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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 

Volume LXXVI • No. 1958 • January 3, 1977 

» — / ) • 

MINISTERIAL MEETING OF NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL 

AT BRUSSELS 

Arrival Statement and News Conferences by Secretary Kissinger 

at Brussels and London 1 

Message From President-Elect Carter Delivered by Secretary Kissinger 

and Text of North Atlantic Council Communique 9 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 

Foi- index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 
PRICE: 
52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 
domestic $42.50, foreign $53. \b 
Single copy 85 cents 
The Secretary of State has determined that the pub- 
lication of this periodical is necessary in the transac- 
tion of the public business required by law of this 
Department. Use of funds for printing this periodi- 
cal has been approved by the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget through January 31 
1981. 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be re- 
printed. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The 
BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to 
Periodical Literature. 



Vol. LXXVI, No. 1958 
January 3, 1977 



The Department of State BULLETIN 
a weekly publication issued by th^ 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 

The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, and 
news conferences of the President and 
the Secretary of State and other offi- 
cers of the Department, as well as spe- 
cial articles on various phases of in- 
ternational affairs and the functions of 
the Department. Information is in- 
cluded concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a party 
and on treaties of general interna- 
tional interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 



Secretary Kissinger Attends NATO Ministerial Meeting at Brussels 
and Meets With British Officials at London 



Secretary Kissinger headed the U.S. dele- 
gation to the regular ministerial meeting of 
the North Atlantic Council at Brussels De- 
cember 9-10 and visited London Decetnber 
10-12. Following are the texts of his state- 
ment made on arrival at Brussels on De- 
cember 7, his news conference following the 
meeting on December 10, and his news con- 
ference with Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs Anthony Cros- 
land at London on December 10. * 



ARRIVAL, BRUSSELS, DECEMBER 7 

Press release 5^9 dated December 8 

I am very happy to be back in Brussels for 
the annual NATO meeting. 

Through all changes of Administration the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been 
the cardinal commitment of the United 
States, and I am certain that it will continue 
to be so in the future. 

It will be very pleasant for me to review 
with my colleagues the state of our alliance, 
which is historically unique. I do not think 
any alliance in modern history has lasted so 
long, grown so much in vitality, and ex- 
tended the range of its concerns so effec- 
tively. 

We have many problems before us; but the 
future of freedom and of democracy and of 
developing of our nations depends on our 
cohesiveness, and it is in that spirit that we 
will conduct our discussions. 



' Press releases relating to bilateral meetings during 
Secretary Kissinger's visit to Brussels are Nos. 590 and 
.591 of Dec. 8, 592 and 593 of Dec. 9, and 596, 597, and 
598 of Dec. 10. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, BRUSSELS, DECEMBER 10 

Press release 600 dated December 11 

Secretary Kissinger: I will go right to your 
questions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, don't you think that the 
purchase by the Libyan Government of 15 
percent of the 7najor Italian industry Fiat 
could influence in some ways the foreign pol- 
icy of Italy, which is still a NATO country? 

Secretary Kissinger: In the waning days of 
my public career I dare not take on both the 
Italian and Libyan public opinion. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, during the course of the 
talks, did the situation in souther?! Africa 
come up, and if so, were any proposals made 
for further action by you or the United 
States? 

Secretary Kissinger: The situation in 
southern Africa came up in the sense that I 
gave an account of the situation as I saw it 
and Mr. Crosland made an English interpre- 
tation of my remarks. We substantially 
agreed in our analysis of the situation. As 
you know, I am going to meet Mr. Crosland 
and his associates this afternoon in London 
and again tomorrow. No recommendations 
were made by NATO with respect to south- 
ern Africa, but there was a discussion of the 
situation as we saw it. 

Q. In which areas did you and the Foreign 
Secretary not agree in your analysis on 
Rhodesia? 

Secretary Kissinger: I would say that the 
Foreign Secretary and I agree completely in 
our analysis of the situation in Rhodesia. We 
greatly appreciate the role that Britain is 



January 3, 1977 



playing under great difficulties at Geneva. It 
is a complicated negotiation which proceeds 
through a series of crises and dramatic head- 
lines but in which we believe that progress 
remains possible. 

The United States, as Great Britain, sup- 
ports majority rule in Rhodesia and supports 
a transition government in which the African 
component is in the majority. Now, how to 
work out the relationship of the various com- 
ponents to each other is the subject of the 
negotiations. But there is no disagreement 
whatever between the United States and the 
British point of view. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you feel that you can 
still play any role at all in helping break the 
deadlock by meeting Mr. Nkomo [Joshua 
Nkomo, Zimbabwe Africa People's Union] in 
London or any of the other participants'? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have no plans to 
meet Mr. Nkomo — I will not meet Mr. 
Nkomo — because I know that some of the 
exegetists here will misinterpret the word 
that I have no "plans." 

I believe that we can continue to play a 
useful role in remaining in contact both with 
the parties in Geneva and with the frontline 
Presidents, who have such an important re- 
sponsibility. We are indeed in frequent con- 
tact with all of these parties, and we will con- 
tinue to use our influence in the direction of 
the basic principles of the transfer of power 
to the black majority under conditions in 
which minority rights are protected. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you think your 
policy regarding the Middle East, or let us 
say American policy regarding the Middle 
East, will continue after you and with the 
new Administration. Can you give us a gen- 
eral assessment about the situation as you 
see it? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I am sure you 
know that I am not the spokesman that has 
been chosen for the new Administration, so I 
would not want to make pronouncements 
about their policies. Mr. Vance is an old 
friend of mine. 

I believe that the foreign policy of the 
United States can never be based on the per- 
sonal preferences of individuals and to the 



extent possible we attempted to analyze the 
basic realities and the basic interests and 
purposes of the United States. In that sense, 
if our conclusions were substantially correct, 
I would believe that a new Administration 
would follow a similar course. There might 
be differences in tactics, differences in per- 
sonalities. 

I believe the main commitment toward a 
just peace in the Middle East is dictated by 
American interests and by world interests 
and finally by the best interests of the par- 
ties concerned, and I am convinced that the 
United States will continue to play a major 
role in the search for peace in the Middle 
East. 

Q. What is your assessment? 

Secretary Kissinger: My assessment, 
which I have been making for months, both 
before and after our election, is that the ob- 
jective conditions that make for peace in the 
Middle East are better than they have been 
in perhaps decades. 

I believe that all of the parties have come 
to a realization that there is no military solu- 
tion to their conflict and that some 
negotiated peace must be sought. An endless 
conflict will have profound consequences for 
the peoples involved and profound global 
consequences, and therefore I believe that 
the parties are now more ready and the con- 
ditions are now more ripe for a significant ef- 
fort toward peace than has been the case in a 
long time. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, should the PLO [Pales- 
tine Liberation Organization] be represented 
at those negotiations? 

Secretary Kissinger: The United States 
has stated repeatedly its attitude toward the 
PLO, which is that until the PLO accepts the 
existence of the State of Israel and the res- 
olutions on which the present negotiations 
are being conducted — that the United States 
cannot address this sort of a question. 

Q. Is there any prospect of that accept- 
ance? 

Secretary Kissinger: That is for the PLO 
to answer. 



Department of State Bulletin 



Q. But I take it that you say unless they do 
they will not be at Geneva, so far as the 
United States is concerned? 

Secretary Kissinger: Until January 20, 
anyway. [Laughter.] 

Q. That is all I could ask. 

Q. Do you agree ivith the idea that your 
period of service for the American Goveim- 
ment has served to reinforce the Atlantic al- 
liance and at the same time to destroy (sic) 
European political unity? 

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that the At- 
lantic alliance has been greatly strengthened 
in recent years. I believe that the system of 
consultation that now e.xists within NATO 
and between the countries of NATO, even 
outside the NATO framework, is intimate 
and substantial and it reflects the realization 
by all of the countries that we are united not 
only for security but as the repositories of 
freedom in the world today. And I believe 
that NATO in its political aspect is stronger 
than it has been and that the political unity of 
the Western countries has been greatly en- 
hanced. 

Q. And Europe? 

Secretary Kissinger: And the unity of 
Europe? The United States is strongly in 
favor of the unity of Europe. I believe also 
that in the last eight years significant con- 
crete progress has been made toward the 
unity of Europe in both its economic and, 
even more importantly, in its political as- 
pects, and I hope very much that this will 
continue. 

Q: Mr. Secretary, looking back what do 
you consider to be your most satisfying 
achievements and your greatest disappoint- 
ments ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have told the 
NATO Council that it is too early to write 
obituaries — and having such a distinguished 
group of people here that have been analyz- 
ing my drawbacks and achievements, with 
emphasis on the former, I would not want to 
interfere with your work. [Laughter.] 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could I pursue this ques- 



tion along these lines? You have been asked 
many times since you have been here for 
you to volunteer some of your thoughts, and 
you have handled this usiially with humor 
and with a jocular aside. I wonder, sir, if at 
this time in your farewell news conference 
here in Europe, whether you would take a 
moment and share with us some of your 
thoughts at the present time, as you prepare 
to step down. 

Secretary Kissinger: I expressed some of 
these thoughts, in answer to the previous 
question. 

I have always believed that the ultimate 
test of whatever an American Secretary of 
State or President does with respect to any 
other part of the world will be the degree to 
which it contributes to the unity and vitality 
and strength of the free peoples, especially 
the peoples of the North Atlantic area. 

Security by itself is not enough. We have 
to ask: Security for what, and for what pur- 
pose? We therefore owe it to our peoples, as 
we seek security, to make clear that we are 
also seeking peace; and we also owe it to our 
peoples that as we develop our cohesion we 
define the purpose that this cohesion is to 
serve in terms of a better world. 

This I consider the permanent task of 
American foreign policy, and history will 
have to judge how any one Administration 
carried it out. But I am positive that any new 
Administration will address itself to the 
same agenda. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, tinder what conditions 
do you think that one day we can control the 
current armaments race and enter into a 
real organization for peace? 

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that nuclear 
weapons have the characteristic that will 
make the traditional reflections about mili- 
tary power substantially irrelevant and that 
they impose on all statesmen an obligation to 
bring the armaments race under control. We 
have made considerable progress in the con- 
trol of strategic armaments, and I believe 
that a further agreement on the limitation of 
strategic arms is within reach. There are 
other discussions going on on the limitation of 
forces in Central Europe. 

We have the obligation to conduct our pol- 



January 3, 1977 



icy between two extremes: On the one hand 
not to disarm ourselves either by unilateral 
actions or by theories that produce a 
paralysis of will, but on the other hand not to 
believe that the mere accumulation of ar- 
maments is in itself a policy. Therefore there 
is a necessity to conduct negotiations on the 
limitation of arms soberly, realistically, but 
with great dedication. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what role do you antici- 
pate playing in the Carter Administration in 
formulating foreign policy? 

Secretary Kissinger: I do not anticipate 
playing any role in the Carter Administration 
in formulating foreign policy. On January 21 
I will achieve infallibility [laughter] and will 
join all of you in my capacity to analyze prob- 
lems. 

I am always prepared to assist in specific 
circumstances and to offer advice in specific 
circumstances, because I believe that the 
foreign policy of the United States is a non- 
partisan enterprise; but I do not anticipate 
playing a role in the formulation of the policy 
of the new Administration. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, under which conditions 
can you foresee a positive contribution of 
China to the world balance? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, China is a great 
country and a major power; and by its exist- 
ence, its strong dedication to its independ- 
ence, and the talent of its people and lead- 
ership, it will always make a contribution to 
the world balance. Whatever contribution 
China makes will derive from its own inher- 
ent convictions and not the prescriptions of 
Americans. And our cooperation with China 
derives from a parallelism of interest and not 
any formal arrangement. 

Q. On Rhodesia, Mr. Secretary, do you 
consider the proposals that yo2i put to Mr. 
Ian Smith are still just a basis for negotia- 
tions or, as he insists, a program to be ac- 
cepted or rejected as a package? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have always believed 
that they should serve as a basis for negotia- 
tions and that all parties in Geneva have an 
obligation to take into consideration the 



views of the others. This is true of Ian Smith; 
it is also true, in my judgment, of the black 
negotiators in Geneva. 

Q. There has apparently been a leak from 
you to the Western delegations at the CIEC 
[Conference on International Economic 
Cooperation] talks in Paris. Could you give 
us your assessment of the possible damage 
that this leak might incur? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, to tell you the 
truth, I read an extract of that cable in a 
newspaper this morning, and it had the sort 
of bureaucratic obtuseness which would 
make it sound as plausibly having been de- 
veloped in the Department of State. [Laugh- 
ter.] I have been looking for the cable ever 
since, so I cannot vouch for its accuracy. In 
the present state of our capacity to guard 
classified information it is always possible 
that documents appear out of context. I 
would not think that this particular document 
should do any significant damage. 

The United States believes — indeed, it was 
one of the organizers of the North-South 
dialogue — we believe that an inter- 
national order can only be built on the coop- 
eration between the developed and the de- 
veloping nations. We believe that the de- 
veloped nations have a special obligation to 
put forward constructive, concrete proposals 
and that the developing nations have an obli- 
gation to proceed in a spirit of discussion 
rather than a spirit of confrontation. 

It is true that we did not think that this 
was the best moment for the conference. An 
outgoing Administration would be in the ex- 
tremely difficult position of having to put 
forward proposals that would have to be im- 
plemented by another Administration. And 
therefore it did not seem to us to be the right 
moment to have a conference, because either 
we would confine ourselves to the period for 
which we had responsibility and would there- 
fore disappoint the developing countries or we 
would commit a new Administration to a pro- 
gram which it had no part in shaping. 

There were other reasons that other coun- 
tries had for the postponement, but as far as 
the United States is concerned, this was the 
reason why we favored a postponement. 



Department of State Bulletin 



whatever extracts fi'om obtuse documents 
may appear in newspapers. But I will track 
down that document if it exists. 

Q. If Spain joins NATO have yon studied 
what might be the next response of the Soviet 
Union to this diseqidUbrinin? 

Secretary Kissinger: They might ask Al- 
bania to join the Warsaw Pact. [Laughter.] 

The United States has favored the partici- 
pation of Spain in NATO, and the political 
progress that is being made in Spain, which 
we welcome, in our view should speed the 
day when that situation is possible. I do not 
believe that this will bring about a change in 
the military balance, because we have al- 
ready a bilateral arrangement with Spain and 
clearly it is not a part of any offensive inten- 
tion against the Soviet Union. So we believe 
that it is a matter that should not affect 
Soviet dispositions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the differences 
that is frequeyitly cited between the kind of 
foreign policy that you have conducted and 
the type of foreign policy that President-elect 
Carter may conduct has to do with morality. 
Do you believe President-elect Carter may be 
making a mistake by giving too much em- 
phasis to the subject of morality, or do you 
feel, in fact, that yoii have conducted a 
foreign policy with full regard to that? 

Secretary Kissinger: I made a rather ex- 
tensive speech on that subject before our 
election. I believe that the relationship be- 
tween morality and foreign policy is not a 
simple one. 

I agree with what my successor said at a 
press conference — that it is necessary to 
have strong moral convictions but it is also 
necessary to bring into relationship the 
realities of the situation with moral pur- 
poses. It is the essence of moral purposes 
that they appear absolute; it is the essence of 
foreign policy that any individual step can 
only be partial. It is the essence of morality 
that it is asserted to be universal; it is the 
essence of foreign policy to take into account 
the views of others that may also be claimed 
to be universal. 

Now, I do not believe that what I now as- 



sert about my conduct of foreign policy will 
be decisive. I believe that a foreign policy 
without moral convictions lacks a sense of di- 
rection and a sense of purpose, but what bal- 
ance is struck in each Administration is very 
hard to predict and very difficult to foretell 
from abstract statements. 

Q. Economic questions have appeared 
more proyniyiently in your deliberations this 
week than they have at some previous al- 
liance meetings. Could you give us your 
thoughts on the extent to which there is a 
danger that the global economic situation 
might deteriorate to the point where econoyn- 
ic, social, ayid political stability in the al- 
liance was brought into some question — to 
what exteyit that prospect is bro^ight nearer by 
a substantial increase in oil prices? 

Secretary Kissinger: The United States is 
strongly opposed to any significant increase 
in oil prices, precisely because it believes 
that the impact of those on the global econ- 
omy would be extremely unfortunate and 
would have consequences which in the long 
run, or even in the medium run, would affect 
the very countries that are now raising or 
thinking of raising the oil prices. 

I believe that the last three or four years 
have made clear that one can no longer com- 
partmentalize foreign policy into security, 
political, and economic concerns. The social 
cohesion of all our societies, our capacity to 
act with conviction internationally, depends 
on growing and vital economies. And these 
economies in turn depend on the mutual 
sense of responsibility for each other of the 
free countries. This is why these economic 
summits have been both symbolically and 
substantively important and why I believe 
and hope that they will remain a feature of 
the international scene and why one can no 
longer separate the security concerns. 

Q. An easy question for you, sir. What 
kiyid of advice, as we sit here at NATO today 
and you prepare to step down, do you have 
for Cyrus Vance? 

Secretary Kissinger: We will take one 
more question after this one, but since you 
will all stampede out to report the monumen- 



January 3, 1977 



tal news that you have been imparted here, I 
want to take this opportunity to thank you 
for the relative courtesy with which I have 
always been treated here and the fairness 
which you have shown. 

As far as advice for Cyrus Vance is con- 
cerned, I wish him well. I have repeatedly 
stated that he is extremely well qualified for 
his position. I have already made available to 
him all communications that come to me. He 
will be given a schedule of all my activities in 
Washington, and he is free to participate in 
any of them and at any meetings that I have. 
I will be spending most of the day with him 
next Wednesday, and we will be meeting 
regularly and frequently after that. 

I do not think it would be appropriate for 
me, however, to give public advice to my 
successor before I have had an opportunity 
for full discussions with him. But I do want 
to say that he deserves the confidence of the 
American people, that he deserves the confi- 
dence of all foreign countries who are con- 
cerned with the direction of American policy. 

Q. Would you like to say something, sir, 
about the future of East-West relations in the 
light of the large commercial debts that the 
Soviets are acquiring toward the West and 
the continued extension of easy credit and 
transfer of Western technology to the 
Soviets ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, let me separate 
the two questions — one, the extension of 
credit and transfer of technology; the second, 
the future of the East-West relations. 

With respect to the extension of credit, I 
advocated last year at the OECD [Organiza- 
tion for Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment] meeting, and I repeated it at the NATO 
meeting, that it is essential for the industrial 
democracies to develop a common approach 
and a common concept. It makes no sense for 
these countries to compete with each other 
on credit terms without taking a look at the 
overall picture and the overall consequences 
of their actions. So I believe on the technical 
and economic issue that this is an area in 
which great coherence among the industrial 
democracies is essential. 

As for the future of East-West relations, in 



the nuclear age there can be no question that 
we have a dual responsibility. One is to pre- 
vent any temptation on the part of those 
countries that continue to multiply their ar- 
maments to believe that they can achieve 
political or economic solutions by the use of 
arms, and we therefore have to see to our se- 
curity and make the necessary efforts. At the 
same time, the future of world peace, and in- 
deed perhaps the survival of humanity de- 
pend on whether we can, in the relationship 
between East and West, find solutions to our 
common problems and a code of restraint, 
lest we slide again — as has happened so often 
before in history through a series of miscal- 
culations and the accumulation of marginal 
advantages — into a perhaps unimaginable 
catastrophe. So, we have the task of security 
and the task of construction of peace. And 
the challenge to the Western societies is 
whether they can pursue both policies simul- 
taneously or whether they will slight one at 
the expense of the other. 

JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE, LONDON, 
DECEMBER 10 

Press release 601 dated December IS 

Foreign Secretary Crosland: Dr. Kissinger 
is paying a valedictory visit to London, which 
he has long since planned, following the 
NATO conference in Brussels. He will be 
doing a number of important things — going 
to a football match tomorrow, going to the 
theater tomorrow night. More importantly, 
he is being given a farewell dinner — farewell 
only in his role as Secretary of State — by the 
Prime Minister this evening at No. 10. And 
we are very glad to welcome him here. 

This, in fact, was arranged — this visit — a 
long time before we also arranged by coinci- 
dence a roundup review of the Rhodesian 
situation with Mr. Ivor Richard, who has 
come back from Geneva for this. It has been 
a very helpful accident that the two have fall- 
en together, because we have been able to 
exchange views with Ivor Richard as well as 
with Dr. Kissinger's officials and my officials 
on Rhodesia. And I think that we approached 
that problem with a very wide measure of 
agreement. 



Department of State Bulletin 



We have not taken any decisions this 
evening — did not intend, in fact, to take any 
decisions this evening. We shall be meeting 
again privately and bilaterally for further 
talks tomorrow morning, and I do not doubt 
that in any event I shall make a statement to 
the House before Parliament recesses for 
Christmas. 

Now we are rather pushed for time, so I 
will not say any more than that at the begin- 
ning of the conference and simply answer any 
questions. 

Q. I would like to ask Dr. Kissinger how 
he sees the Rhodesian situation at the mo- 
ment. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think that the 
conference has been very ably conducted by 
Mr. Richard, that in a conference between 
parties where the distrust is so profound, in- 
evitably many disagreements will emerge. 

The United States has supported majority 
rule in Rhodesia and continues to support 
this. And I believe that from what I have 
heard from Mr. Richard and from what I 
know through our constant contacts during 
the negotiations that a possibility for prog- 
ress exists and will be explored to the fullest 
by the British Government. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Smith [Ian D. 
Smith, of Rhodesia] said in Geneva this af- 
ternoon that he had been brought there under 
false pretenses, that he had understood he was 
there to implement the solemn, firm, and 
binding agreement. Do you think he has any 
reasonable grounds for saying that? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think we have gone 
over this allegation repeatedly. We gave Mr. 
Smith our best judgment of a framework for 
negotiations. These negotiations are now 
going on; and obviously, in any negotiation, 
the views of all the parties must be consid- 
ered. 

Q. Mr. Crosland, when you say that no de- 
cisions have been taken, what kind of deci- 
sions might you have taken? 

Foreign Secretary Crosland: It is not a 
question of taking decisions week by week, I 
do not think. We constantly review the prog- 



ress of the conference with Ivor Richard. He 
comes back here periodically, as you know. 
And we have to decide to take different deci- 
sions according to the period of time. We did 
take a decision 10 days ago that I would give 
a parliamentary answer saying that the 
British Government would be prepared to 
have the British presence in Rhodesia, for 
instance. 

It is not a question of specific decisions 
being required, but a question of regular re- 
view of how the Geneva conference is going 
to see whether there is something further 
which we, the British Government, or the 
chairman should do in order to bring it more 
successfully to a conclusion. 

Q. Is there any chance that you would ask 
Dr. Kissinger to once again take an active 
part in the negotiations? 

Foreign Secretary Crosland: Well, I mean, 
I love Dr. Kissinger deeply — and I would 
love him to live a full and active life. 

But I do not think I have any intention, 
and I do not think he has any intention, that 
we should agree together that the United 
States should resume the critically important 
role which they pursued — Dr. Kissinger pur- 
sued on America's behalf — last summer. No. 
I think that it is agreed between the two 
governments, and certainly the two of us, 
that the American role, which was critical 
and crucial during those months last sum- 
mer, should at a certain point give way to a 
role that could be only exercised by Great 
Britain as the power that had some sort of 
legal, constitutional, and even colonial re- 
sponsibility. And so it has not been a matter 
of discussion between us. 

Q. In view of the many stories that come 
out about what Mr. Smith has understood or 
not understood, are you prepared to meet 
with him again before you retire as Secretary 
of State to clear this up? 

Secretary Kissinger: I do not think there is 
any need for me to meet Mr. Smith to clear 
this up. We have repeatedly communicated 
with him our understanding of what was dis- 
cussed. I do not think there is any need for a 
further meeting. 



January 3, 1977 



Foreign Secretary Crosland: We do not 
want too much of a rerun of this. Surely, 
both Dr. Kissinger and I have answered 
questions on this subject now for a period of 
two months, I should think about 500 times. 

Q. In reference to your answer before that 
negotiations are a time for considering the 
views of all parties, have the black leaders 
changed their views or their positions since 
you went to Africa, ayid do you consider this 
insincere or inconstant or just a normal 
course of events in negotiations? 

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, when I 
went to Africa I dealt with, primarily with, 
two of the frontline states. Because of the 
agreement we had made with President Nye- 
rere [of Tanzania] we did not deal with the 
nationalist leaders directly. 

Secondly, this is the first time that all of 
the nationalist leaders have been together in 
one negotiation, and it is therefore under- 
standable that points of view will evolve and 
that points of view would be presented that 
we had not heard previously from parties 
with which we had not been in contact. 

It is not a question of good faith; it is a 
question of finding a solution to a problem 
that has existed for a decade or more, that 
needs the serious concern of all of the par- 
ties. This is what I understand Mr. Richard 
is doing. And, again, I want to compliment 
him and to make clear that the United States 
fully supports the British conduct of the 
negotiations and the actions taken by the 
Foreign Secretary and Mr. Richard. 

Q. Woiild you say, sir, that Mr. Smith's 
delegation has also been playing fair as you 
described the blacks as playing fair? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think the Rhodesian 
delegation has also, within its lights, played 
fair. I do not think this issue can be settled 
by accusing each other of fairness or unfair- 
ness. Obviously, both parties are approaching 
this problem from totally different points of 
view, which produced the dilemmas to begin 
with. It is now to arrange for the transfer of 
power from the white minority to the black 
majority, which is the essence of the prob- 



lem, under conditions in which the white 
minority has an opportunity to adjust to the 
new, changed conditions. It is obviously an 
enormously delicate and complicated issue, 
very painful to some and probably very pain- 
ful to all, for one side to give up power, for 
the other to take it in stages. 

And I do not think any purpose is served 
by accusing any of the parties of bad faith, 
but rather to look, as I understand Mr. 
Richard is seeking, for some way by which 
the impasse can be broken. And from what I 
have heard I believe that possibilities exist 
which require exploration. 

Q. The black nationalist leaders in Geneva 
are clearly very anxious to have spelled out 
to them what the direct role Britain might be 
prepared to take during the transitional gov- 
eryiment period. Are you yet prepared to re- 
veal anything about that? 

Foreigyi Secretary Crosland: No, I am not 
at the moment. I stick to what I said when I 
made the statement about the British pres- 
ence, which was this: that having expressed 
our willingness to have a British presence, 
we wanted to elicit from the black African 
leaders — we wanted to elicit from them what 
useful role they thought the British could 
play. In other words, we want to get a sense 
of how they see a British role before we 
commit ourselves to the detail of what kind 
of a role we will be prepared to play. 

Q. [Inaudible] 

Foreign Secretary Crosland: No, not as 
yet; but mind you, some interesting points 
have come out. 

Q. Do you see the recess as a helpful de- 
velopment, or does it mean negotiating from 
some kind of trouble? 

Foreign Secretary Crosland: What recess 
is this? 

Q. From the Geneva conference. 

Foreign Secretary Croslajid: I have not 
decided on a recess. I might make a state- 
ment about that next week. 



Department of State Bulletin 



Q. You said earlier that you hoped to make 
a statement on Rhodesia before the Christ- 
mas recess. In that statement will you spell 
out the direct role that you envisage? 

Foreign Secretary Crosland: I should wait 
for the statement. It will be lucid and very 
interesting. 

Thank you very much indeed. 



North Atlantic Council Meets 
at Brussels 

Folloiving is the text of a message from 
President-elect Carter delivered on his behalf 
by Secretary Kissinger in the tninisterial 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council on De- 
cember 9, together with the text of a com- 
munique issued at the conclusion of the 
meeting on December 10. 



MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT-ELECT CARTER 
DELIVERED BY SECRETARY KISSINGER 

Press release 595 dated December 10 

Our NATO alliance lies at the heart of the 
partnership between North America and 
Western Europe. NATO is the essential in- 
strument for enhancing our collective securi- 
ty. The American commitment to maintain- 
ing the NATO alliance shall be sustained and 
strengthened under my Administration. 

Over the past month, I discussed a number 
of challenges that face NATO — that we main- 
tain a common strategy against common 
threats, that we have efficient and strong 
military forces, and that we consult closely 
as we negotiate with others on both Euro- 
pean and global issues. I have no doubt that 
these challenges can be met. 

I take the opportunity of this message to 
reaffirm that belief. I am convinced that 
NATO's mission and the North Atlantic al- 
liance are no less important today than when 
NATO was originally established. I look for- 
ward to working closely with all the govern- 
ments represented at this meeting. 



NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL COMMUNIQUE 

Press release 602 dated December 13 

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministe- 
rial session in Brussels on 9th and 10th De- 
cember. Ministers recognized the indispen- 
sable role of a stong alliance in ensuring the 
security of member countries, and in provid- 
ing the foundation for their efforts to estab- 
lish a more constructive and stable relation- 
ship with the Warsaw Pact countries. They 
expressed their determination to maintain 
and enhance the cohesion and strength of the 
Alliance. 

2. Ministers stressed the need for East- 
West relations to develop at a more satisfac- 
tory pace. They recognized nonetheless that 
progressive improvement of these relations 
may be slow and sometimes difficult, and 
that it calls for perseverance and steadiness 
over the years. They emphasized that their 
governments would continue to seek realistic 
opportunities to resolve points of difference 
with the East and to build on mutual inter- 
est, and look for corresponding efforts by the 
Warsaw Pact countries. 

Ministers stressed, however, that if de- 
tente is to progress, with the necessary pub- 
lic support, and not to falter, there must be 
real improvements across the entire range of 
international relations. It should not be as- 
sumed that heightened tensions in one area 
of relations would not have repercussions on 
other areas. In all parts of the world, con- 
frontation can and should be avoided by re- 
spect for the accepted principles of interna- 
tional behavior. 

Ministers also emphasized the cardinal im- 
portance they attached to reducing the risks 
of confrontation in the military sphere. They 
viewed with concern the high level of mili- 
tary expenditure in the Soviet Union and the 
continued disquieting expansion of the mili- 
tary power of the Warsaw Pact on land, air 
and sea, which are difficult to reconcile with 
the avowed desire of the Soviet Union to im- 
prove East-West relations. Faced with this 
persistent growth in military might. Minis- 
ters reiterated their determination to take 
the measures necessary to maintain and im- 



January 3, 1977 



prove their own defensive military forces, in 
order to ensure credible deterrence and to 
safeguard their countries from any risk of 
military aggression or political pressure. 

3. At the same time, Ministers expressed 
their concern that the continued expansion of 
armaments w^ould increasingly endanger not 
only world security but also the economic 
well-being of all nations. They stressed that 
these dangers could only be averted if all 
countries concerned joined in realistic efforts 
to achieve genuine and controlled measures 
of disarmament and arms control. 

Ministers confirmed that the countries of 
the Alliance, in the event of an attack on 
them, cannot renounce the use, as may be 
required for defense, of any of the means 
available to them. Ministers also stated their 
view that all States which participated in the 
CSCE should respect strictly the renuncia- 
tion of the threat or use of force as laid down 
in the Charter of the United Nations and 
reaffirmed in the Final Act of Helsinki. > This 
renunciation must apply to all types of 
weapons. It is essential for the strengthening 
of peace that there should be no build-up of 
armaments of any type beyond the needs of 
defense, a policy which has always been fol- 
lowed by the Alliance. Ministers also stated 
their position that the Alliance will remain a 
free association open to all European states 
devoted to the defense of the freedom, com- 
mon heritage and civilization of their 
peoples. Furthermore, Ministers recalled 
that the right of states to belong or not to 
belong to treaties of alliance was confirmed 
in the Final Act of Helsinki. It is in light of 
these considerations that they have con- 
cluded that the recently published Warsaw 
Pact proposals could not be accepted. 

4. Ministers stated again the determina- 
tion of their governments to continue to 
comply with all the principles and provisions 
of the Final Act of the CSCE and expected 
that all other signatories would take steps to 
fully implement them. They noted that some 
progress had been made in implementation. 



'For text of the Final Act of the Conference on Se- 
curity and Cooperation in Europe, signed at Helsinki 
on Aug. 1, 1975, see Bulletin of Sept. 1, 1975, p. 
323. 



However, much remains to be done before 
the benefits of the Final Act become signifi- 
cantly apparent in tangible improvements, 
not only in relations between states, but also 
in the lives of peoples and individuals. Minis- 
ters recalled that the Final Act acknowledges 
that wider human contacts and dissemination 
of information would contribute to the 
strengthening of peace and expressed the 
hope that the Warsaw Pact countries would 
take measures leading to significant progress 
in the pace of implementation of the Final 
Act in the months to come. 

Ministers also noted that Allied govern- 
ments had fully and scrupulously im- 
plemented the provisions of the Final Act 
dealing with confidence-building measures. 
They noted that the practice of notifying 
major maneuvers was beginning to be estab- 
lished; however, unlike Allied countries, 
Warsaw Pact countries had still not notified 
maneuvers involving less than 25,000 men. 
They regretted that the Warsaw Pact coun- 
tries had failed up to now to accept invita- 
tions to send observers to Western maneu- 
vers. 

Ministers looked forward with interest to 
the follow-up meeting to be held in Belgrade 
during 1977. The meeting provides an oppor- 
tunity for a thorough and objective review of 
the situation prevailing in all the signatory 
countries as regards all the areas covered by 
the Final Act, and also for considering the 
further progress that could be made towards 
the objective agreed in Helsinki. Allied gov- 
ernments intend to play their full part in 
seeking positive results, with the aim of fur- 
thering the cause of peace and cooperation in 
Europe. 

5. Ministers heard a report from the 
United States Secretary of State on the 
progress and prospects of the United 
States-USSR Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks and discussed the relationship between 
the SALT negotiations and Allied security 
interests. Ministers found the report on 
SALT both useful and informative and wel- 
comed continued United States efforts to- 
wards achievement of a satisfactory SALT 
agreement which takes into account Allied 
interests and concerns. 



10 



Department of State Bulletin 



6. Ministers of the participating countries 
reviewed the state of negotiations in Vienna 
on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions 
(MBFR). They expressed their conviction 
that these negotiations would achieve their 
agreed aim of contributing to a more stable 
relationship and to the strengthening of 
peace and security in Europe only if they 
were to result in eliminating the existing 
ground force manpower disparity in Central 
Europe and in mitigating the disparity in 
main battle tanks. 

These Ministers reaffirmed their position 
that these objectives would be achieved by 
their proposal to establish, in the area of re- 
ductions, approximate parity in ground 
forces in the form of a common collective ceil- 
ing for ground force manpower on each side 
and to reduce the disparity in main battle 
tanks. These Ministers stressed that agree- 
ment to the goal of a common collective ceil- 
ing and reductions of United States and 
Soviet ground forces in the first phase would 
be an important and practical first step lead- 
ing to the common collective ceiling which 
would be reached through additional reduc- 
tions in the second phase. 

These Ministers noted with regret that the 
important specific additional offer they made 
one year ago had thus far not met with an 
adequate response. They reaffirmed their 
conviction that the Western proposals pro- 
vided a reasonable foundation for a just and 
equitable MBFR agreement. They re- 
emphasized their continuing resolve to press 
for the achievement of the objectives of the 
Western participants which would ensure 
undiminished security for all countries con- 
cerned. They expressed satisfaction with 
their governments' continuing solidarity, and 
reaffirmed the principle that NATO forces 
should not be reduced except in the context 
of Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction 
agreements. 

7. In connection with Germany and Berlin, 
Ministers reviewed the developments which 
had occurred since their last meeting in May 
1976. 

Ministers expressed themselves satisfied 
with the progress which has been possible in 
matters relating to Berlin on the basis of the 



Quadripartite Agreement during the five 
years since its signature. In particular, the 
agreement had significantly alleviated the 
lives of many Germans. 

Ministers confirmed the continued com- 
mitment of their countries to the security 
and viability of Berlin. These remain essen- 
tial elements of Western policy, and of de- 
tente between East and West. They noted 
the need for Berlin fully to benefit from any 
improvement in East- West relations, in par- 
ticular through its ties to the Federal Repub- 
lic of Germany as they are confirmed in the 
Quadripartite Agreement. 

Ministers emphasized that the Quadripar- 
tite Agreement was part of a greater balance 
of interests which had, to a very great de- 
gree, made possible and contributed to the 
development of better relations between 
East and West in Europe. They noted that 
this process would be placed in serious jeop- 
ardy if any of the signatories failed fully to 
observe the commitments which it undertook 
in the Quadripartite Agreement. 

8. Ministers reviewed developments in the 
Mediterranean area since their last meeting. 
They welcomed the end of hostilities in the 
Lebanon and expressed the hope that there 
would be continued progress towards stabil- 
ity and reconstruction in that country. They 
considered, nonetheless, that the continuing 
instability in the Middle East still gave cause 
for serious concern and could have dangerous 
consequences. They underlined the urgency 
of continuing efforts designed to achieve an 
overall settlement resulting in a just and 
durable peace in the Middle East. 

Ministers took note of the report on the 
situation in the Mediterranean prepared on 
their instructions. They emphasized the need 
to preserve the balance of forces throughout 
the Mediterranean area. They requested the 
Council in Permanent Session to continue its 
consultations on these questions and report 
to them again at their next meeting. 

In this context. Ministers reaffirmed their 
view that the coming into operation of de- 
fense cooperation agreements between Allied 
countries will strengthen the Allied defenses 
in the Mediterranean. 

The Ministers voiced their satisfaction on 



January 3, 1977 



11 



the agreement between Greece and Turkey 
on the procedure to be followed for the delim- 
itation of the continental shelf and expressed 
their hope for the successful solution of this 
issue and the Aegean air space matters. 

9. In the context of improving the military 
capability of the Alliance and making more 
effective use of available resources, Minis- 
ters discussed various aspects of stand- 
ardization and interoperability of equipment 
and procedures. They approved the second 
report by the ad hoc Committee on Equip- 
ment Interoperability and agreed to take a 
number of actions, particularly in respect to 
tactical area communications, rearming of 
tactical aircraft and the implementation of 
NATO standardization agreements. They au- 
thorized the Committee to continue its ef- 
forts for the time being, both in specific 
areas and in the elaboration of procedures for 
ensuring the interoperability of future 
equipment. They also noted the progress in 
standardization achieved by the Conference of 
National Armaments Directors in promoting 
cooperation among member nations in 
selected equipment areas. 

10. Ministers took note of the progress 
achieved by the Committee on the Chal- 
lenges of Modern Society (CCMS), and its 
contribution to effective international coop- 
eration in dealing with environmental prob- 
lems confronting our societies. They took 
note of the completion of the pilot studies on 
advanced health care and urban transporta- 
tion, and of the Committee's continuing em- 
phasis on implementation by member coun- 
tries of action resolutions. Ministers noted 
and endorsed the initiation of two new pilot 
studies, one to assist in world-wide efforts to 
clean the marine environment and the other 
to permit environmentally acceptable utiliza- 
tion of high-sulfur coal and oil. Ministers 
noted too that the Committee's discussions 
focused attention on global issues such as the 
effect of fluorocarbons on the stratosphere 
and long-range transport of air pollutants. 

11. Ministers recognized that the basic 
problems in East-West relations were un- 
likely to be resolved quickly and that the Al- 
liance must respond with a long-term effort 
commensurate to the challenges confronting 



it. The Allies could rely not only on their ma- 
terial resources, but also on the creative 
power demonstrated in all fields by their free 
and democratic societies. Ministers were con- 
fident that, with the mutual support and sol- 
idarity provided by the Alliance, their gov- 
ernments and peoples would be able to over- 
come the problems which faced them. 

12. The next Ministerial session of the 
North Atlantic Council will be held in Lon- 
don on 10th and 11th May, 1977. 



Prime Minister Andreotti of Italy 
Visits Washington 

Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti of the Ital- 
ian Republic made an official visit to Wash- 
ington December 5-8,' during which he met 
with President Ford and other government of- 
ficials. Following is an exchange of remarks 
between President Ford and Prime Minister 
Ayidreotti at a welcoming ceremony on the 
South Lawn of the White House on Decem- 
ber 6. > 

Weekly Coni|ijl:ni(in of Presidential Documents dated December 13 

PRESIDENT FORD 

Prime Minister Andreotti, I am delighted 
to welcome you and your party to Washing- 
ton, D.C., our National Capital. 

Mr. Prime Minister, I have long looked 
forward to this meeting — since July, when 
you took office as President of the Council of 
Ministers. 

Since that time, you have worked intensely 
and with great courage and determination on 
the difficult issues facing your nation and 
your government. I am extremely pleased 
that you have found time for this visit and for 
consultations on the broad range of interests 
shared by our two governments. 

During the last two years, the United 



' For an exchange of toasts between President Ford 
and Prime Minister Andreotti at a dinner at the White 
House on Dec. 6, see Weekly Compilation of Presiden- 
tial Documents dated Dec. 13, 1976, p. 1700. 



12 



Department of State Bulletin 



States and Italy have consulted at the high- 
est levels with greater frequency than ever 
before. President Leone's state visit to the 
United States in 1974 was the first state visit 
of this Administration. Our leaders have met 
at NATO summits and economic summits and 
at the European Security Conference. I re- 
member with great warmth my own trip to 
your country a year and a half ago and the 
friendship extended to me on behalf of the 
American people by the Italian people and by 
your government. 

We are friends. We are allies. We have 
worked together and solved problems to- 
gether. We will do so in the future. 

Few countries have so special a place in 
the hearts of the American people. The 
United States and Italy are committed to 
freedom and share a firm dedication to de- 
mocracy. We are both committed to the 
strength of the North Atlantic alliance and to 
the reduction of tensions which threaten in- 
ternational peace and stability. 

Americans value the constructive role of 
Italy in the world today and in the past. We 
deeply appreciate Italy's contribution to 
NATO, your contribution to a stronger 
Europe — working together with the United 
States — your contribution to the dialogue 
with the developing nations, and your dedi- 
cation to peace and international understand- 
ing. 

Mr. Prime Minister, our two governments 
have made it a priority task to strengthen 
the North Atlantic alliance. The alliance has 
made progress in strengthening its defenses, 
standardizing equipment, and coordination of 
strategies and planning. Nevertheless, much 
more needs to be done. 

All of us know that the defensive strength 
and the cohesion of our alliance are crucial to 
the balance of power in Europe that is so 
critical to European freedom and interna- 
tional security. 

Our alliance, of course, has a purpose be- 
yond military defense. The United States 
and Italy both recognize that Western 
Europe unity is a pillar of world peace. We 
must reduce tensions and reduce the possibil- 
ity of confrontation in Central Europe, where 
almost 2 million armed men face one another. 



We must promote mutually beneficial coop- 
eration between Western and Eastern 
Europe. 

The industrial democracies, if we are to be 
the masters of our own destiny, must work 
together, for we share basic, common inter- 
ests on global issues — from defense to 
energy, the environment, trade, and rela- 
tions with the developing countries of the 
world. 

Mr. Prime Minister, our discussions on 
these many issues will be of great value to 
the United States not only in practical terms, 
but to reaffirm our profound friendship. Few- 
nations are linked as strongly as the United 
States of America and the Republic of Italy 
by history, culture, economics, and the emi- 
gration of peoples. Our friendship has deep 
roots that insure its preservation. 

Italy's contribution was one of the high- 
lights of America's Bicentennial celebration. 
We especially welcomed, Mr. Prime Minis- 
ter, the visit of Mrs. Vittoria Leone, the 
First Lady of Italy, when the La Scala Opera 
came here for its spectacular performance. 
The American people thank you for this won- 
derful presentation. 

I look forward with great anticipation, Mr. 
Prime Minister, to our discussions today and 
tonight. As two democratic allies, we have a 
large area of common ground and many com- 
mon concerns. 

I bid you and your party, on behalf of the 
American people, a hearty welcome to the 
United States of America. 

PRIME MINISTER ANDREOTTI^ 

Mr. President, I am deeply grateful for the 
invitation you were kind enough to extend to 
me at a particularly challenging time for my 
country. 

Two years after the visit of President 
Leone — whom you kindly mentioned — your 
invitation confirms, through the frequency of 
our meetings, the spirit of close and sincere 
friendship between the United States and 
Italy. And I equally thank you for the warm 



^ Prime Minister Andreotti spoke in Italian. 



January 3, 1977 



13 



words you just expressed about my country 
and myself. 

The United States and Italy are bound by 
ties of alliance and cooperation, by harmoni- 
ous ideals of democracy, and by choices of 
peace, freedom, and development. The At- 
lantic alliance, which binds our two nations in 
a common objective of defense, represents a 
guarantee of security for the Western World, 
to which we belong for historical vocation 
and on account of political choice, which 
proves to be an essential element of the inter- 
national strategic balance, basic condition for 
a detente policy which will create the basis of 
a long-lasting peace. 

With the same objectives of peace and 
progress, Italy is engaged, together with its 
partners of the European Community, in a 
policy of unity which will permit Europe to 
contribute to the creation of a more just and 
stable world. 

Many elements unite us: the interest in so- 
cial and cultural progress; in the advance- 
ment of science; in respect of men; in the 
choice of a style of life which guarantees and 
protects, to the greatest extent, the de- 
velopment of capabilities and potential for 
initiative of the individual; the awareness, 
both political and moral, of a necessary inter- 
relationship and solidarity among all nations; 
the search for international order, which em- 
phasizes at the same time the rights of men 
and those of nations; a vision of international 
relations which aim, to quote the unforgetta- 
ble words of George Washington's farewell 
speech, to observe good faith and justice to- 
ward nations and cultivate peace and har- 
mony with everybody. 

But beyond these common ideals, our two 
countries are joined by the presence in this 
hospitable country of America of a large 
community of Italian-Americans who, 
through their work and human qualities, 
honored their land of origin and contributed 
to the increased prosperity and greatness of 
their new country. 

The Bicentennial of the Declaration of In- 
dependence of the United States reminds us 
of the ideals of the Founding Fathers who 
are both yours and ours, founders of the 
United States and those of major instru- 
ments of an era of Western history which 



brought man and his freedom to the center of 
our civilization. 

The American Revolution is an element of 
the continuity of Western history and also 
renews it. It allows the Western World to 
accept the challenges of science, technology, 
industry, and to carry out a social transfor- 
mation which is of paramount importance 
within the framework of a humanistic soci- 
ety, inspired in the values rediscovered by 
the Renaissance men. This era of the West- 
ern World's history cannot be considered 
complete. Its motivations and hopes are still 
alive. The ideal thrust must renew itself 
through a constant critical search for the 
most adequate objectives in order to accept 
present and future challenges. To this pur- 
pose, we are stimulated by the commitment 
and the concerns of the new generation. 

Mr. President, during the scheduled meet- 
ings we will deal with many issues, because 
the present circumstances present many 
problems and they require an effort of imagi- 
nation and understanding. But the guarantee 
of their success is given by the spirit of 
openness and sincerity which always charac- 
terized the Italian-American relationships 
during the past 30 years. 

Mr. President, on behalf of the President 
of the Italian Republic, of the Italian Gov- 
ernment, and conveying the feelings of the 
Italian people, I bring you warm and friendly 
greetings which I extend to Mrs. Ford and to 
your entire family. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 



94th Congress, 2d Session 

International Banking Act of 1976. Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions of the Senate 
Committee on Banl<ing, Housing and Urban Affairs 
on H.R. 13876, To Pi-ovide for Federal Regulation of 
Participation by Foreign Banks in Domestic Financial 
Markets. August 31, 1976. 399 pp. 

U.S. Honey Industry. Communication from the Presi- 
dent of the United States transmitting a report on his 
determination that import relief recommended by the 
U.S. International Trade Commission for the U.S. 
honey industry is not in the national economic inter- 
est, pursuant to section 203(b)(2) of the Trade Act of 
1974. H. Doc. 94-596. August 31, 1976. 2 pp. 



14 



Department of State Bulletin 



TREATY INFORMATION 



United States and Romania Sign 
New Fisheries Agreement 



Joint Statement 



Press release 581 dated November 23 



On November 23, 1976, representatives of 
the United States and the Socialist Republic 
of Romania signed a new agreement relating 
to fishing activities of Romania off the coasts 
of the United States. The agreement sets out 
the arrangements between the countries 
which will govern fishing by Romanian ves- 
sels within the fishery conservation zone of 
the United States beginning March 1, 1977. 
The agreement will come into force after the 
completion of internal procedures by both 
governments. The signing of this agreement 
took place at Bucharest. Minister of Trans- 
portation and Telecommunications, Traian 
Dudas, signed for the Socialist Republic of 
Romania. Harry G. Barnes, Jr., U.S. Am- 
bassador to Romania, signed for the United 
States. Both delegations expressed their 
satisfaction with the new accord. 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Coffee 

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. 
Done at London December 3, 1975. Entered into force 
provisionally October 1, 1976. 

Ratifications deposited: Panama, December 13, 1976; 
Spain, December 9, 1976; Togo, December 8, 1976. 
Acceptance deposited: Japan, December 10, 1976. 

Economic Cooperation 

Agreement establishing a Financial Support Fund of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De- 
velopment. Done at Paris April 9, 1975.' 
Ratification deposited: Spain, Decembers, 1976. 

Finance 

Agreement establishing the African Development 



Fund, with schedules. Done at Abidjan November 29, 
1972. Entered into force June 30, 1973. 
Acceptance deposited: United States, November 18, 
1976. 

Oil Pollution 

International convention on civil liability for oil pollu- 
tion damage. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. 
Entered into force June 19, 1975. ^ 
Ratification deposited: Portugal, November 26, 1976. 

Postal 

Additional protocol to the constitution of the Postal 
Union of the Americas and Spain, general regula- 
tions, regulations governing the International Office 
and Transfer Office, and convention with final pro- 
tocol and detailed regulations. Done at Lima March 
18, 1976. Entered into force October 1, 1976, provi- 
sionally, e.xcept for art. 107, par. 1 of the general 
regulations which entered into force March 18, 1976, 
provisionally. 

Signatures: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba,^ Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hon- 
duras, Me.xico, Nicaragua, Panama,^ Paraguay, 
Peru, Spain, United States,^ Uruguay, Venezuela, 
March 18, 1976. 
Money order agreement and final protocol of the Postal 
Union of the Americas and Spain. Done at Lima 
March 18, 1976. Entered into force October 1, 1976, 
provisionally. 

Signatures: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic. Ecuador. El Sal- 
vador, Guatemala, Honduras, Me.xico. Nicaragua, 
Panama,-'' Peru, Spain, United States,^ Uruguay, 
Venezuela, March 18, 1976. 
Parcel post agreement, final protocol and detailed regu- 
lations of the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain. 
Done at Lima March 18, 1976. Entered into force Oc- 
tober 1, 1976, provisionally. 

Signatures: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, 
Chile, Colombia. Costa Rica, Cuba,^ Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hon- 
duras, Me.xico, Nicaragua, Panama,^ Paraguay, 
Peru, Spain, United States,^ Uruguav, Venezuela, 
March 18, 1976. 

Safety at Sea 

Convention on the international regulations for pre- 
venting collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London Oc- 
tober 20, 1972. Enters into force July 15, 1977. 
Ratification deposited: New Zealand, November 26, 
1976. 

Tin 

Fifth international tin agreement, with annexes. Done 
at Geneva June 21, 1975. Entered into force provi- 
sionally July 1, 1976. 
Ratification deposited: Spain, December 9, 1976. 

Wheat 

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat 
trade convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971. Done at Washington March 17, 
1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect 



' Not in force. 

^ Not in force for the United States. 

^ With declarations. 



January 3, 1977 



15 



to certain provisions and July 1, 1976, with respect to 
other provisions. 

Acceptance deposited: Japan, December 10, 1976. 
Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid 
convention (part of the international wheat agree- 
ment) 1971. Done at Washington March 17, 1976. En- 
tered into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain 
provisions and July 1, 1976, with respect to other 
provisions. 
Acceptance deposited: Japan, December 10, 1976.'' 

World Heritage 

Convention concerning the protection of the world cul- 
tural and natural heritage. Done at Paris November 
23, 1972. Entered into force December 17, 1975. 
TIAS 8226. 

Acceptance deposited: Canada, July 23, 1976. 
Ratification deposited: Pakistan, July 23,1976. 



BILATERAL 

Brazil 

Interim agreement relating to air transport services. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Brasilia October 27 
and November 1, 1976. Entered into force November 
1, 1976. 

Cape Verde 

Agreement relating to the provision of site test, com- 
missioning and/or periodic flight checks of air naviga- 
tion aids by the Federal Aviation Administration. 
Signed at Washington and Praia October 13 and 
November 19, 1976. Entered into force November 19, 
1976. 

Indonesia 

Loan agreement for rural sanitation manpower de- 
velopment training program. Signed at Jakarta Oc- 
tober 28, 1976. Entered into force October 28, 1976. 

Loan agreement relating to Citanduy River Basin de- 
velopment. Signed at Jakarta October 28, 1976. En- 
tered into force October 28, 1976. 

Agreement amending the loan agreement of June 30, 
197.5, relating to irrigation systems and land de- 
veloi)ment. Signed at Jakarta October 28, 1976. En- 
tered into force October 28, 1976. 

Iran 

Cooperative agreement relating to environmental pro- 
tection and improvement, with annex. Signed at 
Tehi-an November 10, 1976. Enters into force as from 
the date of the last notification by either party to the 
other that it has complied with its domestic legal re- 
quirements for entry into force. 

Israel 

Loan agreement to promote the economic and political 
stability of Israel, with exhibits. Signed at Washing- 
ton November 23, 1976. Entered into force November 
23, 1976. 

Program assistance grant agreement to promote the 
economic and political stability of Israel, with 
exhibits. Signed at Washington November 23, 1976. 
Entered into force November 23, 1976. 



Cash grant agreement to support the economic re- 
quirements of Israel. Signed at Washington 
November 23, 1976. Entered into force November 23, 
1976. 

Mexico 

Treaty on the execution of penal sentences. Signed at 
Mexico November 25, 1976. Enters into force 30 days 
after the exchange of ratifications. 

Romania 

Agreement extending the agreement of December 4, 
1973, relating to civil air transport (TIAS 7901). Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Bucharest October 28 
and 30, 1976. Entered into force October 30, 1976. 



PUBLICATIONS 



^ With reservation. 



1950 "Foreign Relations" Volume 
on the U.N.; Western Hemisphere 

Press release 564 dated November 18 (for release November 27) 

The Department of State on November 27 released 
"Foreign Relations of the United States," 1950, volume 
II, "The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere." 
The "Foreign Relations" series has been published con- 
tinuously since 1861 as the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. The volume released on November 27 is 
the first of seven volumes for the year 1950. 

This volume of 1,049 pages presents high-level 
documentation (nearly all of which is newly declas- 
sified) on the policies of the United States in the United 
Nations on such major issues as the Chinese represen- 
tation question, the "uniting for peace" resolution, the 
Southwest Africa question, and the drafting of the first 
international covenant on human rights. The volume 
also includes the record of U.S. relations with the 
American republics and Canada. Of particular note are 
those papers concerned with the action taken by the 
United States toward the ratification of the Charter of 
the Organization of American States, the attitude of the 
United States over Communist activity in Guatemala, 
the negotiations of a petroleum credit to Mexico, the 
recognition of the military junta government of Haiti, 
and the political and economic relations with Argentina, 
Colombia, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. 

"Foreign Relations," 1950, volume II, was prepared 
by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, 
Department of State. Listed as Department of State 
publication 8853 (GPO cat. no. Sl.l:950/v. II), this vol- 
ume may be obtained for $13.00. Checks or money or- 
ders should be made out to the Superintendent of 
Documents and should be sent to the U.S. Government 
Book Store, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 
20520. 



16 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX January 3, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1958 



Arms Control and Disarmament. Secretary Kis- 
singer Attends NATO Ministerial Meeting at 
Brussels and Meets With British Officials at 
London (Kissinger, Crosland) 1 

China. Secretary Kissinger Attends NATO 
Ministerial Meeting at Brussels and Meets 
With British Officials at London (Kissinger, 
Crosland) 1 

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating to 
Foreign Policy 14 

Economic Affairs 

Secretary Kissinger Attends NATO Ministerial 
Meeting at Brussels and Meets With British Of- 
ficials at London (Kissinger, Crosland) 1 

United States and Romania Sign New Fisheries 
Agreement (joint statement) 15 

Europe. Secretary Kissinger Attends NATO 
Ministerial Meeting at Brussels and Meets 
With British Officials at London (Kissinger, 
Crosland) 1 

Italy. Prime Minister Andreotti of Italy Visits 
Washington (Ford, Andreotti) 12 

Middle East. Secretary Kissinger Attends 
NATO Ministerial Meeting at Brussels and 
Meets With British Officials at London (Kis- 
singer, Crosland) 1 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

North Atlantic Council Meets at Brussels (mes- 
sage from President-elect Carter delivered by 
Secretary Kissinger, text of communique) 9 

Secretary Kissinger Attends NATO Ministerial 
Meeting at Brussels and Meets With British Of- 
ficials at London (Kissinger, Crosland) 1 

Presidential Documents. Prime Minister An- 
dreotti of Italy Visits Washington 12 

Publications. 1950 "Foreign Relations" Volume 
on the U.N. ; Western Hemisphere 16 

Romania. United States and Romania Sign New 
Fisheries Agreement (joint statement) 15 

Southern Rhodesia. Secretary Kissinger At- 
tends NATO Ministerial Meeting at Brussels 
and Meets With British Officials at London 
(Kissinger, Crosland) 1 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 15 

United States and Romania Sign New Fisheries 
Agreement (joint statement) 15 



Name Ivder 

Andreotti, Giulio 12 

Carter, President-elect 9 

Crosland, Anthony 1 

Ford, President 12 

Kissinger, Secretary 1 



Checklist of Department of State 


Press Releases: December 13-19 


Press releases may be obtained from the Office 


of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash- 


ingto 


n, D.C 


20520. 


No. 


Date 


Subject 


601 


12/13 


Kissinger, British Foreign Secre- 
tary Crosland: news conference, 
London, Dec. 10. 


602 


12/13 


North Atlantic Council ministerial 
meeting, Brussels, Dec. 9-10: 
communique. 


*603 


12/13 


L. Bruce Laingen sworn in as Am- 
bassador to Malta (biographic 
data). 


*604 


12/13 


U.S. consulate at Barranquilla, 
Colombia, to be reestab ished 
Dec. 14. 


t605 


12/15 


Meat import negotiations held. 


*606 


12/15 


Study Group 5 of the U.S. National 
Committee of the International 
Telegraph and Telephone Com- 
mittee, Jan. 13. 


*607- 


12/17 


Waldheim, Kissinger: remarks fol- 
lowing meeting. New York, Dec. 
16. 

U.S. and Bulgaria sign new 


t608 


12/17 






fisheries agreement. 


*609 


12/17 


Advisory Panel on Academic Music, 
Jan. 17. 


*610 


12/17 


Advisory Committee on Transna- 
tional Enterprises, working 
group on transfer of technology, 
Jan. 7. 


*611 


12/17 


Advisory Committee on Transna- 
tional Enterprises, working 
group on illicit payments, Jan. 5 

ted. 


* Not prin 


t Held for 


a later issue of the BULLETIN. 



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/J, 





THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 

Volume LXXVI • No. 1959 • January 10, 1977 



UNITED STATES DISCUSSES DISARMAMENT ISSUES 
IN U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE 

Statements by Ambassador Martin and Dr. Ikle 
and Text of Environmental Modification Convention 1 7 

U.S. GIVES VIEWS ON U.S.S.R. PROPOSAL FOR WORLD TREATY 

ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE 

Statements in Political and Legal Committees 

of the U.N. General Assembly 30 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE B U L L E T I 



Vol. LXXVI, No. 1959 
January 10, 1977 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

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Single copy 85 cents 

The Secretary of State has determined that the pub- 
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tion of the public business required by law of this 
Department. Use of funds for printing this periodi- 
cal has been approved by the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget through January 31, 
1981. 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be re- 
printed. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The 
BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to 
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The Department of State BULLETIN 
a weekly publication issued by Ih 
Office of Media Services, Bureau 
Public Affairs, provides the public an 
interested agencies of the governmeii 
with information on developments t| 
the field of U.S. foreign relations an 
on the work of the Department 
the Foreign Service. 

The BULLETIN includes select 
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the Department. Information is ini 
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United States is or may become a parti 
and on treaties of general inferno^ 
tional interest. 

Publications of the Department oj 
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legislative material in the field oM 
international relations are also listedJ 



United States Discusses Disarmament Issues 
in U.N. General Assembly Debate 



Following are statements made in Com- 
mittee I (Political and Security) of the U.N. 
General Assembly on November 1 by U.S. 
Representative Joseph Martin, Jr., head of 
the U.S. delegation to the Conference of the 
Committee on Disarmament (CCD), and on 
Novem.ber 18 by U.S. Representative Fred C. 
Ikle, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, together with the text 
of a resolution adopted by the Assembly on 
December 10 which includes the Convention 
on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other 
Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques. 



STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR MARTIN, 
COMMITTEE I, NOVEMBER 1 

USUN press release 135 dated November 1 

Nineteen seventy-six has seen gratifying 
progress in multilateral disarmament. Nota- 
bly, the Conference of the Committee on 
Disarmament, fulfilling the General Assem- 
bly's request in Resolution 3475 (XXX), has 
negotiated and forwarded to the Assembly a 
draft Convention on the Prohibition of Mili- 
tary or Any Other Hostile Use of Environ- 
mental Modification Techniques. 

The United States considers that adher- 
ence to this convention will effectively elimi- 
nate the serious dangers that the hostile use 
of such techniques may pose. The convention 
thus will protect the security interests of all 
states parties with respect to this means of 
warfare. 

We therefore think it is extremely impor- 
tant to correct a mistaken impression which 
seems to have arisen on the part of at least 



one delegation at the CCD and at this As- 
sembly. 

The convention does not permit in any 
sense the hostile use of environmental mod- 
ification techniques to generate such poten- 
tially catastrophic phenomena as earth- 
quakes, tidal waves, cyclones or hurricanes, 
or alterations in climate patterns, weather 
patterns, ocean currents, the state of the 
ozone layer, or the ionosphere. These 
phenomena are specifically listed illustra- 
tively in an agreed understanding forwarded 
by the CCD to the General Assembly to- 
gether with the convention text itself.* In 
the understanding the CCD agreed that all 
those phenomena, when produced by hostile 
use of environmental modification 
techniques, would result, or could rea- 
sonably be expected to result, in wide- 
spread, long-lasting, or severe destruction, 
damage, or injury. 

The convention thus would prohibit any 
hostile use of environmental modification 
techniques to cause any of those phenomena 
as a means of destruction, damage, or injury 
to another party. Therefore the generation of 
any of those catastrophic phenomena is abso- 
lutely prohibited under the convention. 
There can simply be no dispute on this point. 

In this respect, the convention is consist- 
ent with the identical drafts tabled at the 
CCD in August 1975 ^ and referred to in 
Resolution 3475. However, responsive to the 



' For texts of the agreed understandings, see Report 
of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, 
vol. I, Official Records of the General Assembly, 
Thirty-First Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/31/27), p. 
91. 

2 For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 15, 1975, p. 419. 



January 10, 1977 



17 



views of numerous other countries as set 
forth in a genuinely multilateral negotiating 
process, the present text also reflects a 
number of very significant modifications of the 
original drafts. 

For example, the questions of peaceful use 
of environmental modification techniques are 
dealt with much more extensively in the text 
before this committee. Thus, the preamble of 
the convention now refers to the 1972 Stock- 
holm Declaration on international respon- 
sibilities with respect to the environment.^ 
And article III, besides providing that the 
convention shall not hinder peaceful use of 
environmental modification techniques, now 
calls for the fullest possible exchange of sci- 
entific and technical information concerning 
such use. The article also includes an under- 
taking to contribute to international economic 
and scientific cooperation in the preservation, 
improvement, and peaceful utilization of the 
environment, with due consideration to the 
needs of developing areas. 

Article V of the convention contains an in- 
novation in multilateral arms control com- 
pliance procedures. It provides for convening 
a consultative committee of experts upon the 
request of any state party to undertake ap- 
propriate findings of fact and provide expert 
views in connection with any problems the 
requesting party raises with respect to the 
objectives or application of the convention. 
The consultative committee should afford all 
parties the assistance of international exper- 
tise which might otherwise be unavailable for 
factual findings and explanations concerning 
what may be highly complex technical ques- 
tions. We consider the provisions for the con- 
sultative committee a genuine advance over 
previous practice. 

In another change from the original draft, 
article VIII of the convention adds provi- 
sions for a review conference five years after 
entry into force. The conference is to 
examine in particular the convention's effec- 
tiveness in eliminating the dangers of mili- 



^ For text of the Declaration of the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment, adopted at 
Stociiholm on June 16, 1972, see Bulletin of July 24, 
1972, p. 116. 



tary or any other hostile use of environmen- 
tal modification techniques. If, contrary to 
our expectations, the convention is deemed 
to have proven ineffective, the conference 
could consider remedial action. Thus the 
draft which you are called upon to consider is 
the result of intensive negotiations which 
have produced an intricate cloth of com- 
promises of many sincerely felt points of 
view. It will be impossible to unravel one 
strand without unraveling the entire fabric. 

Taken as a whole, my delegation believes 
that the Environmental Modification Con- 
vention as reported by the CCD is worthy of 
broad acceptance. Accordingly, we think it 
should be commended by the General As- 
sembly and opened for signature and ratifica- 
tion as soon as possible. We will support a 
resolution to that effect and hope most other 
delegations will do the same. The CCD 
worked with great determination and dili- 
gence to produce the text of the Environ- 
mental Modification Convention this year. 
The adoption of such a resolution by the As- 
sembly will recognize the committee's ac- 
complishment and enable it next year to con- 
centrate on other important subjects on its 
agenda. 

Consideration of Chemical Weapons Issues 

Mr. Chairman, since the 30th session of the 
General Assembly useful work has also been 
accomplished in international consideration 
of controls on chemical weapons. The CCD's 
discussions of this subject during 1976 have 
been active and constructive. We were en- 
couraged by increasing acceptance of the 
concept of a phased approach to a com- 
prehensive chemical weapons ban and by 
progress on the question of defining the 
agents to be covered in the initial phase. 

The committee's deliberations also reflect- 
ed increased awareness of the central impor- 
tance of verification problems related to re- 
straints on chemical weapons. In this connec- 
tion, while maintaining our reservations re- 
garding reliance on national technical means, 
we have noted with interest the statement on 
verification of destruction of chemical 
weapons stocks contained in the disarma- 



18 



Department of State Bulletin 



ment memorandum recently circulated to the 
General Assembly by the Soviet Union." 

The CCD's consideration of chemical 
weapons questions this past summer was 
complemented by technical consultations be- 
tween U.S. and Soviet experts. These talks 
were helpful in clarifying the views of the 
two sides on a variety of comple.x issues, 
especially relating to verification, and in 
identifying some areas of agreement. Both 
sides considered the consultations useful and 
agreed that they should be resumed at a fu- 
ture date to be determined. Our view re- 
mains that continuation of such consultations 
cannot in any way substitute for the CCD's 
ongoing work in this very important arms 
control area. 

Indeed, during the committee's 1977 ses- 
sion we expect it to devote major attention to 
chemical weapons issues. We look forward 
particularly to hearing others' views, and of- 
fering our own, on the draft convention ta- 
bled by the United Kingdom in a welcome 
initiative last August. More generally, the 
United States expects to participate actively 
in the continuing search for solutions to the 
difficult and complex problems which still 
face us as we pursue our common objective of 
effective measures for the prohibition of 
chemical weapons. 

Mr. Chairman, besides its work on en- 
vironmental modification and chemical 
weapons, the CCD this year showed renewed 
vitality and procedural flexibility in other 
ways as well. 

For example, in connection with questions 
related to nuclear testing, an experts group 
was established under CCD auspices to study 
possible measures of international coopera- 
tion in detecting and identifying seismic 
events. The group has made a promising be- 
ginning. Its prospective contribution would 



'' The statement reads as follows: "Supervision of 
compliance with the prohibition of chemical weapons 
should be based on national means. In this respect 
there exists a positive precedent in the convention ban- 
ning bacteriological weapons. At the same time, the 
Soviet Union is ready to examine the possibility of 
using additional supervision procedures and, in particu- 
lar, to discuss methods of verifying the destruction of 
stockpiles of chemical weapons which are to be excluded 
from the arsenals of States." (U.N. doc. A/31/232, p. 9.) 



be enhanced if experts from regions of the 
world now unrepresented or underrepre- 
sented on the panel would join in its sub- 
sequent work. 

Also, the Secretary General's working 
group on the reduction of military budgets 
met twice in Geneva, maintaining informal 
contact with various CCD delegations. The 
working group has produced a valuable re- 
port which clarifies definitional and other 
technical issues relating to the comparison of 
military expenditures.^ 

The CCD's accomplishments this year 
renew our conviction that under existing cir- 
cumstances the committee constitutes the 
best available vehicle for multilateral disar- 
mament negotiations. On the other hand, we 
acknowledge the continuing interest shown 
by many countries in a more general forum 
and in particular the attention currently 
being devoted to the question of a General 
Assembly special session on disarmament. 
My delegation is prepared to consider an ap- 
propriate resolution that would set in motion 
preparations for a special session in 1978. ^ If 
it does prove possible for us to support such 
a resolution, we would hope to take part in 
the preparatory activity, which must be care- 
ful and thorough if the special session is to 
make progress. 



Progress Since NPT Review Conference 

Mr. Chairman, once again this year, an 
important topic for consideration by the 
First Committee is the question of prevent- 
ing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
While the committee's discussion can be ex- 
pected to span a range of international ef- 
forts in the nonproliferation field, the most 
immediate focus, as specified in the title of 
the agenda item, will be the implementation 
of the "conclusions" of the conference to re- 



5 U.N. doc. A/31/222. 

^ A resolution deciding to convene a special session of 
the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to be 
held in New York May-June 1978, and establishing a 
preparatory committee was adopted by Committee I by 
consensus on Dec. 2 and by the Assembly by consensus on 
Dee. 21 (A/RES/31/189 B). 



January 10, 1977 



19 



view the operation of the Nonproliferation 
Treaty (NPT), held in May 1975.^ 

Less than a year and a half has passed 
since the review conference. Nevertheless, 
the collective findings and recommendations 
of conference participants, as well as the 
momentum and international interest gener- 
ated by the conference itself, have stimu- 
lated new or accelerated activity in several 
critical areas of the nonproliferation effort 
which has already yielded some substantial 
results. 

It is also encouraging that some of the 
principal accomplishments of the last 18 
months that were promoted by review con- 
ference recommendations have involved the 
cooperation not only of NPT parties but also 
of states that have not yet chosen to join the 
treaty. In our view, this reflects the near- 
universal appreciation of the threat to man- 
kind posed by the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, as well as the recognition that suc- 
cess in preventing such proliferation depends 
on the concerted efforts of all groups of 
states. Permit me, Mr. Chairman, to review 
briefly some of the gains that have been 
made in the last year and a half: 

— Significant steps have been taken, in 
conformity with review conference recom- 
mendations, to increase the effectiveness of 
IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agen- 
cy] safeguards. These include: 

1. Efforts to develop new verification 
techniques and instrumentation; 

2. Broadening of safeguards coverage in 
agreements with non-nuclear-weapon states 
not party to the NPT; and 

3. Negotiation and approval of agreements 
to implement the voluntary offers by the 
United States and United Kingdom to place 
their civilian nuclear installations under 
IAEA safeguards. 

— In early 1976, as a result of consultations 
with other nuclear suppliers, the United 



' For text of the treaty, see Bulletin of July 1, 
1968, p. 8; for text of a U.S. statement in the review 
confe)-ence and the final declaration of the conference, 
see Bulletin of June 30, 1975, p. 921; for a U.S. in- 
terpretive statement, see Bulletin of Aug. 4, 1975 p. 
193. 



States adopted as national policy certain 
principles that will govern future nuclear ex- 
ports. We were informed that other govern- 
ments would do the same. Strengthening 
common nuclear export requirements was an 
important consensus recommendation of the 
review conference. This recommendation re- 
flected the recognition by suppliers and 
recipients alike that the exercise of special re- 
sponsibility by supplier governments would 
promote the security and economic interests of 
all states. 

— Efforts to implement review conference 
recommendations on the physical protection 
of nuclear materials have been pursued on 
several fronts. Major suppliers have decided 
to include provisions in their nuclear cooper- 
ation agreements requiring adequate levels 
of physical protection in recipient countries. 
The IAEA has issued a revised set of rec- 
ommendations on physical protection. In ad- 
dition, the United States has suggested an 
international convention that provides for 
physical protection of nuclear materials in 
transit and for international collaboration in 
the recovery of lost or diverted materials and 
encourages participating countries to adopt 
measures conforming to international criteria 
for effective physical protection. 

— We have continued to fulfill our com- 
mitment under NPT article IV, reaffirmed at 
the review conference, to facilitate the ex- 
change of nuclear technology and materials 
for peaceful purposes consistent with the re- 
straints required by articles I and II. 
Through our bilateral cooperative arrange- 
ments for the supply of nuclear reactors and 
fuel, as well as our expanded contributions to 
the IAEA's technical assistance programs, 
we have demonstrated our determination to 
assist developing countries, particularly 
those party to the NPT, in meeting their 
growing energy requirements. 

— The review conference gave impetus to 
the search for safe and economical alterna- 
tives to nationally owned sensitive nuclear 
facilities, such as uranium enrichment and 
chemical reprocessing plants. Specifically, it 
encouraged active consideration of multina- 
tional nuclear fuel cycle centers. In accord- 
ance with that recommendation, the IAEA's 



20 



Department of State Bulletin 



study of such multinational centers is under- 
way. We believe it is desirable, among other 
approaches, to continue studying the idea of 
a few suitably sited multinational fuel cycle 
centers to serve regional needs, when effec- 
tively safeguarded and economically war- 
ranted. Through these and related means, we 
can minimize incentives for the spread of 
dangerous fuel cycle capabilities. 

— We continue to support the validity of the 
review conference finding that the technol- 
ogy of nuclear explosions for peaceful pur- 
poses (PNE's) is still at the developmental 
stage. Nonetheless, considerable progress 
has been made in implementing the confer- 
ence's recommendations on peaceful nuclear 
explosions. The conference asked that the 
IAEA expedite examination of the legal is- 
sues involved in, and commence considera- 
tion of the structure and content of, the in- 
ternational agreement or agreements con- 
templated in NPT article V. In response, the 
IAEA Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Peaceful 
Nuclear Explosions — itself the result of a re- 
view conference recommendation — has 
studied various legal and other factors in- 
volved in the establishment and operation of 
an international PNE service and plans to 
advise the Board of Governors on these mat- 
ters during 1977. 

Security of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States 

The recommendations contained in the re- 
view conference final declaration do not, of 
course, deal only with safeguards and coop- 
eration in the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy. 

Participants at the conference recognized, 
as had the negotiators of the NPT itself, that 
national security and political considerations 
are the motivating factors in a decision to ac- 
quire nuclear explosive capabilities and, ac- 
cordingly, that in the long run any successful 
approach to the nonproliferation problem 
would have to deal satisfactorily with con- 
cerns in these areas. 

This recognition was reflected in several 
consensus recommendations concerning 
strengthening of the security of non- 
nuclear-weapon states and the cessation of 



the nuclear arms race. The United States at- 
taches great importance to these recommen- 
dations and plans to work actively toward 
their implementation. Efforts already have 
been made to put the recommendations into 
effect, but we can share in the regret that 
has been expressed that more rapid progress 
has not proved possible. 

The United States recognizes that allevia- 
tion of the legitimate security concerns of 
non-nuclear-weapon states is a critical com- 
ponent of international efforts to prevent nu- 
clear proliferation. It is easier, however, to 
state the objective than to devise practical 
and effective means of promoting it. Reluc- 
tance to forgo the nuclear weapons option 
often arises from local conflicts and insecuri- 
ties whose origins are invariably complex and 
rarely susceptible to quick solutions. 

For its part, the United States has tried to 
promote the security of non-nuclear-weapon 
states in a variety of ways, such as efforts to 
assist in solving regional conflicts, for exam- 
ple, in the Middle East and in southern Af- 
rica; encouragement for regional arms con- 
trol arrangements; and the provision of posi- 
tive security assurances such as Security 
Council Resolution 255.® In addition, in exer- 
cising the right of collective self-defense, the 
United States and a number of other nations 
have entered into mutual security relation- 
ships for the purpose of deterring and de- 
fending against armed attack. We believe 
these alliances, by providing sufficient as- 
surance regarding security needs, have had a 
major impact in influencing states involved 
to renounce the nuclear weapons option. 

On the other hand, we have not been able 
to accept proposals for universally applicable 
assurances on the non-use of nuclear 
weapons, because we have not discovered 
any formulation that would effectively serve 
the varied security needs of non-nuclear- 
weapon states, including our allies. How- 
ever, we are prepared to consider any appro- 
priate means of strengthening the security of 
those states, provided such means do not det- 
rimentally affect existing security arrange- 



* For text of the resolution, adopted on June 19, 
1968, see Bulletin of July 8, 1968, p. 58. 



January 10, 1977 



21 



ments, which, as I have just noted, are im- 
portant components of the nonproliferation 
effort. 

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Arms Control Agreements 

As Secretary Kissinger stated in plenary 
on September 30, we continue to approach 
the nonproliferation problem in full recogni- 
tion of the responsibility that we and other 
nuclear powers have in limiting our nuclear 
weapons arsenals. Mindful of this responsi- 
bility, and in line with the review conference 
recommendations on SALT [Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks], the United States and the 
U.S.S.R. have continued actively to pursue 
an agreement, based on the Vladivostok ac- 
cord, on the limitation of offensive strategic 
arms.^ We would like to stress, however, 
that we would not regard such an agreement 
as the final step of the SALT process. We are 
determined to begin negotiations on further 
limitations and reductions in the level of 
strategic arms as soon as possible following 
the conclusion of a SALT Two agreement. 

The review conference expressed the hope 
for early solutions to the technical and politi- 
cal difficulties that have blocked agreement 
on an effective comprehensive test ban. So 
far, these difficulties have not been resolved. 
However, in our view, some important steps 
have recently been taken toward our common 
objective of achieving a comprehensive test 
ban. In particular, we believe that the 
Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the inte- 
grally related Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear 
Explosions, the latter of which was signed by 
the United States and the U.S.S.R. in May 
1976, place significant restraints on U.S. and 
Soviet nuclear explosions.'" Moreover, the 
Threshold Test Ban Treaty contains an 
explicit commitment to continue negotiations 



" For text of a joint U.S. -Soviet statement issued at 
Vladivostok on Nov. 24, 1974, see Bulletin of Dec. 23, 
1974, p. 879. 

'"For texts of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Treaty and Pro- 
tocol on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear 
Weapon Tests, signed at Moscow on July 3, 1974, see 
Bulletin of July 29, 1974, p. 217; for texts of the 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Treaty and Protocol on Underground 
Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes and agreed 
statement, see Bulletin of June 28, 1976, p. 802. 



toward the cessation of all nuclear weapons 
tests, and we are determined to fulfill that 
commitment. 

To sum up, we believe that a reasonably 
good start has been made, but that we must 
redouble our efforts to put the review con- 
ference recommendations fully into effect. Of 
course, international action on nonprolifera- 
tion should not be confined to ideas outlined 
at the review conference in May 1975. The 
nature of the nonproliferation challenge con- 
tinues to change, and accordingly the re- 
quirements of a successful strategy to meet 
that challenge must continue to evolve. The 
review conference conclusions might there- 
fore be regarded simply as a foundation upon 
which we can build further cooperative in- 
ternational efforts — involving NPT parties as 
well as nonparties, nuclear recipients as well 
as suppliers, and nuclear powers as well as 
non-nuclear-weapon states. We beheve this 
General Assembly should provide a mandate 
for such efforts. 

Mr. Chairman, in a major foreign policy 
statement on October 28, President Ford 
outlined a program of international action in 
the nonproliferation field. Later in our de- 
bate, my delegation will present a detailed 
account of that important initiative. We also 
reserve the right to make interventions on 
other matters as the debate proceeds. 



STATEMENT BY DR. IKLE, COMMITTEE I, 
NOVEMBER 18 

USUN press release 15.3 dated November 18 

We welcome this opportunity to address 
the First Committee again. We consider this 
the ideal forum in which to present a fuller 
up-to-date explanation of the United States' 
most recent policy and proposals on nuclear 
energy and put forward a related arms con- 
trol proposal. 

Throughout the nuclear age, the United 
States has launched many efforts to control 
the destructive potential of the atom and yet 
keep the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy 
in mankind's service. Some 30 years ago, 
when only the United States possessed the 
atom bomb, we made a proposal to the 



22 



Department of State Bulletin 



United Nations that envisaged placing all nu- 
clear resources throughout the world under 
the ownership and control of an independent 
international authority. Perhaps that pro- 
posal called for too great a willingness of 
other nations to place their trust in interna- 
tional cooperation. 

Less than a decade later, in 1954, the 
United States undertook a second major 
initiative — the Atoms for Peace program — to 
assist other countries in acquiring nuclear 
technology for peaceful uses. And we invited 
other nations to join with us in building an 
international agency to facilitate cooperation 
in peaceful uses of the atom and to safeguard 
nuclear technology from diversion to de- 
structive ends. The fruit of this initiative can 
be seen in the broad acceptance and useful- 
ness of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency and its unprecedented safeguards 
system. 

But in the last two decades, much has been 
learned about both the promise and the 
threat of nuclear technology, and the thin di- 
viding line between them. It became clear 
that further and far-reaching measures were 
needed. Otherwise, in region after region, 
new nuclear threats and rivalries could ac- 
company the worldwide spread of peaceful 
nuclear technology. This concern is widely 
shared in the United States and other coun- 
tries. President Ford's October 28 an- 
nouncement on U.S. nuclear energy policy is 
a response to these concerns and represents 
a wide spectrum of agreement in my country 
as to the steps needed.'* 

I believe it is important to emphasize to 
you certain premises on which this policy is 
based: 

— First, success in stemming the spread of 
nuclear weapons must be based on sympathe- 
tic understanding of the energy needs of all 
states. States electing to participate in the 
necessary restraint arrangements must 
therefore be assured that they will be able to 
benefit fully from the peaceful uses of nu- 
clear energy. 



" For a statement by President Ford issued at 
Washington on Oct. 28, 1976, see Bulletin of Nov. 22, 
1976, p. 629. 



— Second, if the United States asks other 
nations to exercise restraint in certain aspects 
of their nuclear power programs, it must be 
prepared to show comparable restraint at 
home. 

— Third, it is of crucial importance that all 
nations clearly recognize their common 
interest in preventing the spread of nuclear 
weapons capabilities to country after coun- 
try. No single nation or group of nations can 
insure an effective nonproliferation effort. 
As President Ford has said: "The United 
States is prepared to work with all other na- 
tions .... Effective nonproliferation meas- 
ures will require the participation and sup- 
port of nuclear suppliers and consumers." 
The security of many of the nonnuclear na- 
tions represented here is perhaps more di- 
rectly threatened by further proliferation 
than is the security of countries now possess- 
ing nuclear weapons. 

Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology 

Our new nuclear energy policy sets forth 
action the United States has decided to take 
on its own and proposals the United States 
will make to other nations. Several of these 
measures are designed to avert the serious 
dangers that would result from the existence 
throughout the world of nationally owned 
uranium enrichment plants and plutonium- 
reprocessing plants. These plants can pro- 
duce the materials that can readily be made 
into nuclear weapons. 

In regard to uranium enrichment, we of 
course recognize that countries which plan 
for nuclear reactors as an important source of 
electrical energy need to have an assured and 
reliable source of nuclear fuel. In forgoing 
acquisition of sensitive nuclear facilities 
under national control, it is evident that such 
countries are entitled to assurances that 
suitable nuclear fuel will remain available. 

It has long been assumed that the energy 
value remaining in spent reactor fuel would 
be recovered by reprocessing recovered fis- 
sile material and recycling it back into power 
reactors. However, as our understanding and 
information improved, two facts became 
plain: First, the economic advantages for 



January 10, 1977 



23 



plutonium recycle are at this time very un- 
certain; second, and more important, in the 
absence of adequate safeguard measures, the 
accumulation of separated plutonium can 
greatly increase the risk of diversion to nu- 
clear weapons. And this risk would lead to 
instability among the neighboring countries 
of a region. 

The U.S. policy statement of October 28 
specifies several actions, domestic and inter- 
national, aimed at restraining the spread of 
such plutonium: 

— The United States has decided to defer 
commercial reprocessing activities. We no 
longer i-egard reprocessing and recycling of 
plutonium as a necessary and inevitable step 
in the nuclear fuel cycle. We will pursue 
them in the future only if there is sound rea- 
son to conclude that it is economically jus- 
tified and that the world community can ef- 
fectively overcome the associated risks of 
proliferation. In the meantime, we will ex- 
pand our capacity to store unreprocessed 
spent fuel, we will fully consider all the im- 
plications of reprocessing, and we will also 
explore alternative means for recovering the 
energy value from used nuclear fuel without 
separating plutonium. Several ideas have 
been advanced for such recovery methods, 
and research will now be undertaken to de- 
termine their validity. 

— We are calling on all nations to join us in 
refraining from the transfer of reprocessing 
and enrichment technology and facilities for a 
period of at least three years. We are also 
asking suppliers and consumers to work to- 
gether to establish reliable international 
means for meeting nuclear fuel needs with 
minimum risk. 

— We will invite other nations to participate 
in our new evaluation program on the values 
and risks of plutonium reprocessing and re- 
cycling, and the alternatives that may be 
available. 

In addition to these actions, the U.S. pol- 
icy calls for better controls on the accumula- 
tion of plutonium. It proposes international 
discussions aimed at secure and safe storage 
arrangements for civil plutonium and spent 
reactor fuel under the auspices of the Inter- 



national Atomic Energy Agency, pending ul- 
timate disposition. We are prepared, when 
such a storage arrangement is broadly ac- 
cepted and in operation, to place our own ex- 
cess civil plutonium and spent fuel under its 
control. We are also prepared to consider 
providing a site for international storage of 
spent fuel and radioactive wastes under 
IAEA auspices. 

Another important element of the U.S. 
program of action is support for strengthen- 
ing the IAEA safeguards system. We hope 
that all states will join us in insuring that the 
IAEA has the technical resources and staff 
necessary to meet its growing respon- 
sibilities. We are committing more resources 
to help the Agency improve its safeguards 
capabilities, and our national laboratories 
with expertise in safeguards will provide as- 
sistance on a continuing basis to the IAEA as 
the Agency identifies its needs. 

Nuclear Export Policies 

Let me now turn to U.S. nuclear export 
policies. The United States is adopting new 
criteria to encourage nations to pursue co- 
operative and responsible nonproliferation 
policies. In determining whether to enter 
into new or expanded nuclear cooperation, 
we will consider the following factors: 

— Adherence to the Nonproliferation Trea- 
ty will be a strong positive factor favoring 
cooperation with a non-nuclear-weapon state. 

— Non-nuclear-weapon states that have not 
yet adhered to the Nonproliferation Treaty 
will receive positive recognition if they are 
prepared to submit to full fuel cycle 
safeguards, pending adherence. 

— We will favor recipient nations that are 
prepared to forgo, or postpone for a substan- 
tial period, the establishment of national re- 
processing or enrichment activities or, in 
certain cases, are prepared to shape and 
schedule their reprocessing and enriching 
facilities to foster nonproliferation needs. 

— Positive recognition will also be given to 
nations prepared to participate in an interna- 
tional storage regime, under which spent fuel 
and any separated plutonium would be placed 
pending use. 



24 



Department of State Bulletin 



Moreover, we will also encourage other 
nuclear suppliers to adopt these same 
criteria as common guidelines. As a funda- 
mental element of our nonproliferation ef- 
fort, I now reiterate the continuing U.S. 
support for the Nonproliferation Treaty and 
our position that all nations ought to adhere 
to it. 

My government believes the international 
community must take certain concerted ac- 
tions. It must be made clear that no state can 
expect to abrogate or violate any nonprolif- 
eration agreement with impunity. As President 
Ford stated on October 28, the United States 
will, at a minimum, respond to a violation of 
any safeguards agreement with the United 
States by immediately cutting off the supply 
of nuclear fuel to the violator and ending 
cooperation. We would also consider further 
steps against violators, steps not necessarily 
confined to ending nuclear cooperation. 
Moreover, our actions would not be limited 
only to agreements in which we are directly 
involved. In case of violation of any 
safeguards agreement, particularly one in- 
volving the IAEA, we will initiate immediate 
consultations with all interested nations to 
determine appropriate action. We invite all 
concerned governments to adopt a similar 
policy. 

Assuring Adequate and Reliable Supplies 

Mr. Chairman, while the United States be- 
lieves that the steps I have outlined will in- 
hibit the further spread of nuclear weapons, 
it recognizes that nuclear energy policy, of 
course, must also offer the benefits of coop- 
eration and incentives, bearing in mind the 
importance of nuclear power as an alterna- 
tive to fossil fuel. The United States will take 
steps to assure that states which practice re- 
sponsible nonproliferation policies, and join 
appropriate international arrangements, will 
have an adequate and reliable supply of nu- 
clear energy: 

— The United States is prepared to act, in 
cooperation with other nations, to assure re- 
liable supplies of nuclear fuel at equitable 
prices to a country that accepts effective re- 
straints on reprocessing, plutonium disposi- 



tion, and other sensitive technologies. We 
will initiate consultations with other nations 
to develop the means to insure that suppliers 
will be able to offer, and consumers will be 
able to receive, an uninterrupted and eco- 
nomical supply of low-enriched uranium fuel 
and fuel services. 

— The United States will offer other equi- 
table arrangements. Where appropriate, this 
may include providing fresh, low-enriched 
uranium fuel in return for mutual agreement 
on the disposition of spent fuel, where this 
clearly fosters our common nonproliferation 
objectives. 

— We will expand cooperative efforts with 
other countries to develop their indigenous 
nonnuclear energy resources. We have pro- 
posed that an International Energy Institute 
be established to help other countries match 
the most economical and readily available 
sources of energy to their power needs. We 
will offer technological assistance through 
this Institute and other appropriate means. 

Mr. Chairman, my government believes 
that the program of actions described in the 
Presidential statement of October 28, and 
summarized very briefly today, can provide 
an improved foundation for the use of nuclear 
energy throughout the world in ways that 
meet both nonproliferation objectives and 
electric power needs. "The task we face," 
President Ford emphasized in his statement, 
"calls for an international cooperative ven- 
ture of unprecedented dimensions." So we 
ask all nations to join in this opportunity to 
work together for the benefit of all. 

Radiological Weapons Agreement 

I must ask you, however, to keep in mind 
that all these steps cannot change the fact 
that large amounts of radioactive materials 
will continue to accumulate until the question 
of their final utilization or disposition is re- 
solved. I would like to turn now to a further 
opportunity for arms control. 

These rapidly accumulating radioactive 
materials have the potential for use in 
radiological weapons, a hazard distinct from 
nuclear explosives. Such weapons, if ever 
developed, could produce pernicious 



January 10, 1977 



25 



effects — long term and short term— solely by 
the radioactivity emitted. Virtually any of 
the strongly radioactive isotopes might be 
used to contaminate areas for long periods of 
time. For example, the amount of plutonium 
virhich could be dispersed by a conventional 
explosive could contaminate a substantial 
area, with the material retaining its radioac- 
tive characteristics for tens of thousands of 
years. Decontamination, if feasible at all, 
would be extremely costly. 

My government suggests that next year an 
appropriate forum, such as the CCD, con- 
sider an agreement that would prohibit the 
use of radioactive materials as radiological 
weapons. Such an agreement would not af- 
fect the production of radioactive materials, 
either as a necessary by-product of power 
reactors or for other peaceful applications, or 
affect our call for storage of spent fuel under 
international auspices. 

Such an agreement could complement the 
Geneva Protocol of 1925, which prohibits the 
use of poison gas and bacteriological methods 
of warfare. In addition, a radiological war- 
fare agreement could contain a provision for 
appropriate measures by the parties to pre- 
clude diversion of radioactive materials for 
use as radiological weapons. 

Such a commitment would, of course, be a 
particularly worthwhile undertaking for the 
major nuclear industrial states. Countries 
with substantial nuclear energy programs 
have accumulated large amounts of waste 
materials with extensive remaining radioac- 
tivity. 

Negotiation of a radiological weapons 
agreement should not, of course, impede 
work on other multilateral arms control is- 
sues. It is our intent that it will not. But feas- 
ible arms control steps, such as this, should 
not go unrealized simply because larger prob- 
lems have yet to be solved. Such a proposal, 
if adopted, would address a potentially sig- 
nificant future danger; each arms control 
agreement that is sound on its own merits 
can be another positive step toward a safer 
world. 

Mr. Chairman, the measures the United 
States is here advocating are important to 
progress in arms control. They will make 



more durable our peaceful nuclear coopera- ji 
tion by making it safer. They will help pre- I 
vent the world's search for energy from fos- 
tering rivalries for mankind's most destruc- 
tive weapon. 

All this is good; but all this, of course, is 
not enough. We must move resolutely toward 
much broader and more far-reaching controls 
on nuclear weapons. The security of every 
nation, of every person, requires that we do 
our utmost to limit and reduce the nuclear 
arsenals and that we work with no less de- 
termination toward a more secure interna- 
tional order. The United States pledges its 
continuing dedication to this goal. 



TEXT OF RESOLUTION 12 

The General Assembly, 

Recalling its resolutions 3264 (XXIX) of 9 December 
1974 and 3475 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 

Recalling its resolution 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 
1961, in which it recognized that all States have a deep 
interest in disarmament and arms control negotiations, 

Determined to avert the potential dangers of military 
or any other hostile use of environmental modification 
techniques, 

Convinced that broad adherence to a convention on 
the prohibition of such action would contribute to the 
cause of strengthening peace and averting the threat of 
war, 

Noting with satisfaction that the Conference of the 
Committee on Disarmament has completed and trans- 
mitted to the General Assembly, in the report of its 
work in 1976, the text of a draft Convention on the Pro- 
hibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of En- 
vironmental Modification Techniques, 

Noting further that the Convention is intended to 
prohibit effectively military or any other hostile use of 
environmental modification techniques in order to 
eliminate the dangers to mankind from such use, 

Bearing in mind that draft agreements on disarma- 
ment and arms control measures submitted to the Gen- 
eral Assembly by the Conference of the Committee on 
Disarmament should be the result of a process of effec- 
tive negotiations and that such instruments should duly 
take into account the views and interests of all States 



'^ A/RES/31/72 (text from U.N. doc. A/31/382, report 
of the First Committee on agenda item 45, Convention 
on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of 
environmental modification techniques); adopted by the 
committee on Dec. 3 by a recorded vote of 89 (U.S.) to 
11, with 25 abstentions, and by the Assembly on Dec. 
10 by a recorded vote of 96 (U.S.) to 8, with 30 
abstentions. 



26 



Department of State Bulletin 



so that they can be joined by the widest possible 
number of countries, 

Bearing in mind that article VII of the Convention 
makes provision for a conference to review the opera- 
tion of the Convention five years after its entry into 
force, with a view to ensuring that its purposes and provi- 
sions are being realized. 

Also bearing in mind all relevant documents and 
negotiating records of the Conference of the Committee 
on Disarmament on the discussion of the draft Conven- 
tion, 

Convinced that the Convention should not affect the 
use of environmental modification techniques for peace- 
ful purposes, which could contribute to the preservation 
and improvement of the environment for the benefit of 
present and future generations. 

Convinced that the Convention will contribute to the 
realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter 
of the United Nations, 

Anximis that during its 1977 session the Conference of 
the Committee on Disarmament should concentrate on 
urgent negotiations on disarmament and arms limitation 
measures, 

1. Refers the Convention on the Prohibition of Mili- 
tary or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Mod- 
ification Techniques, the text of which is annexed to the 
present resolution, to all States for their consideration, 
signature and ratification; 

2. Requests the Secretary-General, as depositary of 
the Convention, to open it for signature and ratification 
at the earliest possible date; 

3. Expresses its hope for the widest possible adher- 
ence to the Convention; 

4. Calls upon the Conference of the Committee on 
Disarmament, without prejudice to the priorities estab- 
lished in its programme of work, to keep under review 
the problem of effectively averting the dangers of mili- 
tary or any other hostile use of environmental modifica- 
tion techniques; 

5. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the 
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament all docu- 
ments relating to the discussion by the General Assem- 
bly at its thirty-first session of the question of the pro- 
hibition of military or any other hostile use of environ- 
mental modification techniques. 

ANNEX 

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or 
Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques 

The States Parties to this Convention, 

Guided by the interest of consolidating peace, and 
wishing to contribute to the cause of halting the arms 
race, and of bringing about general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective international 
control, and of saving mankind from the danger of using 
new means of warfare. 

Determined to continue negotiations with a view to 
achieving effective progress towards further measures 
in the field of disarmament. 



Recognizing that scientific and technical advances 
may open new possibilities with respect to modification 
of the environment. 

Recalling the Declaration of the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment, adopted at 
Stockholm on 16 June 1972, 

Realizing that the use of environmental modification 
techniques for peaceful purposes could improve the 
interrelationship of man and nature and contribute to 
the preservation and improvement of the environment 
for the benefit of present and future generations, 

Recognizing, however, that military or any other 
hostile use of such techniques could have effects 
extremely harmful to human welfare, 

Desiring to prohibit effectively military or any other 
hostile use of environmental modification techniques in 
order to eliminate the dangers to mankind from such 
use, and affirming their willingness to work towards 
the achievement of this objective. 

Desiring also to contribute to the strengthening of 
trust among nations and to the further improvement of 
the international situation in accordance with the 
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations, 

Have agreed as follows: 

Article I 

1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes 
not to engage in military or any other hostile use of 
environmental modification techniques having 
widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means 
of destruction, damage or injury to any other State 
Party. 

2. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not 
to assist, encourage or induce any State, group of 
States or international organization to engage in 
activities contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1 of 
this article. 

Article II 

As used in article I, the term "environmental 
modification techniques" refers to any technique for 
changing — through the deliberate manipulation of 
natural processes — the dynamics, composition or 
structure of the earth, including its biota, lithosphere, 
hydrosphere, and atmosphere, or of outer space. 

Article III 

1. The provisions of this Convention shall not hinder 
the use of environmental modification techniques for 
peaceful purposes and shall be without prejudice to 
generally recognized principles and applicable rules of 
international law concerning such use. 

2. The States Parties to this Convention undertake to 
facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the 
fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological 
information on the use of environmental modification 
techniques for peaceful purposes. States Parties in a 
position to do so shall contribute, alone or together with 
other States or international organizations, to interna- 
tional economic and scientific co-operation in the pres- 



January 10, 1977 



27 



ervation, improvement, and peaceful utilization of the 
environment, with due consideration for the needs of 
the developing areas of the world. 

Article IV 

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to 
take any measures it considers necessary in accordance 
with its constitutional processes to prohibit and prevent 
any activity in violation of the provisions of the Con- 
vention anywhere under its jurisdiction or control. 

Article V 

1. The States Parties to this Convention undertake to 
consult one another and to co-operate in solving any 
problems which may arise in relation to the objectives 
of, or in the application of the provisions of, the 
Convention. Consultation and co-operation pursuant to 
this article may also be undertaken thi-ough appropriate 
international procedures within the framework of the 
United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. 
These international procedures may include the 
services of appropriate international organizations, as 
well as of a consultative committee of experts as 
provided for in paragraph 2 of this article. 

2. For the purposes set forth in paragraph 1 of this 
article, the Depositary shall, within one month of the 
receipt of a request from any State Party, convene a 
consultative committee of experts. Any State Party 
may appoint an expert to this committee whose 
functions and rules of procedure are set out in the 
annex, which constitutes an integral part of this 
Convention. The committee shall transmit to the 
Depositary a summary of its findings of fact, 
incorporating all views and information presented to 
the committee during its proceedings. The Depositary 
shall distribute the summary to all States Parties. 

3. Any State Party to this Convention which has 
reasons to believe that any other State Party is acting 
in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of 
the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security 
Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint 
should include all relevant information as well as all 
possible evidence supporting its validity. 

4. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to 
co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the 
Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the 
basis of the complaint received by the Council. The 
Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the 
Convention of the results of the investigation. 

5. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to 
provide or support assistance, in accordance with the 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to any 
Party to the Convention which so requests, if the 
Security Council decides that such Party has been 
harmed or is likely to be harmed as a result of violation 
of the Convention. 

Article VI 

1. Any State Party may propose amendments to this 
Convention. The text of any proposed amendment shall 



be submitted to the Depositary, who shall promptly 
circulate it to all States Parties. 

2. An amendment shall enter into force for all States 
Parties which have accepted it, upon the deposit with 
the Depositary of instruments of acceptance by a 
majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter 
into force for any remaining State Party on the date of 
deposit of its instrument of acceptance. 

Article VII 
This Convention shall be of unlimited duration. 

Article VIII 

1. Five years after the entry into force of this Con- 
vention, a conference of the States Parties to the Con- 
vention shall be convened by the Depositary at Geneva. 
The conference shall review the operation of the Con- 
vention with a view to ensuring that its purposes and 
provisions are being realized, and shall in particular 
examine the effectiveness of the provisions of article I, 
paragraph 1, in eliminating the dangers of military or 
any other hostile use of environmental modification 
techniques. 

2. At intervals of not less than five years thereafter, 
a majority of the States Parties to this Convention may 
obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the 
Depositary, the convening of a conference with the 
same objectives. 

3. If no review conference has been convened 
pursuant to paragraph 2 of this article within 10 years 
following the conclusion of a previous review 
conference, the Depositary shall solicit the views of all 
States Parties to this Convention on the holding of such 
a conference. If one third or 10 of the States Parties, 
whichever number is less, respond affirmatively, the 
Depositary shall take immediate steps to convene the 
conference. 

Article IX 

1. This Convention shall be open to all States for 
signature. Any State which does not sign the Conven- 
tion before its entry into force in accordance with para- 
graph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time. 

2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by 
signatory States. Instruments of ratification and 
instruments of accession shall be deposited with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations. 

3. This Convention shall enter into force upon the 
deposit with the Depositary of instruments of 
ratification by 20 Governments in accordance with 
paragraph 2 of this article. 

4. For those States whose instruments of ratification 
or accession are deposited after the entry into force of 
this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of 
the deposit of their instruments of ratification or 
accession. 

5. The Depositary shall promptly inform all signatory 
and acceding States of the date of each signature, the 
date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of 
accession and the date of the entry into force of this 
Convention and of any amendments thereto, as well as 
of the receipt of other notices. 



28 



Department of State Bulletin 



6. This Convention shall be registered by the 
Depositary in accordance with Article 102 of the Char- 
ter of the United Nations. 

Article X 

This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, 
English, French, Russian, and Spanish texts are 
equally authentic, shall be deposited with the 
Secretary -General of the Untied Nations who shall send 
certified copies thereof to the Governments of the 
signatory and acceding States. 

In Witness Whereof, the undersigned, duly 
authorized thereto, have signed this Convention. 

Done at On 

Annex to the Convention 

Consultative Committee of Experts 

1. The Consultative Committee of Experts shall 
undertake to make appropriate findings of fact and 
provide expert views relevant to any problem raised 
pursuant to article V, paragraph 1, of this Convention 
by the State Party requesting the convening of the 
Committee. 

2. The work of the Consultative Committee of 
Experts shall be organized in such a way as to permit it 
to perform the functions set forth in paragraph 1 of this 
annex. The Committee shall decide procedural 
questions relative to the organization of its work, 
where possible by consensus, but otherwise by a 
majority of those present and voting. There shall be no 
voting on matters of substance. 

3. The Depositary or his representative shall serve as 
the Chairman of the Committee. 

4. Each expert may be assisted at meetings by one or 
more advisers. 

5. Each expert shall have the right, through the 
Chairman, to request from States, and from 
international organizations, such information and 
assistance as the expert considers desirable for the 
accomplishment of the Committee's work. 



Bill of Rights Day, Human Rights 
Day and Week, 1 976 

A PROCLAMATION' 

We Americans have been deeply moved by the sights 
and sounds of our Bicentennial observance, celebrated 
this year with pageantry, with fireworks, and with tall 
ships whose friendly visits have reminded us of our 
close ties, both contemporary and historical, with many 
nations around the globe. More importantly, we have 
given renewed thought to those principles of liberty 
and justice that underlie our national experience. 
Reexamined in the light of the past two centuries, the 
great instruments of our freedom — the Declaration of 



Independence, the Constitution and the Bill of 
Righl.s — retain both their vitality and their relevance to 
today's jiroblems. 

When he introduced his proposal for a Bill of Rights 
to the House of Representatives of the First Congress, 
James Madison called it "the great work." He said: "It 
will be a desirable thing to extinguish from the bosom 
of every member of the community, any apprehensions 
that there are those among his countrymen who wish to 
deprive them of the liberty for which they valiantly 
fought and honorably bled." 

Madison argued that "the great object in view is to 
limit and qualify the powers of Government, by except- 
ing out of the grant of power those cases in which the 
Government ought not to act, or to act only in a particu- 
lar mode." Those cases include rights and freedoms all 
Americans cherish today — freedom of religion, of 
speech, of the press; security against unreasonable 
searches and seizures; freedom from self-incrimination; 
the guarantee of due process of law; trial by jury. 

Our national commitment to the principles of the Bill 
of Rights is echoed in the community of nations by our 
respect for the ideals enunciated in the Universal Dec- 
laration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Na- 
tions General Assembly in 1948. This Declaration 
eloquently affirms that the foundation of freedom, jus- 
tice and peace in the world lies in the recognition of the 
inherent dignity, and the equal and inalienable rights, 
of all members of the human family. 

In December we pay special tribute to these funda- 
mental documents. December 15 is the one hundred and 
eighty-fifth anniversary of the adoption of the Bill of 
Rights and December 10 is the twenty-eighth anniver- 
sary of the Universal Declaration. As we enter the 
third century of our national existence we need more 
than ever to remember that the principles contained in 
these fundamental statements of human purpose have 
immediate application, not only domestically in our 
dealings with one another, but also internationally in 
our pursuit of friendly relations with all countries. 

Now, Therefore, I, Gerald R. Ford, President of 
the United States of America, do hereby proclaim De- 
cember 10, 1976, as Human Rights Day and December 
15, 1976, as Bill of Rights Day. I call upon the American 
people to observe the week beginning December 10, 
1976, as Human Rights Week. Further, I ask all Ameri- 
cans, as they reflect with conscious pride on our his- 
tory, not to be content with past accomplishments but 
to recognize the future task of our Nation and mankind: 
to bring about the full realization of the ideals and aspi- 
rations expressed in the Bill of Rights and the Univer- 
sal Declaration of Human Rights. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand 
this first day of December, in the year of our Lord nine- 
teen hundred seventy-six, and of the Independence of 
the United States of America the two hundred and 
first. 

Gerald R. Ford. 



1 No. 4479; 41 Fed. Reg. 52977. 



January 10, 1977 



29 



U.S. Gives Views on U.S.S.R. Proposal for World Treaty 
on the Non-Use of Force 



Following are statements made in Com- 
ynittee I (Political and Security) of the U.N. 
General Assembly by U.S. Representative 
Albert W. Sherer, Jr., on October 28 and 29 
and a statement made in Committee VI 
(Legal) by U.S. Representative Robert 
Rosenstock on November 22. 



AMBASSADOR SHERER, COMMITTEE I 



Statement of October 28 

L SL'N press release 133 dated October 28 

I would like at the outset to touch on a 
procedural aspect of this discussion. The 
chairman, in making his introduction to the 
current item at the morning meeting on Oc- 
tober 25, was somewhat imprecise in refer- 
ring to the General Assembly's decision as to 
the handling of the item. In fact, the General 
Committee recommended, on the conciliatory 
proposal of President [of the General Assem- 
bly Hamilton Shirley] Amerasinghe, that the 
item be allocated initially to the First Com- 
mittee and thereafter to the Sixth Commit- 
tee. 

The General Assembly considered this rec- 
ommendation the same afternoon. The Presi- 
dent of the Assembly stated, and I quote: 

. . .it is my understanding that it was agreed that the 
item be referred to the sixth committee promptly upon 
completion of its consideration in the First Committee. 
May I tal<e it that the General Assembly adopts the 
General Committee's recommendations? 

It was so decided. 

We are aware that the President has in- 
formed our chairman that this item is to be 
referred "at the appropriate stage" to the 
Sixth Committee "for examination of its legal 



implications"; ^ but what this means, if in- 
terpreted in good faith, is that the matter 
will be sent promptly to the Sixth Committee 
in conformity with the decision of the Gen- 
eral Assembly. 

As a gesture both to the President and to 
the proponents of this item, the U.S. delega- 
tion accepted the conciliatory proposal by 
President Amerasinghe in the General Com- 
mittee and the corresponding decision taken 
by the General Assembly. Efforts to deprive 
the General Assembly of its rightful oppor- 
tunity to consider the significant legal as- 
pects involved in the current treaty proposal 
amount to a disavowal of the President's 
proposal and the Assembly's decision. 

Mr. Chairman, this year marks the 31st 
anniversary of the United Nations Charter, a 
treaty dedicated to the maintenance of inter- 
national peace and to the prevention of war. 

Every member state of the United Nations 
has pledged to uphold the provisions of that 
treaty, including article 2, paragraph 3, 
which calls upon all members to "settle their 
international disputes by peaceful means," 
and article 2, paragraph 4, which obligates 
all members to "refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state." In other sec- 
tions, the charter goes on to develop further 
the obligations of member states regarding 
the use of force and, for example, draws a 
distinction between the legitimate threat or 
use of force in the exercise of the right of in- 
dividual or collective self-defense and the 



'U.N. doe. A/C.l/31/l/Add.l, Oct. 4, 1976; Alloca- 
tion of agenda items to the First Committee; letter 
dated Oct. 4 from the President of the General Assem- 
bly to the chairman of the committee. 



30 



Department of State Bulletin 



illegitimate use of force for purposes of ag- 
gression. 

Indeed, the obligations of article 2, para- 
graph 4, of the charter regarding the use of 
force are binding not only on U.N. members. 
They are declarations of general interna- 
tional law and represent standards of be- 
havior binding on all states. Moreover, it is 
essential that we insist upon such a broad 
application of these principles if the world is 
to have hope of ever being spared continued 
lawlessness and violence, whatever their 
source. 

It is precisely because the charter's basic 
provisions concerning the conduct of states 
are so clear and have such broad and au- 
thoritative application that the United States 
views with concern any proposal for their re- 
statement or revision. It is important for 
world peace that we not diminish the full 
force and effect of the obligations imposed by 
the United Nations Charter and that any at- 
tempt to modify those obligations be under- 
taken only in accordance with the provisions 
of the charter. 

Moreover, because sound international re- 
lations depend upon the understanding and 
strong support of our citizenry, it is also im- 
portant we be confident that any such effort 
be accepted as a genuine step forward in the 
development of standards by which states 
will guide their relations. Otherwise, we 
would not only mislead ourselves, our gov- 
ernments, and our people but lead them to 
treat with suspicion all international under- 
standings. 

Viewing the Soviet proposal for a treaty on 
the non-use of force from these perspec- 
tives,^ the United States is forced to con- 
clude that, at very best, the proposal would 
add nothing to the obligations which we al- 
ready have under the charter and therefore 
is unnecessary and unwise. Article 2, para- 
graphs 3 and 4, set forth the charter's basic 
obligations with respect to the peaceful set- 
tlement of disputes and the non-use of force, 
and the primacy of those obligations is firmly 
established by article 103. 

Under closer scrutiny, however, the 
United States concludes that the Soviet pro- 
posal would have us embark on an exercise 



which purports to expand but which may in 
fact diminish the charter's obligations by 
casting doubt on the solemnity of the legal 
commitments undertaken therein. The very 
proposal of a separate treaty on the non-use 
of force tends to undermine existing charter 
obligations by implying that the member 
states of the United Nations are still free to 
adopt or reject the principle of non-use of 
force embodied in article 2, paragraph 4, of 
the charter. We reject any such suggestion. 

Mr. Chairman, there is no lack of obliga- 
tions and standards regarding the non-use of 
force. These exist, and they can be read in 
their most forceful and authoritative version 
in the Charter of the United Nations. The 
problem lies in continuing unwillingness to 
abide by and enforce existing obligations. 

In short, we have rules enough. What we 
need is the will to adhere to the rules that 
exist. It is to that end, rather than to the 
repetition and restatement of existing stand- 
ards, that the governments of the United 
Nations should dedicate themselves. 



Statement of October 29 

USUN press release 13J dated October 20 

The United States will abstain in the vote 
on the draft resolution before us (document 
A/C.l/31/L.3.)3 We are concerned that the 
proposal by the Soviet Union for a treaty on 
the non-use of force could undermine the 
United Nations Charter — either by need- 
lessly duplicating it or by selecting certain 
provisions to endorse but omitting others, 
thereby adding new and disputed provisions. 
These are serious matters, in our view. It is 
curious that one of the strongest opponents 
of charter review in general seems to have 
developed doubts as to the relevance and suf- 
ficiency of the charter's basic provisions 



^ For text of the propcsed treaty, see U.N. doc. 
A/31/24.3, Sept. 28, 1976. 

•' The resolution, which "Invites Member states to 
examine further the . . . draft World Treaty on the 
Non-Use of Force in International Relations . . .," was 
adopted by Committee I on Oct. 29 by a rollcall vote of 
94 to 2, with 35 abstentions (U.S.), and by the Assem- 
bly on Nov. 8 by a recorded vote of 88 to 2, with 31 
abstentions (U.S.) (A/RES/31/9). 



January 10, 1977 



31 



against the use of force and in favor of peace- 
ful settlements of disputes. 

Even with these problems, the United 
States could have voted in favor of a study of 
the question of the need for or desirabihty of 
a new treaty. But what we cannot accept is 
the apparent attempt to prejudge the issue. 
The draft resolution determines, without any 
consultation or discussion of the very serious 
issues involved, that a treaty is needed and 
that all that remains to be done is to 
negotiate the contents of that new treaty. 
We described our position to the Soviet dele- 
gation and stated our willingness to join in an 
objective study of whether there is a need for 
such a treaty. We regret that there was no 
indication of flexibility on its part in this 
matter. 

MR. ROSENSTOCK, COMMITTEE VI, 
NOVEMBER 22 

USUN pie.'is release 156 dated November 22 

The prohibition of the threat or use of 
force is one of this century's greatest contri- 
butions to law and to mankind. The modern 
origins of the idea of eliminating force as a 
means of settling disputes lie in the great 
conferences of the last days of the 19th cen- 
tury. The League of Nations Covenant and 
the Kellogg-Briand Pact marked the begin- 
nings of governmental commitment to norms 
designed to eliminate force as a legitimate 
aspect of governmental policy. 

The Charter of the United Nations repre- 
sents the culmination of the drive to elimi- 
nate the use of force in international rela- 
tions. For the first time in the history of the 
world, states e.xpressly committed them- 
selves to a binding treaty obligation in article 
2, paragraph 4, to "refrain in their interna- 
tional relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or polit- 
ical independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes 
of the United Nations." Today that clear and 
direct rule is universally recognized as a 
peremptory norm of international law bind- 
ing on all and not subject to derogation by 
unilateral declarations or bilateral agree- 
ments. 



In the years since 1945, the international 
community has deepened its understanding 
of this fundamental norm through experience 
and through pronouncements such as those 
contained in the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Re- 
lations and Cooperation Among States in Ac- 
cordance with the Charter. "• It is far from 
clear that further U.N. pronouncements on 
the matter are likely to be useful. 

As a result of the clarity of article 2, para- 
graph 4, and the subsequent consideration of 
the norm, there is little doubt as to its con- 
tent. Indeed, none of the post-1945 armed 
conflicts can be attributed to any lack of un- 
derstanding of the rule on the part of the de- 
cisionmakers in national governments. If one 
reflects on the instances of conflict in the last 
31 years, one finds occasions of total cynical 
or contemptuous disregard of the prohibi- 
tion, examples of disputes as to underlying 
facts, and instances of long-festering dis- 
putes which, left unresolved, exploded into 
conflicts. 

This analysis leads to the conclusion that 
what is desperately needed is not further 
glosses on the prohibition of the threat or use 
of force or further instruments reiterating 
once again obligations none deny, but: 

— First, greater will on the part of states 
to honor what they know full well to be their 
obligations; 

— Second, examination of methods of re- 
solving differences as to facts and an inten- 
sive, prolonged, and detailed examination of 
the alternative to the use of force — the 
peaceful settlement of disputes. 

Clearly, differences between states exist 
and will continue to exist for the foreseeable 
future. It is a moral as well as a pragmatic 
imperative in today's interdependent, nu- 
clear world that states become habituated to 
settling their disputes by peaceful means. 
There is no rational alternative. Unfortu- 
nately, while there is much learning and lit- 
tle doubt concerning the meaning of para- 
graph 4 of article 2 of the charter, the same 



^ For text of the declaration, adopted by the General 
Assembly on Oct. 24, 1970 (A/RES/2625 (XXV)), see 
Bulletin of Nov. 16, 1970, p. 627. 



32 



Department of State Bulletin 



cannot be said of paragraph 3 of article 2. 
The charter wisely listed the obligation to 
settle international disputes by peaceful 
means ahead of the prohibition of the threat 
or use of force because disputes must be set- 
tled if we are to avoid violence. The two 
norms are part of an inseparable whole. 

Whether we concentrate on the prohibition 
of the threat or use of force or on the peace- 
ful settlement of disputes or both, one thing 
is clear: the issues are complex and delicate. 
If we are to examine these issues usefully, 
we must first recognize that they need care- 
ful examination grounded in expertise and 
experience. They need examination by those 
trained in the analysis of legal norms. They 
should be examined by the Legal Committee, 
which has gained so much learning and made 
such contributions as the Declaration on 
Friendly Relations and the Aggression Defi- 
nition. ^ These perceptions are essential to 
any serious examination of these questions. 

If a detailed examination is to be underta- 
ken, we must, moreover, take great care not 
to base such an examination on a premise 
which is harmful to our shared goal. What- 
ever the motivation for the item before us, if 
we decide to proceed further with it we must 
do so responsibly. The issues are too serious 
to allow the matter to be handled in a casual 
manner without due regard for the effect this 
item may have for concrete obligations. 

To commence discussion of the prohibition 
of the use of force on the basis that what is 
needed is a new treaty is to approach the 
problem in a counterproductive manner. 

We all have a solemn treaty commitment to 
avoid the threat or use of force in the char- 
ter. We must not diminish the full force and 
effect of these charter obligations by 
elaborating a partial parallel treaty struc- 
ture. We would do no service to the primacy 
of the charter by adopting another treaty on 
the same subject matter. 

If the provisions of both treaties were to 
be identical, we would debase the treatymak- 
ing process and rule of pacta sunt servanda 



' For text of the Definition of Aggression, adopted by 
the General Assembly on Dec. 14, 1974 (A/RES/3314 
(XXLX)), see Bulletin of Feb. 3, 1975, p. 158. 



[treaties are to be observed] by suggesting 
that two treaties are better than one. If the 
words of the two treaties were not precisely 
the same, comma for comma, a number of dif- 
ficulties would be bound to arise. Among the 
foremost of the difficulties would be that not 
all states will become parties to the second 
treaty and we will have two regimes, some- 
times parallel, sometimes divergent. A sec- 
ond major difficulty that would arise is that 
some states will seek to find interpretive 
loopholes stemming from the differences be- 
tween the two texts, however slight those 
differences may be. It is even possible that 
some may argue that the elaboration of a new 
treaty implies member states are free to 
adopt or reject the basic prohibition of the 
threat or use of force. 

All of these difficulties produce uncer- 
tainty and confusion in the critical field of the 
prohibition of the threat or use of force. They 
must be avoided. 

If we are not to follow the treaty route, 
but decide the general area merits further 
examination, we would do well to ask 
whether the suggestions of the character 
contained in the U.S.S.R. proposal contain a 
useful basis for pursuing the elaboration of a 
recommendation such as a resolution or dec- 
laration. If it is decided to continue examina- 
tion of this matter in the future, this is ob- 
viously a question which would need careful 
and detailed examination in this committee, 
and not something on which we or anyone 
else can comment definitively at this time. 

What we can do at this point is share some 
preliminary reactions with a view to more 
considered discussion at any subsequent 
stage which may be agreed upon. On balance, 
we are inclined to think that the approach 
and format contained in the Soviet text are 
not, even aside from the inadvisability of a 
treaty, a good basis for consideration of the 
complex of issues involved in the prohibition 
of the threat or use of force and the obliga- 
tion to settle disputes by peaceful means. 

We are disinclined to take note of an un- 
specified series of instruments and declara- 
tions, some of which may contain or support 
doctrines that are not consonant with the 
fundamental obligations of the charter. We 



January 10, 1977 



33 



are, moreover, concerned that any reference 
to the Conference on Security and Coopera- 
tion in Europe not suggest that any one part 
of that conference's work is more important 
than any other part. The Helsinki Declara- 
tion is a compilation of various elements 
including the non-use of force but also includ- 
ing humanitarian issues and the free ex- 
change of ideas and information. ** If the 
conference produced nothing more than a 
reiteration in nontreaty form of existing ob- 
ligations it would be a redundant way to 
spend time; the emphasis on human rights 
and the free exchange of ideas and informa- 
tion is what protects that declaration from a 
charge of redundancy. 

We see no merit in new paraphrases of ar- 
ticle 2, paragraph 4, of the charter, whether 
in the context of a treaty or a resolution; for 
such a paraphrase can only create confusion 
of a potentially dangerous nature. The 
danger is enhanced when the paraphrase 
takes a single notion out of the context of any 
entire legal framework. 

We agree that any serious effort to deal 
with the problem of the threat or use of force 
must deal with the peaceful settlement of 
disputes, which is, as noted above, another of 
the aspects of the international security sys- 
tem as a whole. In order to be meaningful, 
however, any effort to deal with peaceful set- 
tlement must build upon the principle con- 
tained in the Friendly Relations Declaration 
that: 

Recourse to, or acceptance of, a settlement procedure 
freely agreed to by States with regard to existing or 
future disputes to which they are parties shall not be 
regarded as incompatible with sovereign equality. 

What is needed is an examination of the 
various means of dispute settlement and a 
recognition that acceptance of dispute set- 
tlement procedures involving impartial third 
parties for future disputes is essential if we 
are to eliminate force as a means to settle 
disputes. Experience teaches us that once a 
dispute has become serious each party may 



* For text of the Final Act of the Conference on Secu- 
rity and Cooperation in Europe, adopted at Helsinki on 
Aug. 1, 1975, see Bulletin of Sept. 1, 197.5, p. 32.3. 



be hesitant to seek third-party dispute set- 
tlement for fear it is a sign of weakness. The 
stronger party is frequently tempted to find 
ways of avoiding third-party settlement lest 
it lose the advantages flowing from its 
superior strength; its public opinion may in- 
sist it yield no advantages without a 
negotiated quid pro quo. 

States derive their sovereignty from inter- 
national law. They must come to recognize 
that the supreme manifestation of that 
sovereignty is to agree not merely to the 
principle of peaceful settlement but to mean- 
ingful and expeditious settlement proce- 
dures. This is where the concern to avoid the 
use of force can now be most productively di- 
rected. 

A meaningful effort to discuss the norms 
contained in article 2 of the charter must not 
suggest that these norms exist in a vacuum. 
Other parts of the entire system, such as 
chapters VI [Pacific Settlement of Disputes], 
VII [Action With Respect to Threats to the 
Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of 
Aggression], and VIII [Regional Ar- 
rangements], must also be taken into ac- 
count, if distortion and confusion are to be 
avoided. Emphasis on only some parts of the 
interlocking system risks downgrading other 
parts. Vague references to measures for lim- 
iting confrontation and for disarmament are 
more likely to distract us from serious efforts 
to reduce armaments and tension than con- 
tribute to positive change. 

If we are to proceed with future considera- 
tion of ways and means of ehminating the use 
of force, all of these aspects of the problem 
must be carefully studied and analyzed. 
There is no benefit to be derived from ill- 
considered and hastily adopted political man- 
ifestations which reflect merely a general 
disinclination to oppose high-sounding 
phrases. Such exercises debase the United 
Nations and create the risk of lulling some 
with the view that our problems have been 
lessened. 

There are a number of critical problems in 
the world. The recurrence of resort to force 
is one of them. If this institution determines 
that future study of the problem of the use of 



34 



Department of State Bulletin 



force merits priority consideration, then we 
need to decide how that consideration is to 
proceed. We must not assume that the prob- 
lem is simple or subject to ready amelioration 
by the hasty adoption of glib generalities. If 
we intend to grapple with the problem, we 
must do so carefully and with the benefit of 
existing expertise. We believe that expertise 
exists to a unique extent in the Legal Com- 
mittee and are consequently firmly convinced 
that any future study of the item should be 
conducted in the Legal Committee. 



Letters of Credence 

India 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of India, Kewal Singh, presented 
his credentials to President Ford on 
November 30.* 

Singapore 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Singapore, Punch Coomara- 
swamy, presented his credentials to Presi- 
dent Ford on November 30. * 

Spain 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Spanish State, Juan Jose Rovira, presented 
his credentials to President Ford on 
November 30.* 

Surinam 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Surinam, Roel F. Karamat, pre- 
sented his credentials to President Ford on 
November 30." 

Venezuela 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Venezuela, Ignacio Iribarren 
Borges, presented his credentials to Presi- 
dent Ford on November 30.' 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Health 

Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the constitution of 
the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as 
amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva 
May 22, 1973.' 

Acceptance deposited: The Bahamas, December 14, 
1976. 

Patents 

Strasbourg agreement concerning the international 
patent classification. Done at Strasbourg March 24, 
1971. Entered into force October 7, 1975. TIAS 8140. 
Declaration of continued application: Surinam, 
November 16, 1976. 

Property — Industrial 

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial 
property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at 
Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 en- 
tered into force May 19, 1970; for the United States 
August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 entered into 
force April 26, 1970; for the United States September 
5, 1970. TIAS 6923. 

Notification from World intellectual Property Or- 
ganization that accession deposited: The Bahamas 
(with the exception of articles 1 to 12), December 
10, 1976. 
Declaration of continued application: Surinam, 
November 16, 1976. 

Property — Intellectual 

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Prop- 
erty Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. 
Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United 
States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932. 
Declaration of continued application: Surinam, 
November 16, 1976. 

Terrorism — Protection of Diplomats 

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes 
against internationally protected persons, including 
diplomatic agents. Done at New York December 14, 
1973.1 

Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, November 25, 
1976. 

Trade 

Proces-verbal extending the declaration on the provi- 
sional accession of Colombia. Done at Geneva 
November 12, 1976. Enters into force between Co- 



' For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the 
President's reply, see Department of State press re- 
lease dated Nov. 30. 



' Not in force. 



January 10, 1977 



35 



lombia and any participating government as soon as it 
has been accepted by Colombia and such government. 

Wheat 

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat 
trade convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971. Done at Washington March 17, 
1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect 
to certain provisions and July 1, 1976, with respect to 
other provisions. 

Ratification deposited: Finland, December 20, 1976. 
Accession deposited: Spain, December 22, 1976. 

Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid 
convention (part of the international wheat agree- 
ment) 1971. Done at Washington March 17, 1976. En- 
tered into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain 
provisions and July 1, 1976, with respect to other 
provisions. 
Ratification deposited: Finland, December 20, 1976. 



BILATERAL 

Belize 

Memorandum of understanding relating to cooperative 
efforts to protect crops from plant pest damage and 
plant diseases. Signed at Washington December 8, 
1976. Entered into force December 8, 1976. 

Bulgaria 

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the 
United States, with agreed minute and related letter. 
Signed at Washington December 17, 1976. Enters 
into force on a date to be mutually agreed by ex- 
change of notes. 

Federal Republic of Germany 

Technical exchange and cooperative arrangement in the 
field of management of radioactive wastes, with pat- 
ent addendum and appendix. Signed at Bonn De- 
cember 20, 1976. Entered into force December 20, 
1976. 

Haiti 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relat- 
ing to the agreement of March 20, 1975, with memo- 
randum of understanding. Signed at Port-au-Prince 
November 30, 1976. Entered into force November 30, 
1976. 

Iceland 

Memorandum of cooperative mapping arrangements, 
with annex. Signed at Washington November 10, 
1976. Entered into force November 10, 1976. 

Indonesia 

Loan agreement relating to the development of higher 
education, with annex. Signed at Jakarta October 28, 
1976. Entered into force October 28, 1976. 

Iran 

Agreement concerning management, disposal, and 
utilization of funds derived from sale of military as- 
sistance program property. Signed at Tehran October 
19, 1976. Entered into force October 19, 1976. 

Israel 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of ag- 
ricultural commodities of September 30, 1976 (TIAS 



8382). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington 
December 10, 1976. Entered into force December 10, 
1976. 

Mexico 

Agreement relating to additional cooperative arrange- 
ments to curb the illegal production and traffic in 
narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico 
November 22, 1976. Entered into force November 22, 
1976. 

Pakistan 

Loan agreement relating to Tarbela Dam repairs. 
Signed at Islamabad September 22, 1976. Entered 
into force September 22, 1976. 

Loan agreement relating to on-farm management, with 
annex. Signed at Islamabad October 27, 1976. En- 
tered into force October 27, 1976. 

Zaire 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of ag- 
ricultural commodities of March 25, 1976 (TIAS 
8403). Effected by exchange of notes at Kinshasa Au- 
gust 23 and December 7, 1976. Entered into force De- 
cember 7, 1976. 

Zambia 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, with 
minutes. Signed at Lusaka December 3, 1976. En- 
tered into force December 3, 1976. 



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36 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX January 10, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1959 



Arms Control and Disarmament. United States 
Discusses Disarmament Issues in U.N. General 
Assembly Debate (Ikie, Martin, text of resolu- 
tion including Environmental Modification Con- 
vention) 17 

Environment. United States Discusses Disarma- 
ment Issues in U.N. General Assembly Debate 
(Ikle, Martin, te.xt of resolution including En- 
vironmental Modification Convention) 17 

Human Rights. Bill of Rights Day, Human Rights 
Day and Week, 1976 (proclamation) 29 

India. Letters of Credence (Singh) 35 

Presidential Documents. Bill of Rights Day, 
Human Rights Day and Week, 1976 (proclama- 
tion) 29 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications 36 

Singapore. Letters of Credence (Coomar- 
aswamy) 35 

Spain. Letters of Credence (Rovira) 35 

Surinam. Letters of Credence (Karamat) 35 

Treaty Information. Current Actions 35 

United Nations 

United States Discusses Disarmament Issues in 
U.N. General Assembly Debate (Ikle, Martin, 
text of resolution including Environmental Mod- 
ification Convention) 17 

U.S. Gives Views on U.S.S.R. Proposal for World 
Treaty on the Non-Use of Force (Rosenstock, 
Sherer) 30 

Venezuela. Letters of Credence (Iribarren) 35 

Name 1 ttde,r 

Coomarasvvamy, Punch 35 

Ford, President 29 



Ikle, FredC 17 

Iribarren Borges, Ignacio 35 

Karamat, Roel F 35 

Martin, Joseph, Jr 17 

Rosenstock, Robert .30 

Rovira, Juan Jose 35 

Sherer, Albert W. , Jr 30 

Singh, Kew-al 35 



Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: December 20-26 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

*612 12/20 Shipping Coordinating Commit- 
tee, Subcommittee on Safety of 
Life at Sea, working group on 
radioeommunications, Jan. 19. 

*613 12/20 Kissinger: Bicentennial essay 
published in Dec. 27 issue of 
Time magazine. 

*614 12/22 Ocean Affairs Advisory Commit- 
tee, Jan. 25-26. 

*615 12/22 Study group 1, U.S. National 
Committee of the International 
Telegraph and Telephone Con- 
sultative Committee (CCITT), 
Jan. 18-19. 

t616 12/22 Visit by Ghassan Tueini, special 
envoy of Lebanese President 
Sarkis. 

*617 12/23 Study group CMTT, U.S. National 
Committee for the International 
Radio Consultative Committee 
(CCIR), Jan. 26. 

*618 12/23 Study group 2, U.S. National Com- 
mittee for CCIR, .Jan. 26. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



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washington. dc. 20402 



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of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



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79&0 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 

Volume LXXVI • No. 1960 • January 17, 1977 



U.S. GIVES VIEWS IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE 

ON THE MIDDLE EAST 

Statement by Ambassador Scranton and Text of Resolution 37 

U.S. REAFFIRMS COMMITMENT TO SELF-DETERMINATION 
AND INDEPENDENCE FOR NAMIBIA 

U.S. Statements and Texts of U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 4-3 

U.S. REITERATES SUPPORT FOR NEGOTIATED SOLUTION IN RHODESIA 
U.S. statements and Texts of U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 53 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 

For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
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BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to 
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Vol. LXXVI, No. 1960 
January 17, 1977 



The Department of State BVLLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 

The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, and 
news conferences of the President and 
the Secretary of State and other offi- 
cers of the Department, as well as spe- 
cial articles on various phases of in- 
ternational affairs and the functions of 
the Department. Information is in- 
cluded concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a party 
and on treaties of general interna- 
tional interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United \ations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of\ 
international relations are also listed. 



I 






U.S. Gives Views in General Assembly Debate 
on the Middle East 



Following is a statement made in the U.N. 
General Assembly on December 9 by U.S. 
Re'presentative William W. Scranton, to- 
gether with the texts of two resolutions 
adopted by the Assembly that day. 



STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCRANTON 

USUN press release 184 dated December 9 

As we move through the final debates of 
this General Assembly session, we are also 
approaching the end of a very difficult period 
in the history of the Middle East — the year of 
the tragedy of Lebanon. I want to express my 
government's profound gratification that the 
long travail of the people of Lebanon is draw- 
ing to an end. We will give every feasible 
support to President Sarkis as he faces the 
task of the reconstruction of his country; and 
we look forward to the day when Lebanon — 
its territorial integrity, its political independ- 
ence, and its national unity preserved — will 
resume its proud and rightful place among the 
nations of the Middle East. 

In the calmer atmosphere in the area 
created by the healing process now going on 
in Lebanon, it is natural that attention is 
turning again to the overriding issue in the 
Middle East — the need for progress toward a 
peaceful settlement of the conflict that has so 
long burdened that region, and without which 
no period of calm can endure. There is 
today — and we welcome it — fresh insistence 
that the negotiating process recommence and 
a sense of impatience with the status quo, 
which we share with the parties to the con- 
flict. For our part, we believe conditions are 
now conducive to the resumption of efforts to 
solve the underlying problems both of Leba- 
non and of the region as a whole. 



We welcome the recent encouraging state- 
ments of President Sadat of Egypt and Prime 
Minister Rabin of Israel. And here in the 
United Nations, I for one was encouraged by 
some of the comments made in the most re- 
cent Middle East debate, particularly those of 
the Jordanian and the Israeli Representa- 
tives. And now in this debate we have wit- 
nessed a unique experience — the introduction 
of resolutions advocating a peace conference 
by both Egypt and Israel.' 

In the past, events in the Middle East have 
often seemed to run ahead of diplomatic ef- 
forts to shape them into a peaceful course. 
This need not and must not be the pattern for 
the future. Out of this conviction were born 
the U.S. initiatives in the aftermath of the 
1973 war, taken at the request of the parties. 
These efforts have yielded the first tangible, 
practical steps toward an agreed settlement in 
nearly three decades of fighting and uneasy 
truces. The three agreements reached in 1974 
and 1975 are partial and interim accords, but 
they have helped give substance to the 
framework for negotiation established in De- 
cember 1973 in Geneva. They have begun to 
build patterns of cooperation, of interaction, 
of negotiation which are necessary prereq- 
uisites to successful negotiations for an over- 
all settlement. 

Mr. President, a new Administration will 
take office in Washington on January 20. Ob- 
viously I do not speak with authority on the 
details of its policies. There is, however, con- 



' The Representative of Israel introduced on Dec. 6 a 
draft resolution {A/31/L.24) calling for reconvening of 
the Peace Conference on the Middle East under the 
framework of Security Council Resolutions 242 and .3.38. 
An amendment (A/31/L.25) was introduced calling for 
participation by the Palestine Liberation Organization. 
The Representative of Isi-ael withdrew the draft res- 
olution on Dec. 9. 



January 17, 1977 



37 



sistency in the approach of the United States 
to the problems of the Middle East, which re- 
flects principles and policies enjoying over- 
whelming public support in our country. With 
full conviction and confidence, I therefore say 
to those parties with whom we have worked 
in the Middle East to advance the cause of 
peace that they can rest assured we will con- 
tinue to work with them in this vital effort in 
the months and the years ahead. Much has 
been accomplished already. Mutual commit- 
ments have been made to pursue the negotiat- 
ing process; and there is a balanced and 
comprehensive framework in the form of Res- 
olutions 242 and 338, which contain the fun- 
damental elements for those negotiations. The 
United States will not now abandon its de- 
termined and urgent search for peace. We will 
persevere, and we are convinced that a set- 
tlement will be achieved. The alternative is 
unthinkable. 

I turn now to the resolutions under consid- 
eration in connection with our discussion of 
the situation. The omnibus resolution [A/31/ 
L.26] is similar in many respects to a resolu- 
tion we opposed last year. We shall do so 
again. 

We do not beheve that the blanket condem- 
nations of one side contained in this resolution 
are warranted or will have any positive effect. 
Nor do we see any logic in a call on all states 
to desist from supplying military and other 
aid to one side but not to the other. The 
United States cannot support and will not be 
guided by this proposal if it is endorsed. 

This resolution also lacks balance in its ref- 
erence to the potential elements of a peace. 
One side cannot be expected to give every- 
thing and gain nothing. 

There is no i-eference (1) to the end of the 
state of war; (2) to an agreement which pro- 
vides not only for the legitimate interests of 
the Palestinians but for the security of Israel 
as well; and (3) to the right of a free and inde- 
pendent Israel to exist in the Middle East. 

This resolution contains a request to the 
Security Council that carries at least the im- 
plication that somehow it ought to impose a 
settlement on the parties and that this should 
be done within an "appropriate time-table," as 



it says. The parties to this dispute have 
accepted the framework for a negotiating proc- 
ess which is aimed at producing an agreed solu- 
tion. This is the essence of what has been 
accomplished— a mutual commitment to 
negotiate rather than to rely on timetables or 
imposed solutions. The Security Council has 
in the past and can in the future make impor- 
tant contributions to peace in the Middle 
East. However, we do not believe it is either 
appropriate or practical to look to the Council 
to impose its will on the parties to the negoti- 
ations. 

The temptation to write prescriptions in 
advance is a natural one, but it is also danger- 
ous. Such prescriptions, hastily formed, can 
close the door to peace rather than opening 
it — because there are still differences among 
us, and especially among the parties directly 
involved in the dispute, and those differences 
can only be resolved by negotiation between 
those parties. We cannot write a peace 
agreement here, not among 146 nations, nor 
can we bring about a detailed prescription for 
the procedure for reconvening the Geneva 
Conference without raising the possibility of 
ahenation of one or more of the parties, which 
would doom the conference before it began. 

This brings me to the second draft before 
us, resolution A/31/L.27. The motivation and 
a good deal of the resolution itself is consist- 
ent with our view of the urgency of resuming 
the negotiating process. We are compelled, 
however, to vote "No" because of serious 
problems in two areas. First, this resolution 
sets an artificial deadline for reconvening of 
the Geneva Conference. This is not a matter 
for the General Assembly but, rather, for the 
parties themselves to decide. It also sets out a 
time frame for a meeting of the Security 
Council, a decision which we believe should be 
subject to consultations among Council mem- 
bers in light of the situation at that time and 
not prejudged by this Assembly. Secondly, 
the request to the Secretary General to re- 
sume his contacts with the parties to the con- 
flict is phrased in such a way as to imply that 
the Palestine Liberation Organization should 
be one of the parties consulted in preparation 
for reconvening the Geneva Conference. We 



38 



Department of State Bulletin 



i ilieve that the question of additional partici- 
pants at the Geneva Conference is one which 
(.an only be addressed by the original partici- 
pants themselves. 

And now the United States is in a special 
position which we recognize concerning this 
particular resolution and, indeed, with regard 
to the reconvening of the Middle East Peace 
Conference — a position with which all of you 
are intimately familiar. A new U.S. Adminis- 
tration will take office in Washington on 
January 20, and we therefore do not consider 
it appropriate to join now in a definition of de- 
tailed options or time limits governing the 
evolution of this crucial negotiating process. 
The procedures and timing of a resumed 
Geneva Conference are matters which rightly 
must be determined by the participants them- 
selves and by the cochairmen. This is ob- 
viously a question which will be addressed by 
the new American Administration. Accord- 
ingly, we will vote "No" on this resolution. 
However, in so doing we join with all the rest 
of the nations here represented who sincerely 
desire that negotiations toward an overall set- 
tlement resume promptly and that peace be 
the result therefrom for all the peoples of the 
Middle East. 

In this connection, Mr. President, I would 
like to recall the words of Secretary of State 
Kissinger in speaking to this Assembly on 
September 22, 1975: 

In the Middle East today there is a yearning for 
peace surpassing any known for three decades. Let us 
not doom the region to another generation of futile 
struggle. Instead, let the world community seize the 
historic opportunity before it. The suffering and brav- 
ery of all the peoples of the Middle East cry out for it; 
the hopes and interests of all the world's peoples de- 
mand it. The United States promises its full dedication 
to further progress toward peace. 

Those words have gained in urgency in the 
months since they were spoken, but the op- 
portunity for peace still remains with us. 

And now, Mr. President, I ask for the in- 
dulgence of this body for a few moments more 
to recount a personal experience. Some of you 
may remember that in 1968 there was also a 
change of Administration in the United 
States, that I was sent by the then 
President-elect on a short mission to the Mid- 



dle East. Upon returning from consultations 
with leaders there, I reported that many be- 
lieved there was then an opportunity for 
negotiations toward a peaceful settlement. 
Some experts and some of us nonexperts 
agreed. 

Such negotiations did not materialize. His- 
torians may argue forever as to whether or 
not an opportunity was missed. But that ex- 
perience of disappointment runs deep in my 
memory and lingers on and on. 

Right now there appears to be another op- 
portunity. Many experts and many of us who 
are nonexperts believe that negotiations are 
possible now and should be undertaken. Ap- 
parently more are of this opinion now than in 
1968. The possibility is exciting — it's 
enticing — even to the point of a gleam of hope 
of an overall settlement. And with this ex- 
citement comes a new responsibility, a deep 
and abiding responsibility, to us all in this 
body. Rhetoric for home consumption, 
polemics for home headlines, should be 
avoided. In advance of negotiations, beguiling 
prescriptions for results that will be "your 
way," or "my way," or "our way" can block 
that opportunity for negotiation. The slightest 
error, a misstatement, a mismeaning here can 
ruin that chance. 

I know it is no time for lectures either, 
especially from an American who is in com- 
parative safety thousands of miles away — no 
lecture to an Egyptian or a Syrian or a Jorda- 
nian or an Israeli or a Palestinian who has 
lived on the brink of war or experienced war 
itself over decades and who even today won- 
ders, "Will it come again next year, or next 
month, or next week, or tomorrow?" This is 
no lecture. I simply request with all my heart 
that we all think before we speak now, that 
we all think before we act, so that like those of 
us who had some hopes in 1968 we will not 
witness and feel our hopes dashed. 

Peacekeeping and peacemaking are very 
difficult; they are very tenuous efforts. No 
one knows that better than members of the 
United Nations. In comparison to lasting 
peace, war comes all too easily. So let us work 
quietly for negotiation to begin so that peace 
may come. 



January 17, 1977 



39 



TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS 

General Assembly Resolution 31/61 

The Situation in the Middle East 

The General Assembly, 

Recalling its resolution 3414 (XXX) of 5 December 
1975 and noting with concern that no progress has been 
achieved towards the implementation of that resolution, 
in particular its paragraph 4, 

Recalliny the debate held in the Security Council in 
January IS^G on the problem of the Middle East includ- 
ing the Palestinian question, in implementation of sub- 
paragraph (a) of Council resolution 381 (1975) of 30 
November 1975, 

Deeply concerned at the increasing deterioration of 
the situation in the Middle East due to continued Israeli 
occupation and Israel's refusal to implement United 
Nations resolutions, 

Reaffirming the necessity of establishing a just and 
lasting peace in the region based on full respect for the 
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations as well as for the resolutions concerning the 
problem of the Middle East and the question of Pales- 
tine, 

1. Affirms that the early resumption of the Peace 
Conference on the Middle East with the participation of 
all the parties concerned, including the Palestine Lib- 
eration Organization, in accordance with General As- 
sembly resolution 3375 (XXX) of 10 November 1975, is 
essential for the realization of a just and lasting settle- 
ment in the region: 

2. Condemns Israel's continued occupation of Arab 
territories in violation of the Charter of the United Na- 
tions, the principles of international law and repeated 
United Nations resolutions; 

3. Reaffirms that a just and lasting peace in the Mid- 
dle East cannot be achieved without Israel's with- 
drawal from all Arab territories occupied since 1967 and 
the attainment by the Palestinian people of their in- 
alienable rights, which are the basic prerequisites enabling 
all countries and peoples in the Middle East to live in 
peace; 

4. Condemns all measures taken by Israel in the oc- 
cupied territories to change the demographic and geo- 
graphic character and institutional structure of these 
territories; 

5. Requests once again all States to desist from sup- 
plying Israel with military and other forms of aid or any 
assistance which would enable it to consolidate its occu- 
pation or to exploit the natural resources of the oc- 
cupied territories; 



6. Requests the Security Council to take effective 
measures, within an appropriate time-table, for the im- 
plementation of all relevant resolutions of the Council 
and the General Assembly on the Middle East and 
Palestine; 

7. Requests the Secretary-General to inform the Co- 
Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East 
of the present resolution and to submit a report on the 
follow-up of its implementation to the General Assem- 
bly at its thirty-second session. 



General Assembly Resolution 31/62 ^ 

Peace Conference on the Middle East 

The General Assembly, 

Having discussed the item entitled "The situation in 
the Middle East", 

Noting the report of the Secretary-General on this 
item and his initiative of 1 April 1976, 

Gravely concerned at the lack of progress towards 
the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Mid- 
dle East, 

Convinced that any relaxation in the search for a 
comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the 
Middle East problem to achieve a just peace in the area 
constitutes a grave threat to the prospects of peace in 
the Middle East as well as a threat to international 
peace and security, 

1. Requests the Secretary-General: 

(a) To resume contacts with all the parties to the con- 
flict and the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on 
the Middle East, in accordance with his initiative of 1 
April 1976, in preparation for the early convening of the 
Peace Conference on the Middle East; 

(b) To submit a report to the Security Council on the 
results of his contacts and on the situation in the Middle 
East not later than 1 March 1977: 

2. Calls for the early convening of the Peace Confer- 
ence on the Middle East, under the auspices of the 
United Nations and the co-chairmanship of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of 
America, not later than the end of March 1977; 

3. Requests the Security Council to convene sub- 
sequent to the submission by the Secretary-General of 
the report referred to in paragraph 1 (b) above, in order 
to consider the situation in the area in the light of that 
report and to promote the process towards the estab- 
lishment of a just and lasting peace in the area; 

4. Further requests the Secretary-General to inform 
the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle 
East of the present resolution. 



^ Adopted by the Assembly on Dec. 9 by a rolleall 
vote of 91 to 11 (U.S.), with 29 abstentions (text from 
U.N. doc. A/31/L.26, draft resolution). 



^ Adopted by the Assembly on Dec. 9 by a rolleall 
vote of 122 to'2 (U.S.), with 8 abstentions (text from 
U.N. doc. A/31/L.27, draft resolution, with revision by 
the sponsors). 



40 



Department of State Bulletin 



U.S. Votes Against U.N. Resolution 
on Question of Palestine 

Folloiving /,s a statement made in the U.N. 
General Assembly by U.S. Representative 
William W. Scranton on November 23. 

USUN press rele^ise 159 dated November 23 

That the legitimate aspirations and inter- 
ests of the Palestinian people must be taken 
into account in working out a settlement in 
the Middle East is an elementary truth. 
Without doubt, this is one of the central is- 
sues that must be resolved in the negotia- 
tions to have a just and lasting peace, which 
is what we all seek for the Middle East. The 
United States matches its commitment to 
such an outcome with any other country here 
represented. 

But the committee's report we are consid- 
ering today is based on this premise without 
consideration of other vital and absolutely 
essential issues; or if there was consideration 
given to these issues, they are not repre- 
sented in the report whatsoever. ^ 

I shall name but a few. There is no mention 
of the right of an Israel to exist in the Middle 
East. The need for the Palestinians to accept 
the legitimacy and reality of the State of Is- 
rael is utterly ignored. The maintenance of 
normal and peaceful relations with Israel 
within the framework of an overall peace set- 
tlement is not mentioned. Moreover, 
nowhere in the recommendations is there the 
stipulation that the Arab states, as well as 
Israel, must join in ending the state of war 
and in arriving at a peaceful settlement in 
the area. Even these few examples make 
clear the one-sidedness and lack of balance in 
the committee's report. 

There is one further very basic flaw in the 
report. In large measure the committee's 
recommendations prejudge the outcome of 
negotiations — negotiations that must take 



' Report of the Committee on the Exercise of the In- 
alienable Rights of the Palestinian People, Official Rec- 
ords of the General Assembly, Thirty-First Session, 
Supplement No. 35 (A/31/35). " 



place between the parties themselves in ac- 
cordance with Security Council Resolutions 
242 and 338. Any individual or state involved 
in international negotiations is aware that no 
solution to this or any other dispute can be 
imposed by this Assembly. Such an imposi- 
tion without agreement of the parties is ob- 
viously unfair in the first place, but it is 
futile besides. It is senseless because it will 
not work. 

One recommendation in the report, that 
there be a complete withdrawal by Israeli oc- 
cupation forces "no later than 1 June 1977," 
utterly conflicts with Security Council Res- 
olutions 242 and 338, which call for negotia- 
tions between the parties concerned for the 
purpose of settling all outstanding problems. 
In short, this recommendation would have us 
circumvent the framework of a negotiated 
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict as es- 
tablished by the United Nations itself. 

The purpose of negotiation is to reconcile 
differences, to balance the rights and inter- 
ests of the parties involved, and, in this case, 
to do so within the framework which fully 
considers the inhabitants of the region. Such 
negotiations cannot take place in the General 
Assembly. 

I conclude from reading the report that the 
committee had one intention: to bring to the 
attention of the General Assembly that the 
legitimate aspirations and interests of the 
Palestinian people must be taken into ac- 
count in working out a settlement in the 
Middle East. With this conclusion we agree. 

But to draw from that premise a report 
which attempts to impose a solution to the 
Arab-Israeli dispute by this Assembly, ut- 
terly ignoring other basic issues in this dis- 
pute, a text totally devoid of balance, with 
conclusions that are unworkable and recom- 
mendations which prejudge the outcome of 
negotiations — frankly and bluntly, that 
makes the United Nations look ridiculous. 

Further, Mr. President, in this resolution 
we are also asked to vote to extend the man- 
date of this committee. No constructive 
purpose will be served by this action. The 
committee's work is finished. It has produced 
a report setting forth the views and recom- 



January 17, 1977 



41 



mendations of the members of the committee. 
An extension of the committee's mandate will 
not contribute in any way whatsoever to the 
work that lies ahead; namely, negotiations 
among the parties themselves. 

We are also asked to refer this question 
once again to the Security Council. The 
Council has already considered the commit- 
tee's report. Will a solution to the dispute be 
advanced by another Security Council meet- 
ing on the subject? Of course not. 

So far the Council has considered the prob- 
lems associated with the occupied territories 
and the future of the Palestinian people on 
five separate occasions this year. Over and 
over again the same speakers say the same 
things, and none of this excessive rhetoric 
advances the negotiations even by one step. 

For all these reasons the United States 
will vote "No" on the resolution before us,^ as 
we did last June in the Security Council on the 
Palestine Committee report.^ 

I believe this body intends to be a respon- 
sible one. We understand the motive behind 
this report, the deep feelings of the members 
of the committee for the Palestinian people 
and their longstanding sufferings in the Mid- 
dle East. The vivid image of one of those ref- 
ugee camps lives with me always, as I am 
sure it does with each and every one of you 
who may have visited them. All of us — I as- 
sume every single one of us here — want to 
resolve that problem for those people, for all 
the people of the Middle East — indeed, for 
the world, for peace, and for humanity. 

Recently we have been reading and hear- 
ing about the possibility of another effort for 
peace in the Middle East. I am one of those 
who believes that such an opportunity exists. 
I hope and pray it will be undertaken. For 
the General Assembly cannot impose peace 



^At the conclusion of its debate on agenda item 27, 
Question of Palestine, the Assembly on Nov. 24 adopted 
by a recorded vote of 90 to 16 (U.S.), with 30 absten- 
tions, resolution 31/20, which, inter alia, "authorizes 
the Committee to e.xert all efforts to promote the im- 
plementation of its recommendations and to report 
thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-second 
session" and "urges the Security Council to "consider 
once again as soon as possible the recommendations con- 
tained in the report ..." 

= For background, see Bulletin of July 26, 1976, p. 
143. 



on the Middle East dispute. Lasting peace 
can come only through negotiation by the 
parties directly involved. 

The talking should stop and the negotiat- 
ing begin. The framework for these negotia- 
tions exists — the framework established by 
the United Nations. Diplomatic channels are 
open. This Assembly should get on with its 
other work. 



U.N. Disengagement Observer Force 
in Israel-Syria Sector Extended 

Following is a stateynent made in the U.N. 
Security Council by U.S. Representative W. 
Tapley Bennett, Jr., on November 30. 

USUN press rele,ise 169 (ialed November 30 

The United States is gratified that the re- 
newal of the mandate of UNDOF has been 
expeditiously handled.' Keeping the peace is 
a goal on which we can all agree, and 
UNDOF has done an outstanding job in over- 
seeing the cease-fire on the Golan Heights. 
My delegation would like to commend in par- 
ticular the excellent work done by the Secre- 
tary General and by the Commander of 
UNDOF. 

The cooperation of the Governments of Is- 
rael and Syria with UNDOF has assured the 
success of UNDOF's mission. It is the two 
parties who have kept the cease-fire. Their 
agreement to the resolution extending 
UNDOF's mandate is a major element in the 
Council's action. Today's decision by the Se- 
curity Council is an important contribution to 
the maintenance of peace. 

In concluding, I should like to congratulate 
you, Mr. President [Jorge Enrique Illueca, of 
Panama], for your persistent efforts in bring- 
ing about the agreement of the parties to this 
further renewal of UNDOF. 



' The Security Council on Nov. 30 adopted a resolu- 
tion (S/RES/398 (1976)) renewing "the mandate of the 
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for 
another period of six months, that is, until 31 May 
1977." The vote was 12 (U.S.) to 0; Benin, the People's 
Republic of China, and Libya did not participate in the 
voting. 



42 



Department of State Bulletin 



U.S. Reaffirms Commitment to Self-Determination 
and Independence for Namibia 



Following are statements made in Commit- 
tee IV (Trusteeship) of the U.N. General As- 
sembly on December 2 by U.S. Representative 
Williant W. Scranton and on December 10 by 
U.S. Representative Stephen Hess, together 
with the texts of tivo resohdions adopted by 
the comrnittee on December 10 and by the As- 
sembly on December 20. 



U.S. STATEMENTS IN COMMITTEE IV 



Ambassador Scranton, December 2 

USUN press release 176 dated December 2 

This year has been crucial for southern Af- 
rica. It has also been an important year in the 
relations of my country with that region of the 
world. 

As members of this Assembly know, at 
Lusaka in April Secretary of State Kissinger 
launched a major diplomatic initiative to en- 
courage positive change in southern Africa. 
He offered to assist the nations of the region 
in negotiating solutions to the dangerous 
problems of Southern Rhodesia and Namibia. 

As a result of intensive consultations among 
the frontline states of southern Africa, South 
Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States, consideration of the Rhodesian prob- 
lem has now shifted to the conference table in 
Geneva. While very difficult problems, very 
serious problems, remain to be resolved, the 
important fact is that independence and 
majority rule in Rhodesia are closer today as 
a result of British and American efforts than 
many would have expected at the beginning of 
the year. 

This year has also witnessed extensive con- 
sultations to bring the Namibian problem to 
the conference table. The United States has 



made a concerted and vigorous effort to per- 
suade the interested parties to resolve the 
problem of Namibia by negotiations and not 
bloodshed. Although formal talks have not yet 
begun, progress has been made and diplomatic 
consultations continue. 

The United States is dedicated to ending 
the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Af- 
rica and to bringing about majority rule and 
independence for Namibia as a single, unitary 
state. Secretary Kissinger outlined the main 
elements of a negotiated solution to the 
Namibian problem in his speech to the Gen- 
eral Assembly on September 30. The United 
States favors the following elements: 

— Independence for Namibia within a fixed, 
short time Hmit; 

— The calhng of a constitutional conference 
at a neutral location under the United Nations 
aegis; and 

— The participation in that conference of all 
authentic national forces including, specifical- 
ly, SWAPO [South West Africa People's Or- 
ganization]. 

In a meeting the day before his speech, the 
Secretary underlined to Mr. Sam Nujoma, the 
president of SWAPO, the importance which 
the United States attaches to the participa- 
tion of SWAPO. 

Progress toward all these objectives has 
been made in negotiations with the Govern- 
ment of South Africa. 

But we must also be reahstic. There are 
other genuine Namibian interests and voices 
which must be heard on the future of the ter- 
ritory. The United States believes that the 
place to resolve the differences between the 
parties to the Namibian problem is the con- 
ference table. We will exert every effort to 
bring the parties to undertake a process of 
negotiations. 



January 17, 1977 



43 



At the same time, candor requires me to 
state that there are governments and indi- 
viduals who appear determined to raise bar- 
riers to a peaceful settlement and to create an 
atmosphere in which it will become increas- 
ingly difficult for the United States to assist 
the parties. Demagoguery has been employed 
and unfounded allegations have been propa- 
gated, clearly intended to diminish the 
chances of bringing about the negotiated set- 
tlement which this organization has been 
seeking. There are also, unfortunately, those 
who, while proposing no constructive solu- 
tions of their own, seek through their words 
and actions to impede the efforts of others. 

There have recently been absurd stories in 
the world press about alleged U.S. policy on 
Namibia. Accusatory fabrications have been 
issued — that the United States plans to create 
an army in Namibia, that the United States 
has already chosen a candidate to lead an in- 
dependent Namibia. There is not a shred of 
truth in either of these accusations. The ob- 
ject of these attacks can only be to discredit 
efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement. 
However, we will not be deterred in our 
search for a peaceful and realistic path to 
genuine freedom and independence for 
Namibia, but we do wish to point out that 
constant calumnies can only impede progress 
toward a solution. 

Mr. President, there are several other as- 
pects of my government's policy toward 
Namibia which I would like to bring to your 
attention: 

In addition to the major diplomatic effort 
which the United States has made during the 
past year, my government has also been ac- 
tive in providing educational assistance to 
young Namibians. In the past year the United 
States has provided $300,000 for the training 
of Namibian students to help prepare them to 
assume the obligations of building and ad- 
ministering an independent Namibia. The 
United States has contributed $250,000 to the 
United Nations Institute for Namibia in 
Lusaka and $50,000 to the United Nations 
Educational and Training Program for South- 
ern Africa, specially earmarked for Nami- 
bians. These contributions also reflect the im- 
portance the United States places in the 



United Nations as the legitimate authority for 
Namibia. 

The United States also remains seriously 
concerned over the application of South Afri- 
can legislation in the territory. We have pro- 
tested to the South African authorities the en- 
forcement of the Terrorism Act in Namibia. 
In May we protested against a particular ap- 
plication of the act against four Namibians, 
two of whom were sentenced to death. 

In conclusion, Mr. President, I would like 
to reaffirm the commitment of the United 
States to achieving self-determination and in- 
dependence in Namibia in accordance with Se- 
curity Council Resolution 385. Our support for 
these principles remains as strong today as 
any time in past years. The United States has 
worked hard to advance the process leading to 
Namibian independence; actions to impede 
our efforts do not help this process. 

The United States strongly urges all the 
parties concerned with Namibia to resolve 
their differences and work out at the confer- 
ence table the transition to a free and inde- 
pendent nation. As Secretary Kissinger said 
on September 30, the United States pledges 
"our continued solicitude for the independence 
of Namibia so that it may, in the end, be a 
proud achievement of this organization and a 
symbol of international cooperation." 

Mr. Hess, December 10 

USUN press release 1H6 dated December 10 

The United States has voted against draft 
resolution A/C.4/31/L.30 [A/RES/31/146], 
concerning the situation in Namibia, because 
we cannot support a number of its para- 
graphs. We cannot, for example, be party to 
the endorsement in the resolution of armed 
struggle as a means to resolve the Namibian 
problem. As the United States e.xplained dur- 
ing the general debate, we are committed to 
the search for a peaceful, negotiated solution 
to the Namibian problem. 

The United States also cannot support the 
paragraphs of that resolution which describe 
the situation in Namibia as constituting a 
threat to international peace and security and 
call on the Security Council to impose a man- 
datory arms embargo against South Africa. 



44 



Department of State Bulletin 



As is well known, the United States also does 
not regard any of the political groups inside or 
outside of Namibia as the sole authentic rep- 
resentative of the Namibian people. 

The United States abstained on draft res- 
olution A/C.4/31/L.31 [A/RES/31/147], con- 
cerning the program of work of the United 
Nations Council for Namibia. Our position is 
consistent with our past abstentions on 
Resolution 2248 and others, since we have 
reservations about the implications of the res- 
olution and the practical authority of the 
Council. We also cannot support all the rec- 
ommendations of the Council for Namibia re- 
port [U.S. doc. A/31/24]. 

The United States abstained on draft res- 
olution A/C.4/31/L.32 [A/RES/31/148], con- 
cerning the intensification and coordination of 
United Nations action in support of Namibia, 
since we cannot accept the blanket condemna- 
tion of economic relations with South Africa 
which would include termination of business 
interests established in Namibia prior to the 
termination of South Africa's mandate. We 
also have reservations as to whether it is feas- 
ible and legally appropriate to require 
member states to enforce the provisions of 
Decree No. 1 of the United Nations Council 
for Namibia. 

The United States abstained on draft res- 
olution A/C.4/31/L.33 [A/RES/31/149], con- 
cerning action by intergovernmental and 
nongovernmental organizations with respect 
to Namibia, because we cannot support that 
paragraph which calls for such assistance by 
the specialized agencies to a liberation move- 
ment. Our views on that question were dis- 
cussed in detail in the Fourth Committee 
earlier this year. 

The United States abstained on draft res- 
olution A/C.4/31/L.34 [A/RES/31/150], con- 
cerning dissemination of information on 
Namibia, because, among other things, we 
oppose the excessive expenditure of U.N. 
funds which will be necessitated by the pubhc- 
ity campaign recommended in this resolution. 
We reserve the right to oppose the financial 
implications of this resolution when it comes 
before the Fifth Committee. 

The United States was pleased to partici- 
pate in the adoption without a vote of draft 
resolution A/C.4/31/L.35 [A/RES/31/151], 



concerning the United Nations Fund for 
Namibia. Our position on this resolution, 
however, does not indicate a change in our 
view that U.N. voluntary funds should be 
maintained by voluntary contributions and not 
by disbursements of the regular United Na- 
tions budget. 

The United States has abstained on draft 
resolution A/C.4/31/L.36 [A/RES/31/152], 
concerning observer status for the South 
West Africa People's Organization. As U.S. 
spokesmen have indicated many times, we 
view SWAPO as an important element of any 
future state of Namibia, but there are other 
Namibian voices which must also be heard. 
We do not consider SWAPO to be the sole 
legitimate representative of all the Namibian 
people. This resolution's designation of 
SWAPO would seem to preclude any role for 
any other Namibians at the United Nations. 
The United States cannot support this view, 
nor do we believe it advances the prospects 
for negotiations. 

The United States was pleased to partici- 
pate in the consensus adoption of draft resolu- 
tion A/C.4/31/L.37 [A/RES/31/153], concern- 
ing the nationhood program. We have 
supported this resolution because we endorse 
efforts to prepare the people of Namibia for 
independence while not wishing to signify 
any change in our position on SWAPO, al- 
ready mentioned in this explanation of our 
voting. 

Mr. Chairman, I would also like to use this 
occasion to deny the allegation that the 
United States has licensed or shipped any 
armored personnel carriers to Namibia. Fur- 
ther, I reiterate that the United States con- 
tinues to enforce strictly our arms embargo 
against South Africa. 

In conclusion, I wish to point out that de- 
spite our disagreement with a number of 
points in these resolutions, the United States 
remains steadfast in its policy of seeking to 
promote a conference of the parties involved 
in the Namibian problem, under U.N. aus- 
pices, at the earliest possible date, with a 
view toward achieving early independence. 
We continue to support the provisions of Se- 
curity Council Resolution 385 concerning the 
future of the territory. 

I would reiterate the statement made by 



January 17, 1977 



45 



Ambassador Scranton in the Fourth Commit- 
tee on December 2, when he stated, "The 
United States is dedicated to ending the il- 
legal occupation of Namibia by South Africa 
and to bringing about majority rule and inde- 
pendence for Namibia as a single, unitary 
state." 

Furthermore, as Secretary Kissinger said 
on September 30, the United States pledges 
"our continued solicitude for the independence 
of Namibia so that it may ... be a proud 
achievement of this organization and a symbol 
of international cooperation." 

Mr. Chairman, the "no" vote and the 
"abstention" votes of my government today 
reflect the views that we do not feel that 
these resolutions positively contribute to this 
worthy goal.. 



TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS 



General Assembly Resolution 31/146 ' 

Situation in Namibia resulting from the illegal 
occupation of the Territory by South Africa 

The General Assemblii, 

Having examined the report of the United Nations 
Council for Namibia and the relevant chapters of the 
report of the Special Committee on the Situation with 
regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples, 

Having heard the statements of the representative 
of the South West Africa People's Organization, who 
participated in an observer capacity in the considera- 
tion of the item by the Fourth Committee, 

Recalling its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 
1960, containing the Declaration on the Granting of In- 
dependence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 

Recalling, in particular, its resolutions 214.5 (XXI) of 
27 October 1966 and 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967 and sub- 
sequent resolutions of both the General Assembly and 
the Security Council relating to the question of 
Namibia, as well as the advisory opinion of the Interna- 
tional Court of Justice of 21 June 1971, delivered in re- 
sponse to the request addressed to it by the Council in 
its resolution 284 (1970) of 29 July 1970, 

Taking into consideration the relevant resolution 



' Adopted by the committee on Dec. 10 by a recorded 
vote of 108 to 6 (U.S.), with 12 abstentions, and by the 
Assembly on Dec. 20 by a recorded vote of 107" to 6 
(U.S.), with 12 ab.stentions (te.xt from U.N. doc. A/.31/ 
437, report of the Fourth Committee on agenda item 85, 
Question of Namibia). 



adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization 
of African Unity at its twenty-seventh ordinary ses- 
sion, and subsequently endorsed by the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government of the Organization of 
African Unity at its thirteenth ordinary session, held at 
Port Louis in July 1976, 

Also taking into consideration the political declara- 
tion and the resolution relating to Namibia adopted by 
the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government 
of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Colombo in August 
1976, 

Reaffirming that the Territory and people of Namibia 
are the direct responsibility of the United Nations and 
that the Namibian people must be enabled to attain 
self-determination and independence within a united 
Namibia, 

Strongly deploring South Africa's continued refusal 
to comply with the resolutions and decisions of the 
United Nations, its continued illegal occupation of 
Namibia, its brutal repression of the Namibian people 
and its persistent violation of their human rights, as 
well as its efforts to destroy the national unity and ter- 
ritorial integrity of Namibia, 

Strongly condemning attempts by South Africa, 
through the convening of a so-called constitutional con- 
ference, to perpetuate its colonial e.xploitation of the 
people and resources of Namibia by misrepresenting 
the genuine aspirations of the Namibian people. 

Gravely concerned at the militarization of Namibia by 
the illegal occupation regime of South Africa, its 
threats and acts of aggression against independent Af- 
rican countries and the forceful removal of Namibians 
from the northern border of the Territory for military 
purposes. 

Strongly deploring the policies of those States, 
which, despite the relevant decisions of the United Na- 
tions and the advisory opinion of the International 
Court of Justice of 21 June 1971, continue to maintain 
diplomatic, economic, consular and other relations with 
South Africa, purporting to act on behalf of or concern- 
ing Namibia, as well as military or strategic collabora- 
tion, all of which has the effect of supporting or 
encouraging South Africa in its defiance of the United 
Nations, 

Recognizing that the situation in Namibia constitutes 
a threat to international peace and security. 

Noting with satisfaction the opposition of the Nami- 
bian people to South Africa's illegal presence in the 
Territory and to its oppressive racist policies and, in 
particular, the progress of their struggle in all its forms 
for national liberation under the leadership of the South 
West Africa People's Oi'ganization, 

Strongly supporting the efforts of the United Nations 
Council for Namibia in the discharge of the respon- 
sibilities entrusted to it by the relevant resolutions of 
the General Assembly, 

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of 
Namibia to self-determination, freedom and national 
independence in a united Namibia, in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations and as recognized in 
resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2145 (XXI), as well as sub- 



46 



Department of State Bulletin 



se(juent resolutions of the General Assembly relating to 
Namibia, and the legitimacy of their strugjile by all 
means at their disposal against the illegal occupation of 
their Territoi'y by South Africa: 

2. Recogiiizef! that the national liberation movement 
of Namibia, the South West Africa People's Organiza- 
tion, is the sole and authentic representative of the 
Namibian people; 

3. Supports the armed struggle of the Namibian 
people, led by the South West Africa People's Organi- 
zation, to achieve self-determination, freedom and na- 
tional independence in a united Namibia; 

4. Appeah to all States Members of the United Na- 
tions to grant all necessary support and assistance to 
the South West Africa People's Organization in its 
struggle to achieve independence and national unity for 
Namibia; 

5. Requests all specialized agencies and other or- 
ganizations within the United Nations system to pre- 
pare, in consultation with the United Nations Council 
for Namibia and within their respective spheres of 
competence, programmes of assistance to the people of 
Namibia and their liberation movement, the South 
West Africa People's Organization; 

6. Decides to increase the financial provisions in the 
budget of the United Nations Council for Namibia to 
finance the office of the South West Africa People's Or- 
ganization in New York, in order to ensure the due and 
proper representation of the people of Namibia through 
the South West Africa People's Organization at the 
United Nations; 

7. Decides to continue to defray the expenses of a 
representative of the South West Africa People's Or- 
ganization, whenever the United Nations Council for 
Namibia so requires; 

8. Strongly condemns South Africa for its persistent 
refusal to withdraw from Namibia and for its ma- 
noeuvres to consolidate its illegal occupation of the Ter- 
ritory; 

9. Strongly condemns the illegal South African ad- 
ministration for its aggression against the Namibian 
people and their national liberation movement; 

10. Sti-ongly condemns the illegal South African ad- 
ministration for its massive repression of the people of 
Namibia and their liberation movement with the inten- 
tion of establishing, among other things, an atmosphere 
of intimidation and terror for the purpose of imposing 
upon the Namibian people a bogus constitutional struc- 
ture aimed at subverting the territorial integrity and 
unity of Namibia and perpetuating a ruthless policy of 
racial segregation; 

11. Strongly condemns South Africa for its military 
build-up in Namibia, its threats and acts of aggression 
against independent African countries and the forceful 
removal of Namibians from the northern border of the 
Territory for military purposes; 

12. Strongly condemns South Africa for organizing 
the so-called constitutional talks at Windhoek, which 
seek to perpetuate the apartheid and homelands 
policies as well as the colonial oppression and exploita- 
tion of the people and resources of Namibia by misrep- 
resenting the genuine aspirations of the Namibian people 



for self-determination, freedom and national independ- 
ence in a united Namibia; 

13. Urgently calls ujion the international community, 
especially all States Members of the United Nations, to 
refrain from according any recognition to. or co- 
operation with, any authority which the illegal occupa- 
tion regime may install under the cui-rent fraudulent 
constitutional talks or any other circumstances in 
Namibia; 

14. Strongly condemns the activities of all foreign 
corporations operating in Namibia under the illegal ad- 
ministration of South Africa which are exi)loiting the 
human and natural resources of the Tei'ritory. and de- 
mands that such exploitation cease forthwith; 

15. Reaffirms that the activities of those coi'poi'ations 
are illegal; 

16. Decides that any independence talks regarding 
Namibia must be between the representatives of South 
Africa and the South West Africa People's Organiza- 
tion, under the auspices of the United Nations, for the 
sole purpose of discussing the modalities for the trans- 
fer of power to the people of Namibia; 

17. Requests all Member States to co-operate fully 
with the United Nations Council for Namibia in dis- 
charging the mandate entrusted to it under the terms 
and provisions of General Assembly resolution 2248 
(S-V); 

18. Covdemns South Africa for its persistent refusal 
to comply with the pertinent resolutions of the Security 
Council, in particular resolution 385 (1976) of 30 
January 1976; 

19. Demands that South Africa put an end to extend- 
ing apaiiheid in Namibia and to its policy of "bantu- 
stanization" of the Territoi-y, aimed at destroying the 
national unity and the territorial integrity of Namibia; 

20. Demands that South Africa release all Namibian 
political prisoners, including all those imprisoned or de- 
tained in connexion with offences under so-called inter- 
nal security laws, whether such Namibians have been 
charged or tried or are held without charge and 
whether held in Namibia or South Africa; 

21. Declares that, in ordei' that the people of Namibia 
shall be enabled freely to determine their own future, it 
is imperative that free elections under the supervision 
and control of the United Nations be held urgently in 
the whole of Namibia as one political entity; 

22. Demands that South Africa accord uncondition- 
ally to all Namibians currently in exile for political rea- 
sons full facilities for their return to their country 
without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or im- 
prisonment; 

23. Reiterates that the illegal occupation of Namibia 
and the war being waged there by South Africa consti- 
tute a threat to international peace and security; 

24. Declares that the continued illegal occupation of 
Namibia by South Africa constitutes an act of aggres- 
sion against the Namibian people and against the 
United Nations as the legal authority to administer the 
Territory until independence; 

25. Urges the Security Council to take up again the 
question of Namibia, which is still on its agenda, and, in 
view of South Africa's failure to comply with Council 



January 17, 1977 



47 



resolution 385 (1976), to impose a mandatory arms em- 
bargo against South Africa; 

26. Requests all States to cease and desist from any 
form of direct or indirect military consultation, co- 
operation or collaboration with South Africa; 

27. Requests all States to take effective measures to 
prevent the recruitment of mercenaries for service in 
Namibia or South Africa: 

28. Requests all States to take steps to ensure the 
termination of all arms licensing agreements with South 
Africa and to prohibit the transfer to South Africa of all 
information relating to arms and armaments; 

29. Requests all States to cease and prevent: 

(a) Any supply of arms and ammunition to South Af- 
rica; 

(b) Any supply of aircraft, vehicles or military 
equipment for the use of the armed forces and 
paramilitary or police organizations of South Africa; 

(c) Any supply of spare parts for arms, vehicles or 
military equipment used by the armed forces and 
paramilitary or police organizations of South Africa: 

(d) Any supply of so-called dual-use aircraft, vehicles 
or equipment which could be converted to military use 
by South Africa: 

(e) Any activities in their countries which promote or 
are calculated to promote the supply of arms, ammuni- 
tion, military aircraft or military vehicles to South Af- 
rica and the supply of equipment or materials for the 
manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition 
in South Africa and Namibia; 

(f) Any co-operation or activities by public or private 
corporations in conjunction with South Africa in the de- 
velopment, directly or indirectly, of nuclear technol- 
ogy, including the development of a nuclear capability 
by the racist regime in South Africa; 

30. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the 
General Assembly at its thirty-second session on the 
implementation of the present resolution. 



Recalling, in particular, its resolution 3111 (XXVIII) 
of 12 December 1973, by which it recognized the South 
West Africa People's Organization as the authentic rep- 
resentative of the Namibian people, 

Notin<i that the Organization of African Unity and 
the non-aligned countries have recognized and invited 
the South West Africa People's Organization to partici- 
pate in their meetings in an observer capacity, 

1. Invites the South West Africa People's Organiza- 
tion to participate in the sessions and the work of the 
General Assembly in the capacity of observer: 

2. Invites the South West Aftnca People's Organization 
to participate in the sessions and the work of all inter- 
national conferences convened under the auspices of the 
General Assembly in the capacity of observer: 

3. Considers that the South West Africa People's Or- 
ganization is entitled to participate as an observer in 
the sessions and the work of all international confer- 
ences convened under the auspices of other organs of 
the United Nations; 

4. Requests the Secretary-General to take the neces- 
sary steps for the implementation of the present resolu- 
tion and to accord all the facilities as may be required. 



United States Urges Peaceful Change 
in South Africa 

Following are statements made in the 
U.N. General Assembly on November 3 and 
9 by U.S. Representatives Stephen Hess and 
Rev. Robert P. Hupp. 

STATEMENT BY MR. HESS, NOVEMBER 3 



General Assembly Resolution 31/152 ^ 

Observer status fur the South West Africa 
People's Organization 

The General Assetiihly, 

Having considered the question of Namibia, 

Recognizing the crucial phase reached in the struggle 
of the Namibian people and the added demands and crit- 
ical tasks imposed upon their liberation movement, the 
South West Africa People's Organization, 

Taking into consideration the report of the United 
Nations Council for Namibia and the recommendations 
contained therein, 

Reaffiiining the resolutions and decisions of the Gen- 
eral Assembly and the Security Council concerning the 
question of Namibia, 



2 Adopted by the committee on Dec. 10 by a recorded 
vote of 114 to 0, with 13 abstentions (U.S.), and by the 
Assembly on Dec. 20 by a recorded vote of 113 to 0, 
with 13 abstentions (U.S.); (te.xt from U.N. doc. A/31/ 
437). 



USUN press release 139 dated November .3 

This year's debate on apartheid takes place 
in the lengthening shadow of confrontation 
and violence in South Africa. Over 300 lives 
have been lost. Countless others have been 
injured. Hundreds more have been detained, 
many for no reasons other than that they op- 
pose apartheid. The people of the United 
States mourn with those who have lost their 
brave young friends and children. 

The position of my government has been 
made clear by Secretary of State Kissinger in 
a speech in Philadelphia on August 31 when 
he said: 

. . .South Africa's internal structure is incompatible 
with any concept of human dignity. We are deeply sad- 
dened by the recent and continuing clashes in black 
urban townships, universities, and schools throughout 



48 



Department of State Bulletin 



South Africa. They are dramatic evidence of the frus- 
tration of black South Africans toward a system which 
denies them status, equality, and political rights. No 
system that leads to political upheavals and violence 
can possibly be just or acceptable — nor can it last. 

The United States must be true to its own beliefs. We 
urge South Africa to take account of the conscience of 
humanity. We will continue to use all our influence to 
bring about peaceful change, equality of opportunity, 
and basic human rights in South Africa. 

The United States has not wavered from 
this position, nor will it. In taking this posi- 
tion we recognize that no nation or political 
system can claim a perfect record in the field 
of human rights. We are all too keenly aware 
that respect for the dignity of the human 
being is declining in too many countries in 
nearly every region of the world and that 
this General Assembly, which is dedicated to 
universal principles, frequently applies them 
in a highly selective fashion. At a time when 
consciousness of human rights violations is 
increasing, so too is the number of states 
where fundamental standards of human be- 
havior are not observed. The situation in 
South Africa, founded as it is on a racially 
discriminatory legal system, is of particular 
concern and commands our attention and our 
condemnation. 

U.S. policy is dedicated to self- 
determination for all and is opposed to viola- 
tions of human rights wherever they may oc- 
cur. We shall continue to use what influence 
we have to bring about peaceful change, 
equality of opportunity, and basic human 
rights for all South Africans. To this end, we 
shall continue to enforce rigorously our com- 
prehensive arms embargo against South Af- 
rica, which we first imposed in 1962 and 
broadened in 1963. 

We are concerned that unless substantial 
changes in South African society are forth- 
coming, the violence will increase and inevi- 
tably destroy a rich and productive country 
capable of providing for the economic and so- 
cial needs of all its citizens. This would be a 
tragedy for all South Africans. We urge the 
South African Government to make deci- 
sions necessary to dismantle the apartheid 
system and to respond positively to the ur- 
gent need for genuine freedom for all its 
people. 

Mr. President, if I might just add one very 



brief personal note — because of the very 
moving conclusion of the statement we have 
just heard from the distinguished delegate 
from Singapoi'e. This is in the nature of a 
people-to-people statement, not a gov- 
ernment-to-government one; for I'm not a 
professional diplomat, but rather, as is a 
tradition in our country, I'm a private citizen 
of the United States and one of three persons 
chosen by the President and the Senate to be 
a public member of our delegation. And I, 
too, have listened to the great debate in this 
Assembly for nearly a week, and from time 
to time I've heard an inflection in the voice of 
wise speakers that I have found troubling. 

And perhaps that unease that I felt was 
most properly put in context by the last 
speaker when he concluded by quoting from 
that inspiring novel by Alan Paton, "Cry, the 
Beloved Country," when the black priest, 
and may I just quote those beautiful lines 
again, said, you will recall: "I have one great 
fear in my heart, that one day when they turn 
to loving, they will find we are turned to hat- 
ing." 

And so, Mr. President, my personal prayer 
is that we may somehow seek justice in 
South Africa without, in turn, losing our 
sense of humanity or our capacity to love. 



STATEMENT BY REVEREND HUPP, NOVEMBER 9 

The United States was pleased to partici- 
pate in the adoption, without objection, of 
the draft resolutions in documents A/31/L.6 
[A/RES/31/6 B] on the United Nations Trust 
Fund for South Africa and A/31/L.7 [A/ 
RES/31/6 C] concerning solidarity with South 
African political prisoners. 

We voted against the draft resolution in 
document A/31/L.8 [A/RES/31/6 D] concern- 
ing the arms embargo against South Africa. 
We did so because we are not convinced that 
the invocation of chapter VII of the Charter 
of the United Nations against South Africa 
for its apartheid policies is appropriate at 
this time. We object strongly to those para- 
graphs which allege that the United States is 
sending weapons to South Africa. As the 
General Assembly well knows, the United 
States has continued to impose its own arms 



January 17, 1977 



49 



embargo against South Africa since 1962 and 
has urged other nations to impose voluntarily 
an embargo concerning military equipment. 

Recently it was discovered that a U.S. 
company had illegally shipped arms to South 
Africa. The shipment was made as a result of 
misrepresentation by a company employee. 
That employee was subsequently prosecuted, 
convicted, and sent to jail. 

Let me make this clear so that no doubt 
remains as to the strength of our commit- 
ment. We have jailed an American citizen 
for facilitating an arms shipment to South 
Africa. The U.S. Department of Justice is 
continuing to investigate reports of illegal 
arms sales to South Africa involving Ameri- 
can arms manufacturers. 

The United States voted against the draft 
resolution in document A/31/L.9 [A/RES/31/6 
E] concerning relations between Israel and 
South Africa. We disagree with the decision 
to single out Israel for criticism of its rela- 
tions with South Africa. While we do not 
condone Israel's military trade with South 
Africa, we are aware that other nations also 
are involved in such trade. The report of the 
Special Committee Against Apartheid and 
this unbalanced draft resolution stem from 
anti-Israeli political motives rather than 
from any decision to investigate impartially 
those countries which are trading in military 
materiel with South Africa. 

The United States abstained in the vote on 
the draft resolution in document A/31/L.10/ 
Rev. 1 [A/RES/31/6 F] concerning apartheid 
in sports. The U.S. Government supports the 
Olympic principle that no discrimination be 
allowed in sporting events on the grounds of 
race, religion, or political affiliation. We urge 
U.S. sports teams to respect the principle 
and to compete against teams that are 
selected on the principle of the Olympic 
ideal. 

Because U.S. sports teams are organized 
privately and have no official sponsorship or 
regulation, we are not able to support sev- 
eral of the recommendations contained in 
that draft resolution. Those recommenda- 
tions would have the U.S. Government 
intervene in the affairs of private sports or- 
ganizations, which it lawfully cannot do. The 



results of this resolution could, in fact, prove 
contrary to its sponsors' intentions and instead 
of breaking down apartheid could assist in con- 
solidating it. 

This is borne out by the experience of the 
last four years, when open international 
competition has resulted in some breaking 
down of barriers in South Africa. For in- 
stance, Arthur Ashe broke the color barrier 
in the South African Open. He encouraged 
the South African tennis authorities to de- 
segregate the audience for the Open. Black 
tennis players were also permitted to par- 
ticipate in other major tennis tournaments in 
the country. 

The United States abstained in the vote on 
the draft resolution in document A/31/L.11 
[A/RES/31/6 G] concerning the program of 
work of the Special Committee Against 
Apartheid, and we have elaborated on this 
elsewhere in this statement. 

In our view, the decision to impose a type 
of economic sanction against South Africa is 
a decision of the utmost seriousness and can 
and should be taken only by the Security 
Council. Moreover, we believe that the facts 
do not warrant such a decision. We cannot 
accept the thesis of this resolution that eco- 
nomic relations with South Africa work to 
the disadvantage of the population or neces- 
sarily result in their exploitation. On the 
contrary, some U.S. corporations have been 
among the leading forces for equal rights and 
enlightened employment practices in South 
Africa. It is too simplistic to condemn in 
blanket fashion economic relations with 
South Africa.* 

The United States voted against the draft 
resolution in document A/31/L.13 [A/RES/ 
31/6 I] concerning the situation in South Af- 
rica. We cannot agree with a number of 
paragraphs in the resolution. Specifically, we 
do not believe that the situation in South Af- 
rica, however abhorrent the policies of the 
South African Government, constitutes a 
threat to international peace or security. It 
is also clear that this lengthy resolution is 



' The United States voted against A/RES/31/6 H con- 
cerning economic collaboration with South Africa and 
abstained on A/RES/31/6 K concerning investments in 
South Africa. 



50 



Department of State Bulletin 



tantamount to a call for an uprising in South 
Africa that would, in effect, result in a racial 
bloodbath. My government cannot subscribe 
to the thesis that this is the best or only way 
to work for peace in South Africa. 

The United States voted against the draft 
resolution in document A/31/L.14 [A/RES/ 
31/6 J] concerning a program of action 
against apartheid. The U.S. Government is 
not prepared to support a comprehensive re- 
gime of sanctions against South Africa, which 
this and other draft resolutions have called 
for, or to provide assistance for a violent up- 
rising in South Africa. We also have serious 
reservations on the financial implications of 
the program of action and the drawing of 
U.N. specialized agencies into this clearly 
political campaign. 

The United States has already discussed 
its position toward South Africa as set forth 
by Secretary Kissinger in Philadelphia on 
August 31. We continue to believe that, al- 
though time is running out, the opportunity 
still exists for South Africa to move away 
from the apartheid system peacefully and to 
create a just society with freedom for all 
South Africans. 



U.S. Joins Security Council Appeal 
for Assistance to Lesotho 

Following is a statement made in the U.N. 
Security Council by U.S. Representative Al- 
bert W. Sherer, Jr., on December 22, together 
with the text of a resolution adopted by the 
Council that day. 

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SHERER 

USUN press release 199 dated December 22 

The United States has joined in the consen- 
sus adoption of this resolution because we 
wish to make very clear our support for its 
main point. Restricting movement between 
Lesotho and that territory known as Transkei 
has imposed serious burdens on the economy 



of Lesotho, and we believe the world commu- 
nity should assist Lesotho in this difficult 
period. 

At the same time, Mr. President, I must 
comment on operative paragraph 1 of the res- 
olution. It endorses and quotes General As- 
sembly Resolution 31/6 A, on which the 
United States abstained. 

My delegation did not abstain in the Gen- 
eral Assembly because we intend to recognize 
that territory known as Transkei. On the con- 
trary, we have made it eminently clear that 
we have no intention of recognizing the so- 
called Transkei. We do, however, reserve the 
right to attend to the welfare and protection 
of American citizens. Realistically, the occa- 
sion may arise in the future when it would be 
required to have some contact with the au- 
thorities of the entity in question. 

Despite the foregoing, Mr. President, we 
feel that the main purpose of this resolution 
clearly is to encourage assistance to Lesotho 
and, accordingly, we have joined in the con- 
sensus adoption. 

In that connection, I would like to point out 
that the United States already is extending 
substantial assistance to the Government of 
Lesotho. We have cooperated in a regional 
health project involving maternal and child 
health care and family planning services in 
rural areas and in the development of a more 
comprehensive program intended to upgrade 
the knowledge and skills of health personnel 
in planning and managing a national health 
system. We also are cooperating with projects 
in land and water conservation and livestock, 
farm management, irrigation, and agricul- 
ture. We currently are examining other ways 
to assist the Government of Lesotho. 

Mr. President, what I have just said dem- 
onstrates our commitment to helping the Gov- 
ernment and the people of Lesotho to over- 
come the obstacles which have been placed in 
the way of their national development. We 
hope that the concern of this Council will be 
heard and that the border posts in question 
will be opened promptly to the free movement 
of the people of Lesotho. 

Before closing, Mr. President, I would like 
to express our appreciation for and satisfac- 
tion with the spirit of cooperation and close 



January 17, 1977 



51 



coordination which went into the preparation 
of this resolution. Such coordination clearly 
assisted the Council in reaching a consensus 
agreement. It is an example of the type of 
coordination and cooperation which can only 
assist us all in resolving problems before us. 
We hope that this e.xample may be followed in 
the future. 



TEXT OF RESOLUTION > 

The Security Council, 

Having heard the statement of the Foreign Minister 
of the Kingdom of Lesotho on 21 December 1976, 

Gravely concerned at the serious situation created 
by South Africa's closure of certain border posts be- 
tween South Africa and Lesotho aimed at coercing 
Lesotho into according recognition to the bantustan 
Transkei, 

Recalling relevant General Assembly resolutions, in 
particular resolution 3411 D (XXX), condemning the es- 
tablishment of bantustans and calling on all Govern- 
ments not to recognize the bantustans, 

Recalling further General Assembly resolution 31/6 A 
on the so-called independent Transkei and other ban- 
tustans, which, inter alia, calls upon all Governments 
to deny any form of recognition to the so-called inde- 
pendent Transkei and to refrain from having any deal- 
ings with the so-called independent Transkei or other 
bantustans, 

Noting with appreciation the decision of the Govern- 
ment of Lesotho not to recognize the Transkei bantustan 
in compliance with United Nations decisions, 

Considering that the decision of Lesotho constitutes 
an important contribution to the realization of United 
Nations objectives in southern Africa in accordance 
with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the 
United Nations, 



1 U.N. doc. S/RES/402 (1976); adopted by the Council 
by consensus on Dec. 22. 



Taking note of the urgent and special economic needs 
of Lesotho arising from the closure of the border posts, 

1. Endorses General Assembly resolution 31/6 A, 
which, inter alia, calls upon all Governments to deny 
any form of recognition to the so-called independent 
Transkei and to refrain from having any dealings with 
the so-called independent Transkei or other bantustans; 

2. Commends the Government of Lesotho for its de- 
cision not to recognize the so-called independence of 
Transkei; 

3. Condemns any action by South Africa intended to 
coerce Lesotho into according recognition to the ban- 
tustan Transkei; 

4. Calls upon South Africa to take immediately all 
necessary steps to reopen those border posts; 

5. Appeals to all States to provide immediate finan- 
cial, technical and material assistance to Lesotho so 
that it can carry out its economic development pro- 
grammes and enhance its capacity to implement fully 
the United Nations resolutions on apartheid and ban- 
tustans; 

6. Requests the United Nations and the organizations 
and programmes concerned, in particular the United 
Nations Development Programme, the World Food 
Programme and all the United Nations specialized 
agencies, to assist Lesotho in the present situation and 
to consider periodically the question of economic assist- 
ance to Lesotho as envisaged in the present resolution; 

7. Requests the Secretary-General, in collaboration 
with the appropriate organizations of the United 
Nations system, to organize, with immediate effect, all 
forms of financial, technical and material assistance to 
the Kingdom of Lesotho to enable it to overcome the 
economic difficulties arising from the closure of the 
border posts by South Africa due to the refusal of 
Lesotho to recognize the so-called independence of 
Transkei; 

8. Further requests the Secretary-General to keep 
the situation under constant review to maintain close 
liaison with Member States, regional and other inter- 
governmental organizations, the specialized agencies 
and international financial institutions, and to report to 
the Security Council at its subsequent meeting on the 
question; 

9. Decides to remain seized of the question. 



52 



Department of State Bulletin 



U.S. Reiterates Support for Negotiated Solution in Rhodesia 



Following are statements made in Com- 
mittee IV (Trusteeship) of the U.N. General 
Assembly on December 13 by U.S. Represent- 
ative William W. Scranton and on De- 
cember lU by U.S. Representative Richard 
Petree, Counselor for Political Affairs, U.S. 
Mission to the United Nations; a statement 
made in plenary on December 20 by U.S. 
Representative Albert W. Sherer, Jr.; and the 
te.rts of two resolutions adopted by the com- 
mittee on December H and by the Assembly 
on December 20. 



U.S. STATEMENTS 

Ambassador Scranton, Committee IV, 
December 13 

USUN press release lf>5 dated December 13 

The Fourth Committee meets this year on 
the question of Southern Rhodesia in an at- 
mosphere of hope and cautious optimism. For 
the first time in a decade this Assembly can 
look forward to a realistic prospect of major- 
ity rule in an independent Zimbabwe. The 
opportunity for a negotiated solution to the 
Rhodesian problem has been created, and the 
parties involved are meeting face to face over 
the conference table. While many major 
problems remain to be solved, vigorous ef- 
forts are being made to establish an interim 
government for the territory. The United 
Nations has every reason to lend its support 
to these efforts toward realization of the 
long-sought goal of peace and majority rule 
in Rhodesia. 

The United States is pleased to have 
played a part in the negotiations which have 
brought about the conference currently 
underway in Geneva. We salute the British 
Government for its prompt and efficient or- 
ganization of the Geneva Conference and the 



efforts of its very able chairman of the con- 
ference, our colleague Ivor Richard [British 
Representative to the United Nations]. 

While we are pleased with the progress 
made thus far, we are under no illusions as to 
the obstacles which remain for the 
negotiators in Geneva. Ten years of violence 
create deep suspicions and animosity which 
cannot easily be forgotten. The representa- 
tives of the people of the territory who are 
now meeting in Geneva must rise above their 
own personal feelings and consider the future 
of their country and the welfare of all. The 
alternative to magnanimity and compromise 
is only further violence. It is in the interests 
of all to support the current negotiating 
process and the creation of a just transitional 
government with an African majority and an 
African Prime Minister. 

The United States can understand the 
legitimate differences between the parties at 
the Geneva Conference and the real problems 
facing that conference. We cannot but de- 
plore, however, the efforts of those countries 
and individuals who see some shortrun gain 
in fueling the flames of violence and racial 
strife in Rhodesia. Those who back these 
goals and who attempt to subvert a 
negotiated solution are no friends of Africa 
or the people of Rhodesia. They offer no con- 
structive solutions and instead encourage 
continued violence, continued bloodshed. 

In addition to U.S. efforts in the diplomat- 
ic consultations on the future of Rhodesia, 
my government has also been active this past 
year in providing assistance to students from 
the territory. As a followup to Secretary 
Kissinger's pledge in Lusaka in April 1976 to 
expand existing programs for training 
Namibian and Zimbabwean refugees as ad- 
ministrators and technicians, the U.S. Gov- 
ernment obtained urgent authorization from 
Congress to provide $2.7 million in educa- 



January 17, 1977 



53 



tional assistance to southern African students 
in fiscal year 1976, including over $1 million 
for Zimbabwean students. In addition, the 
U.S. Congress, at the Administration's re- 
quest, has appropriated $4 million for south- 
ern African students in fiscal year 1977. 
These programs are designed to train the fu- 
ture leaders of Zimbabwe in the skills neces- 
sary to develop a new nation in the modern 
world. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would like 
to reiterate the support of my government 
for a negotiated solution in Rhodesia and to 
call on this Assembly to offer its support. In 
the last analysis, the current conference of- 
fers the best hope for a peaceful transition to 
majority rule, a goal which the United Na- 
tions has worked for diligently for over 10 
years. 

As Secretary Kissinger said in his speech 
to the General Assembly on September 30: 
"The people of Rhodesia, and the neighbor- 
ing states, now face a supreme challenge. 
Their ability to work together, their capacity 
to unify, will be tested in the months ahead 
as never before." The United States believes 
that at this crucial moment the United Na- 
tions must support the people of Rhodesia in 
their efforts to forge a free and independent 
Zimbabwe. 

Mr. Petree, Committee IV, December 14 

USUN press release IS" dated December 14 

The United States has participated in the 
consensus adopting draft resolution L.45, 
concerning the question of Southern 
Rhodesia. My government fully supports the 
Geneva Conference as the best means to 
achieve majority rule and independence in 
Rhodesia. We call on all participants in the 
conference to redouble their efforts to find a 
negotiated settlement to the Rhodesian prob- 
lem. 

The United States has voted against draft 
resolution L.46, regarding Rhodesian 
sanctions — not because we oppose such sanc- 
tions or want to see them vitiated in any 
way. To the contrary, and as members of this 
Assembly know full well, the United States 
supports those sanctions against Rhodesia 



and has been open and frank in those circum- 
stances where the United States has been un- 
able because of domestic legislation to imple- 
ment the sanctions fully. The United States 
voluntarily reports fully to the Security 
Council's Sanctions Committee on imports 
under the Byrd amendment. 

Mr. Chairman, for obvious reasons, com- 
pletely accurate statistics on all Rhodesian 
exports are not available. However, it is un- 
likely that U.S. imports account for more 
than 5 percent of total Rhodesian export 
earnings. Obviously, 95 percent of the 
Rhodesian earnings originate elsewhere. 

And so this resolution cites one country 
which is honest and ignores the countries 
which we estimate to be the providers of 95 
percent of Rhodesia's export earnings. 

Accordingly, we deeply resent being 
singled out for criticism. In a year when the 
United States has exerted every effort to 
bring about the peaceful transition to major- 
ity rule in Rhodesia we believe it petty and 
unjust for this Assembly to criticize the 
United States alone for sanctions violations. 
The resolution applies a double standard in 
dealing with Rhodesia, because, as we all 
know, there are other countries involved in 
trade with Rhodesia, some of whom are Afri- 
can countries. Some of those countries have 
joined in voting for this resolution. My gov- 
ernment will not associate itself with this 
form of hypocrisy. Because we openly and 
fully report what is permitted by our own 
domestic legislation, we alone are chastised 
while other nations go unmentioned for their 
secret and much more extensive trade with 
Rhodesia. 

Certain allegations have been made during 
our debate concerning the provision of oil to 
Rhodesia. I suspect that these allegations 
are related to those of the Center for Social 
Action of the United Church of Christ to the 
effect that the Mobil Oil Corporation, certain 
of its officers, and foreign subsidiaries have 
violated the U.N. sanctions. As the United 
States has pointed out in the Sanctions 
Committee, the U.S. Treasury Department's 
Office of Foreign Assets Control served an 
administrative order on Mobil Oil on June 30, 
1976, directing the company to furnish speci- 



54 



Department of State Bulletin 



tied records for examination and requiring 
the company to obtain additional documents 
from Mobil South Africa and Mobil Rhodesia. 
The Office of Foreign Assets Control has 
periodically broadened the scope of the ad- 
ministrative order to require Mobil to pro- 
vide additional material as new avenues of 
investigation were opened. The United 
States will provide the Sanctions Committee 
with the final results of that investigation as 
soon as they become available from the De- 
partment of the Treasury. 

Other allegations have been made concern- 
ing assurances to Ian Smith of "tangible as- 
sistance," should the Geneva talks fail. There 
is no basis whatsoever, Mr. Chairman, for 
these allegations. 

Ambassador Sherer, Plenary, December 20 

USl'N press release 196 dated December 20 

While the United States voted "No" in the 
Fourth Committee on the draft resolution 
concerning Rhodesian sanctions, we shall 
abstain in plenary. 

We have changed our vote from committee 
to plenary so that our position concerning 
Rhodesian sanctions not be misunderstood in 
any way, either by the Smith regime or by 
those with whom we share the deep convic- 
tion that majority rule must and will prevail 
in an independent Zimbabwe. There is no 
change whatsoever in the American Govern- 
ment's strong support of the U.N. sanctions 
against Rhodesia. 

At the same time, we wish to make it em- 
phatically clear, Mr. President, that we do 
not accept in this resolution the arbitrary 
and unfair singling out of the United States 
for condemnation — a singling out which re- 
sulted from U.S. honesty in reporting sanc- 
tions violations. It is well known that many 
other countries indulge in violations but do 
not report them. We reject this application of 
a double standard. 

As everyone here present is aware. Presi- 
dent Ford and Secretary Kissinger are exert- 
ing every effort to bring about a peaceful 
transition to majority rule in Rhodesia. 
Under such circumstances it is also petty and 
unjust for this Assembly to criticize the 



United States alone for sanctions violations. 
Further, so that there never again will be 
any misunderstanding, the United States 
puts the General Assembly on notice that any 
resolution in the future which specifically 
contains a condemnation of the United States 
will receive our negative vote. 

TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS 

General Assembly Resolution 31/154 A' 

The General Assembly, 

Having considered the question of Southern Rhodesia 
(Zimbabwe), 

Having examined the relevant chapters of the report 
of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard 
to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Grant- 
ing of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 

Having heard the statement of the representative of 
the administering Power, 

Taking into acconnt the report of the Ad Hoc Group 
established by the Special Committee at its 1029th 
meeting, on 1 April 1976, 

Recalli)ig the Declaration on the Granting of Inde- 
pendence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained 
in its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, and the 
programme of action for the full implementation of the 
Declaration, contained in its resolution 2621 (XXV) of 12 
October 1970, as well as all other resolutions relating to 
the question of Southern Rhodesia adopted by the Gen- 
eral Assembly, the Security Council and the Special 
Committee, 

Bearing in mind that the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as the 
administering Power, has the primary responsibility for 
putting an end to the critical situation in Southern 
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) which, as repeatedly affiimed by 
the Security Council, constitutes a threat to interna- 
tional peace and security. 

Reaffirming that any attempt to negotiate the future 
of Zimbabwe with the illegal regime on the basis of in- 
dependence before majority rule would be in contraven- 
tion of the inalienable rights of the people of the Terri- 
tory and contrary to the provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations and of resolution 1514 (XV), 

Taking note of the declared position of the administer- 
ing Power that there shall be no independence before 
majority rule in Zimbabwe, 

Reaffinning also its endorsement of the relevant pro- 
visions of the Dar es Salaam Declaration on Southern 
Africa, adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Or- 



' Adopted by the committee by consensus on Dec. 14 
(draft resolution A/C.4/31/L.45) and by the Assembly 
by consensus on Dec. 20 (te.xt from U.N. doc. A/31/ 
447, report of the Fourth Committee on agenda item 
86, Question of Southern Rhodesia). 



January 17, 1977 



55 



ganization of African Unity at its ninth extraordinary 
session, held from 7 to 10 April 1975, 

Endorsing the relevant provisions of the Political 
Declaration adopted by the Fifth Conference of Heads 
of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held 
at Colombo from 16 to 19 August 1976, relating to 
southern Africa, 

Taking note of the convening of the conference on 
Zimbabwe at Geneva, 

Condemning the illegal racist minority regime for its 
intensified oppression of the people of Zimbabwe, the 
arbitrary imprisonment and detention of political lead- 
ers and others, the illegal execution of freedom fight- 
ers and the continued denial of fundamental human 
rights, including in particular the wanton beating, tor- 
ture and murder of innocent villagers, arbitrary crimi- 
nal measures of collective punishment and measures 
designed to create an apartheid State in Zimbabwe, 

Commending the firm determination of the people of 
Zimbabwe, under the leadership of their national lib- 
eration movement, to achieve freedom and independ- 
ence, 

1. Reaffhins the inalienable right of the people of 
Zimbabwe to self-determination, freedom and inde- 
pendence and the legitimacy of their struggle to secure 
by all the means at their disposal the enjoyment of 
that right as set forth in the Charter of the United Na- 
tions and in conformity with the objectives of General 
Assembly resolution 1514 (XV); 

2. Reaffirms the principle that there should be no 
independence before majority rule in Zimbabwe and 
that any settlement relating to the future of the Terri- 
tory must be worked out with the full participation of 
the people of Zimbabwe and in accordance with their 
true aspirations: 

S. Strongly condemns the illegal racist minority re- 
gime for its continued brutal and repressive measures 
perpetrated against the people of Zimbabwe and in 
particular the wanton killings of Africans carried out 
by the regime within and outside Zimbabwe; 

4. Further strongly condemns the illegal racist 
minority regime for its systematic acts of aggression 
against neighbouring African States; 

5. Calls npon the Government of the United King- 
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in the dis- 
charge of its primary responsibility as the administer- 
ing Power, to take all effective measures to enable 
Zimbabwe to accede to independence in accordance 
with the aspirations of the majority of the population 
and not under any circumstances to accord to the il- 
legal regime any of the powers or attributes of 
sovereignty; 

6. Commends to the administering Power for appro- 
priate action the relevant sections of the report of the 
Ad Hoc Group established by the Special Committee 
on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of 
the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples, at its 1029th meeting, 
on 1 April 1976; 

7. Finnly supports the people of Zimbabwe in their 
struggle to achieve majority rule; 



8. Demands: 

(a) The termination forthwith of the executions of 
freedom fighters being carried out by the illegal Smith 
regime; 

(b) The unconditional and immediate release of all 
political prisoners, detainees and restrictees, the re- 
moval of all restrictions on political activity and the 
establishment of full democratic freedom and equality 
of political rights, as well as the restoration to the 
population of fundamental human rights; 

(c) The discontinuance forthwith of all repressive 
measures, in particular the brutality committed in the 
"operational area", the arbitrary closure of African 
areas, the eviction, transfer and resettlement of Afri- 
cans and the creation of so-called protected villages 
and the persecution of Christian missionaries support- 
ing the cause of the liberation of Zimbabwe; 

(d) The cessation of the influx of foreign immigrants 
into the Territory and the immediate withdrawal of all 
mercenaries therefrom; 

9. Calls upon all States to take all necessary and ef- 
fective measures to prevent advertisement for, and re- 
cruitment of, mercenaries for Southern Rhodesia; 

10. Requests all States, directly and through their 
action in the specialized agencies and other organiza- 
tions within the United Nations system of which they 
are members, as well as the non-governmental organi- 
zations concerned and the various programmes within 
the United Nations, to extend, in consultation and co- 
operation with the Organization of African Unity, to 
the people of Zimbabwe and their national liberation 
movement all the moral, material, political and human- 
itarian assistance necessary in their struggle for the 
restoration of their inalienable rights; 

11. Invites all Governments, the specialized agencies 
and other organizations within the United Nations sys- 
tem, the United Nations bodies concerned and non- 
governmental organizations having a special interest in 
the field of decolonization, as well as the Secretary- 
General, to take steps, as appropriate, to give wide- 
spread and continuous publicity through all the media 
at their disposal to information on the situation in 
Zimbabwe and on the relevant decisions and actions of 
the United Nations, with particular reference to the 
application of sanctions against the illegal regime; 

12. Expresses the hope that the conference on Zim- 
babwe at Geneva will succeed in establishing the con- 
ditions for early independence on the basis of majority 
rule, in accordance with the relevant resolutions 
adopted by the United Nations; 

13. Requests the Government of the United King- 
dom, in keeping with its express readiness to do so, to 
co-operate with the Special Committee in the dis- 
charge of the mandate entrusted to the latter by the 
General Assembly, and to I'eport thereon to the Spe- 
cial Committee and to the Assembly at its thirty- 
second session; 

14. Requests the Special Committee to keep the situ- 
ation in the Territory under review as a matter of 
priority and to report thereon to the General Assembly 
at its thirty-second session. 



56 



Department of State Bulletin 



General Assembly Resolution 31/154 B ^ 

The General Asaeinbly, 

Having adopted resoUition [31/154 A] of (9) De- 
cember 1976 on the question of Southern Rhodesia 
(Zimbabwe), 

Strunqhi deploring the increasing collaboration, in 
violation of Article 25 of the Charter of the United Na- 
tions and of the relevant decisions of the United Na- 
tions, which certain States, particularly South Africa, 
maintain with the illegal racist minority regime, 
thereby seriously impeding the effective application of 
sanctions and other measures taken so far against the 
illegal regime, 

Seriou.tly concerned at the continued importation of 
chrome and nickel into the United States of America 
from Southern Rhodesia, in violation of the relevant 
decisions of the Security Council and in disregard of 
the related resolutions of the General Assembly, 

Deeply disturbed at recent reports of widespread 
violations of United Nations sanctions, including the 
operation of Southern Rhodesian aircraft for interna- 
tional passenger and cargo traffic, as well as the con- 
tinued functioning of information and airline offices of 
the illegal regime outside Southern Rhodesia and the 
resultant influx of foreign tourists into the Territory, 

Considering that developments in the area call in 
particular for positive, concerted international action 
with a view to imposing maximum isolation on the il- 
legal regime. 

Reaffirming its conviction that the sanctions will 
not put an end to the illegal racist minority regime un- 
less they are comprehensive, mandatory and effec- 
tively supervised, enforced and complied with, particu- 
larly by South Africa, 

Noting with appreciation the decision of the Gov- 
ernment of Mozambique to close its borders with 
Southern Rhodesia and to impose sanctions against the 
illegal racist minority regime in compliance with the 
relevant decisions of the Security Council, 

1. Strongly condemns those Governments, particu- 
larly the racist regime of South Africa, for their 
policies which, in violation of the relevant resolutions 
of the United Nations and in open contravention of 
their specific obligations under Article 2, paragraph 5, 
and Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations, 
continue to collaborate w'ith the illegal racist minority 
regime, and calls upon those Governments to cease 
forthwith all such collaboration; 

2. Condemns all violations of the mandatory sanc- 
tions imposed by the Security Council, as well as the 
continued failure of certain Member States to enforce 
those sanctions strictly, as being contrary to the obli- 
gations assumed by them under Article 2, paragraph 5, 
and Article 25 of the Charter; 



^ Adopted by the committee on Dec. 14 by a vote of 
121 to 1 (U.S.), with 6 abstentions, and by the Assem- 
bly on Dec. 20 bv a vote of 124 to 0, with 7 abstentions 

(U.S.); (text from U.N. doc. A/31/447). 



3. Condemns the continued importation of chrome 
and nickel from Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) into 
the United States of America, and calls upon the Gov- 
ernment of the United States to repeal speedily all 
legislation permitting such importation; 

4. Calls upon all Governments which so far have not 
done so: 

(a) To take stringent enforcement measures to en- 
sure strict compliance by all individuals, associations 
and bodies corporate under their jurisdiction with the 
sanctions imposed by the Security Council and to pro- 
hibit any form of collaboration by them with the illegal 
regime; 

(b) To take effective steps to prevent or discourage 
the emigration to Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) of 
any individuals or groups of individuals under their 
jurisdiction; 

(c) To discontinue any action which might confer a 
semblance of legitimacy on the illegal regime, inter 
alia, by forbidding the operation and activities of Air 
Rhodesia, the Rhodesia National Tourist Board and 
the Rhodesian Information Office, or any other ac- 
tivities which contravene the aims and purposes of the 
sanctions; 

(d) To invalidate passports and other documents for 
travel to the Territory; 

5. Highly commends the action taken by the Gov- 
ernment of Mozambique in closing its borders with 
Southern Rhodesia and imposing total sanctions 
against the Smith regime, and considers that that ac- 
tion constitutes an important contribution in support of 
the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe and towards the 
maximum isolation of the illegal regime; 

6. Requests al! States, directly and through their ac- 
tion in the specialized agencies and other organizations 
within the United Nations system of which they are 
members, and the various programmes within the 
United Nations system to extend to the Government of 
Mozambique all forms of financial, technical and mate- 
rial assistance in order to enable it to overcome any 
economic difficulties in connexion with its application 
of economic sanctions against the illegal regime; 

7. Further requests the Security Council to under- 
take a periodic review of the question of economic as- 
sistance to the Government of Mozambique as well as 
to the Government of Zambia; 

8. Reiterates its conviction that the scope of the 
sanctions against the illegal regime must be widened 
to include all the measures envisaged under Article 41 
of the Charter and requests the Security Council to 
consider taking the necessary measures in that regard 
as a matter of urgency; 

9. Requests the Special Committee on the Situation 
with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples to follow the implementation of the pres- 
ent resolution and invites the Security Council Com- 
mittee established in pursuance of resolution 253 
(1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia to 
continue to co-operate in the related work of the Spe- 
cial Committee. 



January 17, 1977 



57 



United States Reemphasizes Spirit 
of Cooperation With OAU 

Following is a statement made in plenary 
session of the U.N. General Assembly by 
U.S. Representative Ersa Poston on 
November 16. 

I'Sl'N press release 152 llaled November 16 

As the General Assembly again considers 
the question of cooperation between the 
United Nations and the Organization of Afri- 
can Unity, the United States wishes to reaf- 
firm our respect for the OAU and the ideals 
embodied in its charter and to emphasize 
that we look forward to maintaining close 
cooperation with the organization and with 
its members. 

As a country which participated in the 
founding of the first of the regional organiza- 
tions, we are aware of the essential role such 
organizations can play. We believe regional 
cooperation is a step on the way to global 
cooperation. We also believe that there are 
some issues which transcend regional con- 
cern and require global attention. 

Nineteen seventy-six has been a crucial 
year in U.S. -African relations. In addition to 
building on the strong and significant ties 
which we have with African nations, this 
past year has witnessed an unprecedented 
level of U.S. involvement in trying to help 
find solutions to many of the pressing prob- 
lems of the African Continent. Secretary of 
State Kissinger's efforts in particular have 
underlined our commitment to assist the na- 
tions of southern Africa find negotiated solu- 
tions to the problems of Namibia and 
Zimbabwe. While progress has been made — 
and we have tried to play a part — difficult 
decisions still lie ahead. The United States 
will not relax its efforts to see these crucial 
international issues resolved. 

The past year also has seen concerted U.S. 
efforts in multilateral forums to solve eco- 
nomic problems of the nations of Africa. 
Some progress has been achieved in eradicat- 
ing poverty and ushering in a new era of eco- 
nomic development for all of Africa. Much 
still remains to be done. The United States 
remains committed to assisting the people of 



Africa utilize their great potential in human 
and natural resources in order to achieve 
economic progress in the years ahead. 

Above all else, 1976 has seen the realiza- 
tion of a spirit of cooperation by the United 
States in our relations with Africa. As Secre- 
tary Kissinger said in his toast at a luncheon 
for representatives of the OAU nations on 
October 8: 

There can no longer be any question that America is 
coinmitted to Africa's goals and to working with the na- 
tions of Africa to solve the continent's problems .... 

Let us set aside the suspicions of the past and work 
for our common future. Together we can constitute the 
community of man on the basis of mutual benefit and 
shared endeavor. We can show that races can live to- 
gether, that there is an alternative to hatred. 

Mr. President, the United States will do 
all in its power to make this spirit of coop- 
eration a reality in our dealings with the 
OAU and with its members. 



U.S. Supports U.N. Membership 
of Western Samoa 

Following is a statement made in the U.N. 
Security Council by U.S. Representative 
Albert W. Sherer, Jr., on December 1. 

rSl'N press release 173 dated December 1 

My country is pleased to support the can- 
didacy of the Independent State of Western 
Samoa for membership in the United Na- 
tions.' 

The United States has had a long and fruit- 
ful relationship with the people and Govern- 
ment of Western Samoa. We have worked 
with them through the years in bilateral rela- 
tionships and within the context of the South 
Pacific Commission and the South Pacific 
Forum. There are, of course, close ties be- 
tween the peoples of Western Samoa and the 
people of American Samoa, who share the 



' The Council on Dec. 1 adopted unanimously a res- 
olution (S/RES/399 (1976)) recommending to the Gen- 
eral Assembly "that Western Samoa be admitted to 
membership in the United Nations." The Assembly on 
Dec. 15 adopted unanimously a resolution (A/RES/31/ 
104) admitting Western Samoa to membership. 



58 



Department of State Bulletin 



same culture, language, and history. I am 
sure that through its membership in the 
United Nations, Western Samoa will make a 
valuable contribution to international peace 
and understanding and will bring to this or- 
ganization the unique perception of the 
peoples of the Pacific. 

We will be pleased therefore to welcome 
Western Samoa to the United Nations and 
look forward to continuing here the close and 
cordial relations that have developed be- 
tween our two countries. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 
1974. Message from the President of the United 
States transmitting the convention. S. Ex. 0. Augu.st 
31, 1976. 266 pp. 

Export Reorganization Act of 1976. Report of the Sen- 
ate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energv to accompany S. 1439. 
S. Rept. 94-1193. August 31,' 1976. 81 pp. 

The United States and China. A report by Senator 
Hugh Scott, Minority Leader, U.S. Senate, to the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. September 
1976. ,55 pp. 

The Political and Economic Crisis in Southern Africa. A 
staff report to the Subcommittee on Foreign Assist- 
ance of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 
September 1976. 52 pp. 

Concerning Recent Actions by the Governments of 
North Korea and South Korea. Report of the House 
Committee on International Relations, together with 
supplemental views, to accompany H. Res. 1506. H. 
Rept. 94-1462. September 2, 1976. 17 pp. 

Urging the President Not To Extend Diplomatic or 
Other Recognition to the Transkei Territory. Report 
of the House Committee on International Relations to 
accompany H. Res. 1509. H. Rept. 94-1463. Sep- 
tember 2, 1976. 7 pp. 

Religious Repression in the Soviet Union: Dissident 
Baptist Pastor Georgi Vins. Report of the House 
Committee on International Relations to accompany 
H. Con. Res. 726: H. Rept. 94-1464; September 2, 
1976: 5 pp. Report of the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations: S. Rept. 94-1306: September 24, 
1976: 2 pp. 

Customs Convention on Containers, 1972, and Interna- 
tional Convention for Safe Containei's. Report of 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to ac- 
company Ex. X, 93-1. S. Ex. Rept. 94-33. September 
3, 1976. 61 pp. 

Humanitarian Assistance to Earthquake Victims in 
Italy. A staff report prepared for the use of the Sub- 
committee To Investigate Problems Connected With 
Refugees and Escapees of the Senate Committee on 
the Judiciary. September 10, 1976. 24 pp. 



United States and Bulgaria Sign 
New Fisheries Agreement 



Joint Statement 



Press release (>(l.s dated Decemher 17 



On December 17, 1976, representatives of 
the United States of America and the 
People's Republic of Bulgaria signed a new 
agreement relating to fishing activities of 
Bulgaria off the coasts of the United States. 

The agreement sets out the arrangements 
between the countries which will govern fish- 
ing by Bulgarian vessels within the fishery 
conservation zone of the United States be- 
ginning on March 1, 1977. The agreement 
will come into force after the completion of 
internal procedures by both governments. 

The signing of this agreement took place in 
Washington. Lubomir Popov, Ambassador to 
the United States of the People's Republic of 
Bulgaria, signed for Bulgaria. Rozanne L. 
Ridgway, Ambassador of the United States 
for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs, signed for 
the United States. Both delegations ex- 
pressed their satisfaction with the new ac- 
cord and the hope that it will strengthen 
cooperation between Bulgaria and the United 
States. 



Current Treaty Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Antarctica 

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the 
principles and objectives of the Antarctic treaty of 
December 1, 1959 (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Oslo June 
20, 1975. » 
Notification of approval: Chile, December 22, 1976. 

Meteorology 

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. 
Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into 
force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052. 
Accession deposited: Malta, December 28, 1976. 

Oil Pollution 

International convention for the prevention of pollution 
of the sea by oil, as amended. Done at London May 



Not in force. 



January 17, 1977 



59 



12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the 
United States December 8, 1961. TIAS 4900, 6109. 
Acceptance deposited: Surinam, December 1, 1976. 

Postal 

Second additional protocol to the constitution of the 
Universal Postal Union of July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881, 
7150), general regulations with final protocol and an- 
ne.x, and the universal postal convention with final 
approval and detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne 
July 5, 1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976. 
TIAS 8231. 

Ratifications deposited: Bangladesh, October 28, 
1976; German Democratic Republic, July 15, 1976; 
Norway, October 20, 1976. 

Money orders and postal travellers' checks agreement, 
with detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne Julv 5, 
1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976. TIAS 8232. 
Ratification deposited: Norway, November 19, 1976. 

Trade 

Arrangement regarding international trade in textiles, 
with annexes. Done at Geneva December 20, 1973. 
Entered into force January 1, 1974, except for article 
2, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, which entered into force 
April 1, 1974. TIAS 7840. 

Accepta)ice deposited: Bangladesh, December 3, 
1976. 



BILATERAL 



Jordan 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relat- 
ing to the agreement of November 27, 1974 (TIAS 
7995), with minutes. Signed at Amman November 29, 
1976. 



GPO Sales Publications 

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock 
number from the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
20^02. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 
100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to 
the same address. Remittances, payable to the 
Superintendent of Documents, must accompany 
orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic 
postage, are subject to change. 

15th Annual Report to the Congress, U.S. Arms Con- 
trol and Disarmament Agency. "This 15th annual re- 
port . . . sets forth in detail and perspective the ad- 
vances that have been made and the difficult, essential 
work that must still be done ... to create stability 
rather than a spiraling arms race in weapons of incalcul- 
able destructiveness." ACDA Pub. 88. 75 pp. $2.45. 
(Cat. No. 81.117/5:88). 

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Tenth 
proces-verbal extending the declaration of November 
12, 1959, on provisional accession of Tunisia to the gen- 
eral agreement. TIAS 8320. 9 pp. 350. (Cat. No. 
89.10:8320). 

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Proces- 
verbal extending the declaration of August 9, 1973, on 
provisional accession of the Philippines to the general 
agreement. TIAS 8321. 9 pp. 350. (Cat. No. 89.10:8321). 

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Declaration 
on the provisional accession of Colombia to the agree- 
ment of October 30, 1947. TIAS 8322. 24 pp. 450. (Cat. 
No. 89.10:8322). 

Trade — Meat Imports. Agreement with Australia. 
TIAS 8323. 8 pp. 350. (Cat. No. 89.10:8323). 



60 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX January 17, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1960 



Africa. United States Reemphasizes Spirit of 
Cooperation With OAU (Poston) 58 

Bulgaria. United States and Bulgaria Sign New 
F'isheries Agreement (joint statement) 59 

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating to 
Foreign Policy 59 

Economic Affairs. United States and Bulgaria 
Sign New Fisheries Agreement (joint state- 
ment ) 59 

Israel. U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in 
Israel-Syria Sector Extended (Bennett) 42 

Lesotho. U.S. Joins Security Council Appeal for 
Assistance to Lesotho (Sherer, te.xt of resolu- 
tion) 51 

Middle East 

U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in Lsrael- 
Syria Sector Extended (Bennett) 42 

U.S. Gives Views in General Assembly Debate on 
the Middle East (Scranton, texts of resolutions) 37 

U.S. Votes Against U.N. Resolution on Question 
of Palestine (Scranton) 41 

Namibia. U.S. Reaffirms Commitment to Self- 
Determination and Independence for Namibia 
(Hess, Scranton, texts of U.N. General Assem- 
bly resolutions) 43 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications 60 

South Africa 

U.S. Joins Security Council Appeal for Assistance 
to Lesotho (Sherer, text of resolution) 51 

United States Urges Peaceful Change 'n South 
Africa (Hess, Hupp) 48 

Southern Rhodesia. U.S. Reiterates Support for 
Negotiated Solution in Rhodesia (Petree, 
Scranton, Sherer, texts of U.N. General As- 
sembly resolutions) 53 

Syria. U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in 
Israel-Syria Sector Extended (Bennett) 42 

Treaty Information 

Current Treaty Actions 59 

I'nited States and Bulgaria Sign New Fisheries 
Agreement (joint statement ) .59 

United Nations 

U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in Israel- 
Syria Sector Extended (Bennett) 42 

U.S. Gives Views in General Assembly Debate on 
the Middle East (Scranton, texts of resolu- 
tions 37 

U.S. Joins Security Council Appeal for Assist- 
ance to Lesotho (Sherer, text of resolution) ... 51 

U.S. Reaffirms Commitment to Self-Deter- 
niination and Independence for Namibia (Hess, 
Scranton, texts of U.N. General Assembly res- 
olutions) 43 



United States Reemphasizes Spirit of Coopcii 
tion With OAU (Poston) oH 

U.S. Reiterates Support for Negotiated Solution 
in Rhodesia (Petree, Scranton, Sherer, texts of 
U.N. General Assembly resolutions) 53 

U.S. Supports U.N. Membership of Western 
Samoa (Sherer) 58 

United States Urges Peaceful Change in South 
Africa (Hess, Hupp) 48 

U.S. Votes Against U.N. Resolution on Question 
of Palestine (Scranton) 41 

Western Samoa. U.S. Supports U.N. Member- 
ship of Western Samoa (Sherer) 58 

Name Inde.r 

Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr 42 

Hess, Stephen 43, 48 

Hupp, Rev. Robert P 48 

Petree, Richard 53 

Poston, Ersa 53 

Scranton, William W 37, 41, 43, 53 

Sherer, Albert W. , Jr 51, 53, 58 



Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: Dec. 27-Jan. 2 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

*620 12/29 Shipping Coordinating Commit- 
tee (SCO, Subcommittee on 
Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS), working group on 
subdivision and stability, Jan. 
26-27. 

*621 12/29 sec, SOLAS, working group on 
standards of training and 
watchkeeping, Jan. 26. 

*622 12/29 Advisory Committee on Inter- 
national Intellectual Proper- 
ty, International Copyright 
Panel, Feb. 2. 

*623 12/31 Motor travel in State of Sinaloa, 
Mexico. 
tl 1/1 U.S. withdrawal from Interna- 

tional Convention for the 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. 

* Not printed. 

+ Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN. 



Superintendent of Documents 

j s. government printing office 

washington, dc. 20402 



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v^ 



/'J: 



mi 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 

Volume LXXVI • No. 1961 • January 24, 1977 



ENERGY AND THE WORLD ECONOMY 

Statement by Assistant Secretary Katz 61 

AMBASSADOR SCRANTON'S ASSESSMENT 

OF THE 31st U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY 

Statement in Closing Plenary Session 68 

U.S. SUPPORTS ESTABLISHMENT OF U.N. AD HOC COMMITTEE 

ON DRAFTING OF CONVENTION AGAINST TAKING OF HOSTAGES 

U.S. Statements and Text of General Assembly Resolution 72 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For inde.x see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



Vol. I.XXVI, No. 1961 
January 24, 1977 



For sale by the SuiJerintendenl of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

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domestic $42.50, foreign $53.15 

Single copy 85 cents 

The Secretary of State has determined that the pub- 
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Department. L'se of funds for printing this periodi- 
cal has been approved by the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget through January :il. 
1981. 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be re- 
printed. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The 
BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to 
Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State fHLLKTI\,& 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, fiureau oi 
Public Affairs, provides the public ant 
interested agencies of the gocerninenl 
with information on developments in 
the field of i'.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 

The BILLETI.X includes seleclet 
press releases on foreign policy, issuet 
by the White House and the Depart' 
ment, and statements, addresses, and 
news conferences of the President and 
the Secretary of State and other offi- 
cers of the Department, as well as spe- 
cial articles on various phases of in- 
ternational affairs and the functions of 
the Department. Information is in- 
cluded concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a party 
and on treaties of general interna- 
tional interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United .\ations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 



Energy and the World Economy 



Statement by Julius L. Katz 

Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs * 



I welcome the opportunity to appear be- 
fore your committee to discuss the interna- 
tional energy situation and its impact on the 
world economy. This hearing takes place 
against the background of a further demon- 
stration at the recent OPEC [Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries] meeting in 
Doha, Qatar, of the extent to which the eco- 
nomic well-being of the United States and 
the rest of the world is vulnerable to unilat- 
eral decisions on oil prices by the OPEC oil 
producers. In these remarks I would like to 
discuss the recent OPEC price decision, to 
comment on the effect of this and earlier oil 
price increases on the global economy, and to 
elaborate a number of longer term economic 
and energy policy considerations that emerge 
from the oil price situation. 

The Doha Price Decision 

In many ways, the OPEC ministerial meet- 
ing in Qatar in mid-December followed the 
familiar pattern of OPEC meetings in recent 
years. Accompanied by wide-ranging specu- 
lation about the outcome of their delibera- 
tions, the 13 member nations met in closed 
sessions to decide among themselves on the 
price other nations would have to pay for oil. 
But the Qatar meeting was unique in one im- 
portant aspect. Failing to agree on a common 
price for the marker crude, upon which all 



' Submitted to the Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs on Jan. 5. The complete 
transcript of the hearings will be published by the 
committee and will be available from the Superintend- 
ent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



their prices have been based in the past, the 
OPEC countries broke openly and in effect 
created a two-tier price system. 

Eleven OPEC members announced their in- 
tention to raise their prices by 10 percent on 
January 1 and a further 5 percent in July. 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, 
on the other hand, refused to go along with 
the majority. They indicated the intention to 
increase their prices by 5 percent and to hold 
this level throughout 1977. 

It will be several weeks or months before 
we know whether the OPEC majority can 
sustain their high posted prices or whether 
prices will drift down toward the level estab- 
lished by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates. A number of factors contribute to 
this uncertainty. 

The most important of these is the level of 
demand for oil from the 11 high-price mem- 
bers of OPEC over the next several months. 
If demand for their oil remains at or near the 
level of late 1976, they will be able to make 
their 10 percent increase stick. However, if 
their market begins to shrink appreciably, 
they will have to choose between maintaining 
their higher prices and accepting a lower 
level of revenues or lowering their prices to 
compete with lower priced Saudi Arabian and 
U.A.E. oil in an effort to maintain their 
share of the market. 

The market outlook for these 11 countries 
will depend on the level of total world de- 
mand for oil and on the speed with which 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates 
can increase production. Total demand for oil 
should decline over the next few months as 



January 24, 1977 



61 



companies draw down the inventories they 
built up in the final months of 1976 in antici- 
pation of a large OPEC price increase, al- 
though a cold winter and the ambiguous state 
of economic recovery in some major indus- 
trial countries have created unusual uncer- 
tainty in the demand outlook. 

The Saudis and the United Arab Emirates 
have stated their readiness to raise their 
production to meet increased demand for 
their less expensive oil, and some substantial 
increase should be possible. However, Saudi 
production at the end of 1976 had already 
risen to near capacity levels, and it is unclear 
how much incremental capacity can be 
brought into production quickly. 

There are other factors which make it even 
more difficult to assess the outcome of the 
OPEC meeting. For example, it is unclear 
how much companies can shift their sources 
of supply quickly, despite the price differen- 
tial. They purchase much of their crude under 
long-term contracts and in many cases have 
already contracted for crude into the first 
and second quarters of 1977. Also, there are 
questions about the demand for the particu- 
lar qualities of additional crude oil available 
from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emi- 
rates. This will depend on the refining 
capabilities and marketing requirements of 
individual companies and importing coun- 
tries. 

General Economic Implications of Oil Prices 

Because of these uncertainties, we cannot 
yet draw final conclusions about the conse- 
quences and impact of the price decision on 
the world economy. But one fact is clear: 
Notwithstanding the pressure on the OPEC 
majority to hold the price increase below the 
level they established, there will be an in- 
crease in the price of imported oil. Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates dem- 
onstrated a greater sense of responsibility 
for global growth and stability than the other 
eleven. But whether the increase is ulti- 
mately 5 percent or 10 percent or something 
in between, it is nonetheless a price increase, 
an increase that is both unwarranted and 
harmful to the world economy. 



Moreover, it comes on top of the massive 
oil price increases of the past few years as 
the price of this essential input has risen 
more than fivefold since January 1973. This 
unprecedented price rise constitutes a mas- 
sive income transfer from oil-importing coun- 
tries to a handful of oil-exporting countries. 
It has had, and continues to have, a profound 
impact on the world economy and on growth 
and income in oil-consuming countries. It 
contributed in a major way to the worldwide 
inflationary pressures of 1974-75. It also 
seriously aggravated the recession of the 
same period when the abrupt increase in oil 
import costs drained consumer purchasing 
power, acting in effect as an excise tax on the 
economies of the importing countries. 

Given the already high level of oil prices, 
even a relatively small increase in percentage 
terms can have a substantial economic im- 
pact. Our analysis in advance of the Doha 
meeting indicated that each 5 percent in- 
crease in the cost of crude oil would cost oil- 
consuming countries approximately $6 billion 
in higher oil bills, with the United States pay- 
ing around $1.7 billion of that total. Absent 
compensating domestic policy actions, each 5 
percent increase costs the seven largest in- 
dustrialized countries an average of 0.3 per- 
cent each in real GNP [gross national prod- 
uct] growth and adds roughly 0.3 percent to 
consumer prices. 

The oil price rise has also had a fundamen- 
tal impact on income distribution because in- 
creases in the price of gasoline, home heat- 
ing, and electricity have a disproportionate 
effect on lower income groups. It has caused 
structural adjustments in industry and the 
premature obsolescence of industrial plant. 
In addition, the new energy situation will 
have a continuing impact on the allocation of 
investment capital; much more investment 
will be needed in the energy area, leaving 
less capital available for other economic and 
social objectives. 

We made a major effort in the months 
prior to the Doha meeting to persuade the 
oil-producing countries not to raise prices. 
We stressed that any increase in the price of 
oil would seriously harm the effort to regain 
sustainable, noninflationary growth and 



62 



Department of State Bulletin 



would have particularly serious consequences 
for the weaker developed-eountry economies 
and the developing countries. We also coun- 
tered the argument of some of the producers 
that an increase in oil prices was justified by 
an increase in the cost of their imports; in 
fact, the cost of exports to OPEC from the 
seven largest industrialized countries has 
risen less than 4 percent since September 
1975, when the oil price was raised by 10 
percent. 

We believe that our efforts and those of 
other industrialized countries and some de- 
veloping nations probably moderated the 
final OPEC decision. But the fact that an 
unwarranted and unjustified increase oc- 
curred despite this major diplomatic effort 
underlines the need for effective long-term 
action in the energy area to lessen our vul- 
nerability to continued increases in the price 
of oil. OPEC meets every six months; and in 
the absence of action to affect the supply- 
demand balance for energy, the world will 
confront every six months the possibility of a 
further increase in the price of oil. 

Financial Impact of Oil Price Increases 

The entire range of U.S. economic policies 
and objectives has to take account of higher 
oil prices and the structural adjustments 
needed to cope with these higher prices in 
the United States and the rest of the world. 
Our central concern is to insure a sustainable 
and noninflationary expansion over the next 
several years. 

This task will be complicated by the diver- 
gent economic trends among major indus- 
trialized economies. It will require an inten- 
sification of the process of economic policy 
collaboration through the OECD [Organiza- 
tion for Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment] and other contacts, including meetings 
at the summit. One of the central objectives 
of such collaboration will be concerted action 
to deal with the serious financial imbalances 
which have resulted from higher oil prices 
and will continue at least through the end of 
the decade. 

In the 1974-76 period, OPEC members had 
a cumulative current account surplus of $142 



billion. With annual surpluses in excess of 
$40 billion likely for the next few years, 
OPEC's accumulation of financial assets 
could easily surpass $300 billion by the end of 
1980. This represents the oil-consuming 
countries' aggregate indebtedness to OPEC 
members, a net claim on our resources. The 
bulk of these claims are held by three OPEC 
members. 

The large surplus position of OPEC nations 
is matched by aggregate deficits in oil- 
importing countries, both developed and de- 
veloping. No amount of adjustment action by 
oil-importing countries as a group can elimi- 
nate the deficit in the medium term. Under 
these circumstances it would be foolhardy 
and dangerous for individual oil-importing 
countries to try to improve their position at 
the expense of others through "beggar-thy- 
neighbor" policies of import restriction and 
artificial export stimulation. Rather, the key 
questions are how the deficit will be distrib- 
uted and how it will be financed. 

In the aggregate, the huge OPEC current 
account surplus is self-financing. The OPEC 
countries in a strong financial position have 
no choice but to invest their surplus funds in 
oil-importing countries. The pattern of in- 
vestment of OPEC financial surpluses, how- 
ever, does not match the needs of individual 
countries to finance costly oil imports. The 
current account deficit of oil-importing coun- 
tries is very unevenly distributed. In the in- 
dustriahzed world, the diverse impact of oil 
price increases aggravates the divergent 
rates of growth and inflation, with the al- 
ready weaker economies the hardest hit. 
Some OECD nations, particularly the Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany, have had consist- 
ent surpluses. Others, such as the United 
Kingdom and Italy, have had to make funda- 
mental adjustments in growth rates as well 
as investment and consumption levels to take 
account of energy needs and higher oil 
prices. This process will take longer than 
classic balance-of-payments adjustments. 

Certain developing countries also suffer 
dispropoi'tionately. Generally, the capacity 
of developing countries to adjust their 
economies to higher oil prices is limited. 
Many developing countries therefore face 



January 24, 1977 



63 



painful choices as tiiey reassess their de- 
velopment prospects in light of added bur- 
dens of strained financial resources and 
mounting bills for imported oil. 

These changes in the structure of financial 
relations have a number of important impli- 
cations and repercussions: 

— There is pressure on weaker indus- 
trialized countries to adjust through restric- 
tions that would threaten our system of open 
trade and capital flows. To avoid such ac- 
tions, we must insure that they have enough 
financing to allow orderly adjustment. A bal- 
anced and concerted strategy for sustained 
recovery, which will enhance their export 
prospects, is also essential. 

— Until 1973, developed countries as a 
group ran consistently large current account 
surpluses, which enabled them to provide 
sufficient financing to developing nations 
through aid and investment flows. The vastly 
larger financing requirements of developing 
nations and the deficit position of developed 
countries as a group now make such flows in- 
adequate. As a result, higher income de- 
veloping countries (as well as weaker indus- 
tralized ones) have increasingly turned to 
private markets for financing, mostly in the 
form of Eurodollar credits and syndicated 
bank loans. The terms and conditions of 
these credits have not always been appro- 
priate to the adjustment problem faced. 
Moreover, while private lenders presently 
can continue to provide a high volume of 
financing, they will become more selective in 
their lending policies. In particular, their 
willingness to maintain lending levels to cer- 
tain important problem countries may di- 
minish. 

— The unprecedented external borrowing 
of developing countries has swelled the 
debt-service payments they face in the com- 
ing years. 1976 debt-service payments of 
non-oil-producing developing nations are in 
excess of $21 billion, or more than double the 
1973 level — of which over 80 percent relate 
to payments on commercial debt. These 
payments consume about 20 percent of their 
income from merchandise exports, as com- 
pared to 15 percent in 1973. In the 1977-80 
period there will undoubtedly be a bunching 



of debt-service payments, which will increase 
these figures. The debt is heavily concen- 
trated in higher income developing nations 
which have dynamic economies and a strong 
debt-service capacity. Nevertheless, some 
countries may not find sufficient capital to 
pay their debts without imposing very re- 
strictive economic policies. Debt-service dif- 
ficulties in one or more important develop- 
ing nations could trigger a credit squeeze 
which could cause private lenders to take a 
restrictive view of the creditworthiness of 
less developed countries as a group. 

One of the fundamental limitations of 
heavy reliance on international lending from 
private sources is that these lenders cannot 
carry out the function of developing com- 
prehensive economic stabilization programs 
with the borrowing country. Facilitating 
such stabilization as a condition of financial 
support is an essential function of official 
multilateral lending, in particular from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 

These considerations point clearly to the 
need to insure adequate amounts of official 
financing in the coming period to facilitate 
sound adjustment in the economies of oil- 
consuming countries. External financial sup- 
port is an essential ingredient in reinforcing 
the adjustment efforts of borrowing coun- 
tries. In the period ahead, we will therefore 
need to develop and strengthen further the 
framework of the international financial sys- 
tem to insure that it has the flexibility neces- 
sary to meet the needs of an international 
economy which has been so profoundly 
changed by the high cost of imported oil. 

In the first instance, this means more ac- 
tive use of the International Monetary Fund, 
including both its normal lending operations 
and new facilities such as the Extended Fund 
Facility, the liberalized Compensatory 
Financing Facility, and the special Trust 
Fund for the poorest developing countries. 
We have also negotiated and submitted to 
Congress a supplementary OECD Financial 
Support Fund. In conjunction with IMF 
facilities, it could provide a safety net to deal 
with the particular financial vulnerability of 
the industrialized economies. Finally, we 
should strongly support the activities of the 



64 



Department of State Bulletin 



IMF-IBRD [International Bank for Recon- 
struction and Development] Development 
Committee aimed at strengthening the ac- 
cess of less developed countries to long-term 
private capital markets. 

Energy Objectives 

Over the next several years, we must pur- 
sue economic, trade, and financial policies 
designed to minimize the extent to which 
high oil prices jeopardize our objective of 
sustainable, noninflationary growth. But we 
cannot be in a position of only reacting to the 
evolving world energy system; we must also 
act to shape the development of that system. 

Mr. Chairman, the events of the past four 
years have clearly demonstrated the extent 
to which the United States and our major 
trading and security partners are vulnerable 
to unilateral OPEC decisions to raise oil 
prices and to the threatened or actual use of 
an oil embargo by some oil-exporting coun- 
tries as an instrument of national policy. 

But the existence of OPEC is not the sole 
cause of our energy vulnerability. Our weak- 
ness stems directly from our increasing de- 
pendence on imported oil for our complex, 
energy-intensive economy. As recently as 
the mid-1960's, the United States, while an 
importer of oil, had substantial unused 
domestic production capacity. By the late 
1960's, rising consumption had eliminated 
that surplus capacity, and we became a 
larger and larger net importer. This com- 
bined with rising oil imports by Japan and 
Western Europe to bring about a major in- 
crease in world requirements for OPEC oil 
and a profound shift in the world balance of 
supply and demand. 

OPEC countries have taken advantage of 
this supply-and-demand situation to control 
the supply of oil offered in world markets. 
This control over supply, together with the 
absence of a readily available substitute for 
imported oil, enables OPEC to dictate the 
world price. 

In this regard, it would be a mistake to 
view the split decision at Doha as evidence of 
an imminent breakup of OPEC. There are 
obvious differences of view and interest 



within OPEC, but each member has an over- 
riding interest, political as well as economic, 
in the viability of OPEC. OPEC survived a 
major drop in world demand for oil during 
the recession of 1975. With economic recov- 
ery and increasing demand, the latest dis- 
agreement does not appear to pose a major 
threat to OPEC solidarity. 

We have taken action to reduce our vul- 
nerability to interruptions of oil supplies. 
Through the emergency sharing system of 
the IE A [International Energy Agency] and 
our national strategic petroleum reserves, 
we have significantly enhanced our ability to 
deter another oil embargo and to withstand 
the economic impact of an embargo should 
one occur. 

In the area of oil prices, we have made 
progress in strengthening our relationships 
with key members of OPEC and in convinc- 
ing them of the extent to which their own 
economic interests are adversely affected by 
actions which threaten the well-being of the 
world economy. However, until there is a 
basic change in the supply-demand balance 
the effectiveness of these diplomatic efforts 
on the issue of oil prices will be limited. 

The United States has a tremendous po- 
tential to help bring about a more acceptable 
balance of supply and demand by reducing its 
dependence on imported oil. On the one 
hand, we are the largest single consumer of 
energy. The development of our industrial, 
residential, and transportation systems has 
been based on a premise of unlimited quan- 
tities of inexpensive energy. That premise is 
no longer valid, and the entire structure of 
our economy must undergo a series of pro- 
found changes designed to improve the effi- 
ciency of our energy systems. In some cases, 
this greater efficiency will result from the 
stimulus of higher prices. In other cases, 
however, it will have to be mandated or en- 
couraged by tax and other incentives. 

At the same time, the United States is 
blessed with an enormous potential for the 
development of new energy supplies, includ- 
ing conventional oil, gas, nuclear, and coal 
power and eventually synthetics and nonde- 
pletable energy sources such as solar and fu- 
sion power. There are of course constraints 



January 24, 1977 



65 



on the development of new energy supplies, 
and these must be carefully evaluated. But 
the development of major new energy 
supplies will require both adequate incen- 
tives for the enormous investment outlays 
needed and, unavoidably, some compromise 
among our legitimate energy, economic, and 
environmental policies. 

Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, the U.S. 
response to the energy challenge has thus far 
been inadequate. We are now more depend- 
ent on imported oil than we were at the time 
of the October 1973 embargo. More impor- 
tantly, we still have not as a nation made a 
credible, long-term commitment to the goal 
of reduced import dependence and the policy 
measures necessary to achieve that goal. 

The design and implementation of the new 
actions necessary to achieve our goal of re- 
duced energy vulnerability will require the 
close and active collaboration of the Congress 
and the executive. We urgently need a con- 
sensus on a comprehensive and effective 
energy policy. 

Our energy concerns, like our general eco- 
nomic and financial interests, cannot be 
viewed solely in a national context. Energy is 
just one element — although a central 
element — in the web of our political, econom- 
ic, and security ties with the rest of the 
world. The other industrialized consuming 
countries face greater vulnerability in 
energy than the United States because of 
even greater dependence on imported oil. By 
the same token, it is not enough for the 
United States alone to reduce its import de- 
pendence; U.S. success could be offset by the 
failure of other major nations to limit their 
requirements for imported oil. 

In energy, as in other areas, our 
industralized-country allies look to us for 
leadership. Because we account for roughly 
one-half of OECD energy consumption and 
for nearly one-quarter of demand for OPEC 
exports, our leadership, if it is to be effec- 
tive, requires visible evidence that we are 
meeting our national energy responsibilities 
by improving the efficiency of our energy 
use and developing new supplies. 

Just as we recognize that our efforts to es- 
tablish a more stable world energy balance 
could be undercut by the failure of other 



major consumers to limit their dependence 
on imported oil, so do they recognize that 
they will be unable to reduce their energy 
vulnerability unless U.S. import dependence 
is reduced. Therefore we must work to- 
gether, strengthening national policies and 
pursuing common programs, where possible, 
in energy conservation, in the development 
of new supplies, and in research and de- 
velopment (R. & D.). The common objective 
of such measures is to reduce our total de- 
pendence and to achieve a global energy bal- 
ance in which consumers share control with 
producers. 

We have made the International Energy 
Agency the principal vehicle for this coopera- 
tion in energy with the rest of the indus- 
trialized world. This organization has 
achieved notable successes in the two years 
of its existence. It has: 

— Put in place a comprehensive emergency 
program to build oil stocks, to establish 
standby demand-restraint measures, and to 
share available oil supplies in the event of fu- 
ture disruptions in the supply of imported oil; 

— Agreed to a long-term cooperative pro- 
gram of conservation and the development of 
alternative supplies, including a number of 
joint R. & D. projects and a framework for 
joint projects in the actual development of 
new supplies; 

— Established an oil market information 
system aimed at improving understanding of 
the international oil market: and 

— Provided the forum for industrialized- 
country coordination for the energy dialogue 
in the Conference on International Economic 
Cooperation. 

At a U.S. initiative, the IE A is currently 
engaged in a process to establish group and 
individual national targets for reducing de- 
pendence on imported oil by 1985. It is en- 
visioned that member countries will under- 
take political commitments to these targets 
and the policy measures necessary to achieve 
them at an lEA ministerial meeting in the 
first half of 1977. 

We are also seeking to expand our coopera- 
tive efforts with the oil producers in the de- 
velopment and diversification of their 
economies. As their economies become more 



66 



Department of State Bulletin 



dependent on the health of the international 
economy, they should accept more readily 
their own responsibility for global economic 
stability and growth in their oil pricing and 
production policies. We also appreciate the 
special energy difficulties of the non-oil de- 
veloping countries and have made clear our 
leadiness to facilitate access to, and modifi- 
cation of, our energy technology to help 
them develop their indigenous resources and 
use energy more efficiently. 

Mr. Chairman, the oil price increases over 
the past several years have caused funda- 
mental structural changes in the interna- 
tional economy. The adjustments that are al- 
ready taking place and which will be required 
in the future are profound. To meet these 
new challenges, we must, as a nation and in 
cooperation with others, implement policies 
to sustain global growth, to preserve and im- 
prove the world trading system, and to 
strengthen the international framewoi'k for 
financial cooperation. 

We must also act decisively to end our 
energy vulnerability. As the leader of the in- 
dustrialized world, we have the capacity to 
confront directly and overcome our national 
and collective energy vulnerability. We must 
also demonstrate a determination to take the 
hard decisions required. 



President Ford Responds to Action 
by OPEC Increasing Oil Prices 



tions and ignoring the destructive conse- 
quences of their actions, chose to take a 
course which can only be termed irresponsi- 
ble. 

The United States has joined with many 
other nations in an international effort to im- 
prove the quality and degree of global coop- 
eration. The prosperous world which we and 
other nations seek, in the interest of de- 
veloped and developing nations alike, de- 
pends on a sense of shared responsibility. 

This requires that nations avoid actions 
which harm one another. It requires that 
every country understand that, in an inter- 
dependent world, shortsighted actions, how- 
ever seemingly attractive in the near term, 
can have long-term consequences detrimental 
to its prosperity and to that of all other coun- 
tries. It requires a common commitment to 
the well-being of all peoples and special sen- 
sitivity to the plight of the world's poorest 
societies. The decision of the OPEC majority 
clearly does not meet such standards of in- 
ternational responsibility. 

For our part this latest price increase can 
only serve as a sharp reminder for all Ameri- 
cans of the need to take urgent action to 
strengthen our conservation efforts and de- 
velop new sources of energy in order to re- 
duce our dependence. And it must serve as a 
reminder to all oil-consuming nations of the 
need to work closely together to reduce our 
reliance on imported oil and our vulnerability 
to arbitrary OPEC decisions. 



Statement by President Ford 

white House press release dated December 17 

We deeply regret OPEC's decision to 
raise, once again, the price of oil. We very 
much appreciate the efforts of those OPEC 
members, particularly Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates, whose sense of inter- 
national responsibility and concern for the 
adverse impact of an oil price increase on the 
world economy led them to advocate re- 
straint and to refuse to go along with the in- 
crease proposed by the others. Unfortu- 
nately, however, the majority of OPEC 
members, citing artificial economic justifica- 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

Resources in Namibia: Implications for U.S. Policy. 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on International 
Resources, Food, and Energy of the House Commit- 
tee on International Relations. June 10, 1975-May 13, 
1976. 165 pp. 

U.S. International Grain Policy: Sales and Manage- 
ment. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Interna- 
tional Resources, Food, and Energy of the House 
Committee on International Relations. December 3, 
1975. 34 pp. 

Proposed Foreign Military Sales to Middle Eastern 
Countries-1976. Hearings before the Subcommittee 
on International Political and Military Affairs of the 
House Committee on International Relations. Feb- 
ruary 23-September 21, 1976. 100 pp. 



January 24, 1977 



67 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



Ambassador Scranton's Assessment of the 31st U.N. General Assembly 



Following is a state>nent by U.S. Repre- 
sentative William W. Scranton made in the 
closing plenary session of the 31st United 
Nations General Assembly on December 22. 

USL'N press release 200 dated December 22 

A year ago the problems of disarmament, 
the Middle East, and southern Africa were 
acute. Negotiations, however, were stagnant. 
The deteriorating situation in Lebanon kept 
Arabs and Israelis from seeking ways to 
move toward solutions. As prospects for 
peaceful solution in southern Africa dwin- 
dled, a downward spiral toward violence 
gained momentum. Superpower commitment 
to strategic arms discussions and disarma- 
ment talk in general was questionable. 

This world situation affected the United 
Nations. The lack of progress or even a pros- 
pect for progress was aggravated by one of 
the sharpest and most dangerous confronta- 
tions in General Assembly history: the dis- 
pute over the equation of Zionism with ra- 
cism. There, another divisive factor was 
added to an already intensely comple.x Mid- 
dle East debate. This wounding rhetoric and 
other acts nearly as excessive embittered 
many people toward the United Nations, cer- 
tainly in the United States. 

Today, hope exists for settlement in the 
Middle East. This results partly, though only 
partly, from a winding down of the tragic 
struggle in Lebanon. Equally important, the 
energies of all parties are today engaged 
productively in pursuing ways for the parties 
to come together. For the first time all sides 
have manifested a renewed determination to 
achieve peace. For the first time all parties 
desire a negotiating process. 



As to southern Africa, determination is 
strong to bring about majority rule for multi- 
racial nations living in peace. Meaningful 
talks concerning Rhodesia are in process. 
Talks on Namibia are within reach — talks al- 
lowing peaceful change, change by negotia- 
tions, the only course that will avoid the hor- 
ror of mass violence. 

This positive tone extends to the difficult 
issues of arms control and disarmament, in- 
cluding nuclear proliferation — issues that 
will be with us after many others are solved. 
Today, none doubt the necessity of resolution 
or that superpowers must take the first 
steps. 

These developments are no cause for 
euphoria, but they do offer a basis for hope. 
In contrast with the last General Assembly, 
this session has had a lessening of confronta- 
tion. Some significant changes in the world 
situation combined with a more mature tone 
here to alter the atmosphere for the better. 
A small but perceptible change of mood took 
place. The U.N.'s cup, last year half empty, 
this year became half full. 

I repeat: There is no reason for euphoria, 
but it just may be that we have turned a 
corner. It just may be that this new tone will 
permit us to do more together. Having ap- 
proached the brink and drawn back, perhaps 
we will now turn to our common tasks with 
resolve to make substantive progress rather 
than political points. 

At the very least, our growing recognition 
of the value of small steps taken together is 
indeed an accomplishment. 

And now, Mr. President and fellow dele- 
gates, once again I ask your indulgence for 
some personal comments, a habit of mine to 



68 



Department of State Bulletin 



which you have become accustomed but to 
which you will not be subjected much longer. 
Having been the American Representative 
for nine months, I have become an instant 
expert on all aspects of the United Nations. 
More seriously, I am deeply indebted to each 
of you and many others for this educational 
process, and when I leave in another month, 
it will be with more understanding of the 
United Nations than when I arrived. 

Let me begin with a few basic thoughts. 
Although the United Nations has many pur- 
poses, three are most frequently and clearly 
enunciated in the charter: maintaining inter- 
national peace and security, assisting in eco- 
nomic development, and promoting human 
rights. 

As to the first, we are making progress. 
Let me cite one example: Eight years ago on 
a trip to the Middle East, I was informed by 
the leaders of all six countries I visited that 
they believed there was no further role for 
the United Nations in the Middle East dis- 
pute. Today, none deny the essential role of 
the U.N. presence between Syria and Israel 
and between Egypt and Israel. Through 
these temporary peacekeeping forces the 
United Nations is giving the world time to 
find a way to bring peace in the Middle East. 
And there is virtually unanimous opinion that 
the route to peace definitely and prominently 
involves the United Nations. 

In this geo-economic era, increasing 
interdependence and an acceleration of the 
desire by people everywhere for a better way 
of life bring economic problems and opportu- 
nities to the United Nations to a greater de- 
gree than ever before. The nations of the 
world now recognize that new mechanisms 
must be initiated and developed in the U.N. 
system for world resources and world trade 
to meet the special needs of many while 
benefiting us all. 

In both these areas — peacekeeping and eco- 
nomic development — I am encouraged, as I 
think we all are, not only by the demands on 
the United Nations but by its response, even 
though it is limited. Time will tell, and a 
short time at that, whether we take further 
opportunities now before us. 



But while much is encouraging with regard 
to two of the main purposes of the United 
Nations, little can be said about the third. 
With the exception of successful action on the 
initiative of the Federal Republic of Germany 
in regard to hostages, for which I congratu- 
late the General Assembly, little has hap- 
pened during this session to improve protec- 
tion of human rights where human rights 
most need protection. The strong and un- 
swerving views of the U.S. Government on 
this subject were recently made plain to the 
Third Committee. 

This brings me to the United States. Over 
and over again I am told here that the United 
States must lead — that it must lead with re- 
gard to a settlement in the Middle East; that 
it must lead with regard to majority rule in 
southern Africa; that, with the Soviet Union, 
it must lead in disarmament initiatives; that 
it must lead and be forthcoming in regard to 
interdependence in the economic field; that 
the United States must lead the West in the 
East-West dialogue and it must lead the 
North in the North-South dialogue. 

I believe that, working with many of your 
countries, the United States has important 
roles to play in the effort to find "proximate 
solutions to the insoluble problems" of man- 
kind. How will each of our nations meet the 
test? Will all of us measure up to our re- 
sponsibilities? 

I can speak only as one American. But at 
this moment my feelings are clear and my 
hopes high. 

Like all nations and all governments and 
all peoples, we have made mistakes. That 
came home dramatically to Americans in the 
last decade. 

We have been looking at oui-selves — just as 
you have been looking at us — with confusion, 
with anger in some cases, and with some ef- 
fort at dispassionate analysis. 

Every one of you sees the United States 
firsthand. You are here. You read about us 
in our newspapers every day. You hear about 
us on radio and you see us on television. Our 
assets and liabilities are wide open to you. 

When I look at the United States as our 
Bicentennial year comes to a close, I have a 



January 24, 1977 



69 



simple emotion: I rejoice. I find an America 
which is quieter, calmer, more modest, but 
sounder and more secure. Also, we are be- 
coming better listeners. Though we no longer 
expect the rest of the world to copy our eco- 
nomic system, we believe that of all the eco- 
nomic systems in the world, it is the most 
productive, the most creative, and the most 
beneficial to the people. 

We also know that we are joined irrevoca- 
bly with the rest of the world, that neither 
we nor anyone else can "go it alone." 

But out of 30 years of postwar turbulence 
has come a more important security than 
simply an economic one, and this Bicenten- 
nial year epitomizes it. There is a deeper 
dedication to the basic precepts of this coun- 
try as declared in the Bill of Rights of our 
Constitution. I believe the people of the 
United States are more firmly convinced 
today than ever before in our history that 
our individual freedoms, our open society, 
are the most precious part of our lives. They 
are our inspiration and our only real securi- 
ty. 

What does all this mean for the United Na- 
tions? I think it means that the United States 
will take leadership. It means that we will 
try with our hearts and our minds to work 
for a lasting peace in the Middle East, to 
bring majority rule to southern Africa, to 
build the mechanisms necessitated by eco- 
nomic interdependence, and to progress in 
arms control and disarmament. 

It also means that you will hear a great 
deal from us about freedom and human 
rights — for we believe in them. We believe 
there is a natural desire in people 
everywhere to live not only in peace but also 
in freedom; that governments are installed 
foremost to secure those rights; and that no 
human being has peace or freedom where his 
or her human rights are denied. 

I believe you will find us easier to hve with 
and a better leader. I believe Americans re- 
spect you, and you will have good reason to 
respect us. 

One final thought: The United Nations is 
not a parliament. It cannot enforce its will by 
enacting laws. It cannot define reality or es- 
tablish truth by majority vote. The United 



Nations is a gathering of sovereign states, 
born out of consensus and destined to survive 
only by consensus. Consensus comes down 
simply to this: commitment from each of us to 
strive for a safer and better life for human 
beings everywhere, now and for generations 
to come. 



U.S. Signs Articles of Agreement 
of Agricultural Development Fund 

Following are texts of a statement by Pres- 
ident Ford issued at Vail, Colo., on De- 
cember 22 and a statement by Daniel Parker, 
Administrator, Agency for International 
Development, made at U.N. Headquarters 
that day upon signing the articles of agree- 
ment establishing the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development. 

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT FORD 

White House press release (Vail. Colo.f dated December 22 

I have instructed Daniel Parker, Adminis- 
trator of the Agency for International De- 
velopment, to sign, on behalf of the United 
States, the articles of agreement establishing 
the International Fund for Agricultural De- 
velopment. The Fund — which has received 
pledges amounting to $1 billion — will provide 
financial assistance to enable poor countries 
to increase their own food output. The U.S. 
contribution will be $200 million. 

The Fund is the product of a cooperative 
effort between the industrialized and oil- 
exporting countries to meet the needs of the 
world's poor nations, which thus exemplifies 
the progress which can be achieved by con- 
structive international cooperation. The 
Fund also received considerable impetus 
from the Conference on International Eco- 
nomic Cooperation, which has been meeting 
in Paris. 

The United States remains thoroughly 
committed to cooperation among developed 
and developing nations, oil importers and oil 
exporters, to meet the problems of economic 



70 



Department of State Bulletin 



development and to build a prosperous world 
economy from which all nations will benefit. 

The United States was one of the earliest 
supporters of the International Fund for Ag- 
ricultural Development. In his speech to the 
seventh special session of the U.N. General 
Assembly in September 1975, Secretary of 
State Kissinger announced my intention to 
seek a contribution to the Fund. 

Throughout the planning for the Fund and 
negotiations with other nations, there has 
been close cooperation between the executive 
branch and the Congress. This has enabled 
the United States to maintain its leadership 
role and to make a substantial contribution to 
helping the developing countries better meet 
their own food needs. 

This is an important step toward the heal- 
thier and more prosperous world which all 
nations seek. 



STATEMENT BY MR. PARKER 

USUN press release 198 dated December 22 

It is with a great deal of satisfaction that I 
am signing today on behalf of the United 
States, the articles of agreement establishing 
the International Fund for Agricultural De- 
velopment. 

IFAD, as it has come to be called, repre- 
sents the culmination of two years of interna- 
tional negotiations and brings to fruition one 
of the major initiatives proposed at the 1974 
World Food Conference — to accelerate the 
flow of development resources for improving 
food production and nutrition in the poorer 
developing nations. 

The U.S. contribution of $200 million to 



the Fund is entirely additional to the assist- 
ance provided through our existing bilateral 
and multilateral foreign aid programs and as 
such reflects a major budgetary decision to 
increase the U.S. commitment to alleviating 
problems of hunger and malnutrition. 

A significant aspect of this new Fund is the 
fact that it brings together both OECD [Or- 
ganization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development] countries and OPEC [Organi- 
zation of Petroleum Exporting Countries] 
members in a major multilateral assistance 
program. The establishment of IFAD has 
also been strongly encouraged by all partici- 
pants in the Conference on International 
Economic Cooperation and represents a posi- 
tive step forward in the North-South 
dialogue. 

Throughout the lengthy process of making 
IFAD a reality, the United States has played 
a strong leadership role. We pledged our 
$200 million contribution at an early stage 
and we have helped design the articles of 
agreement to insure efficient operation of the 
Fund in close coordination with existing in- 
ternational institutions. 

U.S. leadership has been made possible by 
the exceptional degree of coordination and 
cooperation between the executive branch 
and the Congress that has characterized U.S. 
participation in IFAD from the beginning. 

With the articles of agreement now open 
for signature, it is our hope that ratification 
by member governments will quickly follow 
so that IFAD may become fully engaged in 
its vital role of improving the global food 
situation, which is essential for the economic 
and social well-being of the world's poor 
people. 



January 24, 1977 



71 



U.S. Supports Establishment of U.N. Ad Hoc Committee 
on Drafting of Convention Against Taking of Hostages 



Following are texts of a statement made i)i 
Committee VI (Legal) of the U.N. General 
Assembly on November 29 by U.S. Represen- 
tative Robert Rosenstock, Legal Affairs Ad- 
viser to tite U.S. Mission to the United Na- 
tions, and a statement made in plenary ses- 
sion on December 15 by U.S. Representative 
W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., together with the text 
of a resolution adopted by the cormnittee on 
December 10 a)td by the Assembly 0)i De- 
cember 15. 



U.S. STATEMENTS 



Mr. Rosenstock, Committee VI, November 29 

rSL'N |ii-e>s relejtse 170 dated N(j\embec 2S) 

As the General Assembly has unanimously 
recognized, the taking of hostages is an ur- 
gent and important international problem. 
The increasing number of cases in which hos- 
tages are taken compels the United Nations 
to act immediately. Our delegation is there- 
fore pleased that the Legal Committee has 
been entrusted to undertake consideration of 
this item. We are hopeful that this considera- 
tion will soon culminate in an international 
convention against the taking of hostages. 

The act of taking hostages has sometimes 
resulted in the death of the hostages, other 
times in the death of persons in the area of 
confrontation between the police and the 
perpetrators, and even in threats to interna- 
tional peace. Always it has resulted in the 
great suffering of the hostage, his family, 
and his friends — and indeed of all people. 

All states should be willing — indeed, 
an.xious — to denounce this act. The citizens of 
every state have been, or potentially are, the 



objects of the act. Experience establishes 
that no state can feel confident it will not be 
placed in the difficult position of choosing be- 
tween complying with unacceptable demands 
and risking lives, sometimes of its own na- 
tionals. Accordingly, each state has a meas- 
ure of self-interest in taking steps to prohibit 
this act. 

More importantly, each state is already 
committed to principles that are violated by 
any seizure of a hostage. The Charter of the 
United Nations recognizes fundamental 
human rights and the dignity and worth of all 
persons. These charter principles have been 
elaborated and enshrined in the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights, which pro- 
claims the right of everyone, without excep- 
tion, to life, liberty, and security of person. 
All states have publicly acknowledged their 
commitment to these principles. We must 
now act collectively to protect them. 

In the past, when actions of an interna- 
tional character have produced a significant 
threat to fundamental rights, the world 
community has responded by formulating a 
protective mechanism. Piracy on the high 
seas is but the oldest of many examples. It 
has long been recognized in the context of 
the laws of war that certain means of waging 
them are unacceptable and may not be en- 
gaged in by either the aggressor state or the 
poor victim exercising its inherent right of 
self-defense. The Geneva Convention of 1949 
on Protection of Civilian Persons was 
prompted in large measure by concern over 
the inhumane practices of the Second World 
War. It was recognized that the true horror 
of Lidice and Katyn was not who perpetrated 
the outrages or why, but that outrages 
against human life and human dignity had oc- 



72 



Department of State Bulletin 



curred and that a law which was not appli- 
cable to such cases was a defective law. It 
has always been recognized that it is of the 
essence of these outrages that no amount of 
sympathy for the alleged cause can ever be 
thought to justify them. 

Following the rash of airplane hijackings in 
the 1960's, the international community 
adopted the Tokyo, Montreal, and Hague 
Conventions for the protection of civil avia- 
tion. More recently, we responded to re- 
peated assaults on diplomats by elaborating 
the Convention on Protection of Diplomats. 
These conventions built on the customary 
and codified law relating to piracy. 

The considerations that promoted these 
conventions have arisen again. The threat to 
the lives of innocent persons through the tak- 
ing of hostages has reached a level that the 
international community must not tolerate. 
Diplomats on post, ministers attending con- 
ferences, businessmen, grandmothers en 
route to visiting their families, schoolchil- 
dren, and babies have been held hostages. 
The taking of hostages is an action with in- 
ternational ramifications since the crime is 
often perpetrated outside the country of the 
hostages and since it has the obvious poten- 
tial to provoke breaches of the peace. Rapid 
international action is urgently needed. 

By its nature, the taking of hostages en- 
tails the seizure of an individual, the depri- 
vation of his liberty, and a threat to his life, 
coupled with an ultimatum that some third 
party comply with the demands of the per- 
petrators. It always involves demands on a 
third party. The person or persons held are 
not held for reasons relating to themselves 
but to the demands on a third party; they are 
thus by definition innocent in the context of 
the act in question — innocent in this context 
whether or not they have led blameless lives 
or committed grave sins or crimes, innocent 
whether we like them or not, innocent 
whether the regime they lead has been the 
object of sanctions or the object of universal 
applause. Prisoners may be innocent or they 
may be guilty, but not hostages; hostages are 
human beings held for what ransom they may 
bring — held for what ransom they may bring, 
not for them or for their acts. It would be at 



the least redundant and at most dangerously 
confusing to add an inherently irrelevant ad- 
jectival qualifier to the term "hostage." 

Mr. Chairman, we are convinced that the 
resolution tabled by the Federal Republic of 
Germany and a number of other cosponsors is 
the appropriate way to begin to form another 
protective mechanism for fundamental 
human rights.* The resolution decides to 
convene an Ad Hoc Committee on the Draft- 
ing of an International Convention Against 
the Taking of Hostages. An international 
convention seems the best method to erect a 
legal mechanism to combat the problem, and 
it is consistent with what we have done on 
previous occasions. 

The resolution would have us convene the 
ad hoc committee "on the basis that the tak- 
ing of hostages should be condemned, prohib- 
ited and punished and that persons who per- 
petrate such acts should be prosecuted or ex- 
tradited for the purpose of prosecution." We 
think this instruction to the committee is ap- 
propriate and inescapable, for it follows nat- 
urally from the conclusion that the act of tak- 
ing hostages infringes on fundamental rights. 

Finally, the resolution requests the ad hoc 
committee to prepare the draft convention in 
time to allow its consideration at the 32d 
General Assembly. If the committee ap- 
preciates the gravity of this problem and 
draws on the experience of the Civil Aviation 
and Protection of Diplomats Conventions, we 
are confident the committee will have no dif- 
ficulty in fulfilling this request. The means of 
drafting conventions of this nature based on 
the principle auf dedare aut judicare [extra- 
dite or prosecute] are well known and should 
present few problems. 

We do not suggest that the elaboration of a 
convention will alone eliminate the danger. 
What we do suggest is that the elaboration of 
a convention along the by now familiar Hnes 
laid down in the Hague, Montreal, and Pro- 
tection of Diplomats Conventions presents no 
significant difficulties. Such a convention will 



' Draft resolution A/C.6/31/L.10; on Dec. 9 the Rep- 
resentative of the Federal Republic of Gemiany intro- 
duced a revised version (A/C.6/31/L.10/Rev.l) of the 
draft resolution. 



January 24, 1977 



73 



strengthen the hands of those responsible for 
the well-being of their people in a joint co- 
operative effort to diminish the threat 
through the normal legal avenue of deter- 
rence and isolation of offenders. Such a con- 
vention will contribute not merely because of 
the deterrent and punitive potential inherent 
in its terms, but because its elaboration will 
serve to crystallize and underscore the de- 
termination of the international community 
not to allow the unchecked spread of the 
human outrage involved in the taking of hos- 
tages. 

It is particularly important that the inter- 
national community express itself on acts 
such as interference with civil aviation, at- 
tacks on diplomatic agents, and the taking of 
hostages. Such acts have a significance and 
importance that transcends even the large 
number of people directly injured by them 
and even the extremely large and widespread 
number of people threatened by such acts; 
for these acts strike at the heart of the notion 
of an organized international society. The or- 
ganized international society must be pre- 
pared to demonstrate its willingness to re- 
spond to such attacks on its raison d'etre or 
recognize the absence of a raison d'etre or 
anything that could be called a self- 
respecting international society. 

In closing, we urge member states to be 
sensitive to the suffering caused by the tak- 
ing of hostages and to realize that the taking 
of hostages is a significant and growing prob- 
lem. Every occurrence is an affront to our 
most closely held principles and a challenge 
to the United Nations. We believe that the 
resolution before us is a commendable re- 
sponse to this challenge; we urge its unani- 
mous adoption. 

Ambassador Bennett, Plenary, December 15 



rSUN int 



lil:! ihiteil Dfttmlu-r 111 



My delegation is pleased to vote in favor of 
this resolution. It is important that action be 
undertaken to deal with the contemptible 
practice of the taking of hostages. It is im- 
portant that the international community is 
prepared to undertake the task of drafting an 
international convention against the taking 
of hostages. 



We have no doubt that the convention will 
be drafted along the by now familiar lines of 
the Hague, Montreal, and Protection of Dip- 
lomats Conventions; namely, with the princi- 
ple of aut dedare aut judicare forming the 
central mechanism. Perpetrators of these 
acts must be denied a safe haven. They must 
know that wherever they are they will be 
subject either to prosecution or extradition. 

We are particularly pleased that the Legal 
Committee has recommended a course of ac- 
tion which follows the Protection of Diplo- 
mats model and has avoided the introduction 
of irrelevant material and not suggested any 
exclusions of the type which have plagued 
other items. We are confident these decisions 
reflect the widespread recognition that no 
cause can excuse and no motive justify so 
condemnable an act as the taking of hos- 
tages. 

We hope and expect the ad hoc committee 
will have a draft convention ready for the 32d 
session of the Assembly. 



TEXT OF RESOLUTION ^ 

Drafting of an international convention 
against the taking of hostages 

The General Assembly, 

Considering that the progressive development of in- 
ternational law and its codification contribute to the 
implementation of the purposes and principles set forth 
in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, 

Considering that, in accordance with the principles 
proclaimed in the Charter, freedom, justice and peace 
in the world are inseparable from the recognition of the 
inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of 
all members of the human family. 

Having regard to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights which provide that everyone has 
the right to life, liberty and security. 

Recognizing that the taking of hostages is an act 
which endangers innocent human lives and violates 
human dignity. 

Gravely concerned at the increase of such acts, 

Recalling the prohibition of the taking of hostages in 



2 Adopted by the committee on Dec. 10 (A/C.6/31/ 
L.lO/Rev.l) and by the Assembly on Dec. 15 by consen- 
sus (A/RES/31/103) (te.xt from U.N. doc. A/3i/430, re- 
port of the Sixth Committee on agenda item 123, Draft- 
ing of an international convention against the taking of 
hostages). 



74 



Department of State Bulletin 



articles 3 and 34 of the Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 
August 1949, the Hague Convention of 1970 for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, the 
Montreal Convention of 1971 for the Suppression of Un- 
lawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, the 
Convention of 1973 on the Prevention and Punishment 
of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, 
including Diplomatic Agents, as well as General As- 
sembly resolution 2645 (XXV) of 25 November 1970 
condemning aerial hijacking or interference with civil 
air travel. 

Recognising the urgent need for further effective 
measures to put an end to the taking of hostages. 

Mindful of the need to conclude, under the auspices 
of the United Nations, an international convention 
against the taking of hostages, 

1. Decider to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on the 
Drafting of an International Convention Against the 
Taking of Hostages, composed of 35 Member States; 

2. Requests the President of the General Assembly, 
after consultations with the Chairman of the regional 
groups, to appoint the members of the Ad Hoc Commit- 
tee on the basis of equitable geographical distribution 



and representing the principal legal systems of the 
world; 

3. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to draft at the 
earliest possible date an international convention 
against the taking of hostages and authorizes the Com- 
mittee, in the fulfilment of its mandate, to consider 
suggestions and proposals from any State, bearing in 
mind the views expressed during the debate im this 
item at the thirty-first session of the Genei'al Assembly; 

4. Requests the Secretary-General to afford the Ad 
Hoc Committee any assistance and provide it with all 
facilities it may require for the performance of its work, 
to provide the Committee with pertinent information on 
the taking of hostages and to ensure that summary rec- 
ords on the meetings of the Committee will be drawn up 
and submitted; 

5. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to present its re- 
port and to make every effort to submit a draft conven- 
tion to the General Assembly in good time for considera- 
tion at its thirty-second session and requests the 
Secretary-General to communicate the report to 
Member States; 

6. Decides to include the item entitled "Drafting of an 
international convention against the taking of hostages" 
in the provisional agenda of its thirty-second session. 



U.S. Calls for Responsible Measures Against international Terrorism 



Following is a statement made in Commit- 
tee VI (Legal) of the U.N. General Assembly 
on December 6 by U.S. Representative Mon- 
roe Leigh, Legal Adviser of the Department 
of State. 



rSUN press release 17 



tliiteti Decembel- fi 



The item before us is profoundly impor- 
tant. No one can deny that the scourge of 
terrorism continues to plague the international 
community and to devastate the innocent. 

It is accordingly incumbent upon all gov- 
ernments to join in taking the measures that 
the international community can take to deal 
with this pervasive problem. It is incumbent 
upon all governments to consider, and act 
upon, what can be done to deal with ter- 
rorism, for a number of reasons. 

Governments have a paramount obligation 
to protect the lives of their citizens. If there 
is one thing that is clear, it is that the inher- 
ently indiscriminate nature of terrorism 
makes it a threat to people everywhere. Not 
only is the terrorist act itself aimed at taking 



human lives — often for the mere publicity 
value of the act — but the reactions that such 
acts inevitably and understandably engender 
also sometimes result in loss of life. Ter- 
rorism is the starting point of a process 
which is likely to lead not merely to 
bloodshed on a small scale but to a threat to 
the peace, or worse. 

Governments are obligated, moreover, to 
consider the effect on their standing and that 
of the international coinmunity of tolerating 
acts of terrorism. Can any government 
worthy of governing be expected to ac-. 
quiesce in the continuing victimization of its 
citizens? Can an organized international 
community which tolerates acts of terrorism 
maintain that measure of self-respect neces- 
sary for its simple survival as an organized 
international community — still less its closer 
and more effective integration? Can the 
United Nations be taken seriously as a force 
for human rights, racial justice, and eco- 
nomic equity if, as an institution, it is indif- 
ferent to internationally promoted murder? 



January 24, 1977 



75 



For its part, my government remains con- 
cerned. We believe that the international 
community should and must undertake 
measures to deal with terrorism. We believe 
those measures should be grounded on the 
same humanitarian concerns that underlie 
laws of war. If we can limit the conduct per- 
missible to a state which is fighting for its 
survival in accordance with its inherent right 
of self-defense, we surely can limit actions by 
groups or individuals which, whether under- 
taken for base or noble goals, are not consid- 
ered legal by states under international law. 
We certainly can do so in cases where such 
acts are of an international character or where 
they violate fundamental human rights (as 
they characteristically do). 

The United States submitted a draft con- 
vention to the General Assembly in 1972 for 
the prevention and punishment of certain 
acts of international terrorism. Our draft was 
not aimed at all acts of terrorism but only at 
the spread of terrorism to persons and places 
removed from the scene of the conflict. We 
said at that time, and we say now, that we do 
not maintain that our approach is the only 
possible approach or the best of all ap- 
proaches. It is the best approach which we 
have devised in light of the circumstances. 
We invite others to support our suggested 
approach or to propose something better. 

We are aware of the objections some have 
raised to our proposal for a treaty that would 
attempt to deter the export of terrorism. 
Briefly put, these objections can be sum- 
marized under three headings: (1) that na- 
tional liberation movements must have a free 
hand; (2) that governmental action causes 
death, so why single out acts of other en- 
tities; and (3) that there can be no action 
taken against terrorism until the underlying 
causes of terrorism are eliminated. 

While we have a measure of sympathy and 
a larger measure of understanding for some 
of the motives behind some of these argu- 
ments, we find them wholly unconvincing — 
from the standpoint of the progressive de- 
velopment of international law and from the 
standpoint of the preservation of the peace. 

We do not believe that any government 
disagrees with those humanitarian aspects of 



the laws of war which Hmit or endeavor to 
limit state conduct. If, then, there are hor- 
rors and outrages that even states fighting 
for their lives cannot indulge in, there must 
be limits to what conduct groups or individu- 
als may indulge in. Indeed, no one has yet 
argued that groups or individuals may use 
poison gas or dumdum bullets. The sooner we 
recognize that we all agree that there are 
limits on permissible conduct of groups or in- 
dividuals to use force to promote their objec- 
tives, the sooner we can sit down and talk 
about what those limits are or ought to be. 
We may wish to set the international limits 
at one level and another government may 
wish to set them at another, but that is a 
matter susceptible to solution by rational 
discourse. Our plea is that we stop throwing 
up smokescreens of false argument and sit 
down to work out humanitarian limits. 

The argument that one cannot take action 
against groups or individuals without taking 
action against states — against so-called 
"state terrorism" — is transparently falla- 
cious. Indeed, we doubt many assert that 
nihilistic view with genuine conviction. The 
world is too full of problems, and if we refuse 
to deal with one of them until we can deal 
with all of them, we shall never deal with 
any. For example, our inability to eradicate 
violations of human rights in all cases — even 
in all grave cases — cannot be a basis for re- 
fusing to try to alleviate human rights viola- 
tions in southern Africa. 

Moreover, we must recognize that there is 
already in existence an established body of 
rules governing state conduct. There is the 
United Nations Charter, with its unarguable 
prohibition against the threat or use of force. 
There are the laws of war that govern those 
situations when fighting nevertheless breaks 
out. The laws of war have had great human- 
itarian effect, though at the same time 
gravely inadequate effect; and of course 
those imperfect rules are now being revised. 
But new rules are not needed to inform 
states when the use of force is permissible 
and when it is not. And even if new rules 
were necessary, and achieveable, a need to 
deal with that problem would not provide a 
valid excuse for ignoring others, such as 



76 



Department of State Bulletin 



those of international economic order — new, 
old, or whatever. Nor would it provide a 
valid excuse for refusing to take measures to 
deal with terrorism. 

The third argument often used to bar 
e.xamination of possible measures is that we 
cannot engage in a discussion of practical 
measures until we eliminate the root causes 
of terrorism. The very existence of all of our 
governments indicates how spurious this line 
of argument is. Crime occurs in all of our 
countries, bar none. More in some than 
others, but the society does not exist whose 
laws are never violated. In many cases, that 
crime has its roots in social causes. Yet all 
our governments apprehend, prosecute, and 
punish criminals. None of our heads of state, 
parliamentary bodies, or judges urge the 
elimination of criminal law until the causes of 
criminal conduct have been eliminated. Re- 
pressive governments merely punish those 
they consider criminal. Responsible govern- 
ments do not merely punish criminals. They 
seek to improve the nature of their societies 
and to insure the widest measure of justice 
so that punishment is proportionate and the 
causes of crime are ameliorated. 

Were the United Nations to embark on 
concluding a convention along the lines we 
suggest, would it be behaving like a repres- 
sive government or a responsible one? The 
answer to that question lies in the immense 
work that is currently going on throughout 
the U.N. system to improve the social situa- 
tion for all the world's people. Poverty and 
injustice are being fought directly in more 
than half of the main committees of the As- 
sembly as well as the Economic and Social 
Council and the Security Council and the 
specialized agencies. Like that of most na- 
tional governments, the record of the United 
Nations is one of only partial success. If, then, 
the United Nations could not be said to resem- 
ble a repressive government, could it be said to 
resemble a responsible one? My government 
does not believe we can give an unqualified af- 
firmative response to that question so long as 
there is an unwiUingness in this body to take 
responsible measures to deal with the scourge 
of terrorism. 

We respectfully urge all members who care 



whether the United Nations can be regarded 
as an organization comprised of responsible 
members to join our efforts to find measures 
to control international terrorism. We urge 
all members to join in a common effort to 
protect all mankind from barbaric acts of vio- 
lence which have already cost so many lives 
to so little purpose. 



U.S. Supports U.N. Resolution 
Against the Practice of Torture 

Folloiving is a statennent made in Commit- 
tee III (Social, H^imanitarian and Cultural) 
of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Rep- 
resentative Jacob M. Myerson on December 
3, together with the text of a resolution 
adopted by the coinmittee on December 3 and 
by the Assembly on December 13. 

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR MYERSON 

USUN press release 177 dated December 3 

In accordance with an injunction you have 
given us on other occasions, I shall endeavor 
to be brief. We are at a late stage of our work 
in the 31st session of the General Assembly. 
We are perhaps — perhaps I should say the 
hour is also late for human rights, at least for 
human rights work in the United Nations, as 
we have recently had occasion to point out. 

Sir, in many countries around the world — 
and not just in those countries it is fashionable 
to attack in this body — people are locked up 
in prison, often simply because of the views 
they dare to hold. Some of these people are 
subjected to torture. 

Three years ago in Resolution 3059 the 
General Assembly expressed its grave con- 
cern over the fact "that torture is still prac- 
tised in various parts of the world." The 
shocking fact for all of us is that such a con- 
cern had to be expressed 25 years after ap- 
proval of the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights. Torture is practiced in spite 
of the fact that every civilized government 
accepts without question that no human 



January 24, 1977 



77 



being should be subjected to torture. Free- 
dom from torture is a basic human right rec- 
ognized in article 5 of the Universal Declara- 
tion. In the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights it is further specified that no overrid- 
ing circumstance of public emergency 
threatening the life of a nation can be cited to 
derogate from this basic right. 

Certainly, Mr. Chairman, if this Assembly 
has a mission to promote human rights it 
cannot escape taking action to bring to an 
end the practice of torture in our modern-day 
world. My government has been in the fore- 
front of those calling for action. U.S. repre- 
sentatives in the various U.N. forums which 
have been acting to strengthen the guaran- 
tees against torture have given their full 
support to the measures which this Assembly 
has requested. The draft resolution which 
has been presented to us in document 
A/C.3/31/L.38 takes account of the activities 
which are presently underway in a number of 
U.N. bodies. 

The accomplishments of the Committee on 
Crime Prevention and Control with respect 
to a draft code of conduct for law enforce- 
ment officers have been a welcome develop- 
ment, in our view. Likewise, the work of that 
body in extending the range of application of 
the Standard Minimum Rules for Treatment 
of Prisoners has, we think, constituted a 
worthwhile and important step forward. 

The Subcommission on Prevention of Dis- 
crimination and Protection of Minorities has 
acted to begin preparation of a body of prin- 
ciples for the protection of all persons under 
any form of detention or imprisonment. The 
subcommission has decided to appoint a 
working group to analyze the materials re- 
ceived in connection with its annual review of 
developments relating to the question of the 
human rights of persons subjected to any 
form of detention or imprisonment. We have 
taken note of this development with interest 
also. 

Mr. Chairman, my government has no 
quarrel with the intent of the draft resolution 
which is before us to endorse this important 
work and to give support for further meas- 
ures in pursuit of the overall plan of trying to 



construct a system of guarantees to protect 
persons under detention. We therefore wel- 
come the provisions of the operative para- 
graphs. All of these will, we are confident, 
complement the achievement of the last As- 
sembly session in agreeing upon the declara- 
tion on the protection of all persons against 
torture which was unanimously adopted by 
our Resolution 3452. 

Having said all this, Mr. Chairman, I can- 
not refrain from posing a question: Are all of 
these measures which are now underway 
enough to meet the problem? 

I think it is perhaps extremely revealing 
that, based on the record, the adoption of the 
various resolutions passed by this body on 
torture has been remarkably easy. Unanim- 
ity has been the rule when governments have 
been called upon to take a position on meas- 
ures to combat torture. 

But what are the facts, Mr. Chairman? The 
facts reveal, of course, that torture still per- 
sists. Just last week this Assembly adopted a 
far-reaching resolution which had as its 
major impetus the recurring reports of tor- 
ture being practiced in Chile. But none of us 
would be so naive, I am sure, as to assert 
that Chile is the only place in the world that 
requires our attention as far as the practice 
of torture is concerned. There is overwhelm- 
ing evidence easily available to those who 
may be interested in seeking it which is 
equally disturbing — disturbing as to the 
practice of torture in other countries — 
torture practiced by governmental agencies, 
in some cases with the clear connivance of 
high-level governmental authorities. 

Are we then, Mr. Chairman, fellow dele- 
gates, doing enough? Are these unanimous 
expressions of support for the resolutions 
which we have adopted, such as that now be- 
fore us, indicative that we may be engaging 
in an exercise in self-deception — that we are 
meeting the need to combat the evil of tor- 
ture by actions which we all know with vari- 
ous degrees of uneasiness may not reach to 
the heart of the problem? Mr. Chairman, I 
believe that many of us fear that it is not 
enough. 

In saying this I do not wish to denigrate 



78 



Department of State Bulletin 



the possible utility of the measures under- 
way. Any strengthening of the fabric of in- 
ternational protection by the drafting of 
codes, declarations, and strongly worded 
resolutions can have a positive effect. My 
delegation does, however, believe that as 
long as the problem of torture persists in the 
world we must keep in mind that more direct 
actions may be required. 

Now, sir, at this particular stage, my dele- 
gation does not wish to present any specific 
proposals. It is within the power of this As- 
sembly to establish machinery to deal with 
this problem on a worldwide basis — 
machinery which could bear more directly on 
the instances of torture which may exist — ma- 
chinery which could focus on those instances 
in the glare of public opinion which this or- 
ganization is uniquely equipped to bring to 
bear. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like 
simply to reiterate my government's support 
for the resolution which is before this com- 
mittee. We do so because we are deeply con- 
cerned that this most shocking human rights 
violation, the practice of torture, is one 
which cries out for our attention. Torture 
must be eliminated. We shall be untrue to 
the purposes of the charter if we fail to per- 
sist in bringing this barbaric practice to an 
end everywhere in the world. 



TEXT OF RESOLUTION i 

Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treat- 
ment or punishment in relation to detention and im- 
prisonment 

The General Assembly, 

Recalling the Declaration on the Protection of All 
Persons from being Subjected to Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish- 
ment, unanimously adopted in its resolution 3452 
(XXX) of 9 December 1975, 

Recalling also its resolution 3453 (XXX) of 9 De- 



' Adopted by the committee on Dec. 3 (A/C.3/31/ 
L.38) and bv the Assembly on Dec. 10 without a vote 
(A/RES/31/85) (text from U.N. doc. A/31/394, report of 
the Third Committee on agenda item 74, "Torture and 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.") 



cember 1975, in which it requested the competent 
bodies to conduct further work on the elaboration of: 

(a) A body of princijjles for the protection of all per- 
sons under any form of detention or imjirisonment, 

(b) A draft code of conduct for law enforcement offi- 
cials, 

(c) Principles of medical ethics relevant to the protec- 
tion of persons subjected to any form of detention or 
imprisonment against torture and other cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment; 

Noting Economic and Social Council resolution 1993 
(LX) of 12 May 1976 and resolution 10 (XXXII) adopted 
by the Commission on Human Rights on 5 March 1976, 

Welcoming the work of the Committee on Crime Pre- 
vention and Control at its fourth session, in particular 
with respect to a draft code of conduct for law enforce- 
ment officials as well as the range of application and the 
implementation of the Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners, 

Noting further the decision of the Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities at its twenty-ninth session to appoint a Rap- 
porteur to prepai'e the first draft of a body of principles 
for the protection of all persons under any form of de- 
tention or imprisonment, and its resolution 3 (XXIX) of 
31 August 1976, recommending the appointment of a 
working group to analyse the materials received in con- 
nexion with its annual review of developments relating 
to the question of the human rights of persons sub- 
jected to any form of detention or imprisonment, 

Reiterating its belief that further efforts are needed 
to help ensure adequate protection for all against tor- 
ture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment, 

1. Calls upon Governments, as well as inter- 
governmental and non-governmental organizations con- 
cerned with human rights, to give maximum publicity 
to the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from 
being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; 

2. Invites the Economic and Social Council to give 
due priority to the examination of the draft code of con- 
duct for law enforcement officials proposed by the 
Committee on Crime Prevention and Control, in order 
that the Council at its sixty-second session and the 
General Assembly at its thirty-second session take fur- 
ther steps with a view to the adoption of this instru- 
ment; 

3. Also invites the Economic and Social Council to 
consider with due priority the recommendation of the 
Committee on Crime Prevention and Control at its 
fourth session contained in new draft rule 95 of the 
Standard Minimum Rules seeking to assure the applica- 
bility of the Standard Minimum Rules to all persons ar- 
rested or imprisoned with or without charge and con- 
viction, as well as to the draft procedures for the effec- 
tive implementation of the Rules; 

4. Requests the Commission on Human Rights, 



January 24, 1977 



79 



through the Economic and Social Council, to present a 
comprehensive report on the elaboration of a body of 
principles for the protection of all persons under any 
form of detention or imprisonment to the General As- 
sembly at its thirty-third session: 

5. I twites the World Health Organization to prepare a 
draft Code on Medical Ethics relevant to the protection 
of persons subjected to any form of detention or impris- 
onment against torture and other cruel, inhuman or de- 
grading treatment or punishment, and to bring it to the 
attention of the General Assembly at its thirty-second 
session; 

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its 
thirty-second session the item entitled "Torture and 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment". 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Aviation 

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at 
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 
4, 1947. TIAS 1591. 
Adherence deposited: Mozambique, January 5, 1977. 

Coffee 

Intei'national coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. 
Done at London December 3, 1975. Entered into force 
provisionally October 1, 1976. 

Ratifications deposited: Guatemala, December 15, 
1976: Yugoslavia, December 28, 1976. 

Fisheries 

International convention for the Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries. Done at Washington February 8, 1949. En- 
tered into force July 3, 1950. TIAS 2089. 
Withdrawal effective: United States, December 31, 

1976. 
Rerocatioii of notice of intention to withdraw: 

Canada, December 28, 1976. 

Health 

Amendments to articles 24 and 25 of the constitution of 
the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as 
amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva 
May 17, 1976. ' 

Acceptances deposited: Egypt, December 21, 1976: 
Niger, December 28, 1976; Norway, December 29, 
1976. 



Maritime Matters 

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as 
amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). 
Adopted at London October 17, 1974.' 
Acceptances deposited: Dominican Republic, Hun- 
gary, December 30, 1976. 

Program-Carrying Signals — Distribution 

by Satellite 

Convention relating to the distribution of programme- 
carrving signals transmitted by satellite. Done at 
Brussels May 21, 1974.' 

Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, December 29, 
1976. 

Safety at Sea 

International regulations for preventing collisions at 
sea. Approved by the International Conference on 
Safety of Life at Sea held at London from May 17 to 
June 17, 1960. Entered into force September 1, 1965. 
TIAS 5813. 
Acceptance deposited: Barbados, Decembers, 1976. 

Seals 

Convention for the conservation of Antarctic seals, with 
anne.x and final act. Done at London June 1, 1972.' 
Instrutnent of ratification signed by the President: 
December 28, 1976. 

Space 

Convention on registration of objects launched into 
outer space. Done at New York January 14, 1975. En- 
tered into force September 15, 1976.^ 
Ratification deposited: Niger, December 22, 1976. 

Space — Liability 

Convention on international liability for damage caused 
by space objects. Done at Washington, London, and 
Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into force Sep- 
tember 1, 1972; for the United States October 9, 
1973. TIAS 7762. 
Accession deposited: Uruguay, January 7, 1977. 

BILATERAL 

Korea 

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the 
United States, with agreed minutes and exchange of 
notes. Signed at Washington January 4, 197". Enters 
into force on a date to be mutually agreed by ex- 
change of notes. 

Peru 

Agreement amending the agreement of July 21 and Au- 
gust 8, 1976, relating to the transfer of commodities 
to Peru to support the national primary school feed- 
ing program. Signed at Lima December 14 and 20, 
1976. Entered into force December 20, 1976. 



' Not in force. 

^ Not in force for the United States. 



80 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX January 2J,, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1961 



Agriculture. U.S. Signs Articles of Agreement of 
Agricultural Development Fund (Ford, 
Parker) 70 

Congress 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

Policy 67 

Energy and the World Economy (Katz) 61 

Economic .Affairs. Energy and the World Econ- 
omy (Katz) 61 

Energy 

Energy and the World Economy (Katz) 61 

President Ford Responds to Action by OPEC In- 
creasing Oil Prices (statement) 67 

Food. U.S. Signs Articles of Agreement of Ag- 
ricultural Development Fund (Ford, Parker) . 70 

Human Rights. U.S. Supports U.N. Resolution 
Against the Practice of Torture (Myerson, text 
of resolution) 77 

Petroleum 

Energy and the World Economy (Katz) 61 

President Ford Responds to Action by OPEC In- 
creasing Oil Prices (.statement) 67 

Presidential Documents 

President Ford Responds to Action by OPEC In- 
creasing Oil Prices 67 

U.S. Signs Articles of Agreement of Agricultural 
Development Fund 70 

Saudi Arabia. President Ford Responds to 
Action by OPEC Increasing Oil Prices 
(statement) 67 

Terrorism 

U.S. Calls for Responsible Measures Against In- 
ternational Terrorism (Leigh) 75 

U.S. Supports Establishment of U.N. Ad Hoe 
Committee on Drafting of Convention Against 
Taking of Hostages (Bennett, Rosenstock, text 
of resolution) 72 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 80 

S. Signs Articles of Agreement of Agricultural 
Development Fund (Ford, Parker) 70 



United Arab Emirates. President Ford Re- 
sponds to Action by OPEC Increasing Oil 
Prices (statement) 67 

United Nations 

Ambassador Scranton's Assessment of the 31st 
U.N. General Assembly (statement in closing 
plenary session) 68 

U.S. Calls for Responsible Measures Against In- 
ternational Terrorism (Leigh) 75 

U.S. Supports Establishment of U.N. Ad Hoc 
Committee on Drafting of Convention Against 
Taking of Hostages (Bennett, Rosenstock, text 
of resolution) 72 

U.S. Supports U.N. Resolution Against the Prac- 
tice of Torture (Myerson, text of resolution) . . 77 



Name Index 

Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr 72 

Ford, President 67, 70 

Katz, Julius L 61 

Leigh, Monroe 75 

Myerson, Jacob M 77 

Parker, Daniel 70 

Rosenstock, Robert 72 

Scranton, William W 68 



Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: January 3 — 9 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, 
D.C. 20520. 



No. 

t2 



Date 

1/4 



Suhjcit 

U.S. and Republic of Korea sign 
new fisheries agreement. 



t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



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776^ 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 

Volume LXXVI • No. 1962 • January 31, 1977 



LAYING THE FOUNDATION OF A LONG-TERM POLICY 
Remarks by Secretary Kissinger Before the National Press Club 81 

SECRETARY KISSINGER EMPHASIZES NEED 
FOR NONPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY 

Remarks Before the Foreign Policy Association of New York 88 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLET I 



Vol. LXXVI, No. 1962 
January 31, 1977 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
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BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The 
BULLETIN is inde.xed in the Readers' Guide to 
Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BVLLETI ^ 
a weekly puf)lication issued by thff. 
Office of Media Services, Bureau ot 
Public Affairs, provides the public anSj, 
interested agencies of the governmenh 
with information on development:! in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations ant 
on the work of the Department am 
the Foreign Service. 

The BULLETIN includes selectet 
press releases on foreign policy, issuet 
by the White House and the Depart 
ment, and statements, addresses, ani 
news conferences of the President am 
the Secretary of State and other offl 
cers of the Department, as well as spe 
ciat articles on various phases of in 
ternational affairs and the functions o 
the Department. Information is in 
eluded concerning treaties and inter 
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United States is or may become a parti 
and on treaties of general interna 
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Publications of the Department oA 
State, United Nations documents, ana 
legislative material in the field ot 
international relations are also listed.i 



Laying the Foundation of a Long-Term Policy 



Following are remarks made by Secretary 
Kissinger at a National Press Club luncheon 
at Washington on January 10 and the tran- 
script of the questions and answers which 
followed. * 



Press release 3 dated January 11 

REMARKS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER 

In these last few weeks many of you have 
asked me how I would sum up the successes 
and failures of our foreign policy. As you 
know, my hearing consistently fails during 
the second part of that question. But since I 
shall soon settle that issue conclusively in my 
memoirs, let me confine myself today to some 
general principles. 

I have participated in the conduct of 
■ American foreign policy during a period of 
fundamental change. As always in such 
times, that policy emerged from an amalgam 
of factors: objective circumstances, domestic 
pressures, the values of our society, and the 
decisions of individual leaders. The relative 
weight to be given to each can be left to his- 
torians. But their mix shaped a profound 
transition in our nation's foreign policy. The 
trauma of Vietnam transformed our interna- 
tional perceptions; the nightmare of Water- 
gate brought into question the validity of our 
domestic institutions. These upheavals coin- 
cided with radical alterations in the interna- 
tional environment. We have had to cope, 
over the past decade, with an increasingly 
complex and turbulent world in which 
America must seek to achieve its principles 



' Introductory and closing remarks by Robert Alden, 
president of the National Press Club, and the opening 
paragraphs of Secretary Kissinger's remarks are not 
printed here. 



and its purposes under circumstances greatly 
at variance with traditional attitudes. 

Through the greater part of the past two 
centuries America defined and justified its 
role in the world in terms of abstract princi- 
ples. Our isolation, vast margins of safety, 
and a preoccupation with developing our own 
continent produced a sense of American 
uniqueness and a conviction that our power 
and the uses we made of it were but the 
physical expression of our moral purpose. We 
tended to beheve that in foreign affairs our 
involvement or noninvolvement was a matter 
of our own choice and that we needed to act 
only when our democratic principles bade us 
to do so. 

In the early years of this century we found 
ourselves, alone among the democracies, suf- 
ficiently powerful to maintain the precarious 
world balance. But then, shunning the claims 
of security and alliance, we fell back on our 
traditional isolationism; we sought, re- 
peatedly and unsuccessfully, to substitute 
law for politics and to legislate solutions to 
international conflicts. 

After World War II we finally accepted the 
responsibilities of world leadership. But the 
great exertions we undertook were based on 
the premise that they would be temporary — 
that at some point our allies would need us no 
longer; that poor nations would embrace de- 
mocracy and move toward self-sufficiency; 
that our adversaries would change or that 
their systems would collapse. We applied 
abroad policies and programs modeled after 
our domestic experience of the New Deal and 
wartime mobilization; we acted as if any 
political problem anywhere could be solved 
by overwhelming it with our resources, as if 
the revolutions of our time had primarily 
economic, rather than political and even 
spiritual, causes. 



January 31, 1977 



81 



The sixties were the last full flowering of 
these impulses — the belief in our omnipo- 
tence, in our self-sufficiency, in our ability to 
remake other societies in our image. To be 
sure, temptations remain with us and occa- 
sionally surface in our domestic debate or in 
our legislation. 

But as the decade drew to a close, we 
began to learn that we cannot legislate our 
own moral preferences upon the world at a 
time when we no longer enjoy physical pre- 
dominance. We came to see that abstract 
principles are not self-fulfilling; they can lead 
to an overinvolvement as pernicious as our 
earlier isolation. We live today in a world of 
many centers of power and contending 
ideologies; a collection of some 150-odd na- 
tions sharing few agreed legal or moral as- 
sumptions; an international economic system 
in which the well-being of all peoples is ine.x- 
tricably intertwined — in short, a set of new 
historical realities in which the challenges of 
peace, prosperity, and justice have no termi- 
nal date and are unending. 

Seldom before has foreign policy had to be 
conducted against the background of such 
vast ideological divisions; never before has it 
been conducted in the knowledge that mis- 
calculation could mean the end of civilized 
life. The need for a global structure has long 
been evident, but the gap between developed 
and developing countries — a constant chal- 
lenge to tranquillity — has continued to 
widen. The growing reality of our interde- 
pendence is in constant tension with the 
compelling trends of separatism and intense 
nationalism. 

At the turn of the decade, our cardinal task 
was to disengage from a war that had placed 
550,000 Americans on the mainland of Asia in 
a way that preserved our abihty to design 
and to influence the development of a new in- 
ternational order. Newly conscious of our 
limits, we sought to put into place a foreign 
policy of the kind less favored nations had to 
conduct throughout history — a foreign policy 
that depended on the perception of priorities, 
a feeling for the importance of nuance, and a 
realization that there could be no terminal 
date to our efforts. Our traditional predispo- 
sition for moral, legal, and clear-cut solutions 



was not abandoned, but we attempted to rec- 
oncile them with a new understanding of the 
geopolitical reahties of our time. Above all, 
we needed to rally and maintain the support i 
of the American people for the long haul. 

It is in the nature of foreign policy that 
problems of world structure cannot be con- 
cluded in one Administration. I believe that 
we have emerged from one of the most trying 
decades in our history with new maturity, 
with the foundations of a long-term policy in 
place, with the world and America more 
tranquil than we found them, and with con- 
siderable opportunities for constructive 
achievement before us. We are no longer in- 
nocent, but neither have we grown cynical. 
We have reconfirmed our historic responsi- 
bility to contribute to the eternal quest of all 
peoples to live in security and peace, free 
from fear, oppression, or foreign domination. 
We must never forget that no other free na- 
tion is strong enough or cohesive enough to 
replace us. If we falter, no one can step into 
the breach, and hostile purposes and incom- 
patible values will then shape the future of 
mankind. Without our commitment there can 
be no security; without our contribution 
there can be no progress. This is America's 
inescapable burden, its incontestable glory. 

So, as the Administrations change, let us 
dedicate ourselves to the task of insuring 
that our common purposes transcend our dif- 
ferences. No matter how strong the founda- 
tions we have laid, the challenges confront- 
ing the next Administration will be complex, 
difficult, and painful. There will continue to 
be, as there have been in the past, many 
complicated choices to make; and there will 
continue to be intense dispute over the wis- 
dom of the choices made and the courses that 
have been set. Achievement will inevitably 
fall short of hope and expectation, as it has in 
every Administration. The new Administra- 
tion may avoid some of the mistakes we 
made; it will surely make some new ones of 
its own. But all of us owe those who carry 
the burden of responsibihty the benefit of the 
doubt, a healthy understanding for the mag- 
nitude of their problems and compassion for 
the narrow range of choices available. 

Long before I had any expectation that I 



82 



Department of State Bulletin 



would be leaving office, I emphasized, 
perhaps self-servingly, the vital importance 
of a nonpartisan foreign policy. I repeat that 
plea now with equal fervor. The divisions 
that have characterized the last decade in 
this country must finally end. The deeds de- 
manded of America in the decade ahead can 
only be accomplished by a united people and 
government acting with boldness, persever- 
ance, and vision. 

This is the time to build a new foreign pol- 
icy consensus similar in scope though differ- 
ent in content than that which sustained the 
post-World War II generation. Americans 
must once again conduct their foreign policy 
debates with a recognition that we are, after 
all, partners in a vital national endeavor on 
\\ hich depends our future and that of the rest 
of the world. Let us behave during these 
years so that we shall remember them as the 
time when the American people rediscovered 
tlieir unity. For my own part, I wish my suc- 
cessors well. I will do my best to contribute 
to an informed, constructive, and supportive 
public dialogue. 

You ladies and gentlemen of the Fourth 
Estate have a stake in this enterprise. If I 
may make a parting request it is to look upon 
my successors' challenges with some 
sympathy — to remember that what appears 
to an outsider as lack of candor may in reality 
be the best judgment of serious people grap- 
pling with events emerging from a fog of con- 
fusing reports and putting forward policies 
which they believe to be right, but which 
they cannot know to be right until the time 
for decision is past. 

The profound alterations over the past 
decade in our perceptions of morahty and 
political propriety have affected every aspect 
of our public life, and they have had a drama- 
tic impact upon the relationship between the 
government and the press. The days when 
statesmen and journalists coexisted in an at- 
mosphere of trust and shared confidences 
have given way to a state of almost perpetual 
inquest which, at its worst, can degenerate 
into a relationship of hunter and hunted, de- 
ceiver and dupe. 

But in its best sense these new attitudes 
have been, and will be, centrally important 



to the health and vitality of our democracy. 
What public servant who bears that title 
with pride and integrity ultimately will not 
be grateful for a press that relentlessly holds 
its officials to high standards of truth and in- 
tegrity? Can one ever forget the sinking feel- 
ing of being asked a question at a press con- 
ference by a reporter who already knows the 
answer from an earlier background session? 
What official has not been aged by the 
panicky knowledge that some journalist is 
seducing another source to confirm what he 
has been told on an off-the-record basis? And 
who can avoid the special anguish of knowing 
that if the reporter succeeds, one has gotten 
exactly what one deserves? 

You and I have been reasonably good pro- 
tagonists. The jokes and the conflicts, the 
cooperation and the pain that we have had 
over the past eight years reflect the fact that 
under our system the press and the govern- 
ment are natural sparring partners that 
nevertheless need each other. Both are pow- 
erful institutions attempting to serve the 
public interest by their own lights and ac- 
cording to their own legitimate purposes. 
The aim of the executive branch is to govern 
and lead and to implement public policy; 
yours is to illuminate, question, and analyze. 
The fact that we are generally right and you 
are generally wrong does not change the 
basic elements made up on both sides of re- 
spect, fear, deference, and the attempt by 
each side to get the better of the other. 

Nor can it avoid the difference in perspec- 
tive inherent in the two points of view. I 
know how exciting it is for reporters to be 
given access to arcane classified documents, 
even though they are usually appallingly 
written and generally incomprehensible. I, of 
course, hold the view that the real essence of 
our foreign policy was to be found in the 
series of speeches I have given around the 
country. These, of course, have often been 
slighted (I consider anything except running 
the full text as being slighted) — I suspect be- 
cause they were unclassified. But I have one 
consolation. If you had had all the classified 
documents that were available to me, you 
would be as confused as I was. 

We shall not settle this debate here — all 



January 31, 1977 



83 



the less so since after January 20 I hope to 
profit from the leaks which you print. This 
may be the occasion to say that for all my 
needling, I have admired the objectivity, the 
honesty, and the fundamental fairness of the 
press corps which covers the Department of 
State and the White House. They are the 
most amusing and perceptive collection of 
outrageous individualists that I have known. 
They have, at times, left me breathless 
with exasperation. But they have sharp- 
ened my wits as well. They have even made 
me concede, in sentimental moments, there 
may be something in Thomas Jefferson's 
claim that were it left to him to decide be- 
tween a government without newspapers or 
newspapers without a government, he would 
prefer the latter. Luckily for us all, Jefferson 
never had to pronounce himself regarding 
television. 

We have had, to put it mildly, an intense 
experience, and we are now at the end of our 
time together — at least until late January 
1981. [Laughter.] As a result of the extraor- 
dinary record of discourse between us, we 
understand each other better. And if I may 
be so bold, I believe that our discourse has 
also served the American people, for they 
know more, as a result, about the role and 
responsibilities of this nation in the world — 
perhaps more at times than I wanted them to 
know. 

This nation has never lost its spirit or its 
faith in its destiny. Even in the difficult 
times through which we so recently passed, 
we kept our balance and showed the world 
the resiliency of our free institutions. And 
we should forever thank the fates that watch 
over us for the steady hand of the President 
it has been my honor to serve for more than 
two years. His strength and his honesty 
calmed our troubled land and restored our 
pride, our integrity, and our sense of de- 
cency. President Ford leaves to Governor 
Carter a nation recovered, a nation confi- 
dent in the progressive fulfillment of the 
American dream. 

Our new President and Secretary of State 
deserve the understanding and the support 
of all Americans, for today our relations with 
other nations affect every citizen. The search 



for peace is — in this age of nuclear 
weapons — a moral and practical imperative. 
The pursuit of well-being, a traditional con- 
cern of nations, becomes now, in an age of i 
interdependence, one that can only be 
realized in cooperation with others. The 
problems of justice take on fresh urgency and i 
complexity when the future of democracy 
rests in the hands of a dwindling number of 
countries. Today America's leaders must ad- 
dress the familiar goals of peace, prosperity, 1 
and justice in a global landscape that has 
been transformed and for which our histori- 
cal experience offers little guidance. Let us, 
for the first time in over a decade, chart our 
future as a united people. 

Three and a half years ago, I, a naturalized 
citizen, was sworn in as Secretary of State of 
my adopted country. The responsibilities 
once borne by such men as Jefferson, Madi- 
son, Monroe, Marshall, and Acheson were 
temporarily bequeathed to me. In no other 
country in the world would this have been 
possible. Because of my origin, I have 
perhaps had a unique perspective of what 
America means to the cause of freedom and 
human dignity. And I have had no higher aim 
than to repay in some small measure my debt 
to this country which saved me from to- 
talitarianism and the world from slavery. 

I leave to you, for a time, the great domain 
of public policy. I would be hypocritical if I 
pretended that to part is easy. I envy you the 
excitement, the responsibihty, the opportu- 
nities that will be yours. I shall never forget 
how hard you tested me. I shall always 
cherish the experiences we enjoyed together. 
And I will think of you with affection tinged 
with exasperation. 



QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 

Q. What do you believe will be regarded as 
your most enduring achievement in the con- 
duct of U.S. foreign policy? 

Secretary Kissinger: Occasionally making 
a decision that was not recommended by the 
Foreign Service. [Laughter.] 

In general, before I appear totally evasive 



84 



Department of State Bulletin 



m my last appearance with the press 
[laughter], let me confess that I will be eva- 
.^ive [laughter]. I don't think this is the time 
for me to assess my contribution — 
particularly since I have referred in the be- 
tjinning to my well-known humility 
laughter] — I don't want to raise any ques- 
tions about that subject. 

But as I pointed out in my remarks, the 
merit of individual policies will have to be as- 
sessed over an extended period of time. 

The fundamental problem that America 
faced in the late sixties and early seventies 
was how to move from a foreign policy that 
was conducted by analogy to domestic policy 
to a foreign policy that other nations have 
had to conduct throughout most of their 
history — in which interests had to be as- 
sessed in relation to values, in which 
priorities had to be established among objec- 
tives that could not all be achieved simul- 
taneously, and in which we realized that our 
international role would be unending. 

This was the fundamental task that had to 
be begun in this Administration and that will 
now have to be carried forward in the next. 

Q. What was your greatest disappointment 
'" office, apart from losing your job? 
[Laughter.] 

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that the dis- 
integration of executive authority that re- 
sulted from Watergate prevented us from 
exploiting fully the situation that existed in 
the early seventies — and, indeed, it created a 
rather dangerous international environment 
for a limited period of time. It led to needless 
disputes about the relative role of the execu- 
tive and the legislative branch, and it con- 
sumed too much of our energies on pro- 
cedural and peripheral issues. 

Q. Did you have a more free hand in con- 
dxicting foreign policy under President Ford 
or under President Nixon? 

Secretary Kissinger: No matter how I an- 
swer that question I will ruin myself. 
[Laughter.] 

In the relationship of the Security Adviser 
or of the Secretary of State to the President, 
one cannot measure the relative role of either 



by the degree to which they may have dif- 
fered with their President or the degree to 
which the President may have overruled 
them. Any strong Secretary of State has had 
the necessity of a close relationship with the 
President. No Secretary of State can conduct 
foreign policy without the full support of the 
President, and any Secretary of State who 
understands the nature of our system will 
not make a major move without the fullest 
discussion and guidance by the President. 

The personalities of Presidents Nixon and 
Ford were substantially different, and there- 
fore the nature of the relationship and the 
nature in which they made decisions was 
substantially different. But as for my own re- 
lationship with them, I had a relationship of 
confidence with both, and I had the backing 
of both, and I had the guidance of both in the 
conduct of foreign policy. 

Q. Former President Nixon had indicated 
that he was the primary idea man behind the 
Kissinger policies. What is your comment? 
[Laughter. ] 

Secretary Kissinger: My comment is that 
I'll write my book after he completes his. 
[Laughter.] 



Prospects for Middle East Progress 

Q. You have been photographed often in 
embrace with Sadat [Anwar al-Sadat, Presi- 
dent of Egypt] and have been widely hailed 
for your shuttle diplomacy in the Middle 
East. Is the Middle East really any closer to 
solution of the Israeli, Palestinian, and 
other issues that have so long plagued it? 
Has the Middle East been eliminated as a 
likely area of Soviet-American confrontation 
and conflict? 

Secretary Kissinger: The Middle East has 
obviously not been eliminated as a source of 
conflict. It's important to look at the situa- 
tion in 1973 and the situation today. In 1973, 
the Arab world and Israel were engaged in a 
war, at the end of which the danger of a new 
flareup was extremely great. We had no dip- 
lomatic relations with the key Arab coun- 
tries, except Saudi Arabia and Jordan. We 



January 31, 1977 



85 



often sent messages to Cairo or to Damascus 
via Moscow. What was needed was to rees- 
tablish some relationship with the Arab 
world, to maintain our traditional friendship 
with Israel, but to move the area toward 
peace initially by a step-by-step approach, 
which we have always believed would 
emerge in an overall solution. 

We are now approaching the point where 
the conditions in the Middle East for sig- 
nificant progress seem to us propitious. 
Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan are 
all committed to a progress toward a peace 
which recognizes the existence and legiti- 
macy of the State of Israel. The radical ele- 
ments in the area no longer have the influ- 
ence that they possessed some years ago. 

I believe the negotiations will be ex- 
tremely complicated and they may take some 
time. But I do believe that the conditions for 
progress are better than they have been in 
many years. 

Q. According to Murrey Marder, in his 
comprehensive survey of your career that 
appeared in the Washington Post two months 
ago, you have acknowledged duping the press 
on only one occasion. You were reported 
seeking from Syria a list of Israeli prison- 
ers, and the list was in your pocket all the 
time. 

How tnany other times have you duped the 
press, and are you prepared to acknowledge 
any of those occasions today? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think we only 
have two minutes [laughter], and if I give a 
partial answer to that question, you will ac- 
cuse me of duping you again. 

On that particular occasion that Mr. Mar- 
der mentioned, we had a profound human- 
itarian problem, which is that we had been 
given the list on a confidential basis. We had 
told of the fact that we had this list to only 
the highest leaders on the Israeh side, and 
we were afraid that the prisoners would not 
be released if we did not follow the sequence 
that had been suggested to us. 

Maybe it could have been handled in a dif- 
ferent manner, but as soon as we had been 
given the go-ahead to release the list, we ex- 



plained to the press exactly the circum- 
stances in which it had been obtained. But 
we could not do it before we had complied 
with the sequence of events that had been 
suggested to us. 



Debate on Nuclear "Supremacy" 

Q. As a result of the Strategic Arms Lim- 
itation Talks under your stewardship, have 
you put the Soviet Union into a position to 
achieve world nuclear supremacy? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is time that 
we conduct a rational debate on the issue of 
nuclear strategy. It is too important and 
vital a subject to be made the subject of par- 
tisan and doctrinaire political debate. 

First, with respect to the first SALT 
agreement: The limitations that were estab- 
lished at the first SALT agreement resulted 
from the force levels that had been decided 
upon in the 1960's. There was no American 
program that was stopped as a result of the 
first SALT agreement. And 210 Soviet mis- 
siles had to be dismantled, and several Soviet 
programs were stopped. 

I have never understood the argument why 
an agreement that ratified a balance that we 
had unilaterally accepted and that we had un- 
ilaterally established should threaten our se- 
curity when it was simply a reflection of the 
existing reality that no one had proposed to 
change without the agreement. 

With respect to the negotiations that are 
now going on, the American people must un- 
derstand that strategic nuclear weapons con- 
front all of mankind with a new circumstance; 
namely, that for the first time in history, 
mankind can literally destroy itself. 

I do not believe that the Soviet Union is 
achieving military supremacy over the 
United States. I do not believe that any 
American Administration would permit a 
situation to arise in which the Soviet Union 
could achieve strategic superiority over the 
United States. 

But the essence of the contemporary prob- 
lem in the military field is that the term 
"supremacy" — when the casualties on both 



86 



Department of State Bulletin 



sides will be in the tens of millions — has 
practically no operational significance, as 
long as we do what is necessary to maintain a 
balance. 

The military danger we face is with respect 
to regional conflicts. Those forces must be 
modernized and strengthened. 

But no Administration, neither ours nor 
our successors', will ever permit the Soviet 
Union to achieve supremacy. And those who 
are talking as if in the strategic field we 
could still talk about a meaningful conduct of 
military operations are not doing this country 
a service and they are not doing mankind a 
service. 



The War in Vietnam 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in retrospect, could you, 
or u'ould you, have developed other diploma- 
tic initiatives that might have ended the war 
in Vietnam in 1969? Was the price of four 
more years of war worth what we achieved 
otherwise? 

Secretary Kissinger: In 1969 we found 
550,000 Americans in Vietnam suffering 
hundreds of casualties a week. Those of you 
who remember the difficulty of extricating 
10,000 Americans in 1975 will understand the 
complexity of the problem that we con- 
fronted in 1969. 

It was our belief that as a country on which 
many others relied for their security and for 
their commitments, we had to extricate the 
American forces from Vietnam in a manner 
that maintained a belief in our capacity to 
keep our word and that did not throw into 
question our own international role. 

And if you look over the debates that 
existed in 1969, '70, and '71, there were no 
significant proposals to withdraw all our 
forces; the differences concerned tactical is- 
sues of the terms under which they might be 
withdrawn. 

I think the issue of whether it could have 
been done more rapidly will undoubtedly al- 
ways be open. We would not have done what 
we did if we had not believed it to be the 
right course. 



We had one condition: that we would not 
overthrow — as a price of leaving Vietnam — a 
government which our predecessors had es- 
tablished. We did this because of our percep- 
tion of what the honor and the word of the 
United States required. 

As soon as that condition was met, we 
terminated the war. But it will require a long 
and detailed analysis of all of the negotia- 
tions in order to be able to determine what 
other opportunities existed. Obviously, if I 
had believed other opportunities existed, we 
would have seized them. 



Relations With People's Republic of China 

Q. It is almost five years since the signing 
of the Shanghai communique. Why has 
China not been recognized? Why has there 
been no resolution of the Taiwan question, 
and what are the prospects for U.S. -China 
trade? 

Secretary Kissinger: The Shanghai com- 
munique set no deadline for the normaliza- 
tion of relations. 

Our relations with China have two aspects. 
There is the aspect of our assessment of the 
international situation, and the common ob- 
jectives that the People's Republic of China 
and the United States have in preventing 
what we have jointly called hegemony. 

Secondly, there is the commitment in the 
Shanghai communique to the achievement 
progressively of the normalization of rela- 
tions. This commitment remains and will no 
doubt be also pursued by the new Adminis- 
tration. 

The timing, the conditions, under which it 
can be achieved will have to be negotiated 
between the United States and the People's 
Republic of China. And we have not pre- 
viously achieved a meeting of the minds on 
this. But we also believe that in the other 
areas, in the area of our perception of the 
world situation, we have had fruitful talks 
with the Chinese throughout the whole 
period since the Shanghai communique was 
signed and those talks can continue even be- 
fore normalization is concluded. 



January 31, 1977 



87 



Secretary Kissinger Emphasizes Need 
for Nonpartisan Foreign Policy 

The Foreign Policy Association of New 
York held a dinner in honor of Secretary 
Kissiyiger at New York, N.Y., on January 
11. Following are remarks made by Secre- 
tary Kissinger at the dinner. ^ 

Press release 5 dated January 12 

I appreciated particularly that Ambas- 
sador Murphy agreed to preside over these 
proceedings. I do not think that the average 
American understands the ambivalent rela- 
tionship between the Foreign Service and 
the Secretary of State. The Foreign Service 
is the most dedicated, slightly supercilious, 
devoted, and able group of professionals that 
serves any nation. 

From the point of view of the Secretary of 
State, there is only one problem. They are 
opposed to what they call lateral entry, and 
deep down they are convinced that if it were 
not for this unfortunate device whereby 
people are moved in sideways from the out- 
side, no Secretary of State would really have 
been qualified to join the Foreign Service. 
[Laughter.] This accounts for the combina- 
tion of deference, slight feeling of superior- 
ity, and exhausting bureaucratic procedures 
founded on superior knowledge and dedica- 
tion which is the hallmark of the Foreign 
Service. 

Almost every Secretary of State has en- 
tered the Department convinced that he 
would break through this awesome machin- 
ery that he found in place; and every Secre- 
tary of State sooner or later has been 
conquered by this group of outstanding pro- 
fessionals, specialists, presenting options 
that contain no choices [laughter and 
applause], always prepared to rewrite their 
papers as long as the change is confined to 
punctuation and who yet in a marvelous, 
mysterious, and devoted way carry out the 
business of our government. 

Since I have been Secretary of State I 



' Introductory and closing remarks by Ambassador 
Robert D. Murphy, Carter E. Burgess, chairman of the 
association, and others and the opening paragraphs of 
Secretary Kissinger's remarks are not printed here. 



have been present when the bodies of three 
Foreign Service officers were returned. In 
each case they had been the victims of assas- 
sination and in each case a large number of 
volunteers stepped forward, without being 
requested, to take their place. I beheve this 
symbolizes what this country owes to this ex- 
traordinary group of men and women. 

I have harassed them because I believed, 
and still do, that they are the ablest group of 
people that any government has ever assem- 
bled and because I believed it was my duty to 
make them perform at their top performance. 
I have been rewarded, as all my predecessors 
have before me and as my successors without 
question will be, by men and women who 
served their country and not a party, who 
worked for peace and not for an individual. 
And I hope that the nonpartisan, professional 
character of our Foreign Service will always 
be recognized and will always be preserved. 
I want to take this opportunity, in what is 
my last public appearance as Secretary of 
State, to pay tribute to this remarkable 
group that has never been more important in 
our country's history as our foreign policy 
becomes more complicated, as the decisions 
grow more complex. 

We must have a group of men and women 
who represent continuity. We cannot pretend 
to ourselves that the foreign policy of a great 
nation can change every four or eight years, 
and that pretense itself is a factor of instabil- 
ity in the world. We must have, with all the 
tactical alterations that are inevitable, a 
large element of continuity that is required, 
a great degree of technical knowledge, and I 
know that my successor, Mr. Vance, whom I 
admire and who deserves our support, will 
find in the Foreign Service a dedicated, able, 
and brilliant instrument in the conduct of our 
foreign policy. I would like also to say that 
Ambassador Murphy represents the best 
qualities in the Foreign Service. 

I have been Secretary of State during an 
extremely turbulent period in our history. 
Its surface manifestations were the war in 
Vietnam, the tragedy of Watergate, and the 
.disputes between the executive and the legis- 
lative branches of our government, which on 
too many occasions paralyzed action and con- 
fused other nations. But in its deeper sense, 



88 



Department of State Bulletin 



we were going through a period of transition. 
For the first time in our history the United 
States has had to conduct foreign policy the 
same way less favored nations have had to 
conduct it in all their experience. 

Throughout most of our history we could 
pursue one of several strands: either an as- 
sertion that our moral principles were auto- 
matically applicable in every part of the 
world or a belief that we could stand apart 
from the rest of the world and wait till the 
crisis occurred and overwhelm it with 
resources — or else we acted as if our domes- 
tic experience could be applied automatically 
on a global scale. 

As long as the United States was protected 
by two great oceans, as long as our resources 
were infinite in relation to the problems with 
which we had to deal, we could choose any 
one of these approaches and generally be 
successful. But today we face the dilemmas 
that other nations have experienced 
throughout their history. Today we must 
choose among our priorities. We cannot do 
everything simultaneously. Today the nature 
of the world we imagine will determine im- 
portantly the kind of world which we are able 
to build. 

It is the dilemma of the policymaker that 
at the time that he must act he does not have 
the knowledge on which to base such action. 
When he has the knowledge, it is usually too 
late to affect events. A great deal therefore 
depends on judgment, on confidence — 
psychological confidence on the part of the 
policymakers and confidence between the 
policymakers and the public. 

The United States for the last decade has 
consumed itself in a civil strife which is 
bound to have the most profound conse- 
quences on our international affairs. 

While I was Secretary of State I constantly 
preached the importance of a nonpartisan 
approach to foreign policy. Now that I leave 
office I want to reiterate this need. The new 
Administration must be given an opportunity 
to conduct its policies without the bitterness 
and rancor, without the strife between the 
branches of our government, that have been 
so characteristic of the last decade. 

Now, if I am correct in the needs of our 
foreign policy, this Association has played a 



crucial and honorable role. I have traveled, 
as Ambassador Reinhardt [John E. 
Reinhardt, Assistant Secretary for Public 
Affairs] has pointed out, to 35 cities in this 
country to speak, to meet with leaders, to 
exchange ideas, and to explain what we were 
trying to do. All of these trips have been 
taken under the auspices of the various 
World Affairs Councils, and I am particularly 
moved that so many who have heard me in 
cities across the country have done me the 
honor of coming here tonight, probably in 
order to find out for how many minutes I can 
go without placing a verb. [Laughter.] 

Nothing is more important than to give our 
public a correct appreciation of the foreign 
policy issues that they confront. The 
simplifiers, the people who believe that there 
are some easy slogans that produce final an- 
swers, are as pernicious as those who profess 
total indifference to the problems of foreign 
policy. 

We must face the fact that, for as far ahead 
as we can see, the peace of our citizens and 
the well-being of our citizens depends cru- 
cially on our performance in international af- 
fairs. And for as far ahead as we can see, the 
peace of the world and the well-being of the 
world is inseparable from the American per- 
formance. 

Ours is a tremendous responsibility. The 
world has become interdependent; but, alone 
among the free nations, we are capable of 
giving expression to that interdependence on 
a global scale. The world's security can no 
longer be divided; but, alone among the free 
nations of the world, we can form a global 
conception of security. Therefore freedom 
and prosperity everywhere depend on the 
sophistication of our policy and the depth of 
our commitment, and no group has done 
more to bring about informed nonpartisan 
citizenship than this group that is meeting 
here this evening. 

As idealists, as perfectionists, we con- 
stantly come to debate our faults; but, for 
somebody who came to this country as a 
young man, I can never forget what America 
has meant to people who were not born to 
freedom. When I came here in 1938 I was 
asked to write an essay at George Washing- 
ton High School here in this city about what 



January 31, 1977 



89 



it meant to be an American. I wrote that of 
course I missed the people with whom I had 
grown up and the places that were familiar to 
me. But then I thought that this was a coun- 
try where one could walk across the street 
with one's head erect and therefore it was all 
worthwhile. 

What America means to the rest of the 
world is the hope for people everywhere that 
they shall be able to walk with their heads 
erect, and our responsibihty as Americans is 
always to make sure that our purposes tran- 
scend our differences. 

I have tried to make a contribution to this, 
and your organizations have organized the 
meetings and, beyond this, have contributed 
to the education and commitment of the 
American people. And therefore I would like 
to take this opportunity to thank you from 
the bottom of my heart. 



America's Continuing Concerns 
In the Middle East 

The Conference of Presidents of Major 
American Jewish Organizations held a 
luncheon in honor of Secretary Kissinger at 
New York, N.Y., on January 11. Following 
are remarks made by Secretary Kissinger at 
the luncheon. * 

Press release 4 dated January 12 

You and I have gone through a great deal 
together in recent years, and I thought that 
if this meeting made any sense, it would be if 
I spoke to you from the heart about some of 
the considerations on my mind. 

We have had, of necessity, a very compli- 
cated relationship. From my point of view, 
probably no criticism has hurt me more than 
if it came from this community. And probably 
from your point of view, it was especially 
painful if disagreements occurred between 
the Jewish community and the first Jewish 
Secretary of State in American history. 



' Introductory and closing remarks by the chairman 
of the conference, Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler, and 
others and the opening paragraphs of Secretary Kis- 
singer's remarks are not printed here. 



I like to believe, with my friend Simcha 
[Israeli Ambassador to the United States 
Simcha Dinitz], that the disagreements never 
went to the heart of our relationship; that 
they usually concerned tactics by which to 
achieve fundamentally agreed objectives. 
But I thought it was important for the future 
of Israel and for the future of the Jewish 
people that the actions that the U.S. Gov- 
ernment took were not seen to be the result 
of a special personal relationship; that the 
support we gave Israel reflected not my per- 
sonal preferences alone but the basic national 
interests of the United States, transcending 
the accident of who might be in office at any 
particular period. 

I have never forgotten that 13 members of 
my family died in concentration camps, nor 
could I ever fail to remember what it was like 
to live in Nazi Germany as a member of a 
persecuted minority. 

I believe, however, that the relationship of 
Israel to the United States transcends these 
personal considerations. I do not believe that 
it is compatible with the moral conscience of 
mankind to permit Israel to suffer in the 
Middle East a ghetto existence that has been 
suffered by Jews in many individual coun- 
tries throughout their history. 

The support for a free and democratic Is- 
rael in the Middle East is a moral necessity 
of our period to be pursued by every Admin- 
istration and with a claim to the support of 
all freedom-loving people all over the world. 

So, we begin in our concerns with the 
moral and the human dimension. Beyond 
that, any nation has a right to live in security 
and not to be dependent for its survival on 
the good will of its neighbors. It must be a 
basic principle of American policy that Israel 
must be strong enough so that its decisions 
are made by free choice and are not imposed 
on it by a combination of outside factors or 
by its neighbors. And therefore it must be a 
principle of American policy that Israel must 
always be strong enough to defend itself and 
that the United States must see to it that Is- 
rael is strong enough, because only then can 
a peace that is negotiated be lasting and only 
then can peace be perceived to be just. 

I have believed that an effort must be 
made to advance the prospects of peace in 



90 



Department of State Bulletin 






the Middle East. And no people can have a 
greater interest in it than those who for 
thousands of years have been subjected to 
the arbitrary will of many host countries — 
for a nation that in its existence has never 
known recognition and acceptance by its im- 
mediate neighbors. 

Historians will have to judge the methods 
that were appropriate. But that the relations 
between countries divided by distrust and 
suffering for a generation could not be re- 
paired easily and quickly, that the attempt to 
solve everything at once involved the risk of 
catastrophe as well as the prospects of suc- 
cess, can never be overlooked. 

The difference between statesmen and 
those who observe from the outside is that 
there are some experiments that statesmen 
cannot try, because the consequences of their 
failure would be too profound. 

I believe now that there are some pros- 
pects for peace in the Middle East. The influ- 
ence of hostile outside powers is less than at 
any time in decades. The influence of radical 
elements within the Middle East has been 
reduced. But it is an effort that requires 
patience and wisdom and, above all, a pro- 
found understanding for the dilemma of a 
people like Israel, which cannot afford to 
make a mistake and which cannot entrust it- 
self simply to abstract declarations of good 
will. Because if a mistake is made, it is likely 
to be irrevocable. 

Rabbi Schindler pointed out that maybe I 
am glad to be rid of this group, but I do not 
believe I will ever be rid of this group. 
[Laughter and Applause.] And frankly, I do 
not want ever to be rid of this group, though 
I may retract this in a few months. [Laugh- 
ter.] 

The problems of security and of peace in 
the Middle East will be with us for as long as 
we can see. I will remain dedicated, as a 
friend of Israel and as a friend of this group, 
for as long as I live. And I want you to know 
that this meeting has meant a great deal to 
me. 

Throughout their history, Jews have been 
saying to themselves, "Next year in 
Jerusalem." I would like to think that some- 
time soon we can say this in its deepest 
sense — in an Israel that is secure, that is ac- 



cepted, that is at peace. And it will always 
mean a great deal to me to have worked with 
this group, and with my friends in Israel, to 
achieve this objective. 



Lebanese Delegation Discusses 
Rehabilitation Needs 

Department Statement ' 

In response to an invitation extended by 
Secretary Kissinger, President Sarkis of 
Lebanon sent H.E. Ghassan Tueini as his 
personal emissary to Washington as head of a 
delegation to discuss specific ways in which 
the United States can be helpful to the 
Lebanese Government in rebuilding its na- 
tional institutions and economy in the after- 
math of a year and a half of civil strife. 

Since his arrival on December 14, Mr. 
Tueini has met twice with the Secretary. He 
and members of his delegation have also held 
discussions with Deputy Secretary Robinson, 
AID Administrator Parker, as well as other 
high-ranking officials of the Department and 
AID. Mr. Tueini has also met with Mr. 
Robert McNamara, the President of the 
World Bank; Mr. Witteveen, the Managing 
Director of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF); and several members of Congress 
while in Washington and with officials of the 
United Nations in New York. He concludes 
his mission to Washington with a meeting to- 
morrow [December 23] with Under Secretary 
for Political Affairs Habib and Assistant Sec- 
retary for Near Eastern and South Asian Af- 
fairs Atherton. 

The United States steadfastly supports the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and na- 
tional unity of Lebanon; we welcome recent 
progress under the leadership of President 
Sarkis toward the reestablishment of secu- 
rity and the revitalization of political and 
economic processes in Lebanon following the 
tragic events of recent months. Mr. Tueini 
has informed us that Lebanon has suffered an 
estimated $3 billion in destruction. He has 
described the Lebanese Government's 



Is.sued on Dec. 22 (text from press release 616). 



January 31, 1977 



91 



priorities: to meet immediate humanitarian 
needs, while pressing forward rapidly to re- 
store productivity and jobs, and beginning 
the massive long-term task of physical recon- 
struction in ways that will promote social 
justice and assure a sense of opportunity for 
all of Lebanon's citizens. 

Lebanon possesses significant human and 
material resources for the job ahead, but the 
United States recognizes that it will require 
assistance from the international community. 
The United States will very shortly be send- 
ing to Lebanon a small team of experts in key 
aspects of relief and rehabihtation. This will 
lay the groundwork for an expansion of our 
present program of emergency assistance in 
coordination with the Lebanese Government 
and other international donors. 

We have indicated to Mr. Tueini and his 
delegation that we are planning a Public Law 
480 title I food aid program of $20 million, 
subject to appropriate consultations with the 
Congress. The Lebanese Government will also 
be developing priority programs in housing 
both to effect emergency repairs to existing 
shelters for the winter months and, eventu- 
ally, to restore or replace damaged struc- 
tures. We already are engaged in efforts 
through voluntary organizations to assist in 
meeting these immediate needs. We have con- 
sidered with the Tueini delegation the ques- 
tion of the longer term needs of Lebanon. We 
have agreed to examine possible ways in 
which we can be helpful, including the provi- 
sion of technical and managerial expertise, in 
restoring on an emergency basis the remain- 
ing Beirut port facilities to support the relief 
and rehabilitation process. We are already at 
work on one possibility: the immediate provi- 
sion of surplus heavy equipment for interim 
use in the port. These mobile cranes and other 
equipment would also assist in priority pro- 
grams to remove rubble and hazardous struc- 
tures and maintain vital road links in moun- 
tainous regions in the face of winter snows. 

We are agreed that progress in these 
spheres is both important and possible. 

These efforts are in addition to the assist- 
ance we have already made available. Specif- 
ically, we have provided thus far a total of $19 
miUion in humanitarian aid through the Inter- 
national Committee of the Red Cross, the 



American University Hospital in Beirut, the 
Catholic Relief Service, and the U.N. pro- 
gram for Lebanon. These funds have provided 
medical supplies and services and other emer- 
gency assistance for those in need; we are, for 
example, providing commodities under a Pub- 
lic Law 480 title II program to feed 300,000 
persons in Lebanon. 

We will continue our close consultations 
with the Lebanese Government as it lays the 
foundations for the country's long-term recon- 
struction program. Some funds for assistance 
to Lebanon are available in the current fiscal 
year 1977 budget. When we have a clearer 
picture of the contribution the United States 
can make to Lebanon's longer term needs, we 
will discuss with the Congress possible future 
programs and their funding. We will also be in 
regular touch with respected and experienced 
international institutions, such as the World 
Bank, the IMF, and the United Nations, to 
define further the role the United States can 
and should play in support of these efforts, 
which enjoy our sympathy and concern. 



Negotiations Held on Imports 
of Meat to the U.S. for 1977 

Department Announcement, December 15 

Press relea.se 605 dated December 15 

The United States has reached substantive 
agreement with the governments of major 
meat-exporting countries on arrangements to 
govern trade in meat, mainly beef, during 
1977. 

The overall system of arrangements with 
supplying countries will provide assurance 
that aggregate imports into the United 
States will not exceed 1,281.9 million pounds 
next year, an increase of 4 percent over im- 
ports in 1976. In the case of some of the 
countries, the arrangements are agreed on 
an ad referendum basis, subject to final ap- 
proval by their governments. Formal ar- 
rangements are expected to be concluded 
shortly. 

Canada, which has not been a participant 
in previous restraint programs, will be cov- 
ered by the 1977 arrangement. However, the 



92 



Department of State Bulletin 



precise terms of Canada's participation which 
will cover the two-way U.S. -Canadian trade 
in meat are still under discussion. 

Undertaken at the direction of President 
Ford, the negotiations commenced December 
6 in Washington with the United States rep- 
resented by officials of the Departments of 
State and Agriculture and the Office of the 
Special Trade Representative, working 
under the general supervision of the Agricul- 
tural Policy Committee. 



THE CONGRESS 



Seventh Progress Report on Cyprus 
Submitted to the Congress 

Message From President Ford ^ 

To the Congress of the United States: 

This report is the seventh in a series of 
messages pursuant to Public Law 94-104 
through which I have informed the Congress 
of my Administration's efforts to encourage 
progress toward a resolution of the problems 
of Cyprus. In addition to reviewing those ef- 
forts, this report will offer several conclu- 
sions with regard to the role the United 
States can and should play in settlement of 
the Cyprus dispute. 

I know the Congress shares my views that 
a just and early settlement of the Cyprus 
issue is essential both for humanitarian rea- 
sons and to preserve peace in an area of 
great importance to the United States. For 
more than two years my Administration has 
actively sought to help the Cypriot com- 
munities find the basis for substantive and 
sustained negotiations. We have given the 
UN Secretary General our full and active 
support in the negotiations conducted under 
his auspices, negotiations which I believe 
continue to offer the best possible forum for 
progress. 



> Transmitted on Jan. 10 (text from White House 
press release dated Jan. 10). 



I also know the Congress shares my deep 
regret that progress in the negotiations has 
been extremely slow. Inconclusive pro- 
cedural disputes have diverted the parties 
from pressing issues of substance. Domestic 
pressures and international rivalries have 
detracted from the will and commitment that 
are essential to progress. 

In an effort to break this impasse, my Ad- 
ministration has sought over the past several 
months to develop a set of basic principles 
that might provide a framework for con- 
tinued and fruitful intercommunal negotia- 
tion. These principles are based on the con- 
cepts which I set forth in my sixth report to 
the Congress and which Secretary of State 
Kissinger expressed in his September 1976 
UN General Assembly address. These con- 
cepts rest on a fundamental premise which I 
believe all concerned parties continue to 
share — that any settlement must preserve 
the independence, sovereignty, and the ter- 
ritorial integrity of Cyprus. These concepts 
emphasize the importance of territorial ad- 
justments to reduce the area controlled by 
the Turkish side, while taking into account 
the economic requirements and humanitarian 
concerns of the two Cypriot communities, in- 
cluding the plight of those who remain refu- 
gees. Constitutional arrangements are of 
equal importance in providing conditions 
under which the two communities can live in 
freedom and have a large voice in their own 
affairs. Finally, security arrangements which 
would permit the withdrawal of foreign mili- 
tary forces other than those present under 
international agreement are essential for a 
lasting settlement. 

Based upon these concepts, the United 
States has engaged over the past several 
months in extensive consultations on the 
Cyprus issue with the nine member states of 
the European Community, seeking their 
support for a new and accelerated approach. 
Through these consultations we are jointly 
developing the basic principles which we 
hope will stimulate the negotiations. We 
have been greatly impressed and encouraged 
by the extent to which there is a consensus in 
these consultations on both the principles 
and the urgent need to reopen substantive 
intercommunal negotiations. 



January 31, 1977 



93 



I remain convinced, however, that neither 
the United States nor any other outside 
country or group of countries should seek to 
impose a settlement on Cyprus. The princi- 
ples we are developing should serve only as a 
basis for negotiation. It is the Cypriot com- 
munities themselves who must ultimately de- 
cide their relationship and final territorial 
arrangements. 

In addition it is clear that a final solution 
must also have the support of the Greek and 
Turkish governments. It is my firm convic- 
tion that we must seek to maintain the trust 
and friendship of both these NATO allies. 
Thus my Administration has sought to 
strengthen through negotiation our security 
ties with both Greece and Turkey. We have 
consistently sought to follow a balanced 
course in strengthening our relations 
throughout the area. We therefore welcomed 
the steps taken by the Congress to relax the 
arms embargo on Turkey so that Turkey can 
better meet its NATO obligations. We have 
demonstrated through tangible assistance 
our support for Greece. We have worked ac- 
tively, both directly and through the United 
Nations Security Council, to defuse recent 
tensions between Greece and Turkey over the 
Aegean. These two countries have now 
agreed to a negotiating process called for in 
the U.S. sponsored Security Council Resolu- 
tion which I hope will lead to a settlement of 
their dispute.^ 

It is essential to the success of an equitable 
and lasting Cyprus settlement that the 
United States maintain a balanced relation- 
ship among all concerned parties. It would be 
a mistake to place undue pressure on any one 
party for the sake of what appears to be a 
quick settlement. I believe the Congress 
would agree that such a path would neither 
promote lasting progress on Cyprus nor 
serve the cause of stability in the Mediter- 
ranean. 

I am not pessimistic about the future of the 
Cyprus negotiations. I continue to believe 
that a way can and will be found to achieve a 



^ For a U.S. statement and text of Security Council 
Resolution 395, adopted on Aug. 25, 1976, see Bulle- 
tin of Sept. 25, 1976, p. 374. 



just and equitable settlement which will ena- 
ble all of the people of Cyprus to shape a 
harmonious and prosperous future. 

Gerald R. Ford. 

The White House, January 10, 1977. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

United States Policy on Angola. Hearing before the 
House Committee on International Relations. 
January 26, 1976. 45 pp. 

United States Commodity Policies. Joint hearings be- 
fore the Subcommittees on International Resources, 
Food, and Energy; on International Economic Policy; 
on International Organizations; and on International 
Trade and Commerce of the House Committee on In- 
ternational Relations. April 7-27, 1976, 343 pp. 

Foreign Policy and Defense Requirements. Hearing be- 
fore the Subcommittee on International Political and 
Military Affairs of the House Committee on Interna- 
tional Relations. April 29, 1976. 28 pp. 

Investigation Into Certain Past Policies of Genocide 
and Exploration of Policy Options for the Future. 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Future 
Foreign Policy Research and Development of the 
House Committee on International Relations. May 
11-August 30, 1976. 275 pp. 

Human Rights in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Sal- 
vador: Implications for U.S. Policy. Hearings before 
the Subcommittee on International Organizations of 
the House Committee on International Relations. 
June 8-9, 1976. 253 pp. 

Human Rights in Uruguay and Paraguay. Hearings be- 
fore the Subcommittee on International Organiza- 
tions of the House Committee on International Rela- 
tions. June 17-August 4, 1976. 228 pp. 

Congressional Review of International Agreements. 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on International 
Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Com- 
mittee on International Relations. June 22-July 22, 
1976. 416 pp. 

Activities of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency in 
the United States. Hearings before the Subcommittee 
on International Organizations of the House Commit- 
tee on International Relations. Part II. June 22- 
September 30, 1976. 87 pp. 

Human Rights in India. Hearings before the Subcom- 
mittee on International Organizations of the House 
Committee on International Relations. June 23- 
September 23, 1976. 233 pp. 

Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa. Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations. August 4-6, 1976. 138 
pp. 

Namibia: The United Nations and U.S. Policy. Hearings 
before the Subcommittee on International Organiza- 
tions of the House Committee on International Rela- 
tions. August 24-27, 1976. 258 pp. 



94 



Department of State Bulletin 



TREATY INFORMATION 



U.S. Withdraws From Convention 
on Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 

Statement by Charles W. Robinson 
Deputy Secretary ^ 

In April of last year, President Ford 
signed into law the Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act of 1976, extending U.S. 
fishery jurisdiction to 200 miles as of March 
1, 1977. Since that time, the United States 
has been moving steadily toward domestic 
management of our fishery resources. 

As a consequence of our extended domestic 
jurisdiction, and in keeping with the intent of 
the act, the President has decided that the 
United States would withdraw from the In- 
ternational Convention for the Northwest 
Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) effective De- 
cember 31, 1976. 

The United States has been an active 
member of ICNAF since its inception 26 
years ago. That convention has made signifi- 
cant contributions to fishery conservation in 
the Northwest Atlantic area. We have bene- 
fited from decisions taken by convention 
members. The scientific research and man- 
agement of fisheries of the area which have 
been carried out under ICNAF are outstand- 
ing examples of the benefits which can be 
achieved through international cooperation. 
The President has therefore concluded that 
as we move toward implementation of our 
legislation the United States should take into 
account, in developing our 1977 manage- 
ment plans, the management proposals de- 
veloped at the last meeting of the Interna- 
tional Commission for the Northwest Atlan- 
tic Fisheries. 

The expertise developed within ICNAF 
will provide a sound basis for the establish- 
ment of a successor organization which will 



provide for international cooperation in joint 
research, even though fisheries management 
within our 200-mile zone will now be a 
domestic responsibility of the United States. 
The United States will actively support ef- 
forts to continue international consultation 
and cooperation in dealing with fisheries 
problems in the Northwest Atlantic and will 
participate in the conference of plenipoten- 
tiaries in early 1977 to consider the drafting 
of a new convention. 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Agriculture 

Agreement establishing the International Fun-l ivr Ag- 
ricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome June 
13, 1976.' 

Signatures: Morocco, United States, December 22 
1976. 

Aviation 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of 
aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 1970. En- 
tered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 7192. 
Accessions deposited: Kenya, January 11, 1977; 
Uruguay, January 12, 1977. 
Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against 
the safety of civil aviation. Done at Montreal Sep- 
tember 23, 1971. Entered into force January 26, 1973. 
Accessions deposited: Ecuador, January 12, 1977; 
Kenya, January 11, 1977; Uruguay, January 12, 
1977. 

Nuclear Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. 
Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 
1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS 6839. 
Ratification deposited: Panama, January 13, 1977. 

Tin 

Fifth international tin agreement, with annexes. Done 
at Geneva June 21, 1975. Entered into force provi- 
sionally July 1, 1976. 
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, December 29, 

1976. 
Accession deposited: Bulgaria, January 6, 1977. 

Wheat 

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat 
trade convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971. Done at Washington March 17, 
1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect 



' Issued on Jan. 1 (text from press release 1). 



Not in force. 



January 31, 1977 



95 



to certain provisions, and July 1, 1976, with respect 

to other provisions. 

Ratificatiuii deposited: Tunisia, January 12, 1977. 

BILATERAL 

Iran 

Agreement relating to the reciprocal issuance of 
multiple-entry nonimmigrant visas. Effected by e.\- 
change of letters at Tehran December 13 and 16, 
1976. Entered into force December 16, 1976; effective 
January 1, 1977. 

Sri Lanka 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of ag- 
ricultural commodities of October 29, 1976. Effected 
by exchange of notes'at Colombo December 15, 1976. 
Entered into force December 15, 1976. 

Switzerland 

Agreement amending the agreement of October 
13, 1961, concerning the reciprocal acceptance of cer- 
tificates of airworthiness for imported aircraft (TIAS 
5214). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington 
January 7, 1977. Entered into force January 7, 1977. 

United Kingdom 

Memorandum of understanding concerning the transfer 
of technical data relating to the JT-IOD jet engine 
collaboration agreement to third countries. Signed at 
Washington December 30, 1976. Entered into force 
December 30, 1976. 



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Selected Documents No. 4, U.S. Policy in the Middle 
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Restrictive Business Practices. Agreement with the 
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Trade — Meat Imports. Agreement with El Salvador. 
TIAS 8324. 5 pp. 3.5C. (Cat. No. 89.10:8324). 

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Trade — Meat Imports. Agreement with New Zealand. 
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96 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX January 31,1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1962 



Agriculture. Negotiations Held on Imports of 
Meat to the U.S. for 1977 <:Y> 

American Principles 

Laying the Foundation of a Long-Term Policy 
(Secretary Kissinger before the National Press 
Club) -1 

Secretary Kissinger Emphasizes Need for Non- 
partisan Foreign Policy (remarks) ,S8 

Arms Control and Disarmament. Laying the 
Foundation of a Long-Term Policy (Secretary 
Kissinger before the National Press Club) ,'<1 

China. Laying the Foundation of a Long-Term 
Policy (Secretary Kissinger before the National 
Press Club) si 

Congress 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy 94 

Seventh Progress Report on Cyprus Submitted 
to the Congress (message from President 
Ford) '. 93 

Cyprus. Seventh Progress Report on Cyprus 
Submitted to the Congress (message from Pres- 
ident Ford) 93 

Economic Affairs 

Negotiations Held on Imports of Meat to the U.S. 

for 1977 92 

U.S. Withdraws From Convention on Northwest 

Atlantic Fisheries (Robinson) 95 

Foreign Aid. Lebanese Delegation Discusses Re- 
habilitation Needs (Department statement) ... 91 

Israel. America's Continuing Concerns in the 
Middle East (Kissinger) 90 

Lebanon. Lebanese Delegation Discusses Re- 
habilitation Needs (Department statement) ... 91 

Middle East 

America's Continuing Concerns in the Middle 
East (Kissinger) 90 

Laying the Foundation of a Long-Term Policy 
(Secretary Kissinger before the National Press 
Club) 81 

Presidential Documents. Seventh Progress Re- 
port on Cyprus Submitted to the Congress .... 93 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications 96 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 95 

U.S. Withdraws From Convention on Northwest 
Atlantic Fisheries (Robinson) 95 

U.S.S.R. Laying the Foundation of a Long-Term 
Policy (Secretary Kissinger before the National 
Press Club) 81 



Vietnam. Laying the Foundation of a Long-Term 
Policy (Secretary Kissinger before the National 
Press Club) 81 

Name Index 

Ford , President 93 

Kissinger, Secretary 81, 88, 90 

Robinson. Charles W 95 



Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: January 10—16 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wa.sh- 
ington, D.C. 20520. 



Date 

1/U 



1/12 



1/12 



1/12 



1/13 



*8 1/13 



1/13 



Subject 

Robert Alden, Secretary Kis- 
singer: National Press Club, 
.Tan. 10. 

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler, 
Rabbi Israel Miller, Israeli 
Ambassador Simcha Dinitz, 
Yehudi Hellman, Secretary 
Kissinger: Conference of Pres- 
idents of Major American 
Jewish Organizations, New- 
York, Jan. 11. 

Carter E. Burgess, Robert D. 
Murphy, John E. Reinhardt, 
Richard Valeriani, Secretary 
Kissinger: Foreign Policy As- 
sociation, New York, Jan. 11. 

Study group 1, U.S. National 
Committee for the Interna- 
tional Radio Consultative 
Committee, Feb. 15. 

Shipping Coordinating Commit- 
tee, Subcommittee on Safety 
of Life at Sea, working group 
on radiocommunications, Feb. 
17. 

Secretary of State's Advisory 
Committee on Private Inter- 
national Law, Study Group on 
Hotelkeepers' Liability, Feb. 
17. 

Ocean Affairs Advisory Com- 
mittee meeting rescheduled 
for Mar. 15-16. 



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/?U 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 

Volume LXXVI • No. 1963 • February 7, 1977 



THE STATE OF THE UNION 
Excerpts From President Ford's Address to the Congress 97 

SECRETARY KISSINGER INTERVIEWED FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES 102 

DEPARTMENT DISCUSSES IMPLEMENTATION OF ECONOMIC PROVISIONS 

OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE HELSINKI CONFERENCE 

Statement by Deputy Secretary Robinson 108 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



Vol. LXXVI No. 1963 
February 7, 1977 



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legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 



The State of the Union 



Address by President Ford to the Congress (Excerpts) ^ 



Because the transfer of authority in our 
form of government affects the state of the 
Union, and of the world, I am happy to re- 
port to you that the current transition is pro- 
ceeding very well. I was determined that it 
should; I wanted the new President to get off 
on an easier start than I had. 

When I became President on August 9, 
1974, our nation was deeply divided and tor- 
mented. In rapid succession, the Vice Presi- 
dent and the President had resigned in dis- 
grace. We were still struggling with the 
aftereffects of a long, unpopular, and bloody 
war in Southeast Asia. The economy was un- 
stable and racing toward the worst recession 
in 40 years. People were losing jobs. The cost 
of living was soaring. The Congress and the 
Chief Executive were at loggerheads. The 
integrity of our constitutional process and 
other institutions was being questioned. For 
more than 15 years, domestic spending had 
soared as Federal programs multiplied and 
the expense escalated annually. During the 
same period, our national security needs 
were steadily shortchanged. 

In the grave situation which prevailed in 
August 1974, our will to maintain our inter- 
national leadership was in doubt. I asked for 
your prayers and went to work. 

In January 1975 I reported to the Congress 
that the state of the Union was not good. I 
proposed urgent action to improve the econ- 
omy and to achieve energy independence in 



' Delivered on Jan. 12 (te.xt from Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents dated Jan. 17). 



10 years. I reassured America's allies and 
sought to reduce the danger of confrontation 
with potential adversaries. I pledged a new 
direction for America. 

Nineteen seventy-five was a year of dif- 
ficult decisions, but Americans responded 
with realism, common sense, and self- 
discipline. 

By January 1976 we were headed in a new 
direction, which I hold to be the right direc- 
tion for a free society. It was guided by the 
belief that successful problem-solving re- 
quires more than Federal action alone; that it 
involves a full partnership among all 
branches and all levels of government and 
public policies which nurture and promote 
the creative energies of private enterprises, 
institutions, and individual citizens. 

A year ago, I reported that the state of the 
Union was better — in many ways a lot 
better — but still not good enough. 

Common sense told me to stick to the 
steady course we were on, to continue to re- 
strain the inflationary growth of govern- 
ment, to reduce taxes as well as spending, to 
return local decisions to local officials, to 
provide for long-range sufficiency in energy 
and national security needs. I resisted the 
immense pressures of an election year to 
open the floodgates of Federal money and the 
temptation to promise more than I could de- 
liver. I told it as it was to the American 
people and demonstrated to the world that in 
our spirited political competition, as in this 
chamber, Americans can disagree without 
being disagreeable. 



February 7, 1977 



97 



Now, after 30 months as your President, I 
can say that while we still have a way to go, I 
am proud of the long way we have come to- 
gether. 

I am proud of the part I have had in re- 
building confidence in the Presidency, confi- 
dence in our free system, and confidence in 
our future. Once again, Americans believe in 
themselves, in their leaders, and in the prom- 
ise that tomorrow holds for their children. 

I am proud that today America is at peace. 
None of our sons are fighting and dying in 
battle anywhere in the world. And the 
chance for peace among all nations is im- 
proved by our determination to honor our 
vital commitments in defense of peace and 
freedom. 

I am proud that the United States has 
strong defenses, strong alliances, and a 
sound and courageous foreign policy. 

— Our alliances with major partners, the 
great industrial democracies of Western 
Europe, Japan, and Canada, have never been 
more solid. Consultations on mutual security, 
defense, and East-West relations have grown 
closer. Collaboration has branched out into 
new fields, such as energy, economic policy, 
and relations with the Third World. We have 
used many avenues for cooperation, including 
summit meetings held among major allied 
countries. The friendship of the democracies 
is deeper, warmer, and more effective than 
at any time in 30 years. 

— We are maintaining stability in the 
strategic nuclear balance and pushing back 
the specter of nuclear war. A decisive step 
forward was taken in the Vladivostok accord 
which I negotiated with General Secretary 
Brezhnev — joint recognition that an equal 
ceiling should be placed on the number of 
strategic weapons on each side. With resolve 
and wisdom on the part of both nations, a 
good agreement is well within reach this 
year. 

— The framework for peace in the Middle 
East has been built. Hopes for future prog- 
ress in the Middle East were stirred by the 
historic agreements we reached and the trust 
and confidence that we formed. Thanks to 
American leadership, the prospects for peace 
in the Middle East are brighter than they 



have been in three decades. The Arab states 
and Israel continue to look to us to lead them 
from confrontation and war to a new era of 
accommodation and peace. We have no alter- 
native but to persevere, and I am sure we 
will. The opportunities for a final settlement 
are great, and the price of failure is a return 
to the bloodshed and hatred that for too long 
have brought tragedy to all of the peoples of 
this area and repeatedly edged the world to 
the brink of war. 

— Our relationship with the People's Re- 
public of China is proving its importance and 
its durability. We are finding more and more 
common ground between our two countries 
on basic questions of international affairs. 

— In my two trips to Asia as President, we 
have reaffirmed America's continuing vital 
interest in the peace and security of Asia and 
the Pacific Basin, established a new partner- 
ship with Japan, confirmed our dedication to 
the security of Korea, and reinforced our ties 
with the free nations of Southeast Asia. 

— An historic dialogue has begun between 
industrial nations and developing nations. 
Most proposals on the table are the initia- 
tives of the United States, including those on 
food, energy, technology, trade, investment, 
and commodities. We are well launched on 
this process of shaping positive and reliable 
economic relations between rich nations and 
poor nations over the long term. 

— We have made progress in trade negotia- 
tions and avoided protectionism during re- 
cession. We strengthened the international 
monetary system. During the past two years 
the free world's most important economic 
powers have already brought about impor- 
tant changes that serve both developed and 
developing economies. The momentum al- 
ready achieved must be nurtured and 
strengthened, for the prosperity of the rich 
and poor depends upon it. 

— In Latin America, our relations have 
taken on a new maturity and a sense of com- 
mon enterprise. 

— In Africa, the quest for peace, racial jus- 
tice, and economic progress is at a crucial 
point. The United States, in close coopera- 
tion with the United Kingdom, is actively 
engaged in this historic process. Will change 



98 



Department of State Bulletin 



come about by warfare and chaos and foreign 
intervention? Or will it come about by 
negotiated and fair solutions, insuring major- 
ity rule, minority rights, and economic ad- 
vance? America is committed to the side of 
peace and justice and to the principle that 
Africa should shape its own future free of 
outside intervention. 

— American leadership has helped to 
stimulate new international efforts to stem 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to 
shape a comprehensive treaty governing the 
use of the oceans. 

I am gratified by these accomplishments. 
They constitute a record of broad success for 
America and for the peace and prosperity of 
all mankind. This Administration leaves to 
its successor a world in better condition than 
we found. We leave, as well, a solid founda- 
tion for progress on a range of issues that are 
vital to the well-being of America. 

What has been achieved in the field of 
foreign affairs, and what can be accomplished 
by the new Administration, demonstrate the 
genius of Americans working together for 
the common good. It is this, our remarkable 
ability to work together, that has made us a 
unique nation. It is Congress, the President, 
and the people striving for a better world. 

I know all patriotic Americans want this 
nation's foreign policy to succeed. 

I urge members of my party in this Con- 
gress to give the new President loyal support 
in this area. 

I express the hope that this new Congress 
will ree.xamine its constitutional role in in- 
ternational affairs. 

The exclusive right to declare war, the 
duty to advise and consent on the part of the 
Senate, the power of the purse on the part of 
the House, are ample authority for the legis- 
lative branch and should be jealously 
guarded. But because we may have been too 
careless of these powers in the past does not 
justify congressional intrusion into, or 
obstruction of, the proper exercise of Presi- 
dential responsibilities now or in the future. 
There can be only one Commander-in-Chief. 
In these times crises cannot be managed and 
wars cannot be waged by committee. Nor can 
peace be pursued solely by parliamentary 



debate. To the ears of the world, the Presi- 
dent speaks for the nation. While he is of 
course ultimately accountable to the Con- 
gress, the courts, and the people, he and his 
emissaries must not be handicapped in ad- 
vance in their relations with foreign govern- 
ments as has sometimes happened in the 
past. 

Energy is absolutely vital to the defense of 
our country, to the strength of our economy, 
and to the quality of our Hves. Two years ago 
I proposed to the Congress the first com- 
prehensive national energy program: a spe- 
cific and coordinated set of measures that 
would end our vulnerability to embargo, 
blockade, or arbitrary price increases and 
would mobilize U. S. technology and re- 
sources to supply a significant share of the 
free world's energy after 1985. Of the major 
energy proposals I submitted two years ago, 
only half, belatedly, became law. 

In 1973 we were dependent upon foreign 
oil imports for 36 percent of our needs. 
Today we are 40 percent dependent, and 
we'll pay out $34 billion for foreign oil this 
year. Such vulnerability at present or in the 
future is intolerable and must be ended. 

The answer to where we stand on our na- 
tional energy effort today reminds me of the 
old argument about whether the tank is half 
full or half empty. The pessimist will say we 
have half failed to achieve our 10-year energy 
goals; the optimist will say that we have half 
succeeded. I am always an optimist, but we 
must make up for lost time. 

We have laid a solid foundation for com- 
pleting the enormous task which confronts 
us. I have signed into law five major energy 
bills which contain significant measures for 
conservation, resource development, 
stockpiling, and standby authorities. 

We have moved forward to develop the 
naval petroleum reserves; to build a 500- 
million-barrel strategic petroleum stockpile; 
to phase out unnecessary government alloca- 
tion and price controls; to develop a lasting 
relationship with other oil-consuming na- 
tions; to improve the efficiency of energy use 
through conservation in automobiles, build- 
ings, and industry; and to expand research 



February 7, 1977 



99 



on new technology and renewable resources, 
such as wind power, geothermal and solar 
energy. 

All these actions, significant as they are 
for the long term, are only the beginning. I 
recently submitted to the Congress my pro- 
posals to reorganize the Federal energy 
structure and the hard choices which remain 
if we are serious about reducing our depend- 
ence upon foreign energy. These include pro- 
grams to reverse our declining production of 
natural gas and increase incentives for 
domestic crude oil production. I proposed to 
minimize environmental uncertainties affect- 
ing coal development, expand nuclear power 
generation, and create an Energy Independ- 
ence Authority to provide government finan- 
cial assistance for vital energy programs 
where private capital is not available. 

We must explore every reasonable pros- 
pect for meeting our energy needs when our 
current domestic reserves of oil and natural 
gas begin to dwindle in the next decade. 

I urgently ask Congress and the new Ad- 
ministration to move quickly on these issues. 
This nation has the resources and the capabil- 
ity to achieve our energy goals if its govern- 
ment has the will to proceed, and I think we 
do. 



America's first goal is and always will be 
peace with honor. America must remain first 
in keeping peace in the world. We can remain 
first in peace only if we are never second in 
defense. 

In presenting the state of the Union to the 
Congress and to the American people, I have 
a special obligation as Commander-in-Chief 
to report on our national defense. Our sur- 
vival as a free and independent people re- 
quires, above all, strong military forces that 
are well equipped and highly trained to per- 
form their assigned mission. 

I am particularly gratified to report that 
over the past two and a half years we have 
been able to reverse the dangerous decline of 
the previous decade in real resources this 
country was devoting to national defense. 
This was an immediate problem I faced in 
1974. The evidence was unmistakable that 



the Soviet Union had been steadily increas- 
ing the resources it applied to building its 
military strength. During this same period the 
United States' real defense spending declined. 
In my three budgets we not only arrested that 
dangerous decline, but we have established the 
positive trend which is essential to our ability 
to contribute to peace and stability in the 
world. 

The Vietnam war, both materially and 
psychologically, affected our overall defense 
posture. The dangerous antimilitary senti- 
ment discouraged defense spending and un- 
fairly disparaged the men and women who 
serve in our armed forces. 

The challenge that now confronts this 
country is whether we have the national will 
and determination to continue this essential 
defense effort over the long term, as it must 
be continued. We can no longer afford to os- 
cillate from year to year in so vital a matter. 
Indeed, we have a duty to look beyond the 
immediate question of budgets and to 
examine the nature of the problem we will 
face over the next generation. 

I am the first recent President able to ad- 
dress long-term basic issues without the bur- 
den of Vietnam. The war in Indochina con- 
sumed enormous resources at the very time 
that the overwhelming strategic superiority 
we once enjoyed was disappearing. In past 
years, as a result of decisions by the United 
States, our strategic forces leveled off. Yet 
the Soviet Union continued a steady, constant 
buildup of its own forces, committing a high 
percentage of its national economic effort to 
defense. 

The United States can never tolerate a 
shift in strategic balance against us or even a 
situation where the American people or our 
allies believe the balance is shifting against 
us. The United States would risk the most 
serious political consequences if the world 
came to believe that our adversaries have a 
decisive margin of superiority. 

To maintain a strategic balance we must 
look ahead to the 1980's and beyond. The 
sophistication of modern weapons requires 
that we make decisions now if we are to in- 
sure our security 10 years from now. 

Therefore I have consistently advocated 



100 



Department of State Bulletin 



and strongly urged that we pursue three crit- 
ical strategic programs: the Trident missile 
launching submarine; the B-1 bomber, with 
its superior capability to penetrate modern 
air defenses; and a more advanced intercon- 
tinental ballistic missile that will be better 
able to survive nuclear attack and deliver a 
devastating retaliatory strike. 

In an era where the strategic nuclear 
forces are in rough equilibrium, the risks of 
conflict below the nuclear threshold may 
grow more perilous. A major long-term ob- 
jective therefore is to maintain capabilities to 
deal with, and thereby deter, conventional 
challenges and crises, particularly in Europe. 

We cannot rely solely on strategic forces to 
guarantee our security or to deter all types 
of aggression. We must have superior naval 
and marine forces to maintain freedom of the 
seas; strong multipurpose tactical air forces; 
and mobile, modern ground forces. 

Accordingly, I have directed a long-term 
effort to improve our worldwide capabilities 
to deal with regional crises: 

— I have submitted a five-year naval build- 
ing program indispensable to the nation's 
maritime strategy. 

— Because the security of Europe and the 
integrity of NATO remain the cornerstone of 
American defense policy, I have initiated a 
special long-term program to insure the 
capacity of the alliance to deter or defeat ag- 
gression in Europe. 



As I leave office, I can report that our na- 
tional defense is effectively deterring conflict 
today. Our armed forces are capable of carry- 
ing out the variety of missions assigned to 
them. Programs are underway which will as- 
sure we can deter war in the years ahead. 

But I also must warn that it will require a 
sustained effort over a period of years to 
maintain these capabilities. We must have 
the wisdom, the stamina, and the courage to 
prepare today for the perils of tomorrow, and 
I believe we will. 



Letters of Credence 

Argentina 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Argentine Republic, Jorge Antonio Aja Es- 
pil, presented his credentials to President 
Ford on January 13. * 

Mexico 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
United Mexican States, Hugo B. Margain, 
presented his credentials to President Ford 
on January 13. ^ 



' For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the Presi- 
dent's reply, see Department of State press release dated 
January 13. 



February 7, 1977 



101 



Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for the New York Times 



Following is an interview with Secretary 
Kissinger by James Reston, Hedrick Smith, 
and Bernard Gwertzman, as published in the 
New York Times on January 20. 

Press release 18 dated January 21 

Q. A number of serious charges have been 
made against you, and the Times thought 
you should have the opportunity to answer 
them. The first charge is that in a solemn 
world you tried to be funny. 

Secretary Kissinger: In this job you have 
only two choices: you are either funny dehb- 
erately or you are funny unintentionally. 

Q. Are you in a lighthearted tnood, or do 
you want to be serious? 

Secretary Kissinger: Frankly, I am more 
serious. 

Q. What does it add tip to? What legacy 
have you left behind? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I really do not 
know whether on my last day in office I am in 
the best position to evaluate. Just before I 
came here I wrote an article in which I said 
the world is bipolar militarily, multipolar 
politically, and fragmented economically. 
When you talk of world order now you have 
to take account of each of these realities and 
also the fact that probably history will record 
this as one of the philosophical revolutions of 
history. 

In the nature of things, this task could not 
have been completed — even without Water- 
gate. That is the basic thing. I think in one 
way or another the relationship between 
China, the Soviet Union, the industrial de- 
mocracies, the United States, and the de- 
veloping world — this five-sided aspect — is a 
permanent feature of the future. 



I think that in our relations with the indus- 
trial democracies, what I proposed in 1973 
has been more or less accomplished. The 
method I chose as a formal declaration 
turned out not to be the right one, but the 
reality is that now the industrial democracies 
talk not just about their military security 
but their political and economic future has 
been achieved. 

Now, this has to be strengthened, because 
if the cohesion can be increased, then both 
the dialogue with the East and the dialogue 
with the South can be conducted with enor- 
mous confidence. 

We, the industrial democracies, transfer 90 
percent of all the real resources that go to 
the developing world, so if we can develop a 
unified approach we, and only we, can make 
a significant contribution to development. 

In the East-West dialogue I refuse to be 
mesmerized by Soviet strength. It is real, 
but there are also real weaknesses, and I 
think a combination of diplomacy, negotia- 
tion, and strength can keep this in check. 

Q. When you look back on this do you look 
back with pride, with sadness, anger, or 
what? 

Secretary Kissinger: Certainly not with 
anger. I look back with some pride. I think if 
you compare the world report in 1969 with 
the world today, you must consider it more 
peaceful, more hopeful, and with more 
chance for progress. On the other hand, I 
look back with sadness because of the an- 
guish that the country suffered during this 
period, the bitterness of the debate on Viet- 
nam, in the disintegration of authority on the 
Watergate, the destruction of some people I 
knew, and in the sense of things that one 
would have liked to accomplish and didn't 
quite finish. 



102 



Department of State Bulletin 



Q. What in particular? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I would have 
liked to have finished the SALT [Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks] agreement. 

Q. Whij wasn't it finished? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think it was partly 
the other side, partly the election, and partly 
internal disputes within the Administration. 

Q. How do you feel about the future of 
Western civilization? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think the West has 
material strength to deal with all of its prob- 
lems. It has the resources to deal with a 
North-South dialogue; it has the capacity, 
militarily, to prevent aggression; and it has 
the ability to conduct an effective diplomacy. 
What it needs is imagination, dedication, and 
a view of the future. I believe that is attain- 
able. 

Q. Do you think the prospects are better 
now than they were two years ago? 

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, because we have 
gotten through Watergate and because we 
have made great progress in strengthening 
the dialogue with the industrial democracies, 
because unless the free peoples live to- 
gether, we will not be able to solve either the 
East-West or North-South problem. 

Q. When yoii look back, what are the four 
or five moments that you think about with 
most pride? Are there some things that come 
to your mind immediately? 

Secretary Kissinger: Of course landing in 
China was a tremendous experience. When 
Le Due Tho put on the table the proposal 
which I knew would end the Vietnamese war, 
that was a tremendous feeling because I 
thought, not knowing that Watergate was 
coming, that it would unify the American 
people again, which, if you look at my press 
briefings between 1969 and 1973, was my 
overwhelming concern; the SALT agree- 
ment; the signing of the Shanghai com- 
munique; the first disengagement agreement 
between the Egyptians and Israel; and 
strangely enough, the first Rambouillet 
summit, because it meant that at least we 



were beginning to pull the industrial democ- 
racies together. Finally, I was terribly 
moved when President Kaunda got up at the 
end of my Lusaka speech and embraced me. I 
thought that was a moving occasion. 

Q. The African diplomacy that you put so 
much effort into last year, has it sort of 
stalled and fizzled out because of the elec- 
tions ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think the 
elections slowed it down because all of the 
participants are waiting to see what the new 
Administration is going to do and to see 
whether the terms of reference can be 
changed. But I think once Smith [Ian D. 
Smith, of Rhodesia] made his basic speech 
the course was set for settlement. 

I cannot tell you what the exact terms will 
be, but those are not as fundamental as the 
fact that Smith is committed to majority 
rule. 

Q. What were your nightmares during this 
period? 

Secretary Kissinger: One nightmare that I 
am sure my successors will have as well is to 
make sure that some crisis does not escalate 
into nuclear war and that unthinkingly we 
contribute to a massive conflagration. 

The second nightmare was that the Viet- 
nam war would so split our country that rec- 
onciliation would be totally impossible. That 
was immediately followed by the nightmare 
of preventing the collapse of executive au- 
thority from leading to foreign challenge, of 
managing a major crisis in the Middle East 
when our own executive authority was under 
assault. 

In the last period my nightmare was that 
America might become so absorbed with it- 
self and so purist and so critical of itself that 
it would forget that it is the key element for 
security, progress, and freedom in the world. 
I think all of these nightmares are on the way 
to being solved. 

Q. And the agenda for the rest of 1977? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think for 1977 we 
have some rather positive prospects. I think 
in 1977 a SALT agreement ought to be at- 



February 7, 1977 



103 



tainable. The objective conditions for making 
progress in the Middle East are better than 
they have been probably at any time since 
the creation of Israel. 

I do not want to put my successor on the 
spot by pretending it will be easy. It will be a 
murderously difficult, complicated effort. All 
I am saying is the conditions exist for a 
heroic effort. 

I think we can make a breakthrough on law 
of the seas this year. I think we have already 
made major progress, and we can consolidate 
and extend it, on nonproliferation. I think we 
can carry the Rhodesian and Namibian mat- 
ters to a conclusion this year. I do not see 
any overwhelming crises in 1977 unless 
things in Africa get totally out of control, but 
I don't really expect that. 

Q. Panama? 

Secretary Kissinger: Panama is another 
matter that I think will be settled this year. 

Q. You were talking earlier about getting 
together ivith the industrial democracies. 
What about energy supplies and our rela- 
tions particularly with the Arab world? We 
have a respite for six 7nonths because of the 
Saudi decision in prices, but we really have 
not settled that problem. 

Secretary Kissinger: On energy we created 
the International Energy Agency, which I 
believe is an extremely useful institution. We 
have worked out within it a common policy to 
prevent selective embargoes and to obligate 
industrial democracies to support each other. 
It has a good program for developing alter- 
native sources and for conservation. The 
missing link has been the refusal of the 
United States to implement what this pro- 
gram foresees in the area of alternative 
sources, of conservation, and since we con- 
sume 40 percent of the energy of the indus- 
trial democracies we can write whatever plan 
we want, but unless we implement it, it will 
not really help. 

We must work to prevent a situation from 
continuing where every six months or a year 
the West waits impotently while a group of 
nations that do not have identical interests 
decides about its economic future. 

We got through the last OPEC [Organiza- 



tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries] 
meeting, but unless we have changed the ob- 
jective conditions in which energy is being 
dealt with, we will face the same problem 
again. The key is for the nations that are as- 
sembled in the International Energy Agency 
to develop a major program of alternative 
sources, a significant program of conserva- 
tion, and to use all other political tools to en- 
courage restraint among the oil producers. 
Otherwise, as you look four or five years 
ahead, it is frivolous to assume that some- 
times decisions will not be taken that could 
be potentially catastrophic for our economy. 
We were lucky this year, or skillful or 
able, but you cannot do it every year. 

Q. Would you agree that until very re- 
cently the perception of other countries, par- 
ticularly in the Third Wo^id, was that this 
country and its leadership did not care much 
about their problems? 

Secretary Kissinger: It is forgotten today 
that until the end of 1972 we were heavily 
preoccupied with the war in Vietnam and 
with the relationships it took to extricate 
ourselves. For example — putting aside the 
Third World for a moment — we could not 
really make great progress in relations with 
Western Europe as long as in every Western 
European country the issue of Vietnam was 
an inhibition to closer relations with the 
United States. So the war had to be ended 
first. I think it is true that until 1973 we did 
not give it systematic major attention. 

From the end of 1973 on, and in the last 
three years, I think the Third World has 
been a focal point, and if you look at the 
agenda of these discussions in food, in financ- 
ing, and in the development and the transfer 
of technology, the entire international 
agenda was put forward by us. There is al- 
most no other agenda. 

Q. Is there any validity to the argument 
that essentially what this record is that you 
have left here is essentially a brilliant 
negotiatiyig record, tactically very good but 
strategically weak? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I am not the 
best judge of this; but I have to say that I 
pass on a world that is at peace, more at 



104 



Department of State Bulletin 



peace than in any previous transition, in 
which, in addition, in every problem area so- 
lutions can be foreseen even if they have not 
been fully achieved and the framework for 
solutions exist, in which the agenda of most 
international negotiations was put forward 
by the United States. Therefore it cannot be 
entirely an accident, and it cannot be a series 
of tactical improvisations. 

I think it would be more useful to debate 
the nature of the design than to deny that 
there has been a design. The denial shows 
lack of understanding of the nature of foreign 
policy. 

The surface expression of our Middle East 
policy was shuttle diplomacy, but the condi- 
tions that made shuttle diplomacy possible 
were created over four years of a rather 
painful accumulation of new answers. There 
may be some people who remember an inter- 
view I gave in 1970 in which I said what our 
strategy would be in the Middle East and 
people laughed about it. So I think there has 
been a design, and my associates will cer- 
tainly confirm that whenever a problem came 
up we would spend hours here every morning 
before we went into any tactics trying to fig- 
ure out where this thing should go. So I dis- 
agree with that. 

We would almost never accept here a dis- 
cussion of a tactical move without accom- 
panying description of what the implications 
were over a considerable period of time. 

When you take the Lusaka speech, we 
spent weeks here analyzing where we should 
try to go in Africa and how we could balance 
our concern for majority rule with our 
equally strong concern to prevent the 
radicalization of all of Africa, and it was not 
simply a tactical device to get through a few 
weeks' period. In fact there was no demand 
for it at all. 

Q. On the strategic relations with the Rus- 
sians and the Chinese, are they likely to 
come back together again? Is there something 
we have to worry about? Are there differ- 
ences we can still exploit? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is a mistake 
to define the Sino-Soviet relationships in 
terms of our exploiting their differences. 
Their differences came about without our 



comprehending it at the time. We did not 
create them; we cannot exploit them; we can 
only base our policy on the fact that China is 
doing us no favor, is not opposing Soviet 
hegemony as a favor to us; and therefore we 
have to understand the fundamental trends 
that affect these countries. 

I believe it is important that the People's 
Republic of China continue to perceive us as 
interested in maintaining a world equilib- 
rium. If they feel we have lost our interest in 
it or our comprehension of it or our willing- 
ness to preserve it, then they will draw the 
inevitable conclusion, which will be to make 
whatever accommodation they can get, or 
they will try to find some other means of pro- 
tection, such as organizing the Third World 
against both of us. 

You can take either one of those courses. I 
believe that of course the Soviet Union is a 
superpower and as such impinges on us in 
many parts of the world. It is a growing mili- 
tary power that in many respects has the 
capacity to threaten our survival. 

I believe, however, that the military prob- 
lem is soluble. I believe the Soviet Union as a 
system is beset by tremendous weaknesses. 
There is no Communist state in the world 
that has managed to achieve spontaneous 
support of its population. 

The states of Eastern Europe have to ap- 
peal to a sort of bourgeois nationalism to 
maintain a modicum of legitimacy; and to 
imagine that societies that are doing well in 
certain high-priority areas of military techni- 
cal knowledge but that have never solved ef- 
fectively the problem of distribution and of 
even simple administration, that those 
societies can launch themselves on an inde- 
terminate course of world domination 
without grave hesitation, seems to me un- 
realistic. 

Yes, we have to build up enough military 
forces to resist them, but we have to know 
what forces are relevant. I believe that to 
achieve a usable military superiority in the 
field of strategic nuclear weapons is ex- 
tremely unlikely and relatively easy to pre- 
vent and the obsession with it detracts us. I 
would say that if there is a conflict between 
the Soviet Union and us, it is much less likely 
to occur as a result of a Soviet attack, delib- 



Febroary 7, 1977 



105 



erate attack, on a vital interest of the United 
States than as a result of a conflict that 
maybe neither of us saw, into which we are 
drawn through a series of escalating moves. 

In other words, I think World War I is a 
better guide to our dangers than World War 
II. 

Q. In retrospect, should we have gotten 
into major economic deals with the Rus- 
sians ? 

Secretary Kissinger: The curious thing is 
that when we came in in 1969 we developed 
the theory of linkage. The theory of linkage 
was that the Soviet Union would get eco- 
nomic concessions in return for political 
stabilization. At that time we were criticized 
because we were told that we should simply 
go ahead with the economic programs be- 
cause they were produced as political 
stabilizers. 

Q. Is it possible for our people to achieve 
the kind of security that they would like to 
have without creating such a sense of insecu- 
rity in the minds of our adversaries as to be 
dangerous to the world? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is the es- 
sence of the new circumstances I have de- 
scribed that no nation can achieve absolute 
security. Absolute security for one nation 
means absolute insecurity for all nations. We 
have to be satisfied now with relative securi- 
ty, with security that makes it extremely 
improbable that our vital interests are 
threatened but still one that is not totally 
predominant in the world. 

The first time we gave a credit to the 
Soviet Union was after the Berlin agreement 
of 1971, and I would say without exception 
all the economic agreements we made with 
the Soviet Union were parallel to some polit- 
ical agreement. All of our economic agree- 
ments were tied to specific projects. We did 
not give general unrestricted credit, and the 
total amount was something like $400 million. 
As a result of our own domestic debate, in 
effect a freeze was put on this evolution. The 
truth of this has been that the Europeans and 
Japanese have given about $10 billion of un- 



restricted credit to the Soviet Union. 

The Europeans and Japanese are in a much 
worse situation than we to insist on a politi- 
cal quid pro quo, and I have always fully be- 
lieved that economic programs allied to 
specific political foreign projects create the 
possibility first of making specific foreign 
policy agreements, and, secondly, creating 
incentives for cooperation, incentives for re- 
straint. 

If you think of some of these projects that 
would take 15 years to implement before 
there would be any return and if you think of 
the fact that in 15 years other powers would 
have risen that would take some of the load 
of containing the military threat, that is not 
something that one should simply ignore. 

Q. What about a link with force reduction 
talks in Vienna? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I do not want to 
prescribe to the new Administration what 
they should link it to, but they will find 
enough things to link it to if they analyze the 
situation. No, it is not dead, and I think 
Berlin should be actively pursued. 

Q. If you were carrying on, is that some- 
thing you would link, large-scale economic 
involvetnent, yourself? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know whether 
I would link it above all the restraints in 
peripheral areas. 

Q. "Absolute security for one nation is ab- 
solute insecurity for other nations." Would 
you use that principle in the Middle East as 
well as in a strategic relationship? 

Secretary Kissinger: The problem in the 
Middle East is to balance physical security 
against legitimacy. There is no question that 
Israel's physical security is best guaranteed 
by the widest extension of its frontier and at 
no other point are they as physically secure as 
at the maximum point of their extension. 

On the other hand, politically and in the 
long term, they may be militarily even less 
secure if they do not achieve legitimacy. 
Now, how to balance these factors is the di- 
lemma of the Middle East settlement. 



106 



Department of State Bulletin 



Q. How can our aid to Israel he balanced'? 

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that Israel 
must have a sense of security in the military 
field or it cannot negotiate effectively and we 
must not, in attempting to press for a set- 
tlement, break the spirit of Israel and its 
ability to defend itself. 

Q. Let me ask you — I want to be personal 
because it is not just a tour of the horizon we 
are doing here, it is you who is leaving. What 
has this experience done to you? 

Secretary Kissinger: It is going to be quite 
a sight when they carry me out at noon on 
the 20th, like Sewell Avery. That may be the 
only way they will get me out of here. 

Q. Seriously, what did it do to you? 

Secretary Kissinger: Again, I am sure I 
will be more thoughtful about that two 
months from now than now. I have said re- 
peatedly, maybe too often in recent days, 
that the quality that most outsiders do not 
understand is the athletic aspect of decision- 
making so that you really have to react in 
very short timeframes that do not permit 
time for reflection. 

I think I have developed great compassion 
for my successors. I do not think you can 
leave this office — before I came to Washing- 
ton I thought it was very thrilling to be 
called down here as a consultant and I 
thought it was important for me to pick on 
the incumbents and for all I know I may wind 
up doing that. I have my doubts now on the 
utility of outsiders — I am sure I will do my 
utmost to avoid volunteering advice to my 
successors. 



I really think what this country needs now 
is a period of tranquillity and confidence and 
that those of us who have seen this process 
have an obligation to help build that confi- 
dence. That is what I would most like to do. 



U.S. and Republic of Korea Sign 
New Fisheries Agreement 

Joint Statement 

Press release 2 dated January 4 

On January 4, 1977, representatives of the 
United States of America and the Republic 
of Korea signed a new agreement relating to 
fishing activities of the Republic of Korea off 
the coasts of the United States. 

The agreement sets out the arrangements 
between the countries which will govern fish- 
ing by vessels of the Republic of Korea 
within the fishery conservation zone of the 
United States beginning on March 1, 1977. 
The agreement will come into force after the 
completion of internal procedures by both 
governments. 

The signing of this agreement took place in 
Washington. His Excellency Dr. Pyong- 
choon Hahm, Ambassador of the Republic of 
Korea to the United States, signed for the 
Republic of Korea. Ambassador Frederick 
Irving, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Oceans and International Environmental and 
Scientific Affairs, signed for the United 
States. Both representatives expressed their 
satisfaction with the new accord and the hope 
that it will strengthen cooperation between 
the Republic of Korea and the United States. 



February 7, 1977 



107 



Department Discusses Implementation of Economic Provisions 
of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference 

Statement by Deputy Secretary Charles W. Robinson ^ 



I am pleased to have this opportunity to 
appear before the Commission. I understand 
that the purpose of these hearings is to ena- 
ble the Commission to receive information 
and opinions relating to that portion of the 
Final Act of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe known as "Basket 
Two" (Cooperation in the Field of Econom- 
ics, of Science and Technology and of the En- 
vironment).^ 

As you are aware, the Administration's 
overall view of the CSCE and of the im- 
plementation of the Final Act's provisions 
was contained in the President's December 3 
report to the Commission.^ My testimony 
today centers on economic questions that fall 
under the Basket Two provisions, which we 
understand to be the focus of these hearings. 

I believe that thoroughgoing discussions, 
such as have been organized during these 
two days, will help to make clear both to the 
Congress and to the American public the 
range of problems and the prospects for 
practical cooperation surrounding the 



' Made before the Commission on Security and Coop- 
eration in Europe on Jan. 14. The complete transcript 
of the hearings will be published by the Commission and 
will be available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C. 20402. 

'^ For te.xt of the Final Act of the Conference on Secu- 
rity and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), signed at Hel- 
sinki on Aug. 1, 1975, see Bulletin of Sept.l, 1975, 
p. 323. 

^ First Semiannual Report by the President to the 
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
Report submitted to the House Committee on Interna- 
tional Relations. Committee print. December 1976. 62 
pp. 



numerous provisions included in Basket Two. 
For the moment, I would like to turn directly 
to the specific points Mr. Fascell [Congress- 
man Dante B. Fascell, Chairman of the Com- 
mission] asked me to address in this prepared 
statement. Later, in response to further 
questions the Commissioners may have, I 
would be pleased to amplify any items dealt 
with in this statement as well as other perti- 
nent issues. 

First, however, I would like to briefly re- 
view the objectives of the United States and 
the West in general in Basket Two of the 
CSCE, which were similar to those pursued 
throughout all the subject areas covered in 
the conference. We wished to obtain specific 
commitments which would lead to improve- 
ments in areas which have proven to be prob- 
lems for the development of East-West con- 
tacts and cooperation. 

In the economic and trade fields, these 
Western objectives focused on working 
conditions for businessmen, including such 
practical matters as the availability of office 
and residential facilities, increased economic 
and commercial information of use to busi- 
nessmen, improved possibilities for the pro- 
motion and marketing of products, better 
contact between officials involved in business 
transactions, including end users, and stimu- 
lation of joint industrial cooperation projects. 

These objectives were pursued through a 
wide range of specific proposals advanced by 
Western countries and were dealt with in 
conference subcommittees created at the in- 
sistence of the Western delegations to insure 
the kind of detailed negotiation required. To 



108 



Department of State Bulletin 



a large extent the Western objectives were 
met. The Final Act, while neither a treaty 
nor an international agreement, contains a 
number of specific commitments to improve 
standards of performance in areas of interest 
to Western businessmen. 

Signature of the Helsinki Final Act at the 
highest level imposes a strong moral and 
political obligation to carry through on these 
commitments. There has been limited im- 
plementation in Basket Two areas of interest 
to the West and the United States; much re- 
mains to be done. 

U.S. Interests in East-West Economic Ties 

Mr. Chairman, you asked first for my 
evaluation of U.S. interests in economic 
cooperation with the Soviet Union and East- 
ern European countries, the current status of 
this cooperation, and the obstacles to its fur- 
ther development. 

The United States attaches great impor- 
tance to the maintenance and improvement of 
trade and economic relations with the Soviet 
Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. 
Expanding trade, with proper safeguards 
against the sale of goods that would make a 
significant contribution to the military poten- 
tial of these countries, can serve both our 
economic and political interests. The United 
States must derive from these relations the 
usual benefit of foreign trade — namely, a 
market for U.S. goods, with the consequent 
creation of jobs at home and positive effects 
on our balance of trade — as well as a source 
of needed raw materials and of goods pro- 
duced more economically abroad. 

The political dimension of this trade has 
long been of great importance to all parties. 
It is generally accepted that progress in 
political relations must go hand in hand with 
expanding economic relations and that trade 
in turn contributes to more stable political 
ties. And commercial ties require public sup- 
port in the United States — both from leaders 
of the business community and from the pub- 
lic at large. 

Finally, we see in the development of good 
trade and economic ties with the Communist 
countries the possibility for improving con- 



tacts across the wide spectrum of govern- 
ment, private organizations, and individuals 
engaged in this activity, such as commercial 
officers, trade representatives, company of- 
ficials, technical specialists, and industrial 
enterprise managers. Increased human con- 
tacts open valuable avenues for the reduction 
of misunderstanding and distrust between 
our governments and people. 

Obstacles to Rapid Expansion of Trade 

There are some practical obstacles to rapid 
expansion of trade and economic intercourse 
with the Communist countries. 

One of the more evident is the continuing 
difficulty the Soviets and East Europeans 
have in matching their desired import levels 
from the West with like amounts of exports. 
Clearly these countries, which have incon- 
vertible currencies, cannot indefinitely buy 
from hard-currency areas more than they sell 
to those areas. Increased export capabihty, 
however, requires the production of goods 
that are competitive in price and quality in 
world markets. Manufactured goods from the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have yet 
to make an appreciable dent in Western mar- 
kets, and supply problems appear to limit the 
growth of their exports of raw materials. In 
purely trade terms, then, a major obstacle to 
the continued rapid growth of East-West 
trade is the apparent inability of the Com- 
munist countries to achieve large gains in 
their exports to hard-currency customers. 

The continuing inadequacy of public eco- 
nomic and commercial data in most Com- 
munist countries is another obstacle to the 
growth of trade. Limited information re- 
stricts the abihty of our companies to make 
rational business proposals to their commer- 
cial counterparts in the East. As a result, 
both sides lose the benefits of potential busi- 
ness transactions: our firms miss business 
opportunities; and the countries involved do 
not receive either the products, processes, or 
plants which would add to their economic 
well-being, or at least they do not have the 
opportunity to consider an offer from an al- 
ternative, and possibly more advantageous, 
source of supply. 



February 7, 1977 



109 



Another important obstacle to trade has 
been our inability to extend nondiscrimina- 
tory treatment and government-sponsored 
credits to the U.S.S.R. and certain Eastern 
European countries, due to the restrictions 
in the Trade Act of 1974 and the Export- 
Import Bank Act of 1975. The lack of Exim- 
bank credits means that U.S. firms cannot 
compete on an equal basis with their coun- 
terparts in Western Europe and Japan. The 
absence of most-favored-nation treatment 
makes it more difficult for the countries af- 
fected to sell competitively in the United 
States. It is also regarded as discrimination 
by the Soviets and East Europeans, who 
have responded by diverting some business 
away from U.S. firms. It is impossible to 
estimate the exact value of the trade that has 
been lost as a result of the legislative restric- 
tions. While the Soviet claim that the United 
States has lost 2 billion dollars' worth of or- 
ders is probably exaggerated, there is no 
doubt the loss has been significant. 

Role of CSCE Economic Provisions 

Regarding your second question, the pro- 
visions of Basket Two can in principle serve 
our interests in heightened economic and 
trade relations with the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe by helping to overcome ob- 
stacles to trade expansion, some of which I 
described earher. 

For example, the numerous provisions on 
business facilitation, business contacts, mar- 
keting, and industrial cooperation, if fully 
implemented, would help our firms to sell 
and would improve the export potential of 
the Soviets and East Europeans over the 
long run. Meanwhile, innovative trade and 
financing arrangements, including coproduc- 
tion and "compensation" transactions, could 
enable the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
to continue their present high level of imports 
of goods from the Western countries without 
significant near-term drawdowns of scarce 
hard-currency reserves. 

Further, we believe that the Communist 
countries are overlooking potentially valu- 
able trade opportunities with Western firms 
and organizations by not making enough in- 



formation available to permit these firms to 
make reasonable business proposals. I recog- 
nize the political reality of the centralized 
foreign trade structure existing in each of 
these countries. We do not see in the CSCE a 
device for forcing changes on these systems. 
Nonetheless, full implementation of the Bas- 
ket Two provisions for improving the flow of 
economic and commercial data, together with 
the provisions calling for better access by our 
businessmen to the potential end users of 
their technology and equipment in these 
countries, could in our view have very posi- 
tive results. 

Information and Business Facilitation 

The third specific question raised by 
Chairman Fascell was whether or not real 
progress has been achieved since Helsinki in 
the important areas of economic and com- 
mercial information, business facilitation, 
and industrial cooperation. I would like to 
refer the Commissioners to the full and de- 
tailed information provided by the President 
recently in his first semiannual report to the 
Commission. That information remains cur- 
rent and valid. I might just now briefly 
summarize the findings contained in the 
President's report. 

Provision of useful, relevant economic and 
commercial information by the U.S.S.R. and 
Eastern European countries has improved 
only marginally since Helsinki. The most 
forthcoming have been Hungary and Poland, 
which now make available relatively com- 
prehensive and meaningful statistics, plan 
narratives, lists of foreign trade laws and 
regulations, and directories of organizations 
and officials engaged in foreign trade. 
Romania and the Soviet Union are at the 
other end of the spectrum, having taken vir- 
tually no unilateral steps to improve their 
performance. 

The Soviet Union claims that, as a unilat- 
eral CSCE initiative, it now publishes 
foreign trade statistics quarterly as well as 
annually. These figures, however, are so 
highly aggregated both by area of the world 
and by commodity breakdown as to be virtu- 
ally useless to businessmen. Further, the 



110 



Department of State Bulletin 



Soviet Union reduced by one-third the 
number of copies printed of the most recent 
edition of its annual economic statistical 
handbook. 

Romania has improved somewhat its per- 
formance in the provision of data under exist- 
ing bilateral agreements. In the agricultural 
field, for instance, the Romanians have re- 
cently expressed a willingness to be more 
forthcoming in implementing the informa- 
tion-exchange provisions of the September 
1975 bilateral Protocol on Development of 
Agricultural Trade — a willingness we intend 
to test in the near future. 

In the area of business facilitation, Soviet 
and Eastern European performance has been 
somewhat better. Those countries which 
permitted foreign firms to open permanent 
offices on their territory before Helsinki 
have processed new requests reasonably 
promptly in the post-Helsinki period. Some 
other countries, which before Helsinki had 
not allowed foreign firms to open offices, 
have now begun to do so. Czechoslovakia and 
Bulgaria promulgated new regulations after 
Helsinki permitting, in principle, foreign 
firms to open offices in their capitals. Several 
Western companies have had applications 
approved to establish offices in Prague, and a 
few have opened offices in Sofia. None of 
these is American. Also, the German Demo- 
cratic Republic moved with reasonable dis- 
patch to grant permission to open an office in 
East Berlin to the one American firm (Dow 
Chemical) wishing to do so. 

On the question of access to end users we 
find that Soviet and Eastern European com- 
pliance to date with Basket Two commit- 
ments has been disappointing. Such access is 
effectively precluded in most of the Eastern 
countries. As I stated earlier, we believe 
that permitting Western businessmen ready 
contacts with potential end users of their 
equipment /row the outset of a possible busi- 
ness transaction is a needed element in the 
trade "normalization" process, and we en- 
courage U.S. firms to press for such access. 

Regarding industrial cooperation, the pro- 
visions of the Final Act in this area are ba- 
sically a confirmation of a process that was 
already well in train before the CSCE 



negotiations began. Therefore, while indus- 
trial cooperation projects in their various 
forms, especially the so-called "compensa- 
tion" deals, are in fact increasing in number 
and are recognized by both East and West as 
useful to the overall economic relationship, 
one should not attribute this progress to 
Final Act provisions alone. 

U.S. Actions To Promote Implementation 

Concerning steps that the next Congress 
and Administration might consider to pro- 
mote further implementation of Basket Two 
provisions, I beheve that a sound basis for 
future progress has been laid by a number of 
positive actions which the U.S. Government 
has already taken. 

The U.S. record is generally excellent in 
the important areas of information provision 
and business facilitation. Nonetheless, we 
are undertaking further unilateral implemen- 
tation steps in these areas. For example, we 
are publishing a guide for American busi- 
nessmen listing the relevant Basket Two 
provisions of possible utility and interest to 
them in pursuing trade opportunities in the 
Eastern countries. We are gathering com- 
plete reference materials on U.S. firms of all 
kinds to beef up the commercial libraries of 
our Embassies and consulates in the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe. These materials, 
openly available to all trade officials, enter- 
prise specialists, and other interested persons 
in those countries, are of great practical value 
to foreign business representatives. 

Bilaterally, we have stressed the impor- 
tance of Basket Two, and the full implemen- 
tation of its provisions, in the context of our 
joint economic and commercial commissions 
with the U.S.S.R., Romania, and Poland. 
And additionally, we have made diplomatic 
representations with those countries where 
we feel that progress in implementing Basket 
Two provisions has been less than satisfac- 
tory. 

On the multilateral level, the United 
States with its Western allies took the lead in 
assuring that the U.N. Economic Commission 
for Europe (ECE), located in Geneva, be- 
came fully engaged in practical Basket Two 



February 7, 1977 



111 



implementation. The ECE was mandated 
specifically by the Final Act to be the lead 
organization in carrying out numerous Bas- 
ket Two multilateral provisions. 

At the 31st annual session of the ECE last 
March-April, the Commission's first meeting 
since Helsinki, we succeeded first in reaf- 
firming the Commission's CSCE mandate. 
We also were successful in attaining consen- 
sus for a decision calling on the ECE to pay 
special attention to its CSCE mandate in its 
work program and especially to certain spe- 
cific areas of particular interest to the West. 
The Commission has now adopted a useful 
and substantive work program on the provi- 
sion of economic and commercial information, 
and in the environmental area it will under- 
take work in monitoring transboundary air 
pollution. In short, the ECE is now more 
than ever before engaged in practical East- 
West cooperation. 

Legislative Linkage of Trade and Emigration 

Since Helsinki, our trade and economic re- 
lations with the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe have continued to expand. But in the 
area of human rights, progress has been lim- 
ited. 

Our experience with the Trade Act which 
was enacted two years ago demonstrates the 
problems inherent in attempting to achieve 
faster progress on human rights questions 
with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
by creating specific legislative linkages to 
trade. In the early stages of negotiations on 
trade with the Soviet Union the emigration 
question was kept within the bounds of quiet 
diplomacy — and emigration increased 
dramatically. However, the Trade Act, de- 
spite this Administration's deep misgivings, 
made the linkage specific; and the result in 
the case of the Soviet Union was a sharp de- 
chne in emigration. 

It is questionable that Soviet interest in 
trade with the United States is such that 
specific threats and discriminatory acts will 
produce the changes in domestic policies we 
all wish to see. In fact, the Soviet Union will 
seek to demonstrate that it is not subject to 
this kind of economic pressure. Except for 



Romania, the Eastern European govern- 
ments also rejected the terms of the Trade 
Act. 

Today, prospective emigrants continue to 
be harassed and intimidated, and human 
rights activists are detained or jailed for 
acts which would be legal anywhere in the 
West. Yet it is apparent that the Soviet 
leaders are becoming increasingly aware that 
they pay a political and economic price for 
failing to take account of U.S. and Western 
concerns about human rights. 

Since Helsinki, Western attention has fo- 
cused more closely on Soviet performance 
and heightened the pressure to moderate 
repressive policies. The evidence of change 
in Soviet policies is at best halting. There has 
been some simplification of emigration pro- 
cedures, an increase in the number of emi- 
grants (primarily Armenians) given permis- 
sion to leave for the United States, exit per- 
mission for some Jewish applicants who had 
been refused permission to emigrate before, 
and release or expulsion of some prominent 
dissidents. And in the last three months of 
1976 there has been a substantial increase in 
the number of Soviet Jews receiving permis- 
sion to emigrate to Israel — roughly a one- 
third increase over the annual average figure 
for 1975 and 1976. This will result in 1976 
being the first year since 1973 which showed 
an increase — albeit small — in Soviet Jewish 
emigration. It is too early to describe this as 
a trend, and the actions taken against the 
dissident organizers of the December Jewish 
Cultural Symposium in Moscow and other ac- 
tivists are illustrations of continued harass- 
ment of those who speak out strongly. But it 
has been made clear to Soviet officials at all 
levels that modification of the legislative 
linkage between trade and emigration can 
only come if the Congress sees substantial 
improvement in the emigration picture — both 
current and prospective. 

The Soviet Union's Eastern European al- 
lies continue to have emigration policies 
which are fundamentally restrictive in na- 
ture. However, with their different historical 
and cultural backgrounds, the Eastern Euro- 
pean governments generally have been con- 
siderably less restrictive on this score than 



112 



Department of State Bulletin 



the Soviet Union. Since Helsinki, emigration 
practices in most Eastern European coun- 
tries have shown some improvement, and a 
number of individual family-reunification 
cases continued to be successfully resolved. 
With the exception of Romania, however, all 
of the countries affected have toed the line 
set by Moscow and have refused to accept 
the connection made by the Trade Act be- 
tween emigration and normal trade rela- 
tions. 



As you know, the Administration has fa- 
vored amending the trade legislation to pro- 
vide greater flexibiUty to the President. We 
believe that this would permit the U.S. Gov- 
ernment to pursue its political, economic, 
and human rights goals more effectively with 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. While 
Congress must form its own judgment as to 
whether the linkage legislated in 1974 has 
worked, our verdict is that it has not— and 
that we need to try a new approach. 



THE CONGRESS 



Department Discusses International Approaches to Problem 
of Oil Spills From Vessels 



Following is a statement by Ambassador 
at Large T. Vincent Learson, Special Repre- 
sentative of the President for the Law of the 
Sea Conference, submitted to the Senate 
Committee on Commerce on January 11 J 

The recent series of incidents involving 
foreign-flag tankers has highlighted the seri- 
ous and continuing problem of protecting our 
coasts and resources from damage from pol- 
lution from vessels. I have been a sailor for 
many years and have seen firsthand the 
damage that can be caused by oil pollution. 
The long-term impact of such pollution is 
less obvious but perhaps much more serious 
than the immediate and observable damage. 
The solution to this problem has proven to be 
elusive. The United States has undertaken 
many efforts both internationally and domes- 
tically to prevent pollution and has often 



' The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub- 
lished by the committee and will be available from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, U.C. 20402. 



been in the forefront of international efforts. 
Our success has obviously been less than 100 
percent. 

EPA [Environmental Protection Agency] 
Administrator Russell Train has urged the 
creation of an interagency task force to ur- 
gently undertake an analysis of the problem 
of oil spills from vessels and to search for 
more effective solutions. The beginnings of 
such an interagency effort have already 
taken place. I strongly support that effort 
and urge quick executive branch action in 
cooperation with the Congress to produce a 
program of effective measures to reduce ves- 
sel pollution, consistent with our global 
interest in protecting the marine environ- 
ment and in meeting our other oceans objec- 
tives. My preliminary view is that those 
measures should be implemented through 
strict requirements for entry and use of U.S. 
ports. In addition, we are working to for- 
ward to you very soon the 1973 Convention 
on the Prevention of Pollution From Ships 
and its implementing legislation. 



February 7, 1977 



113 



Mr. Chairman, I would like to outline 
briefly the existing international law appli- 
cable to these problems and then to indicate 
the direction of the law of the sea negotia- 
tions on the vessel-pollution problem. This 
discussion will focus on the legal basis for 
preventive measures and enforcement action 
by the coastal state. I will touch briefly on 
liability issues later. As you know, the recent 
incidents varied in their location, with some 
in U.S. waters and some beyond. The legal 
situation differs depending on the location. 

First, let me deal with our rights in inter- 
nal waters, including our ports. This would 
cover such incidents as the recent grounding 
in the Delaware River, inspections in port, 
incidents during loading operations, et cet- 
era. 

In general, the United States has complete 
jurisdiction in these areas and may legislate 
and enforce pollution control regulations by 
domestic law without restriction. However, 
there are certain restrictions on our inspec- 
tion rights since some international conven- 
tions to which we are party require us to ac- 
cept flag-state inspection certificates at face 
value unless we have clear grounds for be- 
lieving that the vessel is not in compliance 
with the regulations of the relevant conven- 
tion. However, we can apply our own domes- 
tic regulations even if they are more strict 
than the regulations of international conven- 
tions. There were efforts during a 1973 in- 
ternational conference on vessel pollution to 
restrict our rights to regulate vessels in our 
ports, but those efforts were defeated. 

There is no legal impediment from our 
point of view to U.S. imposition of its domes- 
tic regulations on all vessels in our ports. 
The Law of the Sea Conference's revised 
single negotiating text and the existing 1958 
Territorial Sea Convention specify this right, 
and I will submit the relevant articles for the 
record. I should make it clear, however, that 
such regulations must be carefully drawn 
taking into account existing international 
regulations and future international efforts. 
We should insure, for example, that domestic 
regulations, while perhaps more stringent 



than international ones, are not in fact in- 
compatible, thus making compliance impos- 
sible. 

Second, there are significant powers to 
deal with incidents in our territorial sea. 
Under present international law, the United 
States has sovereignty in the territorial sea 
subject to the requirement to allow vessels to 
engage in innocent passage. With regard to 
pollution controls, this means that we may 
legislate and enforce effective vessel- 
pollution control regulations in the territorial 
sea. Such actions must not hamper innocent 
passage, but that restriction still leaves us a 
great deal of flexibility. 

There have been strong efforts in the law 
of the sea negotiations to restrict coastal- 
state regulatory powers in the territorial sea 
and to eliminate any coastal-state power to 
establish requirements regarding the design, 
construction, equipment, and manning of 
vessels. Only internationally agreed regula- 
tions would be applicable to such matters. 
The United States is strongly resisting these 
attempts, but the support for the restrictions 
is very strong. All of the major maritime 
powers as well as many developing countries 
support the restrictions which appear in the 
present revised single negotiating text of the 
conference. We will continue to fight on this 
point. 

Third, beyond the territorial sea is the 
area of high seas where, for example, the 
Argo Merchant casualty occurred. The basic 
legal rule on the high seas is that there is 
freedom of navigation. Coastal-state rights 
are limited. The most significant coastal- 
state right is the right to intervene in the 
case of a maritime casualty. The 1969 Con- 
vention on Intervention [on the High Seas in 
Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties] provides 
that the coastal state may take action to pre- 
vent grave and imminent danger to its 
coastline or related interests from oil pollu- 
tion which is reasonably expected to have 
major harmful consequences. The United 
States invoked this right in the case of the 
Argo Merchant. The Convention on Inter- 
vention grew out of the aftermath of the 



114 



Department of State Bulletin 



Torrey Canyon disaster off the coast of Eng- 
land in 1967 and is intended for only the most 
serious cases. 

In addition to this coastal-state right, there 
are several types of existing obligations on 
flag states with regard to their vessels. The 
1958 Convention on the High Seas provides 
that the flag state shall take adequate safety 
measures regarding manning, construction, 
equipment, and seaworthiness of its ships 
and shall apply regulations to prevent oil pol- 
lution from vessels. Also, there are several 
specific conventions containing technical 
regulations and specifications for safety and 
the prevention of pollution. These include the 
1960 Safety of Life at Sea Convention, the 
1954 Convention for the Prevention of the 
Pollution of the Sea by Oil, and the 1973 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
From Ships. The latter is not yet in force. All 
of these conventions include numerous tech- 
nical requirements. In the area beyond the 
territorial sea, they provide for exclusive 
flag-state enforcement. 

In the law of the sea negotiations, there 
have been extensive negotiations on a new 
regime for the prevention of vessel-source 
pollution. It has been recognized in the con- 
ference that we cannot depend solely on flag 
states for the promulgation and enforcement 
of regulations. Consequently, the revised 
single negotiating text contains a mixed re- 
gime which puts certain obligations on flag 
states but also provides specified rights for 
coastal states and for states with vessels in 
their ports. 

The text has been negotiated at some 
length, and the provisions for vessel- 
pollution control in the economic zone are 
very close to being accepted by consensus. 
The provisions emphasize the importance of 
increased enforcement rights and divide the 
responsibility between flag states, coastal 
states, and states with vessels in port. Flag- 
state obligations have been significantly 
strengthened. The flag state is obligated to 
investigate any reported offense by one of its 
vessels against the internationally agreed 
regulations and to prosecute if a violation is 



indicated. Article 82 of the Committee II 
text, which I will submit for the record, 
places a strong administrative obligation on 
the flag state to in fact control its vessels. 
This is aimed directly at the basic problem 
with flags of convenience: the lack of effec- 
tive control for safety and environmental 
purposes. The coastal state may, in the eco- 
nomic zone, investigate and prosecute any 
vessel for a serious discharge causing major 
pollution damage in violation of the interna- 
tional regulations. 

It should be noted that this type of en- 
forcement right would not be useful in pre- 
venting casualties such as the Argo Mer- 
chant. 

Finally, the port state may investigate and 
prosecute any vessel for any violation of the 
international regulations, regardless of the 
place of the incident. I should note that the 
present text provides the flag state with a 
limited right to take over prosecutions of its 
vessels from other states. Of course, the port 
or coastal state may take further action if the 
flag-state prosecution is inadequate. 

In summary, present international law 
provides extensive coastal-state powers for 
the United States in its ports and internal 
waters and in the territorial sea. In the area 
beyond, our authority is limited to the right 
of intervention. The law of the sea treaty 
should preserve these rights, although some 
of our territorial-sea rights are threatened, 
and will expand our enforcement rights in 
ports and in the 200-mile economic zone. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to take a mo- 
ment to explain our position on these issues 
in the law of the sea negotiations and our 
rationale for it. 

We have recognized for some time that the 
present international regime for vessel- 
pollution prevention is inadequate and that 
further action is needed. 

In determining our position for the law of 
the sea negotiations, we had several factors 
in mind. First, we recognized a clear need for 
increased protection for the marine environ- 
ment. Second, we wanted to preserve free- 
dom of navigation on the high seas, including 



February 7, 1977 



115 



the area within the proposed 200-mile eco- 
nomic zone. Consequently, we felt that 
coastal-state rights of action beyond the ter- 
ritorial sea should be limited so as not to 
allow foreign nations discretionary rights to 
interfere with navigation in the open ocean. 
However, we also felt that strong regulatory 
powers should be established and confirmed 
for nations with vessels in their ports. 

Thus a system which emphasized the pow- 
ers of port states achieved both of our objec- 
tives: the prevention of interference with 
U.S. vessels on the high seas and the strong 
right of individual states to insure that ves- 
sels entering ports are safe and sound ships. 
For the United States, almost all of the traffic 
off our coasts enters U.S. ports. We have 
been willing to agree in the negotiations to a 
direct right for the coastal state to act in its 
economic zone in serious cases. But the bur- 
den of regulation and enforcement would fall 
on the port state. We have insisted on the re- 
tention of essentially unrestricted rights to 
apply and enforce domestic regulations to 
vessels in port. Also, we have urged accept- 
ance of a right for the port state to take en- 
forcement action against any vessel in its 
port for any violation of the international 
regulations. In general, this position is being 
adopted in the conference. 

The issue of liability for damage caused by 
oil spills, particularly in the area beyond the 
territorial sea, is complex and highly impor- 
tant. During the last session of Congress, 
both the Administration and the Congress 
worked hard on the "Comprehensive Oil Pol- 
lution Liability and Compensation Act of 
1976." Also, we submitted two conventions 
for advice and consent: the Convention on 
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage and 
the Convention on the Establishment of an 
International Fund for Compensation for Oil 
Pollution Damage. Neither convention has 
been ratified by the United States, although 
the Liability Convention is in force interna- 
tionally. The Liability Convention provides 
for suits against vessel owners for oil-spill 
damages up to a specified limit. The Fund 
Convention would provide additional protec- 
tion up to a higher limit. The terms of both 
conventions limit their coverage to damage in 



the territorial sea or territory of a state. I 
hope that the liability problems can be 
worked out in the context of the continuing 
work between the executive branch and the 
Congress, and consequently I will not com- 
ment further here. 

Mr. Chairman, in closing I want to reiter- 
ate that I share the concern of you and your 
colleagues and assure you that I will press 
for vigorous and rapid action within the pro- 
posed interagency task force. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

Nonproliferation Issues. Hearings before the Subcom- 
mittee on Arms Control, International Organizations 
and Security Agreements of the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations. March 19, 1975-November 8, 
1976. 426 pp. 

Foreign Policy Choices for the Seventies and Eighties. 
Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations. Vol. 1; September 10, 1975-September 20, 
1976; 458 pp. Vol. 2: October 22, 1975-March 16, 
1976; 272 pp. 

Middle East Peace Prospects. Hearings before the Sub- 
committee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. May 
19-July 26, 1976. 396 pp. 

Resource Development in South Africa and U.S. Policy. 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on International 
Resources, Food, and Energy of the House Commit- 
tee on International Relations. May 25-June 9, 1976. 
443 pp. 

Congress and Foreign Policy. Hearings before the Spe- 
cial Subcommittee on Investigations of the House 
Committee on International Relations. June 17- 
September 22, 1976. 347 pp. 

Treaty Powers Resolution. Hearings before the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations. July 21-28, 1976. 
127 pp. 

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Relations and Strategic Balance. Hear- 
ings before the Subcommittee on International Politi- 
cal and Military Affairs of the House Committee on 
International Relations. August 31-September 2, 
1976. .53 pp. 

Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears. Report 
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to ac- 
company E.\. I, 94-1. S. Ex. Rept. 94-.34. September 
3, 1976. 3 pp. 

Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals. 
Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela- 
tions to accompany E.\. K, 94-1. S. E.x. Rept. 94-35. 
September 3, 1976. 13 pp. 

1976 Protocol Amending the Interim Convention on 
Conservation of North Pacific Seals. Report of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accom- 
pany Ex. M, 94-2. S. Ex. Rept. 94-36. September 3, 
1976. 5 pp. 



116 



Department of State Bulletin 



Continuing Most-Favored-Nation Tariff Treatment of 
Imports From Romania. Hearing before the Sub- 
committee on International Trade of the Senate 
Committee on Finance. September 8, 1976. 407 pp. 

Fifth International Tin Agreement. Report of the Sen- 
ate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany S. 
E.\. J. 94-2. S. E.\. Rept. 94-37. September 8, 1976. 
18 pp. 

Human Rights in North Korea. Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on International Organizations of the 
House Committee on International Relations. Sep- 
tember 9, 1976. 70 pp. 

International Investment Survey Act of 1976. Report of 
the House Committee on International Relations, to- 
gether with additional views, to accompany S. 2839. 
H. Rept. 94-1490. September 9, 1976. 12 pj). 

Tijuana River Flood Control Project. Report of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accom- 
panv H.R. 14973. S. Rept. 94-1237. September 14, 
1976. 10 pp. 

United States-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agree- 
ment. Hearing before the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations. September 15, 1976. 32 pp. 

Packing Standards for Imported Tomatoes. Report of 
the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry to 
accompany S. 2440. S. Rept. 94-1239. September" 15, 
1976. 18 pp. 

Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1976. 
Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary to 
accompany H.R. 14535. H. Rept. 94-1553. September 
15, 1976. 37 pp. 

Terrorist Attack at Istanbul Airport. Repoi't of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accom- 
pany S. Res. 524. S. Rept. 94-1235. September 16, 
1976. 5 pp. 

International Agreement With Poland Concerning 
Fisheries off the Coast of the United States. Message 
from the President of the United States transmitting 
the agreement. H. Doc. 94-613. September 16, 1976. 
21 pp. 

The Nuclear Explosive Proliferation Control Act of 
1976. Report by the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy, together with additional views (dissenting), 
to accompany H.R. 15419; H. Rept. 94-1613; Sep- 
tember 18, 1976; 60 pp. Report by the Joint Commit- 
tee on Atomic Energy, together with additional views 
(dissenting), to accompany S. 3853; S. Rept. 94-1336; 
September 29, 1976; 46 pp. 

Implementing International Conventions Against Ter- 
rorism. Report, together with dissenting views, of 
the House Committee on the Judiciary to accompany 
H.R. 15552; H. Rept. 94-1614; September 18, 1976; 
16 pp. Report of the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary to accompany S. 3646; S. Rept. 94-1273; 
September 22, 1976; 16 pp. 

International Navigational Rules Act of 1976. Report of 
the Senate Committee on Commerce to accompany 
H.R. 5446. S. Rept. 94-1271. September 21, 1976. 
30 pp. 

Sale of Missiles to Saudi Arabia. Report of the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany S. 
Con. Res. 161. S. Rept. 94-1305. September 24, 1976. 
7 pp. 

Define Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Agamst 
Foreign States. Report of the Senate Committee on 
the Judiciary to accompany S. 3553. S. Rept. 94-1310. 
September 27, 1976. 42 pp. 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
AND CONFERENCES 



U.S. Abstains on Security Council 
Resolution on Botswana Complaint 

Following are statements made in the 
U.N. Security Council on January 13 by 
U.S. Representative William W. Scranton 
and on January H by U.S. Representative 
Albert W. Sherer, Jr., together with the text 
of a resolution adopted by the Council on 
January H. 

U.S. STATEMENTS IN U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL 

Ambassador Scranton, January 13 ^ 

Now, Mr. President, with regard to the 
matter immediately before us: The real solu- 
tion to this problem and to many other prob- 
lems that have arisen with regard to the 
relationships of near neighbors to the pres- 
ent regime in Southern Rhodesia is clearly a 
changeover to majority rule in that 
country — as soon as possible and with a 
minimum of violence and human suffering. 
The extremely important and difficult 
negotiations now going on to bring about just 
such an objective have been undertaken by 
the United Kingdom and led by our friend 
and colleague Ambassador Ivor Richard. 
These negotiations and the hoped-for out- 
come of majority rule in Southern Rhodesia 
are a real test of those countries and persons 
directly involved, and likewise it is a test of 
the United Nations and those of us here in 
the Security Council. 

The U.S. Government has assured the 
Government of the United Kingdom on sev- 
eral occasions of its complete support of the 
efforts they are undertaking to bring about 
majority rule in Southern Rhodesia. We be- 



' Introductory paragraphs omitted (text from USUN 
press release 2). 



February 7, 1977 



117 



lieve this effort is of paramount importance. 
Accordingly, our delegation has been in- 
structed to follow and support the United 
Kingdom on the matter before us in view of 
its close reference to those efforts. 

I do not wish to end my comments right 
there, in the event of any misunderstanding 
about our concern for the issue before us. I 
was deeply impressed by the presentation 
yesterday of the distinguished Foreign 
Minister of Botswana, His Excellency Ar- 
chibald Mogwe, both by his exposition of the 
issue and the facts and especially by his con- 
sidered objectivity. Both my government and 
I personally feel very strongly that Botswana 
and its concerns are concerns of ours. The 
United States has in the past provided de- 
velopmental assistance to Botswana and will 
continue to do so in the future. Our govern- 
ment will continue to pursue close relations 
with the people and the Government of Bot- 
swana and work for the kind of peaceful politi- 
cal settlement in southern Africa which will 
truly assure the independence and integrity of 
Botswana. 

In June of this year, I had the high 
privilege of visiting Gabarone and meeting 
with President Khama and some of the mem- 
bers of his Cabinet to discuss some of the 
problems facing his country and southern Af- 
rica. 

To say that I was deeply impressed with 
his dedication to finding solutions to 
Botswana's internal problems and to the 
problems confronting southern Africa is to 
put it very mildly indeed. In my judgment he 
is an outstanding leader, a man of high prin- 
ciple and deep conviction, who has worked 
untiringly for a peaceful multiracial society 
in his country with a democratic government. 
Though of sizable territory, Botswana is 
small in population — but like many small 
countries with impressive leadership and 
dedicated people it is very meaningful in 
southern Africa and indeed the world. I look 
for the day soon when the bringing about of 
majority rule in Southern Rhodesia will ter- 
minate the constant afflictions between these 
two countries, and I reiterate the U.S. Gov- 
ernment's dedication to that objective. 

Last, but by no means least, I wish to ex- 
press gratitude for the kind words directed 



to me by speakers during the current debate. 
I leave this body in a few days; and in doing 
so I have a very warm feeling for it, for all of 
you, and for the United Nations. 

Ambassador Sherer, January 14 

USUN press release 3 dated January 14 

The views of the United States on the sub- 
stance of the matter before us were set forth 
yesterday by Governor Scranton. Our 
abhorrence of the illegal use of force and our 
commitment to majority rule are fundamen- 
tal U.S. positions. We would only wish to add 
that we recognize the efforts of the cospon- 
sors in seeking to meet the views of a wide 
number of members of the Council. 

My government has played a particular 
role in seeking to bring all sides together in 
the search for a peaceful solution of the un- 
derlying problem. We believe our ability to 
continue to contribute in this way is best 
served by joining the United Kingdom, which 
has a very special role in the current effort to 
find a peaceful settlement of the Rhodesian 
problem. For these reasons we will abstain. 

TEXT OF RESOLUTION 2 

The Security CouyicH, 

Taking note of the letters dated 22 December 1976 
(S/12262) and 12 January 1977 (S/12275) from the Per- 
manent Representative of Botswana to the United Na- 
tions, and having heard the statement of the Minister 
for External Affairs of Botswana, concerning hostile 
acts against Botswana by the illegal minority regime in 
Southern Rhodesia, 

Gravely concerned at the dangerous situation created 
by the provocative and hostile acts committed by the 
illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia against the secu- 
rity and well-being of Botswana, 

Reaffirming the inalienable right of the people of 
Southern Rhodesia to self-determination and independ- 
ence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 
1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and the legitimacy of 
their struggle to secure the enjoyment of such rights as 
set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, 

Recalling its resolutions 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966 
and 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968 which detemined and reaf- 
firmed respectively that the situation in Southern 
Rhodesia constituted a threat to international peace and 
security. 

Taking note of General Assembly resolution 31/154 of 
20 December 1976, 



2 U.N. doc. A/RES/403 (1977); adopted by the Coun- 
cil on Jan. 14 by a vote of 13 to 0, with 2 abstentions 
(U.S., U.K.). 



118 



Department of State Bulletin 



Convinced that the recent provocative and hostile 
acts perpetrated by the illegal regime against Botswana 
aggravate the situation, 

Deeply grieved and concerned at the loss of human 
life and damage to property caused by the acts of the 
illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia against Botswana, 

Noting with appreciation Botswana's decision to con- 
tinue to give asylum to political refugees fleeing from 
inhuman oppression by the illegal racist minority re- 
gime, 

Realizing the need for Botswana to strengthen its se- 
curity in order to safeguard its sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and independence, 

Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the Govern- 
ment of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland over Southern Rhodesia, in accord- 
ance with the relevant resolutions of the United Na- 
tions, 

1. Strongly condemns all acts of provocation and 
harassment, including military threats and attacks, 
murder, arson, kidnapping and destruction of property, 
committed against Botswana by the illegal regime in 
Southern Rhodesia; 

2. Condemns all measures of political repression by 
the illegal regime that violate fundamental rights and 
freedoms of the people of Southern Rhodesia and con- 
tribute to instability and lack of peace in the region as a 
whole; 

3. Deplores all acts of collaboration and collusion 
which sustain the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia 
and encourage defiance with impunity of the resolutions 
of the Security Council, with adverse consequences for 
peace and security in the region; 

4. Demands the immediate and total cessation forth- 
with of all hostile acts committed against Botswana by 
the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia; 

5. Takes cognizance of the special economic hardship 
confronting Botswana as a result of the imperative need 
to divert funds from ongoing and planned development 
projects to hitherto unplanned and unbudgeted for se- 
curity needs necessitated by the urgent need to effec- 
tively defend itself against attacks and threats by the 
illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia; 

6. Accepts the invitation of the Government of 
Botswana to dispatch a mission to assess the needs of 
Botswana in carrying out its development projects 
under the present circumstances, and accordingly re- 
quests the Secretary-General, in collaboration with ap- 
propriate organizations of the United Nations system, 
to organize with immediate effect financial and other 
forms of assistance to Botswana and to report to the 
Security Council not later than 31 March 1977; 

7. Requests the United Nations and the organizations 
and programmes concerned, including the Economic 
and Social Council, the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization, the World Health 
Organization, the United Nations Development Pro- 
gramme, the Food and Agriculture Organization and 
the Fund for Agricultural Development, to assist 
Botswana to carry out the ongoing and planned de- 
velopment projects without interruption as stated in 
paragraph 5 and envisaged under paragraph 6 of this 
resolution; 

8. Appeals to all States to respond positively in pro- 
viding assistance to Botswana, in the light of the report 
of the mission of the Secretary-General, in order to en- 
able Botswana to carry out its planned development 
projects; 

9. Decides to remain seized of the matter. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Health 

Amendments to articles 24 and 25 of the constitution of 
the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as 
amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva 
May 17, 1976.' 
Acceptance deposited: Ethiopia, January 6, 1977. 

Load Lines 

Amendments to the international convention on load 
lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331, 6629. 6720). Adopted at Lon- 
don October 12, 1971.' 
Acceptance deposited: Algeria, January 4, 1977. 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on facilitation of international maritime 
traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965. 
Entered into force March 5, 1967; for the United 
States May 16, 1967. TIAS 6251. 
Acceptance deposited: Hungary (with a statement), 
December 15, 1976. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic 
drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972. Entered 
into force August 8, 1975. TIAS 8118. 
Ratification deposited: Spain, January 4, 1977. 

Oil Pollution 

Amendments to the international convention for the 
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as 
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London Oc- 
tober 21, 1969.' 
Acceptance deposited: Argentina, December 30, 1976. 

International convention relating to intervention on the 
high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, with an- 
nex. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. Entered 
into force May 6, 1975. TIAS 8068. 
Accession deposited: Ecuador, December 23, 1976. 

International convention on civil liability for oil pollu- 
tion damage. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. 
Entered into force June 19, 1975.^ 
Ratification deposited: Brazil, December 17, 1976. 
Accession deposited: Ecuador, December 23, 1976. 

International convention on the establishment of an in- 
ternational fund for compensation for oil pollution 
damage. Done at Brussels December 18, 1971. ' 
Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, December 30, 1976.^ 

Safety at Sea 

Convention on the international regulations for prevent- 



' Not in force. 

^ Not in force for the United States. 

^ Applicable to Berlin (West). 



February 7, 1977 



119 



ing collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London October 

20, 1972. Enters into force July 15, 1977. 

Ratification deposited: Poland, December 14, 1976. 

Accessions deposited: Hungary (with statement and 
declaration), December 15, 1976; South Africa, De- 
cember 20, 1976. 

Satellite Communications System 

Agreement relating to the International Telecommuni- 
cations Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with an- 
nexes. Done at Washington August 20, 1971. Entered 
into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532. 
Accession deposited: El Salvador, January 19, 1977. 

Operating agreement relating to the International 
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTEL- 
SAT), with annex. Done at Washington August 20, 
1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 
7532. 

Signature: Administracion Nacional de Tele- 
comunicaciones (ANTED for El Salvador, January 
19, 1977. 

Seals — Antarctic 

Convention for the conservation of Antarctic seals, with 
annex and final act. Done at London June 1, 1972.' 
Ratification deposited: United States, January 18, 
1977. 

Space 

Convention on registration of objects launched into 
outer space. Done at New York January 14, 1975. En- 
tered into force September 15, 1976. 
Proclaimed by the President: January 18, 1977. 

Telecommunications 

Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 1959, 
as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590, 7435), to 
establish a new frequency allotment plan for high- 
frequency radiotelephone coast stations, with annexes 
and final protocol. Done at Geneva June 8, 1974. En- 
tered into force January 1, 1976; for the United 
States April 21, 1976. 

Notification of approval: Luxembourg, October 14, 
1976. 



BILATERAL 

Hungary 

Agreement relating to issuance of nonimmigrant visas 
on a facilitated basis to certain holders of diplomatic 
or official passports. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Budapest March 29 and April 7, 1976. Entered into 
force April 7, 1976. 



PUBLICATIONS 



Not in force. 



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number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Goveryiment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20102. 
A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more 
copies of any one publication mailed to the same ad- 
dress. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of 
Docuinents , must accompany orders. Prices shown be- 
low, which include domestic postage, are subject to 
change. 

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a 
map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. 
diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A 
complete set of all Background Notes currently in 
stock — at least 140 — $21.80; 1-year subscription service 
for approximately 77 updated or new Notes — .$23.10; 
plastic binder — $1.50.) Single copies of those listed 
below are available at 35? each. 

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Pub. 7962 7 pp 

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Pub. 8301 5 pp 

Portugal Cat. No. S1.123;P83/2 

Pub. 8074 7 pp 

Tunisia Cat. No. S1.123:T83 

Pub. 8142 5 pp 

Atomic Energy — Technical Information Exchange in 
Regulatory Matters. Arrangement with Japan. TIAS 
8341. 7 pp. 350. (Cat. No. S9.10;8341). 

Atomic Energy — Technical Information Exchange 
and Development of Standards. Arrangement with 
Switzerland. TIAS 8342. 7 pp. 350. (Cat. No. 
S9. 10:8342). 

Atomic Energy — Technical Information Exchange 
and Development of Standards. Arrangement with 
Spain. TIAS 8344. 4 pp. 35(Z. (Cat. No. S9. 10:8344). 



120 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX February 7, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1963 



Africa. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for the 
New Yorl< Times 102 

Argentina. Letters of Credence (Aja Espil) 101 

Botswana. U.S. Abstains on Security Council 
Resolution on Botswana Complaint (Scranton, 
Sherer, text of resolution) 117 

China. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for the 
New York Times 102 

Congress 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy 116 

Department Discusses International Approaches 
to Problem of Oil Spills From Vessels 
(Learson) 113 

The State of the Union (excerpts from President 
Ford's address to the Congress) 97 

Economic Affairs 

Department Discusses Implementation of Eco- 
nomic Provisions of the Final Act of the Helsinki 
Conference (Robinson) 108 

U.S. and Republic of Korea Sign New Fisheries 
Agreement (joint statement) 107 

Energy 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for the New 
York Times 102 

The State of the Union (excerpts from President 
Ford's address to the Congress) 97 

Environment. Department Discusses Interna- 
tional Approaches to Problem of Oil Spills From 
Vess;els (Learson) 113 

Europe 

Department Discusses Implementation of Eco- 
nomic Provisions of the Final Act of the Helsinki 
Conference (Robinson) 108 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for the New- 
York Times 102 

Human Rights. Department Discusses Im- 
plementation of Economic Provisions of the 
Final Act of the Helsinki Conference (Robinson) 108 

Korea. U.S. and Republic of Korea Sign New 
Fisheries Agreement (joint statement) 107 

Law of the Sea. Department Discusses Interna- 
tional Approaches to Problem of Oil Spills From 
Vessels (Learson) 113 

Mexico. Letters of Credence (Margain) 101 

Middle East. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed 
for the New York Times 102 

Military Affairs. The State of the Union (ex- 
cerpts from President Ford's address to the 
Congress) 97 

Presidential Documents. The State of the Union 
(excerpts from President Ford's address to the 
Congress) 9'^ 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications 120 

Southern Rhodesia. U.S. Abstains on Security 
Council Resolution on Botswana Complaint 
(Scranton, Sherer, text of resolution) 11" 

Trade. Department Discusses Implementation of 
Economic Provisions of the Final Act of the Hel- 
sinki (Conference (Robinson) 108 



Treaty Information 

Current Actions 119 

U.S. and Republic of Korea Sign New Fisheries 
Agreement (joint statement) 107 

U.S.S.R. 

Department Discusses Implementation of Eco- 
nomic Provisions of the Final Act of the Helsinki 
Conference (Robinson) 108 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for the New- 
York Times 102 

United Nations. U.S. Abstains on Security Coun- 
cil Resolution on Botswana Complaint (Scran- 
ton, Sherer, text of resolution) 117 

Name Index 

Aya Espil, Jorge Antonio 101 

Ford, President 97 

Kissinger, Secretary 102 

Learson, T. Vincent 113 

Margain, Hugo B 101 

Robinson, Charles W 108 

Scranton, William W 117 

Sherer, Albert W., Jr 117 



Checklist of Department of State 


Press Releases: January 17—23 


Press 


releases 


mav be obtained from the Office 


of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash- | 


ington. 


D.C. 20520. 1 


No. 


Date 


Subject 


*10 


1/17 


Government Advisory Commit- 
tee on International Book and 
Library Programs. Feb. 17. 


*11 


1/17 


U.S. Advisory Commission on 
International Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, Feb. 17. 


tl2 


1/19 


Kissinger; American Foreign 
Service Association awards 
ceremony, Jan. 18. 


*13 


1/19 


Kissinger: awards ceremony 
honoring Foreign Service offi- 
cers for service in Vietnam, 
Jan. 18. 


*14 


1/19 


U.S. Advisory Commission on 
International Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, Ottawa, Feb. 
18-19. 


tl5 


1/19 


U.S. ratification of Convention 
for the Conservation of Ant- 
arctic Seals. 


tl6 


1/19 


"Foreign Relations," 1950, vol. 
VI, "East Asia and the 
Pacific" released. 


*17 


1/21 


Kissinger: farewell remarks, 
Jan. 19 


18 


1/21 


Kissinger: interview published 
in New York Times, Jan. 20. 


*19 


1/21 


Special inspection report on Of- 
fice of Foreign Buildings. 


* Not 


printed. 


t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington. dc. 20402 



OFFICIAL BUSINESS 



postage and fees paid 
Department of State STA-501 

Third Class 




Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted 
service, please renew your subscription promptly 
when you receive the expiration notice from the 
Superintendent of Documents. Due to the time re- 
quired to process renewals, notices are sent out 3 
months in advance of the expiration date. Any prob- 
lems involving your subscription will receive im- 
mediate attention if you write to: Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



15 

/J: 




/?6^ 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 

Volume LXXVI • No. 1964 • February 14, 1977 



THE INAUGURAL ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT CARTER 121 

ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT CARTER TO PEOPLE OF OTHER NATIONS 122 

PRESIDENT CARTER INTERVIEWED BY AP AND UPI CORRESPONDENTS 

Excerpts From Transcript 123 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLET I 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

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domestic $42.50, foreign $53.15 

Single copy 85 cents 

The Secretary of State has determined that the pub- 
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1981. 

Not€i Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be re- 
printed. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The 
BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to 
Periodical Literature. 



Vol. LXXVI, No. 1964 
February 14, 1977 

The Department of State BULLETIN 
a weekly publication issued by fA| 
Office of Media Services, Bureau 
Public Affairs, provides the public an 
interested agencies of the governmeii 
with information on developments ('| 
the field of U.S. foreign relations ar 
on the work of the Department an\ 
the Foreign Service. 

The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, and 
news conferences of the President and 
the Secretary of State and other offi- 
cers of the Department, as well as spe- 
cial articles on various phases of in- 
ternational affairs and the functions of 
the Department. Information is in- 
cluded concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a party 
and on treaties of general interna- 
tional interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 



The Inaugural Address of President Carter 



For myself and for our nation, I want to 
thank my predecessor for all he has done to 
heal our land. 

In this outward and physical ceremony we 
attest once again to the inner and spiritual 
strength of our nation. 

As my high school teacher, Miss Julia Cole- 
man, used to say, "We must adjust to 
changing times and still hold to unchanging 
principles." 

Here before me is the Bible used in the in- 
auguration of our first President in 1789, and 
I have just taken the oath of office on the 
Bible my mother gave me just a few years 
ago, opened to a timeless admonition from 
the ancient prophet Micah: 

He hath shewed thee, man, what is good; and what 
doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to 
love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God? (Micah 
6:8) 

This inauguration ceremony marks a new 
beginning, a new dedication within our gov- 
ernment, and a new spirit among us all. A 
President may sense and proclaim that new 
spirit, but only a people can provide it. 

Two centuries ago our nation's birth was a 
milestone in the long quest for freedom, but 
the bold and brilliant dream which excited 
the founders of this nation still awaits its 
consummation. I have no new dream to set 
forth today but, rather, urge a fresh faith in 
the old dream. 

Ours was the first society openly to define 
itself in terms of both spirituality and human 
liberty. It is that unique self-definition which 
has given us an exceptional appeal — but it 
also imposes on us a special obligation: to 
take on those moral duties which, when as- 
sumed, seem invariably to be in our own best 
interests. 

You have given me a great responsibility: 



' Delivered on Jan. 20 (text from White House press re- 
lease). 

February 14, 1977 



to stay close to you, to be worthy of you, and 
to exemplify what you are. Let us create to- 
gether a new national spirit of unity and 
trust. Your strength can compensate for my 
weakness, and your wisdom can help to 
minimize my mistakes. 

Let us learn together and laugh together 
and work together and pray together, confi- 
dent that in the end we will triumph together 
in the right. 

The American dream endures. We must 
once again have full faith in our country — and 
in one another. I believe America can be bet- 
ter. We can be even stronger than before. 

Let our recent mistakes bring a resurgent 
commitment to the basic principles of our na- 
tion, for we know that if we despise our own 
government we have no future. We recall in 
special times when we have stood briefly, but 
magnificently, united. In those times no 
prize was beyond our grasp. 

But we cannot dwell upon remembered 
glory. We cannot afford to drift. We reject 
the prospect of failure or mediocrity or an in- 
ferior quality of life for any person. 

Our government must at the same time be 
both competent and compassionate. 

We have already found a high degree of 
personal Hberty, and we are now struggling 
to enhance equality of opportunity. Our 
commitment to human rights must be abso- 
lute, our laws fair, our natural beauty pre- 
served; the powerful must not persecute the 
weak, and human dignity must be enhanced. 

We have learned that "more" is not neces- 
sarily "better," that even our great nation 
has its recognized limits, and that we can 
neither answer all questions nor solve all 
problems. We cannot afford to do every- 
thing, nor can we afford to lack boldness as 
we meet the future. So together, in a spirit 
of individual sacrifice for the common good, 
we must simply do our best. 

121 



Our nation can be strong abroad only if it is 
strong at home, and we know that the best 
way to enhance freedom in other lands is to 
demonstrate here that our democratic sys- 
tem is worthy of emulation. 

To be true to ourselves, we must be true to 
others. We will not behave in foreign places 
so as to violate our rules and standards here 
at home, for we know that the trust which 
our nation earns is essential to our strength. 

The world itself is now dominated by a new 
spirit. Peoples more numerous and more 
politically aware are craving and now de- 
manding their place in the sun — not just for 
the benefit of their own physical condition 
but for basic human rights. 

The passion for freedom is on the rise. 
Tapping this new spirit, there can be no no- 
bler nor more ambitious task for America to 
undertake on this day of a new beginning 
than to help shape a just and peaceful world 
that is truly humane. 

We are a strong nation, and we will main- 
tain strength so sufficient that it need not be 
proven in combat — a quiet strength based 
not merely on the size of an arsenal but on 
the nobility of ideas. 

We will be ever vigilant and never vulner- 
able, and we will fight our wars against pov- 
erty, ignorance, and injustice; for those are 
the enemies against which our forces can be 
honorably marshaled. 

We are a proudly idealistic nation, but let 
no one confuse our idealism with weakness. 

Because we are free we can never be indif- 
ferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere. Our 
moral sense dictates a clear-cut preference 
for those societies which share with us an 
abiding respect for individual human rights. 
We do not seek to intimidate, but it is clear 
that a world which others can dominate with 
impunity would be inhospitable to decency 
and a threat to the well-being of all people. 

The world is still engaged in a massive ar- 
maments race designed to insure continuing 
equivalent strength among potential adver- 
saries. We pledge perseverance and wisdom 
in our efforts to limit the world's armaments 
to those necessary for each nation's own 
domestic safety. We will move this year a 
step toward our ultimate goal: the ehmina- 
tion of all nuclear weapons from this earth. 



We urge all other people to join us, for suc- 
cess can mean life instead of death. 

Within us, the people of the United States, 
there is evident a serious and purposeful re- 
kindling of confidence, and I join in the hope 
that when my time as your President has end- 
ed, people might say this about our nation: 

— That we had remembered the words of 
Micah and renewed our search for humility, 
mercy, and justice; 

— That we had torn down the barriers that 
separated those of different race and region 
and religion and, where there had been mis- 
trust, built unity, with a respect for diver- 
sity; 

— That we had found productive work for 
those able to perform it; 

— That we had strengthened the American 
family, which is the basis of our society; 

— That we had insured respect for the law, 
and equal treatment under the law, for the 
weak and the powerful, for the rich and the 
poor; and 

— That we had enabled our people to be 
proud of their own government once again. 

I would hope that the nations of the world 
might say that we had built a lasting peace, 
based not on weapons of war but on interna- 
tional policies which reflect our own most 
precious values. 

These are not just my goals, and they will 
not be my accomplishments, but the affirma- 
tion of our nation's continuing moral strength 
and our belief in an undiminished, ever- 
expanding American dream. 



Address by President Carter 
to People of Other Nations 

Following are remarks by President Car- 
ter videotaped for broadcast abroad on 
January 20. 

white House press release dated January 20 

I have chosen the occasion of my inaugura- 
tion as President to speak not only to my own 
countrymen — which is traditional — but also 
to you, citizens of the world who did not par- 



122 



Department of State Bulletin 



ticipate in our election but who will neverthe- 
less be affected by my decisions. 

I also believe that as friends you are enti- 
tled to know how the power and influence of 
the United States will be exercised by its 
new government. 

I want to assure you that the relations of 
the United States with the other countries 
and peoples of the world will be guided dur- 
ing my own Administration by our desire to 
shape a world order that is more responsive 
to human aspirations. The United States will 
meet its obligation to help create a stable, 
just, and peaceful world order. 

We will not seek to dominate nor dictate to 
others. As we Americans have concluded one 
chapter in our nation's history and are begin- 
ning to work on another, we have, I believe, 
acquired a more mature perspective on the 
problems of the world. It is a perspective 
which recognizes the fact that we alone do 
not have all the answers to the world's prob- 
lems. 

The United States alone cannot lift from 
the world the terrifying specter of nuclear 
destruction. We can and will work with 
others to do so. 

The United States alone cannot guarantee 
the basic right of every human being to be 
free of poverty and hunger and disease and 
political repression. We can and will cooper- 
ate with others in combating these enemies 
of mankind. 

The United States alone cannot insure an 
equitable development of the world resources 
or the proper safeguarding of the world's en- 
vironment. But we can and will join with 
others in this work. 

The United States can and will take the 
lead in such efforts. 

In these endeavors we need your help, and 
we offer ours. 

We need your experience. We need your 
wisdom. We need your active participation in 
a joint effort to move the reality of the world 
closer to the ideals of human freedom and 
dignity. 

As friends, you can depend on the United 
States to be in the forefront of the search for 
world peace. You can depend on the United 
States to remain steadfast in its commitment 
to human freedom and liberty. And you can 



also depend on the United States to be sensi- 
tive to your own concerns and aspirations, to 
welcome your advice, to do its utmost to re- 
solve international differences in a spirit of 
cooperation. 

The problems of the world will not be eas- 
ily resolved. Yet the well-being of each and 
every one of us — indeed our mutual 
survival — depends on their resolution. As 
President of the United States I can assure 
you that we intend to do our part. I ask you 
to join us in a common effort based on mutual 
trust and mutual respect. 



President Carter Interviewed 
by AP and UPI Correspondents 

Following are excerpts relating to foreign 
policy from the transcript of an interview 
with President Carter on January 23 by two 
Associated Press and two United Press In- 
ternational correspondents. 



Helen Thomas, UPI: Mr. President, do 
you plan to call a temporary or permanent 
moratorium on arms sales abroad, and also, 
what are the chances of a SALT agreement 
this year? Will you be separating out the 
"Backfire" bomber and the cruise missile? 

President Carter: I don't think a 
"moratorium" would be the right expression, 
because that is an abrupt and total termina- 
tion of all ownership. I don't contemplate 
that. But in our first National Security 
Council meeting we discussed, in I think 
unanimity, the necessity for reducing arms 
sales or having very tight restraints on fu- 
ture commitments to minimize the efforts by 
arms manufacturers to initiate sales early in 
the process. 

The Secretary of State will be much more 
hesitant in the future to recommend to the 
Defense Department the culmination of arms 
sales agreements. I have asked that all 
approvals of arms sales, for a change, be 
submitted to me directly before the recom- 
mendations go to Congress. We also have 



February 14, 1977 



123 



asked Vice President Mondale in his early 
trip among our own allies and friends, some 
of whom are heavy arms exporters, to join 
with us on a multilateral basis. 

We will also be talking to some of the pri- 
mary arms purchasers, particularly the Mid- 
dle East when Secretary Vance goes there 
very shortly, to hold down their own pur- 
chases of arms from us and other countries. 
This will be a continuing effort on my part. 

As far as nuclear arms limitations are con- 
cerned, I would like to proceed quickly and 
aggressively with a comprehensive test ban 
treaty. I am in favor of eliminating the test- 
ing of all nuclear devices, instantly and com- 
pletely. 

Ms. Thomas: Underground tests and all? 

President Carter: Yes. And whether or not 
the Soviets will agree to do that, I don't 
know yet. They have sent an encouraging 
message back, but the exact caveats might 
not yet be in view. I can't answer that ques- 
tion. On the SALT negotiations, we have not 
yet had a chance to meet with the Soviets or 
even particularly their ambassadorial leaders 
here since my inauguration to see what they 
might be willing to explore. But I would 
guess there would be a two-stage evolution. 
One is a fairly rapid ratification of the SALT 
Two agreement. 

Ms. Thomas: That would be Vladivostok? 

President Carter: Yes, and I can't answer 
specific questions on cruise missiles or 
Backfire. But I would not let those two items 
stand in the way of some agreement. I would 
like to move very quickly, even prior to the 
Salt Two agreement, toward a much more 
substantive reduction in atomic weapons as 
the first step to complete elimination in the 
future. 

If we can reach an agreement with the 
Soviet Union for major reductions on atomic 
weapons, of course the next step would be to 
get other atomic nations to try to join in this 
effort, including, of course, France and Eng- 
land and the People's Republic of China. 

Ms. Thomas: You mean in sales and produc- 
tion, our own production and also sales to 
other countries across the board? 



President Carter: I was talking then about 
inventory of atomic weapons, but, obviously, 
production. 

The third item is the nonproliferation ef- 
fort, where we constrain with every means 
available to us in all diplomatic means the 
expanding of a nuclear arms capability on 
weapons to nations that don't presently have 
this capacity. 

We are quite concerned about the reproc- 
essing of spent fuel, where you change nor- 
mal radioactive materials which have been 
used for the production of electric power into 
weapon quality. We would like to have this 
put under international control, subject our- 
selves to the restraint along with those who 
have been processing this material for a 
number of years, and prohibit completely, 
within the bounds of our capability, the ex- 
pansion of the reprocessing plants in the 
countries that don't have it. 

Ms. Thomas: At the risk of dominating, 
only one more question. You said in your 
inaugural you would like to see the elimina- 
tion of all nuclear weapons. Is that a hope or 
a real goal? 

President Carter: That is a hope and a 
goal. I said this in my announcement speech, 
I believe, in December 1974. I said it many 
times during the campaign. I said it in my ac- 
ceptance speech for nomination as a Demo- 
cratic candidate and then my inauguration. I 
mean it very deeply. 

Of course, the phased steps that I describe 
to you are almost inevitable. As we first put 
firm limits on ourselves, with adequate as- 
surance that the monitoring of compliance 
with agreements is there on both sides, then 
substantive reductions will demonstrate to 
the world we are sincere, ourselves and the 
Soviets primarily, then further reductions 
including all nations, even those who have a 
relatively small inventory now. 

Those are the inevitable steps. The defini- 
tive achieving of those steps will depend on 
the cooperation of the Soviet Union. 

Lawrence L. Knutson, AP: How do you re- 
spond, sir, to those who say that it is impos- 
sible at this stage to put the atomic genie 
back in that bottle? 



124 



Department of State Bulletin 



President Carter: I don't believe it is im- 
possible. If all the other world leaders have 
the same commitment that I do, then it 
would be indeed possible. But I can't answer 
that question. 



Ms. Thomas: What are the prospects of a 
Geneva conference on the Middle East soon, 
and will we formulate final Arab-Israeli set- 
tlement proposals that were put on the table? 

President Carter: I think the conference 
on the Middle East is very likely this year. I 
would hate to go into more detail about 
where or when until after at least the Secre- 
tary of State has had a chance to consult in 
depth with the heads of state, Israel and 
Egypt and Syria, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. 

Ms. Thomas: Will he be going to the Mid- 
dle East? 

President Carter: Yes, he will be going to 
the Middle East, I think within the next 
month. Many of these leaders will be invited 
to come and visit me here. I would prefer to 
meet with the leaders of those nations after 
the Secretary of State has had a chance to 
consult with them. 

Ms. Thomas: Would you approve of the 
Palestinians having representation at such a 
peace conference, and would you think in 
terms of their eventually having statehood? 

President Carter: I think it would not be 
appropriate now for me to spell out specifics. 
If the Palestinians should be invited to the 
meeting as agreed by the other participating 
nations, along with us, it would probably be 
as part of one of the Arab delegations. But 
that is something still to be decided. 

Wesley G. Pippert, UPI: On Africa, Am- 
bassador [Ayidrew] Young is going to make a 
trip in March or sometim,e soon. 

Presideyit Carter: Tanzania. 

Mr. Pippert: Just how far can you go, can 
the Administration go, in actively promoting 
black rule in southern Africa, and what are 
you prepared to do ? 

President Carter: Our position has been 



spelled out very thoroughly, during the cam- 
paign and since then. I believe very strongly 
in majority rule, which means relinquishing 
the control of the government by the white 
minorities in the countries affected. 

Ambassador Young will be going primarily 
as an observer and a listener, not as a 
negotiator. He has a very close relationship 
with the so-called frontline Presidents them- 
selves. 

As I said shortly before leaving Plains, I 
think the best role for us to play is to consult 
with the leaders of Great Britain, let them 
maintain the leadership in those negotiations 
and let us help when requested to do so. 

But I think the basic premise that was 
spelled out by Secretary of State Kissinger a 
number of months ago is a proper one. I 
think any modifications of it would be fairly 
minor. 

Mr. Pippert: There are no plans at this 
time for Young to get involved in the talks 
between Great Britain and Rhodesia? 

President Carter: No. 



Message From Secretary Vance 
to Department and Foreign Service 

Following is the text of a message dated 
January 2i. from Secretary Vance to the men 
and women of the Department of State and 
the Foreign Service. 

Press release 21 dated January 25 

As I begin my work as Secretary of State, 
I wish first to greet all of you in the Depart- 
ment of State and the Foreign Service. I look 
forward to working with you, to renewing 
past friendships and forming new ones. 

We face some exciting and I am sure 
strenuous days together. We are all con- 
scious of the press of events in the world- 
changing economic relationships which are 
increasingly intertwined with foreign policy, 
alterations in the nature of national power, 
the growing importance of global issues such 
as nuclear proliferation, energy, food, popu- 



Febroary 14, 1977 



125 



lation growth, and the environment. We 
must also be aware of the hopes and concerns 
within our own country and abroad. 

There is a need for a new examination of 
these issues, and of how our government op- 
erates and allocates scarce resources. There 
are diverse opinions, inevitably, on specific 
foreign poHcy issues. But there is broad sup- 
port for policies — both existing and new — 
that reflect the traditional American values 
of morality, strength, steadfast friendship, 
progress and fairness. And there is a com- 
mon concern that our policies be made as 
openly as possible. 

I have no doubt that the Department can 
help meet these concerns — but only if we all 
work closely together. I look forward to 
shared successes. I am sure there will also be 
some mistakes, collective and individual. No 
one should fear the latter, if they come as 
part of an effort to do things differently and 
better. Initiative always bears risks; it 
should not be penalized. 

I will rely heavily on your knowledge, your 
talents, and your creativity. I recognize the 
equivalent need for me to make available to 
you, to the fullest extent possible, the infor- 
mation and analyses that I have before me. I 
want each of you to feel that sense of respon- 
sibility and participation that will make your 
work as effective as possible. And whether 
you are in the Foreign Service or the Civil 
Service; whether you are a political officer, 
communicator or secretary, I intend to pay 
personal attention to your professional con- 
cerns. 

As we are open to each other — to new pro- 
posals, to wise cautions, to dissenting 
views — we must also profit from the 
dynamism and diversity of our nation. Rep- 
resentatives of our rich and diverse Ameri- 
can community will have an important place 
among us — sometimes in key assignments, 
sometimes as consultants, often as public 
voices to be heeded, always in a spirit of 
fraternity and learning. 

We will be supported by the public as we 
are perceived to be working, and sacrificing, 
for it. We should remember that every dollar 
we spend unnecessarily is a dollar that could 
have gone to help meet the needs of a hard- 



pressed American taxpayer or a hungry per- 
son abroad. 

Our effectiveness will finally depend on our 
ability to produce the support the President 
requires. Each of you is working for him — 
and for the Congress and public — as well as 
with me. Recognition of that fact, in our 
daily work, will help us maintain a clear 
perspective and understanding of our rela- 
tionship to the American society we serve. 

My confidence in our future together 
comes from knowing so many of you, and my 
admiration for you all. I know of no group of 
men and women who have shown greater 
courage, adaptability and integrity. I can as- 
sure you that President Carter appreciates 
your skills and your sacrifices. It is a great 
honor for me to be one of you. 



U.S. Rejects "Internal Solution" 
to Rhodesian Problem 

Following is a statement read to news cor- 
respondents on January 26 by Frederick Z. 
Brown, Director, Office of Press Relations. 

In his January 24 address, Ian Smith said 
that he would be seeking an internal settle- 
ment to the Rhodesian problem and called for 
negotiations between the Salisbury au- 
thorities and Rhodesian Africans. African 
leaders associated with the armed struggle 
would be excluded from these negotiations. 

Negotiations which exclude leaders of 
nationalist movements will not produce a set- 
tlement. As a basis for continued negotia- 
tions, the United States supports the British 
proposals which the Geneva Conference 
chairman, Ivor Richard, has been discussing 
in Africa. 

In our considered view, the so-called 
"internal solution" will not produce a peace- 
ful settlement and therefore does not have 
the support of the United States. We urge all 
parties which have been involved in the 
negotiations to consider their positions care- 
fully and pursue a course which will produce 
a peaceful outcome. 



126 



Department of State Bulletin 



U.S. Ready To Continue Support 
to the Search for Cyprus Solution 

Following is a statement read to news cor- 
respondents on January 28 by Frederick Z. 
Brown, Director, Office of Press Relations. 

The Department of State welcomes the 
meeting which took place yesterday in 
Nicosia between Archbishop Makarios and 
Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash. Our 
pleasure at the meeting is combined with a 
hope that this sign of progress will quickly be 
translated into a meaningful and sustained 
effort to negotiate the many issues which 
must be solved to reach an equitable Cyprus 
settlement. We recognize that this will be a 
very complicated undertaking. 

The United States stands ready to con- 
tinue its full support and assistance to the 
two Cypriot communities and to U.N. Secre- 
tary General Waldheim in this search for a 
solution to the problem of Cyprus. 



Secretary Kissinger Pays Tribute 
to the Foreign Service 

Follov/ing are remarks made by Secretary 
Kissinger on January 18 at the ninth annual 
awards ceremony of the American Foreign 
Service Association (AFSA). ^ 

When I arrived here in September 1973, 
what concerned me most was whether this 
Department and the Foreign Service would 
adequately meet the demands of an increas- 
ingly complex and subtle era in world affairs 
and could play its role in reconciling increas- 
ingly complex and interrelated domestic and 
foreign policy issues — and I was afraid also of 
how I would survive the flood of papers that 
would descend on me and the memoranda 
that when disapproved came back with just 
one comma changed as if a reflection that my 
views had been taken seriously. [Laughter.] 



' Introductory and closing paragraphs omitted (text 
from press release 12 dated Jan. 19). 



The Department had to assume responsi- 
bility for operation as well as policy, to mas- 
ter new and specialized subjects, to become 
more effective in resolving policy issues 
within the executive branch, and in dealing 
with an increasingly assertive Congress. 

For these reasons, I challenged the 
Foreign Service to do more interpretive re- 
porting, analysis, and conceptual thinking; to 
clarify rather than compromise policy options 
in the foreign-policy-making process; and to 
dissent when you differed substantially with 
the policies we had adopted. 

I asked for it, and I got it. From the be- 
ginning, it was clear to me that the last of 
these challenges, at least, would be met with 
pleasure, with dedication, and with en- 
thusiasm. Thus it is appropriate that my last 
official public engagement should be a cere- 
mony honoring those who have disagreed 
with me. And let me say, for the record now, 
that I forgive them. [Laughter and 
applause.] Not even the Foreign Service can 
be right 100 percent of the time. [Laughter.] 

But to be serious, I can say at the end of 
three and a quarter years that the Foreign 
Service has measured up to each of these 
challenges. You have proved that you have 
professional skill, judgment, and dedication 
to duty second to no other group of pubhc 
servants. 

You have demonstrated your capacity for 
change when necessary. The quality of 
Foreign Service reporting, already good, is 
now even better, with more interpretation 
and analysis. The substantive work within 
the Department is of a higher professional 
and intellectual caliber. 

Meanwhile, the Department has taken a 
better hold of its own organizational prob- 
lems. Mechanisms have been established to 
allocate our personnel and funds in accord- 
ance with the country's foreign policy 
priorities. And on occasion we can even get 
some of them away from the regional 
bureaus. 

Strides have been made toward a more 
comprehensive professional development 
program. A start has been made in finding 
women and representatives of ethnic 
minorities in increasing numbers for respon- 



February 14, 1977 



127 



sible positions. And there is a good grievance 
system and a less medieval attitude toward 
employee rights and concerns. 

In my remarks at the AFSA awards cere- 
mony in 1974, I said that I hoped to leave be- 
hind a professional service which handled 
problems as creative opportunities, which 
has a deep and foresighted perception of the 
national interests and the stamina to fight for 
those at home and overseas. 

Today I can look back and say that I be- 
lieve you have moved substantially toward 
that goal. 

There is a widespread notion that the 
growing interdependence of foreign and 
domestic issues and the improvement of 
communications and transportation have un- 
dermined the role of the Foreign Service and 
reduced embassies to little more than mes- 
sage centers and travel agencies. 

But there is no doubt in my mind that 
these assertions of the death of diplomacy 
are highly premature. For diplomacy is con- 
cerned with the enduring problems of rela- 
tions among nations, the lasting challenge of 
peace and progress, the need to minimize 
friction and misunderstanding. More than 
ever, Foreign Service people must have the 
ability to understand and interpret events 
and conditions in other countries, to com- 
prise a continuously open channel, an inter- 
mediary between our own government and 
society and the one where they serve. 

As foreign policy grows more complex, the 
men and women of the Foreign Service be- 
come the repositories of continuity, the con- 
science of America's permanent interests and 
values, prepared to serve with dedication 
whatever Administration is in office with the 
devotion that America's global respon- 
sibilities demand of them. 

No one articulated the unchanging nature 
of the diplomatic profession better than a 
former French Ambassador to this country, 
Jules Cambon, who once wrote: 

Expressions such as "old diplomacy" and "new diplo- 
macy" bear no relation to reality. It is the outward 
form — if you like — the "adornments" of diplomacy that 
are undergoing a change. The substance must remain 
the same, since human nature is unalterable; since 
there exists no other method of regulating international 
differences; and since the best instrument at the dis- 



posal of a government wishing to persuade another 
government will always remain the spoken word of a 
decent man. 

Today we would say "the spoken word of a 
decent person." [Applause and laughter.] 

But the spoken word of a decent person is 
your professional responsibility, your profes- 
sional legacy, and your high goal. 

So long as you maintain your profes- 
sionalism and the level of performance which 
is characteristic of the Foreign Service, you 
need not, and should not, worry about being 
consulted in foreign policy making. No one 
has a claim to being consulted. It must be 
worth it. But if this building does the job of 
which it is capable, and which I know it will 
do in the future as it has done while I was 
here, you will be consulted, because you will 
be the best source of advice available in the 
government. 

It is no accident that almost all my princi- 
pal assistants are career Foreign Service of- 
ficers. I have chosen them because they were 
the best people available and because we will 
never have a professional service if it is not 
used for all of the positions in the Depart- 
ment. 

I strongly support AFSA's attempts to 
help the President-elect carry out his com- 
mitment to make diplomatic appointments on 
the basis of merit, and I have no doubt that 
most of the country's Foreign Service people 
are the most meritorious, or we do something 
wrong in our selection process. 

The members of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service have the assurance 
that in carrying out your responsibilities to 
this country, you are striving not for narrow 
national goals, but for a humane and peaceful 
world — that world alone, in which the United 
States will be secure and prosperous and in 
which other nations can live in peace and 
freedom. 

On assuming the office which I now leave, 
Thomas Jefferson wrote Lafayette: 

I think with others that nations are to be governed 
with regard to their own interests, but I am convinced 
that it is their interest, in the long run, to be grateful, 
faithful to their engagements even in the worst of cir- 
cumstances, and honorable and generous always. 

This blend of stern reality and humane 



128 



Department of State Bulletin 



ideas is as good a statement of our ultimate 
foreign policy objectives as I know. In work- 
ing for this goal, you have the unique 
privilege not only of serving your country 
but the interests of all mankind. 

I leave this building with deep emotions, 
gratitude for the support you gave me, admi- 
ration for your ability, pride in what we have 
accomplished together, and respect for your 
dedication and courage. 

In this last regard, I think of those 
Foreign Service Officers who during my time 
in office gave their lives in the service of 
their country: Rodger Davies, Frank Meloy, 
and Robert Waring. 

I think also of those of you who im- 
mediately volunteered to replace them. 

I think of those, regardless of rank, who 
willingly and reasonably uncomplainingly 
served and lived with their families every 
day in dangerous and difficult conditions in 
many parts of the world. And I think, finally, 
with unbounded admiration of those of my 
immediate staff who put up with me for three 
and a half years. They have passed the first 
test of sainthood. [Laughter.] 

Our job over these past years has been to 
produce a durable foreign policy, one that 
would respond to the needs and values of the 
American people, as well as to the aspira- 
tions of mankind. 

I hope that an objective observer, and 
perhaps even occasionally an AFSA member, 
will agree that strong foundations for future 
progress have been put in place in three cen- 
tral areas — the strength of the great demo- 
cratic nations, the imperative of global 
peace, and the cause of cooperative interna- 
tional progress. 

The record is one of which you all can be 
proud. Your role has been, and will continue 
to be, central and crucial. You share in the 
achievements of our foreign policy, as well 
as — I cannot really bring myself to say it — 
since we haven't known it for three years and 
three months — its failures. [Laughter.] But I 
leave here with confidence — confidence that 
America's foreign policy will be in good 
hands, and that you will give my distin- 
guished successor the loyal and able service 
which you gave me. 



THE CONGRESS 



International Economic Report 
Transmitted to the Congress 

Message From President Ford ' 

To the Congress of the United States: 

The world economy has come a long way 
from the gloom and uncertainty of two years 
ago. Despite many divisive economic pres- 
sures, international cooperation has not 
broken down but has, in fact, improved. U.S. 
initiatives to strengthen international eco- 
nomic cooperation have led to real progress. 
Our major alhes and trading partners have 
cooperated with us and have reciprocated our 
desire for strengthened economic ties. 

At the Economic Summit in Puerto Rico, in 
the OECD, the IMF, the GATT and in 
numerous other meetings in 1976, we joined 
with our major trading and financial partners 
and with other nations to whom develop- 
ments in the larger economies are of primary 
importance, in forging compatible ap- 
proaches to the difficult problems that beset 
our economies. We concurred that first and 
foremost we must place our economies on a 
path of sustained growth without inflation. 
That is the essential ingredient to further 
and lasting reduction in unemployment. We 
also strengthened our common resolve to 
avoid trade restrictive measures and to 
negotiate a more open international trading 
system. We reached a consensus on appro- 
priate means to assist countries needing fi- 
nancial help as they work toward economic 
stability. We also agreed to make construc- 
tive efforts to deal with the problems be- 



^ Transmitted on Jan. 18 (text from White House 
press release). The President's message, together with 
the Annual Report of the Council on International Eco- 
nomic Policy, is printed in "International Economic Re- 
port of the President, Transmitted to the Congress 
January 1977"; for sale by the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C. 20402 (194 pp.; $4.85; stock no. 041-015-00081-1). 



February 14, 1977 



129 



tween developed and developing nations. 

The United States can be proud of its lead- 
ership in these areas. International economic 
cooperation is stronger today than at any 
time since the Second World War. We have 
learned the importance of industrialized de- 
mocracies taking into account the likely im- 
pact of their actions on other nations as they 
develop their economic policies. In an inter- 
dependent world, a nation which disrupts the 
economies of its trading partners does so at 
its own eventual peril. 

We have also come to realize how mutually 
supportive action benefits all countries. Ac- 
cordingly we and our partners have improved 
arrangements for assisting countries in spe- 
cial need as they work to stabilize their 
domestic economies. The United States has 
worked very closely with several of our 
friends and allies in supporting their efforts 
to resolve their economic difficulties. We 
have constructed a strong framework for 
cooperation with other industrialized democ- 
racies to manage future possible disruptions 
of oil supplies and to reduce dependence on 
oil imports. We have attempted to promote a 
more constructive relationship with the de- 
veloping nations. This new relationship will 
enable us to enhance their economic pros- 
pects as a part of a common effort to improve 
the world economy and to give them a 
greater share in the responsibilities for, and 
in the management and benefits of, an or- 
derly and prosperous international economic 
system. 

More specifically, substantial progress, to- 
gether with lingering problems, mark de- 
velopments in several areas. 

Monetary Affairs 

In 1976, member nations of the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund successfully concluded 
the first general revision of the Articles of 
Agreement since the Bretton Woods Agree- 
ment of 1944. In effect, these amendments 
replace the old exchange rate system based 
on par values with one permitting countries 
to establish floating exchange rates, either 
individually or jointly. The new system will 



oblige member countries to promote ex- 
change stability by fostering stable economic 
and financial conditions and to avoid disrup- 
tively influencing exchange rates or the in- 
ternational monetary system. Under the new 
system, Special Drawing Rights will replace 
gold as the unit of account in the Fund. 

The amendments creating this system 
were formally accepted by the United States 
and will become effective upon similar ratifi- 
cation by the requisite number of member 
nations. At that time, the Fund will have 
new and broader responsibilities for oversee- 
ing the international monetary system and 
for developing principles that will help coun- 
tries meet their financial obligations. The ef- 
fect will be to promote expanded trade and 
growth through a more efficient and realistic 
exchange rate system. 

The United States also proposed the crea- 
tion of a Trust Fund, managed by the IMF, 
to provide assistance on concessionary terms 
to low-income Fund members. Resources are 
now being realized from profits on sales, over 
four years, of 25 million ounces of IMF-held 
gold. 

International Trade 

Although the recession and large balance- 
of-payments deficits of the oil consuming 
countries led several of them to move in the 
direction of new restrictive trade policies, on 
the whole, considerable success has been 
achieved in maintaining an open world trad- 
ing system. The growth of world trade re- 
sumed in 1976, following a decline in 1975 — 
the first since World War II. 

On January 1, the United States joined 
other developed countries in establishing a 
Generalized System of Preferences for im- 
ports from developing nations. These prefer- 
ences apply to more than 2,700 tariff items, 
giving duty-free access to the U.S. market to 
qualified developing countries and affording 
these nations the opportunity to diversify 
their exports and to increase their export in- 
come. 

The Multilateral Trade Negotiations in 
Geneva, among more than ninety nations. 



130 



Department of State Bulletin 



made progress in several areas. The United 
States proposed a formula for cutting tariffs, 
and a number of other measures covering 
tropical products from developing countries, 
import safeguards, and quantitative restric- 
tions. Considerable progress was made on a 
product standard code, and work was started 
on improving the GATT framework for in- 
ternational trade and on a code for govern- 
ment procurement. 

This international cooperation in fur- 
therance of open trade was complemented by 
U.S. action in resolving several domestic 
complaints of trade injury. The responsible 
actions of this country strengthened the re- 
solve of our trading partners to resist pres- 
sures for import restrictions, thus contribut- 
ing to brighter prospects for U.S. exports 
and to an orderly and open international 
trading system. 

Commodities and Raw Materials 

Major developments in the international 
commodity area during 1976 included an 
agreement to expand the IMF Compensatory 
Finance Facility; adoption by the UNCTAD 
IV Conference [United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development] of a comprehen- 
sive commodities resolution; continued com- 
modity policy discussions at the Conference 
on International Economic Cooperation; and 
efforts to renew the coffee, tin, and cocoa 
commodity agreements. 

The United States strongly supported ex- 
pansion of the IMF Compensatory Finance 
Facility, designed to help countries to 
stabihze their export earnings. In addition, 
at the UNCTAD IV Conference, the United 
States proposed the creation of a new Inter- 
national Resources Bank to promote produc- 
tion of raw materials in the developing na- 
tions by facilitating investment flows into 
these countries. 

In some respects, however, the approach 
of the United States with respect to commod- 
ity policies differs from that of a number of 
developing countries. Generally, these coun- 
tries support commodity arrangements that 
provide for greater government control of 



prices and production, as well as common 
financing of commodity buffer stocks. In con- 
trast, the commodity policy of the United 
States has three major objectives: 

— To ensure adequate investment in re- 
source development to meet future market 
demands at reasonable prices; 

—To examine on a case-by-case basis indi- 
vidual commodities in order to determine 
how best to improve (where possible) the 
functioning of individual commodity markets 
and to determine whether commodity agree- 
ments would be useful and appropriate; 

—To promote the stable growth of the 
commodity export earnings of developing 
countries. 

The United States has repeatedly pointed 
out that artificial increases of prices serve 
the interests of neither producers nor con- 
sumers in both developed and developing 
countries. Frequently, control of prices and 
production has led to lower, less stable earn- 
ings for producers, mainly because substitute 
sources are developed or existing sources 
expanded. Moreover, controls have often ini- 
tially meant higher prices for consumers, re- 
duced exports, and a decline in the economic 
welfare of all parties. The United States, 
while prepared to genuinely consider 
methods of improving markets for individual 
commodities, generally supports the use of 
market mechanisms to determine supplies 
and prices. 

Multinational Corporations and Interna- 
tional Investtnent 

In June 1976, the United States approved 
the adoption of the Declaration on Interna- 
tional Investment and Multinational Enter- 
prises devised by the Organization for Eco- 
nomic Cooperation and Development. This 
agreement affirms the principle of national 
treatment of multinational corporations 
(MNC's); recommends guidelines of good 
business practices for the activities of MNC's; 
and indicates the responsibihties of govern- 
ments regarding international investment in- 
centives and disincentives. 



February 14, 1977 



131 



The United States recognizes that in- 
creased investment is a critical element for 
international economic growth, and that 
MNC's have contributed substantially to the 
rise in international investment and produc- 
tivity. The activities of MNC's, however, 
have prompted questions about their obhga- 
tions to both home and host countries and 
about the reciprocal responsibilities of na- 
tions where the MNC's do business. Where 
possible, the United States is willing to enter 
into bilateral and multilateral discussions to 
help resolve these intergovernmental dis- 
putes. 

The United States welcomes foreign 
investment in its domestic economy. The 
Administration's Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States has coordi- 
nated overall policy in this area. In 1976, 
major studies of foreign portfolio and foreign 
direct investment in the United States were 
completed and reported to the Congress. 

Critical International Economic Problems 

We must also be aware that the events of 
the past year have left an agenda of unre- 
solved problems including: 

(1) the challenge of achieving stable eco- 
nomic growth in industrial and developing 
nations alike, and reducing inflation, un- 
employment and excessive public sector defi- 
cits; 

(2) the necessity for the United States and 
other nations to obtain an adequate amount 
of real capital formation, to create jobs and 
to increase productivity; 

(3) the major imbalance between oil export- 
ers and oil importing nations, and the directly 
related increasing debt burden of devel- 
oping and some developed nations; 

(4) the failure to achieve an agreement 
among developed and less developed nations 
on an effective and efficient strategy for in- 
creasing prosperity for less developed coun- 
tries in the context of a common effort to im- 
prove the world economy; 

(5) the inadequate progress of the United 
States and other oil-consuming nations in re- 
ducing dependence on oil imports; and the 



need to encourage domestic development of 
oil and gas resources, alternative energy 
sources, and conservation; 

(6) the continuing temptation among na- 
tions to use restrictive trade measures and 
the need to resist such pressures while re- 
ducing trade barriers and improving means 
for managing trade problems. 

This Report traces the progress made in 
1976 in dealing with the major economic is- 
sues facing the world. Evolving economic and 
political developments will continue to chal- 
lenge the leaders of all nations. Because of 
the vigor of our people and the strength of 
our system, the United States today, as 
much or more than in years past, is the 
pivotal force for building a strong and pros- 
perous world economy. By acting in a man- 
ner consistent with the interests of our own 
people yet remaining cognizant of the inter- 
ests of other nations as well, I am certain 
that the United States will continue to pro- 
vide leadership in solving the critical issues 
of today and the unforeseen developments of 
tomorrow. 



Gerald R. Ford. 



The White House, 
January 18, 1977. 



Sixteenth Annual Report of ACDA 
Transmitted to the Congress 

Following is the text of a letter sent by 
President Ford to Speaker of the House 
Thomas P. O'Neill and President of the Sen- 
ate Nelson A. Rockefeller on January 19. 

white House press release dated January 20 

January 19, 1977. 

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. Pres- 
ident:) Arms control as a means of main- 
taining peace and security has been a princi- 
pal objective of my Administration. In this 
nuclear era our arms control policy and de- 



132 



Department of State Bulletin 



fense efforts must be complementary. We 
must seek to influence policies of possible 
adversaries by maintaining strong military 
forces and by pursuing negotiations to en- 
hance stability, not by encouraging an arms 
race which would increase the risk of nuclear 
war. 

SALT is a proven means of furthering the 
essential dialogue between the United States 
and the Soviet Union on arms control. Our 
goal is to promote stability by mutual re- 
straint in strategic nuclear competition, to 
limit growth of the nuclear forces of both 
sides, and to reduce them through verifiable 
agreements. This effort, I am confident, will 
succeed. 

As a part of our efforts to restrain 
strategic nuclear competition with the Soviet 
Union, we have also negotiated two treaties 
which limit the yield of nuclear explosive 
tests: the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 
related Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Pur- 
poses Treaty. Both of these treaties repre- 
sent genuine progress. They contain 
precedent-setting provisions which will en- 
hance the prospects for further progress in 
this area. These treaties have been sub- 
mitted to the Senate, and I urge that it pro- 
vide its advice and consent to ratification. 

Complementing the resolution of nuclear 
rivalry with the Soviet Union is another im- 
perative in our dialogue for survival: Pre- 
venting the further spread of nuclear 
weapons. If nuclear arsenals proliferate in 
the world, the likelihood of a nuclear conflict 
is vastly increased. The worldwide need for 
peaceful nuclear energy complicates this 
problem, since the same technology that pro- 
duces such energy can be diverted to the de- 
velopment and production of nuclear 
weapons. 

To emphasize more strongly our commit- 
ment to the objective of the nuclear Non- 
Proliferation Treaty, I announced a new, 
comprehensive United States nuclear energy 
policy last October which harmonizes our 
non-proliferation objectives with our domes- 
tic energy policy. We have tightened controls 
on American exports of sensitive nuclear ma- 
terials and technology. Our sustained diplo- 



matic initiatives with other suppliers of nu- 
clear technology have also resulted in im- 
proved international comprehension of the 
risks of proliferation, as well as cooperation 
to prevent it. 

Non-proliferation is only one example of 
our pursuit of arms control through multilat- 
eral forums and arrangements. With our 
Western allies we are engaged in negotia- 
tions to reduce military forces in Central 
Europe. Our goal is to obtain a more stable 
military balance in Central Europe at lower 
levels of force. We also participate in the ac- 
tivities of the Conference of the Committee 
on Disarmament (CCD), which recently ap- 
proved a convention outlawing the use of en- 
vironmental modification techniques for hos- 
tile purposes. This Convention will soon be 
open to all nations for ratification. The CCD 
is also continuing its work on a convention to 
limit chemical weapons, and will soon be con- 
sidering a U.S. initiative to ban radiological 
warfare. 

This 16th annual report on the U.S. Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency completes 
the record of activities and developments in 
the arms control field for calendar year 
1976.1 But it is more than a backward look at 
the record. It also reflects the need for for- 
ward planning. In an age of rapidly advanc- 
ing technologies, arms control must look at 
the future as well as the present. Arms con- 
trol must be pursued vigorously and imagina- 
tively, based upon balanced agreements and 
buttressed by mechanisms to preserve confi- 
dence in the viability of those agreements. 

It is particularly important to realize that 
arms control is a complex matter and success 
can be attained only through diligent and 
sustained attention. Problems will persist, 
but we must remain dedicated to continued 
and determined efforts for the control and 
balanced reduction of armaments. 
Sincerely, 

Gerald R. Ford. 



' Single copies of the report are available from the 
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20451. 



February 14, 1977 



133 



Second Sinai Support Mission Report 
Transmitted to the Congress 

Message From President Ford ^ 

To the Congress of the United States: 

I am pleased to transmit herewith the Sec- 
ond Report of the United States Sinai Sup- 
port Mission. This report, following that 
which I forwarded on April 30, 1976, de- 
scribes the manner in which the Mission is 
carrying out its responsibility for operating 
the early warning system in the Sinai, as 
specified in the Basic Agreement between 
Egypt and Israel and its Annex signed on 
September 4, 1975. This report is provided to 
the Congress in conformity with Section 4 of 
Public Law 94-110 of October 13, 1975. 

The Report includes a summary of the op- 
erations of the early warning system since its 
inauguration on February 22, 1976, and a de- 
scription of the Mission's permanent base 
camp facilities which were officially dedi- 
cated on July 4. 

With the completion of major construction 
activity, it has been possible to reduce 
somewhat the number of Americans working 
in the Sinai in accordance with the wishes of 
the Congress. The United States Sinai Sup- 
port Mission will continue to analyze care- 
fully all aspects of the Sinai operation to 
identify ways whereby the numbers might be 
further reduced. 

The proposal to establish an American- 
manned early warning system in the Sinai 
was made at the request of the Governments 
of Egypt and Israel. With the concurrence of 
the Congress, we accepted this undertaking 
because the United States strongly seeks the 
achievement of peace and stability in the 
Middle East. 

The United States Sinai Support Mission 
plays an important role in support of the 
Basic Agreement. Both sides have recently 
reaffirmed their confidence in the manner in 



which the United States has been carrying 
out its responsibilities in the Sinai, and as 
long as it continues to enjoy this support, the 
United States role will represent a meaning- 
ful contribution to the prospects for attaining 
a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. 



Gerald R. Ford. 



1 Transmitted on Jan. 11 (text from Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents dated Jan. 20); also 
printed as H. Doc. 95-41, which includes the text of the 
report. 



The White House, 
January 11, 1977. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

Protocol to the 1975 Tax Convention With the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
Message from the President of the United States 
transmitting the protocol, signed at London on Au- 
gust 26, 1976. S. Ex. Q. September 22, 1976. 6 pp. 

Amendment of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act and 
Other International Monetary Matters. Report of the 
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs, together with supplemental views, to accom- 
pany H.R. 13955. S. Rept. 94-1295. September 22, 
1976. 44 pp. 

Effectiveness of Federal Agency Enforcement of Laws 
and Policies Against Compliance, by Banks and Other 
U.S. Firms, With the Arab Boycott. Report by the 
House Committee on Government Operations. H. 
Rept. 94-1668. September 23, 1976. 38 pp. 

Right-to-Food Resolution. Report of the Senate Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations to accompany H. Con. 
Res. 737. S. Rept. 94-1316. September 28, 1976. 3 
pp. 

Human Rights in Argentina. Hearings before the Sub- 
committee on International Organizations of the 
House Committee on International Relations. Sep- 
tember 28-29, 1976. 67 pp. 

Stockpile Disposals. Report of the Senate Committee 
on Armed Services to accompany S. 3852. S. Rept. 
94-1338. September 29, 1976. 6 pp. 

Aircraft Components. Report of the Senate Committee 
on Finance to accompany H.R. 2177. S. Rept. 94- 
1349. September 29, 1976. 7 pp. 

Aircraft Engines. Report of the Senate Committee on 
Finance to accompany H.R. 2181. S. Rept. 94-1351. 
September 29, 1976. 6 pp. 

Mattress Blanks of Rubber Latex. Report of the Senate 
Committee on Finance to accompany H.R. 11605. 
S. Rept. 94-1352. September 29, 1976. 5 pp. 

Security Assistance to Spain. Communication from the 
President of the United States transmitting justifica- 
tion of Presidential deteiTnination to furnish security 
assistance to Spain. H. Doc. 94-648. September 30, 
1976. 3 pp. 

Soviet Economy in a New Perspective. A compendium 
of papers submitted to the Joint Economic Commit- 
tee. October 14, 1976. 821 pp. 



134 



Department of State Bulletin 



TREATY INFORMATION 



United States Ratifies Convention 
for Conservation of Antarctic Seals 

Press release 15 dated January 19 

On December 28, 1976, President Ford 
signed the instrument of ratification for the 
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Seals. The convention was concluded in Lon- 
don in 1972 among the 12 nations party to the 
Antarctic Treaty, which itself provides no 
protection for seals in the water and on the 
sea ice in Antarctica; the effect of this con- 
vention will be to rectify that situation. 

Although commercial sealing has not yet 
begun in the Antarctic, the seals there have 
been vulnerable to the possible onset at any 
time of uncontrolled exploitation. The con- 
vention is a preventive measure intended to 
create an effective management system for 
the seals well before a stage could be reached 
at which their survival might become seri- 
ously threatened. 

The convention has as basic objectives the 
preservation, conservation, scientific study, 
and rational use of the seals, taking into ac- 
count the effects on the ecological system. It 
provides complete protection for the Ross 
seal, the Southern Elephant seal and the Fur 
seal; and it sets very conservative catch lim- 
its for the other three of the six known Ant- 
arctic species, the Crabeater, Leopard, and 
Weddell seals, all of which are more plentiful. 

Responsibility for monitoring the conven- 
tion is assigned to the Scientific Committee 
on Antarctic Research, which is the principal 
scientific advisory body under the Antarctic 
Treaty. Provision is made for adoption of ad- 
ditional controls beyond those instituted by 
this agreement, should commercial sealing 
get underway in the Antarctic. Each of the 
parties may adopt more stringent controls for 
itself than are provided for in the convention, 
as the United States has already done in 



the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972. 

Signatories to the convention include all 12 
of the original Antarctic Treaty parties: 
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, 
France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South 
Africa, the United Kingdom, the United 
States, and the U.S.S.R. Four of these, 
France, Norway, South Africa, and the 
United Kingdom have completed ratification 
of the convention; upon deposit of its ratifica- 
tion on January 18, the United States became 
the fifth nation to have done so. Ratification 
by 7 of the 12 signatory nations is necessary 
for the convention to enter into force. 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Agriculture 

Agreement establishing the International Fund for Ag- 
ricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome June 
1.3, 1976.' 

Signatures: Chile, January 19, 1977; Norway, 
January 20, 1977; France, India, January 21, 1977. 

Coffee 

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. 
Done at London December 3, 1975. Entered into force 
provisionally October 1, 1976. 

Ratifications deposited: Costa Rica, January 20, 
1977; Haiti, January 21, 1977. 

Customs 

Customs convention regarding E.C.S. carnets for com- 
mercial samples, with annex and protocol of signa- 
ture. Done at Brussels March 1, 1956. Entered into 
force October 3, 1957; for the United States March 3, 
1969. TIAS 6632. 

Notification of denunciation: Switzerland, December 
20, 1976; effective March 20, 1977. 

Health 

Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the Constitution of 
the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as 
amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva 
May 22, 1973.' 

Acceptances deposited: Central African Empire, 

Saudi Arabia, January 13, 1977; Mongolia, January 

19, 1977. 

Amendments to articles 24 and 25 of the Constitution of 

the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as 



' Not in force. 



February 14, 1977 



135 



amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva 
May 17, 1976. > 

Acceptance deposited: Saudi Arabia, January 13, 
1977. 

Hydrographic Organization 

Convention on the International Hydrographic Organi- 
zation, with annexes. Done at Monaco May 3, 1967. 
Entered into force Septembfer 22, 1970. TIAS 6933. 
Accession deposited: Zaire, November 29, 1976. 

Maritime Matters 

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as 
amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). 
Adopted at London October 17, 1974.' 
Acceptance deposited: Singapore, January 18, 1977. 

Phonograms 

Convention for the protection of producers of phono- 
grams against unauthorized duplication of their 
phonograms. Done at Geneva October 29, 1971. En- 
tered into force April 18, 1973; for the United States 
March 10, 1974. TIAS 7808. 

Notifications from World Intellectual Property Or- 
ganization that ratifications deposited: Denmark, 
Italy, December 24, 1976. 
Notification from World Intellectual Property Or- 
ganization that accession deposited: Chile, De- 
cember 24, 1976. 

Property — Industrial 

Locarno agreement establishing an international clas- 
sification for industrial designs, with annex. Done at 
Locarno October 8, 1968. Entered into force April 27, 
1971; for the United States May 25, 1972. TIAS 7420. 
Notification from World Intellectual Property Or- 
ganization that ratification deposited: Nether- 
lands, December 30, i976. 

Safety at Sea 

Convention on the international regulations for pre- 
venting collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London Oc- 
tober 20, 1972. Enters into force July 15, 1977. 
Proclaimed by the President: January 19, 1977. 

Space 

Treaty on principles governing the activities of states 
in the exploration and use of outer space, including 
the moon and other celestial bodies. Done at Wash- 
ington, London, and Moscow January 27, 1967. En- 
tered into force October 10, 1967. TIAS 6347. 
Accession deposited: Saudi Arabia, December 17, 
1976. 

Convention on international liability for damage caused 
by space objects. Done at Washington, London, and 
Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into force Sep- 
tember 1, 1972; for the United States October 9, 
1973. TIAS 7762. 



Accession deposited: Saudi Arabia, December 17, 
1976. 

Wills 

Convention providing a uniform law on the form of an 
international will, with annex. Done at Washington 
October 26, 1973.' 
Accession deposited: Canada, January 24, 1977. '^ 



BILATERAL 

Colombia 

Agreement relating to the operation and maintenance 
of the rawinsonde observation station on San Andres 
Island, with exchanges of notes and memorandum of 
arrangement. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Bogota December 22, 1976. Entered into force De- 
cember 22, 1976; effective January 1, 1977. 

Jamaica 

Agreement amending the agreements for sales of ag- 
ricultural commodities of April 16, 1975 (TIAS 8130), 
and September 30, 1976. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Kingston December 3 and 15, 1976. Entered 
into force December 15, 1976. 

Korea 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of ag- 
ricultural commodities of February 18, 1976 (TIAS 
8261). Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul De- 
cember 22, 1976. Entered into force December 22, 
1976. 

Pakistan 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relat- 
ing to the agreement of November 23, 1974 (TIAS 
7971). Signed at Islamabad December 29, 1976. En- 
tered into force December 29, 1976. 

Portugal 

Protocol relating to exchanges in the field of physical 
education and sports. Signed at Lisbon December 22, 
1976. Entered into force December 22, 1976. 

Thailand 

Memorandum of understanding relating to Chiang Mai 
seismic research station. Signed at Bangkok De- 
cember 29, 1976. Entered into force December 29, 
1976. 

Memorandum of agreement on integrated communica- 
tions system, with appendix. Signed at Bangkok 
January 10, 1977. Entered into force January 10, 
1977. 



' Not in force. 

^ Extends only to the Provinces of Manitoba and New- 
foundland. 



136 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX February U, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 196U 



Africa. President Carter Interviewed by AP and 
UPI Correspondents (excerpts from tran- 
script) 123 

American Principles 

Address by President Carter to People of Other 

Nations (videotaped for broadcast abroad) 122 

The Inaugural Address of President Carter 121 

Arms Control and Disarmament 

President Carter Interviewed by AP and UPI 
Correspondents (excerpts from transcript) . . . 123 

Sixteenth Annual Report of ACDA Transmitted 
to the Congress (letter from President Ford) . 132 

Congress 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy 134 

International Economic Report Transmitted to 
the Congress (message from President Ford) . 129 

Second Sinai Support Mission Report Transmit- 
ted to the Congress (message from President 
Ford) 134 

Sixteenth Annual Report of ACDA Transmitted 
to the Congress (letter from President Ford) . 132 

Cyprus. U.S. Ready To Continue Support to the 
Search for Cyprus Solution (Department 
statement) 127 

Department and Foreign Service 

Message From Secretary Vance to Department 
and Foreign Service 125 

Secretary Kissinger Pays Tribute to the Foreign 
Service (remarks at AFSA awards ceremony) 127 

Economic Affairs. International Economic Re- 
port Transmitted to the Congress (message 
from President Ford) 129 

Environment. United States Ratifies Convention 
for Conservation of Antarctic Seals 135 

Middle East 

President Carter Interviewed by AP and UPI 
Correspondents (excerpts from transcript) . . . 123 

Second Sinai Support Mission Report Transmit- 
ted to the Congress (message from President 
Ford) 134 

Presidential Documents 

Address by President Carter to People of Other 
Nations 122 

The Inaugural Address of President Carter 121 

International Economic Report Transmitted to 
the Congress (message from President Ford) . 129 

President Carter Interviewed by AP and UPI 
Correspondents (excerpts from transcript) . . . 123 

Second Sinai Support Mission Report Transmit- 
ted to the Congress (message from President 
Ford) 134 

Sixteenth Annual Report of ACDA Transmitted 
to the Congress (letter from President Ford) . 132 



Southern Rhodesia 

President Carter Interviewed by AP and UPI 
Correspondents (excerpts from transcript) ... 123 

U.S. Rejects "Internal Solution" to Rhodesian 
Problem (Department statement) 126 

Treaty Information 

Current Action? 135 

United States Ratifies Convention for Conserva- 
tion of Antarctic Seals 135 

U.S.S.R. President Carter Interviewed by AP 
and UPI Correspondents (excerpts from tran- 
script) 123 

Name Index 

Carter, President 121, 122, 123 

Ford, President 129, 132, 134 

Kissinger, Secretary 127 

Vance, Secretary 125 



Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: January 24—30 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20520. 

Subject 

Cyrus R. Vance sworn in as 
Secretary of State, Jan. 23 
(biographic data). 

Secretary Vance: message to 
Department and Foreign 
Service personnel, Jan. 24. 

Secretary Vance; remarks to the 
press upon arrival at the State 
Department, Jan. 24. 

Shipping Coordinating Commit- 
tee, Feb. 23. 

Secretary's Advisory Commit- 
tee on Private International 
Law, Study Group on Interna- 
tional Sale of Goods, New 
York, N.Y., Mar. 5. 

Foreign policy conference, San 
Diego, Calif., Feb. 9-10. 

Marshall Shulman to be Special 
Consultant to the Secretary 
on Soviet Affairs (biographic 
data). 

State Department issues report 
on technology and foreign af- 
fairs. 

Renewal and continuation of 
advisory committees. 

U.S. -Canada Transit Pipeline 
Treaty signed. 

U.S. -Canada fisheries negotia- 
tions, Jan. 17-28. 



No. 


Date 


•■20 


1/24 


21 


1/25 


*22 


1/25 


*23 


1/25 


»24 


1/25 



*25 1/27 

*26 1/28 

*27 1/28 

*28 1/28 

t29 1/28 

*30 1/29 



* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



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U.S. government printing office 

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o 
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y?e,^ 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 

Volume LXXVI • No. 1965 • February 21, 1977 



SECRETARY VANCE'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF JANUARY 31 1S7 

SECRETARY VANCE INTERVIEWED 
BY AP AND UPI CORRESPONDENTS 1U7 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

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Single copy 85 cents 

The Secretary of State has determined that the pub- 
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cal has been approved by the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget through January 31, 
1981. 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be re- 
printed. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The 
BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to 
Periodical Literature. 



Vol. LXXVI, No. 1965 
February 21, 1977 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 

The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, and 
news conferences of the President and 
the Secretary of State and other offi- 
cers of the Department, as well as spe- 
cial articles on various phases of in- 
ternational affairs and the functions of 
the Department. Information is in- 
cluded concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a party 
and on treaties of general interna- 
tional interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 



Secretary Vance's News Conference of January 31 



Following is the transcript of Secretary 
Vance's news conference at the Department 
of State on January 31. 

Press release 32 dated January 31 

Secretary Vance: Good morning. I have 
three matters that I would like to comment on 
briefly before I take questions. 

The first relates to a meeting which I will 
be having starting this morning, and continu- 
ing through lunch, with the Foreign Minister 
of Panama. He is coming today to discuss the 
resumption of the canal negotiations. After 
lunch, when we have completed our discus- 
sions, we will meet with the press briefly. We 
will have a statement to issue, and we will 
take a few questions.* 

Secondly, I would like to make a brief 
statement with respect to the Rhodesian is- 
sue. 

We very much regret that efforts to reach a 
satisfactory negotiated settlement to the 
Rhodesian problem have, for the moment at 
least, been dealt a serious blow. 

The position announced by Mr. Ian Smith 
has resulted in a new and more dangerous 
situation regarding the prospects for peace in 
Rhodesia. We remain dedicated to a peaceful 
resolution of the Rhodesian issue leading to 
majority rule. We are conferring with the 
British Government and are continuing to 
consult with the African leaders most directly 
concerned with this problem, as well as the 
South African Government. 

The British proposal remains, in our view, a 
valid basis for negotiation. The Rhodesian au- 
thorities should understand clearly that under 



no circumstances can they count on any form 
of American assistance in their effort to pre- 
vent majority rule in Rhodesia or to enter into 
negotiations which exclude leaders of 
nationalist movements. 

The so-called "internal solution" will not 
produce a peaceful settlement and therefore 
will not have the support of the United 
States. 

To reemphasize our opposition to the 
maintenance of minority-imposed controi of 
the government of Rhodesia, this Adminis- 
tration will strongly support the repeal of the 
Byrd amendment.^ We do this in conformity 
with our international obligations and also be- 
cause we beheve it represents a step toward 
a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia. 

We call on all the parties to act with flexibil- 
ity and restraint and to give their support to a 
negotiated solution that can bring both peace 
and majority rule to Rhodesia. 

And now a brief word about my travel 
plans. As you know, I am going to the Middle 
East on the 14th of February. In addition to 
that, I have been discussing with the Soviet 
Union a trip to Moscow. I will be going to 
Moscow in March, and I will have an an- 
nouncement as to the timing of that trip later 
this week. 

And now questions. 

Q. Jim Anderson, UPI. Mr. Secretary, on 
the question of international civil rights, is 
this Administration going to continue the 
practice of speaking out on cases such as the 



See p. 146. 



2 The Byrd amendment, attached to a military ap- 
propriations bill in 1971, permits the importation of 
strategic materials from Rhodesia, including chromium, 
asbestos, and nickel, as long as their importation is 
permitted from Communist countries. 



February 21, 1977 



137 



Sakharov episode? ^ Or are you going to con- 
tinue the practice of your predecessor, exert- 
ing quiet diplomatic pressure and using his 
concept of linkage ? 

Secretary Vance: On the issue of human 
rights, the President has often expressed his 
deep concern in this area and has reaffirmed 
that deep concern in the inauguration ad- 
dress. 

We will speak frankly about injustice both 
at home and abroad. We do not intend, how- 
ever, to be strident or polemical, but we do 
believe that an abiding respect for human 
rights is a human value of fundamental impor- 
tance and that it must be nourished. We will 
not comment on each and every issue, but we 
will from time to time comment when we see a 
threat to human rights, when we believe it 
constructive to do so. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Barry Schweid of AP. On 
the same subject, one of the local pundits yes- 
terday called it sudden diplomacy, suggesthig 
that this speaking out hasn't been very well 
thought out, particularly its impact on di- 
plomacy. 

You refer to your trip to Moscow. Do you 
think the statement you have made on 
Sakharov and your general view on human 
rights will have an impact, a negative impact, 
on negotiations with the Soviet Union? In- 
deed, isn't that what Mr. Dobrynin [Anatoliy 
F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.] 
called to tell you the other day? 

Secretary Vance: I do not believe that it 
will have a negative impact. As I indicated, 
we will from time to time speak out. I have 



^ In response to a question at a Department of State 
news briefing on Jan. 26, the following was made avail- 
able to news correspondents on Jan. 27: 

Q. Do you have any comment on the stories concern- 
ing the warnings the Soviets have given to Sakharov 
about his activities? 

A. We have long admired Andrey Sakharov as an 
outspoken champion of human rights in the Soviet 
Union. He is, as you know, a prominent, respected 
scientist, a Nobel laureate, who, at considerable risk, 
has worked to promote respect for human rights in his 
native land. 

Any attempts by the Soviet authorities to intimidate 
Mr. Sakharov will not silence legitimate criticism in the 
Soviet Union and will conflict with accepted interna- 
tional standards in the field of human rights. 



discussed the matter with Mr. Dobrynin, but 
I am sure that our discussions with the Soviet 
Union on a whole range of matters will not be 
adversely affected by what we have said. 



U.S. Role in Southern Africa 

Q. Mr. Secretary, John Wallach of Hearst. 
On the southern Africa situation, there is a 
deadline of sorts coming up in March, when 
the Africans have said that they will bring the 
question of sanctions to the Security Council 
in the same month the United States will be 
President of the Council, chairman of the 
Council. 

Do you feel that in the intervening period, 
the United States should take any initiatives 
in southern Africa, such as, for example, 
your own appointing of a negotiator to visit 
the white areas as well as the — white nations 
as well as the black nations? Or should the 
United States stay back and let the British 
handle the situation? In other words, where 
do you feel we should go from here? 

Secretary Vance: Insofar as the Rhodesia 
problem is concerned, the British, quite prop- 
erly, are taking the leading role. We will sup- 
port the British in this effort and work closely 
and carefully with them. We are in constant 
touch with the British and expect to meet 
with Ivor Richard as soon as he completes his 
mission to southern Africa. And we will work 
out our plans in concert with them. 

With respect to the second half of your 
question — will we be sending a special emis- 
sary to that part of the world?— I do not have 
any final conclusion in my own mind on that. I 
want to think about the problem more and 
study it. As you know, Andrew Young is 
going to Dar es Salaam, and I want to talk to 
him when he comes back and get the benefit 
of his views. 

Q. Is Geneva still the proper forum, as far 
as you are concerned, for the negotiations? 

Secretary Vance: Yes, it is. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Dick Valeriani, NBC. 
On the question of human rights, do you plan 
to go — does the Adyninistration plari to go be- 



138 



Department of State Bulletin 



yond speaking out and making some other 
kind of effort to get various countries to 
change conditions internally, perhaps by of- 
fering certain benefits in terms of the negotia- 
tions you are carrying out with them? 

Secretary Vance: We will couple what we 
say publicly with private conversations with 
various countries. And we hope that will 
strengthen the process of progress in this 
area. 



Cessation of Nuclear Testing 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Murrey Marder of the 
Washington Post. Can you announce, sir, 
now, the head of the Arms Control and Dis- 
armament Agency? And, secondly. President 
Carter, during the campaign, was quite criti- 
cal of two treaties which are now pendirig in 
Congress on the threshold nuclear test ban 
and on the peaceful nuclear explosion ban. 
Nevertheless the Adm,inistration has declared 
its support for those two pending treaties. 
Could you reconcile that position, sir? 

Secretary Vance: Yes. On your first ques- 
tion, there will be an announcement later 
today on the new head of the Arms Control 
Agency. That announcement, quite properly, 
will come from the White House. 

With regard to your second question, I do 
not see any inconsistency with respect to sup- 
port for the two treaties which have already 
been negotiated and which are before the 
Congress. They are stepping stones on the 
road to the ultimate objective, which is a 
complete cessation of testing; and I do not 
think that there is any inconsistency. 

Q. Does the Administration, then, plan 
simultaneously to be supporting these two 
partial treaties and at the same time seeking 
the cornprehensive test ban that President 
Carter has spoken about? 

Secretary Vance: The answer is yes. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I am Morton Kondracke 
of New Republic. Do you have any particular 
timetable for Middle East negotiations to get 
underway — such as, for example, some people 
in the Senate have suggested that demonstra- 



ble progress should be made by July, before 
the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Ex- 
porting Countries] meeting? Is there any 
deadline that you're facing? 

Secretary Vance: There is no deadline ex- 
cept that I think it is critically important that 
progress be made this year in the Middle 
East. And that is one of the reasons that I am 
going at this early date to visit the Middle 
East. 

I think the sooner we get at the process, 
the better. And therefore I am going at this 
point to begin the process of our evaluation of 
the situation as seen by the parties in the 
Middle East. This will be followed by visits to 
this country by leaders from those countries. 
And we will then work with them to develop 
the procedures and the organization which 
will lead to a meeting on the Middle East. 

But I do not want to try and set any specific 
date at this point until I have had a chance to 
meet with those leaders, until we have had a 
chance to review their views; and of course 
this must be taken up in consultation with the 
Cochairman [of the Middle East Peace Con- 
ference at Geneva], the Soviet Union. 



Meeting of Cypriot Leaders 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Henry Bradsher of the 
Washington Star. Can you tell us how you see 
the prospects for a Cypriot settlement in view 
of the fact that Greek and Turkish Cypriots 
have finally managed to talk again, and who 
are you going to appoint to handle those prob- 
lems for you? 

Secretary Vance: I am encouraged by the 
fact that the Archbishop [Archbishop 
Makarios, President of the Republic of Cy- 
prus] and Mr. Denktash [Rauf R. Denktash, 
leader of the Turkish Cypriot community] had 
a meeting and that the results of the meeting 
seemed to be generally constructive. The 
working out of a settlement in Cyprus is going 
to be immensely complicated and very dif- 
ficult, but at least we now have the first step 
having been taken. It has been many, many 
years since a meeting at this level was held 
between the leaders of the two communities in 
Cyprus. 



February 21, 1977 



139 



We, the United States, will do everything 
that we can to help facilitate such a settle- 
ment. We will be sending an individual to that 
part of the world to discuss bilateral relations 
with Greece and with Turkey and also to 
examine the Cypriot problem itself. Insofar as 
the naming of that person, I would expect 
that we would name the person later this 
week. 

Q. Secretary Vance, Bernard Gwertzman, 
the New York Times. The President, in an 
interview last week, said he would not let the 
"Backfire" or the cruise missile issue stand in 
the way of a settlement on SALT. Did he 
mean by that that he was advocating, again 
proposing that those two issues be put aside 
and a settlement be signed noiv, or is he 
thinking in more creative terms ? 

Secretary Vance: He was not suggesting 
that they be put aside; he was suggesting that 
he did not want to see the negotiations fall 
apart if resolution could not be reached at this 
time on those two issues. However, I am sure 
that there will be an attempt to resolve those 
issues, namely, the Backfire and the cruise 
missile, when we resume the negotiations 
with the Soviet Union. 

Sales of Nuclear Plants and Materials 

Q. Antonio Neves of Globo Television, 
Brazil. Mr. Secretary, the United States 
seems to be the only government and the only 
voice protesting the nuclear deal between 
Brazil and Germany — Brazil seems to be 
happy with it — and I wonder how far is the 
U.S. Government willing, how much pressure 
the U.S. Government is willing, to put on 
those two countries to change the deal. 

Secretary Vance: The concern which the 
United States has expressed with respect to 
that transaction reflects the general concern 
which we have on the whole problem of the 
spread of nuclear weapons throughout the 
world. We have discussed the matter with the 
Germans and have begun to discuss the mat- 
ter with the Brazilians. We will continue to 
pursue this matter with both of them and see 
whether or not we cannot find a way to ob- 



viate the construction of these two plants. We 
want to work harmoniously and constructively 
with them, and we have taken the first steps 
to do so. 

Q. Had you come to any conclusion in re- 
gard to the release of nuclear fuel to India? 

Secretary Vance: No. No conclusion has yet 
been reached on that. As you know, that has 
been a matter that has been under study for 
quite a long while; and as yet no conclusion 
has been reached. 

Responses to Human Rights Violations 

Q. Marvin Kalb, CBS. The President said 
yesterday that perhaps the statement about 
Sakharov should have been made by him or by 
you. Yet the day before the State Department 
made its statement on Sakharov, it did come 
out with a statement on Czechoslovakia, 
which apparently had been cleared. Are you 
not running the danger, sir, of setting up 
what amounts to a double standard of the 
manner in which you respond to violations 
of human rights in the Soviet Union and iyi 
smaller countries where there is not a direct, 
vital interest conflict? 

Secretary Vance: This is a very complex 
area. As I indicated, we will not be speaking 
out in every case. We will speak out when we 
believe it advisable to do so, but that will not 
be, as I said, in each and every case. It is an 
area where, as I said, I think we have an obli- 
gation to make our views frankly known; but 
we hope we can do it without being strident, 
as I said, or intrusive in an improper way. 

Q. Isn't that really setting up a kind of 
double standard where the Department, or the 
Adrninistration, might feel itself more free in 
condemning human rights in smaller coun- 
tries where there is not a vital interest af- 
fected? 

Secretary Vance: No. I hope we will not 
have a double standard. I think what we have 
done so far would indicate we have not. 

Q. Jim Klurfeld from Newsday. On this 
same situation, there were reports that you 
were unhappy with the statement ynade on the 



140 



Department of State Bulletin 



Sakharov situation. I just wonder if you can 
tell 7is who did clear that statement. I think 
the President indicated yesterday he did not 
clear it. Who did clear it? And whether you 
feel that this is an instance in which you 
should not have spoken out. 

Secretary Vance: Let me say I did not see 
it; it was cleared at lower levels. I am not 
going to give the name of the individual. I 
have the responsibility in this Department, 
and therefore I accept that responsibility 
fully. Let me say that I respect Mr. Sakharov 
very deeply; I respect his, Mr. Sakharov's, 
principles and his pursuit of those principles. 

Q. Your predecessor frequently said in 
speeches that not only is it inadvisable but 
rather it is counterproductive to speak out, 
specifically in the case of Soviet emigration — 
or emigration from, the Soviet Union by 
minorities, including Jews, which dropped 
sharply after the United States tried to exert 
pressure. Do you subscribe to that theory, 
particularly, that speaking out is actually 
counterproductive ? 

Secretary Vance: No, I do not share that 
view. 

Q. If you don't share that view, could you 
say what your view is on that specific aspect 
of the problem? 

Secretary Vance: My view is that at times 
we will feel it appropriate and necessary to 
speak out and there will be other times when 
we will not. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, getting back to SALT, 
some dozen Congressmen, Democrats all, 
have asked the Administration to suspend de- 
velopment of long-range cruise missiles, a de- 
cision taken in the last days of the Ford Ad- 
ministration, on the grounds that nothing 
really seriously would be lost by a two- or 
three-month suspension while you go to Mos- 
cow. 

Can you tell us, first, what your views are; 
and secondly, if they are to continue de- 
velopment, what is the rationale for continu- 
ing development of one of the major hangups 
in the SALT talks just six to eight weeks be- 
fore you go to Moscow to see if they can be put 



under a treaty? Is it the Pentagon against the 
State Department again, or is there some 
other reason? 

Secretary Vance: No. I think the actions 
which will be taken during this period in 
which our review is taking place will not be 
actions which will be such as to make it im- 
possible to make changes in the future. There- 
fore I think it is appropriate that they should 
go forward during this period of time in which 
we are going to prepare our views. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Mary McGrory, from the 
Washington Star. Your predecessor used to 
complain a great deal about the meddling of 
Congress in the execution of foreign policy, 
and the President in his farewell suggested 
Congress really ought to leave it to the execu- 
tive and the State Department to run foreign 
policy. How do you feel about democracy at 
home? 

Secretary Vance: Insofar as the role of the 
Congress is concerned, I feel very deeply, as I 
said during my confirmation hearings, that 
you cannot have an effective foreign policy un- 
less it is developed in coordination with the 
Congress and implemented in coordination 
with the Congress. I feel very deeply on this 
subject, and we are going to do everything 
that we can to see that we proceed in that 
fashion. 

Relations With Vietnam and China 

Q. [Don] Oberdorfer, Washington Post. Do 
you expect to reopen the talks with the Viet- 
namese within the next month or two or three, 
and could you tell us your attitude toward the 
Vietnamese being seated in the United Na- 
tions and bilateral relations with the United 
States? 

Secretary Vance: I stated during my con- 
firmation hearings that I thought it was in the 
interests of both countries to proceed toward 
normalization of relations, and I hope that we 
will be able to start that process in the near 
future. 

With respect to the question of the seating 
of the Vietnamese in the United Nations, I 
would hope the issue would not be raised until 



February 21, 1977 



141 



we have had a chance to start our discussions 
with respect to normalization. 

Q. Suppose it is raised. What would your 
attitude be? 

Secretary Vance: We will decide that ques- 
tion when it arises. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you are talking 
about normalization, sir, what are your plans 
in pursuing the entire complicated problem, of 
normalizing U.S. relations with China? That 
has been a postponed question, and the expec- 
tation had been that with a new President the 
process would go forth swiftly. 

Secretary Vance: Let me point out we are 
only at the end of our first week. I have 
stated that insofar as our bilateral relations 
are concerned, we will proceed on the basis of 
the principles enunciated in the Shanghai 
communique, that with respect to the pace 
and the mode of reaching normalization, this 
is a matter which we have under intensive re- 
view. I would hope that we can complete that 
review in the not too distant future, and I 
think there really is nothing more that I can 
say at this point. I do support very strongly 
the goal of normalization of relations. 

Q. What I want to ask you, sir, is do you 
have some sort of a time frame in mind 
whereby there would be the establishmeyit of 
full diplomatic relations? 

Secretary Vance: I don't have any specific 
date in mind. I think this is obviously a sub- 
ject we will have to discuss with the People's 
Republic of China; and when we have com- 
pleted our internal thinking within the gov- 
ernment, then I think we should proceed to 
begin to talk to them about the question. 

Critical Period in the Middle East 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Jeff Antevil of the New 
York Daily News. Woiild you explain a little 
further why you think 1977 will be such a crit- 
ical year in the Middle East, and specifically 
do you share Mr. Waldheim's [U.N. Secre- 
tary General Kurt Waldheim] view that there 
is likely to be a resumption of war there in the 
next year or two unless a settlement is 
reached? 



Secretary Vance: I would be happy to dis- 
cuss that. 

I think 1977 is a critical period because I 
think at this point there are a number of fac- 
tors which are more conducive to a settlement 
than have been present in the past. 

Let me hasten to say I don't want to 
minimize the difficulties which lie ahead. But 
at this point we no longer are faced with the 
war in Lebanon. There seems to be a greater 
cohesion among the forces for moderation in 
the area. All of the parties have indicated a 
willingness to proceed to Geneva and to pro- 
ceed promptly. 

Therefore it seems to me that the factors 
are right to proceed during this year. I think 
if this is allowed to drag out and we do not 
proceed to a conference with respect to the 
settlement of the Middle East issue, that all 
kinds of disruptive factors may occur, and 
therefore I think it's incumbent that we pro- 
ceed as fast as we properly can to try and 
move to that point. 

. It would be foolhardy, in my judgment, 
however, to do this until the groundwork has 
been thoroughly explored and plans have been 
arrived at so that there is a realistic chance of 
a constructive solution coming out of the 
Peace Conference on the Middle East. 

Therefore I think one cannot at this point 
talk about any specific date. But I do think it 
is proper and reasonable to say that there 
should be such a conference in the year 1977; 
and indeed I would say that I think it is criti- 
cally important that there be such a confer- 
ence during that period. 

Q. Bernie Gwertzman from the New York 
Tiynes. Do you have in your mind any idea of 
how to get over the Palestinian question, 
which has obviously held up the Geneva Con- 
ference now for more than a year or two? 

Secretary Vance: I do have some thoughts 
on this. I prefer not to talk about them at this 
time, but let me comment on that issue. 

The PLO [Palestine Liberation Organiza- 
tion] up to this point has refused to recog- 
nize the right of Israel to exist or to accept 
the framework for negotiations under U.N. 
Resolutions 242 and 338. Under these circum- 
stances it is difficult to see how progress can 
be made. 



142 



Department of State Bulletin 



In saying this, however, I want to em- 
phasize that we continue to beheve that the 
recognition of the legitimate interests of the 
Palestinian people will be critical to any 
peaceful settlement. 

There are a number of views held by the 
parties as to how one might address this is- 
sue. This is one of the subjects that I would 
hope to discuss and expect to discuss with the 
leaders of the various countries when I go to 
the Middle East. And I hope that when I come 
back fi'om that trip I will have a better under- 
standing of what the course is to follow in this 
area. 

Q. Is there any possibility that you yourself 
or some designated official might have some 
discussions with Palestinian representatives? 

Secretary Vance: Not at this time, as long 
as the circumstances are as I indicated. 



Normalization of Relations With Cuba 

Q. Mr. Secretary , Barrie Dunsmore from 
ABC News. On the subject of normalization 
another country comes to mind, and that is 
Cuba. Recently Ambassador Young [Andrew 
Young, U.S. Representative to the United 
Nations] indicated that the presence of Cuban 
troops in Angola might be considered a 
stabilizing factor. I am wondering if you 
share that view to begin unth and if, by any 
chance, saying things like that is the begin- 
ning of a new trend toward normalization 
unth Cuba. 

Secretary Vance: I think there are two 
points which you have raised. 

First, the question of normalization of rela- 
tions with Cuba: I have previously indicated 
that I think that it is appropriate for the 
United States to seek normalization of rela- 
tions with all countries. I said, insofar as 
Cuba was concerned, that I hoped that there 
would be indications that they would be anx- 
ious and willing to live within the system of 
nations, and if that were the case, then I hope 
we could begin the process of moving toward 
normalization. 

With respect to the presence of Cuban 
troops in Angola, I think the presence of any 
outside forces is not helpful to a peaceful solu- 



tion. I think that this is a matter that should 
be settled by the Africans themselves. 

Q. It is not therefore a prerequisite to nor- 
malization of relations between the United 
States and Cuba? 

Secretary Vance: I don't want to set any 
preconditions at this point about whatever 
discussions might take place. 

Arab Boycott of Israel 

Q. Mort Kondracke, New Republic. There 
is a report in the New York Post that you 
were a member of an organization of busi- 
nessmen and lawyers set up to oppose legisla- 
tion on the Arab oil boycott — on the Arab oil 
boycott of Israel. Is that correct, and to go on 
unth it, what are your feelings — 

Secretary Vance: Before you go on to your 
second question, the answer is no. 1 was 
asked to serve on a committee to deal with the 
economic problems of New York City. I was 
asked to serve by the Mayor, by the Gover- 
nor, and by the two Senators. We were to 
take a look at a whole range of problems that 
affected the flight of business from New York 
City. 

The particular responsibilities that I had 
when I was working with the committee were 
to take a look at the professions and to see 
what things could be done to try and make 
sure that the professions did not flee from 
New York City — and by "the professions" I 
am talking about lawyers, accountants, and 
the like. 

The group also had a number of other sub- 
committees. About halfway through the work 
of the committee, or maybe two-thirds of the 
way through, I was nominated to the post 
which I now hold. I was unable to complete 
my work on the committee's activities. I did 
not have anything to do with any discussions 
with respect to any boycott problems. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what are your views on 
the boycott? 

Secretary Vance: Well, I have said before 
on the boycott problem that I fully support 
the legislation which is currently on the books 
and that we are committed to support that 
legislation and that we will do so. 



February 21, 1977 



143 



With respect to the questions of new legisla- 
tion, I would like to take a look at that in the 
connection of the overall situation in the Mid- 
dle East. There will be hearings with respect 
to new legislation. Those hearings are not 
going to take place until my return from the 
Middle East. I have agreed to testify on the 
28th of February before Senator Proxmire's 
committee on this issue, and by that time I 
would expect that we would have a gov- 
ernmentwide position which I will be pre- 
pared to enunciate at that time. 

Reducing Arms Sales Abroad 

Q. Ken Freed, Associated Press. There has 
been a lot of talk about reducing arms sales 
by the United States. Could you outline the 
program as you see it now, and does it 7nean 
fewer arms for Israel, Iran, and Saudi 
Arabia ? 

Secretary Vance: We haven't gotten to the 
point yet of what the effect would be on indi- 
vidual countries. We are committed to a basic 
principle, and that is to find a way to reduce 
the sale of arms — not only by the United 
States but by other nations around the world. 

This is a terribly important issue and one 
where I think it is possible to make progress. 
It is not going to be easy. Indeed, I think it is 
going to be very, very difficult. But I think 
that we, as the largest seller of arms, have a 
particular responsibility to first put our own 
house in order, to determine what our policy 
will be, and having done that, then to begin to 
work with other nations to see whether we 
can find cooperative arrangements whereby 
they will participate with us in developing 
programs and policies for carrying out this 
kind of a program. 

Let me say that some of the things that we 
are looking at, in addition to what our own 
U.S. policy should be, is the question of 
whether or not it would be constructive to 
issue regulations which would require that 
any arms manufacturer in the United States 
come and receive permission from the State 
Department before they even approach any 
countries overseas with respect to the possi- 
bility of buying new arms. 

My own inclination is that this is a very 



sensible thing to do. It is something that v 
have under consideration and have as ye 
however, reached no conclusion on. 

We will be taking a look, and a careful loo: 
at the various new proposals as they come 
and then, hopefully, apply the standarc 
which we have reached to those. 

Let me say a little bit about the Midd 
East, though, and what the standards ai 
which we have been applying to the questit 
of sales of arms in that area. 

We have said, first, that the arms mm 
satisfy, or must be fitted to, the legitimal 
security needs of the country concerned; se( 
ondly, that they must be looked at in respe( 
to their effect on the overall situation with n 
spect to peace in the Middle East. 

And it seems to me that these are two ver 
fundamental principles that are proper an 
should be applied. 

Q. Would you support a mutual arms ba. 
ivith the Russians with regard to the Middl 
East? That's been proposed a number of time 
to the Soviets. I think they have rejected i1 
Would you be in favor of renewing such ( 
proposal? 

Secretary Vance: Yes. I think it's a ver; 
constructive proposal. I think, quite frankly 
it's unrealistic until you get a political settle 
ment. 

Q. Sir, you said that the United States ha. 
been studying for some time now what to d* 
abotit supplies of nuclear fuel to other coun 
tries. Brazil has been waiting for about threi 
years now to have confirmation for some fue 
for its reactors, and it's given as one of thi 
reasons that the country decided to go — tt'. 
have its own facilities to enrich uranium. 
Should Brazil wait until the United Statet- 
finishes its study — which it cannot say when 
it will happen? And do you think — in the 
same area, sir, Brazil is under a great curios- 
ity about what the United States is going to do 
ivith regimes in Latin America that are not 
democratically elected. What can you say 
about this? 

Secretary Vance: Well, let me take your 
first question. 

I would hope very much that Brazil and 
Germany would wait until we have had a 



144 



Department of State Bulletin 



Ihance to further discuss the question of what 

.Iternatives are there to proceeding with the 

,, eprocessing plant or with enriched uranium 

,„.acilities. This subject has been under study 

,,, or a while with the prior government. We are 

'ery freshly in office and have been studying 

t very intensively. It will take us a little 

., vhile to complete our studies, and I think it 

; vould be not only helpful but important that 

lothing be done until we've had a chance thor- 

i„, lUghly to explore this with both countries. 

' Q. Mr. Secretary, to follow up Mr. Wal- 

ich's question of a moment ago, would the 

'nited States consider the possibility unilat- 

^ rally of reducing arms sales to countries in 

' he Middle East unthout agreement with the 

■-[ 'oviet Union on a common approach to re- 

'itcing arms sales? 

Secretary Vance: This would be something 

'"' hat we would have to discuss with the con- 

umer, as well as among ourselves, before we 

ould arrive at any conclusion on that, Mr. 

' {alb. 

' Q. Mr. Secretary, Scott Sullivan of News- 
veek. You are going to meet with Mr. Boyd 
" Aquilino Boyd, Panamanian Foreign Minis- 
'• ' er] this morning. Could you give us some of 
*' lour thinking on how it may be possible to 
treak the logjam in the Panamanian negotia- 
B ions, given that the Panamanians require 
iihat sovereignty revert to them in the year 
II- ',000 and that the American concern is to keep 
n he canal open and neutral indefinitely? 

[ Secretary Vance: Yes, I do have some ideas 
jn this. We will be discussing some of these 
ideas today with Mr. Boyd. I hope that he will 
have some ideas on his side. I think it would 
be inappropriate for me to comment at this 
press conference on it, but it will be a subject 
for discussion today at our meeting. 

Q. When you go to the Middle East, will 
you extend invitations to all the leaders to 
come to this country, and how will you issue 
the problem of Prime Minister Rabin? 

r Secretary Vance: I'm sorry. I couldn't hear 
you. 

Q. Will you issue invitations to all of the 
' Arab leaders and to Prime Minister Rabin to 



come to this country? And, again, tvhat will 
you do about the problem of Prime Minister 
Rabin, with the election coming up? 

Secretary Vance: I would expect that we 
would extend invitations to all of the leaders 
to meet with the President, including Prime 
Minister Rabin. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it your view that put- 
ting pressure on South Africa is probably the 
m,ost effective and quickest means of bringing 
about some movement in the Rhodesian situa- 
tion? 

Secretary Vance: I think that South Africa 
can play a very important role in this area. 
We have been in constant communication with 
the South Africans and will continue to do so. 

Q. Do you share Ambassador Young's view 
that when South Africa says to Rhodesia 
"negotiate," they have to negotiate? 

Secretary Vance: I don't think it's really 
quite that simple. 

The Korean Question 

Q. Mr. Secretary some pampers awhile ago 
reported that some of President Carter's 
foreign policy staff suggested the United 
States open its door to North Korea to achieve 
a sort of detente in the Korean Peninsula. Do 
you take such consideration into your ac- 
count in dealing with the Korean question? 

Secretary Vance: On the Korean question, 
we will do nothing without full and complete 
consultation with the South Koreans. 

Q. Francois Chatel, Agence France Presse. 
What do you think about the deal, nuclear 
deal, between Brazil and Germany— that is, 
applied to the deal between France and Paki- 
stan? In other words, ivould you like to spe- 
cifically consult proposals made before the 
two countries go through with the deal? 

Secretary Vance: Yes. As I said, our con- 
cerns about proliferation apply across the 
board and not just to one or two countries, 
and therefore we would hope that in each of 
these cases ways could be found to not pro- 
ceed with reprocessing plants. 



February 21, 1977 



145 



Q. And are you — in the case of Pakistan — 
are you hopefiil that the deal mil go through? 

Secretary Vance: I really haven't gotten 
deeply enough into that to express either 
hope or lack of hope at this point. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Administration has 
made a major coynmitment toward huinan 
rights in foreigri policy. On the Korean ques- 
tion, are you planning specific pressure to 
move toward that goal in South Korea? 

Secretary Vance: The question of human 
rights is obviously one which we will be dis- 
cussing with the Koreans. I think that I 
should say nothing more than that at this 
point. 

Q. As this is your first press conference, 
sir, perhaps it would be helpful if we could 
have on the record your general views of your 
attitude on press policy. 

Secretary Vance: Yes. I'd be very happy to 
talk about that. 

As I previously indicated, I have rather 
deep convictions about the necessity to work 
with the Congress in developing and imple- 
menting foreign policy. I also believe very 
strongly that it is necessary to inform the 
American public as to what our objectives 
are, to explain why we hold these objectives, 
and as much as possible to explain how we in- 
tend to proceed in achieving those objectives. 
And to that end I want to give as much time 
as I possibly can to working with the press in 
open sessions to explain what our objectives 
are and how we intend to achieve them. And 
to that end, as I have indicated, I will hold an 
open press conference with you at least once a 
month. 

When I go on a trip, I would intend to speak 
with the press in an open fashion, on the rec- 
ord in almost all cases. And I am going to try 
and make people in our Department more 
available to the press so that they can speak 
with you and keep you up to date with what is 
going on in our operations here in the De- 
partment. 



Q. / wondered if you would make known to 
Chile the new attitude of this government on 
the subject of hutnan rights. Specifically, I'd 
like to know what representations you and the 
Department made to theyn about sending a 
person alleged to be a torturer to this country 
on a goodwill tour. 

Secretary Vance: Mr. Lavin [Lt. Col. Jaime 
Farina Lavin, Director General of the Chilean 
Foreign Ministry] is no longer in this country. 
I think it would be inappropriate for me to 
talk about what individually has passed be- 
tween ourselves and the Chileans on this. We 
will convey our views on human rights and 
civil rights issues, as I said, both pubhcly and 
privately. 

The press: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary Vance: Thank you. 



U.S. and Panama To Continue 
Negotiations on Canal Treaty 

Joint Statement ^ 

Panamanian Foreign Minister Aquilino 
Boyd and Secretary of State Vance met today 
to discuss the status of the negotiations be- 
tween the United States and Panama on the 
Panama Canal. They affirmed their determi- 
nation to continue the negotiations for a new 
Canal treaty on the basis of the Joint State- 
ment of Principles of February 7, 1974, known 
as the Tack-Kissinger Agreement. The Secre- 
tary and the Foreign Minister agreed to make 
a sustained and continuous effort to conclude 
a new treaty at an early date. In pursuit of 
that objective, they agreed that the U.S. and 
Panamanian teams would resume negotiating 
sessions in Panama on February 10, 1977. 



' Read to news correspondents by Secretary Vance at 
an informal news briefing he and the Panamanian 
Foreign Minister held following their meeting on Jan. 
31. 



146 



Department of State Bulletin 



Secretary Vance Interviewed by AP and UPI Correspondents 



Following is the transcript of an interview 
with Secretary Vance on February 3 by 
Barry Schweid and Kenneth Freed of the As- 
sociated Press and James Anderson and 
Nicholas Daniloff of United Press Interna- 
tional. 

Press release 37 dated February 3 

Q. May I start with something that came 
up today? There was a statement on Cuba — 
it was a brief statement. ^ You know what the 
statement was: We would like to be able to 
hold talks regarding the antihijacking 
agreement. Can you tell us if the statement 
was issued with your approval, and what we 
mean exactly by talks? 

Secretary Vance: Yes, the statement was 
issued with my approval. As to the manner in 
which this might be done, I have not yet 
come to any final conclusions, and therefore I 
have nothing that I can add to the statement 
already issued. But I do think it would be 
constructive, both from our standpoint and 
the standpoint of Cuba, to explore whether it 
may not be possible to renew the antihijack- 
ing treaty. 

Q. In the past, two things stood in the way: 
one, Cuba's exporting of revolution and, two, 
the presence of its military forces en masse 
in southern Africa. I gather from what you 
are saying that those two things no longer 
necessarily stand in the way of our having 
direct discussions with Cuba. 



' In response to a question on Feb. 2, the following 
was read at a Department of State news briefing on 
Feb. 3: 

On October 15, 1976, the Cuban Government an- 
nounced its intention to terminate the antihijacking 
agreement with the United States, effective April 15, 
1977. There have been no new developments in this 
matter, but this is something we hope to be able to dis- 
cuss with the Cubans. 



Secretary Vance: No. What I am saying is 
that those items would be discussed in con- 
nection with any general discussions we 
might have with the Cubans, and I don't rule 
out the discussion of them and other things 
that might arise in connection with the dis- 
cussion of the antihijacking treaty. 

Q. Mr. Vance, what issues besides the 
hijacking treaty would you want to discuss 
with the Cubans? 

Secretary Vance: The two issues which you 
have already discussed are two of the items I 
would want to discuss with them. 

Q. What about the humanitarian ques- 
tions? In your answers to Senator Case 
[submitted for the record in connection with 
hearings by the Seriate Foreign Relations 
Committee on Secretary Vance's nom- 
ination], for example, you discussed that, 
and you in fact indicated that it would be a 
nice idea if the Cubans would release Huber 
Matos. That is not a precondition, but really 
an expression of your desire that they should 
do that — is that correct? 

Secretary Vance: Yes. That was an ex- 
pression of my desire, and I said I would also 
think it would be important if they would re- 
lease some American prisoners who are pres- 
ently in Cuba. 

Q. We have been hearing reports — 
speaking of Cubans in southern Africa now, 
we have been hearing reports, one, that there 
appear to be new and large arms shipments 
going to Mozambique and that this may be a 
new center of outside forces. Do you hear 
those reports? Is that correct? 

Secretary Vance: I have heard reports of 
arms shipments to Mozambique. I think 
there is a lack of clarity as to the exact size of 
those shipments. I have previously indicated 



February 21, 1977 



147 



that the question of arms shipments and par- 
ticipation by non-Africans, in my judgment, 
is unhelpful in the southern African situation 
and have urged that problems of southern 
Africa should be decided among the southern 
Africans. 

Q. Regarding the Cuban thing, if I may go 
back a second, have you had any indication, 
direct or indirect, from Cuba that this is an 
appropriate time to have such discussions? 

Secretary Vance: No direct communica- 
tion. 

Q. Nor indirect? Any clear signal at least? 

Secretary Vance: No. I do note that state- 
ments have been made recently about the in- 
tention of the Cubans to begin withdrawing 
further forces from Angola. 

Q. Does that mean withdraw and replace 
with civilian Cubans? 

Secretary Vance: I don't know. 

Relations With the Soviet Union 

Q. On an allied subject, I get the impres- 
sion that you, the new Administration, are 
tending to compartmentalize individual mat- 
ters in relations with the Soviet Union more 
so than was done in the past. For example, 
although there was the probleyn with the 
human rights question last week, apparently 
the preliminary discussions on SALT went 
ahead without any impediment. Is my im- 
pression right, first of all, and is this how 
you intend to continue to operate? 

Secretary Vance: I would not describe it 
quite that way. The central problem that we 
would like to discuss with the Soviet Union is 
the question of the reduction of nuclear arms 
on both sides. That is the subject that is al- 
ready on the table and which I think we must 
address very, very promptly. As I have indi- 
cated, I would like to see this accomplished, 
if possible, beforfe September, at the end of 
which the current agreement expires and 
therefore would have to be extended; and 
therefore I feel that it is important to resume 
as promptly as we can our discussions on 
SALT Two with the Soviets. That is not to 



say that there are not other issues of impor- 
tance between us, and I would expect on my 
trip to Moscow that I would discuss these 
other issues as well, in an initial and pre- 
liminary fashion. 

Q. What I was getting at is, there is no 
linkage between our feelings about the Soviet 
treatment of their citizens and the human 
rights questions and our other relations with 
them — trade, econoynic, and arms talks? 

Secretary Vance: No, there is no linkage. I 
think each of these subjects is an important 
subject and each should be discussed on its 
own footing. 

Q. Mr. Vance, do you see the statements 
that were made last week about human rights 
in the Soviet Union, the Sakharov statement 
among others, as complicating your discus- 
sions? I understand Mr. Dobrynin [Anatoliy 
Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.], 
for example, called you and complained that 
this was interference in their internal af- 
fairs. 

Secretary Vance: No, I don't see them 
complicating our discussions. I think the 
Soviet Union knows that we feel strongly 
about the human rights issues, very 
strongly, very deeply, and that we will speak 
out on those issues when we believe it appro- 
priate to do so. 

Q. When you said "linkage" before — 
because "linkage" is associated with one Sec- 
retary of State's particular style, I would 
like to come back to it and ask you if you 
don't think that Soviet action in one area 
does have implicatioyis over actions in 
others. Should they be forthcoming on 
huynan rights, doesn't it suggest 
something — I don't want to say that there is 
a deal involved — but if they are forthcoming 
on hmnan rights, would not that improve the 
general climate and make a SALT treaty, for 
instance, a little more easy to get? 

Secretary Vance: It would certainly im- 
prove the climate, but I think there has been 
an overemphasis on linkage. 

Q. When yoii go to Moscow at the end of 
March, do you see at that point making a 



148 



Department of State Bulletin 



breakthrough in the current issues which 
deadlock the SALT talks, so that in the fall 
Mr. Brezhnev [Leonid /. Brezhnev, General 
Secretary of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union] could 
com,e here and sign the SALT Two agree- 
ment? 

Secretary Vance: No. I don't anticipate 
making any breakthrough at that time. I 
think this will be the first of the discussions 
on a very difficult and very complex set of 
subjects, and I would not predict any break- 
through at that point. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, we don't expect you to 
bargain with the Soviets through us, but can 
you tell us: Is this a possibility — that the 
Vladivostok agreement of 2,^00 vehicles on 
each side could be reduced by the time SALT 
Two was put into the form of a treaty? 

Secretary Vance: I don't want to go into 
excessive detail, but I think that some reduc- 
tion from the 2,400 is a possibility. 

Q. Do you believe that cruise missiles, in 
the current state of art, are verifiable and 
therefore could well be included in the 
agreement? And probably more important, 
do the Soviets agree with us that they are ver- 
ifiable as strategic weapons by national 
means? 

Secretary Vance: The question of cruise 
missiles is one of the remaining subjects in 
the SALT Two discussions, along with the 
question of the "Backfire" and along with the 
question of mobile missiles. 

As to cruise missiles as such, one of the 
problems is the problem of verification. It is 
a very difficult and complex problem in the 
area of cruise missiles and undoubtedly 
would be one of the matters for discussion in 
connection with trying to resolve the cruise 
missile problem. 

Q. Is the question of the cruise and 
Backfire crucial to a SALT Two agreement? 
Are you willing to seek a fallback position of 
letting them slide for further negotiation 
later? 

Secretary Vance: Well, the President has 
spoken on this already, and the President has 



said that he would hope that the cruise mis- 
sile and Backfire would not result in the fail- 
ure to achieve a SALT Two agreement. 

On the other hand, the Backfire and the 
cruise missile issues are still very much in 
the negotiations and I'm sure will be a sub- 
ject for discussion when we begin our talks 
with the Soviet Union. 

Q. I'm having trouble in following, since 
this Administration came in, their thinking 
on SALT, to see if there's any difference be- 
tween the previous Kissinger-Ford-Nixon 
approach, which the Soviets continually re- 
jected in the last three attempts. Frankly, I 
don't see much of a difference, and I wonder 
why you think that the Soviets would be more 
amenable now to this approach than they 
were last March, last September-October. 

Secretary Vance: Well, I would hope that 
in seeking a SALT Two agreement that we 
would both approach the remaining problems 
with flexibility and see whether we could 
come up with some new ideas, some fresh 
ideas that have not yet been discussed. And 
this is not just a one-way street I'm talking 
about. I would hope and expect the Soviets 
would approach it in the same way. 

Importance of Conventional Arms Reductions 

Q. Mr. Secretary, recently you were — I 
think you were chairman of a panel of the 
United Nations Association that put together 
a report on disarmament, in which you said 
really the problem — you didn't use the word 
"problem" — the most important aspect of 
disarmament is really conventional arms 
because that's where most of the money is 
spent, that's where most of the action is. Are 
you planning to make any early efforts, with 
the Soviets in particular, to start talks on 
large-scale conventional disarmament? 

Secretary Vance: I do believe that the area 
of disarmament or arms reduction in the con- 
ventional arms area is of critical importance. 
It is the area where the largest amount of 
money is spent, and it is a very serious and 
substantial problem. 

I would expect the discussion of reduction 
of conventional arms to be on the agenda of 



February 21, 1977 



149 



items that we might discuss when I go to 
Moscow at the end of March. MBFR, which 
means mutual balanced force reduction, talks 
have been underway for several years. I 
hope very much that we can move these talks 
out of the doldrums and give them very high 
priority and see if we can't move them on to a 
preliminary, yet satisfactory, conclusion of a 
first-stage agreement. 

One of the problems, I think, has been that 
they have not received the emphasis that 
they should in the past. I'm encouraged by 
the fact that not only do we put a very high 
priority on movement in these talks, but the 
Soviets do also. Mr. Brezhnev, in his speech 
at Tula in the last two weeks, has indicated 
that he considers this to be a matter of high 
priority and would like to address it prompt- 

ly. 

Q. Mr. Vance, I want to return to this one 
question — not to beat a dead horse — about 
the question of the Soviet attitude on SALT. 
You seem to be rejecting the Soviets' conten- 
tio7i that it is the Americans' turn to propose 
something significant to move the negotia- 
tions along. Do you have anything in mind 
that the Soviets need to do, need to move? 

Secretary Vance: Well, I think if we are 
both serious about making progress in 
SALT, and I believe we are, then it is in- 
cumbent upon both of us to see what we can 
do to break the logjams which exist and move 
on to the conclusion of a fair and just agree- 
ment which is acceptable to both. 

Q. Regarding conventional arms, has your 
thinking gone to the point where you can 
approach them about some common agree- 
ments, some agreement that both superpow- 
ers would restrain arms sales in specific 
regions? Woiild you declare certain regions 
off bo7inds, for instance, as being beyond the 
contest; Africa, perhaps? Can you amplify 
that a bit? 

Secretary Vance: Yes. I would be happy 
to. 

Not only are we talking about reduction of 
arms and troops in the Central European 
area, but I am also talking about the question 
of a general reduction in the transfer of arms 



in attacking that problem. This is a subject 
that affects not only the United States but 
other Western nations and the Soviet Union 
as well, and this is a subject which we will 
take up with the Soviet Union and discuss 
with them how we might proceed to reduce 
the general sale and transfer of arms 
throughout the world. 

Q. But as a pilot project would you select 
an area like Africa to simply declare off 
bounds and see if that idea could spread? 

Secretary Vance: That would be a possibil- 
ity. 

I think also the whole question of arms 
transfers into the Middle East is an area that 
one might look at. 

Q. In the United Nations Association re- 
port that you mentioned earlier, there are 
several points that were made, one of which 
was sort of a unilateral naval disarmament 
approach test. Woiild you subscribe to that? 

I noticed in that report you dissented from 
one part, but not that part, not on the ques- 
tion of naval disarmament. 

Secretary Vance: Yes. I think that is an 
area that is worth exploring. It is not some- 
thing you could reach agreement on over- 
night, but it is the kind of subject that de- 
serves further thought. 

Q. Mr. Vance, can I just follow up on con- 
ventional arms? 

The other day at your news conference you 
said the United States as a leading arms 
seller bears a heavy responsibility for mov- 
ing this. Would you be prepared to do any- 
thing unilaterally, or would you only move 
in cutting arms transfers in conjunction 
with either the Soviet Union or the other 
leading arms sellers, such as Britain and 
France ? 

Secretary Vance: As I said the other day, I 
think the first thing we have to do is to de- 
termine with more precision what our policy 
is going to be. Having made that determina- 
tion we might wish to take action ourselves 
to demonstrate leadership in this area. 

But in the long run this is a problem that 
must be faced up to and dealt with by both 



150 



Department of State Bulletin 



the supplier and the purchaser nations 
throughout the world, and therefore, in my 
judgment, it is essential that we begin to 
deal with it on an international basis and not 
simply on a unilateral basis. 

Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations 

Q. Mr. Vance, if I may switch to the ques- 
tion of Panama, isn't your biggest problem 
there going to be the opponents on Capitol 
Hill, and if that is the case, what are you 
going to do to try to convince the conserva- 
tives who are taking action in a number of 
different ways to try to prevent you from 
concluding this agreement with Panama? 

Secretary Vance: Let me say first there 
are some difficult issues which remain to be 
negotiated. I do not underestimate the diffi- 
culty of reaching agreement on the remaining 
issues. But in addition, we do face the prob- 
lem of opposition among some of the Senators 
and Congressmen on the Hill. 

I think we have a responsibility as we pro- 
ceed in our negotiations to explain to the 
Congress and to the American people what 
our objectives are, why we hold these objec- 
tives, and to discuss frankly and directly the 
concerns which people have expressed in this 
area and to answer the questions which have 
been raised. 

Q. So you would see a process of going to 
the people as it were, of speaking directly to 
the Aynerican people over this very compli- 
cated and difficult issue? 

Secretary Vance: I would say, going di- 
rectly to the American people and to the 
people on Capitol Hill to talk directly with 
them and to try and answer their questions 
and to answer their concerns. 

Q. There are reports that if the treaty were 
submitted now, as it would be anticipated it 
would be drawn, that it would be defeated or 
at least it wouldn't get the two-thirds major- 
ity that is necessary. 

Secretary Vance: I don't know whose 
evaluation that is. 

Q. A story in the paper. 



Q. Well, you know the Strom Thurmond 
resolution last year, which was against the 
treaty, had 37-39 backers; and if that is the 
case today, of course that would defeat the 
treaty in the Senate. 

Secretary Vance: I don't believe it has that 
support today. 

Q. What support do you think it has today? 

Secretary Vance: Less than a third. 

Q. Less than a third? 

Secretary Vance: Yes. 

Q. So you could get ratification, as you see 
the broad outlines of a treaty developing 
now? 

Secretary Vance: I think one first has to 
see what the treaty finally is. But it is my 
conviction that any treaty which we finally 
negotiate will be able to be ratified. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could I go back to some- 
thing that you said before, just to pick it up? 

You said that the concept of linkage was 
overdone in the past. Whatever else it had, it 
did provide, sometimes, an incentive to bring 
the Soviets along on something that they 
didn't want to move on. 

What, in place of linkage, are you going to 
use as an incentive to induce the Soviets to 
come along on agreements on which they 
would be otherwise reluctant? 

Secretary Vance: Well, I think that — take 
for example, negotiations in the arms field, 
and more specifically, the SALT negotia- 
tions. I think it clearly is in the interests of 
both nations and in the interest of world 
peace for us to reach a satisfactory, 
negotiated settlement with them. So I think 
it stands on its own two feet. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would very much like 
to get you on the record on Paul Warnke,^ on 
the situation developing. 

Secretary Vance: Surely. 

Q. Because, as you know, there is an 



2 On Feb. 2 President Carter nominated Mr. Warnl<e 
to be Director of the United States Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency and special SALT negotiator. 



February 21, 1977 



151 



anonymous letter circulating, and it is hard 
to deal with an anonymous statemeyit, accus- 
ing him of advocating unilateral abandon- 
ment of every iveapons system subject to 
SALT negotiation. Does that — you work with 
him — is that a fair representation of 
Warnke's — 

Secretary Vance: No. Let me first say that 
I deplore anonymous statements. I think that 
if people have issues that they wish to raise 
or criticisms which they choose to make, that 
they should come out and make those directly 
with their names attached to them. 

I think Paul Warnke is an excellent choice. 
He is superbly qualified, and I am convinced 
that he will be approved by the Senate. 

Q. But the views attributed to him, 
anonymously, that he is in favor of unilat- 
eral "abandonment," as they say, of every 
weapons system, — 

Secretary Vance: I don't agree with that. I 
do not think those are his views. I have not 
seen the paper to which you are referring, 
but I think that is a gross misstatement of 
Mr. Warnke's position. 

Q. Do you agree with him,, though, for in- 
stance, that there could be a six-month delay 
in the development of the B-1, unilaterally, 
urithout any Soviet response, to see if it would 
bring — elicit a positive Soviet reaction? 

Secretary Vance: I believe that there could 
be a delay in the B-1 for a period of time. I 
am not sure that that is the ultimate decision 
which will be taken in connection with the 
budget reviews, but I think that such a delay 
would be possible. 

Q. But you, don't agree ivith him, I gather, 
on the question of a unilateral withdrawal of 
some nuclear forces from Europe? At least 
some statements he is associated with? 

Secretary Vance: Well, what I said on 
that — I think it would be inappropriate at 
this time to withdraw our tactical nuclear 
forces or weapons from Europe. That issue is 
already a subject which is on the table in the 
MBFR discussions, and it doesn't make sense 
to me to take such a step while it is currently 



under negotiation in the larger context of the 
MBFR talks. 

Q. In the larger — if I can pursue this just 
one ynore question, in the larger concept of 
his idea of — I don't ivant to say "unilateral 
reductions" but he had developed the idea 
that there are several areas where the United 
States can act unilaterally without the mutual 
reduction by the Soviet Union in arms mat- 
ters. Do you agree with that in concept? 

Secretary Vance: Well, I think it depends 
on what you are talking about. I don't know 
specifically what you have in mind. 

Q. Well, the B-1 was one example. Of 
course you have answered that. 

Secretary Vance: As I said before, I think 
that you can delay it for a period of time. 

Q. And the naval situation was another 
one. He thought that there were areas that 
the United States could reduce its spending 
and deployynent without prior agreement of 
the Soviet Union, to see how they would re- 
spond. 

Secretary Vance: Well, I think you have to 
examine each one of these on its own merits 
and see whether or not it can be done without 
jeopardizing the security of the country. 

Q. So it has to be a case-by-case basis? 

Secretary Vance: Yes, I think it has to be a 
case-by-case basis. 

Discussions on Cyprus Issues 

Q. The White House announced today the 
appointm,ent of Clark Clifford to be the spe- 
cial emissary to the Cyprus area. What do 
you thiyik the United States can do? Is there 
any direct role that we can play in this whole 
episode? 

Secretary Vance: Well, I think the first 
thing we have to do is to have discussions 
with the Greeks and the Turks about our 
bilateral relations, and Mr. Clifford will be 
doing this. 

Secondly, he will be going to Cyprus to 
discuss with the Cypriots the situation in 



152 



Department of State Bulletin 



Cyprus as it stands. I would expect also that 
he would be going to discuss with the Euro- 
pean Community their views with respect to 
the Cyprus situation, because they do in fact 
have very definite views on how the situation 
might be approached and how progress might 
be made. 

After having made this factfinding mis- 
sion, Mr. Clifford will return and report the 
results of his trip to the President and to the 
Secretary of State. 

In addition, I would expect he would re- 
port to the Congress. I think this will then 
give us a basis on which to formulate our 
plans as to how we may or should approach 
the bilateral problems which exist between the 
United States and Greece and Turkey and, at 
the same time, would give us a basis for see- 
ing how we might be able to facilitate the 
achievement of progress in the Cyprus situa- 
tion. 

Q. Could you envision the United States 
playing some kind of role analogous to what 
the United States played in the Middle East 
dispute? 

Secretary Vance: Let me say first in the 
Cyprus situation the Secretary General and 
the United Nations are already playing a 
very constructive role, and we would not 
want to do anything that did not fit or 
dovetail with the activities of the United Na- 
tions in this area. 

I think, however, it may be possible that 
we may be able to come up with some new 
ideas or to find ways to help in bringing the 
parties together. And if we can, we certainly 
want to do it, because peace and stability in 
the eastern Mediterranean are very impor- 
tant not only to that area but to the peace of 
the world generally. 

Q. But in the interim, it is an assumption, 
isn't it? Is it so that you ivill hold back on the 
Turkish aid agreement? You will not submit 
the Greek bases agreement. In fact, you 
won't complete the Greek bases agreement 
until this factfinding mission is complete? 

Secretary Vance: Yes. As I previously in- 
dicated, I don't anticipate any action by the 



Congress until we have had a chance to fur- 
ther study the situation by conversations with 
Turkey and with Greece. 

Relations With China 

Q. Mr. Vance, looking toward China for a 
moment, do you see down the road the 
United States really recognizing the People's 
Republic of China and disengaging itself 
from its security treaty with the Nationalist 
Chinese? 

Secretary Vance: I believe that normaliza- 
tion of relations with the People's Republic of 
China should be our ultimate goal. As I have 
previously said, I believe that the pace at 
which one proceeds and the modalities which 
might be used require further careful study. 
And I further believe that in considering 
that, we must also consider the question of 
the security of the people of Taiwan. 

Q. I don't mean this disrespectfully at all, 
but I don't think you have answered the ques- 
tion. Nick asked you if you really think that 
the United States can recognize China and 
disavow our defense treaty with the 
Taiwanese. 

Secretary Vance: All I can say — 

Q. You said it required careful study. 

Secretary Vance: Ultimately I believe that 
we will be able to achieve normalization of re- 
lations with the People's Republic of China. 

Q. I notice you keep referring to that term, 
that ambiguous term, "achieve normaliza- 
tion." What does that mean, really? Does 
that mean recognition? 

Secretary Vance: It means exactly what it 
says. 

Q. No, but it has a history. 

Secretary Vance: Yes, and that is why it 
means exactly what it says. 

Q. And its beauty lies in its ambiguity. 
But does it mean recognize diplomatically 
the People's Republic of China? 

Secretary Vance: Normalization? 



February 21, 1977 



153 



Q. Yes. Is that what normalization means? 

Secretary Vance: Yes, that is what it 
means ultimately. 

Middle East Situation 

Q. I think we had best go to the Middle 
East because your time is running out. 

Secretary Vance: Yes, I am running out of 
time. 

Q. And we couldn't have a session without 
the Middle East. 

Secretary Vance: Sure. 

Q. Okay, we might as well go right to the 
heart of it. Must there be a Palestinian state 
for there to be peace in the Middle East? 
Bluntly, but — 

Secretary Vance: That is up to the parties 
to decide. I think it is necessary if one is 
going to achieve a settlement to recognize 
the legitimate requirements of the Pales- 
tinian people. And I have said this many 
times before. 

Q. Well, do their legitimate interests in- 
clude nationhood? 

Secretary Vance: Well, that is up to them 
to decide how that might be done. 

Q. Excuse me, when you say "them," you 
mean the parties or do you mean the Pales- 
tinians ? 

Secretary Vance: The parties. 

Q. Do you still look for a resum,ption — do 
you hope for a resumption of the Middle East 
Peace Co7iference some time? 

Secretary Vance: Yes. My view is that it is 
important to have a resumption of a Geneva 
conference in 1977. 

I think, as I have said, that despite the dif- 
ficulties which exist, the situation is more — 
is improved from what it was nine months or 
a year ago and that there are opportunities 
to make progress this year. 

Let me say, further, that I think it is ter- 
ribly important that progress be made this 



year, because if progress is not made this 
year, then, as I see it, there is danger that 
other factors may arise which may destroy 
the more favorable conditions which cur- 
rently exist. 



Department Comments on Subject 
of Human Rights in Czechoslovakia 

Following is a stateynent read to news cor- 
respondents on January 26 by Frederick Z. 
Brown, Director, Office of Press Relations. 

I would like to make a brief statement on 
the subject of human rights in Czechoslo- 
vakia. 

Some 300 individuals in that country have 
petitioned the government to guarantee the 
rights accorded them by the Czechoslovak 
Constitution, the international covenants on 
civil and political and on economic, social, 
and cultural rights, and by the Helsinki Final 
Act.' We have noted that the signers of 
Charter 77 explicitly state that it is not a 
document of political opposition. Some of the 
signers have reportedly been detained or 
harassed. 

As you know, the Helsinki Final Act pro- 
vides that: 

In the field of human rights and fundamental free- 
doms, the participating States will act in conformity 
with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations and with the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. They will also fulfill their obligations as 
set forth in the international declarations and agree- 
ments in this field, including inter alia the International 
Covenants on Human Rights, by which they may be 
bound. 

All signatories of the Helsinki Final Act 
are pledged to promote, respect, and observe 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for 
all. We must strongly deplore the violation of 
such rights and freedoms wherever they 
occur. 



' For text of the Final Act of the Conference on Secu- 
rity and Cooperation in Europe, signed at Helsinki on 
Aug. 1, 1975, see Bulletin of Sept. 1, 1975, p. 323. 



154 



Department of State Bulletin 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 

MULTILATERAL 



Agriculture 

Agreement establishing the International Fund for Ag- 
ricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome June 
13, 1976. ' 
Signatures: Venezuela, January 4, 1977; Switzerland, 

January 24, 1977; Italy, Somalia, January 26, 1977; 

Tunisia, January 27, 1977; Pakistan, January 28, 

1977. 

Antarctica 

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the 
principles and objectives of the Antarctic treaty of 
December 1, 1959 (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Oslo June 
20, 1975. ' 

Notification of appraisal: Belgium, January 21, 1977, 
for recommendations VIII-3, VIII-6-Vlil-14. 

Copyright 

Universal copyright convention, as revised. Done at 
Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. 
TIAS 7868. 
Accession deposited: Bahamas, September 27, 1976. 

Cultural Property 

Convention on the means of prohibiting and preventing 
the illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of 
cultural property. Done at Paris November 14, 1970. 
Entered into force April 24, 1972. ^ 
Acceptance deposited: Saudi Arabia, September 8, 

1976. 
Ratification deposited: Bolivia, October 4, 1976. 

Diplomatic Relations 

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on diplomat- 
ic relations concerning the compulsory settlement of 
disputes. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into 
force April 24, 1964; for the United States December 
13, 1972. TIAS 7502. 
Ratification deposited: Korea, January 25, 1977. 

Expositions 

Protocol revising the convention of November 22, 1928, 
relating to international e.xpositions, with appendix 
and annex. Done at Pai'is November 30, 1972. ' 
Ratification deposited: Romania, May 12, 1976. ^ 

Gas 

Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of as- 
phyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bac- 
teriological methods of warfare. Done at Geneva June 
7, 1925. Entered into force February 8, 1928; for the 
United States April 10, 1975. TIAS 8061. 
Accession deposited: Qatar, September 16, 1976. 



Health 

Amendments to articles 35 and 55 of the Constitution of 
the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as 
amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva 
May 22, 1973. ' 

Acceptances deposited: Comoros, Surinam, January 
27, 1977. 

Oil Pollution 

Amendments to the international convention for the 
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as 
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London Oc- 
tober 21, 1969. 
Acceptances deposited: Dominican Republic, January 

14, 1977; Nigeria, January 19, 1977. 
Enters into force: January 20, 1978. 

Space 

Convention on international liability for damage caused 
by space objects. Done at Washington, London, and 
Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into force Sep- 
tember 1, 1972; for the United States October 9, 
1973. TIAS 7762. 
Ratification deposited: Finland, February 1, 1977. 

Terrorism — Protection of Diplomats 

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes 
against internationally protected persons, including 
diplomatic agents. Done at New York December 14, 
1973. Enters into force February 20, 1977. 
Ratifications deposited: Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, January 25, 1977; Tunisia, January 21, 1977. 
Accession deposited: Chile, January 21, 1977. 

United Nations 

Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the Inter- 
national Court of Justice. Signed at San Francisco 
June 26, 1945. Entered into force October 24, 1945. 59 
Stat. 1031. 

Admission to membership: Angola, December 1, 
1976; Western Samoa, December 15, 1976. 

World Heritage 

Convention concerning the protection of the world cul- 
tural and natural heritage. Done at Paris November 
23, 1972. Entered into force December 17, 1975. 
TIAS 8226. 
Ratification deposited: Bolivia, October 4, 1976. 

BILATERAL 



Australia 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat imports 
from Australia during calendar year 1977. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Washington December 14, 
1976, and January 18, 1977. Entered into force 
January 18, 1977. 



' Not in force. 

^ Not in force for the United States. 

^ With reservation. 



February 21, 1977 



155 



Canada 

Understanding relating to trade in beef and veal be- 
tween Canada and the United States in 1977. Ef- 
fected by exchange of letters December 23 and 29, 

1976. Entered into force December 29, 1976. 

Costa Rica 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat imports 
from Costa Rica during calendar year 1977. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Washington December 14 and 
20, 1976. Entered into force December 20, 1976. 

Dominican Republic 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat imports 
from the Dominican Republic during calendar year 

1977. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington 
December 14 and 16, 1976. Entered into force De- 
cember 16, 1976. 

El Salvador 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat imports 
from El Salvador during calendar year 1977. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Washington December 14 and 
15, 1976. Entered into force December 15, 1976. 

Guatemala 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat imports 
from Guatemala during calendar year 1977. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Washington December 14 and 
15, 1976. Entered into force December 15, 1976. 

Honduras 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat imports 
from Honduras during calendar year 1977. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Washington December 14, 
1976. Entered into force December 14, 1976. 

Hong Kong 

Agreement amending the agreement of July 25, 1974, as 
amended (TIAS 8897, 8274), relating to trade in cot- 
ton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Hong Kong November 22 and 
December 22, 1976. Entered into force December 22, 
1976. 

India 

Agreement for the relief from double taxation on earn- 
ings derived from the operation of aircraft, with re- 
lated notes. Effected by exchange of notes at New 



Delhi November 26, 1976. Entered into force 
November 26, 1976: effective January 1, 1976. 

Mexico 

Agreement extending the agreement of July .31, 1970, 
as amended and extended (TIAS 6941, 7927, 8397), 
for a cooperative meteorological observation program 
in Mexico. Effected by exchange of notes at Tlatelolco 
and Mexico December 17, 1976, and January 12, 
1977. Entered into force January 12, 1977. 

Agreement regarding mutual assistance between the 
U.S. and Mexican customs services. Signed at Mexico 
September 30, 1976. 
Entered into force: January 26, 1977. 

New Zealand 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat imports 
from New Zealand during calendar year 1977. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Washington December 
14 and 23, 1976. Entered into force December 23, 
1976. 

Nicaragua 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat imports 
from Nicaragua during calendar year 1977. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Washington December 14 and 

15, 1976. Entered into force December 15, 1976. 

Panama 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat imports 
from Panama during calendar year 1977. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Washington December 14 and 

16, 1976. Entered into force December 16, 1976. 
Agreement relating to repayment by Panama of Agency 

for International Development loan No. 525-L-006, 
with schedule. Signed at Panama December 30, 1976. 
Entered into force December 30, 1976. 
Agreement relating to repayment by Panama of Agency 
for International Development loan No. 525-L-014, 
with schedule. Signed at Panama December 30, 1976. 
Entered into force December 30, 1976. 

Trinidad and Tobago 

Agreement extending the agreement of June 20, 1968, 
relating to a program of technical assistance in the 
field of tax administration. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Port of Spain November 10, December 7, 
1976, and January 13, 1977. Entered into force 
January 13, 1977. 



156 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX February 21, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1965 



Africa. Secretary Vance Interviewed by AP and 
UPI Correspondents 147 

Arms Control and Disarmament 

Secretary Vance Interviewed by AP and UPI 
Correspondents 147 

Secretary Vance's News Conference of January 
31 ..." 137 

Chile. Secretary Vance's News Conference of 
January 31 137 

China 

Secretary Vance Interviewed by AP and UPI 

Correspondents 147 

Secretary Vance's News Conference of January 

31 ...'. 137 

Cuba 

Secretary Vance Interviewed by AP and UPI 
Correspondents 147 

Secretary Vance's News Conference of January 
31 137 

Cyprus 

Secretary Vance Interviewed by AP and UPI 
Correspondents 147 

Secretary Vance's News Conference of January 
31 ...'. 137 

Czechoslovakia. Department Comments on Sub- 
ject of Human Rights in Czechoslovakia (state- 
ment) 154 

Human Rights 

Department Comments on Subject of Human 
Rights in Czechoslovakia (statement) 154 

Secretary Vance Interviewed by AP and UPI Cor- 
respondents 147 

Secretary Vance's News Conference of January 
31 ...'. 137 

Korea. Secretary Vance's News Conference of 
January 31 137 

Middle East 

Secretary Vance Interviewed by AP and UPI 
Correspondents 147 

Secretary Vance's News Conference of January 
31 137 

Panama 

Secretary Vance Interviewed by AP and UPI 
Correspondents 147 

Secretary Vance's News Conference of January 
31 137 

U.S. and Panama To Continue Negotiations on 
Canal Treaty (joint statement) 146 



Southern Rhodesia. Secretary Vance's News 
Conference of January 31 137 

Treaty Information. Current Actions 155 

U.S.S.R. 

Secretary Vance Interviewed by AP and UPI 
Correspondents 147 

Secretary Vance's News Conference of January 
31 137 

Vietnam. Secretary Vance's News Conference of 
January 31 137 

Name Index 
Vance, Secretary 137, 147 



No. 


Date 


t31 


1/31 


32 
*33 


1/31 
1/31 



Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: Jan. 31 — Feb. 6 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20520. 

Subject 

1977 edition of "Treaties in Force" 
published. 

Vance: news conference. 

Meeting on exploratory talks with 
Committee on Harmonization, 
Conference of European Posts 
and Telecommunications Admin- 
istrations, Feb. 10. 

Foreign educators to study U.S. 
vocational and technical schools, 
Feb. 1-Mar. 1. 

Caribbean-American seminar to 
open at Santo Domingo, Feb. 5. 

U.N. Water Conference, Mar. 
14-25. 

Vance: interview by AP and UPI 
correspondents. 

U.S. and Republic of China amend 
te.xtile agreement, Feb. 3. 



* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



*34 



2/2 



*35 


2/3 


*36 


2/3 


37 


2/3 


*38 


2/4 



Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. government printing office 

WASHINGTON. DC. 20402 



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o 









THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 

Volume LXXVI • No. 1966 • February 28, 1977 



PRESIDENT CARTER'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF FEBRUARY 8 
Excerpts From Transcript 157 

SECRETARY VANCE INTERVIEWED FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES 162 

DEPARTMENT URGES PASSAGE OF BILL TO HALT 

IMPORTATION OF RHODESIAN CHROME 

Statements by Secretary Vance and Assistant Secretary Katz 170 



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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 

For index see inside back cover 



OK>< 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



Vol. LXXVI, No. 1966 
February 28, 1977 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington. D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

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The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 

The BULLETIS includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, and 
news conferences of the President and 
the Secretary of State and other offi- 
cers of the Department, as well as spe- 
cial articles on various phases of in- 
ternational affairs and the functions of 
the Department. Information is in- 
cluded concerning treaties and inter- 
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United States is or may become a party 
and on treaties of general interna- 
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international relations are also listed. 



President Carter's News Conference of February 8 



Following are excerpts relating to foreign 
poUcy from the transcript of a news confer- 
ence held by President Carter on Febru- 
ary 8. ^ 

Q. Mr. President, you cited arms reduc- 
tions as the prime tenet — one of them — of your 
foreign policy. Under the circtirnstances, as a 
first step will you block the sale of coricussion 
bombs to a foreign country? 

President Carter: The sale of concussion 
bombs to a foreign country is an item that 
concerns me very much. Within the next 
week, after this review that has already been 
undertaken is completed, I will have an an- 
nouncement to make about that. The pre- 
vious announcement that concussion bombs 
would be sold was not cleared with the State 
Department nor with the Defense Depart- 
ment. I have asked them to analyze the polit- 
ical and military consequences of the sale. I 
am concerned about it, but have not yet de- 
cided whether to cancel that sale. 

Q. Does that mean, sir, that you are con- 
sidering blocking the sale? 

President Carter: That is one of the op- 
tions that I have, and I will make a decision 
within the next week. 



Q. Mr. President, your nominee to head 
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
Paul Warnke, wrote about a year and a half 
ago that the United States "should try a pol- 
icy of restraint while calling for matching 
restraint from, the Soviet Union." But Mr. 
Warnke didn't seem to believe that that had 



' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents dated Feb. 14, 1977, p. 155. 



to be guaranteed in advance in an agree- 
ment. Is that a view to which you subscribe, 
and could you explain why or why not? 

President Carter: I know Mr. Warnke very 
well. I have met with him several times to 
discuss his attitude on disarmament matters. 
I have complete confidence in him. The first 
two times I asked him to take the job, he 
turned me down. We tried to find an alterna- 
tive who is as well qualified as he is to ex- 
press my own views and those views that 
would be acceptable to our country. I was 
unsuccessful in finding someone to equal him. 
He finally agreed to take the job, at my insist- 
ence, as a public service. 

I believe that his views are well considered 
by me. And I have accepted them. I think 
when the Members of the Senate consider 
what Mr. Warnke stands for, he will be ap- 
proved overwhelmingly. 

I obviously believe that we both have to 
take initiatives, the Soviet Union and the 
United States. Most of our discussions will be 
bilateral in nature. Subsequently, I hope to 
bring in other nations to discuss, for instance, 
comprehensive test ban questions and 
others — the European nations who are nuclear 
powers and also the Chinese. That would come 
later. 

But I believe that Mr. Warnke's proposals 
are sound. And I have no concern about his 
attitude. There will be instances on nuclear 
weapons where each country has to take 
some initiative. But the overall balance of 
mutual restraint, cutting down on the overall 
dependence on nuclear weapons, is what 
counts. 

And I might add one other point. Mr. 
Warnke's positions will be carefully coordi- 
nated with my own, working closely with 
State Department, Defense Department offi- 
cials. Our decisions with the Soviets will be 



February 28, 1977 



157 



made public. We will consult with our allies 
whenever possible. Any ratification of an 
agreement with the Soviet Union would ob- 
viously require senatorial approval. So, even 
if I or Mr. Warnke or one other person in the 
negotiation process should make a mistake 
inadvertently, that mistake would be closely 
scrutinized by the public and I would think 
would be corrected. But I have complete con- 
fidence in him. 



Q. Mr. President, just to follow up a bit on 
Stan's question, could you tell us, sir, do you 
believe that there should be a rough parity 
between the nuclear forces of the Soviet 
Union and the United States? Do you think 
we ought to, in the arms negotiations, strive 
for superior force, or do you believe that as 
long as we have the ability to inflict horren- 
dous damage on them that it really doesn't 
matter which side has the most bombs? 

President Carter: At the present time, my 
judgment is that we have superior nuclear 
capability. The Soviet Union has more 
throw-weight, larger missiles, larger 
warheads. We have more missiles, a much 
higher degree of accuracy, and also we have 
three different mechanisms which are each 
independently adequate to deliver atomic 
weapons — airplanes, submarines, and inter- 
continental ballistic missiles. I think that we 
are roughly equivalent, even though I think 
we are superior, in that either the Soviet 
Union or we could destroy a major part of 
the other nation if a major attack was made 
with losses in the neighborhood of 50 to 100 
million people if a large exchange was ini- 
tiated. 

We have the capability, as do the Soviets, 
to detect the launching of opposing missiles, 
and then I as President and the leaders in 
Russia would have to be faced with the ques- 
tion of how much of a retaliatory attack to 
make. But in the e.xchange tens of millions of 
people would be killed, and the threat of this 
kind of holocaust is what makes it important 
that we do keep an adequate deterrent capa- 
bility. And it also is crucial for all of us to 
remember that it is necessary to have drastic 
reduction in dependence on atomic weapons. 



Almost every major speech that I have 
made since I have been involved in national 
politics, I expressed — committed, first, to 
stabilize the situation; second, to have de- 
monstrable reductions in dependence upon 
atomic weapons and set as our committed 
long-range goal complete elimination of nu- 
clear weapons from the earth. 

I had a meeting this morning with a repre- 
sentative of the People's Repubhc of China, 
and he told me very clearly that the goal of 
the Chinese Government was to reduce de- 
pendence on nuclear weapons to zero. 

If we and the Soviet Union can demon- 
strate an ability to stop the present growth 
and then to have substantial reductions, I be- 
lieve, then, we can go to the French, British, 
the Chinese, and others and say, "Would you 
join us in stopping testing and in moving in 
clearly monitorable ways to reduce depend- 
ence on atomic weapons?" 

Q. Mr. President, to follow that up, a little 
bit earlier, sir, if I understood you correctly, 
you said that you thought that each of the two 
countries, ourselves and the Soviets, might 
have to take some initiatives. I am trying to 
translate that into some of the problems that 
we face. Is the United States today prepared 
to take the initiative perhaps in restraining 
the development of the cruise missile in order 
to get something going in the SALT talks 
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks]? 

President Carter: I wouldn't want to single 
out one particular weapon which is still in the 
development stage, but I will give you a 
couple of examples that are symbolic in na- 
ture, not too profound. One is that I have 
suggested to the Soviet Union that they let 
us know and that we let them know before 
we launch any kind of intercontinental ballis- 
tic missile in a test phase. We launch our 
missiles from Vandenberg Air Force Base. 
We don't launch them from the standard 
silos. The Soviet Union does launch missiles 
from their standard operating silos for test 
purposes. I think a prior notice that this 
launch was going to take place — 24 hours or 
48 hours — would help a great deal. 

I have called on the Soviet Union to join us 
in a comprehensive test ban to stop all nu- 
clear testing for at least an extended period 



158 



Department of State Bulletin 



of time — two years, three years, four years. 
The Soviets are interested in using nuclear 
explosives to divert the course of a river in 
northern Russia. I don't think they need to 
test any more. If they want to put that as a 
proviso in the agreement that they would 
like to go ahead and divert that river, I think 
that would be something that we could 
negotiate and let us have observers there to 
learn from them and vice versa. But I think 
that the initiation of proposals that might be 
mutually acceptable of this kind is very, very 
important. 

Now, we have two unresolved questions 
derived from the Vladivostok agreement, 
called SALT Two, and that is the cruise mis- 
sile and the "Backfire" bomber. I would be 
wiUing to go ahead with the Soviet Union, 
conclude a quick agreement, if they think it 
advisable, and omit the Backfire bomber and 
the cruise missile from the negotiations at 
this stage, and then in a SALT Three talk, if 
necessary, put those two items back in for 
further discussion. 

But I think it is important for us — without 
any pressure on me to proceed too hastily — 
in a very careful and methodical way to dem- 
onstrate to the world that we are sincere. 

Q. I am sorry to pursue the subject, but if I 
may ask one more question about initiatives. 
When Mr. Warnke wrote that, he was appar- 
ently talking aboid weapons systems as well 
as nuclear warheads. And he was talking 
about perhaps restraining the development of 
a particular weapons system, hoping for rec- 
iprocity by the Soviets. 

My question is, would you consider saying 
to the Soviets, say the B-1 or any other 
weapons system, we are not going to develop 
it for six months, we'd like to see something 
from you in the way of reciprocity? 

President Carter: Again, let me avoid ref- 
erence to a particular weapons system on our 
side. Let me refer to a weapons system on 
their side. The Soviets have a missile with 
limited range — it is not intercontinental in 
nature — called the SS-20. They have begun 
to install those missiles in mobile installa- 
tions where they can move them in a con- 
cealed way from one part of an area to 



another. It makes it very difficult to pinpoint 
their exact location. 

I would like to see the Soviets cease de- 
ployment of the mobile missile, even though 
it is not of intercontinental type. It is very 
difficult to distinguish it from the interconti- 
nental missile called the SS-16. But if they 
would agree, for instance, to a cessation of 
the use or deployment of the mobile-type 
missiles which could be moved around in dif- 
ferent locations before launch, that would be 
a very important point for us to join them in 
a mutual agreement. It would mean we 
would not then perhaps spend the large 
amounts of money to develop our own mobile 
missile. But if the Soviets should move to a 
development of an intercontinental-type mis- 
sile that can be moved from one place to 
another undetected and its location cannot 
be pinpointed, then that would put a great 
pressure on us to develop a mobile missile of 
our own. 

So, I think on both sides there has to be 
some initiation. But as individual weapons 
systems are restrained, using initiative, you 
have got to be sure that the overall balance 
of deterrent is not disturbed. 



Q. Mr. President, there have been a series 
of actions taken in recent days by the Soviet 
Union including the expulsion of American 
journalists and the arrests of Aleksandr 
Ginzburg, actions that we have taken issue 
with in one form or another. How concerned 
are you that by being outspoken on issues of 
human rights that we may jeopardize possi- 
bly our relations with the Soviet Union on 
other matters ? 

President Carter: Well, this brings up the 
question that is referred to as "linkage." I 
think we come out better in dealing with the 
Soviet Union if I am consistently and com- 
pletely dedicated to the enhancement of 
human rights, not only as it deals with the 
Soviet Union, but all other countries. I think 
this can legitimately be severed from our in- 
clination to work with the Soviet Union, for 
instance, in reducing dependence upon 
atomic weapons and in also seeking mutual 
and balanced force reductions in Europe. 



February 28, 1977 



159 



I don't want the two to be tied together. I 
think the previous Administration, under 
Secretary Kissinger, thought that there 
ought to be this linkage, that if you men- 
tioned human rights or if you failed to invite 
Mr. [Aleksandr] Solzhenitsyn to the White 
House that you might endanger the progress 
of the SALT talks. 

I don't feel that way. I think it ought to be 
clear, and I have made clear directly in com- 
munication to Mr. Brezhnev [Leonid L 
Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union] and in my meeting with Am- 
bassador Dobrynin [Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, 
Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.] that I was 
reserving the right to speak out strong and 
forcefully whenever human rights are 
threatened — not every instance, but when I 
think it is advisable. This is not intended as a 
public relations attack on the Soviet Union, 
and I would hope that their leaders could 
recognize the American people's deep con- 
cern about human rights. 

I think in many other countries of the 
world there has been some progress. I think 
in the Soviet Union there has already been 
some progress. The number of Jews, for in- 
stance, who have been permitted to emigrate 
from the Soviet Union in the last few months 
has increased. 

If this trend should continue, I would be 
encouraged. But I would have to take this 
position of being independent in my own pub- 
lic pronouncements. I have got a lot to learn. 
I was concerned the other day, for instance, 
when the AP reporter was expelled from 
Moscow. I had a first thought to retaliate by 
expelling the AP reporter from Washington. 
But I found out that was not the right ap- 
proach to take. [Laughter] 

But we have got to be firm, and we have 
got to be forceful. But I don't want to tie ev- 
erything together in one package so that we 
are timid about insisting on human rights. 

Q. Do you interpret this in any way as a 
kind of testing of you by the Soviet Union? 

President Carter: No, I don't. I don't 
interpret it as a testing. I regret the fact 



that the Soviet Union saw fit to expel a 
newspaper reporter. I regret very deeply the 
fact that the Soviet Union has now incarcer- 
ated Mr. Ginzburg, who has been one of the 
leaders in the Soviet Union in representing 
the case of the dissidents. But I can't go in 
with armed forces and try to change the 
internal mechanism of the Soviet Govern- 
ment. 

But I don't think it is designed to aggra- 
vate me or to test me or to test the will of 
this country. My commitment to human 
rights is clear. I will maintain that clarity to 
the maximum extent possible. 

I don't want to mislead the American 
people in dealing with the Soviets or with 
others. We can't expect overnight success. It 
requires long, tedious, labored, very care- 
fully considered progress. I am not looking 
for magic answers, but my determination is 
very deep. 



Soviet Journalist Expelled 
From the United States 

Following is a Department announcement 
issued on February 5. 

The Soviet Government on February 4 in- 
formed our Embassy and the AP Moscow 
bureau that AP Moscow correspondent 
George Krimsky must leave the U.S.S.R. 
within one week. We have notified the Soviet 
Embassy today that Vladimir I. Alekseyev, a 
Washington correspondent of TASS, must 
leave the country within a week. We have 
specified that our expulsion of Alekseyev is 
in response to the Krimsky expulsion. We 
regret this course of events, which is a step 
backward from the objective of improving 
working conditions for journalists contained 
in the Helsinki Final Act and from the more 
fundamental interest of promoting a freer 
flow of information. 1 



' For text of the Final Act of the Conference on Secu- 
rity and Cooperation in Europe, signed at Helsinki on 
Aug. 1, 1975, see Bulletin of Sept. 1, 1975, p. 323. 



160 



Department of State Bulletin 



President Carter's Report 
to the American People 

Following is an excerpt relating to foreign 
policy from President Carter's address 
broadcast on television and radio on Feb- 
ruary 2. 1 

I have also made commitments about our 
nation's foreign policy. 

As Commander in Chief of the Armed 
Forces, I am determined to have a strong, 
lean, efficient fighting force. 

Our policy should be based on close coop- 
eration with our allies and worldwide respect 
for human rights, a reduction in world ar- 
maments, and it must always reflect our own 
moral values. I want our nation's actions to 
make you proud. 

Yesterday, Vice President Mondale re- 
turned from his 10-day visit with leaders of 
Western Europe and Japan. I asked him to 
make this trip to demonstrate our intention 
to consult our traditional allies and friends on 
all important questions. I have been very 
pleased with his report. Vice President Mon- 
dale will be a constant and close adviser for 
me. 

In a spirit of international friendship we 
will soon welcome here in the United States 
the leaders of several nations, beginning 
with our neighbors, Canada and Mexico. 

This month the Secretary of State, Cyrus 
Vance, will go to the Middle East, seeking 
ways to achieve a genuine peace between Is- 
rael and its Arab neighbors. 



' For the complete text, see Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents dated Feb. 7, 1977, p. 138. 



Our Ambassador to the United Nations, 
Andrew Young, left last night on a visit to 
Africa to demonstrate our friendship for its 
peoples and our commitment to peaceful 
change toward majority rule in southern Af- 
rica. 

I will also strive to improve our relations 
with the Soviet Union and the People's Re- 
public of China, insuring our security while 
seeking to reduce the risks of conflict. 

We will continue to express our concern 
about violations of human rights, as we have 
during this past week, without upsetting our 
efforts toward friendly relationships with 
other countries. 

Later, on another program, I will make a 
much more complete report to you on foreign 
policy matters. 



U.S. Concerned at Treatment 
of Aleksandr Ginzburg 

Following is a statement read to news cor- 
respo7idents on February 7 by Frederick Z. 
Brown, Director, Office of Press Relations. 

We are watching with concern the treat- 
ment of Aleksandr Ginzburg, and we have 
made the Soviet Government aware of our 
feeling. Wherever it may occur, the harass- 
ment of individuals who are pursuing the 
principles set forth in the Universal Declara- 
tion of Human Rights, or who are working 
for the implementation of the Final Act of 
the Helsinki Conference, is a matter of pro- 
found concern for all Americans. 



February 28, 1977 



161 



Secretary Vance Interviewed for the New York Times 



Following is the transcript of an interview 
with Secretary Vance on February 9 by Hed- 
rick Smith, Bernard Gwertzman, and 
Graham Hovey, excerpts from which were 
published in the New York Times on Feb- 
ruary 11. 

Press release 43 dated February 11 

Q. You have talked a bit about the Middle 
East; and of course with the trip coming up, 
we are enormously interested in that. But 
rather than plunge immediately into the de- 
tails, can you give us some notion of your 
thinking about the shape of an overall settle- 
ment? What kind of a settlement do you have 
in mind? 

Secretary Vance: Yes. Let me talk first to 
that question. 

I do have some views about the shape of an 
overall settlement, but we are in the process 
now within the government of reviewing the 
whole Middle East situation and getting the 
inputs of various people in the government on 
this. And I think it would be a mistake for me 
at this time to try and put down for you any 
particular set of views which I may have at 
this time. 

In addition to that, it is terribly important, 
in developing our ultimate views on this, that 
we have the critical input which I expect to 
get as a result of the trip which I am about to 
embark on. What I want to do is to get 
firsthand the views of the leaders of the key 
countries which are involved, to have a chance 
to discuss this in a face-to-face manner, and to 
make sure that I understand fully what their 
views are on these various issues. 

I will then come back and report these to 
the President. We will then be able to com- 
plete our analysis and thinking and develop 
our views on how we might best facihtate the 
movement toward a peaceful settlement. 



Q. Do you have the feeling that we, the 
United States, should be playing a more ac- 
tive role in trying to draw up a settlement, as 
Secretary Rogers did at one point — in talking 
about a Palestinian state, trying to figure out 
where the borders should be? Or do you see our 
role being much more a mediating kind of 
role? 

Secretary Vance: I think that we should not 
come up with, or try to come up with, a spe- 
cific plan. 

I think that our role should be one of 
facilitating the process of the parties arriving 
at a settlement. But in this I think we must 
play a very active role. I think that we have 
got to work with the parties and help them in 
the development of a settlement which will be 
acceptable to them. We can't play a passive 
role and accomplish that purpose, and we 
don't intend to. I think it is terribly important 
that progress be made and that it be made in 
1977. 

I think that the situation now is much bet- 
ter than it has been in the past. A lot of things 
have changed in the last nine months to a 
year, as we have talked about before. And I 
think that we should take advantage of these 
facts and press forward for a prompt and 
early resolution of the differences which ob- 
viously remain. 

Now, I don't want to underestimate the dif- 
ficulty of it. The substantive issues which di- 
vide the parties are still very deep and very 
difficult to resolve. But I think it is possible to 
make progress, and we are going to do every- 
thing we can to have it. 

Q. Some people have said there has been 
some movement on the Palestinian position, 
that the Palestinian leadership now seems to 
be looking toward a separate state, not to in- 
corporate the current Israeli boundaries. Do 
you see this as a positive development? 



162 



Department of State Bulletin 



Secretary Vance: If there has been a mod- 
eration in the Palestinian position, then ob- 
viously this would be a helpful step. This is 
something that I'd want to find out firsthand 
from the Arab leaders. I would like to find out 
whether they share this view. There is in- 
creasing talk that this is the case, and I want 
to explore this in depth with them. 

Q. Do you see a need in terms of the Geneva 
conference machinery, a need for a prelimi- 
nary conference in which the PLO [Palestine 
Liberatio7i Organization] would not be repre- 
sented? 

Secretary Vance: Let me talk about the 
broader question of whether there should be a 
preliminary conference. I think it is essential 
that the necessary groundwork be accom- 
plished before one goes to a Geneva confer- 
ence. I think to rush into a Geneva conference 
without thorough and adequate planning 
would be a mistake. Whether it will be neces- 
sary to have some sort of a preliminary con- 
ference to complete that groundwork I don't 
know yet, but I do not rule out that possibil- 
ity. 

Q. You are talking about satisfying or 
somehow meeting the interests of the Pales- 
tiyiians. Do you think, ultimately, that that is 
going to mean a Palestinian state of some 
kind? 

Secretary Vance: Well, let me say that 
there really are three key elements of any 
settlement. One is peace, the other is with- 
drawal, and the third is finding a way to meet 
the legitimate interests of the Palestinian 
people. 

Q. But what does that mean, the "legitimate 
interests" of the Palestinian people? 

Secretary Vance: I think it means just what 
it says. 

Q. In terms of some of the other questions 
out there, the Israelis got the impression, or 
say they got the im,pression, that this Admin- 
istration would go along mth the idea of giv- 
ing them the concussion bombs. The President 
indicated yesterday that was under review. 
Does that signal that there really is likely to 
be a change on that issue? 



Secretary Vance: No decision has yet been 
reached on it. The President said that the 
matter was under review, and he also indi- 
cated that one of the options would be a nega- 
tive decision. But no final decision has yet 
been made. 

Q. Just to be more specific, has there been a 
change? hi other words, did you tell A^nbas- 
sador Dinitz [Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Aynbas- 
sador to the U.S.] at any point that anything 
promised them by the Ford Administration 
would be carried out iii the arms field? 

Secretary Vance: I have not made that spe- 
cific statement to him, no. 

Q. Would a decision on the CBU-72 involve 
a broader policy statement about arms sales 
to the area? 

Secretary Vance: The President has already 
indicated what the broad scope of our arms 
transfer policy is across the globe, and the 
President has also indicated that we consider 
it important to try and reduce the transfer of 
arms into the Middle East. 

In addition, the President has indicated 
that this is a subject which he wishes me to 
take up with the various leaders which I will 
be visiting during my forthcoming trip, and I 
plan to discuss this question with them, be- 
cause I think it's a question of the supplier 
and of the recipient countries. 

Q. Have you already talked about it with 
either Mr. Dobrynin [Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, 
Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.] or any of the 
other Ambassadors of the arms-supplying 
countries, like the French, the Germans — 

Secretary Vance: Yes, indeed. I have dis- 
cussed this with a number of such people. 

Q. What kind of a response do you get? Be- 
cause clearly it is not going to work unless we 
get kind of a general policy here from several 
arms suppliers, is it? 

Secretary Vance: I have gotten a response 
which indicates a wilhngness to discuss the 
question and see whether or not there isn't 
some agreement which we can then reach; be- 
cause I think most of the countries, or at least 
most of the countries that I have talked to, 



February 28, 1977 



163 



have indicated that they share the concern 
that the President has expressed in this area. 

Q. Now, pist to be specific, which countries 
are these? 

Secretary Vance: I would prefer not to give 
you the names, but there are several of them. 

Q. At least including the Germans and the 
French ? 

Q. The Germans don't sell to the Middle 
East. The French and British, I suppose. 

Secretary Vance: Let's just leave it where 

it is. 

Q. hi your press conference [on January 
31], you said you didn't think this would be 
feasible toward the Middle East until a politi- 
cal solution could be arranged — that is, an 
arms holddown. 

Secretary Vance: What I said in my press 
conference, as I recall, was that the Soviet 
position, as I understood it, is that it would be 
unlikely that any agreement could be reached 
with them with respect to the sale of arms to 
the Middle East without a political settle- 
ment; that thereafter they would be in- 
terested in discussing such a solution. 

Possible Factors in Arms Transfer Decisions 

Q. In your press conference, you also 
talked about the possibility of having licens- 
ing before you could approach a country to 
sell. How far has this now gone? Are you 
about ready to put it in the Federal Register? 

Secretary Vance: Yes. We have done more 
work on this, and I would expect that we will 
proceed to publish a draft regulation along 
these lines in the near future. 

Q. Are there certain countries you have 
particularly in mind with this? 

Secretary Vance: No. This is a general prop- 
osition, and the general proposition is a very 
simple one; namely, that before arms man- 
ufacturers go abroad and seek to interest 
other countries in purchasing arms from us, 
they should be required to come to us and 
seek approval. Because we want to make sure 



that whatever is done would be consistent 
with American foreign policy, and this is at 
least one way to begin to try and get hold of 
the problem. 

Q. You have spoken out, the President has, 
the Department has and the White House has, 
on the issue of human rights. Are you headed 
toward a policy, or is this already the begin- 
ning of a policy, in which human rights con- 
siderations uxill affect military sales or aid 
agreements to such countries as Chile or 
Korea or Iran or Argentina? 

Secretary Vance: This is one of the consid- 
erations that I think must be taken into ac- 
count in connection with arms transfers. In- 
deed, the Congress has mandated it in certain 
cases. 

Q. Do you think you are going to be able to 
reach an across-the-board policy, or is it 
going to be on a country-by-country basis, or 
what? 

Secretary Vance: We haven't completed our 
work on this. It is a very complex problem to 
deal with, and I can't give you a clear, defini- 
tive answer at this point. But obviously, it will 
be a factor, and we are working our way to- 
ward trying to define how such a policy would 
be carried out. 

Q. What are some of the considerations? I 
mean, for example, the exposure of the Ko- 
reans or the Iranians in terms of interna- 
tional security situations, as opposed to some 
of the Latin American couyitries where the 
strategic situation is different? 

Secretary Vance: Yes, obviously, the 
strategic situation is of critical importance; 
and if the withholding of arms really jeopard- 
ized the country involved in a situation 
where the peace might be jeopardized, this 
would have to be an important factor which 
you would take into account in making your 
decision. 

Q. Can you discuss the status of the two 
nuclear agreetnents with Egypt and Israel 
that were initialed in the past Administra- 
tion ? 

Secretary Vance: I have nothing new to say 
on this at this time. 



164 



Department of State Bulletin 



I Q. In other ivords, it is still under study? 
Secretary Vance: Yes. 

Proliferation and Arms Transfer Issues 

Q. On the question of nuclear proliferation, 
as I understand the legislation, one of the re- 
quirements is that there be no aid to the coun- 
tries which have reprocessing facilities or 
capabilities, if I understand it correctly. 

Is there any problem in the Middle East, 
and specifically with Israel? Are you satis- 
fied that the Israeli reactor at the moment 
does not pose a problem? Or do you think it 
does? 

Secretary Vance: As I say, this whole ques- 
tion is under study now and I am awaiting the 
results before we forward them to the Presi- 
dent and discuss it with the President. 

Let me talk a bit about proliferation, if I 
might, because this is an area, as well as the 
arms transfer area, where I think new ground 
is really being broken in this Administration. 

In the first place, we have taken the whole 
complex of proliferation issues and the arms 
transfer issues and have moved them directly 
up under the supervision of the Under Secre- 
tary for Security Assistance [Lucy P. Wilson 
Benson]. We have brought in a deputy to the 
Under Secretary, Joe Nye, who is an ex- 
tremely able man, to assist Mrs. Benson in 
working on the problems in the proliferation 
area. 

This is going to be the center for the de- 
velopment of policy with respect to prolifera- 
tion in the government, and the mere fact that 
we have brought it up from the lower levels in 
the Department to the Under Secretary level 
indicates the importance which we attach to 
it. 

Also, there are interrelationships between 
the proliferation issues and the arms transfer 
issues, and I think it is necessary to integrate 
the manner in which we deal with these prob- 
lems both within the Department and within 
the government, and that is another reason 
that we have taken the steps which I have 
just described. 

I really do think that these are terribly im- 
portant issues, and I am hopeful that we can 



really get hold of these problems and give 
some leadership, not only here in this country 
but in the world in general, in these areas. 

Q. Do you have a timetable in mind when 
you expect enough of your studies to be done, 
u'hen you can actually be putting at least 
early tentative proposals on the table? 

Secretary Vance: Yes. I would think that 
before this first six months is out we will 
have some specific proposals that we will be 
able to put on the table. 

Q. Are you speaking to other governments 
there ? 

Secretary Vance: Other governments, and 
the completion of review within our own gov- 
ernment in such areas as arms transfers, so 
that we have a clear idea of what the arms 
transfer policy of the United States should be 
and the reasons for it. 

Q. What has happened to that national se- 
curity memorandum, that was done on Per- 
sian Gulf arms sales? Has that been sort of 
thrown away? 

Secretary Vance: No. They are still work- 
ing on the response to that. 

Q. / see. Because I think Congress needs to 
have it, doesn't it? 

Secretary Vance: That's right, it does. And 
that is in the process of completion at this 
point. 

Q. Can you talk more about the integra- 
tion between arms transfer and prolifera- 
tion? Do you mean by that that if a country 
is assured of an adequate conventional arm,s 
supply it wouldn't have to turn to nuclear 
weapons ? 

Secretary Vance: That is one of the issues. 
It has been suggested by many of those who 
have worked in this area that one of the facts 
which may lead a country not to proceed with 
the development of nuclear weapons is the 
assurance that it has enough conventional 
capability to take care of its national security 
interests. 

That is the kind of issue, I think, that has 
to be studied in the particular context of the 



February 28, 1977 



165 



country with which you are dealing, and the 
two have to be integrated in reaching a con- 
clusion as to how you wish to proceed in that 
particular area. 

Brazil and Nuclear Energy 

Q. How cmcial to this effort over the long 
haul are your current negotiations with the 
German Government on the deal they have 
already made with Brazil? Does that upset 
everything, if they proceed and you are not 
able to dissuade them? 

Secretary Vance: I think our discussions 
are very important and, as you know, they 
begin tomorrow when State Secretary 
Hermes [Peter Hermes, State Secretary, 
Federal German Foreign Office] comes over 
here. And subsequently we will be discussing 
these matters with the Brazilians. 

Q. Several people have raised the question 
about Brazil, both iyi Latin America and in 
this country, that this urge for nuclear capa- 
bility with Brazil is a much broader de- 
velopment than merely pushing the nuclear 
field, that Brazil is now a continental coun- 
try with a ^'manifest destiny" urge, and that 
in the decade ahead Brazil will become much 
more of a power to contend with. Looking 
over the long run, do you see Brazil as more 
of a problem and more of a partner? How do 
you see it? 

Secretary Vance: Obviously Brazil is an 
extremely important nation, not only in this 
hemisphere but in the world, and it is playing 
an increasingly important part in the delib- 
erations of the world bodies on all types of 
issues. 

Coming to the question of nuclear power, I 
am fully sensitive to the need of the Brazil- 
ians for adequate power. And the question is 
not one of their having nuclear reactors to 
develop the necessary power which they re- 
quire. The question relates only to the issue 
of reprocessing plants and enrichment 
plants. 

Q. Do you see other urges to push toward 
the Pacific or other urges in Brazil, in Latin 
Aynerica, which might pose other policy 
problems down the road? 



Secretary Vance: I am afraid I don't un- 
derstand your question. 

Q. Well, a number of people have 
suggested, specialists on Brazil, that Brazil 
is backing Bolivia in its urge to get an open- 
ing to the Pacific and that Brazil is feeling 
its muscles and that over a period of time, 
over the next several years, Brazil is simply 
going to be a much tnore dynamic power, 
which may raise some policy problems for us 
down the pike. 

Secretary Vance: Our relations with Brazil 
have been very good. I expect them to con- 
tinue to improve. And as I have indicated, 
we are going to explore a whole range of is- 
sues in our discussions with the Brazilians. 

Q. Might some of our effort to provide al- 
ternatives for Brazil for the reprocessing and 
the enrichment facilities involve their signa- 
ture of the Nonproliferation Treaty, which 
they haven't sigyied? 

Secretary Vance: We would hope that they 
and others would sign the Nonproliferation 
Treaty, and there are a number of alterna- 
tives that one could consider with respect to 
the forgoing of a reprocessing plant, such as 
the guarantee of the supply of uranium and 
the whole question of the internationalization 
of facilities. 



MBFR Talks 

Q. Shifting to Europe, you and others have 
mentioned in one form or another concern 
about the Soviet arms buildup, conventional 
arms buildup, in the center of Europe. Do 
you all at the moment have any specific 
ideas or thoughts about how to get the MBFR 
bnutual and balanced force reduction] talks 
moving — not necessarily specific proposals, 
but an approach, either in terms of discuss- 
ing pullback or kinds of reductions in ar- 
maments there, which would be helpful to the 
West and to getting the talks moving? 

Secretary Vance: Well, in the first place, it 
seems to me that the problem has been that 
there has not been sufficient political push on 
either side to get the talks moving, and I 
think that is the first step that has to be 



166 



Department of State Bulletin 



taken; and I am encouraged to see that the 
Soviets have indicated that they consider 
this to be of high priority and they are pre- 
pared to move forward with them. We have 
stated that we consider the movement in the 
talks to be of high priority; and if we get this 
kind of political decision taken on both sides, 
then I think it is possible to begin to make a 
move forward. 

Let me make the point, though, that what 
we will be doing, we will be doing with full 
consultation with our allies. We are not talk- 
ing about taking any unilateral steps here. 
Whatever we do will be done after full con- 
sultation. 

Q. / see Joe Kraft alluded to this in his 
column the other day: Are you about ready 
now to begin discussions finally with the 
Chinese on resolving the frozen-assets ques- 
tions 1 

Secretary Vance: Yes. This is a subject 
that I think it would be useful for us to begin 
to discuss with the Chinese. 

Q. Do they feel that way? Do you have any 
idea that they feel that way, other than what 
has appeared in the press? 

Secretary Vance: Yes. We have some indi- 
cation that they feel the same way. 

Q. So, then, you would expect talks at 
some point? 

Secretary Vance: I would hope there would 
be talks in the not too distant future. 

Q. Here or in East Asia? 

Secretary Vance: We are not that far along 
the road yet. 

Q. I see. But it would not necessarily re- 
quire a new head of our mission in Peking to 
move ahead with that sort of thing? 

Secretary Vance: No. 

Q. You mentioned, very interestingly , the 
elevation of this office and appointments 
concerned ivith nuclear proliferation. You 
have brought a number of younger people 
into the State Department. I wonder if you 
would talk with us just a yno^nent about your 
ideas of how you have organized the State 



Department, what it is you are trying to do? 

Secretary Vance: What I have tried to do 
is to bring into the State Department a bal- 
ance of those who have experience and 
younger people who have fresh ideas and 
who can begin to bring along another genera- 
tion of experts in the foreign policy field. I 
think we have been very fortunate in those 
that we have been able to enlist to work in 
the Administration, both in terms of the 
career officers who are the backbone of the 
Department and in the younger group that 
has come in at the Assistant Secretary and 
Deputy Assistant Secretary level to join us. 

I think by putting together this combina- 
tion that we are going to have an excellent 
group of officers and staff that will give us 
the ability to handle the difficult set of prob- 
lems that face us in a satisfactory and con- 
structive way. 

Q. But, organizationally , before you were 
talking about elevating a conceryi — 

Secretary Vance: Yes. 

Q. — and integrating an effort — 

Secretary Vance: Yes. 

Q. — on specific policy problems; nam,ely, 
proliferation and arms sales. Are there other 
organizational changes that you have made 
which, in effect, highlight policy problems, 
specifically global policy problems, that you 
feel are crucial? 

Secretary Vance: Well, we are in the proc- 
ess of examining some other areas in the 
light of possible organizational changes 
which may put more focus on the global prob- 
lems. 

Q. Such as food and environm,ental prob- 
lems, this kind of thing? 

Secretary Vance: That is correct. 
Q. Are those specific things? 

Secretary Vance: I have nothing specific on 
this point. It is clear that this whole set of 
global problems is a new dimension that is of 
increasing importance. And as we look down 
the years ahead, I think they are going to be 
of major importance. 



February 28, 1977 



167 



I further believe that many of these will 
replace some of the traditional security prob- 
lems as the items of principal focus in the 
foreign policy field. 

Q. I have ^mentioned two. I don't want 
them to be my words. I mean, would you 
agree on food and environment ? 

Secretary Vance: Food and environment. 
We have already talked about proliferation, 
arms transfers, the international economic 
problems. Did we talk about population? 

Q. Food and environment, proliferation, 
arms transfers, international econo-tnic 
problems. 

Secretary Vance: Yes, I would definitely 
include population. 

Problems of Paramount Importance 

Q. A substantive question, dealing with 
Cuba and Panama. You have mentioned in 
one context or another an interest at least in 
exploriyig some possibilities for normaliza- 
tion with Cuba. You are obviously pushing 
ahead on the Pa^iayna Canal negotiations. 
Can you move on both these fronts at the 
same time? Each of them are very sensitive 
political issues. Or do you have some kind of 
a sequence of handling these problems in 
mind? 

Secretary Vance: Let me say that at the 
outset we saw a number of problems of 
paramount importance. In order to try to 
begin to move on these, we have taken a 
number of steps. 

First, we have begun to move on the Panama 
Canal, and we now have the talks scheduled to 
resume. 

Another critical issue is the Middle East. 
We are now beginning to take the first steps 
in that particular area. 

Thirdly, the problem of the strategic arms 
talks. Here again I think we are taking the 
necessary steps to begin to move that, as I 
have said, out of the doldrums. 

In a similar fashion, I think the political 
judgments are being made which will make it 
possible for us to begin to move forward with 



the mutual balanced force reduction talks. 

We have also indicated a desire to begin to 
move toward normalization in the area of 
Cuba. 

I have also indicated that we would con- 
sider it important to try and come to grips 
with the missing-in-action question in Viet- 
nam, so that we could then begin to try and 
move toward normalization in that area. 

Q. Do you have any date for that, any 
talks with the Vietnamese? 

Secretary Vance: No specific dates. But 
these are all areas of importance where I 
think we have begun to move and to take the 
necessary first steps to move us along the 
road. 

Now, this is not to say that this is an over- 
all statement of priorities, but these are 
some of the more important areas where we 
have already begun to move. 

One which I should underscore is the very 
important trip which Vice President Mondale 
took at the very outset of this Administra- 
tion. I think it was extremely important that 
he take this trip to visit our key allies and to 
have a chance to discuss with them their 
views as well as our preliminary views on a 
number of important issues. And this under- 
scores the importance which this Administra- 
tion attaches to our relationship with our 
allies. 

So these are some of the things which I 
would point to to indicate a general direction 
in this first two to three weeks of the 
Administration. 

Q. You didn't mention Greece and Turkey 
and the [Clark] Clifford mission, but I am 
sure you meant to. 

Secretary Vance: Yes. 

Q. You meant to include that. 

Secretary Vance: I meant to include that. 

Q. On the Cuba aiid Panama thing, this 
combination — -just looking at Latin America 
for a moment, do you have a sense of timing 
there? 

Secretary Vance: Before I answer you on 
that, another one that I should mention in 



168 



Department of State Bulletin 



the important area is the whole question of 
southern Africa. 

As you know, we have just recently met 
with Ambassador Ivor Richard [Chairman of 
the Geneva Conference on Rhodesia and 
U.K. Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations] for two days. We have had a very 
good discussion of possible further steps that 
might be taken to get the negotiations back 
on the track. 

They will — they, the British — will be dis- 
cussing this among themselves, and we will 
be further refining our thoughts; and we will 
be meeting again in the next two weeks or so 
to see what joint efforts we may come up 
with to try and get some progress again. 

Q. You won't go to London on your way 
back from the Middle East to talk about this? 

Secretary Vance: No, I will not. I will be 
coming directly back. 

Q. Will he come here, then, for a second 
round of talks? Is that what you mean to be 
saying? 

Secretary Vance: I don't know whether he 
will come here or we will have somebody go 
to London. But we will.be discussing our fur- 
ther actions with them. 

Q. You m,ention joint actions. I take it that 
doesn't, however, change the situation in 
which we regard the British as kind of being 
the front-runner on this. 

Secretary Vance: It does not, no. This is 
clearly a case where the British are properly 
the front-runner, and we will be doing every- 
thing we can to support them fully, as we 
have in the past. 

Q. I have gotten the catalogue. Can I come 
back to the Cuba and the Panatna thing? Do 
you have some notion of the sequence here in 
the way that you will handle these issues? 

Secretary Vance: On the Panama situation, 
the negotiations are about to resume, and I 
would hope that they would proceed as we 



indicated in our joint communique, or our 
joint statement, which Minister Boyd and I 
issued, promptly, and that we would make 
rapid progress.' 

Q. Do you have a date yet to talk to the 
Cubans on this law of the sea, or whatever it 

is? 

Secretary Vance: No. I have no dates on 
any discussions at this point with the Cu- 
bans. 

Q. Do you feel that the Soviets, the Soviet 
leadership understands the decoupling of the 
SALT and strategic issues from, the human 
rights issues that has been articulated by the 
President? 

Secretary Vance: I think the President 
made it very clear yesterday that both he 
and I believe that we can and will state our 
views with respect to these very important 
human rights issues. At the same time, we 
believe that we must continue to discuss and 
press forward on the critically important 
strategic arms talks. 

As he indicated, neither he nor I think that 
there is a linkage that prevents these two 
things from proceeding at the same time. 

Q. But is there a linkage on other areas 
such as humayi rights and econoyyiic coopera- 
tion or human rights and mutual coopera- 
tion ? 

Secretary Vance: As I indicated before in 
the interview that I gave, obviously what 
happens in the human rights area affects the 
climate of relations between countries.^ 
What I have said is that I believed that there 
had been an overemphasis on linkage in the 
past. 



'■ For text of a joint statement issued at Washington 
on Jan. 31 following a meeting between Secretary 
Vance and Panamanian Foreign Minister Aquilino 
Boyd, see Bulletin of Feb. 21, 1977, p. 146. 

^ For an interview with Secretary Vance by AP and 
UPI correspondents on Feb. 3, see ibid., p. 147. 



February 28, 1977 



169 



THE CONGRESS 



Department Urges Passage of Bill To Halt 
Importation of Rhodesian Chrome 



Following are statements by Secretary 
Vance and Julius L. Katz, Assistant Secre- 
tary for Economic and Business Affairs, be- 
fore the Subcommittee on African Affairs of 
the Senate Comynittee on Foreign Relations on 
February 10. * 



STATEMENT BY SECRETARY VANCE 

Press release 42 dated February 10 

I am pleased to be with you today and to 
have this opportunity to comment on the 
Rhodesian sanctions bill. 

The Administration fully supports this bill. 
We urge the Congress to pass it into law as 
rapidly as possible. To do so would, I firmly 
believe, strengthen the hand of the United 
States and others who are working to find a 
peaceful solution to the Rhodesian problem. 
Moreover, it would return the United States 
to conformity with its obligations under the 
United Nations Charter. American industry 
is not dependent on Rhodesian chrome, and 
repeal will not harm our economy. 

President Carter has on many occasions 
stated clearly and forcefully his commit- 
ment to human rights. That commitment, 
which I know you share, and which is ex- 
pressed in the provisions of the United Na- 
tions Charter, will be a major factor as this 
Administration formulates its foreign, as 
well as its domestic, policies. We are guided 
by this commitment in our approach to all the 
problems of southern Africa. It requires our 



' The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub- 
lished by the committee and will be available from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



firm and clear opposition to racial injustice 
wherever it exists. 

The world faces an explosive situation in 
southern Africa. Negotiations for a Rhode- 
sian settlement have faltered, though our ef- 
forts to nurture them continue. Violence is 
intensifying. The Namibian dispute is not 
moving toward solution; indeed, it adds to 
the danger that violence in southern Africa 
will spread. And in South Africa itself a sys- 
tem of institutionalized racial discrimination, 
which this Administration strongly opposes, 
feeds black unrest. 

The Rhodesian situation is of greatest 
urgency, however, for there the extent of 
armed conflict is broadest and the threat of 
escalation most immediate. We view with 
deep concern the dangerous situation in 
Rhodesia that has arisen out of the attempt 
of the illegal minority government to main- 
tain itself in power. If the Rhodesian au- 
thorities, who represent less than 4 percent 
of the population, persist in this course, the 
inevitable outcome will be a bitter legacy for 
the future of all the inhabitants of that terri- 
tory. 

Intensified conflict in Rhodesia also entails 
serious adverse economic effects on countries 
in the region. Furthermore, the possibility of 
non-African forces interfering cannot be dis- 
counted. 

We must continue to try to help head off a 
disaster in Rhodesia. We believe that change 
there is necessary. It is certainly inevitable. 
Our challenge is that it be rapid, peaceful, 
and orderly. This can only come through a 
negotiated settlement which leads quickly to 
a system of majority rule and respect for the 
rights and dignity of all, regardless of their 
race. In our effort to help achieve this goal 



170 



Department of State Bulletin 



we shall continue to confer with the British 
Government, African leaders, and the South 
African Government. 

I have said recently that the Rhodesian au- 
thorities should understand clearly that 
under no circumstance can they count on any 
form of American assistance in their effort to 
prevent majority rule in Rhodesia or to enter 
into negotiations which exclude leaders of 
the nationalist movements. 

I underscore that statement again today. 
But the key to peace lies in Mr. Ian Smith's 
hands, and repeal of the Byrd amendment 
would do far more to persuade him to use it. 
It is essential that the Congress and the 
executive branch work together in this re- 
spect to present a unified American position. 

Throughout the world community, people 
are watching to see what the United States 
decides to do. African and other leaders place 
considerable importance on the action Con- 
gress will take with regard to repeal of the 
Byrd amendment — and, I might add, they 
want to know how deeply the Administration 
is committed to its repeal. Let no one be in 
doubt about the depth of our commitment. 

In his talk with Ambassador Young [An- 
drew Young, U.S. Representative to the 
United Nations] last weekend. President 
Nyerere of Tanzania laid stress on repeal of 
the Byrd amendment as part of an active role 
by the United States in tightening U.N. eco- 
nomic sanctions against Rhodesia. Other Af- 
rican leaders have recently expressed the 
same sentiment to us. 

Passage of the Byrd amendment in 1971 
put the United States in violation of its in- 
ternational obligations. The economic sanc- 
tions imposed by the U.N. Security Council 
in 1966 and 1968 were based on the Council's 
right to determine that a threat to the peace 
existed in the Rhodesian situation and to in- 
voke enforcement measures, as it did, under 
chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. 
A legal obhgation for all member states was 
thus created. As a permanent member of the 
Security Council the United States could 
have vetoed the sanctions resolutions. It did 
not, but in fact supported and voted for the 
sanctions. As a matter of international law, 
we are committed, under article 25 of the 
charter, to abide by them. 



With the passage of the Byrd amendment, 
the United States, whose record in enforcing 
sanctions had been as good as or better than 
that of any nation, became one of a handful of 
nations which, as a matter of official policy, 
violate the sanctions. We thereby put our- 
selves at odds with the will of the interna- 
tional community in the only effort ever 
made by the United Nations to use manda- 
tory economic sanctions. We have acted in 
violation of our own often proclaimed devo- 
tion to international law. 

By repealing the Byrd amendment we 
would remove this symbol of ambivalence in 
American policy toward Rhodesia and toward 
international law. We would return to adher- 
ence to our obligations under the United Na- 
tions Charter. 

When the Byrd amendment was passed, it 
was argued that, for strategic and economic 
reasons, the United States needed continued 
access to Rhodesian chrome. However, it 
should now be clear that access to Rhodesian 
chrome and other minerals is not an impor- 
tant element in U.S. security or overall eco- 
nomic policy. We maintained a huge supply of 
chrome in our strategic stockpile, and the 
Defense Department's requirement for 
metallurgical-grade chromite was relatively 
small. Moreover, passage of the Byrd 
amendment did not, as it was intended, make 
us less reliant on imports of Soviet chrome. 

Many of those who supported the Byrd 
amendment did so because of their under- 
standing that the American steel industry 
depended on Rhodesian chrome for the pro- 
duction of American specialty steel. How- 
ever, as one original supporter of the 
amendment. Congressman John Dent, has 
said, "Due to recent technological innova- 
tions, the United States is no longer depend- 
ent on Rhodesian chrome." He added that 
consequently, and because "the existence of 
the amendment might hamper American dip- 
lomatic initiatives," he will now reverse the 
position he has held since 1971, and support 
and vote for repeal of the Byrd amendment. 

It is my firm belief that repeal of the Byrd 
amendment will serve the interests of the 
United States. It will in no way harm us 
strategically or economically. To the con- 
trary, it will strengthen our position and add 



February 28, 1977 



171 



to our stature internationally. And it will as- 
sist us in reaching the goal we share with 
many others: a peaceful transition to major- 
ity rule and equal rights in Rhodesia. This 
goal will be difficult of attainment in any 
case. As long as the Byrd amendment re- 
mains on the books, it will be even harder. 

The Carter Administration attaches the 
highest importance to repeal. In testifying 
today on behalf of the Administration, I 
speak for the President, who strongly sup- 
ports this initiative. We welcome your bill 
and hope that the Congress will give it the 
very full measure of support it deserves. We 
will work with you to this end. 



STATEMENT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY KATZ 

I appreciate this opportunity to appear be- 
fore your committee in support of S. 174, a 
bill to halt the importation of Rhodesian 
chrome, nickel, and other ferroalloys. In this 
statement I intend to discuss the economic 
impact of the Byrd amendment during the 
past four years and the economic conse- 
quences of the reimposition of full sanctions 
against Rhodesia as proposed in this bill. 

The U.S. Bureau of Mines estimates that 
total world resources of chromite amount to 
nearly 9 billion tons, mostly occurring in the 
Eastern Hemisphere. While the United 
States has some resources of chromite in 
Montana, Oregon, California, and Alaska, 
they are low grade and are not presently 
commercially exploitable on a significant 
scale. 

Commercially exploitable reserves around 
the world are estimated at 1.9 billion tons 
and are located chiefly in South Africa, which 
alone has reserves of about 1.1 billion tons, 
Rhodesia, the U.S.S.R., Turkey, and the 
Philippines. Preliminary estimates of world 
chromite production in 1976 are 8.9 million 
tons, of which South Africa produced 27 per- 
cent; Communist countries, 35 percent; Tur- 
key and Rhodesia, about 8 percent each; and 
the Philippines, less than 4 percent. 

Chrome is used by three main branches of 
U.S. industry: the steel industry for produc- 
tion of stainless and alloy steels; the chemical 
industry for pigments, plating, and tanning; 



and the refractory industry for manufacture 
of refractory bricks. 

By far the largest user of chrome is the 
specialty steel industry, which in 1974 ac- 
counted for about 65 percent of U.S. con- 
sumption. Over half of all imports of chro- 
mite are converted by the ferroalloys indus- 
try into ferrochromium, an intermediate 
product used by the specialty steel industry 
to make stainless and alloy steels. Stainless 
steels are vital to production of aircraft, 
machinery, processing equipment, autos, and 
many other capital, strategic, and consumer 
goods requiring a high degree of corrosion 
resistance. 

A number of different technologies have 
been developed to process chromite into fer- 
rochromium, depending on the type of chro- 
mite ore being used. In addition, a relatively 
new technology called the Argon Oxygen De- 
carburization (AOD) process developed by 
industry in the late 1960's has been particu- 
larly successful in providing a higher yield of 
chromium derived from lower grades of 
chromite ore. It is estimated that the AOD 
technology is now used to produce 60 to 65 
percent of the world's stainless steel. The 
significance of this development is that it 
permits increased use of chemical- and 
refractory-grade ores — chiefly found in 
South Africa, Brazil, and other countries — 
which could replace Rhodesian and Russian 
material. 

Apart from recycled scrap, which in 1975 
satisfied 10 percent of the total U.S. chrome 
demand, the United States is almost totally 
dependent on imports for its chrome re- 
quirements. 

The preliminary estimate of imports of 
chromite for 1976 stands at 1.2 million tons, 
compared to 1.4 million in 1970 and 1.05 mil- 
lion in 1972, the year following enactment of 
the Byrd amendment. For ferrochromium 
imports, the preliminary 1976 figure is 
270,000 tons, compared to 42,000 tons in 1970 
and 150,000 tons in 1972. 

These figures indicate small declines in the 
volume of chromite ore imports but a sharply 
rising volume of imports of ferrochromium. 
Growing imports of ferrochromium in large 
part reflect the efforts of chromite-producing 
countries to ship the higher valued inter- 



172 



Department of State Bulletin 



mediate product, ferrochromium, rather than 
shipping chromite ore to the United States 
for conversion. 

Sources of U.S. Imports 

I would now like to turn specifically to 
U.S. dependence on Rhodesia and the impli- 
cations of removal of the Byrd amendment. 

According to the U.S. Bureau of Mines es- 
timate, 64 percent of reserves of minable 
chromite ore of all grades is located in South 
Africa and 32 percent in Rhodesia. For 
metallurgical-grade chromite ore, the grade 
most used in the production of stainless and 
alloy steels, Rhodesia possesses 86 percent of 
known world reserves; South Africa, 9 per- 
cent; the U.S.S.R. and other Communist 
countries, 2 percent; and Turkey, 1 percent. 
For the chemical-grade ore, which via the 
AOD process is also now usable for specialty 
steel making, South Africa has the vast 
majority of the world's reserves, well in ex- 
cess of 1 billion tons. 

The sources of U.S. imports by chromium 
content in 1976 were 3 percent from 
Rhodesia; 17 percent from the U.S.S.R.; 38 
percent from South Africa; 17 percent from 
Turkey; 10 percent from the Philippines; and 
15 percent from other countries. 

Imports of chromite ore from Rhodesia had 
constituted over 50 percent of our imports 
during the 1950's and early 1960's. With the 
imposition of the embargo, imports from 
Rhodesia stopped and then began again fol- 
lowing passage of the Byrd amendment. 
Rhodesian chromite ore, however, never 
really recovered its share of the U.S. mar- 
ket. The Rhodesian Government turned in- 
stead to production of ferrochromium, which 
was exported to the United States in ever- 
increasing amounts beginning in 1972. 

Imports of ferrochromium from all sources 
have increased dramatically in the last sev- 
eral years as U.S. importers decreased de- 
mand for unprocessed chromite in favor of 
increased imports of finished ferrochromium. 
In 1975, imports of ferrochromium alloys 
reached an all-time high of 319,000 tons. By 
percentage of chromium content, U.S. im- 
ports in 1976 came from the following coun- 
tries: Rhodesia, 22 percent; South Africa, 32 



percent; Japan, 17 percent; and others, 29 
percent. 

Enactment of the Byrd amendment in 1971 
was opposed by the Nixon Administration, 
and in subsequent years the previous Admin- 
istration supported efforts to bring about its 
repeal. 

It has been and remains our view that 
Rhodesia cannot be considered a reliable 
supplier. Transportation routes for export of 
raw materials from Rhodesia have been cut 
off one by one until the only remaining possi- 
bility is the South African route. Insurgent 
actions pose a growing threat to operation of 
the mines, which if forced to shut down for 
even a temporary period could require 
months to get back into service due to flood- 
ing and cave-ins. 

Effects of Cutting Off Rhodesian Chrome 

Repeal of the Byrd amendment and the 
consequent cutting off of imports of Rhode- 
sian chrome will require some degree of 
readjustment by the United States and is 
likely to have some effect on prices. How- 
ever, our analysis indicates that dislocations 
should be relatively short term and can be 
largely overcome over a period of time. 

The first consequence of stopping the in- 
flow of chrome from Rhodesia will mean ma- 
terials will need to be found elsewhere. The 
prospects for finding other sources of mate- 
rial are good. While most of our chromium 
will continue to come from our regular major 
suppliers, including South Africa, the 
U.S.S.R., and the Philippines, there are 
other, smaller suppliers who could help fill 
the gap. These include India, Finland, 
Brazil, Turkey, and Albania. 

In addition, imports of greater quantities 
of lower grade ores are now usable due to the 
increasing use of the AOD process for pro- 
duction of steel. 

Finally, private stocks of chrome materials 
are large. The Bureau of Mines estimates 
400,000 tons are held in private stocks at the 
present time. This amount approximates six 
to nine months' consumption. 

In addition, the strategic and critical ma- 
terial stockpile contains the equivalent of 
3.82 million tons of metallurgical chromite 



February 28, 1977 



173 



ores in the form of ores and ferroalloys. Of 
this, 3.59 million tons are reserved to meet 
the needs of national security. A release of 
any portion of these strategic reserves dur- 
ing peacetime is permitted under existing 
legislation when the President determines 
that the release "is required for the pur- 
poses of common defense." Therefore such 
releases could only be used to support 
defense-related production requirements. 
The 0.23 million tons in excess of strategic 
needs could be made available to U.S. indus- 
try if the necessary legislation were enacted 
by Congress. 

Through the early 1960's prices of 
chromium remained fairly stable, took a 
jump in 1969-70 and followed a mixed course 
until 1975, when the representative price 
more than doubled, rising from $65 to $137 
per long ton. This price has held on through 
1976. The U.S.S.R. led off the rise in prices 
in 1975 and was quickly followed by the other 
producers. In effect the U.S.S.R. became the 
price leader. 

Cutting off Rhodesian chrome could put 
some pressure on prices. For a number of 
reasons, however, we believe that upward 
pressures are not likely to continue. 

Current prices are well in excess of costs 
of production, and producers who raise prices 
further risk further resort to substitution 
and economizing technologies and thus a 
long-term decline in demand. As I have al- 
ready explained, possibilities for utilization 
of lower grade material from countries other 
than Rhodesia made possible by the AOD 
technology will encourage production of 
chemical- and refractory-grade ores to com- 
pete with Russian and Rhodesian metallurgi- 
cal ores. 

I have stressed a number of economic rea- 
sons in support of U.S. backing of the U.N. 
economic sanctions against Rhodesia and re- 
peal of the Byrd amendment. The basic eco- 
nomic reason, however, is that such a move 
is a rational economic step looking forward to 
a time when majority African rule in 
Rhodesia will come about. A rapid and peace- 



ful transition in Rhodesia is in our long-term 
economic interests. Our current commerce 
with Rhodesia is perceived as an impediment 
to that transition. 

Finally, our economic interests do not stop 
in Rhodesia. The United States carries on a 
thriving and growing economic relationship 
with the other nations of black Africa both in 
trade and investment. By failing to repeal 
the Byrd amendment we jeopardize this rela- 
tionship. African countries are also an impor- 
tant source of supply for us for a whole range 
of strategic goods including petroleum, 
uranium, manganese, copper, cobalt, and 
diamonds, as well as the whole range of trop- 
ical products like coffee and cocoa. Our dis- 
regard of the U.N. sanctions has indeed 
placed American business at a disadvantage 
in its relationship with African countries in 
such areas as resource development, invest- 
ment, and export opportunities. 

I urge the committee to report S. 174 
favorably, and I recommend quick passage of 
the bill. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

Progress and Problems in Collecting Delinquent Inter- 
national Debts owed to the United States. Report by 
the House Committee on Government Operations. H. 
Kept. 94-1736. September 30, 1976, 15 pp. 

Foreign Palm Oil Development Loans. Report of the 
House Committee on Agriculture to accompany H. 
Res. 1399. H. Rept. 94-1747, Part 1. October 1, 1976. 
6 pp. 

Seizure of the Mayaguez, Part IV. Reports of the 
Comptroller General of the United States submitted 
to the Subcommittee on International Political and 
Military Affairs of the House Committee on Interna- 
tional Relations. October 4, 1976. 162 pp. 

Messages from the President of the United States 
transmitting governing international fishery agree- 
ments. Agreement with Romania; H. Doc. 95-34; 
January 10, 1977; 15 pp. Agreement with the German 
Democratic Republic: H. Doc. 95-35; January 10, 
1977: 14 pp. Agreement with the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics; H. Doc. 95-36; January 10, 1977; 
17 pp. Agreement with the Republic of China; H. 
Doc. 95-37; January 10, 1977; 12 pp. Agreement with 
Bulgaria; H. Doc. 95-46; January 17, 1977; 15 pp. 



174 



Department of State Bulletin 



Department Reviews Developments in International Fisheries Policy 



Statement by Rozanne L. Ridgway 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs ^ 



I welcome the opportunity to review de- 
velopments in international fisheries policy 
with you today. I and other representatives 
of the Department of State, in the months 
since the passage of the Fishery Conserva- 
tion and Management Act of 1976, have had 
frequent consultations with many members 
of the Congress individually and with mem- 
bers of appropriate congressional staffs. I 
know you are aware that I only recently have 
appeared before the Senate Committee on 
Commerce to discuss many of the issues 
which also are of interest to this subcommit- 
tee. 

I do not want merely to repeat what I have 
said before other committees concerning the 
implementation of the international aspects 
of the Fishery Conservation and Manage- 
ment Act. I would like instead to consider 
where we are going in international fisheries, 
both as a coastal fishing nation and a 
distant-water fishing nation, in a somewhat 
different framework. In doing so, Mr. 
Chairman [Senator Claiborne Pell], I will 
comment specifically on the status of our new 
bilateral agreements and the pressures that 
surround bringing all of the terms of the act, 
including its procedures, into force by March 
1. We would hope that nations which have 
signed agreements with us and which are 



'■ Made before the Subcommittee on Oceans and In- 
ternational Environment of the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations on Feb. 3. The complete transcript of 
the hearings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C. 20402. 



prepared to meet our new standards are in 
fact able to continue their fishing activities 
after March 1 where there are surpluses 
identified in appropriate management plans. 

We are, Mr. Chairman, a nation with both 
coastal and distant-water fishing concerns. 
The waters off our shores are home to a sig- 
nificant portion of the world's fisheries re- 
sources. We have had a long history of 
foreign fishing for those resources. There are 
reports of vessels from Europe coming into 
the waters of the North Atlantic off the coast 
of North America as early as 1517 or 1519 — 
history is not clear as to which. History is 
clear, however, on the fact that ever since 
the appearance of foreign fishing fleets off 
our coast, there has been a sense of frustra- 
tion among American fishermen about the 
challenge to their livelihood represented by 
foreign efforts. Those efforts have had a 
changing pattern throughout the years of our 
nation's history. 

The most recent element in the pattern 
was the rapid increase in the late 1950's and 
early 1960's, in the form of large mechanized 
foreign fleets off our coast. I believe most 
would agree that while foreign fishing has 
always been a part of our life, the arrival on 
the fishing grounds of modern technology 
gave a new dimension — a conservation 
dimension — to the challenge. The need to 
preserve opportunities for our own fishermen 
and protect our resources combined to make 
fisheries and rights of coastal states concern- 
ing fisheries resources off their coasts cen- 
tral to the negotiations toward a new law of 
the sea. The same needs led to the enactment 



February 28, 1977 



175 



of the Fishery Conservation and Manage- 
ment Act. 

I would note that in passing the act, Con- 
gress made clear its intention that the 
United States should continue to pursue its 
interests in the law of the sea negotiations, 
including its fisheries interests. We have 
done so, Mr. Chairman, and as you are aware 
from your own personal interest in this field, 
have sought a balanced regime which would 
give us the desired control over our coastal 
stocks, protect the interests of our distant- 
water fishermen, and provide for rational 
conservation and management of all fisheries 
resources. 

While most of the attention given to the 
act has been in the area of the protection of 
our coastal interests, the act also makes clear 
that the United States, as a matter of pohcy 
and law, intends to protect its interests off 
the coasts of other countries. 

These goals were very much on our minds 
as we embarked upon the international 
negotiations required by the passage of the 
act. We had to keep in mind that what we 
expected of others might be expected of us 
and that standards we set for others might 
become precedents for our own distant-water 
fisheries. Mr. Chairman, I believe this is also 
true in the area of domestic management of 
our fisheries resources. As we move to im- 
plement the technical elements of our man- 
agement regime, we have had to be conscious 
of the influence of our own decisions on deci- 
sions others will make regarding our inter- 
ests. 



Goals of International Negotiations 

Against this background, Mr. Chairman, I 
would like to outline for you and the commit- 
tee the status of the international negotia- 
tions we have undertaken since April 13, 
1976, pursuant to the act. In these negotia- 
tions our goals have been: 

— To obtain recognition of the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the United States over the 
fisheries conservation zone extending to 200 
miles off our coasts, over anadromous species 



of U.S. origin, and over the resources of the 
continental shelf; and, second, 

— To reach agreement on the principles 
and procedures by which the United States 
intends to be guided as it assumes jurisdic- 
tion over foreign fishing in that zone after 
March 1. 

We have, to date, signed governing inter- 
national fishery agreements with, as you 
enumerated in your opening statement, Mr. 
Chairman, Poland, the Republic of China, 
the German Democratic Republic, Romania, 
the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and the Republic 
of Korea. All of these agreements, with the 
exception of that concerning Korea, have 
been submitted for review by the Congress 
under the congressional oversight provisions 
of the act. We hope to submit the Korean 
agreement within a short time. The negotia- 
tions with Spain have been concluded, and 
we are in the process of setting a date for 
signature. 

Although there are some differences in 
language and in intei-nal organization from 
agreement to agreement, each agreement ac- 
complishes the recognition of our fisheries 
conservation zone. Each sets out the princi- 
ples and procedures by which foreign fishing, 
if any, will be permitted for the concerned 
country. 

Bilateral Negotiations in Progress 

Bilateral negotiations are still in progress 
with Japan, the European Economic Com- 
munity (EEC), and Canada. The negotiations 
with Japan concern our future fishing rela- 
tionship with one of our major allies. They 
have been continuing over several months. 
These negotiations have been complex and, 
since they involve important economic issues 
for both sides, protracted. These negotia- 
tions are now almost completed. 

Our negotiations with Canada are unique. 
Each of us has important fisheries off the 
coasts of the other. Both nations are in the 
process of implementing extended jurisdic- 
tion over fisheries. I have just returned from 
the latest round of negotiations with Canada. 



176 



Department of State Bulletin 



I and the head of the Canadian delegation are 
in the process of reviewing with our govern- 
ments the progress to date. 

Three member nations of the European 
Community have traditional fisheries off our 
coasts: the Federal Republic of Germany, 
France, and Italy. We have agreed to 
negotiate with the Community so long as it 
can assume the required binding obligations 
on its member states' behalf. The establish- 
ment by the EEC of its own 200-mile 
fisheries zone further complicates the 
negotiations because approximately 100 U.S. 
shrimp trawlers fish in waters off French 
Guiana which lie in that zone. We are meet- 
ing with EEC officials today to further dis- 
cuss outstanding issues that we would hope 
to have resolved in the time remaining. 

Mr. Chairman, at the time the Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act was 
passed, we had less than one year to bring 
into existence the agreements that acknowl- 
edge our fisheries jurisdiction and thus 
launch the complete restructuring of our re- 
lationship with the nations fishing off our 
coasts. I believe we come to you today with a 
record of accomplishment. With the excep- 
tion of the three negotiations to which I have 
referred, we have succeeded in meeting most 
of our international objectives. I believe the 
negotiations still in progress will be com- 
pleted soon. 

Problems of Transition Period 

As we have been moving in the interna- 
tional setting to bring the act into force, the 
Regional Management Councils and our col- 
leagues in the Department of Commerce 
have been moving toward the implementa- 
tion of the domestic features of the act. 
While they are doing so, the Department of 
State has a responsibility to advise them of 
the foreign policy implications of their work, 
including international fisheries policies and 
international oceans policies. Therefore I 
think it would be appropriate for me to indi- 
cate to you some of the concerns we are ex- 
pressing to them. 

Each country which has signed an agree- 



ment has accepted as fact that the United 
States will manage its resources responsibly 
and with due respect for the principles set 
forth in our law. This situation places a great 
responsibility on us and must be considered 
as we move to implement our new regime. 

We have some particular problems that re- 
late only to this transition period. The De- 
partment of State has agreed to accept appli- 
cations from countries that have signed 
agreements pending the completion of con- 
gressional oversight procedures related to 
the agreements themselves. Action by the 
Congress, however, to bring the agreements 
now lying before it into effect as soon as pos- 
sible would be of great practical importance. 
This could be done either by early congres- 
sional approval of the agreements or by a 
waiver of the oversight provisions for 
agreements signed before March 1. 

The steps taken to resolve the transition 
problem should also take into account the 
problem of how to treat countries with whom 
we are still negotiating. I am referring only 
to Japan and the European Economic Com- 
munity, as Canada is a special case. There is 
some feeling that we should set deadlines for 
the signature of the remaining agreements 
and subject any country that has not signed 
by that date to the full administrative proc- 
essing described in the law. Such a procedure 
could take several months after an agree- 
ment was signed. I can understand the sen- 
timent that lies behind such reasoning, but I 
would like to point out that in addition to 
scheduhng difficulties, unique considerations 
enter into these two negotiations. I believe 
that the negotiated acknowledgment of our 
jurisdiction is of special importance to us. We 
expect both of these negotiations to be com- 
pleted before March 1 and do not think we 
should close doors by setting arbitrary cutoff 
dates for signature. 

Other features of the act could create a 
situation during this transition period in 
which countries that have signed agree- 
ments, submitted applications for permits, 
and otherwise agreed to comply with all con- 
ditions and restrictions still will not have 
valid permits to fish on board by March 1, 



February 28, 1977 



177 



1977. These include the likelihood that Re- 
gional Councils will not have had enough 
time to complete their review of applications 
and the possibility that the fee schedule now 
under consideration will not have been com- 
pleted in time for other countries to complete 
arrangements for obtaining finances at a date 
very close to March 1. 

To forbid fishing, for these reasons, by 
vessels of countries that have entered into 
agreements with us in the expectation that 
the United States would be able to operate 
under the act by March 1 would place the 
United States in an unfortunate position. The 
Fishery Conservation and Management Act 
has put the United States in the lead in the 
move toward coastal-state jurisdiction over 
fisheries. Our act is the first of its kind, in- 
cluding as it does not only the simple exten- 
sion of jurisdiction but new machinery for the 
exercise of that jurisdiction. We are being 
closely watched by other nations as they also 
move toward extended jurisdiction and ex- 
pect the United States to provide the exam- 
ple. This poses an enormous challenge to us, 
Mr. Chairman, and one which I believe the 
United States can meet. 

If these problems are seen simply as com- 
plications associated with this first year 
rather than as challenges to the integrity of 
the act, some solutions become immediately 
apparent. I have already referred to possible 
ways to shorten the period of congressional 
oversight. We believe it also would be ap- 
propriate for this transition period to shorten 
the time provided for review of applications 
by the Councils. It would also be helpful if 
the question of payment for fisheries au- 
thorized for 1977 could be handled by allow- 
ing payment to take place after the issuance 
of the permits and the initiation of the 
fishery on March 1. 

Mr. Chairman, other witnesses are more 
expert on the details of these domestic man- 
agement features of the act than I. For my 
part, I would hope that I have made clear the 
commitment of the Department to carry out 
its role under the act and the necessity for all 
of us to pursue policies and practices in 
fisheries management which advance all of 
the interests engaged in what is known as in- 
ternational fisheries policy. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



United States and Canada Sign 
Transit Pipeline Treaty 

Press release 29 dated January 28 

The Canadian Ambassador to the United 
States, J. H. Warren, and Assistant Secre- 
tary for Economic and Business Affairs 
Julius L. Katz signed on January 28 an 
agreement between Canada and the United 
States concerning transit pipelines. (For 
text, see press release 29.) 

This treaty is another example of the broad 
cooperative energy relationship the United 
States has with Canada. It will facilitate and 
promote pipelines across the two countries 
carrying hydrocarbons to serve their energy 
needs. The treaty, which was initialed by 
chief negotiators in January 1976, would con- 
firm to both countries a regime of noninter- 
ference and nondiscrimination for transit 
pipelines carrying oil and natural gas des- 
tined for one country across the territory of 
the other. 

The agreement will not enter into force 
until ratification by both countries. 



United States and Japan Conclude 
New Fisheries Agreement 

Press release 47 dated February 10 

On February 10, 1977, representatives of 
the United States of America and the Gov- 
ernment of Japan concluded a new agreement 
relating to fishing activities of Japan off the 
coast of the United States. 

The agreement sets out the arrangements 
between the countries which will govern fish- 
ing by Japanese vessels within the fishery 
conservation zone of the United States be- 
ginning on March 1, 1977. The comprehen- 
sive agreement will come into force after the 
completion of internal procedures by both 



178 



Department of State Bulletin 



governments. The ceremony included an ex- 
change of notes covering 1977 and the initial- 
ing of a long-term agreement covering the 
period 1978-1982. 

The initialing and exchange of notes took 
place in Washington. Minister Seiya Nishida 
[of the Embassy of Japan] initialed for Japan. 
Rozanne L. Ridgway, Ambassador of the 
United States for Oceans and Fisheries Af- 
fairs, initialed for the United States. Both 
delegations expressed their satisfaction with 
the new accord and the hope that it will 
strengthen cooperation between Japan and 
the United States. 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Agriculture 

Agreement establishing the International Fund for Ag- 
ricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome June 
13, 1976.' 
Signature: Netherlands, February 4, 1977. 

Health 

Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the Constitution of 
the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as 
amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva 
May 22, 1973. 
Acceptances deposited: Iraq, January 28, 1977; 

Yemen (Aden), February 3, 1977. 
Entered into force: February 3, 1977. 

Load Lines 

International convention on load lines. Done at London 
April 5, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 1968. TIAS 
6331, 6629, 6720. 
Accession deposited: Indonesia, January 17, 1977. 

Property — Industrial 

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial 
property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at 
Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 en- 
tered into force May 19, 1970; for the United States 
August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 entered into 
force April 26, 1970; for the United States September 
5, 1970. TIAS 6923. 

Notification from World Intellectual Property Or- 
ganization that ratification deposited: Italy, 
January 24, 1977. 

Nice agreement concerning the international classifica- 
tion of goods and services for the purposes of the reg- 
istration of marks of June 15, 1957, as revised at 
Stockholm on July 14, 1967. Entered into force March 
18, 1970; for the" United States May 25, 1972. TIAS 
7419. 
Notification from World Intellectual Property Or- 



ganization that ratification deposited: Italy, 
January 24, 1977. 

Property — Intellectual 

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Prop- 
erty Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. 
Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United 
States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932. 
Ratification deposited: Italy, January 20, 1977. 
Accession deposited: Burundi, December 30, 1976. 

Telecommunications 

International telecommunication convention, with an- 
nexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos 
October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1975; 
for the United States April 7, 1976. 
Ratifications deposited: Brazil, November 30, 1976; 
Burma, November 15, 1976; Federal Republic of 
Germany, November 18, 1976;^ Sierra Leone, 
November 25, 1976; Vatican City, Zaire, December 
10, 1976. 
Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 1959, 
as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590, 7435), to 
establish a new frequency allotment plan for high- 
frequency radiotelephone coast stations, with an- 
nexes and final protocol. Done at Genevii June 8, 
1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976; for the 
United States April 21, 1976. 
Notification of approval: India, October 22, 1976. 



BILATERAL 

Australia 

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports of meat 
of Australian origin other than imports which are di- 
rect shipments or on a through bill of lading from 
Australia or foreign trade zones, territories, or pos- 
sessions of the United States. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Washington December 22 and 23, 1976. 
Entered into force December 23, 1976. 

Agreement relating to the launching of Aerobee sound- 
ing rockets for scientific investigations. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Canberra September 20, 1976, 
and January 14, 1977. Entered into force January 14, 
1977. 

Brazil 

Agreement extending the agreement of March 14, 1975 
(TIAS 8253), concerning shrimp. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Brasilia December 30, 1976. En- 
tered into force December 30, 1976. 

Republic of China 

Agreement modifying the agreement of May 21, 1975, 
as modified, relating to trade in cotton, wool, and 
man-made fiber textiles. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington February 3, 1977. Entered into 
force February 3, 1977. 

international Telecommunications Satellite 
Organization 

Headquarters agreement. Signed at Washington 
November 22 and 24, 1976. 
Entered into force: November 24, 1976. 



' Not in force. 

^ Applicable to Berlin (West). 



February 28, 1977 



179 



Japan 

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coast of the 
United States. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington February 10, 1977. Enters into force 
upon notification by the United States that its inter- 
nal procedures have been completed. 

New Zealand 

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports of meat 
of New Zealand origin other than imports which are 
direct shipments or on a through bill of lading from 
New Zealand or foreign trade zones, territories, or 
possessions of the United States. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Washington December 22 and 23, 
1976. Entered into force December 23, 1976. 

Romania 

Interim arrangement regarding trade in certain textile 
products. Effected by exchange of notes at Washing- 
ton January 17, 1977. Entered into force January 17, 
1977; effective January 1, 1977. 

Thailand 

Agreement modifying and continuing the agreements of 
December 23, 1960 (TIAS 4665), and April 1 and 25, 
1963 (TIAS 5340), relating to the SEATO Medical 
Research Project and the SEATO Clinical Research 
Centre. Effected by exchange of notes at Bangkok 
January 19 and 28," 1977. Enters into force July 1, 
1977. 



PUBLICATIONS 



1950 "Foreign Relations" Volume 
on East Asia and Pacific Released 

Press release 16 dated .January 19 (for release January 29) 

The Department of State on Januai'y 29 released 
"Foreign Relations of the United States," 1950, volume 
VI, "East Asia and the Pacific." The "Foreign Rela- 
tions" series has been published continuously since 1861 
as the official record of American foreign policy. 

This volume presents 1,581 pages of previously un- 
published documentation (much of it newly declassified) 
on multilateral and bilateral relations in the area. Con- 
siderable coverage is given to regional security ar- 
rangements and the extension of military and economic 
assistance to the nations of Southeast Asia. There is 
also extensive documentation on relations with Austra- 
lia, Burma, Indochina, Indonesia, Japan, the Philip- 
pines, and Thailand. The largest single collection of ma- 
terials deals with the China area, encompassing U.S. 
relations with the Republic of China and policy toward 
mainland China subsequent to the advent to power of 
the People's Republic of China, along with economic 



measures taken by the United States and United Na- 
tions following the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. The 
Korean war will be the subject of volume VII in the 
series, scheduled for release in 1977. 

"Foreign Relations," 1950, volume VI, was prepared 
in the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, 
Department of State. Volume II for 1950 has also been 
published, and five more volumes are in preparation. 
Copies of volume VI (Department of State publication 
8858; GPO Cat. No. Sl.l:950/v. VI) may be obtained for 
$16.00 (domestic postpaid). Checks or money orders 
should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents 
and should be sent to the U.S. Government Book Store, 
Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 



GPO Sales Publications 

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock 
number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 
A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more 
copies of any one publication mailed to the same ad- 
dress. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of 
Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shotvn be- 
low, which include domestic postage, are subject to 
change. 

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreign relations of each counti-y. Each contains a 
map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. 
diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A 
complete set of all Background Notes currently in 
stock — at least 140 — $21.80; 1-year subscription service 
for approximately 77 updated or new Notes — $23.10; 
plastic binder — $1.50.) Single copies of those listed 
below are available at 350 each. 

Austria Cat. No. SI. 123:AU7 

Pub. 7955 8 pp. 

Liechtenstein Cat. No. SI. 123:L62 

Pub. 8610 4 pp. 

Netherlands Antilles Cat. No. S1.123:N38/2 

Pub. 8223 4 pp. 

Your Trip Abroad. This pamphlet provides the Ameri- 
can tourist, business person, or student traveling 
abroad with basic information on official documents, vac- 
cinations, unusual travel requirements, dual nationality, 
drugs, modes of travel, customs, legal requirements 
abroad, and many other topics. Pub. 8872. Department 
and Foreign Service Series 155. 28 pp. 4.5C. (Cat. No. 
SI. 69:8872). 

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Fiji. TIAS 
8281. 9 pp. 35e. (Cat. No. S9.10:8281). 

Atomic Energy — Technical Information Exchange 
and Research and Development on Reactor Safety. 

Arrangement with Sweden. TIAS 8343. 6 pp. 350. (Cat. 
No. 89.10:8343). 

Atomic Energy — Technical Information Exchange 
and Development of Standards. Arrangement with 
France. TIAS 8345. 7 pp. 35C. (Cat No. 89.10:8345). 



180 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX February 28, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1966 



Africa. Secretary Vance Interviewed for the 
New York Times 162 

Arms Control and Disarmament 

President Carter's News Conference of February 
8 (excerpts) ". 157 

Secretary Vance Interviewed for tlie New York 
Times 162 

Brazil. Secretary Vance Interviewed for tiie 
New York Times 162 

Canada. United States and Canada Sign Transit 
Pipeline Treaty 178 

China. Secretary Vance Interviewed for tlie New 
York Times 162 

Congress 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy 174 

Department Reviews Developments in Interna- 
tional Fisheries Policy (Ridgway) 175 

Department Urges Passage of Bill To Halt Impor- 
tation of Rhodesian Chrome (Katz, Vance) 170 

Cuba. Secretary Vance Interviewed for the New 
York Times 162 

Economic Affairs 

Department Reviews Developments in Interna- 
tional Fisheries Policy (Ridgway) 175 

Department Urges Passage of Bill To Halt Im- 
portation of Rhodesian Chrome (Katz, Vance) . 170 

United States and Japan Conclude New Fisheries 
Agreement 178 

Energy. United States and Canada Sign Transit 
Pipeline Treaty 178 

Fisheries 

Department Reviews Developments in Interna- 
tional Fisheries Policy (Ridgway) 175 

United States and Japan Conclude New Fisheries 
Agreement 1 78 

Human Rights 

President Carter's News Conference of February 
8 (excerpts) 157 

Secretary Vance Interviewed for the New York 
Times 162 

Japan. United States and Japan Conclude New 
Fisheries Agreement 178 

Latin America. Secretary Vance Interviewed for 
the New York Times . ! 162 

Panama. Secretary Vance Interviewed for the 
New York Times 162 

Presidential Documents 

President Carter's News Conference of February 
8 (excerpts) 157 

President Carter's Report to the American 
People (excerpt) 161 

Publications 

GPO Sales Publications 180 

1950 "Foreign Relations" Volume on East Asia 
and Pacific Released 180 

Southern Rhodesia. Department Urges Passage 
of Bill To Halt Importation of Rhodesian 
Chrome (Katz, Vance) 170 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 179 

United States and Canada Sign Transit Pipeline 
Treaty 178 



United States and Japan Conclude New Fisheries 
Agreement 1 78 

U.S.S.R. 

President Carter's News Conference of February 
8 (excerpts) 157 

Soviet Journalist Expelled From the United 
States (Department announcement) 160 

U.S. Concerned at Treatment of Aleksandr 
Ginzburg (Department statement) 161 

Vietnam. Secretary Vance Interviewed for the 
New York Times 162 

Name Indent- 
Carter, President 157, 161 

Katz, .Julius L 170 

Ridgway, Rozanne L 175 

Vance, Secretary 162, 170 



Chec 


<list of Department of State 


Press Releases: February 7—13 


Press releases 


may be obtained from the Office 


of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash- | 


ingtor 


, D.C. 20520. 


No. 


Date 


Subject 


*39 


2/7 


Study group 1 of the U.S. Na- 
tional Committee of the Inter- 
national Telegraph and Tele- 
phone Consultative Commit- 
tee (CCITT), Mar. 2-3. 


*40 


2/7 


Secretary of State's Advisory 
Committee on Private Inter- 
national Law, Study Group on 
Agency, Chicago, Mar. 5. 


*41 


2/7 


Allard K. Lowenstein to head 
U.S. delegation to annual 
meeting of the U.N. Human 
Rights Commission, Feb. 
7-Mar. 11. 


42 


2/10 


Vance: Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations Subcommit- 
tee on African Affairs. 


43 


2/11 


Vance: interview for the New 
York Times. 


*44 


2/10 


U.S. and Hong Kong amend 
bilateral textile agreement, 
Dec. 22. 


*45 


2/10 


Shipping Coordinating Commit- 
tee (SCO, Subcommittee on 
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 
working group on ship design 
and equipment. Mar. 10. 


*46 


2/10 


sec, SOLAS, working group on 
ship design and equipment. 
Mar. 17-18. 


47 


2/10 


U.S. and Japan conclude new 
fisheries agreement. 


*48 


2/11 


Program for the official visit of 
President Jose Lopez Portillo 
of the United Mexican States. 


*49 


2/11 


Secretary of State's Advisory 
Committee on Private Inter- 
national Law, Mar. 26. 


* Not printed 


t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington, dc. 20402 



OFFICIAL BUSINESS 



postage and fees paid 
Department of State STA-501 

Third Class 




Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted 
service, please renew your subscription promptly 
when you receive the expiration notice from the 
Superintendent of Documents. Due to the time re- 
quired to process renewals, notices are sent out 3 
months in advance of the expiration date. Any prob- 
lems involving your subscription will receive im- 
mediate attention if you write to: Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



^ 



/'J: 



76. 



/767 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 

Volume LXXVI • No. 1967 • March 7, 1977 



VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE VISITS EUROPE AND JAPAN 
Remarks and News Conference 181 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN! 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington. D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 

domestic $42.50. foreign $53. 15 

Single copy 85 cents 

The Secretary of State has determined that the pub- 
lication of this periodical is necessary in the transac- 
tion of the public business required by law of this 
Department. Use of funds for printing this periodi- 
cal has been approved by the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget through January 31, 
1981. 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be re- 
printed. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The 
BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to 
Periodical Literature. 



Vol. LXXVI, No. 1967 
March 7, 1977 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by thi 
Office of Media Services, Bureau oi 
Public Affairs, provides the public am 
interested agencies of the governmenf 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 

The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, and 
news conferences of the President and 
the Secretary of State and other offi- 
cers of the Department, as well as spe- 
cial articles on various phases of in- 
ternational affairs and the functions of 
the Department. Information is in- 
cluded concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a party 
and on treaties of general interna- 
tional interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 



Vice President Mondale Visits Europe and Japan 



On behalf of President Carter, Vice Presi- 
dent Mondale departed Washington on 
January 23 to meet with leaders of Western 
Europe and Japan. His itinerary was Brus- 
sels (January 23-2Jt), Bonn (January 2Ji.-26), 
Berlin (January 26), Rome (January 26- 
27), Vatican City (Jayiuary 27), London 
(January 27-28), Paris (January 28-29), 
Keflavik (January 29), and Tokyo (January 
30-February 1). 

Following are remarks made by President 
Carter and Vice President Mondale before 
his departure, addresses and statements 
during his trip, and the transcript of his 
news conference held on February 2 after a 
meeting with President Carter. 



DEPARTURE, THE WHITE HOUSE, 
JANUARY 23 ' 



Remarks by President Carter 

I am very grateful to come this morning 
to have my last meeting with Vice President 
Mondale before he goes to Europe and to 
Japan. The early initiation of this very im- 
portant diplomatic trip and the fact that the 
Vice President himself is going shows the 
importance that our nation attaches to 
friendly relationships between ourselves and 
the seven nations specifically with whose 
leaders Senator Mondale — or Vice President 
Mondale now will be meeting. 

We also have arranged for him to meet 
with the leaders of the OECD [Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment], the NATO countries, and the Com- 



' Closing paragraphs omitted (text from Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents dated January 
31). 



mon Market countries of Europe. He'll be 
visiting Pope Paul and will be gone for ten 
days. This trip will not be limited in its 
scope. He'll be discussing both political and 
economic and military matters. 

We had a very thorough preparation for 
this trip with the members of the National 
Security Council yesterday morning. And 
for the last couple of weeks. Vice President 
Mondale and I have been preparing for this 
diplomatic venture. 

There are several things specifically that 
he will be addressing. One is the prepara- 
tion for a summit meeting that will likely 
occur later on this spring, which will not it- 
self be limited to economic matters. He'll be 
discussing the importance that we attach to 
the limitation of proliferation of the capabil- 
ity for atomic weapons. 

He'll be discussing future substantive 
changes that we hope will improve the 
strength of NATO and our own friendly and 
close relationships with our natural allies 
and friends in both Europe and Japan. 

Vice President Mondale has my complete 
confidence. He is a personal representative 
of mine, and I'm sure that his consultation 
with the leaders of these nations will make 
it much easier for our country to deal di- 
rectly with them on substantive matters in 
the future. 

I'm going to miss him. I know that I'll be 
looking forward to ten days from now when 
he returns with a good report. And this is 
one of the best things, I think, that I could 
have possibly done as a new President, to 
show the strength and purpose of our own 
nation and our commitment to carry out the 
obligations that we have as a leader in the 
world community. 

So, Fritz, good luck. Don't get too much 
rest, and we'll see you when you get back. 



March 7, 1977 



181 



Remarks by Vice President Mondale 

Thank you very much, Mr. President. 

I understand that this trip is a historic 
first. To have a Vice President leave on a 
diplomatic mission this quickly after 
inauguration — on a diplomatic mission of this 
kind — is unprecedented in American history. 
And the reason for the trip is to demon- 
strate immediately and dramatically the 
high level of importance that the Carter 
Administration places on high-level continu- 
ous cooperative relationships with our tradi- 
tional allies and friends. 

The many problems that we face they also 
face. The problems of inflation, unemploy- 
ment, nuclear proliferation, control of ar- 
maments, the relationships between our 
nations and the poorer nations of the world, 
and many other issues are issues which we 
face together. And it's essential at the very 
moment of beginning that the cooperative 
relationship be established in a way that 
permits us to move ahead quickly, effec- 
tively, and cooperatively. 

I look forward to this trip, and I wish to 
thank the President for his confidence in 
me. 



ADDRESS TO NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, 
BRUSSELS, JANUARY 24 

In behalf of President Carter, I have come 
today to NATO Headquarters as a matter of 
the first priority. I have come to convey to 
you and the member governments of the 
North Atlantic alliance: 

— The President's most sincere greetings; 

— His commitment, and the full commit- 
ment of the United States, to the North At- 
lantic alliance as a vital part of our deep and 
enduring relations with Canada and Western 
Europe; and 

— His dedication to improving cooperation 
and consultations with our oldest friends so 
as to safeguard our peoples and to promote 
our common efforts and concerns. 

The President's conviction concerning 
NATO's central role is deep rooted and firm. 



As he stated in his message to the NATO 
Ministers last month: ^ 

Our NATO alliance lies at the heart of the partner- 
ship between North America and Western Europe. 
NATO is the essential instrument for enhancing our 
collective security. The American commitment to 
maintaining the NATO alliance shall be sustained and 
strengthened under my Administration. 

This statement of renewed American 
commitment comes at a time of great prom- 
ise in our country. We are a young 
Administration — some 90 hours old. We 
have come to office following a long period 
of difficulty in the United States, and of 
doubt among friends about our will and 
steadfastness. But this has also been a time 
of promising change in America, just as in 
Europe and elsewhere in the world. As 
President Carter said in his inaugural ad- 
dress, "The world itself now is dominated by 
a new spirit." 

I share his belief that in the United States 
"there is evident a serious and purposeful 
rekindling of confidence." There is a new 
understanding of our society and apprecia- 
tion of our recognized limits. But there is 
also a new faith in the strength of our demo- 
cratic system of government, a new willing- 
ness to meet challenges and continuing 
responsibilities abroad. Some of these chal- 
lenges are unfamiliar to us all — as the wind 
of change has transformed so much of the 
world. We are ready to play our role in 
meeting these challenges. But we believe 
the requirement for leadership and creativ- 
ity also falls upon our friends and allies in 
Europe, Japan, and elsewhere. 

I share the confidence of President Carter 
that, together, we will be equal to the tasks 
of the future as we have met those in the 
past. To this end, the United States is 
wholeheartedly dedicated: 

— To the security, prosperity, and well- 
being of our people and of our allies; 

— To "eternal vigilance" in preserving 
peace; and 

— To promoting human values and human 
dignity for people everywhere. 



^ For te.xt, see Bulletin of Jan. 3, 1977, p. 9. 



182 



Department of State Bulletin 



In cooperation with our friends abroad, 
President Carter is proceeding immediately 
with steps to strengthen the American econ- 
omy. He is proceeding with steps which will 
enable the United States to help meet the ex- 
traordinai-y energy challenge facing all our 
countries. He is giving priority attention to the 
agenda of vital economic and political issues 
before the industrialized nations of the 
West — in Europe, North America, and Japan. 
And President Carter is deeply conscious of 
the aspirations of people in the world's de- 
veloping nations and of the need for all of us to 
seek new and cooperative relations with these 
countries. 

President Carter takes office at a time when 
we have moved from the rigid period of the 
cold war into a period of expanded contact and 
greater potential for accommodation — for 
mutual benefit — with potential adversaries in 
particular but still Hmited areas. It is now pos- 
sible to talk, where befoi'e it was only possible 
to confront one another in deadly and undi- 
minished hostility. And it is imperative that 
we continue this dialogue, ever seeking to ex- 
pand its depth and compass, yet fully consist- 
ent with Western interests. 

At the same time, the President and his 
Administration are vitally aware of the con- 
tinuing growth in Soviet military power and 
the uncertainties that lie ahead with inevitable 
changes in Soviet leadership in the years to 
come. The growth of Soviet military power 
makes us keenly aware of the need for the 
NATO alliance to modernize and improve its 
defenses — not for the sake of military power 
itself but, rather, for a more fundamental rea- 
son. This reason is stated in the North Atlantic 
Treaty: that we are determined to safeguard 
the freedom, the common heritage, and the 
civilization of our peoples, founded on the prin- 
ciples of democracy, individual liberty, justice, 
and the rule of law. 

As President Carter said in his inaugural 
address about our own country: 

We are a strong nation, and we will maintain strength 
so sufficient that it need not be proven in combat — a 
quiet strength based not merely on the size of an arsenal 
but on the nobility of ideas. 

The Atlantic alliance has successfully with- 



stood repeated testing for more than a quarter 
century. And as President Carter begins his 
Administration, we mark another milestone in 
U.S.-European relations — the 30th anniversary 
of the Marshall plan. Today, as we look back on 
how much we have done together, it is fitting to 
recall what Secretary of State Marshall said at 
Harvard in June 1947: 

Our policy is directed not against any country or doc- 
trine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and 
chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working 
economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of 
political and social conditions in which free institutions 
can exist. 

And this concern with basic values still 
motivates us today. 

Mr. Secretary General, members of the 
Council, 30 years ago the United States en- 
tered into a firm commitment to enduring in- 
volvement on this continent — as vital to both 
the United States and Europe and as reflecting 
shared political and human values. President 
Carter has asked me personally to convey to 
you that the American commitment remains 
firm and undiminished. 

In support of our close ties with our NATO 
allies — our commitment to allied defense — 
President Carter is determined to maintain 
fully effective defense forces in Europe. As 
you are well aware, we are determined to re- 
duce waste and inefficiency in the U.S. defense 
budget. But he has asked me to inform you 
that his new budget and these efficiencies will 
not result in any decrease in planned invest- 
ment in NATO defense — and these plans in- 
volve some growth. 

Before I left Washington, President Carter 
emphasized to me his deep concern about 
NATO's defense. He told me that he is pre- 
pared to consider increased U.S. investment in 
NATO's defense. In turn, we look to America's 
alHes to join with us in improving NATO's de- 
fense forces to the limit of individual abihties, 
to provide a defense fully adequate to our 
needs. Of course, economic and social problems 
make a strong claim on our resources — no less 
so in the United States than in Europe. And in 
a time of detente, it is easy to lose sight of the 
need for adequate defense. But this need is 
inescapable. It demands continuing efforts in 
common. 



March 7, 1977 



183 



The alliance as a whole must take into ac- 
count the growth in Soviet military power and 
together agree on the appropriate response. In 
improving our defense forces, we must re- 
double our efforts to standardize weapons, 
rationalize our military posture, increase effi- 
ciency, and improve reinforcement capability. 
We must place greater emphasis on improved 
force readiness. And as an alHance, we cannot 
accept reductions in NATO defense 
capabilities except through negotiations with 
the Warsaw Pact — negotiations fully securing 
allied interests and leading to a more stable 
military balance. 

Negotiations on force levels in Europe — 
MBFR [mutual and balanced force reduc- 
tions] — must move forward with the closest 
attention paid to the interests of each member 
state and as a clear expression of common and 
agreed positions. 

Furthermore, President Carter is com- 
mitted to an early resumption of the Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks, looking toward 
another step this year in the effort to end the 
strategic arms race with the Soviet Union. He 
has publicly stated that thi'ee basic principles 
will guide him in this effort: 

— He will pursue arms control agreements in 
the best interests of the United States, the al- 
liance, and world peace; 

— He will insist on no less than equivalent 
advantage for the West in any agreement; and 

— He will strengthen consultations and 
cooperation with America's natural friends and 
allies throughout the negotiating process. 

The President has asked me today to affirm 
again his intention to consult closely with our 
NATO allies before the Strategic Arms Lim- 
itation Talks are resumed. He also looks for- 
ward to working in closest cooperation with 
you on MBFR. And while the new Administra- 
tion is undertaking a careful review of these 
negotiations, we anticipate no early change in 
U.S. proposals to our alhes concerning the al- 
lied position at the force reduction talks. 

At the same time the President has asked 
me to express to you his desire for closest pos- 
sible consultations on the implementation of 
the Final Act of the Conference on Security 



and Cooperation in Europe — and on looking to 
the future. Both seeking the full implementa- 
tion of the Helsinki agreement and searching 
for further ways to improve security and coop- 
eration in Europe are vital to the possibilities 
for productive discussions at the forthcoming 
review conference in Belgrade. But both de- 
pend on Western unity and on the success of 
our efforts to work together — both in NATO 
and in other forums — in the months before 
Belgrade. As President Carter said in his in- 
augural address: "Because we are free we can 
never be indifferent to the fate of freedom 
elsewhere." 

The issues that I have discussed so far relate 
directly to our security in the immediate area 
covered by the alliance and to the future of our 
cooperative relations together. Yet while the 
NATO alliance provides each of our nations 
with the blessings of peace and security in the 
North Atlantic, tension and conflict in some 
other parts of the world involving economic 
and political as well as military issues can ad- 
versely affect our common security. 

President Carter and Secretary of State 
Vance are turning early attention to other 
areas of vital concern: in the Middle East, in 
southern Africa, in Cyprus, and regarding 
both the sale of conventional arms and efforts 
to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. On 
these issues, the President looks forward to 
working closely with our friends and allies in 
Western Europe. 

Mr. Secretary General, members of the 
council, we do not live in easy times. But they 
are hopeful times, as well. This is a period of 
historic opportunity. All Americans look to the 
future confident in the belief that — with vi- 
sion, hard work, and firm unity of purpose — 
our association of free peoples will continue to 
provide the security and cooperation vital to us 
all. 

This association goes beyond NATO itself. 
For the strength and vitahty of the NATO al- 
liance is only one task facing all of us. As we 
seek to promote and strengthen our security in 
the broadest sense, we must also use effec- 
tively those other forums we have to resolve 
the great economic and other issues facing our 
nations and peoples. And we must work with 
those countries facing economic difficulty and 



184 



Department of State Bulletin 



support nations in Europe seeking to rebuild 
or strengthen democratic institutions. 

Together, we share many strengths. Ours is 
an alliance of democratic governments, of 
economies which have provided an unprece- 
dented abundance, of energetic and imagina- 
tive peoples. Our countries are part of a great 
civilization of high moral purpose, deep 
human values, and a shared commitment to 
justice and compassion. Our societies are resil- 
ient and flexible, and thanks to NATO, we have 
a strong common defense. 

President Carter and his Administration are 
dedicated not only to preserving these 
strengths and virtues but also to building on 
them in the years ahead. This is his basic mes- 
sage to you and to your countries. I hope my 
visit here will also enable me to convey to the 
President your thoughts and your concerns. 
For these will be of great value to us in Wash- 
ington as we shape our own policies and pro- 
grams. I look forward to hearing your 
comments. 

Years ago, Jean Monnet, the father of 
Europe, spoke eloquently on the problem fac- 
ing us: "Europe and America," he said, "must 
acknowledge that neither of us is defending a 
particular country, that we are all defending 
our common civilization." We have acknowl- 
edged that basic truth, and it will bind us ever 
closer together in the years to come. 



NEWS CONFERENCE OPENING STATEMENT, 
BRUSSELS, JANUARY 24 

I have had a very useful and productive day 
in Brussels today, meeting first with Prime 
Minister Tindemans and members of his 
Cabinet, with Secretary Luns [Joseph Luns, 
Secretary General of NATO] and the North 
Atlantic Council, with General Haig [Alexan- 
der M. Haig, Jr., Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe], Mr. Jenkins [Roy Harris Jenkins, 
President of the European Commission] and 
members of the European Commission. And 
during the course of these talks we have dealt 
with a whole range of issues including 
economic problems of unemployment and in- 
flation, the difficulties surrounding the mul- 
tilateral trade negotiations, monetary prob- 



lems, balance-of-payments problems, and the 
rest. We have had wide-ranging discussions on 
our energy program which we hope to an- 
nounce by April, the creation of the new De- 
partment of Energy under Mr. [James] 
Schlesinger. 

We have talked about security matters, 
East-West matters. We have discussed the re- 
lationship of developed countries in the con- 
text of the so-called North-South dialogue. We 
have briefly discussed issues such as the Mid- 
dle East and Cyprus. And as a result of these 
conversations we have been able to develop 
agreements on consultations which will lead 
toward closer consultation and coordination 
between the poHcies of the United States and 
the governments and organizations with whom 
we have been talking. 

The purpose of this trip is to demonstrate 
the need for and begin the closest coordination 
and cooperation with our traditional alHes and 
friends. This first day's visit convinces me that 
the trip is important, it is timely, it is going to 
be very useful; and I come away from this first 
day's visits convinced that we are in a good po- 
sition to develop the kind of relationship that 
will permit us to do a much better job of solving 
our problems. 



NEWS CONFERENCE OPENING STATEMENT 
BONN, JANUARY 25 ^ 

I am delighted to be here today and particu- 
larly to report that the President's objective of 
establishing immediately close and warm and 
cooperative discussions with our traditional 
friends and allies is being achieved in the full- 
est sense of the word. 

Today the Chancellor and I had a chance to 
discuss a whole range of issues. The discussion 
was very useful, very helpful, and begins our 
relationships with the new Government of the 
United States and the Government of Ger- 
many on the best possible basis. I will return 
to the United States and report to the Presi- 
dent of this very warm and useful discussion. 
And it bodes well for the coordination of our 



^ Made at a joint news conference held by Vice Presi- 
dent Mondale and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. 



March 7, 1977 



185 



two nations in dealing with the vast range of 
concerns that affect our people, that affect the 
people all over the world. 

In the course of our discussion we dealt with 
economic concerns, the need to stimulate our 
economies in a prudent way in order to in- 
crease employment, in order to increase the 
amount to the extent of international economic 
activity. We talked about the need particularly 
for the three strongest economies in the 
world — the United States, Germany, and 
Japan — to proceed cooperatively and share the 
burden of stimulating the international econ- 
omy as the result of the activities of our sepa- 
rate economies. We talked about the need, and 
we agreed on the need, to gain new momentum 
in the multilateral trade negotiations, the so- 
called GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade] talks, to resolve differences that 
are in the way of our jointly shared hopes for 
an open international economy. We discussed 
the expected summit conference, questions of 
timing and location and agenda. 

We discussed the issue of nonprolife ration, 
and on that had an excellent exchange and 
agreed to consult further and in a cooperative 
frame of mind; and prospects for a cooperative 
solution are much enhanced by this discussion. 

We briefly discussed the Middle East and 
the need for progress and the need for the new 
Administration to have time through the 
Vance mission to visit the leadership of the 
various Middle Eastern nations to develop a 
fuller understanding of what steps should be 
taken there: and it is also of importance to us 
that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. 
Genscher, will also be visiting these same na- 
tions at about the same time as Secretary 
Vance, opening further opportunities for coop- 
eration in that area. We briefly discussed the 
very favorable developments in Portugal and 
Spain. And we discussed our shared hopes that 
something could be done in a cooperative way, 
in a multinational way, to restrain the sale of 
conventional armaments that is now — which are 
now being sold in such abundance around the 
world. 

These are some of the issues we discussed. 
May I say, Mr. Chancellor, how much I deeply 
appreciate your warmth and your candor and 
the spirit with which you carried out these 
talks. 

186 



ADDRESS AT CITY HALL, BERLIN, 
JANUARY 26 ■* 

President Carter has asked me to come to 
Europe for early consultations with our allies, 
to begin the process of close cooperation on the 
common agenda. 

High on that agenda are measures aimed at 
reducing tensions between East and West and 
assuring our security. 

Preserving the status of Berlin and assuring 
its future are central to these objectives. 

Our President, Mr. Carter, visited Berlin 
four years ago and has the fondest memories 
of this great city. He knows firsthand of your 
determination to be free. 

In the words of his inaugural address, "Be- 
cause we are free we can never be indifferent 
to the fate of freedom elsewhere." 

I am here, barely hours after our new gov- 
ernment has assumed office, in his behalf to 
assure you that U.S. policy is based on our full 
support for your city — a policy that guaran- 
tees, with our allies, your freedom and security. 

Maintaining our responsibility to Berlin 
means, first of all, that we will leave no doubt 
that the United States stands by its commit- 
ment to use whatever means may be necessary 
to resist any attempt to undermine the free- 
dom of the city. The continued presence of 
American troops, along with those of our 
British and French allies, is Hving proof of our 
will to honor that commitment. 

Fortunately, the survival of Berlin is not 
now in question. What I see today is a rich and 
a vibrant city increasingly sure of its unique 
place in the world and determined to demon- 
strate how a free people can succeed, whatever 
the challenge placed before them. 

And the President has asked me to convey to 
you his determination that the United States 
will not only fulfill its promise to see that 
Berlin survives but also to go further to help 
this city and its residents flourish as an im- 
portant part of the Western world. 

For Berlin is a part of the Western world. 
Its place is assured through its close ties with 
the Federal Republic of Germany and through 



^ Opening paragraphs are not printed here. 

Department of State Bulletin 



its participation in the activities of the Euro- 
pean Community. 

And Berlin is more than that. As a vital part 
of the West, the people of Berlin are deeply 
involved in the common efforts we are making 
to meet the challenges we all face in the mod- 
ern world. Your city is involved in answers to 
the great economic and other issues facing 
people elsewhere. 

Berhners contribute in a meaningful way to 
solving these issues through their full partici- 
pation in the work of international organiza- 
tions. Through your famous hospitality and 
incomparable congress facilities, you are mak- 
ing West Berlin an international 
meetingplace, a center for the meeting of 
minds and peoples. 

Our promise to Berlin assures your con- 
tinued involvement in this process. Equally 
important, we seek to insure the inclusion of 
Berlin in broader efforts to reduce tensions be- 
tween East and West. More than once during 
the past 30 years, East and West have gone to 
the brink of war over tensions first manifested 
in this city. 

Today, when major efforts are underway to 
reduce the tensions which have so long divided 
East from West, confrontation over Berlin 
must be put firmly and forever in the past. 

The President is committed to continuing ef- 
forts to lower the danger of conflict in Europe. 
No other city in the world stands to benefit 
more from these efforts than Berlin. 

At the same time, unless Berhners are given 
an opportunity to benefit fully from improve- 
ments in East-West relations, progress toward 
a further reduction of tensions will be more 
difficult. 

Three basic principles are vital: 

— First, stability of the situation in Berhn 
requires continued respect for the Four Power 
rights and responsibilities for Berlin as a 
whole. These rights and responsibilities 
formed the legal basis for the quadripartite 
agreement of 1971 and were reaffirmed in that 
agreement. Any questioning of this important 
legal basis and any unilateral attempt to alter 
the Four Power status of the city would not be 
in accordance with the quadripartite agree- 
ment and would vastly complicate efforts to 
reduce tensions. 



— Second, it is essential to recognize the 
kind of future the people of this great city 
want. In the exercise of their right of free ex- 
pression, Berliners have chosen freely and 
consciously to be a part of the West. They have 
clearly shown their desire to maintain and de- 
velop their ties with the Federal Republic. 
Only an approach to the situation in Berhn 
which accepts these basic desires of Berliners 
themselves can aid in the reduction of ten- 
sions. 

— Finally, the essential balance which gov- 
erns the situation in Berhn is reflected in the 
quadripartite agreement. This agreement has 
brought important benefits both to Berlin and 
to efforts toward peace throughout Europe. 
The President firmly believes and will con- 
tinue to insist that this agreement be strictly 
observed and fully implemented by all con- 
cerned parties. 

Mr. Governing Mayor, Foreign Minister 
Genscher, distinguished guests, as I sign the 
Golden Book I am aware that there are no 
fewer than 16 million American signatures in 
this City Hall and that, in the steeple above 
it, there stands the Freedom Bell given to 
Berlin by these same Americans. I am hon- 
ored to join so many other Americans in salut- 
ing this great city. President Carter and his 
Administration are dedicated to insuring that 
the Freedom Bell will continue to ring proudly 
in the years to come. 



STATEMENT, ROME, JANUARY 26 ^ 

I am delighted and pleased by the very fine 
talks that we've had today continuing on ear- 
her discussions which we had when you visited 
our capital in Washington last December. I 
come to this meeting bringing the warmest 
greetings and best wishes of our new Presi- 
dent, Mr. Carter, to Mr. Andreotti and to his 
government. Today we discussed a range of 
concerns which we mutually share. 

First of all, in the economic area, we were 
able to report on the economic pohcies of my 
government designed to stimulate the Ameri- 



^ Made following a meeting with Prime Minister Giulio 
Andreotti, whose remarks are not printed here. 



March 7, 1977 



187 



can economy in a prudent way but in a way 
designed to increase international economic 
activity and thus improve the economic oppor- 
tunities and employment opportunities of 
economies around the world and on our talks 
with leaders of other nations whose economies 
are in a strong position and which we have 
been urging to pursue similar policies of stimu- 
lation designed to achieve the same objective 
for improvement in the pace of international 
economic activity. 

The Italian economy, of course, faces serious 
difficulties. Some of these are external, caused 
by the world economic slump and by the rise in 
oil prices. President Carter, as I have men- 
tioned, has introduced an expansionary pro- 
gram to help stimulate the world economy, and 
on my trip I have been encouraging the other 
strong economies of the world to expand their 
economic activity in parallel. These measures 
will help Italy, but Italy also has internal eco- 
nomic difficulties; we have had a full report 
today of the measures that the Italian Gov- 
ernment has been taking and has decided to 
take and of the discussions between the unions 
and the business organizations, and we have 
been greatly encouraged by them. 

We know that negotiations with the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund are currently taking 
place, and we look forward to a successful con- 
clusion to those negotiations on terms that are 
satisfactory to all concerned. We are of course 
not a direct pail of those negotiations, but we 
hope and trust they will produce satisfactory 
results. In the meantime, we hope to produce 
through our own economies and through en- 
couraging cooperative efforts by others a more 
stimulative international economy. 

We also discussed the matter of the upcom- 
ing summit — its timing, proposals concerning 
location, and items that are suggested for the 
agenda. We discussed the GATT and the mul- 
tilateral trade negotiations and our wish that 
those negotiations move forward as quickly as 
possible. I strongly represented the Presi- 
dent's hope that we could make progress on the 
nonproliferation of nuclear armaments and on 
the issue of proliferation of the capacity for 
producing weapons-grade materials, and our 
hope that the arms-producing nations of the 
world — including my own — could cooperate 



toward a program of substantially reducing the 
sale of conventional arms around the world. 
We also briefly discussed the so-called North- 
South dialogue issues, which are of great im- 
portance to all of us. 

We of course went into substantial detail on 
the proposals and on the actions of the Gov- 
ernment of Italy to deal with some of the eco- 
nomic problems that we've discussed. This has 
been a very fruitful beginning of what we hope 
will be a long and consistent cooperation be- 
tween your government and mine, between 
our leaders, and through the various multilat- 
eral organizations to which we both belong. 

I am most grateful to you, Mr. Andreotti, 
and I look forward to continuing this dialogue. 

NEWS CONFERENCE OPENING STATEMENT, 
LONDON, JANUARY 27 » 

May I say that we are delighted to be here. 
The President of the United States asked me 
to visit London early, in order to make clear 
and to express our hope for the warmest possi- 
ble working relationship in the years ahead. 
And our meeting today certainly leaves no 
doubt in my mind that that kind of cooperative, 
mutually respectful, mutually beneficial rela- 
tionship has been established and will con- 
tinue. . . . 

We discussed many of the issues to which 
the Prime Minister has made reference. The 
economic issue, of course, is one that is central 
to the whole world, and it is important that we 
develop economic policies together which deal 
with the twin problems of unemployment and 
inflation, which deal with the specialized prob- 
lems of trade; and at our conference I ex- 
pressed the hope, at which the British lead- 
ership agreed, that we might move the 
multilateral trade negotiations talks along fas- 
ter than they are now proceeding. We did dis- 
cuss issues of the so-called North-South 
dialogue. 

We also discussed the issue of the Rhodesian 
matter, and may I say here that my govern- 
ment is exceedingly grateful to the Prime 



^ Made at a joint news conference held by Vice Presi- 
dent Mondale and Prime Minister James Callaghan. 



188 



Department of State Bulletin 



Minister and to the leadership being provided 
by the British Government in that very, very 
difficult situation. And we stand fully behind 
your government in the difficult task that you 
have undertaken to try to find a reasonable 
solution in that area. 

We also discussed some security matters and 
other matters, and I did bring some private 
messages from the President that I do not feel 
at hberty to disclose here. 

NEWS CONFERENCE OPENING STATEMENT, 
PARIS, JANUARY 29 

We just completed a very useful and produc- 
tive conference with President Giscard, Prime 
Minister Barre, the Foreign Minister, and the 
Secretary General of the Elysee. I brought to 
the President the best wishes of the President 
of the United States, Mr. Carter. 

We discussed several common concerns, 
among them the general economic picture in 
the world. We described in some detail the 
economic package just introduced by President 
Carter to stimulate the economy of the United 
States and to do so in a way that would bring 
increased trade opportunities and economic ac- 
tivities for employment for economies around 
the world. We discussed the upcoming summit, 
including suggestions concerning location, 
agenda, and timing. 

We discussed the Middle East. As you know. 
President Giscard has just returned from a 
visit to the Middle East, where he has talked 
to leaders of some of those nations; and he was 
able to give us a current briefing of his esti- 
mate of the situation there. 

We discussed briefly security matters. I re- 
viewed for him the comments that we had 
made earlier this week in Brussels before the 
NATO Council. 

We discussed North-South issues and their 
concern, which we share, that there be mean- 
ingful talks in the CIEC Conference [Confer- 
ence on International Economic Cooperation] 
and elsewhere leading to a more fruitful 
dialogue between the developed nations and 
the other nations of the world. 

They showed great interest in our upcoming 
energy programs, and I was able to report that 
the United States is preparing to establish a 



Department of Energy under the secre- 
taryship of Mr. Schlesinger and that we were 
going to accelerate the rate of the accumula- 
tion of oil stockpiles under our new program, 
that we intended to have a more far- 
reaching — a substantially more far- 
reaching — program for energy conservation 
and energy production, and that we hoped to 
substantially increase the extent of coopera- 
tion in research and development on an inter- 
national basis on all aspects of the energy 
problem. 

We discussed the problem of terrorism and 
the threat it poses to all countries. We raised 
that issue in a constructive spirit and ex- 
changed views. We pointed out that our most 
recent concerns were based not only on our 
broad concern for the problem of terrorism but 
also because one of our Ambassadors was 
killed in an effort by the Black September or- 
ganization to free this individual from jail in 
the Middle East. 

We discussed strategic issues; and I pointed 
out that the President's recent statements 
concerning the elimination of nuclear weapons 
and a comprehensive test ban repeated 
pledges that he had made during the campaign, 
that they represent long-term objectives of the 
United States and do not reflect a change in 
our strategy of deterrence. They are not aimed 
at any country. And one of the purposes of my 
consultation hei-e so soon after coming into of- 
fice is to consult with France and our other 
alHes about the implications of moving in this 
direction and how these might affect their con- 
cerns and interests. We also mentioned the 
President's concern for restricting and reduc- 
ing the level of sale of conventional armaments 
in international trade, an objective which the 
French Government shares. 

Mr. Giscard raised the issue of the Concorde 
and gave us their view of Concorde landing at 
Kennedy Airport. We indicated our sensitivity 
to their concerns, and I will be conveying his 
message to the President of the United States. 
I pointed out that this matter is now currently 
before the courts in New York, with a decision 
expected sometime in the near future. As you 
know, the Carter Administration has reaf- 
firmed its intention to continue with the full 
trial period for the Concorde at Dulles Airport. 



March 7, 1977 



189 



Within a few hours we will be leaving for 
Iceland, where we will be meeting with Prime 
Minister Hallgrimsson, and then for Japan, 
where we will be meeting with Prime Minister 
Fukuda and other members of the Japanese 
Government. There we will be talking about 
many of the same concerns which have been 
central to the discussions with the leaders of 
Western Europe. 

I think we can say at this point that the trip 
has been extremely well received. I am very, 
very pleased by the outcome of our talks. The 
personal relationships that exist simply could 
not be better than they are today. We estab- 
lished beyond any doubt a full desire on all 
sides to continue the fullest possible consulta- 
tion and cooperation along the agenda which 
we have been discussing. We have gone far 
toward developing a consensus on the key mat- 
ters that will be involved at the summit; and 
we have commenced a crucial preparatory 
work that is a precondition of a successful 
summit by our visits to the various multilat- 
eral institutions in Europe — NATO, EC, and 
the OECD. We have helped express and 
dramatize the interest of our nation in the 
closest possible cooperation with those mul- 
tilateral institutions. 

I think the dialogue and the understanding 
concerning economic problems — our view of 
those economic problems, the need for stimula- 
tion on the part of the stronger economies, the 
need for the closest possible cooperation in 
order to deal with the combined problems of 
unemployment and inflation — have been 
moved along very successfully. Our view and 
theirs that the multilateral trade talks should 
be resumed at a higher level of progress have 
been well received by all parties. 

We were particularly appreciative of the 
French statement on nuclear proliferation of a 
few weeks ago, which we consider to be a very 
helpful contribution to the serious problem of 
controlling nuclear fuel that is of weapons- 
grade quality. We think that the progress on 
understanding the American position and thus 
cooperating on the security concern through 
NATO in Western Europe has now been very 
well advanced, and great progress has been 
made there. 

And, in short, the dialogue and the relation- 
ships crucial to that dialogue on the central is- 



sues affecting all of our nations have now been 
established between the governments and the 
multilateral institutions we visited in Europe 
and our new government in the United States. 
And for all of these reasons we believe that 
this trip has been a success and we are now on 
a sound basis for progress. 



NEWS CONFERENCE OPENING STATEMENT, 
TOKYO, FEBRUARY 1 

I have just concluded two days of highly 
satisfactory talks with Prime Minister Fukuda 
and other representatives of the Government 
of Japan. During these talks I stressed the im- 
portance which President Carter personally 
attaches to relations with Japan. We assured 
the Japanese that we would consult them fully 
in all matters of mutual concern and there 
would be no surprises in the relationship. 

I extended an invitation on behalf of the 
President to the Prime Minister to visit Wash- 
ington on March 21 and 22. I informed the 
Prime Minister of the President's intention to 
name a high-caliber Ambassador to Japan in 
the near future, although no decision had yet 
been made on that matter. 

We discussed the site and timing of the up- 
coming summit conference, and I will be re- 
porting to the President on the views not only 
of Prime Minister Fukuda but of all the other 
leaders with whom I met. It is my belief that 
the final decision on the site and timing can be 
worked out through normal diplomatic chan- 
nels without any serious difficulties. 

Throughout the talks I stressed our concern 
that the three main engines of the world 
economy — Germany, Japan, and the United 
States — should work to coordinate their eco- 
nomic recovery plans more closely and to 
monitor each other's progress. 

I am impressed with the Japanese stimulus 
program, and I hope that it will achieve the 
growth target of 6.7 percent that they have set 
for themselves. 

I voiced our government's concern for some 
specific problems in our bilateral trade rela- 
tions, including problems of Japanese exports 
to the United States, particularly of steel and 
color televisions, and the restrictions on citrus 
imports to Japan. 



190 



Department of State Bulletin 



I underscored the President's concern about 
dealing with the question of stopping the 
spread of sensitive nuclear technology and ma- 
terials. The Japanese explained to me in detail 
their special problems and needs in this field, 
and we agreed to consult in detail on this issue 
in the near future. 

Turning to regional and strategic issues, I 
emphasized the fact that the Administration 
does not intend to turn its back on Asia. We 
should and will remain an Asian-Pacific power. 
Our alliance with Japan remains central to our 
policy in this vast and important part of the 
world. We will preserve a balanced and flexi- 
ble military strength in the Pacific, and we will 
continue our interests in Southeast Asia. 

With respect to Korea, I emphasized our 
concern to maintain a stable situation on the 
Korean Peninsula. I cited that we will phase 
down our ground forces only in close consulta- 
tion and cooperation with the Governments of 
Japan and South Korea. We will maintain our 
air capability in Korea and continue to assist in 
upgrading Korean self-defense capabilities. In 
regard to China, I stated that we continue to 
desire normalization of relations with the 
People's Republic of China within the 
framework of the Shanghai communique. 

My visit to Japan has given me great per- 
sonal satisfaction. It seems clear to me that 
these two new governments — one in Washing- 
ton and one in Tokyo— are ready, anxious, and 
able to work closely with one another. 

It is my hope and belief that this trip is a 
productive and rapid way to start this process 
and that when we welcome Prime Minister 
Fukuda to Washington next month we will see 
further deepening of this already close rela- 
tionship. 

With the conclusion of today's talks in Tokyo 
we have completed a very valuable round of 
consultations with good friends and allies of 
the United States. And a trip which began 
more than a week ago and in my talks in Brus- 
sels, Bonn, Berlin, Rome, Vatican City, Lon- 
don, Paris, Iceland, and here in Tokyo, we 
have in President Carter's behalf conveyed the 
President's deep commitment to the best pos- 
sible cooperation; established beyond all doubt 
and resolved on all sides to continue the fullest 
possible consultations and cooperation on our 
agenda of important issues; gone far, as I will 



be reporting to President Carter, toward de- 
veloping a consensus in what will be involved 
at the summit; set in motion a process of inten- 
sified consultations which I am confident will 
enable our nations to deal with greater effec- 
tiveness and to deal successfully with matters 
bearing on the security and well-being of each 
of our peoples, the health of our economies, 
and our common goal to reduce tensions and to 
increase the prospects for a more stable inter- 
national environment. 

I will be returning to Washington with the 
belief that the discussions I have had— in each 
instance very substantive and positive — have 
permitted me to convey some of the Presi- 
dent's initial thinking and have permitted me 
to gain the valuable insights of each of these 
leaders with whom I have met. 

This visit to Japan and to Europe, seen in 
the context of the foreign policy initiatives the 
President has taken at the very outset of his 
Administration, I am most hopeful, has 
marked an early step forward and a meaningful 
contribution to progress toward the goals we 
share with our good friends in Japan, in 
Europe, and North America. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, WASHINGTON, 
FEBRUARY 2 

Weekly Compilation of Prei^idential Documents dated February 7 

Vice President Mondale: I've just completed 
a meeting with the President, which lasted 
about an hour and a half, at which I briefed him 
on the various visits and stops on my trip to 
Western Europe and to Japan. 

I believe the trip is a success because it 
began a process that we consider crucial to the 
Carter Administration; namely, the closest 
possible cooperative consultations and 
partnerships with our traditional friends and 
allies. And I'm convinced that that process has 
begun, and on the best possible basis. 

We've established beyond doubt our desire 
to have such a relationship, and we have begun 
a series of important consultations on matters 
which concern us, such as developing a consen- 
sus on what will be involved at the summit. 
We've set in motion a process of intensified 
consultations which will enable our nations to 
deal with greater effectiveness and to deal 



March?, 1977 



191 



successfully with matters bearing on the secu- 
rity and well-being of each of our peoples, the 
health of our economies, and our common goal 
to reduce tensions and to increase the pros- 
pects for a more stable international environ- 
ment. 

Q. Mr. Vice President, has it finally been 
decided that the summit will be devoted en- 
tirely to economic issues and not political and, 
if it has been, is that in deference to France? 
And what about our other allies and our own 
objectives which go beyond economic? 

Vice President Mondale: We have received 
several different suggestions from the various 
nations about what should be on the agenda. 
And I have reported on those matters by 
nation — that is, suggestions offered by each 
nation — to the President; and now through 
normal diplomatic channels we will be develop- 
ing the agenda, undertaking the crucial prep- 
aration work that's essential to an effective 
summit, agreeing through diplomatic channels 
on the location and the timing. And that will be 
announced jointly by the nations involved at 
the time the agreement is reached. 

It is our hope that the agenda will include 
economic matters, to be sure, but other crucial 
matters of political and security significance. 
Just what those matters will be has not yet 
been decided; what the modalities for those 
discussions might be has not yet been decided. 

Q. Mr. Mondale, with Europe now moving, 
or at least indicating its mllingness to dump 
the dollar and move to a new economic system, 
in order to avoid the kind of austerity and 
fascistn and war policies that the IMF [Inter- 
national Monetary Fund] is now imposing on 
Egypt, weren't you embarrassed to have to 
represent — coming from the United States — to 
have to put forward the ynost backivard energy 
policies and the ynost backward economic 
policies of hyperinflation for Japan and West 
Germany and deflation for the rest of Europe? 

Vice President Mondale: Due to a break- 
down in my briefing, we did not see our posi- 
tions in quite that light. 

Q. Mr. Vice President, do you have any 
hopes that West Germany and France, post 
your discussioyis there, may reconsider the 



sale of nuclear reprocessing appliances to 
Brazil and to Pakistan? 

Vice President Mondale: What we asked in 
each case was, first, to be heard on the concern 
of the Carter Administration about the dan- 
gers and the risks involved in the distribution 
of sensitive nuclear technology from which 
weapons-grade material could be developed. 
We made that point at each of the capitals. And 
we asked that consultations commence on that 
matter and on the broader issues of nuclear 
proliferation at the earliest possible moment. 
It was agreed that that should occur. It will 
occur. Arrangements are already being made 
to do so. And that was what we sought to ac- 
complish and accomplished in those talks. 

Q. Do you have an agreement then — 
tentatively — an agreement that they mil hold 
up on those sales until you have a chance to 
talk specifically? 

Vice President Mondale: All we discussed 
was the importance of having intensive, early 
consultations on the matter. There has been no 
agreement beyond that point. 

Q. Mr. Vice President, did you discuss with 
the President what sort of foreign missions 
you might undertake in the future and what 
sort of role you might play in American 
foreign policy in the future? 

Vice President Mondale: No, we did not. 
The meeting today involved a report on the 
various visits, messages that I brought from 
foreign leaders, observations that I made 
about different concerns to the President, and 
did not involve future possible missions. 

Q. Mr. Vice President, did you discuss with 
President Giscard d'Estaing the release by the 
French court of the gentlernan Abu Daoud? 

Vice President Mondale: Yes. I brought it 
up briefly and mentioned our President's con- 
cern, and then we talked about, in general 
terms, the need to deal with terrorism. 

Q. Do you think that the subject of terrorism 
folloump should be a matter for the summit to 
consider when it meets? 

Vice President Mondale: I would just as 
soon not discuss particular topics at this point. 



192 



Department of State Bulletin 



because I think the nations offering the pro- 
posals did so in confidence. 

Q. Mr. Vice President, before this trip, sev- 
eral of this Administration's officials were ex- 
pressing concern that the Germans and the 
Japanese were not moving quickly enough to 
reflate their economies. Did you achieve any 
agreement from these two governments in this 
area? 

Vice President Mondale: We made very 
clear, first of all, our belief that the stronger 
economies, which you might call the three 
great engines, the United States, Japan, and 
Germany, that are now in strong economic po- 
sitions do so — should stimulate their 
economies sufficiently to assist other nations 
that are in difficulty so that they would have 
increased export and thus employment oppor- 
tunities as the result of a heightened accelera- 
tion of international economic activities and 
that our three nations, particularly because we 
are strong economically, should assume as 
much of that burden as possible. 

We also pointed out that because of OPEC 
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun- 
tries] surpluses, that we had responsibility to 
try to assume part of that resultant world defi- 
cit in the planning of our economic programs. 
We made that point with great care and 
strength. And then I also reported in some de- 
tail on our own economic stimulation package. 
The other governments then reported on their 
plans. 

There is complete agreement on the part of 
their leadership, as well as our own, on the 
need to stimulate. The size, the proportion, 
the prudence, the relation to inflation becomes 
exceedingly complex, and what we've agreed 
to do is to pursue our policies, to consult 
closely, to monitor the economic indicators as 
we proceed, to see if we're achieving our 
jointly agreed objective on a stimulative policy 
that will help these other nations and help 
bring about a higher level of international eco- 
nomic activities, bearing in mind the problem 
of inflation as well. 



Q. Mr. Vice President, if both the Germans 
and, I believe, the French claim that in their 
deals with the Pakistanis and Brazilians for 



those nuclear facilities that there are adequate 
safeguards — if that's so — what's the problem? 

Vice President Mondale: The position that 
the Administration has taken is that these 
facilities possess the capacity to produce 
weapons-grade materials, and to the extent 
possible, and hopefully to the fullest possible 
extent, we can prohibit the transfer of this 
technology, which greatly complicates the 
problem of control; and that it was our hope 
that alternatives could be found to deal with 
the nuclear power needs of these nations which 
we accept, which does not include the risk of 
facilities that can produce weapons-grade ma- 
terial; and that we were willing to consider 
ways in which secure supplies of low-grade nu- 
clear fuel could be made available for plants; 
that we were willing to consider ways in which 
these alternatives could not conceivably in- 
volve commercial advantage as a result of 
withdrawing the availability of such nuclear 
technology; and that we also understood the 
great complexity of this issue, both from a 
technical standpoint and from a political 
standpoint. 

And that what was really needed at this 
point and what we were asking for was that the 
new Administration be given time to consult 
very closely with them and with the other na- 
tions about the total picture and what might be 
done to diminish, reduce if not eliminate, the 
risks that flow from facilities from which 
weapons-grade material can be produced. 

That's the status of our position, and that's 
what these consultations will involve. 

Q. Two questions, two unrelated questions, 
if I may. You seemed to be saying earlier that 
it was the hope of the United States to expand 
the summit meeting to some extent beyond 
economic questions. Can you elaborate on that 
for us to give us whatever additional you can 
on that hope by the United States? 

My second question, which is unrelated, is 
whether or not you discussed with the various 
leaders President Carter's proposal for a total 
test ban, nuclear testing ban. If so, what kind 
of reaction you got and, particularly, if you 
can tell me what kind of reaction you got from 
them, if any, on this aspect of it; that is, the 
Chinese — hoiv the Chinese, how China might 
fit into that or what their reaction is. Did they 



March/, 1977 



193 



tell you anything about what they thought 
China's reaction would be on it? 
So I've got two unrelated questions here. 

Vice President Mondale: On the first ques- 
tion of the summit, it is our hope that we sim- 
ply call it the summit and that all the matters 
would be on the table that were of mutual con- 
cern, whether they were economic or not. We 
anticipate that economics will be a central con- 
cern, and obviously it was a central concern 
throughout our trip and must be considered as 
such. 

Such issues as nuclear proliferation, 
North-South dialogue, energy matters, and a 
whole range of other concerns that are not 
strictly economic but by definition economics, 
we would hope could freely be included on the 
agenda on the agreement of the other parties. 
That's essentially our approach. 

We have asked the other nations for their 
suggestions. We want to be forthcoming and 
cooperative, and I think that we will be able to 
work out an agenda that is mutually satisfac- 
tory for all. 

Q. If I might ask, that would be, then, an 
agenda that is considerably broader than 
Rambouillet and Puerto Rico? 

Vice President Mondale: I will have to stand 
corrected on that. I guess I'm not prepared to 
answer that question. But that's the approach 
we wished to take. 

On the nuclear test ban treaty, comprehen- 
sive test ban, that was discussed, and it was 
agreed there would be additional consultations 
on the matter. It was touched on briefly, and 
there will be additional consultations on it. 

Q. Can you give us the reaction of any of the 
leaders you talked to to a total test ban agree- 
ment? 

Vice President Mondale: I don't believe I 
can disclose their point of view. 

Mr. Vice President, could you itemize, sir, 
the countries that ivould be included? For in- 
stance, would India be included, because 
India is getting heavy water from Russia, 
making atomic weapons? 

Vice President Mondale: I mentioned that 
there were many, many aspects of nuclear pro- 



liferation, in addition to those that I've dis- 
cussed, which really involve what you might 
call the next generation of concerns about nu- 
clear proliferation; that might involve, for 
example, as Chancellor [of the Federal Ger- 
man Repubhc Helmut] Schmidt has suggested, 
a new follow-on treaty for the nuclear prolifer- 
ation treaty. It's a very complex, difficult mat- 
ter that involves consultation. We did not get 
into all the possible ramifications. 

Q. May I ask a followup question because, 
you see, once they have the atomic energy 
given to them, they can create, like yogurt — all 
you need is a tablespoon of yogurt and you can 
make more. They make the atomic daughters, 
you see. So what do you do with those? 

Vice President Mondale: It is very complex, 
as your yogurt analogy points out. [Laughter] 

Q. To follow on Herb's question, did the 
Germans and the French agree to give the Ad- 
ministration this tiyne that you asked for be- 
fore they take any specific actions to carry out 
these contracts? 

Vice President Mondale: We agreed to have 
consultations and that they would occur im- 
mediately on an intensive basis and that there 
would be a chance for the free exchange of 
ideas and alternatives and options. But there 
has been no agreement beyond that. 

Q. One other question: Was the Secretary of 
State at your meeting or, if not, how do you 
plan to brief him and other Cabinet members? 

Vice President Mondale: The Secretary of 
State was invited to the meeting this morning, 
but he had testimony before the Hill, and I will 
brief him thoroughly. He had his representa- 
tive — Mr. Cooper [Under Secretary-designate 
for Economic Affairs Richard N. Cooper] was 
there. But I will thoroughly also brief him, as 
soon as he's through with his testimony. 

Q. Mr. Vice President, did you have any 
disappointments on this trip? I think, for 
example, of the French — they didn't agree to 
expanding the summit beyond economic mat- 
ters; the Germans really didn't agree to reflate 
beyond the package. Were there any disap- 
pointments for you? 



194 



Department of State Bulletin 



Vice President Mondale: First of all, in 
both instances, it was not quite as the question 
described it. 

We had a very good talk with President Gis- 
card about the summit, about the issues that 
should be there. They indicated in private 
what they've said pubhcly about the economic 
summit. And I'm sure that we can work out an 
arrangement that includes the appropriate 
items on the agenda, and it is really not a mat- 
ter of great, serious substance at all. I am con- 
vinced it can be worked out. 

On the reflation issue, I think it was very 
helpful. I think there is substantial consensus 
and agreement now among the stronger 
economies in the world that it is necessary for 
our economies to stimulate, to help share the 
burden of increasing international economic 
activity — exports and the other — and to help 
head off protectionism and to resume progress 
on the multilateral trade talks and so on. 

I think the talks are very helpful in under- 
standing each other's economic programs. I 
found some misunderstanding, for example, 
about just how we intended to proceed. Well, 
it was helpful to clarify that. And we've begun 
the process of consulting and monitoring eco- 
nomic progress to make certain that we reach 
the economic targets that are generally 
agreed to be necessary. 

Now, it's hard to be specific in terms of per- 
centage points, but one of the things we found 
out when we talked to the other nations was 
that there was understandable disagreement 
and doubt as to what certain economic pro- 
grams would produce in terms of economic 
stimulation. OECD [Organization for Eco- 
nomic Cooperation and Development], for 
example, has a lower expectation about what 
our programs will produce than our own gov- 
ernment does. We think we are right; they 
think they are right. 

So that as we go along we will monitor, care- 
fully calibrate, the growth of our economies, 
based on new information that will come forth 
on the statistical base that's developed in our 
nations. So that I think we made a good deal of 
progress, and it may be a somewhat 
unbeHevable — I came away very, very pleased 
with the trip, and there were no substantial 
disappointments. 



Q. Mr. Vice President, I don't think the 
President has set a firm date for a suinmit. He 
said some time after the 1st of May. Based on 
your findings, did you recommend to him any- 
thing about timing, as to whether it would be 
sooner or later? What are your views on that? 

Vice President Mondale: I want this to be off 
the record. Midyear. [Laughter] 

Q. Mr. Vice President, what can you say on 
the record? [Laughter] 

Vice President Mondale: Don't dare file it. 
No international explosions. 

We now have to consult. We had two or 
three different suggestions. We now have to 
consult through diplomatic channels and agree 
on a summit, but it will be midyear. 

Q. Mr. Vice President, what was President 
Carter's reaction to your trip? Was there one 
specific area where he was more excited or en- 
thused about the results you achieved than 
others? 

Vice President Mondale: No. I would say he 
was thrilled with all of it. [Laughter] He has 
some new countries he wants me to go to. But 
he was disappointed in the press corps that 
followed me. That was his major — [Laughter] 

Q. Mr. Vice President, what impression did 
you bring back from Italy, not only on the eco- 
nomic situation there but on the short-range 
prospective of European Communists? 

Vice President Mondale: That was very 
briefly discussed. Our talks were almost en- 
tirely on economic matters and on our plans for 
economic growth. They were interested in our 
discussions with the leaders of the German 
Government and the Japanese Government. 

We talked about the multilateral trade 
negotiations. We talked about their plans to 
slowly phase out some of the deposits that 
were developed to try to discourage imports 
and encourage exports as a part of their con- 
tribution to a more open international trading 
economy. And while we did discuss it, it was 
very brief and we barely touched on the sub- 
ject. 

Q. Mr. Vice President, a number of Euro- 
pean governments, I think, have suggested 



March/, 1977 



195 



that the present Administration's economic 
package isn't big enough. Based on your find- 
ings, is the $31 billion figure flexible? Could 
it move upward or is it now fixed? 

Vice Presideni Mondale: The size of our 
economic package is approximately 1 percent 
of our gross national product. That's almost 
identical with the size of the Japanese pack- 
age. We feel that it will achieve the real eco- 
nomic growth rates that will stimulate our 
economy, increase employment, increase in- 
ternational economic activity, and will do so 
short of that — that point that's hard to decide 
on, where you might reignite inflationary 
forces. 

There was general agreement and satisfac- 
tion with that package in other governments. 
However, OECD, as I mentioned earlier, in 
their projections doubt — they think that the 
United States, the German Government, and 
the Japanese are all being too optimistic in 
what their stimulative packages will accom- 
plish. And that's why we've agreed to monitor 
this very closely as we go along, to make cer- 
tain that our projections are fulfilled. 

Q. Mr. Vice President, does your monitor- 
ing allow the possibility that this year you 
might restimulate, when you talk to the 
Japanese and West Germans more, or will 
that only be left until next year? 

Vice President Mondale: The nature of the 
understanding was to simply monitor, based 
on our own economic indicators, how well 
we're doing. There was no discussion about 
what follows, but that we all wanted to reach 
these targets of growth that we've described 
officially. 

Q. Mr. Vice President, what were you able 
to learn about the attitude of the Japanese 
Government toward the President's expressed 
intention to undertake a phased withdrawal 
of American ground forces in Korea? 

Vice President Mondale: I think we were 
able to reassure them that in pursuit of our 
announced policies of withdrawing U.S. 
ground forces from Korea, that we intended 
to do so on a phased basis; that we intended to 



do it only after the closest consultation with 
the Governments of Japan and Korea; that we 
intended to pursue that objective in a way 
which in no way destabihzed the credibility of 
the security interests of all of the nations in- 
volved in the Pacific area; and that we in- 
tended to help improve the combat effective- 
ness of the Korean ground forces; that we in- 
tended to retain our air force presence in the 
area; and that we intended completely to ful- 
fill our standing treaty commitments to Ja- 
pan. 

It was my impression that the Japanese 
leaders were reassured by that presentation 
and it helped increase understanding on that 
objective. As you know, I carried an invita- 
tion from President Carter to Prime Minister 
Fukuda, and he will be visiting the United 
States. And no doubt those matters and 
others will be on the agenda of that discus- 
sion. 

Q. If I could ask a brief followup, in your 
talks generally, did you detect a high level of 
interest in what would be the defense and de- 
terrence policies of the Administration and 
any lack of certainty about that? 

Vice President Mondale: No. I think they 
were quite reassured by my statement, which 
is, of course, identical with the public — in 
other words, what we said privately to the 
Japanese was a careful repetition of what the 
President's position publicly has been. In our 
talks with them, I emphasized the fact that 
the Administration does not intend to turn its 
back on Asia; that we should and will remain 
an Asian-Pacific power; that our alliance with 
Japan remains central to our policy in that 
vast and important part of the world; that we 
will preserve a balanced and flexible military 
strength in the Pacific and continue our inter- 
ests in Southeast Asia. 

With respect to Korea, I emphasized our 
concern to maintain a stable situation on the 
Korean Peninsula. I cited that we will phase 
down our ground forces only in close consulta- 
tion and cooperation with the Governments of 
Japan and South Korea. And we will maintain 
our air capability in Korea and continue to as- 
sist in upgrading Korean self-defense capabil- 



196 



Department of State Bulletin 



ity. And I think they found that formulation 
satisfactory and reassuring. 

Q. Would you amplify increasing the com- 
bat effectiveness of Korean ground forces? 
Are you planning to give South Korea the sort 
of weapons that it doesn't have now, or more 
sophisticated equipment? Are you just saying 
that, or is there some major program for giv- 
ing, for upgrading Korean ground forces? 

Vice President Mondale: I think it's a con- 
tinuation of an existing commitment that we 
would help the ground forces increase their 
combat effectiveness. I don't have a specific 
answer to that. But it does not go beyond that 
statement. Thank you very much. 



U.S. Relations With the ILO 
To Remain Under Review 

Following is a joint statement by the De- 
partments of State, Labor, and Commerce 
issued on February 16, which was read to 
news correspondents that day by Frederick 
Z . Brown, Director, Office of Press Rela- 
tions. 

Press release 57 dated February 16 

The question of U.S. relations with the 
International Labor Organization remains a 
matter of high priority and will remain 
under continuing review by a Cabinet-level 
committee, where, we hope, the AFL-CIO 
and the Chamber of Commerce will continue 
to play active roles. 

Because of dissatisfaction in the U.S. 
Government and among labor and industry 
leaders with a number of unfortunate trends 



in the ILO, the United States submitted a 
letter on November 5, 1975, giving the re- 
quired two-year notice of intent to withdraw 
from the organization. In that letter, it was 
stated: 

The United States does not desire to leave the ILO. 
The United States does not e.xpect to do so. But we do 
intend to make every possible effort to promote the 
conditions which will facilitate our continued participa- 
tion. If this should prove impossible, we are in fact 
prepared to depart. 

Those views are no less valid today. They 
will guide our actions and our ultimate deci- 
sion in the critical months ahead. 



New Organizational System 
for National Security Council 

Following is a statement made to news 
correspondents on January 22 by White 
House Press Secretary Jody Powell. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated January 24 

A new organizational system has been es- 
tablished for the NSC [National Security 
Council]. In place of the previous seven 
committees, there will be only two. 

There will be a Committee on Policy Re- 
view, chaired by departmental officials, nor- 
mally the senior departmental official. There 
will be a Committee on Special Coordination 
dealing with crosscutting issues, chaired by 
the President's National Security Adviser, 
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski. 

This system was devised and ordered by 
the President himself. It reflects his desire 
for more simplified and responsive organiza- 
tion throughout government. 



March 7, 1 977 



197 



Department Urges Appropriation of Funds 
for International Financial Institutions 



Statement by Paul H. Boeker 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs * 



I welcome this opportunity to testify in 
support of tiie Administration's requests for 
appropriation of our contributions to the in- 
ternational development lending institu- 
tions. 

These institutions make vitally important 
contributions to the poorer countries' strug- 
gles to overcome the formidable obstacles to 
economic development. Our support for 
them is a major element in our effort to fos- 
ter constructive, mutually beneficial rela- 
tionships with developing countries. Equally 
significant to us, however, is the contribu- 
tion the international financial institutions 
make to creation of a structure of interna- 
tional cooperation based on mutual responsi- 
bility among developing as well as developed 
nations for maintaining the economic and 
political health of the world. 

Controlling rapid population growth, pro- 
viding adequate food supplies, managing the 
world's energy and mineral resources, limit- 
ing damage to the environment, and main- 
taining adequate growth and stability in the 
world economy are global problems. The 
United States has a fundamental and direct 
interest in having them addressed on the 
basis of effective international collaboration 
and mutual responsibilities of states. 

The developing countries have become in- 
creasingly important participants in the 



' Submitted to the Subcommittee on Foreign Opera- 
tions of the House Committee on Appropriations on 
Feb. 16. The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available from 
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



structure of international cooperation we 
seek to foster. The growing importance of 
developing countries is mirrored in our own 
economic exchange with them. The recent 
share of developing countries in total U.S. 
trade (40 percent), direct investment (25 
percent), and overseas financial claims (60 
percent) is significant and increasing. Our 
exports to the developing world trebled 
from 1972 to 1975. They have reached a 
level of $40 billion and now account for 35 
percent of total U.S. exports. Our imports 
from the developing countries have in- 
creased from $14 bilHon in 1972 to $52 billion 
today. They now represent 44 percent of our 
total imports and 28 percent of our non- 
petroleum imports. 

The developing countries face major prob- 
lems, however. Central to those problems, 
and therefore at the heart of our relation- 
ship with those countries, are issues of eco- 
nomic and social development. The needs of 
the developing world are enormous. Their 
problems of food, nutrition, health, educa- 
tion, population control, and energy de- 
velopment are staggering. The needs for 
basic economic infrastructure, especially in 
the poorest countries, are immense. The 
problems of urban overcrowding and squalor 
are fed by the lack of rural development. 

The developing countries themselves are 
making major efforts to address these prob- 
lems. Over the last decade a number of them 
have made sufficient progress so they can 
now generate adequate investment for 
growth from domestic savings and through 
their foreign trade and borrowing in capital 



198 



Department of State Bulletin 



markets. Many more developing countries 
still have very limited access to interna- 
tional capital markets except through the in- 
termediation of the World Bank and the re- 
gional banks. 

For the lower income countries, the over- 
whelming demands for immediate consump- 
tion make the surplus available for invest- 
ment inadequate for anything other than 
marginal rates of economic and social de- 
velopment. Their limited ability to service 
debt on commercial terms makes external 
concessional assistance essential for any 
hope of future development. 

A comprehensive U.S. development as- 
sistance program is a central element of a 
mutually beneficial relationship with the de- 
veloping world. Support for economic and 
social progress of poor people in the de- 
veloping world is also a reflection of what 
we are — a humanitarian nation — and of the 
character and purpose we project to the rest 
of the world. 

President Carter is now reviewing the 
Administration's fiscal year 1978 budget 
recommendations and will be submitting his 
revisions to the Congress shortly. It is clear 
that one element of this package will be a 
balanced foreign assistance program contain- 
ing bilateral and multilateral elements involv- 
ing both hard- and soft-term assistance, as 
well as food aid. 



Broadly Shared Aid Effort 

The international development lending in- 
stitutions play a unique role in our assist- 
ance effort. They have been the primary ve- 
hicle over the last two decades for making 
what was once a primarily U.S. aid effort 
one broadly shared among the industrial 
countries of the West and Japan. These in- 
stitutions and the IMF [International Mone- 
tary Fund] have also taken the lead in 
working out with developing countries 
policies and programs which improve their 
own resource mobilization efforts. At the 
same time, the international development 
lending institutions embody an approach to 
international economic growth based on 
mutual obligations and open exchange of in- 
ternational trade and investment. As such 



the international financial institutions repre- 
sent more than the sum of contributions 
which individual countries provide. They 
represent a collective consensus on the 
priorities of the international effort to pro- 
mote economic and social progress. 

The United States has a large stake in the 
international development banks. They were 
created in good part as a result of U.S. 
leadership. They reflect to a considerable 
extent our concept of the development task 
and of the means to address it. We helped 
mold the international consensus which is 
the foundation of their effectiveness. 

The appropriations you are now consider- 
ing for fiscal years 1977 and 1978 will help 
restore the U.S. position of effective lead- 
ership in these important institutions. They 
will demonstrate to other industrial and de- 
veloping countries U.S. dedication and pur- 
pose in addressing the fundamental concerns 
of development. 

The appropriations we seek at this time 
involve broad global, as well as regional, 
concerns. Each of the institutions for which 
we are seeking your support has a unique 
role, and each has widespread support in the 
developing world. 

The World Bank Group 

This year a large part of our request is for 
the various elements of the World Bank 
Group. This group sets the standard for 
multilateral development cooperation efforts 
and enjoys the confidence of investors, lend- 
ers, and borrowers alike. 

At the heart of the system is the World 
Bank itself. The Bank's broad membership 
and long distinguished record in develop- 
ment cooperation make it a leader in the 
task of global development. Its leadership 
position has enabled the Bank to play a 
major role in defining the priorities for de- 
velopment and establishing an environment 
within which development efforts can pros- 
per. 

Ever since its inception, the philosophy 
and program of the World Bank have paral- 
leled our development assistance program. 
Our leadership helped create the Bank, and 
we helped direct its activities into areas we 



March 7, 1 977 



199 



could support. The fact that the Bank is 
headquartered in Washington and has al- 
ways had an American president reflects the 
substantial U.S. investment and influence in 
the institution. 

The appropriation request for fiscal year 
1978 represents the first appropriation for 
the World Bank since fiscal year 1972. Since 
that time the Bank's lending program has 
grown in response to the enormous needs of 
the developing world for investment capital, 
but the Bank's capital base has remained 
unchanged. Unless its capital is increased, it 
will be forced to cut back its lending pro- 
gram, with serious repercussions for de- 
veloping countries. 

The International Development Associa- 
tion (IDA) is the principal multilateral chan- 
nel for concessional assistance to the poorest 
countries of the world. These countries are 
in desperate need of external assistance, but 
their economies are in most cases too fragile 
to absorb debt on conventional terms. In 
many cases IDA represents the principal 
hope for the capital inflows necessary for 
development. 

This year is crucial for IDA. By June 30, 
IDA will have committed the resources it 
has available under the terms of the fourth 
replenishment agreed to in Nairobi in 1973. 
Unless new funds are made available on an 
urgent basis, IDA will be forced to cease 
making new loan commitments, with severe 
consequences for millions of people in the 
poorest developing countries. As you are 
aware, negotiations for a fifth replenishment 
of IDA have been underway for over a year. 
Because of the extraordinary importance of 
IDA to the poorest countries, these negotia- 
tions have become a focal point of attention 
and concern in the North-South dialogue. 

The International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) was established because of the com- 
mon recognition of the need for a special in- 
stitution within the World Bank Group to 
address the particular needs of the private 
sector in the developing world. The real 
value of the IFC hes not only in the amount 
of direct resources it makes available but in 
its role in mobilizing resources for private- 
sector development. Every dollar IFC has 



committed has generated over four dollars 
in additional resources for development 
projects. 

The IFC has not had a replenishment 
since its inception in 1956. In recognition of 
its record to date and of the increased needs 
for IFC financing, agreement was reached 
at the seventh special session of the United 
Nations General Assembly and at the an- 
nual meeting of the IBRD [International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(World Bank)] in September 1975 on the 
need for a substantial replenishment of IFC 
resources. The appropriation being re- 
quested at this time is needed to implement 
this important initiative. 

Each of the major geographic regions has 
specific requirements that the regional 
banks are designed to address. These in- 
stitutions complement the activities of the 
World Bank Group and make vital contribu- 
tions to development in their regions. 

Inter-American Development Bank 

The Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB), oldest and largest of the regional 
banks, was established in the belief that 
Latin American countries should assume 
greater responsibility for managing their 
own development and participating in deci- 
sions regarding the use of foreign resources. 
It has become the major channel for U.S. 
support of economic and social progress in 
Latin America. 

The IDB serves the development needs of 
a region with which we share a good deal of 
common history, a close political relation- 
ship, and significant economic ties. Latin 
America accounts for 15 percent of our ex- 
ports and about one-quarter of our oil im- 
ports. We have substantial direct invest- 
ments and financial relations with the re- 
gion. Several countries of the area — for 
example, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela — 
wield increasing political influence on a wide 
range of global issues. 

In a decision which we encouraged and 
supported, the IDB last year admitted non- 
regional donor members, who are assuming a 
significant role in the Bank, thereby con- 



200 



Department of State Bulletin 



tributing to equitable burden sharing. These 
new donors will welcome affirmation of con- 
tinued U.S. support for the Bank. 

Asian and African Institutions 

The Asian Development Bank (ADB), 
founded in 1966 with American support but 
as an Asian initiative, serves another geo- 
graphic area of strong American interests. 
Asia includes nations which have become 
significant trading partners of the United 
States, major suppliers of such important 
raw materials as natural rubber, tin, petro- 
leum, hard fibers, timber, and countries 
where American investors have important 
interests. 

In the last 25 years America has partici- 
pated in two wars in the region served by 
the ADB. Today there is peace in Asia. To 
maintain this peace and stability it is impor- 
tant to foster economic development and to 
facilitate improvement in the quality of life 
for the Asian peoples. Some countries 
served by the Asian Development Bank are 
among the poorest on earth, with the 
minimum assurance of economic security. 
Others, such as Malaysia and Thailand, are 
somewhat better off but still face staggering 
obstacles to their efforts to provide their 
expanding populations with decent employ- 
ment opportunities. Economic growth is es- 
sential for political stability in the face of 
potentially hostile neighbors. Still others, 
with admirable records of economic de- 
velopment, are nevertheless highly vulnera- 
ble to fluctuations of the world economy as 
well as external threats to their security. 

The Asian Development Bank contributes 
significantly to the alleviation of these prob- 
lems. American support for the Asian De- 
velopment Bank and its soft-loan affiliate, 
the Asian Development Fund, is an effective 
way for us to share in these tasks and an 
important indication of sustained U.S. polit- 
ical interest in the region. 

Finally, I would like to turn to the newest 
regional international financial institution, 
the African Development Fund, the conces- 
sionary affiliate of the African Development 
Bank. 



Our joining this institution on November 
18, 1976, has marked a new period in our 
relations with Africa. As a tangible commitment 
by the United States to the only established 
pan-African economic development institution, 
our membership has been welcomed by Africans 
and non-Africans alike. 

Africa faces enormous political and eco- 
nomic problems. In addition to the turmoil 
caused by the transition to majority rule in 
southern Africa, Africa is one of the world's 
poorest continents and faces severe eco- 
nomic development problems. The job of 
nationbuilding and regional political stability 
are inseparable. Support of the African De- 
velopment Fund is therefore an important 
political symbol as well as a sound venture 
in development cooperation. 

Mr. Chairman, the appropriations re- 
quests you have before you are of consider- 
able foreign policy significance. We are at a 
crossroads in our relations with the develop- 
ing world. We have the opportunity both to 
reaffirm the dedication of the United States 
to effective cooperation with developing 
countries and to direct the substance of this 
cooperation into forms and fora that reflect 
our interest in mutual sharing of respon- 
sibilities. The international financial institu- 
tions represent a critical element of U.S. ef- 
forts to achieve constructive collaboration 
between industrial and developing nations. 
Our support for them is crucial. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

Review of Immigration Problems. Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and In- 
ternational Law of the House Committee on the 
Judiciary, on Immigration and Nationality Act waiv- 
ers, foreign students, consular functions abroad, and 
immigration benefits to illegitimate children. June 
11, 1975July 28, 1976. 159 pp. 

Soviet Activities in Cuba— Parts VI and VII. Com- 
munist Influence in the Western Hemisphere. Hear- 
ings before the Subcommittee on International Polit- 
ical and Military Affairs of the House Committee on 
International Relations. October 7, 1975-September 
16, 1976. 127 pp. 

China Enters the Post-Mao Era. A report by Senator 
Mike Mansfield, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, to the 



March 7, 1977 



201 



Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. November 
1S76. 158 pp. 

China and the Chinese. A compendium of papers sub- 
mitted to the Joint Economic Committee. November 
19, 1976. 139 pp. 

Charting a New Course: Southeast Asia in a Time of 
Change. A report by Senator Mitce Mansfield, Major- 
ity Leader, U.S. Senate, to the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations. December 1976. 103 pp. 

Americans Missing in Southeast Asia. Final report, 
together with additional and separate views, of the 
House Select Committee on Missing Persons in 
Southeast Asia. H. Rept. 94-1764. December 13, 
1976. 267 pp. 

Legislative Review Activities of the House Committee 
on International Relations, 94th Congress. H. Rept. 
94-1774. December 30, 1976. 76 pp. 

Human Rights and U.S. Policy: Argentina, Haiti, In- 
donesia, Iran, Peru, and the Philippines. Reports 
submitted to the House Committee on International 
Relations by the Department of State. December 31, 

1976. 37 pp. 

Use of U.S. Food Resources for Diplomatic 
Purposes — An E.xamination of the Issues. Prepared 
for the House Committee on International Relations 
by the Congressional Research Service, Library of 
Congress. January 1977. 85 pp. 

Congress and Foreign Policy. Report of the Special 
Subcommittee on Investigations of the House 
Committee on International Relations. January 2, 

1977. 26 pp. 

Report on the Activities of the House Merchant Marine 
and Fisheries Committee, 94th Congress. H. Rept. 
94-1784. January 3, 1977. 260 pp. 

Military Sales to Turkey. Communication from the 
President of the United States dated November 18 
transmitting his determination on the sale and financ- 
ing of certain defense articles to Turkey during fiscal 
year 1977. H. Doc. 9S-6. January 4, 1977. 6 pp. 

Communications from the Acting Assistant Secretary 
of State for Congressional Relations transmitting 
texts of International Labor Organization conven- 
tions and recommendations. ILO Convention and 
Recommendation Concerning Organizations of Rural 
Workers and Their Role in Economic and Social De- 
velopment; H. Doc. 95-15; January 4, 1977; 18 pp. 
ILO Convention and Recommendation Concerning 
Vocational Training in the Development of Human 
Resources; H. Doc. 95-16; January 4, 1977; 31 pp. 
ILO Convention and Recommendation Concerning 
Migrations in Abusive Conditions and Equality of 
Treatment of Migrant Workers; H. Doc. 95-17; 
January 4, 1977; 22 pp. 

Protocol to the Convention on International Civil Avia- 
tion. Message from the President of the United 
States transmitting the protocol signed at Montreal 
October 16, 1974, amending article 50(a) of the con- 
vention to increase the membership of the ICAO 
Council. S. Ex. A, 95th Congress, 1st session. 
January 12, 1977. 4 pp. 

Two Related Protocols to the Convention for the Unifi- 
cation of Certain Rules Relating to International 
Carriage by Air, as Amended. Message from the 
President of the United States transmitting the pro- 
tocols done at Montreal September 25, 1975. S. Ex. 
B, 95th Congress, 1st session. January 14, 1977. 17 
pp. 



Presidential Advisory Board 

on Ambassadorial Appointments 

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER> 

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Con- 
stitution and statutes of the United States of America, 
and as President of the United States of America, in ac- 
cordance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App. I), it is hereby ordered 
as follows: 

Section l. (a) There is hereby established the Presi- 
dential Advisory Board on Ambassadorial Appoint- 
ments, hereinafter referred to as the Board, which shall 
be composed of members appointed by the President.^ 

(b) The President shall designate a Chairman from 
among the members of the Board. 

(c) The Secretary of State shall designate an Execu- 
tive Secretary. 

Sec. 2. (a) The Board shall, whenever requested, 
make confidential recommendations to the Secretary of 
State and the President as to the qualifications of indi- 
viduals for an ambassadorial post for which noncareer 
individuals are being considered, and such other advice 
as the President shall request. 

(b) In considering the qualifications of a prospective 
nominee, the Board shall consider such background in- 
formation on the requirements of particular ambassado- 
rial posts, evaluation criteria, and information regarding 
the prospective nominee which may be furnished by the 
Department of State; and the Board shall consider such 
other information as it deems appropriate in order to 
render an informed judgment concerning a prospective 
nominee's qualifications and suitability. 

Sec. 3. Upon request by the President or the Secre- 
tary of State, the Board shall consider which ambas- 
sadorial posts should be filled by career people and 
which should be filled by noncareer people, and shall 
make its recommendations in confidence regarding same 
to them. 

Sec. 4. Board members may not be appointed to an 
ambassadorial post during their service on the Board 
nor for at least one year thereafter. The President may 
waive this provision in specific cases and will in such 
cases state his reasons for doing so. 

Sec. 5. Members of the Board who are not officers or 
employees of the Federal Government shall receive no 
compensation from the Government of the United States 



1 No. 11970; 42 Fed. Reg. 7919. 

^ On Feb. 5, President Carter appointed the 
following-named persons to the Board: Reubin O'D. As- 
kew, Chairman; Maria Duran; Maurice Ferre; Nancy 
Flaherty; John Hope Franklin; Chris Gitlin; W. Averell 
Harriman: Stanley Hoffmann; Anne Clark Martindell; 
Vilma Martinez; Joan Masuck; Thomas P. O'Neill III; 
Mary Jean Patterson; Dean Rusk; Stephen I. 
Schlossberg; William W. Scranton; Alex Seith; Donald 
Stewart; Ben J. Wattenberg; Barbara M. White. 



202 



Department of State Bulletin 



for their service as members of the Board, but may, to 
the extent permitted by law, be allowed travel ex- 
penses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as au- 
thorized by law (5 U.S.C. 5702 and 5703) for persons 
employed intermittently in the government service. 

Sec. 6. The Secretary of State shall, to the extent 
permitted by law, provide administrative and staff serv- 
ices, support, and facilities for the Board. 

Sec. 7. Notwithstanding the provisions of any other 
Executive order, the functions of the President under 
the Federal Advisoiy Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App. I), 
except that of reporting annually to the Congress, 
which are applicable to the Board, shall be perfoiTned 
by the Secretaiy of State in accordance with guidelines 
and procedures established by the Office of Management 
and Budget. 

Sec. 8. The Board shall terminate on December 31, 
1978, unless extended prior to that date. 



Jimmy Carter. 



The White House, Febmai-y 5, 1977. 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
AND CONFERENCES 



U.S. Discusses Its Preparations 
for the U.N. Water Conference 

Following is a statement made on January 
i by U.S. Representative Jacob M. Myerson 
in the second special session of the Commit- 
tee on Natural Resources, Intergovernment- 
al Preparatory Committee for the United 
Nations Water Conference. 

USUN press release 1 dated January 5 

A busy year has passed since the first pre- 
paratory session for the United Nations 
Water Conference. The task before us this 
week is of special importance with barely 2V2 
months until the meeting in Argentina. We 
share the general hope and expectation that 
we shall conclude our work this week with a 
clear sense of the organization and adminis- 
tration of the conference — and also with an 
appreciation of the issues upon which our 
governments must take positions in March. 



We listened with great interest to the re- 
ports by Secretary Mageed [Secretary Gen- 
eral of the conference Yahia Abdel Mageed, 
of Sudan] and the Representative of the Gov- 
ernment of Argentina on the status of prep- 
arations for the conference. My government 
wishes to express its appreciation to Mr. 
Mageed for the excellent job he has done in 
the short time he has been involved in con- 
ference planning, particularly considering 
the limited budgetary resources he has had 
available to him. We share his disappoint- 
ment that some of the basic conference 
documentation is not yet available to the 
committee, for reasons which we understand 
and appreciate. We hope these documents 
can be completed and made available 
promptly so that governments will be in a 
position to express views on them at the con- 
ference. The United States will study them 
thoroughly. As far as the work of this com- 
mittee is concerned, it is our view that we 
have the responsibility to take note of the 
documentation and transmit it to the 
conference — and not to deal with it in sub- 
stantive detail. 

We would also like to express our appreci- 
ation to the distinguished Representative of 
Argentina for his comprehensive report on 
host-country preparations. It is clear that 
planning is proceeding expeditiously, and we 
look forward to visiting Mar del Plata in 
March. 

Certainly nothing has occurred since the 
last meeting of our committee to diminish the 
importance of the conference we are plan- 
ning. The year 1976 saw large areas of the 
world affected by severe drought conditions. 
The drought in the Sahel continued; and 
Europe experienced a major drought, as did 
regions of my own country. There is no evi- 
dence which suggests that these situations 
will not be repeated. Indeed, our own ex- 
perience indicates that nations must begin to 
plan with the expectation of drought. 

Other nations reported last year on serious 
problems of flooding and associated loss of 
life and property. Indications are that floods 
are also increasing in scope and intensity be- 
cause of the rapid loss of forests and vegeta- 



Mareh 7, 1 977 



203 



tive cover which historically retained much 
of the precipitation. 

Water pollution is yet another major con- 
cern. While some countries reported limited 
successes with certain water pollution prob- 
lems, the worldwide picture is that of a 
deterioriating situation. The yet unsolved 
problem of the disposal of human wastes is 
now further complicated by new classes of 
pollutants. In the United States, for exam- 
ple, the growing incidence of water pollution 
by toxic chemicals has resulted in the recent 
passage of major new legislation to deal with 
it. 

I could obviously go on, but this is perhaps 
not the appropriate moment. Suffice it to say 
that the spectrum of global water-related 
problems and issues clearly indicates that a 
meeting of nations to consider measures for 
preventing and solving them is indeed 
timely. 

As we indicated last year, Mr. Chairman, 
the United States has been preparing for the 
U.N. Water Conference in a serious and 
thorough manner. That work has continued 
throughout 1976. Our preparations are being 
carried out by a national committee which is 
broadly representative of the wide variety of 
water interests in our country. Federal and 
state governments, private industry, and the 
academic community all are actively engaged 
in our preparations. 

I would like to take special note of the 
prominent and very useful role being played 
by U.S. private nongovernmental organiza- 
tions, several of which have spoken this 
morning through the international bodies 
with which they are affiliated. Many such or- 
ganizations have long been active in the 
water resources field and have consequently 
been able to bring to bear on our preparatory 
efforts a wealth of valuable experience and 
expert knowledge. Accordingly, Mr. Chair- 
man, I hope that this committee will encour- 
age and provide for maximum participation 
of nongovernmental organizations from the 
United States and other nations at the con- 
ference in March. 

With the guidance of our national prepara- 
tory committee, the United States has sub- 



mitted 17 thematic papers for the conference. 
An 18th, on boundary water management, 
was developed jointly with the Government 
of Canada. These papers collectively reflect 
the scope of our water interests and con- 
cerns. They range from consideration of the 
need to integrate water management into 
overall planning for national development to 
specialized topics. A few examples of the lat- 
ter category are flood plain management, 
drought contingency planning, control of 
toxic substances, and remote sensing. We 
have also participated as members or observ- 
ers in three of the U.N. regional prepara- 
tory meetings. We have contributed 
specialists to the expert groups which were 
convened to address the topics of community 
water supply and food-water relationships 
and have assisted in the preparation of the 
summary of country thematic papers. 

Mr. Chairman, the level and detail of U.S. 
preparations reflect my government's view 
that this conference deserves serious atten- 
tion and constructive efforts by all nations. 
We hope the conference will be well attended 
and that it will attract high-level participa- 
tion by policy planners and decisionmakers 
who can deal with the range of diverse water 
problems — and opportunities. 

The global problems of water quantity and 
water quality are so urgent — and opportuni- 
ties so prevalent — that we must endeavor to 
keep our work here, and especially in Argen- 
tina in March, clearly focused and construc- 
tive. In that regard, Mr. Chairman, it is vital 
that the conference focus on water resources 
policies and the problems of water resources 
management. Important technical aspects 
can be dealt with in the numerous other 
forums which are available or contemplated. 
We believe there is a consensus on this point, 
but I feel it should be reemphasized as we 
complete our planning efforts for this confer- 
ence. 

In addition, we should carry out our work 
mindful of the fact that this conference is 
substantively interconnected to other world 
conferences which have been or will be de- 
voted to different but related aspects of nat- 
ural resources management. We are pleased 



204 



Department of State Bulletin 



with the emphasis which has already been 
placed on the need to keep the Water Con- 
ference in perspective and to build the 
proper Hnkages with the other world meet- 
ings. In particular, we must insure that the 
relationships to the forthcoming U.N. Deser- 
tification Conference are carefully examined 
and developed. 

One of the lessons we have learned from 
previous world meetings on resource man- 
agement problems is that the introduction of 
localized political issues into a global confer- 
ence setting is counterproductive. Debate on 
such issues drains energy and ideas away 
from the central purpose of the conference. 
It tends to frustrate efforts to find meaning- 
ful solutions to urgent problems affecting the 
lives of millions of people. We have said this 
before in many forums, but it bears repeat- 
ing. There are also many bilateral water re- 
sources management problems which are un- 
resolved. Other forums for debating these 
matters exist. We trust that the promising 
forward motion that has already been made 
to focus the U.N. Water Conference on 
water problems which are important to the 
community of nations will be maintained and 
not be compromised. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, we must proceed 
with an appreciation of the fact that this is a 
time of budgetary constraint for the U.N. 
system and for all of our countries; certainly, 
this is the case for the United States. Thus 
plans for both the Water Conference and for 
conference followup activities must be de- 
signed in recognition of the need to promote 
efficiency and cost-saving approaches. It is 
important to us, and we believe to others, to 
insure that proposals for followup activities 
emanating from the conference be carefully 
conceived and economical. Having said this, 
we have every confidence that both the con- 
ference and the recommendations of the 
conference with regard to postconference ac- 
tivities will represent valuable contributions 
to the future treatment of world water re- 
source management problems. 

For its part, the United States is working 
hard so as to be in a position to address a 
broad range of critical global water resources 



problems with relevant insights and with 
concrete suggestions and proposals. 

Mr. Chairman, it has been said that while 
economic development is exceedingly com- 
plex, the provision of jobs and fresh water is 
the key to success. With this in mind, the 
United States looks forward to the Water 
Conference because it provides a unique op- 
portunity to address the second of these 
needs. In so doing we believe the conference 
can make a significant contribution to the 
well-being of millions of people in developed 
and developing countries, especially in those 
areas involving the poorest and the least 
privileged throughout the world. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



United States and EEC Sign 
New Fisheries Agreement 

Press release 52 dated February 15 

On February 15, 1977, representatives of 
the United States of America and the Euro- 
pean Economic Community signed a new 
agreement relating to fishing activities of 
member states of the Community off the 
coasts of the United States. 

The agreement sets out the arrangements 
between the parties which will govern fish- 
ing by vessels of member states of the 
Community within the fishery conservation 
zone of the United States beginning March 
1, 1977. The agreement will come into force 
after the completion of internal procedures 
by both parties. 

The signing of this agreement took place 
in Washington. Lord Bridges, Minister to 
the United States of the United Kingdom, 
signed for the Presidency of the Council of 
the European Communities, and Jean-Pierre 
Leng signed on behalf of the Commission of 
the European Communities. Frederick Ir- 
ving, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Oceans 



March 7, 1977 



205 



and International Environmental and Scien- 
tific Affairs, signed for the United States. 
Both delegations expressed their satisfac- 
tion with the new accord and the hope that it 
will strengthen cooperation between the 
European Economic Community and the 
United States. 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Agriculture 

Agreement establishing the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome 
June 13, 1976.' 

Signatures: Japan, February 11, 1977; Canada, 
Yugoslavia, February 10, 1977. 

Coffee 

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. 
Done at London December 3, 1975. Entered into 
force provisionally October 1, 1976. 
Ratificatio}! deposited: Me.xico, February 9, 1977. 

Cultural Relations 

Agreement for facilitating the international circulation 
of visual and auditory materials of an educational, 
scientific and cultural character, with protocol. Done 
at Lake Success July 15, 1949. Entered into force 
August 12, 1954; for the United States January 12, 
1967. TIAS 6116. 
Accession deposited: Cuba, February 7, 1977. 

Customs 

Customs convention regarding E.C.S. carnets for 
commercial samples, with anne.x and protocol of sig- 
nature. Done at Brussels March 1, 1956. Entered 
into force October 3, 1957; for the United States 
March 3, 1969. 

Notification of termination: Czechoslovakia, effec- 
tive April 5, 1977. 

Law, Private International 

Amendments to articles 5, 11, and 16 of the Statute of 
the International Institute for the Unification of 
Private Law (UNIDROIT). Done at Rome February 
18, 1969. 
Entered into force: September 29, 1976. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at 
Vienna February 21, 1971. Entered into force Au- 
gust 16, 1976.2 
Ratification deposited: Greece, February 10, 1977. 



' Not in force. 

2 Not in force for the United States. 



Ocean Dumping 

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by 
dumping of wastes and other matter, with anne.xes. 
Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washing- 
ton December 29, 1972. Entered into force August 30, 

1975. TIAS 8165. 

Ratification deposited: France (with a reservation 
and statement), February 14, 1977. 

Wheat 

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat 
trade convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971. Done at Washington March 17, 

1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect 
to certain provisions, and July 1, 1976, with respect 
to other provisions. 

Ratification deposited: Cuba (with declarations), 
February 17, 1977. 

World Meteorological Organization 

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. 
Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into 
force March 23, 1950. 
Accession deposited: Seychelles, February 15, 1977. 



BILATERAL 

Bangladesh 

Loan agreement relating to construction of fertilizer 
warehouses and ancillary buildings, with annex. 
Signed at Dacca December 8, 1976. Entered into 
force December 8, 1976. 

Canada 

Agreement concerning transit pipelines. Signed at 
Washington January 28, 1977. Enters into force on 
the first day of the month following the month in 
which instruments of ratification are exchanged. 

Colombia 

Loan agreement relating to improvement and expan- 
sion of rural training programs, with annex. Signed 
at Bogota November 29, 1976. Entered into force 
November 29, 1976. 

Guarantee agreement concerning the loan agreement 
of November 29, 1976, relating to improvement and 
expansion of rural training programs. Signed at 
Bogota November 29, 1976. Entered into force 
November 29, 1976. 

European Economic Community 

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the 
United States. Signed at Washington February 15, 
1977. Enters into force on the date of the last notifi- 
cation by which the parties inform each other of the 
completion of the procedures required under internal 
law for entry into force. 

Haiti 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat imports 
from Haiti during calendar year 1977. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Washington December 14 and 
23, 1976. Entered into force December 23, 1976. 

India 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, with 



206 



Department of State Bulletin 



agreed minutes. Signed at New Delhi February 3, 
1977. Entered into force February 3, 1977. 

Pakistan 

Loan agreement relating to the acquisition of agricul- 
tural inputs required to ma.ximize food production. 
Signed at Islamabad March 9, 1976. Entered into 
force March 9, 1976. 

Agreement amending the loan agreement of March 9, 

1976, relating to the acquisition of agricultural in- 
puts required to maximize food production. Signed at 
Islamabad January 18, 1977. Entered into force 
January 18, 1977. 

Spain 

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the 
United States. Signed at Washington February 16, 

1977. Enters into force on a date to be mutually 
agreed by an e.xchange of notes. 



PUBLICATIONS 



Department Publishes 1977 Edition 
of "Treaties in Force" 



Press release 31 dated January 31 

The Department of State published on January 31 
"Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other Inter- 
national Agreements of the United States in Force on 
January 1, 1977." 

This is a collection reflecting the bilateral relations of 
the United States with 178 countries or other political 
entities and the multilateral relations of the United 
States with other contracting parties to more than 380 
treaties and agreements on 96 subjects. The 1977 edi- 
tion lists some 475 new treaties and agreements, includ- 
ing the terrorism convention; the two conventions on 
political rights of women; the tin agreement; the 
agreement on the conservation of polar bears; the ex- 
tradition treaties with Canada and the United King- 
dom; the tax conventions with Poland and Romania; the 
fisheries agreement with Mexico; and the protocol to 
the 1972 treaty on limitation of anti-ballistic missile 
systems with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 

The bilateral treaties and other agreements are ar- 
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"Treaties in Force" provides information concerning 
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states, indicating wherever possible the provisions of 



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Information on current treaty actions, supplementing 
the information contained in "Treaties in Force," is 
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Bulletin. 

The 1977 edition of "Treaties in Force" (391 pp.) is 
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Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a 
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diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A 
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Bolivia Cat. No. S1.123:B63 

Pub. 8032 6 pp. 

Bhutan Cat. No. S1.123:B46 

Pub. 8334 4 pp. 

Guyana Cat. No. S1.123:G99 

Pub. 8095 5 pp. 

World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 
1966-1975. This ninth annual report provides statistical 
information on national military spending, armed 
forces, and international transfers of conventional arms 
including data on transfers of major weapons systems 
by type as well as dollar values. Pub. 90. 85 pp. $1.50. 
(Stock No. 002-000-00058-0.) 

Atomic Energy — Technical Information Exchange, 
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rangement with Italy. TIAS 8346. 11 pp. 35C. (Cat. No. 
89.10:8346). 

Atomic Energy — Technical Information Exchange 
and Research and Development on Reactor Safety. 

Arrangement with the Federal Republic of Germany. 
TIAS 8347. 23 pp. 55C. (Cat. No. 89.10:8347). 

Atomic Energy — Research Participation and Techni- 
cal Information Exchange in Loss of Fluid Test 
(LOFT). Agreement with the Federal Republic of 
Germany. TIAS 8348. 7 pp. 350. (Cat. No. 89.10:8348). 



March 7, 1977 



207 



Fisheries — Certain Fisheries Problems on the High 
Seas in the Western Areas of the Middle Atlantic 
Ocean. Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics. TIAS 8349. 41 pp. 70C. (Cat. No. 
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Acquisition of Military Aircraft. Memorandum of un- 
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Conventional Ammunition Logistics. Memorandum of 
agreement with the Republic of Korea. TIAS 8351. 14 
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Education — Financing of Exchange Programs. 

Agreement with Nepal amending the agreement of June 
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Agricultural Sector Loan. Agreement with the 
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Establishment of Temporary Purchasing Commis- 
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Military Assistance — Payments Under Foreign As- 
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with Laos. TIAS 8357. 4 pp. 35?. (Cat. No. 89.10:8.357). 



Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: February 14-20 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of 
Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, 
D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

t50 2/14 Vance: interview by Israeli press. 
Feb. 10. 

t51 2/14 Vance: interview by Egyptian and 
Syrian media, Feb. 8. 
52 2/15 U.S. and European Economic Com- 
munity sign new fisheries agree- 
ment. 

t53 2/15 Vance: departure, Andrews Air Force 
Base, Feb. 14. 

t54 2/16 Vance: arrival, Jerusalem, Feb. 15. 

t55 2/16 Vance, Rabin: remarks. 

+ 56 2/16 U.S. and Spain sign new fisheries 
agreement. 
57 2/16 Joint statement by Departments of 
State, Labor, and Commerce on 
ILO participation. 

*58 2/17 Vance. Allon: news conference, Feb. 
16. 

*59 2/17 Shipping Coordinating Committee, 
Subcommittee on Safety of Life at 
Sea, working group on fire protec- 
tion. Mar. 16. 



No. Date Subject 

*60 2/17 Study Group 6 of the U.S. National 
Committee for the International 
Radio Consultative Committee, 
Mar. 15. 
*61 2/17 Vance: toast at Knesset dinner, Feb. 
16. 
Vance: arrival, Cairo. 
U.S. and Japan exchange notes on tex- 
tile arrangement, Feb. 15. 
Vance: departure, Cairo. 
Vance, al-Sadat: news conference, 

Feb. 17. 
"Foreign Relations," 1950, vol. VII, 

Korea, released. 
Broadcasters from 16 countries begin 
two-month tour of U.S. facilities, 
Feb. 28. 
*68 2/18 Program for official visit of Prime 
Minister Trudeau of Canada, Feb. 
21-23. 
*69 2/18 Vance: arrival, Amman. 
t70 2/19 Vance: news conference en route to 

Beirut, Feb. 18. 
t71 2/19 Vance: departure, Amman. 



* Not printed 

+ Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



*62 
*63 


2/17 
2/17 


*64 
t65 


2/18 
2/18 


t66 


2/18 


*67 


2/18 



208 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX March 7, 1977 Vol. LXXVI, No. 1967 

Arms Control and Disarmament. Vice President 
Mondale Visits Europe and Japan (Carter, 
Mondale) 181 

Belgium. Vice President Mondale Visits Europe 
and Japan (Carter, Mondale) 181 

Congress 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy 201 

Department Urges Appropriation of Funds 
for International Financial Institutions 
(Boeker) 198 

Department and Foreign Service. Presidential 
Advisory Board on Ambassadorial Appoint- 
ments (Executive order) 202 

Economic Affairs 

United States and EEC Sign New Fisheries 
Agreement 205 

Vice President Mondale Visits Europe and Japan 
(Carter, Mondale) 181 

Environment. U.S. Discusses Its Preparations 
for the U.N. Water Conference (Myerson) 20.3 

Europe. United States and EEC Sign New 
Fisheries Agreement 205 

Fisheries. United States and EEC Sign New 
Fisheries Agreement 205 

Foreign Aid. Department Urges Appropriation 
of Funds for International Financial Institu- 
tions (Boeker) 198 

France. Vice President Mondale Visits Europe 
and Japan (Carter, Mondale) 181 

Germany. Vice President Mondale Visits Europe 
and Japan (Carter, Mondale) 181 

Government Organization. New Organizational 
System Announced for National Security Coun- 
cil (statement by White House press secre- 
tary) 197 

Iceland. Vice President Mondale Visits Europe 
and Japan (Carter, Mondale) 181 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

U.S. Relations With the ILO To Remain Under 



Review (joint State-Labor-Commerce state- 
ment) 197 

Italy. Vice President Mondale Visits Europe and 
Japan (Carter, Mondale) 181 

Japan. Vice President Mondale Visits Europe 
and Japan (Carter, Mondale) 181 

Korea. Vice President Mondale Visits Europe 
and Japan (Carter, Mondale) 181 

Labor. U.S. Relations With the ILO To Remain 
Under Review (joint State-Labor-Commerce 
statement) 197 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Vice Pres- 
ident Mondale Visits Europe and Japan (Car- 
ter, Mondale) 181 

Presidential Documents 

Presidential Advisory Board on Ambassadorial 
Appointments (Executive order) 202 

Vice President Mondale Visits Europe and 
Japan 181 

Publications 

Department Publishes 1977 Edition of "Treaties 

in Force" 207 

GPO Sales Publications 207 

Terrorism. Vice President Mondale Visits 
Europe and Japan (Carter, Mondale) 181 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 206 

United States and EEC Sign New Fisheries 
Agreement 205 

United Kingdom. Vice President Mondale Visits 
Europe and Japan (Carter, Mondale) 181 

United Nations. U.S. Discusses Its Preparations 
for the U.N. Water Conference (Myerson) .... 203 



Name Index 

Boeker, Paul H 198 

Carter, President 181, 202 

Mondale, Vice President 181 

Myerson, Jacob M 203 



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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 

Volume LXXVI • No. 1968 • March 14, 1977 



SECRETARY VANCE'S VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST FEBRUARY 14-21 
Remarks and News Conferences 209 

SECRETARY TESTIFIES ON ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH 

TO FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 

Statement by Secretary Vance 236 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back cover 






THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



Vol. LXXVI, No. 1968 
March 14, 1977 



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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
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BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to 
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The Department of State BULLETIN , 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
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The BULLETIN includes selected 
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Secretary Vance's Visit to the Middle East February 14-21 



Secretary Vance visited the Middle East 
February H-21 and met with government 
leaders in Israel (February 15-16), Egypt 
(Febriiary 17-18), Lebanon (February 18), 
Jordan (February 18-19), Saudi Arabia 
(February 19-20), and Syria (February 20- 
21). Following are remarks and news confer- 
ences by Secretary Vance and foreign leaders 
on various occasions during the trip. * 



to learn, to listen to what the leaders of each 
of these countries have to say in terms of 
their views as to how to best move toward 
achieving a peaceful settlement. I will then 
return to this country and report the results 
of my trip to the President so we can form our 
opinion as to how — and then proceed. We will 
then meet with these leaders here in the 
United States and then move on from that 
point. 



DEPARTURE, ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE, 
FEBRUARY 14 

Press release 53 dated February 15 

Secretary Vance: I am beginning on this 
journey tonight because the President be- 
lieves that it is deeply important to achieve a 
just and lasting peace in the Middle East. We 
believe that the opportunity may now exist to 
begin to make progress toward this end. In- 
deed, all of the countries which we are to visit 
welcome our visit and our efforts to achieve 
this end. 

I undertake this visit in the spirit of friend- 
ship which exists between our country and 
each of the countries which I am to visit. 

It's now been 30 years since the search for 
peace began. I don't underestimate the dif- 
ficulties which lie before us, but the task is of 
utmost importance and we are determined to 
do everything we can to help achieve this end. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, how will you know 
whether this trip to the Middle East succeeds? 
What are your measurements? 

Secretary Vance: As I said before, this is a 
trip on which I am going to go, as a first step, 



* Other press releases relating to Secretary Vance's 
trip are Nos. 58, 61, and 62 of Feb. 17; 64 and 69 of Feb. 
18: and 73 of Feb. 21. 



ARRIVAL, BEN GURION AIRPORT, 
FEBRUARY 15 

Press release 54 dated February 16 

Secretary Vance: Thank you very much, 
Mr. Minister [Yigal Allon]. 

First, may I say how grateful I am to be 
here and to meet my old friend the Foreign 
Minister again. As he indicated, this is the 
first stop on my first mission for President 
Carter as Secretary of State. Tomorrow I will 
discuss with Prime Minister Rabin and the 
leaders of your government the quest for 
peace. 

It is right and particularly fitting that that 
discussion should begin here between old 
friends. We all know that this will not be an 
easy task, nor one which is quickly achieved. I 
will not go into detail, as we will begin our 
detailed discussions of how the process may 
start tomorrow. 

I have one simple message, and that mes- 
sage is that the United States is convinced 
that a fundamental underlying principle of our 
search for this peace is the enduring trust and 
confidence between our two nations, which 
has been the foundation of our relationship for 
three decades. 

Let there be no question. The United States 
is deeply committed to the security and 



March 14, 1977 



209 



survival of Israel, to its values. These are ob- 
jects of peace, a peace which we all devoutly 
hope for. 

REMARKS BY SECRETARY VANCE AND 
PRIME MINISTER RABIN, FEBRUARY 16 ^ 

Secretary Vance: We have just had a thor- 
ough discussion with the Prime Minister and 
other leaders. We have discussed the mihtary 
situation and a number of related problems, 
as well as economic problems and other sub- 
jects of common interest between our two 
countries. It has been a very helpful and use- 
ful set of talks for which I am most apprecia- 
tive. I think that I now have a much clearer 
understanding of the position of Israel with 
respect to a number of issues relating to the 
search for peace, and I look forward now to 
moving on to other countries to try and obtain 
a similar thorough and searching review of 
the issues as seen in those capitals. 

Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin: Mr. Secre- 
tary, as I said on two occasions before, we 
welcome you to your visit to Israel. We are 
glad that on your first trip as the Secretary of 
State of the new Administration, your first 
trip is to the Middle East and your first stop 
is in Israel. We, at least, see in it a sign that 
the close, intimate relations between our two 
countries are going to be continued and are 
going to be improved. I believe that in our 
talks, we have put to you all our positions, the 
reasons for what we aspire to, and we hope 
that your trip will be another step in the 
common effort of the United States and Israel 
to move forward toward a more peaceful situ- 
ation in the area and hopefully toward peace. 
We wish you a good stay and a nice trip. 

Q. On the matter of military supplies such 
as the concussion bombs [inaudible]? 

Secretary Vance: Yes, we discussed a 
number of issues including the question of 
concussion bombs. I indicated that this is a 
decision which will be made by the President, 
and I do not want to comment on it until such 
time as the President makes his decision. 



2 Made following a meeting at Jerusalem (text from 
press release 55 dated Feb. 16). 



Q. How about the Kfir fighters to Ecuador, 
was that also discussed? 

Secretary Vance: Yes, that also was dis- 
cussed, and we heard the views of Israel with 
respect to that decision. As I indicated in the 
United States, that decision was taken be- 
cause of our policy with respect to the intro- 
duction of advanced weapons into Latin 
America, and the decision was consistent with 
our longstanding policy with respect to not 
selling advanced weapons to Latin American 
countries. 

Q. Are you inviting Mr. Rabin to Washing- 
ton? 

Secretary Vance: We are inviting all of the 
leaders, including Mr. Rabin, to come to 
Washington in the future to meet with the 
President. As to the dates when those visits 
may occur, they will be worked out in the 
near future in accordance with the calendars 
of the various chiefs of state. 

Q. Will there be more than one Israeli leader 
invited to Washington? 

Secretary Vance: As I said, we are extend- 
ing the invitation to the heads of state of each 
of the countries involved. 

Q. Mr. Rabin, did Secretary Vance's answer 
about the Kfir and about the concussion bombs 
satisfy you? Do you see these American deci- 
sions as final ? 

Prime Minister Rabin: Well, it is not up to 
me to pass judgment about the American 
decisions or what might be the American deci- 
sions. In our relations with the United States, 
we put what we want and the reasons for that 
and, whenever, they have to be taken by com- 
mon understanding. I don't believe it will be 
advisable at the present to say more than that. 

Q. Is there any change in Israel's stand re- 
garding the PLO [Palestine Liberation Or- 
ganization] as a negotiating party? 

Prime Minister Rabin: The answer is sim- 
ple: no. 

Q. Has there been any change in the U.S. 
stand, Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary Vance: The answer is no. 



210 



Department of State Bulletin 



NEWS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY VANCE 
AND PRESIDENT SADAT, CAIRO, FEBRUARY 17 

Press release 65 dated February l^ 

Q. There has been much talk about the pos- 
sibility that you ivould be presenting new 
ideas for a formula to resume the Geneva con- 
ference to Mr. Vance. Did you present him 
with such ideas, and if so, could you share 
them with us? 

President Anwar al-Sadat: Well, let me say 
this. We had a survey of the peace process 
that we have started together immediately 
after the October war until this moment. I 
must tell you also that President Carter was 
kind enough to send me an invitation, which 
was handed to me by Secretary Vance, and I 
hope I shall be fulfilling this visit. 

In the first place, I seize this opportunity to 
tell you that I have asked Secretary Vance to 
convey to President Carter our deepest 
gratitude for the initiative that he has already 
taken in helping us in our difficult moments in 
our economy by allotting $500 million as a 
help for the Egyptian people. It has touched 
us deeply at heart really. Immediately before 
I came here to meet with Secretary Vance, it 
was declared that President Carter has al- 
ready taken a decision regarding this concus- 
sion bomb. Really, it is a very positive and 
creative step and it shows great statesman- 
ship from the side of President Carter. Apart 
from this we have discussed, as I told you, the 
whole problem from every aspect. 

Q. Have you yourself detected any ynodera- 
tion in the position of the Palestine Libera- 
tion Organization regarding the right of Is- 
rael to exist? 

President Sadat: Well, the Palestinian 
question was one of the questions we dis- 
cussed. Secretary Vance and I. It is for the 
Palestinians to speak for themselves; I cannot 
speak for the Palestinians. But I want to say 
one word: The Palestinian question is the core 
of the whole problem; we couldn't ignore it. 

Q. Does anybody think that the Geneva con- 
ference could meet in March, and is there any 
possibility that the Palestinians should par- 
ticipate in this conference? 



Secretary Vance: With respect to a date of a 
Geneva meeting, I have always said that I 
think that the greater likelihood of a date for 
the meeting would be in the last half of 1977. I 
still believe that that is the best estimate that 
one can make. The Israeli elections will not be 
until May of this year; and although I suppose 
anything is possible, I would think it would be 
unlikely that a Geneva conference would be 
held until after those elections. 

Q. Mr. President, is Egypt advising the 
Palestinians to rewrite or ainend the covenant 
ivhich refers to Israel's right to exist? 

President Sadat: Yasir Arafat, the leader of 
the PLO, had a meeting today with Foreign 
Minister Fahmy. And we have discussed this 
because it was discussed before between Sec- 
retary Vance and Secretary Fahmy. And we 
discussed it. 

Q. When do you expect to be in the States, 
Mr. President? 

President Sadat: Well, I hope about the be- 
ginning of April. 

Q. Do you think it is possible to have a pre- 
liminary conference before Geneva in which 
the question of Palestinian representation 
could be discussed? In other words, to have a 
meeting with the former participants of 
Geneva present without any additional par- 
ties? 

President Sadat: To be frank, we haven't 
discussed this item. 

Q. I ivas just asking your opinion. 

President Sadat: I hope after I visit — after 
Secretary Vance has the information he wants 
to have from the area here and returns to the 
States, I shall be visiting, as I told you, about 
the 1st of April, about the beginning of April, 
and maybe we can say something about this 
by that time. But not before Secretary Vance 
collects whatever he needs in information 
from the area. 

Q. Mr. Ford has proposed that concussion 
bombs, plus airplanes, be given to Israel. The 
cancellation of this is only including the con- 
cussion bombs or also includes the planes he 
promised to Israel? 



March 14, 1977 



211 



Secretary Vance: I believe the decision re- 
lated only to the concussion bomb. I have not 
seen a firsthand report of what was decided 
today, but it is my understanding that the de- 
cision merely said that the concussion bomb 
would not be made available to the Israehs. 

Let me say — could I just take this occasion 
to say how much I appreciate the opportunity 
which I have had to meet with President 
Sadat, and for the very full and complete dis- 
cussion which we have had. It has been ex- 
tremely useful to me, and I am very apprecia- 
tive of this opportunity. 

Q. Mr. President, you have said on numer- 
ous occasions that it is for the next generation 
of Egyptians to make a real peace with Israel 
in terms of trade and exchange of people, 
civilians, and ideas. Do you believe that if the 
current initiatives are successful in securing 
Israeli withdrawal to '67 boundaries, or close 
to the '67 boundaries, and providing guaran- 
tees for the establishment of a Palestinian en- 
tity that Egypt, after that accord, would be 
willing to enter into what the Israelis call a 
real peace, trade, and exchange of people and 
ideas with that nation, including diplomatic 
relations? 

President Sadat: Let me say this in the first 
hand. 

I didn't say at all that we are going to 
postpone peace. What I said and I say now — 
and I have already discussed with Secretary 
Vance — we are now for establishing perma- 
nent peace in the area, in a peace agreement 
in which the state of belligerency is ended 
after 28 years and the borders are defined, 
guarantees are given, the withdrawal of Is- 
rael, the creation of a Palestinian state. 

I never said that peace would be postponed 
for the next generation. But I said this — when 
I was asked what about the diplomatic rela- 
tions or open borders or so, I said, well, you 
can't start this like this, and you can't write it 
in a peace agreement. It has never occurred 
before. Or is it some sort of imposing condi- 
tions from the side of Israel? This is the old 
theory of Ben Gurion, to impose peace on the 
Arabs. 

Well, peace cannot be imposed at all. Peace 
can be negotiated. 



Q. Mr. President, are you saying that at the 
end of this process, if it is satisfactory to you, 
that Egypt would be willing to engage in trade 
and exchange of ideas with the State of Is- 
rael? 

President Sadat: It is a matter of pure 
sovereignty, my dear. Why should you plant 
this misunderstanding like the Israehs are 
planting already? It is a matter of 
sovereignty. 

Q. You mentioned that Mr. Arafat and Mr. 
Fahmy this morning discussed possible 
changes to the Palestinian charter. Would 
you expect — the Arab side expect the changes 
to that charter — that if the Palestinians con- 
sidered some changes to the charter, there 
should also be more concessions froyn the 
Western side, from the United States perhaps; 
and if so, ivhat form should those concessions 
take? 

President Sadat: Regarding the Pales- 
tinians, it is a matter for them to decide. But 
I must tell you this, as I told Secretary Vance 
also, that without the help of the United 
States in every step and every stage, we can't 
establish peace in the area here. Someone 
may be furious against me, but it is a fact. I 
have said before that 99 percent of the cards 
of this game is in the hands of the United 
States. So we seek the help of the United 
States in every stage and in every form. 

Q. Do those stages include talks between the 
United States and the Palestinians, in your 
view? Is that one of the things that you told 
Vance — that the United States ought to mod- 
ify its stance against talking with the PLO? 

President Sadat: I didn't tell Secretary 
Vance anything like this. We have discussed 
the whole problem, but I didn't tell him what 
you have already referred to. 

Q. If and when the Geneva coriference is re- 
convened, do you favor the PLO going as a 
separate delegation? And if and when there is 
a final peace settleynent, must there be a 
separate Palestinian state? 

President Sadat: I have already stated my 
position on this. The Palestinian question is 
the core of the whole problem. Very well. 



212 



Department of State Bulletin 



They should participate if you want to reach 
permanent peace like we are trying now. 

And I say that an official and declared link 
should take place between this Palestinian 
state and Jordan, even before Geneva starts. 

Q. Mr. President, what is Egypt prepared 
to contribute to the peace process? Israel you 
ask to withdraw. What is Egypt prepared to 

give? 

President Sadat: I gave Secretary Vance 
my view on this. Egypt is ready 100 percent 
for peace. 

Q. Could you be a little more concrete? 
What sort of concessions is Egypt prepared to 
give for peace? 

President Sadat: What are we going to say 
in Geneva if we are going to discuss here, 
now, such a thing like this? [Laughter.] 

Q. You are saying here that Israel should 
withdraw. You are saying that before Geneva. 
What is Egypt prepared to contribute to 
peace? 

President Sadat: Egypt is ready for every- 
thing. If Israel really wants peace, Egypt is 
ready for everything. 

Q. Mr. President, as I understood you a 
moment ago, you said that an official and de- 
clared link should take place between the 
Palestinian state and Jordan even before a 
Geneva conference. Could you explain more 
fully what kind of link, and how it would be 
established? 

President Sadat: We should leave this for 
the parties concerned, to the Palestinians and 
King Hussein; but I have in my mind some 
sort of confederation or so. 

Q. Do you expect another step-by-step to be 
taken or do you expect a full Geneva confer- 
ence to meet? Because reports from Israel 
were saying that you have proposed a type of 
Geneva conference where there ivould be the 
Israelis arid the Egyptians, the Israelis and 
the Syrians, and the Israelis and the 
Jordanians — ivhat is called a Geneva-type 
confereyice. Is this a correct report, sir? 

Secretary Vance: It is correct that I have 



suggested that there be a Geneva-type con- 
ference in the last half of this year, 1977. I 
have not proposed that there be a step-by- 
step process, but that will be up to the parties 
to decide. 

Q. What is meant by a Geneva-type confer- 
ence? 

Secretary Vance: I mean a Geneva confer- 
ence, a conference to be held at Geneva. Last 
night, I was asked the same question — did I 
draw a distinction between it? — and I said I 
did not. 

Q. Does it mean that all the partners — all 
the parties will be at the conference? 

Secretary Vance: It would mean that there 
would have been a determination prior to the 
conference as to who should attend — that is a 
procedural question — and that invitations 
would then be extended and the parties would 
all attend. 

Q. If the dispute over Palestinian represen- 
tation at Geneva is not resolved in the next 
several weeks or months, would Egypt be pre- 
pared to renew negotiations with Israel for 
another disengagement in the Sinai or on any 
other negotiations? 

President Sadat: I have stated before that 
the step-by-step has ended, and we are now 
for permanent peace and global solutions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said before you left 
on this trip that you hoped to explore in depth 
the talk that the PLO was moderating its posi- 
tion. Based on your conversations with Pres- 
ident Sadat today, do you have any more spe- 
cific feeling about the problem? 

Secretary Vance: I have received additional 
information today. I wish to complete my vis- 
its with the other capitals before I have any 
final answer to the question. 

Q. If the PLO amends its charter and be- 
comes more moderate on the question of Is- 
rael, would the United States then change its 
attitude toward the PLO? 

Secretary Vance: I have said that the prob- 
lem up to this date that has concerned the 
United States is that the PLO has had in its 



March 14, 1977 



213 



covenant a provision to tiie effect that they 
would not recognize Israel as a state, the ex- 
istence of Israel, and that they did not recog- 
nize that [U.N. Security Council Resolutions] 
242 and 338 are a basis for convening a con- 
ference. 

Q. [Inaudible] links between a Palestiyiian 
state and even before the Geneva conference, 
what in your judgment should be the relation- 
ship of the Palestine Liberation Organization 
to that Palestinian state? 

President Sadat: You know, according to 
the decision that we have already taken in the 
Arab summit in Rabat, we have given all the 
responsibility to the PLO. So the PLO will be 
negotiating this with King Hussein, about the 
relation between themselves and whatever 
question may be raised in this field. 

Let me tell you this please — it appears that 
you are repeating the question — I must tell 
you something before the end of this confer- 
ence. I seize this opportunity to send my 
deepest thanks to President Carter for send- 
ing a distinguished personality, Secretary 
Vance. I have enjoyed, really immensely, the 
talks with him. He was honest, straightfor- 
ward, and I hke to deal with him, and I hope 
that we shall continue the peace process that 
we have started already together, the United 
States and Egypt. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, FEBRUARY 18 ^ 

Q. In the White House yesterday Jody Poiv- 
ell said they held up the CBU decision so that 
you could inforyn the Israelis. Now, last 
evening in Israel did you and the Israelis dis- 
cuss what the decision was? 

Secretary Vance: Late that night, the last 
night there, I received the President's deci- 
sion and informed them of that decision defini- 
tively that next day. 

Q. The next day? 

Secretary Vance: Yes. I had indicated to 
them it was my judgment the day before it 



^ Held aboard the aircraft en route from Cairo to 
Beirut (text from press release 70 dated Feb. 19). 



would come out, but it wasn't until late that 
night that I got the President's final decision. 
I informed them on my way to the airport. 

Q. That would mean that Jody Powell 
didyi't get it straight, because he said you in- 
formed the Israelis on Wednesday. That's 
wrong then? 

Secretary Vance: Yes, it was my indication. 
I told them I thought that this is where it 
might come out. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is a story this 
moryiing in the Washington Post to the effect 
that King Hussein has been on the CIA 
payroll personally since about 1957 and that 
last week President Carter stopped the ar- 
rangement. Do you know, approximately, if 
he was, and if true, it has been stopped? 

Secretary Vance: I heard about the story 
today, and I have no comment. 

Q. Do you know anything about the situa- 
tion ? 

Secretary Vance: I have no comment on 
the matter. 

Q. I understand, sir, but let me just beg to 
explain why I'm asking, because the story 
says way down in the story that the new Ad- 
ministration was not informed during the 
transition. Am, I correct? That's why I am 
asking you about the matter. 

Secretary Vance: Yes, I have no comment 
on the story. 

Q. Could you address yourself to the pro- 
posal of President Sadat on some sort of a 
confederatioyi to exist between the PLO or the 
Palestinian West Bank State and Jordan, 
and whether you regard this as a constructive 
thing, and if so, how will it move the situation 
forward? 

Secretary Vance: It seems to me it's a con- 
structive suggestion. It begins to move for- 
ward suggestions which have been made by 
the IsraeHs as to how the Palestinian question 
might be resolved. And therefore there ap- 
pears to be some narrowing of the differing 
positions, and to that extent it seems to me 
it's a constructive suggestion. 



214 



Department of State Bulletin 



Q. Did you discuss that proposal with Pres- 
ident Sadat dimng your conversations yes- 
terday? 

Secretary Vance: Yes, I did. 

Q. Was it discussed at length? Did you 
propose — did you, for example; suggest that 
the link between Hussein, and the PLO be a 
matter for Geneva rather than afterward? 

Secretary Vance: Let me say that the pur- 
pose of my trip has been to find out as much 
as I could and to learn as deeply as I could 
what the positions of the various states are 
with respect to the whole range of substantive 
and procedural issues which are bound up in 
the Middle East problem. I have found the 
discussions in the two capitals which I have 
been to, or in the two countries which I have 
been to, to be very helpful in this regard. 
People have been frank. They have answered 
all the questions that I put to them. I have 
been able to probe in depth questions which I 
might have with respect to various sugges- 
tions or proposals. As a result of that, I think 
that I have gained information which is going 
to be very helpful to me and the President as 
we move along in attacking the Middle East 
problem. 

I do not intend to go into all the details of 
the conversations I have had with the various 
heads of government and their cabinets. Our 
role is to try and act as a facilitator who could 
bring the parties together. I think it would 
not be useful to me to go into all the details of 
suggestions which are made to me as possible 
bridging steps. 

Q. Could you comment, could you make a 
judgment solidly that the Egyptians are 
ready to try to move the PLO specifically — I 
am asking whether he thinks he senses that 
the Egyptians are ready to try to move the 
PLO on this question of the covenant specif- 
ically. Would this have to be resolved? 

Secretary Vance: Yes, I do, I do have that 
feeling. 

Q. Is it your impression that this proposal 
had the support of at least some of the PLO ? 
Obviously, Fahmy had seen Arafat yesterday. 
There seemed to be some connection. Was 
there in fact a connection? 



Secretary Vance: The only thing I want to 
say on this is it appeared that it did have the 
support of the — 

Q. The support of the PLO? 

Secretary Vance: Yes, but I don't want to 
say anything more than that. 

Q. Are you referring to the link with the 
Jordanians? You're not referring to the cov- 
enant business? 

Secretary Vance: I was referring to the 
linkage. 

Q. But you have no indication of how the 
PLO might go? 

Secretary Vance: I don't know how the PLO 
will go. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, excuse tne? Do you see 
King Hussein supporting the idea ? 

Secretary Vance: I don't know. I haven't 
had my talks with him yet. I'll find out when I 
talk to him. 

Q. You do think the Egyptians are ready to 
move the PLO on the covenant, that means on 
the specific issue of the recognition of the 
State of Israel? 

Secretary Vance: Yes. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you bring up, or did 
they bring up with you, future amis sales to 
Egypt — specifically, the F-5's? 

Secretary Vance: Let me say that we dis- 
cussed the policy of the United States as 
enunciated by President Carter — make it the 
concern rather than the policy — the concern of 
President Carter with respect to the question 
of arms sales throughout the world and his 
desire to try and find ways to cut down on the 
sale of arms and our responsibilities in this 
regard because of our position as the principal 
arms seller. 

I also discussed with them the problem of 
arms sales in the Middle East and our desire 
to try and find a way to reduce the sale of 
arms to the countries in the Middle East. In 
this connection the Egyptians raised the ques- 
tion of their military requirements and needs 
and indicated that they had read my tes- 
timony at the confirmation hearings in which I 



March 14, 1977 



215 



had said that if requests were received from 
them, we would consider them applying the 
three principles which I enunciated at the con- 
firmation hearings and again in the press con- 
ference which I had with all of you. 

Q. How does that translate, sir? Does that 
mean that there could be a possibility of the 
U.S.— 

Secretary Vance: No. All it means is that 
they may make requests of us, and if so, we 
will treat them in accordance with the princi- 
ples that I have previously enunciated. 

Q. Did yesterday's announcement by Mr. 
Sadat — did Mr. Sadat's proposal catch you by 
surprise? 

Secretary Vance: Which? 

Q. To have the confederation with Jordan 
and the West Bank, and secondly, what is 
now the gap? 

Secretary Vance: Let's take it question by 
question. I had not heard that proposal from 
him until he made it. 

Q. In your private talks? 

Secretary Vance: Yes. 

Q. Secondly, what is now the gap between 
Israel and Egypt? 

Secretary Vance: What? 

Q. What is now the gap in the understand- 
ing Israel has and Mr. Sadat's proposal in 
seating the joint Palestinian-Jordanian dele- 
gation? Is there now a major difference? 

Secretary Vance: Let me say this, there is 
still a major difference. 

Q. I'm a little lost by that, sir. A major dif- 
ference in what, sir? 

Secretary Vance: He said is there a gap and 
what is the nature of the gap between the po- 
sitions enunciated by Sadat yesterday with 
respect to the Palestinian question and the 
view of the Israelis, and I said, yes, there is a 
gap, and I'm not going to go into the details. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that you were 
going to look for the "give" in positions. Did 
you find a lot of flexibility on the Israeli side 



and the Egyptian side? Did you really find 
much give, or did you get a pretty hard line? 

Secretary Vance: No, there are big differ- 
ences between them, but both of them indi- 
cated that if the procedural questions could be 
resolved, that they are prepared to go to a 
Geneva conference without preconditions. 

Q. You say you found give in there? 

Secretary Vance: I think that's give. 

Q. Is there any practicality in this notion of 
trying to move toward some kind of entity 
linking Jordan arid a West Bank Palestinian 
state to go before Geneva this year? It all 
seems you have to compress so much. 

Secretary Vance: Let me say, if we are 
going to play the kind of role I think we can, 
moving between the parties and trying to 
bring them together, that for me to go into 
too much detail on what I think of this pro- 
posal and that proposal is not constructive. I 
think our role is one here of trying to bring 
the parties together, and I don't want to make 
comments about what I may think about the 
validity or strength of one proposal as op- 
posed to another. 

Q. Is it your understanding that this pro- 
posal is also supported in a general way by 
Syria and Saudi Arabia? 

Secretary Vance: I don't know. I will find 
out when I go there. I think it's been dis- 
cussed with them before, but I'm not going to 
speak for them. I'll hear it from them. 

Q. Cayi you address a general question of 
practicality though, Mr. Secretary? That's 
what's bothering me. Whether it's still possi- 
ble to think in terms of getting to Geneva this 
year? 

Secretary Vance: Yes, I still think it's pos- 
sible. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you explain why you 
continue to say "Geneva type," and then when 
we ask about it you say, "I mean Geneva"? 

Secretary Vance: It's a slip of the tongue. I 
really don't draw any distinction on that. 

Q. Has there been any advancement in 
Sadat's thinking on the kind of peace that he's 



216 



Department of State Bulletin 



ivilling to conclude with Israel at the end of 
this process ? 

Secretary Vance: Yes. 

Q. Did you take anything he said at the 
press conference or ivhat he said to you as an 
indication that he would be willing to estab- 
lish trade, diplomatic relations, have a nor- 
mal relationship with Israel, as if it were any 
other state? 

Secretary Vance: Let me just say this. 
There was more flexibility than I had thought 
before I came to Cairo, from having read var- 
ious positions. 

Q. Did you find the same thing in 
Jerusalem, too? 

Secretary Vance: Yes. Yes, a little bit. But 
I 'don't want to say, I think you know, that 
there aren't very deep substantive differences 
and procedural differences, but I do get a feel 
of some flexibility developing on the part of 
the parties I talked to, at least those I have 
talked to. 

Q. I have a little problem with that. 

Secretary Vance: I am not trying to seem 
overly optimistic about this. 

Q. You talked about preconditions. With 
preconditions I have a little trouble, because 
you were talking about the procedure of seat- 
ing, of representation, but preconditions usu- 
ally go to the substance of what will happen. 
Can you expand oji that a bit? 

Secretary Vance: You didn't listen to me. 
What I said was that if the procedural ques- 
tions can be resolved, then the parties have 
said, the ones I've talked to, that they would 
be willing to go to a Geneva conference with- 
out preconditions on the substantive issues. 

Q. And that is give on procedure, if you 
take that as being a sign that they're giving? 

Secretary Vance: I think it's obvious if 
somebody says they'll go and talk substance 
without preconditions that that's progress. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, did President Sadat 
make any specific arms requests of you? 

Secretary Vance: I answered that question. 



I've got nothing to add to that. Let me add to 
that. I said, I really said all I'm going to say 
on that. 

Q. You said he may ask for things, and if 
so, you would consider it, using the three 
principles. 

Secretary Vance: He indicated to me in 
general terms his needs and I would not rule 
out the possibility that they may make a re- 
quest, but we'll deal with that when it comes. 

Q. What did you think of him personally, of 
Sadat? What ivas your reaction to him? 

Secretary Vayice: I found him to be a very 
warm and intelHgent man who had obviously 
thought deeply about the problems of the 
Middle East and the need for a peaceful res- 
olution of the Middle East problem. I found 
him completely frank and forthcoming in an- 
swering any questions that I asked of him. 
And I came away with a very high regard for 
him as a man. 

Q. Did he ask for any m,ore economic aid? 

Secretary Vance: We discussed economic 
aid and the need for economic aid and the im- 
portance of that to his country and I indicated 
to him what was in the present budget which 
we are sending up to Congress, in that re- 
spect. 

Q. Abotit $900 million? What was that fig- 
ure? Was that figure $900 million? 

Secretary Vance: About 900. I think it's 750 
plus 114 of Pubhc Law 480. That's my recol- 
lection. 

Q. Is that the same now as fiscal year 

1977? 

Secretary Vance: A little bigger. 



DEPARTURE, AMMAN, FEBRUARY 19 

press release 71 dated February 19 

Secretary Vance: Good morning, ladies and 
gentlemen. My meetings with His Majesty 
King Hussein and his close advisers have 
been extremely useful to me in clarifying my 
understanding of the starting point for a re- 



Mareh 14, 1977 



217 



sumption of peace negotiations. His insights 
and counsel have been invaluable. 

I have e.\perienced and reaffirmed the 
close and harmonious relationship which 
exists between our two countries. I have re- 
viewed with His Majesty the interests which 
we share and have confirmed President Car- 
ter's commitment to them. I have stated un- 
equivocally the commitment of the United 
States to Jordan's economic progress and to 
our cooperation in the pursuit of peace. 

His Majesty has exerted an important and 
moderating influence and continues to do so 
in this area. We have deep respect for his 
contributions to the peacemaking efforts. 

I am delighted to report that His Majesty 
has accepted President Carter's invitation to 
visit the United States to meet with Presi- 
dent Carter in April. 

Let me say I am particularly grateful that 
His Majesty has graciously received me dur- 
ing this time of great personal tragedy. 



REMARKS BY PRINCE SA'UD BIN FAISAL 
AND SECRETARY VANCE, FEBRUARY 20 * 

Foreign Minister Prince Sa'ud bin Faisal 
(summary translation): In essence, His 
Royal Highness was expressing his apprecia- 
tion for this visit. He explained how the dis- 
cussions that took place between you and 
him, and of course between you and the 
Crown Prince, were conducted in an atmos- 
phere of frankness and cordiality. 

His Royal Highness emphasized mainly 
two points which made them, the Arabs and 
the Saudis in particular, optimistic about the 
future: One was the fact that you in the out- 
set of the Administration were dispatched 
here to see with your own eyes and meet face 
to face with the leaders of this area; and two, 
the fact that you yourself expressed the fact 
that at the core of the Middle East problem is 
the Palestine question. 

We are all at a turning point, said His 
Royal Highness, at this point in history. We 
must preserve, we must keep up our good 



'' Made upon the Secretary's departure from Riyadh 
(te.xt from press release 72 dated Feb. 21). 



spirits and optimism, and we certainly look 
forward to cooperation with our friends the 
American people and the American Govern- 
ment, which finally, not at last but certainly 
afresh, has expressed its dedication to the 
pursuit of peace in the area in cooperation 
with the leaders of the concerned countries, 
and we wish you continued success. 

Secretary Vance: Thank you very much. 
Your Royal Highness. I am extremely grate- 
ful for the extraordinarily warm reception 
which has been given to me and to my col- 
leagues on this visit to Riyadh. We deeply 
appreciate the frankness and the cordiahty 
which marked the talks between us. I 
learned much from these frank conversa- 
tions. 

I agree that there is basis for optimism, 
yet at the same time I must caution that the 
road ahead will be a long and difficult one. 
We, the United States, are determined to 
preserve and to do all in our power to work 
with the parties to move the talks toward a 
successful conclusion. 

It is true that the Palestinian question is 
one of the core questions that must be re- 
solved in the achievement of the final solu- 
tion to the Middle East problem, and that, 
along with the other key issues, will be the 
subject of continuing discussion and consul- 
tation between ourselves and our good 
friends in Saudi Arabia as well as the other 
parties. We are looking forward with great 
anticipation to the visit of His Royal High- 
ness Crown Prince Fahd at a convenient time 
for him, hopefully in the very near future, to 
the United States, where the President of 
the United States will have an opportunity to 
meet with him in face-to-face discussions of 
these key issues. 

I would emphasize that I have been ex- 
tremely impressed with the wisdom of the 
views and observations made by Crown 
Prince Fahd and by His Royal Highness the 
Foreign Minister. Again may I say that it is a 
great pleasure for me to renew association 
with the Foreign Minister and I look forward 
with great anticipation to working with him 
as we proceed down this road in the search 
for peace. 

Q. Prince Sa'ud, in a broadcast the 



218 



Department of State Bulletin 



iceekend before the Secretary began his trip, 
you said that Saudi Arabia had held oil price 
increases to 5 percent in a hope that the 
United States would exert pressure, your 
words were, on Israel for the Arab cause. 
Now that you have talked to the Secretary 
and he has been in the area for almost a 
week, can you tell us what your observations 
are now. Is the United States exerting the 
kind of pressure that you would like exerted 
on Israel? 

Prince Sa'ud: Well, I don't know what 
broadcast you are talking about. I don't re- 
member making a broadcast. 

In any event, I'll tell you what I said about 
the decision of Saudi Arabia in the Doha 
meeting.^ Our decision in the Doha meeting 
was a completely economic decision. In any 
case, all that we do, or our policies in any- 
thing we do are geared and are aimed at sta- 
bility and improving prospects for a settle- 
ment in the Middle East. One should view 
the policies of Saudi Arabia in the context of 
their entirety and not just in one action. 

As to the policy as regards oil prices, we 
have made it very clear. I think, over and 
over again, that these are not political but 
economic in nature. We are, as part of the 
international community, very mindful of the 
health of international economics, and in 
holding the increase to 5 percent we hope to 
maintain and continue the health and pros- 
perity of the international community. 

This in no way detracts from our hope and 
desire that the United States be instrumen- 
tal in achieving peace in the Middle East. 
The decision of OPEC is not linked to that, 
but it does not detract from the fact that we 
hope that the United States would use their 
influence to bring about peace in this area. 

NEWS CONFERENCE, DAMASCUS, FEBRUARY 21 

Press release 74 dated February 21 

Secretary Vance: When I started out, I in- 
dicated that I had several objectives in mind. 



^ A ministerial meeting of the Organization of Petro- 
leum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was held at Doha, 
Qatar, in December 1976. 



The first objective was to indicate the impor- 
tance that the President and I attached to the 
question of peace in the Middle East. The sec- 
ond was to get a chance to meet the leaders of 
the various countries involved and their prin- 
cipal advisers. And the third was to get a 
chance to learn firsthand their views and have 
an opportunity to discuss those views with 
them in an effort to obtain a clearer under- 
standing and to find where there might be 
areas of common ground with the positions of 
others. 

With respect to each of these objectives, I 
feel satisfied that they have been accom- 
plished. 

Every one of the leaders to whom I talked 
indicated an appreciation of the fact that this 
mission was taken at this time and the reas- 
surance that it gave to them of the importance 
which the United States attached to the ques- 
tion of a resolution of the Middle East ques- 
tion. 

Secondly, I found it was indeed important 
to meet these men face to face. As President 
Asad said to me yesterday afternoon, there is 
no substitute for seeing a man face to face and 
having a chance to look him in the eye. 

With respect to the final objective, I do feel 
that I have a much clearer understanding of 
the views of the parties and an idea with re- 
spect to those areas where there may be 
common understanding on agreement. Let me 
briefly summarize those areas for you. 

First, all the parties are agreed on the need 
for peace. Every one of the leaders pointed 
out to me the importance of cutting back on 
military expenditures and putting those re- 
sources into meeting the economic and social 
needs of their countries. There wasn't one 
that did not underscore the importance of this 
to me. 

Secondly, all of the parties stated that they 
are prepared to go to a Geneva conference in 
the last half of 1977 to discuss an overall peace 
settlement. 

Thirdly, all of the parties agreed that if 
procedural questions can be resolved, they 
are prepared to discuss all substantive ques- 
tions at Geneva without preconditions. 

And finally, all the parties are agreed as to 
the general nature of the three core elements 



March 14, 1977 



219 



of a final settlement— namely, peace, with- 
drawal, and resolution of the Palestinian 
question. 

The two sides are deeply divided, however, 
on the definition and methods of resolving 
these three core issues. 

First, on the definition of what peace 
means. On the one hand you have the view 
that peace is an end of war, and that is gener- 
ally the Arab view. And one must expect time 
to pass before there can be normal relations 
across the board between countries that have 
been at war, in a state of belligerency for 
years and years. On the other hand, the Is- 
raehs would define peace as basically the es- 
tablishment of full normal relations. And as 
you can see, there is a very broad gap be- 
tween these two views. 

Secondly, there is a clear difference be- 
tween the two sides on the meaning of shape 
of withdrawal. 

And finally, there is a difference of views 
between the two sides on how to resolve the 
Palestinian question. As a matter of fact, 
there appear to be even differences among the 
Arabs themselves as to how that question 
should be resolved. And finally, the parties 
are sharply divided on the key procedural 
question of how to deal with the issue of the 
PLO. 

So as you can see, although there are com- 
mon areas of understanding and agreement, 
there are also very sharp differences. And the 
conclusion that I draw from that is that one 
must be very careful not to be overoptimistic, 
as King Hussein cautioned when we were in 
Amman. 

On the other hand, there are areas of com- 
mon ground which provide a basis for some 
encouragement in the fact that all of them 
really do, sincerely, in my judgment, believe 
that there is a desperate need for peace. That 
is a positive factor. Those are very prelimi- 
nary conclusions I have come to as I start the 
last day of this visit. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you say that all sides 
agree that it might be possible to get into 
Geneva discussions in the second half of this 
year. And yet there still are some basic dis- 
agreements on the basic procedural issue of 
how to handle the PLO. Why is everyone ex- 



pecting to get into those discussions this year, 
unless they can overcome that procedural 
question ? 

Secretary Vance: What I said was that all of 
them are prepared to go to Geneva and hope 
that they could go to Geneva in the last half of 
the year. 

Q. Do you have a feeling that that pro- 
cedural problem can be overcome, Mr. Secre- 
tary 1 

Secretary Vance: I do not have an answer 
yet, nor do they. This is one of the most dif- 
ficult questions that faces us. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, does one approach to the 
Palestinian question at Geneva seem to have 
more favor than the others? And if so, could 
you outline it for us ? 

Secretary Vance: No, at this point there 
does not seem to be one that is more favored 
than the others among the parties. There 
seems to be a wide variance of view on this 
issue at this point. 

Q. Did Sadat's proposal seem to have the 
endorsement of anybody else? That is, the 
Jordanian-Palestinian link before Geneva? 

Secretary Vance: Other leaders said that 
they were interested in it and wanted to study 
it. They felt that they needed to have a better 
understanding of precisely what was meant by 
it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that they all 
agreed on the substantive issues to go to 
Geneva vAthout preconditions. It has been a 
basic Israeli thing that they would never 
negotiate without preconditions. And in the 
past they have included among the precondi- 
tions the standard Arab interpretation of 2Jt2, 
which is all — every inch — every last grain 
of sand of territory. Does that mean that 
Asad,for example, is now ready to negotiate 
this point? 

Secretary Vance: The way I put the ques- 
tion to them, I said, assuming all procedural 
questions are out of the way, are you pre- 
pared to go to Geneva to discuss all substan- 
tive questions without preconditions? The an- 
swer I got was yes. 



220 



Department of State Bulletin 



Q. With Old a for instance? 

Secretary Vance: Without a for instance. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I want to ask you a gen- 
eral question of what peace means. You stated 
very precisely that for the Arabs peace was 
the end of war and that time must pass before 
normal relations could begin. 

Secretary Vance: Let me add that it might 
vary between countries with respect to the re- 
lations between x and y, that they might be 
able to move at a faster pace than between x 
and 2. 

Q. What I ivant to ask you is, as you know, 
the Israelis have said they don't want to give 
up the territory that they won in 1967 this 
time without some firyn guarantees that there 
will be real peace, or a trade with some of the 
other_ things that they define as real peace. Is 
it your view that in a final settlement which 
would come out of Geneva, the end of 
Geneva, however long that took, that the Is- 
raelis want to get some elem,ents of real 
peace? 

Secretary Vance: I don't want to comment 
on what any of the parties are to get at this 
point. It is obvious that these three core ele- 
ments are intertwined with each other. And 
that is one of the complexities of the negotia- 
tions when people do go to Geneva. 

Q. I just want to be clear. You are not, on 
the other hand supporting the Arab view that 
peace — 

Secretary Vance: I am not supporting any- 
body's view at this point. I am not supporting 
anybody's view. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what did President Asad 
tell you about the willingness of the PLO to 
either set up a West Bank state, rewrite the 
covenant, or — 

Secretary Vance: He said he could not 
speak for the PLO. 

Q. Did he give you any indication of their 
attitude, of what might be developing in the 
leadership of the PLO ? 

Secretary Vance: Nothing. 

Q. Where do we go from here? 



Secretary Vance: I will go back to the 
United States and report to the President 
immediately the results of the trip. We will 
then reflect and begin to develop our views 
with respect to the way that we can best pro- 
ceed to help move toward a peaceful settle- 
ment. The various heads of government will 
be coming to the United States, with one ex- 
ception which I will refer to in a minute, to 
meet with the President as we continue the 
process of our work in the United States. And 
at the same time there will be discussion 
among the parties in the Middle East them- 
selves with respect to a number of issues 
which remain unresolved among them. So that 
work will be going on both in the United 
States and here during the months im- 
mediately ahead. 

I said with one exception. Yesterday I ex- 
tended an invitation to President Asad to 
meet with President Carter. President Asad 
indicated he will at some future date come to 
Washington to meet with the President, that 
the precise date could not be fixed now, but 
that he would be prepared to meet with the 
President, as the President suggested in his 
letter, in Europe. And I would think it Hkely 
that is what will happen. 

Q. [Inaudible]. 

Secretary Vance: Yes, that point was made 
to me many times by a number of the Arab 
leaders. 

Q. Are you in any way understanding of 
that position? 

Secretary Vance: Let me say at this point 
that I am on a factfinding mission and I don't 
want to comment on substantive positions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that each of the 
parties is prepared to go to Geneva in the sec- 
ond half of 1977. On the other hand, two or 
three days before we arrived. President Asad 
told the French press that he is extremely 
dubious about the possibility of a Geneva con- 
ference convening in 1977. Given that, can 
you give us something of the flavor, the tone, 
of Asad? 

Secretary Vance: He is deeply committed to 
achieve a peaceful solution. There isn't any 



March 14, 1977 



221 



question about that. On the other hand, he 
sees the problems as very difficult and com- 
plex, as all of us do, and therefore I think he 
is merely expressing the same caution against 
overoptimism, or a similar caution against 
overoptimism, such as that that was ex- 
pressed by King Hussein. 

Q. He's not reluctant? 

Secretary Vance: He's not reluctant to 
what? 

Q. To go to Geneva this year? 

Secretary Vance: No, he said that he would 
be prepared to do so. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I may suffer from over- 
pessimism,, but when you say that nobody has 
any preconditions about Geneva, and they 
answered your question in the affirmative 
when you talked about preconditions, it still 
conies back to, for instance, last night — the 
Syrian Government's statement demanding 
that Israel withdraw and giving the 
maximum Arab [inaudible] on 21,2. The Is- 
raeli leaders in Israel repeated again the 
standard Israeli position that under no cir- 
cumstayices would they ever give back all the 
territories before October. Do you think these 
are really just opening bargaining points that 
have been unth us for so many years now? Or 
do you think [inaudible]? 

Secretary Vance: I'm convinced from talking 
to the parties that these are deeply held views 
and they will be difficult for people to change. 
On the other hand, I believe them when they 
say they are prepared to come and to discuss, 
and if you can get people sitting around to- 
gether and discussing these issues, then there 
is always a possibility that there may be 
change. But I don't want to underestimate the 
complexity and difficulty of it. I don't want to 
leave the impression that I think that there 
isn't a very hard and difficult road ahead. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, two specific points. What 
did President Asad have to say about the idea 
of a Palestiyiian state in confederation with 
Jordan; and two, with either Asad or with 
any other, did the idea come up on the estab- 
lishment of a Palestinian state in exile in 
order to get around the covenant question ? 



Secretary Vance: Let me say this, that we 
discussed with him the questions which you 
have just raised. He very frankly discussed 
them with me. I don't think it's appropriate 
for me to give those to you. If he's going to 
give a press conference, you might want to 
ask him about those views today. I don't think 
it's appropriate for me to talk about them. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, one of your purposes in 
coming on this trip was to try to do something 
abo2it this armaments buildup in the Middle 
East. Cotdd you tell us what your conclu- 
sions are on this score? 

Secretary Vance: As I said, everyone 
agrees that they've got to find some way to cut 
back on the armament burden which is just 
crushing every one of them. And they all say 
that they would love to be able to stop pur- 
chasing arms, but they say how can we do this 
unless we get an agreement across the board 
at this point that everybody else is going to do 
the same thing. So that although they agree in 
principle, the implementation of the principle 
appears terribly difficult, if not impossible, at 
this point. 

Q. Do you see there is a role for the United 
States to play in the process? 

Secretary Vance: Yes, I think there is. This 
is a general proposition the Administration is 
working on and one of the fundamental areas 
of President Carter's concern. It is going to 
be more difficult in the Middle East, I think, 
than in most other places because of the ten- 
sion that exists in the area. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said before you came 
that you were going to pi'ess all these leaders 
to the limits and you were going to look for 
"give." Can you tell us if you found any 
"give" with Asad, and a little bit about it if 
you did? 

Secretary Vance: I'm not going to go into 
details with respect to his views, as I haven't 
with others, because I don't think it is appro- 
priate for me to do so. I found him under- 
standing and had the feeling that he would be 
willing to listen to other people and weigh 
their views at any peace conference. I think 
that's all I ought to say. I don't want to 
characterize any further than that. 



222 



Department of State Bulletin 



ARRIVAL, ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE, 
FEBRUARY 21 

Press release 75 dated February 22 

Q. How was your trip, Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary Vaiice: We had a good trip. When 
I left a long week ago, I set out with several 
purposes in mind: first, to indicate the high 
priority which President Carter and I attach 
to the search for a just peace in the Middle 
East; secondly, to have the opportunity to 
meet with the leaders of the countries which 
will be involved in that search for peace; and 
thirdly, to have a chance to discuss firsthand 
with those leaders their views with respect to 
how we should proceed in that process, and 
thus to get a feel for what the areas might be 
that we should concentrate our attention on in 
the work yet to be done by us. 

Q. On what areas do we first concentrate, 
sir? 

Secretary Vance: Yes, well let me tell you 
that. Let me say that as a result of the trip, I 
think that we accomplished those basic objec- 
tives. We found a certain amount of common 
ground, or common understanding, among the 
parties. 

First, there was common agreement among 
all of those leaders that peace was desperately 
needed so that they could turn the attention 
of their countries to meeting the economic and 
social needs of those countries. 

Secondly, there was common agreement 
that we should seek to have a Geneva confer- 
ence in the fall of 1977; the purpose of that 
conference to seek an overall peace. 

Thirdly, there was common agreement that 
if the procedural questions could be satisfac- 
torily worked out that all would proceed to 
the conference without any preconditions as 
to the substantive matters. 

And finally, in each of the countries we 
found that the leaders expressed the hope 
that the United States would play a very ac- 
tive part in the search for peace, and we shall 
do that. 

Now that I am back here, I will first meet 
and brief the President in detail. In addition 



to that we will consult with members of the 
Congress. We shall also consult with our allies 
and with the Cochairman [of the Geneva 
conference] — the Soviet Union — all of whom 
share the common goal of achieving a just and 
lasting peace in the Middle East. Let me say 
that the road ahead is a long and difficult one. 
But I think we have made a first step and we 
shall move on from there. 

Q. Are you any closer to the solution of the 
Palestinian problem, sir? 

Secretary Vance: We are no closer to the so- 
lution of that at this time. All of the leaders 
did agree on the three fundamental core is- 
sues that have to be taken up at the peace 
conference, and they are the question of 
peace, the question of withdrawal, and the 
resolution of the Palestinian question. Those 
are issues on which there are very sharp dif- 
ferences of views between the various coun- 
tries. 



Letters of Credence 

Australia 

The newly appointed Ambassador of Aus- 
tralia, Alan Philip Renouf, presented his cre- 
dentials to President Carter on February 
17.1 

Botswana 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Botswana, Bias Mookodi, pre- 
sented his credentials to President Carter on 
February 17.^ 

Ecuador 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Ecuador, Gustavo Ycaza Borja, 
presented his credentials to President Carter 
on February 17.' 



' For te.xts of the Ambassador's remarks and the 
President's reply, see Department of State press release 
dated Feb. 17. 



March 14, 1977 



223 



Interview With Secretary Vance on February 8 
by Egyptian and Syrian Media Representatives 



Following is the transcript of an interview 
with Secretary Vance at Washington on Feb- 
ruary 8 by Ahmed Fawzi, Egyptian television 
commentator, and Ghassan Rifai, of Tishriin 
Daily, Damascus. 



Press release fjl dated February 14 



Mr. Fawzi: Mr. Secretary, on behalf of our 
Egyptian viewers, first let me thank you for 
giving us so much of your time. And may I 
start out by asking you whether your trip to 
the Middle East— will you be carryiyig any 
concrete proposals with you, or is this an ini- 
tial listening visit, as it were, feeling the 
pulse? 

Secretary Vance: First let me say how 
pleased I am to have this occasion to meet 
with you. 

The fact that this is the first major diplomat- 
ic effort of the new Administration indicates 
the importance that the President attaches to 
this mission. This is a mission where I am 
going to be taking the opportunity to come 
and seek to hear firsthand the views of the 
leaders of the key countries in the Middle 
East. 

There is nothing more important than to be 
able to get firsthand the views of those who 
will be involved in the search for peace in that 
area. I am not coming with any specific pro- 
posals. I think this is understood by the lead- 
ers in those countries. The role that the 
United States can play in this search for peace 
is to try and facilitate the process by which 
the parties can reach a peaceful settlement of 
these longstanding issues, and I do not think 
it would be constructive at this time for me to 
come with any specific U.S. proposals. 

Let me underscore, however, that we do in- 
tend to play an active role, that upon my re- 



turn from the Middle East I will report to 
President Carter and then we will formulate 
our views in light of what I've learned during 
my trip. 

Mr. Fawzi: Mr. Secretary, you have cer- 
tainly made an extensive study of the situa- 
tion in the Middle East; and having several 
briefings on the Middle East situation, what 
is your appraisal of things as they stand now 
and of Egypt's efforts so far in the quest for 
peace? 

Secretary Vance: Let me say that I have 
indeed studied intensively the situation in the 
Middle East. The situation, as I see it at the 
present time, is more promising than it has 
been in a long while. The crisis of Lebanon 
has eased. It would appear that moderating 
forces are predominant in the area at this 
time. As a consequence of this, I think that 
the circumstances which exist are, as I indi- 
cated, more promising than they have been 
for a long time. 

Now, that is not to say that there are not 
many very difficult problems to be resolved, 
and I do not want to underestimate the diffi- 
culty of the resolution of these problems; but I 
think that the surrounding circumstances are 
such that it will help in the search for a solu- 
tion to those problems. 

Now, as to the question of Egypt's role, 
we here in the United States know that Pres- 
ident Sadat believes deeply in and is committed 
to a lasting and just peace in the area. We 
hold President Sadat in very high regard be- 
cause of his leadership and because of his vi- 
sion for peace and for economic progress — not 
only for Egypt but for the entire Arab world. 
When millions of Americans recall his historic 
visit to the United States in 1975, we all are 
much impressed by what he had to say then 



I 



224 



Department of State Bulletin 



and has been saying since then. I know that 
President Carter counts heavily on the advice 
he will receive from President Sadat in 
searching for constructive solutions that may 
be suggested by our country in helping the 
general search for peace. 

Mr. Fawzi: With your loug political and 
negotiating experience, Mr. Secretary, you 
realize that much time is cousumed in pro- 
dncing only the shape of a negotiating table. 
Noiv, there are basic issues that are going to 
be discussed on that table in Geneva; and I 
believe our Egyptian viewers and viewers in 
the Arab world would be interested in learn- 
ing the U.S. Government and people's stand 
OH the basic issues; namely, total Israeli 
withdrawal to pre-June 1967 lines and the 
right of the Palestinian people to a national 
entity of their own. 

Secretary Vance: U.N. Resolutions 242 and 
338 have laid out the basic principles for a so- 
lution to the Middle East problem. These res- 
olutions, as we all know, have been adopted 
and approved by the parties involved. In ad- 
dition, the United States has also voted in 
favor of these resolutions. This being the 
case, they lay the groundwork — the 
framework — for progress and for the shape of 
the negotiations. 

I think it would be a ^nistake for me, how- 
ever, at this point, at this early stage, to try 
and give specific answers to our positions in 
specific areas such as you have indicated. I 
think it's much more appropriate for me to 
come at the outset and hear what the leaders 
of the key countries have to say, and then 
come back and discuss these, as I previously 
indicated, with the President before we for- 
mulate our final suggestions, which we can 
then communicate to the parties. 

Mr. Fawzi: While we're talking about 
Geneva, one issue that is very important to 
everyone is Palestinian representation in 
Geneva. What form of Palestinian representa- 
tion would be acceptable to the U.S. Govern- 
ment? 

Secretary Vance: Now, clearly, this is one 
of the key issues that is going to be involved 
in deciding how one can best return to 



Geneva. I am sure that each of the leaders 
with whom I meet will have views with re- 
spect to this particular issue; and I expect to 
learn much from them about this particular 
problem, which will help us in shaping our 
views here in the United States on this par- 
ticular issue. 

I don't think it's really, at this stage, ap- 
propriate for me to say anything further than 
that. 

Mr. Fawzi: Mr. Secretary, the new Admin- 
istratioyi has expressed its interest iyi reduc- 
ing arms sales throughout the world, and you 
have spoke?! of target areas, .such as the Mid- 
dle East, as areas where possible pilot arms 
reduction projects could be carried out. Our 
question is: Will that affect your arms supply 
to Israel? Will you be cutting back equally 
arms szipplies to Israel? What would be the 
ratio of your cutbacks, and would yon be ex- 
pecting other aryns-producing couritries to 
comply? 

Secretary Vance: As you know, and I be- 
lieve your people know, President Carter and 
I have both said that we place the highest 
priority on the reduction of arms sales 
throughout the world. President Carter has 
also indicated that he wishes me to discuss 
with the leaders of the countries in the Middle 
East the question of reduction of arms sales in 
these countries. This I shall do. 

In doing so, I will be guided by the basic 
principles which I have previously enun- 
ciated, and they are the following: 

Are the arms which are being requested vi- 
tally necessary to the security requirements 
of the requesting nation? 

Secondly, will the giving of those arms 
upset the precarious but critical balance that 
e.xists in the Middle East? 

And finally, will the granting of a license to 
sell those arms affect the movement toward 
peace in a positive way? 

Now, the question of arms sales is not a 
one-way street. We, as the leading arms sell- 
er, I think have a special responsibility to 
take leadership in this area; but this is also a 
question for purchasers as well as suppliers. 
And therefore we intend not only to discuss 
this on this trip with the leaders as I have in- 



March 14, 1977 



225 



dicated; but we intend to discuss it with other 
nations — to seek not only in this area but 
throughout the world a reduction in the sale 
of arms both in terms of arms to specific areas 
and in the general sense. 

Mr. Fawzi: Well, in the few minutes we 
have left, Mr. Secretary, I would like to point 
out Egypt's current economic difficulties and 
ask you what the United States can do to en- 
courage more American capital investment in 
Egypt and joint development projects. 

Secretary Vance: I think we've made some 
progress already on that. I know that there 
are several serious American proposals that 
are currently before your government. And in 
addition, there are a number of other propos- 
als which are being considered by the Joint 
Commission which exists between our two 
countries — which, if they should prove satis- 
factory to both, will be forwarded to your 
government. 

With respect to the question of your eco- 
nomic problems, we are very sensitive to the 
difficulty of those problems. We have at- 
tempted to assist, and will continue to assist, 
in that area. We have made contributions in 
the area of aid, and in that we have tried to 
direct them not only to the immediate com- 
modities but also to project development, 
which we know is a very important area of 
concern insofar as your country is concerned. 
And you can count on us to continue to assist 
in this area, not only on a government basis 
but insofar as private industry is concerned. 

Dr. Rifai: There is a general feeling, Mr. 
Secretary, that the new Administration gives 
to the Middle East problem an urgent prior- 
ity. Have the new developments, local or na- 
tional, convinced the new Ad^nini strati on 
that a new approach to the problem would 
lead to progress toward an overall settlement? 

Secretary Vance: Let me say that we do at- 
tach the highest priority to progress in the 
Middle East and to progress in 1977. There is 
no issue, insofar as the United States is con- 
cerned, which has higher priority; and the fact 
that President Carter has asked me to under- 
take this mission as the first major diplomatic 
effort of this country I think is an indication of 



the importance which this Administration and 
President Carter attach to the peaceful solu- 
tion of the Middle East problem. 

Now, insofar as the conditions for peace are 
concerned, I think that the conditions have 
substantially improved in the last nine months 
or so. The war in Lebanon has receded; the 
forces of moderation seem to be in an ascend- 
ancy. All of the parties to a Geneva confer- 
ence have indicated their willingness to go to 
such a conference — so that these circum- 
stances would seem to indicate that the signs 
are right for moving toward a conference in 
the year 1977. 

I must say, however, that we should not 
underestimate the difficulties which lie ahead. 
There will be very difficult and thorny ques- 
tions to be resolved, and it will take coopera- 
tion and flexibility on the part of all to make 
progress. We intend to play a very active 
part. We hope that we can help the parties in 
moving toward a solution of these questions in 
this year. 

Dr. Rifai: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

You're expected to visit the Middle East 
next iveek, probably to get a firsthand ap- 
preciation of the real problem. Is that trip of a 
purely exploratory nature, or are there some 
specific proposals that you would like to pre- 
sent to the concerned governments in the area? 

Secretary Vance: I have no specific propos- 
als that I intend to propose to the key gov- 
ernments which I will be visiting. I have come 
to meet with the leaders in each of these coun- 
tries because I believe it's essential to hear 
firsthand their views as to the issues and 
ways of resolving these issues. 

I also believe that by making this visit I will 
be able to get a better understanding of the 
nature of some of these problems than has 
been possible in the past and, as a result of 
this, will be able to report to our President 
and, with him, better help to formulate our 
suggestions in the future with respect to the 
resolution of these problems. 

Dr. Rifai: Mr. Secretary, your trip is pre- 
ceded by an official visit undertaken by the 
Secretary General of the United Nations and 
would be folloived probably by the official vis- 



226 



Department of State Bulletin 



its of the French, German, and English 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Is there any 
coordination between the American initiative 
and that of the United Nations on the one 
hand and that of the West Europeans on the 
other? 

Secretary Vance: Yes. I met with the Sec- 
retary General of the United Nations im- 
mediately before he left on his trip to the 
Middle East. We discussed at length his plans 
for that trip. He and I are keeping in close 
touch on this. And although he himself will 
not be back before I leave on my trip, one of 
his colleagues who is traveling with him will 
return to Washington and will meet with me 
on next Monday, the day I leave, to bring me 
fully up to date on what has transpired during 
his visits with the various leaders in the Mid- 
dle East. 

I am also in touch with the Foreign Minis- 
ters of the countries which you have men- 
tioned and will be in further touch with them 
so that I can have the benefit of their views. 

We have also been in touch with the mem- 
bers of the European Community, as you 
know, through Vice President Mondale's trip; 
and upon my return from the Middle East, I 
will coordinate my views and report to them 
as well as to the people here in the United 
States. 

Dr. Rifai: Mr. Secretary, it is expected that 
the Geneva Peace Conference for the Middle 
East will be convened shortly this year. This 
conference, as we know, is under the auspices 
of the United Nations and the cochairman- 
ship of the United States and the Soviet 
Union. Has the new Administration agreed 
on the principles and the framework of the 
conference with the United Nations Secretary 
General and the Government of the Soviet 
Union? 

Secretary Vance: We have not agreed on 
any concrete framework; but we have dis- 
cussed the matter, as I indicated, with the 
Secretary General. He himself has not arrived 
at any final conclusions as to what he beheves 
would be the best method of proceeding but 
hopes to have a better idea of that which he 
will recommend as a result of his trip. 

The Soviet Union, of course, as the 



Cochairman, also has an important role to 
play; and I will be discussing, upon my return 
from the Middle East, the results of my trip 
with representatives of the Soviet Union — 
which as Cochairman, as I've indicated, will 
have an important role to play. 

Dr. Rifai: Mr. Secretary, any possible set- 
tlement to the Arab-Israel conflict would take 
into consideration two necessary conditions: 
first, a complete withdrawal of Israel from all 
occupied territories; and second, the recogni- 
tion of the legitimate national rights of the 
Palestinian people. We know that the role of 
the United States is decisive in any possible 
settlement. What would be the attitude of the 
United States vis-a-vis these tivo conditions? 

Secretary Vance: At this point I don't think 
it would be helpful for me to speak specifically 
with respect to the views of the United States 
on these two issues. These are issues which I 
will be discussing with the leaders of the vari- 
ous countries which I will be visiting. 

After having the benefit of their views, we 
will, in the United States, discuss within the 
government the positions we believe are most 
constructive in this area and will communicate 
those views to the parties involved. But I 
think at this early stage it would not be con- 
structive for me to try and come with any 
specific proposals, and I think the leaders of 
the countries I am visiting are fully aware of 
this. 

Dr. Rifai: Mr. Secretary, southern Lebanon 
is the only sector where peace has not been es- 
tablished. The Arab peace forces entrusted 
with security in Lebanon are deployed for 
that purpose. Israel is creating a situation 
whereby it seeks to prevent this task from 
being fulfilled. What do you think should be 
done in southern Lebanon to prevent a recur- 
rence of civil war and that there should be no 
return of tension along the Israeli border? 

Secretary Vance: The problems of southern 
Lebanon are very difficult problems. We sup- 
port very strongly the efforts of President 
Sarkis to extend control of the central au- 
thorities throughout all of Lebanon, but the 
problem that exists is that the forces do not 
exist at this point within Lebanon to achieve 



March 14, 1977 



227 



this. As a result of that, it makes the situation 
extremely difficult and complex. 

Because of this, we have used our best of- 
fices to facilitate the communication between 
all of the parties concerned. We are sensitive 
to the concerns of the various parties. We 
have tried to play a calming role in this re- 
spect. And we have urged, and will continue 
to urge, restraint on the part of all of the par- 
ties. 

Dr. Rifai: Mr. Secretary, a last ques- 
tion — ways of developing and keeping bilat- 
eral relations and your evaluation of the role 
now being played by Syria in the Middle 
East. 

Secretary Vance: With respect to our bilat- 
eral relations, I am pleased to say that I think 
that they have improved substantially. 

Insofar as trade relations are concerned, 
they have expanded during the last year. 
American businessmen have been seeking 
markets in Syria. 

In addition to this, our cultural exchanges 
are going to expand. Tourism is picking up. 
And I hope that more and more of our people 
will be going to Syria to see the beauties of 
your country. 

I am also pleased with the increasing 



exchange in the journalistic area so that the 
journalists of both countries can go and return 
and explain to their respective countries and 
their countrymen what the other countries 
are like. I think, in short, we have made some 
constructive steps; and I want to do every- 
thing I can within my power to continue this 
progress and to have warmer and closer rela- 
tionships between our two countries and their 
people. 

Now, I believe there was a second question 
you asked? 

Dr. Rifai: Your evaluation of the role now 
being played by Syria in the Middle East. 

Secretary Vance: I think Syria has played a 
very constructive role. During the past year 
in the Lebanon, they have helped in the resto- 
ration of ti-anquillity, or the approach toward 
tranquillity, in that area. Syria is a key coun- 
try in the peacemaking process. President 
Asad is one of the leading statesmen of the 
world, and I look forward very much to hav- 
ing the opportunity to meet with him and to 
discuss with him the problems of achieving 
peace in the Middle East. 

Dr. Rifai: Thank you very much, Mr. Sec- 
retary. 



Interview With Secretary Vance on February 10 
by Israeli Media Representatives 



Following is the transcript of an interview 
with Secretary Vance at Washington on Feb- 
mary 10 by Eli Nissan of Israeli radio and TV; 
Wolf Blitzer, Jerusalem Post; Ido Dis- 
sentshik, Ma'ariv; Nah^im Barnea, Davar; 
and Dan Margalit, Ha'aretz. 

Press release 50 dated February 14 

Mr. Nissan: Mr. Secretary, what would 
you expect to achieve, in practical terms, dur- 
ing your trip to the Middle East? 



Secretary Vance: Well, first let me say that 
the fact that I am taking this trip at the re- 
quest of the President indicates the impor- 
tance which we attach to the mission on which 
I am about to embark. This is the first major 
diplomatic mission which this new Adminis- 
tration has undertaken. 

The first country which I am going to visit 
is your country; and there, because of the 
close and special relationship which has 
existed for many years, I would expect to 



228 



Department of State Bulletin 



have a searching exchange of ideas with the 
leaders of your country. 

I expect to have full and complete discus- 
sions with the leaders in the other countries 
which I am going to visit also. And what I am 
seeking to do is to obtain firsthand their views 
on how it may be possible to move forward to 
a peace settlement in the Middle East. 

I am not going to engage in shuttle diplo- 
macy at this time. What I am trying to do is 
to ascertain as clearly as I can what the views 
of the key leaders are so that I can then re- 
turn to the United States and report to the 
President and we can then develop our views 
as to how we can be most useful in trying to 
promote peace in the Middle East. 

Let me say two things. One, we consider 
the need for progress in 1977 to be very im- 
portant. And secondly, we, the United States, 
intend to play an active role in helping facili- 
tate a peaceful solution. 

Mr. Nissan: Mr. Secretary, in that respect, 
could you specify the terms of reference for 
reconvening the Geneva confereyice, and who 
should represent Palestinian interests there? 

Secretary Vance: With respect to the con- 
vening or reconvening of a Geneva confer- 
ence, this is something which all of the parties 
seem to be agreed upon. They have all indi- 
cated that they see it to be a useful step to 
take. 

At this early stage, without having had the 
benefit of meeting with your leaders and the 
leaders of the other countries, I don't really 
think it would be useful for me to try to get 
into that kind of detail. 

After I have had the benefit of my ex- 
changes with them, I think that then we can 
speak more usefully to this kind of subject. 

Mr. Nissayi: Could you elaborate to what 
extent has the new Administration committed 
itself to the achievement of an overall settle- 
ment in the Middle East? 

Secretary Vance: The question, again, of 
the shape of a settlement is something which I 
think is premature to comment on at this 
time. We know that the key elements of any 
settlement are peace, withdrawal, and the 



question of the legitimate interests of Pales- 
tinians. 

These are all going to have to be taken care 
of and resolved in any settlement. But at this 
very early stage, when I am just taking the 
first step, it seems to me that it would not be 
productive or helpful to try to go into the kind 
of detail which your question calls for. 

Mr. Nissan: Would you preclude the possi- 
bility of negotiating further interim agree- 
ments if an overall settlement cannot be 
achieved? 

Secretary Vance: The question of the 
form — again, that is going to have to depend 
on what I learn from my conversations with 
the leaders. I really can't say at this time 
what seems to be possible. What I learn from 
what I hear in Israel will be very important in 
what I report to the President and what we 
may suggest. 

Mr. Nissan: Mr. Secretary, could you 
elaborate on the political and practical mean- 
ing of the term "the legitimate interests of the 
Palestinian people"? 

Secretary Vance: The question of what is 
the meaning of "the legitimate interests of the 
Palestinian people" is a subject which is going 
to have to be worked out in the negotiations. 
That is a key issue, as I indicated, which is 
part of the negotiations. 

Mr. Nissan: But you are not going to 
suggest any other yneans? 

Secretary Vance: Not at this time. 

Mr. Nissa n : Do you foresee any significant 
role for the United Nations to play in the 
process of peacemaking in the Middle East? 

Secretary Vance: Yes. I talked to Secretary 
General Waldheim before he left on his trip to 
the Middle East, where he is now. He told me 
that he would keep me informed of his conver- 
sations with the various leaders. And indeed 
he has offered, and I have accepted, the 
suggestion that he will ask Mr. [Brian E.] 
Urquhart, who is traveling with him — one of 
the Under Secretaries at the United Nations — 



March 14, 1977 



229 



to come back and brief me on Monday im- 
mediately before I leave on the trip. 

I have told the Secretary General that I will 
meet with him shortly after my return from 
the Middle East and will let him know what I 
have learned as a result of my discussions. 

The United Nations, in my judgment, does 
have a role to play. Exactly what the 
parameters of that role are will be defined in 
the future. 

Mr. Nissan: Mr. Secretary, could you give 
us any indication as to whether the Soviet 
Union has been willing to cooperate with an 
upcoming U.S. initiative in the Middle East? 

Secretary Vance: Yes. I have discussed my 
upcoming mission with the Soviets and have 
indicated to them that upon my return that I 
would be happy to share with them the results 
of my trip. 

As you know, they are Cochairman of the 
Geneva conference and, as such, have a re- 
sponsibility for seeing that we move toward 
peace in the area. 

They have indicated that they wish to coop- 
erate in discharging that role. We consider 
this to be a vitally important role as far as we 
are concerned, and we welcome their offer of 
cooperation. 

Mr. Blitzer: Mr. Secretary, you mentioned 
before that an Israeli ivithdrawal will be one 
of the key elements of a settlement. Will Is- 
rael have to wifhdraiv to its pre-1967 borders 
ivith only minor modifications in exchange 
for a genuine peace agreement with their Arab 
neighbors? Do you foresee the Arabs accept- 
ing anything less? 

Secretary Vance: Again, I think it is too 
early to answer that kind of a specific ques- 
tion. Obviously the nature of withdrawal will 
be a subject which will have to be discussed 
among the parties in the determination of the 
shape of the settlement. And I think it would 
be counterproductive for me at this point to 
try and define what the parties may be able to 
agree to or not agree to in the future. 

Mr. Dissentshik: Mr. Secretary, can you 
foresee any Palestinian representation other 
than the PLO [Palestine Liberation Or- 



ganization] in any circumstance that will 
arise in the future? 

Secretary Vance: Let me say a word about 
the PLO. The PLO have been unwilhng to 
recognize the existence of Israel. In addition, 
the PLO have been unwilhng to accept the 
framework of Resolutions 242 and 338 as a 
basis for a Geneva conference. 

In these circumstances, it seems to me that 
their participation would be out of the ques- 
tion. What the future may bring, no one can 
say at this point. I do note, as I indicated ear- 
lier, that the question of the legitimate inter- 
ests of the Palestinian people is, however, a 
subject which is one of the keys to a peace 
settlement. 

Mr. Baryiea: Mr. Secretary, will you follow 
up the President by asking the Israelis and 
the Arabs in the Middle East to reduce the 
amount of arms that they buy? 

Secretary Vance: Yes. You may have 
heard, or read in the papers, that the Presi- 
dent stated that he wished me, during my 
trip, to discuss with the leaders the question 
of arms sales in the Middle East, and I shall 
do so. 

Both the President and I feel very strongly 
that the issue of arms sales generally 
throughout the world is one of the major is- 
sues that we intend to address ourselves to, 
and it is not just a matter of us, as suppliers, 
but it is a matter to be discussed with the re- 
cipient countries, the buying nations, as well. 

We do have a particular responsibility, 
however, because of the fact that we are the 
largest arms supplier in the world. And be- 
cause of that, we are first going to have to 
determine what our own policy with respect 
to arms sales generally — and I am not relating 
it to the Middle East at this point — should be 
and then begin to discuss these questions with 
the buyer nations. 

Now, insofar as arms sales in the Middle 
East are concerned, we have indicated that 
there are three criteria which we apply: 

First, does the country requesting arms 
have a clear requirement for those arms for its 
national security? 



230 



Department of State Bulletin 



Second, what would the transfer of those 
arms do to the critical balance which exists in 
the Middle East? 

And third, if the arms sales were made, 
would they facilitate the movement to peace? 

Now, these are the criteria we have been 
applying. These are the criteria which we will 
continue to apply. 

Mr. Barnea: Do you believe that the failure 
of Israel to obtain a license for the selling of 
Kfir to Ecuador harmed Israel- American re- 
lations? 

Secretary Vance: I hope it did not. We have 
explained the reason for our decision in this 
matter. The reason for that decision is that it 
has been our policy not to sell advanced 
weapons systems to Latin American coun- 
tries. We have been following this policy for 
many years; and if we had not made the deci- 
sion that we did, we would have been going 
contrary to a longstanding policy of the 
United States. 

Mr. Margalit: Mr. Secretary, did the State 
Department recommend to President Carter 
that the sale of the CBU-72 cluster bombs, as 
approved by President Ford, go through as 
planned? 

Secretary Vance: As the President indi- 
cated, he does not have any recommendations 
before him at this time. We have not yet com- 
pleted our review here in the State Depart- 
ment. The President indicated that he ex- 
pected that we would have that recommenda- 
tion to him sometime in the next week to 10 
days. We will have our recommendation to 
him at that time. At this point, there is no 
recommendation, and the decision will have to 
await the recommendation and his determina- 
tion at that time in the future. 

Mr. Margalit: Are you and the State De- 
partment aware — are you familiar with the 
military purpose in clearing minefields and 
destroying runways? 

Secretary Vance: Yes. I understand. 

Mr. Margalit: If so, what makes it so con- 
troversial ? 



Secretary Vance: There are a number of 
factors that come into play in this, and I don't 
think this is the point to go into that until we 
have completed our work and made our rec- 
ommendation to the President. 

Mr. Barnea: Are you going to discuss it on 
your trip to Israel? 

Secretary Vance: I would assume that the 
subject might be raised with me. 

Mr. Barnea: That will be before the decision 
will be made here? 

Secretary Vance: I don't know. I assume 
that it may be raised when I am in Israel on 
Tuesday. 

Mr. Blitzer: Mr. Secretary, do you believe 
that the continued presence of Syrian troops 
in southern Lebanon is constructive? 

Secretary Vance: Well, the problem of 
southern Lebanon is a very complex and dif- 
ficult one. First, we do not want to see fight- 
ing flare up again there. Secondly, we do not 
want to see any danger to Israel as a result of 
troops in the southern part of Lebanon, and 
we feel very strongly about that. The trouble 
is that the Lebanese do not have the security 
forces which are necessary to maintain secu- 
rity in the area, and that has been the heart of 
the problem. We strongly support the efforts 
of President Sarkis to develop the kind of 
forces, and we know that it will not be possi- 
ble to have an adequate number until some- 
time in the future. 

Now, as a result of this, we have felt it 
would be useful for us to act as a channel of 
communication among the various parties 
which are concerned with the problem of 
southern Lebanon, so that we could keep the 
channels of communication open between 
them. This we have done. We have hoped that 
this has been a calming influence. We have 
urged restraint upon all of the parties, and I 
think that the role we have played has been a 
constructive role. 

Mr. Blitzer: Is Lebanon not, in fact, a 
satellite of Syria now that Syria controls 
three-quarters of Lebanon? 



March 14, 1977 



231 



Secretary Vance: We have stated many 
times that we support strongly the unity, the 
independence, and the territorial integrity of 
Lebanon. 

Mr. Dissentshik: Since Israel is now, Mr. 
Secretary, in the midst of an internal politi- 
cal campaign, do you expect to see leaders or 
personalities other tha)i those now serving in 
the caretaker government? 

Secretary Vance: My time is very limited, 
and I am going to have to be having intensive 
conversations on a wide variety of subjects 
dealing with the search for peace in the Mid- 
dle East. As a result of that, I will be meeting 
officially only with the leaders of the govern- 
ment. I may, at a social function, see those 
who are not members of the government, but 
I have no plans to do so at this time. 

Mr. Dissentshik: Did you take into consid- 
eration some charges that were made in Israel 
that your presence at this particular time 
may indicate your preference for a certain 
candidate"? 

Secretary Varjce: We have no preferences. I 
have heard that some people made such a 
charge. That charge is totally without founda- 
tion. As I previously told you, we consider it 
of the utmost importance to get started on the 
process of trying to find a peaceful solution; 
and therefore it was important for me to go to 
the Middle East as soon as possible. That is 
why I am going at this time. It has nothing to 
do with the political situation in Israel. 

Mr. Barnea: Will you consider inviting 
people here to Washington before the election, 
in addition to Mr. Rabin — political figures 
who are involved in the campaign? 

Secretary Vance: I will be discussing the 
question of visits to Washington. As to the 
timing of those visits, it will have to be a sub- 
ject of discussion with the various leaders. 

Mr. Margalit: Would the United States 
supply Israel and Egypt with the nuclear 
reactors — and maybe I will add thefolloivup: 
are you in favor of selling arms to the Egyp- 
tians? 



Secretary Vance: Let ine take your first 
question, and then I will come on and pick up 
the second one. 

I think — as all of you know, and we have 
said, we have the question of the providing of 
nuclear reactors, the sale of nuclear reactors 
to Israel and to Egypt, under study, as I am 
sure is understandable, since we are a new 
Administration coming in. We have not com- 
pleted that study, and we will make our de- 
termination only after that is done. 

Now, insofar as the question of selling arms 
to Egypt is concerned, I have already given 
you what the criteria are with respect to arms 
sales to any nation in the area; and in connec- 
tion with any request that might be made, we 
would apply those criteria. As yet, we have 
had no request from Egypt for arms. 

Mr. Biitzer: Changing the subject for a sec- 
ond, Mr. Secretary, during the campaign 
President Carter expressed his concern over 
the situation of Soviet Jewry. How do you 
plan on getting more Jews out of the Soviet 
Union now that you are the Secretary of 
State? And, related to that, should Congress 
consider revising the Jackson-Vanik amend- 
ment [to the Trade Act of 197 A]? 

Secretary Vance: I think the question of 
trying to get more Jews out of the Soviet 
Union is a subject which we should discuss 
with the Soviets, and we plan to do so. 

As to the Jackson-Vanik amendment, that 
is a matter for the Congress, and a matter 
which we will have to consider with the Con- 
gress to determine whether or not changes 
can be made in that regard. 

Mr. Biitzer: Has the Administration, the 
new Administration, taken — or begun study- 
ing this? 

Secretary Vance: It has not made a deter- 
mination yet in this area. 

Mr. Biitzer: Are you studying the problem 
of getting more Jews out of the Soviet Union, 
at this stage? 

Secretary Vance: Yes, we are. 

Mr. Biitzer: You have raised it with the 
Soviet Union? 



232 



Department of State Bulletin 



Secretary Vance: I don't want to talk about 
it any further than I have. 

Mr. Dissodsliik: Is linkage dead only in 
U.S. -Soviet, relations, or is it dead across the 
board? 

Secretary Vance: Well, let me say a word 
about linkage. What I said about linkage was, 
I thought there had been an overemphasis on 
linkage. 

And then I talked specifically about human 
rights, and I said, as far as human rights were 
concerned, that we were going to speak our 
minds on human rights issues, and we were 
going to speak them clearly and forcefully 
when we deemed it necessary to do so. 

And I said, the fact that we did that, in my 
judgment, did not mean that we could not and 
would not discuss such issues as the reduction 
in strategic arms. I went on to say that the 
climate, however, could not help but be af- 
fected by what happened in areas such as 
human rights issues. 

Now, I am not sure that that answers your 
question or not. 

Mr. Dissentshik : It already does. 

Mr. Bamea: In your statements since you 
became Secretary of State, you said our 
boycott — you will discuss the question of our 
boycott when you go to the Middle East, and I 
believe you linked it to the question of peace 
in the area. 

Secretary Vance: No. I said that I would 
discuss the question of boycott. I am sure it 
will come up. I am sure it is going to be raised 
by some of the leaders with whom I meet. In- 
sofar as the question of the U.S. position on 
the Arab boycott goes, we have stated that 
we have it under study, and I will be testify- 
ing with respect to what the U.S. position is 
when I return. I believe the hearings are 
going to be held on February 28 before Sena- 
tor Proxmire's committee, and I believe there 
will be another set of hearings before the In- 
ternational Relations Committee in the 
House, or one of the subcommittees of the In- 
ternational Relations Committee. 

Mr. Bamea: But the last news reports from 
Saudi Arabia and other oil countries say that 



they link their cooperation for achieving 
peace in the area to the question of the legisla- 
tion here on the boycott. How do you consider 
that? 

Secretary Vance: Well, that is their posi- 
tion. I hear what they are saying. But we 
have not yet reached our determination as to 
what our position will be, and we will state 
what our position is when I testify on the 
28th. 

Mr. Margalit: Mr. Secretary, there was a 
report in the New York Times saying that the 
Soviet Union, through other Comynunist coun- 
tries, continues to supply arms to Egypt. Do 
you have something to confirm it? 

Secretary Vance: No, I have nothing to con- 
firm that. 

Mr. Blitzer: On another issue yet, there 
may be some linkage involved. 

Secretary Vance: [Laughter] More link- 
age? 

Mr. Blitzer: Perhaps you can tell us 
whether or not you plan to raise the issue of 
Syrian Jewry with President Asad when you 
visit Damascus next week? 

Secretary Vance: Let me say that this is an 
important issue; I am familiar with the issue. 
I am glad that some progress has been made 
on this matter; and I think, in the interest of 
the Jews in Syria, that we ought to just leave 
it there without a specific answer to your 
question. 

Mr. Blitzer: In other words, you would 
support quiet diplomacy in resolving this 
matter? 

Secretary Vance: Let's just leave it where I 
left it. 
Last question. 

Mr. Dissentshik: It will be again on link- 
age; I want to a little widen the scope of the 
question of my colleague. The Saudi Arabians 
not only tied the oil prices to the question of 
the boycott legislation, but also they said that 
they have taken this very mild approach with 
regard to oil prices, provided that the United 
States and the rest of the world will comefor- 



Mareh 14, 1977 



233 



ward positively on a peace settlement in the 
Middle East. The President — and I think you 
yourself — have stated in the past that these 
two issues are not linked. 

Secretary Vance: That's absolutely correct. 
We have stated it. There was no commitment 
at all made by either of us or anybody else in 
the Administration in connection with the de- 
cision that the Saudis made with respect to oil 
prices. 

Mr. Dissentshik: And this remains the po- 
sition? 

Secretary Vance: Yes. No change. 



U.S. Increases Relief Aid 
to Lebanon 

Folloiving is an announcement released at 
Beirut and by the Agency for International 
Development (AID) at Washington on Feb- 
ruary 18. 



medical supplies; and $1.5 million for other 
relief and rehabihtation activities that will be 
jointly selected over the next four months. 

The P.L. 480 Title I program, now under 
congressional review, will provide wheat, 
rice, and other basic commodities to help 
meet Lebanese food requirements. The hous- 
ing program, already underway, will help 
meet short-term needs for housing renova- 
tion and repair and will help finance new 
low-cost housing construction for displaced 
persons. Medical equipment and supplies will 
be provided to replenish the depleted stocks 
of Lebanese hospitals and health clinics, in- 
cluding the American University Hospital. 

Equipment, for which procurement already 
is underway, will be employed to help put the 
port back into operation. In that way the 
port will be able to handle a greater volume 
of incoming relief and reconstruction supplies 
and materials. 

The $19 million assistance provided to 
Lebanon during the past 18 months was used 
mainly for medical supplies and food. 



Agency for international Development press release 77-7 

Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance an- 
nounced in Beirut on February 18 that the 
United States will provide an additional $50 
million over the next few months to support 
relief and rehabihtation efforts in Lebanon. 

The announcement came following consul- 
tations between the two governments and 
the findings of a team of experts from the 
Agency for International Development which 
visited Lebanon to assess damages caused by 
19 months of civil strife. The $50 million an- 
nounced on February 18 brings the U.S. con- 
tribution of humanitarian and relief aid to 
Lebanon to nearly $69 million since October 
1975. 

The $50 million package includes: $20 mil- 
lion for a Public Law 480 Title I food aid 
program; $5 million to reactivate the Port of 
Beirut, enabling it to handle emergency re- 
lief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction 
goods; $19.5 million in financing and techni- 
cal assistance in housing repair, rehabilita- 
tion, and reconstruction ($15 million of this 
will be provided under AID's housing in- 
vestment guarantee program); $4 million for 



President Lopez Portillo of Mexico 
Visits the United States 

Jose Lopez Portillo, President of the United 
Mexican States, made a state visit to the 
United States February 13-17, during which 
he met with President Carter and other gov- 
ernment officials and addressed the U.S. 
House of Representatives. Following is the 
text of a joint communique issued on Feb- 
ruary 17. 1 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated February 21 

President Jimmy Carter of the United 
States of America and President Jose Lopez 
Portillo of the United Mexican States, during 
two days of discussions in Washington, recon- 



' For an exchange of remarks between President 
Carter and President Lopez Portillo at a welcoming 
ceremony at the White House on Feb. 14 and their ex- 
change of toasts at a dinner at the White House that 
evening, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu- 
ments dated Feb. 21, 1977, pp. 193 and 196; for Presi- 
dent Lopez Portillo's address before the U.S. House of 
Representatives, see Congressional Record of Feb. 17, 
1977, p. H 1122. 



234 



Department of State Bulletin 



firmed the special importance each places on 
close and friendly relations between the two 
neighboring nations. The two Presidents 
pledged that they would examine closely in 
the next few months the multiple aspects of 
the relations between Mexico and the United 
States with a view to developing policies that 
reflected the interrelated nature of mutual 
problems. The two Presidents concluded that 
the primary objective of each government 
would be to develop a mutually beneficial re- 
lationship that would contribute to the well- 
being of their nations. To this end they agreed 
to meet to review progress in the develop- 
ment of comprehensive policies of each of 
their governments. 

The two Presidents also discussed the 
global situation and agreed to consult reg- 
ularly on the search for world-wide peace, 
economic betterment and respect for the 
rights of man. They reaffirmed that the prin- 
ciples governing relations between the United 
Statps and Mexico were non-interference in 
internal affairs, respect for the sovereign 
rights of each nation and the recognition of 
the particular nature of the relationship of 
neighboring countries. 

The two Presidents considered carefully a 
number of important subjects including eco- 
nomic and monetary questions, investment, 
trade, immigration, narcotics, smuggling, and 
some illicit activities, agricultural exchanges, 
energy, nonproliferation of nuclear arms, 
Mexico's desire for increased and improved 
access to international financial institutions 
and capital markets and the need to seek a 
better balance in trade between the two coun- 
tries. They also agreed that it would be of 
mutual benefit to both countries to contribute 
to Mexico's development through an increase 
in the flow of trade between Mexico and the 
United States, and to stimulate tourism in 
both directions. 

President Carter was impressed by the de- 
termination and ability of the Mexican Gov- 
ernment to deal with these problems and of- 
fered his cooperation in seeking solutions. 



President Carter and President Lopez Por- 
tillo agreed that the Secretary of Foreign Re- 
lations of Mexico and the Secretary of State of 
the United States should maintain close and 
frequent personal contacts to assure high- 
level coordination on actions that might affect 
both countries. They also agreed that other 
high officials in both countries should have di- 
rect access to each other to discuss pertinent 
issues when necessary and that mechanisms 
would be established to study these issues in 
detail. 

The state visit of President Lopez Portillo 
and the open and friendly discussions between 
the Presidents of Mexico and the United 
States served to underscore and reaffirm the 
close and friendly relationship between the 
two countries. 



United States and Spain Sign 
New Fisheries Agreement 

Press release 56 dated February 16 

On February 16, 1977, representatives of 
the United States of America and Spain 
signed a new agreement relating to fishing 
activities of Spain off the coasts of the 
United States. 

The agreement sets out the arrangements 
between the countries which will govern 
fishing by Spanish vessels within the fishery 
conservation zone of the United States be- 
ginning March 1, 1977. The agreement will 
come into force after the completion of 
internal procedures by both governments. 

The signing of this agreement took place 
in Washington. Juan Jose Rovira, Amb