 
in  each  of  the  countries  in  which  they  operate, 

(1)  respect  the  right  of  their  employees  to  be 
represented  by  trade  unions  and  other  bona  fide 
organisations  of  employees,  and  engage  in  con- 
structive negotiations,  either  individually  or  through 
employers'  associations,  with  such  employee  organi- 
sations with  a  view  to  reaching  agreements  on  em- 
ployment conditions,  which  should  include  provisions 
for  dealing  with  disputes  arising  over  the  interpre- 
tation of  such  agreements,  and  for  ensuring  mutually 
respected   rights   and   responsibilities; 

(2)  (a)  provide  such  facilities  to  representatives 
of  the  employees  as  may  be  necessary  to  assist  in  the 
development  of  effective  collective  agreements; 

(b)  provide  to  representatives  of  employees 
information  which  is  needed  for  meaningful  negotia- 
tions on  conditions  of  employment; 

(3)  provide  to  representatives  of  employees  where 
this  accords  with  local  law  and  practice,  information 
which  enables  them  to  obtain  a  true  and  fair  view 
of  the  performance  of  the  entity  or,  where  appropri- 
ate, the  enterprise  as  a  whole; 

(4)  observe  standards  of  employment  and  in- 
dustrial   relations    not    less    favourable    than    those 


86 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


observed  by  comparable  employers  in  the  host  coun- 
try; 

(5)  in  their  operations,  to  the  greatest  extent 
practicable,  utilise,  train  and  prepare  for  upgrad- 
ing members  of  the  local  labour  force  in  co-operation 
with  representatives  of  their  employees  and,  where 
appropriate,  the  relevant  governmental  authorities; 

(6)  in  considering  changes  in  their  operations 
which  would  have  major  effects  upon  the  livelihood 
of  their  employees,  in  particular  in  the  case  of  the 
closure  of  an  entity  involving  collective  lay-offs  or 
dismissals;  provide  reasonable  notice  of  such  changes 
to  representatives  of  their  employees,  and  where  ap- 
propriate to  the  relevant  governmental  authorities, 
and  co-operate  with  the  employee  representative  and 
appropriate  governmental  authorities  so  as  to  miti- 
gate to  the  maximum  extent  practicable  adverse 
effects; 

(7)  implement  their  employment  policies  includ- 
ing hiring,  discharge,  pay,  promotion  and  training 
without  discrimination  unless  selectivity  in  respect 
of  employee  characteristics  is  in  furtherance  of 
established  governmental  policies  which  specifically 
promote  greater  equality  of  employment  oppor- 
tunity; 

(8)  in  the  context  of  bona  fide  negotiations  '  with 
representatives  of  employees  on  conditions  of  em- 
ployment or  while  employees  are  exercising  a  right 
to  organise,  not  threaten  to  utilise  a  capacity  to 
transfer  the  whole  or  part  of  an  operating  unit  from 
the  country  concerned  in  order  to  influence  unfairly 
those  negotiations  or  to  hinder  the  exercise  of  a  right 
to  organise; 

(9)  enable  authorised  representatives  of  their  em- 
ployees to  conduct  negotiations  on  collective  bargain- 
ing or  labour  management  relations  issues  with 
representatives  of  management  who  are  authorised 
to  take  decisions  on  the  matters  under  negotiation. 

Science  and  Technology 
Enterprises  should 

(1)  endeavor  to  ensure  that  their  activities  fit 
satisfactorily  into  the  scientific  and  technological 
policies  and  plans  of  the  countries  in  which  they 
operate,  and  contribute  to  the  development  of  na- 
tional scientific  and  technological  capacities,  includ- 
ing as  far  as  appropriate  the  establishment  and 
improvement  in  host  countries  of  their  capacity  to 
innovate; 

(2)  to  the  fullest  extent  practicable,  adopt  in  the 
course    of   their    business    activities    practices    which 


'  Bona  fide  negotiations  may  include  labour  dis- 
putes as  part  of  the  process  of  negotiation.  Whether 
or  not  labour  disputes  are  so  included  will  be  deter- 
mined by  the  law  and  prevailing  employment  prac- 
tices of  particular  countries.    [Footnote   in  original.] 


July  19,  1976 


permit  the  rapid  diffusion  of  technologies  with  due 
regard  to  the  protection  of  industrial  and  intellectual 
property  rights; 

(3)  when  granting  licenses  for  the  use  of  in- 
dustrial property  rights  or  when  otherwise  trans- 
ferring technology  do  so  on  reasonable  terms  and 
conditions. 


Texts  of  Decisions  of  the  Council  ^ 

Decision  of  the  Council  on  Inter-Governmental 
Consultation  Procedures  on  the  Guidelines 
FOR  Multinational  Enterprises 

The  Council, 

Having  regard  to  the  Convention  on  the  Organisa- 
tion for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development  of 
14th  December,  1960  and,  in  particular,  to  Articles 
2(d),  3  and  5(a)   thereof; 

Having  regard  to  the  Resolution  of  the  Council  of 
21st  January,  1975  establishing  a  Committee  on 
International  Investment  and  Multinational  Enter- 
prises and,  in  particular,  to  paragraph  2  thereof 
[C(74)247(Final)]; 

Taking  note  of  the  Declaration  by  the  Governments 
of  OECD  Member  countries  of  21st  June,  1976  in 
which  they  jointly  recommend  to  multinational 
enterprises  the  observance  of  guidelines  for  multi- 
national enterprises; 

Recognising  the  desirability  of  setting  forth  pro- 
cedures by  which  consultations  may  take  place  on 
matters  related  to  these  guidelines; 

On  the  proposal  of  the  Committee  on  International 
Investment   and   Multinational   Enterprises; 

Decides: 

1.  The  Committee  on  International  Investment  and 
Multinational  Enterprises  (hereinafter  called  the 
"Committee")  shall  periodically  or  at  the  request  of 
a  Member  country  hold  an  e.xchange  of  views  on 
matters  related  to  the  guidelines  and  the  experience 
gained  in  their  application.  The  Committee  shall 
periodically  report  to  the  Council  on  these  matters. 

2.  The  Committee  shall  periodically  invite  the 
Business  and  Industry  Advisory  Committee  to  OECD 
(BIAC)  and  the  Trade  Union  Advisory  Committee  to 
OECD  (TUAC)  to  express  their  views  on  matters 
related  to  the  guidelines  and  shall  take  account  of 
such  views  in  its  reports  to  the  Council. 

3.  On  the  proposal  of  a  Member  country  the  Com- 
mittee may  decide  whether  individual  enterprises 
should  be  given  the  opportunity,  if  they  so  wish, 
to  express  their  views  concerning  the  application 
of  the  guidelines.  The  Committee  shall  not  reach 
conclusions  on  the  conduct  of  individual  enterprises. 

4.  Member   countries   may    request   that   consulta- 


'  Turkey  abstained  on  the  three  decisions. 


87 


tions  be  held  in  the  Committee  on  any  problem 
arising  from  the  fact  that  multinational  enterprises 
are  made  subject  to  conflicting  requirements.  Gov- 
ernments concerned  will  co-operate  in  good  faith 
with  a  view  to  resolving  such  problems,  either  with- 
in the  Committee  or  through  other  mutually  accept- 
able  arrangements. 

5.  This  Decision  shall  be  reviewed  within  a  period 
of  three  years.  The  Committee  shall  make  proposals 
for  this  purpose  as  appropriate. 

Decision  of  the  Council  on  National  Treatment 

The  Council, 

Having  regard  to  the  Convention  on  the  Organisa- 
tion for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development  of 
14th  December,  1960  and,  in  particular.  Articles 
2(c),  2(d),  3   and   5(a)    thereof; 

Having  regard  to  the  Resolution  of  the  Council  of 
21st  January,  1975  establishing  a  Committee  on 
International  Investment  and  Multinational  Enter- 
prises and,  in  particular,  paragraph  2  thereof 
[C(74)247(Final)]; 

Taking  note  of  the  Declaration  by  the  Govern- 
ments of  OECD  Member  countries  of  21st  June,  1976 
on  national  treatment; 

Considering  that  it  is  appropriate  to  establish 
within  the  Organisation  suitable  procedures  for  re- 
viewing laws,  regulations  and  administrative  prac- 
tices (hereinafter  referred  to  as  "measures")  which 
depart  from  "National   Treatment"; 

On  the  proposal  of  the  Committee  on  International 
Investment  and  Multinational  Enterprises; 

Decides  : 

1.  Measures  taken  by  a  Member  country  constitut- 
ing exceptions  to  "National  Treatment"  (including 
measures  restricting  new  investment  by  "Foreign- 
Controlled  Enterprises"  already  established  in  their 
territory)  which  are  in  effect  on  the  date  of  this 
Decision  shall  be  notified  to  the  Organisation  within 
60  days  after  the  date  of  this  Decision. 

2.  Measures  taken  by  a  Member  country  constitut- 
ing new  exceptions  to  "National  Treatment"  (in- 
eluding  measures  restricting  new  investment  by 
"Foreign-Controlled  Enterprises"  already  established 
in  their  territory)  taken  after  the  date  of  this 
Decision  shall  be  notified  to  the  Organisation  within 
30  days  of  their  introduction  together  with  the 
specific  reasons  therefore  and  the  proposed  duration 
thereof. 

3.  Measures  introduced  by  a  territorial  subdivision 
of  a  Member  country,  pursuant  to  its  independent 
powers,  which  constitute  exceptions  to  "National 
Treatment",  shall  be  notified  to  the  Organisation  by 
the  Member  country  concerned,  insofar  as  it  has 
knowledge  thereof,  within  30  days  of  the  responsible 
officials  of  the  Member  country  obtaining  such 
knowledge. 

4.  The  Committee  on  International  Investment  and 
Multinational     Enterprises     (hereinafter    called     the 


"Committee")  shall  periodically  review  the  applica- 
tion of  "National  Treatment"  (including  exceptions 
thereto)  with  a  view  to  extending  such  application 
of  "National  Treatment".  The  Committee  shall  make 
proposals  as  and  when  necessary  in  this  connection. 

5.  The  Committee  shall  act  as  a  forum  for  con- 
sultations, at  the  request  of  a  Member  country, 
in  respect  of  any  matter  related  to  this  instrument 
and  its  implementation,  including  exceptions  to  "Na- 
tional Treatment"  and  their  application. 

6.  Member  countries  shall  provide  to  the  Commit- 
tee, upon  its  request,  all  relevant  information  con- 
cerning measures  pertaining  to  the  application  of 
"National  Treatment"  and  exceptions  thereto. 

7.  This  Decision  shall  be  reviewed  within  a  period 
of  three  years.  The  Committee  shall  make  proposals 
for  this  purpose  as  appropriate. 

Decision  of  the  Council  on  International 
Investment  Incentives  and  Disincentives 

The  Council, 

Having  regard  to  the  Convention  on  the  Organisa- 
tion for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development  of 
14th  December,  1960  and,  in  particular,  Articles 
2(c),  2(d),  2(e),  3  and  5(a)    thereof; 

Having  regard  to  the  Resolution  of  the  Council 
of  21st  January,  1975  establishing  a  Committee  on 
International  Investment  and  Multinational  Enter- 
prises and,  in  particular,  paragraph  2  thereof 
[C(74)247(Final)]; 

Taking  note  of  the  Declaration  by  the  Govern- 
ments of  OECD  Member  countries  of  21st  June,  1976 
on  international  investment  incentives  and  disin- 
centives; 

On  the  proposal  of  the  Committee  on  International 
Investment   and   Multinational   Enterprises; 

Decides  : 

1.  Consultations  will  take  place  in  the  framework 
of  the  Committee  on  International  Investment  and 
Multinational  Enterprises  at  the  request  of  a  Mem- 
oer  country  which  considers  that  its  interests  may 
be  adversely  affected  by  the  impact  on  its  flow  of 
international  direct  investments  of  measures  taken 
by  another  Member  country  specifically  designed 
to  provide  incentives  or  disincentives  for  interna- 
tional direct  investment.  Having  full  regard  to  the 
national  economic  objectives  of  the  measures  and 
without  prejudice  to  policies  designed  to  redress 
regional  imbalances,  the  purpose  of  the  consulta- 
tions will  be  to  examine  the  possibility  of  reducing 
such  effects  to  a  minimum. 

2.  Member  countries  shall  supply,  under  the  con- 
sultation procedures,  all  permissible  information  re- 
lating to  any  measures  being  the  subject  of  the 
consultation. 

3.  This  Decision  shall  be  reviewed  within  a  period 
of  three  years.  The  Committee  on  International  In- 
vestment and  Multinational  Enterprises  shall  make 
proposals  for  this  purpose  as  appropriate. 


88 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Conference  at  Paris  June  22 


Folloiving  is  the  transcript  of  a  news  con- 
ference held  by  Secretary  Kissinger  at  the 
American  Embassy  at  Paris  on  June  22} 

Press   leleavc  317   (iated  June  22 

Secretary  Kissinger:  This  was  supposed  to 
be  a  joint  conference  witli  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury,  but — because  of  bureaucratic 
confusions,  we  hadn't  realized  about  his 
plane — he  has  a  fixed  departure  for  Poland, 
and  he  got  delayed  at  OECD  [Organization 
for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development] . 
So  I  will  answer  all  technical  economic  ques- 
tions and  produce  a  major  crisis  in  inter- 
national finance. 

Basically,  our  attempt  at  the  OECD  meet- 
ing was  to  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  the 
industrial  democracies  possess  the  resources 
to  have  produced  the  highest  standard  of 
living  for  their  peoples  of  any  group,  the 
resources  to  advance  the  growth  of  the  de- 
veloping countries,  and  indeed  the  resources 
to  which  even  countries  of  a  different  eco- 
nomic philosophy  appeal  if  they  want  to  ac- 
celerate their  own  advance. 

Therefore  the  industrial  democracies  have 
the  opportunity,  if  they  coordinate  their  ef- 
forts, to  contribute  to  the  overwhelming 
problem  of  our  period,  which  is  to  construct 
an  international  order — for  the  first  time  in 
history  on  a  global  basis — in  which  all  or  at 
least  most  nations  have  a  sense  of  partici- 
pation. 

And  at  a  time  when  there  is  so  much  talk 
about  who  is  on  the  rise  and  who  is  on  the 
decline,  it  is  important  to  take  stock  of  the 
fact  that,  in  the  main  element  of  what  makes 

'  Other  press  releases  relating  to  the  Secretary'.- 
June  20-23  visit  to  Paris  are  Nos.  312  and  312A  of 
June  20,  314  of  June  21,  315  and  316  of  June  22,  and 
323  of  June  23. 


life  worthwhile  for  people,  it  is  the  industrial 
democracies  that  have  the  capacity  to  help 
both  their  own  people  and  all  of  the  rest  of 
mankind,  if  they  coordinate  their  efforts, 
and  that  this  is  well  within  their  capabilities. 

This  was  the  major  theme  of  our  ap- 
proach ;  this  is  what  we  asked  OECD  to  join 
us  in  doing;  and  this  is  the  basis  for  an  opti- 
mistic appraisal  about  the  prospects  of  world 
order  in  the  next  decade  or  so. 

With  this  I  will  be  glad  to  answer  your 
questions. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  I  am  sure  there  ivill  he 
a  lot  of  questions  about  OECD,  so  I  don't 
suppose  you'll  mind  if  I  ask  for  your  com- 
ments on  the  Italian  elections. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  You  know,  1  didn't 
see  the  final  results  of  the  Italian  election 
until  this  morning,  and  we  have  not  yet  had 
an  opportunity  to  analyze  all  its  nuances  and 
to  discuss  it  with  our  colleagues  here  and  in 
Washington.  I  would  call  attention  to  the 
fact  that  the  democratic  parties — that  is,  the 
non-Communist,  non-Fascist  parties — have 
something  over  56  percent  of  the  vote,  so 
that  the  possibility  of  forming  a  majority 
based  on  democratic  parties  exists.  But  the 
Italian  parties  will  now  have  to  discuss 
among  themselves  about  how  to  proceed. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  ivhat  practical  measures 
has  the  Congress  of  your  country  provided 
for  the  survival  of  the  Cyprus  Republic? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  United  States 
has  repeatedly  stated  its  views  that  a  settle- 
ment of  Cyprus  must  respect  the  dignity  and 
self-respect  of  the  population,  that  the  divid- 
ing lines  cannot  be  the  existing  dividing  lines 
on  Cyprus,  and  that  we  are  in  favor  of  an 
independent  and  united  Cyprus. 


July  19,  1976 


89 


We  have  attempted  to  bring  the  two  par- 
ties together  in  negotiations  at  various  fo- 
rums. I  think  it  is  safe  to  say  that  the  Greek 
and  Turkish  negotiators  throughout  his- 
tory have  not  found  compromise  the  easiest 
road  for  dealing  with  each  other. 

But  the  United  States  strongly  supports  a 
negotiated  settlement,  urges  the  parties  to 
return  to  negotiations  as  rapidly  as  possible, 
and  does  not  exclude  putting  forward  ideas 
of  our  own  once  the  positions  of  the  two 
sides  begin  to  approach  each  other  more.  But 
as  long  as  the  gap  between  the  two  parties  is 
as  wide  as  it  is,  it  is  very  difficult  for  the 
United  States  to  put  forward  a  compromise 
proposal. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  do  you  feel  that  tve  are 
any  closer  to  a  settlement  of  the  Lebanese 
crisis  today  than  ive  were  three  days  ago? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  don't  .see  what  has 
changed  in  the  last  three  days  that  would 
make  a  settlement  of  the  Lebanese  crisis 
easier.  The  problem  remains  substantially 
what  it  has  been  all  along.  The  differences 
between  the  warring  factions  in  Lebanon 
have  proved  extremely  complicated  to  recon- 
cile. Secondly,  even  when  there  is  a  central 
government  there  is  the  problem  of  how  to 
supply  it  with  a  security  force  that  would 
enable  it  to  make  its  writ  run  in  all  of  Leb- 
anon. 

We  strongly  support  any  initiative  that 
bi-ings  the  conflicting  groups  together;  we 
favor  a  negotiation  among  these  factions 
and  among  the  various  groups;  and  we 
strongly  support  a  united  Lebanon  whose  in- 
dependence and  sovereignty  is  respected  and 
in  which  the  various  communities  can  live  in 
security. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  in  Nairobi  the  United 
States  expressed  reservations  concerning  the 
final  agreement.  Here  the  United  States  has 
refused  stabilization  of  raw  materials.  Are 
you  intending  to  place  back  into  question 
the  matter  of  the  consensus  secured  at 
UNCTAD  \_U.N.  Conference  on  Trade  and 
Development']  ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  don't  know  exactly 


what  you're  referring  to.  The  United  States 
has  supported  an  approach  on  a  case-by-case 
basis  to  commodities.  It  has  agreed  at 
UNCTAD,  and  it  continues  to  agree,  to  a 
schedule  by  which  these  commodities  should 
be  negotiated.  It  has  suggested  that  buffer 
stocks  were  the  most  efficient  way  of  doing 
this,  and  it  has  agreed  to  examine  funds  for 
each  commodity  with  which  to  do  it.  The 
United  States  has  expressed  reservations 
about  a  common  fund  for  all  commodities 
and  has  not  agreed  to  proceed  with  this.  But 
the  United  States  is  not  putting  into  ques- 
tion the  consensus  that  was  achieved  at 
UNCTAD. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  could  you  supply  some- 
thing which  may  be  a  footnote — or  may  be 
more  than  a  footnote — to  the  Lebanese  evac- 
uation? Did  the  U.S.  Government  directly 
contact  the  PLO  [Palestine  Liberation  Or- 
ganization'] or  any  agency  of  the  PLO  to, 
first,  arrange  for  the  evacuation  and,  second, 
to  thank  them  for  their  support  and  coopera- 
tion during  it? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  United  States  at 
no  time  has  been  in  direct  contact  with  the 
PLO  during  the  evacuation.  The  United 
States,  of  necessity,  had  to  deal  through 
various  intermediaries  with  the  PLO.  That  is 
to  say,  other  countries  that  have  relations 
with  the  PLO  contacted  the  PLO  about  the 
physical  arrangements  in  an  area  that  was 
controlled  by  Palestinians.  It  wasn't  only  the 
PLO,  there  were  other  Palestinian  groups 
that  controlled  the  area  from  which  the  evac- 
uation took  place. 

There  has  been,  to  the  best  of  my  knowl- 
edge, no  direct  contact  between  the  United 
States  and  the  PLO  on  the  subject,  before  or 
subsequently,  at  any  time  during  the  Leba- 
nese [inaudible].  All  communications  have 
been  through  intermediaries.  And  in  all 
cases,  except  for  a  general  expression  of 
thanks  to  all  people  who  helped,  there  were 
no  messages  at  all.  We  left  it  to  the  interme- 
diaries to  arrange  what  needed  to  be  ar- 
ranged. 

Q.    Mr.    Secretary,    coming    back    to    the 


90 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


(JECD,  does  the  United  States  subscribe  to 
the  OECD  thesis  that  the  strategy  for  the 
rest  of  this  decade  calls  for  only  moderate 
(jroivth,  which  implies  continued  slack  and 
slow  improvement  in  the  unemployment  rate? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  am  sorry  that  my 
friend  [Secretary  of  the  Treasury]  Bill 
Simon  isn't  here.  But  I  would  suppose  that 
any  document  that  we  signed  we  subscribe 
to.  Most  of  the  time  that  is  true. 

Q.  Dr.  Kissinger,  there  has  been  a  lot  of 
talk  about  the  CIEC  {Conference  on  Inter- 
national Economic  Cooperation']  Conference 
in  Paris.  What  concessions  would  you  like 
to  see  from  the  OPEC  {Organization  of 
Petroleum  Exporting  Countries']  countries 
on  energy,  and  do  you  agree  with  the  OPEC 
analysis  that  nuclear  poiver  cannot  make  a 
considerable  contribution  to  the  energy  bal- 
ance of  the  industrialized  ivorld? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  We  are  at  this  mo- 
ment formulating  our  detailed  positions  for 
the  CIEC  Conference.  We  have  always  be- 
lieved and  continue  to  believe  that  the  CIEC 
Conference  is  the  principal  instrument 
through  which  the  dialogue  between  the  de- 
veloped and  the  developing  countries  should 
take  place.  And  we  welcome  the  initiative 
that  brought  it  into  being  and  brought  it  to 
Paris. 

We  will  make  serious  proposals  in  all  of 
the  categories,  in  all  of  the  four  commissions 
in  which  CIEC  is  operating.  We  don't  want  to 
put  it  in  terms  of  what  concessions  do  we 
want  from  any  particular  group.  We  will 
rather  put  it  in  terms  of  a  coherent  program 
in  which  the  concessions  of  both  sides  are 
balanced. 

With  respect  to  nuclear  power,  I  think  it 
is  probably  correct  that  nuclear  power  by 
itself  cannot  replace  oil  as  a  principal  source 
of  energy.  And  it  is  for  this  reason  that  in 
my  remarks  yesterday  I  called  attention  to 
other  substitutes  for  oil. 

But  the  fact  is  that  with  or  without  the 
energy  crisis  the  reserves  of  petroleum  are 
limited  and  the  industrialized  countries  and, 
indeed,  the  i-est  of  the  world  have,  at  most. 


the  rest  of  this  century  to  develop  significant 
alternative  sources  for  energy.  And  this 
must  be  a  major  part  of  our  energy  program. 

Q.  With  regard  to  your  remarks  in  favor 
of  negotiations  on  Lebanon,  hoiv  ivould  you 
assess  the  prospects  for  a  negotiation  noiv? 
And  two,  is  your  meeting  with  American 
Ambassadors  from  the  Middle  East  tonight 
related  in  any  way  to  any  neiv  interrMtioyial 
initiative  on  a  negotiation? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Actually,  the  meet- 
ing with  the  Ambassadors  was  arranged  be- 
fore the  tragic  deaths  of  the  two  American 
diplomats  in  Beirut.  It  seemed  to  me  then 
that  it  was  important  to  have  an  opportunity 
to  get  a  firsthand  view  from  our  Ambassa- 
dors in  those  countries  in  the  Middle  East 
that  are  most  concerned  with  the  Lebanon 
crisis.  And  also  to  give  us  an  opportunity  to 
avoid  misconceptions  about  what  role  the 
United  States  may  or  may  not  have  played 
in  particular  events. 

Out  of  this  meeting  today  I  do  not  expect 
an  American  peace  initiative  for  Lebanon; 
but  we  will  continue,  as  we  have  in  the  past, 
to  support  any  peace  initiative  in  Lebanon 
that  is  promising.  The  tragedy  of  Lebanon 
must  be  ended  as  rapidly  as  possible,  and  our 
Ambassadors  will  be  instructed  to  use  their 
maximum  influence  and  to  offer  their  fullest 
cooperation  to  the  governments  in  the  area 
in  that  effort.  But  the  meeting  today  is  con- 
fined to  Lebanon  and  is  not  dealing  with  Mid- 
dle East  peace  in  general. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  in  all  your  negotiations, 
do  you  find  it  more  difficult  now  to  negotiate 
since  it  is  an  election  year? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  My  megalomania,  of 
course,  reaches  levels  in  which  an  admission 
of  inadequacy  is  next  to  inconceivable.  But 
it  is  obvious  that  in  an  election  year  other 
countries  are  asking  themselves  about  the 
continuity  of  American  foreign  policy.  It  is 
my  belief  that  the  main  lines  of  our  foreign 
policy  reflect  the  permanent  interests  of  the 
United  States  and  will  be  continued.  And  I 
must   honestly   say   I   have   not   found   that 


July  19,  1976 


91 


there  is  a  significant  inhibition  to  the  con- 
duct of  our  diplomacy,  despite  the  excitement 
that  is  occurring  in  the  United  States. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  regarding  Lebanon,  can 
you  tell  us  if  there  is  any  promise  in  either 
the  French  proposal  for  a  roundtable  or  for 
the  French  proposal  for  a  French  force  in 
Lebanon ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  With  respect  to  the 
idea  of  a  roundtable  in  Paris,  the  United 
States  does  not  want  to  commit  itself  to  any- 
one particular  formula.  We  would  certainly 
think  that  a  roundtable  in  a  place  that  ap- 
pears neutral  to  most  of  the  participants 
would  be  an  obvious  solution.  And  if  all  of 
the  parties  were  to  agree  to  come  to  Paris, 
we  would  think  that  was  a  reasonable  venue, 
and  we  would  support  it. 

We  have  not  put  forward  any  particular 
locale,  but  we  would  not  only  have  no  objec- 
tion to  Paris,  we  would  think  it  has  some- 
thing to  commend  it. 

With  respect  to  the  French  force,  as  I  un- 
derstand the  French  proposal,  it  is  that  if  all 
the  parties  ask  for  French  participation,  as 
well  as  the  states  most  concerned,  like  Syria 
and  Egypt,  and  if  there  are  conditions  of 
cease-fire,  then  France  would  be  prepared  to 
send  forces  to  help  assure  the  cease-fire  for  a 
limited  period  of  time. 

If  all  of  these  conditions  are  met,  the 
United  States  would  believe  that  a  French 
force,  especially  under  the  conditions  which 
now  exist,  might  play  a  useful  role.  It  is  not, 
however,  for  us  to  say  whether  a  French  force 
should  go  to  Lebanon.  It  depends,  as  Presi- 
dent Giscard  himself  has  pointed  out,  on  the 
wishes  of  the  Arab  parties  concerned  and  on 
a  prior  achievement  of  a  cease-fire.  If  all  of 
those  conditions  are  met,  the  United  States 
would  certainly  not  object  to  such  a  force. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  how  did  the  OECD  meet- 
ing contribute  to  the  Puerto  Rico  summit 
that  is  planned  for  this  iveekend,  and  tvhat 
do  you  see  as  the  relationship? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  major  topics  that 
wei'e  raised  at  OECD  will  also  be  raised  at 


the  Puerto  Rico  summit,  and  the  OECD 
meeting  gave  an  opportunity  to  exchange  in 
a  wider  circle  some  of  the  issues  that  will  be 
discussed  intensively  in  Puerto  Rico,  and 
they  raised  the  questions  which  the  heads 
of  governments  will  deal  with  in  greater 
detail. 

The  basic  reason  for  the  summits  that 
have  taken  place  within  the  last  year  has 
been  the  conviction  that  the  industrial  de- 
mocracies owe  it  to  their  people  to  demon- 
strate that  they  are  in  control  of  their  des- 
tinies and  that  they  are  willing  to  coordinate 
their  policies  both  for  growth  and  for  devel- 
opment and  perhaps  also  in  other  spheres  of 
economic  activity.  That  will  be  the  basic 
theme  of  the  Puerto  Rico  summit ;  and  in  this 
sense  the  OECD  meeting  should  be  viewed 
as  a  preparatory  conference,  although  it  was 
obviously  not  scheduled  for  that  reason. 

Q.  You  spoke  of  possible  political  pressures 
in  the  East,  as  a  result  of  the  rapid  expan- 
sion of  East-West  trade,  on  particular  West- 
ern comitries.  Can  you  provide  us  with  some 
examples  of  either  ivhere  this  has  taken 
place  in  the  past  or  hypothetical  illustrations 
of  how  it  can  happen  in  the  future? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  What  I  attempted  to 
do  in  my  remarks  yesterday  was  to  call  at- 
tention to  a  series  of  problems  that  can  arise 
over  the  future.  I  did  not  refer  to  any  par- 
ticular difficulties  that  have  in  fact  occurred. 
It  seems  to  me,  however,  that  when  the  trade 
between  the  industrial  democracies  and  the 
state  trading  systems  is  increasing  at  the 
rate  that  it  is,  it  would  be  foolhardy  not  to 
look  at  the  problems  that  could  develop  over 
the  future. 

Obviously,  state  trading  systems,  being 
centrally  controlled  and  subject  to  immediate 
political  direction,  can  switch  their  purchases 
rapidly  from  one  country  to  another;  and 
they  can,  therefore,  if  the  trade  has  reached 
a  certain  level,  bring  about  a  situation  that 
could  have  economic  consequences.  They 
could  cut  off  deliveries  of  what  they  have 
agreed  to  do,  rapidly. 

And  therefore  what  we  would  like  to  do  is 
to  review  the  whole  range  of  problems  that 


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Department  of  State   Bulletin 


could  arise  and  to  establish  for  ourselves 
some  guidelines  by  which  the  industrial  de- 
mocracies could  cooperate;  because  many  of 
these  difficulties  that  one  foresees  could  the- 
oretically be  dealt  with  by  some  of  the  meth- 
ods that  were  tried  out  in  the  lEA  [Interna- 
tional Energy  Agency]  without  any  detri- 
ment to  the  overall  level  of  trade — and,  in- 
deed, to  its  encouragement. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  I  wonder  if  we  might 
ask  yon  again  a  little  bit  more  about  your 
reaction  to  the  Italian  election.  Noic  you 
said  you  hare  not  yet  had  a  chance  to  study 
the  nuances.  However,  the  bare  numbers  are 
there.  I  wonder  if  you  could  categorize  your 
reaction  in  some  tvay.  For  example,  do  the 
results  in  any  way  justify  the  alarm  that 
you  expressed  prior  to  the  vote — the  alarm, 
that  is,  of  a  possible  Communist  participation 
in  the  government? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  never  expressed  un- 
provoked alarm.  And  I  think  it  would  be 
important  for  the  European  press  to  under- 
stand that  almost  all  of  my  comments  on  the 
subject  were  elicited  with  my,  I  must  say, 
not  very  excessive  reluctance. 

But  nevertheless,  the  essential  problem 
which  we  confronted  in  the  spring  has  not 
been  fundamentally  changed  by  the  Italian 
election ;  namely,  whether  the  necessary  re- 
forms in  Italy  should  be  carried  out  by  a 
coalition  of  democratic  parties  or  whether 
they  should  be  carried  out  with  the  partici- 
pation of  the  Communist  Party. 

The  possibility  exists,  as  I  pointed  out,  on 
the  basis  of  the  election,  to  form  a  coalition 
of  democratic  parties,  since  there  is  some- 
thing like  56  percent  of  the  parties  that  are 
neither  Communist  nor  Fascist.  It  is  now  up 
to  the  Italian  political  parties  to  decide  which 
way  they  want  to  direct  Itahan  politics;  and 
beyond  this  I  am  not  prepared  to  go  today. 

Q.  Will  the  EEC  [European  Economic 
Community']  participate  in  the  Puerto  Rico 
summit  ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  participation  of 
the  EEC  is  a  question  that  is  for  the  Euro- 
peans  to   resolve   and   not   for   the   United 


States,  and  therefore  we  will  wait  to  get  a 
European  reaction. 

Q.  Regarding  your  statements  on  energy 
yesterday,  do  you  expect  non-IEA  countries 
like  France  to  join  the  lEA  in  an  attempt 
to  form  a  common  front? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  We  have  in  fact 
achieved  a  high  degree  of  cooperation  be- 
tween France  and  the  lEA,  and  we  are  pre- 
pared to  proceed  on  a  pragmatic  basis.  That 
is  to  say,  we  are  interested  in  the  results  and 
not  in  the  legal  structure,  and  I  believe  it 
would  be  possible  to  work  out  a  parallel  pro- 
gram between  the  lEA  and  France  within 
either  the  framework  of  the  OECD  or 
through  bilateral  arrangements.  We  do  not 
insist  that  France  join  the  IE  A,  and  we  be- 
lieve that  the  program  we  propose  is  achiev- 
able without  formal  participation  of  France. 

Q.  Can  you  elaborate  on  your  statement 
on  Cyprus,  ivith  partic^dar  reference  to  the 
dividing  line? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  have  said  before 
that  it  seems  to  us  that  the  present  dividing 
lines  should  not  be  the  permanent  divid- 
ing lines  on  Cyprus.  What  the  exact  dividing 
lines  should  be  is  what  the  negotiation  is 
supposed  to  accomplish,  and  we  have  urged 
both  parties  to  negotiate  these  issues  as  rap- 
idly as  possible  for  the  sake  of  the  popula- 
tion of  Cyprus,  which  has  suffered  enough, 
and  for  the  sake  of  peace  in  the  eastern 
Mediterranean. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  could  you  give  us  some 
idea  of  the  impact  of  the  events  in  South 
Africa  on  your  approach  to  your  talks  ivith 
Prime  Minister  Vorster? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  purpose  of  my 
meeting  with  Prime  Minister  Vorster  has 
been  to  contribute  to  a  peaceful  evolution  of 
the  problems  of  South  Africa,  an  evolution 
which  would  enable  all  communities  there  to 
live  with  each  other  with  recognition  of  each 
other's  dignity  and  which,  at  the  same  time, 
would  avoid  outside  intervention  and  move 
toward  a  majority  rule,  respect  for  the  mi- 
nority rights,  and  negotiations.  The  meeting 


July  19,  1976 


93 


with  Prime  Minister  Vorster  resulted  from 
the  fact  that  all  black  African  leaders  with 
whom  I  spoke  on  my  recent  trip  urged  me  to 
bring  South  Africa  into  this  process.  And 
within  the  United  States  I  was  urged  by  the 
Black  Caucus  to  bring  South  Africa  into  this 
process.  Last  week,  after  the  riots  in  South 
Africa,  I  met  with  40  African  Ambassadors 
in  Washington,  and  they  unanimously  asked 
me  to  go  ahead  despite  the  riots,  because  the 
riots  underline  the  urgency  of  the  situation. 

As  far  as  the  United  States  is  concerned, 
1  expressed  our  strong  opposition  to  the  sys- 
tem of  legalized  separation  of  the  races  that 
is  taking  place  in  South  Africa.  We  joined 
the  U.N.  Security  Council  consensus  and 
made  a  separate  statement  expressing  our 
strong  opposition  to  the  violence  that  was 
used  ill  the  face  of  the  demonstrations.  And 
we  regret  that  the  meeting  with  the  Prime 
Minister  is  taking  place  in  these  circum- 
stances. 

But  precisely  because  South  Africa  is  such 
an  essential  part  of  any  attempt  to  bring- 
about  a  negotiated  solution  in  southern 
Africa,  because  the  problems  will  not  be 
easier  four  or  eight  weeks  from  now,  we 
have  decided  to  go  ahead  with  these  meet- 
ings— in  full  consultation  with  all  interested 
black  African  states,  with  whose  leaders  we 
have  been  in  close  contact  prior  to  this 
meeting  and  with  whom  we  hope  to  be  in 
close  contact  after  this  meeting. 

The  United  States  is  attempting  to  move 
matters  to  a  solution  through  negotiation 
rather  than  through  violence.  And  it  will  at- 
tempt to  do  what  it  can  to  avoid  outside 
intervention  and  to  permit  a  solution  in 
which  African  problems  are  solved  by  Afri- 
can nations,  and  we  are  doing  this  in  the 
closest  cooperation  with  all  the  states  of 
Africa.  It  is  in  this  spirit  and  not  in  any 
sense  as  an  endorsement  of  anything  that  is 
going  on  in  South  Africa — quite  the  con- 
trary— that  I  am  meeting  the  South  African 
Prime  Minister  tomorrow. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  back  to  the  Middle  East 
for  a  moment,  please.  There  is  a  report — / 
have  not  seen  the  report  fully — out  of  Israel 
that  you  have  told  Ambassador  Dinitz  that. 


for  the  transitional  quarter,  Israel  will  have 
to  get  along  ivith  $200  million  instead  of  the 
$500  million  voted  by  Congress.  Now  I  realize 
that  reports  get  garbled,  and  as  I  say,  I  have 
not  seen  the  report,  so  could  you  clarify  this? 
Has  there  been  such  a  decision  made  by  the 
Administration  to  cut  Israel's  aid  during  the 
transitional  quarter,  and  if  so,  why? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  First  of  all,  it  is  in- 
correct to  characterize  this  as  cutting  Is- 
rael's aid.  The  problem  has  been  how  much 
should  be  added  to  aid  for  Israel  during  the 
transitional  quarter.  The  President  has  been 
attempting  to  work  out  a  compromise  with 
interested  Members  of  the  Congress  on  the 
amount  of  aid  for  Israel,  between  the  sum  of 
$500  million  that  has  been  requested  by 
Israel  as  an  addition  to  the  sums  that  have 
already  been  appropriated  and  what  he  feels 
is  possible  and  will  still  meet  his  budgetary 
ceiling.  To  the  best  of  my  information,  this 
sum  is  still  under  negotiation,  and  therefore 
any  particular  figure  would  be  incorrect. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you  refer  to  interme- 
diaries between  the  United  States  and  the 
PLO.  May  I  ask  if  Egypt  played  a  part  in 
this  capacity?  May  I  ask  you  about  the  pros- 
pect for  a  Geneva  meeting? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  First  of  all,  "inter- 
mediary" between  the  United  States  and  the 
PLO  is  perhaps  too  sweeping  a  word.  The 
United  States  had  the  practical  problem  of 
evacuating  citizens  from  areas  that  were 
controlled  by  Palestinians,  and  therefore  it 
was  necessary  to  make  certain  technical  ar- 
rangements with  the  Palestinians.  In  this 
respect  the  Government  of  Egypt  played  an 
extremely  helpful  role,  for  which  we  are  very 
grateful,  and  we  dealt  with  it  by  stating  our 
requirements  to  the  Government  of  Egypt, 
which  then  dealt  with  whatever  group  they 
felt  was  necessary  to  achieve  it. 

But  they  did  not  pass  any  messages  from 
us  to  any  other  group.  It  was  done  by  the 
Government  of  Egypt  on  its  own  authority. 
There  were  other  Arab  governments  such  as 
the  Government  of  Saudi  Arabia  and  of 
Tunisia  that  were  extremely  helpful  in  ar- 
ranging the  evacuation,  and  we  have  thanked 


94 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


them.  The  President  has  sent  messages  to  all 
of  them. 

With  respect  to  the  resumption  of  the 
Geneva  Conference,  the  United  States  has 
expressed  its  view  that  an  extended  stagna- 
tion of  conditions  in  the  Middle  East  would 
be  dangerous  to  the  peace  of  the  area.  We 
therefore  support  a  peace  process  which  in 
our  view  now  should  proceed  on  all  fronts, 
either  in  stages  or  toward  the  final  settle- 
ment, whichever  the  parties  agree  to. 

We  are  prepared  for  a  resumption  of  the 
Geneva  Conference.  We  are  prepared  to  do 
it  in  any  other  forum  that  indicates  prog- 
ress. We  at  one  point  proposed  the  prepara- 
tory conference  in  order  to  examine  what 
could  be  done,  but  we  are  openminded  in 
this  matter.  The  major  objective  is  to  make 
realistic  progress,  and  we  are  in  touch  with 
all  of  the  parties  in  oi'der  to  achieve  it. 


Secretary  Comments  on  Discussions 
With  South  African  Prime  Minister 

Secretary  Kissinger  met  ivith  Prime  Min- 
ister John  Vorster  of  South  Africa  June  23- 
2Jf  at  Bodenmais  and  Grafenau,  Federal  Re- 
public of  Germany.  Following  is  the  tran- 
script of  a  news  conference  held  by  Secretary 
Kissinger  and  Federal  German  Foreign  Min- 
ister Hans-Dietrich  Genscher  at  Furstenfeld- 
bruck  Airport  on  June  2U-^ 

Press    ielea!^e   327   dated   June   24 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Ladies  and  gentle- 
men, I  primarily  want  to  take  this  oppor- 
tunity to  thank  the  Government  of  the  Fed- 
eral Republic  and  the  Foreign  Minister  for 
the  arrangements  that  were  made  for  my 
meeting  with  the  Prime  Minister  of  South 
Africa.  The  arrangements  could  not  have 
been  better,  and  all  the  technical  arrange- 
ments were  extraordinarily  efficient,  and 
with  the  complicated  transportation  arrange- 
ments. We  would  like  to  express  our  appre- 
ciation to  the  Government  of  the  Federal  Re- 
public, to  the  Chancellor  and  to  the  Foreign 


Minister  for  the  personal  interest  they  have 
taken  in  this. 

I  have  had  a  discussion  with  the  Foreign 
Minister  here,  and  of  course,  as  you  know, 
the  state  of  our  consultation  is  now  such  that 
when  we  don't  see  each  other  for  three  days 
we  both  become  very  lonely,  and  we  will  see 
each  other  again  this  weekend.  But  I  re- 
poi'ted  to  the  Foreign  Minister  about  my  con- 
versations with  the  Prime  Minister  of  South 
Africa  and  his  colleagues,  and  we  also  dis- 
cussed the  preparations  for  Puerto  Rico, 
where  we  will  of  course  meet  again  this 
weekend. 

That  is  all  I  want  to  say  now. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  can  you  tell  us  a  bit  more 
about  your  discussion.^  with  the  South  Afri- 
can Prime  Minister? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  can't  really  add  a 
great  deal  to  what  has  already  been  said. 
The  Prime  Minister  and  I  reviewed  in  great 
detail  all  of  the  aspects  of  the  situation  in 
southern  Africa.  From  the  point  of  view  of 
moving  matters  toward  a  solution  and  avoid- 
ing the  threatening  conflicts  in  that  area, 
we  looked  at  all  the  possibilities  that  have 
been  suggested  by  various  parties. 

The  Prime  Minister  has  to  return  to  South 
Africa  to  talk  to  his  colleagues  and  to  reflect 
about  matters,  and  we  will  follow  up 
through  other  channels  and  stay  in  close 
touch  to  see  what  can  be  done  to  move  mat- 
ters forward. 

The  United  States  stands  by  the  policy 
which  has  been  enunciated  in  Lusaka,  and 
any  solution  in  which  we  participate  will  be 
in  that  framework.^ 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  hoiv  woidd  yon  charac- 
terize the  Prime  Minister's  reactions? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  don't  think  it  would 
be  appropriate  for  me  to  characterize  the  re- 
actions in  any  other  way  than  that  there 
was  a  full  and  detailed  exploration  of  all  the 
methods  that  might  be  used  to  bring  about 
a  solution,  and  I  believe  there  is  an  under- 
standing of  the  seriousness  of  the  situation 


'  For  remarks  by  Secretary  Ki.';singer  at  Grafenau 
on  June  23,  see  press  release  325. 


-■  For  Secretary  Kissinger's  address  at   Lusaka  on 
Apr.  27,  see  Bulletin  of  May  31,  1976,  p.  672. 


July  19,  1976 


95 


and  of  the  need  for — and  of  the  urgency — 
with  which  the  solution  must  be  sought. 

Q.   lUnintelligible.'] 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  I  think  it  is  pre- 
mature to  discuss  this  until  further  dis- 
cussions can  have  been  held,  and  I  will  also 
send  the  Assistant  Seci-etary  of  State  foi- 
African  Affairs  to  Africa  to  report  to  the 
leaders  of  the  black  African  countries  that 
are  most  concerned  with  these  matters  and 
ask  if  we  can  have  their  opinion.  Then  we 
can  be  more  specific. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  your  speech  in  Lusaka 
put  an  emphasis  on  Rhodesia.  Were  your 
talks  primarily  about  Rhodesia,  or  did  you 
spend  0  great  deal  of  time  on  South  Africa 
itself? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  We  said  that  all  the 
problems  of  southern  Africa — which  in- 
cludes Rhodesia,  Namibia,  and  South  Africa 
— -were  discussed. 

Q.  Could  you  expand  on  the  problems  of 
South  Africa?  I  am  not  so  sure  of  what  it  is 
[unintelligible]. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  we  have  stated, 
1  stated,  in  Lusaka  that  the  United  States  is 
against  the  institutionalized  and  legalized 
separation  of  the  races.  And  we,  I  repeat, 
discussed  all  the  problems  of  southern 
Africa. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you  said  before  the  meet- 
ing began  that  you  believe  that  South  Afri- 
ca's participation  was  necessary  to  the  peace- 
ftd  resolution  of  the  probletns  of  [unintel- 
ligible'] it  is  your  impression  that  the  South 
African  [unintelligible]  are  prepared  to  par- 
ticipate in  a  peacef^d  resolution? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  I  think  that  the 
Government  of  South  Africa  will  have  to 
speak  for  itself,  but  the  discussions  started 
from  that  assumption  and  were  carried  out 
in  that  framework.  What  in  fact  can  be 
done  and  what  will  be  done  will  be  deter- 
mined in  the  next  weeks  and  months,  but  we 
believe    that    the    process    that    we    have 


started  in  April  is  still  undei-way  after  these 
discussions. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  did  the  Prime  Minister 
give  much  inspiration  about  ivhites  [unintel- 
ligible] ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  We  have  always 
stated  that  a  solution  in  southern  Africa 
must  take  into  account  not  only  the  claims 
of  the  majority  but  the  rights  of  the  minor- 
ity and  a  solution  must  be  sought  in  the 
framework  in  which  all  communities  can  ex- 
ist within  a  framework  of  dignity  and  self- 
respect. 

Q.   [Unintelligible.] 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  United  States 
has  stated  its  views  on  that  subject  in  the 
U.N.  Security  Council  debate  last  Saturday, 
and  these  views  are  unchanged. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you  mentioned  you  will 
talk  with  [British  Prime  Minister  James] 
Callaghan   tomorroiv    [unintelligible]. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Of  course  I  cannot 
speak  for  the  British  Government.  I  plan  to 
see  Mr.  Crosland  [British  Foreign  Secretary 
Anthony  Crosland]  and  Mr.  Callaghan  to- 
morrow, and  then  over  the  weekend  in 
Puerto  Rico  we  will  have  an  opportunity  to 
talk  to  our  other  colleagues  from  other 
West  European  countries. 

I  would  think  that  Britain  has  an  impor- 
tant role  to  play,  especially  with  respect  to 
Rhodesia,  and  I  would  hope  that  Britain  will 
participate  and  play  a  leading  role  in  the 
evolution  of  the  Rhodesian  question.  But  I 
would  first  like  to  discuss  details  of  this 
with  the  Prime  Minister  and  the  Foreign 
Secretary. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  your  South  African  [un- 
intelligible]. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  I  don't  think 
matters  have  reached  a  point  where  any 
specific  decisions  can  be  communicated  to 
anybody,  and  of  course  you  will  have  to  keep 
in  mind  that  in  this  whole  process  we  have 
to  stay  in  touch,  both  with  the  Government 
of  South  Afi-ica  as  well  as  with  the  govern- 


96 


Department   of   State    Bulletin 


meiits  of  black  Africa.  We  also  have  to  be, 
we  intend  to  be,  in  the  closest  touch  and 
consultation  with  West  European  govern- 
ments that  have  an  interest  in  this  subject, 
and  it  is  quite  premature  to  talk  of  any 
intermediaries. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you  said  before  you  set 
out  that  one  of  the  things  you  wanted  to  find 
out  -tvas  \_unintelligible]  separate  Rhodesia 
from  South  West  Africa.  Do  you  have  a  bet- 
ter idea  what  that  is  now? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  I  have  a  better 
idea  of  the  views  of  the  Soutli  African  Prime 
Minister  and  his  colleagues,  but  of  course  he 
will  have  to  speak  for  himself.  I  think  we 
have  made  clear  that  the  framework — that 
the  process  in  which  we  are  engaged  is 
continuing  and  that  the  framework  for  it  is 
unchanged ;  and  you  may  be  able  to  draw 
some  conclusions  from  that. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  as  a  result  of  these  meet- 
ings have  you  decided  ivhen  you  ivill  ask  for 
[unintelligible]  ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  this  is  a  ques- 
tion for  the  President  to  decide  in  the  light 
of  the  assessment  of  his  legislative  advisers 
as  to  the  situation  in  the  Congress.  I  have 
not  so  distinguished  myself  in  my  under- 
standing of  congressional  sentiment  that  my 
recommendations  would  be  decisive.  But  we 
will  undoubtedly  ask  for  it,  and — 

Q.  There  is  indeed,  but  the  point  is,  do  the 
discussions  do  anything  about  accelerating  or 
delaying   your   recommendations? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  discussions  that 
took  place  are  essentially  not  relevant  to  the 
decision  that  we  will  make  with  respect  to 
the  Byrd  amendment. 

Q.   [Unintelligible.'] 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  I  really  think 
that  is  a  question  that  the  Government  of 
South  Africa  has  to  answer,  which  perhaps 
is  put  this  way  in  a  slightly  extreme  form. 
The  problem  is  whether  it  is  possible  to 
start  an  evolution  in  southern  Africa  in 
which    there    are    sufficient    guarantees    for 


minorities  so  that  the  political  evolution  that 
the  majority  of  the  people  want  is  bearable 
for  the  minorities. 

This  is  the  essence  of  the  problem,  and 
it  should  not  be  viewed  in  terms  of  separat- 
ing oneself  from  any  particular  group. 

Q.  And  did.  you  get  an  ansiver  to  that 
question? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  as  we  have  an- 
nounced, we  discussed  all  aspects  of  the 
problems  in  southern  Africa. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you  spoke  before  of  set- 
ting up  a  process  as  a  result  of  these  meet- 
ings. Did  you  get  any  final  answer?  Do  you 
feel  that  you  have  established  this  process 
[unintelligible]  ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  do  not  know 
whether  there  will  be  any  solution;  but  we 
believe  that  the  process  is  in  motion,  and  we 
hope,  as  we  have  hoped  from  the  beginning, 
to  contribute  toward  a  resolution  that  is 
achieved  by  negotiation  and  not  by  violence 
and  which  respects  the  dignity  of  all  the 
peoples  in  the  area. 

And  I  believe  that  this  process  is  in 
motion. 

Foreign  Minister  Genscher:  I  should  like 
to  add  that  the  Government  of  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany,  like  the  Government 
of  the  United  States,  is  undertaking  efforts 
to  make  its  contribution  toward  a  peaceful 
solution  of  the  problems  besetting  southern 
Africa,  and  we  are  undertaking  these  efforts 
together  with  our  partners  in  the  European 
Community.  And  that  is  why  the  informa- 
tion we  received  from  the  Secretary  of  State 
was  very  important  for  us,  since  the  Chan- 
cellor is  seeing  the  Prime  Minister  of  South 
Africa  tomorrow  to  expi-ess  and  put  before 
him  the  views  of  the  Government  of  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  as  I  did  last 
Tuesday  to  the  Foreign  Minister  of  the  Re- 
public of  South  Africa.  Therefore  I  would 
like  to  take  this  opportunity  again  to  thank 
the  Secretary  of  State  for  the  information 
lie  has  been  making  available  to  me. 

Thank  you  very  much. 


July  19,  1976 


97 


U.S.  Embassy  Officials  Murdered 
in  Lebanon 

Following  are  statements  made  on  June 
16  by  President  Ford  and  Secretary  Kissin- 
ger on  the  deaths  of  U.S.  Ambassador  to 
Lebanon  Francis  E.  Meloy,  Jr.,  Economic 
Counselor  Robert  0.  Waring,  and  Embassy 
chauffeur  Zohair  Moghrabi. 

STATEMENT   BY   PRESIDENT  FORD 

Whitt   House  press    i  elease  dated  June  16 

The  assassination  of  our  Ambassador  in 
Beirut,  Francis  E.  Meloy,  Jr.,  and  of  our 
Counselor  for  Economic  Affairs,  Robert  0. 
Waring,  and  of  their  driver  is  an  act  of 
senseless,  outrageous  brutality.  I  extend  to 
their  families  my  own  deep  sense  of  sorrow 
and  that  of  all  of  the  American  people. 

These  men  were  on  their  way  to  meet 
with  President-elect  Sarkis.  They  were  on  a 
mission  of  peace,  seeking  to  do  what  they 
could  in  the  service  of  their  country  to  help 
restore  order,  stability,  and  reason  to  Leba- 
non. Their  deaths  add  another  tragedy  to  the 
suffering  which  the  Lebanense  people  have 
endured  beyond  measure. 

These  men  had  lived  with  danger  for  many 
weeks  and  did  so  with  dedication  and  dis- 
regard of  personal  safety— as  we  have  come 
to  expect  of  the  Foreign  Service. 

The  goals  of  our  policy  must  remain  un- 
changed. The  United  States  will  not  be 
deterred  in  its  search  for  peace  by  these 
murders. 

I  have  instructed  Secretary  Kissinger  to 
continue  our  intensive  efforts  in  this  direc- 
tion. I  will  name  a  new  Ambassador  to  Leba- 
non within  the  very  near  future  to  resume 
the  mission  of  Ambassador  Meloy,  which  he 
performed  so  brilliantly.^  I  have  also  in- 
structed the  Secretary  to  get  in  touch  with 
all  of  the  governments  in  the  area  and  with 
the   Lebanese   leaders   to   help   identify   the 


murderers  and  to  see  that  they  are  brought 
to  justice.  I  have  also  ordered  that  all  ap- 
propriate resources  of  the  United  States 
undertake  immediately  to  identify  the  per- 
sons or  group  responsible  for  this  vicious  act. 
Those  responsible  for  these  brutal  assassi- 
nations must  be  brought  to  justice.  At  the 
same  time,  we  must  continue  our  policy  of 
seeking  a  peaceful  solution  in  Lebanon.  That 
is  the  way  we  can  best  honor  the  brave  men 
who  gave  their  lives  for  this  country  and  for 
the  cause  of  peace. 

STATEMENT  BY  SECRETARY    KISSINGER 


'  On  June  22  the  White  House  announced  President 
Ford's  designation  of  Talcott  Seelye  to  go  to  Beirut 
as  his  Special  Representative  to  take  charge  of  the 
U.S.   Embassy   temporarily. 


98 


Press    lelease   305   dated   June    16 

I  learned  this  morning  with  profound 
sorrow  of  the  kidnaping  and  brutal  murder 
of  our  Ambassador  to  Lebanon,  Francis  E. 
Meloy,  Jr.,  the  Economic  Counselor  of  our 
Embassy  in  Beirut,  Robert  0.  Waring, 
and  the  Ambassador's  Lebanese  chauffeur, 
Zohair  Moghrabi.  Ambassador  Meloy  and 
Mr.  Waring  were — as  part  of  our  intensive 
effort  to  bring  peace  to  Lebanon— on  their 
way  to  a  meeting  with  President-elect  Sarkis. 
They  disappeared  en  route;  the  three  bodies 
were  later  found  and  their  identities  con- 
firmed. 

The  President's  statement  expressed  the 
shock  and  revulsion  that  all  of  us  feel  at 
this  tragic,  cowardly,  and  senseless  act.  It 
also  expresses  our  determination  not  to  be 
deterred,  by  brutal  and  vicious  action,  from 
the  search  for  peace.  But  equally,  no  nation 
or  group  should  believe  that  the  United 
States  will  not  find  ways  to  protect  its  > 
diplomatic  personnel. 

I  have  commented  before  on  the  particu- 
larly monstrous  injustice  in  violent  death 
coming  to  those  engaged  in  the  work  of 
peace.  The  vicious  cycle  of  violence  and  I 
counterviolence  which  has  engulfed  Lebanon 
for  months  has  now  cost  the  American  peo- 
ple two  of  their  ablest  public  servants. 

The  two  American  diplomats  had  served 
their  country  long  and  faithfully  at  many 
posts  throughout  the  world.  Ambassador 
Meloy,  at  the  President's  request,  had  gone 
to  Beirut  only  a  few  weeks  ago  from  his 

Department  of  State   Bulletin 


previous  post  in  Guatemala  on  very  short 
notice,  fully  realizing  the  dangers  and  chal- 
lenges of  this  important  assignment.  Mr. 
Waring  had  performed  brilliantly  in  Beirut 
over  the  past  year  under  the  most  difficult 
and  hazardous  circumstances.  Mr.  Moghrabi 
has  worked  for  our  Embassy  for  over  20 
years  with  distinction  and  courage. 

These  men  had  faced  the  necessity  of  liv- 
ing with  constant  mortal  danger  in  order  to 
carry  out  their  mission.  They  served  the 
cause  of  peace  and  died  for  their  cause. 
They  did  so  with  the  dedication  and  dis- 
regard of  personal  safety  which  we  have 
come  to  expect  of  our  distinguished  Foreign 
Service. 

The  men,  sadly,  are  gone.  But  duty  re- 
mains. These  senseless  murders  remind  us 
of  the.  urgency  of  that  duty,  and  of  the 
need  for  a  world  free  of  terror  and  living 
with  a  consciousness  of  peace.  We  shall  not 
forget  that,  and  we  shall  be  inspired  by  the 
courage  and  sacrifice  of  our  colleagues. 


President  Ford  Announces  Evacuation 
of  American  Citizens  From  Lebanon 

Following    are    statements    by    President 
Ford  issued  on  June  18  and  June  20. 


STATEMENT  OF  JUNE  18 


White   House  pi 


elease  dated  June  18 


Due  to  the  continuing  uncertainty  of  the 
situation  in  Beirut,  I  have  directed  the  U.S. 
Embassy  there  to  assist  in  the  departure  by 
overland  convoy  to  Damascus  of  U.S.  citizens 
who  wish  to  depart  Lebanon  at  this  time. 

The  convoy  is  expected  to  leave  Beirut 
Saturday,  and  American  citizens  are  being 
alerted  both  by  the  Embassy  and  by  broad- 
cast on  the  Voice  of  America  to  be  prepared 
for  departure  at  that  time,  if  they  so  wish. 

The  remains  of  Ambassador  Francis  Meloy 
and  Mr.  Robert  Waring  have  been  brought 
to  Damascus  overland.  They  will  be  picked 
up  by  a  U.S.  plane  and  returned  to  the 
United  States,  arriving  on  Saturday. 


Only  those  Embassy  officials  not  essential 
to  our  continuing  operations  will  be  leaving 
Lebanon.  The  American  Embassy  in  Beirut 
is  to  remain  open  to  continue  our  efforts  to 
help  bring  an  end  to  the  strife  which  has 
brought  this  tragedy  to  Lebanon. 


STATEMENT  OF  JUNE  20 

White  House  press   release  dated  June  20 

The  evacuation  operation  [by  sea]  in 
Beirut  today  was  completed  successfully 
without  incident.  The  success  of  this  opera- 
tion was  made  possible  through  the  combined 
efforts  of  our  Armed  Forces  and  State  De- 
partment personnel  both  here  and  in  the 
field. 

I  want  to  express  my  deep  appreciation 
and  pride  in  the  outstanding  performance  of 
all  the  men  and  women  who  contributed  to 
this  effort.  We  are  grateful,  as  well,  for  the 
assistance  of  other  governments  and  in- 
dividuals that  facilitated  the  evacuation. 
The  United  States  will  continue  to  play  a 
positive  role  in  seeking  to  restore  stability 
and  bring  peace  to  Lebanon. 

I  would  like  to  express  to  all  those  who 
played  a  part  in  the  success  of  this  opera- 
tion my  heartfelt  thanks. 


U.S.  Vetoes  Admission  of  Angola 
to  the  United  Nations 

Following  is  a  statement  made  in  the  U.N. 
Security  Council  by  U.S.  Representative 
Albert  W.  Sherer,  Jr.,  on  June  23. 

USUN   press   lelease  67  dated   June  23 

First  of  all  I  would  like  to  thank  the  many 
Council  members  who  have  supported  us 
publicly  or  privately  in  our  desire  to  post- 
pone consideration  of  Angola's  application 
until  a  more  propitious  time.  I  do  not  have 
to  name  the  many  Council  members  who 
have  been  helpful;  we  all  know  who  they 
are.  Regrettably,  we  also  know  who  on  this 
Council  has  unhelpfully  ignored  the  inter- 
ests of  Angola  and  instead  yielded  to  the 
temptations  of  short-term  political  gains. 


July  19,  1976 


99 


Mr.  President,  the  United  States  feels 
obliged  to  vote  against  Angola's  application 
at  this  time  because  we  remain  convinced 
that  Angola  does  not  yet  meet  the  require- 
ments for  membership  set  forth  in  article 
4  of  the  charter.'  The  continuing  presence 
and  apparent  influence  of  Cuban  troops,  mas- 
sive in  number  in  the  Angolan  context,  is  the 
basis  of  our  view.  There  is  no  justification 
for  such  a  large  and  armed  foreign  presence 
in  a  truly  independent  African  state: 

— Major  hostilities  have  been  terminated. 
— South  Africa  has  withdrawn  her  troops. 
— Neighboring  African  states  have  begun 
normalizing   relations   with   Angola. 

We  regret  that  the  Angolan  Government 
has  seen  fit,  in  an  apparent  spirit  of  con- 
frontation, to  press  its  application  now,  be- 
fore time  and  developments  in  Angola  might 
have  permitted  a  resolution  of  our  concerns. 
This  is  particularly  regrettable  since  the 
application  cannot  be  acted  upon  by  the 
General  Assembly  in  any  event  for  another 
three  months. 


Measures   To  Limit   Imports 
of  Specialty  Steel  Announced 

Folio  whig  i.s-  a  statement  issued  by  the 
Office  of  the  Special  Representative  for  Trade 
Negotiations  (STR)  on  June  11. 

STR    press   release   22ii    dated   June   U 

An  agreement  limiting  U.S.  imports  of 
specialty  steel  from  Japan  was  signed  on 
June  11  by  Ambassador  Frederick  B.  Dent, 
President  Ford's  Special  Representative  for 
Trade  Negotiations,  and  His  Excellency  Fu- 
mihiko  Togo,  the  Ambassador  of  Japan,  at 
Washington. 

Japan  has  accounted  for  more  than  50  per- 
cent of  recent  U.S.  imports  of  specialty  steel. 


'  The  Council  on  June  2.3  voted  on  the  draft  resolu- 
tion (S/12110)  to  recommend  the  admission  of  the 
People's  Republic  of  Angola  to  the  United  Nations; 
the  vote  was  \'A  in  favor  and  1  (U.S.)  against  (the 
People's  Kepuhlic'  of  China  did  not  participate  in 
the  vote). 


The  orderly  marketing  agreement  calls  for 
U.S.  imports  of  these  products  from  Japan  to 
be  limited  to  66,400  tons  for  the  12-month 
period  from  June  14,  1976,  to  June  13,  1977, 
with  3  percent  annual  increases  in  each  of 
the  two  subsequent  years.  Japan  supplied 
78,500  tons  in  1975,  and  30,900  tons  in  the 
first  four  months  of  1976. 

Following  signature  of  the  U.S.-Japan 
agreement.  Ambassador  Dent  announced 
that  the  President  will  proclaim,  effective 
June  14,'  three-year  restraints  on  U.S.  im- 
ports of  specialty  steel  from  other  foreign 
suppliers,  pursuant  to  his  previous  deter- 
mination on  March  16.  These  actions  are 
based  upon  a  USITC  [U.S.  International 
Trade  Commission]  finding  that  imports  are 
a  substantial  cause  of  serious  injury  to  the 
domestic  industry.  The  USITC  proposed  five- 
year  quotas  as  a  result  of  its  investigation  of 
an  escape  clause  import  relief  petition  filed 
by  the  alloy  tool  and  stainless  (specialty) 
steel  industry  and  the  United  Steelworkers 
of  America  under  the  Trade  Act  of  1974. 

Quotas  imposed  are  as  follows:  The  quota 
for  the  period  June  14,  1976,  to  June  13, 
1977,  is  147,000  tons,  comparable  to  the 
overall  level  recommended  by  the  USITC. 
For  the  1977-78  period,  the  total  quota  is 
151,500  tons;  and  for  1978-79,  155,900  tons. 

The  relief  program  determined  by  the 
President  provides  for  immediate  reductions 
in  total  imports  from  the  1974,  1975,  and 
first-third  1976  levels,  over  which  period 
they  increased  markedly.  Imports  totaled 
151,200  tons  in  1974,  153,700  tons  in  1975, 
and  wei'e  running  at  an  annual  rate  of 
168,900  tons  for  the  first  four  months  of 
1976.  The  1976-77  quota  represents  reduc- 
tions from  those  levels  of  3  percent,  4  per- 
cent, and  14  percent,  respectively. 

Ambassador  Dent  explained  that  the  pro- 
gram provides  for  historical-supplier  market 
shares,  growth  factors,  new-supplier  consid- 
erations, and  authority  to  allocate  specific 
product  coverages  and  to  reallocate  short- 
falls on  a  basis  which  will  assure  equitable 
utilization  of  the  quotas.  It  is  nondiscrimina- 


'  For  text  of  Presidential  Proclamation   No.   4445, 
signed  June  11,  see  41  Fed.  Reg.  24107. 


100 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


tory  and  takes  into  account  both  U.S.  and 
foreign  suppliers'  trade  interests.  The  pro- 
gram was  developed  following  thorough  con- 
sultations with  most  exporting  countries,  in- 
cluding the  principal  suppliers — Japan,  the 
European  Community  (EC),  Sweden,  and 
Canada — and  takes  into  account  the  concerns 
of  exporting  countries.  The  agreement  with 
Japan  provides  for  additional  consultations, 
and  the  United  States  remains  open  to  con- 
sultations with  others. 

Allocations  of  the  quotas  generally  are 
applied  to  supplier  countries  on  the  basis  of 
their  proportionate  import  shares  of  the  U.S. 
market  over  the  five-year  period  1971-75. 
Specific  allocations  are  provided  for  Japan, 
the  EC,  Sweden,  Canada,  and  all  other  sup- 
pliers. These  quotas  will  cover  five  product 
categories:  stainless  steel  sheet  and  strip, 
plate,  bar,  and  rod;  and  alloy  tool  steel.  Ex- 
cluded from  the  quota  program  is  stainless 
steel  strip  imported  for  use  in  the  manufac- 
ture of  razor  blades.  The  USITC  found  that 
currently  this  is  not  being  produced  domes- 
tically. This  exclusion  thus  benefits  consum- 
ers without  jeopardizing  effective  import  re- 
lief of  injury  to  the  domestic  industry. 

Under  the  program,  the  EC  is  allocated  an 
overall  quota,  covering  all  nine  member 
states,  of  32,000  tons.  The  Swedish  quota  is 
24,000  tons;  Canada's,  12,600.  The  "basket" 
quota  for  all  other  countries  as  a  group  is 
12,000  tons.  Each  of  these  quotas  will  be  in- 
creased by  an  additional  3  percent  in 
1978-79. 

In  announcing  the  President's  action.  Am- 
bassador Dent  noted  that  specialty  steel  ton- 
nage represents  less  than  2  percent  of  total 
U.S.  steel  imports. 

After  a  review  of  the  USITC  findings  and 
recommendations  by  the  Cabinet-level  Trade 
Policy  Committee,  the  President  last  March 
instructed  Ambassador  Dent  to  seek  orderly 
marketing  agreements  with  principal  sup- 
plier nations  to  remedy  injury  to  the  domes- 
tic industry  in  a  manner  meeting  the  special 
concerns  of  each  of  the  nations  affected. 

Also  in  March,  the  President  announced 
his  intention  to  proclaim  by  June  14  import 
quotas  at  overall  levels  comparable  to  those 
recommended  by  the  USITC  but  not  neces- 


sarily with  respect  to  specific  country  or 
product  category  allocations  recommended 
by  the  Commission,  in  the  event  that  orderly 
marketing  agreements  were  not  concluded. 
He  also  rejected  as  too  inflexible  the  five- 
year  quota  system  recommended  by  the 
Commission. 

The  President's  March  determination  fur- 
ther provided  that  any  import  restraints 
may  be  relaxed  or  removed  at  any  time  prior 
to  June  1979  when  he  finds — upon  the  advice 
of  the  USITC  and  the  Secretaries  of  Com- 
merce and  Labor — that  the  domestic  indus- 
try is  regaining  a  healthy  production  and 
employment  position. 

In  order  to  record  and  review  both  the 
effectiveness  of  the  restraint  program  an- 
nounced on  June  11  and  the  economic  condi- 
tion of  the  domestic  industry,  a  monitoring 
system  will  be  put  into  effect  immediately. 
This  system  will  provide  current  data  on 
production,  shipments,  employment,  man- 
hours  worked,  imports,  exports,  prices,  and 
consumption,  collected  on  a  monthly  basis 
and  published  quarterly.  Additional  data  also 
will  be  collected  and  made  public  on  profits, 
investment,  capacity,  inventories,  and  orders. 


Congressional  Documents 
Relating  to  Foreign  Policy 


94th  Congress,  2d  Session 

Portugal  (Including  the  Azores)  and  Spain  in  Search 
of  New  Directions.  A  report  by  Senator  Claiborne 
Pell  to  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations. 
March  1976.  22  pp. 

Inter- American  Development  Bank  and  African  Devel- 
opment Fund  Act  of  1976.  Report  of  the  Senate 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  to  accompany  H.R. 
9721.  S.  Kept.  94-673.  March  1,  1976.  31  pp. 

Senate  Committee  on  Intelligence  Activities.  Report 
of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Government  Operations 
to  accompany  S.  Res.  400,  resolution  to  establish 
a  standing  committee  of  the  Senate  on  intelligence 
activities,  and  for  other  purposes;  S.  Rept.  94-67o; 
March  1,  1976;  42  pp.  Report  of  the  Senate  Com- 
mittee on  Rules  and  Administration,  together  with 
minority  views  and  recommendations  of  the  Com- 
mittee on  the  Judiciary,  to  accompany  S.  Res.  400; 
S.  Rept.  94-770;  April  29,  1976;  81  pp. 

International  Petroleum  Exposition.  Report  of  the 
House  Committee  on  International  Relations  to  ac- 


July  19,  1976 


101 


company  H.J.  Res.  296.  H.  Rept.  94-854.  March  1, 
1976.  14  pp. 

Spanish  Base  Treaty.  Hearings  before  the  Senate 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  on  Executive  E 
(94th  Congress,  2d  Session),  the  Treaty  of  Friend- 
ship and  Cooperation  Between  the  United  States 
and  Spain,  signed  at  Madrid  on  January  24,  1976, 
together  with  its  seven  supplementary  agreements 
and  its  eight  related  exchanges  of  notes;  March 
3-24,  1976;  157  pp.  Report  of  the  committee  to 
accompany  Ex.  E,  94-2;  S.  Ex.  Rept.  94-25;  May 
20,  1976;   11  pp. 

Guatemala  Relief  and  Rehabilitation  Act  of  1976. 
Report  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Rela- 
tions to  accompany  S.  3056.  S.  Rept.  94-679.  March 
3,  1976.  11  pp. 

Foreign  Relations  Authorization.  Hearing  before  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations.  March  4, 

1976.  101  pp. 

Report  of  Secretary  of  State  Kissinger  on  His  Trip  to 
Latin  America.  Hearing  before  the  House  Commit- 
tee on  International  Relations.  March  4,  1976.  38  pp. 

Communications  from  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  (Enforcement,  Operations,  and  Tariff 
Affairs)  transmitting  determinations  waiving  the 
imposition  of  countervailing  duties  on  imports  for  a 
temporary  period  not  to  extend  beyond  January 
3,  1979.  Waiver  of  Countervailing  Duties  on  Certain 
Austrian  Cheeses;  H.  Doc.  94-404;  7  pp.  Waiver 
of  Counter\'ailing  Duties  on  Korean  Rubber  Foot- 
wear; H.  Doc.  94—405;  9  pp.  Waiver  of  Counter- 
vailing Duties  on  Certain  Mexican  Steel  Plate;  H. 
Doc.  94-406;  9  pp.  March  11,  1976. 

Proposed  Sale  of  AWAC's  to  NATO.  Hearing  before 
the  Subcommittee  on  Foreign  Assistance  of  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  on  S.  Con. 
Res.  99,  expressing  the  objection  of  the  Congress 
to  the  proposed  sale  of  32  airborne  early  warning 
aircraft  to  NATO;  March  12,  1976;  34  pp.  Hear- 
ing before  the  House  Committee  on  International 
Relations  on  H.  Con.  Res.  576;  March  18,  1976; 
21  pp. 

First  Use  of  Nuclear  Weapons:  Preserving  Responsi- 
ble Control.  Hearings  before  the  Subcommittee  on 
International  Security  and  Scientific  Affairs  of  the 
House  Committee  on  International  Relations. 
March  16-25,   1976.  246  pp. 

Specialty  Steel  Import  Relief  Action.  Message  from 
the  President  of  the  United  States  transmitting  a 
report  on  the  actions  he  will  take  with  respect  to 
stainless  and  alloy  steel  products  covered  by  the 
finding  of  the  International  Trade  Commission.  H. 
Doc.  94-409.  March  16,  1976.  4  pp. 

Foreign    Relations    Authorization    Act,    Fiscal    Year 

1977.  Report  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign 
Relations  to  accompany  S.  3168.  S.  Rept.  94-703. 
March  18,  1976.  31  pp. 

Fishery  Consei-vation  and  Management  Act  of  1976. 
Report  of  the  committee  of  conference  to  accom- 
pany H.R.  200.  H.  Rept.  94-948.  March  24,  1976. 
60  pp. 

International  Navigational  Rules.  Report  of  the  House 
Committee  on  Merchant  Marine  and  Fisheries  to 
accompany  H.R.  5446.  H.  Rept.  94-973.  March  29, 
1976.  69  pp. 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


U.S.  and  Federal  Republic  of  Germany 
Sign  Antitrust  Cooperation  Agreement 

Press   release  330  dated  June  25 

The  Department  of  State  announced  on 
June  25  the  signing  at  Bonn,  Federal  Repub- 
lic of  Germany,  on  June  23  of  an  Antitrust 
Cooperation  Agreement  between  the  United 
States  and  the  Federal  RepubHc  of  Ger- 
many. The  agreement  formalizes  a  long- 
standing practice  of  cooperation  and  provides 
for  exchange  of  nonconfidential  information, 
assistance  in  investigations,  and  coordina- 
tion and  noninterference  in  antitrust  mat- 
ters. The  agreement  is  to  be  carried  out  by 
the  Antitrust  Division  of  the  Department  of 
Justice  and  the  Federal  Trade  Commission 
in  the  United  States,  and  by  the  Ministry  of 
Economy  and  the  Federal  Cartel  Office  in  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany. 


U.S.  and  Ireland  Reach  Understanding 
on  Acceptance  of  Air  Charters 

Department  Announcement ' 

The  United  States  and  Ireland  concluded 
on  May  28  a  memorandum  of  understanding 
on  air  passenger  charter  services  under 
which  each  government  will,  with  some  ex- 
ceptions, accept  as  charterworthy  transat- 
lantic charter  flights  originating  in  the  terri- 
tory of  the  other  government  which  is 
organized  and  operated  pursuant  to  the 
charterworthiness  rules  of  the  other  govern- 
ment. 

The  understanding,  which  supersedes  the 
similar  but  somewhat  more  limited  under- 
standing of  June  29,  1973,  was  brought  into 
force  by  an  exchange  of  notes  in  Dublin.  It 


'  Issued  on  June  4  (text  from  press  release  245, 
which  includes  the  text  of  the  memorandum  of 
understanding). 


102 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


is  expected  to  facilitate  the  operation  of 
charter  flights,  including  the  new  one-stop 
inclusive  tour  charters,  between  the  United 
States  and  Ireland  by  the  airlines  of  both 
countries.  The  understanding  with  Ireland 
is  the  fourth  such  agreement  the  United 
States  has  concluded  to  facilitate  transat- 
lantic charter  operations  during  1976. 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Aviation 

Convention  on  the  international  recognition  of  rights 
in  aircraft.  Done  at  Geneva  June  19,  1948.  Entered 
into  force   September   17,   1953.   TIAS   2847. 
Adherence  deposited:   Luxembourg,   December   16, 
1975. 

Convention  on  offenses  and  certain   other  acts  com- 
mitted on  board  aircraft.  Done  at  Tokyo  September 
14,    1963.    Entered    into    force    December    4,    1969. 
TIAS  6768. 
Ratification     deposited:     Ireland,     November     14, 

1975. 
Accession  deposited:   Turkey.   December   17,   1975. 
Notification    of   succession:    Papua    New    Guinea. 
November  6,  1975. 

Protocol  relating  to  an  amendment  to  the  convention 
on  international  civil  aviation   (TIAS  1591),  Done 
at  New  York  March  12,  1971.   Entered  into  force 
January  16,  1973.  TIAS  7616. 
Ratification  deposited:  Iraq,  February  10,  1976. 

Biological  Weapons 

Convention  on  the  prohibition  of  the  development, 
inoduction  and  stockpiling  of  bacteriological 
(biological)  and  toxin  weapons  and  on  their 
destruction.  Done  at  Washington,  London,  and 
Moscow  April  10,  1972.  Entered  into  force  March 
26,   1975.  TIAS  8062. 

Ratification    deposited:    Sierra    Leone,    June    29, 
1976, 

Customs 

Inti'i-national  cojivention  to  facilitate  the  importation 
iif  commercial  samples  and  advertising  material. 
Done  at  Geneva  November  7,  1952.  Entered  into 
force  November  20,  1955;  for  the  United  States 
October  17,  1957.  TIAS  3920. 

Accession    deposited:    Cuba     (with    reservation). 
April  26,  1976. 

Economic  Cooperation 

Agreement  establishing  a  financial  support  fund  of 
the    Organization    for    Economic    Cooperation    and 
Development.   Done  at  Paris  April  9,  1975.' 
Ratifications   deposited:   Austria,   June   22,    1976; 
Greece,  June  17,  1976, 


Fisheries 

International  convention  for  the  Northwest  Atlantic 

fisheries.   Done   at   Washington    February   8,   1949. 

Entered  into  force  July  3,  1950.  TIAS  2089, 

Notices  of  intention   to  withdraw,   to  be  effective 

December  31,   1976.   unless   withdrawn:   United 

States,  June  22,  1976;  Canada,  June  29,  1976. 

Genocide 

Convention  on  the  prevention  and  punishment  of  the 
crime  of  genocide.  Done  at  Paris  December  9,  1948. 
Entered  into  force  January  12,  1951.' 
Accession  deposited:  Ireland,  June  22,   1976. 

Hydrographic  Organization 

Convention  on  the  International  Hydrographic 
Organization,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Monaco  May 

3,  1967.   Entered    into   force   September   22,    1970. 
TIAS  6933. 

Accession  deposited:  Nigeria,   May  31,   1976. 

Narcotic  Drugs 

Single  convention  on  narcotic  drugs,  1961.  Done  at 
New  York  March  30,  1961.  Entered  into  force 
December  13,  1964;  for  the  United  States  June 
24,    1967.   TIAS   6298. 

Notification  of  succession:  Barbados,  June  21. 
1976. 

Protocol  amending  the  single  convention  on  narcotic 
drugs,  1961.  Done  at  Geneva  March  25,  1972. 
Accession  deposited:   Barbados.   June   21,   1976. 

Racial  Discrimination 

International  convention  on  the  elimination  of  all 
forms  of  racial  discrimination.  Done  at  New  York 
December    21,    1965.    Entered    into    force    January 

4,  1969.= 

Accession  deposited:  Zaire,   April  21,   1976. 

Tin 

Fifth    international    tin    agreement,    with    annexes. 
Done  at  Geneva  June  21,  1975.' 
Notification     of    intention     to     ratify     deposited: 

United  States,  June  29,  1976, 
Acceptance  deposited:  Japan,  June  17,   1976. 

Tonnage  Measurement 

International  convention  on  tonnage  measurement 
of  ships,  1969,  with  annexes.  Done  at  London  June 
23,   1969,' 

Accession  deposited:  Romania  (with  statements), 
May  21,  1976. 

Tourism 

Statutes  of  the  World  Tourism  Organization,  Done 
at  Mexico  City  September  27,  1970.  Entered  into 
force  January  2,  1975;  for  the  United  States 
December   12,   1975. 

Declarations  of  adoption  deposited:  Algeria,  May 
5,  1976;  Czechoslovakia  (with  declaration), 
April  9,  1976;  Hungary,  September  8,  1975; 
Netherlands.  May  10,  1976.' 


July  19,  1976 


'  Not  in  force. 

-  Not  in  force  for  the  United  States. 
'  For  the  Kingdom  in  Europe  and  the  Netherlands 
Antilles. 


103 


Wheat 

Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the  wheat 
trade  convention  (part  of  the  international  wheat 
agreement)  1971.  Done  at  Washington  March  17, 
1976.  Entered  into  force  June  19,  1976,  with  respect 
to  certain  provisions  and  July  1,  1976,  with  respect 
to  other  provisions. 

Declaration    of   provisional   application   deposited: 
Peru.  June  28,  1976. 


BILATERAL 

Canada 

Agreement  relating  to  a  cooperative  program  con- 
cerning the  development  and  procurement  of  a 
space  shuttle  attached  remote  manipulator  system, 
with  memorandum  of  understanding.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Washington  June  23,  1976. 
Entered  into  force  June  23,   1976. 

Egypt 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of 
agricultural  commodities  of  October  28,  1975 
(TIAS  8201).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Cairo  June  14,  1976.  Entered  into  force  June  14, 
1976. 

Finland 

Extradition  treaty.  Signed  at  Helsinki  June  11,  1976. 
Enters  into  force  three  months  after  the  date  of 
the  exchange  of  instruments  of  ratification. 

Federal   Republic  of  Germany 

Agreement  for  research  and  technology  in  the  field 
of  liquid  metal-cooled  fast  breeder  reactors.  Signed 
at  Bonn  June  8,  1976.  Entered  into  force  June  8, 
1976.-' 

Guatemala 

Agreement  relating  to  the  limitation  of  meat  imports 
from  (Juatemala  during  calendar  year  1976.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Guatemala  April 
29,  1976,  Entered  into  force  April  29,  1976. 

Honduras 

Loan  agreement  to  assist  in  financing  Honduras' 
program  for  recovery  and  reconstruction  from  the 
effects  of  Hurricane  "Fifi."  Signed  at  Tegucigalpa 
February  19,  1975.  Entered  into  force  February 
19,  1975. 

Indonesia 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of 
agricultural  commodities  of  April  19,  1976.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Jakarta  June  14 
and  15,  1976.  Entered  into  force  June  15,  1976, 


'  Applicable  to  Land  Berlin. 


GPO  Sales  Publications 

Publications  may  be  ordered  by  catalog  or  stock 
number  from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents. 
U.S.  Govern^nent  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C. 
20402.  A  25-percent  discount  is  made  on  orders  for 
100  or  more  copies  of  any  one  publication  mailed  to 
the  same  address.  Remittances,  payable  to  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  must  accompany 
orders.  Prices  shown  below,  which  include  domestic 
postage,  are  subject  to  change. 

Background  Notes:  Short,  factual  summaries  which 
describe  the  people,  history,  government,  economy, 
and  foreign  relations  of  each  country.  Each  contains 
a  map,  a  list  of  principal  government  officials  and 
U.S.  diplomatic  and  consular  officers,  and  a  reading 
list.  (A  complete  set  of  all  Background  Notes  cur- 
rently in  stock — at  least  140 — $21.80;  1-year  sub- 
scription service  for  approximately  77  updated  or 
new  Notes— $23.10;  plastic  binder— $1.50.)  Single 
copies  of  those  listed  below  are  available  at  35^*  each. 


Togo  .  . 
Turkey  . 
Venezuela 


Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  Tanzania. 
TIAS  8158.  15  pp.  ^t  (Cat.  No.  S9.10:8158). 

Cooperation  in  Agriculture.  Protocol  with  the  Social- 
ist Republic  of  Romania.  TIAS  8166.  14  pp.  35<>. 
(Cat.  No.  S9.10:8166). 

.Suez    Canal    Clearance — Extension   of    Task     Force. 

Agreement  with  Egypt.  TIAS  8170.  3  pp.  35«'.  (Cat. 
No.  S9,10:8170). 

Exhibition  of  Art  Treasures.  Agreement  with  Egypt. 
TIAS  8171.  8  pp.  35*'.  (Cat.  No.  S9.10:8171). 

Cooperation  in  Environmental  Protection,  Agreement 
with  Japan.  TIAS  8172,  16  pp,  SSt*.  (Cat.  No.  S9.10: 
8172). 

Claims — IMarcona  Mining  Company,  Memorandum  of 
Understanding  with  Peru.  TIAS  8173.  7  pp.  35<'.  (Cat. 
No.  S9.10:8173). 

Weather  Station — Cooperative  Program  at  Seawell 
Airport.  Agreement  with  Barbados,  TIAS  8174.  23  pp. 
45^.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:8174), 


Cat. 

No. 

S1.123:T57 

Pub. 

8325 

4  pp 

Cat. 

No. 

S1.123:T84 

Pub. 

7850 

7  pp 

Cat. 

No. 

S1.123:V.55 

Pub. 

7749 

7  pp 

104 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


INDEX     July  19,  1976     Vol.  LXXV,  No.  1934- 


Africa.  Secretary  Comments  on  Discussions 
With  South  African  Prime  Minister  (news 
conference) 

Angola.  U.S.  Vetoes  Admission  of  Angola  to 
the  United  Nations   (Sherer) 

Aviation.  U.S.  and  Ireland  Reach  Understand- 
ing on  Acceptance  of  Air  Charters  .... 

Congress.  Congressional  Documents  Relating 
to    Foreign    Policy 

Cyprus.  Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Confer- 
ence at  Paris  June  22 


Middle  East.  Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Con- 
ference at  Paris  June  22 


Department  and  Foreign  Service 

President     Ford     Announces     Evacuation     of 

American   Citizens   From   Lebanon    (Ford)    . 
U.S.    Embassy   Officials   Murdered   in    Lebanon 

(Ford,    Kissinger) 

Developing  Countries.  The  Cohesion  of  the 
Industrial  Democracies:  The  Precondition  of 
Global  Progress  (Kissinger,  texts  of  OECD 
declaration  on  international  investment  and 
multinational  enterprises  and  decisions  re- 
lating  to   the  declaration) 

Economic  Affairs 

The  Cohesion  of  the  Industrial  Democracies: 
The  Precondition  of  Global  Progress  (Kis- 
singer, texts  of  OECD  declaration  on  in- 
ternational investment  and  multinational 
enterprises  and  decisions  relating  to  the 
declaration) 

Measures  To  Limit  Imports  of  Specialty  Steel 
Announced    (STR    announcement)     .... 

Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Conference  at 
Paris  June  22 

U.S.  and  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  Sign 
Antitrust   Cooperation   Agreement    .... 

Germany.  U.S.  and  Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
many Sign  Antitrust  Cooperation  Agreement 

Industrial  Democracies.  The  Cohesion  of  the 
Industrial  Democracies:  The  Precondition  of 
Global  Progress  (Kissinger,  texts  of  OECD 
declaration  on  international  investment  and 
multinational  enterprises  and  decisions  re- 
lating  to   the    declaration)    .  • 

International    Organizations    and    Conferences. 

The  Cohesion  of  the  Industrial  Democracies: 
The  Precondition  of  Global  Progress  (Kis- 
singer, texts  of  OECD  declaration  on  in- 
ternational investment  and  multinational 
enterprises  and  decisions  relating  to  the 
declaration) 

Ireland.  U.S.  and  Ireland  Reach  Understanding 
on   Acceptance   of  Air  Charters 

Italy.  Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Conference 
at    Paris    June    22 

Lebanon 

President  Ford  Announces  Evacuation  of 
American   Citizens   From   Lebanon    (Ford)    . 

Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Conference  at 
Paris  June  22 

U.S.  Embassy  Officials  Murdered  in  Lebanon 
(Ford,   Kissinger) 


95 

99 

102 

101 

89 


73 
100 


102 
102 


73 
102 


95 


100 


Presidential  Documents 

President     Ford     Announces     Evacuation     of 

American   Citizens  From   Lebanon   .... 

U.S.  Embassy  Officials  Murdered  in  Lebanon  . 

Publications.  GPO  Sales  Publications  .... 

South  Africa 

Secretary  Comments  on  Discussions  With 
South  African  Prime  Minister  (news  con- 
ference)      

Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Conference  at 
Paris  June  22 

Trade.  Measures  To  Limit  Imports  of  Specialty 
Steel   Announced    (STR   announcement)    .     . 

Treaty  Information 

Cui'rent  Actions 103 

U.S.   and   Federal   Republic   of   Germany   Sign 

Antitrust  Cooperation  Agreement  ....  102 
U.S.    and    Ireland     Reach    Understanding    on 

Acceptance    of    Air    Charters 102 

United  Nations.  U.S.  Vetoes  Admission  of 
Angola  to  the  United  Nations  (Sherer)   .     .        99 


Name  Index 

Ford,   President 98,  99 

Genscher,  Hans-Dietrich 95 

Kissinger,    Secretary 73,  89,  95,  98 

Sherer,  Albert  W.,  Jr 99 


Checklist  of 

Department  of  State 

Press  Releases:    June  28-July  4 

Press    releases   may    be    obtained   from    the 

Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 

Washington 

D.C.   20520. 

No.      Date 

Subject 

*334     6/28 

U.S.  and  U.K.  Bicentennial  fellows 

in  creative  and  performing  arts 

named. 

*335     6/28 

Program    for    the    state    visit    of 

Queen  Elizabeth  II. 

t336     6/30 

Kissinger:  interview  with  Die  Zeit. 

*337     6/30 

U.S.  Advisory  Commission  on  In- 

ternational      Educational       and 

Cultural  Affairs,  Aug.   25. 

*338      7/1 

Philip     C.     Habib    sworn     in     as 

Under    Secretary    for    Political 

Affairs  (biographic  data), 
d. 

*  Not  printt 

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(70'^ 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 

BULLETIN 


Volume  LXXV 


No.  1935 


July  26,  1976 


THE  WESTERN  ALLIANCE :  PEACE  AND  MORAL  PURPOSE 

Address  by  Secretary  Kissinger    105 

LEADERS  OF  MAJOR  INDUSTRIAL  DEMOCRACIES  MEET  IN  PUERTO  RICO     116 

CONGRESS  AND  FOREIGN  POLICY 
Statement  by  Assistant  Secretary  McCloskey    139 


THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 

For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


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Vol.  LXXV,  No.  1935 
July  26,  1976 

The  Department  of  State  BULLETIK 
a    weekly   publication   issued   by   tk 
O/Kce  of  Media  Services,  Bureau  c 
Public  Affairs,  provides  ttte  public  an 
interested  agencies  of  tlte  governmen 
Willi  information  on  developments  I 
tlie  field  of  U.S.  foreign  relations 
on  tfte  work  of  tfie  Department  ai 
the  Foreign  Service. 
Tlie     BULLETIN     includes     select 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy,  issue 
by  the  White  House  and  the  Depart 
ment,     and     statements,     addressei 
and  news  conferences  of  the  Presidei 
and  the  Secretary  of  State  and  oth 
officers  of  the  Department,  as  well  t 
special  articles  on  various  phases  t 
international  affairs  and  the  functioiut 
of    the    Department.     Information    is 
included  concerning  treaties  and  inter- 
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national interest. 
Publications    of    the    Department 
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international  relations  are  also  Uatei 


The  Western  Alliance:  Peace  and  Moral  Purpose 


Address  by  Secretary  Kissinger  '• 


On  my  arrival  in  Washington  seven  years 
ago,  one  of  my  first  acts  was  to  gather  a 
group  of  senior  scholars  of  European  affairs 
to  have  them  give  their  advice  to  a  new 
President  on  relations  with  our  allies.  The 
chairman  of  that  group  was  Alastair  Buchan. 

He  should  not  be  held  responsible  for  the 
results.  But  it  was  only  natural  to  seek  his 
counsel.  For  Alastair  was  more  than  a  dis- 
tinguished expert;  he  was  a  consummate 
man  of  the  West.  A  Scot  by  birth,  he  con- 
sidered himself,  and  referred  to  himself,  as 
a  European.  He  lived  many  years  in  the 
United  States  and  visited  us  often,  applying 
his  incisive  mind  to  the  study  of  America 
and  its  role  in  the  world.  He  was  a  champion 
of  the  importance,  indeed,  the  inevitability, 
of  the  transatlantic  tie  between  North 
America  and  Europe. 

Beneath  the  skeptical  air  was  a  passionate 
commitment  to  the  values  and  traditions  we 
cherish  as  Western  civilization.  Sir  Peter 
Ramsbotham  [U.K.  Ambassador  to  the 
United  States]  said  in  his  eulogy  of  Alastair 
in  Washington  that  no  other  countryman  of 
his  had  contributed  more  to  the  understand- 
ing of  international  affairs  and  the  strategic 
implications  of  nuclear  power  in  the  latter 
half  of  the  20th  century.  But  Alastair's  focus 
was  not  simply  the  structure  of  global  poli- 
tics and  the  roots  of  war;  it  was  the  central 
role  of  the  West  in  preserving  peace  and 
giving  it  moral  purpose. 


Made  at  London  on  June  25  before  the  Interna- 
tional Institute  for  Strategic  Studies,  inaugurating 
the  Alastair  Buchan  memorial  lecture  series  (text 
from  press  release  329). 


This  institute  is  a  monument  to  his  quest. 

Alastair  had  that  combination  of  intellect 
and  compassion  known  as  wisdom.  It  moti- 
vated the  great  contribution  he  made  to 
scholarship  and  to  a  generation's  understand- 
ing of  the  transformation  of  international 
relationships.  He  has  left  his  mark  on  every 
person  in  this  hall.  During  the  last  seven 
years  he  never  hesitated  to  scold  me,  in  all 
friendship,  when  he  thought  that  American 
policy  did  not  do  justice  to  the  great  cause 
of  European-American  cooperation. 

I  would  like  to  think  that  had  he  lived  he 
would  feel  that  after  many  starts  we  have 
made  great  strides  in  strengthening  the 
unity  of  the  West.  And  if  that  were  his  con- 
viction, I  for  one  would  be  very  proud. 

Alastair  wrote: 

Structural  changes  are  occurring  in  the  relative 
power  and  influence  of  the  major  states;  there  has 
been  a  quantitative  change  of  colossal  proportions 
in  the  interdependence  of  Western  societies  and  in 
the  demands  we  make  on  natural  resources;  and 
there  are  qualitative  changes  in  the  preoccupations 
of  our  societies. 

He  then  posed  the  question: 

Can  the  highly  industrialized  states  sustain  or 
recover  a  quality  in  their  national  life  which  not 
only  satisfies  the  new  generation,  but  can  act  as  an 
example  or  attractive  force  to  other  societies  ?• 

All  of  US  who  wish  to  honor  Alastair's 
memory  must  do  so  in  the  way  he  would 
want  most  of  all — by  proving  that  the  an- 
swer to  his  question  is  "Yes."  A  world  that 
cries  out  for  economic  advance,  for  social 
justice,  for  political  liberty,  and  for  a  stable 
peace  needs  our  collective  commitment  and 


July  26,  1976 


105 


contribution.  I  firmly  believe  that  the  indus- 
trial democracies  working  together  have  the 
means,  if  they  have  the  will,  to  shape  crea- 
tively a  new  era  of  international  affairs.  In- 
deed, we  are  doing  so  on  many  fronts 
today,  thanks  no  little  to  the  clarity  Alastair 
brought  to  our  purposes  and  directions. 

A  generation  ago.  Western  statesmen 
fashioned  new  institutions  of  collaboration  to 
stave  off  a  common  threat.  Our  progress 
after  30  years  has  been  striking.  Global  war 
has  been  deterred,  and  all  of  the  industrial 
democracies  live  with  an  enhanced  sense  of 
security.  Our  economies  are  the  most  pros- 
perous on  earth;  our  technology  and  produc- 
tive genius  have  proven  indispensable  for  all 
countries  seeking  to  better  the  welfare  of 
their  peoples,  be  they  Socialist  or  develop- 
ing. Our  societies  represent,  more  than  ever, 
a  beacon  of  hope  to  those  who  yearn  for 
liberty  and  justice  and  progress.  In  no  part 
of  the  woi'ld  and  under  no  other  system  do 
men  live  so  well  and  in  so  much  freedom.  If 
performance  is  any  criterion,  the  contest 
between  freedom  and  communism,  of  which 
so  much  was  made  three  decades  ago,  has 
been  won  by  the  industrial  democracies. 

And  yet  at  this  precise  moment,  we  hear 
in  our  countries  premonitions  of  decline, 
anxieties  about  the  travail  of  the  West  and 
the  advance  of  authoritarianism.  Can  it  be 
that  our  deeper  problems  are  not  of  re- 
sources but  of  will,  not  of  power  but  of 
conception  ? 

We  who  overcame  great  dangers  30  years 
ago  must  not  now  paralyze  ourselves  with 
illusions  of  impotence.  We  have  already 
initiated  the  construction  of  a  new  system 
of  international  relations,  this  time  on  a 
global  scale ;  we  must  summon  the  deter- 
mination to  work  toward  it  in  unity  and 
mutual  confidence. 

For  America,  cooperation  among  the  free 
nations  is  a  moral,  and  not  merely  a  practi- 
cal, necessity.  Americans  have  never  been 
comfortable  with  calculations  of  interest  and 
power  alone.  America,  to  be  itself,  needs  a 
sense  of  identity  and  collaboration  with 
other  nations  who  share  its  values. 

Our    association    with    Western    Europe, 


106 


Canada,  and  Japan  thus  goes  to  the  heart  of 
our  national  purpose.  Common  endeavors 
with  our  sister  democracies  raise  the  goals 
of  our  foreign  policy  beyond  physical  sur- 
vival toward  a  peace  of  human  progress  and 
dignity.  The  ties  of  intellectual  civilization, 
democratic  tradition,  historical  association, 
and  more  than  a  generation  of  common  en- 
deavor bind  us  together  more  firmly  than 
could  any  pragmatic  conception  of  national 
interest  alone.  The  unity  of  the  industrial 
democracies  has  been  the  cornerstone  of 
American  foreign  policy  for  30  years,  and 
it  will  remain  so  for  as  far  ahead  as  we 
can  see. 

So  I  would  like  to  pay  tribute  to  Alastair 
this  evening  by  addressing  the  issues  he 
raised :  Can  America,  Europe,  and  the  indus- 
trial democracies  meet  the  challenge  of  the 
world's  future?  What  is  the  state  of  our 
relationship? 

The  United  States  and  a  United  Europe 

In  1973,  with  Viet-Nam  at  last  behind  us, 
and  fresh  from  new  initiatives  with  China 
and  the  Soviet  Union,  the  United  States 
proposed  that  the  collaboration  of  the  indus- 
trial democracies  be  given  new  impetus. 
Military  security,  while  still  crucial,  was  noj 
longer  sufficient  to  give  content  or  political 
cohesion  to  our  broader  relationship  or  to 
retain  support  for  it  from  a  new  genera- 
tion. We  faced  important  East-West  nego- 
tiations on  European  security  and  force  re- 
ductions, a  fresh  agenda  of  international 
economic  problems,  the  challenge  of  shap- 
ing anew  our  relationship  with  the  develop- 
ing world,  and  the  need  to  redefine  relations, 
between  America  and  a  strengthened  and 
enlarged  European  community. 

It  is  academic  to  debate  now  whether  thefiti 
United  States  acted  too  theoretically  in  pro- 
posing to  approach  these  challenges  through 
the  elaboration  of  a  new  Atlantic  Declara- 
tion, or  whether  our  European  friends  acted 
wisely  in  treating  this  proposal  as  a  test  case 
of  European  identity.  The  doctrinal  argu- 
ments of  1973  over  the  procedure  for  Atlan- 
tic   consultations,   or   whether   Europe   was 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


f( 


3xercising  its  proper  global  role,  or  whether 
sconomic  and  security  issues  should  be 
linked,  have  in  fact  been  settled  by  the 
practice  of  consultations  and  cooperation  un- 
precedented in  intensity  and  scope.  The 
reality  and  success  of  our  common  endeavors 
have  provided  the  best  definition  and  re- 
vitalization  of  our  relationship. 

There  is  no  longer  any  question  that 
Euiope  and  the  United  States  must  cooper- 
ate closely  under  whatever  label  and  that  the 
unity  of  Europe  is  essential  to  that  process. 

In  its  early  days,  the  European  Com- 
munity was  the  focus  of  much  American 
idealism,  and  perhaps  of  some  paternalism, 
as  we  urged  models  of  federal  unity  and 
transatlantic  burden  sharing  on  our  Euro- 
pean friends.  By  now,  leaders  on  both  sides 
of  the  Atlantic  have  come  to  understand 
that  European  unity  cannot  be  built  by 
Americans  or  to  an  American  prescription; 
it  must  result  from  European  initiatives. 

The  evolution  of  European  initiatives — 
both  its  successes  and  its  setbacks — in- 
evitably gives  rise  to  new  questions  about 
whether  the  United  States  still  welcomes 
European  unification.  Let  me  take  this  occa- 
sion to  emphasize  our  conviction  that  Euro- 
pean unity  is  crucial  for  Europe,  for  the 
West,  and  for  the  world.  We  strongly  support 
and  encourage  it. 

We  have  perhaps  become  a  little  more 
sophisticated  about  our  contribution  to  the 
process.  We  no  longer  expect  that  it  will 
grow  from  the  desire  to  ease  American 
burdens.  If  Europe  is  to  carry  a  part  of  the 
West's  responsibilities  in  the  world,  it  must 
do  so  according  to  its  own  conceptions  and 
in  its  own  interest. 

Alastair  Buchan  wrote: 

It  is  impossible  to  inspire  Western  Europe  to 
political  unity  or  to  encourage  Japanese  self-reliance 
unless  they  have  the  freedom  and  confidence  to  de- 
fine their  interests  in  every  sphere,  interests  which 
must  be  reconciled  with  those  of  the  United  States 
but  not  subordinated  to  them. 

The  United  States  endorses  this  princi- 
ple wholeheartedly.  It  is  not  healthy  for  the 
United  States  to  be  the  only  center  of  initia- 
tive and  leadership  in  the  democratic  world. 


It  is  not  healthy  for  Europe  to  be  only  a 
passive  participant,  however  close  the  friend- 
ship and  however  intimate  the  consultation. 

We  therefore  welcome  the  fact  that 
Europe's  role  in  global  affairs  is  gaining  in 
vigor  and  eff'ectiveness.  A  vital  and  cohesive 
Western  Europe  is  an  irreplaceable  weight 
on  the  scales  of  global  diplomacy;  American 
policy  can  only  gain  by  having  a  strong  part- 
ner of  parallel  moral  purposes. 

Of  course  we  do  not  want  Europe  to  find 
its  identity  in  opposition  to  the  United 
States.  But  neither  does  any  sensible  Euro- 
pean. Of  course  there  will  be  disagreements 
between  us  of  tactics  and  sometimes  of  per- 
spectives, if  not  of  ends.  But  I  do  not  be- 
lieve that  we  Americans  have  so  lost  confi- 
dence in  ourselves  that  we  must  inhibit  the 
role  of  others  with  whom  we  may  have  occa- 
sional differences  but  who  share  our  highest 
values.  The  wisest  statesmen  on  the  two 
sides  of  the  ocean  have  always  known  that 
European  unity  and  Atlantic  partnership  are 
both  essential  and  mutually  reinforcing. 

So  let  us  finally  put  behind  us  the  debates 
over  whether  Europe's  unity  has  American 
support.  We  consider  the  issue  settled.  Let 
us,  rather,  address  ourselves  to  the  urgent 
challenges  of  mutual  concern  which  a  unit- 
ing Europe,  the  United  States,  and  all  indus- 
trial democracies  must  face  together — com- 
mon defense,  East-West  relations,  and  the 
international  economy. 

Security  and  the  Democracies 

Security  is  the  bedrock  of  all  that  we  do. 
A  quarter  century  ago,  the  American  defense 
commitment  to  Europe  provided  the  shield 
behind  which  Western  Europe  recovered  its 
economic  health  and  political  vitality.  Today, 
our  collective  defense  alliance — and  the  U.S.- 
Japanese relationship — continue  to  be  essen- 
tial for  global  stability.  But  the  nature  of 
security  and  strategy  has  fundamentally 
changed  since  the  time  when  our  alliances 
were  founded: 

— The  Soviet  Union  has  recovered  from 
the  devastation  of  World  War  II  and  pressed 
vigorously  ahead  on  the  path  of  industrial 


July  26,  1976 


107 


growth.  Possessing  resources  on  a  conti- 
nental scale  and  imposing  on  its  people 
enormous  sacrifices  in  the  name  of  its  ideol- 
ogy, the  U.S.S.R.  has  developed  its  economic 
strength  and  technology  to  a  point  where  it 
can  match  the  West  in  many  sectors  of  in- 
dustrial and  military  power.  It  shows  no 
signs  of  changing  its  priorities. 

For  centuries,  it  was  axiomatic  that  in- 
creases in  military  power  could  be  trans- 
lated into  almost  immediate  political  ad- 
vantage. It  is  now  clear  that  in  strategic 
weaponry,  new  increments  of  weapons  or 
destructiveness  do  not  automatically  lead  to 
either  military  or  political  gains.  The  de- 
structiveness of  strategic  weapons  has  con- 
tributed to  the  emergence  of  nuclear  stale- 
mate. Neither  side,  if  it  acts  with  minimum 
prudence,  will  let  the  balance  tip  against  it, 
either  in  an  arms  race  or  in  an  agreement  to 
limit  arms. 

Beneath  the  nuclear  umbrella,  the  temp- 
tation to  probe  with  regional  forces  or  proxy 
wars  increases.  The  steady  growth  of  Soviet 
conventional  military  and  naval  power  and 
its  expanding  global  reach  cannot  be  ignored. 
Conventional  forces  and  military  assistance 
to  allies  assume  pivotal  importance.  We  must 
insure  that  the  strength  and  flexibility  of  all 
forces  capable  of  local  defense  are  enhanced. 
And  we  must  conduct  a  prudent  and  force- 
ful foreign  policy  that  is  prepared  to  use  our 
strength  to  block  expansionism. 

These  new  realities  demand  from  us  steadi- 
ness, above  all.  Democratic  societies  have 
always  fluctuated  in  their  attitude  toward 
defense — between  complacency  and  alarmist 
concern.  The  long  leadtimes  of  modern 
weapons  and  their  complexity  make  both 
these  aberrations  dangerous.  We  cannot 
afford  alternation  between  neglect  and  bursts 
of  frenzy  if  we  are  to  have  a  coherent  de- 
fense program  and  public  support  for  the 
necessary  exertions.  We  need  an  allied  de- 
fense posture  that  is  relevant  to  our  dangers, 
credible  to  lx)th  friends  and  adversaries,  and 
justifiable  to  our  peoples.  And  we  must  be 
prepared  to  sustain  it  over  the  long  term. 
It  is  imperative  that  we  maintain  the  pro- 
grams that  insure  that  the  balance  is  pre- 


served. But  we  owe  it  to  ourselves  to  see  the 
military  balance  in  proper  perspective.  Com- 
placency may  produce  weakness,  but  ex- 
aggeration of  danger  can  lead  to  a  loss  of  j 
will.  To  be  sure,  there  has  been  a  steady 
buildup  of  Soviet  military  power.  But  we 
have  also  seen  to  the  steady  growth  and  im- 
provement of  our  own  forces  over  the  same 
period. 


—We  have  always  had  to  face  Soviet 
ground  forces  larger  than  our  own,  partly 
because  of  the  Soviet  Union's  definition  of  its 
needs  as  a  power  in  the  heart  of  the  Eurasian 
landmass,  with  perceived  threats  on  both 
flanks.  Its  naval  power,  while  a  growing  and 
serious  problem,  is  far  weaker  than  com- 
bined allied  naval  strength  in  terms  of  ton- 
nage, firepower,  range,  access  to  the  sea, 
experience,  and  seamanship. 

—The  United  States,  for  its  part,  is  ex- 
panding its  Army  from  13  to  16  divisions 
through  new  measures  of  streamlining 
forces;  we  are  increasing  our  combat 
forces  in  Europe;  we  plan  to  station  a  new 
Army  brigade  on  the  critical  sector  of  the 
north  German  plain ;  we  are  augmenting  our 
naval  forces.  Our  European  allies  have  com- 
pleted major  programs  to  build  common 
infrastructure.  We  have  undertaken  new 
joint  efforts  of  standardization  and  inter- 
operability of  allied  forces. 

U.S.    strategic    forces    are    superior    in; 

accuracy,  diversity,  reliability,  survivability, 
and  numbers  of  separately  targetable  nu- 
clear warheads.  We  have  a  commanding  lead' 
in  strategic  bombers.  In  addition,  there  are 
American  deployments  overseas  and  the  nu- 
clear forces  of  two  Atlantic  allies. 

Even  with  our  different  priorities,  the 

economic  and  technological  base  whichi 
underlies  Western  military  strength  remains 
overwhelmingly  superior  in  size  and  capacity! 
for  innovation.  The  Soviet  Union  suffers  en- 
demic weakness  in  its  industry  and  agricul 
ture;  recent  studies  indicate  that  this 
chronic  inefficiency  extends  even  into  their 
military  sector  to  a  much  greater  extent 
than  realized  before. 

These  strengths  of  ours  demonstrate  thatf 


108 


Department  of  State  Bulletin] 


uui-  present  security  posture  is  adequate  and 
that  it  is  well  within  our  capacities  to  con- 
tinue to  balance  the  various  elements  of 
Soviet  power.  To  maintain  the  necessai-y  de- 
fense is  a  question  of  leadership  more  than 
of  power.  Our  security  responsibility  is  both 
manageable  and  unending.  We  must  under- 
take significant  additional  efforts  for  the  in- 
definite future.  For  as  far  ahead  as  we  can 
see,  we  will  live  in  a  twilight  area  between 
tranquillity  and  open  confrontation. 

This  is  a  task  for  both  sides  of  the  At- 
lantic. Our  defense  effort  within  the  alliance 

I  '  will  be  importantly  affected  by  the  degree 
to  which  the  American  public  is  convinced 
that  our  allies  share  similar  perceptions  of 
the  military  challenge  and  a  comparable 
determination  to  meet  it.  The  greatest 
threat   to   the   alliance   would   occur  if,   for 

'  whatever  reason — through  misreading  the 
threat,  or  inattention  to  conventional  forces, 
or  reductions  of  the  defense  efforts  of  allies, 
or  domestic  developments  within  NATO  mem- 

I  bers — U.S.  public  support  for  NATO  were 
weakened. 

The  challenge  of  building  sufficient  hard- 

I  ware  is  easier  than  those  of  geopolitical 
understanding,  political  coordination,  and 
above  all,  resolve.  In  the  nuclear  age,  once 
a  change  in  the  geopolitical  balance  has  be- 

I  come  unambiguous,  it  is  too  late  to  do  any- 
thing about  it.  However  great  our  strength, 
it  will  prove  empty  if  we  do  not  resist  seem- 
ingly marginal  changes  whose  cumulative 
impact  can  undermine  our  security.  Power 
serves  little  purpose  without  the  doctrines 
and  concepts  which  define  where  our  inter- 
ests require  its  application. 

Therefore  let  us  not  paralyze  ourselves  by 
a  rhetoric  of  weakness.  Let  us  concentrate 
on  building  the  understanding  of  our  strate- 

■  gic  interests  which  must  underlie  any  policy. 
The  fact  is  that  nowhere  has  the  West  been 
defeated  for  lack  of  strength.  Our  setbacks 
have  been  self-inflicted,  either  because  lead- 
ers chose  objectives  that  were  beyond  our 
psychological  capabilities  or  because  our  leg- 
islatures refused  to  support  what  the  execu- 
tive branch  believed  was  essential.  This — 
and  not  the  various  "gaps"  that  appear  in  the 


American  debate  in  years  divisible  by  four — 
is  the  deepest  security  problem  we  face. 

East-West  Relations 

As  long  ago  as  the  Harmel  report  of  De- 
cember 1967,-  the  Atlantic  alliance  has 
treated  as  its  "two  main  functions"  the  as- 
surance of  military  secui'ity  and  realistic 
measures  to  reduce  tensions  between  East 
and  West.  We  never  considered  confronta- 
tion— even  when  imposed  on  us  by  the  other 
side — or  containment  an  end  in  itself.  Nor 
did  we  believe  that  disagreements  with  the 
Soviet  Union  would  automatically  disappear. 
On  the  contrary,  the  very  concept  of  "de- 
tente" has  always  been  applicable  only  to  an 
adversary  relationship.  It  was  designed  to 
prevent  competition  fi'om  sliding  into  mili- 
tary hostilities  and  to  create  the  conditions 
for  the  relationship  to  be  gradually  and 
prudently  improved. 

Thus,  alliance  policy  toward  the  East  has 
two  necessary  dimensions.  We  seek  to  pre- 
vent the  Soviet  Union  from  transforming  its 
military  power  into  political  expansion.  At 
the  same  time,  we  seek  to  resolve  conflicts 
and  disputes  through  negotiation  and  to 
strengthen  the  incentives  for  moderation  by 
expanding  the  area  of  constructive  relations. 

These  two  dimensions  are  mutually  re- 
inforcing. A  strong  defense  and  resistance 
to  adventurism  are  prerequisites  for  efforts 
of  conciliation.  By  the  same  token,  only  a 
demonstrated  commitment  to  peace  can  sus- 
tain domestic  support  for  an  adequate  de- 
fense and  a  vigilant  foreign  policy.  Our  pub- 
lic and  Congress  will  not  back  policies  which 
appear  to  invite  crises,  nor  will  they  support 
firmness  in  a  crisis  unless  they  are  con- 
vinced that  peaceful  and  honorable  alterna- 
tives have  been  exhausted.  Above  all,  we 
owe  it  to  ourselves  and  to  future  generations 
to  seek  a  world  based  on  something  more 
stable  and  hopeful  than  a  balance  of  terror 
constantly  contested. 


-  For  text  of  the  report  (annex  to  the  communique 
issued  at  the  conclusion  of  the  December  1967  min- 
isterial meeting  of  the  North  Atlantic  Council),  see 
Bulletin  of  Jan.  8,  1968,  p.  50. 


July  26,   1976 


109 


However  we  label  such  a  policy,  it  is  im- 
posed by  the  unprecedented  conditions  of  the 
nuclear  age.  No  statesman  can  lightly  risk 
the  lives  of  tens  of  millions.  Every  American 
President,  after  entering  office  and  seeing 
the  facts,  has  come  to  President  Eisen- 
hower's view  that  there  is  no  alternative  to 
peace. 

Our  generation  has  been  traumatized  by 
World  War  II,  because  we  remember  that 
war  broke  out  as  a  result  of  an  imbalance  of 
power.  This  is  a  lesson  we  must  not  forget. 
But  neither  must  we  forget  the  lesson  of 
World  War  I,  when  war  broke  out  despite  an 
equilibrium  of  power.  An  international  struc- 
ture held  together  only  by  a  balance  of  forces 
will  sooner  or  later  collapse  in  catastrophe. 
In  our  time  this  could  spell  the  end  of  civi- 
lized life.  We  must  therefore  conduct  a  di- 
plomacy that  deters  challenges  if  possible 
and  that  contains  them  at  tolerable  levels  if 
they  prove  unavoidable — a  diplomacy  that 
resolves  issues,  nurtures  restraint,  and 
builds  cooperation  based  on  mutual  interest. 

This  policy  has  critics  in  all  our  countries. 
Some  take  for  granted  the  relative  absence  of 
serious  crises  in  recent  years,  which  the 
policy  has  helped  to  bring  about,  and  then 
fault  it  for  not  producing  the  millennium, 
which  it  never  claimed.  Some  caricature  its 
objectives,  portraying  its  goals  in  more  ex- 
alted terms  than  any  of  its  advocates,  and 
then  express  dismay  at  the  failure  of  reality 
to  conform  to  this  impossible  standard.  They 
describe  detente  as  if  it  meant  the  end  of  all 
rivalry;  when  rivalry  persists,  they  conclude 
that  detente  has  failed  and  charge  its  advo- 
cates with  deception  or  naivete.  They  meas- 
ure the  success  of  policy  toward  adversaries 
by  criteria  that  should  be  reserved  for  tra- 
ditional friendships.  They  use  the  reality  of 
competition  to  attack  the  goal  of  coexistence, 
rather  than  to  illusti'ate  its  necessity. 

In  fact,  this  policy  has  never  been  based  on 
such  hope  or  gullibility.  It  has  always  been 
designed  to  create  conditions  in  which  a  cool 
calculus  of  interests  would  dictate  restraint 
rather  than  opportunism,  settlement  of  con- 
flicts rather  than  their  exacerbation.  West- 
ern policies  can  at  best  manage  and  shape, 
not  assume  away,  East-West  competition. 

110 


A  pivot  of  the  East-West  relationship  is 
the  U.S.-Soviet  negotiation  on  limitation  of 
strategic  arms.  Increasingly,  strategic  forces 
find  their  function  only  in  deterring  and 
matching  each  other.  A  continuing  buildup  of 
strategic  arms  therefore  only  leads  to  fresh 
balances,  but  at  higher  levels  of  expenditures 
and  uncertainties.  In  an  era  of  expanding 
technological  possibilities,  it  is  impossible  to 
make  rational  choices  of  force  planning 
without  some  elements  of  predictability  in 
the  sti-ategic  environment.  Moreover,  a  con- 
tinuing race  diverts  resources  from  other 
needed  areas  such  as  forces  for  regional  de- 
fense, where  imbalances  can  have  serious 
geopolitical  consequences.  All  these  factors 
have  made  arms  limitation  a  practical  inter- 
est of  both  sides,  as  well  as  a  factor  for 
stability  in  the  world. 

We  have  made  considerable  progress  to- 
ward curbing  the  strategic  arms  race  in  re- 
cent years.  We  will  continue  vigorously  to 
pursue  this  objective  in  ways  which  protect 
Western  interests  and  reflect  the  counsel  of 
our  allies. 

In  defining  and  pursuing  policies  of  relax- 
ing tensions  with  the  East,  the  unity  of  the 
industrial  democracies  is  essential.  Our  con- 
sultations have  been  intensive  and  frequent, 
and  the  record  of  Western  cohesion  in  re- 
cent years  has  been  encouraging — in  the 
negotiations  leading  to  the  Four  Powei 
Agreement  on  Berlin,  in  the  mutual  and  bal- 
anced force  reduction  talks,  in  the  SALT 
negotiations  [Strategic  Arms  Limitatior 
Talks],  and  in  the  preparation  for  the  Euro- 
pean Security  Conference. 

Allied  cooperation  and  the  habits  of  con- 
sultation  and  coordination  which  we  have 
formed  will  be  even  more  important  in  the 
future.  For  as  the  policy  of  relaxing  tensions 
proceeds,  it  wiU  involve  issues  at  the  hear! 
of  all  our  interests. 

No  one  should  doubt  the  depth  of  oui 
commitment  to  this  process.  But  we  alsc 
need  to  be  clear  about  its  limits  and  about 
our  conception  of  reciprocity: 

— We  should  require  consistent  patterns! 
of  behavior  in  different  parts  of  the  world 
The  West  must  make  it  clear  that  coexist- 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


line  requires  mutual  restraint,  not  only  in 
Europe  and  in  the  central  strategic  relation- 
ship but  also  in  the  Middle  East,  in  Africa, 
in  Asia— in  fact,  globally.  The  NATO  For- 
eign Ministers,  at  their  Oslo  meeting  last 
month,  stressed  the  close  link  between  sta- 
bility and  security  in  Eui'ope  and  in  the 
world  as  a  whole.  We  must  endorse  this  not 
only  by  our  rhetoric  but  above  all  by  our 
actions. 

—We  should  make  clear  the  tolerable 
definition  of  global  ideological  rivalry.  We 
do  not  shrink  from  ideological  competition. 
We  have  every  reason  for  confidence  in  the 
indestructible  power  of  man's  yearning  for 
freedom.  But  we  cannot  agree  that  ideology 
alone  is  involved  when  Soviet  power  is  ex- 
tended into  areas  such  as  southern  Africa  in 
the  name  of  "national  liberation"  or  when  re- 
gional or  local  instabilities  are  generated  or 
exploited  in  the  name  of  "proletarian  inter- 
nationalism." 

— We  should  not  allow  the  Soviet  Union 
to  apply  detente  selectively  within  the  alli- 
ance. Competition  among  us  in  our  diplo- 
matic or  economic  policies  toward  the  East 
risks  dissipating  Western  advantages  and 
opening  up  Soviet  opportunities.  We  must 
resist  division  and  maintain  the  closest 
coordination. 

The  process  of  improving  East- West  rela- 
tions in  Europe  must  not  be  confined  to  rela- 
tions with  the  Soviet  Union.  The  benefits  of 
relaxation  of  tensions  must  extend  to  East- 
ern as  well  as  Western  Europe.  There  should 
be  no  room  for  misconceptions  about  U.S. 
policy: 

— We  are  determined  to  deal  with  Eastern 
Europe  on  the  basis  of  the  sovereignty  and 
independence  of  each  of  its  countries.  We 
recognize  no  spheres  of  influence  and  no  pre- 
tensions to  hegemony.  Two  American  Presi- 
dents and  several  Cabinet  officials  have  vis- 
ited Romania  and  Poland  as  well  as  non- 
aligned  Yugoslavia,  to  demonstrate  our  stake 
in  the  flourishing  and  independence  of  those 
nations. 

— For  the  same  reason,  we  will  persist  in 
our  efforts  to  improve  our  contacts  and  de- 


velop our  concrete  bilateral  relations  in  eco- 
nomic and  other  fields  with  the  countries  of 
Eastern  Europe. 

— The  United  States  supports  the  efforts 
of  West  European  nations  to  strengthen 
their  bilateral  and  regional  ties  with  the 
countries  of  Eastern  Europe.  We  hope  that 
this  process  will  help  heal  the  divisions  of 
Europe  which  have  persisted  since  World 
War  II. 

— And  we  will  continue  to  pursue  meas- 
ures to  improve  the  lives  of  the  people  in 
Eastern  Europe  in  basic  human  terms — such 
as  freer  emigration,  the  unification  of  fami- 
lies, gi'eater  flow  of  information,  increased 
economic  interchange,  and  more  oppor- 
tunities for  ti'avel. 

The  United  States,  in  parallel  with  its 
allies,  will  continue  to  expand  relationships 
with  Eastern  Europe  as  far  and  as  fast  as  is 
possible.  This  is  a  long-term  process;  it  is 
absurd  to  imagine  that  one  conference  by  it- 
self can  transform  the  internal  structure  of 
Communist  governments.  Rhetoric  is  no  sub- 
stitute for  patient  and  realistic  actions.  We 
will  raise  no  expectations  that  we  cannot 
fulfill.  But  we  will  never  cease  to  assert  our 
traditional  principles  of  human  liberty  and 
national  self-determination. 

The  course  of  East-West  relations  will  in- 
evitably have  its  obstacles  and  setbacks.  We 
will  guard  against  erosion  of  the  gains  that 
we  have  made  in  a  series  of  diflicult  negotia- 
tions ;  we  will  insure  that  agreements  already 
negotiated  are  properly  implemented.  We 
must  avoid  both  sentimentality  that  would 
substitute  good  will  for  strength  and  mock 
toughness  that  would  substitute  posturing 
for  a  clear  conception  of  our  purposes. 

We  in  the  West  have  the  means  to  pursue 
this  policy  successfully.  Indeed,  we  have  no 
realistic  alternative.  We  have  nothing  to 
fear  from  competition:  If  there  is  a  military 
competition,  we  have  the  strength  to  defend 
our  interests;  if  there  is  an  economic  com- 
petition, we  won  it  long  ago;  if  there  is  an 
ideological  competition,  the  power  of  our 
ideas  depends  only  on  our  will  to  uphold  them. 

We  need  only  to  stay  together  and  stay  the 
course.  If  we  do  so,  the  process  of  East-West 


July  26,   1976 


111 


relations  can,  over  time,  strengthen  the  fab- 
ric of  peace  and  genuinely  improve  the  lives 
of  all  the  peoples  around  the  world. 

Our  Economic  Strength 

One  of  the  greatest  strengths  of  the  in- 
dustrial democracies  is  their  unquestioned 
economic  preeminence.  Partly  because  we 
ai-e  committed  to  the  free  market  system 
which  has  given  us  this  preeminence,  we  have 
not  yet  fully  realized  the  possibilities — in- 
deed, the  necessity — of  applying  our  eco- 
nomic strength  constructively  to  shaping  a 
better  international  environment. 

The  industrial  democracies  together  ac- 
count for  65  percent  of  the  world's  produc- 
tion and  70  percent  of  its  commerce.  Our 
economic  performance  drives  international 
trade  and  finance.  Our  investment,  technol- 
ogy, managerial  expertise,  and  agricultural 
productivity  are  the  spur  to  development  and 
well-being  around  the  world.  Our  enormous 
capacities  are  multiplied  if  we  coordinate  our 
policies  and  efforts. 

The  core  of  our  strength  is  the  vitality 
and  growth  of  our  own  economies.  At  the 
Rambouillet  economic  summit  last  Novem- 
ber, at  the  Puerto  Rico  summit  next  week, 
in  the  OECD  [Organization  for  Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development],  and  in  many 
other  forums,  the  major  democratic  nations 
have  shown  their  ability  to  work  together. 

But  an  extensive  agenda  still  summons  us. 
We  will  require  further  efforts  to  continue 
our  recovery  and  promote  noninflationary 
growth.  We  will  need  to  facilitate  adequate 
investment  and  supplies  of  raw  materials. 
We  must  continue  to  avoid  protectionist 
measures,  and  we  must  use  the  opportunity 
of  the  multilateral  trade  negotiations  to 
strengthen  and  expand  the  international 
trading  system.  We  need  to  reduce  our  vul- 
nerability and  dependence  on  imported  oil 
through  conservation,  new  sources  of  energy, 
and  collective  preparations  for  possible  emer- 
gencies. And  we  must  build  on  the  progress 
made  at  Rambouillet  and  at  Jamaica  last 
January  to  improve  the  international  mone- 
tary system. 

Our    central    challenge    is    to    pool    our 

112 


strengths,  to  increase  our  coordination,  and 
to  tailor  our  policies  to  the  long  term.  On  the 
basis  of  solid  cooperation  among  ourselves, 
we  must  deal  more  effectively  with  the  chal- 
lenges of  the  global  economy — such  as  our 
economic  relations  with  the  centrally  planned 
Communist  economies  and  with  the  scores 
of  new  nations  concerned  with  development. 

East-West  economic  interchange,  while 
small  in  relative  scale,  is  becoming  an  im- 
portant economic  and  political  factor.  This 
growth  reflects  our  fundamental  strength. 
It  carries  risks  and  complications,  both  polit- 
ical and  economic.  But  it  also  presents  op- 
portunities for  stabilizing  relations  and  in- 
volving the  Communist  countries  in  responsi- 
ble international  conduct.  If  the  democracies 
pursue  parallel  policies — not  allowing  the 
Communist  states  to  stimulate  debilitating 
competition  among  us  or  to  manipulate  the 
process  for  their  own  unilateral  advantage — 
East-West  economic  relations  can  be  a  factor 
for  peace  and  well-being. 

We  must  insure  that  benefits  are  I'ecipro- 
cal.  We  must  avoid  large  trade  imbalances 
which  could  open  opportunities  for  political 
pressure.  We  should  structure  economic  rela- 
tions so  that  the  Communist  states  will  bei 
drawn  into  the  international  economic  sys- 
tem and  accept  its  disciplines. 

When  dealing  with  centrally  controlled! 
state  economies,  we  have  to  realize  that  eco- 
nomic relations  have  a  high  degree  of  politi- 
cal content  and  cannot  be  conducted  solely  oni 
the  normal  commercial  basis.  Obviously, 
profitability  must  be  one  standard,  but  we 
need  a  broader  strategy,  consistent  with  our 
free  enterprise  system,  so  that  economic 
relations  will  contribute  to  political  objec- 
tives. 

The  industrial  democracies  should  coordi- 
nate their  policies  to  insure  the  orderly  and 
beneficial  evolution  of  East-West  relations. 
To  these  ends,  the  United  States  has  pro- 
posed to  the  OECD  that  we  intensify  our 
analyses  of  the  problems  and  opportunities 
inherent  in  East- West  trade  with  a  view  to;j 
charting  common  objectives  and  approaches. 

If  the  economic  strength  of  the  industrial 
democracies  is    important    to    the    Socialist 


: 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  I 


lountries,  it  is  vital  for  the  developing 
world.  These  nations  seek  to  overcome  per- 
\  asive  poverty  and  to  lift  the  horizons  of 
their  peoples.  They  ask  for  an  equitable 
sliare  of  global  economic  benefits  and  a 
ffieater  role  in  international  decisions  that 
atl'ect  them. 

The  process  of  development  is  crucial  not 
only  for  the  poorer  nations  but  for  the  in- 
dustrial nations  as  well.  Our  own  prosperity 
is  closely  linked  to  the  raw  materials,  the 
niaikets,  and  the  aspirations  of  the  develop- 
ing countries.  An  international  order  can  be 
stal)le  only  if  all  nations  perceive  it  as  fun- 
damentally just  and  are  convinced  that  they 
have  a  stake  in  it.  Over  the  long  term,  co- 
operative North-South  relations  are  thus 
clearly  in  the  interest  of  all,  and  the  objec- 
tives of  industrial  and  developing  countries 
,s/;«»W  be  complementary. 

However,  the  North-South  dialogue  has 
Ijeen  far  from  smooth.  Tactics  of  pressure 
and  an  emphasis  on  rhetorical  victories  at 
conferences  have  too  often  created  an  at- 
mosphere of  confrontation.  Such  attitudes 
oijscure  the  fundamental  reality  that  devel- 
opment is  an  arduous  long-term  enterprise. 
It  will  go  forward  only  if  both  sides  face 
fact.s  without  illusions,  shunning  both  con- 
fi'ontation  and  sentimentahty. 

Far  more  is  involved  than  the  mechanical 
application  of  technology  and  capital  to  pov- 
erty. There  must  be  within  the  developing 
cuuntry  a  sense  of  purpose  and  direction, 
determined  leadership,  and  perhaps  most  im- 
portant, an  impulse  for  change  among  the 
people.  Development  requires  national  ad- 
ministration, a  complex  infrastructure,  a  re- 
vised system  of  education,  and  many  other 
social  reforms.  It  is  a  profoundly  unsettling 
process  that  takes  decades. 

For  many  new  countries  it  is  in  fact  even 
more  difficult  than  similar  efforts  by  the 
Western  countries  a  century  ago,  for  their 
social  and  geographic  conditions  reflect  the 
arbitrary  subdivisions  of  colonial  rule.  Some 
face  obstacles  which  could  not  be  surmounted 
even  with  the  greatest  exertions  on  their 
own.  Their  progress  depends  on  how  well  the 
inteinational  community  responds  to  the  im- 


peratives of  economic  interdependence. 

It  is  senseless,  therefore,  to  pretend  that 
development  can  proceed  by  quick  fixes  or 
one-shot  solutions.  Artificial  majorities  at  in- 
ternational conferences  confuse  the  issue. 
Confrontational  tactics  will  in  time  destroy 
the  domestic  support  in  the  industrial  coun- 
tries for  the  forward-looking  policy  which 
the  developing  countries  so  desperately  need. 

The  industrial  democracies  have  special 
responsibilities  as  well.  Development  re- 
quires their  sustained  and  collective  coopera- 
tion. They  represent  the  largest  markets  and 
most  of  the  world's  technology  and  capital. 
They  have  an  obligation  to  show  understand- 
ing for  the  plight  of  the  poorest  and  the 
striving  for  progress  of  all  developing  na- 
tions. But  they  do  the  developing  countries 
no  favor  if  they  contribute  to  escapism.  If 
they  compete  to  curry  favor  over  essentially 
propagandistic  issues,  contributions  will  be 
diluted,  resources  will  go  unallocated,  and  un- 
workable projects  will  be  encouraged. 

The  developing  countries  need  from  us  not 
a  sense  of  guilt  but  intelligent  and  realistic 
proposals  that  merge  the  interests  of  both 
sides  in  an  expanding  world  economy: 

— First,  we  must  develop  further  the 
mechanisms  of  our  own  cooperation.  To  this 
end  the  United  States  has  made  a  number  of 
concrete  proposals  at  the  recently  concluded 
OECD  meeting. 

— Second,  the  industrial  democracies 
should  coordinate  their  national  aid  pro- 
grams better  so  that  we  use  our  respective 
areas  of  experience  and  technical  skill  to  best 
advantage.  [French]  President  Giscard 
d'Estaing's  proposal  for  an  integrated  West- 
ern fund  for  Africa  is  an  imaginative  ap- 
proach to  regional  development. 

— Third,  we  should  regularly  consult  and 
work  in  close  parallel  in  major  international 
negotiations  and  conferences.  The  Confer- 
ence on  International  Economic  Cooperation ; 
the  multilateral  trade  negotiations;  U.N. 
General  Assembly  special  sessions;  world 
conferences  on  food,  population,  environ- 
ment, or  housing;  and  UNCTAD  [U.N.  Con- 
ference on  Trade  and  Development]  all  can 
achieve  much  more  if  the  industrial  democ- 


July  26,   1976 


113 


racies  approach  them  with  a  clear  and  co- 
herent purpose. 

— Fourth,  we  should  stop  conducting  all 
negotiations  on  an  agenda  not  our  own.  We 
should  not  hesitate  to  put  forward  our  own 
solutions  to  common  problems. 

— And  finally,  we  need  a  clear  longer  term 
strategy  for  development.  The  diverse  ele- 
ments of  the  process,  including  various  forms 
of  assistance,  technology  transfer,  and  trade 
and  financial  policy,  must  be  better  inte- 
grated. 

Cooperation  among  developed  countries  is 
not  confrontation  between  North  and  South, 
as  is  often  alleged.  The  fact  is  that  a  respon- 
sible development  policy  is  possible  only  if 
the  industrial  democracies  pursue  realistic 
goals  with  conviction,  compassion,  and  coor- 
dination. They  must  not  delude  themselves  or 
their  interlocutors  by  easy  panaceas,  or  mis- 
take slogans  for  progress.  We  make  the 
greatest  contribution  to  development  if  we 
insist  that  the  North-South  dialogue  empha- 
size substance  rather  than  ideology  and  con- 
centrate on  practical  programs  instead  of 
empty  theological  debates. 


The  Future  of  Democratic  Societies 

In  every  dimension  of  our  activities,  then, 
the  industrial  democracies  enter  the  new  era 
with  substantial  capacities  and  opportunities. 
At  the  same  time,  it  would  be  idle  to  deny 
that  in  recent  years  the  moral  stamina  of  the 
West  has  been  seriously  challenged. 

Since  its  beginnings.  Western  civilization 
has  clearly  defined  the  individual's  relation- 
ship to  society  and  the  state.  In  southern 
Europe,  the  humanism  of  the  Renaissance 
made  man  the  measure  of  all  things.  In 
northern  Europe,  the  Reformation,  in  pro- 
claiming the  priesthood  of  all  believers  and 
off'ering  rewards  for  individual  effort,  put  the 
emphasis  on  the  individual.  In  England,  the 
sense  of  justice  and  human  rights  and  re- 
sponsibilities evolved  in  the  elaboration  of 
the  common  law.  Two  hundred  years  ago  the 
authors  of  our  Declaration  of  Independence 
drew  upon  this  heritage;  to  them  every  hu- 


man being  had  inalienable  rights  to  life,  lib- 
erty, and  the  pursuit  of  happiness.  The  state 
existed  to  protect  the  individual  and  permit 
full  scope  for  the  enjoyment  of  these  rights. 

Today  in  the  West,  30  years  after  the  Mar- 
shall plan,  our  deepest  challenge  is  that  a 
new  generation  must  explore  again  the  is- 
sues of  liberty  and  social  responsibility,  in  an 
era  when  societies  have  grown  vastly  in  size, 
complexity,  and  dynamism. 

The  modern  industrial  society,  though 
founded  in  freedom  and  offering  prosperity, 
risks  losing  the  individual  in  the  mass  and 
fostering  his  alienation.  The  technical  com- 
plexity of  public  issues  challenges  the  func- 
tioning of  democracy.  Mass  media  and  the 
weakening  of  party  and  group  structures 
further  the  isolation  of  the  individual;  they 
transform  democratic  politics,  adding  new 
elements  of  volatility  and  unpredictability. 
The  bureaucratic  state  poses  a  fundamental 
challenge  to  political  leadership  and  respon- 
siveness to  public  will. 

Basic  moral  questions  are  raised:  How  do 
we  inspire  a  questioning  new  generation  in  a 
relativistic  age  and  in  a  society  of  impersonal 
institutions?  Will  skepticism  and  cynicism 
sap  the  spiritual  energies  of  our  civilization 
at  the  moment  of  its  greatest  technical  and 
material  success?  Having  debunked  author- 
ity, will  our  societies  now  seek  refuge  in  false 
simplifications,  demagogic  certitudes,  or  ex- 
tremist panaceas? 

These  questions  are  not  a  prediction  but  a 
test — a  test  of  the  creativity  and  moral  for- 
titude of  our  peoples  and  leaders. 

Western  civilization  has  met  such  tests 
before.  In  the  late  15th  century,  Europe  was 
in  a  period  of  gloomy  introspection,  preoc- 
cupied with  a  sense  of  despair  and  mortality. 
The  cities  which  had  sparked  its  revival  fol- 
lowing the  Islamic  conquests  were  in  de- 
cline. Its  territory  was  being  diminished  by 
the  depredations  of  a  powerful  invader  from 
the  East.  Its  spiritual,  economic,  and  cultural 
center — Italy — was  a  prey  to  anarchy  and 
dismemberment. 

And  yet  Europe  at  that  very  moment  was 
already  well  launched  on  one  of  the  world's 
periods  of  greatest  political  and  intellectual 


114 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


advance.  The  Renaissance  and  Reformation, 
tlu>  great  discoveries,  the  revival  of  human- 
istic values,  the  industrial  and  democratic 
revolutions — these  were  all  to  create  the 
character  and  the  dynamism  of  the  Western 
civilization  of  which  we,  on  both  sides  of  the 
Atlantic,  are  the  heirs. 

Similarly  today,  the  West  has  assets  to 
meet  its  challenges  and  to  draw  from  them 
the  material  for  new  acts  of  creation.  It  is 
our  nations  that  have  been  the  vanguard  of 
the  modern  age.  Intellectually  and  morally,  it 
is  our  societies  that  have  proven  themselves 
the  vast  laboratory  of  the  experiment  of 
modernization.  Above  all,  it  is  the  Western 
democracies  that  originated — and  keep  alive 
today — the  vision  of  political  freedom,  social 
justice,  and  economic  well-being  for  all  peo- 
ples. None  of  us  lives  up  to  this  vision  ideally 
or  all  the  time.  But  the  rigorous  standard  by 
which  we  judge  ourselves  is  what  makes  us 
ditl'erent  from  totalitarian  societies,  of  the 
left  or  the  right. 

This,  then,  is  our  moral  task: 

— First,  as  democratic  governments  we 
must  redeem,  over  and  over  again,  the  trust 
of  our  peoples.  As  a  nation  which  has  ac- 
cepted the  burden  of  leadership,  the  United 
States  has  a  special  responsibility:  we  must 
overcome  the  traumas  of  the  recent  period, 
eradicate  their  causes,  and  preserve  the  qual- 
ities which  world  leadership  demands.  In  Eu- 
rope, wherever  there  has  been  a  slackening  in 
governmental  responsiveness  to  the  needs  of 
citizens,  there  should  be  reform  and  revival. 

— Second,  we  must  confront  the  complexi- 
ties of  a  pluralistic  world.  This  calls  for  more 


than  specific  technical  solutions.  It  requires 
of  leaders  a  willingness  to  explain  the  real 
alternatives,  no  matter  how  complicated  or 
difficult.  And  it  requires  of  electorates  an 
understanding  that  we  must  make  choices 
amidst  uncertainty,  where  the  outcome  may 
be  neither  immediate  nor  reducible  to  simple 
.slogans. 

— Third,  we  must  clarify  our  attitudes  to- 
ward political  forces  within  Western  socie- 
ties which  appeal  to  electorates  on  the 
ground  that  they  may  bring  greater  effi- 
ciency to  government.  But  we  cannot  avoid 
the  question  of  the  commitment  of  these 
forces  to  democratic  values  nor  a  concern 
about  the  trends  that  a  decision  based  on 
temporary  convenience  would  set  in  motion. 
At  the  same  time,  opposition  to  these  forces 
is  clearly  not  enough.  There  must  be  a  re- 
sponse to  legitimate  social  and  economic  as- 
pirations and  to  the  need  for  reforms  of 
inadequacies  from  which  these  forces  derive 
much  of  their  appeal. 

— Finally,  the  solidarity  of  the  democratic 
nations  in  the  world  is  essential  both  as  ma- 
terial support  and  as  a  moral  symbol.  There 
could  be  no  greater  inspiration  of  our  peoples 
than  the  reaffirmation  of  their  common  pur- 
pose and  the  conviction  that  they  can  shape 
their  fortune  in  freedom. 

We  cannot  afford  either  a  perilous  compla- 
cency or  an  immobilizing  pessimism.  Alastair 
Buchan  posed  his  questions  not  to  induce  pa- 
ralysis, but  as  a  spur  to  wiser  action  and 
fresh  achievement. 

We  know  what  we  must  do.  We  also  know 
what  we  can  do.  It  only  remains  to  do  it. 


July  26,  1976 


115 


Leaders  of  Major  Industrial  Democracies  Meet  in  Puerto  Rico 


President  Ford  and  Prime  Minister  Pierre 
Elliott  Trudeau  of  Canada,  President  Valery 
Giscard  d'Estaing  of  France,  Chancellor  Hel- 
mut Schmidt  of  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,  Prime  Minister  Aldo  Moro  of  Italy, 
Prime  Minister  Takeo  Miki  of  Japan,  and 
Prime  Minister  James  Callaghan  of  the 
United  Kingdom  met  at  Dorado  Beach, 
Puerto  Rico,  June  27-28.  Folloiving  are  re- 
marks by  President  Ford  upon  arrival  in 
Puerto  Rico  on  June  26,  his  remarks  pre- 
pared for  delivery  at  the  opening  session  of 
the  conference,  his  remarks  at  the  conclusion 
of  the  conference  on  June  28,  and  the  tran- 
script of  a  news  conference  held  by  Secre- 
tary Kissinger  and  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
William  E.  Simon  on  June  28,  together  with 
the  text  of  a  joint  declaration  issued  at  the 
conclusion  of  the  conference. 


PRESIDENT  FORD'S  REMARKS  UPON  ARRIVAL, 
SAN  JUAN  AIRPORT,  JUNE  26 

Weekly    Compilation   of    Presidential    Documents    dated    July    5 

Mr.  Governor,  distinguished  members  of 
the  welcoming  committee:  I  thank  you  for 
the  very  warm  welcome  upon  my  arrival  at 
the  summit.  It  is  an  honor  for  the  United 
States  to  be  the  host  of  this  conference.  I 
know  that  world  leaders  who  are  joining  me 
will  be  as  appreciative  of  the  beauty  and  the 
hospitality  of  Puerto  Rico  as  I  am. 

In  recent  years,  the  industrialized  democ- 
racies have  become  increasingly  concerned 
with  the  questions  of  economic  growth  and 
stability.  The  linkages  between  our  nations 
have  multiplied.  Our  economies  have  become 
more  closely  interrelated.  Last  November  at 
Rambouillet,  we  began  a  dialogue  which  rec- 
ognized our  mutual  concerns  and  our  interre- 


lationships. Today,  we  come  together  to 
continue  that  dialogue.  We  are  fully  aware 
of  how  important  it  is  for  us  to  work  to- 
gether to  shape  policies,  to  achieve  stable 
economic  growth,  and  to  respond  to  the  new 
challenges  and  opportunities  which  face  us 
all. 

Since  we  last  met,  we  have  witnessed  sig- 
nificant economic  improvements  throughout 
the  world.  Certainly  in  the  United  States  our 
progress  has  been  better  than  many  pre- 
dicted, but  some  old  problems  remain  and 
new  ones  confront  us.  The  very  speed  of  the 
recovery  itself  serves  as  a  major  test  of  our 
ability  to  insure  long-term  stability  in  our 
economy. 

This  is  not  a  test,  however,  for  the  United 
States  alone.  It  is  the  special  challenge  facing 
the  people  of  all  the  industrialized  democra- 
cies. I  welcome  the  opportunity  to  meet 
again  with  the  leaders  of  our  major  economic 
partners.  I  am  confident  that  these  discus- 
sions will  help  us  to  continue  our  current  eco- 
nomic progress  and  move  us  ever  closer  to 
our  goal  of  economic  growth  and  stability 
throughout  the  world. 

Mr.  Governor,  this  is  my  first  visit  as  Pres- 
ident to  the  Commonwealth  of  Puerto  Rico. 
It  is  a  fitting  moment  to  reflect  on  the  rich 
and  long  history  of  cooperation  and  participa- 
tion which  this  island  and  its  people  share 
with  the  United  States.  That  history  has 
been  built  on  a  simple  but  fundamental  con- 
cept— the  right  of  the  people  of  Puerto  Rico 
and  the  United  States  freely  to  determine 
the  nature  of  their  ties  with  one  another. 
Over  the  years  we  have  chosen  to  have  a  close 
relationship.  We  have  built  this  relationship 
around  a  common  citizenship,  a  common  de- 
fense, a  common  currency,  and  a  common 
market. 


116 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Today,  we  find  that  the  nature  of  our  rela- 
tionship is  again,  as  in  the  past,  a  subject  of 
free  discussion  and  free  debate.  This  in  itself 
is  the  best  testament  to  the  strength  of  what 
we  have  built  together,  and  it  is  the  best 
promise  that  what  we  together  choose  to  do 
in  the  future  will  be  beneficial  to  the  people 
of  this  island. 

There  are  those,  however,  who  seek  to  dis- 
tort the  facts,  to  mislead  others  about  our 
relationship  with  Puerto  Rico.  The  record  is 
clear ;  the  record  is  open.  We  are  proud  of  the 
relationship  that  we  have  developed  together, 
and  we  invite  the  world  to  examine  it.  We 
commend  to  its  critics  the  same  freedom  of 
choice  through  free  and  open  election  which 
is  enjoyed  by  the  people  of  Puerto  Rico. 

Those  who  might  be  inclined  to  interfere 
in  our  freely  determined  relations  should 
know  that  such  an  act  will  be  considered  an 
intervention  in  the  domestic  affairs  of  Puerto 
Rico  and  the  United  States  and  will  be  an  un- 
friendly act  which  will  be  resisted  by  appro- 
priate means. 

In  the  midst  of  this  beautiful  setting,  we 
cannot  forget  that  problems,  both  political 
and  economic,  still  remain.  As  we  base  our 
hopes  on  freedom  of  choice  and  expression 
to  help  resolve  the  political  problems,  so  we 
look  to  cooperation  and  interdependence  to 
overcome  our  economic  problems. 

Mr.  Governor,  I  am  hopeful  that  the  work 
of  this  summit  will  give  a  new  impetus  to  the 
growth  of  our  worldwide  economy  and  im- 
prove international  cooperation,  and  thus  we 
will  have  a  positive  effect  on  both  the  United 
States  and  Puerto  Rico. 

Again,  I  thank  you,  Mr.  Governor,  for  your 
warm  welcome  and  for  your  help  in  hosting 
this  summit.' 


PRESIDENT  FORD'S  REMARKS  PREPARED  FOR 
OPENING  SESSION  OF  CONFERENCE,  JUNE  27 

Weekly    Compilation    of    Presidential    Documents    dated    July    5 

On  behalf  of  myself  and  my  colleagues  and 
the  people  of  the  United  States,  I  welcome 
you  to  Puerto  Rico.  We  have  a  formidable 
task  ahead  of  us  in  these  next  two  days — to 
address  major  common  concerns  and  to  iden- 


tify areas  in  which  improved  cooperation 
among  us  can  contribute  to  the  well-being  of 
our  citizens  and  to  a  more  secure  and  pros- 
perous world. 

As  we  all  know,  meetings  of  this  sort  raise 
anticipations  of  dramatic  results.  But  the  im- 
portant thing  about  Rambouillet  and  our 
meeting  here  today  is  that  they  are  part  of 
an  essential  and  continuing  bilateral  and 
multilateral  effort  by  the  leaders  of  key  in- 
dustrialized democracies  to  address  common 
problems  and  to  improve  mutual  under- 
standing. 

The  complexity  of  our  nations'  economies, 
individually  and  collectively,  means  that  we 
as  leaders  cannot  afford  to  allow  major  diffi- 
culties to  arise  and  then,  by  dramatic  meet- 
ings, attempt  to  resolve  them.  It  requires  in- 
stead that  we  concert  our  effort  to  prevent 
problems  from  arising  in  the  first  place — to 
shape  the  future  rather  than  reacting  to  it. 
It  is  with  that  objective  in  mind  that  this 
summit  is  being  held. 

The  central  economic,  political,  and  secu- 
rity importance  of  our  countries  to  one  an- 
other and  to  the  world  confers  upon  us  special 
responsibilities.  In  the  economic  area,  on 
which  we  will  focus  today  and  tomorrow,  our 
strong  commitment  to  shape  constructive  ap- 
proaches can  contribute  to  the  prosperity  of 
our  peoples,  strengthen  our  broader  relation- 
ships, and  prove  highly  beneficial  to  the 
world  at  large. 

Recent  experience  has  clearly  demon- 
strated that  because  of  the  interdependence 
of  our  nations,  common  problems  are  un- 
likely to  be  solved  unless  we  apply  our  mu- 
tual efforts.  They  have,  in  addition,  shown 
that  our  common  interests  are  far  more 
significant  than  the  differences  which  arise 
among  us  from  time  to  time.  We  have,  there- 
fore, wisely  approached  recent  problems  with 
a  political  will  and  spirit  of  cooperation 
which  have  not  only  helped  us  resolve  them 
but  which  have  in  fact  strengthened  con- 
siderably  relations   among  our  nations  and 


'  For  a  reply  by  Governor  Rafael  Hernandez- 
Colon  of  the  Commonwealth  of  Puerto  Rico,  see 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents  dated 
July  5,   1976,  p.   1088. 


July  26,   1976 


117 


among  the  industrialized  democracies  as  a 
whole. 

This  conference  builds  on  and  can  help  us 
continue  the  progress  already  made.  This 
vision  and  sense  of  shared  purpose  which  re- 
sults from  our  meetings  will  help  each  of  us 
pursue  constructive  policies  at  home,  with 
respect  to  our  economic  partners,  and  in  deal- 
ing with  major  global  issues. 

I  am  confident  that  the  same  positive  spirit 
that  was  developed  at  Rambouillet  will  ex- 
tend through  our  meetings  here  in  Puerto 
Rico  and  beyond.  Much  of  the  world's  future 
depends  on  our  constructive  cooperation. 


PRESIDENT  FORD'S  REMARKS  AT  CONCLUSION 
OF  CONFERENCE,  JUNE  28 

Weekly    Compilation    of    Presidential    Documents    dated    July    5 

We  have  just  concluded  two  days  of  very 
productive  discussions  on  a  number  of  issues 
of  great  importance  to  us  all.  Our  talks  were 
characterized  by  a  seriousness  of  puiijose,  a 
firm  desire  to  improve  our  understanding  of 
one  another's  views,  and  a  common  commit- 
ment to  strengthen  constructive  cooperation 
among  all  nations. 

During  the  course  of  our  discussions,  we 
reached  agreement  in  several  significant 
areas.  These  are  set  out  in  the  declaration 
that  we  have  just  adopted. 

First,  we  are  confident  about  the  future 
economic  and  financial  outlook  for  our  coun- 
tries. All  of  us  are  committed  to  achieving 
sustainable  growth  which  will  reduce  unem- 
ployment without  jeopardizing  our  common 
aim  of  avoiding  a  new  wave  of  inflation.  We 
recognize  that  the  sustained  economic  expan- 
sion we  seek  and  the  resultant  increase  in 
individual  well-being  cannot  be  achieved  in 
the  context  of  high  inflation  rates. 

We  agreed  that  our  objective  of  monetary 
stabiUty  must  not  be  undermined  by  the 
strains  of  financing  payments  imbalances. 
Each  nation  should  manage  its  economy  and 
its  international  monetary  affairs  so  as  to 
correct  or  avoid  persistent  or  structural  in- 
ternational payments  imbalances. 

We   have   recognized   that  problems  may 


arise  for  a  few  developed  countries  which 
have  special  needs,  which  have  not  yet  re- 
stored domestic  economic  stability,  and 
which  face  major  payments  deficits.  We 
agreed  that  if  assistance  in  financing  transi- 
tory balance-of-payments  deficits  is  neces- 
sary to  avoid  general  disruptions  in  economic 
growth,  it  can  best  be  provided  by  multi- 
lateral means,  in  conjunction  with  a  firm 
program  for  restoring  underlying  equi- 
librium. 

The  industrialized  democracies  can  be 
most  successful  in  helping  developing  nations 
by  agreeing  on  and  working  together  to  im- 
plement sound  solutions  to  their  own  prob- 
lems, solutions  which  enhance  the  efficient 
operation  of  the  international  economy.  Our 
efforts  must  be  mutually  supportive  rather 
than  competitive.  We  remain  determined  to 
continue  the  dialogue  with  the  developing 
countries  to  achieve  concrete  results. 

We  agreed  on  the  importance  of  maintain- 
ing a  liberal  climate  for  the  flow  of  interna- 
tional investment.  We  agreed  to  examine 
carefully  the  various  aspects  of  East-West 
economic  contacts  so  that  they  enhance  over- 
all East-West  relations. 

Together,  the  results  of  our  discussions 
represent  a  significant  step  forward  in  coop- 
eration among  the  industrial  democracies. 
They  establish  positive  directions  which  will 
benefit  not  only  our  peoples  but  the  interna- 
tional economy  as  a  whole. 

In  conclusion,  let  me  add  a  personal  note. 
I  was  greatly  impressed  with  the  candid  and 
friendly  atmosphere  here.  Our  countries 
have  come  through  a  difficult  period.  Our 
cooperation  during  this  period  has  not  only 
contributed  to  the  resolution  of  problems  but 
has  in  fact  significantly  strengthened  rela- 
tions among  our  countries  and  among  the  in- 
dustrialized democracies  as  a  whole. 

We  can  be  proud  of  this  record  and  of  our 
nations'  abilities  to  meet  the  severe  chal- 
lenges we  have  faced.  In  my  view,  the  spirit 
of  Rambouillet,  which  was  carried  forward  to 
these  meetings  in  Puerto  Rico,  has  strength- 
ened prospects  for  progress  by  the  industri- 
alized democracies  in  a  number  of  key  areas. 
If  we  nurture  the  sense  of  common  purpose 


118 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


and  vision  which  has  characterized  these  dis- 
cussions, we  have  an  opportunity  to  shape 
events  and  better  meet  the  needs  of  our  citi- 
zens and  all  the  world. 


NEWS  CONFERENCE  BY  SECRETARY  KISSINGER 
AND  TREASURY  SECRETARY  SIMON,  JUNE  28 

Wci'kly    Compilation    of   Presidential    Documents    dated    July    G 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Let  me  say  that  ba- 
sically the  purpose  of  this  conference  was  to 
enable  the  leaders  of  the  industrial  democ- 
racies, a  group  of  nations  that  between  them 
have  60  percent  of  the  world's  GNP,  to  dis- 
cuss a  number  of  economic  issues  and  to  dis- 
cuss a  number  of  issues  where  economic  and 
political  considerations  merge,  such  as  East- 
West  and  North-South  issues.  They  dis- 
cussed them  in  a  very  free  and  relaxed 
atmosphere. 

It  was  not  a  question  of  reading  prepared 
statements  at  each  other;  but  as  Prime  Min- 
ister Callaghan  said,  there  was  usually  one 
of  the  leaders  who  introduced  one  of  the  is- 
sues, and  then  there  was  a  free  and  easy 
discussion. 

We  believe  that  on  the  major  issues  con- 
fronting these  countries  a  large  degree  of 
understanding  was  reached  that  should  help 
encourage  the  economic  processes,  and  it 
should  also  enable  the  countries  represented 
here  to  work  together  on  international  issues 
such  as  those  that  were  mentioned  in  the 
communique.  But  what  no  communique  can 
reflect  is  the  many  conversations  that  took 
place  at  the  side,  the  attitude  of  the  partici- 
pants that  reflected  the  conviction  that  they 
represented  paraflel  values  and  the  realiza- 
tion that  their  destinies  were  linked  together. 

With  this,  let  us  answer  your  specific  ques- 
tions. 

Q.  Can  any  of  you  quantify  the  type  of 
iinsistance  that  is  in  mind  for  Italy? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  There  was  no  specific 
discussion  of  any  particular  amount  nor 
indeed  of  the  framework  within  which  assist- 
ance can  take  place.  There  is  a  general  state- 
ment in  this  document  that  we  would  apply 


to  all  circumstances  in  which  there  are  per- 
sistent or  temporary  disequilibria  and  per- 
haps Bill  can  explain  its  significance  better. 
Secretary  Simo7i:  Well,  there  is  an  existing 
agreement  in  the  International  Monetary 
Fund  that  loans  can  be  made  on  a  supplemen- 
tary basis  when  resources  are  needed  to 
forestall  or  to  cope  with  a  temporary  prob- 
lem in  the  international  monetary  system 
that  is  impairing  its  proper  functioning,  and 
we  discussed  the  possibility  of,  if  something 
like  this  were  needed — as  I  believe  the  com- 
munique says  verbatim — what  type  mech- 
anism should  be  brought  into  place  for 
transitory  financing  for  balance-of-payments 
purposes  under  very  stringent  economic  con- 
ditions. 

Q.  May  I  ask  the  first  Secretary  [laughter'] 
— given  the  fact  that  you  said  ive  should  not 
expect  any  dramatic  developments  out  of 
this,  can  you  give  us  an  idea  of  any  changes 
that  might  come  about  as  a  result  of  this 
meeting,  or  any  new  directions  that  U.S. 
policy  might  take? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  first  of  all,  one 
cannot  expect  that  the  foreign  policy  of 
major  countries  can  be  redesigned  every  six 
months,  and  if  that  were  to  happen,  that 
would  be  a  reason  for  alarm  rather  than  for 
congratulations. 

On  the  economic  side,  all  of  the  countries 
face  the  situation  now  that  the  recession 
which  seemed  to  be  the  dominant  problem  at 
Rambouillet  has  turned  to  a  greater  or  lesser 
degree  in  the  various  countries  into  a  recov- 
ery problem,  and  the  problem  that  had  to  be 
discussed  was  how  to  sustain  this  recovery 
without  inflation. 

On  the  East- West  trade,  this  was  not  dis- 
cussed at  Rambouillet  at  all,  and  we  agreed 
to  study  the  various  implications  of  the  rela- 
tionship between  state  economies  and  market 
economies  so  that  commerce  can  develop  to 
the  mutual  benefit  and  cannot  be  used  for 
political  purposes. 

With  respect  to  North-South,  there  was  a 
very  full  and  detailed  discussion  in  the  hght 
of  the  experience  which  we  have  all  had  at 
UNCTAD    [U.N.   Conference  on  Trade  and 


July  26,  1976 


119 


Development]  in  Nairobi  and  at  the  meeting 
of  the  Conference  on  International  Economic 
Cooperation  in  Paris  as  to  how  the  indus- 
trialized countries,  the  industrialized  democ- 
racies, that  between  them  contribute  almost 
the  entire  development  effort — the  Socialist 
countries  contribute  nothing — how  those 
countries  can  cooperate  for  the  mutual 
benefit  of  both  developed  and  developing 
countries  and  for  the  benefit  of  the  world 
economy.  That,  too,  was  not  an  entirely  new 
direction,  but  a  new  emphasis  on  which  very 
fruitful  discussions  took  place. 

Q.  Can  you  tell  us  anything,  Mr.  Secretary, 
about  the  President's  talks  ivith  Giscard, 
Mora,  Callaghan,  Miki? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Of  course,  one  of  the 
great  benefits  of  these  meetings  is  the  ability 
to  exchange  ideas  not  only  in  a  meeting 
room  but  on  a  bilateral  basis.  And  with  the 
various  leaders  there  was  an  exchange  be- 
cause, obviously,  with  the  Italian  Prime  Min- 
ister, there  was  a  discussion  of  the  implica- 
tions of  what  political  developments  might 
occur  in  Italy  that  could  be  most  conducive 
to  reform,  and  we  got  the  assessment  of  the 
Italian  leaders. 

We  will  see  the  Japanese  Prime  Minister 
again  on  Wednesday  in  Washington,  so  this 
was  more  in  the  nature  of  a  preliminary  talk. 

The  talk  with  President  Giscard  d'Estaing 
concerned  the  review  of  the  entire  world 
situation,  including  some  topics  that  were 
not  discussed  in  the  general  session,  such  as 
the  Middle  East  and  Africa.  And  you  will  re- 
member I  said  it  is  only  to  point  out  why 
there  were  no  bilaterals  with  certain  other 
people,  that  the  President  has  seen  Prime 
Minister  Trudeau  two  weeks  ago  and  will 
see  Chancellor  Schmidt  two  weeks  from  now. 
So,  this  is  the  essence  of  his  conversations. 

Q.  Did  you  get  any  further  in  the  North- 
South  deal,  on  getting  a  common  approach? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  don't  think  it  is  pos- 
sible— nor  did  we  attempt — to  get  all  the 
details  of  a  common  approach  in  a  meeting 
of  a  day  and  a  half,  but  there  was  a  general 
understanding  that  there  should  be  a  com- 


mon approach  or  at  least  a  parallel  approach. 
There  was  also  a  general  understanding,  as 
the  communique  reflects,  that  the  developed 
countries  can  make  their  best  contribution 
by  putting  forward  sound  positions  rather 
than  wait  for  proposals  to  be  put  to  them  and 
let  themselves  be  driven  by  the  negotiating 
tactics  of  a  particular  conference,  and  it 
was  agreed  that  we  would  work  closely  to- 
gether in  preparation  for  other  meetings. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
much  of  the  developing  payment  deficit  re- 
sults from  oil,  was  that  discussed,  any  stand 
to  be  taken  on  that  question? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  there  was  a 
general  discussion  of  the  energy  problem 
but  more  from  the  point  of  view  of  what  the 
industrial  democracies  can  do  to  reduce  their 
dependence  on  it,  and  there  were  general  dis- 
cussions of  the  economic  aspects  of  balance- 
of-payments  deficits  which  I  will  let  Secre- 
tary Simon  answer. 

Secretary  Simon:  There  was  one  impor- 
tant point,  if  I  understand  your  question  and 
statement  correctly,  that  the  balance-of- 
payments  problem  stems  entirely  from  oil — 
that  is  not  correct.  Obviously  the  quadrupling 
of  the  oil  price  had  a  significant  part  to  play, 
but  there  are  those  countries  who  have  not 
sufficiently  adjusted  their  economic  pohcies 
to  compensate  for  the  increased  cost  of  oil, 
and  these  adjustments,  while  difficult  politi- 
cally and  socially,  must  indeed  be  made.  And 
it  was  in  that  framework — of  the  responsi- 
bilities of  nations  in  surplus  as  well  as  in 
deficit — that  we  discussed  the  balance-of- 
payments  problems,  that  President  Ford 
explained  to  the  participants  this  year 
the  United  States  is  going  to  have  a  dra- 
matic swing  of  $15-$16  billion  in  our  current 
account  balance,  from  a  $12  billion  surplus 
last  year  to  approximately  $3  billion  deficit 
this  year.  We  view  this  with  equanimity  and 
indeed — as  other  countries  in  surplus  posi- 
tions should,  too. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary  Simon,  should  we  inter- 
pret the  communique  to  indicate  that  Prime 
Minister  Miki  is  receptive  to  the  idea  of  re- 
valuating  the  yen? 


120 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


Secretary  Simon:  When  we  talk  about  re- 
valuation of  a  currency,  the  Japanese  yen  is 
a  floating  currency  that  is  subjected  to  the 
market  evaluation,  if  you  will,  and  that  is 
what  occurs.  Now  there  are  occasions  which 
— I  don't  say  the  Japanese  have  been  guilty 
of — where  one  can  artificially  attempt  for  a 
time  to  peg  a  rate,  but  I  have  not  seen  this 
occur,  no.  Floating  rates,  the  market  sets 
the  rate. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  ivas  there  any  discussion 
at  all  of  southern  Africa  and  Rhodesia? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Not  in  the  meetings 
as  such,  but  at  the  fringes  of  the  meetings. 

Q.  Was  there  anything  decided  about  it? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  There  was  no  at- 
tempt made  to  decide  anything.  As  I  pointed 
out  after  my  meetings  with  Prime  Minister 
[of  South  Africa  John]  Vorster,  he  has  now 
to  consider  several  problems  with  his  col- 
leagues, and  we  are  consulting  various  black 
African  states  and  various  of  our  allies  be- 
fore we  can  formulate  the  precise  next  move, 
but  we  also  insist  that  the  process  which  was 
set  in  motion  is  still  underway  and  in  our 
view  has  a  chance  of  continuing. 

We  also  have  called  attention  in  Britain, 
and  I  want  to  do  it  here,  about  the  central 
role  that  Britain  can  play  with  respect  to 
Rhodesia,  and  it  is  a  responsibility  which  we 
have  the  impression — indeed  the  British 
Government  has  said  it  is  willing  to  exercise. 

Q.  Aside  from  having  the  agreement  that 
there  should  be  a  common  approach  to  it,  do 
you  knoiv  already  or  do  you  have  a  hint  in 
tvhich  direction  the  North-South — 

Secretary  Kissinger:  There  was  a  rather 
full  discussion  of  various  of  the  topics  that 
have  been  on  the  international  agenda,  and 
experts  and  others  will  work  on  that  in  the 
spirit  of  this  meeting  in  the  weeks  ahead. 

Q.  /  would  like  to  ask  Secretary  Simon 
what  the  prospects  are  for  the  British  pound 
and  how  this  was  discussed  at  the  meeting. 

Secretary  Simon:  Number  one,  we  don't 
discuss  other  currencies  of  other  countries. 


That  is  for  obvious  reasons.  Going  back  to 
the  Jamaica  agreement,  one  of  the  basic 
tenets  of  that  agreement  was  that  exchange 
rate  stability  would  only  be  achieved  when 
we  achieved  underlying  economic  stability; 
and  as  countries  adjust  to  the  durable  infla- 
tion problems  and  other  problems  today  their 
currencies  indeed  will  stabilize,  and  actuaUy 
most  currencies  in  recent  months,  since  the 
Jamaica  agreement,  have  been  remarkably 
stable.  There  have  been  a  few  notable  excep- 
tions, due  to  the  fundamental  economic 
problems  which  are  being  corrected. 

Q.  How  much  of  the  $5  billion  have  the 
British  draivn  down? 

Secretary  Simon:  I  don't  have  that  figure, 
and  if  I  did  I  am  not  sure  that  that  figure 
should  not  be  announced,  if  indeed  it  should 
be  at  ah,  by  the  U.K.  officials,  not  by  an 
American  finance  official. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  was  there  any  discussion 
ivith  Giscard  on  the  possible  French  force  to 
Lebanon? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  That  issue  is  not  at 
this  particular  moment  acute.  The  French 
Government  knows  our  attitude,  and  it  is 
parallel  to  their  own,  which  is  to  say  that, 
if  under  conditions  of  cease-fire,  if  all  of  the 
parties  should  invite  a  French  force,  and  if 
the  French  Government  were  prepared  to 
send  one,  it  could  play  a  potentially  useful 
role,  but  it  is  not  now  being  discussed,  and 
our  impression  is  that  the  Arab  League  force 
will  be  the  principal  international  instrument 
that  is  being  used. 


TEXT  OF  JOINT  DECLARATION  OF  THE 
INTERNATIONAL  CONFERENCE,  JUNE  28 

Weekly    Compilation    of    Presidential    Documents    dated   July    5 

The  heads  of  state  and  government  of  Canada, 
France,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  Italy, 
Japan,  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and 
Northern  Ireland  and  the  United  States  of  America 
met  at  Dorado  Beach,  Puerto  Rico,  on  the  27th  and 
28th  of  June,  1976,  and  agreed  to  the  following 
declaration: 


July  26,  1976 


121 


The  interdependence  of  our  destinies  makes  it 
necessary  for  us  to  approach  common  economic  prob- 
lems with  a  sense  of  common  purpose  and  to  work 
toward  mutually  consistent  economic  strategies 
through  better  cooperation. 

We  consider  it  essential  to  take  into  account  the 
interests  of  other  nations.  And  this  is  most  particu- 
larly true  with  respect  to  the  developing  countries 
of  the  world. 

It  was  for  these  purposes  that  we  held  a  broad 
and  productive  exchange  of  views  on  a  wide  range 
of  issues.  This  meeting  provided  a  welcome  oppor- 
tunity to  improve  our  mutual  understanding  and  to 
intensify  our  cooperation  in  a  number  of  areas. 
Those  among  us  whose  countries  are  members  of 
the  European  Economic  Community  intend  to  make 
their  efforts  within  its  framework. 

At  Rambouillet,  economic  recovery  was  established 
as  a  primary  goal  and  it  was  agreed  that  the  desired 
stability  depends  upon  the  underlying  economic  and 
financial  conditions  in  each  of  our  countries. 

Significant  progress  has  been  achieved  since  Ram- 
bouillet. During  the  recession  there  was  widespread 
concern  regarding  the  longer-run  vitality  of  our 
economies.  These  concerns  have  proved  to  be  un- 
warranted. Renewed  confidence  in  the  future  has 
replaced  doubts  about  the  economic  and  financial 
outlook.  Economic  recovery  is  well  under  way  and  in 
many  of  our  countries  there  has  been  substantial 
progress  in  combatting  inflation  and  reducing  un- 
employment. This  has  improved  the  situation  in 
those  countries  where  economic  recovery  is  still  rela- 
tively weak. 

Our  deteiTTiination  in  recent  months  to  avoid  ex- 
cessive stimulation  of  our  economies  and  new  impedi- 
ments to  trade  and  capital  movements  has  contrib- 
uted to  the  soundness  and  breadth  of  this  recovery. 
As  a  result,  restoration  of  balanced  growth  is  within 
our  grasp.  We  do  not  intend  to  lose  this  opportunity. 

Our  objective  now  is  to  manage  effectively  a  tran- 
sition to  expansion  which  will  be  sustainable,  which 
will  reduce  the  high  level  of  unemployment  which 
persists  in  many  countries  and  will  not  jeopardize 
our  common  aim  of  avoiding  a  new  wave  of  inflation. 
That  will  call  for  an  increase  in  productive  invest- 
ment and  for  partnership  among  all  groups  within 
our  societies.  This  will  involve  acceptance,  in  accord- 
ance with  our  individual  needs  and  circumstances, 
of  a  restoration  of  better  balance  in  public  finance, 
as  well  as  of  disciplined  measures  in  the  fiscal  area 
and  in  the  field  of  monetary  policy  and  in  some  cases 
supplementary  policies,  including  incomes  policy. 
The  formulation  of  such  policies,  in  the  context  of 
growing  interdependence,  is  not  possible  without  tak- 
ing into  account  the  course  of  economic  activity  in 
other  countries.  With  the  right  combination  of  poli- 
cies we  believe  that  we  can  achieve  our  objectives 
of  orderly  and  sustained  expansion,  reducing  un- 
employment and  renewed  progress  toward  our  com- 
mon  goal    of   eliminating   the    problem    of    inflation. 


Sustained  economic  expansion  and  the  resultant  in- 
crease in  individual  well-being  cannot  be  achieved  in 
the  context  of  high  rates  of  inflation. 

At  the  meeting  last  November,  we  resolved  differ- 
ences on  structural  reform  of  the  international  mone- 
tary system  and  agreed  to  promote  a  stable  system 
of  exchange  rates  which  emphasized  the  prerequi- 
site of  developing  stable  underlying  economic  finan- 
cial conditions. 

With  those  objectives  in  mind,  we  reached  specific 
understandings,  which  made  a  substantial  contribu- 
tion to  the  IMF  [International  Monetary  Fund] 
meeting  in  Jamaica.  Early  legislative  ratification  of 
these  agreements  by  all  concerned  is  desirable.  We 
agreed  to  improve  cooperation  in  order  to  further 
our  ability  to  counter  disorderly  market  conditions 
and  increase  our  understanding  of  economic  prob- 
lems and  the  corrective  policies  that  are  needed.  We 
will  continue  to  build  on  this  structure  of  consulta- 
tions. 

Since  November,  the  relationship  between  the 
dollar  and  most  of  the  main  currencies  has  been 
remarkably  stable.  However,  some  currencies  have 
suffered  substantial  fluctuations. 

The  needed  stability  in  underlying  economic  and 
financial  conditions  clearly  has  not  yet  been  restored. 
Our  commitment  to  deliberate,  orderly  and  sustained 
expansion,  and  to  the  indispensable  companion  goal 
of  defeating  inflation  provides  the  basis  for  in- 
creased stability. 

Our  objective  of  monetary  stability  must  not  be 
undermined  by  the  strains  of  financing  international 
payments  imbalances.  We  thus  recognize  the  impor- 
tance of  each  nation  managing  its  economy  and  its 
international  monetary  affairs  so  as  to  correct  or 
avoid  persistent  or  structural  international  payments 
imbalances.  Accordingly,  each  of  us  affirms  his  in- 
tention to  work  toward  a  more  stable  and  durable 
pajTTients  structure  through  the  application  of  ap- 
propriate internal  and  external  policies. 

Imbalances  in  world  payments  may  continue  in 
the  period  ahead.  We  recognize  that  problems  may 
arise  for  a  few  developed  countries  which  have  spe- 
cial needs,  which  have  not  yet  restored  domestic 
economic  stability,  and  which  face  major  payments 
deficits.  We  agree  to  continue  to  cooperate  with 
others  in  the  appropriate  bodies  on  further  analysis 
of  these  problems  with  a  view  to  their  resolution. 
If  assistance  in  financing  transitory  balance  of  pay- 
ments deficits  is  necessary  to  avoid  general  disrup- 
tions in  economic  growth,  then  it  can  best  be  pro- 
vided by  multilateral  means  coupled  with  a  firm  pro- 
gram for  restoring  underlying  equilibrium. 

In  the  trade  area,  despite  the  recent  recession, 
we  have  been  generally  successful  in  maintaining  an 
open  trading  system.  At  the  OECD  [Organization 
for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development]  we  re- 
affirmed our  pledge  to  avoid  the  imposition  of  new 
trade  barriers. 

Countries  yielding  to  the  temptation  to  resort  to 


122 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


commercial  protectionism  would  leave  themselves 
open  to  a  subsequent  deterioration  in  their  competi- 
tive standing;  the  vigor  of  their  economies  would  be 
affected  while  at  the  same  time  chain  reactions 
would  be  set  in  motion  and  the  volume  of  world  trade 
would  shrink,  hurting  all  countries.  Wherever  de- 
partures from  the  policy  set  forth  in  the  recently 
renewed  OECD  trade  pledge  occur,  elimination  of 
the  restrictions  involved  is  essential  and  urgent. 
Also,  it  is  important  to  avoid  deliberate  exchange 
rate  policies  which  would  create  severe  distortions 
in  trade  and  lead  to  a  resurgence  of  protectionism. 

We  have  all  set  ourselves  the  objective  of  com- 
pleting the  Multilateral  Trade  Negotiations  by  the 
end  of  1977.  We  hereby  reaffirm  that  objective  and 
commit  ourselves  to  make  every  effort  through  the 
appropriate  bodies  to  achieve  it  in  accordance  with 
the  Tokyo  Declaration." 

Beyond  the  conclusion  of  the  trade  negotiations  we 
recognize  the  desirability  of  intensifying  and 
strengthening  relationships  among  the  major  trad- 
ing areas  with  a  view  to  the  long-term  goal  of  a 
maximum  expansion  of  trade. 

We  discussed  East-West  economic  relations.  We 
welcomed  in  this  context  the  steady  growth  of  East- 
West  trade,  and  expressed  the  hope  that  economic 
relations  between  East  and  West  would  develop  their 
full  potential  on  a  sound  financial  and  reciprocal 
commercial  basis.  We  agreed  that  this  process  war- 
rants our  careful  examination,  as  well  as  efforts  on 
our  part  to  ensure  that  these  economic  ties  enhance 
overall  East-West  relationships. 

We  welcome  the  adoption,  by  the  participating 
countries,  of  converging  guidelines  with  regard  to 
export  credits.  We  hope  that  these  guidelines  will 
be  adopted  as  soon  as  possible  by  as  many  countries 
as  possible. 

In  the  pursuit  of  our  goal  of  sustained  expansion, 
the  flow  of  capital  facilitates  the  efficient  allocation 
of  resources  and  thereby  enhances  our  economic 
well-being.  We,  therefore,  agree  on  the  importance 
of  a  liberal  climate  for  international  investment 
flows.  In  this  regard,  we  view  as  a  constructive  de- 
velopment the  declaration  which  was  announced 
last  week  when  the  OECD  Council  met  at  the  Min- 
isterial level. 


"  For  text  of  the  declaration,  approved  at  Tokyo  on 
Sept.  14,  1973,  by  a  ministerial  meeting  of  the  Con- 
tracting Parties  to  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs 
and  Trade,  see  Bulletin  of  Oct.  8,  1973,  p.  450. 


In  the  field  of  energy,  we  intend  to  make  efforts 
to  develop,  conserve  and  use  rationally  the  various 
energy  resources  and  to  assist  the  energy  develop- 
ment objectives  of  developing  countries. 

We  support  the  aspirations  of  the  developing  na- 
tions to  improve  the  lives  of  their  peoples.  The  role 
of  the  industrialized  democracies  is  crucial  to  the 
success  of  their  efforts.  Cooperation  between  the  two 
groups  must  be  based  on  mutual  respect,  take  into 
consideration  the  interests  of  all  parties  and  reject 
unproductive  confrontation  in  favor  of  sustained  and 
concerted  efforts  to  find  constructive  solutions  to  the 
problems  of  development. 

The  industrialized  democracies  can  be  most  suc- 
cessful in  helping  the  developing  countries  meet  their 
aspirations  by  agreeing  on,  and  cooperating  to  imple- 
ment, sound  solutions  to  their  problems  which  en- 
hance the  efficient  operation  of  the  international 
economy.  Close  collaboration  and  better  coordination 
are  necessary  among  the  industrialized  democracies. 
Our  efforts  must  be  mutually  supportive,  not  com- 
petitive. Our  efforts  for  international  economic  co- 
operation must  be  considered  as  complementary  to 
the  policies  of  the  developing  countries  themselves 
to  achieve  sustainable  growth  and  rising  standards 
of  living. 

At  Rambouillet,  the  importance  of  a  cooperative 
relationship  between  the  developed  and  developing 
nations  was  affirmed;  particular  attention  was  di- 
rected to  following  up  the  results  of  the  Seventh 
Special  Session  of  the  UN  General  Assembly,  and 
especially  to  addressing  the  balance  of  payments 
problems  of  some  developing  countries.  Since  then, 
substantial  progress  has  been  made.  We  welcome 
the  constructive  spirit  which  prevails  in  the  work 
carried  out  in  the  framework  of  the  Conference  on 
International  Economic  Cooperation,  and  also  by  the 
positive  results  achieved  in  some  areas  at  UNCTAD 
IV  in  Nairobi.  New  measures  taken  in  the  IMF 
have  made  a  substantial  contribution  to  stabilizing 
the  export  earnings  of  the  developing  countries  and 
to  helping  them  finance  their  deficits. 

We  attach  the  greatest  importance  to  the  dialogue 
between  developed  and  developing  nations  in  the 
expectation  that  it  will  achieve  concrete  results  in 
areas  of  mutual  interest.  And  we  reaffirm  our  coun- 
tries' determination  to  participate  in  this  process  in 
the  competent  bodies,  with  a  political  will  to  suc- 
ceed, looking  toward  negotiations,  in  appropriate 
cases.  Our  common  goal  is  to  find  practical  solutions 
which  contribute  to  an  equitable  and  productive  re- 
lationship among  all  peoples. 


July  26,   1976 


123 


Secretary  Kissinger  Interviewed  for  Die  Zeit  of  Hamburg 


Folloiving  is  the  transcript  of  an  interview 
ivith  Secretary  Kissinger  on  June  25  by 
Theo  Sommer  which  ivas  published  in  the 
tveekly  newspaper  Die  Zeit  of  Hamburg  on 
June  30. 

Press   release   336   dated   June   30 

Mr.  Sommer:  Mr.  Secretary,  the  United 
States  is  celebrating  its  Bicentennial.  During 
the  past  two  centuries,  it's  been  vacillating 
between  isolationism  and  expansionism.  What 
does  America  mean  to  the  world  on  the 
threshold  of  its  third  century"? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  wouldn't  agree  that 
America  has  been  consciously  expansionist. 
I  think  America  has  been  alternating  be- 
tween isolationism  and  a  kind  of  conception 
in  which  we  assumed  great  responsibility  for 
the  world's  security  and  economic  progress. 
This  got  us  involved  in  many  places,  but  it 
was  not  based  on  a  conscious  strategy  of 
expansionism. 

It  is  my  belief  that  the  biggest  change  in 
American  foreign  policy  has  been  that  we 
are  now  permanently  involved  in  foreign 
affairs.  This  is  a  new  experience  for  America. 
Previously,  whether  we  were  isolationist  or 
interventionist — it  was  always  justified  in 
America  on  the  grounds  that  we  were  deal- 
ing with  specific  crises  which  had  particular 
solutions,  after  which  we  could  return  home. 
At  least  we  had  the  option  of  noninvolve- 
ment.  That  is  now  over. 

Mr.  Sommer:  You  don't  think  we  are  going 
to  see  another  retreat  of  America? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  think  that  even  if 
we  were  to  see  another  retreat  of  America 
the  consequences  would  be  so  grievous — it 
would  have  such  traumatic  consequences — 
that   it   would   only   underline  what  I   have 


124 


said.  But  I  don't  believe  we  will  see  another 
retreat  of  America. 

Mr.  Som7ner:  Does  the  intrusion  of  domes- 
tic politics  and  the  conflict  between  the  legis- 
lature and  the  executive  branch  maim  your 
capacity  to  conduct  a  rational  and  calculable 
and  reliable  foreign  policy? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  conflict  is  not 
simply  an  executive-legislative  conflict.  It 
was  produced  by  the  weakening  of  executive 
authority  as  a  result  of  Viet-Nam  and 
Watergate.  It  reflects  also  the  disorganiza- 
tion of  the  Congress,  where  there  are  no 
longer  any  clear  power  centers  and  a  large 
number  of  congressional  committees  can  as- 
sert jurisdiction.  And  any  number  of  individ- 
ual Congressmen  can  push  their  preferences. 
So  we  are  dealing  here  with  a  more  funda- 
mental problem  than  an  executive-legislative 
conflict. 

Mr.  Sommer:  Do  you  regret  the  passing  of 
"the  imperial  Presidency"  and  of  the  "Grand 
Vizier"? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  I  think  "the  im- 
perial Presidency"  is  a  phrase  that  was  in- 
vented after  the  fact.  You  cannot  conduct 
foreign  policy  without  authority  or  without 
some  central  focal  point.  And  in  fact  it  has 
been  conducted  this  way  even  in  the  midst 
of  executive-legislative  conflict. 

The  real  problem  these  days  is  not  the  dis- 
mantling of  the  central  point  of  authority, 
but  how  a  central  point  of  authority  can  re- 
late itself  to  congressional  concerns.  That 
has  to  be  worked  out.  I  regret  a  state  of 
aff'airs  which  made  possible  events  like  the 
Turkish  arms  embargo,  the  manner  in  which 
the  Angolan  problem  was  handled,  and  sev- 
eral other  setbacks. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Mr.  Sonimer:  Is  America  going  to  be  a 
reliable  partner?  Is  it?  Does  it  have  the 
means  and  the  resolve  to  pull  its  weight,  and 
more  specifically,  tvhat  kind  of  a  situation  in 
a  foreign  country  would  justify  a  U.S.  inter- 
vention? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  believe  that  after 
the  present  turmoil  is  over  the  United 
States  will  probably  be  an  even  more  reliable 
partner,  because  it  is  through  this  turmoil 
that  the  post-Marshall  Plan  generation  is 
getting  its  feel  for  foreign  policy  and  ad- 
justing to  the  new  realities  of  international 
life.  I  am  basically  optimistic  that  when  this 
debate  is  behind  us — and  we  are  in  its  last 
phase — our  foreign  policy  will  be  steadier. 

On  your  second  question,  it  depends  on 
what  you  mean  by  intervention.  I  think  what 
any  great  power  needs,  and  what  America 
needs,  is  to  understand  which  geopolitical 
changes  are  against  our  interests  and  should 
be  resisted.  What  to  resist  and  how  to  resist 
it,  you  cannot  do  in  a  blueprint  in  the 
abstract. 

Mr.  Sommer:  Are  ive  back  to  containment? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Containment  has  al- 
ways been  one  aspect  of  foreign  policy  in 
the  sense  that  we  cannot  permit  the  Soviet 
Union  to  gain  a  preponderant  strategic  ad- 
vantage. On  the  other  hand,  whereas  in  the 
forties  and  fifties  containment  was  consid- 
ered an  end  in  itself,  it  is  now  just  the  be- 
ginning of  wisdom;  it  is  the  condition  on 
which  other  constructive  policies  have  to  be 
based. 

We  used  to  think  that  if  the  Soviet  Union 
could  be  contained  long  enough,  peace  would 
break  out  at  some  magical  moment  and  all 
problems  would  disappear.  Today  we  know 
that  we  cannot  permit  the  Soviets  to  gain 
military  and  strategic  preponderance.  But 
that  doesn't  solve  our  foreign  policy  problem. 

Mr.  Sommer:  Which  side  is  the  United 
States  on?  Zbigniew  Brzezinski,  an  academic 
and  political  critic  as  well  as  a  rival  of  yours, 
has  recently  said  that  the  curious  thing  is 
that  the  nation  committed  from  its  birth  to 
independence   now   feels   troubled  and   even 


threatened,  by  a  world  based  on  self-determi- 
nation and  striving  for  equality,  and  he  says 
that  the  Administration  is  taking  refuge  in 
the  notion  of  a  hostile  world  as  it  used  to  take 
refuge  in  the  notion  of  the  cold  xoar. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  This  is  an  election 
year,  and  many  people  have  to  say  things  to 
distinguish  themselves  from  the  present 
policy.  I  recognize  no  element  of  our  foreign 
policy  in  this  description.  Nor  could  it  be 
supported  by  anything  I  have  been  saying 
in  my  speeches. 

Where  do  we  say  we  are  living  in  a  hostile 
world?  This  is  not  reflected  in  our  policy 
toward  Europe,  toward  Latin  America,  to- 
ward Africa.  Our  initiatives  at  the  seventh 
special  session  of  the  General  Assembly  and 
in  other  international  forums  were  all  based 
on  the  assumption  that  the  United  States 
has  a  particular  responsibility  to  help  con- 
struct an  international  environment  in  which 
nations  can  develop  themselves  along  their 
own  lines. 

I  simply  do  not  recognize  this  description 
as  applying  to  our  policies. 

Mr.  Sommer:  Hotv  do  you  reconcile  the 
postulates  of  realpolitik  and  moral  considera- 
tions in  your  handling — no,  let's  say  stabiliz- 
ing— the  colonels'  regime  in  Greece,  destabi- 
lizing Allende,  or  in  your,  some  people  feel, 
rather  late  awakening  to  the  African  prob- 
lems? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  First,  I  can't  accept 
your  description  either  that  we  stabilized 
the  colonels'  regime  in  Greece  or  that  we  de- 
stabilized Allende.  This  is  a  bit  of  folklore 
that,  after  having  been  repeated  so  often,  is 
now  an  unshakable  part  of  general  mythol- 
ogy. You  can  say  that  we  did  not  move  all- 
out  against  the  colonels,  but  both  our  mili- 
tary aid  and  our  diplomatic  contacts  were 
reduced ;  to  say  that  we  actively  "stabilized" 
the  colonels  is  totally  incorrect. 

The  same  is  true  with  Allende.  Allende  de- 
stabilized himself.  We  did  not  produce  the 
inefliciency  of  his  regime.  We  did  not  procure 
the  decisions  of  the  leadership  of  the  Na- 
tional Assembly.  And  the  President  of  the 


July  26,  1976 


125 


Supreme  Court  declared  his  acts  unconstitu- 
tional and  refused  to  vote  for  his  programs. 
Those  were  Chilean  decisions.  We  did  try  to 
keep  the  democratic  parties  alive  in  the  face 
of  much  governmental  harassment  so  that 
they  could  put  forward  candidates  in  the 
election  of  1976.  But  we  also  kept  open  the 
economic  pipeline  to  Chile,  and  Allende  re- 
ceived over  $200  million  of  aid,  plus  $100 
million  of  debt  rescheduling  to  which  the 
United  States  agreed.  That  is  a  lot  more  aid 
disbursements  than  his  successors  have  re- 
ceived from  the  United  States. 

Now  with  respect  to  your  specific  ques- 
tion on  the  relationship  between  realpolitik 
and  morality.  This  is  usually  stated  as  a 
dichotomy:  Either  you  conduct  realpolitik 
or  you  conduct  a  moral  policy.  The  fact  is 
that  all  foreign  policy  actions,  whatever  their 
motivation,  whether  moral  or  cynical,  take 
place  in  some  objective  context.  And  it  is  the 
obligation  of  the  statesman  to  understand 
what  that  objective  context  is.  However 
principled  he  may  be,  if  he  cannot  use  the 
material  at  hand,  he  cannot  be  effective. 

On  the  other  hand,  a  policy  based  only  on 
so-called  realpolitik  is  likely  to  be  driven  by 
events.  And  it's  likely  to  become  totally  ran- 
dom. I  would  argue  that  without  strong 
moral  conviction  it  is  very  difficult  to  con- 
duct a  realpolitik,  and  I  believe  that  you 
need  strong  moral  convictions  and  a  clear 
sense  of  moral  purpose  to  define  the  objec- 
tives of  foreign  policy.  Then  in  every  individ- 
ual case  you  still  have  to  determine  what  you 
can  achieve  and  how  to  go  about  it.  And  the 
dilemma  of  the  statesman,  as  contrasted 
with  professors,  is  that  a  professor  can  af- 
ford to  put  down  the  full  complexity  and  ele- 
gance of  his  moral  elevation;  a  statesman 
has  to  achieve  his  objectives  by  stages,  each 
one  of  which  is  likely  to  be  imperfect.  So 
there  is  no  inevitable  opposition  between 
realpolitik  and  moral  principles  entirely. 

Mr.  Sommer:  If  you  look  at  the  African 
situation  in  this  context — 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Okay,  let's  take  the 
African  situation.  When  foreign  policy  is 
discussed  today,  people  speak  totally  in  the 


abstract,  as  if  all  foreign  policies  could  have 
been  conducted  simultaneously  and  as  if 
nothing  else  were  going  on  in  the  United 
States.  People  forget  now  that  we  went 
through  internal  upheavals  that  had  revolu- 
tionary manifestations  during  the  Viet-Nam 
war ;  that  when  we  came  into  office  we  found 
550,000  Americans  in  Viet-Nam,  that  we 
confronted  a  total  freeze  in  our  relationship 
with  the  Soviet  Union  and  no  relationship 
at  all  with  the  People's  Republic  of  China, 
and  that  relations  with  Europe  were  in 
rather  poor  shape.  It  was  inevitable  that  we 
had  to  settle  the  Viet-Nam  war  first,  re-do 
our  relationships  with  Western  Europe  and 
with  the  Communist  countries  before  we 
could  turn,  with  energy,  to  the  problems  of 
the  developing  world.  No  one  in  America 
would  have  understood  if  we  had  suddenly 
turned  our  full  energies  to  Africa  at  a  time 
when  we  had  all  these  other  priorities. 

Mr.  Sommer:  But  now  you  do. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Now  we  do. 

Mr.  Sommer:  And  what  are  the  yardsticks 
by  which  you  measure  the  situation? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  There  are  several  as- 
pects to  our  African  policy:  of  course  there 
is  the  overwhelming  problem  of  southern 
Africa  and  the  challenge  of  the  basic  orien- 
tation of  the  rest  of  Africa ;  and  finally  there 
is  the  relationship  of  Africa  to  the  rest  of 
the  world. 

With  respect  to  southern  Africa,  we  are 
attempting  to  bring  about  a  situation  in 
which  the  solution  is  found  through  negotia- 
tions rather  than  conflict,  and  by  African 
nations  rather  than  by  outside  powers. 
Hopefully,  such  a  solution  will  achieve  the 
aspirations  of  the  African  peoples  and  pro- 
tect the  rights  of  minorities.  And  if  that 
succeeds,  that  will  remove  one  of  the  great- 
est incentives,  in  fact  almost  the  only  oppor- 
tunity, for  outside  intervention.  Simultane- 
ously, we  are  trying  to  encourage  the  elabo- 
ration of  programs  that  give  the  aspirations 
to  development  a  positive  content  by  such 
proposals  as  the  Sahel  development  scheme, 
support    for     [French]     President    Giscard 


126 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


d'Estaing's  idea  of  an  Afi'ican  fund,  and  by 
the  expansion  of  our  own  development  pro- 
gram. And  so  far  I'm  rather  encouraged  by 
the  progress  we  are  making  with  respect  to 
southern  Africa,  or  at  least  I  think  it  is 
possible  we  can  make  progress. 

Mr.  Sommer:  Did  your  meeting  ivith  Mr. 
Vorster  [Prime  Minister  John  Vorster  of 
South  Africa]  yield  any  prospects  for  im- 
provement ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  It's  an  extremely 
delicate  situation  which  presents  eveiybody 
with  serious  dilemmas.  I  therefore  do  not 
want  to  characterize  it  at  this  moment,  ex- 
cept to  say  that  the  process  which  I've  de- 
scribed to  you  is  still  going  on,  that  is  to  say, 
the  possibilities  of  achieving  what  I  de- 
scribed exist,  and  I  would  say  that  with 
the  full  knowledge  of  my  conversation  with 
Prime  Minister  Vorster. 

Mr.  Sommer:  What  is  the  role  in  all  this 
for  Europe,  and  tuhat  future  do  you  see  for 
the  transatlantic  relationship? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  today  I'm  giv- 
ing a  perhaps  excessively  long  speech  on 
that  subject  at  the  Institute  for  Strategic 
Studies.  I  believe  that  Europe,  finding  its 
political  unity,  should  become  a  major  par- 
ticipant in  many  global  problems. 

I  would  think  with  respect  to  southern 
Africa,  for  example,  the  cooperation  of 
Europe  is  almost  essential.  It  cannot  be  done 
effectively  as  a  purely  American  policy. 

I  think  Great  Britain,  with  respect  to 
Rhodesia — Great  Britain,  the  Common  Mar- 
ket, and  the  United  States,  with  respect  to 
other  aspects  of  southern  Africa — can  give 
perhaps  an  element  of  guarantee  and  of 
stability  that  the  United  States  by  itself 
could  not  provide. 

On  the  whole  issue  of  development,  the 
close  cooperation  between  Europe  and  the 
United  States  is  essential.  And  I  think  reality 
will  bring  us  to  a  point  where,  in  East-West 
relations,  both  political  and  economic,  we 
will  have  to  synchronize  our  strategy. 

Mr.  Sommer:  Given  the  difficulties  of  pro- 


gressing toioard  greater  unity  in  Europe, 
given  the  problems  on  the  northern  and 
the  southern  flanks,  and  given  the  specter  of 
Eurocommunism,  do  you  still  believe  that 
Europe  ivill  be  Marxist  in  10  years'  time? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  have  never  believed 
that  Europe  will  be  Marxist  in  10  years' 
time. 

Mr.  Sommer:  The  sentence  is  ascribed  to 
you. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  sentence  may  be 
ascribed  to  me,  but  it  is  part  of  a  general 
mythology  of — 

Mr.  Sommer:  You  never  said  it. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  never  said  it  and — 

Mr.  Sommer:  And  you  don't  believe  it. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  And  I  don't  believe  it. 

Mr.  Sommer:  There  are  some  people  in  the 
United  States  who  feel  that  Europe  is  just 
too  bothersome,  and  probably  it  will  break 
up  ayiyway,  and  NATO  might  come  unstuck, 
and  that  our  best  bet  would  be  a  strengthen- 
ing of  a  Bonn-Washington  axis.  How  do  you 
feel  about  that? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Throughout  my  pub- 
lic life  I  have  been  a  strong  advocate  of  the 
closest  ties  between  Bonn  and  Washington. 
German  leaders,  in  and  out  of  office,  are 
personal  friends  of  mine.  Nevertheless  I 
think  it  would  be  unfortunate  for  the  Fed- 
eral Republic,  unfortunate  for  NATO,  and  not 
in  anybody's  interest  to  turn  NATO  into  a 
special  Bonn-Washington  relationship.  It 
would  be  too  heavy  a  burden  on  the  Federal 
Republic.  It  would  raise  all  the  suspicions  in 
the  rest  of  Europe  that  a  generation  of  re- 
sponsible German  foreign  policy  has  erased. 
And  it  would  encourage  the  splitting  up  of 
the  West  rather  than  be  an  element  of  sta- 
bility. I  don't  believe  it  is  necessary.  I  don't 
favor  it.  I  know  no  German  leader  who  favors 
it. 

Mr.  Sommer:  Do  you  see  a  special  role  for 
Germany  ? 


July  26,  1976 


127 


Secretary  Kissinger:  Germany,  because  of 
its  strength,  inherently  plays  a  vital  role. 
And  you  don't  get  a  special  role  by  being 
handed  a  piece  of  paper.  Germany  has  a  very 
major  role  which  it  has  exercised  responsibly 
and  which  it  should  continue  to  exercise  in 
the  existing  framework. 

Mr.  Sommer:  You've  involved  yourself  in 
so  many  election  campaigns  this  year.  Would 
you  care  to  comment  on  the  German  election 
campaign? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  [Laughter.]  I  said 
I'd  confine  myself  to  one  election  campaign 
at  a  time,  and  I  have  to  give  preference  to 
the  United  States. 

Mr.  Sommer:  What  is  your  comment  on 
the  Italian  election  results? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  Italian  election 
result  has  polarized  the  situation  that  led 
to  the  election  by  having  in  effect  an  anti- 
Communist  party  and  a  Communist  Party 
with  the  intermediary  parties  substantially 
weakened  and  some  of  them  brought  to  the 
edge  of  extinction.  There  is  now  almost  ex- 
actly the  situation  that  produced  the  election 
except  that  now  most  of  the  opposition  forces 
have  moved  toward  the  Communists  and  the 
anti-Communist  forces  have  moved  to  a 
slightly  lesser  extent  toward  the  Christian 
Democrats.  But  the  electoral  arithmetic  is 
almost  the  same  as  in  the  previous  parlia- 
ment. 

Mr.  Sommer:  So  we  are  not,  in  your  view, 
any  nearer  to  a  solution,  or  to  greater  stabil- 
ity. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  think  the  dilemma 
remains  exactly  the  same.  Major  reforms  are 
necessary  in  Italy.  If  they  are  carried  for- 
ward with  the  Communists,  will  it  set  a 
precedent  for  many  other  situations?  On  the 
other  hand,  can  the  non-Communist  forces 
create  sufficient  cohesion  to  carry  out  the 
necessary  reform  programs?  We,  of  course, 
hope  that  the  democratic  forces  will  form  a 
government  without  Communist  participa- 
tion and  carry  out  the  necessary  reforms. 

Mr.  Sommer:  Looking  hack  at  nearly  eight 


years  formulating  and  implementing  Amer- 
ican foreign  policy,  tvhich  tvere  your  greatest 
satisfactions  and  which  your  deepest  frus- 
trations? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  have  to  begin  by 
saying  that  my  present  judgments  are  quite 
unreliable,  because  when  you  are  in  this  office 
you  react  almost  athletically.  Events  keep 
crowding  in  on  you  and  you  have  to  I'e- 
spond — 

Mr.  Sommer:  Athletically — 

Secretary  Kissinger:  — almost  like  an  ath- 
lete, and  I'm  sure  that  once  I'm  out  of  office 
I  will  be  more  reflective.  The  danger  is  that 
if  I  am  out  of  office  a  long  time,  I  may  be  re- 
flecting on  things  that  never  happened. 

But  I  would  think  the  greatest  immediate 
dramas  were  the  first  time  I  met  Chou  En-lai, 
or  the  moment  when  Le  Due  Tho  handed  over 
the  proposals  which  permitted  the  existing 
governmental  structure  in  Saigon  to  survive, 
and  therefore  I  knew  that  the  settlement  of 
the  Viet-Nam  war  had  at  last  become  in- 
evitable. People  forget  now  the  enormous 
emotional  investment  we  all  had  in  ending 
the  war  in  Viet-Nam.  Other  great  sources  of 
immediate  satisfaction  were  the  moments 
when  the  various  Middle  East  agreements 
were  achieved. 

What  will  probably  give  me  satisfaction 
in  the  longer  term  are  structural  achieve- 
ments :  the  attempt  to  create  a  foreign  policy 
based  on  permanent  values  and  interests.  In 
this  category  I  would  evaluate  our  relations 
with  Western  Europe  and  Japan,  as  well  as 
our  relations  with  Latin  America,  quite 
positively. 

Mr.  Sommer:  Isn't  your  China  policy  in 
tatters  already  with  the  death  of  Chou  En- 
lai? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Absolutely  not.  Ev- 
erything depends  on  what  you  understand 
by  our  China  policy.  I  believe  that  without 
Watergate  we  probably  could  have  made 
more  rapid  progress  in  the  China  policy. 
But  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  remarkable  how 
well  the  China  policy  has  survived  all  the 
turmoil  in  both  countries.  And  the  basic  rela- 


128 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


tionship  between  China  and  the  United 
States,  which  is  based  on  certain  fundamen- 
tal common  interests  in  the  world  situation, 
lias  been — for  all  practical  purposes — un- 
affected. Things  like  cultural  exchange, 
trade,  these  are  symptoms.  They  are  not  the 
underlying  reahty. 

Mr.  Sommer:  Do  you  have  pangs  of  con- 
science at  night  about  Viet-Nam,  or  about 
Cambodia,  or  about  other  things? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  What  is  there  to  have 
pangs  of  conscience  at  night  about  with 
Viet-Nam?  We  found  550,000  American 
troops  in  Viet-Nam,  and  we  ended  the  war 
without  betraying  those  who  in  reliance  on 
us  had  fought  the  Communists.  And  to  re- 
move 550,000  troops  under  combat  condi- 
tions is  not  an  easy  matter. 

Mr.  Sommer:  You  don't  think  it  took  too 
much  time? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  It  was  important  that 
the  war  not  be  ended  with  the  United 
States  simply  abandoning  people  whom  we 
had  encouraged  to  resist  the  Communists. 
No  one  could  foresee  that  Watergate  would 
so  weaken  the  executive  authority  that  we 
could  not  maintain  a  settlement  that  in  it- 
self was  maintainable.  And  if  you  look  at 
what  our  opposition  was  saying  during  that 
time,  their  proposals  were  usually  only  about 
six  months  ahead  of  where  we  were  going 
anyway.  Some  said  we  should  end  the  war 
by  the  end  of  '71.  Well,  we  ended  it  by  the 
end  of  '72.  After  all,  it  took  De  Gaulle  five 
years  to  end  the  Algerian  war.  And  it  was  a 
very  difficult  process. 

Now,  with  respect  to  Cambodia.  It  is  an- 
other curious  bit  of  mythology.  People  usual- 
ly refer  to  the  bombing  of  Cambodia  as  if  it 
had  been  an  unprovoked,  secretive  U.S.  ac- 
tion. The  fact  is  that  we  were  bombing  North 
Vietnamese  troops  that  had  invaded  Cam- 
bodia for  many  years,  that  were  in  unpopu- 
lated areas  of  Cambodia,  that  were  killing 
many  Americans  from  these  sanctuaries,  and 
we  were  doing  it  with  the  acquiescence  of  the 
Cambodian  Government,  which  never  once 
protested  against  it  and  which,  indeed,  en- 
couraged us  to  do  it. 


I  may  have  a  lack  of  imagination,  but  I 
fail  to  see  the  moral  issue  involved  and  why 
Cambodian  neutrality  should  apply  to  only 
one  country.  Why  is  it  moral  for  the  North 
Vietnamese  to  have  50,000  to  100,000  troops 
in  Cambodia,  why  should  we  let  them  kill 
Americans  from  that  territory,  and  why, 
when  the  government  concerned  never  once 
protested  and  indeed  told  us  that  if  we 
bombed  unpopulated  areas  they  would  not 
notice,  why  in  all  these  conditions  is  there  a 
moral  issue? 

And  finally,  I  think  it  is  fair  to  say  that  in 
the  six  years  of  the  war,  not  10  percent  of 
the  people  were  killed  in  Cambodia  as  were 
killed  in  one  year  of  Communist  rule. 

Mr.  Sommer:  To  change  the  tack,  how  do 
you  account  for  the  fact  that  so  many  of 
your  policies  which  used  to  be  widely  ac- 
claimed are  now  rather  unpopular?  For  in- 
stance, detente.  Is  that  due  to  shifts  in  public 
mood,  or  is  it  due  to  problems  inherent  in 
these  policies?  Has  detente  been  a  one-way 
street?  What  is  the  position  of  the  U.S.S.R. 
today,  compared  to  what  it  ivas  when  you 
started?  Has  detente  reached  the  end  of  the 
road?  How  is  it  going  to  continue? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  would  judge  that  a 
year  from  now,  the  policy  that  has  been 
called  detente  will  be  seen  to  be  reflecting 
the  existing  realities,  and  the  only  realistic 
and,  for  that  matter,  moral  policy  that  the 
West  can  pursue. 

Memories  are  brief.  Think  back  to  the 
period  of  the  fifties  and  sixties,  when  we  had 
endless  crises  over  Berlin  and  other  issues, 
crises  that  led  to  the  edge  of  confrontation. 

It  seems  to  me  axiomatic  that  when  two 
countries  possess  the  capacity  to  destroy 
civiHzed  life,  they  cannot  conduct  their 
affairs  on  the  basis  of  a  constant  test  of 
strength  with  nuclear  weapons.  They  have 
an  obligation  to  attempt  to  avoid  crises,  if 
possible,  to  moderate  crises  if  they  occur, 
and  to  search  for  a  constructive  relationship. 

If  they  do  not  do  this,  it  will  demoralize 
their  publics.  They  will  create  "peace  move- 
ments," in  every  country,  that  accuse  their 
governments  of  having  failed  in  its  principal 
obligation  of  protecting  them  against  a  nu- 


July  26,  1976 


129 


clear  catastrophe.  The  very  fact  that  there 
are  no  significant  such  movements  in  any 
Western  country  today  is  an  important  trib- 
ute to  existing  policy. 

Secondly,  where,  exactly,  has  detente 
been  a  one-way  street?  What  concrete  agree- 
ment was  to  the  unilateral  benefit  of  the 
Soviet  Union? 

Mr.  Sonimer:  Your  critics  quote  SALT. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  What  was  the  alter- 
native to  SALT?  And  indeed,  what  was  the 
essence  of  SALT?  In  1971  the  United  States 
was  involved  in  the  war  in  Viet-Nam;  the 
United  States  had  for  five  years  not  begun 
one  single  new  strategic  launcher  program. 
The  Soviet  Union  was  building  120  sea-based 
and  about  90  land-based  missiles  a  year.  The 
numerical  balance  was  therefore  shifting 
with  every  month  against  the  United  States. 
Given  long  leadtimes,  the  United  States  had 
no  possibility  for  at  least  five  years  to  re- 
dress it.  I  therefore  fail  to  see  why  an  agree- 
ment that  stopped  ongoing  Soviet  programs 
but  no  U.S.  programs,  could  have  been 
against  the  interests  of  the  United  States.  A 
much  more  persuasive  case  can  be  made  that 
it  was  unilaterally  to  the  Soviet  disadvan- 
tage. But  what  the  Soviets  obviously  calcu- 
lated was  that  they  were  balancing  our  ca- 
pacity for  long-term  buildup,  not  what  we 
were  actually  doing. 

Mr.  Sommer:  You  said  in  your  Dallas 
speech  that  detente  is  not  paradise,  that  as 
far  as  you  can  see  ahead  we  will  be  living  in 
a  twilight  between  tranquillity  and  con- 
frontation. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  That's  right.  That  is 
inherent  in  the  large  nuclear  arsenals,  the 
conflicting  ideologies,  and  in  the  reality  that 
the  Russia  of  its  present  extent  and  power, 
even  with  a  different  leadership,  would  still 
be  a  security  problem  for  us.  It  is  not,  after 
all,  an  invention  of  the  Communists  that 
Russia  has  been  a  security  problem  for  Eu- 
rope. It  has  existed  at  least  since  the  Napo- 
leonic war,  if  not  before  then,  but  every 
statesman  has  an  obligation  to  ease  this  con- 
dition or  confrontation.  And  I  have  every 


confidence  that  whoever  is  President  next 
year  will,  in  this  respect,  pursue  substantially 
the  same  policies. 

Mr.  Sommer:  For  Germans,  the  Berlin 
problem  is  a  litmus  test  of  detente.  Are  you 
satisfied  tvith  the  situation  in  and  around 
Berlin? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  have  to  separate 
two  issues:  the  legal  situation  and  how 
agreements  are  being  carried  out.  I  believe 
that  the  Four  Power  Agreement  was  a  big 
step  forward  in  regularizing  the  status  of 
Berlin  and  in  ending  the  cycles  of  crises  that 
existed  in  the  fifties  and  sixties.  In  the  imple- 
mentation of  that  agreement  I  believe  im- 
provements are  possible  and,  conversely,  that 
opportunities  remain  for  what  have  up  to 
now  been  minor  harassments. 

On  balance  I  prefer  an  existing  explicit 
agreement  to  a  potentially  explosive  situa- 
tion. The  Western  powers  must  insist  on  the 
scrupulous  observance  of  the  agreement.  And 
they  must  defend  with  great  tenacity  the 
right  of  Berlin  to  live.  That  was  true  in  the 
fifties,  and  it  is  true  today.  But  we  have  a 
better  legal  basis  to  do  it  today,  and  on  the 
whole  I  think  the  situation  from  the  legal 
and  political  point  of  view  is  better  than  it 
was  previously. 

Mr.  Sommer:  Notv  our  recurrent  squabbles 
about  the  West  German  right  to  strengthen 
the  ties  between  West  Berlin  and  the  Fed- 
eral Republic,  to  establish  institutions  or  of- 
fices there.  Did  the  Russians  say  that  this 
was  not  ivhat  they  had  bargained  for  and 
this  is  not  the  meaning  of  the  Quadripartite 
Agreement?  How  do  you  feel  about  this,  and 
how  do  you  feel  about  the  suggestion  that 
has  been  made  recently  that  perhaps  there 
should  be  a  second  round  of  negotiations  try- 
ing to  refine  the  finer  points? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  A  new  negotiation  on 
Berlin  may  generate  new  demands  by  the 
other  side.  Our  general  policy  has  been  to 
support  the  Government  of  the  Federal  Re- 
public. The  management  of  the  situation  for 
them  requires  wisdom  and  restraint  by  all 
parties. 


130 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


Mr.  Sommer:  Restrained  in  putting 
more — 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  don't  want  to  say 
restraint  in  putting  institutions  there, 
because  obviously  the  viability  of  Berlin  has 
to  be  demonstrated.  Our  general  policy  has 
been  to  support  the  Federal  Republic. 

Mr.  Sommer:  You  have  never  counseled 
taking  it  easy  in  that  respect. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Certainly  not  as  a 
matter  of  principle.  We  may  have  on  indi- 
vidual occasions  expressed  our  views  to  the 
other  two  allies  with  special  responsibilities 
for  Berlin. 

Mr.  Sommer:  Let  me  ask  you  a  two- 
pronged  question.  If  President  Ford  wins 
and  if  he  offers  you  the  job  again,  ivould  you 
take  it?  And  the  other  part  of  the  question — 
if  not,  tvhat  are  the  tasks  you  leave  to  your 
successor? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  I  can't  go  be- 
yond what  I've  already  said  on  this  subject. 
In  terms  of  tasks,  I  think  it  is  fair  to  say 
that  in  foreign  policy  you  can  never  define  a 
terminal  point  after  which  problems  end.  I 
think  that  the  problem  of  arms  control,  even 
if  there  should  be  a  SALT  agreement,  will 
remain  before  us.  I  think  that  while  consider- 
able progress  toward  peace  in  the  Middle 
East  has  been  made,  the  task  will  have  to  be 
completed.  We  have  moved  the  African  pol- 
icy in  the  right  direction,  but  it  would  be 
arrogant  to  pretend  that  it  could  be  finished 
in  a  three-  to  six-month  period.  So  a  succes- 
sor of  mine  will  not  lack  excitement. 

Mr.  Sommer:  Will  the  rules  of  detente 
have  to  be  extended  to  outlying  areas? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Yes.  In  fact  I'm 
speaking  about  that  tonight  at  the  Institute 
for  Strategic  Studies. 

Mr.  Sommer:  What  nefarious  developments 
do  you  fear  most?  Do  you  foresee  a  North- 
South  confrontation? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  What  worries  me 
most  is  a  possible  loss  of  will  by  the  industrial 
democracies.    I    believe    that    the    industrial 


democracies  should  mobilize  their  resources 
and  coordinate  their  efforts  to  deal  with  the 
vast  range  of  problems  before  them.  They 
have  the  means  to  do  so.  The  North-South 
problem  can  be  moved  increasingly  in  a  posi- 
tive direction,  because  it  will  become  increas- 
ingly clear  that  it  is  a  long-term  process 
requiring  complex  solutions  and  therefore 
particularly  susceptible  to  the  kind  of  solu- 
tions that  the  industrial  democracies  are 
particularly  well  able  to  produce. 

Mr.  Sommer:  Hoio  do  some  of  the  tenets 
held  by  Dr.  Kissinger  at  Harvard  look  in  the 
light  of  your  experience  in  Washington? 
You  complained  about  statesmen  being  mired 
in  the  crises  of  the  moment.  You  said  there 
was  a  conflict  betiveen  short-term  goals  and 
long-range  purposes.  And  you  said  the  20th 
century  was  not  a  time  for  statesmanship. 
Does  your  experience  bear  that  out? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  If  you  conduct  foreign 
policy,  you  cannot  avoid  dealing  with  de- 
tails, because  if  you  do,  you  get  over- 
whelmed by  events.  The  problem  is  whether 
you  have  enough  of  a  long-range  conception 
so  that  the  details  do  not  become  ends  in 
themselves.  I  have  tried — with  what  success 
historians  will  have  to  judge — to  have  an 
overriding  concept.  It  can  be  found  in  innu- 
merable, maybe  pedantic,  speeches  I  have 
given  over  the  years.  I  don't  think  it  is  for 
me  to  judge  the  success.  It  should  be  done 
by  others. 

Mr.  Sommer:  You  criticized  Castlereagh 
for  ignoring  the  domestic  situation  of  his 
country  and  Metternich  for  overtaxing  his. 
Now,  didn't  you  sometimes  simultaneously 
commit  both  mistakes? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  But  you  have  to  re- 
member the  evolution  of  our  domestic  situa- 
tion. I  went  through  a  period  of  maybe  exor- 
bitant praise  and  then  through  a  period  of 
maybe  exorbitant  criticism.  But  my  public 
opinion  polls  have  held  remarkably  steady  at 
about  60  percent  support  even  in  the  middle 
of  an  election  year.  So  when  you  speak  of 
public  support,  it  hasn't  been  all  that  lack- 
ing, and  much  of  the  debate  of  foreign  policy 


July  26,  1976 


131 


has  resulted  from  domestic  conditions  that 
were  substantially  extraneous  to  foreign 
policy. 

Mr.  Sommer:  You  once  told  Scotty  Reston 
that  as  a  historian  you  ivere  inclined  to  look 
at  the  fate  of  mankind  in  deep  pessimism. 
But  as  a  statesman  you  ivere  battling  every 
day  to  justify  a  more  optimistic  viejv.  Noio 
has  the  result  of  your  oivn  labors  changed 
your  pessimistic  outlook? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  have  never  said  that 
I  have  a  pessimistic  outlook.  I  have  said, 
what  is  after  all  empirically  true,  that  most 
civilizations  that  we  know  anything  about 
have  eventually  declined.  All  you  have  to  do 
is  travel  around  the  world  and  look  at  the 
ruins  of  past  cultures  to  confirm  that  fact. 

As  a  historian  one  has  to  be  conscious  of 
the  possibility  of  tragedy.  However,  as  a 
statesman,  one  has  a  duty  to  act  as  if  one's 
country  were  immortal.  I  have  acted  on  the 
assumption  that  our  problems  are  soluble. 
The  agenda  we  have  set — in  East-West  rela- 
tions, in  arms  control,  in  development,  in 
Africa,  Latin  America,  Europe,  and  Japan, 
all  on  the  same  canvas  and  more  or  less  at 
the  same  time — shows  considerable  optimism 
that  our  problems  are  soluble,  that  our  coun- 
try can  master  its  problems.  If  setting  big 
tasks  is  a  sign  of  confidence,  then  I  would 
say  we  have  conducted  an  optimistic  policy. 
But  I  would  be  irresponsible  to  pretend  that 
success  is  guaranteed. 

Mr.  Som,mer:  But  you  do  not  in  your  poli- 
cies, in  your  actual  policies,  indulge  in 
Spenglerian  visions  of  a  decline  of  the  West 
and  a  rise  of  the  new  barbarians. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  These  quotations  are 
invented  by  overambitious  and  unscrupulous 
political  candidates.  These  are  not  my  views. 

Mr.  Sommer:  How  much  freedom  ivould  a 
new  Secretary  of  State  or,  for  that  matter,  a 
new  President  have  to  conduct  a  new  foreign 
policy,  American  foreign  policy? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  It  would  be  basically 
unfortunate  for  the  United  States  to  pretend 
that  every  four  to  eight  years  it  has  the  op- 
portunity   to    begin    a  new    foreign   policy. 


Nothing  could  disquiet  our  friends  more 
than  the  belief  that  every  eight  years,  no 
matter  what  they  do,  the  United  States 
starts  on  an  entirely  new  course. 

A  great  power  lives  in  the  real  world.  At 
some  point  its  assessment  of  that  world  must 
reflect  permanent  realities.  And  therefore  its 
margin  for  maneuver  is  limited.  Of  course, 
new  people  coming  in  can  bring  new  ideas  to 
familiar  problems.  They  may  be  able  to  be 
more  imaginative  about  achieving  agreed 
ends. 

I'm  not  saying  that  a  new  Secretary  is 
bound  by  the  same  tactics,  only  that  one  of 
the  most  important  necessities  for  American 
policy  is  to  give  other  countries  a  sense  of 
stability.  If  we  bring  new  people  in  from 
time  to  time,  they  must  not  rip  up  every  tree 
to  see  whether  the  roots  are  still  there. 

Whenever  I  leave  office,  I  would  certainly 
do  my  best  to  help  my  successor  achieve  this 
continuity.  I  do  not  believe  that  the  basic  ref- 
erences of  foreign  policy  should  be  regularly 
challenged,  unless  there  is  an  overwhelming 
moral  issue  involved. 


Letters  of  Credence 

Brazil 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  the 
Federative  Republic  of  Brazil,  Joao  Baptista 
Pinheiro,  presented  his  credentials  to  Presi- 
dent Ford  on  June  22.' 

Guatemala 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  the 
Republic  of  Guatemala,  Federico  Abundio 
Maldonado  Gularte,  presented  his  credentials 
to  President  Ford  on  June  22.' 

Malaysia 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  Ma- 
laysia, Zain  Azraai  Bin  Zainal  Abidin,  pre- 
sented his  credentials  to  President  Ford  on 
June  22.' 


'  For  texts  of  the  Ambassador's  remarks  and  the 
President's  reply,  see  Department  of  State  press 
release  dated  June  22. 


132 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


U.S.  Gives  Views  on  UNCTAD  IV  and  Commodities  Resolution 


The  fourth  ministerial  meeting  of  the  U.N. 
Conference  on  Trade  and  Development  ivas 
held  at  Nairobi  May  5-31.  Folloiving  are  a 
joint  statement  by  Secretary  Kissinger  and 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  William  E.  Simon 
issued  at  Washingtori  on  June  1,  statements 
made  at  the  final  plenary  session  of  the  con- 
ference at  Nairobi  on  May  31  by  Paul  Boeker, 
Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for  International 
I  Finance  and  Development,  and  a  U.S.-Group 
B  (developed  market-economy  countries) 
statement,  together  with  a  summary  of  the 
resolution  on  commodities  adopted  by  the 
conference,  prepared  by  the  Bureau  of  Eco- 
nomic and  Business  Affairs. 


JOINT  STATEMENT  BY  SECRETARY  KISSINGER 
AND  TREASURY  SECRETARY  SIMON,  JUNE  1  ' 

The  United  States  went  to  UNCTAD  IV  at 
Nairobi  in  a  serious  and  cooperative  spirit. 
In  preparation  for  the  conference,  we  con- 
ducted a  thorough  review  of  U.S.  interna- 
tional economic  policies  in  which  all  agencies 
of  the  government  participated.  There  was 
agreement  on  a  series  of  proposals  of  special 
relevance  to  the  developing  countries,  which 
we  presented  at  UNCTAD.  We  were  repre- 
sented by  the  most  senior  delegation  in  the 
history  of  UNCTAD  meetings,  and  for  the 
first  time,  the  U.S.  position  was  set  forth  in 
an  opening  statement  by  the  Secretary  of 
State.-  In  that  statement,  the  United  States 
put  forward  its  proposals  to  deal  with  the 
problems  of  the  developing  world,  including 
proposals    directly    related    to    commodities, 


'Issued  at  Washington  (text  from  press  release 
279). 

'  For  Secretary  Kissinger's  statement  at  Nairobi 
on  May  6,  see  Bulletin  of  May  31,  1976,  p.  657. 


and  at  the  same  time  indicated  that  there 
were  certain  proposals  that  we  could  not  ac- 
cept. Throughout  the  four-week  meeting, 
the  United  States  cooperated  with  other  na- 
tions and  important  progress  was  made  on 
a  number  of  matters  before  the  conference. 

In  our  review  of  international  commodity 
policies  in  preparation  for  the  UNCTAD 
meeting,  and  otherwise,  we  have  tried  to 
find  ways  of  meeting  the  concerns  of  the  de- 
veloping countries,  within  the  framework  of 
an  efficient  international  market  system.  As 
we  have  made  clear  at  the  U.N.  conference, 
we  are  prepared  to  participate  in  a  case-by- 
case  examination  of  arrangements  to  im- 
prove the  functioning  of  the  international 
commodity  markets  through  a  broad  range 
of  measures  appropriate  to  specific  commodi- 
ties, but  we  have  opposed  mechanisms  to  fix 
prices  or  limit  production  by  intergovern- 
mental action. 

One  of  the  most  significant  of  the  U.S. 
proposals  addressed  the  problem  of  increas- 
ing investment  in  mineral  development.  For 
that  reason,  the  United  States,  in  an  effort 
to  meet  the  interests  of  the  developing  coun- 
tries and  the  world  economy  at  large,  pro- 
posed an  International  Resources  Bank  (IRB) 
to  facilitate  the  continued  flow  of  essential 
capital,  management,  and  technology  for  the 
development  of  new  resources  in  the  LDC's 
[less  developed  countries]. 

As  the  conference  progressed,  a  senior 
interagency  group  in  Washington  reviewed 
all  proposals  before  the  conference  with  a 
view  to  accepting  as  many  as  possible  of  the 
suggestions  being  made  by  the  LDC's  and 
other  countries  consistent  with  our  basic 
principles. 

At  the  final  plenary  session  an  LDC  reso- 
lution on  commodities  was  adopted  by  con- 


July  26,  1976 


133 


sensus.  The  interagency  group  authorized 
reservations  about  parts  of  this  resolution, 
which  were  read  at  the  conference.  Never- 
theless, we  joined  the  consensus  because  we 
wanted  to  contribute  to  the  spirit  of  har- 
mony in  the  closing  sessions  of  the  confer- 
ence and  because  the  resolution  contained  a 
number  of  elements  of  our  own  comprehen- 
sive approach  which  had  been  agreed  within 
the  government  and  advanced  by  Secretary 
Kissinger  in  his  address  to  the  conference 
three  weeks  earlier.  As  our  reservations  in- 
dicate, we  did  not  believe  that  all  aspects 
of  the  LDC  proposals  were  practical  and 
feasible.  However,  we  committed  ourselves 
to  the  search  for  concrete,  practical  solutions 
to  commodity  problems  that  will  be  in  the 
interests  of  both  producers  and  consumers. 

It  is  all  the  more  regrettable,  therefore, 
that  the  resolution  proposing  further  study 
of  the  International  Resources  Bank  was  de- 
feated by  two  votes,  with  31  votes  in  favor. 
Ninety  countries  at  the  last  minute  ab- 
stained or  absented  themselves. 

A  substantial  number  of  the  33  votes 
against  were  the  Socialist  countries,  whose 
contribution  to  the  development  of  the 
poorer  countries  of  the  world  is  negligible. 

Forty-four  countries  cooperated  in  this 
effort  by  abstaining  on  the  International  Re- 
sources Bank,  and  46  absented  themselves — 
almost  all  of  which  were  the  developing  coun- 
tries. This  does  not  augur  well  for  the  future 
of  the  dialogue  of  the  worldwide  develop- 
ment effort.  The  United  States,  whose  role 
is  so  vital,  does  not  expect,  when  it  makes 
major  efforts  to  coopei'ate,  that  its  pi'oposals 
will  be  subject  to  accidental  majorities. 

If  the  dialogue  between  the  developing 
and  developed  countries,  to  which  we  attach 
great  importance,  is  to  succeed,  suggestions 
put  foi-ward  by  the  developed  nations,  such 
as  the  IRB  at  UNCTAD,  must  be  treated  on 
the  merits  and  with  serious  consideration. 
The  LDC's  must  not  lend  themselves  to 
parliamentary  manipulation  by  those  states 
who  contribute  nothing  to  the  development 
of  the  poor  nations  of  the  world. 

We  will  be  addressing  the  problems  of  re- 


source development  financing  again  in  later 
meetings,  including  the  preparatory  confer- 
ences contemplated  by  the  commodities  reso- 
lution of  UNCTAD  IV.  We  will  advance  the 
IRB  proposal  again,  and  we  expect  that  it 
will  be  considered  with  the  same  respect  and 
care  which  the  United  States  will  lend  to 
the  study  of  the  proposals  which  the  LDC's 
will  table. 

The  United  States  went  to  Nairobi  with  a 
wide  range  of  other  proposals  aimed  at  deal- 
ing constructively  and  pragmatically  with 
the  urgent  problems  of  the  developing  world. 
We  are  gratified  that  the  conference  em- 
braced a  number  of  these  suggestions,  dealing 
with  resource  and  technology  transfer  and 
trade  expansion.  We  will  continue  to  elabo- 
rate these  proposals — as  well  as  the  proposal 
for  the  Resources  Bank — in  appropriate 
fora,  because  they  are  right  for  the  pro- 
found problems  we  are  addressing. 


STATEMENTS  BY  MR.  BOEKER,  NAIROBI,  MAY  31 

Statement  of  Reservations,  Explanations, 
and  Interpretations  ^ 

Now  that  the  plenary  session  of  the 
Fourth  UNCTAD  Conference  has  completed 
action  on  the  resolutions  before  it,  the  U.S. 
delegation  would  like  to  express  some  views 
on  certain  aspects  of  those  resolutions.  My 
delegation  has  been  pleased  to  join  the  con- 
sensus on  a  number  of  important  resolutions 
which  we  are  confident  will  conti'ibute  to 
international  economic  cooperation  and  de- 
velopment. The  United  States,  knowing  the 
hopes  attached  to  UNCTAD  IV  by  the  de- 
veloping countries,  has  expended  significant 
effort  to  make  constructive  contributions 
toward  the  success  of  this  conference. 

The  Nairobi  Conference  marks  another 
significant  step  forward  in  the  era  of  con- 
structive negotiation  launched  at  the  seventh 
special  session  of  the  General  Assembly.  We 

'  The  statement  includes  U.S.  reservations  on  the 
commodities  resolution  and  explanations  and  inter- 
pretations of  other  resolutions. 


134 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


have  taken  major  steps  by  consensus  in  such 
essential  fields  as  commodities,  trade,  trans- 
fer of  technology,  debt,  special  measures  to 
assist  the  poorest  and  least  developed  of  the 
developing  countries,  and  in  strengthening 
UNCTAD  itself. 

The  spokesmen  for  Group  B  have  made 
certain  statements  on  behalf  of  the  group  as 
a  whole.  The  United  States  was  associated 
with  those  statements. 

In  addition,  Mr.  President,  I  wish  to  make 
several  supplementary  observations  on  par- 
ticular resolutions.  These  observations  are 
made  in  a  constructive  spirit.  We  believe  it 
important  there  be  no  uncertainty  as  to  the 
views  of  any  country  as  we  increasingly 
broaden  areas  of  agreement. 

Commodities 

The  consensus  resolution  on  commodities 
[TD/RES/93(IV)]  is  a  central  element  of 
this  conference.  We  are  all  aware  of  the 
massive  effort,  by  all  parties,  which  has  led 
to  this  text.  We  can  be  satisfied  that  on  a 
matter  where  such  disparate  views  exist,  the 
common  desire  to  reach  agreement  has  pro- 
duced consensus.  We  particularly  welcome 
the  practical  elements  of  the  program  of 
work  on  commodities  which  it  has  been  for 
some  time  our  policy  to  support. 

With  regard  to  section  IV  of  this  resolu- 
tion, our  understanding  of  the  request  to  the 
Secretary  General  to  convene  preparatory 
meetings  is  that  the  purpose  of  such  meet- 
ings is  to  determine  the  nature  of  the  prob- 
lems affecting  particular  commodities  and  to 
determine,  without  commitment,  the  meas- 
ures which  might  be  appropriate  to  each 
product.  Such  meetings  will  indicate  the 
cases  where  we  can  enter  into  negotiation  of 
agreements  or  other  arrangements  which 
could  encompass  a  broad  range  of  measures 
to  improve  trade  in  commodities. 

It  is  our  further  understanding  that  the 
Secretary  General  in  convening  preparatory 
meetings  will  utilize  existing  commodity 
bodies.  Where  there  are  no  such  bodies,  ad 
hoc  groups  will  be  convened.  We  interpret 
this  section  to  mean  that  preparatory  meet- 


ings will  be  convened  on  individual  products 
and  that  the  preparatory  meetings  are  con- 
sultations prior  to  a  decision  whether  to 
enter  negotiations. 

A  decision  on  a  financial  relationship 
among  buffer  stocks  will  need  to  be  con- 
sidered in  the  light  of  developments  on  in- 
dividual funds.  However,  since  there  may  be 
advantages  in  linking  the  financial  resources 
of  individual  buffer  stocks,  we  will  partici- 
pate, without  any  commitment,  in  prepara- 
tory meetings  to  examine  whether  further 
arrangements  for  financing  of  buffer  stocks, 
including  common  funding,  are  desirable. 
After  the  outcome  of  these  preparatory  dis- 
cussions we  will  decide  on  our  participation 
in  any  negotiating  conference. 

We  have  accepted  this  resolution  on  the 
understanding  that  its  various  positions,  in- 
cluding those  on  commodity  arrangements 
and  compensatory  financing,  do  not  alter  our 
reservations  on  the  concept  of  indexation. 

We  are  not  indicating  in  this  or  other  reso- 
lutions of  this  conference,  as  far  as  the 
United  States  is  concerned,  any  change  in 
our  known  views  on  the  new  international 
economic  order  and  the  Charter  of  Economic 
Rights  and  Duties  of  States. 

We  would  emphasize  the  difficulties  we  see 
related  to  the  concept  that  production  of  syn- 
thetics and  substitutes  should  be  harmonized 
with  supplies  of  natural  resources. 

We  regret  that  this  resolution,  which  is 
supposed  to  deal  with  commodity  problems 
in  an  overall  sense,  does  not  address  the 
problem  of  supporting  development  of  re- 
sources in  developing  countries.  Failure  to 
adopt  the  proposed  resolution  regarding  the 
International  Resources  Bank  represents  a 
similar  lack  of  attention  to  this  task. 

We  accept  this  resolution  on  commodities 
with  these  reservations  and  explanations. 

Multilatei-al  Trade  Negotiations  (MTN) 

Regarding  resolution  L.113  [TD/RES/ 
91  (IV)]  on  the  multilateral  trade  negotia- 
tions, we  do  not  view  the  MTN  as  the  appro- 
priate forum  for  the  consideration  of  the 
nature  or  operation  of  the  generalized  sys- 


July  26,  1976 


135 


terns  of  preferences,  despite  the  importance 
we  attach  to  these  systems  as  a  means  to 
increase  trade  opportunities  for  developing 
countries. 

Economic    Cooperation    Among    Developing 
Countries 

With  regard  to  the  resolution  on  economic 
cooperation  among  developing  countries  (L. 
117)  [TD/RES/92/(IV)],  particularly  para- 
graph (b)(iii),  my  delegation  will  support 
decisions  taken  by  developing  countries  in 
the  understanding  that  such  decisions  are 
consistent  with  international  obligations  and 
standards. 

Institutional  Arrangements 

With  respect  to  the  resolution  on  institu- 
tional arrangements  contained  in  TD/L.118 
[TD/ RES/90 (IV)],  we  are  pleased  to  be 
able  to  join  in  the  consensus. 

The  United  States  believes  that  this  reso- 
lution affords  an  opportunity  to  transform 
UNCTAD  into  a  more  effective  organization 
which  will  serve  the  interests  of  all  member 
states  within  its  important  mandate.  We 
urge  that  the  Secretary  General  of  UNCTAD 
undertake  early  consultations  pursuant  to 
paragraph  5  of  section  B  with  the  Secretary 
General  of  the  United  Nations  so  that  the 
results  can  be  thoroughly  considered  before 
the  October  meeting  of  the  Trade  and  De- 
velopment Board. 

We  also  believe  that  it  would  be  useful 
for  the  United  States  to  reiterate  its  position 
on  certain  issues  raised  in  L.118  and  in  cer- 
tain other  resolutions  of  the  conference.  The 
United  States,  while  not  supporting  the  Dec- 
laration and  Program  of  Action  for  the  Es- 
tablishment of  a  New  International  Eco- 
nomic Order  and  the  Charter  of  Economic 
Rights  and  Duties  of  States,  has  recognized 
that  majority  decisions  of  the  General  As- 
sembly place  obligations  on  the  subsidiary 
bodies  of  the  General  Assembly  to  respond. 

While  the  United  States  firmly  maintains 
its  reservations  on  these  two  matters,  we  will 


continue  to  work  cooperatively  to  carry  out 
those  portions  with  which  we  agree  in 
UNCTAD  and  elsewhere. 

We  have  adopted  the  same  attitude  to- 
ward the  Lima  Declaration  and  Plan  of 
Action. 

Debt 

The  United  States  supports  the  resolution 
[TD/RES/94(IV)]  passed  on  the  impor- 
tant question  of  debt.  The  policy  of  the 
United  States  remains  that  of  engaging  in 
debt-rescheduling  negotiations  in  the  credi- 
tor club  framework  only  where  there  is  some 
presumption  of  imminent  default. 

Finally,  Mr.  Chairman,  the  United  States 
wishes  to  make  clear,  with  regard  to  all  of 
the  resolutions  passed  at  UNCTAD  IV,  that 
it  will  honor  the  undertakings  it  has  accepted 
during  this  conference  to  the  full  measure 
permitted  by  relevant  laws,  policies,  and  in- 
ternational obhgations. 

Explanation  of  U.S.  Abstention  on  Resolution 
on  Transnational  Corporations  * 

We  would  like  to  explain  why  we  cannot 
support  this  resolution.  Developing  countries, 
which  consider  that  transnational  corpora- 
tions as  well  as  other  private  investment 
can  be  a  positive  contribution  for  their  de- 
velopment process  or  plans,  should  endeavor 
to  promote  an  appropriate  investment  cli- 
mate. We  recognize  that  the  transnational 
corporations  should  conduct  their  operations 
in  accordance  with  local  laws  and  in  har- 
mony with  local  policy,  but  we  would  also 
like  to  underline  the  importance  of  local  laws 
being  stable  and  consistent  with  inter- 
national laws. 

In  regulating  the  activities  of  trans- 
national corporations,  governments  should 
be  guided  by  an  understanding  of  the  legiti- 
mate   methods    of   an  entity    that   is   often 


'The    resolution    ( TD/ RES/97  ( IV ) )    was    adopted 
on  May  31  by  a  vote  of  84-0,  with  16  abstentions. 


136 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


privately  owned;  otherwise  the  positive  con- 
tributions from  such  activities  to  develop- 
ment could  be  diminished. 

Cooperation  among  governments  can  im- 
prove the  foreign  investment  climate,  en- 
courage the  positive  contribution  which 
transnational  corporations  can  make  to  eco- 
nomic and  social  progress  and  minimize  and 
resolve  any  difficulties  which  may  arise  from 
their  various  operations. 

For  this  reason  we  welcome  the  decision 
by  ECOSOC  [U.N.  Economic  and  Social 
Council]  to  establish  a  Commission  and  a 
Center  on  Transnational  Corporations  for 
"comprehensive  and  in-depth  consideration 
of  issues  relating  to  Transnational  Corpora- 
tions." We  hope  UNCTAD  will  be  available 
to  help  in  this  work,  particularly  through  its 
work  in  fields  of  restrictive  business  prac- 
tices and  transfer  of  technology. 

Explanation  on  Resolution  on  Manufactures 
and  Semimanufactures 

Regarding  the  resolution  on  expansion  and 
diversification  of  exports  of  manufactures 
and  semimanufactures  of  developing  coun- 
tries (L.115)  [TD/RES/96(IV)],  we  sub- 
port  that  provision  of  the  resolution  which 
states  that  the  generalized  system  of  pref- 
erences (GSP)  should  continue  beyond  the 
initial  period  of  10  years  originally  envis- 
aged. Since  the  legislation  authorizing  our 
scheme  expires  in  1985,  our  GSP  will  con- 
tinue four  years  beyond  the  period  envisaged 
in  the  original  GATT  [General  Agreement 
on  Tariffs  and  Trade]  waiver.  As  we  ap- 
proach the  expiration  of  our  legislation,  we 
will  make  a  decision  as  to  its  prolongation, 
taking  into  account  the  evolving  needs  of 
beneficiary  countries. 

The  United  States  views  on  redeployment 
of  industries  (section  E),  as  expressed  in 
the  seventh  special  session  of  the  U.N.  Gen- 
eral Assembly,  are  unchanged.  While  we 
favor  policies  which  will  facilitate  the  nor- 
mal evolution  of  industrial  production  in  re- 
sponse   to    market   forces,   our   government 


cannot  intervene  directly  in  this  process. 

With  regard  to  restrictive  business  prac- 
tices and  their  international  regulation  and 
control,  we  welcome  the  decision  to  continue 
work  in  this  area.  We  believe  that  in  this 
area  we  should  focus  principally  on  situa- 
tions where  there  is  an  adverse  effect  on 
international  trade.  Other  criteria  would  be 
insufficient,  in  our  view.  We  also  believe  that 
multilaterally  agreed  principles  and  rules 
should  be  voluntary.  With  regard  to  notifica- 
tion and  exchange  of  information  on  restric- 
tive business  practices,  it  is  our  understand- 
ing that  these  procedures  should  be  recipro- 
cal and  at  the  intergovernmental  level. 

Mr.  Chairman,  we  are  pleased  that  it  was 
possible  to  adopt  this  resolution  by  consen- 
sus. I  should  like  to  state  for  the  record, 
however,  that  if  there  had  been  a  vote  we 
would  have  abstained  on  paragraph  (d)  of 
section  I., A.  We  do  not  accept  the  possible 
implication  that  some  countries  are  using 
the  GSP  for  coercive  purposes. 


U.S.-GROUP  B  STATEMENTS  ON  RESOLUTIONS 
ON   TRANSFER   OF  TECHNOLOGY 

International  Code  of  Conduct  on  Transfer 
of  Technology 

Mr.  Chairman :  We  are  pleased  to  note  that 
notwithstanding  initial  divergent  positions 
on  questions  relating  to  a  code  of  conduct 
for  the  transfer  of  technology,  the  confer- 
ence has  reached  a  consensus  on  a  resolution 
which  enables  concrete  work  on  this  matter 
to  go  forward.  We  are  ready  and  willing  to 
engage  in  negotiations,  in  accordance  with 
the  resolution  contained  in  TD/L.128  [TD/ 
RES/89/ (IV)],  toward  the  end  of  establish- 
ing a  code  of  conduct  which  sets  reasonable 
standards  for  both  governments  and  enter- 
prises. 

We  remain  convinced  that  the  establish- 
ment of  a  voluntary  code  of  conduct  would 
best  serve  the  transfer  of  technology  and 
that  such  a  code  of  conduct  should  be  uni- 


July  26,   1976 


137 


versally  applicable — covering  all  interna- 
tional transfer  of  technology— and  be  di- 
rected to  source  and  recipient  enterprises 
and  their  governments.  The  conference 
agreed  not  to  prejudge  the  legal  character 
of  the  code,  and  the  resolution  contained  in 
TD/L.128  is  also  compatible  with  the  con- 
cept that  the  code  may  be  entirely  volun- 
tary in  character  and  may  be  adopted  as  a 
U.N.  resolution. 

It  is  with  these  understandings  in  mind 
that  we  look  forward  to  participating  in  the 
work  of  the  intergovernmental  group  that 
has  been  established  by  this  conference.  We 
believe  that  a  code  can  be  produced  which 
will  make  a  major  and  positive  contribution 
to  the  international  transfer  of  technology, 
as  well  as  to  strengthening  the  technological 
capacity  of  all  states,  especially  developing 
countries. 

We  hope  that  negotiations  to  come  will 
permit  further  progress  and  facilitate  full 
agreement  on  this  most  important  matter. 

Strengthening  the  Technological  Capacity  of 

Developing  Countries 

The  members  of  Group  B  lend  their  full 
support  to  the  resolution  on  strengthenmg 
the  technological  capacity  of  developmg 
countries  (TD/L.lll  and  TD/L.lll/Corr. 
1)  [TD/RES/87(IV)],  which  we  believe 
contains  positive  and  meaningful  measures 
aimed  at  improving  the  technological  infra- 
structure and  capability  of  developing  coun- 

tri6s. 

Mr.  Chairman,  the  members  of  Group  B 
wish  to  make  clear  their  interpretation  of 
paragraph  5(b)  (i)  of  this  resolution.  We 
support  appropriate  exchange  of  information 
on  technological  alternatives  between  devel- 
oping countries.  It  is  recognized  that  much 
of  the  technological  information  available  to 
governments  is  developed  by  enterprises. 
Therefore,  we  affirm  that  "appropriate"  ex- 
change of  "available"  information  must  be 
consistent  with  contractual  agreements  and, 
where  relevant,  respect  confidentiality  of 
technological  information. 


SUMMARY  OF  RESOLUTION  ON  COMMODITIES 

In  the  resolution  on  commodities,  the  conference 
took  two  significant  actions: 

1.  It  established  a  timetable  for  preparatory  meet- 
ings and  a  negotiating  conference  on  the  possible 
establishment  of  a  common  fund  to  finance  buffer 
stocks  and  other  measures;  and 

2.  It  established  a  timetable  for  preparatory 
meetings  and,  as  and  when  required,  negotiating 
conferences  on  a  series  of  commodities. 

Regarding  the  first  of  these  actions,  the  confer- 
ence agreed  that  a  negotiating  conference  should  be 
convened  by  the  Secretary  General  of  UNCTAD  no 
later  than  March  1977.  This  negotiating  conference 
will  be  open  to  all  members  of  UNCTAD;  there  is 
no  advance  commitment  by  the  United  States  (or 
other  UNCTAD  members)  to  attend  this  conference. 
Before  the  conference  is  held,  two  series  of  actions 
are  specified  in  the  commodities  resolution: 

1.  By  September  30,  1976,  member  countries  are 
invited  to  transmit  to  the  Secretary  General  of 
UNCTAD  any  proposals  they  may  wish  to  make  on 
the  objectives  and  operations  of  the  fund;  and 

2.  The  Secretary  General  is  to  convene  preparatory 
meetings  on  the  fund  proposals  to  discuss: 

(a)  elaboration  of  objectives; 

(b)  financing  needs; 

(c)  sources  of  financing; 

(d)  mode  of  operations;  and 

(e)  decisionmaking  and  management. 

The  commodities  resolution  noted  that  differences 
of  view  persist  regarding  the  objectives  and  modali- 
ties of  a  common  fund. 

The  UNCTAD  Secretary  General  was  also  re- 
quested by  the  conference  in  its  commodities  reso- 
lution to  convene  a  series  of  preparatory  meetings 
on  18  commodities  specified  in  the  resolution  in  the 
period  beginning  September  1,  1976,  and  ending  no 
later  than  February  1976.  The  commodities  included 
in  the  resolution  are:  bananas,  bauxite,  cocoa,  coffee, 
copper,  cotton  and  cotton  yarns,  hard  fibers  and 
products,  iron  ore,  jute  and  products,  manganese, 
meat,  phosphates,  rubber,  sugar,  tea,  tropical  tim- 
ber, tin,  and  vegetable  oils,  including  olive  oil,  and 
oilseeds.  Although  the  resolution  refers  to  the  meet- 
ings as  "preparatory  meetings  for  international 
negotiations,"  the  resolution  also  makes  clear  that 
actual  negotiating  conferences  to  be  completed  by 
the  end  of  1976  will  be  called  only  "as  and  when 
required."  These  commodity  meetings  are  to  take 
place  "in  consultation  with  international  organiza- 
tions concerned." 


138 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Congress  and  Foreign  Policy 


Statement  by  Robert  J.  McCloskey 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Congressional  Relations 


Dean  Acheson,  who,  among  his  other  con- 
siderable achievements,  served  for  a  time  as 
what  is  now  called  Assistant  Secretary  for 
Congressional  Relations,  often  remarked 
that  what  he  looked  for  in  the  liaison  be- 
tween the  Congress  and  the  executive  was 
a  "fair  wind."  What  he  meant,  of  course,  is 
that  combination  of  forces  in  nature  without 
which  the  ship  of  state  has  no  bearing.  On 
infrequent  occasions,  I  have  experienced  that 
invigorating,  heady  feeling  that  comes  with 
"fair  wind."  I'm  not  certain  that  I  can  sum- 
mon quickly  to  mind  the  issues  that  re- 
freshed the  air,  but  I  recall  the  exhilaration. 

Perhaps  it  needn't  be  said,  Mr.  Chairman 
[Representative  Lee  H.  Hamilton]  ;  however, 
I  am  certain  we  would  both  agree  that  our 
national  interest  would  prosper  if  there  were 
more  clear  weather  to  guide  our  relationship. 
I  see  that  horizon  clearing. 

The  genius  of  the  American  political  sys- 
tem grows  out  of  the  simplicity  with  which 
it  is  defined  in  our  Constitution.  The  writers 
of  this  extraordinary  document  demon- 
strated uncommon  wisdom  in  determining 
that  power  should  not  be  concentrated  in  any 
one  of  our  three  branches  of  government. 
That  was  well  and  good.  However,  historical 
evolution    has    complicated    this    design    by 


'-  Made  before  the  Special  Subcommittee  on  In- 
vestigations of  the  House  Committee  on  Interna- 
tional Relations  on  June  22.  The  complete  transcript 
of  the  hearings  will  be  published  by  the  committee 
and  will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Wash- 
ington, D.C.  20402. 


introducing  new  responsibilities  and  com- 
plexities into  the  affairs  of  our  respective 
institutions,  particularly  into  the  creation 
and  conduct  of  foreign  policy. 

As  the  United  States  became  more  in- 
volved in  the  world  the  simplicity  which  de- 
fined the  roles  of  the  Congress  and  the 
executive  opened  the  way  not  only  to  ambi- 
guity and  dispute  but  to  an  entire  new  world 
of  scholarship.  This  is  not  a  premise  from 
which  to  argue  for  a  more  definitive  organic 
law  any  more  than  it  is  a  defense  of  the 
axiom  that  "the  President  proposes,  the  Con- 
gress disposes."  More  to  the  point,  it  is  an 
acknowledgment  of  the  judgment  of  scholars 
like  Professor  Edward  S.  Corwin,  who  argue 
that  the  Constitution  presents  the  two 
branches  with  "an  invitation  to  struggle  for 
the  privilege  of  directing  American  foreign 
policy."  There  may  be  other  words  to  de- 
scribe the  issue,  but  this  characterization 
draws  it  close  enough,  in  my  view,  for  this 
discussion. 

Even  without  the  traumatizing  American 
experience  in  Indochina,  the  dilemma  which 
concerns  us  was  earlier  taking  shape.  What 
Viet-Nam  did  was  to  inject  fever  into  the 
struggle  and  bring  it  to  a  confrontation.  And 
now  our  present  efforts  are  directed  at  mov- 
ing us  in  the  direction  of  greater  reason.  If 
we  can  agree  that  willingness  to  compromise 
must  be  at  the  heart  of  any  successful  policy, 
we  will  at  least  be  looking  in  the  same  direc- 
tion. As  vital  as  compromise  is  to  the  politi- 
cal process,  so  is  it  to  the  conduct  of  affairs 
by   governments.   All   this  is   more   reason, 


July  26,   1976 


139 


then,  why  we  should  work  to  effect  it  be- 
tween branches  of  the  same  government. 

Improper  assumptions  of  power  have  now- 
been  acknowledged  by  the  executive  as  they 
related  to  foreign  affairs  and  to  domestic  is- 
sues as  well.  I  do  not  need  to  catalogue  the 
transgressions  of  various  Administrations. 
If  all  haven't  been  officially  acknowledged, 
they  are  well  known  and  will  serve  to  remind 
that  tampering  with  the  truth  risks  nothing 
less  than  the  life  of  an  Administration.  Con- 
gress has  demonstrated  its  outrage  and  vowed 
it  will  not  tolerate  abuses  of  a  similar  nature 
again. 

Mr.  Chairman,  we  in  the  executive  branch 
understand  that.  We  are  acting  scrupulously 
to  eliminate  the  causes  of  mistrust.  We  are 
dedicating  ourselves  to  the  elimination  of 
any  cause  for  mistrust.  And  I  believe  we 
have  begun  to  make  some  repairs  in  our  rela- 
tionship. 

I  take  some  encouragement  that  our  two 
branches  are  working  more  cooperatively 
now  across  a  range  of  issues:  new  policy 
initiatives  for  Africa;  enhanced  U.S.  rela- 
tionships in  the  Iberian  Peninsula;  submis- 
sion of  military  base  agreements  for  formal 
congressional  approval;  participation  by 
Members  and  staff  in  important  international 
conferences. 

Insuring  the  Congressional  Role 

Mr.  Chairman,  your  letter  of  invitation 
addressed  several  questions  which  go  to  the 
heart  of  the  relationship  between  our  two 
branches  in  this  period  in  our  history.  I 
would  like  to  discuss  each  in  turn  as  we  see 
them  from  the  Department  of  State. 

The  role  of  Congress  in  foreign  policy  and 
how  it  may  be  insured:  If,  as  I  believe,  the 
attitude  in  the  executive  toward  Congress 
was  one  of  neglect  or  worse,  that  is  no  longer 
the  case.  Indeed,  I  could  prove  it  hasn't  been 
for  some  time. 

I  am  here  to  reaffirm  the  belief  of  the  De- 
partment of  State  that  the  role  of  the  Con- 
gress is  quintessential  to  the  formulation  of 
foreign  policy.  Foreign  policy  must  respond 
to  the  interests,  and  receive  the  support,  of 

140 


a  great  majority  of  our  people.  In  a  repre- 
sentative democracy  the  Congress  must  be 
involved  both  in  speaking  for  the  people  it 
represents  and  in  helping  to  create  within  its 
constituencies  the  consensus  necessary  for 
the  support  of  foreign  policies,  once  decided 
upon. 

In  the  ideal  sense,  it  should  be  possible  to 
construct  what  I  tend  to  think  of  as  an  archi- 
tectural partnership  between  the  Congress 
and  the  executive,  one  that  is  designed  to 
stimulate  the  creation  of  foreign  policy.  This, 
it  seems  to  me,  would  maximize  the  benefits 
to  the  country.  The  administration  of  these 
policies  in  turn  would  be  conducted  by  the 
agencies  of  the  Presidency,  with  primary 
stewardship  at  the  State  Department.  As  its 
part  of  the  coordinating  process.  Congress 
would  from  time  to  time  call  for  a  review  of 
the  policies  it  helped  to  create  as  a  means  of 
insuring  that  they  are  consistent  with  the 
interests  of  the  electorate. 

The  fixed  vehicles  for  insuring  the  con- 
gressional role  already  exist  in  the  tradi- 
tional committees — International  Relations, 
Foreign  Relations,  Appropriations,  Armed 
Services.  Another  important,  less  formal,  in- 
stitution would  be  a  close  cooperative  rela- 
tionship between  congressional  leadership 
and  the  Presidency.  Even  though  the  text- 
book relationship  is  an  adversary  one,  Con- 
gress should  be  able  to  rely  on  the  word  of 
the  executive  branch,  which  promises  to  in- 
sure a  proper  legislative  involvement  in  the 
policy  process.  The  Presidency  will  be  more 
encouraged  in  this  direction  if  it  can  assume 
that  congressional  leadership  can  speak  with 
confidence  on  behalf  of  significant  numbers 
of  Members. 

Strengths  and  Weaknesses 

Strengths  and  weaknesses  of  Congress  in 
foreign  policy:  Thinking  about  commenting 
on  this  reminded  me  of  the  man  who,  after 
his  conviction,  was  told  by  the  king:  "I  in- 
tend to  sentence  you  to  death,  but  not  for 
two  years,  and  I  will  reconsider  if  by  then 
you  have  taught  my  horse  to  talk."  Later,  to 
his  puzzled  friends,  the  man  explained  his 
acquiescence :  "In  these  two  years  I  may  die 

Department  of  State   Bulletin 


a  natural  death.  Or  the  king  may  die.  Or  the 
liorse  may  talk." 

"Weakness"  is  not  the  first  word  that 
comes  to  mind  these  days  when  I  think  about 
the  Congress  and  foreign  policy.  I  am  well 
aware  that  the  Congress  imposed  its  consid- 
erable strength — a  show  of  force — as  a  re- 
sult of  executive  action  with  which  it 
disagreed.  The  question  is  whether  it  is  in 
the  national  interest  to  strike  with  the  ax  or 
seek  remedy  with  the  scalpel. 

Profound  questions  arise  when  legislative 
actions  are  taken  like  the  anti-OPEC  [Or- 
ganization of  Petroleum  Exporting  Coun- 
tries] amendment  last  year,  which  harmed 
our  relations  with  Latin  America  but  carried 
little  or  no  real  penalty  for  the  countries 
which  sponsored  the  oil  boycott;  or  the 
amendment  to  the  trade  bill  which  provoked 
Soviet  rejection  of  our  trade  agreement  and 
rejection  of  their  World  War  II  lend-lease 
debt,  coupled  with  a  decrease  in  the  flow  of 
emigres;  or  the  military  assistance  embargo 
against  Turkey,  which  did  not  stimulate  dip- 
lomatic progress  on  Cyprus. 

The  obvious  strengths  of  the  Congress  re- 
side in  its  unilateral  power  to  legislate  for  or 
against  policy.  Ideally,  its  actions  should  re- 
flect the  majority  will  in  the  country.  It  is 
an  important  trust  which  the  Congress  en- 
joys. Its  other  strengths  are  less  tangible 
and  representative  of  the  whole  than  of  in- 
dividuals or  subcommittee-size  groups.  This 
has  to  do  with  the  level  of  knowledge  among 
Members  and  staff  of  particular  foreign  pol- 
icy issues.  My  colleagues  and  I  at  the  State 
Department  have  been  used  to  dealing  with 
individual  Members  and  staff  officers  who  are 
impressively  well  informed  and  who  possess 
highly  qualified  opinions  on  given  subjects. 
So,  in  its  "strengths,"  Congress  is  formi- 
dable. 

Having  said  this,  we  find  it  increasingly 
difl!icult  to  identify  a  foreign  policy  objective 
or  position  shared  by  large  majorities  in  Con- 
gress. More  often  than  not  we  find  ourselves 
under  roughly  equivalent  pressures  on  both 
sides  of  most  issues.  When  this  occurs,  we 
frequently  encounter  inactivity  or  paralysis, 
which  places  us  in  the  unenviable  position  of 


having  to  attempt  to  broker  differences  be- 
tween Members  or  committees. 

The  multiple  interests  and  responsibilities 
of  most  Members  have  led  to  what  may 
fairly  be  regarded  as  "weakness"  in  Con- 
gress. Members  keep  tyrannical  schedules 
and  oftentimes  are  not  available  for  that 
briefing  or  background  talk  which  could 
throw  an  issue  into  perspective  and  permit  a 
more  considered  vote  when  the  buzzer 
sounds.  Too  often,  I  fear,  votes  on  interna- 
tional questions  are  squandered  because 
there  wasn't  enough  time  to  examine  the 
problem. 

Improving  the  Consultative  Process 

Improvement  of  the  consultative  process 
and  how  procedures  and  mechanisms  can  be 
improved:  Ideally,  I  envisage  a  joint  commit- 
tee of  the  Congress  which  assigns  itself  re- 
sponsibility for  leading  the  Congress  on  for- 
eign policy  issues  across  the  board.  This  joint 
group  would  represent  all  those  committees 
which  now  play  a  role  in  international  affairs 
— Appropriations,  Armed  Services,  Foreign 
Relations,  and  the  others  who,  because  of 
the  increased  complexity  of  our  agenda,  have 
an  acknowledged  interest.  It  would  enable 
the  Congress,  by  pooling  its  resources,  to 
create  the  capacity  to  treat  foreign  policy  in 
its  entirety.  I  can  see  many  advantages 
growing  out  of  such  an  arrangement,  the 
most  important  of  which  could  be  a  genuine 
partnership  at  senior  levels  between  the  Con- 
gress and  the  executive.  I  know  some  Mem- 
bers of  both  Houses  who  would  support  such 
an  establishment. 

On  our  side,  I  can  see  being  spared  the 
often  conflicting  demands  of  the  large  num- 
ber of  committees  and  subcommittees  before 
whom  we  are  driven  to  present  repetitive  tes- 
timony because  lines  of  jurisdiction  between 
and  among  the  many  committees  are  in  some 
cases  indistinguishable.  One  advantage  to  the 
Congi-ess  might  be  the  time  saved  for  Mem- 
bers. Another  could  be  the  pooling  of  some 
of  the  superb  staflf  officers  who  now  work  for 
individual  Members  or  the  many  committees. 
Equally  important,  such  a  prestigious  com- 


July  26,  1976 


141 


mittee  would  greatly  influence  legislative 
initiatives  that  depart  from  the  main  lines  of 
policy  in  which  the  Congress  and  the  Admin- 
istration would  find  adequate  basis  for  agree- 
ment. 

In  your  letter  you  also  ask  how  congres- 
sional input  in  crisis  management  can  be  in- 
sured. If  the  executive  were  permitted  to 
deal  continually  with  such  a  congressionally 
mandated  joint  committee,  I  believe  that  in- 
evitably the  relationship  would  guarantee 
such  an  end. 

Having  said  that,  I  believe  it  unrealistic 
to  expect  any  form  of  consultation — as  we 
in  the  executive  branch  and  you  in  the  Con- 
gress see  it  from  our  differing  perspectives 
— to  ever  satisfy  everyone,  especially  in 
crisis  situations.  Nothing  short  of  full  par- 
ticipation in  the  minute-to-minute  planning 
for  and  reacting  to  a  fast-breaking  situation 
would  merit  description  as  consultation  by 
some.  Perhaps  we  should  recognize  at  the 
very  outset  that  any  arrangement  will  be 
an  imperfect  one  in  need  of  continuing  im- 
provement. But  we  should  begin  by  agreeing 
on  a  mechanism. 

Despite  what  I  regard  as  a  quantum  im- 
provement recently  in  the  general  consulta- 
tive process,  it  could  be  better.  While  it  will 
require  sustained  performance  on  our  part, 
at  the  same  time  we  look  for  response  from 
the  Congress.  I  have  to  say  that  sometimes 
it  is  not  there.  We  would  like  the  privilege 
of  coming  to  the  Hill  with  issues  we're  inter- 
ested in  as  well  as  being  summoned  because 
of  a  special  interest  up  here. 

I  readily  admit  that  too  often  Administra- 
tions have  abused  the  word  "consultation" 
when  describing  what  in  fact  has  been  noti- 
fication to  Congress  with  regard  to  an  action 
or  a  decision  already  taken.  But  like  the 
mule  that  was  slammed  on  the  head,  we're 
now  alert — you  have  our  attention.  We  can 
and  will  continue  to  do  better.  What  we  ask 
for  is  improved  organization  at  your  end. 

In  the  absence  of  the  kind  of  joint  com- 
mittee to  which  I  referred  above,  we  will 
need  at  least  a  better  match-up  of  our  avail- 
able resources.  The  executive  conducts  for- 


eign policy  through  several  agencies,  with 
the  State  Department  theoretically  preemi- 
nent among  them.  Regardless  of  which 
agency  motivates  a  proposal  for  Presidential 
decision,  the  policy  must  be  implemented  in 
terms  of  the  area  or  country  involved.  With 
respect  to  Europe,  as  an  example,  the  office 
of  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  Euro- 
pean Afi'airs  is  the  principal  protagonist  at 
the  Washington  end.  Likewise,  in  functional 
terms  in  the  Department,  the  office  of  the 
Assistant  Secretary  for  Economic  and  Busi- 
ness Affairs  is  central  to  the  development  of 
international  trade  policy,  U.S.  economic  pol- 
icy in  international  institutions,  and  other 
related  policies. 

Until  a  few  years  ago,  your  committee 
had  a  subcommittee  system  which  paralleled 
our  own  divisions.  The  subcommittee  which 
you  headed,  Mr.  Chairman,  corresponded 
organizationally  with  our  Bureau  of  Near 
Eastern  and  South  Asian  Affairs.  Today, 
the  subcommittee  structure  presents  us  with 
bureaucratic  difficulties  in  matching  up  our 
resources.  As  a  result  it  is  more,  not  less, 
difficult  to  keep  Members  and  staff  of  the 
subcommittees  tied  to  a  close  and  continuing 
relationship  with  our  bureaus  and  thereby 
insure  maximum  cooperation.  As  matters 
now  stand,  our  people  are  repeating  testi- 
mony before  different  subcommittees  with 
overlapping  areas  of  jurisdiction. 

Developing  Broad  Consensus  on  Goals 

What  is  needed  to  develop  the  broadest 
possible  consensus  on  foreign  policy  goals: 
Many  observers  of  the  legislative-executive 
relationship  yearn  for  the  kind  of  harmony 
that  would  exist  if  the  participants  were 
singing  from  the  same  sheet  of  music,  like 
a  choir  of  angels.  Such  a  scene  is  perhaps  as 
unrealistic  as  it  is  unworldly. 

Shrewd  and  skeptical  judges  of  human  na- 
ture that  they  were,  our  forefathers  allowed 
for  constitutional  disharmony  and  rivalry, 
which  is  to  say  they  wittingly  established  an 
adversary  relationship.  This,  we  presume, 
was  intended   to  promote   liberty  and   good 


142 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


government,  and  at  the  same  time  prevent 
tyranny.  While  this  is  understandable,  we 
must  avoid  provoking  situations  in  which 
the  branches  become  enemies  and  spokes- 
men publicly  attack  one  another's  motiva- 
tions. It  deserves  better  than  for  one  or 
the  other  party  to  cry,  "Your  end  of  the 
boat  is  sinking."  There  is  then  the  risk  that 
the  people  will  tend  to  believe  the  charges, 
which  could  lead  to  a  breakdown  of  public 
faith  in  the  system. 

Polls  today  are  replete  with  evidence  of 
the  discouraging  opinion  the  American  pub- 
lic has  of  government — Congress  as  well  as 
the  executive.  We  owe  it  to  ourselves  and  to 
all  Americans  to  construct — I  hesitate  to 
use  the  word — a  consensus  on  foreign  policy 
issues.  This  cannot  be  beyond  our  reach. 

I  do  not  look  for  "bipartisan  foreign  pol- 
icy" as  a  euphemism  for  congressional  sur- 
render of  its  role  in  the  formulation  of  for- 
eign policy.  To  the  contrary,  you  were  elected 
to  represent  the  will  of  the  people  and  to 
exercise  your  judgment  on  their  behalf. 
When  there  is  a  conflict  between  the  articu- 
lated view  of  the  constituents,  guidance  of 
party  leadership,  and  your  own  best  judg- 
ment, you  face  hard  choices.  I  am  encour- 
aged at  the  choices  you  and  most  of  your 
colleagues  frequently  make.  Seldom  are  these 
choices  reached  on  a  strictly  partisan  basis. 
Certainly  the  International  Relations  Com- 
mittee does  not  line  up  on  a  party  basis  on 
votes  of  interest  to  us. 

But  we  are  still  a  long  way  from  the  kind 
of  consensus  we  became  comfortable  with  in 
the  1950's  and  early  1960's.  Detente,  arms 
transfers,  human  rights,  the  Middle  East, 
and  the  complex  issues  of  trade,  aid,  and 
commodities  in  our  relationship  with  the  less 
developed  countries  will  continue  to  generate 
major  policy  debates  within  and  between  the 
two  branches.  There  is  more  that  is  worthy 
of  us. 

As  this  debate  continues,  what  we  should 
hope  is  that  it  be  conducted  with  an  im- 
proved spirit  of  trust  that  both  sides  are 
participating  with  honesty  and  the  best 
interests  of  the  whole  country  at  heart. 


U.S.  Vetoes  Unbalanced  Resolution 
on  Palestinian  Rights 

Folloiving  is  a  statement  made  in  the  U.N. 
Security  Council  by  U.S.  Representative  Al- 
bert W.  Sherer,  Jr.,  on  June  29,  together  with 
the  text  of  a  draft  resolution  tvhich  tvas 
vetoed  by  the  United  States  that  day. 

STATEMENT   BY   AMBASSADOR   SHERER 

USUN    press  lekase   71   dated  June  29 

I  take  this  opportunity  to  thank  once  again 
all  those  in  this  Council  who  have  so  gener- 
ously expressed  their  sympathy  to  the 
United  States  on  the  death  of  the  American 
Ambassador  to  Lebanon,  his  Economic  Coun- 
selor, and  their  driver.  This  terrible  act 
brings  to  reality,  as  often  our  words  do  not, 
the  seriousness,  the  explosiveness,  the  trag- 
edy, of  the  whole  situation  in  the  Middle 
East. 

The  subject  that  is  before  us  today,  the 
report  of  the  Committee  on  the  Exercise  of 
the  Inalienable  Rights  of  the  Palestinian 
People,  is  an  eff'ort  to  come  to  grips  with  one 
aspect — a  very  central  aspect — of  the  Middle 
East  conflict. 

My  government  does  not  doubt  that  the 
effort  has  been  well  intentioned  and  that 
members  of  the  committee  have  worked  hard 
and  seriously  to  develop  recommendations 
that  will  pi'omote  a  Middle  East  settlement. 
But  I  must  say  in  all  candor,  as  my  delega- 
tion has  said  before,  that  the  basic  approach 
that  has  been  followed  strikes  us  as  mis- 
guided. 

The  Middle  East  conflict  is  probably  the 
most  complex  dispute  in  the  international 
scene.  Is  it  realistic  to  assume  such  a  prob- 
lem can  be  resolved  by  committees,  no  mat- 
ter how  well  meaning?  Or  is  it  not  the  duty 
of  the  United  Nations  to  encourage  the  par- 
ties to  resume  negotiations  on  the  serious 
issues  that  confront  them? 

Peace  will  come  about  through  a  negoti- 
ated comprehensive  settlement  taking  into 
account  all  the  issues  involved  in  the  Arab- 


July  26,  1976 


143 


Israeli  dispute.  The  framework  for  this  set- 
tlement exists  in  Security  Council  Resolu- 
tions 242  and  338.  In  the  numerous  meetings 
of  this  Council  since  the  beginning  of  the 
year  touching  various  aspects  of  the  Middle 
East  situation,  the  United  States  has  made 
clear  its  position  on  the  principles  that  must 
underlie  a  Middle  East  settlement,  on  the 
Palestinian  question  as  a  whole,  and  on  the 
situation  in  the  territories  occupied  by  Israel. 

Our  position  is  also  clear  on  the  report 
that  has  occasioned  our  meeting.  We  voted 
against  General  Assembly  Resolution  3376 
of  November  10,  1975,  which  created  the 
Committee  of  20,  just  as  we  voted  against 
General  Assembly  Resolution  3236,  which  it 
seeks  to  implement. 

Our  reason  is  not  lack  of  concern  for  the 
Palestinian  people.  We  have  consistently 
made  clear  our  concerns  on  this  score  and 
our  conviction  that  there  must  be  a  solution 
to  the  Palestinian  issue  if  there  is  to  be  a 
lasting  settlement.  We  are  convinced  that 
resolutions  and  committee  reports  are  not 
the  most  effective  way  of  dealing  with  the 
question  of  the  political  future  of  the  Pales- 
tinians. The  United  States  will  do  its  utmost 
to  bring  about  the  early  resumption  of  seri- 
ous negotiations  looking  toward  a  settlement 
of  all  the  issues,  and  we  believe  that  it  is 
through  such  negotiations  that  we  must  seek 
a  solution  to  the  issue  of  the  Palestinians. 

Mr.  President,  I  should  like  to  explain  my 
government's  position  on  the  draft  resolution 
that  is  before  the  Council.  There  are,  in  our 
view,  two  fundamental  flaws  to  this  reso- 
lution. 

First,  the  text  is  totally  devoid  of  balance, 
stressing  the  rights  and  interests  of  one 
party  to  the  Middle  East  dispute  and  ignor- 
ing the  rights  and  interests  of  other  parties. 

Second,  the  draft  "affirms  the  inalienable 
rights  of  the  Palestinian  people  to  self-de- 
termination, including  the  right  of  return 
and  the  right  to  national  independence  and 
sovereignty  in  Palestine  .  .  ."  The  political 
interests  of  the  Palestinians  and  their  role 
in  a  flnal  Middle  East  settlement  constitute, 
in  my  government's  view,  a  matter  that  must 


be  negotiated  between  the  parties  before  it 
can  be  defined  in  resolutions  of  this  Council. 

For  these  reasons,  Mr.  President,  my  dele- 
gation intends  to  vote  "No"  on  the  resolution 
before  us. 

In  closing  I  would  like  to  second  the  ap- 
peal made  by  my  British  colleague  for  spe- 
cial contributions  to  UNRWA  [U.N.  Relief 
and  Works  Agency  for  Palestine  Refugees  in 
the  Near  East],  to  enable  it  to  continue  its 
humanitarian  work  touching  the  daily  lives 
of  Palestinians  in  need.  We  are  heartened  by 
the  news  of  the  generous  contribution  of 
Saudi  Arabia  and  the  intentions  of  the  Gov- 
ernments of  Japan  and  the  United  Kingdom. 
President  Ford  has  submitted  a  request  to 
Congress  for  substantial  additional  money  to 
add  to  the  U.S.  contribution  to  UNRWA  for 
1976.  We  believe  this  is  an  appropriate  way 
to  deal  with  immediate  Palestinian  needs  as 
we  resolve  to  make  a  better  future  for  the 
Palestinian  people  and  the  Middle  East  as  a 
whole. 


TEXT  OF  DRAFT  RESOLUTION  ' 

The  Security  Council, 

Having  considered  the  item  entitled  "The  ques- 
tion of  the  exercise  by  the  Palestinian  people  of  its 
inalienable  rights",  in  accordance  with  the  request 
contained  in  paragraph  8  of  General  Assembly  reso- 
lution 3376  (XXX)   of  10  November  1975, 

Having  heard  the  representatives  of  the  parties 
concerned,  including  the  Palestine  Liberation  Organi- 
zation, representative  of  the  Palestinian  people, 

Having  considered  the  report  of  the  Committee 
on  the  Exercise  of  the  Inalienable  Rights  of  the 
Palestinian  People  (document  S/12090),  transmitted 
to  the  Security  Council  in  accordance  with  the  pro- 
visions of  paragraph  7  of  General  Assembly  resolu- 
tion 3376   (XXX), 

Deeply  concerned  that  no  just  solution  to  the  prob- 
lem of  Palestine  has  been  achieved,  and  that  this 
problem  therefore  continues  to  aggravate  the  Arab- 
Israeli  conflict,  of  which  it  is  the  core,  and  to  en- 
danger  international   peace   and   security. 


^  U.N.  doc.  S/12119;  the  draft  resolution  was  not 
adopted  owing  to  the  negative  vote  of  a  permanent 
member  of  the  Council,  the  vote  being  10  in  favor, 
1  against  (U.S.),  with  4  abstentions  (France,  Italy, 
Sweden,  U.K.). 


144 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Recognizing  that  a  just  and  lasting  peace  in  the 
Middle  East  cannot  be  established  without  the 
achievement,  inter  alia,  of  a  just  solution  of  the 
problem  of  Palestine  on  the  basis  of  the  recognition 
of  the  inalienable  rights  of  the  Palestinian  people, 

1.  Takes  note  of  the  report  of  the  Committee  on 
the  Exercise  of  the  Inalienable  Rights  of  the  Pales- 
tinian People   (document   S/12090); 

2.  Affirms  the  inalienable  rights  of  the  Palestinian 
people  to  self-determination,  including  the  right  of 
return  and  the  right  to  national  independence  and 
sovereignty  in  Palestine,  in  accordance  with  the 
Charter  of  the  United  Nations. 


U.S.-lndonesia  Consultations 
Held  at  Washington 

Following  is  a  joint  U.S.-lndonesia  press 
statement  issued  at  Washington  and  Jakarta 
on  June  29. 

Foredgn  Minister  Adam  Malik  of  Indo- 
nesia met  today  with  Secretary  of  State 
Henry  A.  Kissinger  at  the  conclusion  of 
three  days  of  meetings  between  officials  of 
the  two  governments  in  Washington.  This 
was  the  first  of  a  series  of  periodic  consulta- 
tions agreed  upon  by  President  Suharto  and 
President  Ford  during  the  latter's  visit  to 
Indonesia  in  December  1975.  The  two  Presi- 
dents saw  the  consultations  as  a  way  of  ex- 
panding the  dialogue  between  the  two  gov- 
ernments and  of  strengthening  the  close  and 
friendly  ties  between  them. 

Following  a  lunch  given  by  Secretary 
Kissinger  for  Foreign  Minister  Malik,  the 
two  met  with  their  advisers  for  a  wide- 
ranging  review  of  relations  between  the  two 
countries  and  of  the  major  international 
issues  of  interest  to  them.  Secretary  Kis- 
singer stressed  the  importance  attached  by 
the  United  States  to  its  relations  with  Indo- 
nesia. Particular  emphasis  was  given  to  an 
exchange  of  views  on  developments  in  South- 
east Asia.  Foreign  Minister  Malik  described 
the  ASEAN  [Association  of  Southeast 
Asian  Nations]  countries'  plans  for  regional 
development  projects  and  the  need  for  exter- 
nal assistance  for  such  projects. 


The  two  Ministers  discussed  the  various 
aspects  of  economic  relations  between  the 
United  States  and  Indonesia,  including  trade 
and  investment  matters.  Indonesia's  develop- 
ment requirements  were  discussed,  and  the 
United  States  described  its  recent  proposals 
for  greater  cooperation  with  the  developing 
nations  of  the  world. 

The  Ministers  agreed  that  the  next  round 
of  consultations  would  be  held  in  Jakarta  at 
a  mutually  convenient  time. 

During  the  preceding  two  days,  officials  of 
the  Departments  of  State,  Defense,  Treas- 
ury, Agriculture,  Commerce  and  other  agen- 
cies met  with  their  Indonesian  counterparts 
for  reviews  of  the  specific  policies  and  pro- 
grams of  the  two  governments. 


U.S.-U.K.  Income  Tax  Convention 
Transmitted  to  the  Senate 

Message  From  President  Ford  ' 

To  the  Senate  of  the  United  States: 

I  transmit  herewith  for  Senate  advice  and 
consent  to  ratification  the  Convention  for  the 
Avoidance  of  Double  Taxation  and  the  Pre- 
vention of  Fiscal  Evasion  with  respect  to 
Taxes  on  Income  signed  at  London  on  De- 
cember 31,  1975,  together  with  an  exchange 
of  notes  modifying  certain  provisions  of  the 
Convention  signed  at  London  on  April  13, 
1976. 

I  also  transmit  for  the  information  of  the 
Senate  the  report  of  the  Department  of  State 
with  respect  to  the  Convention  and  the  ex- 
change of  notes. 

This  Convention  and  exchange  of  notes 
are  designed  to  modernize  the  relationship 
with  respect  to  taxes  on  income  which  has 
evolved  between  the  United  States  and  the 


'Transmitted  on  June  24  (text  from  White  House 
press  release);  also  printed  as  S.  Ex.  K,  94th  Cong., 
2d  sess.,  which  includes  the  texts  of  the  convention 
and  exchange  of  notes  and  the  report  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  State. 


July  26,  1976 


145 


United  Kingdom  from  a  similar  Convention 
signed  at  Washington  on  April  16,  1945. 

The  Convention  with  subsequent  exchange 
of  notes  is  similar  to  other  recent  United 
States  income  tax  treaties,  although  it  does 
have  some  new  features  which  are  described 
in  the  enclosed  report  of  the  Department  of 
State. 

Such  tax  conventions  help  promote  eco- 
nomic cooperation  with  other  countries.  I 
urge  the  Senate  to  act  favorably  on  this  Con- 
vention and  exchange  of  notes  at  an  early 
date  and  to  give  its  advice  and  consent  to 
ratification. 

Gerald  R.  Ford. 

The  White  House,  June  2k,  1976 


Congressional  Documents 
Relating  to  Foreign  Policy 


94th  Congress,  2d  Session 

International  Security  Assistance  and  Arms  Export 
Control  Act  of  1976.  Hearings  before  the  House 
Committee  on  International  Relations.  March  23- 
April  5,  1976.  253  pp. 

Foreign  Intelligence  Surveillance  Act  of  1976.  Com- 
munication from  the  President  of  the  United  States 
transmitting  a  draft  of  proposed  legislation  to 
amend  title  18,  U.S.  Code,  to  authorize  applications 
for  a  court  order  approving  the  use  of  electronic 
surveillance  to  obtain  foreign  intelligence  informa- 
tion. H.  Doc.  94-422.  March  24,  1976.  6  pp. 

International  Security  Assistance.  Hearings  before 
the  Subcommittee  on  Foreign  Assistance  of  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  on  fiscal 
year  1977  international  security  assistance  pro- 
grams. March  26-April  8,  1976.  148  pp. 

East-West  Foreign  Trade  Board  Fourth  Quarterly 
Report.  Communication  from  the  Chairman  of  the 
Board  transmitting  the  Board's  fourth  quarterly 
report  on  trade  between  the  United  States  and 
nonmarket  economy  countries,  pursuant  to  section 
411(c)  of  the  Trade  Act  of  1974.  H.  Doc.  94-430. 
March  30,  1976.  109  pp. 

Making  Appropriations  for  Foreign  Assistance  and 
Related  Programs  for  Fiscal  Year  Ending  June  30, 
1976,  and  Period  Ending  September  30,  1976,  and 
for  Other  Purposes.  Report  of  the  committee  of 
conference  to  accompany  H.R.  12203.  H.  Rept. 
94-1006.  April  2,  1976.  14  pp. 

Guatemala  Relief  and  Rehabilitation  Act  of  1976.  Re- 
port of  the  committee  of  conference  to  accompany 
S.  3056.  H.  Rept.  94-1009.  April  6,  1976.  5  pp. 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


U.S.  Files  Notice  of  Intent 
To  Withdraw  From  ICNAF 

Press    release   322   dated   June   22 

The  United  States  on  June  22  filed  notice 
of  its  intent  to  withdraw  from  the  Interna- 
tional Convention  for  the  Northwest  Atlan- 
tic Fisheries  (ICNAF). 

Ambassador  Rozanne  L.  Ridgway,  Deputy 
Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  Oceans  and 
Fisheries  Affairs,  had  announced  on  June  8 
in  a  Montreal  speech  to  delegates  of  the  18 
member  nations  of  the  International  Com- 
mission for  the  Northwest  Atlantic  Fisheries 
that  the  United  States  would  file  the  notice 
of  intent  to  withdraw. 

Unless  the  notice  of  intent  to  withdraw  is 
revoked  prior  to  December  31,  1976,  U.S. 
withdrawal  will  be  effective  on  that  date 
under  the  terms  of  the  convention. 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


Aviation 

Convention    for    the    suppression    of    unlawful    acts 
against  the  safety  of  civil  aviation.  Done  at  Mon- 
treal September  23,  1971.  Entered  into  force  Janu- 
ary 26,   1973.   TIAS  7570. 
Ratification  deposited:  Gabon,  June  29,  1976. 

Coffee 

International   coffee   agreement    1976,   with   annexes. 
Done   at  London   December  3,   1975.^ 
Signatures:   Denmark,   Dominican   Republic,  June 
30,  1976. 

Maritime  Matters 

Amendments   to   the   convention    of   March   6,    1948, 
as   amended,   on   the   Intergovernmental   Maritime 
Consultative     Organization      (TIAS     4044,     6285. 
6490).  Adopted  at  London  October  17,  1974." 
Acceptance  deposited:  Nigeria,  June  30,  1976. 


'  Not  in  force. 


146 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


Narcotic  Drugs 

Protocol  amending  the  single  convention  on  narcotic 
drugs,  1961.  Done  at  Geneva  March  25,  1972. 
Ratification  deposited:  Tunisia,  June  29,  1976. 

Nuclear  Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty  on   the   nonproliferation   of  nuclear  weapons. 

Done  at  Washington,  London,  and  Moscow  July  1, 

1968.  Entered  into  force  March  5,  1970.  TIAS  6839. 

Notification    of    succession    deposited:     Surinam. 

June  30,  1976,  effective  November  25,  1975. 

Racial  Discrimination 

International    convention    on    the    elimination    of   all 
forms  of  racial  discrimination.  Done  at  New  York 
December  21,  1965.  Entered  into  force  January  4, 
1969.'' 
Accesssion  deposited:  Ethiopia,  June  23,  1976. 

Satellite  Communications  System 

Agreement  relating  to  the  International  Telecom- 
munications Satellite  Organization  (INTELSAT), 
with  annexes.  Done  at  Washington  August  20, 
1971.  Entered  into  force  February  12,  1973.  TIAS 
7532. 
Accession  deposited:  Mali,  July  6,  1976. 

Operating  agreement  relating  to  the  International 
Telecommunications  Satellite  Organization  (IN- 
TELSAT), with  annex.  Done  at  Washington 
August  20,   1971.  Entered  into  force  February  12, 

1973.  TIAS  7532. 

Signature :     Telecommunications     Internationales 
du  Mali   (T.I.M.)    of  Mali,  July  6,   1976. 

Telecommunications 

Partial  revision  of  the  radio  regulations,  Geneva, 
1959,  as  amended  (TIAS  4893,  5603,  6332,  6590, 
7435),  to  establish  a  frequency  allotment  plan  for 
high-frequency  radiotelephone  coast  stations,  with 
annexes  and  final  protocol.  Done  at  Geneva  June  8, 

1974.  Entered  into  force  January  1,  1976. 
Notification  of  approval:  Kenya,  April  23,  1976. 
Ratification   deposited:    United    States,    April    21, 

1976." 
Entered  into  force  for  the   United  States:  April 

21,  1976. 
Telegraph   regulations,  with   appendices,  annex,   and 
final  protocol.  Done  at  Geneva  April  11,  1973. 
Ratification   deposited:    United    States,    April    21, 

1976.* 
Entered  into  force  for  the   United  States:   April 

21,  1976. 
Telephone     regulations    with    appendices    and    final 
protocol.  Done  at  Geneva  April  11,  1973.  Entered 
into  force  September  21,  1974. 
Ratification   deposited:    United    States,    April    21, 

1976.'' 
Entered  into  force  for  the   United  States:  April 

21,  1976. 


'  Not  in  force  for  the  United  States. 
'  With  reservation. 
*  With  declarations. 


Tin 

Fifth    international    tin    agreement,    with    annexes. 
Done  at  Geneva  June  21,  1975. 
Ratifications  deposited:  United  Kingdom,  June  28, 

1976;  Canada,  Denmark,  June  30,  1976. 
Entered  into  force  provisionally :  July  1,  1976. 

Wheat 

Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the  wheat 
trade  convention  (part  of  the  international  wheat 
agreement)  1971  (TIAS  7144,  8227).  Done  at 
Washington  March  17,  1976.  Entered  into  force 
June  19,  1976,  with  respect  to  certain  provisions, 
and  July  1,  1976,  with  respect  to  other  provisions. 
Accession  deposited:   Trinidad   and   Tobago,   July 

8,  1976. 
Approval  deposited:  Norway,  July  7,  1976. 


BILATERAL 

Australia 

Agreement  relating  to  the  limitation  of  meat  imports 
from  Australia  during  calendar  year  1976.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washington  June  25  and 
28,  1976.  Entered  into  force  June  28,  1976. 

Brazil 

Agreement  relating  to  reciprocal  acceptance  of  air- 
worthiness certifications.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Brasilia  June  16,  1976.  Entered  into  force 
June  16,  1976. 

Egypt 

Loan  agreement  to  assist  Egypt  to  increase  its  in- 
dustrial and  agricultural  production.  Signed  at 
Cairo  May  22,  1976.  Entered  into  force  May  22, 
1976. 

Federal  Republic  of  Germany 

Agreement  relating  to  mutual  cooperation  regarding 
restrictive  business  practices.  Signed  at  Bonn 
June  23,  1976.  Enters  into  force  one  month  from 
the  date  of  an  exchange  of  notes  wherein  the 
parties  inform  each  other  that  all  the  domestic 
legal  requirements  for  entry  into  force  have  been 
fulfilled. 

International  Telecommunications  Union 

Special  arrangement  permitting  third-party  ex- 
changes between  International  Telecommunications 
Union  and  amateur  stations  under  U.S.  jurisdic- 
tion. Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at  Geneva 
and  Washington  April  28  and  June  7,  1976. 
Entered  into  force  June  7,  1976. 

Japan 

Agreement  providing  for  Japan's  financial  contribu- 
tion for  U.S.  administrative  and  related  expenses 
for  Japanese  fiscal  year  1976  pursuant  to  the  mu- 
tual defense  assistance  agreement  of  March  8, 
1954  (TIAS  2957).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at  Tokyo  June  18,  1976.  Entered  into  force  June 
18,  1976. 


July  26,  1976 


147 


Jordan 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  of 
agricultural  commodities  of  October  14,  1975 
(TIAS  8197).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Amman  June  23,  1976.  Entered  into  force  June 
23,  1976. 

Mexico 

Agreement  relating  to  the  limitation  of  meat  im- 
ports from  Mexico  during  calendar  year  1976. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Mexico  and 
Tlatelolco  April  26  and  June  11,  1976.  Entered  into 
force  June  11,  1976. 

Poland 

Convention  for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxation  and 
the    prevention    of   fiscal    evasion    with    respect    to 
taxes    on    income,    with    related    notes.    Signed    at 
Washington  October  8,  1974. 
Ratifications  exchanged:  June  22,  1976. 
Entered  into  force:  July  23,  1976. 

Saudi  Arabia 

Project  agreement  for  technical  cooperation  in  man- 
power training  and  development,  with  annexes. 
Signed  at  Riyadh  June  12,  1976.  Entered  into 
force  June  12,  1976. 

Tanzania 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities. 
Signed  at  Dar  es  Salaam  June  15,  1976.  Entered 
into  force  June  15,  1976. 

Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics 

Protocol  to  the  treaty  of  May  26,  1972  (TIAS  7503), 
on   the  limitation   of  antiballistic  missile   systems. 
Signed  at  Moscow  July  3,  1974.  Entered  into  force 
May  24,  1976. 
Proclaimed  by  the  President:  July  6,  1976. 


PUBLICATIONS 


GPO  Sales  Publications 

Publications  may  be  ordered  by  catalog  or  stock 
number  from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents, 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C. 
20i02.  A  25-percent  discount  is  made  on  orders  for 
100  or  more  copies  of  any  one  publication  mailed  to 
the  same  address.  Remittances,  payable  to  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  must  accompany 
orders.  Prices  shown  below,  which  include  domestic 
postage,  are  subject  to  change. 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  Pakistan. 
TIAS  8189.  9  pp.  35«(.  (Cat.  No.  S9.10:8189). 

Social  Security.  Agreement  with  Singapore.  TIAS 
8190.  4  pp.  35(S.  (Cat.  No.  S9.10:8190). 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  Bangla- 
desh. TIAS  8191.  9  pp.  35(f.  (Cat.  No.  S9.10:8191). 

Trade  in  Textiles — Consultations  on  Market  Disrup- 
tion. Agreement  with  Malta.  TIAS  8192.  4  pp.  35«f 
(Cat.  No.  89.10:8192). 

Tarbela  Development  Fund,  1975.  Agreement  with 
Other  Governments.  TIAS  8193.  7  pp.  35<>.  (Cat.  No. 
S9.10:8193). 

Maritime  Matters.  Agreement  with  the  Union  of 
Soviet  Socialist  Republics.  TIAS  8195.  131  pp.  $2. 
(Cat.  No.   89.10:8195). 

Scientific  Cooperation.  Agreement  with  Italy  extend- 
ing the  agreement  of  June  19,  1967,  as  extended. 
TIAS  8199.  3  pp.  35<f.   (Cat.  No.  89.10:8199). 


148 


Department  of  State   Bulletin 


INDEX     July  26,  1976     Vol.  LXXV,  No.  1935 


Africa.  Secretary  Kissinger  Interviewed  for 
Die  Zeit  of  Hamburg 124 

Brazil.  Letters  of  Credence  (Pinheiro)   .    .     .      132 

Cambodia.  Secretary  Kissinger  Interviewed 
for  Die  Zeit  of  Hamburg 124 

Chile.  Secretary  Kissinger  Interviewed  for  Die 
Zeit   of   Hamburg 124 

China.  Secretary  Kissinger  Interviewed  for 
Die  Zeit  of  Hamburg 124 

Commodities.  U.S.  Gives  Views  on  UNCTAD 
IV  and  Commodities  Resolution  (Kissinger, 
Simon,  Boeker,  U.S.-Group  B  statements, 
summary  of  commodities   resolution)    .     .    .      133 

Congress 

Congress  and  Foreign  Policy  (McCloskey)  .  .  139 
Congressional  Documents  Relating  to  Foreign 

Policy 146 

U.S.-U.K.  Income  Tax  Convention  Transmitted 

to  the  Senate  (message  from  President  Ford)       145 

Economic  Affairs 

Leaders  of  Major  Industrial  Democracies  Meet 
in  Puerto  Rico  (Ford,  Kissinger,  Simon, 
conference    declaration) 116 

U.S.  Gives  Views  on  UNCTAD  IV  and  Com- 
modities Resolution  (Kissinger,  Simon, 
Boeker,  U.S.-Group  B  statements,  summary 
of  commodities  resolution) 133 

The  Western  Alliance:  Peace  and  Moral  Pur- 
pose (Kissinger) 105 

Europe 

Secretary  Kissinger  Interviewed  for  Die  Zeit 
of    Hamburg 124 

The  Western  Alliance:  Peace  and  Moral  Pur- 
pose (Kissinger) 105 

Germany.  Secretary  Kissinger  Interviewed  for 
Die  Zeit  of  Hamburg 124 

Greece.  Secretary  Kissinger  Interviewed  for 
Die  Zeit  of  Hamburg 124 

Guatemala.  Letters  of  Credence  (Maldonado 
Gularte) 132 

Indonesia.  U.S. -Indonesia  Consultations  Held 
at  Washington   (joint  press  statement)   .    .      145 

Italy.  Secretary  Kissinger  Interviewed  for  Die 
Zeit    of    Hamburg 124 

Malaysia.  Letters  of  Credence  (Zain  Azraai)  .      132 

Middle  East.  U.S.  Vetoes  Unbalanced  Resolu- 
tion on  Palestinian  Rights  (Sherer,  text  of 
draft  U.N.  Security  Council  resolution)   .    .      143 

Presidential  Documents 

Leaders  of  Major  Industrial  Democracies  Meet 
in  Puerto  Rico 116 

U.S.-U.K.  Income  Tax  Convention  Transmitted 
to  the  Senate 145 

Publications.  GPO  Sales  Publications  ....      148 

Treaty  Information 

Current  Actions 146 

U.S.    Files    Notice    of    Intent    To    Withdraw 

From  ICNAF 146 

U.S.-U.K.  Income  Tax  Convention  Transmitted 

to  the  Senate  (message  from  President  Ford)       145 


U.S.S.R. 

Secretary  Kissinger  Interviewed  for  Die  Zeit 
of    Hamburg 124 

The  Western  Alliance:  Peace  and  Moral  Pur- 
pose (Kissinger) 105 

United  Nations 

U.S.  Gives  Views  on  UNCTAD  IV  and  Com- 
modities Resolution  (Kissinger,  Simon, 
Boeker,  U.S.-Group  B  statements,  summary 
of  commodities   resolution) 133 

U.S.  Vetoes  Unbalanced  Resolution  on  Pales- 
tinian Rights  (Sherer,  text  of  draft  U.N. 
Security    Council    resolution) 143 

Viet-Nam.  Secretary  Kissinger  Interviewed 
for  Die  Zeit  of  Hamburg 124 

'Name  Index 

Boeker,   Paul 133 

Ford,   President 116,  145 

Kissinger,    Secretary 105,  116,  124,  133 

Maldonado  Gularte,  Federico  Abundio  ....      132 

McCloskey,   Robert  J 139 

Pinheiro,  Joao  Baptista 132 

Sherer,  Albert  W.,  Jr 143 

Simon,  William  E 116,  133 

Zain  Azraai,  Bin  Zainal  Abidin 132 


Checklist  of  Department  of  State 

Press 

Releases:  July  5-11 

Press    releases    may    be    obtained    from    the 

Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 

Washington 

D.C.  20520. 

No. 

Date 

BnbjMt 

t339 

7/6 

Kissinger:     Chicago     Council     on 
Foreign     Relations     and     Mid- 
America  Committee. 

*g39A 

7/6 

Remarks     introducing     Secretary 
Kissinger,  Chicago. 

t339B 

V/6 

Questions   and   answers   following 
address,    Chicago. 

t340 

7/6 

Availability    of   advisory   commit- 
tee   reports    on    closed    sessions 
of  1975. 

*341 

7/7 

Viron  P.  Vaky  sworn  in  as  Am- 
bassador    to     Venezuela     (bio- 
graphic data). 

*342 

7/8 

Shipping  Coordinating  Committee 
Subcommittee  on  Safety  of  Life 
at  Sea,  working  group  on  ship 
design  and  equipment,  Aug.  3-5. 

*343 

7/9 

Program   for   the   official   visit   of 
Chancellor    Helmut    Schmidt    of 
the    Federal    Republic    of    Ger- 
many. 

t344 

7/9 

Kissinger:    toast   at   luncheon   for 
Prince       Abdallah       of       Saudi 
Arabia,  July  8. 

t345 

7/10 

Kissinger:  news  conference, 
ited. 

*  Not  prii 

t  Held  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 

Superintendent   of    Documents 

u.s.  government  printing  office 

washington.  d.c.  20402 

official  business 


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s 


o- 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 

BULLETIN 


Volume  LXXV 


No.  1936 


August  2,  1976 


THE  FUTURE  OF  AMERICA'S  FOREIGN  POLICY 
Address  by  Secretary  Kissinger    H9 

SECRETARY  KISSINGER'S   NEWS   CONFERENCE  OF  JULY  10     16^ 

THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  MIDDLE  EAST 
Address  by  Assistant  Secretary  Atherton     17 A 

U.S.  GIVES  VIEWS  IN  SECURITY  COUNCIL  DEBATE 

ON  ISRAELI  RESCUE  OF  HIJACKING  VICTIMS  AT  ENTEBBE  AIRPORT 

Statements  by  Ambassador  Scranton  and  Ambassador  Bennett 

and  Texts  of  Draft  Resolutions    181 

,,,.^ .cadent  of  Documents 

THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 

For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


For  >ate  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents 

U.S.  Government  Printing  OfBce 

Washington,  B.C.  20402 

PRICE: 

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domestic  $42.50,  foreign  $63.15 

Single  copy  85  cents 

The  Secretary  of  State  has  determined  that 
the  publication  of  this  periodical  is  necessary 
in  the  transaction  of  the  public  business  re- 
quired by  law  of  this  Department.  Use  of 
funds  for  printing  this  periodical  has  been 
approved  by  the  Director  of  the  Office  of  Man- 
agement and  Budget  through  Januai*y  31.  1981. 
Note:  Contents  of  this  publication  are  not 
copyrighted  and  items  contained  herein  may  be 
reprinted.  Citation  of  the  DEPARTMENT  OF 
STATE  BULLETIN  as  the  source  will  be 
appreciated.  The  BULLETIN  is  indexed  In 
the    Readers'    Guide   to    Periodical    Literature. 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE  BULLET  I 


Vol.  LXXV,  No.  1936 
August  2,  1976 

The  Department  of  State  BVLLETIR 
a  weekly  publication  issued  by  th 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau 
Public  Affairs,  provides  the  public  ai 
interested  agencies  of  the  governmen 
with  information  on  developments 
the  field  of  V.S.  foreign  relations  an 
on  the  work  of  the  Department  an 
the  Foreign  Service. 
The  BULLETIN  includes  select 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy,  issm 
by  the  White  House  and  the  Depm 
ment,  and  statements,  addresst 
and  news  conferences  of  the  Preside! 
and  the  Secretary  of  State  and  othl 
officers  of  the  Department,  as  well  ^ 
special  articles  on  various  phases  ( 
international  affairs  and  the  functioi 
of  the  Department.  Information 
included  concerning  treaties  and  inta 
national  agreements  to  which  it 
United  States  is  or  may  become 
party  and  on  treaties  of  general  inte, 
national  interest. 
Publications  of  the  Department 
State,  United  Nations  documents,  an 
legislative  material  in  the  field 
international  relations  are  also  Uste 


The  Future  of  America's  Foreign  Policy 


Address  by  Secretary  Kissinger 


Two  days  ago  this  nation  joyfully  and  con- 
fidently celebrated  its  200th  birthday.  And 
in  a  little  less  than  four  months  our  people 
will  go  to  the  polls  to  elect  a  President  and 
begin  charting  our  course  through  our  third 
century. 

No  two  events  more  vividly  symbolize  our 
contemporary  challenge,  its  hope  and  its 
promise.  For  200  years  we  struggled  to  build 
a  nation  from  a  wilderness,  a  sanctuary  for 
the  oppressed,  and  a  home  for  all  those  who 
love  liberty  and  believe  in  man's  right  to 
govern  himself.  And  during  those  200  years, 
despite  occasional  setbacks  and  mistakes,  we 
have  succeeded  in  vindicating  the  dreams  of 
the  great  men  who  came  together  in  Philadel- 
phia to  proclaim  a  new  nation.  At  home,  we 
have  created  a  society  more  free,  just,  and 
prosperous  than  any  other  on  earth.  And 
abroad,  no  nation  has  done  more  to  defend 
peace,  promote  prosperity,  feed  the  hungry, 
heal  the  sick,  spread  knowledge,  welcome 
refugees  from  tyranny,  and  champion  the 
rights  of  man. 

The  past  gives  perspective  to  our  en- 
deavors, pride  in  where  we  are,  and  hope  for 
what  we  may  become.  But  the  future,  as 
always,  depends  on  choices  which  now  are 
ours  to  make. 

Much  will  be  said  in  the  months  between 
now  and  November  about  the  state  of  our 
nation.  Some  of  it  will  make  sense;  some  will 
not.  Some  of  it  will  reflect  reality;  some  of 


'  Made  at  Chicago,  111.,  on  July  6  before  a  luncheon 
meeting  sponsored  by  the  Chicago  Council  on  For- 
eign Relations  and  the  Mid-America  Committee 
(text  from  press  release  339). 


it  will  not — but  rather  the  desire  to  create  a 
temporary  mood  or  to  capitalize  on  it. 

Let  us  recall  that  four  years  ago  we  were 
told  by  some  that  we  had  become  a  nation 
of  potential  war  criminals,  that  our  military 
establishment  had  passed  the  bounds  of  rea- 
son and  was  out  of  control,  that  our  foreign 
policy  aggressively  invited  conflict,  and  that 
we  were  neglecting  the  needs  of  our  people. 
That  was  not  true  then.  It  is  not  true  now. 

Today  we  are  told  that  we  have  let  our 
military  position  slip  to  the  point  that  we  are 
second  rate,  that  we  are  being  pushed 
around,  and  that  our  government  is  resigned 
to  seeking  the  best  available  terms.  That 
also  is  not  true,  and  the  American  people 
know  it.  They  know  we  remain  far  and  away 
the  strongest  nation  in  the  world.  They  know 
that  America's  dedication  to  peace  and  prog- 
ress is  essential  to  the  world's  security  and 
well-being.  They  learned  painfully  long  ago 
that  military  conflict  abroad  threatens 
American  lives ;  more  recently  they  have 
seen  how  global  economic  conflict  can 
threaten  American  jobs  and  well-being. 

With  our  defense  shield  the  core  of  the 
security  of  free  countries,  with  our  economy 
representing  a  third  of  the  gross  national 
product  of  the  entire  free  world,  our  actions 
and  the  confidence  of  those  nations  who  de- 
pend on  us  are  crucial  for  the  prospects  of 
all  free  peoples.  We  must  avoid  a  compla- 
cency that  is  unworthy  of  our  challenges. 
But  equally  we  must  resist  a  rhetoric  of  im- 
potence which  disquiets  friends  and  em- 
boldens adversaries. 

The  people  of  Chicago  hardly  need  a  lec- 


August  2,  1976 


149 


ture  about  the  vigor  and  strength  of  their 
country.  Chicago  has  been  called  "the  pulse 
of  America,"  "the  city  of  the  big  shoulders." 
Chicago  is  a  symbol  of  America's  phenomenal 
productivity,  energy,  and  economic  power. 
No  other  city  so  embodies  the  sense  of  Amer- 
ica's fiber.  Here  is  where  the  skyscraper  was 
born;  here  is  where  the  atomic  age  began. 
This  city  is  a  promontory  from  which  to 
view  the  world  of  tomorrow,  a  world  in  which 
America  must  live  and  which  it  therefore 
must  help  to  shape.  Chicago's  excitement  is 
a  testimony  to  might  and  mass  and  beauty 
and  to  the  raw  pursuit  of  excellence. 

It  is  clear  that  before  us  lies  a  period  of 
potentially  unparalleled  creativity.  This  is 
an  age  of  complex  and  dangerous  forces.  But 
the  United  States,  and  the  great  industrial 
democracies  which  share  our  values  and  our 
ideals,  have  the  opportunity  to  give  a  new 
meaning  to  the  vision  of  human  dignity 
which  for  centuries  has  brightened  the 
prospects  of  Western  man. 

Thirty  years  ago,  with  the  Truman  doc- 
trine, the  Marshall  plan,  the  formation  of 
our  alliances  and  new  international  economic 
institutions,  America  burst  forth  on  the  world 
scene  in  a  great  outburst  of  creative  states- 
manship. Because  it  had  conquered  the  de- 
pression, the  generation  which  shaped  our 
postwar  policy  had  faith  in  the  power  of 
governmental  programs  to  promote  economic 
advance  and  social  progress.  Because  it  had 
won  a  war  whose  moral  imperatives  were 
clear  cut,  it  acted  on  the  assumption  that  we 
would  always  face  straightforward  moral 
choices.  That  generation  was  inspired  by  the 
hope  that  at  some  point  its  exertions  could 
end,  as  our  allies  became  self-sustaining  and 
our  adversaries  mellowed. 

Today,  reality  is  more  complex.  We  have 
learned  that  economic  development  cannot 
be  achieved  overnight  or  through  govern- 
mental projects  alone.  The  nuclear  age  im- 
poses upon  us  the  inevitability  of  coexist- 
ence. We  now  live  in  a  world  of  greater 
diversity,  a  world  of  many  centers  of  power 
and  ideology.  America,  for  the  first  time  in 
our  history,  faces  the  reality  of  permanent 
involvement  in  international  affairs. 

The  challenges  of  peace,  prosperity,  and 


justice  are  unending;  there  are  no  easy  and 
no  final  answers.  Good  intentions  alone  do 
not  constitute  a  foreign  policy.  We  must 
learn  to  conduct  foreign  policy  as  other  na- 
tions throughout  history  have  had  to  con- 
duct it — with  persistence,  subtlety,  flexibility, 
nuance,  and  perseverance;  with  the  knowl- 
edge that  what  can  be  achieved  at  any  one 
point  will  always  fall  short  of  the  ideal  but 
that  without  ideals  the  search  for  the  merely 
practical  becomes  stultifying.  We  can  no 
longer  afford  to  oscillate  between  isolation  in 
preservation  of  our  purity  and  intervention- 
ism  in  pursuit  of  objectives  whose  attain- 
ment would  permit  us  to  withdraw  from  the 
world.  Foreign  policy  must  be  conducted  not 
as  a  response  to  domestic  passions,  or  to 
international  crises,  but  as  a  long-term  en- 
terprise— engaging  our  best  efforts  for  as 
far  ahead  as  we  can  see — of  building  a  better 
and  safer  world. 

Our  national  objectives  and  ideals,  if  they 
are  well  conceived,  cannot  change  every  four 
years  or  with  every  new  Administration.  To 
pretend  that  they  do,  or  even  that  they  can, 
would  make  American  policy  itself  a  major 
factor  of  instability  in  the  world. 

Whether  we  call  it  "structure"  or  "archi- 
tecture," whether  the  process  which  produces 
policy  is  solitary  or  done  by  committee,  the 
nation  will  have  to  continue  to  engage  itself 
in  managing  the  transition  from  the  postwar 
international  order  based  primarily  on  de- 
fense against  aggression  to  a  new  inter- 
national system  which  adds  to  security  the 
needs  of  economic  cooperation  and  political 
consensus  on  a  global  scale. 

And  we  must  do  so  under  radically  altered 
psychological  conditions  at  home.  The  gen- 
ei-ation  that  undertook  the  great  initiatives 
of  the  postwar  period  was  inspired  by  the 
recollection  of  a  conflict  whose  morality  was 
unquestioned  and  whose  outcome  was  conclu- 
sive. The  generation  that  will  have  to  sus- 
tain contemporary  foreign  policy  recalls  only 
wars  that  appeared  morally  ambiguous  and 
whose  outcomes  were  profoundly  frustrat- 
ing. Ours  is  a  period  much  less  confident  of 
the  ability  of  governments  to  manage  the 
great  issues  of  the  era. 

And  yet  too  much  depends  on  us  to  per- 


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mit  our  commitment  to  falter.  We  have 
physical  strength  in  abundance.  We  must 
marshal  the  vision  to  put  it  into  the  service 
of  our  ideals. 

The  time  has  come  to  build  a  new  foreign 
policy  consensus  similar  in  scope  but  differ- 
ent in  content  from  that  which  sustained  our 
previous  achievements.  Democrats  and  Re- 
publicans, Congress  and  the  executive,  gov- 
ernment and  citizen,  must  once  again  con- 
duct the  foreign  policy  debate  in  the  spirit  of 
partnership — recognizing  that  we  are  not  at 
war  with  each  other,  but  engaged  in  a  vital 
national  enterprise  affecting  our  future  and 
the  world  at  large.  Our  electoral  process  can 
do  much  to  strengthen  our  role  in  the  world 
— both  by  healing  the  wounds  of  the  last 
decade  and  by  forging  the  elements  of  a  new 
nonpartisan  consensus  in  foreign  policy.  This 
election,  whatever  its  outcome,  should  be  re- 
membered as  the  time  when  the  American 
people  rediscovered  their  unity  in  the  for- 
mulation and  execution  of  foreign  policy. 

Despite  the  domestic  turmoil  of  recent 
years,  much  has  already  been  achieved. 

For  the  first  time  in  a  decade  and  a  half, 
we  are  at  peace.  Our  relations  with  the  in- 
dustrial democracies  are  the  closest  they 
have  been  in  20  years,  and  our  collaboration 
is  steadily  expanding  into  new  fields.  Here 
in  the  Western  Hemisphere,  we  are  forging 
a  new  association  based  on  equality  and  mu- 
tual respect.  We  have  inaugurated  a  hopeful 
new  policy  in  Africa.  Important  progress  to- 
ward peace  in  the  Middle  East  has  been 
made,  and  the  elements  for  major  new  ad- 
vances exist.  In  Asia,  our  relations  with 
Japan  have  never  been  better.  We  have 
opened  a  new  relationship  with  the  People's 
Republic  of  China  that  will  expand  in  keep- 
ing with  the  Shanghai  communique.  And 
with  respect  to  the  Soviet  Union  we  have 
combined  vigilance  with  conciliation,  a  de- 
termination to  resist  expansion  with  a  readi- 
ness to  build  relations  on  a  more  stable  and 
lasting  basis  than  a  balance  of  terror. 

But  great  tasks  remain:  to  strengthen 
further  the  solidarity  with  our  major  allies, 
to  explore  new  prospects  for  reducing  ten- 
sions with  our  adversaries,  and  to  shape  the 
new  dialogue  between  the  industrial  and  de- 


veloping  nations    into  a   constructive   long- 
term  relationship  of  common  benefit. 
Let  me  turn  now  to  these  issues. 

The  Collaboration  of  the  Democracies 

The  collaboration  of  the  industrial  democ- 
racies of  Western  Europe,  North  America, 
and  Japan  has  been  the  central  core  of 
America's  foreign  relations  throughout  the 
postwar  period.  It  remains  the  principal 
focus  of  our  foreign  policy  today.  And  it  has 
been  constantly  strengthened  in  recent  years. 

The  intensity,  regularity,  and  scope  of  the 
permanent  dialogue  among  the  industrial 
democracies  can  scarcely  be  exaggerated. 
President  Ford  since  he  has  been  in  office 
has  conferred  with  the  leaders  of  our  NATO 
and  Japanese  allies  at  four  summit  meetings 
and  over  60  individual  meetings,  abroad  or 
in  Washington.  I  have  met  with  Foreign 
Ministers  or  heads  of  government  of  the  in- 
dustrial democracies  over  200  times  since  I 
have  been  Secretary  of  State — ^including  over 
100  times  with  leaders  of  the  major  nations 
represented  at  the  Puerto  Rico  summit.  This 
solidarity  is  a  record  unmatched  by  any 
other  group  of  independent  nations.  For 
many  years  there  have  been  no  major  dis- 
putes between  America  and  our  allies ;  today 
there  are  no  significant  differences  in  ap- 
proach or  policy.  The  relations  among  the 
industrial  democi-acies  have  not  been  as 
close  in  many  decades — and  are  far  closer 
than  they  were  10  years  ago. 

Of  course,  frequency  of  consultation  is 
not  enough.  We  must  never  cease  to  keep  our 
alliances  relevant  to  current  conditions.  Our 
alliances  were  formed  a  generation  ago  to 
stave  off  common  dangers — the  threat  of 
Communist  aggression  and  the  fear  of  eco- 
nomic collapse.  These  goals  have  been  sub- 
stantially achieved. 

Our  economies  are  the  most  prosperous  on 
earth ;  we  comprise  65  percent  of  the  world 
gross  national  product  and  70  percent  of  its 
trade.  Our  technology,  managerial  skill,  and 
productive  dynamism  have  proven  to  be  in- 
dispensable to  all  nations  that  seek  to  de- 
velop their  economies  and  improve  the  lot  of 
their  citizens.  The  developing  countries  and 


August  2,  1976 


151 


the  Socialist  countries — despite  their  habit- 
ual denunciation  of  the  free  market  system 
— now  recognize  that  they  must  turn  to  the 
industrial  democracies  for  trade  and  assist- 
ance in  improving  their  own  economies. 

We  confront  the  agenda  before  us  with 
confidence,  aware  that  our  cohesion  which 
has  brought  us  this  far  remains  crucial  to 
all  that  we  do: 

— We  must  maintain  our  common  security 
in  changed  circumstances.  For  most  of  the 
postwar  period  we  relied  on  strategic  forces 
for  both  deterrence  and  defense.  Today,  the 
numbers  and  destructive  power  of  nuclear 
weapons  tend  to  produce  a  strategic  stale- 
mate. Challenges  below  the  strategic  nuclear 
level  become  more  dangerous;  forces  for  re- 
gional defense — land,  sea,  and  air — therefore 
grow  more  important.  Our  alliance  forces 
must  reflect  these  new  realities  and  be 
strengthened  in  crucial  categories. 

— We  must  continue  to  coordinate  our 
economic  strategies  to  encourage  economic 
growth  while  controlling  inflation.  In  a  period 
of  growing  economic  interdependence,  we 
cannot  aff'ord  to  have  national  economic 
policies  working  at  cross-pui'poses. 

— We  must  develop  joint  approaches  to 
relations  with  the  developing  nations.  Al- 
most all  development  in  the  world  today 
gains  its  impetus  from  the  industrial  democ- 
racies. There  is  no  reason  for  defensiveness. 
If  we  compete  among  ourselves  for  the  favor 
of  the  developing  nations,  we  dissipate  our 
own  resources  and  tempt  the  developing  na- 
tions in  unproductive  and  unrealistic  direc- 
tions. If  the  industrial  nations  cooperate 
among  ourselves,  we  have  the  best  chance 
to  bring  about  cooperative  relations  between 
developed  and  developing.  Only  this  can  end 
tactics  of  confrontation  and  contribute  to 
new  global  arrangements  in  which  all  nations 
participate  and  benefit. 

— Finally,  the  industrial  democracies 
must  coordinate  our  policies  with  respect  to 
East-West  trade.  The  volume  of  that  trade 
has  been  growing  at  a  rapid  rate — more  in 
the  other  industrial  democracies  than  in  the 
United  States.  We  must  better  understand 
the    implications    of    interchange    between 


market  and  centrally  controlled  economies; 
we  must  avoid  its  political  exploitation;  we 
must  study  the  implications  of  the  mount- 
ing debts  of  the  nonmarket  economies;  we 
must  shape  the  trade  in  a  direction  bene- 
ficial to  the  overall  purposes  of  the  industrial 
democracies. 

This  is  the  meaning  of  the  President's 
meeting  10  days  ago  with  the  leaders  of 
Canada,  France,  Germany,  Great  Britain, 
Italy,  and  Japan  at  the  Puerto  Rico  economic 
summit.  There,  as  at  Rambouillet  last  No- 
vember, the  allied  leaders  discussed  such 
basic  issues  as  how  to  consolidate  our  eco- 
nomic recovery  and  head  off"  a  resurgence  of 
inflation.  They  exchanged  views  on  East- 
West  economic  relations  and  the  status  of 
the  dialogue  with  the  developing  nations. 
The  meeting  reflected  and  promoted  the 
growing  cooperation  of  the  industrial  democ- 
racies. It  symbolizes  their  political  will  to 
shape  their  future  together. 

All  the  tasks  that  I  have  enumerated  here 
grow  out  of  the  strength  of  the  industrial 
democracies.  And  all  these  tasks  are  in- 
escapable. We  have  every  reason  to  face  the 
future  with  confidence.  A  world  that  yearns 
for  peace  and  freedom,  for  economic  advance, 
for  fundamental  human  justice,  today  looks 
to  our  nations  for  understanding  and  for 
leadership.  If  the  democracies  remain  strong 
and  united,  we  can  usher  in  an  era  of  un- 
precedented peace  and  progress. 

The  Agenda  of  War  and  Peace 

Throughout  its  existence,  the  Atlantic 
alliance  has  based  its  quest  for  peace  on  two 
complementary  policies.  P'irst,  we  must  main- 
tain our  defenses,  resist  military  challenges, 
and  prevent  the  Soviet  Union  from  trans- 
forming its  military  strength  into  political 
expansion.  Second,  we  must  seek  to  resolve 
conflicts  and  disputes  through  negotiation, 
foster  habits  of  restraint  in  international 
conduct,  and  expand  the  area  of  constructive 
relations. 

However  we  label  such  an  approach,  its 
objectives  are  imposed  by  the  unprecedented 
conditions  of  the  nuclear  age.  No  statesman 


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Department  of  State  Bulletin 


will  lightly  risk  the  lives  of  tens  of  millions. 
Every  President,  after  entering  office  and 
seeing  the  facts,  has  come  to  President 
Eisenhower's  insight  that  there  is  no  alter- 
native to  peace. 

We  have  no  illusions  about  the  Soviet 
ideological  and  geopolitical  challenge,  but 
neither  should  there  be  illusions  about  what 
is  needed  to  deal  with  it. 

The  strength  of  the  West — military,  eco- 
nomic, and  moral — must  be  used  to  shape 
international  relationships  in  accordance 
with  our  vision  of  a  better  world  and  with  a 
full  sense  of  responsibility  toward  the  awful 
cataclysm  of  nuclear  war.  We  must  avoid 
both  a  sentimentality  that  would  substitute 
good  will  for  strength  and  mock  toughness 
that  would  substitute  posturing  for  a  clear 
perception  of  our  interests.  We  will  maintain 
the  balance  of  power,  but  we  will  also  recog- 
nize that  peace,  to  be  lasting,  must  rest 
upon  more  than  a  balance  of  terror  con- 
stantly contested.  Specifically: 

— We  will  continue  to  seek  a  fair  and 
reliable  agreement  on  strategic  arms  limita- 
tion, because  this  is  in  our  interest  and  the 
interest  of  world  peace.  The  President  will 
not  hesitate  to  sign  an  agreement  that  pro- 
tects our  national  interests  and  those  of  our 
allies.  But  he  will  never  agree  simply  for  the 
sake  of  agreement  or  run  risks  with  our 
national  security. 

— We  will  continue,  together  with  our 
allies,  to  seek  negotiated  solutions  to  East- 
West  political  problems  in  order  to  diminish 
the  risks  of  confrontation. 

— We  will  continue  to  develop  cooperative 
ties  on  the  basis  of  reciprocity  to  foster  re- 
sponsible international  behavior  and  a  mu- 
tual interest  in  better  political  relations. 

It  goes  without  saying  that  a  reduction  of 
tensions  requires  an  equivalence  of  obliga- 
tions and  commitments: 

— Agreements  reached  must  be  balanced 
and  reliable;  they  must  be  complied  with 
strictly  both  as  to  their  letter  and  their 
spirit. 

— There  must  be  consistent  patterns  of 
behavior  in  different  parts  of  the  world.  We 


will  not  permit  the  relaxation  of  tensions  to 
be  practiced  selectively.  We  cannot  accept 
insistence  on  restraint  on  strategic  arms  or 
in  Central  Europe  while  tensions  are  exacer- 
bated in  other  parts  of  the  world  in  the  name 
of  "national  liberation"  or  "proletarian  inter- 
nationalism." 

— There  must  be  tolerable  definitions  of 
ideological  rivalry.  We  do  not  fear  ideological 
competition;  indeed,  we  assume  it.  We  have 
every  reason  for  confidence  in  the  power  of 
the  idea  of  freedom.  But  we  cannot  agree  that 
ideology  alone  is  involved  when  Soviet  mili- 
tary power  is  exerted  in  remote  areas  or 
when  ideology  is  invoked  so  that  regional  or 
local  instabilities  can  be  exploited. 

— The  relaxation  of  tensions  must  not  be- 
come a  subterfuge  to  play  allies  off  against 
each  other.  Allied  cohesion  insures  that  i-e- 
laxation  of  tensions  is  broadly  based ;  divi- 
sion and  competition  among  us  would  only 
dissipate  our  advantages  and  open  up  oppor- 
tunities for  adversaries. 

In  Europe,  the  relaxation  of  tensions  must 
apply  to  the  Eastern  as  well  as  Western  half 
of  the  continent.  There  should  be  no  room 
for  misconceptions  about   American  policy: 

— We  are  determined  to  deal  with  Eastern 
Europe  on  the  basis  of  the  sovereignty  and 
independence  of  each  of  its  countries.  We 
recognize  no  spheres  of  influence  and  no  pre- 
tentions to  hegemony. 

— For  this  reason,  we  will  continue  to  de- 
velop our  bilateral  ties  in  economic  and  other 
fields  with  the  nations  of  Eastern  Europe 
and  encourage  similar  efforts  on  the  part  of 
our  Western  European  allies. 

— We  will  continually  seek  improvements 
in  the  basic  conditions  of  human  life  in 
Eastern  Europe,  in  terms  of  emigration,  uni- 
fication of  families,  freer  flow  of  informa- 
tion, and  increased  travel  and  economic 
interchange. 

Improving  relations  between  East  and 
West  is  a  long-teiTn  process.  We  pursue  it  on 
the  basis  of  our  purposes  and  our  ideals.  We 
will  never  slacken  the  quest  for  peace. 

We  can  only  benefit  from  the  challenge  of 
peaceful  competition.  Nowhere  have  the  in- 


August  2,  1976 


153 


dustrial  democracies  suffered  setbacks  be- 
cause of  lack  of  strength.  Without  exception, 
the  problems  have  been  internal;  they  are 
therefore  within  our  power  to  remedy. 

We  must  not  so  bemuse  ourselves  with 
rhetoric  that  we  forget  that  in  every  cate- 
gory of  relevant  power,  the  democracies  have 
the  means  to  preserve  and  foster  their  objec- 
tives. We  need  only  to  stay  together  and 
stay  the  course. 

In  the  military  field,  we  have  the  strength 
to  defend  our  interests.  In  the  economic 
area,  our  performance  has  been  overwhelm- 
ingly superior.  In  the  ideological  competi- 
tion, it  is  not  our  nations,  but  the  East,  that 
has  shown  fear  of  the  power  of  freedom. 
The  winds  of  change  are  blowing  from  the 
West.  If  we  act  with  wisdom  and  unity,  the 
free  nations  have  it  in  our  power  to  leave 
our  children  a  safer  and  more  hopeful  world 
than  the  one  we  found. 

The  Emerging  Structure  of  a  Global  Community 

Within  the  past  decade  and  particularly 
over  the  past  several  years,  a  new  dimension 
of  international  affairs  has  moved  to  center 
stage:  the  relations  between  the  Northern 
and  the  Southern  Hemispheres. 

For  the  first  time  in  history  the  inter- 
national system  has  become  truly  global. 
Decolonization  and  the  expansion  of  the 
world  economy  have  given  birth  to  scores  of 
new  centers  of  power  and  initiative.  The 
globe's  security  and  prosperity  have  become 
more  and  more  indivisible. 

Yet  in  a  world  of  over  150  sovereign  na- 
tions, many  of  which  have  only  recently 
achieved  independence,  progress  toward 
understanding  of  our  common  destiny  has 
been  halting  and  uneasy.  Too  many  nations 
still  seek  to  extort  what  is  meaningful  only 
if  freely  offered.  Attempts  at  economic  war- 
fare, and  sterile  disputes  between  the  indus- 
trial and  developing  nations,  have  been  all 
too  characteristic  of  international  confer- 
ences. Such  tactics  overlook  some  basic 
realities: 

— Development  is  an  arduous  and  long- 
term  process  not  susceptible  to  quick  or  easy 


solutions.  It  requires  great  efforts  to  bring 
about  social  change,  above  all  by  the  develop- 
ing countries  themselves. 

— If  there  is  to  be  any  hope  of  develop- 
ment, the  new  nations  need  the  sustained 
help  of  the  industrial  democracies.  The  Com- 
munist countries  have  been  to  all  practical 
purposes  irrelevant  to  this  process  and  clearly 
unwilling  to  assist  it. 

— A  serious  development  effort  requires 
cooperation.  Confi'ontation  and  artificial  vot- 
ing majorities  destroy  the  psychological 
basis  for  a  sustained  relationship.  Parlia- 
mentary victories  in  international  forums 
prove  empty  if  they  are  not  followed  by  the 
willing  implementation  of  the  minority. 

The  United  States  has  a  vital  stake  in  the 
health  of  the  world  economic  system.  We 
need  only  recall  the  oil  embargo  of  1973  to 
know  that  interdependence  is  more  than 
a  slogan.  That  event  helped  to  produce  the 
worst  inflation  as  well  as  the  most  severe 
recession  of  the  postwar  period.  The  price 
and  supply  of  energy  and  raw  materials,  the 
conditions  of  trade  and  investment,  the  pro- 
tection of  the  environment,  the  use  of  the 
oceans  and  space — these  are  all  issues  on 
which  American  jobs  and  livelihood  and 
progress  depend.  And  we  know  as  well  that 
no  structure  of  international  relations  can 
be  durable  if  the  world  remains  divided  be- 
tween the  rich  and  the  poor,  the  privileged 
and  the  oppressed,  the  hopeful  and  the 
despairing. 

We  have  offered  our  cooperation  in  our 
own  interest  and  in  the  hope  that  it  will 
help  build  a  better  world.  But  we  insist  that 
others  meet  us  in  the  same  spirit.  We  will 
not  submit  to  blackmail  or  to  pressure.  We 
will  resist  hostile  resolutions  and  unwork- 
able proposals.  Artificial  majorities  and 
claims  to  a  monopoly  on  morality  in  world 
forum.s  will  only  undermine  public  support 
here  and  in  the  other  industrial  democracies 
— the  only  nations  capable  of  contributing 
effectively  to  development. 

The  task  is  to  build  a  consensus  based  on 
mutual  respect  and  self-interest.  Only  in  this 
way  can  we  encourage  realistic  methods  of 
international  collaboration  and  lay  the  foun- 


154 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


dation  for  a  cooperative  international 
economy. 

To  this  end  the  United  States  has  in  the 
last  few  years  assumed  a  role  of  leadership. 
We  have  offered  comprehensive  initiatives 
in  such  areas  as  energy,  food,  trade,  finance, 
commodities,  technology  transfer,  and  the 
special  problems  of  the  poorest  countries. 
We  have  done  so  in  many  international  fo- 
rums: at  the  seventh  special  session  of  the 
U.N.  General  Assembly  last  September,  at 
the  Paris  Conference  on  International  Eco- 
nomic Cooperation  in  December,  at  the  Ja- 
maica conference  on  world  monetary  issues 
in  January,  at  the  U.N.  Conference  on  Trade 
and  Development  in  Nairobi  this  spring.  Prog- 
ress has  been  achieved  on  many  of  our  pro- 
posals; many  new  institutions  and  vehicles  of 
cooperation  are  already  underway. 

Thus,  just  as  we  seek  to  move  beyond  a 
balance  of  power  in  East-West  relations,  so 
we  are  seeking  long-term  cooperation  in 
North-South  relations  with  a  view  to  building 
a  genuine  world  community. 

In  this  enterprise  there  is  no  more  im- 
portant place  to  start  than  in  our  own  hemi- 
sphere. If  we  are  to  build  a  stable,  prosper- 
ous, and  just  world  structure,  we  will  need 
the  firm  foundations  of  close  bonds  with  our 
friends  in  Latin  America. 

Our  traditional  special  relationship  in  the 
hemisphere  antedates  our  cooperation  with 
other  regions  of  the  developing  world.  We 
share  unique  experiences  in  the  Americas — 
the  exploration  and  development  of  new  conti- 
nents, the  forging  of  nations  free  from  colo- 
nial domination,  the  development  of  unique 
human  and  moral  ideals.  We  have  shaped 
democratic  institutions  and  spurred  eco- 
nomic growth,  conscious  that  we  benefited 
greatly  from  our  relationship  with  each 
other.  We  have  long  held  a  common  interest 
in  shielding  our  hemisphere  from  the  intru- 
sion of  others.  We  have  led  the  world  in 
building  international  organizations  to  serve 
our  cooperative  endeavors  for  both  collec- 
tive security  and  economic  progress. 

The  challenge  we  face  today  is  that  history 
— and  indeed  the  very  growth  and  success 
we  have  achieved — have  complicated  our  re- 
lationship. What  used  to  be  a  simple  percep- 


tion of  hemispheric  uniqueness,  and  a  self- 
contained  exclusive  relationship,  has  become 
enmeshed  in  the  wider  concerns  we  all  now 
have  in  the  rest  of  the  world. 

The  United  States  recognizes  its  global 
responsibility  to  maintain  the  world  balance 
of  power,  to  help  resolve  the  age-old  political 
conflicts  that  undermine  peace,  and  to  help 
shape  a  new  international  order  encompass- 
ing the  interests  and  aspirations  of  the 
more  than  150  nations  that  now  comprise 
our  planet. 

At  the  same  time,  in  the  sixties  and 
seventies  Latin  American  nations  have  be- 
come steadily  more  prosperous  and  self- 
confident.  They  are  now  major  factors  in 
their  own  right  on  the  world  scene.  Their 
economies  are  among  the  most  advanced  of 
the  developing  world — indeed,  they  can  be 
said  to  constitute  a  "middle  class"  among 
the  nations  of  the  world,  encouraging  prog- 
ress but  with  an  increasing  stake  in  stabil- 
ity. They  are  increasingly  important  in  the 
global  economy  and  the  world's  political 
forums.  And  they  have  a  growing  sense  of 
solidarity  with  developing  nations  in  Africa 
and  Asia.  Such  global  involvement  is  in- 
evitable; at  the  same  time,  it  inevitably 
creates  new  and  conflicting  pressures  on  tra- 
ditional friendships. 

The  United  States  has  sought  to  build  a 
new  framework  in  our  hemispheric  relations 
which  takes  into  account  new  realities  with- 
out sacrificing  the  precious  advantage  of  our 
tradition  of  collaboration. 

Most  important,  given  the  long  period  of 
neglect,  real  or  perceived,  our  sister  repub- 
lics in  the  Western  Hemisphere  now  know 
that  we  care.  We  have  inaugurated  a  new 
dialogue  based  on  equality  and  mutual  re- 
spect and  on  a  recognition  of  sovereign 
independence. 

This  dialogue  does  not  reflect  demands  by 
one  side  and  defense  of  old  patterns  by  the 
other.  On  the  basis  of  the  new  Latin  Amer- 
ican strength  and  self-confidence,  we  now 
deal  with  one  another  with  a  mutuality  of 
regard  and  understanding  quite  impossible 
a  few  years  or  even  a  decade  ago. 

There  is  a  growing  recognition   that  we 


August  2,  1976 


155 


have  shared  concerns  as  well  as  different 
perspectives;  that  the  nations  of  this  hemi- 
sphere, where  men  sought  a  haven  from 
oppression,  have  an  opportunity  to  begin  a 
new  era  of  cooperation  between  industrially 
advanced  and  developing  countries. 

In  the  past  few  years,  the  United  States 
has  offered  initiatives  to  deal  coherently 
with  the  catalogue  of  hemispheric  issues — 
political,  economic,  and  moral.  A  milestone 
in  this  process  came  at  the  General  Assem- 
bly of  the  Organization  of  American  States 
in  Santiago  last  month,  where  we  presented 
a  comprehensive  series  of  proposals: 

— To  advance  hemispheric  cooperation  for 
development,  including  trade  opportunities 
and  access  to  contemporary  technology; 

— To  strengthen  joint  efforts  to  deal 
with  the  issue  of  human  rights  in  the 
hemisphere;  and 

— To  modernize  our  inter-American  sys- 
tem of  political  consultation. 

The  United  States  is  demonstrating 
leadership  on  all  these  issues.  As  a  result, 
Latin  American  nations  expressed  their 
belief  at  Santiago  that  a  new  chapter  in 
hemispheric  relations  is  opening  up.  There 
was  a  climate  of  candor,  of  friendship  with- 
out complexes,  and  of  common  endeavor. 
Our  initiatives  no  longer  raise  fears  of  pa- 
ternalism or  domination  but  are  welcomed 
again  by  our  sister  republics  as  reflecting 
mutual  interests  and  our  proper  role. 

We  believe  that  we  have  inaugurated  a 
new  era  of  inter-American  cooperation  based 
on  equality  and  mutual  benefit.  And  we  be- 
lieve, too,  that  this  can  serve  as  a  bridge 
between  developed  and  developing  nations 
everywhere  and  as  an  example  for  the  world 
community. 

America  and  the  World 

The  world  has  entered  a  new  era.  We  live 
in  a  time  marked  by  change  and  uncer- 
tainty; our  age  cries  out  for  new  patterns 
of  order  and  new  efforts  to  better  the  hu- 


man condition.  The  challenges  of  peace  and 
progress  and  justice  require  sustained  and 
devoted  effort  from  the  responsible  nations 
of  the  world  and  a  permanent  role  of  lead- 
ership by  the  United  States. 

The  United  States  has  faced  challenge  be- 
fore. No  other  people  could  have  celebrated 
its  birthday  so  joyfully  or  with  such  opti- 
mism about  its  future.  America  has  always 
stood  for  something  beyond  its  own  physi- 
cal strength.  The  heritage  we  have  cele- 
brated this  week  is  a  vision  of  mankind's 
most  glorious  ideals — the  equality  of  all  peo- 
ples and  individuals;  the  right  to  life,  lib- 
erty, and  the  pursuit  of  happiness.  Only  in 
our  free  countries,  where  these  principles 
are  secure,  do  they  sometimes  seem  plati- 
tudes; to  a  world  in  which  the  majority  of 
mankind  lives  without  them,  they  are  the 
burning  issues  of  our  time. 

America's  success  has  come  from  its  blend 
of  pragmatism  and  idealism.  Our  pragmatic 
tradition  has  helped  us  confront  reality, 
neither  blinded  by  dogma  nor  daunted  by 
challenge.  Our  idealism  has  given  us  not  only 
principles  to  defend  but  the  conviction  and 
courage  to  defend  them.  In  today's  world  of 
complexity,  we  need  more  than  ever  a  moral 
compass  to  steer  by,  a  sense  of  conviction 
that  enables  us  to  persevere  through  the 
stages  of  the  attainable  toward  the  ideal 
which  will  always  be  beyond. 

The  world  no  longer  offers  us  the  sim- 
plicity of  detachment  or  temporary  appli- 
cations of  overwhelming  power.  In  a  world 
of  interdependence,  of  unending  challenge, 
and  of  diversity,  we  must  recognize  our  per- 
manent involvement.  Nor  do  we  have  rea- 
son for  apology  or  hesitation.  We  remain 
the  most  powerful  nation  on  earth.  And 
there  is  much  to  accomplish  together  with 
the  other  industrial  democracies  as  long  as 
we  offer  the  leadership  for  which  all  free 
nations  long.  And  other  nations  will  join  us 
in  collaborative  endeavors  if  they  see  us — 
the  world's  most  powerful  nation — offering 
leadership. 


156 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


So  it  is  time  to  put  an  end  to  our  domes- 
tic divisions,  for  they  are  the  principal  ob- 
stacle to  the  full  realization  of  our  oppor- 
tunities. We  have  consumed  too  much  of  our 
substance  in  domestic  strife;  we  run  the  risk 
that  in  pursuit  of  such  self-absorption  we 
will  lower  our  sights.  All  great  achievements 
were  dreams  before  they  were  realities.  The 
truly  creative  actions  do  not  grow  out  of 
fine  calculations  of  expediency  and  techni- 
cal analysis.  They  require  a  vision  which 
draws  men  to  far  horizons. 

Almost  70  years  ago  Winston  Churchill, 
with  that  blend  of  optimism  and  humanity 


that  so  set  him  apart  from  lesser  men,  de- 
scribed our  contemporary  challenge: 

What  is  the  use  of  living,  if  it  be  not  to  strive  for 
noble  causes  and  to  make  this  muddled  world  a 
better  place  for  those  who  will  live  in  it  after  we 
are  gone  ?  How  else  can  we  put  ourselves  in  har- 
monious relation  with  the  great  verities  and  consola- 
tions of  the  infinite  and  the  eternal  ?  And  I  avow 
my  faith  that  we  are  marching  towards  better  days. 

So  let  US  avow  our  faith  that  we  are 
marching  toward  better  days.  And  through 
that  act,  America,  with  its  vast  strength,  its 
optimism  and  idealism,  can  make  a  decisive 
contribution  to  a  world  of  peace,  progress, 
and  justice. 


Questions  and  Answers  Following  the  Secretary's  Address  at  Chicago 


Press   release   339B  dated  July   6 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  would  you  please  com- 
ment on  what  hearing  the  outcome  of  last 
week's  meeting  of  European  Communist 
Parties  has  on  the  future  course  of  our  for- 
eign policy  and  particidarly  the  hearing  it 
has  on  maintaining  the  unity  with  the  in- 
dustrial democracies  ivhich  you  have  so 
stressed? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  have  expressed  my 
view  on  the  Communist  Parties  of  Western 
Europe  on  a  number  of  occasions,  and  I 
found  that  I  became  a  political  issue,  even 
in  foreign  countries.  [Laughter.]  I  feel  that 
I  can  be  a  political  issue  in  only  one  country 
at  a  time,  and  I  have  to  give  preference  to 
the  United  States.  [Laughter.] 

But  there  are  two  problems  in  connection 
with  the  Communist  Parties  of  Western  Eu- 
rope: one  is  their  relationship  to  Moscow; 
and  secondly,  that  they  are  Communists,  re- 
gardless of  what  their  relationship  to  Mos- 
cow may  or  may  not  be.  None  of  these  parties 
has  disavowed  the  Leninist  principles  of  po- 
litical organization  which  have  inspired  their 
leaders  for  all  of  their  adult  life.  For  all  of 


them,  participation  in  government  would 
raise  serious  problems  for  NATO,  for  the 
European  Community,  and  for  other  multi- 
lateral institutions. 

Nor  can  one  take  statements  at  face  value. 
They  would  have  to  be  tested  over  a  period 
of  time.  In  1947  the  leader  of  the  Czech  Com- 
munist Party,  Mr.  Gottwald,  made  the  fol- 
lowing statement: 

The  Czechoslovak  Communist  Party  seeks  to  at- 
tain socialism,  but  we  are  of  the  opinion  that  to 
reach  socialism  there  exists  not  only  the  method  of 
the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat.  I  believe  not  only 
that  we  are  capable  of  attaining  socialism  by  routes 
different  from  that  of  the  Soviet  example,  but  that 
we  have  already  set  off  in  that  direction.  The  Com- 
munist coalition  with  other  parties  is  not  oppor- 
tunism. With  regard  to  parliamentary  institutions, 
they  will  have  no  more  vigilant  guardians  than  the 
Communists,  when  they  are  written  into  the  new 
Constitution. 

A  year  later  Mr.  Gottwald  overthrew  the 
parliamentary  institutions. 

So  I  would  have  to  say  that  we  have  to 
look  at  the  actions  and  not  at  the  rhetoric 
before  we  make  any  judgment  about  the  final 
significance  of  that  conference. 


August  2,  1976 


157 


Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  in  your  estimation  tvould 
relaxation  of  tensions  rvith  the  Soviet  Union, 
or  detente,  if  you  please — is  there  a  consen- 
sus in  which  U.S.  foreign  policy  can  operate 
and,  if  so,  ichat  is  it? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Since  there  is  press 
here,  I  want  to  make  it  clear  that  the  word 
"detente"  was  used  by  the  questioner. 
[Laughter.] 

I  think  that  the  relations  with  the  Soviet 
Union  are  a  permanent  feature  of  the  inter- 
national scene.  I  think  that  the  avoidance  of 
nuclear  war  must  be  a  permanent  objective 
of  American  foreign  policy.  And  I  believe 
that  to  seek  to  avoid  war  by  maintaining  our 
principles  and  our  interests  enables  us  to 
define  the  consensus  and  to  obtain  public  sup- 
port. 

How  to  do  this  in  every  concrete  circum- 
stance, of  course,  requires  discussion  and 
examination.  But  in  itself,  we  should  not  pre- 
tend to  ourselves  that  we  have  a  choice  in 
which,  suddenly,  the  problem  of  the  Soviet 
Union  will  disappear — the  problem  will  be 
with  us.  It  is  the  responsibility  of  the  gov- 
ernment and  of  the  public,  together,  to  man- 
age it  in  such  a  way  that  we  preserve  our 
values  and  the  interests  of  our  country  and 
of  our  allies  without  nuclear  war.  And  we 
can  do  it. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  what  will  he  the  U.S. 
position  on  the  [IsraeW^  raid  to  rescue  hos- 
tages [at  Entebbe]  ?  And  also,  Mr.  Secre- 
tary, ivhat  is  your  personal  view  on  this 
event? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  President  has 
expressed  the  great  gratification  of  the 
American  people  at  the  rescue  of  the  hos- 
tages. It  is  very  difficult  to  establish  a  gen- 
eral rule  in  a  situation  like  this.  Clearly  the 
attack  on  an  airport  is  an  unprecedented  at- 
tack. But  equally  clear  is  that  the  hijacking 
of  airliners — the  holding  of  a  hundred  inno- 
cent people  for  ransom  in  a  situation  where 
the  host  government,  at  a  minimum,  proved 
impotent  to  enforce  any  accepted  interna- 
tional law — indicates  that  we  face  here  a 
new  international  problem. 

The  United  States  over  a  period  of  years 


has  proposed  to  the  United  Nations  an  inter- 
national convention  where  no  country  would 
permit  hijacked  airliners  to  land  or  where, 
automatically,  hijacked  airplanes  that  do  land 
are  subject  then  to  arrest  and  will  receive  no 
support  whatever  from  the  government  con- 
cerned. For  many  years  we  have  failed  in 
this  effort. 

We  believe  that  it  is  essential  that  some 
international  arrangement  be  made  to  deal 
with  terrorism,  because  it  cannot  be  toler- 
ated that  innocent  people  become  the  play- 
things of  international  thugs. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  is  there  going  to  be  some 
effort  made  to  maintain  the  present  value  of 
the  dollar  internationally? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  have  a  treaty  of 
nonaggression  with  Secretary  [of  the  Treas- 
ury William  E.]  Simon,  because  he  holds  the 
view  that  my  knowledge  of  economics  is 
an  argument  against  universal  suffrage. 
[Laughter.]  And  the  agreement  is  that  if  I 
will  not  speak  about  economic  matters,  he 
will  take  over  foreign  policy  only  slowly. 
[Laughter.] 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  my  question  relates  to 
southern  Africa.  Can  tve  expect  our  govern- 
ment to  take  a  greater  and  more  realistic 
attitude  to  the  problems  in  southern  Africa 
as  they  affect  the  black  Africans  themselves 
and  the  interests  of  the  devout  democratic 
nations  as  well? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  We  have,  in  recent 
months,  attempted  to  adjust  our  African 
policy  to  the  new  realities  in  southern  Af- 
rica. These  realities  are:  that  a  war  is  al- 
ready taking  place  in  Rhodesia,  which  all 
black  African  countries  are  supporting;  sec- 
ond, that  15,000  Cuban  troops  were  permit- 
ted to  land  in  Angola  and  that  we  were 
prohibited  by  the  Congress  from  opposing 
them;  third,  that  a  way  must  be  found  to 
permit  African  problems  to  be  settled  within 
an  African  context,  because  otherwise  there 
will  be  major  international  confrontations; 
[and]  fourth,  that  the  best  hope  for  the 
white  minorities  in  countries  like  Rhodesia 
and  Namibia  is  a  negotiated  solution  with 
moderate  black  leaders,   before  the  radical 


158 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


elements  take  over  perhaps  supported  by  for- 
eign forces. 

The  United  States  has  attempted  to  put 
an  end  to  the  war  that  has  ah-eady  been 
going  on  in  southern  Africa,  to  return  mat- 
ters to  the  negotiating  table,  to  permit  the 
white  minorities  and  the  black  majorities  to 
work  out  a  method  of  coexistence,  to  encour- 
age the  moderate  African  states  that  are  pre- 
pared to  settle  matters  without  foreign  in- 
tervention and  on  the  basis  of  the  rights  of 
all  the  peoples  in  these  countries. 

We  are  doing  this  because  without  it,  the 
warfare  is  certain  to  escalate — and  the  dan- 
ger of  foreign  intervention  is  likely  to  in- 
crease. And  a  racial  conflict  of  extreme 
violence  is  likely  to  break  out  all  over  south- 
ern Africa,  in  which  then  the  coexistence  be- 
tween the  races  becomes  impossible. 

So  our  intent  is  to  mediate  and  to  enable 
the  communities  to  live  together  and  to  put 
an  end  to  the  cycle  of  violence  that  started 
before  we  made  our  speeches. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  as  you  mentioned  during 
your  talk,  there  has  been  some  recent  criti- 
cism of  American  defense  policy  for  allegedly 
falling  behind  the  Soviet  Union  in  military 
strength. 

Regardless  of  the  accuracy  of  this  criti- 
cism, others  have  contended  that  the  more 
important  factor  is  that  the  Soviet  Union  is 
perceived  by  leaders  in  many  parts  of  the 
world  as  gaining  rapidly  in  military  strength 
and  that  the  military  balance  is  tending  in 
its  favor. 

Does  this  problem  of  perception  seriously 
weaken  the  political  influence  of  the  United 
States  in  the  world? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Of  course  there  is  a 
third  factor:  it's  that  the  perception  of 
many  foreign  leaders  is  formed  by  what  is 
said  in  the  United  States  in  the  years 
divisible  by  four.  [Laughter.] 

There  is  no  question  that  the  Soviet  mili- 
tary strength  is  growing,  as  Soviet  indus- 
trial strength  and  its  technological  basis  are 
growing.  And  therefore  the  free-world  coun- 
tries must  make  continued  eff'orts  to  main- 
tain the  military  balance. 

August  2,  1976 


As  somebody  who  has  had  responsibility 
for  diplomacy  for  many  years — no  one  is 
more  convinced  than  I  am  that  you  cannot 
have  an  eff'ective  diplomacy  without  an  ade- 
quate military  strength. 

At  the  same  time,  we  must  not  talk  our- 
selves into  a  position  of  impotence. 

In  most  significant  categories  of  strength 
we  are  still  ahead  of  the  Soviet  Union. 

The  Soviet  Union  has  always  had  a  very 
large  land  army.  And  if  we  look  ahead  over 
the  next  10  years,  as  I  pointed  out  in  my 
prepared  remarks,  we  must  make  greater 
efforts,  together  with  our  allies,  in  building 
forces  that  are  suitable  for  regional  defense, 
because  the  strategic  balance  is  tending 
toward  a  stalemate. 

But  overall,  if  we  look  at  the  total  parity 
of  sti'ength,  the  free-world  countries  cannot 
be  defeated  by  a  lack  of  strength.  Their  prob- 
lem is  to  muster  the  will  to  mobilize  that 
strength. 

I  think  at  this  moment  the  United  States' 
strength  is  adequate  to  its  responsibilities, 
and  we  have  every  intention  of  maintaining 
it  in  this  position  as  far  as  we  can. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  I  offer  this  question  most 
respectfully  and  ask  ivhy  should  the  United 
States  continue  to  remain  a  member  and  pro- 
vide a  major  portion  of  the  financial  support 
for  an  organization  ivhose  charter  and  prin- 
ciples have  become  a  mockery  and  the  anti- 
thesis of  ivhat  we  as  a  nation  stand  for?  And 
of  course  I  am  referring  to  the  United  Na- 
tions. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  United  States 
has  expressed  repeatedly  its  objection  to 
many  of  the  tendencies  that  we  now  see  in 
the  United  Nations. 

In  my  remarks  today,  I  pointed  out  that 
these  artificial  majorities,  one-way  morality, 
and  the  dependence  on  parliamentary  maneu- 
vering cannot  be  accepted  as  the  normal 
pattern  of  international  relations.  We  have 
repeatedly  pointed  out  in  U.N.  votes  that  we 
will  not  accept  this. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  is  a  necessity  for 
some  meetingplace  where  views  can  be  ex- 
changed and  for  some  mechanism  in  which 
crises  can  be  handled  rapidly  and  in  which 

159 


discussion  can  take  place  without  the  need 
for  formal  arrangements. 

So  we  still  believe  that  the  United  Nations 
has  a  useful  role  to  perform,  but  we  shall 
also  insist  that  the  United  Nations  behave 
in  a  more  equitable  manner  than  has  been 
the  case  in  recent  years.  And  we  will  not  let 
ourselves  be  pressured  by  the  artificial 
majorities  that  can  be  generated  by 
demagoguery. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  do  you  foresee  a  perma- 
nent peace  settlement  in  the  Middle  East — 
especially  in  Beirut,  Lebanon,  in  the  near 
future? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  there  are  two 
separate  but  related  problems:  one  is  the 
problem  of  Lebanon,  and  the  second  is  the 
overall  problem  of  the  Middle  East,  although 
I  recognize  that  the  two  are  related. 

The  tragedy  of  Lebanon  arises  from  the 
fact  that  two  communities  that  have  co- 
existed for  several  generations — and  used  to 
be  cited  as  an  example  of  how  different  re- 
ligions can  live  together  in  the  Middle  East — 
have  gradually  fallen  into  conflict  with  one 
another,  partly  because  of  demographic 
changes,  partly  because  of  the  influence  of 
outside  countries. 

The  Constitution  of  Lebanon  of  the  1930's 
depended,  or  was  based,  on  certain  assump- 
tions about  a  population  ratio  which  a  gen- 
eration since  then  has  altered.  So  some 
political  adjustment  was  inevitable  in 
Lebanon. 

It  then  became  caught  up  in  the  politics 
of  the  area,  where  various  of  the  factions 
were  supported  by  various  of  the  Arab  coun- 
tries and  by  some  other  outside  countries, 
with  the  result  that  Lebanon  became  a 
microcosm  of  the  larger  countries. 

The  United  States  has  constantly  warned 
against  military  actions  in  Lebanon.  The 
United  States  believes  in  the  sovereignty  and 
independence  and  territorial  integrity  of 
Lebanon  and  in  a  political  solution  which  per- 
mits both  the  Christian  and  the  Moslem 
communities  to  coexist  side  by  side. 


The  missing  ingredient  has  been  how  an 
outside  force  could  be  introduced,  or  how  an 
inside  force  could  be  generated,  that  would 
bring  about  the  authority  of  the  central 
government. 

We  favor  a  roundtable  discussion  among 
all  of  the  parties.  And  a  new  special  repre- 
sentative of  the  President,  who  went  there 
last  week,  is  encouraging  all  the  parties  in 
that  direction. 

Of  course  the  primary  solution  has  to  be 
found  among  the  concerned  Arab  states  and 
cannot  be  imposed  by  the  United  States.  But 
I  am  hopeful  that  a  solution  will  be  found. 

With  respect  to  the  Middle  East  in  gen- 
eral, I  believe  that  significant  progress  has 
been  made  toward  a  settlement  in  the  Middle 
East.  I  believe  that  conditions  are  being  cre- 
ated in  which  further  progress  can  be  made, 
and  I  would  stress  that  a  permanent  peace 
in  the  Middle  East  is  one  of  the  primary  ob- 
jectives of  American  foreign  policy — and  one 
of  the  goals  which  must  be  approached  on  a 
nonpartisan  basis  in  the  interest  of  all 
concerned. 


President  Ford  Expresses  Satisfaction 
at  Rescue  of  Fiijacking  Victims 

Following  is  the  text  of  a  letter  sent  on 
Jidy  U  by  President  Ford  to  Prime  Minister 
Yitzhak  Rabin  of  Israel. 

White    House    press    release    (Philadelphia,    Pa.)    dated   July   4 

July  4, 1976. 

Dear  Mr.  Prime  Minister:  The  Ameri- 
can people  join  me  in  expressing  our  great 
satisfaction  that  the  passengers  of  the  Air 
France  flight  seized  earlier  this  week  have 
been  saved  and  a  senseless  act  of  terrorism 
thwarted. 

Sincerely, 

Gerald  R.  Ford. 


160 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


President  Ford's  News  Conference 
of  July  9 

Folloiving  are  excerpts  relating  to  foreign 
policy  from  the  transcript  of  a  news  confer- 
ence held  bij  President  Ford  at  the  White 
House  on  July  5.' 


to  free  the  hostages,  and  at  the  same  time 
we  reiterated  our  firm  opposition  to  interna- 
tional terrorism. 

Q.  Did  we  knoiv  in  advance  of  that  Israeli 
raid? 

President  Ford:  We  did  not. 


Q.  Mr.  President,  Governor  Reagan  made 
the  statement  when  apprised  of  the  Israeli 
rescue  raid  in  Uganda,  "This  is  what  Ameri- 
cans used  to  do."  And  one  of  the  hostages, 
who  is  an  American  citizen,  said  America 
didn't  "give  a  damn  about  us,  Israel  freed 
us."  I  ivonder,  ivhat  is  your  reaction? 

Presidoit  Ford:  I  can  assure  you  that  this 
Administration  has  taken  a  firm  action  wher- 
ever we  have  been  confronted  with  any  ille- 
gal international  action.  The  best  illustration 
of  course  is  what  we  did  in  1975  in  the  Maya- 
guez  incident.  I  think  that  was  a  clear  warn- 
ing to  any  nation  that  violates  international 
law  that  this  Administration  will  act  swiftly 
and  firmly  and,  I  think,  successfully. 

Q.  If  I  could  follow  that  up,  the  State  De- 
partment said — ivhe7i  asked,  "What  is  the 
United  States  doing?" — said  that  they  had 
contacted  numerous  governments,  as  well  as 
the  International  Red  Cross.  What  else  did 
ive  do  to  compare  with  the  Israeli  action? 

President  Ford:  We  took  whatever  action 
we  felt  was  appropriate  at  that  time  to  indi- 
cate our  strong  feeling  against  international 
terrorism,  and  we  asked  for  the  full  coopera- 
tion of  all  governments  to  make  certain  that 
the  hostages  were  freed. 

And  as  you  know,  we  indicated  to  Prime 
Minister  Rabin  that  we  were  gratified  that 
the  Israelis  had  taken  the  very  specific  action 


'  For  the  complete  transcript,  see  Weekly  Com- 
pilation of  Presidential  Documents  dated  July  12, 
1976,  p.  1144. 


Q.  Mr.  President,  when  you  met  tvith  the 
Saudi  official  [Prince  Ahdallah  bin  Abd  al- 
Aziz  Al-Sa'ud,  Second  Deputy  Prime  Min- 
ister} this  morning,  did  he  indicate  to  yon 
that  oil  prices  will  be  going  up  again  at  the 
end  of  the  year,  or  didn't  you  discuss  this  at 
all? 

President  Ford:  There  was  no  discussion 
of  the  prospect  of  any  oil  price  increase.  1 
expressed  my  appreciation  for  the  action  by 
OPEC  [Organization  of  Petroleum  Exporting 
Countries]  in  not  increasing  oil  prices  in 
their  recent  meeting.  I  pointed  out  I  thought 
that  was  in  the  best  interests  of  the  free 
world  and  that  it  would  be  beneficial  not  only 
to  the  oil  consumers  but  the  oil  producers  in 
the  long  run. 


Q.  Mr.  President,  what  would  you  like  for 
the  International  Olympic  Committee  to  do  to 
resolve  the  dispute  between  Canada  and 
Taiwan? 

President  Ford:  I  think  it's  tragic  that 
international  politics  and  foreign  policy  get 
involved  in  international  sport  competition.  I 
strongly  feel  that  the  Olympics  are  a  healthy 
thing  for  the  world  as  a  whole.  Competition 
between  athletes  from  all  countries  ought  to 
be  stimulated  rather  than  curtailed.  And  so 
I  hope  and  trust  that  the  diplomatic  problems 
or  the  international  foreign  policy  problems 
can  be  resolved  so  that  this  healthy  compe- 
tition can  go  on. 

Q.  Have  you  done  anything  about  it?  Have 
you  contacted  the  Canadian  Government? 


August  2,  1976 


161 


President  Ford:  I  am  being  kept  abreast 
of  it,  but  this  is  a  decision  that  gets  involved 
in  Canadian  Government  decisions  on  the  one 
hand  and  the  International  Olympic  Commit- 
tee on  the  other.  I  have  expressed  myself 
very  clearly  that  we  hope  they  will  continue 
as  broadly  based  as  possible. 

Q.  Mr.  President,  do  you  believe  that  the 
Israeli  violation  of  Uganda  national  sover- 
eignty tvas  justified? 

President  Ford:  The  Department  of  State 
and  our  representatives  to  the  United  Na- 
tions will  set  forth  our  position  very  clearly 
in  the  debate  that  I  think  begins  today,  on 
one  or  more  resolutions  before  the  Security 
Council.  I  am  told  that  our  position  is  a  firm 
one,  on  good  legal  grounds,  and  I  will  wait 
and  let  that  be  expressed  by  them  during  the 
debate. 


Q.  Mr.  President,  could  we  talk  about  the 
Alaska  pipeline  another  time?  Yoti  are  from 
the  Middle  West,  and  when  the  pipeline  act 
ivas  passed  in  Congress — 

President  Ford:  I  voted  for  it. 

Q.  Okay.  There  ivas  quite  a  debate,  though, 
about  building  a  trans-Canada  pipeline  that 
tvould  deliver  oil  to  the  Middle  West  where 
it  is  needed.  There  is  still  talk  about  that 
and,  in  fact,  there  is  some  legislation.  Woidd 
you  support  legislation  to  build  a  pipeline 
from  Valdez  across  Canada  to  the  Middle 
West? 

President  Ford:  I  don't  believe  that  is  an 
active  possibility.  I  think  you  are  referring  to 
the  possibility  of  a  gas  pipeline — 

Q.  They  were  going  to  double-truck  it,  ap- 
parently. 

President  Ford:  — from  northern  Canada 
or  northern  Alaska  to  the  Middle  West  as 
one  of  several  alternatives.  There  are  other 
alternatives  that  would  involve  bringing  the 
gas  down  to  the  Gulf  of  Alaska. 


That  matter  is  before  the  Federal  Power 
Commission  at  the  present  time.  It  is  also 
before — in  one  way  or  another — before  the 
comparable  agency  in  the  Canadian  Govern- 
ment. 

There  is  legislation  that  is  being  spon- 
sored which  I  think  is  good  legislation,  that 
would  expedite  the  determination  as  to  which 
route  is  the  preferable  one.  It  would  be  legis- 
lation much  like  that  which  was  approved  for 
the  delivei-y  of  Alaskan  oil. 

If  that  gas  is  badly  needed  in  the  United 
States — and  I  am  not  saying  on  the  west 
coast  or  the  Middle  West — but  I  think  a  de- 
cision has  to  be  expedited.  And  so  I  would 
favor  such  legislation  which  would  expedite 
the  determination  by  the  proper  authorities 
as  to  which  route  was  the  better  of  the  two 
or  which  is  the  best,  if  there  are  more  than 
two. 

Q.  Mr.  President,  since  this  is  an  election 
year,  I  wonder  if  you  think  there  is  not  much 
chance  of  any  startling  developments  in  the 
area  of  foreign  affairs,  such  as  a  SALT 
[Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks]  agree- 
ment or  MBFR  [mutual  and  balanced  force 
reductions'],  or  in  any  other  area?  Do  you 
think  it  is  very  difficult  to  conduct  negotia- 
tions at  a  time  ivhen,  frankly,  the  occupancy 
of  the  White  House  is  going  to  be  uncertain 
for  next  year?  Are  we  sort  of  at  a  standstill 
for  the  rest  of  the  year  in  foreign  affairs? 

President  Ford:  I  have  said  specifically,  as 
far  as  SALT  is  concerned,  if  we  can  get  a 
good  agreement  I  will  make  that  agreement 
regardless  of  any  political  consequences.  We 
are  in  the  process  of  thoroughly  analyzing 
our  last  proposal,  the  Soviet  Union's  reac- 
tion or  last  proposal.  And  if  we  can  move  for- 
ward on  a  good  SALT  agreement,  I  certainly 
will  push  for  it,  because  I  think  it  is  in  the 
national  interest  and  in  the  best  interest  of 
mankind  as  a  whole.  So  politics  won't  enter 
into  any  decision  as  far  as  SALT  is  con- 
cerned. I  know  of  no  other  major  areas  that 
would  have  any  political  consideration  as  far 
as  foreign  policy. 


162 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Q.  Hoiv  about  the  SALT  agreement? 

President  Ford:  I  intend  to  push  for  it.  I 
am  not  passing  judgment  as  to  whether  it 
will  come  or  won't  come,  but  we  are  working 
on  it,  and  I  intend  to  push  it.  Whether 
we  can  achieve  an  agreement  or  not  is  un- 
certain. But  it  is  in  the  best  interest  of  the 
United  States  and  mankind  as  a  whole  if  we 
can  get  the  right  agreement.  And  I  will  do 
it  regardless  of  the  political  atmosphere  that 
may  prevail  here  because  of  our  election. 


Statement  of  July  10 

White   House   press  release    (Newport.   R.I.)    ilateil   July    lu 

The  President  strongly  condemns  the  un- 
justified and  unwarranted  execution  of 
Daniel  Gearhart  by  the  Government  of  An- 
gola. This  execution,  carried  out  in  defiance 
of  worldwide  pleas  for  a  humane  commuta- 
tion of  Mr.  Gearhart's  sentence,  will  make 
even  more  difficult  any  steps  toward  the  nor- 
malization of  relations  between  Angola  and 
the  United  States. 

The  President  has  expressed  his  sincerest 
condolences  to  Mr.  Gearhart's  family. 


Execution  of  Daniel  Gearhart 
in  Angola 

FoUo^ving  are  statements  by  Ronald  H. 
Nessen,  Press  Secretary  to  President  Ford, 
issued  on  July  9  and  10  and  a  statement  by 
Secretary  Kissinger  issued  on  July  10. 


STATEMENTS  BY  WHITE  HOUSE 
PRESS  SECRETARY 

Statement  of  July  9 

white   House  press   release  dated  July    9 

The  President  was  shocked  to  learn  that 
Angolan  President  Neto  has  refused  to  com- 
mute the  death  sentence  of  Daniel  Gearhart 
for  alleged  mercenary  activity  in  Angola. 
The  death  sentence  is  unjustified  by  the  facts 
presented  at  Mr.  Gearhart's  trial  and  unwar- 
ranted by  international  law.  We  will  continue 
to  use  every  available  means  in  urging  Presi- 
dent Neto  to  reconsider  his  decision  and  to 
commute  Mr.  Gearhart's  sentence  as  an  act  of 
justice  and  humanity. 

The  President  hopes  that  President  Neto 
would  reconsider  in  a  humanitarian  spirit 
the  death  sentences  of  the  others  which  were 
reconfirmed  today. 


STATEMENT  BY  SECRETARY  KISSINGER,  JULY  10 

I  have  learned  with  a  deep  sense  of  shock 
that  the  Angolan  authorities  have  executed 
Daniel  Gearhart  despite  the  numerous  pleas 
for  clemency  in  his  case  that  it  had  received 
from  the  United  States,  other  governments, 
international  organizations,  and  individuals. 

As  I  said  in  my  press  conference  this 
morning,  there  is  absolutely  no  basis  in  na- 
tional or  international  law  for  the  action  now 
taken  by  the  Angolan  authorities.  The  "law" 
under  which  Mr.  Gearhart  was  executed  was 
nothing  more  than  an  internal  ordinance  of 
the  MPLA  [Popular  Movement  for  the  Liber- 
ation of  Angola]  issued  in  1966,  when  the 
MPLA  was  only  one  of  many  guerrilla 
groups  operating  in  Angola.  Furthermore,  no 
evidence  whatsoever  was  produced  during 
the  trial  of  Mr.  Gearhart  in  Luanda  that  he 
had  even  fired  a  shot  during  the  few  days  he 
was  in  Angola  before  his  capture. 

The  decision  by  President  Neto  to  ignore 
both  the  law  and  the  facts  can  only  be  re- 
garded by  the  United  States  as  a  deliberately 
hostile  act  toward  this  country  and  its  peo- 
ple. As  such,  it  cannot  help  but  affect  ad- 
versely the  development  of  relations  between 
the  United  States  and  Angola. 

Mrs.  Gearhart  and  her  family  have  my 
deepest  condolences  on  the  tragic  death  of 
her  husband. 


August  2,  1976 


163 


Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Conference  of  July  10 


Press   release  345  dated  July   10 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  good  morning. 

Immediatehj  after  the  Israeli  raid  on  En- 
tebbe Airport,  President  Ford  sent  a  mes- 
sage to  Prime  Minister  Rabin  expressing 
U.S.  gratification  over  the  rescue  of  the 
hostages.  Since  then,  the  State  Department 
seems  to  have  had  second  thoughts  about  the 
legality  of  such  operations.  Can  you  explain 
this  apparent  contradiction  in  U.S.  policy? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  There  is  no  contra- 
diction in  U.S.  policy.  The  President  ex- 
pressed gratification  about  the  rescue  of  the 
hostages.  The  United  States  is  going  to  state 
in  detail  its  position  with  respect  to  the 
legality  and  the  international  implications  of 
this  operation  when  Ambassador  Scranton 
speaks  at  the  United  Nations — I  believe  it  is 
in  all  likelihood  going  to  be  on  Monday. 

I  stated  our  view  on  Tuesday  in  Chicago, 
in  which  I  pointed  out  that  it  is  of  course  an 
unprecedented  act  for  a  nation  to  rescue 
hostages  at  the  airport  of  another.  It  is  also 
totally  unprecedented  to  deal  with  the  issue 
of  terrorism  that  we  now  find  in  the  world. 

We  have  been  telling  nations  for  years 
that  terrorism  must  be  ended ;  and  when 
innocent  people  are  being  held  under  condi- 
tions in  which  the  government  that  controls 
them  either  is  unable  or  unwilling  to  co- 
operate against  the  terrorists,  you  have  a 
situation  for  which  there  is  no  precedent  in 
international  law  and  in  which  various  con- 
.siderations  must  be  balanced.  That  has  been 
our  position  consistently,  and  there  are  no 
second  thoughts. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you  have  linked  the — 
that  is,  the  resolution  of  the  Lebanese  con- 
flict with  the  general  Middle  East  settlement. 
There  are  reports  noiv  that  U.S.  officials  are 


depressed,  or  despair  of  ever  finding  a  Leba- 
nese settlement.  Does  that  mea7i  a  Middle 
East  settlement  is  out  of  the  picture? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  the  depressed 
U.S.  officials  aren't  talking  to  me,  probably 
because  they  would  feel  more  depressed  if 
they  did. 

I  have  pointed  out  that  one  of  the  ele- 
ments in  a  Middle  East  settlement  is  a 
degree  of  unity  among  the  Arab  nations.  The 
conflict  in  Lebanon,  in  which  there  is  dis- 
agreement among  several  of  the  key  Arab 
countries,  has  deflected  attention  and  con- 
cern away  from  the  overall  Middle  East 
settlement. 

We  strongly  support  a  conference  in  which 
all  the  parties  in  Lebanon  get  together  and 
attempt  to  settle  their  affairs. 

We  are  not  depressed  about  the  prospects. 
We  believe  that  there  are  prospects  for  a 
solution — given  some  good  will  and  given, 
above  all,  the  increasing  realization  that  none 
of  the  parties  can  impose  a  solution  by 
force. 

So  we  believe  that  there  are  possibilities 
of  a  Lebanese  settlement,  and  we  are  con- 
vinced that  there  are  prospects  for  a  Middle 
East  settlement,  and  we  will  be  encouraging 
both  of  these. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you  have  been  talking 
about  the  need  for  a  new  consensus  in  Amer- 
ican foreign  policy.  In  line  rvith  that,  do  you 
think  it  would  be  a  good  idea  if,  after  the 
conventions.  President  Ford,  tvhether  he  is 
nominated  or  yiot,  conferred  with  Jimmy 
Carter,  presuming  he  will  be  nominated,  and 
Mr.  Reagan,  if  he  is  nominated,  or  just  him- 
self and  Mr.  Carter,  to  discuss  how  Ameri- 
can foreign  policy  could  proceed  in  the  in- 
terim months? 


164 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


In  other  tvords,  it  has  been  said  that  be- 
cause of  the  elections,  it  is  difficult  to  get 
progress  on  any  substantive  fields  in  foreign 
police/.  But  if  it  ivas  possible  to  ivork  out 
some — at  least  implicit — agreements,  ivould 
that  be  possible? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  I  have  been 
calling  attention  to  the  importance  of  a 
national  foreign  policy  ever  since  my  con- 
firmation hearings.  This  is  not  a  new  theme 
for  me. 

I  have  always  believed  that  the  foreign 
policy  of  the  United  States  must  reflect  per- 
manent interests  and  permanent  values — 
those  values  and  interests  cannot  change  at 
regular  intervals.  Of  course  there  can  be 
tactical  disagreements,  but  at  some  point 
the  lines  of  American  foreign  policy  ought 
to  be  set  for  a  considerable  period  of  time. 

This  has  been  my  conviction,  which  I  have 
expressed  in  every  speech  for  over  three 
years. 

With  respect  to  the  particular  solution  that 
you  put  forward,  I  think  this  is  a  decision 
that  has  to  be  made  after  the  nominations 
of  both  parties  have  been  made,  and  it  in- 
volves many  considerations. 

I  do  not  believe  that  the  foreign  policy  is 
being  slowed  down. 

I  also  believe  that  the  main  lines  of  some 
of  the  themes  that  I  have  heard  from  the 
candidates  are  compatible  enough  to  permit 
progress  to  be  made. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you — 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  with  respect  to  the  style 
of  the  conduct  of  foreign  policy,  do  you  think 
it  ivould  be  a  good  idea,  then,  after  the  elec- 
tion, to  end  your  "Lone  Ranges'"  style  of 
diplomacy  ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  of  course,  I 
am  very  flattered  to  be  constantly  put  on 
horses  by  various  people.  It  gives  me  great 
prestige  with  my  children,  who  have  never 
seen  me  on  one.  [Laughter.] 

So,  I  think  we  will  continue  foreign  policy 
the  way  it  has  been  conducted. 


Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  rvhat  are  the  prospects 
for  preserving  the  life  of  Daniel  Gearhart, 
in  your  estimation,  and  how  far  is  the  United 
States  xvilling  to  go  to  accomplish  this? 

American  Under  Death  Sentence  in  Angola 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  United  States 
has  made  enormous  efforts.  We  have  ap- 
pealed to  over  10  countries.  There  has  been 
a  direct  appeal  to  President  Neto.  There  has 
been  an  appeal  through  international  organi- 
zations like  the  International  Red  Cross. 

If  one  considers  that  Mr.  Gearhart  is  being 
tried  under  a  law — under  a  regulation  that 
was  promulgated  in  1966,  when  the  MPLA 
[Popular  Movement  for  the  Liberation  of 
Angola]  was  one  of  many  resistance  move- 
ments to  the  Portuguese,  one  can  only  feel 
that  the  legal  basis  for  this  action  is  prob- 
lematical. 

We  hope  that  the  decision  that  was  an- 
nounced yesterday  is  not  final,  and  we  ai-e 
appealing  it  on  humanitarian  grounds. 

We  cannot  permit  our  basic  foreign  policy 
to  be  dictated  by  our  concern  for  the  lives  of 
Americans — of  individual  Americans — that 
may  be  held  prisoner,  because  this  would  en- 
courage people  to  take  Americans  prisoners 
all  over  the  world.  But  we  believe,  on  hu- 
manitarian grounds,  there  is  a  strong  case 
for  clemency,  and  we  hope  that  President 
Neto,  on  reconsideration,  will  consider  it  in 
this  light  and  wifl  also  consider  the  impact 
on  American  opinion  if  he  goes  through  with 
his  intention. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you  have  been  quoted  as 
saying  that  you  could  live  with  the  foreign 
policy  outlined  by  Governor  Carter.  Do  you, 
in  fact,  support  the  basic  outline  of  the  for- 
eign policy  as  he  has  laid  it  doivn,  or  do  you 
find  objection  to  certain  points?  And  if  so, 
ivhich  ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  think  this  issue  is 
stated  a  little  bit  upside  down. 

We  have  been  talking  about  foreign  policy 
a  lot  longer  than   Governor  Carter,  and  if 


August  2,  1976 


165 


there  is  agreement  by  him  with  several  of 
the  things  that  have  been  put  forward  by 
this  Administration,  we  of  course  welcome 
support  wherever  we  can  find  it. 

There  have  been  some  indications,  some 
hints  in  the  speeches  that  have  not  been 
fully  elaborated,  with  which  we  would  dis- 
agree, but  I  would  prefer  to  wait  until  they 
are  elaborated  moi'e  before  commenting  on 
them. 

But  the  main  outlines  that  I  have  found 
in  the  speeches  have  been  fairly  consistent 
with  the  outlines  of  the  foreign  policy  that 
we  have  put  forward  previously. 

Resolution  on  Terrorism 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  there  was  apparently 
some  thought  in  the  State  Department  last 
week  that  the  United  States  should  seize  the 
initiative  in  the  U.N.  Security  Council  de- 
bate that  is  going  on  and  perhaps  iyitroduce 
a  resolution  condemning  terrorism  and  ask- 
ing for  cooperation  from  other  countries. 

In  vieiv  of  the  legal  debate  over  the  Is- 
raeli actions,  has  that  initiative  noiv  been 
dropped? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  You  know,  I  am  not 
aware  of  a  legal  debate  over  the  Israeli 
action  that  has  been  going  on  here. 

Our  position  with  respect  to  the  Israeli 
action  has  been  consistent  from  the  first 
day.  We  have  maintained  it  since  then,  and 
there  have  been  no  second  thoughts  about 
this. 

We  are  at  this  moment  discussing  with 
other  countries  a  resolution  which  we  hope 
to  introduce,  together  with  other  countries, 
dealing  with  the  subject  of  terrorism,  and 
we  have  not  yet  achieved  a  final  consensus 
with  all  of  the  other  countries.  But  when 
we  do,  we  will  put  it  forward. 

If  we  cannot  achieve  a  consensus,  we  will 
put  it  forward  on  our  own. 

We  believe  that  the  issue  of  terrorism  is 
one  that  the  international  community  must 
address.  It  is  intolerable  that  innocent  peo- 
ple are  being  used  as  hostages  for  the  po- 


litical aims  of  particular  groups.  It  is  a  viola- 
tion of  the  Geneva  Convention '  and  of  all 
basic  principles  of  humanity,  and  the  United 
States  will  strongly  oppose  it  and  will  par- 
ticipate in  nothing  that  encourages  it. 


Communist  Conference  in  East  Berlin 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  are  you — is  your  con- 
cern about  the  participation  of  Communists 
in  the  Italian  Government  m  any  ivay  re- 
lieved by  the  recent  elections  and/or  by  the 
recent  events  at  the  Communist  Party  meet- 
ing in  East  Berlin,  which  turned  to  a  rati- 
fication of  national  communism,  and  ivould 
you  appraise  that  East  Berlin  meeting? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  outcome  of  the 
Italian  election  has  tended  to  polarize  Ital- 
ian political  life  between  the  Christian  Demo- 
crats and  the  Communists.  The  Christian 
Democrats  did  better  than  had  been  expected 
by  some.  The  Communists  did  quite  well. 

It  is  important  to  remember  that  the 
non-Communist  vote  was  more  than  two- 
thirds  of  the  total  vote.  So  one  cannot,  in 
any  sense,  speak  of  a  mandate  for  the  Com- 
munists. The  Communists  had  34  percent  of 
the  vote;  66  percent  was  non-Communist. 

Even  if  you  exclude  the  right-wing  non- 
democratic  parties,  you  would  still  have  to 
say  that  the  democratic  parties  had  over  56 
percent  of  the  vote  in  the  Italian  Parliament. 
So  the  technical  possibility  for  constituting 
a  government  without  the  participation  of 
the  Communists  exists. 

Our  concern  about  Communist  participa- 
tion has  been  stated,  and  we  have  not 
changed  our  view  with  respect  to  that  in 
any  sense. 

With  respect  to  the  conference  in  East 
Berlin,  there  are  a  number  of  things  to  keep 
in  mind. 

First,  the  issue  concerned  the  internal  or- 
ganization of  the  Communist  movement.  It 


'  The  Secretary  meant  to  refer  to  the  Hague  Con- 
vention of  1970  which  deals  with  the  unlawful  seiz- 
ure of  aircraft.   [Footnote  in  transcript.] 


166 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


did  not  concern  the  policies  of  the  individual 
Communist  Parties. 

Second,  our  concern  is  not  only  whether 
the  parties  are  controlled  from  Moscow,  but 
also  that  they  are  Communist  and  that  their 
philosophy  and  their  basic  approach  is  likely 
to  have  long-term  consequences  for  the 
Western  alliance  which  we  consider  un- 
healthy for  the  Western  alliance. 

Third,  this  is  not  the  first  time  in  history 
that  there  have  been  statements  about 
"different  roads  toward  Communism."  And  I 
would  urge  all  of  you  to  read  statements 
that  were  made  between  1945  and  1948  by 
the  leaders  of  the  Communist  Parties  of 
Eastern  Europe,  by  Mr.  Gottwald,  by  Mr. 
Gomulka,  by  Mr.  Dimitrov — we  have  a  com- 
pilation of  those  which  we  can  make  avail- 
able next  week — in  which,  in  effect,  at  that 
time  they  set  their  different  roads  toward 
communism:  We  have  chosen  in  Eastern 
Europe  the  democratic  road;  the  revolu- 
tionary means  or  the  dictatorship  of  the 
proletariat  is  not  the  inevitable  result. 

Now,  I  am  not  saying  necessarily  that  the 
views  that  are  expressed  now  are  insincere. 
All  I  am  saying  is  that  it  is  dangerous  to 
judge  the  long-term  orientation  of  these 
parties  by  what  is  said  when  their  interests, 
their  electoral  interests  are  so  identical  with 
what  they  are  now  saying.  And  I  do  point 
out  that  this  is  not  the  first  time  that  this 
has  happened. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  I  would  like  to  follow 
that  up  with  a  question.  In  1968  your  prede- 
cessor Mr.  Dean  Rusk  described  a  doctrine 
that  has  been  put  forth  in  the  Soviet  Union 
as  the  Brezhnev  doctrine  of  limited  sover- 
eignty. Do  you  think  that  doctrine  still  exists, 
folloiving  the  East  Berlin  conference? 

Secretary  Kissiyiger:  I  do  not  think  one 
can  judge  from  the  East  Berlin  conference 
whether  or  not  the  doctrine  still  exists.  And 
if  one  judges  by  the  historical  record,  one 
has  to  say  that  historically  any  attempt  by 
Communist  Parties  in  Eastern  Europe  to 
establish  independent  positions  has  been 
dealt  with,  if  necessary,  by  military  force. 


August  2,  1976 


I  would  not  make  a  final  judgment  on  the 
basis  of  the  East  Berlin  conference  whether 
the  Brezhnev  doctrine  still  exists.  We,  of 
course,  hope  it  does  not.  And  if  it  does  not, 
that  would  mark  a  significant  change.  But  I 
think  it  is  totally  premature  to  draw  the 
conclusions  that  I  have  seen  in  some  of  the 
speculations. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  when  the  President  was 
asked  yesterday  about  the  comment  of  one 
of  the  American  hostages  in  Uganda  that, 
quote,  "America  didn't  give  a  damn  about 
us,  but  Israel  freed  us,"  Mr.  Ford  replied  by 
asking  us  to  remember  his  Administration's 
swift  and  decisive  action  ivith  regard  to  the 
Mayaguez,  and  tvithin  hours,  on  another  is- 
sue, the  President  expressed  shock  about 
what  he  termed  the  unjustified  death  sen- 
tence of  Daniel  Gearhart. 

My  question  is,  since  Ambassador  Scran- 
ton  has  apparently  sanctioned  black  national- 
ist intrusion  into  Rhodesia,  why  can't  this 
Administration  consider  some  sort  of  Maya- 
guez or  Israeli  action  to  save  Gearhart  from 
being  what  the  President  terms  "unjustifi- 
ably executed"? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Each  of  these  circum- 
stances has  to  be  looked  at  in  the  condi- 
tions that  prevail  and  in  relation  to  what  is 
physically    possible. 

We  are  not  elaborating  a  doctrine  by 
which  a  nation,  whenever  it  has  any  griev- 
ance against  another  nation,  can  enforce  it 
by  the  use  of  military  power. 

With  respect  to  Ambassador  Scranton, 
our  position  is  that  we  are  attempting  to 
settle  the  conflict  in  southern  Africa  by 
peaceful  means.  All  of  our  efforts  have  been 
designed  to  bring  an  end  to  the  violence  that 
had  already  started  before  we  enunciated 
our  policy.  We  have  urged  all  of  the  parties 
in  southern  Africa  to  resort  to  negotiations. 

The  efforts  we  are  now  undertaking  in  our 
conversations  with  the  South  African  Prime 
Minister,  in  the  mission  that  Ambassador 
Schaufele  [William  E.  Schaufele,  Assistant 
Secretary  for  African  Affairs]  is  now  under- 
taking in  black  Africa,  are  designed  not  to 


167 


encourage  violence.  Quite  the  opposite.  They 
are  designed  to  bring  an  end  to  violence  and 
to  permit  the  communities  in  southern  Africa 
to  coexist  under  conditions  of  justice  and 
equality. 

Radiation  at  U.S.  Embassy  at  Moscow 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  now  that  the  Depart- 
ment has  broken  its  silence  with  respect  to 
the  radiation  problem  at  the  U.S.  Embassy 
in  Moscow,  could  you  please  clarify  some  of 
the  aspects  of  this  which  have  caused  a  lot 
of  concern  among  Foreign  Service  personnel 
and  the  public? 

First,  why  did  the  United  States  wait  for 
15  years  before  making  a  concerted  effort  to 
stop  the  radiation  at  the  U.S.  Embassy  in 
Moscoic?  Second,  is  the  U.S.  timidity  and 
long  silence  related  to  American  electronic 
eavesdropping  from  the  roof  of  that  Em- 
bassy, and  if  so,  why  doesn't  it  stop,  since 
the  Russians  already  obviou-tly  knou-  about 
it? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  would  not  accept 
your  characterization  of  "American  timid- 
ity" with  respect  to  this  signal.  There  were 
many  complicated  issues  involved,  and  the 
intensity  of  the  signal  did  not  reach  propor- 
tions that  required  concentrated  action  until 
the  second  half  of  last  year. 

At  that  point  the  United  States — at  all 
times,  the  intensity  of  the  signal  was  well 
below  American  safety  standards. 

It  is  now  an  infinitesimal  proportion  of 
American  safety  standards  and  well  below 
levels  that  exist  in  many  American  buildings 
from  existing  American  electronic  equip- 
ment. 

Therefore,  there  is  no  present  danger. 
The  level  has  been  significantly  reduced.  It 
has  been  reduced  to  one  ten-thousandth  of 
the  American  safety  standard,  and  it  was 
never  more  than  a  fraction  of  the  American 
safety   standard. 

But,  ])e  that  as  it  may,  there  are  many 
factors  involved  in  the  American  response. 
And  even  if  some  things  are  known,  there 
is  not  always  the  possibility  to  do  something 
about  them,  even  when  they  are  known. 


Q.  May  I  follow  that  up  by  asking  if  there 
are  no  grounds  for  concern,  or  very  little,  as 
the  Department  said  in  its  statement  and  as 
you  suggest,  why  are  we  criticizing  the  Rus- 
sians for  continuing  this,  "without  regard 
for  the  ivorking  life  of  Americans  in  Mos- 
coiv"? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Because  we  do  not 
believe  that  a  signal  of  whatever  intensity 
aimed  at  an  American  installation  is  an  ap- 
pi'opriate  procedure.  But  we  have  reduced 
the  intensity  of  the  signal,  partly  through 
unilateral  action  and  partly  through  negotia- 
tion, to  an  infinitesimal  part  of  the  American 
safety  standard,  and  a  very  small  fraction  of 
the  Soviet  safety  standard. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  why  have  the  Soviets 
declined,  or  what  have  they  [inaudiblel  given 
you  as  a  reason  for  not  stopping  the  signal? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  As  I  have  pointed 
out,  there  are  many  complicated  issues  in- 
volved with  respect  to  the  signal  and  also 
with  respect  to  our  own  counteractions  which 
have  been  very  carefully  considered. 

Timidity  or  concern  about  our  overall 
relations  with  the  Soviet  Union  has  not  been 
a  factor  in  these,  but  we  have  had  to  balance 
various  advantages  and  disadvantages  for 
the  United  States,  and  we  have  of  course 
had  to  pay  primary  attention  to  the  health 
of  our  employees. 

There  has  been  a  response  in  a  very  sub- 
stantial reduction  in  the  intensity  of  the 
signal. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  what  do  you  knoiv  about 
the  fate  of  Dora  Bloch,  the  ivoman  in  the 
Kenya — in  the  Uganda  hospital? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  We  have  really  no 
information  beyond  what  has  been  printed 
in  the  newspapers.  The  last  we  know  is  that 
she  was  taken  from  the  hospital  in  which 
she  was  held  by  two  Ugandan  plainclothes- 
men,  and  we  have  had  no  account  of  her 
whereabouts  since  then. 

The  statement  that  was  made  on  the 
Ugandan  radio  is  obviously  untrue. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  the  House  Select  Com- 
mittee on  Intelligence  has  charged  that  you 


168 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


and  Deputy  Under  Secretary  for  Manage- 
ment Eagleburger  violated  Federal  laiv  by 
interfering  ivith  the  civil  right  of  a  State 
Department  officer  by  the  name  of  Thomas 
Boyatt  to  transmit  information  to  that  com- 
mittee. What  ivas  your  response  to  those 
charges? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  am  not  familiar 
with  these  charges.  Are  you  talking  about 
the  report  that  was  not  published? 

Q.  That  is  correct.  It  was  published;  it 
just  ivasn't  published  by  the  Congress.  It 
was  published  before  [sic]  the  House  Select 
Committee  on  Intelligence. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  am  not  familiar 
with  the  charge  that  we  interfered  with 
the  right  of — what  is  the  name  of  this — ? 

Q.  Boyatt. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Oh,  Thomas  Boyatt. 
Well,  we  went  through  this  at  great  length. 
The  Department  took  the  position  that  rec- 
ommendations by  junior  officials  to  their 
seniors  should  not  be  submitted  to  congres- 
sional committees,  because  it  would  lead  to 
a  situation  in  which  every  official  would  be 
afraid  to  make  his  recommendations  for  fear 
that  either  then  or  later  he  would  be  haled 
before  a  congressional  committee  to  account 
for  his   recommendations. 

We  offered  to  make  available  any  policy- 
making official,  any  official  whose  appoint- 
ment had  been  confirmed  by  the  Congress, 
and  let  him  testify  with  respect  to  this  par- 
ticular— to  any  policy  matter,  and  with  re- 
spect to  any  recommendation  that  had  been 
made  to  him. 

In  addition,  we  offered  to  the  committee, 
and  indeed  the  committee  accepted,  that  we 
would  make  a  compilation  of  all  the  recom- 
mendations that  had  been  made  on  the  sub- 
ject, including  Mr.  Boyatt's  recommenda- 
tion, without  identifying  them  by  name,  so 
that  the  committee  would  have  before  it  all 
the  recommendations  that  we  had  before  us, 
without,  however,  the  names  of  the  people 
who  had  made  the  recommendations. 


We  made  such  a  compilation.  We  sub- 
mitted it  with  the  approval  of  the  committee 
that  voted,  I  think,  nine  to  five  in  favor  of 
this.  Therefore  the  committee  had  before  it 
all  the  recommendations  that  had  been  made 
to  us. 

But,  for  the  protection  of  the  integrity  of 
the  Foreign  Service,  we  do  not  believe  that 
middle-level  officials  should  be  compelled  to 
be  accountable  for  their  recommendations. 
The  responsibility  for  the  recommendations, 
and  for  the  actions  that  are  taken,  is,  in  the 
first  instance,  that  of  the  Secretary  of 
State  and,  secondly,  those  other  senior  offi- 
cials who  have  a  congressional  appointment. 

Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks 

Q.  The  Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks 
have  been  a  cornerstone  of  your  and  the 
President's  policy.  A  number  of  months  have 
passed  now  with  no  apparent  sign  of  prog- 
ress. Could  you  give  us  some  indication  of 
where  we  are  on  this  matter? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  Strategic  Arms 
Limitation  Talks  have  settled  a  large  per- 
centage of  the  outstanding  problems.  There 
are  two  major  issues  that  remain — whether 
"Backfires"  should  be  counted  in  the  total 
and  how  cruise  missiles  should  be  either 
counted  or  limited. 

On  these  two  issues,  there  has  not  been  a 
final  resolution.  We  have  put  forward  an 
approach.  The  Soviet  Union  has  put  forward 
a  different  approach,  and  it  has,  up  to  now, 
not  been  possible  to  settle,  to  reconcile,  those 
two   approaches. 

On  the  other  hand,  in  Geneva,  the  teams 
have  continued  to  negotiate  on  the  very 
considerable  area  on  which  agreement  has 
already  been  reached,  working  out  the  tech- 
nical implementation  of  the  agreements  in 
principle  that  have  been  achieved,  so  that 
whenever  those  two  issues  of  the  cruise  mis- 
sile and  the  Backfire  are  finally  resolved,  it 
ought  to  be  possible  to  make — when  they  are 
conceptually  resolved — it  ought  to  be  possi- 
ble to  make  fairly  rapid  progress  toward  a 
solution. 


August  2,  1976 


169 


Q.  Is  there  active  negotiation  on  those  two 
outstanding  issues  at  this  point? 

Sec7-etary  Kissinger:  On  those  two  issues, 
we  are  studying  the  Soviet  position.  They 
are  studying  our  position.  And  these  two 
issues  are  still  open,  and  there  is  no  imme- 
diate negotiation  going  on  until  we  have  re- 
studied  our  position  on  those  two  limited — 
on  those  two  issues. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  despite  your  pronounce- 
ment in  Lusaka,  thus  far  since  you  came 
back  from  Africa  the  Administration  has 
really  made  no  major  push  toward  getting 
the  Byrd  amendment  repealed.  It  has  paid 
Upservice  to  it,  but  really  no  major  Admin- 
istration effort.  Is  such  a  major  push  in  the 
offing  this  session? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  We  will  put  before 
the  Congress  the  repeal  of  the  Byrd  amend- 
ment, but  even  without  the  repeal  of  the 
Byrd  amendment,  we  are  making  major  ef- 
forts to  bring  about  a  diplomatic  solution  to 
the  issues  of  Rhodesia  and  Namibia  and  to 
make  progress  on  the  whole  range  of  issues 
in  southern  Africa.  And  if  these  diplomatic 
efforts  succeed,  of  course,  then  it  may  be 
that  over  time  the  issue  of  the  Byrd  amend- 
ment could  become  moot.  But  we  are  pro- 
ceeding to  make  major  diplomatic  efforts, 
and  we  will  also  approach  the  Congress  on 
the  Byrd  amendment. 

Paramount  Factor  in  Radiation  Issue 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary — 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  gentleman  in  the 
rear. 

Q.  Sir,  returning  to  the  question  of  the 
microivave  signals  in  Moscow,  are  you  say- 
ing that  there  is  some  effort  being  made  to 
achieve  a  mutual  level  of  eavesdropping  back 
and  forth? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  am  not  saying  there 
is  an  effort  being  made  to  achieve  a  mutual 
level  of  eavesdropping.  I  am  saying  that  in 
making  our  decisions  as  to  what  diplomatic 
approaches  to  use  and  what  retaliation  might 


be  appropriate,  we  have  to  consider  many 
factors,  but  the  paramount  factor  is  the 
health  of  our  employees,  which  I  believe 
has  been  adequately  safeguarded. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  may  I  ask  again,  what 
reason  do  the  Soviets  give  for  not  stopping 
the  signals  entirely?  Do  they  say  that  there 
is  no  safety  factor  involved,  so  it  is  not  the 
Embassy's  business,  or  is  it  because  of  cer- 
tain American  activity — electronic  activity — 
at  the  site  of  the  Embassy? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  don't  think  it  would 
be  appropriate  for  me  to  give  the  content 
of  the  diplomatic  exchanges.  But  in  activities 
of  this  kind,  it  is  not  always  easy  to  obtain 
an  admission  that  it  has  taken  place  to  begin 
with,  and  sometimes  one  can  observe  de 
facto  actions  without  having  a  theoretical 
discussion  as  to  whether  they  are  in  fact 
taking  place. 

Q.  Does  the  fact  that  the  State  Department 
went  public  recently  mean  that  they  have 
really  given  up,  or  there  does  not  seem  to  be 
any  great  chance  of  getting  a  stoppage? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  They  have  pointed 
out  there  is  no — the  best  medical  judgment 
that  we  have  been  able  to  obtain — and  meas- 
ured also  against  any  safety  standards  that 
any  nation  has  ever  devised  for  this  prob- 
lem— what  is  now  going  on  is  an  infinitesimal 
amount  and  a  smaller  amount  than  takes 
place  in  many  industrial  areas  simply  by 
walking  in  the  streets.  So  we  are  not  dealing 
now  with  a  health  problem  of  any  kind. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you  might  not  now  be 
dealing  with  a  health  problem,  but  I  think  it 
is  a  fact  that  the  American  standard  that 
you  quote  is  a  thousand  times  less  stringent 
than  the  Soviet  standard,  and  the  Soviets  do 
take  into  account  a  great  many  medical  is- 
sues that  the  United  States  does  not,  and 
there  was  a  time  last  year  tvhen  the  level  of 
activity  on  the  Russian  part  was  higher 
than  their  otvn  standard  would  have  per- 
mitted. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  That  is  correct,  and 
at  that  point  we  took  very  strong  action. 


170 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Q.  Is  it  not  possible  then,  or  are  you  ac- 
knowledging here  that  it  simply  isn't  pos- 
sible to  demand  that  the  Russians  stop  this? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  We  have  demanded 
that  the  Russians  stop  it — 


Q.  And  they  haven' t- 

Secretary    Kissinger. 
completely  stopped. 


-it    has    not    been 


Proposed  Purchase  of  Aircraft  by  Kenya 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  in  vieiv  of  the  tension 
in  east  Africa,  is  the  United  States  sending 
any  naval  imits  to  the  area  of  Kenya — 
Uganda?  And  what  is  your  opinion  of 
Kenya's  proposed  purchase  of  20  F-SE's 
from  the  United  States? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  it  would  be 
quite  a  trick  to  send  naval  units  to  Uganda. 
[Laughter.]  So  I  can  safely  say  that  none  of 
that  is  being  contemplated. 

There  have  been  periodic  port  calls  at 
Mombasa,  and  there  will  be  a  port  call  by  an 
American  frigate  in  the  near  future.  But  this 
is  not  a  new  development.  This  is  something 
that  has  taken  place  in  the  past. 

With  respect  to  the  sale  of  airplanes  to 
Kenya,  one  has  to  keep  in  mind  that  Kenya 
is  surrounded  by  neighbors  that  are  heavily 
armed  by  Communist  nations,  that  have 
made  territorial  claims  on  Kenya;  that 
Kenya  has  been  a  country  that  has  pursued  a 
very  moderate  policy — has  pursued  a  policy 
in  which  the  various  races  and  communities 
have  been  able  to  live  side  by  side,  and  it  is 
the  direction  in  which  we  would  hope  African 
countries  in  other  parts  of  Africa  will  also 
evolve. 

So  we  are  sympathetic  to  some  of  its  mili- 
tary  requirements. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  before  the  California 
primary  you  canceled  a  couple  of  speeches 
because  I  think  the  Department  said  they 
might  be  viewed  as  too  political.  Why  do  you 
think  it  is  noiv  proper  to  go  around  the 
country  making  speeches  that  will  also  cer- 
tainly be  interpreted  as  political? 


Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  at  that  time  it 
was  on  the  Friday  before  the  primary  in  a 
campaign  which  was  very  intense,  and  it 
seemed  to  me  that  to  speak,  even  though  it 
was  before  a  nonpartisan  forum  two  days  be- 
fore the  election — or  three  days  before  the 
election — might  be  viewed  as  a  partisan  ef- 
fort. What  I'm  doing  now  is  a  continuation  of 
what  I've  been  doing  for  nearly  two  years — 
that  is,  to  speak  about  once  a  month  in  some 
part  of  the  country  about  the  main  outlines 
of  American  foreign  policy  before  non- 
partisan forums. 

In  the  leadership  meetings  that  take  place 
off  the  record,  we  always  invite  individuals 
of  all  political  parties  and  of  different  views. 
And  my  effort  is  to  bring  before  the  Ameri- 
can public  the  nature  of  our  foreign  policy. 

And  it  is  not  a  new  effort.  It  is  not 
especially  related  to  the  election. 

Effect  of  Execution  on  U.S. -Angola  Relations 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary — 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  may  I  clarify  an  earlier 
answer  on  the  Gearhart  matter?  You  said 
that  it  ivould  not  be  proper  for  us  to  permit 
our  foreign  policy  to  become  hostage  to  the 
fate  of  any  one  particular  individual  or 
prisoner,  because  this  would  encourage  other 
countries  to  do  so.  Does  this  mean  that  you 
are  not — you  have  not  and  you  will  not,  in 
any  ivay,  link  the  question  of  future  eco- 
nomic aid  to  Angola  to  the  fate  of  Mr.  Gear- 
hart  or  any  other  prisoner? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  We  will  not  promise 
economic  aid  to  Angola  in  order  to  obtain  the 
release  of  Mr.  Gearhart.  Obviously,  the  exe- 
cution of  Mr.  Gearhart  will  worsen  the  rela- 
tionship between  Angola  and  the  United 
States  and  slow  down  any  possibilities  of 
normalization  that  may  have  existed.  But 
we  are  putting  our  appeal  to  President  Neto 
on  humanitarian  grounds,  and  we  are  not 
negotiating  a  ransom. 

Q.  Well,  ive  haven't  told  Mr.  Neto  lohat 
you're  saying  here  today — that  his  execution 
would  obviously  slow  down  this  process  of 


August  2,  1976 


171 


admission  to  the  United  Nations,  for  exam- 
ple? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  am  not  talking 
about  any  particular  political  conditions  that 
we  have  put  before  Mr.  Neto.  Mr.  Neto  must 
understand — and  he  certainly  has  been  given 
to  understand — that  the  general  attitude  of 
Americans  toward  Angola  will  be  seriously 
affected  by  his  actions  in  the  case  of  Mr. 
Gearhart. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  has  the  United  States 
noticed  yet  any  net  reduction  in  the  presence 
of  Cuban  troops  in  Angola? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  What  makes  a  judg- 
ment very  difficult  to  come  by  is  that  there 
is  obviously  an  outflow  of  some  Cuban 
troops,  but  there's  also  an  inflow  of  other 
Cubans.  And  to  make  a  net  judgment  as  to 
how  many  have  returned  and  how  many 
remain  has  not  been  easy. 

We've  also  had  unconfirmed  reports  that 
some  of  the  Cuban  troops  that  are  leaving 
Angola  are  going  to  other  African  countries. 
We  have  not  been  able  to  confirm  it  yet.  But 
it  is  clear  that  whatever  reduction  has  taken 
place  is  not  significant  enough  to  afi'ect  the 
basic  situation  that  the  government  is  being 
significantly  supported  by  a  foreign  expedi- 
tionary force  of,  by  African  standards,  very 
substantial  dimensions — which  is,  in  turn, 
supported  by  the  Soviet  Union — and  it  is  a 
precedent  which  we  find  extremely  difficult  to 
live  with. 


Prince  Abdallah  of  Saudi  Arabia 
Visits  Washington 

Following  is  a  toast  by  Secretary  Kissin- 
ger given  at  a  luncheon  in  honor  of  Prince 
Abdallah  bin  Abd  al-Aziz  Al-Sa'ud,  Second 
Deputy  Prime  Minister  of  Saudi  Arabia,  on 
Jidy  8. 

Press   lelease  344   dated  July  9 

Your  Royal  Highness:  It  is  always  a  great 
privilege  for  me  to  welcome  friends  from 
Saudi  Arabia  to  the  United  States. 

His  Royal  Highness  pointed  out  to  me  that 


I  have  visited  Saudi  Arabia  13  times  in  the 
last  three  years;  I  pointed  out  to  him  that 
on  my  first  visit  I  detected  a  certain  suspi- 
ciousness on  the  part  of  my  host,  but  I'm 
glad  to  say  that  we  have  developed  a  rela- 
tionship now  of  mutual  confidence  and  of  per- 
sonal friendship. 

Of  course,  I  always  feel  a  little  apologetic 
when  I  welcome  people  from  Saudi  Arabia 
here,  because  I  recognize  that  as  far  as  hos- 
pitality is  concerned,  the  United  States  is  an 
underdeveloped  country.   [Laughter.] 

Your  Royal  Highness  is  visiting  the  United 
States  at  a  very  important  period  in  the 
relationship  between  the  Arab  countries  and 
the  United  States  and  in  the  history  of  the 
Middle  East.  We  are  all  conscious  of  the 
tragedy  that  is  taking  place  in  Lebanon,  and 
we  are  also  aware  of  the  necessity  of  making 
progress  toward  peace  in  the  Middle  East. 
The  two  events  are  closely  related  because, 
in  all  candor,  peace  in  the  Middle  East  cannot 
progress  without  unity  among  the  Arab  na- 
tions. Contrary  to  what  our  critics  are  say- 
ing, the  United  States  favors  unity  among 
the  Arab  nations. 

We  think  that  the  Kingdom,  and  His  Maj- 
esty in  particular,  has  taken  wise  initiatives 
in  bringing  together  the  Prime  Ministers  of 
Syria  and  Egypt  and  in  using  the  good  offices 
of  Saudi  Arabia  to  arrange  negotiations 
among  all  of  the  parties  in  Lebanon. 

Whatever  assistance  the  United  States  can 
give  these  efi'orts,  we  will  be  eager  to  do. 
We  believe  that  the  time  has  come  in  Lebanon 
for  all  of  the  parties  to  recognize  that  a  con- 
tinuation of  the  conflict  only  leads  to  a  need- 
less loss  of  life  and  only  encourages  outside 
forces — that  are  neither  interested  in  the 
independence  of  Lebanon  nor  in  progress  to- 
ward peace  in  the  Middle  East — to  exploit  the 
situation.  I  believe,  and  I  have  the  impres- 
sion that  our  friends  in  Saudi  Arabia  also  be- 
lieve, that  it  is  time  to  have  a  roundtable 
conference  in  which  all  of  the  parties  discuss 
arrangements  in  which  the  various  commu- 
nities can  live  together,  the  independence  and 
sovereignty  of  Lebanon  are  safeguarded,  and 
outside  influences  are  gradually  withdrawn. 

As  far  as  the  Middle  East  as  a  whole  is 
concerned,  the  United  States  has  stated  re- 


172 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


peatedly  that  we  believe  important  steps 
have  been  taken  toward  peace  in  the  Middle 
East.  But  very  major  steps  remain  to  be 
taken;  and  those  steps,  in  our  view,  and  I 
believe  in  the  view  of  all  of  the  parties  now, 
have  to  be  taken  on  all  fronts,  so  that  prog- 
ress towai-d  peace  can  be  uniform  for  all  of 
the  principal  parties  concerned.  This  is  the 
attitude  with  which  the  United  States  is  ap- 
proaching the  problem,  and  again,  I  want  to 
emphasize  that  the  cooperation  between  the 
Arab  states  has  to  be  an  important  compo- 
nent of  this  effort. 

As  far  as  our  bilateral  relations  with  Saudi 
Arabia  are  concerned,  Saudi  Arabia  has  been 
our  oldest  friend  in  the  Arab  world.  We  have 
had  an  uninterrupted  relationship  of  trust 
and  confidence,  and  in  the  world  as  it  is 
today,  it  is  important  that  countries  know 
that  friends  of  the  United  States  know  of  our 
interest  in  their  sovereignty,  in  their  pros- 
perity, and  in  their  independence ;  and  that 
it  is  known  that  the  United  States  stands  be- 
hind its  friends. 

A  few  years  ago,  a  group  at  the  National 
War  College  sent  a  plaque — in  brass,  since 
only  the  Saudis  can  afford  gold — with  a  piece 
of  a  plank  on  which  the  first  meeting  took 
place  between  President  Roosevelt  and  the 
King  of  Saudi  Arabia.  A  few  weeks  ago,  the 
wheel  of  that  ship  was  presented  by  Ambas- 
sador [William  J.]  Porter  to  the  Government 
of  Saudi  Arabia.  It  symbolizes  the  fact  that, 
while  it  may  have  taken  170  years  of  our 
history  for  our  leaders  to  meet  the  leaders 
of  Saudi  Arabia,  in  the  last  30  years  these 
contacts  have  been  frequent  and  important 
in  the  negotiations  that  I  have  had  the  priv- 
ilege of  conducting  in  the  Middle  East. 

The  advice  of  His  Majesty  King  Faisal,  of 
His  Majesty  King  Khalid,  and  of  the  Crown 
Prince,  Prince  Fahd,  has  been  of  enormous 
importance.  And  anyone  who  knows  how 
Saudi  diplomacy  operates — discreetly  and 
unostentatiously — also  knows  that  our  Saudi 


friends  always  do  more  than  they  say,  and  I 
would  like  to  stress  that  this  close  relation- 
ship we  are  dedicated  to  maintaining  and  to 
strengthening. 

It  is  a  great  privilege.  Your  Royal  High- 
ness, to  welcome  you  to  the  Department  of 
State  and  to  the  United  States,  and  I  would 
like  all  of  our  guests  to  drink  a  toast:  To  His 
Royal  Highness  and  to  the  growing  friend- 
ship between  our  two  peoples. 


Congressional  Documents 
Relating  to  Foreign  Policy 

94th  Congress,  2d  Session 

International  Security  Assistance  and  Arms  Export 
Control  Act  of  1976.  Report  of  the  committee  of 
conference  to  accompany  S.  2662.  H.  Rept.  94-1013. 
April   6,   1976.   78  pp. 

Middle  East  Assistance.  Communication  from  the 
President  of  the  United  States  transmitting  his 
objections  to  the  Senate  action  adding  to  the  budget 
for  foreign  military  sales  credits  and  security  sup- 
porting assistance  for  the  transition  quarter  for 
Israel,  Eg^pt,  Jordan,  and  Syria.  H.  Doc.  94-444. 
April  8,  1976.  2  pp. 

U.S.  Participation  in  the  OECD  Financial  Support 
Fund.  Report  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign 
Relations,  together  with  minority  views,  to  ac- 
company S.  1907.  S.  Rept.  94-746.  April  9,  1976. 
11  pp. 

Deep  Seabed  Hard  Minerals  Act.  Report  of  the  Sen- 
ate Committee  on  Interior  and  Insular  Affairs  to 
accompany  S.  713;  S.  Rept.  94-754;  April  14,  1976; 
54  pp.  Joint  report  of  the  Senate  Committees  on 
Commerce,  Armed  Services,  and  Foreign  Relations, 
together  with  additional  views;  S.  Rept  94-935; 
June  8,  1976;  28  pp. 

Establishing  a  Commission  on  Security  and  Coopera- 
tion in  Europe.  Report  of  the  Senate  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations  to  accompany  S.  2679;  S.  Rept. 
94-756;  April  23,  1976;  6  pp.  Report  of  the  House 
Committee  on  International  Relations;  H.  Rept. 
94-1149;  May  14,  1976;  8  pp. 

To  Amend  Further  the  Peace  Corps  Act.  Report  of 
the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  to  ac- 
company H.R.  12226.  S.  Rept.  94-757.  April  23, 
1976.  24  pp. 

Relations  With  the  Soviet  Union.  Report  of  the  Sen- 
ate Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  to  accompany 
S.  Res.  406.  S.  Rept.  94-758.  April  23,  1976.  4  pp. 


August  2,  1976 


173 


The  United  States  and  the  Middle  East 


Address  by  Alfred  L.  Atherton,  Jr. 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Near  Eastern  and  South  Asiati  Affairs ' 


It  is  particularly  appropriate,  just  four 
days  before  the  Bicentennial  of  our  Decla- 
ration of  Independence,  to  be  meeting  with 
members  of  an  organization  whose  history 
goes  well  back  into  the  first  century  of 
America's  independence.  For  133  of  Amer- 
ica's 200  years,  B'nai  B'rith  has  been  a 
guardian  of  the  principles  of  freedom,  jus- 
tice, tolerance,  and  individual  dignity  which 
are  the  essence  of  this  nation. 

I  do  not  feel  a  stranger  among  you.  For 
as  long  as  I  can  remember,  and  long  before 
I  knew  what  the  words  "B'nai  B'rith"  meant, 
that  name  has  been  synonymous  to  me  with 
the  highest  ideals  of  service  and  brother- 
hood. 

In  more  recent  years,  I  have  had  a  fruit- 
ful dialogue  with  your  representatives  in 
Washington  on  the  subject  I  want  to  speak 
about  tonight:  U.S.  policy  in  the  Middle 
East.  This  dialogue  has  helped  me  under- 
stand the  special  feeling  of  American  Jews 
for  Israel.  It  has  also,  I  believe,  helped 
your  representatives  understand  the  com- 
plex considerations  which  those  of  us  who 
deal  daily  with  the  problems  of  the  Middle 
East  must  weigh  in  conducting  our  rela- 
tions with  this  area  of  such  vital  impor- 
tance to  our  national  interests. 

This  gathering  this  evening  is  an  exten- 
sion of  that  dialogue.  I  welcome  it,  and  I 
am  glad  to  be  here.  Thffe  kind  of  interchange 


'  Made  before  the  108th  Annual  Convention  In- 
stallation Banquet  of  B'nai  B'rith,  District  6,  at 
Omaha,  Nebr.,  on  June  30. 


is  indispensable  to  the  formulation  of  for- 
eign policy  in  a  democracy.  Foreign  poli- 
cies must  be  based  on  an  informed  public 
opinion,  and  they  must  have  public  support, 
if  they  are  to  be  sustained.  I  hope  my  words 
this  evening  will  find  a  response  among  you 
that  will  contribute  to  the  national  con- 
sensus we  must  strive  for  in  the  search  for 
peace  in  the  Middle  East. 

All  of  us  here  tonight  would  agree  that  the 
security  and  survival  of  Israel  must  be  a  non- 
negotiable  premise  of  American  Middle  East 
policy.  No  significant  body  of  opinion  in  this 
country  would  disagree  with  that  premise. 

Our  national  commitment  to  Israel's  se- 
curity and  survival  is  not  at  issue.  The  issue, 
precisely  stated,  is  to  define  and  pursue  a 
national  policy  that  puts  us  in  the  strongest 
possible  position  to  continue  to  meet  that 
commitment.  A  responsible  Middle  East  pol- 
icy for  America  must  assure  that  we  retain 
the  capacity  to  influence  the  course  of  events 
in  the  Middle  East  commensurate  with  our  bi- 
lateral and  global  responsibilities  as  a  major 
power. 

The  United  States,  with  the  good  will 
which  it  uniquely  has  among  all  the  parties 
in  the  Middle  East,  is  in  a  position  to  help 
shape  events,  to  help  prevent  wars,  and  to 
help  the  parties  to  find  their  way  along  the 
hard  road  to  a  negotiated  peace.  To  continue 
to  play  this  role,  we  must  pursue  policies 
which  take  into  account  the  broad  range  of 
American  concerns  and  interests  in  the  Mid- 
dle East. 

It   is   therefore   important,   as   a   starting 


174 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


point,  to  identify  what  those  concerns  and 
interests  are: 

— I  have  ah-eady  mentioned  our  strong 
commitment  to  the  security  and  survival  of 
Israel.  It  is  a  commitment  rooted  deeply  in 
history.  It  has  been  reaffirmed  by  every  Ad- 
ministration in  this  country  since  the  mod- 
ern State  of  Israel  came  into  existence  almost 
30  years  ago.  As  recently  as  last  May  13, 
President  Ford  told  the  annual  meeting  of 
the  American  Jewish  Committee  in  Washing- 
ton: 

A  strong  Israel  is  essential  to  a  stable  peace  in 
the  Middle  East.  Our  commitment  to  Israel  will  meet 
the  test  of  American  steadfastness  and  resolve.  My 
Administration  will  not  be  found  wanting.  The 
United  States  will  continue  to  help  Israel  provide 
for  her  security. 

A  concrete  manifestation  of  President 
Ford's  policy  toward  Israel  can  be  seen  in  the 
fact  that  for  the  fiscal  years  1976  and  1977 
he  has  requested  over  $4  billion  in  economic 
and  military  assistance,  compared  to  a  total 
of  only  $6  billion  in  U.S.  assistance  since  the 
founding  of  the  State  of  Israel. 

— We  also  have  good  and  mutually  bene- 
ficial relations  with  most  of  the  nations  of 
the  Arab  world.  This  is  important  to  them. 
They  seek  American  technology  and  mana- 
gerial know-how  for  their  development  pro- 
grams. Moderate  Arab  leaders  also  look  to 
military  assistance  from  the  United  States 
as  a  buttress  to  their  moderation  and  as  a 
means  of  protecting  themselves  against 
more  radical  forces  in  the  area.  These  good 
relations  are  also  important  to  us.  They  are 
important  economically,  for  example,  in  jobs 
created  in  this  country  by  the  growing  vol- 
ume of  exports  to,  and  investment  in,  Arab 
countries.  They  are  important  in  helping 
meet  our  energy  requirements  for  the  years 
ahead.  They  are  also  important  politically,  in 
a  world  where  the  interdependence  of  devel- 
oped and  developing  nations  is  a  condition  for 
the  well-being  of  all. 

Our  relations  with  the  Arab  world,  wisely 
nui'tured,  can  enhance  our  ability  to 
strengthen  the  forces  of  moderation  in  the 
Middle  East  and  advance  the  cause  of  peace. 


A  return  to  the  estrangement  that  so  long 
marred  our  relations  with  many  Arab  na- 
tions would,  in  today's  interdependent  world, 
have  negative  effects  on  our  interests  extend- 
ing far  beyond  the  Middle  East. 

— A  third  interest  of  the  United  States  is 
the  preservation  and  strengthening  of  our 
alliances.  Each  crisis  in  the  Middle  East 
places  severe  strains  on  the  fabric  of  those 
alliances. 

— Finally,  we  have  an  interest,  dictated  by 
our  global  responsibilities  in  this  nuclear 
age,  to  prevent  conflict  in  the  Middle  East 
from  again  becoming  a  flashpoint  of  super- 
power confrontation. 

Fundamental  Issues  in  Peace  Process 

We  cannot  pursue  our  interests  in  the  Mid- 
dle East  selectively.  Yet  so  long  as  the  Arab- 
Israeli  conflict  persists,  there  are  potential 
contradictions  among  them. 

Simple  logic  therefore  requires  us — in- 
deed, impels  us — to  persevere  in  the  search 
for  a  comprehensive  settlement  of  the  Arab- 
Israeli  conflict.  In  no  other  way  can  we 
guard  against  an  evolution  of  events  that 
could  bring  our  multiple  interests  and  con- 
cerns into  conflict,  benefiting  only  those,  both 
within  and  outside  the  region,  who  seek  to 
inflame  or  polarize  or  exploit  the  conflict.  An 
Arab-Israeli  peace  settlement  which  had  the 
strong  backing  of  the  United  States  and  of 
the  world  community  generally  would  con- 
stitute in  the  long  run  the  best  guarantee  of 
Israel's  security  and  survival. 

The  question  we  must  therefore  ask  our- 
selves is  whether  or  not  conditions  exist 
which  make  a  settlement  of  the  Arab-Israeli 
conflict  attainable.  What  are  the  fundamen- 
tal issues  which  must  be  dealt  with  if  there 
is  to  be  tangible  progress  toward  peace? 
Briefly  stated,  the  issues  are  these: 

— Israel  seeks  from  the  Arabs  recognition 
of  its  legitimacy  and  right  to  exist,  with  all 
this  implies:  an  end  to  belligerency,  an  end 
to  threats  of  force,  and  commitments  to  live 
together  in  peace  and  security. 

— The  Arab  states  seek  the  restoration  of 


August  2,  1976 


175 


occupied  territories  and,  in  their  words,  jus- 
tice for  the  Palestinian  people. 

The  suspicions  between  Arabs  and  Israelis 
are  so  deep,  the  absence  of  meaningful  com- 
munication between  them  so  absolute,  that 
each  tends  to  put  the  worst  interpretation  on 
the  stated  objectives  of  the  other.  When  Is- 
rael says  it  seeks  security,  the  Arabs  take 
this  to  mean  that  Israel  seeks  to  retain 
major  parts,  if  not  all,  of  the  territories  oc- 
cupied in  the  1967  war.  When  the  Arabs 
speak  of  the  national  rights  of  the  Palestin- 
ians, Israelis  hear  a  call  for  the  destruction 
of  Israel  as  a  Jewish  state. 

Undoubtedly  some  on  both  sides  do  harbor 
such  extreme  feelings.  But  there  are  also 
those  who  do  not.  Public  opinion  is  not  mono- 
lithic in  either  Israel  or  the  Arab  world;  it 
is  in  flux,  and  there  is  a  great  yearning  on 
both  sides  for  an  end  to  the  killing  and  con- 
flict. The  present  generation  of  Arab  and 
Israeli  leaders  has  an  opportunity  to  lead 
their  peoples  to  a  genuine  peace  between 
them — an  opportunity  that  has  not  existed 
before  and  that  may  not  come  again  soon  if 
the  present  opportunity  is  missed. 

Achievements  and  Beginnings 

Support  for  a  peaceful  settlement  can  only 
be  consolidated,  the  true  intentions  of  both 
sides  can  only  be  tested,  in  the  give-and-take 
of  a  process  of  negotiations  between  the 
parties  that  holds  out  hope  for  peace.  The 
precise  form  of  negotiations — whether  face- 
to-face,  indirect  through  a  third  party,  or 
some  combination  of  the  two — is  less  impor- 
tant than  the  dynamics  of  the  process  itself. 

To  generate  such  a  process  has  been  the 
central  purpose  of  American  diplomacy  for 
years,  and  in  particular  throughout  the  ac- 
tive and  creative  period  since  the  Arab- 
Israeli  war  of  October  1973.  Through  all  the 
drama  of  shuttle  diplomacy,  Geneva  Confer- 
ence, and  debates  in  the  United  Nations,  our 
efforts  have  been  directed  toward  this  objec- 
tive— to  engage  Arabs  and  Israelis  in  a  proc- 
ess of  negotiations  that  they  themselves  will 
come  to  recognize  as  in  their  own  best  in- 
terests. 


Because  there  is  so  far  yet  to  go,  it  is  easy 
to  forget  how  much  has  already  been 
achieved.  Between  1949  and  1974,  there  were 
no  Arab-Israeli  negotiations  on  the  funda- 
mental issues  and  no  agreements  to  which 
they  were  direct  parties.  In  two  short  years, 
1974  and  1975,  there  were  four  negotiations 
and  three  agreements — two  between  Egypt 
and  Israel,  one  between  Syria  and  Israel. 

Measured  against  the  absolutes  of  final 
peace,  the  territorial  and  political  distance 
covered  by  these  agreements  is  modest.  In 
psychological  terms,  it  represents  a  quantum 
leap  forward.  For  the  first  time  in  a  quarter 
of  a  century,  the  rigid  mindsets  and  sterile 
rhetoric  that  for  so  many  years  made  prog- 
ress toward  peace  impossible  have  given  way 
to  the  beginnings  of  a  new  pragmatism  and 
of  a  new  vision  of  what  the  Middle  East 
could  be. 

Like  all  changes  that  touch  the  deepest 
emotions,  fears,  and  hopes  of  nations,  that 
demand  a  break  with  past  patterns  of 
thought  and  behavior  and  a  step  into  the  un- 
knowable future,  these  fragile  beginnings 
have  created  new  tensions  and  awakened  old 
traumas.  The  internal  debate  in  Israel,  the 
dissensions  within  the  Arab  world,  the  travail 
of  Lebanon,  have  in  the  first  instance  their 
own  internal  causes.  But  it  is  equally  clear 
that  these  developments,  which  prolong  and 
increase  the  ferment  in  the  Middle  East,  are 
infinitely  more  intense  and  less  amenable  to 
solution  precisely  because  they  are  caught  in 
the  crosscurrents  of  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict. 


Risks  of  Prolonged  Stalemate 

The  resumption  of  negotiations  looking  to- 
ward a  solution  of  that  conflict  must  remain 
a  high  priority  on  the  agenda  of  unfinished 
business  in  the  foreign  relations  of  the 
United  States.  We  cannot  change  the  impera- 
tives of  history.  If  our  government  does  not 
retain  the  initiative  in  dealing  with  these 
issues,  we  will  be  forced  to  respond  to  the 
initiatives  of  others,  and  to  events  them- 
selves. The  same  is  true  of  our  friends  in  the 
Middle  East,  who  are  much  more  directly 
concerned. 


176 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


They  recognize,  as  we  do,  that  time  is 
needed  to  prepare  for  the  difficult  decisions 
which  lie  ahead.  We  are  not  today  at  the  mo- 
ment of  decision  between  war  and  peace. 

But  neither  can  that  moment  be  postponed 
indefinitely.  Sometime  in  the  months  and 
years  ahead  the  Middle  East  will  come  to 
the  crossroad  where  all  concerned — ^both 
within  and  outside  the  region — must  make 
the  hard  decision  whether  they  will  this  time 
take  the  road  toward  peace  or  the  road  to- 
ward yet  another  Arab-Israeli  war.  That  de- 
cision will  confront  all  concerned  with 
difficult  and  agonizing  choices,  as  they  come 
to  grips  with  the  basic  issues  between  them 
— the  issue  of  how  to  live  together  for  the 
first  time  in  peace  after  so  many  decades  of 
belligerency  and  war,  the  issue  of  territorial 
withdrawals  and  final  borders,  and  the  issue 
of  the  future  of  the  Palestinian  people. 

All  these  questions  are  the  proper  subject 
for  negotiations.  It  would  be  tragic  if  the 
world  community  despaired  of  the  hope  that 
Arabs  and  Israelis  could  find  the  answers  to 
their  own  destiny  and  concluded  that  peace 
should  be  imposed  on  the  nations  of  that 
troubled  region.  This  is  not  our  way.  We  pre- 
fer to  work  instead  for  a  peace  through  ne- 
gotiations among  the  parties  themselves — 
with  whatever  assistance  we  and  others  can 
provide,  in  whatever  forums  prove  the  most 
practical  and  acceptable. 

But  in  the  absence  of  a  negotiating  proc- 
ess, and  of  the  compromises  that  will  be  nec- 
essary to  make  such  a  process  possible,  pres- 
sures will  grow  to  seek  an  alternative  way. 
If  there  is  anything  the  history  of  this  con- 
flict should  have  taught,  it  is  that  the  Middle 
East  will  not  stand  still.  It  has  experienced 
four  wars  in  25  years.  The  intervals  be- 
tween wars  have  grown  shorter  and  have 
been  marked  by  sporadic  tension  and  vio- 
lence, including  acts  of  terrorism  which  feed 
on  the  unresolved  hatred  and  frustration  of 
the  basic  conflict.  The  cost  of  each  successive 
war,  in  blood  and  money,  has  increased  ap- 
pallingly ;  and  each  war  has  had  increasingly 
dangerous  global  economic  and  political  re- 
percussions. It  is  unthinkable  that  there 
should  be  a  fifth  Arab-Israeli  war — and  yet 


that  is  the  grim  alternative  to  negotiation, 
compromise,  and  further  progress  toward 
peace. 

The  risks  of  moving  toward  peace  are 
great  for  the  leaders  on  both  sides ;  witness, 
for  example,  the  storm  of  criticism  unleashed 
against  Egypt  for  President  Sadat's  states- 
manlike decision,  in  concluding  the  most  re- 
cent Sinai  agreement,  to  commit  Egypt  to 
seek  a  final  settlement  through  peaceful  and 
not  military  means.  For  Israel,  the  risks  it 
perceives  are  agonizing.  Israelis  feel  they 
are  being  asked  to  exchange  something  tan- 
gible— territory  occupied  in  1967 — for  some- 
thing intangible — commitments  by  their 
neighbors  to  recognize  Israel's  right  to  exist 
and  to  live  in  peace.  Seen  through  Arab  eyes, 
however,  these  commitments  are  also  tan- 
gible, representing  as  they  do  an  abandon- 
ment of  the  claim  to  recover  all  of  former 
Palestine — a  claim  which  was  the  unanimous 
Arab  position  for  many  years. 

Whatever  the  risks  of  moving  toward 
peace,  the  risks  in  not  doing  so  are  infinitely 
greater.  I  do  not  need  to  dwell  on  the  costs 
and  risks,  should  there  be  another  war.  But 
consider  the  costs  even  in  the  absence  of  war, 
not  least  of  all  the  risk  that  prolonged  stale- 
mate will  set  in  motion  forces  which  will 
undermine  moderate  leaders  in  the  region, 
seek  to  isolate  the  United  States  and  Israel 
in  the  world,  and  erode  our  ability  to  influ- 
ence the  course  of  events. 

The  Balance  Sheet  for  Further  Progress 

If  there  were  no  alternative  to  this  sce- 
nario of  despair,  the  prospects  for  the  Mid- 
dle East  and  for  the  world  would  be  grim 
indeed.  I  believe,  however,  that  an  alternative 
does  exist.  Let  us  look  at  the  balance  sheet. 

On  the  one  hand,  the  factors  which  make 
progress  difficult  are  clear : 

— The  Lebanese  crisis,  which  is  in  a  sense 
an  Arab  crisis,  makes  more  difficult  the 
achievement  of  agreement  by  the  Arab  gov- 
ernments on  how  to  move  toward  a  settle- 
ment with  Israel. 

— Second,  the  leadership  of  the  Palestin- 
ian movement  has  not  accepted  the  frame- 


August  2,  1976 


177 


work  for  peace  hammered  out  in  U.N.  debates 
and  embodied  in  Security  Council  Resolu- 
tions 242  and  338  following  the  1967  and 
1973  wars.  That  framework  calls  for  with- 
drawal from  occupied  territory  and  clear  rec- 
ognition of  Israel's  right  to  exist  in  the  con- 
text of  a  peace  settlement.  While  the  legiti- 
mate interests  of  the  Palestinian  people  must 
be  taken  into  account  in  a  final  settlement,  it 
is  not  reasonable  to  ask  Israel  to  negotiate 
with  them  so  long  as  they  do  not  agree  that 
part  of  a  final  settlement  must  be  an  agree- 
ment to  live  in  peace  with  a  sovereign,  Jewish 
State  of  Israel. 

— A  third  factor  is  the  continuing  debate 
in  Israel  about  peace  goals ;  for  example,  how 
to  deal  with  the  Palestinian  issue  and  what 
should  be  given  up  in  return  for  peace. 
Meanwhile,  policies  such  as  the  continued 
establishment  of  settlements  in  occupied  ter- 
ritories raise  questions  in  Arab  minds  about 
Israel's  ultimate  intentions. 

— Similarly,  voices  of  extremism  in  the 
Arab  world  and  anti-Israel  actions  in  inter- 
national forums — usually  supported  for  op- 
portunistic reasons  by  many  governments 
not  directly  involved  in  the  Arab-Israeli  con- 
flict— raise  questions  in  Israeli  minds  about 
ultimate  Arab  intentions. 

Let  us  look  now  at  the  plus  side  of  the 
ledger : 

— An  internationally  sanctioned  frame- 
work for  a  negotiated  peace  exists  in  Secu- 
rity Council  Resolutions  242  and  338.  Israel, 
the  principal  Arab  governments  concerned, 
and  the  overwhelming  majority  of  the  world 
community — including  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union — are  formally  commit- 
ted to  and  have  accepted  that  framework. 
This  framework  was  explicitly  reaffirmed  in 
the  agreements  between  Israel,  Egypt,  and 
Syria. 

— Second,  while  active  negotiations  are  not 
presently  going  on,  we  have  been  exploring 
with  the  Arab  governments  concerned,  and 
are  prepared  to  continue  to  do  so,  an  Israeli 
proposal  for  negotiations  based  on  the  con- 
cept of  a  termination  of  the  state  of  war  and 
further  territorial  withdrawals  on  one  or 
more  fronts.  In  our  view,  this  would  offer  a 


practical  way — though  not  necessarily  the 
only  way — of  continuing  the  negotiating 
process. 

— Third,  for  the  first  time  in  the  history 
of  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict,  and  despite  con- 
tinued outbursts  of  shrill  rhetoric  from  some 
quarters,  there  is  today  in  much  of  the  Arab 
world  a  moderate  leadership  which  has  ac- 
cepted the  principle  of  making  peace  with 
Israel  and  no  longer  espouses  the  goal  of 
Arab  sovereignty  over  all  of  what  was  Pal- 
estine. 

— Fourth,  the  Soviet  Union  no  longer  has 
the  same  position  of  major  influence  it  once 
enjoyed  in  certain  Arab  countries.  Arab 
leaders  perceive  increasingly  that  while 
Soviet  support  may  help  them  make  war, 
only  the  United  States — of  the  major  pow- 
ers— can  produce  progress  toward  peace,  and 
the  Soviet  Union  is  well  aware  of  the  risks  to 
it  of  continuing  conflict,  including  setbacks 
to  U.S. -Soviet  relations. 

— Fifth,  there  has  been  a  constructive  evo- 
lution in  public  understanding  in  this  country 
of  the  complexities  of  the  Middle  East  con- 
flict, of  its  shades  of  gray  as  well  as  its  blacks 
and  whites,  and  of  the  importance  of  con- 
tinued progress  toward  peace.  This  strength- 
ens the  ability  of  your  government  to  speak 
with   authority   in   its   peacemaking  eff'orts. 

— Finally,  the  United  States  today  enjoys 
the  kind  of  relationship  with  both  sides  to 
the  conflict  which  permits  us  to  play  a  unique 
and  positive  role  to  the  benefit  of  all  who 
seek  a  reasonable,  just,  and  lasting  peace 
settlement. 

If  all  the  parties  concerned  act  with  the 
vision  that  distinguishes  true  statesmanship, 
I  believe  these  factors  on  the  plus  side  of 
the  ledger  can  prevail.  This  will  require  diffi- 
cult decisions  by  Arab  and  Israeli  leaders;  it 
will  require  putting  aside  dreams  of  abso- 
lute objectives  for  the  sake  of  achieving  real- 
istic compromises ;  it  will  require  each  side  to 
understand  the  fears  and  legitimate  national 
aspirations  of  the  other;  it  will  require  a 
determined  and  prolonged  test  of  intentions 
in  the  crucible  of  negotiations;  and  it  will 
require  that  the  United  States  persist  in  its 
efforts   to  keep  the  peace  process  alive,  to 


178 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


avoid  stagnation,  to  help  the  parties  find  soki- 
tions  which  are  in  their  best  interests — and 
ours.  The  United  States  will  work  with  Israel 
throughout  this  process.  I  want  to  read  you 
a  brief  quotation : 

I  note  with  satisfaction  that  (luring  the  past  two 
years,  relations  between  the  United  States  and 
Israel  have  become  closer. 

Our  governments  have  arrived  at  a  common  ap- 
proach regarding  the  desirable  political  direction  on 
the  road  to  peace  and  in  the  development  of  the 
processes  of  peace  ....  There  has  been  no  erosion 
in  the  position  and  attitude  vis-a-vis  Israel  of  the 
Administration,  the  Congress  or  the  American 
public. 

Relations  between  the  United  States  and  Israel 
remain  firm. 

This  was  a  statement  by  Prime  Minister 
Rabin  in  the  Knesset  on  June  15,  two  weeks 
ago. 

Yet  the  challenge  remains,  with  all  its  dan- 
gers and  opportunities.  The  issues  are  clear, 
and  they  will  neither  change  nor  disapp3ar. 
The  imperatives  for  the  nations  of  the  Mid- 
dle East,  and  for  the  interests  of  the  United 
States,  will  be  the  same  tomorrow  as  they 
are  today.  Our  responsibilities  to  Israel,  to 
ourselves,  and  to  world  peace  and  stability 
therefore  leave  us  no  realistic  alternative  but 
to  continue  on  course,  sustained  by  the  hope 
that  someday  our  children  will  look  back  on 
this  period  of  history  as  the  time  when  the 
Middle  East — after  a  quarter  century  of 
strife — chose  the  road  to  peace. 


Fifth  International  Tin  Agreement 
Transmitted  to  the  Senate 

Message  From  President  Ford  ' 

To  the  Senate  of  the  United  States: 

I  am  transmitting  herewith,  for  the  ad- 
vice and  consent  of  the  Senate  to  ratifica- 
tion, the  Fifth  International  Tin  Agreement, 
which  was  signed  by  the  United  States  on 
March  11,  1976.  The  Fifth  International  Tin 


'Transmitted  on  June  23  (text  from  White  House 
press  release);  also  printed  as  S.  Ex.  J,  94th  Cong., 
2d  sess.,  which  includes  the  texts  of  the  agreement 
and  the  report  of  the  Department  of  State. 


Agreement  replaces  the  Fourth  International 
Tin  Agreement,  which  expires  on  June  30, 
1976.  The  Fifth  International  Tin  Agreement 
is  scheduled  to  come  into  force  July  1,  1976, 
for  a  period  of  five  years. 

Tin  is  a  critical  commodity  for  the  United 
States.  We  have  no  mineable  reserves  and 
must  import  80%  of  our  requirements  of 
tin,  meeting  the  remainder  by  recycling  tin- 
bearing  scrap.  In  addition,  our  strategic 
stockpile  contains  an  approximately  four 
year  supply  of  tin  at  current  rates  of  con- 
sumption. We  are  the  world's  largest  single 
consumer  of  tin,  other  large  consumers  being 
Japan,  the  European  Community,  Australia, 
and  Canada.  Primary  tin  is  produced  chiefly 
by  six  developing  countries  in  Asia,  Africa, 
and  Latin  America.  Malaysia  is  the  world's 
largest  producer,  accounting  for  about  40% 
of  world  supplies.  Tin  is  an  important  source 
of  foreign  exchange  for  all  these  countries 
and  vital  to  the  success  of  their  develop- 
ment plans. 

Like  its  predecessors,  the  Fifth  Inter- 
national Tin  Agreement  has  as  its  main  pur- 
pose stabilizing  tin  prices  within  agreed  lim- 
its. Previous  agi'eements  have  had  some  suc- 
cess in  achieving  this  objective,  especially 
with  regard  to  the  floor  price.  These  agree- 
ments have  proved  a  notable  example  of 
cooperation  between  producers  and  consum- 
ers in  seeking  solutions  to  common  problems. 
The  chief  features  of  the  Fifth  International 
Tin  Agreement  are  the  following : 

— An  International  Tin  Council  which 
meets  on  a  regular  basis  to  consider  impor- 
tant issues  and  make  decisions.  Votes  are 
divided  equally  between  producer  and  con- 
sumer members  as  groups.  Within  the  two 
groups  votes  are  apportioned  among  mem- 
bers on  the  basis  of  their  share  of  world 
production  or  consumption.  Thus,  the  larger 
producers  and  consumers  carry  more  weight 
in  the  Council's  proceedings,  but  neither  pro- 
ducei's  nor  consumers  as  a  group  can  domi- 
nate the  Council.  Normally,  decisions  require 
a  simple  majority  vote  of  both  producers 
and  consumers,  but  certain  important  deci- 
sions require  a  two-thirds  majority  vote  of 
both.  As  a  member  of  the  Council,  the  United 


August  2,  1976 


179 


states  would  hold  the  largest  number  of 
consumer  votes. 

— A  buffer  stock  consisting  of  at  least 
20,000  metric  tons  of  tin  or  its  equivalent  in 
money.  Sales  are  made  from  the  buffer  stock 
as  the  tin  price  approaches  the  agreed  ceil- 
ing in  an  effort  to  defend  the  ceiling,  while 
purchases  are  made  as  the  price  approaches 
the  agreed  floor  in  order  to  defend  the  floor. 
Producer  members  are  required  to  make  con- 
tributions to  the  buffer  stock  proportional 
to  their  share  of  world  production.  Consumer 
members  may  make  such  contributions  on  a 
voluntary  basis  and  four — The  United  King- 
dom, France,  Belgium,  and  the  Nethei*- 
lands — have  elected  to  do  so.  Both  during  the 
course  of  the  negotiations  of  the  Fifth  Inter- 
national Tin  Agreement  and  since  that  time, 
we  have  made  clear  that,  should  the  United 
States  elect  to  join,  we  would  not  make  a 
contribution  to  the  buffer  stock. 

— Provision  for  the  imposition  of  export 
controls  on  producers.  Export  controls  are 
usually  imposed  only  after  the  buffer  stock 
of  tin  metal  has  risen  to  over  5,000  metric 
tons  as  a  result  of  efforts  to  slow  falling 
prices. 

— A  requirement  that  member  govern- 
ments consult  with  the  International  Tin 
Council  before  making  disposals  from  na- 
tional stocks.  For  some  years  we  have  con- 
sulted with  the  International  Tin  Council  as 
a  matter  of  routine  before  making  disposals 
from  our  strategic  stockpile.  This  require- 
ment, therefore,  would  not  constitute  any 
change  for  us.  We  have  made  clear,  however, 
that  we  retain  our  right  to  make  disposals 
from  the  stockpile  as  we  see  fit. 

The  United  States  did  not  join  any  of  the 
first  four  International  Tin  Agreements. 
However,  we  participated  in  the  negotiation 
of  all  but  the  Second  International  Tin 
Agreement,    where    we    were    an    Observer. 


Following  the  completion  of  the  negotiations 
for  the  Fifth  International  Tin  Agreement  in 
June,  1975,  it  received  careful  interagency 
examination  and  evaluation.  As  a  result  of 
that  study,  I  have  concluded  that  joining 
the  Fifth  International  Tin  Agreement 
would : 

— Have  minimal  impact  on  the  American 
economy  and  carry  with  it  no  adverse  eco- 
nomic effects. 

— Afford  some  protection  to  American  in- 
dustry and  consumers  by  enabling  the 
United  States  to  influence  the  decisions  of 
an  organization  that  seeks  to  balance  the 
international  supply  of  tin  with  demand. 

— Provide  support  for  the  concept  of  pro- 
ducer-consumer cooperation,  and  accommo- 
date the  strong  desire  of  both  producer  and 
consumer  members  that  the  United  States, 
the  world's  largest  single  consumer  of  tin, 
join  them  in  their  work. 

— Constitute  a  clear  demonstration  of  our 
willingness  to  join  with  others  in  seeking 
solutions  to  outstanding  commodity  prob- 
lems on  a  case-by-case  basis,  and  of  our  de- 
sire to  be  forthcoming  towards  the  develop- 
ing world  while  safeguarding  our  national 
interests. 

In  view  of  these  conclusions,  I  am  con- 
vinced that  joining  the  Fifth  International 
Tin  Agreement  would  serve  our  interests  and 
have  foreign  policy  benefits.  I  am  transmit- 
ting a  report  submitted  to  me  by  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  that  explains  the  Fifth  Inter- 
national Tin  Agreement  and  our  assessment 
of  it  in  greater  detail. 

I  recommend  that  the  Senate  give  early 
and  favorable  consideration  to  the  Fifth 
International  Tin  Agreement,  and  grant  its 
advice  and  consent  to  ratification. 

Gerald  R.  Ford. 

The  White  House,  June  28,  1976. 


180 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


U.S.  Gives  Views  in  Security  Council  Debate  on  Israeli  Rescue 
of  Hijacking  Victims  at  Entebbe  Airp^ort 


Following  are  statements  made  in  the  U.N. 
Security  Council  by  U.S.  Representative 
William  W.  Scranton  on  July  12  and  by  U.S. 
Representative  W.  Tapley  Bennett,  Jr.,  on 
July  IJf,  together  with  the  texts  of  tivo  draft 
resolutions. 


STATEMENT  BY  AMBASSADOR  SCRANTON, 
JULY  12 

USUN   press   release   81   dated   July   12 

This  Council  has  been  convened  to  discuss 
the  military  operation  of  Israel  to  rescue  the 
hostages  that  were  held  by  air  hijackers  at 
Entebbe  Aii'port  in  Uganda.  The  Govern- 
ment of  Uganda  has  condemned  Israel  for 
what  is  termed  "aggression  against  Uganda." 
Israel  has  been  accused  of  violating  the  ter- 
ritorial sovereignty  and  integrity  of  Uganda, 
of  wantonly  destroying  sections  of  Entebbe 
Airport,  and  of  killing  a  num.ber  of  Ugandan 
soldiers.  These  are  very  grave  charges,  and 
it  is  clearly  the  duty  of  this  Council  to  con- 
sider them  in  light  of  the  facts  and  inter- 
national law. 

As  members  of  this  Counci]  know,  I  have 
spoken  several  times  earlier  this  year  in  this 
Council  defending  the  principle  of  territorial 
sovereignty  in  Africa.  I  reaffirm  that  today. 
In  addition  to  that  principle,  there  are  other 
basic  principles  and  issues  at  stake  in  the 
question  that  is  before  us.  We  must  be 
deeply  concerned  with  the  problem  of  air 
piracy  and  the  callous  and  pernicious  use  of 
innocent  people  as  hostages  to  promote  polit- 
ical ends.   This   Council   cannot  forget  that 


the  Israeli  operation  in  Uganda  would  never 
have  come  about  had  the  hijacking  of  the 
Air  France  flight  from  Athens  not  taken 
place. 

Let  us  review  the  circumstances  surround- 
ing the  Israeli  action  at  Entebbe  Airport.  On 
July  4,  in  order  to  rescue  the  remaining  100 
hostages  that  had  been  hijacked  in  the  Air 
France  airbus  and  taken  to  Uganda,  Israel 
sent  a  small  military  force  to  Entebbe  Air- 
port. This  force  succeeded  in  rescuing  the 
hostages  and  returning  to  Israel.  Three  of  the 
hostages,  one  Israeli  soldier,  seven  of  the 
terrorists,  and  a  number  of  Ugandan  soldiers 
were  apparently  killed,  and  several  Ugandan 
aircraft  were  destroyed.  The  Israeli  force 
was  on  the  ground  for  an  hour  and  a  half  and 
departed  for  Israel  as  soon  as  it  was  possible 
to  do  so  in  safety. 

Israel's  action  in  rescuing  the  hostages 
necessarily  involved  a  temporary  breach  of 
the  territorial  integrity  of  Uganda.  Normally 
such  a  breach  would  be  impermissible  under 
the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations.  However, 
there  is  a  well-established  right  to  use  lim- 
ited force  for  the  protection  of  one's  own  na- 
tionals from  an  imminent  threat  of  injury  or 
death  in  a  situation  where  the  state  in  whose 
territory  they  are  located  either  is  unwill- 
ing or  unable  to  protect  them.  The  right, 
flowing  from  the  right  of  self-defense,  is 
limited  to  such  use  of  force  as  is  necessary 
and  appropriate  to  protect  threatened  na- 
tionals from  injury. 

The  requirements  of  this  right  to  protect 
nationals  were  clearly  met  in  the  Entebbe 
case.  Israel  had  good  reason  to  believe  that 


August  2,  1976 


181 


at  the  time  it  acted  Israeli  nationals  were  in 
imminent  danger  of  execution  by  the  hi- 
jackers. Moreover,  the  actions  necessary  to 
release  the  Israeli  nationals  or  to  prevent  sub- 
stantial loss  of  Israeli  lives  had  not  been 
taken  by  the  Government  of  Uganda,  nor 
was  there  a  reasonable  expectation  such  ac- 
tions would  be  taken.  In  fact,  there  is  sub- 
stantial evidence  that  the  Government  of 
Uganda  cooperated  with  and  aided  the  hi- 
jackers. 

A  number  of  the  released  hostages  have 
publicly  related  how  the  Ugandan  authori- 
ties allowed  several  additional  terrorists  to 
reinforce  the  original  group  after  the  plane 
landed,  permitted  them  to  receive  additional 
arms  and  additional  explosives,  participated 
in  guarding  the  hostages,  and  according  to 
some  accounts,  even  took  over  sole  custody 
of  some  or  all  of  the  passengers  to  allow  the 
hijackers  to  rest.  The  ease  and  success  of 
the  Israeli  effort  to  free  the  hostages  further 
suggests  that  the  Ugandan  authorities  could 
have  overpowered  the  hijackers  and  released 
the  hostages  if  they  had  really  had  the  desire 
to  do  so. 

The  apparent  support  given  to  the  hijack- 
ers by  the  Ugandan  authorities  causes  us  to 
question  whether  Uganda  lived  up  to  its  in- 
ternational legal  obligations  under  the  Hague 
Convention  [for  the  Suppression  of  Unlawful 
Seizure  of  Aircraft].  The  rights  of  a  state 
carry  with  them  important  responsibilities 
which  were  not  met  by  Uganda  in  this  case. 
The  Israeli  military  action  was  limited  to  the 
sole  objective  of  extricating  the  passengers 
and  crew  and  terminated  when  that  objec- 
tive was  accomplished.  The  force  employed 
was  limited  to  what  was  necessary  for  that 
rescue  of  the  passengers  and  crew. 

That  Israel  might  have  secured  the  release 
of  its  nationals  by  complying  with  the  ter- 
rorists' demands  does  not  alter  these  conclu- 
sions. No  state  is  required  to  yield  control 
over  persons  in  lawful  custody  in  its  terri- 
tory under  criminal  charges.  Moreover,  it 
would  be  a  self-defeating  and  dangerous  pol- 
icy to  release  prisoners,  convicted  in  some 
cases  of  earlier  acts  of  terrorism,  in  order  to 
accede  to  the  demands  of  the  terrorists. 

It  should  be  emphasized  that  this  assess- 


mc^it  of  the  legality  of  Israeli  actions  de- 
peinds  heavily  on  the  unusual  circumstances 
of  1  this  specific  case.  In  particular,  the  evi- 
deisice  is  strong  that,  given  the  attitude  of 
the^  Ugandan  authorities,  cooperation  with  or 
reliance  on  them  in  rescuing  the  passengers 
an^d  crew  was  impracticable.  It  is  to  be  hoped 
th  at   these    unique    circumstances    will    not 
ai^'ise  in  the  future.  We,  of  course,  strongly 
d,efend  the  concept  of  national  sovereignty 
find     territorial     integrity.     Moreover,     the 
TJnited  States  deplores  the  loss  of  life  and 
property  at  Entebbe  and  extends  its  sympa- 
thy to  those  families  who  were  bereaved  by 
events  originating  in  acts  of  terrorism  that 
they  neither  supported  nor  condoned. 

But  the  U.S.  delegation  believes  very 
strongly  that  this  Council  should  address  it- 
self to  the  causes  of  incidents  such  as  that 
which  occurred  last  week  in  Uganda.  We  be- 
ll eve  that  this  Council  should  once  again 
ta  ke  positive  action  to  put  an  end  to  such 
senseless  violence.  We  believe  the  United 
Nations  should  do  everything  within  its 
powt^r  to  insure  against  a  recurrence  of  this 
brutar,.  callous,  and  senseless  international 
crime  of  hijacking — the  crime  which  gave 
rise  to  the  Israeli  action. 

At  the  very  least,  it  seems  to  us,  this 
Council  should  immediately  record  its  collec- 
tive view  th.at  international  terrorism — and 
specifically  hijacking — must  be  stopped. 
There  is  ample  precedent  for  taking  such  ac- 
tion. The  Unit.pd  Nations  has  spoken  out 
strongly  against  hijacking  and  interference 
with  international  civil  aviation  a  number  of 
times. 

On  September  9,  1970,  the  Security  Coun- 
cil adopted  by  consensus  Resolution  286  ap- 
pealing "for  the  immediate  release  of  all  pas- 
sengers and  crew  without  exception,  held  as 
a  result  of  hijackings  .  .  .  ."  It  called  on 
states  ''to  take  all  possible  legal  steps  to  pre- 
vent further  hijackings  or  any  other  inter- 
ff;rence  with  international  civil  air  travel." 
Later  in  the  autumn  of  1970  the  General 
Assembly  adopted  its  detailed  Resolution 
2645  (XXV)  condemning  "without  exception 
whatsoever,  all  acts  of  aerial  hijacking 
.  .  .  ."  The  resolution,  which  the  Assembly 
adopted  by  an  overwhelming  vote  of  105  in 


182 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


favor  and  none  against,  with  eight  absten- 
tions, further  declared  that  "the  exploitation 
of  unlawful  seizure  of  aircraft  for  the  pur- 
pose of  taking  hostages  is  to  be  condemned," 
and  it  called  for  every  effort  to  make  a  suc- 
cess out  of  the  then  forthcoming  Hague  Con- 
ference negotiations  for  an  antihijacking 
treaty. 

Again  acting  by  consensus,  the  Security 
Council  on  June  20,  1972,  stated  its  grave 
concern  "at  the  threat  to  the  lives  of  passen- 
gers and  crew  arising  from  the  hijacking  of 
aircraft  .  .  .  ."  The  Council  called  upon 
states  "to  deter  and  prevent  such  acts  and 
to  take  effective  measures  to  deal  with  those 
who  commit  such  acts." 

In  addition,  there  already  exists  an  inter- 
national legal  obligation  for  all  states  to  pre- 
vent terrorist  acts.  The  U.N.  Declaration  on 
Friendly  Relations  and  Cooperation  Among 
States,  contained  in  General  Assembly  Reso- 
lution 2625  (XXV),  declares: 

Every  State  has  the  duty  to  refrain  from  organiz- 
ing, instigating,  assisting  or  participating  in  acts  of 
civil  strife  or  terrorist  acts  in  another  State  or 
acquiescing  in  organized  activities  within  its  terri- 
tory directed  toward  the  commission  of  such  acts, 
when  the  acts  referred  to  in  the  present  paragraph 
involve  a  threat  or  use  of  force. 

Concerning  air  hijacking  in  particular,  12 
members  of  this  Council  have  ratified  the 
Convention  for  the  Suppression  of  Unlawful 
Seizure  of  Aircraft,  signed  at  The  Hague  on 
December  16,  1970.  Over  half  the  members 
of  the  international  community  have  ac- 
cepted this  convention,  including  Uganda  and 
Israel.  The  purpose  of  the  Hague  Convention 
is  to  promote  the  safety  of  international 
civil  aviation.  It  seeks  to  discourage  hijack- 
ing by  creating  the  realistic  prospect  of  se- 
vere treatment  by  states  against  persons 
hijacking  aircraft. 

To  achieve  this  objective  the  convention 
requires  every  contracting  state  to  make  hi- 
jacking an  offense  punishable  by  severe  pen- 
alties. Each  contracting  state  is  also  bound 
to  take  such  measures  as  may  be  necessary 
to  establish  its  jurisdiction  over  the  offense 
of  hijacking  and  any  other  act  of  violence 
against  passengers  or  crew  of  a  hijacked  air- 
craft which  comes  within  its  territory. 


According  to  the  convention,  a  contracting 
state  shall  take  all  appropriate  measures  to 
restore  control  of  the  aircraft  to  its  lawful 
commander.  It  must  also  facilitate  the  con- 
tinuation of  the  journey  of  the  passengers 
and  crew  as  soon  as  practicable  and  shall 
without  delay  return  the  aircraft  and  its 
cargo  to  persons  lawfully  entitled  to  its  pos- 
session. Finally,  it  must  take  the  hijackers 
into  custody  and  either  prosecute  or  extra- 
dite them. 

These  are  high  standards — nobody  denies 
that — but  they  are  reasonable  standards.  My 
government  does  not  believe  that  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Uganda  has  lived  up  to  its  legal 
obligations  under  the  Hague  Convention,  to 
which  it  is  a  party. 

The  United  States  believes  that  the  United 
Nations  should  go  much  further  in  address- 
ing itself  to  the  evils  of  international  terror- 
ism. In  1972,  we  proposed  a  draft  convention 
to  the  General  Assembly,  which  provided, 
inter  alia,  that  a  signatory  state  either  pros- 
ecute persons  in  its  jurisdiction  who  commit 
any  acts  of  international  terrorism  or  extra- 
dite them  to  the  state  in  which  the  crime 
was  committed.  Unfortunately,  nothing  has 
yet  come  of  our  initiative,  because  of  dis- 
agreement over  the  definition  of  terrorism. 

With  regard  to  air  hijacking  in  particular, 
the  United  States  has  repeatedly  pressed  in 
the  International  Civil  Aviation  Organiza- 
tion for  the  adoption  of  an  independent  con- 
vention enabling  states  parties  to  act  in 
concert  against  a  state,  even  if  not  a  party, 
that  harbors  hijackers  or  saboteurs  or  that 
fails  to  return  an  aircraft,  passengers,  or 
crew.  We  will  continue  to  urge  the  adoption 
of  such  a  convention,  because  we  believe  that 
it  could  provide  for  worldwide  enforcement 
of  the  fundamental  legal  principles  that  are 
reflected  in  the  Hague  Convention. 

Mr.  President,  this  Council  can  and  should 
reaffirm  its  own  stand  in  opposition  to  air 
hijacking  which  was  expressed  in  the  Coun- 
cil's consensus  decision  on  hijacking  adopted 
on  June  20,  1972.  Let  us  condemn  the  taking 
of  innocent  people  as  hostages.  Let  us  de- 
plore the  threat  to  innocent  human  life  at 
the  hands  of  terrorists.  Let  us  also  reaffirm 
our  dedication  to  the  preservation  of  the  na- 


August  2,  1976 


183 


tional  sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity  of 
every  member  state.  Most  important,  let  us 
take  a  firm  stand  against  terrorist  hijacking 
— one  of  the  most  dangerous  threats  to  peace 
and  security  in  the  world  today. 

Mr.  President,  these  are  the  measured  and 
considered  views  of  my  government  concern- 
ing this  episode,  views  with  which  I  totally 
concur.  But  I  ask  you  and  my  colleagues  here 
to  bear  with  me  a  few  minutes  longer,  for  I 
wish  to  make  some  personal  comments  about 
this  episode  in  the  context  of  the  image  of 
the  United  Nations  itself  and  particularly 
the  Security  Council. 

My  tenure  here,  as  you  all  well  know,  has 
been  of  very  short  duration — approximately 
four  months.  In  that  period  of  time  the  Se- 
curity Council  has  been  in  session  almost 
continuously.  With  rare  exceptions  the  issues 
before  it  have  been  exclusively  those  of  the 
Middle  East,  outstandingly,  and  southern 
Africa. 

To  my  Arab  friends  here  and  elsewhere: 
the  U.S.  delegation  has  made  it  clear  on  sev- 
eral occasions  that  problems  in  the  Middle 
East  are  by  no  means  totally  one-sided.  Each 
of  us,  I  am  sure,  has  individual  pictures  and 
vivid  images  that  dwell  in  our  minds  when- 
ever matters — as  they  have  over  the  last 
four  months  many  times — concerning  the 
Middle  East  confront  us. 

In  my  own  personal  experience,  there  is 
outstandingly  a  visit  to  a  refugee  camp 
southwest  of  Amman,  where  decent  people 
were  living  under  very  trying  conditions  only 
with  the  help  of  UNRWA  [U.N.  Relief  and 
Works  Agency  for  Palestine  Refugees  in  the 
Near  East],  having  been  expelled  from  their 
homes  in  some  cases  not  once  but  twice,  in 
1948  and  1967.  And  another  picture  which 
will  never  leave  my  mind  ever — the  condi- 
tion of  Karameh  after  the  raid  on  that 
village. 

On  the  other  hand  there  is  an  equally  vivid 
picture  of  Jews  with  access  now  to  pray  at 
the  Wailing  Wall.  Or,  even  more  vivid — and 
you  must  all  remember  these — those  horrors 
of  Buchenwald,  Dachau,  and  Auschwitz. 

To  my  African  friends  here  and  elsewhere : 
on  the  issue  of  the  liberation  of  southern 
Africa,     my     government     has    put     itself 


squarely  on  the  side  of  those  who  seek  ma- 
jority rule  with  the  determination  that  it  be 
achieved  by  peaceful  means.  I  am  very  happy 
that  policy  has  been  adopted  while  I  am  here. 

But  to  my  Arab  and  African  friends  I  say 
here  and  now,  loud  and  strong,  there  may 
have  been  mixed  pictures  concerning  some  of 
the  questions  that  have  confronted  the  Se- 
curity Council  in  the  immediate  past,  but  to 
my  mind  there  is  no  doubt  on  this  one,  not 
one  iota. 

Why  do  I  say  that  so  strongly  and  so 
deeply?  Yes,  there  was  a  temporary  breach 
of  the  territorial  sovereignty  of  Uganda,  and 
let  us  hope  that  that  never  happens  again. 
But  there  is  another  value,  another  judgment 
which  surpasses  that  one  in  importance. 

Like  most  of  you  I  have  never  been  the 
head  of  a  nation  nor  had  the  responsibilities 
thereof,  but  I  have  been  accountable  for  the 
safety  and  protection  of  12  million  people  in 
the  Commonwealth  of  Pennsylvania.  During 
that  period  of  time,  even  though  hardly 
under  the  same  circumstances,  I  know,  there 
were  several  occasions  in  which  incidents 
concerning  the  safety,  the  protection,  and 
the  lives  of  Pennsylvanians  came  to  my  office. 
Action  thereon  had  to  be  decided  by  me,  the 
ultimate  executive  authority  in  the  Common- 
wealth. That  was  my  first  and  foremost  re- 
sponsibility. It  is  the  first  and  foremost 
responsibility  of  all  governments. 

In  this  episode,  that  responsibility  lay  with 
the  Government  of  Israel  to  protect  her  citi- 
zens, hostages  threatened  with  their  very 
lives,  in  mortal  danger  in  a  faraway  place. 
Those  innocent  people  were  subjected  to  the 
terrorist  hijacking  of  the  airplane  on  which 
they  were  rightfully  flying  and  further  sub- 
jected to  a  six-day  terrorizing  experience  in 
a  foreign  country — seeing  other  persons  freed 
while  the  Jews  were  forced  to  remain — sub- 
jected at  gunpoint  to  seven  hijacker  terrorists 
who  know  no  law — aware  that  the  only  pos- 
sibility of  freedom  came  from  a  government 
whose  head  had  previously  rejoiced  at  the 
slaying  of  Israeli  athletes  at  Munich,  called 
for  the  extinction  of  Israel,  and  praised  that 
madman  Hitler,  who  had  on  his  evil  con- 
science, if  he  had  a  conscience  at  all,  the 
murder  of  6  million  Jews. 


184 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Under  such  circumstances,  it  seems  to  me, 
the  Government  of  Israel  invoked  one  of  the 
most  remarkable  rescue  missions  in  history, 
a  combination  of  guts  and  brains  that  has 
seldom  if  ever  been  surpassed.  It  electrified 
millions  everywhere,  and  I  confess  I  was  one 
of  them. 

Justified,  truly  justified,  because  innocent, 
decent  people  have  a  right  to  live  and  be  res- 
cued from  terrorists  who  recognize  no  law 
and  are  ready  to  kill  if  their  demands  are 
not  met. 

Who  has  a  conscience  about  this?  We 
should.  Every  single  one  of  us. 

I  assume  that  every  one  of  us  wants  to  do 
all  in  our  power  to  avoid  such  episodes  in  the 
future.  This  is  one  episode  in  a  series  of  cases 
of  hijackings  by  terrorists — about  which  we 
can  do  a  great  deal.  I  believe  that  if  we  really 
want  to,  the  Security  Council  and  the  United 
Nations  can  wipe  such  episodes  off  the  face 
of  this  earth. 

As  my  government  has  stated  in  this  mes- 
sage I  have  just  finished  delivering,  we  can 
do  this ;  I  pointed  out  how.  We  must  do  this, 
and  then  and  only  then  will  our  consciences 
be  clear  for  the  future.  They  will  never  be 
clear  for  the  past. 


STATEMENT   BY   AMBASSADOR    BENNETT, 
JULY  14 

USUN    press    release    83   dated   July    14 

I  would  like  to  make  several  observations 
on  the  conduct  and  substance  of  the  debate 
which  we  are  now  concluding.  The  United 
States  very  much  regrets  that  this  Council 
did  not  take  positive  action  against  the  crim- 
inal act  of  hijacking  committed  last  week 
against  the  Air  France  aircraft  and  its  pas- 
sengers. 

We  believe  that  the  resolution  which  we 
cosponsored  with  the  United  Kingdom  was  a 
balanced  attempt  at  recording  this  Council's 
determined  opposition  to  hijacking,  as  well 
as  its  respect  for  the  sovereignty  and  terri- 
torial integrity  of  states  and  its  concern  for 
the  loss  of  human  life  in  this  tragic  incident. 
We  take  considerable  satisfaction  that,  with 


a  majority  of  the  membership  participating 
in  the  vote,  not  a  single  delegation  could 
bring  itself  to  vote  against  such  a  balanced 
resolution. 

Mr.  President,  we  deeply  regret  the  deaths 
of  those  on  all  sides  of  this  controversy, 
those  who  had  no  responsibility  for  the  act  of 
terrorism  which  gave  rise  to  the  subsequent 
events.  We  extend  our  sincere  condolences 
once  again  to  all  the  families  concerned, 
and  particularly  to  the  family  of  Mrs.  Dora 
Bloch. 

Furthermore,  we  are  most  sensitive  to  the 
major  points  stressed  by  our  colleagues  from 
Africa  during  this  debate — that  sovereignty 
and  territorial  integrity  of  states  must  be 
sustained  and  protected.  This  is  a  natural 
and  fundamental  standard  to  which  my  gov- 
ernment fully  adheres.  As  my  country  re- 
views its  history  in  the  year  1976,  we 
particularly  recall  our  own  keen  concern  with 
this  principle  from  the  very  outset  of  our 
life  as  a  nation.  We  do  not,  however,  view 
the  exceptional  nature  of  the  incident  at 
Entebbe  as  unjustified  under  international 
law.  At  the  same  time,  we  do  not  see  it  as  a 
precedent  which  would  justify  any  future  un- 
authorized entry  into  another  state's  terri- 
tory that  is  not  similarly  justified  by  excep- 
tional circumstances. 

This  debate  has  provided,  in  our  view,  a 
valuable  opportunity  to  air  the  entire  ques- 
tion of  hijacking  and  the  issues  surrounding 
the  Israeli  operation  at  Entebbe.  The  debate 
has  heightened  public  and  governmental 
awareness  of  the  real  threat  which  air  hi- 
jacking poses  to  the  world  today.  The  Secu- 
rity Council  has  provided  a  unique  forum  for 
a  full  discussion  of  what  actually  happened 
at  Entebbe  and  the  antecedent  cause  of  that 
incident. 

One  lesson  has  emerged  clearly  for  all  of 
us  in  this  debate.  We  have  had  impressed 
upon  us  the  terrible  toll  in  human  life  and 
property  caused  by  hijacking  and  the  use  of 
innocent  people  as  hostages. 

My  delegation  has  been  encouraged  by  sev- 
eral statements  made  during  this  debate  by 
members  of  the  United  Nations  who  have 
stated  their  intention  to  press  for  action 
against   hijacking   by   this   organization.   In 


August  2,  1976 


185 


particular,  we  applaud  the  statement  by  the 
Representative  of  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,  who  announced  that  his  govern- 
ment will  urge  action  by  the  31st  General 
Assembly  for  international  measures  to  pre- 
vent the  taking  of  hostages.  My  government 
will  strongly  support  the  efforts  of  the  Fed- 
eral Republic  of  Germany,  and  we  shall  work 
closely  with  them  and  with  others  to  encour- 
age all  members  of  the  United  Nations  to 
support  a  convention  to  this  end.  We  are 
pleased  to  note  in  that  connection  that  the 
Representative  of  the  U.S.S.R.,  speaking  to 
the  Security  Council  on  July  13,  said,  and  I 
quote,  "We  are  ready,  along  with  other  states, 
to  take  new  additional  measui-es  against  acts 
of  international  terrorism." 

The  sooner  all  the  member  nations  of  this 
body  formally  recognize  that  hijacking  is  a 
worldwide  problem,  the  sooner  we  take  posi- 
tive steps  to  do  away  with  this  plague  of 
international  lawlessness,  the  safer  life  will 
be  for  ourselves  and  for  our  children. 


TEXTS  OF  DRAFT  RESOLUTIONS 


U.S.-U.K.  Draft  Resolution  ' 

The  Security  Council, 

Noting  the  letter  dated  5  July  1976  from  the 
Permanent  Representative  of  Uganda  to  the  United 
Nations  (S/12124)  and  the  letter  dated  4  July  1976 
from  the  Permanent  Representative  of  Israel  to  the 
United  Nations  (S/12123), 

Recalling  its  decision  on  hijacking  adopted  by 
consensus  on  20  June  1972,  the  Hague  Convention 
for  the  Suppression  of  Unlawful  Seizure  of  Aircraft, 
the  Montreal  Convention  for  the  Suppression  of  Un- 
lawful Acts  Against  the  Safety  of  Civil  Aviation, 
and  the  Standards  and  Practices  Governing  Airport 
Security  and  Aircraft  Safety  recommended  by  the 
International    Civil    Aviation    Organization, 

Reminding  all  States  signatory  to  the  Hague 
and  Montreal  Conventions  of  their  obligations  flow- 
ing from  their  accession  to  these  agreements, 


'U.N.  doc.  S/12138;  the  Council  voted  on  the  draft 
resolution  on  July  14;  the  vote  was  6  in  favor  (U.S., 
U.K.,  France,  Italy,  Japan,  Sweden),  with  2  absten- 
tions (Panama,  Romania);  Benin,  the  People's  Re- 
public of  China,  Guyana,  Libya,  Pakistan,  Tanzania, 
and  the  U.S.S.R.  did  not  participate  in  the  vote.  Nine 
affirmative  votes  are   required  for  adoption. 


1.  Condemns  hijacking  and  all  other  acts  which 
threaten  the  lives  of  passengers  and  crews  and  the 
safety  of  international  civil  aviation  and  calls  upon 
all  States  to  take  every  necessary  measure  to  pre- 
vent and  punish  all  such  terrorist  acts; 

2.  Deplores  the  tragic  loss  of  human  life  which 
has  resulted  from  the  hijacking  of  the  French  air- 
craft; 

3.  Reaffirms  the  need  to  respect  the  sovereignty 
and  territorial  integrity  of  all  States  in  accordance 
with  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations  and  inter- 
national law; 

4.  Enjoins  the  international  community  to  give 
the  highest  priority  to  the  consideration  of  further 
means  of  assuring  the  safety  and  reliability  of  inter- 
national civil  aviation. 

Benin-Llbya-Tanzania  Draft  Resolution  ^ 

The  Security  Council, 

Having  considered  the  contents  of  the  telegram 
from  the  current  Chainnan  of  the  Organization  of 
African  Unity  (OAU),  the  Prime  Minister  of  Mauri- 
tius, His  Excellency,  Sir  Seewoosagur  Ramgoolam 
(S/12126),  and  the  letter  from  the  President  of 
Uganda,  His  Excellency,  Field  Marshall  Alhaji  Dr. 
Idi  Amin  Dada    (S/12124), 

Having  heard  the  statement  of  the  Foreign  Min- 
ister of  Uganda, 

Haviyig  heard  the  statement  of  the  Foreign  Min- 
ister of  Mauritius,  Chairman  of  the  twenty-seventh 
ordinary  session  of  the  OAU  Council  of  Ministers, 

Having  also  heard  the  statement  of  the  repre- 
sentative of  Israel, 

Bearing  in  mind  that  all  States  Members  of  the 
United  Nations  must  refrain  in  their  international 
relations  from  the  threat  or  use  of  force  against  the 
territorial  integrity  or  political  independence  of  any 
State,  or  in  any  other  manner  inconsistent  with  the 
purposes  of  the  United  Nations  Charter, 

Gravely  concerned  at  the  premeditated  military 
raid  committed  by  Israel  against  Uganda  in  viola- 
tion of  its  sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity. 

Grieved  at  the  tragic  loss  of  human  life  caused 
by  the  Israeli  invasion  of  Ugandan  territory. 

Gravely  concerned  also  at  the  damage  and  de- 
struction done  by  the  Israeli  invading  forces  in 
Uganda, 

1.  Condemns  Israel's  flagrant  violation  of 
Uganda's  sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity; 

2.  Demands  that  the  Government  of  Israel  meet 
the  just  claims  of  the  Government  of  Uganda  for 
full  compensation  for  the  damage  and  destruction 
inflicted  on  Uganda; 

3.  Requests  the  Secretary-General  to  follow  the 
implementation  of  this  resolution. 


=  U.N.  doc.  S/12139;  the  draft  resolution  was  with- 
drawn by  its  sponsors  on  July  14. 


186 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

Finance 

Amendments  to  the  agreement  of  April  8,  1959,  as 
amended,  establishing  the  Inter-American  Devel- 
opment Bank  with  respect  to  the  creation  of  the 
inter-regional  capital  stock  of  the  Bank  and  to 
related  matters.  Approved  at  Washington  June  1, 
1976.  Entered  into  force  June   1,  1976. 

Property — Industrial 

Convention  of  Paris  for  the  protection  of  industrial 

property   of   March   20,   1883,  as   revised.    Done   at 

Stockholm   July    14,    1967.    Articles    1    through    12 

entered   into  force   May   19,   1970;   for  the   United 

States    August   25,    1973.    Articles    13    through    30 

entered  into  force  April  26,   1970;  for  the  United 

States   September  5,   1970.  TIAS  6923. 

Notifications    from    World    Intellectual    Property 

Organization  that  accessions  deposited:  Ghana, 

Libya,'  June  28,  1976;  Mauritania,  June  21,  1976; 

Mauritius,  June  24,  1976. 

Property — Intellectual 

Convention  establishing  the  World  Intellectual  Prop- 
erty   Organization.    Done    at    Stockholm    July    14, 
1967.   Entered   into  force   April   26,   1970;   for  the 
United  States  August  25,  1970.  TIAS  6932. 
Accessions     deposited:     Libya,     June     28,     1976; 

Mauritania,  June   17,  1976;   Mauritius,  June  21, 

1976. 

Terrorism 

Convention  to  prevent  and  punish  the  acts  of  terror- 
ism taking  the  form  of  crimes  against  persons  and 
related  extortion  that  are  of  international  signifi- 
cance. Signed  at  Washington  February  2,  1971. 
Entered  into  force  October  16,  1973.= 
Ratification  deposited:  Dominican  Republic,  May 
25,   1976. 

War 

Convention  relating  to  the  treatment  of  prisoners  of 

war; 
Convention  for  the  amelioration  of  the  condition  of 
the  wounded  and  sick  of  armies  in  the  field. 
Done  at  Geneva  July  27,  1929.  Entered  into  force 
June  19,  1931;  for  the  United  States  August  4, 
1932.  TIAS  2021,  2074,  respectively. 
Notification   of   succession:    Papua    New    Guinea, 
April  7,  1976. 
Geneva  convention  for  amelioration  of  condition   of 
wounded  and  sick  in  armed  forces  in  the  field; 


Geneva  convention  for  amelioration  of  the  condition 
of  wounded,  sick  and  shipwrecked  members  of 
armed  forces  at  sea; 
Geneva  convention  relative  to  the  treatment  of  pris- 
oners of  war; 
Geneva  convention  relative  to  protection  of  civilian 
persons  in  time  of  war. 

Done  at  Geneva  August  12,  1949.  Entered  into  force 
October  21,  1950;  for  the  United  States  Febru- 
ary 2,   1956.   TIAS  3362,   3363,   3364,   and   3365, 
respectively. 
Notification    of   succession:    Papua    New    Guinea, 

May  26,  1976. 
Accession    deposited:    Sao    Tome    and    Principe, 
May  21,  1976. 

Wheat 

Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the  wheat 
trade  convention  (part  of  the  international  wheat 
agreement)  1971  (TIAS  7144).  Done  at  Washing- 
ton March  17,  1976.  Entered  into  force  June  19, 
1976  with  respect  to  certain  parts;  with  respect 
to  remaining  parts  July  1,  1975;  entered  into  force 
provisionally  for  the  United  States  June  19,  1976. 
Accession  deposited:  Dominican  Republic,  July 
13,  1976. 


BILATERAL 

Bolivia 

Loan  agreement  relating  to  the  improvement  of 
rural  education  in  Bolivia,  with  annex.  Signed  at 
La  Paz  December  29,  1975.  Entered  into  force 
December  29,  1975. 

Loan  agreement  to  assist  small  farmer  organizations 
in  Bolivia  to  strengthen  their  viability  as  self- 
sustaining  units,  with  annex.  Signed  at  La  Paz 
March  24,  1976.  Entered  into  force  March  24,  1976. 

Canada 

Agreement  amending  and  extending  the  agreement 
of  June  29,  1973  (TIAS  7702),  relating  to  the  use 
of  facilities  at  Goose  Bay  airport  by  the  United 
States.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Ottawa 
June  28  and  29,  1976.  Entered  into  force  July  1, 
1976. 

Colombia 

Loan  agreement  concerning  construction  of  feeder 
roads  as  a  means  of  promoting  increased  agricul- 
tural productivity  in  Colombia,  with  annex.  Signed 
at  Bogota  March  12,  1976.  Entered  into  force 
March  22,  1976. 

Guarantee  agreement  relating  to  the  loan  agreement 
of  March  12,  1976,  concerning  construction  of 
feeder  roads  as  a  means  of  promoting  increased 
agricultural  productivity  in  Colombia.  Signed  at 
Bogota  April  22,  1976,  Entered  into  force  April  22, 
1976. 


'  With  reservation  and  declaration. 
'■'  Not  in  force  for  the  United  States. 


August  2,  1976 


187 


Costa  Rica 

Agreement  relating  to  the  operation  and  mainte- 
nance of  a  rawinsonde  observation  station  at  San 
Jose,  with  memorandum  of  arrangement  dated 
June  28,  1976.  Eflfected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
San  Jose  April  29  and  June  8,  1976.  Entered  into 
force  June  8,  1976. 

Agreement  relating  to  the  provision  of  additional 
assistance  by  the  United  States  to  support  co- 
operative efforts  to  curb  illegal  narcotics  produc- 
tion and  traffic.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
San  Jose  June  21  and  24,  1976.  Entered  into  force 
June  24,  1976. 

Dominican  Republic 

Agreement  relating  to  the  limitation  of  meat  im- 
ports from  the  Dominican  Republic  for  calendar 
year  1976.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Santo 
Domingo  April  29  and  June  30,  1976.  Entered  into 
force  June  30,  1976. 

Haiti 

Loan  agreement  to  assist  Haiti  in  reconstructing 
agricultural  feeder  roads,  with  annex.  Signed  at 
Port-au-Prince  June  29,  1976.  Entered  into  force 
June  29,  1976. 

Mali 

Project  agreement  relating  to  improvement  of  crop 
production  in  Mali,  with  annexes.  Signed  at  Ba- 
mako June  29,  1976.  Entered  into  force  June  29, 
1976. 

Mexico 

Procedures  for  mutual  assistance  in  the  administra- 
tion of  justice  in  connection  with  the  General  Tire 
and  Rubber  Company  and  the  Firestone  Tire  and 
Rubber  Company  matters.  Signed  at  Washington 
June  23,  1976.  Entered  into  force  June  23,  1976. 

Morocco 

Loan  agreement  relating  to  construction  of  the 
Doukkala-Zemamra  sprinkler  irrigation  system, 
with  annex.  Signed  at  Rabat  June  14,  1976.  En- 
tered into  force  June  14,  1976. 

Seychelles 

Agreement  relating  to  the  establishment,  operation 
and  maintenance  of  a  tracking  and  telemetry  fa- 
cility on  the  island  of  Mahe.  Signed  at  Victoria 
June  29,  1976.  Entered  into  force  June  29,  1976. 

Switzerland 

Treaty  on  mutual  assistance  in  criminal  matters  with 
related  notes.   Signed  at  Bern   May  25,   1973." 
Instrument    of   ratification   signed    by    the   Presi- 
dent: July  10,  1976. 

Turkey 

Agreement  on  procedures  for  mutual  assistance  in 
the   administration   of   justice   in   connection   with 


the  Lockheed  Aircraft  Corporation  and  the 
McDonnell  Douglas  Corporation  matters.  Signed 
at  Washington  July  8,  1976.  Enters  into  force  in 
the  manner  provided  by  the  domestic  laws  of  the 
United  States  and  Turkey,  respectively. 


PUBLICATIONS 


'  Not  in  force. 


GPO  Sales  Publications 

Publications  may  be  ordered  by  catalog  or  stock 
number  from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents, 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C. 
201,02.  A  25-'percent  discount  is  made  on  orders  for 
100  or  more  copies  of  any  one  publication  mailed  to 
the  same  address.  Remittances,  payable  to  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  must  accompany 
orders.  Prices  shown  below,  which  include  domestic 
postage,  are  subject  to  change. 

Background  Notes:  Short,  factual  summaries  which 
describe  the  people,  history,  government,  economy, 
and  foreign  relations  of  each  country.  Each  contains 
a  map,  a  list  of  principal  government  officials  and 
U.S.  diplomatic  and  consular  officers,  and  a  reading 
list.  (A  complete  set  of  all  Background  Notes  cur- 
rently in  stock — at  least  140 — $21.80;  1-year  sub- 
scription service  for  approximately  77  updated  or 
new  Notes— $23.10;  plastic  binder— $1.50.)  Single 
copies  of  those  listed  below  are  available  at  35(J  each. 

Bangladesh       ....     Cat.  No.  S1.123:B22 

Pub.  8693  8  pp. 

French  Antilles  and         Cat.      No.      S1.123:F88/976 

Guiana Pub.  8856  4  pp. 

Gabon Cat.  No.  S1.123:G11 

Pub.  7968  4  pp. 

Greece Cat.  No.  S1.123:G81 

Pub.  8198  7  pp. 

Guinea-Bissau      .     .    .     Cat.    No.    S1.123:G94/2/976 

Pub.  8209  4  pp. 

Nauru Cat.  No.  S1.123:N22 

Pub.  8595  4  pp. 

Economic,  Commercial,  Scientific,  Technological,  Edu- 
cational and  Cultural  Cooperation.  Agreement  with 
India.  TIAS  8176.  15  pp.  45(!'.   (Cat.  No.  S9.10:8176). 

Space  Research — Rocket  Launches  and  Similar  Ex- 
periments   at    Cape    Parry,    Northwest    Territories. 

Understanding  with  Canada.  TIAS  8177.  6  pp.  35<f. 
(Cat.  No.  S9.10:8177). 

Peace  Corps.  Agreement  with  Mali.  TIAS  8178.  11  pp. 
Zht  (Cat.  No.  S9.10:8178). 

Trade  in  Cotton  Textiles.  Agreement  with  the  Polish 
People's  Republic.  TIAS  8180.  8  pp.  35?'.  (Cat.  No. 
S9.10:8180). 


188 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


INDEX    August  2,  1976     Vol.  LXXV,  No.  1936 


Africa.  Questions  and  Answers  Following  the 
Secretary's  Address  at  Chicago 157 

Angola 

Execution  of  Daniel  Gearhart  in  Angola  (state- 
ments by  Secretary  Kissinger  and  White 
House   Press  Secretary) 163 

Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Conference  of 
July    10 164 

Canada.  President  Ford's  News  Conference  of 
July    9    (excerpts) 161 

Commodities.  Fifth  International  Tin  Agree- 
ment Transmitted  to  the  Senate  (message 
from  President  Ford) 179 

Communism 

Questions  and  Answers  Following  the  Secre- 
tary's Address  at  Chicago 157 

Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Conference  of 
July    10 164 

Congress.    Congressional    Documents    Relating 

to    Foreign    Policy 173 

Department  and  Foreign  Service.  Secretary 
Kissinger's  News  Conference  of  July  10  .    .      164 

Developing  Countries.  The  Future  of  Amer- 
ica's Foreign  Policy  (Kissinger) 149 

Industrial  Democracies.  The  Future  of  Amer- 
ica's Foreign  Policy  (Kissinger) 149 

Israel 

President  Ford  Expresses  Satisfaction  at  Res- 
cue of  Hijacking  Victims  (letter  to  Prime 
Minister  of  Israel) 160 

President  Ford's  News  Conference  of  July  9 
(excerpts) 161 

Questions  and  Answers  Following  the  Secre- 
tary's Address  at  Chicago 157 

Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Conference  of 
July    10 164 

The  United  States  and  the  Middle  East 
(Atherton) 174 

U.S.  Gives  Views  in  Security  Council  Debate 
on  Israeli  Rescue  of  Hijacking  Victims  at 
Entebbe  Airport  (Bennett,  Scran  ton,  texts  of 
draft    resolutions) 181 

Lebanon 

Prince  Abdallah  of  Saudi  Arabia  Visits  Wash- 
ington (toast  by  Secretary  Kissinger)  .    .     .      172 

Questions  and  Answers  Following  the  Secre- 
tary's Address  at  Chicago 157 

Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Conference  of 
July    10 164 

Middle  East.  The  United  States  and  the 
Middle  East  (Atherton) 174 

Presidential  Documents 

Fifth  International  Tin  Agreement  Trans- 
mitted to  the   Senate 179 

President  Ford  Expresses  Satisfaction  at  Res- 
cue   of   Hijacking  Victims 160 

President  Ford's  News  Conference  of  July  9 
(excerpts) 161 

Publications.  GPO  Sales  Publications  ....       188 

Saudi  Arabia.  Prince  Abdallah  of  Saudi  Arabia 
Visits  Washington  (toast  by  Secretary  Kis- 
singer)            172 

Terrorism 

President  Ford  Expresses  Satisfaction  at  Res- 
cue of  Hijacking  Victims  (letter  to  Prime 
Minister  of  Israel) 160 


Questions  and  Answers  Following  the  Secre- 
tary's Address  at  Chicago 157 

Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Conference  of 
July    10 164 

U.S.  Gives  Views  in  Security  Council  Debate 
on  Israeli  Rescue  of  Hijacking  Victims  at 
Entebbe  Airport  (Bennett,  Scranton,  texts 
of   draft   resolutions) 181 

Treaty  Information 

Current  Actions 187 

Fifth  International  Tin  Agreement  Trans- 
mitted to  the  Senate  (message  from  Presi- 
dent Ford) 179 

Uganda.  U.S.  Gives  Views  in  Security  Council 
Debate  on  Israeli  Rescue  of  Hijacking  Vic- 
tims at  Entebbe  Airport  (Bennett,  Scranton, 
texts  of  draft  resolutions) 181 

U.S.S.R. 

The  Future  of  America's  Foreign  Policy  (Kis- 
singer)       149 

President  Ford's  News  Conference  of  July  9 
(excerpts) 161 

Questions  and  Answers  Following  the  Secre- 
tary's  Address   at  Chicago 157 

Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Conference  of 
July    10 164 

United  Nations 

Questions  and  Answers  Following  the  Secre- 
tary's Address   at   Chicago 157 

U.S.  Gives  Views  in  Security  Council  Debate 
on  Israeli  Rescue  of  Hijacking  Victims  at 
Entebbe  Airport  (Bennett,  Scranton,  texts 
of  draft   resolutions) • .      181 


Name  Index 

Atherton,  Alfred  L.,  Jr 174 

Bennett,  W.  Tapley,  Jr 181 

Ford,   President 160,  161,  179 

Kissinger,    Secretary    .     .    .     149,  157,  163,  164,  172 

Nessen,   Ronald   H 163 

Scranton,  William  W 181 


Checklist  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  July  12-18 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 


No.    Date 


Sabject 


*343A  7/12  Correction  to  itinerary  of  official 
visit  of  Federal  German  Chan- 
cellor Schmidt. 

*346  7/12  Arthur  W.  Hummel,  Jr.,  sworn  in 
as  Assistant  Secretary  for  East 
Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  (bio- 
graphic data). 

*347  7/12  Office  for  International  Labor  Or- 
ganization Affairs  established 
in  Bureau  of  International  Or- 
ganization Affairs. 

*348  7/13  U.S.  and  Canada  discuss  Poplar 
River  thermal  generation  proj- 
ect. 


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THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 

BULLETIN 


Volume  LXXV 


No.  1937 


August  9,  1976 


CHANGES  AND  CHOICES  AT  THE  UNITED  NATIONS 
Address  by  Assistant  Secretary  Lewis     189 

U.S.  DISCUSSES  RELATIONS  WITH  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES 

IN  OPENING  STATEMENT  AT  ECOSOC  MEETING 

Statement  by  Ambassador  Scranton     201 

DEPARTMENT  DISCUSSES  U.S.  PRISONERS  IN  MEXICO 
Statement  by  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  Luers    211 


THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 

For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE  BULLET  I 


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the    Readers'    Guide   to    Periodical    Literature. 


Vol.  LXXV,  No.  1937 
August  9,  1976 

The  Department  of  State  BULLETIN, 
a  weekly  publication  issued  by  tht 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau  ot 
Public  Affairs,  provides  tlte  public  oni 
interested  agencies  of  tlte  government 
icitfi  information  on  developments  in 
the  field  of  U.S.  foreign  relations  am 
on  the  work  of  the  Department  ant 
the  Foreign  Service. 
The  BULLETIN  includes  seleetu 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy,  issuet 
by  tfie  White  House  and  the  Depart 
ment,  and  statements,  addresses 
and  news  conferences  of  the  Presidem 
and  the  Secretary  of  State  and  othei 
officers  of  the  Department,  as  well  w 
special  articles  on  various  phases  a 
international  affairs  and  the  function 
of  the  Department.  Information  i 
included  concerning  treaties  and  inter 
national  agreements  to  which  thi 
United  States  is  or  may  become  i 
party  and  on  treaties  of  general  inter 
national  interest. 

Publications  of  the  Department  oi 
State,  United  Nations  documents,  ant 
legislative  material  in  the  field  01 
international  relations  are  also  listei 


Changes  and  Choices  at  the  United  Nations 


Address  by  Samuel  W.  Lewis 

Assistant  Secretary  for  International  Organization  Affairs  ' 


No  people  understand  better  than  the 
American  people  the  need  to  respond  crea- 
;ively  to  the  demands  of  rapid  change. 
And  no  people  have  been  more  successful 
:han  the  American  people  at  finding  prac- 
ical  solutions  to  the  conflicts  which  change 
nevitably  creates. 

Our  own  history  is  characterized  by 
Iramatic  transformation.  We  have  grown 
rom  a  small  to  an  immense  country.  We 
leveloped  from  an  agricultural  society  to 
in  industrial  giant.  We  changed  from  a 
country  of  homogeneous  racial  origins  to 
i  multiracial  society  of  rich  and  diverse 
composition.  And  we  have  evolved  from  a 
country  preoccupied  with  its  own  concerns 
;o  a  nation  burdened  with  the  responsibili- 
;ies  of  world  leadership. 

Beyond  our  borders,  the  world  itself 
changes  with  extraordinary  rapidity.  We 
ire  all  familiar  with  the  revolutions  of  our 
entury — in  technology,  in  global  com- 
nnunications,  in  the  conflict  of  ideologies, 
n  the  creation  of  mass  destruction  weap- 
)ns,  and  in  the  explosion  of  population 
rowth.  These  have  produced  fears,  hopes, 
'erment,  and  struggle — arousing  new  ex- 
aectations  in  places  where  for  centuries 
;here  was  only  mute  suffering. 

All  of  these  changes,  good  and  bad,  in- 
jvitably  create  conflict.  And  conflict  re- 
luires  that  we  make  choices.  This  is  in- 
jscapable.  If  we  try  to  avoid  making 
choices,  that  is  in  itself  a  choice. 


'  Made  before  the  General  Federation  of  Women's 
lubs  at  Philadelphia,  Pa.,  on  June  17  (text  from 
Department  of  State  oress  release). 


The  pace  of  change  throughout  the 
world  is  nowhere  more  vividly  exposed 
than  at  the  United  Nations.  And  because 
the  breadth  of  the  U.N.'s  work  is  so  central 
to  many  of  our  nation's  purposes,  I  think  it 
is  vital  that  all  of  us  assess  realistically 
the  choices — and  their  consequences — that 
confront  us  in  the   United   Nations  today. 

This  afternoon,  then,  I  want  to  discuss 
with  you  what  I  believe  to  be  the  most 
important  changes  with  which  we  must 
cope  and  the  practical  choices  which  fol- 
low from  them.  Our  decisions  can  shape  the 
world  system  for  the  rest  of  this  century 
and  well  into  the  next.  And  our  future 
security  and  prosperity  are  both  at  stake. 

The  Changes  Confronting  Us 

Among  the  great  changes  of  the  last 
three  decades,  I  would  like  to  focus  on 
three  which  I  believe  are  especially 
important: 

— First,  the  significance  of  a  U.N.  mem- 
bership expanded  roughly  three  times, 
from  some  50  to  nearly  150  .sovereign 
nations. 

— Second,  the  change  in  the  role  and  in- 
fluence of  the  United  States. 

— Third,  the  changes  in  the  problems 
with  which  the  world  community  must 
cope,  especially  at  the  United  Nations. 

When  the  United  Nations  was  founded 
over  30  years  ago,  most  of  its  original  51 
members  shared  Western  traditions  of 
government      and      practiced     traditional 


^ugust  9,  1976 


189 


forms  of  diplomacy.  Our  main  preoccupa- 
tion in  the  early  years  was  to  contain 
threats  from  the  Soviet  Union  and  its  allies. 
We  did  well  in  this  task ;  most  of  the  world, 
most  members  of  the  United  Nations,  were 
solidly  with  us. 

In  the  1960's  dozens  of  new  countries 
emerged  from  colonialism.  We  welcomed 
the  newly  independent  states — indeed,  we 
were  foremost  among  the  major  powers  in 
pressing  for  a  rapid  end  to  colonial  em- 
pires. We  did  so  because  the  right  of  peo- 
ples to  rule  themselves  is  one  of  our  bed- 
rock beliefs,  enshrined  200  years  ago  by 
Jefferson's  pen  here  at  Philadelphia.  We 
cannot  forget  our  own  first  premise.  The 
principle  of  self-rule  transcends  the  incon- 
venience and  conflict  which  we  and  other 
governments  have  to  endure  as  new  states 
scramble  over  unfamiliar  terrain  on  the 
road  toward  their  rightful  place  in  the 
family  of  nations. 

But  the  consequences  for  the  United 
Nations  have  been  profound.  Originally, 
the  U.N.'s  problems  were  those  of  its 
founding  members — predominantly  West- 
ern countries.  Originally,  we  practiced 
diplomacy  there  in  the  traditional  mode — 
even  allowing  for  an  occasional  outburst, 
as  when  a  Soviet  leader  once  employed  a 
shoe  noisily  on  his  table  to  capture  the 
world's  attention. 

Today  the  United  Nations  is  preoccupied 
with  issues  important  to  both  new  and 
older  states — problems  of  economic  links 
between  the  developing  and  industrial 
worlds  or  the  process  of  completing  the 
liquidation  of  colonialism  and  racial  dis- 
crimination in  southern  Africa.  Today,  U.N. 
debates  feature  a  rough-and-tumble  style 
of  diplomacy,  practiced  by  many  represent- 
atives of  the  newer  states  which  have  no 
quiet,  genteel  diplomatic  tradition. 

These  changes  have  good  and  bad  as- 
pects. It  is  good  that  most  of  the  world  is 
now  represented  in  the  United  Nations  and 
that  the  world  body  has  begun  to  tackle 
global  problems  of  far-reaching  impor- 
tance to  the  world's  peoples,  problems 
such     as     food      production,      population 


growth,  threats  to  the  global  environment, 
or  the  ownership  of  resources  found  in  the ! 
world's  oceans.  But  it  is  bad  when  inter- 
national institutions  are  misused,  when  im- 
patience and  passion  lead  to  confronta- 
tion, abusive  rhetoric,  and  illusory  tests  of  I 
strength. 

While  the  United  Nations  has  been 
changing,  so  also  have  the  past  30  years 
seen  fundamental  alterations  in  the  role 
and  influence  of  the  United  States.  When 
the  United  Nations  was  founded,  many , 
former  power  centers  of  the  world  had 
been  devastated.  U.S.  influence  and  power' 
were  overwhelming.  Everybody  needed 
our  help — desperately.  And  we  gave  gen- 
erously of  our  immense  wealth.  This  situa- 
tion of  almost  total  U.S.  preponderance 
was,  of  course,  reflected  at  the  United  i 
Nations. 

As  we  all  know,  the  situation  hasi 
changed  dramatically.  Europe  and  Japan, 
with  our  assistance,  have  made  brilliant 
recoveries.  The  economic  and  military 
strength  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  its  allies 
have  increased  greatly.  The  People's  Re- 
public of  China  is  now  a  major  actor  on 
the  world  scene.  And  many  of  the  100 
new  countries  have  become  significant  par- 
ticipants in  the  world  economy. 

This  does  not  mean  that  we  have  become 
in  any  sense  a  second-rate  nation.  We  are ; 
still  the  world's  strongest  country,  mili- 
tarily and  economically.  The  Common- 
wealth of  Pennsylvania  alone  has  a  greater 
production  of  goods  and  services  than  nine- 
tenths  of  the  world's  nations.  And  more 
important,  America  and  American  ideals 
are  still  a  source  of  hope  for  much  of  the 
world.  Our  creativity  and  our  ability  to  find 
innovative  solutions  to  new  challenges  are 
greatly  admired.  But  others  are  also  im- 
portant now  and  play  vital  roles  along 
with  us.  This  change  is  reflected  in  the 
United  Nations.  Indeed,  it  would  be  strange 
if  it  were  not. 

And  at  the  very  time  when  our  own  rela- 
tive power  to  control  events  has  lessened, 
we  find  ourselves  confronted  by  new  prob- 
lems   of    enormous    complexity — problems; 


190 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


which  even  raise  questions  about  man- 
kind's ability  to  survive  into  the  21st 
century. 

Now  we  must  work  out  how  4  billion 
human  beings  can  better  share  the  re- 
sources of  our  planet  in  a  way  that  pro- 
motes global  economic  growth  and  pro- 
duces more  economic  justice  for  millions 
who  have  been  living  at  the  margin  of  exist- 
ence. Now  we  must  devise  means  to  pre- 
serve our  environment  for  future  genera- 
tions while  harnessing  and  adapting  tech- 
nology for  economic  development  rather 
than  destruction.  And  of  course  some  of 
the  age-old  problems  remain  as  vital,  as 
demanding,  as  ever — the  need  to  contain 
local  conflict,  to  resolve  disputes,  and  to 
avoid  world  war. 


The  Choices  Open  To  Us 

Changes  of  such  vast  magnitude  inevita- 
bly demand  choices.  I  would  like  to  define 
them  by  asking  three  fundamental  ques- 
tions, all  of  which  have  particular  rele- 
vance to  our  role  in  the  United  Nations: 

— First,  are  we  prepared  to  be  realistic 
in  confronting  the  world's  problems  and  in 
recognizing  our  own  strengths  and  limits? 

— Second,  are  we  prepared  to  commit 
our  energies  to  cooperative  endeavors  with- 
in the  framework  of  existing  world  institu- 
tions? 

— Third,  are  we  prepared  to  bring  to 
bear  our  special  blend  of  idealism  and 
practicality? 

These  are  big  questions.  They  are  well 
worth  our  honest  examination;  for  our 
answers  to  them  will  essentially  decide 
whether  we  play  a  leading,  constructive 
role  in  solving  world  problems  or  whether 
others  increasingly  take  actions  without 
our  participation  which  may  or  may  not  be 
in   our  interest. 

First,  can  we  deal  realistically  ivith  our 
problems?  This  is  the  most  fundamental 
choice  we  may  ever  make.  For  unless  we 
look  at  things  honestly,  none  of  the  other 


choices  we  make  are  likely  to  do  us  any 
good.  We  all  know  this  in  our  professional 
lives.  One  cannot  manage  any  enterprise 
effectively  and  achieve  satisfactory  results 
unless  decisions  are  based  upon  an  honest 
appraisal  of  one's  own  capabilities — and 
an  understanding  of  the  interests  of  others. 

But  it  has  perhaps  been  harder  for 
Americans  to  keep  in  mind  the  inescap- 
able need  for  realism  in  the  sphere  of  inter- 
national relations.  We  have  until  recently 
been  spared  the  defeats  and  frustrations 
that  others  in  the  world  have  had  to  suffer. 
Our  country  has  never  been  laid  waste  by 
foreign  war.  Our  people  have  experienced 
two  centuries  of  economic  growth.  We 
have  enjoyed  personal  freedoms  about 
which  many  other  societies  have  only 
dreamed. 

Thus  we  often  feel  privileged — a  little 
apart  from  the  troubles  of  the  rest  of  the 
world.  But  now  our  only  realistic  option  is 
to  accept  the  reality  that  our  problems  are 
interwoven  with  those  of  others.  This  is  so 
for  many  reasons : 

— Because  local  wars,  as  in  the  Middle 
East,  can  easily  escalate  to  world  wars. 

— Because  global  conflict  today  can  de- 
stroy the  entire  planet  in  a  nuclear  holo- 
caust. 

— Because  our  economic  prosperity  de- 
pends on  cooperation  with  other  countries, 
rich  and  poor. 

— Because  we  need  the  raw  materials 
and  the  markets  of  many  others  to  con- 
tinue to  grow  ourselves.  To  maintain  our 
modern  industry,  for  example,  we  need  to 
import  not  only  much  of  our  energy  re- 
quirements, but  we  are  now  also  depend- 
ent on  foreign  sources  for  essential  mineral 
needs,  including  more  than  half  the 
nickel,  zinc,  and  tungsten  and  more  than 
three-fourths  of  the  bauxite,  manganese, 
cobalt,  and  tin  we  consume. 

— And  finally,  our  nation's  destiny  is 
linked  with  that  of  others  because  we 
could  not  long  survive  as  a  free  and  crea- 
tive society  if  we  were  surrounded  by  a 
world  of  hostility  and  hatred. 


August  9,  1976 


191 


These  are  the  facts  of  interdependence. 
And  our  only  realistic  course  is  not  to  deny 
them,  but  to  accept  them.  For  otherwise 
we  would  be  choosing  isolation,  stagna- 
tion— and  the  undermining  of  our  confi- 
dence, our  values,  and  even  our  freedoms. 

To  choose  realistic  options  in  inter- 
national affairs  also  means  that  we  must 
accept  and  understand  the  limits  of  our 
own  capabilities.  This  is  not  easy  for 
Americans.  Our  prestige  and  comparative 
wealth  were  so  great  after  the  Second 
World  War  that  it  seemed  we  could  get 
our  way  on  almost  any  issue  by  urging 
enough  friendly  and  grateful  countries  to 
support  our  position.  And  we  seemed  to 
have  virtually  unlimited  resources  to 
throw  at  every  problem.  Now,  however, 
we  must  learn  to  work  in  a  more  complex 
environment,  knowing  that  we  no  longer 
have  overwhelming  weight. 

We  must  also  face  the  fact  that  for  the 
foreseeable  future  the  poor  nations,  im- 
patient to  improve  their  lot,  will  continue 
to  resent  the  great  inequalities  existing 
under  a  world  system  which  they  did  not 
create.  And  many  will  blame  the  rich 
countries  who,  in  their  eyes,  were  the  cre- 
ators of  this  system  and  are  its  main  bene- 
ficiaries. 

But  let  us  not  forget — the  poor  coun- 
tries are  trying  to  do  something  with 
which  we  Americans  deeply  sympathize : 
to  improve  the  quality  of  life  for  their 
peoples.  And  they  are  struggling  against 
nearly  overwhelming  odds.  We  should  rec- 
ognize that  these  nations  vary  enormously 
in  their  history,  in  their  geography,  in  their 
cultural  backgrounds.  It  is  inevitable  that 
many  will  not  choose  paths  to  nation- 
building  that  are  the  same  as  ours.  Indeed, 
they  cannot  do  so. 

We,  however,  have  nothing  to  fear 
from  diversity.  Just  as  it  is  sacred  to  us  that 
diversity  may  flourish  within  our  own 
country,  so  also  must  we  accept  and  sup- 
port diversity  in  the  rest  of  the  world. 

Our  tasks  in  the  new  world  environment 
will  not  be  easy.  When  we  want  others  to 
do  something  in  our  interest,  we  will  have 


192 


to  show  them  that  it  is  also  in  their  inter- 
est. We  will  have  to  take  the  time  and 
effort  to  explain  our  proposals  patiently, 
because  others  will  not  automatically  as- 
sume that  we  know  what's  best  for  them 
or  that  our  and  their  interests  coincide. 
And  we  will  need  to  show  genuine  concern 
for  the  problems  of  other  nations,  since 
they  cannot  be  forced  to  take  a  sympathet- 
ic view  of  our  problems  merely  because 
we  demand  it.  Reciprocity  is  indispensable. 
But  these  concepts  should  be  very  famil- 
iar to  Americans.  We  have  been  extremely 
successful  in  business  enterprise — as  suc- 
cessful as  any  people  in  history.  It  is  the 
most  fundamental  element  of  realism  that 
if  you  want  to  make  a  deal  and  have  it 
stick,  it  has  to  be  in  the  genuine  interest  of 
both  parties. 

Our  second  major  choice  is  this:  Are  we 
willing  to  use  our  great  energies  and  capa- 
bilities to  work  at  solving  vital  world 
problems  through  the  institutions  ivhich 
we  took  the  lead  in  establishing?  This  is 
not  simply  a  rhetorical  question.  We  all 
know  that  the  United  Nations  in  recent 
years  has  been  the  scene  of  increasing  con- 
frontation. Many  therefore  have  questioned 
whether  it  remains  in  our  interest  to  stay 
in  the  United  Nations  or  at  least  in  some 
of  its  bodies,  like  the  General  Assembly, 
where  confrontation  has  sometimes  been 
acute.  And  many  also  ask  whether  we 
should  reduce  the  level  of  our  support  by 
withholding  financial  contributions. 

Let  us  examine  our  choices  objectively. 
Is  it  a  practical  option  to  turn  our  back  on 
the  United  Nations?  Could  we  start  over 
again  to  fashion  a  new  organization  which 
would  serve  our  interests  more  effectively, 
which  would  avoid  the  contention  and 
acrimony  we  find  offensive? 

The  answer  is  "No." 

When  the  United  Nations  was  founded 
after  the  Second  World  War,  we  estab- 
lished a  comprehensive,  fair,  and  balanced 
structure.  It  was  based  on  fundamental 
principles  in  which  we  believe.  But  since 
we  no  longer  possess  the  overwhelming  in- 
fluence in  the  world  state  system  that  we 

Department  of  State   Bulletin 


could  deploy  in  1945,  we  could  not  con- 
ceivably hope  to  create  today  a  U.N. 
structure  as  sound  or  as  balanced  as  the 
present  one. 

Moreover,  other  nations  do  not  want  to 
start  all  over  again.  Some  might  say  that 
the  newer  nations  are  happy  with  the 
present  system  because  a  new  majority  of 
small  countries  now  can  control  what  goes 
on  at  the  United  Nations. 

There  is  some  truth  to  this,  but  not  much. 
The  majority  of  small  countries  does  not 
control  everything  that  goes  on  at  the 
United  Nations.  In  fact,  they  complain 
bitterly  about  the  undue  influence  of  the 
great  powers — and  in  any  charter  revision 
would  seek  to  reduce  it.  We  retain  a  veto 
in  the  U.N.'s  most  sensitive  and  important 
body,  the  Security  Council,  which  can  take 
binding  decisions  on  issues  of  peace  and 
security.  And  actions  in  a  great  many  other 
U.N.  bodies  are  largely  taken  by  consensus. 
In  the  1975  General  Assembly,  for  ex- 
ample, nearly  two-thirds  of  all  decisions 
were  adopted  in  this  manner. 

This  means  that  we  have  often  been  able 
to  negotiate  satisfactory  outcomes  with 
the  new  majority.  The  examples  of  trau- 
matic confrontation  are  very  much  in  the 
minority,  even  though  their  reverberations 
sometimes  drown  out  reports  on  the  good 
work  done  throughout  the  U.N.  system. 

But  it  is  true  that  there  can  be,  and  there 
have  been,  serious  abuses  of  procedure  at 
the  United  Nations,  particularly  in  some  of 
the  larger  bodies  like  the  General  Assem- 
bly. And  there  have  been  some  egregious 
distortions  of  truth  and  applications  of  a 
double  standard  of  morality.  But  these 
offenses  will  not  be  solved  or  removed  by 
running  away  from  the  scene  of  action. 

If  we  should  turn  our  back  on  the  United 
Nations,  the  consequences  would  be: 

— The  organization  would  struggle  on 
without  us,  and  there  would  undoubtedly 
be  more,  not  less,  irresponsibility.  World 
problems  would  be  dealt  with  in  a  more 
ineffectual  way  than  they  are  now.  and  less 
in  accord  with  U.S.  interests. 

— In  time  the  world  organization  would 

August  9,  1976 


probably  collapse.  It  could  not  long  survive 
the  absence  of  the  world's  strongest  and 
economically  most  advanced   country. 

Let  there  be  no  doubt  about  this  funda- 
mental point:  If  there  ceased  to  be  a 
United  Nations,  we  would  very  shortly  find 
it  essential  to  create  a  new  world  organiza- 
tion. For  all  of  us — rich  and  poor,  large 
and  small — would  feel  the  need  of  a  global 
institution  to  deal  with  inescapable  global 
problems. 

Although  we  cannot  abandon  the  United 
Nations  or  realistically  hope  to  negotiate  a 
new,  more  satisfactory  U.N.  Charter,  we 
can  work  strenuously  to  improve  the  ef- 
fectiveness and  fairness  of  the  present  sys- 
tem. This  is  the  course  that  we  are  pursu- 
ing, and  we  believe  it  is  a  choice  which 
warrants  the  support  of  the  American 
l)eople. 

Let  me  list  a  few  of  the  steps  we  are 
taking  to  enhance  our  prospects  for  suc- 
cessful diplomacy  in  the  U.N.  arena: 

— First,  we  are  engaged  in  a  new  inten- 
sive effort  to  work  with  other  govern- 
ments on  U.N.  problems  throughout  the 
year.  Our  purpose  is  to  exchange  views — 
to  persuade,  not  to  coerce. 

— Second,  we  have  begun  to  speak  out 
more  forcefully  in  U.N.  forums  to  defend 
our  interests  and  our  country  against  un- 
warranted attacks. 

— Third,  we  are  making  clear  to  others 
that  we  expect  the  same  standards  of  re- 
sponsibility and  mutual  respect  in  multi- 
lateral affairs  which  normally  prevail  in 
bilateral  diplomatic  relations.  If  a  govern- 
ment chooses  to  work  unremittingly 
against  us,  for  example,  on  behalf  of  some 
abstract  notion  of  bloc  solidarity,  it  will 
know  that  this  can  have  a  cost  in  our  bi- 
lateral relations. 

— Fourth,  we  are  participating  energet- 
ically in  a  new  effort  at  the  United  Nations 
to  restructure  the  organization's  economic 
work  and  to  improve  its  procedures,  includ- 
ing greater  use  of  consensus. 

— Fifth,  and  most  important,  we  are  tak- 
ing the   initiative   in   seeking   cooperative. 


193 


practical  solutions  to  the  problems  of  eco- 
nomic interdependence  which  affect  both 
rich  and  poor  countries  alike. 

We  believe  that  many  nations,  though 
not  all,  will  eventually  join  us  in  seeking 
practical  results  rather  than  expending 
their  energies  in  sterile  polemics.  Indeed, 
that  was  their  response  to  Secretary  Kissin- 
ger's comprehensive  proposals  at  the  his- 
toric seventh  special  session  of  the  U.N. 
General  Assembly  last  September.  At  that 
session,  American  initiatives  provided  the 
basis  for  a  broad,  concrete  program, 
adopted  by  consensus,  to  promote  world 
economic  cooperation.  We  cannot  hope  to 
eliminate  all  political  conflict  from  eco- 
nomic forums.  But  to  the  extent  that  we 
offer  positive  alternatives  to  the  develop- 
ing nations,  their  incentive  to  fall  back  on 
political  confrontation  can  be  lessened. 

The  last  major  element  of  choice  I  want 
to  discuss  today  is  this:  Can  we  bring  the 
unique  American  blend  of  idealis7n  and 
practicality  to  bear  in  dealing  with  world 
problems?  The  United  Nations  was 
founded  upon  the  highest  ideals.  After  the 
calamitous  suffering  of  the  Second  World 
War,  people  everywhere  hoped  that  the 
new  organization  would  forever  spare  man- 
kind from  the  scourge  of  war.  We  wanted 
the  United  Nations  to  insure  universal  co- 
operation and  justice. 

After  30  years  of  world  turmoil  we  know 
that  our  hopes  were  premature.  But  this 
does  not  mean  that  the  choice  before  us 
now  is  whether  or  not  to  abandon  these 
hopes  in  disgust.  The  great  truths  and  as- 
pirations embodied  in  the  U.N.  Charter  re- 
main valid  world  goals. 

Our  real  choice  is  whether  we  can  accept 
that  in  an  imperfect  and  frustrating  world 
we  must  persevere  in  seeking  gradual 
gains.  The  accumulated  burdens  of  centu- 
ries of  misery  and  injustice  throughout  the 
world  cannot  be  wiped  out  in  a  few 
decades. 

We  all  know  from  experience  that  last- 


ing progress  to  bring  reality  into  accord 
with  aspiration  can  be  made  only  gradu- 
ally. The  struggle  in  our  own  country  to 
achieve  racial  equality  continues  a  century 
after  we  fought  our  Civil  War  over  this 
principle. 

Many  parallels  exist  with  our  participa- 
tion in  world  affairs.  The  Charter  of  the 
United  Nations,  like  our  Declaration  of  In- 
dependence and  our  Constitution,  expresses 
ideals  in  which  we  deeply  believe:  that  the  i 
strong  should  not  subjugate  the  weak,  that 
there  should  be  justice  for  all.  We  should 
sustain  the  same  blend  of  idealism  and  pa- 
tient realism  in  the  world  and  in  the  United 
Nations  that  we  have  applied  to  advancei 
justice  within  our  own  country. 

This  is  not  an  abstract  point.  The  chal- 
lenge to  blend  idealism  and  realism  is  be- 
fore us  in  many  specific  projects  at  the 
United  Nations.  If  we  are  prepared  to; 
make  realistic  choices,  if  we  are  prepared 
to  throw  ourselves  into  the  practical  work 
of  the  United  Nations,  we  can  advance 
goals  of  the  highest  moral  importance.  Let' 
me  provide  a  few  concrete  illustrations: 

— Working  for  peace,  for  the  avoidancei 
or  halting  of  conflict,  must  be  our  para-, 
mount  concern.  The  United  Nations,  and'i 
especially  the  Security  Council,  can  help( 
to  prevent  or  stop  conflicts  that  bear  the 
seeds  of  world  war.  The  Council  did  so  in 
1973  when  it  placed  peacekeeping  forces" 
between  Arab  and  Israeli  armies.  In  our| 
nuclear  age,  it  is  clear  that  the  avoidancei 
of  world  conflict — which  in  minutes  could! 
destroy  the  civilization  of  millennia — is  a« 
vital  condition  for  building  a  world  of 
justice. 

— The  United  Nations  can  advance  the 
search  for  equitable  economic  relations  be- 
tween rich  and  poor  societies.  Practical 
measures  of  international  cooperation  can 
be  hammered  out,  and  many  United  Na- 
tions agencies  can  help  developing  coun-' 
tries  build  more  self-sufficient  economies.! 
Our   country    is   contributing   its    vast   ex- 


194 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  < 


perience  and  technological  know-how.  It 
should  be  a  source  of  deep  satisfaction  to 
Americans  that  our  efforts  through  the 
United  Nations  help  make  possible  a  life 
of  more  hope  and  decency  for  many  whose 
faces  we  in  this  room  shall  never  see. 

— An  urgent  task  requiring  the  practical 
skills  mobilized  by  the  U.N.'s  Food  and 
Agriculture  Organization  is  to  help  other 
countries  increase  their  production  of  food. 
Here  the  moral  dimension  is  obvious.  No 
world  system  can  be  tolerable  if  millions 
of  persons  periodically  die  of  famine  or 
cannot  achieve  their  full  human  potential 
as  a  result  of  malnutrition. 

— In  the  field  of  health,  a  U.N.  agency 
also  works  at  the  boundary  between  prac- 
ticality and  morality.  The  World  Health 
Organization  applies  modern  science  to 
combat  one  of  the  globe's  most  tenacious 
enemies:  contagious  disease.  It  is  a  moral 
imperative  that  Americans  support  the 
struggle  to  lift  from  mankind's  shoulders 
the  burdens  of  debilitating  and  crippling 
disease. 

— The  United  Nations  is  sponsoring  the 
most  complex  global  negotiation  ever  at- 
tempted over  the  future  use  of  more  than 
two-thirds  of  our  planet.  The  Law  of  the 
Sea  Conference — now  in  its  fourth  year — 
is  dealing  directly  with  urgent  issues  of 
practicality  and  equity.  The  welfare  and 
livelihood  of  millions  will  be  affected  by 
the  details  of  arrangements  worked  out 
regarding  fishing,  mining,  energy  extrac- 
tion, pollution,  scientific  research,  and 
many  other  areas.  But  the  solutions  must 
be  accepted  as  fair  and  just  by  all  partici- 
pants if  they  are  to  be  enduring.  The  alter- 
native is  chaos  and  strife. 

— The  U.N.  Charter  and  the  Universal 
Declaration  of  Human  Rights  set  high 
standards  for  the  world's  governments  in 
the  field  of  human  rights,  goals  with  which 
Americans  especially  can  identify.  We  are 
disappointed  at  the  slowness  of  progress, 
the  difficulty  in  achieving  acceptance  of 
solid  measures  to  protect  fundamental  hu- 


man rights.  But  the  United  Nations  pro- 
vides an  opportunity  to  raise  our  voice  in 
behalf  of  goals  we  know  to  be  inde- 
structible. 

— And  I  would  note  one  final  area  in 
which  the  United  Nations  has  recently 
taken  the  lead.  In  the  establishment  of  an 
International  Women's  Year,  the  United 
Nations  has  now  begun  to  marshal  forces 
to  realize  the  full  rights  and  potential  of 
half  the  world's  people.  Moral  considera- 
tions are  paramount.  But  there  is  also  a 
practical  necessity.  To  achieve  its  great 
promise,  our  civilization  must  use  to  the 
fullest  the  capabilities  of  women — their 
creativity,  their  strength,  and  their  com- 
passion. 

These  are  only  a  few  illustrations  of  how 
moral  goals  and  practical  tasks  intersect. 
Let  us  recognize  that  the  United  Nations 
provides  a  unique  opportunity  to  pursue 
goals  in  a  uniquely  American  way:  ideal- 
ism combined  with  practicality. 

Advancing  U.S.  Ideals  on  a  Global  Scale 

I  have  spoken  bluntly  today  about 
choices  confronting  the  United  States.  It 
seems  to  me  that  it  is  especially  important 
in  our  country — one  of  the  world's  greatest 
democracies — that  we  discuss  realistically 
what  we  are  up  against  in  the  world  and 
what  our  opportunities  are.  For  it  is  the  es- 
sence of  our  democratic  process  that  our 
citizens  participate  in  the  making  of 
choices. 

But  our  right  and  our  ability  to  make 
choices  must  also  impose  responsibilities. 
We  have  a  duty  to  look  at  the  facts 
squarely.  We  have  a  duty  to  assess  the 
long-range  as  well  as  the  immediate  conse- 
quences of  our  choices.  And  we  have  a  duty 
to  be  true  to  our  traditions. 

One  of  our  strongest  traditions  has  been 
dedication  to  the  pursuit  of  great  moral 
goals  in  a  practical  way.  I  feel  privileged 
to  have  discussed  this  theme  in  this  200th 
anniversary  year  before  a  group  of  Ameri- 


August  9,  1976 


195 


cans  from  all  over  the  country  meeting 
here  in  Philadelphia,  the  birthplace  of  our 
nation. 

When  our  forebears  here  in  this  city 
signed  the  Declaration  of  Independence 
and  the  Constitution,  they  gave  life  to  ex- 
alted and  ennobling  concepts.  They  pro- 
claimed our  conviction  that  men  and 
women  can  arrange  their  affairs  in  ways 
that  protect  the  deepest  aspiration  of  all 
people :  the  search  for  a  life  of  dignity  and 
justice. 

That  also  is  what  the  United  Nations  is 
all  about.  It  was  conceived  to  realize  man- 
kind's most  enduring  dreams — to  supplant 
intimidation  and  subjugation  with  persua- 
sion and  accommodation — to  dissipate  fear, 
misery,  injustice  and  to  put  in  their  place 
self-fulfillment  and  respect  for  human 
rights. 

If  we  are  to  be  realistic,  and  we  must 
be,  we  will  admit  to  ourselves  that  the 
United  Nations  is  far  from  perfect.  Indeed, 
it  has  a  great  many  imperfections,  as  do 
all  large  political  institutions. 

But  if  we  are  realistic,  we  will  also  un- 
derstand that  the  United  Nations,  with  all 
its  imperfections,  represents  our  best 
framework — the  only  worldwide  frame- 
work— for  building  a  safer,  more  equitable, 
more  humane  world.  We  must  strengthen 
and  improve  the  United  Nations.  We  can- 
not afford  to  weaken  or  abandon  it. 

I  have  faith,  as  an  American  celebrating 
our  200th  anniversary  along  with  other 
Americans,  that  our  country  will  make  the 
right  choices,  the  responsible  choices, 
about  our  participation  in  the  only  world 
organization.  And  when  we  do  so,  we  will 
know  that  we  are  advancing  on  a  global 
scale  those  same  ideals  which  were  pro- 
claimed here  in  this  city  two  centuries  ago. 

Let  me  close  with  the  words  of  Thomas 
Jefferson,  who  declared:  "I  believe  .  .  . 
that  morality,  compassion,  generosity,  are 
innate  elements  of  the  human  constitution 
.  .  .  that  justice  is  the  fundamental  law 
of  society  .  .  .  ."  "I  hope  and  firmly  be- 
lieve that  the  whole  world  will,  sooner  or 
later,  feel  benefit  from  the  issue  of  our  as- 
sertion of  the  rights  of  man." 


Queen  Elizabeth  II  Makes  State  Visit 
to  the  United  States 

Queen  Elizabeth  II  of  the  United  Kingdom 
of  Great  Britain  and  Northern  Ireland  made 
a  state  visit  to  the  United  States  Jtdy  6-11. 
Following  is  an  exchange  of  remarks  hetiveen 
President  Ford  and  Queen  Elizabeth  at  a 
welcoming  ceremony  on  the  South  Lawn  of 
the  White  House  07i  July  7.^ 


Weekly   Compilation   of    Presidential   Documents   dated  July    12 

PRESIDENT  FORD 

Your  Majesty,  Your  Royal  Highness, 
ladies  and  gentlemen:  On  behalf  of  the 
American  people,  I  am  delighted  to  wel- 
come you  and  your  party  to  the  United 
States  and  to  the  White  House. 

Your  first  state  visit  to  America  in  1957 
marked  the  350th  anniversary  of  the  settle- 
ment of  Jamestown,  the  first  permanent 
British  colony  in  this  new  land.  You  honor 
us  again  by  coming  to  share  our  Bicenten- 
nial observance  in  the  new  spirit  of  opti- 
mism and  cooperation  generated  by  this 
great  occasion. 

During  the  169  years  between  the  first 
settlement  of  Jamestown  and  our  in- 
dependence, 13  colonies  prospered,  pro- 
tected by  the  British  Navy,  enjoying  the 
advantage  of  British  commerce  and  adopt- 
ing British  concepts  of  representative  self- 
government.  In  declaring  independence  in 
1776,  we  looked  for  guidance  to  our  Brit- 
ish heritage  of  representative  govern- 
ment— representative  government  as  well, 
as  law.  As  a  sovereign  nation,  we  have  kept 
and  nurtured  the  most  durable  bond  of 
all — the  bond  of  idealism  in  which  our  new 
nation  was  conceived. 

Your  Majesty's  visit  symbolizes  our  deep' 
and  continuing  commitment  to  the  common 
values  of  an  Anglo-American  civilization. 
Your  Majesty,  for  generations  our  peoples 


'  For  an  exchange  of  toasts  between  President 
Ford  and  Queen  Elizabeth  II  at  a  White  House 
dinner  that  evening,  see  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  dated  July  12,  1976,  p.  1142. 


196 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


have  worked  together,  and  fought  to- 
gether, side  by  side.  As  democracies,  we 
continue  our  quest  for  peace  and  justice. 

The  challenges  we  now  face  are  differ- 
ent from  those  that  we  have  confronted  to- 
gether and  overcome  in  the  past.  At  stake 
is  the  future  of  the  industrialized  democ- 
racies which  have  sustained  their  destiny 
in  common  for  more  than  a  generation. 

At  stake  is  the  further  extension  of  the 
blessings  of  liberty  to  all  humanity  in  the 
creation  of  a  better  world.  As  new  nations 
and  old,  each  set  their  political  course  to 
achieve  these  aims.  The  principles  of  hu- 
man dignity  and  individual  rights  set  forth 
in  the  Magna  Carta  and  our  own  Declara- 
tion of  Independence  remain  truly  revolu- 
tionary landmarks. 

Your  Majesty,  the  wounds  of  our  part- 
ing in  1776  healed  long  ago.  Americans 
admire  the  United  Kingdom  as  one  of  our 
truest  allies  and  best  friends.  There  could 
be  no  more  convincing  evidence  of  that 
friendship  than  the  splendid  British  con- 
tributions and  participation  on  the  occa- 
sion of  our  Bicentennial. 

Last  month,  I  had  the  privilege  and 
honor  to  welcome  to  the  White  House  Rose 
Garden  the  distinguished  delegation  of 
the  British  Parliament  who  escorted  an 
historic  copy  of  the  Magna  Carta  to  Amer- 
ica. The  loan  of  this  document  for  our  Bi- 
centennial is  a  gesture  that  will  bring 
pleasure  and  inspiration  to  all  who  view  it. 

Yesterday,  in  Philadelphia,  Your  Maj- 
esty inaugurated  the  new  Bicentennial  bell, 
a  gift  from  the  people  of  Britain  to  the 
people  of  the  United  States,  inscribed  "Let 
Freedom  Ring."  It  will  hang  in  the  Bell 
Tower  in  Independence  National  Historical 
Park.  When  I  was  in  Philadelphia  on  the 
Fourth  of  July,  I  thought  what  a  perfect 
complement  the  new  bell  will  be  to  our 
own  Liberty  Bell  and  the  Centennial  bell  in 
Independence   Hall. 

For  these  gifts  and  for  many  others 
which  Britain  has  honored  our  historic 
celebration,  the  American  people  are 
deeply  grateful.  Above  all,  we  appreciate 
the  personal  honor  you  have  so  graciously 


demonstrated  by  visiting  our  shores  at  this 
special  moment  in  our  history. 

During  your  visit,  you  will  travel  to 
hallowed  American  landmarks.  You  will 
observe  many  changes  since  you  were  last 
here.  But  as  you  travel  throughout  our 
land,  I  trust  that  you  will  find  something 
else  in  the  United  States,  a  new  sense  of 
unity,  of  friendship,  of  purpose,  and  tran- 
quillity. 

Something  wonderful  happened  to  Amer- 
ica this  past  weekend.  A  spirit  of  unity  and 
togetherness  deep  within  the  American 
soul  sprang  to  the  surface  in  a  way  that  we 
had  almost  forgotten.  People  showed  again 
that  they  care,  that  they  want  to  live  in 
peace  and  harmony  with  their  neighbors, 
that  they  want  to  pull  together  for  the 
good  of  the  nation  and  for  the  good  of 
mankind. 

This  weekend  we  had  a  marvelous  re- 
affirmation of  the  American  spirit.  In  the 
days  ahead,  we  would  like  very  much  to 
share  that  spirit  with  you. 

During  your  visit  in  1957,  President 
Eisenhower  remarked  that  America's  re- 
spect for  Britain  was  symbolized  in  our 
affection  for  the  royal  family.  It  is  in  this 
spirit  we  welcome  Your  Majesty's  visit  as 
a  happy  occasion  for  reaffirming  our  joint 
dedication  to  freedom,  to  peace,  democ- 
racy, and  the  well-being  of  our  people. 

Your  Majesty,  America  bids  you.  Prince 
Philip,  and  your  party  a  most  cordial  and 
heartfelt  welcome. 


QUEEN  ELIZABETH 

Mr.  President:  Thank  you  for  your  wel- 
come to  us.  We  are  very  pleased  to  be  with 
you  and  the  American  people  in  this  most 
important  week  of  your  Bicentennial  year. 

Our  countries  have  a  great  deal  in  com- 
mon. The  early  British  settlers  created 
here  a  society  that  owes  much  to  its  origins 
across  the  ocean.  For  nearly  170  years 
there  was  a  formal  constitutional  link  be- 
tween us.  Your  Declaration  of  Independ- 
ence broke  that  link,  but  it  did  not  for 
long  break  our  friendship. 


August  9,  1976 


197 


John  Adams,  America's  first  Ambassa- 
dor, said  to  my  ancestor  King  George  III 
that  it  was  his  desire  to  help  with  the  res- 
toration of  "the  old  good  nature  and  the 
old  good  humor  between  our  peoples." 

That  restoration  has  long  been  made, 
and  the  links  of  language,  tradition,  and 
personal  contact  have  maintained  it. 

Yesterday,  Prince  Philip  and  I  were 
deeply  moved  by  the  welcome  we  were 
given  in  Philadelphia.  And  now  we  are 
looking  forward  to  our  time  in  Washington 
and  to  our  visits  to  New  York  and  Boston 
and  to  the  home  of  Thomas  Jefferson  at 
Monticello.  We  shall  have  visited  the 
four  cities  that  were  at  the  center  of  events 
200  years  ago.  We  also  hope  to  see  some- 
thing of  America  of  1976  and  of  the  young 
people  who  will  be  taking  this  country 
forward  into  its  third  century. 

Mr.  President,  the  British  and  American 
people  are  as  close  today  as  two  peoples 
have  ever  been.  We  see  you  as  our  strong 
and  trusted  friend,  and  we  believe  that 
you,  in  turn,  will  find  us  as  ready  as  ever 
to  bear  our  full  share  in  defending  the 
values  in  which  we  both  believe. 

That  is  why  we  are  so  happy  to  be  here. 


President  Signs  Security  Assistance 
and  Arms  Export  Control  Act 

Statement  by  President  Ford  ' 

I  have  signed  into  law  H.R.  13680,  the 
International  Security  Assistance  and  Arms 
Export  Control  Act  of  1976.  This  measure 
authorizes  appropriations  to  carry  out  se- 
curity assistance  and  other  programs  in  the 
fiscal  years  1976  and  1977,  and  makes  ex- 
tensive changes  in  the  methods,  organiza- 
tion, and  procedures  through  which  those 
programs  are  carried  out. 

On  May  7,  1976,  I  returned  to  the  Con- 
gress  without   my    approval    S.    2662,   the 


'Issued  on  July  1  (text  from  White  House  press 
release);  as  enacted  the  bill  is  Public  Law  94-329, 
approved  June  30,  1976. 


198 


predecessor  of  the  bill  which  I  am  signing 
today.  I  did  so  because  that  bill  contained 
numerous  provisions  which  would  have 
seriously  undermined  the  constitutional  re- 
sponsibility of  the  President  for  the  con- 
duct of  the  foreign  affairs  of  the  United 
States.  That  bill  embodied  a  variety  of  re- 
strictions that  would  have  seriously  inhib- 
ited my  ability  to  implement  a  coherent 
and  consistent  foreign  policy,  and  some 
which  raised  fundamental  constitutional 
difficulties  as  well. 

The  present  bill,  H.R.  13680,  imposes 
new  requirements,  restrictions,  and  limita- 
tions on  the  implementation  of  security  as- 
sistance programs.  Many  of  these  new  re- 
quirements are  based  on  congressional 
desires  to  increase  the  flow  of  information 
regarding  the  scope  and  direction  of  se- 
curity assistance  programs  worldwide. 
Others  impose  new  substantive  restrictions 
reflecting  new  policies,  or  policies  not  here- 
tofore expressed  in  law. 

Most  of  the  unacceptable  features  of  the 
earlier  bill  have  either  been  dropped  from 
H.R.  13680  or  have  been  modified  into  an 
acceptable  form.  I  am  pleased  to  note,  for 
example,  that  this  bill  does  not  attempt  tc 
impose  an  arbitrary  and  unwieldy  annua! 
ceiling  on  the  aggregate  value  of  govern- 
ment and  commercial  arms  sales,  a  ceiling 
which  would  have  served  to  hinder,  rathei 
than  foster,  our  efforts  to  seek  multilateral 
restraints  on  the  proliferation  of  conven- 
tional weaponry,  and  which  could  hav€ 
prevented  us  from  meeting  the  legitimate 
security  needs  of  our  allies  and  othei 
friendly  countries.  In  addition,  the  provi- 
sions on  discrimination  and  on  humar 
rights  in  this  bill  go  far  toward  recognizing 
that  diplomatic  effoi'ts,  rather  than  abso- 
lute statutory  sanctions,  are  the  most  effec- 
tive way  in  which  this  country  can  seek 
further  progress  abroad  in  these  areas  ol 
deep  concern  to  all  Americans  and  that  the 
executive  branch  must  have  adequate  flexi- 
bility to  make  these  efforts  bear  fruit. 

I  am  especially  pleased  to  note  that  with 
one  exception  the  constitutionally  objec- 
tionable features  of  S.  2662,  whereby  au- 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Ihorlty  conferred  on  the  President  by  law 
could  be  rescinded  by  the  adoption  of  a 
concurrent  resolution  by  the  Congress,  have 
all  been  deleted  from  H.R.  13680.  The 
manifest  incompatibility  of  such  provisions 
with  the  express  requirements  of  the  Con- 
stitution that  legislative  measures  having 
the  force  and  effect  of  law  be  presented  to 
the  President  for  approval  and,  if  disap- 
proved, be  passed  by  the  requisite  two- 
thirds  majority  of  both  Houses  was  per- 
haps the  single  most  serious  defect  of  the 
previous  bill  and  one  which  went  well  be- 
yond security  assistance  and  foreign  affairs 
in  its  implications.  Moreover,  such  provi- 
sions would  have  purported  to  involve  the 
Congress  in  the  performance  of  day-to- 
day executive  functions  in  derogation  of 
the  principle  of  separation  of  powers,  re- 
sulting in  the  erosion  of  the  fundamental 
constitutional  distinction  between  the  role 
of  the  Congress  in  enacting  legislation 
and  the  role  of  the  executive  in  carrying 
it  out. 

The  one  exception  to  this  laudable  action 
is  the  retention  in  H.R.  13680  of  the  legis- 
lative-veto provision  regarding  major  gov- 
ernmental sales  of  military  equipment  and 
services.  This  is  not  a  new  provision  but  has 
been  in  the  law  since  1974.  To  date  no  con- 
current resolution  of  disapproval  under  sec- 
tion 36(b)  has  been  adopted,  and  the 
constitutional  question  has  not  been  raised 
directly.  Although  I  am  accepting  H.R. 
13680  with  this  provision  included,  I  re- 
serve my  position  on  its  constitutionality  if 
the  provision  should  ever  become  opera- 
tive. 

In  my  message  of  May  7,  I  expressed  my 
serious  concern  that  the  termination  of 
military  assistance  and  military  assistance 
advisory  groups  after  fiscal  year  1977 
would  result  in  a  serious  impact  upon  our 
relations  with  other  nations  whose  security 
is  important  to  our  own  security  and  who 
are  not  yet  able  to  bear  the  entire  burden 
of  their  defense  requirements.  That  con- 
cern remains.  H.R.  13680  retains  language 
recognizing  that  it  may  be  necessary  and 
desirable   to   maintain   military    assistance 

August  9,  1976 


programs  and  military  assistance  advisory 
groups  in  specific  countries  even  after  Sep- 
tember 30,  1977.  Accordingly,  this  bill  will 
not  deter  the  executive  branch  from  seek- 
ing at  the  appropriate  time  the  necessary 
authority  for  the  continuation  of  such  pro- 
grams as  the  national  interest  of  the  United 
States  may  require. 

H.R.  13680  will  require  that  many 
changes  be  made  in  present  practices  and 
policies  regarding  the  implementation  of 
security  assistance  programs.  Some  of 
these  new  requirements  I  welcome  as  dis- 
tinct improvements  over  existing  law. 
There  are  others  for  which  the  desirabil- 
ity and  need  is  less  clear.  Nevertheless,  I 
shall  endeavor  to  carry  out  the  provisions 
of  this  bill  in  a  manner  which  will  give  ef- 
fect to  the  intent  of  the  Congress  in  enact- 
ing them.  As  time  goes  by  and  experience 
is  gained,  both  the  executive  and  the  Con- 
gress will  come  to  know  which  of  the  pro- 
visions of  this  bill  will  be  effective  and 
workable  and  which  others  require  modifi- 
cation or  repeal. 

This  bill  recognizes  that  security  assist- 
ance has  been  and  remains  a  most  impor- 
tant instrument  of  U.S.  foreign  policy.  My 
approval  of  H.R.  13680  will  enable  us  to 
go  forward  with  important  programs  in 
the  Middle  East,  in  Africa,  and  elsewhere 
in  the  world  aimed  at  achieving  our  goal 
of  international  peace  and  stability. 


Foreign  Assistance  Appropriations  Act 
Signed  Into  Law 

Statement  by  President  Ford  ' 

I  have  signed  H.R.  12203,  the  Foreign 
Assistance  and  Related  Programs  Appro- 
priations Act,  1976  and  the  period  ending 
September  30,  1976.  The  bill  appropriates 
funds  for  a  variety  of  programs  in  support 
of  U.S.  foreign  policy  objectives,  most  im- 


'  Issued  on  July  1  (text  from  White  House  press 
release);  as  enacted,  the  bill  is  Public  Law  94-330, 
approved  June  30,  1976. 


199 


portantly  our  pursuit  of  a  peaceful  solu- 
tion to  the  problems  of  the  Middle  East. 

Nevertheless,  I  have  serious  reservations 
regarding  one  element  of  the  bill  and  be- 
lieve it  is  necessary  to  comment  on  why  I 
have  signed  the  bill  notwithstanding  my 
objections  to  it. 

Title  I  of  the  bill  contains  a  provision 
which  conditions  the  availability  of  appro- 
priated funds,  in  certain  instances,  upon 
the  acquiescence  of  the  Appropriations 
Committees  of  each  House  of  Congress. 
This  requirement  violates  the  fundamental 
constitutional  doctrine  of  separation  of 
powers.  While  similar  provisions  have  been 
included  in  congressional  enactments  and 
have  been  found  objectionable  on  these 
grounds,  this  particular  requirement  is  es- 
pecially onerous  in  that  it  intrudes  upon 
the  execution  of  programs  in  19  different 
appropriation  categories. 

Since  I  view  this  provision  as  severable 
from  what  is  an  otherwise  valid  exercise 
of  legislative  authority,  and  because  it  is 
presented  for  my  signature  in  the  last  week 
of  the  fiscal  year,  I  am  not  withholding  my 
approval.  We  shall  continue  to  work  with 
the  Appropriations  Committees,  as  with  all 
committees  of  the  Congress,  in  a  spirit  of 
cooperation.  We  shall  continue  to  keep  the 
Congress  fully  informed  on  a  current  basis 
on  the  execution  of  the  laws.  However,  we 
shall  not  concur  in  a  delegation  of  the  pow- 
ers of  appropriation  to  two  committees  of 
Congress. 


Summary  Reports  of  Closed  Meetings 
of  Advisory  Committees  Available 

Press  release  340   dated   July   6 

Pursuant  to  Public  Law  92-463  and  the 
Office  of  Management  and  Budget  Circular 
A-63  (March  27,  1974),  this  notice  is  to  ad- 
vise that  summary  reports  have  been  pre- 
pared covering  advisory  committee  meetings 
or  sessions  of  meetings  which  wei'e  closed  to 
the  public  under  5  U.S.C.  552(b)    (1). 

The  advisory  committees  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  required  to  file  summary  re- 
ports for  1975  are: 

Advisory    Committee    on    "Foreign    Relations    of    the 

United  States" 
Advisory  Committee  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea 
Advisory    Committee    to    the    United    States    Section 

International  North  Pacific  Fisheries  Commission 
Advisory  Panel  on  International  Law 
Northwest  Atlantic  Fisheries  Advisory  Committee 
Ocean  Affairs  Advisory  Committee 
United  States  Advisory  Commission  on  International 

Educational   and  Cultural  Affairs 

The  reports  summarizing  the  committees' 
discussions  are  available  for  inspection 
and/or  copying  at  the  Library  of  Congress, 
Anyone  interested  in  these  reports  should! 
contact  the  Rare  Book  Room,  Second  Floor, 
Main  Building,  Library  of  Congress,  10  First; 
Street,  SE.,  Washington,  D.C.  20540,  or  write 
or  telephone  the  Advisory  Committee  Man- 
agement Officer,  Department  of  State,  Wash- 
ington, D.C.  20520,  (area  code  202)  632-2297. 


200 


Department  of  State  Bulletin' 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS  AND  CONFERENCES 


U.S.  Discusses  Relations  With  Developing  Countries 
in  Opening  Statement  at  ECOSOC  Meeting 


Text  of  Statement  by  William  W.  Scranton 
U.S.  Representative  to  the  United  Nations  ' 


On  behalf  of  the  Government  and  the 
people  of  the  United  States,  I  would  like 
to  express  to  you,  to  His  Excellency  Presi- 
dent Houphouet-Boigny,  and  to  the  Gov- 
ernment and  people  of  the  Ivory  Coast  our 
sincere  appreciation  for  your  country's 
most  generous  offer  to  act  as  host  to  the 
Economic  and  Social  Council,  for  the  mag- 
nificent facilities  which  you  have  made 
available,  and  for  the  wonderful  hospital- 
ity which  has  been  extended  to  us.  Such  a 
friendly  atmosphere  cannot  fail  to  facili- 
tate our  deliberations. 

It  is  fitting  that,  in  1976,  the  Economic 
and  Social  Council  should  be  holding  its 
first  meeting  in  Africa.  When  the  United 
Nations  was  created,  virtually  all  of  Africa 
and  many  areas  of  Asia  were  under  colo- 
nial administration.  We  have  witnessed  the 
process  of  decolonization  over  the  past  30 
years.  This  has  nowhere  been  more  evident 
than  in  Africa.  The  membership  of  the 
United  Nations  has  almost  tripled  in  this 
process,  and  African  states  now  represent 
almost  a  third  of  its  total  membership.  In- 
deed, I  wish  to  welcome  on  behalf  of  my 
government  the  entry  of  the  Seychelles  to 
the  community  of  nations  this  very  week. 


'  Read  before  the  61st  session  of  the  U.N.  Eco- 
nomic and  Social  Council  (ECOSOC)  at  Abidjan  on 
June  30  by  Jacob  M.  Myerson,  U.S.  Representative 
to  the  Economic  and  Social  Council  (text  from  USUN 
press  release  74  dated  July  1).  The  61st  session  of 
ECOSOC  met  at  Abidjan  June  30-July  9  and  re- 
sumed at  Geneva  July  12. 

August  9,  1976 


But  the  importance  of  Africa  is  not  a 
question  of  numbers.  This  continent,  with 
all  its  diversity,  symbolizes  the  challenges 
and  the  hopes  of  all  of  us — to  remove  those 
last  vestiges  of  colonialism  so  that  all  na- 
tions and  peoples  can  choose  their  own  des- 
tiny; to  overcome  the  burdens  of  economic 
disadvantage  so  as  to  permit  the  full 
development  of  human  and  natural  re- 
sources; and  to  fashion  a  pattern  of  cooper- 
ation which  will  permit  peoples  to  maintain 
their  respective  traditions  and  principles, 
but  to  work  together  in  pursuit  of  a  common 
overriding  goal  of  a  better  life  for  all 
people. 

The  growing  importance  of  independent 
Africa  on  the  international  scene,  the  jus- 
tice of  its  cause,  and  the  political,  eco- 
nomic, and  cultural  ties  that  link  it  to  the 
United  States  and  other  countries  have  un- 
derscored the  need  for  us  to  maintain  close 
ties  with  African  governments. 

This  perception  found  expression  in  Sec- 
retary Kissinger's  visit  to  Africa  in  April 
and  May  of  this  year.  The  visit  came  at  a 
time  of  growing  crises  in  southern  Africa 
and  provided  an  opportunity  for  the  Sec- 
retary to  enunciate  at  Lusaka  our  southern 
African  policy.  He  made  clear  our  nation's 
unequivocal  support  for  racial  justice  and 
self-determination. 

The  policy  of  the  United  States  is  based 
on  the  recognition  that  the  movement  of 
Africa  to  full  freedom  and  human  dignity 
will  not  be  complete  until  racial  equality  is 


201 


fully  established  throughout  the  continent. 

The  recent  tragic  and  deplorable  events 
in  South  Africa  underline  the  urgency  of 
the  situation  and  the  total  unacceptability 
of  the  system  of  legalized  racial  discrimi- 
nation that  prevails  in  South  Africa. 
Equally,  we  recognize  that  the  process  will 
not  be  complete  until  majority  rule  is  fully 
established  throughout  the  African  Conti- 
nent. The  United  States  is  pledged  to  sup- 
port these  goals  by  all  appropriate  and 
peaceful  means. 

In  his  Lusaka  statement,  Secretary  Kis- 
singer set  forth  specific  proposals  aimed  at 
helping  solve  the  pressing  problems  of  the 
region.  He  indicated  our  willingness  to 
play  a  more  active  role  in  concert  with  Af- 
rican governments. 

In  this  regard,  the  advice  of  African 
leaders  has  been  of  particular  importance 
in  developing  our  initiatives  on  southern 
Africa,  including  the  recent  meeting  of 
Secretary  Kissinger  and  Prime  Minister 
Vorster  [of  South  Africa] .  On  these  and 
other  matters,  we  shall  continue  close  and 
useful  consultation  with  African  govern- 
ments. 

During  his  African  tour,  the  Secretary 
made  two  other  statements  to  which  we  at- 
tach major  importance.  In  Dakar,  he  called 
for  the  creation  of  an  international  consor- 
tium to  undertake  a  systematic  and  com- 
prehensive attack  on  the  development 
problems  of  the  Sahel  region.  And  in 
Nairobi  at  the  fourth  session  of  the  U.N. 
Conference  on  Trade  and  Development 
[UNCTAD  IV],  he  set  forth  our  policy  on 
the  major  North-South  development  issues. 

I  will  talk  about  this  in  greater  detail 
later.  But  I  wish  to  emphasize  now  the  two 
major  themes  in  our  approach  to  Africa — 
to  assist  African  efforts  for  liberation  and 
for  human  and  economic  development.  I 
underscore  the  words  "to  assist"  because 
the  basic  strategy  and  the  basic  effort  for 
progress  in  Africa  should  and  must  remain 
in  the  hands  of  Africans  themselves. 

Just  before  coming  to  this  conference  I 
had  the  opportunity — and  the  pleasure — 
of  visiting  several  countries  in  Africa.  This 
trip  was  undertaken  at  the  suggestion  of 


President  Ford  and  Secretary  Kissinger,  to 
continue  our  dialogue  with  African  leaders. 
It  was  of  a  necessity  a  series  of  rapid  visits 
to  11  countries  and  certainly  does  not  qual- 
ify me  as  an  expert.  But  I  would  like  to 
share  with  you  some  of  my  impressions, 
because  I  think  that  they  are  pertinent  to 
the  deliberations  of  this  Council. 

African  Priorities  and  Goals 

First,  I  was  most  impressed  with  the  pri- 
orities of  the  national  development  pro- 
grams of  the  countries  visited.  They  em- 
phasized : 

— Agricultural  development  aimed  at  in- 
suring sufficient  food  for  their  people. 

— Health  services  to  reduce  infant  mor- 
tality, to  provide  better  care  throughout 
their  citizens'  lives,  and  to  increase  life  ex- 
pectancy. 

— Education,  both  general  education  for 
all  and  in  the  technical  vocational  fields,  a 
necessity  for  countries  to  realize  and  to 
manage  their  potential. 

— Social  development  to  preserve  basic 
traditions  and  so  that  all  citizens  may  bet- 
ter understand  and  participate  effectively 
in  the  development  of  their  countries. 

These  are  priorities  directed  not  toward 
the  preservation  of  a  system  or  simply  the 
promotion  of  an  ideology  but,  much  more 
importantly,  at  improving  and  enhancing 
the  quality  of  life.  As  such  it  is  develop- 
ment for  the  highest  purpose — for  hu- 
manity. 

And  what  about  the  development  of  re- 
sources in  Africa?  This  is  my  second  point. 
One  very  clear  impression  is  that  the  sim- 
ple transfer  of  money  is  no  guarantee  of 
purposeful  development — in  fact,  this 
could  lead  to  an  international  misallocation 
of  resources.  What  is  critical  is  aid  to  spe- 
cific projects,  especially  self-help  projects, 
which  will  in  fact  contribute  to  national 
development.  In  this  connection,  we — both 
developed  and  developing  countries — must 
clarify  the  conceptual  confusion  which  ex- 
ists between  exploitation  and  development. 
Whether  in  Africa  or  elsewhere,  exploita- 


202 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


tion  is  wrong.  It  should  not  and  must  not 
be  the  pattern  for  the  future.  The  devel- 
oped and  the  developing  nations  must  now 
work  together  on  a  resource  program 
aimed  at  increasing  the  standard  of  living 
for  people  in  the  countries  concerned.  This 
is  not  a  one-way  street.  It  is  to  the  mutual 
advantage  of  developed  countries  as  well 
as  developing  countries,  for  it  produces  bet- 
ter markets  for  products  and  a  healthier 
international  economy. 

Thirdly,  Mr.  President,  talks  in  the  coun- 
tries I  have  just  visited  underlined  the  ab- 
solute necessity  for  a  rapid  speedup  in  the 
liberation  of  all  Africa — first  and  foremost 
because  of  our  humanitarian  concern  but 
also  because  the  present  situation  repre- 
sents a  basic  deterrent  to  the  economic  de- 
velopment of  the  region. 

Finally,  Mr.  President,  I  cannot  speak  of 
my  visit  to  Africa  without  paying  tribute  to 
the  hospitality  of  governments  and  people 
wherever  we  went,  to  the  vision  and  com- 
mitment of  the  leaders  with  whom  we 
talked,  and  to  their  willingness  to  share 
with  us  their  thinking. 

Our  talks  were  characterized  by  a  com- 
mon dedication  to  peace,  cooperation,  and 
the  betterment  of  mankind's  condition.  Our 
areas  of  agreement  are  substantial  and  out- 
weigh any  differences  of  perception  or 
policy.  This  is  a  "continent  of  hope,"  with 
great  potential.  A  way  of  life  for  Africans 
in  freedom  and  self-fulfillment  is  near  on 
the  horizon.  It  is  within  man's  grasp. 

Progress  in  the  North-South  Dialogue 

Mr.  President,  one  of  the  basic  purposes 
of  the  United  Nations  as  set  forth  in  the 
charter  is  "to  achieve  international  cooper- 
ation in  solving  international  problems  of 
an  economic,  social,  cultural,  or  humani- 
tarian character."  Our  recent  efforts  in  this 
respect  have  focused  primarily  on  the  prob- 
lems of  development — those  matters  em- 
braced by  the  North-South  dialogue. 

One  milestone  in  this  dialogue  was  the 
seventh  special  session  of  the  General  As- 
sembly. On  that  occasion  developed  and 
developing  nations  put  aside  confrontation 


and  declared  their  common  purpose  of 
moving  forward  cooperatively  in  accord- 
ance with  an  agreed  agenda  for  action. 
True,  there  was  hard  bargaining,  but  it 
achieved  consensus  acceptable  to  all.  The 
principles  and  programs  outlined  there  re- 
main the  cornerstone  of  my  government's 
efforts  to  assist  developing  nations  and  to 
strengthen  ties  of  cooperation  with  them. 

In  accordance  with  the  consensus 
reached  at  the  seventh  special  session,  sig- 
nificant and  practical  steps  have  been  un- 
dertaken or  are  underway  in  various  U.N. 
and  other  international  forums  or  through 
the  actions  of  individual  countries.  The 
actions  cover  the  wide  range  of  problems 
confronting  us — compensatory  financing, 
funding  of  international  development  in- 
stitutions, commodities,  trade,  technology 
transfer,  agricultural  production,  bilateral 
aid  programs,  and  so  on. 

I  do  not  propose  to  catalogue  the  specific 
actions  now,  since  the  Council  is  to  review 
this  matter  later  in  the  present  session.  The 
point  that  I  wish  to  emphasize  is  that  the 
United  States  has  taken  its  commitments 
seriously  and  is  genuinely  attempting  to 
translate  the  agreed  principles  into  specific 
actions. 

The  seventh  special  session  is  only  a 
milestone,  not  the  end  of  the  road.  My 
government  is  committed  to  a  continuing 
process  of  negotiation  seeking  practical 
solutions  to  real  problems.  Thus  we  are 
participating  in  the  Paris  Conference  on 
International  Economic  Cooperation,  one  of 
the  principal  forums  in  which  the  dialogue 
between  developed  and  developing  coun- 
tries is  being  carried  out. 

UNCTAD  IV  represents  another  mile- 
stone. There  were,  indeed,  positive  achieve- 
ments at  Nairobi,  although  the  outcome 
failed  to  satisfy  everyone.  For  example,  we 
are  aware  that  even  though  developed 
countries,  including  the  United  States,  went 
further  than  ever  before  in  their  commit- 
ment to  proceed  with  work  on  major  as- 
pects of  commodity  issues — not  the  least  on 
buffer  stock  financing — some  of  our  friends 
in  the  developing  countries  had  hoped  for 
more. 


August  9,  1976 


203 


The  United  States  for  its  part  was  deeply 
disappointed  that  its  proposal  for  an  Inter- 
national Resources  Bank — presented  at 
UNCTAD  IV  on  behalf  of  all  Group  B 
countries  [developed  market-economy 
countries] — did  not  receive  the  considera- 
tion we  believe  it  deserves.  We  are  pursu- 
ing this  proposal  as  one  important  element 
of  any  comprehensive  approach  to  com- 
modities problems.  We  trust  that  it  will  re- 
ceive serious  and  thorough  consideration. 

It  is  in  no  way  intended  to  preclude  other 
approaches  nor  to  compete  with  any  other 
proposal.  The  purpose  of  the  International 
Resources  Bank  is  to  facilitate  the  flow  of 
essential  private  capital,  management,  and 
technology  into  the  development  of  min- 
eral resources  in  developing  countries  on  a 
basis  fully  acceptable  to  such  countries — 
one  compatible  with  their  sovereignty  and 
their  national  plans. 

In  our  view  this  would  be  of  particular 
benefit  to  countries  of  Africa  and  else- 
where. We  have  recently  presented  a  state- 
ment on  the  proposed  International  Re- 
sources Bank  to  the  Paris  Conference  on 
International  Economic  Cooperation  and 
will  be  actively  following  up  on  this  matter. 

In  spite  of  these  disappointments  and 
with  the  perspective  of  a  month  since  Nai- 
robi, UNCTAD  IV  seems  to  us  to  have  been 
more  successful  than  many  at  first  imag- 
ined. A  number  of  resolutions  were  ap- 
proved by  consensus,  including  those  on 
debt,  technology,  and  the  least  developed 
countries,  as  well  as  commodities. 

The  United  States  will  continue  to  work 
toward  the  goals  it  has  accepted  and  to 
contribute  to  programs  in  which  it  has 
agreed  to  participate.  We  will  take  part  in 
the  meetings  preparatory  to  UNCTAD's 
March  1977  negotiating  conference  on 
commodities.  We  also  intend  to  participate 
fully  and  actively  in  the  extensive  series  of 
meetings  on  the  18  specific  commodities  set 
forth  in  the  UNCTAD  IV  commodities  reso- 
lution. Where  differences  persist  regarding 
objectives  or  methods,  we  shall  be  pre- 
pared to  pursue  a  discussion  with  a  view 
to  reconciliation. 


Mr.  President,  this  month  there  have 
been  two  meetings  of  the  industrialized 
countries  of  considerable  significance  for 
relations  between  developed  and  develop- 
ing countries — the  OECD  [Organization 
for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Develop- 
ment] ministerial  meeting  and  the  Puerto 
Rico  summit.  These  meetings  emphasized 
the  need  for  closer  coordination  between 
participating  countries. 

Working  together,  the  industrialized 
countries  seek  to  achieve  sustained  eco- 
nomic growth,  which  is  directly  related  to 
the  demand  for  the  mineral,  agricultural, 
and  manufactured  products  of  developing 
countries.  They  can  seek  to  minimize  infla- 
tion and  its  impact,  for  example,  on  the 
cost  of  developing-country  imports.  And 
they  can  better  position  themselves  both 
to  initiate  proposals  and  to  respond  con- 
structively to  proposals  by  the  developing 
countries. 

Issues  Before  ECOSOC 

Mr.  President,  the  61st  session  of 
ECOSOC  can  mark  another  milestone  on 
the  road  to  enhanced  cooperation  among 
the  members  of  the  Council  and  among  de- 
veloped and  developing  countries  gener- 
ally. The  Council  will  have  to  address  a 
broad  agenda — one  which  will  give  it  full 
opportunity  to  meet  the  responsibilities 
vested  in  it  by  the  U.N.  Charter.  The  U.S. 
delegation  stands  ready  to  play  its  full 
part. 

One  of  the  subjects  we  will  be  con- 
sidering is  the  complex  of  issues  related  to 
transnational  corporations.  In  the  meeting 
of  the  Commission  on  Transnational  Cor- 
porations in  Lima  last  March,  the  United 
States  proposed  a  special  effort  in  the 
field  of  corrupt  practices  and  payments — 
a  problem,  I  should  add,  that  goes  beyond 
the  question  of  transnational  corporations 
per  se. 

My  delegation,  with  the  support  of 
others,  will  be  submitting  a  draft  resolu- 
tion on  this  subject  at  the  current  session 
of  ECOSOC.  We  are  hopeful  that  it  will 
receive  full  and  sympathetic  consideration 


204 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


so  that  an  expert  group  may  be  established 
as  soon  as  possible  to  take  up  this  matter. 

One  of  the  significant  results  of  the 
seventh  special  session  was  the  decision  to 
create  the  ad  hoc  committee  to  examine 
the  restructuring  of  the  economic  and  so- 
cial sectors  of  the  U.N.  system.  That  body 
is  now  pursuing  its  deliberations. 

An  important  aspect  of  the  restructuring 
exercise  involves  efforts  to  revitalize  the 
ECOSOC  so  that  it  may  carry  out  its  re- 
sponsibilities more  effectively.  We  have 
made  some  suggestions  in  this  regard,  and 
we  shall  have  additional  ideas  to  present. 
Meanwhile,  we  are  convinced  that  the 
high  quality  of  the  Council's  work  under 
the  distinguished  Presidency  of  the  Ivory 
Coast  will  serve  to  reinforce  our  deter- 
mination in  this  regard. 

Challenges  for  the  Future 

Looking  ahead  in  the  next  decade,  we 
face  great  challenges.  How  can  we  in- 
crease food  production  in  poor  countries 
with  food  deficits?  When  will  the  world 
finally  have  some  assurance  that  economic 
gains  will  not  eventually  be  wiped  out  by 
population  increases?  How  can  we  involve 
the  rural  poor,  the  unemployed,  the  under- 
employed, and  women  in  economic  and 
social  development?  How  can  the  poorer 
countries  develop  a  sound  economic  base 
for  continuing  advancement  and  eventual 
self-reliance  in  an  interdependent  world? 

In  seeking  solutions  for  these  problems, 
we  in  the  United  States  have  redoubled  our 


efforts  over  the  past  year;  we  have  modi- 
fied some  positions,  and  we  have  made 
many  new  proposals.  We  take  pride  in 
what  we  have  accomplished,  but  we  will 
not  rest  on  these  achievements. 

Mr.  President,  in  four  days  the  United 
States  will  be  celebrating  its  Bicentennial. 
The  men  who  wrote  the  Declaration  of  In- 
dependence assumed  that  the  American 
Revolution  was  only  the  beginning  of  a 
process  of  liberation  and  that  the  ideals  set 
forth  were  applicable  to  mankind  in  gen- 
eral. Thus,  from  its  inception  the  United 
States  has  favored  efforts  of  others  to  as- 
sure both  their  independence  and  their 
human  dignity.  As  we  enter  our  third  cen- 
tury, we  are  committed  to  the  view  that 
independence,  individual  liberties,  and 
human  dignity  should  and  must  flourish 
everywhere. 

In  this  session  of  the  Economic  and  Social 
Council,  therefore,  let  us  remember  that 
our  intentions  transcend  the  specific  issues, 
important  as  each  one  of  them  is.  Beyond 
them  lies  a  high  reality: 

— A  world  economic  system  with  shared 
interests  for  all  its  members. 

— A  world  system  characterized  by 
fairness  for  the  weak  as  well  as  the  strong, 
by  compassion  for  the  poor,  by  the  eradi- 
cation of  hunger,  and  by  social  and  eco- 
nomic progress  for  all. 

These  goals  can  be  achieved  if  nations 
recognize  and  accept  that  each  bears  a 
responsibility  toward  the  others  and 
toward  mankind. 


August  9,  1976 


205 


U.S.  Discusses  Progress  and  Challenges  in  Space  Technology  and  Law 
in  U.N.  Outer  Space  Committee 


The  19th  session  of  the  U.N.  Committee  on 
the  Peaceful  Uses  of  Outer  Space  7net  at  Neiv 
York  June  21-July  9.  Following  is  a  state- 
ment made  in  the  committee  by  U.S.  Repre- 
sentative Herbert  K.  Reis  on  June  22. 

USUN   press   release   66   dated  June  22 

The  U.S.  delegation  is  happy  to  partici- 
pate in  this  19th  session  of  the  Committee 
on  the  Peaceful  Uses  of  Outer  Space. 
Since  its  first  session  in  1962,  this  commit- 
tee has  established  a  record  of  solid 
achievement.  It  has  stimulated  inter- 
national cooperation  in  space  and  space- 
related  activities,  educated  governments  on 
the  practical  applications  of  space  tech- 
nology, and  helped  to  establish  a  legal 
regime  for  space  activities  characterized 
by  freedom  of  scientific  investigation  and 
the  sharing  of  information. 

We  believe  it  appropriate  on  this  occa- 
sion to  review  the  current  status  of  the 
four  multilateral  agreements  concerning 
outer  space  and  space  activities  negotiated 
in  the  Outer  Space  Committee.  These  are 
the  Outer  Space  Treaty,  the  Astronaut 
Agreement,  the  Liability  Convention,  and 
the  Registration  Convention.  As  you  know, 
the  United  States  is  one  of  the  three  deposi- 
tary governments  for  the  first  three  of 
these  treaties,  while  the  Secretary  General 
is  the  single  depositary  for  the  Registra- 
tion Convention.  The  information  I  will 
give  is  current  as  of  the  opening  of  our 
session,  June  21. 

The  1967  Treaty  on  Principles  Govern- 
ing the  Activities  of  States  in  the  Explora- 
tion and  Use  of  Outer  Space,  including  the 
Moon  and  Other  Celestial  Bodies,  has  now 
been   ratified  or  acceded  to  by  69  states. 


This  represents  approximately  one-half  the 
membership  of  the  United  Nations.  It 
seems  reasonable  to  expect  this  number  to 
grow  steadily  in  view  of  the  increasing 
recognition  of  the  practical  applications  of 
space  technology. 

The  1968  Agreement  on  the  Rescue  of 
Astronauts,  the  Return  of  Astronauts  and 
the  Return  of  Objects  Launched  into  Outer 
Space  has  received  64  ratifications  and  ac- 
cessions in  all,  most  of  them  recently;  in 
addition,  the  European  Space  Agency 
(ESA)  has  filed  a  declaration  of  accept- 
ance under  article  VI  of  the  agreement. 

The  1972  Convention  on  International 
Liability  for  Damage  Caused  by  Space  Ob- 
jects has  been  ratified  or  acceded  to  by  40 
countries,  but  I  note  that  of  37  members  of 
the  Outer  Space  Committee  only  16  have 
so  far  become  party  to  this  convention. 

Finally,  the  1974  Convention  on  Regis- 
tration of  Objects  Launched  Into  Outer 
Space  was  opened  for  signature  here  at  the 
United  Nations  in  January  1975.  It  has 
been  signed  by  24  countries  and  has  been 
ratified  by  France,  Bulgaria,  and  Sweden. 

Mr.  Chairman,  our  delegation  is  pleased 
to  be  able  to  report  that  the  Senate  of  the 
United  States  yesterday  gave  its  advice  and 
consent  to  the  ratification  by  the  President 
of  the  Registration  Convention.  The  Senate 
took  this  action  unanimously  by  a  vote  of 
88  in  favor,  with  none  opposed.  We  appre- 
ciate this  action  by  the  Senate  and  hope 
the  Administration  will  be  able  shortly  to 
deposit  the  U.S.  instrument  of  ratification 
with  the  Secretary   General. 

We  would  like  to  suggest  that  the  Outer 
Space  Committee  consider  recommending 
to  our  governments  that  they  review  the 


206 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


desirability  of  accepting  the  rights  and 
obligations  contained  in  these  treaty  instru- 
ments. While  the  General  Assembly  regu- 
larly includes  a  suggestion  in  this  regard  in 
its  omnibus  resolution  on  the  annual  outer 
space  agenda  item,  progress  may  begin 
better  "at  home"  in  this  committee.  Let  us 
encourage  those  of  our  governments  which 
are  not  party  to  these  treaties  to  undertake 
a  fresh  analysis  of  them. 

U.S.  Cooperative  Programs  and  Activities 

Mr.  Chairman,  since  the  last  session  of 
the  committee  in  June  1975,  there  have 
been  many  significant  achievements  in  in- 
ternational outer  space  cooperation  and 
the  exploration  and  use  of  space.  One  dra- 
matic example  is  the  Apollo-Soyuz  mission, 
successfully  completed  through  coopera- 
tion between  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union,  involving  both  scientific  ex- 
periments and  a  rendezvous  and  docking 
program  in  July  1975. 

Its  many  engineering  and  scientific 
achievements  included  the  design  and 
flig^ht  testing  of  a  universal  docking  sys- 
tem, which  will  be  required  for  the  opera- 
tion of  any  large  cooperative  manned  sys- 
tems in  the  future.  Another  main  product 
is  the  establishment  of  an  expanded  rescue 
capability  for  future  manned  flights.  A  sig- 
nificant satellite  and  communications  engi- 
neering feat  involved  relay  of  live  televi- 
sion coverage  of  the  Apollo-Soyuz  mission 
through  the  ATS-6  satellite  [Applications 
Technology  Satellite]  and  via  an  earth  sta- 
tion near  Madrid  to  television  audiences 
around  the  world. 

Apart  from  the  tangible  results  of 
Apollo-Soyuz,  the  participating  states  and 
the  international  community  as  a  whole 
have  enjoyed  a  variety  of  less  tangible  but 
important  benefits,  such  as  the  cordial  re- 
lations that  have  grown  up  among  large 
numbers  of  U.S.  and  U.S.S.R.  men  and 
women  during  the  preparation  of  the  mis- 
sion and  the  good  will  engendered  in  astro- 
naut  and    cosmonaut   tours   following   the 


mission.  In  another  cooperative  venture  in- 
volving several  Eastern  European  coun- 
tries, the  United  States  contributed  scien- 
tific experiments  as  part  of  a  biological 
satellite  payload  (Cosmos  782)  launched 
by  the  Soviet  Union  late  last  November. 

The  establishment  of  these  relations  and 
the  demonstration  of  the  feasibility  of 
joint  mi.ssions  in  space  have  laid  the  foun- 
dation for  future  operations  in  the  interest 
of  all  countries  and  have  contributed  sig- 
nificantly to  the  implementation  of  the 
guiding  theme  of  promoting  international 
cooperation  and  understanding  as  set  forth 
in  article  III  of  the  1967  Outer  Space 
Treaty. 

On  August  1,  1975,  the  Satellite  Instruc- 
tional Television  Experiment  (SITE)  was 
inaugurated  by  the  Indian  Space  Research 
Organization  (ISRO).  In  1969,  NASA 
[National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Adminis- 
tration] had  undertaken  to  make  an  ATS 
satellite  available  to  India  for  four  hours 
every  day  for  one  year  in  order  to  broad- 
cast programs  on  family  planning,  agricul- 
ture, and  public  health,  as  well  as  school 
and  adult  education  programs,  to  5,000 
Indian  villages.  About  2,700  of  these  vil- 
lages received  the  programs  on  conven- 
tional television  receivers  augmented  with 
a  low-cost  10-foot-diameter  parabolic  an- 
tenna, a  frequency  converter,  and  a  pre- 
amplifier. 

India  has  had  full  responsibility  for  the 
design,  development,  operation,  and  main- 
tenance of  the  ground  receiving  and  trans- 
mitting equipment  and  for  the  programing 
of  SITE  broadcasts.  ISRO  will  also  evalu- 
ate the  social  impact  of  the  experiment. 
The  Administrator  of  NASA  recently  con- 
firmed on  his  return  from  a  tour  in  India 
that  the  programs  are  arousing  great  inter- 
est in  the  villages,  and  the  experiment 
appears  to  be  highly  successful. 

Since  the  committee's  18th  session  last 
year,  NASA  has  launched  two  Viking  auto- 
mated spacecraft  to  orbit  and  place  a 
lander  on  Mars.  The  first  of  these  two 
craft  entered  Martian  orbit  on  June  19. 

A  primary  objective  of  the  mission  is  to 


August  9,  1976 


207 


determine  whether  there  are  or  have  been 
living  microorganisms  either  on  or  below 
the  Martian  surface.  The  initial  lander, 
which  is  expected  to  descend  to  the  Mar- 
tian surface  during  the  first  week  of  July, 
is  also  intended  to  provide  a  spatial  and 
spectral  characterization  of  the  landing 
site  and  the  surrounding  atmosphere. 
Among  other  experiments,  it  will  make 
geological,  biological,  and  meteorological 
analyses.  Several  non-U. S.  scientists  will 
be  using  data  from  Viking  for  scientific 
studies  of  Mars. 

Another  international  cooperative  pro- 
gram of  major  significance  during  the  past 
year  has  involved  the  successful  launching 
by  NASA  of  the  Canadian  Communications 
Technology  Satellite  (CTS)  in  January 
1976.  This  is  an  advanced  experimental 
communication  satellite  designed  to  trans- 
mit at  substantially  higher  power  levels 
than  standard  communication  satellites 
and  thereby  permit  the  use  of  smaller  re- 
ceiving stations  in  isolated  communities 
and  for  governmental  and  industrial  opera- 
tions in  northern  Canada.  In  addition,  a 
Canadian  program  to  contribute  a  remote 
manipulator  system  for  use  on  the  NASA 
space  shuttle  continues  on  schedule. 

The  development  by  the  European  Space 
Agency  of  the  Spacelab  to  be  launched  in 
the  space  shuttle  is  proceeding  on  sched- 
ule. The  experimental  objectives  of  the 
first  Spacelab  flight,  scheduled  for  1980, 
have  been  selected  jointly  by  ESA  and 
NASA. 

Moreover,  under  the  Helios  Cooperative 
Solar  Probe  Project  carried  out  with  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  NASA  suc- 
cessfully launched  Helios-2  in  January 
1976.  Helios-1,  which  was  launched  in 
1975,  has  already  discovered  unexpected 
characteristics  of  the  solar  wind  as  well 
as  particle  fluxes  and  cosmic  dust  concen- 
trations in  hitherto  unexplored  areas  in 
pi'oximity  to  the  Sun.  Helios-2  will  be 
working  with  its  predecessor  to  extend 
and  correlate  those  investigations  in  space 
and  time. 


Other  cooperative  projects  under  study 
or  development  and  involving  the  United 
States  are  an  Infrared  Astronomy  Satellite 
with  the  Netherlands,  an  X-ray  satellite  of 
the  Explorer  class  with  the  United  King- 
dom, a  space  telescope  project  with  the 
European  Space  Agency,  and  an  out-of- 
the-ecliptic  probe  with  ESA  designed  to 
examine  the  astronomical  region  beyond 
the  principal  plane  of  the  solar  system. 

The  past  year  has  also  seen  marked 
progress  in  the  field  of  satellite  remote  sens- 
ing of  the  natural  phenomena  and  environ- 
ment of  the  Earth,  a  subject  of  principal 
concern  to  both  the  Scientific  and  Techni- 
cal and  the  Legal  Subcommittees  at  their 
recent  sessions. 

Facilities  for  direct  reception  of  Land- 
sat  data  are  currently  in  operation  in 
Brazil,  Canada,  Italy,  and  the  United 
States.  Chile,  Iran,  and  Zaire  have  also 
concluded  agreements  with  NASA  under 
which  they  will  fund  the  construction  of 
Landsat  ground  facilities  in  their  countries, 
and  a  number  of  other  countries  are  active- 
ly considering  establishing  such  stations  in 
1977  and  1978.  The  United  States  intends 
to  continue  to  be  responsive  to  the  growing 
interest  in  this  network. 

Although  not  exhaustive,  these  various 
projects  illustrate  the  advances  that  are 
being  made  for  the  benefit  of  mankind  as 
a  whole.  In  addition,  many  other  countries, 
developed  and  developing  alike,  are  be- 
coming increasingly  capable  of  exploiting 
space  technology  for  their  own  purposes. 

In  the  10-year  period  1965-75  NASA 
conducted  more  than  40  international  re- 
imbursable launches  in  addition  to  co- 
operative programs  in  which  funds  are 
not  exchanged.  Five  such  international  re- 
imbursable launches  will  be  conducted  in 
1976  and  11  more  are  scheduled  for  1977. 
This  level  of  activity  is  a  clear  index  to  the 
improved  capacity  of  states  to  benefit  from 
space  technology. 

The  U.N.  Committee  on  the  Peaceful 
Uses  of  Outer  Space  has  made  a  major 
contribution     to     these     achievements     by 


208 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


creating  a  climate  of  international  co- 
operation in  which  space  science,  explora- 
tion, and  applications  have  been  able  to 
flourish. 

Work  of  the  Subcommittees 

As  the  scientists  and  technicians  of  the 
world  are  making  impressive  progress  in 
the  exploration  of  outer  space,  the  mem- 
bers of  this  committee,  through  their  rep- 
resentatives in  the  Scientific  and  Technical 
and  the  Legal  Subcommittees,  have  also 
been  hard  at  work  trying  to  assess  the  fu- 
ture technical  potential  and  the  organiza- 
tional and  legal  needs  of  the  international 
community  in  this  area. 

Each  of  the  subcommittees  devoted  a 
considerable  amount  of  time  this  year  to 
the  subject  of  remote  sensing.  The  work  of 
the  Scientific  and  Technical  Subcommittee 
in  particular  was  assisted  by  a  series  of  de- 
tailed and  most  useful  studies  written  and 
compiled  by  the  Secretariat. 

Although  many  different  aspects  of  re- 
mote sensing  were  examined  by  the  Scien- 
tific and  Technical  Subcommittee,  one  of 
the  most  important  results  of  its  review  was 
the  emerging  consensus  in  support  of  re- 
gional cooperation  for  the  reception,  proc- 
essing, and  analysis  of  data.  Building  on 
the  recommendation  of  its  12th  session  in 
1975  that  training  facilities  should  be  com- 
bined with  such  regional  centers,  the  sub- 
committee noted  the  expanding  number  of 
training  opportunities  being  offered  by 
states  and  international  organizations  in 
order  to  increase  the  capability  of  all  coun- 
tries to  share  in  the  benefits  derived  from 
remote  sensing  of  the  earth.  The  subcom- 
mittee specifically  noted  that  "Interna- 
tional cooperation  was  needed  as  this  was 
the  only  cost-effective  approach  for  acquir- 
ing the  benefits  of  satellite  remote  sensing 
for  the  majority  of  countries."  ' 

The  subcommittee  also  "reaffirmed  the 


view  that  a  regional,  international  and  na- 
tional approach  would  be  preferable  for 
reception  of  remote  sensing  data  from  sat- 
ellites." The  subcommittee  cited  three  ex- 
amples of  regional  arrangements  including 
"(i)  a  station  encompassing  a  geographic 
zone  within  a  given  nation;  (ii)  a  station 
jointly  owned  and  operated  by  several  na- 
tions; (iiij  a  national  station  that  may 
serve  the  needs  of  several  States  under 
appropriate  bilateral  or  multilateral  ar- 
rangements between  those  States." 

In  the  view  of  the  United  States,  the 
practical  experience  which  the  interna- 
tional community  has  gained  thus  far 
through  current  experimental  programs 
strongly  supports  the  desirability  of  a  co- 
operative international  approach  to  the  re- 
ception, development,  and  sharing  of  bene- 
fits from  remote-sensing  data. 

We  also  believe  that  the  United  Nations 
can  play  a  most  valuable  role  in  the  dis- 
semination of  information  about  the  tech- 
nical aspects  of  remote  sensing,  about  the 
potential  benefits  in  which  all  countries 
may  share,  and  about  how  scientists  and 
other  experts  in  all  countries  may  apply 
those  benefits  to  their  own  development 
programs. 

Our  delegation  has  read  with  consider- 
able attention  the  note  from  the  Perma- 
nent Mission  of  India  concerning  a  possible 
regional  ground  station  for  remote  sensing 
which  might  be  established  in  India  con- 
tained in  document  A/AC. 105/174.  We 
await  with  interest  a  fuller  exposition  of 
this  matter  by  the  delegation  of  India. 

For  its  part  the  Legal  Subcommittee  has 
begun  a  careful  and  useful  analysis  of  the 
legal  implications  of  remote  sensing.  This 
analysis  includes  the  drafting  of  guiding 
principles  in  areas  where  common  elements 
have  been  identified  through  the  discussion 
of  legal  implications.  Five  such  principles 
have  been  developed  and  additional  com- 
mon   elements   identified.^ 


'  For  the  report  of  the  Scientific  and  Technical 
Subcommittee  on  the  work  of  its  13th  session,  see 
U.N.  doc.  A/AC.105/170. 


-  For  texts  of  the  draft  principles,  see  annex  III 
to  U.N.  doc.  A/AC.105/171,  report  of  the  Legal  Sub- 
committee on  the  work  of  its  15th  session. 


August  9,  1976 


209 


As  we  continue  this  work,  we  believe 
that  the  most  constructive  progress  can  be 
made  through  careful  attention  to  the  in- 
terdisciplinary aspects  of  remote  sensing 
and  to  the  need  to  integrate  legal,  techni- 
cal, and  organizational  considerations  in 
the  development  of  additional   principles. 

We  believe  it  is  worth  noting  that  in  the 
body  of  the  five  principles  so  far  developed, 
the  single  paragraph  unburdened  by  brack- 
ets reinforces  the  regional  cooperation 
theme.  The  paragraph  reads:  "In  order  to 
maximize  the  availability  of  benefits  from 
such  remote  sensing  data,  States  are  en- 
couraged to  consider  agreements  for  the 
establishment  of  shared  regional  facilities." 

The  Legal  Subcommittee  also  made  sub- 
stantial progress  in  drafting  principles  to 
guide  broadcasting  authorities  planning 
the  conduct  of  direct  television  broadcast- 
ing by  satellite.  Although  certain  issues  re- 
main to  be  resolved,  the  discussions  at  the 
May  session  of  the  subcommittee  have  been 
useful  and  productive. 

It  may  well  tax  our  collective  ingenuity 
to  develop  mutually  acceptable  solutions  to 
the  remaining  issues,  for  there  are  funda- 
mental values  involved  which  require  very 
considerable  discussion  and  analysis.  For 
the  United  States  as  for  many  other  coun- 
tries, the  principle  of  the  free  and  open 
exchange  of  information  and  ideas  is  cen- 
tral. Nevertheless,  the  Outer  Space  Com- 
mittee has  faced  diflficult  issues  in  the  past 
and  will  do  so  again  in  the  future.  We 
hope  that  in  the  course  of  time  we  will  be 
able  to  develop  a  consensus  in  this  matter 
as  well. 

We  also  hope  the  Legal  Subcommittee 
will  be  able  to  complete  its  work  on  the 
draft  Moon  treaty  and  add  this  agreement 
to  the  growing  list  of  successful  products  of 
the  subcommittee  to  be  approved  by  the 
Outer  Space  Committee  and  endorsed  by 
the  General  Assembly. 

A  topic  of  increasing  interest  to  govern- 
ments is  the  matter  of  energy  develop- 
ment programs.  We  have  heard  interesting 
and  stimulating  comments  in  this  area  by 
several  speakers,  including  our  distin- 
guished    chairman.     Ambassador     Janko- 


witsch  [Peter  Jankowitsch,  of  Austria]  ; 
and  there  are  two  papers  on  the  subject 
before  the  committee  at  the  current  ses- 
sion. There  is,  of  course,  a  great  deal  of 
work  which  could  be  done  in  this  area. 

While  it  is  desirable  to  employ  a  certain 
caution  as  to  the  scope  of  a  possible  study 
by  the  Outer  Space  Committee,  it  may  be 
helpful  for  governments  to  be  asked  to 
present  at  the  next  session  of  the  Scientific 
and  Technical  Subcommittee  a  survey  of 
work  in  progress  or  planned  in  each  coun- 
try in  the  area  of  developing  energy  re- 
sources or  systems  in  space. 

The  agenda  of  each  subcommittee  con- 
tinues to  be  full.  Each  has  important  and 
difficult  questions  of  interest  to  all  of  our 
governments.  The  tenor  of  our  work  has 
been  notably  constructive.  The  U.S.  delega- 
tion looks  forward  to  continuing  to  join  in 
the  collective  effort  to  explore  the  many 
important  aspects  of  the  peaceful  uses  of 
outer  space. 


United  Nations  Documents: 
A   Selected   Bibliography 


Mimeographed  or  processed  documents  (such  as  those 
listed  below)  may  be  consulted  at  depository  libraries 
in  the  United  States.  U.N.  printed  publications  may 
be  purchased  from  the  Sales  Section  of  the  United 
Nations,  United  Nations  Plaza,  N.Y.  10017. 


General  Assembly 

Committee   on   the   Peaceful   Uses   of   Outer   Space: 
Report   of   the   United   Nations   Expert   on   Space 
Applications  to  the  Scientific  and  Technical  Sub- 
committee.  A/AC.105/163.  January  20,   1976.  10 
pp. 
Coordination  of  outer  space  activities  within  the 
United  Nations  system.  Report  of  the  Secretary 
General.  A/AC.105/166.  February  5,  1976.  18  pp. 
Review   of   national   and   cooperative   international 
space    activities    for    the    calendar    year    1975. 
A/AC.105/167;     February     20,     1976;     139     pp. 
A/AC.105/167/Add.l;  March  U,  1976;  22  pp. 


Economic  and  Social  Council 

The  establishment  of  an  international  research  and 
training  group  for  the  advancement  of  women. 
Report  of  the  Secretary  General.  E/5772.  March 
29,  1976.  9  pp. 


210 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  CONGRESS 


Department  Discusses  U.S.  Prisoners  in  Mexico 


Statement  by  William  H.  Luers 

Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for  Inter-American  Affairs 


I         I  am  happy  to  have  the  opportunity  to  re- 
'     port  to  the  subcommittee  on  the  status  of 
•     Americans  arrested  and  imprisoned  in  Mexi- 
■     can  jails.  We  consider  this  a  serious  problem 
1     and    one    which    your    subcommittee,    Mr. 
Chairman,    has    played    an    important    and 
I     constructive   role    in    pursuing.    Public    ex- 
changes between  the  executive  and  legisla- 
tive branches  on  problems  of  this  type  are 
essential  to  airing  openly  for  the  American 
,,    people  the  policy  problems  and  progress  on 
matters  of  such   critical  importance.   These 
hearings  have  also,  quite  frankly,  provided 
impetus,    ideas,    and    support   for    our    own 
'     efforts. 

Since  our  January  report  to  you  there  have 
'     been  a  number  of  real  ai-eas  of  improvement 
in  conditions  for  Americans  in  Mexican  jails. 
There  has  also  been  a  promising  new  initia- 
tive. But  although  there  has  been  progress, 
there  are  other  areas  where  we  must  state 
J     frankly  no  meaningful  improvement  can  be 
►     reported. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  this  morning 
.     to: 

— First,  place  the  U.S.-prisoners  issue  in 
the   broader  context  of   U.S.-Mexican   rela- 
1,     tions ; 


'  Made  before  the  Subcommittee  on  International 
Political  and  Military  Affairs  of  the  House  Commit- 
tee on  International  Relations  on  June  29.  The  com- 
plete transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be  published  by 
the  committee  and  will  be  available  from  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


— Second,  outline  for  you  the  Mexican 
Government's  proposals  on  a  possible  ar- 
rangement to  transfer  sanctions  for  U.S.  and 
Mexican  prisoners; 

— Third,  discuss  some  hopeful  signs  that 
the  Mexicans  themselves  are  concerned  about 
the  prison  conditions ; 

— Fourth,  report  on  our  continuing  serious 
problem  areas;  and 

— Finally,  provide  you  a  status  report  on 
our  efforts  to  improve  our  guidance  to  con- 
sular officials  and  to  expand  our  public  infor- 
mation program  to  Americans  traveling 
abroad. 

U.S.-Mexican  Relations 

As  I  said  at  the  outset,  Mr.  Chairman,  we 
consider  the  treatment  of  American  citizens 
in  Mexican  jails  a  serious  problem — one  to 
which  we  give  the  highest  priority.  It  is  im- 
portant, however,  when  addressing  the  prob- 
lem to  place  it  in  the  context  of  our  expand- 
ing and  ever  more  complex  relationship  with 
our  neighbor.  There  is  no  nation  in  the  world 
with  which  we  have  greater  human  and  ma- 
terial interaction  than  with  Mexico.  More- 
over, Mexico's  very  proximity  and  involve- 
ment with  the  United  States  makes  her 
government  officials  particularly  sensitive  to 
indications  of  U.S.  encroachment  on  Mexican 
sovereignty  and  independence.  As  you  recall, 
Mr.  Chairman,  I  testified  on  this  very  sub- 
ject just  two  weeks  ago  before  your  commit- 
tee in  another  context. 


August  9,  1976 


211 


Although  Mexico  has  taken  a  forcefully 
independent  posture  in  international  affairs, 
our  bilateral  relations  have  remained  excel- 
lent. Our  ability  to  speak  frankly  and  directly 
to  each  other  has  been  enhanced  by  Mexico's 
heightened  self-confidence  and  growing  pos- 
ture as  an  important  spokesman  for  the  de- 
veloping world. 

I  need  not  recite  here  for  you  the  statis- 
tics on  trade  and  tourism  or  on  our  border 
crossings  and  commerce.  But  I  think  it  is 
important  to  state  three  major  areas  of  ne- 
gotiations and  collaboration: 

— First,  the  Mexican  Government  has  de- 
veloped a  bold,  imaginative,  and  effective 
approach  to  attacking  the  drug  flow.  We 
commend  the  Mexican  Government's  major 
effort  to  eradicate  poppies  and  cut  back  on 
the  damaging  flow  of  heroin  to  this  country. 

— Second,  we  are  engaged  in  important 
negotiations  with  the  Mexican  Government 
on  law  of  the  sea  and  fisheries  matters  which 
are  of  considerable  importance  to  large  num- 
bers of  American  citizens. 

— Third,  we  have  begun  in  the  last  year  a 
productive  series  of  exchanges  with  the  Mex- 
ican Government  over  the  complex  and  often 
emotional  issue  of  Mexican  illegal  migrants 
in  this  country.  We  are  encouraged  by  the 
tone  and  mutual  sense  of  importance  our  two 
governments  have  brought  to  those  dis- 
cussions. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  mention  these  matters  not 
to  detract  from  the  U.S.-prisoners  issue,  but 
to  put  the  issue  in  perspective.  The  lives  and 
well-being  of  American  citizens  can  be  sec- 
ond to  no  U.S.  foreign  policy  interest.  There 
are  actions  which  we  can  take,  and  have 
taken,  to  increase  service  to  and  improve  the 
conditions  of  U.S.  prisoners  in  Mexico.  There 
are,  however,  aspects  of  the  problem  which 
involve  national  sovereignty.  Those  aspects 
which  involve  sovereignty  can  only  be  solved 
through  discussions  and  negotiations  be- 
tween our  two  governments.  We  also  wish  to 
stress  that  we  see  no  inconsistency  whatso- 
ever between  our  desire  for  continued  Mexi- 
can efforts  to  curb  the  flow  of  heroin  and  our 
desire  for  fair  treatment  to  U.S.  prisoners. 


New  Initiatives 

As  the  subcommittee  is  aware,  Secretary 
of  State  Kissinger  discussed  the  problem  of 
the  prisoners  with  the  President  and  Foreign 
Secretary  of  Mexico  during  his  visit  to  that 
country  from  June  10  to  12.  Mexico  proposed 
several  possible  remedies  to  the  problem  of 
the  detention  of  American  citizens  in  Mexi- 
can jails  and  of  Mexican  citizens  in  American 
jails.  It  was  pointed  out  that  incarceration  in 
a  foreign  jail,  deprived  of  the  support  of 
one's  family  and  friends,  may  be  more  bur- 
densome for  the  prisoner  than  it  would  be 
if  he  served  his  sentence  in  his  home  country. 

Consideration  is  being  given  by  both  gov- 
ernments to  the  feasibility  of  making  ar- 
rangements whereby  the  nationals  of  one 
country  incarcerated  in  the  other  country's 
jails  might  request  being  transferred  to- their 
home  countries  to  serve  their  sentences.  Al- 
though neither  the  United  States  nor  Mexico 
is  presently  a  party  to  an  arrangement  of 
this  character,  the  idea  of  such  transfer  is 
not  new.  In  addition  to  the  European  Con- 
vention on  the  International  Validity  of 
Criminal  Judgments,  developed  within  the 
Council  of  Europe  in  1970,  there  are  bilateral 
conventions  on  the  subject  between  several 
countries. 

The  Department  does  not  believe  that  the 
fact  that  we  have  never  had  a  treaty  of  this 
character  should  prevent  exploring  with  the 
Mexicans  the  possibility  of  an  agreement 
that  would  ameliorate  the  burden  on  citizens 
of  both  countries  incarcerated  abroad  and  re- 
lieve a  problem  that  is  an  irritant  in  our  his- 
torically friendly  relations.  Accordingly,  we 
have  decided  to  pursue  the  matter  with  the 
Government  of  Mexico. 

Ambassador  [Joseph  J.]  Jova  has  been  in- 
structed to  present  a  note  to  the  Mexicans 
indicating  some  of  the  issues  with  which  an 
agreement  would  have  to  deal  and  asking  for 
the  views  of  the  Government  of  Mexico  on 
these  questions.  We  are  also  asking  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Mexico  to  make  suggestions  with 
respect  to  other  issues  with  which  an  agree- 
ment might  deal. 

We  will  study  sympathetically  the  Mexican 
replies.  We  hope  that  after  this  written  ex- 
change  of   views   our   lawyers   might   meet 


212 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


with  their  lawyers  to  consider  what  further 
steps  should  be  taken.  We  would  expect  to 
keep  the  subcommittee  informed  of  the  prog- 
ress of  this  initiative. 


Hopeful  Signs  of  Mexican  Concern 

In  addition  to  the  Mexican  proposal  on  the 
a    transfer  of  sanctions,  there  are  a  number  of 
1  i  other  indications  of  growing  Mexican  concern 
with  prison  conditions  in  that  country. 
Foremost  among  these  is   the  reform  of 
,    the  administration  of  Lecumberri  Prison  in 
1    Mexico  City.   Living  conditions  and  corrup- 
;.    tion  in  this  prison  reached  the  point  where 
r.    the  Mexicans   themselves  demanded   rectifi- 
j    cation.  The  reform  was  triggered  by  the  es- 
:    cape  of  four  prisoners,  only  one  of  whom  may 
have    a    claim    to    U.S.    nationality.    Yet    it 
,    quickly  became  apparent  that  the  Mexican 
Government  was  not  prepared  to  tolerate  a 
continuation  of  the  elaborate  web  of  extor- 
tion and  other  abuses  which  had  made  life 
intolerable  for  both  Mexican  and  American 
prisoners.  As  a  result,  the  commandant  was 
.    removed  from  office  and  the  chief  of  guards 
imprisoned  on  charges  of  corrupt  practices. 
A  new  acting  director,  a  subsecretary  in  the 
Interior  Ministry,  has  been  appointed,  with 
the  specific  mandate  of  eliminating  abuses. 

The  notorious  "mayor"  system,  a  prisoner 
hierarchy,  which  was  the  primary  mecha- 
nism for  intimidation  and  extortion  of  pris- 
oners, has  been  abolished.  Prisoners  are  no 
longer  required,  among  other  things,  to  pay 
rent  for  their  cells  or  for  the  retention  of 
commissioned  jobs. 

Furthermore,  since  the  new  prison  direc- 
tor learned  of  past  abuses  of  the  commis- 
sioned-work system,  he  has  instituted  a 
f  program  of  review  of  prisoners'  claims  to 
commissioned-work  credit  to  insure  that  pris- 
oners receive  the  full  credit  to  which  they 
are  entitled  for  work  performed.  The  Em- 
bassy is  assisting  American  prisoners,  where 
possible,  in  this  regard. 

The  new  director  has  also  made  public 
statements  regarding  exploitation  by  law- 
yers. At  this  time  it  is  too  early  to  determine 
if  this  serious  abuse  has  finally  been  cor- 
rected. 


With  particular  understanding  of  the  spe- 
cial needs  of  the  American  prisoners  in  his 
care,  the  new  director  has  taken  the  initia- 
tive in  collecting  English-language  books  and 
magazines  for  the  prisoners'  use.  In  contrast 
to  the  limited  physical  exercise  facilities 
available  to  most  of  the  American  prisoners 
under  the  old  regime,  an  American-style 
football  team  has  now  been  organized  and 
American  prisoners  are  encoui'aged  to  par- 
ticipate. Other  improvements  have  been 
made  to  facilitate  constructive  communication 
between  the  prison  administration  and  the 
inmates.  The  new  administration  has  shown 
marked  cooperation  and  willingness  to  work 
with  our  consular  officers  for  the  welfare  of 
the  American  prisoners. 

We  are  particularly  pleased  to  note  that 
these  reforms  at  Lecumberri  and  the  general 
subject  of  need  for  improvements  in  prison 
conditions  have  been  and  continue  to  be  the 
subjects  of  widespread  reporting  and  in- 
tense discussion  in  the  press  throughout 
Mexico.  As  an  example  of  this  concern  out- 
side of  Mexico  City,  our  consulate  at  Mazat- 
lan  has  recently  reported  on  a  scathing 
article  in  a  Culiacan,  Sinaloa,  newspaper  de- 
scribing in  lurid  but  accurate  terms  the  de- 
plorable conditions  existing  in  the  notorious 
Mazatlan  prison. 

The  Department  believes  that  it  is  too 
early  to  judge  whether  this  heightened  Mexi- 
can concern  with  prison  conditions  as  reflected 
in  the  media  will  eventually  lead  to  wide- 
spread prison  reform. 

We  should  report  on  one  case,  in  which 
two  American  prisoners  in  an  outlying  area 
were  assaulted  by  four  guards.  When  this 
incident  was  brought  to  the  attention  of  the 
appropriate  Mexican  authorities  by  our  con- 
sular post,  the  matter  was  investigated  and 
the  guards  removed  from  their  employment. 

Continuing  Problem  Areas 

While  we  have  seen  evidence  of  height- 
ened Mexican  concern  with  problems  of 
treatment  of  inmates  in  some  of  their  penal 
institutions,  we  cannot  report  commensurate 
improvement  in  the  treatment  of  newly  de- 
tained Americans  at  the  hands  of  arresting 


August  9,  1976 


213 


officers  and  those  responsible  for  interroga- 
tion. 

Since  January  1,  1976,  incidents  of  physi- 
cal abuse  in  18  percent  of  new  arrest  cases 
have  been  substantiated.  We  continue  to 
have  serious  problems  in  regard  to  early 
notification  of  arrest  of  our  citizens  and  in 
obtaining  prompt  consular  access  to  them. 
We  continue  to  believe  that  prompt  consular 
access  offers  the  best  hope  of  effective  de- 
terrence of  abuse  during  interrogation. 

As  we  have  indicated,  we  continue  to  pro- 
test all  incidents  of  abuse  where  we  can 
do  so.  Here,  however,  our  hands  are  often 
tied  by  the  fact  that  many  prisoners  who 
have  suffered  mistreatment  decline  to  au- 
thorize our  consular  officers  to  make  official 
protests  or  authorize  protest  only  many 
months  after  the  fact,  thus  severely  weaken- 
ing the  thrust  of  the  protest.  Also,  many  of 
the  protests  which  our  Embassy  has  made 
to  Mexican  authorities  in  cases  of  physical 
abuse  have  merely  elicited  denials  that  such 
abuse  has  taken  place. 

We  are  most  concerned  about  the  lack  of 
significant  improvement  in  the  treatment  of 
U.S.  citizens  in  the  period  shortly  after  their 
arrest  and  continue  to  make  this  concern 
known  at  all  levels  of  the  Mexican  Govern- 
ment. We  have  asked  for  strict  adherence  to 
the  granting  of  all  human  rights  to  U.S. 
prisoners  guaranteed  under  the  Mexican 
Constitution  and  by  accepted  international 
standards. 

Guidance  to  Consuls;   Information   Programs 

We  have  recently  completed  the  drafting 
and  editing  of  a  new  handbook  on  the  pro- 
tection of  American  nationals  to  supplement 
and  expand  upon  the  regulations  governing 
arrestee  and  prisoner  services.  The  handbook 
draws  largely  upon  our  experience  in  Mexico 
but  also  incorporates  lessons  learned  all  over 
the  world.  In  our  preliminary  research  for 
the  compilation  of  the  handbook,  we  soon 
realized  that  every  good  idea  for  arrestee 
and   prisoner  services,   every  insight,  every 


214 


method  of  getting  the  job  done  in  the  best 
possible  way,  was  already  in  existence  and 
in  use  in  one  or  more  of  our  consular  offices 
around  the  world.  The  handbook,  for  the  fir.st 
time,  brings  together  and  distills  the  ideas 
which  could  be  identified  as  having  general 
applicability  and  makes  them  available  to 
all  our  consular  officers  in  Mexico  and 
elsewhere. 

The  first  edition  of  the  handbook  is  now 
in  the  process  of  being  published.  I  empha- 
size "first  edition,"  because  we  fully  ex- 
pect the  handbook  to  be  revised  soon  and 
often  to  refine  further  the  ideas,  suggestions, 
and  requirements  in  it  as  well  as  to  incorpo- 
rate new  ideas  which  will  inevitably  arise 
from  the  new,  positive,  inventive  attitude 
toward  prisoner  services  which  we  are  now 
building.  I  would  like  to  i-ead  you  the  intro- 
duction to  the  handbook,  to  give  you  an  idea 
of  the  philosophy  that  went  into  it: 

One  of  the  basic  functions  of  a  consul  has  tradi- 
tionally been  to  provide  a  "cultural  bridge"  between 
the  host  community  and  the  consul's  own  com- 
patriots traveling  or  residing  abroad.  No  one  needs 
that  cultural  bridge  more  than  the  individual  ar- 
rested in  a  foreign  place  or  imprisoned  in  a  foreign 
jail. 

Neither  arrest  nor  conviction  deprives  a  United 
States  national  of  the  right  to  the  consul's  best 
efforts  in  facilitating  the  citizen's  welfare  and  de- 
fense or  in  protecting  the  citizen's  legal  and  human 
rights.  Like  attorneys  and  social  workers,  consular 
officers  are  obliged  to  serve  their  clients  with  dedi- 
cated professional  enthusiasm  regardless  of  their 
opinions  of  the  client's  innocence  or  personal  merit. 

The  guidelines  in  this  handbook  should  not  be 
taken  as  defining  the  limits  of  the  consular  officer's 
responsibility,  but  rather  as  furnishing  a  frame 
of  reference  for  each  officer's  own  creative  approach 
to  arrestee  and  prisoner  services. 

Also,  the  Department  of  State  has  ex- 
panded its  public  information  program  to 
warn  Americans  of  the  horrendous  personal 
consequences  of  becoming  involved  with 
drugs  abroad.  Since  January,  the  Adminis- 
trator of  the  Bureau  of  Security  and  Con- 
sular Affairs,  Mr.  Leonard  F.  Walentynowicz, 
and  his  Deputy,  Mr.  Loren  E.  Lawrence, 
have  personally  appeared  on  numerous  tele- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


vision  and  radio  programs  to  speak  on  this 
siiliject,  and  both  have  given  a  number  of 
newspaper  interviews  and  made  personal  ap- 
Ipearances  on  this  same  theme.  Further,  the 

,  !Department  is  preparing  for  distribution  the 
first  of  a  number  of  new  pamphlets  warning 
in  detail  of  the  terrible  price  to  be  paid  for 

,  drug  offenses  in  Mexico  and  elsewhere 
labroad.  A  copy  of  this  pamphlet  is  available 

,  for  members  of  the  subcommittee. 

In  our  expanded  public  information  pro- 
gram it  is  essential  that  we  reach  as  broad 

,  a  base  of  the  American  populace  as  is  possi- 
ble. To  this  end,  on  July  18  singer-actor  Kris 

'  Kristofferson  is  making  a  professionally  pre- 
pared    public-service     television     spot     an- 

'  nouncement  on  the  dangers  of  drug  use 
abroad.  We  are  also  having  prepared  a  series 
of  30-second  radio  spots  for  use  on  stations 
oriented  to  young  listeners,  which  we  hope 
actor  Warren  Beatty  will  narrate. 

Mr.  Chairman,  in  summary,  we  in  the  De- 
partment of  State  have  been  most  gratified 
with  the  concern  shown  by  the  Mexican 
Government  in  regard  to  prison  conditions, 
a  concern  arising  from  Mexican  sensibility  to 

,  human  rights.  We  are  especially  hopeful  that 
the  Mexican  Government's  initiative  in  re- 

;  gard  to  transfer  of  sanctions  will  bear  fruit 

'  and  thus  alleviate  the  plight  of  some  of  the 
Americans  now  in  prison  in  Mexico. 

[      We  are  disappointed,  however,  that  neither 

.  Mexican  concern  for  human  rights  nor  our 

:  vigorous  protests  have  put  an  end  to  physi- 
cal abuse  of  arrestees  during  interrogation. 

'  Naturally,  we  also  remain  dissatisfied  with 
the  fact  that  many  of  our  citizens  imprisoned 
in  Mexico  continue  to  exist  in  deplorable 
conditions. 

We  will  not  fail  to  bring  to  the  attention 
of  Mexican  officials  at  all  levels  our  ongoing 
deep  concern  and  distress  over  abuses  suf- 
fered by  U.S.  citizens  arrested  in  Mexico.  We 
are  hopeful  that  our  latest  discussions  of 
this  problem  at  the  highest  levels  of  govern- 
ment— which  we  find  share  our  concern  over 
the  allegations  of  abuse — will  have  positive 
results.  Specifically  we  hope  to  see  greater 


pressure  being  brought  to  bear  on  the  operat- 
ing-level officials — those  who  make  the  ar- 
rests, question  the  accused,  and  guard  the 
prisons — to  desist  from  any  action  that  is 
in  violation  of  the  rights  granted  to  all 
arrestees,  both  Mexican  and  foreign,  under 
the  Mexican  Constitution  and  statutes. 


Congressional  Documents 
Relating  to  Foreign  Policy 

94th  Congress,  1st  and  2d  Sessions 

U.S.  Missile  Sale  to  Jordan.  Hearings  before  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  on  S. 
Con.  Res.  50,  to  express  the  objection  of  the  Con- 
gress to  the  proposed  sale  of  improved  Hawk  mis- 
siles and  Redeye  missiles  to  Jordan.  July  15-21, 
1975.  99  pp. 

Effects  of  Limited  Nuclear  Warfare.  Hearing  before 
the  Subcommittee  on  Arms  Control,  International 
Organizations  and  Security  Agreements  of  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  on  pos- 
sible effects  on  U.S.  society  of  nuclear  attacks 
against  U.S.  military  installations.  September  18, 
1975.  61  pp. 

Conference  on  Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe: 
Part  II.  Hearings  before  the  Subcommittee  on 
International  Political  and  Military  Affairs  of  the 
House  Committee  on  International  Relations  on 
H.  Res.  864  and  related  resolutions,  e.xpressing 
the  sense  of  the  House  on  nonrecognition  of  the 
Soviet  Union's  annexation  of  the  Baltic  nations, 
and  H.R.  9466  (S.  2679),  to  establish  a  Commis- 
sion on  Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe.  No- 
vember 18,  1975-May  4,  1976.  191  pp. 

U.S.  Citizens  Imprisoned  in  Mexico.  Hearings  before 
the  Subcommittee  on  International  Political  and 
Military  Affairs  of  the  House  Committee  on  Inter- 
national Relations.  Part  II.  October  22,  1975-Janu- 
ary  27,  1976.  110  pp. 

94th  Congress,  2d  Session 

United  States-Canadian  Relations.  Hearing  before 
the  Subcommittee  on  International  Political  and 
Military  Affairs  of  the  House  Committee  on  Inter- 
national Relations.  January  28,   1976.  26  pp. 

Travel  Program  for  Foreign  Diplomats,  Inc.  Hearing 
before  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations. 
March  22,  1976.  32  pp. 

Western  European  Union.  Joint  meeting  of  the 
House  Committee  on  International  Relations  and 
the  General  Affairs  Committee  of  the  Western 
European   Union.   April   8,   1976.   38   pp. 


August  9,  1976 


215 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Oil  Pollution 

Amendments  to  the  international  convention  for  the 

prevention  of  pollution  of  the  sea  by  oil,  1954,  as 

amended   (TIAS  4900,  6109).  Adopted  at  London 

October  21,  1969.' 

Acceptance  deposited:  Algeria,  June  7,  1976. 
International  convention   relating  to   intervention   on 

the  high   seas  in  cases  of  oil   pollution  casualties. 

with  annex.  Done  at  Brussels  November  29,  1969. 

Entered  into  force  May  6,  1975.  TIAS  8068. 

Ratification  deposited:  Poland.  June  1,  1976. 

Accession  deposited:  Cuba,  May  5,   1976." 
International    convention    on    civil    liability    for    oil 

pollution  damage.  Done  at  Brussels  November  29, 

1969.  Entered  into  force  June  19,  1975.' 

Ratification  deposited:  Yugoslavia.  June  18,  1976. 

Accession  deposited:  Japan,  June  3,  1976. 
Amendments  to  the  international  convention  for  the 

prevention  of  pollution  of  the  sea  by  oil,  1954,  as 

amended    (TIAS  4900,   6109).   Adopted   at   London 

October  12,  1971.' 

Acceptance  deposited:   Italy.  June   17,   1976. 
Amendments  to  the  international  convention  for  the 

prevention  of  pollution  of  the  sea  by  oil,  1954,  as 

amended    (TIAS  4900,   6109).    Adopted   at    London 

October  15,  1971.' 

Acceptance  deposited:   Italy,  June   17,   1976. 

Safety  at  Sea 

Convention  on  the  international  regulations  for 
preventing  collisions  at  sea,  1972.  Done  at  London 
October  20,  1972. 

Ratification  deposited:   Federal   Republic   of   Ger- 
many, July  14,  1976. 
Enters  into  force:  July  15,  1977. 

International  regulations  for  preventing  collisions  at 
sea.  Approved  by  the  International  Conference  on 
Safety  of  Life  at  Sea  held  at  London  from  May  17 
to  June  16,  1960.  Entered  into  force  September  1, 
1965.  TIAS  5813. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Algeria,  June  7,  1976. 

Wheat 

Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the  wheat 
trade  convention   (part  of  the  international  wheat 


'  Not  in  force. 

'  With  a  declaration. 

'  Not  in  force  for  the  United  States. 


agreement)  1971  (TIAS  7144,  8227).  Done  at 
Washington  March  25,  1975.  Entered  into  force 
June  19,  1975,  with  respect  to  certain  provisions, 
and  July  1,  1975,  with  respect  to  other  provisions. 
Accession  deposited:  Syrian  Arab  Republic,  July 
19,  1976. 


BILATERAL 

African   Development   Bank 

Grant  agreement  relating  to  a  regional  onchocercia- 
sis area  land  satellite  (Landsat)  related  study  in 
Benin,  Ghana,  and  Upper  Volta,  with  annex. 
Signed  at  Abidjan  June  30,  1976.  Entered  into 
force  June  30,  1976. 

Brazil 

Agreement  relating  to  the  continuation  of  a  col- 
laborative experimental  program  in  the  field  of 
remote  sensing  surveys  of  earth  resources,  with 
related  letters.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Brasilia  May  26,  1976.  Entered  into  force  May  26, 
1976. 

Egypt 

Grant  agreement  relating  to  construction  of  a  ther- 
mal power  plant  near  Ismailia,  with  annex.  Signed 
at  Cairo  May  30,  1976.  Entered  into  force  May  30. 
1976. 

Grant  agreement  relating  to  technical  and  feasibility 
studies.  Signed  at  Cairo  May  30,  1976.  Entered 
into  force  May  30,  1976. 

Ethiopia 

Grant  agreement  relating  to  a  nutrition/health  early 
warning  system  project  and  access  road  construc- 
tion. Signed  at  Addis  Ababa  June  30,  1976.  En- 
tered into  force  June  30,  1976. 

Haiti 

Agreement  relating  to  the  limitation  of  imports  from 
Haiti  of  fresh,  chilled,  or  frozen  meat  of  cattle, 
goats,  and  sheep,  except  lambs,  during  calendar 
year  1976.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Port-au-Prince  April  30  and  June  29,  1976. 
Entered   into  force  June   29,   1976. 

Panama 

Agreement  relating  to  the  limitation  of  imports  from 
Panama  of  fresh,  chilled,  or  frozen  meat  of  cattle, 
goats,  and  sheep,  except  lambs,  during  calendar 
year  1976.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Pan- 
ama April  26  and  July  7,  1976.  Entered  into  force 
July  7,  1976. 

Zaire 

Loan  agreement  to  assist  Zaire  in  alleviating  balance- 
of-payments  problems.  Signed  at  Kinshasa  June 
29,  1976.  Entered  into  force  June  29,  1976. 


216 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


INDEX     August  9,  1976     Vol.  LXXV,  No.  1937 


Advisory  Committees.  Summary  Reports  of 
Closed  Meetings  of  Advisory  Committees 
Available 200 

Africa.  U.S.  Discusses  Relations  With  Develop- 
ing Countries  in  Opening  Statement  at 
ECOSOC  Meeting  (Scranton) 201 

Congress 

Congressional  Documents  Relating  to  Foreign 

Policy 215 

Department  Discusses  U.S.  Prisoners  in  Mexico 

(Luers) 211 

Foreign  Assistance  Appropriations  Act  Signed 

Into  Law  (Ford) 199 

President  Signs  Security  Assistance  and  Arms 

Export  Control  Act  (Ford) 198 

Consular  Affairs.  Department  Discusses  U.S. 
Prisoners   in   Mexico    (Luers) 211 

Developing  Countries.  U.S.  Discusses  Relations 
With  Developing  Countries  in  Opening  State- 
ment at  ECOSOC  Meeting  (Scranton)  ...       201 

Economic  Affairs.  U.S.  Discusses  Relations 
With  Developing  Countries  in  Opening  State- 
ment at  ECOSOC  Meeting  (Scranton)  ...       201 

Foreign  Aid 

Foreign  Assistance  Appropriations  Act  Signed 
Into  Law  (Ford) 199 

President  Signs  Security  Assistance  and  Arms 
Export  Control  Act  (Ford) 198 

Mexico.  Department  Discusses  U.S.  Prisoners 
in   Mexico    (Luers) 211 

Military  Affairs.  President  Signs  Security  As- 
sistance and  Arms  Export  Control  Act  (Ford)       198 

Presidential  Documents 

Foreign  Assistance  Appropriations  Act  Signed 

Into     Law 199 

President  Signs  Security  Assistance  and  Arms 
Export  Control  Act 198 

Queen  Elizabeth  II  Makes  State  Visit  to  the 
United   States 196 

Space.  U.S.  Discusses  Progress  and  Challenges 
in  Space  Technology  and  Law  in  U.N.  Outer 
Space  Committee  (Reis) 206 

Treaty  Information.  Current  Actions  ....       216 

United  Kingdom.  Queen  Elizabeth  II  Makes 
State  Visit  to  the  United  States  (Elizabeth 
II,  Ford) 196 

United  Nations 

Changes  and   Choices   at   the   United   Nations 

(Lewis) 189 

United  Nations  Documents 210 


U.S.  Discusses  Progress  and  Challenges  in 
Space  Technology  and  Law  in  U.N.  Outer 
Space  Committee  (Reis) 206 

U.S.  Discusses  Relations  With  Developing 
Countries  in  Opening  Statement  at  ECOSOC 
Meeting  (Scranton) 201 


Name  Index 

Queen  Elizabeth  II 196 

Ford,    President 196,  198,  199 

Lewis,    Samuel    W 189 

Luers,    William    H 211 

Reis,  Herbert  K 206 

Scranton,  William  W 201 


Checklist  of  Department  of  State 

Press  Releases:  July  19-25 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,   D.C.   20520. 

No.    Date  Sobjeat 

*349  7/20  Shipping  Coordinating  Commit- 
tee, Subcommittee  on  Safety  of 
Life  at  Sea,  working  group  on 
radiocommunications,   Aug.    19. 

*350  7/22  Program  for  the  official  visit  to 
Washington  of  Prime  Minister 
J.  Malcolm  Fraser  of  Australia. 

t351  7/22  Kissinger:  Downtown  Rotary  Club 
and  Seattle  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce, Seattle,  Wash. 

t351A  7/22  Questions  and  answers  following 
address,  Seattle. 

*352  7/22  Munitions  export  license  to  be 
issued  to  United  Technologies 
International  for  collaboration 
agreement  on  new  commercial 
jet  engine. 

*353  7/22  Kissinger:  news  conference, 
Seattle. 

t354  7/22  Kissinger:  panel  discussion.  World 
Affairs  Council,  Portland,  Oreg. 

*355  7/23  James  J.  Blake  sworn  in  as  Am- 
bassador to  Iceland  (biographic 
data). 

*  Not  printed. 

t  Held  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


I 


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7a 


/?JS 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 

BULLETIN 


Volume  LXXV      •      No.  1938 


August  16,  1976 


AMERICA  AND  ASIA 
Address  by  Secretary  Kissinger    217 

SECRETARY   KISSINGER  INTERVIEWED  BY  PANEL  AT  PORTLAND,  OREG. 

Transcript     232 

DEPARTMENT  DISCUSSES  CONTINUING  EFFORTS  TO  ACCOUNT 

FOR  AMERICANS  MISSING  IN  INDOCHINA 

Statement  by  Under  Secretary  Habib     2A9 


THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 

For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


Ij 

THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE  BULLET  I 


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Note:  Contents  of  this  publication  are  not 
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appreciated.  The  BULLETIN  is  indexed  In 
the    Readers'    Guide   to    Periodical    Literature. 


August  16,  1976 
Vol,  LXXV,  No.  1938 

The  Department  of  State  BULLET 
a    weekly    publication    issued   by 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau 
Public  Affairs,  provides  tfie  public  ■ 
interested  agencies  of  the  governm 
with  information  on  development* 
the  field  of  U.S.  foreign  relations 
on  the  work  of  the  Department 
the  Foreign  Service. 
The     BULLETIN     includes     selet 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy,  isa 
by  the  White  House  and  the  Depi 
ment,     and     statements,     addret 
and  news  conferences  of  the  Presle^ 
and  the  Secretary  of  State  and  oi 
officers  of  the  Department,  as  well 
special  articles  on  various  phases 
international  affairs  and  the  funeti 
of    the    Department.     Information 
included  concerning  treaties  and  in 
national    agreements    to    which 
United   States   is   or   may   beconb 
party  and  on  treaties  of  general  in 
national  interest. 
Publications    of    the    Department 
State,  United  Nations  documents, 
legislative    material    in    the    field 
international  relations  are  also  ttii 


America  and  Asia 


Address  by  Secretary  Kissinger  ' 


A  little  more  than  two  weeks  ago  this 
lation  celebrated  its  200th  birthday.  In 
he  process  of  that  celebration,  Americans 
earned  that  despite  the  agony,  the  tur- 
noil,  and  the  constitutional  crisis  of  the 
ast  decade,  we  are  still  proud  to  be  Ameri- 
ans  and  still  proud  of  what  America 
neans  to  the  world.  We  felt  once  again 
hat  our  country  is  free  and  vibrant  with 
,ife  and  change.  We  saw  that  tolerance 
and  hope  and  dedication  are  far  more  a 
)art  of  the  American  national  character 
•oday  than   hatred,   division,  and   despair. 

To  the  generation  that  came  to  maturity 
n  the  late  sixties  or  early  seventies,  these 
ruths  may  have  been  apparent  for  the  first 
;ime.  For  my  generation,  it  was,  rather,  a 
•eminder  of  basic  verities  about  America 
,vhich  had  been  in  danger  of  being  ob- 
scured by  the  turmoil  of  a  decade.  But  for 
ill  of  us,  of  whatever  generation,  it  was  an 
iplifting  experience. 

Certainly  the  events  of  one  celebration, 
lowever  inspiring,  cannot  by  themselves 
;olve  the  long-term  problems  that  our  na- 
ion  will  face  in  its  third  century.  But  they 
lluminate  the  road  before  us  as  we  enter 
jur  electoral  campaign.  They  tell  us  that  it 
s  time  to  move  away  from  the  counsels  of 
timidity,  fear,  and  resentment  which  have 
pone  so  much  to  corrupt  our  public  dia- 
logue. 

Ours  is  not  a  nation  bent  on  domination, 


'  Made  at  Seattle,  Wash.,  on  July  22  before  a 
uncheon  sponsored  by  the  Downtown  Rotary  Club 
ind  the  Seattle  Chamber  of  Commerce  (text  from 
aress  release  351). 


as  we  were  told  four  years  ago.  Ours  is  not 
a  nation  in  retreat,  as  we  have  been  told 
too  often  this  year.  Ours  is  a  nation  which 
understands  that  America  cannot  be  at 
peace  if  the  world  is  at  war,  that  America 
cannot  be  prosperous  if  the  world  is  mired 
in  poverty,  that  America  cannot  be  true  to 
its  heritage  unless  it  stands  with  those  who 
.strive  for  freedom  and  human  dignity.  In 
short,  we  know  that  our  lives,  liberty,  and 
pursuit  of  happiness  depend  on  the  world 
in  which  we  live  and  that  America's  lead- 
ership is  crucial  to  shaping  what  kind  of 
world  that  will  be. 

We  face  today,  as  we  have  for  several 
years,  international  conditions  quite  unlike 
those  known  by  earlier  generations  of 
Americans.  We  have  designed  a  foreign 
policy  capable  of  mastering  those  new 
challenges,  a  foreign  policy  for  the  last 
quarter  of  the  20th  century,  based  on  four 
propositions : 

— First,  American  strength  is  essential  to 
the  peace  of  the  world  and  to  the  success 
of  our  diplomacy.  We  should  not  bemuse 
ourselves  with  false  choices  between  de- 
fense or  domestic  needs,  between  security 
or  social  justice.  Unless  we  pursue  all  these 
objectives  we  are  likely  to  achieve  none  of 
them.  Security  cannot  be  the  sole  goal  of 
our  policy,  but  no  other  achievements  can 
endure  without  it. 

— Second,  our  alliances  with  the  great 
democracies  of  North  America,  Western 
Europe,  and  Asia  are  the  bedrock  and  the 
top  priority  of  our  foreign  policy. 


August  16,  1976 


217 


— Third,  in  an  age  of  thermonuclear 
weapons  and  strategic  balance,  we  have  a 
moral  as  well  as  a  political  obligation  to 
strive  mightily  toward  the  overriding  goal 
of  peace.  We  are  ready  to  use  our  strength 
to  resist  blackmail  or  pressure;  we  must 
also  be  prepared  to  negotiate  longstanding 
disputes,  foster  habits  of  moderation,  and 
develop  more  constructive  ties  with  poten- 
tial adversaries.  The  American  people  and 
the  people  of  the  world  ask  for  a  peace 
more  secure  than  a  balance  of  terror  con- 
stantly being  contested. 

— Fourth,  security  and  peace  are  the 
foundations  for  addressing  the  positive  as- 
pirations of  peoples.  Prosperity,  human 
rights,  protecting  the  environment,  eco- 
nomic development,  scientific  and  techni- 
cal advance,  and  cultural  exchange  have 
become  major  concerns  of  international  di- 
plomacy. In  these  spheres,  the  destinies  of 
nations  are  interdependent  .and  a  world  of 
order  and  progress  requires  new  forms  of 
cooperation  among  all  nations,  rich  and 
poor,  industrialized  and  developing. 

We  want  our  children  to  live  in  a  world 
of  greater  peace  and  justice.  We  want 
them  to  have  the  opportunity  to  apply  their 
own  genius,  in  their  own  time,  to  the  bet- 
terment of  mankind.  To  enable  them  to  do 
so  we,  in  our  time,  must  help  shape  an 
international  order  that  welcomes  the  par- 
ticipation of  all  nations  and  responds  to 
the  deepest  concerns  of  all  peoples. 

We  have  come  a  long  way  already.  We 
are  at  peace  for  the  first  time  in  more  than 
15  years.  Our  collaboration  with  the  great 
industrial  democracies  is  steadily  expand- 
ing into  new  fields,  while  its  fundamental 
basis  is  stronger  than  it  has  been  in  years. 
We  have  made  progress  toward  peace  in 
the  Middle  East,  and  partly  because  of  our 
unique  role  there,  the  elements  for  major 
new  advances  exist.  In  Asia,  we  have — as 
I  will  discuss  in  greater  detail — solidified 
our  ties  with  both  our  friends  and  our  po- 
tential adversaries.  Here  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere  we  are  building  a  new  rela- 
tionship based  on  equality  and  mutual  re- 
spect. We  have  inaugurated  a  hopeful  new 

218 


policy  in  Africa.  And  with  respect  to  th 
Soviet  Union,  we  have  combined  a  detei 
mination  to  resist  expansion  with  a  read! 
ness  to  build  relations  on  a  more  stabl 
and  lasting  basis — we  are,  and  will  b( 
conciliatory  but  vigilant. 

The  people  of  the  Pacific  Northwei 
hardly  need  to  be  told  of  the  strength  c 
role  of  America.  Yours  is  a  region  but  n 
cently  carved  from  a  wilderness  by  me 
and  women  of  courage  and  vision.  Hei 
the  pioneer  spirit  that  is  so  much  a  part  ( 
our  history  lives  on,  and  from  here  Amerio 
looks  out  across  the  Pacific  toward  the  xu 
tions — new  and  old — of  Asia. 

And  it  is  America's  relations  with  Asi 
that  I  would  like  to  discuss  with  you  toda) 


The  Asian  Dimension 

No  region  in  the  world  is  more  dynamii  j 
more  diverse,  or  more  complex  than  Asij  n 

— In  the  past  generation,  Americai 
have  fought  three  major  wars  in  Asia.  W 
have  learned  the  hard  way  that  our  ow 
safety  and  well-being  depend  upon  pea« 
in  the  Pacific  and  that  peace  cannot  1 
maintained  unless  we  play  an  active  pan 

— Our  prosperity  is  inextricably  links 
to  the  economy  of  the  Pacific  Basin.  La 
year  our  trade  with  Asian  nations  exceed* 
our  trade  with  Europe.  Asian  raw  mat< 
rials  fuel  our  factories;  Asian  manufa 
tures  serve  our  consumers;  Asian  marke 
offer  outlets  for  our  exports  and  investmen 
opportunities  for  our  business  communiU 

— Our  ties  with  Asia  have  a  unique  hi 
man  dimension.  For  generations  America) 
have  supplied   an   impulse   for   change 
Asian  societies;  Asian  culture  and  ideas 
turn    have   touched    our   own    intellectui 
artistic,  and  social  life  deeply. 


American  foreign  policy  has  known  bo* 
great  accomplishment  and  bitter  disai 
pointment  in  Asia.  After  World  War  II  v 
sought  above  all  to  contain  Communist  e 
pansion.  We  essentially  succeeded.  ^ 
forged  a  close  alliance  with  a  democrat 
Japan.   We   and   our  allies  assisted   Soul 

Department  of  State  Bullet 


.oYHii  in  defeating  aggression.  We  pro- 
'ded  for  the  orderly  transition  of  the  Phil- 
i  pines  to  full  independence.  We  strength- 
(led  the  ties  with  Australia  and  New 
Ipaland  that  had  been  forged  as  allies  in 
ifo  wars.  We  spurred  the  development  of 
1  e  Pacific  Basin  into  a  zone  of  remarkable 
lonomic  vitality  and  growth. 
By  the  late  1960's,  however,  old  policies 
iinfronted  new  realities:  American  disen- 
(lantment  with  a  war  we  would  not  win 
nd  could  not  end,  acute  rivalry  between 
1e  major  Communist  powers,  and  above 
il,  Japan's  bui-geoning  power  and  pros- 
jjrity.  It  was  becoming  apparent  that  our 
ommitments  in  Asia  too  often  dictated  our 
iterests,  that  we  sometimes  acted  as 
liough  our  stake  in  our  allies'  security  was 
j-eater  than  their  own,  that  estrangement 
•ith  China  no  longer  served  either  nation's 
terests  or  the  cause  of  global  stability, 
lat  uur  economic  dealings  not  infrequently 
]:sembled  patron-client  relationships. 
Throughout  the  first  half  of  this  decade, 
lerefore,  we  have  been  fashioning  a  new 
)licy  for  Asia.  We  have  been  bringing  our 
)mmitments  into  balance  with  our  inter- 
;ts.  We  have  helped  our  allies  and  friends 
agment  their  own  strength,  while  we  have 
.radually  reduced  our  own  military  pres- 
ice  in  Asia  by  130,000  men  in  addition  to 
le  550,000  troops  we  withdrew  from  Viet- 
am.  We  have  strengthened  our  relations 
ith  Japan,  begun  a  new  relationship  with 
le  People's  Republic  of  China,  and 
,;arched  for  political  solutions  to  Asian  re- 
ional  conflicts.  We  have  encouraged  Asian 
ations  in  their  self-reliance  and  in  their 
^orts  at  regional  cooperation.  We  have 
elcomed  Asian  nations  in  new  multilat- 
:al  efforts  to  improve  the  global  economic 
/stem. 

While  a  great  deal  has  been  accom- 
lished,  Asia  remains  a  region  of  potential 
irbulence.  The  collapse  of  Viet-Nam  last 
ear  produced  concern  about  a  more  gen- 
ral  American  retreat  from  Asia.  Happily, 
jch  fears  have  subsided,  largely  because 
merican  policy  has  buttressed  the  inher- 
nt  strength  and  resilience  of  the  nations 
f  Asia. 


But  there  are  no  grounds  for  compla- 
cency. Soviet  activity  in  Asia  is  growing. 
North  and  South  Korea  remain  locked  in 
bitter  confrontation.  Hanoi  represents  a 
new  center  of  power,  and  its  attitude  to- 
ward its  neighbors  remains  ambiguous  and 
potentially  threatening.  Most  developing 
nations  remain  afflicted  by  social  and  po- 
litical tensions.  And  the  scramble  for  oil 
and  ocean  resources  raises  the  specter  of 
possible  future  territorial  disputes. 

Much  will  depend  on  our  actions  and  on 
the  confidence  of  Asian  nations  in  our 
steadiness.  Indeed,  all  the  strands  of  our 
global  policy  meet  in  Asia: 

— Peace  in  Asia  is  crucial  for  global 
peace. 

— The  need  to  resolve  conflicts  and  to 
ease  tensions  is  nowhere  more  acute  than 
in  Asia. 

— The  effort  to  shape  new  patterns 
of  international  cooperation  holds  great 
promise  in  Asia,  where  the  developing  na- 
tions are  among  the  world's  most  dynamic 
and  self-reliant. 

Let  me  now  discuss  each  of  these  chal- 
lenges in  turn. 


Asian  Security 

First,  the  problem  of  security  in  Asia. 

All  the  world's  major  powers — the 
United  States,  Japan,  China,  the  Soviet 
Union,  Western  Europe — have  significant 
interests  in  Asia.  All  would  be  directly  af- 
fected by  conflict  there.  Yet  the  security 
of  none  of  these  powers  is  determined  ex- 
clusively— and  in  some  cases  not  even  pri- 
marily— by  events  in  Asia.  Therefore  no 
nation  should  believe  that  it  can  enhance 
its  security  by  deflecting  conflicts  from  one 
continent  to  another.  If  the  European  bal- 
ance is  upset,  our  security  and  the  security 
of  Asian  countries  will  be  affected.  If  the 
Asian  balance  is  jeopardized,  serious  re- 
percussions will  be  felt  in  Europe.  Neither 
in  Europe  nor  in  Asia  can  we  permit  others 
to  dictate  our  destiny  or  the  destiny  of 
those  whose  independence  is  of  concern 
to  us. 


ugust  16,   1976 


219 


Security  policy  for  Asia  must  therefore 
be  formed  in  global  terms.  Yet  its  require- 
ments are  uniquely  complex.  In  Europe 
two  alliance  systems  face  each  other  di- 
rectly across  a  clear  line  drawn  down  the 
center  of  the  continent.  The  principal  dan- 
ger is  external  attack  by  organized  mili- 
tary forces.  The  strengths  and  weaknesses 
of  both  sides  are  relatively  calculable. 

In  Asia  the  balance  is  more  multiple  and 
fluid.  The  focal  point  is  not  solely  between 
East  and  West — it  includes  the  contention 
between  the  two  major  Communist  pow- 
ers, and  the  threats  are  highly  diverse. 

In  some  areas,  such  as  Korea,  the  prin- 
cipal danger  lies  in  armed  attack  across  an 
established  frontier.  In  others,  such  as 
Southeast  Asia,  the  more  immediate  threats 
involve  insurgency.  Governments  confront 
the  difficult  challenge  of  nation-building. 
Most  are  burdened  by  complex  social  prob- 
lems arising  from  religious,  racial,  and  cul- 
tural differences.  Virtually  all  must  con- 
tend with  armed  dissidents  who  are 
frequently  ready  to  accept  outside  assist- 
ance. 

As  President  Ford  stated  in  Honolulu 
last  December,  the  linchpin  of  our  Asian 
security  effort  must  be  a  strong  and  bal- 
anced U.S.  military  posture  in  the  Pacific. 
Only  if  we  are  perceived  to  be  clearly 
capable  of  supporting  friends  can  we  dis- 
courage aggression  against  them.  Only  by 
showing  that  we  understand  the  necessities 
of  the  regional  balance  of  power  can  we 
encourage  free  countries  to  see  to  their 
self-defense. 

To  the  extent  that  the  nations  of  Asia 
achieve  a  margin  of  security,  the  political 
forces  that  stand  for  democracy  and  hu- 
man liberty  are  encouraged.  By  the  same 
token,  unilateral  withdrawals  from  Asia 
diminish  our  security  as  well  as  our  influ- 
ence even  over  the  domestic  evolution  of 
friendly  countries. 

It  goes  without  saying  that  an  American 
commitment  is  vital  only  if  it  is  perceived 
to  be  as  much  in  the  interest  of  our  allies 
as  of  ourselves.  No  nation  should  conduct 
its  policy  under  the  illusion  that  it  is  doing 

220 


the  United  States  a  favor  by  permitting  us 
to  contribute  to  its  defense.  Those  whc 
seek  to  adjust  their  defense  relationships; 
with  us  will  find  us  prepared  to  accommo- 
date their  desires  in  a  spirit  of  reciprocity 

At  the  same  time  let  there  be  no  doubi 
about  this  Administration's  firmness  wit! 
regard  to  our  treaty  commitments.  Allie! 
needing  our  support  will  find  us  constant 
adversaries  testing  our  resolution  will  fine 
us  steadfast. 

It  is  not  possible  to  enumerate  all  ou 
security  interests  in  Asia  in  one  speech.  Le 
me  therefore  discuss  three  areas  of  specia 
importance  or  complexity:  Japan,  Korea 
and  Southeast  Asia. 

Japan  and  Korea 

No  relationship  is  more  important  to  th 
United  States  than  our  alliance  with  Japan 
Mutual  security  remains  fundamental  t 
our  collaboration;  but  in  a  new  era  w 
have  extended  our  partnership  to  a  broai 
range  of  common  interests:  easing  tensioi) 
in  Asia,  solving  regional  and  global  prol 
lems,  and  combining  our  vast  economi 
strength  to  spur  stable  and  noninflationat 
world  economic  growth. 

In  the  early  1970's,  Japan  and  tU 
United  States  passed  through  an  inevitabil 
period  of  adjustment  from  dependence  an 
American  predominance  to  equality  an 
mutual  responsibility.  There  were  friction 
over  textiles  and  monetary  policies  ar 
over  the  timing  of  our  essentially  parall 
China  policies.  But  these  difficulties  hail 
been  overcome;  they  proved  to  be  til 
growing  pains  of  a  more  mature  and  equi 
relationship. 

Today  our  relations  with  Japan  are  be 
ter  than  they  have  ever  been.  There  are  r 
significant  bilateral  disputes.  We  have  dl 
veloped  a  clearer  common  perception  i 
our  security  requirements,  which  will  l 
further  enhanced  by  the  recently  forme 
Joint  Committee  on  Defense  Cooperatio) 
We  have  injected  greater  balance  and  rec 
procity  into  our  economic  relations.  Vi 
have  learned  to  identify  and  deal  with  pi 
tential  difficulties  before  they  become  p( 

Department  of  State  Bullet 


litically  explosive.  We  have  consulted  with 
Kieater  frequency  and  frankness  and  in 
jrreater  depth  than  in  any  previous  period. 
l!oth  nations  are  displaying  sensitivity  to 
tlio  intangibles  of  our  relationship  and  have 
built  a  wide  base  of  public  support  for 
closer  cooperation. 

Our  relationship  with  Japan  plays  a  cen- 
tral role  in  furthering  stability  and  prog- 
ress in  Asia  and  the  world.  Our  security 
relationship  is  crucial  for  the  global  bal- 
ance of  power.  Japan  is  our  largest  over- 
seas trading  partner.  Each  of  us  seeks  to 
improve  relations  with  Moscow  and  Pe- 
king, to  ease  tensions  in  Korea,  to  encour- 
age a  stable  political  evolution  in  South- 
east Asia.  Each  of  us  cooperates  in  the 
development  of  effective  international  ef- 
forts to  promote  stable  economic  growth, 
strengthen  bonds  among  the  industrial  de- 
mocracies, and  shape  more  positive  ties 
between  the  industrial  and  developing 
countries. 

Japan  and  the  United  States  share  a 
common  dedication  to  the  principles  of  de- 
mocracy. And  so  close  consultation  on  key 
regional  and  global  issues  is  at  the  heart 
of  our  respective  policies.  The  United 
States  will  make  every  effort  to  strengthen 
these  bonds. 

Americans  fought  and  died  to  preserve 
South  Korea's  independence.  Our  experi- 
ence and  our  sacrifice  define  our  stake  in 
the  preservation  of  this  hard-won  stability ; 
treaty  obligations  of  mutual  defense  define 
our  legal  obligations.  Our  support  and  as- 
sistance will  be  available  where  it  has  been 
promised. 

In  fulfilling  our  commitments  we  will 
look  to  South  Korea  to  assume  the  primary 
responsibility  for  its  own  defense,  espe- 
cially in  manpower.  And  we  will  continue 
to  remind  the  South  Korean  Government 
that  responsiveness  to  the  popular  will  and 
social  justice  are  essential  if  subversion  and 
external  challenge  are  to  be  resisted.  But 
we  shall  not  forget  that  our  alliance  with 
South  Korea  is  designed  to  meet  an  exter- 
nal threat  which  affects  our  own  security 
and  that  of  Japan  as  well. 


Southeast  Asia 

Difficult  as  the  situation  still  remains  in 
Korea,  it  is  the  friendly  nations  of  South- 
east Asia  that,  in  the  wake  of  Indochina, 
are  facing  the  greatest  adjustment  to  new 
conditions. 

Nations  which  once  looked  almost  ex- 
clusively to  us  for  their  security  have  been 
forced  by  events  into  greater  self-reliance 
and  broader  cooperation  with  one  another. 
The  members  of  the  Association  of  South- 
east Asian  Nations  (ASEAN) — the  Philip- 
pines, Indonesia,  Thailand,  Malaysia,  and 
Singapore — are  determined  to  preserve 
their  independence  by  hastening  the  pace 
of  regional  consolidation.  All  face  serious 
problems  that  are  endemic  to  the  process 
of  development;  all  seek  to  sustain  and  ex- 
pand their  relations  with  us;  all  hope  that 
we  will  retain  an  active  interest  in  their 
destiny. 

President  Ford,  in  his  speech  in  Honolulu 
last  December  and  in  his  visits  to  the  Phil- 
ippines and  Indonesia,  affirmed  our  con- 
tinuing interest  in  the  well-being  and 
safety  of  Southeast  Asia.  We  shall  encour- 
age the  efforts  of  the  ASEAN  countries  to 
bolster  their  independence;  we  welcome 
Southeast  Asian  regional  cooperation. 

Clearly  our  effort  cannot  substitute  for, 
but  only  supplement,  regional  efforts.  But 
we  are  prepared  to  continue  to  provide  mil- 
itary assistance,  though  with  greater  em- 
phasis on  cash  and  credit  sales.  We  will, 
as  well,  maintain  our  military  presence  in 
the  western  Pacific,  especially  our  mobile 
naval  and  air  power.  We  are  in  the  process 
of  negotiating  a  new  base  agreement  with 
the  Philippines.  We  will  promote  new  pat- 
terns of  economic  cooperation.  And  we  will 
cooperate  with  ASEAN  countries,  consist- 
ent with  their  own  initiatives  and  concepts. 

Easing  Tensions  To  Strengthen  Peace 

Second,  let  me  turn  to  the  problem  of 
easing  tensions. 

In  the  thermonuclear  age,  we  have  no 
more  important  obligation  than  to  push 
back  the  shadow  of  nuclear  confrontation. 


August  16,  1976 


221 


If  crises  occui',  they  must  not  result  from 
any  lapse  of  vision  on  our  part.  Accommo- 
dation without  strength  or  principle  leads 
to  appeasement;  but  in  the  thermonuclear 
age,  reliance  on  power — not  coupled  with 
a  spirit  of  conciliation — can  spell  catas- 
trophe for  all  of  mankind. 

Thus  the  United  States,  in  concert  with 
its  allies,  seeks  to  reach  beyond  security 
toward  better  relations — based  on  strict 
reciprocity  and  principle — with  former  or 
potential  adversaries. 

The  People's  Republic  of  China 

No  nation  is  more  important  to  this  proc- 
ess than  the  People's  Republic  of  China. 
Together  we  have  turned  a  dramatic  new 
page,  following  a  generation  of  mutual  sus- 
picion and  hostility. 

There  have  long  been  deep  sentimental 
attachments  between  the  American  and 
Chinese  peoples  which  have  provided  an 
important  bond  between  our  two  nations 
even  in  the  most  difficult  times.  But  it  was 
mutual  necessity  that  impelled  us  both  to 
launch  a  fresh  beginning  in  1969.  Our 
shared  concern  that  the  world  remain  free 
from  domination  by  military  force  or  black- 
mail— "hegemony,"  as  we  have  described 
it  in  our  various  communiques — provided 
the  strategic  foundation  for  a  new  relation- 
ship. This  mutual  interest  continues  and  is 
the  basis  for  durable  and  growing  ties. 

Both  sides  derive  benefits  from  construc- 
tive relations — improved  prospects  for 
maintaining  a  global  equilibrium,  reduced 
dangers  of  conflict  in  Asia,  mutually  bene- 
ficial trade  and  cultural  exchanges,  and  ex- 
panded possibilities  for  cooperative  or  par- 
allel action  on  specific  global  issues. 

We  have  made  significant  progress  in 
improving  relations  with  China  over  the 
past  several  years.  We  have  established 
liaison  ofl!ices  in  each  other's  capitals.  We 
have  increased  trade  and  promoted  ex- 
changes. Frequent  and  wide-ranging  talks 
with  Chinese  leaders — including  visits  by 
two  American  Presidents  and  many  con- 
gressional     delegations — have      deepened 


222 


our  mutual  understanding.  On  some  inter- 
national issues  there  is  substantial  compati- 
bility in  our  perspective,  and  where  our 
interests  diverge,  we  are  diminishing  the 
risks  of  miscalculation. 

It  is  important  to  recognize  that  China's 
perception  of  the  United  States  as  a  strong 
and  resolute  force  in  international  events 
is  an  important  factor  in  shaping  our  rela- 
tions. We  will  keep  Chinese  views  in  mind 
in  framing  our  approach  to  important  in- 
ternational questions.  But  equally,  if  so 
subtle  and  complex  a  relationship  is  to 
prosper,  the  People's  Republic  of  China 
must  take  our  concerns  and  problems  into 
account  as  well.  We  must  deal  with  each 
other  on  the  basis  of  equality  and  mutual 
benefit — and  a  continuing  recognition  that 
our  evolving  relationship  is  important  for 
global  stability  and  progress. 

The  new  relationship  between  the  United 
States  and  the  People's  Republic  of  China 
is  now  an  enduring  and  important  feature 
of  the  international  scene.  We  are  deter- 
mined to  work  to  improve  it  further.  While 
difficult  issues  remain,  we  intend  to  con- 
tinue to  move  toward  the  noi'malization  of 
our  relationship  in  keeping  with  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  Shanghai  communique. 

The  Korean  Peninsula 

On  the  Korean  Peninsula,  too,  we  are 
prepared  to  make  serious  efforts  to  ease 
tensions. 

In  recent  years  North  Korea  and  its 
friends  have  mounted  a  major  diplomatic 
campaign — especially  in  the  so-called  non- 
aligned  forums  and  the  United  Nations — 
to  alter  the  institutional  arrangements  of 
the  armistice  agreement  which  ended  hos- 
tilities in  Korea  23  years  ago  and  helps  to 
keep  the  peace  today. 

They  insist  upon  unconditional  dissolu- 
tion of  the  U.N.  Command,  which,  together 
with  North  Korea  and  China,  is  a  signatory 
to  the  armistice  agreement.  They  have 
gone  so  far  as  to  claim  that  if  the  command 
is  dissolved,  the  armistice  agreement  itself 
would  cease  to  exist. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


At  the  same  time,  North  Korea  demands 
he  unilateral  withdrawal  of  American 
orces  from  Korea.  They  propose  that  the 
ssLies  of  peace  and  security  on  the  penin- 
lUla  be  discussed  in  bilateral  talks  with  the 
Jnited  States  alone,  excluding  the  Repub- 
ic  of  Korea,  which  represents  two-thirds 
)f  the  Korean  population. 

North  Korea's  proposals  are  designed 
lot  to  promote  peace  but  to  isolate  our 
illy,  to  precipitate  unilateral  American 
vithdrawal,  and  to  dissolve  the  existing 
eKiii  arrangements  into  amorphous  general 
H'Kotiations. 

The  United  States  will  never  accept  such 
ii'nposals.  No  nation  that  truly  believes  in 
)eace  should  support  them;  no  country  in- 
erested  in  genuine  nonalignment  should 
end  itself  to  so  one-sided  an  approach. 

We  do  not  maintain  that  present  ar- 
rangements in  the  Korean  Peninsula  must 
•emain  forever  frozen.  On  the  contrary, 
he  United  States  favors  new  negotiations 
0  promote  security  and  to  ease  tensions 
here.  We  are  prepared  to  discuss  a  new 
egal  basis  for  the  existing  armistice.  We 
ire  also  ready  to  replace  the  armistice  with 
nore  permanent  arrangements. 

But  this  Administration  cannot,  and  will 
lot,  negotiate  behind  the  back  of  our  South 
Korean  ally  over  issues  which  affect  its 
/ery  existence.  Nor  will  the  United  States 
igree  to  terminate  the  U.N.  Command 
ivithout  new  arrangements  which  preserve 
;he  integrity  of  the  armistice  agreement — 
;he  only  existing  legal  arrangement  which 
commits  the  parties  concerned  to  keep  the 
peace — or  which  establish  a  new  perma- 
nent legal  basis.  And  the  United  States  will 
lot  undermine  stability  and  hopes  for  ne- 
gotiation by  withdrawing  its  forces  unilat- 
erally. 

The  U.S.  position  with  respect  to  Korea 
s  clear: 

— First,  we  urge  a  resumption  of  serious 
discussions  between  North  and  South 
Korea. 

— Second,  if  North  Korea's  allies  are 
prepared   to   improve  their  relations  with 


August  16,  1976 


South  Korea,  then  and  only  then,  will  we 
be  prepared  to  take  similar  steps  toward 
North  Korea. 

— Third,  we  continue  to  support  propos- 
als that  the  United  Nations  open  its  doors 
to  full  membership  for  South  and  North 
Korea  without  prejudice  to  their  eventual 
reunification. 

— Finally,  we  are  prepared  to  negotiate 
a  new  basis  for  the  armistice  or  to  replace 
it  with  more  permanent  arrangements  in 
any  form  acceptable  to  all  the  parties. 

In  this  spirit,  we  proposed  last  Septem- 
ber a  conference  including  North  and 
South  Korea,  the  United  States,  and  the 
People's  Republic  of  China — the  parties 
most  immediately  concerned — to  discuss 
ways  of  preserving  the  armistice  agreement 
and  of  reducing  tensions  in  Korea.  We 
noted  that  in  such  a  meeting  we  would  be 
ready  to  explore  possibilities  for  a  larger 
conference  to  negotiate  more  fundamental 
and  durable  arrangements. 

Today,  President  Ford  has  asked  me  to 
call  again  for  such  a  conference. 

Specifically,  the  U.S.  Government  is  pre- 
pared to  meet  with  South  Korea,  North 
Korea,  and  the  People's  Republic  of  China 
during  the  coming  session  of  the  U.N.  Gen- 
eral Assembly.  We  propose  New  York,  but 
we  are  ready  to  consider  some  other  mu- 
tually agreeable  place.  We  are  willing  to 
begin  immediate  discussions  on  issues  of 
procedure  and  site.  Such  a  conference 
could  provide  a  new  legal  structure  for  the 
armistice  if  the  parties  agree.  It  could  re- 
place it  with  more  permanent  arrange- 
ments. It  could  ease  tensions  throughout 
Asia. 

We  urge  other  parties  to  respond  affirm- 
atively. Any  nation  genuinely  interested  in 
peace  on  the  peninsula  should  be  pre- 
pared to  sit  down  and  talk  with  the  other 
parties  on  ways  to  improve  the  existing  sit- 
uation. 

Indochina 

Southeast  Asia,  as  much  as  Northeast 
Asia,  requires  our  careful  attention.  Indo- 


223 


china,  an  arena  of  war  for  generations,  has 
yet  to  find  a  positive  and  peaceful  role. 
Viet-Nam  has  been  unified  by  force,  pro- 
ducing a  new  and  strong  power  in  the  re- 
gion, and  Communist  regimes  have  taken 
over  in  Laos  and  Cambodia.  The  relations 
of  the  Indochinese  states  with  one  another 
are  unsettled  and  unclear,  as  are  Hanoi's 
longer  term  ambitions.  Our  policy  is  de- 
signed to  bolster  the  independence  of  our 
friends,  encourage  the  restraint  of  former 
foes,  and  help  chart  a  more  constructive 
pattern  of  relations  within  the  region. 

We  have  said  on  many  occasions  that  for 
us  the  Indochina  war  is  over.  We  are  pre- 
pared to  look  to  the  future;  we  are  willing 
to  discuss  outstanding  issues;  we  stand 
ready  to  reciprocate  gestures  of  good  will. 
We  have  conveyed  our  willingness  to  open 
discussions  with  the  Vietnamese  authori- 
ties, with  both  sides  free  to  raise  any  issues 
they  wish. 

For  us  the  Americans  missing  in  action 
remain  the  principal  concern.  Let  there  be 
no  mistake:  There  can  be  no  progress  to- 
ward improved  relations  with  Hanoi  with- 
out a  wholly  satisfactory  accounting  for 
these  men.  Nor  will  we  yield  to  cynical  ef- 
forts to  use  the  anguish  of  American  fami- 
lies to  extort  economic  aid. 

If  the  Vietnamese  meet  our  concerns  for 
the  missing  in  action  and  exhibit  restraint 
toward  their  neighbors,  they  will  find  us 
ready  to  reciprocate  and  to  join  in  the 
search  for  ways  to  turn  a  new  page  in  our 
relations. 


New  Patterns  of  Cooperation 

Third,  the  problem  of  international  co- 
operation. 

Beyond  security,  beyond  the  imperative 
of  easing  tensions,  lies  a  new  dimension  of 
international  relations:  to  help  shape  a 
global  structure  that  responds  to  the  aspi- 
rations of  peoples  and  assures  our  children 
a  world  of  prosperity,  justice,  and  hope. 
We  must  meet  this  challenge  because: 

— There  cannot  be  enduring  tranquillity 


224 


in  a  world  scarred  by  injustice,  resentment,' 
and  deprivation. 

— There  cannot  be  assured  prosperity  in 
a  world  of  economic  warfare  and  failed  de- 
velopment. 

— There  cannot  be  an  enduring  interna- 
tional order  in  a  world  in  which  million? 
are  estranged  from  decisions  and  practices 
which  determine  their  national  well-being, 

As  the  world's  strongest  economy,  the 
United  States  has  accepted  responsibilitj 
for  leadership  in  this  agenda  of  interde 
pendence.  In  many  international  forum;- 
over  several  years,  we  have  put  forth  com- 
prehensive initiatives  to  produce  concrete 
progress  on  the  most  compelling  issues  ol 
our  interdependent  world:  food,  energy 
commodities,  trade,  technology,  the  envi 
ronment,  and  the  uses  of  mankind's  las; 
frontiers — the  oceans  and  outer  space. 

Nowhere  are  the  possibilities  and  bene-i 
fits  of  economic  cooperation  greater  than 
in  Asia.  The  record  of  developing  countries 
in  Asia  is  extraordinary.  Most  grew  at  an-i 
nual  rates  of  6-7  percent  a  year  for  the  em 
tire  decade  prior  to  the  1973  oil  embargoi 
Asian  economies  have  flourished  even  in 
the  face  of  global  recession. 

The  secret  of  their  economic  perf  ormanci! 
is  no  mystery.  Rich  in   natural   resources 
fertile   land,   and   industrious  people,  Easi 
Asia — with    few    exceptions — is    not    bur 
dened   with  massive   overpopulation.   Mos'    - 
countries  in  the  area  possess  talented  entr©  im 
preneurs  and  skilled  administrators ;  mosH  ki 
governments   have   rejected   the   confininj  " 
straitjacket  of  statist  economic   practices 
virtually  all   provide  a  hospitable  climat( 
for  foreign  investment. 

If  growth  and  vitality  are  a  commoi 
feature,  the  developing  nations  of  Asi; 
otherwise  reflect  a  considerable  diversity 
Some,  despite  abundant  resources,  remaii 
among  the  world's  poorest  in  terms  of  pei 
capita  income.  Others  are  rapidly  ap 
preaching  the  ranks  of  the  advanced  na 
tions.  Some  export  principally  raw  mate  - 
rials  and  foodstuffs,  while  others  hav( 
joined  Japan  as  industrial  workshops  foi 
the  world. 


ipp 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Although  the  impulse  for  regional  inte- 
ration  is  apparent,  the  Asian-Pacific 
larket  economy  is  open  and  accessible  to 
he  world.  The  United  States,  Japan,  and 
thers  supply  capital,  markets,  manage- 
lent  skills,  and  technology.  We  in  turn 
btain  from  the  developing  countries  of 
i.sia  reliable  supplies  of  important  raw 
laterials,  fair  treatment  of  our  invest- 
lents,  and  expanding  markets  for  our 
rade. 

Economic  development  does  not  auto- 
(latically  insure  tranquillity  between  states 
r  within  them.  But  it  can  enhance  the 
bility  of  governments  to  obtain  public 
up  port,  strengthen  the  legitimacy  of  in- 
titutions,  and  consolidate  national  inde- 
)endence.  These  factors  are  of  particular 
mportance  for  Asian  nations  beset — as 
hey  often  are — by  the  problems  of  nation- 
)uilding  and  domestic  dissidence. 

Cooperative  relations  between  the  indus- 
rialized  nations  and  the  developing  na- 
ions  of  Asia  are  both  inescapable  and 
■ital. 

The  United  States  and  the  developing 
lations  of  Asia  share  important  interests: 

— We  should  both  value  an  international 
'Cduomic  system  which  insures  steady, 
iiminflationary  growth  and  expands  the 
ipportunities  of  our  citizens. 

— We  must  both  recognize  that  if  eco- 
lomic  development  is  to  strengthen  stabil- 
t\ ,  it  must  enhance  national  self-reliance. 
The  developing  nations  of  Asia  need  con- 
:essional  foreign  assistance  far  less  than 
support  for  their  efforts  to  participate  in 
the  international  economy  on  a  more  equal 
footing. 

— We  must  deal  with  each  other  on  the 
basis  of  parity  and  dignity,  seeking  respon- 
sible progress  on  issues,  to  liberalize  trade, 
to  expand  investment  opportunities,  and  to 
transfer  technology. 

— We  must  cooperate  to  improve  the 
effectiveness  of  established  institutions 
such  as  the  Asian  Development  Bank.  We 
must  be  ready  to  create  new  instruments, 
for    example,    the    proposed    International 

August  16,   1976 


Resources  Bank,  to  address  the  new  range 
of  issues  in  the  field  of  commodities. 

The  nations  bordering  on  the  Pacific 
have  an  opportunity  to  usher  in  an  era  of 
cooperation  which  will  enhance  the  pros- 
perity of  their  peoples  and  give  an  impetus 
to  the  well-being  of  mankind. 

America's  Strength  and  Spirit 

Three  times  in  the  past  35  years  many 
thousands  of  American  lives  have  been  lost 
in  wars  on  the  Asian  Continent.  For  us. 
World  War  II  began  and  ended  there.  A 
blatant  Communist  attempt  to  conquer 
Korea  was  defeated  there.  And  the  tragedy 
of  Viet-Nam,  with  its  50,000  dead  and  the 
wave  of  bitterness  it  created  here  at  home, 
was  played  out  there. 

It  mu.st  not  happen  again.  It  will  not 
happen  again  if  America's  policy,  profiting 
from  the  past,  takes  charge  of  its  future, 
making  aggres.sion  too  costly  to  attempt 
and  peace  too  tempting  to  reject. 

Our  greatest  challenge  abroad  is  to  con- 
tinue to  act  on  the  knowledge  that  neither 
peace  nor  prosperity — for  ourselves  or  any- 
one else  on  our  small  planet — is  possible 
without  the  wisdom  and  the  continuing  ac- 
tive involvement  of  the  United  States.  Our 
size,  our  economy,  our  strength,  and  our 
principles  leave  us  no  alternative  but  to  be 
concerned  with  events  in  the  world  around 
us. 

Our  greatest  foreign  policy  need  at  home 
is  steadiness,  cohesion,  and  a  realization 
that  in  shaping  foreign  policy  we  are  en- 
gaged in  an  enterprise  beyond  party  and 
not  bounded  by  our  electoral  cycles.  Today, 
Americans — of  whatever  party  or  political 
conviction — can  have  confidence  that  their 
country,  as  always,  has  the  substance  and 
the  strength  to  do  its  duty: 

— We  have  the  military  and  economic 
power,  together  with  our  allies,  to  maintain 
the  balance  of  stability  upon  which  global 
peace  must  rest. 

— We  have  the  wisdom  to  see  that  an 

225 


enduring    peace    requires    dedicated    and 
realistic  measures  to  reduce  tension. 

We  have  the  vision  to  fashion  new  re- 
lationships among  all  nations  in  an  inter- 
dependent world,  to  work  toward  a  true 
and  lasting  world  community. 

The  bond  between  America's  spirit  and 
America's  achievement,  between  her  cour- 
age and  her  responsibility,  was  expressed 
by  a  great  poet  here  in  Seattle. 


As  Theodore  Roethke  said : 

I  feel  my  fate  in  what  I  cannot  fear. 
I  learn  by  going  where  I  have  to  go. 

That  is  the  American  way.  We  are  a 
people  accustomed  to,  and  capable  of, 
forging  our  own  destiny.  We  are  ready,  as 
Americans  always  have  been  ready,  to  face 
the  future  without  fear.  We  shall  go  where 
we  have  to  go.  We  shall  do  what  we  have 
to  do. 


Questions  and  Answers  Following  the  Secretary's  Address  at  Seattle 


Press  release  351A  dated  July  22 

Q.  Dr.  Kissinger,  my  question  is:  In  the 
light  of  the  recent  yiuclear -weapons-making 
capability,  please  explain  your  position  on 
the  export  of  nuclear  materials. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  danger  of  nu- 
clear proliferation  arises  from  the  fact 
that,  with  the  energy  crisis,  nuclear  energy 
has  become  economical — in  fact,  essential 

therefore  a  market  for  many  countries 

that  can  produce  nuclear  reactors  all  over 
the  globe.  Most  of  these  nuclear  reactors, 
as  a  byproduct,  produce  materials  that, 
either  directly  or  through  reprocessing, 
can  be  turned  into  fissionable  materials. 

Therefore  the  problem  is  how,  short  of 
prohibiting  the  export  of  nuclear  reactors 

which    none    of    the    nuclear    suppliers 

seems  to  be  ready  to  accept — one  can 
establish  safeguards  that  inhibit  nuclear 
proliferation. 

Now,  this  is  a  very  difficult  process.  Our 
policy  has  been  that  we  will  not  sell  proc- 
essing plants  which  will  enable  countries 
to  reprocess  the  material  that  emerges 
from  nuclear  reactors  into  fissionable  ma- 
terial suitable  for  explosives.  Other  coun- 
tries have  not  followed  this  approach,  and 
we  have  brought  a  considerable  amount  of 
pressure  to  prevent  the  spreading  of  re- 
processing plants. 

226 


We  have  also  created  or  invited  countries 
to  join  a  suppliers  conference,  in  which 
countries  that  are  supplying  nuclear  mate- 
rials or  nuclear  reactors  would  agree  on 
common  safeguards  so  that  the  nations  of 
the  world  do  not  compete  with  each  other 
in  easing  safeguards  in  order  to  do  nuclear 
business.  This  conference  has  made  con- 
siderable progress,  but  the  rate  of  the 
spread  of  these  nuclear  reactors  is  such 
that  it  becomes  extremely  difficult  to  pre- 
vent the  capabilities  of  the  countries  receiv 
ing  them  in  the  nuclear  field  from  growing 

It  is  a  problem  to  which  we  have  giver 
the  highest  priority  attention,  in  which  w( 
are  making  a  major  effort,  in  which  we  wil 
continue  to  make  a  major  effort,  and  which 
we  hope  we  can  get  under  increasing  con- 
trol. 

Q.  Dr.  Kissinger,  a  decision  of  the  Statt 
Department  has  resulted  in  an  increase  o) 
$31  million  in  the  annual  natural  gas  bill  fo7 
Washington  State.  The  Canadian  Govern- 
ment was  ready  to  recognize  different  U.S. 
areas'  dependence  on  their  exports.  Is  then 
any  possibility  that  your  Department  can  re- 
consider its  decision? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  I  have  had  oc- 
casion to  say  this  morning  that  it  is  moving 
for  me  to  find  that  people  outside  of  Wash 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


iiigton  talk  of  the  State  Department  as  a 
cohesive  organization  [laughter] — as  a 
Department  that  has  unified  opinions.  I  can 
tell  you  when  you  sit  where  I  do  that  I 
don't  share  that  impression. 

Second,  I  must  tell  you — which  will  be 
extremely  discouraging  for  most  of  the 
audience  here — I  was  not  aware  that  this 
issue  was  particularly  contentious  until  I 
airived  in  Seattle.  [Laughter.]  Since  then 
it  is  apparent  to  me  that  there  is  not  com- 
plete unanimity  on  it.  [Laughter.] 

Our  position  was  not  aimed  against  the 
Northwest.  Our  position  derived  from  the 
fact  that  we  did  not  want  to  accept  the 
principle  that  a  foreign  government  could 
establish  differential  rates  in  the  United 
States  by  its  own  unilateral  action  and  to 
exercise  in  effect  monopoly  powers  seemed 
to  us  to  set  an  unfortunate  precedent. 

Now,  I  have  heard  so  much  about  this 
problem  since  I've  come  here  [laughter] 
that  I  will  take  another  look  at  it  when  I 
get  back  [laughter].  But  what  I  am  aiming 
at  primarily  is  to  get  out  of  town  in  one 
piece.   [Laughter.] 

I'll  tell  you  another  thing.  The  State  De- 
partment may  not  have  an  extremely  uni- 
fied opinion,  but  it  is  extremely  good  in 
delaying  replies.   [Laughter.] 

Relations  With  Canada 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  I  would  like  to  follow  up 
on  another  question  regarding  our  relation- 
ship with  Canada.  That  relationship  has 
undergone  some  drastic  changes  in  the  past 
several  years — changes  that  have  been  in- 
flicted on  the  people  in  this  region  by  strains 
in  the  area  of  yiatural  gas,  Alaska  oil  ship- 
ments, construction  of  the  Trident  base,  the 
pipeline,  the  flooding  in  the  upper  Skagit 
Valley,  Columbia  River  compact,  Point  Rob- 
erts, and  large-scale  property  purchases 
across  the  border.  Leaders  on  both  sides 
have  expressed  some  deep  concerns  about 
this  and  one — Senator  Jackson — recently 
suggested  it  ivould  appear  that  these  rela- 
tions ought  to  be  one  priority  in  our  foreign 
policy. 


Now,  ivhy  is  it  in  such  bad  disrepair?  And 
ivhat  plans,  if  any,  are  there  to  correct  this? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I,  first  of  all,  do  not 
believe  that  our  relations  with  Canada  are 
in  such  an  acute  stage  of  disrepair. 

Secondly,  one  should  not  believe  that 
problems  which  exist  can  always  be  re- 
solved by  hyperactivity. 

It  is  inevitable  that  a  country  like  Can- 
ada, which  has  such  a  powerful  neighbor 
and  such  a  great  percentage  of  whose 
economy  is  tied  to  the  United  States,  will 
try  to  develop  an  identity  that  is  separate 
from  the  United  States  or  that  it  becomes 
very  conscious  of  its  own  identity.  And  I 
think  we  have  to  accept  the  fact  that  in 
Canadian  politics  a  certain  amount  of  abil- 
ity to  show  that  one  is  independent  of  the 
United  States  is  not  unprofitable.  And  this 
has  not  been  lost  on  the  various  Canadian 
political  leaders. 

On  the  other  hand,  our  ties  economically 
are  really  so  close  that  the  practical  possi- 
bilities of  divergence  between  our  countries 
are  fairly  limited. 

There  are  a  number  of  irritating  prob- 
lems, most  of  them  growing  out  of  the  eco- 
nomic impact  of  the  populations  living 
along  the  border  on  each  other.  We  are  in 
the  process  of  negotiating  many  of  them. 
And  it  is  one  of  the  few  cases  where  the 
public  dialogue  is  more  bitter  than  the  pri- 
vate dialogue  [laughter]  because,  usually, 
after  the  public  controversy  has  been  gone 
through,  privately  we  manage  to  make 
some  progress  on  these  issues. 

So  I  think  we  have  to  be  mature  about 
our  relationship  with  Canada.  We  have  to 
recognize  that  there  will  occasionally  be 
voices  that  are  not  particularly  pleasant  to 
us.  But  we  also  have  to  recognize  that  on 
most  fundamental  issues  Canada  and  the 
United  States  work  together  very  well.  And 
considering  the  interdependence  of  our  two 
nations,  and  considering  the  extent  to 
which  our  economies  interact,  I  think  we 
can  keep  these  disputes  to  manageable  pro- 
portions. 


August  16,  1976 


227 


Controlling  the  Arms  Race 

Q.  Dr.  Kissinger,  my  question  to  you  is: 
Beyond  the  limitations  created  by  SALT  on 
strategic-weapons  delivery  systems,  what 
neio  initiatives  can  the  United  States  take  to 
reduce  the  global  arms  race?  And  second, 
how  long  can  bilateral  deterrence  provide 
global  security  in  an  increasingly  nmltipolar 
world  ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Of  course,  the  most 
important  negotiation  is  the  one  of  stra- 
tegic arms  limitations  that  is  now  going  on 
in  Geneva,  which  attempts  to  put  a  ceiling 
on  the  strategic  arms  race  and  which,  in  its 
next  phase,  will  attempt  to  turn  it  down 
and  reduce  the  strategic  armaments. 

In  addition,  we  are  engaged  in  negotia- 
tions for  the  reduction  of  forces  in  Central 
Europe,  which  also  attempt  to  ease  the 
burden  of  arms  in  those  areas. 

The  third  area  in  which  arms  competi- 
tion creates  problems  is  in  such  areas  as 
the  Middle  East,  where  there  are  large  re- 
sources and  many  arms  suppliers  and  on 
top  of  it  many  contentious  parties — and 
parties  whose  own  differences  among  each 
other  seem  to  them  to  outweigh  the  re- 
quirements of  global  peace  very  often. 
Now,  in  that  area,  how  to  control  the  ship- 
ment of  arms  into  an  area  like  the  Middle 
East  is  a  matter  to  which  we  must  give  in- 
creasing attention. 

I  would  point  out,  however,  a  number  of 
serious  problems  here.  The  shipment  of 
arms  among  Arab  countries  is  relatively 
easy,  while  Israel  has  only  one  country 
from  which  it  can  acquire  arms.  So  until 
about  five  years  ago,  it  used  to  be  thought 
that  if  the  shipment  of  arms  could  be  lim- 
ited into  the  Arab  states  bordering  Israel, 
one  could  get  some  through.  But  the  fact 
of  the  matter  is  that  arms  now  move  with 
increasing  ease  among  these  various  coun- 
tries, as  we  have  seen  recently  in  Lebanon, 
and  therefore  the  problem  of  controlling 
the  international  arms  trade  must  reach  all 
of  the  suppliers  and  all  of  the  possible  re- 
cipients and  also  those  countries  that  could 
transfer  arms  among  each  other  and  there- 

228 


fore  strengthen  one  of  the  sides  in  the  re- 
gion. That  is  an  important  issue  to  which 
we  have  to  turn. 

Impact  of  Viet-Nam  War 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  the  American  war  effort 
in  Viet-Nam  is  justified  by  our  government 
largely  in  terms  of  the  various  consequences 
accrued  in  South  Viet-Nam  held  by  the  Com- 
munists. 

Now  that  more  than  a  year  has  passed 
since  the  fall  of  Viet-Nam,  can  you  list  the 
negative  consequences  of  that  event?  And 
also,  in  your  opinion,  are  those  consequences 
of  sufficient  magnitude  to  justify  the  human 
and  material  cost  of  the  American  war  ef- 
fort? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  of  course,  I 
think  it  is  important  to  keep  in  mind — 
which  is  sometimes  forgotten — that  when 
we  came  to  Washington  there  were 
550,000  American  troops  in  Viet-Nam  and 
that  some  of  those  who  most  actively  op- 
posed the  war  were  those  who  put  the 
troops  there.  And  it  is  a  difficult  problem — 
how  to  remove  troops  once  a  country's 
prestige  is  already  engaged. 

Secondly,  you  cannot  measure  the  impact 
of  an  international  event  after  one  year. 
History  moves  more  slowly  than  this,  and 
the  effect  of  any  event  can  only  be  meas- 
ured in  a  5-  or  10-year  period. 

The  immediate  effect  of  the  collapse  of 
Indochina  has  been  the  collapse  of  Laos 
and  Cambodia,  of  course,  following  it — and 
the  human  cost  in  Cambodia  has  been 
dreadful.  The  deaths  number  in  the  hun- 
dred of  thousands  in  one  year,  in  addition 
to  the  incredible  suffering  that  has  been 
imposed  on  the  population. 

Thailand  has  moved  toward  a  position 
of  neutralism.  The  Philippines  has  begun 
to  change  its  policy. 

The  impact  on  the  perception  of  other 
countries  of  the  American  failure  in  Indo- 
china will  take  many  years  to  work  itself 
out,  and  therefore  I  have  to  say  no  one 
should  recommend  to  a  country  that  losing 
a  war  is  painless. 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Whether  the  entry  into  the  war  was  well 
considered — whether  one  should  have 
made  this  move  in  the  middle  1960's — is  a 
different  matter.  But  the  consequences  of 
the  war  in  Indochina — the  impact  of  our 
defeat  there — will  take  many  years  to 
work  themselves  out;  and  they  will  not  be 
favorable  to  us. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  is  our  foreign  policy 
sufficiently  broad  based  and  bipartisan  to 
alloiv  for  continuity  of  present  long-range 
policies  should  there  be  a  regrettable  change 
of  the  Secretary  of  State?  ILaughter.] 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  think  that  the  for- 
eign policy  of  the  United  States  has  to  be 
based  on  the  permanent  interests  and  per- 
manent values  of  the  United  States,  and 
those  are  independent  of  personalities. 

And  therefore  I  tend  to  believe  the  main 
lines  of  our  foreign  policy  will  be  con- 
tinued, regardless  of  Administration  and 
regardless  of  the  incumbent  Secretary  of 
State,  hard  as  the  latter  is  to  imagine  for 
me.  [Laughter.] 

Agricultural  Exports 

Q.  Dr.  Kissinger,  I  am  Laivrence  Peterson, 
a  drylands  wheat  farmer  from  eastern  Wash- 
ington for  about  40  years  and — in  view  of 
the  fact  that  we  are  noiv  seeing  the  start  of 
a  surplus  of  grain  products — wheat,  corn, 
and  that — /  would  like  to  ask  this  question: 
Do  you  believe  in  withholding  food  products 
as  a  diplomatic  bargaining  tool? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  will  tell  you  the 
experience  that  I  have  had.  When  I  travel 
around  the  United  States,  in  most  nonfarm 
states  people  come  up  to  me  and  shake 
their  fist  and  say:  "Why  don't  you  with- 
hold food  products,  as  a  bargaining  weapon 
against  the  Soviet  Union  or  against  other 
countries?"  In  the  wheat-growing  states,  I 
get  a  slightly  opposite  reaction.  [Laugh- 
ter.] 

I  think  we  have  to  make  a  national  de- 
cision. If  we  want  to  gain  diplomatic  bene- 
fits from  our  farm  products,  then  we  must 

August  16,   1976 


have  some  mechanism  by  which  the  sale 
of  these  products  is  geared  to  certain  for- 
eign policy  decisions.  On  the  other  hand,  I 
understand  the  feeling  of  the  farmers  that 
they  should  not  have  to  pay,  themselves, 
for  foreign  policy  initiatives. 

The  Administration  has  taken  the  posi- 
tion that  we  would  not  interrupt  the  sale  of 
wheat  and  we  would  not  interrupt  the  mar- 
kets. But  the  practical  consequence  of  this 
is  that  any  foreign  country  can  enter  our 
market  on  the  basis  of  equality  and  can 
use  our  free  markets  the  way  they  oper- 
ate, and  then  we  cannot  use  it  for  that 
reason  for  foreign  policy  reasons. 

I  am  not  criticizing  the  decision  of  the 
Administration.  I  am  simply  pointing  out 
what  the  consequences  are.  I  support  the 
decision  of  the  Administration. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  essentially  what  is  U.S. 
policy  on  Taiwan?  Do  you  think  the  United 
States  will  eventually  recognize  the  People's 
Republic  of  China  as  the  true  representative 
government?  If  "Yes,"  ivon't  that  be  a  sharp 
departure  from  our  past  policy? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  the  United 
States  indicated  in  the  Shanghai  commu- 
nique our  view  that  the  relationship  be- 
tween the  mainland  and  Taiwan  should  be 
settled  by  peaceful  negotiations  between 
the  parties  concerned.  This  has  been  the 
stumbling  block  to  progress  on  normaliza- 
tion. And  we  have  not  changed  our  view 
that  these  relations  should  be  settled  on  a 
peaceful  basis. 

Trends  in  the  United  Nations 

Q.  Dr.  Kissinger,  as  the  current  Secretary 
of  State,  based  on  your  past  background  at 
the  United  Nations,  do  you  think  the  United 
Natio7is  has  any  real  purpose  now  that  the 
Council  has  again  failed  to  only  condemn  ter- 
rorism— mostly  the  pro-Palestinians — the  hi- 
jackings and  the  killings?  Don't  you  think 
that  this  in  effect  gives  the  green  light  to 
further  terrorism?  And  what  does  this  mean 
to  the  future  of  the  United  Nations  as  you 
see  it? 


229 


Secretanj  Kissinger:  Well,  to  us,  as  far  as 
the  United  Nations  is  concerned,  we  have 
come  to  an  interesting  transformation  in 
this  country. 

Until  about  two  years  ago,  when  one 
met  with  an  audience  like  this,  the 
general  question  was:  "How  can  you 
strengthen  the  United  Nations?"  Now 
there  has  been  a  growing  skepticism  about 
the  United  Nations,  which  is  justified  in  a 
considerable  part  by  its  performance. 

There  are  many  aspects  of  the  United 
Nations  to  which  we  strongly  object.  We 
object  to  the  automatic  majorities.  We  ob- 
ject to  the  one-way  morality.  We  object  to 
the  fact  that  more  stringent  criteria  are 
applied  to  some  countries  than  to  others. 

We  will  not  submit  vital  interests  to  such 
procedures. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  is  needed  in 
the  world  some  meetingplace  where  it  is 
easy  for  parties  to  get  together  and  where 
you  can  have  an  exchange  of  views  which 
does  not  have  to  be  especially  organized. 
And  therefore  we  believe  that  the  United 
Nations  as  an  institution  still  has  impor- 
tant functions. 

And  we  also  believe  that  if  the  trend  in 
the  United  Nations  of  recent  years  con- 
tinues— the  trend  toward  confrontation ; 
the  trend  toward  one-way  voting;  the  trend 
toward  automatic  majorities,  the  tendency 
to  get  the  so-called  Group  of  77,  which  is 
really  more  than  a  hundred  nations,  always 
voting  together  so  that  they  constitute  a 
bloc  of  their  own — that  then  the  political 
functions  of  the  United  Nations  will  be- 
come less  and  less  relevant  to  the  issues 
concerned. 

Now  actually,  we  think  that  the  Security 
Council  debate,  while  it  did  not  condemn 
terrorism,  marked  a  step  forward,  because 
they  also  did  not  condemn  Israel.  In  fact, 
they  withdrew  their  resolution  condemning 
Israel. 

And  we  had  a  majority  for  the  con- 
demnation of  terrorism,  but  it  was  not  the 
majority  that  is  needed  to  pass  something 


230 


in  the  Security  Council.  So  I  believe  that 
there  are  functions  that  are  still  necessary 
to  be  performed  by  the  United  Nations;  but 
the  United  States  will  fight  and  not  accept 
the  sort  of  procedures  that  have  become,  i 
unfortunately,  too  characteristic  of  the 
U.N.  procedures. 

And  we  hope  very  much  that  in  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly  this  year,  there  will  be  some 
improvement.  And  if  there  isn't,  we  will 
certainly  make  our  position  very  plain. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  yesterday  the  West  Ger- 
man press  broke  the  scandal  of  the  shipment 
of  arms  from  U.S.  bases  in  West  Germany  to 
the  Phalange  factioyi  in  Lebanon.  The  Soviets 
have  been  increasingly  threatening  nuclear — 
or  rather,  military — activity  to  defend  the 
existence  of  the  Palestinians.  And  many  of 
our  sources  in  the  Ford  faction  in  the  White 
House  point  to  the  immediate  danger  of  a 
global  nuclear  war  from  your  global  policies. 

Well,  "Dr.  Strangelove"  [laughter'],  Fd 
like  to  ask  if  you  don't  think  that  a  policy  of 
debt  moratorium  is  preferable  to  a  global 
thermonuclear  war. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  I  will  make  the^ 
daring  assertion  that  I  am  against  thermo- 
nuclear war.  [Laughter.] 

I  am  not  familiar  with  that  story  in  the' 
German  press  that  material  has  been 
shipped  from  Germany  to  the  Christian 
groups  in  Lebanon.  And  if  it  has,  I  don't 
believe  it  was  American  equipment.  It  was 
certainly  not  done  with  our  permission. 

Q.  This  is  in  the  Munich  press  in  West 
Germany. 

Secretaiy  Kissinger:  Well,  it  could  be.  I 
am  not  familiar  with  it. 

But  I  also  believe  that  we  cannot  set  up 
a  false  antithesis  between  the  development 
— a  debt  moratorium  is  really  just  one  way 
of  encouraging  development — between  de 
velopment  and  security. 

Now  there  has  to  be  security  for  develop- 
ment to  be  meaningful,  and  we  have  not 
the  choice  between  security  and  develop 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ment.  If  we  cannot  do  both,  we  cannot  do 
either.  So  I  am  in  favor  of  pursuing  both 
courses  simultaneously,  as  I  have  attempted 
to  indicate. 

There  was  somebody  over  there  who  still 
wanted  to  ask  me  a  question,  but  he  seems 
to  have  disappeared. 

Q.  How  about  a  question  from  the  gallery? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Do  you  want  to  have 
one  question  from  the  gallery?  [Applause.] 
I  will  tell  you  after  I  hear  the  question, 
whether —  [Laughter  and  applause.] 

Q.  Thank  you  very  much,  Dr.  Kissinger.  It 
is  a  great  pleasure  [i7iaudible'\  in  ivorld  af- 
fairs. 

I  would  like  to  ask  one  question,  if  I  may, 
but  it  calls  for  a  statement  first:  It  appears 
to  m.e  that  the  record  will  show  that  you  have 
done  everything  to  promote  disarmament  and 
the  destruction  of  our  defenses  in  America. 
You,  in  fact,  have  made  the  statement  that 
the  tvay  of  the  future  is  the  Communist-Mos- 
cow ivay  of  government. 

I  ivould  like  to  know,  if  a  man  in  your 
important  position  in  America  truthfully 
holds  that  vieiv,  ivhy  do  you  not  resign  and 
let  a  true  American  take  your  place? 

Voices:  No! 

Secretary  Kissinger:  This  is  beginning  to 
sound  like  a  Washington  press  conference. 
[Laughter.] 

I  don't  want  to  disturb  the  equilibrium  of 
the  questioner  [laughter],  but  I  hate  to 
tell  him  that  I  have  never  said,  nor  do  I 
believe,  that  communism  is  the  wave  of 
the  future.  I  have  said,  and  I  have  tried  to 
conduct  foreign  policy  on,  exactly  the  op- 
posite proposition. 

Secondly,  I  have  always  believed,  and  I 
have  said  so  in  every  public  speech,  that  a 
strong  defense  is  essential  for  an  effective 
foreign  policy.  You  cannot  have  an  effec- 
tive foreign  policy  without  a  strong  de- 
fense. 

At   the   same   time,   I   believe   that  the 


August  16,  1976 


American  people  have  to  understand  this: 
That  in  the  thermonuclear  age,  a  nuclear 
war  would  mean  the  end  of  civilized  life 
as  we  know  it. 

And  therefore  a  responsible  government 
official  cannot  engage  in  much  tough  rhet- 
oric. He  has  an  obligation  to  see  what  can 
be  done  to  reduce  the  danger  of  nuclear 
catastrophe  on  the  basis  of  reciprocal 
agreements,  on  the  basis  of  unilateral 
American  action. 

And  maybe  this  gentleman  and  the  pre- 
vious questioner  can  get  together  and 
check  their  perception,  because  I  think 
they  have  slightly  divergent  views  of  what 
I  stand  for. 


Letters  of  Credence 

Argentina 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  the 
Argentine  Republic,  Arnaldo  T.  Musich, 
presented  his  credentials  to  President  Ford 
on  July  19.' 

Cape  Verde 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  the 
Republic  of  Cape  Verde,  Raul  Querido 
Varela,  presented  his  credentials  to  Presi- 
dent Ford  on  July  19.' 

Iceland 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  the 
Republic  of  Iceland,  Hans  G.  Andersen, 
presented  his  credentials  to  President  Ford 
on  July  19.' 

Liberia 

The  newly  appointed  Ambassador  of  the 
Republic  of  Liberia,  Francis  A.  W.  Dennis, 
presented  his  credentials  to  President  Ford 
on  July  19.' 


'  For  texts  of  the  Ambassador's  remarks  and  the 
President's  reply,  see  Department  of  State  press 
release  dated  July   19. 


231 


Secretary  Kissinger  Interviewed  by  Panel  at  Portland,  Oreg. 


Folloicing  is  the  transcript  of  an  intervietv 
tvith  Secretary  Kissinger  by  a  panel  at  a 
dinner  meeting  on  July  22  sponsored  by  the 
Portland,  Oreg.,  World  Affairs  Council.  Mem- 
bers of  the  panel  were  Wanda  McAlister, 
editor  of  the  editorial  page,  Corvallis,  Oreg., 
Gazette  Times;  Tom  McCaU,  commentator, 
KATU-TV,  Portland,  and  former  Governor 
of  Oregon;  Kenneth  Rystrom,  editor,  Van- 
couver, Wash.,  Columbian;  Donald  Sterling, 
Jr.,  editor,  Oregon  Journal,  Portland;  and 
Richard  Nokes,  editor,  Portland  Oregonian, 
moderator.^ 

Press   release  354  dated  July  22 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  basic  point  that 
I  would  like  to  leave  with  you,  ladies  and 
gentlemen,  is  that  we  have  been  living 
through  a  revolutionary  period  of  foreign 
policy — not  because  we  want  to,  but  be- 
cause conditions  in  the  world  have 
changed. 

Through  all  of  American  history  until 
the  late  sixties  the  United  States  was  phys- 
ically predominant.  We  could  choose  to 
enter  foreign  affairs  or  withdraw,  as  we 
saw  fit.  We  had  such  a  margin  of  physical 
superiority  over  other  countries  that  we 
could  wait  until  dangers  became  over- 
whelming. 

Now  we  live  in  a  world  in  which  there 
are  other  countries  of  roughly  equal 
strength.  And  therefore  we  have  to  con- 
duct foreign  policy,  no  matter  who  is  in 
office,  with  a  sense  of  nuance,  on  the  basis 
of  permanence,  the  way  other  nations  have 
had  to  conduct  foreign  policy  throughout 
their  history.  That  means  that  the  relation- 


'  Introductory  remarks  by  Mr.  Nokes  and  by  Perry 
Holland,  president,  Portland  World  Affairs  Council, 
and  the  opening  paragraphs  of  Secretary  Kissinger's 
remarks  are  not  printed  here. 


232 


ship  between  the  public  and  those  who 
make  decisions  becomes  extremely  impor- 
tant— more  important  than  in  any  previous 
period.  Because  when  the  scope  for  action 
is  greatest,  the  knowledge  on  which  to  base 
such  action  is  at  a  minimum,  and  when  the 
knowledge  is  greatest,  the  scope  for  action 
has  often  disappeared. 

In  1936,  Hitler's  Germany  could  have 
been  stopped  with  very  little  effort.  And  if 
that  had  been  done,  people  would  still  be 
arguing  today  whether  Hitler  was  a  mis- 
understood nationalist  or  a  maniac  bent  on 
world  domination.  But  by  1941,  everyone 
knew  that  he  was  a  maniac  bent  on  world 
domination.  We  had  to  pay  for  this  knowl- 
edge— or  the  world  had  to  pay  for  this 
knowledge — with  20  million  lives. 

So,  when  one  acts  in  time,  one  has  to  do 
so  on  the  basis  of  an  assessment  that  one 
cannot  prove  true  when  it  happens.  And 
therefore  there  is  a  need  for  confidence  and 
a  need  for  restraint  if  one  is  to  avoid  harder 
decisions  further  down  the  road. 

We  have,  in  the  thermonuclear  age,  com- 
plicated problems;  on  the  one  hand,  of 
maintaining  our  military  security,  because 
no  nation  can  make  itself  dependent  on  the 
good  will  of  another  nation.  But  we  also 
have  to  realize  the  fact  that  in  the  thermo- 
nuclear age  the  question  of  war  and  peace 
takes  on  an  unprecedented  character.  A 
nuclear  war  would  mean  tens  of  millions 
of  casualties  and  the  end  of  society  as  we 
have  known  it.  Therefore  no  task  is  more 
urgent  than  the  maintenance  and  preser- 
vation of  peace,  as  long  as  it  can  be  done 
honorably. 

In  addition  to  this,  we  live  in  a  world  in 
which  there  are  a  hundred  or  so  new  na- 
tions that  have  to  be  integrated  into  the 
community  of  nations. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


So  these  tasks  of  security,  of  peace,  of 
(he  construction  of  an  international  order, 
arc  the  tasks  that  have  preoccupied  me 
while  I  have  been  in  office,  and  preoccu- 
pied President  Ford,  and  they  will  pre- 
i)n  upy  anybody  else  who  is  in  this  position. 
J  And  it  is  for  this  reason  that  I  welcome 
opportunities  such  as  these  to  go  out  into 
the  country,  meet  with  concerned  citizens, 
hear  their  questions,  and  try  to  respond  to 
the  best  of  my  ability. 

So,  why  don't  we,  with  your  permission, 
turn  this  over  to  the  panel. 

Mr.  Nokes:  Thank  you,  Mr.  Secretary.  I 
decided  that  I  had  the  right  to  ask  the  first 
question,  and  I  am  sure  someone  ivill  ask  it 
tonight,  so  I  will  ask  it  now  and  get  it  out 
of  the  ivay. 

Mr.  Secretary,  three  or  four  years  ago, 
you  were  riding  the  crest  of  a  popularity 
wave.  You  were  on  the  cover  of  the  news 
fmagazines,  ivhich  called  you  "Super  K."  More 
hitdij  you  have  been  bruised  by  Democratic 
criticism  in  Congress,  Republican  criticism 
ti-(im  Ronald  Reagan's  supporters,  and  a 
picket  line  in  front  of  our  building  tonight. 

Do  you  feel,  in  retrospect,  that  you  shoidd 
hui-c  quit  tvhile  you  were  ahead  [laughter'], 
and  is  there  any  feeling  on  your  part,  or  on 
thi  President's  part,  that  you  should  leave 
ijiiiir  present  position  prior  to  the  election  in 
Xi'cember? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  of  course,  my 
father  is  of  the  view  that — and  he  is  an  ob- 
jective observer  [laughter] — that  this  criti- 
cism is  extremely  unfair  [laughter]. 

It  is  true  that  there  has  been  some  criti- 
cism. But  I  think  this  is  inevitable  in  an 
election  year.  I  have  the  impression  that 
fi)i  the  main  lines  of  our  foreign  policy 
there  is  considerable  support.  I  don't  think 
it  would  be  proper  to  leave  to  husband 
one's  popularity.  I  think  one  has — if  one  is 
fortunate  enough  to  have  public  support, 
that  is  something  one  should  use  to  do  con- 
structive things  and  not  something  that  one 
should  attempt  to  bank  and  preserve.  And 
in  attempting  to  bank  it,  one  will  certainly 
lose  it.   Because  the  ultimate  judgment  is 


August  16,  1976 


what  people  think  of  one's  actions  5  or  10 
years  from  now  and  not  the  fluctuations  of 
day-to-day  opinion. 

But,  on  the  whole,  I  think  we  have  had 
the  sort  of  support  that  makes  policy 
possible. 

I  have  no  intention  of  leaving  before  the 
election.  After  the  election,  there  are  many 
applicants  for  my  job.   [Laughter.] 

M)-.  McCall:  Two  months  ago,  Mr.  Secre- 
tary, I  interviewed  your  boss,  the  Presidetit, 
and  you  had  made  the  statement  the  day 
before  that  you  planned  to  leave  the  Admin- 
istration. And  I  said  to  Mr.  Ford,  "Aren't 
you  going  to  wheedle  him  into  staying  and 
try  to  keep  him  there?"  And  he  said,  "I  be- 
lieve tvhen  you  have  a  good  man,  you  want 
to  try  to  keep  him."  I  am  wondering  if  any 
amount  of  wheedling,  either  by  President 
Ford  or  Jimmy  Carter,  might  induce  you  to 
stay  on  as  Secretary  of  State? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  I  have  seen  the 
beginnings  of  three  Administrations,  and 
that  is  a  rough  period,  while  people  adjust 
to  each  other.  So,  I  would  say  that  I  would 
not  think  that  I  should  begin  with  a  new 
Administration  again.  But  I  would  hasten 
to  add  that  I  don't  have  the  impression  that 
I  will  have  to  spend  sleepless  nights  on  that 
problem.  [Laughter.]  I  couldn't  break  so 
many  hearts  of  people  who  are  already 
measuring  the  drapes  in  my  office.  [Laugh- 
ter.] In  case  President  Ford — or  when 
President  Ford  is  reelected,  I  don't  think  it 
would  be  proper  for  me  to  say  now  that  I 
will  not  talk  to  him,  and  we  will  just  have 
to  wait  until  that  situation  occurs. 

The  Olympic  Games 

Mrs.  McAlister:  The  Olympic  teams  are 
very  much  on  people's  minds  on  television 
these  days.  At  one  point,  the  United  States 
threatened  to  boycott  the  games  because  of 
the  Taiwan-China  question.  And  now  29  or 
30 — /  don't  know  how  Tnany — teams  have 
}valked  out  over  the  New  Zealand  team's  tour 
of  South  Africa.  And  the  ivhole  future  of  the 
games  seems  very  much  up  in  the  air. 


233 


I  am  wondering,  as  a  foreign  relations 
asset  do  the  games  really  serve  a  constructive 
purpose,  or  has  politicalization  become  too 
intense  to  ^varrant  continuation  of  the 
games  ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Our  basic  position  has 
been  that  the  Olympic  games  should  be 
treated  as  a  sports  event  in  which  the  com- 
petitors are  there  because  of  athletic  abil- 
ity and  not  to  make  a  political  point. 

We  were  in  no  position  as  a  government 
to  either  enter  a  team  or  to  withdraw  a 
team.  Our  position  was  not  geared  to  the 
merits  of  the  issue  of  which  of  the  govern- 
ments that  claimed  to  represent  China 
should  be  represented  at  the  Olympics. 

Our  position  was  that  if  the  host  govern- 
ment insisted  on  its  political  judgment  over 
that  of  the  International  Olympics  Com- 
mittee, then  in  1980,  when  these  games  are 
in  Moscow,  or  in  1984,  when  they  could  be 
anywhere  else,  there  would  be  a  political 
test  applied  to  each  of  the  participants  and 
the  games  would  become  totally  politi- 
cized. 

Our  position  was  that  whomever  the  In- 
ternational Olympics  Committee  certified 
should  be  free  to  appear  and  that  the  host 
government  should  act  as  a  landlord  rather 
than  as  a  screening  agency. 

Similarly,  we  think  that  the  participation 
of  other  governments,  or  of  other  countries, 
should  not  depend  on  their  agreement  with 
actions  of  one  of  the  member  countries 
whose  individual  team  may  have  competed 
in  a  way  that  they  didn't  like. 

So  we  hope  very  much  that  the  Olympic 
games  can  be  returned  to  the  athletes  and 
do  not  become  an  arena  in  which  political 
tests  are  applied. 


Illegal  Immigration 

Mr.  Sterling:  Sir,  one  of  the  issues  that  is 
of  some  concern  here  in  the  Pacific  North- 
west is  the  problem  of  illegal  immigration, 
especially  from  Mexico.  Is  there  anything  the 
United  States  can  do  that  it  hasn't  done  to 
reduce  that  floiv  or  to  otherwise  alleviate  it? 


234 


Secretary  Kissinger:  The  illegal  immigra- 
tion is  produced  by  two  pressures — obvi- 
ously by  pressures  within  Mexico  which 
make  it  attractive  for  people  to  leave  and 
work  in  the  United  States  and  by  pressures 
in  the  United  States  to  get  cheap  labor.  In 
addition,  there  is  a  long  frontier  which  is 
almost  impossible  to  police. 

We  have  attempted  to — we  have  had 
negotiations  with  the  Mexican  Government 
on  this  subject.  And  the  latest  idea  which 
we  are  attempting  to  explore  is  to  see 
whether  we  can  put  the  economic  assist- 
ance, or  the  technical  aid,  that  we  give  to 
Mexico  in  those  farm  areas  from  which  the 
greatest  exodus  takes  place,  to  create  addi- 
tional incentives  for  people  to  stay  there. 
And  many  people  think,  and  the  Mexican 
Government  believes,  that  this  may  be  a 
promising  approach,  which  we  will  be  try- 
ing in  the  next  year. 

Q.  Do  you  have  the  impression,  sir,  that 
the  Mexican  Governmeyit  is  doing  all  it  can 
to  discourage  this  illegal  immigration? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  It  is  a  tough  political 
problem  for  the  Mexican  Government.  It 
is  not  using  maximum  force,  which  one  can 
understand. 

Conducting  Foreign  Policy  in  Election  Year 

Mr.  Rystrom:  Mr.  Secretary,  recently  you 
said  that  Governor  Carter's  foreign  policy 
basically  was  parallel  to  yours,  his  proposed 
foreign  policy.  And  I  was  curious  what  was 
behind  your  statement.  Were  you  trying  to 
take  the  foreign  policy  out  of  the  fall  cam- 
paign? Were  you  looking  for  a  job  next  Jan- 
uary? [Laughter.'] 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  have  already  said 
that  I — 

Mr.  Rystrom:  I  knoiv,  you  kind  of  stole  my 
thunder  on  that  one.  [Laughter.']  But  I  still 
had  to  ask  that  question.  But  further,  in 
what  areas  do  you  see  your  policy  and  his 
proposals  as  being  parallel? 

Secretary   Kissinger:   Of  course,   I   suffer 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


:rom  the  fact  that  Governor  Carter  has 
jronounced  himself  on  foreign  policy  only 
;wice  in  general  speeches.  So  there  has  not 
een  excessive  precision  in  his  pronounce- 
nents.  I  was  referring  to  the  general  philo- 
iophical  outlines. 

I  do  believe  that  the  foreign  policy  of 
;he  United  States  should  be  approached  on 
I  nonpartisan  basis.  I  do  not  believe  it  is 
lealthy  for  our  country  and  for  other  coun- 
;ries  to  have  the  impression  that  every  four 
)r  eight  years  there  can  be  a  fundamental 
evision  of  foreign  policy. 

That  doesn't  mean  that  there  cannot  be 
;actical  disagreements.  Of  course  there  can 
)e.  But  the  main  lines  of  our  foreign  policy 
lave  to  reflect  the  basic  interests  and  basic 
/alues  of  the  American  people.  And  they 
ion't  change  that  frequently. 

This  is  why  I  believe  that  if  at  all  possi- 
jle,  debates  on  foreign  policy  should  be 
onducted  with  great  restraint.  And  my 
general  hope  is  to  keep  the  foreign  policy 
ssues  on  as  high  a  level  as  possible. 

I  don't  doubt  that  as  Governor  Carter 
spells  out  his  program  in  greater  detail  my 
professorial  instinct  may  run  away  with 
ne.  And  undoubtedly  disagreements  will 
develop.  And  as  I  said  at  a  press  confer- 
ence in  Washington  some  weeks  ago,  there 
have  been  enough  hints  and  indications  in 
what  Governor  Carter  has  said  on  individ- 
ual items  in  which  we  would  not  see  eye  to 
sye.  But  I  will  wait  until  they  are  spelled 
3Ut  more  before  we  make  any  comment. 

But  I  don't  think,  in  any  event,  that  it  is 
the  function  of  the  Secretary  of  State  to  be 
a  principal  participant  in  a  political  cam- 
paign. 

M?-.  McCall:  Do  you  think,  Mr.  Secretary, 
that  the  dialogue  in  the  Presidential  race  has 
in  any  way  influenced  or  impaired  the  con- 
duct of  American  foreign  policy? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Inevitably  in  an  elec- 
tion year,  foreign  governments  are  begin- 
ning to  look  at  what  may  be  ahead.  Inevi- 
tably they  will  have  to  ask  the  question 
whether  the  government  with  which  they 
are    dealing — or   the   Administration   with 


August  16,  1976 


which  they  are  dealing — is  going  to  be 
able  to  carry  out  whatever  commitments  it 
is  making  in  the  negotiations.  Which  is  one 
reason  why  it  is  important  for  foreign  gov- 
ernments to  have  the  sense  that  there  will 
be  substantial  continuity  for  the  main  lines 
of  our  foreign  policy  no  matter  who  is  in 
office. 

I  cannot  say  that  our  foreign  policy  has 
as  yet  been  impaired  by  the  political  cam- 
paign. I  have  the  impression  that  foreign 
governments  are  getting  more  sophisticated 
in  understanding  what  is  being  said  in  the 
pageant  of  the  moment. 

So,  on  the  whole,  and  in  fact  rather  sur- 
prisingly for  me,  I  think  we  have  been  able 
to  conduct  foreign  policy  without  any  sub- 
stantial impact  by  the  election. 

International  Action  on  Terrorism 

Mrs.  McAlister:  Terrorism,  ivith  all  its 
trappings  of  political  murders  and  skyjack- 
ing and  all  the  rest,  continues  unabated  and 
seems  to  be  on  the  increase.  Yet  the  United 
Natioyis  can't  even  pass  a  resolution  con- 
demning terrorist  acts. 

Is  there  any  hope  that  that  organization 
can  take  effective  action  whatsoever  to  re- 
duce terrorism?  Or  hotv  do  you  propose  that 
internationa]  terrorism  can  be  controlled? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  difficulty  with 
getting  international  action  on  terrorism  is 
that  there  are  always  some  governments 
that  sympathize  with  the  objectives  of 
some  of  the  terrorists  even  though  they 
don't  agree  with  their  methods.  There  are 
other  governments  that  are  afraid  of  what 
the  terrorists  might  do  to  them  if  they  take 
drastic  action.  And  therefore  in  the  past  it 
has  not  been  possible  to  get  international 
action. 

Now  it  is  becoming,  however,  increas- 
ingly apparent — I  think  more  and  more  na- 
tions are  coming  to  realize  that  terrorism 
is  a  blight  on  the  human  conscience  and  it 
is  an  offense  to  all  civilized  relationships 
among  nations. 

It  is  true  we  could  not  get  the  required 


235 


majority  for  the  antiterrorism  vote  in  the 
U.N.  Security  Council.  But  we  did  have  six 
nations  in  favor  and  four  nations  opposed, 
and  we  were  just  lacking  the  three  addi- 
tional votes  which  it  would  have  taken  to 
make  it  a  legal  resolution. 

But  the  other  resolution,  the  one  that 
was  condemning  Israel  for  its  raid,  was 
never  brought  to  a  vote  at  all,  which  is  a 
considerable  change  over  the  mood  in  the 
United  Nations  a  year  or  two  ago. 

We  will  reintroduce — or  we  will  support 
the  reintroduction  of — an  antiterrorism  res- 
olution, and  particularly  focused  on  the 
kidnaping  of  people,  on  the  issue  of  the 
kidnaping  of  people  and  hijacking  of  air- 
planes, in  which  we  hope  that  the  interna- 
tional community  of  the  United  Nations 
will  put  some  teeth  into  its  provisions,  and 
we  will  not  understand  if  nations  will  not 
go  along  with  trying  to  stamp  out  this 
blight. 

Mrs.  McAUster:  What  sort  of  "teeth"  are 
you  talking  about? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  For  example — we  are 
now  working  with  several  countries  on  this. 
But  if,  for  example,  there  were  interna- 
tional agreements  to  prevent  hijackers 
from  landing  in  an  airport  and  if  countries 
that  permitted  hijackers  to  land  were  then 
excluded  from  the  International  Civil  Avi- 
ation Organization,  I  think  some  progress 
could  be  made. 

We  had  a  spate  of  hijackings  with  Cuba 
for  a  long  time,  and  then  an  agreement 
was  made,  and  since  then  there  haven't 
been  any.  So  we  know  it  can  be  stamped 
out  if  there  is  decisive  international  action, 
if  there  is  no  haven  to  which  the  terrorists 
could  go. 

Lebanon  and  Middle  East  Peace  Process 

Mr.  Sterling:  Shifting  to  the  Middle  East, 
sir,  ivhat  effect  does  the  war  in  Lebanon  have 
on  your  step-by-step  diplomacy  in  the  Middle 
East? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  First,  let  me  explain 


236 


with  respect  to  our  diplomacy.  We  were 
faced  in  1973  with  a  situation  in  which 
there  was  an  oil  embargo.  We  had  no  diplo- 
matic relations  with  any  of  the  key  Arab- 
countries.  The  whole  industrialized  world 
was  in  increasing  difficulties  because  of  the 
impact  of  the  Middle  East  war.  The  Soviet 
Union  was  backing  the  Arab  countries  and 
was  the  principal  influence  in  several  of 
the  Arab  countries. 

Under  those  conditions,  our  immediate 
objective  had  to  be  to  prevent  the  impact 
of  this  crisis  from  escalating  further.  We 
also  thought  that  for  nations  who  had 
made  no  progress  toward  peace  for  a  gen- 
eration, it  was  important  above  all  to  get 
to  learn  to  deal  with  each  other. 

Under  those  conditions,  the  step-by-step 
approach  was  the  most  effective  method  to 
make  progress,  because  it  enabled  us  to  re- 
duce problems  to  manageable  proportions 
— insofar  as  anything  is  manageable  in  the 
Middle  East — and  enabled  the  countries  to 
take  those  steps  on  which  they  could  agree. 
We  were  also  convinced  that  somewhere 
along  the  line  the  step-by-step  approach 
would  merge  into  an  overall  approach  and 
that  an  attempt  would  be  made  to  bring 
about  a  permanent  peace  on  the  basis  of 
negotiations  between  the  Arab  countries 
and  Israel.  And  we  are  approaching  that 
point  in  any  event. 

Now,  the  impact  of  Lebanon  on  this  proc- 
ess has  been  that  for  the  time  being  the 
energies  of  almost  all  of  the  participants  in 
a  potential  negotiation  in  the  Middle  East, 
and  particularly  of  the  Arab  participants, 
is  focused  on  their  disagreements  with  re- 
spect to  the  evolution  of  Lebanon.  And  the 
Lebanese  civil  war  has  taken  on  these' 
tragic  dimensions  because  each  of  the  fac- 
tions— each  of  the  Arab  factions — is 
backed  to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent  by 
some  of  the  Arab  countries. 

So  I  would  have  to  say  that  until  the 
problem  of  Lebanon  is  resolved,  it  will  be 
very  difficult  to  get  enough  attention  to 
[make]  serious  progress  on  the  Middle 
East.    And    a   degree   of   unity   among  the 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Arab  countries  as  to  their  political  objec- 
tives is  essential  to  make  significant  prog- 
ress toward  peace. 

Mr.  Sterling:  As  a  folloiviip,  then,  by  your 
lights,  what  ivould  he  the  happiest  possible 
resolution  of  the  Lebanese  situation? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  think,  however,  that 
as  the  Lebanese  situation  develops  and  as 
it  evolves,  the  experience  of  the  various 
Arab  countries  with  the  crisis  may  bring 
about  consolidations  that  would  be  quite 
favorable  to  peace. 

Now,  what  the  United  States  has  always 
believed  is  that  the  outcome  in  Lebanon 
should  be  one  in  which  the  territorial  integ- 
rity of  Lebanon  is  preserved,  in  which  the 
two  communities — the  Christian  and  the 
Moslem  communities — can  exist  side  by 
side  without  either  of  them  attempting  to 
impose  its  will  on  the  other.  And  this  will 
require  some  new  constitutional  arrange- 
ments from  those  that  prevailed  previously. 
And  if  the  Lebanese  parties  are  left  to  set- 
tle their  disputes — and  I  believe  that  some 
formula  can  be  found  and  will  be  found,  in 
which  these  objectives  can  be  achieved. 

Mr.  Ry Strom:  Are  you  prepared,  Mr.  Sec- 
retary, or  are  you  willing  to  state  whether 
the  United  States  played  any  role  at  all  in 
the  rescue  of  the  Israeli  plane  in  Uganda, 
the  gathering  of  intelligence,  the  role  of  the 
CIA,  or  any  other  type  of  activity? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  As  you  know,  we 
would  be  glad  to  grab  any  little  bit  of 
credit  that  is  available.  And  we  have  been 
known  to  do  that.  [Laughter.] 

But  even  with  the  best  will  in  the  world, 
we  can't  claim  any  credit  for  the  Israeli 
actions.  We  did  not  know  ahead  of  time 
what  they  were  planning  or  that  they  were 
planning  anything.  And  we  gave  them  no 
intelligence.  They  did  this  by  themselves, 
and  we  were  as  surprised  as  anybody 
else  when  we  were  informed  about  it. 

Mr.  Ry  Strom:  What  does  that  then  say 
about  your  intelligence?  [Laughter.] 

Secretary  Kissinger:  According  to  the  ac- 


August  16,  1976 


counts  that  have  been  published,  this  whole 
operation  was  conceived,  planned,  and  car- 
ried out  within  a  48-hour  period.  And  with- 
in a  48-hour  period,  it  is  extremely  difficult 
to  put  together  these  various  indicators 
that  you  can  tend  to  get  in  retrospect  that 
would  give  you  these  indications. 

You  have  to  remember  that  intelligence 
is  composed  of  many  bits  and  pieces,  many 
of  which  are  quite  confusing  when  you  get 
them.  Afterwards,  when  the  whole  event 
has  occurred,  you  can  usually  then  under- 
stand what  each  little  item  meant.  But  this 
was  something  that  in  the  nature  of  things 
we  could  have  very  little  information 
about.  And  that  would  not  be  a  failure  of 
intelligence,  because  our  intelligence  is  not 
specifically  targeted  on  Israeli  actions  in 
Africa.   [Laughter.] 

U.S.  Position  on  Korea  Negotiations 

Mr.  Nokes:  I  wonder  if  the  moderator 
might  interject  a  question  concerning  the 
local  area?  Mr.  Secretary,  South  Korea  is 
extremely  important  in  this  area  as  a  trading 
partner.  Today  in  Seattle,  you  renewed  a  call 
for  a  four-party  conference  for  the  People's 
Republic  of  China,  North  Korea,  and  South 
Korea,  to  meet  in  Netv  York  to  negotiate  a 
reduction  of  tensions  and  create  a  permanent 
armistice  in  Korea.  I  believe  you  stated  that 
old  agreements  are  not  the  Ten  Command- 
ments. 

Might  this  not  be  interpreted  as  a  ivilling- 
)iess  on  our  part  to  ivrite  off  our  old  friend 
South  Korea  as  a  part  of  the  Communist 
world?  What  would  the  United  States  seek 
from  such  a  conference?  What  would  be  our 
goals? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  That  was  a  rather 
eloquent  phrase  there  that  I  wished  I  had 
used.  [Laughter.]  I  must  compliment  the 
Associated  Press  writer,  who  is  a  lot  more 
eloquent  than  I  am.  [Laughter.] 

What  I  attempted  to  do  in  Seattle  is  to 
explain  the  proposals  that  the  North  Ko- 
reans and  their  allies  and  supporters  have 
made  in  the  United  Nations.  I  pointed  out 
that  those  proposals  are  absolutely  unac- 


237 


ceptable  to  the  United  States.  Those  pro- 
posals are  the  unilateral  withdrawal  of 
American  forces,  the  abolishing  of  the  U.N. 
Command,  and  in  effect  the  end  of  the  ar- 
mistice on  a  unilateral  basis,  and  then  bi- 
lateral negotiations  between  the  United 
States  and  North  Korea. 

I  pointed  out  that  the  United  States 
would  not  negotiate  with  North  Korea  ex- 
cept in  the  presence  of  South  Korea,  that 
we  would  not  negotiate  over  the  fate  of  an 
ally  without  the  participation  of  that  ally. 

Secondly,  we  expressed  our  general 
readiness  to  replace  the  existing  armistice 
agreement  by  a  more  permanent  arrange- 
ment, if  a  more  permanent  arrangement 
could  be  negotiated. 

Mr.  Nokes:  A  two-Korea  arrangement? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  A  two-Korea  ar- 
rangement, unless  the  two  Koreas  agreed 
to  unify,  which  is  up  to  the  two  Koreas,  but 
not  something  that  we  will  impose  on  them. 

I  think  if  you  read  my  speech,  you  will 
find  it  a  strong  defense  of  our  South  Korean 
allies,  a  strong  statement  that  we  will  rtot 
accept  the  Communist  negotiating  program 
but  that  we  are  prepared  to  meet  in  a  fo- 
rum in  which  there  would  be  a  representa- 
tive of  the  United  States,  South  Korea, 
North  Korea,  and  the  People's  Republic  of 
China  to  discuss  other  ideas. 

The  proposal  that  I  made  today  had  the 
strong  and  willing  support  of  the  South  Ko- 
rean Government,  which  has  urged  us  to 
make  some  concrete  proposal  to  indicate 
that  we  are  prepared  to  have  arrangements 
on  the  peninsula  that  do  not  depend  simply 
on  an  armistice  agreement.  But  under  no 
circumstances  will  the  United  States  nego- 
tiate behind  the  back  of  its  ally. 

And  under  no  circumstances  will  we  uni- 
laterally withdraw  our  forces  from  Korea 
in  the  absence  of  a  political  arrangement. 

Mr.  McCall:  I  am  looking  at  a  copy  or  a 
clipping  from  the  Los  Angeles  Times  con- 
cerning your  press  conference  of  a  recent 
Saturday,  Mr.  Secretary,  and  the  reporter 
said  yot(  seemed  to  be  more  concerned  tvith 


justifying  past  policies  than  urging  new  ones. 
Is  that  because  you  are  looking  forward  to 
a  neiv  career  in  November,  or  is  the  situa- 
tion so  turbulent  that  you  have  to  in  diplo- 
macy simply  react  rather  than  initiate?  Are 
initiatives — what  direction  ivould  some  netv 
initiatives  take?  Or  are  ive  just  trying  to 
combat  yesterday's  leftovers  as  far  as  prob- 
le))is  are  concei-ned? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  didn't  read  this  par- 
ticular story.  It  is  in  the  nature  of  the 
format  of  a  press  conference  that  you  are 
always  justifying  old  policies.  I  don't  re- 
member that  in  a  press  conference  anyone 
ever  got  up  and  said,  "Have  you  thought 
of  any  new  initiatives  lately?"  [Laughter.] 

The  press  conference  is  not  the  place 
where  you  float  new  initiatives;  and  this, 
therefore,  is  a  criticism  that  can  be  made 
of  any  press  conference  that  any  President 
or  Secretary  of  State  has  ever  had  that 
dealt  with  foreign  policy. 

I  think,  over  the  past  year,  we  have 
made  a  number  of  major  initiatives  in  the 
field  of  our  relations  between  the  devel- 
oped and  developing  countries,  as  in  the 
special  session  of  the  U.N.  General  Assem- 
bly and  at  the  Conference  on  International 
Economic  Cooperation.  We  have  made 
major  initiatives  in  the  field  of  our  rela- 
tions with  our  allies.  We  are  continuing 
initiatives  with  relation  to  the  limitation  of 
armaments. 

But  when  we  make  proposals,  we  make 
them  in  formal  speeches  and  not  in  answers 
to  questions,  because  it  might  just  happen 
that  the  right  question  isn't  asked,  and  then 
we  would  be  left  sitting  there  and  having 
the  press  conference.   [Laughter.] 

Preventing  Race  War  in  Southern  Africa 

Mrs.  McAlister:  Secretary  Kissinger,  after 
what  has  been  called  the  "decade  of  benign 
neglect,"  the  United  States  has  suddenly  and 
very  conspicuously  injected  itself  on  the 
African  scene.  The  war  in  Angola,  with  par- 
ticipation by  the  Cuban  troops  as  the  Soviet 
arm,  seemed  to  precipitate  this  involvement. 


238 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


First  off,  are  there  any  indications  in  fact 
tlidt  Cuba  ivill  take  its  troops  home  from 
Aiif/ola?  And,  secondly,  is  the  United  States 
iiKiking  some  dent  in  convincing  South  Africa 
(I  ml  Rhodesia  to  take  more  rapid  steps  to- 
irnrd  eventual  majority  black  rule? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  With  respect  to  the 
Cuban  troops,  we  were  given  an  indication, 
when  I  visited  Sweden,  by  the  Prime  Min- 
ister of  Sweden,  who  was  speaking  on 
behalf  of  the  Cuban  Government,  that  they 
would  start  withdrawing  troops  at  a  speci- 
fied rate. 

We  have  not  been  able  to  confirm  this  in 
any  manner.  It  is  true  that  Cuban  troops 
are  leaving  Angola.  It  is  also  true  that 
other  Cubans,  either  troops  or  civilian  per- 
sonnel, are  entering  Angola.  And  what  the 
net  flow  is  has  not  been — we  have  not  been 
able  to  determine  conclusively. 

In  any  event,  the  net  flow  is  so  relatively 
insignificant  that  it  does  not  affect  the  basic 
situation  of  a  massive  Cuban  expeditionary 
force  in  Angola  that  has  imposed  a  govern- 
ment on  Angola  that  could  not  have  been 
achieved  any  other  way.  That  is  the  basic 
factor  to  which  we  object. 

Now,  with  respect  to  the  United  States 
in  South  Africa. 

The  United  States  has  an  interest  in  pre- 
venting a  race  war  from  developing  in 
southern  Africa,  which  will  have  a  high 
potential  of  bringing  in  new  outside  inter- 
vention, which  would  then  turn  the  African 
countries  more  and  more  toward  violence 
and  radicalism ;  and  given  the  historical  re- 
lationship between  Europe  and  Africa,  and 
between  many  parts  of  our  population  and 
Africa,  such  a  consequence  would  have  a 
major  impact  on  the  stability  of  the  inter- 
national system. 

So,  our  attempt  in  Africa  has  been  to  see 
whether  it  was  possible  to  settle  these  con- 
flicts through  a  negotiation  in  which  both 
communities  in  Rhodesia  and  Namibia  es- 
pecially, white  and  black  communities,  can 
continue  to  live  side  by  side.  And  to  do 
this  before  they  get  into  a  war  that  would 
take  on  new  dimensions  in  which  the  out- 
come can  only  be  a  radical  solution. 

August  16,   1976 


We  are  not  injecting  ourself  into  a  situ- 
ation that  would  not  exist  without  us.  If 
we  do  not  act,  then  violence  will  become 
more  and  more  widespread  and  coexistence 
will  become  impossible.  And  it  is  the  judg- 
ment of  everybody  who  has  studied  the 
problem,  of  all  the  experts,  that  sooner  or 
later  these  minority  governments,  such  as 
Rhodesia,  will  not  be  able  to  support  them- 
selves. 

This  is  why  we  have  strongly  urged  ne- 
gotiated solutions.  We  are  now  in  the  proc- 
ess of  exploring  with  black  African  coun- 
tries and  with  South  Africa  a  formula  by 
which  perhaps  a  negotiated  .solution  can 
be  achieved. 

We  do  this  in  order  to  put  an  end  to  the 
violence,  in  order  to  put  an  end  to  the  war, 
and  in  order  to  permit  the  white  and  the 
black  communities  to  live  side  by  side,  to 
avoid  a  race  war,  and  to  avoid  the  radicali- 
zation  of  all  of  Africa. 

We  could  do  nothing,  which  is  the  tempt- 
ing thing  to  do.  Then,  a  year  or  two  from 
now,  we  would  face  impossible  problems. 
And  just  as  Angola  made  the  next  case 
more  difficult,  so  Inactivity  in  Rhodesia  and 
Namibia  would  make  further  evolution 
even  more  painful  and  even  more  difficult. 

This  is  why  we  take  this  initiative.  This 
is  why  we  are  making  an  effort.  And  we 
believe  that  there  are  possibilities  of  a  solu- 
tion in  which  the  black  moderate  leaders 
and  the  white  communities  can  coexist  and 
with  which  a  race  war  is  averted,  which  is 
both  a  moral  and  political  necessity. 

Mrs.  McAlister:  And  you  are  saying  prog- 
ress is  being  made  toward  this? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  think  there  is  a  pos- 
sibility of  progress.  Passions  are  very  high, 
and  the  differences  between  these  people 
are  very  great.  But  we  think  that  the  pos- 
.sibility  of  progress  exists. 

Mr.  Nokes:  Before  we  come  on  to  you, 
Don,  may  I  ask  those  ivho  have  been  selected 
from  the  floor  to  ask  questions,  approach  the 
mikes  and  get  ready,  and  now  we  have  time 
for  one  more  short  question  from  Don. 

Mr.    Sterling:   In    the    light   of   your    ex- 

239 


pressed  hope  for  a  peaceful  resolution  in  Af- 
rica, why  do  we  continue  to  allotv  the 
recruiting  of  mercenaries  in  the  United 
States? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  am  not  aware  that 
mercenaries  are  being  recruited  in  the 
United  States  right  now.  And  it  is  certainly 
not  done  with  the  connivance  or  agreement 
of  the  government.  I  am  not  exactly  sure 
what  the  legal  position  is  and  what  legal 
authority  we  have.  But  I  want  to  make  it 
absolutely  clear  that  the  United  States  does 
not  encourage  or  support  the  recruiting  of 
mercenaries  for  the  wars  in  Africa. 

Mr.  Nokes:  We  are  now  ready  to  take 
questions  from  the  mikes. 

Withstanding  Future  Oil  Embargo 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  my  question  is  as  fol- 
lows: What  are  the  chances  of  a  second  Arab 
oil  embargo?  And  what  shoidd  the  U.S.  re- 
sponse be  to  a  possible  second  Arab  oil  em- 
bargo, if  one  should  occur? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  the  possibilities 
— our  relations  with  the  Arab  world  have 
improved  to  a  point  where  an  oil  embargo 
is  not  likely  to  be  undertaken  lightly.  If 
there  should  be  another  Arab-Israeli  con- 
flict, I  suppose  that  there  will  be  several 
Arab  states  that  will  be  tempted  to  do  this. 

Since  1973  we  and  the  other  industrial- 
ized nations  have  formed  an  agency,  the 
so-called  International  Energy  Agency, 
whose  purpose  it  is  to  make  it  easier  for 
the  industrialized  nations  to  withstand  the 
impact  of  an  oil  embargo.  We  have  built 
up  our  oil  stocks  so  that  most  countries  now 
have  six  to  nine  months  of  reserves.  We've 
agreed  to  share  available  supplies;  and 
we've  brought  about  a  situation  where  a 
selective  embargo  is  no  longer  possible,  be- 
cause of  the  mutual  support  that  the  in- 
dustrialized nations  will  give  to  each  other. 
So  an  embargo  would  be  a  much  more 
complicated  matter. 

And  without  going  into  details,  it's  not 
a  matter  which  the  oil-exporting  countries 
should  take  lightly,  because  in  the  future 


240 


the  United  States  and  its  industrial  allies 
would  also — would  look  to  their  own  eco- 
nomic means  of  resistance. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  I  would  like  to  know: 
Will  the  United  States  take  any  action  to  try 
to  reconcile  the  differences  between  Taiwan 
and  the  People's  Republic  of  China? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  both  parties 
have  maintained  that  we  have  no  standing 
in  reconciling  these  differences,  and  both 
parties  have  insisted  that  this  is  an  essen- 
tially internal  Chinese  affair.  We  have 
stated  publicly  that  we  favor  a  peaceful 
negotiation  of  these  differences  and  we 
would  welcome  any  efforts  to  do  this. 

But  this  is  a  matter  that  may  take  awhile 
to  work  itself  out,  and  it  is  a  matter  that 
we  will  leave  primarily  to  the  Chinese  to 
negotiate — although,  of  course,  you're 
aware  of  the  fact  that  we  have  a  defense 
treaty  with  Taiwan. 

Situation  in  Cyprus 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  do  you  feel  now  that  the 
State  Department  made  a  mistake  in  not 
intervening  and  to  stop  the  Turkish  nation 
to  halt  their  invasion  of  Cyprus — as  ivas 
done  previously  by  President  Johnson — and 
since  the  results  of  not  intervening  are  ivhat 
they  are  today,  what  are  your  plans  and  sug- 
gestions for  a  settlement  of  the  Cyprus 
tragedy? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  first  of  all,  the 
State  Department  is — I'm  always  moved 
when  I  travel  around  and  I'm  asked  about 
the  State  Department  as  if  it  were  a  mono- 
lithic organization.  [Laughter.]  It's  not  the 
impression  of  it  where  I  sit.  [Laughter.] 

Secondly,  those  of  you  who  know  Wash- 
ington know  that  the  Pentagon  doesn't 
necessarily  do  what  the  State  Department 
asks  it  to  do  [laughter] — so  these  decisions 
are  national  decisions  taken  by  the  Presi- 
dent. 

Thirdly,  if  you  look  at  the  situation  that 
existed  at  the  time  of  the  Cyprus  crisis,  the 
United  States,  if  it  had  intervened  militar- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


)iy,  would  have  been  intervening  against 
an  ally  on  behalf  of  a  Greek  Government 
of  which  we  strongly  disapproved  and  in 
defense  of  an  action  which  had  been 
started  by  that  Greek  Government.  It  is 
forgotten  today  that  during  the  first  week 
of  that  crisis,  the  week  during  which  the 
Turkish  invasion  took  place,  the  State  De- 
partment was  accused  of  siding  with  the 
Greeks  and  of  not  condemning  the  Greeks 
sufficiently.  And  this  may  have  been  true 
because  we  wanted  to  discourage  a  Turkish 
invasion. 

Now — and  if  you  will  remember  also  the 
situation  that  existed  in  the  United  States 
in  July  1974  in  the  last  weeks  of  the 
Watergate  crisis — to  engage  in  a  military 
action  against  an  ally  under  those  circum- 
stances, on  behalf  of  a  government  with 
which  we  were  in  strong  disagreement, 
would  not  have  been  a  simple  matter.  And 
therefore  I  supported — and  still  support  in 
retrospect — the  decision  that  was  then 
made  not  to  use  the  6th  Fleet  in  a  military 
Ulceration. 

I  must  say  also  that  one  of  the  primary 
reasons  why  further  progress  has  not  been 
made  is  the  intervention  by  the  Congress, 
which  has  constantly  legislated  acts  which 
have  interrupted  the  negotiating  process 
through  the  various  embargoes  which  they 
have  legislated — which  have  deprived  both 
sides  of  the  incentives  to  make  concessions 
and  which  have  brought  about  a  situation 
where  the  status  quo  has  lasted  a  lot  longer 
than  it  should  have. 

I  believe  that  progress  can  be  made.  The 
United  States  would  strongly  support  and 
be  willing  to  assist  in  the  negotiating  proc- 
ess. 

We  have  stated  publicly  that  we  do  not 
believe  that  the  territory — that  the  settle- 
ment can  be  along  the  lines  that  now  exist 
in  Cyprus.  We  have  stated  publicly — and 
we  are  willing  to  back  this  up — that  a 
settlement  must  take  into  account  a  sense 
of  justice  and  self-respect  of  all  of  the  com- 
munities, especially  of  the  Greek  commu- 
nity, which  has  been  deprived  of  a  great 
deal  of  its  territory. 


August  16,  1976 


But  it  is  not  possible  to  conduct  a  serious 
negotiation  when  there  are  constant  spe- 
cific legislative  proposals,  because  a  nego- 
tiation has  to  be  conducted  over  a  suflficient 
period  of  time.  It  can  only  be  conducted  by 
a  few  people. 

That  is  the  basic  reason  why  there  have 
been  difficulties  in  the  negotiations  in  Cy- 
prus, which  we  regret,  and  in  which  we 
would  be  prepared  to  make  a  major  effort 
to  bring  about  a  just  settlement. 

Credits  and  Sales  to  the  Soviet  Union 

Q.  The  question,  Mr.  Secretary,  is:  What 
is  the  basis  for  selling  goods,  technology,  and 
making  hank  credits  available  to  the  Soviet 
Union,  when  these  are  helping  the  Soviet 
Union  extend  its  worldwide  policies  against 
the  interests  and  security  of  the  United 
States? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  first  of  all,  as 
far  as  credits  are  concerned,  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment has  made  available  only  infinitesi- 
mal credits  compared  to  what  other  nations 
have  done.  The  governmental  indebtedness 
of  the  Soviet  Union  to  the  United  States  is 
a  few  hundred  million  dollars.  The  credits 
given  by  Western  Europe  and  Japan  to  the 
Soviet  Union  are  close  to  $11  billion. 

So  what  the  United  States  has  done  is  a 
rather  small  part  of  the  total;  and  it  is  a 
pity  that  we  have  been  deprived,  again 
through  legislative  action,  of  the  authority 
to  do  more — because  we  would  be  in  a 
better  position  to  negotiate  specific  politi- 
cal arrangements  in  return  for  credits  than 
the  weaker  countries  and  the  weaker  econ- 
omies of  Western  Europe  and  Japan. 

With  respect  to  both  the  credits  and  the 
food,  we  face  this  problem.  This  morning 
in  Seattle  I  was  asked  the  same  question 
from  exactly  the  opposite  point  of  view. 
The  question  was  put  in  terms  of  our  inter- 
rupting the  sale  of  grain  to  the  Soviet 
Union  for  political  objectives. 

And  the  national  decision  we  have  to 
make  is  whether  foreign  countries  can 
enter  the  American  market  simply  on  com- 


241 


mercial  terms,  regardless  of  the  political 
circumstances,  without  the  United  States 
negotiating  some  political  foreign  policy 
benefit  for  itself  or  whether  the  United 
States  will  try  to  get  some  foreign  policy 
benefits.  If  we  try  to  get  foreign  policy 
benefits  there  will  have  to  be  some  author- 
ity to  interrupt  the  entering  of  our  market. 
Now,  this  is  a  question  that  in  the  case 
of  the  grain  has  been  resolved  in  favor  of 
permitting  foreign  countries  to  enter  our 
market,  essentially  without  restrictions.  It 
has  been  a  policy  that  I  have  noticed  every 
Presidential  candidate  has  affirmed  and 
that  also  reflects  our  national  decision.  But 
in  that  case  one  cannot  afterward  complain 
that  we  are  selling  grain  to  the  Soviets,  be- 
cause that  has  been  the  decision  which  has 
been  produced  by  our  democratic  process. 

Jewish  Emigration  From  the  Soviet  Union 

Q.  Dr.  Kissinger,  my  Jeivish  brothers  and 
sisters  are  being  tortured,  enslaved,  and 
murdered  in  the  Soviet  Union.  In  vietv  of  the 
Helsinki  accord,  is  not  the  right  of  Jeivish 
emigration  of  prime  concern  to  this  Admin- 
istration? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  When  this  Admin- 
istration came  into  office  in  1969,  500  Jew- 
ish people  emigrated  from  the  Soviet  Union 
a  year.  We  have  taken  the  position — we 
took  the  position  then — that  we  would  not 
make  any  dramatic  issues  but  that  we 
would  appeal  to  the  Soviet  Union  quietly 
and  using  the  general  atmosphere  of  our 
relationship  in  order  to  make  progress  on 
emigration. 

Between  1969  and  1973  the  rate  of  emi- 
gration from  the  Soviet  Union  went  from 
500  a  year  to  35,000  a  year.  It  was  then 
made  a  public  political  issue  and  again  the 
subject  of  attention.  And  the  emigration 
went  down  from  35,000  to  12,000. 

The  question  therefore  is:  What  policy 
is  most  likely  to  bring  results? 

This  Administration  has  never  ceased 
urging  an  increase  in  emigration.  We  have 


242 


repeatedly  and  successfully  submitted  lists 
of  people  in  prison  to  the  Soviet  Union,  and 
we  have  achieved  the  release  of  a  large 
percentage  of  those  lists  that  we  have  sub- 
mitted. When  we  have  been  successful,  we 
have  not  made  any  public  claim  for  it,  be- 
cause we  have  thought  that  the  saving  of 
lives  was  more  important  than  getting  the 
credit. 

It  is  our  conviction  that  results  are  more 
likely  if  we  do  not  turn  it  into  a  public  con- 
frontation on  an  issue  that  will  be  argued 
as  being  within  the  Soviet  domestic  juris- 
diction. But  it  is  a  matter  of  profound  con- 
cern— a  matter  which  this  Administration 
has  strongly  supported — and  in  which 
great  progress  has  been  made  and  in  which 
we  are  prepared  to  continue  to  exercise  a 
great  deal  of  influence. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  can  you  tell  us  the  dif- 
ference bettveen  your  latest  concept  of  for- 
eign policy  as  differing  from  that  of  Pro- 
fessor [Zbignieivl  Brzezinski,  who  likes  to 
think  of  himself  as  your  possible  successor? 
[Laughter.'\ 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  I've  told  my 
friend  Brzezinski  that  there  is  no  constitu- 
tional requirement  that  the  Secretary  of 
State  must  be  foreign-born.  [Laughter.] 
And  one  of  the  difficulties  of  being  both  a 
professor  and  a  Secretary  of  State  is  that 
half  of  the  professors  in  the  country  then 
get  to  think  that  they  should  also  be  Secre- 
taries of  State.  [Laughter.]  They  can  bear 
having  a  lawyer  or  a  businessman  in  this 
office,  but  one  of  their  own  is  more  than 
their  nervous  constitution  can  tolerate. 
[Laughter.] 

Now,  as  far  as  Brzezinski  is  concerned, 
I  don't  consider  myself  in  competition  with 
him.  And  he  has  been  known  to  change  his 
opinion  at  various  times.  Sometimes  I've 
agreed  with  him;  sometimes  I  haven't 
agreed  with  him.  But  he's  a  man  of  con- 
siderable ability  and  has  written  some  out- 
standing books.  And  I  wish  him  well  in  his 
academic  career.   [Laughter.] 


Department  of  State  Bulletiit 


Panama  Canal  Negotiations 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  could  you  tell  us  ivhat  in 
principle  is  the  official  U.S.  proposal  regard- 
ing the  Panama  Canal? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  One  of  the  amazing 
things  of  this  Presidential  campaign  is  that 
sud 'enly  an  issue  was  raised  that  gave  the 
impression  that  new  negotiations  had  been 
started  on  the  Panama  Canal. 

The  first  thing  to  keep  in  mind  is  that  the 
negotiations  about  the  Panama  Canal  have 
been  going  on  since  1964  in  three  Admin- 
istrations and  not  necessarily  commented 
upon  by  some  of  the  most  vocal  critics  of 
the  Panama  negotiations  this  year. 

The  issue  of  the  Panama  Canal  is  not 
whether  the  United  States  should  accept 
the  position  of  a  "tinhorn  dictator" — as 
the  phrase  went — in  Panama.  The  issue  is 
the  relationship  of  the  United  States  to  all 
the  countries  of  the  Western  Hemisphere. 
And  what  the  United  States  has  to  decide 
is  whether — if  we  can  achieve  guaranteed 
free  and  uninterrupted  access  through  the 
canal — whether  it  is  possible  to  change 
some  of  the  other  arrangements  with  re- 
spect to  the  canal. 

We  cannot  make  any  concessions  on  the 
right  of  free,  guaranteed,  and  neutral  ac- 
cess through  the  canal.  If  that  condition 
can  be  met,  then  there  are  serious  issues 
having  to  do  with  the  operation  of  the 
canal,  issues  having  to  do  with  the  defense 
installations  in  the  Canal  Zone  and  having 
to  do  with  the  nature  of  the  defense  ar- 
rangements for  the  canal.  Those  are  in  the 
process  of  being  negotiated,  and  not  one 
line  of  an  agreement  has  yet  been  put  on 
paper.  All  our  negotiations  have  been  fully 
briefed  to  the  congressional  committees. 

The  procedure  that  we  would  undoubt- 
edly follow  if  the  negotiations  were  to 
make  progress  would  be  first  to  agree  on  a 
basic  concept,  to  submit  this  to  the  Con- 
gress for  discussion,  and  then  when  the 
basic  concept  has  achieved  general  agree- 
ment, then   we  would   negotiate  a  treaty. 


August   16,   1976 


That  treaty  would  again  go  to  the  Senate, 
where  it  could  be  blocked  by  a  one-third- 
plus-one  vote. 

So  there  is  no  possibility  of  doing  any- 
thing that  does  not  have  the  overwhelming 
support  of  the  American  public.  We  are  of 
course  prepared  to  defend  our  rights  for 
free  and  unimpeded  access  through  the 
Panama  Canal.  But  if  we  have  to  do  this, 
we  want  to  be  able  to  look  the  American 
people  in  the  eye  and  say,  "We  have  made 
every  effort  to  avoid  such  a  contingency." 
And  we  do  not  want  to  risk  all  our  rela- 
tions with  all  of  the  countries  in  the  West- 
ern Hemisphere  without  at  least  exploring 
whether  it  is  possible  to  make  an  arrange- 
ment which  guarantees  our  rights  by  other 
means. 

Q.  Dr.  Kissinger,  as  Admiral  [Elmo  i?.] 
Ziamoalt  suggested,  do  you  believe  that  the 
United  States  in  the  future  will  lose  its  posi- 
tion of  preeminent  leadership  in  world  af- 
fairs? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Pve  nominated  Ad- 
miral Zumwalt  for  the  Pulitzer  Prize  for 
fiction.  [Laughter.]  I  don't  think  the  good 
admiral  has  yet  fully  grasped  the  fact  that 
in  running  for  the  Senate  in  Virginia  his 
opponent  is  called  Byrd  and  not  Kissinger. 
[Laughter.] 

I  have  never  expressed  the  view  that  he 
ascribes  to  me,  and  I  do  not  believe — I've 
never  believed,  nor  do  I  believe  today — 
that  the  United  States  is  bound  to  become 
in  a  secondary  position  to  any  other  coun- 
try. 

I  do  believe  that  there  are  changing  cir- 
cumstances in  the  world  which  we  have  to 
take  into  account,  but  under  no  circum- 
stances will  the  United  States  accept  sec- 
ond place,  and  under  all  circumstances 
must  the  United  States  maintain  sufficient 
military  power  to  make  sure  that  no  other 
country  can  impose  its  will  on  the  United 
States. 

Q.  Secretary  Kissinger,  during  the  Ken- 
nedy  Alliance   for  Progress    era,    a   strong 


243 


U.S.-Latin  America  bond  was  beginning  to 
form.  What  since  has  happened,  and  hoiv  can 
this  pan-American  bond  again  be  rece- 
mented  ? 

New  Dialogue  With  Latin  America 

Secretary  Kissinger:  During  the  Kennedy 
period,  the  Alliance  for  Progress  was  a 
very  imaginative  approach  to  Latin  Amer- 
ica, but  it  is  also  true  that  it  was  no  longer 
appropriate  to  the  conditions  that  devel- 
oped later.  The  basic  premises  of  the  Alli- 
ance for  Progress — namely,  that  the  United 
States  could  define  for  Latin  America  what 
its  institutions  might  be  and  that  the 
United  States  could  develop  a  program 
made  in  the  United  States  for  Latin  Amer- 
ica— do  not  correspond  to  the  realities  of 
the  late  sixties  and  of  the  contemporary 
period. 

We  have  tried  to  substitute  for  it  some- 
thing that  we  have  called  the  new  dialogue, 
in  which  we  deal  with  each  other  on  a 
more  equal  basis  and  in  which  we  try  to 
take  into  account  the  emergence  in  Latin 
America  of  many  countries  that  are  going 
to  be  within  a  generation  among  the  most 
powerful  nations  in  the  world  and  whose 
rate  of  economic  progress  is  very  consider- 
able. 

This  policy  has  made  considerable  prog- 
ress. It  is  not  as  dramatic,  because  a  long- 
range  policy  doesn't  lend  itself  to  great 
drama.  But  I  think  the  foundations  have 
been  laid  for  close  cooperation  in  the  field 
of  economic  cooperation,  in  the  field  of 
transfer  of  technology,  and  in  the  field  of 
restructuring  the  institutions  of  the  West- 
ern Hemisphere  that  in  the  next  year  or 
two  are  going  to  show  considerable  result. 

Arms  Sales  to  Oil-Producing  Countries 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  how  can  a  rise  in  the 
price  of  oil  by  the  oil-producing  countries  be 
prevented  by  other  means  than  trading  in 
armaments? 

Secretary  Kissinger:   Well,   I   don't  think 


244 


that  the  trade  in  armaments  is  a  device  to 
prevent  a  rise  in  oil  prices.  I  think  it  results 
from  the  rise  in  oil  prices  that  has  already 
occurred,  because  it  gives  the  oil-producing 
countries  enormously  large  resources  with 
which  to  purchase  either  industrial  goods 
or  armaments — if  that's  what  they  choose. 
So  the  basic  problem  is  not  that  we  are 
trying  to  prevent  a  rise  in  oil  prices  by 
selling  armaments. 

The  fact  is  that  having  already  achieved 
such  tremendous  surpluses  as  a  result  of 
the  oil  prices  that  have  occurred  since 
1973,  the  oil-producing  countries  can  enter 
the  international  market  and  buy  arma- 
ments. And  if  they  don't  get  them  from  us, 
they  get  them  from  other  countries.  And  it 
isn't  in  our  interest. 

Our  purpose  in  selling  arms,  when  we 
do,  is  not  to  prevent  a  rise  in  prices  but  in 
order  to  prevent  other  countries  from  gain- 
ing the  position  of  influence  that  often 
comes  with  the  sale  of  arms. 

Scope  for  Greater  Autonomy  in  Eastern  Europe 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  I'd  like  to  ask  if  you  be- 
lieve that  the  Russians  control  the  Easterii 
European  nations.  And  do  you  think  their 
dealings  with  the  West  continue,  or  are  those 
countries  becoming  more  independent  i)i 
their  dealings  tvith  us  now? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Of  the  East  European 
nations? 

Q.  Yes.  The  bloc  of  the  East  European  \ 
nation.s. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  believe  that  many 
countries  in  Eastern  Europe  are  making  an 
attempt  to  achieve  a  greater  degree  of 
autonomy  in  their  dealings  with  the  West. 
At  the  same  time,  the  scope  of  their  inde- 
pendence is  severely  limited  by  the  kind  of 
economic  ties  that  the  Soviet  Union  has  in- 
sisted upon  and  by  the  presence  of  Soviet 
troops  in  almost  all  of  these  countries  and, 
finally,  by  the  memory  of  what  has  hap- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


pened  in  those  countries  that  tried  to  make 

decisive  break. 

So  I  would  say  that  there  is  a  greater 
scope  for  greater  autonomy  in  Eastern  Eu- 
rope— a  scope  that  we  encourage.  We  do 
lot  accept  the  proposition  that  the  Soviet 
Union  has  a  right  to  dominance  in  Eastern 
Europe.  But  we  also  do  not  make  promises 
we  cannot  fulfill. 

But  there  is  a  greater  autonomy — but 
there  is  not  the  degree  of  freedom  that  we 
would  prefer. 

Encouragement  of  Moderation  in  Africa 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you  recently  tvent  to 
Africa,  and  at  the  time  the  United  States 
does  not  seem  to  want  the  physical  involve- 
ment in  Africa.  Don't  you  think  that  this 
trip  upsets  the  delicate  balance  of  power  cur- 
rently existing  in  Africa  and  that  the  loords 
in  favor  of  the  most  radical  black  liberation 
movements  will  cause  considerable  trouble  to 
the  more  moderate  governments,  black  or 
white  ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  the  purpose  of 
going  to  Africa  was  to  encourage  and  to 
strengthen  the  moderate  governments  in 
Africa.  And  the  trip  was  especially  wel- 
comed by  the  moderate  governments  in 
Africa  and  was  constantly  attacked  by  the 
radical  governments  in  Africa. 

The  purpose  of  the  trip  was  to  prevent 
the  further  radicalization  of  a  situation 
that  was  already  getting  increasingly  vio- 
lent and  increasingly  threatened  to  get  out 
of  control.  And  therefore  I  would  say,  far 
from  upsetting  a  balance,  we're  trying  to 
bring  about  a  balance.  Far  from  encourag- 
ing the  radical  governments,  we're  trying 
to  create  situations  in  which  the  moderate 
governments  would  be  able  to  have  a  pro- 
gram to  which  they  can  relate  themselves. 
And  far  from  trying  to  encourage  one  com- 
munity against  the  other,  we're  trying  to 
bring  about  conditions  in  which  all  commu- 
nities can  live  under  conditions  of  justice 
and  progress. 


August  16,   1976 


Federal  German  Chancellor  Schmidt 
Visits  the  United  States 

Helmut  Schmidt,  Chancellor  of  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany,  made  an  official  visit 
to  the  United  States  Jidy  H-17.  He  met  with 
President  Ford  and  other  government  offi- 
cials at  Washington  July  15-16.  Following  is 
an  exchange  of  greetings  by  President  Ford 
and  Chancellor  Schmidt  at  a  welcoming  cere- 
mony on  the  South  Laivn  of  the  White  House 
on  July  15,  together  ivith  the  text  of  a  joint 
statement  on  mutual  defense  issues  issued  on 
July  17.' 


EXCHANGE  OF  GREETINGS,  JULY   15 


Weekly   Comijilation 

President  Ford 


iidenlial    Documents    dated    Jidy    111 


Mr.  Chancellor,  Mrs.  Schmidt,  ladies  and 
gentlemen:  I  am  delighted  to  welcome 
back  to  Washington  a  very  steadfast  ally, 
distinguished  statesman,  and  an  esteemed 
personal  friend.  Mr.  Chancellor,  the  Fed- 
eral Republic  of  Germany  honors  us 
through  your  presence  in  Washington  as 
we  celebrate  our  200th  anniversary  of  our 
independence. 

Throughout  the  United  States,  the  Bicen- 
tennial celebrations  of  1976  have  rekindled 
our  traditional  optimism,  strengthened  our 
national  unity  and  our  pride  as  a  people, 
and  generated  a  new  spirit  of  confidence 
and  inspiration  as  we  look  to  the  chal- 
lenges of  America's  third  century. 

Mr.  Chancellor,  as  the  American  adven- 
ture continues  to  unfold  for  us,  we  are  ever 
more  mindful  that  we  live  in  an  interde- 
pendent world.  Accordingly,  we  attach  the 


'  For  an  exchange  of  toasts  by  President  Ford  and 
Chancellor  Schmidt  at  a  dinner  at  the  White  House 
on  July  15.  see  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  dated  July  19,  1976,  p.  1165;  for  their 
remarks  at  a  reception  on  board  the  German  train- 
ing ship  Gorch  Fock  at  Baltimore,  Md..  on  July  16, 
see  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents 
dated  July  26,  1976.  p.  1172. 


245 


greatest  importance  to  our  international  re- 
sponsibilities. The  United  States  takes  im- 
mense satisfaction  in  having  in  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany  a  true  friend  and  ally 
who  shares  our  deep  commitment  to  lib- 
erty, democracy,  and  human  freedom. 

Just  30  years  ago,  the  world  had  wit- 
nessed the  development  in  Germany  of  a 
democratic  state  which  stands  as  a  model 
of  stability,  social  justice,  and  economic 
well-being.  Americans  admire  the  achieve- 
ments of  the  Federal  Republic  and  the  vital 
role  that  you  play  within  the  Atlantic 
alliance. 

The  close  ties  between  our  countries 
have  this  year  been  dramatically  reaf- 
firmed. On  behalf  of  the  American  people, 
let  me  express  to  you,  Mr.  Chancellor,  our 
heartfelt  appreciation  for  the  Federal  Re- 
public's generous  participation  in  our  Bi- 
centennial anniversary. 

We  are  especially  honored  that  over 
4,000  events  devoted  to  America's  Bicen- 
tennial are  being  held  in  the  Federal  Re- 
public this  year.  The  Federal  Republic  has 
given  exceptional  Bicentennial  gifts  to  sev- 
eral American  institutions.  Among  them  is 
your  establishment  of  the  Albert  Einstein 
Spacearium  of  the  Smithsonian's  Air  and 
Space  Museum,  which  you  will  inaugurate 
this  afternoon. 

This  new  institution,  dedicated  to  a  great 
scientist,  scholar,  and  humanist  whose 
vision  transcended  national  boundaries,  is 
indeed  a  fitting  symbol  of  humanity's 
progress. 

Mr.  Chancellor,  your  arrival  today 
marks  our  eighth  meeting  over  the  past  two 
years,  underscoring  the  continuity  of  our 
consultations  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic. 
Since  your  first  visit  as  Chancellor  in  1974, 
the  countries  of  the  West  have  been  work- 
ing more  closely  than  ever  between  our- 
selves. 

At  the  NATO  summit  in  Brussels,  at  the 
Helsinki  summit  last  August,  and  in  our 
conferences  at  Rambouillet  and  Puerto 
Rico,  we  have  demonstrated  new  unity 
among  the  industrialized  democracies,  a 
new   determination   to   achieve  the   objec- 

246 


tives  of  peace  and  prosperity  for  all  ou: 
peoples,  and  a  new  confidence  that  we  wil 
achieve  these  objectives.  The  progress  ove: 
the  past  two  years  clearly  indicates  thai 
we  will  succeed. 

Mr.  Chancellor,  I  look  forward  with 
great  anticipation  to  our  discussions.  I  bid 
a  very  hearty  welcome  to  you,  Mr.  Chan- 
cellor, as  well  as  to  Mrs.  Schmidt  and  to  all 
the  members  of  the  German  party. 


Chancellor  Schmidt 

Mr.  President,  Mrs.  Ford,  ladies  and  gen^ 
tlemen:  I  thank  you,  Mr.  President,  for 
your  kind  words  of  welcome,  which  indeed 
have  moved  me  deeply.  I  do  attach  special 
importance  to  this  visit  to  the  United  States 
of  America  which,  as  you  have  reminded 
me,  is  my  third  as  head  of  the  Government 
of  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany. 

The  Bicentennial  anniversary  of  your 
great  country,  Mr.  President,  for  us  is  a 
date  of  eminent  significance.  It  is  a  date  of 
eminent  significance  to  all  free  and  demo 
cratic  countries  in  the  world. 

For  the  citizens  of  the  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany,  it  is  a  welcome  occasion  to 
reflect  on  the  fundamental  democratic 
values  for  which  both  our  countries  stand 
as  well  as  the  close  bonds  of  friendship 
that  have  developed  harmoniously  in  the 
27  years  since  the  birth  of  the  Federal  Re 
public  of  Germany. 

The  German  people  do  not  forget  the 
spiritual  and  material  contribution  of  the^ 
United  States  to  the  development  of  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany  and  hence  to 
what  it  does  represent  today.  But  our  reC' 
ollection  also  embraces  the  participation  of 
millions  of  immigrants  of  German  stock  in 
the  fortunes  of  the  United  States  in  the 
course  of  its  200-year  history,  a  fact  which 
we  Germans  are  commemorating  this  year 
with  a  large  variety,  as  you  have  men 
tioned,  sir,  of  functions  and  festivities. 

During  our  stay  here  we  shall,  of  course, 
not  be  concerned  with  festivities  only.  Our 
talks    will    be   governed   by   a   number   of 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


inoblems  facing  both  our  countries,  other 
countries  as  well,  problems  which  can  only 
be  solved  by  joint  effort. 

The  community  of  nations  is  still  con- 
fronted with  unsolved  political  problems 
which  cause  us  concern — complex  prob- 
lems affecting  the  world  economy,  prob- 
lems affecting  the  future  of  all  of  us — 
which  demand  our  full  attention,  our  en- 
tire energies,  and  the  firm  will  of  all  con- 
cerned to  cooperate  with  each  other. 

Your  initiative,  Mr.  President,  for  talks 
in  Puerto  Rico  was  a  valuable  step  in  this 
direction,  with  valuable  results.  In  your 
address  you  have  rightly  pointed  out  the 
importance  of  the  Atlantic  alliance,  which 
has  increased  still  more  in  the  light  of  these 
problems.  Along  with  European  unification, 
the  alliance  is  the  bedrock  of  our  foreign 
policy.  We  are  resolved  to  continue  making 
our  contribution  as  before  and  not  to  lose 
sight  of  the  common  aims. 

I  can  say  without  exaggeration,  sir,  that 
our  bilateral  relations  could  not  be  better. 
Our  proven  partnership  is  based  on  firm 
friendship.  My  country  has  deep  confidence 

-and  this  also  goes  for  my  people — deep 
confidence  in  the  United  States  of  America. 

Mr.  President,  my  fellow  countrymen 
back  home  in  Germany  and  also  this  dis- 
tinguished delegation  of  ours  and  myself, 
we  wish  your  great  nation  happiness  and 
success  on  its  way  into  its  third  century. 

Thank  you. 


to  this  effort  amounts  to  DM  171.2  million  ($68.48 
million). 

The  Chancellor  and  the  President  have  also  been 
discussing,  over  a  period  of  time,  the  general  ques- 
tion of  offset  arrangements  which  serve  our  own  and 
the  Alliance's  security  needs.  As  is  well  known,  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany  through  the  years  has 
purchased  substantial  amounts  of  military  equip- 
ment in  the  United  States,  and  is  expected  to  con- 
tinue to  do  so.  This  procurement  has,  of  course,  bene- 
fitted the  United  States  in  the  economic  sense. 

It  should  also  be  reiterated  that  since  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany  became  a  partner  in  the  NATO 
effort,  it  maintained  its  defense  forces  in  a  state  of 
combat  readiness  equal  to  the  tasks  before  it.  At  a 
time  of  extreme  budgetary  and  political  difficulties 
in  the  Alliance,  it  is  reassuring  to  the  US  that  the 
Chancellor  intends  to  continue  this  highly  positive 
and  welcome  attitude  toward  the  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany's  NATO  commitment. 

Given  the  recently  introduced  changes  in  the  inter- 
national monetary  area,  specifically  flexible  exchange 
rates,  as  well  as  the  notably  improved  strength  of 
the  dollar  and  a  more  acceptable  US  balance  of  pay- 
ments position,  the  President  and  the  Chancellor 
consider  that  the  traditional  offset  arrangements 
approach  has  lost  its  relevance. 


President  Ford  Addresses  Convention 
of  League  of  Families  of  MIA's 

Following  are  remarks  made  by  President 
Ford  at  Washington  on  July  2U  before  the 
annual  convention  of  the  National  League  of 
Families  of  American  Prisoners  and  Missing 
in  Southeast  Asia. 


JOINT  STATEMENT,  JULY  17  2 

Joint  Statement  on  Mutual  Defense  Issues  by 
President  Gerald  R.  Ford  and  Chancellor 
Helmut  Schmidt,  July  17 

The  Chancellor  and  the  President  have  agreed  on 
measure  exemplifying  the  close  German-American 
security  relationship  in  Europe,  one  which  strength- 
ens considerably  the  force  posture  of  NATO  de- 
fenses. The  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  has  agreed 
to  share  as  a  single  payment  in  the  costs  of  relocat- 
ing a  US  combat  brigade  into  the  northern  area  of 
the  Federal  Republic,  near  Bremen.  The  contribution 


Released  at  the  Department  of  State. 


Wtekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents  dated  August  2 

It  is  a  very  high  honor  and  a  very  great 
privilege  to  meet  once  again  with  this 
courageous  assembly  of  Americans  whose 
loved  ones  remain  unaccounted  for  in  South- 
east Asia.  You  have  borne  a  very  heavy 
burden  with  incredible  couiage.  Every  citi- 
zen in  this  country  admires  your  bravery, 
your  dignity,  and  your  persistence. 

Through  long,  long  months  and  years  of 
trial,  you  have  been  sustained  by  the  love 
of  your  missing  men  and  by  your  love  of 
the  country  those  men  defended.  I  am  proud 
of  you,  and  I  am  proud  of  your  men. 

But   my   admiration   is   not   enough.   The 


August  16,  1976 


247 


gratitude  of  this  nation  is  not  enough.  You 
and  your  loved  ones  must  be  assured  of  a 
continuing  commitment  from  your  govern- 
ment to  obtain  a  full  accounting  of  those 
missing  in  action  (MIA)  or  still  listed  as 
prisoners  of  war. 

Let  me  reemphaslze  this,  from  me  as  well 
as  from  your  government:  This  is  a  firm, 
unequivocal  commitment;  it  is  a  longstand- 
ing commitment;  it  is  still  an  active  com- 
mitment; and  for  me,  as  I  said  a  moment 
ago,  It  is  a  very  personal  commitment,  and 
that  is  why  I  am  here  tonight. 

When  I  came  home  from  the  Pacific 
roughly  30  years  ago  I  joined — as  many  of 
us  did — several  veteran  organizations.  And 
then  a  short  time  later,  I  had  the  good  for- 
tune to  become  a  Member  of  the  House  of 
Representatives.  During  my  service  as  a 
Member  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  I 
can  recall  vividly  working  on  MIA  problems 
on  an  individual,  a  case-by-case  basis  during 
both  the  Korean  and  the  Vietnam  conflicts. 

As  a  Congressman,  as  many  of  you  know, 
I  met  with  members  of  the  National  League 
of  Families  here  in  Washington  and  back 
home  in  my  community  of  Grand  Rapids, 
Michigan.  I  did  not  forget  you  then,  and  I 
have  not  forgotten  you  now.  One  of  my  very 
last  meetings  as  Vice  President  was  a  meet- 
ing with  your  board  of  directors.  A  year 
ago,  as  President,  I  attended  this  convention 
and  shortly  thereafter  met  with  your  board 
of  directors  in  the  Cabinet  Room  in  the  West 
Wing  of  the  White  House. 

Let  me  assure  you  we  are  employing  every 
effective  means  to  account  for  your  loved 
ones.  Let  me  assure  you  without  any  hesita- 
tion or  reservation  that  I  will  continue  that 
effort. 

We  must  be  honest  with  ourselves.  This 
is  a  frustrating,  painstaking,  difficult  proc- 
ess. It  Is  a  tragic  fact — and  It  makes  me,  as 
well  as  you  and  millions  and  millions  like 
you,  very,  very  sad — that  every  missing 
man,   or  information   concerning  that   indi- 


vidual, may  never  be  available  regardless  of 
any  superhuman  effort  by  the  most  and  the 
best  in  our  government. 

Furthermore,  as  all  of  you  know,  we  are 
dealing  with  a  government  that  has  demon- 
strated very  little  concern  for  your  feelings. 
The  Vietnamese  claim  to  have  established 
agencies  to  search  for  the  missing,  but  thus 
far  they  have  withheld  this  information, 
totally  without  justification. 

We  have  offered  to  carry  out  the  searches 
ourselves  or  to  enlist  a  neutral  government 
or  the  Red  Cross  in  this  humanitarian 
search.  Thus  far,  none  of  these  offers  have 
been  accepted.  But  we  will  persist.  We  will 
keep  trying  as  long  as  we  have  any  hope 
whatsoever,  and  I  promise  you  that. 

We  are  willing  to  talk  with  the  Vietnam- 
ese. At  my  direction,  we  have  exchanged 
messages  with  them  indicating  our  willing- 
ness to  discuss  outstanding  issues  in  our 
two  countries.  We  have  made  clear  that  our 
primary  concern  is  to  obtain  an  accounting 
for  our  servicemen  who  are  missing  in  ac- 
tion. Without  a  satisfactory  solution  of  the 
MIA  issue,  no  further  progress  in  our  rela- 
tions is  possible. 

I  know  that  many  of  you  are  deeply  con- 
cerned about  declassification  of  information 
relating  to  MIA's.  Several  months  ago  I  dis- 
cussed in  depth  this  problem  with  the  mem- 
bers of  my  staff  and  directed  that  progress 
be  made  in  that  regard,  and  I  have  been 
informed  that  progress  has  been  made.  But 
let  me  reemphaslze  there  will  be  continuing 
progress  in  this  regard. 

Everyone  in  this  room  has  demonstrated 
a  strength,  has  demonstrated  a  resolve, 
which  makes  you  equal  to  the  burdens  that 
you  are  carrying.  Your  courage  has  been 
an  inspiration  to  me  and  to  millions  of  your 
fellow  citizens.  Your  loved  ones  have  not 
been  forgotten.  You  have  not  been  aban- 
doned. I  promise  you  I  will  not  rest  until  the 
fullest  possible  accounting  of  your  loved  ones 
has  been  made. 


248 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


THE  CONGRESS 


Department  Discusses  Continuing  Efforts  To  Account 
for  Americans  Missing  in  Indochina 


Statement  by  Philip  C.  Habib 

Under  Secretary  for  Political  Affairs  ' 


I  am  glad  to  appear  on  behalf  of  the 
State  Department  to  describe  for  the  com- 
mittee our  continuing  efforts  to  account  for 
Americans  lost  in  connection  with  the  In- 
dochina conflict. 

As  the  committee  knows  from  its  per- 
sonal contacts  with  Secretary  Kissinger, 
the  Secretary  and  all  of  us  with  responsi- 
bilities in  this  area  share  the  concern  that 
is  so  widely  felt  about  the  lack  of  account- 
ing for  our  men.  We  have  always  ap- 
proached this  as  an  important  humani- 
tarian problem,  and  we  will  continue  to  do 
so.  We  value  greatly  the  consideration  and 
cooperation  we  have  received  from  the 
committee,  and  we  admire  the  committee's 
own  vigorous  efforts  on  behalf  of  our  miss- 
ing and  dead  in  Indochina. 

Already  before  the  Paris  negotiations 
began,  we  were  conscious  of  the  need  to 
account  for  our  men,  because  of  the  Com- 
munist side's  refusal  throughout  the  con- 
flict to  provide  complete  information  on  our 
prisoners  of  war  as  required  by  the  1949 
Geneva  Conventions.  As  a  result,  we  knew 
we  would  have  to  do  all  we  could  by  all 
available  means  to  obtain  information 
about  our  missing  personnel. 


'  Made  before  the  House  Select  Committee  on 
Missing  Persons  in  Soutlieast  Asia  on  July  21.  The 
complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be  published 
by  the  committee  and  will  be  available  from  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


I  was  a  member  of  our  negotiating  team 
in  Paris  and  thus  can  testify  from  personal 
experience  on  the  importance  that  the  re- 
lease of  prisoners  and  accounting  for  the 
missing  had  in  these  deliberations.  For  ex- 
ample, in  one  of  the  first  lists  of  negotiat- 
ing points  put  forward  by  the  North  Viet- 
namese, the  Communist  side  bracketed  the 
release  of  prisoners  with  what  they  de- 
scribed as  "U.S.  responsibility  for  war  dam- 
age in  Viet-Nam"  in  a  single  numbered 
point.  Although  humanitarian  issues  such 
as  prisoners  of  war  and  missing  in  action 
(POW-MIA's)  have  been  subjects  of  dis- 
agreement in  the  settlement  of  other  past 
conflicts,  I  know  of  no  instance  in  which 
an  adversary  so  openly  treated  this  human- 
itarian problem  in  this  way.  We  thus  rec- 
ognized from  an  early  date  what  we  were 
up  against  and  countered  by  making  re- 
lease of  prisoners  and  accounting  for  the 
missing  a  basic  element  of  our  own  negoti- 
ating strategy. 

I  might  note  that  international  law,  as 
framed  in  the  Geneva  Conventions,  does 
not  permit  the  linking  of  humanitarian  ob- 
ligations to  other  issues  in  the  way  done  by 
the  North  Vietnamese.  North  Viet-Nam  is 
signatory  to  these  conventions.  The  conven- 
tions are  not  predicated  on  bargaining  or 
reciprocity,  but  are  intended  to  provide 
basic  standards  that  all  countries  should 
adhere  to,  regardless  of  their  war  aims  and 
political  and   economic  objectives.  If  this 


August  16,  1976 


249 


were  not  the  case,  the  humanitarian  stand- 
ards in  the  conventions  would  themselves 
become  subjects  of  dispute ;  and  if  that 
happened,  the  framework  of  international 
law  in  armed  conflicts  would  rapidly  be 
shattered. 

The  Paris  negotiations  culminated  in 
January  1973  in  an  agreement  which  in- 
cluded specific  requirements  for  the  release 
of  prisoners  of  war  on  both  sides  and  co- 
operation in  the  search  for  the  missing  and 
the  return  of  the  remains  of  the  dead.  The 
release  of  prisoners  was  to  be  accomplished 
in  a  60-day  period  under  the  supervision 
of  a  Four  Party  Joint  Military  Commis- 
sion, to  be  succeeded  by  a  Four  Party  Joint 
Military  Team  (FPJMT)  whose  sole  mis- 
sion was  the  search  for  the  missing  and  the 
return  of  the  remains  of  the  dead.  This 
MIA-accounting  requirement  is  the  most 
explicit  ever  concluded,  and  I  know  of  no 
previous  case  in  which  a  special  body  was 
established  by  such  an  agreement  specifi- 
cally for  this  purpose. 

This  committee  has  already  heard  testi- 
mony about  our  efforts  to  make  the  FPJMT 
live  up  to  its  stated  objectives  and  get  on 
with  the  job  of  accounting  for  the  missing. 
After  prolonged  negotiations,  North  Viet- 
Nam  agreed  in  Mai'ch  1974  to  the  repatri- 
ation of  the  remains  of  23  Americans  iden- 
tified as  having  died  in  captivity  in  North 
Viet-Nam.  Unfortunately,  the  sense  of  ac- 
complishment produced  by  this  was  short 
lived,  and  the  return  of  the  23  proved  to 
be  the  only  instance  in  which  the  FPJMT 
accomplished  any  of  its  stated  mission. 

I  might  note  that  in  the  early  days  of  the 
FPJMT,  the  Communist  side  submitted  lists 
of  their  own  personnel  missing  or  captured 
in  South  Viet-Nam.  The  Republic  of  Viet- 
Nam  authorities  responded  promptly  to 
these  requests  for  information,  in  precisely 
the  spirit  called  for  in  the  Paris  agreement. 
The  Communist  side  soon  stopped  submit- 
ting such  lists,  apparently  realizing  the 
awkward  contrast  which  would  highlight 
their  own  nonfulfillment  of  this  require- 
ment. 


250 


Approaches  to  Hanoi  Authorities 

Supplementing  the  FPJMT,  we  contin- 
ued our  efforts  through  diplomatic  chan- 
nels to  press  the  Hanoi  authorities  on  this 
subject.  In  a  sense,  the  Paris  negotiations 
continued  through  1973  and  into  1974 — 
and  a  major  part  of  our  exchanges  con- 
cerned MIA  accounting.  When  Dr.  Kissin- 
ger flew  to  Hanoi  in  February  1973,  on  the 
eve  of  the  first  prisoner  release,  he  took 
with  him  records  on  a  number  of  our  men 
on  whom  information  was  likely  to  be 
available  in  North  Viet-Nam.  We  raised 
the  MIA-accounting  subject  in  each  subse- 
quent contact  with  the  Hanoi  authorities 
and  pressed  it  in  a  number  of  formal  diplo- 
matic notes,  one  of  which,  dated  July  29, 
1973,  was  devoted  solely  to  the  MIA  and 
return-of-remains  question. 

Our  diplomatic  efforts  to  obtain  an  ac- 
counting for  MIA's  did  not  end  with  the 
fall  of  Saigon.  In  July  1975  we  approached 
the  Vietnamese  Embassy  in  Paris  to  re- 
quest the  return  of  the  remains  of  three 
U.S.  pilots  whose  names  had  been  earlier 
broadcast.  On  August  9  the  Vietnamese 
agreed  to  return  the  bodies.  We  expressed 
our  appreciation  and  asked  about  specific 
arrangements.  On  August  13  the  North 
Vietnamese  withdrew  the  offer.  We  met 
with  them  again  in  September,  but  they 
refused  to  renew  the  offer.  Subsequently, 
your  committee  visited  Hanoi  and  the  Viet- 
namese returned  these  remains  to  you. 

The  activities  of  your  committee  such  as 
your  visits  to  Paris  and  Hanoi  last  Decem- 
ber helped  to  stress  further  to  the  Viet- 
namese the  concern  for  an  early  resolution 
of  this  problem.  Following  your  report  to 
the  President  and  your  consultations  with 
Secretary  Kissinger,  the  Administration 
sent  a  message  to  the  Vietnamese  on 
March  26,  1976,  stating  that  we  were  pre- 
pared to  discuss  with  them  issues  outstand- 
ing between  our  two  countries.  In  ongoing 
contacts  we  have  had  with  the  Vietnamese,' 
and  in  our  public  statements,  we  have 
made  clear  that  our  primary  concern  in  any 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


liscLissions  will  be  obtaining  an  accounting 
or  our  missing  men  and  the  return  of  the 
emains  of  our  servicemen  killed  in  the  war 
n  Indochina. 

Our  initiation  of  this  exchange  demon- 
;trates  our  policy  of  looking  to  the  future 
ather  than  the  past  in  our  relations  with 
/it  -Nam.  We  have  no  desire  to  refight  the 
/iet-Nam  war  on  the  diplomatic  front.  We 
ire  prepared  to  talk  to  the  Vietnamese; 
)ut  as  Secretary  Kissinger  has  stated,  with- 
)ut  resolution  of  the  MIA  issue  further  im- 
)rovement  in  U.S.-Vietnamese  relations  is 
lot  possible. 


he  Missing  and  Dead  in  Laos  and  Cambodia 

We  have  also  pressed  this  issue  with  the 
ther  countries  of  Indochina  where  Ameri- 
an  servicemen  were  killed  or  reported 
nissing. 

In  Laos,  the  Lao  coalition  government 
ormed  in  April  1974  undertook  the  obli- 
ation  to  account  for  the  missing  as  pro- 
ided  in  article  5  of  the  Vientiane  agree- 
nent.  The  Lao  Government  established  a 
ubcommittee  to  implement  this  obligation. 
)ur  Embassy  in  Vientiane  held  repeated 
fieetings  with  both  Vientiane-side  and 
*athet  Lao  members  of  this  subcommittee. 
Ve  provided  lists  of  our  missing  men  to 
acilitate  searches. 

One  American,  a  civilian  pilot,  was  re- 
eased  on  September  18,  1974,  giving  rise 
0  hope  that  progress  might  be  made  on 
esolution  of  the  approximately  320  MIA 
ases  in  Laos. 

However,  as  the  Communist  side  in  the 
overnment  gained  strength  in  late  1974 
,nd  early  1975  and  the  coalition  began  to 
issolve,  momentum  on  the  POW-MIA 
5sue  slackened.  The  Pathet  Lao  refused  to 
ermit  American  teams  or  teams  from  neu- 
ral countries  or  international  organiza- 
ions  to  visit  crash  and  burial  sites,  some  of 
^hich  were  readily  accessible  and  which 
re  knew  contained  recent  and  relatively 
itact  wreckage. 


lUgust  16,  1976 


We  continued  our  efforts  on  the  POW- 
MIA  front  after  the  coalition  government 
was  replaced  by  an  openly  Communist  one 
in  December  1975.  The  visit  in  late  Decem- 
ber by  the  select  committee  to  Vientiane 
served  as  a  stimulus  to  these  efforts.  Our 
Embassy,  following  up  on  the  visit,  has 
made  several  contacts  with  the  Lao  Gov- 
ernment to  convince  them  of  our  strong 
concern  and  to  press  for  progress  on  an  ac- 
counting. In  formal  approaches  and  infor- 
mal contacts,  members  of  our  Embassy 
have  sought  ways  to  keep  the  issue  before 
the  Lao. 

After  all  our  approaches,  as  the  commit- 
tee itself  knows,  the  Lao,  while  expressing 
interest  in  eventual  resolution  of  this  prob- 
lem, have  not  undertaken  any  specific  ef- 
forts to  produce  an  accounting.  They  have 
claimed  that  they  will  search  for  all  those 
missing  in  Laos,  Lao  as  well  as  foreign,  but 
they  have  made  clear  that  other  matters 
have  a  higher  priority  for  them. 

The  Lao  have  available  ample  material, 
which  we  have  provided,  to  investigate  and 
produce  an  accounting  on  many  of  the 
crash  and  burial  sites  in  their  country.  Ex- 
cept for  the  release  of  Emmett  Kay  in 
September  1974,  there  has  been,  unfortu- 
nately, no  progress  in  the  POW-MIA 
field. 

With  regard  to  Americans  unaccounted 
for  in  Cambodia,  we  attempted,  prior  to 
the  end  of  the  conflict,  to  inquire  about 
them  through  the  North  Vietnamese  and 
the  International  Committee  of  the  Red 
Cross.  We  have  also  supported  the  contin- 
uing effort  of  the  International  Professional 
Committee  for  the  Safety  of  Journalists  on 
Dangerous  Missions  to  seek  information 
about  missing  newsmen  in  Cambodia.  Our 
Mission  at  the  United  Nations  contacted 
the  Cambodian  Mission  late  last  year  and 
provided  them  with  a  list  of  Americans 
missing  in  Cambodia. 

The  Cambodians  have  consistently  an- 
swered that  there  are  no  Americans  and 
no  foreigners  in  Cambodia,  and  they  have 


251 


produced    no   information    on   any   of   our 
missing  or  dead. 

Other  Means  of  Seeking  Accounting 

In  addition  to  these  diplomatic  efforts, 
we  took  action  to  account  for  our  men  by 
our  own  means.  From  our  experience  with 
returning  prisoners  during  the  conflict,  we 
l<;new  this  was  an  especially  good  source  of 
information ;  and  elaborate  preparations 
had  been  made  to  debrief  all  returning 
POW's.  This  information  was  systemati- 
cally analyzed  and  correlated  and  remains 
to  this  day  the  most  significant  accounting 
we  have  had  for  our  men. 

Soon  after  the  Paris  agreement  was 
signed,  we  established  a  Joint  Casualty 
Resolution  Center  for  the  dual  purpose  of 
carrying  out  searches  for  the  missing  and 
compiling  information  from  all  sources  on 
each  of  our  men.  Computer  techniques  fa- 
cilitated the  task  of  the  resolution  of  each 
individual  case.  Although  we  made  good 
use  of  these  impersonal  means,  we  never 
lost  sight  of  the  fact  that  we  were  dealing 
with  the  names  and  fates  of  real  people 
whose  wives,  parents,  and  families  des- 
perately sought  information  about  them. 

I  can  assure  this  committee  that  the 
President,  the  Secretary  of  State,  and  the 
other  highest  officers  of  this  Administration 
continue  to  feel  keenly  the  obligation  to 
press  for  the  fullest  possible  accounting  for 
all  our  men.  Our  efforts  have  applied,  and 
will  continue  to  apply,  equally  to  those 
who  have  been  declared  dead  and  to  those 
who  are  listed  as  missing. 

In  this  regard  it  should  be  noted  that  in 
the  few  cases  in  which  information  has 
been  forthcoming,  as  often  as  not  it  has 
applied  to  men  previously  declared  dead. 
For  example,  two  of  the  three  whose  re- 
mains were  returned  to  this  committee  dur- 
ing its  visit  to  Hanoi  last  December  had 
previously  been  declared  dead — one  at  the 
time  his  plane  went  down  in  North  Viet- 
Nam  in  1965;  the  other  more  recently,  in 
1973;  with  the  third  man  listed  as  missing. 


252 


However,  the  return  of  those  remains 
helped  the  families  of  all  three  of  those 
men  to  accept  the  fate  of  their  loved 
ones. 

What  we  mean  by  an  "accounting"  has 
sometimes  been  of  concern.  Clearly,  we 
want  to  know  what  happened  to  these  men. 
We  understand  of  course  that  many  were 
lost  in  circumstances  which  make  it  un- 
likely that  any  direct  information  about 
them  will  be  recovered.  Some  were  lost 
over  water  or  in  heavily  forested  or  moun 
tainous  terrain  where  intensive  search  is 
virtually  impossible.  What  we  expect  fron 
the  Communist  authorities  is  that  they  wil 
provide  all  the  information  in  their  posses 
sion  on  our  POW's  and  MIA's  and  tha 
they  will  carry  out  serious  search  efforts  ti 
ascertain  the  fate  of  others. 

The  North  and  South  Vietnamese  au 
thorities  told  this  committee  and  othe 
visitors  that  they  have  established  agencie 
to  search  for  the  missing.  During  th 
FPJMT  talks  they  told  us  that  they  knoi 
where  some  of  our  men  may  be  buriec 
We  consider  it  unacceptable  that  the  Vie' 
namese  authorities  should  have  such  infoi 
mation  and  yet  should  withhold  it,  appai 
ently  in  the  belief  that  they  can  use  it  f( 
bargaining  purposes. 

Proposed  Protocol  to  Geneva  Conventions 

In  this  connection,  I  would  like  to  r 
port  to  this  committee  on  the  work  of  tl 
Diplomatic  Conference  on  Humanitarii 
Law  in  Armed  Conflict,  which  recent 
concluded  its  third  session  in  Geneva,  . 
which  you,  Mr.  Chairman  [Representati^ 
G.  V.  Montgomery],  served  as  a  valm 
congressional  adviser. 

The  U.S.  delegation  at  this  session  playt 
a  key  role  in  gaining  preliminary  approv 
for  a  proposed  new  section  on  the  missii 
and  dead  as  part  of  the  proposed  dra 
protocol  to  the  1949  Geneva  Conventio 
on  which  the  conference  is  working.  A 
though  the  Geneva  Conventions  have  pr 
vided  generally  for  procedures  on  accoui 


Department  of  State  Bullel 


ing  for  POW's  and  MIA's,  this  new  section 
for  the  first  time  would  establish  the  right 
of  families  to  know  the  fate  of  their  rela- 
tives as  a  new  principle  of  international 
law.  It  spells  out  in  specific  detail  the  obli- 
gations of  governments  and  parties  to  con- 
flicts with  regard  to  searching  for  the 
missing,  providing  information,  and  pro- 
tecting of  the  remains  of  the  dead. 

We  hope  and  expect  that  this  section  will 
receive  final  approval  of  the  diplomatic 
conference  during  its  final  session  in 
Geneva  starting  in  April  1977. 

The  initiative  for  this  section  flowed 
from  earlier  actions  at  international  meet- 
ings in  which  the  U.S.  Government  also 
played  a  leading  role.  During  the  Inter- 
national Conference  of  the  Red  Cross  in 
Tehran  in  November  1973,  for  example, 
our  delegation  helped  draft  and  win  ap- 
proval for  a  resolution  calling  for  account- 
ing for  the  missing  in  armed  conflicts.  This 
was  followed  in  November  1974  by  a  U.N. 
General  Assembly  resolution,  also  spon- 
sored by  the  United  States,  which  for  the 
first  time  referred  to  the  entitlement  of 
families  to  information  about  the  missing. 
The  U.N.  resolution  concluded  by  calling 
on  the  diplomatic  conference  to  act  on  this 
subject,  and  the  conference  has  responded 
with  the  new  MIA  section  of  which  I  have 
just  spoken. 

Although  the  new  Geneva  Protocol  does 
not  apply  to  armed  conflicts  of  the  past,  we 
believe  that  this  section,  in  addition  to 
breaking  new  ground  for  the  future,  helps 
underline  the  concern  felt  in  the  inter- 
national community  about  the  lack  of  ac- 
counting for  the  missing  in  past  armed- 
conflict   situations. 

Steps  Taken  by  United  Nations  and  Red  Cross 

In  addition  to  the  resolutions  to  which  I 
have  referred,  the  United  Nations  and  In- 
ternational Red  Cross  have  also  taken  prac- 
tical steps  to  help  solve  this  problem. 

This  committee  knows  from  personal  ex- 


August  16,  1976 


perience  the  assistance  that  has  been  pro- 
vided by  the  U.N.  High  Commissioner  for 
Refugees  and  his  staff,  both  as  a  channel 
for  communication  and  in  arranging  for  the 
return  of  Americans  from  Viet-Nam.  The 
UNHCR  played  a  key  role  in  the  release 
of  14  U.S.  and  foreign  prisoners  from 
Hanoi  in  October  1975,  shortly  after  this 
committee  came  into  being.  UNHCR  rep- 
resentatives also  assisted  members  of  the 
committee  in  the  repatriation  of  remains 
during  your  visit  to  Hanoi  last  Decem- 
ber. 

In  line  with  its  traditional  responsibilities 
for  POW's  and  MIA's,  the  International 
Committee  of  the  Red  Cross  has  made  con- 
tinuing efforts  to  help  account  for  the  miss- 
ing. The  ICRC's  Central  Tracing  Agency 
provides  a  repository  for  POW-MIA  infor- 
mation for  the  entire  world. 

The  ICRC  also  is  serving  as  a  tenuous 
lifeline  for  Americans  still  in  South  Viet- 
Nam.  Despite  assurances  given  to  this  com- 
mittee by  North  Vietnamese  officials  that 
all  Americans  would  be  free  to  leave,  a 
substantial  number  are  still  stranded  in 
Saigon.  There  were  recent  reports  that 
another  group  of  Americans  would  be  com- 
ing out,  but  this  has  not  yet  happened.  This 
is  a  matter  of  continuing  concern  to  the 
State  Department,  and  we  have  appre- 
ciated the  committee's  own  efforts  to  ex- 
pedite the  departure  of  Americans  from 
South   Viet-Nam. 

I  wish  to  close  this  statement  by  express- 
ing our  thanks  for  this  committee's  own 
contribution  toward  resolution  of  this  hu- 
manitarian problem.  Secretary  Kissinger 
and  all  of  us  in  the  State  Department  work- 
ing on  this  subject  appreciate  the  commit- 
tee's determined  efforts  to  make  progress 
toward  an  accounting. 

You  have  been  resourceful  and  tireless, 
and  your  efforts  have  helped  demonstrate 
to  the  Communist  authorities  the  impor- 
tance we  attach  to  this  subject.  I  can  as- 
sure you  our  own  efforts  will  continue  as 
long  as  necessary  to  obtain  the  fullest 
possible  accounting  for  our  men. 


253 


Actions  To  Prevent  Discrimination 
In  Overseas  Assignments  Discussed 

Statement  by  Carol  C.  Laise 

Director  General  of  the  Foreign  Service ' 

I  appreciate  this  opportunity  to  discuss 
with  you  the  President's  memorandum  of 
November  20,  1975,-  and  the  Department  of 
State's  implementation  of  the  directive 
barring  discriminatory  practices  in  overseas 
assignments. 

The  President's  memorandum  of  Novem- 
ber 20  is  a  firm  directive  and  statement  of 
principle  for  all  of  the  government  and  gives 
new  force  to  the  efforts  which  we  have  been 
making.  As  the  committee  is  aware,  the  de- 
partmental directives  barring  discrimination 
in  assignments  go  back  to  1972.  Our  record 
in  this  regard  was  provided  to  the  commit- 
tee in  the  Department's  letter  of  July  29, 
1975.  In  particular,  you  will  recall  that  over 
a  year  ago  we  instructed  all  Ambassadors  to 
report  any  case  of  a  foreign  government 
excluding  employees  of  any  agency  of  the 
U.S.  Government  or  its  contractors  on  a  dis- 
criminatory basis. 

Since  receiving  the  President's  memoran- 
dum, we  have  taken  the  following  additional 
actions : 

1.  The  text  of  the  memorandum  has  been 
given  to  our  employees  in  a  Department 
notice  of  December  2,  1975. 

2.  We  have  provided  the  President's  state- 
ment to  all  Ambassadors  as  guidance  in 
their  dealings  with  foreign  governments. 


'  Made  before  the  Subcommittee  on  Government 
Information  and  Individual  Rights  of  the  House 
Committee  on  Government  Operations  on  July  27. 
The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be  pub- 
lished by  the  committee  and  will  be  available  from 
the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office,   Washington,  D.C.   20402. 

-  For  text  of  a  memorandum  dated  Nov.  20,  1975, 
from  President  Ford  to  heads  of  departments  and 
agencies,  see  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  dated  Nov.  24,  1975,  p.  1306;  for  text 
of  a  statement  by  President  Ford  issued  Nov.  20, 
1975,  soe  Bulletin  of  Dec.  22,  1975,  p.  898. 


3.  The  Bureau  of  Security  and  Consular 
Affairs  has  assumed  responsibility  for  co- 
ordination of  requests  for  assistance  in 
cases  where  visas  are  refused. 

4.  The  heads  of  other  government  agencies 
have  been  asked  to  notify  the  Secretary  of 
cases  in  which  visas  are  denied. 

5.  Our  internal  regulations,  although  al- 
ready consistent  with  the  President's  memo- 
randum, have  been  reviewed  and  revised  to 
incorporate  the  language  of  his  statement. 

Since  your  hearings  in  April  of  last  year, 
only  one  case  of  discrimination  against  an 
employee  of  the  U.S.  Government  or  its  con- 
tractors by  a  foreign  government  has  so 
far  been  brought  to  the  Department's  atten- 
tion. Congressman  [Charles  C]  Diggs  and 
Mrs.  Diggs,  a  Foreign  Service  officer  travel- 
ing in  a  private  capacity,  were  refused  visas 
by  the  South  African  Government.  Official 
representations  and  protests  were  made  both 
to  the  Embassy  here  and  to  the  Government 
of  South  Africa,  but  we  were  unable  to  re- 
verse the  decision  of  the  government  in  the 
time  afforded  us.  However,  since  the  issu- 
ance of  the  President's  memorandum,  we 
have  not  had  any  cases  in  which  visas  were 
denied. 

While  the  specific  course  of  action  in  any 
future  case  can  only  be  determined  in  the 
context  in  which  the  case  arises  and  by  the 
avenues  open  to  us  at  the  time  to  get  effec- 
tive results,  we  believe  the  President's 
memorandum,  as  a  statement  of  national 
policy,  will  strengthen  our  position  in  deal- 
ing with  foreign  governments,  who  have 
now  been  put  on  notice  that  they  will  have 
to  weigh  the  effects  of  their  actions  on  our 
overall  relationship. 

We  are  mindful  of  the  committee's  con- 
cern that  by  some  silent  rule  or  established 
practice  the  language  and  purpose  of  the 
President's  directive  might  be  evaded,  the 
principles  for  which  our  country  stands 
could  be  eroded,  and  the  career  opportunities 
of  our  employees  limited,  by  our  own  actions 
in  deference  to  the  discriminatory  attitudes 


254 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


or  practices  of  other  governments.  The  law, 
the  poHcy  stated  by  the  President,  and  our 
regulations  prohibit  discrimination  in  assign- 
ments, and  I  assure  you  that  it  is  our  inten- 
tion to  see  that  the  attitudes  and  practices 
of  the  Department  accord  with  these  pre- 
cepts. 

The  control  of  the  Bureau  of  Personnel 
over  all  assignments  has  been  strengthened 
by  the  Secretary  of  State,  who  on  June  27, 
1975,  saidi^* 

...  I  have  instructed  the  Director  General  to 
establish  a  more  open,  centrally  directed  assignment 
process.  While  the  new  procedures  will  take  into 
account  the  legitimate  interests  of  the  individual,  the 
bureaus,  and  the  posts  abroad,  they  can  only  be  fair 
and  orderly  if  they  drastically  limit  the  right  of  an 
Assistant  Secretary  or  Ambassador  to  veto  assign- 
ments .... 

Under  this  directive,  the  right  of  Ambas- 
sadors and  heads  of  bureaus  to  disapprove 
assignments  has  been  limited  to  selecting 
their  principal  deputies  and  personal  staff 
from  a  slate  of  candidates. 

Further,  we  have  made  it  possible  for 
all  employees,  worldwide,  to  know  of  antici- 
pated vacancies  well  in  advance  and  to  ex- 
press their  interest  in  assignment  to  any 
position.  Employees'  expressed  interest  is 
being  considered  by  assignment  panels  in 
every  case,  and  the  decisions  published. 

It  is,  then,  the  active  policy  of  the  Depart- 
ment not  to  exclude  any  employee  from  con- 
sideration at  any  stage  of  the  assignment 
process  for  any  reason  other  than  the  rela- 
tive merits  of  his  or  her  professional  quali- 
fications for  the  position. 

These  measures  have  significantly  im- 
proved our  ability  to  comply  in  letter  and 
spirit  with  the  terms  of  the  law  and  the 
President's  directive,  and  we  intend  to  work 
with  our  missions  and  other  agencies  to  see 
that  the  intent  of  the  President's  memoran- 
dum is  fulfilled. 


'  For  remarks  by  Secretary  Kissinger  made  at  the 
swearing-in  ceremony  for  the  119th  Foreign  Service 
oflRcer  class  on  June  27,  1975,  see  Bulletin  of  July 
21,  1975,  p.  85. 


August  16,  1976 


Congressional  Documents 
Relating  to  Foreign  Policy 

94th  Congress,  2d  Session 

Export  Licensing  of  Advanced  Technology:  A  Re- 
view. Hearings  before  the  Subcommittee  on  Inter- 
national Trade  and  Commerce  of  the  House  Com- 
mittee on  International  Relations.  March  11-30, 
1976.  277  pp. 

First  Use  of  Nuclear  Weapons:  Preserving  Respon- 
sible Control.  Hearings  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  International  Security  and  Scientific  Affairs  of 
the  House  Committee  on  International  Relations. 
March  16-25,  1976.  246  pp. 

United  States  National  Security  Policy  vis-a-vis 
Eastern  Europe  (The  "Sonnenfeldt  Doctrine"). 
Hearing  before  the  Subcommittee  on  International 
Security  and  Scientific  Affairs  of  the  House  Com- 
mittee on  International  Relations.  April  12,  1976. 
67  pp. 

Twentieth  Annual  Report  on  the  Trade  Agreements 
Program.  Message  from  the  President  of  the 
United  States  transmitting  the  report.  H.  Doc.  94- 
469.  April  27,  1976.  64  pp. 

Nuclear  Proliferation:  Future  U.S.  Foreign  Policy 
Implications.  Report  of  the  House  Committee  on 
International  Relations  to  accompany  H.  Con.  Re.s. 
570.  H.  Rept.  94-1051,  April  28,  1976.  7  pp. 

International  Convention  on  the  Prevention  and  Pun- 
ishment of  the  Crime  of  Genocide.  Report  of  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  to  accom- 
pany Ex.  0,  81st  Cong.,  1st  sess.  S.  Ex.  Rept.  94-23. 
April  29,  1976.  41  pp. 

Duty-Free  Entry  of  Carillon  Bells  for  the  Use  of 
Smith  College,  Massachusetts.  Report  of  the  House 
Committee  on  Ways  and  Means  to  accompany 
H.R.  1386.  H.  Rept.  94-1058.  April  29,  1976.  2  pp. 

Exemption  From  Duty  of  Certain  Components  and 
Materials  Installed  in  Aircraft  Previously  Exported 
From  the  United  States.  Report  of  the  House  Com- 
mittee on  Ways  and  Means  to  accompany  H.R. 
2177.  H.  Rept.  94-1060.  April  29,  1976.  4  pp. 

Duty-Free  Treatment  of  Certain  Aircraft  Engines. 
Report  of  the  House  Committee  on  Ways  and 
Means  to  accompany  H.R.  2181.  H.  Rept.  94-1061. 
April  29,  1976.   4  pp. 

Continuation  of  Temporary  Suspension  of  Duty  on 
Certain  Horses.  Report  of  the  House  Committee 
on  Ways  and  Means  to  accompany  H.R.  9401. 
H.  Rept.  94-1063;  April  29,  1976;  3  pp.  Report  of 
the  Senate  Committee  on  Finance  to  accompany 
H.  Rept.  9401;  S.  Rept.  94-992;  June  25,  1976; 
3  pp. 

Asian  Development  Fund.  Report  of  the  Senate 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  to  accompany  S. 
3103;  S.  Rept.  94-773;  May  3,  1976;  17  pp.  Report 
of  the  House  Committee  on  Banking,  Currency  and 
Housing,  together  with  dissenting  views;  H.  Rept. 
94-1145;  May  14,  1976;  14  pp. 


255 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Coffee 

International   coffee  agreement   1976,   with   annexes. 
Done  at  London  December  3,  1975.' 
Sig7iatures:  Austria,  July  19,  1976;  Sierra  Leone, 

July  13,  1976;  Spain,  July  13,  1976. 
Ratification   deposited:   Papua  New   Guinea,   July 
19,  1976. 

Health 

Amendments  to  articles  34  and  55  of  the  Constitution 
of  the  World  Health  Organization  of  July  22,  1946, 
as  amended  (TIAS  1808,  4643,  8086).  Adopted  at 
Geneva  May  22,  1973.' 

Acceptances    deposited:    German    Democratic    Re- 
public. July  13,  1976;  Malta,  July   19,  1976. 

Maritime  Matters 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  March  6,  1948,  as 
amended,  on  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime  Con- 
sultative   Organization    (TIAS    4044,    6285,    6490). 
Adopted  at  London  October  17,  1974.' 
Acceptance  deposited:  Belgium,  June  22.  1976. 

Meteorology 

Convention   of   the   World    Meteorological    Organiza- 
tion.   Done   at   Washington   October  11,    1947.   En- 
tered into  force  March  23,  1950.  TIAS  2052. 
Accession  deposited:   Surinam.  July  26,  1976. 

Refugees 

Protocol  relating  to  the  status  of  refugees.  Done  at 
New  York  January  31,   1967.   Entered  into  force 
October  4,  1967;  for  the  United  States  November 
1,  1968.  TIAS  6577. 
Accession  deposited:  Portugal,  July  13,  1976. 

Safety  at  Sea 

International  convention  for  the  safety  of  life  at  sea, 
1974,  with  annex.   Done   at  London   November   1, 
1974.' 
Accession  deposited:  India,  June  16,  1976. 

Tin 

Fifth    international    tin    agreement,    with    annexes. 
Done  at  Geneva  June  21,  1975.  Entered  into  force 
provisionally  July   1,  1976. 
Ratification  deposited:  India,  July  9,   1976. 


256 


Tonnage  Measurement 

International  convention  on  tonnage  measurement  of 
ships,  1969,  with  annexes.  Done  at  London  June  23, 
1969.' 
Accession  deposited:  Colombia,  June  16,  1976. 

Wheat 

Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the  wheat 
trade  convention  (part  of  the  international  wheat 
agreement)  1971  (TIAS  7144).  Done  at  Washing- 
ton March  17,  1976.  Entered  into  force  June  19, 
1976,  with  respect  to  certain  provisions,  and  July  1, 
1976,  with  respect  to  other  provisions. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Algeria,  July  28,  1976; 
Barbados,  July  26,  1976;  Peru,  July  27,  1976. 


BILATERAL 

Bermuda 

Agreement  concerning  assistance  to  be  rendered  on  a 
reimbursable  basis  by  the  U.S.  Coast  Guard  in  the 
event  of  major  oil  spills.  Signed  at  Hamilton  July 
13,  1976.  Entered  into  force  July  13,  1976. 

Kenya 

Grant  agreement  relating  to  improvement  of  institu- 
tional capabilities  to  plan,  implement  and  evaluate 
agriculture  and  rural  development  policies  and 
programs,  with  annexes.  Signed  at  Nairobi  June  30, 
1976.  Entered  into  force  June  30.  1976. 

Mexico 

Agreement  amending  the  agreements  of  December  11, 
1974,  as  amended,  and  February  4,  1976,  relating 
to  the  provision  of  support  for  Mexican  efforts  to 
curb  illegal  narcotics  production  and  traffic.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  letters  at  Mexico  May  18, 
1976.  Entered  into  force  May  18,  1976. 

Agreement  relating  to  additional  cooperative  ar- 
rangements to  curb  illegal  traffic  in  narcotics. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at  Mexico  June  30, 
1976.  Entered  into  force  June  30,  1976. 

Poland 

Convention  for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxation  and 
the  prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with  respect  to 
taxes  on  income,  with  related  notes.  Signed  at 
Washington  October  8,  1974.  Entered  into  force 
July  23,  1976. 
Proclaimed  by  the  President:  July  23,  1976. 

Switzerland 

Treaty  on  mutual  assistance  in  criminal  matters  with 
related  notes.  Signed  at  Bern  May  25,  1973. 
Ratifications  exchanged :  July  27,  1976. 
Betters  into  force:  January  23,  1977. 


'  Not  in  force. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


INDEX     August  16,  1976     Vol.  LXXV,  No.  1938 


Africa.    Secretary    Kissinger    Interviewed    by 
Panel  at  Portland,  Oreg 


232 


Agriculture.  Questions  and  Answers  Following 
the  Secretary's  Address  at  Seattle  ....      226 

Argentina.  Letters  of  Credence   (Musich)   .    .      231 

Arms  Control  and  Disarmament.  Questions  and 
-.nswers  Following  the  Secretary's  Address 
at    Seattle 226 

Asia.  America  and  Asia  (Kissinger)   ....      217 

Cambodia.  Department  Discusses  Continuing 
Efforts  To  Account  for  Americans  Missing 
in   Indochina    (Habib) 249 

Canada.  Questions  and  Answers  Following  the 
Secretary's   Address   at   Seattle 226 

Cape  Verde.  Letters  of  Credence  (Varela)  .    .      231 

China 

America  and  Asia   (Kissinger) 217 

Questions  and  Answers  Following  the  Secre- 
tary's  Address   at   Seattle 226 

Secretary  Kissinger  Interviewed  by  Panel  at 
Portland,     Oreg 232 

Congress 

Actions  To  Prevent  Discrimination  in  Over- 
seas  Assignments   Discussed    (Laise)    .     .     .       254 

Congressional  Documents  Relating  to  Foreign 
Policy 255 

Department  Discusses  Continuing  Efforts  To 
Account  for  Americans  Missing  in  Indochina 
(Habib) 249 

Cyprus.  Secretary  Kissinger  Interviewed  by 
Panel  at  Portland,  Oreg 232 

Department  and  Foreign  Service.  Actions  To 
Prevent  Discrimination  in  Overseas  Assign- 
ments Discussed  (Laise) 254 

Energy.  Secretary  Kissinger  Interviewed  by 
Panel  at  Portland,  Oreg 232 

Germany.  Federal  German  Chancellor  Schmidt 
Visits  the  United  States  (Ford,  Schmidt, 
joint  statement  on  mutual  defense  issues)   .       245 

Iceland.  Letters  of  Credence  (Andersen)  .    .    .      231 

Japan.  America  and  Asia  (Kissinger)  ....      217 

Korea 

America   and   Asia    (Kissinger) 217 

Secretary  Kissinger  Interviewed  by  Panel  at 
Portland,     Oreg 232 

Laos.  Department  Discusses  Continuing  Efforts 
To  Account  for  Americans  Missing  in  Indo- 
china (Habib) 249 

Latin  America.  Secretary  Kissinger  Inter- 
viewed by  Panel  at  Portland.  Oreg  ....      232 

Lebanon.  Secretary  Kissinger  Interviewed  by 
Panel  at  Portland,  Oreg 232 

Liberia.  Letters  of  Credence  (Dennis)  ....       231 

Mexico.  Secretary  Kissinger  Interviewed  by 
Panel  at  Portland,  Oreg 232 

Middle  East 

Questions  and  Answers  Following  the  Secre- 
tary's Address  at  Seattle 226 

Secretary  Kissinger  Interviewed  by  Panel  at 
Portland,     Oreg 232 


Panama.  Secretary  Kissinger  Intei-viewed  by 
Panel  at  Portland,  Oreg 232 

Presidential  Documents 

Federal  German  Chancellor  Schmidt  Visits  the 
United  States 245 

President  Ford  Addresses  Convention  of 
League  of  Families  of  MIA's 247 

Terrorism.  Secretary  Kissinger  Interviewed  by 
Panel  at  Portland,  Oreg 232 

Treaty  Information.  Current  Actions  ....       256 
U.S.S.K.    Secretary   Kissinger   Interviewed   by 

Panel  at  Portland,  Oreg 232 

United  Nations 

Questions  and  Answers  Following  the  Secre- 
tary's Address  at  Seattle 226 

Secretary  Kissinger  Interviewed  by  Panel  at 
Portland,    Oreg 232 

Viet-Nam 

America  and  Asia    (Kissinger) 217 

Department  Discusses  Continuing  Efforts  To 
Account  for  Americans  Missing  in  Indo- 
china (Habib) 249 

President  Ford  Addresses  Convention  of 
League  of  Families  of  MIA's  (Ford)  ...      247 

Questions  and  Answers  Following  the  Secre- 
tary's Address  at  Seattle 226 

Name  Index 

Andersen,  Hans  G 231 

Dennis,  Francis  A.  W  .    .    .    .  •    •    ■      ^^^ 

F°rd.  President .'    .'  245,  247 

Habib.  Philip  C 249 

Kissinger,    Secretary 217,  226,  232 

Laise,   Carol    C 254 

Musich.  Arnaldo  T 231 

Schmidt,    Helmut .     .     .    .      245 

Varela,  Raul  Querido .    .      231 


Checklist  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  July  26-August  1 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 


No.      Date 


Subject 


t356  7/27  U.S.-Mexico  Mixed  Commission  on 
Scientific  and  Technical  Cooper- 
ation, July  19-20. 

*-357  7/28  Program  for  state  visit  of  Presi- 
dent Urho  Kekkonen  of  the 
Republic  of  Finland. 

*358  7/29  Philip  V.  Sanchez  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  Colombia  (bio- 
graphic data). 

*359  7/30  Shipping  Coordinating  Committee. 
Subcommittee  on  Tonnage  Meas- 
urement, Aug.  30. 


*  Not  printed. 

t  Held  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


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K 


7?3? 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 

BULLETIN 


Volume  LXXV 


No.  1939 


August  23,  1976 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  AFRICA:  STRENGTHENED  TIES 
FOR  AN  ERA  OF  CHALLENGE 
Address  by  Secretary  Kissinger    257 

HUMANITARIAN  PROBLEMS  IN  LEBANON  DISCUSSED  BY  DEPARTMENT 

Statement  by  Under  Secretary  Habib     266 

DEPARTMENT  URGES  SUPPORT  OF  COFFEE  AND  TIN  AGREEMENTS 
AND  PROTOCOLS  EXTENDING  WHEAT  AGREEMENT 

Statement  by  Assistant  Secretary  Greemvald    271 


THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 

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THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE  B  U  L  L  E  T  I  ^ 


Vol.  LXXV,  No.  1939 
August  23,  1976 

The  Department  of  State  BULLETIl 
a  weekly  publication  iasued  by  tt 
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rhe  United  States  and  Africa:  Strengthened  Ties 
r  an  Era  of  Challenge 


Address  by  Secretary  Kissinger '^ 


More  than  a  century  ago  Abraham 
lincoln  remarked  that  Americans  were 
he  "Almighty's  almost  chosen  people." 
A^hether  he  meant  that  the  Almighty  had 
iven  us  careful  consideration  and  decided 
;o  pass  us  by,  or  whether  he  was  simply 
eing  modest  on  our  behalf,  I  do  not  know. 

prefer  to  believe,  however,  that  he 
neant  that  America  had  been  provided 
nth  everything — material  and  spiritual — 
>eeded  to  lead  the  world  toward  a  better 
;ime  and  that  the  rest  was  up  to  us. 

In  the  111  years  that  have  passed  since 
,n  assassin's  bullet  ended  Lincoln's  life, 
Americans  have  done  much  to  make  this  a 
etter  world.  More  than  any  other  nation, 
America  has  stood  in  opposition  to  intol- 
Brance,  poverty,  and  war.  We  have  offered 

haven  to  the  homeless  and  food  to  the 
liungry ;  we  have  striven  to  bring  hope  to 
;h€  downtrodden  and  freedom  to  the  op- 
pressed. 

Being  human,  we  have  known  prejudice, 
injustice,  and  cruelty;  our  institutions  have 
lometimes  been  rigid  and  unresponsive. 
But  being  a  nation  of  principle,  our  values 
have  goaded  our  conscience  ;  we  have  regu- 
^  larly  produced  sweeping  movements  for 
change  which  have  given  new  impetus  to 
our  institutions  and  fresh  dedication  to  our 
people.  Americans  have  never  been  satis- 
fied with  what  we  were,  so  long  as  it  was 
less  than  what  we  knew  it  should  be. 

The     Urban    League     epitomizes    those 


'  Made  before  the  annual  conference  of  the  Na- 
tional Urban  League  at  Boston.  Mass.,  on  Aug.  2 
(text  from  press  release  360). 

August  23,   1976 


qualities.  This  organization  has  worked 
tirelessly  against  prejudice  and  for  equal- 
ity with  wisdom  and  uncompromising  prin- 
ciple. The  league  has  been  a  part  of  the 
conscience  of  our  time.  I  have  known  this 
personally  since  the  1950's  because  of  my 
friendship  with  Lester  Granger,  one  of  the 
founders  of  the  Urban  League.  He  was  a 
fine  man  and  a  distinguished  American 
who  felt  deeply  that  genuine  progress  for 
black  and  white  alike  could  only  come 
through  cooperation.  Because  of  that 
friendship  and  because  of  the  distinguished 
work  of  this  organization,  it  is  a  special 
honor  for  me  to  be  here  today. 

My  purpose  is  to  speak  to  you  about  the 
foreign  policy  of  the  United  States,  and  in 
particular  about  Africa.  No  part  of  the  world 
more  challenges  American  purposes  and 
values  than  that  vast  and  vital  continent. 

There  is,  fir.st,  a  profound  human  and 
moral  dimension  to  America's  ties  with 
Africa.  Three  months  ago  I  stood  in  the 
dank  cells  of  a  slave  prison  on  the  Isle  of 
Goree  in  Senegal,  from  which  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  Africans  were  forcibly  trans- 
ported to  the  New  World.  I  was  deeply 
moved  by  that  grim  and  awesome  scene. 
The  institution  of  slavery  still  remains — 
and  always  shall  remain — the  worst  blot 
on  the  history  of  our  nation.  It  has  affected 
the  lives  of  every  American  who  has  ever 
lived.  Its  bitter  residue  continues  to  this 
day.  Our  challenge  now  is  to  show  the 
world  that  the  two  races  who  began  their 
association  so  tragically  can  surmount  the 
legacy  of  the  pa.st  and  learn  to  live  together 

257 


in  freedom  and  harmony  based  on  a  recog- 
nition of  their  common  humanity. 

History  has  linked  America  to  Africa  in 
a  special  bond.  The  heritage  and  the  strug- 
gle of  23  million  black  Americans  have 
inspired  throughout  this  country  a  pro- 
found awareness  of,  and  support  for,  the 
aspirations  of  the  African  peoples  who  seek 
their  freedom  and  their  future  against 
great  odds.  In  this  generation  the  assertion 
of  black  nationhood  in  Africa  has  coin- 
cided with  the  new  affirmation  of  equality, 
dignity,  and  justice  in  the  United  States. 
Americans  know  that  the  values  their  coun- 
try stands  for — peace,  equality,  economic 
opportunity,  and  national  independence — 
are  today  being  tested  in  Africa  as  no- 
where else  in  the  world. 

The  moral  imperative  behind  our  Afri- 
can policy  is  reinforced  by  practical  con- 
siderations. With  the  sweep  of  political 
independence  and  economic  interdepend- 
ence, Africa,  in  less  than  a  decade,  has 
assumed  great  importance  in  world  affairs. 
It  is  a  continent  of  immense  size,  strate- 
gically located,  with  nearly  50  nations  of 
increasing  weight  in  the  world  scene.  Its 
vast  natural  resources  are  essential  ele- 
ments of  the  global  economy.  In  the  last 
20  years  direct  American  investment  in 
black  Africa  has  tripled.  Trade  has  grown 
at  an  even  faster  rate. 

Africa's  importance  to  us  as  a  producer 
of  energy  and  commodities  and  as  a  market 
for  our  own  products  is  substantial  and 
bound  to  grow  in  the  future.  It  is  also  im- 
portant for  the  other  industrialized  democ- 
racies; Western  Europe's  and  Japan's  com- 
bined trade  with  Africa  now  exceeds  $30 
billion  a  year. 

An  independent  and  thriving  Africa  is 
essential  not  only  to  America's  national 
interest  and  moral  purpose  but  to  global 
stability  and  progress  as  well. 

America's  Global  Responsibility  and  Africa 

I  do  not  want  to  pretend  that  the  reali- 
zation of  the  significance  of  Africa  has 
come  easily  to  American  policy.  It  grew  out 
of  painful  experience.  But  whatever  past 

258 


omissions,  the  lesson  has  been  learned.  And 
we  will  now  pursue  our  new  African  policy 
with  conviction  and  dedication. 

To  be  effective  our  foreign  policy  must 
be  global;  to  be  realistic,  it  must  be  com- 
plex; to  be  lasting,  it  must  be  rooted  in  the 
hearts  as  well  as  the  minds  of  the  peoples 
it  is  designed  to  serve. 

That  global  policy  is  the  product  of 
necessity  and  of  the  American  people's 
moral  and  practical  interest  in  the  peace 
of  the  world  and  the  progress  of  our  fellow 
man.  Africa  has  an  important  place  in  that 
design.  The  fundamental  principles  of  our 
policy  and  the  basic  issues  of  our  time  are 
being  tested  there.  We  cannot  achieve  our 
worldwide  foreign  policy  goals  if  we  do 
not  strive  mightily  for  them  in  Africa. 

The  United  States  is  the  world's  strong- 
est nation,  militarily,  economically,  and  in 
our  commitment  to  democracy.  When  wc 
fail — for  whatever  reason — to  use  our 
strength  for  peace  and  progress,  there  is  a 
gap  that  no  one  else  can  fill.  Without  our 
vigilance,  there  can  be  no  global  security; 
without  our  support  for  friends,  there  can 
be  no  regional  balances.  Without  our  co- 
operation, there  is  no  realistic  hope  for  ad- 
vancement of  the  new  nations.  Without  our 
espousal  of  freedom,  justice,  and  human 
dignity,  their  cause  will  fade. 

And  the  reverse  is  equally  true.  Never 
before  has  our  well-being  been  so  affected 
by  events  abroad.  America's  peace  and 
safety  rest  crucially  on  a  global  balance  of 
power;  our  prosperity  depends  on  a  flour- 
i.shing  international  economy;  our  future  is 
bound  up  with  the  fate  of  freedom  around 
the  world. 

But  the  world  of  the  1970's  is  more  di- 
verse, fluid,  and  complex  than  was  the 
world  of  the  quarter  century  following  the 
Second  World  War.  Our  strength  has  be- 
come less  predominant;  our  margin  for 
error  has  narrowed ;  our  choices  are  more 
difficult  and  ambiguous. 

New  centers  of  power  have  emerged — 
including  stronger  allies  and  more  asser- 
tive energy-  and  raw-material-producing 
nations.  There  is  now  a  substantial  nuclear 
balance  between  the  nuclear  superpowers. 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


The  once-monolithic  Communist  bloc  has 
been  fractured  by  bitter  rivalries.  The  eco- 
nomic system  links  all  nations'  fortunes, 
but  the  developing  nations  rightly  claim  a 
greater  role  in  it. 

The  colonial  and  cold  war  structures  of 
international  relations  have  come  to  an 
end,  but  a  new  accepted  international  sys- 
tem has  yet  to  take  their  place.  To  shape  a 
new  pattern  of  global  relations  assuring 
peace,  freedom,  and  progress  is  the  fore- 
most task  of  our  time. 

In  pursuit  of  this  objective  we  have  con- 
solidated our  partnerships  with  our  princi- 
pal allies,  the  great  industrial  democracies 
of  Western  Europe,  North  America,  and 
Japan.  We  have  resisted  attempts  to  tip 
the  global  balance  or  to  threaten  the  inde- 
pendence of  smaller  nations.  We  have 
sought  to  reach  beyond  security  to  a  rela- 
tionship more  hopeful  than  a  balance  of 
terror  constantly  contested.  And  we  have 
striven  to  engage  the  developing  countries 
of  Africa,  Asia,  and  Latin  America  in  full 
and  constructive  participation  in  the  inter- 
national order. 

Today,  all  these  global  challenges  have 
a  crucial  African  dimension.  The  nations  of 
Africa  face  a  uniquely  difficult  task.  A  con- 
tinent of  vast  wealth  and  potential  is  frag- 
mented by  the  arbitrary  boundaries  of  the 
colonial  era.  Tribal  differences  divert  ener- 
gies and  resources;  racial  hatred  smothers 
the  spirit  and  the  talents  of  both  its  victims 
and  its  advocates.  National  identity — a 
concept  often  taken  for  granted  in  other 
parts  of  the  world — must,  in  many  African 
countries,  be  consciously  created  in  an  al- 
most impossibly  short  span  of  years.  An 
enterprise  of  nation-building  is  being  pur- 
sued at  a  rate  and  in  ways  which  have  no 
parallel  in  human  experience. 

And  in  the  last  two  years,  the  pace  of 
change  in  Africa  has  accelerated  in  every 
dimension: 

— The  sudden  collapse  of  the  Portuguese 
colonial  empire  created  fundamental 
changes  in  southern  Africa.  Efforts  to  nego- 
tiate the  racial  conflict  in  Rhodesia  and 
Namibia  stalled.  The  forces  for  moderation 

August  23,   1976 


in  black  Africa  risked  being  discredited. 
Radical  movements  and  guerrilla  violence 
were  on  the  rise. 

— Worldwide  recession  and  the  sharp 
rise  in  oil  prices  had  a  drastic  impact  on 
the  world's  poor  nations,  many  of  them 
African.  Developing  countries  began  to 
form  blocs  to  challenge  the  industrial  coun- 
tries, threatening  new  cartels  and  economic 
warfare. 

— Factional  divisions  within  liberation 
movements  drew  outside  powers  into  con- 
frontation in  Angola.  After  Angola,  there 
was  a  general  fear  that  foreign  interven- 
tion would  spread  to  other  conflicts  in 
southern  Africa.  Responsible  Africans 
feared  that  the  peace,  integrity,  unity,  and 
independence  of  the  continent  were 
gravely  threatened. 

The  United  States  could  not  remain  in- 
different to  these  trends.  We  decided  to 
exert  our  influence  in  the  search  for  nego- 
tiated solutions  in  southern  Africa  before 
time  ran  out,  to  seek  new  ways  to  foster 
Africa's  economic  development  and  prog- 
ress, and  to  buttress  the  principle  of  Afri- 
can solutions  for  African  problems  in  the 
face  of  the  growing  danger  of  foreign 
intervention. 

President  Ford  made  the  courageous 
decision,  for  these  reasons,  to  send  me  on 
a  mission  to  Africa.  It  was  essential  to  pro- 
vide responsible  African  leaders  with  a 
moderate  alternative  to  the  grim  prospects 
of  violence  so  rapidly  taking  shape  before 
them ;  it  was  time  to  strengthen  U.S. -Afri- 
can relations  in  ways  with  which  Africans 
could  identify  and  cooperate.  The  new 
impetus  we  gave  to  our  policy  in  Africa 
was  designed  to  demonstrate  that  there  is 
a  positive  and  peaceful  road  open  to  fulfill 
African  aspirations  and  that  America  can 
be  counted  on  for  understanding,  advice, 
and  assistance. 

Against  this  background,  let  me  discuss 
in  greater  detail  our  response  to  the  three 
principal  challenges: 

— Africa's  quest  for  self-determination 
and  human  dignity  in  southern  Africa  and 
throughout  the  continent; 

259 


— Africa's  striving  for  economic  prog- 
ress; and 

— Africa's  determination  to  preserve  its 
unity  and  freedom  from  outside  interfer- 
ence and  great-power  rivalry. 

Southern  Africa 

Late  last  year  the  situation  in  southern 
Africa  took  on  a  new  and  more  critical 
dimension  with  implications  not  only  for 
the  peace,  independence,  and  unity  of 
Africa  but  for  global  peace  and  stability. 

For  the  first  time  since  the  end  of  the 
colonial  era  in  the  early  1960's,  external 
interventions  had  begun  to  overwhelm  an 
essentially  African  problem.  The  political 
evolution  of  Angola  was  slipping  out  of 
African  control  toward  determination  by 
outsiders.  The  United  States  was  prevented 
by  congressional  action  from  assisting  its 
friends  in  their  efforts  to  counter  foreign 
intervention  and  negotiate  a  compromise 
African  solution. 

After  Angola,  there  was  concern  that  the 
precedent  of  external  intervention  would 
spread  to  Rhodesia,  where  a  guerrilla  war 
was  already  taking  place.  The  white  minor- 
ity regime  there — representing  only  4  per- 
cent of  the  population — is  not  recognized 
by  a  single  government  in  the  world.  The 
negotiations  which  it  had  conducted  with 
black  leaders  had  broken  down,  and  guer- 
rilla actions  had  intensified.  Even  moderate 
African  leaders  began  to  urge  a  military 
solution. 

To  reverse  these  trends,  the  United 
States  set  forth  a  comprehensive  program 
in  Lusaka,  Zambia,  in  April.  We  put  our 
weight  behind  a  British  proposal  for  ma- 
jority rule  in  Rhodesia  within  two  years. 
We  stated  our  readiness  to  help  a  new 
majority-ruled  Rhodesia  in  its  peaceful 
transition  to  an  independent  Zimbabwe 
and  after.  We  stressed  the  importance  of 
racial  peace  and  equality,  including  minor- 
ity rights. 

The  United  States  is  working  hard  to 
carry  forward  this  program.  We  are  con- 
sulting closely  with  the   leaders  of  black 


Africa,  Western  Europe,  and  South  Africa 
to  promote  equitable  solutions.  We  are  not 
seeking  to  impose  an  American  blueprint; 
instead  we  are  doing  our  best  to  encourage 
the  African  parties  involved  to  negotiate  a 
settlement  in  which  black  and  white  can 
coexist  and  cooperate  for  Africa's  future 
on  the  basis  of  equality,  dignity,  and  peace. 
The  United  States,  together  with  others, 
stands  ready  to  help  the  parties  overcome 
the  economic  dislocations  which  inevitably 
will  accompany  the  process  of  change  in 
southern  Africa. 

In  recent  weeks  we  have  heard  charges 
that  through  its  policy  toward  Rhodesia 
the  United  States  is  raising  the  likelihood 
of  violence  and  of  civil  war. 

The  truth  is  just  the  opposite.  There  is 
bloodshed  and  civil  war  now  and  has  been 
for  years.  The  violence  is  certain  to  in- 
crease. The  Rhodesian  authorities — recog- 
nized by  no  one — face  an  impossible  task. 
The  issue  is  not  whether  change  will  take 
place,  but  how — whether  by  violence  or  by 
peaceful  means,  whether  the  future  of 
southern  Africa  will  be  determined  by 
guns  or  through  accommodation.  The  an- 
swer will  determine  what  legacy  will  be 
left  to  the  peoples  of  southern  Africa. 

What  we  seek  is  the  only  alternative  to 
intensified  conflict:  a  negotiated  settlement 
that  assures  the  rights  of  all  Rhodesians, 
black  and  white,  preserves  the  economic 
strength  of  the  country,  and  removes  the 
opportunity  for  foreign  intervention. 

We  are  moving  energetically  to  take 
advantage  of  the  momentum  thus  far 
achieved.  A  process  is  in  train.  We  are  en- 
gaged in  frequent  consultations  with  the 
African  states  most  directly  concerned.  We 
have  been  in  close  touch  with  Great  Brit- 
ain, which  has  a  historic  and  legal  respon- 
sibility for  Rhodesia.  Following  my  trip  to 
Africa  I  had  useful  talks  with  South  Afri- 
can Prime  Minister  Vorster,  after  which 
the  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  African 
Affairs  returned  to  Africa  for  further  con- 
sultations. 

Obviously  I  cannot  go  into  details  about 
delicate      and      complicated      negotiations 


260 


Department  of  State  Bulletin|Ai 


uliic'h  are  still  in  a  formative  stage.  I  can 
say  that  while  the  task  is  formidable,  it  is 
l)y  110  means  impossible.  If  it  is  to  succeed, 
liouever,  all  interested  parties  will  have  to 
,|do  their  share. 

The  white  population  of  Rhodesia  must 
recognize  the  inevitable  and  negotiate  for 
a  solution  which  respects  its  basic  interests 
while  there  is  yet  time. 

South  Africa  must  demonstrate  its  dedi- 
cation to  Africa  by  assisting  a  negotiated 
outcome. 

The  black  African  states — especially 
those  most  directly  concerned — must  pro- 
vide guidance,  encourage  unity  among 
black  leaders,  and  help  ease  the  transition 
to  a  government  based  on  majority  rule 
and  minority  rights. 

The  black  leaders  of  Rhodesia  must  sub- 
merge their  differences  and  outline  a  fu- 
ture of  cooperation  and  racial  coexistence 
in  an  independent  Zimbabwe. 

Failure  would  be  serious,  but  it  will  not 
occur  because  of  lack  of  effort  by  the 
United  States. 

We  have  made  progress.  We  will  con- 
tinue on  our  course  with  hope  and  dedi- 
cation. 

While  Rhodesia  is  the  most  immediately 
dangerous  of  the  problems  of  southern 
Africa,  the  future  of  Namibia  is  also  of 
deep  concern. 

The  former  German  colony  of  South 
West  Africa  was  a  mandated  territory  of 
South  Africa  from  1920  until  the  United 
Nations  terminated  the  mandate  in  1966. 
Five  years  ago  the  International  Court  of 
Justice  held  that  South  Africa's  continued 
occupation  of  Namibia  was  illegal.  The 
United  States  supported  both  of  those  deci- 
sions and  voted  for  a  U.N.  resolution  call- 
ing for  South  Africa  to  take  specific  steps 
toward  Namibia's  self-determination  and 
independence  by  August  1976.  That  dead- 
line is  now  upon  us. 

Progress  in  solving  the  Namibian  prob- 
lem has  become  imperative.  A  source  of 
international  discord  for  many  years, 
Namibia,  like  Rhodesia,  contains  the  seeds 
of  greater  conflict.  With  thousands  of  for- 


August  23,  1976 


eign  troops  north  of  the  Namibian  border 
and  with  intensifying  warfare  in  Rhodesia, 
a  far  more  volatile  climate  for  violence  ex- 
ists in  southern  Africa.  The  risks  of 
confrontation  mount.  Time  is  running  out. 

The  United  States  strongly  supports  self- 
determination  and  independence  for  Na- 
mibia. We  urge  South  Africa  to  permit 
the  people  and  all  the  political  groups  of 
Namibia  to  express  themselves  freely, 
under  U.N.  supervision,  and  to  participate 
in  determining  the  future  of  their  country. 
We  support  also  a  firm  date  for  self-deter- 
mination for  Namibia.  At  the  same  time  we 
urge  the  African  groups  concerned  to  ap- 
proach negotiations  in  a  spirit  of  concilia- 
tion. We  are  working  actively  in  this 
direction. 

We  are  convinced  that  a  solution  can  be 
found  protecting  the  interests  of  all  who 
live  and  work  in  Namibia.  Once  concrete 
steps  are  underway,  the  United  States  will 
ease  its  restrictions  on  trade  and  invest- 
ment in  Namibia  and  provide  economic  and 
technical  assistance  to  help  that  nation  con- 
solidate its  independence. 

The  problem  of  South  Africa  itself  is 
more  complex.  No  one — including  the  re- 
sponsible leaders  of  black  Africa — chal- 
lenges the  right  of  white  South  Africans  to 
live  in  their  country.  They  are  not  colonial- 
ists; historically  they  are  an  African  peo- 
ple; they  have  lived  on  African  soil  for  300 
years.  But  South  Africa's  internal  structure 
is  explosive  and  incompatible  with  any  con- 
cept of  human  dignity. 

Racial  discrimination  is  a  blight  which 
afflicts  many  nations  of  the  world.  But 
South  Africa  is  unique  in  institutionalizing 
discrimination  in  an  all-pervasive  enforced 
separation  of  the  races  which  mocks  any 
definition  of  human  equality.  The  recent 
clashes  in  black  urban  townships  and  black 
universities  in  South  Africa  are  a  vivid  ex- 
pression of  the  frustration  of  black  South 
Africans  with  a  system  that  denies  them 
status,  dignity,  or  political  rights.  The 
United  States  appeals  to  South  Africa  to 
heed  these  warning  signals. 

The  United  States,  true  to  its  own  beliefs. 


261 


will  use  all  its  influence  to  encourage 
peaceful  change,  an  end  to  institutionalized 
inequality,  and  equality  of  opportunity  and 
basic  human  rights  in  South  Africa. 

The  new  momentum  of  our  policy  in 
southern  Africa  has  been  welcomed  by 
African  leaders  of  all  political  persuasions. 
It  has  found  widespread  support  around 
the  world.  It  has  given  heart  to  moderate 
leaders  and  friends  of  America.  It  is  the 
best  chance  for  peaceful  solutions  and  for 
a  secure  and  just  future  for  Africa  free  of 
outside  intervention. 

There  are  grounds  for  hope.  What  is 
needed  now  is  vision  and  courage  among 
the  groups  and  governments  involved — and 
in  America  public  support  and  understand- 
ing for  the  course  which  we  are  pursuing. 
In  this  spirit,  the  United  States  appeals  to 
all  nations  and  parties  involved  to  take 
rapid,  responsible,  and  cooperative  steps 
and  thereby  spare  countless  thousands  the 
agony  and  sacrifices  that  violence  brings: 

— We  appeal  to  the  current  Rhodesian 
authorities  to  begin  urgent  talks  for  an 
independent  Zimbabwe  while  the  future  of 
the  white  population  can  still  be  negoti- 
ated peacefully  and  guarantees  are  yet  at- 
tainable. On  this  basis,  let  all  Rhodesians, 
black  and  white,  end  the  bloodshed  and 
work  together  to  create  a  new  nation  in 
which  all  races  coexist  and  cooperate  in 
peace. 

— We  appeal  to  the  Republic  of  South 
Africa  to  recognize  that  the  wind  of  change 
is  again  blowing  through  Africa.  Let  it  end 
its  increasing  isolation  and  demonstrate  its 
commitment  to  Africa  by  making  a  posi- 
tive contribution  to  the  humane  evolution 
of  the  continent. 

— We  appeal  to  the  black  African  na- 
tions of  southern  Africa  to  continue  the 
.statesmanlike  effort  which  they  have  al- 
ready begun.  They  have  declared  that 
peace  and  stability  can  only  be  built  upon 
a  settlement  that  takes  account  of  the  legit- 
imate interests  of  all  the  groups  and  races 
involved.  Let  them  help  make  these  pro- 
nouncements a  reality. 

— And  we  appeal  to  the  former  colonial 

262 


powers  to  use  their  valued  continuing  ties 
to  Africa  to  promote  justice,  peace,  and 
economic  progress  for  Africa,  turning  the 
legacy  of  the  past  into  a  proud  and  posi- 
tive future. 

Let  all  the  nations  and  groups  make  a 
conscious  and  dedicated  effort  to  overcome 
the  hatred  and  distrust  of  generations. 
This  cannot  be  easy.  But  to  repeat  the  past 
is  to  perpetuate  its  anguish.  Old  injustices 
cannot  be  removed  by  accumulating  new 
ones.  At  some  point,  the  cycle  of  violence 
must  be  broken  and  the  suffering  ended. 
There  will  not  soon  come  again  an  oppor- 
tunity such  as  we  now  have. 

Economic  Development 

The  nations  of  Africa  do  not  want  to  ex- 
pend all  their  energies  on  the  problems  of 
southern  Africa.  No  peoples  have  more 
earned  the  right  to  economic  progress. 
None  have  a  better  prospect  to  realize  their 
aspiration  to  economic  development.  Amer- 
ica stands  ready  to  cooperate  with  Africa 
on  the  long-term  positive  tasks  of  economic 
development.  The  obstacles  are  vast — but 
so  are  the  opportunities. 

Africa  is  blessed  with  immense  natural 
wealth.  The  ratio  of  population  to  re- 
sources is  more  favorable  than  in  almost 
any  other  region  of  the  developing  world. 
And  there  is  great  potential  for  increasing 
agricultural  productivity. 

But  development  in  Africa  must  also  sur- 
mount great  handicaps,  some  faced  by  de- 
veloping nations  everywhere,  others  unique 
to  Africa : 

— First,  Africa  is  encumbered  by  a  cruel 
legacy  of  history.  The  continent  is  frag- 
mented by  frontiers  drawn  in  the  colonial 
period  into  political  units  that  do  not  al- 
ways produce  viable  national  economies. 
Tribal  divisions  often  thwart  the  national 
cohesion  and  social  organization  needed  for 
development.  Spanning  these  states  are  re- 
gions of  enormous  extremes,  from  fertile 
and  rich  lands  to  poor  and  barren  deserts. 

— Second,  Africa  bears  a  crushing  bur- 
den of  poverty.  Eighteen  of  the  world's  28 

Department  of  State  Bulletin i 


kast  developed  countries  are  located  in 
Africa.  Only  17  percent  of  the  people  arc 
literate.  Out  of  every  hundred  infants  born, 
15  die  before  their  first  birthday;  life  ex- 
pectancy is  10  years  less  than  the  average 
in  the  developing  world  and  almost  30 
years  less  than  in  the  United  States. 

— Third,  Africa  is  the  chronic  victim  of 
natural  disaster.  Few  regions  are  so  sub- 
ject to  natural  catastrophe.  For  example, 
drought  in  the  Sahel,  on  the  southern  edge 
of  the  Sahara  Desert,  has  become  chronic; 
it  is  altering  the  ecology  of  western  Africa 
and  has  expanded  the  desert,  which  now 
encroaches  steadily  into  once-fertile  lands, 
producing  famine  and  suffering. 

— Fourth,  Africa  is  dependent  on  the 
world  economy  to  an  extraordinary  de- 
gree. Many  African  countries  rely  almost 
exclusively  on  the  export  of  one  or  two 
primary  products  for  critical  foreign  ex- 
change earnings.  The  world  recession  and 
declining  raw  material  prices,  together 
'  with  rising  prices  for  food  and  fuel,  have 
hit  the  African  nations  harder  than  any 
other  region  of  the  world. 

America  has  a  stake  in  the  economic  de- 
velopment of  Africa.  A  world  in  which  half 
^  prosper  while  the  other  half  despair  can- 
;  not  be  tranquil;  a  world  which  the  major- 
:  ity  of  nations  considers  unjust  is  a  world 
of  instability,  turmoil,  and  danger.  We  have 
r  sought  to  respond  to  the  challenges  of  Af- 
;  rican  development  in  four  ways: 

— First,  to  surmount  the  economic  frag- 
mentation that  is  the  legacy  of  the  colonial 

•  era,  the  United  States  has  supported  efforts 

■  for  regional  cooperation  within  Africa.  For 
example,  we  have  offered  our  help  to  pro- 
mote a  more  efficient  regional  transporta- 

-  tion  network  in  southern  Africa.  We  have 

*  stressed  the  importance  of  regional  cooper- 
)'  ation  to  deal  with  the  pervasive  problems 
e  of  the  Sahel.  We  believe  that  the  African 
'(fund  proposed  by  President  Giscard 
^  d'Estaing  of  France  can  be  used  to  encour- 

■  age  other  regional  initiatives. 

;j     — Second,  to   help   Africa   surmount   its 

in  August  23,  1976 


pervasive  poverty,  American  trade  and  in- 
vestment are  crucial,  and  they  are  rapidly 
expanding.  But  they  are  not  enough,  espe- 
cially for  the  poorest  countries.  Our  bilat- 
eral assistance  programs  are  increasingly 
concentrated  on  the  least  developed  coun- 
tries and  on  such  sectors  as  food,  education, 
and  population,  where  the  needs  of  the 
poor  are  greatest.  Our  requests  to  the  Con- 
gress for  development  assistance  for  Africa 
are  planned  to  grow  substantially  over  the 
coming  years. 

— Third,  to  reduce  Africa's  vulnerability 
to  natural  disasters,  the  United  States  is 
placing  great  emphasis  on  long-term  de- 
velopment projects.  The  time  has  come 
for  comprehensive  international  programs 
aimed  at  eliminating  problems  rather  than 
relief  efforts  to  ease  their  effects.  Last  May 
in  Dakar  we  outlined  a  program  for  inter- 
national cooperation  to  help  the  nations  of 
the  Sahel  develop  additional  water  re- 
sources, increase  crop  acreage  by  modern 
agricultural  methods,  and  improve  food 
storage  facilities,  all  designed  to  make  the 
Sahel  less  vulnerable  to  crises  in  the  future. 

— Fourth,  the  United  States  has  taken 
the  lead  in  efforts  to  reform  the  global  eco- 
nomic system  for  the  benefit  of  the  develop- 
ing nations.  We  called  for,  and  made 
recommendations  to,  the  World  Food  Con- 
ference of  1974,  to  expand  agricultural 
production  worldwide.  In  U.N.  meetings 
ever  since,  we  have  set  forth  comprehen- 
sive proposals  to  accelerate  development. 
As  a  result,  several  new  institutions  and 
mechanisms  of  cooperation  have  been  cre- 
ated. We  have  proposed  just  means  of  im- 
proving the  earnings  potential  of  key  raw 
materials.  We  have  reduced  trade  barriers 
to  the  exports  of  many  developing  coun- 
tries into  the  United  States.  We  are  paying 
special  attention  to  problems  of  developing 
countries  at  the  multilateral  trade  negotia- 
tions now  underway  in  Geneva.  We  have 
made  proposals  for  a  system  of  world  food 
security.  We  are  examining  ways  to  help 
developing  countries  hard  hit  by  increasing 
energy  costs  to  improve  their  energy  pro- 
grams.  All   these    initiatives    have    special 

263 


relevance  to   Africa   and   bring   particular 
benefits  to  it. 

Economic  development  in  Africa  requires 
the  cooperation  of  all  the  industrial  de- 
mocracies. No  other  group  of  countries — 
certainly  not  the  Socialist  countries — is 
able  to  provide  similar  levels  of  technology, 
managerial  expertise,  or  resources.  But  the 
industrial  democracies  must  coordinate 
their  programs  if  they  are  not  to  dissipate 
resources  and  see  their  efforts  overlap  or 
conflict.  This  is  vi^hy  the  United  States  has 
endorsed  the  imaginative  proposal  of  Pres- 
ident Giscard  d'Estaing  of  France  for  a 
fund  to  organize  and  coordinate  Western 
assistance  efforts  for  Africa.  And  we  are 
seeking  within  the  Organization  for  Eco- 
nomic Cooperation  and  Development  a 
more  general  coordination  of  development 
efforts  among  the  industrial  democracies. 

Economic  development  is  a  long-term 
process.  Manifestos,  rhetorical  assaults,  or 
wholesale  programs  to  redistribute  wealth 
are  not  the  answer.  Development  depends, 
above  all,  on  the  sustained  and  substantial 
effort  of  the  developing  countries  them- 
selves. And  it  requires  cooperation  between 
industrialized  and  developing  nations. 
Neither  can  impose  solutions  on  the  other. 
An  atmosphere  of  rancor,  extortion,  or  un- 
workable resolutions  undermines  public 
support  in  the  industrial  nations,  whose  ef- 
fective contribution  is  crucial  to  develop- 
ment. Confrontation  leads  to  retrogression 
for  both  the  industrial  and  the  developing 
world.  Progress  will  be  sustained  only  if  it 
benefits  both  sides. 

The  choice  we  all  face  is  between  cooper- 
ation and  chaos.  America  has  made  its  de- 
cision. We  will  work  with  all  nations  in  a 
constructive  spirit  to  make  our  interde- 
pendence a  period  of  unparalleled  prog- 
ress for  all  of  mankind. 


African  Independence 

The  surest  way  to  thwart  all  hopes  for 
political  and  economic  progress  in  Africa 
will  be  to  permit  the  continent  to  become 


264 


an  arena  in  which  outside  powers  contest 
for  spheres  of  influence.  Africa  has  only 
recently  freed  itself  of  great-power  rivalry. 
The  clock  must  never  be  turned  back. 

The  United  States  does  not  seek  any  pro- 
American  bloc  in  Africa.  We  will  accept 
and  support  the  nonalignment  of  all  nations 
and  groups.  But  we  strongly  oppose  the  ef- 
forts of  any  other  nation  that  seeks  to  un- 
dermine African  independence  and  unity 
by  attempting  to  establish  an  exclusive, 
dominant  position.  African  unity,  integrity, 
and  independence  are,  and  will  remain, 
fundamental  tenets  of  our  policy. 

We  have  heard  it  said  that  there  is  no 
need  to  fear  foreign  intervention  in  Africa 
— that  however  successful  non-African  na- 
tions may  prove  to  be  temporarily,  at  some 
indefinite  date  in  the  future  African  na- 
tionalism will  reassert  itself  and  expel  the 
intruder.  But  let  us  not  forget  that  it  took 
generations  to  throw  off  colonial  powers. 
The  modern  forms  of  intervention  are 
much  more  refined  and  more  difficult  to 
remove. 

Those  who  are  threatened  or  pressured 
from  outside  do  not  have  the  luxury  of 
waiting  for  history;  they  must  decide 
whether  to  resist  or  succumb.  Advice  which 
counsels  adaptation  and  confidence  in  the^ 
verdict  of  the  future  and  which  pretends 
that  freedom  occurs  automatically  may 
sentence  African  nations  to  decades  of  out- 
side interference  and  the  entire  contineni 
to  increasing  great-power  confrontation. 

There  is  no  better  guarantee  against  for- 
eign intervention  than  the  determination  of 
African  nations  to  defend  their  own  inde- 
pendence and  unity.  Let  us,  therefore,  not 
minimize  the  importance  of  the  security 
problems  that  some  African  nations  face. 
I  cannot  accept  the  proposition  that  black 
African  nations  do  not  have  the  same  right 
as  other  nations  to  defend  themselves 
against  recognized  dangers — especially 
when  their  neighbors  have  been  heavily 
armed  by  the  Soviet  Union.  We  are  deter- 
mined to  avoid  unnecessary  arms  races.  But 
when  friendly  nations  like  Kenya  or  Zaire 
make  modest  and  serious  requests  for  as- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


sistance  to  protect  themselves  against 
neighbors  possessing  substantial  Soviet 
arms,  we  owe  them  our  serious  considera- 
tion. 

The  ultimate  solution  is  for  Africa  to 
strengthen  the  institutions  of  its  unity  and 
thereby  its  capacity  to  insulate  African 
problems  from  outside  involvement.  We 
welcome  the  efforts  of  those  black  African 
leaders  who  have  specifically  warned 
against  great-power  involvement  in  the 
problems  of  southern  Africa  and  who  have 
asked  the  great  powers  to  refrain  from  sup- 
11  plying  individual  factions.  The  United 
States  supports  this  principle  and  will  abide 
Ity  it.  The  United  States  will  do  its  utmost 
to  help  prevent  a  repetition  of  the  factional 
and  regional  rivalries  that  made  it  possible 
fur  outsiders  in  Angola  to  replace  a  Portu- 
jriK'se  army  of  occupation  with  a  Cuban 
one. 

We  will  vigorously  support  African 
unity,  independence,  and  integrity. 

America's  Commitment 

Distant  events  touch  our  lives  and  our 
hearts — whether  it  is  a  drought  in  the 
Sahel,  a  civil  war  in  Lebanon,  or  an  earth- 
quake in  China.  In  the  modern  age,  our 
consciousness  of  each  other  is  a  moral  as 
well  as  a  practical  reality.  The  future  of 
races,  nations,  or  continents  is  shared. 

That  is  why  America's  acceptance  of 
global  responsibilities  is  not  an  act  of  gen- 
erosity, but  a  wise  pursuit  of  the  national 
interest.  If  we  do  not  do  our  best  to  main- 
tain the  peace,  it  is  not  just  the  rest  of  the 
world  but  we  ourselves  who  will  suffer.  If 


we  fail  to  help  those  living  in  poverty  and 
despair,  the  torrent  of  revolution  and  tur- 
moil that  will  inevitably  follow  will  affect 
us  all.  And  if  we  flag  in  our  effort  to  sup- 
port the  forces  of  liberty  and  human  dig- 
nity we  cannot  long  preserve  our  own 
freedom. 

For  two  centuries  the  oppressed  every- 
where have  known  that  the  Declaration  of 
Independence  was  addressed  not  just  to 
Americans  but  to  all  the  world.  Men  and 
women  deprived  of  freedom  in  other  lands 
knew  that  it  was  an  appeal  not  just  to  the 
conscience  of  this  country  but  to  all  man- 
kind. 

No  group  knows  better  than  this  one  that 
ju.stice  must  always  be  evenhanded,  that 
no  moral  end  is  served  if  the  contest  is  de- 
fined as  which  group  shall  dominate  the 
others.  As  we  defend  majority  rule,  we 
must  not  neglect  minority  rights.  As  we 
promote  economic  development,  we  must 
never  forget  that  economic  progress  is 
empty  if  it  does  not  extend  the  area  of  hu- 
man freedom. 

Today,  one  of  history's  great  human 
dramas  is  being  played  out  in  Africa. 
There,  peoples  cry  out  for  liberty  and  eco- 
nomic advance.  They  will  not  be  denied. 
The  question  is  whether  mankind  has 
learned  from  its  travail,  whether  the  price 
of  freedom  must  be  paid  in  treasure  and 
lasting  hatred. 

Let  us  pray  it  will  not  be  so.  Let  us  help 
the  voice  of  reason  to  prevail  in  Africa.  In 
so  doing,  we  will  have  reflected  America's 
own  values  in  the  world.  And  we  will  have 
taken  a  great  step  toward  the  goal  of  a 
true  world  community  of  brotherhood  that 
remains  our  most  noble  vision. 


August  23,  1976 


265 


Humanitarian  Problems  in  Lebanon  Discussed  by  Department 


Statement  by  Philip  C.  Habib 

Under  Secretary  for  Political  Affairs  ' 


Mr.  Chairman  [Senator  Edward  M.  Ken- 
nedy] :  I  greatly  welcome  your  invitation 
to  discuss  with  the  subcommittee  the  hu- 
manitarian problems  arising  from  the  con- 
tinuing tragedy  afflicting  Lebanon.  Over 
the  many  months  of  civil  strife  in  that 
country,  the  human  costs  of  this  chronic 
situation  have  been  of  great  concern  to  the 
U.S.  Government.  We  have  taken  various 
steps,  given  the  overwhelming  physical 
problems,  to  alleviate  human  suffering  in 
Lebanon. 

Before  I  proceed  to  outline  what  we 
have  been  able  to  do  to  meet  the  needs  in 
Lebanon,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to 
take  a  moment  to  set  the  stage  regarding 
the  difficulties  of  operating  programs  of 
any  kind  in  that  stricken  land. 

As  you  are  aware,  a  chronic  state  of  in- 
security has  prevailed  in  many  parts  of  the 
country,  and  particularly  in  Beirut,  for 
some  time.  In  this  atmosphere,  instrumen- 
talities of  the  Lebanese  Government  have 
ceased  to  function  nationwide,  and  agen- 
cies of  the  United  Nations  have  been,  in 
many  cases,  withdrawn,  along  with  a  large 
number  of  diplomatic  missions. 

Aside  from  the  increasing  difficulties  of 
day-to-day  operation,  accentuated  by  the 
collapse   of  some   public   services  and  the 


'  Made  befon-  the  Subcommittee  on  Refugees  anil 
Escapees  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  the  Judiciary 
on  July  29.  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be  avail- 
able from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Oovernment  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


266 


scarcity  of  essential  commodities  such  as 
gasoline,  very  little  remains  in  the  way  of 
structure  to  receive,  administer,  and  dis- 
tribute humanitarian  assistance  from  any 
source.  It  is  even  difficult  to  know  what  the 
needs  are  and  to  what  extent  efforts  are 
being  used  effectively. 

To  complicate  the  situation  further, 
transport  and  communications  links — par- 
ticularly the  Beirut  port  and  international 
airport — are  severed  for  much  of  the  time. 

In  summary,  assistance  efforts  of  any 
kind  face  difficult  problems  calling  for  flex- 
ibility and  ingenuity  so  long  as  the  fighting 
continues. 

As  you  know,  earlier  this  year  when  it 
appeared  that  a  cease-fire  would  take  hold 
in  Lebanon,  the  United  Nations  issued  an 
appeal  for  $50  million  to  undertake  a 
large-scale  relief  program  for  approxi- 
mately 250,000  people  who  have  been  dis- 
placed or  made  destitute  by  the  civil  war. 
The  $20  million  budget  amendment  to  the 
Foreign  Assistance  Act  for  fiscal  year  1977 
submitted  by  the  President  on  June  18, 
1976,  was  designed  to  enable  the  United 
States  to  respond  positively  to  this  appeal: 
75  percent,  or  $15  million,  of  the  total  re- 
quested was  earmarked  for  the  U.N.  pro- 
gram; the  remaining  $5  million  was  in- 
tended for  medical  supplies  and  other 
support  to  the  International  Committee  of 
the  Red  Cross  (ICRC),  the  American  Uni- 
versity Hospital  { AUH),  and  other  relief 
activities. 

Since  the  original  U.N.  appeal,  the  se- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


curity  situation  in  Lebanon  has  deterio- 
rated, and  the  United  Nations  has  indicated 
that  it  will  not  be  able  to  undertake  its 
relief  program  until  after  the  fighting  is 
reduced  substantially.  At  that  time,  we  will 
review  our  earlier  request  to  determine  if 
it  is  still  responsive  to  total  relief  needs  in 
Lebanon  and  advise  the  appropriate  com- 
mittees of  Congress  accordingly.  The  ex- 
perience with  the  U.N.  program,  however, 
illustrates  my  previous  point  about  the  con- 
siderable practical  obstacles  to  relief 
activities  in  Lebanon. 

Under  the  circumstances  which  I  have 
sketched  above,  we  have  found  only  two 
neutral  institutions,  the  International  Com- 
mittee of  the  Red  Cross  and  the  American 
University  Hospital,  which  have  been  able 
to  function  on  a  continuing  basis  during 
the  period  of  the  Lebanese  crisis.  U.S.  sup- 
port for  these  institutions,  in  the  form  of 
financial  assistance  as  well  as  medical  and 
commodity  support,  has  been  significant  in 
permitting  them  to  continue  to  provide 
vital  humanitarian  assistance  to  the  victims 
of  Lebanon's  civil  strife. 

The  ICRC,  which  is  the  only  functioning 
international  agency  in  Lebanon,  has  been 
quite  active  there,  providing  direct  medical 
and  relief  assistance.  At  present  it  has  36 
delegates  and  medical  personnel  in  Leba- 
non, not  counting  local  staff.  I  am  certain, 
for  example,  that  you  are  familiar  with  its 
current  efforts  to  arrange  the  evacuation  of 
the  seriously  wounded  from  the  refugee 
camp  at  Tal  Zaatar  in  east  Beirut.  In  ad- 
dition, the  ICRC  has  operated  an  airlift 
from  Larnaca,  Cyprus,  to  Beirut  to  trans- 
port medical,  food,  and  other  relief  sup- 
plies for  various  hospitals  in  Lebanon, 
including  its  own  field  hospital.  Larger  Red 
Cross  shipments  have  also  been  sent  by  sea 
from  Cyprus. 

The  U.S.  Government  has  contributed  a 
total  of  $2  million  in  response  to  ICRC  ap- 
peals for  its  program  in  Lebanon.  This 
amounts  to  approximately  40  percent  of 
the  ICRC's  program  expenditures  in  that 
country  since  October  1975,  and  we  antici- 


August  23,   1976 


pate  making  further  contributions  as  these 
appear  needed  and  appropriate. 

We  have  also  provided  medical  supplies 
valued  at  $1.65  million  to  the  American 
University  Hospital  since  November  1975. 
This  facility  has  been  a  major  center  for 
treating  casualties  during  the  crisis  and, 
given  its  superior  facilities,  has  also  func- 
tioned as  a  referral  institution.  Sub.stantial 
portions  of  the  medical  supplies  provided 
to  AUH  by  the  U.S.  Government  were  re- 
distributed to  hospitals  on  both  sides  of  the 
confrontation  line  bisecting  Beirut.  AUH 
has  recently  submitted  a  new  list  of  ur- 
gently needed  medical  supplies  which  we 
estimate  will  cost  about  $1  million,  which 
will  bring  the  amount  of  our  direct  assist- 
ance to  the  institution  to  over  $2.65  million. 

In  addition  to  direct  commodity  support 
to  AUH,  a  grant  of  $1.5  million  is  in  proc- 
ess under  the  American  schools  and  hos- 
pital program  [of  the  Agency  for  Interna- 
tional Development  (AID)].  That  will, 
among  other  effects,  assist  the  hospital  in 
meeting  a  serious  cash-flow  problem 
brought  about  by  the  high  casualty  patient 
load  accepted  on  a  "pay-if-you-can"  basis 
and  by  other  fiscal  problems  deriving  from 
the  civil  war. 

We  have  appreciated  your  initiative,  Mr. 
Chairman,  in  offering  an  amendment  to  the 
1977  foreign  assistance  appropriation  to 
provide  an  additional  $5  million  to  the 
State  Department  in  support  of  the  ICRC's 
program  in  Lebanon. 

We  anticipate  at  this  time  that  at  least 
that  level  of  additional  funding  will  be 
needed  there  for  humanitarian  relief.  We 
understand  that  your  amendment  would 
appropriate  these  funds  to  the  State  De- 
partment refugee  and  migration  account. 
While  we  recognize  that  your  purpose  in 
this  approach  is  to  assure  that  funds  be 
made  available  to  the  ICRC  as  rapidly  as 
possible,  we  would  suggest  that  the  funds 
be  appropriated  for  this  purpose  to  the 
AID  foreign  disaster  account.  The  $2  mil- 
lion we  have  already  committed  to  ICRC 
has  been  drawn  from  the  foreign  disaster 


267 


account,  and  we  believe  it  would  be  simpler 
to  continue  our  funding  for  this  purpose 
under  this  heading.  In  addition,  we  would 
hope  that  the  additional  funds  provided  by 
your  amendment  could  be  used  for  other 
humanitarian  purposes  in  Lebanon,  such 
as  the  American  University  Hospital, 
rather  than  exclusively  for  the  ICRC. 

A  joint  State-AID  task  force  has  been 
established  to  monitor  the  relief  needs  on 
a  daily  basis  so  that  prompt  action  can  be 
taken  to  meet  emergency  and  humanitarian 
relief  needs  as  they  become  known. 

Since  November  1975  we  have  thus  con- 
tributed $4.65  million  to  help  alleviate  the 
human  tragedy  of  Lebanon,  and  we  pres- 
ently have  another  $1.5  million  in  process. 

Another  important  aspect  of  the  Leba- 
nese tragedy  involves  stateless  refugees — 
Assyrian,  Armenian,  and  Coptic  Christians 
— who  were  awaiting  international  re- 
settlement in  Lebanon  when  the  situation 
there  deteriorated.  As  Under  Secretary 
Sisco  [Joseph  J.  Sisco,  then  Under  Secre- 
tary for  Political  Affairs]  informed  the 
committee  in  testimony  last  April,  some 
2,700  refugees  were  transported  to  safe 
haven  in  Athens.  This  operation  was  suc- 
cessfully completed  as  the  result  of  an 
extraordinary  effort  on  the  part  of  the  U.N. 
High  Commissioner  for  Refugees,  ICEM 
[Intergovernmental  Committee  for  Euro- 
pean Migration],  the  voluntary  agencies, 
the  Immigration  and  Naturalization  Serv- 
ice (INS),  and  Embassy  officials  in  Beirut 
and  Athens.  Out  of  the  2,730  flown  to 
Athens,  2,341  have  arrived  in  the  United 
States,  primarily  in  the  Chicago  area, 
where  they  are  being  carefully  resettled  by 
the  Assyrian-Armenian  community  in  con- 
cert with  the  voluntary  agencies. 

In  conclusion,  I  would  like  to  address 
briefly  the  question  of  visa  issuance,  both 
immigrant  and  nonimmigrant,  to  Lebanese 
citizens.  As  you  may  be  aware,  the  con- 
sular section  of  our  Embassy  in  Beirut  was 
closed  on  July  19  in  accordance  with  the 
decision  to  reduce  substantially  the  size  of 
our  official  presence  in  that  war-torn  city. 
Consular      personnel      departed     Lebanon 


July  27.  The  visa  files  from  Beirut  have 
been  packed  for  relocation  at  Athens,  and 
further  processing  will  become  possible 
once  this  has  been  accomplished. 

Without  going  into  great  detail,  I  can 
say  that  throughout  the  civil  strife  in  Leba- 
non, the  Department  has  attempted,  within 
the  constraints  of  applicable  law,  to  be 
sympathetic  to  the  plight  of  the  Lebanese 
and  aware  of  the  special  problems  they 
face.  We  have  taken  care  of  that  consular 
officers  in  third  countries  where  Lebanese 
citizens  might  apply  for  nonimmigrant 
visas  are  cognizant  of  these  special  circum- 
stances and  in  a  position  to  view  applica- 
tions sympathetically  and  realistically.  We 
have  also  sought  to  be  as  responsive  as 
possible  in  immigrant  visa  cases. 

As  the  internal  situation  in  Lebanon 
worsened,  the  volume  of  immigrant  visa 
applications  increased  and  the  need  for 
rapid  processing  became  more  acute. 
Among  the  administrative  measures  insti- 
tuted to  expedite  issuance  are  the  follow- 
ing: 

— The  Department  worked  out  proce- 
dures with  the  INS  to  transmit  approved 
petitions  for  immigrant  visa  applications 
by  telegram. 

— The  INS  agreed  to  the  Department's 
proposal  to  approve  petitions  from  rela- 
tives in  the  United  States  conditional  upon 
the  presentation  of  documentation  estab- 
lishing relationships  to  the  consular  officer 
abroad  by  the  visa  applicant  at  the  time  of 
the  interview. 

— All  visa-issuing  posts  were  alerted  to 
the  fact  that  conditions  in  Lebanon  make 
impossible  the  presentation  of  some  docu- 
mentation ordinarily  required  and  were 
reminded  of  the  necessity  for  the  exercise 
of  discretionary  powers  to  waive  docu- 
ments under  exceptional  conditions  of 
hardship. 

— A  special  channel  for  the  telegraphic 
request  of  visa  numbers  for  Lebanese  was 
established. 

And  in  addition  to  these  measures  of 
assistance    to    visa    applicants,     we    have 


268 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


worked  closely  with  the  INS  to  ease  the 
problems  of  Lebanese  who  are  in  the 
United  States  temporarily.  I  am  pleased  to 
report  that  the  INS  expressed  complete 
understanding  and  agreed  to  consider  ap- 
plications for  extensions  of  stay  on  a  case- 
by-case  basis,  taking  into  account  the 
necessity  to  grant  permission  to  accept  em- 
ployment when  there  is  an  indication  of 
the  need  to  do  so. 

I  believe,  Mr.  Chairman,  that  this  state- 
ment will  provide  you  and  the  members  of 
your  committee  with  the  broad  outlines  of 
our  efforts  to  deal  with  the  significant  hu- 
manitarian aspects  of  the  Lebanese  tragedy. 
It  is  much  to  be  regretted  that  the  violence 
in  Lebanon  continues  to  increase  human 
suffering  and  to  complicate  efforts  to  pro- 
vide relief.  Pending  the  restoration  of  some 
decree  of  calm  to  the  Lebanese  scene,  the 
U.S.  Government  and  others  interested  in 
providing  assistance  can  hope  to  offer  only 
the  most  urgent  forms  of  assistance. 


Senate  Asked  To  Approve  Treaties 
With  U.S.S.R.  on  Nuclear  Explosions 

Message  From  President  Ford  ' 

To  the  Senate  of  the  United  States: 

With  a  view  to  receiving  the  advice  and 
consent  of  the  Senate  to  ratification,  I 
transmit  herewith  the  Treaty  between  the 
United  States  of  America  and  the  Union  of 
Soviet  Socialist  Republics  on  the  Limitation 
of  Underground  Nuclear  Weapon  Tests, 
and  the  Protocol  thereto,  referred  to  as  the 
Threshold  Test  Ban  Treaty  (TTB  Treaty), 
and  the  Treaty  between  the  United  States 
of  America  and  the  Union  of  Soviet  Social- 


'  Transmitted  on  July  29  (text  from  White  House 
press  release);  also  printed  as  S.  Ex.  N,  94th  Cong., 
2d  sess.,  which  includes  the  texts  of  the  treaties  and 
protocols  and  the  report  of  the  Department  of  State. 
For  texts  of  the  Threshold  Test  Ban  Treaty  and 
Protocol,  see  Bulletin  of  July  29,  1974,  p.  217; 
for  texts  of  the  Peaceful  Nuclear  Explosion  Treaty 
and  Protocol,  see  Bulletin  of  June  28,  1976,  p.  801. 


August  23,   1976 


ist  Republics  on  Underground  Nuclear  Ex- 
plosions for  Peaceful  Purposes,  and  the 
Protocol  thereto  (PNE  Treaty).  The  TTBT 
was  signed  in  Moscow  on  July  3,  1974  and 
the  PNE  Treaty  was  signed  in  Washington 
and  Moscow  on  May  28,  1976.  For  the  in- 
formation of  the  Senate,  I  transmit  also  the 
detailed  report  of  the  Department  of  State 
on  these  Treaties. 

These  Treaties  together  establish  proce- 
dures for  the  conduct  of  all  underground 
nuclear  explosions  by  the  United  States  and 
the  Soviet  Union.  All  nuclear  explosions 
other  than  underground  nuclear  explosions 
are  prohibited  by  the  Treaty  Banning  Nu- 
clear Weapon  Tests  in  the  Atmosphere,  in 
Outer  Space  and  Under  Water  (the  Limited 
Test  Ban  Treaty)  of  1963.  The  TTB  Treaty 
and  PNE  Treaty  are  the  first  agreements 
since  the  Limited  Test  Ban  Treaty  to  im- 
pose direct  restraints  on  nuclear  explosions 
by  the  Parties  and,  as  such,  contribute  to 
limiting  nuclear  arms  competition. 

These  two  Treaties  represent  approxi- 
mately two  years  of  intensive  effort.  Nego- 
tiation of  the  TTB  Treaty  began  in  the 
Spring  of  1974  and  was  completed  in  July 
of  that  year.  However,  the  question  of  the 
relationship  of  underground  nuclear  explo- 
sions for  peaceful  purposes  to  limitations 
on  nuclear  weapon  testing  was  not  then 
resolved.  As  a  result.  Article  III  of  the 
TTB  Treaty  provided  that  the  Parties 
would  negotiate  and  conclude  an  agree- 
ment governing  underground  nuclear  ex- 
plosions for  peaceful  purposes.  Work  on 
the  PNE  Treaty  began  in  the  Fall  of  1974 
and  after  six  lengthy  negotiating  sessions 
was  completed  in  April  of  1976. 

The  TTB  Treaty  and  the  PNE  Treaty 
are  closely  interrelated  and  complement 
one  another.  The  TTB  Treaty  places  a  lim- 
itation of  150  kilotons  on  all  underground 
nuclear  weapon  tests  carried  out  by  the 
Parties.  The  PNE  Treaty  similarly  provides 
for  a  limitation  of  150  kilotons  on  all  in- 
dividual underground  nuclear  explosions 
for  peaceful  purposes. 

During  the  negotiation  of  the  PNE 
Treaty,   the    Parties   investigated   whether 

269 


individual  explosions  with  yields  above  150 
kilotons  could  be  accommodated  consist- 
ent with  the  agreed  aim  of  not  providing 
weapon-related  benefits  otherwise  pre- 
cluded by  the  TTB  Treaty.  The  Parties  did 
not  develop  a  basis  for  such  an  accommo- 
dation, largely  because  it  has  not  been 
possible  to  distinguish  between  nuclear  ex- 
plosive device  technology  as  applied  for 
weapon-related  purposes  and  as  applied 
for  peaceful  purposes.  The  Parties  there- 
fore agreed  that  the  yield  limitations  on  in- 
dividual explosions  in  the  two  Treaties 
would  be  the  same. 

The  TTB  Treaty  and  the  PNE  Treaty 
contain  numerous  provisions  to  ensure  ade- 
quate verification,  including  some  concepts, 
more  far-reaching  than  those  found  in  pre- 
vious arms  control  agreements,  which  are 
not  only  important  in  themselves  but  which 
will  have  significant  precedential  value  as 
well.  For  example,  the  Limited  Test  Ban 
Treaty  is  verified  only  by  national  techni- 
cal means.  The  TTB  and  PNE  Treaties  add 
requirements  for  exchange  of  specific  in- 
formation in  advance  to  assist  verification 
by  national  technical  means,  and  the  PNE 
Treaty  establishes  procedures  for  on-site 
observation  under  certain  conditions  on  the 
territory  of  the  Party  conducting  the  ex- 
plosion. 

The  TTB  Treaty  provides  for  an  ex- 
change of  data  on  the  geography  and  geol- 
ogy of  nuclear  weapon  test  sites  as  well 
as  the  yields  of  some  actual  weapons  tests 
conducted  at  each  site.  The  PNE  Treaty 
requires  that  the  Party  conducting  any  un- 
derground nuclear  explosion  for  peaceful 
purposes  provide  the  other  Party  in  ad- 
vance with  data  on  the  geography  and 
geology  of  the  place  where  the  explosion  is 
to  be  carried  out,  its  purpose,  and  specific 
information  on  each  explosion  itself.  These 
requirements  are  related  to  the  yield  of  the 
explosion    and    become    more    detailed    as 


the  magnitude  of  the  explosions  increase. 

In  addition  to  the  limitation  on  individ- 
ual nuclear  explosions  of  150  kilotons,  the 
PNE  Treaty  provides  for  an  aggregate 
yield  limitation  of  1.5  megatons  on  group 
underground  nuclear  explosions  for  peace- 
ful purposes.  A  group  explosion  consists  of 
substantially  simultaneous  individual  ex- 
plosions located  within  a  specific  geometri- 
cal relationship  to  one  another.  The  Treaty 
provides  for  mandatory  on-site  observer 
rights  for  group  explosions  with  an  aggre- 
gate yield  in  excess  of  150  kilotons  in  order 
to  determine  that  the  yield  of  each  indi- 
vidual explosion  in  the  group  does  not  ex- 
ceed 150  kilotons  and  that  the  explosions 
serve  the  stated  peaceful  purposes.  The 
Treaty  also  provides  for  on-site  observers 
for  explosions  with  an  aggregate  yield  be- 
tween 100  and  150  kilotons  if  both  Parties 
agree,  on  the  basis  of  information  provided, 
that  such  observers  would  be  appropriate 
for  the  confirmation  of  the  yield  of  the 
explosion. 

The  TTB  Treaty  and  the  PNE  Treaty, 
taken  together  as  integrated  and  comple- 
mentary components  of  this  important  lim- 
itation on  nuclear  explosions,  provide  that 
very  large  yield  nuclear  explosions  will  no 
longer  be  carried  out  by  the  Parties.  This 
is  one  more  useful  step  in  our  continuing 
efforts  to  develop  comprehensive  and  bal- 
anced limitations  on  nuclear  weapons.  We 
will  continue  our  elTorts  to  reach  an  ade- 
quately verifiable  agreement  banning  all 
nuclear  weapon  testing,  but  in  so  doing  we 
must  ensure  that  controls  on  peaceful  nu- 
clear explosions  are  consistent  with  such  a 
ban.  These  Treaties  are  in  the  national  in- 
terest, and  I  respectfully  recommend  that 
the  Senate  give  its  advice  and  consent  to 
ratification. 

Gerald  R.  Ford. 
The  White  House,  July  29,  1976. 


270 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Department  Urges  Support  of  Coffee  and  Tin  Agreements 
and  Protocols  Extending  Wheat  Agreement 


Statement  by  Joseph  A.  Greemvald 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Economic  and  Business  Affairs  ' 


I  welcome  this  opportunity  to  appear 
before  your  committee  to  discuss  the  three 
treaties  before  you :  the  International 
Coffee  Agreement  of  1976;  the  Fifth  Inter- 
national Tin  Agreement;  and  the  third  ex- 
tension of  the  Wheat  Trade  and  Food  Aid 
Conventions,  constituting  the  International 
Wheat  Agreement  of  1971.  Before  describ- 
ing the  three  treaties  and  explaining  our 
reasons  for  supporting  them,  I  would  like 
to  set  them  in  the  perspective  of  our  over- 
all commodity  policy. 

World  trade  in  agricultural  products, 
metals,  minerals,  and  foodstuffs  amounts  to 
a  substantial  portion  of  total  international 
trade.  This  trade  is  important  to  us  both  as 
producers  and  consumers.  The  role  of  com- 
modity trade  in  our  economy  is  growing 
significantly.  We  import,  for  example,  85 
percent  of  our  bauxite  requirements,  80 
percent  of  our  tin,  70  percent  of  our  nickel, 
and  virtually  all  of  our  cocoa  and  coffee. 
For  commodities  such  as  wheat,  our  ex- 
ports account  for  nearly  50  percent  of  total 
world  exports;  for  feed  grains,  60  percent; 
and  for  soybeans,  68  percent.  In  1975,  our 
grain  exports  alone  amounted  to  $11.6 
billion. 


'  Submitted  to  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign 
Relations  on  July  27.  The  complete  transcript  of  the 
hearings  will  be  published  by  the  committee  and 
will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Washing- 
ton, D.C.  20402. 


Other  developed  countries  are  more  de- 
pendent than  the  United  States  on  raw 
material  imports.  Taking  the  nine  major 
industrial  minerals  as  an  illustration,  in 
1950  Europe  imported  65  percent  of  its 
consumption  requirements.  In  1980  it  will 
import  an  estimated  80  percent.  For  Japan, 
the  comparable  shift  is  from  17  percent  in 
1950  to  95  percent  by  1980. 

As  we  have  seen  in  recent  years,  com- 
modity prices  can  be  extremely  volatile  and 
can  have  a  substantial  impact  on  the  econ- 
omies of  both  developing  and  developed 
countries.  The  sharp  rise  in  commodity 
prices  in  1972  and  1973  was  a  major  factor 
in  the  double-digit  inflation  of  that  period. 
The  subsequent  sharp  fall  in  commodity 
prices  in  late  1974  and  1975  greatly  exac- 
erbated the  balance-of-payments  situation 
of  those  commodity-exporting  countries 
which  had  to  pay  substantially  higher 
prices  for  their  oil  imports. 

The  fundamental  objective  of  our  inter- 
national economic  policy  is  to  seek  an  open 
world  economy  that  permits  market  forces 
to  operate  with  the  minimum  restriction  on 
the  flow  of  goods,  services,  capital,  and 
technology  across  international  borders. 
We  are  also  engaged  in  a  concerted  effort 
by  the  economically  advanced  countries  to 
improve  the  development  prospects  of  the 
developing  countries. 

Our  approach  to  commodity  policy  is 
supportive  of  our  general  international  eco- 


August  23,  1976 


271 


nomic  policy.  We  thus  seek  to  rely  to  the 
greatest  extent  possible  on  free  markets  to 
facilitate  the  flow  of  goods  between  pro- 
ducers and  consumers  and  to  deal  with 
serious  problems  in  ways  that  will  expand 
rather  than  restrict  trade.  The  basic  objec- 
tives of  our  commodity  policy  are  : 

1.  To  insure  adequate  investment  in  re- 
source development  to  meet  market  de- 
mand in  the  decades  ahead; 

2.  To  improve  the  functioning  of  individ- 
ual commodity  markets  through  case-by- 
case  consideration  of  specific  problems  and 
the  adoption  of  appropriate  arrangements; 

3.  To  improve  market  access  for  the 
processed  goods  of  developing  countries; 

4.  To  assure  security  of  supply  for  con- 
sumers; and 

5.  To  promote  stable  growth  for  the  com- 
modity export  earnings  of  the  developing 
countries. 

Developing  countries  rely  on  commodi- 
ties for  approximately  two-thirds  of  their 
export  earnings.  Because  of  the  importance 
of  commodity  trade  to  the  developing  coun- 
tries, our  commodity  policies  have  become 
a  major  issue  in  the  so-called  North-South 
dialogue.  Many  Third  World  nations  are 
skeptical  that  the  present  world  system  is 
responsive  to  their  concerns.  These  nations 
have  called  for  greater  control  of  their  eco- 
nomic affairs  and  have  challenged  the  ex- 
isting economic  order. 

It  is  our  view  that  this  challenge  should 
not  and  need  not  lead  to  confrontation. 
Thus,  in  September  of  last  year  at  the  sev- 
enth special  session  of  the  U.N.  General 
Assembly,  Secretary  Kissinger  sought  to  re- 
verse the  trend  toward  North-South  con- 
frontation and  to  shift  the  substance  of 
international  discussions  from  ideological 
debate  to  practical  measures  to  deal  with 
concrete  problems.  In  February  of  this  year 
we  began  an  important  new  dialogue  with 
developing  countries  and  oil-exporting 
countries  in  the  Conference  on  Interna- 
tional Economic  Cooperation  to  consider 
problems  of  energy,  development,  raw  ma- 
terials, and  related  financial  issues.  In  May 


we  participated  actively  in  UNCTAD  IV 
[fourth  ministerial  meeting  of  the  U.N. 
Conference  on  Trade  and  Development] 
and,  among  other  things,  agreed  to  join  in 
further  discussions  on  18  specific  commod- 
ities over  the  next  year  or  two. 

Case-by-Case  Approach  to  Commodity  Problems 

The  three  treaties  before  you  today  illus- 
trate our  case-by-case  approach.  The  eco- 
nomic provisions  of  the  coffee  agreement 
bear  no  resemblance  to  the  measures  pro- 
posed in  the  tin  agreement.  Each  was  the 
result  of  careful  technical  analysis  of  the 
problems  of  the  trade  in  the  specific 
commodity.  The  extension  of  the  wheat 
agreement  contains  no  new  economic  mech- 
anisms, but  provides  for  the  continuation 
of  the  framework  for  international  cooper- 
ation on  wheat  trade  matters. 

I  think  it  is  fair  to  observe,  Mr.  Chair- 
man, that  many  other  countries  tend  to  ap- 
proach commodity  problems  differently 
than  do  we.  Since  the  malfunctioning  of  a 
commodity  market  is  almost  always  re- 
flected in  the  price  of  that  commodity, 
proposals  for  international  action  are  fre- 
quently to  do  something  about  the  price: 
to  raise  it,  to  lower  it,  or  to  stabilize  it. 
Our  approach  is  to  deal  with  each  problem 
more  fundamentally:  to  inquire  about  the 
cause  of  the  malfunction  and  to  examine 
alternative  means  of  dealing  with  it. 

In  some  cases,  the  commodity  problem 
can  be  dealt  with  by  an  international 
agreement  to  stabilize  the  price  of  that 
commodity,  either  through  a  buffer  stock 
or  some  other  kind  of  commodity  arrange- 
ment. Most  often,  however,  the  more  effec- 
tive approach  will  be  to  treat  the  root 
causes  of  the  problem,  rather  than  the 
price  manifestation,  by  means  of  policies 
which  more  directly  promote  investment, 
expand  markets,  encourage  diversification 
into  alternative  production,  or  develop  new 
uses. 

It  is  for  this  reason,  Mr.  Chairman,  that 
we  lay  so  much  stress  on  the  case-by-case 
approach.  The  problems  of  each  commod- 


272 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ity  must  be  carefully  analyzed  and  meas- 
ures adopted  which  would  be  suitable  for 
that  particular  commodity.  We  are  there- 
fore not  committed  to  negotiate  price  sta- 
bilization agreements  for  each  commodity 
or  to  bring  before  the  Senate  every  so- 
called  price  stabilization  agreement  in- 
ternationally negotiated.  We  have,  for 
example,  concluded  after  careful  review 
that  the  International  Cocoa  Agreement, 
as  presently  negotiated,  is  not  a  workable 
agreement;  and  we  have  not  signed  it.  We 
do  believe,  however,  after  equally  careful 
analysis,  that  the  three  agreements  before 
you  today  are  appropriate  mechanisms  for 
dealing  with  the  commodities  they  cover 
and  should  be  supported  by  the  United 
States. 

I  would  like  now,  Mr.  Chairman,  to  turn 
to  the  specific  agreements. 

International  Coffee  Agreement 

After  petroleum,  coffee  is  the  most  im- 
portant export  of  the  developing  world. 
In  1975,  coffee  exports  from  more  than 
40  producing  countries  amounted  to  over 
$4  billion.  In  1976,  that  value  will  exceed 
$7  billion.  Because  of  its  economic  impor- 
tance to  the  exporting  countries,  coffee 
plays  a  significant  role  in  our  overall  rela- 
tions with  them. 

We  rely  almost  entirely  on  foreign  pro- 
duction for  our  coffee.  U.S.  imports  in  1975 
amounted  to  $1.6  billion.  Although  our  per 
capita  coffee  consumption  is  declining,  we 
still  consume  about  35  percent  of  total 
world  imports. 

The  United  States  has  participated  in 
International  Coffee  Agreements  since 
1962.  The  1962  agreement  was  the  result 
of  a  joint  U.S.  and  Brazilian  initiative.  At 
that  time,  the  situation  of  coffee  producers 
was  desperate.  Record  high  prices  in  1954, 
a  situation  similar  to  today,  had  led  to 
massive  planting  of  new  coffee  trees,  fol- 
lowed by  overproduction,  surplus  stocks, 
and  disastrous  prices.  The  purpose  of  the 
1962  agreement  was  to  stabilize  coffee 
prices  and  the  export  earnings  of  the  large 


August  23,  1976 


number  of  producing  countries  in  Latin 
America,  Africa,  and  Asia.  Through  a  sys- 
tem of  export  quotas,  the  1962  agreement 
and  its  successor  in  1968  were  relatively 
successful  in  stabilizing  prices  during  the 
1960's  at  levels  equitable  to  producers  and 
fair  to  consumers. 

By  1972,  however,  both  producers  and 
consumers  recognized  that  the  world  coffee 
outlook  had  changed.  Consumption  was  ex- 
ceeding production,  accumulated  stocks 
were  declining,  and  the  prices  received  by 
producers  had  improved  considerably.  Ac- 
cordingly, the  economic  provisions  of  the 
agreement  were  suspended,  but  the  Inter- 
national Coffee  Organization  was  pre- 
served as  a  forum  for  consultation  and  ne- 
gotiation. In  1973,  the  1968  agreement  was 
extended  for  a  period  of  two  years  with  all 
the  economic  provisions  deleted.  In  1975, 
the  1968  agreement  was  extended  for  a 
further  year.  Each  of  these  agreements  was 
of  course  submitted  to  your  committee  and 
received  the  advice  and  consent  of  the 
Senate. 

When  Mr.  Katz  [Julius  L.  Katz,  Deputy 
A.ssistant  Secretary  for  Economic  and  Busi- 
ness Affairs]  appeared  before  you  last 
September  to  discuss  the  extension  of  the 
1968  agreement,  he  indicated  that  we  al- 
ready had  made  substantial  progress  in  the 
negotiation  of  a  new  agreement  with  eco- 
nomic provisions  and  that  we  hoped  to 
conclude  the  agreement  in  time  to  permit 
entry  into  force  October  1,  1976.  The  nego- 
tiations were  concluded  successfully  in 
December  1975,  and  after  an  intensive  re- 
view, the  President  submitted  the  treaty  to 
you  on  April  5,  1976.  Before  discussing  the 
details  of  the  new  agreement,  I  would  like 
first  to  review  the  background  against 
which  the  negotiations  took  place. 

Coffee  Price  Trends 

Negotiations  began  in  early  1975.  The 
overproduction  phase  of  the  coffee  cycle 
had  clearly  ended.  The  prospect  was  for 
reasonable  balance  between  supply  and 
demand,    barring  some    new    disturbance. 


273 


Prices  had  fallen  from  their  1974  highs  to 
a  level  under  50  cents  per  pound  and  ap- 
peared to  be  trending  downward  in  antici- 
pation of  a  good  Brazilian  crop.  Producers 
had  become  concerned  and  began  to  pur- 
sue seriously  efforts  to  conclude  an  agree- 
ment. 

On  July  17,  1975,  a  severe  frost  struck 
the  coffee-growing  regions  of  Brazil,  and 
the  outlook  for  the  next  several  years  now 
appears  to  be  one  of  relatively  tight  bal- 
ance between  supply  and  demand.  USDA's 
[U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture]  most 
recent  estimate  is  that  Brazil's  1976  pro- 
duction will  amount  to  about  9.5  million 
bags,  compared  to  a  previously  anticipated 
28  million  bags.  At  best,  it  will  take  three 
years  to  fully  restore  Brazil's  pre-frost 
production  of  26-28  million  bags  annually. 

Since  the  frost,  the  prices  paid  for  green 
coffee  have  jumped  very  sharply.  Green 
coffees  which  were  selling  for  under  50 
cents  a  pound  pre-frost  have  recently  sold 
as  high  as  $1.50  a  pound.  As  these  higher 
raw  material  costs  work  their  way  through 
the  processing  and  merchandising  chain, 
retail  prices  are  rising  sharply.  According 
to  the  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  the  one- 
pound  can  of  roasted  coffee  that  cost  an 
average  $1.27  in  May  1975  cost  $1.71  in 
May  1976  and  more  recently  has  sold  at 
the  $2.00  level. 

The  tight  supply  outlook  has  created  a 
situation  in  which  both  buyers  and  sellers 
of  coffee  are  placing  a  much  higher  value 
on  the  product.  In  the  short  run,  rapidly 
escalating  prices  appear  to  have  increased 
rather  than  decreased  demand. 

World  coffee  exports  through  March 
1976  ran  13  percent  ahead  of  the  same  pe- 
riod last  year.  U.S.  imports  of  coffee 
through  April  of  this  year  are  running  13.3 
percent  higher  than  last,  and  roastings  in- 
creased 13  percent  through  June.  It  ap- 
pears that  the  steady  series  of  price  in- 
creases has  induced  consumers  and  perhaps 
retailers  to  build  up  inventories  in  their 
pantries  and  warehouses  in  anticipation  of 
further  price  increases. 

We  are  now  seeing  some  reversal  of  this 


274 


trend.  With  the  threat  of  a  new  frost  in 
Brazil  this  season  largely  behind  us,  there 
is  an  apparent  drawing-down  of  inven- 
tories taking  place  and  prices  have  re- 
sponded. During  the  first  weeks  of  July, 
the  indicator  price  of  "other  milds,"  a  type 
of  coffee  produced  in  Central  America,  has 
fallen  over  25  cents  per  pound. 

Salient  Features  of  Coffee  Agreement 

When  we  resumed  negotiations  in  No- 
vember 1975,  we  had  the  following  goals 
in  mind: 

— Maximum  incentive  for  producers  to 
export  all  available  coffee  during  the  next 
several  years. 

— Encouragement  for  Brazilian  and 
other  producers  to  restore  production  as 
soon  as  possible. 

— Provision  in  the  longer  term  for  build- 
ing of  stocks  as  a  hedge  against  future 
supply  disruption. 

— No  restrictions  on  the  export  of  coffee 
until  necessary  to  defend  much  lower 
prices. 

The  negotiations  were  prolonged  and 
difficult,  but  it  was  clear  that  the  coffee 
producers  feared  that  without  an  agree- 
ment they  might  repeat  the  boom-and-bust 
cycles  of  the  past.  In  the  end,  we  emerged 
with  an  agreement  which  I  believe  meets 
our  goals  and  is  a  significant  improvement 
over  earlier  agreements.  I  will  briefly  out- 
line its  salient  features. 

There  are  no  fixed  price  objectives  and 
there  is  no  indexation  in  the  agreement. 

Export  quota  levels  and  price  ranges  will 
be  established  annually  by  the  Interna- 
tional Coffee  Council  in  the  light  of  the 
prevailing  level  and  trend  of  coffee  prices. 

The  agreement  will  enter  into  force  Oc- 
tober 1,  1976,  with  quotas  in  suspense. 
Under  a  formula  for  introducing  quotas, 
they  can  only  be  triggered  automatically 
when  green  coffee  prices  fall  to  between 
63  and  77  cents  per  pound.  They  probably 
will  not  come  into  operation  before  late 
1979. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


While  quotas  are  in  suspense,  there  is  no 
obligation  on  our  part  to  exclude  coffee 
from  any  source. 

When  quotas  are  in  effect  they  will  be 
suspended  automatically  whenever  prices 
rise  15  percent  above  the  range  estab- 
lished by  the  Council;  or  if  the  Council 
has  not  established  a  price  range,  they 
will  be  suspended  when  prices  rise  15  per- 
cent above  the  average  of  the  preceding 
year. 

All  Council  decisions  regarding  quotas 
and  prices  require  a  two-thirds  majority  of 
producers  and  consumers  voting  sepa- 
rately. The  United  States  has  40  percent 
of  consumer  votes.  Brazil  has  34  percent  of 
producer  votes. 

When  export  quotas  are  in  effect  they 
will  be  distributed  among  producers  in  a 
flexible  manner.  Annual  quotas  will  be 
divided  into  fixed  and  variable  portions. 

The  fixed  portion  will  account  for  70  per- 
cent of  total  annual  quotas  and  will  be 
based  on  a  country's  export  performance 
either  during  the  last  four  years  of  the  old 
agreement  (1968  69  to  1971/72)  or  the  first 
two  years  of  the  new  agreement,  whichever 
is  better  for  the  producing  country.  This 
means  that  a  producing  country  which  im- 
proves its  performance  during  the  next  two 
years  will  be  rewarded  with  a  permanent 
quota  increase  for  the  life  of  the  agree- 
ment. 

The  variable  portion  of  the  annual  quota 
is  30  percent  and  will  be  distributed  to 
producing  countries  in  the  proportion  of 
their  stocks  to  total  world  stocks.  Stocks 
will  be  verified  annually  by  the  Interna- 
tional Coffee  Organization.  This  encour- 
ages all  countries  to  hold  stocks  during 
periods  of  surplus  and  enables  countries 
with  expanding  production  to  increase 
their  quotas. 

A  new  provision  obliges  producers  to 
either  ship  their  full  quota  or  declare  a 
shortfall  and  permit  its  reallocation.  Coun- 
tries which  declare  shortfalls  in  the  first 
six  months  of  a  coffee  year  will  receive  a 
bonus  of  30  percent  of  the  amount  declared 
the  following  year. 


August  23,  1976 


Another  innovation  is  the  establishment 
of  a  producer-financed  fund  for  the  pro- 
motion of  coffee  consumption  in  consuming 
countries.  This  fund  will  raise  $26  million 
in  the  next  two  years  for  eventual  use  on  a 
matching  basis  by  the  trade  and  industries 
in  the  consuming  countries.  In  effect,  the 
producers  are  setting  aside  funds  now  for 
use  later  on  to  combat  the  long-term  trend 
of  declining  consumption  in  the  United 
States  and  other  countries. 

The  agreement  is  for  a  period  of  six 
years ;  however,  after  three  years  each 
member  must  formally  notify  the  United 
Nations  of  its  intention  to  continue  mem- 
bership or  it  automatically  ceases  to  par- 
ticipate at  the  end  of  the  third  year. 

Consumer  and  Foreign  Policy  Interests 

Mr.  Chairman,  throughout  the  negotia- 
tions our  foremost  concern  was  to  improve 
the  protection  provided  for  the  American 
consumer.  An  international  agreement  can- 
not repeal  the  law  of  supply  and  demand, 
nor  can  it  convert  a  situation  of  tight  sup- 
ply into  one  of  surplus.  The  fact  is  that 
tight  supplies  and  high  prices  for  coffee  are 
likely  to  prevail  for  several  years. 

However,  international  cooperation  can 
make  a  valuable  contribution  to  ameliorate 
the  worst  effects  of  the  short-term  outlook. 
It  can  assure  that  no  artificial  restrictions 
are  placed  on  the  flow  of  coffee  to  the 
market.  It  can  offer  an  additional  incentive 
to  ship  during  the  period  of  tightest  supply 
and  reward  those  producers  who  perform 
best.  It  can  provide  a  stimulus  to  the  pro- 
ducing countries  to  restore  production  to 
levels  adequate  to  meet  our  consumption 
needs  at  reasonable  prices.  And  in  the 
longer  term,  it  can  assure  regular  supplies 
and  adequate  stocks  by  preventing  prices 
from  falling  to  levels  which  would  force 
producers  to  move  out  of  coffee  production. 
This,  Mr.  Chairman,  is  what  we  sought  in 
the  new  International  Coffee  Agreement, 
and  I  believe  we  achieved  it. 

The  coffee-producing  countries  have  be- 
haved responsibly  since  the  Brazilian  frost 


275 


last  year.  They  have  Increased  their  ex- 
ports of  available  coffee  to  world  markets. 
Most  have  adopted  internal  measures 
which  will  facilitate  an  increase  in  coffee 
production.  Brazil  is  well  along  with  a  $1 
billion  program  to  rehabilitate  its  damaged 
production.  Many  countries,  including 
Brazil,  have  increased  coffee  prices  to  their 
domestic  consumers  by  amounts  compara- 
ble to  the  increases  experienced  in  this 
country. 

The  43  producing  countries  which  par- 
ticipated in  the  negotiation  of  the  new 
coffee  agreement  have  expressed  their 
strong  desire  to  continue  and  improve  their 
cooperation  with  the  consuming  countries. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  think  that  both  our  for- 
eign policy  interests  and  our  interests  as 
consumers  are  well  served  by  this  new 
agreement.  I  strongly  urge  its  prompt  and 
favorable  consideration  by  this  committee 
and  the  Senate. 

Fifth  International  Tin  Agreement 

Like  coffee,  tin  is  also  an  important  pro- 
vider of  employment  and  a  source  of  for- 
eign exchange  earnings  for  a  number  of 
developing  countries  in  Asia,  Africa,  and 
Latin  America.  Tin  is  also  similar  to  coffee 
in  that  production  is  concentrated  in  de- 
veloping countries  while  consumption  is 
concentrated  principally  in  the  industrial- 
ized nations  of  the  world. 

In  1974,  world  exports  of  tin  totaled 
about  190,000  metric  tons,  valued  at  ap- 
proximately $1.5  billion.  Tin  is  thus  a 
significant  commodity  in  world  trade,  par- 
ticularly in  trade  between  developing  and 
developed  countries. 

The  United  States  is  the  world's  leading 
consumer  of  tin.  Normally  we  consume 
over  25  percent  of  annual  world  produc- 
tion. In  1974  we  consumed  some  66,000 
long  tons  of  tin,  and  in  1975  about  44,000 
tons.  The  production  of  tinplate  for  food 
and  beverage  canning  represents  the  chief 
end  use  for  tin,  followed  by  its  use  in  solder 
and  other  alloys,  and  chemicals.  Approxi- 
mately 75-80  percent  of  our  tin  consump- 


276 


tion  is  of  primary  or  new  tin,  with  second- 
ary or  recycled  tin  accounting  for  the 
remainder. 

U.S.  domestic  production  of  tin  is  negli- 
gible, and  we  must  rely  on  imports  for 
most  of  our  tin  needs.  In  1974  we  imported 
approximately  45,000  tons  of  tin,  valued  at 
$326  million;  and  in  1975  we  imported  just 
under  50,000  tons,  valued  at  $356  million. 

Malaysia,  the  world's  leading  tin  pro- 
ducer, traditionally  has  been  the  principal 
supplier  of  tin  to  the  U.S.  market.  Other 
significant  suppliers  are  Thailand,  Bolivia, 
Indonesia,  and  in  recent  years,  the  People's 
Republic  of  China. 

In  addition  to  imports,  sales  of  surplus 
tin  from  the  General  Services  Administra- 
tion strategic  stockpile  have  supplemented 
our  tin  needs  in  recent  years.  The  GSA 
stockpile  contains  some  204,000  long  tons 
of  tin,  of  which  approximately  164,000 
tons  are  surplus  to  current  stockpile  objec- 
tives. 

Since  1956  world  tin  trade  has  been  in- 
fluenced by  four  successive  five-year  Inter- 
national Tin  Agreements,  and  a  new  Fifth 
International  Tin  Agreement  came  into 
force  provisionally  on  July  1,  1976.  The 
United  States  did  not  join  any  of  the  first 
four  agreements,  but  we  have  signed  the 
fifth  agreement,  which  is  now  before  you 
for  your  advice  and  consent  to  ratification. 

AVe  are  currently  participating  provision- 
ally in  the  work  of  the  International  Tin 
Council,  which  administers  the  tin  agree- 
ment, on  the  basis  of  a  nonbinding  notifica- 
tion of  our  intention  to  ratify  the  agree- 
ment, subject  to  our  constitutional  require- 
ments, which  we  deposited  with  the  United 
Nations  on  June  29.  We  followed  this  pro- 
cedure in  order  to  participate  in  the  first 
session  of  the  Tin  Council  under  the  fifth 
agreement,  which  took  place  in  London 
July  1-7.  Our  delegation  to  this  important 
organizational  meeting  included  repre- 
sentatives of  various  government  agencies, 
as  well  as  advisers  from  a  number  of 
American  industries  concerned  with  tin. 

Membership  in  the  recently  ended  fourth 
agreement     included    seven     tin-exporting 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


countries,  accounting  for  an  estimated  two- 
thirds  of  world  tin  production,  and  22  con- 
sumer countries.  While  not  all  members  of 
the  fourth  agreement  have  yet  deposited 
their  ratifications  or  notifications  of  inten- 
tion to  ratify,  we  believe  that  all  seven 
producer  members  and  virtually  all  of  the 
consumer  members  will  do  so.  The  seven 
producer  members  of  the  new  agreement 
are  Malaysia,  Bolivia,  Indonesia,  Thailand, 
Australia,  Nigeria,  and  Zaire.  The  People's 
Republic  of  China  is  the  only  significant  tin 
producer  and  exporter  not  a  member  of  the 
tin  agreement.  If  we  include  the  United 
States,  all  of  the  world's  major  tin  con- 
sumers are  now  members  of  the  agreement. 

Basically,  the  Fifth  International  Tin 
Agreement,  like  its  predecessors,  seeks  to 
stabilize  tin  prices  within  floor  and  ceiling 
prices  agreed  on  jointly  by  its  producer  and 
consumer  members.  This  is  done  mainly 
through  a  buffer  stock  which  buys  tin  to 
defend  a  floor  price  and  sells  tin  to  defend 
a  ceiling.  In  addition,  under  certain  condi- 
tions the  agreement  permits  the  imposition 
of  export  controls  on  tin  exports  by  pro- 
ducer members  when  necessary  to  supple- 
ment buffer  stock  operations  in  defending 
the  floor  price. 

Buffer  stock  financing  contributions  in 
the  form  of  tin  and./or  cash  are  compulsory 
for  producer  and  voluntary  for  consumer 
members  of  the  agreement.  Thus  far,  five 
consumer  members — Belgium,  Canada, 
France,  the  Netherlands,  and  the  United 
Kingdom — have  announced  they  will  make 
buffer  stock  contributions  under  the  fifth 
agreement.  The  United  States  has  an- 
nounced it  does  not  intend  to  make  a  con- 
tribution. 

Decisions  on  price  ranges,  export  con- 
trols, and  other  matters  relating  to  the 
agreement  are  made  by  the  International 
Tin  Council,  which  is  headquartered  in 
London.  Producers  and  consumers  share 
voting  power  equally  in  the  Council,  with 
each  group  holding  1,000  votes.  Within 
each  group,  the  1,000  votes  are  divided 
among  members  on  the  basis  of  their  pro- 
portionate share  of  tin  production  or  con- 


sumption. All  decisions  of  the  Council  re- 
quire at  least  a  majority  of  votes  cast  by 
both  groups,  voting  separately. 

As  the  world's  leading  tin  consumer,  the 
United  States  holds  the  largest  number  of 
consumer  votes.  On  the  basis  of  member- 
ship to  date  in  the  fifth  agreement,  the  July 
1976  Council  meeting  allotted  the  United 
States  299  of  the  1,000  consumer  votes. 
However,  as  additional  countries  deposit 
their  ratifications  or  notifications  of  inten- 
tion to  ratify,  the  number  of  votes  held  by 
the  United  States  is  expected  to  decline  to 
approximately  260. 

As  a  member  of  the  Fifth  International 
Tin  Agreement,  the  United  States  would 
have  two  basic  obligations: 

— To  pay  a  proportionate  share  of  the 
International  Tin  Council's  administrative 
expenses.  Each  member's  share  of  expenses 
is  keyed  basically  to  its  voting  strength  in 
the  Council,  and  the  U.S.  share  for  the  first 
year  of  membership  would  be  an  estimated 
$115,000. 

— To  consult  with  the  International  Tin 
Council  on  tin  disposals  from  our  GSA 
stockpile.  Since  we  have  always  consulted 
with  the  Council  in  the  past,  the  obligation 
to  consult  on  stockpile  disposals  will  have 
little  practical  effect.  However,  the  United 
States  has  retained  and  will  retain  the 
right  of  final  decision  concerning  its  stock- 
pile disposals.  We  made  this  point  clear  in 
announcing  our  intention  to  sign  the  fifth 
agreement. 

Benefits  of  Membership  In  Tin  Agreement 

Following  negotiation  of  the  fifth  agree- 
ment in  May-June  1975,  in  which  the 
United  States  participated,  the  executive 
branch  undertook  an  intensive  interagency 
review  of  the  new  agreement.  This  study 
concluded  that  U.S.  membership  in  the  fifth 
agreement  would  have  no  adverse  eco- 
nomic effects  on  the  United  States.  We  do, 
however,  see  a  number  of  benefits  stem- 
ming from  membership: 

— Through  its  membership  in  the  Inter- 


August  23,  1976 


277 


national  Tin  Council  the  United  States  will 
be  able  to  influence  the  Council's  policies 
affecting  the  long-term  supply  of  tin.  This 
will  afford  some  protection  to  American 
industry  and  consumers,  who  must  rely  on 
imports  from  the  producer  members  of  the 
tin  agreement  for  the  major  part  of  their 
tin  needs. 

— Our  foreign  relations  will  benefit  from 
our  support  for  this  longstanding  interna- 
tional agreement.  Moreover,  our  member- 
ship in  the  agreement  will  provide  further 
support  for  the  concept  of  producer-con- 
sumer cooperation  on  raw  materials. 

— Since  the  First  International  Tin 
Agreement  in  1956,  both  producer  and  con- 
sumer members  have  strongly  desired  that 
the  United  States,  the  world's  largest  single 
consumer  of  tin,  join  them  in  their  work. 
Our  accommodation  of  this  desire  will  have 
a  positive  effect  on  our  relations  with  these 
countries. 

— Our  membership  would  constitute  a 
clear  affirmation  of  our  willingness  to  join 
with  producers  and  consumers  in  seeking 
solutions  to  outstanding  raw  material  prob- 
lems on  a  case-by-case  basis.  It  would  be  a 
demonstration  of  our  desire  to  be  forth- 
coming toward  the  developing  world  while 
at  the  same  time  safeguarding  our  national 
interests. 

I  am  aware,  Mr.  Chairman,  that  U.S. 
membership  in  the  tin  agreement  is  op- 
posed by  a  number  of  companies  in  the 
steel  industry  and  in  the  tin  trade.  Such 
opposition  was  largely  responsible  for  our 
remaining  out  of  the  first  four  tin  agree- 
ments. As  I  understand  it,  industry  opposi- 
tion is  based  largely  on  the  following 
grounds : 

— The  tin  agreements  have  not  been  suc- 
cessful in  protecting  consumers  from  stead- 
ily rising  tin  prices. 

— U.S.  membership  in  the  tin  agreement 
will  set  a  precedent  and  be  a  forerunner 
to  membership  in  commodity  agreements 
for  other  minerals  and  metals. 

— U.S.  membership  could  damage  our 
relations   with    producer   members   of   the 


agreement  in  the  event  we  take  positions 
opposed  to  theirs  in  the  International  Tin 
Council. 

In  reply,  I  would  first  agree  that  tin 
prices  have  risen  since  the  first  tin  agree- 
ment in  1956.  However,  a  rising  price  trend 
does  not  of  itself  indicate  instability.  The 
costs  of  producing  tin  have  also  risen  dur- 
ing the  past  20  years,  with  labor,  equip- 
ment, power,  and  transportation  all  costing 
more.  Few,  if  any,  raw  materials  have  es- 
caped these  increased  costs  of  production 
and  consequent  higher  prices. 

Although  tin  prices  have  risen,  for  most 
of  the  20  years  since  the  first  tin  agreement 
they  remained  generally  stable  relative  to 
the  prices  of  other  raw  materials.  Perhaps 
the  most  dramatic  departure  from  general 
price  stability  occurred  during  1973-74, 
when  tin  prices  rose  to  record  levels.  How- 
ever, this  price  surge,  which  subsequently 
collapsed,  occurred  during  the  most  inten- 
sive worldwide  commodity  boom  since  the 
Korean  war.  The  1973-74  boom  saw  the 
prices  of  wheat,  soybeans,  copper,  and 
other  commodities,  not  to  mention  the  price 
of  oil,  reaching  record  levels.  With  very 
few  exceptions,  none  of  these  commodities 
were  covered  by  commodity  agreements. 

Opponents  of  the  tin  agreements  have 
also  charged  that  in  practice  the  tin  agree- 
ments have  favored  producer  interests  over 
those  of  consumers.  While  there  may  be 
some  valid  objections  to  the  way  the  agree- 
ments have  operated  in  the  past,  inasmuch 
as  the  United  States  chose  not  to  join  any 
of  the  first  four  Tin  Agreements  it  is  diflfi- 
cult  for  us  to  criticize  their  operations.  As 
a  member,  the  United  States  could  have 
had  a  significant  voice  in  their  implementa- 
tion. Instead,  we  chose  voluntarily  to  forgo 
such  a  role. 

To  cite  an  example,  tin  export  controls 
are  one  issue  which  the  United  States  as  a 
member  could  have  aflfected.  Basically,  we 
oppose  the  use  of  export  controls  in  de- 
fending the  floor  price,  except  under 
extraordinary  circumstances.  We  believe 
that   unless   they   are   used   sparingly   and 


278 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


lifted  as  soon  as  they  are  no  longer  re- 
quired, export  controls  and  production  cut- 
backs add  a  "stop-go"  element  which  could 
affect  tin  supplies  and  contribute  to  price 
instability.  As  a  member  of  the  tin  agree- 
ment the  United  States  will  review  very 
carefully  any  proposals  for  export  controls 
and  will  oppose  their  imposition  unless  it 
believes  them  to  be  absolutely  necessary. 

As  for  the  concern  expressed  that  U.S. 
membership  in  the  tin  agreement  will  be  a 
forerunner  to  participation  in  commodity 
agreements  for  other  minerals  and  metals, 
our  policy  has  been  and  will  continue  to  be 
that  of  examining  any  proposals  for  com- 
modity agreements  on  a  case-by-case  basis. 
Participation  in  the  tin  agreement  in  no 
way  implies  our  possible  participation  in 
agreements  for  other  minerals  or  metals. 
I  might  add  here  that  other  consumer  mem- 
bers of  the  tin  agreement  have  joined  us  in 
opposing  proposals  for  commodity  agree- 
ments where  we  have  felt  such  agreements 
to  be  unfeasible  or  unnecessary. 

Finally,  concern  has  been  expressed  that 
our  relations  with  tin-producing  countries 
might  be  damaged  as  the  result  of  our  tak- 
ing differing  positions  in  the  Tin  Council. 
If  we  were  to  accept  this  argument,  we 
would  probably  have  to  withdraw  from 
most  international  organizations  to  which 
we  belong  and  to  refrain  from  participat- 
ing in  world  affairs.  This,  as  a  nation,  we 
are  not  prepared  to  do.  The  United  States 
belongs  to  a  range  of  international  organi- 
zations in  which  it  takes  positions  based 
on  its  national  interests.  These  positions  do 
not  always  agree  with  those  of  other  coun- 
tries with  which  we  share  common  overall 
interests  and  enjoy  friendly  relations. 

As  in  other  international  organizations, 
our  positions  in  the  Tin  Council  will  be 
based  on  our  national  interests.  From  time 
to  time  we  will  find  it  necessary  to  disagree 
with  the  positions  taken  by  producer  mem- 
bers. However,  we  do  not  see  this  as  affect- 
ing our  basically  friendly  relations  with 
them. 

I  might  add  here  that  both  before  and 
after  reaching  a  decision  to  seek  member- 


August  23,  1976 


ship  in  the  Fifth  International  Tin  Agree- 
ment, the  executive  branch  consulted  with 
American  industry  and  organizations  and 
took  their  views  into  consideration.  We  will 
continue  to  do  so.  Our  delegation  to  the 
first  session  of  the  Tin  Council  under  the 
new  agreement  included  industry  advisers 
representing  American  can  manufacturers, 
solder  producers,  the  single  U.S.  tin 
smelter,  and  the  tin  trade.  We  believe  that 
broad  industry  representation  is  extremely 
useful  in  providing  technical  advice  to  our 
delegation,  and  we  intend  to  continue  this 
practice. 

Extension  of  International  Wheat  Agreement 

The  Administration  has  also  requested 
the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate  to 
ratification  of  the  Protocols  for  the  Third 
Extension  of  the  Wheat  Trade  and  Food 
Aid  Conventions,  constituting  the  Interna- 
tional Wheat  Agreement  of  1971.  Secretary 
[of  Agriculture  Earl  L.]  Butz  signed  the 
protocols  for  the  United  States  on  April  5, 
and  the  United  States  applied  them 
provisionally  June  17.  A  conference  of  gov- 
ernments in  London  on  June  29  determined 
that  conditions  had  been  met  for  entry  into 
force  of  the  extending  protocols. 

The  protocols  extend  the  International 
Wheat  Agreement  until  June  30,  1978. 
This  two-year  extension  of  the  Interna- 
tional Wheat  Agreement,  following  two 
one-year  extensions,  was  sought  by  the 
United  States  and  supported  by  other 
major  exporters  and  importers  of  wheat. 

Extension  of  the  Wheat  Trade  Conven- 
tion maintains  the  framework  for  interna- 
tional cooperation  on  wheat  trade  matters. 
The  extension  of  the  Food  Aid  Convention 
continues  the  commitment  of  the  adhering 
parties  to  provide  minimum  annual  quanti- 
ties of  food  aid.  The  contributions  of  the 
United  States  under  the  convention  are 
made  up  of  commodities  sold  concession- 
ally  or  donated  under  Public  Law  480  or 
U.S.  assistance  programs.  All  members  of 
the  Food  Aid  Convention  have  now  de- 
posited    ratifications     or     provisional     ap- 


279 


plications  of  the  third  extending  protocol. 

The  importance  of  the  International 
Wheat  Council,  established  by  the  Inter- 
national Wheat  Agreement,  goes  beyond 
information  exchange.  The  Council  has 
served  as  the  principal  forum  for  discus- 
sion of  one  of  the  key  initiatives  of  the 
World  Food  Conference,  the  establishment 
of  an  international  system  of  nationally 
held  grain  reserves.  Disappearance  within 
this  decade  of  large  grain  stocks  has  made 
the  maintenance  of  adequate  world  grain 
supplies  more  vulnerable  to  fluctuations  in 
production.  The  U.S.  proposal  for  a  food 
security  reserve  in  the  context  of  a  new 
International  Wheat  Agreement  is  de- 
signed to  provide  greater  assurance  to  all 
nations  that  adequate  supplies  will  be 
available  despite  unpredictable  shortfalls 
in  global  production. 

After  the  United  States  presented  its 
reserves  proposal  in  the  International 
Wheat  Council  in  London  in  September 
1975,  a  number  of  countries  indicated  that 
these  discussions  should  also  include 
broader  grain  trade  questions.  The  Euro- 
pean Community  (EC),  in  particular,  in- 
sisted that  negotiations  on  reserves  should 
be  a  part  of  the  overall  multilateral  trade 
negotiations  underway  in  Geneva  under 
the  auspices  of  the  GATT  [General  Agree- 
ment on  Tariffs  and  Trade]  and  not  a  sepa- 
rate negotiation  in  the  Wheat  Council.  I 
am  pleased  to  report  that  this  procedural 
obstacle  was  overcome  at  the  beginning  of 
the  year  and  that  discussions  on  reserves 
have  continued  in  the  International  Wheat 
Council  with  EC  participation. 

This  does  not  mean  that  the  issue  of  the 
relationship  between  food  security  and 
trade  relations  has  disappeared  from  the 
discussion.  On  the  contrary,  the  relation- 
ship remains  a  central  element  in  the  de- 
bate that  continues  in  both  London  and 
Geneva.  The  major  obstacle  to  more  rapid 
progress  on  the  reserves  initiative  has  been 
the  stand  taken  by  many  countries,  includ- 
ing many  developing  countries,  that  the 
negotiations  should  give  greater  emphasis 
to  the  establishment  of  price  objectives  and 
particularly    price    floors   on    world    grain 

280 


markets  rather  than  to  the  provision  of 
adequate  supplies  of  grain  during  periods 
of  severe  world  shortage.  The  United 
States  regards  this  focus  on  the  mainte- 
nance of  market  prices  as  an  unfortunate 
diversion  from  the  strategy  for  improved 
world  food  security  set  forth  at  the  World 
Food  Conference. 

Talks  in  the  International  Wheat  Coun- 
cil will  continue  in  the  months  to  come.  The 
United  States  favors  the  early  establish- 
ment of  a  reserves  system  within  a  new 
International  Wheat  Agreement  and  be- 
lieves that  the  trade  implications  of  a  nego- 
tiation on  reserves  should  be  taken  into 
account  in  the  multilateral  trade  negotia- 
tions. The  World  Food  Council  at  its  min- 
isterial meeting  in  Rome  last  month 
registered  concern  over  the  slow  progress 
on  establishing  a  reserves  system.  We  share 
that  concern  and  hope  that  the  Food  Coun- 
cil's endorsement  will  strengthen  our  ef- 
forts for  an  early  and  successful  conclusion 
of  the  International  Wheat  Council's  work. 

Let  me  close  by  commenting  briefly  on 
consumer  interests  and  the  International 
Wheat  Agreement.  The  American  con- 
sumer wants  assured  supplies  of  wheat  at 
reasonably  stable  prices.  Because  we  have 
open  markets  for  agricultural  products,  the 
price  the  American  consumer  must  pay  de- 
pends importantly  on  overall  world  supply. 
Wheat  prices  must  be  high  enough  to  pro- 
vide adequate  incentives  for  farmers  to 
produce  the  increasing  amounts  of  wheat 
the  world  needs.  But  if  they  are  too  high, 
there  is  danger  of  excess  supply,  which 
will  either  reduce  production  or  require 
large  government  subsidies  to  farmers  to 
continue  growing  wheat.  We  seek  a  new 
International  Wheat  Agreement  in  which 
prices  are  determined  by  market  forces. 
At  the  same  time,  in  order  to  insure  that 
year-to-year  fluctuations  in  production  do 
not  result  in  very  wide  price  movements, 
it  is  important  to  reestablish  world  food 
reserves  along  the  lines  we  have  proposed. 

Ratification  of  these  protocols  is  impor- 
tant to  allow  continuing  U.S.  participation 
in  the  activities  of  the  International  Wheat 
Council,   to    demonstrate    our   support   for 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


food  assistance  to  needy  nations,  and  to 
continue  our  role  in  the  deliberations  for  a 
successor  agreement  to  the  present  Inter- 
national Wheat  Agreement  which  we  hope 
will  enhance  assurance  of  continuing  avail- 
ability of  adequate  wheat  supplies. 

In  closing  this  statement,  Mr.  Chairman, 
I  would  like  to  reiterate  the  relationship  of 
these  three  agreements  to  our  overall  com- 
modity policy. 

Our  policy  is  based  on  case-by-case  con- 
sideration of  individual  commodity  prob- 
lems. We  have  considered  each  of  the  three 
agreements  before  you  today  on  their  own 
merits.  They  are  being  presented  to  your 
committee  together  only  for  the  sake  of 
time  and  convenience.  They  are  not  sub- 
stantively linked  except  for  the  fact  that 
they  represent  three  of  the  five  commodity 
agreements  extant  today  (we  have  rejected 
the  cocoa  agreement,  and  sugar  will  not 
be  renegotiated  until  next  year). 

Support  of  the  three  agreements  will  re- 
inforce the  credibility  of  our  case-by-case 
approach,  and  I  commend  them  for  the 
favorable  consideration  of  your  committee. 


Senate  Asked  To  Approve  Protocol 
to  North  Pacific  Fur  Seal  Convention 

Message  From  President  Ford  ' 

To  the  Senate  of  the  United  States: 

With  a  view  to  receiving  the  advice  and 
consent  of  the  Senate  to  ratification,  I 
transmit  herewith  the  Protocol  amending 
the  Interim  Convention  on  Conservation  of 
North  Pacific  Fur  Seals,  signed  at  Wash- 
ington on  February  9,  1957,  which  Protocol 
was  signed  at  Washington  on  May  7,  1976, 
on  behalf  of  the  Governments  of  Canada, 
Japan,  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Repub- 
lics, and  the  United  States  of  America. 
The  provisions  of  the  Protocol  were  ini- 


'  Transmitted  on  July  19  (text  from  White  House 
press  release) ;  also  printed  as  S.  Ex.  M,  94th  Cong.. 
2d  sess.,  which  includes  the  texts  of  the  protocol  and 
the  report  of  the  Department  of  State. 

August  23,  1976 


tially  formulated  by  the  North  Pacific  Fur 
Seal  Conference  held  at  Washington  from 
December  1  through  December  12,  1975. 

I  transmit  also,  for  the  information  of  the 
Senate,  the  report  by  the  Department  of 
State  with  respect  to  the  Protocol. 

This  Protocol  is  significant  because  it 
permits  the  continuation  in  force,  with 
minor  modifications,  of  the  only  interna- 
tional agreement  affording  protection  to 
the  fur  seals  of  the  North  Pacific.  I  recom- 
mend that  the  Senate  give  favorable  con- 
sideration to  this  Protocol  at  an  early  date 
because  all  the  States  party  to  the  Interim 
Convention  must  ratify  the  Protocol  prior 
to  October  14,  1976  to  prevent  the  lapse  ol 
the  Interim  Convention. 

Gerald  R.  Ford. 

The  White  House,  Juhj  19,  1976. 


Senate  Asked  To  Approve  Convention 
on  Authentication  of  Documents 

Message  From  President  Ford ' 

To  the  Senate  of  the  United  States: 

With  a  view  to  receiving  the  advice  and 
consent  of  the  Senate  to  ratification,  I 
transmit  herewith  a  certified  copy  of  the 
Convention  Abolishing  the  Requirement 
of  Legalisation  for  Foreign  Public  Docu- 
ments adopted  at  the  Ninth  Session  of  the 
Hague  Conference  on  Private  International 
Law  on  October  26,  1960.  The  Convention, 
which  was  opened  for  signature  on  Oc- 
tober 5,  1961,  is  presently  in  force  in 
twenty  countries. 

This  is  the  third  convention  in  the  field 
of  international  civil  procedure  produced 
by  the  Hague  Conference  on  Private  Inter- 
national Law  to  be  sent  to  the  Senate.  It 
complements  the  Conventions  on  the  Serv- 
ice  Abroad   of  Judicial   and  Extrajudicial 


'  Transmitted  on  July  19  (text  from  White  House 
press  release);  also  printed  as  S.  Ex.  L,  94th  Cong., 
2d  sess.,  which  includes  the  texts  of  the  convention 
and  the  report  of  the  Department  of  State. 


281 


Documents  in  Civil  and  Commercial  Mat- 
ters and  on  the  Taking  of  Evidence  Abroad 
in  Civil  and  Commercial  Matters  which  are 
already  in  force  for  the  United  States  to 
assist  litigants  and  their  lawyers  in  civil 
proceedings  abroad. 

The  provisions  of  the  Convention  contain 
short  and  simple  rules  which  will  reduce 
costs  and  delays  for  litigants  in  inter- 
national cases.  The  provisions  would  elimi- 
nate unnecessary  authentications  of  docu- 
ments without  affecting  the  integrity  of 
such  documents.  They  would  also  free 
judges  and  other  officials,  who  presently 
certify  signatures,  from  the  time-consuming 
and  unnecessary  administrative  process 
presently  required. 

The  Convention  has  been  thoroughly 
studied  by  the  bench  and  bar  of  the  United 
States.  Its  ratification  is  supported  by  the 
Judicial  Conference  of  the  United  States, 
by  the  American  Bar  Association,  and  by 
other  bar  associations  at  the  state  and  local 
level. 

I  recommend  that  the  Senate  of  the 
United  States  promptly  give  its  advice  and 
consent  to  the  ratification  of  this  Conven- 
tion. 

Gerald  R.  Ford. 

The  White  House,  July  19,  1976. 


Congressional  Documents 
Relating  to  Foreign  Policy 

94th  Congress,  2d  Session 

Nuclear  Weapons  Proliferation  and  the  International 
Atomic  Energy  Agency.  An  analytical  report 
prepared  for  the  Senate  Committee  on  Government 
Operations  by  the  Congressional  Research  Serv- 
ice, Library  of  Congress.  March  1976.  139  pp..  11 
appendixes. 

Temporary  Reduction  of  Duty  on  Levulose.  Report 
of  the  House  Committee  on  Ways  and  Means  to 
accompany  H.R.  11259.  H.  Rept.  94-1064.  April  29, 
1976.  4  pp. 

Temporary  Suspension  of  Duty  on  Mattress  HIanks 
of  Rubber  Latex.  Report  of  the  House  Committee 
on  Ways  and  Means  to  accompany  H.R.  1160.5. 
H.  Rept.  94-1066.  April  29,  1976.  4  pp. 


State  Department  Authorization  Act,  Fiscal  Year 
1977.  Report  of  the  House  Committee  on  Interna- 
tional Relations  to  accompany  H.R.  13179.  H.  Rept. 
94-1083.  May  4,  1976.  15  pp. 

U.S.  Policy  Toward  Africa.  Report  of  the  Senate 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  to  accompany  S. 
Res.  436.  S.  Rept.  94-780.  May  5,  1976.  13  pp. 


INTERNATIONAL   ORGANIZATIONS 
AND  CONFERENCES 


U.S.  Abstains  on  U.N.  Resolution 
on  Incursion  Into  Zambia 

Folloiving  is  a  statement  made  in  the  U.N. 
Security  Council  by  U.S.  Representative 
William  W.  Scranton  on  July  30,  together 
with  the  text  of  a  resolution  adopted  by  thr 
Council  that  day. 

STATEMENT  BY  AMBASSADOR  SCRANTON 

USUN   press  release  85  dated  July  30 

The  U.S.  delegation  has  followed  this  de- 
bate with  particular  interest  and  concern. 
As  members  of  this  Council  know,  my  gov- 
ernment is  involved  in  a  most  significant 
and  important  effort  to  assist  the  nations 
and  the  peoples  of  southern  Africa  to  find 
a  solution  to  the  complicated  political  and 
human  problems  of  their  region.  We  were 
therefore  deeply  alarmed  at  the  announce- 
ment by  the  Government  of  Zambia  of  an 
mcursion  into  their  territory  on  July  11. 
We  were  deeply  distressed  to  hear  of  the 
loss  of  24  lives  and  the  wounding  of  45 
other  individuals.  We  were  also  concerned 
that  the  sensitive  and  delicate  process  of 
consultations  concerning  southern  Africa 
would  be  materially  harmed  by  this  in- 
cursion. 

Let  me  state  first,  and  forcefully,  that 
my  government  condemns  this  incursion 
into  Zambia.  We  oppose  unequivocally  the 
violation  of  Zambia's  territorial  sover- 
eignty  and    integrity.    We  deeply   deplore 


282 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


he  loss  of  life  and  the  destruction  of 
property. 

Further,  it  is  important  to  record  that 
^outh  Africa  has  no  legal  right,  in  our  opin- 
on,  to  continue  to  administer  the  Territory 
bf  Namibia.  It  has  no  legal  right  to  station 
;roops  on  Namibian  soil.  Thus  it  has  no 
jasis  to  complain  of  incursions  into 
>Iamibia.  If  the  South  African  Government 
ivas  responsible  for  this  raid  and  utilized 
;he  territory  of  Namibia  as  the  base  of  its 
jperation,  then  South  Africa  is  clearly  in 
/iolation  of  international  law. 

In  spite  of  our  very  strong  views  on  South 
Africa's  illegal  occupation  of  Namibia,  my 
government  has  a  comment  on  the  evi- 
ience  brought  forth  during  this  debate  to 
determine  the  responsibility  for  the 
July   11   i-aid. 

The  distinguished  Foreign  Minister  of 
Zambia  has  made  a  very  impressive  and 
Well-documented  presentation  of  the  out- 
rages to  which  his  country  has  been  sub- 
jected. No  one  has  denied  that  the  attack 
3n  Sialolo  took  place.  The  Representative 
Df  South  Africa  in  reply  has  simply  said 
:hat  his  government  has  no  knowledge 
whatsoever  of  this  event. 

Under  such  circumstances,  we  believe 
;hat  this  was  a  case  in  which  investigation 
ould  have  produced  a  more  careful  and 
authoritative  statement  on  the  part  of  this 
body;  and  we  regret  that  there  was  no  in- 
clination on  the  part  of  the  members  of 
;his  body  to  authorize  such  an  investiga- 
;ion,  which  we  think  might  have  resulted 
n  strong  Security  Council  action. 

As  a  result,  several  paragraphs  of  this 
resolution  contain  language  which,  in  our 
i^iew,  is  too  categorical  in  light  of  the  evi- 
dence that  has  so  far  been  made  available 
bere. 

Secondly,  and  very  important  to  us,  the 
resolution  has  another  major  shortcoming. 
There  are  currently  efforts  of  a  serious  na- 
ture being  made  to  make  progress  toward 
olutions  in  southern  Africa  which  this 
Council  has  long  advocated.  We  believe 
that  it  would  be  appropriate  for  a  resolu- 
tion which  addressed  any  issue  beyond  the 

August  23,   1976 


immediate  incident  concerned  to  have  wel- 
comed these  efforts  and  to  have  encour- 
aged every  possible  assistance  to  them. 

For  these  reasons,  Mr.  President,  my  del- 
egation has  abstained  on  this  resolution. 


TEXT  OF  RESOLUTION  ' 

The  Security  Council, 

Taking  note  of  the  letter  of  the  representative  of 
the  Republic  of  Zambia  contained  in  document 
S/12147, 

Having  considered  the  statement  of  the  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Republic  of  Zambia, 

Gravely  concerned  at  the  numerous  hostile  and 
unprovoked  acts  by  South  Africa  violating  the  sov- 
ereignty, air  space  and  territorial  integrity  of  the 
Republic  of  Zambia,  resulting  in  death  and  injury  of 
innocent  people  as  well  as  in  the  destruction  of 
property  and  culminating  on  11  July  1976  in  an 
armed  attack  which  resulted  in  the  regrettable  los? 
of  24  innocent  lives  and  the  injury  of  45  other 
persons. 

Gravely  concerned  at  South  Africa's  use  of  the 
international  Territory  of  Namibia  as  a  base  for 
attacking  neighbouring  African  countries. 

Reaffirming  the  legitimacy  of  the  struggle  of  the 
people  of  Namibia  to  liberate  their  country  from  the 
illegal  occupation  of  the  racist  regime  of  South 
Africa, 

Convinced  that  the  continuance  in  time  of  the 
deteriorating  situation  in  southern  Africa  could  con- 
stitute a  threat  to  international  peace  and  security. 

Conscious  of  the  need  to  take  effective  steps  for 
the  prevention  and  removal  of  threats  to  interna- 
tional peace  and  security. 

Recalling  also  its  resolution  300  (1971)  which, 
inter  alia,  called  upon  South  Africa  to  respect  fully 
the  sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity  of  the  Re- 
public of  Zambia, 

Bearing  in  mind  that  all  Member  States  must  re- 
frain in  their  international  relations  from  the  threat 
or  use  of  force  against  the  tei-ritorial  integrity  or 
political  independence  of  any  State,  or  in  any  other 
manner  inconsistent  with  the  purposes  of  the  United 
Nations, 

1.  Strongly  condemns  the  armed  attack  of  South 
Africa  against  the  Republic  of  Zambia,  which  con- 
stitutes a  flagrant  violation  of  the  sovereignty  and 
territorial  integrity  of  Zambia; 

2.  Demands  that  South  Africa  scrupulously  re- 
spect the  independence,  sovereignty,  air  space  and 
territorial  integrity  of  the  Republic  of  Zambia; 


'U.N.  doc.  S/RES/393  (1976);  adopted  by  the 
Council  on  July  30  by  a  vote  of  14-0,  with  1  absten- 
tion (U.S.). 


283 


3.  Demands  that  South  Africa  desist  forthwith 
from  the  use  of  the  international  Territory  of  Nami- 
bia as  a  base  for  launching  armed  attacks  against 
the  Republic  of  Zambia  and  other  African  countries; 

4.  Commends  the  Republic  of  Zambia  and  other 
"frontline"  States  for  their  steadfast  support  of  the 
people  of  Namibia  in  their  legitimate  struggle  for 
the  liberation  of  their  country  from  illegal  occupa- 
tion by  the  racist  regime  of  South  Africa; 

5.  Declares  that  the  liberation  of  Namibia  and 
Zimbabwe  and  the  elimination  of  apartheid  in  South 
Africa  are  necessary  for  the  attainment  of  justice 
and  lasting  peace  in  the  region; 

6.  Further  declares  that,  in  the  event  of  South 
Africa  committing  further  acts  of  violation  of  the 
sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity  of  Zambia,  the 
Security  Council  will  meet  again  to  consider  the 
adoption  of  effective  measures,  in  accordance  with 
the  appropriate  provisions  of  the  United  Nations 
Charter. 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Aviation 

Amendment  to  the  agreement  of  September  25,  1956, 
on  the  joint  financing  of  certain  air  navigation 
services  in  Iceland  to  provide  for  additional  serv- 
ices. Adopted  by  the  ICAO  Council  at  Montreal 
June  14,  1976.  Entered  into  force  June  14,  1976. 

Amendment  of  article  V  of  the  agreement  of  Septem- 
ber 25,  1956,  on  the  joint  financing  of  certain  air 
navigation  services  in  Greenland  and  the  Faroe 
Islands  to  increase  the  financial  limit  for  services. 
Adopted  by  the  ICAO  Council  at  Montreal  June  14, 
1976.  Entered  into  force  June  14,  1976. 

Pollution 

Protocol  relating  to  intervention  on  the  high  seas  in 
cases  of  marine  pollution  by  substances  other  than 
oil.  Done  at  London  November  2,  1973." 
Ratification  deposited:  Sweden,  June  28,  1976. 
Accession  deposited:  Tunisia.   May  4,   1976. 

Refugees 

Protocol  relating  to  the  status  of  refugees.  Done  at 
New   York  January   31,    1967.   Entered   into   force 
October  4,  1967;  for  the  United  States  November  1. 
1968.  TIAS  6577. 
Accession  deposited:  Iran,  July  28,  1976. 

284 


Space 

Convention  on  registration  of  objects  launched  into 
outer  space.  Opened  for  signature  at  New  York 
January   14,   1975.' 

Instrum.ent  of  ratification  signed  by  the  President : 
July  24,  1976. 

Telecommunications 

Partial  revision  of  the  radio  regulations,  Geneva, 
1959,  as  amended  (TIAS  4893,  5603,  6332,  6590, 
7435),  to  establish  a  new  frequency  allotment  for 
high-frequency  radiotelephone  coast  stations,  with 
anne.xes  and  final  protocol.  Done  at  Geneva  June  8, 
1974.  Entered  into  force  January  1,  1976;  for  the 
United  States  April  21,  1976. 

Notification  of  approval:  New  Zealand,  April  27, 
1976.= 

Tourism 

Statutes   of  the   World  Tourism   Organization.   Done 
at  Mexico  City   September  27,   1970.  Entered  into 
force  January  2,  1975;  for  the  United  States  De- 
cember 16,  1975. 
Proclaimed  by  the  President :  July  31,  1976. 


BILATERAL 


Canada 

Agreement  relating  to  the  purchase  by  Canada  of 
18  Lockheed  P-3  long-range  patrol  aircraft,  with 
related  note.  Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at 
Washington  July  6  and  7,  1976.  Entered  into  force 
July  7,  1976. 

Colombia 

Loan  agreement  for  research  and  technical  assist- 
ance to  identify  and  overcome  constraints  to  smal' 
farmer  development,  with  annex.  Signed  at  Bogota 
June  14,  1976.  Entered  into  force  June  14,  1976. 

Guatemala 

Project  agreement  relating  to  assistance  for  Guate- 
mala's earthquake  relief  efforts,  with  annexes 
Signed  at  Guatemala  June  17,  1976.  Entered  intc 
force  June  17,  1976. 

Poland 

Agreement  concerning  fisheries  off  the  coasts  of  tht 
United  States,  with  annexes,  agreed  minutes,  anc 
related  letter.  Signed  at  Warsaw  August  2.  1976 
Enters  into  force  on  a  date  to  be  mutually  agreet 
by  exchange  of  notes. 

Spain 

Agreement  on  procedures  for  mutual  assistance  ir 
connection  with  the  Lockheed  Aircraft  Corpora- 
tion matter,  with  annex.  Signed  at  Washingtor 
July  14,  1976.  Entered  into  force  July  14,  1976 

'  Not  in  force. 

"  Applicable  to  Cook  Islands,  Nine  and  the  Tokelat 
Islands. 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


I  INDEX     August  23,  1976     Vol.  LXXV,  No.  1939 


^  Africa.  The  United  States  and  Africa: 
i  Strengthened  Ties  for  an  Era  of  Challenge 
I      (Kissinger)        257 

1  Arms  Control  and  Disarmament.  Senate  Asked 
'       To  Approve  Treaties  With  U.S.S.R.  on  Nu- 
clear  Explosions    (message    from    President 
I      Ford) 269 

Commodities.  Department  Urges  Support  of 
Coffee  and  Tin  Agreements  and  Protocols 
Extending  Wheat  Agreement   (Greenwald)   .       271 

Congress 

Congressional  Documents  Relating  to  Foreign 
Policy 282 

Department  Urges  Support  of  Coffee  and  Tin 
Agreements  and  Protocols  Extending  Wheat 
Agreement    (Greenwald) 271 

Humanitarian  Problems  in  Lebanon  Discussed 
by   Department   (Habib) 266 

Senate  Asked  To  Approve  Convention  on  Au- 
thentication of  Documents  (message  from 
President    Ford) 281 

Senate  Asked  To  Approve  Protocol  to  North 
Pacific  Fur  Seal  Convention  (message  from 
President    Ford) 281 

Senate  Asked  To  Approve  Treaties  With 
U.S.S.R.  on  Nuclear  Explosions  (message 
from  President  Ford) 269 

Developing  Countries.  The  United  States  and 
Africa:  Strengthened  Ties  for  an  Era  of 
Challenge  (Kissinger) 257 

Economic  Affairs 

Department  Urges  Support  of  Coffee  and  Tin 
Agreements  and  Protocols  Extending  Wheat 
Agreement   (Greenwald) 271 

The  United  States  and  Africa:  Strengthened 
Ties  for  an  Era  of  Challenge  (Kissinger)  .    .      257 

Environment.  Senate  Asked  To  Approve  Proto- 
col to  North  Pacific  Fur  Seal  Convention 
(message  from  President  Ford) 281 

Foreign  Aid.  Humanitarian  Problems  in  Leba- 
non Discussed  by  Department  (Habib)  .     .     .       266 

Law.  Senate  Asked  To  Approve  Convention 
on  Authentication  of  Documents  (message 
from  President  Ford) 281 

Lebanon.  Humanitarian  Problems  in   Lebanon 

Discussed  by  Department   (Habib)   ....       266 

Namibia 

U.S.  Abstains  on  U.N.  Resolution  on  Incursion 
Into  Zambia   (Scranton,  text  of  resolution)   .       282 

The  United  States  and  Africa:  Strengthened 
Ties  for  an  Era  of  Challenge  (Kissinger)  .     .      257 

Presidential  Documents 

Senate  Asked  To  Approve  Convention  on  Au- 
thentication  of   Documents 281 

Senate  Asked  To  Approve  Protocol  to  North 
Pacific  Fur  Seal  Convention 281 

Senate  Asked  To  Approve  Treaties  With 
U.S.S.R.   on   Nuclear  Explosions 269 

Refugees.  Humanitarian  Problems  in  Lebanon 

Discussed  by  Department   (Habib)   ....       266 

South  Africa 

U.S.  Abstains  on  U.N.  Resolution  on  Incursion 

Into  Zambia  (Scranton,  text  of  resolution)  .       282 

The  United  States  and  Africa:  Strengthened 
Ties  for  an  Era  of  Challenge  (Kissinger)  .    .      257 

Southern  Rhodesia.  The  United  States  and 
Africa:  Strengthened  Ties  for  an  Era  of 
Challenge  (Kissinger) 257 


Treaty  Information 

Current  Actions 284 

Department  Urges  Support  of  Coffee  and  Tin 
Agreements  and  Protocols  Extending  Wheat 
Agreement   (Greenwald) 271 

Senate  Asked  To  Approve  Convention  on  Au- 
thentication of  Documents  (message  from 
President   Ford) 281 

Senate  Asked  To  Approve  Protocol  to  North 
Pacific  Fur  Seal  Convention  (message  from 
President    Ford) 281 

Senate  Asked  To  Approve  Treaties  With 
U.S.S.R.  on  Nuclear  Explosions  (message 
from  President  Ford) 269 

U.S.S.R.  Senate  Asked  To  Approve  Treaties 
With  U.S.S.R.  on  Nuclear  Explosions  (mes- 
sage from  President  Ford) 269 

United  Nations.  U.S.  Abstains  on  U.N.  Reso- 
lution on  Incursion  Into  Zambia  (Scranton, 
text   of  resolution) 282 

Zambia.  U.S.  Abstains  on  U.N.  Resolution  on 
Incursion  Into  Zambia  (Scranton,  text  of 
resolution) 282 


Name  Index 

Ford,   President 269,  281 

Greenwald,  Joseph  A 271 

Habib,  Philip  C 266 

Kissinger,    Secretary 257 

Scranton,  William  W 282 


Checklist  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  August  2-8 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 


No.      Date 

360 

t361 
t362 
*363 


8/2 
8/2 


8/4 
8/4 


t364 
t365 


t366 
t367 


8/4 
8/5 


8/6 
8/7 


*368     8/7 


*'369 
1370 
t371 


Sabject 

Kissinger:  National  Urban  League, 

Boston. 
U.S.  and  Poland  sign  new  fisheries 

agreement. 
Robinson:     National     Press     Club, 

Canberra. 
Secretary's     Advisory     Committee 

on     Private     International     Law, 

Sept.  17. 
Kissinger:    letter    to    President    of 

Law  of  the  Sea  Conference. 
ANZUS  Council  communique,  Can- 
berra, Aug.  4. 
Kissinger,  Ansary:   toasts,  Tehran. 
Kissinger,     Ansary:     remarks     to 

press. 
U.S. -Iran     Joint     Commission     for 

Economic     Cooperation,     Tehran, 

Aug.  6-7:  agreed  minutes. 
Kissinger:  arrival,  Lahore. 
Kissinger,  Bhutto:  toasts,  Lahore. 
Joint  U.S.-Afghanistan   statement. 


*  Not  printed. 

t  Held  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


Superintendent   of    Documents 
U.S.  government  printing  office 

WASHINGTON.    DC.    20402 


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/?^o 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 

BULLETIN 


Volume  LXXV 


No.  1940 


August  30,  1976 


INTERDEPENDENCE,  THE  PACIFIC  BASIN,  AND  THE  FUTURE 

Address  by  Deputy  Secretary  Robinson     285 

SHARING  THE  WORLD'S  NATURAL  RESOURCES: 
PROSPECTS  FOR  INTERNATIONAL  COOPERATION 

Address  by  Assistant  Secretary  Greemvald    29A 

DEPARTMENT  DISCUSSES  U.S.  POLICY 
TOWARD  COUNTRIES  OF  THE  HORN  OF  AFRICA 

Statement  by  Assistant  Secretary  Schaufele    300 


THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 

For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE  BULLET  I 


I 


For  ule  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents 

U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 

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PRICE: 

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the    Readers'    Guide   to    Periodical    Literature. 


Vol.  LXXV,  No.  1940 
August  30,  1976 

The  Department  of  State  BULLET 
a    weekly    publication    issued   by 
Office   of  Media   Services,   Bureatt\ 
Public  Affairs,  provides  tJie  public  i 
interested  agencies  of  ttte  governmen\ 
witli  information  on  developments  u 
tfie  field  of  U.S.  foreign  relations 
on  tfte  work  of  tlie  Department 
tlie  Foreign  Service. 
Tfte     BULLETIN     includes     seled 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy,  iss| 
by  the  White  House  and  the  Dep 
ment,      and     statements,     addre» 
and  news  conferences  of  the  Presid 
and  the  Secretary  of  State  and  oC 
officers  of  the  Department,  as  welt 
special  articles  on  various  phasett 
international  affairs  and  the  funetlt 
of    the    Department.     Information   L 
included  concerning  treaties  and  inter' 
national    agreements    to    which 
United   States   is   or  may  becomi 
party  and  on  treaties  of  general  in^ 
national  interest. 
Publications    of    the    Department ' 
State,  United  Nations  documents, 
legislative    material   in    the    field  \ 
international  relations  are  also  U$i 


I  Interdependence,  the  Pacific  Basin,  and  the  Future 


Address  by  Deputy  Secretary  Charles  W.  Robinson 


This  is  my  first  visit  to  Australia  as  an 
officer  of  the  U.S.  Government.  But  I'm  no 
stranger  to  this  part  of  the  world.  In  a  pre- 
vious incarnation  as  a  businessman  I  had 
the  great  privilege,  and  the  great  chal- 
lenge, of  participating  in  the  development 
of  the  natural  resources  of  Western  Aus- 
tralia. 

My  experience  here  reinforced  the  spe- 
cial feeling  I  had  always  had  for  this  coun- 
try. I  recall  that  in  the  1850's  there  was 
significant  migration  from  my  part  of  Cal- 
ifornia, the  San  Francisco  area,  to  this  con- 
tinent. California  was  one  of  the  last 
frontiers  of  America;  and  Calif  ornians 
today  still  have  the  frontier  perception  of 
limitless  possibilities,  a  perception  I  found 
myself  sharing  with  the  Australians  with 
whom  I  worked  here. 

I  am  not  the  first  American  public  offi- 
cial to  note  the  similarity  of  American  and 
!  Australian  history — our  common  ethnic 
background;  our  expansion  over  continent- 
sized  areas;  our  parallel  development  of 
constitutional,  democratic,  representative, 
and  libertarian  political  systems;  our  soci- 
eties characterized  by  informality,  rapid 
upward  mobility,  self-reliance,  and  respect 
for  individual  merit. 

Our  natural  relationship  is  symbolized 
by  Australia's  celebration  of  our  Bicenten- 
nial— here  in  Australia,  in  sending  your 
exquisite  Australian  Ballet  to  the  United 
States,  and  in  the  endowment  of  a  chair  in 


'  Made  before  the  National  Press  Club  at  Canberra, 
Australia,  on  Aug.  4  (text  from  press  release  362). 


Australian  studies  at  Harvard  University. 
When  Australia  celebrates  the  bicenten- 
nial of  the  arrival  of  the  First  Fleet  in  1988, 
I  am  sure  that  the  United  States  will  recip- 
rocate. If  I  am  still  in  public  life — and  it  is 
difficult  for  me  to  look  more  than  a  few 
months  ahead — I  will  certainly  try  to  get  in 
on  the  celebration. 

But  when  Americans  get  together  with 
Australians  it  is  not  merely  a  time  to  note 
the  similarities  of  our  background  and  his- 
tory or  reminisce  about  the  wars  we  have 
fought  side  by  side.  It  is  in  recognition  of 
the  depth  and  breadth  of  our  ties  that  we 
have  for  the  past  25  years  been  allied  as 
partners  in  ANZUS  [Australia,  New 
Zealand,  United  States  Security  Treaty]. 

Formed  in  a  previous  era  of  uncertainty, 
the  ANZUS  Pact  remains  today  of  prime 
importance  to  all  its  signatories.  It  pro- 
vides the  framework  in  which  we  can 
collaborate  to  insure  adequate  defensive 
capabilities  in  Southeast  Asia,  in  the  Pa- 
cific, and  in  the  Indian  Ocean.  Of  course  it 
is  not  the  only  vehicle  for  regional  defense 
cooperation.  The  United  States  continues 
its  defense  commitments  to  certain  coun- 
tries in  the  region,  while  Australia  and 
New  Zealand  have  their  own  defense  co- 
operation with  other  countries  of  the  re- 
gion, such  as  Malaysia  and  Singapore. 

The  ANZUS  Pact  manifests,  in  the  area 
of  military  security,  the  realization  of  its 
partners  that  we  have  a  common  interest 
in  the  peaceful  development  of  the  Pacific 
Basin.  Perhaps  more  important,  the  ANZUS 
Pact  is  symbolic  not  of  the  past  but  of  the 


August  30,  1976 


285 


future — the     interdependent    future — that 
will  be  so  important  to  all  of  us. 

Interdependence  and  the  Pacific  Era 

Until  after  World  War  II  the  expression 
"Pacific  Basin"  meant  more  to  geologists 
than  to  politicians  or  economists.  During 
that  previous  era  of  continental  develop- 
ment, ocean  transportation  had  advanced 
little,  and  the  United  States  and  other  in- 
dustrializing nations  concentrated  on  the 
movement  of  goods  and  people  by  rail  and 
highway. 

But  the  technological  revolution  which 
accelerated  so  rapidly  following  World 
War  II  fundamentally  changed  both  air 
and  sea  transportation  and  transformed 
the  Pacific  from  a  barrier  into  a  bridge. 
The  peoples  of  the  Pacific  Basin  have  been 
brought  together  in  an  increasingly  com- 
plex web  of  economic,  social,  cultural,  and 
security  relationships.  A  significant  factor 
in  that  progress  has  been  the  fantastic 
growth  of  the  Japanese  industrialized  so- 
ciety, the  strong  pull  of  the  U.S.  and  Jap- 
anese economies  on  each  other,  and  the 
impact  of  that  relationship  on  others  in  the 
region. 

Trade  within  the  Pacific  Basin  has  risen 
30  percent  annually  since  1970,  reaching 
$92  billion  in  1974.  Since  1972  U.S.  trade 
with  Pacific  Basin  nations  has  exceeded 
that  with  the  European  Community,  and 
the  expansion  of  the  economies  of  the 
Pacific  has  helped  Australia  and  New 
Zealand  to  adjust  to  Britain's  entry  into  the 
European  Community.  The  emergence  of 
the  northern-tier  economies  such  as  Korea, 
Taiwan,  and  Hong  Kong  as  major  manu- 
facturing exporters  and  higher  earnings 
for  raw  material  exporters  in  the  southern 
tier — Australia,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  for 
example — have  helped  to  swell  the  trade 
flows. 

The  flow  of  investment  within  the  Pa- 
cific Basin  region  has  also  increased  rap- 
idly since  1970.  Much  of  it  has  come  from 
the  United  States  and  Japan,  and  much  of 
the  increase  in  capital  flows  has  gone  to 


raw  material  development  projects  in  Aus- 
tralia as  well  as  other  nations  of  the  south- 
ern tier — Indonesia,  Malaysia,  and  the 
Philippines.  Almost  half  of  the  increase  in 
American  investment  has  been  in  Australia, 
much  of  it  in  the  mining  industry.  Austra- 
lia is  the  world's  fourth  largest  recipient 
of  American  investment.  We  are  the  lead- 
ing foreign  investor  here. 

Japan's  exports  to  Pacific  Basin  coun- 
tries rose  from  $12  billion  in  1970  to  $29 
billion  in  1974,  representing  half  its  total 
global  exports. 

The  increased  importance  of  Australia 
and  Japan  to  each  other  has  been  recog- 
nized by  the  signing  of  the  treaty  between 
your  two  countries  by  Prime  Minister  Era- 
ser in  Tokyo  in  June  of  this  year. 

That  agreement  represents  an  important 
step  forward  because  it  establishes  a  firm 
basis  for  Australian-Japanese  cooperation 
in  trade  and  commerce  and  should  assure 
greater  long-range  stability  for  both  part- 
ners in  their  economic  relations.  The  treaty 
also  serves  U.S.  interests  in  the  growth  and 
stability  of  the  Pacific  Basin. 

Moreover,  the  agreement  further 
strengthens  what  can  be  regarded  as  a 
triangular  axis  of  the  United  States  and 
Canada  in  the  Northeast  Pacific,  Japan  in 
the  Northwest,  and  Australia  and  New 
Zealand  in  the  South  Pacific. 

These  five  countries,  the  industrialized 
and  developed  democracies  of  the  Pacific 
Basin,  have  a  special  role  to  play  in  the 
development  of  this  area.  A  number  of  pri- 
vate businessmen,  including  myself,  recog- 
nized this  in  1967  when  we  organized  the 
Pacific  Basin  Economic  Council,  or  PBEC. 
PBEC  was  designed  to  recognize  our  in- 
creasing interdependence  and  to  foster  de- 
velopment in  that  light.  While  its  aims 
were  modest,  at  one  time  it  did  make  the 
Europeans  nervous;  it  seems  they  felt  that 
only  they  should  be  permitted  to  form  su- 
pranational bodies  and  they  feared  PBEC 
as  a  potential  rival  to  the  Common  Market. 
Among  other  things,  we  developed  a  volun- 
tary code  of  conduct  for  multinational  cor- 
porations, an  idea  recently   picked   up  by 


286 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


the  countries  of  the  Third  World  and  by 
the  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation 
and  Development   (OECD). 

PBEC  continues  as  a  unique  regional 
grouping  of  businessmen  from  the  Pacific 
Basin  who,  in  recognition  of  basin  interde- 
pendence, are  working  together  to  deal 
with  the  region's  growing  number  of  im- 
portant trade  and  investment  issues. 

As  one  nurtured  in  the  world  of  private 
business,  I  am  of  course  a  supporter  of  the 
international  market  system  and  the  inter- 
national application  of  the  principle  of 
comparative  advantage,  which  I  believe  to 
be  largely  responsible  for  the  enormous 
expansion  achieved  in  the  global  economy 
since  World  War  II  and  the  spread  of  the 
benefits  of  economic  prosperity.  As  I  have 
indicated,  this  has  been  particularly  true 
in  the  Pacific  Basin. 

Nevertheless,  today  one  must  recognize 
that  the  reality  of  interdependence  intro- 
duces new  variables  into  the  law  of  com- 
parative advantage.  We  must  be  sensitive 
to  the  challenge  this  poses  for  Adam 
Smith's  invisible  hand  and  be  prepared  to 
adopt  measures  to  insure  more  effective 
functioning  of  the  market  system  to  serve 
national,  regional,  and  global  interests. 

Just  as  the  Japanese  economic  miracle 
and  the  general  increase  in  the  world  gross 
product  has  helped  countries  like  Austra- 
lia, so  the  effects  of  the  1974-75  world  re- 
cession and  inflation  spread  to  all  parts  of 
the  world.  And  even  when  the  world  econ- 
omy is  stable  and  growing,  all  countries 
want  to  maintain  a  degree  of  control  over 
their  own  economic  destiny.  They  want  to 
insure  that  foreign  investment  does  not 
dominate  crucial  sectors  of  the  economy 
and  that  the  trade  balance  does  not  de- 
pend too  heavily  on  any  single  export,  or 
the  domestic  economy  on  supplies  from  a 
single  foreign  source.  They  want  to  insure 
that  other  countries  do  not  follow  "beggar 
thy  neighbor"  policies  aimed  at  solving 
their  own  economic  problems  at  the  ex- 
pense of  others — a  game  in  which  all  end 
up  as  losers. 


Development  and   the  Pacific   Basin 

Despite  the  problems  of  the  industrial- 
ized democracies,  we  still  collectively  dom- 
inate the  world  economy  and  hold  in  trust 
the  values  of  democracy  and  individual 
freedom  and  dignity.  While  we  make  mis- 
takes, for  which  we  criticize  ourselves  pas- 
sionately and  bitterly,  we  remain  a  magnet 
for  people  in  the  Communi.st  countries  as 
well  as  in  the  developing  nations  of  the 
Third  World.  And  the  increased  coordina- 
tion and  cooperation  of  the  industrialized 
democracies,  particularly  through  the 
OECD,  is  essential  to  turning  international 
economic  interdependence  to  our  common 
benefit. 

In  the  Tokyo  round  of  the  multilateral 
trade  negotiations  at  Geneva,  the  industri- 
alized countries  are  hoping  to  move  toward 
the  further  reduction  of  tariffs,  as  well  as 
to  attack  seriously,  for  the  first  time  in  such 
an  international  forum,  nontariff  barriers 
to  trade. 

In  the  future  we  must  also  cooperate 
closely  among  ourselves  in  our  relations 
with  the  Communist  countries  to  make  sure 
that  our  drive  for  exports  does  not  com- 
promise our  strategic  interests,  that  their 
centrally  controlled  economies  do  not  ex- 
ploit our  market  systems,  and  that  the  po- 
tential expansion  of  our  economic  relations 
with  those  countries  develops  in  a  way  that 
encourages  moderation  in  Communist  be- 
havior, strengthens  the  vested  interests  in 
peaceful  coexistence,  and  enhances  the 
prospects  for  individual  freedom  for  their 
people. 

And,  of  transcending  importance,  our  in- 
dustrialized democracies  will  have  to  con- 
tinue and  expand  our  cooperation  in 
developing  new  approaches  to  the  problem 
of  world  poverty.  We  cannot  expect  our 
own  relative  prosperity,  stability,  and  se- 
curity to  continue  indefinitely — in  the  Pa- 
cific Basin  or  in  the  world  as  a  whole — if 
billions  of  people  in  the  developing  coun- 
tries feel  a  sense  of  injustice,  deprivation, 
f lustration,  and  resentment  at  their  inabil- 
ity to  better  their  own  lot. 


August  30,  1976 


287 


Fortunately,  nowhere  in  the  world  are 
the  possibilities  and  benefits  of  economic 
cooperation  among  the  developed  and  de- 
veloping nations  greater  than  in  the  Pacific 
Basin. 

Most  developing  countries  in  the  region 
grew  at  annual  rates  of  6-7  percent  for  the 
entire  decade  prior  to  the  1973  oil  em- 
bargo; many  have  continued  to  flourish  de- 
spite the  global  recession.  Among  the 
developing  countries  of  the  Pacific  region 
few  are  massively  overpopulated ;  most 
have  talented  entrepreneurs  and  capable 
administrators;  most  governments  of  the 
region  reject  the  dogmatic  straitjacket  of 
Marxist  economics.  Of  course  there  are 
wide  variations  among  them.  Some,  particu- 
larly countries  like  South  Korea,  Taiwan, 
Hong  Kong,  and  Singapore,  have  devel- 
oped highly  labor-intensive  economies  and 
are  rapidly  approaching  the  ranks  of  the 
industrialized  ;  others,  like  Indonesia,  Thai- 
land, Malaysia,  and  the  Philippines,  are 
rich  in  natural  resources  but  still  poor  in 
terms  of  per  capita  income. 

The  overall  economic  success  of  these 
countries  has  no  doubt  made  them  more 
moderate  than  some  in  their  attitudes  to- 
ward the  present  international  economic 
order,  but  the  post-1973  world  economic  re- 
cession has  stimulated  a  desire  among  the 
developing  countries  to  diversify  their  eco- 
nomic links  and  reduce  their  dependence 
on  their  industrialized  partners. 

All  countries  of  this  region — developed 
and  developing  alike — share  an  interest  in 
an  economic  system  which  insures  steady, 
noninflationary  growth  and  expands  the 
opportunities  for  our  peoples.  And  we  must 
recognize  that  if  economic  development  is 
to  strengthen  stability,  it  must  enhance  na- 
tional self-reliance,  with  emphasis  on  equal 
opportunity  for  the  economies  of  the  devel- 
oping countries  of  the  region. 

Finally,  we  must  all  deal  with  each  other 
on  the  basis  of  parity  and  dignity,  seeking 
responsible  progress  on  issues  such  as  the 


liberalization  of  trade  and  the  reduction  of 
trade  barriers;  the  expansion  of  investment 
opportunities,  combined  with  fair  relations, 
between  foreign  investors  and  host  govern-j 
ments;  and  the  transfer  of  technology.  Wej 
must  all  cooperate  to  improve  the  effec-j 
tiveness  of  established  regional  institutions! 
.-■■uch  as  the  Asian  Development  Bank  and; 
the  U.N.  Economic  and  Social  Commission 
for  Asia  and  the  Pacific  and  encourage — 
but  not  interfere  in — the  economic  cooper- 
ative efforts  of  the  Association  of  Southeast 
Asian  Nations.  We  should  support  the  cre- 
ation of  new  institutions  such  as  the  Inter- 
national Fund  for  Agricultural  Develop- 
ment and  the  International  Resources 
Bank,  which  Secretary  Kissinger  proposed 
last  May  at  the  Fourth  U.N.  Conference  on 
Trade  and  Development  in  Nairobi.  The 
Resources  Bank  would  encourage  the  inter- 
national flow  of  capital,  management,  and 
technology  required  for  a  rational  develop- 
ment of  global  resources  with  equitable , 
sharing  of  the  benefits. 

Contributions  of  United  States  and  Australia 

The  nations  of  the  Pacific  Basin — North- 
west, Northeast,  and  South;  industrialized.! 
democracies  and  Third  World  societies; 
raw  material  producers  and  industrial  cen- 
ters— have  before  them  the  opportunity  to 
expand  cooperation  in  ways  which  will  en- 
hance prosperity  and  security  and  demon- 
strate to  the  world  how  diverse  peoples 
may  work  together  to  the  mutual  benefit 
of  all. 

We  Americans  know  we  must  play  an 
important  role  in  this  effort.  We  realize 
that  the  postwar  era  is  over;  the  United 
States  can  no  longer  seek  to  overwhelm 
international  problems  through  applica- 
tion of  its  power — economically  or  militar- 
ily. 

Yet  we  know  that  we  cannot  return  to 
the  earlier  and  simpler  era  of  American 
isolationism.  Despite  our  setbacks  and  dis- 


288 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ippointments  in  Southeast  Asia  and  the 
oas.sionate  dissension  they  created  for  us 
it  home,  Americans  recognize  that  our  own 
trosperity  and  security  are  inextricably  re- 
ated  to  that  of  the  world.  And  Americans 
\nn\v  that  the  Pacific  Basin  is  an  increas- 
n^ly  important  part  of  that  world.  We 
lave  adjusted  to  the  changes  in  the  secu- 
ity  map  of  the  region;  but  where  we  are 
.vanted  and  committed,  we  will  stay. 

Australia  plays  a  vital  role  in  the  con- 
inuing  stability  and  development  of  the 
Pacific  Basin.  Australia  is  a  country  of  the 
South,  with  much  in  common  with  the  in- 
lustrialized  North;  a  country  located  in 
he  Orient  which  shares  the  heritage  and 
/alues  of  the  West;  an  industrialized  coun- 
ry  which  shares  with  many  developing 
countries  the  role  of  producer  and  exporter 
)f  commodities  and  wishes  to  avoid  exces- 
dve  dependence  on  the  economy  of  any 
)ther  country.  You  can  make  a  fundamen- 
al  contribution  to  enhancing  the  under- 
standing among  the  industrialized  and  the 
leveloping  countries  of  the  Pacific  Basin 
ind  thereby  contribute  to  peace,  prosper- 
ty,  and  progress  for  the  entire  region. 

Australia  and  the  United  States  recog- 
Tize  that  the  advanced  countries  of  the 
.vorld  can  ignore  the  needs  of  the  less  ad- 
vanced only  at  the  risk  of  losing  what  we 
wish  to  keep  and  defend.  Recognition  of 
;his  reality  confronts  us  not  with  insur- 
nountable  obstacles  but  with  the  funda- 
nental  challenge  of  our  era. 

We  of  the  advanced  countries  have 
earned  to  extend  life  through  improved 
lutrition  and  the  prevention  of  contagious 
lisease,  to  harness  the  atom  and  go  to  the 
Moon  and  Mars.  From  all  these  things  the 
people  of  our  nations  have  benefited.  The 
:hallenge  of  our  time  is  to  extend  these 
jenefits  to  all  mankind  and  to  build  a 
A'orld  in  which  none  suffer  from  want 
ind  opportunity  is  there  for  all  who  will 
?rasp  it. 

This  can  and  must  be  our  goal  as  we 
nove  forward  in  this  era  of  the  Pacific. 


ANZUS  Council  Meeting  Held 
at  Canberra 

Folloiving  is  the  text  of  a  communique  is- 
sued at  Canberra  on  Atigust  4  at  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  25th  meeting  of  the  ANZUS 
Council. 

I'less  release  365  dated   August  5 

The  ANZUS  Council  held  its  twenty-fifth 
meeting  in  Canberra  on  3  and  4  August 
1976.  Attending  were  the  Honourable  B.  E. 
Talboys,  Deputy  Prime  Mini.ster  and  Min- 
ister for  Foreign  Affairs  of  New  Zealand; 
the  Honourable  Charles  W.  Robinson,  Dep- 
uty Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States; 
and  the  Honourable  Andrew  Peacock,  Min- 
ister for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  the  Honour- 
able D.  J.  Killen,  Minister  for  Defence,  of 
Australia. 

The  Council  members  exchanged  views 
on  a  wide  range  of  issues.  They  noted  that 
consultation  and  cooperation  had  charac- 
terized the  work  of  the  Council  during  the 
quarter  century  of  change  since  the 
ANZUS  Treaty  [Australia,  New  Zealand, 
United  States  Security  Treaty]  was  con- 
cluded ;  and  expressed  their  confidence 
that  the  close  relationship  among  the  three 
countries,  based  as  it  is  on  a  shared  com- 
munity of  interests,  would  endure  and  be 
further   developed. 

The  Council  members  expressed  support 
for  the  fabric  of  negotiations  which  had 
been  developed  between  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union  and  noted  that  the  at- 
tempt to  stabilize  the  balance  between  the 
most  powerful  nations  is  an  important 
precondition  of  an  enduring  structure  of 
peace. 

The  Council  reviewed  the  situation  in 
Korea  and  North  East  Asia  and  empha- 
sized its  interest  in  the  maintenance  of 
peace  and  stability  in  the  area.  In  particu- 
lar, the  Council  noted  the  close  relations 
between  each  of  the  ANZUS  partners  and 
Japan  and  welcomed  the  signature  of  the 
basic  Treaty  of  Friendship  and  Cooperation 


August  30,  1976 


289 


between  Australia  and  Japan  concluded  on 
16  June  1976. 

The  Council  noted  the  potentially  impor- 
tant contribution  of  the  People's  Republic 
of  China  in  the  affairs  of  the  Asian/Pacific 
region  and,  generally,  in  world  affairs. 

The  Council  reviewed  recent  develop- 
ments in  the  South  Pacific  and  noted  the 
general  increase  in  external  awareness  of 
the  region.  The  Council  reaffirmed  the  im- 
portance which  it  attached  to  the  security 
of  the  region  and  in  this  connection  empha- 
sized the  contribution  to  be  made  by  steady 
and  sustained  economic  progress.  The 
Council  noted  the  intention  of  Australia 
and  New  Zealand  to  give  greater  priority 
to  the  South  Pacific  in  their  development 
assistance  programs.  It  also  welcomed  the 
growing  sense  of  regionalism  among  the 
countries  of  the  South  Pacific,  as  exempli- 
fied by  the  South  Pacific  Forum  and  the 
South  Pacific  Commission.  It  underlined  the 
need  for  these  and  other  institutions  for  re- 
gional cooperation  active  in  the  South  Pa- 
cific to  respond  effectively  and  promptly  in 
key  development  areas.  The  Council  wel- 
comed the  Joint  Declaration  on  the  Law  of 
the  Sea  issued  by  the  South  Pacific  Forum 
at  its  recent  meeting  in  Nauru,  in  which  the 
member  governments  recognized  the  value 
of  a  coordinated  approach. 

The  Council  noted  the  importance  of 
peaceful  and  cooperative  relations  among 
all  the  states  of  South  East  Asia.  It  wel- 
comed the  progress  of  the  individual  South 
East  Asian  nations  in  developing  their  coun- 
tries and  in  strengthening  their  self-reli- 
ance. It  also  welcomed  the  continued  prog- 
ress of  the  Association  of  South  East  Asian 
Nations  (ASEAN)  in  developing  broad- 
based  regional  cooperation.  It  expressed 
support  for  efforts  among  all  countries  of 
the  region. 

The  Council  noted  with  concern  the  in- 
creased Soviet  military  presence  and  ca- 
pacity in  the  Indian  Ocean.  In  this  connec- 
tion, it  welcomed  the  actions  taken  by  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  to  estab- 
lish a  modest  facility  at  Diego  Garcia  to 


290 


support  United  States  forces  in  the  region. 
The  Council  believed  that  a  broad  balance 
of  military  capability,  coupled  with  a  gen- 
eral forbearance  from  provocative  actions, 
was  an  essential  prerequisite  for  stability 
and  for  the  restraint  that  was  needed  in  the 
Indian  Ocean. 

The  Council  reviewed  the  efforts  being 
made  towards  achieving  satisfactory  meas- 
ures of  arms  limitation,  which  it  consid- 
ered were  essential  to  the  establishment  ot 
a  peaceful  and  stable  world  order.  In  par- 
ticular, the  Council  reaflfirmed  the  dangers 
posed  by  the  proliferation  of  nuclear  ex- 
plosives and  weapons  capabilities  and  the 
need  to  move  against  these  dangers.  It  en- 
dorsed the  various  measures  being  taker 
to  strengthen  the  nuclear  non-proliferation 
regime  including  strengthened  safeguards 
of  and  controls  on  the  export  of  nucleai 
equipment,  materials  and  technology.  Con- 
cern was  voiced  that  there  remained  im- 
portant exceptions  in  all  regions  of  the 
world  to  the  general  trend  towards  univer- 
sal acceptance  of  the  Nuclear  Non-Prolif- 
eration  Treaty  and  the  hope  was  expressed 
that  countries  not  yet  party  to  it  would 
accede. 

The  Council  further  supported  the  con 
tinning  negotiations  between  the  Unitec 
States  and  Soviet  Union  over  strategic  arm; 
limitation  as  important  to  the  maintenance 
of  a  stable  world  balance  and  hoped  that 
these  would  lead  to  further  curbs  of  the 
increase  of  strategic  nuclear  weapon  levels 
It  also  welcomed  the  signature  of  the 
agreement  between  the  United  States  and 
the  Soviet  Union  governing  the  conduct  oi 
and  limiting  the  yield  of  peaceful  nucleai 
explosions  to  supplement  the  Threshold 
Test  Ban  Treaty  of  1974.  The  Ministers  re- 
affirmed the  hope  that  it  would  be  possible 
at  an  early  date  to  transform  the  preseni 
agreements  limiting  nuclear  testing  into  a 
comprehensive  test  ban  treaty. 

The  Council  members  expressed  satisfac- 
tion at  the  degree  of  cooperation  which  ex- 
isted between  their  respective  armed 
forces.  In  this  connection  the  members  wel- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


6omed  the  decision  by  the  Australian  and 
New  Zealand  Governments  to  permit  the 
resumption  of  visits  to  their  ports  by  United 
States  nuclear-powered  warships.  It  was 
agreed  that  this  was  a  natural  part  of  the 
cooperation  under  the  ANZUS  Treaty.  The 
Council  also  welcomed  the  Australian  Gov- 
ernment's decisions  to  accelerate  the 
construction  of  a  naval  facility  at  Cockburn 
Sound  in  Western  Australia. 

In  conclusion,  the  ANZUS  partners  con- 
firmed the  great  importance  that  each  at- 
tached to  the  alliance  and  stressed  their 
desire  to  strengthen  further  their  coopera- 
tion to  meet  changing  circumstances.  They 
emphasized  that  the  Asian/Pacific  region 
should  continue  to  develop  in  peace  and 
prosperity  and  agreed  to  maintain  close 
consultation  on  matters  of  common  con- 
cern. 


Prime  Minister  Fraser  of  Australia 
Visits  Washington 

Prime  Minister  J.  Malcolm  Fraser  of  Aus- 
tralia made  an  official  visit  to  Washington 
July  27-29.  Folloiving  is  a  joint  statement 
by  President  Ford  and  Prime  Minister 
Fraser  issued  July  28} 

At  the  invitation  of  President  Gerald  R. 
Ford  of  the  United  States  of  America,  the 
Right  Honorable  Malcolm  Fraser,  M.P., 
Prime  Minister  of  Australia,  made  an  offi- 
cial visit  to  Washington  on  27,  28,  and  29 
July.  This  was  Prime  Minister  Fraser's  first 
visit  to  the  United  States  since  assuming 
office.  During  his  visit  the  Prime  Minister 
held  talks  with  the  President,  the  Vice 
President,  and  cabinet  secretaries,  and  met 


'  For  an  exchange  of  remarks  by  President  Ford 
and  Prime  Minister  Fraser  at  a  welcoming  ceremony 
on  the  South  Lawn  of  the  White  House  on  July  27 
and  their  exchange  of  toasts  at  a  White  House 
dinner  that  evening,  see  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  dated  Aug.  2,  1976,  pp.  1211 
and  1215. 


August  30,  1976 


senior  members  of  Congress.  The  Prime 
Minister  and  the  President  agreed  that  the 
visit  reemphasized  and  strengthened  the 
cordiality  of  the  relationships  between  the 
Australian  and  American  people,  and  re- 
inforced the  close  ties  between  the  two 
governments. 

The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister 
recognized  that  all  nations  should  treat 
each  other  as  equals  despite  differences  in 
power,  size  and  circumstances.  The  Presi- 
dent expressed  the  view  that  there  was  a 
significant  role  for  countries  of  Australia's 
material  wealth  and  power  in  influencing 
opinion  in  the  world.  The  President  said 
that  the  United  States  intended  to  work 
closely  with  her  friends  and  allies,  with 
those  of  common  philosophical  commit- 
ment, to  achieve  a  greater  unity  of  purpose 
and  understanding  between  such  nations, 
large  and  small.  In  this  respect  the  Presi- 
dent and  the  Prime  Minister  agreed  that 
relations  between  nations  reflected  more 
than  factors  of  power.  National  interests, 
common  principles,  frankness  of  expression 
and  mutual  trust  were  also  very  significant 
in  determining  relations  between  nations. 
The  President  reaffirmed  the  determination 
of  the  United  States  to  pursue  a  policy  of 
peace  through  strength,  to  relax  tensions 
where  it  was  possible  without  sacrifice  of 
interests  or  principles  and  to  build  a  stable 
world  order.  The  President  and  the  Prime 
Minister  agreed  that  shared  democratic 
values  and  the  goal  of  peace  linked  the 
international  aims  of  Australia  and  the 
United  States. 

The  Prime  Minister  expressed  the  belief 
that  the  United  States  had  a  unique  leader- 
ship role  and  mission  as  the  world's  most 
powerful  democracy.  The  President  and 
Prime  Minister  agreed  that  the  steady  pur- 
suit of  that  mission  was  essential  for  the 
stability  and  peaceful  development  of  the 
nations  of  the  world.  The  President  noted 
the  need  for  continuing  close  collaboration 
with  friends  and  allies  including  Australia. 
The  President  and  Prime  Minister  noted 
the   importance   of  maintaining  the   cohe- 


291 


sion  and  constancy  of  alliances  in  present 
international  circumstances,  and  the  im- 
portance of  conventional  forces  in  condi- 
tions of  nuclear  parity.  In  this  connection 
they  agreed  on  the  desirability  of  maintain- 
ing the  excellent  record  of  consultation  and 
cooperation  that  has  characterized  the 
ANZUS  [Australia,  New  Zealand,  United 
States  Security  Treaty]  relationship.  The 
President  and  the  Prime  Minister  agreed 
on  the  political  and  strategic  importance 
of  the  Indian  Ocean  to  many  countries  in- 
cluding Australia  and  the  United  States. 
Noting  the  importance  of  achieving  and 
maintaining  an  adequate  balance,  Aus- 
tralia supported  United  States  efforts  to 
upgrade  the  facilities  at  Diego  Garcia. 
Both  leaders  expressed  the  hope  that  all 
parties  concerned  would  exercise  restraint 
in  this  key  area. 

The  President  and  Prime  Minister  agreed 
that  the  sustained  growth  in  the  military 
capability  of  the  Warsaw  Pact  countries 
beyond  levels  apparently  justified  for  de- 
fensive purposes,  to  which  the  NATO  coun- 
tries had  drawn  attention,  was  a  matter  of 
concern  not  only  in  Europe  but  throughout 
the  world.  The  Prime  Minister  gave  the 
President  an  account  of  his  recent  visits  to 
the  People's  Republic  of  China  and  Japan. 
He  explained  the  great  importance  to  Aus- 
tralia of  its  relationship  with  Japan  and 
the  steps  taken  during  his  visit  to  enhance 
the  political  and  economic  relationship  and 
to  forge  closer  links  of  understanding  be- 
tween the  two  peoples.  The  President  and 
Prime  Minister  agreed  that  the  close  and 
cordial  relationships  Australia  and  the 
United  States  enjoy  with  Japan  are  essen- 
tial to  the  continued  stability,  progress,  and 
prosperity  of  the  international  community. 
They  each  pledged  to  maintain  and 
strengthen  those  ties.  The  Prime  Minister 
emphasized  that  widening  communication 
between  Australia  and  China  and  between 
China  and  many  other  countries,  was  of 
great  importance.  The  President  agreed 
that  effective  communication  with  and  the 


292 


involvement  of  the  People's  Republic  of 
China  are  important  to  the  promotion  of 
peace  and  progress,  and  reaffirmed  that 
the  United  States  is  determined  to  com- 
plete the  process  of  normalizing  its  rela- 
tions with  the  People's  Republic  of  China 
on  the  basis  of  the  Shanghai  Communique. 

The  Prime  Minister  and  the  President 
reiterated  the  fundamental  importance 
which  their  countries  attach  to  their  rela- 
tions with  Southeast  Asian  nations  and 
noted  the  significance  of  ASEAN,  the  Asso- 
ciation of  Southeast  Asian  Nations,  as  a 
stabilizing  influence  in  the  region.  They  re- 
affirmed an  interest  they  share  with 
ASEAN  that  no  one  power  should  domi- 
nate Southeast  Asia. 

The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister 
discussed  the  current  situation  in  the  Mid- 
dle East  and  Southern  Africa.  They  ex- 
pressed concern  about  the  continuing 
instability  in  Lebanon.  The  Prime  Minister 
commended  the  continued  efforts  of  the 
United  States  in  its  search  for  a  settlement 
in  the  Middle  East.  Both  deplored  the  con- 
tinuation of  racial  injustices  in  the  minor- 
ity-ruled countries  of  Africa,  and  con- 
demned any  practices  which  did  not  accord 
true  dignity  to  all  people  as  equals  regard- 
less of  race. 

In  reviewing  the  world  economic  situa-il 
tion  the  President  gave  the  Prime  Minister 
an  outline  of  discussions  at  the  recent  eco- 
nomic summit  in  Puerto  Rico.  They  agreed! 
that  the  United  States  and  Australia,  to- 
gether with  other  industrialized  democ- 
racies, must  continue  to  pursue  an  economic" 
strategy  directed  at  achieving  sustained 
economic  expansion  and  a  reduction  in  un- 
employment while  not  jeopardizing  thei 
common  aim  of  reducing,  and  avoiding  a 
new  wave  of,  inflation.  This  strategy  would! 
require  the  continued  application  of  disci- 
plined measures  in  the  field  of  fiscal  andi 
monetary  policies. 

They  recognized  that  a  period  of  sus-j 
tained  non-inflationary  growth  in  the  majop 
industrialized  nations  will  make  a  major 


Department  of  State  Bulletini 


contribution  to  the  economic  progress  of 
the  developing  countries.  The  President 
and  the  Prime  Minister  reviewed  develop- 
ments in  the  dialogue  between  the  in- 
dustrialized and  developing  nations  and 
agreed  on  the  need  for  a  continued  effort 
in  the  various  international  fora  for  a  con- 
structive long-term  relationship  of  common 
benefit. 

The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister 
agreed  that  a  more  open  international  trad- 
ing system  was  in  the  interest  of  both 
developed  and  developing  nations,  and 
stressed  the  need  for  increasing  momen- 
tum in  the  Multilateral  Trade  Negotiations 
now  being  held  in  Geneva.  They  agreed 
that  increases  in  trade  opportunities,  par- 
ticularly in  processed  goods  and  agricul- 
tural products,  would  help  to  lift  the  stand- 
ard of  living  in  the  developing  countries. 

The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister 
had  discussions  about  Australia's  commer- 
cial relations  with  the  United  States.  It  was 
agreed  that  further  progress  in  the  trading 
relationship  would  be  to  the  advantage  of 
each  country. 

The  Prime  Minister  gave  the  President 
an  outline  of  recent  changes  in  Australia's 
foreign  investment  policy.  He  indicated  an 
increased  need  for  foreign  investment  in 
Australia  in  partnership  with  Australian 
investors.  He  therefore  welcomed  such  in- 
vestment to  help  develop  Australia's  great 
national  resources  to  the  advantage  of  Aus- 
tralia and  of  Australia's  trading  partners. 

The  Prime  Minister  conveyed  to  the 
President  the  good  wishes  of  the  Australian 
people  on  the  occasion  of  the  American  Bi- 
centenary. The  Australian  Government  was 
participating  in  a  range  of  activities  to 
celebrate  the  occasion.  The  Prime  Minis- 
ter said  he  was  looking  forward  to  his  visit 
to  Harvard  University  to  inaugurate  the 
Chair  of  Australian  studies.  He  expressed 
the  hope  that  this  Chair  would  be  used  to 
advance  understanding  not  merely  between 
the  United  States  and  Australia  but  be- 
tween   both    countries    and    other    nations 


with  different  history,  traditions  and  cul- 
ture. 

The  President  and  the  Prime  Minister 
considered  that  their  discussions  had  shown 
a  very  close  similarity  of  views  on  a  wide 
range  of  important  international  and  bi- 
lateral matters  and  had  further  strength- 
ened ties  between  Australia  and  the  United 
States.  The  Prime  Minister  thanked  the 
President  and  Mrs.  Ford  for  the  warmth  of 
the  welcome  and  the  hospitality  extended 
to  him  and  to  Mrs.  Fraser  and  to  members 
of  his  party. 


U.S.  Condemns  Terrorist  Attack 
at  Istanbul  Airport 

Folloiving  is  a  statement  read  to  news 
correspondents  on  August  12  by  Frederick 
Z.  Brown,  Director,  Office  of  Press  Relations. 

I  have  a  brief  statement  on  the  tragic  ter- 
rorist attack  in  Istanbul  yesterday. 

Many  innocent  persons  were  injured,  and 
four  persons  were  senselessly  killed  in  this 
attack.  One  of  the  four  was  Mr.  Harold 
Rosenthal,  an  assistant  to  Senator  Jacob 
Javits,  who  was  on  his  way  to  Tel  Aviv.  We 
profoundly  lament  the  death  of  Mr.  Rosen- 
thal and  extend  our  deep  sympathy  to  his 
family. 

It  is  fortunate  indeed  that  the  aircraft 
was  not  seized  and  that  a  still  greater  trag- 
edy did  not  take  place. 

We  condemn  this  savage  attack.  The 
U.S.  Government  has  long  held  that  the 
nations  of  the  world  should  join  together 
to  eliminate  the  scourge  of  international 
terrorism.  We  hope  that  the  Istanbul  at- 
tack, along  with  the  recent  Air  France  hi- 
jacking to  Uganda,  will  prod  the  leaders  of 
the  world  into  taking  positive  action  on  the 
question  of  terrorism. 

This  is  an  issue  that  must  be  addressed  in 
the  United  Nations,  and  it  is  a  matter  of 
the  greatest  urgency. 


August  30,  1976 


293 


Sharing  the  World's  Natural  Resources:  Prospects  for  International  Cooperation 


Address  by  Joseph  A.  Greemvald 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Economic  and  Business  Affairs ' 


As  the  organizers  of  this  program  have 
recognized,  natural  resource  issues  are  now 
at  the  top  of  the  public  policy  agenda — 
both  national  and  international.  In  the  in- 
dustrialized as  well  as  the  developing  coun- 
tries, attention  is  focused  on  energy,  raw 
materials,  and  food.  The  perception  of 
global  interdependence  has  been  sharp- 
ened by  the  oil  embargo  which  accompa- 
nied the  war  in  the  Middle  East. 

More  than  ever  before,  the  specific  and 
practical  natural  resource  problems  with 
which  you  deal  are  related  to  the  interna- 
tional political  and  economic  situation. 
Although  resource  development  in  Commu- 
nist countries  obviously  has  its  own  pecu- 
liar features,  I  propose  today  to  talk  about 
relations  with  the  developing  countries — 
what  has  come  to  be  called  the  North- 
South  dialogue.  This  dialogue  occupies  the 
center  of  the  stage  because: 

— A  large  part  of  the  world's  raw  mate- 
rials are  found  in  the  developing  countries. 

— Sovereignty  and  control  over  natural 
resources  has  become  a  major  political  is- 
sue for  the  developing  countries. 

— Developing-country  markets  will  pro- 
vide, over  the  long  run,  a  key  element  in 
world  economic  growth. 

— Improvement  in  the  economic  situa- 
tion of  the  developing  countries  is  crucial 
to  stability  and  peace  in  the  world. 


'  Made  before  the  Natural  Resources  Law  Section 
of  the  American  Bar  Association  at  Atlanta,  Ga.,  on 
Aug.    10. 

294 


Thus  the  course  of  the  dialogue  with  the 
Third  World  will  aflfect  your  professional 
activities,  our  future  well-being,  and  the 
shape  of  the  world  in  which  we  live  over 
the  next  decade. 

Will  this  world  be  one  of  antagonistic 
and  hostile  camps — the  rich  versus  the 
poor?  Will  it  be  marked  by  political  insta- 
bility? By  shortages,  high  prices,  cartels? 
Or  will  it,  on  the  contrary,  be  the  kind  of 
world  where  developed  and  developing 
countries  can  reach  mutually  satisfactory 
understandings  that  will  insure  continued 
growth  and  an  equitable  sharing  of  the 
benefits? 

I  cannot  give  you  definitive  answers  to 
these  questions,  but  I  will  describe  ourt( 
progress  to  date  and  our  hopes  for  thei^ 
future. 

In  the  period  immediately  following 
World  War  II,  we  concentrated  on  the  re- 
construction of  the  war-torn  countries  of 
Europe  and  Asia.  We  succeeded  very  well, 
as  the  recovery  of  Western  Europe  and 
Japan  attests. 

The  postwar  strategy  for  countries 
which  needed  to  develop  stressed  financial 
aid  and  technical  assistance.  This  was  be- 
lieved to  be  the  answer  to  problems  of 
illiteracy,  undernourishment,  overpopula- 
tion, ill  health,  low  living  standards,  and 
the  lack  of  infrastructure. 

While  our  attention  was  focused  on  mili- 
tary-political objectives,  alliance  politics, 
and  the  cold  war  during  the  1950's  and 
early  1960's,  the  world  around  us  changed 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


fundamentally.  Over  80  countries  achieved 
their  independence.  And  these  new  coun- 
tries soon  found  that  political  independ- 
ence did  not  solve  all  their  problems,  nor 
did  aid  from  the  rich  countries  provide  the 
answer. 

If  financial  assistance  was  not  the  magic 
formula  for  development,  what  was  it?  The 
slogan  became  "Trade  not  aid."  At  the 
same  time,  the  developing  countries  turned 
to  the  institutional  issue.  They  felt  that 
the  international  organizations  established 
after  the  war  were  designed  to  favor  the 
developed  countries.  These  themes  domi- 
nated the  North-South  discussions  in  the 
1960's.  The  main  i-esults  were  the  setting 
up  of  a  new  organization  in  1964 — the 
United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and 
Development  (UNCTAD),  dominated  by 
the  developing  countries — and  agreement 
in  1968  on  a  worldwide  system  of  tariff 
preferences  in  favor  of  these  countries. 

Not  surprisingly,  since  economic  devel- 
opment is  at  best  a  gradual  process  and  the 
gap  between  rich  and  poor  countries  was 
bound  to  widen  in  absolute  terms,  the  feel- 
ing persisted  among  the  developing  coun- 
tries that  the  cards  were  stacked  against 
them.  Even  though  the  rate  of  growth  of 
developing  countries  taken  as  a  group  was 
faster  than  that  of  the  industrial  countries, 
the  decade  was  marked  by  increasing  frus- 
tration and  bitterness  on  the  part  of  the 
developing  countries. 

The  next  phase  of  the  dialogue  began 
with  the  OPEC  [Organization  of  Petro- 
leum Exporting  Countries]  decision  to  raise 
oil  prices  fourfold  at  the  end  of  1973.  This 
achievement  resulting  from  the  solidarity 
of  the  petroleum  producers  has  brought  the 
commodity  issue  to  the  fore  in  international 
discussions.  The  application  of  the  "petro- 
power"  principle  to  other  products  became 
the  new  panacea. 

The  1970's  also  saw  the  emergence  of 
the  idea  of  using  voting  power  in  the 
United  Nations  to  impose  a  "new  interna- 
tional economic  order"  on  the  world.  At  the 
recent  UNCTAD  meeting  in  Nairobi  the 
principal  outcome  was  an  integrated  com- 
modity program  calling  for  the  negotiation 


of  commodity  agreements  for  an  array  of 
products  and  a  common  fund  for  buffer 
stock  financing. 

Over  the  past  year,  the  developed  coun- 
tries have  carried  out  their  commitment  to 
provide  more  liberal  financial  facilities  for 
the  developing  countries  through  the  In- 
ternational Monetary  Fund.  But  these  im- 
provements have  been  lost  in  the  excite- 
ment over  the  exercise  of  commodity  and 
voting  power. 

I  have  taken  the  time  to  review  the  his- 
tory of  the  North-South  dialogue  because  1 
believe  it  has  to  be  seen  in  perspective  to 
understand  the  current  situation  and  the 
prospects  for  the  future. 

Another  element  which  is  usually  brought 
into  a  discussion  of  the  North-South  dia- 
logue is  the  fact  of  growing  interdepend- 
ence: we  live  in  a  global  economy  to  a  far 
greater  extent  than  we  did  even  10  years 
ago.  For  this  audience,  however,  it  is  not 
necessary  to  document  the  case.  You  are 
directly  involved  in  the  consequences  of 
worldwide  interdependence.  Dependence 
on  imports  varies  from  one  material  to  an- 
other; and  new  developments  in  technol- 
ogy and  resources,  for  instance,  develop- 
ment of  the  deep  seabeds,  may  change  the 
picture.  But,  in  the  long  run,  dependence 
on  world  trade,  both  for  supplies  and  for 
markets,  is  a  fact  of  life. 

The  reactions  to  this  inevitable  interde- 
pendence are,  of  course,  at  the  bottom  of 
some  of  the  North-South  issues.  We  have 
sought  to  meet  the  challenge  through  an 
open  system.  We  believe  that  the  most  effi- 
cient use  of  the  world's  resources  can  be 
achieved  by  removing  obstacles  to  the  free 
flow  of  products,  investment,  and  tech- 
nology. 

Most  developing  countries,  on  the  other 
hand,  consider  that  they  are  at  a  disad- 
vantage in  such  a  system.  They  believe  that 
in  a  world  of  unequal  economic  strength, 
laissez-faire  is  a  weapon  of  the  strong. 
They  seek  preferential  treatment  for  their 
products,  agreements  which  result  in  the 
transfer  of  resources,  indexation  of  com- 
modity prices,  access  to  technology  without 
full  payment,  control  over  foreign  invest- 


August  30,  1976 


295 


ment,    and    nationalization    without    ade- 
quate compensation. 

This,  then,  is  a  short  history  and  sum- 
mary of  the  North-South  dialogue.  It  is  cur- 
rently being  carried  on  at  two  levels:  the 
political  level  in  the  U.N.  framework  and 
the  pragmatic  level  at  the  Conference  on 
International  Economic  Cooperation  in 
Paris.  The  UNCTAD,  which  had  its  confer- 
ence at  Nairobi  last  May,  is  somewhere  be- 
tween these  two  levels — it  produces  a  lot 
of  rhetoric  but  also  some  concrete  results. 


The  Energy  Problem 

Let  me  now  turn  to  three  subjects  which 
are  likely  to  figure  prominently  in  the  dia- 
logue over  the  next  year  or  two — energy, 
commodities,  and  food. 

Energy  has  been  the  priority  natural  re- 
source issue  both  internationally  and  do- 
mestically since  late  1973.  The  Arab  oil 
embargo  of  1973  and  massive  price  hike 
that  followed  had  pervasive  and  far-reach- 
ing effects  on  the  world  economy,  more  so 
than  any  other  single  event  since  World 
War  II.  Coming  as  it  did  at  the  crest  of 
the  boom  in  world  economic  activity  in 
1973-74,  the  oil  price  increase  greatly  ac- 
celerated existing  inflation  in  the  devel- 
oped countries  and  severely  aggravated  the 
cyclical  downturn  in  world  economic  activ- 
ity that  took  place  in  1974-75. 

The  energy  crisis  made  clear  the  need 
for  a  coordinated  approach  by  major  oil- 
consuming  countries  to  reduce  their  polit- 
ical and  economic  vulnerability  resulting 
from  growing  dependence  on  imported  oil. 
The  crisis  demonstrated  that  no  single 
country,  including  the  United  States,  could 
alone  create  a  new  balance  in  the  world  oil 
market.  It  further  demonstrated  that  no 
one  country  could  defend  itself  against  a 
new  embargo  nor  could  any  one  country 
alone  undertake  all  the  research  and  devel- 
opment or  provide  the  capital  required  to 
develop  new  energy  sources  when  fossil 
fuels  are  exhausted. 

Our  efforts  to  develop  a  comprehensive 
and   coordinated   approach   to   the   energy 

296 


problem  were  initially  directed  toward  co- 
operation  among  consuming  countries.   In 
the  21   months  since  the  establishment  of    | 
the  International  Energy  Agency,  we  have :    i 

— Developed  and  tested  an  emergency 
program  to  deal  with  future  embargoes. 

— Reached   agreement  on  a  comprehen- 
sive program  of  joint  efforts  in  conserva-    . 
tion,     accelerated     production     of     inter-   i 
national    energy   sources,    and    energy   re-   j 
search  and  development.  ' 

— Launched  a  discussion  with  oil- 
producing  and  oil-consuming  countries  to 
seek  better  understanding  of  their  mutual 
interests. 

I 
Commodities 

In    contrast   to    energy,    where    a    small 
number   of   countries   control   the   bulk   of   i 
the  world's  easily  accessible  oil,  commodi-   I 
ties  are  a  far  more  diffuse  issue. 

As   I   explained   earlier,   the   developing    , 
countries     now      look      upon      commodity  1 
agreements  as  the  key  to  the  improvement  | 
of  their  situation.  They  take  this  position 
despite  the  fact  that  many  of  the  poorer 
countries  do   not   have  many   commodities 
to  export  and  industrialized  countries  are 
also     substantial^   exporters     of     primary 
products. 

Developing  countries  explained  their 
commodity  concerns  and  proposed  remedy 
at  UNCTAD.  It  is  called  an  "integrated" 
program  and  calls  for  a  series  of  commod- 
ity arrangements  for  18  agricultural  and 
industrial  raw  materials,  which  account 
for  about  75  percent  of  their  commodity 
trade.  For  many  of  these  commodities, 
UNCTAD  proposes  the  establishment  of 
international  commodity  agreements  based 
on  buffer  stocks,  augmented  by  export 
controls  and  production  controls.  The 
stocks  would  be  financed  by  a  "common 
fund."  The  theory  behind  the  common 
fund  is  that  fluctuations  in  commodity 
prices  will  not  be  synchronized ;  that  is,  the 
prices  of  some  will  be  rising  while  the 
prices  of  others  will  be  falling.  Thus  a 
common  fund  supporting  all  of  them  will; 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


need  less  money  than  a  series  of  individual 
and  uncoordinated  buffer  stock  funds. 
UNCTAD  estimates  that  such  a  fund 
could  begin  operation  with  $3  billion,  of 
which  $1  billion  would  be  paid  in  initially. 

As  you  know,  the  U.S.  approach  has 
been  to  look  at  commodity  problems  on  a 
case-by-case  basis.  We  believe  there  may 
1)0  situations  in  which  intergovernmental 
arrangements  can  help  smooth  out  wide 
price  fluctuations  and  thus  improve  the 
working  of  the  market.  Accordingly,  we 
have  participated  in  commodity  confer- 
ences and  have  signed  the  coffee  and  tin 
agreements.  We  also  see  merit  in  buffer 
stocks  for  stabilization  purposes.  But  the 
problem  is  not  financing;  it  is  whether  the 
particular  commodity  lends  itself  to  the 
buffer  stock  technique. 

At  Nairobi,  Secretary  Kissinger  put  for- 
ward a  comprehensive  approach  to  com- 
modities which  contained  the  following 
features: 

— Insuring  sufficient  financing  for  re- 
source development  and  the  equitable 
sharing  of  benefits  by  the  host  nation. 

— Improving  the  conditions  of  trade  and 
investment  in  individual  commodities  and 
moderating  excessive  price  fluctuations. 

— rStabilizing  the  overall  export  earnings 
of  developing  countries. 

— Improving  access  to  markets  for  the 
products  of  developing  countries. 

— International  arrangements  to  assure 
reliability  of  supply. 

In  our  view,  a  key  missing  element  of 
the  UNCTAD  program  is  the  encourage- 
ment of  investment  in  resource  develop- 
ment. In  the  coming  decades,  the  problem 
will  be  adequate  supplies  of  raw  materials, 
particularly  metals  and  minerals.  With  this 
prospect  in  mind,  we  launched  at  Nairobi 
the  idea  of  an  International  Resources 
Bank  (IRB).  This  initiative  grew  out  of  the 
recognition  that  the  cost  of  resource  de- 
velopment has  grown  substantially  and 
that  it  takes  much  longer  to  get  a  reason- 
able return  on  investment.  At  the  same 
time,  the  risks  associated  with  natural  re- 


source projects  in  developing  countries  has 
increased.  The  flow  of  investment  into  de- 
veloping countries  is  adversely  affected. 
We  felt  that  what  was  needed  to  turn  the 
situation  around  was  a  mechanism  to  deal 
with  the  political  risks. 

The  main  functions  of  the  IRB  would 
be  to : 

— Act  as  guarantor  of  performance  by 
investor  and  host  country  through  a  tri- 
lateral agreement,  tailored  to  each  project, 
in  which  the  foreign  investor,  the  host 
country  government,  and  the  IRB  would 
participate. 

— Guarantee  the  investment  against  loss 
as  a  result  of  noncommercial  factors 
through  a  loss  reserve  fund,  initially  $1  bil- 
lion contributed  by  the  member  govern- 
ments of  the  IRB. 

— Facilitate  financing  of  projects  by  act- 
ing as  an  agent  for  project  bonds. 

Looking  further  ahead,  the  natural  re- 
source question  is  likely  to  be  affected  in  a 
significant  way  by  the  results  of  the 
lengthy  Conference  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea. 

The  effort  to  devise  rules  to  govern  hu- 
man activities  on,  over,  and  beneath  the 
seas  that  cover  70  percent  of  the  globe  has 
been  described  by  Secretary  Kissinger  as 
"one  of  the  most  significant  negotiations 
in  diplomatic  history."  -  We  will  have 
made  a  great  stride  toward  our  objectives 
of  peace  and  international  cooperation  if 
we  are  able  to  reach  an  agreement  that  as- 
sures the  avoidance  of  conflict  and  protects 
our  vital  interests  in  the  myriad  activities 
involving  the  seas. 

One  of  the  most  difficult  and  intractable 
problems  at  the  current  session  is  the 
question  of  an  appropriate  legal  regime  to 
govern  exploitation  of  minerals  from  the 
deep  seabeds.  We  have  known  for  more 
than  a  decade  that  vast  potential  resources 
of  copper,  nickel,  manganese,  and  cobalt 
are  present  in  nodules  on  the  seabeds,  often 
as  deep   as   15,000  feet  below  sea   level. 


"  For  Secretary  Kissinger's  address  at  New  York, 
N.Y.,  on  Apr.  8,  see  Bulletin  of  Apr.  26,  1976, 
p.  .533. 


August  30,  1976 


297 


American  industry  has  been  in  the  fore- 
front of  the  research  and  development  into 
processes  for  recovering  and  extracting 
these  mineral-rich  nodules,  and  we  expect 
that  seabed  mineral  production  can  begin 
within  the  next  five  to  seven  years. 

The  eventual  regime  governing  deep 
seabed  mining  operations  is  beginning  to 
take  shape.  An  International  Seabed  Re- 
source Authority  is  to  be  established  to 
supervise  exploration  and  development  of 
deep  seabed  resources.  We  seek  an  Au- 
thority with  carefully  defined  powers  that 
will  reflect  the  producer  and  consumer  in- 
terests of  member  states  directly  concerned 
with  deep  seabed  mining.  An  essential  U.S. 
objective  is  to  establish  guaranteed  non- 
discriminatory and  quota-free  access  to 
mining  sites  for  states  and  their  nationals. 

Both  the  powers  of  the  Authority  and 
the  questions  of  nondiscriminatory  access 
are  vital  issues  for  the  United  States.  Let 
there  be  no  misunderstanding  of  this.  We 
want  a  law  of  the  sea  treaty,  and  we  have 
sought — and  continue  to  seek — this  objec- 
tive in  a  spirit  of  cooperation  and  com- 
promise. We  are  not  prepared,  however,  to 
acquiesce  in  a  treaty  that  does  not  ade- 
quately reflect  these  paramount  interests 
of  the  United  States. 

World  Food  Supply 

The  final  sector,  agriculture,  is  one 
where  for  many  products,  like  grains  and 
oilseeds,  the  shoe  is  on  the  other  foot — we 
are  a  major  supplier. 

Developing  countries,  particularly  in 
South  Asia  and  parts  of  Africa,  have  be- 
gun to  import  increased  amounts  of  food, 
especially  grains.  In  many  of  these  coun- 
tries, the  shift  to  imports  results  not  from 
economic  growth  so  much  as  from  the  fail- 
ure of  their  agricultural  sectors  to  produce 
the  food  their  people  require.  Since  the 
economic  performance  of  many  of  these 
countries  has  not  been  adequate,  the  for- 
eign exchange  cost  of  these  imports  has 
been  a  serious  burden.  In  addition,  the 
agricultural  growth  rate  of  these  countries 


has  been  so  low  that  many  observers  fore- 
see their  increasing  dependence  on  food 
imports. 

The  basic  problem  is  one  of  inefficient 
production  and  distribution.  More  than 
two-thirds  of  the  world's  population  pro- 
duces only  about  one-third  of  the  world's 
food.  Developing  countries  devote  twice  as 
much  land  as  developed  countries  to  grain 
production  but  produce  about  20  percent 
less  grain.  The  consequences  are  enor- 
mous— also  500  million  people  suffer  from 
malnutrition;  hundreds  of  millions  more 
are  ill  fed.  The  wastage  of  human  re- 
sources is  great. 

What  are  we  doing  about  it? 

We  are  moving  to  meet  the  world's  food 
problem  on  four  major  fronts. 

First,  we  are  giving  higher  priority  in 
our  foreign  assistance  programs  to  agri- 
culture, nutrition,  and  rural  development. 
The  World  Bank  is  doing  the  same.  We  are 
actively  working  for  establishment  of  an 
International  Fund  for  Agricultural  De- 
velopment that  would  provide  concessional 
aid  to  help  poor  countries  feed  their  peo- 
ple and  have  pledged  to  contribute  $200 
million  to  it  once  total  contributions  reach 
$1  billion.  We  are  hopeful  that  this  fund 
will  be  established  this  year. 

Second,  until  developing  countries  can 
make  the  necessary  advances  in  food  pro- 
duction, we  and  other  food-surplus  coun- 
tries must  cooperate  to  insure  adequate 
food  aid.  For  this  fiscal  year,  the  U.S.  food 
aid  budget  provides  for  approximately 
6  million  tons  of  food  grains,  60  percent  of 
the  global  target  set  by  the  World  Food 
Conference  in  1974  and  a  20  percent  in- 
crease over  the  U.S.  contribution  in  1975. 

Third,  we  have  taken  the  lead  in  propos- 
ing the  establishment  of  an  international 
system  of  nationally  held  grain  reserves  as 
a  means  of  providing  sufficient  supplies  to 
offset  future  shortfalls  in  global  produc- 
tion. Our  proposal  provides  that  these  re- 
serves would  be  spread  among  the  major 
grain  exporters  and  importers  so  that  we 
would  not  return  to  the  situation  of  the 
1950's  and  1960's,  when  the  United  States 


298 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


carried  international  grain  reserves  vir- 
tually singlehandedly. 

Fourth,  we  are  increasing  our  food  pro- 
duction in  the  short  run  and  encouraging 
other  exporters  to  do  the  same.  We  have 
returned  37  million  acres  to  crops  in  the 
last  two  years.  We  expect  record  harvests 
of  grain,  including  rice,  of  over  260  million 
metric  tons  this  year. 

I'm  sure  I  don't  have  to  tell  you  that 
there  are  no  quick  answers  to  the  natural 
resource  issues  and  the  political  considera- 
tions surrounding  them.  The  challenge 
from  the  developing  world  that  finds  ex- 
pression in  this  issue  is  a  fundamental  one: 
The  desire  for  economic  progress,  for  a 
greater  participation  in  international  deci- 
sions that  affect  them,  for  a  more  equita- 
ble share  of  the  benefits. 

We  accept  this  challenge.  We  have  pre- 
sented realistic  and  comprehensive  pro- 
posals in  international  discussions.  We  be- 
lieve our  basic  long-term  interests  and 
those  of  the  developing  countries  are  not 
incompatible. 

But  as  Secretary  Kissinger  said  last 
June,^  recognition  of  the  complementary 
nature  of  our  interests  is  not  automatic. 
Effective  cooperation  requires  that  both 
sides  face  certain  realities  without  illusion. 
One  of  these  realities  is  the  long-term  na- 
ture of  economic  development.  A  second  is 
that  the  developing  countries  themselves 
must  follow  sensible  policies.  Finally,  any 
effective  action  requires  the  full  coopera- 
tion of  the  industrial  countries  if  it  is  to  be 
successful.  This  cooperation  will  not  be 
forthcoming  if  the  North-South  dialogue 
becomes  one  marked  by  extortion  and  pres- 


"  For  Secretary  Kissinger's  statement  at  the  min- 
isterial meeting  of  the  Council  of  the  Organization 
for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  at  Paris 
on  June  21,  see  Bulletin  of  July  19.  1976,  p.  73. 


sure,  by  the  presentation  of  sweeping,  un- 
workable proposals,  or  by  sterile  parlia- 
mentary  maneuvers. 

If  both  sides  proceed  in  a  positive  way, 
I  believe  we  can  find  constructive  and 
creative  solutions. 


Agreement  Signed  on  Polish  Fishing 
in  U.S.  Fishery  Conservation  Zone 

Press   release  3G1   dated  August   2 

Representatives  of  the  Governments  of 
Poland  and  the  United  States  on  August  2 
signed  a  new  agreement  relating  to  Polish 
fishing  activities  off  the  coasts  of  the  United 
States,  which  will  come  into  force  after  the 
completion  of  internal  procedures  by  both 
governments. 

The  agreement  sets  out  the  arrangements 
between  the  countries  which  will  govern 
Polish  fishing  within  the  fisheries  conserva- 
tion zone  of  the  United  States  beginning 
March  1,  1977. 

Vice  Minister  Edwin  Wisniewski  of  the 
Ministry  of  Foreign  Trade  and  Shipping 
signed  for  Poland.  Ambassador  Rozanne 
L.  Ridgway,  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  of 
State  for  Oceans  and  Fisheries  Affairs, 
signed  for  the  United  States. 

The  Vice  Minister  and  the  Ambassador 
headed  delegations  which  began  negotiat- 
ing the  new  agreement  in  Montreal  in 
June.  The  negotiations  were  completed  in 
Warsaw  on  July  31. 

Both  delegations  expressed  their  satis- 
faction with  the  new  accord.  The  agree- 
ment signed  by  Poland  and  the  United 
States  is  the  first  fisheries  agreement  since 
passage  by  the  United  States  of  legislation 
creating  a  200-mile  fishery  conservation 
zone,  effective  March  1,  1977. 


August  30,  1976 


299 


THE  CONGRESS 


Department  Discusses  U.S.  Policy  Toward  Countries  of  the  Horn  of  Africa 


Statement  by  William  E.  Schaufele,  Jr. 
Assista7it  Secretary  for  African  Affairs  ' 


The  strategic  importance  of  the  Horn  of 
Africa  has  gradually  increased  over  the 
years.  Located  on  the  Strait  of  Bab  el  Man- 
deb,  it  has  always  controlled  access  to  the 
Indian  Ocean  by  the  coastal  states  of  the 
Red  Sea.  Since  the  completion  of  the  Suez 
Canal  in  1869,  it  has  enjoyed  a  dominant 
position  on  one  of  the  world's  leading  East- 
West  maritime  routes.  In  recent  years  the 
importance  of  the  area  has  been  further 
increased  by  its  proximity  to  the  Middle 
East  oilfields  and  the  Indian  Ocean  oil 
routes. 


Regional  Relations 

The  Horn  of  Africa  is  characterized  by 
the  strained  relations  which  have  existed 
for  a  long  time  between  the  Somalis  and 
the  Ethiopians.  Since  attaining  independ- 
ence in  1960,  Somalia  has  maintained  a 
claim  on  large  areas  of  Ethiopia  populated 
by  ethnic  Somalis,  as  well  as  areas  of 
Kenya  and  of  the  French  Territory  of  the 
Afars  and  Issas  (F.T.A.I.).  This  ancient 
hostility  has  been  further  exacerbated  by 
Somalia's  decision  to  turn  to  the  Com- 
munist states,  and  particularly  the  Soviet 
Union,  for  economic  and  military  assist- 
ance, as  against  Ethiopia's  traditional  ties 
with  the  West. 


'  Made  before  the  Subcommittee  on  Africa  of  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  on  Aug.  6. 
The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be  pub- 
lished by  the  committee  and  will  be  available  from 
the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


300 


The  Ethiopian-Somali  rivalry  has  been 
most  recently  fueled  by  the  French  deci- 
sion to  grant  independence  to  the  F.T.A.I., 
whose  capital  and  deep  water  port  of 
Djibouti  dominate  the  Strait  of  Bab  el 
Mandeb.  The  new  revolutionary  regime  of 
Ethiopia,  already  beset  by  an  insurgency 
in  the  coastal  province  of  Eritrea,  and 
going  through  the  travails  of  internal 
radicalization,  greatly  fears  a  Somali  at- 
tempt to  dominate  or  take  over  the  post- 
independence  F.T.A.I.,  thus  further  imped- 
ing Ethiopian  access  to  the  sea. 

The  rivalry  over  Djibouti  and  the  out- 
come of  the  Eritrean  secession  and  of 
Ethiopia's  internal  turmoil  are  also  of  im- 
portance to  the  coastal  states  of  the  Red 
Sea  in  view  of  their  interest  in  continued 
and  unimpeded  access  to  the  Indian  Ocean. 

Finally,  other  states  in  the  region,  such 
as  Sudan,  Saudi  Arabia,  Egypt,  Israel,  and 
Kenya,  are  concerned  by  the  threat  that 
political  instability  and  increasing  Soviet 
influence  pose  to  the  region. 

U.S.   Interests  and  Relations 

The  strategic  importance  of  the  Horn 
has  led  the  United  States  to  place  high 
value  on  good  relations  with  the  countries 
of  the  area,  access  to  ports  and  airfields, 
and  regional  stability.  U.S.  acquisition  of 
a  communications  facility  at  Kagnew  in 
Asmara  in  1942,  which  was  subsequently 
greatly  expanded,  also  contributed  to  our 
interests  in  the  area.  At  the  present  time 
our  access  to  the  area  has  been  restricted 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


essentially  to  Ethiopia  and  Djibouti,  while 
major  Soviet  military  facilities  such  as  we 
enjoy  nowhere  in  Africa  have  been  con- 
structed in  Somalia. 

Ethiopia 

Our  interests  in  the  Horn  of  Africa  were 
in  the  past  concentrated  on  Ethiopia.  As 
one  of  the  few  independent  black  African 
countries  throughout  the  colonial  period 
and  as  an  ancient  Christian  kingdom,  it  has 
long  held  a  special  fascination  for  Ameri- 
cans, strengthened  during  the  1930's  as 
a  result  of  its  victimization  by  Fascist 
colonialism. 

During  the  early  post-World  War  II  pe- 
riod our  interests  in  Ethiopia  were  pri- 
marily continental  and  bilateral.  We  hoped 
that  our  longstanding  relationship  with 
Ethiopia  would  assist  us  in  establishing 
good  relations  with  the  newly  independent 
states  of  Africa ;  we  developed  our  im- 
portant communications  facility  at  Kagnew 
in  Asmara;  and  we  benefited  from  access 
to  Ethiopian  ports  and  airfields. 

In  the  past  few  years  the  relationship 
with  Ethiopia  has  also  acquired  increased 
regional  and  strategic  importance.  Al- 
though we  have,  over  the  past  five  years, 
reduced  the  number  of  employees  from 
3,000  to  35,  the  Kagnew  Naval  Communi- 
cations Unit  remains  important  to  us,  as 
does  access  to  Ethiopia's  airfields  and 
ports,  at  a  time  when  our  interests  and 
operations  in  this  increasingly  important 
area  have  grown.  For  these  reasons, 
among  others,  although  we  remain  con- 
cerned by  the  present  disunity  of  the  coun- 
try, we  have  taken  particular  care  to  dem- 
onstrate by  the  constancy  of  our  relation- 
ship that  the  ties  between  the  United 
States  and  Ethiopia  need  not  be  disrupted 
by  a  change  in  its  form  of  government. 

We  believe  that  our  present  policy  to- 
ward Ethiopia  will  not  only  contribute  to 
the  stability  of  this  second  most  populous 
country  in  black  Africa  but  also  assist  black 
African  states  in  maintaining  the  principle 
of  territorial  integrity,  a  cardinal  principle 
of  the  Organization  of  African  Unity.  We 

August  30,  1976 


believe  we  would  incur  much  criticism 
from  our  friends  in  Africa  and  elsewhere 
were  we  to  withdraw  support  from  the 
Ethiopian  Government  during  this  time  of 
difficulty;  such  a  move  would  also  be  at- 
tributed to  distaste  for  Ethiopia's  brand  of 
socialism. 

We  are  well  aware  that  our  military  aid 
is  a  two-edged  sword  and  that  it  is  a  major 
support  of  the  present  government,  with 
whose  actions  we  do  not  always  agree, 
particularly  in  the  field  of  human  rights. 
However,  for  the  reasons  given  above,  al- 
though we  have  conscientiously  refrained 
from  any  advisory  effort  in  the  Ethiopian 
counterinsurgency  operations,  we  have 
continued  to  supply  Ethiopia  with  arms  in 
accordance  with  our  military  assistance 
agreement  with  Ethiopia,  which  dates 
from  May  1953. 

The  extent  of  our  relationship  with  this 
nation  of  28  million  can  be  measured  by 
the  amount  of  aid  we  have  provided.  This 
has  amounted  to  over  $350  million  in  eco- 
nomic aid  since  1952  and  over  $275  million 
in  military  assistance  to  the  country's 
40,000-man  defense  force. 

Whether  we  can  continue  this  degree  of 
cooperation  with  Ethiopia  will  depend 
largely  on  the  course  finally  taken  by  the 
new  revolutionary  military  regime,  which 
assumed  power  in  1974.  It  has  deliber- 
ately decided  to  alter  Ethiopia's  previous 
reliance  on  the  West  and  has  consequently 
.strengthened  its  relations  with  the  Social- 
ist countries.  To  the  extent  that  this  does 
not  lead  to  systematic  opposition  to  the 
United  States,  it  still  leaves  ample  oppor- 
tunity for  continued  cooperation,  particu- 
larly as  we  are  sympathetic  to  many  of  the 
new  regime's  ambitions  to  improve  the  liv- 
ing conditions  of  its  people.  But  the  situa- 
tion is  sufficiently  volatile  to  bear  close 
watching. 

Somalia 

Somalia  is  a  country  of  3.2  million  people 
with  an  army  of  approximately  20,000. 
Composed  of  former  British  and  Italian 
Somaliland,  it  gained  its  independence  in 


301 


1960.  Somali  nationalists  continue  to  claim 
the  Somali-inhabited  portions  of  northeast 
Kenya,  eastern  Ethiopia,  and  the  French 
Territory  of  the  Afars  and  Issas. 

Following  independence,  Somalia  and 
the  United  States  enjoyed  a  close  and 
friendly  relationship,  and  the  United 
States  extended  almost  $80  million  in  aid 
between  1954  and  1970.  However,  follow- 
ing the  overthrow  of  the  civilian  govern- 
ment in  1968,  the  Government  of  the 
Somali  Democratic  Republic  turned  in- 
creasingly to  the  Soviet  Union  both  for 
military  equipment  and  for  economic  and 
ideological  support.  In  the  process,  our 
own  relations  with  the  Mogadiscio  govern- 
ment deteriorated,  and  in  1970  the  U.S. 
Government  was  obliged  to  terminate  its 
aid  program  because  of  continued  Somali- 
flag  trade  with  North  Viet-Nam. 

Nevertheless,  we  have  sought  to  improve 
relations  with  the  Government  of  the  So- 
mali Democratic  Republic  and  to  find 
grounds  for  mutual  respect  and  coopera- 
tion. We  have  assured  the  Somali  Govern- 
ment that  their  proclaimed  policy  of  non- 
alignment  is  one  with  which,  if  impartially 
conducted,  we  have  no  quarrel. 

We  also  recently  renewed  economic  as- 
sistance to  the  country  and  have  aided 
Somalia  in  its  attempts  to  recover  from 
the  recent  drought.  This  summer  Somalia 
is  receiving  10,000  metric  tons  of  relief 
grain.  I  must  admit  in  all  candor,  as  I  have 
informed  the  Somali  Ambassador  in  Wash- 
ington, that  we  have  not  recently  seen  any 
reciprocal  Somali  gestures. 

French  Territory  of  the  Afars  and  Issas 

The  French  Territory  of  the  Afars  and 
Issas  has  a  population  of  approximately 
180,000,  divided  between  the  Afar,  or 
Danakil,  people,  whose  primary  home  is  in 
Ethiopia,  and  the  Issas  and  other  Somali 
tribesmen. 

The  French  decision  to  grant  independ- 
ence to  Djibouti  has  increased  the  tension 


between  Somalia  and  Ethiopia.  The  rail- 
head and  port  of  Djibouti  are  vital  com- 
munication links  for  Ethiopia.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  is  clear  that  some  Somali  national- 
ists are  using  the  occasion  to  work  for  con- 
ditions which  could  lead  to  the  eventual 
incorporation  of  the  territory  into  Somalia. 
The  common  distrust  of  the  Ethiopian  and 
Somali  Governments,  and  the  traditional 
Somali  claims  on  much  of  eastern  Ethiopia, 
make  cooperation  between  these  two  gov- 
ernments in  support  of  the  independence 
of  Djibouti  a  difficult  undertaking. 

Political  developments  leading  to  in- 
dependence have  included  the  kidnaping 
of  the  French  Ambassador  to  Mogadiscio 
by  Somali  nationalists,  the  capture  of  a 
schoolbus  of  French  schoolchildren  [in 
Djibouti]  by  another  group  of  nationalists 
in  February,  and  extensive  political  agita- 
tion against  the  former  President  of  the 
F.T.A.I.  Government,  Ali  Aref.  He  was 
finally  forced  to  resign  on  July  17,  and  a 
replacement  was  elected  by  the  F.T.A.I. 
Chamber  of  Deputies  on  July  29.  Although 
an  Afar,  the  new  President,  Abdallah 
Khamil,  is  thought  to  enjoy  greater  sup- 
port among  the  Somali  population  than  did 
his  predecessor  and  stands  a  better  chance 
of  leading  a  government  of  national  unity 
to  independence,  which  will  probably  be 
granted  within  the  next  year. 

For  our  part,  we  support  the  peaceful 
transition  to  independence,  and  we  encour- 
age the  states  of  the  area  to  create  the 
conditions  necessary  to  maintain  the  long- 
term  independence  of  Djibouti.  In  doing i 
so,  we  join  our  aspirations  with  those  oi 
the  international  regional  organizations 
and  a  number  of  states  in  the  area,  as  well 
as  with  the  governments  most  directly 
concerned. 

Kenya 

Because  of  the  territorial  dispute  be- 
tween Somalia  and  Kenya  over  the  north- 
eastern region  of  the  latter,  relations  be- 


302 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


ween   Nairobi   and    Mogadiscio   were   not 
stablished  until  1968. 

We  have  recently  been  led  to  agree  to 
lilitary  sales  to  Nairobi,  in  part  because  of 
he  discrepancy  between  the  size  and  level 
f  equipment  of  the  armed  forces  of  the 
wo  countries  and  in  part  because  of  the 
Jganda  threat  to  western  Kenya.  The  ad- 
lition  of  military  sales  fits  in  well  with  our 
•revious  relationship  to  Kenya.  We  have 
Iways  found  a  cooperative  reception  in 
his  stable  country  which  has  one  of  the 
ew  free  economies  in  that  region  and  is 
he  only  country  on  that  part  of  the  Indian 
)cean  which  permits  U.S.  naval  visits. 

iudan 

Our  relations  with  the  Sudan  took  a  turn 
or  the  worse  in  June  1974  when  the  Suda- 
lese  Government  turned  over  to  Egypt  the 
ight  Palestinian  terrorists  whom  Sudanese 
ourts  had  convicted  of  killing,  in  1973, 
lur  Ambassador  and  Deputy  Chief  of  Mis- 
ion  in  Khartoum. 

After  nearly  two  years  during  which  we 
uspended  most  of  our  bilateral  programs 
vith  the  Sudan,  we  have  now  embarked  on 

course  of  normalizing  our  relations,  on 
he  grounds  that  the  deliberate  cooling  of 
)ur  relationship  had  lasted  long  enough 
ind  in  recognition  of  the  considerable  as- 
istance  brought  to  us  by  the  Sudanese 
overnment  in  obtaining  the  release  of 
\merican  prisoners  held  by  the  Eritrean 
nsurgent  movement,  which  is  in  rebellion 
igainst  the  Ethiopian  Government.  We  con- 
idered  that  further  prolongation  of  the 
itanddown  in  our  relations  risked  perma- 
lently  jeopardizing  our  ability  to  build  a 
;ooperative  relationship  with  this  country 
vhich  is  of  importance  to  us  in  both  the 
African  and  Middle  East  contexts  and 
vhich  has  considerable  economic  potential. 
The  convicted  killers  are  still  in  Egyptian 
ustody. 

Gentlemen,  I  will  now  be  happy  to  reply 
0  your  questions. 


August  30,  1976 


Congressional  Documents 
Relating  to  Foreign  Policy 

94th  Congress,  2d  Session 

United  Nations.  Hearings  before  the  Senate  Com- 
mittee on  Foreign  Relations  on  tlie  nomination  of 
William  W.  Scranton  to  be  U.S.  Representative  to 
the  United  Nations  and  on  the  future  of  U.S. 
participation  in  the  United  Nation.s.  March  2-25, 
1976.  260  pp. 

Psychiatric  Abuse  of  Political  Prisoners  in  the  Soviet 
Union — Testimony  by  Leonid  Plyushch.  Hearing 
before  the  Subcommittee  on  International  Organi- 
zations of  the  House  Committee  on  International 
Relations.  March  30,  1976.  82  pp. 

Chile:  The  Status  of  Human  Right.s  and  Its  Relation- 
ship to  U.S.  Economic  Assistance  Prograni.s.  Hear- 
ings before  the  Subcommittee  on  Internationa! 
Organizations  of  the  House  Committee  on  Interna- 
tional Relations.  April  29-May  5,  1976.  198  pp. 

United  States-Japan  Cooperative  Medical  Science 
Program.  Message  from  the  President  of  the 
United  States  transmitting  the  ninth  annual  report 
of  the  program,  pursuant  to  the  International 
Health  Research  Act  of  1960.  H.  Doc.  94-48.5.  May 
4,  1976.  21  pp. 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


Aviation 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful  acts 
against  the  safety  of  civil  aviation.  Done  at  Mon- 
treal September  23,  1971.  Entered  into  force 
January  26,  1973.  TIAS  7570, 

Ratification  deposited:  Belgium.  August  13,  1976. 
Accession  deposited:   France.   June  30,   1976.' 

Coffee 

International  coffee  agreement  1976,  with  annexes. 
Done  at  London  December  3,   1975." 


'  With  a  resei-vation. 
■  Not  in  force. 


303 


Signatures:  Sweden,  June  22,  1976;  Central  Afri- 
can Republic,  European  Economic  Community, 
Ethiopia,  Italy,  Japan,  Netherlands,  Panama, 
July  27,  1976;  Ecuador,  Israel,  New  Zealand, 
July  28,  1976;  Ivory  Coast,  Uganda,  July  29, 
1976;  Australia,  Belgium,  Canada,  Finland, 
Gabon,  Ghana,  Guinea,  Luxembourg,  Nigeria, 
Venezuela,  Zaire,  July  30,  1976;  Burundi,  Yugo- 
slavia, July  31,  1976. 

Ratification  deposited:  Norway.  July  1.  1976. 

Finance 

Articles  of  agreement  establishing  the  Asian  Devel- 
opment Bank,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Manila  De- 
cember 4,  1965.  Entered  into  force  August  22,  1966. 
TIAS  6103. 

Admission  to  membership:  Cook  Islands,  April  20, 
1976. 

Intergovernmental    Maritime    Consultative 
Organization 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  March  6,  1948,  as 
amended,  on  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime  Con- 
sultative Organization.  Adopted  at  London  Octo- 
ber 17,  1974,  at  the  fifth  extraordinary  session  of 
the  Assembly  of  IMCO.= 

Acceptances  deposited:  Brazil,  Libya.  July  30, 
1976. 

Postal 

Second  additional  protocol  to  the  constitution  of  the 
Universal  Postal  Union  of  July  10,  1964  (TIAS 
5881.  7150),  general  regulations  with  final  protocol 
and  annex,  and  the  universal  postal  convention 
with  final  protocol  and  detailed  regulations.  Done 
at  Lausanne  July  5,  1974.  Entered  into  force  Janu- 
ary 1,  1976.  TIAS  8231. 

Ratification  deposited:  Ghana,  June  9,  1976. 
Accession  deposited:  Italy.  May  7,  1976. 

Money   orders   and    postal    travellers'    checks    agree- 
ment, with  detailed  regulations.  Done  at  Lausanne 
July  5,  1974.  Entered  into  force  January   1,   1976. 
TIAS  8232. 
Accession  deposited:  Italy.  May  7,  1976. 

Space 

Convention  on  international  liability  for  damage 
caused  by  space  objects.  Done  at  Washington,  Lon- 
don, and  Moscow  March  29,  1972.  Entered  into 
force  September  1,  1972;  for  the  United  States 
October  9.  1973.  TIAS  7762. 
Ratification  deposited:  Belgium.  August  13.   1976. 

Tin 

Fifth  international  tin  agreement,  with  annexes. 
Done  at  Geneva  June  21,  1975.  Entered  into  force 
provisionally  July  1,  1976. 


'  Not  in  force. 


Notifications  of  intention  to  ratify  deposited 
Turkey,  June  9,  1976;  Yugoslavia,  June  22,  1976 
Australia,  France,  June  23,  1976;  Poland.  Jum 
24,  1976;  Netherlands,''  Nigeria,  June  28,  1976 
Bulgaria,  Czechoslovakia,  Federal  Republic  o 
G«rmany,  Indonesia.  Ireland,  June  29,  1976;  Bel 
gium,  Bolivia,  Council  of  European  Communities 
Denmark,  Luxembourg,  June  30,  1976. 

BILATERAL 

Belgium 

Agreement  amending  annex  B  of  the  mutual  defens 
assistance  agreement  of  January  27,  1950  (TIA; 
2010).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Brussel 
July  19  and  29,  1976.  Entered  into  force  July  2! 
1976. 

Egypt 

Grant  agreement  relating  to  a  program  to  develo 
and  apply  advanced  water  management  practice 
in  selected  regions  of  Egypt,  with  annex.  Signe 
at  Cairo  June  30,  1976.  Entered  into  force  June  3( 
1976. 

Iran 

Agreed  minutes  of  the  third  session  of  the  Unite 
States-Iran  Joint  Commission  for  Economic  C^ 
operation,  with  annexes.  Signed  at  Tehran  Augui 
7,  1976.  Entered  into  force  August  7,  1976. 

Philippines 

Loan  agreement  relating  to  construction,  improvi 
ment  and  rehabilitation  of  secondary  and  tertiai 
(feeder)  roads  and  bridges  and  strengthening 
road  maintenance  capability  in  the  Philippine 
Signed  at  Manila  April  28,  1976.  Entered  into  fori 
April  28,  1976. 

Spain 

Supplementary     treaty    on     extradition.     Signed    i 
Madrid  January   25,   1975.  Enters   into  force  upc 
exchange  of  instruments  of  ratification. 
Instrument  of  ratification  signed  by  the  Presiden 
August  10,  1976. 

Switzerland 

Treaty  on  mutual  assistance  in  criminal  matters  wit 
related  notes.  Signed  at  Bern  May  25.  1973.  Entei 
into  force  January  23,  1977. 
Proclaimed  by  the  President:  August  9.  1976. 

United  Nations 

Basic  agreement  governing  grants  by  the  Unite 
States  to  the  United  Nations  Trust  Fund  f( 
Africa.  Signed  at  Washington  June  17,  1976.  Ei 
tared  into  force  June  17,  1976. 


'  For  the  Kingdom  in  Europe. 


304 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


INDEX     August  30,  1976     Vol  LXXV,  No.  19i0 


Africa.  Department  Discusses  U.S.  Policy 
Toward  Counti'ies  of  the  Horn  of  Africa 
(Schaufele) 300 

Asia.  Interdependence,  the  Pacific  Basin,  and 
the    Future    (Robinson) 285 

Australia 

ANZUS    Council    Meeting    Held    at   Canberra 

(communique) 289 

Interdependence,  the  Pacific  Basin,  and  the 
Future    (Robinson) 285 

Prime  Minister  Fraser  of  Australia  Visits 
Washington  (joint  statement  by  President 
Ford  and  Prime  Minister  Fraser)   ....      291 

Commodities.  Sharing  the  World's  Natural  Re- 
sources: Prospects  for  International  Coopera- 
tion (Greenwald) 294 

Congress 

Congressional  Documents  Relating  to  Foreign 
Policy 303 

Department  Discusses  U.S.  Policy  Toward 
Countries  of  the  Horn  of  Africa  (Schaufele)       300 

Developing  Countries 

Interdependence,  the  Pacific  Basin,  and  the 
Future    (Robinson) 285 

Sharing  the  World's  Natural  Resources: 
Prospects  for  International  Cooperation 
(Greenwald) 294 

Economic  Affairs 

Agreement   Signed  on   Polish   Fishing  in    U.S. 

Fishery  Conservation  Zone 299 

Interdependence,    the    Pacific    Basin,    and    the 

Future    (Robinson) 285 

Sharing     the     World's     Natural     Resources: 

Prospects      for      International      Cooperation 

(Greenwald) 294 

Energy.  Sharing  the  World's  Natural  Re- 
sources: Prospects  for  International  Coopera- 
tion    (Greenwald) 294 

Ethiopia.  Department  Discusses  U.S.  Policy 
Toward  Countries  of  the  Horn  of  Africa 
(Schaufele) 300 

Food.  Sharing  the  World's  Natural  Resources: 
Prospects  for  International  Cooperation 
(Greenwald)       294 

French  Territory  of  the  Afars  and  Issas.  De- 
partment Discusses  U.S.  Policy  Toward 
Countries  of  the  Horn  of  Africa  (Schaufele)       300 

Industrial    Democracies.    Interdependence,    the 

Pacific  Basin,  and  the  Future  (Robinson)  .     .       285 

Japan.  Interdependence,  the  Pacific  Basin,  and 

the    Future    (Robinson) 285 

Kenya.  Department  Discusses  U.S.  Policy 
Toward  Countries  of  the  Horn  of  Africa 
(Schaufele) 300 

New  Zealand.  ANZUS  Council  Meeting  Held 
at  Canberra  (communique) 289 


Poland.  Agreement  Signed  on  Polish  Fishing 
in  U.S.  Fishery  Conservation  Zone  ....      299 

Presidential  Documents.  Prime  Minister  Fraser 
of  Australia  Visits  Washington 291 

Somalia.  Department  Discusses  U.S.  Policy 
Toward  Countries  of  the  Horn  of  Africa 
(Schaufele) 300 

Sudan.  Department  Discusses  U.S.  Policy 
Toward  Countries  of  the  Horn  of  Africa 
(Schaufele) 300 

Terrorism.  U.S.  Condemns  Terrorist  Attack  at 
Istanbul  Airport  (Department  statement)    .      293 

Treaty  Information 

Agreement   Signed   on   Polish   Fishing   in   U.S. 

Fishery   Conservation  Zone 299 

Current  Actions 303 

Name  Index 

Ford,    President 291 

Fraser,  J.  Malcolm 291 

Greenwald,  Joseph  A 294 

Robinson,   Charles  W 285 

Schaufele,   William   E.,   Jr 300 


Checklist  of  Department  of  State 
Press  Releases:  August  9-15 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Office  of  Press  Relations.  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

No.      Date  Snbject 

t368A  8/9  U.S.-Iran  Joint  Commission  com- 
munique. 

t372  8/9  Kissinger:  news  conference,  La- 
hore, Pakistan. 

*373  8/10  Kissinger:  remarks  to  press, 
Deauville,   France. 

*374  8/11  Kissinger:  remarks  to  press  upon 
departure,   Deauville. 

t375  8/11  Kissinger,  van  der  Stoel:  news 
conference,  The  Hague. 

*376  8/13  Ignacio  E.  Lozano,  Jr.,  sworn  in 
as  Ambassador  to  El  Salvador 
(biographic  data). 

t377  8/13  Kissinger:  remarks  to  U.S.  dele- 
gation to  Law  of  the  Sea  Con- 
ference.  New  York,  N.Y. 

t378  8/13  Kissinger:  toast  at  luncheon  in 
honor  of  Law  of  the  Sea  Con- 
ference   leadership. 

^Not  printed. 

t  Held  for  a  later  issue  of  the  BULLETIN. 


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THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 

BULLETIN 

Volume  LXXV      •      No.  1941      •      September  6,  1976 


SECRETARY  KISSINGER'S  AUGUST  4-11  TRIP 
TO  IRAN,  AFGHANISTAN,  PAKISTAN,  AND  THE  NETHERLANDS 

Toasts  and  Neivs  Conferences, 

U.S. -Iran  Joint  Commission  Communique, 

U.S. -Afghanistan  Joint  Statement 


THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 

For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE  BULLET  1 1 


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Note:  Contents  of  this  publication  are  not 
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STATE  BULLETIN  as  the  source  will  be 
appreciated.  The  BULLETIN  is  indexed  In 
the    Readers'    Guide   to    Periodical    Literature. 


Vol.  LXXV,  No.  1941 
September  6,  1976 

The  Department  of  State  BULLETl 
a    weekly    publication    issued   by  i 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau 
Public  Affairs,  provides  tlie  public  ft 
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The     BULLETIN     includes     select 
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Secretary  Kissinger  Attends  Session  of  U.S.-lran  Joint  Commission; 
Visits  Afghanistan,  Pakistan,  and  the  Netherlands 


Secretary  Kissinger  visited  the  United 
Kingdom,  Iran,  Afghanistan,  Pakistan, 
France,  a)td  the  Netherlands  August  i-11. 
Following  are  toasts  hy  Secretary  Kissinger 
and  news  conferences,  together  with  the 
texts  of  the  communique  of  the  U.S.-lran 
Joint  Commission  and  a  U.S.- Afghanistan 
joint  statement.^ 


TOAST  BY  SECRETARY  KISSINGER, 
TEHRAN,  IRAN,  AUGUST  6^ 

Mr.  Minister,  Mrs.  Ansary,  distinguished 
guests:  Let  me  first  of  all,  on  behalf  of  all 
of  my  colleagues,  express  my  gratitude  for 
the  marvelous  reception  that  we  have  re- 
ceived here.  We  realize  that  the  point 
Hushang  made  so  subtly,  about  the  relative 
lengths  of  our  histories,  reflects  itself  in 
our  relative  hospitalities.  And  we  know 
that  we  in  the  United  States  are,  as  far  as 
hospitality  is  concerned,  an  underdevel- 
oped country.  So  we  appreciate  it.  But  first 
of  all  we  appreciate  the  kind  words,  totally 
undeserved,  that  you  said  about  us.  But  we 
feel,  as  always,  very  happy  here.  Hushang 
said  to  me  that  he  was  giving  a  little  dinner 
party  tonight  in  a  place  that  was  not  quite 
as  elegant  as  the  State  Department,  prov- 
ing that  he  is  a  great  diplomat  or  that  he 
is  talking  about  a  State  Department  that 
I  don't  know. 


'  Other  press  releases  relating  to  the  Secretary's 
Aug.  4-11  trip  are  Nos.  368  of  Aug.  7,  369  of  Aug.  8, 
373  of  Aug.   10,  and  374  of  Aug.  11. 

Given  at  a  dinner  hosted  by  Minister  of  Economic 
Affairs  and  Finance  Hushang  Ansary  (text  from 
press  release  366,  which  includes  Minister  Ansary's 
toast). 

September  6,  1976 


We  are  beginning  our  Joint  Commission 
meetings  tomorrow,  which  is  one  reason 
why  I  still  have  my  coat  and  shirt,  because 
usually  after  a  day's  negotiations  with  An- 
sary I  have  lost  almost  everything  that  I 
possess,  and  I  just  want  to  tell  this  to  our 
Iranian  friends  here — ^that  the  real  nego- 
tiation hasn't  started  yet  and  so  I'm  still 
reasonably  intact. 

The  Joint  Commission,  however,  ex- 
presses the  close  identity  of  interest  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Iran ;  and  it 
attempts  to  express  and  it  has  successfully 
expre.ssed,  across  a  wide  variety  of  com- 
mon efforts,  the  close  connection  that  has 
grown  up  between  our  two  societies.  Hu- 
shang said  that  he  was  somewhat  pained 
that  some  Americans  do  not  appreciate  the 
nature  of  this  relationship.  I  would  like  to 
say  to  him  that  the  President  and  the  Sec- 
retary of  State  and  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  do  appreciate  the  nature  of 
this  relationship. 

There  has  been  a  great  deal  of  literature 
during  the  past  week  about  the  number  of 
Americans  that  find  themselves  in  Iran,  and 
I  think  it  might  be  useful  to  reflect  about 
this. 

There  are  about  24,000  Americans  in 
Iran.  Of  those,  about  1,000  are  military 
personnel;  2,000  are  engaged  in  training 
activities  that  will  end  when  the  training  is 
completed ;  another  thousand  are  engaged 
in  combined  training  and  maintenance  ac- 
tivities, which  will  also  end  when  the 
capabilities  are  developed.  Five  thousand 
are  here  in  the  oil  business,  and  2,000  are 
here  in  other  businesses.  And  the  rest  are 
dependents. 

So  it  is  true  there  are  24,000  Americans 

305 


here.  There  are  11,000  who  are  working 
here,  7,000  in  civilian  pursuits,  and  their 
families.  So  when  people  "talk  lightly 
about  "hostages,"  the  hostages  are  created 
by  the  nature  of  the  connection  of  our 
societies  and  not  by  any  particular  decision 
having  to  do  with  military  affairs  alone  or 
even  primarily. 

Iran  is  the  country  where  in  1946  Presi- 
dent Truman  considered  it  important  to 
the  interest  of  the  United  States  to  con- 
front the  Soviet  Union  over  Azerbaijan, 
when  there  were  only  a  few  hundred 
Americans  in  this  country,  because  we 
thought  then  that  the  territorial  integrity 
of  Iran  was  important  for  the  United 
States. 

Iran  is  the  country  about  which  in  1949, 
again,  President  Truman  developed  point 
4,  to  express  the  close  connection  we  felt 
not  only  with  the  territorial  integrity  but 
with  the  development  of  Iran. 

Iran  is  the  country  with  which  President 
Eisenhower  in  1959  made  an  executive 
agreement  in  which  he  pledged  that  the 
United  States  would  come  again  to  the  as- 
sistance of  Iran  against  Communist  attack 
or  Communist-inspired  attack,  according  to 
our  constitutional  processes.  And  while  one 
can  debate  today,  in  the  sophisticated  pe- 
riod in  which  we  have  the  great  fortune  of 
living,  what  the  legal  significance  of  an 
executive  agreement  was,  there  can  be  no 
question  that  it  reflected  the  conviction  of 
an  American  President  that  the  security  of 
Iran  was  an  important  interest  of  the 
United  States. 

And  now,  in  1976,  when  the  efforts  of 
1946  and  the  efforts  of  1949  have  led  to 
the  result  that  Iran's  security  is  no  longer 
as  precarious  as  it  was  right  after  the  war 
and  Iran's  progress  economically  has 
reached  a  point  where  it  is  part  of  the  plan 
of  Iran  that  within  10  years  this  country 
will  have  the  economic  level  of  activity  of 
Western  Europe  today — under  those  con- 
ditions it  goes  without  saying  that  Iran  has 
not  become  less  important  to  the  United 
States. 

At  the  time  when  Iran  and  the  United 


States  first  encountered  each  other  in  the 
postwar  period,  we  were  predominant  in 
the  world ;  and  we,  in  our  innocence  of 
international  affairs,  assumed  all  the  bur- 
dens for  defense  and  for  economic  advance. 
And  it  was  indeed  necessary  that  we  do  so, 
because  there  was  no  one  else  to  man  the 
ramparts. 

Now,  in  1976,  the  world  has  become 
much  more  complicated.  Other  centers  of  I 
power  have  developed.  The  threats  have  I 
become  more  complex.  The  United  States 
cannot  assume  all  the  responsibilities. 
Under  those  conditions  we  especially  value  ' 
those  friends  who  are  prepared  to  make 
their  own  efforts  for  their  economic  ad- 
vance and  who  are  prepared  to  make  a 
significant  contribution  to  their  own  de- 
fense. 

As  the  recent  period  has  made  amply 
clear,  the  Middle  East,  always  a  pivot  of 
world  affairs,  has  become  one  of  the  poten- 
tially most  tense  areas  of  the  globe.  In  the 
circumstances,  the  stability  of  Iran,  the 
commitment  of  Iran  to  its  security,  is  a 
major  factor  for  global  peace  and  a  major 
factor  in  the  stability  of  the  Middle  East. 

There  are  at  least  some  Americans  whr 
do  not  take  it  for  granted,  because  the\ 
remember  that  even  in  Iran  things  were  no1 
always  that  way  and  that  they  do  not  al- 
ways have  to  be  that  way  and  that  we  owe 
something  to  the  farsighted  leadership  of 
His  Imperial  Majesty,  which  has  broughl 
matters  to  this  point. 

It  is  true  that  Iran  has  made  great  eco 
nomic  progress.  It  is  also  true  that  Iran  hat 
made  strenuous  efforts  in  its  own  defense 
And  finally,  it  is  true  that  it  has  been  the 
policy  of  the  United  States  to  support  both 
of  these  efforts. 

The  first,  the  economic  effoi't,  no  longei 
requires  American  support.  In  fact,  it  ma> 
be  a  little  bit  the  reverse,  if  Hushang  keep^ 
raising  the  oil  prices. 

But  in  assessing  the  relationship  between 
the  two  countries,  we  note  a  number  ol 
factors.  First,  on  all  major  international 
issues,  the  policies  of  the  United  States  and 
the  policies  of  Iran  have  been  parallel  and 


306 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Itherefore  mutually  reinforcing.  Those  coun- 
jtries  which  have  represented  the  greatest 
threat  to  the  security  of  Iran  are  also  those 
countries  whose  domination  of  Iran  would 
have  a  profound  effect  on  the  global  bal- 
ance of  power  or  on  the  regional  balance 
of  power  and  would  therefore  have 
[profound  consequences  for  the  United 
jStates. 

j  In  all  the  years  of  our  cooperation,  Iran 
Ihas  never  gone  to  war,  or  threatened  to 
go  to  war,  for  any  purpose  which  would 
not  have  been  parallel  to  our  own. 

And  this  cooperation  has  been  all  the 
moi'e  significant  because  it  grew  out  of  a 
leadership  that  is  clearly  independent,  that 
pursues  its  conception  of  its  own  national 
interest  based  on  a  history  of  2,500  years 
of  Iranian  policy ;  and  this  is  what  has 
,made  the  cooperation  all  the  more  effec- 
tive. 

I  do  not  want  to  paint  too  idyllic  a  pic- 
ture. There  have  been  conferences  where 
we  have  not  seen  eye  to  eye — not  involving 
questions  of  peace  and  war.  Unfortunately, 
the  technical  competence  of  your  personnel 
is  such  that  when  we  do  not  agree  you  can 
make  life  extremely  unpleasant  for  us.  But 
those  occasions  have  been  rare;  and  they 
have  not  gone  to  the  central  issues  of 
global  stability  and  global  peace,  not  to 
the  strategy  toward  the  Middle  East  nor  to 
the  strategy  toward  the  Soviet  Union,  both 
key  elements  in  the  global  balance. 

I  have  taken  the  liberty  of  speaking  in 
this  manner  because  I  wanted  our  Iranian 
friends  to  understand  that,  not  out  of 
sentimentality,  though  we  are  always 
happy  here,  but  out  of  a  calculation  of  our 
own  national  and  global  interests — just  as 
Iranian  policy  is  based  on  its  calculation 
of  its  national  interests — there  has  devel- 
oped a  parallelism  of  views  on  many  key 
problems  that  has  made  our  cooperation  a 
matter  that  is  in  the  profound  national 
interest  of  both  countries.  This  is  the  con- 
viction of  our  Administration.  It  is  this 
conviction  that  has  brought  me  here,  and 
it  will  be  pursued  in  the  period  ahead. 
I     So  it  is  in  this  spirit  that  I  would  like  to 


propose  a  toast  to  your  great  leader  His 
Imperial  Majesty  the  Shahanshah  and  to 
the  permanent  friendship  between  the 
peoples  of  the  United  States  and  the  great 
people  of  Iran.  And  if  I  may,  I  also  pro- 
pose a  toast  to  my  good  friend  the  Minister 
of  Finance  and  Mrs.  Ansary. 


NEWS  CONFERENCE  BY  SECRETARY  KISSINGER 
AND  MINISTER  ANSARY  ' 

Minister  Ansary:  Ladies  and  gentlemen, 
we  just  concluded  the  deliberations  of  our 
third  session  of  the  Joint  Iran-U.S.  Com- 
mission on  Economic  Cooperation;  and  to- 
gether with  the  Secretary  of  State  and  the 
members  of  the  American  delegation,  I'm 
glad  to  say  that  we  have  reached  some 
very  important  decisions.  This  session  has 
started,  as  you  know,  with  meetings  of  ex- 
perts at  committee  levels,  and  the  Secre- 
tary's visit  started  with  an  audience  yester- 
day with  His  Imperial  Majesty  the 
Shahanshah,  following  which  the  work  of 
the  Commission  began  this  morning. 

The  Commission,  as  you  know,  was  set 
up  to  concretize  decisions  and  policy  mat- 
ters and  provide  directions  for  the  develop- 
ment of  trade  and  economic  cooperation 
between  Iran  and  the  United  States;  and 
in  that  context  I  am  very  pleased  to  say 
that  this  session — this  particular  session — 
has  been  highly  successful.  The  highlights 
of  these  agreements  which  you  have  just 
signed  with  the  Secretary  of  State  are  as 
follows. 

In  the  field  of  trade  you  may  recall  that 
at  the  last  session  of  the  Commission  in 
Washington  last  year,  an  estimate  was 
provided  for  an  amount  of  trade  between 
the  two  countries  in  the  order  of  about  15 
billion  U.S.  dollars.  At  this  particular  ses- 
sion we  reached  an  agreement  for  the 
figure  of  trade  to  be  more  comprehensive 
and  to  present  a  very  clear  picture  of  what 
we   envisage   would   lie   ahead   in   the   ex- 


Held  at  Tehran  on  Aug.  7  at  the  conclusion  of  the 
third  session  of  the  U.S. -Iran  Joint  Commission  (text 
from  press  release  367). 


September  6,  1976 


307 


change  of  goods  and  services  between  the 
two  countries. 

We  must  revise  our  previous  estimate  to 
include  the  additional  potentials  that  we 
feel  lie  ahead  in  the  course  of  the  next  few 
years  until  1980.  We  have  therefore  re- 
vised the  figure  upward,  in  the  order  of 
about  $40  billion,  to  include  exports  of  oil 
from  Iran  to  the  United  States,  exports  of 
industrial  and  traditional  goods  from  Iran 
to  the  United  States,  and  the  import  of 
goods  and  services  from  the  United  States, 
but  not  inclusive  of  military  input. 

I  would  like  to  say  here  and  now  that  we 
are  appreciative  of  the  readiness  that  has 
been  expressed  on  the  part  of  the  U.S. 
Government  to  facilitate  and  cooperate 
with  us  for  the  expansion  of  Iranian  ex- 
ports to  the  United  States  so  that  we  will 
over  the  years  attain  a  reasonable  propor- 
tion in  the  amount  of  exports  and  imports 
between  the  two  countries. 

In  the  field  of  energy  I  would  like  to  say 
that  as  far  as  nuclear  energy  is  concerned, 
we  are  pleased  that  we  have  made  very 
good  progress  forward  in  our  discussions 
for  cooperation  in  this  field  between  the 
two  countries.  Iran,  as  you  know,  is  a  signa- 
tory to  the  Nonproliferation  Treaty,  and 
we  very  strongly  believe  in  the  measures 
that  are  needed  to  assure  safeguards  in  this 
particular  area.  We  are  ready  to  support 
measures  on  an  international  level  aimed  at 
preventing  proliferation  in  the  world  at 
large.  We  therefore  quite  naturally  indi- 
cated our  readiness  to  agree  to  safeguards 
that  are  necessary,  as  long  as  we  are  as- 
sured of  the  supply  of  enriched  uranium — 
not  Plutonium — needed  for  our  fast-breed- 
ers. We  are  hoping  that  in  the  light  of  this 
progress  and  our  talk  with  the  Secretary 
of  State  and  the  American  delegation,  we 
will,  hopefully,  reach  the  final  phase  of  our 
agreement  in  the  near  future. 

We  also  reached  an  agreement  to  coop- 
erate between  the  two  countries  in  the  field 
of  solar  energy  and  in  other  fields  of 
energy,  including  gas,  in  connection  with 
which  we  have  two  important  multibillion- 
dollar    agreements    now    under   considera- 


tion. Because  of  this  we  have  created  a  new 
Research  and  Development  Committee  in 
this  field  so  that  the  experts  and  the  offi- 
cials of  the  two  sides  may  continue  their 
active  cooperation  because  primarily — not 
only  for  the  concern  of  the  two  sides  that 
need  to  meet  the  energy  requirements  of 
the  two  countries  but  also  of  the  require- 
ments of  the  world  at  large  in  the  next 
decade. 

In  the  field  of  agriculture,  we  agreed  to 
some  important  decisions  in  pinpointing  the 
areas  of  cooperation  including  the  possi- 
bilities of  cooperation  between  the  two 
countries  for  the  purpose  of  manufacturing 
agricultural  machinery  and  implements  as 
well  as  insecticides  and  petrochemicals  and 
chemicals  for  use  not  only  in  Iran  but  also 
for  meeting  the  needs  of  the  general  re- 
gion as  a  whole. 

Because  of  our  mutual  concern  for  active 
steps  that  are  necessary  for  the  purpose  of 
meeting  food  requirements  of  the  world  at 
large  and  this  general  region  as  a  whole, 
we  feel  therefore  that  the  discussions  that 
were  held  in  the  past  two  days  for  the  pur- 
pose of  selecting  a  special  region  in  Irar 
for  development  with  U.S.  cooperation  ir 
the  field  of  agriculture  are  also  importani 
in  this  particular  field. 

In  the  field  of  housing  we  have  reached 
agreement  to  encourage  the  private  sectoi 
on  both  sides  as  well  as  the  public  sectoi 
in  Iran  to  engage  in  ventures  that  would  b( 
aimed  at  manufacturing  and  producing 
construction  material  and  housing  compo 
nents  and  participating  in  the  developmen 
of  construction  technology  for  mass  pro 
duction  of  housing  in  Iran.  This,  of  course 
would  also  include  participation,  on  th( 
part  of  Iran  and  on  the  part  of  the  Unitec 
States,  in  commercial  exhibitions  in  this 
particular  field,  as  well  as  engagement  ii 
training  programs. 

In  the  field  of  science,  technology,  anc 
education,  the  cooperation  will  continue  ii 
oceanography,  fishery  studies,  geologica 
and  mineral  surveys  and  environmenta 
protection,  health  care  education,  and  th( 
like. 


308 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  * 


Ill  the  field  of  health  we  have  reached  an 
agreement  in  principle  to  cooperate  for 
the  purpose  of  establishing  a  Food  and 
Drug  Administration  in  Iran  and  the  de- 
velopment of  procedures  for  specific  tech- 
niques in  the  laboratories  for  drug  and 
food  control.  On  the  Iranian  side,  we  at- 
tach a  great  deal  of  importance  to  this 
particular  field  of  cooperation  between  our 
two  countries. 

In  the  field  of  industry,  we  have  reached 
an  agreement  to  encourage  further  activi- 
ties on  the  part  of  the  private  sector  on 
both  sides  to  an  active  participation  on  the 
part  of  the  Joint  Business  Council  that  was 
established  as  a  result  of  the  decisions  of 
the  Commission  previously,  and  we  feel 
that  in  various  big  indu.stries  it  would  re- 
sult in  agreement  for  joint  ventures  in 
promising  areas  to  both  countries,  espe- 
cially in  the  field  of  petrochemicals  and 
mining  as  well  as  in  other  fields  of  in- 
terest. 

As  far  as  investment  is  concerned,  we 
have  expressed  our  readiness  in  principle 
on  both  sides  to  encourage  movement  in 
the  private  sector  in  accordance  with  the 
laws  and  regulations  of  the  two  countries, 
iand  we  believe  that  the  measures  that  will 
be  introduced  as  a  result  of  these  decisions 
in  principle  will  encourage  movement  in 
that  direction. 

I  want  to  express  my  sincere  apprecia- 
tion to  the  Secretary  of  State  for  his  in- 
valuable contributions  to  the  deliberations 
of  the  Commission  and  for  the  very  friendly 
atmosphere  in  which  the  talks  were  con- 
ducted. I  believe  we  have  taken  some  very 
important  steps  forward,  the  results  of 
which  should  be  witnessed  in  the  coming 
|12  months  and  in  the  years  that  we  have 
ahead  of  us,  as  a  result  of  which  we  are 
certain  the  friendship  between  our  two 
peoples  will  advance  and  the  trade  and 
economic  relations  between  the  two  coun- 
tries will  further  consolidate  our  friend- 
ship. 

I  will  now  ask  the  Secretary  of  State  to 
please  address  the  group. 


Secretarii  Kissinger:  P^irst  of  all,  I  would 
like  to  express  on  behalf  of  my  colleagues 
my  gratitude  for  the  extraordinary  hospi- 
tality we  have  received  here  and  for  the 
cordiality  and  spirit  of  cooperation  in 
which  the  discussions  were  conducted. 

My  colleague  and  friend  has  outlined  the 
major  results  of  the  work  of  the  Commis- 
sion. I  would  like  to  emphasize  that  they 
demon.strate  the  broad  cooperation  in  civil- 
ian fields  that  is  going  on  between  Iran  and 
the  United  States,  reflecting  the  importance 
that  both  sides  attach  to  the  relationship 
and  the  importance  also  that  the  United 
States  attaches  to  the  position  of  Iran. 

With  respect  to  the  trade  figures  that 
were  given,  we  have  decided  to  include 
the  oil  figures  because  it  makes  it  a  more 
meaningful  presentation.  If  one  takes  the 
comparable  figures  from  last  year,  we  pro- 
ject an  increase  from  $15  billion  in  trade 
to  $26  billion  in  trade.  That  would  be  an 
increase  of  about  60  to  65  percent  over  the 
figures  of  last  year,  but  we  will  from  now 
on  use  the  basis  of  the  entire  two-way  trade 
between  the  two  countries. 

I  would  like  to  say  a  word  about  the 
problem  of  nuclear  energy.  We  have  had 
extraordinarily  fruitful  talks  with  respect 
to  the  relationship  between  nuclear  energy, 
peaceful  uses  of  nuclear  energy,  and  the 
problem  of  nonproliferation,  and  we  have 
explored  a  number  of  way.s,  which — if  they 
are  implemented  as  we  intend  to  imple- 
ment them — will  tui'n  this  into  a  commer- 
cial issue ;  that  is,  who  is  to  pay  for  the 
consequences  of  nonproliferation — of  the 
commercial  cost  of  nonproliferation.  But  if 
we  proceed  as  we  intend  to  proceed  to  a 
eonclu.sion  of  these  discussions,  it  can  be  a 
model  not  only  for  this  particular  set  of 
relationships  but  for  other  relationships  in 
the  area  of  peaceful  uses  of  nuclear  tech- 
nology. 

I  would  like  to  express  the  appreciation 
of  the  American  side  for  the  constructive 
attitudes  which  our  Iranian  colleagues — 
led  by  His  Imperial  Majesty,  who  laid  the 
basis  for  it  yesterday — followed  on  today, 
and   our  discussion   approached   this  topic 


September  6,  1976 


309 


which  is  of  such  great  importance  for  the 
future  of  mankind. 

I  think  with  this  we  can  perhaps  answer 
questions. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  thank  you  for  explaining 
the  difference  in  the  comparison  of  the  figures 
over  a  five-year  period,  hut  it  seems  to  me 
that  last  year  it  did  not  include  military  fig- 
ures and  this  time  it  does  include  military 
figures. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  It  does  not  include 
military  figures.  The  military  estimates 
would  add  between  $2  and  $3  billion  a 
year  over  that  five-year  period.  If  you  add 
the  military  you  have  to  add  the  total  fig- 
ure, which  would  be  about  $50  to  $55 
billion. 

Q.  Let  me  see,  $50  to  $55  billion  over  the 
five-year  period?  Spread,  out  over  the  five 
years ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Of  which  roughly  $10 
billion  would  be  military;  roughly  $24  bil- 
lion would  be  American  exports  to  Iran ; 
roughly  $14  billion  would  be  Iranian  oil 
exports  to  the  United  States;  roughly  $2 
billion  would  be  civilian  exports.  Is  that 
approximately  correct? 

Minister  Ansary:  Yes,  sir,  that  is  correct. 

Q.  Is  it  not  possible,  Mr.  Secretary,  to 
break  this  down  to  ati  annual  figure  then? 
Do  all  of  these  figures  cover  a  four-year,  five- 
year  period? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  They  cover  a  five- 
year  period,  but  you  can  divide  it  by  five 
and  you  would  be  roughly  correct. 

Q.  So  the  $15  billion  that  ivas  talked  about 
last  year  jvas  based  also  on  a  five-  or  six-year 
projection  ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Five-year  projection. 

Q.  The  military  aspect  of  this  trade  is  not 
included  in  this  document  ivhich  you  just 
signed?  That  i^  a  projection  ivhich  ivould  be 
negotiated  uttder  a  different  rubric? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  That  is  correct.  This 
Commission  deals  only  with  the  civilian  re- 


lationship   between   Iran    and   the    United 
States. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  does  it  mean  that  oil  in 
some  way  has  come  into  a  more  formal  con- 
text here  by  including  it  in  this  new  arrange- 
ment? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  What  it  means  quite 
frankly,  if  my  friend  will  permit  me,  be- 
cause last  year  we  got  into  a  hoiTible  mess 
explaining  these  figures  because  if  you  ex- 
clude the  oil  exports  there  is  a  considerable 
imbalance  in  these  trade  figures.  You  cannot 
give  a  fair  estimate  of  the  economic  inter- 
relationship between  Iran  and  the  United 
States  unless  you  include  the  oil  figures, 
So  this  is  an  attempt  on  our  part  to  give  asi 
accurate  a  description  of  the  total  inter- 
play of  economic  relationships,  excluding, 
the  military  one,  that  exists  between  Iran 
and  the  United  States.  Is  that  correct? 

Minister  Ansary:  That  is  correct.  It  would 
just  complete  the  picture  of  trade. 

Q.    Have    you    in    any    way   discussed   oil  i 
quotas  or  anything  like  that? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Oil  what? 

Q.  Oil  quotas? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  No. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  regarding  the  nucleat 
cooperation  between  Iran  and  America,  how 
many  reactors  are  actually  involved,  and  aro 
there  going  to  be  any  programs  for  trainiuii 
the  personnel  required  to  run  these  reactors 

Secretary  Kissinger:  We  have  been  talkinj 
about  six  to  eight  reactors,  and  there  wil 
be  programs  for  training  the  personnel 
What  has  concerned  the  United  States  ii 
that  the  beginning  of  these  programs — W( 
have  no  concern  about  the  reactors  as  sue! 
— what  we  have  been  concerned  about  ii 
the  problem  of  reprocessing  and  the  pos 
sible  diversion  of  materials  into  weaponi 
usage.  We  have  had  very  satisfactory  talki 
on  this  issue  both  with  His  Imperial  Maj 
esty  and  with  the  responsible  ministers 
And  we  believe  that  we  are  on  the  way  t( 
a  solution  that  meets  both  the  Iranian  con 


310 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


cerns  for  nuclear  power  and  our  concerns 
about  nuclear  proliferation. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary  or  Mr.  Minister,  either 
one,  does  this  balance  or  imbalance  now  rep- 
resent the  reasonable  level  that  you  ivant  to 
reach  on  the  trade?  Is  it  going  to  be  a  more 
evening  process  in  the  next  five  years? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  we  have  indi- 
cated that  we  will  encourage  Iranian  ex- 
ports in  the  industrial  and  traditional 
commodities  to  the  United  States.  As  you 
can  see,  there  is  still  a  gap,  even  with  the 
oil  exports,  and  we  will  encourage  this. 

Minister  Ansary:  May  I  add  to  that?  An 
ideal  situation,  of  course,  is  a  balance  of 
trade,  but  at  the  moment — with  Iran  de- 
veloping very  fast,  needing  capital  goods, 
machinery,  and  other  equipment  for  its  de- 
velopment programs — we  envision  that  a 
reasonable  ratio  between  the  imports  and 
exports  of  the  two  countries  would  be  an 
acceptable  situation  until  such  time  as  we 
are  capable  of  producing  more  for  export 
to  the  United  States  and  other  nations. 

Q.  Do  these  figures  represent  a  commit- 
ment or  a  projection? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  They  represent  a  pro- 
jection, but  it  is  based  also  on  a  foreseeable 
commitment.  We  believe  that  we  have 
made  a  statistical  study  of  this  with  great 
care,  and  this  represents  what  we  in  fact 
think  is  the  minimum  that  is  likely. 

Q.  Sir,  does  it  include  the  projected  value 
of  any  barter  arrangements? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  No.  It  doesn't  include 
any  of  the  barter  arrangements. 

Minister  Ansary:  It  does  not  take  into  ac- 
count any  future  developments  unforeseen 
in  the  trade.  Obviously  we  have  negotia- 
tions for  imports,  exports,  and  so  on,  so  that 
when  the  Commission  meets,  of  course,  in 
the  future,  taking  into  account  other  de- 
velopments, the  figures  can,  of  course,  be 
revised. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  As  I  understand  it,  if 
some  of  these  barter  arrangements  go 
through,  it  would  not  increase  the  number 


of  arms,  the  level  of  the  arms  projection; 
it  would  increase  the  export  of  Iranian  oil. 

Q.  Now,  Mr.  Secretary,  yesterday  His 
Majesty  spoke  of  needing  possibly  as  much 
as  three  times  the  arms  imports  that  are 
coming  in.  These  projections  that  you  pre- 
sented to  us  today  contain  a  steady  figure 
of  $2  to  $3  billion  a  year  for  ioeapons. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  As  I  understood  His 
Majesty  yesterday,  he  was  responding  to  a 
lot  of  insistent  oratory  that  was  put  to  him, 
and  he  was  saying  that  if  Iran  were  arm- 
ing itself  in  the  same  proportion  per  capita 
as  some  of  its  neighbors,  it  would  require 
three  times  the  armament  that  it  now  has. 
In  none  of  our  discussions  had  he  ever  pro- 
posed a  level  of  armaments  that  is  meas- 
ured per  capita  in  the  same  relation  as  his 
neighbors,  and  this  was  a  point  to  illustrate 
that.  In  his  judgment  Iranian  requests  had 
not  been  excessive.  It  was  not  a  projection 
of  what  he  has  in  fact  discussed  with  us. 

Q.  Unless  I'm  totally  mistaken,  even 
though  the  figure  first  presented  by  His 
Majesty  ivas  a  vague  one,  he  did  indicate  that 
Iran  wanted  more  tveapons  in  the  future  and 
not  a  steady  supply. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  it  depends  what 
you  mean  by  "more."  As  we  understand 
the  request  that  Iran  has  made  of  us,  it  is 
for  a  replacement  of  some  of  the  existing 
weapons  with  modern  generations  of  weap- 
ons that  will  involve,  due  to  inflation  and 
greater  technological  complexity,  undoubt- 
edly an  increase  in  expenditure,  but  no 
substantial  increase  at  the  total  force  lev- 
els, as  I  understand  it. 

Q.  The  projected  trade  that  is  talked  about 
at  this  meeting,  where  would  that  leave  the 
Uiiited  States  relative  to  Iran's  other  trading 
partyiers? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  think  about  18  per- 
cent, isn't  it,  Hushang? 

Minister  Ansary:  Do  you  mean  in  terms — 

Q.  Woidd  the  United  States  be  your  big- 
gest trading  partner  and  if  so  by  how  much? 


September  6,  1976 


311 


Minister  Ansary:  I  would  envisage  that  if 
this  trend  continues  the  United  States 
would  most  probably  occupy  the  first  posi- 
tion among  Iran's  trading  partners.  There 
is  West  Germany  ranking  first  at  this  time. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  did  your  talks  in  Tehran 
go  beyond  bilateral  limits  when  you  talked 
about  international  affairs  with  the  Finance 
Minister? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Whenever  I  have  the 
privilege  of  meeting  His  Majesty,  we  have 
a  detailed  review  of  the  international  situ- 
ation. This,  of  course,  puts  particular  em- 
phasis on  those  areas  that  are  of  profound 
concern  to  Iran;  that  is  to  say,  the  Middle 
East,  South  Asia,  the  Indian  Ocean.  But  a 
central  review  of  the  world  situation,  and 
we  discussed  this  in  considerable  detail,  as 
I  said  yesterday,  we  have  found  the  poli- 
cies in  Iran  in  these  respects,  and  ours,  to 
be  parallel  and  mutually  supportive. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  could  you  kindly  tell  me 
wtiat  percentage  of  the  projects  which  were 
agreed  upon  two  years  ago  when  Mr.  Kissi^i- 
ger  visited  Tehran  have  been  implonented? 
What  progress  we  have  had  over  the  past 
tivo  years? 

Minister  Ansary:  I  can  tell  you  that  we 
have  had  considerable  progress  in  imple- 
menting the  decisions  that  were  made  in 
the  past  sessions  of  the  Commission.  But  I 
can't  give  you  off  the  top  of  my  head  a 
percentage.  I  think  it  can  be  provided. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  if  we  can  go  back  for  a 
moment  to  the  arms  question,  a  two-part 
question:  I  wonder  if  you  would,  comment 
briefly  on  what  sort  of  role  discussion  about 
the  Senate  report'*  had  in  your  talks  with 
His  Majesty?  And  secondly,  are  both  sides 
concerned  about  the  management  of  these 
arms  transfers  and  their  coyitrol,  and  are 
they  taking  any  steps  to  shore  up  any  inade- 
quacies that  might  exist? 


'  U.S.  Military  Sales  to  Iran.  A  staff  report  to  the 
Subcommittee  on  Foreign  Assistance  of  the  Senate 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations.  July  1976.  59  pp. 


312 


Secretary  Kissinger:  First  of  all,  I  think 
the  report  itself  was  far  less  sensational 
than  some  of  the  conclusions  that  were 
drawn  from  it  in  various  media.  The  report 
as  such  was  discussed  only  briefly.  The  im- 
plications of  our  relationship  were  obvi- 
ously discussed  at  greater  length. 

It  is  in  the  interest  of  both  Iran  and  the 
United  States  to  make  certain  that  the  arms 
that  are  supplied  to  Iran  are  handled  in 
an  effective  manner,  that  the  management 
of  these  programs  be  eflficient  and  suitable 
to  the  common  purposes  that  we  have. 

We  believe  that  on  the  American  side  the 
reorganization  that  was  conducted  about 
18  months  ago  has  proved  to  be  effective, 
and  most  of  the  criticisms  referred  to  the 
period  before  the  reorganization  of  our  Mil- 
itary Advisory  Group  and  that  part  of  the 
Embassy  that  dealt  with  this  program 
Since  most  of  the  criticism  concerned  the 
American  side,  I  don't  want  to  comment 
on  the  Iranian  handling  of  it,  but  I  had  the 
firm  impression  from  His  Majesty  that  he 
is  firmly  determined  on  his  side  to  make 
certain  that  there  is  an  efficient  cooperation 
and  an  efficient  utilization  of  these 
weapons. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  when  you  said  that  armt 
over  a  five-year  period  would  only  come  om 
to  about  $10  billion,  ivas  that  something  thai 
was  agreed  upon  and  projected  during  thit 

visit? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  That  is  not  agreed 
upon,  that  is  a  projection.  On  this  visil 
there  was  no  agreement  made  on  any  par- 
ticular weapon  system,  on  any  particulai 
supply.  We  were  talking  about  the  projec- 
tion  of  needs,  and  indeed,  this  figure  I'n; 
giving  you  was  not  discussed  between  His 
Majesty  and  myself.  It  is  a  figure  that  we 
projected  on  the  basis  of  foreseeable  Ira^ 
nian  requests  in  the  replacement  field  as 
we  were  putting  together  the  figures  foi 
this  meeting.  It  is  not  an  agreed  figure  be- 
tween the  two  countries,  but  a  reasonable 
projection. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  to  prevent  a  repetitio'n 


Department  of  State  Bulletiil 


of  last  year's  press  conference,  where  there 
was  a  great  misjinderstanding,  I  gather,  as 
to  statistics,  my  memory  is  that  last  year 
the  arms  sales  were  included  in  the  disctts- 
sion  at  the  press  conference  as  !cithi)i  the 
$15  billion  projection  of  sales. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  This  is  a  confusion 
that  we  have  never  really  fully  cleared  up. 
I  can  assure  you  that  the  $26  billion-a-year 
figure  and  the  $40  billion-a-year  figure 
clearly  exclude  the  arms  figure  and  that 
the  arms  sales  beyond  this  are  not  part  of 
an  agreement  by  the  Commission  but  are  a 
projection  that  the  experts  made  on  the 
basis  of  recent  trends  of  what  was  probable 
over  a  five-year  period,  but  not  something 
that  was  discussed  in  any  detail  and  which 
was  subjected  to  any  scrutiny.  It  was 
simply  to  enable  us  to  answer  your  ques- 
tions. The  $40  billion  figure  was  examined 
in  great  detail  and  represents  the  best 
judgment  of  all  the  experts,  and  it  explic- 
itly excludes  the  militai'y  precisely  to  avoid 
the  trouble  of  last  year. 

Q.  My  second  question  is  on  the  oil  export 
tii/in-e.  What  has  been  the  oil  export  figure 
t)om  Iran  to  the  United  States,  say  for  the 
/((.sf  two  years,  in  dollars? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Please,  you  would 
know  that  better. 

Minister  Ansary:  If  you  want  the  exact 
figures,  I  have  them  here:  1975,  9.8  million 
tdiis,  through  the  consortium;  6.8  million 
tons  direct  exports  by  NIOC  [National 
Iranian  Oil  Co.].  In  1976,  we  expect  it  to 
reach  a  total  of  20  or  21  million  tons  and 
for  1977  we  have  approximately  24  million 
tuns. 

Q.  Do  you  have  a  dollar  figure  by  any 
chance? 

Minister  Ayisary:  Trade  for  1975  is  ap- 
proximately, excluding  oil,  $2.5  billion. 

Q.  Excluding  oil  and  military? 

Minister  Ansary:  [Inaudible.] 

Q.  Are  there  any  especially  set  up  meas- 
ures,  or  have   you  discussed  any  measures 


unth  the  Secretary  on  exports  of  uranium  to 
the  United  States? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  One  of  the  measures 
that  is  mentioned  in  the  communique  is  the 
conviction  of  the  executive  branch  that  a 
distinction  ought  to  be  made  in  our  legisla- 
tion between  those  OPEC  nations  that 
joined  the  oil  embargo  and  those  OPEC  na- 
tions that  not  only  did  not  join  the  last 
embargo  but  have  explicitly  stated  that 
they  would  not  join  any  new  embargo.  This 
would  remove  a  number  of  discriminatory 
features  vis-a-vis  Iranian  exports  that  our 
current  legislation  imposes  on  them. 

We  would  also  be  prepared  to  assist  the 
Iranian  trade  promotion  eflfort  and  to  con- 
sult with  Iran  on  other  measures  to  close 
the  gap  that  the  figures  that  we  have  given 
here  indicate. 

Q.  Mr.  Minister,  at  your  news  conference 
in  Washington  a  year  ago  you  talked  about 
plans  to  create  here  in  Iran  a  major  financial 
center,  which  you  said  would  be  the  only 
one  between  Zurich  and  Singapore.  Is  that 
plan  still  alive? 

Minister  Ansary:  Yes.  As  you  know  we 
had  a  financial  conference  with  the  active 
participation  of  the  members  of  the  Joint 
Iran-U.S.  Business  Council  at  which  cer- 
tain decisions  were  made,  which  are  being 
followed  up. 

Q.  Do  you  have  any  firm  date?  I'm  sorry. 

Minister  Ansary:  In  the  meantime,  meas- 
ures are  being  taken  to  facilitate  the  flow 
of  capital  in  and  out  of  Iran.  As  you  know, 
we  have  no  restrictions  on  the  outflow  of 
capital  from  Iran  and  other  measures  are 
being  studied  on  the  part  of  the  govern- 
ment and  the  central  bank,  which  are  all 
being  aimed  in  that  direction. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  ivhy  has  Iran  needed 
$2.-5  billion  worth  of  arms  a  year  for  the  last 
four  years  and  projected  for  the  next  five 
years,  and  why  is  it  U.S.  policy  to  sell  Iran 
that  many  arms? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Iran  has  borders  with 
Iraq,  the  Soviet  Union,   Afghanistan,   and 


September  6,  1976 


313 


Pakistan.  Iran  has  committed  itself  to  make 
the  maximum  effort  in  its  own  defense, 
which  is  consistent  with  our  own  objectives 
that  countries  in  whose  security  we  do  have 
an  interest  should  make  a  major  effort  in 
their  own  defense. 

I  think  if  one  looks  at  the  threats,  the 
potential  threats,  that  Iran  faces,  the  ar- 
maments of  its  neighbors,  and  the  role  that 
Iran  has  played  in  international  affairs,  it's 
evident  that  its  self-defense  is  strongly  in 
the  American  interest.  This  is  not  a  favor 
that  we  do  to  Iran. 

If  you  add  to  it  that  Iran  is  paying  cash 
for  its  armament,  that  it  has  at  no  time 
threatened  to  use  its  armament  for  pur- 
poses of  which  the  United  States  has  dis- 
approved ...  if  you  look  at  the  stabilizing 
role  that  Iran  has  played  in  both  Middle 
East  and  South  Asia  policy,  we  have  found 
it  to  be  in  the  national  interest  of  the 
United  States  and  the  interest  of  regional 
stability  to  cooperate  with  Iran  in  its  prog- 
ress. 

Minister  Ansary:  Last  question,  please. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  putting  Iran-American 
relations  aside  for  a  while,  I  ivould  like  to 
hear  your  comments  on  the  latest  develop- 
ments in  the  Middle  East  and  in  particular 
the  Lebanese  situation.  With  reference  to  the 
cooperation  betiveen  the  U.S.  Embassy  and 
the  Palestinians,  would  this  have  any  impli- 
cation on  forward  developments  in  that  re- 
gion ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  contact  between 
the  United  States  Embassy  and  the  Pales- 
tinians in  Beirut  resulted  from  the  de  facto 
control  of  west  Beirut  by  the  Palestinians. 
It  was  confined  to  the  security  of  American 
personnel  in  Beirut  and  the  evacuation  of 
Americans  from  Lebanon.  It  had  no  other 
significance.  And  it  had  no  implication  for 
the  evolution  of  the  Middle  East  negoti- 
ations. 

The  situation  in  Lebanon  is  a  tragedy  for 
the  people  of  Lebanon.  The  United  States 
is  deeply  interested  in  the  territorial  integ- 
rity and  sovereignty  of  Lebanon  and  hopes 
that  the  parties  concerned  can  negotiate  a 

314 


solution  that  will  rapidly  restore  these  con- 
ditions. 

With  respect  to  peace  in  the  Middle  East, 
the  United  States  has  repeatedly  said  that 
we  do  not  believe  that  a  long  period  of 
stagnation  is  in  the  interest  of  anybody. 
The  United  States  will  support  efforts  to 
begin  a  negotiating  process  again  as  soon 
as  the  parties  concerned  are  ready  to  do  so 
and  the  [inaudible]  of  their  efforts  which 
Lebanon  represents  is  at  an  end.  But  we  be- 
lieve that  a  lasting  and  just  peace  in  the 
Middle  East  must  be  high  on  the  agenda 
of  all  people  who  are  concerned  with  peace 
in  the  world. 

Minister  Ansary:  Thank  you,  ladies  and 
gentlemen. 


COMMUNIQUE   OF   U.S.-IRAN    JOINT 
COMMISSION  ISSUED  AT  TEHRAN  AUGUST  7 

Press   release   368A   dated   August  9 

The  Iran-U.S.  Joint  Commission  met  in  Tehran  for 
its  third  session  August  6  and  7,  1976.  His  Excellency 
Hushang  Ansary,  Minister  of  Economic  Affairs  and 
Finance,  and  the  Secretary  of  State,  the  Honorable 
Henry  A.  Kissinger,  Co-Chairmen  of  the  Commission, 
headed  the  Iranian  and  the  U.S.  delegations. 

During  his  visit  to  Iran,  the  Secretary  of  State 
was  received  in  audience  by  His  Imperial  Majesty, 
the  Shahanshah,  at  Nowshahr  and  conveyed  to  him 
the  personal  greetings  of  President  Ford.  In  their 
talks,  His  Imperial  Majesty  and  Secretary  Kissinger 
discussed  the  current  world  situation  and  reviewed 
bilateral  matters  in  the  spirit  of  mutual  respect  and 
understanding  characteristic  of  relations  between 
Iran  and  the  United  States. 

Trade  and  Investment  • 

The  Commission  noted  with  satisfaction  that  the 
trade  between  the  two  countries  had  expanded  well 
beyond  earlier  expectations.  In  March  1975  a  target 
of  $15  billion  in  trade  (exclusive  of  oil  and  military 
items)  over  the  following  five  years  was  established. 
The  Commission  agreed  that  a  target  of  $26  billion 
for  the  period  1975-80  is  now  attainable,  and  agreed 
that  the  two  governments  would  cooperate  to  reach 
that  goal.  If  Iran's  oil  exports  to  the  United  States 
are  taken  into  account,  total  non-military  trade  is 
expected  to  exceed  $40  billion  over  the  period  1975-80. 

In  their  desire  to  achieve  continued  expansion  of 
trade  and  econonxic  cooperation  between  the  two 
countries,  the  two  parties  recognized  the  need  for 
considerable  expansion  of  Iranian   industrial  exports 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


to  the  United  States.  In  this  connection  the  U.S. 
delegation  expressed  its  readiness  to  cooperate  in 
the  Iranian  efforts  to  increase  such  exports.  The 
Iranian  side  emphasized  that  exclusion  of  Iranian 
exports  from  the  U.S.  generalized  system  of  prefer- 
ences [GSP]  runs  counter  to  the  aim  and  determina- 
tion of  the  two  sides  in  facilitation  and  expanding 
trade  between  the  two  countries.  The  U.S.  side  stated 
that  while  any  change  in  GSP  eligibility  would  re- 
quire an  act  of  Congress,  the  U.S.  Executive  Branch 
supports  legislation  recently  introduced  to  provide 
GSP  benefits  covering  Iran  and  will  continue  to  use 
its  best  efforts  to  achieve  passage  in  the  current  ses- 
sion  of  Congress. 

The  Commission  expressed  its  satisfaction  at  the 
cooperative  spirit  which  characterized  the  March 
1976  Inaugural  Meeting  of  the  Iran-U.S.  Business 
Council,  followed  by  the  Iran-U.S.  Financial  Con- 
ference. The  Commission  welcomed  the  decisions  of 
these  bodies  to  create  a  joint  study  group  on  finan- 
cial matters  and  joint  task  forces  on  investment  and 
trade.  The  two  sides  believe  that  further  contacts 
between  the  U.S.  and  Iranian  financial  and  com- 
mercial communities  would  be  useful  and  urged  the 
Iran-U.S.  Business  Council  to  facilitate  action  pro- 
grams in  these  fields. 

The  two  sides  expressed  satisfaction  over  the  de- 
velopments in  the  two  countries  in  the  field  of 
investment,  and  welcomed  increased  flows  of  capital 
on  both  sides. 

,,   Energy 

Both  delegations  agreed  that  one  of  the  major 
problems  facing  mankind  in  the  decades  ahead  will 
be  the  availability  of  adequate  energy  to  meet  the 
demands  of  growing  populations  and  industrial  ex- 
pansion throughout  the  world.  Iran,  as  a  major  sup- 
plier of  petroleum  with  vast  natural  gas  reserves, 
and  the  United  States  as  a  center  of  advanced  tech- 
nology, have  the  shared  responsibility  to  work  to- 
gether to  contribute  to  solutions  of  this  problem.  In 
order  to  facilitate  broad  cooperation  throughout  the 
spectrum  of  energy  research  and  development,  the 
Commission  established  an  Energy  Research  and 
Development  Committee  and  instructed  it  to  initiate 
rapidly  an  innovative   and  practical   program. 

The  Commission  noted  that  substantial  progress 
has  been  made  in  defining  the  principles  of  a  new 
cooperative  agreement  in  nuclear  power,  which  takes 
into  account  Iran's  interest  in  developing  the  peace- 
ful uses  of  nuclear  energy  and  the  concern  of  both 
countries  to  prevent  the  proliferation  of  nuclear 
weapons.  Good  progress  has  been  made  in  reconcil- 
ing these  two  objectives  and  as  a  result  of  this  dis- 
cussion, a  realistic  basis  for  proceeding  with  final 
negotiations  now  exists.  The  Commission  agreed  that 
these  negotiations  should  be  pursued  promptly  in 
order  to  reach  an  early  agreement. 

The  Commission  particularly  noted  cooperation  be- 
tween the  two  countries  in  the  evaluation  of  sites  for 


the  establishment  of  nuclear  power  plants  in  Iran, 
exploration  in  Iran  for  uranium  resources,  training 
of  Iranian  engineers  and  scientists,  and  fabrication 
of  slightly  enriched  fuel  uranium  for  nuclear  power 
reactors. 

The  Commission  noted  that  solar  energy  must  have 
an  increasingly  prominent  role  in  meeting  man's 
energy  needs,  and  agreed  to  develop  a  program  of 
cooperation  in  this  field.  As  the  first  step,  a  team  of 
experts  from  Iran  will  visit  the  United  States  in  the 
near  future  to  consult  with  officials  of  the  Energy 
Research  and  Development  Administration.  It  is  an- 
ticipated that  the  cooperative  research  program  will 
be  coordinated  with  multilateral  arrangements  in 
this  field. 

Further  discussions  will  be  held  looking  to  col- 
laboration in  research  and  development  in  alterna- 
tive energy  fields. 

The  Iranian  party  reviewed  recent  natural  gas 
developments  in  Iran,  noting  that  proven  reserves 
may  now  exceed  those  of  any  other  country  and 
that  the  Imperial  Government  of  Iran  has  well- 
advanced  plans  for  the  utilization  of  these  resources. 
Two  multibiUion-doUar  joint  ventures  involving  the 
National  Iranian  Gas  Company  and  U.S.  private 
companies  are  under  consideration.  The  American 
delegation  reported  President  Ford's  recent  decisions 
establishing  the  United  States  policies  on  natural 
gas  imports.  These  policies  enable  the  U.S.  Executive 
Branch  to  encourage  and  support  projects  for  the 
production  and  delivery  of  natural  gas  to  the  United 
States    on    economically    attractive    terms. 

Technical  Cooperation 

The  two  delegations  reviewed  existing  and  planned 
programs  of  technical  cooperation.  In  particular,  the 
Commission  noted  the  following  activities: 

— The  agreement  between  the  U.S.  Department  of 
Transportation's  Federal  Highway  Administration 
and  the  Iranian  Ministry  of  Roads  and  Transport. 

— The  initiation  of  a  new  program  by  the  Man- 
power and  Technical  Cooperation  Committee,  con- 
cerning the  measurement  and  improvement  of  Ira- 
nian labor  productivity. 

— The  continuation  of  vocational  training  pro- 
gram development  and  employment  service  units.  In 
this  connection,  the  Commission  noted  Iran  plans  to 
acquire  40  more  mobile  training  and  employment 
service  units  for  use  in  non-urban  areas.  These  units 
and  the  23  centers  which  have  been  already  obtained 
and  will  start  operation  during  the  current  year  will 
increase  the  annual  capacity  of  training  skilled 
workers  by  1,700,  and  will  facilitate  the  mobility  of 
the  workers  according  to  the  requirements  of  the 
country. 

— The  Commission  agreed  to  expand  cooperation  in 
the  field  of  agriculture  with  an  emphasis  on  encour- 
aging the  respective  sectors  of  the  two  countries  to 


September  6,  1976 


315 


form  joint  ventures  for  intensive  production,  and 
distribution  of  agricultural  products  as  well  as 
machinery,  pesticides,  fertilizers,  etc. 

— Tentative  plans  have  been  developed  for  coopera- 
tion between  the  two  countries  in  animal  health, 
plant  pest  control,  forest  and  range  management, 
agricultural  extension  and  education. 

— A  team  of  American  experts  will  visit  Iran  in 
October  1976  in  order  to  cooperate  with  the  Iranian 
party  in  preparing  a  program  for  the  establishment 
of  an  integrated  agricultural  region. 

Hotishig 

The  Commission  observed  that  considerable  ex- 
change of  information  has  taken  place  in  the  field  of 
large-scale  housing,  with  the  U.S.  private  sector 
gaining  a  better  understanding  of  Iranian  housing 
and  building  plans  and  regulations  and  Iranian  offi- 
cials gaining  greater  knowledge  of  U.S.  housing 
methods  and  technology.  The  Commission  approved 
plans  to  broaden  the  scope  of  cooperation  in  the 
coming  year.  These  will  include  the  encouragement 
of  private  sector  joint  ventures  and  provision  of 
know-how  and  services  related  to  the  manufacture 
of  housing  and  housing  components.  It  also  includes 
the  transfer  of  technology  in  housing  and  urban 
management,  housing  finance,  and  technical  informa- 
tion. Participation  in  commercial  exhibits  and  train- 
ing activities  also  will  be  expanded. 

Science  and  Technology 

The  Commission  noted  the  expansion  of  scientific 
and  technological  cooperation,  particularly  with  re- 
gard to  programs  underway  or  planned  in  the  field 
of  oceanography,  seismic  studies  and  geological  and 
minerals  surveys.  Both  delegations  agreed  that  en- 
vironmental protection,  health  care  education,  bio- 
medical sciences  and  arid  land  sciences  were  promis- 
ing areas  for  cooperation. 

The  United  States  noted  with  appreciation  the 
generosity  of  Her  Imperial  Majesty's  Committee  for 
the  American  Bicentennial,  in  establishing  an  Ameri- 
can Studies  endovraient  fund,  capitalized  at  $1  mil- 
lion to  support  American  studies  programs  in  Iran. 
The  U.S.  delegation  also  expressed  appreciation  for 
the  Imperial  Government  of  Iran's  creation  of  a 
$100,000  Bicentennial  scholarship  fund  to  assist 
American  students  to  study  in  Iran. 

The  Commission  expressed  satisfaction  at  the  com- 
pletion of  the  study,  undertaken  by  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment in  accordance  with  a  decision  of  the  last  meet- 
ing of  the  Commission,  of  ways  to  facilitate  and 
expedite  education  linkages  between  U.S.  and  Iranian 
institutions  of  higher  learning. 

The  Commission  agreed  that  the  two  countries  will 
cooperate  in  food  and  drug  administration,  and,  in 
particular,  development  of  specific  techniques  in 
laboratory  procedures  for  drug  and  food  control  and 
exchange  of  know-how  and  experts.  Cooperation  in 

316 


the   field   of  health   will   also   cover  control   of   drug 
addiction  and  rehabilitation  of  addicts. 

It  was  agreed  to  hold  the  next  meeting  in  Wash- 
ington at  a  mutually  convenient  time,  in  1977. 


U.S.-AFGHANISTAN   JOINT   STATEMENT 
ISSUED  AT  KABUL  AUGUST  8 

Press   release   371   dated  August  8 

At  the  invitation  of  the  Government  of  Afghani- 
stan, Dr.  Henry  Kissinger,  Secretary  of  State  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  paid  an  official  visit  to 
Afghanistan  on  August  8,  1976.  Head  of  State  and 
Prime  Minister  Mohammad  Daoud  received  Dr.  Kis- 
singer and  had  talks  with  him. 

During  these  talks,  which  were  held  in  the  warm 
and  friendly  atmosphere  characterizing  Afghan- 
American  relations,  the  two  sides  held  a  friendly 
and  fruitful  exchange  of  views  on  major  international 
questions  of  mutual  interest,  especially  the  develop- 
ment of  the  situation  in  South  Asia  and  the  Middle 
East,  as  well  as  on  Afghan-American  bilateral  rela- 
tions and  cooperation  in  different  fields. 

The  two  sides  reaffirmed  the  importance  of  the 
strengthening  and  expansion  of  friendship  and  coop- 
eration between  states  for  preserving  and  consolidat- 
ing regional  and  world  peace.  The  sides  expressed 
the  view  that  differences  between  states  should  be 
settled  by  peaceful  means  and  through  comprehensive 
and  realistic  discussions. 

The  Secretary  of  State  expressed  the  United 
States'  strong  support  for  the  recent  initiatives 
which  have  improved  relations  among  the  states  of 
the  region. 

The  two  sides  noted  the  similarity  of  the  views 
and  purposes  of  Afghan  and  American  leaders  and 
peoples  regarding  national  independence  and  in- 
tegrity. 

The  Government  of  Afghanistan  pointed  out  that 
its  traditional  policy — based  on  positive  neutrality, 
non-alignment  and  friendship  and  cooperation  with 
all  peace-loving  countries — safeguards  its  national 
independence.  The  United  States  expressed  under- 
standing of  Afghanistan's  position. 

On  the  afternoon  of  August  8,  1976,  the  American 
Secretary  of  State  paid  a  courtesy  call  on  Mr.  Mo- 
hammad Naim  [Chief  Foreign  Policy  Adviser  to 
Head  of  State  Daoud]. 

Later  in  the  afternoon.  Secretary  of  State  Kissin- 
ger held  talks  vdth  an  Afghan  delegation  on  bilateral 
Afghan-American  relations  and  cooperation.  These 
talks  were  attended  from  the  Afghan  side  by  Min- 
ister of  Planning  Ali  Ahmad  Khurram,  Minister  of 
Education  Professor  Abdul  Kayum,  Minister  of  Mines 
and  Industries  Abdul  Tawab  Asefi,  Minister  of  Pub- 
lic Health  Dr.  Abdullah  Omar,  Deputy  Foreign  Min- 
ister Waheed  Abdullah,  and  Director  General  for 
Political  Affairs,  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs.  Abdul 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Siiiiad  Ghaus;  and  from  the  American  side,  in  addi- 
ti.iii  to  Dr.  Kissinger,  by  Ambassador  Theodore  L. 
Kl;iit,  Jr.,  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Near 
Ea.-t  and  South  Asia  Alfred  L.  Atherton,  Jr..  AID 
I^iiictor  for  Afghanistan  Vincent  W.  Brown,  and 
.Mr.  Peter  Rodman  of  the  National  Security  Council 
Slalf. 

I II  these  discussions,  Secretary  Kissinger  reaffirmed 
liiited  States  interest  in  participating  closely  in 
.Al'^'hanistan's  economic  and  social  development  and 
II'  ;>tl  on-going  programs  in  the  Helmand  Valley, 
lural  works,  education  and  rural  health.  The  Afghan 
.■;:ilr  expressed  its  pleasure  at  American  contributions 
\vli:ih  have  been  and  are  being  made  through  bi- 
lateral economic,  technical,  and  educational  coopera- 
tion. Both  sides  expressed  their  desire  to  expand 
further  existing  cooperation,  particularly  in  the  tech- 
iiiial  and  economic  fields. 

Ih-.  Kissinger  attended  the  signing  ceremony  of  an 
aL'r.'ement  between  the  United  States  and  Afghan- 
i.v'an  for  the  sale  of  edible  oil  to  Afghanistan  under 
ciiiuessional  terms.  The  agreement  was  signed  for 
Afghan  side  by  Minister  of  Planning  Khurram 
for  the  American  side  by  Ambassador  Eliot. 


tlir 


TOAST   BY   SECRETARY   KISSINGER, 
LAHORE,  PAKISTAN,  AUGUST  8  = 

Mr.  Prime  Minister,  Mrs.  Bhutto,  distin- 
guished guests:  It  is  always  a  joy  for  me  to 
visit  Pakistan,  but  there  always  occurs  a 
moment  of  terror,  when  I  have  to  follow 
one  of  the  great  orators  of  our  period,  who 
not  only  speaks  more  eloquently  than  I  do 
but  with  a  better  English  than  I  possess. 

I  think  all  of  the  distinguished  guests 
here  have  understood  some  of  the  subtle 
points  that  the  Prime  Minister  made.  It  is 
clear  that  I  have  never  tamed  rivers  and 
therefore  our  match  tomorrow  will  be  in- 
herently unequal.  But  if  by  any  chance  I 
should  on  this  or  that  point  rise  to  the  oc- 
casion, it  is  also  clear  to  me  what  is  wait- 
ing for  me  underneath.  So  as  far  as  I  can 
see,  the  negotiations  tomorrow  will  con- 
cern primarily  the  rate  at  which  I  acqui- 
esce to  the  proposals  of  the  distinguished 
Prime  Minister  of  Pakistan. 

When  I  was  a  professor,  many  learned 
articles  were  written  about  whether  or  not 
individuals  made  a  difference  in  history  or 


°  Given  at  a  dinner  hosted  by  Prime  Minister 
Zulfikar  Ali  Bhutto  (text  from  pre.ss  release  370, 
which  includes  Prime  Minister  Bhutto's  toast). 

September  6,  1976 


whether  history  resulted  from  objective 
factors  that  would  take  the  same  course  no 
matter  who  led  his  country.  I  believe  that 
all  of  us  who  have  had  the  privilege  of 
knowing  and  working  with  the  Prime  Min- 
ister understand  that  individuals  do  make 
a  difference.  We  know  how  he  took  over 
this  country  in  a  tragic  and  desperate 
period  and  how  he  has  returned  it  to  inter- 
national respect,  to  self-confidence,  and  to 
a  more  important  role  than  it  has  ever 
played  before.  In  fact,  the  Prime  Minister 
has  succeeded  so  well  in  this  task  that  he 
now  finds  that  he  has  time  available  not 
only  to  reform  his  own  country  but  occa- 
sionally to  lecture  some  other  friendly 
countries.  And  those  of  us  who  have  been 
exposed  to  this  advice  suffer  from  the  fact 
that  he  almost  invariably  turns  out  to  be 
right. 

This  relationship  that  exists  between  our 
two  countries  and  between  the  leaders  of 
our  two  countries  is  of  great  significance 
because  both  of  our  countries  have  gone 
through  not  an  identical  experience  but  a 
somewhat  parallel  experience.  The  United 
States,  too,  has  gone  through  a  rather  diffi- 
cult and  occasionally  tragic  period.  We, 
too,  have  had  to  ask  ourselves  what  our 
fundamental  values  were  and  where  our 
basic  interests  lay.  We,  too,  have  had  to 
fight  a  war  whose  outcome  did  not  meet 
with  our  expectations.  And  we,  too,  are 
going  through  a  process  of  redefining  an 
international  position.  I  believe  that  this 
process,  when  it  is  concluded,  as  I  believe 
it  will  be  after  our  election,  will  see  Amer- 
ica emerge  stronger  and  more  understand- 
ing of  the  requirements  of  peace  and  of 
progress  in  the  world. 

Through  these  years  of  difficulty  that  our 
two  countries  have  had — for  different  rea- 
sons but  with  some  of  the  same  character- 
istics— your  Prime  Minister  has  never 
failed  to  stress  that  the  security  of  the 
world  depended  importantly  on  America's 
understanding  and  that  the  progress  of 
peoples  depended  crucially  on  America's 
commitment.  And  if  he  has  sometimes 
scolded   us,   it  has  always  been   from  the 


317 


conviction  that  the  future  of  hundreds  of 
millions  around  the  world  depended  on 
American  understanding  and  on  the  Ameri- 
ican  dedication.  And  this  is  why  our  talks 
have  been  so  important  to  us  and  so 
fruitful. 

Tomorrow  I  will  enter,  with  some  trepi- 
dation, this  conference  room  that  the  Prime 
Minister  has  so  threateningly  described, 
and  we  will  talk  again  about  the  problems 
that  concern  us  all.  What  is  the  nature  of 
security?  And  what  is  the  meaning  of 
progress? 

Nations  that  feel  secure  only  if  they  re- 
duce everyone  to  impotence  become  of  con- 
cern for  all  surrounding  countries  and 
eventually  for  the  security  of  all  of  man- 
kind. And  equally,  we  understand  that  it 
may  be  possible  to  have  local  security  and 
yet,  within  a  region,  there  may  be  elements 
of  insecurity.  So  what  we  have  to  find  is  an 
approach  to  the  problem  of  security  which 
preserves  both  the  general  peace  and  the 
regional  peace,  which  banishes  not  only  the 
fear  of  general  war  but  which  also  gives  a 
sense  of  security  to  all  the  individual  na- 
tions whose  fate  may  not  by  itself  affect  the 
general  peace  but  the  example  of  whose 
destruction  or  the  impairment  of  whose  se- 
curity would  have  a  profound  effect  on  the 
general  attitude  of  all  the  peoples  of  the 
world. 

We  live  in  a  world  of  fearsome  weapons 
in  which  one  must  balance  security  against 
universal  cataclysm.  And  these  are  the  is- 
sues which  we  will  discuss — in  the  context, 
however,  of  what  we  have  repeatedly 
stated :  that  the  sovereign  territorial  integ- 
rity and  independence  of  Pakistan  are  a 
matter  of  great  concern  to  the  United 
States;  that  we  will  be  talking  about  meth- 
ods of  security  and  not  the  principles.  And 
of  course  one  also  has  to  realize  that  a 
world  cannot  rest  on  security  alone  but  it 
must  have  a  vision  of  a  positive  future  in 
which  men  can  improve  their  status  and 
realize  their  potentiality.  And  in  these 
areas,  too,  we  are  prepared  to  work  with 
our  old  friends  in  Pakistan. 

Mr.  Prime  Minister,  distinguished  guests, 

318 


Pakistan  is  the  country  which  made  it  pos- 
sible for  us  to  launch  our  initiative  toward 
China,  an  initiative  which  we  believe  is  im- 
portant to  the  peace  of  the  world  and  for 
which  [applause]  we  will  never  forget  the 
role  that  Pakistan  has  played  in  this  effort. 

In  the  lives  of  all  nations,  there  is  a  proc- 
ess of  constant  renewal,  and  nations  have 
periodically  to  reprocess  themselves.  And 
they  have  to  decide  what  it  is  that  is  worth 
reprocessing  and  what  it  is  that  is  better 
left  alone.  This  is  the  nature  of  history,  and 
no  doubt  when  we  have  our  philosophical 
discussions,  we  will  reflect  about  that  prob- 
lem as  well.  But  for  now,  Mr.  Prime  Min- 
ister, let  me  say  on  behalf  of  all  of  my  col- 
leagues, we  feel  that  we  are  here  among 
friends  and  that  you  can  also  count  on  our 
friendship.  We  shall  continue  to  cooperate 
in  the  years  ahead  as  we  have  in  the  past. 
We  attach  importance  to  your  country,  we 
attach  importance  to  your  leadership,  and 
I  am  grateful  to  have  had  this  occasion  to 
visit  this  beautiful  city  and  look  forward  to 
our  talks  tomorrow. 

Let  me  propose  a  toast  to  the  Prime  Min- 
ister and  Begum  Bhutto  and  to  the  lasting 
friendship  between  the  Pakistani  and  the 
American  people. 


NEWS  CONFERENCE  BY  SECRETARY  KISSINGER, 
LAHORE,  AUGUST  9 

Press    release   372   dated   August  9 

Secretary  Kissinger:  1  would  like,  before 
I  take  your  questions,  to  make  two  points. 

First,  on  behalf  of  my  colleagues  and  my 
family  and  myself,  I  would  once  again 
want  to  express  our  appreciation  to  the 
Government  of  Pakistan,  Prime  Minister 
and  Mrs.  Bhutto  for  the  extraordinarily 
warm  reception  that  we  have  had  here. 
Our  talks  have  been  conducted  with  a  cor- 
diality that  has  marked  our  relationship, 
and  I  consider  them  both  wide-ranging  and 
very  constructive. 

Secondly,  on  behalf  of  the  President,  I 
want  to  express  the  sympathy  of  the  Amer- 
ican  people  for  the  disaster  that  has  be- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


lallen  Pakistan  in  the  flood,  and  we  are 
making  available  200,000  tons  of  wheat 
under  Public  Law  480  to  assist  in  the  re- 
covery. 

Those  ai-e  the  two  things  that  I  wanted 
til  say,  and  now  I  will  be  glad  to  take  your 
questions.  Perhaps  we  can  start  with  ques- 
tions from  Pakistani  journalists  before 
mder  breaks  down  when  American  jour- 
nalists are  asking  questions. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  has  your  visit  in  any 
iray  changed  Pakistan's  attitude  toward  the 
reprocessing  plant? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Are  you  Pakistani? 

Q.  Pakistani  based. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  the  issue  of  re- 
processing, as  you  know,  is  an  extremely 
complicated  issue.  Pakistan  has  been  ne- 
gotiating with  France  on  a  reprocessing 
plant  for  many  years  and  has  concluded 
an  agreement  with  respect  to  it.  That 
agreement  has  all  the  international  safe- 
guards that  were  considered  appropriate 
at  the  time  that  those  negotiations  started. 
As  far  as  the  United  States  is  concerned, 
we  have,  as  we  have  studied  the  problem, 
developed  increasing  concern  about  the 
spread  of  reprocessing  plants,  even  with 
the  safeguards  that  were  considered  ap- 
propriate several  years  ago.  Our  concern  is 
not  directed  toward  the  intentions  of  Paki- 
stan, but  toward  the  general  problem  of  the 
proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons  which  can 
have,  in  our  view,  disastrous  consequences 
for  the  future  of  mankind.  The  Prime  Min- 
ister and  I  have  had  extensive  talks  about 
the  problems  that  are  produced  by  these 
two  attitudes.  We  have  agreed  to  continue 
these  discussions  in  the  weeks  and  months 
ahead,  but  we  are  going  to  conduct  these 
discussions  with  the  determination  on  both 
sides  that  there  will  be  no  confrontation 
on  that  issue. 

Q.  Sir,  there  appears  to  be  a  dichotomy  in 
the  American  approach  to  the  nuclear  efforts 
in  Pakistan  and  India.  How  do  you  resolve 
that? 


Secretary  Kissinger:  No,  there  is  no  di- 
chotomy in  the  approach  toward  India  and 
Pakistan.  We  have  deplored,  we  have 
greatly  deplored,  the  Indian  effort  in  set- 
ting off  a  nuclear  explosive  device,  and  we 
believe  that  what  India  has  done  is  very 
inimicable  to  the  process  of  proliferation 
and  therefore  to  the  problems  of  world 
peace. 

We  nevertheless — and  we  also  can  un- 
derstand the  concerns  of  Pakistan  with  re- 
spect to  that — nevertheless,  we  believe  that 
the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons  and  nuclear 
explosive  technology  is  of  such  long-range 
danger  to  the  survival  of  mankind  that  at 
some  point  the  line  must  be  drawn,  and  the 
problem  we  now  face  in  the  discussions 
that  we  started  this  morning  is  how  to  rec- 
oncile the  particular  concerns  of  one  coun- 
try with  the  general  concerns.  And  while  I 
do  not  say  we  have  reached  a  conclusion — 
in  fact  we  have  not  reached  a  conclusion — 
we  will,  as  I  said,  conduct  these  discus- 
sions with  the  attitude  that  we  will  avoid 
a  confrontation. 

Q.  Sir,  do  you  generally  believe  that  de- 
spite the  lifting  of  the  embargo,  the  rate  of 
supply  of  arms  to  Pakistan  is  rather  slow? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  the  American 
bureaucracy  is  becoming  increasingly  com- 
plicated as  its  numbers  multiply.  And  even 
the  Secretary  of  State  has  trouble  getting 
answers  to  his  questions  from  the  bureauc- 
racy, unrelated  to  Pakistan.  I  believe  that 
the  requests  that  have  been  before  us  have 
been — are  now  all  either  answered  or  in 
the  process  of  being  answered,  except  for 
one  item.  And  I  believe  that  we  are  making 
progress  in  this  field  now. 

Q.  Sir,  did  you  discuss  the  proposed  rec- 
ommendations in  the  subcontinent  and  the 
proposal  mooted  by  the  Shahanshah  of  Iran 
about  the  "common  market"  comprising  Pak- 
istan, India,  and  Bangladesh  and  other  coun- 
tries of  this  region?  Did  you  discuss  that? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  the  United 
States  strongly  supports  the  efforts  at  nor- 
malization in  this  area.  And  we  have  paid 


September  6,  1976 


319 


tribute  to  the  farsighted  efforts  that  have 
been  made  by  all  of  the  parties,  but  we 
would  like  to  pay  particular  tribute  to  the 
Prime  Minister  for  his  efforts  in  this  direc- 
tion. 

As  for  any  particular  scheme,  such  as 
the  common  market,  of  these  countries,  the 
United  States  does  not  oppose  it,  and  if  it 
commends  itself  to  the  parties  concerned, 
the  United  States  would  have  no  objection. 
But  it  seems  to  me  to  be  a  matter  that  the 
parties  involved  have  to  decide  in  negotia- 
tions among  each  other,  and  it  is  not  one 
that  should  appear  as  an  American  scheme. 

Q.  Sir,  yoii  have  identified  ivhat  other  dis- 
putes between  the  two  countries  which  have 
been  settled.  Only  one  remains.  As  one  of  the 
parties  who  supported  the  resolution  in  the 
United  Nations,  will  America  be  playing  a 
helpful  role  in  the  solution  of  the  Kashmir? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  as  I  have  under- 
stood the  position  of  the  Prime  Minister 
and  of  the  Government  of  Pakistan,  this  is 
an  issue  that  will  be  discussed  between  the 
two  governments  in  a  principled  but  pa- 
tient manner  and  that  the  Government  of 
Pakistan  has  not  asked  any  outside  coun- 
try to  inject  itself  in  these  negotiations.  We 
welcome  any  efforts  at  a  peaceful  resolu- 
tion, and  we  also  commend  the  basic  atti- 
tude of  negotiating  this  issue  with  patience 
and  on  the  basis  of  principle. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  what  connection,  if  any, 
is  there  between  the  purchase  of  a  reprocess- 
ing plant  and  the  sale  of  American  iveapons 
to  Pakistan? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  do  not  want  to  say 
more  about  the  problem  of  reprocessing 
than  what  I  have  already  stated.  These  are 
complicated  negotiations  among  friends, 
and  they  will  be  discussed  on  their  merits 
without  blackmail  or  pressure  by  either 
side.  We  have  to  reconcile  these  two  prin- 
ciples that  I  have  enunciated  at  the  begin- 
ning: the  concern  of  Pakistan  with  agree- 
ments it  has  made  in  good  faith  on  the 
basis  of  the  knowledge  it  had  at  the  time 


320 


of  making  them,  and  the  concern  of  the 
United  States  with  the  principle  of  non- 
proliferation.  And  these  discussions  will 
continue. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  will  the  United  States 
now  sell  aircraft  to  Pakistan? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  don't  want  to  get 
into  any  particular  supply  relationship.  We 
will  look  at  Pakistan's  requests  with  a 
basic  attitude  of  interest  in  the  territorial 
integrity  of  Pakistan,  and  we  will  discuss 
them  as  they  come  and  on  their  merits. 

Q.  Sir,  do  you  require  some  further  safe- 
guards on  this  reprocessing  plant?  Or  is  it 
your  position  that  Pakistan  should  not  have 
it  at  all  under  any  circumstarices? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  problem  of  re- 
processing is  not  one  that  is  directed 
against  any  one  country.  We  have,  for 
example,  worked  out  some  arrangements 
on  reprocessing  with  Iran  that  may  or  may 
not  commend  themselves  to  other  nations 
as  they  study  the  problem  over  a  period  of 
time.  We  believe  that  what  we  should  look 
for — I  am  speaking  now  for  the  United 
States,  not  for  Pakistan — the  United  States 
will  try  to  elaborate  general  principles  with 
respect  to  reprocessing  that  would  apply 
equally  to  all  countries  and  that  do  not 
involve  discrimination  against  any  one  par- 
ticular country.  And  it's  with  this  attitude 
that  we  conduct  our  conversations  also 
with  our  friends  here. 

Q.  [Inaudible.'] 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  have  not  said  that 
any  conclusions  have  been  reached.  And  I 
am  sure  that  the  Pakistani  press  knows  the 
Prime  Minister  is  a  man  of  principle  and  of 
spirit.  All  I  described  was  the  issue  as  we 
defined  it  and  the  attitude  with  which  we 
will  seek  to  solve  it.  And  we  have  solved 
other  problems  between  us.  In  fact,  we 
have  always  solved  problems  between  us, 
and  we  will  approach  it  in  this  spirit. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you  said  that  there  will 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


/*(  no  confrontation,  hut  the  U.S.  Congres.^s 
appears  to  he  hent  on  confrontation  over  this 
issue.  On  the  basis  of  your  conversations 
litre,  are  you  confident  that  you  can  handle 
the  congressional  attitude? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  As  I  pointed  out,  we 
will  have  futui'e  discussions  over  the  weeks 
and  months  ahead,  and  we  are  very  hope- 
ful to  avoid  confrontation  from  any  source. 

Q.  Sir,  if  Pakistan  goes  ahead  ivith  the 
rcprocessiyig  plant,  ivill  this  mean  a  cut  in 
American  economic  and  military  aid? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  think  that  it's  to- 
tally inappropriate  for  me  to  speculate  now 
about  events  that  may  happen  in  the  fu- 
ture. I  have  come  here  as  a  friend,  and  we 
are  discussing  these  issues  as  friends,  so 
there  is  no  point  in  speculating  about  how 
provisions  in  our  law  will  apply  to  circum- 
stances that  at  this  moment  do  not  exist. 

Q.  Sir,  is  there  any  possihility  that  French 
re'processing  plants  will  he  used  as  so7-t  of  a 
regional  center  such  as  you  were  discussing 
with  Iran? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  just  don't  want  to 
go  into  the  various  possibilities  that  may 
emerge  from  discussions.  I  have  explained 
the  spirit  with  which  these  negotiations 
will  be  conducted  and  the  attitudes  that 
both  sides  have,  and  from  that  it  should  be 
apparent  that  we  will  look  for  constructive 
solutions. 

Q.  Sir,  is  it  true  that  your  attitude,  the 
U.S.  attitude,  ahout  the  reprocessing  plant 
remains  the  same  that  it  was  hefore  your 
arrival  in  Lahore? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  basic  U.S.  atti- 
tude toward  the  problem  of  reprocessing 
and  its  impact  on  nonproliferation  is  as  I 
have  stated  at  the  beginning.  It  is  substan- 
tially unchanged.  But  this  is  a  basic  atti- 
tude; it  is  not  to  be  applied  to  concrete 
circumstances.  And  that  is  what  we  will 
try  to  discuss  in  the  weeks  and  months 
ahead. 


September  6,  1976 


Q.  Sir,  the  Indian  atomic  energy  chief  has 
said  that  within  five  years  India  will  be  self- 
sufficient  in  nuclear  materials.  Meamchile, 
the  Americans  are  providing  India  with  nu- 
clear fuels  [inaudihW]. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  No,  the  American 
supply  to  India  refers  to  one  particular 
contract  that  was  made  many  years  ago. 
Certainly  with  respect  to  any  new  contracts 
the  United  States  would  take  into  account 
the  impact  of  Indian  attitudes  on  the  prob- 
lem of  nonproliferation  and  would  insist  on 
safeguards  that  would  give  us  assurance 
with  respect  to  this. 

The  only  immediate  issue  is  whether  a 
contract  that  was  made  many  years  ago 
should  be  fulfilled  with  respect  to  one  par- 
ticular reactor,  and  that  raises  questions 
with  respect  to  the  general  reliability  of 
American  contracts  once  they  are  made. 
This  is  the  issue  that  arises.  But  in  any  new 
contract  that  India  would  attempt  to  make 
with  us,  the  basic  principle  I  have  stated 
with  nonproliferation  would  be  stringently 
applied. 

Q.  Sir,  talking  ahout  contracts,  is  it  pos- 
sible that  Pakistan  can  noiv  back  out  of  the 
French  deal  in  view  of  the  fact  that  it  has 
already  signed  a  contract? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  simply  do  not  think 
that  it  is  appropriate  for  me  to  go  into  all 
the  complexities.  This  is  one  of  the  aspects 
of  the  Pakistan  problem  that  exists  and, 
of  course,  as  the  Prime  Minister  said  yes- 
terday, Pakistan  conducts  a  principled 
policy.  We  have  to  look  at  all  of  these  as- 
pects in  our  discussions.  And  I  will  not  now 
prejudge  what  the  possible  outcome  could 
be,  what  solutions  could  be  found,  if  any 
solutions  can  be  found.  But  the  spirit  in 
which  we  have  always  conducted  our  dis- 
cussions and  the  attitude  which  we  have 
decided  to  adopt  at  least  make  me  believe 
that  we  will  give  it  a  very  good  try. 

I  think  I  had  better  get  my  plane. 

Thank  you. 


321 


NEWS  CONFERENCE  BY  SECRETARY  KISSINGER 
AND  FOREIGN  MINISTER  VAN  DER  STOEL  » 

Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  Max  van  der 
Stoel:  Ladies  and  gentlemen,  I  will  perhaps 
first  of  all  mention  the  way  the  visit  of 
Secretary  of  State  Kissinger  to  the  Nether- 
lands came  about.  As  you  know,  the 
Netherlands  has  at  the  moment  the  Presi- 
dency of  the  European  Community,  and  we 
do  feel  especially  the  need  to  keep  in  close 
contact  on  the  number  of  current  inter- 
national problems  with  the  United  States. 
I  therefore,  at  the  end  of  July,  invited  the 
Secretary  for  a  visit  to  The  Hague,  and  I 
am  very  pleased  that  he  found  his  way 
on  his  return  from  Asia  to  pay  a  visit  to 
the  Netherlands  to  discuss  a  number  of 
current  problems  early  in  the  Presidency 
of  the  Netherlands  of  the  European 
Community. 

We  have  spent  time  together,  in  my  view, 
in  a  very  fruitful  way,  and  we  have  dis- 
cussed a  wide  range  of  issues.  We  have 
discussed  the  problem  of  southern  Africa; 
we  have  discussed  the  developments  in  the 
Middle  East;  we  have  discussed  the  forth- 
coming General  Assembly  of  the  United 
Nations;  and  we  have  discussed  the  prob- 
lems which  have  arisen  between  Greece 
and  Turkey,  a  subject  on  which  I  have  in- 
formed the  Secretary  also  of  my  impres- 
sions during  my  visit  the  last  few  days. 

In  essence,  we  discussed  over  luncheon, 
in  the  presence  of  the  Minister  of  Develop- 
ment and  Cooperation  [Jan  P.  Pronk],  the 
North-South  dialogue  in  Paris  and  the  ways 
of  securing  its  success.  On  the  subjects 
which  came  up,  I  am  not  aware  of  any 
specific  bilateral  questions  we  discussed, 
because  the  state  of  our  bilateral  relations 
is  a  happy  one,  so  I  think  we  spent  very 
useful  hours  together  in  a  very  frank  ex- 
change of  views. 

May  I  now  call  on  you,  Mr.  Secretary. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Before  we  take  ques- 
tions,  I   would    simply   like   to   thank   the 


"Held  at  The  Hague  on  Aug.  11    (text  from  press 
release  375). 


322 


Foreign  Minister  for  the  friendly  recep- 
tion we  have  had  here  and  the  very  fruit- 
ful talks  we  have  conducted.  He  has 
enumerated  the  subjects,  and  the  discus- 
sion was  conducted  in  the  atmosphere  of 
friends  that  have  similar  values  and  whose 
disagreements  concern  how  to  reach 
agreed  objectives.  I  consider  the  talks  very 
fruitful. 

We  will  cooperate  closely  with  the 
Netherlands  in  its  Presidency  of  the  Euro- 
pean Community.  We  will  stay  in  close 
touch  with  each  other,  and  the  Foreign 
Minister  has  kindly  agreed  to  visit  Wash- 
ington when  he  is  in  the  United  States 
during  the  meeting  of  the  General  Assem- 
bly, and  we  will  continue  our  dialogue 
then. 

Now  I'll  be  glad  to  answer  questions. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  ivhat  is  the  U.S.  position 
now  on  the  sale  of  the  French  nuclear  weap- 
ons to  Pakistan  since  Prime  Minister  [in- 
audibW] — 

Secretary  Kissinger:  There  is  no  question 
of  selling  French  nuclear  weapons  to  Pak- 
istan. There  is  the  concern  with  nonprolif- 
eration.  [Sentence  partially  inaudible]  the 
sale  of  the  reprocessing  plant.  I  believe 
that  too  much  has  been  said  all  around  or. 
this  subject.  There  are  two  separate  issues 
involved :  one  is  the  contract  between  Pak- 
istan and  France,  which  is  a  matter  be- 
tween Pakistan  and  France;  the  second 
is  the  question  of  general  nonproliferation 
in  which  all  nations  have  an  interest.  It  is 
of  no  benefit  to  any  one  nation  to  prevent 
the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons,  and  we  be- 
lieve still  that  these  two  problems — the 
problem  of  any  particular  contract  and  the 
problem  of  the  debate  of  the  issue  of  non- 
proliferation — can  be  discussed.  We  are 
trying  to  create  a  calm  atmosphere  for  it 
and  we  will  say  no  more  about  the  subjed 
until  everybody  has  cooled  off  a  little  bil 
and  then  return  to  the  basic  issues. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  there  is  the  impression 
that  you  had  proposed  a  tripartite  conference 

Secretary   Kissinger:   I   think   there  is   £ 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


misunderstanding.  I  have  never  proposed 
a  tripartite  conference  between  France, 
Pakistan,  and  the  United  States.  I  believe 
that  the  issues  should  be  discussed  among 
various  parties,  but  I've  never  proposed  a 
tripartite  conference. 

Q.  We  can  say  there  arc  three  fields  of 
possible  detente — the  political,  the  militarij, 
and  the  humanitarian  one.  The  humanitarian 
one  is  probably  point  7  and  "basket"  3  of  the 
Final  Act  of  Helsinki.'  There  is  some  fear, 
especially  among  Soviet  dissidents,  that  the 
United  States  may  give  less  priority  to  point 
7  and  basket  3  in  order  to  obtain  more  suc- 
cess in  the  other  fields.  Is  this  fear  justified, 
and  how  much  weight  do  you  attach  to  point 
7  and  basket  3? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  United  States 
will  not  trade  concessions  in  the  humani- 
tarian field  for  benefits  in  the  economic  or 
military  field,  so  that  is  absolutely  out  of 
the  question.  We  attach  considerable  im- 
portance to  basket  3  of  the  Final  Act  of 
Helsinki,  and  it  was  one  of  the  principal 
incentives  we  had  for  signing  the  Final  Act. 
Therefore  we  will  give  considerable  atten- 
tion to  it,  and  we  expect  to  work  together 
with  our  allies  in  Western  Europe  on  pre- 
paring for  the  Belgrade  Conference  next 
summer,  where  we  will  stress  this  point 
very  much. 

Q.  This  includes  point  7,  of  course? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Yes,  this  includes — 
frankly,  I  don't  know  the  individual  points, 
so  I  don't  want  to  say  yes;  what  is  7? 

Q.  It  involves  the  free  press  inside  the 
countries. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Yes,  the  entire  bas- 
ket 3. 

Q.  Would  you  please  give  us  your  opinion 
on  how  you  see  the  respective  roles  of  Europe 


For  text  of  the  Final  Act  of  the  Conference  on 
Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe,  see  Bulletin 
of  Sept.  1,  1975,  p.  323;  for  "basket"  3,  Co-operation 
in  Humanitarian  and  Other  Fields,  see  p.  339. 


September  6,  1976 


and  the  United  States  in  a  potential  settle- 
ment of  the  Greek-Turkish  problem? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  the  Greek- 
Turkish  problem,  of  course,  has  many  as- 
pects. There  is  the  problem  of  Cyprus,  the 
problem  of  the  Aegean.  The  United  States 
feels  very  strongly  that  both  of  these  prob- 
lems should  be  settled  by  negotiations.  We 
have  stated  repeatedly  with  respect  to 
Cyprus  that  we  do  not  believe  that  the 
status  quo  on  Cyprus  is  an  acceptable  basis 
for  a  settlement  and  that  therefore  a  solu- 
tion has  to  be  found  that  takes  into  ac- 
count the  self-respect  and  dignity  of  all 
of  the   communities. 

As  it  happened,  I  had  an  extensive  talk 
with  Mr.  van  der  Stoel  on  this  subject,  and 
I  would  not  wish  to  say  who  has  a  greater 
role  to  play  here — the  United  States  or  the 
European  Community.  I  believe  we  both 
have  an  obligation  to  do  our  utmost  to  see 
to  it,  first  of  all,  that  there  are  no  addi- 
tional military  clashes,  because  this  would 
be  a  catastrophe  for  the  two  countries  as 
well  as  a  misfortune  for  NATO;  secondly, 
to  move  the  two  countries  toward  equitable 
solutions  on  both  of  these  issues.  I  had  the 
impression  that  we  agreed  on  these  ob- 
jectives, and  we  will  pursue  parallel  poli- 
cies in  which  each  of  us  in  our  own  way 
will  urge  restraint  on  both  sides  and  will 
give  whatever  support  we  can  to  peaceful 
solutions.  Is  that  a  fair  statement? 

Minister  van  der  Stoel:  I  think  so,  yes.  Let 
me  add  that  the  countries  of  the  European 
Community  have  been  in  touch  both  with 
Ankara  and  Athens  in  order  to  convey 
their  views;  that  is,  the  Nine  have  agreed 
on  a  specific  line  calling  for  moderation 
and  restraint.  It  has  been  made  clear  and 
explained  in  both  capitals — Ankara  and 
Athens. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  And  so  has  the 
United  States,  but  separately  and  not  with 
notes  that  were  coordinated.  It  turned  out 
we  had  very  parallel  views  on  the  subject. 

Q.  What  about  the  case  being  taken  to  the 
International  Court  at  The  Hague  which  was 


323 


confirmed  last  night  by  the  registrar  of  the 
Court?  Would  you  regard  this  as  a  help  or  as 
a  hindrance  to  your  present  policy? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  We  are  basically  sup- 
porting a  peaceful  solution.  Referring  it  to 
the  International  Court  is  one  of  those 
which  we  certainly  would  not  exclude  and 
would  not  consider  a  hindrance,  but  it  of 
course  has  to  be  accepted  by  both  parties. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  is  there  a  reasonable 
chance  that  a  SALT  Two  agreement  will  be 
signed  before  the  Presidential  election? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  It  depends  whom  you 
talk  to  in  the  United  States.  Now,  I  would 
not  want  to  predict  when  a  SALT  Two 
agreement  will  be  signed.  The  issues  that 
remain  to  be  solved  are  clearly  defined,  and 
they  deal  substantially  with  the  relation- 
ship of  cruise  missiles  to  Backfire  bomb- 
ers. There  are  discussions  within  our  gov- 
ernment of  various  approaches  to  this  prob- 
lem. Most  press  accounts  of  these  ap- 
proaches are  incorrect;  but  nevertheless, 
there  are  various  approaches  to  it,  and 
when  we  have  formulated  our  position  and 
submitted  it  to  the  Soviet  Union,  then  it  is 
hard  to  predict  how  long  it  will  take  to 
negotiate  it. 

Q.  Have  yon  formulated  that  position  now, 
already? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  No,  it  is  still  before 
the  National  Security  Council. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  there  is  a  report  from 
Johannesburg  saying  that  there  has  been  a 
breakthrough  on  the  negotiations  on  Nami- 
bia. One,  are  you  aware  of  such  a  break- 
through? Two,  does  that  mean  avoiding  con- 
frontation at  the  United  Nations?  And  three, 
do  you  foresee  a  smooth  transition  to  black 
majority  rule  in  Namibia? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  We  have  been  talk- 
ing to  South  Africa  about  the  problem  of 
Namibia,  and  we  have  been  urging  a  solu- 
tion that  moves  in  the  direction  of  self- 
determination  for  Namibia,  and  we  have 
publicly   supported    self-determination   for 


Namibia  and  a  date  for  independence.  I 
think  it  is  premature  to  say  that  there  has 
been  a  breakthrough.  We  have  had  useful 
talks  with  the  Prime  Minister  of  South 
Africa,  but  I  would  think  it  is  premature  to 
speak  of  a  breakthrough. 

Q.  Would  you  consider  another  term  in 
your  present  job  if  whoever  was  elected 
President  asks  you  to  remain? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  If  I  as  much  as  sug- 
gested that  a  Democratic  President  might 
ask  me,  there  would  be  20  candidates  for 
my  position  on  the  Democratic  side  who 
would  be  in  a  state  of  extreme  agitation. 
I  have  stated  my  view  on  the  subject  re- 
peatedly, and  I  think  the  time  to  consider 
this  is  after  President  Ford  is  reelected,  and: 
I  have  stated  my  preferences  on  that 
subject. 

Q.  I  would  like  to  know  if  you  also  dis- 
cussed with  Mr.  van  der  Stoel  the  type  of 
Puerto  Rican  meetings  you  are  having  from 
time  to  time,  where  you  exclude  the  smaller 
countries  of  the  Common  Market  by  their 
[inaudible]  ?  Noiv  the  last  one  concerned 
Italy  and  aid  to  Italy,  and  I  understand  that 
Dutch  Socialist  Prime  Minister  den  Uyl  has 
other  views  on  that  than  cutting  off  aid  that: 
would  be  [inaudible]  Communists  in  the- 
government.  Could  you  say  more  on  that? 
What  is  your  next  plan  for  meeting  and  will 
you  then  invite  the  other  countries  as 
ivell? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  first  of  all,  I 
haven't  had  the  privilege  of  meeting  your 
Prime  Minister.  I  will  do  that  after  the 
press  conference,  but  it  would  not  be  the 
first  time  in  history  that  his  views  did  not 
exactly  coincide  with  ours  without  in  any 
way  indicating  any  lack  of  friendship  on 
either  side. 

Now,  on  the  Puerto  Rico  meeting,  there 
is  no  Puerto  Rico  meeting  foreseeable  dur- 
ing the  Presidency  of  the  Netherlands  and 
so  this  issue  did  not  come  up.  Also,  it  is 
incorrect  to  describe  the  Puerto  Rico  meet- 
ing as  concerning  Italy.  It  was  inevitable 
that,  as  various  leaders  met,  various  ideas 


324 


Department  of  State  Bulletin! 


were  exchanged  on  the  subject.  But  that 
was  not  the  purpose  of  the  meeting,  and 
there  have  been  some  exaggerated  ac- 
counts of  what  it  was  that  was  in  fact  dis- 
cussed. At  any  rate,  there  will  be  no  meet- 
ing of  the  Puerto  Rican  type  during  the 
Presidency  of  the  Netherlands  that  I  can 
foresee  and  thereafter;  I  also  don't  foresee 
one,  but  thereafter  I  can't  preclude  it  for 
all  eternity,  particularly  if  one  of  the  20 
people  that  we  talked  about — 

Q.  And  did  you  think  the  stateme)it  by 
Chancellor  [of  the  Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
many Helmut^  Schmidt  exaggerated? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  As  I  understand  it, 
Chancellor  Schmidt  didn't  even  make  a 
formal  statement.  These  were  accounts  of 
things  that  he  was — I  think  they  gave  it — 
it  gave  an  impression  of  formality  to  gen- 
eral discussions.  That  was  perhaps  exag- 
gerated, yes. 

Q.  Is  the  United  States  still  of  the  opinion 
that  aid  should  be  cut  off  from  Italy  if  there 
would  be  Communists  in  the  government? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  have  stated  the 
U.S.  view  about  Communist  participation  in 
Italy  on  repeated  occasions,  always  under 
extreme  provocation.  And  I  have  now  de- 
cided that  I  will  no  longer  be  provoked, 
so  you  will  have  to  read  my  previous 
statements. 

Q.  A  week  ago  you  spoke  about  negotia- 
tions in  southern  Africa  being  in  a  formative 
state.  That  means  to  say  that  you  will  not  be 
expected  to  give  any  details.  Can  you  give  us 
a  general  idea  as  to  ivhat  U.S.  diplomacy  is 
up  to  and  ivhat  role,  if  any,  the  European 
Community  ivill  play? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  We  are  obviously  try- 
ing to  find  a  basis  by  which  progress  can  be 
made  toward  self-determination  in  south- 
ern Africa,  with  particular  emphasis  in 
this  phase  on  Rhodesia  and  Namibia. 

We  are  in  the  closest  touch  with  Great 
Britain  on  the  Rhodesian  question  because 
of  its  historical  and  legal  responsibilities. 
We  also   exchanged  views  on  this  matter 


with  the  Dutch  Foreign  Minister.  We  be- 
lieve that  the  problems  of  Africa  are  not 
American  problems,  but  first  of  all  African 
problems.  But  if  any  other  outside  coun- 
tries take  an  interest  in  it,  I  think  Europe, 
because  of  its  historical  relationship  to  it, 
has  a  major  responsibility  as  well.  So,  our 
basic  concern  is  to  defuse  the  situation  that 
may  be  drifting  toward  radical  and  violent 
solutions  with  great  rapidity  and  to  find 
an  outcome  that  respects  the  dignity  of  all 
of  the  communities  involved  there  and 
which  is  achieved  by  negotiation.  But  time 
is  clearly  running  out,  and  this  gives  a  cer- 
tain urgency  to  our  efforts. 

Q.  About  southern  Africa,  you  spoke  about 
Rhodesia  and  Namibia.  First  question:  Is 
the  question  of  self-determination  also  criti- 
cal to  South  Africa?  Second  question:  about 
the  Middle  East,  you  mentioned  in  the  past 
the  responsible  role  of  Syria  in  Lebanon.  Do 
you  think  at  this  moment  that  Syria  is  still 
filling  a  responsible  role  in  Lebanon  or  not? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  United  States 
has  expressed  its  opposition  to  the  policy 
of  apartheid,  and  it  has  repeatedly  called 
attention  to  the  need  to  heed  the  warnings 
of  [inaudible]  are  reflected  in  such  issues 
and  such  tragedies  as  the  riots  that  have 
recently  occurred  in  South  Africa.  At  the 
same  time,  we  believe  that  the  problem  of 
South  Africa  has  a  different  dimension 
from  the  problem  of  Rhodesia  and  Namibia 
in  the  sense  that  the  latter  can  be  called, 
can  be  generally  put  under  the  category  of 
the  vestiges  of  a  colonial  period,  while 
South  Africa,  whatever  one  thinks  of  the 
moral  quality  of  apartheid,  is  not  a  colonial 
problem  but  an  African  problem,  and 
therefore  it  requires  a  different  mode  of 
solution  and  a  different  approach.  But  we 
are,  in  principle,  opposed  to  the  policy  of 
apartheid  and  have  stated  so  repeatedly. 

With  respect  to  Lebanon,  our  view  is  that 
the  Damascus  formula  of  earlier  this  year 
is  the  best  solution  to  the  problem  of  Leba- 
non ;  that  is  to  say,  a  certain  reapportion- 
ment of  power  as  between  the  Christian 
and  the  Moslem  communities  but  neverthe- 


September  6,  1976 


325 


less  an  essential  balance  in  their  political 
influence.  This  is  what  we  have  considered 
a  responsible  solution.  As  for  the  individual 
moves  that  are  being  carried  out,  we  are 
not  in  favor  of  interference  of  any  outside 
country,  and  our  present  conviction  is  that 
there  should  be  a  roundtable  conference  as 
rapidly  as  possible  among  all  of  the  parties 
to  bring  about  a  solution. 

Q.  [Inaudible]  and  do  you  expect  in  this 
regard  something  from  the  meeting  of  the 
nonaligned  countries  and  the  Group  of  77? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  As  a  general  propo- 
sition I  cannot  accept  the  argument  that 
whenever  there  is  a  deadlock  in  the  North- 
South  dialogue  it  is  up  to  the  United  States 
to  break  it.  Nor  can  I  accept  as  a  general 
proposition  the  argument  that  we  must  al- 
ways talk  on  an  agenda  which  is  proposed 
by  the  Group  of  77.  On  the  other  hand,  I 
believe  we  had  very  good  talks  here  with 
the  Foreign  Minister  and  Minister  Pronk 
about  the  general  direction  this  dialogue 
might  take.  I  expect  to  meet  with  Canadian 
Foreign  Minister  MacEachen,  who  is  the 
chairman  of  the  conference — cochairman 
of  the  conference — next  week.  I  will  also 
invite  Minister  Perez  Guerrero  [Manuel 
Perez-Guerrero,  Venezuelan  Minister  for 
International  Economic  Affairs,  cochair- 
man of  the  Conference  on  International 
Economic  Cooperation]  to  meet  with  me, 
and  I  think  fhat  after  I've  had  those  two 
meetings  it  will  be  clearer  about  what 
progress  can  be  made. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  what  do  you  think  about 
the  recent  events  at  the  frontier  bettveen 
the  German  Democratic  Republic  and  [in- 
audible] and  Mr.  Kreisky  [Chancellor  of 
Austria]  said  events  like  these  must  be  dis- 
cussed at  the  conference  in  Belgrade? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  At  the  risk  of  creat- 
ing another  uproar  with  another  friendly 
government,  I  have  to  tell  you  I  have  not 
studied  all  the  details  of  what  happened 
during  my  trip.  Of  course,  we  believe  that 
the  dividing  line  and  the  manner  in  which 
it  is  enforced  is  itself  contrary  to  the  aspira- 
tions of  the  German  people  and  we  deplore 

326 


this  enforced  separation  of  the  peoples  of 
the  two  Germanys.  I  would  believe  that  it 
might  well  be  discussed  in  Belgrade,  but  I 
had  reserved  to  study  all  the  incidents 
when  I  returned,  since  I  have  been  travel- 
ing for  nearly  10  days. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary  and  Mr.  Foreign  Min- 
ister, did  the  Lockheed  affair  come  up  in  your 
discussions  today? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  We  have  taken  the 
position  from  the  beginning  that  the  Lock- 
heed affair  is  a  legal  problem  and  not  a 
foreign  policy  problem  between  the  United 
States  and  any  other  country.  And  in  pur- 
suit of  this  we  have  deliberately  not  in- 
formed ourselves  of  any  of  the  documents 
that  are  involved  and  have  insisted  that 
they  be  handled  strictly  between  the  legal 
authorities  of  the  United  States  and  the 
countries  concerned.  This  being  our  posi- 
tion, we  have  no  basis  for  any  discussions 
on  the  foreign  minister  level.  The  issue  was 
not  raised  or  discussed. 

Minister  van  der  Stoel:  I  can  only  confirm 
what  the  Secretary  has  just  said. 

Q.  You  have  several  times  in  the  past  feiv 
weeks  spoken  of  a  need  or  a  preference  for 
a  roundtable  conference  on  the  Lebanese  sitti- 
ation.  First  of  all,  have  you  ever  had  any 
favorable  response  from  any  of  the  parties, 
and  secondly,  would  you  consider  it  advisable 
for  the  United  States  to  participate  in  such 
a  conference? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  There  have  been  at 
various  times  indications  from  various 
parties  that  they  might  be  willing  to  do  it, 
but  it  has  never  been  possible  to  bring  them 
to  the  point  of  fruition.  I  do  not  believe 
that  the  United  States  should  invite  itself 
to  such  a  conference.  If  all  the  parties  were 
to  agree  to  invite  us,  we  would  have  to 
look  at  it,  but  I  consider  that  an  unlikely 
prospect. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you  said  in  the  beginning 
that  the  United  States  will  not  sacrifice 
humanitarian  issues  for  economic  or  military 
factor's.  Is  it  a  general  principle  of  your  gov- 
ernment, or  is  the  principle  applicable  only 
to  the  East  bloc? 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Secretary  Kissinger:  In  the  sense  of  en- 
gaging in  a  negotiation  in  which  we  would 
sacrifice  a  humanitarian  principle  for  some 
other  benefit,  I  would  say  it  is  a  general 
proposition.  If  you  apply  it  in  a  more  ab- 
stract way,  it  is  clear  we  also  have  to  weigh 
security  and  economic  factors  together 
with  humanitai-ian  factors  in  relation  to 
many  issues  in  the  world  and  that  creates 
the  dilemmas  of  policymaking. 

Q.  In  your  assessment,  does  there  noiv 
exist  a  real  danger  of  armed  conflict  betiveen 
Greece  and  Turkey? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  cannot  believe  that 
those  two  countries  which  have  already 
suffered  so  much  from  their  conflict  would 
resort  to  armed  means  to  settle  an  issue 
which,  serious  as  it  is,  has  far  from  ex- 
hausted all  the  peaceful  means.  Greece  has 
taken  the  case  to  the  Security  Council,  and 
I  would  believe  this  offers  one  way  in 
which  the  discussion  of  the  issue  can  occur. 
So  I  do  not  believe  that  an  armed  conflict 
should  occur,  and  the  United  States  will 
use  all  its  influence  with  both  parties  to  urge 
them  to  explore  the  many  means  of  peace- 
ful resolution  that  are  still  available.  And 
I  believe  that  the  European  Community  has 
a  similar  attitude. 

Q.  You  said  that  the  time  ivas  running  out 
in  Namibia  and  Rhodesia.  You  said  you  are 
in  close  touch  with  Britain  as  far  as  policy  is 
concerned.  Would  you  say  time  has  come  now 
for  Britain  for  a  major  initiative? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  As  I  pointed  out,  we 
are  in  the  closest  touch  with  Great  Britain. 
I  believe  that  our  policies  are  essentially  in 
harmony  on  this  matter.  We  are  not  ahead 
of  Great  Britain  in  the  policy  we  are  pur- 
suing. We  are  not  urging  it  to  go  any 
faster.  I  think  matters  are  proceeding  at 
the  pace  we  consider  appropriate,  and  we 
and  Britain  have  essentially  agreed  that  is 
the  most  effective  way  to  proceed.  So  we 
have  no  private,  and  even  less  public,  ad- 
vice to  extend  to  Great  Britain  at  this  mo- 
ment. We  have  to  keep  one  country  on  this 
continent,  in  Europe,  on  friendly  terms. 


Q.  The  Europeans  are  most  concerned 
about  changes  of  American  policy  with  a 
change  in  government.  Can  you  say  anything 
concerning  that? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Of  course,  I  don't 
anticipate  a  change  in  government,  but  in 
the  unlikely  event  that  this  were  to  happen, 
the  American  foreign  policy  is  determined 
by  the  permanent  interests  and  values  of 
the  United  States.  I  believe  that  any  re- 
sponsible leader  will  interpret  those  in  an 
analogous  way,  and  while  there  are  un- 
doubtedly differences  in  emphasis,  I  would 
think  the  main  lines  of  American  foreign 
policy  are  determined  by  our  interests  and 
not  by  our  parties. 


Secretary  Reaffirms  U.S.  Commitment 
to  Law  of  the  Sea  Negotiations 

Folloiving  is  the  text  of  a  letter  dated 
August  3  from  Secretary  Kissinger  to  Hamil- 
ton Shirley  Amerisinghe,  President  of  the 
Third  U.N.  Conference  on  the  Law  of  the 
Sea,  tvhich  teas  delivered  on  August  4  by 
Ambassador  T.  Vincent  Learson,  Special 
Representative  of  the  President  for  the  Law 
of  the  Sea  Conference. 

Press    release   364   dated    August    4 

August  3,  1976. 

Dear  Mr.  President:  As  the  Law  of  the 
Sea  Conference  resumes  in  New  York  this 
week,  I  want  to  offer  you  the  views  of  my 
Government  on  the  importance  of  cooper- 
ative progress  to  resolve  the  major  out- 
standing issues  remaining  before  us. 

As  you  know,  it  is  the  belief  of  the 
United  States  that  this  Conference  has  been 
engaged  in  one  of  the  most  important  dip- 
lomatic negotiations  in  history.  No  current 
matter  on  the  international  agenda  is  more 
vital  for  the  long-term  stability  and  pros- 
perity of  our  planet.  Unless  the  competitive 
practices  and  claims  of  nations  can  be  har- 
monized, the  world  could  well  face  the 
prospect  of  mounting  contention,  or  even 
conflict. 


September  6,  1976 


327 


The  achievements  of  the  Conference  thus 
far  give  us  hope  that  a  successful  conclu- 
sion is  possible — one  which  all  nations  and 
groups  of  nations  should  find  satisfactory. 
But  we  have  nov^f  come  to  a  point  where 
rapid,  responsible  and  cooperative  progress 
is  indispensable.  The  world  community  now 
faces  the  possibility  that  domestic  pres- 
sures of  many  nations  may  set  in  motion 
unilateral  national  moves  which  could 
gravely  impair  the  chances  of  achieving  a 
treaty  in  the  near  future,  if  at  all.  Thus  it 
is  vital  that  this  current  session  of  the  Con- 
ference be  successful. 

The  United  States  attaches  the  utmost 
importance  to  this  objective.  I  will  attend 
the  Conference  during  the  week  of  August 
9,  and  at  other  times  throughout  the 
session  will  give  the  work  of  the  Confer- 
ence my  personal  attention.  The  leaders  of 
all  delegations  and  their  governments 
share  a  heavy  responsibility  to  work  consci- 
entiously and  with  perseverance.  If  we  do 
so,  I  am  convinced  that  it  will  be  possible 
for  us  to  resolve  the  major  remaining  issues 
during  this  session. 

As  always,  Mr.  President,  your  leader- 
ship will  be  of  great  importance.  I  want  to 
convey  to  you  my  own  appreciation,  and 
that  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States,  for  the  work  you  have  done. 

I  regret  that  I  will  not  have  the  oppor- 
tunity to  meet  with  you  before  your  de- 
parture for  the  meeting  of  the  non-aligned 
nations  in  Colombo.  But  I  want  to  assure 
you  now  that  you  may  count  on  the  con- 
tinuing commitment  of  the  United  States 
Delegation  to  work  with  you  and  with  all 
others  at  this  session  in  a  spirit  of  mutual 
cooperation.  We  have,  Mr.  President,  an 
opportunity  and  a  duty  to  make  this  Con- 
ference a  cornerstone  of  a  new  era  in  in- 
ternational affairs  which  brings  peace, 
prosperity  and  justice  to  all  peoples. 

With  my  best  wishes. 
Sincerely, 

Henry  A.  Kissinger. 


328 


Congressional  Documents 
Relating  to  Foreign  Policy 

94th  Congress,  2d  Session 

Humanitarian  Problems  in  Lebanon.  Hearing  before 
the  Subcommittee  To  Investigate  Problems  Con- 
nected With  Refugees  and  Escapees  of  the  Senate 
Committee  on  the  Judiciary.  April  5,  1976.  88  pp. 

Adjustment  Assistance  for  the  U.S.  Stainless  Steel 
Table  Flatware  Industry.  Message  from  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  transmitting  a  report 
on  his  decision  to  provide  adjustment  assistance  to 
the  U.S.  stainless  steel  flatware  industry  in  lieu 
of  the  import  relief  recommended  in  the  March  1, 
1976,  finding  of  the  International  Trade  Commis- 
sion under  section  201(d)(1)  of  the  Trade  Act  of 
1974,  pursuant  to  section  203(b)(2)  of  the  act. 
H.  Doc.  94-483.  April  30,  1976.  1  pp. 

The  Shifting  Pattern  of  Narcotics  Trafficking:  Latin 
America.  Report  submitted  to  the  House  Commit- 
tee on  International  Relations  by  a  special  study 
mission,  conducted  by  Representatives  Lester  L. 
Wolff  and  Benjamin  A.  Oilman  January  6-18,  1976, 
to  Mexico,  Costa  Rica,  Panama,  and  Colombia. 
May  1976.  76  pp. 

Cessation  of  Loans  for  Palm  Oil  Production.  Report 
of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Agriculture  and  For- 
estry to  accompany  S.  Res.  444.  S.  Rept.  94-804. 
May  6,  1976.  3  pp. 

Training  of  Foreign  Nationals  at  the  Coast  Guard 
Academy.  Report  of  the  House  Committee  on  Mer- 
chant Marine  and  Fisheries  to  accompany  H.R. 
11407.  H.  Rept.  94-1110.  May  10,  1976.  8  pp. 

U.S.  Information  Agency  Authorization  Act,  Fiscal 
Year  1977.  Report  of  the  House  Committee  on 
International  Relations  to  accompany  H.R.  13589. 
H.  Rept.  94-1116.  May  11,  1976.  7  pp. 

Inter-American  Development  Bank.  Report  of  the 
committee  of  conference  to  accompany  H.R.  9721. 
H.  Rept.  94-1121.  May  11,  1976.  4  pp. 

Foreign  Investment  Survey  Act  of  1976.  Report  of 
the  Senate  Committee  on  Commerce  to  accompany 
S.  2839.  S.  Rept.  94-834.  May  13,  1976.  14  pp. 

Export  Reorganization  Act  of  1976.  Report  of  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Government  Operations  to 
accompany  S.  1439.  S.  Rept.  94-875.  May  13,  1976. 
38  pp. 

Aftermath  of  War:  Humanitarian  Problems  of 
Southeast  Asia.  A  staff  report  prepared  for  the  use 
of  the  Subcommittee  To  Investigate  Problems 
Connected  With  Refugees  and  Escapees  of  the 
Senate  Committee  on  the  Judiciary.  May  17,  1976. 
589  pp. 

Humanitarian  Assistance  to  Earthquake  Victims  in 
Italy.  Hearing  before  the  Subcommittee  To  In- 
vestigate Problems  Connected  With  Refugees  and 
Escapees  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  the  Judi- 
ciary. May  19,  1976.  33  pp. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


U.S.  Policy  With  Respect  to  Lebanon.  Report  of  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  to  accom- 
pany S.  Res.  448.  S.  Rept.  94-908.  May  20,  1976. 
3  pp. 

S.  1439:  Export  Reorganization  Act  of  1976.  Hearing 
before  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy. 
June  22,  1976.  468  pp. 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 


Astronauts 

Agreement  on  the  rescue  of  astronauts,  the  return  of 
astronauts,  and  the  return  of  objects  launched 
into  outer  space.  Opened  for  signature  at  Wash- 
ington, London,  and  Moscow  April  22,  1968.  En- 
tered into  force  December  3,  1968.  TIAS  6599. 
Notification  of  succession:  Bahamas,  August  13, 
1976. 

Aviation 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful  seizure 
of  aircraft.  Done  at  The  Hague  December  16,  1970. 
Entered  into  force  October  14,  1971.  TIAS  7192. 
Notification  of  succession:   Bahamas,  August  13, 
1976. 

Containers 

International    convention    for    safe    containers,    with 
anne.xes.  Done  at  Geneva  December  2,  1972.' 
Ratification   deposited:   Federal   Republic   of   Ger- 
many, July  27,  1976.' 

Copyright 

Universal  copyright  convention,  as  revised.   Done  at 
Paris  July   24,   1971.   Entered   into   force   July   10, 
1974.  TIAS  7868. 
Accession  deposited:  Colombia,  March  18,  1976. 

Energy 

Agreement     on    an     international    energy    program. 
Done   at   Paris   November   18.    1974.    Entered   into 
force  January  19,  1976.  TIAS  8278. 
Notification    of    consent    to    be    bound    deposited: 
Austria,  June  30,  1976. 

Health 

Amendments  to  articles  34  and  55  of  the  constitution 
of  the  World  Health  Organization  of  July  22,  1946, 


as  amended   (TIAS   1808,  4643,  8086).  Adopted  at 
Geneva  May  22,  1973.' 

Acceptances   deposited:    Grenada,   July    16,    1976; 
Zaire,  July   15,   1976. 

Load  Lines 

International  convention  on  load  lines,  1966.  Done  at 
London  April  5,  1966.  Entered  into  force  July  21, 
1968.  TIAS  6331,  6629,  6720. 
Accession  deposited:  Bahamas,  July  22,   1970. 

Maritime  Matters 

Convention  on  facilitation  of  international   maritime 
traffic,  with  annex.  Done  at  London  April  9,  1965. 
Entered  into  force  March  5,  1967;  for  the  United 
States  May   16,  1967.  TIAS  6251. 
Accession  deposited:  Bahamas,  July  22,   1976. 

Convention  on  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime  Con- 
sultative  Organization.   Done  at  Geneva   March   6, 
1948.    Entered    into   force    March    17,    1958.    TIAS 
4044. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Bahamas,  July  22,  1976. 

Narcotic  Drugs 

Protocol  amending  the  single  convention  on  narcotic 
drugs,  1961.  Done  at  Geneva  March  25,  1972.  En- 
tered into  force  August  8,  1975. 
Accession  deposited:  Canada,  August  5,   1976. 

Nuclear  Test  Ban 

Treaty  banning  nuclear  weapon  tests  in  the  at- 
mosphere, in  outer  space  and  under  water.  Done 
at  Moscow  August  5,  1963.  Entered  into  force 
October  10,  1963.  TIAS  5422. 

Notification   of  succession:   Bahamas,   August   13, 
1976. 

Nuclear    Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty   on   the   nonproliferation   of   nuclear  weapons. 

Done  at  Washington,  London,  and  Moscow  July  1, 

1968.  Entered  into  force  March  5,  1970.  TIAS  6839. 

Notification   of  succession:   Bahamas.   August   13, 

1976. 

Ocean  Dumping 

Convention  on  the  prevention  of  maritime  pollution 
by  dumping  of  wastes  and  other  matter,  with  an- 
nexes. Done  at  London,  Mexico  City.  Moscow,  and 
Washington  December  29,  1972.  Entered  into  force 
August  30,  1975.  TIAS  8165. 

Accession   deposited:   German   Democratic   Repub- 
lic, August  20,  1976. 

Oil  Pollution 

International  convention  for  the  prevention  of  pollu- 
tion of  the  sea  by  oil,  as  amended.  Done  at  London 
May   12,   1954.   Entered   into  force  July   26,   1958; 


'  Not  in  force. 

"  Applicable  to  Berlin  (West). 


September  6,  1976 


329 


for    the    United    States   December    8,    1961.    TIAS 

4900,  6109. 

Acceptance  deposited:  Bahamas,  July  22,  1976." 

Amendments  to  the  international  convention  for  the 
prevention  of  pollution  of  the  sea  by  oil,  1954,  as 
amended  (TIAS  4900,  6109).  Adopted  at  London 
October  21,  1969.' 

Acceptances  deposited:  Bahamas,  July  22,  1976; 
Ghana,  July  2,  1976;  Greece,  August  3,  1976; 
Libya,  July  19,  1976;  Yugoslavia,  June  2.5,  1976. 

Amendments  to  the  international  convention  for  the 
prevention  of  pollution  of  the  sea  by  oil,  1954,  as 
amended    (TIAS   4900,   6109).   Adopted  at   London 
October  15,  1971.' 
Acceptance  deposited:  Yugoslavia.  June  25.  1976. 

International  convention  relating  to   intervention   on 
the  high  seas  in   cases  of  oil  pollution  casualties, 
with  annex.  Done  at  Brussels  November  29,  1969. 
Entered  into  force  May  6,  1975.  TIAS  8068. 
Accession  deposited:  Bahamas.  July  22,  1976.  . 

International  convention  on  civil  liability  for  oil  pollu- 
tion damage.  Done  at  Brussels  November  29,  1969. 
Entered  into  force  June  19,  1975.' 
Accessions    deposited:    Bahamas,    July    22,    1976; 
Greece,  June  29,  1976. 

International  convention  on  the  establishment  of  an 
international  fund  for  compensation  for  oil  pollu- 
tion damage.  Done  at  Brussels  December  18,  1971." 
Accession  deposited:  Bahamas,  July  22,  1976. 
Ratification  deposited:  Japan,  July  7,   1976. 

Patents 

Patent  cooperation  treaty,  with  regulations.  Done  at 
Washington  June  19,  1970.' 

Ratification  deposited:  Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
many, July  19.  1976.= 

Postal 

Constitution  of  the  Universal  Postal  Union  with 
final  protocol  signed  at  Vienna  July  10,  1964 
(TIAS  5881),  as  amended  by  additional  protocol, 
general  regulations  with  final  protocol  and  annex, 
and  the  universal  postal  convention  with  final  pro- 
tocol and  detailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Tokyo 
November  14,  1969.  Entered  into  force  July  1,  1971, 
except  for  article  V  of  the  additional  protocol, 
which  entered  into  force  January  1,  1971.  TIAS 
7150. 
Accession  deposited:  Comoros,  May  10,   1976. 

Second  additional  protocol  to  the  constitution  of  the 
Universal  Postal  Union  of  July  10,  1964  (TIAS 
5881,  7150),  general  regulations  with  final  proto- 
col and  annex,  and  the  universal  postal  convention 
with  final  protocol  and  detailed  regulations.  Done 
at  Lausanne  July  5,  1974.  Entered  iijto  force  Janu- 
ary 1,  1976.  TIAS  8231. 
Ratifications  deposited:  India.  July  6,  1976;  Togo, 

June  30,  1976;  Yugoslavia,  July  2,  1976. 
Accession  deposited:  Comoros,  May  10,  1976. 

Money  orders  and  postal  travellers'  checks  agree- 
ment, with  detailed  regulations.  Done  at  Lausanne 
July  5,  1974.  Entered  into  force  Januarv  1,  1976. 
TIAS  8282. 


330 


Ratifications    deposited:    Togo,    June    30,     1976; 

Yugoslavia,  July  2,  1976. 
Accession  deposited:  Comoros,  May  10,  1976. 

Safety  at  Sea 

International  regulations  for  preventing  collisions  at 
sea.  Approved  by  the  International  Coivference  on 
Safety  of  Life  at  Sea  held  at  London  from  May  17 
to  June  17,  1960.  Entered  into  force  September  1, 
1965.  TIAS  5813. 

Acceptance  deposited:  Bahamas.  July  22.  1976. 
International  convention  for  the  safety  of  life  at  sea, 
1960.  Done  at  London  June  17,  1960.  Entered  into 
force  May  26,  1965.  TIAS  5780,  6284. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Bahamas,  July  22,  1976." 
Amendments  to  the  international  convention  for  the 
safety  of  life  at  sea.   1960   (TIAS  5780).  Adopted 
at  London  November  30,  1966.' 
Acceptance  deposited:  Bahamas,  July  22,  1976. 
Amendments  to  the  international  convention  for  the 
safety  of  life  at  sea,  1960   (TIAS  5780).  Adopted 
at  London  October  25,   1967.' 
Acceptances    deposited:    Austria,    July    27,    1976; 

Bahamas,  July  22,  1976;  Belgium  (not  including 

annex   III),   March   19,   1976;   Nauru,   November 

25,  1975. 
Amendments  to  the  international  convention  for  the 
safety  of  life  at  sea,  1960   (TIAS  5780).  Adopted 
at  London  November  26.   1968.' 
Accepta7ices    deposited:    Austria.    July    27.    1976; 

Bahamas,  July  22,  1976. 
Amendments  to  the  international  convention  for  the 
safety  of  life  at  sea,  1960   (TIAS  5780).  Adopted 
at  London  October  21,  1969.' 
Acceptances    deposited:    Austria,    July    27,    1976; 

Bahamas,  July  22,  1976. 
Amendments  to  the  international  convention  for  the 
safety  of  life  at  sea,  1960   (TIAS  5780).  Adopted 
at  London  October  12,  1971.' 
Acceptance  deposited:   United  Kingdom,  July   19, 

1976. 
Amendment  to  chapter  VI  of  the  international  con- 
vention for  the  safety  of  life  at  sea,  1960   (TIAS 
5780).  Adopted  at  London  November  20,  1973.' 
Acceptance  deposited:   United   Kingdom,  July   19, 

1976. 
Amendments   to  chapters  II,   III,   IV,  and   V   of   the 
international   convention  for  the  safety   of  life  at 
sea,  1960  (TIAS  5780).  Adopted  at  London  Novem- 
ber 20,  1973.' 
Acceptance  deposited:   United  Kingdom,  July   19, 

1976. 
Convention  on  the  international  regulations  for  pre- 
venting  collisions    at   sea,    1972.    Done   at   London 
October  20,  1972.  Enters  into  force  July  15,  1977. 
Accession  deposited:  Bahamas,  July  22,  1976. 


'  Not  in  force. 

■'Applicable  to  Berlin  (West). 

"  With  declaration  and  reservations. 

'  Not  in  force  for  the  United  States. 

'  With  a  declaration. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Space 

Treaty  on  principles  governing  the  activities  of 
states  in  the  exploration  and  use  of  outer  space, 
including  the  moon  and  other  celestial  bodies, 
Opened  for  signature  at  Washington,  London,  and 
Moscow  January  27,  1967.  Entered  into  force  Octo- 
ber 10,  1967.  TIAS  6347. 

Notification  of  succession:   Bahamas,   August   13, 
1976. 

Convention  on  registration  of  objects  launched  into 
outer  space.  Opened  for  signature  at  New  York 
January  14,   1975.^ 

Ratification  deposited:  Canada,  August  4,  1976. 
Signature:  Niger.  August  5,  1976. 

Terrorism 

Convention    on    the    prevention    and    punishment    of 
crimes   against    internationally    protected    persons, 
including   diplomatic    agents.    Done    at   New   York 
December  14,  1973.' 
Ratification  deposited:  Canada.  August  4.  1976. 

Tonnage  Measurement 

international  convention  on  tonnage  measurement  of 
ships,  1969,  with  annexes.  Done  at  London  June  23, 
1969.' 

Accession  deposited:  Bahamas,  July  22,  1976. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Poland,  July  27.  1976. 

Jnited  Nations 

A.mendment  to  article  109  of  the  Charter  of  the 
United  Nations.  Adopted  by  the  General  Assembly 
at  United  Nations  Headquarters,  New  York,  De- 
cember 20,  1965.  Entered  into  force  June  12,  1968. 
TIAS  6529. 
Ratification  deposited:  Cuba,  May  17,  1976. 

Amendment    to    article    61    of    the    United    Nations 
Charter  to  enlarge  the  Economic  and  Social  Coun- 
cil. Done  at  New  York  December  20,  1971.  Entered 
into  force  September  24,  1973.  TIAS  7739. 
Ratification  deposited:   Cuba,  May  17,  1976. 

i/Vheat 

Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the  wheat 
trade  convention  (part  of  the  international  wheat 
agreement)  1971  (TIAS  7144,  8227).  Done  at 
Washington  March  17,  1976.  Entered  into  force 
June  19,  1976,  with  respect  to  certain  provisions, 
and  July  1,  1976,  with  respect  to  other  provisions. 
Accession  deposited:  Panama,  August  18.  1976. 


BILATERAL 

rtonduras 

Agreement  relating  to  the  limitation  of  meat  imports 
from  Honduras  during  calendar  year  1976.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  notes  at  Tegucigalpa  April  28  and 
June  10,  1976.  Entered  into  force  June  10,  1976. 


'  Not  in  force. 


ieptember  6,  1976 


GPO  Sales  Publications 

Publications  may  be  ordered  by  catalog  or  stock 
number  from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington,  B.C.  201,02. 
A  25-percent  discount  is  made  on  orders  for  100  or 
more  copies  of  any  one  publication  mailed  to  the 
sayne  address.  Remittances,  payable  to  the  Superin- 
tendent of  Documents,  must  accompany  orders. 
Prices  shown  below,  which  include  domestic  postage, 
are  subject  to  change. 

Background  Notes:  Short,  factual  summaries  which 
describe  the  people,  history,  government,  economy, 
and  foreign  relations  of  each  country.  Each  contains 
a  map,  a  list  of  principal  government  officials  and 
U.S.  diplomatic  and  consular  officers,  and  a  reading 
list.  (A  complete  set  of  all  Background  Notes  cur- 
rently in  stock— at  least  140— $21.80;  1-year  sub- 
scription service  for  approximately  77  updated  or 
new  Notes— $23.10;  plastic  binder— $1.50.)  Single 
copies  of  those  listed  below  are  available  at  35^  each. 

Bahrain       


Belize 


Burma 


China,    Republic    of 
Mali 


.    Cat.    No.    S1.123:B14/2 

Pub.   8013  4  pp. 

.     Cat.    No.    S1.123:B44/2 

Pub.  8332  4  pp. 

.     Cat.    No.    S1.123:B92 

Pub.  7931  8  pp. 

.     Cat.    No.    S1.123:C44/2 

Pub.  7791  8  pp. 

.    Cat.    No.    S1.123:M29/o 

Pub.  8056  5  pp. 

Somali  Democratic  Republic    Cat.    No.    SI. 123:805 

Pub.  7881  6  pp. 

Documents  on  Disarmament  1974.  Basic  documents 
on  arms  control  and  disarmament  arranged  in  chron- 
ological order,  preceded  by  a  topical  list  of  documents 
and  lists  of  abbreviations  and  conferences  and  fol- 
lowed by  a  bibliography,  a  list  of  persons,  and  an 
index.  ACDA  Pub.  76.  918  pp.  $8.60.  (Cat.  No. 
81.117/5:76).   (Stock  No.  002-000-00049-1). 

Cultural  Relations  Programs  of  the  U.S.  Department 
of  State,  Historical  Studies:  Number  1,  America's 
Cultural  Experiment  in  China,  by  Wilma  Fairbank. 
Monograph  which  recounts  the  history  of  the  1942-49 
U.S.  Government  program  ".  .  .  aimed  directly  at 
offering  assistance  to  the  Chinese  people  in  education, 
public  health,  sanitation,  agriculture,  engineering, 
and  the  like."  Appendixes  and  index  included.  Pub. 
8839.  Intei'national  Information  and  Cultural  Series 
108.  233  pp.  $5.10.  (Cat.  No.  81.67:8839.).  (Stock  No. 
044-000-01597-8). 


331 


1975  Report  of  the  Visa  Office.  Report  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  State's  activities  in  carrying  out  its  respon- 
sibilities under  tlie  Immigration  and  Nationality  Act 
for  FY  1975  including  statistical  tables  with  index. 
Pub.  8810.  Department  and  Foreign  Service  Series 
150.  84  pp.  $1.70.  (Cat.  No.  Sl.l./4:8810).  (Stock  No. 
044-000-01612-5). 

World  IVIeteorological  Organization.  Amendments  to 
the  convention  of  October  11,  1947,  as  amended. 
TIAS  8175.  10  pp.  35(^.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:8175). 

Trade  in  Cotton,  Wool  and  Man-Made  Fiber  Textiles. 

Agreement  with  Japan  modifying  the  arrangement  of 
September  27,  1974.  TIAS  8181.  21  pp.  35«'.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:8181). 

Cooperation  in  Geothermal  Energy  Research  and  De- 
velopment. Agreement  with  Italy.  TIAS  8182.  12  pp. 
35<t.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:8182). 

Peace  Corps.  Agreement  with  Upper  Volta.  TIAS 
8183.  11  pp.  35<t.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:8183). 

Economic  and  Social  Development — Sino-American 
Fund.  Agreement  with  the  Republic  of  China  extend- 
ing the  agreement  of  April  9,  1965,  as  amended  and 
extended,  TIAS  8184.  8  pp.  S54.  (Cat.  No.  89,10:8184), 

Telecommunication — Assignment  of  Television  Chan- 
nels Along  United  States-Mexican  Border.  Agreement 
with  Mexico  amending  the  agreement  of  April  18, 
1962.  TIAS  8185.  7  pp.  S5l  (Cat.  No.  89.10:8185). 

Military  Mission.  Agreement  with  Iran  amending  and 
extending  the  agreement  of  November  27,  1943,  as 
amended  and  extended.  TIAS  8186.  6  pp.  35(f.  (Cat. 
No.  89.10:8186). 

Trade  in  Textiles — Consultations  on  Market  Disrup- 
tion. Agreement  with  Portugal.  TIAS  8187.  5  pp.  35(t. 
(Cat.  No.  89,10:8187). 

Agricultural    Commodities — Agreement    with    Chile. 

TIAS  8188.  7  pp.  35f  (Cat,  No.  89.10:8188). 

Social  Security.  Agreement  with  Niger.  TIAS  8194. 
8  pp.  35^.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:8194). 


Education — Financing  Educational  Exchange  Pro- 
grams, Agreement  with  Finland  amending  the  agree- 
ment of  July  2,  1952,  as  amended.  TIAS  8196,  7  pp. 
35<f.   (Cat.  No.   89.10:8196). 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  Jordan. 
TIAS  8197.  12  pp.  35^.   (Cat.  No.  89.10:8197). 

Mutual  Defense  Assistance — Cash  Contribution  by 
Japan.  Arrangement  with  Japan  relating  to  the 
agreement  of  March  8,  1954.  TIAS  8198.  6  pp.  35<f. 
(Cat.  No.  89.10:8198). 

Agricultural  Commodities,  Agreement  with  Israel 
amending  the  agreement  of  December  16,  1974. 
TIAS  8200.  2  pp.  35(f.   (Cat.  No,   89.10:8200), 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  Egypt, 
TIAS  8201.  4  pp,  354.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:8201). 

Energy — Solar  Heating  and  Cooling  Systems  in 
Buildings.  Memorandum  of  Understanding  with 
Other  Governments.  TIAS  8202.  4  pp.  35<f.  (Cat.  No. 
89.10:8202). 

Remote     Sensing — Acquisition     of     Satellite     Data. 

Memorandum  of  Understanding  with  Iran.  TIAS 
8203.  4  pp,  35<t,  (Cat.  No.  89.10:8203). 

Continued  Operation  of  Long  Range  Aid  to  Naviga- 
tion (LORAN)  Stations.  Agreement  with  the  Philip- 
pines. TIAS  8204.  3  pp,  35<(.   (Cat.  No.  89.10:8204) 

Grains  Agreement.  Agreement  with  the  Union  ol 
Soviet  Socialist  Republics.  TIAS  8206.  8  pp.  35^ 
(Cat.  No.  89.10:8206). 

Remote     Sensing — Acquisition     of     Satellite     Data 

Memorandum  of  Understanding  with  Chile.  TIA5 
8211,  4  pp.  35(?.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:8211). 

Finance — Damascus  Water  System.  Agreement  witl 
Syria.  TIAS  8212.  33  pp.  45«f.   (Cat.  No.  89.10:8212) 

Remote     Sensing — Acquisition     of     Satellite     Data 

Memorandum  of  Understanding  with  Italy.  TIA! 
8213.  4  pp,  35<t.  (Cat,  No.  89.10:8213). 


332 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 


INDEX     September  6,  1976     Vol  LXXV,  No.  19^1 


Afghanistan.  Secretary  Kissinger  Attends  Ses- 
sion of  U.S.-Iran  Joint  Commission;  Visits 
Afghanistan,  Pal<istan,  and  tiie  Netlierlands 
(toasts,  news  conferences.  Joint  Commission 
communique,  U.S.-Afglianistan  joint  state- 
ment)     

Africa.  Secretary  Kissinger  Attends  Session  of 
U.S.-Iran  Joint  Commission;  Visits  Afghani- 
stan, Pal<istan,  and  the  Netherlands  (toasts, 
news  conferences,  Joint  Commission  com- 
munique, U.S.-Afghanistan  joint  statement) 

Arms  Control  and  Disarmament.  Secretary 
Kissinger  Attends  Session  of  U.S.-Iran  Joint 
Commission;  Visits  Afghanistan,  Palcistan, 
and  the  Netherlands  (toasts,  news  confer- 
ences. Joint  Commission  communique,  U.S.- 
Afghanistan joint  statement) 

Congress.  Congressional  Documents  Relating 
to    Foreign    Policy 

Economic  Affairs.  Secretary  Kissinger  Attends 
Session  of  U.S.-Iran  Joint  Commission; 
Visits  Afghanistan,  Pakistan,  and  the  Neth- 
erlands (toasts,  news  conferences.  Joint 
Commission  communique,  U.S.-Afghanistan 
joint   statement) 

Greece.  Secretary  Kissinger  Attends  Session  of 
U.S.-Iran  Joint  Commission;  Visits  Afghani- 
stan, Pakistan,  and  the  Netherlands  (toasts, 
news  conferences.  Joint  Commission  com- 
munique, U.S.-Afghanistan  joint  statement) 

Iran.  Secretary  Kissinger  Attends  Session  of 
U.S.-Iran  Joint  Commission;  Visits  Afghani- 
stan, Pakistan,  and  the  Netherlands  (toasts, 
news  conferences.  Joint  Commission  com- 
munique, U.S.-Afghanistan  joint  statement) 

Law  of  the  Sea.  Secretary  Reaffirms  U.S.  Com- 
mitment to  Law  of  the  Sea  Negotiations 
(letter  to  President  of  the  Law  of  the  Sea 
Conference) 

Lebanon.  Secretary  Kissinger  .A.ttends  Session 
of  U.S.-Iran  Joint  Commission;  Visits  Af- 
ghanistan, Pakistan,  and  the  Netherlands 
(toasts,  news  conferences.  Joint  Commission 
communique.  U.S.-Afghanistan  joint  state- 
ment)     

Netherlands.  Secretary  Kissinger  Attends  Ses- 
sion of  U.S.-Iran  Joint  Commission;  Visits 
Afghanistan,  Pakistan,  and  the  Netherlands 
(toasts,  news  conferences,  Joint  Commission 
communique,  U.S.-Afghanistan  joint  state- 
ment)     

Pakistan.  Secretary  Kissinger  Attends  Session 
of  U.S.-Iran  Joint  Commission;  Visits  Af- 
ghanistan, Pakistan,  and  the  Netherlands 
(toasts,  news  conferences,  Joint  Commission 
communique.  U.S.-Afghanistan  joint  state- 
ment)     

Publications.  GPO  Sales  Publications  .... 

Treaty  Information.  Current  Actions  .... 

Turkey.  Secretary  Kissinger  Attends  Session  of 
U.S.-Iran  Joint  Commission;  Visits  Afghani- 


305 


30.5 
328 


305 


305 


305 


305 


305 


305 
331 
329 


stan,  Pakistan,  and  the  Netherlands  (toasts, 
news  conferences.  Joint  Commission  com- 
munique, U.S.-Afghanistan  joint  statement)       305 

United  Nations.  Secretary  Reaffirms  U.S.  Com- 
mitment to  Law  of  the  Sea  Negotiations 
(letter  to  President  of  the  Law  of  the  Sea 
Conference) 327 


Name  Index 

Ansary,    Hushang 307 

Kissinger,    Secretary 305,  327 

van  der  Stoel,  IVIax 322 


Chec 

dist  of  Department  of  State 

Press 

Releases:  August    16-22 

Press    releases    may    be    obtained    from    the      1 

Office  of  Pr 

^ss  Relations,  Department  of  State, 

Washington 

D.C.  20520. 

No. 

Date 

BDbjMt 

*-379 

8/17 

Shipping  Coordinating  Committee 
(SCO,  Sept.  23. 

*380 

8/17 

sec,  Sept.  24. 

*381 

8/17 

sec.   Subcommittee   on   Safety   of 
Life   at   Sea    (SOLAS),   working 
group  on  safety  of  fishing  ves- 
sels, Sept.  21. 

*382 

8/17 

U.S.   National   Committee   for   the 
International       Telegraph       and 
Telephone   Consultative  Commit- 
tee, Sept.  15. 

'■3B3 

8/17 

sec,    SOLAS,   working   group   on 
ship      design      and      equipment, 
Sept.   14-16. 

*384 

8/17 

sec,   SOLAS,   working   group   on 
standards  of  training  and  watch- 
keeping,   Sept.   14. 

*385 

8/16 

U.S. -Canada  joint  press  release  on 
delay   of  the   Intel-national  Joint 
Commission  report  on  the  Garri- 
son Diversion  Unit. 

*386 

8/18 

News   specialists  from   nine  coun- 
tries   participate    in    journalism 
project. 

*387 

8/18 

sec,    SOLAS,    working   group    on 
fire  protection,  Sept.  17. 

*388 

8/18 

see,    SOLAS,    working    group    on 
life-saving   appliances,   Sept.    17. 

*389 

8/18 

Advisory   Committee    to   U.S.    Na- 
tional Section  of  Inter-American 
Tropical    Tuna    Commission,    La 
Jolla,   Calif.,   Sept.   23-25. 

"390 

S/19 

sec,    SOLAS,   working   group    on 
radiocommunications,  Sept.  16. 

*391 

8/20 

Stephen  Low  sworn  in  as  Ambas- 
sador    to     Zambia     (biographic 
data). 

ited. 

*  Not  pri 

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15 


U: 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 

BULLETIN 


Volume  LXXV     •      No.  1942 


September  13,  1976 


SECRETARY  KISSINGER  DISCUSSES  PROGRESS  AND  GOALS 
IN  LAW  OF  THE  SEA  NEGOTIATIONS 
Remarks  to  U.S.  Delegation  and  Toast  at  Luncheon 
Honoring  Latv  of  the  Sea  Conference  Leadership    333 

DEPARTMENT  DISCUSSES  ACTIONS  BY  OAS  IN  HUMAN  RIGHTS  FIELD 
Statement  by  Ambassador  MaUliard    339 


THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 

For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE  B  U  L  L  E  T I 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents 

U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 

Washington,  D.C.  20402 

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Single  copy  85  cents 

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approved  by  the  Director  of  the  Office  of  Man- 
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Note:  Contents  of  this  publication  are  not 
copyrighted  and  Items  contained  herein  may  be 
reprinted.  Citation  of  the  DEPARTMENT  OF 
STATE  BULLETIN  as  the  source  will  be 
appreciated.  The  BULLETIN  is  indexed  in 
the    Readers'    Guide    to    Periodical    Literature. 


Vol.  LXXV,  No.  1942 
September  13,  1976 


I 


The  Department  of  State  BVLLETl 
a  weekly  publication  issued  by  i 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau 
Public  Affairs,  provides  tfte  public  a 
interested  agencies  of  tfte  governmt 
witli  information  on  developments 
tfie  field  of  U.S.  foreign  relations  a 
on  tfie  worfc  of  tlie  Department  a 
tfie  Foreign  Service. 
Tfie  BULLETIN  includes  select 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy,  isst 
by  tfte  Wfiite  House  and  tfie  Depa 
ment,  and  statements,  address 
and  news  conferences  of  tfie  Preside 
and  tfie  Secretary  of  State  and  ot\ 
officers  of  tfie  Department,  as  well 
special  articles  on  various  pfiases 
international  affairs  and  ttie  functii 
of  tfie  Department.  Information 
included  concerning  treaties  and  int 
national  agreements  to  wfiicfi  i 
United  Slates  is  or  may  become 
party  and  on  treaties  of  general  int 
national  interest. 
Publications  of  tfte  Department 
State,  United  Nations  documents,  a 
legislative  material  in  tfie  field 
international  relations  are  also  list 


I  Secretary  Kissinger  Discusses  Progress  and  Goals 
in  Law  of  the  Sea  Negotiations 


Folloiving  are  remarks  made  by  Secretary 
Kissinger  to  the  U.S.  delegation  to  the  Third 
U.N.  Conference  on  the  Laiv  of  the  Sea  at 
New  York  on  August  13  and  a  toast  he  gave 
that  day  at  a  luncheon  in  honor  of  the  Acting 
President  of  the  conference,  committee  chair- 
men, and  several  members  of  the  conference 
secretariat. 


lEMARKS  TO  U.S.  DELEGATION 


release  377  dated  August   13 

As  you  know,  I  regard  this  conference  as 
potentially  one  of  the  most  significant 
diplomatic  negotiations  of  our  time.  And  at 
this  session  it  has  taken  on  an  added  aspect 
of  urgency — as  we  are  called  upon  to  help 
conclude  a  treaty  before  the  pressure  of 
events  and  contention  places  international 
consensus  irretrievably  beyond  the  grasp 
of  the  nations  of  the  world. 

I  want  to  thank  all  the  members  of  this 
delegation  for  your  very  hard  work  and 
your  perseverance  in  dealing  with  a  mul- 
titude of  highly  complex  and  momentous 
issues.  I  have  followed  the  progress  of  your 
efforts  daily.  Thus  I  understand  full  well 
the  many  diificulties  you  are  facing. 

Owing  to  your  efforts  considerable  prog- 
ress has  already  been  made  in  these  nego- 
tiations. But  we  must  acknowledge  that 
forward  movement  has  been  accompanied 
by  increasing  tendencies  in  many  nations 
toward  unilateral  actions  that  will  make 
the  task  before  us  more  and  more  difficult. 

Despite — indeed,  because  of — these  ten- 
dencies, it  is  imperative  that  this  session 
make   significant   progress   on   all   the   re- 


September  13,  1976 


maining  major  issues  still  in  contention. 
Our  objective  is  to  make  possible  a  final 
session  early  next  year  to  complete  agree- 
ment on  the  text  of  the  law  of  the  sea 
convention. 

The  United  States  has  already  made  sig- 
nificant efforts  in  earlier  sessions — espe- 
cially this  spring — to  accommodate  the  in- 
terests of  other  states.  This  was  made  with 
the  understanding  that  our  interests  also 
would  be  protected.  There  is  a  limit  be- 
yond which  the  United  States  cannot  go  in 
these  negotiations.  There  are  a  number  of 
proposals  in  the  conference  which  this 
government  could  not  accept  and,  indeed, 
our  Congress  would  never  ratify.  These 
limits  must  be  recognized  if  we  are  to  ob- 
tain a  widely  acceptable  treaty. 

Nonetheless,  we  are  committed  to  con- 
tinue to  put  forth  every  effort  to  cooperate 
with  the  other  delegations  to  find  reason- 
able and  responsible  ways  to  reconcile  the 
many  legitimate  interests  and  concerns 
before  us. 

I  have  come  to  this  session  to  underline 
the  importance  with  which  the  United 
States  regards  this  effort — and  to  obtain  a 
firsthand  view  of  how  we  are  progressing 
in  these  negotiations.  We  must  determine 
how  best  we  can  use  the  remaining  time 
available  in  this  session  to  work  toward  a 
package  agreement  on  all  of  the  different 
main  issues.  I  will  be  meeting  with  a  num- 
ber of  the  key  conference  and  delegation 
leaders  from  a  number  of  countries  repre- 
senting various  viewpoints,  geographical  as 
well  as  functional.  I  want  to  hear  of  their 
concerns  directly  and  to  speak  to  them 
about  our  own. 


333 


Specifically,  I  will  be  meeting  with  the 
conference  leadership,  including  the  Act- 
ing Conference  President  Minister  Jens 
Evensen  [Norwegian  Minister  Without 
Portfolio],  to  get  their  assessment  of  the 
present  negotiating  situation,  how  far  we 
have  to  go,  and  how  best  to  move  forward. 
In  my  own  discussions  I  will  emphasize  the 
need  to  move  with  as  much  speed  as  possi- 
ble toward  a  final  consensus  acceptable  to 
all  major  groups  of  states. 

The  problems  we  face  must  neither  be 
magnified  nor  disregarded.  These  are  diflfi- 
cult  negotiations.  But  the  problems  we  face 
must  be  measured  against  the  costs  of 
failure — to  all  nations.  If  a  mood  of  pessi- 
mism prevails  we  surely  will  not  succeed. 
What  is  called  for  now  is  determination  and 
a  new  creative  effort. 

In  Committee  I  we  face  these  negotia- 
tions' most  complex  and  contentious  issues. 
Most  important  remains  the  question  of 
deep  seabed  mining — who  shall  do  it  and 
under  what  conditions.  The  United  States 
position  is  that  an  equitable  solution  should 
insure  that  all  states  party  to  the  conven- 
tion and  their  nationals  have  guaranteed 
access  to  seabed  mining  sites  under  fair 
conditions. 

With  that  understanding,  we  could  agree 
on  the  establishment  of  an  "Enterprise" 
representing  the  Seabed  Authority  which 
would  be  able  to,  on  its  own,  mine  seabed 
minerals.  Revenue  sharing  from  all  mining 
would  go  to  the  world  community  to  be 
used  primarily  for  economic  development 
of  the  poorer  countries.  No  other  solution 
would  be  fair  to  the  developing  countries 
who  desire  to  have  an  Enterprise  which 
can  exploit  seabed  resources  and  who  want 
revenues  from  mining  for  needed  economic 
growth. 

In  Committee  II  the  outstanding  issue 
remains  the  high  seas  status  of  the  eco- 
nomic zone.  The  solution  to  this  difficult 
problem  must  insure  that  the  interests  of 
the  international  community — and  those 
high  seas  freedoms  which  are  reserved  to 
that  community — are  preserved  in  the  law 
of  the  sea  convention  for  the  benefit  of  all 


mankind.  Only  such  a  solution  can  balance 
the  rights  of  coastal  states  over  the  eco- 
nomic resources  of  the  zone  while  at  the 
same  time  preserving  the  interests  of  the 
international  community  in  crucial  matters 
such  as  navigation. 

In  Committee  III  a  main  goal  of  the 
United  States  is  to  preserve  within  the 
economic  zone  freedom  for  scientific  re- 
search not  directly  related  to  the  exploita- 
tion and  exploration  of  resources  within 
the  zone.  Only  through  open  scientific  re- 
search and  the  wide  dissemination  of  its 
results  throughout  the  world  can  the  global 
community  continue  to  probe  the  mysteries 
of  our  planet  to  better  the  lives  and  pre- 
serve the  health  of  all.  It  would  be  most 
difficult  for  the  United  States  to  accept  a 
treaty  that  would  restrict  the  existing 
freedom  of  scientific  research.  The  solu- 
tion we  seek  would  protect  all  countries 
through  a  balance  of  obligations  and  re- 
sponsibilities; the  freedom  of  scientific  re- 
search in  the  economic  zone  would  be  guar- 
anteed ;  coastal  states  could  participate  in 
such  research  and  benefit  from  its  results; 
and  safeguards  against  marine  pollution 
would  be  established.  It  is  very  doubtful, 
in  my  view,  that  we  would  be  able  to  ob- 
tain the  consent  of  Congress  to  this  treaty 
unless  it  incorporated  such  a  balance  of 
rights  and  responsibilities. 

Finally,  with  respect  to  dispute  settle- 
ment, I  believe  there  is  a  wide  consensus 
that  a  binding  and  compulsory  dispute  set- 
tlement mechanism  is  crucial — for  both  the 
deep  seabeds  and  the  economic  zone.  Only 
through  such  procedures  can  we  prevent 
future  conflict  arising  over  differing  inter- 
pretations of  the  convention  text. 

I  want  you  to  know  that  this  visit  today 
will  not  be  my  last.  I  will  return  to  this 
conference  later  as  we  endeavor  to  achieve 
an  overall  agreement  on  the  major  remain- 
ing issues.  It  is  imperative  that  all  of  us 
put  forth  our  full  effort  to  help  bring  about 
an  equitable  and  acceptable  treaty  in  the 
weeks  ahead.  Our  determination,  our  skill, 
and  our  vision  are  vital  if  this  great  inter- 
national effort  is  to  succeed.  And  succeed  it 


334 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


'•  nust,   for   no   current   diplomatic   negotia- 

*  aon  is  more   important  for  the   long-term 
stability  and  prosperity  of  our  globe. 

The  United  States  is  determined  to  do 
ill  it  can  to  help  this  conference  succeed. 
The  problems  are  vast,  but  the  possibility 
md  the  promise  have  never  been  more 
lear.  And  through  reason,  through  re- 
sponsibility, and  by  working  together,  we 
hall  succeed. 
II 

rOAST  AT  LUNCHEON  HONORING 
ai  CONFERENCE  LEADERSHIP 

8, 

'fr!  Press  release  378  dated   Aug\ist  13 

*  I  have  learned  a  great  deal  in  my  brief 
«!/isit  here  today.  I  have  had  a  sense  of  the 
'firange  of  the  issues  that  are  before  us,  and 
''■'[  appreciate  the  frankness  with  which  the 

leads  of  the  committees  and  Acting  Presi- 
-  ;lent  have  spoken  to  me,  and  also  the 
f- members  of  the  various  delegations  that  I 
T'  tiad  an  opportunity  to  consult  this  morn- 
it  :ng  and  shall  consult  with  this  afternoon. 
s;  The  United  States  believes  that  you  are 
M  all  engaged  in  one  of  the  historic  confer- 
i  3nces  of  many  decades.  It  is  not  often  that 
»■  diplomats  can  accept  something  which  they 
tyknow  will  last  for  an  indefinite  period.  It 
of  is  not  often  that  man  has  an  opportunity  to 
establish  a  legal  regime  for  vast  areas  of 
ethe  world.  It  is  not  often  that  great  riches 
Hi  have  been  apportioned  on  the  basis  of  ne- 
!ti?otiations  and  at  least  an  attempt  of  a  just 
If  settlement  rather  than  on  the  basis  of 
iyipower.  From  all  of  these  points  of  view  you 
ctiare  engaged  in  a  historic  enterprise  and  it 
T- 'proves  that  history  can  be  made  in  an  un- 
iramatic,  complicated,  serious  way. 

There  is  often  discussion  in  this  country 
3n  why  things  are  moving  so  relatively 
lowly.  But  if  one  looks  at  the  vastness  of 
the  challenges  of  the  time  when  territorial 
seas  were  three  miles,  when  the  concept  of 
the  economic  zone  was  not  even  thought 
Df,  when  the  exploration  of  the  deep  sea- 
Deds  was  a  dream  for  science  fiction — 
iwhen  one  considers  all  of  these  problems 
[that  had  to  be  addressed,  and  had  to  be 


addressed  by  150  nations,  then  one  must 
congratulate  you  on  the  progress  that  has 
been  made. 

In  our  discussions  at  lunch,  the  discus- 
sions this  morning,  it  is  clear  that  the  is- 
sues that  remain  to  be  solved  can  probably 
be  enumerated  on  the  fingers  of  two  hands, 
that  vast  areas  of  general  agreement  have 
already  been  reached.  Disagreements  that 
remain  very  often  concern  the  implemen- 
tation of  principles  that  have  already  been 
established. 

The  concept  of  a  common  heritage  of 
mankind,  the  concept  that  humanity  has  a 
responsibility  to  the  world  community  in 
the  deep  seabeds  is,  I  think,  a  historic 
breakthrough  of  enormous  proportion. 
Compared  to  this,  how  you  finance  the  in- 
ternational portion  of  this  exploration  is  a 
technically  enormously  difficult  problem, 
but  I  have  no  doubt  that  we  will  find  a 
way  of  solving  it.  If  we  don't  find  it,  the 
distinguished  chairman  of  the  First  Com- 
mittee will  write  a  document  which  he  rep- 
resents as  the  consensus  of  all  of  us,  and 
which  will  no  doubt  eventually  find  the 
common  assent.  So  I  think,  again,  when  we 
speak  of  the  issues  in  Committee  II,  of 
what  the  characteristics  are  of  the  200- 
mile  economic  zone,  there  are  important 
technical  problems  that  remain. 

But  when  we  start  discussing  in  con- 
crete detail  what  essential  interests  of 
each  country  are  and  we  get  away  from 
philosophical  and  confrontational  skews, 
again  I  am  confident  we  will  find  a  solu- 
tion, and  the  same  is  true  in  many  things. 
We  have  not,  in  fact,  had  a  great  deal  of 
discussion  about  the  settlement  of  dis- 
putes, simply  because,  it  seems  to  me,  if 
we  successfully  complete  the  substantive 
part  of  it,  none  of  us  can  afford  to  let  this 
conference  fail  over  how  we  are  going  to 
settle  disputes  on  such  a  major  achieve- 
ment. I  must  therefore  say  I  am  basically 
optimistic. 

The  United  States  will  study  the  diflfer- 
ences  that  remain  with  the  attitude  of 
where  we  can  take  into  account  concerns 
of  the   other  nations.   Obviously,   we  have 


September  13,  1976 


335 


concerns  which  we  cannot  give  up,  and 
there  are  limits  beyond  which  we  cannot 
go.  This  is  true  of  almost  all  of  the  other 
participants  in  the  conference. 

Having  come  this  far,  however,  it  is  my 
conviction  that  we  can  settle  the  differ- 
ences. The  United  States  will  make  a 
major  effort  to  work  closely  with  you.  We 
hope  the  attitude  will  be  one  not  of  con- 
frontation but  of  a  recognition  of  this  great 
historic  opportunity. 

If  we  succeed,  as  I  am  persuaded  we 
will,  then  future  generations  can  look  back 
on  this  period  and  say  that  mankind  put 
three-quarters  of  the  earth's  surface  under 
a  regime  that  reflected  justice  and  equity 
and  human  concerns  in  a  peaceful  manner 
and  has  banished  from  that  part  of  the 
world  the  contest  for  power  and  the  rivalry 
that  has  been  the  bane  of  mankind  on  land, 
and  there  would  not  be  the  least  irony  of 
history  in  having  sought  to  establish  peace 
for  so  long  on  land  that  it  should  be  a 
conference  of  the  law  of  the  sea  which 
gives  the  impetus  for  universal  peace. 

So  I  would  like  to  propose  a  toast  to  the 
success  of  the  conference  and  pay  tribute 
to  all  of  you  who  are  working  so  closely 
together. 


Eleven  MAAG's  To  Be  Terminated 
Under  Security  Assistance  Act 

Department  Announcement  ^ 

On  June  30  the  President  signed  the 
International  Security  Assistance  and  Arms 
Export  Control  Act  of  1976.  That  act  re- 
quires that  "After  September  30,  1976,  the 
number  of  military  missions,  groups,  and 
similar  organizations  may  not  exceed  34." 
To  comply  with  this  statutory  requirement, 
the  President  has  authorized  termination 
of  Military  Assistance  Advisory  Groups 
(MAAG's)  in  the  following  11  countries  by 
September  30:  Belgium,  Denmark,  France, 
Germany,  Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Norway, 
India,  Costa  Rica,  Paraguay,  Uruguay. 


'Issued  on  Aug.  25  (text  from  press  release  397). 


President  Kekkonen  of  Finland 
Visits  Washington 


President  Urho  Kekkonen  of  the  Republii 
of  Finland  made  a  state  visit  to  Washingtovi 
August  S-U,  during  which  he  met  ivith  Presi 
dent  Ford  and  other  government  officials' 
FoUoiuing  is  an  exchange  of  remarks  betweer 
President  Ford  and  President  Kekkonen  a, 
a  ivelcoming  ceremony  on  the  South  Lawt 
of  the  White  Hoiise  on  August  5.' 


WeL'kly    Compilation   of   Presidential   Documents   dated    August 

PRESIDENT  FORD 

President  Kekkonen,  ladies  and  gentle 
men:  On  behalf  of  the  American  people,  ' 
am  delighted  to  welcome  you  to  our  coun 
try.  Your  visit  permits  us  to  reaffirm  thi 
closeness  of  the  ties  between  our  two  coun 
tries  and  to  reciprocate  the  wonderful  hos 
pitality  extended  to  Mrs.  Ford  and  me  ii 
Helsinki  just  a  year  ago. 

Finns  began  arriving  in  America  ove 
300  years  ago  and  have  contributed  mucl 
to  the  building  of  the  United  States.  M; 
home  state,  Michigan,  which  is  said  t 
resemble  Finland  in  many  respects,  has  at 
tracted  many  Finns.  Their  cultural  influ 
ence,  the  deep  Finnish  devotion  to  educa 
tion,  commerce,  farming,  and  physica 
fitness  is  evident  in  Michigan's  coppe 
country. 

Mr.  President,  Finland  has  proven  be 
yond  any  doubt  whatsoever  in  recent  year 
that  a  small  country  can  make  importan 
contributions  to  world  peace  and  worh 
understanding  of  fundamental  importanct 
to  both  of  our  nations. 

Your  active  involvement  in  world  affairs 
your  role  in  the  United  Nations,  including 
a  significant  part  in  peacekeeping  force! 
in  the  Middle  East  and  in  Cyprus,  youi 
serving    as    a     host    to     important    inter 


336 


'  For  an  exchange  of  toasts  between  President  Fore 
and  President  Kekkonen  at  a  White  House  dinnei 
that  evening,  see  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidentia 
Documents  dated  Aug.  9,  1976,  p.  1239. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


lational  conferences  such  as  the  initial 
ihase  of  the  strategic  arms  negotiations 
,nd  the  Conference  on  Security  and  Co- 
peration  in  Europe,  have  ail  contributed  to 
,  better  world. 

i  Finland  has  played  a  constructive  role 
vithin  the  Nordic  Council  and  the  Organi- 
;ation  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  De- 
•elopment  and  has  followed  closely  the 
lialogue  which  has  been  established  be- 
ween  the  developed  and  developing 
ountries. 

Humanity  respects  and  values  Finland's 
ifforts  to  help  bridge  differences  among 
lations  and  overcome  obstacles  to  inter- 
lational  peace  and  stability. 

Mr.  President,  you  honor  us  by  this  Bi- 
entennial  visit.  Your  personal  participa- 
ion  in  celebrations  organized  by  Finnish- 
\mericans  contributes  to  the  wonderful 
nood  the  Bicentennial  has  generated.  As 
I  people,  we  are  deeply  grateful  for 
'""inland's  participation. 

The  establishment  at  the  University  of 
Helsinki  of  a  Bicentennial  Chair  of  Ameri- 
an  Studies,  the  American  Days  Program 
n  Finland  in  June,  and  Bicentennial  pro- 
grams in  more  than  a  dozen  Finnish  cities 
ire  vivid  reminders  of  our  friendship  and 
dnship. 

Mr.  President,  the  nations  of  the  world 
low  face  many,  many  challenges.  Their 
solution  requires  our  best  common  efforts 
n  the  counsel  and  understanding  of  na- 
ions  working  together.  With  a  positive 
qiirit,  with  understanding,  and  with  full 
kdication,  we  will  prevail. 

I    look   forward  to   our   discussions,   Mr. 

President,  today  and  future  good  relations 

ietween    Finland    and   the    United    States. 

m  A.mericans,  one  and  all,  bid  you  welcome 

ind  wish  you  an  enjoyable  and  productive 

rc(  /isit. 

■01 

iei 

Mr.  President:  I  thank  you  for  your  very 
ntii  kind  words  of  welcome.  Indeed  it  gives  me 
?reat  pleasure  to  have  this  opportunity  to 

"'  ieptember  13,  1976 


>RESIDENT  KEKKONEN 


pay  a  visit  to  your  country.  I  am  particu- 
larly delighted  that  this  occasion  coincides 
with  the  Bicentennial  celebration  of  the 
independence  of  the  United  States. 

We  in  Finland  realize  very  well  the 
enormous  responsibility  which  the  United 
States  as  a  great  power  bears  in  solving 
international  problems. 

Mr.  President,  your  active  conduct  of 
foreign  policy  and  your  efforts  to  solve 
these  problems  in  an  equitable  manner,  de- 
pendably and  honestly,  are  respected  all 
over  the  world. 

Your  visit  in  Finland,  Mr.  President,  last 
summer  in  connection  with  the  Helsinki 
summit  provided  me  with  the  personal  oc- 
casion for  talks  that  I  hope  will  be  both 
found  informative  and  constructive.  Then 
we  had  the  privilege  of  acting  as  host  for 
the  Conference  on  Security  and  Coopera- 
tion in  Europe,  and  memories  of  those  days 
are  still  present  in  the  hearts  of  the 
Finnish  people. 

In  a  sense,  my  present  visit  has  a  two- 
fold   purpose: 

Firstly,  I  wish  to  transmit  the  greetings 
of  the  people  of  Finland  to  the  people  of 
the  United  States  in  their  Bicentennial 
year.  This  is  a  most  welcome  task  for  me. 
The  good  political  relations  between  our 
countries  have  traditionally  been  comple- 
mented by  ties  of  friendship  and  common 
heritage  between  our  peoples. 

Secondly,  I  am  looking  forward  to  the 
opportunity  of  exchanging  views  on  topics 
of  mutual  interest,  particularly  on  the 
problems  related  to  the  relaxation  of  inter- 
national tension.  As  you  know,  Mr.  Presi- 
dent, it  is  our  policy  to  give  high  priority 
to  this  development. 

I  am  very  much  looking  forward  to  the 
discussions  and  meetings  that  I  am  going 
to  have  with  you,  Mr.  President,  and  with 
other  leaders  of  your  country. 

Thank  you  for  the  invitation,  and  let  me 
once  more  express  my  joy  for  this  oppor- 
tunity of  visiting  the  United  States. 

Thank  you. 

337 


United  States  Completes  1976  Pledge 
to  UNRWA 

FoUoiving  is  a  statement  made  on  August 
2  by  William  W.  Scranton,  U.S.  Representa- 
tive to  the  United  Nations,  upon  presenting 
to  Brian  E.  Urquhart,  U.N.  Under  Secretary 
for  Political  Affairs,  a  check  in  fulfillment  of 
the  U.S.  pledge  for  calendar  year  197 G  to  the 
U.N.  Relief  and  Works  Agency  for  Palestiyie 
Refugees  in  the  Near  East  (UNRWA). 

USUN    press    release   87   dated   August    2 

The  United  States  is  pleased  to  announce 
today  the  fulfillment  of  its  1976  pledge  to 
UNRWA.  The  pledge  for  UNRWA  from 
the  United  States  for  1976,  as  announced  on 
November  26,  1975,  was  $26.7  million.  An 
initial  payment  of  $9.8  million  was  made 
last  January ;  with  this  sum  of  $16.9  million 
the  United  States  completes  its  pledge  for 
1976. 

U.S.  support  for  UNRWA  underscores 
the  importance  we  attach  to  the  excellent 
work  of  this  organization.  UNRWA  pro- 
vides food,  housing,  schooling,  and  health 
services  to  refugees  who  became  homeless 
through  Middle  East  conflicts. 

Over  $1.6  million  refugees  are  registered 
with  UNRWA;  approximately  800,000 
are  receiving  directly  UNRWA  rations. 
UNRWA  carries  out  its  vital  mission  often 
under  the  most  difficult  circumstances, 
which  have  been  further  exacerbated  by 
the  crisis  in  Lebanon. 

UNRWA's  achievement  under  these  con- 
ditions is  a  tribute  to  its  effective  staff  per- 
sonnel and  to  its  untiring  and  imaginative 
Commissoner  General,  Sir  John  Rennie.  We 


salute  the  Commissioner  General  and  th^ 
contribution  of  UNRWA  to  human  value 
and  to  peace  in  the  Middle  East. 

The  United  States  urges  other  countrieJ 
who  have  not  yet  contributed  in  proportioi 
to  their  resources  to  join  in  providing  thost 
funds  as  required  for  the  essential  work  o; 
UNRWA. 


ill 
U.S.  Welcomes  ECOSOC  Action  | 

on  Illicit  Payments  Issue  '' 

ft 

Folloxving   is  a   statement    by  Ronald  R  '« 
Nessen,  Press  Secretary  to  President  Ford 
issued  on  August  5. 

ID 
White   House   press    release   dated   August    r.  % 

Today  the  Economic  and  Social  Counci  ff 
of  the  United  Nations  agreed  to  establisl'  •*' 
an  intergovernmental  group  authorized  h 
prepare  an  accord  to  prevent  bribery  anr  M: 
corrupt  practices  in  international  commer  s 
cial  transactions.  ft 

We  are  very  pleased  by  this  action  ni 
which  is  a  direct  result  of  a  major  U.S  Ct 
initiative.  We  consider  this  action  a  majo'  "ii 
step  toward  an  international  agreement  oji  It 
bribery  which  will  provide  an  elfectiv*  ni 
means  of  eliminating  illicit  payments  madll  »i 
to  influence  foreign  governments.  k 

The  President  has  noted  that  an  effectiv* 
solution  to  this  problem  must  involve  action 
at  both  the  national  and  Internationa , 
levels.  The  international  action  whicl, 
ECOSOC  has  taken  today  is  consistent  witJ 
the  President's  proposals  made  on  Monda) 
for  domestic  legislation  on  illicit  payments  , 


338 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  St; 


THE  CONGRESS 


Department  Discusses  Actions 
by  OAS  in  Human  Rights  Field 

Following  is  a  statement  by  WiUiayn  S. 
Mailliard,  U.S.  Permanent  Representative  to 
^hc  Organization  of  American  States,  made 
'nfare  the  Subcommittee  on  International 
Iviianizations  of  the  House  Committee  on 
Jnternational  Relations  on  August  10.^ 

I  appreciate  this  opportunity  to  testify 
)n  the  developments  with  respect  to  hu- 
nan  rights  at  the  recent  session  of  the  Gen- 
jral  Assembly  of  the  Organization  of 
\.merican  States  in  Santiago. 

Given  the  locale  of  the  General  Assem- 
)ly,  it  was  inevitable  that  the  human  rights 
ssue  would  dominate  our  deliberations. 
!!harges  that  the  Chilean  Government  has 
related  human  rights,  including  the  U.N. 
Commission  on  Human  Rights  charge  of 
'institutionalized  torture"  made  it  certain 
;hat  the  OAS  would  have  to  face  the  hu- 
nan  rights  issue  squarely  or  leave  Santiago 
vith  its  reputation  tarnished.  Our  strategy 
vas: 

— To  work  along  with  other  concerned 
governments  for  an  inter-American  con- 
ensus  on  the  importance  of  protecting  hu- 
nan  rights; 

— To  state  our  commitments  in  terms  of 
iniversal  and  international  declarations  on 
luman  rights ; 

—To  support  the  conclusions  of  the  re- 
)orts  of  the  Inter-American  Human  Rights 
])ommission;  and 

—To  advocate  practical  measures  to 
trengthen  that  body. 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be 
ublished  by  the  committee  and  will  be  available 
rom  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Govern- 
lent  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


eptember  13,  1976 


The  candid  and  straightforward  state- 
ment of  our  views  by  Secretary  Kissinger 
put  the  U.S.  delegation  on  the  record  as 
supporting  strong  resolutions  in  favor  of 
human  rights.  You  will  recall  that  the  Sec- 
retary specifically  referred  to  the  fact  that: 

In  the  United  States  concern  is  widespread  in  the 
executive  branch,  in  the  press,  and  in  the  Congress, 
which  has  taken  the  extraordinary  step  of  enacting 
specific  statutory  limits  on  U.S.  military  and  eco- 
nomic aid  to  Chile. 

The  Secretary  continued  by  pointing  out 
that: 

The  condition  of  human  rights  as  assessed  by  the 
OAS  Human  Rights  Commission  has  impaired  our 
relationship  with  Chile  and  will  continue  to  do  so. 
We  wish  this  relationship  to  be  close,  and  all  friends 
of  Chile  hope  that  obstacles  raised  by  conditions 
alleged  in  the  report  will  soon  be  removed. 

The  Secretary  did  not,  however,  confine 
his  judgment  to  Chile  alone.  He  stated,  and 
I  quote : 

The  rights  of  man  have  been  authoritatively  iden- 
tified both  in  the  U.N.'s  Universal  Declaration  of 
Human  Rights  and  in  the  OAS's  American  Declara- 
tion of  the  Rights  and  Duties  of  Man.  There  will,  of 
course,  always  be  differences  of  view  as  to  the  pre- 
cise extent  of  the  obligations  of  government.  But 
there  are  standards  below  which  no  government  can 
fall  without  offending  fundamental  values,  such  as 
genocide,  officially  tolerated  torture,  mass  imprison- 
ment or  murder,  or  the  comprehensive  denial  of  basic 
rights  to  racial,  religious,  political,  or  ethnic  groups. 
Any  government  engaging  in  such  practices  must 
face  adverse  international  judgment. 

The  Secretary  also  pointed  out  the  con- 
sistent pattern  of  human  rights  violations 
in  Cuba  and  emphasized  that: 

The  cause  of  human  dignity  is  not  served  by  those 
who  hypocritically  manipulate  concerns  with  human 
rights  to  further  their  political  preferences  nor  by 
those  who  single  out  for  human  rights  condemnation 
only  those  countries  with  whose  political  views  they 
disagree. 


339 


In  commending  the  Inter-American  Hu- 
man Rights  Commission  for  its  efforts,  the 
Secretary  suggested  that  the  OAS  broaden 
the  Commission's  mandate  in  order  that  it 
can  report  regularly  on  the  status  of  hu- 
man rights  throughout  the  hemisphere.  He 
added  that  in  support  of  the  suggestion  we 
propose  that  the  budget  and  the  staff  of  the 
Commission  be  enlarged. 

We  were  pleased  with  the  outcome  of 
the  human  rights  debate  in  Santiago. 
Through  the  Secretary's  initiative  and  be- 
cause of  the  full  participation  by  the 
United  States  in  the  overall  debate  and,  of 
course,  in  concert  with  representatives 
from  like-minded  countries,  we  achieved 
three  separate  resolutions. 

These  resolutions  strengthened  the  hand 
of  the  Inter-American  Human  Rights  Com- 
mission, urged  the  member  states  to  protect 
and  fully  maintain  human  rights,  renewed 
the  mandate  of  the  Inter-American  Human 
Rights  Commission  to  continue  monitoring 
progress  in  Chile  and  elsewhere,  and  sent 
Chilean  proposals  to  define  the  powers  of 
the  Inter-American  Human  Rights  Com- 
mission to  the  Permanent  Council  for 
study. 

According  to  members  of  the  Inter- 
American  Human  Rights  Commission  and 
the  international  press,  the  forthright  stand 
of  the  Secretary  and  the  staff  work  of  the 
U.S.  delegation  constituted  an  important 
breakthrough  in  OAS  treatment  of  this 
sensitive  and  vital  matter. 

As  you  are  aware,  this  was  the  first  oc- 
casion when  the  Inter-American  Human 
Rights  Commission  reports  were  not  merely 
noted  and  filed  away.  In  the  past,  the  na- 
tions of  the  hemisphere  strongly  preferred 
not  to  point  the  finger  at  any  one  govern- 
ment, at  least  in  part  for  fear  they  could 
be  on  the  receiving  end  of  accusations  the 
next  time.  The  real  breakthrough,  then,  is 
this:  We  have  established  a  precedent 
which  can  insure  that  the  status  of  human 
rights  in  the  hemisphere  receives  a  full  and 


frank  airing  at  the  annual  OAS  General 
Assembly. 

Our  continuing  task  is  to  build  a  con- 
sensus that  the  human  rights  problem  is 
properly  an  issue  of  international  and  re- 
gional concern.  Many  countries  have  signed 
charters  and  declarations,  but  very  few 
have  made  these  documents  a  living  part 
of  their  national  experience. 

In  this  connection,  I  could  point  out  that 
the  subcommittee  might  like  to  consider  a 
study  project  on  what  international  and 
regional  covenants  the  United  States  could 
sign  and  ratify,  if  modified  to  satisfy  our 
constitutional  and  other  requirements.  The 
American  Convention  on  Human  Rights 
was  not  signed  by  the  United  States,  and 
of  course  never  ratified.  It  might  be  useful 
to  study  this  and  other  conventions  with  a 
view  toward  strengthening  the  U.S.  posi- 
tion as  a  supporter  of  high  international 
standards  on  human  rights.  This  could  be 
a  consciousness-raising  exercise  for  us;  and 
it  would,  believe  me,  have  a  beneficial  im- 
pact throughout  the  Americas. 

I  do  not  want  to  be  thought  of  as  self- 
satisfied  or  complacent.  We  have  accom- 
plished something.  But  much  remains  to  be 
done. 

We  cannot  go  too  far  too  fast,  because 
the  human  rights  issue  is  as  sensitive  as  it 
is  important.  We  cannot  risk  the  appear- 
ance of  intervention  in  the  internal  affairs 
of  the  states  of  Latin  America.  Given  our 
history,  this  is  an  issue  which  could  unite 
Latin  America  against  the  United  States. 
Moreover,  we  cannot  preach  too  often  if  we 
wish  to  have  any  effect.  We  cannot  let 
words  take  the  place  of  actions. 

We  should  try  to  strengthen  collective 
action  in  the  hemisphere;  at  the  heart  of 
that  collective  action  is  the  Inter-American 
Human  Rights  Commission.  It  is  here  that 
we  can  begin  the  work  of  achieving  a  con- 
sensus on  minimum  human  rights  stand- 
ards. Such  a  consensus  should  be  one  of 
our  primary  objectives  in  the  OAS. 


340 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


I  am  convinced  that  one  of  our  chief  suc- 
cesses at  the  Santiago  meeting  was  that 
while  we  were  among  the  leaders  we  did 
not  try  to  dominate.  We  shared  the  role  of 
leadership  with  other  democracies,  whose 
representatives  spoke  passionately  and  con- 
vincingly on  human  rights;  and  that  will- 
ingness to  speak  out  made  a  great  differ- 
ence. 

Our  problem  now  is  to  translate  this  suc- 
cessful beginning  at  the  OAS  General  As- 
sembly into  progress  in  real  terms.  I 
understand  you  have  questions  about  this 
and  I  will  be  pleased  to  try  to  answer 
them. 


Department  Discusses  Allegations 
Regarding  Mercenaries  in  Angola 

Statement  by  William  E.  Schaufele,  Jr. 
Assistant  Secretary  for  African  Affairs  ' 

I  am  pleased  to  have  the  opportunity  to 
respond  to  your  invitation  to  testify  today 
on  the  subject  of  mercenaries  in  Angola 
and  the  recent  trial  in  Luanda,  as  requested 
in  your  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

Let  me  begin  by  stating  the  position  of 
the  U.S.  Government  toward  the  recruit- 
ment of  mercenaries  in  the  United  States. 
The  recruitment  of  mercenaries  within  the 
territory  of  the  United  States  to  serve  in 
the  armed  forces  of  a  foreign  country  is  an 
offense  under  our  neutrality  laws.  Because 
of  the  allegation  that  such  recruitment  has 
gone  on,  the  Justice  Department  has  been 
investigating  these  reports,  and  this  inves- 


'  Made  before  the  Special  Subcommittee  on  Investi- 
gations of  the  House  Committee  on  International 
Relations  on  Aug.  9.  The  complete  transcript  of  the 
hearings  will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents, 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C. 
20402. 


tigation  is  continuing.  The  Department  of 
State  is  concerned  over  such  allegations 
and  automatically  refers  any  information 
regarding  such  activity  that  comes  to  its 
attention  to  the  Department  of  Justice  for 
investigation. 

In  regard  to  the  charge  that  the  U.S. 
Government  was  involved  in  recruiting  the 
Americans  recently  involved  in  Angola,  I 
wish  to  state  that  no  Americans  were  re- 
cruited directly  or  indirectly  by  the  U.S. 
Government  to  fight  in  Angola.  Those  men 
were  there  on  their  own,  without  our  ad- 
vance knowledge  or  approval.  We  at- 
tempted to  discourage  Americans  from 
going  to  Angola  as  mercenaries.  Anyone 
who  called  us  was  given  that  message 
clearly  and  distinctly.  As  I  mentioned  pre- 
viously, we  asked  the  Department  of  Justice 
to  look  into  allegations  that  American  citi- 
zens were  being  recruited  for  that  pur- 
pose. 

In  respect  to  the  position  of  the  U.S. 
Government  on  this  issue,  I  would  like  to 
quote  Secretary  Kissinger's  remarks  made 
in  response  to  a  question  during  a  panel 
session  at  the  World  Affairs  Council  in 
Portland,  Oregon,  on  July  22,  1976: 

I  am  not  aware  that  mercenaries  are  being  re- 
cruited in  the  United  States  right  now.  And  it  is 
certainly  not  done  with  the  connivance  or  agreement 
of  the  government. 

Mr.  Chairman,  it  might  be  useful  to  in- 
terject at  this  point  some  general  comments 
on  mercenaries.  A  key  point  is  that  a  le- 
gally accepted  definition  of  what  consti- 
tutes a  mercenary  does  not  exist  in 
international  law.  Nor  is  the  act  of  serving 
as  a  mercenary  a  crime  in  international  law 
— not  to  mention  Angolan  law,  where  the 
Angolan  authorities  were  forced  to  use  a 
set  of  guidelines  for  their  combatants 
which  the  MPLA  [Popular  Movement  for 
the  Liberation  of  Angola]  issued  in 
1966. 

The  general  international  practice  ap- 
pears to  consider  mercenaries  in  the  same 


September  13,  1976 


341 


status  as  other  combatants  and  therefore  to 
be  treated  as  such  under  the  terms  of  the 
Geneva  Conventions  of  1949.  This  has  cer- 
tainly been  American  practice  back  to  the 
Revolutionary  War  and  was  reflected  in 
our  treatment  of  captured  Hessian  troops. 
This  was  also  the  case  in  the  Civil  War, 
when  there  were  combatants  on  both  sides 
who  fought  for  hire,  adventure,  or  beliefs 
and  who  could  be  considered  by  some  as 
mercenaries. 

Three  American  citizens,  Mr.  Daniel 
Gearhart,  Mr.  Gary  Acker,  and  Mr.  George 
Bacon,  plus  one  permanent  resident  na- 
tional, Mr.  Gustav  Marcello  Grillo,  were 
apparently  involved  in  the  Angolan  war 
earlier  this  year.  There  may  have  been  a 
few  others.  Accoi'ding  to  information 
available  to  us,  these  men  arrived  in  Zaire 
in  early  February  and  several  days  later 
went  into  Angola.  On  or  about  February  14 
(according  to  charges  made  at  their  trial 
in  Luanda)  they  encountered  armed  forces 
supporting  the  MPLA  faction,  with  the  re- 
sult that  George  Bacon  was  killed  and  the 
others  were  captured. 

Together  with  10  other  prisoners  of  Brit- 
ish nationality,  Gearhart,  Acker,  and  Grillo 
went  on  trial  in  Luanda  on  June  10, 
charged  with  being  mercenaries.  The  fam- 
ily of  Mr.  Acker  engaged  two  American 
lawyers,  Mr.  Robert  E.  Cesner,  Jr.,  and 
Mr.  William  Wilson,  who  arrived  in  Angola 
on  June  5  and  eventually  represented  both 
Acker  and  Gearhart.  (Mr.  Grillo  elected  to 
retain  the  services  of  a  court-appointed 
local  lawyer.)  The  13  defendants  were 
charged  with  being  professional  soldiers, 
hired  to  fight  against  the  newly  independ- 
ent Angolan  Government.  Several  of  the 
defendants,  but  none  of  the  Americans, 
were  also  charged  with  specific  violent 
crimes.  Sentence  was  passed  on  June  28, 
1976.  All  were  found  guilty,  and  four,  in- 
cluding Mr.  Gearhart,  were  given  death 
sentences,  while  the  others  were  given 
prison  sentences  of  varying  lengths. 


342 


Following  the  announcement  of  the  sen- 
tences, the  Angolan  leader,  Dr.  Agostinho 
Neto,  indicated  publicly  that  he  would  re- 
view the  sentences  after  a  time  for  some 
reflection  and  a  chance  for  world  public 
opinion  to  express  itself. 

We  had  been  skeptical  about  the  quality 
of  the  justice  administered  and  were  ap- 
palled by  the  severity  of  the  sentence  given 
to  Mr.  Gearhart.  As  we  pointed  out  on  nu- 
merous occasions,  the  act  of  being  a  mer- 
cenary is  not  a  crime  in  international  law, 
and  mercenaries  were  entitled  to  the  same 
status  and  protection  as  other  combatants 
under  the  1949  Geneva  Convention  and  the 
rules  of  warfare.  Mr.  Gearhart  was  not 
charged  with  any  other  specific  crime.  No 
evidence  was  presented  that  he  had 
harmed  anyone  during  the  few  days  he  was 
in  Angola  before  his  capture. 

In  carrying  out  the  responsibility  to  as- 
sist U.S.  citizens  and  nationals  charged 
with  crimes  in  foreign  countries,  we  at- 
tempted as  best  we  could  to  obtain  a  recon- 
sideration of  the  death  penalty  for  Mr. 
Gearhart.  For  reasons  which  are  not  clear 
to  us,  but  appear  to  be  largely  political.  Dr. 
Neto  refused  to  listen  to  us  or  to  any  other! 
of  the  appeals  made  to  him.  Despite  our 
efforts.  Dr.  Neto  confirmed  the  death  sen- 
tences on  July  9,  and  they  were  executedll 
the  following  day. 

The  Angolan  authorities  charged  the  de- 
fendants with  being  mercenaries  and  withn 
being  the  agents  of  foreign  interests  andl 
governments.  The  U.S.  Government  andi 
the  CIA  were  often  mentioned,  but  I  wishm 
to  emphasize  that  no  evidence  of  any  sort, 
apart  from  undocumented  and  vague' 
charges,  was  ever  presented;  that  is,  unlesst 
you  consider  that  the  claim  that  the  mer- 
cenaries were  paid  in  "crisp  $100  bills" — 
a  charge  apparently  made  much  of — con- 
stitutes proof  of  involvement  by  the  U.S. 
Government. 

Mr.  Chairman,  that  concludes  my  pre- 
pared statement. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


international  EfForts  To  Control 
Radioactive-Waste  Disposal  at  Sea 

Following  is  a  statement  by  Lindsey  Grant, 
Acting  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for  En- 
vironmental and  Population  Affairs,  made 
before  the  Subcommittee  on  Eriergy  and  the 
Environmetit  of  the  Hoicse  Committee  on 
Interior  and  Insular  Affairs  on  July  26} 

Thank  you  for  giving  the  Department  of 
State  an  opportunity  to  appear  before  the 
subcommittee  today  to  discuss  the  impor- 
tant subject  of  radioactive  contamination 
of  the  oceans.  I  believe  I  might  usefully  re- 
view international  activities,  institutions, 
and  law  relevant  to  your  inquiry. 

In  legal  terms,  the  right  to  dispose  of 
waste  materials  on  the  high  seas  is  a  tra- 
ditional freedom  of  the  high  seas.  However, 
under  the  1958  Geneva  Convention  on  the 
High  Seas,  this  freedom,  like  all  other  free- 
doms of  the  seas,  must  be  exercised  with 
reasonable  regard  to  other  states'  use  of 
the  oceans.  In  article  25  of  that  conven- 
tion, the  international  community  specifi- 
cally called  on  states  to  take  measures  to 
prevent  pollution  of  the  seas  from  the 
dumping  of  radioactive  wastes.  However, 
since  there  were  no  generally  accepted 
standards,  and  none  were  provided  by  the 
1958  convention,  the  point  at  which  radio- 
active pollution  becomes  "unreasonable" 
could  not  be  established  easily.  Obviously, 
more  specific  controls  were  needed. 

During  the  1950's  the  United  States 
dumped  containerized  low-level  radioac- 
tive wastes  into  the  sea  under  the  close 
supervision  of  the  Atomic  Energy  Commis- 
sion. We  curtailed  this  program  in  1962 
and  stopped  it  entirely  in  1970. 

The  President,  in  his  February  1971  en- 
vironmental  message  to   Congress,  recom- 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be 
published  by  the  committee  and  will  be  available 
from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Govern- 
ment Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


September  13,  1976 


mended  that  the  United  States  regulate  its 
own  ocean  dumping  of  all  harmful  sub- 
stances and  take  the  initiative  to  develop 
international  controls  for  the  same  purpose. 
This  led  to  enactment  of  the  Marine  Pro- 
tection, Research  and  Sanctuaries  Act  of 
1972,  which  prohibited  ocean  dumping  of 
high-level  radioactive  wastes.  I  won't  dis- 
cuss the  act  here,  as  I  understand  the 
Environmental  Protection  Agency  (EPA) 
will  testify  on  it. 

Internationally,  the  United  States  in  1971 
tabled  a  draft  treaty  on  ocean  dumping  at 
the  first  meeting  of  an  International  Work- 
ing Group  on  Marine  Pollution  which  was 
formed  to  prepare  for  the  1972  Stockholm 
Conference  on  the  Human  Environment. 
After  a  complex  series  of  negotiations,  the 
Convention  on  the  Prevention  of  Marine 
Pollution  by  Dumping  of  Wastes  and  Other 
Matter — the  London  Dumping  Convention 
— emerged  in  December  1972. 

The  United  States  ratified  the  Dumping 
Convention  in  April  1974.  The  convention 
came  into  force  on  August  30,  1975.  The 
contracting  parties,  of  which  there  are  cur- 
rently 26,  will  hold  their  first  substantive 
consultative  meeting  September  20-24  of 
this  year. 

How  does  the  convention  apply  to  radio- 
active wastes?  It  defines  dumping  as  "any 
deliberate  disposal  at  sea  of  wastes  or 
other  matter  from  vessels,  aircraft,  plat- 
forms or  other  man-made  structures.  .  .  ." 
This  definition,  by  the  way,  does  not  in- 
clude the  disposal  at  sea  of  materials  aris- 
ing from  the  normal  operations  of  vessels, 
aircraft,  platforms,  et  cetera,  or  from  sea- 
bed mineral  exploration  and  exploitation. 
Nor  does  it  include  the  placement  of  mat- 
ter for  a  purpose  other  than  disposal. 

Annex  I  of  the  convention  contains  a  list 
of  substances  the  dumping  of  which  is 
entirely  prohibited,  including  "High-level 
radioactive  wastes  or  other  high-level  ra- 
dioactive matter,  defined  on  public  health, 
biological  or  other  grounds,  by  the  compe- 


343 


tent  international  body  in  this  field,  at 
present  the  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency  [IAEA],  as  unsuitable  for  dumping 
at  sea." 

Annex  II  lists  materials  for  which  na- 
tional authorities  must  issue  special  per- 
mits before  they  can  be  dumped,  among 
them,  "Radioactive  wastes  and  other  radio- 
active materials  not  included  in  Annex  I." 
In  issuing  permits  for  the  dumping  of  this 
matter,  national  authorities  are  to  take  full 
account  of  the  recommendations  of  the 
IAEA. 

Annex  III  discusses  the  criteria  to  be  con- 
sidered in  issuing  permits,  including  the 
characteristics  and  composition  of  the 
wastes,  the  characteristics  of  the  dump  site, 
and  the  method  of  disposal,  including  pack- 
aging and  containment. 

The  IAEA  has  already  produced  a  pro- 
visional definition  of  high-level  radioactive 
wastes  and  provisional  recommendations 
for  the  handling  of  other  radioactive-waste 
disposal  at  sea  as  required  by  annexes  I 
and  II  of  the  convention.  These  were  first 
published  in  its  information  circular  205/ 
Add.l  in  January  1975  and  will  be  consid- 
ered by  the  convention  parties  at  the  Sep- 
tember consultative  meeting.  In  the  mean- 
time, there  still  is  no  final  internationally 
accepted  definition  of  high-level  radioac- 
tive wastes,  although  in  practice  IAEA's 
provisional  definition  and  recommendations 
are  adhered  to  by  the  countries  currently 
disposing  low-level  wastes  at  sea. 

The  United  States  submitted  an  interpre- 
tative statement  at  the  1972  London  meet- 
ing to  the  effect  that,  in  the  absence  of  an 
agreed  international  definition,  it  would 
use  the  definition  contained  in  our  domestic 
legislation;  namely,  "the  aqueous  wastes 
resulting  from  the  operation  of  the  first 
cycle  solvent  extraction  system,  or  equiva- 
lent, and  the  concentrated  wastes  from 
subsequent  extraction  cycles,  or  equivalent, 
in  a  facility  for  processing  irradiated  reac- 
tor fuels." 

Enforcement  of  the  convention  is  left  to 
each    nation   individually.    Article   VII   re- 


quires each  party  to  take  appropriate 
measures  to  insure  compliance  with  the 
provisions  of  the  convention  by  all  vessels 
and  aircraft  registered  in  its  territory  or 
loading  in  its  territory  matter  to  be 
dumped,  and  by  all  vessels,  aircraft,  and 
fixed  and  floating  platforms  under  its  juris- 
diction believed  to  be  engaged  in  dumping. 

In  addition  to  the  global  arrangements 
established  by  the  London  Dumping  Con- 
vention, there  are  a  number  of  regional  ar- 
rangements which  set  more  localized 
standards.  Notable  among  these  are  the 
1972  Oslo  Convention,  the  1974  Helsinki 
Convention,  and  the  1976  Barcelona  Pro- 
tocol on  Dumping. 

What  is  the  current  status  of  ocean 
dumping  of  radioactive  wastes?  No  coun- 
try has,  to  our  knowledge,  ever  disposed 
of  high-level  radioactive  wastes  at  sea.  The 
United  States,  as  I  have  indicated,  stopped 
all  ocean  disposal  of  low-level  radioactive 
wastes  in  1970.  As  far  as  we  know,  the 
only  current  dumping  of  low-level  wastes 
into  the  ocean  is  carried  out  under  the  su- 
pervision of  the  OECD's  [Organization  for 
Economic  Cooperation  and  Development] 
Nuclear  Energy  Agency  at  a  4,800-meter- 
deep  (15,744  feet)  dumping  area  located 
approximately  570  miles  southwest  of 
Lands  End,  England.  Eight  European  coun- 
tries— Belgium,  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,  France,  Italy,  the  Netherlands, 
Sweden,  Switzerland,  and  the  United 
Kingdom — have  all  utilized  this  area  from 
time  to  time,  dumping  an  estimated  total 
weight  of  39,000  metric  tons  of  packaged 
low-level  radioactive  material  from  1967 
through  1975.  Although  the  IAEA's  recom- 
mendations for  such  dumping  are  provi- 
sional, the  Nuclear  Energy  Agency,  in  its 
supervision  of  the  dumping  area,  is  meet- 
ing IAEA's  present  requirements. 

Mr.  Chairman,  the  United  States  is  con- 
cerned that,  without  proper  environmental 
and  engineering  constraints,  the  disposal 
of  even  low-level  radioactive  wastes  at  sea 
could  adversely  affect  the  world's  oceans. 
We  are  therefore  constantly  searching  for 


344 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


safer  methods;  and  to  this  end,  as  I  believe 
you  will  learn  from  EPA,  we  are  currently 
monitoring  our  former  ocean  dump  sites  to 
learn  more  about  possible  harmful  effects. 
We  will  make  this  information  available  to 
interested  international  organizations  and 
states.  We  will  work  closely  with  IAEA  to 
develop  sound  internationally  agreed  defi- 
nitions and  techniques.  We  are  encourag- 
ing all  states  with  radioactive-waste  dis- 
posal requirements  to  ratify  or  accede  to 
the  London  Dumping  Convention  so  that 
we  may  work  together  through  the  conven- 
tion for  environmentally  sound  solutions  to 
our  common  problems. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman.  This  con- 
cludes my  prepared  testimony.  I  would  be 
delighted  to  answer  any  questions. 


Fifteenth  Annual  Report  of  ACDA 
Transmitted  to  the  Congress 

Message  Front  President  Ford ' 

To  the  Congress  of  the  United  States: 

As  we  celebrate  our  Bicentennial  year, 
we  are  thankful  that  America  is  at  peace. 
For  the  first  time  in  many  years,  no  Ameri- 
can is  engaged  in  combat  anywhere  in  de- 
fense of  our  freedom.  But  we  know  that 
there  are  in  the  world  forces  hostile  to  free- 
dom, and  that  to  protect  our  security  and 
the  values  we  prize  we  must  maintain  our 
strength,  our  resolve,  and  our  endeavors  to 
safeguard  peace. 

To  meet  our  responsibilities  today  we 
must  deal  with  the  problems  of  security  in 
ways  never  dreamed  of  by  our  founding 
fathers.  We  must  influence  the  policies  of 
possible  adversaries  in  two  ways:  by  keep- 
ing our  military  forces  strong,  and  by  pur- 
suing negotiations  to  create  stability  rather 


'Transmitted  on  July  29  (text  from  White  House 
press  release);  single  copies  of  the  15th  annual  re- 
port are  available  from  the  U.S.  Arms  Control  and 
Disarmament   Agency,   Washington,   D.C.   20451. 


than  a  spiraling  arms  race  in  weapons  of 
incalculable  destructiveness. 

In  both  these  endeavors,  there  are 
grounds  for  confidence.  We  have  and  will 
maintain  a  strategic  relationship  with  the 
Soviet  Union  which  preserves  our  security. 
At  the  same  time,  we  will  continue  to  pur- 
sue arms  control  agreements  that  lessen  the 
danger  of  war  and  serve  to  promote  a 
stable  and  peaceful  international  order. 
We  are  negotiating  with  the  Soviet  Union, 
with  the  Warsaw  Pact  countries,  in  the 
multilateral  Geneva-based  Conference  of 
the  Committee  on  Disarmament,  and  in  the 
United  Nations.  We  are  mindful  that  many 
difficult  questions  remain  to  be  solved,  but 
I  can  report  that  steady  progress  has  been 
made. 

On  May  28  I  signed  the  Treaty  on  Un- 
derground Nuclear  Explosions  for  Peaceful 
Purposes  which  has  now  been  submitted  to 
the  Senate  together  with  the  related 
Threshold  Test  Ban  Treaty.  Both  treaties 
represent  genuine  progress  in  the  two- 
decade  -struggle  to  halt  nuclear  weapons 
testing. 

In  the  current  phase  of  the  Strategic 
Arms  Limitation  Talks,  we  and  the  Soviet 
Union  have  made  considerable  progress 
since  the  Vladivostok  meeting.  Most  of  the 
elements  needed  for  final  agreement  are 
already  agreed.  Certain  issues  are  still  un- 
settled but  we  will  continue  our  effort  to 
resolve  them  in  a  way  that  protects  the 
interests  of  both  sides,  and  enables  us  to 
complete  a  new  SALT  agreement  on  the 
basis  of  the  Vladivostok  accords. 

In  negotiations  to  reduce  forces  in  cen- 
tral Europe,  both  the  NATO  and  the  War- 
saw Pact  nations  have  made  new  proposals. 
Through  these  negotiations  we  hope  to 
achieve  a  more  stable  military  balance  in 
central  Europe  at  lower  levels  of  forces. 
And  in  the  Conference  of  the  Committee  on 
Disarmament,  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  have  tabled  identical  draft 
texts  of  a  convention  to  outlaw  environ- 
mental modification  techniques  for  hostile 
purposes. 


September  13,  1976 


345 


The  Administration  has  undertaken  a 
vigorous  action  program  to  strengthen  the 
barriers  against  further  proliferation  of 
nuclear  weapons.  We  have  moved  to  in- 
crease the  effectiveness  of  the  Non-pro- 
liferation Treaty  and  the  International 
Atomic  Energy  Agency.  Controls  on  Amer- 
ican exports  of  nuclear  materials  and  sensi- 
tive technology  have  been  made  even  more 
rigorous.  The  United  States  has  taken  an 
important  initiative  to  establish  new  coop- 
eration with  the  other  major  nations  sup- 
plying nuclear  equipment  and  technology, 
and  a  common  understanding  has  been 
reached  on  principles  and  standards  gov- 
erning nuclear  exports. 

These  are  tangible  evidence  of  progress. 
This  fifteenth  annual  report  of  the  U.S. 
Arms  Control  and  Disarmament  Agency 
sets  forth  in  detail  and  perspective  the  ad- 
vances that  have  been  made  and  the  diffi- 
cult, essential  work  that  must  still  be  done. 
My  Administration  remains  dedicated  to 
continued  and  determined  efforts  for  the 
control  and  balanced  reduction  of  arma- 
ments. 

Gerald  R.  Ford. 

The  White  House,  Juhj  29,  1976. 


Congressional  Documents 
Relating  to  Foreign  Policy 


94th  Congress,  2d  Session 

World  Hunger,  Health,  and  Refugee  Problems.  Part 
VH:  International  Health  and  Guatemala  Earth- 
quake. Joint  hearings  before  the  Subcommittee  on 
Health  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Labor  and 
Public  Welfare  and  the  Subcommittee  To  Investi- 
gate Problems  Connected  With  Refugees  and  Es- 
capees of  the  Senate  Committee  on  the  Judiciary. 
February  18,  1976.   173  pp. 

International  Security  Assistance  and  Arms  Export 
Control  Act  of  1976-1977.  Report  of  the  Senate 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  to  accompany  S. 
3439;  S.  Rept.  94-876;  May  14,  1976;  131  pp. 
Report  of  the  House  Committee  on  International 
Relations,  together  with  supplemental  views,  to 
accompany  H.R.  13680;  H.  Rept.  94-1144;  May  14, 
1976;  114  pp. 


346 


Supplemental  Appropriation  for  Disaster  Relief  in 
Lebanon.  Communication  from  the  President  of 
the  United  States  transmitting  a  proposed  supple- 
mental appropriation  for  fiscal  year  1976  for  for- 
eign assistance.  H.  Doc.  94-498.  May  17,  1976.  1  p. 

Law  of  the  Sea.  Hearing  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Oceans  and  International  Environment  of  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  on  New 
York  session  of  the  Third  U.N.  Law  of  the  Sea 
Conference.  May  20,  1976.  40  pp. 

Export  Administration  Amendments,  Foreign  Boy- 
cotts, and  Domestic  and  Foreign  Investment  Im- 
proved Disclosure  Acts  of  1976.  Report  of  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Banking,  Housing  and  Urban 
Affairs,  together  with  additional  views,  to  accom- 
pany S.  3084.  S.  Rept.  94-917.  May  25,  1976.  49  pp. 

International  Banking  Act  of  1976.  Report  of  the 
House  Committee  on  Banking,  Currency  and  Hous- 
ing, together  with  additional  and  dissenting  views, 
to  accompany  H.R.  13876.  H.  Rept.  94-1193.  May 
26,  1976.  31  pp. 

Science,  Technology,  and  Diplomacy  in  the  Age  of 
Interdependence.  Prepared  for  the  Subcommittee 
on  International  Security  and  Scientific  Affairs  of 
the  House  Committee  on  International  Relations 
by  the  Congressional  Research  Service,  Library  of 
Congress,  as  part  of  an  extended  study  of  the 
interactions  of  science  and  technology  with  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  June  1976.  492  pp. 

Assessing  the  New  Political  Trends.  Report  on  the 
ninth  meeting  of  Members  of  Congress  and  of  the 
European  Parliament,  Dublin,  April  21-23,  1976. 
Submitted  to  the  House  Committee  on  Interna- 
tional Relations  by  Representatives  Donald  M. 
Fraser  and  Benjamin  S.  Rosenthal.  June  1976. 
86  pp. 

Tariff  Treatment  of  Ferricyanide  and  Ferrocyanide 
Pigments.  Message  from  the  President  of  the 
United  States  transmitting  a  report  on  his  deter- 
mination that  the  import  relief  for  the  U.S.  in- 
dustry producing  ferricyanide  and  ferrocyanide 
pigments  recommended  in  the  April  2,  1976,  find- 
ing of  the  International  Trade  Commission,  is  not 
in  the  national  economic  interest,  pursuant  to  sec- 
tion 203(b)(2)  of  the  Trade  Act  of  1974.  H.  Doc. 
94-510.  June  1,   1976.  2  pp. 

United  States-Romanian  Trade  Agreement  Exten- 
sion. Message  from  the  President  of  the  United 
States  transmitting  his  recommendation  to  extend 
waiver  authority  applicable  to  the  Socialist  Repub- 
lic of  Romania,  pursuant  to  section  402(d)(1)  of 
the  Trade  Act  of  1974.  H.  Doc.  94-513.  June  2, 
1976.  5  pp. 

Nuclear  Proliferation  and  Reprocessing.  Hearing  be- 
fore the  Subcommittee  on  International  Security 
and  Scientific  Affairs  of  the  House  Committee  on 
International  Relations.  June  7,  1976.  32  pp. 

Treaty  of  Friendship  and  Cooperation  With  Spain; 
Participation  by  Italy  in  NATO.  Hearings  before 
the  Subcommittee  on  International  Political  and 
Military  Affairs  of  the  House  Committee  on  Inter- 
national Relations  on  H.R.  14940  and  H.  Con.  Res. 
651.  June  8-16,  1976.  124  pp. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

Antarctica 

Recommendations  relating  to  the  furtherance  of  the 
principles  and  objectives  of  the  Antarctic  treaty 
of  December  1,  1959  (TIAS  4780).  Adopted  at  Oslo 
June  20,  1975.' 

Notification  of  approval:  South  Africa,  August  20, 
1976. 

Aviation 

Convention   on   international   civil   aviation.   Done   at 
Chicago    December    7,    1944.    Entered    into    force 
April  4,  1947.  TIAS  1591. 
Adherence  deposited:  Cape  Verde,  August  19,  1976. 

Coffee 

International   coffee   agreement    1976,   with   annexes. 
Done  at  London  December  3,  1975.' 
Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification:  August 

23,   1976. 
Ratification   deposited:    El    Salvador,    August    11. 

1976. 

Conservation 

Convention    on    international    trade    in    endangered 
species  of  wild  fauna   and   flora,  with  appendices. 
Done  at  Washington  March  3,  1973.  Entered  into 
force  July  1,   1975.  TIAS  8249. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Australia.  July  29.   1976; 

India,   July    20,    1976;    Norway,    July    27,    1976; 

United  Kingdom,  August  2,   1976." 
Accessio7i  deposited:  Zaire,  July  20,  1976. 

Energy 

Agreement    on    an     international    energy    program. 
Done   at   Paris   November   18,    1974.    Entered   into 
force  January  19,  1976.  TIAS  8278. 
Notificatio7i  of  consent  to  be  bound  deposited :  Bel- 
gium, July  29,  1976. 

Judicial  Procedures 

Convention  on  the  taking  of  evidence  abroad  in  civil 
or  commercial  matters.  Done  at  The  Hague  March 
18,  1970.  Entered  into  force  October  7,  1972.  TIAS 
7444. 

Ratification  deposited:  United  Kingdom.  July  16. 
1976.= 

Load  Lines 

Amendments  to  the  international  convention  on  load 
lines,  1966  (TIAS  6331,  6629,  6720).  Adopted  at 
London  October  12,  1971." 


September  13,  1976 


Acceptances  deposited:  Ireland,  August  10,  1976; 
Poland,  July  15,   1976. 

Maritime  Matters 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  March  6,  1948,  as 
amended,  on  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime  Con- 
sultative   Organization    (TIAS    4044,    6285,    6490). 
Adopted  at  London  October  17,  1974.' 
Acceptance  deposited:  Denmark,  July  20,  1976. 

Ocean  Dumping 

Convention  on  the  prevention  of  marine  pollution  by 
dumping  of  wastes  and  other  matter,  with  annexes. 
Done  at  London,  Mexico  City,  Moscow,  and  Wash- 
ington December  29,  1972.  Entered  into  force 
August  30,  1975.  TIAS  8165. 

Ratifications  deposited:  Byelorussian  Soviet  So- 
cialist Republic,  January  29,  1976;  Ukrainian 
Soviet   Socialist   Republic,   February   5,    1976. 

Tin 

Fifth    international    tin    agreement,    with    annexes. 
Done  at  Geneva  June  21,  1975.  Entered  into  force 
provisionally  July  1.   1976. 
Ratifications     deposited:     Indonesia,     August     3, 

1976;   Nigeria,  July   6,    1976;    Denmark,   August 

12,  1976. 

Wheat 

Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the  wheat 
trade  convention  (part  of  the  international  wheat 
agreement)  1971  (TIAS  7144).  Done  at  Washing- 
ton March  17,  1976.  Entered  into  force  June  19, 
1976,  with  respect  to  certain  provisions,  and  July  1, 
1976,  with  respect  to  other  provisions. 
Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification:  August 
23.  1976. 

Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the  food 
aid  convention  (part  of  the  international  wheat 
agreement)  1971  (TIAS  7144).  Done  at  Washing- 
ton March  17,  1976.  Entered  into  force  June  19, 
1976,  with  respect  to  certain  provisions,  and  July  1, 
1976,  with  respect  to  other  provisions. 
Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification:  August 
23,  1976. 


BILATERAL 

Abu  Dhabi 

Agreement  for  technical  assistance  in  connection  with 
a  project  for  collecting  and  conserving  water  sup- 

'  Not  in  force. 

-Applicable  to  Hong  Kong  (with  reservation  under 
Article  XXIII),  the  Bailiwick  of  Guernsey,  the  Baili- 
wick of  Jersey,  the  Isle  of  Man,  Belize,  Bermuda, 
British  Indian  Ocean  Territory,  British  Virgin  Is- 
lands, Falkland  Islands,  Gibraltar,  Gilbert  Islands, 
Montserrat,  Pitcaim,  St.  Helena  and  Dependencies 
(Tristan  de  Cunha,  Ascension   Islands),  Tuvalu. 

=  With  reservation,  declarations  and  designations. 


347 


plies  from  surface  runoff,  with  annexes.  Signed  at 
Abu  Dhabi  July  10,  1976.  Entered  into  force  July 
10,   1976. 

Universal  Postal  Union 

Agreement  relating  to  a  procedure  for  U.S.  income 
tax  reimbursements.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
letters  at  Geneva  and  Bern  May  25  and  26.  1976. 
Entered  into  force  IMay  26,  1976;  effective  Janu- 
ary 1,  1975. 


PUBLICATIONS 


1948  "Foreign  Relations"  Volume 
on  General  Foreign  Policy  Released 

Press  release  399  dated  August   27    (for  release  September  4) 

The  Department  of  State  released  on  September  4 
"Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States,"  1948, 
volume  I,  "General;  The  United  Nations,"  part  2. 
Nine  other  volumes,  including  two  half  volumes, 
have  already  been  published  in  this  series  for  the 
year  1948.  One  remaining  half  volume  (dealing  with 
the  U.S.  attitude  toward  the  Arab-Israeli  contro- 
versy in  1948)  is  in  preparation  and  will  be  released 
shortly.  The  "Foreign  Relations"  series  has  been 
published  continuously  since  1861  as  the  official  rec- 
ord of  U.S.  foreign  policy. 

This  half  volume  of  509  pages  contains  previously 
unpublished  and  generally  highly  classified  docu- 
mentation on  national  security  policy  and  the  foreign 
policy  aspects  of  the  atomic  energy  program,  as  well 
as  the  basic  lines  of  foreign  economic  policy.  Of 
particular  note  are  those  previously  highly  classified 
documents  on  the  preparation  and  approval  by  the 
National  Security  Council  of  major  policy  reports  on 
U.S.  objectives  in  countering  Soviet  threats  to  U.S. 
security — NSC  7  and  the  NSC  20  series.  Also  of  high 
importance  are  those  policymaking  steps  leading  to 
NSC  30,  the  National  Security  Council  paper  on  U.S. 
policy  on  atomic  warfare.  The  documentation  on  for- 
eign   economic    policy    shows    how    U.S.    diplomacy 


sought  in  three  international  conferences  at  the  time 
to  encourage  the  expansion  of  international  trade 
(the  two  GATT  conferences)  and  to  promote  full 
employment  (the  international  trade  organization 
conference  at  Havana).  The  efforts  by  the  United 
States  to  foster  support  for  the  establishment  of  an 
international  status  for  Antarctica  are  also  docu- 
mented. 

Part  1  of  this  volume  was  published  in  June  1975. 
It  contains  documentation  on  U.S.  policies  with  re- 
gard to  the  United  Nations. 

This  half  volume  now  released  was  prepared  by 
the  Historical  Office,  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs. 
Copies  of  volume  I,  part  2,  for  1948  (Department  of 
State  publication  8849;  GPO  cat.  no.  Sl.l:948/v.  I,  2). 
may  be  obtained  for  $8.50  (domestic  postpaid). 
Checks  or  money  orders  should  be  made  out  to  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents  and  should  be  sent  to 
the  U.S.  Government  Book  Store,  Department  of 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 


GPO  Sales  Publications 

Publications  may  be  ordered  by  catalog  or  stock 
number  from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents, 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office.  Washington,  D.C. 
201t02.  A  25-percent  discount  is  made  on  orders  for 
100  or  more  copies  of  any  one  publication  ^nailed  to 
the  same  address.  Remittances,  payable  to  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  must  accompany 
orders.  Prices  shown  below,  which  include  domestic 
postage,  are  subject  to  change. 

Fisheries — Northeastern  Pacific  Ocean  off  the  United 
States  Coast.  Agreement  witli  the  Union  of  Soviet 
Socialist  Republics.  TIAS  8207.  48  pp.  lOt  (Cat.  No 
S9.10:8207). 

Deployment  in  Bahrain  of  the  United  States  Middle 
East  Force.  Agreement  with  Bahrain  implementing 
articles  8  and  11  of  the  agreement  of  December  23, 
1971.  TIAS  8208.  4  pp.  SS^  (Cat.  No.  S9.10:8208). 

Civil  Emergency  Preparedness.  Memorandum  of 
Understanding  with  Iran.  TIAS  8209.  7  pp.  35i}. 
(Cat.   No.   89.10:8209). 

General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade.  Third  Certi- 
fication of  Changes  to  Certain  Schedules.  TIAS  8214, 
756  pp.  $7.05.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:8214). 


348 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


INDEX     September  13,  1976    Vol.  LXXV,  No.  19A2 


Angola.  Department  Discusses  Allegations  Re- 
garding Mercenaries  in  Angola  (Schaufele)       341 

Arms  Control  and  Disarmament.  Fifteenth 
Annual  Report  of  ACDA  Transmitted  to  the 
Congress   (message  from  President  Ford)   .      345 

Congress 

Congressional  Documents  Relating  to  Foreign 
Policy 346 

Department  Discusses  Actions  by  OAS  in 
Human  Rights  Field  (Mailliard) 339 

Department   Discusses    Allegations   Regarding 

Mercenaries  in  Angola  (Schaufele)   ....       341 

Fifteenth  Annual  Report  of  ACDA  Trans- 
mitted to  the  Congress  (message  from 
President    Ford) 345 

International  Efforts  To  Control  Radioactive- 
Waste  Disposal  at  Sea   (Grant) 343 

Economic  Affairs.  U.S.  Welcomes  ECOSOC 
Action  on  Illicit  Payments  Issue  (statement 
by  White  House  Press   Secretary)    ....       338 

Environment.  International  Efforts  To  Control 
Radioactive-Waste  Disposal   at  Sea   (Grant)       343 

Finland.  President  Kekkonen  of  Finland  Visits 
Washington  (Ford,  Kekkonen) 336 

Foreign  Aid.  Eleven  MAAG's  To  Ue  Termi- 
nated Under  Security  Assistance  Act  (De- 
partment announcement) 336 

Human  Rights.  Department  Discusses  Actions 
by  OAS  in  Human  Rights  Field  (Mailliard)       339 

Latin  America.  Department  Discusses  Actions 
by  OAS  in  Human  Rights  Field   (Mailliard)       339 

Law  of  the  Sea.  Secretary  Kissinger  Discusses 
Progress  and  Goals  in  Law  of  the  Sea  Nego- 
tiations (remarks  to  U.S.  delegation,  toast  at 
luncheon  honoring  conference  leadership)  .     .       333 

Middle  East.  United  States  Completes  1976 
Pledge   to   UNRWA    (Scranton) 338 

Military  Affairs.  Eleven  MAAG's  To  Be  Termi- 
nated Under  Security  Assistance  Act  (De- 
partment announcement) 330 

Organization  of  American  States.  Department 
Discusses  Actions  by  OAS  in  Human  Rights 
Field     (Mailliard) 339 

Presidential  Documents 

Fifteenth  Annual  Report  of  ACDA  Trans- 
mitted   to   the   Congress 345 

President  Kekkonen  of  Finland  Visits  Wash- 
ington   336 

Publications 

3P0   Sales  Publications 348 

1948  "Foreign  Relations"  Volume  on  General 
Foreign  Policy  Released 348 

Refugees.  United  States  Completes  1976 
Pledge   to  UNRWA    (Scranton) 338 

Treaty  Information.  Current  Actions  ....      347 


United  Nations 

United  States  Completes  1970  Pledge  to 
UNRWA    (Scranton) 338 

U.S.  Welcomes  ECOSOC  Action  on  Illicit  Pay- 
ments Issue  (statement  by  White  House 
Press  Secretary) 338 


Name  Index 


Ford,  President  .  . 
Grant,  Lindsey  .  . 
Kekkonen,  Urho  .  . 
Kissinger,  Secretary 
Mailliard,  William  S 
Schaufele,  William  E. 
Scranton,  William  W 


336,  345 
343 
336 
333 
339 
341 
338 


Checklist  of  Department  of  State 

Press  Releases:  August  23-29 

Press    releases    may    be    obtained    from    the 

Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 

Washington 

D.C.  20520. 

No.       Date 

Subject 

*392    8/23 

Study   Group   4   of   the    U.S.    Na- 

tional  Committee  for  the   Inter- 

national Radio  Consultative  Com- 

mittee   (CCIR),   Sept.    14. 

*393     8/24 

Shipping  Coordinating  Committee, 

Committee    on    Ocean    Dumping, 

Sept.   15. 

*394     8/24 

Study   Group   1   of   the   U.S.   Na- 

tional Committee  for  the  CCIR, 

Sept.  28. 

*-395     8/24 

Advisory    Committee    to    the    U.S. 

National    Section    of    the    Inter- 

national North   Pacific   Fisheries 

Commission,  Sept.  27-28,  Seattle, 

Wash. 

*396     8/25 

Herbert    V.    Tobias,    Jr.,    awarded 

Department's    Sports    Exchange 

Plaque    for    basketball-coaching 

assignments  in  Africa. 

397     8/25 

Eleven     Military    Assistance    Ad- 

visory Groups  to  be  terminated. 

*368     8/25 

Correction    to    press    release    368 

issued  Aug.  7. 

*398     8/26 

History     of     U.S. -China     cultural 

relations,   1942-49,  published   by 

Department. 

399     8/27 

"Foreign  Relations,"  1948,  volume 

I,  General;  The  United  Nations, 

part   2,  released. 
Jd. 

*  Not  print 

Superintendent   of    Documents 
U.S.  government  printing  office 

WASHINGTON.    DC.    20402 
OFFICIAL  BUSINESS 


postage  and  fees  paid 
Department  of  State  STA-SOI 


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service,  please  renew  your  subscription  promptly 
when  you  receive  the  expiration  notice  from  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents.  Due  to  the  time  re- 
quired to  process  renewals,  notices  are  sent  out  3 
months  in  advance  of  the  expiration  date.  Any  prob- 
lems involving  your  subscription  will  receive  im- 
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7S, 


/f'f'S 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 

BULLETIN 

Volume  LXXV     •     No.  1943     •     September  20,  1976 


THE  CHALLENGES  OF  AFRICA 
Address  by  Secretary  Kissinger    3^9 

SECRETARY  KISSINGER'S  NEWS  CONFERENCE  AT  PHILADELPHIA    358 

SECRETARY  KISSINGER  INTERVIEWED 
BY  PHILADELPHIA  WORLD  AFFAIRS  COUNCIL  PANEL     363 


THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 

For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE  BULLET  I 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents 

U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 

Washington,  D.C.  20402 

PRICE: 

62  Issues  plus  semiannual  indexes, 

domestic  $42.50,  foreign  $53.15 

Single  copy  83  cents 

The  Secretary  of  State  has  determined  that 
the  publication  ot  this  periodical  is  necessary 
in  the  transaction  ot  the  public  business  re- 
quired by  law  ot  this  Department.  Use  of 
funds  for  printing  this  periodical  has  been 
approved  by  the  Director  of  the  Office  of  Man- 
agement and  Budget  through  January  31.  1981. 
Note:  Contents  of  this  publication  are  not 
copyrighted  and  items  contained  herein  may  be 
reprinted.  Citation  of  the  DEPARTMENT  OF 
STATE  BULLETIN  as  the  source  ■will  be 
appreciated.  The  BULLETIN  is  indexed  in 
the    Readers'    Guide   to    Periodical    Literature, 


Vol.  LXXV,  No.  1943 
September  20,  1976 


The  Department  of  State  BULLE'  y 
a  weekly  publication  issued  by  u 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureai  i 
Public  Affairs,  provides  the  public  U 
interested  agencies  of  the  governi  t 
with  information  on  development  ii 
the  field  of  U.S.  foreign  relations  li 
on  the  work  of  the  Department  li 
tlie  Foreign  Service. 
The  BULLETIN  includes  sell  i 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy,  is  i 
by  the  White  House  and  the  Deri 
ment,  and  statements,  addre  a, 
and  news  conferences  of  the  Presi  i6 
and  the  Secretary  of  State  and  t  er 
officers  of  the  Department,  as  we  n 
special  articles  on  various  phase  rf 
international  affairs  and  the  tuna  il 
of  the  Department.  Informatiot  It 
included  concerning  treaties  and  ii  T- 
national  agreements  to  which  i( 
United  States  is  or  may  becon  i 
party  and  on  treaties  of  general  i)  r 
national  interest. 

Publications  of  the  Department  Dl 
State,  United  Nations  documents,  ii 
legislative  material  in  the  fieh  D 
international  relations  are  also  lit  i 


The  Challenges  of  Africa 


Address  by  Secretary  Kissinger ' 


I  am  proud  to  speak  before  this  remark- 
ible  group  that  so  well  embodies  the 
American  tradition  of  humane  concern 
:ombined  with  practical  action.  And  I  want 

0  add  my  voice  to  the  tribute  you  have 
*l  Daid  two  great  Americans  in  presenting 
'i;he    A.    Philip    Randolph    award    to    Roy 

iVilkins.  These  men  have  demonstrated 
nvidly  the  qualities  of  courage  and  vision 
A'hich  have  built  this  country  and  made  it 

1  champion  of  democratic  and  compassion- 
ite  principles  around  the  world. 

I   have   come   here  today  to  talk   about 
'Africa — one  of  the  compelling  concerns  of 
3ur  time. 
When  we  read  of  young  African  students 
J  (killed  in  riots,  of  guerrilla  raids,  of  refugee 
i«i:amps  attacked  in  reprisal,  the  reality  lies 
*  not  in  the  cold  statistics  that  the  media  re- 
port.  In   Africa,   it   is   the   death   of   men, 
women,  and  children;  it  means  hopes  ex- 
tinguished    and     dreams     shattered.     The 
III  grand  issues  of  strategy  or  the  complexity 
III  of  negotiations  are  no  consolation  to  inno- 
cent, brutalized  victims. 

As  long  as  these  conflicts  fester,  Africans 
of  all  races  will  be  caught  up  in  a  widening 
and  escalating  cycle  of  violence.  Until  these 
wars  are  ended,  Africa  faces  a  future  of 
danger,  anguish,  and  growing  risks  of  for- 
eign intervention. 

This  is  why  I  will  leave  on  Friday  to  con- 
tinue discussions  on  the  President's  behalf 


'  Made  before  the  convention  of  Opportunities  In- 
dustrialization Centers  (OIC)  at  Philadelphia,  Pa., 
on  Aug.  31   (text  from  press  release  403). 


September  20,  1976 


with  the  Prime  Minister  of  South  Africa. 
This  trip  will  be  the  next  step  in  an  inten- 
sive diplomatic  effort  ushered  in  by  my  visit 
to  Africa  in  April.  Under  Secretary  of  State 
[for  Economic  Affairs  William  D.]  Rogers 
and  Assistant  Secretary  [for  African  Af- 
fairs William  E.]  Schaufele  have  just  re- 
turned from  a  mission  to  Tanzania,  Zambia, 
Mozambique,  and  Zaire,  where  they  met 
with  the  Presidents  of  those  African  na- 
tions most  affected  by  events  in  southern 
Africa — the  third  such  mission  in  three 
months.  In  close  collaboration  with  Great 
Britain,  a  serious  effort  by  this  country  is 
now  underway.  We  shall  use  our  power 
and  influence  to  help  resolve  the  burning 
conflicts  of  southern  Africa  which  now 
sunder  Africa's  peace,  unity,  and  hopes  for 
progress. 

Nearly  a  third  of  the  world's  some  150 
sovereign  nations  are  on  the  continent  of 
Africa.  Africa's  independence — now  barely 
20  years  old — has  transformed  the  charac- 
ter and  scope  of  international  affairs.  Afri- 
can nations  play  a  major  role  in  interna- 
tional institutions;  their  importance  to  the 
world  economy  is  growing;  the  interde- 
pendence of  Africa  and  the  industrialized 
world  is  obvious.  Thus,  conflict  in  Africa 
has  political,  security,  and  economic  impli- 
cations that  reach  far  beyond  the  continent 
itself. 

The  relationship  between  the  United 
States  and  Africa  is  unique.  We  were  never 
a  colonial  power,  but  America's  character 
and  destiny  have  been  permanently  shaped 
by  our  involvement  in  a  tragic  aspect  of 


349 


Africa's  past.  Twenty-three  million  black 
citizens  testify  to  this  heritage,  and  all  the 
American  people  have  been  profoundly 
affected  by  it.  In  this  generation,  the  affir- 
mation of  equality  and  black  dignity  in 
America  has  coincided  with  the  assertions 
of  black  nationhood  in  Afi'ica.  Both  repre- 
sent a  great  human  struggle  for  freedom; 
both  compel  our  support  if  America's  prin- 
ciples are  to  have  meaning. 

The  United  States  is  the  only  country 
which  can  speak  to  all  sides  in  southern 
Africa's  current  conflicts.  We  seek  no  spe- 
cial place  for  ourselves  and  thus  have  an 
influence  that  can  be  important  for  a  peace- 
ful outcome.  That  position  carries  with  it 
a  great  responsibility  to  promote  fair  and 
lasting  solutions.  Our  values,  our  own  self- 
interest  in  an  Africa  that  lives  in  peace  and 
racial  harmony,  and  our  abiding  commit- 
ment to  peace  and  world  order  permit  us 
no  other  course. 

America's  contribution  to  peace  and 
progress  in  Africa  cannot  depend  on  good 
will  and  good  intentions  alone.  Nor  can  our 
policy  be  confined  to  one  continent.  Our 
ability  to  act  effectively  in  Africa  reflects 
in  large  measure  our  standing  in  the  world 
— our  strength,  our  vision,  and  our  reputa- 
tion for  reliability  and  steadfastness. 

It  is  with  great  satisfaction,  therefore, 
that  I  can  tell  you  that  America's  foreign 
relations  are  prospering  and  dynamic;  that 
the  American  people  are  clearly  prepared 
to  do  their  part  in  helping  shape  a  better 
and  freer  world : 

— Today  we  are  at  peace  for  the  first 
time  in  over  a  decade.  No  American  is  in 
combat  anywhere  in  the  world. 

— We  have  the  world's  strongest  and 
technologically  most  advanced  military 
establishment. 

— Our  relations  with  our  allies  in  North 
America,  Western  Europe,  and  Japan  have 
never  been  better.  Our  close  cooperation  on 
a  wide  range  of  political  and  economic 
issues  now  reinforces  our  traditional  con- 
cern with  collective  security. 

— We  have  established  durable  new  rela- 
tions with  China,  the  world's  most  popu- 

350 


lous  nation.  This  relationship  will  holdi 
great  significance  for  global  stability  and 
progress  as  we  continue  to  broaden  it  ini 
the  years  to  come. 

— We  are  on  the  road  to  bringing  peace 
to  the  Middle  East  after  unprecedented 
progress  in  recent  years. 

— We  have  reduced  the  levels  of  tension 
with  the  Soviet  Union,  resolved  some  con- 
flicts, and  begun  to  push  back  the  specter 
of  nuclear  war.  We  have  slowed  the  stra- 
tegic arms  race ;  and  there  is  hope  that  we 
may  soon,  for  the  first  time  in  history,  set 
a  firm  ceiling  on  the  total  number  of  stra 
tegic  nuclear  weapons  of  the  two  major 
nuclear  powers. 

— And  we  have  begun  a  comprehensive 
and  promising  dialogue  with  the  nations  of 
Latin  America,  Asia,  and  Africa  on  funda- 
mental questions  of  economic  equity  and 
progress. 

In  short,  America  has  come  through  a^ 
decade  and  more  of  travail  with  unmatched!  m 
strength  and  resiliency  and  with  a  rein-jm 
forced  dedication  to  the  cause  of  freedom 
America  with  its  vast  strength  remains  thel 
hope  of  the  world;  America  with  its  opti-; 
mism  and  energy  remains  the  tide  of  the 
future. 

And  we  ourselves  have  much  at  stake. 
Never  before  has  the  well-being  of  Ameri- 
cans been  so  affected  by  events  abroad. 
Our  own  peace  and  safety  depend  on 
global  security;  our  prosperity  at  home  de- 
pends on  a  flourishing  global  economy. 

Nowhere  are  contemporary  events  mov- 
ing more  rapidly  than  in  Africa.  Within 
recent  months  southern  Africa  has  faced! 
an  imminent,  seemingly  inescapable  pros- 
pect of  widening  violence,  economic  dis- 
array, and  a  virulent  new  form  of  colonial- 
ism. The  Soviet  Union  and  its  Cuban  surro- 
gate took  upon  themselves  the  right  of 
massive  military  intervention.  Time  has 
been  running  out  fast  for  negotiated  solu- 
tions— the  only  alternative  to  mounting 
warfare  which  could  embitter  and  burden 
the  region  for  generations  to  come. 

Change  has  come  to  Africa  with  aston-   ^ 
ishing  swiftness.  Thirty  years  ago,  much  of 

Department  of  State  Bulletin!  ^ 


Africa  was  the  dominion  of  European 
powers;  today  we  see  a  continent  of  49 
independent  nations  struggling  against 
time,  against  the  elements,  and  against  the 
forces  of  instability,  to  consolidate  their 
nationhood. 

Africa  seeks  to  achieve  three  funda- 
mental goals:  self-determination  and  ra- 
cial justice  in  southern  Africa,  economic 
development  and  progress  for  all  of  Africa, 
and  the  preservation  of  the  continent's 
unity  and  integrity  against  outside  inter- 
ference and  great-power  rivalry. 

The  pace  of  change  has  accelerated  in 
the  last  two  years  in  every  dimension: 

— The  sudden  collapse  of  the  Portuguese 
colonial  empire  wrought  fundamental 
changes  in  southern  Africa.  The  remaining 
outposts  of  colonialism  were  placed  in  an 
untenable  position.  But  civil  war  within  the 
liberation  movement  in  Angola,  Soviet- 
Cuban  intervention,  and  the  continuing 
massive  Cuban  military  presence  in  Angola 
raised  the  danger  that  foreign  powers  act- 
ing for  their  own  ends  would  seek  to  im- 
(Pose  solutions  to  all  the  problems  of  south- 
ern Africa. 

— New  efforts  to  find  negotiated  solutions 
for  the  racial  conflicts  in  Rhodesia  and 
Namibia  failed.  The  forces  for  moderation 
in  black  Africa  risked  becoming  irrelevant. 
The  peoples  of  southern  Africa  were  men- 
aced by  a  mounting  spiral  of  action  and 
reprisal.  A  course  of  violence  from  which 
no  nation  was  safe  had  been  set  in  motion. 

— Worldwide  recession  and  the  sharp 
rise  in  oil  prices  had  a  drastic  impact  on  the 
poorest  nations,  many  of  them  African. 
Development  plans  were  crippled  by  the 
fall  of  export  earnings  and  by  the  surge  of 
prices  for  fuel,  fertilizer,  and  other  key 
imports.  New  cycles  of  drought  and  famine 
halted  economic  progress  and  intensified 
the  suffering  of  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
people. 

Against  this  ominous  backdrop.  Presi- 
dent Ford,  last  April,  decided  on  a  new 
American  initiative  in  support  of  peace, 
racial    justice,    prosperity,    and    independ- 

September  20,  1976 


ence  for  Africa.  Our  offer  of  help  and  con- 
structive influence  was  strongly  encouraged 
by  the  leaders  of  Africa. 

With  wisdom  and  flexibility  by  the 
parties  involved,  and  with  the  support  of 
the  American  people,  we  have  a  chance  to 
contribute  to  a  turning  point  in  the  history 
of  Africa.  We  can,  if  we  will,  participate 
in  a  new  birth  of  independence  and  racial 
peace ;  we  can,  if  we  will,  help  shape  a  new 
international  dedication  to  Africa's  eco- 
nomic development;  and  we  can,  if  we  will, 
contribute  to  an  Africa  strong  and  free  of 
the  threat  of  outside  intervention. 

There  is  no  guarantee  that  our  current 
diplomatic  effort  will  succeed.  It  would  be 
naive  to  suggest  that  a  peaceful  solution  to 
issues  so  surrounded  by  passions  is  inevita- 
ble. But  whatever  the  immediate  outcome, 
let  it  never  be  said  that  the  United  States 
did  not  exert  itself  with  energy  and  deter- 
mination in  the  cause  of  peace,  freedom, 
and  human  dignity  at  a  moment  of  need 
and   opportunity. 

Let  me  discuss  with  you  what  has  been 
achieved,  and  what  yet  remains  to  be  done. 

Southern  Africa 

Most  urgent  has  been  the  mounting  ra- 
cial conflict  of  southern  Africa — in  Rho- 
desia, in  Namibia,  and  in  the  Republic  of 
South  Africa  itself. 

The  white  minority  regime  in  Rhodesia, 
representing  only  some  4  percent  of  the 
population,  is  not  recognized  by  a  single 
government — not  even  by  neighboring 
South  Africa.  Its  unilateral  declaration  of 
independence  from  Britain  in  November 
1965  is  regarded  as  illegal  by  every  mem- 
ber of  the  world  community.  Three  U.S. 
Administrations  have  supported  Britain 
throughout  its  long  effort  to  restore  its  con- 
stitutional authority ;  Britain  has  been — 
and  remains — committed  to  grant  inde- 
pendence only  under  conditions  of  majority 
rule. 

Early  this  year,  negotiations  between  the 
illegal  white  minority  regime  and  moderate 
black  nationalist  leaders  broke  down.  Guer- 


351 


rilla  action  intensified;  rapidly  escalating 
violence  threatened  to  engulf  the  region. 

While  Rhodesia  is  the  most  immediately 
dangerous  problem,  Namibia  is  also  of  ur- 
gent concern. 

From  1920,  South  Africa  administered 
the  former  German  colony  of  South  West 
Africa  under  a  League  of  Nations  mandate. 
In  1966,  the  U.N.  General  Assembly  con- 
cluded that  South  Africa  was  violating  im- 
portant obligations.  As  a  result,  the  United 
Nations,  with  U.S.  support,  terminated 
South  Africa's  mandate.  The  United  Na- 
tions assumed  direct  responsibility  for  the 
territory.  South  Africa,  however,  stayed  on. 
In  1971,  the  International  Court  of  Justice 
concluded  that  South  Africa's  occupation 
was  illegal,  that  it  must  immediately  with- 
draw, and  that  no  country  should  recog- 
nize, support,  or  assist  South  Africa  in 
Namibia. 

The  United  States  has  consistently  sup- 
ported the  conclusions  of  the  Court  and  the 
resolutions  of  the  Security  Council. 

The  latest  resolution,  which  passed 
unanimously  last  January,  calls  on  South 
Africa  to  comply  with  the  Court's  conclu- 
sions, to  declare  its  acceptance  of  free  elec- 
tions under  U.N.  supervision  and  control, 
and  to  respect  the  rights  of  Namibians  and 
the  responsibility  of  the  United  Nations. 
The  Security  Council  decided  to  review 
South  Africa's  compliance  on  or  before 
today,  August  31,  1976. 

Namibia,  like  Rhodesia,  contains  the 
seeds  of  greater  conflict.  There,  too,  time 
is  running  out.  With  thousands  of  foreign 
troops  north  of  the  Namibian  border  and 
with  intensifying  warfare  in  Rhodesia,  a 
volatile  situation  is  emerging. 

And  in  South  Africa  itself,  the  recent 
outbreaks  of  racial  violence  have  under- 
scored the  inevitable  instability  of  a  system 
that  institutionalizes  human  inequality  in 
a  way  repugnant  to  the  world's  conscience. 

Therefore,  in  Lusaka,  Zambia,  in  April, 
on  behalf  of  President  Ford  I  put  forward 
an  American  initiative  which  addressed 
the  full  sweep  of  the  crisis  in  southern 
Africa: 


352 


— We  promised  that  we  would  actively  ji 
support  [U.K.  Prime  Minister  James]  Cal-  Si 
laghan's  proposal  for  majority  rule  in  Rhon  J 
desia  in  two  years  or  less.  We  urged  the 
African  parties  involved  to  pursue  a  nego 
tiated  settlement  in  which  black  and  white 
could  coexist  and  cooperate.  We  stated  oui 
readiness  to  assist  a  new  Rhodesia — Zim- 
babwe— to  overcome  economic  dislocations 
so  that  it  could  effectively  take  its  place  ir 
the  community  of  nations. 

— We  urged  South  Africa  to  set  a  dat( 
for  Namibian  independence  and  to  broader 
the  political  process.  In  our  view,  all  th( 
political  groups  of  Namibia  should  be  per 
mitted  to  express  themselves  freely,  undei 
U.N.  supervision,  and  to  participate  h 
shaping  the  constitutional  and  politica 
future  of  their  country. 

— And  I  restated  on  African  soil  Amer 
ica's  rejection  of  the  principle  and  practici 
of  apartheid.  I  called  on  South  Africa  t( 
demonstrate  its  commitment  to  peace  an( 
harmony  on  the  continent  by  facilitatinj 
early  solutions  in  Rhodesia  and  Namibia. 

Unmistakable  progress  has  been  mad 
since  this  American  initiative: 

— The  character  of  our  relationship  witl 
black  Africa  has  been  transformed.  Ou 
dialogue  with  the  nations  of  black  Afric 
has  become  close  and  intensive.  Mutual 
confidence  and  respect  between  Americi 
and  black  Africa  have  grown  substantially! 
We  are  now  seen  as  active  agents  in  th 
process  toward  independence,  self-detei 
mination,  justice,  and  human  dignity  i:i 
Africa,  not  as  passive  observers. 

— Since  my  talks  with  Prime  Ministet 
Vorster  in  June,  South  Africa  has  publicl; 
proclaimed  its  support  for  majority  rule  i: 
Rhodesia — an  important  step  forward. 

— In  Namibia,  the  constitutional  confer 
ence  organized  by  South  Africa  has  re 
cently  pr-oposed  a  date  of  December  31 
1978,  for  Namibia's  independence,  con 
ceding  the  vital  principles  of  independenC' 
and  majority  rule.  The  means  and  proc 
esses  by  which  the  country  moves  to  inde 
pendence  must  still  be  worked  out  betweei 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 


le  interested  parties,  but  the  fact  that 
Tamibia  will  shortly  be  independent  is  in 
self  a  major  breakthrough. 

These  significant  developments  show 
hat  progress  is  possible.  But  the  obstacles 
)  a  negotiated  settlement  remain  formi- 
able. 

In  Rhodesia,  it  is  now  vital  to  bring  to- 
ether  the  leaders  of  black  Africa,  the  vari- 
us  liberation  movements.  South  Africa, 
nd  of  the  Rhodesian  regime  on  a  common 
irogram.  Namibia  will  not  be  removed 
rom  the  world's  agenda  of  crises  until  a 
neans  and  a  forum  are  found  for  working 
ait  Namibia's  political  future  on  the  basis 
if  participation  by  all  authentic  groups. 

The  situation  in  South  Africa  continues 
0  be  highly  volatile;  it  not  only  poses  a 
hreat  of  intensified  suffering  within  that 
■ountry  but  also  threatens  South  Africa's 
ibility  to  assist  constructively  in  solutions 
or  Rhodesia  and  Namibia. 

The  task  of  diplomacy  is  to  find  the  com- 
non  ground  among  the  differing  objectives 
)f  the  multitude  of  nations  and  groups  in- 
olved.  Our  consultations  have  convinced 
IS  that  there  is  common  ground.  But  all 
larties  must  overcome  the  legacy  of  gen- 
nations  of  mistrust;  all  must  keep  in  mind 
;hat  the  desire  to  achieve  everything  at 
DHce  may  frustrate  the  significant  progress 
jjwhich  may  now  be  attainable. 

We  shall  be  carrying  this  message : 

— The  white  populations  of  Rhodesia 
and  Namibia  must  recognize  that  majority 
rule  is  inevitable.  The  only  issue  is  what 
form  it  will  take  and  how  it  will  come 
bout.  Will  it  be  through  protracted  and 
Dloody  conflict  that  will  leave  a  heritage 
of  bitterness  and  destruction  for  genera- 
tions? Or  will  it  come  rapidly  through  the 
peaceful  means  which  offer  hope  for  a  just 
and  cooperative  future  in  which  majority 
rule  is  coupled  with  a  guarantee  of  minor- 
ity rights? 

— South  Africa  has  taken  positive  steps 
with  respect  to  Rhodesia  and  Namibia.  We 
hope  that  it  will  continue  to  recognize  that 
now  is  the  time  to  make  a  constructive  con- 


tribution to  Africa  by  committing  itself  to 
rapid  progress  toward  independence  in 
Rhodesia  and  Namibia. 

— Black  African  leaders  in  the  states 
neighboring  Rhodesia  and  Namibia  have 
perhaps  the  most  difficult  challenge.  They 
feel  in  their  hearts  the  suffering  of  their 
brothers;  they  have  themselves  experienced 
the  oppression  of  colonial  rule;  and  they 
have  seen  past  efforts  at  settlements  fade 
away.  All  their  instincts  are  for  rapid  solu- 
tions without  the  tedious  give-and-take  of 
negotiations.  And  yet  violence  will  only  es- 
calate bloodshed  and  lengthen,  rather  than 
shorten,  the  road  to  their  goal.  The  wisdom 
and  moderating  influence  of  black  African 
leaders  are  essential  if  progress  is  to  be 
achieved.  Their  own  suffering  must  have 
taught  that  new  injustice  does  not  right  old 
injustice.  They  now  have  the  opportunity 
to  break  the  vicious  cycle  of  centuries  of 
suffering  by  seizing  this  opportunity  not 
for  conflict  but  for  reconciliation  of  the 
races. 

— Black  nationalist  groups  competing 
for  power  must  bridge  their  differences  if 
there  is  to  be  early  progress  to  majority 
rule.  We  will  urge  them  not  to  jeopardize 
everything  by  personal  competition  for 
power.  Those  rivalries  are  certain  to  delay 
— and  may  even  defeat — the  realization  of 
what  they  have  fought  so  long  to  attain. 

A  complex  process  of  negotiation  is  un- 
derway on  the  urgent  issues  of  Rhodesia 
and  Namibia.  These  issues  are  related,  but 
we  recognize  that  the  requirements  for  so- 
lutions in  each  case  are  substantially  differ- 
ent. If  circumstances  so  indicate,  each 
issue  can  be  dealt  with  at  the  pace  appro- 
priate to  it.  Depending  on  the  desires  of 
the  many  interested  parties,  we  are  pre- 
pared to  deal  with  each  issue  on  its  indi- 
vidual merits. 

Most  importantly,  all  parties  must  keep 
in  mind  that  lost  opportunities  can  be  irre- 
trievable ;  there  are  now  conditions  for 
settling  both  issues  that  did  not  exist 
pi-eviously  and  may  never  do  so  again.  It 
would  be  ironic,  to  say  the  least,  if  after 


September  20,  1976 


353 


years  of  struggle,  hope,  and  disappoint- 
ment, those  who  have  the  most  to  gain 
should  let  the  opportunity  slip  away  be- 
cause of  internal  disagreements. 

Public  support  for  this  effort  will  be  a 
major  factor  in  the  success  and  durability 
of  any  settlement  that  may  eventually 
emerge.  Our  goals — to  end  the  suffering 
and  violence  of  southern  Africa  and  to 
bring  about  majority  rule  and  minority 
rights — reflect  what  is  best  in  American 
values.  They  are  a  firm  foundation  for  our 
common  commitment;  they  are  not  con- 
fined to  one  party  or  one  branch  of  the  gov- 
ernment. They  represent  an  American 
effort. 

South  Africa's  racial  problems  are  more 
complex.  In  Lusaka  in  April,  I  pointed  out 
that  South  African  assistance  in  bringing 
about  rapid  negotiated  solutions  in  Rho- 
desia and  Namibia  would  be  viewed  posi- 
tively by  the  community  of  nations  as  well 
as  by  the  rest  of  Africa.  And  I  must  point 
out  here  that  since  then  South  Africa's  role 
— with  respect  to  these  two  problems — has 
been  constructive. 

As  for  conditions  within  South  Africa 
itself,  the  world,  and  most  black  African 
leaders,  recognize  South  Africa  as  an  Afri- 
can country.  Its  white  settlers  have  lived  on 
African  soil  for  centuries.  No  one,  includ- 
ing the  responsible  leaders  of  black  Africa, 
challenges  their  right  to  remain  there.  Un- 
like Rhodesia  and  Namibia,  South  Africa 
cannot  be  regarded  as  an  illegitimate  gov- 
ernment, as  an  outside  colonial  intrusion. 

But  South  Africa's  internal  structure  is 
incompatible  with  any  concept  of  human 
dignity.  We  are  deeply  saddened  by  the 
recent  and  continuing  clashes  in  black 
urban  townships,  universities,  and  schools 
throughout  South  Africa.  They  are  dra- 
matic evidence  of  the  frustration  of  black 
South  Africans  toward  a  system  which  de- 
nies them  status,  equality,  and  political 
rights.  No  system  that  leads  to  periodic  up- 
heavals and  violence  can  possibly  be  just 
or  acceptable — nor  can  it  last. 

The  United  States  must  be  true  to  its  own 
beliefs.  We  urge  South  Africa  to  take  ac- 


354 


count  of  the  conscience  of  humanity.  We 
will  continue  to  use  all  our  influence  to 
bring  about  peaceful  change,  equality  of 
opportunity,  and  basic  human  rights  in 
South  Africa.  Our  policy  is  based  upon  the 
premise  that  within  a  reasonable  period  of 
time  we  will  see  a  clear  evolution  toward 
just  internal  arrangements.  In  our  talks 
with  the  South  African  Prime  Minister  and 
in  our  diplomatic  efforts,  we  will  impress 
upon  South  Africa  the  need  to  make  this 
premise  a  reality. 

Economic  Progress 

It  is  economic  progress  which  ultimately 
will  determine  whether  Africa  can  fulfill 
the  aspirations  of  its  peoples. 

You  here  at  this  convention  know  that 
the  economic  dimension  is  fundamental. 
You  know  full  well,  as  a  black  Mississippi 
politician  said  recently,  that  "It's  no  good 
being  able  to  join  the  country  club  if  you 
haven't  got  the  money  to  buy  a  drink." 

And  you  are  taking  action. 

Africa's  development  needs  are  massive; 
and  your  OIC  programs  strike  at  their' 
heart:  vocational  training  to  teach  the 
skills  that  Africa  needs  to  realize  its  poten- 
tial regardless  of  changing  political  circum- 
stances. A  mechanic's  training  or  a  carpen- 
ter's trade  can  be  practiced  in  the  mosi 
turbulent  times;  political  upheavals  can- 
not diminish  the  individual's  sense  of  worth 
which  your  training  instills.  We  give  you 
concrete  support  through  the  Agency  foi 
International  Development  and  will  con- 
tinue to  do  so.  But  it  is  your  initiative  and 
energy  which  has  turned  that  support  into 
something  vital  and  alive. 

Beyond  its  need  for  skilled  manpower, 
Africa's  economic  aspirations  confront  a 
wide  range  of  other  challenges. 

Africa  is  blessed  with  immense  natural 
wealth.  The  ratio  of  population  to  re- 
sources is  as  favorable  as  that  of  any  region 
of  the  developing  world.  Agricultural  pro- 
ductivity can  be  vastly  improved. 

But  no  continent  suffers  so  cruelly  when 
crops  fail  for  lack  of  rain.  No  continent's 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


, ;  atural  economic  regions  are  so  frag- 
lented  by  borders  drawn  up — often  arbi- 
rarily — in  the  colonial  era.  And  no 
ontinent  bears  such  a  crushing  burden  of 
overty  and  illiteracy. 

Africa  is  doubly  challenged — by  recur- 
ent  economic  catastrophes  and  by  the 
eed  for  long-term  growth.  The  United 
tates  is  dealing  with  the  various  dimen- 
ions  of  the  task : 

— To  provide  relief  from  natural  dis- 
sters,  drought,  and  famine,  we  have,  in 
he  past  five  years,  more  than  quadrupled 
emergency  aid  to  African  nations. 

— American  trade  and  investment  are 
rucial  for  Africa's  development.  While 
hey  are  rapidly  expanding,  they  are  not 

lallnough,  especially  for  the  poorest  coun- 
ries.  Therefore  we  plan  to  increase  devel- 
)pment  assistance  for  Africa  substantially 
)ver  the  coming  years — especially  for  the 

oileast  developed  countries. 

— Because  Africa's  needs  frequently 
ranscend  the  limits  of  national  boundaries, 

vilve  are  now  directing  much  of  our  assist- 
ince  to  support  regional  cooperation — in 
ransportation,  agricultural  development 
ind  health  programs,  and  in  collecting  in- 
ormation  by  satellite  on  crops,  weather, 
ivater  resources,  land  use,  and  mineral  ex- 
:raction. 

What  Africa  requires  above  all  else  is  a 
strategy  for  development.  For  example,  the 
3ahel,  the  chronically  drought-ridden  re- 
gion on  the  southern  edge  of  the  Sahara 
Desert,  has  been  a  major  recipient  of  inter- 
national relief  assistance.  The  monumental 
suffering  in  that  area  has  prompted  the 
generous  contributions  of  many  individual 
Americans,  as  well  as  large-scale  govern- 
ment relief  efforts. 

But  the  disasters  which  afflict  the  Sahel 
come  in  recurrent  cycles.  They  are  alter- 
ing the  ecology  across  central  and  western 
Africa ;  the  desert  is  steadily  encroaching 
upon  once-fertile  lands. 

The  time  has  come  to  go  beyond  peri- 
odic measures  of  relief  and  to  take  compre- 
hensive   steps.    To    this    end    the    United 


September  20,  1976 


States,  together  with  an  international 
group  of  donor  countries,  is  seeking  to  re- 
verse the  economic  and  ecological  decline 
of  the  Sahel  and  lay  the  foundations  for 
future  growth.  We  have  proposed  develop- 
ing major  river  basins  to  improve  water 
supply;  increasing  crop  acreage  by  mod- 
ern agricultural  methods;  improving  food 
storage  facilities;  and  enhancing  the  trans- 
portation network  of  the  area. 

The  long-term  effort  in  the  Sahel,  and 
others  needed  elsewhere  in  Africa,  will  re- 
quire intensified  cooperation  among  the  in- 
dustrial democracies  of  North  America, 
Western  Europe,  and  Japan.  This  is  why 
the  United  States  has  endorsed  the  imag- 
inative proposal  of  President  Giscard 
d'Estaing  of  France  for  a  fund  to  organize 
and  coordinate  Western  assistance  efforts 
for  Africa.  And  we  are  seeking  within  the 
Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation 
and  Development  a  more  general  coordina- 
tion of  development  efforts  among  the  in- 
dustrial democracies. 

Africa  is  heavily  dependent  upon  the 
world  economy.  No  African  nation  can  plan 
its  future  effectively  if  its  income  is  buf- 
feted by  external  economic  forces  over 
which  it  has  little  or  no  influence.  The  ex- 
port earnings  of  many  African  economies 
rely  upon  global  market  conditions  for  a 
single  commodity.  And  higher  energy 
prices  or  inflation  abroad  can — as  they 
have — raise  to  prohibitive  levels  the  price 
of  imports  that  Africa  desperately  needs. 

One  year  ago,  at  the  special  session  of 
the  U.N.  General  Assembly,  the  United 
States  presented  a  comprehensive  series  of 
proposals  aimed  at  responding  in  a  coop- 
erative spirit  to  the  needs  of  the  develop- 
ing countries.  We  have  followed  up  these 
initiatives  with  major  efforts  at  the  Paris 
Conference  on  International  Economic  Co- 
operation, at  the  U.N.  Conference  on  Trade 
and  Development  in  Nairobi,  and  in  many 
other  international  institutions.  Many  of 
our  proposals  have  been  implemented  and 
have  had  a  direct  impact  on  Africa. 

Substantial  progress  has  been  made  in 
the  past  year  in  shaping  the  long-term  eco- 


355 


nomic  relationship  between  the  nations  of 
the  Northern  and  Southern  Hemispheres. 
The  initiatives  which  now  form  the  agenda 
for  discussion  are,  by  and  large,  proposals 
made  by  the  United  States.  But  much  work 
remains  to  be  done.  The  United  States  is 
prepared  to  move  forward  in  areas  of  great 
importance  to  the  nations  of  Africa.  For 
example: 

— We  are  prepared  to  address  the  crush- 
ing balance-of-payments  problems  and 
debt  burdens  which  many  poor  African 
nations  suifer  as  a  result  of  high  oil  prices, 
global  inflation,  and  the  recession-related 
downturn  in  export  earnings. 

— We  are  prepared  to  join  with  produc- 
ers and  consumers  of  key  commodities  to 
explore  measures  to  improve  and  stabilize 
markets.  We  are  ready  to  participate  in 
producer-consumer  forums  in  ways  that 
will  benefit  Africa. 

— We  will  seek  satisfactory  international 
arrangements  to  foster  the  investment  nec- 
essary for  Africa's  growth — arrangements 
which  both  respect  national  sovereignty 
and  assure  predictability  and  fair  treat- 
ment for  foreign  investors. 

— We  have  proposed  in  the  multilateral 
trade  negotiations  to  reduce  tariffs  for 
tropical  products  which  are  of  special  in- 
terest to  Africa. 

— We  are  seeking  authorization  from 
Congress  to  make  an  initial  contribution  of 
$15  million  to  the  African  Development 
Bank's  Development  Fund  in  order  to 
foster  industrialization. 

— And  we  will  make  major  efforts  to 
stimulate  the  flow  of  modern  technology  to 
Africa  so  as  to  promote  growth  and  diver- 
sify economies  now  excessively  dependent 
on  a  single  commodity. 

The  United  States  is  committed  to  work 
constructively  with  the  nations  of  Africa 
and  with  other  developing  countries  to  pro- 
mote economic  progress  and  fuller  partici- 
pation in  the  global  economic  system.  But 
we  must  be  frank  to  say  that  rhetorical  as- 
saults and  one-sided  declarations  under- 
mine the  conditions  for  such  cooperation. 
They  weaken  public  support  for  develop- 


ment in  the  industrial  democracies,  whose 
effective  and  sustained  role  is  crucial.  No 
other  group  of  countries — least  of  all  the 
Socialist  countries — is  able  to  provide  the 
technology,  the  managerial  expertise,  or 
the  resources. 

Many  of  the  resolutions  of  the  just  con- 
cluded nonaligned  conference  in  Colombo 
were  clearly  anything  but  nonaligned  in 
content  or  phraseology.  We  reject  such  one- 
sided proclamations  and  warn  that  to  be 
effective  nonalignment  must  be  true  to  its 
name.  It  cannot — indeed,  it  will  not — be 
taken  seriously  if  it  becomes  nothing  more 
than  a  rigid  grouping  aimed  at  producing 
automatic  majorities  and  rhetorical  attacks 
against  the  industrial  democracies. 

The  choice  that  all  nations  face  is  be- 
tween cooperation  and  chaos.  America 
has  made  its  decision  for  cooperation.  We 
invite  others  to  join  us  in  the  same  spirit. 

African  Independence:  Precondition  for  Progress 

Africa's  development  will  be  impossible 
if  the  independence  and  integrity  of  the 
continent  are  not  maintained.  Africa  must 
not  again  become  an  arena  in  which  out- 
side powers  contest  for  spheres  of  influ- 
ence. ' 

This  is  why  the  United  States  agreed 
with  the  Presidents  of  Botswana,  Mozam- 
bique, Tanzania,  and  Zambia  that  non- 
African  nations  should  not  deal  directly 
with  the  liberation  movements  of  southern 
Africa — to  avoid  the  divisions  and  the  com- 
petition which  led  to  the  tragedies  of  the, 
Angolan  civil  war.  We  oppose  those  who 
would  subject  the  African  people  to  out- 
side domination.  Western  colonialism  in 
Africa  is  dying;  it  must  not  now  be  re- 
placed by  a  new  form  of  external  inter- 
vention more  insidious  because  less  familiar 
which,  in  the  end,  may  take  generations 
to  root  out. 

The  United  States  seeks  no  African  bloc 
of  its  own,  no  paramount  influence  in 
Africa.  We  will  oppose  all  those  who  do. 
The  United  States  calls  on  all  nations  to 
affirm  the  principle  that  Africa's  destiny  is 
for  Africa  to  determine.  The  United  Statesi 


356 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


.vill  not  import  great-power  conflict  into 
Africa.  We  will  expect  others  to  do  the 
^ame. 

There  is  no  better  guarantee  against  for- 
y\^n  intervention  than  the  determination  of 
Alncan  nations  to  defend  their  own  inde- 
pendence and  unity.  Let  us,  therefore,  not 
minimize  the  importance  of  the  security 
problems  that  some  African  nations  face. 
Economic  development  is  certainly  a  cru- 
cial priority;  but  by  itself  it  cannot  prevent 
outside  pressure  or  threats  to  African  sov- 
ereignty. 

So  let  us  not  accept  the  facile  proposi- 
tion that  black  African  nations  do  not  have 
the  same  need  as  other  nations  to  defend 
themselves  against  recognized  dangers — 
especially  when  they  perceive  serious  and 
imminent  threats  from  nearby  nations 
which  have  been  heavily  armed  by  the 
Soviet  Union.  We  are  determined  to  avoid 
unnecessary  arms  races.  But  when  friendly 
and  moderate  nations  like  Kenya  or  Zaire 
make  modest  and  responsible  requests  for 
assistance  to  protect  themselves  against 
belligerent  neighbors  possessing  substantial 
quantities  of  modern  Soviet  weapons,  we 
owe  them  our  serious  consideration. 

Africa  and  the  World 

One  fact  is  clear:  a  time  of  change  has 
come  again  to  Africa.  Let  us  all  take  the 
opportunity  before  us  to  avoid  a  future  of 


bitterness,  escalating  war,  and  foreign  in- 
tervention. Let  us  all  help  a  peaceful  and 
prospering  and  just  Africa  take  its  rightful 
place  in  the  world. 

What  Africa  needs  now  is  not  a  return  to 
the  exploitative  or  interventionist  practices 
of  decades  past.  Nor  does  it  need  exuber- 
ant promises  and  vapid  expressions  of  good 
will.  It  requires  concrete  commitments  to 
progress — political  and  economic.  It  re- 
quires our  readiness  to  cooperate  as  sover- 
eign equals  on  the  basis  of  mutual  respon- 
sibility and  mutual  benefit. 

In  this  spirit,  the  United  States  will  do 
its  part.  Let  there  be  no  mistake :  Africa 
will  take  its  destiny  firmly  into  its  own 
hands,  whether  we  like  it  or  not;  it  will 
make  its  contribution  to  the  world  commu- 
nity in  its  own  way,  whether  we  cooperate 
or  not.  But  the  cause  of  freedom,  not  only 
for  ourselves  but  for  all  mankind,  will  be 
vitally  affected  by  the  part  America  plays. 
We  can  turn  our  backs  on  one  of  the  most 
massive  awakenings  of  a  people  in  history 
and,  in  the  process,  desert  our  principles 
and  help  doom  a  continent  to  a  future  of 
despair. 

Or  we  can,  as  every  generation  of  Amer- 
icans before  us,  make  history  ours. 

I  believe  Americans  will  choose  the 
course  of  hope  and  heart.  And  by  so  doing 
we  will  once  again  have  demonstrated  the 
vitality  of  our  values  and  given  the  world 
a  "new  birth  of  freedom." 


September  20,  1976 


357 


Secretary  Kissinger's  News  Conference  at  Philadelphia  August  31 


Press  release  404  dated  August  31 

Q.  Thank  you,  Reverend  Sullivan.^ 
Ml'.  Secretary,  in  connection  ivith  your  up- 
coming talks,  what  specific  recommendations 
will  you  make  on  behalf  of  the  United  States 
to  make  peace  in  South  Africa  and  also  Rho- 
desia? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  do  not  think  it 
would  be  appropriate  for  me  to  go  into  the 
details  of  discussions  that  are  about  to 
take  place  this  weekend.  But  I  have  laid 
out  our  views  with  respect  to  both  Rhodesia 
and  Namibia. 

With  respect  to  Rhodesia,  we  believe 
that  there  should  be  a  rapid  transition  to 
majority  rule,  protection  for  minority 
rights,  and  a  negotiation  in  which  the  black 
African  states,  the  various  movements  in 
Rhodesia,  and  the  existing  authorities  of 
Rhodesia  participate  to  find  a  solution 
within  that  framework. 

With  respect  to  Namibia,  we  believe  that 
there  should  be  a  firm  date  for  independ- 
ence, a  negotiation  in  which  all  the  groups 
— all  the  relevant  groups — participate  and 
establish  a  constitutional  framework  on  the 
basis  of  majority  rule. 

Q.  Are  you  suggesting,  perhaps — in  your 
speech  earlier,  with  economic  help  to  Africa 
— a  neiv  "Marshall  plan"  for  Africa?  Is  that 
what  you  have  in  mind? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  the  methods  that 
were  appropriate  at  the  time  of  the 
Marshall  plan  do  not  lend  themselves  ex- 
actly to  the  conditions  in  the  1970's.  But 
we  believe  that  Africa  needs  regional  de- 


'  Opening  remarks  by  Reverend  Leon  H.  Sullivan, 
founder,  Opportunities  Industrialization  Centers,  are 
included  in  press  release  404. 


velopment  because  many  of  the  nations  are 
very  fragmented.  And  we  believe  also  that 
other  industrial  nations  should  cooperate 
with  us  in  order  to  get  the  maximum 
impact. 

We  have  to  remember  that  Africa  is 
actually — it  is  a  huge  continent,  but  not 
too  thickly  populated.  So  that  it  is  possible 
in  Africa,  with  its  substantial  resources,  to 
make  considerable  progress  if  coordinated 
efforts   are   developed. 

Q.  On  South  Africa,  you  said,  "Our  policy 
is  based  upon  the  premise  that  within  a 
reasonable  period  of  time  we  ivill  see  a  clear 
evolution  toward  just  internal  arrange- 
ments." 

Can  you  tell  me  first  tvhat  you  consider  a 
reasonable  period  of  time  and  what  you  con- 
sider a  clear  evolution  to\vard  changes?  And, 
failing  these,  ivhat  action  tvould  the  United\\ 
States  take  in  regard  to  South  Africa? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  am  meeting  with 
the  Prime  Minister  of  South  Africa  this 
weekend,  and  I  don't  think  it  would  be 
appropriate  for  me  to  go  into  details  on 
these  points  now. 

Q.  You  said  earlier  in  the  speech  that  you 
believe  the  white  populations  of  Rhodesia  and 
Namibia  should  accept  the  concept  of  major- 
ity rule,  and  you  did  not  mention  South 
Africa.  Was  that  an  intentional  omission? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  have  also  stated  we 
do  not  accept  the  principles  and  practice 
of  apartheid.  We  have  made  a  distinction 
in  all  our  public  statements,  not  on  the 
principle  of  majority  rule  but  on  the 
principle  that  South  Africa  does  not,  in 
oui  view,  represent  a  colonial  entity.  It 
represents  a  legitimate  government  which 


358 


Department  of  Stale  Bulletin  j 


J 


carries  out  practices  with  which  we  dis- 
agree. And  this  is  a  different  phenomenon 
from  Rhodesia  and  Namibia,  requiring  a 
different  sort  of  influence. 

Q.  Does  the  United  States  support  the  con- 
,  cept  of  majority  rule  in  South  Africa? 

I     Secretary   Kissinger:    The    United    States 
,  supports    the    principle    of    majority    rule 
everywhere. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  does  the  United  States 
plan  to  recognize  Angola,  and  if  not,  ivhy 
not?  And  also,  can  tve  expect  economic  aid  to 
be  forthcoming  for  Mozambique,  as  promised 
in  the  Lusaka  speech? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  With  respect  to  An- 
gola, the  United  States  has  stated  re- 
peatedly that  our  objection  to  Angola  is 
not  the  grouping  that  took  power  there.  We 
recognized  Mozambique  immediately,  even 
though  its  leadership  also  had  a  radical 
orientation. 

Our  concern  with  Angola  is  the  in- 
fluence— it  is  the  existence  there  of  a  large 
Cuban   military   force   that   permeates   all 

'  aspects  of  that  society. 

In  a  speech  in  Monrovia,  Liberia,  last 
April,  I  indicated  that  if  we  were  given 
some  assurances  about  the  removal  of  those 
forces,  the  road  to  recognition  would  be 
open. 

A  few  weeks  later,  we  were  given  some 
assurances  through  the  Prime  Minister  of 
Sweden   to   the    effect  that   Cuban   forces 

I  would  be  removed  over  a  period  of  time. 

I  We  have  been  watching  this  now  since 
we  received  those  assurances,  and  we  have 
no  clear-cut  indication  that  Cuban  forces 
are  being  removed.  Some  are  leaving  and 
new  ones  are  coming  in. 

So  the  obstacle  to  our  relations  with 
Angola  is  the  presence  of  a  Cuban  expedi- 
tionary force. 

With   respect  to   Mozambique,   the   Ad- 

:  ministration  has  made  its  proposal  to  the 

.  Congress,  and  it  is  now  in  the  hands  of  the 

.  Congress. 

'      Q.  You've  been  holding  meetings  with  the 


black    movement    for    quite    a    number    of 
weeks — 

Secretary  Kissinger:  With  whom?  I  didn't 
hear — 

Mr.  Funseth  [Robert  L.  Fmiseth,  Special 
Assistant  for  Press  Relations']:  The  black 
movement. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  black  movement, 
yes. 

Q.  Yes.  I  ivas  tvondering  how  valuable  the 
input  has  been  to  you,  and  has  it  heightened 
your  sensitivity  to  the  problem  in  South 
Africa? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  It  is  true  that  I  have 
been  meeting  with  leaders  of  the  black 
movement.  And  I  think,  as  Reverend  Sulli- 
van pointed  out,  this  had  not  previously 
been  the  practice  of  my  predecessors,  and 
therefore  both  sides  have  had  something 
to  learn.  Many  of  the  leaders  of  the  black 
movement  have  not  in  the  past  dealt  at  the 
policy  level,  and  I  had  no  experience  at 
dealing  with  black  leaders,  as  I  demon- 
strated in  my  remarks  to  the  Urban  League 
in  Boston  a  few  weeks  ago. 

But  it  has  been  extremely  valuable  to 
me  in  giving  me  a  sense  of  the  mood  of 
that  part  of  our  population  which  has  per- 
haps the  deepest  concern  for  these  prob- 
lems. And  these  meetings  are  taking  place 
regularly  now  and  will  continue  to  be  part 
of  our  policy  considerations. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  your  speech  today  seemed 
to  indicate  a  concern  for  perhaps  a  weaken- 
ing of  support  among  some  black  African 
leaders  and  also  a  concern  for  the  frag- 
mentation of  black  nationalist  leaders  in 
Africa.  This  being  the  case,  and  along  ivith 
some  of  the  statements  made  recently  by 
[Zambianl  President  Kaunda,  is  the  situa- 
tion worse  today  or  better  today,  as  you  em- 
bark on  your  new  efforts? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  think  the  situation 
has  been  improving,  but  as  progress  is 
being  made,  obviously  the  difficulties  also 
become  more  apparent.  Because  as  long  as 


September  20,  1976 


359 


you  are  talking  about  an  objective  in  the 
abstract,  hard  decisions  do  not  have  to  be 
made.  As  an  objective  grows  nearer,  the 
decisions  become  more  complicated. 

So  the  reports  of  Under  Secretary  [for 
Economic  Affairs  William  D.]  Rogers  and 
Assistant  Secretary  [for  African  Affairs 
William  E.]  Schaufele  were,  on  the  whole, 
positive.  But  the  issue  of  Rhodesia  is  ex- 
tremely complicated,  involving,  as  it  does, 
the  many  parties  of  black  Africa,  of  the 
var&us  liberation  movements  of  Rhodesia 
and  South  Africa.  The  issue  of  Namibia  is 
separable  from  the  issue  of  Rhodesia,  and, 
as  I  pointed  out  in  my  speech,  need  not  be 
dealt  with  in  the  same  time  frame.  But  it 
also  has  its  complications. 

•  So,  on  the  whole,  I  would  say  progress 
is  being  made,  and  as  progress  is  being 
made,  obviously  the  more  difficult  issues 
remain  for  the  last. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  Dr.  Sullivan  suggested 
that  the  United  States  should  withdraw  its 
diplomatic  presence  if  the  elimination  of 
apartheid  does  not  occur  in  South  Africa 
within  a  reasonable  time.  What  is  your  re- 
action to  that  and  also  to  his  proposal  that 
the  U.S.  Government  use  its  influence  to  see 
that  American  businesses  operating  in  South 
Africa  end  racial  apartheid  within  their  oivn 
organizations?  What  kind  of  influence  can 
you  exert  on  those  businesses? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  We  strongly  support 
the  proposal  that  American  businesses  not 
practice  apartheid,  and  practice  the  same 
policies  that  they  do  at  home. 

With  respect  to  future  measures  about 
South  Africa,  our  hope  is  still  to  promote  a 
peaceful  evolution.  And  we  shall  discuss  the 
subject,  and  I  think  it  would  be  inappropri- 
ate for  me  to  set  deadlines  or  to  threaten 
prior  to  a  meeting  in  which  we  will  discuss 
issues  which  we  hope  will  lead  to  majority 
rule  in  Rhodesia  and  Namibia  and  will  have 
a  beneficial  impact  within  South  Africa. 

Q.  How  likely  is  a  peaceful  settlement  in 
the  entire  South  Africa — southern  African 
region  ? 


360 


Secretary  Kissinger:  It  is  an  extremely 
complicated  issue.  On  the  other  hand,  we 
also  feel  that  time  is  running  out  on  it  and 
that  we  have  a  moral  and  political  obliga- 
tion to  do  what  we  can  to  bring  about  a 
peaceful  settlement,  all  the  more  so  as 
violence  will  delay  achievement  of  these, 
goals  and  may  have  serious  consequences 
for  everybody. 

We  will  do  the  best  we  can,  but  obviously 
we  cannot  predict  the  outcome. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  today  is  the  deadline,  I 
think,  that  has  been  set  by  the  Security 
Council  for  some  positive  action  concerning 
Namibia's  independence.  Some  of  us  are 
waiting  to  hear  what  is  going  to  be  done  or 
said  by  South  Africa.  Can  you  anticipate 
what  is  going  to  be  done? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Because  of  some  of 
the  diplomatic  efforts  now  underway,  there 
has  been  a  general  consensus  to  delay  the 
debate  in  the  Security  Council  until  later 
in  the  month  of  September,  and  the  dis- 
cussions will  take  place  at  that  time,  and 
what  will  be  done  will  depend  on  the 
events  that  have  occurred  in  the  interval. 

Q.  There  is  a  rumor,  Mr.  Secretary,  that 
you  have  a  crystal  ball  soyneivhere.  Can  you 
look  into  that  crystal  ball  and  try  to  give  us  o 
hint  as  to  ivhat  might  happen? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  believe  that  a  solu- 
tion to  the  problem  of  Namibia  is  possi- 
ble, since  the  principle  of  independence 
has  now  been  accepted.  But  there  are  stil' 
many  thorny  issues  on  the  road  to  a  settle- 
ment, and  I  would  reserve  making  a  fina 
prediction  until  the  consultations  which  1 
am  starting  this  Friday — or  this  Saturday 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  in  February  you  prom- 
ised the  Black  Caucus  to  hire  more  blacks  ih 
the  State  Department.  Has  that  been  fulfillea 
yet,  sir? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Let  me  explain  the 
situation  of  hiring  in  the  State  Department, 

I  think  it  is  fair  to  say  that  traditionally 
the   State    Department   has   considered    it- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


^cir — or  has  been  an  organization  which 
has  been  largely  white,  and  it  has  been 
sxtremely  difficult  to  break  that  mold. 

In  1973,  when  I  became  Secretary  of 
State,  there  were  eight  Ambassadors,  most 
jf  them  political — eight  black  Ambassa- 
dors, one  principal  officer  in  a  Mission,  and 
3110  Deputy  Chief  of  Mission. 

Now  we  have  still  eight  Ambassadors, 
but  most  of  them  are  career.  We  have  one 
black  Assistant  Secretary — the  first  in  the 
Department's  history — two  Deputy  Assist- 
ant Secretaries,  four  Deputy  Chiefs  of  Mis- 
sion, and  four  principal  officers. 

Now,  the  numbers  aren't  very  large  be- 
cause the  whole  Foreign  Service  is  a  rela- 
tively small  organization  of  less  than  5,000 
members. 

Secondly,  the  number  of  officers — of 
black  officers — has  risen  from  250  to  some- 
thing like  361. 

Now,  it  is  a  slow  process  because  we 
have  to  do  two  things.  We  have  to  get  more 
black  college  students  to  apply  for  the 
Foreign  Service.  And  in  order  to  change  the 
numerical  balance  in  the  direction  of  hiring 
more  blacks,  we  have  started  a  system  of 
what  is  called  lateral  entry,  where  people 
can  enter  the  middle  grades  of  the  Foreign 
Service  without  going  through  the  whole 
process  of  promotion.  This  system  was  only 
started  in  1975,  and  we  take  20  black  offi- 
cers a  year  under  that  system.  We  now 
have  300  applicants  under  that  program. 

We  have  also  created  an  Office  of  Equal 
Opportunity  which  has  the — has  no  other 
responsibility  than  to  improve  the  recruit- 
ment of  minority  personnel  and  which  can 
also  act  as  a  grievance  board  for  minority 
personnel. 

We  have  made  a  special  recruiting 
ett'ort  and  have  allocated  funds  by  going 
to  203  universities  and  19  black  colleges 
in  order  to  get  more  black  applicants  into 
the  Foreign  Service.  Since  the  law  pro- 
hibits us  from  keeping  records  on  the  basis 
of  color,  I  cannot  give  you  the  breakdown 
of  how  many  additional  black  officers  are 
in  fact  applying. 

And,  finally,  we  have  had  now  underway 


September  20,  1976 


for  a  year  two  outside  studies,  one  having 
to  do  with  the  problem  of  lateral  entry  and 
one  having  to  do  with  the  problem  of  re- 
cruitment under  the  equal  opportunity 
system. 

So,  while  we  started  very  far  behind  in 
the  State  Department,  we  are  making  a 
major  effort  to  bring  in  more  black  per- 
sonnel by  the  various  methods  that  I  have 
described  and  by  the  promotions  that  I 
have  indicated. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  can  you  give  us  some 
idea  of  what  the  factors  are  that  will  deter- 
mine whether  or  not  you  will  personally  visit 
South  Africa  and.  whether  the  extent  of  their 
cooperation  in  the  Rhodesian  effort  ivill  be  a 
factor  in  determining  ivhether  you  go? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Whether  I  personally 
visit  southern  Africa,  you  must  mean. 

Q.  No,  South  Africa. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  first  question  is 
whether  I  will — there  is  no  point  in  going 
to  South  Africa  unless  I  go  to  black  Africa 
first.  So,  a  great  deal  will  depend  on  my 
conclusions  after  some  exchanges  which 
we  are  now  engaged  in  with  black  African 
leaders  and  my  discussions  with  Prime 
Minister  Vorster. 

Then  I  will  have  to  decide — I  do  not 
believe  that  it  is  possible  to  settle  the 
Rhodesian  issue  within  a  few  weeks.  That 
will  take  a  more  extended  period  of  time. 

But  if  I  am  convinced  that  progress  is 
possible  on  the  Rhodesian  issue,  that  would 
affect  the  decision. 

The  same  is  true  of  the  Namibian  issue, 
which  is  somewhat  less  complicated  and 
perhaps  lends  itself  better  to  a  solution. 

But  the  judgment  will  be  made  on  the 
basis  of  whether  significant  enough  prog- 
ress is  achievable,  even  if  no  final  solution 
is  possible. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  ivhy  is  it  that  the  United 
States  has  suddenly  expressed  such  great 
interest  in  black  Africa  after  sort  of  ignoring 
it  for  decades?  You  are  now  planning  your 
second   major   trip   there.   There    has   been 


361 


fighting  in  Sudan  and  previously  ive  ignored 
it.  What  has  changed  to  bring  about  this  neiv 
U.S.  interest?  Is  it  the  American  political 
race  at  the  moment,  or  is  it  something  else? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  think  that  it  was 
obvious  that  my  previous  trip  was  not  one 
of  the — was  not  a  political  "ten-strike." 

We  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  con- 
ditions in  Africa  would  lead  to — if  the 
United  States  did  not  play  a  more  active 
role — would  lead  inexorably  to  great- 
power  involvement,  to  a  major  risk  of  war, 
or  to  the  radicalization  of  the  entire 
continent. 

And  we  concluded  that  it  was  in  the 
interest  of  world  peace,  in  the  interest  of 
security,  and  in  the  interest  of  the  United 
States  and  in  the  interest  of  Africa  that 
the  United  States  make  a  major  effort.  Be- 
cause otherwise  we  saw  only  a  deteriorat- 
ing situation. 

Having  made  that  decision,  we  felt  that 
we  should  make  a  major  effort,  because  if 
it  is  worth  doing,  it  is  worth  doing  with 
energy  and  conviction. 

Dr.  Sullivan:  And  there  is  another  reason, 
because  some  of  us  in  this  country  aren't 
going  to  let  them  sit  and  do  nothing  any 
more.  It  will  never  happen  as  long  as  fel- 
lows like  me  are  around  now.  There  is  a 
change.  And  whatever  happens,  it  will 
never  be  like  it  was  before. 


That  is  why  we  say  there  has  got  to  be 
freedom  in  Namibia;  there  has  got  to  be  1 
majority  rule  for  Rhodesia ;  and  apartheid 
has  got  to  come  to  an  end  sometime  in  | 
South  Africa.  It  is  a  whole  different  ball ' 
game  now.  That's  another  reason  why. 

Q.  Dr.  Kissinger,  could  you  amplify  on  this 
point,  tvhich  you  touched  on  in  your  speech 
from  a  different  perspective. 

In  vieiv  of  the  recent  spiral  of  violence  in 
South  Africa  itself,  does  this  make  it  awk- 
ward for  you  to  visit,  to  contemplate  visiting 
South  Africa,  or  do  you  believe,  with  some 
reason,  that  this  makes  it  more  necessary  for 
you  to  go? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Visiting  South  Africa 
is  not  the  purpose  of  the  trip  to  Africa. 

If  I  should  go  to  South  Africa,  it  would 
be  with  the  full  support  of  the  leaders  of 
black  Africa,  in  order  to  bring  about  objec- 
tives which  we  have  jointly  worked  out 
with  the  leaders  of  black  Africa.  Whether 
that  is  possible  will  depend  on  talks  first 
with  the  South  African  Prime  Minister, 
and  afterward,  if  I  decide  to  go  to  Africa, 
with  the  leaders  of  black  Africa. 

So,  this  is  not  a  mission  that  the  United 
States  undertakes  as  a  protocol  visit.  It  is 
a  mission  which  we  would  take  in  the  clos- 
est cooperation  and  with  the  full  support 
of  black  Africa,  or  it  would  not  be  under- 
taken. 


362 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


Secretary  Interviewed  by  Philadelphia  World  AfFairs  Council  Panel 


Following  is  the  transcript  of  an  interview 
with  Secretary  Kissinger  at  a  dinner  meet- 
ing sponsored  hy  the  Philadelphia  World 
Affairs  Council  on  August  31.  Members  of 
the  panel  were  Creed  C.  Black,  editor,  Phila- 
delphia Inquirer;  John  G.  McCidlough,  editor 
of  the  editorial  page,  Philadelphia  B7dletin: 
Jessica  Savitch,  anchorwoman  and  reporter, 
KYW-TV ;  C.  Sumner  Stone,  associate  editor 
and  columnist,  Philadelphia  Daily  Neivs;  and 
William  W.  Bodine,  Jr.,  president,  Philadel- 
phia World  Affairs  Council,  moderator.^ 


release  403  dated  August   31 


Secretary  Kissinger:  First,  the  foreign 
policy  of  a  great  nation  is  not  the  inven- 
tion of  its  President  or  of  its  Secretary  of 
State.  The  foreign  policy  of  a  nation  is 
determined  very  importantly  by  the  objec- 
tive circumstances  in  which  it  finds  itself, 
by  the  values  of  its  people,  and  only  to 
some  extent  by  the  ability  of  its  leaders  to 
discern  these  trends  and  to  shape  them  for 
their  own  ends. 

One  therefore  should  not  believe  that 
foreign  policy  can  be  changed  dramatically 
at  regular  intervals.  Indeed,  a  well-con- 
sidered foreign  policy  at  some  point  in  the 
nation's  history  must  achieve  some  level  of 
stability  and  must  in  its  main  lines  be  fixed. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  occasionally 
are  periods  of  great  change.  And  in  the  last 
eight  years,  the  United  States  has  under- 
gone very  important  changes  in  the  inter- 
national environment  in  which  we  find 
ourselves. 

It  is  not  only  that  we  had  to  end  a  war, 
which  we  found  when  coming  into  office. 


'  Introductory  remarks  by  Mr.  Bodine  and  the 
opening  paragraphs  of  Secretary  Kissinger's  re- 
marks, which  are  included  in  press  release  405,  are 
not   printed   here. 


in  a  rather  painful  and  difficult  way  and 
that  America  had  to  adjust  to  this  traumatic 
experience.  It  is  also  that  the  many  ele- 
ments in  the  international  environment,  as 
we  have  known  it  throughout  our  modern 
history,  had  radically  altered. 

First,  this  is  the  period  in  which  the 
growth  of  nuclear  weapons  on  both  sides 
has  created  the  unprecedented  fact  that 
there  are  two  nations  in  the  world  that 
can  destroy  each  other  and  destroy  hu- 
manity. And  therefore  many  of  the  tradi- 
tional patterns  of  international  relations, 
many  of  the  risks  that  in  the  past  could  be 
run,  are  no  longer  applicable.  Whoever  is 
President  will  sooner  or  later  be  driven  to 
the  realization  that  was  first  expressed  by 
President  Eisenhower — that  there  is  no 
alternative  to  peace. 

How  to  create  a  stable  peace  and  how 
to  control  the  nuclear  arsenals  of  both 
sides  becomes  an  overriding  task  of  our 
diplomacy. 

Throughout  history,  it  was  inconceivable 
that  a  nation  could  possess  too  much 
power.  Almost  any  additional  increment 
of  power  you  acquired  could  be  put  to 
political  use.  We  live  in  a  period  in  which 
an  upper  limit  of  destructiveness  is  reached 
beyond  which,  civilization  having  already 
been  destroyed,  the  additional  accumula- 
tion of  at  least  strategic  power  is  no  longer 
relevant. 

What  conclusions  one  draws  from  this  in 
the  field  of  negotiations  or  in  the  field  of 
day-to-day  diplomacy,  we  can  perhaps  dis- 
cuss with  the  panel.  I  simply  want  to  point 
out  the  new  facts  of  international  relations. 

The  second  new  fact  is  that  for  the  first 
time  in  history,  foreign  policy  has  become 
truly  global.  Never  before  have  the  conti- 
nents been  in  daily  contact  with  each  other. 


September  20,  1976 


363 


Never  before  have  there  been  power  cen- 
ters in  every  part  of  the  globe.  And  never 
before  has  it  been  necessary  to  construct 
an  international  community  out  of  so  many 
diverse  elements. 

And  this  is  compounded  by  the  rapidity 
of  communications,  so  that  not  only  is 
policy  global,  reaction  has  to  be  nearly 
instantaneous. 

Now,  when  one  speaks  of  peace,  one  has 
to  speak  of  a  world  which  the  majority  of 
the  nations  considers  just  or  at  least  just 
enough  so  that  they  do  not  feel  that  they 
can  achieve  their  ends  only  by  overthrow- 
ing it. 

The  great  upheavals  of  our  period  have 
been  caused  because  there  have  been 
countries  which  assaulted  the  international 
order  as  it  then  existed.  And  the  great 
challenge  of  our  time  is  to  build  a  peace 
in  which  the  majority  of  nations  will  have 
a  sense  of  participating. 

This  is  why  I  have  greatly  welcomed  the 
efforts  made  here  in  this  city  that  have 
taken  the  form  of  a  declaration  of  inter- 
dependence, because  interdependence  is 
the  cardinal  fact  of  our  period  and  is  one 
of  the  novel  features  of  our  period. 

And  as  Americans,  we  are  living  for  the 
first  time  since  our  early  days  under  con- 
ditions in  which  we  do  not  have  over- 
whelming power.  Our  influence  for  good 
or  ill  is  decisive  for  security  and  for  prog- 
ress. But  we  can  no  longer  overwhelm  our 
problems  with  resources.  We  no  longer 
have  the  margin  of  safety  that  permitted 
us  to  wait  until  threats  became  overwhelm- 
ing before  we  reacted  or  that  enabled  us 
to  solve  the  economic  problems  of  a  conti- 
nent as  we  did  at  the  time  of  the  Marshall 
plan  with  unilateral  American  decisions. 

So  much  more  depends  on  our  under- 
standing and  on  our  sophistication  and  on 
our  public  support  than  ever  before  in  our 
history. 

And  this  means  that  we  have  to  face  one 
of  the  fundamental  problems  of  statesman- 
ship, which  is  that  when  the  scope  for 
action  is  greatest,  the  knowledge  on  which 
to  base  such  action  is  at  a  minimum.  When 


364 


your  knowledge  is  greatest,  the  scope  for 
action  has  very  often  disappeared. 

In  1936,  it  would  have  been  very  simple 
to  deal  with  the  threat  represented  by 
Hitler.  But  the  world  would  still  be  debat- 
ing today  whether  Hitler  was  a  misunder- 
stood nationalist  or  a  maniac  bent  on  world 
domination. 

By  1941,  everybody  knew  that  he  was  a 
maniac  bent  on  world  domination,  but  it 
was  a  knowledge  acquired  at  the  price  of 
tens  of  millions  of  lives,  and  therefore  we 
have  to  face  the  fact  that  our  most  impor- 
tant actions  have  to  be  based  on  assess- 
ments that  cannot  be  proved  true  when 
they  are  made.  And  foreign  policy  there- 
fore requires  a  greater  degree  of  public 
understanding  and  a  greater  degree  of 
support  than  has  ever  been  the  case  in  our 
history. 

Now,  I  think  it  would  be  better  to  re- 
spond to  specifics  of  our  foreign  policy  in 
the  form  of  answers  to  questions.  But  it  is 
important  to  keep  in  mind  the  permanent 
goals  of  American  foreign  policy — for 
peace,  for  progress,  for  justice,  for  inter- 
national order,  for  relating  these  scores  of 
new  nations  that  have  come  into  being  to 
a  new  system,  for  strengthening  our  ties 
with  our  traditional  friends,  and  for  bring- 
ing about  a  safer  and  more  progressive 
world  than  the  one  we  found. 

And  with  this,  I  will  be  glad  to  answei 
questions. 

Mr.  Black:  Mr.  Secretary,  as  the  first 
media  representative  speaking,  I  suppose  1 
should  join  in  the  welcome.  You  certainly 
have  made  our  lives  more  interesting  ovei 
the  last  eight  years.  And  I  would  ask  you  tc 
extend  our  special  regards  to  that  highly 
placed  source  that  usually  travels  ivith  you. 
If  he  isn't  with  you  tonight,  we  ivill  tell  him 
how  help  fid  he  has  been.  [Laughter.] 

It  is  true,  as  you  say,  that  in  the  last  yearn 
there  have  been  some  dramatic  changes  in 
our  policy.  And  you  have,  despite  what  you 
say  about  the  formation  of  foreign  policy, 
been  the  architect  of  many  of  these  changes. 

hi  Kansas  City,  a  couple  of  weeks  ago,  the 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


k 


lepublican  Party  adopted  an  amendment  to 
he  foreign  policy  plank  which  was  generally 
egarded  as  a  repudiation  of  many  of  these 
policies. 

One  of  our  Washington  colleagues  just  this 
lery  morning,  who  I  think  is  very  well  in- 
armed— that  is,  Marquis  Childs — wrote  a 
olumn  in  ivhich  he  quoted  one  of  your  asso- 
iates  as  saying  that,  just  as  you  left  for 
'{ansas  City,  you  described  this  as  the  most 
earing  experience  of  your  life.  I  tvonder 
f  you  could  tell  us  if  that  is  an  accurate  de- 
cription  of  your  reaction  to  the  action  of 
/our  own  party  in  Kansas  City? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  You  know,  one  of  the 
ittributes  of  high  office  is  that  none  of 
)ne's  associates  is  ever  willing  to  admit 
hat  he  doesn't  know  what  he  is  talking 
ibout.   [Laughter.] 

The  so-called  morality  plank  in  the  Re- 
jublican  platform  has  to  be  seen  in 
;erms  of  the  internal  maneuvering  of  the 
Republican  Party  of  the  convention  and 
not  as  an  expression  of  well-considered 
ubstantive  sentiment. 

There  was  an  intention  to  force  a  fight 
between  the  Ford  camp  and  the  Reagan 
amp,  after  the  Ford  camp  had  won  the 
rule  16(c). 

President  Ford  and  his  associates  de- 
cided, in  my  view  wisely,  not  to  fight  on  a 
plank  which  in  itself  was  really  quite 
unexceptionable. 

The  phrases  in  that  plank  can  be  sub- 
scribed to  by  anybody,  including  myself, 
by  about  90  percent.  To  be  sure,  we  are 
not  children,  and  we  know  that  a  few 
words  were  put  in  there  in  order  to  result 
in  some  needling. 

But  if  you  say,  should  we  make  unilateral 
concessions,  nobody  can  say  we  were  mak- 
ing unilateral  concessions.  And  the  basic 
principles  that  were  stated  there  are  prin- 
ciples that  I  don't  object  to — in  fact,  that 
I  subscribe  to.  And  the  maneuvering  with 
respect  to  that  platform  had  much  more  to 
do  with  lining  up  delegates  for  the  final 
nominating  vote  than  with  the  substance 
of  foreign  policy.  And  I  stayed  out  of  it, 


September  20,  1976 


And  I  consider  that  the  decisions  of  that 
week  were  not  decisions  in  which  I  should 
get  myself  involved. 

Southern  Africa 

Mr.  Stone:  Mr.  Secretary,  in  your  public 
utterances,  you  have  consistently  drawn  a 
moral  distinction  between  Rhodesia  and 
Namibia  on  the  one  hand  and  South  Africa 
on  the  other.  For  example,  in  a  speech  at 
noon  today  before  the  OIC  [Opportunities 
Industrialization  Centers'],  you  said,  "The 
white  populations  of  Rhodesia  and  Namibia 
must  recognize  that  majority  ride  is  inevita- 
ble." And  one  of  my  colleagues  from  the  In- 
quirer suggested  you  deliberately  omitted 
South  Africa. 

Later  in  the  speech,  you  said,  "Unlike 
Rhodesia  and  Namibia,  South  Africa  cannot 
be  regarded  as  an  illegitimate  government." 

Do  you  think  that  black  Africa's  leaders 
and  South  Africa's  disenfranchised  blacks 
agree  ivith  your  assessment  of  South  Africa 
as  a  legitimate  government? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  think  that  most  of 
black  Africa's  leaders — and  I  would  say 
all  of  the  ones  that  I  know — would  agree 
that  there's  a  big  difference  between  South 
Africa  and  Namibia  and  Rhodesia. 

They  consider  Namibia  and  Rhodesia  a 
colonial  structure.  They  consider  South 
Africa  an  African  government  that  has  an 
unjust  domestic  structure  that  must  be 
changed. 

But  they  are  not  talking  about  expelling 
the  white  population  from  South  Africa. 
And  therefore  I  would  think  that  the  prob- 
lem of  South  Africa  is  a  different  problem 
from  the  problem  of  Namibia  and  Rho- 
desia, even  though  in  my  speech  this  after- 
noon I  also  condemned  the  practices  of  the 
South  African  Government  with  respect  to 
its  domestic   legislation. 

Mr.  Stone:  Would  you  [inaudible]  say  that 
majority  rule  is  inevitable  in  South  Africa? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  would  believe  that 
the  practice  of  apartheid  must  end. 


365 


Mr.  Stone:  I  didn't  ask  that  question. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  believe  that  major- 
ity rule  must  also  come  to  South  Africa. 
But  I  would  say  the  way  of  achieving  it  is 
a  different  way  than  the  way  in  Namibia 
and   Rhodesia. 

Ms.  Saviteh:  Mr.  Secretary,  getting  back- 
to  Mr.  Black's  question  on  what  happened  in 
Kansas  City.  During  the  Nixon  years,  it 
seems  as  thottgh  you  acted  as  a  personal 
emissary  of  the  President,  ivhile  in  the  Ford 
Administration  it  seems  as  though  foreign 
policy  is  implemented  on  a  much  wider  level. 

What  are  your  oivn  future  plans  past  Jan- 
uary 26,  or  ivhenever  Inauguration  Day  is? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  in  the  Nixon 
Administration,  except  for  the  last  year,  I 
was  Assistant  to  the  President.  And 
through  all  of  the  Ford  Administration,  I 
have  been  Secretary  of  State.  And  those 
are  two  different  functions. 

As  Assistant  to  the  President,  you  act 
primarily  as  an  extension  to  the  President. 
As  the  Secretary  of  State,  you  have  to  con- 
duct the  foreign  policy  of  the  United  States 
through  a  well-established  apparatus. 

As  far  as  my  own  personal  plans  are 
concerned,  I  am  constantly  asked  that 
question.  I  believe  it  is  important  to  keep 
in  mind  that  we  have  to  conduct  foreign 
policy,  even  during  this  election,  in  a 
rather  dangerous  and  complicated  period. 
And  I  don't  want  to  add  any  more  uncer- 
tainty to  it. 

I  have  said  repeatedly  that  after  Presi- 
dent Ford  is  reelected  is  the  time  to  discuss 
this  and  that  it  would  be  presumptuous  for 
me  to  say  now  what  I  will  do. 

Ms.  Saviteh:  Has  it  hurt  us  diplomatically, 
or  has  it  hurt  you  as  a  diplomatic  negotiator, 
and  has  anyone  perceived  you  as  possibly 
being  a  lameduck  negotiator? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  as  you  know,  it 
is  not  always  easy  to  get  a  word  in 
edgewise  with  me,  so  I  am  not  abso- 
lutely sure  how  people  have  reacted  to  me. 
[Laughter.] 

An  election  year  in  the  United  States  is 


often  unsettling  to  foreign  nations  because 
they  hear  very  many  extreme  statements 
that  are  being  made  by  various  candidates. 

The  impression  is  always  created  that 
everything  that  has  been  done  is  a  dis- 
aster and  that  everything  that  will  come 
after  will  be  a  radical  change. 

And  while  foreign  nations  are  becoming 
more  sophisticated  about  the  exuberance 
of  our  rhetoric,  it  nevertheless  tends  to 
create  a  period  of  some  uncertainty. 

I  must  say  that  on  the  major  issues  with 
which  I  have  dealt,  I  have  not  found  that 
the  election  year  has  significantly  affected 
our  foreign  policy,  but  it  does  tend  to 
produce  a  certain  slowdown  in  the  conduct 
of  some  of  the  issues. 

Korea  and  Stability  of  Northeast  Asia 

Mr.  McCullough:  Mr.  Secretary,  you  men- 
tioned the  need  for  public  support  of  foreign 
policy,  and  I  take  that  to  mean  a  foreign  pol- 
icy with  which  the  people  feel  comfortable. 
I  ivould  like  to  talk  for  a  moment  about  Korea 
and  the  fact  that — 

Secretary  Kissinger:  About  what — 

Mr.  McCullough:  About  Korea.  Even  dur- 
ing the  midst  of  the  crisis  on  the  truce  line, 
the  Government  of  South  Korea  has  impris- 
oned 18  quite  respected  dissenters.  Some  of 
the  people  tvere  formerly  in  the  government 
there.  Some  were  clergy,  others  teachers. 
And  it  seems  to  some  of  us  that  the  Govern- 
ment of  South  Korea  is  not  above  using  the 
tragic  death  of  the  two  American  officers  to 
bring  the  United  States  into  even  closer  sup- 
port of  the  regime  there. 

And  my  questions — tivo  of  them — do  you 
feel  comfortable  about  the  level  of  civil  lib- 
erties in  the  Republic  of  South  Korea?  And 
if  not,  is  there  anything  we  in  the  United 
States  can  do  about  it? 

Seci'etary  Kissinger:  There  are  several 
aspects  to  this  problem.  One  is,  do  we  feel 
comfortable  about  the  level  of  civil  liber- 
ties in  South  Korea?  The  answer  is,  no; 
South  Korea  does  not  have  standards  of 
human  rights  comparable  to  our  own.  And 


366 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


only  this  Monday  we  presented  a  formal 
note  to  the  Korean  Government  expressing 
our  view  on  this  matter. 

Secondly,  we  are  not  in  Korea  because 
of  the  practices  of  the  Korean  Govern- 
ment, but  because  of  the  importance  that 
Korea  has  for  the  stability  of  Northeast 
Asia.  And  we  believe  that  if  the  Commu- 
nists, if  they  were  to  take  over  South 
Korea — as  several  Presidents  believed  be- 
fore this  Administration — this  would  have 
an  enormously  unsettling  effect  on  the 
stability  of  Northeast  Asia,  particularly  of 
Japan. 

Therefore  we  have  to  balance  our  se- 
curity necessities  against  some  of  the  feel- 
ings with  respect  to  certain  governmental 
practices.  And  we  are  trying  to  do  our  best 
to  improve  those  practices. 

But  at  the  same  time,  we  have  an  im- 
portant commitment,  not  only  legally  but 
strategically,  to  the  security  of  Northeast 
Asia  that  impels  certain  actions  on  our 
part. 

Mr.  Black:  Mr.  Secretary,  I  would  like  to 
get  back  to  this  question  of  the  continuity  of 
our  foreign  policy  and  the  public  understand- 
ing of  it,  because  one  of  the  problems,  it 
seems  to  me,  is  that  many  differences  are  too 
often  too  subtle  and  too  sophisticated  to  be 
understood  by  the  public. 

We  are  now  in  this  election  campaign,  and 
Mr.  Carter  is  being  briefed  by  a  number  of 
people  trooping  doivn  to  Plains,  Georgia,  who 
have  been  critics  of  your  foreign  policy — 
George  Ball,  Zbignieiv  Brzezinski,  and  others. 

Surely  there  must  be  some  differences  be- 
tween the  policies  of  the  tivo  parties.  I  ivon- 
der  if  you  could  explain  to  us  tvhat  differ- 
ences you  see,  as  you  understand  Mr.  Carter's 
foreign  policy. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Of  course,  I  basically 
believe  that  the  political  defense  of  our 
foreign  policy  is  not  the  primary  responsi- 
bility of  the  Secretary  of  State ;  and  there- 
fore I  don't  volunteer  comments  like  this. 
But  to  answer  your  question,  first  of  all  I 
would  have  to  say  that  the  formal  state- 
ments    of     Governor     Carter     have     not 

September  20,  1976 


been  characterized  by  excessive  precision. 
[Laughter.] 

Mr.  Black:  Perhaps  they  will  be  now. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  So,  it  isn't  easy,  as  I 
said,  to  get  a  hold  on  them. 

Now,  in  answers  to  questions,  he  has  in- 
dicated some  directions  with  which  we 
would  strongly  disagree.  He  has  indicated, 
for  example,  that  he  would  save  $7  billion 
from  the  defense  budget  by  bringing  home 
troops  from  abroad.  Now,  you  can't  save 
those  $7  billion  by  bringing  home  troops 
from  abroad  unless  you  also  disband  them, 
because  they  cost  as  much  in  the  United 
States  as  they  do  abroad.  So  that  would 
have  to  mean  an  objective  reduction  in  our 
strength. 

We  have  a  disagreement  as  to  his  assess- 
ment about  the  American  reaction  to  Com- 
munist parties  coming  to  power  in  West 
European  governments,  though  I  seem  to 
have  detected  a  certain  evolution  in  his 
position.  We  disagree  with  respect  to  mili- 
tary assistance  for  such  African  countries 
as  Kenya  and  Zaire.  And  we  disagree  with 
respect  to  his  view  about  some  aspects  of 
the  role  of  covert  intelligence. 

I  am  sure  that  as  the  campaign  develops, 
other  disagreements  will  emerge.  But 
these,  from  the  record  that  now  exists,  are 
some  of  the  important  disagreements. 

We  have  also  conducted — he  seems  to 
imply  that  the  Middle  East  should  be  set- 
tled by  a  prior  agreement  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  which 
afterward  is  presented  to  the  parties.  Our 
view  is  that  the  negotiations  in  the  Middle 
East  should  be  conducted  by  the  parties, 
with  some  assistance  from  the  United 
States,  though  if  there  is  a  final  settlement 
the  Soviet  Union  can  participate  in  guar- 
anteeing it. 

These  are  some  of  the  diflferences  that 
I  see  now. 

Mr.  Stone:  Mr.  Secretary,  your  Depart- 
ment estimated  that  in  the  last  three  years 
you  made  approximately  30  heartland 
speeches  around  the  country. 

367 


This  month  ivas  sort  of  a  record.  In  your 
Administration,  like  Jimmy  Carter,  you  ivere 
"born  again,"  and  you  addressed  two  black 
groups  for  the  first  time,  in  one  month — the 
Urban  League  on  August  2  and  today  the 
QIC. 

Traditionally,  the  black  community  has 
been  very  weak  in  its  impact  and  influence 
on  foreign  policy;  it's  had  very  little  involve- 
ment. This  audience  is  a  good  example — 
there  are  only  three  or  four  blacks  here  to- 
night. What  do  you  expect  to  gain  by  talking 
to  black  groups  who  have  so  little  influence 
at  the  higher  councils  of  policy,  of  which  you 
have  been  a  part  in  denying  them  in  your 
three  years  as  Secretary  of  State? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  First  of  all,  I  didn't 
solicit  these  invitations. 

Mr.  Stone:  The  QIC  said  you  did. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  That  is  absolutely  in- 
correct. Dr.  [Leon]  Sullivan  came  to  my 
office — first  of  all,  he  wrote  me  a  letter  and 
then  he  invited  me  to  speak  there.  And  I 
have  not  solicited  either  invitation.  But  I 
thought  it  was  important  to  explain  to 
these  audiences  what  our  policy  with  re- 
spect to  Africa  was. 

Now,  I  have,  in  fact,  had  the  practice  to 
meet  with  the  Black  Caucus  from  the  early 
days  of  my  incumbency  in  Washington. 
And  I  believe  I  am  the  first  Secretary  of 
State  who  has  done  so. 

My  basic  responsibility  is  to  create  un- 
derstanding for  our  foreign  policy  and  to 
get  as  much  advice  from  leaders  of  various 
groups  as  I  can. 

The  purpose  of  these  visits  is  not  politi- 
cal, because  all  of  the  experts  have  a  pretty 
good  estimate  as  to  what  the  likely  voting 
lineup  is  going  to  be  in  the  various  com- 
munities. 

But  I  believe  that  it  is  important,  as  long 
as  we  are  engaged  on  a  major  new  initia- 
tive in  Africa,  that  we  get  the  views  of  the 
black  leaders  and  that  we  convey  our 
thinking  to  black  audiences. 

As  I  said,  I  was  meeting  with  the  Black 
Caucus  even  at  the  time  when  we  thought 


368 


the  opportunities  for  American  initiatives 
in  Africa  did  not  yet  exist  over  the  last  two 
years. 

The  Problem  of  Terrorism 

Ms.  Saviteh:  It  has  come  to  my  attention 
that  the  Rand  Corporation  recently  com- 
pleted a  study  for  the  State  Department  on 
terrorism  and  that  between  1965  and  the 
present  there  have  been  almost  1,000  terror- 
ist acts  recorded. 

Now,  we  in  the  media  are  constantly  being 
criticized  in  that  if  we  cover  these  terroristic 
events,  we  are  somehoiv  promoting  them;  if 
we  do  not,  ive  are  censoring,  and  it  is  a  news 
blackout. 

Is  the  State  Department  in  much  the  same 
position,  untenable  position?  In  other  words, 
if  you  ignore  terrorist  acts,  you  are  knuckling 
under;  if  you  use  force,  you  can  escalate  to 
larger  armed  confrontation. 

What  is  your  policy  going  to  be  ivith  re- 
gard to  terrorism? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  problem  of  ter- 
rorism is  novel  in  international  diplomacy. 
And  there  aren't  really  any  good  rules,  and 
there  may  not  be  any  rules  unless  we  can 
get  an  international  convention  that  bans 
terrorism  and  in  which  all  the  nations 
agree  that  nobody  will  give  any  assistance 
to  terrorists,  no  matter  what  they  think  of 
their  political  views. 

We  believe  that  the  use  of  innocent  peo- 
ple for  political  purposes  which  they  can- 
not affect  and  in  decisions  in  which  they 
have  no  part  is  unconscionable. 

Now,  the  problem  of  terrorism  reaches 
the  Department  of  State  when  American 
citizens  are  kidnaped  or  most  frequently 
when  American  officials  are  kidnaped  and 
when  we  have  been  asked  to  negotiate  with 
the  terrorists. 

We  have  adopted  the  painful  and  diffi- 
cult policy  of  refusing  all  negotiations  with 
terrorists.  The  reason  we  do  this  is  because 
no  matter  how  successful  any  one  negotia- 
tion may  be,  there  are  so  many  Americans 
spread  all  over  the  world  that  once  it  is 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


:nown  that  the  United  States  is  prepared 
0  negotiate,  then  all  Americans  will  be 
ontinually  in  jeopardy. 

As  long  as  terrorists  know  that  Ameri- 
an  Ambassadors  have  no  authority,  or  no 
lope  of  any  authority,  for  negotiating 
ibout  terrorist  acts,  there  is  at  least  a  low- 
red  incentive. 

Now,  in  any  one  case,  it  produces  the 
nost  anguishing  decision  for  us. 

I  must  say  that  this  policy  of  not  nego- 
iating  has  worked  in  a  number  of  cases. 
For  example,  there  were  a  number  of 
(Americans  that  had  been  kidnaped  in  Eri- 
;rea.  There  were  several  attempts  to  con- 
;act  us  and  to  negotiate  with  us.  We 
efused  all  substantive  negotiations.  And 
ifter  several  months,  these  kidnaped 
Americans  were  released. 

It  doesn't  always  work,  but  often  nothing 
works  in  these  cases. 

We  believe  that  it  is  the  best  policy,  the 
one  that  will  save  the  most  lives  and  that 
will  protect  the  most  Americans  abroad. 
However,  we  believe  that  the  ultimate  solu- 
tion must  be  an  international  convention  in 
which  all  nations  pledge  themselves  to  give 
no  assistance  of  any  kind  to  terrorists  and 
in  which  those  nations  which  refuse  to  join 
are  ostracized  from  international  air  serv- 
ice and  other  measures.  And  we  are  going 
to  push  this  strongly  at  the  General  Assem- 
bly at  the  United  Nations. 

Dealing  With  Boycott  Practices 

Mr.  McCuUough:  Mr.  Secretary,  many  of 
the  individuals  in  your  audience  tonight  are 
people  in  business,  and  some  have  spoken 
out  in  support  of  a  proposal  apparently  gain- 
ing support  in  Congress  that  ivould  block 
the  cooperation  by  U.S.  business  in  the  Arab 
League  boycott  against  Israel. 

Senator  Ribicoff  sponsored  it  and  said  this 
is  the  only  realistic  way  of  dealing  ivith  what 
he  thinks  is  an  illegal  and  immoral  type  of 
economic  tvarfare. 

Treasury  Secretary  Simon,  who  I  think  is 
the  last  member  of  the  Cabinet  to  speak  out 
on  this,  said  that  such  a  law  would  make 


September  20,  1976 


matters  worse  and  woidd  harden  Arab  atti- 
tudes. 

I  wonder  if  you  woidd  talk  about  that  to- 
night and  give  us  your  view  on  it. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Not  willingly. 
[Laughter.]  Can  I  talk  about  it  on  Novem- 
ber 3?   [Laughter.] 

Now  that  you  have  asked  me — and  1 
wish  that  the  chairman  had  stopped  before 
this — I   agree  with  Secretary  Simon. 

I  am  against  a  boycott.  I  think  it  is 
wrong  for  American  firms  to  participate  in 
it.  I  also  believe  that  we  have  important 
interests  in  some  of  the  countries  con- 
cerned. Saudi  Arabia  can  have  a  major 
impact  on  the  oil  prices,  which  in  turn  can 
have  a  major  impact  on  developing  of  the 
American  economy. 

Many  of  these  countries  are  needed  for 
progress  toward  peace  in  the  Middle  East. 
We  believe  that  the  way  to  deal  with  the 
boycott  is  through  the  Executive  orders  and 
through  the  actions  of  the  Attorney  Gen- 
eral that  the  Administration  has  already 
done.  And  we  are  afraid  that  some  of  the 
legislation  that  is  now  being  considered  is 
going  to  produce  confrontations  and  disad- 
vantages from  which  everybody  will  suffer. 

And  therefore  I  support  Secretary  Si- 
mon's opposition  to  this  amendment. 

Mr.  Bodine:  Thank  you,  panelists,  very 
much  indeed. 

Noiv,  ladies  and  gentlemen,  we  would  like 
to  give  an  opportunity  to  those  on  the  ball- 
room floor  ivho  wish  to  question  the  Secre- 
tary. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  keeping  in  mind  that  in 
1956  we  had  the  Hungary  crisis  and  in  1968 
the  Czechoslovakia  business  took  place,  pre- 
dominately during  the  National  Democratic 
Convention  tveek,  my  question  to  you  is  this: 
Is  there  any  evidence  that  either  the  Soviet 
Union  or  the  Republic  of  China  has  a  prefer- 
ence as  to  ivhich  candidate  wins  this  year? 
And  if  so,  do  you  expect  either  to  manipulate 
a  crisis  to  help  effect  that  end? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  neither  of  the 
two  countries  has  as  yet  communicated  its 


369 


preference.  [Laughter.]  And  I  am  not  ab- 
solutely sure  that  I  would  know  how  it 
would  come. 

But  I  think  it  is  exaggerated  to  believe 
that  in  1956  and  in  1968  the  Soviet  Union 
organized  these  actions  in  order  to  affect 
our  political  campaign.  It  happened  that 
there  were  uprisings  in  both  Czechoslo- 
vakia and  Hungary  that  the  Soviet  Union 
considered  incompatible  with  the  stability 
of  its  own  domestic  structure. 

But  to  answer  your  question,  it  is  prob- 
ably true  that  most  foreign  governments 
always  prefer  the  Administration  in  office 
because  they  know  it,  they  have  worked 
with  it,  and  they  know  what  to  expect.  And 
that  would  be  generally  the  case. 

I  don't  know  whether  that  is  the  case 
with  respect  to  the  Soviet  Union  and  the 
People's  Republic  of  China. 

I  think  that  any  country  would  make  a 
major  mistake  to  create  a  crisis  in  order  to 
affect  our  national  election,  because  I  am 
confident  that  there  would  be  united  sup- 
port for  the  policy  of  the  Administration 
on  a  nonpartisan  basis  in  resisting  foreign 
pressures. 

Law  of  the  Sea  Negotiations 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  with  respect  to  the  Laiv 
of  the  Sea  Conference  now  going  on  in  Netv 
York,  what  can  the  United  States  do  to  re- 
direct some  of  the  efforts  of  the  nonaligned 
countries  that  are  restricting  -progress  in 
Committee  I  negotiations  ivith  respect  to  the 
deep  seabed  resources? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  am  going,  in  fact, 
from  here  to  New  York  in  order  to  see 
whether  we  can  bring  about  more  rapid 
progress  on  the  law  of  the  sea  negotiations. 

The  law  of  the  sea  negotiations  now  are 
organized  in  three  major  committees.  The 
first  committee  deals  with  the  deep  sea- 
beds.  The  second  committee  deals  with  the 
so-called  economic  zone;  that  is,  the  ex- 
ploitation of  the  200-mile  zone  off  the 
coast.  And  the  third  deals  with  scientific 
research. 


370 


With  respect  to  Committees  II  and  III, 
while  there  are  still  unsolved  issues,  I  am 
reasonably  optimistic  that,  by  the  end  of 
the  conference  in  two  and  a  half  weeks, 
substantial  agreement  will  have  been 
reached. 

With  respect  to  the  Committee  I  on  the 
deep  seabeds,  progress  has  been  less  rapid. 

The  deep  seabeds  have  a  great  deal  of 
mineral  wealth.  The  United  States,  at  this 
moment,  is  probably  the  only  country  with 
the  technology  to  mine  this  wealth,  al- 
though over  a  period — but  even  the  United 
States  cannot  really  begin  operating  before 
1983  and  1984,  in  that  time  frame.  By  the 
end  of  the  1980's,  many  other  countries 
will  be  in  a  position  to  do  so. 

So  the  problem  is  to  create  a  regime  for 
the  deep  seabeds  in  which  business  can 
operate  in  a  legal  framework  and  in  which 
we  avoid  on  the  oceans  the  sort  of  colonial 
rivalry,  or  the  sort  of  rivalry  that  led  to 
colonial  disputes  in  the  19th  century. 

Some  of  the  disagreements  in  Commit- 
tee I  have  to  do  with  the  intrinsic  difficulty 
of  the  subject.  And  we  will  make  some  pro- 
posals tomorrow  and  the  next  day  that  we 
hope  will  break  some  of  the  deadlocks. 

Other  difficulties  are  caused,  as  you  cor- 
rectly pointed  out  in  your  question,  by  the 
attitudes  of  some  of  the  radical  nonaligned 
countries  that  are  trying  to  put  all  of  the 
deep  seabeds  under  international  control, 
which  would  mean  that  our  exploration 
would  be  the  subject  of  majorities  in  which 
we  have  no  decisive  influence,  even  though 
we  are  the  only  country  that  has  the  ca- 
pacity to  engage  in  this  mining. 

That  proposition  we  cannot  and  will  not 
accept. 

We  are  prepared  to  divide  the  explora- 
tion of  the  oceans  between  an  area  that  is 
generally  available  for  private  enterprise 
and  an  area  that  is  generally  available  for 
international  enterprise. 

The  problem  now  will  be  how  to  find  the 
means  to  regulate  this.  And  I  am  going  up 
there  for  the  next  two  days  in  the  hope  of 
making  some  progress  by  making  some  new 
proposals  on  some  of  the  more  reasonable 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


dimands  that  have  been  made.  But  the  ex- 
treme demands,  we  cannot  possibly  meet. 
And  therefore  if  no  agreement  is  reached 
wo  will  have  to  proceed  unilaterally,  reluc- 
tant as  we  are  to  do  that. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  some  observers  have  re- 
marked that  you  'personalized  the  position  of 
the  Secretary  of  State.  Would  you  care  to 
connnent  on  the  extent  to  tvhich  tjou  feel  your 
personality  has  influenced  the  course  of  inter- 
national events  during  your  tenure? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  you  know,  many 
of  my  associates  will  tell  you  that  humility 
is  one  of  my  most  outstanding  traits. 
[Laughter.]  I  don't  think  I  am  the  best 
judge  of  the  degree  to  which  my  person- 
ality influences  foreign  policy.  I  think  my 
'  father  could  give  you  a  much  more  objec- 
tive opinion  on  the  subject.   [Laughter.] 

But  I  was  in  office  during  a  period  when 
a  number  of  dramatic  initiatives  took  place, 
with  some  of  which  I  was  associated. 

The  secret  trip  to  China,  the  secret  ne- 
gotiations with  the  Vietnamese,  the  begin- 
:  ning  of  negotiations  with  other  countries, 
the  breakthroughs  in  the  Middle  East — all 
of  them  lent  themselves  to  a  series  of  dra- 
matic events. 

And  then  during  the  period  of  Water- 
1!  gate,  more  attention  focused  on  the  Secre- 
a  tary  of  State  than  would  normally  be  the 
!t  case,  regardless  of  the  qualities  of  the  Sec- 
•  retary  of  State. 

I  believe  that  in  general,  foreign  policy 

f  — the   reason  these   dramatic   events  took 

:  place    was   because    of   the    revolutionary 

i-  changes  in   the   international   environment 

that  I  described  in  the  beginning.  But  it 

ot  would  be  a  mistake  to  believe  that  this  sort 

of  event  can  happen  regularly  or  can  be 

the  normal  style  of  foreign  policy. 

It  was  a  combination  of  circumstances, 

-  both  international  and  domestic. 

'      Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  the  United  States  is  now 

the  greatest  supplier  of  arms  in  the  tvorld. 

The  last  figure  I  read  ivas  some  136  nations. 

What  concerns  me  is  the  amount  and  the 

'  sophistication  of  arms  being  sold  to  countries 

"  in  the  Middle  East,  especially  to  Iran. 


September  20,  1976 


With  billions  of  arms  going  to  Iran,  some 
26,000  technicians  there,  I  understand,  are 
ive  not  creating  a  "hostage"  in  that  country? 
What  ivoidd  happen,  for  instance,  if  Iran 
went  to  ivar  ivith  any  nation?  Would  tve  not 
then  be  very  much  involved?  Would  you  be 
good  enough  to  comment  on  this? 

U.S.  Arms  Sales  Abroad 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  let  me  do  it  in 
two  parts.  First,  the  general  problem  of  the 
arms  sales — and  there  the  growing  re- 
sources of  many  countries  to  buy  arms, 
coupled  with  the  competition  between  vari- 
ous countries,  does  create  a  problem.  And 
we  are  setting  up  machinery  which  we 
hope  to  announce  within  the  next  few 
weeks  to  have  a  more  systematic  review  of 
various  arms  requests  than  has  ever  been 
possible. 

At  the  same  time,  the  case  of  Iran  is  not 
the  best  case  for  your  argument,  if  I  may 
say  so.  Iran  is  a  country  whose  independ- 
ence has  been  considered  important  to  the 
United  States  since  the  days  that  President 
Truman  warned  the  Soviet  Union  about  its 
occupation  of  Azerbaijan. 

Iran  is  one  of  the  larger  oil  producers  in 
the  Middle  East.  It  has  pursued  a  foreign 
policy  very  parallel  to  our  own.  It  has  not 
joined  any  embargo.  It  has  never  used  its 
weapons  for  any  purposes  of  which  we  did 
not  approve.  It  has  never  threatened  to  use 
its  weapons  for  any  purposes  of  which  we 
did  not  approve.  It  has  never  transferred 
its  weapons  to  any  other  country,  much  less 
to  any  country  of  which  we  didn't  approve. 

It  is  threatened  by  the  Soviet  Union  to 
the  north.  It  has  as  its  neighbor  Iraq,  which 
is  one  of  the  most  radical  Arab  states  and 
which,  in  relation  to  per  capita,  is  armed 
much  more  extensively  by  the  Soviet  Union 
than  we  are  arming  Iran. 

So,  I  would  believe  that  Iran's  willing- 
ness to  defend  itself,  and  to  defend  itself  by 
paying  cash  for  its  arms,  is  a  positive  de- 
velopment. 

Now,  as  for   the   Americans  in  Iran:   I 


371 


have  read  this  figure  of  24,000  Americans 
that  are  in  Iran.  But  it  is  important  to  break 
down  the  figure.  Of  these  24,000  Ameri- 
cans, 1,000  are  in  the  military  advisory 
group;  3,000  are  with  defense-related  ac- 
tivities— that  is,  they  are  advisers  for 
equipment  which  we  have  sold  to  Iran  and 
in  which  they  are  training  Iranians,  and 
they  will  leave  within  a  period  of  one  or 
two  years — 7,000,  no,  5,000,  are  connected 
with  the  oil  industry;  2,000  are  connected 
with  other  private  enterprise;  and  the  rest 
are  dependents. 

So  even  if  you  took  out  all  the  Americans 
connected  with  military  activities,  you  still 
would  have  some  15,000  Americans  in  Iran. 
And  if  we  therefore  advanced  the  proposi- 
tion that  we  cannot  have  Americans  in  any 
country  abroad  because  it  would  be  too 
risky,  then  we  will  finally  wind  up  with 
having  no  Americans  in  any  country  but 
also  no  influence  in  any  country  and  with  a 
severe  undermining  of  our  economy. 

In  general,  I  recognize  the  concern  about 
arms  sales.  But  one  has  to  keep  in  mind 
also  that  some  countries — for  example, 
there  are  countries  in  Latin  America — 
which  for  diplomatic  reasons  I  do  not  wish 
to  mention — that  were  denied  arms  by  the 
United  States  many  years  ago  with  the  ar- 
gument that  they  should  put  their  resources 
into  economic  development.  They  then  put 
their  resources  into  Soviet  arms.  And  now 
the  Soviet  Union  has  a  military  establish- 
ment in  those  countries,  or  at  least  has 
trainers  in  those  countries  in  a  greater  de- 
gree than  they  otherwise  would  have  had. 

So  nobody  is  pursuing  a  policy  of  selling 
arms  for  their  own  sake,  but  especially  in 
the  case  of  Iran — a  country,  I  repeat,  that 
did  not  join  the  embargo;  that  is  selling  oil 
to  Israel;  that  has  declared  that  it  will  not 
join  any  other  embargo;  and  that  has  been 
a  great  friend  and  supporter  of  the  United 
States  on  almost  all  objectives  of  foreign 
policy. 

I  think  it  is,  on  the  whole,  in  the  Ameri- 
can interest  to  enable  it  to  defend  itself. 
All  the  more  so  as  it  is  done  entirely  with 
its  own  resources. 


372 


Q.   Mr.   Secretary,   Takvan — are  we   pro- 
gressing toward  a  solution? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  didn't  hear  you. 

Q.  Taiwan.  In  light  of  the  Shanghai  memo- 
randum, are  ive  progressing  toward  a  sohi- 

tion  ?  I 

I 
Secretary  Kissinger:  The  Shanghai  com- 
munique states  as  an  objective  the  normali- 
zation of  relations.  The  United  States 
stated  that  we  believe — we  also  stated  that 
the  Chinese  on  both  sides  of  the  China 
straits  assert  that  there  is  only  one  China, 
and  we  do  not  contest  that  proposition. 

We  diifered  with  the  People's  Republic 
of  China  on  the  method  in  which  the  one 
China  should  be  achieved.  And  we  stated 
in  the  Shanghai  communique  that  the 
United  States  believed  that  the  methods 
should  be  peaceful. 
We  are  prepared  to  normalize  relations 
with  the  People's  Republic  of  China.  We 
have  not,  however,  up  to  now,  been  able  to 
agree  on  the  modalities  by  which  this 
should  be  achieved,  and  therefore  this  is  a 
matter  that  is  still  open. 


Congressional  Documents 
Relating  to  Foreign  Policy 

94th  Congress,  2d  Session 

Foreign  Assistance  and  Related  Programs  Appro- 
priations Bill,  1977.  Report  of  the  House  Commit 
tee  on  Appropriations,  together  with  additional 
and  supplemental  views,  to  accompany  H.R.  14260. 
H.  Rept.  94-1228.  June  8,  1976.  76  pp. 

Authorization  of  Funds  for  Treaty  of  Friendship 
and  Cooperation  With  Spain,  Fiscal  Year  1977. 
Report  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Rela- 
tions to  accompany  S.  3557.  S.  Rept.  94-941.  June 
11,  1976.  4  pp. 

Supplementary  Extradition  Treaty  With  Spain.  Re- 
port of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations 
to  accompany  Ex.  B,  94-2.  S.  Ex.  Rept.  94-26, 
June  15,  1976.  3  pp. 

Extradition  Treaty  With  the  United  Kingdom  of 
Great  Britain  and  Northern  Ireland.  Report  of  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  to  ac- 
company Ex.  A.  94-2.  S.  Ex.  Rept.  94-27.  June 
15,  1976.  6  pp. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


'»||U.S.  Calls  for  Greece-Turkey  Talks 
on  Aegean  Sea  Dispute 

Folloiving  is  a  statement  made  in  the  U.N. 
Security  Council  by  U.S.  Representative 
W.  Tapley  Bennett,  Jr.,  on  August  25,  to- 
gether ivith  the  text  of  a  resolution  adopted 
by  the  Council  that  day. 

STATEMENT  BY   AMBASSADOR  BENNETT 

USUN  press   release  95  dated  August   25 

My  delegation  has  followed  the  course 
of  this  discussion  in  the  Security  Council 
with  great  interest  and  special  concern. 
For  the  United  States  has  the  closest  of 
ties  with  both  Greece  and  Turkey.  They 
are  our  friends  and  allies.  We  share  with 
them  common  purposes  based  upon  com- 
mon interests. 

Accordingly,  differences  between  them 
are  of  special  concern  to  us.  A  problem 
such  as  this — which  led  both  governments 
to  send  their  distinguished  Foreign  Minis- 
ters to  address  the  Council — requires  not 
only  our  most  careful  attention  but  has  led 
my  government  to  exert  its  best  efforts  to 
encourage  progress  toward  a  resolution  of 
the  issues. 

We  do  not  underestimate  the  depth  of 
feeling  on  both  sides  or  the  complexity  of 
the  legal  issues  involved.  The  historical 
roots  of  some  aspects  of  the  problem  go 
back  to  classical  times.  The  legal  issues 
related  to  the  continental  shelf  are  among 
the  most  sensitive  in  the  entire  field  of  the 
law  of  the  sea.  I  do  not  believe,  however, 
that  this  is  the  place  to  analyze  such  com- 
plex issues  of  international  law. 

This  Council,  instead,  should  do  all  it 
can  to  encourage  the  two  parties  to  engage 
in  contacts  and  discussions  that  will  insure 
that  the  problem  between  them  does  not 
now  or  at  any  time  in  the  future  lead  to  a 
threat  to  the  peace  of  the  area.  To  achieve 
this  objective,  this  Council  must  exercise  its 
responsibilities  under  the  charter  in  a  way 
that  will  contribute  to  the  settlement  of  the 
dispute. 


In  working  with  othei>  delegations  to 
develop  the  resolution  before  you,  my  dele- 
gation held  the  strong  view  that  nothing 
was  to  be  gained  by  settling  on  language 
which  would  simply  provide  temporary 
satisfaction  to  one  or  the  other  of  the  par- 
ties, because  inevitably  the  result  would  be 
that  the  underlying  problem  would  remain 
unaffected.  What  was  needed  was  a  reso- 
lution which  both  parties  could  accept  and 
under  which  they  both  could  work  to 
strengthen  the  peace. 

My  government  believes  this  objective 
has  been  achieved. 

During  recent  weeks  and  days,  my  gov- 
ernment has  been  in  close  touch  with  both 
the  Greek  and  Turkish  Governments  to  en- 
courage on  both  .sides  restraint  and  a  re- 
newed effort  to  achieve  a  basis  for 
discussion.  We  are  gratified  that  the  lead- 
ers of  both  countries  have  sought  to 
approach  their  differences  with  statesman- 
ship and  moderation. 

Prime  Minister  Caramanlis  stated  on  Au- 
gust 9  that  Greece  is  avoiding  any  resort 
to  force  and  is  instead  hoping  that  the  dis- 
pute will  be  resolved  by  peaceful  proce- 
dures. At  the  same  time  Turkish  leaders 
have  expressed  their  desire  to  resolve  the 
dispute  through  negotiation,  and  they  have 
affirmed  that  their  research  activities  are 
not  intended  to  prejudice  the  legal  rights 
of  either  Greece  or  Turkey  in  the  Ae- 
gean. 

In  the  course  of  our  current  debate  the 
distinguished  Foreign  Minister  of  Greece 
has  stated  that  there  are  many  opportu- 
nities offered  by  Greece  to  Turkey  for  the 
peaceful  settlement  of  the  dispute  and 
that  these  were  not  confined  only  to  the 
proposal  that  the  matter  be  referred  to  the 
International  Court  of  Justice.  The  distin- 
guished Foreign  Minister  of  Turkey  has 
reaffirmed  that  Turkey  stands  ready  to  re- 
solve all  outstanding  differences  with 
Greece  by  peaceful  means  and  that  it  does 
not  exclude  recourse  to  the  International 
Court  of  Justice. 

Therefore,  both  sides  have  reaffirmed  to 
this    Council    their    willingness   to    resolve 


September  20,  1976 


373 


their  dispute  regarding  the  continental 
shelf  of  the  Aegean. 

We  now  believe  that  a  fundamental 
basis  exists  for  the  kind  of  discussion  and 
adjudication  which  must  be  undertaken  if 
a  settlement  is  to  be  achieved. 

In  such  a  situation,  Mr.  President,  I  be- 
lieve that  there  are  two  cardinal  elements 
to  any  advice  which  this  Council  might  give 
to  Greece  and  Turkey. 

First,  it  is  essential  that  this  Council  urge 
Greece  and  Turkey  to  continue  to  exercise 
utmost  restraint  and  avoid  falling  into  a 
pattern  of  action  and  reaction,  the  result  of 
which  would  be  an  increasing  rigidity  of 
position,  the  raising  of  the  stakes  each 
party  considers  to  be  involved  in  the  con- 
flict, and  a  consequent  heightening  of  ten- 
sions between  the  two  countries. 

Second,  both  governments  should  be  en- 
couraged to  pursue  the  array  of  procedures 
which  are  available  to  them  for  the  peace- 
ful settlement  of  this  dispute. 

From  what  we  have  heard  here  from  the 
distinguished  spokesmen  of  Greece  and 
Turkey,  I  think  it  is  clear  that  both  coun- 
tries recognize  that  it  is  only  through  the 
resumption  of  direct  and  meaningful  dis- 
cussions between  them  that  such  a  settle- 
ment can  be  achieved,  or  indeed  must  be 
achieved. 

For  our  part,  the  United  States  strongly 
favors  and  urges  the  earliest  return  by  the 
parties  to  such  discussions.  I  believe  it  is 
also  clear  that  both  parties  recognize  the 
potentially  valuable  role  of  the  Interna- 
tional Court  of  Justice  to  consider  matters 
which  remain  unresolved  after  negotiation. 

The  important  thing  is  that  the  parties 
find  a  basis  through  direct  contacts  be- 
tween them  for  whatever  combination  of 
direct  talks  and  supporting  adjudication 
may  be  necessary  to  achieve  the  peaceful 
settlement  that  my  government  is  confident 
both  governments  seek. 

Finally,  I  have  no  doubt  that  all  of  us 
are  also  agreed  that  the  conditions  for 
progress  toward  solutions  to  problems  be- 
tween Greece  and  Turkey  can  only  further 
improve   if  both  sides  avoid   any  military 

374 


measures  which  could  in  any  way  be  inter- 
preted as  threatening  and  thus  detracting 
from  an  atmosphere  of  peace  which  is  now 
so  essential. 

My  delegation  has  sought  to  bear  these 
criteria  in  mind  in  our  participation  in  the 
efforts  that  led  to  the  elaboration  of  the 
text  we  have  joined  in  tabling.  We  believe 
that  text  is  fair  and  reasonable.  It  is  in- 
tended to  assist  in  creating  a  context  in 
which  the  parties  can  solve  their  differ- 
ences. We  urge  the  parties  to  accept  the 
Council's  advice. 


TEXT  OF  RESOLUTION  > 

The  Security  Council, 

Taking  note  of  the  letter  of  the  Permanent  Repre- 
sentative of  Greece  dated  10  August  1976  (S/12167), 

Having  heard  and  noted  the  various  points  made 
in  the  statements  by  the  Foreign  Ministers  of  Greece 
and  Turkey, 

Expressing  its  concern  over  the  present  tensions 
between  Greece  and  Turkey  in  relation  to  the  Aegean 
Sea, 

Bearing  in  mind  the  principles  of  the  Charter  of 
the  United  Nations  concerning  the  peaceful  settle- 
ment of  disputes,  as  well  as  the  various  provisions 
of  Chapter  VI  of  the  Charter  concerning  procedures 
and  methods  for  the  peaceful  settlement  of  disputes, 

Noting  the  importance  of  the  resumption  and 
continuance  of  direct  negotiations  between  Greece 
and  Turkey  to  resolve  their  differences, 

Conscious  of  the  need  for  the  parties  both  to  re- 
spect each  other's  international  rights  and  obliga- 
tions and  to  avoid  any  incident  which  might  lead  to 
the  aggravation  of  the  situation  and  which,  conse- 
quently, might  compromise  their  efforts  towards  a 
peaceful  solution, 

1.  Appeals  to  the  Governments  of  Greece  and 
Turkey  to  exercise  the  utmost  restraint  in  the  pres- 
ent situation; 

2.  Urges  the  Governments  of  Greece  and  Turkey 
to  do  everything  in  their  power  to  reduce  the  present 
tensions  in  the  area  so  that  the  negotiating  process 
may  be  facilitated; 

3.  Calls  on  the  Governments  of  Greece  and  Turkey 
to  resume  direct  negotiations  over  their  differences 
and  appeals  to  them  to  do  everything  within  their 
power  to  ensure  that  these  result  in  mutually  ac- 
ceptable   solutions; 

4.  Invites  the  Governments  of  Greece  and  Turkey 


'U.N.   doc.    S/RES/395    (1976);    adopted   by   con- 
sensus  on  Aug.  25. 

Department  of  State  Bulletii 


n  tliis  respect  to  continue  to  take  into  account  the 
ontribution  that  appropriate  judicial  means,  in 
jarticular  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  are 
ualified  to  make  to  the  settlement  of  any  remaining 
gal  differences  which  they  may  identify  in  con- 
nexion with  their  present  dispute. 


J.S.-Mexico  Science  and  Technology 
Commission  Holds  Second  Meeting 

foint  Statement 

'rc-^   release  356  dated  July  27 

The  United  States-Mexico  Mixed  Com- 
mission on  Scientific  and  Technical  Coopera- 
tion met  July  19  and  20,  1976,  in  the  Ministry 
3f  Foreign  Affairs  of  Mexico  at  Tlatelolco, 
10  review  and  orient  the  expanding  program 
3f  scientific  and  technical  cooperation  be- 
tween the  two  countries.  The  Commission 
was  established  by  the  Agreement  for  Sci- 
entific and  Technical  Cooperation  between 
the  United  States  and  Mexico,  effected  by 
an  exchange  of  notes  signed  in  the  spirit 
of  good  will  and  friendship  on  June  15,  1972, 
during  the  visit  of  President  Echeverria  to 
Washington,  D.C.  This  was  the  second  meet- 
jing  of  the  Commission ;  the  first  was  held 
lin  Washington,  D.C,  in  June  1974. 

Cochairmen  of  the  Commission  meeting 
were  Ambassador  Frederick  Irving,  Assist- 
lant  Secretary  of  State  for  Oceans  and 
International  Envii'onmental  and  Scientific 
Affairs,  and  Ambassador  Jose  Gallastequi, 
Undersecretary  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  Mexico. 
Dr.  John  Granger,  Acting  Assistant  Director 
for  Scientific,  Technological  and  Interna- 
tional Affairs,  National  Science  Foundation, 
and  Lie.  Gerardo  Bueno  Zirion,  Director 
General  of  the  National  Council  for  Science 
and  Technology  of  Mexico,  served  as  co- 
chairmen  of  their  respective  delegations. 

In  their  opening  remarks,  the  cochairmen 
of  the  meeting  noted  the  unique  historical 
and  personal  ties  between  the  two  countries, 
and  the  desire  of  both  governments  to 
strengthen  these  ties  through  closer  cooper- 
ation in  science  and  technology.  It  was  rec- 
ognized   that    the    promise    of   science    and 

September  20,  1976 


technology  for  furthering  economic  and  so- 
cial progress  can  best  be  fulfilled  if  national 
priorities  receive  primary  attention  in  the 
programs  of  scientific  and  technical  coopera- 
tion. Ambassador  Gallastequi,  in  his  opening 
remarks,  made  special  mention  of  the  fact 
that  this  year's  Mixed  Commission  meeting 
coincided  with  the  U.S.  Bicentennial  celebra- 
tion. Ambassador  Irving  expressed  his  sin- 
cere appreciation  for  these  comments. 

In  the  course  of  the  meeting,  the  Com- 
mission reviewed  and  accepted  three  prog- 
ress reports,  the  first  jointly  prepared  by  the 
executive  agencies  in  both  countries — the 
National  Science  Foundation  of  the  United 
States  and  the  National  Council  of  Science 
and  Technology  of  Mexico — on  cooperation 
in  science  and  technology.  The  Commission 
noted  with  satisfaction  and  commended  both 
agencies  for  the  progress  made  since  the 
first  meeting.  The  Commission  also  accepted 
a  joint  report  on  the  Program  of  Exchange 
of  Young  Technicians  between  the  two  coun- 
tries. A  third  report  which  redefines  the 
scope  of  the  Agreement  for  Scientific  and 
Technical  Cooperation  and  appropriate 
mechanisms  for  broadening  and  expanding 
cooperation  between  the  two  countries  was 
also  approved. 

The  Commission  identified  six  areas  of 
national  priority  for  special  attention  for 
increased  cooperation.  These  are:  Energy, 
Tropical  Agriculture,  Ecology  and  Wildlife 
Preservation,  Remote  Sensing,  Scientific  and 
Technical  Information,  and  Standards. 

Presentations  were  made  to  the  Commis- 
sion by  representatives  of  the  principal 
related  agencies  of  both  countries  and  sub- 
sequent discussions  were  held  on  the  oppor- 
tunities offered  within  these  fields  to  work 
ahead  together  toward  mutually  agreed  and 
beneficial  scientific  and  technical  objectives, 
especially  to  develop  new  joint  research  proj- 
ects. The  Commission  encouraged  a  continu- 
ing dialogue  between  these  representatives 
to  achieve  broader  understanding  between 
the  technical  agencies  of  both  countries  and 
increase  cooperative  research  activities. 

The  Mixed  Commission  decided  to  hold 
its    next    regular    meeting    in    Washington, 

375 


D.C.,  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the 
Agreement  for  Scientific  and  Technical  Co- 
operation between  the  two  countries,  at  a 
mutually  agreeable  time  in  1978.  The  Com- 
mission expressed  its  appreciation  for  the 
strong  technical  participation  in  the  meeting 
by  officials  and  scientists  of  both  countries 
and  looks  to  the  good  will  and  determination 
of  both  delegations  to  advance  cooperation 
under  the  agreement  to  a  higher  level  of 
activity  and  service  during  the  next  two 
years. 


TREATY   INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Aviation 

Convention    for    the    suppression    of    unlawful    acts 
against  the  safety  of  civil  aviation.  Done  at  Mon- 
treal September  23.  1971.  Entered  into  force  Janu- 
ary 26,  1973.  TIAS  7570. 
Accession  deposited:  Indonesia,  August  27,  1976.' 

Convention  for  the   suppression  of  unlawful   seizure 
of  aircraft.  Done  at  The  Hague  December  16,  1970. 
Entered  into  force  October  14,  1971.  TIAS  7192. 
Ratification  deposited:  Indonesia,  August  27,  1976  ' 

Coffee 

International  coffee   agreement    1976,   with   annexes. 
Done  at  London  December  3,  1975.' 
Ratifications  deposited:  Burundi,  August  25,  1976; 
United  Kingdom,  August  19,  1976. 

Maritime  Matters 

Convention  on  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime  Con- 
sultative Organization.  Done  at  Geneva  March  6, 
1948.  Entered  into  force  March  17,  1958.  TIAS 
4044. 

Acceptance    deposited:    Cape    Verde,    August    24, 
1976. 

Amendment  of  article  VII  of  the  convention  on  facili- 
tation of  international  maritime  traffic,  1965  (TIAS 
6251).  Adopted  at  London  November  19.  1973.' 
Acceptance   deposited:    New   Zealand,   August    17, 
1976. 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  March  6,  1948,  as 
amended,  on  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime  Con- 
sultative Organization  (TIAS  4044,  6285,  6490). 
Adopted  at  London  October  17,  1974.' 

376 


Acceptance    deposited:    Cape    Verde,    August    24, 
1976. 

Patents 

Strasbourg  agreement  concerning  the  international 
patent  classification.  Done  at  Strasbourg  March  24, 
1971.  Entered  into  force  October  7,  1975.  TIAS 
8140. 
Notification    from     World    Intellectual    Property 

Organization  that  ratification  deposited:  Japan 

August  18,  1976. 
Notification    from     World     Intellectual    Property 

Organization  that  accession  deposited:  German 

Democratic   Republic,  August  24,   1976.^ 

Telecommunications 

Telegraph  regulations,  with  appendices,  annex,  and 

final    protocol.    Done    at    Geneva    April    11,    1973. 

Entered    into    force    September    1,    1974;    for    the 

United   States  April  21,   1976. 

Notification  of  approval:  Byelorussian  Soviet  So 
cialist  Republic,  June  22,  1976. 
Telephone    regulations,    with    appendices    and    final 

protocol.   Done  at  Geneva  April   11,   1973.  Entered 

into    force    September    1,    1974;    for    the     United 

States  April  21,  1976. 

Notification  of  approval:   Byelorussian  Soviet  So- 
cialist Republic,  June  22,  1976. 

Women — Political  Rights 

Inter-American  convention  on  the  granting  of  politi- 
cal rights  to  women.  Done  at  Bogota  May  2,  1948 
Entered  into  force  April  22,  1949;  for  the  Unitec 
States  May  24,  1976. 
Proclaimed  by  the  President:  August  30,  1976. 


BILATERAL 

Mexico 

Agreement  relating  to  the  provision  of  additiona 
equipment,  material  and  technical  support  by  th( 
United  States  to  curb  illegal  traffic  in  narcotics 
Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at  Mexico  Augus 
9,  1976.  Entered  into  force  August  9,  1976. 

Portugal 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales  o. 
agricultural  commodities  of  March  18,  1976  (TIAS 
8264).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Lisboi 
August  13,  1976.  Entered  into  force  August  13 
1976. 

United  Kingdom 

Protocol  amending  the  convention  of  December  31 
1975,  as  amended  April  13,  1976,  for  the  avoidancs 
of  double  taxation  and  the  prevention  of  fisca 
evasion  with  respect  to  taxes  on  income  and  cap- 
ital gains.  Signed  at  London  August  26,  1976 
Enters  into  force  30  days  following  the  date  of 
exchange  of  instruments  of  ratification. 


'  With  a  reservation. 
'  Not  in  force. 
'With  a  declaration. 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


INDEX     September  20,  1976     Vol.  LXXV,  No.  1943 


Africa 

The  Challenges  of  Africa  (Kissinger)  ....  349 
Secretary   Interviewed   by   Philadelphia  World 

Affairs  Council  Panel 363 

Secretary    Kissinger's    News     Conference    at 

Philadelphia  August   31 358 

China.  Secretary  Interviewed  by  Philadelphia 
World   Affairs  Council   Panel 363 

Congress.  Congressional  Documents  Relating 
to   Foreign    Policy 372 

Department  and  Foreign  Service.  Secretary 
Kissinger's  News  Conference  at  Philadelphia 
August    31 358 

Developing  Countries.  The  Challenges  of  Africa 
(Kissinger) 349 

Economic  Affairs.  The  Challenges  of  Africa 
(Kissinger) 349 

Greece.  U.S.  Calls  for  Greece-Turkey  Talks 
on  Aegean  Sea  Dispute  (Bennett,  text  of 
U.N.   Security  Council   resolution)    ....      373 

Iran.  Secretary  Interviewed  by  Philadelphia 
World   Affairs  Council   Panel 363 

Korea.  Secretary  Interviewed  by  Philadelphia 
World  Affairs   Council   Panel 363 

Law  of  the  Sea.  Secretary  Interviewed  by 
Philadelphia  World  Affairs  Council  Panel  .     .      363 

Mexico.  U.S.-Mexico  Science  and  Technology 
Commission  Holds  Second  Meeting  (joint 
statement) 375 

Middle  East.  Secretary  Interviewed  by  Phila- 
delphia World  Affairs  Council  Panel  ...      363 

Namibia 

The  Challenges   of  Africa    (Kissinger)    .     .    .      349 
Secretary    Kissinger's    News     Conference    at 
Philadelphia   August  31 358 

Science  and  Technology.  U.S.-Mexico  Science 
and  Technology  Commission  Holds  Second 
Meeting   (joint  statement) 375 

South  Africa 

The  Challenges  of  Africa  (Kissinger)  ....      349 
Secretary    Kissinger's    News    Conference    at 
Philadelphia  August  31 358 

Southern  Rhodesia 

The  Challenges  of  Africa  (Kissinger)  ....      349 
Secretary    Kissinger's    News     Conference    at 
Philadelphia  August  31 358 

Terrorism.  Secretary  Interviewed  by  Philadel- 
phia World  Affairs  Council  Panel   ....      363 

Treaty  Information.  Current  Actions  ....      376 

Turkey.  U.S.  Calls  for  Greece-Turkey  Talks 
on  Aegean  Sea  Dispute  (Bennett,  text  of 
U.N.   Security   Council   resolution)    ....      373 


United  Nations.  U.S.  Calls  For  Greece-Turkey 
Talks  on  Aegean  Sea  Dispute  (Bennett,  text 
of  U.N.   Security  Council  resolution)    .     .     .       373 

Name  Index 

Bennett,  W.  Tapley,  Jr 373 

Kissinger,    Secretary 349,  358,  363 


Checklist  of  Department  of  Stale 
Press  Releases:  Aug.  29-Sept.  5 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

No.      Date  Snbject 

t400  8/30  Kissinger:  letter  to  Chairman, 
Board  for  International  Broad- 
casting, Aug.  28. 

*'401  8/30  U.S.  Advisory  Commission  on  In- 
ternational Educational  and  Cul- 
tural Affairs,  Oct.  8. 

t402  8/30  Kissinger,  Simon,  Richardson:  let- 
ter to  corporate  executives 
transmitting  OECD  investment 
declaration,  Aug.  19. 

403  8/31    Kissinger:  Opportunities  Industri- 

alization Centers,  Philadelphia. 

404  8/31    Kissinger:  news  conference,  Phila- 

delphia. 

405  8/31    Kissinger:  panel  discussion,  World 

Affairs  Council,  Philadelphia. 

*406  9/1  Advisory  Committee  on  the  Law 
of  the  Sea,  Oct.  29-30. 

t407  9/1  Kissinger:  remarks  at  reception 
for  heads  of  Law  of  the  Sea 
Conference  delegations.  New 
York. 

*408  9/1  Television  specialists  from  15  na- 
tions to  participate  in  project  in 
U.S.  beginning  Sept.  12. 

t409  9/1  Kissinger:  remarks  following 
meeting  with  President  of  Law 
of  the  Sea  Conference,  New 
York. 

t410  9/2  Kissinger,  Waldheim:  remarks 
following   meeting.   New   York. 

t411  9/3  Kissinger:  departure,  Andrews 
AFB. 

*412  9/4  Kissinger:  remarks  to  press,  Lon- 
don. 

*415  9/5  Statement  on  Sept.  4  Kissinger- 
Vorster  meeting,  Zurich. 

♦■Not  printed. 

t  Held  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 


Superintendent   of    Documents 

u.s.  government  printing  office 

washington.  dc.  20402 


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service,  please  renew  your  subscription  promptly 
when  you  receive  the  expiration  notice  from  the 
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<J: 


\^//f^^ 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE 

BULLETIN 

Volume  LXXV     •      No.  1944     •      September  27,  1976 


SECRETARY  KISSINGER  MEETS  WITH  SOUTH  AFRICAN  PRIME  MINISTER 
AT  ZURICH  AND  CONFERS  WITH  BRITISH,  FRENCH,  AND  GERMAN  LEADERS 

Transcripts  of  News  Conferences    377 

DEPARTMENT  DISCUSSES  AUGUST  18  INCIDENT  AT  PANMUNJOM 

AND  ITS  AFTERMATH 

Statement  by  Assistant  Secretary  Hummel    386 

SECRETARY  KISSINGER  DISCUSSES  U.S.  POSITION 
ON  LAW  OF  THE  SEA  CONFERENCE     395 


THE  OFFICIAL  WEEKLY  RECORD  OF  UNITED  STATES  FOREIGN  POLICY 

For  index  see  inside  back  cover 


0CT2  2W 


THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE  BULLETIN 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Doeumenta 

U.S.  Government  Printine  Office 

Washington.  D.C.  20402 

PRICE: 

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domestic  $42.50,  foreign  $63.16 

Single  copy  85  cents 

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the  publication  of  this  periodical  is  necessary 
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agement and  Budget  through  January  31.  1981. 
Note:  Contents  of  this  publication  are  not 
copyrighted  and  items  contained  herein  may  be 
reprinted.  Citation  of  the  DEPARTMENT  OF 
STATE  BULLETIN  as  the  source  will  be 
appreciated.  The  BULLETIN  is  indexed  in 
the    Readers'    Guide    to    Periodical    Literature. 


Vol.  LXXV,  No.  1944 
September  27,  1976 

The  Department  of  State  BULLETl. 
a   weekly   publication   issued   by  t 
Office  of  Media  Services,  Bureau 
Public  Affairs,  provides  ttie  public  ai 
interested  agencies  of  tlie  governme 
witJi  information  on  developments 
ttie  field  of  U.S.  foreign  relations  a, 
on  ttie  work  of  tlte  Department  a, 
tfie  Foreign  Service. 
Tlte     BULLETIN     includes     select 
press  releases  on  foreign  policy,  issu 
by  tfie  Wftite  House  and  tlte  Depai 
ment,     and     statements,     address- 
and  news  conferences  of  tlte  Preside 
and  the  Secretary  of  State  and  oth 
officers  of  the  Department,  as  well 
special  articles  on  various  phases 
international  affairs  and  the  functic 
of    the    Department.     Information 
included  concerning  treaties  and  inU 
national    agreements    to    which    t 
United   States    is   or   may   become 
party  and  on  treaties  of  general  intt . 
national  interest. 

Publications    of    the    Department    il 
State,  United  Nations  documents,  wi§ 
legislative    material    in    the    field 
international  relations  are  also  list 


Secretary  Kissinger  Meets  With  South  African  Prime  Minister  at  Zurich 
and  Confers  With  British,  French,  and  German  Leaders 


Secretary  Kissinger  left  Washington  Sep- 
temher  3  for  a  trip  to  London,  Zurich,  Paris, 
and  Hamburg.  Folloiving  are  transcripts  of 
a  neivs  conference  held  by  Secretary  Kissin- 
ger at  Zurich  on  September  6  and  a  news 
conference  held  by  the  Secretary  and  Federal 
German  Chancellor  Helmut  Schmidt  at  Ham- 
burg on  September  7.' 


NEWS  CONFERENCE,  ZURICH,  SEPTEMBER  6 

Press   release  416  dated  September  6 

Ladies  and  gentlemen:  Let  me  explain, 
first,  what  we  are  trying  to  do;  secondly, 
the  evolution  of  these  negotiations;  and 
thirdly,  the  various  elements  that  have  to 
be  reconciled  in  these  negotiations.  And 
then  I  will  take  your  questions. 

The  United  States  is  making  an  effort  to 
bring  an  end  to  the  mounting  crisis  in 
southern  Africa.  The  United  States  is  con- 
scious of  the  fact  that  an  escalating  guer- 
rilla war  is  already  taking  place  in  Rho- 
desia, that  conditions  in  Namibia  will 
inevitably  lead  to  a  similar  crisis.  And  of 
course  we  are  also  aware  of  conditions  in 
South  Africa. 

The  United  States  is  making  a  serious 
effort  in  order  to  see  whether  we  can 
achieve  the  following  objectives:  majority 
rule  and  minority  rights;   a  peaceful   end 


'  Other  press  releases  relating  to  the  Secretary's 
Sept.  3-8  trip  are  Nos.  411  of  Sept.  3;  412  of  Sept.  4; 
415  of  Sept.  5;  417,  419,  and  420  of  Sept.  7;  and  422 
of  Sept.  8. 


September  27,  1976 


to  the  disagreements;  and  negotiation  that 
enables  all  of  the  communities  to  live  side 
by  side  under  conditions  of  dignity  and 
progress. 

We  do  so  in  the  interest  of  world  peace, 
because  continuing  conflict  in  Africa  will 
inevitably  bring  in  the  interests  of  outside 
powers  and  runs  a  major  risk  of  turning 
Africa  into  an  area  of  contention  of  non- 
African  countries. 

We  do  so  in  the  national  interest  of  the 
United  States,  because  of  our  interest — we 
have  a  profound  interest  in  a  world  of 
peace,  in  a  world  that  respects  human  dig- 
nity, and  in  conditions  of  economic  ad- 
vance. 

And  thirdly,  and  above  all,  we  do  it  in 
the  interest  of  the  peoples  of  the  area.  They 
will  be  those  who  suffer  most  from  a  con- 
tinuation of  conflict.  They  will  have  to  pay 
the  price  for  any  failure  of  negotiations. 
And  they  will  have  to  be  considered,  as 
alternatives  to  peaceful  resolution  are 
being  considered. 

Now  to  the  talks  that  have  been  taking 
place  here  in  the  last  two  days.  The  pur- 
pose of  these  talks  has  not  been  to  develop 
a  joint  American-South  African  program. 
The  evolution  of  these  talks  and  what  has 
brought  us  to  this  point  is  as  follows. 

On  my  visit  to  Africa  in  April,  all  Afri- 
can leaders  urged  a  solution  to  the  prob- 
lems of  southern  Africa  through  quiet  dis- 
cussions with  the  Prime  Minister  of  South 
Africa;  that  for  many  of  these  problems 
the  policies  of  his  government  held  the  key 
if  a  peaceful  solution  was  to  be  achieved. 


377 


Based  on  these  views,  we  initiated  contact 
with  the  Government  of  South  Africa. 

Prior  to  my  meeting  with  Prime  Minister 
Vorster  in  Germany  in  June,  we  solicited 
the  views  of  the  black  African  governments 
as  to  the  subjects  to  be  discussed  and  as 
to  the  conditions  under  which  they  believed 
a  peaceful  solution  to  the  problems  of 
southern  Africa  was  achievable.  We  pre- 
sented their  considerations  to  the  South 
African  Prime  Minister  in  June.  Those  dis- 
cussions led  to  a  certain  amount  of  prog- 
ress. 

After  those  discussions  the  United  States 
sent  two  missions  to  the  black  African 
states.  The  United  Kingdom,  whose  role  is 
crucial  in  all  of  these  actions,  which  has  a 
historic  responsibility  for  Rhodesia,  and  to 
whose  cooperation  and  wisdom  in  this  mat- 
ter I  would  like  to  pay  tribute,  also  sent 
two  missions  to  Africa. 

On  the  basis  of  these  two  American  and 
two  British  missions,  a  new  set  of  consider- 
ations was  developed  which  formed  the 
basis  for  my  discussions  with  the  South 
African  Prime  Minister  over  the  last  two 
days.  Those  discussions  have  been  fruitful. 
I  believe  that  progress  toward  the  objec- 
tives which  have  been  jointly  developed  by 
the  United  States,  the  United  Kingdom, 
and  the  states  of  black  Africa  has  been 
made.  It  is  our  view  that  a  basis  for  fur- 
ther negotiations  exists,  though  work  still 
remains  to  be  done. 

In  assessing  the  prospects  you  have  to 
keep  in  mind  that  we  are  dealing  with  a 
negotiation  of  extraordinary  complexity  in 
terms  of  the  issues  involved  and  in  terms 
of  the  parties  involved. 

In  attempting  mediation  there  is,  first  of 
all,  the  United  States  and  the  United  King- 
dom. We  have  worked  together  in  close 
harmony  and  with  no  significant  differ- 
ences, but  we  have  had  to  coordinate  our 
positions,  and  we  have  done  so  successfully. 

Within  Africa  we  are  dealing  interna- 
tionally now  with  two  major  problems — 
the  problem  of  Rhodesia  and  the  problem 
of  Namibia.  They  both  have  the  same  ob- 
jectives; that  is  to  say,  independence,  ma- 


378 


jority  rule,  minority  rights,  and  assurances} 
for  economic  progress. 

The  United  States  and,  I  think  I  am  safe 
in  saying,  the  United  Kingdom  stronglj 
support  these  objectives.  But  in  achieving 
these  objectives  we  are  dealing  with  twc 
different  sets  of  parties  in  each  case. 

The  problem  of  Namibia  is  betweer 
South  Africa,  the  various  groups  that  have 
formed  the  constitutional  conference 
within  Namibia,  and  certain  outside  groups 
such  as  SWAPO  [South  West  Africa  Peo- 
ple's Organization],  which  had  been  e» 
eluded  from  the  negotiations  up  to  now 
plus  such  neighboring  states  as  Angola  that  lie 
has — with  which  our  communications  arfiMt 
not,  shall  we  say,  ideal. 

With  respect  to  Rhodesia,  the  problem 
is  between  four  so-called  frontline  states — 
that  is,  states  that  are  bordering  Rhodesis 
— four  black  states  bordering  Rhodesia  i 
three  independence  movements;  Rhodesian 
white  authorities  that  are  not  recognizee 
by  either  the  United  States  or  the  Unitec- 
Kingdom ;  and  South  Africa,  which  does 
not  recognize  the  Rhodesian  authorities  at 
a  government  and  which  has  given  suppon 
to  it  in  one  way  or  another. 

In  other  words,  we  are  dealing  with  twc 
different  problems,  five  states,  four  liberaJjj 
tion  movements  in  black  Africa,  and  SoutB 
Africa,  plus  the  authorities  of  Rhodesia  ano 
the  authorities  within  Namibia.  Neverthei 
less,  with  all  of  these  complexities,  ano  k; 
while  we  must  expect  ups  and  downs, 
believe  that  conditions  for  a  negotiation 
exist  on  both  issues. 

The    United    States    will    work    for   thelf 
objectives  that  I  have  described. 

The  United  States  is  opposed  to  violence 
and  the  United  States  is  opposed  to  outside 
intervention.  The  United  States  does  be-! 
lieve  that  the  objectives  of  majority  rule; 
minority  rights,  and  economic  progress  foi 
all  the  peoples  of  the  area  are  attainable 
with  patience,  with  good  will,  and  with 
dedication.  And  the  United  States  is  pre- 
pared, together  with  the  United  Kingdom, 
to  offer  its  good  offices  in  the  attainment  of 
these  objectives. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


And  now  I  will  be  glad  to  answer  your 
questions. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  can  you  say  lohether  you 
made  any  progress  here  toward  setting  up  a 
y^iegotlating    framework    for    resolving    the 
VNamibia  question? 

'f*!  Secretary  Kissinger:  I  would  like  to  say 
'i*  aefore  I  answer  any  questions  that  I  hope 
'*  i^ou  ladies  and  gentlemen  will  understand 
■™l  ;hat  at  a  time  before  we  have  had  the  op- 
f(  portunity  to  inform  the  leaders  of  black 
'8  A-frica  of  the  details  of  the  negotiations, 
™  iomething  which  we  will  do  in  the  immedi- 
4  ite  future,  you  will  understand  that  I  can- 
iii  lot  go  into  details  on  many  of  the  questions 
;hat  you  may  ask  me. 

I  believe — just  a  minute,  I  have  not  an- 
swered him  yet — I  believe  that  progress 
tias  been  made  toward  setting  up  a  negoti- 
K  ating  framework,  but  of  course  we  will 
have  to  await  also  the  reaction — in 
Namibia,  the  reaction  of  other  leaders. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  did  Prime  Minister  Vor- 
sfcr  shoiv  any  signs  of  a  willingness  to 
recognize  SWAPO  in  Namibia? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  the  United 
States  has  stated  that  it  favors  the  partici- 
pation of  all  groups  in  negotiations,  and 
clearly  we  include  SWAPO  in  this.  It  is  of 
course  up  to  the  Prime  Minister  to  speak 
for  his  position.  But  it  is  our  view  that  a 
negotiating  process  will  have  to  include 
such  groups  as  SWAPO. 

Q.  Sir,  do  you  envisage  the  possibility  of 
your  meeting  with  Mr.  Smith  [Rhodesian 
Prime  Minister  Ian  D.  Smith]  ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  have  no  present 
plans  to  meet  with  Mr.  Smith,  and  this 
would  depend  entirely  on  assurance  that 
a  successful  outcome  of  the  negotiations 
will  occur.  But  at  this  moment  there  are  no 
plans  to  meet  with  Mr.  Smith,  and  there 
are  no — it  would  be  totally  premature  to 
peculate  on  it. 


Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  could  you  tell  us  if  you 
had    any   communication   with    the    leaders 


September  27,  1976 


meeting   in  Dar  es  Salaam  and  what  your 
pla7is  are  regarding  your  trip  to  Africa? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  There  has  been  a 
meeting  of  the  leaders  in  Dar  es  Salaam 
which  only  began  a  few  hours  ago.  We 
have  been  in  touch  over  the  weekend  with 
some  of  the  leaders,  but  that  was  prior  to 
their  assembling.  My  own  plans  are  to  re- 
turn to  the  United  States  tomorrow.  I  am 
ready  to  continue  the  negotiations  in  Africa 
if  the  parties  should  desire.  We  will  com- 
municate the  results  of  these  meetings  to 
the  parties,  and  we  believe  that  conditions 
exist  for  the  continuation  of  these  nego- 
tiations. 

Q.  Dr.  Kissinger,  I  have  a  question  in  tivo 
parts:  (a)  have  you  been  in  contact  ivith 
black  African  leaders  in  Rhodesia,  and  (b) 
hoiv  do  you  see  the  prospects  of  bringing 
these  black  leaders  of  Rhodesia  together? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  On  my  trip  to  Africa 
in  April,  I  agreed  with  the  Presidents  of 
the  so-called  fi-ontline  states,  that  is,  states 
that  border  the — that  border  Rhodesia, 
that  a  repetition  of  Angola  should  be 
avoided. 

By  this  we  mean  that  the  outside  powers, 
and  especially  the  superpowers,  should 
avoid  direct  contact  with  the  so-called  lib- 
eration movements  and  let  the  liberation 
movements  be  dealt  with  by  the  black  Afri- 
can states.  We  therefore  have  been  in  only 
very  infrequent  contacts  with  the  black 
leaders  of  Rhodesia,  and  we  have  always 
informed  the  leaders  of  black  Africa  of 
these  contacts. 

We  believe  that  the  unification  of  this 
leadership  is  a  task  not  for  the  United 
States,  but  is  a  task  for  black  Africa.  We 
hope  very  much  that  other  outside  powers 
exercise  similar  restraint. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  did  you  get  an  invitation 
to  visit  South  Africa?  Are  you  in  favor  of 
going  there? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Prime  Minister  Vor- 
ster  did  extend  an  invitation  to  visit  South 
Africa. 

A  visit  by  me  to  South  Africa  would  de- 


379 


pend  on  whether  negotiations  on  the  solu- 
tion of  problems  of  southern  Africa  are 
going  forward.  It  would,  in  any  event,  be 
preceded  by  a  visit  to  black  Africa;  and 
the  program  I  would  take  to  South  Africa 
would  reflect,  as  did  all  previous  programs, 
the  considerations  of  the  black  African 
leaders  that  I  have  met. 

In  other  words,  a  visit  by  me  to  South 
Africa  would  be  in  the  interest  of  peace 
of  southern  Africa  and  would  not  be  a  pro- 
tocol visit  by  a  Secretary  of  State. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  as  you  ivell  know,  many 
of  the  Africans  have  said  that  the  time  for 
talk  is  past  and  the  time  is  noio  for  fight- 
ing. Beyond  the  general  expression  of  views 
that  you  have  given  here  as  to  the  U.S.  and 
British  intentions,  are  you  noiv  in  a  position 
to  propose  specific  financial,  political,  and 
other  suggestions  that  you  have  been  able  to 
agree  ivith  Prime  Minister  Vorster  to  the 
black  leaders,  or  ivere  you  essentially  only 
holding  open  the  possibility  of  good  offices 
tvithout  any  concrete  offers? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  We  are  moving  to- 
ward a  position  where  we  will  be  able  to 
put  to  the  leaders  of  black  Africa  a  con- 
crete program  by  which  the  objectives  that 
I  have  described  can  be  achieved  for  both 
Namibia  and  Rhodesia. 

We  do  not  yet  have  all  the  details,  but 
we  are  moving  in  that  direction.  And  the 
leaders  of  black  Africa  at  that  point  will 
have  to  decide  first  whether  the  program 
meets  those  needs,  which  I  would  hope  it 
does,  and  whether  they  are  prepared  to  go 
the  route  of  negotiations  or  whether  they 
prefer  the  route  of  armed  struggle. 

Q.  Just  to  follow  that  up,  does  that  repre- 
sent a  joint  U.S.-South  African  position,  or 
individual  views  which  vary  on  the  tivo  sub- 
jects in  some  respect  on  Rhodesia  and  Nami- 
bia? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  have  pointed  out 
that  there  is  no  joint  U.S.-South  African 
position.  The  proposals  we  have  put  to 
South  Africa  have  emerged  from  our  dis- 
cussions with  the  leaders  of  black  Africa. 

380 


Of  course  those  that  are  then  accepted  by 
South  Africa  would  tend  to  create  a  con- 
sensus. And  in  any  negotiation  a  point  must 
be  reached  where  all  parties  agree,  if  it  is 
to  succeed.  But  the  proposals  we  have  put 
forward  had  been  developed  first  in  con- 
sultation with  the  leaders  of  Africa  and 
are  now  being  discussed  with  leaders  of 
South  Africa. 

Q.  In  case  that  the  African  summit  in  Tan-, 
zania  decides  on  black  rule  in  Rhodesia  and 
Namibia,  what  will  be  your  next  step? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  do  not  want  to 
speculate  on  decisions  that  the  summit  in 
Dar  es  Salaam  may  make.  If  it  recommends 
majority  rule  in  Rhodesia  and  Namibia,  the 
United  States  has  already  indicated  its  sup- 
port for  it.  The  issue  is  not  what  is  the  ob- 
jective but  how  it  is  to  be  achieved — one, 
by  what  negotiating  procedure,  and  second, 
under  what  concrete  conditions.  And  there 
we  have  attempted  to  shape  the  proposals 
we  have  received  from  Africa  and  the 
views  we  have  heard  from  South  Africa 
into  the  program  which  we  hope  will  b( 
acceptable  to  all  of  the  parties.  But  oi 
course  the  solution  can  only  come  by  th( 
agreement  of  the  parties  concerned  and  nd 
by  an  imposition  by  the  United  States. 

Q.  Does  your  program  that  you  are  draw 
ing  up  involve  changes  in  South  Africa  o; 
well  as  Namibia? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  negotiations- 
the  international  negotiations  at  this  mo 
ment  concern  Rhodesia  and  Namibia.  Thi 
United  States  has  stated  its  view  with  re 
spect  to  South  Africa  last  week  and  ha: 
had  a  response  from  South  Africa  as  well 

Q.  Does  South  Africa  [inaudible]  ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  No.  It  has  been  pub 
licly  stated.  And  I  am  certain  that  th( 
Prime  Minister  of  South  Africa  will  speal 
for  himself  when  he  meets  the  press. 

Q.  Has  South  Africa  agreed  to  help  finano 
any  guarantees  program  in  Rhodesia? 

Secretary  Kissinger:   There  has  been   ai 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 


■xtraordinary  amount  of  speculation  about 
his  so-called  guarantees  program.  Our 
:oncern  is  not  simply  to  deal  with  the  mi- 
lority — with  the  white  minority  in  Rho- 
lesia;  our  concern  is  an  economic  program 
hat  brings  about  the  economic  advance- 
ment of  all  of  Rhodesia  and,  within  that 
:ontext,  to  provide  opportunities  for  all 
•aces  and  all  communities  to  live  side  by 
dde  with  some  security  and  with  some  as- 
uirances  against  rapid  changes  in  their 
position.  This  program  is  still  in  a  state  of 
_'\()iution,  and  its  details  will  have  to  await 
;he  precise  discussions,  though  progress 
!ias  been  made  in  these  and  previous  talks. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  it  has  been  reported  this 
morning  on  the  radio  that  if  the  Dar  es 
■Balaam  people  take  the  residts  of  your  talks 
jidte  ivell,  it  is  thought  that  there  may  be  a 
Namibia  conference  in  Geneva  quite  shortly, 
by  the  beginning  of  October,  say. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  do  not  want  to  go 
nto  specifics  over  negotiations  that  are  still 
joing  on.  But  obviously,  if  independence 
for  Namibia  is  to  be  achieved,  there  will 
tiave  to  be  a  conference.  There  has  to  be  a 
location,  and  there  will  have  to  be  an 
agreement  as  to  participants.  And  you  can 
Safely  assume  that  this  is  one  of  the  sub- 
jects we  are  discussing  right  now.  [Laugh- 
ter.] 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you  are  to  meet  tomor- 
row President  Giscard  d'Estaing.  Will  you 
discuss  ivith  him  about  the  selling  to  South 
Africa  of  its  installations  for  treatment  [in- 
ludible']? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  do  not  commit  sui- 
:ide  twice  in  a  row.  [Laughter.]  It's  also 
physically  impossible.  [Laughter.]  And  I 
will  attempt  to  arrive  in  France  for  once 
without  outraged  statements  in  the  French 
press. 

When  I  meet  the  President  of  France, 
my  primary  objective  is  to  review  with  him 
:he  state  of  these  negotiations  and  the 
world  situation,  as  we  always  do,  in  a  spirit 
3f  friendship  and  cooperation.  I  do  not 
lave   on  my   agenda  any  specific  French 

ieptember  27,  1976 


commercial  transactions,  but  rather  the 
general  strategy  that  the  United  States  and 
other  countries  are  pursuing  with  respect 
to  southern  Africa,  to  get  the  benefits  of 
the  views  of  a  leader  whose  opinion  we 
value  greatly  and  of  whose  friendship  we 
are  proud. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you  used  the  term  "prog- 
ress" here,  and  so  did  Mr.  Vorster.  "Prog- 
ress," of  course,  is  a  very  rubbery  term 
diplomatically.  Is  there  any  jvay  under  the 
limitations  upon  you,  with  your  diplomatic 
requirements,  that  you  can  be  in  any  way  any 
more  specific  on  any  one  of  these  spheres 
rather  than  telling  us  that  progress  has  been 
made?  Can  you  give  us  any  kind  of  measure- 
ment  or  increment  of  progress? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Should  I  say  progress 
is  at  hand?  [Laughter.]  We  change  the 
noun  every  four  years. 

I  would  say  we  have  made  progress  both 
with  respect  to  procedure  and  with  respect 
to  substance.  I  would  want  to  repeat  again 
that  I  measure  this  progress  by  the  opin- 
ions we  have  previously  collected  from  our 
various  missions  to  Africa  and  the  objec- 
tives which  we  have  stated  for  the  United 
States  and,  I  believe,  for  the  United  King- 
dom. And  we  believe  that  progress  is  being 
made  with  respect  both  to  the  procedures 
and  to  the  substance,  though  of  course  the 
many  parties  that  I  have  described  previ- 
ously must  make  the  final  judgment  on 
that. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  when  will  the  proposals 
you  have  outlined  here  be  presented  to  the 
[inaudible']  ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Our  tentative  plan  is 
to  send  Assistant  Secretary  [for  African 
Affairs  William  E.]  Schaufele  to  Africa, 
but  we  may  modify  this.  But  this  is  our  ten- 
tative plan,  and  in  any  event,  you  can  be 
sure  that  by  one  means  or  another  they  will 
be  presented  within  the  next  48  hours. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  before  these  negotiations 
started,  before  the  talks  here  started,  it  ivas 
generally  thought  that  the  Namibian  prob- 


381 


lem  might  be  a  little  more  tractable  than  the 
Rhodesian  one.  Is  that  still  your  vieiv  now? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  anybody  who 
makes  estimates  of  the  tractability  of  Afri- 
can problems  is  being  very  rash.  I  would 
think  that  the  Namibian  problem,  having 
fewer  parties,  and  being  at  an  earlier 
phase,  in  which  procedure  is  as  yet  more 
dominant  than  substance,  may  lend  itself 
to  more  rapid  progress.  I  want  to  make 
clear  that  as  far  as  the  United  States  is 
concerned  we  are  prepared  to  move  at  a 
pace  as  rapid  as  it  is  possible  to  achieve 
agreement  among  the  parties  on  both  of 
these  issues. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  how  [inaudible']  will  the 
United  Nations  come  into  the  negotiations? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  the  United  Na- 
tions has,  of  course,  a  role  in  South  West 
Africa,  which  some  of  its  representatives 
carry  out  very  vocally.  Thei-e  will  be  a  role 
for  the  United  Nations,  and  this  is  one  of 
the  subjects  that  is  now  under  discussion. 
But  the  United  States  supports  a  role  for 
the  United  Nations  in  these  negotiations. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  how  much  further  do  you 
think  your  negotiations  about  Rhodesia  can 
go  on  without  contact  or  reference  to  ivhat  is 
the  de  facto  government? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  somebody  will 
have  to  be  in  contact  with  the  authorities 
in  Salisbury,  and  I  believe  that  those  pos- 
sibilities of  contact  exist,  but  it  doesn't  nec- 
essarily have  to  be  the  United  States  at  this 
stage. 

NEWS   CONFERENCE   BY   SECRETARY   KISSINGER 
AND  FEDERAL  GERMAN  CHANCELLOR  SCHMIDT 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Mr.  Chancellor  and 
Mr.  Foreign  Minister,  let  me  take  this  op- 
portunity first  of  all  to  thank  both  of  you 


'  Held  at  Hamburg  on  Sept.  7  (text  from  press  re- 
lease 421). 


for  the  characteristically  warm  and  cordial 
reception  that  we  had  here. 

It  is  customary  for  American  and  Ger- 
man Ministers  to  consult  with  each  other 
about  international  events.  We  are  at  this 
moment  engaged  in  discussions  with  vari- 
ous African  countries,  and  it  was  therefore 
considered  very  desirable  by  the  President 
as  well  as  myself  to  have  this  opportunity 
to  exchange  ideas  and  to  obtain  the  views 
of  the  Chancellor  and  the  Foreign  Min- 
ister. 

We  reviewed  the  negotiations  with  re- 
spect to  southern  Africa;  we  discussed  the 
situation  in  the  Middle  East;  we  talked  also 
about  the  Law  of  the  Sea  Conference  and 
about  East-West  relations  in  general. 

Relations  between  our  two  countries  are 
close;  the  coordination  of  policies  is  taking 
place  on  every  level,  including  the  higher 
level.  The  policies  of  both  countries  have 
shown  great  continuity  and  will  continue  to 
show  this.  And  for  all  these  reasons,  it  has 
been  a  great  pleasure  for  me  to  be  here.  I 
want  to  thank  the  Chancellor  and  the  For- 
eign Minister  for  giving  us  this  opportunity 
to  exchange  ideas. 

Chancellor  Schmidt:  I  don't  think  I  have 
to  add  much  to  this,  ladies  and  gentlemen. 
We  have  touched  upon  just  about  all  areas 
of  foreign  policy.  Secretary  Kissinger  has 
already  mentioned  some  of  them. 

I  should  add  that  of  course  we  have 
talked  especially  about  East-West  rela- 
tions, the  continuation  of  the  policy  of  "re- 
laxation of  tensions,"  about  the  agreements 
to  which  both  the  United  States  of  America 
and  we  are  signatory  parties  and  the  ob- 
servance of  which  by  ourselves  and  by  the 
other  treaty  partners  we  both  feel  is  of 
great  importance. 

Maybe  I  should  confine  myself  to  this 
and  leave  room  for  questions,  which,  as  I 
hope,  will  be  directed  mainly  to  Mr.  Kis- 
singer, who,  as  the  guest  here,  will  be  the 
more  interesting  man  to  answer  than  the 
born  Hamburger  or  the  Wuppertaler  who 
came  to  us  via  Bremen  from  Saxony  to  be- 
come Foreign  Minister. 


382 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  since  you  both  talked 
about  Africa,  may  I  talk  about  Africa?  Can 
you  make  it  official,  sir,  that  you  will  be 
going  to  an  African  shuttle,  when  will  you  go, 
to  which  capitals  will  you  go,  and  which 
parties  will  you  negotiate  betiveen? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  cannot  at  this  point 
make  it  official.  We  have  had  a  communi- 
cation from  the  Tanzanian  Government 
that  they  would  welcome  a  visit.  I  would 
like  to  wait,  however,  until  Assistant  Sec- 
retary Schaufele,  who  is  now  on  his  way 
to  Tanzania,  has  had  an  opportunity  to  talk 
to  President  Nyerere  and  maybe  to  other 
Presidents  who  have  been  at  this  meeting 
before  we  make  the  final  decision  whether 
to  go. 

Q.  What  are  the  odds,  in  fact,  sir,  that  you 
u-iU  go,  and  could  you  outline  the  kind  of 
shuttle  in  which  you  ivould  engage? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  I  think  it  would 
depend  very  much  on  the  decisions  of  the 
summit,  of  which  we  have  not  yet  been 
formally  informed.  What  we  will  attempt 
to  do  is  to  bring  together  the  so-called 
frontline  Presidents  that  are  concerned 
with  Rhodesia,  as  well  as  the  liberation 
movements  concerned  with  Rhodesia,  on  a 
negotiated  program  for  majority  rule  and 
minority  rights  and  an  end  of  warfare  in 
Rhodesia.  We  would  also  encourage  the 
process  of  negotiation  that  may  be  possible 
with  respect  to  Namibia. 

The  U.S.  objective  is  to  avoid  violence. 
We  cannot  support  violence,  and  we  are 
bound  to  oppose  foreign  interventions.  But 
we  will  support  peaceful  negotiations  be- 
tween the  various  parties.  Which  countries 
would  be  visited — I  will  want  to  wait  until 
we  have  had  the  official  communications 
from  the  summit. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  although  you  have  not 
had  formal  notification  from'Dar  [es  Sa- 
laam], you  knoiv  that  they  finished  their 
deliberations  ivith  a  brief  statement  that  said 
that    they   intend    to   further   intensify    the 


armed  struggle.  What  kind  of  an  analysis  do 
you  make  of  that? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  cannot  make  a 
judgment  as  to  this.  The  U.S.  position  is  to 
encourage  a  peaceful  solution,  to  bring 
about  conditions  in  which  majority  rule, 
minority  rights,  and  economic  progress  can 
be  achieved  without  violence. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  how  soon  could  you  be 
prepared  to  leave,  sir? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  it  is  difficult  to 
speculate,  but  I  would  be  prepared — if  the 
conditions  were  right,  I  could  leave  per- 
haps next  week  sometime.  But  I  want  to 
repeat  I  would  first  want  to  await  the  re- 
port of  Assistant  Secretary  Schaufele. 

Q.  When  tvould  you  expect  to  receive  this? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  would  think  that  I 
would  have  heard  from  him  by  Thursday 
morning. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  what  do  you  think  the 
domestic  political  impact  of  the  mission  would 
be,  whether  you  succeed  or  fail? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  The  mission  has  no 
domestic  political  implications.  The  situa- 
tion in  Rhodesia  is  such  that  an  escalation 
of  violence  is  probable  and  at  some  point 
events  may  get  beyond  the  control  of  ne- 
gotiations. I  think  that  the  promotion  of 
peace  is  a  nonpartisan  effort  which  will  be 
supported  by  both  political  parties  and  is 
not  contentious  between  the  political 
parties. 

Q.  Mr.  Chancellor,  is  Germany  willing  to 
participate  in  the  new  economic  aid  program 
in  southern  Africa,  including  a  guarantee 
program  for  the  white  minority  in  Rhodesia  ? 

Chancellor  Schmidt:  German  interests  are 
foremost  and,  generally  speaking,  the  same 
as  those  Secretary  Kissinger  has  described 
for  the  United  States  of  America;  namely, 
the  interest  to  avoid  bloodshed  and  vio- 
lence; the  interest  to  avoid  outside  inter- 
vention; third,  the  interest  to  bring  about 


September  27,  1976 


383 


democratic  elections  and  governments  in 
these  countries  for  these  two  purposes. 

I  want  to  add  as  a  fourth  point  that  we 
Germans  are  a  little  bit  more  interested  in 
Namibia  than  Rhodesia  because  in  Nami- 
bia there  are  about  25,000  people  of  Ger- 
man descent  with  whom  we  naturally  have 
special  links. 

We  have  spoken  in  a  general  way  about 
the  concepts  that  the  American  Govern- 
ment has  in  mind  in  order  to  reach  these 
goals,  which  we  have  roughly  outlined 
here.  These  include,  too,  as  Secretary  Kis- 
singer has  said,  not  only  majority  rule  but 
also  the  rights  of  minorities. 

To  achieve  this,  possibly  economic  aid 
will  be  needed.  The  states  which  are  trans- 
forming themselves  here  need  economic 
help  in  many  respects.  The  Federal  Repub- 
lic of  Germany  has,  worldwide,  never  re- 
fused such  help.  Whether  there  will  be 
some  special  assistance  and  whether  we 
will  join  in  will  have  to  be  seen  within 
some  weeks  or  even  months.  But  at  the  end 
of  these  remarks  I  want  to  accentuate 
again  our  special  interest  in  Namibia. 

Q.  Mr.  Chancellor,  you  have  also  mentioned 
the  topic  "Ostpolitik";  could  you  go  into  a 
little  more  detail  and  be  a  little  more  con- 
crete? 

Chancellor  Schmidt:  The  three  of  us  have 
not  used  the  word  "Ostpolitik,"  but  we 
have,  as  I  have  mentioned  already,  used  the 
expression  "relaxation  of  tensions,"  but 
this  is  the  same  thing,  and  we  have  also 
discussed  the  status  of  the  fulfillment  of  the 
treaties.  In  this  connection,  because  of  this 
summer's  events,  the  Quadripartite  Agree- 
ment on  Berlin  has  also  played  a  role.  But 
maybe  it  would  be  better  if  I  would  confine 
myself  to  saying  that  we  were  in  complete 
agreement,  and  perhaps  the  American  Sec- 
retary of  State  would  like  to  make  a  few 
remarks  about  this  subject. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  I  would  say 
first  of  all  that  there  was  an  identity  of 
views  between  Chancellor  Schmidt,  the 
Foreign  Minister,  and  ourselves  on  the  is- 
sues of  East-West  relations. 


384 


As  far  as  the  United  States  is  concerned, 
we  will  consider  the  policy  of  relaxation  of 
tension   or   detente,   which   has   now   beeni 
again  legitimized  by  the  Republican  plat-! 
form    [laughter],  and  because  we  believe; 
that  it  is  necessary  for  world  peace  and  for- 
the   future  of  mankind.  We  also  believe, 
however,  that  such  a  policy  must  be  based 
on  the  strict  fulfillment  of  the  letter  and 
the  spirit  of  existing  treaties,  and  we  will 
insist  on  this,  just  as  we  are  prepared  to 
carry  out  the  letter  and  spirit  of  the  exist- 
ing arrangements. 

The  Quadripartite  Agreement  on  Berlin 
is  an  important  aspect  of  this  policy  and 
an  important  test  of  the  sincerity  of  Soviet 
intentions.  The  United  States  attaches  the 
greatest  importance  to  the  strict  fulfillment 
of  the  provisions  of  this  agreement  and  the 
greatest  importance  to  the  integrity  and 
freedom  of  Berlin,  and  this  is  a  constant 
policy  of  the  United  States  which  we  shall 
continue  to  pursue. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  what  kind  of  possibility 
do  you  foresee  concerning  Namibia  or 
SWAPO  to  join  in?  Is  it  possible  [inaudible']  ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  I  do  not  think 
it  would  be  appropriate  for  me  to  give  de- 
tails of  discussions  that  may  be  taking 
place.  The  U.S.  position  has  been  that  all 
authentic  groups,  among  whom  we  would 
include  SWAPO,  should  participate  in  any 
talks  that  might  be  held  on  the  future  of 
Namibia.  What  the  framework  of  these 
talks  should  be — that  remains  to  be  dis- 
cussed in  any  negotiations  that  could  take 
place  over  the  next  few  weeks. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  have  you  been  in  contact 
with  SWAPO  leaders  or  Mr.  Ian  Smith  in 
the  leadup  to  these  discussions  or  during 
these  discussions  with  Mr.  Vorster? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Under  Secretary  [for 
Economic  Affairs  William  D.]  Rogers  and 
Assistant  Secretary  Schaufele  on  their  re- 
cent trip  through  Africa  had  a  conversa- 
tion with  the  head  of  SWAPO  in  addition 
to  conversations  with  the  Presidents  of 
African  states. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Q.  Mr.  Chancellor,  while  I  recognize  that 
lOur  discussions  with  Mr.  Kissinger  may  he 
treliminary  on  this  point,  could  you  clarify, 
ir,  whether  your  conception  ivould  be  of  a 
}erman  national  contribution  to  financial 
marantees  for  southern  Africa,  or  are  you 
peaking  possibly  in  terms  of  a  European 
Commission  contributioti  or  support? 

Chancellor  Schmidt:  You  were  right  in 
'■our  introductory  remark,  that  we  were 
reating  this  matter  in  preliminary  talks, 
•ut  I  want  in  any  case  to  go  so  far  as  to 
ay  that  up  to  now  we  have  not  spoken 
bout  a  common  European  contribution 
hrough  the  EEC  [European  Economic 
yommunity]. 


'resident  Ford  Discusses  U.S.  EfForts 
n  Southern  Africa 

Following  is  a  statement  made  by  President 
^ord  at  the  opening  of  his  news  conference 
f  September  5.' 

%ite  House  press   release  dated  September  8 

I  met  this  morning  with  Secretary  Kis- 
inger  to  discuss  his  report  on  his  meetings 
ath  [South  African]  Prime  Minister  Vor- 
ter  and  with  European  leaders.  On  the 
asis  of  this  report,  I  believe  that  good 
rogress  has  been  made  on  the  problems 
oncerning  southern  Africa. 

It  is  important  to  understand  that  in  this 
iplomatic    process    now     unfolding,    the 


For  the  complete  transcript,  see  Weekly  Compila- 
on     of     Presidential     Documents     dated     Sept.     13, 
1314. 


United  States  is  offering  its  good  offices  as 
an  intermediary.  We  are  willing  to  present 
ideas  on  how  progress  can  be  achieved,  but 
we  are  not — and  I  emphasize  "not" — try- 
ing to  develop  a  specific  American  plan. 

We  have  three  objectives:  First,  to  pre- 
vent an  escalation  of  the  violence,  which  in 
time  could  threaten  our  national  security; 
second,  to  realize  popular  aspirations  while 
guaranteeing  minority  rights  and  insuring 
economic  progress;  third,  to  resist  the  in- 
tervention in  the  African  situation  by  out- 
side forces. 

In  his  discussions  with  Prime  Minister 
Vorster,  the  Secretary  put  forward  some 
ideas  conveyed  to  the  United  States  by 
black  African  leaders,  and  Prime  Minister 
Vorster  gave  us  his  reactions.  As  a  result 
of  these  discussions.  Assistant  Secretary 
[for  African  Affairs  William  E.]  Schaufele 
is  currently  in  Africa  discussing  the  situ- 
ation. 

On  the  basis  of  his  report,  I  will  decide 
whether  further  progress  can  be  made 
through  a  visit  by  Secretary  Kissinger  to 
Africa,  starting  with  black  African  coun- 
tries most  concerned.  We  want  to  create 
the  opportunities  and  conditions  for  all 
races  to  live  side  by  side. 

The  United  States  cannot  solve  by  itself 
these  complicated  problems.  We  need  the 
continued  good  will  and  dedication  of  the 
parties  involved. 

The  process  that  is  now  beginning  is  an 
e.xtremely  important  one.  It  is  extremely 
complicated.  There  is  no  guarantee  of  suc- 
cess. But  I  believe  the  United  States  must 
now  make  a  major  effort  because  it  is  the 
right  thing  to  do.  It  is  in  our  national  inter- 
est, and  it  is  in  the  interest  of  world  peace. 


sptember  27,  1976 


385 


leitti' 


Department  Discusses  August  18  Incident  at  Panmunjom 
and  Its  Aftermath 


Statement  by  Arthur  W.  Hummel,  Jr.  .^     ,  ^  . 

Assistant  Secretary  for  East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs 


I  appreciate  the  opportunity  to  appear 
before  these  subcommittees  and  to  testify 
on  the  August  18  incident  at  Panmunjom 
and  its  aftermath. 

As  members  of  the  subcommittees  are 
fully  aware,  the  Korean  Peninsula  has  been 
in  an  armed  truce  since  1953,  with  the 
political  problems  that  caused  the  Korean 
hostilities  still  unresolved  and  two  heavily 
armed  forces  facing  each  other  across  a 
four-kilometer-wide  demilitarized  zone. 
Over  the  past  23  years  of  the  armistice  the 
consistent  goal  of  the  United  States  has  been 
to  prevent  the  outbreak  of  new  hostilities 
and  contribute  to  stability  in  an  area  where 
the  interests  of  four  great  powers— our- 
selves, Japan,  the  U.S.S.R.,  and  the  Peo- 
ple's Republic  of  China— all  intersect.  The 
security  of  Korea  remains  vital  to  peace  in 
Northeast  Asia  and  is  closely  linked  to  the 
security  of  Japan,  a  major  ally. 

Throughout  the  long  period  since  the 
end  of  the  Korean  war,  North  Korea  has 
not  given  up  its  goal  of  reunifying  the 
peninsula  on  its  own  terms  and  views  the 
use  of  force  as  one  measure  of  achieving 
this  goal.  The  North  has  remained  intran- 


'  Made  before  the  Subcommittees  on  International 
Political  and  Military  Affairs  and  on  International 
Organizations  of  the  House  Committee  on  Interna- 
tional Relations  on  Sept.  1.  The  complete  transcript 
of  the  hearings  will  be  published  by  the  committee 
and  will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Wash- 
ington, D.C.  20402. 


386 


sigent  on  all  the  political  issues  which  di- 
vide North  and  South  and  has  posed  a 
constant  military  threat.  The  demilitarized 
zone  has  thus  been  an  area  of  major  ten- 
sion since  the  armistice  agreement,  with 
frequent  military  clashes  which,  over  the 
years,  have  taken  49  American  and  over 
1,000  Korean  lives. 

The  United  States,  which  was  of  course 
a  major  participant  in  the  Korean  hostili- 
ties, is  firmly  committed  to  the  security  of 
Korea  through  its  important  interests  in  the 
peninsula  and  the  Mutual  Defense  Treaty 
of  1954  with  the  Republic  of  Korea.  We 
continue  to  maintain  forces  in  the  Repub 
lie  of  Korea  under  this  treaty  to  preserve 
the  peace  by  deterring  renewed  aggressior 
from  the  North. 

You  will  recall  that  after  the  fall  o1 
Viet-Nam  there  was  a  period  of  time  dur- 
ing which  there  was  the  possibility  thai 
the  North  Koreans  might  miscalculate  oui 
commitment  to  peace  and  stability  on  the 
Korean  Peninsula  and  our  commitment 
under  the  Mutual  Defense  Treaty  of  1954 
to  the  security  of  the  Republic  of  Korea 
This  commitment  was  strongly  restated  by 
the  President,  Secretary  Kissinger,  and 
other  high-level  U.S.  Government  officials, 
We  believe  that  this  commitment,  together 
with  the  state  of  readiness  of  the  United 
States  and  the  Republic  of  Korea  forces, 
continues  to  deter  any  renewed  major  ag- 
gression by  North  Korea.  We  believe  that 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


neither  the  People's  Republic  of  China  nor 
the  U.S.S.R.  wishes  to  see  North  Korea 
make  any  move  that  would  destabilize  the 
situation  on  the  Korean  Peninsula. 

At  present  there  is  on  the  peninsula  a 
rough  military  balance  between  the  forces 
of  South  Korea  and  the  United  States  on 
the  one  hand  and  those  of  the  North  on  the 
other.  It  has  been  a  major  goal  of  the 
North  Koreans  to  destroy  this  balance  by 
securing  the  withdrawal  of  U.S.  forces 
from  the  Republic  of  Korea.  North  Korea 
has  repeatedly  called  for  such  a  with- 
drawal, trying  to  win  international  support 
for  this  goal  by  depicting  the  U.S.  pres- 
ence as  a  source  of  tension  in  the  area. 

Intensified  Campaign  Against  the  U.S. 

Immediately  prior  to  the  August  18  in- 
cident, P'yongyang  embarked  upon  a 
major  intensification  of  this  longstanding 
campaign.  On  August  5  they  issued  a 
strongly  worded  government  statement  at- 
tacking the  United  States  and  the  Republic 
of  Korea.  The  statement  was  accompanied 
by  a  supporting  memorandum  purporting 
to  document  the  statement's  allegations 
that  the  United  States  was  about  to  make 
war  on  North  Korea. 

The  statement  said  the  United  States 
had  completed  war  preparations  and  was 
entering  into  a  "phase  of  directly  trigger- 
ing war"  from  a  "phase  of  directly  prepar- 
ing for  war."  It  demanded  that  the  United 
States  withdraw  all  its  military  equipment 
from  the  Republic  of  Korea,  abandon  what 
it  called  a  "two  Koreas"  policy,  disband 
the  U.N.  Command,  withdraw  all  foreign 
troops  under  the  U.N.  flag,  and  replace  the 
armistice  agreement  with  a  peace  agree- 
ment. 

From  earlier  North  Korean  statements 
we  know  that  the  phrase  "foreign  troops 
under  the  U.N.  flag"  also  means  all  U.S. 
forces  in  Korea  under  bilateral  U.S.- 
Republic of  Korea  arrangements.  The 
statement  claimed  that  the  reunification  of 
Korea  could  then  be  achieved  by  the 
Korean    people    through    a    national    con- 


September  27,  1976 


gress.  There  was  no  recognition  of  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Republic  of  Korea.  The 
statement  also  appealed  to  other  nations 
to  condemn  alleged  U.S.  attempts  to  trigger 
a  war  in  Korea. 

This  statement  was  also  the  culmination 
of  anti-U.S.  efforts  among  the  nonaligned 
nations  which  were  about  to  hold  their 
nonaligned  summit  meeting  in  Colombo. 
At  the  nonaligned  meeting,  which  took 
place  in  mid-August,  we  believe  the  North 
Koreans  hoped  for  endorsement  of  very 
harsh  anti-U.S.  and  anti-Republic  of 
Korea  language  which  they  could  subse- 
quently utilize  in  lobbying  for  a  resolu- 
tion submitted  by  their  supporters  at  the 
U.N.  General  Assembly. 

As  you  may  recall,  the  U.N.  General 
Assembly  last  year  approved  two  contra- 
dictory resolutions  on  Korea — one  sub- 
mitted by  supporters  of  North  Korea  and 
one  submitted  by  ourselves  and  other  sup- 
porters of  the  Republic  of  Korea.  We  be- 
lieve that  at  this  year's  U.N.  General  As- 
sembly the  North  Koreans  hope  to  score  a 
diplomatic  victory  which  would  contribute 
to  isolation  of  the  Republic  of  Korea  and 
its  supporters  by  securing  approval  of  its 
own  propagandistic  resolution  and  the  de- 
feat of  the  friendly  resolution.  I  shall  re- 
turn to  the  U.N.  General  Assembly  situa- 
tion later. 

The  Joint  Security  Area 

The  August  18  incident  came  in  the  con- 
text of  this  heightened  propaganda  cam- 
paign. Before  I  describe  this  incident,  let 
me  make  some  comments  on  the  Joint 
Security  Area.  This  is  a  smal),  roughly 
circular  area  of  the  demilitarized  zone 
some  800  yards  in  diameter  in  which  the 
Military  Armistice  Commission  meetings 
are  held.  It  is  a  neutral  area,  maintained 
and  patrolled  by  both  sides.  Each  side  is 
permitted  to  have  35  armed  guards  in  the 
area  at  any  given  time.  Larger  groups  of 
unarmed  work  personnel  are  permitted. 
Specific  maintenance  and  groundskeeping 
tasks,  such  as  the  pruning  of  trees,  have 


387 


been    carried    out    by    each    side    without 
prior  consultation  with  the  other. 

The  North  Koreans  have  frequently 
caused  incidents  in  the  Joint  Security  Area, 
harassing  U.N.  Command  personnel,  en- 
gaging in  verbal  threats  and  on  occasion 
in  physical  assaults.  In  1975  a  U.N.  Com- 
mand officer  was  knocked  to  the  ground 
and  severely  injured  with  a  kick  to  the 
throat. 

The  August  18  Incident 

With  respect  to  the  tree  involved  in  the 
August  18  incident,  it  was  found  that  the 
foliage  on  this  tree  was  obstructing  the 
line  of  sight  between  two  U.N.  Command 
guardposts.  One  of  these  guardposts  was 
near  the  North  Korean  side  of  the  military 
demarcation  line  near  the  Bridge  of  No 
Return.  It  was  felt  that  if  this  guardpost 
were  not  fully  visible  from  the  other,  the 
chances  for  its  being  subject  to  harassment 
or  attack  by  North  Korean  personnel  were 
increased.  It  was  decided,  therefore,  to 
remove  the   obstruction. 

On  August  5  a  work  party  went  to  the 
tree,  which  is  located  on  the  U.N.  Com- 
mand side  of  the  military  demarcation 
line,  for  the  purpose  of  felling  it.  North 
Korean  guards  told  them  to  leave  the  tree 
alone,  although  they  did  not  lodge  a  for- 
mal protest  over  the  matter.  Subsequently, 
it  was  determined  that  guardpost  visibility 
could  be  improved  by  trimming  the  tree 
rather  than  cutting  it  down. 

On  Wednesday,  August  18,  1976,  at 
approximately  10:30  local  time,  a  U.N. 
Command  work  crew  of  five  Korean 
laborers  accompanied  by  three  U.N.  Com- 
mand officers  (two  U.S.  and  one  Republic 
of  Korea)  and  a  seven-man  security  force 
arrived  in  the  Joint  Security  Area  at  Pan- 
munjom.  Their  purpose  was  routine  and 
nonthreatening;  namely,  to  prune  the  tree. 

Shortly  after  the  party  began  its  work, 
two  North  Korean  Army  officers  and  about 
nine  enlisted  men  arrived  in  a  truck.  They 
inquired  about  the  work  in  progress.  After 
being  told  that  the  tree  was  to  be  trimmed, 

388 


not  cut  down,  one  North  Korean  Army 
officer  stated  that  this  was  "good."  Work 
continued  for  10-15  minutes  during  which 
some  North  Korean  Army  personnel  tried 
to  direct  the  U.N.  Command  workers  on 
how  to  prune  the  tree.  At  about  10:50, 
some  20  minutes  after  work  began,  one 
North  Korean  Army  officer  told  the  U.N. 
Command  officer  to  halt  work.  After  a 
short  discussion,  the  North  Korean  Army 
officer  threatened  the  U.N.  Command  per- 
sonnel. The  U.N.  Command  officer  told 
his  men  .to  keep  working.  The  North  Ko- 
rean Army  officer  then  ordered  the  Korean 
laborers  to  stop  working.  The  U.N.  Com- 
mand officer  indicated  that  work  would 
continue,  at  which  point  the  North  Korean 
Army  officer  sent  a  guard  across  the 
bridge,  apparently  to  summon  reinforce- 
ments. Several  minutes  thereafter  the 
number  of  North  Korean  Army  guards  on 
the  scene  had  increased  to  approximately 
30. 

At  this  point,  one  North  Korean  Army 
officer  put  his  watch,  which  he  had 
wrapped  in  a  handkerchief,  into  his 
pocket.  Another  rolled  up  his  sleeves.  One 
officer  yelled  "kill"  and  then  struck  Cap- 
tain [Arthur  G.]  Bonifas,  knocking  him  tc 
the  ground.  Five  other  North  Korear 
Army  guards  jumped  on  Bonifas  and  con 
tinned  to  beat  him.  Other  North  Korear 
Army  guards  attacked  the  other  U.N 
Command  guards,  beating  them  with  a? 
handles  and  clubs.  U.N.  Command  wit 
nesses  reported  that  North  Korean  Armj 
guards  picked  up  the  axes  used  by  tht 
tree  pruners.  Captain  Bonifas  was  beater 
with  the  blunt  heads  of  the  axes  while  h( 
was  on  the  ground.  All  U.N.  Commanc 
personnel  received  repeated  beatings  ever 
though  they  tried  to  break  contact  anc 
leave  the  area. 

Casualties  from  this  incident — whicl 
lasted  less  than  five  minutes — were  twc 
U.S.  Army  officers  killed,  four  U.S.  Armj 
enlisted  personnel  wounded,  and  four  en- 
listed Korean  augmentees  to  the  U.S 
Army  wounded. 

We  believe  that  the  August  18  incident 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


may  have  been  an  attempt  by  North 
Korea  to  underscore  the  theme  of  its  prop- 
aganda campaign:  that  tensions  were  high 
in  Korea  as  a  result  of  the  U.S.  presence. 
The  number  of  North  Korean  personnel 
involved  in  the  incident,  the  ferocity  of 
their  attack,  and  their  readiness  to  spill 
blood  in  the  Joint  Security  Area,  an  area 
in  which  there  had  been  no  deaths  during 
the  23  years  of  the  armistice,  all  indicate 
that  this  was  meant  to  be  a  major  provoca- 
tion. As  a  result,  we  believe  that  the  North 
Koreans  may  have  been  seeking  an  inci- 
dent which  could  be  used  extensively  in 
their  propaganda  efforts  to  depict  us  as 
seeking  war  on  the  peninsula. 

We  also  believe  the  incident  was  in- 
tended to  test  whether  in  the  midst  of  a 
national  election  campaign  we  would  firmly 
maintain  our  security  commitment  to  the 
Republic  of  Korea.  It  threatened  our  goal 
of  maintaining  peace  and  stability  on  the 
peninsula. 


U.S.  Response  and  North  Korean  Reaction 

We  believe  our  response  was  sobering  to 
the  North  Koreans.  Our  reactions  were 
measured  and  calculated.  Our  military 
moves — the  deployment  of  the  F-4's  from 
Okinawa,  and  the  F-lll's  from  Idaho  to 
Korea,  the  dispatching  of  the  Midway  task 
force  to  the  area,  the  raising  of  our  de- 
fense alert  status  to  DefCon  3,  and  daily 
B-52  flights  from  Guam  to  Korea — were 
swift  and  coordinated.  They  demonstrated 
to  P'yongyang  that  we  were  willing  and 
able  to  move  decisively  to  counter  any 
threat  in  this  area. 

In  the  context  of  this  military  response, 
the  tree-cutting  operation  itself  [August 
21]  made  it  clear  to  P'yongyang  that  we 
would  not  tolerate  interference  with  our 
rights  in  the  Joint  Security  Area  under  the 
armistice  agreement  and  that  we  were 
determined  to  protect  U.N.  Command  per- 
sonnel in  the  area  in  order  to  maintain  the 
viability  of  the  armistice  agreement. 

Let  me  make  a  few  further  points  with 
regard  to  the  tree  cutting.  We  are  aware 


September  27,  1976 


of  critical  comments  to  the  effect  that  we 
took  massive  and  expensive  military  moves 
simply  to  cut  down  a  tree.  This  is  not  the 
case.  The  military  augmentations  were  pre- 
cautionary deployments  designed  to  make 
it  clear  to  P'yongyang  that  we  were  deter- 
mined to  meet  any  larger  military  threat 
which  they  might  pose.  The  tree-cutting 
operation,  as  I  have  indicated,  was  meant 
to  uphold  the  rights  of  the  U.N.  Command 
in  the  Joint  Security  Area  and  to  help  in- 
sure the  future  safety  of  the  U.N.  Com- 
mand personnel. 

P'yongyang  was  clearly  taken  aback  by 
both  our  military  response  and  the  tree- 
cutting  operation.  It  put  its  own  forces  on 
a  so-called  "war  footing"  and  took  certain 
defensive  measures,  but  gave  no  indication 
that  it  was  contemplating  any  military  re- 
action to  our  moves.  In  the  Joint  Security 
Area,  North  Korean  guards  watched  the 
tree-cutting  operation  without  attempting 
to  interfere. 

A  few  hours  later.  North  Korean  Presi- 
dent Kim  Il-song  took  the  unprecedented 
step  of  conveying  a  message  through  the 
Military  Armistice  Commission  to  the 
Commander  in  Chief  of  the  U.N.  Command, 
General  [Richard]  Stilwell,  expressing  re- 
gret that  the  August  18  incident  had  oc- 
curred and  urging  that  further  incidents  in 
the  area  be  avoided.  Kim's  conciliatory  mes- 
sage has  been  widely  viewed  as  an  im- 
plicit acceptance  of  responsibility  for  the 
incident,  particularly  when  contrasted  with 
P'yongyang's  usual  rhetoric. 

At  subsequent  Military  Armistice  Com- 
mission meetings,  the  North  Koreans  have 
been  uncharacteristically  subdued  and 
businesslike  and  have  reiterated  Kim  II- 
song's  expression  of  regret.  They  have  also 
suggested  a  proposal  for  new  security  ar- 
rangements at  Panmunjom  to  avoid  inci- 
dents in  the  Joint  Security  Area. 

The  U.N.  Command  is  now  considering 
the  proposal — which  it  put  forth  itself  in 
1970  and  which  the  North  has  now  picked 
up.  One  important  element  of  this  plan 
will  be  the  removal  of  four  guardposts 
which  the  North  Koreans  now  have  on  the 

389 


U.N.  Command  side  of  the  military  de- 
marcation line.  The  U.N.  Command  has  no 
guardposts  on  the  North  Korean  side  of 
the  line. 

We  think  the  North  Koreans  have  been 
chastened  by  the  incident.  It  is  not  certain 
that  the  lesson  will  stick ;  however,  it  is 
evident  that  P'yongyang  now  has  a  clearer 
picture  of  our  readiness  to  maintain  the 
security  of  the  Korean  Peninsula  and  to 
uphold  the  armistice  agreement.  We  be- 
lieve the  North  Koreans  may  also  fear  that 
our  response  to  any  future  incidents  of  the 
kind  that  occurred  on  August  18  could  well 
be  costly  to  them. 

World  Reaction 

World  reaction  to  the  August  18  incident 
and  its  aftermath  has  of  course  varied  ac- 
cording to  the  predisposition  of  the  coun- 
tries involved,  but  there  has  been  wide- 
spread support  for  our  position  on  the  in- 
cident and  for  our  subsequent  moves. 

Most  significantly,  both  the  Soviet  and 
Chinese  media  were  very  restrained  in 
their  handling  of  the  issue.  They  gave  it 
only  limited  attention  and  confined  them- 
selves to  quotes  from  the  North  Korean 
press,  avoiding  any  editorial  comment  of 
their  own.  This  clearly  indicated  a  lack  of 
enthusiasm  for  the  North  Korean  provoca- 
tion and  a  reluctance  to  be  sharply  critical 
of  our  response. 

It  is  not  clear  to  what  extent  the 
August  18  incident  affected  the  language 
adopted  on  Korea  at  the  nonaligned  con- 
ference, which  was  in  its  final  sessions  at 
the  time  the  incident  occurred.  The  North 
Koreans  were  successful  in  ramming 
through  the  hard-line  language  they 
wanted,  largely  because  the  drafting  com- 
mittee was  composed  of  Pyongyang's 
supporters.  However,  many  countries  rec- 
ognized the  one-sided  nature  of  this  lan- 
guage, and  for  the  first  time  on  any  ques- 
tion in  the  nonaligned  meetings,  specific 
reservations  to  the  language  of  the  politi- 
cal declaration  and  resolution  on  Korea 
were  entered.  We  do  not  yet  have  a  full 
list  of  countries  which  did  so,  since  reserva- 

390 


tions  are  still  being  submitted,  but  the  total 
may  reach  20  to  25.  It  well  may  be  that 
the  brutal  murders  in  the  Joint  Security 
Area  were  seen  as  evidence  of  North  Ko- 
rean belligerence  and  not  aggressiveness 
on  the  part  of  the  United  States. 

Forthcoming  U.N.  General  Assembly 

It  is  also  unclear  at  this  point  how  the 
incident  and  its  aftermath  will  affect  the 
U.N.  General  Assembly's  vote  on  the  two 
resolutions  which  have  been  submitted  on 
the  Korean  question. 

We  had  made  it  clear  this  year  that  we, 
the  Republic  of  Korea,  and  many  other 
countries  hoped  to  avoid  another  sterile 
Korean  debate  although  we  were  prepared 
to  meet  the  challenge  if  one  was  mounted 
by  North  Korea  and  its  supporters. 

North  Korean  supporters,  however,  sub- 
mitted a  harsh  and  inflexible  resolution 
even  before  the  nonaligned  had  finished 
their  debate  on  a  Korean  position,  thus 
demonstrating  that  North  Korea  was  more 
interested  in  maintaining  its  inflexible  posi- 
tion than  in  obtaining  a  true  nonaligned 
consensus  on  Korea. 

This  resolution,  which  draws  heavily  on 
the  August  5  government  statement,  calls 
for  the  withdrawal  of  all  foreign  forces 
under  the  U.N.  flag.  North  Korea  made 
clear  last  year  that  this  also  means  the 
withdrawal  of  all  U.S.  forces  in  Korea 
under  the  bilateral  arrangements  with  the 
Republic  of  Korea.  There  are  now  only 
about  300  personnel  in  Korea  under  the 
U.N.  flag,  of  whom  about  250  are  Ameri- 
cans. It  "demands"  the  withdrawal  oi 
"new"  types  of  military  equipment  from 
the  Republic  of  Korea  and  an  end  to  al- 
leged acts  aggravating  tensions  and  in- 
creasing the  danger  of  war. 

The  resolution  also  calls  for  the  un- 
conditional dissolution  of  the  U.N.  Com- 
mand. North  Korea  has  said  that  if  the 
Command  is  dissolved,  the  armistice  agree- 
ment, the  only  legal  document  binding  the 
parties  to  keep  the  peace,  would  cease  to 
exist. 

It  also  calls  for  the  replacement  of  the 

Department  of  State  Bulletin   i 


armistice  agreement  with  a  peace  agree- 
ment. The  latter  means  an  agreement 
with  the  United  States  and  is  an  attempt  to 
negotiate  future  security  arrangements  on 
the  peninsula  without  the  participation  of 
the  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Korea, 
which  represents  two-thirds  of  the  penin- 
sula's population. 

The  resolution  further  "hopes"  for  re- 
unification through  a  "great  national  con- 
gress." The  Government  of  the  Republic 
of  Korea  is  not  mentioned ;  this  provision 
is  an  attempt  to  obfuscate  North  Korea's 
refusal  to  accept  the  necessity  of  South- 
North  discussions  and  its  failure  to  respond 
to  repeated  offers  by  the  Republic  of  Korea 
to  resume  without  preconditions  the  South- 
North  discussions  which  both  sides  agreed 
to  in  1972  and  which  were  broken  off  by 
North  Korea  in  1973. 

Through  this  resolution  the  North  is  at- 
tempting to  isolate  our  ally  the  Republic  of 
Korea,  precipitate  American  troop  with- 
drawal, and  dissolve  existing  legal  ar- 
rangements without  substituting  suitable 
arrangements  to  maintain  peace  and  sta- 
bility. We  will  not  accept  such  proposals. 
We  will  not  negotiate  on  future  security 
arrangements  on  the  Korean  Peninsula 
without  the  participation  of  the  Republic 
of  Korea. 

To  meet  this  challenge,  the  United  States 
and  18  other  countries  introduced  on 
August  20  a  noncontentious  resolution  on 
Korea  which  calls  for  the  resumption  of 
the  South-North  dialogue  to  achieve  by  ne- 
gotiation the  resolution  of  the  outstanding 
problems  between  them.  It  calls  on  both 
sides  to  exercise  restraint  so  as  to  create 
an  atmosphere  conducive  to  peace  and 
dialogue.  It  also  urges  that  South  and 
North  Korea  and  the  other  parties  directly 
concerned,  ourselves  and  the  People's  Re- 
public of  China,  er/cer  into  early  negotia- 
tions permitting  fne  dissolution  of  the  U.N. 
Command  by  adapting  the  armistice  agree- 
ment or  replacing  it  with  more  permanent 
arrangements  to  maintain  the  peace. 

This  provision  refers  to  a  major  U.N. 
General  Assembly  initiative  which  we  and 
the  Republic  of  Korea  undertook  last  year. 

September  27,  1976 


On  September  22,  1975,  Secretary  Kis- 
singer proposed  that  we  and  the  Republic 
of  Korea  meet  with  the  other  parties  di- 
rectly concerned,  the  People's  Republic  of 
China  and  North  Korea,  to  discuss  ways 
of  preserving  the  armistice  agreement  and 
of  reducing  tensions  in  Korea.  We  said  that 
in  such  a  meeting  we  would  be  ready  to 
explore  possibilities  for  a  larger  confer- 
ence to  negotiate  more  fundamental  ar- 
rangements to  keep  the  peace. 

This  invitation  was  not  accepted  then 
and  was  dismissed  by  North  Korea  in  its 
statement  August  5,  1976,  after  the  Secre- 
tary restated  the  proposal  in  a  speech 
July  22,  1976. 

U.S.  Policy  on  Korea 

Our  position  on  Korea  is  clear: 

— We  urge  the  resumption  of  serious 
South-North  discussions,  which  both  sides 
agreed  to  in  1972  and  which  North  Korea 
has  broken  off. 

— If  North  Korea's  allies  are  prepared 
to  improve  their  relations  with  South 
Korea,  we  are  prepared  to  take  reciprocal 
steps  toward  North  Korea. 

— We  continue  to  support  proposals  that 
the  United  Nations  give  full  membership 
to  both  South  and  North  Korea,  without 
prejudice  to  eventual  reunification. 

— We  are  prepared  to  negotiate  a  new 
basis  for  the  armistice  or  replace  it  with 
more  permanent  arrangements  in  any  form 
acceptable  to  all  the  parties  concerned. 

As  a  result  of  North  Korea's  intransi- 
gence, we  thus  again  face  a  tough  and 
time-consuming  confrontation  in  the  U.N. 
General  Assembly  on  Korea  which  is  likely 
to  be  both  contentious  and  unproductive. 
The  effect  of  the  August  18  incident  on 
what  will  follow  in  the  U.N.  General  As- 
sembly confrontation,  as  I  have  said,  is 
difficult  to  judge.  We  believe  few  coun- 
tries take  seriously  the  charge  that  the 
United  States  is  about  to  make  war  on 
North  Korea.  The  pattern  of  North  Korean 
propaganda,  together  with  the  brutality  of 
the    North   Korean   assault,  the  measured 

391 


response  from  our  side,  and  the  subsequent 
backing  down  on  Pyongyang's  part  may 
serve  to  convince  some  nonaligned  countries 
that  continued  support  of  the  North's  in- 
flexible position  is  not  productive  and  may 
well  increase  tensions.  We  also  believe  many 
nonaligned  countries  recognize  that  there 
cannot  be  progress  on  the  Korean  question 
until  South  and  North  resume  direct  dis- 
cussions and  that  the  North's  refusal  to  talk 
with  the  Government  of  the  Republic  of 
Korea  is  an  unrealistic  and  self-defeating 
posture.  The  reservations  on  the  Korea 
language  at  the  nonaligned  meeting  that  I 
mentioned  earlier  are  a  sign  of  this  view. 

We  believe  that  our  firm  and  judicious 
response  to  the  August  18  incident  has 
shown  the  North  that  we  are  prepared  to 
resist  aggression. 

We  do  not  view  the  August  18  incident 
as  having  a  major  effect  on  decisions  re- 
garding U.S.  force  levels  in  Korea.  As 
then-Assistant  Secretary  [for  East  Asian 
and  Pacific  Affairs  Philip  C]  Habib  said 
before  the  Subcommittee  on  Foreign  Assist- 
ance and  Economic  Policy  of  the  Senate 
Foreign  Relations  Committee  April  8 : 

.  .  .  the  specific  level  of  our  forces  in  Korea  is  not 
immutable.  It  is  a  function  of  the  North  Korean 
threat,  the  ability  of  the  Republic  of  Korea  forces 
to  meet  that  threat,  and  the  prevailing  interna- 
tional situation. 

Mr.  Habib  went  on  to  say  that  we  in- 
tended to  honor  commitments  and  maintain 
our  presence  in  the  area  and  in  this  context 
we  had  no  present  plans  for  significant 
force  reduction  in  Korea.  Our  response  to 
the  incident  of  August  18  has  demonstrated 
that  we  will  meet  our  commitments. 

We  would  hope  that  the  firmness  we 
demonstrated  in  the  aftermath  of  this  inci- 
dent will  eventually  cause  the  North  to 
reassess  its  inflexible  position  of  seeking  to 
reunify  the  peninsula  on  its  own  terms. 
Meanwhile  we  and  the  Republic  of  Korea 
are  prepared  to  seek  the  easing  of  tensions 
and  more  permanent  security  arrangements 
on  the  peninsula  through  negotiation  rather 
than  confrontation. 


392 


United  States  Condemns  Murder 
of  American  Officers  in  Korea 

Folloioing  is  a  statement  by  the  White 
House  Press  Secretary  issued  at  Kansas  City, 
Mo.,  on  August  18,  together  with  a  statement 
read  to  neivs  correspondents  that  day  by 
Frederick  Z.  Broivn,  Director,  Office  of  Press 
Relations,  Department  of  State. 

WHITE   HOUSE   STATEMENT 

White  House  press  release    (Kansas  City,   Mo.)    dated   Au^at   18 

The  President  condemns  the  vicious  and 
unprovoked  murder  of  two  American  offi- 
cers last  night  in  the  demilitarized  zone 
near  Panmunjon  in  Korea. 

These  officers  were  peacefully  supervis- 
ing a  work  detail  in  the  neutral  zone  when 
they  were  subjected  to  a  brutal  and  cow- 
ardly attack  totally  without  warning. 

Total  responsibility  for  the  consequences 
of  these  murders  rests  with  the  Nortl: 
Korean  Government. 

DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT 

On  the  morning  of  August  18,  Korear 
time.  North  Korean  military  personnel  mad( 
an  unprovoked  attack  on  the  U.N.  Com 
mand  personnel  in  the  Joint  Security  Are£ 
(JSA)  in  the  demilitarized  zone,  brutallj 
murdering  two  American  officers  and  in 
juring  four  Americans  and  five  Republic 
of  Korea  military  personnel. 

The  details  regarding  this  act  of  aggres 
sion  are  contained  in  a  statement  issued  bj 
the  U.N.  Command,  which  I  will  now  reac 
to  you : 

Two  United  Nations  Command  officers  were  mur- 
dered in  an  unprovoked  assault  by  North  Korear 
guards  this  morning  at  the  Joint  Security  Area 
Panmunjom. 

The  two  army  officers,  both  Americans,  died  fron 
massive  head  injuries  and  stab  wounds  inflicted  bj 
an  estimated  thirty  North  Korean  guards  who  at 
tacked  a  small  United  Nations  Command  work  party 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  | 


with  axes,  metal  pikes  and  axe  handles,  about 
10:45  a.m. 

A  Republic  of  Korea  Army  enlisted  man,  a  secu- 
rity guard  assigned  to  the  U.S.  Army  Support  Group, 
JSA,  sustained  stab  wounds  and  is  in  the  121st  Evac- 
uation Hospital  in  Seoul. 

A  Republic  of  Korea  Army  officer,  four  other  U.S. 
soldiers  and  three  additional  Republic  of  Korea  Army 
soldiers  were   treated  for  minor  cuts  and  bruises. 

The  U.N.  Command  has  called  for  the  379th  Mili- 
tary Armistice  Commission  meeting  to  convene  at 
11:00  a.m.,  Thursday,  August  19.  North  Korea  has 
not  yet  replied. 

The  three  U.N.  Command  officers  and  the  enlisted 
guards  were  escorting  five  Korean  Service  Corps 
workers  who  were  routinely  trimming  branches  from 
a  tree  some  35-40  yards  from  U.N.  Command  Check- 
point Number  3,  at  the  south  side  of  the  Bridge  of 
No  Return. 

Two  North  Korean  officers  and  several  guards 
came  to  the  area  of  the  work.  After  some  discussion 
during  which  a  North  Korean  officer  expressed  nij 
objection  to  the  tree  trimming,  the  North  Koreans 
suddenly  demanded  that  the  Korean  Service  Corp.s 
personnel  stop  work. 

Shortly  afterwards,  a  North  Korean  vehicle 
brought  additional  guards  and  the  North  Korean 
officer  was  heard  to  tell  them  "to  kill"  the  U.N. 
Command  personnel  and  the  fight  ensued  with  many 
of  the  North  Koreans  joining  in. 

These  murders  were  the  first  deaths  ever  in  the 
Joint  Security  Area,  site  of  the  joint  Armistice  Com- 
mission meetings.  It  is  a  neutral  area  within  the 
Demilitarized  Zone  where  free  access  and  movement 
are  guaranteed  by  the  Armistice  Agreement. 

The  North  Koreans  also  damaged  three  U.N.  Com- 
mand  vehicles  during   the   melee. 

Identification  of  the  casualties  is  pending  notifica- 
tion of  the  next  of  kin.  U.N.  Command  continues  to 
investigate  the   incident. 

The  North  Koreans  have  falsely  charged 
that  the  personnel  of  the  U.N.  Command 
first  assaulted  North  Korean  guards.  This 
is  a  lie  and  a  flagrant  attempt  to  deceive. 
We  find  it  significant  that  the  North  Korean 
account  does  not  claim  that  any  North 
Koreans  were  wounded  or  that  reinforce- 
ments from  the  U.N.  Command  side  were 
sent  into  the  Joint  Security  Area. 

This  brutal  behavior  by  the  North  Ko- 
rean regime  tells  us  something  of  its  true 
nature  and  demonstrates  the  hollowness  of 
North  Korea's  alleged  desire  for  a  peaceful 
resolution  of  the  differences  that  exist  be- 
tween it  and  South  Korea. 


September  27,  1976 


The  U.S.  Government  considers  these 
cowardly  acts  of  murder  a  serious  violation 
of  the  armistice  agreement.  The  North 
Koreans  have  committed  violent  acts  in  the 
Joint  Security  Area  before,  but  these  mur- 
ders are  the  first  such  deaths  that  have 
occurred  in  that  area  since  the  signing  of 
the  armistice  agreement  23  years  ago. 

The  United  States  views  this  brutal  and 
unprovoked  assault  with  gravity  and  con- 
cern and  warns  the  North  Koreans  that 
such  violent  and  belligerent  actions  cannot 
be  tolerated.  North  Korea  must  bear  full 
responsibility  for  all  the  consequences  of 
its  brutal  action. 


U.S.  and  Republic  of  Korea  Welcome 
New  Joint  Security  Area  Arrangement 

Follotving  is  a  joint  statement  by  the  Gov- 
ernments of  the  United  States  and  the  Re- 
public of  Korea  issued  at  Washington  and 
Seoul  on  September  6. 

Press  relea!!e  413  dated  September  6 

The  Governments  of  the  United  States  of 
America  and  the  Republic  of  Korea  wel- 
come the  signing  of  the  agreement  amend- 
ing the  Military  Armistice  Commission 
Headquarters  Agreement  at  Panmunjom, 
September  6,  1976.  The  two  Governments 
believe  that  the  new  arrangement,  restrict- 
ing movement  of  military  personnel  of  both 
sides  to  their  respective  portions  of  the 
Joint  Security  Area  (JSA),  eliminating 
contact  in  the  JSA  infringing  on  personal 
safety,  and  removing  the  North  Korean 
guard  posts  from  the  UNC  [United  Na- 
tions Command]  side  of  the  JSA,  are  real- 
istic and  constructive  steps  which  when 
implemented  will  better  assure  the  secu- 
rity of  personnel  of  both  sides  in  the  Joint 
Security  Area.  The  two  Governments  will 
make  every  effort  to  see  that  these  new 
arrangements  are  implemented  effectively. 
They  expect  that  the  signatories  of  the 
Armistice  Agreement  for  the  other  side  will 


393 


do  the  same.  The  two  Governments  for 
their  part  will  continue  to  avoid  provoca- 
tive acts  and  will  abide,  as  in  the  past,  by 
the  terms  of  the  Armistice  Agreement 
along  the  full  "length  of  the  DMZ  [demili- 
tarized zone]  as  well  as  within  the  JSA.  In 
the  spirit  of  the  new  agreement,  they  will 
hold  the  North  Korean  side  responsible  for 
avoiding  future  provocative  actions.  As  the 
response  of  the  Governments  of  the  United 
States  and  the  Republic  of  Korea  to  the 
August  18  incident  has  demonstrated,  the 
two  Governments  are  determined  to  re- 
spond firmly  to  North  Korean  provocations. 
North  Korean  leaders  should  have  no  doubt 
about  this  fact  in  determining  their  future 
actions. 


Nonaligned  Summit  Meeting  Position 
on  Korea  and  Puerto  Rico  Rejected 

Department  Announcement ' 

The  Colombo  noiaaligned  summit  meet- 
ing addressed  a  number  of  current  interna- 
tional issues  to  which  we  will  be  giving 
careful  attention  in  the  months  ahead.  I 
would  like,  however,  to  restrict  my  com- 
ments now  only  to  two  issues  in  which  the 


'  Head  to  news  correspondents  on  Aug.  25  by 
Robert  L.  Funseth,  Special  Assistant  to  the  Secretary 
for  Press  Relations. 


United  States  is  directly  involved  and 
which  are  before  the  United  Nations. 

The  conference  addressed  the  issue  of 
Korea,  which  for  reasons  of  both  historical 
involvement  and  recent  events  is  of  deep 
concern  to  the  United  States,  in  words 
which  were  so  tendentious  and  one-sided 
as  to  be  unacceptable  to  a  substantial  num- 
ber of  participants  at  Colombo,  who  en- 
tered written  or  oral  reservations.  We  find 
the  endorsement  of  North  Korea's  com- 
pletely unfounded  charges  against  the 
United  States  particularly  unseemly,  com- 
ing as  it  did  immediately  following  the 
brutal  murder  of  two  U.S.  officers  of  the 
U.N.  Command  in  the  Joint  Security  Area 
of  the  demilitarized  zone  in  Korea  by 
North  Korean  Army  personnel.  We  do  not 
believe  that  any  country  which  supports 
the  highly  partisan  language  on  Korea  con- 
tained in  the  declaration,  and  even  more 
so  in  the  separate  resolution  on  Korea,  can 
be  considered  nonaligned  on  this  issue. 

With  regard  to  Puerto  Rico,  the  confer- 
ence called  for  discussion  of  this  matter  by 
the  United  Nations  as  if  it  were  a  colonial 
issue.  We  consider  any  such  declaration  as 
interference  in  U.S.  domestic  affairs.  Since 
the  recognition  in  1953  by  the  United  Na- 
tions of  Puerto  Rico's  act  of  self-determina- 
tion, there  are  no  legal  grounds  for  discus- 
sion or  action  with  respect  to  this  issue  by 
any  international  body.  And  we  will  ignore 
any  action  taken  by  an  international  bodj 
on  this  issue. 


394 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


Secretary  Kissinger  Discusses  U.S.  Position 
on  Law  of  the  Sea  Conference 


FolVowing  are  remarks  made  by  Secretary 
Kissinger  at  U.N.  Headquarters  on  Septem- 
ber 1  folloiving  a  meeting  2vith  Hamilton 
Shirley  Amerasinghe,  President  of  the  U.N. 
Conference  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea,  and  his 
remarks  at  a  reception  that  evening  for  heads 
of  delegations  to  the  conference. 


REMARKS  FOLLOWING  MEETING 

fss   release  409  dated  September   I 

I  came  here  first  of  all  to  pay  tribute  to 
the  President  of  this  conference  for  the 
impartial  and  thoughtful  way  in  which  he 
has  conducted  what  is  probably  the  most 
important  negotiation  that  is  now  going  on 
anywhere.  With  three-quarters  of  the 
world's  surface  being  put  under  the  possi- 
bility of  some  international  legal  system, 
the  stakes  could  hardly  be  higher.  And  the 
issues  are,  of  course,  extremely  compli- 
cated. 

The  United  States  will  make  a  major 
effort  to  bring  these  negotiations  to  a  sat- 
isfactory conclusion.  "Satisfactory"  must 
mean,  as  the  President  correctly  pointed 
out,  a  solution  that  all  groups  and  all  na- 
tions can  accept.  And  it  is  not  possible  for 
one  nation  or  for  any  group  of  nations  to 
seek  to  impose  its  views  on  the  others. 

Now,  in  the  three  committees  that  are 
working — in  Committee  II,  dealing  with 
the  so-called  economic  zone,  and  in  Com- 
mittee III,  dealing  with  scientific  research, 
we  believe  that  reasonable  progress  is 
being  made,  and  we  are  quite  optimistic 
that  an  agreed  solution  of  at  least  a  gen- 
eral outline  can  be  found  at  the  end  of  this 
ses-sion. 


September  27,  1976 


In  Committee  I,  it  is  our  view  that  the 
negotiating  tactics  have  been  too  confron- 
tational and  that  there  has  been  too  much 
of  a  tendency  to  seek  to  approach  it  by 
means  of  bloc  approaches.  That  will  not 
work.  No  group  can  impose  its  preferred 
solution  on  the  other. 

The  United  States  proposed  at  the  last 
session  the  so-called  dual-access  system,  in 
which  one  part  of  the  ocean  is  available  for 
nations  and  their  firms  and  the  other  is 
mined  by  an  international  Enterprise  and 
all  of  it  is  put  under  a  general  international 
Authority.  We  cannot  give  up  this  prin- 
ciple, but  what  we  can  do — and  what  I'm 
here  to  discuss  with  my  colleagues  is  how 
the  international  Enterprise  can  in  fact 
function  so  the  international  Enterprise 
will  in  fact  have  the  financial  resources 
and  the  means  to  proceed. 

We  are  also  prepared,  since  we  are  talk- 
ing about  a  long-term  future,  to  agree  to 
periodic  reviews  of  that  issue,  all  the  more 
so  as  we  cannot  in  any  event  begin  mining 
for  about  10  years. 

The  President  and  I  agreed,  I  believe,  or 
at  least  I  suggested  to  the  President  and 
he  is  considering  it,  that  we  should  strive 
at  the  end  of  this  conference  to  have  some 
common  text  which  becomes  then  the  basis 
for  a  final  conclusion  and  that  some  means 
be  found  within  the  remaining  two  weeks 
to  reduce  the  various  positions  to  a  common 
text  to  which  formal  amendments  can  then 
perhaps  be  offered  but  which  will  provide 
a  framework  for  the  negotiation.  The  Pres- 
ident and  I  are  going  to  meet  again  for 
breakfast  tomorrow,  at  which  time  I  will 
review  with  him  my  impressions  of  my  con- 
sultations today. 


395 


I  would  like  to  stress  the  commitment  of 
the  United  States  to  come  to  a  solution 
that  is  in  the  interest  of  all  mankind.  We 
know  that  no  agreement  can  last  that  is  not 
freely  accepted  by  the  overwhelming  ma- 
jority of  mankind.  We  hope  that  others 
here  come  to  the  same  view,  and  we  hope 
that  everybody  will  realize  that  if  we  can 
establish  a  peaceful  and  legal  solution  to 
the  problems  of  the  ocean,  a  great  step  will 
also  have  been  made  toward  peace  on  land. 

Thank  you  very  much. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  some  countries  here  want 
to  stand  pat,  think  that  they  tvill  have  better 
prospects  under  a  new  Administration.  What 
can  you  tell  me? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  first  of  all,  there 
won't  be  a  new  Administration,  and  sec- 
ondly, I  will  tell  them  that  the  foreign  pol- 
icy of  the  United  States  is  conducted  on 
the  basis  of  the  best  judgment  of  the 
permanent  interests  and  values  of  the 
United  States  and  I'm  confident  that  any 
group  studying  this  problem  is  going  to 
come  roughly  to  the  same  conclusions. 

I  think  it  would  be  a  great  mistake  for 
foreign  nations  to  attempt  to  second-guess 
the  American  domestic  political  process. 

On  the  views  that  we  have  expressed 
here,  I  find  a  wide  consensus,  and  I  have 
not  encountered  any  significant  disagree- 
ment among  any  of  the  experts  that  we 
have  consulted  about  the  American  posi- 
tion, and  I  think  that  this  would  be  a  great 
mistake;  and  if  the  negotiation  deadlocks 
completely,  there  is  a  much  greater  danger 
that  the  United  States  will  act  unilaterally 
than  that  the  United  States  will  change  its 
position. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  you  said  last  night  that 
you  were  coming  here  with  a  neiv  proposal. 
Will  you  tell  us  what  those  neio  proposals 
are? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  I  have  indicated 
the  areas  in  which  we  will  keep  discussing 
it;  that  is,  financial — how  do  you  make  the 
Enterprise  financially  operative? — review 
clauses.  And  we  are  willing  to  discuss  other 
aspects  of  the  views  of  our  colleagues. 

396 


I  think  it  would  be  more  appropriate  if  I 
had  the  discussions  and  then  made  it  pub- 
lic than  if  I  announce  now,  because  this 
might  inspire  the  rhetorical  impulses  of 
other  delegations.  [Laughter.] 

Q.  Are  you  going  to  address  the  conference 
tomorrow? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  have  no  such  plans, 
but  I'm  giving  a  reception  for  the  delega- 
tions tonight,  and  I  plan  to  address  them 
then  informally. 

Q.  With  the  extension  of  the  exclusive  eco- 
nomic zone  to  200  miles  and  the  poiver  to 
search  vessels  within  that  zone,  without  use 
of  the  hovering  vessels  [inaudible'] 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I'll  tell  you  the  truth, 
this  is  a  degree  of  detail  my  associates  have 
not  yet  revealed.  [Laughter.] 

Q.  Are  you  working  on  a  consolidated  text? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  I  tried  to  avoid 
the  words  "consolidated  text,"  because  I 
want  to  leave  the  nomenclature  to  the  con- 
ference. I  believe  that  some  common  text 
that  brings  together  the  work  of  the  three 
committees  in  a  document  that  can  then 
be  the  basis  of  negotiation  would  be  sup- 
ported by  the  United  States  and  would  be  a 
logical  outcome  of  this  conference,  and  we 
are  hoping  that  the  President  of  the  con- 
ference will  take  leadership  in  that  di- 
rection. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  referring  to  the  funding 
of  the  Enterprise,  are  we  speaking  in  terms 
of  U.S.  grants  or  loans,  or  are  we  thinking  of 
somehotv  convincing  U.S.  companies  to  in- 
vest? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  there  are  two 
aspects.  One  is  the  principle  of  finding  fi- 
nancing for  the  Enterprise;  second,  the 
means  by  which  this  is  achieved.  I  think  the 
second  issue  is  subsidiary  to  the  first  be- 
cause, if  we  agree  to  find  financing,  it  will 
be  negotiated  in  such  a  way  that  it  is  ac- 
ceptable to  the  countries  concerned. 

We  think  it  is  a  reasonable  proposition 
on  the  part  of  some  of  the  developing  na- 
tions to  be  sure  that  the  Enterprise  does 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


not  become  a  paper  institution  but  that  it 
has  an  opportunity  to  function  in  what  has 
been  called  the  common  heritage  of  man- 
kind. The  details  of  how  we  do  this  are  open 
to  negotiation. 

Thank  you  very  much. 


REAAARKS  AT  RECEPTION  > 

I  believe  very  deeply,  and  so  do  all  of 
my  colleagues,  that  the  negotiation  in 
which  all  of  you  are  engaged  is  the  most 
significant  international  negotiation  that  is 
now  taking  place.  It  is  not  as  dramatic  as 
some  other  events  that  catch  the  daily 
headlines,  but  what  other  group  has  had 
the  opportunity  to  establish  international 
norms  for  three-quarters  of  the  earth's  sur- 
face? When  else  has  a  group  of  diplomats 
been  able  to  assemble  and  establish  a  legal 
order  for  a  part  of  the  globe  that  contains 
so  much  of  our  resources  and  that  will 
affect  so  much  of  our  future? 

And  I  know  that  in  the  tedious  negotia- 
tions that  go  on  daily  we  will  never  lose 
sight  of  the  fact  that  we're  engaged  in  a 
historic  enterprise  and  it  is  an  enterprise 
that  simply  cannot  afford  to  fail. 

We  therefore  should  not  deal  with  each 
other  with  threats  of  confrontation,  be- 
cause the  advantages  that  can  be  gained 
on  this  or  that  issue  pale  in  significance 
compared  to  the  long-range  benefits — not 
just  to  this  or  that  nation  but  to  all  of  man- 
kind— that  are  inherent  in  this  process. 

This  is  the  basic  attitude  of  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment. This  is  the  reason — and  not  any 
economic  necessity  nor  any  negotiating 
pressures — that  compelled  us  to  make  a 
maximum  effort  to  bring  matters  forward 
to  some  sort  of  conclusion. 

I  believe,  therefore,  in  the  two  weeks  or 
so  that  are  left  in  this  conference  it  is  ex- 
tremely important  that  we  move  matters 
to  a  point  in  which  we  can  say  to  ourselves, 
can  say  to  our  people,  that  on  the  law  of 
the  sea  the  nations  of  the  world  are  mak- 


'  Text  from  press  release  407  (opening  paragraphs 
omitted). 

September  27,  1976 


ing  progress  and  that  we  do  not  export  into 
the  sea  all  of  the  conflicts  that  have  made 
life  complicated  on  land. 

And,  conversely,  if  we  should  succeed  in 
that  arena,  it  must  have  the  profoundest 
significance  on  our  other  relations  as  well. 

We  are  working  essentially  in  three 
committees.  I  believe  that  in  Committee  II, 
the  debate  of  whether  the  economic  zone  is 
sui  generis  or  whether  it  has  attributes  of 
high  seas  status  can,  in  my  view,  after  the 
discussions  we  have  had  this  morning,  be 
resolved  in  a  manner  practical  and  satis- 
factory to  all  of  the  parties  concerned.  It 
will  require  further  efforts,  but  I  believe 
that  an  understanding  can  be  reached. 

Similarly,  with  respect  to  scientific — ma- 
rine scientific — research  of  Committee  III, 
if  all  of  the  delegations  work  with  the 
spirit  that  has  characterized  them  so  far,  I 
believe  that  a  satisfactory  conclusion  can 
also  be  reached. 

We  must  keep  in  mind  in  both  of  these 
negotiations,  first,  that  we  are  starting  a 
new  international  regime  in  these  200-mile 
zones  that  has  not  existed  previously  but 
also  that  there  are  certain  practical  prob- 
lems that  must  be  solved  if  the  interpreta- 
tion of  our  texts  is  not  to  lead  to  endless 
future  disputes. 

Now,  let  me  say  a  few  words  about 
Committee  I  and  the  deep  seabeds.  And  you 
notice  I  did  not  say  that  if  Committee  I 
continues  to  work  in  the  spirit  it  has  exhib- 
ited up  to  now,  success  is  probable. 
[Laughter.] 

I  believe  that  Committee  I  has  clearly 
the  most  novel  and  the  most  complicated 
issue.  And  it  is  important  that  in  solving  it 
we  do  not  approach  it  too  much  from  a 
theoretical  point  of  view  and  that  we  do 
not  attempt  to  use  it  to  prove  ideological 
points  which  there  are  many  opportunities 
to  vindicate. 

With  respect  to  the  deep  seabeds,  we 
face  two  realities.  One  is  that  the  devel- 
oped countries — a  few  developed  countries 
at  this  moment — alone  possess  the  technol- 
ogy with  which  to  exploit  the  seabeds — 
why  don't  I  use  a  more  happy  word? — to 
"mine"  the  seabeds.   [Laughter.] 

397 


On  the  other  hand,  there  is  the  concept 
that  the  deep  seabeds  represent  the  com- 
mon heritage  of  mankind,  and  therefore 
there  is  a  certain  conflict  between  the  real- 
ities of  the  capabilities  of  certain  countries 
and  the  theoretical  conviction  of  many 
other  countries. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  those  who 
possess  the  technology,  many  of  the  pro- 
posals that  have  already  been  made  repre- 
sent very  significant  concessions  in  the 
sense  that  they  represent  self-imposed  re- 
strictions on  what  would  otherwise  be  an 
unrestricted  freedom  of  action. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  many  of  the 
developing  countries  some  of  these  conces- 
sions, in  view  of  their  convictions,  are  not 
considered  concessions  at  all  but  tend  to  be 
taken  for  granted. 

At  the  last  session,  the  United  States 
proposed  the  system  of  parallel  access  in 
which,  concurrently  with  any  state  or  pri- 
vate mining  of  the  deep  seabeds,  a  similar 
site  would  have  to  be  set  aside  for  the  in- 
ternational community  to  be  exploited  or 
mined  by  the  international  community.  And 
this  concept  was  reflected  in  the  negotiat- 
ing text  which  emerged  from  the  last 
session. 

On  reflection,  many  countries  have  ex- 
pressed reservations  about  this  concept  on 
many  grounds — more  familiar  to  the  dele- 
gates here  than  to  me,  I'm  sure — but  one 
of  the  principal  grounds  was  that  it  did  no 
good  to  set  aside  .a  part  of  the  mining  sites 
for  the  internatioiaal  community  if  the  in- 
ternational community  did  not  possess  the 
financial  resources  with  which  to  mine  or 
to  put  its  Enterpn'se  into  business  and  if 
there  were  no  provisions  for  the  transfer  of 
technology  to  the  international  community. 

We  have  taken  tlhes<3  views  into  serious 
consideration.  And,  therefore,  on  the  occa- 
sion of  my  meeting  with  some  of  the  mem- 
bers of  Committee  I,  I  proposed  on  behalf 
of  the  U.S.  Government  that  the  United 
States  would  be  prepared  to  agree  to  a 
means  of  financing  the  Enterprise  in  such  a 
manner  that  the  Enterprise  could  begin  its 
mining  operation  ^either  con'currently  with 


398 


the  mining  of  state  or  private  enterprises  or 
within  an  agreed  timespan  that  was  prac- 
tically concurrent. 

We  proposed  also  that  this  would  in- 
clude agreed  provisions  for  the  transfer  of 
technology  so  that  the  existing  advantage 
of  certain  industrial  states  would  be  equal- 
ized over  a  period  of  time. 

We  have  also  taken  into  account  the 
views  that  have  been  expressed  by  some 
delegates  that  it  might  be  premature  to 
establish  a  permanent  regime  for  the  deep 
seabeds,  for  the  exploitation  of  the  deep 
seabeds,  at  the  beginning  of  a  process  of 
technology  and  to  freeze  it  for  an  indefinite 
period  of  time. 

For  this  reason  we  have  proposed  today 
that  there  could  be  periodic  review  con 
ferences  at  intervals  to  be  negotiated — for 
example,  25  years — in  which  the  methcKis 
by  which  mining  in  the  deep  seabeds  takes 
place  and  the  apportionment  between  vari- 
ous sectors  could  be  periodically  reex- 
amined. 

In  other  words,  the  United  States  has 
made  a  serious  effort  to  move  forward  on 
this  deep  seabed  question. 

I  have  heard,  since  I  was  here,  the  view 
that  perhaps  a  settlement  is  premature  ir. 
the  light  of  our  unsettled  domestic  situa 
tion.  [Laughter.]  Of  course,  some  of  U! 
consider  our  domestic  situation  more  set 
tied  than  others.  [Laughter.]  But  I  woulc 
believe — I  would  consider  it  highly  un 
likely  that  the  basic  principles  are  likely  tc 
be  changed  that  I  have  put  forward  wit! 
respect  to  the  deep  seabeds. 

And  I  do  not  have  the  impression  tha 
they  are  the  subject  of  partisan  discussion 
as  is  reflected  by  the  bipartisan  compositioi 
of  the  congressional  delegation  that  par 
ticipates  in  these  meetings. 

We  obviously  will  not  be  able  to  setth 
all  of  the  issues  now.  And  this  afternoon 
for  example,  some  proposals  were  made — 
including  by  the  distinguished  delegatf 
from  Nigeria — in  the  discussions  of  Com- 
mittee I  that  we  will  examine  with  great 
care.  But  I  would  urge  that  the  time  has 
come  to  put  aside  the  theoretical  debates 


Department  of  State  Bultetii 


I  believe  the  issues  are  too  crucial  to  try  to 
prove  abstract  ideological  points. 

The  United  States  has  made  its  propos- 
als, which  represent  significant  restrictions 
on  our  freedom  of  action,  for  the  sake  of 
international  peace  and  international  har- 
mony and  for  the  purpose  of  demonstrat- 
ing that  in  this  new  area  of  mankind's  ac- 
tivities we  will  make  every  effort  to  avoid 
the  sort  of  rivalries  that  characterized 
colonial  exploitations  of  the  19th  century. 

But  there  are  limits  beyond  which  no 
American  leader  can  go.  And  if  those  limits 
are  attempted  to  be  exceeded,  then  we  will 
find  ourselves  in  the  regrettable  and  tragic 
situation  where  at  sea — ju.st  as  previously 
on  land — unilateralism  will  reign  supreme. 

We  in  the  United  States  would  not,  in 
the    short   term,    have   any    disadvantages 


from  this — quite  the  contrary.  But  we  are 
part  of  mankind,  and  we  believe  that  an 
opportunity  would  be  lost  that  may  not 
come  again. 

So,  on  behalf  of  the  American  delega- 
tion, I  want  to  assure  you  that  in  all  of  the 
committees,  and  on  the  crucial  issue  of  dis- 
pute settlement,  we  will  work  with  dedi- 
cation and  conviction  and  with  a  profound 
sense  of  responsibility  that  what  we  are 
doing  here — or  rather,  what  you  are  doing 
here — is  of  historic  significance.  And  we 
hope  that  in  this  spirit  we  can  use  the  next 
few  weeks  to  move  matters  forward  to  a 
point  from  which  a  final  solution  in  the 
early  part  of  next  year  becomes  so  inevi- 
table that  even  the  brilliant  negotiators  as- 
sembled here  cannot  find  enough  fine 
points  to  interfere.   [Laughter.] 


Secretary  Kissinger  Meets  With  U.N.  Secretary  General  Waldheim 


Following  are  remarks  made  by  Secretari/ 
Kissinger  and  U.N.  Secretary  General  Kurt 
Waldheim  following  their  meeting  at  U.N. 
Headquarters  on  September  2. 

Press   release  410   dated   September  2 

Secretary  General  Waldheim:  Ladies  and 
gentlemen,  I  had  a  useful  and  very  interest- 
ing exchange  of  views  with  the  Secretary 
of  State,  Dr.  Kissinger,  on  the  international 
situation  in  general  and  special  problems 
concerning  the  United  Nations.  We  dis- 
cussed the  Middle  East,  the  situation  in 
southern  Africa,  the  question  of  Cyprus, 
and  of  course  the  Law  of  the  Sea  Confer- 
ence. 

I  am  most  grateful  to  Dr.  Kissinger  for 
this  opportunity,  especially  because  all  of 
the  problems  we  have  discussed  this  morn- 
ing are  on  the  agenda  of  the  forthcoming 
General  Assembly  of  the  United  Nations. 
It  was  therefore   most  helpful    to  me   to 


September  27,  1976 


know  the  position  of  the  Government  of 
the  United  States. 

This  is  all  I  wish  to  say,  and  I  now  give 
the  floor  to  Dr.  Kissinger. 

Secretary  Kissinger:  I  would  like  to  ex- 
press the  appreciation  of  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment for  the  distinguished  role  which  the 
Secretary  General  is  playing  on  all  of  the 
key  issues  with  respect  to  peacekeeping 
and  improving  the  international  climate  in 
which  he  is  involved.  And  we  talked  about 
the  Middle  East,  about  Cyprus,  about 
southern  Africa,  about  the  law  of  the  sea. 
And  I  would  only  add  to  his  description — 
to  his  adjective  "useful" — the  adjective 
"cordial"  for  our  talks. 

Thank  you  very  much.  I'll  be  glad  to 
answer  some  questions. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  did  your  discussions 
about  economic  financing  of  the  regime  go 
well  last  night? 


399 


Secretary  Kissinger:  Of  course,  all  of  the 
delegations  will  have  to  speak  for  them- 
selves. I  had  a  good  discussion  yesterday 
with  about  16  members  of  Committee  I.  I 
met  this  morning  with  the  head  of  the 
Mexican  delegation  and  with  the  Peruvian 
delegate  in  Committee  I,  Sri  Lanka,  Nor- 
way. 

And  I  have  the  impression  that  there  is 
now  an  understanding  that  some  progress 
will  have  to  be  made  on  all  sides  and  that 
our  proposals  of  yesterday  may  provide  a 
basis  for  some  counterproposals  by  some 
others — and,  even  if  not  for  some  precise 
counterproposals,  to  move  forward  perhaps 
toward  a  consolidated  text  which  can  be 
an  instrument  of  negotiation  at  the  next 
session. 

With  respect  to  Committee  II  and  III,  I 
am  very  hopeful  that  we  will  reach  a  sub- 
stantial conclusion  of  the  effort.  So,  alto- 
gether, if  the  conference  continues  on  the 
course  which  we  believe  possible,  it  will 
have  made  a  significant  step  forward. 

Q.  Are  you  prepared  to  state  what  that 
economic  proposal  was? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  we  have  pro- 
posed that  we  would  see  to  the  financing 
of  the  international  Enterprise;  and  also 
we  have  agreed  to  a  25-year — or  some 
agreed  period — review  clause.  Considering 
that  the  particular  concern  of  many  of  the 
Group  of  77  was  that  the  international  En- 
terprise might  not  have  the  financing  or  the 
technical  capability  to  proceed,  our  offer  to 
put  it  into  business  concurrently,  or  nearly 
concurrently,  with  private  or  state  enter- 
prises should  go  a  long  step  toward  meeting 
their  needs.  And  you  have  to  remember 
that  in  a  situation  in  which  the  United 
States  at  this  moment  possesses  practically 
a  monopoly  of  technology,  we  have  agreed 
to  put  all  of  it  under  an  international  re- 
gime— half  of  it  under  an  international 
Enterprise — and  to  provide  the  financing 
for  the  international  Enterprise,  and  to  pro- 
vide a  review  after  25  years.  So  we  think 
we  have  made  a  significant  contribution. 


Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  the  question  of  the  ad- 
mission of  Viet-Nam  is  coming  to  the  United 
Nations  again  next  iveek.  Could  you  tell  ?<n 
whether  the  United  States  intends  to  use  the 
veto  again? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  I  would  not 
want  to  deprive  you  of  the  suspense  that  is 
inherent  in  this  question  prematurely.  For 
us,  the  issue  of  the  missing  in  action  is  of 
course  a  key  issue,  and  we  want  to  see 
whether  any  progress  can  be  made  there. 

Q.  When  yoii  see  [South  Africaii']  Prime 
Minister  Vorster  at  the  end  of  this  week,  are 
you  prepared  to  press  him  hard  on  these  two 
points:  First,  that  elections  in  Namibia  come 
off  in  a  matter  of  months,  not  years;  and 
secondly,  that  they  come  out — that  they  are 
undertaken — not  just  under  international 
supervision,  as  I  believe  Mr.  Vorster  /lo.s 
mentioned,  but  under  U.N.  supervision? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  I  have  made 
several  statements  this  week  about  our  po- 
sition with  respect  to  southern  Africa 
which  have  achieved  the  unique  result  of 
being  criticized  both  by  some  black  mem- 
bers of  the  Congress  and  by  Prime  Minister 
Vorster.  I  think,  considering  that  I  will  be 
meeting  him  within  48  hours,  I  should  not 
go  beyond  what  I  have  already  stated  pub- 
licly and  leave  something  for  the  discus- 
sions that  will  then  take  place. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  terrorism  is  an  issue  that 
has  been  before  the  United  Nations  for  some 
time  now.  An  effort  is  being  made,  has  been 
made.  Do  you,  as  the  U.S.  representative, 
see  any  prospect  for  a  solution  to  this  issue 
here? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  we  believe  that 
terrorism  is  an  issue  that  affects  the  whole 
international  community  and  which  must  be 
solved  by  the  international  community.  The 
use  of  innocent  people  to  affect  decisions  in 
which  they  have  absolutely  no  role  and  in 
which  they  have  no  capacity  for  action  is 
unconscionable.  And  the  United  States  will 
support  any  effort  by  others — and  failing 
that,  will  make  major  efforts  of  its  own — 
to  get  an  international  agreement  that  will 


400 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


bring  the  common  action  of  the  world  com- 
munity to  bear  on  the  issue  of  terrorism. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  has  the  United  States 
changed  its  position  on  adniission  of  Angola 
to  the  United  Nations? 


Secretary  Kissinger:  As  we  pointed  out 
sirepeatedly,  our  concern  with  Angola  is  not 
r  the  regime  that  is  in  power  in  Angola.  Our 
concern  is  the  issue  of  the  presence  of  a 
Cuban  expeditionary  force  of  very  substan- 
tial size  in  that  country.  That,  too,  is  an 
issue  in  which  informal  consultations  are 
taking  place  here  now,  and  we  are  not  pre- 
pared to  state  our  position  now. 

Q.  Have  any  of  the  Cuban  troops  been 
withdrawn  ? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  We,  frankly,  have 
great  difficulty  determining  whether  there 
has  been  a  net  outflow  of  Cubans.  Some 
Cubans  have  been  withdrawn;  others  seem 
to  have  arrived.  And  we  do  not  have  a 
clear  perception  of  whether  there  has  been 
a  significant  net  outflow. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  on  your  planned  trip  this 
weekend  tvhen  you  talk  to  Prime  Minister 
Vorster,  is  it  your  plan  also  to  talk  with  the 
black  African  leaders  on  this  particular  trip 

and  (2)  is  there  any  likelihood  of  your 
having  any  discussion  ivith  Ian  Smith  [Prime 
Minister  of  Rhodesia]  himself  directly  which 
might  lead  to  repeal,  for  example,  of  the  Byrd 
amendment? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Whether  I  will  go  on 
from  Zurich  to  Africa  has  not  yet  been 
ompletely  decided.  I  want  to  have  con- 
sultations with  the  Government  of  Great 
Britain,  which  has  itself  been  in  consulta- 
tion with  key  African  countries  and  which 
has  an  important  role  to  play  there — espe- 
cially in  Rhodesia — and  I  want  to  make  an 
assessment  of  where  we  stand  after  those 
talks.  There  is  a  possibility  that  I  will  go  to 
liscuss  the  issues,  especially  of  Namibia  and 
Rhodesia,  with  the  Presidents  of  black  Af- 
rican states  and  see  whether  some  progress 
^  "an  be  made. 

I  do  not  think  a  final  solution  of  these 


September  27,  1976 


issues  is  likely  in  the  very  near  future.  But 
if  I  believe  that  some  progress  can  be 
made,  I  may  undertake  the  trip. 

I  have  no  plan  now  to  talk  with  Ian 
Smith,  and  I  consider  it  almost  out  of  the 
question  that  I  would  be  meeting  with  him. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  in  Lebanon,  you  now 
have  two  emissaries  ivorking  tvith  the  Chris- 
tian side.  Does  this  indicate  that  the  United 
States  is  moving  toivard  recognizing  a  parti- 
tion? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  No.  The  United  States 
is  opposed  to  the  partition  of  Lebanon.  It 
maintains  the  independence  and  sover- 
eignty and  territorial  integrity  of  Lebanon. 
However,  our  Embassy  in  Beirut  has  found 
it  impossible  to  communicate  with  the 
Christian  part  of  Lebanon ;  and  when  our 
Ambassador  attempted  to  cross  over,  as  you 
know,  some  months  ago,  he  was  assassi- 
nated. We  have  therefore  found  it  techni- 
cally more  convenient  to  send  in  people  via 
Cyprus.  They  will  be  there  for  about  a 
week  of  consultations,  and  they  will  then 
return.  And  our  hope  would  be  that  condi- 
tions will  soon  exist  in  which  the  Embassy 
in  Beirut  can  perform  its  functions  in  both 
parts  of  Lebanon  and  not  force  us  into  the 
present  measures. 

We  will  not  support  partition  of  Leba- 
non, and  this  visit  is  simply  an  opportunity 
to  get  the  views  of  the  Christian  leaders 
that  we  have  not  had  an  opportunity  to 
obtain  for  the  last  few  months. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  hotv  ivoidd  you  assess 
the  passage  of  the  Magnuson  bill  and  the 
unilateral  extension  of  a  200-mile  conserv- 
ancy zone  at  this  particular  time  on  the  bar- 
gaining position  of  the  United  States  and 
upon  the  success  of  this  particular  confer- 
ence? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  we  were  op- 
posed to  the  unilateral  extension  of  the 
200-mile  zone  as  an  Administration,  and 
we  went  along  with  it  because  we  were 
afraid  that  it  would  lead  to  a  set  of  uni- 
lateral moves  by  other  countries — which, 
indeed,  it  has  contributed  to. 


401 


However,  I  believe  now  that  Committee 
II,  which  is  dealing  substantially  with  that 
issue,  is  close  to  a  solution.  And  if  that 
should  prove  to  be  the  case,  then  I  would 
have  to  say  that  even  though  we  did  not 
favor  the  Magnuson  bill  it  has  not  impeded 
the  progi'ess  of  the  negotiations. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  in  your  speech  in  Phila- 
delphia you  stated  that  the  United  States 
woidd  not  accept  what  you  call  the  one-sided 
and  unilateral  declarations  that  were  issues 
at  the  Colombo  nonaligned  summit.  In  those 
declarations  the  nonaligned  countries  stated 
that  unless  there  ivas  substantial  progress  at 
the  Paris  North-South  talks  that  they  ivere 
prepared  to  take  some  iinilateral  steps,  par- 
ticularly on  the  question  of — the  question  of 
general  debt  moratorium. 

What  ivould  be  your  respoyise  to  a  declara- 
tion along  those  lines  by  either  a  group  of  or 
a  number  of  Third  World  countries? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  I  am  not  saying 
that  every  last  statement  that  was  made 
in  Colombo  had  the  character  of  a  one- 
sided declaration. 

In  general,  we  do  not  believe  it  is  appro- 
priate for  any  country  or  group  of  coun- 
tries to  proceed  with  the  threat  of  a  uni- 
lateral action  in  issues  that  require  really 
multilateral  solutions.  We  have  been  op- 
posed to  a  general  debt  moratorium  be- 
cause it  is  our  belief  that  this  will  penalize 
those  countries  that  have  made  a  major 
effort  to  put  their  houses  in  order. 

We  are  prepared,  however,  to  engage  in 
discussions  about  general  principles  of  debt 
relief  that  can  be  applied  on  a  case-by- 
case  basis;  we  are  prepared  to  let  others 
put  forward  their  proposals  in  the  North- 
South  dialogue  and  to  examine  them  with 
an  open  mind. 

What  our  reaction  would  be  in  a  hypo- 
thetical case  that  hasn't  arisen,  I  cannot 
now  predict,  because  it  isn't  possible  for 
debtors  to  put  a  debt  moratorium  unilater- 
ally into  operation  without  serious  conse- 
quences to  themselves. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  last  year  the  United 
States  proposed  a  resolution  at  the  General 

402 


Assembly  calling  for  amne.sty  for  political 
prisoners.  Do  you  foresee  any  similar  initia- 
tives being  taken  by  the  United  States  this 
year  in  the  United  Nations? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  We  have  not  yet  de- 
cided the  full  range  of  the  initiatives  that 
we  are  going  to  put  forward  at  the  General 
Assembly. 

Q.  Will  President  Ford  address  the  General 
Assembly? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  I  do  not  know 
whether  I  want  to  deprive  myself  of  an 
opportunity  to  speak  to  all  of  my  col- 
leagues here.  This  is  a  decision  that  the 
President  has  to  make  in  the  light  of  his 
other  schedules  here.  There  is  no  present 
plan  for  him  to  speak  at  the  General 
Assembly. 

Q.  The  q2iestion  of  the  Middle  East  was 
discussed  between  yourself  and  the  Secre- 
tary General.  Can  you  tell  us  ivhether  any 
neiv  initiative — either  on  your  part  or  on  the 
U.N.  part  or  anything — %vas  discussed  and 
you  knew  of  the  making  or  sensed  it? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  the  Secretary 
General  was  kind  enough  to  give  me  his 
impressions  from  the  nonaligned  confer- 
ence and  of  the  attitude  of  those  Arat 
leaders  that  he  had  an  opportunity  to  ex- 
change views  with  at  the  nonaligned  con- 
ference. And  I  would  not  expect  a  specific 
initiative — at  least,  on  our  part — and  the 
Secretary  General  would  have  to  talk  foi 
himself  in  the  immediate  future.  But  oui 
general  concern  that  progress  in  the  Mid- 
dle East  toward  peace  is  necessary,  thai 
negotiations  will  have  to  be  resumed,  and 
that  the  current  situation  should  not  b€ 
frozen — we  have  reaffirmed  this  position 
and  we  will  be  continuing  to  exchange 
views  on  how  to  bring  progress. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  to  what  degree  might 
this — an  election  year — help  or  hinder  youi 
efforts  in  South  Africa? 

Secretary  Kissinger:  Well,  I  have  not 
noticed  that  its  being  an  election  year 
greatly  helps  the  efforts. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  Sef 


The  reason  for  action  in  southern  Africa 
las   nothing   to   do   with    elections   in   the 

f'ii  Jnited  States,  because  any  study  of  our 
jlectoral  arithmetic  makes  clear  that  this 
3  not  a  significant  issue.  The  reason  we 
ire  concerned  with  making  progress  in 
outhern  Africa  is  that  there  is  a  guerrilla 
ivar  going  on  in  Rhodesia  today,  that  it  is 
;ertain  to  escalate — the  loss  of  life  is  going 

f'fi  .0  increase,  the  complexities  are  going  to 
Tiount — and  it  simply  cannot  wait  for  our 
electoral  process. 

With  respect  to  Namibia,  which  is  a  sep- 
irable  problem,  there  is  a  time  limit  before 
;he  international  community.  And  there, 
;oo,  the  situation  is  going  to  deteriorate 
substantially,  both  on  the  ground  and  inter- 
lationally,  unless  a  serious  effort  is  made. 
We  are  conducting  our  policy  in  order  to 
bring  peace  to  a  troubled  area  and  to  serve 
;he  national  interests  of  the  United  States, 
[t  can  have  no  impact  on  our  election  that 

(III!  [  can  discern. 


OECD  Declaration  on  Investment 

hi:  Commended  to  U.S.  Businesses 

fer 

fjl  Folloiving  is  the  text  of  a  letter  dated 
August  19  from  Secretary  Kissinger,  Secre- 
tary of  the  Treasury  William  E.  Simon,  and 

,\f^(  Secretary  of  Commerce  Elliot  L.  Richardson, 

(!,( which  ivas  sent  to  more  than  800  chief  execu- 
tives of  major  U.S.  corporations.^ 


August  19,  1976. 
On  June  21,  1976,  twenty-three  govern- 
ments of  the  Organization  for  Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD) 
jointly  adopted  a  Declaration  on  Interna- 
tional Investment  and  Multinational  Enter- 
prises, which  we  believe  will  contribute 
significantly  to  an  open  and  stable 
environment  for  international  investment.^ 
Maintenance  of  such  an  environment  over 


'  Text  from  press  release  402  dated  Aug.  30,  which 
includes  an  announcement  of  the  release  of  the  letter. 

-  For  texts  of  the  declaration,  annex,  and  related 
decisions,  see  Bulletin  of  July  19,  1976,  p.  83. 


September  27,  1976 


coming  years  depends  on  strengthening 
mutual  expectations  of  governments  and 
enterprises  regarding  responsible  policies 
and  practices. 

This  balance  of  governmental  and  enter- 
prise responsibilities  is  the  core  of  the  ap- 
proach to  international  investment  which 
is  reflected  in  the  OECD  Declaration  and 
the  related  decisions  providing  for  continu- 
ing consultation  and  cooperation  among  the 
industrial  countries  of  the  OECD  on  the 
basic  principles  of  the  Declaration. 

The  main  elements  of  the  OECD  invest- 
ment declaration  and  related  decisions, 
which  are  enclosed,  are  the  following: 

— affirmation  by  OECD  Governments  of 
their  basic  orientation  toward  international 
investment,  stressing  that  such  investment 
increases  general  welfare  and  should  be 
facilitated; 

— a  recommitment  by  OECD  Govern- 
ments to  their  obligations  vis-a-vis  multina- 
tional enterprises,  including  undertakings 
to  accord  them  "national"  or  non-discrim- 
inatory treatment  vis-a-vis  domestic  firms, 
and  to  treat  them  in  accordance  with  inter- 
national law  and  agreements  as  well  as 
contracts  to  which  they  have  subscribed; 

— a  recommendation  that  enterprises 
operating  in  OECD  countries  voluntarily 
observe  those  guidelines  of  good  business 
practice  contained  in  an  annex  to  the  Dec- 
laration ; 

— a  pledge  by  OECD  Governments  to 
closer  consultation  and  cooperation  on  in- 
ternational direct  investment  issues,  includ- 
ing problems  arising  from  official  incen- 
tives and  disincentives  for  such  investment. 

In  our  view,  this  Declaration  represents 
a  major  step  in  support  of  a  favorable  en- 
vironment for  direct  investment  among  the 
industrial  countries.  Throughout  the  nego- 
tiation of  this  Declaration,  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment consulted  closely  with  private 
sector  representatives  because  the  Guide- 
lines for  Multinational  Enterprises  are  vol- 
untary— as  the  United  States  held  they 
should  be — and  in  order  to  assure  that  the 
Guidelines     and     the     entire     Declaration 

403 


would  be  fair  and  balanced.  We  believe 
our  objectives  have  been  achieved.  The 
U.S.,  therefore,  joined  the  other  OECD 
Governments  in  recommending  to  enter- 
prises operating  in  the  OECD  countries  ob- 
servance of  the  Guidelines,  in  the  context 
of  the  governmental  assurances  contained 
in  the  Declaration.  We  commend  these 
Guidelines  to  all  enterprises  in  the  United 
States. 

Sincerely  yours, 

Henry  A.  Kissinger 
Secretary  of  State 

William  E.  Simon 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury 

Elliot  L.  Richardson 
Secretary  of  Commerce 


Fifth  Progress  Report  on  Cyprus 
Submitted  to  the  Congress 

Message  From  President  Ford  ' 

To  the  Congress  of  the  United  States: 

Pursuant  to  Public  Law  94-104,  I  am 
submitting  my  fifth  periodic  report  on  the 
progress  of  the  Cyprus  negotiations  and 
the  efforts  this  Administration  is  making 
to  help  find  a  lasting  solution  to  the  prob- 
lems of  the  island.  In  previous  reports  I 
have  emphasized  my  strong  desire  to  see 
a  just  and  lasting  settlement.  I  have  re- 
viewed in  detail  the  efforts  this  Adminis- 
tration has  made  to  help  realize  that 
achievement,  and  the  progress  that  has 
been  made  thus  far.  I  have  indicated  that 
while  a  Cyprus  solution  cannot  be  dictated 
by  the  United  States,  or  imposed  by  any 
outside  party,  there  are  certain  elements 
which  are  considered  essential  to  an  equi- 
table settlement.  These  I  detailed  for  the 
Congress  in  my  report  of  December  8,  1975. 


'Transmitted  on   Aug.  6   (text  from  White  House 
press  release). 


404 


These  essential  elements  have  not 
changed.  Nor  has  my  conviction,  voiced  in 
earlier  reports,  that  real  progress  can  be 
achieved  provided  mutual  distrust  and  sus- 
picions are  set  aside  and  both  parties  fore- 
go rhetoric  which  needlessly  hinders  the 
search  for  a  just  settlement. 

We  have  lost  no  opportunity  to  contrib- 
ute to  our  common  goal  of  achieving  a 
Cyprus  solution.  I  have  discussed  the 
Cyprus  problem  at  length  with  the  Foreign 
Ministers  of  Greece  and  Turkey.  At  the 
Summit  Conference  in  Puerto  Rico  in  June 
1976,  I  spoke  about  Cyprus  with  leaders  of 
the  major  industrial  nations.  Secretary 
Kissinger  has  also  devoted  considerable  ef- 
fort to  achieving  a  favorable  atmosphere 
for  discussions,  continuing  personally  to 
press  our  views  at  the  highest  levels  in 
Athens  and  Ankara.  Our  Ambassadors  in 
Greece,  Turkey  and  Cyprus  have  worked 
unstintingly  to  help  bring  the  two  sides 
together  in  an  atmosphere  of  true  negotia- 
tion ;  and  we  have  strongly  and  continu- 
ously supported  the  efforts  of  Unitedl 
Nations  Secretary  General  Waldheim  to: 
achieve  this  same  end.  In  spite  of  all  these' 
efforts,  we  have  been  unsuccessful  thus  fan 
in  getting  the  parties  to  set  aside  proce- 
dural problems  and  to  move  on  to  discus- 
sions of  the  key  substantive  issues,  such  as 
territory. 

The  process  of  finding  a  solution  to  the* 
Cyprus  problem  has  been  carried  forwards 
through  intercommunal  talks  between  tha 
two  Cypriot  sides,  under  the  aegis  of  Sec- 
retary General  Waldheim.  These  talks 
have  been  in  recess  since  February.  Lower- 
level  "humanitarian"  talks,  now  also  in  re- 
cess, have  produced  limited  progress  on 
subsidiary  issues,  but  have  left  the  central 
points  of  contention  unresolved.  Mean- 
while new  frictions  continue  to  arise  on  the 
island  as  each  side  seeks  to  maintain  oi 
improve  its  position,  either  locally  on  the 
island  or  on  the  wider  international  stage, 

We  continue  to  seek  solutions  for  the  on- 
going humanitarian  problems  of  those  who 


Department  of  State  Bulletir 


were  displaced  from  their  homes  on  Cyprus 
by  the  conflict  of  1974.  The  United  States, 
through  the  UN  High  Commissioner  for 
Refugees,  has  contributed  some  $25  million 
in  each  of  the  past  two  years  to  help  to 
alleviate  these  problems.  On  Cyprus,  new 
programs  to  provide  housing  for  those  dis- 
placed are  underway.  With  these  pro- 
grams, we  would  hope  that  most  of  those 
Cypriots  still  living  in  temporary  dwellings 
— now  down  to  about  10  percent  of  the 
original  number  of  refugees — could  be  in 
new  homes  by  early  next  year.  In  support 
of  this  effort  our  program  of  humanitarian 
assistance  will  continue  in  the  coming  year. 

Secretary  General  Waldheim's  Special 
Representative  on  Cyprus,  Ambassador 
Perez  de  Cuellar,  has  recently  engaged  in 
discussions  in  Ankara,  Athens  and  Nicosia 
with  a  view  to  developing  a  basis  for  an 
early  resumption  of  the  intercommunal 
talks.  The  United  States  has  strongly  sup- 
ported these  efforts  and  will  remain  in  close 
contact  with  the  Secretary  General  in  the 
days  immediately  ahead. 

On  July  29  of  this  year  I  met  with  Bulent 
Ecevit,  the  Turkish  opposition  leader,  and 
stressed  the  compelling  need  for  a  more 
conciliatory  approach  by  both  sides.  More- 
over, we  have  again  been  active  with  our 
European  allies  to  insure  that  all  avenues 
are  explored  in  the  search  for  a  settlement. 

Though  there  are  many  proposals  for  a 
settlement  of  the  situation  on  Cyprus,  the 
only  solution  which  will  restore  domestic 
tranquility  for  all  the  citizens  of  that  island 
is  one  which  they  work  out  among  them- 
selves. We  are  dedicating  our  efforts  to 
assisting  in  the  resumption  of  negotiations 
which  will  achieve  the  goal  we  share — an 
equitable  and  just  peace  on  Cyprus.  This 
Administration,  with  the  support  of  the 
Congress,  will  continue  actively  to  encour- 
age that  process  in  every  way  possible. 

Gerald  R.  Ford. 

The  White  House,  August  6,  1976. 


September  27,  1976 


Secretary  Kissinger  Praises  Work 
of  Radio  Free  Europe,  Radio  Liberty 

Following  is  the  text  of  a  letter-  dated 
August  28  from  Secretary  Kissinger  to 
David  M.  Abshire,  Chairman,  Board  for  In- 
ternational Broadcasting. 

Press   leleafe  400  dated  August  30 

AUGUST  28,  1976. 

Dear  Dave:  I  understand  that  the  Board 
for  International  Broadcasting  will  hold 
its  first  annual  review  conference  of  Radio 
Free  Europe  and  Radio  Liberty  program- 
ming in  Munich  later  this  month.  I  would 
like  to  take  this  opportunity  to  reiterate  to 
all  participants  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment's firm  commitment  to  the  free  flow 
and  dissemination  of  information  through 
international  broadcasting. 

The  Final  Act  of  the  Conference  on  Se- 
curity and  Cooperation  in  Europe,  signed 
by  35  Governments,  declared  that,  "The 
participating  States  .  .  .  make  it  their  aim 
to  facilitate  the  freer  and  wider  dissemina- 
tion of  information  of  all  kinds,"  and  that 
"The  participating  States  note  the  expan- 
sion in  the  dissemination  of  information 
broadcast  by  radio,  and  express  the  hope 
for  the  continuation  of  this  process,  so  as  to 
meet  the  interest  of  mutual  understanding 
among  peoples  and  the  aims  set  forth  by 
this  Conference."  * 

Radio  Free  Europe  and  Radio  Liberty 
broadcasts  can  admirably  serve  the  stated 
aim  of  the  participating  states  "to  facili- 
tate the  freer  and  wider  dissemination  of 
information  of  all  kinds."  The  comprehen- 
sive coverage,  quality  reporting,  and  objec- 
tive news  analyses  of  the  broadcasts  are  a 
uniquely  meaningful  and  often  vital  source 
of  information  and  encourage  the  "con- 
structive dialogue  with  the  peoples  of  East- 


'  For  text  of  the  Final  Act  of  the  Conferenci;  on 
Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe,  signed  at  Hel- 
sinki on  Aug.  1,  1975,  see  Bulletin  of  Sept.  1,  1975, 
p.  323. 


405 


ern  Europe  and  the  USSR"  mandated  by 
the  Board  for  International  Broadcasting 
Act  of  1973. 

The  "jamming"  of  international  broad- 
casts continues  in  the  Soviet  Union,  Czech- 
oslovakia, Bulgaria  and,  sporadically,  in 
Poland.  It  must  be  eliminated  if  the  goals 
of  the  CSCE  Final  Act  are  to  be  met. 

The  United  States  Government  categori- 
cally rejects  allegations  made  by  Soviet 
and  East  European  officials  and  media  that 
Radio  Free  Europe  and  Radio  Liberty  con- 
travene the  aims  of  the  Helsinki  Declara- 
tion, or  that  either  is  associated  with  the 
Central  Intelligence  Agency.  The  Radios 
are  independent,  highly  professional  oper- 
ations which  make  a  vital  contribution  to 
the  free  flow  of  information  between 
peoples. 

Warm  regards, 

Henry  A.  Kissinger. 


Congressional  Documents 
Relating  to  Foreign  Policy 


94th  Congress,  2d  Session 

Convention  on  Registration  of  Objects  Launched  Into 
Outer  Space.  Report  of  the  Senate  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations  to  accompany  Ex.  G,  94-2.  S.  Ex. 
Rept.  94-28.  June  15,  1976.  8  pp. 

Annual  Report  of  the  Subcommittee  To  Investigate 
the  Administration  of  the  Internal  Security 
Act  and  Other  Internal  Security  Laws  of  the  Sen- 
ate Committee  on  the  Judiciary.  S.  Rept.  94-947. 
June  15,  1976.  79  pp. 

Treaty  With  the  Swiss  Confederation  on  Mutual 
Assistance  in  Criminal  iVIatters.  Report  of  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  to  accom- 
pany Ex.  F,  94-2.  S.  Ex.  Rept.  94-29.  June  17, 
1976.  10  pp. 

Report  of  Secretary  of  State  Kissinger  on  His  Visits 
to  Latin  America,  Western  Europe,  and  Africa. 
Hearing  before  the  House  Committee  on  Interna- 
tional Relations.  June  17,   1976.  31   pp. 

Protocols  for  the  Third  Extension  of  the  Interna- 
tional Wheat  Agreement,  1971.  IVIessage  from  the 
President  of  the  United  States  transmitting  the 
protocols.  S.  Ex.  I.  June  18,  1976.  8  pp. 

Continuation  of  Temporary  Suspension  of  Duties  on 
Manganese  Ore  and  Related  Products.  Report  of 
the  Senate  Committee  on  Finance  to  accompany 
H.R.  12033.  S.  Rept.  94-994.  June  25,  1976.  3  pp. 

Foreign    Relations    Authorization    Act,    Fiscal    Year 

406 


1977.  Report  of  the  committee  of  conference  to 
accompany  S.  3168.  H.  Rept.  94-1302.  June  25, 
1976.  42  pp. 

Petroleum  Industry  Competition  Act  of  1976.  Report 
of  the  Senate  Committee  on  the  Judiciary,  to- 
gether with  additional  views,  minority  views,  and 
additional  minority  views,  to  accompany  S.  2387. 
S.  Rept.  94-1005.  Part  1;  June  28,  1976;  185  pp. 
Part  2;  July  1,  1976;  92  pp. 

Making  Appropriations  for  the  Departments  of  State, 
Justice,  and  Commerce,  the  Judiciary.  Report  of 
the  committee  of  conference  to  accompany  H.R. 
14239.  H.  Rept.  94-1309.  June  28,  1976.  12  pp. 

Aeronautics  and  Space  Activities.  Message  from  the 
President  of  the  United  States  transmitting  the 
annual  report  for  calendar  year  1975  on  U.S.  aero- 
nautics and  space  activities.  H.  Doc.  94-541.  June 
29,  1976.  112  pp. 

Foreign  Assistance  and  Related  Programs  Appro- 
priation Bill,  1977.  Report  of  the  Senate  Commit- 
tee on  Appropriations,  together  with  additional 
views,  to  accompany  H.R.  14260.  S.  Rept.  94-1009. 
June  29,  1976.  160  pp. 

Status  of  the  Baltic  Nations.  Report  of  the  Senate 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  to  accompany 
S.  Res.  319.  S.  Rept.  94-1018.  June  30,  1976.  2  pp. 

Executive  Sessions  of  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations 
Committee  (Historical  Series).  Volume  II;  81st 
Congress,  first  and  second  sessions,  1949-50;  made 
public  July  1976;  840  pp.  Volume  III,  part  1;  82d 
Congress,  first  session,  1951;  made  public  August 
1976.  639  pp. 

Indochina  Refugee  Children  Assistance  Act  of  1975. 
Report  of  the  committee  of  conference  to  accom- 
pany S.  2145.  H.  Rept.  94-1333.  July  1,  1976.  16  pp. 

Corrupt  Overseas  Payments  by  U.S.  Business  Enter- 
prises. Report  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Bank- 
ing, Housing  and  Urban  Affairs  to  accompany  S. 
3664.  S.  Rept.  94-1031.  July  2,  1976.  17  pp. 

A  Review  of  the  Environmental,  Economic  and  Inter- 
national Aspects  of  the  Garrison  Diversion  Unit, 
North  Dakota.  Twenty-eighth  report  of  the  House 
Committee  on  Government  Operations.  H.  Rept. 
94-1335.  July  2,  1976.  161  pp. 

Establishing  Certain  Accounting  Standards  Relating 
to  the  Panama  Canal  Company.  Report  of  the 
House  Committee  on  Merchant  Marine  and  Fish- 
eries to  accompany  H.R.  14311.  H.  Rept.  94-1342. 
July  14,  1976.  35  pp. 

Foreign  Intelligence  Surveillance  Act  of  1976.  Report 
of  the  Senate  Committee  on  the  Judiciary,  to- 
gether with  additional  and  minority  views,  to  ac- 
company S.  3197;  S.  Rept.  94-1035;  July  15,  1976; 
179  pp.  Report  of  tlie  Senate  Select  Committee  on 
Intelligence,  together  with  additional  views;  S. 
Rept.  94-1161;  August  24,  1976;  77  pp. 

Negotiation  of  Voluntary  Restraints  on  Palm  Oil 
Imports.  Report  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Ag- 
riculture and  Forestry  to  accompany  S.  Res.  487. 
S.  Rept.  94-1036.  July  15,  1976.  3  pp. 

Foreign  Payments  Disclosure.  Message  from  the 
President  of  the  United  States  urging  enactment 
of  proposed  legislation  to  require  the  disclosure  of 
payments  to  foreign  officials.  H.  Doc.  94-572. 
August  3,  1976.  3  pp. 

Department  of  State  Bulletin 


TREATY  INFORMATION 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Astronauts 

Agreement  on  the  rescue  of  astronauts,  the  return  of 
astronauts,  and  the  return  of  objects  launched  into 
outer  space.  Opened  for  signature  at  Washington, 
London,  and  Moscow  April  22,  1968.  Entered  into 
force  December  3,  1968.  TIAS  6599. 
Accession  deposited:  Singapore,  September  10, 
1976. 

Consular  Relations 

Vienna    convention    on    consular    relations.    Done    at 
Vienna  April  24,  1963.  Entered  into  force  March  19, 
1967;    for   the    United   States    December   24,    1969. 
TIAS  6820. 
Ratification  deposited:  Zaire,  July  15,  1976. 

Containers 

International   convention  for  safe  containers   (CSC), 
with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  December  2,  1972.' 
Ratification   deposited:   Union   of   Soviet   Socialist 
Republics  (with  statement),  August  24,  1976. 

Narcotic  Drugs 

Protocol  amending  the  single  convention  on  narcotic 
drugs,  1961   (TIAS  6298).  Done  at  Geneva  March 
25,  1972.  Entered  into  force  August  8,  1975.  TIAS 
8118. 
Accession  deposited:  Zaire,  July  15,  1976. 

Satellite  Communications  System 

Agreement  relating  to  the  International  Telecommu- 
nications Satellite  Organization  (INTELSAT), 
with  annexes.  Done  at  Washington  August  20, 
1971.  Entered  into  force  February  12,  1973.  TIAS 
7532. 

Notification  of  withdrawal:  Republic  of  China, 
September  10,  1976,  effective  December  10,  1976. 
Operating  agreement  relating  to  the  International 
Telecommunications  Satellite  Organization  (IN- 
TELSAT), with  annex.  Done  at  Washington 
August  20,  1971.  Entered  into  force  February  12, 
1973.  TIAS  7532. 

Notification  of  withdrawal:  International  Tele- 
communication Development  Corporation,  Ltd.  of 
the  Republic  of  China,  September  10,  1976,  effec- 
tive December  10,  1976. 

Scientific  Cooperation 

Memorandum  of  understanding  for  a  transatlantic 
balloon  program.  Signed  at  Washington  July  21 
and  22,  1976.  Entered  into  force  July  22,  1976. 

September  27,  1976 


Seabed  Disarmament 

Treaty  on  the  prohibition  of  the  emplacement  of  nu- 
clear weapons  and  other  weapons  of  mass  destruc- 
tion on  the  seabed  and  the  ocean  floor  and  in  the 
subsoil  thereof.  Done  at  Washington,  London,  and 
Moscow  February  11,  1971.  Entered  into  force 
May  18,  1972.  TIAS  7337. 

Ratification  deposited:   Singapore,    September   10 
1976. 

Space 

Treaty  on  principles  governing  the  activities  of 
states  in  the  exploration  and  use  of  outer  space, 
including  the  moon  and  other  celestial  bodies. 
Opened  for  signature  at  Washington,  London,  and 
Moscow  January  27,  1967.  Entered  into  force  Octo- 
ber 10,  1967.  TIAS  6347. 

Accession    deposited:    Singapore,    September    10 
1976. 

Wheat 

Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the  wheat 
trade  convention  (part  of  the  international  wheat 
agreement)  1971  (TIAS  7144,  8227).  Done  at 
Washington  March  17,  1976.  Entered  into  force 
June  19,  1976,  with  respect  to  certain  provisions 
and  July  1,  1976,  with  respect  to  other  provisions. 
Accession  deposited:  Ireland,  September  7,  1976. 

Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the  food 
aid  convention  (part  of  the  intemational  wheat 
agreement)  1971  (TIAS  7144,  8227).  Done  at 
Washington  March  17,  1976.  Entered  into  force 
June  19,  1976,  with  respect  to  certain  provisions 
and  July  1,  1976,  with  respect  to  other  provisions. 
Accession  deposited:  Ireland.  September  7,  1976, 

BILATERAL 


Canada 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of  November  16 
and  December  18,  1970,  as  extended  (TIAS  7024, 
7686),  concerning  activities  of  the  United  States 
at  Churchill  Research  Range.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Ottawa  June  8  and  July  30, 
1976.  Entered  into  force  July  30,  1976,  effective 
July  1,  1976. 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of  April  2  and 
May  9,  1974,  as  extended  (TIAS  8137),  relating 
to  the  construction,  installation,  and  maintenance 
of  a  seismograph  station  at  Kluane  Lake,  Yukon 
Territory.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Ottawa 
July  14  and  August  5,  1976.  Entered  into  force 
August  5,  1976. 

El  Salvador 

Agreement  terminating  the  agreement  of  April  19, 
1972,  as  amended  (TIAS  7284,  7644),  relating  to 
trade  in  cotton  textiles.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  San  Salvador  July  15.  1976.  Entered  into 
force  July  15,  1976. 


Not  in  force. 


407 


Federal  Republic  of  Germany 

Agreement  relating  to  mutual  cooperation  regarding 
restrictive     business    practices.     Signed     at     Bonn 
June  23,  1976. 
Entered  into  force:  September  11,  1976. 

Spain 

Treaty  of  friendship  and  cooperation  with  related 
notes  and  supplementary  agreements.  Signed  'at 
Madrid  January  24,  1976." 

Instrument  of  ratification  signed  by  the  President: 
September  4,  1976,  with  declaration. 

Zambia 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities. 
Signed  at  Lusaka  August  24,  1976.  Entered  into 
force  August  24,  1976. 


PUBLICATIONS 


GPO  Sales  Publications 

Publications  may  be  ordered  by  catalog  or  stock 
number  from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents, 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office.  Washington,  D.C. 
20Jt02.  A  25-perceyit  discount  is  made  on  orders  for 
100  or  more  copies  of  any  one  publication  mailed  to 
the  same  address.  Remittances,  payable  to  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  must  accotnpany 
orders.  Prices  shown  below,  which  include  domestic 
postage,  are  subject  to  change. 

".  .  .  To  Form  a  More  Perfect  Union  .  .  ."  Justice 
for  American  Women.  Report  of  the  National  Com- 
mission on  the  Observance  of  International  Women's 
Year,  1976,  appointed  to  "promote  equality  between 
men  and  women."  Parts  I-III  contain  actions  recom- 
mended   by    the    Commission    as    a    whole;    Part    TV 


'  Not  in  force. 


lists  Commission  members;  and  Part  V  contains  find- 
ings and  recommendations  of  working  committees. 
Pub.  Y3.W84:l/976.  Stock  No.  040-000-00350/9. 
382  pp.  $5.20. 

Air  Charter  Services.  Agreement  with  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany  extending  the  agreement  of 
April  13,  1973,  as  amended  and  extended.  TIAS  8210. 
2  pp.  35<'.   (Cat.  No.   89.10:8210). 

Agricultural  Commodities.  Agreement  with  the 
Dominican  Republic.  TIAS  8215.  10  pp.  25t  (Cat. 
No.  89.10:8215). 

Air  Charter  Services.  Agreement  with  the  Nether- 
lands extending  the  agreement  of  July  11,  1978. 
TIAS  8216.  3  pp.  35^.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:8216). 

Air  Transport  Services.  Agreement  with  the  Union 
of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  amending  the  agree- 
ment of  November  4,  1966,  as  amended  and  extended. 
TIAS  8217.  6  pp.  35(?.   (Cat.  No.  89.10:8217). 

Trade  in  Cotton,  Wool  and  Man-Made  Fiber  Textiles. 

Agreement  with  the  Republic  of  China  modifying 
the  agreement  of  May  21,  1975.  TIAS  8218.  6  pp 
35<'.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:8218). 

Air  Transport  Services.  Agreement  with  Mexico  ex- 
tending the  agreement  of  August  15,  1960,  a: 
amended  and  extended.  TIAS  8219.  4  pp.  35^.  (Cat 
No.   89.10:8219). 

Narcotic  Drugs — Assistance  to  Curb  Illegal  Produc 
tion  and  Traffic.  Agreement  with  Costa  Rica.  TIAJ 
8220.  6  pp.  35^.   (Cat.  No.  89.10:8220). 

Fisheries — Certain  Fisheries  Problems  on  the  Hig) 
Seas  in  the  Western  Areas  of  the  Middle  AHanti^ 
Ocean.  Agreement  with  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialis 
Republics  extending  the  agreement  of  February  26 
1975.  TIAS  8221.  3  pp.  35^.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:8221). 

Trade — Meat  Imports.  Agreement  with  Haiti.  TIAi 
8222.  10  pp.  35(.   (Cat.  No.  89.10:8222). 

Trade  in  Cotton  Textiles  and  Cotton  Textile  Products 

Agreement  with  Egypt.  TIAS  8223.  7  pp.  35<t.  (Cal 
No.   89.10:8223). 

Drought  Recovery  Program.  Agreement  with  Mauri 
tania.  TIAS  8224.  17  pp.  35^.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:8224) 


408 


Department  of  State  Bulletii 


INDEX     September  27,  1976     Vol.  LXXV,  No.  19U 


Africa 

President  Ford  Discusses  U.S.  Efforts  in 
Soutliern  Africa  (news  conference  opening 
statement) 

Secretary  Kissinger  Meets  With  Soutli  African 
Prime  Minister  at  Zuricli  and  Confers  With 
British,  French,  and  German  Leaders  (Kis- 
singer, Schmidt) 

Secretary  Kissinger  Meets  With  U.N.  Secretary 
General  Waldheim  (remarks  to  the  press)  . 

Congress 

Congressional  Documents  Relating  to  Foreign 
Policy 

Department  Discusses  August  18  Incident  at 
Panmunjom  and   Its  Aftermath    (Hummel) 

Fifth  Progress  Report  on  Cyprus  Submitted  to 
the  Congress  (message  from  President  Ford) 

Cyprus.  Fifth  Progress  Report  on  Cyprus  Sub- 
mitted to  the  Congress  (message  from  Presi- 
dent  Ford)    


Economic  Affairs.  OECD  Declaration  on  In- 
vestment Commended  to  U.S.  Businesses 
(letter  from  Secretaries  Kissinger,  Simon, 
and  Richardson  to  corporate  executives)   .     . 

Europe.  Secretary  Kissinger  Praises  Work  of 
Radio  Free  Europe,  Radio  Liberty  (letter 
to  Chairman,  Board  for  International  Broad- 
casting)      

France.  Secretary  Kissinger  Meets  With  South 
African  Prime  Minister  at  Zurich  and  Con- 
fers With  British.  French,  and  German 
Leaders  (Kissinger,  Schmidt) 

Germany.  Secretary  Kissinger  Meets  With 
South  African  Prime  Minister  at  Zurich  and 
Confers  With  British,  French,  and  German 
Leaders  (Kissinger,  Schmidt) 

Information  Policy.  Secretary  Kissinger  Praises 
Work  of  Radio  Free  Europe,  Radio  Liberty 
(letter  to  Chairman,  Board  for  International 
Broadcasting) 

Korea 

Department  Discusses  August  18  Incident  at 
Panmunjom  and  Its  Aftermath   (Hummel)   . 

Nonaligned  Summit  Meeting  Position  on  Korea 
and  Puerto  Rico  Rejected  (Department 
statement) 

U.S.  and  Republic  of  Korea  Welcome  New  Joint 
Security  Area  Arrangement  (joint  statement) 

United  States  Condemns  Murder  of  American 
Officers  in  Korea  (White  House  and  Depart- 
ment   statements) 

Law  of  the  Sea 

Secretary  Kissinger  Discusses  U.S.  Position  on 
Law  of  the  Sea  Conference 

Secretary  Kissinger  Meets  With  U.N.  Secretary 
General  Waldheim  (remarks  to  the  press)   . 

Lebanon.  Secretary  Kissinger  Meets  With  U.N. 
Secretary  General  Waldheim  (remarks  to 
the    press)    

Namibia.  Secretary  Kissinger  Meets  With 
South  African  Prime  Minister  at  Zurich  and 
Confers  With  British,  French,  and  German 
Leaders  (Kissinger,  Schmidt) 

Presidential  Documents 

Fifth  Progress  Report  on  Cyprus  Submitted 
to   the   Congress 

President  Ford  Discusses  U.S.  Efforts  in  South- 
ern Africa 

Publications.  GPO  Sales  Publications  .... 


385 

377 
390 

406 
386 
404 

404 
403 


377 


377 


405 


394 
393 

392 

395 
399 

399 
377 


385 
408 


South  Africa.  Secretary  Kissinger  Meets  With 
South  African  Prime  Minister  at  Zurich  and 
Confers  With  British,  French,  and  German 
Leaders  (Kissinger,  Schmidt) 377 

Southern  Rhodesia.  Secretary  Kissinger  Meets 
With  South  African  Prime  Minister  at  Zurich 
and  Confers  With  British,  French,  and  Ger- 
man Leaders   (Kissinger,  Schmidt)   ....       377 

Treaty  Information.  Current  Actions  ....      407 

United  Kingdom.  Secretary  Kissinger  Meets 
With  South  African  Prime  Minister  at  Zurich 
and  Confers  With  British.  French,  and  Ger- 
man Leaders  (Kissinger,  Schmidt)  ....      377 


Name  Index 

Ford,   President 385,  404 

Hummel,  Arthur  W.,  Jr 386 

Kissinger,    Secretary    .    .     .    377,  395,  399,  403,  405 

Schmidt,  Helmut 377 

Waldheim,  Kurt 399 


Checklist  of  Department  of  State 

Press 

Releases:  September  6-12 

Press    releases    may    be    obtained    from   the 

Office 

of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 

Washington 

,  D.C.  20520. 

No. 

Date 

Snbjcwt 

413 

9/6 

U.S.-Republic  of  Korea  joint  state- 
ment. 

*414 

9/7 

Women  leaders  from  19  countries 
to  participate  in  30-day  program 
on  "The   Role  of  Women   in  the 
Political    Process." 

416 

9/6 

Kissinger:    news    conference,    Zu- 
rich. 

*-417 

9/7 

Kissinger:  arrival,  Paris. 

*418 

9/7 

Operation    of   citizens   band    radio 
equipment  in   Mexico. 

*419 

9/7 

Kissinger:  remarks  to  press,  Paris. 

*420 

9/7 

Kissinger,  Genscher:  arrival,  Ham- 
burg. 

421 

9/7 

Kissinger,   Schmidt:    news   confer- 
ence, Hamburg. 

*422 

9/7 

Kissinger:    arrival,    Andrews    Air 
Force  Base. 

t423 

9/9 

Kissinger:    news    conference. 

*424 

9/10 

Study     Group    6,    U.S.    National 
Committee  for  the  International 
Radio    Consultative     Committee, 
Amherst,  Mass.,  Oct.   14. 

*425 

9/10 

Advisory  Panel   on   Music,  Oct.   6. 

*426 

9/10 

Shipping  Coordinating  Committee 
(SCC),   Subcommittee   on   Mari- 
time Law,  Oct.  15. 

*'427 

9/10 

see,   Subcommittee   on    Safety   of 
Life   at   Sea,   working   group   on 
subdivision  and  stability,  Oct.  6. 

*428 

9/10 

Robert  J.  McCloskey  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to   the   Netherlands 
(biographic  data). 

t429 

9/11 

Kissinger:  news  conference, 
ited. 

*  Not  prii 

t  Held  for  a  later  issue  of  the  Bulletin. 

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