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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Volume LXXVI • No. 1958 • January 3, 1977
» — / ) •
MINISTERIAL MEETING OF NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
AT BRUSSELS
Arrival Statement and News Conferences by Secretary Kissinger
at Brussels and London 1
Message From President-Elect Carter Delivered by Secretary Kissinger
and Text of North Atlantic Council Communique 9
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
Foi- index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
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BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to
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Vol. LXXVI, No. 1958
January 3, 1977
The Department of State BULLETIN
a weekly publication issued by th^
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of U.S. foreign relations and
on the work of the Department and
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses, and
news conferences of the President and
the Secretary of State and other offi-
cers of the Department, as well as spe-
cial articles on various phases of in-
ternational affairs and the functions of
the Department. Information is in-
cluded concerning treaties and inter-
national agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and on treaties of general interna-
tional interest.
Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.
Secretary Kissinger Attends NATO Ministerial Meeting at Brussels
and Meets With British Officials at London
Secretary Kissinger headed the U.S. dele-
gation to the regular ministerial meeting of
the North Atlantic Council at Brussels De-
cember 9-10 and visited London Decetnber
10-12. Following are the texts of his state-
ment made on arrival at Brussels on De-
cember 7, his news conference following the
meeting on December 10, and his news con-
ference with Secretary of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs Anthony Cros-
land at London on December 10. *
ARRIVAL, BRUSSELS, DECEMBER 7
Press release 5^9 dated December 8
I am very happy to be back in Brussels for
the annual NATO meeting.
Through all changes of Administration the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been
the cardinal commitment of the United
States, and I am certain that it will continue
to be so in the future.
It will be very pleasant for me to review
with my colleagues the state of our alliance,
which is historically unique. I do not think
any alliance in modern history has lasted so
long, grown so much in vitality, and ex-
tended the range of its concerns so effec-
tively.
We have many problems before us; but the
future of freedom and of democracy and of
developing of our nations depends on our
cohesiveness, and it is in that spirit that we
will conduct our discussions.
' Press releases relating to bilateral meetings during
Secretary Kissinger's visit to Brussels are Nos. 590 and
.591 of Dec. 8, 592 and 593 of Dec. 9, and 596, 597, and
598 of Dec. 10.
NEWS CONFERENCE, BRUSSELS, DECEMBER 10
Press release 600 dated December 11
Secretary Kissinger: I will go right to your
questions.
Q. Mr. Secretary, don't you think that the
purchase by the Libyan Government of 15
percent of the 7najor Italian industry Fiat
could influence in some ways the foreign pol-
icy of Italy, which is still a NATO country?
Secretary Kissinger: In the waning days of
my public career I dare not take on both the
Italian and Libyan public opinion.
Q. Mr. Secretary, during the course of the
talks, did the situation in souther?! Africa
come up, and if so, were any proposals made
for further action by you or the United
States?
Secretary Kissinger: The situation in
southern Africa came up in the sense that I
gave an account of the situation as I saw it
and Mr. Crosland made an English interpre-
tation of my remarks. We substantially
agreed in our analysis of the situation. As
you know, I am going to meet Mr. Crosland
and his associates this afternoon in London
and again tomorrow. No recommendations
were made by NATO with respect to south-
ern Africa, but there was a discussion of the
situation as we saw it.
Q. In which areas did you and the Foreign
Secretary not agree in your analysis on
Rhodesia?
Secretary Kissinger: I would say that the
Foreign Secretary and I agree completely in
our analysis of the situation in Rhodesia. We
greatly appreciate the role that Britain is
January 3, 1977
playing under great difficulties at Geneva. It
is a complicated negotiation which proceeds
through a series of crises and dramatic head-
lines but in which we believe that progress
remains possible.
The United States, as Great Britain, sup-
ports majority rule in Rhodesia and supports
a transition government in which the African
component is in the majority. Now, how to
work out the relationship of the various com-
ponents to each other is the subject of the
negotiations. But there is no disagreement
whatever between the United States and the
British point of view.
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you feel that you can
still play any role at all in helping break the
deadlock by meeting Mr. Nkomo [Joshua
Nkomo, Zimbabwe Africa People's Union] in
London or any of the other participants'?
Secretary Kissinger: I have no plans to
meet Mr. Nkomo — I will not meet Mr.
Nkomo — because I know that some of the
exegetists here will misinterpret the word
that I have no "plans."
I believe that we can continue to play a
useful role in remaining in contact both with
the parties in Geneva and with the frontline
Presidents, who have such an important re-
sponsibility. We are indeed in frequent con-
tact with all of these parties, and we will con-
tinue to use our influence in the direction of
the basic principles of the transfer of power
to the black majority under conditions in
which minority rights are protected.
Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you think your
policy regarding the Middle East, or let us
say American policy regarding the Middle
East, will continue after you and with the
new Administration. Can you give us a gen-
eral assessment about the situation as you
see it?
Secretary Kissinger: Well, I am sure you
know that I am not the spokesman that has
been chosen for the new Administration, so I
would not want to make pronouncements
about their policies. Mr. Vance is an old
friend of mine.
I believe that the foreign policy of the
United States can never be based on the per-
sonal preferences of individuals and to the
extent possible we attempted to analyze the
basic realities and the basic interests and
purposes of the United States. In that sense,
if our conclusions were substantially correct,
I would believe that a new Administration
would follow a similar course. There might
be differences in tactics, differences in per-
sonalities.
I believe the main commitment toward a
just peace in the Middle East is dictated by
American interests and by world interests
and finally by the best interests of the par-
ties concerned, and I am convinced that the
United States will continue to play a major
role in the search for peace in the Middle
East.
Q. What is your assessment?
Secretary Kissinger: My assessment,
which I have been making for months, both
before and after our election, is that the ob-
jective conditions that make for peace in the
Middle East are better than they have been
in perhaps decades.
I believe that all of the parties have come
to a realization that there is no military solu-
tion to their conflict and that some
negotiated peace must be sought. An endless
conflict will have profound consequences for
the peoples involved and profound global
consequences, and therefore I believe that
the parties are now more ready and the con-
ditions are now more ripe for a significant ef-
fort toward peace than has been the case in a
long time.
Q. Mr. Secretary, should the PLO [Pales-
tine Liberation Organization] be represented
at those negotiations?
Secretary Kissinger: The United States
has stated repeatedly its attitude toward the
PLO, which is that until the PLO accepts the
existence of the State of Israel and the res-
olutions on which the present negotiations
are being conducted — that the United States
cannot address this sort of a question.
Q. Is there any prospect of that accept-
ance?
Secretary Kissinger: That is for the PLO
to answer.
Department of State Bulletin
Q. But I take it that you say unless they do
they will not be at Geneva, so far as the
United States is concerned?
Secretary Kissinger: Until January 20,
anyway. [Laughter.]
Q. That is all I could ask.
Q. Do you agree ivith the idea that your
period of service for the American Goveim-
ment has served to reinforce the Atlantic al-
liance and at the same time to destroy (sic)
European political unity?
Secretary Kissinger: I believe that the At-
lantic alliance has been greatly strengthened
in recent years. I believe that the system of
consultation that now e.xists within NATO
and between the countries of NATO, even
outside the NATO framework, is intimate
and substantial and it reflects the realization
by all of the countries that we are united not
only for security but as the repositories of
freedom in the world today. And I believe
that NATO in its political aspect is stronger
than it has been and that the political unity of
the Western countries has been greatly en-
hanced.
Q. And Europe?
Secretary Kissinger: And the unity of
Europe? The United States is strongly in
favor of the unity of Europe. I believe also
that in the last eight years significant con-
crete progress has been made toward the
unity of Europe in both its economic and,
even more importantly, in its political as-
pects, and I hope very much that this will
continue.
Q: Mr. Secretary, looking back what do
you consider to be your most satisfying
achievements and your greatest disappoint-
ments ?
Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have told the
NATO Council that it is too early to write
obituaries — and having such a distinguished
group of people here that have been analyz-
ing my drawbacks and achievements, with
emphasis on the former, I would not want to
interfere with your work. [Laughter.]
Q. Mr. Secretary, could I pursue this ques-
tion along these lines? You have been asked
many times since you have been here for
you to volunteer some of your thoughts, and
you have handled this usiially with humor
and with a jocular aside. I wonder, sir, if at
this time in your farewell news conference
here in Europe, whether you would take a
moment and share with us some of your
thoughts at the present time, as you prepare
to step down.
Secretary Kissinger: I expressed some of
these thoughts, in answer to the previous
question.
I have always believed that the ultimate
test of whatever an American Secretary of
State or President does with respect to any
other part of the world will be the degree to
which it contributes to the unity and vitality
and strength of the free peoples, especially
the peoples of the North Atlantic area.
Security by itself is not enough. We have
to ask: Security for what, and for what pur-
pose? We therefore owe it to our peoples, as
we seek security, to make clear that we are
also seeking peace; and we also owe it to our
peoples that as we develop our cohesion we
define the purpose that this cohesion is to
serve in terms of a better world.
This I consider the permanent task of
American foreign policy, and history will
have to judge how any one Administration
carried it out. But I am positive that any new
Administration will address itself to the
same agenda.
Q. Mr. Secretary, tinder what conditions
do you think that one day we can control the
current armaments race and enter into a
real organization for peace?
Secretary Kissinger: I believe that nuclear
weapons have the characteristic that will
make the traditional reflections about mili-
tary power substantially irrelevant and that
they impose on all statesmen an obligation to
bring the armaments race under control. We
have made considerable progress in the con-
trol of strategic armaments, and I believe
that a further agreement on the limitation of
strategic arms is within reach. There are
other discussions going on on the limitation of
forces in Central Europe.
We have the obligation to conduct our pol-
January 3, 1977
icy between two extremes: On the one hand
not to disarm ourselves either by unilateral
actions or by theories that produce a
paralysis of will, but on the other hand not to
believe that the mere accumulation of ar-
maments is in itself a policy. Therefore there
is a necessity to conduct negotiations on the
limitation of arms soberly, realistically, but
with great dedication.
Q. Mr. Secretary, what role do you antici-
pate playing in the Carter Administration in
formulating foreign policy?
Secretary Kissinger: I do not anticipate
playing any role in the Carter Administration
in formulating foreign policy. On January 21
I will achieve infallibility [laughter] and will
join all of you in my capacity to analyze prob-
lems.
I am always prepared to assist in specific
circumstances and to offer advice in specific
circumstances, because I believe that the
foreign policy of the United States is a non-
partisan enterprise; but I do not anticipate
playing a role in the formulation of the policy
of the new Administration.
Q. Mr. Secretary, under which conditions
can you foresee a positive contribution of
China to the world balance?
Secretary Kissinger: Well, China is a great
country and a major power; and by its exist-
ence, its strong dedication to its independ-
ence, and the talent of its people and lead-
ership, it will always make a contribution to
the world balance. Whatever contribution
China makes will derive from its own inher-
ent convictions and not the prescriptions of
Americans. And our cooperation with China
derives from a parallelism of interest and not
any formal arrangement.
Q. On Rhodesia, Mr. Secretary, do you
consider the proposals that yo2i put to Mr.
Ian Smith are still just a basis for negotia-
tions or, as he insists, a program to be ac-
cepted or rejected as a package?
Secretary Kissinger: I have always believed
that they should serve as a basis for negotia-
tions and that all parties in Geneva have an
obligation to take into consideration the
views of the others. This is true of Ian Smith;
it is also true, in my judgment, of the black
negotiators in Geneva.
Q. There has apparently been a leak from
you to the Western delegations at the CIEC
[Conference on International Economic
Cooperation] talks in Paris. Could you give
us your assessment of the possible damage
that this leak might incur?
Secretary Kissinger: Well, to tell you the
truth, I read an extract of that cable in a
newspaper this morning, and it had the sort
of bureaucratic obtuseness which would
make it sound as plausibly having been de-
veloped in the Department of State. [Laugh-
ter.] I have been looking for the cable ever
since, so I cannot vouch for its accuracy. In
the present state of our capacity to guard
classified information it is always possible
that documents appear out of context. I
would not think that this particular document
should do any significant damage.
The United States believes — indeed, it was
one of the organizers of the North-South
dialogue — we believe that an inter-
national order can only be built on the coop-
eration between the developed and the de-
veloping nations. We believe that the de-
veloped nations have a special obligation to
put forward constructive, concrete proposals
and that the developing nations have an obli-
gation to proceed in a spirit of discussion
rather than a spirit of confrontation.
It is true that we did not think that this
was the best moment for the conference. An
outgoing Administration would be in the ex-
tremely difficult position of having to put
forward proposals that would have to be im-
plemented by another Administration. And
therefore it did not seem to us to be the right
moment to have a conference, because either
we would confine ourselves to the period for
which we had responsibility and would there-
fore disappoint the developing countries or we
would commit a new Administration to a pro-
gram which it had no part in shaping.
There were other reasons that other coun-
tries had for the postponement, but as far as
the United States is concerned, this was the
reason why we favored a postponement.
Department of State Bulletin
whatever extracts fi'om obtuse documents
may appear in newspapers. But I will track
down that document if it exists.
Q. If Spain joins NATO have yon studied
what might be the next response of the Soviet
Union to this diseqidUbrinin?
Secretary Kissinger: They might ask Al-
bania to join the Warsaw Pact. [Laughter.]
The United States has favored the partici-
pation of Spain in NATO, and the political
progress that is being made in Spain, which
we welcome, in our view should speed the
day when that situation is possible. I do not
believe that this will bring about a change in
the military balance, because we have al-
ready a bilateral arrangement with Spain and
clearly it is not a part of any offensive inten-
tion against the Soviet Union. So we believe
that it is a matter that should not affect
Soviet dispositions.
Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the differences
that is frequeyitly cited between the kind of
foreign policy that you have conducted and
the type of foreign policy that President-elect
Carter may conduct has to do with morality.
Do you believe President-elect Carter may be
making a mistake by giving too much em-
phasis to the subject of morality, or do you
feel, in fact, that yoii have conducted a
foreign policy with full regard to that?
Secretary Kissinger: I made a rather ex-
tensive speech on that subject before our
election. I believe that the relationship be-
tween morality and foreign policy is not a
simple one.
I agree with what my successor said at a
press conference — that it is necessary to
have strong moral convictions but it is also
necessary to bring into relationship the
realities of the situation with moral pur-
poses. It is the essence of moral purposes
that they appear absolute; it is the essence of
foreign policy that any individual step can
only be partial. It is the essence of morality
that it is asserted to be universal; it is the
essence of foreign policy to take into account
the views of others that may also be claimed
to be universal.
Now, I do not believe that what I now as-
sert about my conduct of foreign policy will
be decisive. I believe that a foreign policy
without moral convictions lacks a sense of di-
rection and a sense of purpose, but what bal-
ance is struck in each Administration is very
hard to predict and very difficult to foretell
from abstract statements.
Q. Economic questions have appeared
more proyniyiently in your deliberations this
week than they have at some previous al-
liance meetings. Could you give us your
thoughts on the extent to which there is a
danger that the global economic situation
might deteriorate to the point where econoyn-
ic, social, ayid political stability in the al-
liance was brought into some question — to
what exteyit that prospect is bro^ight nearer by
a substantial increase in oil prices?
Secretary Kissinger: The United States is
strongly opposed to any significant increase
in oil prices, precisely because it believes
that the impact of those on the global econ-
omy would be extremely unfortunate and
would have consequences which in the long
run, or even in the medium run, would affect
the very countries that are now raising or
thinking of raising the oil prices.
I believe that the last three or four years
have made clear that one can no longer com-
partmentalize foreign policy into security,
political, and economic concerns. The social
cohesion of all our societies, our capacity to
act with conviction internationally, depends
on growing and vital economies. And these
economies in turn depend on the mutual
sense of responsibility for each other of the
free countries. This is why these economic
summits have been both symbolically and
substantively important and why I believe
and hope that they will remain a feature of
the international scene and why one can no
longer separate the security concerns.
Q. An easy question for you, sir. What
kiyid of advice, as we sit here at NATO today
and you prepare to step down, do you have
for Cyrus Vance?
Secretary Kissinger: We will take one
more question after this one, but since you
will all stampede out to report the monumen-
January 3, 1977
tal news that you have been imparted here, I
want to take this opportunity to thank you
for the relative courtesy with which I have
always been treated here and the fairness
which you have shown.
As far as advice for Cyrus Vance is con-
cerned, I wish him well. I have repeatedly
stated that he is extremely well qualified for
his position. I have already made available to
him all communications that come to me. He
will be given a schedule of all my activities in
Washington, and he is free to participate in
any of them and at any meetings that I have.
I will be spending most of the day with him
next Wednesday, and we will be meeting
regularly and frequently after that.
I do not think it would be appropriate for
me, however, to give public advice to my
successor before I have had an opportunity
for full discussions with him. But I do want
to say that he deserves the confidence of the
American people, that he deserves the confi-
dence of all foreign countries who are con-
cerned with the direction of American policy.
Q. Would you like to say something, sir,
about the future of East-West relations in the
light of the large commercial debts that the
Soviets are acquiring toward the West and
the continued extension of easy credit and
transfer of Western technology to the
Soviets ?
Secretary Kissinger: Well, let me separate
the two questions — one, the extension of
credit and transfer of technology; the second,
the future of the East-West relations.
With respect to the extension of credit, I
advocated last year at the OECD [Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment] meeting, and I repeated it at the NATO
meeting, that it is essential for the industrial
democracies to develop a common approach
and a common concept. It makes no sense for
these countries to compete with each other
on credit terms without taking a look at the
overall picture and the overall consequences
of their actions. So I believe on the technical
and economic issue that this is an area in
which great coherence among the industrial
democracies is essential.
As for the future of East-West relations, in
the nuclear age there can be no question that
we have a dual responsibility. One is to pre-
vent any temptation on the part of those
countries that continue to multiply their ar-
maments to believe that they can achieve
political or economic solutions by the use of
arms, and we therefore have to see to our se-
curity and make the necessary efforts. At the
same time, the future of world peace, and in-
deed perhaps the survival of humanity de-
pend on whether we can, in the relationship
between East and West, find solutions to our
common problems and a code of restraint,
lest we slide again — as has happened so often
before in history through a series of miscal-
culations and the accumulation of marginal
advantages — into a perhaps unimaginable
catastrophe. So, we have the task of security
and the task of construction of peace. And
the challenge to the Western societies is
whether they can pursue both policies simul-
taneously or whether they will slight one at
the expense of the other.
JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE, LONDON,
DECEMBER 10
Press release 601 dated December IS
Foreign Secretary Crosland: Dr. Kissinger
is paying a valedictory visit to London, which
he has long since planned, following the
NATO conference in Brussels. He will be
doing a number of important things — going
to a football match tomorrow, going to the
theater tomorrow night. More importantly,
he is being given a farewell dinner — farewell
only in his role as Secretary of State — by the
Prime Minister this evening at No. 10. And
we are very glad to welcome him here.
This, in fact, was arranged — this visit — a
long time before we also arranged by coinci-
dence a roundup review of the Rhodesian
situation with Mr. Ivor Richard, who has
come back from Geneva for this. It has been
a very helpful accident that the two have fall-
en together, because we have been able to
exchange views with Ivor Richard as well as
with Dr. Kissinger's officials and my officials
on Rhodesia. And I think that we approached
that problem with a very wide measure of
agreement.
Department of State Bulletin
We have not taken any decisions this
evening — did not intend, in fact, to take any
decisions this evening. We shall be meeting
again privately and bilaterally for further
talks tomorrow morning, and I do not doubt
that in any event I shall make a statement to
the House before Parliament recesses for
Christmas.
Now we are rather pushed for time, so I
will not say any more than that at the begin-
ning of the conference and simply answer any
questions.
Q. I would like to ask Dr. Kissinger how
he sees the Rhodesian situation at the mo-
ment.
Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think that the
conference has been very ably conducted by
Mr. Richard, that in a conference between
parties where the distrust is so profound, in-
evitably many disagreements will emerge.
The United States has supported majority
rule in Rhodesia and continues to support
this. And I believe that from what I have
heard from Mr. Richard and from what I
know through our constant contacts during
the negotiations that a possibility for prog-
ress exists and will be explored to the fullest
by the British Government.
Q. Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Smith [Ian D.
Smith, of Rhodesia] said in Geneva this af-
ternoon that he had been brought there under
false pretenses, that he had understood he was
there to implement the solemn, firm, and
binding agreement. Do you think he has any
reasonable grounds for saying that?
Secretary Kissinger: I think we have gone
over this allegation repeatedly. We gave Mr.
Smith our best judgment of a framework for
negotiations. These negotiations are now
going on; and obviously, in any negotiation,
the views of all the parties must be consid-
ered.
Q. Mr. Crosland, when you say that no de-
cisions have been taken, what kind of deci-
sions might you have taken?
Foreign Secretary Crosland: It is not a
question of taking decisions week by week, I
do not think. We constantly review the prog-
ress of the conference with Ivor Richard. He
comes back here periodically, as you know.
And we have to decide to take different deci-
sions according to the period of time. We did
take a decision 10 days ago that I would give
a parliamentary answer saying that the
British Government would be prepared to
have the British presence in Rhodesia, for
instance.
It is not a question of specific decisions
being required, but a question of regular re-
view of how the Geneva conference is going
to see whether there is something further
which we, the British Government, or the
chairman should do in order to bring it more
successfully to a conclusion.
Q. Is there any chance that you would ask
Dr. Kissinger to once again take an active
part in the negotiations?
Foreign Secretary Crosland: Well, I mean,
I love Dr. Kissinger deeply — and I would
love him to live a full and active life.
But I do not think I have any intention,
and I do not think he has any intention, that
we should agree together that the United
States should resume the critically important
role which they pursued — Dr. Kissinger pur-
sued on America's behalf — last summer. No.
I think that it is agreed between the two
governments, and certainly the two of us,
that the American role, which was critical
and crucial during those months last sum-
mer, should at a certain point give way to a
role that could be only exercised by Great
Britain as the power that had some sort of
legal, constitutional, and even colonial re-
sponsibility. And so it has not been a matter
of discussion between us.
Q. In view of the many stories that come
out about what Mr. Smith has understood or
not understood, are you prepared to meet
with him again before you retire as Secretary
of State to clear this up?
Secretary Kissinger: I do not think there is
any need for me to meet Mr. Smith to clear
this up. We have repeatedly communicated
with him our understanding of what was dis-
cussed. I do not think there is any need for a
further meeting.
January 3, 1977
Foreign Secretary Crosland: We do not
want too much of a rerun of this. Surely,
both Dr. Kissinger and I have answered
questions on this subject now for a period of
two months, I should think about 500 times.
Q. In reference to your answer before that
negotiations are a time for considering the
views of all parties, have the black leaders
changed their views or their positions since
you went to Africa, ayid do you consider this
insincere or inconstant or just a normal
course of events in negotiations?
Secretary Kissinger: First of all, when I
went to Africa I dealt with, primarily with,
two of the frontline states. Because of the
agreement we had made with President Nye-
rere [of Tanzania] we did not deal with the
nationalist leaders directly.
Secondly, this is the first time that all of
the nationalist leaders have been together in
one negotiation, and it is therefore under-
standable that points of view will evolve and
that points of view would be presented that
we had not heard previously from parties
with which we had not been in contact.
It is not a question of good faith; it is a
question of finding a solution to a problem
that has existed for a decade or more, that
needs the serious concern of all of the par-
ties. This is what I understand Mr. Richard
is doing. And, again, I want to compliment
him and to make clear that the United States
fully supports the British conduct of the
negotiations and the actions taken by the
Foreign Secretary and Mr. Richard.
Q. Woiild you say, sir, that Mr. Smith's
delegation has also been playing fair as you
described the blacks as playing fair?
Secretary Kissinger: I think the Rhodesian
delegation has also, within its lights, played
fair. I do not think this issue can be settled
by accusing each other of fairness or unfair-
ness. Obviously, both parties are approaching
this problem from totally different points of
view, which produced the dilemmas to begin
with. It is now to arrange for the transfer of
power from the white minority to the black
majority, which is the essence of the prob-
lem, under conditions in which the white
minority has an opportunity to adjust to the
new, changed conditions. It is obviously an
enormously delicate and complicated issue,
very painful to some and probably very pain-
ful to all, for one side to give up power, for
the other to take it in stages.
And I do not think any purpose is served
by accusing any of the parties of bad faith,
but rather to look, as I understand Mr.
Richard is seeking, for some way by which
the impasse can be broken. And from what I
have heard I believe that possibilities exist
which require exploration.
Q. The black nationalist leaders in Geneva
are clearly very anxious to have spelled out
to them what the direct role Britain might be
prepared to take during the transitional gov-
eryiment period. Are you yet prepared to re-
veal anything about that?
Foreigyi Secretary Crosland: No, I am not
at the moment. I stick to what I said when I
made the statement about the British pres-
ence, which was this: that having expressed
our willingness to have a British presence,
we wanted to elicit from the black African
leaders — we wanted to elicit from them what
useful role they thought the British could
play. In other words, we want to get a sense
of how they see a British role before we
commit ourselves to the detail of what kind
of a role we will be prepared to play.
Q. [Inaudible]
Foreign Secretary Crosland: No, not as
yet; but mind you, some interesting points
have come out.
Q. Do you see the recess as a helpful de-
velopment, or does it mean negotiating from
some kind of trouble?
Foreign Secretary Crosland: What recess
is this?
Q. From the Geneva conference.
Foreign Secretary Croslajid: I have not
decided on a recess. I might make a state-
ment about that next week.
Department of State Bulletin
Q. You said earlier that you hoped to make
a statement on Rhodesia before the Christ-
mas recess. In that statement will you spell
out the direct role that you envisage?
Foreign Secretary Crosland: I should wait
for the statement. It will be lucid and very
interesting.
Thank you very much indeed.
North Atlantic Council Meets
at Brussels
Folloiving is the text of a message from
President-elect Carter delivered on his behalf
by Secretary Kissinger in the tninisterial
meeting of the North Atlantic Council on De-
cember 9, together with the text of a com-
munique issued at the conclusion of the
meeting on December 10.
MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT-ELECT CARTER
DELIVERED BY SECRETARY KISSINGER
Press release 595 dated December 10
Our NATO alliance lies at the heart of the
partnership between North America and
Western Europe. NATO is the essential in-
strument for enhancing our collective securi-
ty. The American commitment to maintain-
ing the NATO alliance shall be sustained and
strengthened under my Administration.
Over the past month, I discussed a number
of challenges that face NATO — that we main-
tain a common strategy against common
threats, that we have efficient and strong
military forces, and that we consult closely
as we negotiate with others on both Euro-
pean and global issues. I have no doubt that
these challenges can be met.
I take the opportunity of this message to
reaffirm that belief. I am convinced that
NATO's mission and the North Atlantic al-
liance are no less important today than when
NATO was originally established. I look for-
ward to working closely with all the govern-
ments represented at this meeting.
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL COMMUNIQUE
Press release 602 dated December 13
The North Atlantic Council met in Ministe-
rial session in Brussels on 9th and 10th De-
cember. Ministers recognized the indispen-
sable role of a stong alliance in ensuring the
security of member countries, and in provid-
ing the foundation for their efforts to estab-
lish a more constructive and stable relation-
ship with the Warsaw Pact countries. They
expressed their determination to maintain
and enhance the cohesion and strength of the
Alliance.
2. Ministers stressed the need for East-
West relations to develop at a more satisfac-
tory pace. They recognized nonetheless that
progressive improvement of these relations
may be slow and sometimes difficult, and
that it calls for perseverance and steadiness
over the years. They emphasized that their
governments would continue to seek realistic
opportunities to resolve points of difference
with the East and to build on mutual inter-
est, and look for corresponding efforts by the
Warsaw Pact countries.
Ministers stressed, however, that if de-
tente is to progress, with the necessary pub-
lic support, and not to falter, there must be
real improvements across the entire range of
international relations. It should not be as-
sumed that heightened tensions in one area
of relations would not have repercussions on
other areas. In all parts of the world, con-
frontation can and should be avoided by re-
spect for the accepted principles of interna-
tional behavior.
Ministers also emphasized the cardinal im-
portance they attached to reducing the risks
of confrontation in the military sphere. They
viewed with concern the high level of mili-
tary expenditure in the Soviet Union and the
continued disquieting expansion of the mili-
tary power of the Warsaw Pact on land, air
and sea, which are difficult to reconcile with
the avowed desire of the Soviet Union to im-
prove East-West relations. Faced with this
persistent growth in military might. Minis-
ters reiterated their determination to take
the measures necessary to maintain and im-
January 3, 1977
prove their own defensive military forces, in
order to ensure credible deterrence and to
safeguard their countries from any risk of
military aggression or political pressure.
3. At the same time, Ministers expressed
their concern that the continued expansion of
armaments w^ould increasingly endanger not
only world security but also the economic
well-being of all nations. They stressed that
these dangers could only be averted if all
countries concerned joined in realistic efforts
to achieve genuine and controlled measures
of disarmament and arms control.
Ministers confirmed that the countries of
the Alliance, in the event of an attack on
them, cannot renounce the use, as may be
required for defense, of any of the means
available to them. Ministers also stated their
view that all States which participated in the
CSCE should respect strictly the renuncia-
tion of the threat or use of force as laid down
in the Charter of the United Nations and
reaffirmed in the Final Act of Helsinki. > This
renunciation must apply to all types of
weapons. It is essential for the strengthening
of peace that there should be no build-up of
armaments of any type beyond the needs of
defense, a policy which has always been fol-
lowed by the Alliance. Ministers also stated
their position that the Alliance will remain a
free association open to all European states
devoted to the defense of the freedom, com-
mon heritage and civilization of their
peoples. Furthermore, Ministers recalled
that the right of states to belong or not to
belong to treaties of alliance was confirmed
in the Final Act of Helsinki. It is in light of
these considerations that they have con-
cluded that the recently published Warsaw
Pact proposals could not be accepted.
4. Ministers stated again the determina-
tion of their governments to continue to
comply with all the principles and provisions
of the Final Act of the CSCE and expected
that all other signatories would take steps to
fully implement them. They noted that some
progress had been made in implementation.
'For text of the Final Act of the Conference on Se-
curity and Cooperation in Europe, signed at Helsinki
on Aug. 1, 1975, see Bulletin of Sept. 1, 1975, p.
323.
However, much remains to be done before
the benefits of the Final Act become signifi-
cantly apparent in tangible improvements,
not only in relations between states, but also
in the lives of peoples and individuals. Minis-
ters recalled that the Final Act acknowledges
that wider human contacts and dissemination
of information would contribute to the
strengthening of peace and expressed the
hope that the Warsaw Pact countries would
take measures leading to significant progress
in the pace of implementation of the Final
Act in the months to come.
Ministers also noted that Allied govern-
ments had fully and scrupulously im-
plemented the provisions of the Final Act
dealing with confidence-building measures.
They noted that the practice of notifying
major maneuvers was beginning to be estab-
lished; however, unlike Allied countries,
Warsaw Pact countries had still not notified
maneuvers involving less than 25,000 men.
They regretted that the Warsaw Pact coun-
tries had failed up to now to accept invita-
tions to send observers to Western maneu-
vers.
Ministers looked forward with interest to
the follow-up meeting to be held in Belgrade
during 1977. The meeting provides an oppor-
tunity for a thorough and objective review of
the situation prevailing in all the signatory
countries as regards all the areas covered by
the Final Act, and also for considering the
further progress that could be made towards
the objective agreed in Helsinki. Allied gov-
ernments intend to play their full part in
seeking positive results, with the aim of fur-
thering the cause of peace and cooperation in
Europe.
5. Ministers heard a report from the
United States Secretary of State on the
progress and prospects of the United
States-USSR Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks and discussed the relationship between
the SALT negotiations and Allied security
interests. Ministers found the report on
SALT both useful and informative and wel-
comed continued United States efforts to-
wards achievement of a satisfactory SALT
agreement which takes into account Allied
interests and concerns.
10
Department of State Bulletin
6. Ministers of the participating countries
reviewed the state of negotiations in Vienna
on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
(MBFR). They expressed their conviction
that these negotiations would achieve their
agreed aim of contributing to a more stable
relationship and to the strengthening of
peace and security in Europe only if they
were to result in eliminating the existing
ground force manpower disparity in Central
Europe and in mitigating the disparity in
main battle tanks.
These Ministers reaffirmed their position
that these objectives would be achieved by
their proposal to establish, in the area of re-
ductions, approximate parity in ground
forces in the form of a common collective ceil-
ing for ground force manpower on each side
and to reduce the disparity in main battle
tanks. These Ministers stressed that agree-
ment to the goal of a common collective ceil-
ing and reductions of United States and
Soviet ground forces in the first phase would
be an important and practical first step lead-
ing to the common collective ceiling which
would be reached through additional reduc-
tions in the second phase.
These Ministers noted with regret that the
important specific additional offer they made
one year ago had thus far not met with an
adequate response. They reaffirmed their
conviction that the Western proposals pro-
vided a reasonable foundation for a just and
equitable MBFR agreement. They re-
emphasized their continuing resolve to press
for the achievement of the objectives of the
Western participants which would ensure
undiminished security for all countries con-
cerned. They expressed satisfaction with
their governments' continuing solidarity, and
reaffirmed the principle that NATO forces
should not be reduced except in the context
of Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction
agreements.
7. In connection with Germany and Berlin,
Ministers reviewed the developments which
had occurred since their last meeting in May
1976.
Ministers expressed themselves satisfied
with the progress which has been possible in
matters relating to Berlin on the basis of the
Quadripartite Agreement during the five
years since its signature. In particular, the
agreement had significantly alleviated the
lives of many Germans.
Ministers confirmed the continued com-
mitment of their countries to the security
and viability of Berlin. These remain essen-
tial elements of Western policy, and of de-
tente between East and West. They noted
the need for Berlin fully to benefit from any
improvement in East- West relations, in par-
ticular through its ties to the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany as they are confirmed in the
Quadripartite Agreement.
Ministers emphasized that the Quadripar-
tite Agreement was part of a greater balance
of interests which had, to a very great de-
gree, made possible and contributed to the
development of better relations between
East and West in Europe. They noted that
this process would be placed in serious jeop-
ardy if any of the signatories failed fully to
observe the commitments which it undertook
in the Quadripartite Agreement.
8. Ministers reviewed developments in the
Mediterranean area since their last meeting.
They welcomed the end of hostilities in the
Lebanon and expressed the hope that there
would be continued progress towards stabil-
ity and reconstruction in that country. They
considered, nonetheless, that the continuing
instability in the Middle East still gave cause
for serious concern and could have dangerous
consequences. They underlined the urgency
of continuing efforts designed to achieve an
overall settlement resulting in a just and
durable peace in the Middle East.
Ministers took note of the report on the
situation in the Mediterranean prepared on
their instructions. They emphasized the need
to preserve the balance of forces throughout
the Mediterranean area. They requested the
Council in Permanent Session to continue its
consultations on these questions and report
to them again at their next meeting.
In this context. Ministers reaffirmed their
view that the coming into operation of de-
fense cooperation agreements between Allied
countries will strengthen the Allied defenses
in the Mediterranean.
The Ministers voiced their satisfaction on
January 3, 1977
11
the agreement between Greece and Turkey
on the procedure to be followed for the delim-
itation of the continental shelf and expressed
their hope for the successful solution of this
issue and the Aegean air space matters.
9. In the context of improving the military
capability of the Alliance and making more
effective use of available resources, Minis-
ters discussed various aspects of stand-
ardization and interoperability of equipment
and procedures. They approved the second
report by the ad hoc Committee on Equip-
ment Interoperability and agreed to take a
number of actions, particularly in respect to
tactical area communications, rearming of
tactical aircraft and the implementation of
NATO standardization agreements. They au-
thorized the Committee to continue its ef-
forts for the time being, both in specific
areas and in the elaboration of procedures for
ensuring the interoperability of future
equipment. They also noted the progress in
standardization achieved by the Conference of
National Armaments Directors in promoting
cooperation among member nations in
selected equipment areas.
10. Ministers took note of the progress
achieved by the Committee on the Chal-
lenges of Modern Society (CCMS), and its
contribution to effective international coop-
eration in dealing with environmental prob-
lems confronting our societies. They took
note of the completion of the pilot studies on
advanced health care and urban transporta-
tion, and of the Committee's continuing em-
phasis on implementation by member coun-
tries of action resolutions. Ministers noted
and endorsed the initiation of two new pilot
studies, one to assist in world-wide efforts to
clean the marine environment and the other
to permit environmentally acceptable utiliza-
tion of high-sulfur coal and oil. Ministers
noted too that the Committee's discussions
focused attention on global issues such as the
effect of fluorocarbons on the stratosphere
and long-range transport of air pollutants.
11. Ministers recognized that the basic
problems in East-West relations were un-
likely to be resolved quickly and that the Al-
liance must respond with a long-term effort
commensurate to the challenges confronting
it. The Allies could rely not only on their ma-
terial resources, but also on the creative
power demonstrated in all fields by their free
and democratic societies. Ministers were con-
fident that, with the mutual support and sol-
idarity provided by the Alliance, their gov-
ernments and peoples would be able to over-
come the problems which faced them.
12. The next Ministerial session of the
North Atlantic Council will be held in Lon-
don on 10th and 11th May, 1977.
Prime Minister Andreotti of Italy
Visits Washington
Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti of the Ital-
ian Republic made an official visit to Wash-
ington December 5-8,' during which he met
with President Ford and other government of-
ficials. Following is an exchange of remarks
between President Ford and Prime Minister
Ayidreotti at a welcoming ceremony on the
South Lawn of the White House on Decem-
ber 6. >
Weekly Coni|ijl:ni(in of Presidential Documents dated December 13
PRESIDENT FORD
Prime Minister Andreotti, I am delighted
to welcome you and your party to Washing-
ton, D.C., our National Capital.
Mr. Prime Minister, I have long looked
forward to this meeting — since July, when
you took office as President of the Council of
Ministers.
Since that time, you have worked intensely
and with great courage and determination on
the difficult issues facing your nation and
your government. I am extremely pleased
that you have found time for this visit and for
consultations on the broad range of interests
shared by our two governments.
During the last two years, the United
' For an exchange of toasts between President Ford
and Prime Minister Andreotti at a dinner at the White
House on Dec. 6, see Weekly Compilation of Presiden-
tial Documents dated Dec. 13, 1976, p. 1700.
12
Department of State Bulletin
States and Italy have consulted at the high-
est levels with greater frequency than ever
before. President Leone's state visit to the
United States in 1974 was the first state visit
of this Administration. Our leaders have met
at NATO summits and economic summits and
at the European Security Conference. I re-
member with great warmth my own trip to
your country a year and a half ago and the
friendship extended to me on behalf of the
American people by the Italian people and by
your government.
We are friends. We are allies. We have
worked together and solved problems to-
gether. We will do so in the future.
Few countries have so special a place in
the hearts of the American people. The
United States and Italy are committed to
freedom and share a firm dedication to de-
mocracy. We are both committed to the
strength of the North Atlantic alliance and to
the reduction of tensions which threaten in-
ternational peace and stability.
Americans value the constructive role of
Italy in the world today and in the past. We
deeply appreciate Italy's contribution to
NATO, your contribution to a stronger
Europe — working together with the United
States — your contribution to the dialogue
with the developing nations, and your dedi-
cation to peace and international understand-
ing.
Mr. Prime Minister, our two governments
have made it a priority task to strengthen
the North Atlantic alliance. The alliance has
made progress in strengthening its defenses,
standardizing equipment, and coordination of
strategies and planning. Nevertheless, much
more needs to be done.
All of us know that the defensive strength
and the cohesion of our alliance are crucial to
the balance of power in Europe that is so
critical to European freedom and interna-
tional security.
Our alliance, of course, has a purpose be-
yond military defense. The United States
and Italy both recognize that Western
Europe unity is a pillar of world peace. We
must reduce tensions and reduce the possibil-
ity of confrontation in Central Europe, where
almost 2 million armed men face one another.
We must promote mutually beneficial coop-
eration between Western and Eastern
Europe.
The industrial democracies, if we are to be
the masters of our own destiny, must work
together, for we share basic, common inter-
ests on global issues — from defense to
energy, the environment, trade, and rela-
tions with the developing countries of the
world.
Mr. Prime Minister, our discussions on
these many issues will be of great value to
the United States not only in practical terms,
but to reaffirm our profound friendship. Few-
nations are linked as strongly as the United
States of America and the Republic of Italy
by history, culture, economics, and the emi-
gration of peoples. Our friendship has deep
roots that insure its preservation.
Italy's contribution was one of the high-
lights of America's Bicentennial celebration.
We especially welcomed, Mr. Prime Minis-
ter, the visit of Mrs. Vittoria Leone, the
First Lady of Italy, when the La Scala Opera
came here for its spectacular performance.
The American people thank you for this won-
derful presentation.
I look forward with great anticipation, Mr.
Prime Minister, to our discussions today and
tonight. As two democratic allies, we have a
large area of common ground and many com-
mon concerns.
I bid you and your party, on behalf of the
American people, a hearty welcome to the
United States of America.
PRIME MINISTER ANDREOTTI^
Mr. President, I am deeply grateful for the
invitation you were kind enough to extend to
me at a particularly challenging time for my
country.
Two years after the visit of President
Leone — whom you kindly mentioned — your
invitation confirms, through the frequency of
our meetings, the spirit of close and sincere
friendship between the United States and
Italy. And I equally thank you for the warm
^ Prime Minister Andreotti spoke in Italian.
January 3, 1977
13
words you just expressed about my country
and myself.
The United States and Italy are bound by
ties of alliance and cooperation, by harmoni-
ous ideals of democracy, and by choices of
peace, freedom, and development. The At-
lantic alliance, which binds our two nations in
a common objective of defense, represents a
guarantee of security for the Western World,
to which we belong for historical vocation
and on account of political choice, which
proves to be an essential element of the inter-
national strategic balance, basic condition for
a detente policy which will create the basis of
a long-lasting peace.
With the same objectives of peace and
progress, Italy is engaged, together with its
partners of the European Community, in a
policy of unity which will permit Europe to
contribute to the creation of a more just and
stable world.
Many elements unite us: the interest in so-
cial and cultural progress; in the advance-
ment of science; in respect of men; in the
choice of a style of life which guarantees and
protects, to the greatest extent, the de-
velopment of capabilities and potential for
initiative of the individual; the awareness,
both political and moral, of a necessary inter-
relationship and solidarity among all nations;
the search for international order, which em-
phasizes at the same time the rights of men
and those of nations; a vision of international
relations which aim, to quote the unforgetta-
ble words of George Washington's farewell
speech, to observe good faith and justice to-
ward nations and cultivate peace and har-
mony with everybody.
But beyond these common ideals, our two
countries are joined by the presence in this
hospitable country of America of a large
community of Italian-Americans who,
through their work and human qualities,
honored their land of origin and contributed
to the increased prosperity and greatness of
their new country.
The Bicentennial of the Declaration of In-
dependence of the United States reminds us
of the ideals of the Founding Fathers who
are both yours and ours, founders of the
United States and those of major instru-
ments of an era of Western history which
brought man and his freedom to the center of
our civilization.
The American Revolution is an element of
the continuity of Western history and also
renews it. It allows the Western World to
accept the challenges of science, technology,
industry, and to carry out a social transfor-
mation which is of paramount importance
within the framework of a humanistic soci-
ety, inspired in the values rediscovered by
the Renaissance men. This era of the West-
ern World's history cannot be considered
complete. Its motivations and hopes are still
alive. The ideal thrust must renew itself
through a constant critical search for the
most adequate objectives in order to accept
present and future challenges. To this pur-
pose, we are stimulated by the commitment
and the concerns of the new generation.
Mr. President, during the scheduled meet-
ings we will deal with many issues, because
the present circumstances present many
problems and they require an effort of imagi-
nation and understanding. But the guarantee
of their success is given by the spirit of
openness and sincerity which always charac-
terized the Italian-American relationships
during the past 30 years.
Mr. President, on behalf of the President
of the Italian Republic, of the Italian Gov-
ernment, and conveying the feelings of the
Italian people, I bring you warm and friendly
greetings which I extend to Mrs. Ford and to
your entire family.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
94th Congress, 2d Session
International Banking Act of 1976. Hearing before the
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions of the Senate
Committee on Banl<ing, Housing and Urban Affairs
on H.R. 13876, To Pi-ovide for Federal Regulation of
Participation by Foreign Banks in Domestic Financial
Markets. August 31, 1976. 399 pp.
U.S. Honey Industry. Communication from the Presi-
dent of the United States transmitting a report on his
determination that import relief recommended by the
U.S. International Trade Commission for the U.S.
honey industry is not in the national economic inter-
est, pursuant to section 203(b)(2) of the Trade Act of
1974. H. Doc. 94-596. August 31, 1976. 2 pp.
14
Department of State Bulletin
TREATY INFORMATION
United States and Romania Sign
New Fisheries Agreement
Joint Statement
Press release 581 dated November 23
On November 23, 1976, representatives of
the United States and the Socialist Republic
of Romania signed a new agreement relating
to fishing activities of Romania off the coasts
of the United States. The agreement sets out
the arrangements between the countries
which will govern fishing by Romanian ves-
sels within the fishery conservation zone of
the United States beginning March 1, 1977.
The agreement will come into force after the
completion of internal procedures by both
governments. The signing of this agreement
took place at Bucharest. Minister of Trans-
portation and Telecommunications, Traian
Dudas, signed for the Socialist Republic of
Romania. Harry G. Barnes, Jr., U.S. Am-
bassador to Romania, signed for the United
States. Both delegations expressed their
satisfaction with the new accord.
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Coffee
International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes.
Done at London December 3, 1975. Entered into force
provisionally October 1, 1976.
Ratifications deposited: Panama, December 13, 1976;
Spain, December 9, 1976; Togo, December 8, 1976.
Acceptance deposited: Japan, December 10, 1976.
Economic Cooperation
Agreement establishing a Financial Support Fund of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment. Done at Paris April 9, 1975.'
Ratification deposited: Spain, Decembers, 1976.
Finance
Agreement establishing the African Development
Fund, with schedules. Done at Abidjan November 29,
1972. Entered into force June 30, 1973.
Acceptance deposited: United States, November 18,
1976.
Oil Pollution
International convention on civil liability for oil pollu-
tion damage. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969.
Entered into force June 19, 1975. ^
Ratification deposited: Portugal, November 26, 1976.
Postal
Additional protocol to the constitution of the Postal
Union of the Americas and Spain, general regula-
tions, regulations governing the International Office
and Transfer Office, and convention with final pro-
tocol and detailed regulations. Done at Lima March
18, 1976. Entered into force October 1, 1976, provi-
sionally, e.xcept for art. 107, par. 1 of the general
regulations which entered into force March 18, 1976,
provisionally.
Signatures: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba,^ Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, Me.xico, Nicaragua, Panama,^ Paraguay,
Peru, Spain, United States,^ Uruguay, Venezuela,
March 18, 1976.
Money order agreement and final protocol of the Postal
Union of the Americas and Spain. Done at Lima
March 18, 1976. Entered into force October 1, 1976,
provisionally.
Signatures: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic. Ecuador. El Sal-
vador, Guatemala, Honduras, Me.xico. Nicaragua,
Panama,-'' Peru, Spain, United States,^ Uruguay,
Venezuela, March 18, 1976.
Parcel post agreement, final protocol and detailed regu-
lations of the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain.
Done at Lima March 18, 1976. Entered into force Oc-
tober 1, 1976, provisionally.
Signatures: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, Colombia. Costa Rica, Cuba,^ Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, Me.xico, Nicaragua, Panama,^ Paraguay,
Peru, Spain, United States,^ Uruguav, Venezuela,
March 18, 1976.
Safety at Sea
Convention on the international regulations for pre-
venting collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London Oc-
tober 20, 1972. Enters into force July 15, 1977.
Ratification deposited: New Zealand, November 26,
1976.
Tin
Fifth international tin agreement, with annexes. Done
at Geneva June 21, 1975. Entered into force provi-
sionally July 1, 1976.
Ratification deposited: Spain, December 9, 1976.
Wheat
Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat
trade convention (part of the international wheat
agreement) 1971. Done at Washington March 17,
1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect
' Not in force.
^ Not in force for the United States.
^ With declarations.
January 3, 1977
15
to certain provisions and July 1, 1976, with respect to
other provisions.
Acceptance deposited: Japan, December 10, 1976.
Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid
convention (part of the international wheat agree-
ment) 1971. Done at Washington March 17, 1976. En-
tered into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain
provisions and July 1, 1976, with respect to other
provisions.
Acceptance deposited: Japan, December 10, 1976.''
World Heritage
Convention concerning the protection of the world cul-
tural and natural heritage. Done at Paris November
23, 1972. Entered into force December 17, 1975.
TIAS 8226.
Acceptance deposited: Canada, July 23, 1976.
Ratification deposited: Pakistan, July 23,1976.
BILATERAL
Brazil
Interim agreement relating to air transport services.
Effected by exchange of notes at Brasilia October 27
and November 1, 1976. Entered into force November
1, 1976.
Cape Verde
Agreement relating to the provision of site test, com-
missioning and/or periodic flight checks of air naviga-
tion aids by the Federal Aviation Administration.
Signed at Washington and Praia October 13 and
November 19, 1976. Entered into force November 19,
1976.
Indonesia
Loan agreement for rural sanitation manpower de-
velopment training program. Signed at Jakarta Oc-
tober 28, 1976. Entered into force October 28, 1976.
Loan agreement relating to Citanduy River Basin de-
velopment. Signed at Jakarta October 28, 1976. En-
tered into force October 28, 1976.
Agreement amending the loan agreement of June 30,
197.5, relating to irrigation systems and land de-
veloi)ment. Signed at Jakarta October 28, 1976. En-
tered into force October 28, 1976.
Iran
Cooperative agreement relating to environmental pro-
tection and improvement, with annex. Signed at
Tehi-an November 10, 1976. Enters into force as from
the date of the last notification by either party to the
other that it has complied with its domestic legal re-
quirements for entry into force.
Israel
Loan agreement to promote the economic and political
stability of Israel, with exhibits. Signed at Washing-
ton November 23, 1976. Entered into force November
23, 1976.
Program assistance grant agreement to promote the
economic and political stability of Israel, with
exhibits. Signed at Washington November 23, 1976.
Entered into force November 23, 1976.
Cash grant agreement to support the economic re-
quirements of Israel. Signed at Washington
November 23, 1976. Entered into force November 23,
1976.
Mexico
Treaty on the execution of penal sentences. Signed at
Mexico November 25, 1976. Enters into force 30 days
after the exchange of ratifications.
Romania
Agreement extending the agreement of December 4,
1973, relating to civil air transport (TIAS 7901). Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Bucharest October 28
and 30, 1976. Entered into force October 30, 1976.
PUBLICATIONS
^ With reservation.
1950 "Foreign Relations" Volume
on the U.N.; Western Hemisphere
Press release 564 dated November 18 (for release November 27)
The Department of State on November 27 released
"Foreign Relations of the United States," 1950, volume
II, "The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere."
The "Foreign Relations" series has been published con-
tinuously since 1861 as the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. The volume released on November 27 is
the first of seven volumes for the year 1950.
This volume of 1,049 pages presents high-level
documentation (nearly all of which is newly declas-
sified) on the policies of the United States in the United
Nations on such major issues as the Chinese represen-
tation question, the "uniting for peace" resolution, the
Southwest Africa question, and the drafting of the first
international covenant on human rights. The volume
also includes the record of U.S. relations with the
American republics and Canada. Of particular note are
those papers concerned with the action taken by the
United States toward the ratification of the Charter of
the Organization of American States, the attitude of the
United States over Communist activity in Guatemala,
the negotiations of a petroleum credit to Mexico, the
recognition of the military junta government of Haiti,
and the political and economic relations with Argentina,
Colombia, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.
"Foreign Relations," 1950, volume II, was prepared
by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs,
Department of State. Listed as Department of State
publication 8853 (GPO cat. no. Sl.l:950/v. II), this vol-
ume may be obtained for $13.00. Checks or money or-
ders should be made out to the Superintendent of
Documents and should be sent to the U.S. Government
Book Store, Department of State, Washington, D.C.
20520.
16
Department of State Bulletin
INDEX January 3, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1958
Arms Control and Disarmament. Secretary Kis-
singer Attends NATO Ministerial Meeting at
Brussels and Meets With British Officials at
London (Kissinger, Crosland) 1
China. Secretary Kissinger Attends NATO
Ministerial Meeting at Brussels and Meets
With British Officials at London (Kissinger,
Crosland) 1
Congress. Congressional Documents Relating to
Foreign Policy 14
Economic Affairs
Secretary Kissinger Attends NATO Ministerial
Meeting at Brussels and Meets With British Of-
ficials at London (Kissinger, Crosland) 1
United States and Romania Sign New Fisheries
Agreement (joint statement) 15
Europe. Secretary Kissinger Attends NATO
Ministerial Meeting at Brussels and Meets
With British Officials at London (Kissinger,
Crosland) 1
Italy. Prime Minister Andreotti of Italy Visits
Washington (Ford, Andreotti) 12
Middle East. Secretary Kissinger Attends
NATO Ministerial Meeting at Brussels and
Meets With British Officials at London (Kis-
singer, Crosland) 1
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
North Atlantic Council Meets at Brussels (mes-
sage from President-elect Carter delivered by
Secretary Kissinger, text of communique) 9
Secretary Kissinger Attends NATO Ministerial
Meeting at Brussels and Meets With British Of-
ficials at London (Kissinger, Crosland) 1
Presidential Documents. Prime Minister An-
dreotti of Italy Visits Washington 12
Publications. 1950 "Foreign Relations" Volume
on the U.N. ; Western Hemisphere 16
Romania. United States and Romania Sign New
Fisheries Agreement (joint statement) 15
Southern Rhodesia. Secretary Kissinger At-
tends NATO Ministerial Meeting at Brussels
and Meets With British Officials at London
(Kissinger, Crosland) 1
Treaty Information
Current Actions 15
United States and Romania Sign New Fisheries
Agreement (joint statement) 15
Name Ivder
Andreotti, Giulio 12
Carter, President-elect 9
Crosland, Anthony 1
Ford, President 12
Kissinger, Secretary 1
Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: December 13-19
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash-
ingto
n, D.C
20520.
No.
Date
Subject
601
12/13
Kissinger, British Foreign Secre-
tary Crosland: news conference,
London, Dec. 10.
602
12/13
North Atlantic Council ministerial
meeting, Brussels, Dec. 9-10:
communique.
*603
12/13
L. Bruce Laingen sworn in as Am-
bassador to Malta (biographic
data).
*604
12/13
U.S. consulate at Barranquilla,
Colombia, to be reestab ished
Dec. 14.
t605
12/15
Meat import negotiations held.
*606
12/15
Study Group 5 of the U.S. National
Committee of the International
Telegraph and Telephone Com-
mittee, Jan. 13.
*607-
12/17
Waldheim, Kissinger: remarks fol-
lowing meeting. New York, Dec.
16.
U.S. and Bulgaria sign new
t608
12/17
fisheries agreement.
*609
12/17
Advisory Panel on Academic Music,
Jan. 17.
*610
12/17
Advisory Committee on Transna-
tional Enterprises, working
group on transfer of technology,
Jan. 7.
*611
12/17
Advisory Committee on Transna-
tional Enterprises, working
group on illicit payments, Jan. 5
ted.
* Not prin
t Held for
a later issue of the BULLETIN.
UPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS
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of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402.
o
/J,
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Volume LXXVI • No. 1959 • January 10, 1977
UNITED STATES DISCUSSES DISARMAMENT ISSUES
IN U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE
Statements by Ambassador Martin and Dr. Ikle
and Text of Environmental Modification Convention 1 7
U.S. GIVES VIEWS ON U.S.S.R. PROPOSAL FOR WORLD TREATY
ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE
Statements in Political and Legal Committees
of the U.N. General Assembly 30
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE B U L L E T I
Vol. LXXVI, No. 1959
January 10, 1977
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
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52 issues plus semiannual indexes,
domestic .$-12.. 50, foreign $.53.15
Single copy 85 cents
The Secretary of State has determined that the pub-
lication of this periodical is necessary in the transac-
tion of the public business required by law of this
Department. Use of funds for printing this periodi-
cal has been approved by the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget through January 31,
1981.
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may be re-
printed. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The
BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to
Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BULLETIN
a weekly publication issued by Ih
Office of Media Services, Bureau
Public Affairs, provides the public an
interested agencies of the governmeii
with information on developments t|
the field of U.S. foreign relations an
on the work of the Department
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes select
press releases on foreign policy, issuei
by the White House and the DeparSl
ment, and statements, addresses, an
news conferences of the President ani
the Secretary of State and other o/Zia
cers of the Department, as well as spe4
cial articles on various phases of in*
ternational affairs and the functions o|
the Department. Information is ini
eluded concerning treaties and inter*
national agreements to which tht
United States is or may become a parti
and on treaties of general inferno^
tional interest.
Publications of the Department oj
State, United Nations documents, an
legislative material in the field oM
international relations are also listedJ
United States Discusses Disarmament Issues
in U.N. General Assembly Debate
Following are statements made in Com-
mittee I (Political and Security) of the U.N.
General Assembly on November 1 by U.S.
Representative Joseph Martin, Jr., head of
the U.S. delegation to the Conference of the
Committee on Disarmament (CCD), and on
Novem.ber 18 by U.S. Representative Fred C.
Ikle, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, together with the text
of a resolution adopted by the Assembly on
December 10 which includes the Convention
on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other
Hostile Use of Environmental Modification
Techniques.
STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR MARTIN,
COMMITTEE I, NOVEMBER 1
USUN press release 135 dated November 1
Nineteen seventy-six has seen gratifying
progress in multilateral disarmament. Nota-
bly, the Conference of the Committee on
Disarmament, fulfilling the General Assem-
bly's request in Resolution 3475 (XXX), has
negotiated and forwarded to the Assembly a
draft Convention on the Prohibition of Mili-
tary or Any Other Hostile Use of Environ-
mental Modification Techniques.
The United States considers that adher-
ence to this convention will effectively elimi-
nate the serious dangers that the hostile use
of such techniques may pose. The convention
thus will protect the security interests of all
states parties with respect to this means of
warfare.
We therefore think it is extremely impor-
tant to correct a mistaken impression which
seems to have arisen on the part of at least
one delegation at the CCD and at this As-
sembly.
The convention does not permit in any
sense the hostile use of environmental mod-
ification techniques to generate such poten-
tially catastrophic phenomena as earth-
quakes, tidal waves, cyclones or hurricanes,
or alterations in climate patterns, weather
patterns, ocean currents, the state of the
ozone layer, or the ionosphere. These
phenomena are specifically listed illustra-
tively in an agreed understanding forwarded
by the CCD to the General Assembly to-
gether with the convention text itself.* In
the understanding the CCD agreed that all
those phenomena, when produced by hostile
use of environmental modification
techniques, would result, or could rea-
sonably be expected to result, in wide-
spread, long-lasting, or severe destruction,
damage, or injury.
The convention thus would prohibit any
hostile use of environmental modification
techniques to cause any of those phenomena
as a means of destruction, damage, or injury
to another party. Therefore the generation of
any of those catastrophic phenomena is abso-
lutely prohibited under the convention.
There can simply be no dispute on this point.
In this respect, the convention is consist-
ent with the identical drafts tabled at the
CCD in August 1975 ^ and referred to in
Resolution 3475. However, responsive to the
' For texts of the agreed understandings, see Report
of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament,
vol. I, Official Records of the General Assembly,
Thirty-First Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/31/27), p.
91.
2 For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 15, 1975, p. 419.
January 10, 1977
17
views of numerous other countries as set
forth in a genuinely multilateral negotiating
process, the present text also reflects a
number of very significant modifications of the
original drafts.
For example, the questions of peaceful use
of environmental modification techniques are
dealt with much more extensively in the text
before this committee. Thus, the preamble of
the convention now refers to the 1972 Stock-
holm Declaration on international respon-
sibilities with respect to the environment.^
And article III, besides providing that the
convention shall not hinder peaceful use of
environmental modification techniques, now
calls for the fullest possible exchange of sci-
entific and technical information concerning
such use. The article also includes an under-
taking to contribute to international economic
and scientific cooperation in the preservation,
improvement, and peaceful utilization of the
environment, with due consideration to the
needs of developing areas.
Article V of the convention contains an in-
novation in multilateral arms control com-
pliance procedures. It provides for convening
a consultative committee of experts upon the
request of any state party to undertake ap-
propriate findings of fact and provide expert
views in connection with any problems the
requesting party raises with respect to the
objectives or application of the convention.
The consultative committee should afford all
parties the assistance of international exper-
tise which might otherwise be unavailable for
factual findings and explanations concerning
what may be highly complex technical ques-
tions. We consider the provisions for the con-
sultative committee a genuine advance over
previous practice.
In another change from the original draft,
article VIII of the convention adds provi-
sions for a review conference five years after
entry into force. The conference is to
examine in particular the convention's effec-
tiveness in eliminating the dangers of mili-
^ For text of the Declaration of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment, adopted at
Stociiholm on June 16, 1972, see Bulletin of July 24,
1972, p. 116.
tary or any other hostile use of environmen-
tal modification techniques. If, contrary to
our expectations, the convention is deemed
to have proven ineffective, the conference
could consider remedial action. Thus the
draft which you are called upon to consider is
the result of intensive negotiations which
have produced an intricate cloth of com-
promises of many sincerely felt points of
view. It will be impossible to unravel one
strand without unraveling the entire fabric.
Taken as a whole, my delegation believes
that the Environmental Modification Con-
vention as reported by the CCD is worthy of
broad acceptance. Accordingly, we think it
should be commended by the General As-
sembly and opened for signature and ratifica-
tion as soon as possible. We will support a
resolution to that effect and hope most other
delegations will do the same. The CCD
worked with great determination and dili-
gence to produce the text of the Environ-
mental Modification Convention this year.
The adoption of such a resolution by the As-
sembly will recognize the committee's ac-
complishment and enable it next year to con-
centrate on other important subjects on its
agenda.
Consideration of Chemical Weapons Issues
Mr. Chairman, since the 30th session of the
General Assembly useful work has also been
accomplished in international consideration
of controls on chemical weapons. The CCD's
discussions of this subject during 1976 have
been active and constructive. We were en-
couraged by increasing acceptance of the
concept of a phased approach to a com-
prehensive chemical weapons ban and by
progress on the question of defining the
agents to be covered in the initial phase.
The committee's deliberations also reflect-
ed increased awareness of the central impor-
tance of verification problems related to re-
straints on chemical weapons. In this connec-
tion, while maintaining our reservations re-
garding reliance on national technical means,
we have noted with interest the statement on
verification of destruction of chemical
weapons stocks contained in the disarma-
18
Department of State Bulletin
ment memorandum recently circulated to the
General Assembly by the Soviet Union."
The CCD's consideration of chemical
weapons questions this past summer was
complemented by technical consultations be-
tween U.S. and Soviet experts. These talks
were helpful in clarifying the views of the
two sides on a variety of comple.x issues,
especially relating to verification, and in
identifying some areas of agreement. Both
sides considered the consultations useful and
agreed that they should be resumed at a fu-
ture date to be determined. Our view re-
mains that continuation of such consultations
cannot in any way substitute for the CCD's
ongoing work in this very important arms
control area.
Indeed, during the committee's 1977 ses-
sion we expect it to devote major attention to
chemical weapons issues. We look forward
particularly to hearing others' views, and of-
fering our own, on the draft convention ta-
bled by the United Kingdom in a welcome
initiative last August. More generally, the
United States expects to participate actively
in the continuing search for solutions to the
difficult and complex problems which still
face us as we pursue our common objective of
effective measures for the prohibition of
chemical weapons.
Mr. Chairman, besides its work on en-
vironmental modification and chemical
weapons, the CCD this year showed renewed
vitality and procedural flexibility in other
ways as well.
For example, in connection with questions
related to nuclear testing, an experts group
was established under CCD auspices to study
possible measures of international coopera-
tion in detecting and identifying seismic
events. The group has made a promising be-
ginning. Its prospective contribution would
'' The statement reads as follows: "Supervision of
compliance with the prohibition of chemical weapons
should be based on national means. In this respect
there exists a positive precedent in the convention ban-
ning bacteriological weapons. At the same time, the
Soviet Union is ready to examine the possibility of
using additional supervision procedures and, in particu-
lar, to discuss methods of verifying the destruction of
stockpiles of chemical weapons which are to be excluded
from the arsenals of States." (U.N. doc. A/31/232, p. 9.)
be enhanced if experts from regions of the
world now unrepresented or underrepre-
sented on the panel would join in its sub-
sequent work.
Also, the Secretary General's working
group on the reduction of military budgets
met twice in Geneva, maintaining informal
contact with various CCD delegations. The
working group has produced a valuable re-
port which clarifies definitional and other
technical issues relating to the comparison of
military expenditures.^
The CCD's accomplishments this year
renew our conviction that under existing cir-
cumstances the committee constitutes the
best available vehicle for multilateral disar-
mament negotiations. On the other hand, we
acknowledge the continuing interest shown
by many countries in a more general forum
and in particular the attention currently
being devoted to the question of a General
Assembly special session on disarmament.
My delegation is prepared to consider an ap-
propriate resolution that would set in motion
preparations for a special session in 1978. ^ If
it does prove possible for us to support such
a resolution, we would hope to take part in
the preparatory activity, which must be care-
ful and thorough if the special session is to
make progress.
Progress Since NPT Review Conference
Mr. Chairman, once again this year, an
important topic for consideration by the
First Committee is the question of prevent-
ing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
While the committee's discussion can be ex-
pected to span a range of international ef-
forts in the nonproliferation field, the most
immediate focus, as specified in the title of
the agenda item, will be the implementation
of the "conclusions" of the conference to re-
5 U.N. doc. A/31/222.
^ A resolution deciding to convene a special session of
the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to be
held in New York May-June 1978, and establishing a
preparatory committee was adopted by Committee I by
consensus on Dec. 2 and by the Assembly by consensus on
Dee. 21 (A/RES/31/189 B).
January 10, 1977
19
view the operation of the Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT), held in May 1975.^
Less than a year and a half has passed
since the review conference. Nevertheless,
the collective findings and recommendations
of conference participants, as well as the
momentum and international interest gener-
ated by the conference itself, have stimu-
lated new or accelerated activity in several
critical areas of the nonproliferation effort
which has already yielded some substantial
results.
It is also encouraging that some of the
principal accomplishments of the last 18
months that were promoted by review con-
ference recommendations have involved the
cooperation not only of NPT parties but also
of states that have not yet chosen to join the
treaty. In our view, this reflects the near-
universal appreciation of the threat to man-
kind posed by the proliferation of nuclear
weapons, as well as the recognition that suc-
cess in preventing such proliferation depends
on the concerted efforts of all groups of
states. Permit me, Mr. Chairman, to review
briefly some of the gains that have been
made in the last year and a half:
— Significant steps have been taken, in
conformity with review conference recom-
mendations, to increase the effectiveness of
IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agen-
cy] safeguards. These include:
1. Efforts to develop new verification
techniques and instrumentation;
2. Broadening of safeguards coverage in
agreements with non-nuclear-weapon states
not party to the NPT; and
3. Negotiation and approval of agreements
to implement the voluntary offers by the
United States and United Kingdom to place
their civilian nuclear installations under
IAEA safeguards.
— In early 1976, as a result of consultations
with other nuclear suppliers, the United
' For text of the treaty, see Bulletin of July 1,
1968, p. 8; for text of a U.S. statement in the review
confe)-ence and the final declaration of the conference,
see Bulletin of June 30, 1975, p. 921; for a U.S. in-
terpretive statement, see Bulletin of Aug. 4, 1975 p.
193.
States adopted as national policy certain
principles that will govern future nuclear ex-
ports. We were informed that other govern-
ments would do the same. Strengthening
common nuclear export requirements was an
important consensus recommendation of the
review conference. This recommendation re-
flected the recognition by suppliers and
recipients alike that the exercise of special re-
sponsibility by supplier governments would
promote the security and economic interests of
all states.
— Efforts to implement review conference
recommendations on the physical protection
of nuclear materials have been pursued on
several fronts. Major suppliers have decided
to include provisions in their nuclear cooper-
ation agreements requiring adequate levels
of physical protection in recipient countries.
The IAEA has issued a revised set of rec-
ommendations on physical protection. In ad-
dition, the United States has suggested an
international convention that provides for
physical protection of nuclear materials in
transit and for international collaboration in
the recovery of lost or diverted materials and
encourages participating countries to adopt
measures conforming to international criteria
for effective physical protection.
— We have continued to fulfill our com-
mitment under NPT article IV, reaffirmed at
the review conference, to facilitate the ex-
change of nuclear technology and materials
for peaceful purposes consistent with the re-
straints required by articles I and II.
Through our bilateral cooperative arrange-
ments for the supply of nuclear reactors and
fuel, as well as our expanded contributions to
the IAEA's technical assistance programs,
we have demonstrated our determination to
assist developing countries, particularly
those party to the NPT, in meeting their
growing energy requirements.
— The review conference gave impetus to
the search for safe and economical alterna-
tives to nationally owned sensitive nuclear
facilities, such as uranium enrichment and
chemical reprocessing plants. Specifically, it
encouraged active consideration of multina-
tional nuclear fuel cycle centers. In accord-
ance with that recommendation, the IAEA's
20
Department of State Bulletin
study of such multinational centers is under-
way. We believe it is desirable, among other
approaches, to continue studying the idea of
a few suitably sited multinational fuel cycle
centers to serve regional needs, when effec-
tively safeguarded and economically war-
ranted. Through these and related means, we
can minimize incentives for the spread of
dangerous fuel cycle capabilities.
— We continue to support the validity of the
review conference finding that the technol-
ogy of nuclear explosions for peaceful pur-
poses (PNE's) is still at the developmental
stage. Nonetheless, considerable progress
has been made in implementing the confer-
ence's recommendations on peaceful nuclear
explosions. The conference asked that the
IAEA expedite examination of the legal is-
sues involved in, and commence considera-
tion of the structure and content of, the in-
ternational agreement or agreements con-
templated in NPT article V. In response, the
IAEA Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Peaceful
Nuclear Explosions — itself the result of a re-
view conference recommendation — has
studied various legal and other factors in-
volved in the establishment and operation of
an international PNE service and plans to
advise the Board of Governors on these mat-
ters during 1977.
Security of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States
The recommendations contained in the re-
view conference final declaration do not, of
course, deal only with safeguards and coop-
eration in the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy.
Participants at the conference recognized,
as had the negotiators of the NPT itself, that
national security and political considerations
are the motivating factors in a decision to ac-
quire nuclear explosive capabilities and, ac-
cordingly, that in the long run any successful
approach to the nonproliferation problem
would have to deal satisfactorily with con-
cerns in these areas.
This recognition was reflected in several
consensus recommendations concerning
strengthening of the security of non-
nuclear-weapon states and the cessation of
the nuclear arms race. The United States at-
taches great importance to these recommen-
dations and plans to work actively toward
their implementation. Efforts already have
been made to put the recommendations into
effect, but we can share in the regret that
has been expressed that more rapid progress
has not proved possible.
The United States recognizes that allevia-
tion of the legitimate security concerns of
non-nuclear-weapon states is a critical com-
ponent of international efforts to prevent nu-
clear proliferation. It is easier, however, to
state the objective than to devise practical
and effective means of promoting it. Reluc-
tance to forgo the nuclear weapons option
often arises from local conflicts and insecuri-
ties whose origins are invariably complex and
rarely susceptible to quick solutions.
For its part, the United States has tried to
promote the security of non-nuclear-weapon
states in a variety of ways, such as efforts to
assist in solving regional conflicts, for exam-
ple, in the Middle East and in southern Af-
rica; encouragement for regional arms con-
trol arrangements; and the provision of posi-
tive security assurances such as Security
Council Resolution 255.® In addition, in exer-
cising the right of collective self-defense, the
United States and a number of other nations
have entered into mutual security relation-
ships for the purpose of deterring and de-
fending against armed attack. We believe
these alliances, by providing sufficient as-
surance regarding security needs, have had a
major impact in influencing states involved
to renounce the nuclear weapons option.
On the other hand, we have not been able
to accept proposals for universally applicable
assurances on the non-use of nuclear
weapons, because we have not discovered
any formulation that would effectively serve
the varied security needs of non-nuclear-
weapon states, including our allies. How-
ever, we are prepared to consider any appro-
priate means of strengthening the security of
those states, provided such means do not det-
rimentally affect existing security arrange-
* For text of the resolution, adopted on June 19,
1968, see Bulletin of July 8, 1968, p. 58.
January 10, 1977
21
ments, which, as I have just noted, are im-
portant components of the nonproliferation
effort.
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Arms Control Agreements
As Secretary Kissinger stated in plenary
on September 30, we continue to approach
the nonproliferation problem in full recogni-
tion of the responsibility that we and other
nuclear powers have in limiting our nuclear
weapons arsenals. Mindful of this responsi-
bility, and in line with the review conference
recommendations on SALT [Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks], the United States and the
U.S.S.R. have continued actively to pursue
an agreement, based on the Vladivostok ac-
cord, on the limitation of offensive strategic
arms.^ We would like to stress, however,
that we would not regard such an agreement
as the final step of the SALT process. We are
determined to begin negotiations on further
limitations and reductions in the level of
strategic arms as soon as possible following
the conclusion of a SALT Two agreement.
The review conference expressed the hope
for early solutions to the technical and politi-
cal difficulties that have blocked agreement
on an effective comprehensive test ban. So
far, these difficulties have not been resolved.
However, in our view, some important steps
have recently been taken toward our common
objective of achieving a comprehensive test
ban. In particular, we believe that the
Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the inte-
grally related Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear
Explosions, the latter of which was signed by
the United States and the U.S.S.R. in May
1976, place significant restraints on U.S. and
Soviet nuclear explosions.'" Moreover, the
Threshold Test Ban Treaty contains an
explicit commitment to continue negotiations
" For text of a joint U.S. -Soviet statement issued at
Vladivostok on Nov. 24, 1974, see Bulletin of Dec. 23,
1974, p. 879.
'"For texts of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Treaty and Pro-
tocol on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear
Weapon Tests, signed at Moscow on July 3, 1974, see
Bulletin of July 29, 1974, p. 217; for texts of the
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Treaty and Protocol on Underground
Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes and agreed
statement, see Bulletin of June 28, 1976, p. 802.
toward the cessation of all nuclear weapons
tests, and we are determined to fulfill that
commitment.
To sum up, we believe that a reasonably
good start has been made, but that we must
redouble our efforts to put the review con-
ference recommendations fully into effect. Of
course, international action on nonprolifera-
tion should not be confined to ideas outlined
at the review conference in May 1975. The
nature of the nonproliferation challenge con-
tinues to change, and accordingly the re-
quirements of a successful strategy to meet
that challenge must continue to evolve. The
review conference conclusions might there-
fore be regarded simply as a foundation upon
which we can build further cooperative in-
ternational efforts — involving NPT parties as
well as nonparties, nuclear recipients as well
as suppliers, and nuclear powers as well as
non-nuclear-weapon states. We beheve this
General Assembly should provide a mandate
for such efforts.
Mr. Chairman, in a major foreign policy
statement on October 28, President Ford
outlined a program of international action in
the nonproliferation field. Later in our de-
bate, my delegation will present a detailed
account of that important initiative. We also
reserve the right to make interventions on
other matters as the debate proceeds.
STATEMENT BY DR. IKLE, COMMITTEE I,
NOVEMBER 18
USUN press release 15.3 dated November 18
We welcome this opportunity to address
the First Committee again. We consider this
the ideal forum in which to present a fuller
up-to-date explanation of the United States'
most recent policy and proposals on nuclear
energy and put forward a related arms con-
trol proposal.
Throughout the nuclear age, the United
States has launched many efforts to control
the destructive potential of the atom and yet
keep the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy
in mankind's service. Some 30 years ago,
when only the United States possessed the
atom bomb, we made a proposal to the
22
Department of State Bulletin
United Nations that envisaged placing all nu-
clear resources throughout the world under
the ownership and control of an independent
international authority. Perhaps that pro-
posal called for too great a willingness of
other nations to place their trust in interna-
tional cooperation.
Less than a decade later, in 1954, the
United States undertook a second major
initiative — the Atoms for Peace program — to
assist other countries in acquiring nuclear
technology for peaceful uses. And we invited
other nations to join with us in building an
international agency to facilitate cooperation
in peaceful uses of the atom and to safeguard
nuclear technology from diversion to de-
structive ends. The fruit of this initiative can
be seen in the broad acceptance and useful-
ness of the International Atomic Energy
Agency and its unprecedented safeguards
system.
But in the last two decades, much has been
learned about both the promise and the
threat of nuclear technology, and the thin di-
viding line between them. It became clear
that further and far-reaching measures were
needed. Otherwise, in region after region,
new nuclear threats and rivalries could ac-
company the worldwide spread of peaceful
nuclear technology. This concern is widely
shared in the United States and other coun-
tries. President Ford's October 28 an-
nouncement on U.S. nuclear energy policy is
a response to these concerns and represents
a wide spectrum of agreement in my country
as to the steps needed.'*
I believe it is important to emphasize to
you certain premises on which this policy is
based:
— First, success in stemming the spread of
nuclear weapons must be based on sympathe-
tic understanding of the energy needs of all
states. States electing to participate in the
necessary restraint arrangements must
therefore be assured that they will be able to
benefit fully from the peaceful uses of nu-
clear energy.
" For a statement by President Ford issued at
Washington on Oct. 28, 1976, see Bulletin of Nov. 22,
1976, p. 629.
— Second, if the United States asks other
nations to exercise restraint in certain aspects
of their nuclear power programs, it must be
prepared to show comparable restraint at
home.
— Third, it is of crucial importance that all
nations clearly recognize their common
interest in preventing the spread of nuclear
weapons capabilities to country after coun-
try. No single nation or group of nations can
insure an effective nonproliferation effort.
As President Ford has said: "The United
States is prepared to work with all other na-
tions .... Effective nonproliferation meas-
ures will require the participation and sup-
port of nuclear suppliers and consumers."
The security of many of the nonnuclear na-
tions represented here is perhaps more di-
rectly threatened by further proliferation
than is the security of countries now possess-
ing nuclear weapons.
Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology
Our new nuclear energy policy sets forth
action the United States has decided to take
on its own and proposals the United States
will make to other nations. Several of these
measures are designed to avert the serious
dangers that would result from the existence
throughout the world of nationally owned
uranium enrichment plants and plutonium-
reprocessing plants. These plants can pro-
duce the materials that can readily be made
into nuclear weapons.
In regard to uranium enrichment, we of
course recognize that countries which plan
for nuclear reactors as an important source of
electrical energy need to have an assured and
reliable source of nuclear fuel. In forgoing
acquisition of sensitive nuclear facilities
under national control, it is evident that such
countries are entitled to assurances that
suitable nuclear fuel will remain available.
It has long been assumed that the energy
value remaining in spent reactor fuel would
be recovered by reprocessing recovered fis-
sile material and recycling it back into power
reactors. However, as our understanding and
information improved, two facts became
plain: First, the economic advantages for
January 10, 1977
23
plutonium recycle are at this time very un-
certain; second, and more important, in the
absence of adequate safeguard measures, the
accumulation of separated plutonium can
greatly increase the risk of diversion to nu-
clear weapons. And this risk would lead to
instability among the neighboring countries
of a region.
The U.S. policy statement of October 28
specifies several actions, domestic and inter-
national, aimed at restraining the spread of
such plutonium:
— The United States has decided to defer
commercial reprocessing activities. We no
longer i-egard reprocessing and recycling of
plutonium as a necessary and inevitable step
in the nuclear fuel cycle. We will pursue
them in the future only if there is sound rea-
son to conclude that it is economically jus-
tified and that the world community can ef-
fectively overcome the associated risks of
proliferation. In the meantime, we will ex-
pand our capacity to store unreprocessed
spent fuel, we will fully consider all the im-
plications of reprocessing, and we will also
explore alternative means for recovering the
energy value from used nuclear fuel without
separating plutonium. Several ideas have
been advanced for such recovery methods,
and research will now be undertaken to de-
termine their validity.
— We are calling on all nations to join us in
refraining from the transfer of reprocessing
and enrichment technology and facilities for a
period of at least three years. We are also
asking suppliers and consumers to work to-
gether to establish reliable international
means for meeting nuclear fuel needs with
minimum risk.
— We will invite other nations to participate
in our new evaluation program on the values
and risks of plutonium reprocessing and re-
cycling, and the alternatives that may be
available.
In addition to these actions, the U.S. pol-
icy calls for better controls on the accumula-
tion of plutonium. It proposes international
discussions aimed at secure and safe storage
arrangements for civil plutonium and spent
reactor fuel under the auspices of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency, pending ul-
timate disposition. We are prepared, when
such a storage arrangement is broadly ac-
cepted and in operation, to place our own ex-
cess civil plutonium and spent fuel under its
control. We are also prepared to consider
providing a site for international storage of
spent fuel and radioactive wastes under
IAEA auspices.
Another important element of the U.S.
program of action is support for strengthen-
ing the IAEA safeguards system. We hope
that all states will join us in insuring that the
IAEA has the technical resources and staff
necessary to meet its growing respon-
sibilities. We are committing more resources
to help the Agency improve its safeguards
capabilities, and our national laboratories
with expertise in safeguards will provide as-
sistance on a continuing basis to the IAEA as
the Agency identifies its needs.
Nuclear Export Policies
Let me now turn to U.S. nuclear export
policies. The United States is adopting new
criteria to encourage nations to pursue co-
operative and responsible nonproliferation
policies. In determining whether to enter
into new or expanded nuclear cooperation,
we will consider the following factors:
— Adherence to the Nonproliferation Trea-
ty will be a strong positive factor favoring
cooperation with a non-nuclear-weapon state.
— Non-nuclear-weapon states that have not
yet adhered to the Nonproliferation Treaty
will receive positive recognition if they are
prepared to submit to full fuel cycle
safeguards, pending adherence.
— We will favor recipient nations that are
prepared to forgo, or postpone for a substan-
tial period, the establishment of national re-
processing or enrichment activities or, in
certain cases, are prepared to shape and
schedule their reprocessing and enriching
facilities to foster nonproliferation needs.
— Positive recognition will also be given to
nations prepared to participate in an interna-
tional storage regime, under which spent fuel
and any separated plutonium would be placed
pending use.
24
Department of State Bulletin
Moreover, we will also encourage other
nuclear suppliers to adopt these same
criteria as common guidelines. As a funda-
mental element of our nonproliferation ef-
fort, I now reiterate the continuing U.S.
support for the Nonproliferation Treaty and
our position that all nations ought to adhere
to it.
My government believes the international
community must take certain concerted ac-
tions. It must be made clear that no state can
expect to abrogate or violate any nonprolif-
eration agreement with impunity. As President
Ford stated on October 28, the United States
will, at a minimum, respond to a violation of
any safeguards agreement with the United
States by immediately cutting off the supply
of nuclear fuel to the violator and ending
cooperation. We would also consider further
steps against violators, steps not necessarily
confined to ending nuclear cooperation.
Moreover, our actions would not be limited
only to agreements in which we are directly
involved. In case of violation of any
safeguards agreement, particularly one in-
volving the IAEA, we will initiate immediate
consultations with all interested nations to
determine appropriate action. We invite all
concerned governments to adopt a similar
policy.
Assuring Adequate and Reliable Supplies
Mr. Chairman, while the United States be-
lieves that the steps I have outlined will in-
hibit the further spread of nuclear weapons,
it recognizes that nuclear energy policy, of
course, must also offer the benefits of coop-
eration and incentives, bearing in mind the
importance of nuclear power as an alterna-
tive to fossil fuel. The United States will take
steps to assure that states which practice re-
sponsible nonproliferation policies, and join
appropriate international arrangements, will
have an adequate and reliable supply of nu-
clear energy:
— The United States is prepared to act, in
cooperation with other nations, to assure re-
liable supplies of nuclear fuel at equitable
prices to a country that accepts effective re-
straints on reprocessing, plutonium disposi-
tion, and other sensitive technologies. We
will initiate consultations with other nations
to develop the means to insure that suppliers
will be able to offer, and consumers will be
able to receive, an uninterrupted and eco-
nomical supply of low-enriched uranium fuel
and fuel services.
— The United States will offer other equi-
table arrangements. Where appropriate, this
may include providing fresh, low-enriched
uranium fuel in return for mutual agreement
on the disposition of spent fuel, where this
clearly fosters our common nonproliferation
objectives.
— We will expand cooperative efforts with
other countries to develop their indigenous
nonnuclear energy resources. We have pro-
posed that an International Energy Institute
be established to help other countries match
the most economical and readily available
sources of energy to their power needs. We
will offer technological assistance through
this Institute and other appropriate means.
Mr. Chairman, my government believes
that the program of actions described in the
Presidential statement of October 28, and
summarized very briefly today, can provide
an improved foundation for the use of nuclear
energy throughout the world in ways that
meet both nonproliferation objectives and
electric power needs. "The task we face,"
President Ford emphasized in his statement,
"calls for an international cooperative ven-
ture of unprecedented dimensions." So we
ask all nations to join in this opportunity to
work together for the benefit of all.
Radiological Weapons Agreement
I must ask you, however, to keep in mind
that all these steps cannot change the fact
that large amounts of radioactive materials
will continue to accumulate until the question
of their final utilization or disposition is re-
solved. I would like to turn now to a further
opportunity for arms control.
These rapidly accumulating radioactive
materials have the potential for use in
radiological weapons, a hazard distinct from
nuclear explosives. Such weapons, if ever
developed, could produce pernicious
January 10, 1977
25
effects — long term and short term— solely by
the radioactivity emitted. Virtually any of
the strongly radioactive isotopes might be
used to contaminate areas for long periods of
time. For example, the amount of plutonium
virhich could be dispersed by a conventional
explosive could contaminate a substantial
area, with the material retaining its radioac-
tive characteristics for tens of thousands of
years. Decontamination, if feasible at all,
would be extremely costly.
My government suggests that next year an
appropriate forum, such as the CCD, con-
sider an agreement that would prohibit the
use of radioactive materials as radiological
weapons. Such an agreement would not af-
fect the production of radioactive materials,
either as a necessary by-product of power
reactors or for other peaceful applications, or
affect our call for storage of spent fuel under
international auspices.
Such an agreement could complement the
Geneva Protocol of 1925, which prohibits the
use of poison gas and bacteriological methods
of warfare. In addition, a radiological war-
fare agreement could contain a provision for
appropriate measures by the parties to pre-
clude diversion of radioactive materials for
use as radiological weapons.
Such a commitment would, of course, be a
particularly worthwhile undertaking for the
major nuclear industrial states. Countries
with substantial nuclear energy programs
have accumulated large amounts of waste
materials with extensive remaining radioac-
tivity.
Negotiation of a radiological weapons
agreement should not, of course, impede
work on other multilateral arms control is-
sues. It is our intent that it will not. But feas-
ible arms control steps, such as this, should
not go unrealized simply because larger prob-
lems have yet to be solved. Such a proposal,
if adopted, would address a potentially sig-
nificant future danger; each arms control
agreement that is sound on its own merits
can be another positive step toward a safer
world.
Mr. Chairman, the measures the United
States is here advocating are important to
progress in arms control. They will make
more durable our peaceful nuclear coopera- ji
tion by making it safer. They will help pre- I
vent the world's search for energy from fos-
tering rivalries for mankind's most destruc-
tive weapon.
All this is good; but all this, of course, is
not enough. We must move resolutely toward
much broader and more far-reaching controls
on nuclear weapons. The security of every
nation, of every person, requires that we do
our utmost to limit and reduce the nuclear
arsenals and that we work with no less de-
termination toward a more secure interna-
tional order. The United States pledges its
continuing dedication to this goal.
TEXT OF RESOLUTION 12
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolutions 3264 (XXIX) of 9 December
1974 and 3475 (XXX) of 11 December 1975,
Recalling its resolution 1722 (XVI) of 20 December
1961, in which it recognized that all States have a deep
interest in disarmament and arms control negotiations,
Determined to avert the potential dangers of military
or any other hostile use of environmental modification
techniques,
Convinced that broad adherence to a convention on
the prohibition of such action would contribute to the
cause of strengthening peace and averting the threat of
war,
Noting with satisfaction that the Conference of the
Committee on Disarmament has completed and trans-
mitted to the General Assembly, in the report of its
work in 1976, the text of a draft Convention on the Pro-
hibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of En-
vironmental Modification Techniques,
Noting further that the Convention is intended to
prohibit effectively military or any other hostile use of
environmental modification techniques in order to
eliminate the dangers to mankind from such use,
Bearing in mind that draft agreements on disarma-
ment and arms control measures submitted to the Gen-
eral Assembly by the Conference of the Committee on
Disarmament should be the result of a process of effec-
tive negotiations and that such instruments should duly
take into account the views and interests of all States
'^ A/RES/31/72 (text from U.N. doc. A/31/382, report
of the First Committee on agenda item 45, Convention
on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of
environmental modification techniques); adopted by the
committee on Dec. 3 by a recorded vote of 89 (U.S.) to
11, with 25 abstentions, and by the Assembly on Dec.
10 by a recorded vote of 96 (U.S.) to 8, with 30
abstentions.
26
Department of State Bulletin
so that they can be joined by the widest possible
number of countries,
Bearing in mind that article VII of the Convention
makes provision for a conference to review the opera-
tion of the Convention five years after its entry into
force, with a view to ensuring that its purposes and provi-
sions are being realized.
Also bearing in mind all relevant documents and
negotiating records of the Conference of the Committee
on Disarmament on the discussion of the draft Conven-
tion,
Convinced that the Convention should not affect the
use of environmental modification techniques for peace-
ful purposes, which could contribute to the preservation
and improvement of the environment for the benefit of
present and future generations.
Convinced that the Convention will contribute to the
realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter
of the United Nations,
Anximis that during its 1977 session the Conference of
the Committee on Disarmament should concentrate on
urgent negotiations on disarmament and arms limitation
measures,
1. Refers the Convention on the Prohibition of Mili-
tary or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Mod-
ification Techniques, the text of which is annexed to the
present resolution, to all States for their consideration,
signature and ratification;
2. Requests the Secretary-General, as depositary of
the Convention, to open it for signature and ratification
at the earliest possible date;
3. Expresses its hope for the widest possible adher-
ence to the Convention;
4. Calls upon the Conference of the Committee on
Disarmament, without prejudice to the priorities estab-
lished in its programme of work, to keep under review
the problem of effectively averting the dangers of mili-
tary or any other hostile use of environmental modifica-
tion techniques;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament all docu-
ments relating to the discussion by the General Assem-
bly at its thirty-first session of the question of the pro-
hibition of military or any other hostile use of environ-
mental modification techniques.
ANNEX
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or
Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques
The States Parties to this Convention,
Guided by the interest of consolidating peace, and
wishing to contribute to the cause of halting the arms
race, and of bringing about general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international
control, and of saving mankind from the danger of using
new means of warfare.
Determined to continue negotiations with a view to
achieving effective progress towards further measures
in the field of disarmament.
Recognizing that scientific and technical advances
may open new possibilities with respect to modification
of the environment.
Recalling the Declaration of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment, adopted at
Stockholm on 16 June 1972,
Realizing that the use of environmental modification
techniques for peaceful purposes could improve the
interrelationship of man and nature and contribute to
the preservation and improvement of the environment
for the benefit of present and future generations,
Recognizing, however, that military or any other
hostile use of such techniques could have effects
extremely harmful to human welfare,
Desiring to prohibit effectively military or any other
hostile use of environmental modification techniques in
order to eliminate the dangers to mankind from such
use, and affirming their willingness to work towards
the achievement of this objective.
Desiring also to contribute to the strengthening of
trust among nations and to the further improvement of
the international situation in accordance with the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes
not to engage in military or any other hostile use of
environmental modification techniques having
widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means
of destruction, damage or injury to any other State
Party.
2. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not
to assist, encourage or induce any State, group of
States or international organization to engage in
activities contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1 of
this article.
Article II
As used in article I, the term "environmental
modification techniques" refers to any technique for
changing — through the deliberate manipulation of
natural processes — the dynamics, composition or
structure of the earth, including its biota, lithosphere,
hydrosphere, and atmosphere, or of outer space.
Article III
1. The provisions of this Convention shall not hinder
the use of environmental modification techniques for
peaceful purposes and shall be without prejudice to
generally recognized principles and applicable rules of
international law concerning such use.
2. The States Parties to this Convention undertake to
facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the
fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological
information on the use of environmental modification
techniques for peaceful purposes. States Parties in a
position to do so shall contribute, alone or together with
other States or international organizations, to interna-
tional economic and scientific co-operation in the pres-
January 10, 1977
27
ervation, improvement, and peaceful utilization of the
environment, with due consideration for the needs of
the developing areas of the world.
Article IV
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to
take any measures it considers necessary in accordance
with its constitutional processes to prohibit and prevent
any activity in violation of the provisions of the Con-
vention anywhere under its jurisdiction or control.
Article V
1. The States Parties to this Convention undertake to
consult one another and to co-operate in solving any
problems which may arise in relation to the objectives
of, or in the application of the provisions of, the
Convention. Consultation and co-operation pursuant to
this article may also be undertaken thi-ough appropriate
international procedures within the framework of the
United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.
These international procedures may include the
services of appropriate international organizations, as
well as of a consultative committee of experts as
provided for in paragraph 2 of this article.
2. For the purposes set forth in paragraph 1 of this
article, the Depositary shall, within one month of the
receipt of a request from any State Party, convene a
consultative committee of experts. Any State Party
may appoint an expert to this committee whose
functions and rules of procedure are set out in the
annex, which constitutes an integral part of this
Convention. The committee shall transmit to the
Depositary a summary of its findings of fact,
incorporating all views and information presented to
the committee during its proceedings. The Depositary
shall distribute the summary to all States Parties.
3. Any State Party to this Convention which has
reasons to believe that any other State Party is acting
in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of
the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security
Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint
should include all relevant information as well as all
possible evidence supporting its validity.
4. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to
co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the
Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the
basis of the complaint received by the Council. The
Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the
Convention of the results of the investigation.
5. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to
provide or support assistance, in accordance with the
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to any
Party to the Convention which so requests, if the
Security Council decides that such Party has been
harmed or is likely to be harmed as a result of violation
of the Convention.
Article VI
1. Any State Party may propose amendments to this
Convention. The text of any proposed amendment shall
be submitted to the Depositary, who shall promptly
circulate it to all States Parties.
2. An amendment shall enter into force for all States
Parties which have accepted it, upon the deposit with
the Depositary of instruments of acceptance by a
majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter
into force for any remaining State Party on the date of
deposit of its instrument of acceptance.
Article VII
This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
Article VIII
1. Five years after the entry into force of this Con-
vention, a conference of the States Parties to the Con-
vention shall be convened by the Depositary at Geneva.
The conference shall review the operation of the Con-
vention with a view to ensuring that its purposes and
provisions are being realized, and shall in particular
examine the effectiveness of the provisions of article I,
paragraph 1, in eliminating the dangers of military or
any other hostile use of environmental modification
techniques.
2. At intervals of not less than five years thereafter,
a majority of the States Parties to this Convention may
obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the
Depositary, the convening of a conference with the
same objectives.
3. If no review conference has been convened
pursuant to paragraph 2 of this article within 10 years
following the conclusion of a previous review
conference, the Depositary shall solicit the views of all
States Parties to this Convention on the holding of such
a conference. If one third or 10 of the States Parties,
whichever number is less, respond affirmatively, the
Depositary shall take immediate steps to convene the
conference.
Article IX
1. This Convention shall be open to all States for
signature. Any State which does not sign the Conven-
tion before its entry into force in accordance with para-
graph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.
2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by
signatory States. Instruments of ratification and
instruments of accession shall be deposited with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
3. This Convention shall enter into force upon the
deposit with the Depositary of instruments of
ratification by 20 Governments in accordance with
paragraph 2 of this article.
4. For those States whose instruments of ratification
or accession are deposited after the entry into force of
this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of
the deposit of their instruments of ratification or
accession.
5. The Depositary shall promptly inform all signatory
and acceding States of the date of each signature, the
date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of
accession and the date of the entry into force of this
Convention and of any amendments thereto, as well as
of the receipt of other notices.
28
Department of State Bulletin
6. This Convention shall be registered by the
Depositary in accordance with Article 102 of the Char-
ter of the United Nations.
Article X
This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese,
English, French, Russian, and Spanish texts are
equally authentic, shall be deposited with the
Secretary -General of the Untied Nations who shall send
certified copies thereof to the Governments of the
signatory and acceding States.
In Witness Whereof, the undersigned, duly
authorized thereto, have signed this Convention.
Done at On
Annex to the Convention
Consultative Committee of Experts
1. The Consultative Committee of Experts shall
undertake to make appropriate findings of fact and
provide expert views relevant to any problem raised
pursuant to article V, paragraph 1, of this Convention
by the State Party requesting the convening of the
Committee.
2. The work of the Consultative Committee of
Experts shall be organized in such a way as to permit it
to perform the functions set forth in paragraph 1 of this
annex. The Committee shall decide procedural
questions relative to the organization of its work,
where possible by consensus, but otherwise by a
majority of those present and voting. There shall be no
voting on matters of substance.
3. The Depositary or his representative shall serve as
the Chairman of the Committee.
4. Each expert may be assisted at meetings by one or
more advisers.
5. Each expert shall have the right, through the
Chairman, to request from States, and from
international organizations, such information and
assistance as the expert considers desirable for the
accomplishment of the Committee's work.
Bill of Rights Day, Human Rights
Day and Week, 1 976
A PROCLAMATION'
We Americans have been deeply moved by the sights
and sounds of our Bicentennial observance, celebrated
this year with pageantry, with fireworks, and with tall
ships whose friendly visits have reminded us of our
close ties, both contemporary and historical, with many
nations around the globe. More importantly, we have
given renewed thought to those principles of liberty
and justice that underlie our national experience.
Reexamined in the light of the past two centuries, the
great instruments of our freedom — the Declaration of
Independence, the Constitution and the Bill of
Righl.s — retain both their vitality and their relevance to
today's jiroblems.
When he introduced his proposal for a Bill of Rights
to the House of Representatives of the First Congress,
James Madison called it "the great work." He said: "It
will be a desirable thing to extinguish from the bosom
of every member of the community, any apprehensions
that there are those among his countrymen who wish to
deprive them of the liberty for which they valiantly
fought and honorably bled."
Madison argued that "the great object in view is to
limit and qualify the powers of Government, by except-
ing out of the grant of power those cases in which the
Government ought not to act, or to act only in a particu-
lar mode." Those cases include rights and freedoms all
Americans cherish today — freedom of religion, of
speech, of the press; security against unreasonable
searches and seizures; freedom from self-incrimination;
the guarantee of due process of law; trial by jury.
Our national commitment to the principles of the Bill
of Rights is echoed in the community of nations by our
respect for the ideals enunciated in the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Na-
tions General Assembly in 1948. This Declaration
eloquently affirms that the foundation of freedom, jus-
tice and peace in the world lies in the recognition of the
inherent dignity, and the equal and inalienable rights,
of all members of the human family.
In December we pay special tribute to these funda-
mental documents. December 15 is the one hundred and
eighty-fifth anniversary of the adoption of the Bill of
Rights and December 10 is the twenty-eighth anniver-
sary of the Universal Declaration. As we enter the
third century of our national existence we need more
than ever to remember that the principles contained in
these fundamental statements of human purpose have
immediate application, not only domestically in our
dealings with one another, but also internationally in
our pursuit of friendly relations with all countries.
Now, Therefore, I, Gerald R. Ford, President of
the United States of America, do hereby proclaim De-
cember 10, 1976, as Human Rights Day and December
15, 1976, as Bill of Rights Day. I call upon the American
people to observe the week beginning December 10,
1976, as Human Rights Week. Further, I ask all Ameri-
cans, as they reflect with conscious pride on our his-
tory, not to be content with past accomplishments but
to recognize the future task of our Nation and mankind:
to bring about the full realization of the ideals and aspi-
rations expressed in the Bill of Rights and the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand
this first day of December, in the year of our Lord nine-
teen hundred seventy-six, and of the Independence of
the United States of America the two hundred and
first.
Gerald R. Ford.
1 No. 4479; 41 Fed. Reg. 52977.
January 10, 1977
29
U.S. Gives Views on U.S.S.R. Proposal for World Treaty
on the Non-Use of Force
Following are statements made in Com-
ynittee I (Political and Security) of the U.N.
General Assembly by U.S. Representative
Albert W. Sherer, Jr., on October 28 and 29
and a statement made in Committee VI
(Legal) by U.S. Representative Robert
Rosenstock on November 22.
AMBASSADOR SHERER, COMMITTEE I
Statement of October 28
L SL'N press release 133 dated October 28
I would like at the outset to touch on a
procedural aspect of this discussion. The
chairman, in making his introduction to the
current item at the morning meeting on Oc-
tober 25, was somewhat imprecise in refer-
ring to the General Assembly's decision as to
the handling of the item. In fact, the General
Committee recommended, on the conciliatory
proposal of President [of the General Assem-
bly Hamilton Shirley] Amerasinghe, that the
item be allocated initially to the First Com-
mittee and thereafter to the Sixth Commit-
tee.
The General Assembly considered this rec-
ommendation the same afternoon. The Presi-
dent of the Assembly stated, and I quote:
. . .it is my understanding that it was agreed that the
item be referred to the sixth committee promptly upon
completion of its consideration in the First Committee.
May I tal<e it that the General Assembly adopts the
General Committee's recommendations?
It was so decided.
We are aware that the President has in-
formed our chairman that this item is to be
referred "at the appropriate stage" to the
Sixth Committee "for examination of its legal
implications"; ^ but what this means, if in-
terpreted in good faith, is that the matter
will be sent promptly to the Sixth Committee
in conformity with the decision of the Gen-
eral Assembly.
As a gesture both to the President and to
the proponents of this item, the U.S. delega-
tion accepted the conciliatory proposal by
President Amerasinghe in the General Com-
mittee and the corresponding decision taken
by the General Assembly. Efforts to deprive
the General Assembly of its rightful oppor-
tunity to consider the significant legal as-
pects involved in the current treaty proposal
amount to a disavowal of the President's
proposal and the Assembly's decision.
Mr. Chairman, this year marks the 31st
anniversary of the United Nations Charter, a
treaty dedicated to the maintenance of inter-
national peace and to the prevention of war.
Every member state of the United Nations
has pledged to uphold the provisions of that
treaty, including article 2, paragraph 3,
which calls upon all members to "settle their
international disputes by peaceful means,"
and article 2, paragraph 4, which obligates
all members to "refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state." In other sec-
tions, the charter goes on to develop further
the obligations of member states regarding
the use of force and, for example, draws a
distinction between the legitimate threat or
use of force in the exercise of the right of in-
dividual or collective self-defense and the
'U.N. doe. A/C.l/31/l/Add.l, Oct. 4, 1976; Alloca-
tion of agenda items to the First Committee; letter
dated Oct. 4 from the President of the General Assem-
bly to the chairman of the committee.
30
Department of State Bulletin
illegitimate use of force for purposes of ag-
gression.
Indeed, the obligations of article 2, para-
graph 4, of the charter regarding the use of
force are binding not only on U.N. members.
They are declarations of general interna-
tional law and represent standards of be-
havior binding on all states. Moreover, it is
essential that we insist upon such a broad
application of these principles if the world is
to have hope of ever being spared continued
lawlessness and violence, whatever their
source.
It is precisely because the charter's basic
provisions concerning the conduct of states
are so clear and have such broad and au-
thoritative application that the United States
views with concern any proposal for their re-
statement or revision. It is important for
world peace that we not diminish the full
force and effect of the obligations imposed by
the United Nations Charter and that any at-
tempt to modify those obligations be under-
taken only in accordance with the provisions
of the charter.
Moreover, because sound international re-
lations depend upon the understanding and
strong support of our citizenry, it is also im-
portant we be confident that any such effort
be accepted as a genuine step forward in the
development of standards by which states
will guide their relations. Otherwise, we
would not only mislead ourselves, our gov-
ernments, and our people but lead them to
treat with suspicion all international under-
standings.
Viewing the Soviet proposal for a treaty on
the non-use of force from these perspec-
tives,^ the United States is forced to con-
clude that, at very best, the proposal would
add nothing to the obligations which we al-
ready have under the charter and therefore
is unnecessary and unwise. Article 2, para-
graphs 3 and 4, set forth the charter's basic
obligations with respect to the peaceful set-
tlement of disputes and the non-use of force,
and the primacy of those obligations is firmly
established by article 103.
Under closer scrutiny, however, the
United States concludes that the Soviet pro-
posal would have us embark on an exercise
which purports to expand but which may in
fact diminish the charter's obligations by
casting doubt on the solemnity of the legal
commitments undertaken therein. The very
proposal of a separate treaty on the non-use
of force tends to undermine existing charter
obligations by implying that the member
states of the United Nations are still free to
adopt or reject the principle of non-use of
force embodied in article 2, paragraph 4, of
the charter. We reject any such suggestion.
Mr. Chairman, there is no lack of obliga-
tions and standards regarding the non-use of
force. These exist, and they can be read in
their most forceful and authoritative version
in the Charter of the United Nations. The
problem lies in continuing unwillingness to
abide by and enforce existing obligations.
In short, we have rules enough. What we
need is the will to adhere to the rules that
exist. It is to that end, rather than to the
repetition and restatement of existing stand-
ards, that the governments of the United
Nations should dedicate themselves.
Statement of October 29
USUN press release 13J dated October 20
The United States will abstain in the vote
on the draft resolution before us (document
A/C.l/31/L.3.)3 We are concerned that the
proposal by the Soviet Union for a treaty on
the non-use of force could undermine the
United Nations Charter — either by need-
lessly duplicating it or by selecting certain
provisions to endorse but omitting others,
thereby adding new and disputed provisions.
These are serious matters, in our view. It is
curious that one of the strongest opponents
of charter review in general seems to have
developed doubts as to the relevance and suf-
ficiency of the charter's basic provisions
^ For text of the propcsed treaty, see U.N. doc.
A/31/24.3, Sept. 28, 1976.
•' The resolution, which "Invites Member states to
examine further the . . . draft World Treaty on the
Non-Use of Force in International Relations . . .," was
adopted by Committee I on Oct. 29 by a rollcall vote of
94 to 2, with 35 abstentions (U.S.), and by the Assem-
bly on Nov. 8 by a recorded vote of 88 to 2, with 31
abstentions (U.S.) (A/RES/31/9).
January 10, 1977
31
against the use of force and in favor of peace-
ful settlements of disputes.
Even with these problems, the United
States could have voted in favor of a study of
the question of the need for or desirabihty of
a new treaty. But what we cannot accept is
the apparent attempt to prejudge the issue.
The draft resolution determines, without any
consultation or discussion of the very serious
issues involved, that a treaty is needed and
that all that remains to be done is to
negotiate the contents of that new treaty.
We described our position to the Soviet dele-
gation and stated our willingness to join in an
objective study of whether there is a need for
such a treaty. We regret that there was no
indication of flexibility on its part in this
matter.
MR. ROSENSTOCK, COMMITTEE VI,
NOVEMBER 22
USUN pie.'is release 156 dated November 22
The prohibition of the threat or use of
force is one of this century's greatest contri-
butions to law and to mankind. The modern
origins of the idea of eliminating force as a
means of settling disputes lie in the great
conferences of the last days of the 19th cen-
tury. The League of Nations Covenant and
the Kellogg-Briand Pact marked the begin-
nings of governmental commitment to norms
designed to eliminate force as a legitimate
aspect of governmental policy.
The Charter of the United Nations repre-
sents the culmination of the drive to elimi-
nate the use of force in international rela-
tions. For the first time in the history of the
world, states e.xpressly committed them-
selves to a binding treaty obligation in article
2, paragraph 4, to "refrain in their interna-
tional relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or polit-
ical independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations." Today that clear and
direct rule is universally recognized as a
peremptory norm of international law bind-
ing on all and not subject to derogation by
unilateral declarations or bilateral agree-
ments.
In the years since 1945, the international
community has deepened its understanding
of this fundamental norm through experience
and through pronouncements such as those
contained in the Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Re-
lations and Cooperation Among States in Ac-
cordance with the Charter. "• It is far from
clear that further U.N. pronouncements on
the matter are likely to be useful.
As a result of the clarity of article 2, para-
graph 4, and the subsequent consideration of
the norm, there is little doubt as to its con-
tent. Indeed, none of the post-1945 armed
conflicts can be attributed to any lack of un-
derstanding of the rule on the part of the de-
cisionmakers in national governments. If one
reflects on the instances of conflict in the last
31 years, one finds occasions of total cynical
or contemptuous disregard of the prohibi-
tion, examples of disputes as to underlying
facts, and instances of long-festering dis-
putes which, left unresolved, exploded into
conflicts.
This analysis leads to the conclusion that
what is desperately needed is not further
glosses on the prohibition of the threat or use
of force or further instruments reiterating
once again obligations none deny, but:
— First, greater will on the part of states
to honor what they know full well to be their
obligations;
— Second, examination of methods of re-
solving differences as to facts and an inten-
sive, prolonged, and detailed examination of
the alternative to the use of force — the
peaceful settlement of disputes.
Clearly, differences between states exist
and will continue to exist for the foreseeable
future. It is a moral as well as a pragmatic
imperative in today's interdependent, nu-
clear world that states become habituated to
settling their disputes by peaceful means.
There is no rational alternative. Unfortu-
nately, while there is much learning and lit-
tle doubt concerning the meaning of para-
graph 4 of article 2 of the charter, the same
^ For text of the declaration, adopted by the General
Assembly on Oct. 24, 1970 (A/RES/2625 (XXV)), see
Bulletin of Nov. 16, 1970, p. 627.
32
Department of State Bulletin
cannot be said of paragraph 3 of article 2.
The charter wisely listed the obligation to
settle international disputes by peaceful
means ahead of the prohibition of the threat
or use of force because disputes must be set-
tled if we are to avoid violence. The two
norms are part of an inseparable whole.
Whether we concentrate on the prohibition
of the threat or use of force or on the peace-
ful settlement of disputes or both, one thing
is clear: the issues are complex and delicate.
If we are to examine these issues usefully,
we must first recognize that they need care-
ful examination grounded in expertise and
experience. They need examination by those
trained in the analysis of legal norms. They
should be examined by the Legal Committee,
which has gained so much learning and made
such contributions as the Declaration on
Friendly Relations and the Aggression Defi-
nition.^ These perceptions are essential to
any serious examination of these questions.
If a detailed examination is to be underta-
ken, we must, moreover, take great care not
to base such an examination on a premise
which is harmful to our shared goal. What-
ever the motivation for the item before us, if
we decide to proceed further with it we must
do so responsibly. The issues are too serious
to allow the matter to be handled in a casual
manner without due regard for the effect this
item may have for concrete obligations.
To commence discussion of the prohibition
of the use of force on the basis that what is
needed is a new treaty is to approach the
problem in a counterproductive manner.
We all have a solemn treaty commitment to
avoid the threat or use of force in the char-
ter. We must not diminish the full force and
effect of these charter obligations by
elaborating a partial parallel treaty struc-
ture. We would do no service to the primacy
of the charter by adopting another treaty on
the same subject matter.
If the provisions of both treaties were to
be identical, we would debase the treatymak-
ing process and rule of pacta sunt servanda
' For text of the Definition of Aggression, adopted by
the General Assembly on Dec. 14, 1974 (A/RES/3314
(XXLX)), see Bulletin of Feb. 3, 1975, p. 158.
[treaties are to be observed] by suggesting
that two treaties are better than one. If the
words of the two treaties were not precisely
the same, comma for comma, a number of dif-
ficulties would be bound to arise. Among the
foremost of the difficulties would be that not
all states will become parties to the second
treaty and we will have two regimes, some-
times parallel, sometimes divergent. A sec-
ond major difficulty that would arise is that
some states will seek to find interpretive
loopholes stemming from the differences be-
tween the two texts, however slight those
differences may be. It is even possible that
some may argue that the elaboration of a new
treaty implies member states are free to
adopt or reject the basic prohibition of the
threat or use of force.
All of these difficulties produce uncer-
tainty and confusion in the critical field of the
prohibition of the threat or use of force. They
must be avoided.
If we are not to follow the treaty route,
but decide the general area merits further
examination, we would do well to ask
whether the suggestions of the character
contained in the U.S.S.R. proposal contain a
useful basis for pursuing the elaboration of a
recommendation such as a resolution or dec-
laration. If it is decided to continue examina-
tion of this matter in the future, this is ob-
viously a question which would need careful
and detailed examination in this committee,
and not something on which we or anyone
else can comment definitively at this time.
What we can do at this point is share some
preliminary reactions with a view to more
considered discussion at any subsequent
stage which may be agreed upon. On balance,
we are inclined to think that the approach
and format contained in the Soviet text are
not, even aside from the inadvisability of a
treaty, a good basis for consideration of the
complex of issues involved in the prohibition
of the threat or use of force and the obliga-
tion to settle disputes by peaceful means.
We are disinclined to take note of an un-
specified series of instruments and declara-
tions, some of which may contain or support
doctrines that are not consonant with the
fundamental obligations of the charter. We
January 10, 1977
33
are, moreover, concerned that any reference
to the Conference on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe not suggest that any one part
of that conference's work is more important
than any other part. The Helsinki Declara-
tion is a compilation of various elements
including the non-use of force but also includ-
ing humanitarian issues and the free ex-
change of ideas and information. ** If the
conference produced nothing more than a
reiteration in nontreaty form of existing ob-
ligations it would be a redundant way to
spend time; the emphasis on human rights
and the free exchange of ideas and informa-
tion is what protects that declaration from a
charge of redundancy.
We see no merit in new paraphrases of ar-
ticle 2, paragraph 4, of the charter, whether
in the context of a treaty or a resolution; for
such a paraphrase can only create confusion
of a potentially dangerous nature. The
danger is enhanced when the paraphrase
takes a single notion out of the context of any
entire legal framework.
We agree that any serious effort to deal
with the problem of the threat or use of force
must deal with the peaceful settlement of
disputes, which is, as noted above, another of
the aspects of the international security sys-
tem as a whole. In order to be meaningful,
however, any effort to deal with peaceful set-
tlement must build upon the principle con-
tained in the Friendly Relations Declaration
that:
Recourse to, or acceptance of, a settlement procedure
freely agreed to by States with regard to existing or
future disputes to which they are parties shall not be
regarded as incompatible with sovereign equality.
What is needed is an examination of the
various means of dispute settlement and a
recognition that acceptance of dispute set-
tlement procedures involving impartial third
parties for future disputes is essential if we
are to eliminate force as a means to settle
disputes. Experience teaches us that once a
dispute has become serious each party may
* For text of the Final Act of the Conference on Secu-
rity and Cooperation in Europe, adopted at Helsinki on
Aug. 1, 1975, see Bulletin of Sept. 1, 197.5, p. 32.3.
be hesitant to seek third-party dispute set-
tlement for fear it is a sign of weakness. The
stronger party is frequently tempted to find
ways of avoiding third-party settlement lest
it lose the advantages flowing from its
superior strength; its public opinion may in-
sist it yield no advantages without a
negotiated quid pro quo.
States derive their sovereignty from inter-
national law. They must come to recognize
that the supreme manifestation of that
sovereignty is to agree not merely to the
principle of peaceful settlement but to mean-
ingful and expeditious settlement proce-
dures. This is where the concern to avoid the
use of force can now be most productively di-
rected.
A meaningful effort to discuss the norms
contained in article 2 of the charter must not
suggest that these norms exist in a vacuum.
Other parts of the entire system, such as
chapters VI [Pacific Settlement of Disputes],
VII [Action With Respect to Threats to the
Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of
Aggression], and VIII [Regional Ar-
rangements], must also be taken into ac-
count, if distortion and confusion are to be
avoided. Emphasis on only some parts of the
interlocking system risks downgrading other
parts. Vague references to measures for lim-
iting confrontation and for disarmament are
more likely to distract us from serious efforts
to reduce armaments and tension than con-
tribute to positive change.
If we are to proceed with future considera-
tion of ways and means of ehminating the use
of force, all of these aspects of the problem
must be carefully studied and analyzed.
There is no benefit to be derived from ill-
considered and hastily adopted political man-
ifestations which reflect merely a general
disinclination to oppose high-sounding
phrases. Such exercises debase the United
Nations and create the risk of lulling some
with the view that our problems have been
lessened.
There are a number of critical problems in
the world. The recurrence of resort to force
is one of them. If this institution determines
that future study of the problem of the use of
34
Department of State Bulletin
force merits priority consideration, then we
need to decide how that consideration is to
proceed. We must not assume that the prob-
lem is simple or subject to ready amelioration
by the hasty adoption of glib generalities. If
we intend to grapple with the problem, we
must do so carefully and with the benefit of
existing expertise. We believe that expertise
exists to a unique extent in the Legal Com-
mittee and are consequently firmly convinced
that any future study of the item should be
conducted in the Legal Committee.
Letters of Credence
India
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of India, Kewal Singh, presented
his credentials to President Ford on
November 30.*
Singapore
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Singapore, Punch Coomara-
swamy, presented his credentials to Presi-
dent Ford on November 30. *
Spain
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Spanish State, Juan Jose Rovira, presented
his credentials to President Ford on
November 30.*
Surinam
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Surinam, Roel F. Karamat, pre-
sented his credentials to President Ford on
November 30."
Venezuela
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Venezuela, Ignacio Iribarren
Borges, presented his credentials to Presi-
dent Ford on November 30.'
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Health
Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the constitution of
the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as
amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva
May 22, 1973.'
Acceptance deposited: The Bahamas, December 14,
1976.
Patents
Strasbourg agreement concerning the international
patent classification. Done at Strasbourg March 24,
1971. Entered into force October 7, 1975. TIAS 8140.
Declaration of continued application: Surinam,
November 16, 1976.
Property — Industrial
Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial
property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at
Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 en-
tered into force May 19, 1970; for the United States
August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 entered into
force April 26, 1970; for the United States September
5, 1970. TIAS 6923.
Notification from World intellectual Property Or-
ganization that accession deposited: The Bahamas
(with the exception of articles 1 to 12), December
10, 1976.
Declaration of continued application: Surinam,
November 16, 1976.
Property — Intellectual
Convention establishing the World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967.
Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United
States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.
Declaration of continued application: Surinam,
November 16, 1976.
Terrorism — Protection of Diplomats
Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes
against internationally protected persons, including
diplomatic agents. Done at New York December 14,
1973.1
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, November 25,
1976.
Trade
Proces-verbal extending the declaration on the provi-
sional accession of Colombia. Done at Geneva
November 12, 1976. Enters into force between Co-
' For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the
President's reply, see Department of State press re-
lease dated Nov. 30.
' Not in force.
January 10, 1977
35
lombia and any participating government as soon as it
has been accepted by Colombia and such government.
Wheat
Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat
trade convention (part of the international wheat
agreement) 1971. Done at Washington March 17,
1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect
to certain provisions and July 1, 1976, with respect to
other provisions.
Ratification deposited: Finland, December 20, 1976.
Accession deposited: Spain, December 22, 1976.
Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid
convention (part of the international wheat agree-
ment) 1971. Done at Washington March 17, 1976. En-
tered into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain
provisions and July 1, 1976, with respect to other
provisions.
Ratification deposited: Finland, December 20, 1976.
BILATERAL
Belize
Memorandum of understanding relating to cooperative
efforts to protect crops from plant pest damage and
plant diseases. Signed at Washington December 8,
1976. Entered into force December 8, 1976.
Bulgaria
Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the
United States, with agreed minute and related letter.
Signed at Washington December 17, 1976. Enters
into force on a date to be mutually agreed by ex-
change of notes.
Federal Republic of Germany
Technical exchange and cooperative arrangement in the
field of management of radioactive wastes, with pat-
ent addendum and appendix. Signed at Bonn De-
cember 20, 1976. Entered into force December 20,
1976.
Haiti
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relat-
ing to the agreement of March 20, 1975, with memo-
randum of understanding. Signed at Port-au-Prince
November 30, 1976. Entered into force November 30,
1976.
Iceland
Memorandum of cooperative mapping arrangements,
with annex. Signed at Washington November 10,
1976. Entered into force November 10, 1976.
Indonesia
Loan agreement relating to the development of higher
education, with annex. Signed at Jakarta October 28,
1976. Entered into force October 28, 1976.
Iran
Agreement concerning management, disposal, and
utilization of funds derived from sale of military as-
sistance program property. Signed at Tehran October
19, 1976. Entered into force October 19, 1976.
Israel
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of ag-
ricultural commodities of September 30, 1976 (TIAS
8382). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington
December 10, 1976. Entered into force December 10,
1976.
Mexico
Agreement relating to additional cooperative arrange-
ments to curb the illegal production and traffic in
narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico
November 22, 1976. Entered into force November 22,
1976.
Pakistan
Loan agreement relating to Tarbela Dam repairs.
Signed at Islamabad September 22, 1976. Entered
into force September 22, 1976.
Loan agreement relating to on-farm management, with
annex. Signed at Islamabad October 27, 1976. En-
tered into force October 27, 1976.
Zaire
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of ag-
ricultural commodities of March 25, 1976 (TIAS
8403). Effected by exchange of notes at Kinshasa Au-
gust 23 and December 7, 1976. Entered into force De-
cember 7, 1976.
Zambia
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, with
minutes. Signed at Lusaka December 3, 1976. En-
tered into force December 3, 1976.
PUBLICATIONS
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copies of any one publication mailed to the same ad-
dress. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of
Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown be-
low, which include domestic postage, are subject to
change.
U.S. Participation in the UN, Report by the Presi-
dent to the Congress for the Year 1975. Annual report
describing activities such as political and security af-
fairs; economic, social, scientific, and human rights
affairs; trusteeship and dependent areas; legal de-
velopments; and budget and administration. Pub. 8880.
International Organization and Conference Series 124.
407 pp. $3.60. (Cat. No. 81.70:8880).
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8317. 6 pp. 350. (Cat. No. 89.10:8317).
Finance — Health Sector Loan. Agreement with the
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No. 89.10:8319).
36
Department of State Bulletin
INDEX January 10, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1959
Arms Control and Disarmament. United States
Discusses Disarmament Issues in U.N. General
Assembly Debate (Ikie, Martin, text of resolu-
tion including Environmental Modification Con-
vention) 17
Environment. United States Discusses Disarma-
ment Issues in U.N. General Assembly Debate
(Ikle, Martin, te.xt of resolution including En-
vironmental Modification Convention) 17
Human Rights. Bill of Rights Day, Human Rights
Day and Week, 1976 (proclamation) 29
India. Letters of Credence (Singh) 35
Presidential Documents. Bill of Rights Day,
Human Rights Day and Week, 1976 (proclama-
tion) 29
Publications. GPO Sales Publications 36
Singapore. Letters of Credence (Coomar-
aswamy) 35
Spain. Letters of Credence (Rovira) 35
Surinam. Letters of Credence (Karamat) 35
Treaty Information. Current Actions 35
United Nations
United States Discusses Disarmament Issues in
U.N. General Assembly Debate (Ikle, Martin,
text of resolution including Environmental Mod-
ification Convention) 17
U.S. Gives Views on U.S.S.R. Proposal for World
Treaty on the Non-Use of Force (Rosenstock,
Sherer) 30
Venezuela. Letters of Credence (Iribarren) 35
Name 1 ttde,r
Coomarasvvamy, Punch 35
Ford, President 29
Ikle, FredC 17
Iribarren Borges, Ignacio 35
Karamat, Roel F 35
Martin, Joseph, Jr 17
Rosenstock, Robert .30
Rovira, Juan Jose 35
Sherer, Albert W. , Jr 30
Singh, Kew-al 35
Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: December 20-26
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20520.
No. Date Subject
*612 12/20 Shipping Coordinating Commit-
tee, Subcommittee on Safety of
Life at Sea, working group on
radioeommunications, Jan. 19.
*613 12/20 Kissinger: Bicentennial essay
published in Dec. 27 issue of
Time magazine.
*614 12/22 Ocean Affairs Advisory Commit-
tee, Jan. 25-26.
*615 12/22 Study group 1, U.S. National
Committee of the International
Telegraph and Telephone Con-
sultative Committee (CCITT),
Jan. 18-19.
t616 12/22 Visit by Ghassan Tueini, special
envoy of Lebanese President
Sarkis.
*617 12/23 Study group CMTT, U.S. National
Committee for the International
Radio Consultative Committee
(CCIR), Jan. 26.
*618 12/23 Study group 2, U.S. National Com-
mittee for CCIR, .Jan. 26.
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
Superintendent of Documents
u.s. government printing office
washington. dc. 20402
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
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Department of State STA-501
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Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted
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mediate attention if you write to: Superintendent
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402.
/J:
/^.
79&0
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Volume LXXVI • No. 1960 • January 17, 1977
U.S. GIVES VIEWS IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE
ON THE MIDDLE EAST
Statement by Ambassador Scranton and Text of Resolution 37
U.S. REAFFIRMS COMMITMENT TO SELF-DETERMINATION
AND INDEPENDENCE FOR NAMIBIA
U.S. Statements and Texts of U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 4-3
U.S. REITERATES SUPPORT FOR NEGOTIATED SOLUTION IN RHODESIA
U.S. statements and Texts of U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 53
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
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Note: Contents of this publication are not
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BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The
BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to
Periodical Literature.
Vol. LXXVI, No. 1960
January 17, 1977
The Department of State BVLLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of U.S. foreign relations and
on the work of the Department and
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses, and
news conferences of the President and
the Secretary of State and other offi-
cers of the Department, as well as spe-
cial articles on various phases of in-
ternational affairs and the functions of
the Department. Information is in-
cluded concerning treaties and inter-
national agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and on treaties of general interna-
tional interest.
Publications of the Department of
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legislative material in the field of\
international relations are also listed.
I
U.S. Gives Views in General Assembly Debate
on the Middle East
Following is a statement made in the U.N.
General Assembly on December 9 by U.S.
Re'presentative William W. Scranton, to-
gether with the texts of two resolutions
adopted by the Assembly that day.
STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCRANTON
USUN press release 184 dated December 9
As we move through the final debates of
this General Assembly session, we are also
approaching the end of a very difficult period
in the history of the Middle East — the year of
the tragedy of Lebanon. I want to express my
government's profound gratification that the
long travail of the people of Lebanon is draw-
ing to an end. We will give every feasible
support to President Sarkis as he faces the
task of the reconstruction of his country; and
we look forward to the day when Lebanon —
its territorial integrity, its political independ-
ence, and its national unity preserved — will
resume its proud and rightful place among the
nations of the Middle East.
In the calmer atmosphere in the area
created by the healing process now going on
in Lebanon, it is natural that attention is
turning again to the overriding issue in the
Middle East — the need for progress toward a
peaceful settlement of the conflict that has so
long burdened that region, and without which
no period of calm can endure. There is
today — and we welcome it — fresh insistence
that the negotiating process recommence and
a sense of impatience with the status quo,
which we share with the parties to the con-
flict. For our part, we believe conditions are
now conducive to the resumption of efforts to
solve the underlying problems both of Leba-
non and of the region as a whole.
We welcome the recent encouraging state-
ments of President Sadat of Egypt and Prime
Minister Rabin of Israel. And here in the
United Nations, I for one was encouraged by
some of the comments made in the most re-
cent Middle East debate, particularly those of
the Jordanian and the Israeli Representa-
tives. And now in this debate we have wit-
nessed a unique experience — the introduction
of resolutions advocating a peace conference
by both Egypt and Israel.'
In the past, events in the Middle East have
often seemed to run ahead of diplomatic ef-
forts to shape them into a peaceful course.
This need not and must not be the pattern for
the future. Out of this conviction were born
the U.S. initiatives in the aftermath of the
1973 war, taken at the request of the parties.
These efforts have yielded the first tangible,
practical steps toward an agreed settlement in
nearly three decades of fighting and uneasy
truces. The three agreements reached in 1974
and 1975 are partial and interim accords, but
they have helped give substance to the
framework for negotiation established in De-
cember 1973 in Geneva. They have begun to
build patterns of cooperation, of interaction,
of negotiation which are necessary prereq-
uisites to successful negotiations for an over-
all settlement.
Mr. President, a new Administration will
take office in Washington on January 20. Ob-
viously I do not speak with authority on the
details of its policies. There is, however, con-
' The Representative of Israel introduced on Dec. 6 a
draft resolution {A/31/L.24) calling for reconvening of
the Peace Conference on the Middle East under the
framework of Security Council Resolutions 242 and .3.38.
An amendment (A/31/L.25) was introduced calling for
participation by the Palestine Liberation Organization.
The Representative of Isi-ael withdrew the draft res-
olution on Dec. 9.
January 17, 1977
37
sistency in the approach of the United States
to the problems of the Middle East, which re-
flects principles and policies enjoying over-
whelming public support in our country. With
full conviction and confidence, I therefore say
to those parties with whom we have worked
in the Middle East to advance the cause of
peace that they can rest assured we will con-
tinue to work with them in this vital effort in
the months and the years ahead. Much has
been accomplished already. Mutual commit-
ments have been made to pursue the negotiat-
ing process; and there is a balanced and
comprehensive framework in the form of Res-
olutions 242 and 338, which contain the fun-
damental elements for those negotiations. The
United States will not now abandon its de-
termined and urgent search for peace. We will
persevere, and we are convinced that a set-
tlement will be achieved. The alternative is
unthinkable.
I turn now to the resolutions under consid-
eration in connection with our discussion of
the situation. The omnibus resolution [A/31/
L.26] is similar in many respects to a resolu-
tion we opposed last year. We shall do so
again.
We do not beheve that the blanket condem-
nations of one side contained in this resolution
are warranted or will have any positive effect.
Nor do we see any logic in a call on all states
to desist from supplying military and other
aid to one side but not to the other. The
United States cannot support and will not be
guided by this proposal if it is endorsed.
This resolution also lacks balance in its ref-
erence to the potential elements of a peace.
One side cannot be expected to give every-
thing and gain nothing.
There is no i-eference (1) to the end of the
state of war; (2) to an agreement which pro-
vides not only for the legitimate interests of
the Palestinians but for the security of Israel
as well; and (3) to the right of a free and inde-
pendent Israel to exist in the Middle East.
This resolution contains a request to the
Security Council that carries at least the im-
plication that somehow it ought to impose a
settlement on the parties and that this should
be done within an "appropriate time-table," as
it says. The parties to this dispute have
accepted the framework for a negotiating proc-
ess which is aimed at producing an agreed solu-
tion. This is the essence of what has been
accomplished— a mutual commitment to
negotiate rather than to rely on timetables or
imposed solutions. The Security Council has
in the past and can in the future make impor-
tant contributions to peace in the Middle
East. However, we do not believe it is either
appropriate or practical to look to the Council
to impose its will on the parties to the negoti-
ations.
The temptation to write prescriptions in
advance is a natural one, but it is also danger-
ous. Such prescriptions, hastily formed, can
close the door to peace rather than opening
it — because there are still differences among
us, and especially among the parties directly
involved in the dispute, and those differences
can only be resolved by negotiation between
those parties. We cannot write a peace
agreement here, not among 146 nations, nor
can we bring about a detailed prescription for
the procedure for reconvening the Geneva
Conference without raising the possibility of
ahenation of one or more of the parties, which
would doom the conference before it began.
This brings me to the second draft before
us, resolution A/31/L.27. The motivation and
a good deal of the resolution itself is consist-
ent with our view of the urgency of resuming
the negotiating process. We are compelled,
however, to vote "No" because of serious
problems in two areas. First, this resolution
sets an artificial deadline for reconvening of
the Geneva Conference. This is not a matter
for the General Assembly but, rather, for the
parties themselves to decide. It also sets out a
time frame for a meeting of the Security
Council, a decision which we believe should be
subject to consultations among Council mem-
bers in light of the situation at that time and
not prejudged by this Assembly. Secondly,
the request to the Secretary General to re-
sume his contacts with the parties to the con-
flict is phrased in such a way as to imply that
the Palestine Liberation Organization should
be one of the parties consulted in preparation
for reconvening the Geneva Conference. We
38
Department of State Bulletin
i ilieve that the question of additional partici-
pants at the Geneva Conference is one which
(.an only be addressed by the original partici-
pants themselves.
And now the United States is in a special
position which we recognize concerning this
particular resolution and, indeed, with regard
to the reconvening of the Middle East Peace
Conference — a position with which all of you
are intimately familiar. A new U.S. Adminis-
tration will take office in Washington on
January 20, and we therefore do not consider
it appropriate to join now in a definition of de-
tailed options or time limits governing the
evolution of this crucial negotiating process.
The procedures and timing of a resumed
Geneva Conference are matters which rightly
must be determined by the participants them-
selves and by the cochairmen. This is ob-
viously a question which will be addressed by
the new American Administration. Accord-
ingly, we will vote "No" on this resolution.
However, in so doing we join with all the rest
of the nations here represented who sincerely
desire that negotiations toward an overall set-
tlement resume promptly and that peace be
the result therefrom for all the peoples of the
Middle East.
In this connection, Mr. President, I would
like to recall the words of Secretary of State
Kissinger in speaking to this Assembly on
September 22, 1975:
In the Middle East today there is a yearning for
peace surpassing any known for three decades. Let us
not doom the region to another generation of futile
struggle. Instead, let the world community seize the
historic opportunity before it. The suffering and brav-
ery of all the peoples of the Middle East cry out for it;
the hopes and interests of all the world's peoples de-
mand it. The United States promises its full dedication
to further progress toward peace.
Those words have gained in urgency in the
months since they were spoken, but the op-
portunity for peace still remains with us.
And now, Mr. President, I ask for the in-
dulgence of this body for a few moments more
to recount a personal experience. Some of you
may remember that in 1968 there was also a
change of Administration in the United
States, that I was sent by the then
President-elect on a short mission to the Mid-
dle East. Upon returning from consultations
with leaders there, I reported that many be-
lieved there was then an opportunity for
negotiations toward a peaceful settlement.
Some experts and some of us nonexperts
agreed.
Such negotiations did not materialize. His-
torians may argue forever as to whether or
not an opportunity was missed. But that ex-
perience of disappointment runs deep in my
memory and lingers on and on.
Right now there appears to be another op-
portunity. Many experts and many of us who
are nonexperts believe that negotiations are
possible now and should be undertaken. Ap-
parently more are of this opinion now than in
1968. The possibility is exciting — it's
enticing — even to the point of a gleam of hope
of an overall settlement. And with this ex-
citement comes a new responsibility, a deep
and abiding responsibility, to us all in this
body. Rhetoric for home consumption,
polemics for home headlines, should be
avoided. In advance of negotiations, beguiling
prescriptions for results that will be "your
way," or "my way," or "our way" can block
that opportunity for negotiation. The slightest
error, a misstatement, a mismeaning here can
ruin that chance.
I know it is no time for lectures either,
especially from an American who is in com-
parative safety thousands of miles away — no
lecture to an Egyptian or a Syrian or a Jorda-
nian or an Israeli or a Palestinian who has
lived on the brink of war or experienced war
itself over decades and who even today won-
ders, "Will it come again next year, or next
month, or next week, or tomorrow?" This is
no lecture. I simply request with all my heart
that we all think before we speak now, that
we all think before we act, so that like those of
us who had some hopes in 1968 we will not
witness and feel our hopes dashed.
Peacekeeping and peacemaking are very
difficult; they are very tenuous efforts. No
one knows that better than members of the
United Nations. In comparison to lasting
peace, war comes all too easily. So let us work
quietly for negotiation to begin so that peace
may come.
January 17, 1977
39
TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS
General Assembly Resolution 31/61
The Situation in the Middle East
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolution 3414 (XXX) of 5 December
1975 and noting with concern that no progress has been
achieved towards the implementation of that resolution,
in particular its paragraph 4,
Recalliny the debate held in the Security Council in
January IS^G on the problem of the Middle East includ-
ing the Palestinian question, in implementation of sub-
paragraph (a) of Council resolution 381 (1975) of 30
November 1975,
Deeply concerned at the increasing deterioration of
the situation in the Middle East due to continued Israeli
occupation and Israel's refusal to implement United
Nations resolutions,
Reaffirming the necessity of establishing a just and
lasting peace in the region based on full respect for the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations as well as for the resolutions concerning the
problem of the Middle East and the question of Pales-
tine,
1. Affirms that the early resumption of the Peace
Conference on the Middle East with the participation of
all the parties concerned, including the Palestine Lib-
eration Organization, in accordance with General As-
sembly resolution 3375 (XXX) of 10 November 1975, is
essential for the realization of a just and lasting settle-
ment in the region:
2. Condemns Israel's continued occupation of Arab
territories in violation of the Charter of the United Na-
tions, the principles of international law and repeated
United Nations resolutions;
3. Reaffirms that a just and lasting peace in the Mid-
dle East cannot be achieved without Israel's with-
drawal from all Arab territories occupied since 1967 and
the attainment by the Palestinian people of their in-
alienable rights, which are the basic prerequisites enabling
all countries and peoples in the Middle East to live in
peace;
4. Condemns all measures taken by Israel in the oc-
cupied territories to change the demographic and geo-
graphic character and institutional structure of these
territories;
5. Requests once again all States to desist from sup-
plying Israel with military and other forms of aid or any
assistance which would enable it to consolidate its occu-
pation or to exploit the natural resources of the oc-
cupied territories;
6. Requests the Security Council to take effective
measures, within an appropriate time-table, for the im-
plementation of all relevant resolutions of the Council
and the General Assembly on the Middle East and
Palestine;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to inform the Co-
Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East
of the present resolution and to submit a report on the
follow-up of its implementation to the General Assem-
bly at its thirty-second session.
General Assembly Resolution 31/62 ^
Peace Conference on the Middle East
The General Assembly,
Having discussed the item entitled "The situation in
the Middle East",
Noting the report of the Secretary-General on this
item and his initiative of 1 April 1976,
Gravely concerned at the lack of progress towards
the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Mid-
dle East,
Convinced that any relaxation in the search for a
comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the
Middle East problem to achieve a just peace in the area
constitutes a grave threat to the prospects of peace in
the Middle East as well as a threat to international
peace and security,
1. Requests the Secretary-General:
(a) To resume contacts with all the parties to the con-
flict and the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on
the Middle East, in accordance with his initiative of 1
April 1976, in preparation for the early convening of the
Peace Conference on the Middle East;
(b) To submit a report to the Security Council on the
results of his contacts and on the situation in the Middle
East not later than 1 March 1977:
2. Calls for the early convening of the Peace Confer-
ence on the Middle East, under the auspices of the
United Nations and the co-chairmanship of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of
America, not later than the end of March 1977;
3. Requests the Security Council to convene sub-
sequent to the submission by the Secretary-General of
the report referred to in paragraph 1 (b) above, in order
to consider the situation in the area in the light of that
report and to promote the process towards the estab-
lishment of a just and lasting peace in the area;
4. Further requests the Secretary-General to inform
the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle
East of the present resolution.
^ Adopted by the Assembly on Dec. 9 by a rolleall
vote of 91 to 11 (U.S.), with 29 abstentions (text from
U.N. doc. A/31/L.26, draft resolution).
^ Adopted by the Assembly on Dec. 9 by a rolleall
vote of 122 to'2 (U.S.), with 8 abstentions (text from
U.N. doc. A/31/L.27, draft resolution, with revision by
the sponsors).
40
Department of State Bulletin
U.S. Votes Against U.N. Resolution
on Question of Palestine
Folloiving /,s a statement made in the U.N.
General Assembly by U.S. Representative
William W. Scranton on November 23.
USUN press rele^ise 159 dated November 23
That the legitimate aspirations and inter-
ests of the Palestinian people must be taken
into account in working out a settlement in
the Middle East is an elementary truth.
Without doubt, this is one of the central is-
sues that must be resolved in the negotia-
tions to have a just and lasting peace, which
is what we all seek for the Middle East. The
United States matches its commitment to
such an outcome with any other country here
represented.
But the committee's report we are consid-
ering today is based on this premise without
consideration of other vital and absolutely
essential issues; or if there was consideration
given to these issues, they are not repre-
sented in the report whatsoever. ^
I shall name but a few. There is no mention
of the right of an Israel to exist in the Middle
East. The need for the Palestinians to accept
the legitimacy and reality of the State of Is-
rael is utterly ignored. The maintenance of
normal and peaceful relations with Israel
within the framework of an overall peace set-
tlement is not mentioned. Moreover,
nowhere in the recommendations is there the
stipulation that the Arab states, as well as
Israel, must join in ending the state of war
and in arriving at a peaceful settlement in
the area. Even these few examples make
clear the one-sidedness and lack of balance in
the committee's report.
There is one further very basic flaw in the
report. In large measure the committee's
recommendations prejudge the outcome of
negotiations — negotiations that must take
' Report of the Committee on the Exercise of the In-
alienable Rights of the Palestinian People, Official Rec-
ords of the General Assembly, Thirty-First Session,
Supplement No. 35 (A/31/35). "
place between the parties themselves in ac-
cordance with Security Council Resolutions
242 and 338. Any individual or state involved
in international negotiations is aware that no
solution to this or any other dispute can be
imposed by this Assembly. Such an imposi-
tion without agreement of the parties is ob-
viously unfair in the first place, but it is
futile besides. It is senseless because it will
not work.
One recommendation in the report, that
there be a complete withdrawal by Israeli oc-
cupation forces "no later than 1 June 1977,"
utterly conflicts with Security Council Res-
olutions 242 and 338, which call for negotia-
tions between the parties concerned for the
purpose of settling all outstanding problems.
In short, this recommendation would have us
circumvent the framework of a negotiated
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict as es-
tablished by the United Nations itself.
The purpose of negotiation is to reconcile
differences, to balance the rights and inter-
ests of the parties involved, and, in this case,
to do so within the framework which fully
considers the inhabitants of the region. Such
negotiations cannot take place in the General
Assembly.
I conclude from reading the report that the
committee had one intention: to bring to the
attention of the General Assembly that the
legitimate aspirations and interests of the
Palestinian people must be taken into ac-
count in working out a settlement in the
Middle East. With this conclusion we agree.
But to draw from that premise a report
which attempts to impose a solution to the
Arab-Israeli dispute by this Assembly, ut-
terly ignoring other basic issues in this dis-
pute, a text totally devoid of balance, with
conclusions that are unworkable and recom-
mendations which prejudge the outcome of
negotiations — frankly and bluntly, that
makes the United Nations look ridiculous.
Further, Mr. President, in this resolution
we are also asked to vote to extend the man-
date of this committee. No constructive
purpose will be served by this action. The
committee's work is finished. It has produced
a report setting forth the views and recom-
January 17, 1977
41
mendations of the members of the committee.
An extension of the committee's mandate will
not contribute in any way whatsoever to the
work that lies ahead; namely, negotiations
among the parties themselves.
We are also asked to refer this question
once again to the Security Council. The
Council has already considered the commit-
tee's report. Will a solution to the dispute be
advanced by another Security Council meet-
ing on the subject? Of course not.
So far the Council has considered the prob-
lems associated with the occupied territories
and the future of the Palestinian people on
five separate occasions this year. Over and
over again the same speakers say the same
things, and none of this excessive rhetoric
advances the negotiations even by one step.
For all these reasons the United States
will vote "No" on the resolution before us,^ as
we did last June in the Security Council on the
Palestine Committee report.^
I believe this body intends to be a respon-
sible one. We understand the motive behind
this report, the deep feelings of the members
of the committee for the Palestinian people
and their longstanding sufferings in the Mid-
dle East. The vivid image of one of those ref-
ugee camps lives with me always, as I am
sure it does with each and every one of you
who may have visited them. All of us — I as-
sume every single one of us here — want to
resolve that problem for those people, for all
the people of the Middle East — indeed, for
the world, for peace, and for humanity.
Recently we have been reading and hear-
ing about the possibility of another effort for
peace in the Middle East. I am one of those
who believes that such an opportunity exists.
I hope and pray it will be undertaken. For
the General Assembly cannot impose peace
^At the conclusion of its debate on agenda item 27,
Question of Palestine, the Assembly on Nov. 24 adopted
by a recorded vote of 90 to 16 (U.S.), with 30 absten-
tions, resolution 31/20, which, inter alia, "authorizes
the Committee to e.xert all efforts to promote the im-
plementation of its recommendations and to report
thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-second
session" and "urges the Security Council to "consider
once again as soon as possible the recommendations con-
tained in the report ..."
= For background, see Bulletin of July 26, 1976, p.
143.
on the Middle East dispute. Lasting peace
can come only through negotiation by the
parties directly involved.
The talking should stop and the negotiat-
ing begin. The framework for these negotia-
tions exists — the framework established by
the United Nations. Diplomatic channels are
open. This Assembly should get on with its
other work.
U.N. Disengagement Observer Force
in Israel-Syria Sector Extended
Following is a stateynent made in the U.N.
Security Council by U.S. Representative W.
Tapley Bennett, Jr., on November 30.
USUN press rele,ise 169 (ialed November 30
The United States is gratified that the re-
newal of the mandate of UNDOF has been
expeditiously handled.' Keeping the peace is
a goal on which we can all agree, and
UNDOF has done an outstanding job in over-
seeing the cease-fire on the Golan Heights.
My delegation would like to commend in par-
ticular the excellent work done by the Secre-
tary General and by the Commander of
UNDOF.
The cooperation of the Governments of Is-
rael and Syria with UNDOF has assured the
success of UNDOF's mission. It is the two
parties who have kept the cease-fire. Their
agreement to the resolution extending
UNDOF's mandate is a major element in the
Council's action. Today's decision by the Se-
curity Council is an important contribution to
the maintenance of peace.
In concluding, I should like to congratulate
you, Mr. President [Jorge Enrique Illueca, of
Panama], for your persistent efforts in bring-
ing about the agreement of the parties to this
further renewal of UNDOF.
' The Security Council on Nov. 30 adopted a resolu-
tion (S/RES/398 (1976)) renewing "the mandate of the
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for
another period of six months, that is, until 31 May
1977." The vote was 12 (U.S.) to 0; Benin, the People's
Republic of China, and Libya did not participate in the
voting.
42
Department of State Bulletin
U.S. Reaffirms Commitment to Self-Determination
and Independence for Namibia
Following are statements made in Commit-
tee IV (Trusteeship) of the U.N. General As-
sembly on December 2 by U.S. Representative
Williant W. Scranton and on December 10 by
U.S. Representative Stephen Hess, together
with the texts of tivo resohdions adopted by
the comrnittee on December 10 and by the As-
sembly on December 20.
U.S. STATEMENTS IN COMMITTEE IV
Ambassador Scranton, December 2
USUN press release 176 dated December 2
This year has been crucial for southern Af-
rica. It has also been an important year in the
relations of my country with that region of the
world.
As members of this Assembly know, at
Lusaka in April Secretary of State Kissinger
launched a major diplomatic initiative to en-
courage positive change in southern Africa.
He offered to assist the nations of the region
in negotiating solutions to the dangerous
problems of Southern Rhodesia and Namibia.
As a result of intensive consultations among
the frontline states of southern Africa, South
Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United
States, consideration of the Rhodesian prob-
lem has now shifted to the conference table in
Geneva. While very difficult problems, very
serious problems, remain to be resolved, the
important fact is that independence and
majority rule in Rhodesia are closer today as
a result of British and American efforts than
many would have expected at the beginning of
the year.
This year has also witnessed extensive con-
sultations to bring the Namibian problem to
the conference table. The United States has
made a concerted and vigorous effort to per-
suade the interested parties to resolve the
problem of Namibia by negotiations and not
bloodshed. Although formal talks have not yet
begun, progress has been made and diplomatic
consultations continue.
The United States is dedicated to ending
the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Af-
rica and to bringing about majority rule and
independence for Namibia as a single, unitary
state. Secretary Kissinger outlined the main
elements of a negotiated solution to the
Namibian problem in his speech to the Gen-
eral Assembly on September 30. The United
States favors the following elements:
— Independence for Namibia within a fixed,
short time Hmit;
— The calhng of a constitutional conference
at a neutral location under the United Nations
aegis; and
— The participation in that conference of all
authentic national forces including, specifical-
ly, SWAPO [South West Africa People's Or-
ganization].
In a meeting the day before his speech, the
Secretary underlined to Mr. Sam Nujoma, the
president of SWAPO, the importance which
the United States attaches to the participa-
tion of SWAPO.
Progress toward all these objectives has
been made in negotiations with the Govern-
ment of South Africa.
But we must also be reahstic. There are
other genuine Namibian interests and voices
which must be heard on the future of the ter-
ritory. The United States believes that the
place to resolve the differences between the
parties to the Namibian problem is the con-
ference table. We will exert every effort to
bring the parties to undertake a process of
negotiations.
January 17, 1977
43
At the same time, candor requires me to
state that there are governments and indi-
viduals who appear determined to raise bar-
riers to a peaceful settlement and to create an
atmosphere in which it will become increas-
ingly difficult for the United States to assist
the parties. Demagoguery has been employed
and unfounded allegations have been propa-
gated, clearly intended to diminish the
chances of bringing about the negotiated set-
tlement which this organization has been
seeking. There are also, unfortunately, those
who, while proposing no constructive solu-
tions of their own, seek through their words
and actions to impede the efforts of others.
There have recently been absurd stories in
the world press about alleged U.S. policy on
Namibia. Accusatory fabrications have been
issued — that the United States plans to create
an army in Namibia, that the United States
has already chosen a candidate to lead an in-
dependent Namibia. There is not a shred of
truth in either of these accusations. The ob-
ject of these attacks can only be to discredit
efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement.
However, we will not be deterred in our
search for a peaceful and realistic path to
genuine freedom and independence for
Namibia, but we do wish to point out that
constant calumnies can only impede progress
toward a solution.
Mr. President, there are several other as-
pects of my government's policy toward
Namibia which I would like to bring to your
attention:
In addition to the major diplomatic effort
which the United States has made during the
past year, my government has also been ac-
tive in providing educational assistance to
young Namibians. In the past year the United
States has provided $300,000 for the training
of Namibian students to help prepare them to
assume the obligations of building and ad-
ministering an independent Namibia. The
United States has contributed $250,000 to the
United Nations Institute for Namibia in
Lusaka and $50,000 to the United Nations
Educational and Training Program for South-
ern Africa, specially earmarked for Nami-
bians. These contributions also reflect the im-
portance the United States places in the
United Nations as the legitimate authority for
Namibia.
The United States also remains seriously
concerned over the application of South Afri-
can legislation in the territory. We have pro-
tested to the South African authorities the en-
forcement of the Terrorism Act in Namibia.
In May we protested against a particular ap-
plication of the act against four Namibians,
two of whom were sentenced to death.
In conclusion, Mr. President, I would like
to reaffirm the commitment of the United
States to achieving self-determination and in-
dependence in Namibia in accordance with Se-
curity Council Resolution 385. Our support for
these principles remains as strong today as
any time in past years. The United States has
worked hard to advance the process leading to
Namibian independence; actions to impede
our efforts do not help this process.
The United States strongly urges all the
parties concerned with Namibia to resolve
their differences and work out at the confer-
ence table the transition to a free and inde-
pendent nation. As Secretary Kissinger said
on September 30, the United States pledges
"our continued solicitude for the independence
of Namibia so that it may, in the end, be a
proud achievement of this organization and a
symbol of international cooperation."
Mr. Hess, December 10
USUN press release 1H6 dated December 10
The United States has voted against draft
resolution A/C.4/31/L.30 [A/RES/31/146],
concerning the situation in Namibia, because
we cannot support a number of its para-
graphs. We cannot, for example, be party to
the endorsement in the resolution of armed
struggle as a means to resolve the Namibian
problem. As the United States e.xplained dur-
ing the general debate, we are committed to
the search for a peaceful, negotiated solution
to the Namibian problem.
The United States also cannot support the
paragraphs of that resolution which describe
the situation in Namibia as constituting a
threat to international peace and security and
call on the Security Council to impose a man-
datory arms embargo against South Africa.
44
Department of State Bulletin
As is well known, the United States also does
not regard any of the political groups inside or
outside of Namibia as the sole authentic rep-
resentative of the Namibian people.
The United States abstained on draft res-
olution A/C.4/31/L.31 [A/RES/31/147], con-
cerning the program of work of the United
Nations Council for Namibia. Our position is
consistent with our past abstentions on
Resolution 2248 and others, since we have
reservations about the implications of the res-
olution and the practical authority of the
Council. We also cannot support all the rec-
ommendations of the Council for Namibia re-
port [U.S. doc. A/31/24].
The United States abstained on draft res-
olution A/C.4/31/L.32 [A/RES/31/148], con-
cerning the intensification and coordination of
United Nations action in support of Namibia,
since we cannot accept the blanket condemna-
tion of economic relations with South Africa
which would include termination of business
interests established in Namibia prior to the
termination of South Africa's mandate. We
also have reservations as to whether it is feas-
ible and legally appropriate to require
member states to enforce the provisions of
Decree No. 1 of the United Nations Council
for Namibia.
The United States abstained on draft res-
olution A/C.4/31/L.33 [A/RES/31/149], con-
cerning action by intergovernmental and
nongovernmental organizations with respect
to Namibia, because we cannot support that
paragraph which calls for such assistance by
the specialized agencies to a liberation move-
ment. Our views on that question were dis-
cussed in detail in the Fourth Committee
earlier this year.
The United States abstained on draft res-
olution A/C.4/31/L.34 [A/RES/31/150], con-
cerning dissemination of information on
Namibia, because, among other things, we
oppose the excessive expenditure of U.N.
funds which will be necessitated by the pubhc-
ity campaign recommended in this resolution.
We reserve the right to oppose the financial
implications of this resolution when it comes
before the Fifth Committee.
The United States was pleased to partici-
pate in the adoption without a vote of draft
resolution A/C.4/31/L.35 [A/RES/31/151],
concerning the United Nations Fund for
Namibia. Our position on this resolution,
however, does not indicate a change in our
view that U.N. voluntary funds should be
maintained by voluntary contributions and not
by disbursements of the regular United Na-
tions budget.
The United States has abstained on draft
resolution A/C.4/31/L.36 [A/RES/31/152],
concerning observer status for the South
West Africa People's Organization. As U.S.
spokesmen have indicated many times, we
view SWAPO as an important element of any
future state of Namibia, but there are other
Namibian voices which must also be heard.
We do not consider SWAPO to be the sole
legitimate representative of all the Namibian
people. This resolution's designation of
SWAPO would seem to preclude any role for
any other Namibians at the United Nations.
The United States cannot support this view,
nor do we believe it advances the prospects
for negotiations.
The United States was pleased to partici-
pate in the consensus adoption of draft resolu-
tion A/C.4/31/L.37 [A/RES/31/153], concern-
ing the nationhood program. We have
supported this resolution because we endorse
efforts to prepare the people of Namibia for
independence while not wishing to signify
any change in our position on SWAPO, al-
ready mentioned in this explanation of our
voting.
Mr. Chairman, I would also like to use this
occasion to deny the allegation that the
United States has licensed or shipped any
armored personnel carriers to Namibia. Fur-
ther, I reiterate that the United States con-
tinues to enforce strictly our arms embargo
against South Africa.
In conclusion, I wish to point out that de-
spite our disagreement with a number of
points in these resolutions, the United States
remains steadfast in its policy of seeking to
promote a conference of the parties involved
in the Namibian problem, under U.N. aus-
pices, at the earliest possible date, with a
view toward achieving early independence.
We continue to support the provisions of Se-
curity Council Resolution 385 concerning the
future of the territory.
I would reiterate the statement made by
January 17, 1977
45
Ambassador Scranton in the Fourth Commit-
tee on December 2, when he stated, "The
United States is dedicated to ending the il-
legal occupation of Namibia by South Africa
and to bringing about majority rule and inde-
pendence for Namibia as a single, unitary
state."
Furthermore, as Secretary Kissinger said
on September 30, the United States pledges
"our continued solicitude for the independence
of Namibia so that it may ... be a proud
achievement of this organization and a symbol
of international cooperation."
Mr. Chairman, the "no" vote and the
"abstention" votes of my government today
reflect the views that we do not feel that
these resolutions positively contribute to this
worthy goal..
TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS
General Assembly Resolution 31/146 '
Situation in Namibia resulting from the illegal
occupation of the Territory by South Africa
The General Assemblii,
Having examined the report of the United Nations
Council for Namibia and the relevant chapters of the
report of the Special Committee on the Situation with
regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples,
Having heard the statements of the representative
of the South West Africa People's Organization, who
participated in an observer capacity in the considera-
tion of the item by the Fourth Committee,
Recalling its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December
1960, containing the Declaration on the Granting of In-
dependence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
Recalling, in particular, its resolutions 214.5 (XXI) of
27 October 1966 and 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967 and sub-
sequent resolutions of both the General Assembly and
the Security Council relating to the question of
Namibia, as well as the advisory opinion of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice of 21 June 1971, delivered in re-
sponse to the request addressed to it by the Council in
its resolution 284 (1970) of 29 July 1970,
Taking into consideration the relevant resolution
' Adopted by the committee on Dec. 10 by a recorded
vote of 108 to 6 (U.S.), with 12 abstentions, and by the
Assembly on Dec. 20 by a recorded vote of 107" to 6
(U.S.), with 12 ab.stentions (te.xt from U.N. doc. A/.31/
437, report of the Fourth Committee on agenda item 85,
Question of Namibia).
adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization
of African Unity at its twenty-seventh ordinary ses-
sion, and subsequently endorsed by the Assembly of
Heads of State and Government of the Organization of
African Unity at its thirteenth ordinary session, held at
Port Louis in July 1976,
Also taking into consideration the political declara-
tion and the resolution relating to Namibia adopted by
the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government
of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Colombo in August
1976,
Reaffirming that the Territory and people of Namibia
are the direct responsibility of the United Nations and
that the Namibian people must be enabled to attain
self-determination and independence within a united
Namibia,
Strongly deploring South Africa's continued refusal
to comply with the resolutions and decisions of the
United Nations, its continued illegal occupation of
Namibia, its brutal repression of the Namibian people
and its persistent violation of their human rights, as
well as its efforts to destroy the national unity and ter-
ritorial integrity of Namibia,
Strongly condemning attempts by South Africa,
through the convening of a so-called constitutional con-
ference, to perpetuate its colonial e.xploitation of the
people and resources of Namibia by misrepresenting
the genuine aspirations of the Namibian people.
Gravely concerned at the militarization of Namibia by
the illegal occupation regime of South Africa, its
threats and acts of aggression against independent Af-
rican countries and the forceful removal of Namibians
from the northern border of the Territory for military
purposes.
Strongly deploring the policies of those States,
which, despite the relevant decisions of the United Na-
tions and the advisory opinion of the International
Court of Justice of 21 June 1971, continue to maintain
diplomatic, economic, consular and other relations with
South Africa, purporting to act on behalf of or concern-
ing Namibia, as well as military or strategic collabora-
tion, all of which has the effect of supporting or
encouraging South Africa in its defiance of the United
Nations,
Recognizing that the situation in Namibia constitutes
a threat to international peace and security.
Noting with satisfaction the opposition of the Nami-
bian people to South Africa's illegal presence in the
Territory and to its oppressive racist policies and, in
particular, the progress of their struggle in all its forms
for national liberation under the leadership of the South
West Africa People's Oi'ganization,
Strongly supporting the efforts of the United Nations
Council for Namibia in the discharge of the respon-
sibilities entrusted to it by the relevant resolutions of
the General Assembly,
1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of
Namibia to self-determination, freedom and national
independence in a united Namibia, in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations and as recognized in
resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2145 (XXI), as well as sub-
46
Department of State Bulletin
se(juent resolutions of the General Assembly relating to
Namibia, and the legitimacy of their strugjile by all
means at their disposal against the illegal occupation of
their Territoi'y by South Africa:
2. Recogiiizef! that the national liberation movement
of Namibia, the South West Africa People's Organiza-
tion, is the sole and authentic representative of the
Namibian people;
3. Supports the armed struggle of the Namibian
people, led by the South West Africa People's Organi-
zation, to achieve self-determination, freedom and na-
tional independence in a united Namibia;
4. Appeah to all States Members of the United Na-
tions to grant all necessary support and assistance to
the South West Africa People's Organization in its
struggle to achieve independence and national unity for
Namibia;
5. Requests all specialized agencies and other or-
ganizations within the United Nations system to pre-
pare, in consultation with the United Nations Council
for Namibia and within their respective spheres of
competence, programmes of assistance to the people of
Namibia and their liberation movement, the South
West Africa People's Organization;
6. Decides to increase the financial provisions in the
budget of the United Nations Council for Namibia to
finance the office of the South West Africa People's Or-
ganization in New York, in order to ensure the due and
proper representation of the people of Namibia through
the South West Africa People's Organization at the
United Nations;
7. Decides to continue to defray the expenses of a
representative of the South West Africa People's Or-
ganization, whenever the United Nations Council for
Namibia so requires;
8. Strongly condemns South Africa for its persistent
refusal to withdraw from Namibia and for its ma-
noeuvres to consolidate its illegal occupation of the Ter-
ritory;
9. Strongly condemns the illegal South African ad-
ministration for its aggression against the Namibian
people and their national liberation movement;
10. Sti-ongly condemns the illegal South African ad-
ministration for its massive repression of the people of
Namibia and their liberation movement with the inten-
tion of establishing, among other things, an atmosphere
of intimidation and terror for the purpose of imposing
upon the Namibian people a bogus constitutional struc-
ture aimed at subverting the territorial integrity and
unity of Namibia and perpetuating a ruthless policy of
racial segregation;
11. Strongly condemns South Africa for its military
build-up in Namibia, its threats and acts of aggression
against independent African countries and the forceful
removal of Namibians from the northern border of the
Territory for military purposes;
12. Strongly condemns South Africa for organizing
the so-called constitutional talks at Windhoek, which
seek to perpetuate the apartheid and homelands
policies as well as the colonial oppression and exploita-
tion of the people and resources of Namibia by misrep-
resenting the genuine aspirations of the Namibian people
for self-determination, freedom and national independ-
ence in a united Namibia;
13. Urgently calls ujion the international community,
especially all States Members of the United Nations, to
refrain from according any recognition to. or co-
operation with, any authority which the illegal occupa-
tion regime may install under the cui-rent fraudulent
constitutional talks or any other circumstances in
Namibia;
14. Strongly condemns the activities of all foreign
corporations operating in Namibia under the illegal ad-
ministration of South Africa which are exi)loiting the
human and natural resources of the Tei'ritory. and de-
mands that such exploitation cease forthwith;
15. Reaffirms that the activities of those coi'poi'ations
are illegal;
16. Decides that any independence talks regarding
Namibia must be between the representatives of South
Africa and the South West Africa People's Organiza-
tion, under the auspices of the United Nations, for the
sole purpose of discussing the modalities for the trans-
fer of power to the people of Namibia;
17. Requests all Member States to co-operate fully
with the United Nations Council for Namibia in dis-
charging the mandate entrusted to it under the terms
and provisions of General Assembly resolution 2248
(S-V);
18. Covdemns South Africa for its persistent refusal
to comply with the pertinent resolutions of the Security
Council, in particular resolution 385 (1976) of 30
January 1976;
19. Demands that South Africa put an end to extend-
ing apaiiheid in Namibia and to its policy of "bantu-
stanization" of the Territoi-y, aimed at destroying the
national unity and the territorial integrity of Namibia;
20. Demands that South Africa release all Namibian
political prisoners, including all those imprisoned or de-
tained in connexion with offences under so-called inter-
nal security laws, whether such Namibians have been
charged or tried or are held without charge and
whether held in Namibia or South Africa;
21. Declares that, in ordei' that the people of Namibia
shall be enabled freely to determine their own future, it
is imperative that free elections under the supervision
and control of the United Nations be held urgently in
the whole of Namibia as one political entity;
22. Demands that South Africa accord uncondition-
ally to all Namibians currently in exile for political rea-
sons full facilities for their return to their country
without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or im-
prisonment;
23. Reiterates that the illegal occupation of Namibia
and the war being waged there by South Africa consti-
tute a threat to international peace and security;
24. Declares that the continued illegal occupation of
Namibia by South Africa constitutes an act of aggres-
sion against the Namibian people and against the
United Nations as the legal authority to administer the
Territory until independence;
25. Urges the Security Council to take up again the
question of Namibia, which is still on its agenda, and, in
view of South Africa's failure to comply with Council
January 17, 1977
47
resolution 385 (1976), to impose a mandatory arms em-
bargo against South Africa;
26. Requests all States to cease and desist from any
form of direct or indirect military consultation, co-
operation or collaboration with South Africa;
27. Requests all States to take effective measures to
prevent the recruitment of mercenaries for service in
Namibia or South Africa:
28. Requests all States to take steps to ensure the
termination of all arms licensing agreements with South
Africa and to prohibit the transfer to South Africa of all
information relating to arms and armaments;
29. Requests all States to cease and prevent:
(a) Any supply of arms and ammunition to South Af-
rica;
(b) Any supply of aircraft, vehicles or military
equipment for the use of the armed forces and
paramilitary or police organizations of South Africa;
(c) Any supply of spare parts for arms, vehicles or
military equipment used by the armed forces and
paramilitary or police organizations of South Africa:
(d) Any supply of so-called dual-use aircraft, vehicles
or equipment which could be converted to military use
by South Africa:
(e) Any activities in their countries which promote or
are calculated to promote the supply of arms, ammuni-
tion, military aircraft or military vehicles to South Af-
rica and the supply of equipment or materials for the
manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition
in South Africa and Namibia;
(f) Any co-operation or activities by public or private
corporations in conjunction with South Africa in the de-
velopment, directly or indirectly, of nuclear technol-
ogy, including the development of a nuclear capability
by the racist regime in South Africa;
30. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the
General Assembly at its thirty-second session on the
implementation of the present resolution.
Recalling, in particular, its resolution 3111 (XXVIII)
of 12 December 1973, by which it recognized the South
West Africa People's Organization as the authentic rep-
resentative of the Namibian people,
Notin<i that the Organization of African Unity and
the non-aligned countries have recognized and invited
the South West Africa People's Organization to partici-
pate in their meetings in an observer capacity,
1. Invites the South West Africa People's Organiza-
tion to participate in the sessions and the work of the
General Assembly in the capacity of observer:
2. Invites the South West Aftnca People's Organization
to participate in the sessions and the work of all inter-
national conferences convened under the auspices of the
General Assembly in the capacity of observer:
3. Considers that the South West Africa People's Or-
ganization is entitled to participate as an observer in
the sessions and the work of all international confer-
ences convened under the auspices of other organs of
the United Nations;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to take the neces-
sary steps for the implementation of the present resolu-
tion and to accord all the facilities as may be required.
United States Urges Peaceful Change
in South Africa
Following are statements made in the
U.N. General Assembly on November 3 and
9 by U.S. Representatives Stephen Hess and
Rev. Robert P. Hupp.
STATEMENT BY MR. HESS, NOVEMBER 3
General Assembly Resolution 31/152 ^
Observer status fur the South West Africa
People's Organization
The General Assetiihly,
Having considered the question of Namibia,
Recognizing the crucial phase reached in the struggle
of the Namibian people and the added demands and crit-
ical tasks imposed upon their liberation movement, the
South West Africa People's Organization,
Taking into consideration the report of the United
Nations Council for Namibia and the recommendations
contained therein,
Reaffiiining the resolutions and decisions of the Gen-
eral Assembly and the Security Council concerning the
question of Namibia,
2 Adopted by the committee on Dec. 10 by a recorded
vote of 114 to 0, with 13 abstentions (U.S.), and by the
Assembly on Dec. 20 by a recorded vote of 113 to 0,
with 13 abstentions (U.S.); (te.xt from U.N. doc. A/31/
437).
USUN press release 139 dated November .3
This year's debate on apartheid takes place
in the lengthening shadow of confrontation
and violence in South Africa. Over 300 lives
have been lost. Countless others have been
injured. Hundreds more have been detained,
many for no reasons other than that they op-
pose apartheid. The people of the United
States mourn with those who have lost their
brave young friends and children.
The position of my government has been
made clear by Secretary of State Kissinger in
a speech in Philadelphia on August 31 when
he said:
. . .South Africa's internal structure is incompatible
with any concept of human dignity. We are deeply sad-
dened by the recent and continuing clashes in black
urban townships, universities, and schools throughout
48
Department of State Bulletin
South Africa. They are dramatic evidence of the frus-
tration of black South Africans toward a system which
denies them status, equality, and political rights. No
system that leads to political upheavals and violence
can possibly be just or acceptable — nor can it last.
The United States must be true to its own beliefs. We
urge South Africa to take account of the conscience of
humanity. We will continue to use all our influence to
bring about peaceful change, equality of opportunity,
and basic human rights in South Africa.
The United States has not wavered from
this position, nor will it. In taking this posi-
tion we recognize that no nation or political
system can claim a perfect record in the field
of human rights. We are all too keenly aware
that respect for the dignity of the human
being is declining in too many countries in
nearly every region of the world and that
this General Assembly, which is dedicated to
universal principles, frequently applies them
in a highly selective fashion. At a time when
consciousness of human rights violations is
increasing, so too is the number of states
where fundamental standards of human be-
havior are not observed. The situation in
South Africa, founded as it is on a racially
discriminatory legal system, is of particular
concern and commands our attention and our
condemnation.
U.S. policy is dedicated to self-
determination for all and is opposed to viola-
tions of human rights wherever they may oc-
cur. We shall continue to use what influence
we have to bring about peaceful change,
equality of opportunity, and basic human
rights for all South Africans. To this end, we
shall continue to enforce rigorously our com-
prehensive arms embargo against South Af-
rica, which we first imposed in 1962 and
broadened in 1963.
We are concerned that unless substantial
changes in South African society are forth-
coming, the violence will increase and inevi-
tably destroy a rich and productive country
capable of providing for the economic and so-
cial needs of all its citizens. This would be a
tragedy for all South Africans. We urge the
South African Government to make deci-
sions necessary to dismantle the apartheid
system and to respond positively to the ur-
gent need for genuine freedom for all its
people.
Mr. President, if I might just add one very
brief personal note — because of the very
moving conclusion of the statement we have
just heard from the distinguished delegate
from Singapoi'e. This is in the nature of a
people-to-people statement, not a gov-
ernment-to-government one; for I'm not a
professional diplomat, but rather, as is a
tradition in our country, I'm a private citizen
of the United States and one of three persons
chosen by the President and the Senate to be
a public member of our delegation. And I,
too, have listened to the great debate in this
Assembly for nearly a week, and from time
to time I've heard an inflection in the voice of
wise speakers that I have found troubling.
And perhaps that unease that I felt was
most properly put in context by the last
speaker when he concluded by quoting from
that inspiring novel by Alan Paton, "Cry, the
Beloved Country," when the black priest,
and may I just quote those beautiful lines
again, said, you will recall: "I have one great
fear in my heart, that one day when they turn
to loving, they will find we are turned to hat-
ing."
And so, Mr. President, my personal prayer
is that we may somehow seek justice in
South Africa without, in turn, losing our
sense of humanity or our capacity to love.
STATEMENT BY REVEREND HUPP, NOVEMBER 9
The United States was pleased to partici-
pate in the adoption, without objection, of
the draft resolutions in documents A/31/L.6
[A/RES/31/6 B] on the United Nations Trust
Fund for South Africa and A/31/L.7 [A/
RES/31/6 C] concerning solidarity with South
African political prisoners.
We voted against the draft resolution in
document A/31/L.8 [A/RES/31/6 D] concern-
ing the arms embargo against South Africa.
We did so because we are not convinced that
the invocation of chapter VII of the Charter
of the United Nations against South Africa
for its apartheid policies is appropriate at
this time. We object strongly to those para-
graphs which allege that the United States is
sending weapons to South Africa. As the
General Assembly well knows, the United
States has continued to impose its own arms
January 17, 1977
49
embargo against South Africa since 1962 and
has urged other nations to impose voluntarily
an embargo concerning military equipment.
Recently it was discovered that a U.S.
company had illegally shipped arms to South
Africa. The shipment was made as a result of
misrepresentation by a company employee.
That employee was subsequently prosecuted,
convicted, and sent to jail.
Let me make this clear so that no doubt
remains as to the strength of our commit-
ment. We have jailed an American citizen
for facilitating an arms shipment to South
Africa. The U.S. Department of Justice is
continuing to investigate reports of illegal
arms sales to South Africa involving Ameri-
can arms manufacturers.
The United States voted against the draft
resolution in document A/31/L.9 [A/RES/31/6
E] concerning relations between Israel and
South Africa. We disagree with the decision
to single out Israel for criticism of its rela-
tions with South Africa. While we do not
condone Israel's military trade with South
Africa, we are aware that other nations also
are involved in such trade. The report of the
Special Committee Against Apartheid and
this unbalanced draft resolution stem from
anti-Israeli political motives rather than
from any decision to investigate impartially
those countries which are trading in military
materiel with South Africa.
The United States abstained in the vote on
the draft resolution in document A/31/L.10/
Rev. 1 [A/RES/31/6 F] concerning apartheid
in sports. The U.S. Government supports the
Olympic principle that no discrimination be
allowed in sporting events on the grounds of
race, religion, or political affiliation. We urge
U.S. sports teams to respect the principle
and to compete against teams that are
selected on the principle of the Olympic
ideal.
Because U.S. sports teams are organized
privately and have no official sponsorship or
regulation, we are not able to support sev-
eral of the recommendations contained in
that draft resolution. Those recommenda-
tions would have the U.S. Government
intervene in the affairs of private sports or-
ganizations, which it lawfully cannot do. The
results of this resolution could, in fact, prove
contrary to its sponsors' intentions and instead
of breaking down apartheid could assist in con-
solidating it.
This is borne out by the experience of the
last four years, when open international
competition has resulted in some breaking
down of barriers in South Africa. For in-
stance, Arthur Ashe broke the color barrier
in the South African Open. He encouraged
the South African tennis authorities to de-
segregate the audience for the Open. Black
tennis players were also permitted to par-
ticipate in other major tennis tournaments in
the country.
The United States abstained in the vote on
the draft resolution in document A/31/L.11
[A/RES/31/6 G] concerning the program of
work of the Special Committee Against
Apartheid, and we have elaborated on this
elsewhere in this statement.
In our view, the decision to impose a type
of economic sanction against South Africa is
a decision of the utmost seriousness and can
and should be taken only by the Security
Council. Moreover, we believe that the facts
do not warrant such a decision. We cannot
accept the thesis of this resolution that eco-
nomic relations with South Africa work to
the disadvantage of the population or neces-
sarily result in their exploitation. On the
contrary, some U.S. corporations have been
among the leading forces for equal rights and
enlightened employment practices in South
Africa. It is too simplistic to condemn in
blanket fashion economic relations with
South Africa.*
The United States voted against the draft
resolution in document A/31/L.13 [A/RES/
31/6 I] concerning the situation in South Af-
rica. We cannot agree with a number of
paragraphs in the resolution. Specifically, we
do not believe that the situation in South Af-
rica, however abhorrent the policies of the
South African Government, constitutes a
threat to international peace or security. It
is also clear that this lengthy resolution is
' The United States voted against A/RES/31/6 H con-
cerning economic collaboration with South Africa and
abstained on A/RES/31/6 K concerning investments in
South Africa.
50
Department of State Bulletin
tantamount to a call for an uprising in South
Africa that would, in effect, result in a racial
bloodbath. My government cannot subscribe
to the thesis that this is the best or only way
to work for peace in South Africa.
The United States voted against the draft
resolution in document A/31/L.14 [A/RES/
31/6 J] concerning a program of action
against apartheid. The U.S. Government is
not prepared to support a comprehensive re-
gime of sanctions against South Africa, which
this and other draft resolutions have called
for, or to provide assistance for a violent up-
rising in South Africa. We also have serious
reservations on the financial implications of
the program of action and the drawing of
U.N. specialized agencies into this clearly
political campaign.
The United States has already discussed
its position toward South Africa as set forth
by Secretary Kissinger in Philadelphia on
August 31. We continue to believe that, al-
though time is running out, the opportunity
still exists for South Africa to move away
from the apartheid system peacefully and to
create a just society with freedom for all
South Africans.
U.S. Joins Security Council Appeal
for Assistance to Lesotho
Following is a statement made in the U.N.
Security Council by U.S. Representative Al-
bert W. Sherer, Jr., on December 22, together
with the text of a resolution adopted by the
Council that day.
STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SHERER
USUN press release 199 dated December 22
The United States has joined in the consen-
sus adoption of this resolution because we
wish to make very clear our support for its
main point. Restricting movement between
Lesotho and that territory known as Transkei
has imposed serious burdens on the economy
of Lesotho, and we believe the world commu-
nity should assist Lesotho in this difficult
period.
At the same time, Mr. President, I must
comment on operative paragraph 1 of the res-
olution. It endorses and quotes General As-
sembly Resolution 31/6 A, on which the
United States abstained.
My delegation did not abstain in the Gen-
eral Assembly because we intend to recognize
that territory known as Transkei. On the con-
trary, we have made it eminently clear that
we have no intention of recognizing the so-
called Transkei. We do, however, reserve the
right to attend to the welfare and protection
of American citizens. Realistically, the occa-
sion may arise in the future when it would be
required to have some contact with the au-
thorities of the entity in question.
Despite the foregoing, Mr. President, we
feel that the main purpose of this resolution
clearly is to encourage assistance to Lesotho
and, accordingly, we have joined in the con-
sensus adoption.
In that connection, I would like to point out
that the United States already is extending
substantial assistance to the Government of
Lesotho. We have cooperated in a regional
health project involving maternal and child
health care and family planning services in
rural areas and in the development of a more
comprehensive program intended to upgrade
the knowledge and skills of health personnel
in planning and managing a national health
system. We also are cooperating with projects
in land and water conservation and livestock,
farm management, irrigation, and agricul-
ture. We currently are examining other ways
to assist the Government of Lesotho.
Mr. President, what I have just said dem-
onstrates our commitment to helping the Gov-
ernment and the people of Lesotho to over-
come the obstacles which have been placed in
the way of their national development. We
hope that the concern of this Council will be
heard and that the border posts in question
will be opened promptly to the free movement
of the people of Lesotho.
Before closing, Mr. President, I would like
to express our appreciation for and satisfac-
tion with the spirit of cooperation and close
January 17, 1977
51
coordination which went into the preparation
of this resolution. Such coordination clearly
assisted the Council in reaching a consensus
agreement. It is an example of the type of
coordination and cooperation which can only
assist us all in resolving problems before us.
We hope that this e.xample may be followed in
the future.
TEXT OF RESOLUTION >
The Security Council,
Having heard the statement of the Foreign Minister
of the Kingdom of Lesotho on 21 December 1976,
Gravely concerned at the serious situation created
by South Africa's closure of certain border posts be-
tween South Africa and Lesotho aimed at coercing
Lesotho into according recognition to the bantustan
Transkei,
Recalling relevant General Assembly resolutions, in
particular resolution 3411 D (XXX), condemning the es-
tablishment of bantustans and calling on all Govern-
ments not to recognize the bantustans,
Recalling further General Assembly resolution 31/6 A
on the so-called independent Transkei and other ban-
tustans, which, inter alia, calls upon all Governments
to deny any form of recognition to the so-called inde-
pendent Transkei and to refrain from having any deal-
ings with the so-called independent Transkei or other
bantustans,
Noting with appreciation the decision of the Govern-
ment of Lesotho not to recognize the Transkei bantustan
in compliance with United Nations decisions,
Considering that the decision of Lesotho constitutes
an important contribution to the realization of United
Nations objectives in southern Africa in accordance
with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the
United Nations,
1 U.N. doc. S/RES/402 (1976); adopted by the Council
by consensus on Dec. 22.
Taking note of the urgent and special economic needs
of Lesotho arising from the closure of the border posts,
1. Endorses General Assembly resolution 31/6 A,
which, inter alia, calls upon all Governments to deny
any form of recognition to the so-called independent
Transkei and to refrain from having any dealings with
the so-called independent Transkei or other bantustans;
2. Commends the Government of Lesotho for its de-
cision not to recognize the so-called independence of
Transkei;
3. Condemns any action by South Africa intended to
coerce Lesotho into according recognition to the ban-
tustan Transkei;
4. Calls upon South Africa to take immediately all
necessary steps to reopen those border posts;
5. Appeals to all States to provide immediate finan-
cial, technical and material assistance to Lesotho so
that it can carry out its economic development pro-
grammes and enhance its capacity to implement fully
the United Nations resolutions on apartheid and ban-
tustans;
6. Requests the United Nations and the organizations
and programmes concerned, in particular the United
Nations Development Programme, the World Food
Programme and all the United Nations specialized
agencies, to assist Lesotho in the present situation and
to consider periodically the question of economic assist-
ance to Lesotho as envisaged in the present resolution;
7. Requests the Secretary-General, in collaboration
with the appropriate organizations of the United
Nations system, to organize, with immediate effect, all
forms of financial, technical and material assistance to
the Kingdom of Lesotho to enable it to overcome the
economic difficulties arising from the closure of the
border posts by South Africa due to the refusal of
Lesotho to recognize the so-called independence of
Transkei;
8. Further requests the Secretary-General to keep
the situation under constant review to maintain close
liaison with Member States, regional and other inter-
governmental organizations, the specialized agencies
and international financial institutions, and to report to
the Security Council at its subsequent meeting on the
question;
9. Decides to remain seized of the question.
52
Department of State Bulletin
U.S. Reiterates Support for Negotiated Solution in Rhodesia
Following are statements made in Com-
mittee IV (Trusteeship) of the U.N. General
Assembly on December 13 by U.S. Represent-
ative William W. Scranton and on De-
cember lU by U.S. Representative Richard
Petree, Counselor for Political Affairs, U.S.
Mission to the United Nations; a statement
made in plenary on December 20 by U.S.
Representative Albert W. Sherer, Jr.; and the
te.rts of two resolutions adopted by the com-
mittee on December H and by the Assembly
on December 20.
U.S. STATEMENTS
Ambassador Scranton, Committee IV,
December 13
USUN press release lf>5 dated December 13
The Fourth Committee meets this year on
the question of Southern Rhodesia in an at-
mosphere of hope and cautious optimism. For
the first time in a decade this Assembly can
look forward to a realistic prospect of major-
ity rule in an independent Zimbabwe. The
opportunity for a negotiated solution to the
Rhodesian problem has been created, and the
parties involved are meeting face to face over
the conference table. While many major
problems remain to be solved, vigorous ef-
forts are being made to establish an interim
government for the territory. The United
Nations has every reason to lend its support
to these efforts toward realization of the
long-sought goal of peace and majority rule
in Rhodesia.
The United States is pleased to have
played a part in the negotiations which have
brought about the conference currently
underway in Geneva. We salute the British
Government for its prompt and efficient or-
ganization of the Geneva Conference and the
efforts of its very able chairman of the con-
ference, our colleague Ivor Richard [British
Representative to the United Nations].
While we are pleased with the progress
made thus far, we are under no illusions as to
the obstacles which remain for the
negotiators in Geneva. Ten years of violence
create deep suspicions and animosity which
cannot easily be forgotten. The representa-
tives of the people of the territory who are
now meeting in Geneva must rise above their
own personal feelings and consider the future
of their country and the welfare of all. The
alternative to magnanimity and compromise
is only further violence. It is in the interests
of all to support the current negotiating
process and the creation of a just transitional
government with an African majority and an
African Prime Minister.
The United States can understand the
legitimate differences between the parties at
the Geneva Conference and the real problems
facing that conference. We cannot but de-
plore, however, the efforts of those countries
and individuals who see some shortrun gain
in fueling the flames of violence and racial
strife in Rhodesia. Those who back these
goals and who attempt to subvert a
negotiated solution are no friends of Africa
or the people of Rhodesia. They offer no con-
structive solutions and instead encourage
continued violence, continued bloodshed.
In addition to U.S. efforts in the diplomat-
ic consultations on the future of Rhodesia,
my government has also been active this past
year in providing assistance to students from
the territory. As a followup to Secretary
Kissinger's pledge in Lusaka in April 1976 to
expand existing programs for training
Namibian and Zimbabwean refugees as ad-
ministrators and technicians, the U.S. Gov-
ernment obtained urgent authorization from
Congress to provide $2.7 million in educa-
January 17, 1977
53
tional assistance to southern African students
in fiscal year 1976, including over $1 million
for Zimbabwean students. In addition, the
U.S. Congress, at the Administration's re-
quest, has appropriated $4 million for south-
ern African students in fiscal year 1977.
These programs are designed to train the fu-
ture leaders of Zimbabwe in the skills neces-
sary to develop a new nation in the modern
world.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would like
to reiterate the support of my government
for a negotiated solution in Rhodesia and to
call on this Assembly to offer its support. In
the last analysis, the current conference of-
fers the best hope for a peaceful transition to
majority rule, a goal which the United Na-
tions has worked for diligently for over 10
years.
As Secretary Kissinger said in his speech
to the General Assembly on September 30:
"The people of Rhodesia, and the neighbor-
ing states, now face a supreme challenge.
Their ability to work together, their capacity
to unify, will be tested in the months ahead
as never before." The United States believes
that at this crucial moment the United Na-
tions must support the people of Rhodesia in
their efforts to forge a free and independent
Zimbabwe.
Mr. Petree, Committee IV, December 14
USUN press release IS" dated December 14
The United States has participated in the
consensus adopting draft resolution L.45,
concerning the question of Southern
Rhodesia. My government fully supports the
Geneva Conference as the best means to
achieve majority rule and independence in
Rhodesia. We call on all participants in the
conference to redouble their efforts to find a
negotiated settlement to the Rhodesian prob-
lem.
The United States has voted against draft
resolution L.46, regarding Rhodesian
sanctions — not because we oppose such sanc-
tions or want to see them vitiated in any
way. To the contrary, and as members of this
Assembly know full well, the United States
supports those sanctions against Rhodesia
and has been open and frank in those circum-
stances where the United States has been un-
able because of domestic legislation to imple-
ment the sanctions fully. The United States
voluntarily reports fully to the Security
Council's Sanctions Committee on imports
under the Byrd amendment.
Mr. Chairman, for obvious reasons, com-
pletely accurate statistics on all Rhodesian
exports are not available. However, it is un-
likely that U.S. imports account for more
than 5 percent of total Rhodesian export
earnings. Obviously, 95 percent of the
Rhodesian earnings originate elsewhere.
And so this resolution cites one country
which is honest and ignores the countries
which we estimate to be the providers of 95
percent of Rhodesia's export earnings.
Accordingly, we deeply resent being
singled out for criticism. In a year when the
United States has exerted every effort to
bring about the peaceful transition to major-
ity rule in Rhodesia we believe it petty and
unjust for this Assembly to criticize the
United States alone for sanctions violations.
The resolution applies a double standard in
dealing with Rhodesia, because, as we all
know, there are other countries involved in
trade with Rhodesia, some of whom are Afri-
can countries. Some of those countries have
joined in voting for this resolution. My gov-
ernment will not associate itself with this
form of hypocrisy. Because we openly and
fully report what is permitted by our own
domestic legislation, we alone are chastised
while other nations go unmentioned for their
secret and much more extensive trade with
Rhodesia.
Certain allegations have been made during
our debate concerning the provision of oil to
Rhodesia. I suspect that these allegations
are related to those of the Center for Social
Action of the United Church of Christ to the
effect that the Mobil Oil Corporation, certain
of its officers, and foreign subsidiaries have
violated the U.N. sanctions. As the United
States has pointed out in the Sanctions
Committee, the U.S. Treasury Department's
Office of Foreign Assets Control served an
administrative order on Mobil Oil on June 30,
1976, directing the company to furnish speci-
54
Department of State Bulletin
tied records for examination and requiring
the company to obtain additional documents
from Mobil South Africa and Mobil Rhodesia.
The Office of Foreign Assets Control has
periodically broadened the scope of the ad-
ministrative order to require Mobil to pro-
vide additional material as new avenues of
investigation were opened. The United
States will provide the Sanctions Committee
with the final results of that investigation as
soon as they become available from the De-
partment of the Treasury.
Other allegations have been made concern-
ing assurances to Ian Smith of "tangible as-
sistance," should the Geneva talks fail. There
is no basis whatsoever, Mr. Chairman, for
these allegations.
Ambassador Sherer, Plenary, December 20
USl'N press release 196 dated December 20
While the United States voted "No" in the
Fourth Committee on the draft resolution
concerning Rhodesian sanctions, we shall
abstain in plenary.
We have changed our vote from committee
to plenary so that our position concerning
Rhodesian sanctions not be misunderstood in
any way, either by the Smith regime or by
those with whom we share the deep convic-
tion that majority rule must and will prevail
in an independent Zimbabwe. There is no
change whatsoever in the American Govern-
ment's strong support of the U.N. sanctions
against Rhodesia.
At the same time, we wish to make it em-
phatically clear, Mr. President, that we do
not accept in this resolution the arbitrary
and unfair singling out of the United States
for condemnation — a singling out which re-
sulted from U.S. honesty in reporting sanc-
tions violations. It is well known that many
other countries indulge in violations but do
not report them. We reject this application of
a double standard.
As everyone here present is aware. Presi-
dent Ford and Secretary Kissinger are exert-
ing every effort to bring about a peaceful
transition to majority rule in Rhodesia.
Under such circumstances it is also petty and
unjust for this Assembly to criticize the
United States alone for sanctions violations.
Further, so that there never again will be
any misunderstanding, the United States
puts the General Assembly on notice that any
resolution in the future which specifically
contains a condemnation of the United States
will receive our negative vote.
TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS
General Assembly Resolution 31/154 A'
The General Assembly,
Having considered the question of Southern Rhodesia
(Zimbabwe),
Having examined the relevant chapters of the report
of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard
to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Grant-
ing of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
Having heard the statement of the representative of
the administering Power,
Taking into acconnt the report of the Ad Hoc Group
established by the Special Committee at its 1029th
meeting, on 1 April 1976,
Recalli)ig the Declaration on the Granting of Inde-
pendence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained
in its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, and the
programme of action for the full implementation of the
Declaration, contained in its resolution 2621 (XXV) of 12
October 1970, as well as all other resolutions relating to
the question of Southern Rhodesia adopted by the Gen-
eral Assembly, the Security Council and the Special
Committee,
Bearing in mind that the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as the
administering Power, has the primary responsibility for
putting an end to the critical situation in Southern
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) which, as repeatedly affiimed by
the Security Council, constitutes a threat to interna-
tional peace and security.
Reaffirming that any attempt to negotiate the future
of Zimbabwe with the illegal regime on the basis of in-
dependence before majority rule would be in contraven-
tion of the inalienable rights of the people of the Terri-
tory and contrary to the provisions of the Charter of the
United Nations and of resolution 1514 (XV),
Taking note of the declared position of the administer-
ing Power that there shall be no independence before
majority rule in Zimbabwe,
Reaffinning also its endorsement of the relevant pro-
visions of the Dar es Salaam Declaration on Southern
Africa, adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Or-
' Adopted by the committee by consensus on Dec. 14
(draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.45) and by the Assembly
by consensus on Dec. 20 (te.xt from U.N. doc. A/31/
447, report of the Fourth Committee on agenda item
86, Question of Southern Rhodesia).
January 17, 1977
55
ganization of African Unity at its ninth extraordinary
session, held from 7 to 10 April 1975,
Endorsing the relevant provisions of the Political
Declaration adopted by the Fifth Conference of Heads
of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held
at Colombo from 16 to 19 August 1976, relating to
southern Africa,
Taking note of the convening of the conference on
Zimbabwe at Geneva,
Condemning the illegal racist minority regime for its
intensified oppression of the people of Zimbabwe, the
arbitrary imprisonment and detention of political lead-
ers and others, the illegal execution of freedom fight-
ers and the continued denial of fundamental human
rights, including in particular the wanton beating, tor-
ture and murder of innocent villagers, arbitrary crimi-
nal measures of collective punishment and measures
designed to create an apartheid State in Zimbabwe,
Commending the firm determination of the people of
Zimbabwe, under the leadership of their national lib-
eration movement, to achieve freedom and independ-
ence,
1. Reaffhins the inalienable right of the people of
Zimbabwe to self-determination, freedom and inde-
pendence and the legitimacy of their struggle to secure
by all the means at their disposal the enjoyment of
that right as set forth in the Charter of the United Na-
tions and in conformity with the objectives of General
Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
2. Reaffirms the principle that there should be no
independence before majority rule in Zimbabwe and
that any settlement relating to the future of the Terri-
tory must be worked out with the full participation of
the people of Zimbabwe and in accordance with their
true aspirations:
S. Strongly condemns the illegal racist minority re-
gime for its continued brutal and repressive measures
perpetrated against the people of Zimbabwe and in
particular the wanton killings of Africans carried out
by the regime within and outside Zimbabwe;
4. Further strongly condemns the illegal racist
minority regime for its systematic acts of aggression
against neighbouring African States;
5. Calls npon the Government of the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in the dis-
charge of its primary responsibility as the administer-
ing Power, to take all effective measures to enable
Zimbabwe to accede to independence in accordance
with the aspirations of the majority of the population
and not under any circumstances to accord to the il-
legal regime any of the powers or attributes of
sovereignty;
6. Commends to the administering Power for appro-
priate action the relevant sections of the report of the
Ad Hoc Group established by the Special Committee
on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of
the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples, at its 1029th meeting,
on 1 April 1976;
7. Finnly supports the people of Zimbabwe in their
struggle to achieve majority rule;
8. Demands:
(a) The termination forthwith of the executions of
freedom fighters being carried out by the illegal Smith
regime;
(b) The unconditional and immediate release of all
political prisoners, detainees and restrictees, the re-
moval of all restrictions on political activity and the
establishment of full democratic freedom and equality
of political rights, as well as the restoration to the
population of fundamental human rights;
(c) The discontinuance forthwith of all repressive
measures, in particular the brutality committed in the
"operational area", the arbitrary closure of African
areas, the eviction, transfer and resettlement of Afri-
cans and the creation of so-called protected villages
and the persecution of Christian missionaries support-
ing the cause of the liberation of Zimbabwe;
(d) The cessation of the influx of foreign immigrants
into the Territory and the immediate withdrawal of all
mercenaries therefrom;
9. Calls upon all States to take all necessary and ef-
fective measures to prevent advertisement for, and re-
cruitment of, mercenaries for Southern Rhodesia;
10. Requests all States, directly and through their
action in the specialized agencies and other organiza-
tions within the United Nations system of which they
are members, as well as the non-governmental organi-
zations concerned and the various programmes within
the United Nations, to extend, in consultation and co-
operation with the Organization of African Unity, to
the people of Zimbabwe and their national liberation
movement all the moral, material, political and human-
itarian assistance necessary in their struggle for the
restoration of their inalienable rights;
11. Invites all Governments, the specialized agencies
and other organizations within the United Nations sys-
tem, the United Nations bodies concerned and non-
governmental organizations having a special interest in
the field of decolonization, as well as the Secretary-
General, to take steps, as appropriate, to give wide-
spread and continuous publicity through all the media
at their disposal to information on the situation in
Zimbabwe and on the relevant decisions and actions of
the United Nations, with particular reference to the
application of sanctions against the illegal regime;
12. Expresses the hope that the conference on Zim-
babwe at Geneva will succeed in establishing the con-
ditions for early independence on the basis of majority
rule, in accordance with the relevant resolutions
adopted by the United Nations;
13. Requests the Government of the United King-
dom, in keeping with its express readiness to do so, to
co-operate with the Special Committee in the dis-
charge of the mandate entrusted to the latter by the
General Assembly, and to I'eport thereon to the Spe-
cial Committee and to the Assembly at its thirty-
second session;
14. Requests the Special Committee to keep the situ-
ation in the Territory under review as a matter of
priority and to report thereon to the General Assembly
at its thirty-second session.
56
Department of State Bulletin
General Assembly Resolution 31/154 B ^
The General Asaeinbly,
Having adopted resoUition [31/154 A] of (9) De-
cember 1976 on the question of Southern Rhodesia
(Zimbabwe),
Strunqhi deploring the increasing collaboration, in
violation of Article 25 of the Charter of the United Na-
tions and of the relevant decisions of the United Na-
tions, which certain States, particularly South Africa,
maintain with the illegal racist minority regime,
thereby seriously impeding the effective application of
sanctions and other measures taken so far against the
illegal regime,
Seriou.tly concerned at the continued importation of
chrome and nickel into the United States of America
from Southern Rhodesia, in violation of the relevant
decisions of the Security Council and in disregard of
the related resolutions of the General Assembly,
Deeply disturbed at recent reports of widespread
violations of United Nations sanctions, including the
operation of Southern Rhodesian aircraft for interna-
tional passenger and cargo traffic, as well as the con-
tinued functioning of information and airline offices of
the illegal regime outside Southern Rhodesia and the
resultant influx of foreign tourists into the Territory,
Considering that developments in the area call in
particular for positive, concerted international action
with a view to imposing maximum isolation on the il-
legal regime.
Reaffirming its conviction that the sanctions will
not put an end to the illegal racist minority regime un-
less they are comprehensive, mandatory and effec-
tively supervised, enforced and complied with, particu-
larly by South Africa,
Noting with appreciation the decision of the Gov-
ernment of Mozambique to close its borders with
Southern Rhodesia and to impose sanctions against the
illegal racist minority regime in compliance with the
relevant decisions of the Security Council,
1. Strongly condemns those Governments, particu-
larly the racist regime of South Africa, for their
policies which, in violation of the relevant resolutions
of the United Nations and in open contravention of
their specific obligations under Article 2, paragraph 5,
and Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations,
continue to collaborate w'ith the illegal racist minority
regime, and calls upon those Governments to cease
forthwith all such collaboration;
2. Condemns all violations of the mandatory sanc-
tions imposed by the Security Council, as well as the
continued failure of certain Member States to enforce
those sanctions strictly, as being contrary to the obli-
gations assumed by them under Article 2, paragraph 5,
and Article 25 of the Charter;
^ Adopted by the committee on Dec. 14 by a vote of
121 to 1 (U.S.), with 6 abstentions, and by the Assem-
bly on Dec. 20 bv a vote of 124 to 0, with 7 abstentions
(U.S.); (text from U.N. doc. A/31/447).
3. Condemns the continued importation of chrome
and nickel from Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) into
the United States of America, and calls upon the Gov-
ernment of the United States to repeal speedily all
legislation permitting such importation;
4. Calls upon all Governments which so far have not
done so:
(a) To take stringent enforcement measures to en-
sure strict compliance by all individuals, associations
and bodies corporate under their jurisdiction with the
sanctions imposed by the Security Council and to pro-
hibit any form of collaboration by them with the illegal
regime;
(b) To take effective steps to prevent or discourage
the emigration to Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) of
any individuals or groups of individuals under their
jurisdiction;
(c) To discontinue any action which might confer a
semblance of legitimacy on the illegal regime, inter
alia, by forbidding the operation and activities of Air
Rhodesia, the Rhodesia National Tourist Board and
the Rhodesian Information Office, or any other ac-
tivities which contravene the aims and purposes of the
sanctions;
(d) To invalidate passports and other documents for
travel to the Territory;
5. Highly commends the action taken by the Gov-
ernment of Mozambique in closing its borders with
Southern Rhodesia and imposing total sanctions
against the Smith regime, and considers that that ac-
tion constitutes an important contribution in support of
the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe and towards the
maximum isolation of the illegal regime;
6. Requests al! States, directly and through their ac-
tion in the specialized agencies and other organizations
within the United Nations system of which they are
members, and the various programmes within the
United Nations system to extend to the Government of
Mozambique all forms of financial, technical and mate-
rial assistance in order to enable it to overcome any
economic difficulties in connexion with its application
of economic sanctions against the illegal regime;
7. Further requests the Security Council to under-
take a periodic review of the question of economic as-
sistance to the Government of Mozambique as well as
to the Government of Zambia;
8. Reiterates its conviction that the scope of the
sanctions against the illegal regime must be widened
to include all the measures envisaged under Article 41
of the Charter and requests the Security Council to
consider taking the necessary measures in that regard
as a matter of urgency;
9. Requests the Special Committee on the Situation
with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples to follow the implementation of the pres-
ent resolution and invites the Security Council Com-
mittee established in pursuance of resolution 253
(1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia to
continue to co-operate in the related work of the Spe-
cial Committee.
January 17, 1977
57
United States Reemphasizes Spirit
of Cooperation With OAU
Following is a statement made in plenary
session of the U.N. General Assembly by
U.S. Representative Ersa Poston on
November 16.
I'Sl'N press release 152 llaled November 16
As the General Assembly again considers
the question of cooperation between the
United Nations and the Organization of Afri-
can Unity, the United States wishes to reaf-
firm our respect for the OAU and the ideals
embodied in its charter and to emphasize
that we look forward to maintaining close
cooperation with the organization and with
its members.
As a country which participated in the
founding of the first of the regional organiza-
tions, we are aware of the essential role such
organizations can play. We believe regional
cooperation is a step on the way to global
cooperation. We also believe that there are
some issues which transcend regional con-
cern and require global attention.
Nineteen seventy-six has been a crucial
year in U.S. -African relations. In addition to
building on the strong and significant ties
which we have with African nations, this
past year has witnessed an unprecedented
level of U.S. involvement in trying to help
find solutions to many of the pressing prob-
lems of the African Continent. Secretary of
State Kissinger's efforts in particular have
underlined our commitment to assist the na-
tions of southern Africa find negotiated solu-
tions to the problems of Namibia and
Zimbabwe. While progress has been made —
and we have tried to play a part — difficult
decisions still lie ahead. The United States
will not relax its efforts to see these crucial
international issues resolved.
The past year also has seen concerted U.S.
efforts in multilateral forums to solve eco-
nomic problems of the nations of Africa.
Some progress has been achieved in eradicat-
ing poverty and ushering in a new era of eco-
nomic development for all of Africa. Much
still remains to be done. The United States
remains committed to assisting the people of
Africa utilize their great potential in human
and natural resources in order to achieve
economic progress in the years ahead.
Above all else, 1976 has seen the realiza-
tion of a spirit of cooperation by the United
States in our relations with Africa. As Secre-
tary Kissinger said in his toast at a luncheon
for representatives of the OAU nations on
October 8:
There can no longer be any question that America is
coinmitted to Africa's goals and to working with the na-
tions of Africa to solve the continent's problems ....
Let us set aside the suspicions of the past and work
for our common future. Together we can constitute the
community of man on the basis of mutual benefit and
shared endeavor. We can show that races can live to-
gether, that there is an alternative to hatred.
Mr. President, the United States will do
all in its power to make this spirit of coop-
eration a reality in our dealings with the
OAU and with its members.
U.S. Supports U.N. Membership
of Western Samoa
Following is a statement made in the U.N.
Security Council by U.S. Representative
Albert W. Sherer, Jr., on December 1.
rSl'N press release 173 dated December 1
My country is pleased to support the can-
didacy of the Independent State of Western
Samoa for membership in the United Na-
tions.'
The United States has had a long and fruit-
ful relationship with the people and Govern-
ment of Western Samoa. We have worked
with them through the years in bilateral rela-
tionships and within the context of the South
Pacific Commission and the South Pacific
Forum. There are, of course, close ties be-
tween the peoples of Western Samoa and the
people of American Samoa, who share the
' The Council on Dec. 1 adopted unanimously a res-
olution (S/RES/399 (1976)) recommending to the Gen-
eral Assembly "that Western Samoa be admitted to
membership in the United Nations." The Assembly on
Dec. 15 adopted unanimously a resolution (A/RES/31/
104) admitting Western Samoa to membership.
58
Department of State Bulletin
same culture, language, and history. I am
sure that through its membership in the
United Nations, Western Samoa will make a
valuable contribution to international peace
and understanding and will bring to this or-
ganization the unique perception of the
peoples of the Pacific.
We will be pleased therefore to welcome
Western Samoa to the United Nations and
look forward to continuing here the close and
cordial relations that have developed be-
tween our two countries.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea,
1974. Message from the President of the United
States transmitting the convention. S. Ex. 0. Augu.st
31, 1976. 266 pp.
Export Reorganization Act of 1976. Report of the Sen-
ate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energv to accompany S. 1439.
S. Rept. 94-1193. August 31,' 1976. 81 pp.
The United States and China. A report by Senator
Hugh Scott, Minority Leader, U.S. Senate, to the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. September
1976. ,55 pp.
The Political and Economic Crisis in Southern Africa. A
staff report to the Subcommittee on Foreign Assist-
ance of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
September 1976. 52 pp.
Concerning Recent Actions by the Governments of
North Korea and South Korea. Report of the House
Committee on International Relations, together with
supplemental views, to accompany H. Res. 1506. H.
Rept. 94-1462. September 2, 1976. 17 pp.
Urging the President Not To Extend Diplomatic or
Other Recognition to the Transkei Territory. Report
of the House Committee on International Relations to
accompany H. Res. 1509. H. Rept. 94-1463. Sep-
tember 2, 1976. 7 pp.
Religious Repression in the Soviet Union: Dissident
Baptist Pastor Georgi Vins. Report of the House
Committee on International Relations to accompany
H. Con. Res. 726: H. Rept. 94-1464; September 2,
1976: 5 pp. Report of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations: S. Rept. 94-1306: September 24,
1976: 2 pp.
Customs Convention on Containers, 1972, and Interna-
tional Convention for Safe Containei's. Report of
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to ac-
company Ex. X, 93-1. S. Ex. Rept. 94-33. September
3, 1976. 61 pp.
Humanitarian Assistance to Earthquake Victims in
Italy. A staff report prepared for the use of the Sub-
committee To Investigate Problems Connected With
Refugees and Escapees of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary. September 10, 1976. 24 pp.
United States and Bulgaria Sign
New Fisheries Agreement
Joint Statement
Press release (>(l.s dated Decemher 17
On December 17, 1976, representatives of
the United States of America and the
People's Republic of Bulgaria signed a new
agreement relating to fishing activities of
Bulgaria off the coasts of the United States.
The agreement sets out the arrangements
between the countries which will govern fish-
ing by Bulgarian vessels within the fishery
conservation zone of the United States be-
ginning on March 1, 1977. The agreement
will come into force after the completion of
internal procedures by both governments.
The signing of this agreement took place in
Washington. Lubomir Popov, Ambassador to
the United States of the People's Republic of
Bulgaria, signed for Bulgaria. Rozanne L.
Ridgway, Ambassador of the United States
for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs, signed for
the United States. Both delegations ex-
pressed their satisfaction with the new ac-
cord and the hope that it will strengthen
cooperation between Bulgaria and the United
States.
Current Treaty Actions
MULTILATERAL
Antarctica
Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the
principles and objectives of the Antarctic treaty of
December 1, 1959 (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Oslo June
20, 1975. »
Notification of approval: Chile, December 22, 1976.
Meteorology
Convention of the World Meteorological Organization.
Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into
force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.
Accession deposited: Malta, December 28, 1976.
Oil Pollution
International convention for the prevention of pollution
of the sea by oil, as amended. Done at London May
Not in force.
January 17, 1977
59
12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the
United States December 8, 1961. TIAS 4900, 6109.
Acceptance deposited: Surinam, December 1, 1976.
Postal
Second additional protocol to the constitution of the
Universal Postal Union of July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881,
7150), general regulations with final protocol and an-
ne.x, and the universal postal convention with final
approval and detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne
July 5, 1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976.
TIAS 8231.
Ratifications deposited: Bangladesh, October 28,
1976; German Democratic Republic, July 15, 1976;
Norway, October 20, 1976.
Money orders and postal travellers' checks agreement,
with detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne Julv 5,
1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976. TIAS 8232.
Ratification deposited: Norway, November 19, 1976.
Trade
Arrangement regarding international trade in textiles,
with annexes. Done at Geneva December 20, 1973.
Entered into force January 1, 1974, except for article
2, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, which entered into force
April 1, 1974. TIAS 7840.
Accepta)ice deposited: Bangladesh, December 3,
1976.
BILATERAL
Jordan
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relat-
ing to the agreement of November 27, 1974 (TIAS
7995), with minutes. Signed at Amman November 29,
1976.
GPO Sales Publications
Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock
number from the Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
20^02. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for
100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to
the same address. Remittances, payable to the
Superintendent of Documents, must accompany
orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic
postage, are subject to change.
15th Annual Report to the Congress, U.S. Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Agency. "This 15th annual re-
port . . . sets forth in detail and perspective the ad-
vances that have been made and the difficult, essential
work that must still be done ... to create stability
rather than a spiraling arms race in weapons of incalcul-
able destructiveness." ACDA Pub. 88. 75 pp. $2.45.
(Cat. No. 81.117/5:88).
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Tenth
proces-verbal extending the declaration of November
12, 1959, on provisional accession of Tunisia to the gen-
eral agreement. TIAS 8320. 9 pp. 350. (Cat. No.
89.10:8320).
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Proces-
verbal extending the declaration of August 9, 1973, on
provisional accession of the Philippines to the general
agreement. TIAS 8321. 9 pp. 350. (Cat. No. 89.10:8321).
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Declaration
on the provisional accession of Colombia to the agree-
ment of October 30, 1947. TIAS 8322. 24 pp. 450. (Cat.
No. 89.10:8322).
Trade — Meat Imports. Agreement with Australia.
TIAS 8323. 8 pp. 350. (Cat. No. 89.10:8323).
60
Department of State Bulletin
INDEX January 17, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1960
Africa. United States Reemphasizes Spirit of
Cooperation With OAU (Poston) 58
Bulgaria. United States and Bulgaria Sign New
F'isheries Agreement (joint statement) 59
Congress. Congressional Documents Relating to
Foreign Policy 59
Economic Affairs. United States and Bulgaria
Sign New Fisheries Agreement (joint state-
ment ) 59
Israel. U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in
Israel-Syria Sector Extended (Bennett) 42
Lesotho. U.S. Joins Security Council Appeal for
Assistance to Lesotho (Sherer, te.xt of resolu-
tion) 51
Middle East
U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in Lsrael-
Syria Sector Extended (Bennett) 42
U.S. Gives Views in General Assembly Debate on
the Middle East (Scranton, texts of resolutions) 37
U.S. Votes Against U.N. Resolution on Question
of Palestine (Scranton) 41
Namibia. U.S. Reaffirms Commitment to Self-
Determination and Independence for Namibia
(Hess, Scranton, texts of U.N. General Assem-
bly resolutions) 43
Publications. GPO Sales Publications 60
South Africa
U.S. Joins Security Council Appeal for Assistance
to Lesotho (Sherer, text of resolution) 51
United States Urges Peaceful Change 'n South
Africa (Hess, Hupp) 48
Southern Rhodesia. U.S. Reiterates Support for
Negotiated Solution in Rhodesia (Petree,
Scranton, Sherer, texts of U.N. General As-
sembly resolutions) 53
Syria. U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in
Israel-Syria Sector Extended (Bennett) 42
Treaty Information
Current Treaty Actions 59
I'nited States and Bulgaria Sign New Fisheries
Agreement (joint statement ) .59
United Nations
U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in Israel-
Syria Sector Extended (Bennett) 42
U.S. Gives Views in General Assembly Debate on
the Middle East (Scranton, texts of resolu-
tions 37
U.S. Joins Security Council Appeal for Assist-
ance to Lesotho (Sherer, text of resolution) ... 51
U.S. Reaffirms Commitment to Self-Deter-
niination and Independence for Namibia (Hess,
Scranton, texts of U.N. General Assembly res-
olutions) 43
United States Reemphasizes Spirit of Coopcii
tion With OAU (Poston) oH
U.S. Reiterates Support for Negotiated Solution
in Rhodesia (Petree, Scranton, Sherer, texts of
U.N. General Assembly resolutions) 53
U.S. Supports U.N. Membership of Western
Samoa (Sherer) 58
United States Urges Peaceful Change in South
Africa (Hess, Hupp) 48
U.S. Votes Against U.N. Resolution on Question
of Palestine (Scranton) 41
Western Samoa. U.S. Supports U.N. Member-
ship of Western Samoa (Sherer) 58
Name Inde.r
Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr 42
Hess, Stephen 43, 48
Hupp, Rev. Robert P 48
Petree, Richard 53
Poston, Ersa 53
Scranton, William W 37, 41, 43, 53
Sherer, Albert W. , Jr 51, 53, 58
Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: Dec. 27-Jan. 2
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20520.
No. Date Subject
*620 12/29 Shipping Coordinating Commit-
tee (SCO, Subcommittee on
Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS), working group on
subdivision and stability, Jan.
26-27.
*621 12/29 sec, SOLAS, working group on
standards of training and
watchkeeping, Jan. 26.
*622 12/29 Advisory Committee on Inter-
national Intellectual Proper-
ty, International Copyright
Panel, Feb. 2.
*623 12/31 Motor travel in State of Sinaloa,
Mexico.
tl 1/1 U.S. withdrawal from Interna-
tional Convention for the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries.
* Not printed.
+ Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.
Superintendent of Documents
j s. government printing office
washington, dc. 20402
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mi
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Volume LXXVI • No. 1961 • January 24, 1977
ENERGY AND THE WORLD ECONOMY
Statement by Assistant Secretary Katz 61
AMBASSADOR SCRANTON'S ASSESSMENT
OF THE 31st U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Statement in Closing Plenary Session 68
U.S. SUPPORTS ESTABLISHMENT OF U.N. AD HOC COMMITTEE
ON DRAFTING OF CONVENTION AGAINST TAKING OF HOSTAGES
U.S. Statements and Text of General Assembly Resolution 72
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
For inde.x see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Vol. I.XXVI, No. 1961
January 24, 1977
For sale by the SuiJerintendenl of Documents
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Note: Contents of this publication are not
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BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to
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The Department of State fHLLKTI\,&
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, fiureau oi
Public Affairs, provides the public ant
interested agencies of the gocerninenl
with information on developments in
the field of i'.S. foreign relations and
on the work of the Department and
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The BILLETI.X includes seleclet
press releases on foreign policy, issuet
by the White House and the Depart'
ment, and statements, addresses, and
news conferences of the President and
the Secretary of State and other offi-
cers of the Department, as well as spe-
cial articles on various phases of in-
ternational affairs and the functions of
the Department. Information is in-
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Publications of the Department of
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Energy and the World Economy
Statement by Julius L. Katz
Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs *
I welcome the opportunity to appear be-
fore your committee to discuss the interna-
tional energy situation and its impact on the
world economy. This hearing takes place
against the background of a further demon-
stration at the recent OPEC [Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries] meeting in
Doha, Qatar, of the extent to which the eco-
nomic well-being of the United States and
the rest of the world is vulnerable to unilat-
eral decisions on oil prices by the OPEC oil
producers. In these remarks I would like to
discuss the recent OPEC price decision, to
comment on the effect of this and earlier oil
price increases on the global economy, and to
elaborate a number of longer term economic
and energy policy considerations that emerge
from the oil price situation.
The Doha Price Decision
In many ways, the OPEC ministerial meet-
ing in Qatar in mid-December followed the
familiar pattern of OPEC meetings in recent
years. Accompanied by wide-ranging specu-
lation about the outcome of their delibera-
tions, the 13 member nations met in closed
sessions to decide among themselves on the
price other nations would have to pay for oil.
But the Qatar meeting was unique in one im-
portant aspect. Failing to agree on a common
price for the marker crude, upon which all
' Submitted to the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs on Jan. 5. The complete
transcript of the hearings will be published by the
committee and will be available from the Superintend-
ent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402.
their prices have been based in the past, the
OPEC countries broke openly and in effect
created a two-tier price system.
Eleven OPEC members announced their in-
tention to raise their prices by 10 percent on
January 1 and a further 5 percent in July.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates,
on the other hand, refused to go along with
the majority. They indicated the intention to
increase their prices by 5 percent and to hold
this level throughout 1977.
It will be several weeks or months before
we know whether the OPEC majority can
sustain their high posted prices or whether
prices will drift down toward the level estab-
lished by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates. A number of factors contribute to
this uncertainty.
The most important of these is the level of
demand for oil from the 11 high-price mem-
bers of OPEC over the next several months.
If demand for their oil remains at or near the
level of late 1976, they will be able to make
their 10 percent increase stick. However, if
their market begins to shrink appreciably,
they will have to choose between maintaining
their higher prices and accepting a lower
level of revenues or lowering their prices to
compete with lower priced Saudi Arabian and
U.A.E. oil in an effort to maintain their
share of the market.
The market outlook for these 11 countries
will depend on the level of total world de-
mand for oil and on the speed with which
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates
can increase production. Total demand for oil
should decline over the next few months as
January 24, 1977
61
companies draw down the inventories they
built up in the final months of 1976 in antici-
pation of a large OPEC price increase, al-
though a cold winter and the ambiguous state
of economic recovery in some major indus-
trial countries have created unusual uncer-
tainty in the demand outlook.
The Saudis and the United Arab Emirates
have stated their readiness to raise their
production to meet increased demand for
their less expensive oil, and some substantial
increase should be possible. However, Saudi
production at the end of 1976 had already
risen to near capacity levels, and it is unclear
how much incremental capacity can be
brought into production quickly.
There are other factors which make it even
more difficult to assess the outcome of the
OPEC meeting. For example, it is unclear
how much companies can shift their sources
of supply quickly, despite the price differen-
tial. They purchase much of their crude under
long-term contracts and in many cases have
already contracted for crude into the first
and second quarters of 1977. Also, there are
questions about the demand for the particu-
lar qualities of additional crude oil available
from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emi-
rates. This will depend on the refining
capabilities and marketing requirements of
individual companies and importing coun-
tries.
General Economic Implications of Oil Prices
Because of these uncertainties, we cannot
yet draw final conclusions about the conse-
quences and impact of the price decision on
the world economy. But one fact is clear:
Notwithstanding the pressure on the OPEC
majority to hold the price increase below the
level they established, there will be an in-
crease in the price of imported oil. Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates dem-
onstrated a greater sense of responsibility
for global growth and stability than the other
eleven. But whether the increase is ulti-
mately 5 percent or 10 percent or something
in between, it is nonetheless a price increase,
an increase that is both unwarranted and
harmful to the world economy.
Moreover, it comes on top of the massive
oil price increases of the past few years as
the price of this essential input has risen
more than fivefold since January 1973. This
unprecedented price rise constitutes a mas-
sive income transfer from oil-importing coun-
tries to a handful of oil-exporting countries.
It has had, and continues to have, a profound
impact on the world economy and on growth
and income in oil-consuming countries. It
contributed in a major way to the worldwide
inflationary pressures of 1974-75. It also
seriously aggravated the recession of the
same period when the abrupt increase in oil
import costs drained consumer purchasing
power, acting in effect as an excise tax on the
economies of the importing countries.
Given the already high level of oil prices,
even a relatively small increase in percentage
terms can have a substantial economic im-
pact. Our analysis in advance of the Doha
meeting indicated that each 5 percent in-
crease in the cost of crude oil would cost oil-
consuming countries approximately $6 billion
in higher oil bills, with the United States pay-
ing around $1.7 billion of that total. Absent
compensating domestic policy actions, each 5
percent increase costs the seven largest in-
dustrialized countries an average of 0.3 per-
cent each in real GNP [gross national prod-
uct] growth and adds roughly 0.3 percent to
consumer prices.
The oil price rise has also had a fundamen-
tal impact on income distribution because in-
creases in the price of gasoline, home heat-
ing, and electricity have a disproportionate
effect on lower income groups. It has caused
structural adjustments in industry and the
premature obsolescence of industrial plant.
In addition, the new energy situation will
have a continuing impact on the allocation of
investment capital; much more investment
will be needed in the energy area, leaving
less capital available for other economic and
social objectives.
We made a major effort in the months
prior to the Doha meeting to persuade the
oil-producing countries not to raise prices.
We stressed that any increase in the price of
oil would seriously harm the effort to regain
sustainable, noninflationary growth and
62
Department of State Bulletin
would have particularly serious consequences
for the weaker developed-eountry economies
and the developing countries. We also coun-
tered the argument of some of the producers
that an increase in oil prices was justified by
an increase in the cost of their imports; in
fact, the cost of exports to OPEC from the
seven largest industrialized countries has
risen less than 4 percent since September
1975, when the oil price was raised by 10
percent.
We believe that our efforts and those of
other industrialized countries and some de-
veloping nations probably moderated the
final OPEC decision. But the fact that an
unwarranted and unjustified increase oc-
curred despite this major diplomatic effort
underlines the need for effective long-term
action in the energy area to lessen our vul-
nerability to continued increases in the price
of oil. OPEC meets every six months; and in
the absence of action to affect the supply-
demand balance for energy, the world will
confront every six months the possibility of a
further increase in the price of oil.
Financial Impact of Oil Price Increases
The entire range of U.S. economic policies
and objectives has to take account of higher
oil prices and the structural adjustments
needed to cope with these higher prices in
the United States and the rest of the world.
Our central concern is to insure a sustainable
and noninflationary expansion over the next
several years.
This task will be complicated by the diver-
gent economic trends among major indus-
trialized economies. It will require an inten-
sification of the process of economic policy
collaboration through the OECD [Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment] and other contacts, including meetings
at the summit. One of the central objectives
of such collaboration will be concerted action
to deal with the serious financial imbalances
which have resulted from higher oil prices
and will continue at least through the end of
the decade.
In the 1974-76 period, OPEC members had
a cumulative current account surplus of $142
billion. With annual surpluses in excess of
$40 billion likely for the next few years,
OPEC's accumulation of financial assets
could easily surpass $300 billion by the end of
1980. This represents the oil-consuming
countries' aggregate indebtedness to OPEC
members, a net claim on our resources. The
bulk of these claims are held by three OPEC
members.
The large surplus position of OPEC nations
is matched by aggregate deficits in oil-
importing countries, both developed and de-
veloping. No amount of adjustment action by
oil-importing countries as a group can elimi-
nate the deficit in the medium term. Under
these circumstances it would be foolhardy
and dangerous for individual oil-importing
countries to try to improve their position at
the expense of others through "beggar-thy-
neighbor" policies of import restriction and
artificial export stimulation. Rather, the key
questions are how the deficit will be distrib-
uted and how it will be financed.
In the aggregate, the huge OPEC current
account surplus is self-financing. The OPEC
countries in a strong financial position have
no choice but to invest their surplus funds in
oil-importing countries. The pattern of in-
vestment of OPEC financial surpluses, how-
ever, does not match the needs of individual
countries to finance costly oil imports. The
current account deficit of oil-importing coun-
tries is very unevenly distributed. In the in-
dustriahzed world, the diverse impact of oil
price increases aggravates the divergent
rates of growth and inflation, with the al-
ready weaker economies the hardest hit.
Some OECD nations, particularly the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, have had consist-
ent surpluses. Others, such as the United
Kingdom and Italy, have had to make funda-
mental adjustments in growth rates as well
as investment and consumption levels to take
account of energy needs and higher oil
prices. This process will take longer than
classic balance-of-payments adjustments.
Certain developing countries also suffer
dispropoi'tionately. Generally, the capacity
of developing countries to adjust their
economies to higher oil prices is limited.
Many developing countries therefore face
January 24, 1977
63
painful choices as tiiey reassess their de-
velopment prospects in light of added bur-
dens of strained financial resources and
mounting bills for imported oil.
These changes in the structure of financial
relations have a number of important impli-
cations and repercussions:
— There is pressure on weaker indus-
trialized countries to adjust through restric-
tions that would threaten our system of open
trade and capital flows. To avoid such ac-
tions, we must insure that they have enough
financing to allow orderly adjustment. A bal-
anced and concerted strategy for sustained
recovery, which will enhance their export
prospects, is also essential.
— Until 1973, developed countries as a
group ran consistently large current account
surpluses, which enabled them to provide
sufficient financing to developing nations
through aid and investment flows. The vastly
larger financing requirements of developing
nations and the deficit position of developed
countries as a group now make such flows in-
adequate. As a result, higher income de-
veloping countries (as well as weaker indus-
tralized ones) have increasingly turned to
private markets for financing, mostly in the
form of Eurodollar credits and syndicated
bank loans. The terms and conditions of
these credits have not always been appro-
priate to the adjustment problem faced.
Moreover, while private lenders presently
can continue to provide a high volume of
financing, they will become more selective in
their lending policies. In particular, their
willingness to maintain lending levels to cer-
tain important problem countries may di-
minish.
— The unprecedented external borrowing
of developing countries has swelled the
debt-service payments they face in the com-
ing years. 1976 debt-service payments of
non-oil-producing developing nations are in
excess of $21 billion, or more than double the
1973 level — of which over 80 percent relate
to payments on commercial debt. These
payments consume about 20 percent of their
income from merchandise exports, as com-
pared to 15 percent in 1973. In the 1977-80
period there will undoubtedly be a bunching
of debt-service payments, which will increase
these figures. The debt is heavily concen-
trated in higher income developing nations
which have dynamic economies and a strong
debt-service capacity. Nevertheless, some
countries may not find sufficient capital to
pay their debts without imposing very re-
strictive economic policies. Debt-service dif-
ficulties in one or more important develop-
ing nations could trigger a credit squeeze
which could cause private lenders to take a
restrictive view of the creditworthiness of
less developed countries as a group.
One of the fundamental limitations of
heavy reliance on international lending from
private sources is that these lenders cannot
carry out the function of developing com-
prehensive economic stabilization programs
with the borrowing country. Facilitating
such stabilization as a condition of financial
support is an essential function of official
multilateral lending, in particular from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF).
These considerations point clearly to the
need to insure adequate amounts of official
financing in the coming period to facilitate
sound adjustment in the economies of oil-
consuming countries. External financial sup-
port is an essential ingredient in reinforcing
the adjustment efforts of borrowing coun-
tries. In the period ahead, we will therefore
need to develop and strengthen further the
framework of the international financial sys-
tem to insure that it has the flexibility neces-
sary to meet the needs of an international
economy which has been so profoundly
changed by the high cost of imported oil.
In the first instance, this means more ac-
tive use of the International Monetary Fund,
including both its normal lending operations
and new facilities such as the Extended Fund
Facility, the liberalized Compensatory
Financing Facility, and the special Trust
Fund for the poorest developing countries.
We have also negotiated and submitted to
Congress a supplementary OECD Financial
Support Fund. In conjunction with IMF
facilities, it could provide a safety net to deal
with the particular financial vulnerability of
the industrialized economies. Finally, we
should strongly support the activities of the
64
Department of State Bulletin
IMF-IBRD [International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development] Development
Committee aimed at strengthening the ac-
cess of less developed countries to long-term
private capital markets.
Energy Objectives
Over the next several years, we must pur-
sue economic, trade, and financial policies
designed to minimize the extent to which
high oil prices jeopardize our objective of
sustainable, noninflationary growth. But we
cannot be in a position of only reacting to the
evolving world energy system; we must also
act to shape the development of that system.
Mr. Chairman, the events of the past four
years have clearly demonstrated the extent
to which the United States and our major
trading and security partners are vulnerable
to unilateral OPEC decisions to raise oil
prices and to the threatened or actual use of
an oil embargo by some oil-exporting coun-
tries as an instrument of national policy.
But the existence of OPEC is not the sole
cause of our energy vulnerability. Our weak-
ness stems directly from our increasing de-
pendence on imported oil for our complex,
energy-intensive economy. As recently as
the mid-1960's, the United States, while an
importer of oil, had substantial unused
domestic production capacity. By the late
1960's, rising consumption had eliminated
that surplus capacity, and we became a
larger and larger net importer. This com-
bined with rising oil imports by Japan and
Western Europe to bring about a major in-
crease in world requirements for OPEC oil
and a profound shift in the world balance of
supply and demand.
OPEC countries have taken advantage of
this supply-and-demand situation to control
the supply of oil offered in world markets.
This control over supply, together with the
absence of a readily available substitute for
imported oil, enables OPEC to dictate the
world price.
In this regard, it would be a mistake to
view the split decision at Doha as evidence of
an imminent breakup of OPEC. There are
obvious differences of view and interest
within OPEC, but each member has an over-
riding interest, political as well as economic,
in the viability of OPEC. OPEC survived a
major drop in world demand for oil during
the recession of 1975. With economic recov-
ery and increasing demand, the latest dis-
agreement does not appear to pose a major
threat to OPEC solidarity.
We have taken action to reduce our vul-
nerability to interruptions of oil supplies.
Through the emergency sharing system of
the IE A [International Energy Agency] and
our national strategic petroleum reserves,
we have significantly enhanced our ability to
deter another oil embargo and to withstand
the economic impact of an embargo should
one occur.
In the area of oil prices, we have made
progress in strengthening our relationships
with key members of OPEC and in convinc-
ing them of the extent to which their own
economic interests are adversely affected by
actions which threaten the well-being of the
world economy. However, until there is a
basic change in the supply-demand balance
the effectiveness of these diplomatic efforts
on the issue of oil prices will be limited.
The United States has a tremendous po-
tential to help bring about a more acceptable
balance of supply and demand by reducing its
dependence on imported oil. On the one
hand, we are the largest single consumer of
energy. The development of our industrial,
residential, and transportation systems has
been based on a premise of unlimited quan-
tities of inexpensive energy. That premise is
no longer valid, and the entire structure of
our economy must undergo a series of pro-
found changes designed to improve the effi-
ciency of our energy systems. In some cases,
this greater efficiency will result from the
stimulus of higher prices. In other cases,
however, it will have to be mandated or en-
couraged by tax and other incentives.
At the same time, the United States is
blessed with an enormous potential for the
development of new energy supplies, includ-
ing conventional oil, gas, nuclear, and coal
power and eventually synthetics and nonde-
pletable energy sources such as solar and fu-
sion power. There are of course constraints
January 24, 1977
65
on the development of new energy supplies,
and these must be carefully evaluated. But
the development of major new energy
supplies will require both adequate incen-
tives for the enormous investment outlays
needed and, unavoidably, some compromise
among our legitimate energy, economic, and
environmental policies.
Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, the U.S.
response to the energy challenge has thus far
been inadequate. We are now more depend-
ent on imported oil than we were at the time
of the October 1973 embargo. More impor-
tantly, we still have not as a nation made a
credible, long-term commitment to the goal
of reduced import dependence and the policy
measures necessary to achieve that goal.
The design and implementation of the new
actions necessary to achieve our goal of re-
duced energy vulnerability will require the
close and active collaboration of the Congress
and the executive. We urgently need a con-
sensus on a comprehensive and effective
energy policy.
Our energy concerns, like our general eco-
nomic and financial interests, cannot be
viewed solely in a national context. Energy is
just one element — although a central
element — in the web of our political, econom-
ic, and security ties with the rest of the
world. The other industrialized consuming
countries face greater vulnerability in
energy than the United States because of
even greater dependence on imported oil. By
the same token, it is not enough for the
United States alone to reduce its import de-
pendence; U.S. success could be offset by the
failure of other major nations to limit their
requirements for imported oil.
In energy, as in other areas, our
industralized-country allies look to us for
leadership. Because we account for roughly
one-half of OECD energy consumption and
for nearly one-quarter of demand for OPEC
exports, our leadership, if it is to be effec-
tive, requires visible evidence that we are
meeting our national energy responsibilities
by improving the efficiency of our energy
use and developing new supplies.
Just as we recognize that our efforts to es-
tablish a more stable world energy balance
could be undercut by the failure of other
major consumers to limit their dependence
on imported oil, so do they recognize that
they will be unable to reduce their energy
vulnerability unless U.S. import dependence
is reduced. Therefore we must work to-
gether, strengthening national policies and
pursuing common programs, where possible,
in energy conservation, in the development
of new supplies, and in research and de-
velopment (R. & D.). The common objective
of such measures is to reduce our total de-
pendence and to achieve a global energy bal-
ance in which consumers share control with
producers.
We have made the International Energy
Agency the principal vehicle for this coopera-
tion in energy with the rest of the indus-
trialized world. This organization has
achieved notable successes in the two years
of its existence. It has:
— Put in place a comprehensive emergency
program to build oil stocks, to establish
standby demand-restraint measures, and to
share available oil supplies in the event of fu-
ture disruptions in the supply of imported oil;
— Agreed to a long-term cooperative pro-
gram of conservation and the development of
alternative supplies, including a number of
joint R. & D. projects and a framework for
joint projects in the actual development of
new supplies;
— Established an oil market information
system aimed at improving understanding of
the international oil market: and
— Provided the forum for industrialized-
country coordination for the energy dialogue
in the Conference on International Economic
Cooperation.
At a U.S. initiative, the IE A is currently
engaged in a process to establish group and
individual national targets for reducing de-
pendence on imported oil by 1985. It is en-
visioned that member countries will under-
take political commitments to these targets
and the policy measures necessary to achieve
them at an lEA ministerial meeting in the
first half of 1977.
We are also seeking to expand our coopera-
tive efforts with the oil producers in the de-
velopment and diversification of their
economies. As their economies become more
66
Department of State Bulletin
dependent on the health of the international
economy, they should accept more readily
their own responsibility for global economic
stability and growth in their oil pricing and
production policies. We also appreciate the
special energy difficulties of the non-oil de-
veloping countries and have made clear our
leadiness to facilitate access to, and modifi-
cation of, our energy technology to help
them develop their indigenous resources and
use energy more efficiently.
Mr. Chairman, the oil price increases over
the past several years have caused funda-
mental structural changes in the interna-
tional economy. The adjustments that are al-
ready taking place and which will be required
in the future are profound. To meet these
new challenges, we must, as a nation and in
cooperation with others, implement policies
to sustain global growth, to preserve and im-
prove the world trading system, and to
strengthen the international framewoi'k for
financial cooperation.
We must also act decisively to end our
energy vulnerability. As the leader of the in-
dustrialized world, we have the capacity to
confront directly and overcome our national
and collective energy vulnerability. We must
also demonstrate a determination to take the
hard decisions required.
President Ford Responds to Action
by OPEC Increasing Oil Prices
tions and ignoring the destructive conse-
quences of their actions, chose to take a
course which can only be termed irresponsi-
ble.
The United States has joined with many
other nations in an international effort to im-
prove the quality and degree of global coop-
eration. The prosperous world which we and
other nations seek, in the interest of de-
veloped and developing nations alike, de-
pends on a sense of shared responsibility.
This requires that nations avoid actions
which harm one another. It requires that
every country understand that, in an inter-
dependent world, shortsighted actions, how-
ever seemingly attractive in the near term,
can have long-term consequences detrimental
to its prosperity and to that of all other coun-
tries. It requires a common commitment to
the well-being of all peoples and special sen-
sitivity to the plight of the world's poorest
societies. The decision of the OPEC majority
clearly does not meet such standards of in-
ternational responsibility.
For our part this latest price increase can
only serve as a sharp reminder for all Ameri-
cans of the need to take urgent action to
strengthen our conservation efforts and de-
velop new sources of energy in order to re-
duce our dependence. And it must serve as a
reminder to all oil-consuming nations of the
need to work closely together to reduce our
reliance on imported oil and our vulnerability
to arbitrary OPEC decisions.
Statement by President Ford
white House press release dated December 17
We deeply regret OPEC's decision to
raise, once again, the price of oil. We very
much appreciate the efforts of those OPEC
members, particularly Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates, whose sense of inter-
national responsibility and concern for the
adverse impact of an oil price increase on the
world economy led them to advocate re-
straint and to refuse to go along with the in-
crease proposed by the others. Unfortu-
nately, however, the majority of OPEC
members, citing artificial economic justifica-
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
Resources in Namibia: Implications for U.S. Policy.
Hearings before the Subcommittee on International
Resources, Food, and Energy of the House Commit-
tee on International Relations. June 10, 1975-May 13,
1976. 165 pp.
U.S. International Grain Policy: Sales and Manage-
ment. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Interna-
tional Resources, Food, and Energy of the House
Committee on International Relations. December 3,
1975. 34 pp.
Proposed Foreign Military Sales to Middle Eastern
Countries-1976. Hearings before the Subcommittee
on International Political and Military Affairs of the
House Committee on International Relations. Feb-
ruary 23-September 21, 1976. 100 pp.
January 24, 1977
67
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Ambassador Scranton's Assessment of the 31st U.N. General Assembly
Following is a state>nent by U.S. Repre-
sentative William W. Scranton made in the
closing plenary session of the 31st United
Nations General Assembly on December 22.
USL'N press release 200 dated December 22
A year ago the problems of disarmament,
the Middle East, and southern Africa were
acute. Negotiations, however, were stagnant.
The deteriorating situation in Lebanon kept
Arabs and Israelis from seeking ways to
move toward solutions. As prospects for
peaceful solution in southern Africa dwin-
dled, a downward spiral toward violence
gained momentum. Superpower commitment
to strategic arms discussions and disarma-
ment talk in general was questionable.
This world situation affected the United
Nations. The lack of progress or even a pros-
pect for progress was aggravated by one of
the sharpest and most dangerous confronta-
tions in General Assembly history: the dis-
pute over the equation of Zionism with ra-
cism. There, another divisive factor was
added to an already intensely comple.x Mid-
dle East debate. This wounding rhetoric and
other acts nearly as excessive embittered
many people toward the United Nations, cer-
tainly in the United States.
Today, hope exists for settlement in the
Middle East. This results partly, though only
partly, from a winding down of the tragic
struggle in Lebanon. Equally important, the
energies of all parties are today engaged
productively in pursuing ways for the parties
to come together. For the first time all sides
have manifested a renewed determination to
achieve peace. For the first time all parties
desire a negotiating process.
As to southern Africa, determination is
strong to bring about majority rule for multi-
racial nations living in peace. Meaningful
talks concerning Rhodesia are in process.
Talks on Namibia are within reach — talks al-
lowing peaceful change, change by negotia-
tions, the only course that will avoid the hor-
ror of mass violence.
This positive tone extends to the difficult
issues of arms control and disarmament, in-
cluding nuclear proliferation — issues that
will be with us after many others are solved.
Today, none doubt the necessity of resolution
or that superpowers must take the first
steps.
These developments are no cause for
euphoria, but they do offer a basis for hope.
In contrast with the last General Assembly,
this session has had a lessening of confronta-
tion. Some significant changes in the world
situation combined with a more mature tone
here to alter the atmosphere for the better.
A small but perceptible change of mood took
place. The U.N.'s cup, last year half empty,
this year became half full.
I repeat: There is no reason for euphoria,
but it just may be that we have turned a
corner. It just may be that this new tone will
permit us to do more together. Having ap-
proached the brink and drawn back, perhaps
we will now turn to our common tasks with
resolve to make substantive progress rather
than political points.
At the very least, our growing recognition
of the value of small steps taken together is
indeed an accomplishment.
And now, Mr. President and fellow dele-
gates, once again I ask your indulgence for
some personal comments, a habit of mine to
68
Department of State Bulletin
which you have become accustomed but to
which you will not be subjected much longer.
Having been the American Representative
for nine months, I have become an instant
expert on all aspects of the United Nations.
More seriously, I am deeply indebted to each
of you and many others for this educational
process, and when I leave in another month,
it will be with more understanding of the
United Nations than when I arrived.
Let me begin with a few basic thoughts.
Although the United Nations has many pur-
poses, three are most frequently and clearly
enunciated in the charter: maintaining inter-
national peace and security, assisting in eco-
nomic development, and promoting human
rights.
As to the first, we are making progress.
Let me cite one example: Eight years ago on
a trip to the Middle East, I was informed by
the leaders of all six countries I visited that
they believed there was no further role for
the United Nations in the Middle East dis-
pute. Today, none deny the essential role of
the U.N. presence between Syria and Israel
and between Egypt and Israel. Through
these temporary peacekeeping forces the
United Nations is giving the world time to
find a way to bring peace in the Middle East.
And there is virtually unanimous opinion that
the route to peace definitely and prominently
involves the United Nations.
In this geo-economic era, increasing
interdependence and an acceleration of the
desire by people everywhere for a better way
of life bring economic problems and opportu-
nities to the United Nations to a greater de-
gree than ever before. The nations of the
world now recognize that new mechanisms
must be initiated and developed in the U.N.
system for world resources and world trade
to meet the special needs of many while
benefiting us all.
In both these areas — peacekeeping and eco-
nomic development — I am encouraged, as I
think we all are, not only by the demands on
the United Nations but by its response, even
though it is limited. Time will tell, and a
short time at that, whether we take further
opportunities now before us.
But while much is encouraging with regard
to two of the main purposes of the United
Nations, little can be said about the third.
With the exception of successful action on the
initiative of the Federal Republic of Germany
in regard to hostages, for which I congratu-
late the General Assembly, little has hap-
pened during this session to improve protec-
tion of human rights where human rights
most need protection. The strong and un-
swerving views of the U.S. Government on
this subject were recently made plain to the
Third Committee.
This brings me to the United States. Over
and over again I am told here that the United
States must lead — that it must lead with re-
gard to a settlement in the Middle East; that
it must lead with regard to majority rule in
southern Africa; that, with the Soviet Union,
it must lead in disarmament initiatives; that
it must lead and be forthcoming in regard to
interdependence in the economic field; that
the United States must lead the West in the
East-West dialogue and it must lead the
North in the North-South dialogue.
I believe that, working with many of your
countries, the United States has important
roles to play in the effort to find "proximate
solutions to the insoluble problems" of man-
kind. How will each of our nations meet the
test? Will all of us measure up to our re-
sponsibilities?
I can speak only as one American. But at
this moment my feelings are clear and my
hopes high.
Like all nations and all governments and
all peoples, we have made mistakes. That
came home dramatically to Americans in the
last decade.
We have been looking at oui-selves — just as
you have been looking at us — with confusion,
with anger in some cases, and with some ef-
fort at dispassionate analysis.
Every one of you sees the United States
firsthand. You are here. You read about us
in our newspapers every day. You hear about
us on radio and you see us on television. Our
assets and liabilities are wide open to you.
When I look at the United States as our
Bicentennial year comes to a close, I have a
January 24, 1977
69
simple emotion: I rejoice. I find an America
which is quieter, calmer, more modest, but
sounder and more secure. Also, we are be-
coming better listeners. Though we no longer
expect the rest of the world to copy our eco-
nomic system, we believe that of all the eco-
nomic systems in the world, it is the most
productive, the most creative, and the most
beneficial to the people.
We also know that we are joined irrevoca-
bly with the rest of the world, that neither
we nor anyone else can "go it alone."
But out of 30 years of postwar turbulence
has come a more important security than
simply an economic one, and this Bicenten-
nial year epitomizes it. There is a deeper
dedication to the basic precepts of this coun-
try as declared in the Bill of Rights of our
Constitution. I believe the people of the
United States are more firmly convinced
today than ever before in our history that
our individual freedoms, our open society,
are the most precious part of our lives. They
are our inspiration and our only real securi-
ty.
What does all this mean for the United Na-
tions? I think it means that the United States
will take leadership. It means that we will
try with our hearts and our minds to work
for a lasting peace in the Middle East, to
bring majority rule to southern Africa, to
build the mechanisms necessitated by eco-
nomic interdependence, and to progress in
arms control and disarmament.
It also means that you will hear a great
deal from us about freedom and human
rights — for we believe in them. We believe
there is a natural desire in people
everywhere to live not only in peace but also
in freedom; that governments are installed
foremost to secure those rights; and that no
human being has peace or freedom where his
or her human rights are denied.
I believe you will find us easier to hve with
and a better leader. I believe Americans re-
spect you, and you will have good reason to
respect us.
One final thought: The United Nations is
not a parliament. It cannot enforce its will by
enacting laws. It cannot define reality or es-
tablish truth by majority vote. The United
Nations is a gathering of sovereign states,
born out of consensus and destined to survive
only by consensus. Consensus comes down
simply to this: commitment from each of us to
strive for a safer and better life for human
beings everywhere, now and for generations
to come.
U.S. Signs Articles of Agreement
of Agricultural Development Fund
Following are texts of a statement by Pres-
ident Ford issued at Vail, Colo., on De-
cember 22 and a statement by Daniel Parker,
Administrator, Agency for International
Development, made at U.N. Headquarters
that day upon signing the articles of agree-
ment establishing the International Fund for
Agricultural Development.
STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT FORD
White House press release (Vail. Colo.f dated December 22
I have instructed Daniel Parker, Adminis-
trator of the Agency for International De-
velopment, to sign, on behalf of the United
States, the articles of agreement establishing
the International Fund for Agricultural De-
velopment. The Fund — which has received
pledges amounting to $1 billion — will provide
financial assistance to enable poor countries
to increase their own food output. The U.S.
contribution will be $200 million.
The Fund is the product of a cooperative
effort between the industrialized and oil-
exporting countries to meet the needs of the
world's poor nations, which thus exemplifies
the progress which can be achieved by con-
structive international cooperation. The
Fund also received considerable impetus
from the Conference on International Eco-
nomic Cooperation, which has been meeting
in Paris.
The United States remains thoroughly
committed to cooperation among developed
and developing nations, oil importers and oil
exporters, to meet the problems of economic
70
Department of State Bulletin
development and to build a prosperous world
economy from which all nations will benefit.
The United States was one of the earliest
supporters of the International Fund for Ag-
ricultural Development. In his speech to the
seventh special session of the U.N. General
Assembly in September 1975, Secretary of
State Kissinger announced my intention to
seek a contribution to the Fund.
Throughout the planning for the Fund and
negotiations with other nations, there has
been close cooperation between the executive
branch and the Congress. This has enabled
the United States to maintain its leadership
role and to make a substantial contribution to
helping the developing countries better meet
their own food needs.
This is an important step toward the heal-
thier and more prosperous world which all
nations seek.
STATEMENT BY MR. PARKER
USUN press release 198 dated December 22
It is with a great deal of satisfaction that I
am signing today on behalf of the United
States, the articles of agreement establishing
the International Fund for Agricultural De-
velopment.
IFAD, as it has come to be called, repre-
sents the culmination of two years of interna-
tional negotiations and brings to fruition one
of the major initiatives proposed at the 1974
World Food Conference — to accelerate the
flow of development resources for improving
food production and nutrition in the poorer
developing nations.
The U.S. contribution of $200 million to
the Fund is entirely additional to the assist-
ance provided through our existing bilateral
and multilateral foreign aid programs and as
such reflects a major budgetary decision to
increase the U.S. commitment to alleviating
problems of hunger and malnutrition.
A significant aspect of this new Fund is the
fact that it brings together both OECD [Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and
Development] countries and OPEC [Organi-
zation of Petroleum Exporting Countries]
members in a major multilateral assistance
program. The establishment of IFAD has
also been strongly encouraged by all partici-
pants in the Conference on International
Economic Cooperation and represents a posi-
tive step forward in the North-South
dialogue.
Throughout the lengthy process of making
IFAD a reality, the United States has played
a strong leadership role. We pledged our
$200 million contribution at an early stage
and we have helped design the articles of
agreement to insure efficient operation of the
Fund in close coordination with existing in-
ternational institutions.
U.S. leadership has been made possible by
the exceptional degree of coordination and
cooperation between the executive branch
and the Congress that has characterized U.S.
participation in IFAD from the beginning.
With the articles of agreement now open
for signature, it is our hope that ratification
by member governments will quickly follow
so that IFAD may become fully engaged in
its vital role of improving the global food
situation, which is essential for the economic
and social well-being of the world's poor
people.
January 24, 1977
71
U.S. Supports Establishment of U.N. Ad Hoc Committee
on Drafting of Convention Against Taking of Hostages
Following are texts of a statement made i)i
Committee VI (Legal) of the U.N. General
Assembly on November 29 by U.S. Represen-
tative Robert Rosenstock, Legal Affairs Ad-
viser to tite U.S. Mission to the United Na-
tions, and a statement made in plenary ses-
sion on December 15 by U.S. Representative
W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., together with the text
of a resolution adopted by the cormnittee on
December 10 a)td by the Assembly 0)i De-
cember 15.
U.S. STATEMENTS
Mr. Rosenstock, Committee VI, November 29
rSL'N |ii-e>s relejtse 170 dated N(j\embec 2S)
As the General Assembly has unanimously
recognized, the taking of hostages is an ur-
gent and important international problem.
The increasing number of cases in which hos-
tages are taken compels the United Nations
to act immediately. Our delegation is there-
fore pleased that the Legal Committee has
been entrusted to undertake consideration of
this item. We are hopeful that this considera-
tion will soon culminate in an international
convention against the taking of hostages.
The act of taking hostages has sometimes
resulted in the death of the hostages, other
times in the death of persons in the area of
confrontation between the police and the
perpetrators, and even in threats to interna-
tional peace. Always it has resulted in the
great suffering of the hostage, his family,
and his friends — and indeed of all people.
All states should be willing — indeed,
an.xious — to denounce this act. The citizens of
every state have been, or potentially are, the
objects of the act. Experience establishes
that no state can feel confident it will not be
placed in the difficult position of choosing be-
tween complying with unacceptable demands
and risking lives, sometimes of its own na-
tionals. Accordingly, each state has a meas-
ure of self-interest in taking steps to prohibit
this act.
More importantly, each state is already
committed to principles that are violated by
any seizure of a hostage. The Charter of the
United Nations recognizes fundamental
human rights and the dignity and worth of all
persons. These charter principles have been
elaborated and enshrined in the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, which pro-
claims the right of everyone, without excep-
tion, to life, liberty, and security of person.
All states have publicly acknowledged their
commitment to these principles. We must
now act collectively to protect them.
In the past, when actions of an interna-
tional character have produced a significant
threat to fundamental rights, the world
community has responded by formulating a
protective mechanism. Piracy on the high
seas is but the oldest of many examples. It
has long been recognized in the context of
the laws of war that certain means of waging
them are unacceptable and may not be en-
gaged in by either the aggressor state or the
poor victim exercising its inherent right of
self-defense. The Geneva Convention of 1949
on Protection of Civilian Persons was
prompted in large measure by concern over
the inhumane practices of the Second World
War. It was recognized that the true horror
of Lidice and Katyn was not who perpetrated
the outrages or why, but that outrages
against human life and human dignity had oc-
72
Department of State Bulletin
curred and that a law which was not appli-
cable to such cases was a defective law. It
has always been recognized that it is of the
essence of these outrages that no amount of
sympathy for the alleged cause can ever be
thought to justify them.
Following the rash of airplane hijackings in
the 1960's, the international community
adopted the Tokyo, Montreal, and Hague
Conventions for the protection of civil avia-
tion. More recently, we responded to re-
peated assaults on diplomats by elaborating
the Convention on Protection of Diplomats.
These conventions built on the customary
and codified law relating to piracy.
The considerations that promoted these
conventions have arisen again. The threat to
the lives of innocent persons through the tak-
ing of hostages has reached a level that the
international community must not tolerate.
Diplomats on post, ministers attending con-
ferences, businessmen, grandmothers en
route to visiting their families, schoolchil-
dren, and babies have been held hostages.
The taking of hostages is an action with in-
ternational ramifications since the crime is
often perpetrated outside the country of the
hostages and since it has the obvious poten-
tial to provoke breaches of the peace. Rapid
international action is urgently needed.
By its nature, the taking of hostages en-
tails the seizure of an individual, the depri-
vation of his liberty, and a threat to his life,
coupled with an ultimatum that some third
party comply with the demands of the per-
petrators. It always involves demands on a
third party. The person or persons held are
not held for reasons relating to themselves
but to the demands on a third party; they are
thus by definition innocent in the context of
the act in question — innocent in this context
whether or not they have led blameless lives
or committed grave sins or crimes, innocent
whether we like them or not, innocent
whether the regime they lead has been the
object of sanctions or the object of universal
applause. Prisoners may be innocent or they
may be guilty, but not hostages; hostages are
human beings held for what ransom they may
bring — held for what ransom they may bring,
not for them or for their acts. It would be at
the least redundant and at most dangerously
confusing to add an inherently irrelevant ad-
jectival qualifier to the term "hostage."
Mr. Chairman, we are convinced that the
resolution tabled by the Federal Republic of
Germany and a number of other cosponsors is
the appropriate way to begin to form another
protective mechanism for fundamental
human rights.* The resolution decides to
convene an Ad Hoc Committee on the Draft-
ing of an International Convention Against
the Taking of Hostages. An international
convention seems the best method to erect a
legal mechanism to combat the problem, and
it is consistent with what we have done on
previous occasions.
The resolution would have us convene the
ad hoc committee "on the basis that the tak-
ing of hostages should be condemned, prohib-
ited and punished and that persons who per-
petrate such acts should be prosecuted or ex-
tradited for the purpose of prosecution." We
think this instruction to the committee is ap-
propriate and inescapable, for it follows nat-
urally from the conclusion that the act of tak-
ing hostages infringes on fundamental rights.
Finally, the resolution requests the ad hoc
committee to prepare the draft convention in
time to allow its consideration at the 32d
General Assembly. If the committee ap-
preciates the gravity of this problem and
draws on the experience of the Civil Aviation
and Protection of Diplomats Conventions, we
are confident the committee will have no dif-
ficulty in fulfilling this request. The means of
drafting conventions of this nature based on
the principle auf dedare aut judicare [extra-
dite or prosecute] are well known and should
present few problems.
We do not suggest that the elaboration of a
convention will alone eliminate the danger.
What we do suggest is that the elaboration of
a convention along the by now familiar Hnes
laid down in the Hague, Montreal, and Pro-
tection of Diplomats Conventions presents no
significant difficulties. Such a convention will
' Draft resolution A/C.6/31/L.10; on Dec. 9 the Rep-
resentative of the Federal Republic of Gemiany intro-
duced a revised version (A/C.6/31/L.10/Rev.l) of the
draft resolution.
January 24, 1977
73
strengthen the hands of those responsible for
the well-being of their people in a joint co-
operative effort to diminish the threat
through the normal legal avenue of deter-
rence and isolation of offenders. Such a con-
vention will contribute not merely because of
the deterrent and punitive potential inherent
in its terms, but because its elaboration will
serve to crystallize and underscore the de-
termination of the international community
not to allow the unchecked spread of the
human outrage involved in the taking of hos-
tages.
It is particularly important that the inter-
national community express itself on acts
such as interference with civil aviation, at-
tacks on diplomatic agents, and the taking of
hostages. Such acts have a significance and
importance that transcends even the large
number of people directly injured by them
and even the extremely large and widespread
number of people threatened by such acts;
for these acts strike at the heart of the notion
of an organized international society. The or-
ganized international society must be pre-
pared to demonstrate its willingness to re-
spond to such attacks on its raison d'etre or
recognize the absence of a raison d'etre or
anything that could be called a self-
respecting international society.
In closing, we urge member states to be
sensitive to the suffering caused by the tak-
ing of hostages and to realize that the taking
of hostages is a significant and growing prob-
lem. Every occurrence is an affront to our
most closely held principles and a challenge
to the United Nations. We believe that the
resolution before us is a commendable re-
sponse to this challenge; we urge its unani-
mous adoption.
Ambassador Bennett, Plenary, December 15
rSUN int
lil:! ihiteil Dfttmlu-r 111
My delegation is pleased to vote in favor of
this resolution. It is important that action be
undertaken to deal with the contemptible
practice of the taking of hostages. It is im-
portant that the international community is
prepared to undertake the task of drafting an
international convention against the taking
of hostages.
We have no doubt that the convention will
be drafted along the by now familiar lines of
the Hague, Montreal, and Protection of Dip-
lomats Conventions; namely, with the princi-
ple of aut dedare aut judicare forming the
central mechanism. Perpetrators of these
acts must be denied a safe haven. They must
know that wherever they are they will be
subject either to prosecution or extradition.
We are particularly pleased that the Legal
Committee has recommended a course of ac-
tion which follows the Protection of Diplo-
mats model and has avoided the introduction
of irrelevant material and not suggested any
exclusions of the type which have plagued
other items. We are confident these decisions
reflect the widespread recognition that no
cause can excuse and no motive justify so
condemnable an act as the taking of hos-
tages.
We hope and expect the ad hoc committee
will have a draft convention ready for the 32d
session of the Assembly.
TEXT OF RESOLUTION ^
Drafting of an international convention
against the taking of hostages
The General Assembly,
Considering that the progressive development of in-
ternational law and its codification contribute to the
implementation of the purposes and principles set forth
in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the United Nations,
Considering that, in accordance with the principles
proclaimed in the Charter, freedom, justice and peace
in the world are inseparable from the recognition of the
inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of
all members of the human family.
Having regard to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights which provide that everyone has
the right to life, liberty and security.
Recognizing that the taking of hostages is an act
which endangers innocent human lives and violates
human dignity.
Gravely concerned at the increase of such acts,
Recalling the prohibition of the taking of hostages in
2 Adopted by the committee on Dec. 10 (A/C.6/31/
L.lO/Rev.l) and by the Assembly on Dec. 15 by consen-
sus (A/RES/31/103) (te.xt from U.N. doc. A/3i/430, re-
port of the Sixth Committee on agenda item 123, Draft-
ing of an international convention against the taking of
hostages).
74
Department of State Bulletin
articles 3 and 34 of the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12
August 1949, the Hague Convention of 1970 for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, the
Montreal Convention of 1971 for the Suppression of Un-
lawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, the
Convention of 1973 on the Prevention and Punishment
of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons,
including Diplomatic Agents, as well as General As-
sembly resolution 2645 (XXV) of 25 November 1970
condemning aerial hijacking or interference with civil
air travel.
Recognising the urgent need for further effective
measures to put an end to the taking of hostages.
Mindful of the need to conclude, under the auspices
of the United Nations, an international convention
against the taking of hostages,
1. Decider to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on the
Drafting of an International Convention Against the
Taking of Hostages, composed of 35 Member States;
2. Requests the President of the General Assembly,
after consultations with the Chairman of the regional
groups, to appoint the members of the Ad Hoc Commit-
tee on the basis of equitable geographical distribution
and representing the principal legal systems of the
world;
3. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to draft at the
earliest possible date an international convention
against the taking of hostages and authorizes the Com-
mittee, in the fulfilment of its mandate, to consider
suggestions and proposals from any State, bearing in
mind the views expressed during the debate im this
item at the thirty-first session of the Genei'al Assembly;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to afford the Ad
Hoc Committee any assistance and provide it with all
facilities it may require for the performance of its work,
to provide the Committee with pertinent information on
the taking of hostages and to ensure that summary rec-
ords on the meetings of the Committee will be drawn up
and submitted;
5. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to present its re-
port and to make every effort to submit a draft conven-
tion to the General Assembly in good time for considera-
tion at its thirty-second session and requests the
Secretary-General to communicate the report to
Member States;
6. Decides to include the item entitled "Drafting of an
international convention against the taking of hostages"
in the provisional agenda of its thirty-second session.
U.S. Calls for Responsible Measures Against international Terrorism
Following is a statement made in Commit-
tee VI (Legal) of the U.N. General Assembly
on December 6 by U.S. Representative Mon-
roe Leigh, Legal Adviser of the Department
of State.
rSUN press release 17
tliiteti Decembel- fi
The item before us is profoundly impor-
tant. No one can deny that the scourge of
terrorism continues to plague the international
community and to devastate the innocent.
It is accordingly incumbent upon all gov-
ernments to join in taking the measures that
the international community can take to deal
with this pervasive problem. It is incumbent
upon all governments to consider, and act
upon, what can be done to deal with ter-
rorism, for a number of reasons.
Governments have a paramount obligation
to protect the lives of their citizens. If there
is one thing that is clear, it is that the inher-
ently indiscriminate nature of terrorism
makes it a threat to people everywhere. Not
only is the terrorist act itself aimed at taking
human lives — often for the mere publicity
value of the act — but the reactions that such
acts inevitably and understandably engender
also sometimes result in loss of life. Ter-
rorism is the starting point of a process
which is likely to lead not merely to
bloodshed on a small scale but to a threat to
the peace, or worse.
Governments are obligated, moreover, to
consider the effect on their standing and that
of the international coinmunity of tolerating
acts of terrorism. Can any government
worthy of governing be expected to ac-.
quiesce in the continuing victimization of its
citizens? Can an organized international
community which tolerates acts of terrorism
maintain that measure of self-respect neces-
sary for its simple survival as an organized
international community — still less its closer
and more effective integration? Can the
United Nations be taken seriously as a force
for human rights, racial justice, and eco-
nomic equity if, as an institution, it is indif-
ferent to internationally promoted murder?
January 24, 1977
75
For its part, my government remains con-
cerned. We believe that the international
community should and must undertake
measures to deal with terrorism. We believe
those measures should be grounded on the
same humanitarian concerns that underlie
laws of war. If we can limit the conduct per-
missible to a state which is fighting for its
survival in accordance with its inherent right
of self-defense, we surely can limit actions by
groups or individuals which, whether under-
taken for base or noble goals, are not consid-
ered legal by states under international law.
We certainly can do so in cases where such
acts are of an international character or where
they violate fundamental human rights (as
they characteristically do).
The United States submitted a draft con-
vention to the General Assembly in 1972 for
the prevention and punishment of certain
acts of international terrorism. Our draft was
not aimed at all acts of terrorism but only at
the spread of terrorism to persons and places
removed from the scene of the conflict. We
said at that time, and we say now, that we do
not maintain that our approach is the only
possible approach or the best of all ap-
proaches. It is the best approach which we
have devised in light of the circumstances.
We invite others to support our suggested
approach or to propose something better.
We are aware of the objections some have
raised to our proposal for a treaty that would
attempt to deter the export of terrorism.
Briefly put, these objections can be sum-
marized under three headings: (1) that na-
tional liberation movements must have a free
hand; (2) that governmental action causes
death, so why single out acts of other en-
tities; and (3) that there can be no action
taken against terrorism until the underlying
causes of terrorism are eliminated.
While we have a measure of sympathy and
a larger measure of understanding for some
of the motives behind some of these argu-
ments, we find them wholly unconvincing —
from the standpoint of the progressive de-
velopment of international law and from the
standpoint of the preservation of the peace.
We do not believe that any government
disagrees with those humanitarian aspects of
the laws of war which Hmit or endeavor to
limit state conduct. If, then, there are hor-
rors and outrages that even states fighting
for their lives cannot indulge in, there must
be limits to what conduct groups or individu-
als may indulge in. Indeed, no one has yet
argued that groups or individuals may use
poison gas or dumdum bullets. The sooner we
recognize that we all agree that there are
limits on permissible conduct of groups or in-
dividuals to use force to promote their objec-
tives, the sooner we can sit down and talk
about what those limits are or ought to be.
We may wish to set the international limits
at one level and another government may
wish to set them at another, but that is a
matter susceptible to solution by rational
discourse. Our plea is that we stop throwing
up smokescreens of false argument and sit
down to work out humanitarian limits.
The argument that one cannot take action
against groups or individuals without taking
action against states — against so-called
"state terrorism" — is transparently falla-
cious. Indeed, we doubt many assert that
nihilistic view with genuine conviction. The
world is too full of problems, and if we refuse
to deal with one of them until we can deal
with all of them, we shall never deal with
any. For example, our inability to eradicate
violations of human rights in all cases — even
in all grave cases — cannot be a basis for re-
fusing to try to alleviate human rights viola-
tions in southern Africa.
Moreover, we must recognize that there is
already in existence an established body of
rules governing state conduct. There is the
United Nations Charter, with its unarguable
prohibition against the threat or use of force.
There are the laws of war that govern those
situations when fighting nevertheless breaks
out. The laws of war have had great human-
itarian effect, though at the same time
gravely inadequate effect; and of course
those imperfect rules are now being revised.
But new rules are not needed to inform
states when the use of force is permissible
and when it is not. And even if new rules
were necessary, and achieveable, a need to
deal with that problem would not provide a
valid excuse for ignoring others, such as
76
Department of State Bulletin
those of international economic order — new,
old, or whatever. Nor would it provide a
valid excuse for refusing to take measures to
deal with terrorism.
The third argument often used to bar
e.xamination of possible measures is that we
cannot engage in a discussion of practical
measures until we eliminate the root causes
of terrorism. The very existence of all of our
governments indicates how spurious this line
of argument is. Crime occurs in all of our
countries, bar none. More in some than
others, but the society does not exist whose
laws are never violated. In many cases, that
crime has its roots in social causes. Yet all
our governments apprehend, prosecute, and
punish criminals. None of our heads of state,
parliamentary bodies, or judges urge the
elimination of criminal law until the causes of
criminal conduct have been eliminated. Re-
pressive governments merely punish those
they consider criminal. Responsible govern-
ments do not merely punish criminals. They
seek to improve the nature of their societies
and to insure the widest measure of justice
so that punishment is proportionate and the
causes of crime are ameliorated.
Were the United Nations to embark on
concluding a convention along the lines we
suggest, would it be behaving like a repres-
sive government or a responsible one? The
answer to that question lies in the immense
work that is currently going on throughout
the U.N. system to improve the social situa-
tion for all the world's people. Poverty and
injustice are being fought directly in more
than half of the main committees of the As-
sembly as well as the Economic and Social
Council and the Security Council and the
specialized agencies. Like that of most na-
tional governments, the record of the United
Nations is one of only partial success. If, then,
the United Nations could not be said to resem-
ble a repressive government, could it be said to
resemble a responsible one? My government
does not believe we can give an unqualified af-
firmative response to that question so long as
there is an unwiUingness in this body to take
responsible measures to deal with the scourge
of terrorism.
We respectfully urge all members who care
whether the United Nations can be regarded
as an organization comprised of responsible
members to join our efforts to find measures
to control international terrorism. We urge
all members to join in a common effort to
protect all mankind from barbaric acts of vio-
lence which have already cost so many lives
to so little purpose.
U.S. Supports U.N. Resolution
Against the Practice of Torture
Folloiving is a statennent made in Commit-
tee III (Social, H^imanitarian and Cultural)
of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Rep-
resentative Jacob M. Myerson on December
3, together with the text of a resolution
adopted by the coinmittee on December 3 and
by the Assembly on December 13.
STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR MYERSON
USUN press release 177 dated December 3
In accordance with an injunction you have
given us on other occasions, I shall endeavor
to be brief. We are at a late stage of our work
in the 31st session of the General Assembly.
We are perhaps — perhaps I should say the
hour is also late for human rights, at least for
human rights work in the United Nations, as
we have recently had occasion to point out.
Sir, in many countries around the world —
and not just in those countries it is fashionable
to attack in this body — people are locked up
in prison, often simply because of the views
they dare to hold. Some of these people are
subjected to torture.
Three years ago in Resolution 3059 the
General Assembly expressed its grave con-
cern over the fact "that torture is still prac-
tised in various parts of the world." The
shocking fact for all of us is that such a con-
cern had to be expressed 25 years after ap-
proval of the Universal Declaration on
Human Rights. Torture is practiced in spite
of the fact that every civilized government
accepts without question that no human
January 24, 1977
77
being should be subjected to torture. Free-
dom from torture is a basic human right rec-
ognized in article 5 of the Universal Declara-
tion. In the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights it is further specified that no overrid-
ing circumstance of public emergency
threatening the life of a nation can be cited to
derogate from this basic right.
Certainly, Mr. Chairman, if this Assembly
has a mission to promote human rights it
cannot escape taking action to bring to an
end the practice of torture in our modern-day
world. My government has been in the fore-
front of those calling for action. U.S. repre-
sentatives in the various U.N. forums which
have been acting to strengthen the guaran-
tees against torture have given their full
support to the measures which this Assembly
has requested. The draft resolution which
has been presented to us in document
A/C.3/31/L.38 takes account of the activities
which are presently underway in a number of
U.N. bodies.
The accomplishments of the Committee on
Crime Prevention and Control with respect
to a draft code of conduct for law enforce-
ment officers have been a welcome develop-
ment, in our view. Likewise, the work of that
body in extending the range of application of
the Standard Minimum Rules for Treatment
of Prisoners has, we think, constituted a
worthwhile and important step forward.
The Subcommission on Prevention of Dis-
crimination and Protection of Minorities has
acted to begin preparation of a body of prin-
ciples for the protection of all persons under
any form of detention or imprisonment. The
subcommission has decided to appoint a
working group to analyze the materials re-
ceived in connection with its annual review of
developments relating to the question of the
human rights of persons subjected to any
form of detention or imprisonment. We have
taken note of this development with interest
also.
Mr. Chairman, my government has no
quarrel with the intent of the draft resolution
which is before us to endorse this important
work and to give support for further meas-
ures in pursuit of the overall plan of trying to
construct a system of guarantees to protect
persons under detention. We therefore wel-
come the provisions of the operative para-
graphs. All of these will, we are confident,
complement the achievement of the last As-
sembly session in agreeing upon the declara-
tion on the protection of all persons against
torture which was unanimously adopted by
our Resolution 3452.
Having said all this, Mr. Chairman, I can-
not refrain from posing a question: Are all of
these measures which are now underway
enough to meet the problem?
I think it is perhaps extremely revealing
that, based on the record, the adoption of the
various resolutions passed by this body on
torture has been remarkably easy. Unanim-
ity has been the rule when governments have
been called upon to take a position on meas-
ures to combat torture.
But what are the facts, Mr. Chairman? The
facts reveal, of course, that torture still per-
sists. Just last week this Assembly adopted a
far-reaching resolution which had as its
major impetus the recurring reports of tor-
ture being practiced in Chile. But none of us
would be so naive, I am sure, as to assert
that Chile is the only place in the world that
requires our attention as far as the practice
of torture is concerned. There is overwhelm-
ing evidence easily available to those who
may be interested in seeking it which is
equally disturbing — disturbing as to the
practice of torture in other countries —
torture practiced by governmental agencies,
in some cases with the clear connivance of
high-level governmental authorities.
Are we then, Mr. Chairman, fellow dele-
gates, doing enough? Are these unanimous
expressions of support for the resolutions
which we have adopted, such as that now be-
fore us, indicative that we may be engaging
in an exercise in self-deception — that we are
meeting the need to combat the evil of tor-
ture by actions which we all know with vari-
ous degrees of uneasiness may not reach to
the heart of the problem? Mr. Chairman, I
believe that many of us fear that it is not
enough.
In saying this I do not wish to denigrate
78
Department of State Bulletin
the possible utility of the measures under-
way. Any strengthening of the fabric of in-
ternational protection by the drafting of
codes, declarations, and strongly worded
resolutions can have a positive effect. My
delegation does, however, believe that as
long as the problem of torture persists in the
world we must keep in mind that more direct
actions may be required.
Now, sir, at this particular stage, my dele-
gation does not wish to present any specific
proposals. It is within the power of this As-
sembly to establish machinery to deal with
this problem on a worldwide basis —
machinery which could bear more directly on
the instances of torture which may exist — ma-
chinery which could focus on those instances
in the glare of public opinion which this or-
ganization is uniquely equipped to bring to
bear.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like
simply to reiterate my government's support
for the resolution which is before this com-
mittee. We do so because we are deeply con-
cerned that this most shocking human rights
violation, the practice of torture, is one
which cries out for our attention. Torture
must be eliminated. We shall be untrue to
the purposes of the charter if we fail to per-
sist in bringing this barbaric practice to an
end everywhere in the world.
TEXT OF RESOLUTION i
Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment in relation to detention and im-
prisonment
The General Assembly,
Recalling the Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from being Subjected to Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, unanimously adopted in its resolution 3452
(XXX) of 9 December 1975,
Recalling also its resolution 3453 (XXX) of 9 De-
' Adopted by the committee on Dec. 3 (A/C.3/31/
L.38) and bv the Assembly on Dec. 10 without a vote
(A/RES/31/85) (text from U.N. doc. A/31/394, report of
the Third Committee on agenda item 74, "Torture and
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.")
cember 1975, in which it requested the competent
bodies to conduct further work on the elaboration of:
(a) A body of princijjles for the protection of all per-
sons under any form of detention or imjirisonment,
(b) A draft code of conduct for law enforcement offi-
cials,
(c) Principles of medical ethics relevant to the protec-
tion of persons subjected to any form of detention or
imprisonment against torture and other cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment;
Noting Economic and Social Council resolution 1993
(LX) of 12 May 1976 and resolution 10 (XXXII) adopted
by the Commission on Human Rights on 5 March 1976,
Welcoming the work of the Committee on Crime Pre-
vention and Control at its fourth session, in particular
with respect to a draft code of conduct for law enforce-
ment officials as well as the range of application and the
implementation of the Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners,
Noting further the decision of the Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities at its twenty-ninth session to appoint a Rap-
porteur to prepai'e the first draft of a body of principles
for the protection of all persons under any form of de-
tention or imprisonment, and its resolution 3 (XXIX) of
31 August 1976, recommending the appointment of a
working group to analyse the materials received in con-
nexion with its annual review of developments relating
to the question of the human rights of persons sub-
jected to any form of detention or imprisonment,
Reiterating its belief that further efforts are needed
to help ensure adequate protection for all against tor-
ture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment,
1. Calls upon Governments, as well as inter-
governmental and non-governmental organizations con-
cerned with human rights, to give maximum publicity
to the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;
2. Invites the Economic and Social Council to give
due priority to the examination of the draft code of con-
duct for law enforcement officials proposed by the
Committee on Crime Prevention and Control, in order
that the Council at its sixty-second session and the
General Assembly at its thirty-second session take fur-
ther steps with a view to the adoption of this instru-
ment;
3. Also invites the Economic and Social Council to
consider with due priority the recommendation of the
Committee on Crime Prevention and Control at its
fourth session contained in new draft rule 95 of the
Standard Minimum Rules seeking to assure the applica-
bility of the Standard Minimum Rules to all persons ar-
rested or imprisoned with or without charge and con-
viction, as well as to the draft procedures for the effec-
tive implementation of the Rules;
4. Requests the Commission on Human Rights,
January 24, 1977
79
through the Economic and Social Council, to present a
comprehensive report on the elaboration of a body of
principles for the protection of all persons under any
form of detention or imprisonment to the General As-
sembly at its thirty-third session:
5. I twites the World Health Organization to prepare a
draft Code on Medical Ethics relevant to the protection
of persons subjected to any form of detention or impris-
onment against torture and other cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment, and to bring it to the
attention of the General Assembly at its thirty-second
session;
6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its
thirty-second session the item entitled "Torture and
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment".
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Aviation
Convention on international civil aviation. Done at
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April
4, 1947. TIAS 1591.
Adherence deposited: Mozambique, January 5, 1977.
Coffee
Intei'national coffee agreement 1976, with annexes.
Done at London December 3, 1975. Entered into force
provisionally October 1, 1976.
Ratifications deposited: Guatemala, December 15,
1976: Yugoslavia, December 28, 1976.
Fisheries
International convention for the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries. Done at Washington February 8, 1949. En-
tered into force July 3, 1950. TIAS 2089.
Withdrawal effective: United States, December 31,
1976.
Rerocatioii of notice of intention to withdraw:
Canada, December 28, 1976.
Health
Amendments to articles 24 and 25 of the constitution of
the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as
amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva
May 17, 1976. '
Acceptances deposited: Egypt, December 21, 1976:
Niger, December 28, 1976; Norway, December 29,
1976.
Maritime Matters
Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as
amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490).
Adopted at London October 17, 1974.'
Acceptances deposited: Dominican Republic, Hun-
gary, December 30, 1976.
Program-Carrying Signals — Distribution
by Satellite
Convention relating to the distribution of programme-
carrving signals transmitted by satellite. Done at
Brussels May 21, 1974.'
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, December 29,
1976.
Safety at Sea
International regulations for preventing collisions at
sea. Approved by the International Conference on
Safety of Life at Sea held at London from May 17 to
June 17, 1960. Entered into force September 1, 1965.
TIAS 5813.
Acceptance deposited: Barbados, Decembers, 1976.
Seals
Convention for the conservation of Antarctic seals, with
anne.x and final act. Done at London June 1, 1972.'
Instrutnent of ratification signed by the President:
December 28, 1976.
Space
Convention on registration of objects launched into
outer space. Done at New York January 14, 1975. En-
tered into force September 15, 1976.^
Ratification deposited: Niger, December 22, 1976.
Space — Liability
Convention on international liability for damage caused
by space objects. Done at Washington, London, and
Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into force Sep-
tember 1, 1972; for the United States October 9,
1973. TIAS 7762.
Accession deposited: Uruguay, January 7, 1977.
BILATERAL
Korea
Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the
United States, with agreed minutes and exchange of
notes. Signed at Washington January 4, 197". Enters
into force on a date to be mutually agreed by ex-
change of notes.
Peru
Agreement amending the agreement of July 21 and Au-
gust 8, 1976, relating to the transfer of commodities
to Peru to support the national primary school feed-
ing program. Signed at Lima December 14 and 20,
1976. Entered into force December 20, 1976.
' Not in force.
^ Not in force for the United States.
80
Department of State Bulletin
INDEX January 2J,, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1961
Agriculture. U.S. Signs Articles of Agreement of
Agricultural Development Fund (Ford,
Parker) 70
Congress
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 67
Energy and the World Economy (Katz) 61
Economic .Affairs. Energy and the World Econ-
omy (Katz) 61
Energy
Energy and the World Economy (Katz) 61
President Ford Responds to Action by OPEC In-
creasing Oil Prices (statement) 67
Food. U.S. Signs Articles of Agreement of Ag-
ricultural Development Fund (Ford, Parker) . 70
Human Rights. U.S. Supports U.N. Resolution
Against the Practice of Torture (Myerson, text
of resolution) 77
Petroleum
Energy and the World Economy (Katz) 61
President Ford Responds to Action by OPEC In-
creasing Oil Prices (.statement) 67
Presidential Documents
President Ford Responds to Action by OPEC In-
creasing Oil Prices 67
U.S. Signs Articles of Agreement of Agricultural
Development Fund 70
Saudi Arabia. President Ford Responds to
Action by OPEC Increasing Oil Prices
(statement) 67
Terrorism
U.S. Calls for Responsible Measures Against In-
ternational Terrorism (Leigh) 75
U.S. Supports Establishment of U.N. Ad Hoe
Committee on Drafting of Convention Against
Taking of Hostages (Bennett, Rosenstock, text
of resolution) 72
Treaty Information
Current Actions 80
S. Signs Articles of Agreement of Agricultural
Development Fund (Ford, Parker) 70
United Arab Emirates. President Ford Re-
sponds to Action by OPEC Increasing Oil
Prices (statement) 67
United Nations
Ambassador Scranton's Assessment of the 31st
U.N. General Assembly (statement in closing
plenary session) 68
U.S. Calls for Responsible Measures Against In-
ternational Terrorism (Leigh) 75
U.S. Supports Establishment of U.N. Ad Hoc
Committee on Drafting of Convention Against
Taking of Hostages (Bennett, Rosenstock, text
of resolution) 72
U.S. Supports U.N. Resolution Against the Prac-
tice of Torture (Myerson, text of resolution) . . 77
Name Index
Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr 72
Ford, President 67, 70
Katz, Julius L 61
Leigh, Monroe 75
Myerson, Jacob M 77
Parker, Daniel 70
Rosenstock, Robert 72
Scranton, William W 68
Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: January 3 — 9
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington,
D.C. 20520.
No.
t2
Date
1/4
Suhjcit
U.S. and Republic of Korea sign
new fisheries agreement.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
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776^
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Volume LXXVI • No. 1962 • January 31, 1977
LAYING THE FOUNDATION OF A LONG-TERM POLICY
Remarks by Secretary Kissinger Before the National Press Club 81
SECRETARY KISSINGER EMPHASIZES NEED
FOR NONPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY
Remarks Before the Foreign Policy Association of New York 88
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLET I
Vol. LXXVI, No. 1962
January 31, 1977
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
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Note: Contents of this publication are not
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BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The
BULLETIN is inde.xed in the Readers' Guide to
Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BVLLETI ^
a weekly puf)lication issued by thff.
Office of Media Services, Bureau ot
Public Affairs, provides the public anSj,
interested agencies of the governmenh
with information on development:! in
the field of U.S. foreign relations ant
on the work of the Department am
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selectet
press releases on foreign policy, issuet
by the White House and the Depart
ment, and statements, addresses, ani
news conferences of the President am
the Secretary of State and other offl
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ciat articles on various phases of in
ternational affairs and the functions o
the Department. Information is in
eluded concerning treaties and inter
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United States is or may become a parti
and on treaties of general interna
tionat interest.
Publications of the Department oA
State, United Nations documents, ana
legislative material in the field ot
international relations are also listed.i
Laying the Foundation of a Long-Term Policy
Following are remarks made by Secretary
Kissinger at a National Press Club luncheon
at Washington on January 10 and the tran-
script of the questions and answers which
followed. *
Press release 3 dated January 11
REMARKS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER
In these last few weeks many of you have
asked me how I would sum up the successes
and failures of our foreign policy. As you
know, my hearing consistently fails during
the second part of that question. But since I
shall soon settle that issue conclusively in my
memoirs, let me confine myself today to some
general principles.
I have participated in the conduct of
■ American foreign policy during a period of
fundamental change. As always in such
times, that policy emerged from an amalgam
of factors: objective circumstances, domestic
pressures, the values of our society, and the
decisions of individual leaders. The relative
weight to be given to each can be left to his-
torians. But their mix shaped a profound
transition in our nation's foreign policy. The
trauma of Vietnam transformed our interna-
tional perceptions; the nightmare of Water-
gate brought into question the validity of our
domestic institutions. These upheavals coin-
cided with radical alterations in the interna-
tional environment. We have had to cope,
over the past decade, with an increasingly
complex and turbulent world in which
America must seek to achieve its principles
' Introductory and closing remarks by Robert Alden,
president of the National Press Club, and the opening
paragraphs of Secretary Kissinger's remarks are not
printed here.
and its purposes under circumstances greatly
at variance with traditional attitudes.
Through the greater part of the past two
centuries America defined and justified its
role in the world in terms of abstract princi-
ples. Our isolation, vast margins of safety,
and a preoccupation with developing our own
continent produced a sense of American
uniqueness and a conviction that our power
and the uses we made of it were but the
physical expression of our moral purpose. We
tended to beheve that in foreign affairs our
involvement or noninvolvement was a matter
of our own choice and that we needed to act
only when our democratic principles bade us
to do so.
In the early years of this century we found
ourselves, alone among the democracies, suf-
ficiently powerful to maintain the precarious
world balance. But then, shunning the claims
of security and alliance, we fell back on our
traditional isolationism; we sought, re-
peatedly and unsuccessfully, to substitute
law for politics and to legislate solutions to
international conflicts.
After World War II we finally accepted the
responsibilities of world leadership. But the
great exertions we undertook were based on
the premise that they would be temporary —
that at some point our allies would need us no
longer; that poor nations would embrace de-
mocracy and move toward self-sufficiency;
that our adversaries would change or that
their systems would collapse. We applied
abroad policies and programs modeled after
our domestic experience of the New Deal and
wartime mobilization; we acted as if any
political problem anywhere could be solved
by overwhelming it with our resources, as if
the revolutions of our time had primarily
economic, rather than political and even
spiritual, causes.
January 31, 1977
81
The sixties were the last full flowering of
these impulses — the belief in our omnipo-
tence, in our self-sufficiency, in our ability to
remake other societies in our image. To be
sure, temptations remain with us and occa-
sionally surface in our domestic debate or in
our legislation.
But as the decade drew to a close, we
began to learn that we cannot legislate our
own moral preferences upon the world at a
time when we no longer enjoy physical pre-
dominance. We came to see that abstract
principles are not self-fulfilling; they can lead
to an overinvolvement as pernicious as our
earlier isolation. We live today in a world of
many centers of power and contending
ideologies; a collection of some 150-odd na-
tions sharing few agreed legal or moral as-
sumptions; an international economic system
in which the well-being of all peoples is ine.x-
tricably intertwined — in short, a set of new
historical realities in which the challenges of
peace, prosperity, and justice have no termi-
nal date and are unending.
Seldom before has foreign policy had to be
conducted against the background of such
vast ideological divisions; never before has it
been conducted in the knowledge that mis-
calculation could mean the end of civilized
life. The need for a global structure has long
been evident, but the gap between developed
and developing countries — a constant chal-
lenge to tranquillity — has continued to
widen. The growing reality of our interde-
pendence is in constant tension with the
compelling trends of separatism and intense
nationalism.
At the turn of the decade, our cardinal task
was to disengage from a war that had placed
550,000 Americans on the mainland of Asia in
a way that preserved our abihty to design
and to influence the development of a new in-
ternational order. Newly conscious of our
limits, we sought to put into place a foreign
policy of the kind less favored nations had to
conduct throughout history — a foreign policy
that depended on the perception of priorities,
a feeling for the importance of nuance, and a
realization that there could be no terminal
date to our efforts. Our traditional predispo-
sition for moral, legal, and clear-cut solutions
was not abandoned, but we attempted to rec-
oncile them with a new understanding of the
geopolitical reahties of our time. Above all,
we needed to rally and maintain the support i
of the American people for the long haul.
It is in the nature of foreign policy that
problems of world structure cannot be con-
cluded in one Administration. I believe that
we have emerged from one of the most trying
decades in our history with new maturity,
with the foundations of a long-term policy in
place, with the world and America more
tranquil than we found them, and with con-
siderable opportunities for constructive
achievement before us. We are no longer in-
nocent, but neither have we grown cynical.
We have reconfirmed our historic responsi-
bility to contribute to the eternal quest of all
peoples to live in security and peace, free
from fear, oppression, or foreign domination.
We must never forget that no other free na-
tion is strong enough or cohesive enough to
replace us. If we falter, no one can step into
the breach, and hostile purposes and incom-
patible values will then shape the future of
mankind. Without our commitment there can
be no security; without our contribution
there can be no progress. This is America's
inescapable burden, its incontestable glory.
So, as the Administrations change, let us
dedicate ourselves to the task of insuring
that our common purposes transcend our dif-
ferences. No matter how strong the founda-
tions we have laid, the challenges confront-
ing the next Administration will be complex,
difficult, and painful. There will continue to
be, as there have been in the past, many
complicated choices to make; and there will
continue to be intense dispute over the wis-
dom of the choices made and the courses that
have been set. Achievement will inevitably
fall short of hope and expectation, as it has in
every Administration. The new Administra-
tion may avoid some of the mistakes we
made; it will surely make some new ones of
its own. But all of us owe those who carry
the burden of responsibihty the benefit of the
doubt, a healthy understanding for the mag-
nitude of their problems and compassion for
the narrow range of choices available.
Long before I had any expectation that I
82
Department of State Bulletin
would be leaving office, I emphasized,
perhaps self-servingly, the vital importance
of a nonpartisan foreign policy. I repeat that
plea now with equal fervor. The divisions
that have characterized the last decade in
this country must finally end. The deeds de-
manded of America in the decade ahead can
only be accomplished by a united people and
government acting with boldness, persever-
ance, and vision.
This is the time to build a new foreign pol-
icy consensus similar in scope though differ-
ent in content than that which sustained the
post-World War II generation. Americans
must once again conduct their foreign policy
debates with a recognition that we are, after
all, partners in a vital national endeavor on
\\ hich depends our future and that of the rest
of the world. Let us behave during these
years so that we shall remember them as the
time when the American people rediscovered
tlieir unity. For my own part, I wish my suc-
cessors well. I will do my best to contribute
to an informed, constructive, and supportive
public dialogue.
You ladies and gentlemen of the Fourth
Estate have a stake in this enterprise. If I
may make a parting request it is to look upon
my successors' challenges with some
sympathy — to remember that what appears
to an outsider as lack of candor may in reality
be the best judgment of serious people grap-
pling with events emerging from a fog of con-
fusing reports and putting forward policies
which they believe to be right, but which
they cannot know to be right until the time
for decision is past.
The profound alterations over the past
decade in our perceptions of morahty and
political propriety have affected every aspect
of our public life, and they have had a drama-
tic impact upon the relationship between the
government and the press. The days when
statesmen and journalists coexisted in an at-
mosphere of trust and shared confidences
have given way to a state of almost perpetual
inquest which, at its worst, can degenerate
into a relationship of hunter and hunted, de-
ceiver and dupe.
But in its best sense these new attitudes
have been, and will be, centrally important
to the health and vitality of our democracy.
What public servant who bears that title
with pride and integrity ultimately will not
be grateful for a press that relentlessly holds
its officials to high standards of truth and in-
tegrity? Can one ever forget the sinking feel-
ing of being asked a question at a press con-
ference by a reporter who already knows the
answer from an earlier background session?
What official has not been aged by the
panicky knowledge that some journalist is
seducing another source to confirm what he
has been told on an off-the-record basis? And
who can avoid the special anguish of knowing
that if the reporter succeeds, one has gotten
exactly what one deserves?
You and I have been reasonably good pro-
tagonists. The jokes and the conflicts, the
cooperation and the pain that we have had
over the past eight years reflect the fact that
under our system the press and the govern-
ment are natural sparring partners that
nevertheless need each other. Both are pow-
erful institutions attempting to serve the
public interest by their own lights and ac-
cording to their own legitimate purposes.
The aim of the executive branch is to govern
and lead and to implement public policy;
yours is to illuminate, question, and analyze.
The fact that we are generally right and you
are generally wrong does not change the
basic elements made up on both sides of re-
spect, fear, deference, and the attempt by
each side to get the better of the other.
Nor can it avoid the difference in perspec-
tive inherent in the two points of view. I
know how exciting it is for reporters to be
given access to arcane classified documents,
even though they are usually appallingly
written and generally incomprehensible. I, of
course, hold the view that the real essence of
our foreign policy was to be found in the
series of speeches I have given around the
country. These, of course, have often been
slighted (I consider anything except running
the full text as being slighted) — I suspect be-
cause they were unclassified. But I have one
consolation. If you had had all the classified
documents that were available to me, you
would be as confused as I was.
We shall not settle this debate here — all
January 31, 1977
83
the less so since after January 20 I hope to
profit from the leaks which you print. This
may be the occasion to say that for all my
needling, I have admired the objectivity, the
honesty, and the fundamental fairness of the
press corps which covers the Department of
State and the White House. They are the
most amusing and perceptive collection of
outrageous individualists that I have known.
They have, at times, left me breathless
with exasperation. But they have sharp-
ened my wits as well. They have even made
me concede, in sentimental moments, there
may be something in Thomas Jefferson's
claim that were it left to him to decide be-
tween a government without newspapers or
newspapers without a government, he would
prefer the latter. Luckily for us all, Jefferson
never had to pronounce himself regarding
television.
We have had, to put it mildly, an intense
experience, and we are now at the end of our
time together — at least until late January
1981. [Laughter.] As a result of the extraor-
dinary record of discourse between us, we
understand each other better. And if I may
be so bold, I believe that our discourse has
also served the American people, for they
know more, as a result, about the role and
responsibilities of this nation in the world —
perhaps more at times than I wanted them to
know.
This nation has never lost its spirit or its
faith in its destiny. Even in the difficult
times through which we so recently passed,
we kept our balance and showed the world
the resiliency of our free institutions. And
we should forever thank the fates that watch
over us for the steady hand of the President
it has been my honor to serve for more than
two years. His strength and his honesty
calmed our troubled land and restored our
pride, our integrity, and our sense of de-
cency. President Ford leaves to Governor
Carter a nation recovered, a nation confi-
dent in the progressive fulfillment of the
American dream.
Our new President and Secretary of State
deserve the understanding and the support
of all Americans, for today our relations with
other nations affect every citizen. The search
for peace is — in this age of nuclear
weapons — a moral and practical imperative.
The pursuit of well-being, a traditional con-
cern of nations, becomes now, in an age of i
interdependence, one that can only be
realized in cooperation with others. The
problems of justice take on fresh urgency and i
complexity when the future of democracy
rests in the hands of a dwindling number of
countries. Today America's leaders must ad-
dress the familiar goals of peace, prosperity, 1
and justice in a global landscape that has
been transformed and for which our histori-
cal experience offers little guidance. Let us,
for the first time in over a decade, chart our
future as a united people.
Three and a half years ago, I, a naturalized
citizen, was sworn in as Secretary of State of
my adopted country. The responsibilities
once borne by such men as Jefferson, Madi-
son, Monroe, Marshall, and Acheson were
temporarily bequeathed to me. In no other
country in the world would this have been
possible. Because of my origin, I have
perhaps had a unique perspective of what
America means to the cause of freedom and
human dignity. And I have had no higher aim
than to repay in some small measure my debt
to this country which saved me from to-
talitarianism and the world from slavery.
I leave to you, for a time, the great domain
of public policy. I would be hypocritical if I
pretended that to part is easy. I envy you the
excitement, the responsibihty, the opportu-
nities that will be yours. I shall never forget
how hard you tested me. I shall always
cherish the experiences we enjoyed together.
And I will think of you with affection tinged
with exasperation.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Q. What do you believe will be regarded as
your most enduring achievement in the con-
duct of U.S. foreign policy?
Secretary Kissinger: Occasionally making
a decision that was not recommended by the
Foreign Service. [Laughter.]
In general, before I appear totally evasive
84
Department of State Bulletin
m my last appearance with the press
[laughter], let me confess that I will be eva-
.^ive [laughter]. I don't think this is the time
for me to assess my contribution —
particularly since I have referred in the be-
tjinning to my well-known humility
laughter] — I don't want to raise any ques-
tions about that subject.
But as I pointed out in my remarks, the
merit of individual policies will have to be as-
sessed over an extended period of time.
The fundamental problem that America
faced in the late sixties and early seventies
was how to move from a foreign policy that
was conducted by analogy to domestic policy
to a foreign policy that other nations have
had to conduct throughout most of their
history — in which interests had to be as-
sessed in relation to values, in which
priorities had to be established among objec-
tives that could not all be achieved simul-
taneously, and in which we realized that our
international role would be unending.
This was the fundamental task that had to
be begun in this Administration and that will
now have to be carried forward in the next.
Q. What was your greatest disappointment
'" office, apart from losing your job?
[Laughter.]
Secretary Kissinger: I believe that the dis-
integration of executive authority that re-
sulted from Watergate prevented us from
exploiting fully the situation that existed in
the early seventies — and, indeed, it created a
rather dangerous international environment
for a limited period of time. It led to needless
disputes about the relative role of the execu-
tive and the legislative branch, and it con-
sumed too much of our energies on pro-
cedural and peripheral issues.
Q. Did you have a more free hand in con-
dxicting foreign policy under President Ford
or under President Nixon?
Secretary Kissinger: No matter how I an-
swer that question I will ruin myself.
[Laughter.]
In the relationship of the Security Adviser
or of the Secretary of State to the President,
one cannot measure the relative role of either
by the degree to which they may have dif-
fered with their President or the degree to
which the President may have overruled
them. Any strong Secretary of State has had
the necessity of a close relationship with the
President. No Secretary of State can conduct
foreign policy without the full support of the
President, and any Secretary of State who
understands the nature of our system will
not make a major move without the fullest
discussion and guidance by the President.
The personalities of Presidents Nixon and
Ford were substantially different, and there-
fore the nature of the relationship and the
nature in which they made decisions was
substantially different. But as for my own re-
lationship with them, I had a relationship of
confidence with both, and I had the backing
of both, and I had the guidance of both in the
conduct of foreign policy.
Q. Former President Nixon had indicated
that he was the primary idea man behind the
Kissinger policies. What is your comment?
[Laughter. ]
Secretary Kissinger: My comment is that
I'll write my book after he completes his.
[Laughter.]
Prospects for Middle East Progress
Q. You have been photographed often in
embrace with Sadat [Anwar al-Sadat, Presi-
dent of Egypt] and have been widely hailed
for your shuttle diplomacy in the Middle
East. Is the Middle East really any closer to
solution of the Israeli, Palestinian, and
other issues that have so long plagued it?
Has the Middle East been eliminated as a
likely area of Soviet-American confrontation
and conflict?
Secretary Kissinger: The Middle East has
obviously not been eliminated as a source of
conflict. It's important to look at the situa-
tion in 1973 and the situation today. In 1973,
the Arab world and Israel were engaged in a
war, at the end of which the danger of a new
flareup was extremely great. We had no dip-
lomatic relations with the key Arab coun-
tries, except Saudi Arabia and Jordan. We
January 31, 1977
85
often sent messages to Cairo or to Damascus
via Moscow. What was needed was to rees-
tablish some relationship with the Arab
world, to maintain our traditional friendship
with Israel, but to move the area toward
peace initially by a step-by-step approach,
which we have always believed would
emerge in an overall solution.
We are now approaching the point where
the conditions in the Middle East for sig-
nificant progress seem to us propitious.
Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan are
all committed to a progress toward a peace
which recognizes the existence and legiti-
macy of the State of Israel. The radical ele-
ments in the area no longer have the influ-
ence that they possessed some years ago.
I believe the negotiations will be ex-
tremely complicated and they may take some
time. But I do believe that the conditions for
progress are better than they have been in
many years.
Q. According to Murrey Marder, in his
comprehensive survey of your career that
appeared in the Washington Post two months
ago, you have acknowledged duping the press
on only one occasion. You were reported
seeking from Syria a list of Israeli prison-
ers, and the list was in your pocket all the
time.
How tnany other times have you duped the
press, and are you prepared to acknowledge
any of those occasions today?
Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think we only
have two minutes [laughter], and if I give a
partial answer to that question, you will ac-
cuse me of duping you again.
On that particular occasion that Mr. Mar-
der mentioned, we had a profound human-
itarian problem, which is that we had been
given the list on a confidential basis. We had
told of the fact that we had this list to only
the highest leaders on the Israeh side, and
we were afraid that the prisoners would not
be released if we did not follow the sequence
that had been suggested to us.
Maybe it could have been handled in a dif-
ferent manner, but as soon as we had been
given the go-ahead to release the list, we ex-
plained to the press exactly the circum-
stances in which it had been obtained. But
we could not do it before we had complied
with the sequence of events that had been
suggested to us.
Debate on Nuclear "Supremacy"
Q. As a result of the Strategic Arms Lim-
itation Talks under your stewardship, have
you put the Soviet Union into a position to
achieve world nuclear supremacy?
Secretary Kissinger: I think it is time that
we conduct a rational debate on the issue of
nuclear strategy. It is too important and
vital a subject to be made the subject of par-
tisan and doctrinaire political debate.
First, with respect to the first SALT
agreement: The limitations that were estab-
lished at the first SALT agreement resulted
from the force levels that had been decided
upon in the 1960's. There was no American
program that was stopped as a result of the
first SALT agreement. And 210 Soviet mis-
siles had to be dismantled, and several Soviet
programs were stopped.
I have never understood the argument why
an agreement that ratified a balance that we
had unilaterally accepted and that we had un-
ilaterally established should threaten our se-
curity when it was simply a reflection of the
existing reality that no one had proposed to
change without the agreement.
With respect to the negotiations that are
now going on, the American people must un-
derstand that strategic nuclear weapons con-
front all of mankind with a new circumstance;
namely, that for the first time in history,
mankind can literally destroy itself.
I do not believe that the Soviet Union is
achieving military supremacy over the
United States. I do not believe that any
American Administration would permit a
situation to arise in which the Soviet Union
could achieve strategic superiority over the
United States.
But the essence of the contemporary prob-
lem in the military field is that the term
"supremacy" — when the casualties on both
86
Department of State Bulletin
sides will be in the tens of millions — has
practically no operational significance, as
long as we do what is necessary to maintain a
balance.
The military danger we face is with respect
to regional conflicts. Those forces must be
modernized and strengthened.
But no Administration, neither ours nor
our successors', will ever permit the Soviet
Union to achieve supremacy. And those who
are talking as if in the strategic field we
could still talk about a meaningful conduct of
military operations are not doing this country
a service and they are not doing mankind a
service.
The War in Vietnam
Q. Mr. Secretary, in retrospect, could you,
or u'ould you, have developed other diploma-
tic initiatives that might have ended the war
in Vietnam in 1969? Was the price of four
more years of war worth what we achieved
otherwise?
Secretary Kissinger: In 1969 we found
550,000 Americans in Vietnam suffering
hundreds of casualties a week. Those of you
who remember the difficulty of extricating
10,000 Americans in 1975 will understand the
complexity of the problem that we con-
fronted in 1969.
It was our belief that as a country on which
many others relied for their security and for
their commitments, we had to extricate the
American forces from Vietnam in a manner
that maintained a belief in our capacity to
keep our word and that did not throw into
question our own international role.
And if you look over the debates that
existed in 1969, '70, and '71, there were no
significant proposals to withdraw all our
forces; the differences concerned tactical is-
sues of the terms under which they might be
withdrawn.
I think the issue of whether it could have
been done more rapidly will undoubtedly al-
ways be open. We would not have done what
we did if we had not believed it to be the
right course.
We had one condition: that we would not
overthrow — as a price of leaving Vietnam — a
government which our predecessors had es-
tablished. We did this because of our percep-
tion of what the honor and the word of the
United States required.
As soon as that condition was met, we
terminated the war. But it will require a long
and detailed analysis of all of the negotia-
tions in order to be able to determine what
other opportunities existed. Obviously, if I
had believed other opportunities existed, we
would have seized them.
Relations With People's Republic of China
Q. It is almost five years since the signing
of the Shanghai communique. Why has
China not been recognized? Why has there
been no resolution of the Taiwan question,
and what are the prospects for U.S. -China
trade?
Secretary Kissinger: The Shanghai com-
munique set no deadline for the normaliza-
tion of relations.
Our relations with China have two aspects.
There is the aspect of our assessment of the
international situation, and the common ob-
jectives that the People's Republic of China
and the United States have in preventing
what we have jointly called hegemony.
Secondly, there is the commitment in the
Shanghai communique to the achievement
progressively of the normalization of rela-
tions. This commitment remains and will no
doubt be also pursued by the new Adminis-
tration.
The timing, the conditions, under which it
can be achieved will have to be negotiated
between the United States and the People's
Republic of China. And we have not pre-
viously achieved a meeting of the minds on
this. But we also believe that in the other
areas, in the area of our perception of the
world situation, we have had fruitful talks
with the Chinese throughout the whole
period since the Shanghai communique was
signed and those talks can continue even be-
fore normalization is concluded.
January 31, 1977
87
Secretary Kissinger Emphasizes Need
for Nonpartisan Foreign Policy
The Foreign Policy Association of New
York held a dinner in honor of Secretary
Kissiyiger at New York, N.Y., on January
11. Following are remarks made by Secre-
tary Kissinger at the dinner. ^
Press release 5 dated January 12
I appreciated particularly that Ambas-
sador Murphy agreed to preside over these
proceedings. I do not think that the average
American understands the ambivalent rela-
tionship between the Foreign Service and
the Secretary of State. The Foreign Service
is the most dedicated, slightly supercilious,
devoted, and able group of professionals that
serves any nation.
From the point of view of the Secretary of
State, there is only one problem. They are
opposed to what they call lateral entry, and
deep down they are convinced that if it were
not for this unfortunate device whereby
people are moved in sideways from the out-
side, no Secretary of State would really have
been qualified to join the Foreign Service.
[Laughter.] This accounts for the combina-
tion of deference, slight feeling of superior-
ity, and exhausting bureaucratic procedures
founded on superior knowledge and dedica-
tion which is the hallmark of the Foreign
Service.
Almost every Secretary of State has en-
tered the Department convinced that he
would break through this awesome machin-
ery that he found in place; and every Secre-
tary of State sooner or later has been
conquered by this group of outstanding pro-
fessionals, specialists, presenting options
that contain no choices [laughter and
applause], always prepared to rewrite their
papers as long as the change is confined to
punctuation and who yet in a marvelous,
mysterious, and devoted way carry out the
business of our government.
Since I have been Secretary of State I
' Introductory and closing remarks by Ambassador
Robert D. Murphy, Carter E. Burgess, chairman of the
association, and others and the opening paragraphs of
Secretary Kissinger's remarks are not printed here.
have been present when the bodies of three
Foreign Service officers were returned. In
each case they had been the victims of assas-
sination and in each case a large number of
volunteers stepped forward, without being
requested, to take their place. I beheve this
symbolizes what this country owes to this ex-
traordinary group of men and women.
I have harassed them because I believed,
and still do, that they are the ablest group of
people that any government has ever assem-
bled and because I believed it was my duty to
make them perform at their top performance.
I have been rewarded, as all my predecessors
have before me and as my successors without
question will be, by men and women who
served their country and not a party, who
worked for peace and not for an individual.
And I hope that the nonpartisan, professional
character of our Foreign Service will always
be recognized and will always be preserved.
I want to take this opportunity, in what is
my last public appearance as Secretary of
State, to pay tribute to this remarkable
group that has never been more important in
our country's history as our foreign policy
becomes more complicated, as the decisions
grow more complex.
We must have a group of men and women
who represent continuity. We cannot pretend
to ourselves that the foreign policy of a great
nation can change every four or eight years,
and that pretense itself is a factor of instabil-
ity in the world. We must have, with all the
tactical alterations that are inevitable, a
large element of continuity that is required,
a great degree of technical knowledge, and I
know that my successor, Mr. Vance, whom I
admire and who deserves our support, will
find in the Foreign Service a dedicated, able,
and brilliant instrument in the conduct of our
foreign policy. I would like also to say that
Ambassador Murphy represents the best
qualities in the Foreign Service.
I have been Secretary of State during an
extremely turbulent period in our history.
Its surface manifestations were the war in
Vietnam, the tragedy of Watergate, and the
.disputes between the executive and the legis-
lative branches of our government, which on
too many occasions paralyzed action and con-
fused other nations. But in its deeper sense,
88
Department of State Bulletin
we were going through a period of transition.
For the first time in our history the United
States has had to conduct foreign policy the
same way less favored nations have had to
conduct it in all their experience.
Throughout most of our history we could
pursue one of several strands: either an as-
sertion that our moral principles were auto-
matically applicable in every part of the
world or a belief that we could stand apart
from the rest of the world and wait till the
crisis occurred and overwhelm it with
resources — or else we acted as if our domes-
tic experience could be applied automatically
on a global scale.
As long as the United States was protected
by two great oceans, as long as our resources
were infinite in relation to the problems with
which we had to deal, we could choose any
one of these approaches and generally be
successful. But today we face the dilemmas
that other nations have experienced
throughout their history. Today we must
choose among our priorities. We cannot do
everything simultaneously. Today the nature
of the world we imagine will determine im-
portantly the kind of world which we are able
to build.
It is the dilemma of the policymaker that
at the time that he must act he does not have
the knowledge on which to base such action.
When he has the knowledge, it is usually too
late to affect events. A great deal therefore
depends on judgment, on confidence —
psychological confidence on the part of the
policymakers and confidence between the
policymakers and the public.
The United States for the last decade has
consumed itself in a civil strife which is
bound to have the most profound conse-
quences on our international affairs.
While I was Secretary of State I constantly
preached the importance of a nonpartisan
approach to foreign policy. Now that I leave
office I want to reiterate this need. The new
Administration must be given an opportunity
to conduct its policies without the bitterness
and rancor, without the strife between the
branches of our government, that have been
so characteristic of the last decade.
Now, if I am correct in the needs of our
foreign policy, this Association has played a
crucial and honorable role. I have traveled,
as Ambassador Reinhardt [John E.
Reinhardt, Assistant Secretary for Public
Affairs] has pointed out, to 35 cities in this
country to speak, to meet with leaders, to
exchange ideas, and to explain what we were
trying to do. All of these trips have been
taken under the auspices of the various
World Affairs Councils, and I am particularly
moved that so many who have heard me in
cities across the country have done me the
honor of coming here tonight, probably in
order to find out for how many minutes I can
go without placing a verb. [Laughter.]
Nothing is more important than to give our
public a correct appreciation of the foreign
policy issues that they confront. The
simplifiers, the people who believe that there
are some easy slogans that produce final an-
swers, are as pernicious as those who profess
total indifference to the problems of foreign
policy.
We must face the fact that, for as far ahead
as we can see, the peace of our citizens and
the well-being of our citizens depends cru-
cially on our performance in international af-
fairs. And for as far ahead as we can see, the
peace of the world and the well-being of the
world is inseparable from the American per-
formance.
Ours is a tremendous responsibility. The
world has become interdependent; but, alone
among the free nations, we are capable of
giving expression to that interdependence on
a global scale. The world's security can no
longer be divided; but, alone among the free
nations of the world, we can form a global
conception of security. Therefore freedom
and prosperity everywhere depend on the
sophistication of our policy and the depth of
our commitment, and no group has done
more to bring about informed nonpartisan
citizenship than this group that is meeting
here this evening.
As idealists, as perfectionists, we con-
stantly come to debate our faults; but, for
somebody who came to this country as a
young man, I can never forget what America
has meant to people who were not born to
freedom. When I came here in 1938 I was
asked to write an essay at George Washing-
ton High School here in this city about what
January 31, 1977
89
it meant to be an American. I wrote that of
course I missed the people with whom I had
grown up and the places that were familiar to
me. But then I thought that this was a coun-
try where one could walk across the street
with one's head erect and therefore it was all
worthwhile.
What America means to the rest of the
world is the hope for people everywhere that
they shall be able to walk with their heads
erect, and our responsibihty as Americans is
always to make sure that our purposes tran-
scend our differences.
I have tried to make a contribution to this,
and your organizations have organized the
meetings and, beyond this, have contributed
to the education and commitment of the
American people. And therefore I would like
to take this opportunity to thank you from
the bottom of my heart.
America's Continuing Concerns
In the Middle East
The Conference of Presidents of Major
American Jewish Organizations held a
luncheon in honor of Secretary Kissinger at
New York, N.Y., on January 11. Following
are remarks made by Secretary Kissinger at
the luncheon. *
Press release 4 dated January 12
You and I have gone through a great deal
together in recent years, and I thought that
if this meeting made any sense, it would be if
I spoke to you from the heart about some of
the considerations on my mind.
We have had, of necessity, a very compli-
cated relationship. From my point of view,
probably no criticism has hurt me more than
if it came from this community. And probably
from your point of view, it was especially
painful if disagreements occurred between
the Jewish community and the first Jewish
Secretary of State in American history.
' Introductory and closing remarks by the chairman
of the conference, Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler, and
others and the opening paragraphs of Secretary Kis-
singer's remarks are not printed here.
I like to believe, with my friend Simcha
[Israeli Ambassador to the United States
Simcha Dinitz], that the disagreements never
went to the heart of our relationship; that
they usually concerned tactics by which to
achieve fundamentally agreed objectives.
But I thought it was important for the future
of Israel and for the future of the Jewish
people that the actions that the U.S. Gov-
ernment took were not seen to be the result
of a special personal relationship; that the
support we gave Israel reflected not my per-
sonal preferences alone but the basic national
interests of the United States, transcending
the accident of who might be in office at any
particular period.
I have never forgotten that 13 members of
my family died in concentration camps, nor
could I ever fail to remember what it was like
to live in Nazi Germany as a member of a
persecuted minority.
I believe, however, that the relationship of
Israel to the United States transcends these
personal considerations. I do not believe that
it is compatible with the moral conscience of
mankind to permit Israel to suffer in the
Middle East a ghetto existence that has been
suffered by Jews in many individual coun-
tries throughout their history.
The support for a free and democratic Is-
rael in the Middle East is a moral necessity
of our period to be pursued by every Admin-
istration and with a claim to the support of
all freedom-loving people all over the world.
So, we begin in our concerns with the
moral and the human dimension. Beyond
that, any nation has a right to live in security
and not to be dependent for its survival on
the good will of its neighbors. It must be a
basic principle of American policy that Israel
must be strong enough so that its decisions
are made by free choice and are not imposed
on it by a combination of outside factors or
by its neighbors. And therefore it must be a
principle of American policy that Israel must
always be strong enough to defend itself and
that the United States must see to it that Is-
rael is strong enough, because only then can
a peace that is negotiated be lasting and only
then can peace be perceived to be just.
I have believed that an effort must be
made to advance the prospects of peace in
90
Department of State Bulletin
the Middle East. And no people can have a
greater interest in it than those who for
thousands of years have been subjected to
the arbitrary will of many host countries —
for a nation that in its existence has never
known recognition and acceptance by its im-
mediate neighbors.
Historians will have to judge the methods
that were appropriate. But that the relations
between countries divided by distrust and
suffering for a generation could not be re-
paired easily and quickly, that the attempt to
solve everything at once involved the risk of
catastrophe as well as the prospects of suc-
cess, can never be overlooked.
The difference between statesmen and
those who observe from the outside is that
there are some experiments that statesmen
cannot try, because the consequences of their
failure would be too profound.
I believe now that there are some pros-
pects for peace in the Middle East. The influ-
ence of hostile outside powers is less than at
any time in decades. The influence of radical
elements within the Middle East has been
reduced. But it is an effort that requires
patience and wisdom and, above all, a pro-
found understanding for the dilemma of a
people like Israel, which cannot afford to
make a mistake and which cannot entrust it-
self simply to abstract declarations of good
will. Because if a mistake is made, it is likely
to be irrevocable.
Rabbi Schindler pointed out that maybe I
am glad to be rid of this group, but I do not
believe I will ever be rid of this group.
[Laughter and Applause.] And frankly, I do
not want ever to be rid of this group, though
I may retract this in a few months. [Laugh-
ter.]
The problems of security and of peace in
the Middle East will be with us for as long as
we can see. I will remain dedicated, as a
friend of Israel and as a friend of this group,
for as long as I live. And I want you to know
that this meeting has meant a great deal to
me.
Throughout their history, Jews have been
saying to themselves, "Next year in
Jerusalem." I would like to think that some-
time soon we can say this in its deepest
sense — in an Israel that is secure, that is ac-
cepted, that is at peace. And it will always
mean a great deal to me to have worked with
this group, and with my friends in Israel, to
achieve this objective.
Lebanese Delegation Discusses
Rehabilitation Needs
Department Statement '
In response to an invitation extended by
Secretary Kissinger, President Sarkis of
Lebanon sent H.E. Ghassan Tueini as his
personal emissary to Washington as head of a
delegation to discuss specific ways in which
the United States can be helpful to the
Lebanese Government in rebuilding its na-
tional institutions and economy in the after-
math of a year and a half of civil strife.
Since his arrival on December 14, Mr.
Tueini has met twice with the Secretary. He
and members of his delegation have also held
discussions with Deputy Secretary Robinson,
AID Administrator Parker, as well as other
high-ranking officials of the Department and
AID. Mr. Tueini has also met with Mr.
Robert McNamara, the President of the
World Bank; Mr. Witteveen, the Managing
Director of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF); and several members of Congress
while in Washington and with officials of the
United Nations in New York. He concludes
his mission to Washington with a meeting to-
morrow [December 23] with Under Secretary
for Political Affairs Habib and Assistant Sec-
retary for Near Eastern and South Asian Af-
fairs Atherton.
The United States steadfastly supports the
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and na-
tional unity of Lebanon; we welcome recent
progress under the leadership of President
Sarkis toward the reestablishment of secu-
rity and the revitalization of political and
economic processes in Lebanon following the
tragic events of recent months. Mr. Tueini
has informed us that Lebanon has suffered an
estimated $3 billion in destruction. He has
described the Lebanese Government's
Is.sued on Dec. 22 (text from press release 616).
January 31, 1977
91
priorities: to meet immediate humanitarian
needs, while pressing forward rapidly to re-
store productivity and jobs, and beginning
the massive long-term task of physical recon-
struction in ways that will promote social
justice and assure a sense of opportunity for
all of Lebanon's citizens.
Lebanon possesses significant human and
material resources for the job ahead, but the
United States recognizes that it will require
assistance from the international community.
The United States will very shortly be send-
ing to Lebanon a small team of experts in key
aspects of relief and rehabihtation. This will
lay the groundwork for an expansion of our
present program of emergency assistance in
coordination with the Lebanese Government
and other international donors.
We have indicated to Mr. Tueini and his
delegation that we are planning a Public Law
480 title I food aid program of $20 million,
subject to appropriate consultations with the
Congress. The Lebanese Government will also
be developing priority programs in housing
both to effect emergency repairs to existing
shelters for the winter months and, eventu-
ally, to restore or replace damaged struc-
tures. We already are engaged in efforts
through voluntary organizations to assist in
meeting these immediate needs. We have con-
sidered with the Tueini delegation the ques-
tion of the longer term needs of Lebanon. We
have agreed to examine possible ways in
which we can be helpful, including the provi-
sion of technical and managerial expertise, in
restoring on an emergency basis the remain-
ing Beirut port facilities to support the relief
and rehabilitation process. We are already at
work on one possibility: the immediate provi-
sion of surplus heavy equipment for interim
use in the port. These mobile cranes and other
equipment would also assist in priority pro-
grams to remove rubble and hazardous struc-
tures and maintain vital road links in moun-
tainous regions in the face of winter snows.
We are agreed that progress in these
spheres is both important and possible.
These efforts are in addition to the assist-
ance we have already made available. Specif-
ically, we have provided thus far a total of $19
miUion in humanitarian aid through the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross, the
American University Hospital in Beirut, the
Catholic Relief Service, and the U.N. pro-
gram for Lebanon. These funds have provided
medical supplies and services and other emer-
gency assistance for those in need; we are, for
example, providing commodities under a Pub-
lic Law 480 title II program to feed 300,000
persons in Lebanon.
We will continue our close consultations
with the Lebanese Government as it lays the
foundations for the country's long-term recon-
struction program. Some funds for assistance
to Lebanon are available in the current fiscal
year 1977 budget. When we have a clearer
picture of the contribution the United States
can make to Lebanon's longer term needs, we
will discuss with the Congress possible future
programs and their funding. We will also be in
regular touch with respected and experienced
international institutions, such as the World
Bank, the IMF, and the United Nations, to
define further the role the United States can
and should play in support of these efforts,
which enjoy our sympathy and concern.
Negotiations Held on Imports
of Meat to the U.S. for 1977
Department Announcement, December 15
Press relea.se 605 dated December 15
The United States has reached substantive
agreement with the governments of major
meat-exporting countries on arrangements to
govern trade in meat, mainly beef, during
1977.
The overall system of arrangements with
supplying countries will provide assurance
that aggregate imports into the United
States will not exceed 1,281.9 million pounds
next year, an increase of 4 percent over im-
ports in 1976. In the case of some of the
countries, the arrangements are agreed on
an ad referendum basis, subject to final ap-
proval by their governments. Formal ar-
rangements are expected to be concluded
shortly.
Canada, which has not been a participant
in previous restraint programs, will be cov-
ered by the 1977 arrangement. However, the
92
Department of State Bulletin
precise terms of Canada's participation which
will cover the two-way U.S. -Canadian trade
in meat are still under discussion.
Undertaken at the direction of President
Ford, the negotiations commenced December
6 in Washington with the United States rep-
resented by officials of the Departments of
State and Agriculture and the Office of the
Special Trade Representative, working
under the general supervision of the Agricul-
tural Policy Committee.
THE CONGRESS
Seventh Progress Report on Cyprus
Submitted to the Congress
Message From President Ford ^
To the Congress of the United States:
This report is the seventh in a series of
messages pursuant to Public Law 94-104
through which I have informed the Congress
of my Administration's efforts to encourage
progress toward a resolution of the problems
of Cyprus. In addition to reviewing those ef-
forts, this report will offer several conclu-
sions with regard to the role the United
States can and should play in settlement of
the Cyprus dispute.
I know the Congress shares my views that
a just and early settlement of the Cyprus
issue is essential both for humanitarian rea-
sons and to preserve peace in an area of
great importance to the United States. For
more than two years my Administration has
actively sought to help the Cypriot com-
munities find the basis for substantive and
sustained negotiations. We have given the
UN Secretary General our full and active
support in the negotiations conducted under
his auspices, negotiations which I believe
continue to offer the best possible forum for
progress.
> Transmitted on Jan. 10 (text from White House
press release dated Jan. 10).
I also know the Congress shares my deep
regret that progress in the negotiations has
been extremely slow. Inconclusive pro-
cedural disputes have diverted the parties
from pressing issues of substance. Domestic
pressures and international rivalries have
detracted from the will and commitment that
are essential to progress.
In an effort to break this impasse, my Ad-
ministration has sought over the past several
months to develop a set of basic principles
that might provide a framework for con-
tinued and fruitful intercommunal negotia-
tion. These principles are based on the con-
cepts which I set forth in my sixth report to
the Congress and which Secretary of State
Kissinger expressed in his September 1976
UN General Assembly address. These con-
cepts rest on a fundamental premise which I
believe all concerned parties continue to
share — that any settlement must preserve
the independence, sovereignty, and the ter-
ritorial integrity of Cyprus. These concepts
emphasize the importance of territorial ad-
justments to reduce the area controlled by
the Turkish side, while taking into account
the economic requirements and humanitarian
concerns of the two Cypriot communities, in-
cluding the plight of those who remain refu-
gees. Constitutional arrangements are of
equal importance in providing conditions
under which the two communities can live in
freedom and have a large voice in their own
affairs. Finally, security arrangements which
would permit the withdrawal of foreign mili-
tary forces other than those present under
international agreement are essential for a
lasting settlement.
Based upon these concepts, the United
States has engaged over the past several
months in extensive consultations on the
Cyprus issue with the nine member states of
the European Community, seeking their
support for a new and accelerated approach.
Through these consultations we are jointly
developing the basic principles which we
hope will stimulate the negotiations. We
have been greatly impressed and encouraged
by the extent to which there is a consensus in
these consultations on both the principles
and the urgent need to reopen substantive
intercommunal negotiations.
January 31, 1977
93
I remain convinced, however, that neither
the United States nor any other outside
country or group of countries should seek to
impose a settlement on Cyprus. The princi-
ples we are developing should serve only as a
basis for negotiation. It is the Cypriot com-
munities themselves who must ultimately de-
cide their relationship and final territorial
arrangements.
In addition it is clear that a final solution
must also have the support of the Greek and
Turkish governments. It is my firm convic-
tion that we must seek to maintain the trust
and friendship of both these NATO allies.
Thus my Administration has sought to
strengthen through negotiation our security
ties with both Greece and Turkey. We have
consistently sought to follow a balanced
course in strengthening our relations
throughout the area. We therefore welcomed
the steps taken by the Congress to relax the
arms embargo on Turkey so that Turkey can
better meet its NATO obligations. We have
demonstrated through tangible assistance
our support for Greece. We have worked ac-
tively, both directly and through the United
Nations Security Council, to defuse recent
tensions between Greece and Turkey over the
Aegean. These two countries have now
agreed to a negotiating process called for in
the U.S. sponsored Security Council Resolu-
tion which I hope will lead to a settlement of
their dispute.^
It is essential to the success of an equitable
and lasting Cyprus settlement that the
United States maintain a balanced relation-
ship among all concerned parties. It would be
a mistake to place undue pressure on any one
party for the sake of what appears to be a
quick settlement. I believe the Congress
would agree that such a path would neither
promote lasting progress on Cyprus nor
serve the cause of stability in the Mediter-
ranean.
I am not pessimistic about the future of the
Cyprus negotiations. I continue to believe
that a way can and will be found to achieve a
^ For a U.S. statement and text of Security Council
Resolution 395, adopted on Aug. 25, 1976, see Bulle-
tin of Sept. 25, 1976, p. 374.
just and equitable settlement which will ena-
ble all of the people of Cyprus to shape a
harmonious and prosperous future.
Gerald R. Ford.
The White House, January 10, 1977.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
United States Policy on Angola. Hearing before the
House Committee on International Relations.
January 26, 1976. 45 pp.
United States Commodity Policies. Joint hearings be-
fore the Subcommittees on International Resources,
Food, and Energy; on International Economic Policy;
on International Organizations; and on International
Trade and Commerce of the House Committee on In-
ternational Relations. April 7-27, 1976, 343 pp.
Foreign Policy and Defense Requirements. Hearing be-
fore the Subcommittee on International Political and
Military Affairs of the House Committee on Interna-
tional Relations. April 29, 1976. 28 pp.
Investigation Into Certain Past Policies of Genocide
and Exploration of Policy Options for the Future.
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Future
Foreign Policy Research and Development of the
House Committee on International Relations. May
11-August 30, 1976. 275 pp.
Human Rights in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Sal-
vador: Implications for U.S. Policy. Hearings before
the Subcommittee on International Organizations of
the House Committee on International Relations.
June 8-9, 1976. 253 pp.
Human Rights in Uruguay and Paraguay. Hearings be-
fore the Subcommittee on International Organiza-
tions of the House Committee on International Rela-
tions. June 17-August 4, 1976. 228 pp.
Congressional Review of International Agreements.
Hearings before the Subcommittee on International
Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Com-
mittee on International Relations. June 22-July 22,
1976. 416 pp.
Activities of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency in
the United States. Hearings before the Subcommittee
on International Organizations of the House Commit-
tee on International Relations. Part II. June 22-
September 30, 1976. 87 pp.
Human Rights in India. Hearings before the Subcom-
mittee on International Organizations of the House
Committee on International Relations. June 23-
September 23, 1976. 233 pp.
Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa. Hearings before the
Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations. August 4-6, 1976. 138
pp.
Namibia: The United Nations and U.S. Policy. Hearings
before the Subcommittee on International Organiza-
tions of the House Committee on International Rela-
tions. August 24-27, 1976. 258 pp.
94
Department of State Bulletin
TREATY INFORMATION
U.S. Withdraws From Convention
on Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
Statement by Charles W. Robinson
Deputy Secretary ^
In April of last year, President Ford
signed into law the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act of 1976, extending U.S.
fishery jurisdiction to 200 miles as of March
1, 1977. Since that time, the United States
has been moving steadily toward domestic
management of our fishery resources.
As a consequence of our extended domestic
jurisdiction, and in keeping with the intent of
the act, the President has decided that the
United States would withdraw from the In-
ternational Convention for the Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) effective De-
cember 31, 1976.
The United States has been an active
member of ICNAF since its inception 26
years ago. That convention has made signifi-
cant contributions to fishery conservation in
the Northwest Atlantic area. We have bene-
fited from decisions taken by convention
members. The scientific research and man-
agement of fisheries of the area which have
been carried out under ICNAF are outstand-
ing examples of the benefits which can be
achieved through international cooperation.
The President has therefore concluded that
as we move toward implementation of our
legislation the United States should take into
account, in developing our 1977 manage-
ment plans, the management proposals de-
veloped at the last meeting of the Interna-
tional Commission for the Northwest Atlan-
tic Fisheries.
The expertise developed within ICNAF
will provide a sound basis for the establish-
ment of a successor organization which will
provide for international cooperation in joint
research, even though fisheries management
within our 200-mile zone will now be a
domestic responsibility of the United States.
The United States will actively support ef-
forts to continue international consultation
and cooperation in dealing with fisheries
problems in the Northwest Atlantic and will
participate in the conference of plenipoten-
tiaries in early 1977 to consider the drafting
of a new convention.
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Agriculture
Agreement establishing the International Fun-l ivr Ag-
ricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome June
13, 1976.'
Signatures: Morocco, United States, December 22
1976.
Aviation
Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of
aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 1970. En-
tered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 7192.
Accessions deposited: Kenya, January 11, 1977;
Uruguay, January 12, 1977.
Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against
the safety of civil aviation. Done at Montreal Sep-
tember 23, 1971. Entered into force January 26, 1973.
Accessions deposited: Ecuador, January 12, 1977;
Kenya, January 11, 1977; Uruguay, January 12,
1977.
Nuclear Weapons — Nonproliferation
Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.
Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1,
1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS 6839.
Ratification deposited: Panama, January 13, 1977.
Tin
Fifth international tin agreement, with annexes. Done
at Geneva June 21, 1975. Entered into force provi-
sionally July 1, 1976.
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, December 29,
1976.
Accession deposited: Bulgaria, January 6, 1977.
Wheat
Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat
trade convention (part of the international wheat
agreement) 1971. Done at Washington March 17,
1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect
' Issued on Jan. 1 (text from press release 1).
Not in force.
January 31, 1977
95
to certain provisions, and July 1, 1976, with respect
to other provisions.
Ratificatiuii deposited: Tunisia, January 12, 1977.
BILATERAL
Iran
Agreement relating to the reciprocal issuance of
multiple-entry nonimmigrant visas. Effected by e.\-
change of letters at Tehran December 13 and 16,
1976. Entered into force December 16, 1976; effective
January 1, 1977.
Sri Lanka
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of ag-
ricultural commodities of October 29, 1976. Effected
by exchange of notes'at Colombo December 15, 1976.
Entered into force December 15, 1976.
Switzerland
Agreement amending the agreement of October
13, 1961, concerning the reciprocal acceptance of cer-
tificates of airworthiness for imported aircraft (TIAS
5214). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington
January 7, 1977. Entered into force January 7, 1977.
United Kingdom
Memorandum of understanding concerning the transfer
of technical data relating to the JT-IOD jet engine
collaboration agreement to third countries. Signed at
Washington December 30, 1976. Entered into force
December 30, 1976.
PUBLICATIONS
GPO Sales Publications
Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock
number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20102.
A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more
copies of any one publication mailed to the same ad-
dress. Remittances, payable to the Stiperinte^tdent of
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low, which include domestic postage, are subject to
change.
Selected Documents No. 4, U.S. Policy in the Middle
East: November 1974-February 1976. Documents cov-
ering the overall U.S. Government approach to promot-
ing peace in the Middle East and to strengthening our
relations with individual nations of the region. Near
East and South Asian Series 86. Pub. 8878. 126 pp.
$1.75. (Cat. No. 81.86:8878).
Restrictive Business Practices. Agreement with the
Federal Republic of Germany. TIAS 8291. 10 pp. 35(Z.
(Cat. No. S9. 10:8291).
Trade — Meat Imports. Agreement with El Salvador.
TIAS 8324. 5 pp. 3.5C. (Cat. No. 89.10:8324).
Trade — Meat Imports. Agreement with Nicaragua.
TIAS 8325. 8 pp. 35<?. (Cat. No. 89.10:8325).
Trade — Meat Imports. Agreement with Guatemala.
TIAS 8326. 8 pp. 35C. (Cat. No. 89.10:8326).
Trade — Meat Imports. Agreement with Haiti. TIAS
8327. 8 pp. 35e. (Cat. No. 89.10:8327).
Trade — Meat Imports. Agreement with Honduras.
TIAS 8328. 9 pp. 350. (Cat. No. 89.10:8328).
Trade — Meat Imports. Agreement with the Dominican
Republic. TIAS 8329. 9 pp. 35c. (Cat. No. 89.10:8329).
Trade — Meat Imports. Agreement with Panama. TIAS
8330. 5 pp. 35C. (Cat. No. 89.10:8330).
Long Range Aid to Navigation (Loran-C) Station at
Williams Lake, British Columbia. Agreement with
Canada. TIAS 8331. 12 pp. 35(Z. (Cat. No. 89.10:8331).
Technical Assistance in Tax Administration. Agree-
ment with Trinidad and Tobago amending and extend-
ing the agreement of June 20, 1968, as amended and ex-
tended. TIAS 8.332. 4 pp. 350. (Cat. No. 89.10:8332).
Protocol to the Social Progress Trust Fund Agree-
ment. Agreement with the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank. TIAS 8333. 2 pp. 350. (Cat. No.
89.10:8333).
Trade — Meat Imports. Agreement with New Zealand.
TIAS 8334. 7 pp. 350. (Cat. No. 89.10:8334).
Thermal Power Plant Near Ismailia. Agreement with
Egypt. TIAS 8335. 13 pp. 350. (Cat. No. 89.10:8335).
Technical and Feasibility Studies. Agreement with
Egypt. TIAS 8336. 9 pp. 350. (Cat. No. 89.10:8336).
Nutrition/Health Early Warning System and Access
Road Construction. Agreement with Ethiopia. TIAS
8337. 9 pp. 350. (Cat. No. 89.10:8337).
United States Naval Communication Station in Aus-
tralia. Agreement with Australia amending the agree-
ment of May 9, 1963, as amended. TIAS 8338. 5 pp. 350.
(Cat. No. 89.10:8338).
Drought Recovery and Rehabilitation Program.
Agreement with Senegal. TIAS 8339. 20 pp. 350. (Cat.
No. 89.10:8339).
Atomic Energy — Technical Information Exchange
and Development of Standards. Arrangement with
Sweden. TIAS 8340. 4 pp. 350. (Cat. No. 89.10:8340).
96
Department of State Bulletin
INDEX January 31,1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1962
Agriculture. Negotiations Held on Imports of
Meat to the U.S. for 1977 <:Y>
American Principles
Laying the Foundation of a Long-Term Policy
(Secretary Kissinger before the National Press
Club) -1
Secretary Kissinger Emphasizes Need for Non-
partisan Foreign Policy (remarks) ,S8
Arms Control and Disarmament. Laying the
Foundation of a Long-Term Policy (Secretary
Kissinger before the National Press Club) ,'<1
China. Laying the Foundation of a Long-Term
Policy (Secretary Kissinger before the National
Press Club) si
Congress
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 94
Seventh Progress Report on Cyprus Submitted
to the Congress (message from President
Ford) '. 93
Cyprus. Seventh Progress Report on Cyprus
Submitted to the Congress (message from Pres-
ident Ford) 93
Economic Affairs
Negotiations Held on Imports of Meat to the U.S.
for 1977 92
U.S. Withdraws From Convention on Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries (Robinson) 95
Foreign Aid. Lebanese Delegation Discusses Re-
habilitation Needs (Department statement) ... 91
Israel. America's Continuing Concerns in the
Middle East (Kissinger) 90
Lebanon. Lebanese Delegation Discusses Re-
habilitation Needs (Department statement) ... 91
Middle East
America's Continuing Concerns in the Middle
East (Kissinger) 90
Laying the Foundation of a Long-Term Policy
(Secretary Kissinger before the National Press
Club) 81
Presidential Documents. Seventh Progress Re-
port on Cyprus Submitted to the Congress .... 93
Publications. GPO Sales Publications 96
Treaty Information
Current Actions 95
U.S. Withdraws From Convention on Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries (Robinson) 95
U.S.S.R. Laying the Foundation of a Long-Term
Policy (Secretary Kissinger before the National
Press Club) 81
Vietnam. Laying the Foundation of a Long-Term
Policy (Secretary Kissinger before the National
Press Club) 81
Name Index
Ford , President 93
Kissinger, Secretary 81, 88, 90
Robinson. Charles W 95
Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: January 10—16
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wa.sh-
ington, D.C. 20520.
Date
1/U
1/12
1/12
1/12
1/13
*8 1/13
1/13
Subject
Robert Alden, Secretary Kis-
singer: National Press Club,
.Tan. 10.
Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler,
Rabbi Israel Miller, Israeli
Ambassador Simcha Dinitz,
Yehudi Hellman, Secretary
Kissinger: Conference of Pres-
idents of Major American
Jewish Organizations, New-
York, Jan. 11.
Carter E. Burgess, Robert D.
Murphy, John E. Reinhardt,
Richard Valeriani, Secretary
Kissinger: Foreign Policy As-
sociation, New York, Jan. 11.
Study group 1, U.S. National
Committee for the Interna-
tional Radio Consultative
Committee, Feb. 15.
Shipping Coordinating Commit-
tee, Subcommittee on Safety
of Life at Sea, working group
on radiocommunications, Feb.
17.
Secretary of State's Advisory
Committee on Private Inter-
national Law, Study Group on
Hotelkeepers' Liability, Feb.
17.
Ocean Affairs Advisory Com-
mittee meeting rescheduled
for Mar. 15-16.
Not printed.
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7^
/?U
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Volume LXXVI • No. 1963 • February 7, 1977
THE STATE OF THE UNION
Excerpts From President Ford's Address to the Congress 97
SECRETARY KISSINGER INTERVIEWED FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES 102
DEPARTMENT DISCUSSES IMPLEMENTATION OF ECONOMIC PROVISIONS
OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE HELSINKI CONFERENCE
Statement by Deputy Secretary Robinson 108
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Vol. LXXVI No. 1963
February 7, 1977
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
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Note: Contents of this publication are not
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BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The
BULLETIN is inde.xed in the Readers' Guide to
Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BLLLETIN\
a weekly publication innued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of U.S. foreign relations and
on the work of the Department and
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses, and
news conferences of the President and
the Secretary of State and other offi-
cers of the Department, as well as spe-
cial articles on various phases of in-
ternational affairs and the functions of
the Department. Information is in-
cluded concerning treaties and inter-
national agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and on treaties of general interna-
tional interest.
Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.
The State of the Union
Address by President Ford to the Congress (Excerpts) ^
Because the transfer of authority in our
form of government affects the state of the
Union, and of the world, I am happy to re-
port to you that the current transition is pro-
ceeding very well. I was determined that it
should; I wanted the new President to get off
on an easier start than I had.
When I became President on August 9,
1974, our nation was deeply divided and tor-
mented. In rapid succession, the Vice Presi-
dent and the President had resigned in dis-
grace. We were still struggling with the
aftereffects of a long, unpopular, and bloody
war in Southeast Asia. The economy was un-
stable and racing toward the worst recession
in 40 years. People were losing jobs. The cost
of living was soaring. The Congress and the
Chief Executive were at loggerheads. The
integrity of our constitutional process and
other institutions was being questioned. For
more than 15 years, domestic spending had
soared as Federal programs multiplied and
the expense escalated annually. During the
same period, our national security needs
were steadily shortchanged.
In the grave situation which prevailed in
August 1974, our will to maintain our inter-
national leadership was in doubt. I asked for
your prayers and went to work.
In January 1975 I reported to the Congress
that the state of the Union was not good. I
proposed urgent action to improve the econ-
omy and to achieve energy independence in
' Delivered on Jan. 12 (te.xt from Weekly Compilation
of Presidential Documents dated Jan. 17).
10 years. I reassured America's allies and
sought to reduce the danger of confrontation
with potential adversaries. I pledged a new
direction for America.
Nineteen seventy-five was a year of dif-
ficult decisions, but Americans responded
with realism, common sense, and self-
discipline.
By January 1976 we were headed in a new
direction, which I hold to be the right direc-
tion for a free society. It was guided by the
belief that successful problem-solving re-
quires more than Federal action alone; that it
involves a full partnership among all
branches and all levels of government and
public policies which nurture and promote
the creative energies of private enterprises,
institutions, and individual citizens.
A year ago, I reported that the state of the
Union was better — in many ways a lot
better — but still not good enough.
Common sense told me to stick to the
steady course we were on, to continue to re-
strain the inflationary growth of govern-
ment, to reduce taxes as well as spending, to
return local decisions to local officials, to
provide for long-range sufficiency in energy
and national security needs. I resisted the
immense pressures of an election year to
open the floodgates of Federal money and the
temptation to promise more than I could de-
liver. I told it as it was to the American
people and demonstrated to the world that in
our spirited political competition, as in this
chamber, Americans can disagree without
being disagreeable.
February 7, 1977
97
Now, after 30 months as your President, I
can say that while we still have a way to go, I
am proud of the long way we have come to-
gether.
I am proud of the part I have had in re-
building confidence in the Presidency, confi-
dence in our free system, and confidence in
our future. Once again, Americans believe in
themselves, in their leaders, and in the prom-
ise that tomorrow holds for their children.
I am proud that today America is at peace.
None of our sons are fighting and dying in
battle anywhere in the world. And the
chance for peace among all nations is im-
proved by our determination to honor our
vital commitments in defense of peace and
freedom.
I am proud that the United States has
strong defenses, strong alliances, and a
sound and courageous foreign policy.
— Our alliances with major partners, the
great industrial democracies of Western
Europe, Japan, and Canada, have never been
more solid. Consultations on mutual security,
defense, and East-West relations have grown
closer. Collaboration has branched out into
new fields, such as energy, economic policy,
and relations with the Third World. We have
used many avenues for cooperation, including
summit meetings held among major allied
countries. The friendship of the democracies
is deeper, warmer, and more effective than
at any time in 30 years.
— We are maintaining stability in the
strategic nuclear balance and pushing back
the specter of nuclear war. A decisive step
forward was taken in the Vladivostok accord
which I negotiated with General Secretary
Brezhnev — joint recognition that an equal
ceiling should be placed on the number of
strategic weapons on each side. With resolve
and wisdom on the part of both nations, a
good agreement is well within reach this
year.
— The framework for peace in the Middle
East has been built. Hopes for future prog-
ress in the Middle East were stirred by the
historic agreements we reached and the trust
and confidence that we formed. Thanks to
American leadership, the prospects for peace
in the Middle East are brighter than they
have been in three decades. The Arab states
and Israel continue to look to us to lead them
from confrontation and war to a new era of
accommodation and peace. We have no alter-
native but to persevere, and I am sure we
will. The opportunities for a final settlement
are great, and the price of failure is a return
to the bloodshed and hatred that for too long
have brought tragedy to all of the peoples of
this area and repeatedly edged the world to
the brink of war.
— Our relationship with the People's Re-
public of China is proving its importance and
its durability. We are finding more and more
common ground between our two countries
on basic questions of international affairs.
— In my two trips to Asia as President, we
have reaffirmed America's continuing vital
interest in the peace and security of Asia and
the Pacific Basin, established a new partner-
ship with Japan, confirmed our dedication to
the security of Korea, and reinforced our ties
with the free nations of Southeast Asia.
— An historic dialogue has begun between
industrial nations and developing nations.
Most proposals on the table are the initia-
tives of the United States, including those on
food, energy, technology, trade, investment,
and commodities. We are well launched on
this process of shaping positive and reliable
economic relations between rich nations and
poor nations over the long term.
— We have made progress in trade negotia-
tions and avoided protectionism during re-
cession. We strengthened the international
monetary system. During the past two years
the free world's most important economic
powers have already brought about impor-
tant changes that serve both developed and
developing economies. The momentum al-
ready achieved must be nurtured and
strengthened, for the prosperity of the rich
and poor depends upon it.
— In Latin America, our relations have
taken on a new maturity and a sense of com-
mon enterprise.
— In Africa, the quest for peace, racial jus-
tice, and economic progress is at a crucial
point. The United States, in close coopera-
tion with the United Kingdom, is actively
engaged in this historic process. Will change
98
Department of State Bulletin
come about by warfare and chaos and foreign
intervention? Or will it come about by
negotiated and fair solutions, insuring major-
ity rule, minority rights, and economic ad-
vance? America is committed to the side of
peace and justice and to the principle that
Africa should shape its own future free of
outside intervention.
— American leadership has helped to
stimulate new international efforts to stem
the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to
shape a comprehensive treaty governing the
use of the oceans.
I am gratified by these accomplishments.
They constitute a record of broad success for
America and for the peace and prosperity of
all mankind. This Administration leaves to
its successor a world in better condition than
we found. We leave, as well, a solid founda-
tion for progress on a range of issues that are
vital to the well-being of America.
What has been achieved in the field of
foreign affairs, and what can be accomplished
by the new Administration, demonstrate the
genius of Americans working together for
the common good. It is this, our remarkable
ability to work together, that has made us a
unique nation. It is Congress, the President,
and the people striving for a better world.
I know all patriotic Americans want this
nation's foreign policy to succeed.
I urge members of my party in this Con-
gress to give the new President loyal support
in this area.
I express the hope that this new Congress
will ree.xamine its constitutional role in in-
ternational affairs.
The exclusive right to declare war, the
duty to advise and consent on the part of the
Senate, the power of the purse on the part of
the House, are ample authority for the legis-
lative branch and should be jealously
guarded. But because we may have been too
careless of these powers in the past does not
justify congressional intrusion into, or
obstruction of, the proper exercise of Presi-
dential responsibilities now or in the future.
There can be only one Commander-in-Chief.
In these times crises cannot be managed and
wars cannot be waged by committee. Nor can
peace be pursued solely by parliamentary
debate. To the ears of the world, the Presi-
dent speaks for the nation. While he is of
course ultimately accountable to the Con-
gress, the courts, and the people, he and his
emissaries must not be handicapped in ad-
vance in their relations with foreign govern-
ments as has sometimes happened in the
past.
Energy is absolutely vital to the defense of
our country, to the strength of our economy,
and to the quality of our Hves. Two years ago
I proposed to the Congress the first com-
prehensive national energy program: a spe-
cific and coordinated set of measures that
would end our vulnerability to embargo,
blockade, or arbitrary price increases and
would mobilize U. S. technology and re-
sources to supply a significant share of the
free world's energy after 1985. Of the major
energy proposals I submitted two years ago,
only half, belatedly, became law.
In 1973 we were dependent upon foreign
oil imports for 36 percent of our needs.
Today we are 40 percent dependent, and
we'll pay out $34 billion for foreign oil this
year. Such vulnerability at present or in the
future is intolerable and must be ended.
The answer to where we stand on our na-
tional energy effort today reminds me of the
old argument about whether the tank is half
full or half empty. The pessimist will say we
have half failed to achieve our 10-year energy
goals; the optimist will say that we have half
succeeded. I am always an optimist, but we
must make up for lost time.
We have laid a solid foundation for com-
pleting the enormous task which confronts
us. I have signed into law five major energy
bills which contain significant measures for
conservation, resource development,
stockpiling, and standby authorities.
We have moved forward to develop the
naval petroleum reserves; to build a 500-
million-barrel strategic petroleum stockpile;
to phase out unnecessary government alloca-
tion and price controls; to develop a lasting
relationship with other oil-consuming na-
tions; to improve the efficiency of energy use
through conservation in automobiles, build-
ings, and industry; and to expand research
February 7, 1977
99
on new technology and renewable resources,
such as wind power, geothermal and solar
energy.
All these actions, significant as they are
for the long term, are only the beginning. I
recently submitted to the Congress my pro-
posals to reorganize the Federal energy
structure and the hard choices which remain
if we are serious about reducing our depend-
ence upon foreign energy. These include pro-
grams to reverse our declining production of
natural gas and increase incentives for
domestic crude oil production. I proposed to
minimize environmental uncertainties affect-
ing coal development, expand nuclear power
generation, and create an Energy Independ-
ence Authority to provide government finan-
cial assistance for vital energy programs
where private capital is not available.
We must explore every reasonable pros-
pect for meeting our energy needs when our
current domestic reserves of oil and natural
gas begin to dwindle in the next decade.
I urgently ask Congress and the new Ad-
ministration to move quickly on these issues.
This nation has the resources and the capabil-
ity to achieve our energy goals if its govern-
ment has the will to proceed, and I think we
do.
America's first goal is and always will be
peace with honor. America must remain first
in keeping peace in the world. We can remain
first in peace only if we are never second in
defense.
In presenting the state of the Union to the
Congress and to the American people, I have
a special obligation as Commander-in-Chief
to report on our national defense. Our sur-
vival as a free and independent people re-
quires, above all, strong military forces that
are well equipped and highly trained to per-
form their assigned mission.
I am particularly gratified to report that
over the past two and a half years we have
been able to reverse the dangerous decline of
the previous decade in real resources this
country was devoting to national defense.
This was an immediate problem I faced in
1974. The evidence was unmistakable that
the Soviet Union had been steadily increas-
ing the resources it applied to building its
military strength. During this same period the
United States' real defense spending declined.
In my three budgets we not only arrested that
dangerous decline, but we have established the
positive trend which is essential to our ability
to contribute to peace and stability in the
world.
The Vietnam war, both materially and
psychologically, affected our overall defense
posture. The dangerous antimilitary senti-
ment discouraged defense spending and un-
fairly disparaged the men and women who
serve in our armed forces.
The challenge that now confronts this
country is whether we have the national will
and determination to continue this essential
defense effort over the long term, as it must
be continued. We can no longer afford to os-
cillate from year to year in so vital a matter.
Indeed, we have a duty to look beyond the
immediate question of budgets and to
examine the nature of the problem we will
face over the next generation.
I am the first recent President able to ad-
dress long-term basic issues without the bur-
den of Vietnam. The war in Indochina con-
sumed enormous resources at the very time
that the overwhelming strategic superiority
we once enjoyed was disappearing. In past
years, as a result of decisions by the United
States, our strategic forces leveled off. Yet
the Soviet Union continued a steady, constant
buildup of its own forces, committing a high
percentage of its national economic effort to
defense.
The United States can never tolerate a
shift in strategic balance against us or even a
situation where the American people or our
allies believe the balance is shifting against
us. The United States would risk the most
serious political consequences if the world
came to believe that our adversaries have a
decisive margin of superiority.
To maintain a strategic balance we must
look ahead to the 1980's and beyond. The
sophistication of modern weapons requires
that we make decisions now if we are to in-
sure our security 10 years from now.
Therefore I have consistently advocated
100
Department of State Bulletin
and strongly urged that we pursue three crit-
ical strategic programs: the Trident missile
launching submarine; the B-1 bomber, with
its superior capability to penetrate modern
air defenses; and a more advanced intercon-
tinental ballistic missile that will be better
able to survive nuclear attack and deliver a
devastating retaliatory strike.
In an era where the strategic nuclear
forces are in rough equilibrium, the risks of
conflict below the nuclear threshold may
grow more perilous. A major long-term ob-
jective therefore is to maintain capabilities to
deal with, and thereby deter, conventional
challenges and crises, particularly in Europe.
We cannot rely solely on strategic forces to
guarantee our security or to deter all types
of aggression. We must have superior naval
and marine forces to maintain freedom of the
seas; strong multipurpose tactical air forces;
and mobile, modern ground forces.
Accordingly, I have directed a long-term
effort to improve our worldwide capabilities
to deal with regional crises:
— I have submitted a five-year naval build-
ing program indispensable to the nation's
maritime strategy.
— Because the security of Europe and the
integrity of NATO remain the cornerstone of
American defense policy, I have initiated a
special long-term program to insure the
capacity of the alliance to deter or defeat ag-
gression in Europe.
As I leave office, I can report that our na-
tional defense is effectively deterring conflict
today. Our armed forces are capable of carry-
ing out the variety of missions assigned to
them. Programs are underway which will as-
sure we can deter war in the years ahead.
But I also must warn that it will require a
sustained effort over a period of years to
maintain these capabilities. We must have
the wisdom, the stamina, and the courage to
prepare today for the perils of tomorrow, and
I believe we will.
Letters of Credence
Argentina
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Argentine Republic, Jorge Antonio Aja Es-
pil, presented his credentials to President
Ford on January 13. *
Mexico
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
United Mexican States, Hugo B. Margain,
presented his credentials to President Ford
on January 13. ^
' For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the Presi-
dent's reply, see Department of State press release dated
January 13.
February 7, 1977
101
Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for the New York Times
Following is an interview with Secretary
Kissinger by James Reston, Hedrick Smith,
and Bernard Gwertzman, as published in the
New York Times on January 20.
Press release 18 dated January 21
Q. A number of serious charges have been
made against you, and the Times thought
you should have the opportunity to answer
them. The first charge is that in a solemn
world you tried to be funny.
Secretary Kissinger: In this job you have
only two choices: you are either funny dehb-
erately or you are funny unintentionally.
Q. Are you in a lighthearted tnood, or do
you want to be serious?
Secretary Kissinger: Frankly, I am more
serious.
Q. What does it add tip to? What legacy
have you left behind?
Secretary Kissinger: Well, I really do not
know whether on my last day in office I am in
the best position to evaluate. Just before I
came here I wrote an article in which I said
the world is bipolar militarily, multipolar
politically, and fragmented economically.
When you talk of world order now you have
to take account of each of these realities and
also the fact that probably history will record
this as one of the philosophical revolutions of
history.
In the nature of things, this task could not
have been completed — even without Water-
gate. That is the basic thing. I think in one
way or another the relationship between
China, the Soviet Union, the industrial de-
mocracies, the United States, and the de-
veloping world — this five-sided aspect — is a
permanent feature of the future.
I think that in our relations with the indus-
trial democracies, what I proposed in 1973
has been more or less accomplished. The
method I chose as a formal declaration
turned out not to be the right one, but the
reality is that now the industrial democracies
talk not just about their military security
but their political and economic future has
been achieved.
Now, this has to be strengthened, because
if the cohesion can be increased, then both
the dialogue with the East and the dialogue
with the South can be conducted with enor-
mous confidence.
We, the industrial democracies, transfer 90
percent of all the real resources that go to
the developing world, so if we can develop a
unified approach we, and only we, can make
a significant contribution to development.
In the East-West dialogue I refuse to be
mesmerized by Soviet strength. It is real,
but there are also real weaknesses, and I
think a combination of diplomacy, negotia-
tion, and strength can keep this in check.
Q. When you look back on this do you look
back with pride, with sadness, anger, or
what?
Secretary Kissinger: Certainly not with
anger. I look back with some pride. I think if
you compare the world report in 1969 with
the world today, you must consider it more
peaceful, more hopeful, and with more
chance for progress. On the other hand, I
look back with sadness because of the an-
guish that the country suffered during this
period, the bitterness of the debate on Viet-
nam, in the disintegration of authority on the
Watergate, the destruction of some people I
knew, and in the sense of things that one
would have liked to accomplish and didn't
quite finish.
102
Department of State Bulletin
Q. What in particular?
Secretary Kissinger: Well, I would have
liked to have finished the SALT [Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks] agreement.
Q. Whij wasn't it finished?
Secretary Kissinger: I think it was partly
the other side, partly the election, and partly
internal disputes within the Administration.
Q. How do you feel about the future of
Western civilization?
Secretary Kissinger: I think the West has
material strength to deal with all of its prob-
lems. It has the resources to deal with a
North-South dialogue; it has the capacity,
militarily, to prevent aggression; and it has
the ability to conduct an effective diplomacy.
What it needs is imagination, dedication, and
a view of the future. I believe that is attain-
able.
Q. Do you think the prospects are better
now than they were two years ago?
Secretary Kissinger: Yes, because we have
gotten through Watergate and because we
have made great progress in strengthening
the dialogue with the industrial democracies,
because unless the free peoples live to-
gether, we will not be able to solve either the
East-West or North-South problem.
Q. When yoii look back, what are the four
or five moments that you think about with
most pride? Are there some things that come
to your mind immediately?
Secretary Kissinger: Of course landing in
China was a tremendous experience. When
Le Due Tho put on the table the proposal
which I knew would end the Vietnamese war,
that was a tremendous feeling because I
thought, not knowing that Watergate was
coming, that it would unify the American
people again, which, if you look at my press
briefings between 1969 and 1973, was my
overwhelming concern; the SALT agree-
ment; the signing of the Shanghai com-
munique; the first disengagement agreement
between the Egyptians and Israel; and
strangely enough, the first Rambouillet
summit, because it meant that at least we
were beginning to pull the industrial democ-
racies together. Finally, I was terribly
moved when President Kaunda got up at the
end of my Lusaka speech and embraced me. I
thought that was a moving occasion.
Q. The African diplomacy that you put so
much effort into last year, has it sort of
stalled and fizzled out because of the elec-
tions ?
Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think the
elections slowed it down because all of the
participants are waiting to see what the new
Administration is going to do and to see
whether the terms of reference can be
changed. But I think once Smith [Ian D.
Smith, of Rhodesia] made his basic speech
the course was set for settlement.
I cannot tell you what the exact terms will
be, but those are not as fundamental as the
fact that Smith is committed to majority
rule.
Q. What were your nightmares during this
period?
Secretary Kissinger: One nightmare that I
am sure my successors will have as well is to
make sure that some crisis does not escalate
into nuclear war and that unthinkingly we
contribute to a massive conflagration.
The second nightmare was that the Viet-
nam war would so split our country that rec-
onciliation would be totally impossible. That
was immediately followed by the nightmare
of preventing the collapse of executive au-
thority from leading to foreign challenge, of
managing a major crisis in the Middle East
when our own executive authority was under
assault.
In the last period my nightmare was that
America might become so absorbed with it-
self and so purist and so critical of itself that
it would forget that it is the key element for
security, progress, and freedom in the world.
I think all of these nightmares are on the way
to being solved.
Q. And the agenda for the rest of 1977?
Secretary Kissinger: I think for 1977 we
have some rather positive prospects. I think
in 1977 a SALT agreement ought to be at-
February 7, 1977
103
tainable. The objective conditions for making
progress in the Middle East are better than
they have been probably at any time since
the creation of Israel.
I do not want to put my successor on the
spot by pretending it will be easy. It will be a
murderously difficult, complicated effort. All
I am saying is the conditions exist for a
heroic effort.
I think we can make a breakthrough on law
of the seas this year. I think we have already
made major progress, and we can consolidate
and extend it, on nonproliferation. I think we
can carry the Rhodesian and Namibian mat-
ters to a conclusion this year. I do not see
any overwhelming crises in 1977 unless
things in Africa get totally out of control, but
I don't really expect that.
Q. Panama?
Secretary Kissinger: Panama is another
matter that I think will be settled this year.
Q. You were talking earlier about getting
together ivith the industrial democracies.
What about energy supplies and our rela-
tions particularly with the Arab world? We
have a respite for six 7nonths because of the
Saudi decision in prices, but we really have
not settled that problem.
Secretary Kissinger: On energy we created
the International Energy Agency, which I
believe is an extremely useful institution. We
have worked out within it a common policy to
prevent selective embargoes and to obligate
industrial democracies to support each other.
It has a good program for developing alter-
native sources and for conservation. The
missing link has been the refusal of the
United States to implement what this pro-
gram foresees in the area of alternative
sources, of conservation, and since we con-
sume 40 percent of the energy of the indus-
trial democracies we can write whatever plan
we want, but unless we implement it, it will
not really help.
We must work to prevent a situation from
continuing where every six months or a year
the West waits impotently while a group of
nations that do not have identical interests
decides about its economic future.
We got through the last OPEC [Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries]
meeting, but unless we have changed the ob-
jective conditions in which energy is being
dealt with, we will face the same problem
again. The key is for the nations that are as-
sembled in the International Energy Agency
to develop a major program of alternative
sources, a significant program of conserva-
tion, and to use all other political tools to en-
courage restraint among the oil producers.
Otherwise, as you look four or five years
ahead, it is frivolous to assume that some-
times decisions will not be taken that could
be potentially catastrophic for our economy.
We were lucky this year, or skillful or
able, but you cannot do it every year.
Q. Would you agree that until very re-
cently the perception of other countries, par-
ticularly in the Third Wo^id, was that this
country and its leadership did not care much
about their problems?
Secretary Kissinger: It is forgotten today
that until the end of 1972 we were heavily
preoccupied with the war in Vietnam and
with the relationships it took to extricate
ourselves. For example — putting aside the
Third World for a moment — we could not
really make great progress in relations with
Western Europe as long as in every Western
European country the issue of Vietnam was
an inhibition to closer relations with the
United States. So the war had to be ended
first. I think it is true that until 1973 we did
not give it systematic major attention.
From the end of 1973 on, and in the last
three years, I think the Third World has
been a focal point, and if you look at the
agenda of these discussions in food, in financ-
ing, and in the development and the transfer
of technology, the entire international
agenda was put forward by us. There is al-
most no other agenda.
Q. Is there any validity to the argument
that essentially what this record is that you
have left here is essentially a brilliant
negotiatiyig record, tactically very good but
strategically weak?
Secretary Kissinger: Well, I am not the
best judge of this; but I have to say that I
pass on a world that is at peace, more at
104
Department of State Bulletin
peace than in any previous transition, in
which, in addition, in every problem area so-
lutions can be foreseen even if they have not
been fully achieved and the framework for
solutions exist, in which the agenda of most
international negotiations was put forward
by the United States. Therefore it cannot be
entirely an accident, and it cannot be a series
of tactical improvisations.
I think it would be more useful to debate
the nature of the design than to deny that
there has been a design. The denial shows
lack of understanding of the nature of foreign
policy.
The surface expression of our Middle East
policy was shuttle diplomacy, but the condi-
tions that made shuttle diplomacy possible
were created over four years of a rather
painful accumulation of new answers. There
may be some people who remember an inter-
view I gave in 1970 in which I said what our
strategy would be in the Middle East and
people laughed about it. So I think there has
been a design, and my associates will cer-
tainly confirm that whenever a problem came
up we would spend hours here every morning
before we went into any tactics trying to fig-
ure out where this thing should go. So I dis-
agree with that.
We would almost never accept here a dis-
cussion of a tactical move without accom-
panying description of what the implications
were over a considerable period of time.
When you take the Lusaka speech, we
spent weeks here analyzing where we should
try to go in Africa and how we could balance
our concern for majority rule with our
equally strong concern to prevent the
radicalization of all of Africa, and it was not
simply a tactical device to get through a few
weeks' period. In fact there was no demand
for it at all.
Q. On the strategic relations with the Rus-
sians and the Chinese, are they likely to
come back together again? Is there something
we have to worry about? Are there differ-
ences we can still exploit?
Secretary Kissinger: I think it is a mistake
to define the Sino-Soviet relationships in
terms of our exploiting their differences.
Their differences came about without our
comprehending it at the time. We did not
create them; we cannot exploit them; we can
only base our policy on the fact that China is
doing us no favor, is not opposing Soviet
hegemony as a favor to us; and therefore we
have to understand the fundamental trends
that affect these countries.
I believe it is important that the People's
Republic of China continue to perceive us as
interested in maintaining a world equilib-
rium. If they feel we have lost our interest in
it or our comprehension of it or our willing-
ness to preserve it, then they will draw the
inevitable conclusion, which will be to make
whatever accommodation they can get, or
they will try to find some other means of pro-
tection, such as organizing the Third World
against both of us.
You can take either one of those courses. I
believe that of course the Soviet Union is a
superpower and as such impinges on us in
many parts of the world. It is a growing mili-
tary power that in many respects has the
capacity to threaten our survival.
I believe, however, that the military prob-
lem is soluble. I believe the Soviet Union as a
system is beset by tremendous weaknesses.
There is no Communist state in the world
that has managed to achieve spontaneous
support of its population.
The states of Eastern Europe have to ap-
peal to a sort of bourgeois nationalism to
maintain a modicum of legitimacy; and to
imagine that societies that are doing well in
certain high-priority areas of military techni-
cal knowledge but that have never solved ef-
fectively the problem of distribution and of
even simple administration, that those
societies can launch themselves on an inde-
terminate course of world domination
without grave hesitation, seems to me un-
realistic.
Yes, we have to build up enough military
forces to resist them, but we have to know
what forces are relevant. I believe that to
achieve a usable military superiority in the
field of strategic nuclear weapons is ex-
tremely unlikely and relatively easy to pre-
vent and the obsession with it detracts us. I
would say that if there is a conflict between
the Soviet Union and us, it is much less likely
to occur as a result of a Soviet attack, delib-
Febroary 7, 1977
105
erate attack, on a vital interest of the United
States than as a result of a conflict that
maybe neither of us saw, into which we are
drawn through a series of escalating moves.
In other words, I think World War I is a
better guide to our dangers than World War
II.
Q. In retrospect, should we have gotten
into major economic deals with the Rus-
sians ?
Secretary Kissinger: The curious thing is
that when we came in in 1969 we developed
the theory of linkage. The theory of linkage
was that the Soviet Union would get eco-
nomic concessions in return for political
stabilization. At that time we were criticized
because we were told that we should simply
go ahead with the economic programs be-
cause they were produced as political
stabilizers.
Q. Is it possible for our people to achieve
the kind of security that they would like to
have without creating such a sense of insecu-
rity in the minds of our adversaries as to be
dangerous to the world?
Secretary Kissinger: I think it is the es-
sence of the new circumstances I have de-
scribed that no nation can achieve absolute
security. Absolute security for one nation
means absolute insecurity for all nations. We
have to be satisfied now with relative securi-
ty, with security that makes it extremely
improbable that our vital interests are
threatened but still one that is not totally
predominant in the world.
The first time we gave a credit to the
Soviet Union was after the Berlin agreement
of 1971, and I would say without exception
all the economic agreements we made with
the Soviet Union were parallel to some polit-
ical agreement. All of our economic agree-
ments were tied to specific projects. We did
not give general unrestricted credit, and the
total amount was something like $400 million.
As a result of our own domestic debate, in
effect a freeze was put on this evolution. The
truth of this has been that the Europeans and
Japanese have given about $10 billion of un-
restricted credit to the Soviet Union.
The Europeans and Japanese are in a much
worse situation than we to insist on a politi-
cal quid pro quo, and I have always fully be-
lieved that economic programs allied to
specific political foreign projects create the
possibility first of making specific foreign
policy agreements, and, secondly, creating
incentives for cooperation, incentives for re-
straint.
If you think of some of these projects that
would take 15 years to implement before
there would be any return and if you think of
the fact that in 15 years other powers would
have risen that would take some of the load
of containing the military threat, that is not
something that one should simply ignore.
Q. What about a link with force reduction
talks in Vienna?
Secretary Kissinger: Well, I do not want to
prescribe to the new Administration what
they should link it to, but they will find
enough things to link it to if they analyze the
situation. No, it is not dead, and I think
Berlin should be actively pursued.
Q. If you were carrying on, is that some-
thing you would link, large-scale economic
involvetnent, yourself?
Secretary Kissinger: I don't know whether
I would link it above all the restraints in
peripheral areas.
Q. "Absolute security for one nation is ab-
solute insecurity for other nations." Would
you use that principle in the Middle East as
well as in a strategic relationship?
Secretary Kissinger: The problem in the
Middle East is to balance physical security
against legitimacy. There is no question that
Israel's physical security is best guaranteed
by the widest extension of its frontier and at
no other point are they as physically secure as
at the maximum point of their extension.
On the other hand, politically and in the
long term, they may be militarily even less
secure if they do not achieve legitimacy.
Now, how to balance these factors is the di-
lemma of the Middle East settlement.
106
Department of State Bulletin
Q. How can our aid to Israel he balanced'?
Secretary Kissinger: I believe that Israel
must have a sense of security in the military
field or it cannot negotiate effectively and we
must not, in attempting to press for a set-
tlement, break the spirit of Israel and its
ability to defend itself.
Q. Let me ask you — I want to be personal
because it is not just a tour of the horizon we
are doing here, it is you who is leaving. What
has this experience done to you?
Secretary Kissinger: It is going to be quite
a sight when they carry me out at noon on
the 20th, like Sewell Avery. That may be the
only way they will get me out of here.
Q. Seriously, what did it do to you?
Secretary Kissinger: Again, I am sure I
will be more thoughtful about that two
months from now than now. I have said re-
peatedly, maybe too often in recent days,
that the quality that most outsiders do not
understand is the athletic aspect of decision-
making so that you really have to react in
very short timeframes that do not permit
time for reflection.
I think I have developed great compassion
for my successors. I do not think you can
leave this office — before I came to Washing-
ton I thought it was very thrilling to be
called down here as a consultant and I
thought it was important for me to pick on
the incumbents and for all I know I may wind
up doing that. I have my doubts now on the
utility of outsiders — I am sure I will do my
utmost to avoid volunteering advice to my
successors.
I really think what this country needs now
is a period of tranquillity and confidence and
that those of us who have seen this process
have an obligation to help build that confi-
dence. That is what I would most like to do.
U.S. and Republic of Korea Sign
New Fisheries Agreement
Joint Statement
Press release 2 dated January 4
On January 4, 1977, representatives of the
United States of America and the Republic
of Korea signed a new agreement relating to
fishing activities of the Republic of Korea off
the coasts of the United States.
The agreement sets out the arrangements
between the countries which will govern fish-
ing by vessels of the Republic of Korea
within the fishery conservation zone of the
United States beginning on March 1, 1977.
The agreement will come into force after the
completion of internal procedures by both
governments.
The signing of this agreement took place in
Washington. His Excellency Dr. Pyong-
choon Hahm, Ambassador of the Republic of
Korea to the United States, signed for the
Republic of Korea. Ambassador Frederick
Irving, Assistant Secretary of State for
Oceans and International Environmental and
Scientific Affairs, signed for the United
States. Both representatives expressed their
satisfaction with the new accord and the hope
that it will strengthen cooperation between
the Republic of Korea and the United States.
February 7, 1977
107
Department Discusses Implementation of Economic Provisions
of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference
Statement by Deputy Secretary Charles W. Robinson ^
I am pleased to have this opportunity to
appear before the Commission. I understand
that the purpose of these hearings is to ena-
ble the Commission to receive information
and opinions relating to that portion of the
Final Act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe known as "Basket
Two" (Cooperation in the Field of Econom-
ics, of Science and Technology and of the En-
vironment).^
As you are aware, the Administration's
overall view of the CSCE and of the im-
plementation of the Final Act's provisions
was contained in the President's December 3
report to the Commission.^ My testimony
today centers on economic questions that fall
under the Basket Two provisions, which we
understand to be the focus of these hearings.
I believe that thoroughgoing discussions,
such as have been organized during these
two days, will help to make clear both to the
Congress and to the American public the
range of problems and the prospects for
practical cooperation surrounding the
' Made before the Commission on Security and Coop-
eration in Europe on Jan. 14. The complete transcript
of the hearings will be published by the Commission and
will be available from the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C. 20402.
'^ For te.xt of the Final Act of the Conference on Secu-
rity and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), signed at Hel-
sinki on Aug. 1, 1975, see Bulletin of Sept.l, 1975,
p. 323.
^ First Semiannual Report by the President to the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Report submitted to the House Committee on Interna-
tional Relations. Committee print. December 1976. 62
pp.
numerous provisions included in Basket Two.
For the moment, I would like to turn directly
to the specific points Mr. Fascell [Congress-
man Dante B. Fascell, Chairman of the Com-
mission] asked me to address in this prepared
statement. Later, in response to further
questions the Commissioners may have, I
would be pleased to amplify any items dealt
with in this statement as well as other perti-
nent issues.
First, however, I would like to briefly re-
view the objectives of the United States and
the West in general in Basket Two of the
CSCE, which were similar to those pursued
throughout all the subject areas covered in
the conference. We wished to obtain specific
commitments which would lead to improve-
ments in areas which have proven to be prob-
lems for the development of East-West con-
tacts and cooperation.
In the economic and trade fields, these
Western objectives focused on working
conditions for businessmen, including such
practical matters as the availability of office
and residential facilities, increased economic
and commercial information of use to busi-
nessmen, improved possibilities for the pro-
motion and marketing of products, better
contact between officials involved in business
transactions, including end users, and stimu-
lation of joint industrial cooperation projects.
These objectives were pursued through a
wide range of specific proposals advanced by
Western countries and were dealt with in
conference subcommittees created at the in-
sistence of the Western delegations to insure
the kind of detailed negotiation required. To
108
Department of State Bulletin
a large extent the Western objectives were
met. The Final Act, while neither a treaty
nor an international agreement, contains a
number of specific commitments to improve
standards of performance in areas of interest
to Western businessmen.
Signature of the Helsinki Final Act at the
highest level imposes a strong moral and
political obligation to carry through on these
commitments. There has been limited im-
plementation in Basket Two areas of interest
to the West and the United States; much re-
mains to be done.
U.S. Interests in East-West Economic Ties
Mr. Chairman, you asked first for my
evaluation of U.S. interests in economic
cooperation with the Soviet Union and East-
ern European countries, the current status of
this cooperation, and the obstacles to its fur-
ther development.
The United States attaches great impor-
tance to the maintenance and improvement of
trade and economic relations with the Soviet
Union and the countries of Eastern Europe.
Expanding trade, with proper safeguards
against the sale of goods that would make a
significant contribution to the military poten-
tial of these countries, can serve both our
economic and political interests. The United
States must derive from these relations the
usual benefit of foreign trade — namely, a
market for U.S. goods, with the consequent
creation of jobs at home and positive effects
on our balance of trade — as well as a source
of needed raw materials and of goods pro-
duced more economically abroad.
The political dimension of this trade has
long been of great importance to all parties.
It is generally accepted that progress in
political relations must go hand in hand with
expanding economic relations and that trade
in turn contributes to more stable political
ties. And commercial ties require public sup-
port in the United States — both from leaders
of the business community and from the pub-
lic at large.
Finally, we see in the development of good
trade and economic ties with the Communist
countries the possibility for improving con-
tacts across the wide spectrum of govern-
ment, private organizations, and individuals
engaged in this activity, such as commercial
officers, trade representatives, company of-
ficials, technical specialists, and industrial
enterprise managers. Increased human con-
tacts open valuable avenues for the reduction
of misunderstanding and distrust between
our governments and people.
Obstacles to Rapid Expansion of Trade
There are some practical obstacles to rapid
expansion of trade and economic intercourse
with the Communist countries.
One of the more evident is the continuing
difficulty the Soviets and East Europeans
have in matching their desired import levels
from the West with like amounts of exports.
Clearly these countries, which have incon-
vertible currencies, cannot indefinitely buy
from hard-currency areas more than they sell
to those areas. Increased export capabihty,
however, requires the production of goods
that are competitive in price and quality in
world markets. Manufactured goods from the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have yet
to make an appreciable dent in Western mar-
kets, and supply problems appear to limit the
growth of their exports of raw materials. In
purely trade terms, then, a major obstacle to
the continued rapid growth of East-West
trade is the apparent inability of the Com-
munist countries to achieve large gains in
their exports to hard-currency customers.
The continuing inadequacy of public eco-
nomic and commercial data in most Com-
munist countries is another obstacle to the
growth of trade. Limited information re-
stricts the abihty of our companies to make
rational business proposals to their commer-
cial counterparts in the East. As a result,
both sides lose the benefits of potential busi-
ness transactions: our firms miss business
opportunities; and the countries involved do
not receive either the products, processes, or
plants which would add to their economic
well-being, or at least they do not have the
opportunity to consider an offer from an al-
ternative, and possibly more advantageous,
source of supply.
February 7, 1977
109
Another important obstacle to trade has
been our inability to extend nondiscrimina-
tory treatment and government-sponsored
credits to the U.S.S.R. and certain Eastern
European countries, due to the restrictions
in the Trade Act of 1974 and the Export-
Import Bank Act of 1975. The lack of Exim-
bank credits means that U.S. firms cannot
compete on an equal basis with their coun-
terparts in Western Europe and Japan. The
absence of most-favored-nation treatment
makes it more difficult for the countries af-
fected to sell competitively in the United
States. It is also regarded as discrimination
by the Soviets and East Europeans, who
have responded by diverting some business
away from U.S. firms. It is impossible to
estimate the exact value of the trade that has
been lost as a result of the legislative restric-
tions. While the Soviet claim that the United
States has lost 2 billion dollars' worth of or-
ders is probably exaggerated, there is no
doubt the loss has been significant.
Role of CSCE Economic Provisions
Regarding your second question, the pro-
visions of Basket Two can in principle serve
our interests in heightened economic and
trade relations with the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe by helping to overcome ob-
stacles to trade expansion, some of which I
described earher.
For example, the numerous provisions on
business facilitation, business contacts, mar-
keting, and industrial cooperation, if fully
implemented, would help our firms to sell
and would improve the export potential of
the Soviets and East Europeans over the
long run. Meanwhile, innovative trade and
financing arrangements, including coproduc-
tion and "compensation" transactions, could
enable the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
to continue their present high level of imports
of goods from the Western countries without
significant near-term drawdowns of scarce
hard-currency reserves.
Further, we believe that the Communist
countries are overlooking potentially valu-
able trade opportunities with Western firms
and organizations by not making enough in-
formation available to permit these firms to
make reasonable business proposals. I recog-
nize the political reality of the centralized
foreign trade structure existing in each of
these countries. We do not see in the CSCE a
device for forcing changes on these systems.
Nonetheless, full implementation of the Bas-
ket Two provisions for improving the flow of
economic and commercial data, together with
the provisions calling for better access by our
businessmen to the potential end users of
their technology and equipment in these
countries, could in our view have very posi-
tive results.
Information and Business Facilitation
The third specific question raised by
Chairman Fascell was whether or not real
progress has been achieved since Helsinki in
the important areas of economic and com-
mercial information, business facilitation,
and industrial cooperation. I would like to
refer the Commissioners to the full and de-
tailed information provided by the President
recently in his first semiannual report to the
Commission. That information remains cur-
rent and valid. I might just now briefly
summarize the findings contained in the
President's report.
Provision of useful, relevant economic and
commercial information by the U.S.S.R. and
Eastern European countries has improved
only marginally since Helsinki. The most
forthcoming have been Hungary and Poland,
which now make available relatively com-
prehensive and meaningful statistics, plan
narratives, lists of foreign trade laws and
regulations, and directories of organizations
and officials engaged in foreign trade.
Romania and the Soviet Union are at the
other end of the spectrum, having taken vir-
tually no unilateral steps to improve their
performance.
The Soviet Union claims that, as a unilat-
eral CSCE initiative, it now publishes
foreign trade statistics quarterly as well as
annually. These figures, however, are so
highly aggregated both by area of the world
and by commodity breakdown as to be virtu-
ally useless to businessmen. Further, the
110
Department of State Bulletin
Soviet Union reduced by one-third the
number of copies printed of the most recent
edition of its annual economic statistical
handbook.
Romania has improved somewhat its per-
formance in the provision of data under exist-
ing bilateral agreements. In the agricultural
field, for instance, the Romanians have re-
cently expressed a willingness to be more
forthcoming in implementing the informa-
tion-exchange provisions of the September
1975 bilateral Protocol on Development of
Agricultural Trade — a willingness we intend
to test in the near future.
In the area of business facilitation, Soviet
and Eastern European performance has been
somewhat better. Those countries which
permitted foreign firms to open permanent
offices on their territory before Helsinki
have processed new requests reasonably
promptly in the post-Helsinki period. Some
other countries, which before Helsinki had
not allowed foreign firms to open offices,
have now begun to do so. Czechoslovakia and
Bulgaria promulgated new regulations after
Helsinki permitting, in principle, foreign
firms to open offices in their capitals. Several
Western companies have had applications
approved to establish offices in Prague, and a
few have opened offices in Sofia. None of
these is American. Also, the German Demo-
cratic Republic moved with reasonable dis-
patch to grant permission to open an office in
East Berlin to the one American firm (Dow
Chemical) wishing to do so.
On the question of access to end users we
find that Soviet and Eastern European com-
pliance to date with Basket Two commit-
ments has been disappointing. Such access is
effectively precluded in most of the Eastern
countries. As I stated earlier, we believe
that permitting Western businessmen ready
contacts with potential end users of their
equipment /row the outset of a possible busi-
ness transaction is a needed element in the
trade "normalization" process, and we en-
courage U.S. firms to press for such access.
Regarding industrial cooperation, the pro-
visions of the Final Act in this area are ba-
sically a confirmation of a process that was
already well in train before the CSCE
negotiations began. Therefore, while indus-
trial cooperation projects in their various
forms, especially the so-called "compensa-
tion" deals, are in fact increasing in number
and are recognized by both East and West as
useful to the overall economic relationship,
one should not attribute this progress to
Final Act provisions alone.
U.S. Actions To Promote Implementation
Concerning steps that the next Congress
and Administration might consider to pro-
mote further implementation of Basket Two
provisions, I beheve that a sound basis for
future progress has been laid by a number of
positive actions which the U.S. Government
has already taken.
The U.S. record is generally excellent in
the important areas of information provision
and business facilitation. Nonetheless, we
are undertaking further unilateral implemen-
tation steps in these areas. For example, we
are publishing a guide for American busi-
nessmen listing the relevant Basket Two
provisions of possible utility and interest to
them in pursuing trade opportunities in the
Eastern countries. We are gathering com-
plete reference materials on U.S. firms of all
kinds to beef up the commercial libraries of
our Embassies and consulates in the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe. These materials,
openly available to all trade officials, enter-
prise specialists, and other interested persons
in those countries, are of great practical value
to foreign business representatives.
Bilaterally, we have stressed the impor-
tance of Basket Two, and the full implemen-
tation of its provisions, in the context of our
joint economic and commercial commissions
with the U.S.S.R., Romania, and Poland.
And additionally, we have made diplomatic
representations with those countries where
we feel that progress in implementing Basket
Two provisions has been less than satisfac-
tory.
On the multilateral level, the United
States with its Western allies took the lead in
assuring that the U.N. Economic Commission
for Europe (ECE), located in Geneva, be-
came fully engaged in practical Basket Two
February 7, 1977
111
implementation. The ECE was mandated
specifically by the Final Act to be the lead
organization in carrying out numerous Bas-
ket Two multilateral provisions.
At the 31st annual session of the ECE last
March-April, the Commission's first meeting
since Helsinki, we succeeded first in reaf-
firming the Commission's CSCE mandate.
We also were successful in attaining consen-
sus for a decision calling on the ECE to pay
special attention to its CSCE mandate in its
work program and especially to certain spe-
cific areas of particular interest to the West.
The Commission has now adopted a useful
and substantive work program on the provi-
sion of economic and commercial information,
and in the environmental area it will under-
take work in monitoring transboundary air
pollution. In short, the ECE is now more
than ever before engaged in practical East-
West cooperation.
Legislative Linkage of Trade and Emigration
Since Helsinki, our trade and economic re-
lations with the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe have continued to expand. But in the
area of human rights, progress has been lim-
ited.
Our experience with the Trade Act which
was enacted two years ago demonstrates the
problems inherent in attempting to achieve
faster progress on human rights questions
with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
by creating specific legislative linkages to
trade. In the early stages of negotiations on
trade with the Soviet Union the emigration
question was kept within the bounds of quiet
diplomacy — and emigration increased
dramatically. However, the Trade Act, de-
spite this Administration's deep misgivings,
made the linkage specific; and the result in
the case of the Soviet Union was a sharp de-
chne in emigration.
It is questionable that Soviet interest in
trade with the United States is such that
specific threats and discriminatory acts will
produce the changes in domestic policies we
all wish to see. In fact, the Soviet Union will
seek to demonstrate that it is not subject to
this kind of economic pressure. Except for
Romania, the Eastern European govern-
ments also rejected the terms of the Trade
Act.
Today, prospective emigrants continue to
be harassed and intimidated, and human
rights activists are detained or jailed for
acts which would be legal anywhere in the
West. Yet it is apparent that the Soviet
leaders are becoming increasingly aware that
they pay a political and economic price for
failing to take account of U.S. and Western
concerns about human rights.
Since Helsinki, Western attention has fo-
cused more closely on Soviet performance
and heightened the pressure to moderate
repressive policies. The evidence of change
in Soviet policies is at best halting. There has
been some simplification of emigration pro-
cedures, an increase in the number of emi-
grants (primarily Armenians) given permis-
sion to leave for the United States, exit per-
mission for some Jewish applicants who had
been refused permission to emigrate before,
and release or expulsion of some prominent
dissidents. And in the last three months of
1976 there has been a substantial increase in
the number of Soviet Jews receiving permis-
sion to emigrate to Israel — roughly a one-
third increase over the annual average figure
for 1975 and 1976. This will result in 1976
being the first year since 1973 which showed
an increase — albeit small — in Soviet Jewish
emigration. It is too early to describe this as
a trend, and the actions taken against the
dissident organizers of the December Jewish
Cultural Symposium in Moscow and other ac-
tivists are illustrations of continued harass-
ment of those who speak out strongly. But it
has been made clear to Soviet officials at all
levels that modification of the legislative
linkage between trade and emigration can
only come if the Congress sees substantial
improvement in the emigration picture — both
current and prospective.
The Soviet Union's Eastern European al-
lies continue to have emigration policies
which are fundamentally restrictive in na-
ture. However, with their different historical
and cultural backgrounds, the Eastern Euro-
pean governments generally have been con-
siderably less restrictive on this score than
112
Department of State Bulletin
the Soviet Union. Since Helsinki, emigration
practices in most Eastern European coun-
tries have shown some improvement, and a
number of individual family-reunification
cases continued to be successfully resolved.
With the exception of Romania, however, all
of the countries affected have toed the line
set by Moscow and have refused to accept
the connection made by the Trade Act be-
tween emigration and normal trade rela-
tions.
As you know, the Administration has fa-
vored amending the trade legislation to pro-
vide greater flexibiUty to the President. We
believe that this would permit the U.S. Gov-
ernment to pursue its political, economic,
and human rights goals more effectively with
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. While
Congress must form its own judgment as to
whether the linkage legislated in 1974 has
worked, our verdict is that it has not— and
that we need to try a new approach.
THE CONGRESS
Department Discusses International Approaches to Problem
of Oil Spills From Vessels
Following is a statement by Ambassador
at Large T. Vincent Learson, Special Repre-
sentative of the President for the Law of the
Sea Conference, submitted to the Senate
Committee on Commerce on January 11 J
The recent series of incidents involving
foreign-flag tankers has highlighted the seri-
ous and continuing problem of protecting our
coasts and resources from damage from pol-
lution from vessels. I have been a sailor for
many years and have seen firsthand the
damage that can be caused by oil pollution.
The long-term impact of such pollution is
less obvious but perhaps much more serious
than the immediate and observable damage.
The solution to this problem has proven to be
elusive. The United States has undertaken
many efforts both internationally and domes-
tically to prevent pollution and has often
' The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub-
lished by the committee and will be available from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, Washington, U.C. 20402.
been in the forefront of international efforts.
Our success has obviously been less than 100
percent.
EPA [Environmental Protection Agency]
Administrator Russell Train has urged the
creation of an interagency task force to ur-
gently undertake an analysis of the problem
of oil spills from vessels and to search for
more effective solutions. The beginnings of
such an interagency effort have already
taken place. I strongly support that effort
and urge quick executive branch action in
cooperation with the Congress to produce a
program of effective measures to reduce ves-
sel pollution, consistent with our global
interest in protecting the marine environ-
ment and in meeting our other oceans objec-
tives. My preliminary view is that those
measures should be implemented through
strict requirements for entry and use of U.S.
ports. In addition, we are working to for-
ward to you very soon the 1973 Convention
on the Prevention of Pollution From Ships
and its implementing legislation.
February 7, 1977
113
Mr. Chairman, I would like to outline
briefly the existing international law appli-
cable to these problems and then to indicate
the direction of the law of the sea negotia-
tions on the vessel-pollution problem. This
discussion will focus on the legal basis for
preventive measures and enforcement action
by the coastal state. I will touch briefly on
liability issues later. As you know, the recent
incidents varied in their location, with some
in U.S. waters and some beyond. The legal
situation differs depending on the location.
First, let me deal with our rights in inter-
nal waters, including our ports. This would
cover such incidents as the recent grounding
in the Delaware River, inspections in port,
incidents during loading operations, et cet-
era.
In general, the United States has complete
jurisdiction in these areas and may legislate
and enforce pollution control regulations by
domestic law without restriction. However,
there are certain restrictions on our inspec-
tion rights since some international conven-
tions to which we are party require us to ac-
cept flag-state inspection certificates at face
value unless we have clear grounds for be-
lieving that the vessel is not in compliance
with the regulations of the relevant conven-
tion. However, we can apply our own domes-
tic regulations even if they are more strict
than the regulations of international conven-
tions. There were efforts during a 1973 in-
ternational conference on vessel pollution to
restrict our rights to regulate vessels in our
ports, but those efforts were defeated.
There is no legal impediment from our
point of view to U.S. imposition of its domes-
tic regulations on all vessels in our ports.
The Law of the Sea Conference's revised
single negotiating text and the existing 1958
Territorial Sea Convention specify this right,
and I will submit the relevant articles for the
record. I should make it clear, however, that
such regulations must be carefully drawn
taking into account existing international
regulations and future international efforts.
We should insure, for example, that domestic
regulations, while perhaps more stringent
than international ones, are not in fact in-
compatible, thus making compliance impos-
sible.
Second, there are significant powers to
deal with incidents in our territorial sea.
Under present international law, the United
States has sovereignty in the territorial sea
subject to the requirement to allow vessels to
engage in innocent passage. With regard to
pollution controls, this means that we may
legislate and enforce effective vessel-
pollution control regulations in the territorial
sea. Such actions must not hamper innocent
passage, but that restriction still leaves us a
great deal of flexibility.
There have been strong efforts in the law
of the sea negotiations to restrict coastal-
state regulatory powers in the territorial sea
and to eliminate any coastal-state power to
establish requirements regarding the design,
construction, equipment, and manning of
vessels. Only internationally agreed regula-
tions would be applicable to such matters.
The United States is strongly resisting these
attempts, but the support for the restrictions
is very strong. All of the major maritime
powers as well as many developing countries
support the restrictions which appear in the
present revised single negotiating text of the
conference. We will continue to fight on this
point.
Third, beyond the territorial sea is the
area of high seas where, for example, the
Argo Merchant casualty occurred. The basic
legal rule on the high seas is that there is
freedom of navigation. Coastal-state rights
are limited. The most significant coastal-
state right is the right to intervene in the
case of a maritime casualty. The 1969 Con-
vention on Intervention [on the High Seas in
Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties] provides
that the coastal state may take action to pre-
vent grave and imminent danger to its
coastline or related interests from oil pollu-
tion which is reasonably expected to have
major harmful consequences. The United
States invoked this right in the case of the
Argo Merchant. The Convention on Inter-
vention grew out of the aftermath of the
114
Department of State Bulletin
Torrey Canyon disaster off the coast of Eng-
land in 1967 and is intended for only the most
serious cases.
In addition to this coastal-state right, there
are several types of existing obligations on
flag states with regard to their vessels. The
1958 Convention on the High Seas provides
that the flag state shall take adequate safety
measures regarding manning, construction,
equipment, and seaworthiness of its ships
and shall apply regulations to prevent oil pol-
lution from vessels. Also, there are several
specific conventions containing technical
regulations and specifications for safety and
the prevention of pollution. These include the
1960 Safety of Life at Sea Convention, the
1954 Convention for the Prevention of the
Pollution of the Sea by Oil, and the 1973
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
From Ships. The latter is not yet in force. All
of these conventions include numerous tech-
nical requirements. In the area beyond the
territorial sea, they provide for exclusive
flag-state enforcement.
In the law of the sea negotiations, there
have been extensive negotiations on a new
regime for the prevention of vessel-source
pollution. It has been recognized in the con-
ference that we cannot depend solely on flag
states for the promulgation and enforcement
of regulations. Consequently, the revised
single negotiating text contains a mixed re-
gime which puts certain obligations on flag
states but also provides specified rights for
coastal states and for states with vessels in
their ports.
The text has been negotiated at some
length, and the provisions for vessel-
pollution control in the economic zone are
very close to being accepted by consensus.
The provisions emphasize the importance of
increased enforcement rights and divide the
responsibility between flag states, coastal
states, and states with vessels in port. Flag-
state obligations have been significantly
strengthened. The flag state is obligated to
investigate any reported offense by one of its
vessels against the internationally agreed
regulations and to prosecute if a violation is
indicated. Article 82 of the Committee II
text, which I will submit for the record,
places a strong administrative obligation on
the flag state to in fact control its vessels.
This is aimed directly at the basic problem
with flags of convenience: the lack of effec-
tive control for safety and environmental
purposes. The coastal state may, in the eco-
nomic zone, investigate and prosecute any
vessel for a serious discharge causing major
pollution damage in violation of the interna-
tional regulations.
It should be noted that this type of en-
forcement right would not be useful in pre-
venting casualties such as the Argo Mer-
chant.
Finally, the port state may investigate and
prosecute any vessel for any violation of the
international regulations, regardless of the
place of the incident. I should note that the
present text provides the flag state with a
limited right to take over prosecutions of its
vessels from other states. Of course, the port
or coastal state may take further action if the
flag-state prosecution is inadequate.
In summary, present international law
provides extensive coastal-state powers for
the United States in its ports and internal
waters and in the territorial sea. In the area
beyond, our authority is limited to the right
of intervention. The law of the sea treaty
should preserve these rights, although some
of our territorial-sea rights are threatened,
and will expand our enforcement rights in
ports and in the 200-mile economic zone.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to take a mo-
ment to explain our position on these issues
in the law of the sea negotiations and our
rationale for it.
We have recognized for some time that the
present international regime for vessel-
pollution prevention is inadequate and that
further action is needed.
In determining our position for the law of
the sea negotiations, we had several factors
in mind. First, we recognized a clear need for
increased protection for the marine environ-
ment. Second, we wanted to preserve free-
dom of navigation on the high seas, including
February 7, 1977
115
the area within the proposed 200-mile eco-
nomic zone. Consequently, we felt that
coastal-state rights of action beyond the ter-
ritorial sea should be limited so as not to
allow foreign nations discretionary rights to
interfere with navigation in the open ocean.
However, we also felt that strong regulatory
powers should be established and confirmed
for nations with vessels in their ports.
Thus a system which emphasized the pow-
ers of port states achieved both of our objec-
tives: the prevention of interference with
U.S. vessels on the high seas and the strong
right of individual states to insure that ves-
sels entering ports are safe and sound ships.
For the United States, almost all of the traffic
off our coasts enters U.S. ports. We have
been willing to agree in the negotiations to a
direct right for the coastal state to act in its
economic zone in serious cases. But the bur-
den of regulation and enforcement would fall
on the port state. We have insisted on the re-
tention of essentially unrestricted rights to
apply and enforce domestic regulations to
vessels in port. Also, we have urged accept-
ance of a right for the port state to take en-
forcement action against any vessel in its
port for any violation of the international
regulations. In general, this position is being
adopted in the conference.
The issue of liability for damage caused by
oil spills, particularly in the area beyond the
territorial sea, is complex and highly impor-
tant. During the last session of Congress,
both the Administration and the Congress
worked hard on the "Comprehensive Oil Pol-
lution Liability and Compensation Act of
1976." Also, we submitted two conventions
for advice and consent: the Convention on
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage and
the Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil
Pollution Damage. Neither convention has
been ratified by the United States, although
the Liability Convention is in force interna-
tionally. The Liability Convention provides
for suits against vessel owners for oil-spill
damages up to a specified limit. The Fund
Convention would provide additional protec-
tion up to a higher limit. The terms of both
conventions limit their coverage to damage in
the territorial sea or territory of a state. I
hope that the liability problems can be
worked out in the context of the continuing
work between the executive branch and the
Congress, and consequently I will not com-
ment further here.
Mr. Chairman, in closing I want to reiter-
ate that I share the concern of you and your
colleagues and assure you that I will press
for vigorous and rapid action within the pro-
posed interagency task force.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
Nonproliferation Issues. Hearings before the Subcom-
mittee on Arms Control, International Organizations
and Security Agreements of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations. March 19, 1975-November 8,
1976. 426 pp.
Foreign Policy Choices for the Seventies and Eighties.
Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations. Vol. 1; September 10, 1975-September 20,
1976; 458 pp. Vol. 2: October 22, 1975-March 16,
1976; 272 pp.
Middle East Peace Prospects. Hearings before the Sub-
committee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. May
19-July 26, 1976. 396 pp.
Resource Development in South Africa and U.S. Policy.
Hearings before the Subcommittee on International
Resources, Food, and Energy of the House Commit-
tee on International Relations. May 25-June 9, 1976.
443 pp.
Congress and Foreign Policy. Hearings before the Spe-
cial Subcommittee on Investigations of the House
Committee on International Relations. June 17-
September 22, 1976. 347 pp.
Treaty Powers Resolution. Hearings before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations. July 21-28, 1976.
127 pp.
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Relations and Strategic Balance. Hear-
ings before the Subcommittee on International Politi-
cal and Military Affairs of the House Committee on
International Relations. August 31-September 2,
1976. .53 pp.
Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears. Report
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to ac-
company E.\. I, 94-1. S. Ex. Rept. 94-.34. September
3, 1976. 3 pp.
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals.
Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions to accompany E.\. K, 94-1. S. E.x. Rept. 94-35.
September 3, 1976. 13 pp.
1976 Protocol Amending the Interim Convention on
Conservation of North Pacific Seals. Report of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accom-
pany Ex. M, 94-2. S. Ex. Rept. 94-36. September 3,
1976. 5 pp.
116
Department of State Bulletin
Continuing Most-Favored-Nation Tariff Treatment of
Imports From Romania. Hearing before the Sub-
committee on International Trade of the Senate
Committee on Finance. September 8, 1976. 407 pp.
Fifth International Tin Agreement. Report of the Sen-
ate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany S.
E.\. J. 94-2. S. E.\. Rept. 94-37. September 8, 1976.
18 pp.
Human Rights in North Korea. Hearing before the
Subcommittee on International Organizations of the
House Committee on International Relations. Sep-
tember 9, 1976. 70 pp.
International Investment Survey Act of 1976. Report of
the House Committee on International Relations, to-
gether with additional views, to accompany S. 2839.
H. Rept. 94-1490. September 9, 1976. 12 pj).
Tijuana River Flood Control Project. Report of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accom-
panv H.R. 14973. S. Rept. 94-1237. September 14,
1976. 10 pp.
United States-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agree-
ment. Hearing before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations. September 15, 1976. 32 pp.
Packing Standards for Imported Tomatoes. Report of
the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry to
accompany S. 2440. S. Rept. 94-1239. September" 15,
1976. 18 pp.
Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1976.
Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary to
accompany H.R. 14535. H. Rept. 94-1553. September
15, 1976. 37 pp.
Terrorist Attack at Istanbul Airport. Repoi't of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accom-
pany S. Res. 524. S. Rept. 94-1235. September 16,
1976. 5 pp.
International Agreement With Poland Concerning
Fisheries off the Coast of the United States. Message
from the President of the United States transmitting
the agreement. H. Doc. 94-613. September 16, 1976.
21 pp.
The Nuclear Explosive Proliferation Control Act of
1976. Report by the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, together with additional views (dissenting),
to accompany H.R. 15419; H. Rept. 94-1613; Sep-
tember 18, 1976; 60 pp. Report by the Joint Commit-
tee on Atomic Energy, together with additional views
(dissenting), to accompany S. 3853; S. Rept. 94-1336;
September 29, 1976; 46 pp.
Implementing International Conventions Against Ter-
rorism. Report, together with dissenting views, of
the House Committee on the Judiciary to accompany
H.R. 15552; H. Rept. 94-1614; September 18, 1976;
16 pp. Report of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary to accompany S. 3646; S. Rept. 94-1273;
September 22, 1976; 16 pp.
International Navigational Rules Act of 1976. Report of
the Senate Committee on Commerce to accompany
H.R. 5446. S. Rept. 94-1271. September 21, 1976.
30 pp.
Sale of Missiles to Saudi Arabia. Report of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany S.
Con. Res. 161. S. Rept. 94-1305. September 24, 1976.
7 pp.
Define Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Agamst
Foreign States. Report of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary to accompany S. 3553. S. Rept. 94-1310.
September 27, 1976. 42 pp.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND CONFERENCES
U.S. Abstains on Security Council
Resolution on Botswana Complaint
Following are statements made in the
U.N. Security Council on January 13 by
U.S. Representative William W. Scranton
and on January H by U.S. Representative
Albert W. Sherer, Jr., together with the text
of a resolution adopted by the Council on
January H.
U.S. STATEMENTS IN U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL
Ambassador Scranton, January 13 ^
Now, Mr. President, with regard to the
matter immediately before us: The real solu-
tion to this problem and to many other prob-
lems that have arisen with regard to the
relationships of near neighbors to the pres-
ent regime in Southern Rhodesia is clearly a
changeover to majority rule in that
country — as soon as possible and with a
minimum of violence and human suffering.
The extremely important and difficult
negotiations now going on to bring about just
such an objective have been undertaken by
the United Kingdom and led by our friend
and colleague Ambassador Ivor Richard.
These negotiations and the hoped-for out-
come of majority rule in Southern Rhodesia
are a real test of those countries and persons
directly involved, and likewise it is a test of
the United Nations and those of us here in
the Security Council.
The U.S. Government has assured the
Government of the United Kingdom on sev-
eral occasions of its complete support of the
efforts they are undertaking to bring about
majority rule in Southern Rhodesia. We be-
' Introductory paragraphs omitted (text from USUN
press release 2).
February 7, 1977
117
lieve this effort is of paramount importance.
Accordingly, our delegation has been in-
structed to follow and support the United
Kingdom on the matter before us in view of
its close reference to those efforts.
I do not wish to end my comments right
there, in the event of any misunderstanding
about our concern for the issue before us. I
was deeply impressed by the presentation
yesterday of the distinguished Foreign
Minister of Botswana, His Excellency Ar-
chibald Mogwe, both by his exposition of the
issue and the facts and especially by his con-
sidered objectivity. Both my government and
I personally feel very strongly that Botswana
and its concerns are concerns of ours. The
United States has in the past provided de-
velopmental assistance to Botswana and will
continue to do so in the future. Our govern-
ment will continue to pursue close relations
with the people and the Government of Bot-
swana and work for the kind of peaceful politi-
cal settlement in southern Africa which will
truly assure the independence and integrity of
Botswana.
In June of this year, I had the high
privilege of visiting Gabarone and meeting
with President Khama and some of the mem-
bers of his Cabinet to discuss some of the
problems facing his country and southern Af-
rica.
To say that I was deeply impressed with
his dedication to finding solutions to
Botswana's internal problems and to the
problems confronting southern Africa is to
put it very mildly indeed. In my judgment he
is an outstanding leader, a man of high prin-
ciple and deep conviction, who has worked
untiringly for a peaceful multiracial society
in his country with a democratic government.
Though of sizable territory, Botswana is
small in population — but like many small
countries with impressive leadership and
dedicated people it is very meaningful in
southern Africa and indeed the world. I look
for the day soon when the bringing about of
majority rule in Southern Rhodesia will ter-
minate the constant afflictions between these
two countries, and I reiterate the U.S. Gov-
ernment's dedication to that objective.
Last, but by no means least, I wish to ex-
press gratitude for the kind words directed
to me by speakers during the current debate.
I leave this body in a few days; and in doing
so I have a very warm feeling for it, for all of
you, and for the United Nations.
Ambassador Sherer, January 14
USUN press release 3 dated January 14
The views of the United States on the sub-
stance of the matter before us were set forth
yesterday by Governor Scranton. Our
abhorrence of the illegal use of force and our
commitment to majority rule are fundamen-
tal U.S. positions. We would only wish to add
that we recognize the efforts of the cospon-
sors in seeking to meet the views of a wide
number of members of the Council.
My government has played a particular
role in seeking to bring all sides together in
the search for a peaceful solution of the un-
derlying problem. We believe our ability to
continue to contribute in this way is best
served by joining the United Kingdom, which
has a very special role in the current effort to
find a peaceful settlement of the Rhodesian
problem. For these reasons we will abstain.
TEXT OF RESOLUTION 2
The Security CouyicH,
Taking note of the letters dated 22 December 1976
(S/12262) and 12 January 1977 (S/12275) from the Per-
manent Representative of Botswana to the United Na-
tions, and having heard the statement of the Minister
for External Affairs of Botswana, concerning hostile
acts against Botswana by the illegal minority regime in
Southern Rhodesia,
Gravely concerned at the dangerous situation created
by the provocative and hostile acts committed by the
illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia against the secu-
rity and well-being of Botswana,
Reaffirming the inalienable right of the people of
Southern Rhodesia to self-determination and independ-
ence in accordance with General Assembly resolution
1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and the legitimacy of
their struggle to secure the enjoyment of such rights as
set forth in the Charter of the United Nations,
Recalling its resolutions 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966
and 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968 which detemined and reaf-
firmed respectively that the situation in Southern
Rhodesia constituted a threat to international peace and
security.
Taking note of General Assembly resolution 31/154 of
20 December 1976,
2 U.N. doc. A/RES/403 (1977); adopted by the Coun-
cil on Jan. 14 by a vote of 13 to 0, with 2 abstentions
(U.S., U.K.).
118
Department of State Bulletin
Convinced that the recent provocative and hostile
acts perpetrated by the illegal regime against Botswana
aggravate the situation,
Deeply grieved and concerned at the loss of human
life and damage to property caused by the acts of the
illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia against Botswana,
Noting with appreciation Botswana's decision to con-
tinue to give asylum to political refugees fleeing from
inhuman oppression by the illegal racist minority re-
gime,
Realizing the need for Botswana to strengthen its se-
curity in order to safeguard its sovereignty, territorial
integrity and independence,
Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland over Southern Rhodesia, in accord-
ance with the relevant resolutions of the United Na-
tions,
1. Strongly condemns all acts of provocation and
harassment, including military threats and attacks,
murder, arson, kidnapping and destruction of property,
committed against Botswana by the illegal regime in
Southern Rhodesia;
2. Condemns all measures of political repression by
the illegal regime that violate fundamental rights and
freedoms of the people of Southern Rhodesia and con-
tribute to instability and lack of peace in the region as a
whole;
3. Deplores all acts of collaboration and collusion
which sustain the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia
and encourage defiance with impunity of the resolutions
of the Security Council, with adverse consequences for
peace and security in the region;
4. Demands the immediate and total cessation forth-
with of all hostile acts committed against Botswana by
the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia;
5. Takes cognizance of the special economic hardship
confronting Botswana as a result of the imperative need
to divert funds from ongoing and planned development
projects to hitherto unplanned and unbudgeted for se-
curity needs necessitated by the urgent need to effec-
tively defend itself against attacks and threats by the
illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia;
6. Accepts the invitation of the Government of
Botswana to dispatch a mission to assess the needs of
Botswana in carrying out its development projects
under the present circumstances, and accordingly re-
quests the Secretary-General, in collaboration with ap-
propriate organizations of the United Nations system,
to organize with immediate effect financial and other
forms of assistance to Botswana and to report to the
Security Council not later than 31 March 1977;
7. Requests the United Nations and the organizations
and programmes concerned, including the Economic
and Social Council, the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization, the World Health
Organization, the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme, the Food and Agriculture Organization and
the Fund for Agricultural Development, to assist
Botswana to carry out the ongoing and planned de-
velopment projects without interruption as stated in
paragraph 5 and envisaged under paragraph 6 of this
resolution;
8. Appeals to all States to respond positively in pro-
viding assistance to Botswana, in the light of the report
of the mission of the Secretary-General, in order to en-
able Botswana to carry out its planned development
projects;
9. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Health
Amendments to articles 24 and 25 of the constitution of
the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as
amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva
May 17, 1976.'
Acceptance deposited: Ethiopia, January 6, 1977.
Load Lines
Amendments to the international convention on load
lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331, 6629. 6720). Adopted at Lon-
don October 12, 1971.'
Acceptance deposited: Algeria, January 4, 1977.
Maritime Matters
Convention on facilitation of international maritime
traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965.
Entered into force March 5, 1967; for the United
States May 16, 1967. TIAS 6251.
Acceptance deposited: Hungary (with a statement),
December 15, 1976.
Narcotic Drugs
Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic
drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972. Entered
into force August 8, 1975. TIAS 8118.
Ratification deposited: Spain, January 4, 1977.
Oil Pollution
Amendments to the international convention for the
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London Oc-
tober 21, 1969.'
Acceptance deposited: Argentina, December 30, 1976.
International convention relating to intervention on the
high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, with an-
nex. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. Entered
into force May 6, 1975. TIAS 8068.
Accession deposited: Ecuador, December 23, 1976.
International convention on civil liability for oil pollu-
tion damage. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969.
Entered into force June 19, 1975.^
Ratification deposited: Brazil, December 17, 1976.
Accession deposited: Ecuador, December 23, 1976.
International convention on the establishment of an in-
ternational fund for compensation for oil pollution
damage. Done at Brussels December 18, 1971. '
Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of Ger-
many, December 30, 1976.^
Safety at Sea
Convention on the international regulations for prevent-
' Not in force.
^ Not in force for the United States.
^ Applicable to Berlin (West).
February 7, 1977
119
ing collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London October
20, 1972. Enters into force July 15, 1977.
Ratification deposited: Poland, December 14, 1976.
Accessions deposited: Hungary (with statement and
declaration), December 15, 1976; South Africa, De-
cember 20, 1976.
Satellite Communications System
Agreement relating to the International Telecommuni-
cations Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with an-
nexes. Done at Washington August 20, 1971. Entered
into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.
Accession deposited: El Salvador, January 19, 1977.
Operating agreement relating to the International
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTEL-
SAT), with annex. Done at Washington August 20,
1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS
7532.
Signature: Administracion Nacional de Tele-
comunicaciones (ANTED for El Salvador, January
19, 1977.
Seals — Antarctic
Convention for the conservation of Antarctic seals, with
annex and final act. Done at London June 1, 1972.'
Ratification deposited: United States, January 18,
1977.
Space
Convention on registration of objects launched into
outer space. Done at New York January 14, 1975. En-
tered into force September 15, 1976.
Proclaimed by the President: January 18, 1977.
Telecommunications
Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 1959,
as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590, 7435), to
establish a new frequency allotment plan for high-
frequency radiotelephone coast stations, with annexes
and final protocol. Done at Geneva June 8, 1974. En-
tered into force January 1, 1976; for the United
States April 21, 1976.
Notification of approval: Luxembourg, October 14,
1976.
BILATERAL
Hungary
Agreement relating to issuance of nonimmigrant visas
on a facilitated basis to certain holders of diplomatic
or official passports. Effected by exchange of notes at
Budapest March 29 and April 7, 1976. Entered into
force April 7, 1976.
PUBLICATIONS
Not in force.
GPO Sales Publications
Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock
number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Goveryiment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20102.
A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more
copies of any one publication mailed to the same ad-
dress. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of
Docuinents , must accompany orders. Prices shown be-
low, which include domestic postage, are subject to
change.
Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which
describe the people, history, government, economy,
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a
map, a list of principal government officials and U.S.
diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A
complete set of all Background Notes currently in
stock — at least 140 — $21.80; 1-year subscription service
for approximately 77 updated or new Notes — .$23.10;
plastic binder — $1.50.) Single copies of those listed
below are available at 35? each.
Angola Cat. No. S1.123:AN4
Pub. 7962 7 pp
Bermuda Cat. No. SI. 123:845
Pub. 7907 4 pp
Ireland Cat. No. S1.123:IR2
Pub. 7974 7 pp
Laos Cat. No. S1.123;L29
Pub. 8301 5 pp
Portugal Cat. No. S1.123;P83/2
Pub. 8074 7 pp
Tunisia Cat. No. S1.123:T83
Pub. 8142 5 pp
Atomic Energy — Technical Information Exchange in
Regulatory Matters. Arrangement with Japan. TIAS
8341. 7 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9.10;8341).
Atomic Energy — Technical Information Exchange
and Development of Standards. Arrangement with
Switzerland. TIAS 8342. 7 pp. 350. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8342).
Atomic Energy — Technical Information Exchange
and Development of Standards. Arrangement with
Spain. TIAS 8344. 4 pp. 35(Z. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8344).
120
Department of State Bulletin
INDEX February 7, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1963
Africa. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for the
New Yorl< Times 102
Argentina. Letters of Credence (Aja Espil) 101
Botswana. U.S. Abstains on Security Council
Resolution on Botswana Complaint (Scranton,
Sherer, text of resolution) 117
China. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for the
New York Times 102
Congress
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 116
Department Discusses International Approaches
to Problem of Oil Spills From Vessels
(Learson) 113
The State of the Union (excerpts from President
Ford's address to the Congress) 97
Economic Affairs
Department Discusses Implementation of Eco-
nomic Provisions of the Final Act of the Helsinki
Conference (Robinson) 108
U.S. and Republic of Korea Sign New Fisheries
Agreement (joint statement) 107
Energy
Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for the New
York Times 102
The State of the Union (excerpts from President
Ford's address to the Congress) 97
Environment. Department Discusses Interna-
tional Approaches to Problem of Oil Spills From
Vess;els (Learson) 113
Europe
Department Discusses Implementation of Eco-
nomic Provisions of the Final Act of the Helsinki
Conference (Robinson) 108
Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for the New-
York Times 102
Human Rights. Department Discusses Im-
plementation of Economic Provisions of the
Final Act of the Helsinki Conference (Robinson) 108
Korea. U.S. and Republic of Korea Sign New
Fisheries Agreement (joint statement) 107
Law of the Sea. Department Discusses Interna-
tional Approaches to Problem of Oil Spills From
Vessels (Learson) 113
Mexico. Letters of Credence (Margain) 101
Middle East. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed
for the New York Times 102
Military Affairs. The State of the Union (ex-
cerpts from President Ford's address to the
Congress) 97
Presidential Documents. The State of the Union
(excerpts from President Ford's address to the
Congress) 9'^
Publications. GPO Sales Publications 120
Southern Rhodesia. U.S. Abstains on Security
Council Resolution on Botswana Complaint
(Scranton, Sherer, text of resolution) 11"
Trade. Department Discusses Implementation of
Economic Provisions of the Final Act of the Hel-
sinki (Conference (Robinson) 108
Treaty Information
Current Actions 119
U.S. and Republic of Korea Sign New Fisheries
Agreement (joint statement) 107
U.S.S.R.
Department Discusses Implementation of Eco-
nomic Provisions of the Final Act of the Helsinki
Conference (Robinson) 108
Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for the New-
York Times 102
United Nations. U.S. Abstains on Security Coun-
cil Resolution on Botswana Complaint (Scran-
ton, Sherer, text of resolution) 117
Name Index
Aya Espil, Jorge Antonio 101
Ford, President 97
Kissinger, Secretary 102
Learson, T. Vincent 113
Margain, Hugo B 101
Robinson, Charles W 108
Scranton, William W 117
Sherer, Albert W., Jr 117
Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: January 17—23
Press
releases
mav be obtained from the Office
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash- |
ington.
D.C. 20520. 1
No.
Date
Subject
*10
1/17
Government Advisory Commit-
tee on International Book and
Library Programs. Feb. 17.
*11
1/17
U.S. Advisory Commission on
International Educational and
Cultural Affairs, Feb. 17.
tl2
1/19
Kissinger; American Foreign
Service Association awards
ceremony, Jan. 18.
*13
1/19
Kissinger: awards ceremony
honoring Foreign Service offi-
cers for service in Vietnam,
Jan. 18.
*14
1/19
U.S. Advisory Commission on
International Educational and
Cultural Affairs, Ottawa, Feb.
18-19.
tl5
1/19
U.S. ratification of Convention
for the Conservation of Ant-
arctic Seals.
tl6
1/19
"Foreign Relations," 1950, vol.
VI, "East Asia and the
Pacific" released.
*17
1/21
Kissinger: farewell remarks,
Jan. 19
18
1/21
Kissinger: interview published
in New York Times, Jan. 20.
*19
1/21
Special inspection report on Of-
fice of Foreign Buildings.
* Not
printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
Superintendent of Documents
u.s. government printing office
washington. dc. 20402
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
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Third Class
Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted
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when you receive the expiration notice from the
Superintendent of Documents. Due to the time re-
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mediate attention if you write to: Superintendent
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
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15
/J:
/?6^
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Volume LXXVI • No. 1964 • February 14, 1977
THE INAUGURAL ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT CARTER 121
ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT CARTER TO PEOPLE OF OTHER NATIONS 122
PRESIDENT CARTER INTERVIEWED BY AP AND UPI CORRESPONDENTS
Excerpts From Transcript 123
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLET I
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Not€i Contents of this publication are not
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printed. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The
BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to
Periodical Literature.
Vol. LXXVI, No. 1964
February 14, 1977
The Department of State BULLETIN
a weekly publication issued by fA|
Office of Media Services, Bureau
Public Affairs, provides the public an
interested agencies of the governmeii
with information on developments ('|
the field of U.S. foreign relations ar
on the work of the Department an\
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses, and
news conferences of the President and
the Secretary of State and other offi-
cers of the Department, as well as spe-
cial articles on various phases of in-
ternational affairs and the functions of
the Department. Information is in-
cluded concerning treaties and inter-
national agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and on treaties of general interna-
tional interest.
Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.
The Inaugural Address of President Carter
For myself and for our nation, I want to
thank my predecessor for all he has done to
heal our land.
In this outward and physical ceremony we
attest once again to the inner and spiritual
strength of our nation.
As my high school teacher, Miss Julia Cole-
man, used to say, "We must adjust to
changing times and still hold to unchanging
principles."
Here before me is the Bible used in the in-
auguration of our first President in 1789, and
I have just taken the oath of office on the
Bible my mother gave me just a few years
ago, opened to a timeless admonition from
the ancient prophet Micah:
He hath shewed thee, 0 man, what is good; and what
doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to
love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God? (Micah
6:8)
This inauguration ceremony marks a new
beginning, a new dedication within our gov-
ernment, and a new spirit among us all. A
President may sense and proclaim that new
spirit, but only a people can provide it.
Two centuries ago our nation's birth was a
milestone in the long quest for freedom, but
the bold and brilliant dream which excited
the founders of this nation still awaits its
consummation. I have no new dream to set
forth today but, rather, urge a fresh faith in
the old dream.
Ours was the first society openly to define
itself in terms of both spirituality and human
liberty. It is that unique self-definition which
has given us an exceptional appeal — but it
also imposes on us a special obligation: to
take on those moral duties which, when as-
sumed, seem invariably to be in our own best
interests.
You have given me a great responsibility:
' Delivered on Jan. 20 (text from White House press re-
lease).
February 14, 1977
to stay close to you, to be worthy of you, and
to exemplify what you are. Let us create to-
gether a new national spirit of unity and
trust. Your strength can compensate for my
weakness, and your wisdom can help to
minimize my mistakes.
Let us learn together and laugh together
and work together and pray together, confi-
dent that in the end we will triumph together
in the right.
The American dream endures. We must
once again have full faith in our country — and
in one another. I believe America can be bet-
ter. We can be even stronger than before.
Let our recent mistakes bring a resurgent
commitment to the basic principles of our na-
tion, for we know that if we despise our own
government we have no future. We recall in
special times when we have stood briefly, but
magnificently, united. In those times no
prize was beyond our grasp.
But we cannot dwell upon remembered
glory. We cannot afford to drift. We reject
the prospect of failure or mediocrity or an in-
ferior quality of life for any person.
Our government must at the same time be
both competent and compassionate.
We have already found a high degree of
personal Hberty, and we are now struggling
to enhance equality of opportunity. Our
commitment to human rights must be abso-
lute, our laws fair, our natural beauty pre-
served; the powerful must not persecute the
weak, and human dignity must be enhanced.
We have learned that "more" is not neces-
sarily "better," that even our great nation
has its recognized limits, and that we can
neither answer all questions nor solve all
problems. We cannot afford to do every-
thing, nor can we afford to lack boldness as
we meet the future. So together, in a spirit
of individual sacrifice for the common good,
we must simply do our best.
121
Our nation can be strong abroad only if it is
strong at home, and we know that the best
way to enhance freedom in other lands is to
demonstrate here that our democratic sys-
tem is worthy of emulation.
To be true to ourselves, we must be true to
others. We will not behave in foreign places
so as to violate our rules and standards here
at home, for we know that the trust which
our nation earns is essential to our strength.
The world itself is now dominated by a new
spirit. Peoples more numerous and more
politically aware are craving and now de-
manding their place in the sun — not just for
the benefit of their own physical condition
but for basic human rights.
The passion for freedom is on the rise.
Tapping this new spirit, there can be no no-
bler nor more ambitious task for America to
undertake on this day of a new beginning
than to help shape a just and peaceful world
that is truly humane.
We are a strong nation, and we will main-
tain strength so sufficient that it need not be
proven in combat — a quiet strength based
not merely on the size of an arsenal but on
the nobility of ideas.
We will be ever vigilant and never vulner-
able, and we will fight our wars against pov-
erty, ignorance, and injustice; for those are
the enemies against which our forces can be
honorably marshaled.
We are a proudly idealistic nation, but let
no one confuse our idealism with weakness.
Because we are free we can never be indif-
ferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere. Our
moral sense dictates a clear-cut preference
for those societies which share with us an
abiding respect for individual human rights.
We do not seek to intimidate, but it is clear
that a world which others can dominate with
impunity would be inhospitable to decency
and a threat to the well-being of all people.
The world is still engaged in a massive ar-
maments race designed to insure continuing
equivalent strength among potential adver-
saries. We pledge perseverance and wisdom
in our efforts to limit the world's armaments
to those necessary for each nation's own
domestic safety. We will move this year a
step toward our ultimate goal: the ehmina-
tion of all nuclear weapons from this earth.
We urge all other people to join us, for suc-
cess can mean life instead of death.
Within us, the people of the United States,
there is evident a serious and purposeful re-
kindling of confidence, and I join in the hope
that when my time as your President has end-
ed, people might say this about our nation:
— That we had remembered the words of
Micah and renewed our search for humility,
mercy, and justice;
— That we had torn down the barriers that
separated those of different race and region
and religion and, where there had been mis-
trust, built unity, with a respect for diver-
sity;
— That we had found productive work for
those able to perform it;
— That we had strengthened the American
family, which is the basis of our society;
— That we had insured respect for the law,
and equal treatment under the law, for the
weak and the powerful, for the rich and the
poor; and
— That we had enabled our people to be
proud of their own government once again.
I would hope that the nations of the world
might say that we had built a lasting peace,
based not on weapons of war but on interna-
tional policies which reflect our own most
precious values.
These are not just my goals, and they will
not be my accomplishments, but the affirma-
tion of our nation's continuing moral strength
and our belief in an undiminished, ever-
expanding American dream.
Address by President Carter
to People of Other Nations
Following are remarks by President Car-
ter videotaped for broadcast abroad on
January 20.
white House press release dated January 20
I have chosen the occasion of my inaugura-
tion as President to speak not only to my own
countrymen — which is traditional — but also
to you, citizens of the world who did not par-
122
Department of State Bulletin
ticipate in our election but who will neverthe-
less be affected by my decisions.
I also believe that as friends you are enti-
tled to know how the power and influence of
the United States will be exercised by its
new government.
I want to assure you that the relations of
the United States with the other countries
and peoples of the world will be guided dur-
ing my own Administration by our desire to
shape a world order that is more responsive
to human aspirations. The United States will
meet its obligation to help create a stable,
just, and peaceful world order.
We will not seek to dominate nor dictate to
others. As we Americans have concluded one
chapter in our nation's history and are begin-
ning to work on another, we have, I believe,
acquired a more mature perspective on the
problems of the world. It is a perspective
which recognizes the fact that we alone do
not have all the answers to the world's prob-
lems.
The United States alone cannot lift from
the world the terrifying specter of nuclear
destruction. We can and will work with
others to do so.
The United States alone cannot guarantee
the basic right of every human being to be
free of poverty and hunger and disease and
political repression. We can and will cooper-
ate with others in combating these enemies
of mankind.
The United States alone cannot insure an
equitable development of the world resources
or the proper safeguarding of the world's en-
vironment. But we can and will join with
others in this work.
The United States can and will take the
lead in such efforts.
In these endeavors we need your help, and
we offer ours.
We need your experience. We need your
wisdom. We need your active participation in
a joint effort to move the reality of the world
closer to the ideals of human freedom and
dignity.
As friends, you can depend on the United
States to be in the forefront of the search for
world peace. You can depend on the United
States to remain steadfast in its commitment
to human freedom and liberty. And you can
also depend on the United States to be sensi-
tive to your own concerns and aspirations, to
welcome your advice, to do its utmost to re-
solve international differences in a spirit of
cooperation.
The problems of the world will not be eas-
ily resolved. Yet the well-being of each and
every one of us — indeed our mutual
survival — depends on their resolution. As
President of the United States I can assure
you that we intend to do our part. I ask you
to join us in a common effort based on mutual
trust and mutual respect.
President Carter Interviewed
by AP and UPI Correspondents
Following are excerpts relating to foreign
policy from the transcript of an interview
with President Carter on January 23 by two
Associated Press and two United Press In-
ternational correspondents.
Helen Thomas, UPI: Mr. President, do
you plan to call a temporary or permanent
moratorium on arms sales abroad, and also,
what are the chances of a SALT agreement
this year? Will you be separating out the
"Backfire" bomber and the cruise missile?
President Carter: I don't think a
"moratorium" would be the right expression,
because that is an abrupt and total termina-
tion of all ownership. I don't contemplate
that. But in our first National Security
Council meeting we discussed, in I think
unanimity, the necessity for reducing arms
sales or having very tight restraints on fu-
ture commitments to minimize the efforts by
arms manufacturers to initiate sales early in
the process.
The Secretary of State will be much more
hesitant in the future to recommend to the
Defense Department the culmination of arms
sales agreements. I have asked that all
approvals of arms sales, for a change, be
submitted to me directly before the recom-
mendations go to Congress. We also have
February 14, 1977
123
asked Vice President Mondale in his early
trip among our own allies and friends, some
of whom are heavy arms exporters, to join
with us on a multilateral basis.
We will also be talking to some of the pri-
mary arms purchasers, particularly the Mid-
dle East when Secretary Vance goes there
very shortly, to hold down their own pur-
chases of arms from us and other countries.
This will be a continuing effort on my part.
As far as nuclear arms limitations are con-
cerned, I would like to proceed quickly and
aggressively with a comprehensive test ban
treaty. I am in favor of eliminating the test-
ing of all nuclear devices, instantly and com-
pletely.
Ms. Thomas: Underground tests and all?
President Carter: Yes. And whether or not
the Soviets will agree to do that, I don't
know yet. They have sent an encouraging
message back, but the exact caveats might
not yet be in view. I can't answer that ques-
tion. On the SALT negotiations, we have not
yet had a chance to meet with the Soviets or
even particularly their ambassadorial leaders
here since my inauguration to see what they
might be willing to explore. But I would
guess there would be a two-stage evolution.
One is a fairly rapid ratification of the SALT
Two agreement.
Ms. Thomas: That would be Vladivostok?
President Carter: Yes, and I can't answer
specific questions on cruise missiles or
Backfire. But I would not let those two items
stand in the way of some agreement. I would
like to move very quickly, even prior to the
Salt Two agreement, toward a much more
substantive reduction in atomic weapons as
the first step to complete elimination in the
future.
If we can reach an agreement with the
Soviet Union for major reductions on atomic
weapons, of course the next step would be to
get other atomic nations to try to join in this
effort, including, of course, France and Eng-
land and the People's Republic of China.
Ms. Thomas: You mean in sales and produc-
tion, our own production and also sales to
other countries across the board?
President Carter: I was talking then about
inventory of atomic weapons, but, obviously,
production.
The third item is the nonproliferation ef-
fort, where we constrain with every means
available to us in all diplomatic means the
expanding of a nuclear arms capability on
weapons to nations that don't presently have
this capacity.
We are quite concerned about the reproc-
essing of spent fuel, where you change nor-
mal radioactive materials which have been
used for the production of electric power into
weapon quality. We would like to have this
put under international control, subject our-
selves to the restraint along with those who
have been processing this material for a
number of years, and prohibit completely,
within the bounds of our capability, the ex-
pansion of the reprocessing plants in the
countries that don't have it.
Ms. Thomas: At the risk of dominating,
only one more question. You said in your
inaugural you would like to see the elimina-
tion of all nuclear weapons. Is that a hope or
a real goal?
President Carter: That is a hope and a
goal. I said this in my announcement speech,
I believe, in December 1974. I said it many
times during the campaign. I said it in my ac-
ceptance speech for nomination as a Demo-
cratic candidate and then my inauguration. I
mean it very deeply.
Of course, the phased steps that I describe
to you are almost inevitable. As we first put
firm limits on ourselves, with adequate as-
surance that the monitoring of compliance
with agreements is there on both sides, then
substantive reductions will demonstrate to
the world we are sincere, ourselves and the
Soviets primarily, then further reductions
including all nations, even those who have a
relatively small inventory now.
Those are the inevitable steps. The defini-
tive achieving of those steps will depend on
the cooperation of the Soviet Union.
Lawrence L. Knutson, AP: How do you re-
spond, sir, to those who say that it is impos-
sible at this stage to put the atomic genie
back in that bottle?
124
Department of State Bulletin
President Carter: I don't believe it is im-
possible. If all the other world leaders have
the same commitment that I do, then it
would be indeed possible. But I can't answer
that question.
Ms. Thomas: What are the prospects of a
Geneva conference on the Middle East soon,
and will we formulate final Arab-Israeli set-
tlement proposals that were put on the table?
President Carter: I think the conference
on the Middle East is very likely this year. I
would hate to go into more detail about
where or when until after at least the Secre-
tary of State has had a chance to consult in
depth with the heads of state, Israel and
Egypt and Syria, Saudi Arabia and Jordan.
Ms. Thomas: Will he be going to the Mid-
dle East?
President Carter: Yes, he will be going to
the Middle East, I think within the next
month. Many of these leaders will be invited
to come and visit me here. I would prefer to
meet with the leaders of those nations after
the Secretary of State has had a chance to
consult with them.
Ms. Thomas: Would you approve of the
Palestinians having representation at such a
peace conference, and would you think in
terms of their eventually having statehood?
President Carter: I think it would not be
appropriate now for me to spell out specifics.
If the Palestinians should be invited to the
meeting as agreed by the other participating
nations, along with us, it would probably be
as part of one of the Arab delegations. But
that is something still to be decided.
Wesley G. Pippert, UPI: On Africa, Am-
bassador [Ayidrew] Young is going to make a
trip in March or sometim,e soon.
Presideyit Carter: Tanzania.
Mr. Pippert: Just how far can you go, can
the Administration go, in actively promoting
black rule in southern Africa, and what are
you prepared to do ?
President Carter: Our position has been
spelled out very thoroughly, during the cam-
paign and since then. I believe very strongly
in majority rule, which means relinquishing
the control of the government by the white
minorities in the countries affected.
Ambassador Young will be going primarily
as an observer and a listener, not as a
negotiator. He has a very close relationship
with the so-called frontline Presidents them-
selves.
As I said shortly before leaving Plains, I
think the best role for us to play is to consult
with the leaders of Great Britain, let them
maintain the leadership in those negotiations
and let us help when requested to do so.
But I think the basic premise that was
spelled out by Secretary of State Kissinger a
number of months ago is a proper one. I
think any modifications of it would be fairly
minor.
Mr. Pippert: There are no plans at this
time for Young to get involved in the talks
between Great Britain and Rhodesia?
President Carter: No.
Message From Secretary Vance
to Department and Foreign Service
Following is the text of a message dated
January 2i. from Secretary Vance to the men
and women of the Department of State and
the Foreign Service.
Press release 21 dated January 25
As I begin my work as Secretary of State,
I wish first to greet all of you in the Depart-
ment of State and the Foreign Service. I look
forward to working with you, to renewing
past friendships and forming new ones.
We face some exciting and I am sure
strenuous days together. We are all con-
scious of the press of events in the world-
changing economic relationships which are
increasingly intertwined with foreign policy,
alterations in the nature of national power,
the growing importance of global issues such
as nuclear proliferation, energy, food, popu-
Febroary 14, 1977
125
lation growth, and the environment. We
must also be aware of the hopes and concerns
within our own country and abroad.
There is a need for a new examination of
these issues, and of how our government op-
erates and allocates scarce resources. There
are diverse opinions, inevitably, on specific
foreign poHcy issues. But there is broad sup-
port for policies — both existing and new —
that reflect the traditional American values
of morality, strength, steadfast friendship,
progress and fairness. And there is a com-
mon concern that our policies be made as
openly as possible.
I have no doubt that the Department can
help meet these concerns — but only if we all
work closely together. I look forward to
shared successes. I am sure there will also be
some mistakes, collective and individual. No
one should fear the latter, if they come as
part of an effort to do things differently and
better. Initiative always bears risks; it
should not be penalized.
I will rely heavily on your knowledge, your
talents, and your creativity. I recognize the
equivalent need for me to make available to
you, to the fullest extent possible, the infor-
mation and analyses that I have before me. I
want each of you to feel that sense of respon-
sibility and participation that will make your
work as effective as possible. And whether
you are in the Foreign Service or the Civil
Service; whether you are a political officer,
communicator or secretary, I intend to pay
personal attention to your professional con-
cerns.
As we are open to each other — to new pro-
posals, to wise cautions, to dissenting
views — we must also profit from the
dynamism and diversity of our nation. Rep-
resentatives of our rich and diverse Ameri-
can community will have an important place
among us — sometimes in key assignments,
sometimes as consultants, often as public
voices to be heeded, always in a spirit of
fraternity and learning.
We will be supported by the public as we
are perceived to be working, and sacrificing,
for it. We should remember that every dollar
we spend unnecessarily is a dollar that could
have gone to help meet the needs of a hard-
pressed American taxpayer or a hungry per-
son abroad.
Our effectiveness will finally depend on our
ability to produce the support the President
requires. Each of you is working for him —
and for the Congress and public — as well as
with me. Recognition of that fact, in our
daily work, will help us maintain a clear
perspective and understanding of our rela-
tionship to the American society we serve.
My confidence in our future together
comes from knowing so many of you, and my
admiration for you all. I know of no group of
men and women who have shown greater
courage, adaptability and integrity. I can as-
sure you that President Carter appreciates
your skills and your sacrifices. It is a great
honor for me to be one of you.
U.S. Rejects "Internal Solution"
to Rhodesian Problem
Following is a statement read to news cor-
respondents on January 26 by Frederick Z.
Brown, Director, Office of Press Relations.
In his January 24 address, Ian Smith said
that he would be seeking an internal settle-
ment to the Rhodesian problem and called for
negotiations between the Salisbury au-
thorities and Rhodesian Africans. African
leaders associated with the armed struggle
would be excluded from these negotiations.
Negotiations which exclude leaders of
nationalist movements will not produce a set-
tlement. As a basis for continued negotia-
tions, the United States supports the British
proposals which the Geneva Conference
chairman, Ivor Richard, has been discussing
in Africa.
In our considered view, the so-called
"internal solution" will not produce a peace-
ful settlement and therefore does not have
the support of the United States. We urge all
parties which have been involved in the
negotiations to consider their positions care-
fully and pursue a course which will produce
a peaceful outcome.
126
Department of State Bulletin
U.S. Ready To Continue Support
to the Search for Cyprus Solution
Following is a statement read to news cor-
respondents on January 28 by Frederick Z.
Brown, Director, Office of Press Relations.
The Department of State welcomes the
meeting which took place yesterday in
Nicosia between Archbishop Makarios and
Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash. Our
pleasure at the meeting is combined with a
hope that this sign of progress will quickly be
translated into a meaningful and sustained
effort to negotiate the many issues which
must be solved to reach an equitable Cyprus
settlement. We recognize that this will be a
very complicated undertaking.
The United States stands ready to con-
tinue its full support and assistance to the
two Cypriot communities and to U.N. Secre-
tary General Waldheim in this search for a
solution to the problem of Cyprus.
Secretary Kissinger Pays Tribute
to the Foreign Service
Follov/ing are remarks made by Secretary
Kissinger on January 18 at the ninth annual
awards ceremony of the American Foreign
Service Association (AFSA). ^
When I arrived here in September 1973,
what concerned me most was whether this
Department and the Foreign Service would
adequately meet the demands of an increas-
ingly complex and subtle era in world affairs
and could play its role in reconciling increas-
ingly complex and interrelated domestic and
foreign policy issues — and I was afraid also of
how I would survive the flood of papers that
would descend on me and the memoranda
that when disapproved came back with just
one comma changed as if a reflection that my
views had been taken seriously. [Laughter.]
' Introductory and closing paragraphs omitted (text
from press release 12 dated Jan. 19).
The Department had to assume responsi-
bility for operation as well as policy, to mas-
ter new and specialized subjects, to become
more effective in resolving policy issues
within the executive branch, and in dealing
with an increasingly assertive Congress.
For these reasons, I challenged the
Foreign Service to do more interpretive re-
porting, analysis, and conceptual thinking; to
clarify rather than compromise policy options
in the foreign-policy-making process; and to
dissent when you differed substantially with
the policies we had adopted.
I asked for it, and I got it. From the be-
ginning, it was clear to me that the last of
these challenges, at least, would be met with
pleasure, with dedication, and with en-
thusiasm. Thus it is appropriate that my last
official public engagement should be a cere-
mony honoring those who have disagreed
with me. And let me say, for the record now,
that I forgive them. [Laughter and
applause.] Not even the Foreign Service can
be right 100 percent of the time. [Laughter.]
But to be serious, I can say at the end of
three and a quarter years that the Foreign
Service has measured up to each of these
challenges. You have proved that you have
professional skill, judgment, and dedication
to duty second to no other group of pubhc
servants.
You have demonstrated your capacity for
change when necessary. The quality of
Foreign Service reporting, already good, is
now even better, with more interpretation
and analysis. The substantive work within
the Department is of a higher professional
and intellectual caliber.
Meanwhile, the Department has taken a
better hold of its own organizational prob-
lems. Mechanisms have been established to
allocate our personnel and funds in accord-
ance with the country's foreign policy
priorities. And on occasion we can even get
some of them away from the regional
bureaus.
Strides have been made toward a more
comprehensive professional development
program. A start has been made in finding
women and representatives of ethnic
minorities in increasing numbers for respon-
February 14, 1977
127
sible positions. And there is a good grievance
system and a less medieval attitude toward
employee rights and concerns.
In my remarks at the AFSA awards cere-
mony in 1974, I said that I hoped to leave be-
hind a professional service which handled
problems as creative opportunities, which
has a deep and foresighted perception of the
national interests and the stamina to fight for
those at home and overseas.
Today I can look back and say that I be-
lieve you have moved substantially toward
that goal.
There is a widespread notion that the
growing interdependence of foreign and
domestic issues and the improvement of
communications and transportation have un-
dermined the role of the Foreign Service and
reduced embassies to little more than mes-
sage centers and travel agencies.
But there is no doubt in my mind that
these assertions of the death of diplomacy
are highly premature. For diplomacy is con-
cerned with the enduring problems of rela-
tions among nations, the lasting challenge of
peace and progress, the need to minimize
friction and misunderstanding. More than
ever, Foreign Service people must have the
ability to understand and interpret events
and conditions in other countries, to com-
prise a continuously open channel, an inter-
mediary between our own government and
society and the one where they serve.
As foreign policy grows more complex, the
men and women of the Foreign Service be-
come the repositories of continuity, the con-
science of America's permanent interests and
values, prepared to serve with dedication
whatever Administration is in office with the
devotion that America's global respon-
sibilities demand of them.
No one articulated the unchanging nature
of the diplomatic profession better than a
former French Ambassador to this country,
Jules Cambon, who once wrote:
Expressions such as "old diplomacy" and "new diplo-
macy" bear no relation to reality. It is the outward
form — if you like — the "adornments" of diplomacy that
are undergoing a change. The substance must remain
the same, since human nature is unalterable; since
there exists no other method of regulating international
differences; and since the best instrument at the dis-
posal of a government wishing to persuade another
government will always remain the spoken word of a
decent man.
Today we would say "the spoken word of a
decent person." [Applause and laughter.]
But the spoken word of a decent person is
your professional responsibility, your profes-
sional legacy, and your high goal.
So long as you maintain your profes-
sionalism and the level of performance which
is characteristic of the Foreign Service, you
need not, and should not, worry about being
consulted in foreign policy making. No one
has a claim to being consulted. It must be
worth it. But if this building does the job of
which it is capable, and which I know it will
do in the future as it has done while I was
here, you will be consulted, because you will
be the best source of advice available in the
government.
It is no accident that almost all my princi-
pal assistants are career Foreign Service of-
ficers. I have chosen them because they were
the best people available and because we will
never have a professional service if it is not
used for all of the positions in the Depart-
ment.
I strongly support AFSA's attempts to
help the President-elect carry out his com-
mitment to make diplomatic appointments on
the basis of merit, and I have no doubt that
most of the country's Foreign Service people
are the most meritorious, or we do something
wrong in our selection process.
The members of the Department of State
and the Foreign Service have the assurance
that in carrying out your responsibilities to
this country, you are striving not for narrow
national goals, but for a humane and peaceful
world — that world alone, in which the United
States will be secure and prosperous and in
which other nations can live in peace and
freedom.
On assuming the office which I now leave,
Thomas Jefferson wrote Lafayette:
I think with others that nations are to be governed
with regard to their own interests, but I am convinced
that it is their interest, in the long run, to be grateful,
faithful to their engagements even in the worst of cir-
cumstances, and honorable and generous always.
This blend of stern reality and humane
128
Department of State Bulletin
ideas is as good a statement of our ultimate
foreign policy objectives as I know. In work-
ing for this goal, you have the unique
privilege not only of serving your country
but the interests of all mankind.
I leave this building with deep emotions,
gratitude for the support you gave me, admi-
ration for your ability, pride in what we have
accomplished together, and respect for your
dedication and courage.
In this last regard, I think of those
Foreign Service Officers who during my time
in office gave their lives in the service of
their country: Rodger Davies, Frank Meloy,
and Robert Waring.
I think also of those of you who im-
mediately volunteered to replace them.
I think of those, regardless of rank, who
willingly and reasonably uncomplainingly
served and lived with their families every
day in dangerous and difficult conditions in
many parts of the world. And I think, finally,
with unbounded admiration of those of my
immediate staff who put up with me for three
and a half years. They have passed the first
test of sainthood. [Laughter.]
Our job over these past years has been to
produce a durable foreign policy, one that
would respond to the needs and values of the
American people, as well as to the aspira-
tions of mankind.
I hope that an objective observer, and
perhaps even occasionally an AFSA member,
will agree that strong foundations for future
progress have been put in place in three cen-
tral areas — the strength of the great demo-
cratic nations, the imperative of global
peace, and the cause of cooperative interna-
tional progress.
The record is one of which you all can be
proud. Your role has been, and will continue
to be, central and crucial. You share in the
achievements of our foreign policy, as well
as — I cannot really bring myself to say it —
since we haven't known it for three years and
three months — its failures. [Laughter.] But I
leave here with confidence — confidence that
America's foreign policy will be in good
hands, and that you will give my distin-
guished successor the loyal and able service
which you gave me.
THE CONGRESS
International Economic Report
Transmitted to the Congress
Message From President Ford '
To the Congress of the United States:
The world economy has come a long way
from the gloom and uncertainty of two years
ago. Despite many divisive economic pres-
sures, international cooperation has not
broken down but has, in fact, improved. U.S.
initiatives to strengthen international eco-
nomic cooperation have led to real progress.
Our major alhes and trading partners have
cooperated with us and have reciprocated our
desire for strengthened economic ties.
At the Economic Summit in Puerto Rico, in
the OECD, the IMF, the GATT and in
numerous other meetings in 1976, we joined
with our major trading and financial partners
and with other nations to whom develop-
ments in the larger economies are of primary
importance, in forging compatible ap-
proaches to the difficult problems that beset
our economies. We concurred that first and
foremost we must place our economies on a
path of sustained growth without inflation.
That is the essential ingredient to further
and lasting reduction in unemployment. We
also strengthened our common resolve to
avoid trade restrictive measures and to
negotiate a more open international trading
system. We reached a consensus on appro-
priate means to assist countries needing fi-
nancial help as they work toward economic
stability. We also agreed to make construc-
tive efforts to deal with the problems be-
^ Transmitted on Jan. 18 (text from White House
press release). The President's message, together with
the Annual Report of the Council on International Eco-
nomic Policy, is printed in "International Economic Re-
port of the President, Transmitted to the Congress
January 1977"; for sale by the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C. 20402 (194 pp.; $4.85; stock no. 041-015-00081-1).
February 14, 1977
129
tween developed and developing nations.
The United States can be proud of its lead-
ership in these areas. International economic
cooperation is stronger today than at any
time since the Second World War. We have
learned the importance of industrialized de-
mocracies taking into account the likely im-
pact of their actions on other nations as they
develop their economic policies. In an inter-
dependent world, a nation which disrupts the
economies of its trading partners does so at
its own eventual peril.
We have also come to realize how mutually
supportive action benefits all countries. Ac-
cordingly we and our partners have improved
arrangements for assisting countries in spe-
cial need as they work to stabilize their
domestic economies. The United States has
worked very closely with several of our
friends and allies in supporting their efforts
to resolve their economic difficulties. We
have constructed a strong framework for
cooperation with other industrialized democ-
racies to manage future possible disruptions
of oil supplies and to reduce dependence on
oil imports. We have attempted to promote a
more constructive relationship with the de-
veloping nations. This new relationship will
enable us to enhance their economic pros-
pects as a part of a common effort to improve
the world economy and to give them a
greater share in the responsibilities for, and
in the management and benefits of, an or-
derly and prosperous international economic
system.
More specifically, substantial progress, to-
gether with lingering problems, mark de-
velopments in several areas.
Monetary Affairs
In 1976, member nations of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund successfully concluded
the first general revision of the Articles of
Agreement since the Bretton Woods Agree-
ment of 1944. In effect, these amendments
replace the old exchange rate system based
on par values with one permitting countries
to establish floating exchange rates, either
individually or jointly. The new system will
oblige member countries to promote ex-
change stability by fostering stable economic
and financial conditions and to avoid disrup-
tively influencing exchange rates or the in-
ternational monetary system. Under the new
system, Special Drawing Rights will replace
gold as the unit of account in the Fund.
The amendments creating this system
were formally accepted by the United States
and will become effective upon similar ratifi-
cation by the requisite number of member
nations. At that time, the Fund will have
new and broader responsibilities for oversee-
ing the international monetary system and
for developing principles that will help coun-
tries meet their financial obligations. The ef-
fect will be to promote expanded trade and
growth through a more efficient and realistic
exchange rate system.
The United States also proposed the crea-
tion of a Trust Fund, managed by the IMF,
to provide assistance on concessionary terms
to low-income Fund members. Resources are
now being realized from profits on sales, over
four years, of 25 million ounces of IMF-held
gold.
International Trade
Although the recession and large balance-
of-payments deficits of the oil consuming
countries led several of them to move in the
direction of new restrictive trade policies, on
the whole, considerable success has been
achieved in maintaining an open world trad-
ing system. The growth of world trade re-
sumed in 1976, following a decline in 1975 —
the first since World War II.
On January 1, the United States joined
other developed countries in establishing a
Generalized System of Preferences for im-
ports from developing nations. These prefer-
ences apply to more than 2,700 tariff items,
giving duty-free access to the U.S. market to
qualified developing countries and affording
these nations the opportunity to diversify
their exports and to increase their export in-
come.
The Multilateral Trade Negotiations in
Geneva, among more than ninety nations.
130
Department of State Bulletin
made progress in several areas. The United
States proposed a formula for cutting tariffs,
and a number of other measures covering
tropical products from developing countries,
import safeguards, and quantitative restric-
tions. Considerable progress was made on a
product standard code, and work was started
on improving the GATT framework for in-
ternational trade and on a code for govern-
ment procurement.
This international cooperation in fur-
therance of open trade was complemented by
U.S. action in resolving several domestic
complaints of trade injury. The responsible
actions of this country strengthened the re-
solve of our trading partners to resist pres-
sures for import restrictions, thus contribut-
ing to brighter prospects for U.S. exports
and to an orderly and open international
trading system.
Commodities and Raw Materials
Major developments in the international
commodity area during 1976 included an
agreement to expand the IMF Compensatory
Finance Facility; adoption by the UNCTAD
IV Conference [United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development] of a comprehen-
sive commodities resolution; continued com-
modity policy discussions at the Conference
on International Economic Cooperation; and
efforts to renew the coffee, tin, and cocoa
commodity agreements.
The United States strongly supported ex-
pansion of the IMF Compensatory Finance
Facility, designed to help countries to
stabihze their export earnings. In addition,
at the UNCTAD IV Conference, the United
States proposed the creation of a new Inter-
national Resources Bank to promote produc-
tion of raw materials in the developing na-
tions by facilitating investment flows into
these countries.
In some respects, however, the approach
of the United States with respect to commod-
ity policies differs from that of a number of
developing countries. Generally, these coun-
tries support commodity arrangements that
provide for greater government control of
prices and production, as well as common
financing of commodity buffer stocks. In con-
trast, the commodity policy of the United
States has three major objectives:
— To ensure adequate investment in re-
source development to meet future market
demands at reasonable prices;
—To examine on a case-by-case basis indi-
vidual commodities in order to determine
how best to improve (where possible) the
functioning of individual commodity markets
and to determine whether commodity agree-
ments would be useful and appropriate;
—To promote the stable growth of the
commodity export earnings of developing
countries.
The United States has repeatedly pointed
out that artificial increases of prices serve
the interests of neither producers nor con-
sumers in both developed and developing
countries. Frequently, control of prices and
production has led to lower, less stable earn-
ings for producers, mainly because substitute
sources are developed or existing sources
expanded. Moreover, controls have often ini-
tially meant higher prices for consumers, re-
duced exports, and a decline in the economic
welfare of all parties. The United States,
while prepared to genuinely consider
methods of improving markets for individual
commodities, generally supports the use of
market mechanisms to determine supplies
and prices.
Multinational Corporations and Interna-
tional Investtnent
In June 1976, the United States approved
the adoption of the Declaration on Interna-
tional Investment and Multinational Enter-
prises devised by the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development. This
agreement affirms the principle of national
treatment of multinational corporations
(MNC's); recommends guidelines of good
business practices for the activities of MNC's;
and indicates the responsibihties of govern-
ments regarding international investment in-
centives and disincentives.
February 14, 1977
131
The United States recognizes that in-
creased investment is a critical element for
international economic growth, and that
MNC's have contributed substantially to the
rise in international investment and produc-
tivity. The activities of MNC's, however,
have prompted questions about their obhga-
tions to both home and host countries and
about the reciprocal responsibilities of na-
tions where the MNC's do business. Where
possible, the United States is willing to enter
into bilateral and multilateral discussions to
help resolve these intergovernmental dis-
putes.
The United States welcomes foreign
investment in its domestic economy. The
Administration's Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States has coordi-
nated overall policy in this area. In 1976,
major studies of foreign portfolio and foreign
direct investment in the United States were
completed and reported to the Congress.
Critical International Economic Problems
We must also be aware that the events of
the past year have left an agenda of unre-
solved problems including:
(1) the challenge of achieving stable eco-
nomic growth in industrial and developing
nations alike, and reducing inflation, un-
employment and excessive public sector defi-
cits;
(2) the necessity for the United States and
other nations to obtain an adequate amount
of real capital formation, to create jobs and
to increase productivity;
(3) the major imbalance between oil export-
ers and oil importing nations, and the directly
related increasing debt burden of devel-
oping and some developed nations;
(4) the failure to achieve an agreement
among developed and less developed nations
on an effective and efficient strategy for in-
creasing prosperity for less developed coun-
tries in the context of a common effort to im-
prove the world economy;
(5) the inadequate progress of the United
States and other oil-consuming nations in re-
ducing dependence on oil imports; and the
need to encourage domestic development of
oil and gas resources, alternative energy
sources, and conservation;
(6) the continuing temptation among na-
tions to use restrictive trade measures and
the need to resist such pressures while re-
ducing trade barriers and improving means
for managing trade problems.
This Report traces the progress made in
1976 in dealing with the major economic is-
sues facing the world. Evolving economic and
political developments will continue to chal-
lenge the leaders of all nations. Because of
the vigor of our people and the strength of
our system, the United States today, as
much or more than in years past, is the
pivotal force for building a strong and pros-
perous world economy. By acting in a man-
ner consistent with the interests of our own
people yet remaining cognizant of the inter-
ests of other nations as well, I am certain
that the United States will continue to pro-
vide leadership in solving the critical issues
of today and the unforeseen developments of
tomorrow.
Gerald R. Ford.
The White House,
January 18, 1977.
Sixteenth Annual Report of ACDA
Transmitted to the Congress
Following is the text of a letter sent by
President Ford to Speaker of the House
Thomas P. O'Neill and President of the Sen-
ate Nelson A. Rockefeller on January 19.
white House press release dated January 20
January 19, 1977.
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. Pres-
ident:) Arms control as a means of main-
taining peace and security has been a princi-
pal objective of my Administration. In this
nuclear era our arms control policy and de-
132
Department of State Bulletin
fense efforts must be complementary. We
must seek to influence policies of possible
adversaries by maintaining strong military
forces and by pursuing negotiations to en-
hance stability, not by encouraging an arms
race which would increase the risk of nuclear
war.
SALT is a proven means of furthering the
essential dialogue between the United States
and the Soviet Union on arms control. Our
goal is to promote stability by mutual re-
straint in strategic nuclear competition, to
limit growth of the nuclear forces of both
sides, and to reduce them through verifiable
agreements. This effort, I am confident, will
succeed.
As a part of our efforts to restrain
strategic nuclear competition with the Soviet
Union, we have also negotiated two treaties
which limit the yield of nuclear explosive
tests: the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the
related Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Pur-
poses Treaty. Both of these treaties repre-
sent genuine progress. They contain
precedent-setting provisions which will en-
hance the prospects for further progress in
this area. These treaties have been sub-
mitted to the Senate, and I urge that it pro-
vide its advice and consent to ratification.
Complementing the resolution of nuclear
rivalry with the Soviet Union is another im-
perative in our dialogue for survival: Pre-
venting the further spread of nuclear
weapons. If nuclear arsenals proliferate in
the world, the likelihood of a nuclear conflict
is vastly increased. The worldwide need for
peaceful nuclear energy complicates this
problem, since the same technology that pro-
duces such energy can be diverted to the de-
velopment and production of nuclear
weapons.
To emphasize more strongly our commit-
ment to the objective of the nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, I announced a new,
comprehensive United States nuclear energy
policy last October which harmonizes our
non-proliferation objectives with our domes-
tic energy policy. We have tightened controls
on American exports of sensitive nuclear ma-
terials and technology. Our sustained diplo-
matic initiatives with other suppliers of nu-
clear technology have also resulted in im-
proved international comprehension of the
risks of proliferation, as well as cooperation
to prevent it.
Non-proliferation is only one example of
our pursuit of arms control through multilat-
eral forums and arrangements. With our
Western allies we are engaged in negotia-
tions to reduce military forces in Central
Europe. Our goal is to obtain a more stable
military balance in Central Europe at lower
levels of force. We also participate in the ac-
tivities of the Conference of the Committee
on Disarmament (CCD), which recently ap-
proved a convention outlawing the use of en-
vironmental modification techniques for hos-
tile purposes. This Convention will soon be
open to all nations for ratification. The CCD
is also continuing its work on a convention to
limit chemical weapons, and will soon be con-
sidering a U.S. initiative to ban radiological
warfare.
This 16th annual report on the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency completes
the record of activities and developments in
the arms control field for calendar year
1976.1 But it is more than a backward look at
the record. It also reflects the need for for-
ward planning. In an age of rapidly advanc-
ing technologies, arms control must look at
the future as well as the present. Arms con-
trol must be pursued vigorously and imagina-
tively, based upon balanced agreements and
buttressed by mechanisms to preserve confi-
dence in the viability of those agreements.
It is particularly important to realize that
arms control is a complex matter and success
can be attained only through diligent and
sustained attention. Problems will persist,
but we must remain dedicated to continued
and determined efforts for the control and
balanced reduction of armaments.
Sincerely,
Gerald R. Ford.
' Single copies of the report are available from the
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20451.
February 14, 1977
133
Second Sinai Support Mission Report
Transmitted to the Congress
Message From President Ford ^
To the Congress of the United States:
I am pleased to transmit herewith the Sec-
ond Report of the United States Sinai Sup-
port Mission. This report, following that
which I forwarded on April 30, 1976, de-
scribes the manner in which the Mission is
carrying out its responsibility for operating
the early warning system in the Sinai, as
specified in the Basic Agreement between
Egypt and Israel and its Annex signed on
September 4, 1975. This report is provided to
the Congress in conformity with Section 4 of
Public Law 94-110 of October 13, 1975.
The Report includes a summary of the op-
erations of the early warning system since its
inauguration on February 22, 1976, and a de-
scription of the Mission's permanent base
camp facilities which were officially dedi-
cated on July 4.
With the completion of major construction
activity, it has been possible to reduce
somewhat the number of Americans working
in the Sinai in accordance with the wishes of
the Congress. The United States Sinai Sup-
port Mission will continue to analyze care-
fully all aspects of the Sinai operation to
identify ways whereby the numbers might be
further reduced.
The proposal to establish an American-
manned early warning system in the Sinai
was made at the request of the Governments
of Egypt and Israel. With the concurrence of
the Congress, we accepted this undertaking
because the United States strongly seeks the
achievement of peace and stability in the
Middle East.
The United States Sinai Support Mission
plays an important role in support of the
Basic Agreement. Both sides have recently
reaffirmed their confidence in the manner in
which the United States has been carrying
out its responsibilities in the Sinai, and as
long as it continues to enjoy this support, the
United States role will represent a meaning-
ful contribution to the prospects for attaining
a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.
Gerald R. Ford.
1 Transmitted on Jan. 11 (text from Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated Jan. 20); also
printed as H. Doc. 95-41, which includes the text of the
report.
The White House,
January 11, 1977.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
Protocol to the 1975 Tax Convention With the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Message from the President of the United States
transmitting the protocol, signed at London on Au-
gust 26, 1976. S. Ex. Q. September 22, 1976. 6 pp.
Amendment of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act and
Other International Monetary Matters. Report of the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, together with supplemental views, to accom-
pany H.R. 13955. S. Rept. 94-1295. September 22,
1976. 44 pp.
Effectiveness of Federal Agency Enforcement of Laws
and Policies Against Compliance, by Banks and Other
U.S. Firms, With the Arab Boycott. Report by the
House Committee on Government Operations. H.
Rept. 94-1668. September 23, 1976. 38 pp.
Right-to-Food Resolution. Report of the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations to accompany H. Con.
Res. 737. S. Rept. 94-1316. September 28, 1976. 3
pp.
Human Rights in Argentina. Hearings before the Sub-
committee on International Organizations of the
House Committee on International Relations. Sep-
tember 28-29, 1976. 67 pp.
Stockpile Disposals. Report of the Senate Committee
on Armed Services to accompany S. 3852. S. Rept.
94-1338. September 29, 1976. 6 pp.
Aircraft Components. Report of the Senate Committee
on Finance to accompany H.R. 2177. S. Rept. 94-
1349. September 29, 1976. 7 pp.
Aircraft Engines. Report of the Senate Committee on
Finance to accompany H.R. 2181. S. Rept. 94-1351.
September 29, 1976. 6 pp.
Mattress Blanks of Rubber Latex. Report of the Senate
Committee on Finance to accompany H.R. 11605.
S. Rept. 94-1352. September 29, 1976. 5 pp.
Security Assistance to Spain. Communication from the
President of the United States transmitting justifica-
tion of Presidential deteiTnination to furnish security
assistance to Spain. H. Doc. 94-648. September 30,
1976. 3 pp.
Soviet Economy in a New Perspective. A compendium
of papers submitted to the Joint Economic Commit-
tee. October 14, 1976. 821 pp.
134
Department of State Bulletin
TREATY INFORMATION
United States Ratifies Convention
for Conservation of Antarctic Seals
Press release 15 dated January 19
On December 28, 1976, President Ford
signed the instrument of ratification for the
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic
Seals. The convention was concluded in Lon-
don in 1972 among the 12 nations party to the
Antarctic Treaty, which itself provides no
protection for seals in the water and on the
sea ice in Antarctica; the effect of this con-
vention will be to rectify that situation.
Although commercial sealing has not yet
begun in the Antarctic, the seals there have
been vulnerable to the possible onset at any
time of uncontrolled exploitation. The con-
vention is a preventive measure intended to
create an effective management system for
the seals well before a stage could be reached
at which their survival might become seri-
ously threatened.
The convention has as basic objectives the
preservation, conservation, scientific study,
and rational use of the seals, taking into ac-
count the effects on the ecological system. It
provides complete protection for the Ross
seal, the Southern Elephant seal and the Fur
seal; and it sets very conservative catch lim-
its for the other three of the six known Ant-
arctic species, the Crabeater, Leopard, and
Weddell seals, all of which are more plentiful.
Responsibility for monitoring the conven-
tion is assigned to the Scientific Committee
on Antarctic Research, which is the principal
scientific advisory body under the Antarctic
Treaty. Provision is made for adoption of ad-
ditional controls beyond those instituted by
this agreement, should commercial sealing
get underway in the Antarctic. Each of the
parties may adopt more stringent controls for
itself than are provided for in the convention,
as the United States has already done in
the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972.
Signatories to the convention include all 12
of the original Antarctic Treaty parties:
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile,
France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South
Africa, the United Kingdom, the United
States, and the U.S.S.R. Four of these,
France, Norway, South Africa, and the
United Kingdom have completed ratification
of the convention; upon deposit of its ratifica-
tion on January 18, the United States became
the fifth nation to have done so. Ratification
by 7 of the 12 signatory nations is necessary
for the convention to enter into force.
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Agriculture
Agreement establishing the International Fund for Ag-
ricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome June
1.3, 1976.'
Signatures: Chile, January 19, 1977; Norway,
January 20, 1977; France, India, January 21, 1977.
Coffee
International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes.
Done at London December 3, 1975. Entered into force
provisionally October 1, 1976.
Ratifications deposited: Costa Rica, January 20,
1977; Haiti, January 21, 1977.
Customs
Customs convention regarding E.C.S. carnets for com-
mercial samples, with annex and protocol of signa-
ture. Done at Brussels March 1, 1956. Entered into
force October 3, 1957; for the United States March 3,
1969. TIAS 6632.
Notification of denunciation: Switzerland, December
20, 1976; effective March 20, 1977.
Health
Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the Constitution of
the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as
amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva
May 22, 1973.'
Acceptances deposited: Central African Empire,
Saudi Arabia, January 13, 1977; Mongolia, January
19, 1977.
Amendments to articles 24 and 25 of the Constitution of
the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as
' Not in force.
February 14, 1977
135
amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva
May 17, 1976. >
Acceptance deposited: Saudi Arabia, January 13,
1977.
Hydrographic Organization
Convention on the International Hydrographic Organi-
zation, with annexes. Done at Monaco May 3, 1967.
Entered into force Septembfer 22, 1970. TIAS 6933.
Accession deposited: Zaire, November 29, 1976.
Maritime Matters
Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as
amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490).
Adopted at London October 17, 1974.'
Acceptance deposited: Singapore, January 18, 1977.
Phonograms
Convention for the protection of producers of phono-
grams against unauthorized duplication of their
phonograms. Done at Geneva October 29, 1971. En-
tered into force April 18, 1973; for the United States
March 10, 1974. TIAS 7808.
Notifications from World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization that ratifications deposited: Denmark,
Italy, December 24, 1976.
Notification from World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization that accession deposited: Chile, De-
cember 24, 1976.
Property — Industrial
Locarno agreement establishing an international clas-
sification for industrial designs, with annex. Done at
Locarno October 8, 1968. Entered into force April 27,
1971; for the United States May 25, 1972. TIAS 7420.
Notification from World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization that ratification deposited: Nether-
lands, December 30, i976.
Safety at Sea
Convention on the international regulations for pre-
venting collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London Oc-
tober 20, 1972. Enters into force July 15, 1977.
Proclaimed by the President: January 19, 1977.
Space
Treaty on principles governing the activities of states
in the exploration and use of outer space, including
the moon and other celestial bodies. Done at Wash-
ington, London, and Moscow January 27, 1967. En-
tered into force October 10, 1967. TIAS 6347.
Accession deposited: Saudi Arabia, December 17,
1976.
Convention on international liability for damage caused
by space objects. Done at Washington, London, and
Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into force Sep-
tember 1, 1972; for the United States October 9,
1973. TIAS 7762.
Accession deposited: Saudi Arabia, December 17,
1976.
Wills
Convention providing a uniform law on the form of an
international will, with annex. Done at Washington
October 26, 1973.'
Accession deposited: Canada, January 24, 1977. '^
BILATERAL
Colombia
Agreement relating to the operation and maintenance
of the rawinsonde observation station on San Andres
Island, with exchanges of notes and memorandum of
arrangement. Effected by exchange of notes at
Bogota December 22, 1976. Entered into force De-
cember 22, 1976; effective January 1, 1977.
Jamaica
Agreement amending the agreements for sales of ag-
ricultural commodities of April 16, 1975 (TIAS 8130),
and September 30, 1976. Effected by exchange of
notes at Kingston December 3 and 15, 1976. Entered
into force December 15, 1976.
Korea
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of ag-
ricultural commodities of February 18, 1976 (TIAS
8261). Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul De-
cember 22, 1976. Entered into force December 22,
1976.
Pakistan
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relat-
ing to the agreement of November 23, 1974 (TIAS
7971). Signed at Islamabad December 29, 1976. En-
tered into force December 29, 1976.
Portugal
Protocol relating to exchanges in the field of physical
education and sports. Signed at Lisbon December 22,
1976. Entered into force December 22, 1976.
Thailand
Memorandum of understanding relating to Chiang Mai
seismic research station. Signed at Bangkok De-
cember 29, 1976. Entered into force December 29,
1976.
Memorandum of agreement on integrated communica-
tions system, with appendix. Signed at Bangkok
January 10, 1977. Entered into force January 10,
1977.
' Not in force.
^ Extends only to the Provinces of Manitoba and New-
foundland.
136
Department of State Bulletin
INDEX February U, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 196U
Africa. President Carter Interviewed by AP and
UPI Correspondents (excerpts from tran-
script) 123
American Principles
Address by President Carter to People of Other
Nations (videotaped for broadcast abroad) 122
The Inaugural Address of President Carter 121
Arms Control and Disarmament
President Carter Interviewed by AP and UPI
Correspondents (excerpts from transcript) . . . 123
Sixteenth Annual Report of ACDA Transmitted
to the Congress (letter from President Ford) . 132
Congress
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 134
International Economic Report Transmitted to
the Congress (message from President Ford) . 129
Second Sinai Support Mission Report Transmit-
ted to the Congress (message from President
Ford) 134
Sixteenth Annual Report of ACDA Transmitted
to the Congress (letter from President Ford) . 132
Cyprus. U.S. Ready To Continue Support to the
Search for Cyprus Solution (Department
statement) 127
Department and Foreign Service
Message From Secretary Vance to Department
and Foreign Service 125
Secretary Kissinger Pays Tribute to the Foreign
Service (remarks at AFSA awards ceremony) 127
Economic Affairs. International Economic Re-
port Transmitted to the Congress (message
from President Ford) 129
Environment. United States Ratifies Convention
for Conservation of Antarctic Seals 135
Middle East
President Carter Interviewed by AP and UPI
Correspondents (excerpts from transcript) . . . 123
Second Sinai Support Mission Report Transmit-
ted to the Congress (message from President
Ford) 134
Presidential Documents
Address by President Carter to People of Other
Nations 122
The Inaugural Address of President Carter 121
International Economic Report Transmitted to
the Congress (message from President Ford) . 129
President Carter Interviewed by AP and UPI
Correspondents (excerpts from transcript) . . . 123
Second Sinai Support Mission Report Transmit-
ted to the Congress (message from President
Ford) 134
Sixteenth Annual Report of ACDA Transmitted
to the Congress (letter from President Ford) . 132
Southern Rhodesia
President Carter Interviewed by AP and UPI
Correspondents (excerpts from transcript) ... 123
U.S. Rejects "Internal Solution" to Rhodesian
Problem (Department statement) 126
Treaty Information
Current Action? 135
United States Ratifies Convention for Conserva-
tion of Antarctic Seals 135
U.S.S.R. President Carter Interviewed by AP
and UPI Correspondents (excerpts from tran-
script) 123
Name Index
Carter, President 121, 122, 123
Ford, President 129, 132, 134
Kissinger, Secretary 127
Vance, Secretary 125
Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: January 24—30
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20520.
Subject
Cyrus R. Vance sworn in as
Secretary of State, Jan. 23
(biographic data).
Secretary Vance: message to
Department and Foreign
Service personnel, Jan. 24.
Secretary Vance; remarks to the
press upon arrival at the State
Department, Jan. 24.
Shipping Coordinating Commit-
tee, Feb. 23.
Secretary's Advisory Commit-
tee on Private International
Law, Study Group on Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, New
York, N.Y., Mar. 5.
Foreign policy conference, San
Diego, Calif., Feb. 9-10.
Marshall Shulman to be Special
Consultant to the Secretary
on Soviet Affairs (biographic
data).
State Department issues report
on technology and foreign af-
fairs.
Renewal and continuation of
advisory committees.
U.S. -Canada Transit Pipeline
Treaty signed.
U.S. -Canada fisheries negotia-
tions, Jan. 17-28.
No.
Date
•■20
1/24
21
1/25
*22
1/25
*23
1/25
»24
1/25
*25 1/27
*26 1/28
*27 1/28
*28 1/28
t29 1/28
*30 1/29
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o
/J;
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y?e,^
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Volume LXXVI • No. 1965 • February 21, 1977
SECRETARY VANCE'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF JANUARY 31 1S7
SECRETARY VANCE INTERVIEWED
BY AP AND UPI CORRESPONDENTS 1U7
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
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Washington, D.C. 20402
PRICE:
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Single copy 85 cents
The Secretary of State has determined that the pub-
lication of this periodical is necessary in the transac-
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cal has been approved by the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget through January 31,
1981.
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may be re-
printed. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The
BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to
Periodical Literature.
Vol. LXXVI, No. 1965
February 21, 1977
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of U.S. foreign relations and
on the work of the Department and
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses, and
news conferences of the President and
the Secretary of State and other offi-
cers of the Department, as well as spe-
cial articles on various phases of in-
ternational affairs and the functions of
the Department. Information is in-
cluded concerning treaties and inter-
national agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and on treaties of general interna-
tional interest.
Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.
Secretary Vance's News Conference of January 31
Following is the transcript of Secretary
Vance's news conference at the Department
of State on January 31.
Press release 32 dated January 31
Secretary Vance: Good morning. I have
three matters that I would like to comment on
briefly before I take questions.
The first relates to a meeting which I will
be having starting this morning, and continu-
ing through lunch, with the Foreign Minister
of Panama. He is coming today to discuss the
resumption of the canal negotiations. After
lunch, when we have completed our discus-
sions, we will meet with the press briefly. We
will have a statement to issue, and we will
take a few questions.*
Secondly, I would like to make a brief
statement with respect to the Rhodesian is-
sue.
We very much regret that efforts to reach a
satisfactory negotiated settlement to the
Rhodesian problem have, for the moment at
least, been dealt a serious blow.
The position announced by Mr. Ian Smith
has resulted in a new and more dangerous
situation regarding the prospects for peace in
Rhodesia. We remain dedicated to a peaceful
resolution of the Rhodesian issue leading to
majority rule. We are conferring with the
British Government and are continuing to
consult with the African leaders most directly
concerned with this problem, as well as the
South African Government.
The British proposal remains, in our view, a
valid basis for negotiation. The Rhodesian au-
thorities should understand clearly that under
no circumstances can they count on any form
of American assistance in their effort to pre-
vent majority rule in Rhodesia or to enter into
negotiations which exclude leaders of
nationalist movements.
The so-called "internal solution" will not
produce a peaceful settlement and therefore
will not have the support of the United
States.
To reemphasize our opposition to the
maintenance of minority-imposed controi of
the government of Rhodesia, this Adminis-
tration will strongly support the repeal of the
Byrd amendment.^ We do this in conformity
with our international obligations and also be-
cause we beheve it represents a step toward
a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia.
We call on all the parties to act with flexibil-
ity and restraint and to give their support to a
negotiated solution that can bring both peace
and majority rule to Rhodesia.
And now a brief word about my travel
plans. As you know, I am going to the Middle
East on the 14th of February. In addition to
that, I have been discussing with the Soviet
Union a trip to Moscow. I will be going to
Moscow in March, and I will have an an-
nouncement as to the timing of that trip later
this week.
And now questions.
Q. Jim Anderson, UPI. Mr. Secretary, on
the question of international civil rights, is
this Administration going to continue the
practice of speaking out on cases such as the
See p. 146.
2 The Byrd amendment, attached to a military ap-
propriations bill in 1971, permits the importation of
strategic materials from Rhodesia, including chromium,
asbestos, and nickel, as long as their importation is
permitted from Communist countries.
February 21, 1977
137
Sakharov episode? ^ Or are you going to con-
tinue the practice of your predecessor, exert-
ing quiet diplomatic pressure and using his
concept of linkage ?
Secretary Vance: On the issue of human
rights, the President has often expressed his
deep concern in this area and has reaffirmed
that deep concern in the inauguration ad-
dress.
We will speak frankly about injustice both
at home and abroad. We do not intend, how-
ever, to be strident or polemical, but we do
believe that an abiding respect for human
rights is a human value of fundamental impor-
tance and that it must be nourished. We will
not comment on each and every issue, but we
will from time to time comment when we see a
threat to human rights, when we believe it
constructive to do so.
Q. Mr. Secretary, Barry Schweid of AP. On
the same subject, one of the local pundits yes-
terday called it sudden diplomacy, suggesthig
that this speaking out hasn't been very well
thought out, particularly its impact on di-
plomacy.
You refer to your trip to Moscow. Do you
think the statement you have made on
Sakharov and your general view on human
rights will have an impact, a negative impact,
on negotiations with the Soviet Union? In-
deed, isn't that what Mr. Dobrynin [Anatoliy
F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.]
called to tell you the other day?
Secretary Vance: I do not believe that it
will have a negative impact. As I indicated,
we will from time to time speak out. I have
^ In response to a question at a Department of State
news briefing on Jan. 26, the following was made avail-
able to news correspondents on Jan. 27:
Q. Do you have any comment on the stories concern-
ing the warnings the Soviets have given to Sakharov
about his activities?
A. We have long admired Andrey Sakharov as an
outspoken champion of human rights in the Soviet
Union. He is, as you know, a prominent, respected
scientist, a Nobel laureate, who, at considerable risk,
has worked to promote respect for human rights in his
native land.
Any attempts by the Soviet authorities to intimidate
Mr. Sakharov will not silence legitimate criticism in the
Soviet Union and will conflict with accepted interna-
tional standards in the field of human rights.
discussed the matter with Mr. Dobrynin, but
I am sure that our discussions with the Soviet
Union on a whole range of matters will not be
adversely affected by what we have said.
U.S. Role in Southern Africa
Q. Mr. Secretary, John Wallach of Hearst.
On the southern Africa situation, there is a
deadline of sorts coming up in March, when
the Africans have said that they will bring the
question of sanctions to the Security Council
in the same month the United States will be
President of the Council, chairman of the
Council.
Do you feel that in the intervening period,
the United States should take any initiatives
in southern Africa, such as, for example,
your own appointing of a negotiator to visit
the white areas as well as the — white nations
as well as the black nations? Or should the
United States stay back and let the British
handle the situation? In other words, where
do you feel we should go from here?
Secretary Vance: Insofar as the Rhodesia
problem is concerned, the British, quite prop-
erly, are taking the leading role. We will sup-
port the British in this effort and work closely
and carefully with them. We are in constant
touch with the British and expect to meet
with Ivor Richard as soon as he completes his
mission to southern Africa. And we will work
out our plans in concert with them.
With respect to the second half of your
question — will we be sending a special emis-
sary to that part of the world?— I do not have
any final conclusion in my own mind on that. I
want to think about the problem more and
study it. As you know, Andrew Young is
going to Dar es Salaam, and I want to talk to
him when he comes back and get the benefit
of his views.
Q. Is Geneva still the proper forum, as far
as you are concerned, for the negotiations?
Secretary Vance: Yes, it is.
Q. Mr. Secretary, Dick Valeriani, NBC.
On the question of human rights, do you plan
to go — does the Adyninistration plari to go be-
138
Department of State Bulletin
yond speaking out and making some other
kind of effort to get various countries to
change conditions internally, perhaps by of-
fering certain benefits in terms of the negotia-
tions you are carrying out with them?
Secretary Vance: We will couple what we
say publicly with private conversations with
various countries. And we hope that will
strengthen the process of progress in this
area.
Cessation of Nuclear Testing
Q. Mr. Secretary, Murrey Marder of the
Washington Post. Can you announce, sir,
now, the head of the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency? And, secondly. President
Carter, during the campaign, was quite criti-
cal of two treaties which are now pendirig in
Congress on the threshold nuclear test ban
and on the peaceful nuclear explosion ban.
Nevertheless the Adm,inistration has declared
its support for those two pending treaties.
Could you reconcile that position, sir?
Secretary Vance: Yes. On your first ques-
tion, there will be an announcement later
today on the new head of the Arms Control
Agency. That announcement, quite properly,
will come from the White House.
With regard to your second question, I do
not see any inconsistency with respect to sup-
port for the two treaties which have already
been negotiated and which are before the
Congress. They are stepping stones on the
road to the ultimate objective, which is a
complete cessation of testing; and I do not
think that there is any inconsistency.
Q. Does the Administration, then, plan
simultaneously to be supporting these two
partial treaties and at the same time seeking
the cornprehensive test ban that President
Carter has spoken about?
Secretary Vance: The answer is yes.
Q. Mr. Secretary, I am Morton Kondracke
of New Republic. Do you have any particular
timetable for Middle East negotiations to get
underway — such as, for example, some people
in the Senate have suggested that demonstra-
ble progress should be made by July, before
the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries] meeting? Is there any
deadline that you're facing?
Secretary Vance: There is no deadline ex-
cept that I think it is critically important that
progress be made this year in the Middle
East. And that is one of the reasons that I am
going at this early date to visit the Middle
East.
I think the sooner we get at the process,
the better. And therefore I am going at this
point to begin the process of our evaluation of
the situation as seen by the parties in the
Middle East. This will be followed by visits to
this country by leaders from those countries.
And we will then work with them to develop
the procedures and the organization which
will lead to a meeting on the Middle East.
But I do not want to try and set any specific
date at this point until I have had a chance to
meet with those leaders, until we have had a
chance to review their views; and of course
this must be taken up in consultation with the
Cochairman [of the Middle East Peace Con-
ference at Geneva], the Soviet Union.
Meeting of Cypriot Leaders
Q. Mr. Secretary, Henry Bradsher of the
Washington Star. Can you tell us how you see
the prospects for a Cypriot settlement in view
of the fact that Greek and Turkish Cypriots
have finally managed to talk again, and who
are you going to appoint to handle those prob-
lems for you?
Secretary Vance: I am encouraged by the
fact that the Archbishop [Archbishop
Makarios, President of the Republic of Cy-
prus] and Mr. Denktash [Rauf R. Denktash,
leader of the Turkish Cypriot community] had
a meeting and that the results of the meeting
seemed to be generally constructive. The
working out of a settlement in Cyprus is going
to be immensely complicated and very dif-
ficult, but at least we now have the first step
having been taken. It has been many, many
years since a meeting at this level was held
between the leaders of the two communities in
Cyprus.
February 21, 1977
139
We, the United States, will do everything
that we can to help facilitate such a settle-
ment. We will be sending an individual to that
part of the world to discuss bilateral relations
with Greece and with Turkey and also to
examine the Cypriot problem itself. Insofar as
the naming of that person, I would expect
that we would name the person later this
week.
Q. Secretary Vance, Bernard Gwertzman,
the New York Times. The President, in an
interview last week, said he would not let the
"Backfire" or the cruise missile issue stand in
the way of a settlement on SALT. Did he
mean by that that he was advocating, again
proposing that those two issues be put aside
and a settlement be signed noiv, or is he
thinking in more creative terms ?
Secretary Vance: He was not suggesting
that they be put aside; he was suggesting that
he did not want to see the negotiations fall
apart if resolution could not be reached at this
time on those two issues. However, I am sure
that there will be an attempt to resolve those
issues, namely, the Backfire and the cruise
missile, when we resume the negotiations
with the Soviet Union.
Sales of Nuclear Plants and Materials
Q. Antonio Neves of Globo Television,
Brazil. Mr. Secretary, the United States
seems to be the only government and the only
voice protesting the nuclear deal between
Brazil and Germany — Brazil seems to be
happy with it — and I wonder how far is the
U.S. Government willing, how much pressure
the U.S. Government is willing, to put on
those two countries to change the deal.
Secretary Vance: The concern which the
United States has expressed with respect to
that transaction reflects the general concern
which we have on the whole problem of the
spread of nuclear weapons throughout the
world. We have discussed the matter with the
Germans and have begun to discuss the mat-
ter with the Brazilians. We will continue to
pursue this matter with both of them and see
whether or not we cannot find a way to ob-
viate the construction of these two plants. We
want to work harmoniously and constructively
with them, and we have taken the first steps
to do so.
Q. Had you come to any conclusion in re-
gard to the release of nuclear fuel to India?
Secretary Vance: No. No conclusion has yet
been reached on that. As you know, that has
been a matter that has been under study for
quite a long while; and as yet no conclusion
has been reached.
Responses to Human Rights Violations
Q. Marvin Kalb, CBS. The President said
yesterday that perhaps the statement about
Sakharov should have been made by him or by
you. Yet the day before the State Department
made its statement on Sakharov, it did come
out with a statement on Czechoslovakia,
which apparently had been cleared. Are you
not running the danger, sir, of setting up
what amounts to a double standard of the
manner in which you respond to violations
of human rights in the Soviet Union and iyi
smaller countries where there is not a direct,
vital interest conflict?
Secretary Vance: This is a very complex
area. As I indicated, we will not be speaking
out in every case. We will speak out when we
believe it advisable to do so, but that will not
be, as I said, in each and every case. It is an
area where, as I said, I think we have an obli-
gation to make our views frankly known; but
we hope we can do it without being strident,
as I said, or intrusive in an improper way.
Q. Isn't that really setting up a kind of
double standard where the Department, or the
Adrninistration, might feel itself more free in
condemning human rights in smaller coun-
tries where there is not a vital interest af-
fected?
Secretary Vance: No. I hope we will not
have a double standard. I think what we have
done so far would indicate we have not.
Q. Jim Klurfeld from Newsday. On this
same situation, there were reports that you
were unhappy with the statement ynade on the
140
Department of State Bulletin
Sakharov situation. I just wonder if you can
tell 7is who did clear that statement. I think
the President indicated yesterday he did not
clear it. Who did clear it? And whether you
feel that this is an instance in which you
should not have spoken out.
Secretary Vance: Let me say I did not see
it; it was cleared at lower levels. I am not
going to give the name of the individual. I
have the responsibility in this Department,
and therefore I accept that responsibility
fully. Let me say that I respect Mr. Sakharov
very deeply; I respect his, Mr. Sakharov's,
principles and his pursuit of those principles.
Q. Your predecessor frequently said in
speeches that not only is it inadvisable but
rather it is counterproductive to speak out,
specifically in the case of Soviet emigration —
or emigration from, the Soviet Union by
minorities, including Jews, which dropped
sharply after the United States tried to exert
pressure. Do you subscribe to that theory,
particularly, that speaking out is actually
counterproductive ?
Secretary Vance: No, I do not share that
view.
Q. If you don't share that view, could you
say what your view is on that specific aspect
of the problem?
Secretary Vance: My view is that at times
we will feel it appropriate and necessary to
speak out and there will be other times when
we will not.
Q. Mr. Secretary, getting back to SALT,
some dozen Congressmen, Democrats all,
have asked the Administration to suspend de-
velopment of long-range cruise missiles, a de-
cision taken in the last days of the Ford Ad-
ministration, on the grounds that nothing
really seriously would be lost by a two- or
three-month suspension while you go to Mos-
cow.
Can you tell us, first, what your views are;
and secondly, if they are to continue de-
velopment, what is the rationale for continu-
ing development of one of the major hangups
in the SALT talks just six to eight weeks be-
fore you go to Moscow to see if they can be put
under a treaty? Is it the Pentagon against the
State Department again, or is there some
other reason?
Secretary Vance: No. I think the actions
which will be taken during this period in
which our review is taking place will not be
actions which will be such as to make it im-
possible to make changes in the future. There-
fore I think it is appropriate that they should
go forward during this period of time in which
we are going to prepare our views.
Q. Mr. Secretary, Mary McGrory, from the
Washington Star. Your predecessor used to
complain a great deal about the meddling of
Congress in the execution of foreign policy,
and the President in his farewell suggested
Congress really ought to leave it to the execu-
tive and the State Department to run foreign
policy. How do you feel about democracy at
home?
Secretary Vance: Insofar as the role of the
Congress is concerned, I feel very deeply, as I
said during my confirmation hearings, that
you cannot have an effective foreign policy un-
less it is developed in coordination with the
Congress and implemented in coordination
with the Congress. I feel very deeply on this
subject, and we are going to do everything
that we can to see that we proceed in that
fashion.
Relations With Vietnam and China
Q. [Don] Oberdorfer, Washington Post. Do
you expect to reopen the talks with the Viet-
namese within the next month or two or three,
and could you tell us your attitude toward the
Vietnamese being seated in the United Na-
tions and bilateral relations with the United
States?
Secretary Vance: I stated during my con-
firmation hearings that I thought it was in the
interests of both countries to proceed toward
normalization of relations, and I hope that we
will be able to start that process in the near
future.
With respect to the question of the seating
of the Vietnamese in the United Nations, I
would hope the issue would not be raised until
February 21, 1977
141
we have had a chance to start our discussions
with respect to normalization.
Q. Suppose it is raised. What would your
attitude be?
Secretary Vance: We will decide that ques-
tion when it arises.
Q. Mr. Secretary, when you are talking
about normalization, sir, what are your plans
in pursuing the entire complicated problem, of
normalizing U.S. relations with China? That
has been a postponed question, and the expec-
tation had been that with a new President the
process would go forth swiftly.
Secretary Vance: Let me point out we are
only at the end of our first week. I have
stated that insofar as our bilateral relations
are concerned, we will proceed on the basis of
the principles enunciated in the Shanghai
communique, that with respect to the pace
and the mode of reaching normalization, this
is a matter which we have under intensive re-
view. I would hope that we can complete that
review in the not too distant future, and I
think there really is nothing more that I can
say at this point. I do support very strongly
the goal of normalization of relations.
Q. What I want to ask you, sir, is do you
have some sort of a time frame in mind
whereby there would be the establishmeyit of
full diplomatic relations?
Secretary Vance: I don't have any specific
date in mind. I think this is obviously a sub-
ject we will have to discuss with the People's
Republic of China; and when we have com-
pleted our internal thinking within the gov-
ernment, then I think we should proceed to
begin to talk to them about the question.
Critical Period in the Middle East
Q. Mr. Secretary, Jeff Antevil of the New
York Daily News. Woiild you explain a little
further why you think 1977 will be such a crit-
ical year in the Middle East, and specifically
do you share Mr. Waldheim's [U.N. Secre-
tary General Kurt Waldheim] view that there
is likely to be a resumption of war there in the
next year or two unless a settlement is
reached?
Secretary Vance: I would be happy to dis-
cuss that.
I think 1977 is a critical period because I
think at this point there are a number of fac-
tors which are more conducive to a settlement
than have been present in the past.
Let me hasten to say I don't want to
minimize the difficulties which lie ahead. But
at this point we no longer are faced with the
war in Lebanon. There seems to be a greater
cohesion among the forces for moderation in
the area. All of the parties have indicated a
willingness to proceed to Geneva and to pro-
ceed promptly.
Therefore it seems to me that the factors
are right to proceed during this year. I think
if this is allowed to drag out and we do not
proceed to a conference with respect to the
settlement of the Middle East issue, that all
kinds of disruptive factors may occur, and
therefore I think it's incumbent that we pro-
ceed as fast as we properly can to try and
move to that point.
. It would be foolhardy, in my judgment,
however, to do this until the groundwork has
been thoroughly explored and plans have been
arrived at so that there is a realistic chance of
a constructive solution coming out of the
Peace Conference on the Middle East.
Therefore I think one cannot at this point
talk about any specific date. But I do think it
is proper and reasonable to say that there
should be such a conference in the year 1977;
and indeed I would say that I think it is criti-
cally important that there be such a confer-
ence during that period.
Q. Bernie Gwertzman from the New York
Tiynes. Do you have in your mind any idea of
how to get over the Palestinian question,
which has obviously held up the Geneva Con-
ference now for more than a year or two?
Secretary Vance: I do have some thoughts
on this. I prefer not to talk about them at this
time, but let me comment on that issue.
The PLO [Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion] up to this point has refused to recog-
nize the right of Israel to exist or to accept
the framework for negotiations under U.N.
Resolutions 242 and 338. Under these circum-
stances it is difficult to see how progress can
be made.
142
Department of State Bulletin
In saying this, however, I want to em-
phasize that we continue to beheve that the
recognition of the legitimate interests of the
Palestinian people will be critical to any
peaceful settlement.
There are a number of views held by the
parties as to how one might address this is-
sue. This is one of the subjects that I would
hope to discuss and expect to discuss with the
leaders of the various countries when I go to
the Middle East. And I hope that when I come
back fi'om that trip I will have a better under-
standing of what the course is to follow in this
area.
Q. Is there any possibility that you yourself
or some designated official might have some
discussions with Palestinian representatives?
Secretary Vance: Not at this time, as long
as the circumstances are as I indicated.
Normalization of Relations With Cuba
Q. Mr. Secretary , Barrie Dunsmore from
ABC News. On the subject of normalization
another country comes to mind, and that is
Cuba. Recently Ambassador Young [Andrew
Young, U.S. Representative to the United
Nations] indicated that the presence of Cuban
troops in Angola might be considered a
stabilizing factor. I am wondering if you
share that view to begin unth and if, by any
chance, saying things like that is the begin-
ning of a new trend toward normalization
unth Cuba.
Secretary Vance: I think there are two
points which you have raised.
First, the question of normalization of rela-
tions with Cuba: I have previously indicated
that I think that it is appropriate for the
United States to seek normalization of rela-
tions with all countries. I said, insofar as
Cuba was concerned, that I hoped that there
would be indications that they would be anx-
ious and willing to live within the system of
nations, and if that were the case, then I hope
we could begin the process of moving toward
normalization.
With respect to the presence of Cuban
troops in Angola, I think the presence of any
outside forces is not helpful to a peaceful solu-
tion. I think that this is a matter that should
be settled by the Africans themselves.
Q. It is not therefore a prerequisite to nor-
malization of relations between the United
States and Cuba?
Secretary Vance: I don't want to set any
preconditions at this point about whatever
discussions might take place.
Arab Boycott of Israel
Q. Mort Kondracke, New Republic. There
is a report in the New York Post that you
were a member of an organization of busi-
nessmen and lawyers set up to oppose legisla-
tion on the Arab oil boycott — on the Arab oil
boycott of Israel. Is that correct, and to go on
unth it, what are your feelings —
Secretary Vance: Before you go on to your
second question, the answer is no. 1 was
asked to serve on a committee to deal with the
economic problems of New York City. I was
asked to serve by the Mayor, by the Gover-
nor, and by the two Senators. We were to
take a look at a whole range of problems that
affected the flight of business from New York
City.
The particular responsibilities that I had
when I was working with the committee were
to take a look at the professions and to see
what things could be done to try and make
sure that the professions did not flee from
New York City — and by "the professions" I
am talking about lawyers, accountants, and
the like.
The group also had a number of other sub-
committees. About halfway through the work
of the committee, or maybe two-thirds of the
way through, I was nominated to the post
which I now hold. I was unable to complete
my work on the committee's activities. I did
not have anything to do with any discussions
with respect to any boycott problems.
Q. Mr. Secretary, what are your views on
the boycott?
Secretary Vance: Well, I have said before
on the boycott problem that I fully support
the legislation which is currently on the books
and that we are committed to support that
legislation and that we will do so.
February 21, 1977
143
With respect to the questions of new legisla-
tion, I would like to take a look at that in the
connection of the overall situation in the Mid-
dle East. There will be hearings with respect
to new legislation. Those hearings are not
going to take place until my return from the
Middle East. I have agreed to testify on the
28th of February before Senator Proxmire's
committee on this issue, and by that time I
would expect that we would have a gov-
ernmentwide position which I will be pre-
pared to enunciate at that time.
Reducing Arms Sales Abroad
Q. Ken Freed, Associated Press. There has
been a lot of talk about reducing arms sales
by the United States. Could you outline the
program as you see it now, and does it 7nean
fewer arms for Israel, Iran, and Saudi
Arabia ?
Secretary Vance: We haven't gotten to the
point yet of what the effect would be on indi-
vidual countries. We are committed to a basic
principle, and that is to find a way to reduce
the sale of arms — not only by the United
States but by other nations around the world.
This is a terribly important issue and one
where I think it is possible to make progress.
It is not going to be easy. Indeed, I think it is
going to be very, very difficult. But I think
that we, as the largest seller of arms, have a
particular responsibility to first put our own
house in order, to determine what our policy
will be, and having done that, then to begin to
work with other nations to see whether we
can find cooperative arrangements whereby
they will participate with us in developing
programs and policies for carrying out this
kind of a program.
Let me say that some of the things that we
are looking at, in addition to what our own
U.S. policy should be, is the question of
whether or not it would be constructive to
issue regulations which would require that
any arms manufacturer in the United States
come and receive permission from the State
Department before they even approach any
countries overseas with respect to the possi-
bility of buying new arms.
My own inclination is that this is a very
sensible thing to do. It is something that v
have under consideration and have as ye
however, reached no conclusion on.
We will be taking a look, and a careful loo:
at the various new proposals as they come
and then, hopefully, apply the standarc
which we have reached to those.
Let me say a little bit about the Midd
East, though, and what the standards ai
which we have been applying to the questit
of sales of arms in that area.
We have said, first, that the arms mm
satisfy, or must be fitted to, the legitimal
security needs of the country concerned; se(
ondly, that they must be looked at in respe(
to their effect on the overall situation with n
spect to peace in the Middle East.
And it seems to me that these are two ver
fundamental principles that are proper an
should be applied.
Q. Would you support a mutual arms ba.
ivith the Russians with regard to the Middl
East? That's been proposed a number of time
to the Soviets. I think they have rejected i1
Would you be in favor of renewing such (
proposal?
Secretary Vance: Yes. I think it's a ver;
constructive proposal. I think, quite frankly
it's unrealistic until you get a political settle
ment.
Q. Sir, you said that the United States ha.
been studying for some time now what to d*
abotit supplies of nuclear fuel to other coun
tries. Brazil has been waiting for about threi
years now to have confirmation for some fue
for its reactors, and it's given as one of thi
reasons that the country decided to go — tt'.
have its own facilities to enrich uranium.
Should Brazil wait until the United Statet-
finishes its study — which it cannot say when
it will happen? And do you think — in the
same area, sir, Brazil is under a great curios-
ity about what the United States is going to do
ivith regimes in Latin America that are not
democratically elected. What can you say
about this?
Secretary Vance: Well, let me take your
first question.
I would hope very much that Brazil and
Germany would wait until we have had a
144
Department of State Bulletin
Ihance to further discuss the question of what
.Iternatives are there to proceeding with the
,, eprocessing plant or with enriched uranium
,„.acilities. This subject has been under study
,,, or a while with the prior government. We are
'ery freshly in office and have been studying
t very intensively. It will take us a little
., vhile to complete our studies, and I think it
; vould be not only helpful but important that
lothing be done until we've had a chance thor-
i„, lUghly to explore this with both countries.
' Q. Mr. Secretary, to follow up Mr. Wal-
ich's question of a moment ago, would the
'nited States consider the possibility unilat-
^ rally of reducing arms sales to countries in
' he Middle East unthout agreement with the
■-[ 'oviet Union on a common approach to re-
'itcing arms sales?
Secretary Vance: This would be something
'"' hat we would have to discuss with the con-
umer, as well as among ourselves, before we
ould arrive at any conclusion on that, Mr.
' {alb.
' Q. Mr. Secretary, Scott Sullivan of News-
veek. You are going to meet with Mr. Boyd
" Aquilino Boyd, Panamanian Foreign Minis-
'• ' er] this morning. Could you give us some of
*' lour thinking on how it may be possible to
treak the logjam in the Panamanian negotia-
B ions, given that the Panamanians require
iihat sovereignty revert to them in the year
II- ',000 and that the American concern is to keep
n he canal open and neutral indefinitely?
[ Secretary Vance: Yes, I do have some ideas
jn this. We will be discussing some of these
ideas today with Mr. Boyd. I hope that he will
have some ideas on his side. I think it would
be inappropriate for me to comment at this
press conference on it, but it will be a subject
for discussion today at our meeting.
Q. When you go to the Middle East, will
you extend invitations to all the leaders to
come to this country, and how will you issue
the problem of Prime Minister Rabin?
r Secretary Vance: I'm sorry. I couldn't hear
you.
Q. Will you issue invitations to all of the
' Arab leaders and to Prime Minister Rabin to
come to this country? And, again, tvhat will
you do about the problem of Prime Minister
Rabin, with the election coming up?
Secretary Vance: I would expect that we
would extend invitations to all of the leaders
to meet with the President, including Prime
Minister Rabin.
Q. Mr. Secretary, is it your view that put-
ting pressure on South Africa is probably the
m,ost effective and quickest means of bringing
about some movement in the Rhodesian situa-
tion?
Secretary Vance: I think that South Africa
can play a very important role in this area.
We have been in constant communication with
the South Africans and will continue to do so.
Q. Do you share Ambassador Young's view
that when South Africa says to Rhodesia
"negotiate," they have to negotiate?
Secretary Vance: I don't think it's really
quite that simple.
The Korean Question
Q. Mr. Secretary some pampers awhile ago
reported that some of President Carter's
foreign policy staff suggested the United
States open its door to North Korea to achieve
a sort of detente in the Korean Peninsula. Do
you take such consideration into your ac-
count in dealing with the Korean question?
Secretary Vance: On the Korean question,
we will do nothing without full and complete
consultation with the South Koreans.
Q. Francois Chatel, Agence France Presse.
What do you think about the deal, nuclear
deal, between Brazil and Germany— that is,
applied to the deal between France and Paki-
stan? In other words, ivould you like to spe-
cifically consult proposals made before the
two countries go through with the deal?
Secretary Vance: Yes. As I said, our con-
cerns about proliferation apply across the
board and not just to one or two countries,
and therefore we would hope that in each of
these cases ways could be found to not pro-
ceed with reprocessing plants.
February 21, 1977
145
Q. And are you — in the case of Pakistan —
are you hopefiil that the deal mil go through?
Secretary Vance: I really haven't gotten
deeply enough into that to express either
hope or lack of hope at this point.
Q. Mr. Secretary, the Administration has
made a major coynmitment toward huinan
rights in foreigri policy. On the Korean ques-
tion, are you planning specific pressure to
move toward that goal in South Korea?
Secretary Vance: The question of human
rights is obviously one which we will be dis-
cussing with the Koreans. I think that I
should say nothing more than that at this
point.
Q. As this is your first press conference,
sir, perhaps it would be helpful if we could
have on the record your general views of your
attitude on press policy.
Secretary Vance: Yes. I'd be very happy to
talk about that.
As I previously indicated, I have rather
deep convictions about the necessity to work
with the Congress in developing and imple-
menting foreign policy. I also believe very
strongly that it is necessary to inform the
American public as to what our objectives
are, to explain why we hold these objectives,
and as much as possible to explain how we in-
tend to proceed in achieving those objectives.
And to that end I want to give as much time
as I possibly can to working with the press in
open sessions to explain what our objectives
are and how we intend to achieve them. And
to that end, as I have indicated, I will hold an
open press conference with you at least once a
month.
When I go on a trip, I would intend to speak
with the press in an open fashion, on the rec-
ord in almost all cases. And I am going to try
and make people in our Department more
available to the press so that they can speak
with you and keep you up to date with what is
going on in our operations here in the De-
partment.
Q. / wondered if you would make known to
Chile the new attitude of this government on
the subject of hutnan rights. Specifically, I'd
like to know what representations you and the
Department made to theyn about sending a
person alleged to be a torturer to this country
on a goodwill tour.
Secretary Vance: Mr. Lavin [Lt. Col. Jaime
Farina Lavin, Director General of the Chilean
Foreign Ministry] is no longer in this country.
I think it would be inappropriate for me to
talk about what individually has passed be-
tween ourselves and the Chileans on this. We
will convey our views on human rights and
civil rights issues, as I said, both pubhcly and
privately.
The press: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Vance: Thank you.
U.S. and Panama To Continue
Negotiations on Canal Treaty
Joint Statement ^
Panamanian Foreign Minister Aquilino
Boyd and Secretary of State Vance met today
to discuss the status of the negotiations be-
tween the United States and Panama on the
Panama Canal. They affirmed their determi-
nation to continue the negotiations for a new
Canal treaty on the basis of the Joint State-
ment of Principles of February 7, 1974, known
as the Tack-Kissinger Agreement. The Secre-
tary and the Foreign Minister agreed to make
a sustained and continuous effort to conclude
a new treaty at an early date. In pursuit of
that objective, they agreed that the U.S. and
Panamanian teams would resume negotiating
sessions in Panama on February 10, 1977.
' Read to news correspondents by Secretary Vance at
an informal news briefing he and the Panamanian
Foreign Minister held following their meeting on Jan.
31.
146
Department of State Bulletin
Secretary Vance Interviewed by AP and UPI Correspondents
Following is the transcript of an interview
with Secretary Vance on February 3 by
Barry Schweid and Kenneth Freed of the As-
sociated Press and James Anderson and
Nicholas Daniloff of United Press Interna-
tional.
Press release 37 dated February 3
Q. May I start with something that came
up today? There was a statement on Cuba —
it was a brief statement. ^ You know what the
statement was: We would like to be able to
hold talks regarding the antihijacking
agreement. Can you tell us if the statement
was issued with your approval, and what we
mean exactly by talks?
Secretary Vance: Yes, the statement was
issued with my approval. As to the manner in
which this might be done, I have not yet
come to any final conclusions, and therefore I
have nothing that I can add to the statement
already issued. But I do think it would be
constructive, both from our standpoint and
the standpoint of Cuba, to explore whether it
may not be possible to renew the antihijack-
ing treaty.
Q. In the past, two things stood in the way:
one, Cuba's exporting of revolution and, two,
the presence of its military forces en masse
in southern Africa. I gather from what you
are saying that those two things no longer
necessarily stand in the way of our having
direct discussions with Cuba.
' In response to a question on Feb. 2, the following
was read at a Department of State news briefing on
Feb. 3:
On October 15, 1976, the Cuban Government an-
nounced its intention to terminate the antihijacking
agreement with the United States, effective April 15,
1977. There have been no new developments in this
matter, but this is something we hope to be able to dis-
cuss with the Cubans.
Secretary Vance: No. What I am saying is
that those items would be discussed in con-
nection with any general discussions we
might have with the Cubans, and I don't rule
out the discussion of them and other things
that might arise in connection with the dis-
cussion of the antihijacking treaty.
Q. Mr. Vance, what issues besides the
hijacking treaty would you want to discuss
with the Cubans?
Secretary Vance: The two issues which you
have already discussed are two of the items I
would want to discuss with them.
Q. What about the humanitarian ques-
tions? In your answers to Senator Case
[submitted for the record in connection with
hearings by the Seriate Foreign Relations
Committee on Secretary Vance's nom-
ination], for example, you discussed that,
and you in fact indicated that it would be a
nice idea if the Cubans would release Huber
Matos. That is not a precondition, but really
an expression of your desire that they should
do that — is that correct?
Secretary Vance: Yes. That was an ex-
pression of my desire, and I said I would also
think it would be important if they would re-
lease some American prisoners who are pres-
ently in Cuba.
Q. We have been hearing reports —
speaking of Cubans in southern Africa now,
we have been hearing reports, one, that there
appear to be new and large arms shipments
going to Mozambique and that this may be a
new center of outside forces. Do you hear
those reports? Is that correct?
Secretary Vance: I have heard reports of
arms shipments to Mozambique. I think
there is a lack of clarity as to the exact size of
those shipments. I have previously indicated
February 21, 1977
147
that the question of arms shipments and par-
ticipation by non-Africans, in my judgment,
is unhelpful in the southern African situation
and have urged that problems of southern
Africa should be decided among the southern
Africans.
Q. Regarding the Cuban thing, if I may go
back a second, have you had any indication,
direct or indirect, from Cuba that this is an
appropriate time to have such discussions?
Secretary Vance: No direct communica-
tion.
Q. Nor indirect? Any clear signal at least?
Secretary Vance: No. I do note that state-
ments have been made recently about the in-
tention of the Cubans to begin withdrawing
further forces from Angola.
Q. Does that mean withdraw and replace
with civilian Cubans?
Secretary Vance: I don't know.
Relations With the Soviet Union
Q. On an allied subject, I get the impres-
sion that you, the new Administration, are
tending to compartmentalize individual mat-
ters in relations with the Soviet Union more
so than was done in the past. For example,
although there was the probleyn with the
human rights question last week, apparently
the preliminary discussions on SALT went
ahead without any impediment. Is my im-
pression right, first of all, and is this how
you intend to continue to operate?
Secretary Vance: I would not describe it
quite that way. The central problem that we
would like to discuss with the Soviet Union is
the question of the reduction of nuclear arms
on both sides. That is the subject that is al-
ready on the table and which I think we must
address very, very promptly. As I have indi-
cated, I would like to see this accomplished,
if possible, beforfe September, at the end of
which the current agreement expires and
therefore would have to be extended; and
therefore I feel that it is important to resume
as promptly as we can our discussions on
SALT Two with the Soviets. That is not to
say that there are not other issues of impor-
tance between us, and I would expect on my
trip to Moscow that I would discuss these
other issues as well, in an initial and pre-
liminary fashion.
Q. What I was getting at is, there is no
linkage between our feelings about the Soviet
treatment of their citizens and the human
rights questions and our other relations with
them — trade, econoynic, and arms talks?
Secretary Vance: No, there is no linkage. I
think each of these subjects is an important
subject and each should be discussed on its
own footing.
Q. Mr. Vance, do you see the statements
that were made last week about human rights
in the Soviet Union, the Sakharov statement
among others, as complicating your discus-
sions? I understand Mr. Dobrynin [Anatoliy
Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.],
for example, called you and complained that
this was interference in their internal af-
fairs.
Secretary Vance: No, I don't see them
complicating our discussions. I think the
Soviet Union knows that we feel strongly
about the human rights issues, very
strongly, very deeply, and that we will speak
out on those issues when we believe it appro-
priate to do so.
Q. When you said "linkage" before —
because "linkage" is associated with one Sec-
retary of State's particular style, I would
like to come back to it and ask you if you
don't think that Soviet action in one area
does have implicatioyis over actions in
others. Should they be forthcoming on
huynan rights, doesn't it suggest
something — I don't want to say that there is
a deal involved — but if they are forthcoming
on hmnan rights, would not that improve the
general climate and make a SALT treaty, for
instance, a little more easy to get?
Secretary Vance: It would certainly im-
prove the climate, but I think there has been
an overemphasis on linkage.
Q. When yoii go to Moscow at the end of
March, do you see at that point making a
148
Department of State Bulletin
breakthrough in the current issues which
deadlock the SALT talks, so that in the fall
Mr. Brezhnev [Leonid /. Brezhnev, General
Secretary of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union] could
com,e here and sign the SALT Two agree-
ment?
Secretary Vance: No. I don't anticipate
making any breakthrough at that time. I
think this will be the first of the discussions
on a very difficult and very complex set of
subjects, and I would not predict any break-
through at that point.
Q. Mr. Secretary, we don't expect you to
bargain with the Soviets through us, but can
you tell us: Is this a possibility — that the
Vladivostok agreement of 2,^00 vehicles on
each side could be reduced by the time SALT
Two was put into the form of a treaty?
Secretary Vance: I don't want to go into
excessive detail, but I think that some reduc-
tion from the 2,400 is a possibility.
Q. Do you believe that cruise missiles, in
the current state of art, are verifiable and
therefore could well be included in the
agreement? And probably more important,
do the Soviets agree with us that they are ver-
ifiable as strategic weapons by national
means?
Secretary Vance: The question of cruise
missiles is one of the remaining subjects in
the SALT Two discussions, along with the
question of the "Backfire" and along with the
question of mobile missiles.
As to cruise missiles as such, one of the
problems is the problem of verification. It is
a very difficult and complex problem in the
area of cruise missiles and undoubtedly
would be one of the matters for discussion in
connection with trying to resolve the cruise
missile problem.
Q. Is the question of the cruise and
Backfire crucial to a SALT Two agreement?
Are you willing to seek a fallback position of
letting them slide for further negotiation
later?
Secretary Vance: Well, the President has
spoken on this already, and the President has
said that he would hope that the cruise mis-
sile and Backfire would not result in the fail-
ure to achieve a SALT Two agreement.
On the other hand, the Backfire and the
cruise missile issues are still very much in
the negotiations and I'm sure will be a sub-
ject for discussion when we begin our talks
with the Soviet Union.
Q. I'm having trouble in following, since
this Administration came in, their thinking
on SALT, to see if there's any difference be-
tween the previous Kissinger-Ford-Nixon
approach, which the Soviets continually re-
jected in the last three attempts. Frankly, I
don't see much of a difference, and I wonder
why you think that the Soviets would be more
amenable now to this approach than they
were last March, last September-October.
Secretary Vance: Well, I would hope that
in seeking a SALT Two agreement that we
would both approach the remaining problems
with flexibility and see whether we could
come up with some new ideas, some fresh
ideas that have not yet been discussed. And
this is not just a one-way street I'm talking
about. I would hope and expect the Soviets
would approach it in the same way.
Importance of Conventional Arms Reductions
Q. Mr. Secretary, recently you were — I
think you were chairman of a panel of the
United Nations Association that put together
a report on disarmament, in which you said
really the problem — you didn't use the word
"problem" — the most important aspect of
disarmament is really conventional arms
because that's where most of the money is
spent, that's where most of the action is. Are
you planning to make any early efforts, with
the Soviets in particular, to start talks on
large-scale conventional disarmament?
Secretary Vance: I do believe that the area
of disarmament or arms reduction in the con-
ventional arms area is of critical importance.
It is the area where the largest amount of
money is spent, and it is a very serious and
substantial problem.
I would expect the discussion of reduction
of conventional arms to be on the agenda of
February 21, 1977
149
items that we might discuss when I go to
Moscow at the end of March. MBFR, which
means mutual balanced force reduction, talks
have been underway for several years. I
hope very much that we can move these talks
out of the doldrums and give them very high
priority and see if we can't move them on to a
preliminary, yet satisfactory, conclusion of a
first-stage agreement.
One of the problems, I think, has been that
they have not received the emphasis that
they should in the past. I'm encouraged by
the fact that not only do we put a very high
priority on movement in these talks, but the
Soviets do also. Mr. Brezhnev, in his speech
at Tula in the last two weeks, has indicated
that he considers this to be a matter of high
priority and would like to address it prompt-
ly.
Q. Mr. Vance, I want to return to this one
question — not to beat a dead horse — about
the question of the Soviet attitude on SALT.
You seem to be rejecting the Soviets' conten-
tio7i that it is the Americans' turn to propose
something significant to move the negotia-
tions along. Do you have anything in mind
that the Soviets need to do, need to move?
Secretary Vance: Well, I think if we are
both serious about making progress in
SALT, and I believe we are, then it is in-
cumbent upon both of us to see what we can
do to break the logjams which exist and move
on to the conclusion of a fair and just agree-
ment which is acceptable to both.
Q. Regarding conventional arms, has your
thinking gone to the point where you can
approach them about some common agree-
ments, some agreement that both superpow-
ers would restrain arms sales in specific
regions? Woiild you declare certain regions
off bo7inds, for instance, as being beyond the
contest; Africa, perhaps? Can you amplify
that a bit?
Secretary Vance: Yes. I would be happy
to.
Not only are we talking about reduction of
arms and troops in the Central European
area, but I am also talking about the question
of a general reduction in the transfer of arms
in attacking that problem. This is a subject
that affects not only the United States but
other Western nations and the Soviet Union
as well, and this is a subject which we will
take up with the Soviet Union and discuss
with them how we might proceed to reduce
the general sale and transfer of arms
throughout the world.
Q. But as a pilot project would you select
an area like Africa to simply declare off
bounds and see if that idea could spread?
Secretary Vance: That would be a possibil-
ity.
I think also the whole question of arms
transfers into the Middle East is an area that
one might look at.
Q. In the United Nations Association re-
port that you mentioned earlier, there are
several points that were made, one of which
was sort of a unilateral naval disarmament
approach test. Woiild you subscribe to that?
I noticed in that report you dissented from
one part, but not that part, not on the ques-
tion of naval disarmament.
Secretary Vance: Yes. I think that is an
area that is worth exploring. It is not some-
thing you could reach agreement on over-
night, but it is the kind of subject that de-
serves further thought.
Q. Mr. Vance, can I just follow up on con-
ventional arms?
The other day at your news conference you
said the United States as a leading arms
seller bears a heavy responsibility for mov-
ing this. Would you be prepared to do any-
thing unilaterally, or would you only move
in cutting arms transfers in conjunction
with either the Soviet Union or the other
leading arms sellers, such as Britain and
France ?
Secretary Vance: As I said the other day, I
think the first thing we have to do is to de-
termine with more precision what our policy
is going to be. Having made that determina-
tion we might wish to take action ourselves
to demonstrate leadership in this area.
But in the long run this is a problem that
must be faced up to and dealt with by both
150
Department of State Bulletin
the supplier and the purchaser nations
throughout the world, and therefore, in my
judgment, it is essential that we begin to
deal with it on an international basis and not
simply on a unilateral basis.
Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations
Q. Mr. Vance, if I may switch to the ques-
tion of Panama, isn't your biggest problem
there going to be the opponents on Capitol
Hill, and if that is the case, what are you
going to do to try to convince the conserva-
tives who are taking action in a number of
different ways to try to prevent you from
concluding this agreement with Panama?
Secretary Vance: Let me say first there
are some difficult issues which remain to be
negotiated. I do not underestimate the diffi-
culty of reaching agreement on the remaining
issues. But in addition, we do face the prob-
lem of opposition among some of the Senators
and Congressmen on the Hill.
I think we have a responsibility as we pro-
ceed in our negotiations to explain to the
Congress and to the American people what
our objectives are, why we hold these objec-
tives, and to discuss frankly and directly the
concerns which people have expressed in this
area and to answer the questions which have
been raised.
Q. So you would see a process of going to
the people as it were, of speaking directly to
the Aynerican people over this very compli-
cated and difficult issue?
Secretary Vance: I would say, going di-
rectly to the American people and to the
people on Capitol Hill to talk directly with
them and to try and answer their questions
and to answer their concerns.
Q. There are reports that if the treaty were
submitted now, as it would be anticipated it
would be drawn, that it would be defeated or
at least it wouldn't get the two-thirds major-
ity that is necessary.
Secretary Vance: I don't know whose
evaluation that is.
Q. A story in the paper.
Q. Well, you know the Strom Thurmond
resolution last year, which was against the
treaty, had 37-39 backers; and if that is the
case today, of course that would defeat the
treaty in the Senate.
Secretary Vance: I don't believe it has that
support today.
Q. What support do you think it has today?
Secretary Vance: Less than a third.
Q. Less than a third?
Secretary Vance: Yes.
Q. So you could get ratification, as you see
the broad outlines of a treaty developing
now?
Secretary Vance: I think one first has to
see what the treaty finally is. But it is my
conviction that any treaty which we finally
negotiate will be able to be ratified.
Q. Mr. Secretary, could I go back to some-
thing that you said before, just to pick it up?
You said that the concept of linkage was
overdone in the past. Whatever else it had, it
did provide, sometimes, an incentive to bring
the Soviets along on something that they
didn't want to move on.
What, in place of linkage, are you going to
use as an incentive to induce the Soviets to
come along on agreements on which they
would be otherwise reluctant?
Secretary Vance: Well, I think that — take
for example, negotiations in the arms field,
and more specifically, the SALT negotia-
tions. I think it clearly is in the interests of
both nations and in the interest of world
peace for us to reach a satisfactory,
negotiated settlement with them. So I think
it stands on its own two feet.
Q. Mr. Secretary, I would very much like
to get you on the record on Paul Warnke,^ on
the situation developing.
Secretary Vance: Surely.
Q. Because, as you know, there is an
2 On Feb. 2 President Carter nominated Mr. Warnl<e
to be Director of the United States Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency and special SALT negotiator.
February 21, 1977
151
anonymous letter circulating, and it is hard
to deal with an anonymous statemeyit, accus-
ing him of advocating unilateral abandon-
ment of every iveapons system subject to
SALT negotiation. Does that — you work with
him — is that a fair representation of
Warnke's —
Secretary Vance: No. Let me first say that
I deplore anonymous statements. I think that
if people have issues that they wish to raise
or criticisms which they choose to make, that
they should come out and make those directly
with their names attached to them.
I think Paul Warnke is an excellent choice.
He is superbly qualified, and I am convinced
that he will be approved by the Senate.
Q. But the views attributed to him,
anonymously, that he is in favor of unilat-
eral "abandonment," as they say, of every
weapons system, —
Secretary Vance: I don't agree with that. I
do not think those are his views. I have not
seen the paper to which you are referring,
but I think that is a gross misstatement of
Mr. Warnke's position.
Q. Do you agree with him,, though, for in-
stance, that there could be a six-month delay
in the development of the B-1, unilaterally,
urithout any Soviet response, to see if it would
bring — elicit a positive Soviet reaction?
Secretary Vance: I believe that there could
be a delay in the B-1 for a period of time. I
am not sure that that is the ultimate decision
which will be taken in connection with the
budget reviews, but I think that such a delay
would be possible.
Q. But you, don't agree ivith him, I gather,
on the question of a unilateral withdrawal of
some nuclear forces from Europe? At least
some statements he is associated with?
Secretary Vance: Well, what I said on
that — I think it would be inappropriate at
this time to withdraw our tactical nuclear
forces or weapons from Europe. That issue is
already a subject which is on the table in the
MBFR discussions, and it doesn't make sense
to me to take such a step while it is currently
under negotiation in the larger context of the
MBFR talks.
Q. In the larger — if I can pursue this just
one ynore question, in the larger concept of
his idea of — I don't ivant to say "unilateral
reductions" but he had developed the idea
that there are several areas where the United
States can act unilaterally without the mutual
reduction by the Soviet Union in arms mat-
ters. Do you agree with that in concept?
Secretary Vance: Well, I think it depends
on what you are talking about. I don't know
specifically what you have in mind.
Q. Well, the B-1 was one example. Of
course you have answered that.
Secretary Vance: As I said before, I think
that you can delay it for a period of time.
Q. And the naval situation was another
one. He thought that there were areas that
the United States could reduce its spending
and deployynent without prior agreement of
the Soviet Union, to see how they would re-
spond.
Secretary Vance: Well, I think you have to
examine each one of these on its own merits
and see whether or not it can be done without
jeopardizing the security of the country.
Q. So it has to be a case-by-case basis?
Secretary Vance: Yes, I think it has to be a
case-by-case basis.
Discussions on Cyprus Issues
Q. The White House announced today the
appointm,ent of Clark Clifford to be the spe-
cial emissary to the Cyprus area. What do
you thiyik the United States can do? Is there
any direct role that we can play in this whole
episode?
Secretary Vance: Well, I think the first
thing we have to do is to have discussions
with the Greeks and the Turks about our
bilateral relations, and Mr. Clifford will be
doing this.
Secondly, he will be going to Cyprus to
discuss with the Cypriots the situation in
152
Department of State Bulletin
Cyprus as it stands. I would expect also that
he would be going to discuss with the Euro-
pean Community their views with respect to
the Cyprus situation, because they do in fact
have very definite views on how the situation
might be approached and how progress might
be made.
After having made this factfinding mis-
sion, Mr. Clifford will return and report the
results of his trip to the President and to the
Secretary of State.
In addition, I would expect he would re-
port to the Congress. I think this will then
give us a basis on which to formulate our
plans as to how we may or should approach
the bilateral problems which exist between the
United States and Greece and Turkey and, at
the same time, would give us a basis for see-
ing how we might be able to facilitate the
achievement of progress in the Cyprus situa-
tion.
Q. Could you envision the United States
playing some kind of role analogous to what
the United States played in the Middle East
dispute?
Secretary Vance: Let me say first in the
Cyprus situation the Secretary General and
the United Nations are already playing a
very constructive role, and we would not
want to do anything that did not fit or
dovetail with the activities of the United Na-
tions in this area.
I think, however, it may be possible that
we may be able to come up with some new
ideas or to find ways to help in bringing the
parties together. And if we can, we certainly
want to do it, because peace and stability in
the eastern Mediterranean are very impor-
tant not only to that area but to the peace of
the world generally.
Q. But in the interim, it is an assumption,
isn't it? Is it so that you ivill hold back on the
Turkish aid agreement? You will not submit
the Greek bases agreement. In fact, you
won't complete the Greek bases agreement
until this factfinding mission is complete?
Secretary Vance: Yes. As I previously in-
dicated, I don't anticipate any action by the
Congress until we have had a chance to fur-
ther study the situation by conversations with
Turkey and with Greece.
Relations With China
Q. Mr. Vance, looking toward China for a
moment, do you see down the road the
United States really recognizing the People's
Republic of China and disengaging itself
from its security treaty with the Nationalist
Chinese?
Secretary Vance: I believe that normaliza-
tion of relations with the People's Republic of
China should be our ultimate goal. As I have
previously said, I believe that the pace at
which one proceeds and the modalities which
might be used require further careful study.
And I further believe that in considering
that, we must also consider the question of
the security of the people of Taiwan.
Q. I don't mean this disrespectfully at all,
but I don't think you have answered the ques-
tion. Nick asked you if you really think that
the United States can recognize China and
disavow our defense treaty with the
Taiwanese.
Secretary Vance: All I can say —
Q. You said it required careful study.
Secretary Vance: Ultimately I believe that
we will be able to achieve normalization of re-
lations with the People's Republic of China.
Q. I notice you keep referring to that term,
that ambiguous term, "achieve normaliza-
tion." What does that mean, really? Does
that mean recognition?
Secretary Vance: It means exactly what it
says.
Q. No, but it has a history.
Secretary Vance: Yes, and that is why it
means exactly what it says.
Q. And its beauty lies in its ambiguity.
But does it mean recognize diplomatically
the People's Republic of China?
Secretary Vance: Normalization?
February 21, 1977
153
Q. Yes. Is that what normalization means?
Secretary Vance: Yes, that is what it
means ultimately.
Middle East Situation
Q. I think we had best go to the Middle
East because your time is running out.
Secretary Vance: Yes, I am running out of
time.
Q. And we couldn't have a session without
the Middle East.
Secretary Vance: Sure.
Q. Okay, we might as well go right to the
heart of it. Must there be a Palestinian state
for there to be peace in the Middle East?
Bluntly, but —
Secretary Vance: That is up to the parties
to decide. I think it is necessary if one is
going to achieve a settlement to recognize
the legitimate requirements of the Pales-
tinian people. And I have said this many
times before.
Q. Well, do their legitimate interests in-
clude nationhood?
Secretary Vance: Well, that is up to them
to decide how that might be done.
Q. Excuse me, when you say "them," you
mean the parties or do you mean the Pales-
tinians ?
Secretary Vance: The parties.
Q. Do you still look for a resum,ption — do
you hope for a resumption of the Middle East
Peace Co7iference some time?
Secretary Vance: Yes. My view is that it is
important to have a resumption of a Geneva
conference in 1977.
I think, as I have said, that despite the dif-
ficulties which exist, the situation is more —
is improved from what it was nine months or
a year ago and that there are opportunities
to make progress this year.
Let me say, further, that I think it is ter-
ribly important that progress be made this
year, because if progress is not made this
year, then, as I see it, there is danger that
other factors may arise which may destroy
the more favorable conditions which cur-
rently exist.
Department Comments on Subject
of Human Rights in Czechoslovakia
Following is a stateynent read to news cor-
respondents on January 26 by Frederick Z.
Brown, Director, Office of Press Relations.
I would like to make a brief statement on
the subject of human rights in Czechoslo-
vakia.
Some 300 individuals in that country have
petitioned the government to guarantee the
rights accorded them by the Czechoslovak
Constitution, the international covenants on
civil and political and on economic, social,
and cultural rights, and by the Helsinki Final
Act.' We have noted that the signers of
Charter 77 explicitly state that it is not a
document of political opposition. Some of the
signers have reportedly been detained or
harassed.
As you know, the Helsinki Final Act pro-
vides that:
In the field of human rights and fundamental free-
doms, the participating States will act in conformity
with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations and with the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. They will also fulfill their obligations as
set forth in the international declarations and agree-
ments in this field, including inter alia the International
Covenants on Human Rights, by which they may be
bound.
All signatories of the Helsinki Final Act
are pledged to promote, respect, and observe
human rights and fundamental freedoms for
all. We must strongly deplore the violation of
such rights and freedoms wherever they
occur.
' For text of the Final Act of the Conference on Secu-
rity and Cooperation in Europe, signed at Helsinki on
Aug. 1, 1975, see Bulletin of Sept. 1, 1975, p. 323.
154
Department of State Bulletin
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Agriculture
Agreement establishing the International Fund for Ag-
ricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome June
13, 1976. '
Signatures: Venezuela, January 4, 1977; Switzerland,
January 24, 1977; Italy, Somalia, January 26, 1977;
Tunisia, January 27, 1977; Pakistan, January 28,
1977.
Antarctica
Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the
principles and objectives of the Antarctic treaty of
December 1, 1959 (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Oslo June
20, 1975. '
Notification of appraisal: Belgium, January 21, 1977,
for recommendations VIII-3, VIII-6-Vlil-14.
Copyright
Universal copyright convention, as revised. Done at
Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974.
TIAS 7868.
Accession deposited: Bahamas, September 27, 1976.
Cultural Property
Convention on the means of prohibiting and preventing
the illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of
cultural property. Done at Paris November 14, 1970.
Entered into force April 24, 1972. ^
Acceptance deposited: Saudi Arabia, September 8,
1976.
Ratification deposited: Bolivia, October 4, 1976.
Diplomatic Relations
Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on diplomat-
ic relations concerning the compulsory settlement of
disputes. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into
force April 24, 1964; for the United States December
13, 1972. TIAS 7502.
Ratification deposited: Korea, January 25, 1977.
Expositions
Protocol revising the convention of November 22, 1928,
relating to international e.xpositions, with appendix
and annex. Done at Pai'is November 30, 1972. '
Ratification deposited: Romania, May 12, 1976. ^
Gas
Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of as-
phyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bac-
teriological methods of warfare. Done at Geneva June
7, 1925. Entered into force February 8, 1928; for the
United States April 10, 1975. TIAS 8061.
Accession deposited: Qatar, September 16, 1976.
Health
Amendments to articles 35 and 55 of the Constitution of
the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as
amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva
May 22, 1973. '
Acceptances deposited: Comoros, Surinam, January
27, 1977.
Oil Pollution
Amendments to the international convention for the
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London Oc-
tober 21, 1969.
Acceptances deposited: Dominican Republic, January
14, 1977; Nigeria, January 19, 1977.
Enters into force: January 20, 1978.
Space
Convention on international liability for damage caused
by space objects. Done at Washington, London, and
Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into force Sep-
tember 1, 1972; for the United States October 9,
1973. TIAS 7762.
Ratification deposited: Finland, February 1, 1977.
Terrorism — Protection of Diplomats
Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes
against internationally protected persons, including
diplomatic agents. Done at New York December 14,
1973. Enters into force February 20, 1977.
Ratifications deposited: Federal Republic of Ger-
many, January 25, 1977; Tunisia, January 21, 1977.
Accession deposited: Chile, January 21, 1977.
United Nations
Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice. Signed at San Francisco
June 26, 1945. Entered into force October 24, 1945. 59
Stat. 1031.
Admission to membership: Angola, December 1,
1976; Western Samoa, December 15, 1976.
World Heritage
Convention concerning the protection of the world cul-
tural and natural heritage. Done at Paris November
23, 1972. Entered into force December 17, 1975.
TIAS 8226.
Ratification deposited: Bolivia, October 4, 1976.
BILATERAL
Australia
Agreement relating to the limitation of meat imports
from Australia during calendar year 1977. Effected
by exchange of notes at Washington December 14,
1976, and January 18, 1977. Entered into force
January 18, 1977.
' Not in force.
^ Not in force for the United States.
^ With reservation.
February 21, 1977
155
Canada
Understanding relating to trade in beef and veal be-
tween Canada and the United States in 1977. Ef-
fected by exchange of letters December 23 and 29,
1976. Entered into force December 29, 1976.
Costa Rica
Agreement relating to the limitation of meat imports
from Costa Rica during calendar year 1977. Effected
by exchange of notes at Washington December 14 and
20, 1976. Entered into force December 20, 1976.
Dominican Republic
Agreement relating to the limitation of meat imports
from the Dominican Republic during calendar year
1977. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington
December 14 and 16, 1976. Entered into force De-
cember 16, 1976.
El Salvador
Agreement relating to the limitation of meat imports
from El Salvador during calendar year 1977. Effected
by exchange of notes at Washington December 14 and
15, 1976. Entered into force December 15, 1976.
Guatemala
Agreement relating to the limitation of meat imports
from Guatemala during calendar year 1977. Effected
by exchange of notes at Washington December 14 and
15, 1976. Entered into force December 15, 1976.
Honduras
Agreement relating to the limitation of meat imports
from Honduras during calendar year 1977. Effected
by exchange of notes at Washington December 14,
1976. Entered into force December 14, 1976.
Hong Kong
Agreement amending the agreement of July 25, 1974, as
amended (TIAS 8897, 8274), relating to trade in cot-
ton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles. Effected by
exchange of notes at Hong Kong November 22 and
December 22, 1976. Entered into force December 22,
1976.
India
Agreement for the relief from double taxation on earn-
ings derived from the operation of aircraft, with re-
lated notes. Effected by exchange of notes at New
Delhi November 26, 1976. Entered into force
November 26, 1976: effective January 1, 1976.
Mexico
Agreement extending the agreement of July .31, 1970,
as amended and extended (TIAS 6941, 7927, 8397),
for a cooperative meteorological observation program
in Mexico. Effected by exchange of notes at Tlatelolco
and Mexico December 17, 1976, and January 12,
1977. Entered into force January 12, 1977.
Agreement regarding mutual assistance between the
U.S. and Mexican customs services. Signed at Mexico
September 30, 1976.
Entered into force: January 26, 1977.
New Zealand
Agreement relating to the limitation of meat imports
from New Zealand during calendar year 1977. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Washington December
14 and 23, 1976. Entered into force December 23,
1976.
Nicaragua
Agreement relating to the limitation of meat imports
from Nicaragua during calendar year 1977. Effected
by exchange of notes at Washington December 14 and
15, 1976. Entered into force December 15, 1976.
Panama
Agreement relating to the limitation of meat imports
from Panama during calendar year 1977. Effected by
exchange of notes at Washington December 14 and
16, 1976. Entered into force December 16, 1976.
Agreement relating to repayment by Panama of Agency
for International Development loan No. 525-L-006,
with schedule. Signed at Panama December 30, 1976.
Entered into force December 30, 1976.
Agreement relating to repayment by Panama of Agency
for International Development loan No. 525-L-014,
with schedule. Signed at Panama December 30, 1976.
Entered into force December 30, 1976.
Trinidad and Tobago
Agreement extending the agreement of June 20, 1968,
relating to a program of technical assistance in the
field of tax administration. Effected by exchange of
notes at Port of Spain November 10, December 7,
1976, and January 13, 1977. Entered into force
January 13, 1977.
156
Department of State Bulletin
INDEX February 21, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1965
Africa. Secretary Vance Interviewed by AP and
UPI Correspondents 147
Arms Control and Disarmament
Secretary Vance Interviewed by AP and UPI
Correspondents 147
Secretary Vance's News Conference of January
31 ..." 137
Chile. Secretary Vance's News Conference of
January 31 137
China
Secretary Vance Interviewed by AP and UPI
Correspondents 147
Secretary Vance's News Conference of January
31 ...'. 137
Cuba
Secretary Vance Interviewed by AP and UPI
Correspondents 147
Secretary Vance's News Conference of January
31 137
Cyprus
Secretary Vance Interviewed by AP and UPI
Correspondents 147
Secretary Vance's News Conference of January
31 ...'. 137
Czechoslovakia. Department Comments on Sub-
ject of Human Rights in Czechoslovakia (state-
ment) 154
Human Rights
Department Comments on Subject of Human
Rights in Czechoslovakia (statement) 154
Secretary Vance Interviewed by AP and UPI Cor-
respondents 147
Secretary Vance's News Conference of January
31 ...'. 137
Korea. Secretary Vance's News Conference of
January 31 137
Middle East
Secretary Vance Interviewed by AP and UPI
Correspondents 147
Secretary Vance's News Conference of January
31 137
Panama
Secretary Vance Interviewed by AP and UPI
Correspondents 147
Secretary Vance's News Conference of January
31 137
U.S. and Panama To Continue Negotiations on
Canal Treaty (joint statement) 146
Southern Rhodesia. Secretary Vance's News
Conference of January 31 137
Treaty Information. Current Actions 155
U.S.S.R.
Secretary Vance Interviewed by AP and UPI
Correspondents 147
Secretary Vance's News Conference of January
31 137
Vietnam. Secretary Vance's News Conference of
January 31 137
Name Index
Vance, Secretary 137, 147
No.
Date
t31
1/31
32
*33
1/31
1/31
Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: Jan. 31 — Feb. 6
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20520.
Subject
1977 edition of "Treaties in Force"
published.
Vance: news conference.
Meeting on exploratory talks with
Committee on Harmonization,
Conference of European Posts
and Telecommunications Admin-
istrations, Feb. 10.
Foreign educators to study U.S.
vocational and technical schools,
Feb. 1-Mar. 1.
Caribbean-American seminar to
open at Santo Domingo, Feb. 5.
U.N. Water Conference, Mar.
14-25.
Vance: interview by AP and UPI
correspondents.
U.S. and Republic of China amend
te.xtile agreement, Feb. 3.
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
*34
2/2
*35
2/3
*36
2/3
37
2/3
*38
2/4
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o
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Volume LXXVI • No. 1966 • February 28, 1977
PRESIDENT CARTER'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF FEBRUARY 8
Excerpts From Transcript 157
SECRETARY VANCE INTERVIEWED FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES 162
DEPARTMENT URGES PASSAGE OF BILL TO HALT
IMPORTATION OF RHODESIAN CHROME
Statements by Secretary Vance and Assistant Secretary Katz 170
0o:
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
OK><
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Vol. LXXVI, No. 1966
February 28, 1977
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington. D.C. 20402
PRICE:
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Single copy H5 cents
The Secretary of State has determined that the pub-
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Note: Contents of this publication are not
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BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to
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The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of U.S. foreign relations and
on the work of the Department and
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIS includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses, and
news conferences of the President and
the Secretary of State and other offi-
cers of the Department, as well as spe-
cial articles on various phases of in-
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the Department. Information is in-
cluded concerning treaties and inter-
national agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and on treaties of general interna-
tional interest.
Publications of the Department of
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international relations are also listed.
President Carter's News Conference of February 8
Following are excerpts relating to foreign
poUcy from the transcript of a news confer-
ence held by President Carter on Febru-
ary 8. ^
Q. Mr. President, you cited arms reduc-
tions as the prime tenet — one of them — of your
foreign policy. Under the circtirnstances, as a
first step will you block the sale of coricussion
bombs to a foreign country?
President Carter: The sale of concussion
bombs to a foreign country is an item that
concerns me very much. Within the next
week, after this review that has already been
undertaken is completed, I will have an an-
nouncement to make about that. The pre-
vious announcement that concussion bombs
would be sold was not cleared with the State
Department nor with the Defense Depart-
ment. I have asked them to analyze the polit-
ical and military consequences of the sale. I
am concerned about it, but have not yet de-
cided whether to cancel that sale.
Q. Does that mean, sir, that you are con-
sidering blocking the sale?
President Carter: That is one of the op-
tions that I have, and I will make a decision
within the next week.
Q. Mr. President, your nominee to head
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
Paul Warnke, wrote about a year and a half
ago that the United States "should try a pol-
icy of restraint while calling for matching
restraint from, the Soviet Union." But Mr.
Warnke didn't seem to believe that that had
' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents dated Feb. 14, 1977, p. 155.
to be guaranteed in advance in an agree-
ment. Is that a view to which you subscribe,
and could you explain why or why not?
President Carter: I know Mr. Warnke very
well. I have met with him several times to
discuss his attitude on disarmament matters.
I have complete confidence in him. The first
two times I asked him to take the job, he
turned me down. We tried to find an alterna-
tive who is as well qualified as he is to ex-
press my own views and those views that
would be acceptable to our country. I was
unsuccessful in finding someone to equal him.
He finally agreed to take the job, at my insist-
ence, as a public service.
I believe that his views are well considered
by me. And I have accepted them. I think
when the Members of the Senate consider
what Mr. Warnke stands for, he will be ap-
proved overwhelmingly.
I obviously believe that we both have to
take initiatives, the Soviet Union and the
United States. Most of our discussions will be
bilateral in nature. Subsequently, I hope to
bring in other nations to discuss, for instance,
comprehensive test ban questions and
others — the European nations who are nuclear
powers and also the Chinese. That would come
later.
But I believe that Mr. Warnke's proposals
are sound. And I have no concern about his
attitude. There will be instances on nuclear
weapons where each country has to take
some initiative. But the overall balance of
mutual restraint, cutting down on the overall
dependence on nuclear weapons, is what
counts.
And I might add one other point. Mr.
Warnke's positions will be carefully coordi-
nated with my own, working closely with
State Department, Defense Department offi-
cials. Our decisions with the Soviets will be
February 28, 1977
157
made public. We will consult with our allies
whenever possible. Any ratification of an
agreement with the Soviet Union would ob-
viously require senatorial approval. So, even
if I or Mr. Warnke or one other person in the
negotiation process should make a mistake
inadvertently, that mistake would be closely
scrutinized by the public and I would think
would be corrected. But I have complete con-
fidence in him.
Q. Mr. President, just to follow up a bit on
Stan's question, could you tell us, sir, do you
believe that there should be a rough parity
between the nuclear forces of the Soviet
Union and the United States? Do you think
we ought to, in the arms negotiations, strive
for superior force, or do you believe that as
long as we have the ability to inflict horren-
dous damage on them that it really doesn't
matter which side has the most bombs?
President Carter: At the present time, my
judgment is that we have superior nuclear
capability. The Soviet Union has more
throw-weight, larger missiles, larger
warheads. We have more missiles, a much
higher degree of accuracy, and also we have
three different mechanisms which are each
independently adequate to deliver atomic
weapons — airplanes, submarines, and inter-
continental ballistic missiles. I think that we
are roughly equivalent, even though I think
we are superior, in that either the Soviet
Union or we could destroy a major part of
the other nation if a major attack was made
with losses in the neighborhood of 50 to 100
million people if a large exchange was ini-
tiated.
We have the capability, as do the Soviets,
to detect the launching of opposing missiles,
and then I as President and the leaders in
Russia would have to be faced with the ques-
tion of how much of a retaliatory attack to
make. But in the e.xchange tens of millions of
people would be killed, and the threat of this
kind of holocaust is what makes it important
that we do keep an adequate deterrent capa-
bility. And it also is crucial for all of us to
remember that it is necessary to have drastic
reduction in dependence on atomic weapons.
Almost every major speech that I have
made since I have been involved in national
politics, I expressed — committed, first, to
stabilize the situation; second, to have de-
monstrable reductions in dependence upon
atomic weapons and set as our committed
long-range goal complete elimination of nu-
clear weapons from the earth.
I had a meeting this morning with a repre-
sentative of the People's Repubhc of China,
and he told me very clearly that the goal of
the Chinese Government was to reduce de-
pendence on nuclear weapons to zero.
If we and the Soviet Union can demon-
strate an ability to stop the present growth
and then to have substantial reductions, I be-
lieve, then, we can go to the French, British,
the Chinese, and others and say, "Would you
join us in stopping testing and in moving in
clearly monitorable ways to reduce depend-
ence on atomic weapons?"
Q. Mr. President, to follow that up, a little
bit earlier, sir, if I understood you correctly,
you said that you thought that each of the two
countries, ourselves and the Soviets, might
have to take some initiatives. I am trying to
translate that into some of the problems that
we face. Is the United States today prepared
to take the initiative perhaps in restraining
the development of the cruise missile in order
to get something going in the SALT talks
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks]?
President Carter: I wouldn't want to single
out one particular weapon which is still in the
development stage, but I will give you a
couple of examples that are symbolic in na-
ture, not too profound. One is that I have
suggested to the Soviet Union that they let
us know and that we let them know before
we launch any kind of intercontinental ballis-
tic missile in a test phase. We launch our
missiles from Vandenberg Air Force Base.
We don't launch them from the standard
silos. The Soviet Union does launch missiles
from their standard operating silos for test
purposes. I think a prior notice that this
launch was going to take place — 24 hours or
48 hours — would help a great deal.
I have called on the Soviet Union to join us
in a comprehensive test ban to stop all nu-
clear testing for at least an extended period
158
Department of State Bulletin
of time — two years, three years, four years.
The Soviets are interested in using nuclear
explosives to divert the course of a river in
northern Russia. I don't think they need to
test any more. If they want to put that as a
proviso in the agreement that they would
like to go ahead and divert that river, I think
that would be something that we could
negotiate and let us have observers there to
learn from them and vice versa. But I think
that the initiation of proposals that might be
mutually acceptable of this kind is very, very
important.
Now, we have two unresolved questions
derived from the Vladivostok agreement,
called SALT Two, and that is the cruise mis-
sile and the "Backfire" bomber. I would be
wiUing to go ahead with the Soviet Union,
conclude a quick agreement, if they think it
advisable, and omit the Backfire bomber and
the cruise missile from the negotiations at
this stage, and then in a SALT Three talk, if
necessary, put those two items back in for
further discussion.
But I think it is important for us — without
any pressure on me to proceed too hastily —
in a very careful and methodical way to dem-
onstrate to the world that we are sincere.
Q. I am sorry to pursue the subject, but if I
may ask one more question about initiatives.
When Mr. Warnke wrote that, he was appar-
ently talking aboid weapons systems as well
as nuclear warheads. And he was talking
about perhaps restraining the development of
a particular weapons system, hoping for rec-
iprocity by the Soviets.
My question is, would you consider saying
to the Soviets, say the B-1 or any other
weapons system, we are not going to develop
it for six months, we'd like to see something
from you in the way of reciprocity?
President Carter: Again, let me avoid ref-
erence to a particular weapons system on our
side. Let me refer to a weapons system on
their side. The Soviets have a missile with
limited range — it is not intercontinental in
nature — called the SS-20. They have begun
to install those missiles in mobile installa-
tions where they can move them in a con-
cealed way from one part of an area to
another. It makes it very difficult to pinpoint
their exact location.
I would like to see the Soviets cease de-
ployment of the mobile missile, even though
it is not of intercontinental type. It is very
difficult to distinguish it from the interconti-
nental missile called the SS-16. But if they
would agree, for instance, to a cessation of
the use or deployment of the mobile-type
missiles which could be moved around in dif-
ferent locations before launch, that would be
a very important point for us to join them in
a mutual agreement. It would mean we
would not then perhaps spend the large
amounts of money to develop our own mobile
missile. But if the Soviets should move to a
development of an intercontinental-type mis-
sile that can be moved from one place to
another undetected and its location cannot
be pinpointed, then that would put a great
pressure on us to develop a mobile missile of
our own.
So, I think on both sides there has to be
some initiation. But as individual weapons
systems are restrained, using initiative, you
have got to be sure that the overall balance
of deterrent is not disturbed.
Q. Mr. President, there have been a series
of actions taken in recent days by the Soviet
Union including the expulsion of American
journalists and the arrests of Aleksandr
Ginzburg, actions that we have taken issue
with in one form or another. How concerned
are you that by being outspoken on issues of
human rights that we may jeopardize possi-
bly our relations with the Soviet Union on
other matters ?
President Carter: Well, this brings up the
question that is referred to as "linkage." I
think we come out better in dealing with the
Soviet Union if I am consistently and com-
pletely dedicated to the enhancement of
human rights, not only as it deals with the
Soviet Union, but all other countries. I think
this can legitimately be severed from our in-
clination to work with the Soviet Union, for
instance, in reducing dependence upon
atomic weapons and in also seeking mutual
and balanced force reductions in Europe.
February 28, 1977
159
I don't want the two to be tied together. I
think the previous Administration, under
Secretary Kissinger, thought that there
ought to be this linkage, that if you men-
tioned human rights or if you failed to invite
Mr. [Aleksandr] Solzhenitsyn to the White
House that you might endanger the progress
of the SALT talks.
I don't feel that way. I think it ought to be
clear, and I have made clear directly in com-
munication to Mr. Brezhnev [Leonid L
Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union] and in my meeting with Am-
bassador Dobrynin [Anatoliy F. Dobrynin,
Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.] that I was
reserving the right to speak out strong and
forcefully whenever human rights are
threatened — not every instance, but when I
think it is advisable. This is not intended as a
public relations attack on the Soviet Union,
and I would hope that their leaders could
recognize the American people's deep con-
cern about human rights.
I think in many other countries of the
world there has been some progress. I think
in the Soviet Union there has already been
some progress. The number of Jews, for in-
stance, who have been permitted to emigrate
from the Soviet Union in the last few months
has increased.
If this trend should continue, I would be
encouraged. But I would have to take this
position of being independent in my own pub-
lic pronouncements. I have got a lot to learn.
I was concerned the other day, for instance,
when the AP reporter was expelled from
Moscow. I had a first thought to retaliate by
expelling the AP reporter from Washington.
But I found out that was not the right ap-
proach to take. [Laughter]
But we have got to be firm, and we have
got to be forceful. But I don't want to tie ev-
erything together in one package so that we
are timid about insisting on human rights.
Q. Do you interpret this in any way as a
kind of testing of you by the Soviet Union?
President Carter: No, I don't. I don't
interpret it as a testing. I regret the fact
that the Soviet Union saw fit to expel a
newspaper reporter. I regret very deeply the
fact that the Soviet Union has now incarcer-
ated Mr. Ginzburg, who has been one of the
leaders in the Soviet Union in representing
the case of the dissidents. But I can't go in
with armed forces and try to change the
internal mechanism of the Soviet Govern-
ment.
But I don't think it is designed to aggra-
vate me or to test me or to test the will of
this country. My commitment to human
rights is clear. I will maintain that clarity to
the maximum extent possible.
I don't want to mislead the American
people in dealing with the Soviets or with
others. We can't expect overnight success. It
requires long, tedious, labored, very care-
fully considered progress. I am not looking
for magic answers, but my determination is
very deep.
Soviet Journalist Expelled
From the United States
Following is a Department announcement
issued on February 5.
The Soviet Government on February 4 in-
formed our Embassy and the AP Moscow
bureau that AP Moscow correspondent
George Krimsky must leave the U.S.S.R.
within one week. We have notified the Soviet
Embassy today that Vladimir I. Alekseyev, a
Washington correspondent of TASS, must
leave the country within a week. We have
specified that our expulsion of Alekseyev is
in response to the Krimsky expulsion. We
regret this course of events, which is a step
backward from the objective of improving
working conditions for journalists contained
in the Helsinki Final Act and from the more
fundamental interest of promoting a freer
flow of information. 1
' For text of the Final Act of the Conference on Secu-
rity and Cooperation in Europe, signed at Helsinki on
Aug. 1, 1975, see Bulletin of Sept. 1, 1975, p. 323.
160
Department of State Bulletin
President Carter's Report
to the American People
Following is an excerpt relating to foreign
policy from President Carter's address
broadcast on television and radio on Feb-
ruary 2. 1
I have also made commitments about our
nation's foreign policy.
As Commander in Chief of the Armed
Forces, I am determined to have a strong,
lean, efficient fighting force.
Our policy should be based on close coop-
eration with our allies and worldwide respect
for human rights, a reduction in world ar-
maments, and it must always reflect our own
moral values. I want our nation's actions to
make you proud.
Yesterday, Vice President Mondale re-
turned from his 10-day visit with leaders of
Western Europe and Japan. I asked him to
make this trip to demonstrate our intention
to consult our traditional allies and friends on
all important questions. I have been very
pleased with his report. Vice President Mon-
dale will be a constant and close adviser for
me.
In a spirit of international friendship we
will soon welcome here in the United States
the leaders of several nations, beginning
with our neighbors, Canada and Mexico.
This month the Secretary of State, Cyrus
Vance, will go to the Middle East, seeking
ways to achieve a genuine peace between Is-
rael and its Arab neighbors.
' For the complete text, see Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents dated Feb. 7, 1977, p. 138.
Our Ambassador to the United Nations,
Andrew Young, left last night on a visit to
Africa to demonstrate our friendship for its
peoples and our commitment to peaceful
change toward majority rule in southern Af-
rica.
I will also strive to improve our relations
with the Soviet Union and the People's Re-
public of China, insuring our security while
seeking to reduce the risks of conflict.
We will continue to express our concern
about violations of human rights, as we have
during this past week, without upsetting our
efforts toward friendly relationships with
other countries.
Later, on another program, I will make a
much more complete report to you on foreign
policy matters.
U.S. Concerned at Treatment
of Aleksandr Ginzburg
Following is a statement read to news cor-
respo7idents on February 7 by Frederick Z.
Brown, Director, Office of Press Relations.
We are watching with concern the treat-
ment of Aleksandr Ginzburg, and we have
made the Soviet Government aware of our
feeling. Wherever it may occur, the harass-
ment of individuals who are pursuing the
principles set forth in the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, or who are working
for the implementation of the Final Act of
the Helsinki Conference, is a matter of pro-
found concern for all Americans.
February 28, 1977
161
Secretary Vance Interviewed for the New York Times
Following is the transcript of an interview
with Secretary Vance on February 9 by Hed-
rick Smith, Bernard Gwertzman, and
Graham Hovey, excerpts from which were
published in the New York Times on Feb-
ruary 11.
Press release 43 dated February 11
Q. You have talked a bit about the Middle
East; and of course with the trip coming up,
we are enormously interested in that. But
rather than plunge immediately into the de-
tails, can you give us some notion of your
thinking about the shape of an overall settle-
ment? What kind of a settlement do you have
in mind?
Secretary Vance: Yes. Let me talk first to
that question.
I do have some views about the shape of an
overall settlement, but we are in the process
now within the government of reviewing the
whole Middle East situation and getting the
inputs of various people in the government on
this. And I think it would be a mistake for me
at this time to try and put down for you any
particular set of views which I may have at
this time.
In addition to that, it is terribly important,
in developing our ultimate views on this, that
we have the critical input which I expect to
get as a result of the trip which I am about to
embark on. What I want to do is to get
firsthand the views of the leaders of the key
countries which are involved, to have a chance
to discuss this in a face-to-face manner, and to
make sure that I understand fully what their
views are on these various issues.
I will then come back and report these to
the President. We will then be able to com-
plete our analysis and thinking and develop
our views on how we might best facihtate the
movement toward a peaceful settlement.
Q. Do you have the feeling that we, the
United States, should be playing a more ac-
tive role in trying to draw up a settlement, as
Secretary Rogers did at one point — in talking
about a Palestinian state, trying to figure out
where the borders should be? Or do you see our
role being much more a mediating kind of
role?
Secretary Vance: I think that we should not
come up with, or try to come up with, a spe-
cific plan.
I think that our role should be one of
facilitating the process of the parties arriving
at a settlement. But in this I think we must
play a very active role. I think that we have
got to work with the parties and help them in
the development of a settlement which will be
acceptable to them. We can't play a passive
role and accomplish that purpose, and we
don't intend to. I think it is terribly important
that progress be made and that it be made in
1977.
I think that the situation now is much bet-
ter than it has been in the past. A lot of things
have changed in the last nine months to a
year, as we have talked about before. And I
think that we should take advantage of these
facts and press forward for a prompt and
early resolution of the differences which ob-
viously remain.
Now, I don't want to underestimate the dif-
ficulty of it. The substantive issues which di-
vide the parties are still very deep and very
difficult to resolve. But I think it is possible to
make progress, and we are going to do every-
thing we can to have it.
Q. Some people have said there has been
some movement on the Palestinian position,
that the Palestinian leadership now seems to
be looking toward a separate state, not to in-
corporate the current Israeli boundaries. Do
you see this as a positive development?
162
Department of State Bulletin
Secretary Vance: If there has been a mod-
eration in the Palestinian position, then ob-
viously this would be a helpful step. This is
something that I'd want to find out firsthand
from the Arab leaders. I would like to find out
whether they share this view. There is in-
creasing talk that this is the case, and I want
to explore this in depth with them.
Q. Do you see a need in terms of the Geneva
conference machinery, a need for a prelimi-
nary conference in which the PLO [Palestine
Liberatio7i Organization] would not be repre-
sented?
Secretary Vance: Let me talk about the
broader question of whether there should be a
preliminary conference. I think it is essential
that the necessary groundwork be accom-
plished before one goes to a Geneva confer-
ence. I think to rush into a Geneva conference
without thorough and adequate planning
would be a mistake. Whether it will be neces-
sary to have some sort of a preliminary con-
ference to complete that groundwork I don't
know yet, but I do not rule out that possibil-
ity.
Q. You are talking about satisfying or
somehow meeting the interests of the Pales-
tiyiians. Do you think, ultimately, that that is
going to mean a Palestinian state of some
kind?
Secretary Vance: Well, let me say that
there really are three key elements of any
settlement. One is peace, the other is with-
drawal, and the third is finding a way to meet
the legitimate interests of the Palestinian
people.
Q. But what does that mean, the "legitimate
interests" of the Palestinian people?
Secretary Vance: I think it means just what
it says.
Q. In terms of some of the other questions
out there, the Israelis got the impression, or
say they got the im,pression, that this Admin-
istration would go along mth the idea of giv-
ing them the concussion bombs. The President
indicated yesterday that was under review.
Does that signal that there really is likely to
be a change on that issue?
Secretary Vance: No decision has yet been
reached on it. The President said that the
matter was under review, and he also indi-
cated that one of the options would be a nega-
tive decision. But no final decision has yet
been made.
Q. Just to be more specific, has there been a
change? hi other words, did you tell A^nbas-
sador Dinitz [Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Aynbas-
sador to the U.S.] at any point that anything
promised them by the Ford Administration
would be carried out iii the arms field?
Secretary Vance: I have not made that spe-
cific statement to him, no.
Q. Would a decision on the CBU-72 involve
a broader policy statement about arms sales
to the area?
Secretary Vance: The President has already
indicated what the broad scope of our arms
transfer policy is across the globe, and the
President has also indicated that we consider
it important to try and reduce the transfer of
arms into the Middle East.
In addition, the President has indicated
that this is a subject which he wishes me to
take up with the various leaders which I will
be visiting during my forthcoming trip, and I
plan to discuss this question with them, be-
cause I think it's a question of the supplier
and of the recipient countries.
Q. Have you already talked about it with
either Mr. Dobrynin [Anatoliy F. Dobrynin,
Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.] or any of the
other Ambassadors of the arms-supplying
countries, like the French, the Germans —
Secretary Vance: Yes, indeed. I have dis-
cussed this with a number of such people.
Q. What kind of a response do you get? Be-
cause clearly it is not going to work unless we
get kind of a general policy here from several
arms suppliers, is it?
Secretary Vance: I have gotten a response
which indicates a wilhngness to discuss the
question and see whether or not there isn't
some agreement which we can then reach; be-
cause I think most of the countries, or at least
most of the countries that I have talked to,
February 28, 1977
163
have indicated that they share the concern
that the President has expressed in this area.
Q. Now, pist to be specific, which countries
are these?
Secretary Vance: I would prefer not to give
you the names, but there are several of them.
Q. At least including the Germans and the
French ?
Q. The Germans don't sell to the Middle
East. The French and British, I suppose.
Secretary Vance: Let's just leave it where
it is.
Q. hi your press conference [on January
31], you said you didn't think this would be
feasible toward the Middle East until a politi-
cal solution could be arranged — that is, an
arms holddown.
Secretary Vance: What I said in my press
conference, as I recall, was that the Soviet
position, as I understood it, is that it would be
unlikely that any agreement could be reached
with them with respect to the sale of arms to
the Middle East without a political settle-
ment; that thereafter they would be in-
terested in discussing such a solution.
Possible Factors in Arms Transfer Decisions
Q. In your press conference, you also
talked about the possibility of having licens-
ing before you could approach a country to
sell. How far has this now gone? Are you
about ready to put it in the Federal Register?
Secretary Vance: Yes. We have done more
work on this, and I would expect that we will
proceed to publish a draft regulation along
these lines in the near future.
Q. Are there certain countries you have
particularly in mind with this?
Secretary Vance: No. This is a general prop-
osition, and the general proposition is a very
simple one; namely, that before arms man-
ufacturers go abroad and seek to interest
other countries in purchasing arms from us,
they should be required to come to us and
seek approval. Because we want to make sure
that whatever is done would be consistent
with American foreign policy, and this is at
least one way to begin to try and get hold of
the problem.
Q. You have spoken out, the President has,
the Department has and the White House has,
on the issue of human rights. Are you headed
toward a policy, or is this already the begin-
ning of a policy, in which human rights con-
siderations uxill affect military sales or aid
agreements to such countries as Chile or
Korea or Iran or Argentina?
Secretary Vance: This is one of the consid-
erations that I think must be taken into ac-
count in connection with arms transfers. In-
deed, the Congress has mandated it in certain
cases.
Q. Do you think you are going to be able to
reach an across-the-board policy, or is it
going to be on a country-by-country basis, or
what?
Secretary Vance: We haven't completed our
work on this. It is a very complex problem to
deal with, and I can't give you a clear, defini-
tive answer at this point. But obviously, it will
be a factor, and we are working our way to-
ward trying to define how such a policy would
be carried out.
Q. What are some of the considerations? I
mean, for example, the exposure of the Ko-
reans or the Iranians in terms of interna-
tional security situations, as opposed to some
of the Latin American couyitries where the
strategic situation is different?
Secretary Vance: Yes, obviously, the
strategic situation is of critical importance;
and if the withholding of arms really jeopard-
ized the country involved in a situation
where the peace might be jeopardized, this
would have to be an important factor which
you would take into account in making your
decision.
Q. Can you discuss the status of the two
nuclear agreetnents with Egypt and Israel
that were initialed in the past Administra-
tion ?
Secretary Vance: I have nothing new to say
on this at this time.
164
Department of State Bulletin
I Q. In other ivords, it is still under study?
Secretary Vance: Yes.
Proliferation and Arms Transfer Issues
Q. On the question of nuclear proliferation,
as I understand the legislation, one of the re-
quirements is that there be no aid to the coun-
tries which have reprocessing facilities or
capabilities, if I understand it correctly.
Is there any problem in the Middle East,
and specifically with Israel? Are you satis-
fied that the Israeli reactor at the moment
does not pose a problem? Or do you think it
does?
Secretary Vance: As I say, this whole ques-
tion is under study now and I am awaiting the
results before we forward them to the Presi-
dent and discuss it with the President.
Let me talk a bit about proliferation, if I
might, because this is an area, as well as the
arms transfer area, where I think new ground
is really being broken in this Administration.
In the first place, we have taken the whole
complex of proliferation issues and the arms
transfer issues and have moved them directly
up under the supervision of the Under Secre-
tary for Security Assistance [Lucy P. Wilson
Benson]. We have brought in a deputy to the
Under Secretary, Joe Nye, who is an ex-
tremely able man, to assist Mrs. Benson in
working on the problems in the proliferation
area.
This is going to be the center for the de-
velopment of policy with respect to prolifera-
tion in the government, and the mere fact that
we have brought it up from the lower levels in
the Department to the Under Secretary level
indicates the importance which we attach to
it.
Also, there are interrelationships between
the proliferation issues and the arms transfer
issues, and I think it is necessary to integrate
the manner in which we deal with these prob-
lems both within the Department and within
the government, and that is another reason
that we have taken the steps which I have
just described.
I really do think that these are terribly im-
portant issues, and I am hopeful that we can
really get hold of these problems and give
some leadership, not only here in this country
but in the world in general, in these areas.
Q. Do you have a timetable in mind when
you expect enough of your studies to be done,
u'hen you can actually be putting at least
early tentative proposals on the table?
Secretary Vance: Yes. I would think that
before this first six months is out we will
have some specific proposals that we will be
able to put on the table.
Q. Are you speaking to other governments
there ?
Secretary Vance: Other governments, and
the completion of review within our own gov-
ernment in such areas as arms transfers, so
that we have a clear idea of what the arms
transfer policy of the United States should be
and the reasons for it.
Q. What has happened to that national se-
curity memorandum, that was done on Per-
sian Gulf arms sales? Has that been sort of
thrown away?
Secretary Vance: No. They are still work-
ing on the response to that.
Q. / see. Because I think Congress needs to
have it, doesn't it?
Secretary Vance: That's right, it does. And
that is in the process of completion at this
point.
Q. Can you talk more about the integra-
tion between arms transfer and prolifera-
tion? Do you mean by that that if a country
is assured of an adequate conventional arm,s
supply it wouldn't have to turn to nuclear
weapons ?
Secretary Vance: That is one of the issues.
It has been suggested by many of those who
have worked in this area that one of the facts
which may lead a country not to proceed with
the development of nuclear weapons is the
assurance that it has enough conventional
capability to take care of its national security
interests.
That is the kind of issue, I think, that has
to be studied in the particular context of the
February 28, 1977
165
country with which you are dealing, and the
two have to be integrated in reaching a con-
clusion as to how you wish to proceed in that
particular area.
Brazil and Nuclear Energy
Q. How cmcial to this effort over the long
haul are your current negotiations with the
German Government on the deal they have
already made with Brazil? Does that upset
everything, if they proceed and you are not
able to dissuade them?
Secretary Vance: I think our discussions
are very important and, as you know, they
begin tomorrow when State Secretary
Hermes [Peter Hermes, State Secretary,
Federal German Foreign Office] comes over
here. And subsequently we will be discussing
these matters with the Brazilians.
Q. Several people have raised the question
about Brazil, both iyi Latin America and in
this country, that this urge for nuclear capa-
bility with Brazil is a much broader de-
velopment than merely pushing the nuclear
field, that Brazil is now a continental coun-
try with a ^'manifest destiny" urge, and that
in the decade ahead Brazil will become much
more of a power to contend with. Looking
over the long run, do you see Brazil as more
of a problem and more of a partner? How do
you see it?
Secretary Vance: Obviously Brazil is an
extremely important nation, not only in this
hemisphere but in the world, and it is playing
an increasingly important part in the delib-
erations of the world bodies on all types of
issues.
Coming to the question of nuclear power, I
am fully sensitive to the need of the Brazil-
ians for adequate power. And the question is
not one of their having nuclear reactors to
develop the necessary power which they re-
quire. The question relates only to the issue
of reprocessing plants and enrichment
plants.
Q. Do you see other urges to push toward
the Pacific or other urges in Brazil, in Latin
Aynerica, which might pose other policy
problems down the road?
Secretary Vance: I am afraid I don't un-
derstand your question.
Q. Well, a number of people have
suggested, specialists on Brazil, that Brazil
is backing Bolivia in its urge to get an open-
ing to the Pacific and that Brazil is feeling
its muscles and that over a period of time,
over the next several years, Brazil is simply
going to be a much tnore dynamic power,
which may raise some policy problems for us
down the pike.
Secretary Vance: Our relations with Brazil
have been very good. I expect them to con-
tinue to improve. And as I have indicated,
we are going to explore a whole range of is-
sues in our discussions with the Brazilians.
Q. Might some of our effort to provide al-
ternatives for Brazil for the reprocessing and
the enrichment facilities involve their signa-
ture of the Nonproliferation Treaty, which
they haven't sigyied?
Secretary Vance: We would hope that they
and others would sign the Nonproliferation
Treaty, and there are a number of alterna-
tives that one could consider with respect to
the forgoing of a reprocessing plant, such as
the guarantee of the supply of uranium and
the whole question of the internationalization
of facilities.
MBFR Talks
Q. Shifting to Europe, you and others have
mentioned in one form or another concern
about the Soviet arms buildup, conventional
arms buildup, in the center of Europe. Do
you all at the moment have any specific
ideas or thoughts about how to get the MBFR
bnutual and balanced force reduction] talks
moving — not necessarily specific proposals,
but an approach, either in terms of discuss-
ing pullback or kinds of reductions in ar-
maments there, which would be helpful to the
West and to getting the talks moving?
Secretary Vance: Well, in the first place, it
seems to me that the problem has been that
there has not been sufficient political push on
either side to get the talks moving, and I
think that is the first step that has to be
166
Department of State Bulletin
taken; and I am encouraged to see that the
Soviets have indicated that they consider
this to be of high priority and they are pre-
pared to move forward with them. We have
stated that we consider the movement in the
talks to be of high priority; and if we get this
kind of political decision taken on both sides,
then I think it is possible to begin to make a
move forward.
Let me make the point, though, that what
we will be doing, we will be doing with full
consultation with our allies. We are not talk-
ing about taking any unilateral steps here.
Whatever we do will be done after full con-
sultation.
Q. / see Joe Kraft alluded to this in his
column the other day: Are you about ready
now to begin discussions finally with the
Chinese on resolving the frozen-assets ques-
tions 1
Secretary Vance: Yes. This is a subject
that I think it would be useful for us to begin
to discuss with the Chinese.
Q. Do they feel that way? Do you have any
idea that they feel that way, other than what
has appeared in the press?
Secretary Vance: Yes. We have some indi-
cation that they feel the same way.
Q. So, then, you would expect talks at
some point?
Secretary Vance: I would hope there would
be talks in the not too distant future.
Q. Here or in East Asia?
Secretary Vance: We are not that far along
the road yet.
Q. I see. But it would not necessarily re-
quire a new head of our mission in Peking to
move ahead with that sort of thing?
Secretary Vance: No.
Q. You mentioned, very interestingly , the
elevation of this office and appointments
concerned ivith nuclear proliferation. You
have brought a number of younger people
into the State Department. I wonder if you
would talk with us just a yno^nent about your
ideas of how you have organized the State
Department, what it is you are trying to do?
Secretary Vance: What I have tried to do
is to bring into the State Department a bal-
ance of those who have experience and
younger people who have fresh ideas and
who can begin to bring along another genera-
tion of experts in the foreign policy field. I
think we have been very fortunate in those
that we have been able to enlist to work in
the Administration, both in terms of the
career officers who are the backbone of the
Department and in the younger group that
has come in at the Assistant Secretary and
Deputy Assistant Secretary level to join us.
I think by putting together this combina-
tion that we are going to have an excellent
group of officers and staff that will give us
the ability to handle the difficult set of prob-
lems that face us in a satisfactory and con-
structive way.
Q. But, organizationally , before you were
talking about elevating a conceryi —
Secretary Vance: Yes.
Q. — and integrating an effort —
Secretary Vance: Yes.
Q. — on specific policy problems; nam,ely,
proliferation and arms sales. Are there other
organizational changes that you have made
which, in effect, highlight policy problems,
specifically global policy problems, that you
feel are crucial?
Secretary Vance: Well, we are in the proc-
ess of examining some other areas in the
light of possible organizational changes
which may put more focus on the global prob-
lems.
Q. Such as food and environm,ental prob-
lems, this kind of thing?
Secretary Vance: That is correct.
Q. Are those specific things?
Secretary Vance: I have nothing specific on
this point. It is clear that this whole set of
global problems is a new dimension that is of
increasing importance. And as we look down
the years ahead, I think they are going to be
of major importance.
February 28, 1977
167
I further believe that many of these will
replace some of the traditional security prob-
lems as the items of principal focus in the
foreign policy field.
Q. I have ^mentioned two. I don't want
them to be my words. I mean, would you
agree on food and environment ?
Secretary Vance: Food and environment.
We have already talked about proliferation,
arms transfers, the international economic
problems. Did we talk about population?
Q. Food and environment, proliferation,
arms transfers, international econo-tnic
problems.
Secretary Vance: Yes, I would definitely
include population.
Problems of Paramount Importance
Q. A substantive question, dealing with
Cuba and Panama. You have mentioned in
one context or another an interest at least in
exploriyig some possibilities for normaliza-
tion with Cuba. You are obviously pushing
ahead on the Pa^iayna Canal negotiations.
Can you move on both these fronts at the
same time? Each of them are very sensitive
political issues. Or do you have some kind of
a sequence of handling these problems in
mind?
Secretary Vance: Let me say that at the
outset we saw a number of problems of
paramount importance. In order to try to
begin to move on these, we have taken a
number of steps.
First, we have begun to move on the Panama
Canal, and we now have the talks scheduled to
resume.
Another critical issue is the Middle East.
We are now beginning to take the first steps
in that particular area.
Thirdly, the problem of the strategic arms
talks. Here again I think we are taking the
necessary steps to begin to move that, as I
have said, out of the doldrums.
In a similar fashion, I think the political
judgments are being made which will make it
possible for us to begin to move forward with
the mutual balanced force reduction talks.
We have also indicated a desire to begin to
move toward normalization in the area of
Cuba.
I have also indicated that we would con-
sider it important to try and come to grips
with the missing-in-action question in Viet-
nam, so that we could then begin to try and
move toward normalization in that area.
Q. Do you have any date for that, any
talks with the Vietnamese?
Secretary Vance: No specific dates. But
these are all areas of importance where I
think we have begun to move and to take the
necessary first steps to move us along the
road.
Now, this is not to say that this is an over-
all statement of priorities, but these are
some of the more important areas where we
have already begun to move.
One which I should underscore is the very
important trip which Vice President Mondale
took at the very outset of this Administra-
tion. I think it was extremely important that
he take this trip to visit our key allies and to
have a chance to discuss with them their
views as well as our preliminary views on a
number of important issues. And this under-
scores the importance which this Administra-
tion attaches to our relationship with our
allies.
So these are some of the things which I
would point to to indicate a general direction
in this first two to three weeks of the
Administration.
Q. You didn't mention Greece and Turkey
and the [Clark] Clifford mission, but I am
sure you meant to.
Secretary Vance: Yes.
Q. You meant to include that.
Secretary Vance: I meant to include that.
Q. On the Cuba aiid Panama thing, this
combination — -just looking at Latin America
for a moment, do you have a sense of timing
there?
Secretary Vance: Before I answer you on
that, another one that I should mention in
168
Department of State Bulletin
the important area is the whole question of
southern Africa.
As you know, we have just recently met
with Ambassador Ivor Richard [Chairman of
the Geneva Conference on Rhodesia and
U.K. Permanent Representative to the United
Nations] for two days. We have had a very
good discussion of possible further steps that
might be taken to get the negotiations back
on the track.
They will — they, the British — will be dis-
cussing this among themselves, and we will
be further refining our thoughts; and we will
be meeting again in the next two weeks or so
to see what joint efforts we may come up
with to try and get some progress again.
Q. You won't go to London on your way
back from the Middle East to talk about this?
Secretary Vance: No, I will not. I will be
coming directly back.
Q. Will he come here, then, for a second
round of talks? Is that what you mean to be
saying?
Secretary Vance: I don't know whether he
will come here or we will have somebody go
to London. But we will.be discussing our fur-
ther actions with them.
Q. You m,ention joint actions. I take it that
doesn't, however, change the situation in
which we regard the British as kind of being
the front-runner on this.
Secretary Vance: It does not, no. This is
clearly a case where the British are properly
the front-runner, and we will be doing every-
thing we can to support them fully, as we
have in the past.
Q. I have gotten the catalogue. Can I come
back to the Cuba and the Panatna thing? Do
you have some notion of the sequence here in
the way that you will handle these issues?
Secretary Vance: On the Panama situation,
the negotiations are about to resume, and I
would hope that they would proceed as we
indicated in our joint communique, or our
joint statement, which Minister Boyd and I
issued, promptly, and that we would make
rapid progress.'
Q. Do you have a date yet to talk to the
Cubans on this law of the sea, or whatever it
is?
Secretary Vance: No. I have no dates on
any discussions at this point with the Cu-
bans.
Q. Do you feel that the Soviets, the Soviet
leadership understands the decoupling of the
SALT and strategic issues from, the human
rights issues that has been articulated by the
President?
Secretary Vance: I think the President
made it very clear yesterday that both he
and I believe that we can and will state our
views with respect to these very important
human rights issues. At the same time, we
believe that we must continue to discuss and
press forward on the critically important
strategic arms talks.
As he indicated, neither he nor I think that
there is a linkage that prevents these two
things from proceeding at the same time.
Q. But is there a linkage on other areas
such as humayi rights and econoyyiic coopera-
tion or human rights and mutual coopera-
tion ?
Secretary Vance: As I indicated before in
the interview that I gave, obviously what
happens in the human rights area affects the
climate of relations between countries.^
What I have said is that I believed that there
had been an overemphasis on linkage in the
past.
'■ For text of a joint statement issued at Washington
on Jan. 31 following a meeting between Secretary
Vance and Panamanian Foreign Minister Aquilino
Boyd, see Bulletin of Feb. 21, 1977, p. 146.
^ For an interview with Secretary Vance by AP and
UPI correspondents on Feb. 3, see ibid., p. 147.
February 28, 1977
169
THE CONGRESS
Department Urges Passage of Bill To Halt
Importation of Rhodesian Chrome
Following are statements by Secretary
Vance and Julius L. Katz, Assistant Secre-
tary for Economic and Business Affairs, be-
fore the Subcommittee on African Affairs of
the Senate Comynittee on Foreign Relations on
February 10. *
STATEMENT BY SECRETARY VANCE
Press release 42 dated February 10
I am pleased to be with you today and to
have this opportunity to comment on the
Rhodesian sanctions bill.
The Administration fully supports this bill.
We urge the Congress to pass it into law as
rapidly as possible. To do so would, I firmly
believe, strengthen the hand of the United
States and others who are working to find a
peaceful solution to the Rhodesian problem.
Moreover, it would return the United States
to conformity with its obligations under the
United Nations Charter. American industry
is not dependent on Rhodesian chrome, and
repeal will not harm our economy.
President Carter has on many occasions
stated clearly and forcefully his commit-
ment to human rights. That commitment,
which I know you share, and which is ex-
pressed in the provisions of the United Na-
tions Charter, will be a major factor as this
Administration formulates its foreign, as
well as its domestic, policies. We are guided
by this commitment in our approach to all the
problems of southern Africa. It requires our
' The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub-
lished by the committee and will be available from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
firm and clear opposition to racial injustice
wherever it exists.
The world faces an explosive situation in
southern Africa. Negotiations for a Rhode-
sian settlement have faltered, though our ef-
forts to nurture them continue. Violence is
intensifying. The Namibian dispute is not
moving toward solution; indeed, it adds to
the danger that violence in southern Africa
will spread. And in South Africa itself a sys-
tem of institutionalized racial discrimination,
which this Administration strongly opposes,
feeds black unrest.
The Rhodesian situation is of greatest
urgency, however, for there the extent of
armed conflict is broadest and the threat of
escalation most immediate. We view with
deep concern the dangerous situation in
Rhodesia that has arisen out of the attempt
of the illegal minority government to main-
tain itself in power. If the Rhodesian au-
thorities, who represent less than 4 percent
of the population, persist in this course, the
inevitable outcome will be a bitter legacy for
the future of all the inhabitants of that terri-
tory.
Intensified conflict in Rhodesia also entails
serious adverse economic effects on countries
in the region. Furthermore, the possibility of
non-African forces interfering cannot be dis-
counted.
We must continue to try to help head off a
disaster in Rhodesia. We believe that change
there is necessary. It is certainly inevitable.
Our challenge is that it be rapid, peaceful,
and orderly. This can only come through a
negotiated settlement which leads quickly to
a system of majority rule and respect for the
rights and dignity of all, regardless of their
race. In our effort to help achieve this goal
170
Department of State Bulletin
we shall continue to confer with the British
Government, African leaders, and the South
African Government.
I have said recently that the Rhodesian au-
thorities should understand clearly that
under no circumstance can they count on any
form of American assistance in their effort to
prevent majority rule in Rhodesia or to enter
into negotiations which exclude leaders of
the nationalist movements.
I underscore that statement again today.
But the key to peace lies in Mr. Ian Smith's
hands, and repeal of the Byrd amendment
would do far more to persuade him to use it.
It is essential that the Congress and the
executive branch work together in this re-
spect to present a unified American position.
Throughout the world community, people
are watching to see what the United States
decides to do. African and other leaders place
considerable importance on the action Con-
gress will take with regard to repeal of the
Byrd amendment — and, I might add, they
want to know how deeply the Administration
is committed to its repeal. Let no one be in
doubt about the depth of our commitment.
In his talk with Ambassador Young [An-
drew Young, U.S. Representative to the
United Nations] last weekend. President
Nyerere of Tanzania laid stress on repeal of
the Byrd amendment as part of an active role
by the United States in tightening U.N. eco-
nomic sanctions against Rhodesia. Other Af-
rican leaders have recently expressed the
same sentiment to us.
Passage of the Byrd amendment in 1971
put the United States in violation of its in-
ternational obligations. The economic sanc-
tions imposed by the U.N. Security Council
in 1966 and 1968 were based on the Council's
right to determine that a threat to the peace
existed in the Rhodesian situation and to in-
voke enforcement measures, as it did, under
chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
A legal obhgation for all member states was
thus created. As a permanent member of the
Security Council the United States could
have vetoed the sanctions resolutions. It did
not, but in fact supported and voted for the
sanctions. As a matter of international law,
we are committed, under article 25 of the
charter, to abide by them.
With the passage of the Byrd amendment,
the United States, whose record in enforcing
sanctions had been as good as or better than
that of any nation, became one of a handful of
nations which, as a matter of official policy,
violate the sanctions. We thereby put our-
selves at odds with the will of the interna-
tional community in the only effort ever
made by the United Nations to use manda-
tory economic sanctions. We have acted in
violation of our own often proclaimed devo-
tion to international law.
By repealing the Byrd amendment we
would remove this symbol of ambivalence in
American policy toward Rhodesia and toward
international law. We would return to adher-
ence to our obligations under the United Na-
tions Charter.
When the Byrd amendment was passed, it
was argued that, for strategic and economic
reasons, the United States needed continued
access to Rhodesian chrome. However, it
should now be clear that access to Rhodesian
chrome and other minerals is not an impor-
tant element in U.S. security or overall eco-
nomic policy. We maintained a huge supply of
chrome in our strategic stockpile, and the
Defense Department's requirement for
metallurgical-grade chromite was relatively
small. Moreover, passage of the Byrd
amendment did not, as it was intended, make
us less reliant on imports of Soviet chrome.
Many of those who supported the Byrd
amendment did so because of their under-
standing that the American steel industry
depended on Rhodesian chrome for the pro-
duction of American specialty steel. How-
ever, as one original supporter of the
amendment. Congressman John Dent, has
said, "Due to recent technological innova-
tions, the United States is no longer depend-
ent on Rhodesian chrome." He added that
consequently, and because "the existence of
the amendment might hamper American dip-
lomatic initiatives," he will now reverse the
position he has held since 1971, and support
and vote for repeal of the Byrd amendment.
It is my firm belief that repeal of the Byrd
amendment will serve the interests of the
United States. It will in no way harm us
strategically or economically. To the con-
trary, it will strengthen our position and add
February 28, 1977
171
to our stature internationally. And it will as-
sist us in reaching the goal we share with
many others: a peaceful transition to major-
ity rule and equal rights in Rhodesia. This
goal will be difficult of attainment in any
case. As long as the Byrd amendment re-
mains on the books, it will be even harder.
The Carter Administration attaches the
highest importance to repeal. In testifying
today on behalf of the Administration, I
speak for the President, who strongly sup-
ports this initiative. We welcome your bill
and hope that the Congress will give it the
very full measure of support it deserves. We
will work with you to this end.
STATEMENT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY KATZ
I appreciate this opportunity to appear be-
fore your committee in support of S. 174, a
bill to halt the importation of Rhodesian
chrome, nickel, and other ferroalloys. In this
statement I intend to discuss the economic
impact of the Byrd amendment during the
past four years and the economic conse-
quences of the reimposition of full sanctions
against Rhodesia as proposed in this bill.
The U.S. Bureau of Mines estimates that
total world resources of chromite amount to
nearly 9 billion tons, mostly occurring in the
Eastern Hemisphere. While the United
States has some resources of chromite in
Montana, Oregon, California, and Alaska,
they are low grade and are not presently
commercially exploitable on a significant
scale.
Commercially exploitable reserves around
the world are estimated at 1.9 billion tons
and are located chiefly in South Africa, which
alone has reserves of about 1.1 billion tons,
Rhodesia, the U.S.S.R., Turkey, and the
Philippines. Preliminary estimates of world
chromite production in 1976 are 8.9 million
tons, of which South Africa produced 27 per-
cent; Communist countries, 35 percent; Tur-
key and Rhodesia, about 8 percent each; and
the Philippines, less than 4 percent.
Chrome is used by three main branches of
U.S. industry: the steel industry for produc-
tion of stainless and alloy steels; the chemical
industry for pigments, plating, and tanning;
and the refractory industry for manufacture
of refractory bricks.
By far the largest user of chrome is the
specialty steel industry, which in 1974 ac-
counted for about 65 percent of U.S. con-
sumption. Over half of all imports of chro-
mite are converted by the ferroalloys indus-
try into ferrochromium, an intermediate
product used by the specialty steel industry
to make stainless and alloy steels. Stainless
steels are vital to production of aircraft,
machinery, processing equipment, autos, and
many other capital, strategic, and consumer
goods requiring a high degree of corrosion
resistance.
A number of different technologies have
been developed to process chromite into fer-
rochromium, depending on the type of chro-
mite ore being used. In addition, a relatively
new technology called the Argon Oxygen De-
carburization (AOD) process developed by
industry in the late 1960's has been particu-
larly successful in providing a higher yield of
chromium derived from lower grades of
chromite ore. It is estimated that the AOD
technology is now used to produce 60 to 65
percent of the world's stainless steel. The
significance of this development is that it
permits increased use of chemical- and
refractory-grade ores — chiefly found in
South Africa, Brazil, and other countries —
which could replace Rhodesian and Russian
material.
Apart from recycled scrap, which in 1975
satisfied 10 percent of the total U.S. chrome
demand, the United States is almost totally
dependent on imports for its chrome re-
quirements.
The preliminary estimate of imports of
chromite for 1976 stands at 1.2 million tons,
compared to 1.4 million in 1970 and 1.05 mil-
lion in 1972, the year following enactment of
the Byrd amendment. For ferrochromium
imports, the preliminary 1976 figure is
270,000 tons, compared to 42,000 tons in 1970
and 150,000 tons in 1972.
These figures indicate small declines in the
volume of chromite ore imports but a sharply
rising volume of imports of ferrochromium.
Growing imports of ferrochromium in large
part reflect the efforts of chromite-producing
countries to ship the higher valued inter-
172
Department of State Bulletin
mediate product, ferrochromium, rather than
shipping chromite ore to the United States
for conversion.
Sources of U.S. Imports
I would now like to turn specifically to
U.S. dependence on Rhodesia and the impli-
cations of removal of the Byrd amendment.
According to the U.S. Bureau of Mines es-
timate, 64 percent of reserves of minable
chromite ore of all grades is located in South
Africa and 32 percent in Rhodesia. For
metallurgical-grade chromite ore, the grade
most used in the production of stainless and
alloy steels, Rhodesia possesses 86 percent of
known world reserves; South Africa, 9 per-
cent; the U.S.S.R. and other Communist
countries, 2 percent; and Turkey, 1 percent.
For the chemical-grade ore, which via the
AOD process is also now usable for specialty
steel making, South Africa has the vast
majority of the world's reserves, well in ex-
cess of 1 billion tons.
The sources of U.S. imports by chromium
content in 1976 were 3 percent from
Rhodesia; 17 percent from the U.S.S.R.; 38
percent from South Africa; 17 percent from
Turkey; 10 percent from the Philippines; and
15 percent from other countries.
Imports of chromite ore from Rhodesia had
constituted over 50 percent of our imports
during the 1950's and early 1960's. With the
imposition of the embargo, imports from
Rhodesia stopped and then began again fol-
lowing passage of the Byrd amendment.
Rhodesian chromite ore, however, never
really recovered its share of the U.S. mar-
ket. The Rhodesian Government turned in-
stead to production of ferrochromium, which
was exported to the United States in ever-
increasing amounts beginning in 1972.
Imports of ferrochromium from all sources
have increased dramatically in the last sev-
eral years as U.S. importers decreased de-
mand for unprocessed chromite in favor of
increased imports of finished ferrochromium.
In 1975, imports of ferrochromium alloys
reached an all-time high of 319,000 tons. By
percentage of chromium content, U.S. im-
ports in 1976 came from the following coun-
tries: Rhodesia, 22 percent; South Africa, 32
percent; Japan, 17 percent; and others, 29
percent.
Enactment of the Byrd amendment in 1971
was opposed by the Nixon Administration,
and in subsequent years the previous Admin-
istration supported efforts to bring about its
repeal.
It has been and remains our view that
Rhodesia cannot be considered a reliable
supplier. Transportation routes for export of
raw materials from Rhodesia have been cut
off one by one until the only remaining possi-
bility is the South African route. Insurgent
actions pose a growing threat to operation of
the mines, which if forced to shut down for
even a temporary period could require
months to get back into service due to flood-
ing and cave-ins.
Effects of Cutting Off Rhodesian Chrome
Repeal of the Byrd amendment and the
consequent cutting off of imports of Rhode-
sian chrome will require some degree of
readjustment by the United States and is
likely to have some effect on prices. How-
ever, our analysis indicates that dislocations
should be relatively short term and can be
largely overcome over a period of time.
The first consequence of stopping the in-
flow of chrome from Rhodesia will mean ma-
terials will need to be found elsewhere. The
prospects for finding other sources of mate-
rial are good. While most of our chromium
will continue to come from our regular major
suppliers, including South Africa, the
U.S.S.R., and the Philippines, there are
other, smaller suppliers who could help fill
the gap. These include India, Finland,
Brazil, Turkey, and Albania.
In addition, imports of greater quantities
of lower grade ores are now usable due to the
increasing use of the AOD process for pro-
duction of steel.
Finally, private stocks of chrome materials
are large. The Bureau of Mines estimates
400,000 tons are held in private stocks at the
present time. This amount approximates six
to nine months' consumption.
In addition, the strategic and critical ma-
terial stockpile contains the equivalent of
3.82 million tons of metallurgical chromite
February 28, 1977
173
ores in the form of ores and ferroalloys. Of
this, 3.59 million tons are reserved to meet
the needs of national security. A release of
any portion of these strategic reserves dur-
ing peacetime is permitted under existing
legislation when the President determines
that the release "is required for the pur-
poses of common defense." Therefore such
releases could only be used to support
defense-related production requirements.
The 0.23 million tons in excess of strategic
needs could be made available to U.S. indus-
try if the necessary legislation were enacted
by Congress.
Through the early 1960's prices of
chromium remained fairly stable, took a
jump in 1969-70 and followed a mixed course
until 1975, when the representative price
more than doubled, rising from $65 to $137
per long ton. This price has held on through
1976. The U.S.S.R. led off the rise in prices
in 1975 and was quickly followed by the other
producers. In effect the U.S.S.R. became the
price leader.
Cutting off Rhodesian chrome could put
some pressure on prices. For a number of
reasons, however, we believe that upward
pressures are not likely to continue.
Current prices are well in excess of costs
of production, and producers who raise prices
further risk further resort to substitution
and economizing technologies and thus a
long-term decline in demand. As I have al-
ready explained, possibilities for utilization
of lower grade material from countries other
than Rhodesia made possible by the AOD
technology will encourage production of
chemical- and refractory-grade ores to com-
pete with Russian and Rhodesian metallurgi-
cal ores.
I have stressed a number of economic rea-
sons in support of U.S. backing of the U.N.
economic sanctions against Rhodesia and re-
peal of the Byrd amendment. The basic eco-
nomic reason, however, is that such a move
is a rational economic step looking forward to
a time when majority African rule in
Rhodesia will come about. A rapid and peace-
ful transition in Rhodesia is in our long-term
economic interests. Our current commerce
with Rhodesia is perceived as an impediment
to that transition.
Finally, our economic interests do not stop
in Rhodesia. The United States carries on a
thriving and growing economic relationship
with the other nations of black Africa both in
trade and investment. By failing to repeal
the Byrd amendment we jeopardize this rela-
tionship. African countries are also an impor-
tant source of supply for us for a whole range
of strategic goods including petroleum,
uranium, manganese, copper, cobalt, and
diamonds, as well as the whole range of trop-
ical products like coffee and cocoa. Our dis-
regard of the U.N. sanctions has indeed
placed American business at a disadvantage
in its relationship with African countries in
such areas as resource development, invest-
ment, and export opportunities.
I urge the committee to report S. 174
favorably, and I recommend quick passage of
the bill.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
Progress and Problems in Collecting Delinquent Inter-
national Debts owed to the United States. Report by
the House Committee on Government Operations. H.
Kept. 94-1736. September 30, 1976, 15 pp.
Foreign Palm Oil Development Loans. Report of the
House Committee on Agriculture to accompany H.
Res. 1399. H. Rept. 94-1747, Part 1. October 1, 1976.
6 pp.
Seizure of the Mayaguez, Part IV. Reports of the
Comptroller General of the United States submitted
to the Subcommittee on International Political and
Military Affairs of the House Committee on Interna-
tional Relations. October 4, 1976. 162 pp.
Messages from the President of the United States
transmitting governing international fishery agree-
ments. Agreement with Romania; H. Doc. 95-34;
January 10, 1977; 15 pp. Agreement with the German
Democratic Republic: H. Doc. 95-35; January 10,
1977: 14 pp. Agreement with the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics; H. Doc. 95-36; January 10, 1977;
17 pp. Agreement with the Republic of China; H.
Doc. 95-37; January 10, 1977; 12 pp. Agreement with
Bulgaria; H. Doc. 95-46; January 17, 1977; 15 pp.
174
Department of State Bulletin
Department Reviews Developments in International Fisheries Policy
Statement by Rozanne L. Ridgway
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs ^
I welcome the opportunity to review de-
velopments in international fisheries policy
with you today. I and other representatives
of the Department of State, in the months
since the passage of the Fishery Conserva-
tion and Management Act of 1976, have had
frequent consultations with many members
of the Congress individually and with mem-
bers of appropriate congressional staffs. I
know you are aware that I only recently have
appeared before the Senate Committee on
Commerce to discuss many of the issues
which also are of interest to this subcommit-
tee.
I do not want merely to repeat what I have
said before other committees concerning the
implementation of the international aspects
of the Fishery Conservation and Manage-
ment Act. I would like instead to consider
where we are going in international fisheries,
both as a coastal fishing nation and a
distant-water fishing nation, in a somewhat
different framework. In doing so, Mr.
Chairman [Senator Claiborne Pell], I will
comment specifically on the status of our new
bilateral agreements and the pressures that
surround bringing all of the terms of the act,
including its procedures, into force by March
1. We would hope that nations which have
signed agreements with us and which are
'■ Made before the Subcommittee on Oceans and In-
ternational Environment of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations on Feb. 3. The complete transcript of
the hearings will be published by the committee and
will be available from the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C. 20402.
prepared to meet our new standards are in
fact able to continue their fishing activities
after March 1 where there are surpluses
identified in appropriate management plans.
We are, Mr. Chairman, a nation with both
coastal and distant-water fishing concerns.
The waters off our shores are home to a sig-
nificant portion of the world's fisheries re-
sources. We have had a long history of
foreign fishing for those resources. There are
reports of vessels from Europe coming into
the waters of the North Atlantic off the coast
of North America as early as 1517 or 1519 —
history is not clear as to which. History is
clear, however, on the fact that ever since
the appearance of foreign fishing fleets off
our coast, there has been a sense of frustra-
tion among American fishermen about the
challenge to their livelihood represented by
foreign efforts. Those efforts have had a
changing pattern throughout the years of our
nation's history.
The most recent element in the pattern
was the rapid increase in the late 1950's and
early 1960's, in the form of large mechanized
foreign fleets off our coast. I believe most
would agree that while foreign fishing has
always been a part of our life, the arrival on
the fishing grounds of modern technology
gave a new dimension — a conservation
dimension — to the challenge. The need to
preserve opportunities for our own fishermen
and protect our resources combined to make
fisheries and rights of coastal states concern-
ing fisheries resources off their coasts cen-
tral to the negotiations toward a new law of
the sea. The same needs led to the enactment
February 28, 1977
175
of the Fishery Conservation and Manage-
ment Act.
I would note that in passing the act, Con-
gress made clear its intention that the
United States should continue to pursue its
interests in the law of the sea negotiations,
including its fisheries interests. We have
done so, Mr. Chairman, and as you are aware
from your own personal interest in this field,
have sought a balanced regime which would
give us the desired control over our coastal
stocks, protect the interests of our distant-
water fishermen, and provide for rational
conservation and management of all fisheries
resources.
While most of the attention given to the
act has been in the area of the protection of
our coastal interests, the act also makes clear
that the United States, as a matter of pohcy
and law, intends to protect its interests off
the coasts of other countries.
These goals were very much on our minds
as we embarked upon the international
negotiations required by the passage of the
act. We had to keep in mind that what we
expected of others might be expected of us
and that standards we set for others might
become precedents for our own distant-water
fisheries. Mr. Chairman, I believe this is also
true in the area of domestic management of
our fisheries resources. As we move to im-
plement the technical elements of our man-
agement regime, we have had to be conscious
of the influence of our own decisions on deci-
sions others will make regarding our inter-
ests.
Goals of International Negotiations
Against this background, Mr. Chairman, I
would like to outline for you and the commit-
tee the status of the international negotia-
tions we have undertaken since April 13,
1976, pursuant to the act. In these negotia-
tions our goals have been:
— To obtain recognition of the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States over the
fisheries conservation zone extending to 200
miles off our coasts, over anadromous species
of U.S. origin, and over the resources of the
continental shelf; and, second,
— To reach agreement on the principles
and procedures by which the United States
intends to be guided as it assumes jurisdic-
tion over foreign fishing in that zone after
March 1.
We have, to date, signed governing inter-
national fishery agreements with, as you
enumerated in your opening statement, Mr.
Chairman, Poland, the Republic of China,
the German Democratic Republic, Romania,
the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and the Republic
of Korea. All of these agreements, with the
exception of that concerning Korea, have
been submitted for review by the Congress
under the congressional oversight provisions
of the act. We hope to submit the Korean
agreement within a short time. The negotia-
tions with Spain have been concluded, and
we are in the process of setting a date for
signature.
Although there are some differences in
language and in intei-nal organization from
agreement to agreement, each agreement ac-
complishes the recognition of our fisheries
conservation zone. Each sets out the princi-
ples and procedures by which foreign fishing,
if any, will be permitted for the concerned
country.
Bilateral Negotiations in Progress
Bilateral negotiations are still in progress
with Japan, the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC), and Canada. The negotiations
with Japan concern our future fishing rela-
tionship with one of our major allies. They
have been continuing over several months.
These negotiations have been complex and,
since they involve important economic issues
for both sides, protracted. These negotia-
tions are now almost completed.
Our negotiations with Canada are unique.
Each of us has important fisheries off the
coasts of the other. Both nations are in the
process of implementing extended jurisdic-
tion over fisheries. I have just returned from
the latest round of negotiations with Canada.
176
Department of State Bulletin
I and the head of the Canadian delegation are
in the process of reviewing with our govern-
ments the progress to date.
Three member nations of the European
Community have traditional fisheries off our
coasts: the Federal Republic of Germany,
France, and Italy. We have agreed to
negotiate with the Community so long as it
can assume the required binding obligations
on its member states' behalf. The establish-
ment by the EEC of its own 200-mile
fisheries zone further complicates the
negotiations because approximately 100 U.S.
shrimp trawlers fish in waters off French
Guiana which lie in that zone. We are meet-
ing with EEC officials today to further dis-
cuss outstanding issues that we would hope
to have resolved in the time remaining.
Mr. Chairman, at the time the Fishery
Conservation and Management Act was
passed, we had less than one year to bring
into existence the agreements that acknowl-
edge our fisheries jurisdiction and thus
launch the complete restructuring of our re-
lationship with the nations fishing off our
coasts. I believe we come to you today with a
record of accomplishment. With the excep-
tion of the three negotiations to which I have
referred, we have succeeded in meeting most
of our international objectives. I believe the
negotiations still in progress will be com-
pleted soon.
Problems of Transition Period
As we have been moving in the interna-
tional setting to bring the act into force, the
Regional Management Councils and our col-
leagues in the Department of Commerce
have been moving toward the implementa-
tion of the domestic features of the act.
While they are doing so, the Department of
State has a responsibility to advise them of
the foreign policy implications of their work,
including international fisheries policies and
international oceans policies. Therefore I
think it would be appropriate for me to indi-
cate to you some of the concerns we are ex-
pressing to them.
Each country which has signed an agree-
ment has accepted as fact that the United
States will manage its resources responsibly
and with due respect for the principles set
forth in our law. This situation places a great
responsibility on us and must be considered
as we move to implement our new regime.
We have some particular problems that re-
late only to this transition period. The De-
partment of State has agreed to accept appli-
cations from countries that have signed
agreements pending the completion of con-
gressional oversight procedures related to
the agreements themselves. Action by the
Congress, however, to bring the agreements
now lying before it into effect as soon as pos-
sible would be of great practical importance.
This could be done either by early congres-
sional approval of the agreements or by a
waiver of the oversight provisions for
agreements signed before March 1.
The steps taken to resolve the transition
problem should also take into account the
problem of how to treat countries with whom
we are still negotiating. I am referring only
to Japan and the European Economic Com-
munity, as Canada is a special case. There is
some feeling that we should set deadlines for
the signature of the remaining agreements
and subject any country that has not signed
by that date to the full administrative proc-
essing described in the law. Such a procedure
could take several months after an agree-
ment was signed. I can understand the sen-
timent that lies behind such reasoning, but I
would like to point out that in addition to
scheduhng difficulties, unique considerations
enter into these two negotiations. I believe
that the negotiated acknowledgment of our
jurisdiction is of special importance to us. We
expect both of these negotiations to be com-
pleted before March 1 and do not think we
should close doors by setting arbitrary cutoff
dates for signature.
Other features of the act could create a
situation during this transition period in
which countries that have signed agree-
ments, submitted applications for permits,
and otherwise agreed to comply with all con-
ditions and restrictions still will not have
valid permits to fish on board by March 1,
February 28, 1977
177
1977. These include the likelihood that Re-
gional Councils will not have had enough
time to complete their review of applications
and the possibility that the fee schedule now
under consideration will not have been com-
pleted in time for other countries to complete
arrangements for obtaining finances at a date
very close to March 1.
To forbid fishing, for these reasons, by
vessels of countries that have entered into
agreements with us in the expectation that
the United States would be able to operate
under the act by March 1 would place the
United States in an unfortunate position. The
Fishery Conservation and Management Act
has put the United States in the lead in the
move toward coastal-state jurisdiction over
fisheries. Our act is the first of its kind, in-
cluding as it does not only the simple exten-
sion of jurisdiction but new machinery for the
exercise of that jurisdiction. We are being
closely watched by other nations as they also
move toward extended jurisdiction and ex-
pect the United States to provide the exam-
ple. This poses an enormous challenge to us,
Mr. Chairman, and one which I believe the
United States can meet.
If these problems are seen simply as com-
plications associated with this first year
rather than as challenges to the integrity of
the act, some solutions become immediately
apparent. I have already referred to possible
ways to shorten the period of congressional
oversight. We believe it also would be ap-
propriate for this transition period to shorten
the time provided for review of applications
by the Councils. It would also be helpful if
the question of payment for fisheries au-
thorized for 1977 could be handled by allow-
ing payment to take place after the issuance
of the permits and the initiation of the
fishery on March 1.
Mr. Chairman, other witnesses are more
expert on the details of these domestic man-
agement features of the act than I. For my
part, I would hope that I have made clear the
commitment of the Department to carry out
its role under the act and the necessity for all
of us to pursue policies and practices in
fisheries management which advance all of
the interests engaged in what is known as in-
ternational fisheries policy.
TREATY INFORMATION
United States and Canada Sign
Transit Pipeline Treaty
Press release 29 dated January 28
The Canadian Ambassador to the United
States, J. H. Warren, and Assistant Secre-
tary for Economic and Business Affairs
Julius L. Katz signed on January 28 an
agreement between Canada and the United
States concerning transit pipelines. (For
text, see press release 29.)
This treaty is another example of the broad
cooperative energy relationship the United
States has with Canada. It will facilitate and
promote pipelines across the two countries
carrying hydrocarbons to serve their energy
needs. The treaty, which was initialed by
chief negotiators in January 1976, would con-
firm to both countries a regime of noninter-
ference and nondiscrimination for transit
pipelines carrying oil and natural gas des-
tined for one country across the territory of
the other.
The agreement will not enter into force
until ratification by both countries.
United States and Japan Conclude
New Fisheries Agreement
Press release 47 dated February 10
On February 10, 1977, representatives of
the United States of America and the Gov-
ernment of Japan concluded a new agreement
relating to fishing activities of Japan off the
coast of the United States.
The agreement sets out the arrangements
between the countries which will govern fish-
ing by Japanese vessels within the fishery
conservation zone of the United States be-
ginning on March 1, 1977. The comprehen-
sive agreement will come into force after the
completion of internal procedures by both
178
Department of State Bulletin
governments. The ceremony included an ex-
change of notes covering 1977 and the initial-
ing of a long-term agreement covering the
period 1978-1982.
The initialing and exchange of notes took
place in Washington. Minister Seiya Nishida
[of the Embassy of Japan] initialed for Japan.
Rozanne L. Ridgway, Ambassador of the
United States for Oceans and Fisheries Af-
fairs, initialed for the United States. Both
delegations expressed their satisfaction with
the new accord and the hope that it will
strengthen cooperation between Japan and
the United States.
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Agriculture
Agreement establishing the International Fund for Ag-
ricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome June
13, 1976.'
Signature: Netherlands, February 4, 1977.
Health
Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the Constitution of
the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as
amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva
May 22, 1973.
Acceptances deposited: Iraq, January 28, 1977;
Yemen (Aden), February 3, 1977.
Entered into force: February 3, 1977.
Load Lines
International convention on load lines. Done at London
April 5, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 1968. TIAS
6331, 6629, 6720.
Accession deposited: Indonesia, January 17, 1977.
Property — Industrial
Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial
property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at
Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 en-
tered into force May 19, 1970; for the United States
August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 entered into
force April 26, 1970; for the United States September
5, 1970. TIAS 6923.
Notification from World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization that ratification deposited: Italy,
January 24, 1977.
Nice agreement concerning the international classifica-
tion of goods and services for the purposes of the reg-
istration of marks of June 15, 1957, as revised at
Stockholm on July 14, 1967. Entered into force March
18, 1970; for the" United States May 25, 1972. TIAS
7419.
Notification from World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization that ratification deposited: Italy,
January 24, 1977.
Property — Intellectual
Convention establishing the World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967.
Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United
States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.
Ratification deposited: Italy, January 20, 1977.
Accession deposited: Burundi, December 30, 1976.
Telecommunications
International telecommunication convention, with an-
nexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos
October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1975;
for the United States April 7, 1976.
Ratifications deposited: Brazil, November 30, 1976;
Burma, November 15, 1976; Federal Republic of
Germany, November 18, 1976;^ Sierra Leone,
November 25, 1976; Vatican City, Zaire, December
10, 1976.
Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 1959,
as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590, 7435), to
establish a new frequency allotment plan for high-
frequency radiotelephone coast stations, with an-
nexes and final protocol. Done at Genevii June 8,
1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976; for the
United States April 21, 1976.
Notification of approval: India, October 22, 1976.
BILATERAL
Australia
Agreement relating to the limitation of imports of meat
of Australian origin other than imports which are di-
rect shipments or on a through bill of lading from
Australia or foreign trade zones, territories, or pos-
sessions of the United States. Effected by exchange
of notes at Washington December 22 and 23, 1976.
Entered into force December 23, 1976.
Agreement relating to the launching of Aerobee sound-
ing rockets for scientific investigations. Effected by
exchange of notes at Canberra September 20, 1976,
and January 14, 1977. Entered into force January 14,
1977.
Brazil
Agreement extending the agreement of March 14, 1975
(TIAS 8253), concerning shrimp. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Brasilia December 30, 1976. En-
tered into force December 30, 1976.
Republic of China
Agreement modifying the agreement of May 21, 1975,
as modified, relating to trade in cotton, wool, and
man-made fiber textiles. Effected by exchange of
notes at Washington February 3, 1977. Entered into
force February 3, 1977.
international Telecommunications Satellite
Organization
Headquarters agreement. Signed at Washington
November 22 and 24, 1976.
Entered into force: November 24, 1976.
' Not in force.
^ Applicable to Berlin (West).
February 28, 1977
179
Japan
Agreement concerning fisheries off the coast of the
United States. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington February 10, 1977. Enters into force
upon notification by the United States that its inter-
nal procedures have been completed.
New Zealand
Agreement relating to the limitation of imports of meat
of New Zealand origin other than imports which are
direct shipments or on a through bill of lading from
New Zealand or foreign trade zones, territories, or
possessions of the United States. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Washington December 22 and 23,
1976. Entered into force December 23, 1976.
Romania
Interim arrangement regarding trade in certain textile
products. Effected by exchange of notes at Washing-
ton January 17, 1977. Entered into force January 17,
1977; effective January 1, 1977.
Thailand
Agreement modifying and continuing the agreements of
December 23, 1960 (TIAS 4665), and April 1 and 25,
1963 (TIAS 5340), relating to the SEATO Medical
Research Project and the SEATO Clinical Research
Centre. Effected by exchange of notes at Bangkok
January 19 and 28," 1977. Enters into force July 1,
1977.
PUBLICATIONS
1950 "Foreign Relations" Volume
on East Asia and Pacific Released
Press release 16 dated .January 19 (for release January 29)
The Department of State on Januai'y 29 released
"Foreign Relations of the United States," 1950, volume
VI, "East Asia and the Pacific." The "Foreign Rela-
tions" series has been published continuously since 1861
as the official record of American foreign policy.
This volume presents 1,581 pages of previously un-
published documentation (much of it newly declassified)
on multilateral and bilateral relations in the area. Con-
siderable coverage is given to regional security ar-
rangements and the extension of military and economic
assistance to the nations of Southeast Asia. There is
also extensive documentation on relations with Austra-
lia, Burma, Indochina, Indonesia, Japan, the Philip-
pines, and Thailand. The largest single collection of ma-
terials deals with the China area, encompassing U.S.
relations with the Republic of China and policy toward
mainland China subsequent to the advent to power of
the People's Republic of China, along with economic
measures taken by the United States and United Na-
tions following the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. The
Korean war will be the subject of volume VII in the
series, scheduled for release in 1977.
"Foreign Relations," 1950, volume VI, was prepared
in the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs,
Department of State. Volume II for 1950 has also been
published, and five more volumes are in preparation.
Copies of volume VI (Department of State publication
8858; GPO Cat. No. Sl.l:950/v. VI) may be obtained for
$16.00 (domestic postpaid). Checks or money orders
should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents
and should be sent to the U.S. Government Book Store,
Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.
GPO Sales Publications
Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock
number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more
copies of any one publication mailed to the same ad-
dress. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of
Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shotvn be-
low, which include domestic postage, are subject to
change.
Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which
describe the people, history, government, economy,
and foreign relations of each counti-y. Each contains a
map, a list of principal government officials and U.S.
diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A
complete set of all Background Notes currently in
stock — at least 140 — $21.80; 1-year subscription service
for approximately 77 updated or new Notes — $23.10;
plastic binder — $1.50.) Single copies of those listed
below are available at 350 each.
Austria Cat. No. SI. 123:AU7
Pub. 7955 8 pp.
Liechtenstein Cat. No. SI. 123:L62
Pub. 8610 4 pp.
Netherlands Antilles Cat. No. S1.123:N38/2
Pub. 8223 4 pp.
Your Trip Abroad. This pamphlet provides the Ameri-
can tourist, business person, or student traveling
abroad with basic information on official documents, vac-
cinations, unusual travel requirements, dual nationality,
drugs, modes of travel, customs, legal requirements
abroad, and many other topics. Pub. 8872. Department
and Foreign Service Series 155. 28 pp. 4.5C. (Cat. No.
SI. 69:8872).
Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Fiji. TIAS
8281. 9 pp. 35e. (Cat. No. S9.10:8281).
Atomic Energy — Technical Information Exchange
and Research and Development on Reactor Safety.
Arrangement with Sweden. TIAS 8343. 6 pp. 350. (Cat.
No. 89.10:8343).
Atomic Energy — Technical Information Exchange
and Development of Standards. Arrangement with
France. TIAS 8345. 7 pp. 35C. (Cat No. 89.10:8345).
180
Department of State Bulletin
INDEX February 28, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1966
Africa. Secretary Vance Interviewed for the
New York Times 162
Arms Control and Disarmament
President Carter's News Conference of February
8 (excerpts) ". 157
Secretary Vance Interviewed for tlie New York
Times 162
Brazil. Secretary Vance Interviewed for tiie
New York Times 162
Canada. United States and Canada Sign Transit
Pipeline Treaty 178
China. Secretary Vance Interviewed for tlie New
York Times 162
Congress
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 174
Department Reviews Developments in Interna-
tional Fisheries Policy (Ridgway) 175
Department Urges Passage of Bill To Halt Impor-
tation of Rhodesian Chrome (Katz, Vance) 170
Cuba. Secretary Vance Interviewed for the New
York Times 162
Economic Affairs
Department Reviews Developments in Interna-
tional Fisheries Policy (Ridgway) 175
Department Urges Passage of Bill To Halt Im-
portation of Rhodesian Chrome (Katz, Vance) . 170
United States and Japan Conclude New Fisheries
Agreement 178
Energy. United States and Canada Sign Transit
Pipeline Treaty 178
Fisheries
Department Reviews Developments in Interna-
tional Fisheries Policy (Ridgway) 175
United States and Japan Conclude New Fisheries
Agreement 1 78
Human Rights
President Carter's News Conference of February
8 (excerpts) 157
Secretary Vance Interviewed for the New York
Times 162
Japan. United States and Japan Conclude New
Fisheries Agreement 178
Latin America. Secretary Vance Interviewed for
the New York Times . ! 162
Panama. Secretary Vance Interviewed for the
New York Times 162
Presidential Documents
President Carter's News Conference of February
8 (excerpts) 157
President Carter's Report to the American
People (excerpt) 161
Publications
GPO Sales Publications 180
1950 "Foreign Relations" Volume on East Asia
and Pacific Released 180
Southern Rhodesia. Department Urges Passage
of Bill To Halt Importation of Rhodesian
Chrome (Katz, Vance) 170
Treaty Information
Current Actions 179
United States and Canada Sign Transit Pipeline
Treaty 178
United States and Japan Conclude New Fisheries
Agreement 1 78
U.S.S.R.
President Carter's News Conference of February
8 (excerpts) 157
Soviet Journalist Expelled From the United
States (Department announcement) 160
U.S. Concerned at Treatment of Aleksandr
Ginzburg (Department statement) 161
Vietnam. Secretary Vance Interviewed for the
New York Times 162
Name Indent-
Carter, President 157, 161
Katz, .Julius L 170
Ridgway, Rozanne L 175
Vance, Secretary 162, 170
Chec
<list of Department of State
Press Releases: February 7—13
Press releases
may be obtained from the Office
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash- |
ingtor
, D.C. 20520.
No.
Date
Subject
*39
2/7
Study group 1 of the U.S. Na-
tional Committee of the Inter-
national Telegraph and Tele-
phone Consultative Commit-
tee (CCITT), Mar. 2-3.
*40
2/7
Secretary of State's Advisory
Committee on Private Inter-
national Law, Study Group on
Agency, Chicago, Mar. 5.
*41
2/7
Allard K. Lowenstein to head
U.S. delegation to annual
meeting of the U.N. Human
Rights Commission, Feb.
7-Mar. 11.
42
2/10
Vance: Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations Subcommit-
tee on African Affairs.
43
2/11
Vance: interview for the New
York Times.
*44
2/10
U.S. and Hong Kong amend
bilateral textile agreement,
Dec. 22.
*45
2/10
Shipping Coordinating Commit-
tee (SCO, Subcommittee on
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS),
working group on ship design
and equipment. Mar. 10.
*46
2/10
sec, SOLAS, working group on
ship design and equipment.
Mar. 17-18.
47
2/10
U.S. and Japan conclude new
fisheries agreement.
*48
2/11
Program for the official visit of
President Jose Lopez Portillo
of the United Mexican States.
*49
2/11
Secretary of State's Advisory
Committee on Private Inter-
national Law, Mar. 26.
* Not printed
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
Superintendent of Documents
u.s. government printing office
washington, dc. 20402
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
postage and fees paid
Department of State STA-501
Third Class
Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted
service, please renew your subscription promptly
when you receive the expiration notice from the
Superintendent of Documents. Due to the time re-
quired to process renewals, notices are sent out 3
months in advance of the expiration date. Any prob-
lems involving your subscription will receive im-
mediate attention if you write to: Superintendent
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402.
^
/'J:
76.
/767
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Volume LXXVI • No. 1967 • March 7, 1977
VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE VISITS EUROPE AND JAPAN
Remarks and News Conference 181
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
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Note: Contents of this publication are not
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printed. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The
BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to
Periodical Literature.
Vol. LXXVI, No. 1967
March 7, 1977
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by thi
Office of Media Services, Bureau oi
Public Affairs, provides the public am
interested agencies of the governmenf
with information on developments in
the field of U.S. foreign relations and
on the work of the Department and
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses, and
news conferences of the President and
the Secretary of State and other offi-
cers of the Department, as well as spe-
cial articles on various phases of in-
ternational affairs and the functions of
the Department. Information is in-
cluded concerning treaties and inter-
national agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and on treaties of general interna-
tional interest.
Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.
Vice President Mondale Visits Europe and Japan
On behalf of President Carter, Vice Presi-
dent Mondale departed Washington on
January 23 to meet with leaders of Western
Europe and Japan. His itinerary was Brus-
sels (January 23-2Jt), Bonn (January 2Ji.-26),
Berlin (January 26), Rome (January 26-
27), Vatican City (Jayiuary 27), London
(January 27-28), Paris (January 28-29),
Keflavik (January 29), and Tokyo (January
30-February 1).
Following are remarks made by President
Carter and Vice President Mondale before
his departure, addresses and statements
during his trip, and the transcript of his
news conference held on February 2 after a
meeting with President Carter.
DEPARTURE, THE WHITE HOUSE,
JANUARY 23 '
Remarks by President Carter
I am very grateful to come this morning
to have my last meeting with Vice President
Mondale before he goes to Europe and to
Japan. The early initiation of this very im-
portant diplomatic trip and the fact that the
Vice President himself is going shows the
importance that our nation attaches to
friendly relationships between ourselves and
the seven nations specifically with whose
leaders Senator Mondale — or Vice President
Mondale now will be meeting.
We also have arranged for him to meet
with the leaders of the OECD [Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment], the NATO countries, and the Com-
' Closing paragraphs omitted (text from Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents dated January
31).
mon Market countries of Europe. He'll be
visiting Pope Paul and will be gone for ten
days. This trip will not be limited in its
scope. He'll be discussing both political and
economic and military matters.
We had a very thorough preparation for
this trip with the members of the National
Security Council yesterday morning. And
for the last couple of weeks. Vice President
Mondale and I have been preparing for this
diplomatic venture.
There are several things specifically that
he will be addressing. One is the prepara-
tion for a summit meeting that will likely
occur later on this spring, which will not it-
self be limited to economic matters. He'll be
discussing the importance that we attach to
the limitation of proliferation of the capabil-
ity for atomic weapons.
He'll be discussing future substantive
changes that we hope will improve the
strength of NATO and our own friendly and
close relationships with our natural allies
and friends in both Europe and Japan.
Vice President Mondale has my complete
confidence. He is a personal representative
of mine, and I'm sure that his consultation
with the leaders of these nations will make
it much easier for our country to deal di-
rectly with them on substantive matters in
the future.
I'm going to miss him. I know that I'll be
looking forward to ten days from now when
he returns with a good report. And this is
one of the best things, I think, that I could
have possibly done as a new President, to
show the strength and purpose of our own
nation and our commitment to carry out the
obligations that we have as a leader in the
world community.
So, Fritz, good luck. Don't get too much
rest, and we'll see you when you get back.
March 7, 1977
181
Remarks by Vice President Mondale
Thank you very much, Mr. President.
I understand that this trip is a historic
first. To have a Vice President leave on a
diplomatic mission this quickly after
inauguration — on a diplomatic mission of this
kind — is unprecedented in American history.
And the reason for the trip is to demon-
strate immediately and dramatically the
high level of importance that the Carter
Administration places on high-level continu-
ous cooperative relationships with our tradi-
tional allies and friends.
The many problems that we face they also
face. The problems of inflation, unemploy-
ment, nuclear proliferation, control of ar-
maments, the relationships between our
nations and the poorer nations of the world,
and many other issues are issues which we
face together. And it's essential at the very
moment of beginning that the cooperative
relationship be established in a way that
permits us to move ahead quickly, effec-
tively, and cooperatively.
I look forward to this trip, and I wish to
thank the President for his confidence in
me.
ADDRESS TO NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL,
BRUSSELS, JANUARY 24
In behalf of President Carter, I have come
today to NATO Headquarters as a matter of
the first priority. I have come to convey to
you and the member governments of the
North Atlantic alliance:
— The President's most sincere greetings;
— His commitment, and the full commit-
ment of the United States, to the North At-
lantic alliance as a vital part of our deep and
enduring relations with Canada and Western
Europe; and
— His dedication to improving cooperation
and consultations with our oldest friends so
as to safeguard our peoples and to promote
our common efforts and concerns.
The President's conviction concerning
NATO's central role is deep rooted and firm.
As he stated in his message to the NATO
Ministers last month: ^
Our NATO alliance lies at the heart of the partner-
ship between North America and Western Europe.
NATO is the essential instrument for enhancing our
collective security. The American commitment to
maintaining the NATO alliance shall be sustained and
strengthened under my Administration.
This statement of renewed American
commitment comes at a time of great prom-
ise in our country. We are a young
Administration — some 90 hours old. We
have come to office following a long period
of difficulty in the United States, and of
doubt among friends about our will and
steadfastness. But this has also been a time
of promising change in America, just as in
Europe and elsewhere in the world. As
President Carter said in his inaugural ad-
dress, "The world itself now is dominated by
a new spirit."
I share his belief that in the United States
"there is evident a serious and purposeful
rekindling of confidence." There is a new
understanding of our society and apprecia-
tion of our recognized limits. But there is
also a new faith in the strength of our demo-
cratic system of government, a new willing-
ness to meet challenges and continuing
responsibilities abroad. Some of these chal-
lenges are unfamiliar to us all — as the wind
of change has transformed so much of the
world. We are ready to play our role in
meeting these challenges. But we believe
the requirement for leadership and creativ-
ity also falls upon our friends and allies in
Europe, Japan, and elsewhere.
I share the confidence of President Carter
that, together, we will be equal to the tasks
of the future as we have met those in the
past. To this end, the United States is
wholeheartedly dedicated:
— To the security, prosperity, and well-
being of our people and of our allies;
— To "eternal vigilance" in preserving
peace; and
— To promoting human values and human
dignity for people everywhere.
^ For te.xt, see Bulletin of Jan. 3, 1977, p. 9.
182
Department of State Bulletin
In cooperation with our friends abroad,
President Carter is proceeding immediately
with steps to strengthen the American econ-
omy. He is proceeding with steps which will
enable the United States to help meet the ex-
traordinai-y energy challenge facing all our
countries. He is giving priority attention to the
agenda of vital economic and political issues
before the industrialized nations of the
West — in Europe, North America, and Japan.
And President Carter is deeply conscious of
the aspirations of people in the world's de-
veloping nations and of the need for all of us to
seek new and cooperative relations with these
countries.
President Carter takes office at a time when
we have moved from the rigid period of the
cold war into a period of expanded contact and
greater potential for accommodation — for
mutual benefit — with potential adversaries in
particular but still Hmited areas. It is now pos-
sible to talk, where befoi'e it was only possible
to confront one another in deadly and undi-
minished hostility. And it is imperative that
we continue this dialogue, ever seeking to ex-
pand its depth and compass, yet fully consist-
ent with Western interests.
At the same time, the President and his
Administration are vitally aware of the con-
tinuing growth in Soviet military power and
the uncertainties that lie ahead with inevitable
changes in Soviet leadership in the years to
come. The growth of Soviet military power
makes us keenly aware of the need for the
NATO alliance to modernize and improve its
defenses — not for the sake of military power
itself but, rather, for a more fundamental rea-
son. This reason is stated in the North Atlantic
Treaty: that we are determined to safeguard
the freedom, the common heritage, and the
civilization of our peoples, founded on the prin-
ciples of democracy, individual liberty, justice,
and the rule of law.
As President Carter said in his inaugural
address about our own country:
We are a strong nation, and we will maintain strength
so sufficient that it need not be proven in combat — a
quiet strength based not merely on the size of an arsenal
but on the nobility of ideas.
The Atlantic alliance has successfully with-
stood repeated testing for more than a quarter
century. And as President Carter begins his
Administration, we mark another milestone in
U.S.-European relations — the 30th anniversary
of the Marshall plan. Today, as we look back on
how much we have done together, it is fitting to
recall what Secretary of State Marshall said at
Harvard in June 1947:
Our policy is directed not against any country or doc-
trine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and
chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working
economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of
political and social conditions in which free institutions
can exist.
And this concern with basic values still
motivates us today.
Mr. Secretary General, members of the
Council, 30 years ago the United States en-
tered into a firm commitment to enduring in-
volvement on this continent — as vital to both
the United States and Europe and as reflecting
shared political and human values. President
Carter has asked me personally to convey to
you that the American commitment remains
firm and undiminished.
In support of our close ties with our NATO
allies — our commitment to allied defense —
President Carter is determined to maintain
fully effective defense forces in Europe. As
you are well aware, we are determined to re-
duce waste and inefficiency in the U.S. defense
budget. But he has asked me to inform you
that his new budget and these efficiencies will
not result in any decrease in planned invest-
ment in NATO defense — and these plans in-
volve some growth.
Before I left Washington, President Carter
emphasized to me his deep concern about
NATO's defense. He told me that he is pre-
pared to consider increased U.S. investment in
NATO's defense. In turn, we look to America's
alHes to join with us in improving NATO's de-
fense forces to the limit of individual abihties,
to provide a defense fully adequate to our
needs. Of course, economic and social problems
make a strong claim on our resources — no less
so in the United States than in Europe. And in
a time of detente, it is easy to lose sight of the
need for adequate defense. But this need is
inescapable. It demands continuing efforts in
common.
March 7, 1977
183
The alliance as a whole must take into ac-
count the growth in Soviet military power and
together agree on the appropriate response. In
improving our defense forces, we must re-
double our efforts to standardize weapons,
rationalize our military posture, increase effi-
ciency, and improve reinforcement capability.
We must place greater emphasis on improved
force readiness. And as an alHance, we cannot
accept reductions in NATO defense
capabilities except through negotiations with
the Warsaw Pact — negotiations fully securing
allied interests and leading to a more stable
military balance.
Negotiations on force levels in Europe —
MBFR [mutual and balanced force reduc-
tions]— must move forward with the closest
attention paid to the interests of each member
state and as a clear expression of common and
agreed positions.
Furthermore, President Carter is com-
mitted to an early resumption of the Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks, looking toward
another step this year in the effort to end the
strategic arms race with the Soviet Union. He
has publicly stated that thi'ee basic principles
will guide him in this effort:
— He will pursue arms control agreements in
the best interests of the United States, the al-
liance, and world peace;
— He will insist on no less than equivalent
advantage for the West in any agreement; and
— He will strengthen consultations and
cooperation with America's natural friends and
allies throughout the negotiating process.
The President has asked me today to affirm
again his intention to consult closely with our
NATO allies before the Strategic Arms Lim-
itation Talks are resumed. He also looks for-
ward to working in closest cooperation with
you on MBFR. And while the new Administra-
tion is undertaking a careful review of these
negotiations, we anticipate no early change in
U.S. proposals to our alhes concerning the al-
lied position at the force reduction talks.
At the same time the President has asked
me to express to you his desire for closest pos-
sible consultations on the implementation of
the Final Act of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe — and on looking to
the future. Both seeking the full implementa-
tion of the Helsinki agreement and searching
for further ways to improve security and coop-
eration in Europe are vital to the possibilities
for productive discussions at the forthcoming
review conference in Belgrade. But both de-
pend on Western unity and on the success of
our efforts to work together — both in NATO
and in other forums — in the months before
Belgrade. As President Carter said in his in-
augural address: "Because we are free we can
never be indifferent to the fate of freedom
elsewhere."
The issues that I have discussed so far relate
directly to our security in the immediate area
covered by the alliance and to the future of our
cooperative relations together. Yet while the
NATO alliance provides each of our nations
with the blessings of peace and security in the
North Atlantic, tension and conflict in some
other parts of the world involving economic
and political as well as military issues can ad-
versely affect our common security.
President Carter and Secretary of State
Vance are turning early attention to other
areas of vital concern: in the Middle East, in
southern Africa, in Cyprus, and regarding
both the sale of conventional arms and efforts
to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. On
these issues, the President looks forward to
working closely with our friends and allies in
Western Europe.
Mr. Secretary General, members of the
council, we do not live in easy times. But they
are hopeful times, as well. This is a period of
historic opportunity. All Americans look to the
future confident in the belief that — with vi-
sion, hard work, and firm unity of purpose —
our association of free peoples will continue to
provide the security and cooperation vital to us
all.
This association goes beyond NATO itself.
For the strength and vitahty of the NATO al-
liance is only one task facing all of us. As we
seek to promote and strengthen our security in
the broadest sense, we must also use effec-
tively those other forums we have to resolve
the great economic and other issues facing our
nations and peoples. And we must work with
those countries facing economic difficulty and
184
Department of State Bulletin
support nations in Europe seeking to rebuild
or strengthen democratic institutions.
Together, we share many strengths. Ours is
an alliance of democratic governments, of
economies which have provided an unprece-
dented abundance, of energetic and imagina-
tive peoples. Our countries are part of a great
civilization of high moral purpose, deep
human values, and a shared commitment to
justice and compassion. Our societies are resil-
ient and flexible, and thanks to NATO, we have
a strong common defense.
President Carter and his Administration are
dedicated not only to preserving these
strengths and virtues but also to building on
them in the years ahead. This is his basic mes-
sage to you and to your countries. I hope my
visit here will also enable me to convey to the
President your thoughts and your concerns.
For these will be of great value to us in Wash-
ington as we shape our own policies and pro-
grams. I look forward to hearing your
comments.
Years ago, Jean Monnet, the father of
Europe, spoke eloquently on the problem fac-
ing us: "Europe and America," he said, "must
acknowledge that neither of us is defending a
particular country, that we are all defending
our common civilization." We have acknowl-
edged that basic truth, and it will bind us ever
closer together in the years to come.
NEWS CONFERENCE OPENING STATEMENT,
BRUSSELS, JANUARY 24
I have had a very useful and productive day
in Brussels today, meeting first with Prime
Minister Tindemans and members of his
Cabinet, with Secretary Luns [Joseph Luns,
Secretary General of NATO] and the North
Atlantic Council, with General Haig [Alexan-
der M. Haig, Jr., Supreme Allied Commander
Europe], Mr. Jenkins [Roy Harris Jenkins,
President of the European Commission] and
members of the European Commission. And
during the course of these talks we have dealt
with a whole range of issues including
economic problems of unemployment and in-
flation, the difficulties surrounding the mul-
tilateral trade negotiations, monetary prob-
lems, balance-of-payments problems, and the
rest. We have had wide-ranging discussions on
our energy program which we hope to an-
nounce by April, the creation of the new De-
partment of Energy under Mr. [James]
Schlesinger.
We have talked about security matters,
East-West matters. We have discussed the re-
lationship of developed countries in the con-
text of the so-called North-South dialogue. We
have briefly discussed issues such as the Mid-
dle East and Cyprus. And as a result of these
conversations we have been able to develop
agreements on consultations which will lead
toward closer consultation and coordination
between the poHcies of the United States and
the governments and organizations with whom
we have been talking.
The purpose of this trip is to demonstrate
the need for and begin the closest coordination
and cooperation with our traditional alHes and
friends. This first day's visit convinces me that
the trip is important, it is timely, it is going to
be very useful; and I come away from this first
day's visits convinced that we are in a good po-
sition to develop the kind of relationship that
will permit us to do a much better job of solving
our problems.
NEWS CONFERENCE OPENING STATEMENT
BONN, JANUARY 25 ^
I am delighted to be here today and particu-
larly to report that the President's objective of
establishing immediately close and warm and
cooperative discussions with our traditional
friends and allies is being achieved in the full-
est sense of the word.
Today the Chancellor and I had a chance to
discuss a whole range of issues. The discussion
was very useful, very helpful, and begins our
relationships with the new Government of the
United States and the Government of Ger-
many on the best possible basis. I will return
to the United States and report to the Presi-
dent of this very warm and useful discussion.
And it bodes well for the coordination of our
^ Made at a joint news conference held by Vice Presi-
dent Mondale and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt.
March 7, 1977
185
two nations in dealing with the vast range of
concerns that affect our people, that affect the
people all over the world.
In the course of our discussion we dealt with
economic concerns, the need to stimulate our
economies in a prudent way in order to in-
crease employment, in order to increase the
amount to the extent of international economic
activity. We talked about the need particularly
for the three strongest economies in the
world — the United States, Germany, and
Japan — to proceed cooperatively and share the
burden of stimulating the international econ-
omy as the result of the activities of our sepa-
rate economies. We talked about the need, and
we agreed on the need, to gain new momentum
in the multilateral trade negotiations, the so-
called GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade] talks, to resolve differences that
are in the way of our jointly shared hopes for
an open international economy. We discussed
the expected summit conference, questions of
timing and location and agenda.
We discussed the issue of nonprolife ration,
and on that had an excellent exchange and
agreed to consult further and in a cooperative
frame of mind; and prospects for a cooperative
solution are much enhanced by this discussion.
We briefly discussed the Middle East and
the need for progress and the need for the new
Administration to have time through the
Vance mission to visit the leadership of the
various Middle Eastern nations to develop a
fuller understanding of what steps should be
taken there: and it is also of importance to us
that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr.
Genscher, will also be visiting these same na-
tions at about the same time as Secretary
Vance, opening further opportunities for coop-
eration in that area. We briefly discussed the
very favorable developments in Portugal and
Spain. And we discussed our shared hopes that
something could be done in a cooperative way,
in a multinational way, to restrain the sale of
conventional armaments that is now — which are
now being sold in such abundance around the
world.
These are some of the issues we discussed.
May I say, Mr. Chancellor, how much I deeply
appreciate your warmth and your candor and
the spirit with which you carried out these
talks.
186
ADDRESS AT CITY HALL, BERLIN,
JANUARY 26 ■*
President Carter has asked me to come to
Europe for early consultations with our allies,
to begin the process of close cooperation on the
common agenda.
High on that agenda are measures aimed at
reducing tensions between East and West and
assuring our security.
Preserving the status of Berlin and assuring
its future are central to these objectives.
Our President, Mr. Carter, visited Berlin
four years ago and has the fondest memories
of this great city. He knows firsthand of your
determination to be free.
In the words of his inaugural address, "Be-
cause we are free we can never be indifferent
to the fate of freedom elsewhere."
I am here, barely hours after our new gov-
ernment has assumed office, in his behalf to
assure you that U.S. policy is based on our full
support for your city — a policy that guaran-
tees, with our allies, your freedom and security.
Maintaining our responsibility to Berlin
means, first of all, that we will leave no doubt
that the United States stands by its commit-
ment to use whatever means may be necessary
to resist any attempt to undermine the free-
dom of the city. The continued presence of
American troops, along with those of our
British and French allies, is Hving proof of our
will to honor that commitment.
Fortunately, the survival of Berlin is not
now in question. What I see today is a rich and
a vibrant city increasingly sure of its unique
place in the world and determined to demon-
strate how a free people can succeed, whatever
the challenge placed before them.
And the President has asked me to convey to
you his determination that the United States
will not only fulfill its promise to see that
Berlin survives but also to go further to help
this city and its residents flourish as an im-
portant part of the Western world.
For Berlin is a part of the Western world.
Its place is assured through its close ties with
the Federal Republic of Germany and through
^ Opening paragraphs are not printed here.
Department of State Bulletin
its participation in the activities of the Euro-
pean Community.
And Berlin is more than that. As a vital part
of the West, the people of Berlin are deeply
involved in the common efforts we are making
to meet the challenges we all face in the mod-
ern world. Your city is involved in answers to
the great economic and other issues facing
people elsewhere.
Berhners contribute in a meaningful way to
solving these issues through their full partici-
pation in the work of international organiza-
tions. Through your famous hospitality and
incomparable congress facilities, you are mak-
ing West Berlin an international
meetingplace, a center for the meeting of
minds and peoples.
Our promise to Berlin assures your con-
tinued involvement in this process. Equally
important, we seek to insure the inclusion of
Berlin in broader efforts to reduce tensions be-
tween East and West. More than once during
the past 30 years, East and West have gone to
the brink of war over tensions first manifested
in this city.
Today, when major efforts are underway to
reduce the tensions which have so long divided
East from West, confrontation over Berlin
must be put firmly and forever in the past.
The President is committed to continuing ef-
forts to lower the danger of conflict in Europe.
No other city in the world stands to benefit
more from these efforts than Berlin.
At the same time, unless Berhners are given
an opportunity to benefit fully from improve-
ments in East-West relations, progress toward
a further reduction of tensions will be more
difficult.
Three basic principles are vital:
— First, stability of the situation in Berhn
requires continued respect for the Four Power
rights and responsibilities for Berlin as a
whole. These rights and responsibilities
formed the legal basis for the quadripartite
agreement of 1971 and were reaffirmed in that
agreement. Any questioning of this important
legal basis and any unilateral attempt to alter
the Four Power status of the city would not be
in accordance with the quadripartite agree-
ment and would vastly complicate efforts to
reduce tensions.
— Second, it is essential to recognize the
kind of future the people of this great city
want. In the exercise of their right of free ex-
pression, Berliners have chosen freely and
consciously to be a part of the West. They have
clearly shown their desire to maintain and de-
velop their ties with the Federal Republic.
Only an approach to the situation in Berhn
which accepts these basic desires of Berliners
themselves can aid in the reduction of ten-
sions.
— Finally, the essential balance which gov-
erns the situation in Berhn is reflected in the
quadripartite agreement. This agreement has
brought important benefits both to Berlin and
to efforts toward peace throughout Europe.
The President firmly believes and will con-
tinue to insist that this agreement be strictly
observed and fully implemented by all con-
cerned parties.
Mr. Governing Mayor, Foreign Minister
Genscher, distinguished guests, as I sign the
Golden Book I am aware that there are no
fewer than 16 million American signatures in
this City Hall and that, in the steeple above
it, there stands the Freedom Bell given to
Berlin by these same Americans. I am hon-
ored to join so many other Americans in salut-
ing this great city. President Carter and his
Administration are dedicated to insuring that
the Freedom Bell will continue to ring proudly
in the years to come.
STATEMENT, ROME, JANUARY 26 ^
I am delighted and pleased by the very fine
talks that we've had today continuing on ear-
her discussions which we had when you visited
our capital in Washington last December. I
come to this meeting bringing the warmest
greetings and best wishes of our new Presi-
dent, Mr. Carter, to Mr. Andreotti and to his
government. Today we discussed a range of
concerns which we mutually share.
First of all, in the economic area, we were
able to report on the economic pohcies of my
government designed to stimulate the Ameri-
^ Made following a meeting with Prime Minister Giulio
Andreotti, whose remarks are not printed here.
March 7, 1977
187
can economy in a prudent way but in a way
designed to increase international economic
activity and thus improve the economic oppor-
tunities and employment opportunities of
economies around the world and on our talks
with leaders of other nations whose economies
are in a strong position and which we have
been urging to pursue similar policies of stimu-
lation designed to achieve the same objective
for improvement in the pace of international
economic activity.
The Italian economy, of course, faces serious
difficulties. Some of these are external, caused
by the world economic slump and by the rise in
oil prices. President Carter, as I have men-
tioned, has introduced an expansionary pro-
gram to help stimulate the world economy, and
on my trip I have been encouraging the other
strong economies of the world to expand their
economic activity in parallel. These measures
will help Italy, but Italy also has internal eco-
nomic difficulties; we have had a full report
today of the measures that the Italian Gov-
ernment has been taking and has decided to
take and of the discussions between the unions
and the business organizations, and we have
been greatly encouraged by them.
We know that negotiations with the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund are currently taking
place, and we look forward to a successful con-
clusion to those negotiations on terms that are
satisfactory to all concerned. We are of course
not a direct pail of those negotiations, but we
hope and trust they will produce satisfactory
results. In the meantime, we hope to produce
through our own economies and through en-
couraging cooperative efforts by others a more
stimulative international economy.
We also discussed the matter of the upcom-
ing summit — its timing, proposals concerning
location, and items that are suggested for the
agenda. We discussed the GATT and the mul-
tilateral trade negotiations and our wish that
those negotiations move forward as quickly as
possible. I strongly represented the Presi-
dent's hope that we could make progress on the
nonproliferation of nuclear armaments and on
the issue of proliferation of the capacity for
producing weapons-grade materials, and our
hope that the arms-producing nations of the
world — including my own — could cooperate
toward a program of substantially reducing the
sale of conventional arms around the world.
We also briefly discussed the so-called North-
South dialogue issues, which are of great im-
portance to all of us.
We of course went into substantial detail on
the proposals and on the actions of the Gov-
ernment of Italy to deal with some of the eco-
nomic problems that we've discussed. This has
been a very fruitful beginning of what we hope
will be a long and consistent cooperation be-
tween your government and mine, between
our leaders, and through the various multilat-
eral organizations to which we both belong.
I am most grateful to you, Mr. Andreotti,
and I look forward to continuing this dialogue.
NEWS CONFERENCE OPENING STATEMENT,
LONDON, JANUARY 27 »
May I say that we are delighted to be here.
The President of the United States asked me
to visit London early, in order to make clear
and to express our hope for the warmest possi-
ble working relationship in the years ahead.
And our meeting today certainly leaves no
doubt in my mind that that kind of cooperative,
mutually respectful, mutually beneficial rela-
tionship has been established and will con-
tinue. . . .
We discussed many of the issues to which
the Prime Minister has made reference. The
economic issue, of course, is one that is central
to the whole world, and it is important that we
develop economic policies together which deal
with the twin problems of unemployment and
inflation, which deal with the specialized prob-
lems of trade; and at our conference I ex-
pressed the hope, at which the British lead-
ership agreed, that we might move the
multilateral trade negotiations talks along fas-
ter than they are now proceeding. We did dis-
cuss issues of the so-called North-South
dialogue.
We also discussed the issue of the Rhodesian
matter, and may I say here that my govern-
ment is exceedingly grateful to the Prime
^ Made at a joint news conference held by Vice Presi-
dent Mondale and Prime Minister James Callaghan.
188
Department of State Bulletin
Minister and to the leadership being provided
by the British Government in that very, very
difficult situation. And we stand fully behind
your government in the difficult task that you
have undertaken to try to find a reasonable
solution in that area.
We also discussed some security matters and
other matters, and I did bring some private
messages from the President that I do not feel
at hberty to disclose here.
NEWS CONFERENCE OPENING STATEMENT,
PARIS, JANUARY 29
We just completed a very useful and produc-
tive conference with President Giscard, Prime
Minister Barre, the Foreign Minister, and the
Secretary General of the Elysee. I brought to
the President the best wishes of the President
of the United States, Mr. Carter.
We discussed several common concerns,
among them the general economic picture in
the world. We described in some detail the
economic package just introduced by President
Carter to stimulate the economy of the United
States and to do so in a way that would bring
increased trade opportunities and economic ac-
tivities for employment for economies around
the world. We discussed the upcoming summit,
including suggestions concerning location,
agenda, and timing.
We discussed the Middle East. As you know.
President Giscard has just returned from a
visit to the Middle East, where he has talked
to leaders of some of those nations; and he was
able to give us a current briefing of his esti-
mate of the situation there.
We discussed briefly security matters. I re-
viewed for him the comments that we had
made earlier this week in Brussels before the
NATO Council.
We discussed North-South issues and their
concern, which we share, that there be mean-
ingful talks in the CIEC Conference [Confer-
ence on International Economic Cooperation]
and elsewhere leading to a more fruitful
dialogue between the developed nations and
the other nations of the world.
They showed great interest in our upcoming
energy programs, and I was able to report that
the United States is preparing to establish a
Department of Energy under the secre-
taryship of Mr. Schlesinger and that we were
going to accelerate the rate of the accumula-
tion of oil stockpiles under our new program,
that we intended to have a more far-
reaching — a substantially more far-
reaching — program for energy conservation
and energy production, and that we hoped to
substantially increase the extent of coopera-
tion in research and development on an inter-
national basis on all aspects of the energy
problem.
We discussed the problem of terrorism and
the threat it poses to all countries. We raised
that issue in a constructive spirit and ex-
changed views. We pointed out that our most
recent concerns were based not only on our
broad concern for the problem of terrorism but
also because one of our Ambassadors was
killed in an effort by the Black September or-
ganization to free this individual from jail in
the Middle East.
We discussed strategic issues; and I pointed
out that the President's recent statements
concerning the elimination of nuclear weapons
and a comprehensive test ban repeated
pledges that he had made during the campaign,
that they represent long-term objectives of the
United States and do not reflect a change in
our strategy of deterrence. They are not aimed
at any country. And one of the purposes of my
consultation hei-e so soon after coming into of-
fice is to consult with France and our other
alHes about the implications of moving in this
direction and how these might affect their con-
cerns and interests. We also mentioned the
President's concern for restricting and reduc-
ing the level of sale of conventional armaments
in international trade, an objective which the
French Government shares.
Mr. Giscard raised the issue of the Concorde
and gave us their view of Concorde landing at
Kennedy Airport. We indicated our sensitivity
to their concerns, and I will be conveying his
message to the President of the United States.
I pointed out that this matter is now currently
before the courts in New York, with a decision
expected sometime in the near future. As you
know, the Carter Administration has reaf-
firmed its intention to continue with the full
trial period for the Concorde at Dulles Airport.
March 7, 1977
189
Within a few hours we will be leaving for
Iceland, where we will be meeting with Prime
Minister Hallgrimsson, and then for Japan,
where we will be meeting with Prime Minister
Fukuda and other members of the Japanese
Government. There we will be talking about
many of the same concerns which have been
central to the discussions with the leaders of
Western Europe.
I think we can say at this point that the trip
has been extremely well received. I am very,
very pleased by the outcome of our talks. The
personal relationships that exist simply could
not be better than they are today. We estab-
lished beyond any doubt a full desire on all
sides to continue the fullest possible consulta-
tion and cooperation along the agenda which
we have been discussing. We have gone far
toward developing a consensus on the key mat-
ters that will be involved at the summit; and
we have commenced a crucial preparatory
work that is a precondition of a successful
summit by our visits to the various multilat-
eral institutions in Europe — NATO, EC, and
the OECD. We have helped express and
dramatize the interest of our nation in the
closest possible cooperation with those mul-
tilateral institutions.
I think the dialogue and the understanding
concerning economic problems — our view of
those economic problems, the need for stimula-
tion on the part of the stronger economies, the
need for the closest possible cooperation in
order to deal with the combined problems of
unemployment and inflation — have been
moved along very successfully. Our view and
theirs that the multilateral trade talks should
be resumed at a higher level of progress have
been well received by all parties.
We were particularly appreciative of the
French statement on nuclear proliferation of a
few weeks ago, which we consider to be a very
helpful contribution to the serious problem of
controlling nuclear fuel that is of weapons-
grade quality. We think that the progress on
understanding the American position and thus
cooperating on the security concern through
NATO in Western Europe has now been very
well advanced, and great progress has been
made there.
And, in short, the dialogue and the relation-
ships crucial to that dialogue on the central is-
sues affecting all of our nations have now been
established between the governments and the
multilateral institutions we visited in Europe
and our new government in the United States.
And for all of these reasons we believe that
this trip has been a success and we are now on
a sound basis for progress.
NEWS CONFERENCE OPENING STATEMENT,
TOKYO, FEBRUARY 1
I have just concluded two days of highly
satisfactory talks with Prime Minister Fukuda
and other representatives of the Government
of Japan. During these talks I stressed the im-
portance which President Carter personally
attaches to relations with Japan. We assured
the Japanese that we would consult them fully
in all matters of mutual concern and there
would be no surprises in the relationship.
I extended an invitation on behalf of the
President to the Prime Minister to visit Wash-
ington on March 21 and 22. I informed the
Prime Minister of the President's intention to
name a high-caliber Ambassador to Japan in
the near future, although no decision had yet
been made on that matter.
We discussed the site and timing of the up-
coming summit conference, and I will be re-
porting to the President on the views not only
of Prime Minister Fukuda but of all the other
leaders with whom I met. It is my belief that
the final decision on the site and timing can be
worked out through normal diplomatic chan-
nels without any serious difficulties.
Throughout the talks I stressed our concern
that the three main engines of the world
economy — Germany, Japan, and the United
States — should work to coordinate their eco-
nomic recovery plans more closely and to
monitor each other's progress.
I am impressed with the Japanese stimulus
program, and I hope that it will achieve the
growth target of 6.7 percent that they have set
for themselves.
I voiced our government's concern for some
specific problems in our bilateral trade rela-
tions, including problems of Japanese exports
to the United States, particularly of steel and
color televisions, and the restrictions on citrus
imports to Japan.
190
Department of State Bulletin
I underscored the President's concern about
dealing with the question of stopping the
spread of sensitive nuclear technology and ma-
terials. The Japanese explained to me in detail
their special problems and needs in this field,
and we agreed to consult in detail on this issue
in the near future.
Turning to regional and strategic issues, I
emphasized the fact that the Administration
does not intend to turn its back on Asia. We
should and will remain an Asian-Pacific power.
Our alliance with Japan remains central to our
policy in this vast and important part of the
world. We will preserve a balanced and flexi-
ble military strength in the Pacific, and we will
continue our interests in Southeast Asia.
With respect to Korea, I emphasized our
concern to maintain a stable situation on the
Korean Peninsula. I cited that we will phase
down our ground forces only in close consulta-
tion and cooperation with the Governments of
Japan and South Korea. We will maintain our
air capability in Korea and continue to assist in
upgrading Korean self-defense capabilities. In
regard to China, I stated that we continue to
desire normalization of relations with the
People's Republic of China within the
framework of the Shanghai communique.
My visit to Japan has given me great per-
sonal satisfaction. It seems clear to me that
these two new governments — one in Washing-
ton and one in Tokyo— are ready, anxious, and
able to work closely with one another.
It is my hope and belief that this trip is a
productive and rapid way to start this process
and that when we welcome Prime Minister
Fukuda to Washington next month we will see
further deepening of this already close rela-
tionship.
With the conclusion of today's talks in Tokyo
we have completed a very valuable round of
consultations with good friends and allies of
the United States. And a trip which began
more than a week ago and in my talks in Brus-
sels, Bonn, Berlin, Rome, Vatican City, Lon-
don, Paris, Iceland, and here in Tokyo, we
have in President Carter's behalf conveyed the
President's deep commitment to the best pos-
sible cooperation; established beyond all doubt
and resolved on all sides to continue the fullest
possible consultations and cooperation on our
agenda of important issues; gone far, as I will
be reporting to President Carter, toward de-
veloping a consensus in what will be involved
at the summit; set in motion a process of inten-
sified consultations which I am confident will
enable our nations to deal with greater effec-
tiveness and to deal successfully with matters
bearing on the security and well-being of each
of our peoples, the health of our economies,
and our common goal to reduce tensions and to
increase the prospects for a more stable inter-
national environment.
I will be returning to Washington with the
belief that the discussions I have had— in each
instance very substantive and positive — have
permitted me to convey some of the Presi-
dent's initial thinking and have permitted me
to gain the valuable insights of each of these
leaders with whom I have met.
This visit to Japan and to Europe, seen in
the context of the foreign policy initiatives the
President has taken at the very outset of his
Administration, I am most hopeful, has
marked an early step forward and a meaningful
contribution to progress toward the goals we
share with our good friends in Japan, in
Europe, and North America.
NEWS CONFERENCE, WASHINGTON,
FEBRUARY 2
Weekly Compilation of Prei^idential Documents dated February 7
Vice President Mondale: I've just completed
a meeting with the President, which lasted
about an hour and a half, at which I briefed him
on the various visits and stops on my trip to
Western Europe and to Japan.
I believe the trip is a success because it
began a process that we consider crucial to the
Carter Administration; namely, the closest
possible cooperative consultations and
partnerships with our traditional friends and
allies. And I'm convinced that that process has
begun, and on the best possible basis.
We've established beyond doubt our desire
to have such a relationship, and we have begun
a series of important consultations on matters
which concern us, such as developing a consen-
sus on what will be involved at the summit.
We've set in motion a process of intensified
consultations which will enable our nations to
deal with greater effectiveness and to deal
March?, 1977
191
successfully with matters bearing on the secu-
rity and well-being of each of our peoples, the
health of our economies, and our common goal
to reduce tensions and to increase the pros-
pects for a more stable international environ-
ment.
Q. Mr. Vice President, has it finally been
decided that the summit will be devoted en-
tirely to economic issues and not political and,
if it has been, is that in deference to France?
And what about our other allies and our own
objectives which go beyond economic?
Vice President Mondale: We have received
several different suggestions from the various
nations about what should be on the agenda.
And I have reported on those matters by
nation — that is, suggestions offered by each
nation — to the President; and now through
normal diplomatic channels we will be develop-
ing the agenda, undertaking the crucial prep-
aration work that's essential to an effective
summit, agreeing through diplomatic channels
on the location and the timing. And that will be
announced jointly by the nations involved at
the time the agreement is reached.
It is our hope that the agenda will include
economic matters, to be sure, but other crucial
matters of political and security significance.
Just what those matters will be has not yet
been decided; what the modalities for those
discussions might be has not yet been decided.
Q. Mr. Mondale, with Europe now moving,
or at least indicating its mllingness to dump
the dollar and move to a new economic system,
in order to avoid the kind of austerity and
fascistn and war policies that the IMF [Inter-
national Monetary Fund] is now imposing on
Egypt, weren't you embarrassed to have to
represent — coming from the United States — to
have to put forward the ynost backivard energy
policies and the ynost backward economic
policies of hyperinflation for Japan and West
Germany and deflation for the rest of Europe?
Vice President Mondale: Due to a break-
down in my briefing, we did not see our posi-
tions in quite that light.
Q. Mr. Vice President, do you have any
hopes that West Germany and France, post
your discussioyis there, may reconsider the
sale of nuclear reprocessing appliances to
Brazil and to Pakistan?
Vice President Mondale: What we asked in
each case was, first, to be heard on the concern
of the Carter Administration about the dan-
gers and the risks involved in the distribution
of sensitive nuclear technology from which
weapons-grade material could be developed.
We made that point at each of the capitals. And
we asked that consultations commence on that
matter and on the broader issues of nuclear
proliferation at the earliest possible moment.
It was agreed that that should occur. It will
occur. Arrangements are already being made
to do so. And that was what we sought to ac-
complish and accomplished in those talks.
Q. Do you have an agreement then —
tentatively — an agreement that they mil hold
up on those sales until you have a chance to
talk specifically?
Vice President Mondale: All we discussed
was the importance of having intensive, early
consultations on the matter. There has been no
agreement beyond that point.
Q. Mr. Vice President, did you discuss with
the President what sort of foreign missions
you might undertake in the future and what
sort of role you might play in American
foreign policy in the future?
Vice President Mondale: No, we did not.
The meeting today involved a report on the
various visits, messages that I brought from
foreign leaders, observations that I made
about different concerns to the President, and
did not involve future possible missions.
Q. Mr. Vice President, did you discuss with
President Giscard d'Estaing the release by the
French court of the gentlernan Abu Daoud?
Vice President Mondale: Yes. I brought it
up briefly and mentioned our President's con-
cern, and then we talked about, in general
terms, the need to deal with terrorism.
Q. Do you think that the subject of terrorism
folloump should be a matter for the summit to
consider when it meets?
Vice President Mondale: I would just as
soon not discuss particular topics at this point.
192
Department of State Bulletin
because I think the nations offering the pro-
posals did so in confidence.
Q. Mr. Vice President, before this trip, sev-
eral of this Administration's officials were ex-
pressing concern that the Germans and the
Japanese were not moving quickly enough to
reflate their economies. Did you achieve any
agreement from these two governments in this
area?
Vice President Mondale: We made very
clear, first of all, our belief that the stronger
economies, which you might call the three
great engines, the United States, Japan, and
Germany, that are now in strong economic po-
sitions do so — should stimulate their
economies sufficiently to assist other nations
that are in difficulty so that they would have
increased export and thus employment oppor-
tunities as the result of a heightened accelera-
tion of international economic activities and
that our three nations, particularly because we
are strong economically, should assume as
much of that burden as possible.
We also pointed out that because of OPEC
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries] surpluses, that we had responsibility to
try to assume part of that resultant world defi-
cit in the planning of our economic programs.
We made that point with great care and
strength. And then I also reported in some de-
tail on our own economic stimulation package.
The other governments then reported on their
plans.
There is complete agreement on the part of
their leadership, as well as our own, on the
need to stimulate. The size, the proportion,
the prudence, the relation to inflation becomes
exceedingly complex, and what we've agreed
to do is to pursue our policies, to consult
closely, to monitor the economic indicators as
we proceed, to see if we're achieving our
jointly agreed objective on a stimulative policy
that will help these other nations and help
bring about a higher level of international eco-
nomic activities, bearing in mind the problem
of inflation as well.
Q. Mr. Vice President, if both the Germans
and, I believe, the French claim that in their
deals with the Pakistanis and Brazilians for
those nuclear facilities that there are adequate
safeguards — if that's so — what's the problem?
Vice President Mondale: The position that
the Administration has taken is that these
facilities possess the capacity to produce
weapons-grade materials, and to the extent
possible, and hopefully to the fullest possible
extent, we can prohibit the transfer of this
technology, which greatly complicates the
problem of control; and that it was our hope
that alternatives could be found to deal with
the nuclear power needs of these nations which
we accept, which does not include the risk of
facilities that can produce weapons-grade ma-
terial; and that we were willing to consider
ways in which secure supplies of low-grade nu-
clear fuel could be made available for plants;
that we were willing to consider ways in which
these alternatives could not conceivably in-
volve commercial advantage as a result of
withdrawing the availability of such nuclear
technology; and that we also understood the
great complexity of this issue, both from a
technical standpoint and from a political
standpoint.
And that what was really needed at this
point and what we were asking for was that the
new Administration be given time to consult
very closely with them and with the other na-
tions about the total picture and what might be
done to diminish, reduce if not eliminate, the
risks that flow from facilities from which
weapons-grade material can be produced.
That's the status of our position, and that's
what these consultations will involve.
Q. Two questions, two unrelated questions,
if I may. You seemed to be saying earlier that
it was the hope of the United States to expand
the summit meeting to some extent beyond
economic questions. Can you elaborate on that
for us to give us whatever additional you can
on that hope by the United States?
My second question, which is unrelated, is
whether or not you discussed with the various
leaders President Carter's proposal for a total
test ban, nuclear testing ban. If so, what kind
of reaction you got and, particularly, if you
can tell me what kind of reaction you got from
them, if any, on this aspect of it; that is, the
Chinese — hoiv the Chinese, how China might
fit into that or what their reaction is. Did they
March/, 1977
193
tell you anything about what they thought
China's reaction would be on it?
So I've got two unrelated questions here.
Vice President Mondale: On the first ques-
tion of the summit, it is our hope that we sim-
ply call it the summit and that all the matters
would be on the table that were of mutual con-
cern, whether they were economic or not. We
anticipate that economics will be a central con-
cern, and obviously it was a central concern
throughout our trip and must be considered as
such.
Such issues as nuclear proliferation,
North-South dialogue, energy matters, and a
whole range of other concerns that are not
strictly economic but by definition economics,
we would hope could freely be included on the
agenda on the agreement of the other parties.
That's essentially our approach.
We have asked the other nations for their
suggestions. We want to be forthcoming and
cooperative, and I think that we will be able to
work out an agenda that is mutually satisfac-
tory for all.
Q. If I might ask, that would be, then, an
agenda that is considerably broader than
Rambouillet and Puerto Rico?
Vice President Mondale: I will have to stand
corrected on that. I guess I'm not prepared to
answer that question. But that's the approach
we wished to take.
On the nuclear test ban treaty, comprehen-
sive test ban, that was discussed, and it was
agreed there would be additional consultations
on the matter. It was touched on briefly, and
there will be additional consultations on it.
Q. Can you give us the reaction of any of the
leaders you talked to to a total test ban agree-
ment?
Vice President Mondale: I don't believe I
can disclose their point of view.
Mr. Vice President, could you itemize, sir,
the countries that ivould be included? For in-
stance, would India be included, because
India is getting heavy water from Russia,
making atomic weapons?
Vice President Mondale: I mentioned that
there were many, many aspects of nuclear pro-
liferation, in addition to those that I've dis-
cussed, which really involve what you might
call the next generation of concerns about nu-
clear proliferation; that might involve, for
example, as Chancellor [of the Federal Ger-
man Repubhc Helmut] Schmidt has suggested,
a new follow-on treaty for the nuclear prolifer-
ation treaty. It's a very complex, difficult mat-
ter that involves consultation. We did not get
into all the possible ramifications.
Q. May I ask a followup question because,
you see, once they have the atomic energy
given to them, they can create, like yogurt — all
you need is a tablespoon of yogurt and you can
make more. They make the atomic daughters,
you see. So what do you do with those?
Vice President Mondale: It is very complex,
as your yogurt analogy points out. [Laughter]
Q. To follow on Herb's question, did the
Germans and the French agree to give the Ad-
ministration this tiyne that you asked for be-
fore they take any specific actions to carry out
these contracts?
Vice President Mondale: We agreed to have
consultations and that they would occur im-
mediately on an intensive basis and that there
would be a chance for the free exchange of
ideas and alternatives and options. But there
has been no agreement beyond that.
Q. One other question: Was the Secretary of
State at your meeting or, if not, how do you
plan to brief him and other Cabinet members?
Vice President Mondale: The Secretary of
State was invited to the meeting this morning,
but he had testimony before the Hill, and I will
brief him thoroughly. He had his representa-
tive— Mr. Cooper [Under Secretary-designate
for Economic Affairs Richard N. Cooper] was
there. But I will thoroughly also brief him, as
soon as he's through with his testimony.
Q. Mr. Vice President, did you have any
disappointments on this trip? I think, for
example, of the French — they didn't agree to
expanding the summit beyond economic mat-
ters; the Germans really didn't agree to reflate
beyond the package. Were there any disap-
pointments for you?
194
Department of State Bulletin
Vice President Mondale: First of all, in
both instances, it was not quite as the question
described it.
We had a very good talk with President Gis-
card about the summit, about the issues that
should be there. They indicated in private
what they've said pubhcly about the economic
summit. And I'm sure that we can work out an
arrangement that includes the appropriate
items on the agenda, and it is really not a mat-
ter of great, serious substance at all. I am con-
vinced it can be worked out.
On the reflation issue, I think it was very
helpful. I think there is substantial consensus
and agreement now among the stronger
economies in the world that it is necessary for
our economies to stimulate, to help share the
burden of increasing international economic
activity — exports and the other — and to help
head off protectionism and to resume progress
on the multilateral trade talks and so on.
I think the talks are very helpful in under-
standing each other's economic programs. I
found some misunderstanding, for example,
about just how we intended to proceed. Well,
it was helpful to clarify that. And we've begun
the process of consulting and monitoring eco-
nomic progress to make certain that we reach
the economic targets that are generally
agreed to be necessary.
Now, it's hard to be specific in terms of per-
centage points, but one of the things we found
out when we talked to the other nations was
that there was understandable disagreement
and doubt as to what certain economic pro-
grams would produce in terms of economic
stimulation. OECD [Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development], for
example, has a lower expectation about what
our programs will produce than our own gov-
ernment does. We think we are right; they
think they are right.
So that as we go along we will monitor, care-
fully calibrate, the growth of our economies,
based on new information that will come forth
on the statistical base that's developed in our
nations. So that I think we made a good deal of
progress, and it may be a somewhat
unbeHevable — I came away very, very pleased
with the trip, and there were no substantial
disappointments.
Q. Mr. Vice President, I don't think the
President has set a firm date for a suinmit. He
said some time after the 1st of May. Based on
your findings, did you recommend to him any-
thing about timing, as to whether it would be
sooner or later? What are your views on that?
Vice President Mondale: I want this to be off
the record. Midyear. [Laughter]
Q. Mr. Vice President, what can you say on
the record? [Laughter]
Vice President Mondale: Don't dare file it.
No international explosions.
We now have to consult. We had two or
three different suggestions. We now have to
consult through diplomatic channels and agree
on a summit, but it will be midyear.
Q. Mr. Vice President, what was President
Carter's reaction to your trip? Was there one
specific area where he was more excited or en-
thused about the results you achieved than
others?
Vice President Mondale: No. I would say he
was thrilled with all of it. [Laughter] He has
some new countries he wants me to go to. But
he was disappointed in the press corps that
followed me. That was his major — [Laughter]
Q. Mr. Vice President, what impression did
you bring back from Italy, not only on the eco-
nomic situation there but on the short-range
prospective of European Communists?
Vice President Mondale: That was very
briefly discussed. Our talks were almost en-
tirely on economic matters and on our plans for
economic growth. They were interested in our
discussions with the leaders of the German
Government and the Japanese Government.
We talked about the multilateral trade
negotiations. We talked about their plans to
slowly phase out some of the deposits that
were developed to try to discourage imports
and encourage exports as a part of their con-
tribution to a more open international trading
economy. And while we did discuss it, it was
very brief and we barely touched on the sub-
ject.
Q. Mr. Vice President, a number of Euro-
pean governments, I think, have suggested
March/, 1977
195
that the present Administration's economic
package isn't big enough. Based on your find-
ings, is the $31 billion figure flexible? Could
it move upward or is it now fixed?
Vice Presideni Mondale: The size of our
economic package is approximately 1 percent
of our gross national product. That's almost
identical with the size of the Japanese pack-
age. We feel that it will achieve the real eco-
nomic growth rates that will stimulate our
economy, increase employment, increase in-
ternational economic activity, and will do so
short of that — that point that's hard to decide
on, where you might reignite inflationary
forces.
There was general agreement and satisfac-
tion with that package in other governments.
However, OECD, as I mentioned earlier, in
their projections doubt — they think that the
United States, the German Government, and
the Japanese are all being too optimistic in
what their stimulative packages will accom-
plish. And that's why we've agreed to monitor
this very closely as we go along, to make cer-
tain that our projections are fulfilled.
Q. Mr. Vice President, does your monitor-
ing allow the possibility that this year you
might restimulate, when you talk to the
Japanese and West Germans more, or will
that only be left until next year?
Vice President Mondale: The nature of the
understanding was to simply monitor, based
on our own economic indicators, how well
we're doing. There was no discussion about
what follows, but that we all wanted to reach
these targets of growth that we've described
officially.
Q. Mr. Vice President, what were you able
to learn about the attitude of the Japanese
Government toward the President's expressed
intention to undertake a phased withdrawal
of American ground forces in Korea?
Vice President Mondale: I think we were
able to reassure them that in pursuit of our
announced policies of withdrawing U.S.
ground forces from Korea, that we intended
to do so on a phased basis; that we intended to
do it only after the closest consultation with
the Governments of Japan and Korea; that we
intended to pursue that objective in a way
which in no way destabihzed the credibility of
the security interests of all of the nations in-
volved in the Pacific area; and that we in-
tended to help improve the combat effective-
ness of the Korean ground forces; that we in-
tended to retain our air force presence in the
area; and that we intended completely to ful-
fill our standing treaty commitments to Ja-
pan.
It was my impression that the Japanese
leaders were reassured by that presentation
and it helped increase understanding on that
objective. As you know, I carried an invita-
tion from President Carter to Prime Minister
Fukuda, and he will be visiting the United
States. And no doubt those matters and
others will be on the agenda of that discus-
sion.
Q. If I could ask a brief followup, in your
talks generally, did you detect a high level of
interest in what would be the defense and de-
terrence policies of the Administration and
any lack of certainty about that?
Vice President Mondale: No. I think they
were quite reassured by my statement, which
is, of course, identical with the public — in
other words, what we said privately to the
Japanese was a careful repetition of what the
President's position publicly has been. In our
talks with them, I emphasized the fact that
the Administration does not intend to turn its
back on Asia; that we should and will remain
an Asian-Pacific power; that our alliance with
Japan remains central to our policy in that
vast and important part of the world; that we
will preserve a balanced and flexible military
strength in the Pacific and continue our inter-
ests in Southeast Asia.
With respect to Korea, I emphasized our
concern to maintain a stable situation on the
Korean Peninsula. I cited that we will phase
down our ground forces only in close consulta-
tion and cooperation with the Governments of
Japan and South Korea. And we will maintain
our air capability in Korea and continue to as-
sist in upgrading Korean self-defense capabil-
196
Department of State Bulletin
ity. And I think they found that formulation
satisfactory and reassuring.
Q. Would you amplify increasing the com-
bat effectiveness of Korean ground forces?
Are you planning to give South Korea the sort
of weapons that it doesn't have now, or more
sophisticated equipment? Are you just saying
that, or is there some major program for giv-
ing, for upgrading Korean ground forces?
Vice President Mondale: I think it's a con-
tinuation of an existing commitment that we
would help the ground forces increase their
combat effectiveness. I don't have a specific
answer to that. But it does not go beyond that
statement. Thank you very much.
U.S. Relations With the ILO
To Remain Under Review
Following is a joint statement by the De-
partments of State, Labor, and Commerce
issued on February 16, which was read to
news correspondents that day by Frederick
Z . Brown, Director, Office of Press Rela-
tions.
Press release 57 dated February 16
The question of U.S. relations with the
International Labor Organization remains a
matter of high priority and will remain
under continuing review by a Cabinet-level
committee, where, we hope, the AFL-CIO
and the Chamber of Commerce will continue
to play active roles.
Because of dissatisfaction in the U.S.
Government and among labor and industry
leaders with a number of unfortunate trends
in the ILO, the United States submitted a
letter on November 5, 1975, giving the re-
quired two-year notice of intent to withdraw
from the organization. In that letter, it was
stated:
The United States does not desire to leave the ILO.
The United States does not e.xpect to do so. But we do
intend to make every possible effort to promote the
conditions which will facilitate our continued participa-
tion. If this should prove impossible, we are in fact
prepared to depart.
Those views are no less valid today. They
will guide our actions and our ultimate deci-
sion in the critical months ahead.
New Organizational System
for National Security Council
Following is a statement made to news
correspondents on January 22 by White
House Press Secretary Jody Powell.
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated January 24
A new organizational system has been es-
tablished for the NSC [National Security
Council]. In place of the previous seven
committees, there will be only two.
There will be a Committee on Policy Re-
view, chaired by departmental officials, nor-
mally the senior departmental official. There
will be a Committee on Special Coordination
dealing with crosscutting issues, chaired by
the President's National Security Adviser,
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski.
This system was devised and ordered by
the President himself. It reflects his desire
for more simplified and responsive organiza-
tion throughout government.
March 7, 1 977
197
Department Urges Appropriation of Funds
for International Financial Institutions
Statement by Paul H. Boeker
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs *
I welcome this opportunity to testify in
support of tiie Administration's requests for
appropriation of our contributions to the in-
ternational development lending institu-
tions.
These institutions make vitally important
contributions to the poorer countries' strug-
gles to overcome the formidable obstacles to
economic development. Our support for
them is a major element in our effort to fos-
ter constructive, mutually beneficial rela-
tionships with developing countries. Equally
significant to us, however, is the contribu-
tion the international financial institutions
make to creation of a structure of interna-
tional cooperation based on mutual responsi-
bility among developing as well as developed
nations for maintaining the economic and
political health of the world.
Controlling rapid population growth, pro-
viding adequate food supplies, managing the
world's energy and mineral resources, limit-
ing damage to the environment, and main-
taining adequate growth and stability in the
world economy are global problems. The
United States has a fundamental and direct
interest in having them addressed on the
basis of effective international collaboration
and mutual responsibilities of states.
The developing countries have become in-
creasingly important participants in the
' Submitted to the Subcommittee on Foreign Opera-
tions of the House Committee on Appropriations on
Feb. 16. The complete transcript of the hearings will be
published by the committee and will be available from
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
structure of international cooperation we
seek to foster. The growing importance of
developing countries is mirrored in our own
economic exchange with them. The recent
share of developing countries in total U.S.
trade (40 percent), direct investment (25
percent), and overseas financial claims (60
percent) is significant and increasing. Our
exports to the developing world trebled
from 1972 to 1975. They have reached a
level of $40 billion and now account for 35
percent of total U.S. exports. Our imports
from the developing countries have in-
creased from $14 bilHon in 1972 to $52 billion
today. They now represent 44 percent of our
total imports and 28 percent of our non-
petroleum imports.
The developing countries face major prob-
lems, however. Central to those problems,
and therefore at the heart of our relation-
ship with those countries, are issues of eco-
nomic and social development. The needs of
the developing world are enormous. Their
problems of food, nutrition, health, educa-
tion, population control, and energy de-
velopment are staggering. The needs for
basic economic infrastructure, especially in
the poorest countries, are immense. The
problems of urban overcrowding and squalor
are fed by the lack of rural development.
The developing countries themselves are
making major efforts to address these prob-
lems. Over the last decade a number of them
have made sufficient progress so they can
now generate adequate investment for
growth from domestic savings and through
their foreign trade and borrowing in capital
198
Department of State Bulletin
markets. Many more developing countries
still have very limited access to interna-
tional capital markets except through the in-
termediation of the World Bank and the re-
gional banks.
For the lower income countries, the over-
whelming demands for immediate consump-
tion make the surplus available for invest-
ment inadequate for anything other than
marginal rates of economic and social de-
velopment. Their limited ability to service
debt on commercial terms makes external
concessional assistance essential for any
hope of future development.
A comprehensive U.S. development as-
sistance program is a central element of a
mutually beneficial relationship with the de-
veloping world. Support for economic and
social progress of poor people in the de-
veloping world is also a reflection of what
we are — a humanitarian nation — and of the
character and purpose we project to the rest
of the world.
President Carter is now reviewing the
Administration's fiscal year 1978 budget
recommendations and will be submitting his
revisions to the Congress shortly. It is clear
that one element of this package will be a
balanced foreign assistance program contain-
ing bilateral and multilateral elements involv-
ing both hard- and soft-term assistance, as
well as food aid.
Broadly Shared Aid Effort
The international development lending in-
stitutions play a unique role in our assist-
ance effort. They have been the primary ve-
hicle over the last two decades for making
what was once a primarily U.S. aid effort
one broadly shared among the industrial
countries of the West and Japan. These in-
stitutions and the IMF [International Mone-
tary Fund] have also taken the lead in
working out with developing countries
policies and programs which improve their
own resource mobilization efforts. At the
same time, the international development
lending institutions embody an approach to
international economic growth based on
mutual obligations and open exchange of in-
ternational trade and investment. As such
the international financial institutions repre-
sent more than the sum of contributions
which individual countries provide. They
represent a collective consensus on the
priorities of the international effort to pro-
mote economic and social progress.
The United States has a large stake in the
international development banks. They were
created in good part as a result of U.S.
leadership. They reflect to a considerable
extent our concept of the development task
and of the means to address it. We helped
mold the international consensus which is
the foundation of their effectiveness.
The appropriations you are now consider-
ing for fiscal years 1977 and 1978 will help
restore the U.S. position of effective lead-
ership in these important institutions. They
will demonstrate to other industrial and de-
veloping countries U.S. dedication and pur-
pose in addressing the fundamental concerns
of development.
The appropriations we seek at this time
involve broad global, as well as regional,
concerns. Each of the institutions for which
we are seeking your support has a unique
role, and each has widespread support in the
developing world.
The World Bank Group
This year a large part of our request is for
the various elements of the World Bank
Group. This group sets the standard for
multilateral development cooperation efforts
and enjoys the confidence of investors, lend-
ers, and borrowers alike.
At the heart of the system is the World
Bank itself. The Bank's broad membership
and long distinguished record in develop-
ment cooperation make it a leader in the
task of global development. Its leadership
position has enabled the Bank to play a
major role in defining the priorities for de-
velopment and establishing an environment
within which development efforts can pros-
per.
Ever since its inception, the philosophy
and program of the World Bank have paral-
leled our development assistance program.
Our leadership helped create the Bank, and
we helped direct its activities into areas we
March 7, 1 977
199
could support. The fact that the Bank is
headquartered in Washington and has al-
ways had an American president reflects the
substantial U.S. investment and influence in
the institution.
The appropriation request for fiscal year
1978 represents the first appropriation for
the World Bank since fiscal year 1972. Since
that time the Bank's lending program has
grown in response to the enormous needs of
the developing world for investment capital,
but the Bank's capital base has remained
unchanged. Unless its capital is increased, it
will be forced to cut back its lending pro-
gram, with serious repercussions for de-
veloping countries.
The International Development Associa-
tion (IDA) is the principal multilateral chan-
nel for concessional assistance to the poorest
countries of the world. These countries are
in desperate need of external assistance, but
their economies are in most cases too fragile
to absorb debt on conventional terms. In
many cases IDA represents the principal
hope for the capital inflows necessary for
development.
This year is crucial for IDA. By June 30,
IDA will have committed the resources it
has available under the terms of the fourth
replenishment agreed to in Nairobi in 1973.
Unless new funds are made available on an
urgent basis, IDA will be forced to cease
making new loan commitments, with severe
consequences for millions of people in the
poorest developing countries. As you are
aware, negotiations for a fifth replenishment
of IDA have been underway for over a year.
Because of the extraordinary importance of
IDA to the poorest countries, these negotia-
tions have become a focal point of attention
and concern in the North-South dialogue.
The International Finance Corporation
(IFC) was established because of the com-
mon recognition of the need for a special in-
stitution within the World Bank Group to
address the particular needs of the private
sector in the developing world. The real
value of the IFC hes not only in the amount
of direct resources it makes available but in
its role in mobilizing resources for private-
sector development. Every dollar IFC has
committed has generated over four dollars
in additional resources for development
projects.
The IFC has not had a replenishment
since its inception in 1956. In recognition of
its record to date and of the increased needs
for IFC financing, agreement was reached
at the seventh special session of the United
Nations General Assembly and at the an-
nual meeting of the IBRD [International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(World Bank)] in September 1975 on the
need for a substantial replenishment of IFC
resources. The appropriation being re-
quested at this time is needed to implement
this important initiative.
Each of the major geographic regions has
specific requirements that the regional
banks are designed to address. These in-
stitutions complement the activities of the
World Bank Group and make vital contribu-
tions to development in their regions.
Inter-American Development Bank
The Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB), oldest and largest of the regional
banks, was established in the belief that
Latin American countries should assume
greater responsibility for managing their
own development and participating in deci-
sions regarding the use of foreign resources.
It has become the major channel for U.S.
support of economic and social progress in
Latin America.
The IDB serves the development needs of
a region with which we share a good deal of
common history, a close political relation-
ship, and significant economic ties. Latin
America accounts for 15 percent of our ex-
ports and about one-quarter of our oil im-
ports. We have substantial direct invest-
ments and financial relations with the re-
gion. Several countries of the area — for
example, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela —
wield increasing political influence on a wide
range of global issues.
In a decision which we encouraged and
supported, the IDB last year admitted non-
regional donor members, who are assuming a
significant role in the Bank, thereby con-
200
Department of State Bulletin
tributing to equitable burden sharing. These
new donors will welcome affirmation of con-
tinued U.S. support for the Bank.
Asian and African Institutions
The Asian Development Bank (ADB),
founded in 1966 with American support but
as an Asian initiative, serves another geo-
graphic area of strong American interests.
Asia includes nations which have become
significant trading partners of the United
States, major suppliers of such important
raw materials as natural rubber, tin, petro-
leum, hard fibers, timber, and countries
where American investors have important
interests.
In the last 25 years America has partici-
pated in two wars in the region served by
the ADB. Today there is peace in Asia. To
maintain this peace and stability it is impor-
tant to foster economic development and to
facilitate improvement in the quality of life
for the Asian peoples. Some countries
served by the Asian Development Bank are
among the poorest on earth, with the
minimum assurance of economic security.
Others, such as Malaysia and Thailand, are
somewhat better off but still face staggering
obstacles to their efforts to provide their
expanding populations with decent employ-
ment opportunities. Economic growth is es-
sential for political stability in the face of
potentially hostile neighbors. Still others,
with admirable records of economic de-
velopment, are nevertheless highly vulnera-
ble to fluctuations of the world economy as
well as external threats to their security.
The Asian Development Bank contributes
significantly to the alleviation of these prob-
lems. American support for the Asian De-
velopment Bank and its soft-loan affiliate,
the Asian Development Fund, is an effective
way for us to share in these tasks and an
important indication of sustained U.S. polit-
ical interest in the region.
Finally, I would like to turn to the newest
regional international financial institution,
the African Development Fund, the conces-
sionary affiliate of the African Development
Bank.
Our joining this institution on November
18, 1976, has marked a new period in our
relations with Africa. As a tangible commitment
by the United States to the only established
pan-African economic development institution,
our membership has been welcomed by Africans
and non-Africans alike.
Africa faces enormous political and eco-
nomic problems. In addition to the turmoil
caused by the transition to majority rule in
southern Africa, Africa is one of the world's
poorest continents and faces severe eco-
nomic development problems. The job of
nationbuilding and regional political stability
are inseparable. Support of the African De-
velopment Fund is therefore an important
political symbol as well as a sound venture
in development cooperation.
Mr. Chairman, the appropriations re-
quests you have before you are of consider-
able foreign policy significance. We are at a
crossroads in our relations with the develop-
ing world. We have the opportunity both to
reaffirm the dedication of the United States
to effective cooperation with developing
countries and to direct the substance of this
cooperation into forms and fora that reflect
our interest in mutual sharing of respon-
sibilities. The international financial institu-
tions represent a critical element of U.S. ef-
forts to achieve constructive collaboration
between industrial and developing nations.
Our support for them is crucial.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
Review of Immigration Problems. Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and In-
ternational Law of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, on Immigration and Nationality Act waiv-
ers, foreign students, consular functions abroad, and
immigration benefits to illegitimate children. June
11, 1975July 28, 1976. 159 pp.
Soviet Activities in Cuba— Parts VI and VII. Com-
munist Influence in the Western Hemisphere. Hear-
ings before the Subcommittee on International Polit-
ical and Military Affairs of the House Committee on
International Relations. October 7, 1975-September
16, 1976. 127 pp.
China Enters the Post-Mao Era. A report by Senator
Mike Mansfield, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, to the
March 7, 1977
201
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. November
1S76. 158 pp.
China and the Chinese. A compendium of papers sub-
mitted to the Joint Economic Committee. November
19, 1976. 139 pp.
Charting a New Course: Southeast Asia in a Time of
Change. A report by Senator Mitce Mansfield, Major-
ity Leader, U.S. Senate, to the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations. December 1976. 103 pp.
Americans Missing in Southeast Asia. Final report,
together with additional and separate views, of the
House Select Committee on Missing Persons in
Southeast Asia. H. Rept. 94-1764. December 13,
1976. 267 pp.
Legislative Review Activities of the House Committee
on International Relations, 94th Congress. H. Rept.
94-1774. December 30, 1976. 76 pp.
Human Rights and U.S. Policy: Argentina, Haiti, In-
donesia, Iran, Peru, and the Philippines. Reports
submitted to the House Committee on International
Relations by the Department of State. December 31,
1976. 37 pp.
Use of U.S. Food Resources for Diplomatic
Purposes — An E.xamination of the Issues. Prepared
for the House Committee on International Relations
by the Congressional Research Service, Library of
Congress. January 1977. 85 pp.
Congress and Foreign Policy. Report of the Special
Subcommittee on Investigations of the House
Committee on International Relations. January 2,
1977. 26 pp.
Report on the Activities of the House Merchant Marine
and Fisheries Committee, 94th Congress. H. Rept.
94-1784. January 3, 1977. 260 pp.
Military Sales to Turkey. Communication from the
President of the United States dated November 18
transmitting his determination on the sale and financ-
ing of certain defense articles to Turkey during fiscal
year 1977. H. Doc. 9S-6. January 4, 1977. 6 pp.
Communications from the Acting Assistant Secretary
of State for Congressional Relations transmitting
texts of International Labor Organization conven-
tions and recommendations. ILO Convention and
Recommendation Concerning Organizations of Rural
Workers and Their Role in Economic and Social De-
velopment; H. Doc. 95-15; January 4, 1977; 18 pp.
ILO Convention and Recommendation Concerning
Vocational Training in the Development of Human
Resources; H. Doc. 95-16; January 4, 1977; 31 pp.
ILO Convention and Recommendation Concerning
Migrations in Abusive Conditions and Equality of
Treatment of Migrant Workers; H. Doc. 95-17;
January 4, 1977; 22 pp.
Protocol to the Convention on International Civil Avia-
tion. Message from the President of the United
States transmitting the protocol signed at Montreal
October 16, 1974, amending article 50(a) of the con-
vention to increase the membership of the ICAO
Council. S. Ex. A, 95th Congress, 1st session.
January 12, 1977. 4 pp.
Two Related Protocols to the Convention for the Unifi-
cation of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, as Amended. Message from the
President of the United States transmitting the pro-
tocols done at Montreal September 25, 1975. S. Ex.
B, 95th Congress, 1st session. January 14, 1977. 17
pp.
Presidential Advisory Board
on Ambassadorial Appointments
AN EXECUTIVE ORDER>
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Con-
stitution and statutes of the United States of America,
and as President of the United States of America, in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory
Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App. I), it is hereby ordered
as follows:
Section l. (a) There is hereby established the Presi-
dential Advisory Board on Ambassadorial Appoint-
ments, hereinafter referred to as the Board, which shall
be composed of members appointed by the President.^
(b) The President shall designate a Chairman from
among the members of the Board.
(c) The Secretary of State shall designate an Execu-
tive Secretary.
Sec. 2. (a) The Board shall, whenever requested,
make confidential recommendations to the Secretary of
State and the President as to the qualifications of indi-
viduals for an ambassadorial post for which noncareer
individuals are being considered, and such other advice
as the President shall request.
(b) In considering the qualifications of a prospective
nominee, the Board shall consider such background in-
formation on the requirements of particular ambassado-
rial posts, evaluation criteria, and information regarding
the prospective nominee which may be furnished by the
Department of State; and the Board shall consider such
other information as it deems appropriate in order to
render an informed judgment concerning a prospective
nominee's qualifications and suitability.
Sec. 3. Upon request by the President or the Secre-
tary of State, the Board shall consider which ambas-
sadorial posts should be filled by career people and
which should be filled by noncareer people, and shall
make its recommendations in confidence regarding same
to them.
Sec. 4. Board members may not be appointed to an
ambassadorial post during their service on the Board
nor for at least one year thereafter. The President may
waive this provision in specific cases and will in such
cases state his reasons for doing so.
Sec. 5. Members of the Board who are not officers or
employees of the Federal Government shall receive no
compensation from the Government of the United States
1 No. 11970; 42 Fed. Reg. 7919.
^ On Feb. 5, President Carter appointed the
following-named persons to the Board: Reubin O'D. As-
kew, Chairman; Maria Duran; Maurice Ferre; Nancy
Flaherty; John Hope Franklin; Chris Gitlin; W. Averell
Harriman: Stanley Hoffmann; Anne Clark Martindell;
Vilma Martinez; Joan Masuck; Thomas P. O'Neill III;
Mary Jean Patterson; Dean Rusk; Stephen I.
Schlossberg; William W. Scranton; Alex Seith; Donald
Stewart; Ben J. Wattenberg; Barbara M. White.
202
Department of State Bulletin
for their service as members of the Board, but may, to
the extent permitted by law, be allowed travel ex-
penses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as au-
thorized by law (5 U.S.C. 5702 and 5703) for persons
employed intermittently in the government service.
Sec. 6. The Secretary of State shall, to the extent
permitted by law, provide administrative and staff serv-
ices, support, and facilities for the Board.
Sec. 7. Notwithstanding the provisions of any other
Executive order, the functions of the President under
the Federal Advisoiy Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App. I),
except that of reporting annually to the Congress,
which are applicable to the Board, shall be perfoiTned
by the Secretaiy of State in accordance with guidelines
and procedures established by the Office of Management
and Budget.
Sec. 8. The Board shall terminate on December 31,
1978, unless extended prior to that date.
Jimmy Carter.
The White House, Febmai-y 5, 1977.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND CONFERENCES
U.S. Discusses Its Preparations
for the U.N. Water Conference
Following is a statement made on January
i by U.S. Representative Jacob M. Myerson
in the second special session of the Commit-
tee on Natural Resources, Intergovernment-
al Preparatory Committee for the United
Nations Water Conference.
USUN press release 1 dated January 5
A busy year has passed since the first pre-
paratory session for the United Nations
Water Conference. The task before us this
week is of special importance with barely 2V2
months until the meeting in Argentina. We
share the general hope and expectation that
we shall conclude our work this week with a
clear sense of the organization and adminis-
tration of the conference — and also with an
appreciation of the issues upon which our
governments must take positions in March.
We listened with great interest to the re-
ports by Secretary Mageed [Secretary Gen-
eral of the conference Yahia Abdel Mageed,
of Sudan] and the Representative of the Gov-
ernment of Argentina on the status of prep-
arations for the conference. My government
wishes to express its appreciation to Mr.
Mageed for the excellent job he has done in
the short time he has been involved in con-
ference planning, particularly considering
the limited budgetary resources he has had
available to him. We share his disappoint-
ment that some of the basic conference
documentation is not yet available to the
committee, for reasons which we understand
and appreciate. We hope these documents
can be completed and made available
promptly so that governments will be in a
position to express views on them at the con-
ference. The United States will study them
thoroughly. As far as the work of this com-
mittee is concerned, it is our view that we
have the responsibility to take note of the
documentation and transmit it to the
conference — and not to deal with it in sub-
stantive detail.
We would also like to express our appreci-
ation to the distinguished Representative of
Argentina for his comprehensive report on
host-country preparations. It is clear that
planning is proceeding expeditiously, and we
look forward to visiting Mar del Plata in
March.
Certainly nothing has occurred since the
last meeting of our committee to diminish the
importance of the conference we are plan-
ning. The year 1976 saw large areas of the
world affected by severe drought conditions.
The drought in the Sahel continued; and
Europe experienced a major drought, as did
regions of my own country. There is no evi-
dence which suggests that these situations
will not be repeated. Indeed, our own ex-
perience indicates that nations must begin to
plan with the expectation of drought.
Other nations reported last year on serious
problems of flooding and associated loss of
life and property. Indications are that floods
are also increasing in scope and intensity be-
cause of the rapid loss of forests and vegeta-
Mareh 7, 1 977
203
tive cover which historically retained much
of the precipitation.
Water pollution is yet another major con-
cern. While some countries reported limited
successes with certain water pollution prob-
lems, the worldwide picture is that of a
deterioriating situation. The yet unsolved
problem of the disposal of human wastes is
now further complicated by new classes of
pollutants. In the United States, for exam-
ple, the growing incidence of water pollution
by toxic chemicals has resulted in the recent
passage of major new legislation to deal with
it.
I could obviously go on, but this is perhaps
not the appropriate moment. Suffice it to say
that the spectrum of global water-related
problems and issues clearly indicates that a
meeting of nations to consider measures for
preventing and solving them is indeed
timely.
As we indicated last year, Mr. Chairman,
the United States has been preparing for the
U.N. Water Conference in a serious and
thorough manner. That work has continued
throughout 1976. Our preparations are being
carried out by a national committee which is
broadly representative of the wide variety of
water interests in our country. Federal and
state governments, private industry, and the
academic community all are actively engaged
in our preparations.
I would like to take special note of the
prominent and very useful role being played
by U.S. private nongovernmental organiza-
tions, several of which have spoken this
morning through the international bodies
with which they are affiliated. Many such or-
ganizations have long been active in the
water resources field and have consequently
been able to bring to bear on our preparatory
efforts a wealth of valuable experience and
expert knowledge. Accordingly, Mr. Chair-
man, I hope that this committee will encour-
age and provide for maximum participation
of nongovernmental organizations from the
United States and other nations at the con-
ference in March.
With the guidance of our national prepara-
tory committee, the United States has sub-
mitted 17 thematic papers for the conference.
An 18th, on boundary water management,
was developed jointly with the Government
of Canada. These papers collectively reflect
the scope of our water interests and con-
cerns. They range from consideration of the
need to integrate water management into
overall planning for national development to
specialized topics. A few examples of the lat-
ter category are flood plain management,
drought contingency planning, control of
toxic substances, and remote sensing. We
have also participated as members or observ-
ers in three of the U.N. regional prepara-
tory meetings. We have contributed
specialists to the expert groups which were
convened to address the topics of community
water supply and food-water relationships
and have assisted in the preparation of the
summary of country thematic papers.
Mr. Chairman, the level and detail of U.S.
preparations reflect my government's view
that this conference deserves serious atten-
tion and constructive efforts by all nations.
We hope the conference will be well attended
and that it will attract high-level participa-
tion by policy planners and decisionmakers
who can deal with the range of diverse water
problems — and opportunities.
The global problems of water quantity and
water quality are so urgent — and opportuni-
ties so prevalent — that we must endeavor to
keep our work here, and especially in Argen-
tina in March, clearly focused and construc-
tive. In that regard, Mr. Chairman, it is vital
that the conference focus on water resources
policies and the problems of water resources
management. Important technical aspects
can be dealt with in the numerous other
forums which are available or contemplated.
We believe there is a consensus on this point,
but I feel it should be reemphasized as we
complete our planning efforts for this confer-
ence.
In addition, we should carry out our work
mindful of the fact that this conference is
substantively interconnected to other world
conferences which have been or will be de-
voted to different but related aspects of nat-
ural resources management. We are pleased
204
Department of State Bulletin
with the emphasis which has already been
placed on the need to keep the Water Con-
ference in perspective and to build the
proper Hnkages with the other world meet-
ings. In particular, we must insure that the
relationships to the forthcoming U.N. Deser-
tification Conference are carefully examined
and developed.
One of the lessons we have learned from
previous world meetings on resource man-
agement problems is that the introduction of
localized political issues into a global confer-
ence setting is counterproductive. Debate on
such issues drains energy and ideas away
from the central purpose of the conference.
It tends to frustrate efforts to find meaning-
ful solutions to urgent problems affecting the
lives of millions of people. We have said this
before in many forums, but it bears repeat-
ing. There are also many bilateral water re-
sources management problems which are un-
resolved. Other forums for debating these
matters exist. We trust that the promising
forward motion that has already been made
to focus the U.N. Water Conference on
water problems which are important to the
community of nations will be maintained and
not be compromised.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, we must proceed
with an appreciation of the fact that this is a
time of budgetary constraint for the U.N.
system and for all of our countries; certainly,
this is the case for the United States. Thus
plans for both the Water Conference and for
conference followup activities must be de-
signed in recognition of the need to promote
efficiency and cost-saving approaches. It is
important to us, and we believe to others, to
insure that proposals for followup activities
emanating from the conference be carefully
conceived and economical. Having said this,
we have every confidence that both the con-
ference and the recommendations of the
conference with regard to postconference ac-
tivities will represent valuable contributions
to the future treatment of world water re-
source management problems.
For its part, the United States is working
hard so as to be in a position to address a
broad range of critical global water resources
problems with relevant insights and with
concrete suggestions and proposals.
Mr. Chairman, it has been said that while
economic development is exceedingly com-
plex, the provision of jobs and fresh water is
the key to success. With this in mind, the
United States looks forward to the Water
Conference because it provides a unique op-
portunity to address the second of these
needs. In so doing we believe the conference
can make a significant contribution to the
well-being of millions of people in developed
and developing countries, especially in those
areas involving the poorest and the least
privileged throughout the world.
TREATY INFORMATION
United States and EEC Sign
New Fisheries Agreement
Press release 52 dated February 15
On February 15, 1977, representatives of
the United States of America and the Euro-
pean Economic Community signed a new
agreement relating to fishing activities of
member states of the Community off the
coasts of the United States.
The agreement sets out the arrangements
between the parties which will govern fish-
ing by vessels of member states of the
Community within the fishery conservation
zone of the United States beginning March
1, 1977. The agreement will come into force
after the completion of internal procedures
by both parties.
The signing of this agreement took place
in Washington. Lord Bridges, Minister to
the United States of the United Kingdom,
signed for the Presidency of the Council of
the European Communities, and Jean-Pierre
Leng signed on behalf of the Commission of
the European Communities. Frederick Ir-
ving, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Oceans
March 7, 1977
205
and International Environmental and Scien-
tific Affairs, signed for the United States.
Both delegations expressed their satisfac-
tion with the new accord and the hope that it
will strengthen cooperation between the
European Economic Community and the
United States.
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Agriculture
Agreement establishing the International Fund for
Agricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome
June 13, 1976.'
Signatures: Japan, February 11, 1977; Canada,
Yugoslavia, February 10, 1977.
Coffee
International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes.
Done at London December 3, 1975. Entered into
force provisionally October 1, 1976.
Ratificatio}! deposited: Me.xico, February 9, 1977.
Cultural Relations
Agreement for facilitating the international circulation
of visual and auditory materials of an educational,
scientific and cultural character, with protocol. Done
at Lake Success July 15, 1949. Entered into force
August 12, 1954; for the United States January 12,
1967. TIAS 6116.
Accession deposited: Cuba, February 7, 1977.
Customs
Customs convention regarding E.C.S. carnets for
commercial samples, with anne.x and protocol of sig-
nature. Done at Brussels March 1, 1956. Entered
into force October 3, 1957; for the United States
March 3, 1969.
Notification of termination: Czechoslovakia, effec-
tive April 5, 1977.
Law, Private International
Amendments to articles 5, 11, and 16 of the Statute of
the International Institute for the Unification of
Private Law (UNIDROIT). Done at Rome February
18, 1969.
Entered into force: September 29, 1976.
Narcotic Drugs
Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at
Vienna February 21, 1971. Entered into force Au-
gust 16, 1976.2
Ratification deposited: Greece, February 10, 1977.
' Not in force.
2 Not in force for the United States.
Ocean Dumping
Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by
dumping of wastes and other matter, with anne.xes.
Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washing-
ton December 29, 1972. Entered into force August 30,
1975. TIAS 8165.
Ratification deposited: France (with a reservation
and statement), February 14, 1977.
Wheat
Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat
trade convention (part of the international wheat
agreement) 1971. Done at Washington March 17,
1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect
to certain provisions, and July 1, 1976, with respect
to other provisions.
Ratification deposited: Cuba (with declarations),
February 17, 1977.
World Meteorological Organization
Convention of the World Meteorological Organization.
Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into
force March 23, 1950.
Accession deposited: Seychelles, February 15, 1977.
BILATERAL
Bangladesh
Loan agreement relating to construction of fertilizer
warehouses and ancillary buildings, with annex.
Signed at Dacca December 8, 1976. Entered into
force December 8, 1976.
Canada
Agreement concerning transit pipelines. Signed at
Washington January 28, 1977. Enters into force on
the first day of the month following the month in
which instruments of ratification are exchanged.
Colombia
Loan agreement relating to improvement and expan-
sion of rural training programs, with annex. Signed
at Bogota November 29, 1976. Entered into force
November 29, 1976.
Guarantee agreement concerning the loan agreement
of November 29, 1976, relating to improvement and
expansion of rural training programs. Signed at
Bogota November 29, 1976. Entered into force
November 29, 1976.
European Economic Community
Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the
United States. Signed at Washington February 15,
1977. Enters into force on the date of the last notifi-
cation by which the parties inform each other of the
completion of the procedures required under internal
law for entry into force.
Haiti
Agreement relating to the limitation of meat imports
from Haiti during calendar year 1977. Effected by
exchange of notes at Washington December 14 and
23, 1976. Entered into force December 23, 1976.
India
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, with
206
Department of State Bulletin
agreed minutes. Signed at New Delhi February 3,
1977. Entered into force February 3, 1977.
Pakistan
Loan agreement relating to the acquisition of agricul-
tural inputs required to ma.ximize food production.
Signed at Islamabad March 9, 1976. Entered into
force March 9, 1976.
Agreement amending the loan agreement of March 9,
1976, relating to the acquisition of agricultural in-
puts required to maximize food production. Signed at
Islamabad January 18, 1977. Entered into force
January 18, 1977.
Spain
Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the
United States. Signed at Washington February 16,
1977. Enters into force on a date to be mutually
agreed by an e.xchange of notes.
PUBLICATIONS
Department Publishes 1977 Edition
of "Treaties in Force"
Press release 31 dated January 31
The Department of State published on January 31
"Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other Inter-
national Agreements of the United States in Force on
January 1, 1977."
This is a collection reflecting the bilateral relations of
the United States with 178 countries or other political
entities and the multilateral relations of the United
States with other contracting parties to more than 380
treaties and agreements on 96 subjects. The 1977 edi-
tion lists some 475 new treaties and agreements, includ-
ing the terrorism convention; the two conventions on
political rights of women; the tin agreement; the
agreement on the conservation of polar bears; the ex-
tradition treaties with Canada and the United King-
dom; the tax conventions with Poland and Romania; the
fisheries agreement with Mexico; and the protocol to
the 1972 treaty on limitation of anti-ballistic missile
systems with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
The bilateral treaties and other agreements are ar-
ranged by country or other political entity and the mul-
tilateral treaties and other agreements are arranged by
subject with names of countries which have become
parties. Date of signature, date of entry into force for
the United States, and citations to texts are furnished
for each agreement.
"Treaties in Force" provides information concerning
treaty relations with numerous newly independent
states, indicating wherever possible the provisions of
their constitutions and independence arrangements re-
garding assumption of treaty obligations.
Information on current treaty actions, supplementing
the information contained in "Treaties in Force," is
published weekly in the Department of State
Bulletin.
The 1977 edition of "Treaties in Force" (391 pp.) is
Department of State Publication 8891 (GPO Cat. No.
S9. 14:977). It is for sale by the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20402, for $5.30.
GPO Sales Publications
Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock
number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20^02.
A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more
copies of any one publication mailed to the same ad-
dress. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of
Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown be-
low, which include domestic postage, are subject to
change.
Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which
describe the people, history, government, economy,
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a
map, a list of principal government officials and U.S.
diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A
complete set of all Background Notes currently in
stock — at least 140 — $21.80; 1-year subscription service
for approximately 77 updated or new Notes — $23.10;
plastic binder — $1.50.) Single copies of those listed
below are available at 35? each.
Bolivia Cat. No. S1.123:B63
Pub. 8032 6 pp.
Bhutan Cat. No. S1.123:B46
Pub. 8334 4 pp.
Guyana Cat. No. S1.123:G99
Pub. 8095 5 pp.
World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers
1966-1975. This ninth annual report provides statistical
information on national military spending, armed
forces, and international transfers of conventional arms
including data on transfers of major weapons systems
by type as well as dollar values. Pub. 90. 85 pp. $1.50.
(Stock No. 002-000-00058-0.)
Atomic Energy — Technical Information Exchange,
Safety Research and Development of Standards. Ar-
rangement with Italy. TIAS 8346. 11 pp. 35C. (Cat. No.
89.10:8346).
Atomic Energy — Technical Information Exchange
and Research and Development on Reactor Safety.
Arrangement with the Federal Republic of Germany.
TIAS 8347. 23 pp. 55C. (Cat. No. 89.10:8347).
Atomic Energy — Research Participation and Techni-
cal Information Exchange in Loss of Fluid Test
(LOFT). Agreement with the Federal Republic of
Germany. TIAS 8348. 7 pp. 350. (Cat. No. 89.10:8348).
March 7, 1977
207
Fisheries — Certain Fisheries Problems on the High
Seas in the Western Areas of the Middle Atlantic
Ocean. Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics. TIAS 8349. 41 pp. 70C. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8349).
Acquisition of Military Aircraft. Memorandum of un-
derstanding with Brazil. TIAS 8350. 7 pp. 35g. (Cat.
No. 89.10:8350).
Conventional Ammunition Logistics. Memorandum of
agreement with the Republic of Korea. TIAS 8351. 14
pp. 35^. (Cat. No. 89.10:8351).
Education — Financing of Exchange Programs.
Agreement with Nepal amending the agreement of June
9, 1961. TIAS 8352. 4 pp. 35?. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8352).
Agricultural Sector Loan. Agreement with the
Dominican Republic. TIAS 8353. 72 pp. 85(Z. (Cat. No.
S9.10:8353).
Fisheries — Northeastern Pacific Ocean Off the
United States Coast. Agreement with the Polish
People's Republic. TIAS 8354. 67 pp. 90?. (Cat. No.
89.10:8354).
Atomic Energy — Technical Information Exchange
and Development of Safety Criteria. Arrangement
with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland. TIAS 8355. 8 pp. 35C. (Cat. No.
89.10:8355).
Establishment of Temporary Purchasing Commis-
sion. Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics amending and extending the agreement of Oc-
tober 18, 1972, as amended and extended, and amend-
ing the protocol of October 3, 1973. TIAS 8356. 7 pp.
350. (Cat. No. 89.10:8356).
Military Assistance — Payments Under Foreign As-
sistance Act of 1973. Memorandum of understanding
with Laos. TIAS 8357. 4 pp. 35?. (Cat. No. 89.10:8.357).
Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: February 14-20
Press releases may be obtained from the Office of
Press Relations, Department of State, Washington,
D.C. 20520.
No. Date Subject
t50 2/14 Vance: interview by Israeli press.
Feb. 10.
t51 2/14 Vance: interview by Egyptian and
Syrian media, Feb. 8.
52 2/15 U.S. and European Economic Com-
munity sign new fisheries agree-
ment.
t53 2/15 Vance: departure, Andrews Air Force
Base, Feb. 14.
t54 2/16 Vance: arrival, Jerusalem, Feb. 15.
t55 2/16 Vance, Rabin: remarks.
+ 56 2/16 U.S. and Spain sign new fisheries
agreement.
57 2/16 Joint statement by Departments of
State, Labor, and Commerce on
ILO participation.
*58 2/17 Vance. Allon: news conference, Feb.
16.
*59 2/17 Shipping Coordinating Committee,
Subcommittee on Safety of Life at
Sea, working group on fire protec-
tion. Mar. 16.
No. Date Subject
*60 2/17 Study Group 6 of the U.S. National
Committee for the International
Radio Consultative Committee,
Mar. 15.
*61 2/17 Vance: toast at Knesset dinner, Feb.
16.
Vance: arrival, Cairo.
U.S. and Japan exchange notes on tex-
tile arrangement, Feb. 15.
Vance: departure, Cairo.
Vance, al-Sadat: news conference,
Feb. 17.
"Foreign Relations," 1950, vol. VII,
Korea, released.
Broadcasters from 16 countries begin
two-month tour of U.S. facilities,
Feb. 28.
*68 2/18 Program for official visit of Prime
Minister Trudeau of Canada, Feb.
21-23.
*69 2/18 Vance: arrival, Amman.
t70 2/19 Vance: news conference en route to
Beirut, Feb. 18.
t71 2/19 Vance: departure, Amman.
* Not printed
+ Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
*62
*63
2/17
2/17
*64
t65
2/18
2/18
t66
2/18
*67
2/18
208
Department of State Bulletin
INDEX March 7, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1967
Arms Control and Disarmament. Vice President
Mondale Visits Europe and Japan (Carter,
Mondale) 181
Belgium. Vice President Mondale Visits Europe
and Japan (Carter, Mondale) 181
Congress
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 201
Department Urges Appropriation of Funds
for International Financial Institutions
(Boeker) 198
Department and Foreign Service. Presidential
Advisory Board on Ambassadorial Appoint-
ments (Executive order) 202
Economic Affairs
United States and EEC Sign New Fisheries
Agreement 205
Vice President Mondale Visits Europe and Japan
(Carter, Mondale) 181
Environment. U.S. Discusses Its Preparations
for the U.N. Water Conference (Myerson) 20.3
Europe. United States and EEC Sign New
Fisheries Agreement 205
Fisheries. United States and EEC Sign New
Fisheries Agreement 205
Foreign Aid. Department Urges Appropriation
of Funds for International Financial Institu-
tions (Boeker) 198
France. Vice President Mondale Visits Europe
and Japan (Carter, Mondale) 181
Germany. Vice President Mondale Visits Europe
and Japan (Carter, Mondale) 181
Government Organization. New Organizational
System Announced for National Security Coun-
cil (statement by White House press secre-
tary) 197
Iceland. Vice President Mondale Visits Europe
and Japan (Carter, Mondale) 181
International Organizations and Conferences.
U.S. Relations With the ILO To Remain Under
Review (joint State-Labor-Commerce state-
ment) 197
Italy. Vice President Mondale Visits Europe and
Japan (Carter, Mondale) 181
Japan. Vice President Mondale Visits Europe
and Japan (Carter, Mondale) 181
Korea. Vice President Mondale Visits Europe
and Japan (Carter, Mondale) 181
Labor. U.S. Relations With the ILO To Remain
Under Review (joint State-Labor-Commerce
statement) 197
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Vice Pres-
ident Mondale Visits Europe and Japan (Car-
ter, Mondale) 181
Presidential Documents
Presidential Advisory Board on Ambassadorial
Appointments (Executive order) 202
Vice President Mondale Visits Europe and
Japan 181
Publications
Department Publishes 1977 Edition of "Treaties
in Force" 207
GPO Sales Publications 207
Terrorism. Vice President Mondale Visits
Europe and Japan (Carter, Mondale) 181
Treaty Information
Current Actions 206
United States and EEC Sign New Fisheries
Agreement 205
United Kingdom. Vice President Mondale Visits
Europe and Japan (Carter, Mondale) 181
United Nations. U.S. Discusses Its Preparations
for the U.N. Water Conference (Myerson) .... 203
Name Index
Boeker, Paul H 198
Carter, President 181, 202
Mondale, Vice President 181
Myerson, Jacob M 203
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/?6g
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Volume LXXVI • No. 1968 • March 14, 1977
SECRETARY VANCE'S VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST FEBRUARY 14-21
Remarks and News Conferences 209
SECRETARY TESTIFIES ON ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH
TO FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
Statement by Secretary Vance 236
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Vol. LXXVI, No. 1968
March 14, 1977
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Note: Contents of this publication are not
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BULLETIN as the .source will be appreciated. The
BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to
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The Department of State BULLETIN ,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of U.S. foreign relations and
on the work of the Department and
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses, and
news conferences of the President and
the Secretary of State and other offi-
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Publications of the Department of
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international relations are also listed.
Secretary Vance's Visit to the Middle East February 14-21
Secretary Vance visited the Middle East
February H-21 and met with government
leaders in Israel (February 15-16), Egypt
(Febriiary 17-18), Lebanon (February 18),
Jordan (February 18-19), Saudi Arabia
(February 19-20), and Syria (February 20-
21). Following are remarks and news confer-
ences by Secretary Vance and foreign leaders
on various occasions during the trip. *
to learn, to listen to what the leaders of each
of these countries have to say in terms of
their views as to how to best move toward
achieving a peaceful settlement. I will then
return to this country and report the results
of my trip to the President so we can form our
opinion as to how — and then proceed. We will
then meet with these leaders here in the
United States and then move on from that
point.
DEPARTURE, ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE,
FEBRUARY 14
Press release 53 dated February 15
Secretary Vance: I am beginning on this
journey tonight because the President be-
lieves that it is deeply important to achieve a
just and lasting peace in the Middle East. We
believe that the opportunity may now exist to
begin to make progress toward this end. In-
deed, all of the countries which we are to visit
welcome our visit and our efforts to achieve
this end.
I undertake this visit in the spirit of friend-
ship which exists between our country and
each of the countries which I am to visit.
It's now been 30 years since the search for
peace began. I don't underestimate the dif-
ficulties which lie before us, but the task is of
utmost importance and we are determined to
do everything we can to help achieve this end.
Q. Mr. Secretary, how will you know
whether this trip to the Middle East succeeds?
What are your measurements?
Secretary Vance: As I said before, this is a
trip on which I am going to go, as a first step,
* Other press releases relating to Secretary Vance's
trip are Nos. 58, 61, and 62 of Feb. 17; 64 and 69 of Feb.
18: and 73 of Feb. 21.
ARRIVAL, BEN GURION AIRPORT,
FEBRUARY 15
Press release 54 dated February 16
Secretary Vance: Thank you very much,
Mr. Minister [Yigal Allon].
First, may I say how grateful I am to be
here and to meet my old friend the Foreign
Minister again. As he indicated, this is the
first stop on my first mission for President
Carter as Secretary of State. Tomorrow I will
discuss with Prime Minister Rabin and the
leaders of your government the quest for
peace.
It is right and particularly fitting that that
discussion should begin here between old
friends. We all know that this will not be an
easy task, nor one which is quickly achieved. I
will not go into detail, as we will begin our
detailed discussions of how the process may
start tomorrow.
I have one simple message, and that mes-
sage is that the United States is convinced
that a fundamental underlying principle of our
search for this peace is the enduring trust and
confidence between our two nations, which
has been the foundation of our relationship for
three decades.
Let there be no question. The United States
is deeply committed to the security and
March 14, 1977
209
survival of Israel, to its values. These are ob-
jects of peace, a peace which we all devoutly
hope for.
REMARKS BY SECRETARY VANCE AND
PRIME MINISTER RABIN, FEBRUARY 16 ^
Secretary Vance: We have just had a thor-
ough discussion with the Prime Minister and
other leaders. We have discussed the mihtary
situation and a number of related problems,
as well as economic problems and other sub-
jects of common interest between our two
countries. It has been a very helpful and use-
ful set of talks for which I am most apprecia-
tive. I think that I now have a much clearer
understanding of the position of Israel with
respect to a number of issues relating to the
search for peace, and I look forward now to
moving on to other countries to try and obtain
a similar thorough and searching review of
the issues as seen in those capitals.
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin: Mr. Secre-
tary, as I said on two occasions before, we
welcome you to your visit to Israel. We are
glad that on your first trip as the Secretary of
State of the new Administration, your first
trip is to the Middle East and your first stop
is in Israel. We, at least, see in it a sign that
the close, intimate relations between our two
countries are going to be continued and are
going to be improved. I believe that in our
talks, we have put to you all our positions, the
reasons for what we aspire to, and we hope
that your trip will be another step in the
common effort of the United States and Israel
to move forward toward a more peaceful situ-
ation in the area and hopefully toward peace.
We wish you a good stay and a nice trip.
Q. On the matter of military supplies such
as the concussion bombs [inaudible]?
Secretary Vance: Yes, we discussed a
number of issues including the question of
concussion bombs. I indicated that this is a
decision which will be made by the President,
and I do not want to comment on it until such
time as the President makes his decision.
2 Made following a meeting at Jerusalem (text from
press release 55 dated Feb. 16).
Q. How about the Kfir fighters to Ecuador,
was that also discussed?
Secretary Vance: Yes, that also was dis-
cussed, and we heard the views of Israel with
respect to that decision. As I indicated in the
United States, that decision was taken be-
cause of our policy with respect to the intro-
duction of advanced weapons into Latin
America, and the decision was consistent with
our longstanding policy with respect to not
selling advanced weapons to Latin American
countries.
Q. Are you inviting Mr. Rabin to Washing-
ton?
Secretary Vance: We are inviting all of the
leaders, including Mr. Rabin, to come to
Washington in the future to meet with the
President. As to the dates when those visits
may occur, they will be worked out in the
near future in accordance with the calendars
of the various chiefs of state.
Q. Will there be more than one Israeli leader
invited to Washington?
Secretary Vance: As I said, we are extend-
ing the invitation to the heads of state of each
of the countries involved.
Q. Mr. Rabin, did Secretary Vance's answer
about the Kfir and about the concussion bombs
satisfy you? Do you see these American deci-
sions as final ?
Prime Minister Rabin: Well, it is not up to
me to pass judgment about the American
decisions or what might be the American deci-
sions. In our relations with the United States,
we put what we want and the reasons for that
and, whenever, they have to be taken by com-
mon understanding. I don't believe it will be
advisable at the present to say more than that.
Q. Is there any change in Israel's stand re-
garding the PLO [Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization] as a negotiating party?
Prime Minister Rabin: The answer is sim-
ple: no.
Q. Has there been any change in the U.S.
stand, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Vance: The answer is no.
210
Department of State Bulletin
NEWS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY VANCE
AND PRESIDENT SADAT, CAIRO, FEBRUARY 17
Press release 65 dated February l^
Q. There has been much talk about the pos-
sibility that you ivould be presenting new
ideas for a formula to resume the Geneva con-
ference to Mr. Vance. Did you present him
with such ideas, and if so, could you share
them with us?
President Anwar al-Sadat: Well, let me say
this. We had a survey of the peace process
that we have started together immediately
after the October war until this moment. I
must tell you also that President Carter was
kind enough to send me an invitation, which
was handed to me by Secretary Vance, and I
hope I shall be fulfilling this visit.
In the first place, I seize this opportunity to
tell you that I have asked Secretary Vance to
convey to President Carter our deepest
gratitude for the initiative that he has already
taken in helping us in our difficult moments in
our economy by allotting $500 million as a
help for the Egyptian people. It has touched
us deeply at heart really. Immediately before
I came here to meet with Secretary Vance, it
was declared that President Carter has al-
ready taken a decision regarding this concus-
sion bomb. Really, it is a very positive and
creative step and it shows great statesman-
ship from the side of President Carter. Apart
from this we have discussed, as I told you, the
whole problem from every aspect.
Q. Have you yourself detected any ynodera-
tion in the position of the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization regarding the right of Is-
rael to exist?
President Sadat: Well, the Palestinian
question was one of the questions we dis-
cussed. Secretary Vance and I. It is for the
Palestinians to speak for themselves; I cannot
speak for the Palestinians. But I want to say
one word: The Palestinian question is the core
of the whole problem; we couldn't ignore it.
Q. Does anybody think that the Geneva con-
ference could meet in March, and is there any
possibility that the Palestinians should par-
ticipate in this conference?
Secretary Vance: With respect to a date of a
Geneva meeting, I have always said that I
think that the greater likelihood of a date for
the meeting would be in the last half of 1977. I
still believe that that is the best estimate that
one can make. The Israeli elections will not be
until May of this year; and although I suppose
anything is possible, I would think it would be
unlikely that a Geneva conference would be
held until after those elections.
Q. Mr. President, is Egypt advising the
Palestinians to rewrite or ainend the covenant
ivhich refers to Israel's right to exist?
President Sadat: Yasir Arafat, the leader of
the PLO, had a meeting today with Foreign
Minister Fahmy. And we have discussed this
because it was discussed before between Sec-
retary Vance and Secretary Fahmy. And we
discussed it.
Q. When do you expect to be in the States,
Mr. President?
President Sadat: Well, I hope about the be-
ginning of April.
Q. Do you think it is possible to have a pre-
liminary conference before Geneva in which
the question of Palestinian representation
could be discussed? In other words, to have a
meeting with the former participants of
Geneva present without any additional par-
ties?
President Sadat: To be frank, we haven't
discussed this item.
Q. I ivas just asking your opinion.
President Sadat: I hope after I visit — after
Secretary Vance has the information he wants
to have from the area here and returns to the
States, I shall be visiting, as I told you, about
the 1st of April, about the beginning of April,
and maybe we can say something about this
by that time. But not before Secretary Vance
collects whatever he needs in information
from the area.
Q. Mr. Ford has proposed that concussion
bombs, plus airplanes, be given to Israel. The
cancellation of this is only including the con-
cussion bombs or also includes the planes he
promised to Israel?
March 14, 1977
211
Secretary Vance: I believe the decision re-
lated only to the concussion bomb. I have not
seen a firsthand report of what was decided
today, but it is my understanding that the de-
cision merely said that the concussion bomb
would not be made available to the Israehs.
Let me say — could I just take this occasion
to say how much I appreciate the opportunity
which I have had to meet with President
Sadat, and for the very full and complete dis-
cussion which we have had. It has been ex-
tremely useful to me, and I am very apprecia-
tive of this opportunity.
Q. Mr. President, you have said on numer-
ous occasions that it is for the next generation
of Egyptians to make a real peace with Israel
in terms of trade and exchange of people,
civilians, and ideas. Do you believe that if the
current initiatives are successful in securing
Israeli withdrawal to '67 boundaries, or close
to the '67 boundaries, and providing guaran-
tees for the establishment of a Palestinian en-
tity that Egypt, after that accord, would be
willing to enter into what the Israelis call a
real peace, trade, and exchange of people and
ideas with that nation, including diplomatic
relations?
President Sadat: Let me say this in the first
hand.
I didn't say at all that we are going to
postpone peace. What I said and I say now —
and I have already discussed with Secretary
Vance — we are now for establishing perma-
nent peace in the area, in a peace agreement
in which the state of belligerency is ended
after 28 years and the borders are defined,
guarantees are given, the withdrawal of Is-
rael, the creation of a Palestinian state.
I never said that peace would be postponed
for the next generation. But I said this — when
I was asked what about the diplomatic rela-
tions or open borders or so, I said, well, you
can't start this like this, and you can't write it
in a peace agreement. It has never occurred
before. Or is it some sort of imposing condi-
tions from the side of Israel? This is the old
theory of Ben Gurion, to impose peace on the
Arabs.
Well, peace cannot be imposed at all. Peace
can be negotiated.
Q. Mr. President, are you saying that at the
end of this process, if it is satisfactory to you,
that Egypt would be willing to engage in trade
and exchange of ideas with the State of Is-
rael?
President Sadat: It is a matter of pure
sovereignty, my dear. Why should you plant
this misunderstanding like the Israehs are
planting already? It is a matter of
sovereignty.
Q. You mentioned that Mr. Arafat and Mr.
Fahmy this morning discussed possible
changes to the Palestinian charter. Would
you expect — the Arab side expect the changes
to that charter — that if the Palestinians con-
sidered some changes to the charter, there
should also be more concessions froyn the
Western side, from the United States perhaps;
and if so, ivhat form should those concessions
take?
President Sadat: Regarding the Pales-
tinians, it is a matter for them to decide. But
I must tell you this, as I told Secretary Vance
also, that without the help of the United
States in every step and every stage, we can't
establish peace in the area here. Someone
may be furious against me, but it is a fact. I
have said before that 99 percent of the cards
of this game is in the hands of the United
States. So we seek the help of the United
States in every stage and in every form.
Q. Do those stages include talks between the
United States and the Palestinians, in your
view? Is that one of the things that you told
Vance — that the United States ought to mod-
ify its stance against talking with the PLO?
President Sadat: I didn't tell Secretary
Vance anything like this. We have discussed
the whole problem, but I didn't tell him what
you have already referred to.
Q. If and when the Geneva coriference is re-
convened, do you favor the PLO going as a
separate delegation? And if and when there is
a final peace settleynent, must there be a
separate Palestinian state?
President Sadat: I have already stated my
position on this. The Palestinian question is
the core of the whole problem. Very well.
212
Department of State Bulletin
They should participate if you want to reach
permanent peace like we are trying now.
And I say that an official and declared link
should take place between this Palestinian
state and Jordan, even before Geneva starts.
Q. Mr. President, what is Egypt prepared
to contribute to the peace process? Israel you
ask to withdraw. What is Egypt prepared to
give?
President Sadat: I gave Secretary Vance
my view on this. Egypt is ready 100 percent
for peace.
Q. Could you be a little more concrete?
What sort of concessions is Egypt prepared to
give for peace?
President Sadat: What are we going to say
in Geneva if we are going to discuss here,
now, such a thing like this? [Laughter.]
Q. You are saying here that Israel should
withdraw. You are saying that before Geneva.
What is Egypt prepared to contribute to
peace?
President Sadat: Egypt is ready for every-
thing. If Israel really wants peace, Egypt is
ready for everything.
Q. Mr. President, as I understood you a
moment ago, you said that an official and de-
clared link should take place between the
Palestinian state and Jordan even before a
Geneva conference. Could you explain more
fully what kind of link, and how it would be
established?
President Sadat: We should leave this for
the parties concerned, to the Palestinians and
King Hussein; but I have in my mind some
sort of confederation or so.
Q. Do you expect another step-by-step to be
taken or do you expect a full Geneva confer-
ence to meet? Because reports from Israel
were saying that you have proposed a type of
Geneva conference where there ivould be the
Israelis arid the Egyptians, the Israelis and
the Syrians, and the Israelis and the
Jordanians — ivhat is called a Geneva-type
confereyice. Is this a correct report, sir?
Secretary Vance: It is correct that I have
suggested that there be a Geneva-type con-
ference in the last half of this year, 1977. I
have not proposed that there be a step-by-
step process, but that will be up to the parties
to decide.
Q. What is meant by a Geneva-type confer-
ence?
Secretary Vance: I mean a Geneva confer-
ence, a conference to be held at Geneva. Last
night, I was asked the same question — did I
draw a distinction between it? — and I said I
did not.
Q. Does it mean that all the partners — all
the parties will be at the conference?
Secretary Vance: It would mean that there
would have been a determination prior to the
conference as to who should attend — that is a
procedural question — and that invitations
would then be extended and the parties would
all attend.
Q. If the dispute over Palestinian represen-
tation at Geneva is not resolved in the next
several weeks or months, would Egypt be pre-
pared to renew negotiations with Israel for
another disengagement in the Sinai or on any
other negotiations?
President Sadat: I have stated before that
the step-by-step has ended, and we are now
for permanent peace and global solutions.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you said before you left
on this trip that you hoped to explore in depth
the talk that the PLO was moderating its posi-
tion. Based on your conversations with Pres-
ident Sadat today, do you have any more spe-
cific feeling about the problem?
Secretary Vance: I have received additional
information today. I wish to complete my vis-
its with the other capitals before I have any
final answer to the question.
Q. If the PLO amends its charter and be-
comes more moderate on the question of Is-
rael, would the United States then change its
attitude toward the PLO?
Secretary Vance: I have said that the prob-
lem up to this date that has concerned the
United States is that the PLO has had in its
March 14, 1977
213
covenant a provision to tiie effect that they
would not recognize Israel as a state, the ex-
istence of Israel, and that they did not recog-
nize that [U.N. Security Council Resolutions]
242 and 338 are a basis for convening a con-
ference.
Q. [Inaudible] links between a Palestiyiian
state and even before the Geneva conference,
what in your judgment should be the relation-
ship of the Palestine Liberation Organization
to that Palestinian state?
President Sadat: You know, according to
the decision that we have already taken in the
Arab summit in Rabat, we have given all the
responsibility to the PLO. So the PLO will be
negotiating this with King Hussein, about the
relation between themselves and whatever
question may be raised in this field.
Let me tell you this please — it appears that
you are repeating the question — I must tell
you something before the end of this confer-
ence. I seize this opportunity to send my
deepest thanks to President Carter for send-
ing a distinguished personality, Secretary
Vance. I have enjoyed, really immensely, the
talks with him. He was honest, straightfor-
ward, and I hke to deal with him, and I hope
that we shall continue the peace process that
we have started already together, the United
States and Egypt.
NEWS CONFERENCE, FEBRUARY 18 ^
Q. In the White House yesterday Jody Poiv-
ell said they held up the CBU decision so that
you could inforyn the Israelis. Now, last
evening in Israel did you and the Israelis dis-
cuss what the decision was?
Secretary Vance: Late that night, the last
night there, I received the President's deci-
sion and informed them of that decision defini-
tively that next day.
Q. The next day?
Secretary Vance: Yes. I had indicated to
them it was my judgment the day before it
^ Held aboard the aircraft en route from Cairo to
Beirut (text from press release 70 dated Feb. 19).
would come out, but it wasn't until late that
night that I got the President's final decision.
I informed them on my way to the airport.
Q. That would mean that Jody Powell
didyi't get it straight, because he said you in-
formed the Israelis on Wednesday. That's
wrong then?
Secretary Vance: Yes, it was my indication.
I told them I thought that this is where it
might come out.
Q. Mr. Secretary, there is a story this
moryiing in the Washington Post to the effect
that King Hussein has been on the CIA
payroll personally since about 1957 and that
last week President Carter stopped the ar-
rangement. Do you know, approximately, if
he was, and if true, it has been stopped?
Secretary Vance: I heard about the story
today, and I have no comment.
Q. Do you know anything about the situa-
tion ?
Secretary Vance: I have no comment on
the matter.
Q. I understand, sir, but let me just beg to
explain why I'm asking, because the story
says way down in the story that the new Ad-
ministration was not informed during the
transition. Am, I correct? That's why I am
asking you about the matter.
Secretary Vance: Yes, I have no comment
on the story.
Q. Could you address yourself to the pro-
posal of President Sadat on some sort of a
confederatioyi to exist between the PLO or the
Palestinian West Bank State and Jordan,
and whether you regard this as a constructive
thing, and if so, how will it move the situation
forward?
Secretary Vance: It seems to me it's a con-
structive suggestion. It begins to move for-
ward suggestions which have been made by
the IsraeHs as to how the Palestinian question
might be resolved. And therefore there ap-
pears to be some narrowing of the differing
positions, and to that extent it seems to me
it's a constructive suggestion.
214
Department of State Bulletin
Q. Did you discuss that proposal with Pres-
ident Sadat dimng your conversations yes-
terday?
Secretary Vance: Yes, I did.
Q. Was it discussed at length? Did you
propose — did you, for example; suggest that
the link between Hussein, and the PLO be a
matter for Geneva rather than afterward?
Secretary Vance: Let me say that the pur-
pose of my trip has been to find out as much
as I could and to learn as deeply as I could
what the positions of the various states are
with respect to the whole range of substantive
and procedural issues which are bound up in
the Middle East problem. I have found the
discussions in the two capitals which I have
been to, or in the two countries which I have
been to, to be very helpful in this regard.
People have been frank. They have answered
all the questions that I put to them. I have
been able to probe in depth questions which I
might have with respect to various sugges-
tions or proposals. As a result of that, I think
that I have gained information which is going
to be very helpful to me and the President as
we move along in attacking the Middle East
problem.
I do not intend to go into all the details of
the conversations I have had with the various
heads of government and their cabinets. Our
role is to try and act as a facilitator who could
bring the parties together. I think it would
not be useful to me to go into all the details of
suggestions which are made to me as possible
bridging steps.
Q. Could you comment, could you make a
judgment solidly that the Egyptians are
ready to try to move the PLO specifically — I
am asking whether he thinks he senses that
the Egyptians are ready to try to move the
PLO on this question of the covenant specif-
ically. Would this have to be resolved?
Secretary Vance: Yes, I do, I do have that
feeling.
Q. Is it your impression that this proposal
had the support of at least some of the PLO ?
Obviously, Fahmy had seen Arafat yesterday.
There seemed to be some connection. Was
there in fact a connection?
Secretary Vance: The only thing I want to
say on this is it appeared that it did have the
support of the —
Q. The support of the PLO?
Secretary Vance: Yes, but I don't want to
say anything more than that.
Q. Are you referring to the link with the
Jordanians? You're not referring to the cov-
enant business?
Secretary Vance: I was referring to the
linkage.
Q. But you have no indication of how the
PLO might go?
Secretary Vance: I don't know how the PLO
will go.
Q. Mr. Secretary, excuse tne? Do you see
King Hussein supporting the idea ?
Secretary Vance: I don't know. I haven't
had my talks with him yet. I'll find out when I
talk to him.
Q. You do think the Egyptians are ready to
move the PLO on the covenant, that means on
the specific issue of the recognition of the
State of Israel?
Secretary Vance: Yes.
Q. Mr. Secretary, did you bring up, or did
they bring up with you, future amis sales to
Egypt — specifically, the F-5's?
Secretary Vance: Let me say that we dis-
cussed the policy of the United States as
enunciated by President Carter — make it the
concern rather than the policy — the concern of
President Carter with respect to the question
of arms sales throughout the world and his
desire to try and find ways to cut down on the
sale of arms and our responsibilities in this
regard because of our position as the principal
arms seller.
I also discussed with them the problem of
arms sales in the Middle East and our desire
to try and find a way to reduce the sale of
arms to the countries in the Middle East. In
this connection the Egyptians raised the ques-
tion of their military requirements and needs
and indicated that they had read my tes-
timony at the confirmation hearings in which I
March 14, 1977
215
had said that if requests were received from
them, we would consider them applying the
three principles which I enunciated at the con-
firmation hearings and again in the press con-
ference which I had with all of you.
Q. How does that translate, sir? Does that
mean that there could be a possibility of the
U.S.—
Secretary Vance: No. All it means is that
they may make requests of us, and if so, we
will treat them in accordance with the princi-
ples that I have previously enunciated.
Q. Did yesterday's announcement by Mr.
Sadat — did Mr. Sadat's proposal catch you by
surprise?
Secretary Vance: Which?
Q. To have the confederation with Jordan
and the West Bank, and secondly, what is
now the gap?
Secretary Vance: Let's take it question by
question. I had not heard that proposal from
him until he made it.
Q. In your private talks?
Secretary Vance: Yes.
Q. Secondly, what is now the gap between
Israel and Egypt?
Secretary Vance: What?
Q. What is now the gap in the understand-
ing Israel has and Mr. Sadat's proposal in
seating the joint Palestinian-Jordanian dele-
gation? Is there now a major difference?
Secretary Vance: Let me say this, there is
still a major difference.
Q. I'm a little lost by that, sir. A major dif-
ference in what, sir?
Secretary Vance: He said is there a gap and
what is the nature of the gap between the po-
sitions enunciated by Sadat yesterday with
respect to the Palestinian question and the
view of the Israelis, and I said, yes, there is a
gap, and I'm not going to go into the details.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that you were
going to look for the "give" in positions. Did
you find a lot of flexibility on the Israeli side
and the Egyptian side? Did you really find
much give, or did you get a pretty hard line?
Secretary Vance: No, there are big differ-
ences between them, but both of them indi-
cated that if the procedural questions could be
resolved, that they are prepared to go to a
Geneva conference without preconditions.
Q. You say you found give in there?
Secretary Vance: I think that's give.
Q. Is there any practicality in this notion of
trying to move toward some kind of entity
linking Jordan arid a West Bank Palestinian
state to go before Geneva this year? It all
seems you have to compress so much.
Secretary Vance: Let me say, if we are
going to play the kind of role I think we can,
moving between the parties and trying to
bring them together, that for me to go into
too much detail on what I think of this pro-
posal and that proposal is not constructive. I
think our role is one here of trying to bring
the parties together, and I don't want to make
comments about what I may think about the
validity or strength of one proposal as op-
posed to another.
Q. Is it your understanding that this pro-
posal is also supported in a general way by
Syria and Saudi Arabia?
Secretary Vance: I don't know. I will find
out when I go there. I think it's been dis-
cussed with them before, but I'm not going to
speak for them. I'll hear it from them.
Q. Cayi you address a general question of
practicality though, Mr. Secretary? That's
what's bothering me. Whether it's still possi-
ble to think in terms of getting to Geneva this
year?
Secretary Vance: Yes, I still think it's pos-
sible.
Q. Mr. Secretary, can you explain why you
continue to say "Geneva type," and then when
we ask about it you say, "I mean Geneva"?
Secretary Vance: It's a slip of the tongue. I
really don't draw any distinction on that.
Q. Has there been any advancement in
Sadat's thinking on the kind of peace that he's
216
Department of State Bulletin
ivilling to conclude with Israel at the end of
this process ?
Secretary Vance: Yes.
Q. Did you take anything he said at the
press conference or ivhat he said to you as an
indication that he would be willing to estab-
lish trade, diplomatic relations, have a nor-
mal relationship with Israel, as if it were any
other state?
Secretary Vance: Let me just say this.
There was more flexibility than I had thought
before I came to Cairo, from having read var-
ious positions.
Q. Did you find the same thing in
Jerusalem, too?
Secretary Vance: Yes. Yes, a little bit. But
I 'don't want to say, I think you know, that
there aren't very deep substantive differences
and procedural differences, but I do get a feel
of some flexibility developing on the part of
the parties I talked to, at least those I have
talked to.
Q. I have a little problem with that.
Secretary Vance: I am not trying to seem
overly optimistic about this.
Q. You talked about preconditions. With
preconditions I have a little trouble, because
you were talking about the procedure of seat-
ing, of representation, but preconditions usu-
ally go to the substance of what will happen.
Can you expand oji that a bit?
Secretary Vance: You didn't listen to me.
What I said was that if the procedural ques-
tions can be resolved, then the parties have
said, the ones I've talked to, that they would
be willing to go to a Geneva conference with-
out preconditions on the substantive issues.
Q. And that is give on procedure, if you
take that as being a sign that they're giving?
Secretary Vance: I think it's obvious if
somebody says they'll go and talk substance
without preconditions that that's progress.
Q. Mr. Secretary, did President Sadat
make any specific arms requests of you?
Secretary Vance: I answered that question.
I've got nothing to add to that. Let me add to
that. I said, I really said all I'm going to say
on that.
Q. You said he may ask for things, and if
so, you would consider it, using the three
principles.
Secretary Vance: He indicated to me in
general terms his needs and I would not rule
out the possibility that they may make a re-
quest, but we'll deal with that when it comes.
Q. What did you think of him personally, of
Sadat? What ivas your reaction to him?
Secretary Vayice: I found him to be a very
warm and intelHgent man who had obviously
thought deeply about the problems of the
Middle East and the need for a peaceful res-
olution of the Middle East problem. I found
him completely frank and forthcoming in an-
swering any questions that I asked of him.
And I came away with a very high regard for
him as a man.
Q. Did he ask for any m,ore economic aid?
Secretary Vance: We discussed economic
aid and the need for economic aid and the im-
portance of that to his country and I indicated
to him what was in the present budget which
we are sending up to Congress, in that re-
spect.
Q. Abotit $900 million? What was that fig-
ure? Was that figure $900 million?
Secretary Vance: About 900. I think it's 750
plus 114 of Pubhc Law 480. That's my recol-
lection.
Q. Is that the same now as fiscal year
1977?
Secretary Vance: A little bigger.
DEPARTURE, AMMAN, FEBRUARY 19
press release 71 dated February 19
Secretary Vance: Good morning, ladies and
gentlemen. My meetings with His Majesty
King Hussein and his close advisers have
been extremely useful to me in clarifying my
understanding of the starting point for a re-
Mareh 14, 1977
217
sumption of peace negotiations. His insights
and counsel have been invaluable.
I have e.\perienced and reaffirmed the
close and harmonious relationship which
exists between our two countries. I have re-
viewed with His Majesty the interests which
we share and have confirmed President Car-
ter's commitment to them. I have stated un-
equivocally the commitment of the United
States to Jordan's economic progress and to
our cooperation in the pursuit of peace.
His Majesty has exerted an important and
moderating influence and continues to do so
in this area. We have deep respect for his
contributions to the peacemaking efforts.
I am delighted to report that His Majesty
has accepted President Carter's invitation to
visit the United States to meet with Presi-
dent Carter in April.
Let me say I am particularly grateful that
His Majesty has graciously received me dur-
ing this time of great personal tragedy.
REMARKS BY PRINCE SA'UD BIN FAISAL
AND SECRETARY VANCE, FEBRUARY 20 *
Foreign Minister Prince Sa'ud bin Faisal
(summary translation): In essence, His
Royal Highness was expressing his apprecia-
tion for this visit. He explained how the dis-
cussions that took place between you and
him, and of course between you and the
Crown Prince, were conducted in an atmos-
phere of frankness and cordiality.
His Royal Highness emphasized mainly
two points which made them, the Arabs and
the Saudis in particular, optimistic about the
future: One was the fact that you in the out-
set of the Administration were dispatched
here to see with your own eyes and meet face
to face with the leaders of this area; and two,
the fact that you yourself expressed the fact
that at the core of the Middle East problem is
the Palestine question.
We are all at a turning point, said His
Royal Highness, at this point in history. We
must preserve, we must keep up our good
'' Made upon the Secretary's departure from Riyadh
(te.xt from press release 72 dated Feb. 21).
spirits and optimism, and we certainly look
forward to cooperation with our friends the
American people and the American Govern-
ment, which finally, not at last but certainly
afresh, has expressed its dedication to the
pursuit of peace in the area in cooperation
with the leaders of the concerned countries,
and we wish you continued success.
Secretary Vance: Thank you very much.
Your Royal Highness. I am extremely grate-
ful for the extraordinarily warm reception
which has been given to me and to my col-
leagues on this visit to Riyadh. We deeply
appreciate the frankness and the cordiahty
which marked the talks between us. I
learned much from these frank conversa-
tions.
I agree that there is basis for optimism,
yet at the same time I must caution that the
road ahead will be a long and difficult one.
We, the United States, are determined to
preserve and to do all in our power to work
with the parties to move the talks toward a
successful conclusion.
It is true that the Palestinian question is
one of the core questions that must be re-
solved in the achievement of the final solu-
tion to the Middle East problem, and that,
along with the other key issues, will be the
subject of continuing discussion and consul-
tation between ourselves and our good
friends in Saudi Arabia as well as the other
parties. We are looking forward with great
anticipation to the visit of His Royal High-
ness Crown Prince Fahd at a convenient time
for him, hopefully in the very near future, to
the United States, where the President of
the United States will have an opportunity to
meet with him in face-to-face discussions of
these key issues.
I would emphasize that I have been ex-
tremely impressed with the wisdom of the
views and observations made by Crown
Prince Fahd and by His Royal Highness the
Foreign Minister. Again may I say that it is a
great pleasure for me to renew association
with the Foreign Minister and I look forward
with great anticipation to working with him
as we proceed down this road in the search
for peace.
Q. Prince Sa'ud, in a broadcast the
218
Department of State Bulletin
iceekend before the Secretary began his trip,
you said that Saudi Arabia had held oil price
increases to 5 percent in a hope that the
United States would exert pressure, your
words were, on Israel for the Arab cause.
Now that you have talked to the Secretary
and he has been in the area for almost a
week, can you tell us what your observations
are now. Is the United States exerting the
kind of pressure that you would like exerted
on Israel?
Prince Sa'ud: Well, I don't know what
broadcast you are talking about. I don't re-
member making a broadcast.
In any event, I'll tell you what I said about
the decision of Saudi Arabia in the Doha
meeting.^ Our decision in the Doha meeting
was a completely economic decision. In any
case, all that we do, or our policies in any-
thing we do are geared and are aimed at sta-
bility and improving prospects for a settle-
ment in the Middle East. One should view
the policies of Saudi Arabia in the context of
their entirety and not just in one action.
As to the policy as regards oil prices, we
have made it very clear. I think, over and
over again, that these are not political but
economic in nature. We are, as part of the
international community, very mindful of the
health of international economics, and in
holding the increase to 5 percent we hope to
maintain and continue the health and pros-
perity of the international community.
This in no way detracts from our hope and
desire that the United States be instrumen-
tal in achieving peace in the Middle East.
The decision of OPEC is not linked to that,
but it does not detract from the fact that we
hope that the United States would use their
influence to bring about peace in this area.
NEWS CONFERENCE, DAMASCUS, FEBRUARY 21
Press release 74 dated February 21
Secretary Vance: When I started out, I in-
dicated that I had several objectives in mind.
^ A ministerial meeting of the Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was held at Doha,
Qatar, in December 1976.
The first objective was to indicate the impor-
tance that the President and I attached to the
question of peace in the Middle East. The sec-
ond was to get a chance to meet the leaders of
the various countries involved and their prin-
cipal advisers. And the third was to get a
chance to learn firsthand their views and have
an opportunity to discuss those views with
them in an effort to obtain a clearer under-
standing and to find where there might be
areas of common ground with the positions of
others.
With respect to each of these objectives, I
feel satisfied that they have been accom-
plished.
Every one of the leaders to whom I talked
indicated an appreciation of the fact that this
mission was taken at this time and the reas-
surance that it gave to them of the importance
which the United States attached to the ques-
tion of a resolution of the Middle East ques-
tion.
Secondly, I found it was indeed important
to meet these men face to face. As President
Asad said to me yesterday afternoon, there is
no substitute for seeing a man face to face and
having a chance to look him in the eye.
With respect to the final objective, I do feel
that I have a much clearer understanding of
the views of the parties and an idea with re-
spect to those areas where there may be
common understanding on agreement. Let me
briefly summarize those areas for you.
First, all the parties are agreed on the need
for peace. Every one of the leaders pointed
out to me the importance of cutting back on
military expenditures and putting those re-
sources into meeting the economic and social
needs of their countries. There wasn't one
that did not underscore the importance of this
to me.
Secondly, all of the parties stated that they
are prepared to go to a Geneva conference in
the last half of 1977 to discuss an overall peace
settlement.
Thirdly, all of the parties agreed that if
procedural questions can be resolved, they
are prepared to discuss all substantive ques-
tions at Geneva without preconditions.
And finally, all the parties are agreed as to
the general nature of the three core elements
March 14, 1977
219
of a final settlement— namely, peace, with-
drawal, and resolution of the Palestinian
question.
The two sides are deeply divided, however,
on the definition and methods of resolving
these three core issues.
First, on the definition of what peace
means. On the one hand you have the view
that peace is an end of war, and that is gener-
ally the Arab view. And one must expect time
to pass before there can be normal relations
across the board between countries that have
been at war, in a state of belligerency for
years and years. On the other hand, the Is-
raehs would define peace as basically the es-
tablishment of full normal relations. And as
you can see, there is a very broad gap be-
tween these two views.
Secondly, there is a clear difference be-
tween the two sides on the meaning of shape
of withdrawal.
And finally, there is a difference of views
between the two sides on how to resolve the
Palestinian question. As a matter of fact,
there appear to be even differences among the
Arabs themselves as to how that question
should be resolved. And finally, the parties
are sharply divided on the key procedural
question of how to deal with the issue of the
PLO.
So as you can see, although there are com-
mon areas of understanding and agreement,
there are also very sharp differences. And the
conclusion that I draw from that is that one
must be very careful not to be overoptimistic,
as King Hussein cautioned when we were in
Amman.
On the other hand, there are areas of com-
mon ground which provide a basis for some
encouragement in the fact that all of them
really do, sincerely, in my judgment, believe
that there is a desperate need for peace. That
is a positive factor. Those are very prelimi-
nary conclusions I have come to as I start the
last day of this visit.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you say that all sides
agree that it might be possible to get into
Geneva discussions in the second half of this
year. And yet there still are some basic dis-
agreements on the basic procedural issue of
how to handle the PLO. Why is everyone ex-
pecting to get into those discussions this year,
unless they can overcome that procedural
question ?
Secretary Vance: What I said was that all of
them are prepared to go to Geneva and hope
that they could go to Geneva in the last half of
the year.
Q. Do you have a feeling that that pro-
cedural problem can be overcome, Mr. Secre-
tary 1
Secretary Vance: I do not have an answer
yet, nor do they. This is one of the most dif-
ficult questions that faces us.
Q. Mr. Secretary, does one approach to the
Palestinian question at Geneva seem to have
more favor than the others? And if so, could
you outline it for us ?
Secretary Vance: No, at this point there
does not seem to be one that is more favored
than the others among the parties. There
seems to be a wide variance of view on this
issue at this point.
Q. Did Sadat's proposal seem to have the
endorsement of anybody else? That is, the
Jordanian-Palestinian link before Geneva?
Secretary Vance: Other leaders said that
they were interested in it and wanted to study
it. They felt that they needed to have a better
understanding of precisely what was meant by
it.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that they all
agreed on the substantive issues to go to
Geneva vAthout preconditions. It has been a
basic Israeli thing that they would never
negotiate without preconditions. And in the
past they have included among the precondi-
tions the standard Arab interpretation of 2Jt2,
which is all — every inch — every last grain
of sand of territory. Does that mean that
Asad,for example, is now ready to negotiate
this point?
Secretary Vance: The way I put the ques-
tion to them, I said, assuming all procedural
questions are out of the way, are you pre-
pared to go to Geneva to discuss all substan-
tive questions without preconditions? The an-
swer I got was yes.
220
Department of State Bulletin
Q. With Old a for instance?
Secretary Vance: Without a for instance.
Q. Mr. Secretary, I want to ask you a gen-
eral question of what peace means. You stated
very precisely that for the Arabs peace was
the end of war and that time must pass before
normal relations could begin.
Secretary Vance: Let me add that it might
vary between countries with respect to the re-
lations between x and y, that they might be
able to move at a faster pace than between x
and 2.
Q. What I ivant to ask you is, as you know,
the Israelis have said they don't want to give
up the territory that they won in 1967 this
time without some firyn guarantees that there
will be real peace, or a trade with some of the
other_ things that they define as real peace. Is
it your view that in a final settlement which
would come out of Geneva, the end of
Geneva, however long that took, that the Is-
raelis want to get some elem,ents of real
peace?
Secretary Vance: I don't want to comment
on what any of the parties are to get at this
point. It is obvious that these three core ele-
ments are intertwined with each other. And
that is one of the complexities of the negotia-
tions when people do go to Geneva.
Q. I just want to be clear. You are not, on
the other hand supporting the Arab view that
peace —
Secretary Vance: I am not supporting any-
body's view at this point. I am not supporting
anybody's view.
Q. Mr. Secretary, what did President Asad
tell you about the willingness of the PLO to
either set up a West Bank state, rewrite the
covenant, or —
Secretary Vance: He said he could not
speak for the PLO.
Q. Did he give you any indication of their
attitude, of what might be developing in the
leadership of the PLO ?
Secretary Vance: Nothing.
Q. Where do we go from here?
Secretary Vance: I will go back to the
United States and report to the President
immediately the results of the trip. We will
then reflect and begin to develop our views
with respect to the way that we can best pro-
ceed to help move toward a peaceful settle-
ment. The various heads of government will
be coming to the United States, with one ex-
ception which I will refer to in a minute, to
meet with the President as we continue the
process of our work in the United States. And
at the same time there will be discussion
among the parties in the Middle East them-
selves with respect to a number of issues
which remain unresolved among them. So that
work will be going on both in the United
States and here during the months im-
mediately ahead.
I said with one exception. Yesterday I ex-
tended an invitation to President Asad to
meet with President Carter. President Asad
indicated he will at some future date come to
Washington to meet with the President, that
the precise date could not be fixed now, but
that he would be prepared to meet with the
President, as the President suggested in his
letter, in Europe. And I would think it Hkely
that is what will happen.
Q. [Inaudible].
Secretary Vance: Yes, that point was made
to me many times by a number of the Arab
leaders.
Q. Are you in any way understanding of
that position?
Secretary Vance: Let me say at this point
that I am on a factfinding mission and I don't
want to comment on substantive positions.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that each of the
parties is prepared to go to Geneva in the sec-
ond half of 1977. On the other hand, two or
three days before we arrived. President Asad
told the French press that he is extremely
dubious about the possibility of a Geneva con-
ference convening in 1977. Given that, can
you give us something of the flavor, the tone,
of Asad?
Secretary Vance: He is deeply committed to
achieve a peaceful solution. There isn't any
March 14, 1977
221
question about that. On the other hand, he
sees the problems as very difficult and com-
plex, as all of us do, and therefore I think he
is merely expressing the same caution against
overoptimism, or a similar caution against
overoptimism, such as that that was ex-
pressed by King Hussein.
Q. He's not reluctant?
Secretary Vance: He's not reluctant to
what?
Q. To go to Geneva this year?
Secretary Vance: No, he said that he would
be prepared to do so.
Q. Mr. Secretary, I may suffer from over-
pessimism,, but when you say that nobody has
any preconditions about Geneva, and they
answered your question in the affirmative
when you talked about preconditions, it still
conies back to, for instance, last night — the
Syrian Government's statement demanding
that Israel withdraw and giving the
maximum Arab [inaudible] on 21,2. The Is-
raeli leaders in Israel repeated again the
standard Israeli position that under no cir-
cumstayices would they ever give back all the
territories before October. Do you think these
are really just opening bargaining points that
have been unth us for so many years now? Or
do you think [inaudible]?
Secretary Vance: I'm convinced from talking
to the parties that these are deeply held views
and they will be difficult for people to change.
On the other hand, I believe them when they
say they are prepared to come and to discuss,
and if you can get people sitting around to-
gether and discussing these issues, then there
is always a possibility that there may be
change. But I don't want to underestimate the
complexity and difficulty of it. I don't want to
leave the impression that I think that there
isn't a very hard and difficult road ahead.
Q. Mr. Secretary, two specific points. What
did President Asad have to say about the idea
of a Palestiyiian state in confederation with
Jordan; and two, with either Asad or with
any other, did the idea come up on the estab-
lishment of a Palestinian state in exile in
order to get around the covenant question ?
Secretary Vance: Let me say this, that we
discussed with him the questions which you
have just raised. He very frankly discussed
them with me. I don't think it's appropriate
for me to give those to you. If he's going to
give a press conference, you might want to
ask him about those views today. I don't think
it's appropriate for me to talk about them.
Q. Mr. Secretary, one of your purposes in
coming on this trip was to try to do something
abo2it this armaments buildup in the Middle
East. Cotdd you tell us what your conclu-
sions are on this score?
Secretary Vance: As I said, everyone
agrees that they've got to find some way to cut
back on the armament burden which is just
crushing every one of them. And they all say
that they would love to be able to stop pur-
chasing arms, but they say how can we do this
unless we get an agreement across the board
at this point that everybody else is going to do
the same thing. So that although they agree in
principle, the implementation of the principle
appears terribly difficult, if not impossible, at
this point.
Q. Do you see there is a role for the United
States to play in the process?
Secretary Vance: Yes, I think there is. This
is a general proposition the Administration is
working on and one of the fundamental areas
of President Carter's concern. It is going to
be more difficult in the Middle East, I think,
than in most other places because of the ten-
sion that exists in the area.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you said before you came
that you were going to pi'ess all these leaders
to the limits and you were going to look for
"give." Can you tell us if you found any
"give" with Asad, and a little bit about it if
you did?
Secretary Vance: I'm not going to go into
details with respect to his views, as I haven't
with others, because I don't think it is appro-
priate for me to do so. I found him under-
standing and had the feeling that he would be
willing to listen to other people and weigh
their views at any peace conference. I think
that's all I ought to say. I don't want to
characterize any further than that.
222
Department of State Bulletin
ARRIVAL, ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE,
FEBRUARY 21
Press release 75 dated February 22
Q. How was your trip, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Vaiice: We had a good trip. When
I left a long week ago, I set out with several
purposes in mind: first, to indicate the high
priority which President Carter and I attach
to the search for a just peace in the Middle
East; secondly, to have the opportunity to
meet with the leaders of the countries which
will be involved in that search for peace; and
thirdly, to have a chance to discuss firsthand
with those leaders their views with respect to
how we should proceed in that process, and
thus to get a feel for what the areas might be
that we should concentrate our attention on in
the work yet to be done by us.
Q. On what areas do we first concentrate,
sir?
Secretary Vance: Yes, well let me tell you
that. Let me say that as a result of the trip, I
think that we accomplished those basic objec-
tives. We found a certain amount of common
ground, or common understanding, among the
parties.
First, there was common agreement among
all of those leaders that peace was desperately
needed so that they could turn the attention
of their countries to meeting the economic and
social needs of those countries.
Secondly, there was common agreement
that we should seek to have a Geneva confer-
ence in the fall of 1977; the purpose of that
conference to seek an overall peace.
Thirdly, there was common agreement that
if the procedural questions could be satisfac-
torily worked out that all would proceed to
the conference without any preconditions as
to the substantive matters.
And finally, in each of the countries we
found that the leaders expressed the hope
that the United States would play a very ac-
tive part in the search for peace, and we shall
do that.
Now that I am back here, I will first meet
and brief the President in detail. In addition
to that we will consult with members of the
Congress. We shall also consult with our allies
and with the Cochairman [of the Geneva
conference] — the Soviet Union — all of whom
share the common goal of achieving a just and
lasting peace in the Middle East. Let me say
that the road ahead is a long and difficult one.
But I think we have made a first step and we
shall move on from there.
Q. Are you any closer to the solution of the
Palestinian problem, sir?
Secretary Vance: We are no closer to the so-
lution of that at this time. All of the leaders
did agree on the three fundamental core is-
sues that have to be taken up at the peace
conference, and they are the question of
peace, the question of withdrawal, and the
resolution of the Palestinian question. Those
are issues on which there are very sharp dif-
ferences of views between the various coun-
tries.
Letters of Credence
Australia
The newly appointed Ambassador of Aus-
tralia, Alan Philip Renouf, presented his cre-
dentials to President Carter on February
17.1
Botswana
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Botswana, Bias Mookodi, pre-
sented his credentials to President Carter on
February 17.^
Ecuador
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Ecuador, Gustavo Ycaza Borja,
presented his credentials to President Carter
on February 17.'
' For te.xts of the Ambassador's remarks and the
President's reply, see Department of State press release
dated Feb. 17.
March 14, 1977
223
Interview With Secretary Vance on February 8
by Egyptian and Syrian Media Representatives
Following is the transcript of an interview
with Secretary Vance at Washington on Feb-
ruary 8 by Ahmed Fawzi, Egyptian television
commentator, and Ghassan Rifai, of Tishriin
Daily, Damascus.
Press release fjl dated February 14
Mr. Fawzi: Mr. Secretary, on behalf of our
Egyptian viewers, first let me thank you for
giving us so much of your time. And may I
start out by asking you whether your trip to
the Middle East— will you be carryiyig any
concrete proposals with you, or is this an ini-
tial listening visit, as it were, feeling the
pulse?
Secretary Vance: First let me say how
pleased I am to have this occasion to meet
with you.
The fact that this is the first major diplomat-
ic effort of the new Administration indicates
the importance that the President attaches to
this mission. This is a mission where I am
going to be taking the opportunity to come
and seek to hear firsthand the views of the
leaders of the key countries in the Middle
East.
There is nothing more important than to be
able to get firsthand the views of those who
will be involved in the search for peace in that
area. I am not coming with any specific pro-
posals. I think this is understood by the lead-
ers in those countries. The role that the
United States can play in this search for peace
is to try and facilitate the process by which
the parties can reach a peaceful settlement of
these longstanding issues, and I do not think
it would be constructive at this time for me to
come with any specific U.S. proposals.
Let me underscore, however, that we do in-
tend to play an active role, that upon my re-
turn from the Middle East I will report to
President Carter and then we will formulate
our views in light of what I've learned during
my trip.
Mr. Fawzi: Mr. Secretary, you have cer-
tainly made an extensive study of the situa-
tion in the Middle East; and having several
briefings on the Middle East situation, what
is your appraisal of things as they stand now
and of Egypt's efforts so far in the quest for
peace?
Secretary Vance: Let me say that I have
indeed studied intensively the situation in the
Middle East. The situation, as I see it at the
present time, is more promising than it has
been in a long while. The crisis of Lebanon
has eased. It would appear that moderating
forces are predominant in the area at this
time. As a consequence of this, I think that
the circumstances which exist are, as I indi-
cated, more promising than they have been
for a long time.
Now, that is not to say that there are not
many very difficult problems to be resolved,
and I do not want to underestimate the diffi-
culty of the resolution of these problems; but I
think that the surrounding circumstances are
such that it will help in the search for a solu-
tion to those problems.
Now, as to the question of Egypt's role,
we here in the United States know that Pres-
ident Sadat believes deeply in and is committed
to a lasting and just peace in the area. We
hold President Sadat in very high regard be-
cause of his leadership and because of his vi-
sion for peace and for economic progress — not
only for Egypt but for the entire Arab world.
When millions of Americans recall his historic
visit to the United States in 1975, we all are
much impressed by what he had to say then
I
224
Department of State Bulletin
and has been saying since then. I know that
President Carter counts heavily on the advice
he will receive from President Sadat in
searching for constructive solutions that may
be suggested by our country in helping the
general search for peace.
Mr. Fawzi: With your loug political and
negotiating experience, Mr. Secretary, you
realize that much time is cousumed in pro-
dncing only the shape of a negotiating table.
Noiv, there are basic issues that are going to
be discussed on that table in Geneva; and I
believe our Egyptian viewers and viewers in
the Arab world would be interested in learn-
ing the U.S. Government and people's stand
OH the basic issues; namely, total Israeli
withdrawal to pre-June 1967 lines and the
right of the Palestinian people to a national
entity of their own.
Secretary Vance: U.N. Resolutions 242 and
338 have laid out the basic principles for a so-
lution to the Middle East problem. These res-
olutions, as we all know, have been adopted
and approved by the parties involved. In ad-
dition, the United States has also voted in
favor of these resolutions. This being the
case, they lay the groundwork — the
framework — for progress and for the shape of
the negotiations.
I think it would be a ^nistake for me, how-
ever, at this point, at this early stage, to try
and give specific answers to our positions in
specific areas such as you have indicated. I
think it's much more appropriate for me to
come at the outset and hear what the leaders
of the key countries have to say, and then
come back and discuss these, as I previously
indicated, with the President before we for-
mulate our final suggestions, which we can
then communicate to the parties.
Mr. Fawzi: While we're talking about
Geneva, one issue that is very important to
everyone is Palestinian representation in
Geneva. What form of Palestinian representa-
tion would be acceptable to the U.S. Govern-
ment?
Secretary Vance: Now, clearly, this is one
of the key issues that is going to be involved
in deciding how one can best return to
Geneva. I am sure that each of the leaders
with whom I meet will have views with re-
spect to this particular issue; and I expect to
learn much from them about this particular
problem, which will help us in shaping our
views here in the United States on this par-
ticular issue.
I don't think it's really, at this stage, ap-
propriate for me to say anything further than
that.
Mr. Fawzi: Mr. Secretary, the new Admin-
istratioyi has expressed its interest iyi reduc-
ing arms sales throughout the world, and you
have spoke?! of target areas, .such as the Mid-
dle East, as areas where possible pilot arms
reduction projects could be carried out. Our
question is: Will that affect your arms supply
to Israel? Will you be cutting back equally
arms szipplies to Israel? What would be the
ratio of your cutbacks, and would yon be ex-
pecting other aryns-producing couritries to
comply?
Secretary Vance: As you know, and I be-
lieve your people know, President Carter and
I have both said that we place the highest
priority on the reduction of arms sales
throughout the world. President Carter has
also indicated that he wishes me to discuss
with the leaders of the countries in the Middle
East the question of reduction of arms sales in
these countries. This I shall do.
In doing so, I will be guided by the basic
principles which I have previously enun-
ciated, and they are the following:
Are the arms which are being requested vi-
tally necessary to the security requirements
of the requesting nation?
Secondly, will the giving of those arms
upset the precarious but critical balance that
e.xists in the Middle East?
And finally, will the granting of a license to
sell those arms affect the movement toward
peace in a positive way?
Now, the question of arms sales is not a
one-way street. We, as the leading arms sell-
er, I think have a special responsibility to
take leadership in this area; but this is also a
question for purchasers as well as suppliers.
And therefore we intend not only to discuss
this on this trip with the leaders as I have in-
March 14, 1977
225
dicated; but we intend to discuss it with other
nations — to seek not only in this area but
throughout the world a reduction in the sale
of arms both in terms of arms to specific areas
and in the general sense.
Mr. Fawzi: Well, in the few minutes we
have left, Mr. Secretary, I would like to point
out Egypt's current economic difficulties and
ask you what the United States can do to en-
courage more American capital investment in
Egypt and joint development projects.
Secretary Vance: I think we've made some
progress already on that. I know that there
are several serious American proposals that
are currently before your government. And in
addition, there are a number of other propos-
als which are being considered by the Joint
Commission which exists between our two
countries — which, if they should prove satis-
factory to both, will be forwarded to your
government.
With respect to the question of your eco-
nomic problems, we are very sensitive to the
difficulty of those problems. We have at-
tempted to assist, and will continue to assist,
in that area. We have made contributions in
the area of aid, and in that we have tried to
direct them not only to the immediate com-
modities but also to project development,
which we know is a very important area of
concern insofar as your country is concerned.
And you can count on us to continue to assist
in this area, not only on a government basis
but insofar as private industry is concerned.
Dr. Rifai: There is a general feeling, Mr.
Secretary, that the new Administration gives
to the Middle East problem an urgent prior-
ity. Have the new developments, local or na-
tional, convinced the new Ad^nini strati on
that a new approach to the problem would
lead to progress toward an overall settlement?
Secretary Vance: Let me say that we do at-
tach the highest priority to progress in the
Middle East and to progress in 1977. There is
no issue, insofar as the United States is con-
cerned, which has higher priority; and the fact
that President Carter has asked me to under-
take this mission as the first major diplomatic
effort of this country I think is an indication of
the importance which this Administration and
President Carter attach to the peaceful solu-
tion of the Middle East problem.
Now, insofar as the conditions for peace are
concerned, I think that the conditions have
substantially improved in the last nine months
or so. The war in Lebanon has receded; the
forces of moderation seem to be in an ascend-
ancy. All of the parties to a Geneva confer-
ence have indicated their willingness to go to
such a conference — so that these circum-
stances would seem to indicate that the signs
are right for moving toward a conference in
the year 1977.
I must say, however, that we should not
underestimate the difficulties which lie ahead.
There will be very difficult and thorny ques-
tions to be resolved, and it will take coopera-
tion and flexibility on the part of all to make
progress. We intend to play a very active
part. We hope that we can help the parties in
moving toward a solution of these questions in
this year.
Dr. Rifai: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
You're expected to visit the Middle East
next iveek, probably to get a firsthand ap-
preciation of the real problem. Is that trip of a
purely exploratory nature, or are there some
specific proposals that you would like to pre-
sent to the concerned governments in the area?
Secretary Vance: I have no specific propos-
als that I intend to propose to the key gov-
ernments which I will be visiting. I have come
to meet with the leaders in each of these coun-
tries because I believe it's essential to hear
firsthand their views as to the issues and
ways of resolving these issues.
I also believe that by making this visit I will
be able to get a better understanding of the
nature of some of these problems than has
been possible in the past and, as a result of
this, will be able to report to our President
and, with him, better help to formulate our
suggestions in the future with respect to the
resolution of these problems.
Dr. Rifai: Mr. Secretary, your trip is pre-
ceded by an official visit undertaken by the
Secretary General of the United Nations and
would be folloived probably by the official vis-
226
Department of State Bulletin
its of the French, German, and English
Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Is there any
coordination between the American initiative
and that of the United Nations on the one
hand and that of the West Europeans on the
other?
Secretary Vance: Yes. I met with the Sec-
retary General of the United Nations im-
mediately before he left on his trip to the
Middle East. We discussed at length his plans
for that trip. He and I are keeping in close
touch on this. And although he himself will
not be back before I leave on my trip, one of
his colleagues who is traveling with him will
return to Washington and will meet with me
on next Monday, the day I leave, to bring me
fully up to date on what has transpired during
his visits with the various leaders in the Mid-
dle East.
I am also in touch with the Foreign Minis-
ters of the countries which you have men-
tioned and will be in further touch with them
so that I can have the benefit of their views.
We have also been in touch with the mem-
bers of the European Community, as you
know, through Vice President Mondale's trip;
and upon my return from the Middle East, I
will coordinate my views and report to them
as well as to the people here in the United
States.
Dr. Rifai: Mr. Secretary, it is expected that
the Geneva Peace Conference for the Middle
East will be convened shortly this year. This
conference, as we know, is under the auspices
of the United Nations and the cochairman-
ship of the United States and the Soviet
Union. Has the new Administration agreed
on the principles and the framework of the
conference with the United Nations Secretary
General and the Government of the Soviet
Union?
Secretary Vance: We have not agreed on
any concrete framework; but we have dis-
cussed the matter, as I indicated, with the
Secretary General. He himself has not arrived
at any final conclusions as to what he beheves
would be the best method of proceeding but
hopes to have a better idea of that which he
will recommend as a result of his trip.
The Soviet Union, of course, as the
Cochairman, also has an important role to
play; and I will be discussing, upon my return
from the Middle East, the results of my trip
with representatives of the Soviet Union —
which as Cochairman, as I've indicated, will
have an important role to play.
Dr. Rifai: Mr. Secretary, any possible set-
tlement to the Arab-Israel conflict would take
into consideration two necessary conditions:
first, a complete withdrawal of Israel from all
occupied territories; and second, the recogni-
tion of the legitimate national rights of the
Palestinian people. We know that the role of
the United States is decisive in any possible
settlement. What would be the attitude of the
United States vis-a-vis these tivo conditions?
Secretary Vance: At this point I don't think
it would be helpful for me to speak specifically
with respect to the views of the United States
on these two issues. These are issues which I
will be discussing with the leaders of the vari-
ous countries which I will be visiting.
After having the benefit of their views, we
will, in the United States, discuss within the
government the positions we believe are most
constructive in this area and will communicate
those views to the parties involved. But I
think at this early stage it would not be con-
structive for me to try and come with any
specific proposals, and I think the leaders of
the countries I am visiting are fully aware of
this.
Dr. Rifai: Mr. Secretary, southern Lebanon
is the only sector where peace has not been es-
tablished. The Arab peace forces entrusted
with security in Lebanon are deployed for
that purpose. Israel is creating a situation
whereby it seeks to prevent this task from
being fulfilled. What do you think should be
done in southern Lebanon to prevent a recur-
rence of civil war and that there should be no
return of tension along the Israeli border?
Secretary Vance: The problems of southern
Lebanon are very difficult problems. We sup-
port very strongly the efforts of President
Sarkis to extend control of the central au-
thorities throughout all of Lebanon, but the
problem that exists is that the forces do not
exist at this point within Lebanon to achieve
March 14, 1977
227
this. As a result of that, it makes the situation
extremely difficult and complex.
Because of this, we have used our best of-
fices to facilitate the communication between
all of the parties concerned. We are sensitive
to the concerns of the various parties. We
have tried to play a calming role in this re-
spect. And we have urged, and will continue
to urge, restraint on the part of all of the par-
ties.
Dr. Rifai: Mr. Secretary, a last ques-
tion— ways of developing and keeping bilat-
eral relations and your evaluation of the role
now being played by Syria in the Middle
East.
Secretary Vance: With respect to our bilat-
eral relations, I am pleased to say that I think
that they have improved substantially.
Insofar as trade relations are concerned,
they have expanded during the last year.
American businessmen have been seeking
markets in Syria.
In addition to this, our cultural exchanges
are going to expand. Tourism is picking up.
And I hope that more and more of our people
will be going to Syria to see the beauties of
your country.
I am also pleased with the increasing
exchange in the journalistic area so that the
journalists of both countries can go and return
and explain to their respective countries and
their countrymen what the other countries
are like. I think, in short, we have made some
constructive steps; and I want to do every-
thing I can within my power to continue this
progress and to have warmer and closer rela-
tionships between our two countries and their
people.
Now, I believe there was a second question
you asked?
Dr. Rifai: Your evaluation of the role now
being played by Syria in the Middle East.
Secretary Vance: I think Syria has played a
very constructive role. During the past year
in the Lebanon, they have helped in the resto-
ration of ti-anquillity, or the approach toward
tranquillity, in that area. Syria is a key coun-
try in the peacemaking process. President
Asad is one of the leading statesmen of the
world, and I look forward very much to hav-
ing the opportunity to meet with him and to
discuss with him the problems of achieving
peace in the Middle East.
Dr. Rifai: Thank you very much, Mr. Sec-
retary.
Interview With Secretary Vance on February 10
by Israeli Media Representatives
Following is the transcript of an interview
with Secretary Vance at Washington on Feb-
mary 10 by Eli Nissan of Israeli radio and TV;
Wolf Blitzer, Jerusalem Post; Ido Dis-
sentshik, Ma'ariv; Nah^im Barnea, Davar;
and Dan Margalit, Ha'aretz.
Press release 50 dated February 14
Mr. Nissan: Mr. Secretary, what would
you expect to achieve, in practical terms, dur-
ing your trip to the Middle East?
Secretary Vance: Well, first let me say that
the fact that I am taking this trip at the re-
quest of the President indicates the impor-
tance which we attach to the mission on which
I am about to embark. This is the first major
diplomatic mission which this new Adminis-
tration has undertaken.
The first country which I am going to visit
is your country; and there, because of the
close and special relationship which has
existed for many years, I would expect to
228
Department of State Bulletin
have a searching exchange of ideas with the
leaders of your country.
I expect to have full and complete discus-
sions with the leaders in the other countries
which I am going to visit also. And what I am
seeking to do is to obtain firsthand their views
on how it may be possible to move forward to
a peace settlement in the Middle East.
I am not going to engage in shuttle diplo-
macy at this time. What I am trying to do is
to ascertain as clearly as I can what the views
of the key leaders are so that I can then re-
turn to the United States and report to the
President and we can then develop our views
as to how we can be most useful in trying to
promote peace in the Middle East.
Let me say two things. One, we consider
the need for progress in 1977 to be very im-
portant. And secondly, we, the United States,
intend to play an active role in helping facili-
tate a peaceful solution.
Mr. Nissan: Mr. Secretary, in that respect,
could you specify the terms of reference for
reconvening the Geneva confereyice, and who
should represent Palestinian interests there?
Secretary Vance: With respect to the con-
vening or reconvening of a Geneva confer-
ence, this is something which all of the parties
seem to be agreed upon. They have all indi-
cated that they see it to be a useful step to
take.
At this early stage, without having had the
benefit of meeting with your leaders and the
leaders of the other countries, I don't really
think it would be useful for me to try to get
into that kind of detail.
After I have had the benefit of my ex-
changes with them, I think that then we can
speak more usefully to this kind of subject.
Mr. Nissayi: Could you elaborate to what
extent has the new Administration committed
itself to the achievement of an overall settle-
ment in the Middle East?
Secretary Vance: The question, again, of
the shape of a settlement is something which I
think is premature to comment on at this
time. We know that the key elements of any
settlement are peace, withdrawal, and the
question of the legitimate interests of Pales-
tinians.
These are all going to have to be taken care
of and resolved in any settlement. But at this
very early stage, when I am just taking the
first step, it seems to me that it would not be
productive or helpful to try to go into the kind
of detail which your question calls for.
Mr. Nissan: Would you preclude the possi-
bility of negotiating further interim agree-
ments if an overall settlement cannot be
achieved?
Secretary Vance: The question of the
form — again, that is going to have to depend
on what I learn from my conversations with
the leaders. I really can't say at this time
what seems to be possible. What I learn from
what I hear in Israel will be very important in
what I report to the President and what we
may suggest.
Mr. Nissan: Mr. Secretary, could you
elaborate on the political and practical mean-
ing of the term "the legitimate interests of the
Palestinian people"?
Secretary Vance: The question of what is
the meaning of "the legitimate interests of the
Palestinian people" is a subject which is going
to have to be worked out in the negotiations.
That is a key issue, as I indicated, which is
part of the negotiations.
Mr. Nissan: But you are not going to
suggest any other yneans?
Secretary Vance: Not at this time.
Mr. Nissa n : Do you foresee any significant
role for the United Nations to play in the
process of peacemaking in the Middle East?
Secretary Vance: Yes. I talked to Secretary
General Waldheim before he left on his trip to
the Middle East, where he is now. He told me
that he would keep me informed of his conver-
sations with the various leaders. And indeed
he has offered, and I have accepted, the
suggestion that he will ask Mr. [Brian E.]
Urquhart, who is traveling with him — one of
the Under Secretaries at the United Nations —
March 14, 1977
229
to come back and brief me on Monday im-
mediately before I leave on the trip.
I have told the Secretary General that I will
meet with him shortly after my return from
the Middle East and will let him know what I
have learned as a result of my discussions.
The United Nations, in my judgment, does
have a role to play. Exactly what the
parameters of that role are will be defined in
the future.
Mr. Nissan: Mr. Secretary, could you give
us any indication as to whether the Soviet
Union has been willing to cooperate with an
upcoming U.S. initiative in the Middle East?
Secretary Vance: Yes. I have discussed my
upcoming mission with the Soviets and have
indicated to them that upon my return that I
would be happy to share with them the results
of my trip.
As you know, they are Cochairman of the
Geneva conference and, as such, have a re-
sponsibility for seeing that we move toward
peace in the area.
They have indicated that they wish to coop-
erate in discharging that role. We consider
this to be a vitally important role as far as we
are concerned, and we welcome their offer of
cooperation.
Mr. Blitzer: Mr. Secretary, you mentioned
before that an Israeli ivithdrawal will be one
of the key elements of a settlement. Will Is-
rael have to wifhdraiv to its pre-1967 borders
ivith only minor modifications in exchange
for a genuine peace agreement with their Arab
neighbors? Do you foresee the Arabs accept-
ing anything less?
Secretary Vance: Again, I think it is too
early to answer that kind of a specific ques-
tion. Obviously the nature of withdrawal will
be a subject which will have to be discussed
among the parties in the determination of the
shape of the settlement. And I think it would
be counterproductive for me at this point to
try and define what the parties may be able to
agree to or not agree to in the future.
Mr. Dissentshik: Mr. Secretary, can you
foresee any Palestinian representation other
than the PLO [Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization] in any circumstance that will
arise in the future?
Secretary Vance: Let me say a word about
the PLO. The PLO have been unwilhng to
recognize the existence of Israel. In addition,
the PLO have been unwilhng to accept the
framework of Resolutions 242 and 338 as a
basis for a Geneva conference.
In these circumstances, it seems to me that
their participation would be out of the ques-
tion. What the future may bring, no one can
say at this point. I do note, as I indicated ear-
lier, that the question of the legitimate inter-
ests of the Palestinian people is, however, a
subject which is one of the keys to a peace
settlement.
Mr. Baryiea: Mr. Secretary, will you follow
up the President by asking the Israelis and
the Arabs in the Middle East to reduce the
amount of arms that they buy?
Secretary Vance: Yes. You may have
heard, or read in the papers, that the Presi-
dent stated that he wished me, during my
trip, to discuss with the leaders the question
of arms sales in the Middle East, and I shall
do so.
Both the President and I feel very strongly
that the issue of arms sales generally
throughout the world is one of the major is-
sues that we intend to address ourselves to,
and it is not just a matter of us, as suppliers,
but it is a matter to be discussed with the re-
cipient countries, the buying nations, as well.
We do have a particular responsibility,
however, because of the fact that we are the
largest arms supplier in the world. And be-
cause of that, we are first going to have to
determine what our own policy with respect
to arms sales generally — and I am not relating
it to the Middle East at this point — should be
and then begin to discuss these questions with
the buyer nations.
Now, insofar as arms sales in the Middle
East are concerned, we have indicated that
there are three criteria which we apply:
First, does the country requesting arms
have a clear requirement for those arms for its
national security?
230
Department of State Bulletin
Second, what would the transfer of those
arms do to the critical balance which exists in
the Middle East?
And third, if the arms sales were made,
would they facilitate the movement to peace?
Now, these are the criteria we have been
applying. These are the criteria which we will
continue to apply.
Mr. Barnea: Do you believe that the failure
of Israel to obtain a license for the selling of
Kfir to Ecuador harmed Israel- American re-
lations?
Secretary Vance: I hope it did not. We have
explained the reason for our decision in this
matter. The reason for that decision is that it
has been our policy not to sell advanced
weapons systems to Latin American coun-
tries. We have been following this policy for
many years; and if we had not made the deci-
sion that we did, we would have been going
contrary to a longstanding policy of the
United States.
Mr. Margalit: Mr. Secretary, did the State
Department recommend to President Carter
that the sale of the CBU-72 cluster bombs, as
approved by President Ford, go through as
planned?
Secretary Vance: As the President indi-
cated, he does not have any recommendations
before him at this time. We have not yet com-
pleted our review here in the State Depart-
ment. The President indicated that he ex-
pected that we would have that recommenda-
tion to him sometime in the next week to 10
days. We will have our recommendation to
him at that time. At this point, there is no
recommendation, and the decision will have to
await the recommendation and his determina-
tion at that time in the future.
Mr. Margalit: Are you and the State De-
partment aware — are you familiar with the
military purpose in clearing minefields and
destroying runways?
Secretary Vance: Yes. I understand.
Mr. Margalit: If so, what makes it so con-
troversial ?
Secretary Vance: There are a number of
factors that come into play in this, and I don't
think this is the point to go into that until we
have completed our work and made our rec-
ommendation to the President.
Mr. Barnea: Are you going to discuss it on
your trip to Israel?
Secretary Vance: I would assume that the
subject might be raised with me.
Mr. Barnea: That will be before the decision
will be made here?
Secretary Vance: I don't know. I assume
that it may be raised when I am in Israel on
Tuesday.
Mr. Blitzer: Mr. Secretary, do you believe
that the continued presence of Syrian troops
in southern Lebanon is constructive?
Secretary Vance: Well, the problem of
southern Lebanon is a very complex and dif-
ficult one. First, we do not want to see fight-
ing flare up again there. Secondly, we do not
want to see any danger to Israel as a result of
troops in the southern part of Lebanon, and
we feel very strongly about that. The trouble
is that the Lebanese do not have the security
forces which are necessary to maintain secu-
rity in the area, and that has been the heart of
the problem. We strongly support the efforts
of President Sarkis to develop the kind of
forces, and we know that it will not be possi-
ble to have an adequate number until some-
time in the future.
Now, as a result of this, we have felt it
would be useful for us to act as a channel of
communication among the various parties
which are concerned with the problem of
southern Lebanon, so that we could keep the
channels of communication open between
them. This we have done. We have hoped that
this has been a calming influence. We have
urged restraint upon all of the parties, and I
think that the role we have played has been a
constructive role.
Mr. Blitzer: Is Lebanon not, in fact, a
satellite of Syria now that Syria controls
three-quarters of Lebanon?
March 14, 1977
231
Secretary Vance: We have stated many
times that we support strongly the unity, the
independence, and the territorial integrity of
Lebanon.
Mr. Dissentshik: Since Israel is now, Mr.
Secretary, in the midst of an internal politi-
cal campaign, do you expect to see leaders or
personalities other tha)i those now serving in
the caretaker government?
Secretary Vance: My time is very limited,
and I am going to have to be having intensive
conversations on a wide variety of subjects
dealing with the search for peace in the Mid-
dle East. As a result of that, I will be meeting
officially only with the leaders of the govern-
ment. I may, at a social function, see those
who are not members of the government, but
I have no plans to do so at this time.
Mr. Dissentshik: Did you take into consid-
eration some charges that were made in Israel
that your presence at this particular time
may indicate your preference for a certain
candidate"?
Secretary Varjce: We have no preferences. I
have heard that some people made such a
charge. That charge is totally without founda-
tion. As I previously told you, we consider it
of the utmost importance to get started on the
process of trying to find a peaceful solution;
and therefore it was important for me to go to
the Middle East as soon as possible. That is
why I am going at this time. It has nothing to
do with the political situation in Israel.
Mr. Barnea: Will you consider inviting
people here to Washington before the election,
in addition to Mr. Rabin — political figures
who are involved in the campaign?
Secretary Vance: I will be discussing the
question of visits to Washington. As to the
timing of those visits, it will have to be a sub-
ject of discussion with the various leaders.
Mr. Margalit: Would the United States
supply Israel and Egypt with the nuclear
reactors — and maybe I will add thefolloivup:
are you in favor of selling arms to the Egyp-
tians?
Secretary Vance: Let ine take your first
question, and then I will come on and pick up
the second one.
I think — as all of you know, and we have
said, we have the question of the providing of
nuclear reactors, the sale of nuclear reactors
to Israel and to Egypt, under study, as I am
sure is understandable, since we are a new
Administration coming in. We have not com-
pleted that study, and we will make our de-
termination only after that is done.
Now, insofar as the question of selling arms
to Egypt is concerned, I have already given
you what the criteria are with respect to arms
sales to any nation in the area; and in connec-
tion with any request that might be made, we
would apply those criteria. As yet, we have
had no request from Egypt for arms.
Mr. Biitzer: Changing the subject for a sec-
ond, Mr. Secretary, during the campaign
President Carter expressed his concern over
the situation of Soviet Jewry. How do you
plan on getting more Jews out of the Soviet
Union now that you are the Secretary of
State? And, related to that, should Congress
consider revising the Jackson-Vanik amend-
ment [to the Trade Act of 197 A]?
Secretary Vance: I think the question of
trying to get more Jews out of the Soviet
Union is a subject which we should discuss
with the Soviets, and we plan to do so.
As to the Jackson-Vanik amendment, that
is a matter for the Congress, and a matter
which we will have to consider with the Con-
gress to determine whether or not changes
can be made in that regard.
Mr. Biitzer: Has the Administration, the
new Administration, taken — or begun study-
ing this?
Secretary Vance: It has not made a deter-
mination yet in this area.
Mr. Biitzer: Are you studying the problem
of getting more Jews out of the Soviet Union,
at this stage?
Secretary Vance: Yes, we are.
Mr. Biitzer: You have raised it with the
Soviet Union?
232
Department of State Bulletin
Secretary Vance: I don't want to talk about
it any further than I have.
Mr. Dissodsliik: Is linkage dead only in
U.S. -Soviet, relations, or is it dead across the
board?
Secretary Vance: Well, let me say a word
about linkage. What I said about linkage was,
I thought there had been an overemphasis on
linkage.
And then I talked specifically about human
rights, and I said, as far as human rights were
concerned, that we were going to speak our
minds on human rights issues, and we were
going to speak them clearly and forcefully
when we deemed it necessary to do so.
And I said, the fact that we did that, in my
judgment, did not mean that we could not and
would not discuss such issues as the reduction
in strategic arms. I went on to say that the
climate, however, could not help but be af-
fected by what happened in areas such as
human rights issues.
Now, I am not sure that that answers your
question or not.
Mr. Dissentshik : It already does.
Mr. Bamea: In your statements since you
became Secretary of State, you said our
boycott — you will discuss the question of our
boycott when you go to the Middle East, and I
believe you linked it to the question of peace
in the area.
Secretary Vance: No. I said that I would
discuss the question of boycott. I am sure it
will come up. I am sure it is going to be raised
by some of the leaders with whom I meet. In-
sofar as the question of the U.S. position on
the Arab boycott goes, we have stated that
we have it under study, and I will be testify-
ing with respect to what the U.S. position is
when I return. I believe the hearings are
going to be held on February 28 before Sena-
tor Proxmire's committee, and I believe there
will be another set of hearings before the In-
ternational Relations Committee in the
House, or one of the subcommittees of the In-
ternational Relations Committee.
Mr. Bamea: But the last news reports from
Saudi Arabia and other oil countries say that
they link their cooperation for achieving
peace in the area to the question of the legisla-
tion here on the boycott. How do you consider
that?
Secretary Vance: Well, that is their posi-
tion. I hear what they are saying. But we
have not yet reached our determination as to
what our position will be, and we will state
what our position is when I testify on the
28th.
Mr. Margalit: Mr. Secretary, there was a
report in the New York Times saying that the
Soviet Union, through other Comynunist coun-
tries, continues to supply arms to Egypt. Do
you have something to confirm it?
Secretary Vance: No, I have nothing to con-
firm that.
Mr. Blitzer: On another issue yet, there
may be some linkage involved.
Secretary Vance: [Laughter] More link-
age?
Mr. Blitzer: Perhaps you can tell us
whether or not you plan to raise the issue of
Syrian Jewry with President Asad when you
visit Damascus next week?
Secretary Vance: Let me say that this is an
important issue; I am familiar with the issue.
I am glad that some progress has been made
on this matter; and I think, in the interest of
the Jews in Syria, that we ought to just leave
it there without a specific answer to your
question.
Mr. Blitzer: In other words, you would
support quiet diplomacy in resolving this
matter?
Secretary Vance: Let's just leave it where I
left it.
Last question.
Mr. Dissentshik: It will be again on link-
age; I want to a little widen the scope of the
question of my colleague. The Saudi Arabians
not only tied the oil prices to the question of
the boycott legislation, but also they said that
they have taken this very mild approach with
regard to oil prices, provided that the United
States and the rest of the world will comefor-
Mareh 14, 1977
233
ward positively on a peace settlement in the
Middle East. The President — and I think you
yourself — have stated in the past that these
two issues are not linked.
Secretary Vance: That's absolutely correct.
We have stated it. There was no commitment
at all made by either of us or anybody else in
the Administration in connection with the de-
cision that the Saudis made with respect to oil
prices.
Mr. Dissentshik: And this remains the po-
sition?
Secretary Vance: Yes. No change.
U.S. Increases Relief Aid
to Lebanon
Folloiving is an announcement released at
Beirut and by the Agency for International
Development (AID) at Washington on Feb-
ruary 18.
medical supplies; and $1.5 million for other
relief and rehabihtation activities that will be
jointly selected over the next four months.
The P.L. 480 Title I program, now under
congressional review, will provide wheat,
rice, and other basic commodities to help
meet Lebanese food requirements. The hous-
ing program, already underway, will help
meet short-term needs for housing renova-
tion and repair and will help finance new
low-cost housing construction for displaced
persons. Medical equipment and supplies will
be provided to replenish the depleted stocks
of Lebanese hospitals and health clinics, in-
cluding the American University Hospital.
Equipment, for which procurement already
is underway, will be employed to help put the
port back into operation. In that way the
port will be able to handle a greater volume
of incoming relief and reconstruction supplies
and materials.
The $19 million assistance provided to
Lebanon during the past 18 months was used
mainly for medical supplies and food.
Agency for international Development press release 77-7
Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance an-
nounced in Beirut on February 18 that the
United States will provide an additional $50
million over the next few months to support
relief and rehabihtation efforts in Lebanon.
The announcement came following consul-
tations between the two governments and
the findings of a team of experts from the
Agency for International Development which
visited Lebanon to assess damages caused by
19 months of civil strife. The $50 million an-
nounced on February 18 brings the U.S. con-
tribution of humanitarian and relief aid to
Lebanon to nearly $69 million since October
1975.
The $50 million package includes: $20 mil-
lion for a Public Law 480 Title I food aid
program; $5 million to reactivate the Port of
Beirut, enabling it to handle emergency re-
lief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction
goods; $19.5 million in financing and techni-
cal assistance in housing repair, rehabilita-
tion, and reconstruction ($15 million of this
will be provided under AID's housing in-
vestment guarantee program); $4 million for
President Lopez Portillo of Mexico
Visits the United States
Jose Lopez Portillo, President of the United
Mexican States, made a state visit to the
United States February 13-17, during which
he met with President Carter and other gov-
ernment officials and addressed the U.S.
House of Representatives. Following is the
text of a joint communique issued on Feb-
ruary 17. 1
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated February 21
President Jimmy Carter of the United
States of America and President Jose Lopez
Portillo of the United Mexican States, during
two days of discussions in Washington, recon-
' For an exchange of remarks between President
Carter and President Lopez Portillo at a welcoming
ceremony at the White House on Feb. 14 and their ex-
change of toasts at a dinner at the White House that
evening, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu-
ments dated Feb. 21, 1977, pp. 193 and 196; for Presi-
dent Lopez Portillo's address before the U.S. House of
Representatives, see Congressional Record of Feb. 17,
1977, p. H 1122.
234
Department of State Bulletin
firmed the special importance each places on
close and friendly relations between the two
neighboring nations. The two Presidents
pledged that they would examine closely in
the next few months the multiple aspects of
the relations between Mexico and the United
States with a view to developing policies that
reflected the interrelated nature of mutual
problems. The two Presidents concluded that
the primary objective of each government
would be to develop a mutually beneficial re-
lationship that would contribute to the well-
being of their nations. To this end they agreed
to meet to review progress in the develop-
ment of comprehensive policies of each of
their governments.
The two Presidents also discussed the
global situation and agreed to consult reg-
ularly on the search for world-wide peace,
economic betterment and respect for the
rights of man. They reaffirmed that the prin-
ciples governing relations between the United
Statps and Mexico were non-interference in
internal affairs, respect for the sovereign
rights of each nation and the recognition of
the particular nature of the relationship of
neighboring countries.
The two Presidents considered carefully a
number of important subjects including eco-
nomic and monetary questions, investment,
trade, immigration, narcotics, smuggling, and
some illicit activities, agricultural exchanges,
energy, nonproliferation of nuclear arms,
Mexico's desire for increased and improved
access to international financial institutions
and capital markets and the need to seek a
better balance in trade between the two coun-
tries. They also agreed that it would be of
mutual benefit to both countries to contribute
to Mexico's development through an increase
in the flow of trade between Mexico and the
United States, and to stimulate tourism in
both directions.
President Carter was impressed by the de-
termination and ability of the Mexican Gov-
ernment to deal with these problems and of-
fered his cooperation in seeking solutions.
President Carter and President Lopez Por-
tillo agreed that the Secretary of Foreign Re-
lations of Mexico and the Secretary of State of
the United States should maintain close and
frequent personal contacts to assure high-
level coordination on actions that might affect
both countries. They also agreed that other
high officials in both countries should have di-
rect access to each other to discuss pertinent
issues when necessary and that mechanisms
would be established to study these issues in
detail.
The state visit of President Lopez Portillo
and the open and friendly discussions between
the Presidents of Mexico and the United
States served to underscore and reaffirm the
close and friendly relationship between the
two countries.
United States and Spain Sign
New Fisheries Agreement
Press release 56 dated February 16
On February 16, 1977, representatives of
the United States of America and Spain
signed a new agreement relating to fishing
activities of Spain off the coasts of the
United States.
The agreement sets out the arrangements
between the countries which will govern
fishing by Spanish vessels within the fishery
conservation zone of the United States be-
ginning March 1, 1977. The agreement will
come into force after the completion of
internal procedures by both governments.
The signing of this agreement took place
in Washington. Juan Jose Rovira, Ambas-
sador to the United States of Spain, signed
for Spain. Rozanne L. Ridgway, Ambas-
sador of the United States for Oceans and
Fisheries Affairs, signed for the United
States. Both representatives expressed
their hope that the new accord will
strengthen cooperation between Spain and
the United States.
March 14, 1977
235
THE CONGRESS
Secretary Testifies on Administration's Approach to Foreign Assistance
Statement by Secretary Vance '
It is my pleasure to begin today, before this
distinguished committee, my testimony to the
Congress on the Carter Administration's ap-
proach to foreign assistance.
Our foreign assistance programs are di-
verse in substance, serve a variety of objec-
tives, and are aimed at a wide range of
targets. In reviewing our foreign assistance
program we should ask ourselves certain key
questions:
— How do these programs fit together?
— What are the results of our aid in human
terms?
— What ends are served?
— In short, is our aid money being wisely
spent?
I hope to begin this difficult process of
self-examination and cooperative dialogue
with the Congress today — to provide you with
a sense of how the Administration sees the
total range of our foreign assistance programs
as part of a broad foreign policy framework
including:
— Our efforts at development cooperation in
the context of an increasingly important
North-South dialogue;
— Our ability to play a constructive role in
the resolution of regional conflict in the Mid-
dle East, southern Africa, and other trouble
spots in the wo;i'ld; and
— Our basic national security.
' Submitted to the Subcommittee on Foreign Opera-
tions of the Senate Committee on Appropriations on
Feb. 24 (text from press release 79). The complete
transcript of the hearings will be published by the
committee and will be available from the Superinten-
dent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402.
Our Basic Objectives
The foreign assistance efforts of the Carter
Administration are guided by some fundamen-
tal foreign policy objectives:
— To demonstrate America's compassion for
the poor and dispossessed around the
world — those who, through no fault of their
own, are exposed to daily suffering and
humiliation and are struggling to survive^
— To make our fair contribution to the
enormous task of the social, economic, and
technological development of poor countries,
an investment which in this interdependent
world can pay us handsome dividends;
— To foster a climate of constructive coop-
eration, dialogue, and reciprocal benefit in our
North-South diplomacy;
— To contribute to the cause of peace by
providing incentives, in terms of economic and
physical security, for the resolution of old,
and potential, disputes;
— To maintain and foster the environment
of international peace and security essential
to social, economic, and political progress
through selective military assistance that as-
sures our friends and allies adequate self-
defense, while preserving regional arms bal-
ances;
— To take the lead in encouraging the
evolution of a world order based on an open
economic system, a political structure reflect-
ing a just balance of rights and obhgations for
all nations, and social progress and human
rights for individuals wherever they might
be.
This wide range of objectives is essential to
the national interest of the United States in
236
Department of State Bulletin
the complicated interdependent world in
which we live.
Our own economic welfare is vitally affected
by what happens elsewhere in the world. The
standard of living of the American worker and
the American consumer requires cooperation
with the developing world — in expanding
supplies of food, energy, and raw materials
and in controlling population growth and
wasteful use of scarce natural resources. The
stability of the U.S. economy depends greatly
on responsible economic policies in the rest of
the world, including the developing nations.
The fortunes of all national economies, includ-
ing our own, are linked to continued e.xpan-
sion of the highly integrated international
system of trade, investment, and finance. And
in a world in which social and economic prog-
ress has become a central issue of our time,
our national security is linked to progress in
the rest of the world.
In addition, economic issues have assumed
increasing political importance. Disadvan-
taged people everywhere are rejecting the
proposition that poverty must be their fate,
and governments everywhere are putting the
goal of economic development at the top of
their national agendas. We have experienced
severe worldwide economic dislocation: simul-
taneous inflation and recession and abrupt in-
creases in energy prices have curtailed eco-
nomic growth generally, but most painfully in
the poorest countries. Equality of economic
opportunity has become the paramount goal of
diplomacy for 150 developing nations, just as
it has been the goal of disadvantaged citizens
and regions in American history.
We cannot effectively promote multilateral
diplomacy, control the proliferation of nuclear
arms, defuse international terrorism, reduce
the buildup of conventional weapons, or pro-
tect our security interests in the oceans or
space in a hungry, angry, and bitter world.
We can achieve cooperation on these security
issues only if we are doing our fair and rea-
sonable share in the process of international
development cooperation — only if we are seen
as encouraging, not frustrating, the develop-
ment aspirations of others.
In an imperfect world, the objectives we
pose for our foreign policy are not always con-
sistent. We cannot pursue all of them as fully
as we might like all the time. In concrete in-
stances we face a series of difficult choices.
Some of these choices pit our best intentions
against our most pragmatic calculations.
For example, both we and the poorer coun-
tries favor economic development, and we
generally agree that development requires
sound domestic policies as well as interna-
tional transfers of resources to the poor coun-
tries. Moreover, one of our principal objec-
tives is to see that the poorest people of the
developing nations benefit from our assist-
ance.
Our task is to achieve those ends without
interfering in the internal affairs of other coun-
tries, mindful of the fact that there are limits
to what we can achieve no matter how noble
our motives.
Similarly, we hold strongly to the principles
of basic human rights. We are working to ful-
fill both the letter and spirit of current legis-
lation relating human rights concerns to
foreign assistance. This committee itself
spoke to this issue when it wrote in its own
report last summer that: ''■
. . . should we profane our ideals in the interest of
short-term security, we would cause the erosion of our
greatest strength — that of a nation guided by dictates
of reason and moral principles.
But in that report the committee also
noted that we can best achieve our purpose
through conscientious and systematic review
of assistance programs on a country-by-
country basis. In each case we must balance
a political concern for human rights against
economic or security goals. No formula can
resolve the larger conflict of commitments,
but prudent and dedicated attention to both
the basic objectives and the day-to-day oper-
ations of our programs can make specific
problems tractable.
This committee and the Congress have ad-
vocated "new directions" in our bilateral
foreign aid programs. These directions call
for increasing emphasis on the poor majority,
increasing attention to human rights, and
adherence to the moral principles that give
2 S. Kept. 94-1009, June 29, 1976; report of the Sen-
ate Committee on Appropriations, together with addi-
tional views, to accompany H.R. 14260, foreign assist-
ance and related programs appropriation bill, 1977.
March 14, 1977
237
us pride and dignity as a nation. The spirit of
"new directions" underlies our general ap-
proach to all our aid programs.
The Carter Administration accepts the
challenge that Congress has posed. We ask
your cooperation in making "new directions"
a reality — and in helping us resolve the dif-
ficult policy choices we face.
The challenge of the "new directions"
means that, in 1977, we cannot talk simply in
the dry terms of this or that funding level as
if the power to budget and spend were the
power to wish ourselves into a perfect world.
We are interested in results in human as well
as economic terms.
Our Programs
How, then, do the variety of proposed de-
velopment assistance programs fit into this
general policy framework? Each of the pro-
grams serves different objectives. I include
at this point a chart laying out the major
elements of the programs.
Bilateral Development Assistance
First, our bilateral development assist-
ance. This program, as you know, is the most
direct way to put American effort to work
improving the human condition around the
world and spurring economic development.
The fiscal year 1978 program for bilateral
development assistance calls for new budget
authority of $1,355 million. The Congress has
played a major role in shaping the way this
program tackles the raw human problems in
the poor countries. That means food produc-
tion and nutrition, population growth and
basic health services, education and human
resource development. Our bilateral assist-
ance programs also provide a broad range of
U.S. scientific and technical skills, thus en-
gaging American universities, private firms,
and private voluntary organizations in the
development process.
In fiscal year 1978, over 60 percent of our
direct bilateral assistance will go directly to
countries with per capita incomes of $300 or
Foreign Aid Items
Included in Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation Act
New Budget Authority
(in millions of dollars)
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS FUNCTION
Multilateral
International Financial Institutions
International Organizations and Programs
International Fund for Agricultural
Development
Bilateral— A.I. D.
Security Supporting Assistance
Middle East Special Requirements Fund
Development Assistance
Other Bilateral
Peace Corps
Migration and Refugee Assistance
International Narcotics Control
Inter-American Foundation
Israel-U.S. Binational Industrial
Research and Development Fund
Overseas Private Investment Corporation
NATIONAL DEFENSE FUNCTION
Military Assistance
Grant Military Assistance
Foreign Military Training
Foreign Military Credit Sales
Total Foreign Assistance Appropriation
' Excludes loan to Portugal and other items not considered
FY 1977
Estimate
FY 1978
FY 1976
Actual
Ford
Budget
Proposed
Amendments
Carter
Budget
4,023
4.616
5,348
950
6,298
1,098
696
202
1,529
1,285
244
2,211
1,985
226
+ 661
-^631
+ 30
2,872
2,616
256
200
—
—
—
—
2,761
1,690
50
1,021
2,895
1,735
23
1,137
2,840
1,459
25
1,356
+427
+ 428
-1
3,267
1,887
25
1,355
164
81
46
37
192
81
47
34
297
68
40
39
-138
+ 7
+ 5
159
75
45
39
1,313
225
23
1,065
30
985
262
25
698
150
976
230
36
710
5,336 5,601
Foreign Aid."
6,324
-150
-3
-1
-2
+ 947
973
230
35
708
7,271
238
Department of State Bulletin
less. In addition, our request includes the
first U.S. commitment of $50 million for a
major multilateral development effort for the
African Sahelian region, to be carried out
over a number of years. Proposals for disas-
ter assistance, American schools and hospi-
tals abroad, the President's Contingency
Fund, and operating costs of AID [Agency
for International Development] are included
as well.
We must do our part to assist the develop-
ing countries. But they themselves will have
to mobilize most of the resources needed, and
sometimes undertake major policy and in-
stitutional reforms, in order to use these re-
sources effectively.
Multilateral Development Assistance
Over the past 30 years, the United States
has been a leader in building global and re-
gional institutions to deal with the develop-
ment requirements of the poorer nations.
At the center of this framework are the in-
ternational financial institutions. They em-
body the commitment by rich and poor coun-
tries alike to give first priority to the task of
development and to leave political consid-
erations aside.
The international financial institutions
practice a development philosophy which de-
serves our support. Their broadly based
membership and professional competence
make them especially persuasive in encourag-
ing developing countries to pursue sensible
economic policies.
The United States has a large investment
in these institutions. We helped create them.
And through our leadership other donors, in-
cluding some of the newly rich oil-producing
countries, have increased their participation,
thus lowering the relative load we bear our-
selves.
The three institutions of the World Bank
Group account for by far the largest part of
our appropriation requests this year.
The International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development is the acknowledged leader
of the global development effort. It merits
our support so that it can continue to play its
highly effective role.
For the International Development As-
sociation, which provides soft loans to the
poorest countries, the Administration is re-
questing an e.xceptionally large appropria-
tion. This reflects the delayed pattern of the
U.S. contribution to its fourth periodic re-
plenishment of capital and, more important,
our conviction that the United States should
join other donors in supporting a large fifth
replenishment. We will also support a major
replenishment of the International Financial
Corporation to reinforce the role it plays in
promoting the development of the private
sector.
In addition, we have an important stake in
encouraging the effective work of the re-
gional development banks — the Inter-
American Development Bank, the Asian De-
velopment Bank, and the African Develop-
ment Fund.
In support of the institutions mentioned
above, the World Bank Group and the re-
gional banks, we are requesting $540 million
in fiscal year 1977 supplemental appropria-
tions and $2.6 billion in new appropriations
for fiscal year 1978. Of the latter, $1 billion is
for callable capital, which means that no ac-
tual outlays are likely.
In addition to the multilateral banks, U.N.
programs play a unique role in meeting de-
velopmental and humanitarian needs. The
wide scope and approach of the United Na-
tions Development Program is particularly
useful. UNDP and the U.N. specialized
agencies work closely with the multilateral
banks. They require increased resources to
keep up their efforts. For fiscal year 1978,
we are requesting $130 million for the
UNDP, an increase of $30 million over last
year.
Food Aid
To complete the development assistance
picture, let me add a footnote about the role
of food aid in our overall foreign assistance
strategy, even though this program is not in-
cluded in the request before you. We will
work to make these food aid programs serve
our development goals — not only to relieve
hunger and to offset natural catastrophes but
also to improve the use of this form of assist-
ance.
March 14, 1977
239
This year we are planning a food aid pro-
gram of $1.4 billion, roughly the same
amount as last year.
Special Economic Assistance to Portugal
I would like to emphasize the importance
we attach to the special legislation we will
soon be submitting to provide support for
Portugal.
After a period of severe political and eco-
nomic dislocation, the Portuguese economy is
in serious difficulty. The Portuguese Gov-
ernment has announced a comprehensive
program for economic recovery. But they
need help, in the form of a substantial
amount of medium-term balance-of-payments
support from friendly countries. We are now
negotiating such a plan with other countries.
We will soon be asking Congress to appro-
priate funds for U.S. participation in this
joint effort.
Security Supporting Assistance
Security supporting assistance funds of
$1,887 million are proposed for economic as-
sistance to countries experiencing political
and economic stresses where U.S. security
interests are involved. These programs pro-
mote stability and peace in troubled regions.
Middle East Programs. The program pro-
posed for fiscal year 1978 Middle East secu-
rity supporting assistance, administered by
AID, calls for new budget authority of $1,742
million, which is $60 million less than was re-
quested for fiscal year 1977.
By far the largest share of these funds but-
tresses our Middle East peace efforts, with
major programs proposed for Israel, Egypt,
Jordan, and Syria. Other programs that di-
rectly support our peace efforts are the Sinai
Support Mission — the American civilian
early-warning system in the Sinai — and the
Middle East Special Requirements Fund.
This fund of $25 million permits prompt U.S.
responses to special needs which may sud-
denly arise in our efforts to help bring peace
to that region.
Before I left for the Middle East on Feb-
ruary 14, I said that 1977 is a critical year for
progress toward peace in that troubled re-
gion. After my trip I repeat that statement
with renewed conviction. The leaders I vis-
ited all expressed a new willingness to enter
into negotiations looking toward a settle-
ment. They would prefer the benefits of
peace to preparations for war.
We can support our diplomacy of peace
through our aid programs. The economic
needs of some of the key countries in the
Middle East are severe. The IsraeH economy
is burdened with extraordinary defense
costs; Egypt has serious economic difficul-
ties; and the economies of Jordan and Syria
also require substantial assistance.
Africa. America has a responsibility to do
what it can to foster peaceful development to-
ward majority rule in southern Africa. Violence
in southern Africa is in no one's interest.
This year we are requesting $135 milhon, of
which $35 million is for ongoing programs
and the rest for special economic assistance
requirements. The United States is supporting
the efforts of the British to promote peaceful
change in Southern Rhodesia. A peaceful set-
tlement could involve a substantial restructur-
ing of the economy of that territory, as well as
it neighbors, to take advantage of the new eco-
nomic opportunities presented by peace. We
have asked other developed nations to contrib-
ute to the resources required. We must be
ready to do our share.
Military Assistance
Our military assistance programs are im-
portant to our relations with many friendly
nations and allies, to offsetting the strength
of potential adversaries, and to keeping the
peace where regional conflicts threaten it.
U.S. -funded military assistance is one of
the arms transfer issues which are under pol-
icy review by the Carter Administration.
You know of our commitment to bring order,
restraint, and much stricter codes of control
to all arms transfers. Too often, short-term
political or tactical advantages have been
sought without due regard to the possible
longer range effects of arms sales on regional
stability and peace. We are working to insure
improved coordination among all interested
240
Department of State Bulletin
agencies prior to any U.S. Government
commitment. We will be sharing our thinking
on this issue with members of Congress and
seeking your counsel.
The budget proposals for grant military
training and foreign military sales total $973
million. This budget was not originated by
this Administration, nor were the specific
programs designed by us. Nonetheless, our
review of them has convinced us that they are
on the whole wise and in our best interests.
We need to reassure our friends and allies of
the constancy of our interest in their securi-
ty. In this fundamental respect, our objec-
tives will not change. Abrupt actions by the
United States in making major cuts in these
programs would disrupt plans and programs
which are now underway in foreign countries
aod could have serious adverse political con-
sequences.
The President has, however, approved
some relatively small reductions in the Ford
budget requests for grant military materiel
programs and for financing foreign military
sales. As we proceed with our policy reviews
and bring our security assistance programs
into line with objectives of this Administra-
tion, there may be further savings. But I be-
lieve these must be approached deliberately
and not through hasty budget decisions.
We will provide Congress with details of
the security assistance budget proposals
prepared within the executive branch
shortly. I understand that this committee has
scheduled its review of these programs for
the middle of next month. The Department of
State will be pleased to join with the
Department of Defense in supplying any addi-
tional information or data needed or in
testifying before this committee as may be de-
sired.
In closing, let me emphasize that our
foreign assistance programs, composed of
different elements to meet a range of objec-
tives, are a central part of our foreign policy
toward a majority of the nations of the
world. I ask your support for our efforts and
thank you for this opportunity to go over the
proposals with you. I look forward to receiv-
ing the benefit of your views.
Funds Requested for Resumption
of Payment of Dues to UNESCO
Following is a statement made by Donald
R. Toussaint, Acting Assistant Secretary for
International Organization Affairs, before
the Subcominittee on International Opera-
tions of the House Committee on Interna-
tional Relations on February 17.^
I appreciate the opportunity to be here
today to testify in support of the President's
request to increase the authorization for the
fiscal year 1977 under the category "Inter-
national Organizations and Conferences"
by $69,275,000, from $342,460,453 to
$411,735,453. The increase would authorize
additional funds to pay the United States' as-
sessed share of the United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) budget for the calendar years
1975, 1976, and 1977.
As the committee is aware, on December
29, 1976, the President made the certification
required by the Foreign Assistance Act of
1974 to prepare the way for the United
States to resume payments of its dues to
UNESCO. The present Administration
strongly supports this action and has made
its views known in letters dated February 3
from Secretary of State Vance to the chair-
men of the House International Relations
and Appropriations Committee.
Our position favoring payment of our ac-
cumulated arrearages to UNESCO is based
on an analysis of U.S. interests and an as-
sessment of the outcome of the UNESCO
General Conference held in Nairobi last fall.
At that meeting the United States, working
with like-minded countries, succeeded in get-
ting reversed one of the main discriminatory
actions taken against Israel in 1974 — the re-
fusal to assign Israel to a regional group. The
Nairobi conference agreed to assign Israel to
the European regional group. This problem
has now been solved.
' The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub-
lished by the committee and will be available from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
March 14, 1977
241
And while we were not able at this meeting
to prevent the reconfinnation of previous res-
olutions critical of Israeli policies in
Jerusalem and in the occupied territories, we
were successful — because of good support
from a large number of others — in insuring
that the Zionism-racism issue was not in-
jected into the conference deliberations. At
the same time we and our supporters, work-
ing with the UNESCO Secretariat, were able
to thwart other efforts to take new pro-
cedural or substantive actions against Israel.
We were also successful at the Nairobi
meeting in getting widespread support from
other govei'nments to prevent the adoption
of a Communist-backed declaration which
would have sanctioned state control of the
mass media and thus threatened to interfere
with the international activities of American
media. Instead, again with e.xtensive sup-
port, we succeeded in getting the conference
to agree upon a course which opens the op-
portunity to draw up a new declaration — and
with principles consonant with our own basic
values regarding freedom of information.
We were also encouraged that, as a result
of a new mechanism proposed by the Sec-
retariat, the conference focused greater at-
tention on the programs, activities, and re-
sponsibilities which fall to UNESCO under
its constitution.
In order to maintain the momentum
achieved at the Nairobi conference, to en-
courage moderate elements in the organiza-
tion to continue to work with us in the pur-
suit of common objectives such as the
freedom-of-information issue, and to con-
tinue to work effectively for our overall
interests in UNESCO, it is our judgment
that the United States should resume full
participation in the organization, including
the payment of what we owe. Continued
withholding, in our view, is likely to have
results — including a deepening of the organi-
zation's financial crisis — which would make it
very difficult, perhaps impossible, to get
support for further steps to modify or rectify
those conditions within UNESCO which we
still find objectionable. Nor do we believe
such withholding would help us to promote
UNESCO programs in the fields of scientific
research, education, freedom of information,
and many other areas which are of great
value to us.
Finally, continued nonpayment by the
United States would increasingly raise the
question, with implications far beyond UN-
ESCO, whether we intend to abide by our in-
ternational obligations. Prolonged withhold-
ing, in violation of our treaty commitments,
would only encourage other governments to
do the same when they do not agree with all
the actions taken by a U.N. agency, thus
contributing to greater disorder and de-
creased support of the U.N. system, as well
as other international institutions.
It is for these reasons that we are seeking
to increase the appropriation authorization
for fiscal year 1977 by a total of $69.3
million — an amount which will cover U.S. ar-
rearages for the calendar years 1975 and
1976 plus our dues for the calendar year
1977. The regular fiscal year 1978 request in-
cludes an additional amount of $28.1 million
to cover our assessed dues for calendar year
1978.
U.S. -Mexico Treaty on Execution
of Penal Sentences Sent to Senate
Message From President Carter ^
To the Senate of the United States:
With a view to receiving the advice and
consent of the Senate to ratification, I
transmit herewith the Treaty between the
United States of America and the United
Mexican States on the Execution of Penal
Sentences which was signed in Mexico City
on November 25, 1976.
I transmit also, for the information of the
Senate, the report by the Department of
State with respect to the Treaty.
The Treaty would permit citizens of either
nation who had been convicted in the courts
of the other country to serve their sentences
' Transmitted on Feb. 15 {text from Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated Feb. 21); also
printed as S. E.x. D, 95th Cong., 1st sess., which in-
cludes the text of the treaty and the report of the De-
partment of State.
242
Department of State Bulletin
in their home country; in each case the con-
sent of the offender as well as the approval of
the authorities of the two governments
would be required.
This Treaty is significant because it repre-
sents an attempt to resolve a situation which
has inflicted substantial hardships on a
number of citizens of each country and has
caused considerable concern to both govern-
ments. It received the approval of the Senate
of the United Mexican States on December
30, 1976. I recommend that the Senate give
favorable consideration to this Treaty at an
early date.
Jimmy Carter.
The White House, February 15, 1977.
President Discusses Cyprus Issue
in Periodic Report to Congress
Message to the Congress '
To the Congress of the United States:
This report on the progress toward a solu-
tion to the Cyprus dispute is the first of a
series that I will submit pursuant to Public
Law 94-104. Through these reports and con-
tinuing close consultations with the Con-
gress, I will keep the American people fully
informed of developments in the negotia-
tions.
Helping to promote an equitable and last-
ing solution to the problems of Cyprus is a
high priority for my Administration. The
work has already begun. At my request,
former Defense Secretary Clark M. Clifford
will leave on February 15 for a special mis-
sion to Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, as my
personal emissary. Through consultations in
Greece and Turkey, he will seek to improve
our bilateral relations with these valued
NATO allies. With regard to Cyprus, I have
asked for his personal assessment of the situ-
ation on the island, prospects for early
movement toward a negotiated settlement,
and how we might be of assistance in this
'Transmitted on Feb. 11 (text from White House
press release dated Feb. 11).
process. Mr. Clifford will consult with the
Congress before he departs and again — with
other senior officials — after his return, in an
effort to produce policies which are effective
and which have the broad support of the
American people.
We intend to stay in close touch with our
other European friends. Vice President
Mondale raised the subject during his recent
trip and received welcome indications that
member states of the European Community
continue to share our interest in doing what
is possible to encourage a negotiated solu-
tion.
We will also continue to maintain close
contact with the United Nations in its efforts
to promote a peaceful solution. Secretary
General Waldheim has worked tirelessly to
this end since the summer of 1974. He will
soon visit Nicosia for discussions with Cyp-
riot leaders. We hope that through his con-
tinued efforts the talks between the two
communities might resume in the near fu-
ture.
Recent positive developments offer some
prospect of further progress. One such
event was the meeting last month between
President Makarios and Turkish Cypriot
community leader Denktash, the first meet-
ing between the two in thirteen years. I can
assure the Congress that the United States
will do all it can to build on these positive
developments and advance the cause of a
negotiated settlement for Cyprus.
Jimmy Carter.
The White House, February ll, 1977.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
Gorgas Memorial Laboratory 48th Annual Report, Fis-
cal Year 1976. Communication from the President of
the Institute transmitting the report. H. Doc. 95-39.
January 10, 1977. 44 pp.
Income Ta.x Convention With the Republic of the
Philippines. Message from the President of the
United States transmitting the convention signed at
Manila on October 1, 1976, and an exchange of notes.
S. Ex. C, 95th Congress, 1st session. January 19,
1977. 24 pp.
March 14, 1977
243
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Agriculture
Agreement establishing the International Fund for Ag-
ricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome June
13, 1976.'
Signature: Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, February 15,
1977.
Antarctica
Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the
principles and objectives of the Antarctic treaty.
Adopted at Oslo June 20, 1975.'
Notification of approval: Norway, February 17,
1977.
Coffee
International coffee agreement 1976, with anne.xes.
Done at London December 3, 1975. Entered into force
provisionally October 1, 1976.
Ratification deposited: Benin, February 11, 1977.
Energy
Agreement on an international energy program. Done
at Paris November 18, 1974. Entered into force pro-
visionally November 18, 1974; definitively, January
19, 1976! TIAS 8278.
Accession deposited: New Zealand, December 29,
1976.
Load Lines
Amendments to the international convention on load
lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720). Adopted at Lon-
don October 12, 1971.'
Acceptance deposited: Bahamas, January 20, 1977.
Maritime Matters
Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as
amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490).
Adopted at London October 17, 1974.'
Acceptance deposited: Ecuador, January 3, 1977.
Ocean Dumping
Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by
dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes.
Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washing-
ton December 29, 1972. Entered into force August 30,
1975. TIAS 8165.
Ratification deposited: Morocco, February 18, 1977.
Oil Pollution
International convention on civil liability for oil pollu-
tion damage. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969.
Entered into force June 19, 1975.^
Ratification deposited: Belgium, January 12, 1977.
Amendments to the international convention for the
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London Oc-
tober 21, 1969. Enters into force January 20, 1978.
Proclaimed by the President: February 21, 1977.
Acceptances deposited: Bulgaria, January 28, 1977;
Mexico, January 31, 1977.
Safety at Sea
Amendments to the international convention for the
safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at
London October 12, 1971.'
Acceptance deposited: Bahamas, January 20, 1977.
Convention on the international regulations for pre-
venting collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London Oc-
tober 20, 1972. Enters into force July 15, 1977.
Accession deposited: Monaco, January 18, 1977.
Amendments to chapters II, III, IV and V of the inter-
national convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960
(TIAS 5780). Adopted at London November 20,
1973.'
Amendment to chapter VI of the international conven-
tion for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780).
Adopted at London November 20, 1973.'
Acceptances deposited: Bahamas, January 20, 1977.
BILATERAL
Federal Republic of Germany
Agreement in the field of gas-cooled reactor concepts
and technology. Signed at Bonn February 11, 1977.
Entered into force February 11, 1977.
Haiti
Agreement amending the agreement of March 22 and
23, 1976 (TIAS 8268), as amended (TIAS 8395), relat-
ing to trade in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber tex-
tiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of
notes at Washington February 10 and 11, 1977. En-
tered into force February 11, 1977.
Luxembourg
Agreement amending annex B of the mutual defense as-
sistance agreement of January 19 and 31, 1977. En-
tered into force January 31, 1977.
Philippines
Agreement relating to the transfer of non-fat dry milk.
Signed at Manila January 4 and 7, 1977. Entered into
force January 7, 1977.
Tunisia
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relat-
ing to the agreement of June 7, 1976. Signed at Tunis
January 21, 1977. Entered into force January 21,
1977.
United Kingdom
Agreement relating to the limitation of meat imports
from Belize during calendar year 1977. Effected by
exchange of notes at Washington February 8 and 9,
1977. Entered into force February 9, 1977.
' Not in force.
2 Not in force for the United States.
244
Department of State Bulletin
INDEX March U, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1968
Australia. Letters of Credence (Renouf) 223
Botswana. Letters of Credence (Mookodi) 223
Congress
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 243
Funds Requested for Resumption of Payment of
Dues to UNESCO (Toussaint) 241
President Discusses Cyprus Issue in Periodic Re-
port to Congress (message) 243
Secretary Testifies on Administration's Approach
to Foreign Assistance 236
U.S. -Mexico Treaty on Execution of Penal Sen-
tences Sent to Senate (message from President
Carter) 242
Cyprus. President Discusses Cyprus Issue in
Periodic Report to Congress (message) 243
Ecuador. Letters of Credence ( Ycaza) 223
Egypt. Secretary Vance's Visit to the Middle East
February 14-21 (Rabin, Sadat, Sa'.ud, Vance) . . 209
Secretary Vance's Visit to the Middle East Feb-
ruary 14-21 (Rabin, Sadat, Sa'ud. Vance) 209
Fisheries. United States and Spain Sign New
Fisheries Agreement 235
Foreign Aid
U.S. Increases Relief Aid to Lebanon 234
Secretary Testifies on Administration's Approach
to Foreign Assistance 236
Human Rights. Interview With Secretary Vance
on February 10 by Israeli Media Representa-
tives 228
Israel. Secretary Vance's Visit to the Middle East
February 14-21 (Rabin, Sadat, Sa'ud, Vance) . . 209
Secretary Vance's Visit to the Middle East Feb-
ruary 14-21 (Rabin, Sadat, Vance) 209
Jordan. Secretary Vance's Visit to the Middle
East February 14-21 (Rabin, Sadat, Sa'ud,
Vance) 209
Lebanon
Secretary Vance's Visit to the Middle East Feb-
ruary 14-21 (Rabin, Sadat, Sa'ud, Vance) 209
U.S. Increases Relief Aid to Lebanon 234
Mexico
President Lopez Portillo of Mexico Visits the
United States (text of joint communique) 234
U.S. -Mexico Treaty on Execution of Penal Sen-
tences Sent to Senate (message from President
Carter) 242
Middle East
Interview With Secretary Vance on February 8 by
Egyptian and Syrian Media Representa-
tives 224
Interview With Secretary Vance on February 10
by Israeli Media Representatives 228
Secretary Vance's Visit to the Middle East Feb-
i-uaiy 14-21 (Rabin, Sadat, Sa'ud, Vance) 209
Presidential Documents
President Discusses Cyprus Issue in Periodic Re-
port to Congress 243
President Lopez Portillo of Mexico Visits the
United States 234
U.S. -Mexico Treaty on Execution of Penal Sen-
tences Sent to Senate 242
Saudi Arabia. Secretary Vance's Visit to the
Middle East February 14-21 (Rabin, Sadat,
Sa'ud, Vance) 209
Spain. United States and Spain Sign New
Fisheries Agreement 235
Syria. Secretary Vance's Visit to the Middle East
Februai7 14-21 (Rabin, Sadat, Sa'ud, Vance) . . 209
Treaty Information
Current Actions 244
United States and Spain Sign New Fisheries
Agreement 235
United Nations. Funds Requested for Resumption
of Payment of Dues to UNESCO (Toussaint) ... 241
Name Index
Carter, President 242, 243
Mookodi, Bias 223
Rabin, Yitzhak 209
Renouf, Alan Philip 223
Sadat, Anwar al- 209
Prince Sa'ud bin Faisal 209
Toussaint, Donald R 241
Vance, Secretary 209, 224, 228, 236
Ycaza Borja, Gustavo 223
Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: February 21-27
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C.
20520.
No.
Date
Subject
72
2/21
Vance, Sa'ud departure, Riyadh,
Feb. 20.
*73
2/21
Vance: arrival, Damascus, Feb. 20.
74
2/21
Vance: news conference, Damascus.
75
2/22
Vance: arrival, Andrews Air Force
Base, Feb. 21.
*76
2/22
U.S. and Haiti conclude bilateral
textile agreement, Feb. 10.
* 77
2/22
Study group 2 of the U.S. National
Committee for the International
Radio Consultative Committee
(CCIR), Mar. 23.
* 78
2/22
Great Lakes levels discussions.
79
2/24
Vance: Subcommittee on Foreign
Operations, Senate Committee on
Appropriations.
*80
2/24
Advisory Committee on Trans-
national Enterprises, Mar. 17.
t 81
2/24
Agreed U.S. -Canadian communique
on signature of a reciprocal
fisheries agreement.
t 82
2/25
U.S. and Canada amend salmon
agreement.
*83
2/25
Study group 4 of the U.S. National
Committee for the CCIR, Mar.
22.
U.S. and Romania amend cotton
*84
2/25
textile agreement, Jan. 17.
t 86
2/27
Vance: "Face the Nation."
ted.
* Not prir
t H
eld foi
a later issue of the Bulletin.
Superintendent of Documents
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Volume LXXVI • No. 1969 • March 21, 1977
SECRETARY VANCE INTERVIEWED ON "FACE THE NATION" 2U5
PRESIDENT CARTER'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF FEBRUARY 23
Excerpts From Transcript 251
PRESIDENT CARTER VISITS THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Remarks and Questions and Answers With Employees 259
SECRETARY VANCE DISCUSSES ANTIBOYCOTT LEGISLATION
AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
Statement Before the House Comm,ittee on International Relations 267
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
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Vol. LXXVI, No. 1969
March 21, 1977
The Department of State BVLLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of U.S. foreign relations and
on the work of the Department and
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses, and
news conferences of the President and
the Secretary of State and other offi-
cers of the Department, as welt as spe-
cial articles on various phases of in-
ternational affairs and the functions of
the Department. Information is in-
cluded concerning treaties and inter-
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United States is or may become a party
and on treaties of general interna-
tional interest.
Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.
Secretary Vance Interviewed on "Face the Nation'
Following is the transcript of an interview
with Secretary Vance on the CBS television
and radio program "Face the Nation" on Feb-
ruary 27. Interviewing the Secretary ivere
George Herman and Marvin Kalb of CBS
News and Don Oberdorfer of the Washington
Post.
Press release 86 dated February 27
Mr. Herman: The Uganda radio says the
meeting between President Amin and the 24-0
Americans in Uganda has been postponed to
Wednesday at Entebbe air base. Have you
heard anything through any official source of
any kind? More specifically, can you tell us
what it means, what is going on there?
Secretary Vance: We have received assur-
ances from the President, President Amin,
and from his government that the Americans
will be safe. We are following the situation
carefully as it moves along. I don't think that
there is any major conclusion to be drawn
from the fact that the meeting has been post-
poned until Wednesday. There are indeed a
number of people who are located in the back
country. It will take them quite awhile to get
there. So I think no alarming conclusions
should be drawn from the fact that the meet-
ing has been postponed for two days.
Mr. Herman: Mr. Secretary, I rather
carelessly lumped two questions together in
my opening question to you, so let me sepa-
rate out part of them. Have you heard any-
thing through any official source? Do we have
good contact with the West German Embassy
there so that you are kept up to date on the
meaning of things like this postponement?
Secretary Vance: Yes, we do. We have very
good contacts through the West German Em-
bassy. We also have direct contact through
the Charge of Uganda here in the United
States, and he has been in at least once and
sometimes twice a day during the last two or
three days.
Mr. Oberdorfer: What do you think Presi-
dent Amin is up to? Is he responding, do you
believe, to President Carter's remarks about
the horrible murders that took place in that
country and other kinds of rather unusual
language that the President made at a press
conference [on February 23], or does he have
something else in mind?
Secretary Vance: It would be the rankest
kind of speculation on my part to try and say
what is in his mind. He may be responding to
what has been said with respect to the inci-
dents which occurred there, or there may be
other factors which are causing the action
which he took. I just don't think that it would
serve any purpose for me to try and speculate
on that.
Mr. Kalb: Mr. Secretary, to follow that up,
eaHy last week Ambassador Young had a
very strong statement about the death of Arch-
bishop Luwum [the Most Reverend Janani
Luwum, Anglican Archbishop of Uganda].
Then President Carter made his strong state-
ment. Since that time, there has been a prob-
lem. We don't really know if it is a major
crisis, but there certainly is a problem affect-
ing the lives of 2^0 Americans.
Doesn't this really point up the danger of
unprogramed and perhaps overly dramatic
statements from the top people in this Admin-
' For the transcript of a news conference held at New
York on Feb. 17 by Andrew Young, U.S. Representa-
tive to the United Nations, see USUN press release 9
(77) dated Feb. 18.
March 21, 1977
245
istration about human rights, without a care-
fully thought through process of understand-
ing what the iniplications might be?
Secretary Vance: Well, let me talk about
the question of human rights. There has been
a good deal of speculation about the views of
the Administration with respect to human
rights. There has been a great deal written
about it in the newspapers, and I think it
might be helpful if I said something about
human rights and how it fits into the foreign
policy of the United States.
The human rights issue is really grounded
in fundamental values which lie at the root of
the founding of this country. The dignity of
the individual and the protection of those
rights is a very sacred right that is of great
importance to Americans. And therefore it is
something which should be of importance to
us in our domestic lives and in the conduct of
our foreign policy. It has to be interwoven
into the fabric of our foreign policy, and this
we believe can be done.
Now, insofar as speaking out on human
rights issues abroad is concerned, we will
speak out when we believe it desirable to do
so. We will try to do it in a nonstrident, non-
polemical way; and we would expect others, if
they see things happening in the United
States, to criticize us, because this is not a
one-way street.
We have not tried to single out any country.
We will speak out when we believe it appro-
priate to do so with respect to the human
rights issue wherever it may arise throughout
the world.
Mr. Kalb: Mr. Secretary, I appreciate that
comment, sir, but what I was trying to get at
is the strong statements that took place earlier
in the week. The problem that then arose —
whether it is cause and effect I don't know —
since the problem arose, there has been very
measured comment on the part of everybody
in the Administration. And I am wondering
if that does not indicate some sense that you
might have of a cause-and-effect relationship
and the danger of speaking out in a manner
that does not take into account implications.
Secretary Vance: The implication of your
question is that the statements which were
made by Ambassador Young and the Presi-
dent were not thought out ahead of time.
They were thought out ahead of time. And the
statements were not made off the cuff.
As to any cause-and-effect relationship,
again, that would be a matter of speculation
as far as I am concerned, and whether that
indeed was the cause of what has sub-
sequently happened I don't know.
Mr. Herman: There is a problem with that
answer, Mr. Secretary, in a sense. You say
the statements were thought out, and presum-
ably the implications and the possible reac-
tions were thought out ahead of time. It seems
to me that leaves us with two alternatives.
Either when they thought it out ahead of time,
they did not think there would be this action
by President Amin, or else they thought it out
ahead of time and were willing to risk this ac-
tion by President Amin. I don't see what other
alternative there is.
Secretary Vance: You are assuming that
there is a cause-and-effect relationship here. I
am not prepared at this point to say that that
necessarily is the cause and effect.
The U.S.S.R. and Human Rights Issues
Mr. Oberdorfer: On a different facet of this
human rights matter, the Soviet Union has
protested that the United States, by speaking
out on human rights there, is interfering in
the internal affairs of the Soviet Union. And
when the President sends a letter to a leading
dissident, it seems to be coming close to some
kind of involvement in Soviet affairs. How do
you draw the liyie between the United States
sticking up for the things which we have al-
ways believed in as a nation and interfering
in someone else's internal matters?
Secretary Vance: This is a very hard line to
draw, and I don't think that there is any
magic answer to it. I think one has to consider
it on the facts of each case as it comes along
and make a determination.
As I indicated at my last press conference
[on January 31], there will be times when the
United States will feel it appropriate to speak
246
Department of State Bulletin
out publicly. There will be other times when
we will feel it appropriate to communicate by
quiet diplomacy with the country involved and
see what can be accomplished in that way.
And in each case, we are going to have to
weigh the facts and the circumstances and
make our determination.
Mr. Kalb: In that connection, ivhen you
talk about weighing the circumstances,
sir — in weighing all of the factors pro and
con, before the President's letter was sent on
to Andrey Sakharov, we are told that the State
Department had a major input into that and
did preserit the President with these pros and
cons. As you see it, what were the risks?
Secretary Vance: I am not going to talk
about the process of what the State Depart-
ment did or didn't do. Let me say that we did
participate in the process of discussing the
situation, however, and what action should be
taken.
In weighing the decision of responding and
how to respond, one had to take into account
the fact that a communication in response to a
letter from a distinguished scientist in the
Soviet Union might be viewed by the Soviet
Union as an intrusion. On the other hand, the
letter was a very straightforward, honest, and
moderate letter, and on balance it appeared
that this was the appropriate course of action
to take, and I fully support the action which
the President took in sending that letter.
Mr. Kalb: The Russians have indicated that
they would very much appreciate it-and I
am understating it now — if the President did
not receive Vladimir Bukovsky. As I under-
stand it, the Vice President has a meeting
scheduled with this particular Russian dissi-
dent who is now exiled in the United States.
Does the President plan to see him as well?
Secretary Vance: I do not know whether
the President will see him or not. The Vice
President does intend to receive him.
Mr. Oberdorfer: Do you believe that the
Russian upset about the human rights mat-
ters is going to complicate your effort to reach
an agreement with respect to arms control in
your trip to Moscow next month?
Secretary Vance: I don't believe it is, Mr.
Oberdorfer. There is always the possibihty
that something like that might occur; but from
my conversations with the Soviet diplomats
here, and from our other information, it would
seem quite clear to me that it is not going to.
The Soviets are prepared to receive me and
discuss seriously the questions on arms con-
trol, which will be the main subject of my dis-
cussions in the Soviet Union. I hope very
much that we can make some progress during
that visit. There are extremely important
subjects which we are going to be discussing,
and I am hopeful that we can have a fruitful
trip.
Intelligence Activities
Mr. Oberdorfer: Could I ask you on another
matter, is it permissible in this age for the
United States Government, through a CIA or
other intelligence agency, in your opinion, to
make secret payments to foreign leaders
abroad?
Secretary Vance: Let me answer by saying
yes, and then explain why. Throughout the
world, we have cooperative arrangements
leading toward common objectives with many
countries. In connection with the achievement
of those common objectives, various kinds of
assistance are from time to time given to the
countries with which we are working. In the
case of intelligence activities, that assistance
is given through the channels of the Central
Intelligence Agency. The purposes are com-
mon purposes; the actions taken are in the
interests of the country involved as well as
the United States.
In these cases that have been referred to, to
the best of my knowledge there was nothing
improper or illegal, as the President has
pointed out. These kinds of things cannot be
done in the glare of pubHcity, and therefore my
answer to your question is yes, I do believe it
is appropriate.
Mr. Kalb: Well, if you turn that around,
then, to pick up a point Don was making, is it
March 21, 1977
247
proper, then, for the South Koreans, through
their own intelligence operation, to try to pay
off American legislators?
Secretary Vance: That is a different situa-
tion. I don't see that to be the same case at
all.
Mr. Kalb: They are seeking to enhance their
own position within the United States. I pre-
sume when we pay off people in foreign gov-
ernments we are seeking to enhance our own
interests.
Secretary Vance: That was not a
government-to-government kind of operation,
as I understand it. These were payments to
individuals. I am somewhat inhibited in com-
menting on this because it is the subject of a
grand jury investigation here in Washington.
But I draw a clear distinction between a
government-to-government operation and one
that deals with individuals, such as in the Ko-
rean situation.
Mr. Oberdorfer: You said this should be se-
cret because of the sensitivities involved. If
the American press finds out about these
payments, do you think it is a proper thing
for the press to report that the United States is
giving money to certain foreign governments
or leaders?
Secretary Vance: This is a judgment which
the press has to make for itself.
Middle East Peace Efforts
Mr. Herman: Mr. Vance, in your Middle
Easteryi trip at various times you expressed
varying shades of optimism, if I may say so.
At Riyadh [on February 20], for example,
you said, "I agree that there is basis for op-
timism," and then went on to caution about
the long and difficult road ahead. At the end
of the trip, you didn't sound, at least to this
observer, quite as limitedly optimistic even as
you did at Riyadh. What is your final conclu-
sion from, the trip?
Secretary Vance: My final conclusion is that
we have a long and difficult road ahead. I
think there is basis for optimism, however.
We did find a certain amount of common
ground. We found that all the parties are pre-
pared, if we can clear away the procedural
questions, to go to a Geneva meeting in the
fall, in the latter half of 1977. We found that
all the parties are also willing to have, as the
substance of that meeting, an overall peace
settlement, not merely a series of steps along
the way toward an overall settlement.
Mr. Herman: Let me just ask you one other
question that intrigues me, if I may, and that
is, while you were there, so was the Secretary
General of the United Nations, so was the
Foreign Minister of France — what I am curi-
ous about is the state of integration of these
three or more efforts to achieve peace.
Secretary Vance: We have kept closely in
touch.
I met with the Secretary General exten-
sively over the last two days to exchange
views. Indeed, before I went off on my trip to
the Middle East, he kindly sent one of his dep-
uties back to the United States to meet with
me and brief me before I left on the trip.
I have kept in touch with what was happen-
ing with the French, and we have agreed to
exchange views in greater detail and indeed
have done so immediately upon returning.
One of my colleagues, Mr. Habib [Philip C.
Habib, Under Secretary for Political Affairs],
has been in touch with the French and has
briefed them in detail as to what took place.
Mr. Herman: Well, I guess what I am ask-
ing is: Is this triple effort better than a single
effort, and was it conceived of as a better ef-
fort, or was it just accidental?
Secretary Vance: It was not accidental that
both the Secretary General and I went at the
same time. We had both discussed the fact
that we would be going there. I had not pre-
viously consulted with the Foreign Minister of
France, but I think the more thought that can
be brought to bear and the more ideas that
can be exposed with respect to how to deal
with these tremendously complex problems,
the better off we are. I think we certainly
ought to cooperate and concert with respect
to how we can best move forward on this, and
I'm all for it.
248
Department of State Bulletin
Question of the PLO
Mr. Kalb: Mr. Secretary, you mentioned
before that all the parties at this point want a
settlement. Does "all the parties" include the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)?
Secretary Vance: That is a difficult question
to answer. They are not one of the parties to
the Geneva conference at this point, as you
well know. As to what their position is, I
think it is somewhat unclear. There was a
story out of the Middle East today that they
would not, under certain circumstances, if
asked, go to a Geneva conference. The story is
somewhat unclear and confused at this point,
so I really don't want to comment on it.
Mr. Kalb: Under what circumstances
would the United States of America deal sub-
stantively with the PLO? I understand there
have been contacts in the past in Lebanon, at
the United Nations.
Secretary Vance: I don't want to comment
on the past. Insofar as the future is con-
cerned, I have said previously that so long as
the PLO refuse to recognize the right of Is-
rael to exist, there does not seem to be any
basis for discussion. In addition, I would note
that they at this point do not accept Resolu-
tions 242 and 338 as a basis for a Geneva con-
ference. This was the basis on which the
Geneva conference was originally brought to-
gether in Geneva. If that situation should
change in the future, that would be a new
situation and one would have to take a look at
it.
Mr. Kalb: But does this require an explicit
statement on the part of the PLO that they
recognize Israel's right to exist? Or is it suffi-
cient, sir, that the covenant governing the
political life of the PLO be rewritten in a
rather vague way to eliminate the references
to not dealing with Israel?
Secretary Vayice: Let me say that that is a
key and very important question, and I will
just leave it at that.
Mr. Herman: Mr. Secretary, I wonder
whether all three of those items which you
mentioned were prerequisites, whether all
three of them have to be fulfilled before you
would be satisfied?
Secretary Vance: The most important of
those is, certainly, the one which Mr. Kalb re-
ferred to; namely, the refusal of the PLO to
recognize the right of Israel to exist.
Mr. Oberdorfer: Mr. Secretary, if I may
just move to a different part of the world, it
was reported today by Joseph Kraft, the col-
umnist, that the Chinese Government has
asked President Carter whether he is aware of
certain understandings about the normaliza-
tion of relations which evidently were made in
secret between Secretary Kissinger and the
former Chinese leader, Mao Tse-tung. Mr.
Kraft said Mr. Carter did not know, and the
Administration has set about to find a copy of
such matters, such understandings.
My question to you is: Are you satisfied
completely that you have the full record of
what took place between President Nixon,
Secretary Kissinger, and Chinese leaders,
and were there any understandings which we
have not heard about?
Secretary Vance: Let me say at the outset
that we received the fullest cooperation from
Secretary Kissinger during the transition
period. He couldn't have been more coopera-
tive in working with us in every way, and I
am very, very thankful for that full and com-
plete cooperation.
With respect to the specific issue on which
you asked your question, if there are any pa-
pers which we do not have, I'm sure we will
be able to get those papers, and I have no
doubt in my mind about that.
Mr. Oberdorfer: Is Kraft correct that the
Administration is now looking to see if there
are such understandings?
Secretary Vance: We are checking to see
whether we have all the papers in the State
Department. If we do not, we will obtain
them elsewhere.
Mr. Kalb: On Cuba, is there information —
this kind of goes back to Uganda for a
moment — is there information that you have,
sir, that a thousand Cubans may now be in
March 21, 1977
249
Uganda participating in the training of
Ugandan forces ?
Secretary Vance: I don't know. I read that
story in the paper today, and I don't have any
intelligence which would either confirm or
deny that at this point.
Mr. Herman: During the course of your
trip to the Middle East, it seems hard to
imagine that you could have visited all these
Arab countries without somebody mentioning
the word "oil." Was there any discussion with
the Saudis on the question of increasing their
price if there is not sufficient progress toward
peace with Israel?
Secretary Vance: No. At no time did the
Saudis indicate to us that there was a linkage
between these. The Saudis said to us at that
time that they had made their determination
because of their concern for the welfare of the
nations of the world, and particularly in the
developing countries. They said they recog-
nized the consequences of a series of oil price
increases and the impact that that had on both
the developed and the developing world, but
they stressed their particular concern with
respect to the adverse impact that it would
have on the developing countries and stated
that that was the basis for their action.
Mr. Oberdorfer: If Secretary Kissinger's
cooperation was so good, why does the Ad-
ministration have to be lookiyig at this point
to see if there was some understanding you
don't know about?
Secretary Vance: There are an awful lot of
papers. We have only been there for five
weeks, and we are, you know, in the process
of reviewing many different subjects to com-
plete our work; and I simply, myself, haven't
had a chance to go through all these papers
yet. There are an awful lot of papers that are
generated in the State Department.
Mr. Kalb: Sir, do you favor lifting travel
restrictions on Cuba?
Secretary Vance: Insofar as Cuba is con-
cerned, I have said that I think that there are
a number of issues that we ought to start dis-
cussing with the Cubans. I would like to begin
that process, because I think it's been too long
since we refused to talk to each other.
U.S. Concerned at Violations
of Human Rights in Uganda
Following is a statement read to news cor-
respondents on February 23 by Frederick Z.
Brown, Director, Office of Press Relations.
The United States is deeply concerned by
the continuing evidence of massive violations
of human rights in Uganda, including the re-
cent report of the violent death of the Arch-
bishop of Uganda and two Cabinet Minis-
ters. We also have noted with great ap-
prehension new reports that religious and
specific tribal groups are being subjected to
severe persecution. We think the interna-
tional community must promptly look into
such reported human rights violations.
In this connection, we welcome the an-
nouncement of the British Government that it
will call for an investigation of the situation
by the U.N. Human Rights Commission. The
Commission is now in session in Geneva. We
fully support this initiative and will actively
work with the United Kingdom and other
delegations with the aim of protecting the
human rights of all persons in Uganda.
250
Department of State Bulletin
President Carter's News Conference of February 23
Following are excerpts relating to foreign
policy from the transcript of a news confer-
ence held by President Carter on February
Q. Mr. President, do you think it was
proper for the CIA [Central Intelligence
Agency] to pay off King Hussein [of Jordan]
arid other foreign leaders, and what steps are
you taking to make yourself more knowledge-
able and more accountable for what CIA
does?
President Carter: Well, I've adopted a pol-
icy, which I am not going to leave, of not
commenting directly on any specific CIA ac-
tivity. But I can tell you that I have begun a
complete analysis, which will be completed
within the next week, of all activities by the
CIA.
I've received substantial reports already.
I've reviewed the more controversial revela-
tions that have been publicized in the last few
days, some quite erroneous, some with some
degree of accuracy. These same operations
have been reviewed by the Intelligence Over-
sight Board, an independent board, and also
by my predecessor. President Ford.
I have not found anything illegal or improp-
er. If in future assessments, which will come
quite early, I discover such an impropriety or
an illegality I will not only take immediate ac-
tion to correct it but also will let the American
people know about it.
I might say this: This is a very serious prob-
lem of how, in a democracy, to have adequate
intelligence gathered, assessed, and used to
1 For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated Feb. 28, 1977, p.
242.
guarantee the security of our country. It's not
part of the American nature to do things in
secret. Obviously, historically and still at this
modern time, there is a necessity to protect
sources of information from other nations.
Sometimes other governments cooperate
with us fully; sometimes they don't. But I will
try to be sure and so will Stan Turner, who
will be the next director of the intelligence
community. He will try to be sure that every-
thing we do is not only proper and legal but
also compatible with the attitudes of the
American people.
One other point I'd like to make is this: It
can be extremely damaging to our relation-
ship with other nations, to the potential secu-
rity of our country even in peacetime, for
these kinds of operations, which are legiti-
mate and proper, to be revealed. It makes it
hard for us to lay a groundwork on which we
might predicate a successful meeting of a
threat to us in time of war if we don't have
some degree of secrecy.
I am quite concerned about the number of
people now who have access to this kind of in-
formation. And I've been working very
closely with the congressional leaders, yes-
terday and today, to try to reduce the overall
number of people who have access to the
sources of information. But within the bounds
that I've described— propriety, legahty, and
the American attitude toward secrecy— I will
do the best I can not ever to make a mistake.
And I am also assuming on a continuing basis
a direct personal responsibility for the opera-
tion of all the intelligence agencies in our gov-
ernment to make sure that they are meeting
these standards.
Q. Mr. President, if there has been errone-
ous information, wouldn't it behoove you to
correct the record?
March 21, 1977
251
President Carter: In some ways we are cor-
recting the record; but if I began to either dis-
pute or confirm every individual story that's
written, whether correct or erroneous, on
every matter relating to the CIA, then these
matters which are necessarily secret would no
longer be secret. So I am not going to comment
on individual items that relate to intelligence.
Q. In your letter to Mr. [Andrey] Sakharov,
you said that the United States would use its
good offices to seek the release of prisoners of
conscience. And you, said that you wanted to
continue to shape a world responsible to
human aspirations.
President Carter: Yes.
Q. As you know, there are human rights
problems in many other countries. And some
of them, like Iran or the Philippines, we sup-
port with arms or we support unth American
aid. These are countries where many people
believe we have more leverage than we might
have in the Soviet Union. What, if anything,
do you plan to try to do to help victims of
political repression in these countries?
President Carter: I think, without my try-
ing to take credit for it, there has been a sub-
stantial move toward concern about human
rights throughout the world. I think this has
taken place in probably a dozen or more dif-
ferent countries. There is an arousing interest
in the position that our own government here
and our free country does take. Obviously,
there are deprivations of human rights even
more brutal than the ones on which we've
commented up till now.
In Uganda, the actions there have dis-
gusted the entire civilized world, and as you
know, we have no diplomatic relationships
with Uganda. ^
But here is an instance where both Ambas-
^ The White House Press Office issued a correction
which stated "While the United States has withdrawn
its mission from Uganda and has no direct diplomatic
representation there, U.S. affairs in the Republic of
Uganda are carried out through the West German Em-
bassy and the Republic of Uganda has an operating
Embassy and Charge d' Affaires in Washington."
sador Andrew Young and I have expressed
great concern about what is there. The
British are now considering asking the United
Nations to go into Uganda to assess the horri-
ble murders that apparently are taking place
in that country, the persecution of those who
have aroused the ire of Mr. Amin.
I've expressed my concern about impris-
oned political prisoners in South Korea, in
Cuba, in many countries — in several countries
rather — in South America, and I will continue
to do so. I have never had an inchnation to
single out the Soviet Union as the only place
where human rights are being abridged.
We have, I think, a responsibility and a
legal right to express our disapproval of viola-
tions of human rights. The Helsinki agree-
ment, the so-called "basket" 3 provision, in-
sures that some of these human rights shall be
preserved.^ We are a signatory of the Hel-
sinki agreement. We are ourselves culpable in
some ways for not giving people adequate
right to move around our country or restrict-
ing, unnecessarily in my opinion, visitation to
this country by those who disagree with us
politically.
So, I think that we all ought to take a posi-
tion in our country and among our friends and
alHes, among our potential adversaries, that
human rights is something on which we should
bear a major responsibility for leadership.
And I have made it clear to the Soviet Union
and to others in the Eastern European com-
munity that I am not trying to launch a uni-
lateral criticism of them; that I am trying to
set a standard in our own country and make
my concerns expressed throughout the world,
not singled out against any particular coun-
try.
Q. Mr. President, . . . you said earlier that
your review of CIA activities had found noth-
ing illegal or improper, and you later said
that these activities are legitimate and proper.
Isn't that a value judgment that the American
^ For te.xt of the Final Act of the Conference on Secu-
rity and Cooperation in Europe, signed at Helsinki on
Aug. 1, 1975, see Bulletin of Sept. 1, 1975, p. 323; for
"basket" 3, Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other
Fields, see p. 339.
252
Department of State Bulletin
public might like to share, but how can they if
you refuse to give them any idea of what you
have discovered during this revieiv about
payments, including ones made in secret?
President Carter: That is a value judg-
ment. It's made by the independent Intelli-
gence Oversight Board which was estab-
lished and appointed by President Ford. This
Board has made itself available to the In-
spector General and to any employee within
the CIA or within the Defense intelligence
agencies or any other to receive even rumors
of impropriety. They have assessed these op-
erations. They made their inquiries in the
past, which is in accordance with the Execu-
tive order issued by President Ford, to the
Attorney General of the United States and
also to the President.
I have read that correspondence. It's quite
voluminous. And I think that it's accurate to
say that Senator Inouye's committee in the
Senate [Select Committee on Intelligence]
and the appropriate committees in the House
have also received this information in the
past. I have talked to Senator Inouye, and he
confirms what I've just told you. And I think
he would also confirm that the impropriety or
the illegahty does not exist on any ongoing
CIA operation.
Q. Mr. President, are you prepared to lift
the trade embargo against Cuba as one step
toward normalizing relations?
President Carter: I think any substantial
moves in our relationship with Cuba would
have to await further discussions with them
indirectly and also some tangible evidence on
our part that they are wiUing to restore basic
human rights in Cuba involving the number
of prisoners who are being held, their at-
titude toward overseas adventures, such as
the one in Angola, and other matters.
So, I can't say what might come in the fu-
ture. I am willing, though, to discuss these
matters with the Cuban leaders. At this time
we have no direct relationships with them
politically, but through intermediaries com-
ments are being exchanged back and forth,
most of my comments in public statements
like this. But we do have messages coming
back from people who visit Cuba.
Q. Mr. President, you said that in spite of
the fact that the Canadian people would have
to determine their future for themselves, par-
ticularly in regard to the separatism issue in
Quebec, that you had confidence that the
issue would be straightened out relatively
peacefully.
Do you really think that there is little con-
cern in this country about the future of a
unified Canada, and is there anything really
that we can do about it?
President Carter: There is a great deal of
concern in this country about the future of
Canada. And I have complete confidence, as
I said in an interview with the Canadian
news media, in the sound judgment of the
Canadian people. I am familiar — and even
more familiar today than I was two days
ago — after Prime Minister Trudeau's visit,
with the problems in Quebec and the inclina-
tion of some of the French Canadians to have
an independent status from the rest of the
Canadian provinces.
I don't know what is going to be the ulti-
mate outcome, but I believe that we are so
closely tied together with Canada on a mutu-
ally beneficial basis, sharing problems, shar-
ing opportunities, sharing trade, sharing
manufacturing companies that have joint
ownership, our exchange of energy sources,
our sharing of the St. Lawrence Seaway, the
Great Lakes, as far as water pollution is con-
cerned, the bringing of Alaskan oil and natu-
ral gas down to us, that we have got to have
a continuing relationship with Canada.
My own personal preference would be that
the commonwealth stay as it is and that there
not be a separate Quebec province. But
that's a decision for the Canadians to make.
And I would certainly make no private or
public move to try to determine the outcome
of that great debate.
Q. Mr. President, with respect to the B-1,
you said at various times during the cam-
paign that the B-1 was a waste; you also
March 21, 1977
253
promised to cut the waste out of the defense
budget. When would you expect to stop pro-
duction of the B-1 as opposed to research and
development on the B-1?
President Carter: I think I cut out about
more than $200 million from the B-1 program
in the budget just submitted to the Con-
gress. I have serious questions about
whether or not the B-1 ought to be in the fu-
ture the center of our airborne defense capa-
bility. I have several more months before I
have to make a decision on that matter.
And the National Security Council, which
combines, as you know. State, Treasury, De-
fense, and other elements of the government,
working very closely with me, is now making
a complete reassessment of the need for the
B-1 bomber.
I don't know whether we will decide to go
on with it or not, and I don't know whether
we will expedite production of it or not at
this time. Part of the factor to be assessed is
the attitude of the Soviet Union. If we can
have a general lessening of tension, a demon-
strated commitment on their part toward
disarmament, it would certainly make it less
likely that we would go ahead with the B-1.
But I can't answer the question until I
complete my own study, and I think that
would have to be terminated by the end of
May.
Q. Mr. President, you gave us kind of a
timetable for your domestic program in your
preliminary statement. I wonder if you have
a similar timetable of what you hope to
achieve in foreign policy between now and
the end of the year such as in Middle East
peace, Cyprus, the treaty with Panama?
President Carter: Of course I can't answer
that question specifically because I don't
know what cooperation we will get from
other nations, and I don't know what the in-
clination of those nations in disputed regions
of the world want to do toward one another.
Secretary Cyrus Vance has just returned
from what I consider to be a very successful
trip to the Middle East. He not only probed
with the heads of those governments and
their cabinet members their own positions
both public and private on the controversial
issues that have so far prevented a peace in
the Middle East. He also had a chance to
compare their positions on issues, which ones
they found to be in harmony, which ones
there was still a dispute.
We also invited the leaders of all those na-
tions to meet with me. They have all ac-
cepted, and I will be meeting with the heads
of the nations in dispute in the Middle East,
all of them, before the end of May.
The first visit of one of those leaders will
be Mr. Rabin, I believe March the 12th.'*
And he will be followed by the leaders from
Egypt, from Jordan, and from Syria, from
Saudi Arabia. And I look forward to meeting
with them.
At that point I hope I will have a very
clear picture of what role the American Gov-
ernment ought to play.
The same thing applies to the situation
that exists between ourselves and Turkey,
ourselves and Greece, ourselves and Cyprus.
We can't impose our will on other people, but
if they honestly want to seek a solution, we
are perfectly willing to offer our good offices
as a country with influence and interest to
help them resolve their own differences. But
it's got to be done primarily by those coun-
tries involved.
We have begun again, within the last week,
our discussions on the Panama Canal treaty.
We have two extremely good negotiators,
and I hope that we will have success there.
There is no way that I can say at this point
what degree of progress we have made. It's
just beginning.
So throughout the areas of high dispute,
including South Africa and others that I don't
have time to mention, we are probing as best
we can to discern some possibihty of resolution
of those tension areas.
We are meeting today, in fact all this
week, with the British, to try to get a re-
newed proposal to make concerning the ques-
" On Feb. 25 the White House announced that Prime
Minister Rabin, of Israel, would make an official work-
ing visit to Washington Mar. 7-8.
254
Department of State Bulletin
tions surrounding Rhodesia, and then of
course we will still have left Namibia and ul-
timately the majority-rule question in South
Africa.
But I've only been in office a month. I
don't claim to know all the easy answers.
And these questions that have been in exist-
ence for 25 or 30 years are not going to be
easy to solve. But we are going to do the best
we can, openly and forcefully, offering our
good services, not trying to impose our will
on other people.
Prime Minister Pierre-Elliott Trudeau of Canada
Visits Washington
Pierre-Elliott Trudeau, Pritne Minister of
Canada, made an official visit to Washington
February 21-23, where he met with President
Carter and other government officials and
addressed a joint meeting of the Congress.
Following is an exchange of toasts between
President Carter and Prime Minister
Trudeau at a dinner at the White House on
February 21. ^
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated February 28
PRESIDENT CARTER
In preparing for this visit, I learned that we
have some very serious and very intense com-
petition with our friends in the north. Dr.
George Gallup ran a poll recently, and he
asked the people who live in the United States
to name their favorite nations. The United
States got 95 percent; Canada got 91 percent.
[Laughter.] So I feel that I'm in an intense
and constant and very challenging competition
with Pierre Trudeau for the hearts of my own
people.
I think this does indicate the great com-
patibility and friendship and sense of warmth
and mutual admiration that has always
' For an exchange of remarks between President
Carter and Prime Minister Trudeau made at a welcom-
ing ceremony on the South Lawn at the White House on
Feb. 21, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu-
ments dated Feb. 28, 1977, p. 234; for Prime Minister
Trudeau's address before a joint meeting of the Con-
gress, see Congressional Record of Feb. 22, 1977, p. H
1242.
existed among American people toward
Canada. We share a border that's more than
5,200 miles long. And for 200 years our people
have lived — with one very brief interval
around 1812 — in a spirit of friendship. And
that's important to us. Even more than we
think, in our daily lives, we are dependent on
Canada for many things.
Canada has about 22 million people. And
every year 60 million people cross the border.
And there is a kinship and a sharing of delight
and challenge and enjoyment of life that
transcends the political realities of a modern,
fast-changing, technological world.
Of course the technologies are important as
well. We are now beginning to see that many
of the things that we took for granted — the
purity of water in the Great Lakes, an unlim-
ited supply of oil and gas, security in our bor-
ders, free of possible direct attack in a time of
war — those things are now no longer sure.
And I think, in a way, that's bound us even
closer together.
I know that on the other side of the border,
the Canadians feel what we are. The last time
Prime Minister Trudeau came to our country
he said that being a neighbor to the United
States was like sleeping with an elephant
[laughter] — that you could very quickly detect
every twitch or grunt. Well, the elephants are
gone. The donkeys are here [laughter], and
the donkeys are much more companionable
beasts, I think.
I do want to thank the Canadian people and
Prime Minister Trudeau for their gracious
March 21, 1977
255
offer during this time of energy shortage for
our people, for their offer to help us. They
exported some of their cold weather, but they
followed it up with all the natural gas.
And we had a very delightful meeting this
afternoon to discuss some of the international
problems that face us both. Tomorrow we're
going to talk about some things that affect
both Canada and us in a bilateral fashion.
Prime Minister Trudeau's wife, Margaret,
came a couple weeks ago to visit Rosalynn and
to open up a display in one of our famous art
galleries of contemporary Canadian art. And I
think this indicated, first of all, that we are
interested in the same things, but also that
our nations are distinctive.
Although we live in close proximity, we are
quite different. And the differences are care-
fully preserved. There is an understandable
determination not to be dominated and not to
be pressured and to be unique and to maintain
individuality. And that's a sign of strength on
our side and their side of the border that is
precious to us both.
I feel that we have approached an era of
recognition, of mutual purpose and ideals and
hopes and dreams and aspirations and, also,
concerns and problems that might bind us
even closer together now than in the past.
And in a way, I'm thankful for it. I'm proud of
the personal friendship that was almost in-
stantaneous when I met Pierre Trudeau this
afternoon. I had a sense of relaxation and a
sense of compatibility that I hope will be an
accurate indication on a permanent basis of
what our nations feel toward one another.
I would like to close by saying that we have
been close in time of war. And quite often,
when our own nation has made a mistake be-
cause of an excessive dependence on our own
military strength, Canada and its people have
maintained kind of a standard of ethics and
morality and commitment to unchanging
truths that were a subtle reminder to us to
reassess our own position.
So, we learn from one another. And I'm
very grateful to our visitors for coming to
honor us with their presence.
I'd like to propose a toast: To the Queen of
Canada, to the Prime Minister of Canada, and
to the people of Canada.
PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU
Mr. President, Mrs. Carter, friends: I want
to thank you, first of all, for your very warm
hospitality and for the informality of the din-
ner that we are attending tonight. The infor-
mality was to be expected from a household
where you have a child of school age and a
puppy, I understand, and the hospitality and
the warmth of it was to be expected from you,
sir, and from your very charming wife.
I want to say that I am always a little bit
moved and perhaps even intimidated when I
am in the White House. It has such history; it
has such great memories of remarkable
statesmen, American leaders. And it is par-
ticularly moving to be here on George Wash-
ington's birthday. I find some consolation in
that, because I was told an anecdote about
George Washington when he was retiring
from office. The Philadelphia Aurora — there
was then a paper called that name, I don't
know if it still exists — but it had been rather
unkind to President Washington during his
term of office. And when he retired, they had
an editorial saying that if ever there was a
day for great rejoicing, this was it. I feel, sir,
that an old politician like myself takes some
consolation in feeling that times never
change. [Laughter.]
You don't have to seek solace in this type of
anecdote. But indeed, you added to the sense
of hospitality when you were good enough to
quote this finding of Dr. Gallup, of which I
knew nothing. And it makes me feel that if
ever I get in trouble in Canada politically,
maybe I'll come down here. [Laughter.] I can
assure you that if you are ever in trouble,
which I pray will never happen, you would be
very handily chosen to be the leader of the
Canadian people.
Your generous remarks are something
which are very much in keeping with the
friendship and the long history of cooperation
between our peoples. It began, I think,
around 1781, when the Articles of Confedera-
tion proposed that Canada be admitted, be in-
vited to join the Confederation, just by apply-
ing. I believe other colonies had to have the
consent of nine states in order to be admitted,
but Canada was to be admitted just on invita-
256
Department of State Bulletin
tion and acceptance. Well, whether it is good
or not that we didn't accept in those days is
perhaps very hard to speculate upon except to
say that if Canada had accepted, I'm sure we
wouldn't be having such a fine dinner here to-
night. [Laughter.]
Apart from that very short incident of hos-
tihties to which you alluded very gently, we
have since then, since the past 165 years I
guess it is, had very good neighborhood rela-
tions indeed. We've cooperated in many,
many ways. We've built together some of the
greatest of men's enterprises. We've main-
tained democracy ahve within our countries,
and we've cooperated in assisting wherever
we could around the world in helping other
nations in one way or another.
And I think it's fair to say that if in those
days, 150 years ago, we were the hope of the
new world, a large part of the hope of the new
world, I would think that today, perhaps, in
large part, we represent the hope of the Third
World. This joins many of the discussions we
had this afternoon.
And I must say on behalf of the Canadian
Government and people that we are more
than delighted — we are excited with the
generous approach that your ideas convey as
regards the world order, which would be
based on equality and justice.
In our case, sir, we have done our part. In
terms of foreign aid, Canada is amongst the
top four or five nations of assistance to the
Third World, and in terms of our proportion of
our GNP [gross national product]. Since the
end of the Second World War, we have admit-
ted more refugees, political refugees, to
Canada than any other nation, barring the
United States. You have a slight edge on us.
But they have come to Canada by the tens of
thousands from Czechoslovakia, from Hun-
gary, from Tibet, from Uganda, from Chile,
and many, many other places.
So we do try to, as Canadians, show this
hospitality to the world which corresponds to
the generosity of the Canadian people. I was
telling you this afternoon, sir, that though we
have been a nuclear power for some 30 years,
and though we have the technology and the
financial means of building a bomb, we have
chosen not to do so. We have tried to put our
technology toward a more creative and fra-
ternal use.
We, with the United States, are the only
member of NATO which has troops on both
sides of the Atlantic. We're into our fourth
term in the Security Council. We have been in
every peacekeeping operation. United Na-
tions peacekeeping operation, since the end of
the Second World War. We were in Korea. We
were in the four Indochina Control Commis-
sions.
I say these things, sir, partly to be slightly
chauvinistic, but also because we in Canada
today tend to be a little bit cynical toward the
role of Canada in the world and toward its
generosity. And I think that you won't be
angry at me for using this occasion and these
hidden microphones to talk a little bit about
Canada's contribution, because these things
would not have been possible without a strong
and united Canada. And I just want to assure
you, sir, that we intend to keep Canada that
way.
It is said that Daniel Boone, when giving
advice to those who wanted to join him on the
frontier, said that there were three
essentials — to have a good gun, a good horse,
and a good wife. Well, now the frontier has
changed in kind. We are still very much living
on a new kind of a frontier. And in these days
when changing values in the world and the in-
creasing closeness of mankind to each other
and where a new, special kind of brotherhood
is called for, I think we could replace Daniel
Boone's three essentials by three others. I
would say it is to have good goals, good disci-
pline, and good friends.
Well, I know we have good goals, and we
discussed them a great deal this afternoon.
We found that together, we shared many,
many of the goals in foreign relations and, in-
deed, in internal affairs.
In terms of having good friends, well, you
have shown us tonight through your hospital-
ity and your friendship that that is a reahty.
What has to be achieved is good discipline. I
speak for Canada, and I feel that it is a virtue
that we can do with a bit more of — if I can
twist my grammar that way. We are going
through a period now when discipline, self-
discipline, is being understood as the only
March 21, 1977
257
substitute for discipline from the outside or
discipline from the state. And I must say that
I personally was very, very enthusiastic to
see the measure of discipline that appears in
your thoughts, sir, in your approach to prob-
lems, and in your way of life.
I would propose a toast, not to the friend-
ship that we have, and not to the goals that
we share, but to the disciplines of our
people — may it increase — and to President
Carter and to Mrs. Carter who will help Pres-
ident Carter in imparting some of those disci-
plines on the industrialized democracies.
Presidential Commission To Visit
Southeast Asia
Following is a statement read to news cor-
respondents on February 25 by Frederick Z .
Broivyi, Director, Office of Press Relations.
During his campaign and afterward the
President expressed his deep and continuing
concern about missing Americans in South-
east Asia. In keeping with that concern, he is
sending a Presidential Commission of distin-
guished Americans to Southeast Asia to help
him obtain an accounting of these personnel.
The five-member Commission will be
headed by Leonard Woodcock, president of
the UAW.* The Commission will go to Hanoi
to meet with representatives of the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam to seek information on
our personnel, including the return of recov-
erable remains. The Commission will also be
prepared to receive from the Vietnamese
Government their views on matters affecting
our mutual relations. The Government of the
Sociahst Republic of Vietnam has agreed to
accept the Commission's visit.
Upon its return the Commission will report
to the President. We are also in contact with
the Lao People's Democratic Republic to ar-
range a similar visit to that country.
In seeking an accounting we will make clear
that we are concerned about all Americans
lost in Southeast Asia, our servicemen and
civilians, those still listed as missing as well
as the larger number who have been pre-
sumed dead with no accounting being pro-
vided. The fact that a man has been declared
dead for legal purposes does not affect our de-
termination to seek information about him and
to arrange for the return of his remains if
they can be recovered.
This is a further, measured step we are tak-
ing to put the Indochina conflict behind us and
to establish more normal relations between
ourselves and the countries of that area. The
families of our missing have suffered long
enough, along with our nation. We hope we
will soon have the accounting that we seek so
that this humanitarian problem can be con-
cluded.
' On Mar. 1 the Department announced that the Pres-
ident has asked the following persons to serve on the
Commission: Marian Wright Edelman, director of the
Children's Defense Fund; former Senator Mike Mans-
field; Congressman G. V. Montgomery; and former
Ambassador Charles Yost.
258
Department of State Bulletin
President Carter Visits the Department of State
President Carter visited the Department
on February 2^ and spoke to employees. Fol-
lotving are his remarks and excerpts from the
questions and answers. ^
Secretary Vance: Ladies and gentlemen,
the President of the United States.
Mr. President, on behalf of all of the mem-
bers of the State Department, we wish you
the warmest welcome and thank you for com-
ing to visit us here today.
President Carter: Thank you very much. I
am glad to be here.
This has been perhaps the Department on
which I've placed the heaviest reponsibility
for instructing me. I've got a lot to learn, and
I've had superb support from all of you dur-
ing this first month or so that I've been in
office.
I think it's accurate to say that in many
parts of the world, the problem areas in par-
ticular, there was just a clinging to the status
quo, waiting for a new administration to take
over in our powerful and great nation. It's not
because of me. It's because of our country and
because of the hope that exists among people
of all kinds in all nations that we might set an
example in the relationship among nations and
in the search for peace, and also, I might add
very strongly, in the preservation of our deep
and unchanging commitments to basic human
rights. I will never change that commitment
and I know that all of you will maintain this
commitment with me.
I am very grateful, too, that we have
achieved so quickly and so completely a har-
monious relationship among the Cabinet offi-
cers who serve with me — State, Defense,
Treasury, Office of Management and Budget,
' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated Feb. 28, 1977, p.
255.
Commerce, and others. I can tell you in the
most accurate way that there is no dishar-
mony. We have open, frank discussions.
Sometimes we have tough, sharp debate in
the Cabinet meetings that take place every
week. But there is no remnant after those
Cabinet meetings are over of animosity or
divisions or lack of an easy communication
among those who are responsible, along with
you, for the evolution of our attitude toward
foreign countries or domestic affairs.
I am very grateful, too, that Cy Vance has
been able to start an evolutionary process of
depending in a heavier and heavier way on
the superb intelligence and training and
background and experience and sound judg-
ment of professional Foreign Service officers
and those who support them.
I don't want to ever see a concentration of
complete authority within one person, be-
cause when that is done, there is a great ne-
glect of that reservoir of talent and ability
that exists among all of you and those who
work with you in foreign countries.
I am determined that every single selec-
tion that I ever make, working with Secre-
tary of State Vance and others, is on the
basis of merit and nothing else. And I want
to root out once and for all the cheap political
appointments that sometimes in the past
have been an embarrassment to our own
country and sometimes an insult to the na-
tions to whom we send diplomatic officials to
represent us. I want this sense of profes-
sionalism and soundness and cohesiveness in
a common purpose to be an integral part of
this crucial Department of our nation.
As I said earlier, I have a lot to learn, and
we are now probing to see what the differences
are which exist between ourselves and other
countries and even among other countries.
And we will add our good services in those
areas of the world where we are called upon to
March 21, 1977
259
do it. We can't impose our will on the disputive
nations in the Middle East, but we can search
among them as a catalyst for grounds for
agreement, particularly those that are ex-
pressed quietly and confidentially to us. And
when we see fit, without timidity or without
constraint, we will use our influence to bring
together disparate ideas in nations which in
the past have not been able to agree.
We will do the same thing in the Cyprus
and the Turkey-Greek relationships, and in
southern Africa, with our bilateral relation-
ships with Panama, and other parts of the
world who look to us for leadership. This, I
think, is a proper role for our country to
play.
As I said many times during the campaign,
for over two years, I want everything that
we do in dealing with other nations to be
compatible with the hopes and the dreams
and the attitude and the morality and the re-
spect for individuality of each human being to
be mirrored in our foreign policy.
I think in many times past, and particu-
larly in recent years, there has been a vac-
uum in international affairs. For some nation
which can exemplify with constant reassess-
ment of our own position, those basic com-
mitments that ought not ever to change.
I want to be sure that when Cy Vance
speaks or when I speak that it's the absolute
truth. I want over a period of time other na-
tions to know that if our country makes a
commitment, it will be honored. And I want
us to tell the Saudi Arabians and the Syrians
and the Egyptians and the Lebanese and the
Jordanians and the Israelis the same thing,
so that there never is any sense of being mis-
led. These are the kinds of hopes that I have,
that I believe can be reahzed.
We've got additionally a responsibility to
let the American people know what chal-
lenges we face and the possible resolution of
problems and the possible answers to compli-
cated questions. I don't want to give anyone
a false sense that the answers are easy or
that the solutions will necessarily come
quickly. But we will be tenacious and deter-
mined in our search for a greater world
peace.
The final point I want to make before I an-
swer your questions is this: We have some
potential adversaries and some past adver-
saries with whom we want to have better re-
lationships. And that applies to Vietnam and
Laos and Cambodia. It applies even to North
Korea and to Cuba. It applies to the People's
Republic of China and to Russia and to coun-
tries like Iraq. With some we have relations;
some, as you know, we do not. But our con-
stant search will be to find common ground
on which we can reach agreement so that we
can set an example for the rest of the world
in a friendly and mutually respectful at-
titude.
I have been pleased so far at the response
that has been received from our embryonic
efforts to carve out grounds for understand-
ing and peace. I think so far the Soviet Union
has responded well. And we will continue
these kinds of efforts, sometimes anticipat-
ing discouragements. But we will not be de-
terred, and we will not be discouraged our-
selves.
I want the American people to be part of
it. I am going to have a press conference at
least twice a month. I will have frequent
fireside chats. My next one will be devoted
exclusively to foreign affairs and defense
matters. And I am going to have trips around
our country where I might meet in town
meeting forums. And we will have call-in-
type radio programs so that people can ask
me questions about domestic and foreign af-
fairs and so that to the best of my ability I
can give them straight answers.
I think that when our country speaks it
ought to speak with a strong voice. And when
a foreign policy is evolved — even though it
might be the right foreign policy —
exclusively by the President and the Secre-
tary of State and then promulgated to the
world without the understanding or partici-
pation of the Congress, the other Cabinet
members, or the people of our country, the
rest of the world knows that the President
and the Secretary of State, powerful people,
still speak with a hollow voice. So to the ex-
tent that you are involved in the evolution of
an idea or a new approach or a consistent old
approach, to that extent we will all be
strengthened.
260
Department of State Bulletin
We are partners. I can't succeed as Presi-
dent unless you succeed. And if you make a
serious mistake, I am the one who will be the
focal point for that criticism and that despair
and that disillusionment that will follow. I
think when we do make a mistake we ought
to be frank about it and say we erred and this
is the corrective action that we will take.
And we will try to correct our error, and we
will try to do better next time.
I think the American people will respond
well. And I think other nations that look to
us for leadership will respond well also.
I want to make sure that we eliminate in
our own country those vestiges of hatred or
discrimination or deprivation of human rights
that we still retain so that when we do
criticize other countries, or when we do
speak out to deplore the loss of those rights
in other nations, that we ourselves might be
free of justified criticism.
Well, all these matters that have just come
to my mind as I stand here before you are
important to us all. And I just want to be
sure that we work in harmony to alleviate
tensions and to reinspire those who can
legitimately, I hope, in the future look to us
for justified inspiration.
I would be glad to answer any questions
that you might have, or I will refer the ques-
tions I can't answer to these notable people
behind me.
Q. This question regards your talk about
reorganization and reform. As you probably
know, the State Department has been the ob-
ject of so-called attempts at reform during
the last 25 years many more times than any
other part of government — on the average of
once every two years we estimate it. Most of
the times these efforts at reform have failed
because of certain problems in their concep-
tualization and their implementation.
They've been quick fixes, developed in isola-
tion from the real problems of the opera-
tional side of the organization, lacking
commitment on the part of the leadership to
follow up on them and let them flounder
without followthrough.
I wonder, as you approach the question of
reorganization and reform in government,
how you propose to avoid these pitfalls, and
specifically, how do you propose to engage
the career services in the process of designing
your reorganization and reform?
President Carter: I presume that other
than the things you mentioned you liked the
previous efforts, right? [Laughter.]
You may be surprised to know that the last
three reorganization proposals for the State
Department I have studied myself. And I
agree with your analysis of them. There were
some e.xcellent ideas in some of those reor-
ganization proposals. They were not carried
out for several reasons that you have de-
scribed very well.
In the first place, under the zero-base
budgeting technique, which I think all of you
will like and which will be used in its entirety
to prepare the next budget, you will, in a
mandatory way, be involved in the evolution
of the next budget, the establishment of
priorities for expenditure of your own human
and financial resources, the elimination of
obsolete programs, the change and modifica-
tion of those that have been in effect for a
long time, and the promulgation of new ones
that might take place for the first time next
year.
At the foreman level — speaking in business
terms — an analysis would be made, using one
side of one sheet of paper, what you think
can be done to make your own professional
careers more effective. As a result of those
first studies, which will be completed I would
say no later than this August, we will have a
fairly clear picture within this Department of
what you think your Department ought to be
like. And any sort of reorganization effort
that Cyrus Vance recommends to me I would
like for you and him and the other leaders in
this Department to know that it ought to
start with you, so that you might say this is
what we think ought to be done and work its
way up in that fashion.
I am deeply committed to the principle
that we ought to have an efficient, economi-
cal, well-organized, well-managed Federal
Government, so that it can be sensitive to
our people's needs, so that excessive secrecy
might be stripped away, and so that we can
March 21, 1977
261
take maximum advantage of your own talents
and abilities.
So with the zero-base budgeting and that
concept of reorganization, I think I can as-
sure you that the next reorganization pro-
posal that comes for the State Department
will be originated by you, it will be well ad-
vised, and it will also be implemented.
Q. Mr. President, speaking of reorganiza-
tion, do you see a specific direction for the
U.S. foreign aid program or any new em-
phasis on new programs?
President Carter: Well, I think we do need
a substantial change in our foreign aid pro-
grams. They are so diverse — some, as you
know, with institutional aid through the
World Bank and regional banks, through
IMF [International Monetary Fund] loans
and so forth, some strictly bilateral aid to in-
dividual countries, some for a region, some
with loans, some with direct grants — that the
whole thing has gotten confused.
Cy Vance and I were talking about this
very subject on the way up on the elevator,
and we are now going to the Congress to ask
the Congress Members to honor this nation's
commitment for our pro rata share of support
for some of these multilateral aid programs.
We have up until now defaulted on the
word of honor of our country. We have prom-
ised in effect that if Great Britain and Ger-
many and France and other countries will
contribute a certain amount to an interna-
tional lending institution that we will also
contribute a certain amount.
Other countries have kept their word. We
have broken our word so far. So we are going
now to the Congress and say: "Would you
just honor the commitments that our nation
has made?" I think the American people can
understand that and that they will go along
with it.
Governor John Gilligan, who has good ex-
perience in management and who has a great
sensitivity, has now come to help us with this
program. And the analysis of the entire aid
program will be presented to me, looking at
it in an overall fashion. And I believe that it
can be — within the present levels of funding
and perhaps with an expanded level of fund-
ing in the future if it's salable to the Ameri-
can people and the Congress — be much more
effective.
So I think I understand the problem. I
don't understand the answers yet. But I be-
lieve that, with these people behind me, with
your help, we can have a comprehensive aid
program that will be of great help to the na-
tions who need it and which will also be co-
herent and understandable and which will be
a source of pride and not embarrassment to
the American people and the Congress.
I believe in that way we won't have to
worry in the future about a constant annual
fight just to meet our commitments that have
already been made in the past.
Q. Mr. President, I am looking at your
statement saying something to the effect of
openness and frankness. And I know that
you have only been in office for a short time,
but the State Department — I am with AID
[Agency for Internatio7ial Development] —
has been committed for several years to an
affirmative action program. I don't know
about the State Department, but it has been a
dismal failure in AID. And if I looked at the
35 people across there, and I don't see a
blackface, I don't think it's been very effec-
tive in the State Department.
I would like to know, can you — or what
will you do to get at least the Department to
show some semblance of sensitivity toward
this program?
President Carter: I looked at them, too,
when I came in. There are not many women
behind me and there are not many minority
groups.
When I've gone to other Departments,
there has been a much greater percentage.
We have tried hard to do this and I think we
are making some good progress. In the
number of women, for instance, who occupy
the top five grade levels, the executive levels
of our government, we will have, I would
say, four or five times as many as any Ad-
ministration has in the past. In the number
of black citizens who serve in those top posi-
tions we will have four or five times as many
as we have had in the past — three times as
262
Department of State Bulletin
many; in Spanish-speaking Americans, three
or four times as many. But that's a relatively
small total number, although the percentage
is great.
I think that the appointment of top-level-
position employees who are in minority groups
or who are women will help in the long run to
change that around.
In the Commerce Department, 50 percent
of the top-level positions are now filled by
women, for instance; several of them are
black. I think Griffin Bell has done a superb
job in the Attorney General's office by bring-
ing in top-level minority groups and women.
It's a slow thing.
We now have a handicap in the lower levels
of employment over which we presently have
very little control, as you know, because we
have such a confused responsibility within
the Federal Government for guaranteeing
equal employment opportunities. I think we
have seven different Federal agencies re-
sponsible for equal employment. We have a
backlog of 130,000 cases. The average time
from the initiation of a complaint to the res-
olution of a case is about three years. And by
that time, obviously the aggrieved party and
the witnesses and so forth have moved or
have dropped the case, or it's become very
expensive for them.
I hope to bring some order out of that
chaos. I am waiting until I get authority from
the Congress to reorganize to bring that into
being. But my own commitment is totally to
the resolution of this problem.
I think, to be perfectly frank, that the
State Department is probably the Depart-
ment that needs progress more than any
other. And I am determined that this will be
done. It has historically been the case. And I
think that Secretary Vance has made a great
deal of progress already. But he and I will
work together to bring a better answer to
your question the next time I come over here
in the future.
Q. I am concerned about the policy of
openness in regard to intelligence activities.
And I was wondering if it doesn't make it
more difficult for our friends to confide in us
and for those who are not our friends to take
advantage of us?
President Carter: I don't guess you had
time to watch the press conference yester-
day, which was during the working hours. I
didn't get a chance to see it myself.
I was shocked when I took office to learn
about the number of different people who
have access to highly secret sensitive infor-
mation on which the security of our nation
depends. There are about 75 people on
Capitol Hill who have access to this very
sensitive material. There are too many in the
executive branch of government. At the
same time, I know that there is a need for
checks and balances to be sure that we don't
repeat the illegalities and improprieties that
were revealed with the CIA and other intel-
ligence community agencies in the past.
I am conducting now a very careful analy-
sis of the entire intelligence community. Ad-
miral Stan Turner is going to be the new
Director. He shares my commitment. But
working with Cyrus Vance, with Admiral
Turner, with Dr. Brzezinski [Zbigniew
Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs], with the Attor-
ney General, and with Harold Brown [Secre-
tary of Defense] and myself, we are trying to
evolve very rapidly what the intelligence
community ought to be, what the limit of di-
vulging of this material ought to be, and how
can we at the same time guarantee to the
American people that the abuses will be
permanently ehminated.
In the last two or three days, I've had a
chance to meet with the congressional lead-
ers. I have hopes, which may or may not be
realized — it's not in my control — that we can
have one joint congressional committee with
a hmited membership to whom we can reveal
what is going on in its entirety within the
confines of the intelligence community. So,
we will have a key group of Congress — very
small — myself, the Intelligence Oversight
Board, which is an independent agency to
whom anyone can come and give complaints
and revelations, the Attorney General, and
let that be it.
We are not in the position where some of
our key intelligence sources are becoming re-
luctant to continue their relationship with us
because of the danger of their being exposed
in the future.
March 21, 1977
263
Now, I also pointed out to the press yes-
terday that many of the recent public revela-
tions have been erroneous. I have written
two letters to foreign leaders apologizing for
them after I checked the CIA files to find
that the published reports were completely
in error. Others had some degree of accuracy
within them.
I have reviewed all of the correspondence
between the Intelligence Oversight Board
and President Ford last year. The Attorney
General was involved. I have not detected
any instance of an impropriety or an illegal-
ity that is presently being conducted or that
was conducted in the last six or eight
months, as far back as my study went.
And I think it's good for the American
people to know this. But we have got to have
a good intelligence system in order to protect
the security of our country. We sometimes
relax too much in peacetime. We've got to es-
tablish this relationship on a permanent,
workable basis while we are at peace. It's one
of the best means to make sure we don't have
war. And if we should ever be in danger, in a
time of crisis it's too late to build up an
adequate intelligence community, including
our worldwide system of information.
So your question is a very good one. And
this is a matter that presses on me in a very
personal way. And I think I can tell you that
within the next couple of months your ques-
tions will be answered satisfactorily. I've had
good response from the Members of Con-
gress. There are now six committees in the
House that have access to this information by
law. The Speaker has indicated yesterday to
the Vice President that he would favor one
joint committee. Whether that will be feasi-
ble, I don't know, but that's our hope in the
Congress.
And I will do the same thing in the execu-
tive branch of government to make sure we
do have adequate oversight but also, at the
same time, an adequate degree of privacy
and secrecy in things that ought not to be
revealed.
Q. Mr. President, I would like to know if
you are aware of the increased amount of re-
quests for freedom- of -information material
that is going to be released or will be re-
leased, which I think in the future might
come back to haunt us ?
President Carter: I am familiar with the
problem. In general, I favor the freedom-of-
information laws. I think that one thing that
we might do within the bounds of the law,
which I doubt could be repealed even if we
wanted it to be, is to restore the trust of the
American people in us.
When there is a sense among American
citizens that they are being misled or that il-
legalities are taking place within our own
government, like the plotting of assassina-
tions or murders and so forth, or when they
feel that their own rights are not being pro-
tected by their own government, I think
under those circumstances that there is an
excessive pressure on government for infor-
mation. If that same citizen had a sense that
he could trust us, there would be much less
inclination to demand access to the files.
I am not sure that I've answered your
question adequately but that's one approach
to it.
And I think I might, as President, assume
more responsibility in that field. When I
learn more about it, when I have a little more
time in office, when the people have a more
accurate sense of what I am and what I stand
for, I might very well point out to the Ameri-
can people in a press conference or otherwise
that this has become a problem for us, and
just as a matter of idle curiosity or just to
test the law, for them to refrain from asking
for this information. If they genuinely need
it, we will provide it. But I think that the first
few months of a new law like that, there is an
inclination on the part of those who have
fought for it just to test it, to see if they ask
for something, can they really get it.
So I hope that with those two or three ap-
proaches that we might take within the
bounds of the law that we can minimize the
burden on us in months to come. I hope so.
Let me say this in closing: I think we've
made good progress in the first month in
learning about one another and in my learn-
ing about the Federal Government, in seeing
the extent and the limitation of my own in-
fluence in the White House, in learning about
264
Department of State Bulletin
foreign countries and their inclinations to-
ward us, the problem areas that we can ad-
dress and those that we ought to avoid ad-
dressing for a while. I think that we've got a
good sense around the world of what we are
trying to do already.
I can't think of any time in human history,
for instance, when there has been such a
worldwide concern about human rights. And
both nations that are founded on freedom and
those that are founded on totalitarian gov-
ernments are now doing some reassessments
and saying, what are our policies toward our
own citizens and what does the rest of the
world think about us?
So even in these early few days, we are
making some progress. I've got to be careful
not to make a serious mistake. At the same
time, I've got to be careful not to be too
timid, and when I make a judgment, that it's
a proper one. And that's where you come in,
because collectively, you have a sense of
what the world is and what the world might
be.
I want to be a good President. And I want
to serve in such a way that you won't be dis-
appointed in me. But my good relationship
with you and the other senior officials in this
Department are the basis on which I might
succeed.
So, we are partners, and I believe together
we can give the American people an accu-
rate sense that they have a good government
in what is and always has been the greatest
nation on Earth.
President Carter Discusses
Foreign Affairs Priorities
Following are remarks by President Carter
in reply to a question from an employee dur-
ing his visit to the Department of Agriculture
on February 16.^
That question is difficult to answer in a
simplistic way.
I would hope that we could get bilateral and
multilateral agreement between our nation
and one other country, and our nation and all
nations, to eliminate the possibility of addi-
tional nations being able to build atomic
weapons. That would include South Africa,
further development in India, an expansion of
the nuclear capability to other countries, like
Brazil, Argentina, Pakistan, South Korea,
Taiwan.
We are moving very aggressively on this
subject. I am now trying to induce the Ger-
mans not to sell nuclear processing capability
to the Brazilians; to try to induce the French
not to sell the same capabilities to Pakistan.
But it has to be done with a sense among
other people that we can provide part of the
nuclear materials to produce power and then
deprive them of an opportunity to reprocess
waste to make explosives. That is the first
part of your question.
Secondly, I would like to move toward the
reestablishment of normal relationships be-
tween our own country and Angola, among
other nations.
We now have several problems involved
in that. The attitude of Angola and its gov-
ernment toward keeping Cuban mer-
cenaries— I would very much like to see
the Cubans remove their soldiers from An-
gola. Let the Angolan natives make their own
decisions about their government.
We have received information from indirect
sources that Castro and Cuba has promised to
remove those troops. That would be a step
toward full normalization of relationships with
Angola.
The same thing applies ultimately to the res-
toration of normal relationships with Cuba.
If I can be convinced that Cuba wants to re-
move their aggravating influence from other
countries in this hemisphere, will not partici-
pate in violence in nations across the ocean,
will recommit the former relationship that
existed in Cuba toward human rights, then I
would be willing to move toward normalizing
relationships with Cuba as well.
The same thing applies to Vietnam. I would
like to see us work out with Vietnam a proper
accounting for the 2,205 Americans who were
' For the complete transcript of remarks by Presi-
dent Carter and questions and answers at the Depart-
ment of Agriculture on Feb. 16, see Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents dated Feb. 21, 1977, p.
206.
March 21, 1977
265
lost in that war. There are some still classified
as missing in action. Then I would be per-
fectly glad to support the admission of Viet-
nam to the United Nations and to normalize
relationships with Vietnam.
In all we have 14 nations in the world with
whom we do not have normal relationships.
We are dealing with each one of those cases
on an individual basis. In some instances, the
other governments despise us so deeply that
they don't want to deal with us or search out
common grounds for normalizing relation-
ships.
So to hold down nuclear weapons, to re-
move the military presence in the African na-
tions from any other country including our
own, and to normalize relationships with
countries with whom we don't have a present
friendship with — all those are matters of high
priority on my foreign affairs agenda.
President Carter Discusses
Boycott Issue
Following are remarks by President Carter
in reply to a question from an employee dur-
ing his visit to the Departrnent of Commerce
on February 9. ^
I think it is good for all of us to understand
that there are different meanings to the word
"boycott." A primary boycott is perfectly ac-
ceptable in international affairs.
We have, for instance, a primary boycott
against Cuba. It is all right for a nation to say
"We are not going to trade with you." It is
perfectly all right for the Arab countries to
say "We are not going to trade with Israel."
' For the complete transcript of remarks by Presi-
dent Carter and questions and answers at the Depart-
ment of Commerce on Feb. 9, see Weekly Compilation
of Presidential Documents dated Feb. 14, 1977, p. 166.
What does create a problem that I hope to
eliminate is for the Arab countries to say to
us, "You cannot trade with Israel and also
trade with us" or "You cannot trade with us,
the Arab countries, if you have Jews on your
board of directors." This, in my opinion, vio-
lates the constitutional rights of Jewish citi-
zens. It also is completely obnoxious to me in
a society like our own, built on an absence of
legal attention, of recognition of a person's re-
ligious or racial or sexual characteristics.
So that is what is called a secondary and
even tertiary boycott. We now have several
bills that have been introduced in the House
and Senate. We have a cohesive group of
business and labor leaders, many of whom
happen to be Jewish, who are working on the
principles that ought to be included in an
antiboycott law.
And I will support those. I think it is time
for us to root out the concept of the secondary
and tertiary boycott, never permit a foreign
nation to discriminate against any of our citi-
zens who happen to be Jewish, with legal
permission from our own government. And
we also need to have as a last thing uniformity
among the different states of the nation in
dealing with the antiboycott legislation. We
now have a strong antiboycott law in New
York. We have a weak antiboycott law
in New Jersey. So when the Arab countries
want to come and trade, they just bypass
New York, come into New Jersey, and they
can discriminate against Jewish citizens ac-
cordingly.
So, uniformity, and ehmination of attention,
of recognition given to a citizen because they
happen to be Jewish, and a prohibition against
the deprivation of human rights, and a sec-
ondary and tertiary boycott are all things that
I hope to root out.
The right of the Arab countries to boycott
Israel is something with which we have no au-
thority and in which I do not want to become
involved.
266
Department of State Bulletin
Secretary Vance Discusses Antiboycott Legislation
and Nuclear Nonproliferation
Statement Before the House Committee on International Relations '
This is my first formal appearance before
this committee. I hope and expect it will inau-
gurate a most fruitful relationship under your
newly chosen and distinguished chairman
[Representative Clement J. Zablocki].
I am pleased today to address the boycott
issue and the Administration's position con-
cerning proposed new antiboycott legislation.
We favor renewal of the Export Adminis-
tration Act of 1969 in order to provide specific
legislative authority for the Secretary of
Commerce to control exports for reasons of
national security, foreign policy, and short
supply. A number of agencies will be submit-
ting to your committee reports on title I of
the bills to renew the Export Administration
Act, and later in the morning, as agreed, I
will talk briefly about title III, concerning nu-
clear exports.
Question of Foreign Boycotts
Let me turn to the question of boycotts.
As the first representative of the new Ad-
ministration to address this issue before the
Congress, let me say that we want to work
closely with you on the problems that foreign
• Made on Mar. 1 (text from press release 90). For
Secretary Vance's statement of Feb. 28 on the proposed
antiboycott legislation made before the Subcommittee
on International Finance of the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, see press release
87. The complete transcripts of these hearings will be
published by the committees and will be available from
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
boycotts present to American commerce and
American firms, especially as they involve
conduct that is contrary to commonly ac-
cepted American principles and standards.
The President has often made clear his con-
cern, and I share his deep feehngs on this is-
sue. We deplore discrimination on the basis of
race, religion, and national origin. We also
oppose boycott practices requiring American
firms not to deal with friendly countries or
other American firms. Let me summarize
the principles on which we believe an ap-
proach to these problems should be based:
1. Any foreign-boycott-motivated discrimi-
nation against U.S. persons on the basis of
religion, race, or national origin should be
explicitly outlazved. Firms should be prohib-
ited from responding to boycott-related re-
quests for information on religion, race, or na-
tional origin.
2. Refusals by American firms to deal with
any friendly foreign country, demonstrably
related to a foreign boycott, should be prohib-
ited. So, in general, should refusals to deal
with other U.S. firms. We believe that deci-
sions as to what commerce U.S. firms may or
may not have with other countries or with
other U.S. firms should be made, consonant
with American policy, by Americans and only
Americans. This principle raises difficult
questions about enforcement — turning on
judgments about a company's intent when it
does not do business with a friendly country
or another company. We need to examine,
both within the executive branch and in con-
March 21, 1977
267
sultation with the Congress, how this princi-
ple can most effectively be expressed in legis-
lation. We need to provide our companies with
clear and reaHstic guidance on how to conduct
trade in boycott-related situations. We must
consider, for example, such difficult problems
as whether an American company might be
required to ship goods to a foreign country
when it knew that these goods would be
turned back or confiscated at the port of en-
try.
3. The prohibitions affecting U.S. firms
should not, in general, apply to transactions
of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms which
involve the commerce of a foreign country and
not U.S. exports. But they should apply in
cases in which any U.S. firm seeks to use
foreign subsidiaries in a manner intended to
circumvent the law.
4. The new law should preempt provisions
of state laws dealing with foreign boycotts.
This should be done in the interests of uni-
formity and to remove elements of confusion
and uncertainty from the conduct of our
foreign commerce.
5. To enable an orderly transition to be
made to the new legislative requirements,
some kind of grandfather clause or grace
period should be provided with regard to
transactions under existing commitments.
6. The new law should substantially cut
back the reporting requirements on U.S.
firms. Many of the reports now required
would not be needed in enforcing a new law.
The benefits of maintaining such
information-gathering regulations would be
disproportionate to the burden on individual
firms.
7. All boycott reports submitted to Com-
merce should be publicly released. Only pro-
prietary business information should be pro-
tected.
We recognize that this issue stems, at this
time, primarily from concerns about the Arab
boycott of Israel. We believe that, in coopera-
tion with Congress, we can make progress on
these issues without seriously impairing op-
portunities for foreign trade or inhibiting our
diplomacy in the Middle East. And we commit
ourselves to cooperating with Congress to
achieve this result.
We are strongly opposed to foreign boycotts
directed against friendly countries. But we
understand that states do exercise their
sovereign rights to regulate their commerce
and to decide, if they wish, to refuse to deal
with other nations or the firms of other na-
tions. They have the right to control the
source of their imports as well as the destina-
tion of their exports.
We view as a different matter, however, ef-
forts by any foreign countries to influence de-
cisions and activities of American firms in
connection with any primary boycott of
another country. Thus, secondary-'boycott
practices of other countries can intrude seri-
ously into the business practices of American
firms engaged in U.S. commerce and can have
the effect of using U.S. commerce to harm
third countries with whom we are friends. I
believe we will all agree that U.S. firms
should not be required, by the decision of a
foreign nation, to avoid commercial relations
with other friendly countries or with other
U.S. firms.
One specific problem arising from foreign
boycott practices has been the requirement
for use of negative certifications, e.g., certifi-
cations that goods do not originate in a given
country or are not produced by a firm
blacklisted by another country or are not
shipped on a blacklisted vessel. The members
of this committee should be aware that diplo-
matic efforts and the efforts of the U.S. busi-
ness community over many months have
brought about some encouraging changes in
this area of concern. I am happy to report that
during my visit to Saudi Arabia its leaders in-
formed us that Saudi Arabia will accept posi-
tive certifications of origin. We are continuing
our efforts to bring about further voluntary
changes by foreign governments in this and
other areas of intrusive boycott practices.
We agree, Mr. Chairman, on the need to
prohibit by law in absolute terms any dis-
criminatory actions arising from foreign
boycotts, based on race, religion, or national
origin. Forthright diplomacy is another way
to pursue our efforts, and we have found a
forthcoming response. The Government of
Saudi Arabia has very recently informed us
again that its boycott "has no connection with
or basis in matters of race or creed." When
specific instances of discriminatory requests
268
Department of State Bulletin
have been reported in isolated instances, we
have approached foreign governments and re-
ceived assurances that discrimination was
contrary to the pohcy of the government in
question. We appreciate the responsiveness of
the boycotting countries to our concern in
seeking to remedy and avoid recurrence of
any such discrimination, which all of us abhor.
We will remain vigilant on this point.
Core Issues of Middle East Settlement
My appearance here follows closely on my
return from the Middle East. I believe it
would be appropriate to talk for a moment
about our Middle East policy as a whole and
about our hopes and our efforts for a peace set-
tlement in the area.
President Carter asked me to travel to the
Middle East in my first mission abroad as
Secretary of State because he believes that
the Middle East situation must be given very
high and early priority.
My trip had several purposes:
— To demonstrate the importance the Pres-
ident and I attach to the achievement of a just
and durable peace in the Middle East and to
the maintenance of close ties between the
United States and the nations I visited;
— To meet the leaders of those nations and
establish the personal relationships that are
so important to a diplomacy of confidence and
trust; and
— To learn from them their views, so we
might define more clearly areas of both
agreement and disagreement and establish a
base for our own diplomacy in pursuit of
peace.
I am satisfied that these purposes were
met. We face a long and difficult process, with
no assurance of success. But this has been a
good beginning, and we are determined to
proceed.
I was encouraged to find a number of areas
of general agreement among the leaders I
met:
— There is a common commitment to work-
ing for peace so that they may turn the ener-
gies of their governments to bringing the eco-
nomic and social benefits of peace to their
peoples.
— There is a consensus on the desirability of
reconvening the Geneva conference sometime
during the second half of 1977.
— Each agreed to attend such a conference
without preconditions, assuming the resolu-
tion of disagreements on procedural ques-
tions.
— They would like to see the United States
play an active role in facilitating the search
for a settlement.
— And each leader accepted an invitation to
meet with President Carter during the next
three months.
This is a base on which we can build. But
there are complex procedural and substantive
issues that will require imagination and flexi-
bility from us all.
While there was general agreement on what
the core issues of a settlement must be, there
are strongly differing views on how these is-
sues should be resolved. These core issues are
the nature of peaceful relations between Is-
rael and her neighbors, the boundaries of
peace, and the future of the Palestinians. In
addition, there are sharp disagreements over
whether and how the PLO [Palestine Libera-
tion Organization] should be involved in a
Geneva conference.
No one can promise success. But we are
committed to a serious effort at helping the
nations of the Middle East find a just and last-
ing solution to the conflicts and tensions that
have plagued them and threatened the world
for nearly three decades.
Boycott Legislation and Middle East Relations
Given the inherent difficulty of this chal-
lenge, and the very high stakes we have in
meeting it successfully, we believe we are
bound to do what we can to enhance the
chances of success by our handhng of related
issues.
I must also report that I did find concern in
Arab capitals about the effects of legislation
on commercial relations between the United
States and those countries.
They also attach importance to good bilat-
eral relations with the United States. Our
shared economic and commercial interests are
an important part of these relations.
The magnitude of these interests is re-
March 21, 1977
269
fleeted in the latest statistics on economic re-
lations between the United States and Middle
Eastern countries. Over the past four years,
the Middle East market for U.S. exports has
doubled in importance (from about 5 percent
of total U.S. exports to nearly 10 percent of
this total). During this period, our exports to
the Arab countries have nearly quadrupled, to
a present level of $7 billion a year. Our cur-
rent exports to Israel and the Arab countries
of the Middle East now total some $8.5 bilhon.
U.S. oil imports from Arab countries now ac-
count for more than a third of total U.S. im-
ports and more than 15 percent of total U.S.
oil consumption. Reflows to the United States
of petrodollars in the form of investment from
the Arab states are running some $10 billion a
year.
I believe that a forthright but carefully con-
sidered policy emphasizing that U.S. legisla-
tion deals — as is entirely appropriate — with
U.S. commerce and the activities of U.S. per-
sons will be understood by Arab leaders.
We have weighed carefully the risks to our
important political and economic interests in
the Middle East which attend further legisla-
tion directed at activities of U.S. firms re-
lated to foreign boycotts. We believe that
carefully directed legislation combined with
diplomatic action can protect our interests. I
want to emphasize our intention to maintain
close and friendly relations with the countries
of the Middle East.
There is much common ground between
these principles of the Administration and the
objectives of the current proposals for new
legislation. This Administration wants to
work out with the Congress language for an-
tiboycott legislation on which we can both
agree.
I also hope it will be possible, as these hear-
ings proceed, for the various business and
other groups to reconcile their views on the
provisions of some new legislation. In this re-
spect I have received encouraging reports
that the meetings between the Anti-
Defamation League and the Business Round-
table have been constructive. A substantial
meeting of minds by these representative
groups on a set of principles on which legisla-
tion might be based will be a great help to us
in our deliberations.
The other Cabinet members concerned and
I would be happy to make available our ex-
perts to work with your committee staff to
formulate new legislative language on which
we can agree. As issues are developed for de-
cision, I will also be happy personally to con-
sult further with the members of this commit-
tee.
Nuclear Exports and Nonproliferation
Mr. Chairman, at this time I will turn to the
provisions of the bills to renew the Export
Administration Act having to do with nuclear
exports.
I believe you know the deep concern of the
new Administration about the global spread of
nuclear weapons materials and the technology
for producing them.
I, in turn, know of the pioneer work of this
committee over the past several years in
examining the proliferation implications of our
nuclear export policies. You were among the
earliest in Congress to recognize the urgency
of this difficult problem, and your efforts have
been pursued in a truly bipartisan fashion.
The International Relations Committee has
been a focal point for wide-ranging discus-
sions of the key nonproliferation issues,
though in the past the legislative jurisdiction
of the committee was narrowly defined
to the issue of nuclear exports. Now, appro-
priately, your legislative jurisdiction
has been broadened considerably, and the
House Committee on International Relations
will be the key committee in the House to
consider the broad aspects of our nuclear ex-
port policies. That bodes well for our shared
purpose of formulating a coherent nonprolif-
eration policy.
As you know, the President has directed an
urgent and comprehensive review of U.S. nu-
clear export and nonproliferation policies. We
and other concerned agencies have been de-
veloping policy options on the entire range of
proliferation issues confronting us, including
those dealt with in the proposed bill. In the
course of these preparations, we have been in
direct touch with Members of Congress and
intend to be in close consultation with you as
we complete our work. Our policy options will
be submitted shortly to the President, and I
270
Department of State Bulletin
would expect decisions on them this month.
On the basis of those decisions, we will de-
velop legislative recommendations by the end
of this month regarding nuclear export and
nonproliferation proposals. We believe this
approach would have significant advantages.
It would clarify U.S. nonproliferation policy
and provide a sound basis from which to as-
sure U.S. leadership in this field. Meanwhile,
we suggest that the concerned congressional
committees not enact legislation in the non-
proliferation area before giving full considera-
tion to the executive branch's recommenda-
tions.
Certainly legislation will have to be work-
able not only from our standpoint but also
from that of other nations — both recipient and
supplier nations. We think that it should en-
compass not only U.S. nuclear export criteria
but incentives and effective disincentives for
preventing proliferation. In this regard, the
campaign statements of President Carter and
the Presidential statement of October 28 by
President Ford provide a strong bipartisan
basis from which to proceed.
I might add that because of the overriding
importance thi Administration attaches to
this issue, we have centralized responsibihty
for our nuclear policy within the State De-
partment in the office of the Under Secretary
for Security Assistance. This will, I believe,
improve the coherent formulation and im-
plementation of our nuclear export policy.
Ambassador Young Testifies
on Rhodesian Sanctions Bill
Following is a statement by Andrew
Young, U.S. Representative to the United
Nations, before the Subcommittees on Inter-
national Organizations and Africa of the
House Committee on International Rela-
tions on February 2U. ^
Mr. Chairmen: I want to thank you and the
committees for giving me the opportunity
today to comment on the Rhodesian sanctions
bill. It is a piece of legislation which I have
worked hard for as a Congressman and which
I now wholeheartedly support as the U.S.
Permanent Representative at the United Na-
tions.
Let me say at the outset that I fully sup-
port the statement on repeal of the Byrd
amendment made on behalf of the President
by Secretary Vance before the Senate Sub-
committee on African Affairs on February
10. The President believes that the urgent
repeal of the Byrd amendment is of major
importance to our foreign policy. He is hope-
ful that the sanctions bill will receive the
support of the entire Congress.
I personally can testify to the significance
the repeal of the Byrd amendment will have
in Africa and at the United Nations. I have
recently returned from attending major Afri-
can celebrations in Tanzania and Nigeria,
where I had the chance to discuss African
questions with many African leaders. The
Rhodesian question was on all of their minds.
Many stressed to me the very positive effect
that repeal of the Byrd amendment would
have in prompting a settlement in Rhodesia.
In very tangible terms repeal would show
the [Ian D.] Smith regime that it could not
count on assistance from the U.S. Govern-
ment in its obstinate refusal to accede to
majority rule. It would impress on Africans
that the United States is serious in its sup-
port for majority rule in an independent
Zimbabwe.
At the United Nations, repeal of the Byrd
amendment will mean that the United States
will no longer be in clear violation of our ob-
ligations under the United Nations Charter.
We will no longer be accused of transgressing
international law as one of the few nations
openly violating sanctions. By repealing the
Byrd amendment the United States will un-
derscore the importance we attach to ful-
filling our international responsibilities. Re-
peal will have a very positive effect at the
United Nations and will enable me to carry
out my mission with greater effectiveness.
I am convinced that repeal is in the best
interests of the United States. The recent
statement by my good friend and former col-
' The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub-
lished by the committee and will be available from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
March 21, 1977
271
league John Dent, that due to recent techno-
logical changes the United States is no longer
dependent on Rhodesian chrome, undercuts
the argument that the Byrd amendment must
be retained for strategic and economic rea-
sons. I hope that other Congressmen who
shared Congressman Dent's views will now
join him in supporting repeal of the Byrd
amendment.
I believe that the bill to repeal the Byrd
amendment represents an excellent opportu-
nity for the Congress to work closely with
the Administration in jointly furthering our
foreign policy goals. I hope the bill will re-
ceive full bipartisan support and thereby
represent a positive step in closer coopera-
tion between the Administration and the
Congress.
Department Comments on Fishery
Agreements With EEC and Japan
Following is a statement by Rozanne L.
Ridgway, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Oceans and Fisheries Affairs, submitted to
the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife
Conservation and the Environment of the
House Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries on February 22. ^
At my last appearance before this sub-
committee on February 7, I reported on the
status of our negotiations on governing in-
ternational fishery agreements. I indicated
then that there were several negotiations
still in progress which I hoped would be con-
cluded in time for the agreements to qualify
under the terms of House Joint Resolution
240.
I am pleased to say that we signed the
agreement with Spain on February 16, with
Japan on February 10, and with the Euro-
pean Community on February 15. These
agreements, as well as the Korean agree-
ment signed on January 4, are now before
the Congress in accordance with the
congressional-oversight provisions of the
Fishery Conservation and Management Act
of 1976. It is our hope that Congress will
move to amend House Joint Resolution 240 to
enable these agreements to enter into force
and to bring them under the waiver provi-
sions of House Joint Resolution 240.^
Mr. Chairman, I would like to comment
briefly on the agreements with the European
Community and with Japan.
First, the agreement with the European
Community. On previous occasions, I have
reported that the United States was pre-
pared to enter into a governing international
fishery agreement with the Community,
three of whose members traditionally have
fished off our coasts, provided the Community
was able to undertake the obligations in the
act which have been incorporated in the
agreements.
I'm sure you have noted that, in form and
content, the Community agreement is like all
the others, including those with Spain and
Korea. There are, of course, minor differ-
ences as to organization, placement, and
e.xplicitness among all the agreements. We
have asked ourselves two questions with re-
spect to each of the 10 agreements negotiated.
Does it acknowledge the exclusive fishery
management authority of the United States
in a zone out to 200 miles? And does it pro-
vide for the enforcement and implementation
by the United States of all the features of the
act? In every case, the answer is yes.
So in content there is nothing unusual
about the agreement with the Community.
But a different question does arise. As be-
tween the Community and the United States,
does the traditionality of fishing by three
Community members — France, the Federal
Republic of Germany, and Italy — now cover
the Community as a whole so that the Com-
munity can allocate as it chooses among its
members? And if it does not, who deter-
' Introductory paragraph omitted. The complete
transcript of the hearings will be published by the
committee and will be available from the Superinten-
dent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402.
^ H. J. Res. 240, the Fishery Conservation Zone Tran-
sition Act, was signed into law by President Carter on
Feb. 21 (Public Law 95-6).
272
Department of State Bulletin
mines, and by what process, which vessels of
which member states of the Community ac-
tually receive permits to fish off our coasts?
Throughout the negotiations with the
Community, the United States made clear
that it understood that the Community now
has a common fisheries policy and that the
objective of the negotiation was to accommo-
date the interests of the three member states
which traditionally have fished off our
coasts. The United States retains the right,
through the domestic process of approving
applications and issuing permits, to deter-
mine who shall fish off our coasts. Until such
time as the fish stocks off our coasts rebuild,
and even then only when they are in excess
to the harvesting capacity of the U.S. fleet,
we do not expect to allocate, or to approve
applications for, any country that has no rec-
ord of a traditional fishery. For this year,
clearly, permits will be available only to
France, Italy, and the Federal Republic of
Germany. For the life of the agreement, we
retain the right to accept or to reject the ap-
plication for a permit for any vessel.
The agreement with Japan for 1977 is dif-
ferent in form, but not in substance, from
other governing international fishery agree-
ments which have recently been negotiated.
It consists of an exchange of notes. Attached
to that exchange of notes is an initialed
long-term agreement covering the period
1978-82, which is being transmitted to Con-
gress at this time for its information. It will
be resubmitted for formal oversight follow-
ing its signature later this year.
The short-term agreement with Japan in
all material respects is in accord with the act.
It sets out the principles that will govern
fishing by Japan for fisheries over which the
United States exercises management author-
ity for the period ending December 31, 1977.
It provides that Japan may apply for permits
to fish an allocation of that portion of the al-
lowable catch of a specific fishery that will
not be harvested by U.S. fishing vessels. Al-
though its terms are decidedly less explicit
than all other agreements, they provide a
basis for the full implementation by the
United States of the terms of the act. They
effectively recognize exclusive management
authority by the United States within the
200-mile zone. Beyond the zone with respect
to salmon the terms of the International
North Pacific Fishery Convention will still
apply in 1977.
This short-term agreement of unusual form
is the result of our efforts to accommodate
the constitutional procedures of Japan, which
are so similar to ours, without foreclosing the
option of fishing by Japanese vessels in con-
formity with our law during 1977. The
short-term agreement does not require this
lengthy process. We have submitted it so
that it may join the agreements which remain
to be brought into force for the United States
by March 1, 1977.
Provisional Limits Established
for Fishery Conservation Zone
Follou/ing is a statement read to news cor-
responderits on March 1 by Frederick Z.
Brown, Director, Office of Press Relations.
Today the Department of State is sending
to the Federal Register the geographic coor-
dinates of the fishery conservation zone
around the United States and its territories
and possessions which was established by the
Fishery Conservation and Management Act
and which became effective today.'
The establishment of the fishery conserva-
tion zone creates maritime boundaries with
Canada, Mexico, the Soviet Union, the
Bahamas, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, the
Netherlands Antilles, Venezuela, the British
Virgin Islands, Tonga, Western Samoa, the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and
various islands in the Pacific Ocean which are
under the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom
or New Zealand.
The position of the United States is that
maritime boundaries are to be established by
agreement and in accordance with equitable
principles. The Government of the United
States has been, is, and will be, engaged in
1 For text of Public Notice 526, see 42 Fed. Reg.
12937, Mar. 7, 1977.
March 21, 1977
273
consultations and negotiations with the gov-
ernments of neighboring countries concern-
ing the delimitation of areas subject to the
respective jurisdiction of the United States
and of those countries. Pending establish-
ment of maritime boundaries by agreement,
the Government of the United States is re-
quired to establish the provisional limits of
the fishery conservation zone.
Establishment of the limits of the fishery
conservation zone as described by the coor-
dinates which are being sent to the Federal
Register today is intended to be without
prejudice to any negotiations with neighbor-
ing countries or any positions which may be
adopted respecting the limits of maritime
jurisdiction in such areas.
that a fishery agreement for 1977 should be
concluded on the basis of the same spirit of
cooperation which marked their overall dis-
cussions. They reviewed the principles which
would insure that the interests of each in the
fishery zone of the other are accommodated
reciprocally for the remainder of this year.
The two sides looked forward to longer
term arrangements which are yet to be
negotiated. They welcomed the signature of
the agreement as an important step in the
evolution of their fisheries relationship and as
a contribution to their close ties as neighbor-
ing states.
Current Actions
TREATY INFORMATION
United States and Canada Sign
Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement
Agreed U.S. -Canadian Communique ^
The United States and Canada today signed
in Washington a Reciprocal Fisheries Agree-
ment to permit continuation of fishing by
fishermen of each country off the coasts of the
other for 1977, following the extension of
their respective fisheries jurisdiction to 200
miles. The agreement was signed on the
Canadian side by L. H. Legault, Director Gen-
eral, International Directorate, Department of
Fisheries and Environment, and on the U.S.
side by Ambassador Rozanne L. Ridgway,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Oceans and Fisheries Affairs. The agreement
will enter into force upon completion of inter-
nal procedures by both sides.
The agreement was concluded following dis-
cussions between President Carter and Prime
Minister Trudeau. The two leaders concurred
MULTILATERAL
Agriculture
Agreement establishing the International Fund for Ag-
ricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome June
13, 1976.1
Signatures: Egypt, Indonesia, Luxembourg, Feb-
ruary 18, 1977.
Expositions
Protocol revising the convention of November 22, 1928,
relating to international expositions, with appendix
and annex. Done at Paris November 30, 1972.'
Ratification deposited: Norway, August 13, 1976.
Fisheries
International convention for the conservation of Atlan-
tic tunas. Done at Rio de Janeiro May 14, 1966. En-
tered into force March 21, 1969. TIAS 6767.
Adherence deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics (with a statement), January 7, 1977.
Convention on conduct of fishing operations in the
North Atlantic, with annexes. Done at London June
1, 1967.
Ratifications deposited: Belgium, Denmark, Federal
Republic of Germany (with reservation; applicable
to Berlin (West)), Netherlands (for Kingdom in
Europe), June 28, 1976.
Entered into force: September 26, 1976. ^
Narcotic Drugs
Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna
February 21, 1971. Entered into force August 16,
1976. 2
Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, February 16,
1977.
Safety at Sea
International convention for the safety of life at sea.
• Issued on Feb. 24 (text from press release 81).
' Not in force.
^ Not in force for the United States.
274
Department of State Bulletin
1974, with annex. Done at London November 1,
1974.'
Ratification deposited: Norway, February 15, 1977.
Space
Treaty on principles governing the activities of states
in the exploration and use of o;iter space, including
the moon and other celestial br-iie.'s. Done at Wash-
ington, London, and Moscow Ja-iuiiry 27, 1967. En-
tered into force October 10, 19'm. TIAS 6347.
Accession deposited: Israel, February 28, 1977.
BILATERAL
Canada
Protocol to amend the convention for the protection,
preservation and extension of the sockeye salmon
fisheries in the Fraser River system of May 26, 1930,
as amended (50 Stat. 1355; f IAS 3867). Signed at
Washington February 24, 1977. Enters into force on
the date of the exchange of instruments of ratifica-
tion.
Reciprocal fisheries agreement. Signed at Washington
February 24, 1977. Enters into force on the date of
the later notification by which the parties notify each
other of the completion of internal procedures neces-
sary to bring the agreement into force.
Treaty on the execution of penal sentences. Signed at
Washington March 2, 1977. Enters into force on the
date on which instruments of ratification are ex-
changed.
Central American Bank for Economic
Integration
Loan agreement relating to regional rural agribusiness
development, with annex. Signed February 2, 1977.
Entered into force February 2, 1977.
Egypt
Project grant agreement relating to local cost project
support. Signed at Cairo January 22, 1977. Entered
into force January 22, 1977.
France
Agreement in the field of liquid metal-cooled fast
breeder reactors, with related letters. Signed at
Paris January 18, 1977. Entered into force January
18, 1977.
Iran
Agreement extending the military mission agreement
of October 6, 1947, as amended and extended (TIAS
1666, 1924, 2068, 2947, 3112, 3520, 6594, 6886, 7070,
7207, 7576, 7765, 8029, 8279). Effected by exchange
of notes at Tehran November 11, 1976, and February
6, 1977. Entered into force February 6, 1977, effec-
tive March 21, 1977.
Uruguay
Agreement amending the air transport agreement of
December 14, 1946 (TIAS 5692). Effected by ex-
change of notes at Montevideo July 9, 1976, and Feb-
ruary 9, 1977. Entered into force February 9, 1977.
PUBLICATIONS
' Not in force.
March 21, 1977
GPO Sales Publications
Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock
number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington , D.C. 20102.
A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more
copies of any one publication mailed to the same ad-
dress. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of
Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shoum be-
low, which include domestic postage, are subject to
change.
The Creative Woman. This report of the Committee on
the Arts and Humanities of the National Commission
for the Observance of International Women's Year at-
tempts to bring together, for the first time, a broad
perspective on the status of women in the arts and
humanities and to present the Committee's proposals
for correcting the discrimination and inequities it has
found. 54 pp. 90C. (Stock No. 040-000-00368-1.)
Atomic Energy — Technical Information Exchange
and Development of Standards. Arrangement with
Denmark. TIAS 8358. 6 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8358).
Atomic Energy— Research on Reliability Techniques.
Agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland. TIAS 8359. 6 pp. 350. (Cat. No.
89.10:8359).
Defense — Use of Military Facilities in Spain. Agree-
ment with Spain. TIAS 8361. 192 pp. $2.45. (Cat. No.
S9. 10:8361).
Telecommunication — Embassy Facilities. Protocol
with the German Democratic Republic. TIAS 8362. 5
pp. 350. (Cat. No. 89.10:8362).
Telecommunication — Embassy Facilities. Agreement
with Syria. TIAS 8363. 5 pp. 350. (Cat. No.
89.10:8363).
Telecommunication — Embassy Facilities. Agreement
with Nigeria. TIAS 8364. 4 pp. 350. (Cat. No.
89.10:8364).
Weather Stations — Cooperative Meteorological Pro-
gram. Agreement with Costa Rica. TIAS 8367. 10 pp.
350. (Cat. No. 89.10:8367).
North Pacific Fur Seals. Protocol with other govern-
ments amending and extending the interim convention
of February 9, 1957, as amended and extended. TIAS
8368. 30 pp. 450. (Cat. No. 39.10:8368).
Atomic Energy — Technical Information Exchange on
Light Water Reactor Safety Research. Arrangement
with France. TIAS 8369. 8 pp. 350. (Cat. No.
89.10:8369).
Criminal Investigations. Agreement with Spain. TIAS
8370. 10 pp. 350. (Cat. No. 89.10:8370).
Criminal Investigations. Agreement with Turkey.
TIAS 8371. 5 pp. 350. (Cat. No. 89.10:8371).
275
Criminal Investigations. Agreement with Australia.
TIAS 8372. 5 pp. 35(Z. (Cat. No. 59.10:8372).
Criminal Investigations. Agreement with the Federal
Republic of Germany. TIAS 8373. 8 pp. 35?. (Cat. No.
89.10:8373).
Criminal Investigations. Agreement with Italy. TIAS
8374. 5 pp. .35(2. (Cat. No. 89.10:8374).
Establishment of Temporary Purchasing Commis-
sion. Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics amending and e.xtending the agreement of Oc-
tober 18, 1972, as amended and extended. TIAS 8375. 6
pp. 350. (Cat. No. 89.10:8375). _
Availability of Certain Indian Ocean Islands for De-
fense Purposes. Agreement with the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland amending the
agreement of December 30, 1966. TIAS 8376. 3 pp. 35(2.
(Cat. No. 89.10:8376).
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Zambia.
TIAS 8377. 16 pp. 35C. (Cat. No. 89.10:8377).
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Guinea.
TIAS 8378. 67 pp. 850. (Cat. No. 89.10:8378).
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Indonesia
amending the agreement of April 19, 1976, as amended.
TIAS 8379. 2 pp. 350. (Cat. No. 89.10:8379).
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Portugal
amending the agreement of March 18, 1976, as
amended. TIAS 8381. 3 pp. 350. (Cat. No. 89.10:8381).
Tracking Station — Mahe Island. Agreement with
Seychelles. TIAS 8385. 14 pp. 350. (Cat. No.
89.10:8385).
Torpedo Test Range — Strait of Georgia and Jervis In-
let. Agreement with Canada. TIAS 8386. 6 pp. 350.
(Cat. No. 89.10:8386).
Seismograph Station Near Kluane Lake, Yukon Ter-
ritory. Agreement with Canada extending the agree-
ment of April 2 and May 9, 1974, as extended. TIAS
8387. 3 pp. 350. (Cat. No. 89.10:8387).
Scientific Cooperation — Support of United States Ac-
tivities at the Churchill Research Range. Agreement
with Canada extending the agreement of November 16
and December 18, 1970, as extended. TIAS 8389. 4 pp.
350. (Cat No. 89.10:8389).
Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: Feb. 28-Mar. 6
Pre
ss releases may be obtained from the Office
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash- |
ington, D.C.
20520.
No.
Date
Subject
*85
2/28
Warren Christopher sworn in as
Deputy Secretary of State, Feb.
26 (biographic data).
*87
2/28
Vance: Subcommittee on Interna-
tional Finance, Senate Commit-
tee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs.
t88
2/28
President designates Alan Boyd as
special U.S. Representative to
negotiate a new U.S. -U.K. air
services agreement.
*89
2/28
Study group 5 of the U.S. National
Committee for the International
Radio Consultative Committee
(CCIR), Mar. 24.
90
3/1
Vance: House Committee on Inter-
national Relations.
*91
3/1
Soviet dramatist and producer
begin 3-week tour of U.S. thea-
ters, Feb. 28.
t92
3/2
Vance: Subcommittee on Foreign
Operations, House Committee on
Appropriations.
*93
3/2
Shipping Coordinating Committee,
Apr. 13.
*94
3/2
Study groups 10 and 11 of the U.S.
National Committee for the
CCIR, Mar. 29.
t95
3/3
Brazil and U.S. conclude shrimp
fishing agreement, Mar 1.
*96
3/3
17 foreign women economists begin
visits to U.S. Mar. 6.
t97
3/4
Vance: news conference.
*98
3/4
Program for official visit of Prime
Minister Rabin of Israel, Mar.
6-9.
Jamaican Foreign Minister Patter-
*99
3/6
son, Secretary Vance: joint com-
munique following meeting, Mar.
3.
* Not printed.
t H
eld for
a later issue of the Bulletin.
276
Department of State Bulletin
INDEX March 21, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1969
Africa. President Carter's News Conference of
February 23 (excerpts) 251
Arms Control and Disarmament
President Carter Discusses Foreign Affairs
Priorities (remarks at Department of Agricul-
ture) 265
Secretary Vance Discusses Antiboycott Legisla-
tion and Nuclear Nonproliferation 267
Canada
President Carter's News Conference of February
23 (excerpts) 251
Prime Minister Pierre-Elliott Trudeau of Canada
Visits Washington (Carter, Trudeau) 255
United States and Canada Sign Reciprocal
Fisheries Agreement 274
Congress
Ambassador Young Testifies on Rhodesian Sanc-
tions Bill (statement) 271
Department Comments on Fishery Agreements
With EEC and Japan (Ridgway) 272
Secretary Vance Discusses Antiboycott Legisla-
tion and Nuclear Nonproliferation 267
Cuba
President Carter Discusses Foreign Affairs
Priorities (remarks at Department of Agricul-
ture) 265
President Carter's News Conference of February
23 (excerpts) 251
Secretaiy Vance Interviewed on "Face the Na-
tion" 245
Cyprus. President Carter's News Conference of
February 23 (excerpts) 251
Department and Foreign Service. President Car-
ter Visits the Department of State (remarks and
questions and answers with employees) 259
Economic Affairs
President Carter Discusses Boycott Issue (re-
marks at Department of Commerce) 266
Secretary Vance Discusses Antiboycott Legisla-
tion and Nuclear Nonproliferation 267
Europe. Department Comments on Fishery
Agreements With EEC and Japan (Ridgway) . . 272
Fisheries
Department Comments on Fishery Agreements
With EEC and Japan (Ridgway) 272
Provisional Limits Established for Fishery Con-
servation Zone (Department statement) 273
United States and Canada Sign Reciprocal
Fisheries Agreement 274
Foreign Aid. President Carter Visits the De-
partment of State (remarks and questions and
answers with employees) 259
Freedom of Information. President Carter Visits
Department of State (remarks and questions
and answers with employees) 259
Human Rights
President Carter's News Conference of February
23 excerpts) 251
President Carter Visits Department of State (re-
marks and questions and answers with employ-
ees) 259
Secretary Vance Interviewed on "Face the Na-
tion" 245
U.S. Concerned at Violations of Human Rights in
Uganda (Department statement) 250
Intelligence Operations
President Carter's News Conference of February
23 (excerpts) 251
President (barter Visits the Department of State
(reinarks and questions and answers with em-
ployees) 259
Secretary Vance Interviewed on "Face the Na-
tion" 245
Japan. Department Comments on Fishery
Agreements With EEC and Japan (Ridgway) . . 272
Middle East
President Carter's News Conference of February
23 (excerpts) 251
President Carter Visits the Department of State
(remarks and questions and answers with em-
ployees) 259
Secretary Vance Discusses Antiboycott Legisla-
tion and Nuclear Nonproliferation 267
Secretary Vance Interviewed on "Face the Na-
tion" 245
Military Affairs. President Carter's News Con-
ference of February 23 (excerpts) 251
Nuclear Energy. Secretary Vance Discusses An-
tiboycott Legislation and Nuclear Nonprolifera-
tion 267
Panama. President Carter's News Conference of
February 23 (excerpts) 251
Presidential Documents
President Carter Discusses Boycott Issue 266
President Carter Discusses Foreign Affairs
Priorities 265
President Carter's News Conference of February
23 (excerpts) 251
Prime Minister Pierre-Elliott Trudeau of Canada
Visits Washington 255
Publications. GPO Sales Publications 275
Southern Rhodesia. Ambassador Young Testifies
on Rhodesian Sanctions Bill (statement) 271
Treaty Information
Current Actions 274
United States and Canada Sign Reciprocal
Fisheries Agreement 274
Uganda
President Carter's News Conference of February
23 (excerpts) 251
Secretary Vance Interviewed on "Face the Na-
tion" 245
U.S. Concerned at Violations of Human Rights in
Uganda (Depai-tment statement) 250
U.S.S.R. Secretary Vance Interviewed on "Face
the Nation" 245
Vietnam
President Carter Discusses Foreign Affairs
Priorities (remarks at Department of Agricul-
ture) 265
Presidential Commission To Visit Southeast Asia
(Department statement) 258
Name Index
Carter, President 251, 255, 259, 265, 266
Ridgway, Rozanne 272
Trudeau, Pierre-Elliott 255
Vance, Secretary 245, 267
Young, Andrew 271
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76.
/f70
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Volume LXXVI • No. 1970 • March 28, 1977
SECRETARY VANCE'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF MARCH 4 277
SECRETARY GIVES OVERVIEW OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
Statement by Secretary Vance 28k
HUMAN RIGHTS: AN IMPORTANT CONCERN OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
Statement by Deputy Secretary Christopher 289
DEPARTMENT DISCUSSES COFFEE PRICES
Statements by Assistant Secretary Katz and Joan R. Braden 292
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
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Note: Contents of this publication are not
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printed. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The
BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to
Periodical Literature.
Vol. LXXVI, No. 1970
March 28, 1977
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau ot
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments i,
the field of U.S. foreign relations ane
on the work of the Department and
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart
ment, and statements, addresses, and
news conferences of the President and
the Secretary of State and other offi-
cers of the Department, as well as spe-
cial articles on various phases of in-
ternational affairs and the functions ot
the Department. Information is in-
cluded concerning treaties and inter-
national agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and on treaties of general interna
tional interest.
Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field ot
international relations are also listed.
Secretary Vance's News Conference of March 4
Press release 97 dated March 4
Secretary Vance: Good morning, ladies and
gentlemen. Who has the first question?
Q. In the six weeks that this Administra-
tion has been in office there have been several
occasions about human rights violations
throughout the world. Since then, has there
been any demonstrable lesseniyig of human
rights violations in any of these countries that
you have been concerned about?
Secretary Vance: We have had reports from
a number of countries in which there are indi-
cations that there is greater concern in those
countries with respect to human rights viola-
tions and that there have been some reduc-
tions. It is too early, yet, to say that this is a
trend which is going to be manifested across
the world. But I must say I was very pleased
to see the speech of the new British foreign
minister yesterday, in which he emphasized
the importance of the human rights issue and
the fact that the abuses of human rights are a
matter of international concern throughout
the world.
With respect to our own position, it has
been stated many times. It is one of the fun-
damental values that is our heritage. It will
be threaded through our foreign policy. I
don't think that one can expect to see im-
provements overnight. I don't think it should
be measured in the short term. I think you
are going to have to measure it over the long
term. But I do see a greater sensitivity to
these issues as a result of some of the initia-
tives which have been taken by President Car-
ter, and I am very happy about that.
Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if I could follow
that on a more philosophical level. Do you
have a rule in your mind — at what point does
legitimate concern with human rights in other
countries become unwarranted interference in
the internal affairs of another country, either
adversary or ally?
Secretary Vance: There is no precise
black-and-white rule that I can set down. It is
a much more complicated process than that. It
is a balancing process.
This is a judgment which we will have to
make on a case-by-case basis. We have been
doing that and will continue to do so.
Sometimes we will speak out in public, be-
lieving that to be the most appropriate and
forceful way to make our position clear. In
other cases, as I have indicated before, we
will use quiet diplomacy, and it will be a mix-
ture that will have to be determined by us on
a case-by-case basis.
Mr. Kalb [Marvin Kalb, CBS News].
Q. Mr. Secretary, did you notice any cool-
ing in the Soviet- American relations in these
early weeks of the Carter Administration?
And afolloump, right now: Are you planning
to take to Moscow a precise SALT proposal?
Secretary Vance: Let me deal with the first
question, and then I will turn to the SALT
question.
I have noted some of the material which has
been appearing in the Soviet press, which has
commented on the activities and actions we
have taken in the human rights area. On the
other hand, I note a continuing, deep, and
abiding interest in the Soviet Union and
among Soviet leaders for pursuing with us the
questions relating to arms control, particu-
larly in the nuclear area, and in a variety of
other matters. I hope and believe that this
will continue, and I look forward to fruitful
discussions when I go to Moscow.
March 28, 1 977
277
Now with respect to your second question,
I want to emphasize that my discussions in
Moscow will be, in general, exploratory in na-
ture. I do not go there with the intention of
attempting to negotiate a SALT agreement,
but to try and narrow the ground so that we
can proceed to develop concrete proposals and
to hear what proposals the Soviets have on
their side and thus move along to the actual
negotiations which will be taking place there-
after.
Meetings With Middle East Leaders
Q. Mr. Secretary, since your trip to the
Middle East, have you now prepared a plan
which you will begin discussing with the
people who are beginning to come through
Washington now, over the next several weeks,
jrOm the area? And how far along do you ex-
pect to be able to take the process in this series
of visits?
Secretary Vance: As I indicated when I
went to the Middle East, we had no plan that
we were taking along with us, that that was
basically a factfinding trip and also an attempt
to find where the common ground lay and
what the differences were. Those purposes
were achieved.
Since coming back to the United States, we
have been refining our thinking on the various
areas where the parties are divided. We are
developing ideas which we think will be posi-
tive in moving toward a peaceful solution in
these areas.
We will discuss these with the various lead-
ers when they come to the United States,
starting next week with the visit of Prime
Minister Rabin [of Israel] on Monday and
Tuesday of the week, and we hope that by
this process we may begin to make concrete
progress in the narrowing of the differences
between the parties.
Q. Can you elaborate on that statement
about refining your thinking? Can you be
more specific about that? Have you changed
your attitude on any areas ?
Secretary Vance: No, I do not want to go
into the precise state of our thinking on these
various issues. As I have previously indi-
cated, we believe that our function is not to
impose a settlement on the parties, but to try
and bring the parties together in these areas
where there are differences. And I think at
this point, which is still early in the process of
the movement toward a peaceful settlement,
it would not be constructive for me to go into
detail on that.
Q. Mr. Secretary, I am. Norman Fu of the
Central News Agency. On the "Face the Na-
tion" program last Sunday, you were asked
about Mr. Joseph Kraft's article regarding al-
leged secret understandings between Wash-
ington and Peking. In your response, you
said that the State Department was checking
to see whether there were any such papers re-
garding the so-called "secret pledge" made by
Secretary Kissinger to Mao Tse-tung. I won-
der if since then you have found anything to
either prove, confirm, or deny the existence of
these papers.
Secretary Vance: Since the statement which
I made on "Face the Nation" last Sunday, I
have obtained access to President Nixon's pa-
pers. I have gone over some of those papers
myself. Members of my staff are going over
other of the papers which I have not had time
to get to yet myself.
We are having full and complete access to
these papers. The cooperation has been excel-
lent.
I have found nothing that indicates that
there is any secret agreement in those papers.
Q. Jody Powell, at the White House, just
said that you are going to issue a statement
this morning regarding our reaction to the
U.N. Commission's refusal to follow Great
Britain's request for investigation of condi-
tions in Uganda.
Secretary Vance: I hadn't realized that Mr.
Powell had said that. I would be happy to
comment on it, though.
As you know, the issue did come up in the
Human Rights Commission. In addition to
that, the Secretary General has made a re-
quest to the Ugandan Charge that the matter
be looked into further and that cooperation be
received from the Government of Uganda in
that connection.
278
Department of State Bulletin
We are pleased to see that that interna-
tional body is taking action in this area. We
hope that the necessary cooperation will be
achieved in that body or in an appropriate Af-
rican body such as the OAU [Organization of
African Unity].
Discussions on Rhodesian Situation
Q. Mr. Secretary, yesterday Mr. Habib
[Philip C. Habib, Under Secretary for Politi-
cal Affairs] said on the Hill that an an-
nouncement would be expected soon on a new
Rhodesia initiative. Can you give us details
of this initiative?
Secretary Vance: No, I am not going to give
you any details of the initiative, because it is
still a matter of discussion between ourselves
and Great Britain. As you know, we have had
several meetings with the British representa-
tives who have been in the United States. We
have reached, at a working level, general
agreement on the form of that initiative. It is
a subject of discussion currently in Great Brit-
ain at higher levels, and until they have con-
cluded those discussions it would not be ap-
propriate for me to describe further the de-
tails of such an initiative.
Q. May I follow that up, Mr. Secretary? In
general terrns, my understanding is that the
South Africans, when they 7net with you some
weeks ago, reported a willingness 07i the part
of Prime Minister Smith in Rhodesia to ac-
cept the principle of irreversibility of the
process of majority rule ufithin a stipulated
time period, that the process be irrevocable,
and that that be the central principle of a new
initiative.
Can you comment on whether that is an ac-
curate report or not, and whether you think it
would be a good idea for Prime Minister
Smith to accept from a certain date — whatever
that date tnay be, whether it be an 18-month
or a 2-year period — that the guiding principle
be that of irreversibility?
Secretary Vance: Clearly, a vital and cardi-
nal principle is, and must be, irrevocabihty
with respect to the movement toward major-
ity rule. That in and of itself, though, is not
sufficient. Much more than that is required.
That is an encouraging step forward, but
there are other principles and matters in-
volved which have to be worked out before
the parties can return to Geneva, and these
will be matters which will be taken up in the
joint initiative to which I previously referred.
Q. Are we making any efforts now to urge
Americans still in Uganda to leave, or what
is the government's position now about the fu-
ture status and efforts to protect these people,
to do something to help them?
Secretary Vance: Our position has been for
a considerable period of time, as you know,
that the Americans who are residents in
Uganda should make this decision on their
own, because of concerns that have existed in
the past with respect to that. That remains
the position of the United States, and we will
do what we can to facilitate that, should any-
body wish to take advantage of that position.
Q. But has there been any effort since the
events of the last week to urge these people — to
contact them again to urge them to leave?
Secretary Vance: There has not been since
then.
Q. If I could follow up on China, as I un-
derstand it, you say you found no secret
agreements in the papers that you have in-
spected and your staff have inspected.
Secretary Vance: Right.
Q. What Mr. Kraft said was that the
Chinese Government had said that there were
some understandings about the timing of
normalization. Have you found any under-
standings that have not been previously made
known?
Secretary Vance: I have not found any
which have not been previously made known.
Soviet-American Relations
Q. If I could come back to relations with the
Soviet Union, could you perhaps give us your
view on how you would see Soviet-American
relations developing in this first part of this
Administration? Because there seeyns to be
some confusion: On the one hand, the Admin-
March 28, 1977
279
istration talks directly about certain human
rights problems in the Soviet Union, which
the Soviet Government regards as interference
in its internal affairs, particularly the honor-
ing at the White House of a man the Soviet
Union regards as a criminal. Yet at the same
time you seem to believe the Russians want to
go ahead in arms control matters. But do you
think detente exists now in the sense that it
did, say, two years ago, or is there a new kind
of relationship developing?
Secretary Vance: I think that detente does
exist today, and I beheve and hope that it will
continue to exist. I think it is in the interests
of both of our nations to search for common
ground and to lessen the tensions which di-
vide the nations.
In this process I think it is necessary to try
and work out a clear understanding of what
the meaning of detente is as between the two
nations. In a sense, it is the setting down or
arriving at a set of ground rules which permit
competition side by side with the resolution of
outstanding questions. And it is not, again, a
simple task. It is one that has to be worked
out by discussion and by action; and I hope
that as we get into closer dialogue on a face-
to-face basis, we may develop a clearer un-
derstanding among us of what will be accept-
able conduct on both sides.
Q. Do you favor repeal or revision of the
Jackson amendment or other measures which
link human rights questions to trade and
other specific issues ?
Secretary Vance: On the question of the
Jackson-Vanik amendment, the question of
trade is certainly one of the underpinnings of
the detente which has developed between the
Soviet Union and the United States. This will
be a continuing underpinning of that relation-
ship, and I hope that the trade between our
two countries will continue to grow and
flourish.
Now, insofar as the Jackson-Vanik amend-
ment itself is concerned, this is a matter
which we will have to discuss and work out
with the Congress. We plan to do this over
the months ahead, and when we have some-
thing specific to say on how we intend to pro-
ceed on that, I will make a statement on it.
Q. We appear to have gone from the Presi-
dent expressing his disgust for the human
rights violations in Ugayida to the President
thanking Idi Amin for assurances that the
Americans will be all right. Does not this
Ugandan incident underline a certain weak-
ness in the whole policy of speaking out on
human rights?
Secretary Vance: No, I don't think so. I
think it is perfectly possible and proper to
speak out on issues of human rights and yet at
the same time express appreciation for the
fact that the Ugandans have assured and did
carry out those assurances of protecting the
safety of the American citizens. I just don't
think that you can balance them off in the way
that you suggest and say that one undermines
the other.
Transfer of Sensitive Technology
Q. Taking into account the serious differ-
ences that we have seen in the first round of
talks with both Germans and Brazilians
about their nuclear deal, and considering
especially the resistance by the Brazilian
Government to give up on the deal, I wonder
if you are still optimistic about it, and after
Mr. Christopher's [Deputy Secretary Warren
Christopher] visit there, what are you plan-
ning? What are the future steps?
Secretary Vance: Fine, I'd be glad to talk
about that.
Mr. Christopher went down for one day of
meetings. There were two meetings held dur-
ing that one day, as planned. There were
some erroneous stories written which indi-
cated that it was expected that there would be
two days of meetings.
The meetings went as I would have ex-
pected. There was an exchange between the
parties, first, on the overall problem of the
transfer of sensitive technology, and then
there was a discussion of various alternatives
which might be considered in connection with
dealing with that problem. Those matters
have been noted by the two sides. They are
now being considered.
There will be further discussions between
ourselves and the Brazilians, as there will be
280
Department of State Bulletin
between the United States and the Federal
Republic of Germany. So things have gone
just about as I would have expected at this
II point.
Q. What are the next steps you are plan-
ning?
Secretary Vance: Further discussions.
Mr. Secretary, to foUovmp , from your side,
what matters do you intend to raise with
[British] Prime Minister Callaghan and
Foreign Secretary Owen when they come here
next week, and specifically , unll you be able
to ease one bilateral irritant, or offer any as-
surance about this; namely, the question of
the Concorde landing in New York?
Secretary Vance: Let me deal with the Con-
corde question first.
Insofar as the Concorde is concerned, this
has been a subject of extensive bilateral dis-
cussion between Great Britain and the
United States and France and the United
States. We recognize that this is a matter of
sensitivity and of importance in both Great
Britain and in France, and we are sensitive to
those concerns.
Insofar as the Federal Government is con-
cerned, both the Secretary of Transportation
and the President have reaffirmed the actions
taken by Secretary Coleman [former Secre-
tary of Transportation William T. Coleman,
Jr.] with respect to Dulles and Kennedy. At
this point the matter lies in the hands of the
local authorities in New York; namely, the
Port Authority and the Governor, and the de-
cisions which are going to be made will have
to be made by them. So that is where that
rests at this point.
With respect to the more general question,
there are a whole variety of subjects which
are on the agenda, which are both bilateral in
nature and multilateral in nature, and I think
it is best to wait until the Prime Minister is
here, at which time there will be an an-
nouncement out of the White House on the
various subjects which are discussed.
Q. Do you intend to have with Pakistan the
same kind of talks you are having with
Brazil?
Secretary Vance: There have been talks
previously with Pakistan. I would assume we
would have talks with Pakistan in the future.
Currently they are involved in an election
campaign and are very much concerned with
that and so this is not an appropriate time to
raise those discussions.
Let me see. Mr. Kalb [Bernard Kalb, CBS
News] hasn't had a question yet.
Question of U.S.-P.R.C. Economic Relationship
Q. Mr. Secretary, on the assumption that
you will be visiting China later this year,
what steps are you thinking about to advance
Sino-American relations, and is there any
thought at the present time of extending any
form of economic credits or any military aid
to the Chinese?
Secretary Vance: At this point there has
been no thought of any military assistance to
the Chinese. Your question was with respect
to—
Q. Whether you are considering any form of
economic credit or economic aid, given the
nature how the Chinese receive these things.
Secretary Vance: The whole question of
economic credits and economic relationships
would certainly be a subject which I would
plan to take up with the People's RepubHc of
China at the time of a visit. No date, may I
say, has been set for any visit. I would antici-
pate that probably before the end of this year
I will be making a visit to the People's Repub-
lic of China, and certainly at that time that
would be one of the subjects.
Q. May I follow that up?
Secretary Vance: Yes. Go ahead.
Q. You are talking about economic rela-
tionships. Could that be further defined as to
any thinking about economic credits to the
Chinese ?
Secretary Vance: Well, I think it would de-
pend upon, you know, what the general dis-
cussion produced with respect to trade and
what their views were. As far as I know, at
this point there has been no suggestion on
their part that they are seeking any economic
credits from us.
March 28, 1977
281
Yes, Mr. Trewhitt [Henry Trewhitt, Balti-
more Sun].
Q. Mr. Secretary, are you prepared, or is
the United States prepared, to deal directly
with the Cubans on such questions as bilat-
eral agreement on dividing the 90 miles be-
tween Cuba and the United States on fisheries
and renewal of the antihijacking agreement?
Issues for Discussion With Cuba
Secretary Vance: Yes. Let me just say a bit
about Cuba and the statements which I have
made on Cuba and the statements which the
President has made with respect to Cuba.
I indicated in my confirmation hearings that
I thought it would be useful for the United
States to begin to discuss the issues which lie
between ourselves and the Cubans. There are
a number of issues on both sides which would
be the appropriate subjects for discussion. I
indicated at that time that I felt that we
should enter into such discussions if they
chose to do so — they being the Cubans —
without any preconditions. I repeat that at
this time, and the President would concur
with what I am saying.
I think there was some misunderstanding
with respect to some remarks which he made
at the Agriculture Department as to whether
or not they were preconditions to talks. He did
not intend those to be taken as preconditions
to talks. He indicated that those were impor-
tant subjects that would have to be discussed
in any meeting which we might have with the
Cubans.
Now, with respect to fisheries, we have in-
dicated through existing diplomatic channels
which we have — namely, our representatives
in Havana — that this is a matter which should
be the subject of discussion promptly between
us. Because of the fact that we now have our
new fisheries law in effect, I would anticipate
that there will be discussions with respect to
that matter. As to whether there will be
broader talks, I don't know at this point.
Q. Direct, Mr. Secretary? Not necessarily
going through the Swiss ?
Secretary Vance: Yes.
Q. Mr. Secretary, could I follow that up? Is
the United States prepared iyi the meantime to
do anything as either a gesture or a substan-
tive act to ease relations, such as, for exam-
ple, easing travel restrictions to Cuba or per-
mitting the exchange of, let's say, athletic
teams ?
Secretary Vance: With respect to the easing
of travel restrictions and visas, that whole
question is under study by me at this point,
not merely as it relates to Cuba but across the
board, and I may have something to say about
this in the future.
With respect to the question of athletic
teams, those kinds of projects, in my view,
are constructive.
Q. Mr. Secretary, I just want to follow that
up, if I may, to touch on something you also
mentioned at your confirmation hearing
where I think you used the word "ineffective"
to describe the unilateral American embargo
on trade against Cuba.
Is that also under review, and are there any
plans within the next couple of months to, for
example, relax it to permit medicine and
foodstuffs to be traded with Cuba?
Secretary Vance: I think I have said enough
about the Cuban situation at this point. I will
just let it he where it is.
Yes, Mr. Oberdorfer [Don Oberdorfer,
Washington Post].
Q. At the risk of asking one more about
Cuba, there have been prominent press re-
ports that the Cubans have sent some military
advisers or technicians to Uganda. Do you
have any confirmation of those, and could
you tell us whether such action by Cuba —
what effect it would have on our relationship
ivith that country?
Secretary Vance: I checked on that again
this morning. I have checked it every day be-
cause I have been asked this question at every
congressional hearing which I have partici-
pated in during the last several days, and that
has been quite a few.
Again, today we have no hard evidence to
nail down these stories that are coming out
that there are large numbers of Cubans in
Uganda. I cannot rule out the fact that there
may be a few there. But we simply have not
282
Department of State Bulletin
l>een able to nail down in any concrete way
that gives me any assurance that I could say
that there are. The evidence simply is not
there to do that.
Now, with respect to the presence of Cu-
bans in Africa, I have previously indicated
that I feel that it is appropriate for African
problems to be resolved by the Africans
rather than by outside forces.
Q. When you talked earlier about setting
down ground rules on the meaning of detente,
are you talking about trying to negotiate with
the Russians some formal agreement which
would define the limits of political activity
acceptable on both sides or military activity
acceptable on both sides?
Secretary Vance: No, I don't think you can
do that in any kind of formal agreement on
that, but I think that it is possible to reach a
clearer understanding of what each expects of
the other without trying to put that down on
paper.
Q. Mr. Secretary, to what extent, sir, do
you favor narrowing the scope of diplomatic
immunity enjoyed by foreign diplomats in
this country ? Do you favor elimination of the
1790 statutes?
Secretary Vance: Of the which?
Q. The 1790 statutes, which go much further
than the Vienna Convention resolutions do.
Secretary Vance: I'm afraid I'm just going
to have to pass. I don't have enough informa-
tion to answer you on that.
Q. Do you favor narrowing the scope of dip-
lomatic immunity as it's described in bills in-
troduced by Congressmen Fisher, Koch, and
Solarz?
Secretary Vance: I'm just, unfortunately,
unfamiliar with it. I'll have to say I don't
know. I'll be glad to check into it and try and
answer at the next press conference.
Q. I'm just going to take the liberty that Mr.
Oberdorfer did a ynoment ago and go back to
Cuba. [Laughter.]
Secretary Vance: O.K.
Q. / just don't understand one thing that
you said before. You talked about discussions
that should start promptly-
Secretary Vance: On the fisheries.
Q. — on the fisheries — and you hope that
that should start promptly —
Secretary Vance: Yes.
Q. Is there now an agreement that you al-
ready have with Cuba that these talks will
start on fisheries at a certain time, and di-
rectly?
Secretary Vance: Not yet.
Q. Mr. Secretary, if you are not clear as to
whether there are any sizable amounts of
Cuban troops in Uganda, how is it that the
Department can be so certain that reports that
there are Cuban troops in Panama — or
detachments — are wrong? Are you certain
that there are no Cuban troops in Panama?
Secretary Vance: As far as I'm concerned, I
didn't have that question raised with me.
Q. No, I raised it with your spokesman,
and he said "no."
Secretary Vance: Well, he undoubtedly has
checked into it with —
Q. He has?
Secretary Vance: I can't say of my own
knowledge, because I haven't looked into it;
but I have confidence in him. If he said it, I'm
sure he checked into it.
Q. Right. Could I follow that up by asking:
Did you have any reaction to the reports of
General Torrijos' comments about Ambas-
sador Bunker [Ellsworth Bunker, Chief Co-
Negotiator for the Panama Canal Treaty]?
Secretary Vance: Which comments are
those?
Q. Well, the ones that were discussed in the
White House about his being too old for the
job and so forth?
Secretary Vance: Ambassador Bunker is
one of our most distinguished diplomats. He
has rendered extraordinary service to our
country. He certainly is not too old to con-
tinue as one of our negotiators. The President
and I both have utmost confidence in him.
March 28, 1 977
283
Secretary Vance Gives Overview of Foreign Assistance Programs
Statement by Secretary Vance *
I am delighted to testify today before this
distinguished committee on the Carter Ad-
ministration's approach to foreign assistance.
Our foreign assistance programs are in-
tended to serve our foreign policy objectives,
and so ultimately our national interests and
values.
Our foreign assistance efforts demonstrate
America's humanitarian compassion for the
world's poor, our willingness to invest in the
social, economic, and technological develop-
ment of poor countries and to foster a favora-
ble atmosphere for our overall relations with
these countries. And they do more:
— They provide a means for peace by en-
couraging the economic stability that allows
an atmosphere in which old quarrels, and po-
tential new ones, can be dealt with;
— They support, through selective military
assistance, the security of our friends and al-
lies, and thus the possibiHty for greater con-
centration on social and economic progress;
— They encourage the movement toward a
liberal world order based on an open economic
system and on an international political struc-
ture accepted as fair and equitable by all par-
ticipants;
— They contribute to the long-term task of
providing for the protection and advancement
of human rights.
' Made before the Subcommittee on Foreign Opera-
tions of the House Committee on Appropriations on
Mar. 2 (text from press release 92). The complete tran-
script of the hearings will be published by the commit-
tee and will be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20402.
The World Economy and U.S. Interests
Our assistance program serves the national
interest of the United States in several ways:
American economic welfare does not exist,
and cannot be nurtured, in a vacuum. The
health of nations, in 1977, is measured in
terms of economic cooperation among nations,
for our fortunes are intertwined as never be-
fore. The living standard of American work-
ers and consumers requires that we act in
concert with the developing world — in ex-
panding global supplies of food, energy, and
raw materials; in coping with population
growth; in reducing the wasteful use of natu-
ral resources; and in fostering stable economic
development. The price of most of our food
and energy is linked directly or indirectly to
world markets. In brief, the future of the
world economy, including our own, rests on
the steady expansion of a highly integrated
international system of trade, finance, and in-
vestment.
Economic issues in these circumstances as-
sume a new political dimension. Disadvan-
taged people in poor countries are rejecting
the inevitability of their condition and look to
their leaders to improve their Hves. Govern-
ments everywhere are putting the goal of
economic development at the top of their list
of national priorities. Meanwhile, simultane-
ous worldwide inflation and recession and ab-
rupt increases in energy prices have curtailed
economic growth generally, but most painfully
in the poorest countries. Equality of economic
opportunity has become the paramount goal of
diplomacy for more than 100 developing na-
tions, just as it has through the years been
284
Department of State Bulletin
the goal of disadvantaged citizens and regions
in America.
We cannot effectively promote multilateral
diplomacy, control the proliferation of nuclear
arms, fight international terrorism, reduce
the levels of conventional weapons, or protect
our interests in the oceans or space in a hun-
gry, angry, embittered world. We are much
more likely to achieve cooperation on these
basically noneconomic issues if we can do our
fair share in the long-term process of interna-
tional development cooperation — if we are
seen as furthering, not blocking, world aspi-
rations for a better life.
In doing so, we must recognize the fact that
our foreign policy objectives reflect a range of
concerns, and sometimes force us to make dif-
ficult choices among those concerns. It is our
job to make those choices pragmatically, while
holding true to our stated practices and pur-
poses.
For example, we believe that the poorest
people in the developing nations must be the
principal beneficiaries of our assistance. And
we believe that efficient and just domestic so-
cial and economic policies in the recipient
countries are a precondition to the effective
use of our aid. At the same time we uphold
the principle of national sovereignty and seek
to avoid interference in the internal affairs of
recipient countries. Our need to press our
standards of effective development must not
become an occasion for unwarranted interven-
tion.
We also strongly support the protection and
enhancement of basic human rights through-
out the world. We are convinced that this
principle must find expression in our foreign
policy, including our foreign assistance, as
current legislation indeed requires. We have
already announced reductions, related to
human rights, in assistance to three coun-
tries, and we are conducting further reviews
of our entire foreign policy to seek ways to
make it reflect and advance our human rights
goals.
At the same time, no simple blanket for-
mula can be applied. Our concern for human
rights must be considered together with other
economic and security goals. We believe that
in some instances, these judgments can best
be arrived at on a couhtry-by-country basis.
We will at the same time strive for consis-
tency and evenhandedness. We do not have in
mind separate sets of criteria for big coun-
tries, for weak countries, or for Communist
countries.
We are very much aware that in the overall
budget recommendations of the Carter Ad-
ministration it has been necessary to defer
important projects at home. The question in-
evitably arises as to why, at the same time,
we propose to increase the foreign aid pro-
gram.
The answer is that distinctions between our
domestic and international concerns are not
clear and simple. We do not have an open-
and-shut option of choosing between meeting
the needs in the United States for investment
in social and economic programs or doing our
part in building a better world order. Both
needs demand our attention, and both are es-
sential to the future welfare and security of
the United States. We hope that the budget
recommendations will be seen as striking a
sound and reasonable balance between the
calls on our resources.
It should also be remembered that the
United States is only one of a number of
partners in an international effort. In 1975 we
provided only 30 percent of the total official
development assistance by members of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, down from 58 percent a decade
earlier. Our efforts, then, are participatory,
and our purposes common.
The Congress has established "new direc-
tions" in our bilateral foreign aid programs.
The Carter Administration fully accepts these
directions.
I am convinced that our programs are
necessary and effective. They can be made
more effective. We are concentrating on
global development problems of food suffi-
ciency, population growth, health, education,
and employment. We are actively supporting
a development style which emphasizes
growth, broad participation, and improved
equity in delivering services and benefits to
the poorer people of the poorer countries. We
specifically endorse the emphasis that Chair-
man [Clarence D.] Long has placed on the use
March 28, 1977
285
of appropriate technologies to reduce the cap-
ital requirements of the development process,
to expand the use of abundant labor and to
improve its productivity.
We intend to concentrate our assistance
increasingly in those countries showing com-
mitment to effective, broadly based develop-
ment.
There exists a real and practical opportu-
nity in this century to reverse historical
trends which only a few years ago appeared to
doom much of the world's population to endur-
ing poverty. There is today a possibihty that
development efforts of most low-income coun-
tries, if carefully targeted, effectively man-
aged, and properly coordinated, can achieve
significant economic progress. Administration
proposals are a realistic U.S. contribution to
this end.
Our Programs
I include at this point a chart summarizing
our foreign assistance requests.^
The total amount requested has increased
from the current fiscal year and indeed from
the budget submitted by the Ford Adminis-
tration. To a considerable extent these in-
creases from the Ford budget reflect the Car-
ter Administration's agreement with the view
of the Appropriations Committee that all
callable capital subscriptions to the multilat-
eral banks should be appropriated. Other
changes, however, reflect our determination
to place greater emphasis on international
economic development, to meet previous
American commitments to recipients and
other donor countries, and to support our ef-
forts to promote the process of peace in the
Middle East.
Bilateral Development Assistance
Our bilateral development assistance pro-
gram is the most direct way for us to help to
improve the human condition and spur eco-
nomic development around the world.
The fiscal year 1978 program for bilateral
development assistance calls for $1,355 million
in new budget authority. As the Congress has
2 For chart, see Bulletin of Mar. 14, 1977, p. 238.
286
directed, this program emphasizes food pro-
duction and nutrition, population growth and
basic health services, education and human
resource development. It also provides a
broad range of high-quality U.S. scientific and
technical skills, thus engaging American uni-
versities, private firms, and private voluntary
organizations in the development process.
Poor countries with per capita incomes of
$300 or less will receive more than three-
fifths of our direct bilateral assistance in fiscal
year 1978. In addition, we are seeking $50
million for our initial share of a major mul-
tilateral, multi-year development effort for
the African Sahelian region. We are also re-
questing funds for American schools and hos-
pitals abroad, the President's Contingency
Fund, and operating costs of the Agency for
International Development [AID].
As I indicated earlier, the recipient coun-
tries will have to mobilize most of the re-
sources needed, and in some cases undertake
major domestic policy and institutional re-
forms in order to use these resources effec-
tively.
Multilateral Development Assistance
The United States has successfully sought,
over the past 30 years, to erect a structure of
global and regional institutions to respond to
the needs of the developing countries.
The international financial institutions are
at the center of this framework. They embody
the commitment by rich and poor countries
alike to give first priority to the task of de-
velopment.
They practice a development philosophy
which parallels our own. Their broadly based
membership includes both rich and poor coun-
tries. They already have a solid tradition of
professional competence which strengthens
their ability to encourage developing coun-
tries to follow sound development policies.
And through our leadership other donors, in-
cluding some of the oil-producing countries,
have increased their share of contributions.
The largest part of our appropriation re-
quests this year are devoted to the three in-
stitutions of the World Bank Group.
For three decades the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)
Department of State Bulletin
has played a central role in global develop-
ment. The Bank needs our support if it is to
continue its effective efforts.
The Administration is requesting an excep-
tionally large appropriation for the Interna-
tional Development Association, which pro-
vides soft loans to the poorest countries. This
funding proposal reflects the delayed timing
of the U.S. contributions to its fourth periodic
capital replenishment and, more importantly,
our conviction that the fifth replenishment
should be large. The IDA lends to the poorest
countries who desperately need resources.
We will also support a major replenishment of
the International Financial Corporation to
permit it to play a larger role in encouraging
private capital to contribute to the develop-
ment process.
In addition, the United States has an im-
portant stake in permitting the regional de-
velopment banks — the Inter-American De-
velopment Bank, the Asian Development
Bank, and the African Development Fund — to
expand their financial operations apace with
the needs of their borrowers.
In all candor I must note that I was dis-
turbed by the action of this subcommittee in
cutting the Administration request in the fis-
cal year 1977 supplementary appropriation for
the Inter-American Development Bank and
Asian Development Fund by 40 percent each.
Our pledge to each of these institutions is part
of a negotiated funding plan. Shortfalls in
pledges by the United States will probably be
matched by reduced contributions by other
donors to the Inter-American Development
Bank and could jeopardize the replenishment
of the Asian Development Fund. The effec-
tiveness of both institutions would be pro-
foundly affected in any event.
I urge that the full funding pledges by the
United States be appropriated. Our request
for the Inter-American Development Bank
and the Asian Development Bank is the first
concrete action on behalf of Latin America
and Asia since this Administration took office.
Failure to support these two elements in our
regional assistance strategy will surely cer-
tainly be taken as a slackening of American
interest.
To provide additional resources for the
World Bank Group and the regional banks we
have requested, as you know, $540 million in
fiscal year 1977 supplemental appropriations
and $2.6 billion in new appropriations for fis-
cal year 1978. Of the latter, $1 billion is for
callable capital, which will only be expended
in the most unlikely event that these finan-
cially sound institutions have to call on their
subscribers for additional funds.
The multilateral U.N. programs play a spe-
cial role in meeting developmental and hu-
manitarian needs. They focus heavily on tech-
nical assistance, with most of the funding
going to the poorer countries. The wide scope
and approach of the United Nations Develop-
ment Program is particularly useful. It and
the U.N. specialized agencies work closely
with the multilateral banks, whose fi-
nancial operations they complement. They re-
quire increased resources to keep up their ef-
forts. For fiscal year 1978, we are requesting
$130 million for the UNDP, an increase of $30
million over last year.
Food Aid
Although the Public Law 480 program is
not included in the request before you, food
aid plays an important role in our overall
foreign assistance strategy. We will work to
make these food aid programs serve our de-
velopment goals — not only to relieve hunger
and respond to natural catastrophes but also
to use this assistance more effectively to en-
courage food production and better nutrition
in the recipient countries. The food aid pro-
gram for this year proposed at $1.4 billion will
require $900 million in new budget authority.
Special Economic Assistance to Portugal
We will soon be submitting special
legislation to provide support for Portugal. I
would like to emphasize the importance we
attach to this new program.
After a period of severe political and eco-
nomic strain and dislocation the Portuguese
economy requires major adjustment to
restore stability and growth. The Portuguese
authorities have undertaken a courageous
economic stabilization program. But they will
need help in the transition period in the form
of substantial medium-term balance-of-
payments support. We are now negotiating
March 28, 1977
287
multilateral support of this program with
other countries, and we will ask Congress to
provide for U.S. participation in this joint
effort.
Support for Portugal is an earnest of our
support for a loyal ally and a positive
manifestation of the emphasis we place on
democracy and human rights.
Security Supporting Assistance
The Administration requests $1,887 milHon
in security supporting assistance funds.
These appropriations will provide assistance
to countries experiencing economic difficul-
ties and will help provide the time and stabil-
ity needed to find solutions to conflicts in
which U.S. security interests are closely in-
volved.
Arab Countries and Israel. The
AID-administered program of security sup-
porting assistance proposed for fiscal year
1978 in the Middle East requests new budget
authority of $1,742 milKon, slightly less than
the request for fiscal year 1977.
Most of this money directly supports our
Middle East peace efforts. Major programs
are proposed for Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and
Syria. Other programs that directly support
our peace efforts are the Sinai Support
Mission — the American civilian early-
warning system in the Sinai — and the Middle
East Special Requirements Fund, which
permits prompt U.S. responses to special
needs which may suddenly arise in our
efforts to help bring peace to that region.
I am quite aware that these special pro-
grams cannot and should not go on
indefinitely. But in 1977 they continue to
provide the essential foundation for move-
ment toward a desperately needed settlement
in the Middle East.
During my Middle East trip I found a new
wilhngness to enter into negotiations looking
toward eventual peace in the area. Our aid
programs in the Middle East directly support
the diplomacy of peace. The economic needs
of some of the key countries in the Middle
East are severe. The Israeli economy is bur-
dened with inflation and heavy defense costs,
Egypt has serious financial difficulties, and
the economies of Jordan and Syria also re-
quire substantial assistance.
Southern Africa. Violence in southern Af-
rica is in no one's interest. We have a deep
interest in encouraging peaceful movement
toward majority rule in southern Africa. This
year we are requesting $35 million for ongo-
ing programs and $100 million for economic
assistance requirements. A peaceful settle-
ment in Rhodesia may entail a substantial re-
structuring of the economy of that
territory — as well as its neighbors — to take
advantage of the changed economic situation
in the wake of a peaceful settlement. We are
actively discussing a multilateral approach
with other potential contributors. For our
part, we must be ready to do our share.
Military Assistance
Our military assistance programs serve
multiple purposes. They are important to our
relations with many allies and friendly na-
tions, to offsetting the strength of potential
adversaries and keeping the peace where
regional conflicts threaten it.
The Carter Administration is committed to
bringing order, restraint, and much stricter
codes of control to all arms transfers. U.S.-
funded military assistance is an important
component of the arms transfer issues which
are under policy review. We will seek to for-
mulate policies which will enable us to bal-
ance short-term political advantages against
the longer term effects of arms sales on re-
gional stability and peace. We are working
for improved coordination within the U.S.
Government prior to undertaking arms com-
mitments. In recognition of your interest and
our shared concern, we will welcome your
thoughts on this important subject.
We have requested $973 million for grant
military training and foreign military sales.
This Administration did not originate this
budget proposal, nor did we design the spe-
cific programs. Nonetheless, our review of
them has convinced us that they serve our
interests well. There is value in continuity.
We need to reassure our friends and allies of
the constancy of our commitment in their se-
curity. Abrupt and major cuts in these pro-
grams would disrupt plans and programs
which are now underway in foreign countries
and could have unnecessary and undesirable
consequences.
288
Department of State Bulletin
In my testimony before the Senate on Feb-
ruary 24, I noted that the President has de-
cided on several small reductions in the
j request of the previous Administration for
military grant programs and for foreign mili-
tary sales financing. Any further savings
should be the result of a deliberate review of
military assistance programs taken in the
light of the policy reexamination now
underway.
We will provide Congress shortly with de-
tails of the security assistance budget
proposals prepared within the executive
branch. The Department of State is ready to
supply to this committee information or
documentation you would find useful, or to
testify if desired.
This Administration is committed to do
more for the cause of economic and social de-
velopment, to improve the quality as well as
the quantity of American foreign assistance
programs, to give to our programs due em-
phasis on decent respect for human rights,
and to seek peace in the Middle East and
southern Africa. We have requested pro-
grams in support of these goals. Each of our
requests serves a differing set of objectives.
Tradeoffs are very limited. Reductions in any
will affect our ability to reach important eco-
nomic, social, and security goals.
Human Rights: An Important
Concern of U.S. Foreign Policy
Statement by Warren Christopher
Deputy Secretary ^
I am pleased to be here today to affirm this
Administration's commitment to making
human rights an important concern of U.S.
foreign policy. President Carter began this
Administration with the inaugural pledge that
"Because we are free we can never be indif-
ferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere."
' Made before the Subcommittee on Foreign Assist-
ance of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on
Mar. 7. The complete transcript of the hearings will be
published by the committee and will be available from
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
Then, in his confirmation hearings. Secretary
Vance stated that "we must have policies
based upon fundamental values. In particular,
we must stand for human rights."
The concern for human rights will be woven
into the fabric of our foreign policy. If we are
to do justice to our goals, we must act always
with a concern to achieve practical results and
with an awareness of the other demands on
our diplomacy. When it is desirable to do so,
we will speak out, trying to be neither stri-
dent nor polemical. This is not a one-way
street, and we must expect that at times
others may criticize us. We may decide to
communicate by quiet diplomacy with the
country involved to see what can be accom-
plished that way. Or we may prefer to ap-
proach the problem not bilaterally, but
through multilateral channels. In some in-
stances of human rights violations, assistance
programs may be curtailed, but we must also
recognize that to be evenhanded, we should
not just penalize but also inspire, persuade,
and reward.
Already our commitment has prompted def-
inite actions. In pursuit of the goal of major-
ity rule and equal rights in Southern
Rhodesia, we have urged the Congress to re-
peal the Byrd amendment. The State De-
partment expressed concern for the fate of
human rights activists in Eastern Europe,
and President Carter wrote to Nobel Peace
Prize winner Andrey Sakharov to convey di-
rectly our hopes for the promotion of human
rights. As part of a continuing review proc-
ess, we decided to cut the level of security as-
sistance to several countries because of con-
cern over human rights violations. We will be
instructing our Embassies to press the cause
of human rights through private contacts. We
are playing an active part in the work of the
[U.N.] Human Rights Commission.
As an example of our humanitarian concern
for the uprooted and dispossessed, I would
observe that during fiscal year 1976 our gov-
ernment has expended some $475 milhon on
assistance to refugees on a worldwide basis,
and the United States accepted 31,000 refu-
gees for permanent resettlement in this coun-
try. We are of course continuing our generous
assistance to refugees in the current year.
We know that the Congress shares this
March 28, 1977
289
commitment to human rights and deserves
special credit for its attention to this issue in
recent years.
The complexity of the challenge compels
collaboration between us. By working to-
gether more closely and effectively we can re-
store confidence both at home and abroad in
our undertaking to encourage respect for
human rights. The Administration, as well as
the Congress, must reflect in our policies the
values of the American people.
We recognize that these first steps we have
taken are just that. Change takes time — as
demonstrated by the evolution of human
rights within our own country: from religious
freedom through the Bill of Rights, the aboli-
tion of slavery, universal suffrage, the four
freedoms, the civil rights movement, and the
struggle against poverty to the Equal Rights
Amendment. It is a long, hard climb. But the
course is firmly set.
There should be no mistake: The undertak-
ing to promote human rights is now an inte-
gral part of our foreign policy. We know that
domestic support for our policies will falter if
they do not reflect traditional American val-
ues. But I want it to be clear that this is not a
policy of convenience, adopted because of its
popularity at home. A commitment to human
rights protects the domestic vitality of these
values, keeping clear our image of ourselves
and encouraging us to make the democratic
system work. It helps us to maintain lead-
ership of the free societies that share similar
values. And it serves as a pole of attraction to
other states and peoples.
The question is neither the direction nor the
strength of our commitment. The question we
must answer is how to summon the states-
manship and the moral courage to deal with
the practical dilemmas and complexities in
promoting human rights in our foreign rela-
tions. Today I want to discuss briefly the
complexities in linking human rights consid-
erations to economic and security assistance.
The United States recognizes a wide range
of human rights and believes all must be pro-
moted. Our most concentrated areas of concern
have been violations of the integrity of the
person — officially sanctioned murders, tor-
tures, or detentions without trial. These, of
course, are areas emphasized by the legisla-
tion you approved. Political rights and civil
protection are also accorded high priority.
At times it is inevitable that these concerns
will conflict with our commitment to the goal
of economic development. As Secretary Vance
has stated, one of our fundamental foreign
policy objectives is "to demonstrate America's
compassion for the poor and the dispossessed
around the world — those who, through no
fault of their own, are exposed to daily suffer-
ing and humiliation and are struggling to
survive." ^
Other conflicts in policy may arise when the
security of the United States is linked to that
of a country whose human rights priorities are
deficient. It should be uppermost in our minds
that security assistance is rendered to main-
tain or enhance our own security, not to
strengthen the hand of a repressive regime,
although we must face up to that as an unde-
sired and unintended consequence in certain
cases.
We are working to fulfill both the letter and
the spirit of current legislation relating
human rights concerns to foreign assistance.
We can best achieve this purpose through
conscientious and systematic review of assist-
ance programs on a country-by-country basis,
in each case balancing a political concern for
human rights against economic or security
goals. In multilateral development banks the
United States must work to maintain a broad
international consensus and to avoid destruc-
tive bloc politics that would impair the pursuit
of the banks' development objectives. No
formula can resolve the larger conflicts of
these positions, but prudent and dedicated at-
tention to both the basic objectives and the
day-to-day operations of our programs can
make specific problems more tractable.
We have been developing a series of ques-
tions by which to chart the direction of our
policy and our progress. Taken together as
points of reference, they will make us surer of
our basic course and less likely to be driven
^ For a statement by Secretary Vance on Feb. 24, see
Bulletin of Mar. 14," 1977, p. 236.
290
Department of State Bulletin
from it by the force of a particular circum-
stance. The questions we are considering in-
clude:
1. Will our action be useful in promoting
the cause of human rights? Will it actually im-
prove the human rights situation at hand? Or
is it likely to make it worse?
2. What will be the most effective means of
expressing our views? Quiet diplomacy? A
public pronouncement? Withdrawal of aid or
other tangible sanctions?
3. Even when there is only a remote chance
that our action will be influential, does our
sense of values, our American ethic, prompt
us to speak out or take action?
4. Will others support us? Can we expect
the aid of national and international organiza-
tions dedicated to furthering human rights?
5. Have we steered away from the self-
righteous and strident, remembering that our
own record is not unblemished?
6. Finally, have we remembered national
security interests and kept our sense of
perspective, realizing that human rights can-
not flourish in a world impoverished by eco-
nomic decline or ravaged by armed conflict?
The Administration alone cannot take all
the actions that should be part of this gov-
ernment's efforts on behalf of human rights.
The Congress has a unique role to play by re-
flecting public concern for human rights in the
laws it passes and monitoring their implemen-
tation, by forming and funding assistance
programs, and by assuring that our domestic
law is in conformity with our international ob-
ligations.
We urge that you join us in giving present
legislation with human rights provisions a
chance to work and that we carefully consider
together any new legislation. As a matter of
especially high priority, we also urge your
support for repeal of the Byrd amendment.
The first weeks of the Carter Administra-
tion have been a time of change and, we be-
lieve, a time of renewed hope for the
advancement of human rights. We believe our
general emphasis on this important arena of
international concern has already begun to
have a favorable impact. Last week, in a
major foreign policy statement, the British
Government declared a policy comparable to
that of this Administration. We hope other
governments will both speak out in support of
human rights and pursue human rights objec-
tives through their diplomacy.
In a number of countries, important seg-
ments of the population have been stirred to
raise human rights issues internally. And in
several countries, governments have taken
positive steps, such as the release of political
prisoners, which demonstrate that the voice
of this Administration is being heard and lis-
tened to. This reaction encourages us along
the path we have set.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
1975 Annual Report on the Federal Ocean Program.
Message from the President of the United States
transmitting the report. H. Doc. 95-54. January 19,
1977. 107 pp.
Defense Cooperation Agreement With Turkey. Com-
munication dated January 18, 1977, from the Presi-
dent of the United States transmitting a draft of a
proposed joint resolution authorizing the President to
implement the agreement. H. Doc. 95-57. January
20, 1977. 6 pp.
Withdrawal of Designation of the Congo as Beneficiary
Developing Country. Communication dated January
19, 1977, from the President of the United States
transmitting notice of his intention to withdraw the
designation of the People's Republic of the Congo as a
beneficiary developing country for purposes of the
generalized system of preferences. H. Doc. 95-59.
January 20, 1977. 2 pp.
Payments to UNESCO. Communication dated De-
cember 29, 1976, from the President of the United
States transmitting certification that conditions of
section 302 (h) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
have been met and requesting funds to make pay-
ments to UNESCO. H. Doc. 95-63. January 20, 1977.
Ip.
With Respect to the Release of Abu Daoud. Report of
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to ac-
company S. Res. 48. S. Rept. 95-1. January 24, 1977.
2 pp.
March 28, 1977
291
Department Discusses Coffee Prices
Following are statements by Julius L.
Katz, Assistant Secretary for Economic and
Business Affairs, and Joan R. Braden, Con-
sumer Affairs Coordinator for the Department
of State, made on February 22 before a joint
m,eeting of the Subcommittee on Commerce,
Consumer and Monetary Affairs of the House
Committee on Government Operations and
the Subcommittee on Domestic Marketing,
Consumer Relations, and Nutrition of the
House Committee on Agriculture. *
STATEMENT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY KATZ
Thank you for this opportunity to appear
before this joint meeting of the subcommit-
tees. On March 16 last year I appeared before
the Subcommittee on Domestic Marketing and
Consumer Relations to discuss the interna-
tional aspects of coffee prices.
One year ago, the price of green coffee was
near $1 a pound. Today, green coffee prices
are in the vicinity of $2.40 per pound. It is
understandable and appropriate that these
hearings should be held to examine the causes
for the rapid increase of coffee prices. I there-
fore welcome these hearings as an opportu-
nity to inform the American consumer about
the situation.
In my testimony last March, I and other
witnesses outlined the basic supply-and-
demand outlook for the next several years.
Events in the intervening year have con-
firmed the testimony presented then. With
your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like
to append to this statement the statement I
gave on March 16, 1976. I will briefly sum-
marize the major points I made.
I noted that the frost which struck the
coffee-growing regions of Brazil on July 17,
1975, had destroyed or severely damaged 1.5
of the 2.9 billion coffee trees in Brazil. I
pointed out that as a consequence of this frost
Brazihan production in 1976, which otherwise
would have reached 28 miUion bags, would
total no more than 9 million bags. I also dis-
cussed the effect of the civil war in Angola on
its production outlook and less serious disturb-
ances in several other producing countries.
In discussing long-term coffee production
and price trends, I presented a chart showing
the inverse relationship between green coffee
prices and the level of world carryover stocks.
We have prepared an updated version of this
chart based on Department of Agriculture
(USDA) estimates.^ This chart shows graphi-
cally how prices fall when stocks rise and the
reaction of prices to a fall in stocks. As you
can see, stocks now are as low in absolute
terms as they have been in 20 years and are
projected to drop even lower, to a level of
about 20 million bags, or roughly three
months' consumption, by 1978.
A further chart shows world exportable
production and world exports from 1950 to
1976, with projections to 1980.^ This chart il-
lustrates that from 1966 forward, exports ex-
ceeded exportable production in every year
except coffee year 1974/75. The projection to
1980, which assumes no further major produc-
tion disturbances, indicates that 1979 will be
the earliest we could see a return to approxi-
mate balance between production and ex-
ports. In the meantime, world carryover
' The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub-
lished by the committees and will be available from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
2 See p. 293.
3 See p. 294.
292
Department of State Bulletin
March 28, 1977
293
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Department of State Bulletin
stocks will be drawn down to very low levels
to meet world consumption.
In my March 1976 testimony, Mr. Chair-
man, I discussed the negotiation of the new
International Coffee Agreement and its
operating provisions. I pointed out that in the
negotiation we sought an agreement which
provided maximum incentives to exports dur-
ing the next several years. We also sought to
encourage producers to restore production.
In my conclusion I stated that the next sev-
eral years will inevitably see relatively tight
supplies but, barring further disasters, no
acute shortage of coffee. I added that during
this period coffee prices would be extremely
sensitive to changes in the anticipated
supply-demand balance.
Recent Developments
With this review as background, Mr.
Chairman, I will discuss what has happened
since March 1976.
First, the earlier forecasts have proven to
be about right. Compared to normal produc-
tion in Brazil of 25-28 million bags per year,
USDA now projects total Brazilian production
in coffee year 1976/77 at 9.5 million bags. This
is the lowest production in Brazil since coffee
year 1899/1900. USDA further estimates Bra-
zilian production in 1977/78 will amount to
about 16 million bags. This means that the
Brazilian production for the two years follow-
ing the frost will be of the magnitude of 25-30
million bags less than normal.
Second, rapidly escalating prices have in-
creased rather than reduced demand in the
short term. In coffee year 1975/76, imports by
importing members of the International Cof-
fee Organization were 58.7 million bags, the
highest figure recorded in the past seven
years. After analyzing the statistical situa-
tion, the professional staff of the International
Coffee Organization has concluded that higher
prices have resulted in a buildup of stocks on
retail shelves and in consumer pantries equiv-
alent to 2-3 million bags of green coffee.
While not particularly surprising, this de-
velopment does place added demand on al-
ready tight supplies and gives push to rising
prices.
Third, exports from the producing countries
to world markets continued at near-record
levels. In coffee year 1975/76, exports by ex-
porting members of the International Coffee
Organization to all destinations were 57.7 mil-
lion bags, a figure exceeded only once in the
past seven years. For calendar year 1976,
total exports were 58.3 million bags, com-
pared to 57.9 million bags in calendar year
1975 and 54.8 milHon bags in calendar year
1974. Thus, it appears clear that producers
are maintaining their normal export rate and
are not placing artificial restraints on the flow
of coffee to the marketplace.
Fourth, prices have soared since March
1976. From 99 cents a pound in March, they
rose steadily to a peak of $1.49 a pound in
June. In July they dropped back briefly to
$1.37 a pound, but the climb resumed in Au-
gust. By the end of the year they had reached
a level of $2.07 a pound. Since the first of the
year they have soared to almost $2.50 a
pound.
Fifth, the producing countries have adopted
policies and programs to restore production to
normal levels as soon as possible. Brazil is
well underway, with a $1 billion replanting
program to restore its coffee production. Co-
lombia recently announced that it would be
spending $70 million to finance the planting of
200,000 hectares of new coffee which ulti-
mately will produce about 2 million bags of
coffee a year. In most other producing coun-
tries, governments have adopted policies to
increase the use of fertihzers and pesticides.
Our agricultural attaches abroad report that
because of higher prices farmers are taking
especially good care of their coffee trees to
maximize production.
Steps Taken by U.S. Government
I know these subcommittees are interested
in what the U.S. Government has done to deal
with this situation. I will review our efforts
briefly.
First, in direct discussions with the respon-
sible officials of the producing countries and
through our Embassies, we have called upon
producer-country governments to adopt
policies which would restrain price increases.
March 28, 1977
295
We have made clear to producer-country gov-
ernments that a rapid increase in prices is
contrary to their best interests because it is
likely to lead to permanent losses in consump-
tion and reduction of their export earnings.
Second, we have monitored closely the pro-
duction, export, and tax policies of the export-
ing countries, and we have instructed our
Embassies to report actions which might re-
strict the flow of coffee to the market. We
have promptly pursued with governments and
other interested parties rumors and reports
which could adversely affect the markets,
seeking to ascertain the facts and to correct
misinformation. We have attempted to antici-
pate possible problem areas and convey our
views to governments before problems arise.
Third, together with other consuming coun-
tries, we ratified the International Coffee
Agreement of 1976, which contains significant
incentives to producers to restore production
lost by frost and to ship all available coffee to
the world market in the first two years of that
agreement. The ICA also contains the agreed
rules of the game and provides a forum in
which members may discuss possible breaches
of those rules.
Fourth, within the International Coffee Or-
ganization, we have spoken out firmly on the
obligation of members to refrain from arbi-
trary intervention or manipulation in world
coffee markets. With other consuming coun-
tries, we proposed at the most recent meeting
of the ICO Executive Board the creation of a
special working group to prepare a detailed
study of the short-term supply-demand out-
look based on up-to-date statistics and to
undertake a serious technical evaluation of
the long-term production and supply outlook.
We also requested the working group to re-
view the informational activities of the ICO to
identify ways in which the flow of reliable in-
formation to the press and the public could be
imposed.
As a result of our activities we have
gathered considerable information and we
have reached certain conclusions which will be
of interest to the committee.
The most important conclusion is that, to
the best of our knowledge, no coffee-
producing country is pursuing policies which
restrict or inhibit the export of coffee to world
markets. As I noted earlier, data through De-
cember 1976 indicates exports are at near-
record levels.
Detailed information on the internal
policies, prices, and taxes in the countries
which account for over 80 percent of world
exports is attached to my statement as table
I.'* This summary resulted from a survey we
conducted in early January. The two most in-
teresting collections of data are those cover-
ing internal retail price and producer prices.
In nearly every case, the internal retail
price of coffee in the producing countries has
increased substantially since the Brazilian
frost. In Brazil and a number of other impor-
tant producing countries, the price has more
than doubled. Consumers in those countries
are thus also experiencing the impact of the
rising coffee market.
Producer prices received by the coffee-
growers have been raised substantially in most
of the producing countries. The next chart,
for example, illustrates that since the frost
the return to the farmer has tripled in Brazil
and more than doubled in Colombia.^
We also surveyed our Embassies in the 10
largest coffee-consuming countries outside the
United States to determine the retail price of
a one-pound can of roasted coffee in December
1976. The result of that survey can be seen on
the next chart. ^ You will note that while the
French consumer paid $2.96 a pound, the
Japanese consumer paid $3.85, and the Ger-
man consumer paid $5.11 per pound, the U.S.
consumer paid only $2.38 per pound. The
countries represented on that chart account
for 87 percent of total world coffee consump-
tion. I should point out that in many Euro-
pean countries substantial import duties and
other taxes are placed on coffee. There are no
such taxes in the United States.
Mr. Chairman, I would like now to address
directly certain misconceptions about the
present coffee situation.
■• See pp. 298-9.
5 See p. 297.
« See p. 300.
296
Department of State Bulletin
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300
Department of State Bulletin
First, it has been suggested that the State
Department favors high coffee prices as a
substitute for official aid. That is false.
Throughout the negotiation of the Interna-
tional Coffee Agreement and in every other
commodity negotiation in which the United
States has participated, we have made it abso-
lutely clear that we do not support commodity
agreements as a means for transferring re-
sources from developed countries to develop-
ing countries. I have repeatedly emphasized
this in my public statements over the past
several years, and I reiterate it now.
Second, it has been suggested that the cof-
fee agreement is deficient because it contains
no price ceiling. That suggestion shows a fun-
damental misconception of what a commodity
agreement can do. There are only two ways a
commodity agreement can defend a price ceil-
ing. One is through use of stocks accumulated
in times of surplus under international control
and made available to the market when prices
rise; in the present situation no such interna-
tional stocks exist. The second means of de-
fending a ceihng would be to apportion the
available coffee to consumer countries at a
fixed or negotiated price through an elaborate
system of rationing. To be effective, such a
system would require extensive administra-
tive arrangements to enforce obligations and
to police operations. It would probably in-
volve the U.S. Government directly in decid-
ing which American roasting companies re-
ceived how much coffee from a given export-
ing country. In return for such a price
guarantee on the high side, we would have to
guarantee the producing countries a similarly
arbitrary, and probably very high, price on
the lower side. We are not prepared to do so.
Third, it has been suggested that producer
export taxes raise the price of coffee to the
consumers. I do not believe that is the case.
The price of coffee is determined by
worldwide supply-and-demand conditions.
With or without an export tax, a farmer will
try to get the highest possible price for his
coffee in competition with other growers. The
size of the export tax determines the division
of the revenues from coffee sales between the
farmer and his government. As I indicated
earlier, despite the existence of export taxes,
the financial return to the coffeegrowers in
most producing countries has increased con-
siderably since the Brazilian frost. Moreover,
in most countries, some part of the export tax
is returned to the farmer indirectly through
services or credits such as the $1 billion re-
planting credit in Brazil.
Mr. Chairman, the outlook for coffee
supplies and production has not altered signif-
icantly since my appearance last March. I
forecast then that "barring any new frosts or
other difficulties, supplies would return to
normal in 1979." It is worth remembering that
we are now halfway through the three-year
cycle it takes to restore coffee production. We
are on track. Production is being restored in
Brazil and expanded elsewhere. In the mean-
time, we need some calm understanding of the
situation and an avoidance of statements that
will contribute to further panicky buying.
These hearings can contribute importantly
to that understanding, Mr. Chairman, and I
stand ready to contribute by responding to
the questions of the committee.
STATEMENT BY MRS. BRADEN
I believe it is a good thing for consumers
that your committees are holding these hear-
ings. When the price of coffee rises from $2.00
a pound last summer to more than $3.00 a
pound now, it is cause for concern. Consumers
should know why.
Consumers should let their voice be heard.
Elinor Guggenheimer, Consumer Commis-
sioner of New York, has urged consumers to
cut back on their consumption of coffee. I
applaud her efforts. Unfortunately, in order
significantly to affect the market, consumers
would have to cut back substantially. How-
ever, I could get no estimate from any source
as to how much consumers would have to cut
back their demand in order to affect the price.
To date, despite the price rise, coffee sales
have dropped only slightly, if at all, according
to Giant Food's vice president for consumer
programs. Americans don't want to cut back.
They want to drink coffee — no matter what
the price is.
March 28, 1977
301
That, together with the worldwide shortage
of coffee stocks, is why the price of coffee is so
high. There is in fact no evil conspiracy
abroad. That is not to say that some produc-
ers are not making money. That is not to say
there are no speculators in the market who
are taking advantage of the high prices and
buying and selling to make a profit. What I
am saying is that, to the best of my knowl-
edge and belief, the high price of coffee is not
caused by the International Coffee Agree-
ment of 1976. The State Department is not
encouraging Brazil to keep coffee off the mar-
ket. The State Department did in fact antici-
pate the price rise.
Let me explain what has happened since the
coffee agreement went into effect last
November. The two principal objectives of
the agreement have been met.
First, the coffee-producing countries have
planted more coffee plants, which will mature
in three years. This was not a foregone con-
clusion, since some producers were not eager
to do so — not without guarantees that replant-
ing would not lead to a future market glut. To
do this we assured producers that when pro-
duction is restored to normal and prices re-
turn to 1975 levels, quotas will be imposed
and the consuming countries will cooperate to
make sure prices don't fall to disaster levels.
When quotas are imposed, excess coffee will
be held in stock by the producers for insur-
ance against future frosts or other supply
shortages.
Second, the producers are sending what cof-
fee they now have to consumer countries, the
largest of which is the United States. To en-
courage them to do this, the coffee agreement
provided that quotas for each country, if they
come into force two years from now, will de-
pend on that country's export performance
during the period when quotas are suspended.
For example, when El Salvador and Madagas-
car sold coffee to Brazil at higher prices for
soluble coffee instead of to consuming an-
tions, the United States warned them that
such action would mean their quota would be
less by that amount when quotas were
triggered. To avoid that, El Salvador bought
back their coffee from Brazil and put it back
on the market.
On the one hand the agreement protects the
producer when production is restored; on the
other hand, it protects the consumer by a
built-in incentive to ship all available coffee
through establishing each producer's quota at
the level it is exporting in this period of high
prices and tight supplies. When this agree-
ment was negotiated there were short re-
serves and low production due to natural dis-
asters in the coffee-producing countries.
Therefore there were few reserves to release
to bring pressure to lower prices. It is true
that Brazil has raised its export tax from 23
cents to 81 cents per pound during the past 18
months. The increase in tax has no effect on
the market, but only on the earnings of the
farmers.
Now, I have mentioned the inelastic de-
mand. Despite this inelasticity, I do think
that over a period of years if coffee prices
were to continue to soar as rapidly as at pres-
ent, the consumption of coffee would drop and
consumers would turn to alternatives such as
cocoa and tea.
As a matter of fact, even before the higher
prices of the last year there was a gradual de-
cline in coffee consumption — so much so that
one of the objectives of the International Cof-
fee Agreement was "to promote and increase
the consumption of coffee by every possible
means."
To meet that objective there is a provision
in the agreement for a Coffee Promotion
Fund. It provides that the exporting coun-
tries will contribute to a fund to promote con-
sumption in importing countries. Had I been
involved in the negotiation of this agreement,
I would have had reservations. Although it
represents less than two-tenths of a cent of
the cost of a pound of green coffee, consumers
might well object in principle to having an in-
ternational agreement which embodies
charges for advertising. Of course, we do
sanction heavy expenditures for advertising
many products we consume, including coffee,
by allowing tax deductions.
In the last year my job has been to see that
the Department of State takes into considera-
tion the consumer point of view as well as the
foreign policy and the producer points of
view.
It is for that reason I am particularly glad
to see your committees take an interest in
302
Department of State Bulletin
such an important consumer issue. I hope you
will continue your interest in forthcoming
trade issues such as shoes, televisions, sugar,
and meat. In all these issues we must see that
the consumer along with the producer is taken
equally into account.
As an advocate for the consimier, I do not
always expect to win, but I do intend to see
that consumer views are sought and listened
to. Whether by an independent agency or by
strengthened consumer offices within the
executive branch, or both, this Administra-
tion is facing up to the importance of the con-
sumer in international economic policy as well
as in domestic policy.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Agriculture
Agreement establishing the International Fund for Ag-
ricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome June
13, 1976.'
Signatures: Finland, Malta, February 24, 1977;
Korea, March 2, 1977; Kuwait, March 4, 1977.
Agriculture — Diseases (Plant)
International plant protection convention. Done at
Rome December 6, 1951. Entered into force April 3,
1952. TIAS 7465.
Adherence deposited: Barbados, December 6, 1976.
Aviation
Convention on international civil aviation. Done at
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April
4, 1947. TIAS 1591.
Adherence deposited: Sao Tome and Principe.
Coffee
International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes.
Done at London December 3, 1975. Entered into force
provisionally October 1, 1976.
Ratifications deposited: Colombia, February 24,
1977; Kenya, February 23, 1977.
Consular Relations
Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at
Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March 19,
1967; for the United States December 24, 1969. TIAS
6820.
Accessions deposited: Korea, March 7, 1977;
Morocco, February 23, 1977; United Arab Emirates,
February 24, 1977.
Consular Relations — Disputes
Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on consular
relations, concerning the compulsory settlement of
disputes. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into
force March 19, 1967; for the United States December
24, 1969. TIAS 6820.
Accession deposited: Korea, March 7, 1977.
Diplomatic Relations
Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at
Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24,
1964; for the United States December 13, 1972. TIAS
7502.
Accessions deposited: Cameroon, March 4, 1977;
United Arab Emirates, February 24, 1977.
Hydrographic Organization
Convention on the International Hydrographic Organi-
zation, with annexes. Done at Monaco May 3, 1967.
Entered into force September 22, 1970. TIAS 6933.
Accession deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics, February 18, 1977.*
Inter- American Development Bank
Agreement establishing the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank, with annexes. Done at Washington April
8, 1959.
Signature: France, January 10, 1977.'
Adherence deposited: France, January 10, 1977.
Ratification deposited: Austria, January 10, 1977.
Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, January 10,
1977.
Nuclear Weapons — Nonproliferation
Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.
Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1,
1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS 6839.
Ratification deposited: Switzerland, March 9, 1977.*
Property — industrial
Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial
property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at
Stockholm July 14, 1%7. Articles 1 through 12 en-
tered into force May 19, 1970; for the United States
August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 entered into
force April 26, 1970; for the United States September
5, 1970. TIAS 6923.
Notification from World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization that accession deposited: Zambia (with
the exception of articles 1 to 12), February 14,
1977.
Property — intellectual
Convention establishing the World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967.
• Not in force.
* With reservations.
' With statement.
■• With declaration.
March 28, 1977
303
Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United
States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.
Accession deposited: Zambia, February 14, 1977.
Space
Convention on registration of objects launched into
outer space. Done at New York January 14, 1975. En-
tered into force September 15, 1976. TIAS 8480.
Ratifications deposited: Belgium, February 24, 1977;
Mexico, March 1, 1977.
Telecommunications
International telecommunication convention with an-
nexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos
October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1975;
for the United States April 7, 1976.
Ratifications deposited: Norway, Socialist Republic
of Vietnam, December 16, 1976; Mali, December21,
1976; Monaco, 5 Rwanda, December 23, 1976; Bul-
garia,^ People's Repuljlic of China,' Ethiopia,
France, Sweden, United Arab Emirates, December
29, 1976; Cyprus, Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics,' December 31, 1976; Byelorussian Soviet
Socialist Republic,' El Salvador, Iceland, In-
donesia, Laos, Saudi Arabia, Ukrainian Soviet
Socialist Republic, January 6, 1977; New Zealand,
January 7, 1977.
and flight line support equipment, with attachment.
Signed at Washington January 19, 1977. Entered into
force January 19, 1977.
Thailand
Agreement amending the agreement of December 29,
1975, relating to trade in cotton, wool and man-made
fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Bangkok November 24, 1976. En-
tered into force November 24, 1976.
Memorandum of agreement on storage of ammunition in
Thailand. Signed at Bangkok January 24, 1977. En-
tered into force January 24, 1977.
World Tourism Organization
Agreement relating to a procedure for U.S. income tax
reimbursement. Effected by exchange of letters at
Madrid February 24 and 25, 1977. Entered into force
February 25, 1977, effective January 1, 1977.
PUBLICATIONS
BILATERAL
Egypt
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of ag-
ricultural commodities of October 26, 1976 (TIAS
8406). Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo Feb-
ruary 14, 1977. Entered into force February 14, 1977.
international Civil Aviation Organization
Agreement relating to a procedure for U.S. income tax
reimbursement. Effected by exchange of letters at
Montreal February 16 and 21, 1977. Entered into
force February 21, 1977, effective January 1, 1976.
Japan
Agreement amending the agreement of November 8,
1968, establishing the Joint Committee on United
States-Japan Cultural and Educational Cooperation.
Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo February 25,
1977. Entered into force February 25, 1977.
Agreement modifying the arrangement of September
27, 1974, as modified, concerning trade in cotton,
wool and man-made fiber textiles. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Washington February 15, 1977.
Entered into force February 15, 1977.
Mexico
Agreement relating to additional cooperative arrange-
ments to curb the illegal production and traffic in
narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico
February 16, 1977. Entered into force February 16,
1977.
Portugal
Loan agreement relating to T-38 aircraft, spare engines
' Confirmed statement contained in final protocol.
304
1 950 "Foreign Relations" Volume
on Korea Released
Press release 66 dated February 18 (for release February 26)
The Department of State on February 26 released
"Foreign Relations of the United States" 1950, volume
VII, "Korea." The "Foreign Relations" series has been
published continuously since 1861 as the official record
of American foreign policy.
This volume presents 1,675 pages of previously un-
published documentation (much of it newly declassified)
on the diplomacy of the Korean conflict. Considerable
coverage is given to National Security Council de-
cisions following the outbreak of hostilities on June 25,
1950, as well as to U.S. policy in the United Nations
and efforts at mediation by third parties. Extensive
documentation is presented on events which arose after
the assumption of the offensive by the United Nations
Command in September 1950 — the problem of crossing
the 38th parallel, the question of intervention by
Chinese forces, the Truman- Attlee talks of early De-
cember, and the retreat of the U.N. forces.
"Foreign Relations," 1950, volume VII, was pre-
pared in the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public
Affairs, Department of State. For the year 1950, vol-
ume II (United Nations: Western Hemisphere) and
volume VI (East Asia and the Pacific) have also been
published, and four more volumes are in preparation.
Copies of volume VII (Department of State publication
8859; GPO Cat. No Sl.l:950/v. VII) may be obtained for
$17.00 (domestic postpaid). Checks or money orders
should be sent to the U.S. Government Book Store,
Department of State. Washington, D.C. 20520.
Department of State Bulletin
INDEX March 28, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1970
Arms Control and Disarmament. Secretary
Vance's News Conference of March 4 277
Brazil. Secretary Vance's News Conference of
March 4 277
China. Secretary Vance's News Conference of
March 4 277
Commodities. Department Discusses Coffee Prices
(Braden, Katz) 292
Congress
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 291
Department Discusses Coffee Prices (Braden,
Katz) 292
Human Rights: An Important Concern of U.S.
Foreign Policy (Christopher) 289
Secretary Vance Gives Overview of Foreign As-
sistance Programs 284
Cuba. Secretary Vance's News Conference of
March 4 277
Economic Affairs. Department Discusses Coffee
Prices (Braden, Katz) 292
Foreign Aid
Human Rights: An Important Concern of U.S.
Foreign Policy (Christopher) 289
Secretary Vance Gives Overview of Foreign As-
sistance Programs 284
Germany. Secretary Vance's News Conference of
March 4 277
Human Rights
Human Rights: An Important Concern of U.S.
Foreign Policy (Christopher) 289
Secretary Vance's News Conference of March 4 . . 277
Middle East. Secretary Vance's News Conference
of March 4 277
Pakistan. Secretary Vance's News Conference of
March 4 277
Panama. Secretary Vance's News Conference of
March 4 " 277
Publications. 1950 "Foreign Relations" Volume on
Korea Released 304
Southern Rhodesia. Secretary Vance's News Con-
ference of March 4 277
Treaty Information. Current Actions 303
Uganda. Secretaiy Vance's News Conference of
March 4 277
U.S.S.R. Secretary Vance's News Conference of
March4 277
United Kingdom. Secretary Vance's News Confer-
ence of March 4 277
Name Index
Braden, Joan R 292
Christopher, Warren 289
Katz, Julius L 292
Vance, Secretary 277, 284
Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: March 7-13
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20520.
No. Dale Subject
*100 3/7 Advisory Panel on Music, Apr. 12-13.
*101 3/8 Program for visit of Prime Minister
Callaghan of the United Kingdom.
*102 3/9 Deposit by Switzerland of instru-
ments of ratification of Nonprolif-
eration Treaty.
*103 3/8 Shipping Coordinating Committee,
Subcommittee on Safety of Life at
Sea, working group on radiocom-
munications, Apr. 21.
*104 3/10 Opening of new consular training
facility at Foreign Service Insti-
tute.
*105 3/11 International economics e.xperts
from 20 countries begin four-week
visit to U.S. Mar. 13.
*106 3/11 Advisory Committee on Law of the
Sea, Apr. 28-29.
*107 3/11 Study group 7 of the U.S.* National
Committee for the International
Radio Consultative Committee
(CCIR), Apr. 15.
*108 3/11 Study group CMTT of the U.S. Na-
tional Committee for CCIR, Apr.
13.
Not printed.
BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY
Illilllllllll ,
3 9999 06352 796 2